Routledge Companion to Military Conflict since 1945 (Routledge Companions)

The RouTledge Companion To miliTaRy ConfliCT sinCe 1945

This book is a comprehensive and authoritative guide to human conflict since the end of the Second World War. Arranged in an easy to use A to Z format, topics covered include: • • •

wars and campaigns from the Korean War to Rwanda and Iraq concepts such as terrorism, nationalism and democracy international treaties and institutions.

Fully cross-referenced throughout, with guides to further reading and a list of key acronyms, The Routledge Companion to Military Conflict since 1945 is an indispensable reference guide to war and peace in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. John Richard Thackrah has written books and articles on twentieth century history and politics. He has worked in tertiary education, lecturing on military history and conflict. His previous books for Routledge have been an Encyclopaedia of Terrorism and Political Violence and a Dictionary of Terrorism.

Also available from Routledge Fifty Key Medieval Thinkers G.R. Evans 978–0–415–23663–8 The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right Peter Davies and Derek Lynch 978–0–415–21495–7 The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism Edited by Stuart Sim 978–0–415–33359–7

Who’s Who in Military History John Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft 978–0–415–26039–8 Who’s Who in Modern History Alan Palmer 978–0–415–11885–9 Who’s Who in World War I John Bourne 0–415–14179–6 Who’s Who in World War II Edited by John Keegan 0–415–26033–7 Who’s Who in Gay and Lesbian History Edited by Robert Aldrich and Garry Wotherspoon 978–0–415–15983–8

The RouTledge Companion To miliTaRy ConfliCT sinCe 1945

John Richard Thackrah

First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2009 John Richard Thackrah All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-01470-7 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0–415–36353–5 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–415–36354–3 (pbk) ISBN10: 0–203–01470–7 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–36353–2 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–36354–9 (pbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–01470–7 (ebk)

ConTenTs

Introduction and acknowledgements Acronyms Glossary Conceptual map Key concepts Places and regions Countries – specific entries Conflict: some key statistics

vii x xii xiv xviii xx xxi xxii 1

A to Z: Names and terms Websites Chronology of main events Index

276 277 284

v

inTRoduCTion and aCknowledgemenTs

‘Conflict’ is a word that has a variety of definitions covering a range of experiences and issues. Perhaps this is one obvious reason why agreement on resolving conflicts can be elusive. Root causes of conflict, such as poverty or disease, remain largely untreated. Apart from disagreements on definitions, problems also arise over statistical evidence, as witnessed in the Cold War when people argued about the number of warheads on rockets or the types of planes and ships that NATO and the Warsaw Pact could use. The costs of weapons systems cause other differing perspectives, as well as the numbers involved in conflict – civilians, military and the numbers of dead and injured. Ultimately, people may ask ‘When is a conflict not a conflict?’ Personalities make or break conflicts, and all types of conflict behaviour issue first from their leaders’ minds: the suspicions and paranoias of dictators such as Stalin, Pol Pot and Kim Il Sung, or fears about the resurgence of global anti-Semitism and fascism. Peace overtures in areas where conflicts appear intractable, such as Kashmir and Palestine, have foundered and others, such as Northern Ireland, Guatemala and Sudan, have shakily succeeded only after decades of hesitant peacemaking. Often these interminable problems arise as a result of minority issues, especially the overlap between split minorities and disputed frontiers, which has spawned disorder most notably in former Yugoslavia and the Middle East. Another cause of conflict is control of resources such as coal, oil and water. This was true throughout the Cold War and still is in the period of the New World Order, which again as a term in international relations is hotly contested. One area of potential conflict that has become less important since the 1990s is outer space, because of the Soviet collapse and the enormous costs involved. Weaponry has moved on to the general use of missiles and rockets (born out of the V1 and V2 missiles of the Second World War) and more recently to weapons of mass destruction. Politicians and governments may get more kudos from military conflict than from ordinary domestic issues. People and organisations rarely keep to treaties and alliances, obligations and commitments. In some cases they are stymied by issues such as international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, rogue states and environmental factors, such as control of resources – oil, water, natural gas, and plutonium – on land and under the sea. Maritime boundaries can be just as contentious as land frontiers. Wilderness politics has become more noticeable in vii

introduction and acknowledgements

recent years – for example, in the Arctic, Antarctic and Siberia. Dealing with pandemics such as AIDS, SARS and bird flu can cause rivalries to come to the fore. In 1945, superpowers were created with the birth of the nuclear age, and great powers and ordinary powers have to live side by side. One superpower has fragmented – the Soviet Union – but others wish to take their place. China is the logical heir to the title, but this could take some time. Many tensions have existed within and around its borders and have the potential to do so again. Globalisation, it is argued, has made the world a safer place but many would argue that states are controlled increasingly by international organisations or multinational companies. The global village is a far cry from a world carved up by colonial powers or ideologically motivated ones. Yet many in the UN, EU, OAU and OAS argue that such organisations could do more to maintain world peace. The world has definitely moved on from being Eurocentric to being polycentric. New states have proliferated and many see themselves as neutral or perhaps non-aligned with the increasingly free diplomacy since the end of the Cold War. Legal issues have to prevail, to formally end conflicts. Some would ask if military conflict is just, or has it been superseded by diplomatic, economic and political conflict? The shadows of fascism and anti-Semitism, the persecution of religious groups, ethnic rivalries and genocide – which have coloured so many conflicts throughout history – all still exist. The capacity for great evil lies undiminished. The great expanse of military conflict over the past six decades shows clearly the dangers of excessive patriotism and nationalism. The suspension of human rights, even in democratic countries, on its own does not lead to the ending of conflict. The totalitarian temptation is always there. I should like to thank the following libraries for their help with research and finding resources from their vast repositories on this topic, especially David Orgill, the Chief Librarian at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst; John Montgomery, librarian at the Royal United Services Institute Library, London; the Maughan Library and Information Services Centre, Kings College, Unfiversfity of London; the Brotherton Lfibrary, ; the Prfince Consort Library, Aldershot; the Merrill Library, University of York; the Library of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London; the Library of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London and Whitby Library. A book of this type and scope in part derives from the original work done by others. This is evident from the bibliographies and references but I would like to acknowledge my debt to staff at various universities I have attended – Leeds, London, Reading and Sheffield – who have contributed in seminars, lectures and discussions to what is examined in this book. The same acknowledgements apply to those staff and students who have helped on courses run by myself at universities, residential adult colleges and staff colleges. In sum, the book owes much to many people. viii

introduction and acknowledgements

This companion (a compendium, guidebook or handbook) will be of use as a general reference tool for A-level students, first-year undergraduates studying International Relations, History, Strategic/War Studies, Peace and Conflict Studies, and Politics, and those in the Police and Armed Forces who have to have an awareness of the background causes, progression and repercussions of many conflicts. Indeed there are overlaps into many subject areas – geography, politics, economics, sociology, philosophy, psychology, war studies and history. A reference book like this can only give a bitesize taster of each topic, so students are advised to use the bibliographies and further reading to help with their studies in more detail. The work will examine wars and conflicts, incidents, international treaties and alliances, and the future possibilities of peace, mediation and negotiation. Obviously, choices of conflict had to be made, given the constraints of the length of the work, and the author is entirely responsible for the choices made. Conflicts chosen are those that have had an impact or repercussion not only in their countries of origin, but regionally and globally. There is a glossary, chronology, a list of acronyms, a conceptual map and list of key concepts. Most entries have references and/or further reading and readers are encouraged to explore these and find further references of interest to expand their knowledge. Items marked in bold are cross-references to specific entries on that topic. Other crossreferences appear after ‘See also’ at the end of an entry. The entries generally cover events up to early 2008. Terrorism’s close relationship with military conflict is obvious and is treated here, but the reader is asked to look at the author’s Dictionary on Terrorism (2nd edition, 2004), also published by Routledge, for more detailed coverage of 11 September 2001. For more general reference, I recommend Philip’s Guide to the State of the World (2004), published by Philip’s (a division of Osprey); an annual publication, The World Guide, 11th Edition (2007) published by New Internationalist, Oxford; and the free online encyclopaedia, Wikipedia, published by the Wikimedia Foundation of St Petersburg, Florida. I should like to thank Rosie Waters, Commissioning Editor, and David Avital, Acting Commissioning Editor, of Routledge Classics and Student Reference for their help and advice. I am indebted to Peter Cooper of Whitby for placing the entire work in computerised form, checking the draft for inconsistencies and making various helpful suggestions. Gerard M-F Hill of Much Better Text has completed a thoroughly professional task of preparing this work for publication, for which I am most grateful. Richard Cook of Book Now Publishing Services has done considerable work on organising the typesetting. Finally I am grateful for the constant encouragement of my friends, my mother and my late father, without whose support this work would not have been possible. John Richard Thackrah Whitby, North Yorkshire August 2008 ix

aCRonyms

ABM AIDS AIS anc ASEAN cB CFE CIA CIS COMECON CSCE CTBT dmZ EOKA EPLF eta EU FAN FANE FEMA FIS FRC FrP FTO FYROM GATT grae HIV HMMW-V IAEA ICBM ICJ ICRC IFOR

Anti Ballistic Missile Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Armée Islamique du Salut African National Congress Association of South East Asian Nations chemical/biological weapons Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Central Intelligence Agency Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia) Council of Mutual Economic Assistance Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty demilitarised zone Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) Eritrean People’s Liberation Front Euskadi ta Askatasuna European Union Armed Forces of the North Fédération d’action nationaliste et européenne Federal Emergency Management Agency Front Islamique du Salut Fatah Revolutionary Council Federal Response Plan Foreign Terrorist Organisations Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile Human Immunodeficiency Virus an American vehicle similar to a jeep, commonly called a ‘humvee’ International Atomic Energy Agency Intercontinental Ballistic Missile International Court of Justice International Committee of the Red Cross Peace Implementation Force x

acronyms

IMF INF inla ira JKLF KNIL mad MBFR MFR MIRV MNC mPla nam NATO NICRA NLF OAS oas OAU OPEC osce OSS Pira Plo PrePak RRF SALT SAS SDI SEATO START TAOR TOW U2 U235 uda UFF UN UNHCR unita UVF V1 V2

International Monetary Fund Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty Irish National Liberation Army Irish Republican Army Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front Royal Netherlands Indian Army Mutually Assured Destruction Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Mutual Force Reduction Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicle Multi National Corporation Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola Non-Aligned Movement North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association National Liberation Front Organisation of American States Organisation Armée Secrète Organisation of African Unity Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Order for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office of Strategic Services Provisional Irish Republican Army Palestine Liberation Organisation People’s Revolutionary Party of Kungleipak Rapid Reaction Force Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Special Air Service Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars) South East Asian Treaty Organisation Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Tactical Area of Responsibility an American designed anti-tank missile American spy plane isotope of uranium dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki Ulster Defence Association Ulster Freedom Fighters United Nations United Nations High Commission for Refugees Union for the Total Independence of Angola Ulster Volunteer Force flying bomb: Second World War – early form of cruise missile rockets: Second World War – early form of ballistic missile xi

glossaRy

ayatollah Blitzkrieg bloodless coup Blue Berets coup de main coup d’état Desert Storm Enosis Exocet fatah fatwa fedayeen gaige kaifang glasnost hajj Harijans Hamas intifada Islam jihad Lashkar e Toiba madrassa mujahedin Pasdaran perestroika Prague Spring pre-emptive strike pyrrhic victory

rapid reaction force

spiritual leaders of Shi’ite Moslems lightning war seizure of power without bloodshed soldiers of a United Nations force surprise attack seizure of power by use of force operation mounted by an international coalition to recapture Kuwait in 1991 following invasion by Iraq Greek Cypriot call for union with Greece French-designed short range radar-guided anti-ship missile, usually launched from a ship or aircraft the victory Islamic religious ruling warriors reform and opening up openness/transparency pilgrimage to Mecca ‘untouchables’ zeal or enthusiasm uprising submission to God struggle for defence of Islam Army of the Pure Islamic religious school a Moslem guerrilla who believes that he is fighting a holy war in defence of the Islamic faith Iranian Revolutionary Guards economic reform/restructuring liberal reforms in Czechoslovakia 1968 attacking a potential enemy before he attacks your own forces or territory a victory in which the losses suffered by the winning side are so high that they outweigh the advantages gained by winning the battle a combined arms force, which is ready to deploy to an area of operations at very short notice xii

glossary

ricin sangar

biological agent a field fortification constructed by building a circular wall of rocks or sandbags when the ground is too hot or wet to dig trenches Sejm Polish parliament Semtex a Czech produced plastic explosive Sharia Muslim law Shi’ah religious sect Sidewinder an American designed heat seeking air to air missile Sinn Fein ‘we ourselves’ Solidarity (Solidarność) free trade union in Poland Star Wars a media name for the American Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) Stinger an American-designed hand-held surface-to-air missile Sunna custom of Muhammad talib student Tet lunar New Year in Vietnam Tomahawk an American-designed cruise missile Tornado a British/German/Italian designed fighter aircraft towhid a divinely integrated classless society (Iran) Wahhabism hard-line puritanical and anti-Western brand of Islam Yom Kippur Day of Atonement

xiii

ConCepTual map

Algeria Austrian Neutrality Belize Cambodia China Cuba Cyprus Czechoslovakia Eritrea Fiji Haiti Hong Kong Hungary 1956 India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel: Security Issues Lebanon Liberia Libya Macedonia Northern Ireland Pakistan Panama Poland, 1980–81 Romania: Uprising 1989 Russia Rwanda Saudi Arabia Serbia and Montenegro Sierra Leone Somalia Soviet Union Sri Lanka Syria Taiwan

ConfliCT Attitudes to Conflicts and Crises Conflict Conflict Behaviour Conflict Perceptions Conflict Termination Conflicts in Africa Drugs see Narcotics (Drugs) and Conflict Ethnic Conflict International Conflict International Conflict Resolution International Political System: States and Power Interstate Conflicts Intrastate Conflicts Low Intensity Conflict Multinationals and Conflict Narcotics (Drugs) and Conflict Nuclear Accidents Nuclear Materials: Illicit Trafficking Nuclear Proliferation Nuclear Strikes Nuclear Testing Nuclear Winter Political Violence Psychology and Conflict Resources and Conflicts Sino-Soviet Conflict Third World Insurgency Violence Water CounTRy Aden Afghanistan Albania xiv

concePtual maP

United Kingdom (UK) United States (USA)

GRoup Al Qaeda African National Congress Arms Sales/Trade Central Intelligence Agency Child Soldiers CIA Haves and Have-Nots Hawks and Doves HIV/AIDS and Other Diseases: Security Implications Mau Mau Military Leadership and Power Minorities Rapid Reaction Force Refugees Rogue States Taliban Terrorist States Terrorists and Guerrillas: Differences Walls

EquipmenT Ballistic Missile Defense Chemical and Biological Weapons Cruise Missiles Landmines FedeRal/woRld oRganisaTions European Union Security NATO Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Organisation of American States SEATO United Nations War Crimes Trial FuTuRe Axis of Evil (War on Terror) Bio-Terrorism Climate Change: Security Issues Global Threats: Beyond Terror New World Order/Disorder New Terrorism in the 21st Century North–South Global Issues Poverty and Debt Religion and World Issues Security for the Planet Space: Military Uses Special Forces Star Wars see Strategic Defense Initiative Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) War on Terror Weapons of Mass Destruction

InCidenT Berlin Wall, 1961 Congo Crisis, 1960–65 Cuban Missiles Crisis, 1962 Damansky Island (March, 1969) Dien Bien Phu (1954) East Germany: Riots, 1953 Hiroshima and Nagasaki Irangate: The Iran–Contra Affair September 2001 U2 Spy Plane Incident Key Accidental War Amnesty Anarchism Apartheid Arbitration Balance of Power Balance of Terror Civil Defence

GoveRnmenT Crisis and Risk Management Governments and Conflicts and Crisis Management Homeland Security xv

concePtual maP

Civil Disobedience Civil–Military Relations Civil Rights Collective Security Coup d’état Decolonisation Demilitarisation Détente Deterrence Disarmament Domino Theory Frontiers Genocide Geopolitics Globalisation Humanitarian Intervention Intelligence Intergovernmental Organisation International Sanctions Intifada (‘Uprising’) Iron Curtain Irredentism Islam Isolationism Junta Just War Media Militarism Military Globalisation Military–Industrial Complex Millennial Violence Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) Nationalism Neutralism Neutrality Non-Aligned Movement Non-Governmental Organisation Non-Violent Resistance Ostpolitik Pan-Nationalism Peacekeeping Piracy Polycentrism Propaganda Revolution

Self-Determination Separatism Stalinism States and National Roles Surprise Attacks Terrorism Titoism Total War Totalitarianism PlaCes and Regions Berlin Blockade, 1948 Biafra Central America Central Asia and Caucasus Chechnya Chile, 1973 Coup Dagestan Indo-China, 1945–54 Indonesia/Malaya Confrontation, 1963–66 Kashmir Kosovo Kurds Latin America Malaya: The Emergency, 1948–60 Middle East Nagorno-Karabakh North East Africa North Korea Palestine Sarajevo South Asia Spratly and Paracel Islands Suez Crisis, 1956 Tibet Xingjiang TheoRy Aggression Asymmetrical Warfare Bipolarity Conciliation Environmental and Ecological Security xvi

concePtual maP

Escalation International Law International Relations Theories Intervention Maoism Mediation Negotiation Pacifism Partition Peace Peaceful Co-existence Political Geography Sovereignty Special Relationship Spheres of Influence Strategic Defense Initiative Xenophobia

SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) South East Asia Treaty Organisation START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) Summit Negotiation Treaty Truman Doctrine, 1947 Warsaw Pact Yalta Conference, 1945 WaR Angolan Civil War, 1974–2002 Bangladesh: War of Independence, 1971 Civil War Cod War, 1975–76 Cold War Dirty War Falklands War, 1982 Football War, 1969 Grenada (1983) Guerrilla Warfare Gulf War, 1991 Gulf War, 2003 Ideological Warfare Information Warfare Iran–Iraq War, 1980–88 Jordan Civil War Korean War Limited War Local War People’s War Proxy Warfare Second World War: Consequences Sino-Indian War (1962) Six-Day War Vietnam War Yom Kippur War, 1973 Yugoslav Civil War

TReaTy/agReemenT Antarctic Treaty, 1959 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1972 ANZUS Bandung Conference, 1955 Bilateral Security Agreements Brezhnev Doctrine Camp David Agreement, 1978 Central Treaty Organisation Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, 1990 Dayton Accords, 1995 Eisenhower Doctrine Gorbachev Doctrine Helsinki Accords, 1975 Marshall Plan Nixon Doctrine North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Oslo Peace Accords, 1993 Potsdam Conference, 1945 Rapacki Plan Rio Treaty, 1947

xvii

key ConCepTs

accidental war aggression amnesty anarchism apartheid arbitration asymmetrical warfare balance of power balance of terror bipolarity civil defence civil disobedience civil–military relations civil rights civil war collective security conflict conflict behaviour conflict perceptions conflict termination coup d’état crisis and risk management demilitarisation détente deterrence disarmament domino theory escalation ethnic conflict genocide geopolitics guerrilla warfare humanitarian intervention ideological warfare information warfare intelligence

international conflict resolution International Relations theories international sanctions interstate conflicts intervention intifada intrastate conflicts irredentism Islam isolationism junta just war limited war local war low-intensity conflict Maoism media mediation militarism military–industrial complex millennial violence nationalism neutralism neutrality New World Order Non-Aligned Movement non-violent resistance nuclear proliferation nuclear strikes Ostpolitik pacifism pan-nationalism peace peaceful co-existence peacekeeping People’s War xviii

key concePts

piracy political disobedience political violence polycentrism propaganda proxy warfare psychology and conflict revolution rogue states self-determination separation sovereignty special relationship

spheres of influence Stalinism states and national roles surprise attack terrorism Titoism total war totalitarianism violence War on Terror weapons of mass destruction xenophobia

xix

plaCes and Regions

Entries relate to places and regions within countries, or specific wars or incidents Angola Berlin Biafra Caucasus Chechnya Chile Dagestan Damansky Island Dien Bien Phu East Germany Falkland Islands Hiroshima/Nagasaki Indo China Indonesia Iran

Iraq Ireland Jordan Kashmir Kosovo Kurdistan Malaya North-East Africa North Korea Palestine Sarajevo Spratly and Paracel Islands Suez Canal Tibet Vietnam

xx

CounTRies

Lebanon Liberia Libya Macedonia North Korea Northern Ireland Pakistan Panama Poland Romania Russia Rwanda Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Soviet Union Sri Lanka Syria Taiwan United Kingdom United States Yugoslavia

speCifiC enTRies Aden Afghanistan Albania Algeria Austria Bangladesh Belize Cambodia China Congo Cuba Czechoslovakia Eritrea Fiji Grenada Haiti Hungary India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel

xxi

ConfliCT: some key sTaTisTiCs

In the period 1946–2007 there were 324 episodes of armed conflict including 28 ongoing cases. It is problematic whether all these conflicts should be defined as wars, however. When does a rebel uprising become a civil war? Does a separatist insurgency become a war if there is external intervention? Is the ‘war on terror’ a war at all? The largest number of battle deaths civilian and military were in Vietnam (1959–75) with over 2.5 million dead; Korea (1950–53) 3.1 million; Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) 0.6 million; Afghanistan (1978–2002) 1.5 million and French Indo-China (1954–62), 0.3 million. China has the world’s largest army (2.3 million) followed by the United States (1.4 million). 90 per cent of casualties in all armed conflicts have been civilian. 25 million have died in civil wars. The cost of maintaining a military force is an important part of any nation’s budget. The United States and Russia allocate between 2.5 and 4.9 per cent of their gross domestic product, but the United States spending is more than six times that of Russia. Other nations with high military budgets include China, Japan, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. In 2004 the world was estimated to have spent US$ 1,100 billion on defence, with the United States responsible for $600 billion of that, followed by Russia, China, Japan and the United Kingdom. Arms sales around the world in 2004 had a value of US$37 billion according to the United States Congressional Research Service. The top supplier of weapons was the United States with deliveries valued at $12.4 billion or 40 per cent of the world total. The second largest exporter of arms was the United Kingdom at US$3.2 billion followed by Russia, France and China. Most of these weapons were bought by Middle Eastern countries which spent over US$60 billion or 40 per cent of the total. The top buyer was Saudi Arabia, spending US$20 billion. War obviously resulted in many victims and chief among these are refugees. The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in 2007 noted globally nearly 37 million refugees and internationally displaced persons. The UNHCR list of countries hosting the most refugees is led by Iran and Pakistan. Asia and Africa have the most refugees with nearly 6 million.

BiBliogRaphy Philip’s Guide to the State of the World (2004), London: Philip’s (a division of Osprey Publishing Group Limited).

xxii

A to Z

names and TeRms

A

9/11 see sepTemBeR 2001

war between nuclear states has increased, with advances in delivery system technology. Nuclear proliferation has added to the risk, because newcomers to the nuclear club are unlikely to have adequate experience or effective security systems to protect against human error or equipment failure. There is also the worry of rogue states or politically unstable nations acquiring nuclear technology and threatening to make nuclear bombs, as happened in North Korea in 2004–5 and Iran in 2006. This causes great concern among the neighbours of such states and among the established nuclear powers. See also: Cold War; Cuban Missiles Crisis, 1962; Nuclear Materials: Illicit Trafficking; Rogue States.

aCCidenTal waR This is an unintended armed conflict, touched off by an incident caused by human error, defective equipment or pure bad luck – or even no apparent cause. The Cold War raised the distinct possibility that an all-out nuclear exchange between major powers could be caused by the accidental delivery of a weapon of mass destruction. It was the Cuban Missiles Crisis of 1962 that showed American and Soviet leaders how easily catastrophe might result from a communications failure between them. To reduce the threat of accidental war, in 1963 the United States and the Soviet Union established a ‘hot line’ telephone link between Washington and Moscow, to begin discussions in the event of a crisis. Within six years similar ones had been established between Paris and Moscow, and London and Moscow. This hot-line system supplemented the usual, slower diplomatic channels, and it helped the two superpowers reach an understanding that neither side wished to see any enlargement of the Six-Day War, 1967. Two decades later a new agreement between the two superpowers provided for the opening of nuclear-risk reduction centres, the sharing of information about nuclear accidents (notably the Three Mile Island nuclear leak in the USA in 1979 and the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in Ukraine in 1985) and action to prevent thefts of nuclear weapons for use by potentially unstable powers. Since the 1960s the risk of accidental

Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin.

aden Aden became a British crown colony in 1936 and remained so until independence in 1967. The British had originally taken it in 1839, because they considered it the region’s best harbour and most strategic position from which to monitor Turkish activities. Imams continued to wield power locally, and their 3

aFghanistan

autocratic rule led to many abortive uprisings and the birth of the nationalist Free Yemeni Movement in the mid-1940s. In 1958, six ‘states’ of the western Aden Protectorate combined to form the Federation of South Arabia, which by 1965 comprised 17 states. But the balance of power and moral authority had shifted decisively against Britain, and her allies among the local emirs, sheikhs and sultans, in favour of Arab nationalists. Their forces, led by the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), wanted to force British withdrawal from Aden itself as well as the Protectorate. In the Defence White Paper of 1966, Britain announced it would leave the area when the Federation of South Arabia became independent. People realised there would be no way to avoid nationalist rule – or vengeance. In November 1967, the last month of British rule, there was open war as the NLF and FLOSY fought for supremacy until the Federation army ordered a ceasefire and announced its support for the NLF. Insurgents used mortars and bazookas against British security forces, grenade attacks became widespread, roads were mined, the airport was attacked, sniping occurred and many attacks took place at twilight. The British had to rely on patrols, observation posts and temporary checkpoints to gain intelligence and find the insurgents. They suffered over fifty deaths and hundreds of wounded as a result of terrorist activity. The security forces never had the numbers to control the countryside and they never had the correct level of intelligence needed to get to grips with terrorist groups in the towns.

Paget, J. (1969) Last Post: Aden, 1964–1967, London: Faber & Faber.

Further Reading Willmott, A.P. (1981) ‘Cyprus and Aden’ in Sir R. Thompson (ed.) War and Peace: An Analysis of Warfare since 1945, London: Orbis.

afghanisTan After the Second World War, finding itself in the middle of a zone of conflict, Afghanistan tried to remain equidistant between the United States and the Soviet Union. It grew more reliant on the latter as the USA supported Pakistan, which Afghanistan accused of supporting the Pashtuns and their demands for independence. Moscow gave military training to many young Afghans. The royal family, headed by King Zahir, became increasingly unpopular among workers and students, even though his prime minister, Daud Khan, designed a political platform based on democracy and socialism. He had also fallen out with the Islamic world and the Iranians. The king was overthrown in 1973 and the prime minister was assassinated in 1978. Mohammed Turaki was briefly prime minister, until Hafizullah Amin was appointed in 1979. Amin asserted that Afghanistan was a non-aligned nation, but people in rural areas assumed, because of radio broadcasts from Moscow, that the government was Marxist. After its ambassador was murdered, the USA became hostile and saw the Afghans as being pro-Soviet. Amin was assassinated in a coup backed by Soviet troops, who entered Afghanistan in December 1979 for strategic reasons. The new prime minister, Babrak Karmal, faced increasing internal security problems caused by mujahedin or Islamic guerrillas. Their interpretation of Islam inspired fundamentalist volunteers to travel to Afghan territory to fight, and

Bibliography Bell, J.B. (1973) ‘South Arabia: Violence and Revolt’, Conflict Studies, No. 40, London: Institute for Conflict Studies.

4

aFghanistan

millions of Afghans sought refuge in Pakistan or Iran. The mujahedin were split into factions, backed by Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the USA. In 1986, Mohammed Najibullah became prime minister and in 1987 he announced a new ceasefire, with guarantees to guerrilla leaders willing to negotiate with the government, an amnesty for rebel prisoners and the promise of a prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops, but the mujahedin continued to fight. After many years of negotiation, an Afghan-Pakistani accord assured the voluntary return of refugees and an agreement with the USSR led to withdrawal of Soviet troops. Rebel groups increased in numbers, and the government announced it was willing to negotiate with them, but the Pashtun majority in the south and east was not happy. Moderate Muslim groups formed an alliance, while government measures reimposed elements of Islamic law, banned alcohol, restricted women’s rights and tightened up dress codes. Pacts and betrayals characterised relations between groups. In 1995 in the south of the country, the armed Taliban appeared. Their students and guerrillas, trained in Pakistan, aimed to create a united Islamic government in Afghanistan. Mohammed Karzai, a US-backed leader, came to power in December 2001 after the collapse of the Taliban, though fighting continued between factions. Most of the country was controlled by warlords, showing that Karzai’s influence was mainly in and around the capital. Attacks still occurred: Karzai survived assassination attempts, but a deputy president was killed, and car bombs were frequent, especially in Kabul. NATO in 2003 launched a peace mission, its first outside Europe, and was given charge of the International Assistance Security Force under the auspices of the United Nations. The USA came in for

much criticism over its treatment of Afghan’s detainees, many of whom allegedly were tortured. Prior to free elections, a draft constitution was adopted, but there was still instability, especially in the eastern provinces. The main aim of the Afghan Government since the 2001 War has been to bring stability to the country, but it has also faced the challenges of widespread drug-trafficking and poppy cultivation. In 2006, a renewal of the Taliban insurgency, particularly in the south and east, led to NATO taking over leadership of military operations in the south and then across the whole country from October 2006. Relations with Pakistan became tense because the Afghan Government believed President Musharraf of Pakistan had not done enough to prevent militant Pashtun Islamic groups and the Taliban operating along Pakistan’s border and infiltrating into Afghanistan. Many observers believe that Osama bin Laden is hiding in mountains along the border. Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, also remains at large. See also: Pakistan. Bibliography Borer, D.A. (1999) Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared, London: Frank Cass. Cordesman, A.H. (2002) The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence and Force Transformation, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press. Grau, L.W. and Gress, M.A. (transl. and eds) (2002) The Soviet–Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas. Marsden, P. (1999) The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan, London: Oxford University Press.

Further Reading Rais, R.B. (1994) War Without Winners:

5

aFrican national congress

lions of pounds from his family companies, and from donations by wealthy Arab Gulf merchants, to organise centres in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, through which he recruited, enlisted and sheltered Arab volunteers, who became internationally active from that date. One of the founding members of the group was Mahmoud Salim, who after his arrest in Germany in 2000 was identified as a financial adviser and weapons procurer for bin Laden. Bin Laden was generous in financing weapons, transport and income for the families of fighters against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After the Soviets left, in 1989, bin Laden began to retrain his troops, moving away from anti-aircraft and anti-tank attacks to urban guerrilla warfare, sabotage and terrorism, with the aim of destabilising Afghan society and government. He set up Al Qaeda (‘the Base’) in Peshawar in Pakistan as a centre serving Arab Afghans and promoting Wahhabism – a strict form of Islam (to its followers, the only form of Islam) as practised in Saudi Arabia – among Afghans. Companies owned by bin Laden employed thousands of militant Arabs and veterans of the Afghan jihad. When these people were threatened by crackdowns in Pakistan, Egypt and Algeria, he paid in 1993–94 for many to go to the Sudan, and later Afghanistan (the Tora Bora ex-military base and other sites), where branches of Al Qaeda were created. This influenced President Clinton’s decision to launch US attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan, to little effect as some missiles hit the wrong targets. In 1993, bin Laden allegedly agreed to an Al Qaeda plan to buy a nuclear missile or highly enriched uranium from the former Soviet Union, to construct an Islamic bomb. This plan came to nothing, as there were no missiles for sale. Al Qaeda next considered paying to develop a nuclear suitcase bomb, in co-operation with the Chechen mafia. At this time Al Qaeda was

Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition after the Cold War, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roy, O. (1995) Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War, Princeton NJ: Darwin Press. Rubin, B.R. (1995) The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State, New Haven CT: Yale University Press.

afRiCan naTional CongRess see anC

aggRession This may be defined as an attack or harmful act, especially an unprovoked attack by one country on another. Giving free rein to aggression could make the world ungovernable. What constitutes aggression is an issue many countries have to grapple with, and indeed many at the United Nations have serious disagreements. See also: Violence. Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Further Reading Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

al qaeda Founded by Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda was first based in Palestine. Bin Laden established a good relationship with a charismatic Palestinian, Abdullah Azzam, one of the inspirers of the Hamas Movement, who rejected Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and other, smaller groups as too Marxist and not Islamic enough. By 1985, bin Laden had amassed mil6

al qaeda

developing links with Saddam Hussein in Iraq to construct weapons of mass destruction, especially biological weapons. After bin Laden was forced to leave Sudan in 1996, the organisation was directed from its camps in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda next turned its attention to massive assaults on US personal and property abroad, organising the bombing of US military housing in Dharan in Saudi Arabia in 1996, when 19 US servicemen were killed. In 1998 two American embassies were destroyed, in Kenya and Tanzania, and in 2000 a suicide bomber in Aden harbour attacked the USS Cole. In these atrocities, hundreds were killed. From 1996, bin Laden gained in status and he was sheltered by the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The Taliban were professional in managing the Afghan drugs trade, and bin Laden and Al Qaeda both benefited. His moulding of the Al Qaeda organisation helped to secure bin Laden a large personal following throughout the Muslim world, as it proved that he could unify disparate groups of Islamic militants. A close ally of bin Laden, Khalid Al-Fauwaz, working in London, was given some command of Al Qaeda. By the end of the 1990s, the FBI and CIA had publicly identified it as bin Laden’s main vehicle for international terrorism during that decade; indeed, bin Laden can claim it as his organisation. He had laid the groundwork in preparing a terrorist army for war. Bin Laden’s ideas and membership of Al Qaeda soon spread via Yemen and Albania to Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Finance and accounts departments supporting Al Qaeda were created in several European capitals. The group opposes all nations and institutions that do not adhere to the Islamic way of life and beliefs. It supports the 1998 fatwa (religious ruling) that Muslims should kill Americans wherever they are in the world. Muslim governments seen as corrupted by Western influence are to be

overthrown by force. To carry out its aims, its command and control structure includes a Majlis al Shura (Consultancy Council) to approve all terrorist operations, along with business, religious and media committees, and a travel office. Al Qaeda is financed from bin Laden’s personal fortune, estimated at $300 million: his father’s construction company, agricultural, leather and investment companies, and export industries in the Sudan linked with agricultural products. These companies provide cover for the procurement and transport of operatives, weapons and chemicals. More money has come from Islamic clergy and the Dubai Islamic Bank. As with other terrorist groups, it is also financed by robberies and the commercial activities of business personnel. It is a growing international group with links to over 55 countries. Its tactics – in common with other groups – include bombing, hijacking, kidnapping, assassination and suicide attacks. It has been linked to production of the chemical VX in Sudan and the biological agent ricin, and has been trying to obtain enriched uranium. The strength of Al Qaeda lies in its flexibility: it appeals to a range of Muslim activists, who provide recruits and a network of relationships. The appeal of bin Laden’s militant religious movement is its call to fight for a religious vision of the future. Al Qaeda and bin Laden represent extremes that have joined forces, merging secular and sacred, ancient and modern, protest and revolution. Terror can be war as well as crime: Al Qaeda’s hidden targets, globalisation and liberalism, involve war on Western civil society, but it has not observed the ‘Rules of War’. Its training manuals instruct jihad warriors to blend in and appear normal to evade detection, to wear no identifying insignia and not to carry arms openly. Al Qaeda kills innocent non-combatants to spread terror, and its 7

al qaeda

attacks on military targets are carried out in civilian disguise. The intelligence services of the UK and Israel warned the Americans that they would be the target of a major attack. In 1999, MI6 received information that followers of Bin Laden were planning attacks using civilian aircraft in ‘unconventional ways’, though it did not specify targets. MI6 already knew that Al Qaeda was plotting attacks, some on US interests in Europe. In July 2001 Mossad, the Israeli Secret Service, said an attack was imminent. Yet the US Government was unable to stop the attacks of 11 September 2001. It was not helped by federal criminal agencies not disclosing the results of relevant investigations. The events of September 2001 (‘9/11’) showed that Al Qaeda was now a major threat. Since then, its activities have killed 13,000 people around the world, and it has trained and funded other Islamic militants. The group is largely financed by drug trafficking, ID theft and fraud. Yemen is the ancestral home of Osama Bin Laden and there are hundreds of Al Qaeda fighters throughout the country, whose border with Saudi Arabia is a lawless region suspected of harbouring the group that attacked the USS Cole in 2005. In Afghanistan, Al Qaeda supports Taliban efforts to drive out coalition forces. In Iraq, groups linked to it have been trying to expel the US-led coalition, overthrow the Iraqi Government and wage jihad. There are similar groups in Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda supports groups in Syria and Egypt, using Ethiopia as a base for attacks on Taba in 2004 and Sharm el Sheikh in 2005. All these, with bombings in Spain and Turkey, show that Al Qaeda is now a loose network of local terrorist groups using their own initiative. They share goals, motivation and similar methods, but do not appear to be coordinated by Al Qaeda’s leadership. A group called Al Qaeda Europe claimed responsibility

for the terrorist attacks on London on 7 July 2005, which killed 56 people and injured over 700 in the first suicide attack in Europe. The capture of Osama Bin Laden would not necessarily deal a body blow to Al Qaeda. There is no evidence to suggest that the movement is organised around him or that it could not survive without him. Al Qaeda believe their greatest strength is the popular support they enjoy among Muslims. Despite setbacks such as the decentralisation of Al Qaeda following the Taliban defeat in Afghanistan, it remains a global threat. The ideology that inspired Al Qaeda now inspires radicalised Muslims across the Middle East and Europe. See also: New Terrorism in the 21st Century; September 2001; Terrorism; Terrorist States; War on Terror. Bibliography Bergen, P.L. (2001) Holy War: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden, New York: Free Press. Burke, J. (2004) Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

Further Reading Alexander, Y. & Sweetman, M. (2001) Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda: Profile of a Terrorist Network, Ardsley NY: Transnational Publishers. Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury Publishing. Habeck, M.R. (2006) Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror, New York: Yale University Press. Richardson, L. (2006) What Terrorists Want, London: John Murray. Williams, P.L. (2002) Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror, London: Alpha Pearson Education.

8

algeria

alBania Albania became a People’s Republic in January 1946. When Tito and Stalin split on ideological grounds in 1948, the Albanian Workers’ Party sided with the Cominform (Communist parties allied with the Soviet Union). The country broke with Moscow after the de-Stalinisation of the early 1960s and established close ties with the People’s Republic of China. In 1981, when the Marxists of the Cultural Revolution fell from power, Albania broke off relations with China too. The country became really isolated politically when the break with China became official and the Albanian party became hostile to American and Soviet imperialism, Chinese and Yugoslavian revisionism, Eurocommunism and social democracy. Ultimately the Albanians condemned the policies of non-alignment and European détente as set out in the Helsinki Accords. After the death of Enver Hoxha in 1985 (the strong-man dictator who had been in power since 1944) and the end of the Cold War in 1990, Albania came out of its isolation. Diplomatic relations were broadened and independent political parties came into being. Soon after, an economic collapse was followed by accusations of widespread fraud in the political and economic system. In 1997, the collapse of a series of pyramid investment funds led to a bloody social and political uprising. Many people were left penniless and the biggest cities rose in arms. Weapons taken from the army and police fell into civilian hands and armed confrontation caused 1,500 deaths. The socialist government carried out reforms, which included revitalisation of the economy through extensive privatisation. By the late 1990s, civil war was well advanced in the former Yugoslavia, including areas bordering Albania in Serbia and Montenegro. Albania asked NATO to protect Kosovar Albanians, and diplomatic relations between Serbia and Albania were severed. Local mafias supplied weap-

ons to the Kosovo Liberation Army, while Albania accepted thousands of refugees. Diplomatic relations were restored with Serbia, but within Albania political disputes and a gun culture prevailed. The country agreed to destroy its chemical weapons and attempted to reduce lethal levels of environmental pollution. See also: Kosovo; Yugoslav Civil War. Bibliography Pavlowitch, S.K. and Biberaj, E. (1983) ‘The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia: Two Views’, Conflict Studies, Nos. 137–38, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

Further Reading Vickers, M. (1997) The Albanians: A Modern History, revd edn, London: Tauris.

algeRia The French had ruled Algeria harshly for more than a century before the 1950s War of Liberation. Their cruel and degrading treatment of the native population was made worse by expropriation of the best land, retributive taxes and the military governors who ruled the country for much of the nineteenth century, often using it to boost the army and their own careers. The colons – European settlers, many of whom were not French – were constantly pressing the military regime for more exploitation of the country and its people; while most Muslims refused to convert to Christianity or assimilate fully to French culture, thus increasing the already lively disdain for them in France, as well as among the colons. Algerian society was polarised. During and after the First World War, the native labour force became even more important to the French economy, the army, and the factories and plantations of the colons. Generations of resentment help to explain the savagery of the War of Liberation and the harshness of post-revolutionary regimes. 9

amnesty

The Algerian civil war, fought with great cruelty on both sides from November 1954 to May 1962, is often seen as a model of guerrilla warfare. In the conflict, over 1.5 million Algerians were killed or disappeared, a third of Algeria’s economic infrastructure was destroyed during the war in the countryside, and vicious battles were waged in the cities between the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS). Over a million Europeans fled, among them many professional workers, either when fighting began or in the summer of 1962, when the war ended and Algeria became an independent republic. The republic was overthrown in 1965 by a Council of Revolution, which emphasised state power and centralisation. There was economic expansion in urban areas, but not in the countryside, causing discontent. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the economic situation deteriorated. Militant Islamists and others began to question the legitimacy of the FLN, and military and social agitation grew. When the first round of elections in January 1992 suggested that a Muslim group, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), was likely to win round two, the military stepped in and replaced democracy by a High Council of State. As a result, a major insurgency began. Since 1992, over 75,000 people have died in Algeria as a result of bombing campaigns in the cities and massacres in the villages by two Muslim military groups, the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) and the more extreme Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA). Algeria is a fluid society, balanced precariously between its historical French culture and modern Arab concepts. The young are very disillusioned and easily recruited by militants. From 2004 onwards, the government devoted much time to national reconciliation. Any further move towards militancy among Algerian Muslims could also pose serious questions

for security elsewhere, because thousands of Algerians live in France and can travel freely around Europe. Bibliography Stone, M. (1997) The Agony of Algeria, New York: Columbia University Press: Hurst & Co.

Further Reading Crenshaw Hutchinson, M. (1978) Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1945–62, Stanford CA: Hoover Institution. Harris, P. (1997) ‘Algerian Election Puts Democracy Against Terrorism’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 9, No. 9, pp. 422–25. Horne, A. (1977) A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962, London: Macmillan.

amnesTy Amnesty is both a general pardon for offences against a government and the period during which a law is suspended to allow offenders to admit crimes without fear of prosecution. Very often, an amnesty is a way of restoring people’s human rights, by pardoning political offences that would not be crimes in a fair society. An amnesty, over the long term at least, should encompass fair trials for political prisoners and abolition of the death penalty and torture. Under any amnesty, people should be able to see that human rights are indivisible and interdependent, and that the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are adhered to by all. See also: Peace; Peaceful Co-existence. Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

10

anc (aFrican national congress)

Further Reading

Congress in South Africa was a revolt against an established government, without reaching the proportions of a full-scale revolution. The ANC was founded in 1912 with the aim of improving the political, social and economic conditions of blacks in South Africa. From 1948 to 1960 it was revolutionary and radical, but largely non-violent, until the Sharpeville affair in March 1960, when 69 blacks were killed by the police in this township near Johannesburg. After this the ANC was outlawed and went underground. From the early 1960s to the late 1980s it aimed at the violent overthrow of the South African state, but then it began negotiations with the white regime, which abandoned the policy of apartheid in 1991. Finally an ANC-led government of National Unity, headed by President Mandela, emerged in May 1994. The ANC supported the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and promised amnesty to those who confessed their crimes committed under the apartheid system. Mandela’s term as President in 1994–99 cemented his reputation as a world statesman. His deputy, Thabo Mbeki, followed him as President, but he wrestled with a developing economy, continued inequality and a high crime rate. The nation has been bedevilled by an AIDS epidemic and how to face the challenge. In the ANC, Mbeki’s biggest problem was to secure agreement with the ANC’s left wing partners – trade unions and the Communist Party – on remaining social and racial inequalities, while privatising some state industries. The ANC was re-elected in 2004. In June 2005 Mbeki sacked Vice-President Jacob Zuma after he was linked with a corruption scandal. Corruption and rape charges against Zuma were dismissed in 2006, boosting his chances of contesting the presidential elections scheduled for 2009. In December 2007 he became President of the ANC, after defeating the

Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin.

anaRChism Anarchism advocates the abolition of government, giving maximum freedom to the individual. The tension between freedom and restriction has featured in some Western and democratic thinking since 1945, but has now largely been overtaken by the politics of interdependence and transnational relations. Yet to many observers the main cause of war is the anarchic international system, where sovereign states pursue their own ends. World government remains a distant dream, making trust impossible; states reserve the right to use force and leaders must rely on self-help. There is no central authority that can prevent conflict or enforce agreements. The need for military power, and for constant alertness to its strength and use by others, results directly from the system of sovereign states and the power-seeking dimension of human nature. Thus the formally anarchic system of sovereign states promotes a realistic vision of struggle in world politics. See also: Governments and Conflict and Crisis Management; Violence. Bibliography Bullock, A. and Stallybrass, O. (eds) (1982) The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, London: Fontana.

Further Reading Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press.

anC (afRiCan naTional CongRess) One of the world’s major insurgencies from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s, the antiapartheid struggle of the African National 11

angolan civil war,

incumbent Thabo Mbeki, who in turn had to step down in September 2008 to face alleged corruption charges. See also: Apartheid; Civil Rights.

1974–2002

Jonas Savimbi was a close associate of Roberto, but in 1964 he defected from GRAE and went to the south of Angola, to his own people, the Ovambundu, who were three times as numerous as the Bakongo in Angola; two years later he founded the National Unity Party for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). With the rival claim of UNITA, Roberto could not long maintain the fiction that he was leading a united government-in-exile. GRAE gradually faded away, to be replaced by the more militant and military National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), also led by Roberto. A somewhat more sophisticated group, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was founded in 1956. It was an urban movement, strongest in the port of Luanda, the capital where half a million people (including 150,000 Portuguese) lived. It was a party of intellectuals and theorists, and very much influenced by Marxism, led by a poet, Agostinho Neto. Many Portuguese joined the party, as well as mestizos (of mixed Portuguese-African blood) free from tribal links and loyalties. Until 1974 the Portuguese hung on, but the army in Angola was a drain on Portuguese resources. The FNLA was largely inactive and UNITA operated mainly in areas run by Portugal’s white allies. On 25 April 1974 the whole situation changed. In an almost bloodless revolution, the autocratic regime in Portugal was overthrown by the Armed Forces Movement, and the anti-fascist Junta of National Salvation took control there. Two months later Portugal offered independence to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, but it proved impossible to bring the warring Angolan factions together in a transitional government. The Portuguese Army had lost the will to fight, and many of its soldiers supported the MPLA. The longer-established Portuguese – the settlers, artisans, tradesmen and rich minority of plantation owners,

Bibliography Seidman, A. (1985) The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa, Trenton NJ: Africa World Press. Thompson, L.M. (1992) A History of South Africa, revd edn, New Haven CT: Yale University Press.

Further Reading Murray, M.J. (1994) Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-Apartheid South Africa, London: Verso.

angolan Civil waR, 1974–2002 In Angola in the early 1960s, many Portuguese settlers and Colonial Army soldiers were killed by Holden Roberto and his followers in the Bakongo tribe, who in turn suffered at the hands of the army. Roberto formed the first (outlawed) political parties in the Portuguese colony, and in 1962 proclaimed himself head of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE). His advantage was that the Bakongo were a vigorous people who had tasted freedom and power – Joseph Kasavubu, Congo’s first president, was a Bakongo – and were ready to struggle for it elsewhere. But only about one in ten of the six million Angolans were Bakongo, who were limited to the north of Angola. Inevitably, other leaders would represent other tribal or ethnic groups. In 1964 the wind of change had blown across most of black Africa, but not Angola – the heart of Portugal’s African empire. GRAE appeared to be the chief Angolan liberation movement, with headquarters in Kinshasa, Congo. Holden Roberto’s brotherin-law was Joseph Mobutu, Commanderin-Chief of the Congolese Army and soon to be the country’s autocratic ruler. 12

angolan civil war,

right-wing by both inclination and tradition – tended to support anyone who opposed the MPLA. The USA immediately gave direct and indirect support to rival movements – Roberto’s FNLA and Savimbi’s UNITA – to prevent at any cost another ex-colony being taken over by a pro-Soviet movement. China supported the FNLA for anti-Soviet reasons; and in mid-1975 Cuba, with Soviet support, supported a commando assault by sea on the UNITA-held port of Lobito and nearby railhead of Benguela. UNITA was pushed back into the interior. Cuba’s leader, Fidel Castro, poured in troops and money. South Africa sent helicopters and troops across the border to protect the hydroelectric works at Ruacana. Fierce fighting raged in Luanda, where, with Cuban help and Soviet arms, the MPLA destroyed the FNLA headquarters and consolidated their hold. UNITA moved inland, thousands of whites and mestizos fled the country, coffee, sisal and cotton crops went unpicked and the diamond industry collapsed. But South Africa gave more support to UNITA, and achieved success in the south. In the north, Zaire gave more aid to the FNLA, but an FNLA move on the capital led to disaster. That month, November 1975, the MPLA proclaimed independence with Neto as President of the Democratic Republic in Luanda; UNITA proclaimed independence at Nova Lisboa; and the FNLA proclaimed independence in Ambriz with Holden Roberto as President of the Democratic Republic. Roberto, concerned by the poor fighting of Zairean forces, decided with CIA approval to hire sympathisers from Britain and USA. These men showed great courage and ability in attacking Cuban and MPLA troops head on. Their leader, Colonel Callan, maintained discipline ultimately through executions, morale soon collapsed and he was captured. UNITA

1974–2002

also suffered and, after being defeated by the MPLA, Savimbi and the remnant retreated to the bush. By 1976 Roberto was safe in Kinshasa, but with all hopes gone; the Americans halted operations; South Africa withdrew from the Ruacana Dam. The civil war was in effect over and President Neto ruled the country. The captured mercenaries were put on trial amid a blaze of publicity, and Callan and three others were executed. It was triumph for the MPLA, Castro and the Russians, and a body blow not merely to Portuguese pride, but to South Africa, the CIA and the West in general. In 1985 the MPLA, with 15,000 Cuban troops, mounted a big offensive. The USA resumed aid to UNITA and South Africa intervened on a large scale. Both sides agreed to demobilise to prepare for national elections in 1990; but UNITA and MPLA, both without external support, restarted fighting. The government remained in control despite UNITA controlling 70 per cent of the country. In 2002 Jonas Savimbi was surprised in his last redoubt, 500 miles (800 km) southeast of Luanda, and died while firing at government forces. Within months, UNITA stopped fighting and stood down its army. In 2003, as a political party, it elected a new leader, Isaias Samakuva. Talks have now ended Africa’s longestrunning Civil War, which has taken 500,000 lives and displaced millions of poverty-stricken people in this immense, mineral-rich state. Citing the need to restore transport links and clear landmines, the government delayed parliamentary elections to 2008 and presidential elections to 2009. Western governments, especially the USA, have shown interest in the oil deposits. See also: Cuba; Conflicts in Africa. Bibliography Bruce, N. (1973) ‘Portugal’s African Wars’,

13

antarctic treaty,

1959

intercept and destroy attacking missiles. It prohibited the development, testing and deployment of sea-, air- and space-based and mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. The Treaty prevented either side from using a ballistic missile defence as a shield from behind which to launch a first strike; it helped to lock in the superpowers’ basic parity in nuclear capabilities under Mutual Assured Destruction. In 1977 and 1982 the superpowers agreed at review meetings that their interests were being served and no amendments were necessary. In the late 1980s and 1990s, tensions arose when Russia and China attacked American proposals to develop a national missile defence system that would require changes or an end to the 1972 Treaty. In September 2000 a joint statement by the superpowers on strategic stability cooperation established a basis for progress in reducing nuclear weapons arsenals, strengthening the ABM Treaty and confronting new challenges to international security. See also: Cold War; Disarmament.

Conflict Studies, No. 34, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. Vines, A. (1995) ‘Angola and Mozambique: The Aftermath of Conflict’, Conflict Studies, No. 280, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Ellis, J. (1995) From the Barrel of a Gun, London: Mechanicsburg PA: Greenhill, and Stackpole.

anTaRCTiC TReaTy, 1959 Like the oceans of the world, Antarctica belongs to no state. The continent has limited strategic or commercial value. The 1959 Treaty forbids military activity, the presence of nuclear weapons or the dumping of nuclear waste in Antarctica, sets aside all territorial claims on the continent for future resolution and allows various states to conduct scientific research. The Treaty was signed by all states with interests or activities in the area, including the superpowers at the time. Greenpeace set up a permanent base to monitor conditions. In 1991, the continent was turned into a ‘world park’. The continent is of concern in the debate on climate change because of ozone depletion, resulting in more ultraviolet radiation reaching the earth’s surface. The ozone layer is at its thinnest over Antarctica and the hole in it is growing. See also: Resources and Conflicts; Environmental and Ecological Security.

Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

Bibliography Goldstein, J.S. (1999) International Relations, 3rd edn, Harlow, Essex: Longman.

anzus This security treaty, signed in 1951 by Australia, New Zealand and the United States, required the states to provide mutual aid in the event of aggression by foreign powers. It was replaced in 1954 by SEATO (the South East Asia Treaty Organisation). See also: SEATO.

anTi-BallisTiC missile TReaTy, 1972 The Treaty was signed in 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union. It severely limited the extremely effective anti-ballistic missile systems designed to 14

aPartheid

Bibliography and Further Reading

tions threatened regional stability. The issue of Namibia was a case in point – a country that South Africa controlled but refused to give independence to until 1990. Raids by South African forces into Angola – to try to force the withdrawal of Cuban forces, who were fighting a proxy war on behalf of Marxists in Angola while protecting members of the South West Africa People’s Organisation, who in turn were fighting for Namibian independence – did not help to assuage fears of a possible brutal, widespread racial bloodbath in the whole of southern Africa. The turning point for apartheid was in 1977 when the United Nations Security Council set up a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa, the first time the Security Council had taken such action against a member state. The West (including the USA) wanted to preserve regional stability and Western influence while encouraging reform. The Eastern bloc (including the Soviet Union) encouraged national liberation movements and played upon the ambiguities of the Western position in the hope of gaining influence in the region. The black front-line states – Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, Angola and Tanzania – were anti-colonial and anti-white, while being aware of their economic dependence on South Africa (the economic giant of the region). Attempts by the Commonwealth to impose sanctions met with intransigence from successive British governments. In 1990 the President of South Africa, F. W. de Klerk, lifted the banning order on the ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations, and released Nelson Mandela from 27 years in prison on Robben Island near Cape Town. South Africa began the slow progress towards integration into the global community, greatly helped by Mandela as president from 1994 until 2001, overseeing the new majority-rule government, making it stronger and more stable.

Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

apaRTheid Apartheid (‘separation’) was the South African Government’s official policy of racial segregation from 1948 until 1994. It was consistently denounced in the United Nations and frowned on, but largely ignored, by most Western countries until decolonisation brought many new African states onto the world stage, and the policy itself brought increasing violence. Under apartheid, most of the population (71 per cent Black, 13 per cent Coloured [mixed race], 3 per cent Asian) were controlled by the white 13 per cent. In 1960, the United Kingdom acknowledged that a ‘wind of change’ was sweeping through Africa. In March 1961 at Sharpeville, near Johannesburg, the South African police killed 69 people and wounded 180 in a crowd demonstrating against the pass laws (requiring non-whites to carry identification cards and restricting where they could go). The African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress – black political organisations – were banned. Black nationalists were determined to make white people accept African self-rule. In May 1961 South Africa left the Commonwealth, after its African and Asian members made it plain that apartheid was unacceptable. For the next thirty years, the country was virtually isolated globally and faced military and insurgent confrontation with its black neighbours. World opinion was outraged, but economic sanctions failed, and at times between 1961 and 1991 growing frustra15

arBitration

See also: ANC; Conflicts in Africa.

Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Goldstein, J.S. (1999) International Relations, 3rd edn, Harlow, Essex: Longman.

Bibliography Gutteridge, W. (1985) ‘The South African Crisis: Time for International Action’, Conflict Studies, No. 179, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. —— (1990) ‘South Africa: Apartheid’s Endgame’, Conflict Studies, No. 228, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. —— (1995) South Africa from Apartheid to National Unity, 1981–1994, Aldershot, Hampshire: Dartmouth.

aRms sales and TRade For many nations, their security depends on continued access to updated weaponry through the arms trade. For some states, dealing in arms is also a source of wealth – especially for some Third World countries. Many arms suppliers are very secretive. The mere existence of arms can play a major role in internal conflicts – as a proximate cause of conflict, or as a permissive factor allowing antagonists to begin, sustain and intensify conflict. The arms trade is largely uncontrolled and putting more weapons into theatres of conflict will generally intensify or prolong, not reduce, hostilities, though this may be better than allowing an aggressor to triumph. Arms transfers are an important instrument of influence in world politics. Since the end of the Cold War, the world arms market has generally reduced, though still dominated by the United States. Russia has great potential, which is likely to grow as oil/gas wealth helps it to escape its economic difficulties. The Middle East remains the major arms-importing region of the global South. Defence industries are needed to support military mobilisation, to take account of unforeseen international developments, and they must continually engage in research and development. However, the existence of the arms trade has long been criticised by international institutions. The United Nations has voted to restrict the supply of arms to certain states, for example South Africa because of its apartheid policy. There has also been increasing concern about the amount that Third World states spend on arms. Many pro-

aRBiTRaTion Arbitration is a method of conflict settlement by bringing in a third party as mediator. Both sides have to agree in advance to abide by the mediator’s solution; then both sides present their arguments to the arbitrator, who decides on a fair solution. Idealists have argued that the development of arbitration is essential if war is to be eradicated from world politics, but it has been rarely used since 1945. Arbitration has occurred in territorial disputes: in the 1980s between Chile and Argentina, using a panel of Latin American judges; in 1988 between Israel and Egypt over part of the town of Taba; in 1992, between El Salvador and Honduras at the World Court; and in the late 1990s between Serbia and Bosnia over the city of Brcko. Usually a panel of three people is empowered: one chosen by each side and a third on whom both sides agree. Major disputes of great importance to states come before an international legal forum, such as the International Criminal Court in the Hague, the International Court of Justice or the European Court of Justice, which rules on disputes arising out of the treaties regulating the European Union. See also: International Law. Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The

16

attitudes to conFlicts and crises

posals to cut the trade have been put forward, but little has been achieved. The globalisation of arms production means that a fairly unified military technology is now used around the world and defence production has become transnational. However, a few huge defence conglomerates in the United States and Europe now dominate the market, reducing the number of arms suppliers. This close relationship between national security and economics tends to distort both. When economic transactions have implications for national security and defence, they are no longer just economic issues governed by economic logic. Prestige plays a role – historically, the more powerful its military, the more prestigious is the country. At the end of the Cold War, many nations, including Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia and North Korea, benefited from purchasing Soviet weapons and the defecting arms experts providing invaluable knowledge. There has also been a large illicit trade in weapons, many of them purchased by non-state actors. Such unpredictable threats fuel the argument that, if one wants peace, one must prepare for war. Advocates of disarmament would say that more arms mean less peace. See also: Military–Industrial Complex.

tional Relations: Frameworks for Understanding, New York: Macmillan and Collier Macmillan.

asymmeTRiC waRfaRe Warfare is asymmetric when a state seeks to fight on terms that disadvantage its enemy. Nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons are seen as great ‘equalisers’, suited to an asymmetric response to Western military powers equipped with a higher standard of conventional capabilities. A high reliance is placed by the United States on weapons of mass destruction as part of asymmetric strategies. Asymmetric threats that may be used to coerce the West range from computer warfare through international civil disobedience and criminality right up to military acts. They can involve weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear blackmail by terrorists or a rogue state, or even national destabilisation arising from mass migration. See also: Total War. Bibliography Paul, T.V. (1994) Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Further Reading Leech, J. (2002) Asymmetries of Conflict: War Without Death, London: Frank Cass.

Bibliography Russett, B., Starr, H. and Kinsella, D. (2000) World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 6th edn, Boston MA: Bedford/St Martin’s Press. Woods, N (ed.) (1996) Explaining International Relations since 1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

aTTiTudes To ConfliCTs and CRises Certain attitudes and psychological predispositions typically surround a serious conflict or crisis. First, there is suspicion of the opponent, their intentions and the motives underlying their actions. Sudden changes in relationships are likely, and a high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability. Suspicions colour speculation about the other side’s intentions, so that peace gestures, for example, will probably be rejected as a trick.

Further Reading Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (2003) Global Transformations, Cambridge: Polity Press and Blackwell. Papp, D.S. (1984) Contemporary Interna-

17

attitudes to conFlicts and crises

A second attitude common to policy makers in a crisis or conflict is issue escalation. They tend to attach symbolic importance to interests that, commercially or strategically, are not worth very much. During the crisis stage of an international conflict, policy makers feel a sense of urgency and perceive the crisis, if not all conflicts, as a turning point in the relationship between the parties and sometimes in the history of the world. In a crisis, threats are more quickly perceived than the opponent’s relative capabilities. These and other attitudes – hostility, lack of trust and nationalism – are directly linked to people’s propensity to overreact to provocations. Studies help to explain why armed force is frequently the action that is ultimately taken in crisis, though other action may precede force. In the early stages of conflict or crisis, protests, rejections, denials, accusations, demands, warnings, threats, and symbolic actions are likely to occur, whereas formal negotiation is more likely in the settlement stage of the conflict or crisis. Actions in a conflict or crisis may include protest notes; denials and accusations; calling ambassadors home for consultations; withdrawal of an ambassador; threat of serious consequences if certain actions by the opponent do not cease; threat of an application of a limited or total economic boycott or embargo; extensive official denunciation of the opponent; formal break in diplomatic relations; formal blockade; exemplary limited use of force and reprisals; and war, whose nature can vary greatly, depending on the objectives, level of force and geography. Conflicts and crises do not necessarily escalate from one step to the next: several actions may be taken simultaneously, or policy makers may decide to go from warnings straight to the use of military force. A conflict may be settled in any of six ways: by conquest, by avoidance or voluntary withdrawal, by forced submission

or effective deterrence, by some official compromise after extended negotiations and mediation, by award or by passive settlement. Conquest requires overwhelming the opponent by the use of force. There may still be some agreement and bargaining between the antagonists. One side must decide that peace, even under terms of unconditional surrender, is more desirable than continuing the conflict, perhaps because it can no longer achieve even reduced objectives or successfully defend itself. Avoidance or withdrawal is a possible solution when both sides see the incompatibility of their goals, values, interests or positions. One or both parties may then withdraw from a physical or bargaining position, or cease the actions that originally caused hostile responses. It is probably the most common behaviour among governments that normally maintain friendly relations. In submission or deterrence, one side withdraws from a previously held value, position or interest because the opponent makes effective threats to use force. The withdrawal need not be of the same magnitude for both parties. There can be some compromise in which both sides agree to partly withdraw from their initial objectives, positions, demands or actions. The main problem is to get both sides to realise that the price of continued conflict is higher than the cost and consequences of reducing their demands or some form of diplomatic or military withdrawal. A complicated outcome based on a previous compromise is the award, where opponents agree to a settlement achieved through non-bargaining procedures. An award is any decision effected by an independent third party (e.g. a court) or criterion (e.g. majority rule) which sets out the substantive terms of settlement. Most conflicts are not of course resolved by 18

axis oF evil

means of awards, because they involve a surrender of bargaining power and a willingness to resolve the issues on the basis of some impartial criterion, such as law, under which there can be only a winner and a loser. Often international conflicts have no formal outcome (conquest, avoidance, deterrence, compromise or award), but persist for a long period until the parties implicitly accept a new status quo as partly legitimate. See also: Crisis and Risk Management; Governments and Conflict and Crisis Management; Psychology and Conflict.

Bibliography McCauley, M. (2004) Russia, America and the Cold War, 2nd edn, Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education.

axis of evil President George Bush used this phrase in January 2002 to describe Iraq, Iran and North Korea, countries that were seen as giving support to terrorists. The axis of evil gave shape to the enemy in the war against international terrorism, particularly after the 9/11 attacks. Observers argue whether this is a war over culture, ideology or religion, and whether the war can ever be won. Is it indeed one war, or a series of separate conflicts? Any indeterminate war against a largely unseen and indeterminate enemy can cause problems for participating governments. Overstretched forces and extra funding for technological advance cause budget problems for many countries. It can be easy not to respond for requests for help and instead fall into line with increasingly sceptical public opinion about the real aims of the war on terror. At the core of the issue is morality, the defence of democratic values and meeting the challenge of terrorism head-on. In the war against terror, the West wants peace to secure and exploit oil reserves, it wants political reforms to secure democracy, and it wants so-called military stability in countries perceived as pariahs (such as Iran), as inherently unstable (as with Somalia and Afghanistan), or as ethnically and ideologically divided (as in Lebanon). Where does Israel fit into this, especially after the 2006 ‘war’ against Hezbollah in Lebanon? Will this crisis be a turning point? Will it lead towards a comprehensive peace in the region or a widening of the war? In its pursuit of the war on terror, the United States has argued that detention of people suspected of terrorist acts or supporting global terror in the camp at

Bibliography Holsti, K.J. (1974) International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 2nd edn, London: Prentice Hall International.

ausTRian neuTRaliTy, 1955 In May 1955 the Treaty of State ended the post-war occupation of Austria (by France, UK, USA and USSR) in exchange for material obligation and voluntary neutrality: no foreign military units could be based on Austrian soil. This treaty was the only time during the entire Cold War period (1945– 90) that the Soviet Union voluntarily agreed to return territory it occupied in the late 1940s. Ostensibly, Austria had to be evenhanded in dealings with the superpowers, but for all intents and purposes it was proWestern. Within a year came the Hungarian uprising against the Soviet Union and the subsequent Communist clampdown. Some 25,000 Hungarians fled to Austria in November 1956, exacerbating an already serious refugee crisis with political refugees from Poland and other Eastern bloc countries. Austria became a member of the United Nations in 1955 and the Council of Europe in 1956. See also: Cold War. 19

axis oF evil

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is highly legitimate, because they pose a threat to American interests at home and abroad. The counter view is that the US quasijudicial policy of detaining suspects at Guantanamo is a flagrant and persistent breach of international law and human rights. The CIA has accused Osama bin Laden of being the mastermind behind an international terror network, but he is at the epicentre of a much larger diplomatic conundrum. Where is he? Who is backing him? Where is he likely to strike next? Is he backing conflicts in the wider Middle East? Is he the mastermind behind trends in Islamic fundamentalism? Military attacks on the Taliban in Afghanistan, on Islamic insurgents in Iraq and on Hezbollah in the Lebanon have intensified radical Islamic resentment. The resolve of Israel and the Americanled coalition in the face of such resentment has apparently risen. In the eyes of world public opinion, there are rights and wrongs on both sides. Al Qaeda has created a climate of terror and fear in the West. Over the last two years or so, growing anti-war feeling (especially in the USA and UK) has perhaps given hope to those who wish to cut down on foreign adventures against an elusive enemy. Both sides have serious criticisms to address: for example, Al Qaeda need to cease their abhorrent methods, and there needs to be a serious attempt to enforce a

peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. In this, the United States has a massive role to play. There is then the issue of endemic poverty, the huge gap between rich and poor in both oil-rich and oil-barren states, and the issue of creating democratic governments. Some observers interpret the whole war on terror as chasing shadows. How can we fight a belief system such as Islamic fundamentalism? Terrorism is a political method – how does one fight something that is universal and timeless? In the global war on terror, there seems no chance of political compromise or even long-term military compromise. In the eyes of many, no war on terror will ever be won by a total war victory, nor by demonising a faith or leading individuals. As hard as it appears in 2007, compromise and dialogue appear to be the constructive, long-term way forward towards a century of peace and not endemic war. See also: New World Order; Terrorism; Terrorists and Guerrillas: Differences; Terrorist States; War on Terror. Bibliography Chomsky, N. (2000) Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs, London: Pluto Press.

Further Reading Moorcraft, P. (ed.) (2005) Axis of Evil: The War on Terror, Barnsley: Pen and Sword.

20

B

BalanCe of poweR This is a principle in international relations and international politics whereby any state that threatens to increase its power at once faces increases in countervailing power from possible aggressors. Popularly it involves the principle that one side ought to have a margin of strength in order to prevent power becoming distributed unevenly. A balance involving two states (bipolarity) is likely to be more unstable than a complex balance (a multipolar system). Sudden technological change that dramatically increases the power of one side can in a short space of time destroy the equilibrium. Multipolar systems can more readily cope with these occurrences. The system involves a constant calculation of power and interest, and can produce an international hierarchy where states are categorised as great powers, middle powers and small powers. Equality can be seen as existing legalistically, for it is true that all states are equal, but some are more equal than others. During the Cold War, small powers were under constant pressure from both sides to submit to superpower hegemony by joining alliances against the rival bloc. Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, the international balance of power has been based on a number of power centres. This is polycentrism, or flexible balance. The new states see their national interests in economic, social and political modernisation rather than Cold War rivalry. More and more states are able to make independent decisions that affect the level of tension in the world. Neutral states feel they have a greater range of choice.

Balance-of-power proponents see a match of countervailing capabilities as the best guarantee of peace. It helps to regulate international conflict; it preserves national independence and the status quo. Some observers suggest that war may be required to establish a balance of power that subsequently will prevent war. See also: Cold War; Collective Security; International Conflict. Bibliography Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio. Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press.

Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin.

BalanCe of TeRRoR A term dating from the 1950s to describe the uneasy balance that proceeds from fear of nuclear war and ideological propaganda. It involves the power to deter and destroy. In the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union both had assured destruction capabilities, but the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) gave the impression that the balance of terror had been stabilised. However, the last few years of the Cold War showed that, with new war strategies and an interest in ballistic missile defence, the balance of terror was delicately poised. In such a balance, both superpowers 21

Ballistic missile deFence

were deterred from hostile action by the massive scale of each other’s capabilities. Nuclear/atomic weapons make war something that threatens the aggressor too, and indeed the whole world. See also: Cold War; Deterrence; Nuclear Proliferation.

atre missile defence, and the need for clear definitions of ‘theatre’ and ‘strategic defence’ – defining the area to be defended – was met by the ABM Protocol. Both the USA and USSR wished for technological breakthroughs in extremely effective ABM (anti-ballistic missile), air defence systems and very accurate MIRVs (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles), which would have raised the gains from a first strike by reducing the damage expected from the opponent’s retaliation. Later some Americans officially wanted to renegotiate the ABM Treaty to allow for the deployment of American defences under the Strategic Defence Initiative (‘Star Wars’: a plan to develop satellites capable of destroying enemy missiles in space). The ABM Treaty expired in June 2002 following President Bush’s decision not to renew it. See also: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1972; Cold War; SALT; START.

Bibliography Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. —— (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin.

BallisTiC missile defenCe The initial objective of SALT 1 (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) was to limit or eliminate construction of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, which the United States and the Soviet Union were planning in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A ballistic missile is a guided missile that ends its flight in a ballistic descent. Some can fly across oceans and they carry nuclear weapons. The deployment of ABM was controlled by treaty, so there was an incentive to procure enough strategic missiles to overwhelm any defence system. To prevent an accelerated arms race, the ABM Treaty was signed by the USA and USSR in 1972; it prohibited the deployment of a nationwide defence against strategic ballistic missiles. In 1974 the Anti-Ballistic Missile Protocol amended the ABM element of the SALT 1 Treaty, limiting the deployment of defensive weapons to one site for each country. There was concern in the arms community worldwide regarding the-

Bibliography Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury.

Bandung ConfeRenCe, 1955 At this conference in Bandung, Indonesia, 29 African and Asian countries met to oppose colonialism. Many of these countries received considerable American aid and copious Soviet arms. The general tone of the conference was one of neutralism and nonalignment, but strangely the countries attending included China, members of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and North and South Vietnam. The conference pressed for the elimination of nuclear weapons and it enunciated ten principles of political conduct, ranging from respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations to recognition of the equality of all races and of the sociality of all nations large and 22

Bangladesh: war oF indePendence,

small. It allowed small nations to think of themselves as a force in international affairs. Bandung marked a move from neutralism as a negative refusal to take sides towards a more positive policy. Neutralism began to acquire respectability in international politics and at home. It became increasingly attractive to newly independent states and others, and the Bandung meeting was seen as the origin of the NonAligned Movement. See also: Non-Aligned Movement.

1971

try to reach a compromise, but this was impossible. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and some of his Awami League followers were arrested, and others fled to India. An independent state of Bangladesh was proclaimed in March 1971. The repressive actions of the West Pakistan army caused an uprising. The Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters) of East Pakistan fought both conventional and guerrilla war. Millions of East Pakistani refugees crossed into India; as the fighting intensified, so the tide of refugees increased. In December 1971, India invaded East Pakistan on the side of the Mukti Bahini and other irregular forces fighting for independence. Within two weeks the Pakistani Government was forced to surrender. West Pakistan found it difficult to supply the East, since India blocked the direct route. The Pakistan Army also had to fight the Indian Army on India’s western border. Indian intervention was crucial in securing an independent Bangladesh. India wanted to return the refugees to Bangladesh, to reduce Pakistan’s power by breaking up the state, and to exert influence on a weak new state. The Simla Agreement signed in July 1972 formally brought the war to an end; both sides agreed to try to resolve their differences through negotiation. The United States sided with Pakistan in the conflict, while the Soviet Union was sympathetic to India, wishing to see Pakistan broken up and India as the dominant power, so diminishing the influence of the United States in that region. In 1972, Sheikh Mujib became prime minister. In 1974, a famine and the resulting disorder led to Mujib assuming the presidency with dictatorial powers, but he was assassinated in a military coup in 1975. See also: Pakistan.

Bibliography Hadjor, K.B. (1993) Dictionary of Third World Terms, London: Penguin. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

Further Reading Ciment, J. and Hill, K. (eds) (1999) Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, Vols I–II, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn.

Bangladesh: waR of independenCe, 1971 This crisis was one of a series of incidents between Pakistan and India, which flared up at various times after the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. Kashmir, Chinese incursions and the wars of 1947– 49 and 1965 were the other major crises. During the 1950s, East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) became poorer, while West Pakistan did reasonably well. The East produced tea and jute, yet most of the value was taken by West Pakistan. Even in the army, the East was unrepresented. The East Pakistan Awami League became the focus of discontent, demanding that East Pakistan retain full use of its own resources. Civilian government was suspended in 1969 but, in elections in March 1971, the Awami League won convincingly in the East. President Yahya Khan of Pakistan visited East Pakistan to

Bibliography Jackson, R. (1975) South Asian Crisis: India,

23

BeliZe

Pakistan and Bangladesh, New York: Praeger, and London: Chatto & Windus.

The Oxford Dictionary of the British Empire, Vol. IV: The Twentieth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further Reading Arnold, G. (1991) Wars in the Third World since 1945, London: Cassell.

BeRlin BloCkade, 1948 The capital of Germany, badly damaged in the Second World War, was occupied by the four allied powers (USSR, USA, UK and France) after the defeat of Germany. The three Western powers wished to reform the German economy, to help its recovery, and to set up a new German state. The Russians saw this an attempt to reconstitute Germany as a military power and refused to co-operate. In 1948, as a result, the city became divided into Soviet-controlled East Berlin and the US, UK and French zones, forming West Berlin. The Western allies needed regular and unrestricted access to Berlin across the Soviet sector of Germany – which stretched 100 miles to the west of Berlin. The Russians had caused ever increasing difficulties and delays to traffic to and from West Berlin, and were met by increasing Western intransigence. In June 1948 the Russians severed all road and rail links on the pretext of technical problems, and cut off electricity. The blockade quickly led to shortages of food and coal. At a political level the Western allies were determined to pursue a firm line against the Russians, and made their own supply arrangements, soon co-ordinated in a multinational airlift. Within a few months, 5,000 tons of stores were being flown in to West Berlin daily. A counter-blockade halted coal and steel deliveries to the Russian zone and restricted other trade. The limited international support for the Russian line was soon dissipated. In 1949 the UN set up negotiations, producing a Russian offer to end the blockade if the Western allies agreed to a meeting of the four powers to resolve the issue of currency reform. The allies agreed and in May

Belize British Honduras (now Belize) was settled from Jamaica in the seventeenth century. It became a British colony, associated with Jamaica in 1862. From 1945, neighbouring Guatemala laid claim to the territory, and in 1948 the British deployed troops as a precaution. British forces were strengthened in 1961, responding to Guatemalan support for the Belize Liberation Army, which in 1962 sent 20 armed irregulars into British Honduras. The invaders were repelled. British troops have been there ever since, in case of further Guatemalan incursions and as a training base for tropical warfare. In 1972 the Guatemalans massed troops on the border and the British sent naval and air reinforcements to protect Belize, which gained independence in 1981. The USA now supported Belize, after years of backing its loyal ally, Guatemala, which refused to recognise Belize until 1991. The dispute simmered into life again in February 2000 when members of the Belize security forces were apprehended in Guatemala for allegedly entering the country illegally. In turn, Guatemala was accused of invading the territory and kidnapping Belizeans. Guatemala subsequently announced it would work with the international courts to resolve its continued claim to half of the territory of Belize. In 2003, Belize, Honduras and Guatemala signed an agreement to give Guatemala access to the Caribbean Sea. See also: Central America. Bibliography and Further Reading Brown, J.M. and Louis, W.R. (eds) (1999)

24

BiaFra

1949 the Berlin blockade was lifted, though the airlift continued until September to create a large stock of supplies against the possibility of another Soviet blockade. The Russian blockade showed the world that the Western allies were now ‘protectors’ of Germany and no longer ‘occupiers’. It was clear that West Germany must become a state in its own right, at the centre of an anti-communist military alliance. See also: Cold War.

actually had a stabilising effect upon East– West relations in a period of instability. The East German authorities had planned and conducted the operation with meticulous care, ensuring that it remained entirely within the Soviet zone of Berlin. Thus there was virtually no room for the West to take any direct action. As time went by, it was clear that – despite many tense incidents and sabre-rattling by the Wall, and numerous escape attempts, some successful – the two sides were not prepared to go to war over the issue of the Wall, let alone ignite a nuclear holocaust. The divided, walled city became a centre for espionage and spy exchanges between East and West. In the event of military conflict, the isolated Western military garrison would have been no match for a direct assault by Warsaw Pact troops. The Wall was a constant reminder of the deep ideological and cultural rift between East and West, and the true nature of Soviet Communism. The Wall helped to prevent the free movement of people between Eastern and Western Europe. It symbolised the intransigence that affected the long-term relationship between the Soviet Union and the West, and clarified the ground rules for the Cold War in Europe. See also: Cold War; Walls.

Bibliography Morris, E. (1973) Blockade: Berlin and the Cold War, New York: Stein & Day, and London: Hamilton.

BeRlin wall, 1961 Before 1961 there had been a steady stream of refugees from the East to the West. They were voting with their feet in protest at their lack of freedom in Communist-controlled Eastern Europe, especially in the German Democratic Republic and East Berlin. On the Russian side there was evidence that the economy of the German Democratic Republic was being increasingly undermined by the exodus of population, in particular those in skilled trades and professions. With the approval of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states, the German Democratic Republic closed the border between the two Berlins in August 1961 and soon created a permanent barrier – the Berlin Wall. The building of the Berlin Wall presented the Western allies with a fait accompli – their options were reduced to doing nothing or reacting to the altered situation. They did not wish to go to war over the Wall, so their reaction was very restrained. Their main concern was to avoid giving support to dissident elements in East Berlin, who might take to the streets in mass protest and destabilise the German Democratic Republic. The Wall

Bibliography Schick, J. (1971) The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

BiafRa Biafra is an eastern region of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which seceded from the Federation in 1967. In an attempt to protect the interests of the Ibo people against the dominant Hausa, Biafra unilaterally declared independence under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu. The federal government under General Gowon refused to recognise the new state 25

Bilateral security agreements

and took up arms against it. Nearly two million people were killed in the subsequent conflict, between 1967 and 1970. Biafra was an oil-rich province and the source of much of Nigeria’s wealth, but its army of 6,000 troops was far outnumbered by the 80,000 of the Nigerian army, which was also superior in artillery and armoured vehicles. The United States remained neutral, which obviated the risk of a superpower confrontation. The United Kingdom eventually came down firmly on the side of the federal government, despite Shell and BP having large stakes in oil in the eastern region. The Biafran offensive plunged Nigeria into full-scale civil war. Within weeks the Biafran capital, Enugu, was occupied and within six months both Biafra’s major ports, Calabar and Port Harcourt, were lost. Starvation became the main weapon of war and civilians suffered terribly. The last eighteen months of the war consisted largely of slow military strangulation: without access to the sea, a decreasing Biafran enclave could only be supplied by air, while federal forces advanced regularly and forced the Biafran government to keep moving from one centre to another. The war initially had a major adverse effect on the Nigerian oil industry, since most of it was in the war zone, but after just over a year most of the oilfields were again controlled by federal forces. Sheer volume of numbers and resources overcame the Biafrans, who showed tremendous resistance right up to the end. This was partly because of their (mistaken) belief that the Ibo people faced genocide if they surrendered: a view fed by federal authorities. The Soviet Union offered immediate support to the victorious federal government, which meant that Moscow gained another foothold in Africa. Despite the war and its terrible suffering, Africa’s largest black state emerged

intact. As a result of the oil price explosion, Nigeria enjoyed a period of economic boom and considerable influence in Africa during the late 1970s. See also: Conflicts in Africa. Bibliography Ekwe-Ekwe, H. (1991) The Biafra War: Nigeria and the Aftermath, Lewiston NY, and Lampeter, Dyfed, Wales: E. Mellen Press. Niven, R. (1971) The War of Nigerian Unity, 1967–70, Totowa NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.

Further Reading Stremlau, J. (1977) The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

BilaTeRal seCuRiTy agReemenTs Such agreements are between two nations, pledging each other military support in the event of attack by a third state. They are an extension of bilateral diplomacy, meaning traditional modes of dialogue between two states, in contrast to multilateral diplomacy. Many of these agreements are guarantees by a powerful state to stand by a weaker state when it is in danger. Powerful countries can use such agreements to justify intervention. Bilateral security agreements can be specific and active, or general and consultative, and ultimately serve to guarantee the status quo. Most major states in the international system have defence postures that combine bilateral and multilateral security pacts. See also: Collective Security. Further Reading Carr, F. and Callan, T. (2002) Managing Conflict in the New Europe: The Role of International Institutions, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.

26

Bio-terrorism

Bio-TeRRoRism This is perhaps the ultimate weapon in warfare: it has been described as the next threat. The three main types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are chemical weapons, nuclear bombs and biological agents. All can be used in bio-terrorism. The raw materials in chemical weapons are powerful nerve toxins, which are easy to obtain but not well suited to inflicting widespread damage. To kill a sizeable number of people with sarin would require many small, suitably adapted aircraft like crop dusters. For a nuclear attack, a terrorist would need a fissionable substance such as enriched uranium – but, even if it could be obtained (from new ex-Soviet states, for instance), a weapon would take 70 kg of uranium plus hundreds of kilos of casing and machinery. A greater fear would be an attack on a nuclear power plant with conventional explosives. For biological weapons, a terrorist can easily make use of anthrax, plague and smallpox, all potentially lethal – though they can be countered by vaccines and antibiotics, as the anthrax scares in the USA and UK in 2001–3 showed. However, the scares in March 2003 seemed to be criminal acts – in some cases, hoaxes – rather than outright terrorist acts. Anthrax can be used to affect water supplies by contaminating reservoirs. It is kept at over 1,300 sites around the world. Stocks of anthrax in some former states of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were secretly buried in early 2003 to avoid them falling into terrorist hands. The fear, following the Tokyo underground attack in 1995, is that tube networks could be threatened as underground trains push and pull bacteria along the system. In some cities, biological sensors have been placed at strategic points in the underground system. Rapid recognition of illness caused by a biological attack is vital. Proactive measures have been taken: for

instance, emergency medical supply packs at strategic areas around the USA. A contagious disease attack in a city would stop people moving and entering, and the city would be isolated. September 11 has made any disaster plausible, including bio-terror and forced people to think the unthinkable. Research on biological weapons started in the USA in 1942 in university laboratories, military factories and companies under contract. The Russians experimented early on in the Cold War, creating ‘superbugs’, and both sides developed anthrax as a biological weapon. During the Cuba Missiles Crisis in 1962, a biological attack was planned by the Americans but never carried out. In 1969 President Nixon renounced germ weapons. In 1972 the Biological Weapons Convention was signed by the USSR and USA to end weapons production. Russia used the Treaty to develop germ-warfare plants (many in states bordering Afghanistan). The world became aware of the reality of bio-warfare in 1988 when the forces of Saddam Hussein used cyanide bombs in an attack on the Kurdish-held village of Halabja. This sent shock waves through many nations. Osama bin Laden has biological weapons, but only a primitive delivery system. A camp in Afghanistan was used for animal testing with an anthrax germ. It has been alleged that Iraq had an advanced biological warfare test programme and that they hid material from the United Nations inspectors in the late 1990s. Today quite a few nations have biological weapon programmes. It is very hard to check whether bio-weapons are being produced in any country – both good and bad technology can be involved. For example, fomenters used in producing bio-germs can be used for food storage. Whereas biological attacks attempt to infect the target population with live bacteria, in the hope that victims will increase 27

Bio-terrorism

the spread by infecting others, chemical attacks use ‘dead’ toxic agents such as mustard gas (used in the First World War), which depends on inhalation or contact. Chemical and biological weapons are relatively cheap and easy to produce, and the panic effect on the population would be considerable; however, both weapons are unpredictable, counter-measures can be developed, the shelf-life of many agents is short and the methods of delivery have to be large-scale. In 2002–3, medical experts suggested that any bio-terrorist attack was likely to be low-key, spreading an infection such as salmonella or E. coli. Hospitals around the world are speeding up their planned responses to bio-terror attacks. Most worryingly, there is evidence to link biological weapons to the Al Qaeda network. Panic is a major part of the threat, and plague by post causes perhaps the greatest panic of all. Scientists are still more likely than terrorists to make anthrax. A tiny amount only can kill, and inhalation is easy – but the disease is not contagious and, if caught early enough, treatable. Super-terrorism is the use of chemical or biological agents to cause a major disaster, with the death toll in thousands. The September 11 attacks showed that any disaster was plausible, including bioterrorism, forcing people to think the unthinkable. Biological weapons attacks cover a wide area like a nuclear weapon, but are much cheaper. A Domesday scenario would be any attempt to weaponise Ebola with smallpox. In the twenty-first century, experts believe that biological weapons will be the poor man’s nuclear bomb – contrary to all international legal conventions. But then the new terrorists are not inhibited by the need to spare innocents. There are several key threat factors: the actor; the size of the organisation; whether it is hierarchical or a network; intentions in terms of casualties sought; willingness to experiment and

accept failure; and capabilities, including financial, scientific, technical and operational. Terrorists may succeed in causing mass casualties; but only if they understand such issues as availability, ease of handling, fragility, ease of dissemination, susceptibility to the elements and the nature of the target – for example, open air versus enclosed spaces. Two weeks after September 11, anthrax was used for the first time, in letters to New York news teams. Anthrax has numerous advantages over other biological agents. It is cheap, portable and less detectable when used as a biological weapon. Anthrax is more effective when inhaled, rather than ingested through the skin, causing flu-like symptoms and tending to make vital organs break down in the body. Freeze-dried bacteria can be sprayed like powder, and tests were conducted in the 1950s with spraying from planes. Anthrax is not contagious. In 2000, the USA built its own bio-warfare laboratory. All these developments are surpassed by the current stage – characterised by the use of advanced biotechnology and genetic engineering to produce agents that are far more potent, less detectable and easier to spread. Though it depends on the target, in general there is no way to effectively monitor, control or prevent the use of biological weapons. At the time of writing, research is under way to develop technology to detect and destroy biological agents before they cause any harm. See also: Chemical and Biological Weapons; Nuclear Materials: Illicit Trafficking; Terrorism; Weapons of Mass Destruction. Bibliography Buck, K.A. (1989) ‘Super-Terrorism – Biological, Chemical and Nuclear’, Terrorism, Vol. 12, No. 6, pp. 433–34. Cole, L.A. (1997) The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare, New York: W.H. Freeman.

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BreZhnev doctrine

helped the Soviet Army ‘restore order’, introduced the doctrine into Soviet-East European relations – undermining the Warsaw Pact itself, since one member of the Pact had invaded another. The Doctrine also undermined détente with the West, because there was no clear limit on Soviet intervention abroad. The 1968 invasion was followed closely by the Sino-Soviet border conflict, raising the fear in the West that the Doctrine could be used to justify interference in China’s affairs. Not until well after the death of Mao Ze Dong in 1976 did Brezhnev acknowledge that China as a socialist country had no reason to feel threatened by his ‘doctrine of limited sovereignty’. The Doctrine was used to justify the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Even after Brezhnev’s death in 1982, his successors Andropov and Chernenko persisted with the Doctrine, perpetuating the Soviet Union and its hegemony over the Communist bloc. It was left to Mikhail Gorbachev to produce a different policy, offering the West a way to end the Cold War. The Doctrine had been instigated by the Soviet Union for various reasons: to maintain Communism in any socialist state troubled by internal revolt; to protect its security; to respond quickly to challenges to its hegemony in Eastern Europe; and to consolidate the Soviet leaders’ own positions at home by adopting a hard line against liberal tendencies. See also: Afghanistan; Czechoslovakia; Gorbachev Doctrine; Poland; Soviet Union.

Cornish, P. (1997) ‘Sabotage by Sarin: The Threat of Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Intersec, Vol. 7, No. 9, pp. 293–95.

Further Reading Cole, C.A. (1996) ‘The Spectre of Biological Weapons’, Scientific American, Vol. 275, pp. 60–65. Moodie, M. (2001) ‘Response to BioTerror’, The World Today, November, pp. 5–6.

BipolaRiTy This is a situation whose elements tend to cluster around two extreme positions on some scale. In international relations, it describes the tendency for states to group into two opposed blocs or sets, as in the Cold War: the United States and the Soviet Union. All other states were regarded as members of one or other camp, or as committed neutrals. See also: Cold War; United States; Soviet Union. Bibliography Roberts, G.K. (1971) A Dictionary of Political Analysis, London: Longman.

BRezhnev doCTRine The Brezhnev Doctrine was enunciated in July 1968, and its main thesis was that the global socialist community had a legitimate interest in the sovereignty and borders of all Communist states, which had to abide by the norms of Marxism–Leninism as interpreted in Moscow, and reject ‘abstract sovereignty’ in favour of the ‘laws of class struggle’. The Soviet Union now laid down stricter down rules for the ‘socialist commonwealth’ and was firmer in defining the limits of permissible deviation from the Soviet model. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, when Warsaw Pact troops

Bibliography and Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. —— (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin.

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C

CamBodia A former colony, Cambodia was in an unstable situation when the French left in 1953, made worse in the 1960s by spill-over from the war in Vietnam. Prince Sihanouk kept his country out of the Vietnam conflict, but he was overthrown in 1970 by General Lon Nol, who failed to evict Viet Cong guerrillas in eastern Cambodia. In 1975, Pol Pot, leader of the Khmer Rouge, seized power and instituted a vicious regime of reconstruction, relocation and re-education. The Khmer Rouge sought to radically alter society by destroying economic classes and concentrations of capital, outlawing anti-revolutionary ideas, abolishing money and trying to force the nation into line with their own ideology. To do this, the Khmer Rouge executed almost everyone associated with government, business or universities, or with independent ideas. They evacuated the city populations into the countryside, where thousands starved to death. In 1978 Pol Pot was overthrown by the invading Vietnamese, who installed a Communist government in the capital Phnom Penh to rule the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, backed by the Soviet Union. Prince Sihanouk formed an opposition, the United Front, supported by Western nations, the United States and China, and based in the west of the country. The United Nations Security Council was impotent over the Cambodian issue because the permanent members could not agree, while the General Assembly called for foreign forces to withdraw. After

talks between the government and coalition parties, a peace conference was held in 1989. Vietnamese forces withdrew and negotiations continued, as did the fighting until the UN deployed its Advanced Mission in late 1991. In October 1991, after a decade of UN-inspired negotiations, a comprehensive political settlement was signed in Paris. It set up a transitional authority whose tasks included verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces and supervising the ceasefire, demobilisation, weapons control and mine clearance. It completed its work in 1993, when elections took place. A coalition government was elected, and Prince Sihanouk was appointed as King of Cambodia, but the new government was plagued by corruption and the army made little headway against the Khmer Rouge guerrillas. These fighters soon split into factions after the government made overtures for peace. There was also fighting between forces loyal to the two joint prime ministers after one of them, Norodom Ranariddh, wished to bring the remaining Khmer Rouge guerrillas into his part of the army, much disputed by the other prime minister, Hun Sen. In December 1998 the last guerrillas surrendered and were integrated into the army. In 1999, Cambodia joined ASEAN, mainly to make it easier to export its raw materials. In 2002 the first local elections were held, and in 2003 Cambodia joined the World Trade Organisation. This showed just how far the country had regained its respectability. The Communist victory in 1975 showed 30

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that even a small country like Cambodia, on the periphery of international activity, still found it very difficult to withdraw from the international system – very much as Burma (Myanmar) and Albania had tried to do. The disaster of the Khmer Rouge and their ultimate demise showed that the destruction of wealth does nothing to meet the basic needs of poor people. In the end, Cambodia proved a substantial peacekeeping and peace-building success for the United Nations. See also: Indo-China, 1945–54; Domino Theory; Vietnam War.

peace treaty based on this agreement was signed in Washington in 1979. See also: Israel: Security Issues; Palestine. Bibliography and Further Reading Goldstein, J.S. (1999) International Relations, 3rd edn, New York: Longman.

CenTRal ameRiCa For many decades Central America was riven by conflict, with many states ruled by military dictators or juntas. Internal strife was endemic, and there were civil wars in Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador. The Panama Canal has long been an area of strategic concern, especially since Panama has always been relatively unstable, and embroiled in drugs scandals since the 1980s. There has been an American military presence, mainly in Panama (for strategic reasons) and Honduras (to keep an eye on developments in Nicaragua). An Organisation of Central American States was created in 1951 by the Charter of San Salvador, but achieved little. A revised Charter in 1962 made little difference. During the Cold War there was constant concern in the West that other countries could follow Cuba and join the Communist fold. This possibility was certainly seen in the United States as a threat to the whole American continent. The Organisation of American States, dominated by the USA, issued proposals and made declarations about the need for people to live in peace. Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua were beset by guerrilla war and counter-insurgency campaigns. The violence was fuelled by drugs cartels, by a period of Marxist rule in Nicaragua and by the struggle to control vital crops such as coffee in El Salvador and bananas in Guatemala, which in turn sparked a border war with the former British colony

Bibliography Leifer, M. (1989) ‘Cambodian Conflict – The Final Phase?’, Conflict Studies, No. 221, London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies. Van der Kroef, J.M. (1986) ‘Dynamics of the Cambodian Conflict’, Conflict Studies, No. 183, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

Further Reading Chandler, D.P. (1991) The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution since 1945, New Haven CT: Yale University Press.

Camp david agReemenT, 1978 This was an accord between Egypt’s President Sadat and Israel’s Prime Minister, Begin, promoting a Middle East settlement. President Carter acted as mediator in the meetings at Camp David, the US president’s Maryland retreat. The agreement provided for the signing of a treaty within three months, the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations, a phased Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, demilitarised security zones along the frontier and a degree of Palestinian autonomy in Jordan’s West Bank within five years. A 31

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of Belize. There was also endemic peasant unrest in the region owing to low wages, high land rents and periods of repression against rural workers. In Nicaragua the violence was protracted by the Contra rebels (counterrevolutionary guerrilla forces) fighting the left-wing Sandinista government, which redistributed land and promoted education and health services. The fighting became so intense that aid to the Contras became the focus for American political conflict over US policy in Central America. The USA gave covert aid through the CIA, and many people in the USA viewed the Contras as freedom fighters. Despite a stalemate, the civil war lasted until a coalition unexpectedly defeated the Sandinistas in the 1990 elections. Certain Contra factions agreed ceasefires and disarmament in 1990 and 1994. The country, governed by liberal-minded coalitions, struggled to recover from war. In 2006 Daniel Ortega (President, 1984–90) was re-elected President of a Sandinista government to deal with poverty, foreign debt and rising fuel prices. See also: Belize.

border areas of traditional instability such as Afghanistan, Iran and Nepal. Interethnic and inter-religious conflicts are commonplace. Indeed, the new generation of terrorists are driven by a mixture of nationalist and religious hate, rather than purely political aims, and are well supplied with propaganda and finance. Rival groups in the Caucasus are fuelled by gangsterism, which sets criminals of one national minority against another in organised crime. There has been ethnic or separatist violence in Abkhasia, Ossetia and Ingushetia, as well as clashes between Chechnya and Dagestan and in 2008 a brief local war between Georgia and Russia. Central Asia is rich in natural resources, causing conflict in Tajikistan between new elites and regional clans, each of which wants power and riches. Outside intervention could inflame the situation, and internal conflicts are proving hard to resolve. So too are linguistic conflicts and struggles for autonomy, as in Kashmir or Tibet, and these in turn are adjacent to the HinduMuslim struggle. Both regions have acquired new strategic significance, in part because of the war on terrorism. Russia has tried to regain its primacy among fragile former Soviet republics, partly to boost its economy by enlarging its market. President Vladimir Putin (from 2008, Prime Minister) has also been responsible for an increasingly assertive and neo-imperialist foreign policy in the Kremlin. The USA has gained a strategic foothold in both regions, being keen to protect the oil pipeline it financed in the 1990s, running from Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey. The United States has pledged to hold joint military exercises with Azerbaijan and protect its border, and is also co-operating with Armenia, Russia’s closest partner in the Caucasus. Russia has outlined plans to increase its armed forces around the Caspian Sea, where both powers are keen to secure oildrilling platforms.

Bibliography Blakemore, H. (1984) ‘Central American Crisis: Challenge to US Diplomacy’, Conflict Studies, Supplement, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. Landau, S. (1993) The Guerrilla Wars of Central America: Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, New York: St Martin’s Press and Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Further Reading Schooley, H. (1987) Conflict in Central America, Harlow, Essex: Longman.

CenTRal asia and CauCasus Most of the states in these two regions, such as Kazakhstan and Georgia, were formerly republics of the Soviet Union and they 32

cFe (conventional Forces in euroPe) treaty,

Drug trafficking is an intractable problem. Since 2000, drug routes northwards from Iran and Pakistan into Central Asia have been opening up. There is evidence that a drug route into Tajikistan has been used to smuggle uranium and other dangerous contraband towards Pakistan. Drugs are even harder to control because of the endemic corruption of political and military elites who are supposedly trying to stem the narcotics trade. When the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1994, there were fears that they would sweep northwards into Tajikistan, intensifying endemic civil unrest there and elsewhere, which had spread from Afghanistan. Islamic movements reasserted themselves. The Muslim Brotherhood had committed followers right across the region, the Central Asia family of brotherhood stretching from Turkey across Muslim Central Asia into Xingjiang in China. Al Qaeda drew on the Muslim Brotherhood’s members, structures and experience. From Afghanistan, Al Qaeda was able to recruit several hundred Central Asians: Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrghyz, Tajik and Turkmen. Al Qaeda supported the Tajik Islamists’ struggle to topple the Russian-backed Communist government. The threat from Muslim groups, such as the Muslim Union of Uzbekistan, was used by Central Asian states to secure more funding from Western donors. In the aftermath of the defeat of the Taliban it is feared that some Al Qaeda fighters may have retreated to Central Asia to team up with Al Qaeda-trained associate members; who have built a proIslamic network linking the key Islamist groups in the region. Many Central Asian nations provided assistance to the Northern Alliance to keep the Taliban pinned down in a guerrilla struggle during their years in power. Any Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan could spread or cause a renewal of discord in Central Asia.

1990

See also: Chechnya; Dagestan. Bibliography Hyman, A. (1994) ‘Power and Politics in Central Asia’s New Republics’, Conflict Studies, No. 273, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Mandelbaum, M. (ed.) (1994) Central Asia and the World, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Panico, C. (1995) ‘Conflicts in the Caucasus: Russia’s War in Chechnya’, Conflict Studies, No. 281, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Gunaratna, R. (2002) Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, London: C. Hurst & Co. Siegel, J. (2002) Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia, London: I.B. Tauris and Co.

CenTRal inTelligenCe agenCy see Cia CenTRal TReaTy oRganisaTion (CenTo) This was a mutual defence alliance between the United Kingdom, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. It succeeded the Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955, whose goals had been military, economic and social co-operation in the Middle East. CENTO’s object was also military co-operation and economic development, but it came to be seen as an anti-Soviet military alliance. It ended in 1964. Bibliography Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

Cfe (ConvenTional foRCes in euRope) TReaTy, 1990 In early 1989, a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 33

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(CSCE) agreed to restart conventional (non-nuclear) stability discussions. These became the Conventional Forces in Europe talks, which ran alongside a Conference on Disarmament in Europe organised by the CSCE states to discuss confidence and security-building. During the talks, the Berlin Wall was breached and the Communist governments in Eastern Europe collapsed. Two major agreements were reached in Paris in November 1990 between the leaders of France, UK, USA and USSR, effectively ending the Cold War in Europe. The CFE Treaty was pro-Western in effect, ending Soviet dominance in conventional weapons in Europe. Limits were agreed on the armament of the two sides, each alliance having up to 20,000 tanks with no single state having more than 13,300. The CSE states agreed a declaration on individual rights that guaranteed greater democratic freedoms. See also: SALT; START.

mans, and as punishment half a million Chechens were deported to Kazakhstan in Central Asia. In 1956, after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev allowed them to return but many had died during the forced migration, which added to the legacy of distrust in Chechen-Russian relations. As soon as the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Chechens demanded their independence. Following the failed Soviet Communist coup in August 1991, the Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev announced his intentions of independence. The old Chechen Inguish republic was dissolved and replaced by two separate states: Chechnya and Ingushetia. The Inguish decided to remain in the Russian Federation. Russia refused categorically to accept Chechen independence, because it challenged the stability of Russia and would have made it hard for Russia to defend its new boundaries. Chechnya had large oil and gas reserves, and an independent Chechnya could lead to other republics seeking independence. In December 1994 the Russians invaded; the capital of Grozny witnessed five weeks of house-to-house fighting and was virtually destroyed. Many Chechens continued to fight a guerrilla campaign from mountain strongholds in the Caucasus. The Russians declared victory in July 1996 but the following month the Chechens, commanded by Aslan Maskhadov, retook most of the city. A ceasefire was negotiated on President Yeltsin’s orders and under the agreement the Russian troops left Chechnya in January 1997. Despite peace, Chechnya’s status was left vague: Chechens believed it was independent, whereas the Russians insisted that Chechnya was still part of the Russian Federation. The rest of the world held back, especially the United States, which did not wish to halt the Russian transition to a post-Communist economy. Not wanting

Bibliography and Further Reading McCauley, M. (2004) Russia, America and the Cold War, 2nd edn, Harlow, Essex: Pearson/Longman.

CheChnya In any state the process of national integration is continuous and, unless it is guided, it is always susceptible to disintegration. A classic example was the rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union after the Cold War, when Russia had to fight a bloody war against Chechen rebels from December 1994 to August 1996 and again from 1999 to 2000. Chechens have a reputation of being the prime movers in organised crime networks that have been active over all former Soviet territory since the late 1990s. Some thought they had every reason to take up such activity: during the Second World War, Stalin accused the Chechens of having collaborated with the invading Ger34

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to offend Russia, no country recognised Chechnya: it was labelled an internal Russian problem. Within Russia, some politicians hinted that they would not mind an independent Chechnya; others, nationalists and ex-Communists, wanted it to be retaken. Chechnya seemed in Russian eyes a ‘gangster culture’ run by ‘bandits’. The Chechen government by the late 1990s was trying to bring about a Muslim revival, spiritually and morally, which worried the Russians greatly and perhaps other nations to a lesser extent. In August 1999, Vladimir Putin became Russia’s Prime Minister and in 2000 President and policy towards Chechnya changed. In 1999 Islamic secessionist guerrillas were trying to create an Islamic state in Chechnya: they had entered from Dagestan and declared the border region an Islamic area. The Russians, determined to keep Chechnya in the Federation, launched another attack on Grozny (1999–2000): as in the first war, house-to-house fighting and massive destruction ended with the guerrillas moving into the mountains to fight. Amid allegations of gross human rights abuses, the fighting continued into 2001. After the 9/11 attacks, the Russians began to call the war an ‘anti-terrorist operation’ against Islamic extremists linked to Al Qaeda. As in the first Chechen war, the rebels launched bomb attacks in Moscow, and on transport and pipelines in the Federation. Following the rebels’ seizure of a Moscow cinema full of 800 civilians, 100 people died from disabling gas used to end the siege. In 2003, a referendum gave Chechnya the status of a republic within the Russian Federation, but the rebels vowed to fight on. Control over oil has continued to fuel conflict in the wider Caucasus region and this has made Russia even more determined to maintain its control over Chechnya and its neighbours. See also: Central Asia and Caucasus; Dagestan.

Bibliography Gall, C. and de Waal, T. (1998) Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, New York: New York University Press. Mandelbaum, M. (ed.) (1994) Central Asia and the World, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Panico, C. (1995) ‘Conflicts in the Caucasus: Russia’s War in Chechnya’, Conflict Studies, No. 281, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Hoffman, S. (1998) World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post Cold War Era, London: Rowman & Littlefield. Siegel, J. (2002) Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia, London: I.B. Tauris & Co.

ChemiCal and BiologiCal weapons In March 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo sect made an attack on the Tokyo subway system. A chemical gas was released, which killed 12 people and injured over 5,500. It was the first use of chemical weapons on a large scale in a major urban area and raised fears that covert attacks by other groups around the world could inaugurate a new dimension of international terrorism. Chemical-biological weapons are highly toxic, so smaller quantities of agent are needed and this reduces the cost and complexity of producing or otherwise acquiring them. They are not easily detected by traditional anti-terrorist sensor systems. An attack using chemical weapons, generally less destructive, could still cause thousands of casualties. Chemical agents are more easily available commercially or by theft from military or commercial stockpiles. Such attacks could be made by a truck or car equipped with a cheap commercial aeroliser, by a ship equipped with powerful pressurised aerosol generators, or by an aircraft operating in crop-duster 35

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fashion, scattering chemical-biological agents over a wide area. There have been reports of state-sponsored plans to use chemical-biological agents in terrorist attacks on Western targets. For example, there were reported plans by Iraq during the Gulf War to use chemical and bacteriological (CB) bombs against targets in Europe. Insurgent groups have threatened to contaminate export products of a country with which they are in conflict, to damage the economy and draw attention to their cause, for instance Sri Lankan tea producers. Insurgent groups have also threatened or attempted to use chemical-biological agents in the course of open, armed conflict with a government, as in threats by Chechen separatists in the mid-1990s to use chemical and bacteriological weapons on Russian territory. Attempts have been made to assassinate political activists, dissidents or other perceived opponents by the use of chemical and biological agents: notably the use of a ricin-tipped umbrella weapon in the assassination of the Bulgarian defector Georgi Markov in London in September 1978. In the so-called new world order, it is possible that the use of chemical and biological agents will increase. Such weapons have been used in Third World conflicts, despite international prohibitions. Interethnic conflicts and those motivated by religious fundamentalism have become increasingly vicious, with fewer humanitarian constraints. There have also been more and more conflicts between Western powers and smaller states, and these weapons might be used in asymmetric warfare. Since the early 1960s, many multilateral arms limitation treaties have been negotiated, some by the United Nations, that cover chemical and biological weapons, including the 1968 Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling

and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. Such weapons and others equally lethal, referred to as weapons of mass destruction, have an impact on current and future conflict patterns. See also: Bio-terrorism. Bibliography Purver, R. (1997) ‘Chemical and Biological Terrorism: New Threat to Public Safety’, Conflict Studies, No. 295, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Woods, N. (ed.) (1996) Explaining International Relations since 1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further Reading Barnaby, F. (1990) Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Growing Threat in the 1990s, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Child soldieRs One of the most horrific aspects of terrorism is the use of children (those aged under 18) as combatants, in some cases after being kidnapped. They carry supplies and equipment, serve as human mine detectors, undertake suicide missions or act as messengers. They tend to suffer high casualties, and later turn to crime as they have known no other life. Some Palestinians exhort their children to the love of holy war. Some children grow up to be terrorists because their parents are terrorists and they often die brutal deaths. Child soldiers have fought as paramilitaries in Algeria, Colombia, East Timor, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Yugoslavia. They have been a part of the governmentarmed forces of Burundi, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Myanmar and Uganda. As members of armed opposition groups, children have fought in the Congo, Lebanon, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 36

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Peru, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Turkey and Uzbekistan.

nate the left. He did not hand over power to a civilian government until 1989. See also: CIA; Junta; Latin America.

Bibliography Bibliography

Hansen, B. (2001) ‘Children in Crisis’, Congressional Quarterly Researcher, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 657–80. Human Rights Watch (2001) Children’s Rights – Human Rights Developments, London: Human Rights Watch, World Report.

Ciment, J. and Hill, K. (eds) (1999) Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, Vols I–II, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn. Kaufman, E. (1988) Crisis in Allende’s Chile: New Perspectives, New York: Praeger.

China From the October 1949 revolution through to 1976 the leadership, domestic policies and foreign policies of Mao Ze Dong were paramount. Throughout his life, he stressed the need for rural rather than urban-based revolutions in Asia. to reduce the differences, and for perpetual revolution, to prevent the emergence of new elites. He helped precipitate the SinoSoviet split in 1960 and strongly supported a non-aligned Third World strategy. His Maoist ideology was diametrically opposed to the capitalist (industrial) stage propounded by Marx. Since that time, national leaders have produced a broader view of China’s position in the world. Two forces have dominated China’s politics: a national force developed out of China’s own long history and an ideological force of Marxism–Leninism–Maoism. The infusion of communist ideology has reshaped China’s self-perception and her image abroad. China’s world outlook has been conditioned by her soul, whose pride was seared in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by exploitation, humiliation and oppression. The modern three-world theory of global politics is the industrialised West, the Soviet bloc and the developing world. In the Chinese theory, the first world is the imperial world of the Soviet Union and the United States, the second comprises all other developed states and the third world is the developing nations, with China as the inspirational leader.

Chile, 1973 Coup From 1945 to 1970 Chile was dominated by conservative governments. Then Salvador Allende became the first democratically elected Marxist head of state in the world. He governed in a coalition of left-wing parties, which nationalised large private companies, including US-owned copper mines. Allende promised social justice by constitutional means, but this was slow to materialise, and US aid and investment dried up. Right-wing politicians, frustrated by Allende’s popular support, established an alliance with the generals. They received aid and support from the United States through the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). Civil–military relations had been co-operative, but now broke down. At the same time there was a general shortage of goods and rapid inflation. On 11 September 1973, there was a military coup d’état. During the fighting and bombing Allende died, possibly by suicide. The aftermath of the coup represented one of the bloodiest purges in twentiethcentury Latin America, though it was replicated in Argentina in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Violent repression ensued and people were shot without trial, sent to concentration camps or simply ‘disappeared’. A key figure in the military and one of the chiefs of staff, General Augusto Pinochet took over the reins of power and oversaw this ‘reign of terror’ in an attempt to elimi37

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However, since 1980 the Chinese have leaned more to the West while trying to combine self-reliance and neutralism. China realises that relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union is vital to the regional environment needed for China to succeed in its long-term ‘four modernisations’ policy for agriculture, defence, science and technology. Priorities for China include defence against external military attack and the domination and reintegration of outlying and alienated territories (Tibet, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Hong Kong). The Chinese also wish to incorporate Taiwan and prevent foreign interference in Chinese domestic affairs. Over the last two decades they have aimed to regain international respect and a leading role in regional and international affairs. China is keen on developing relations with the United States, since both have much to gain from a warmer relationship, not least from the growth in commerce, for example, trading Chinese natural resources for American technology and goods. This opening to the West is vital to China’s economic modernisation. If this is not achieved rapidly, the opponents of reform and opening up (gaige kaifang) will win. The Chinese image of the United States has changed from that of a mortal foe to a friend of whom to be wary. Tension between China and the Soviet Union was less about ideology than geopolitical strategy and balance of conventional forces. Relations with the Soviet Union benefited from American perfidy, just as relations with the United States profited from Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and expansion in the Pacific. The main difference between the West and China has been attitudes to revolutionary movements in the Third World. Relations between China and Japan have been built on mutual respect in recent times. Japan is one of the principal economic investors in China, which has seen

this as almost entirely beneficial. In the Chinese view, Japan has moved from the position of imperial conqueror (in the 1930s) to one of natural and accessible trading partner. China is rapidly becoming one of the chief global economic powers. With its military power, it can defend its own territory against virtually any assault, but its army is ill-equipped compared with that of the United States when it comes to offensive action. In 2003 it became the third country to send a spaceship carrying humans into orbit. China has been under pressure to improve its human rights record; the award of the 2008 Olympic Games implied that progress has been made. In the debate over climate change, the spotlight is on China to cut down its carbon and greenhouse gas emissions. See also: Sino-Indian War; Sino-Soviet Conflict.; Spratly and Paracel Islands; Taiwan. Bibliography Fairbank, J.K. (1992) China: A New History, Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. King, P. and Kibata, Y. (1996) Peace Building in the Asia Pacific Region, London: Allen & Unwin. Liu, Pin-yen (1990) China’s Crisis, China’s Hope, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Pepper, S. (1978) Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945–1949, Berkeley CA: University of California Press. Spence, J. (1990) The Search for Modern China, New York: Norton, and London: Hutchinson.

Further Reading Hsu, I.C.Y. (1999) The Rise of Modern China, 6th edn, New York: Oxford University Press. McGrew, A. and Brook, C. (eds) (1998) AsiaPacific in the New World Order, London:

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major nuclear powers have put more effort into seeking security, by developing weapons to deter an attack. Since the end of the Cold War, civil defence has moved from protection against nuclear confrontation to protection against natural disasters and terrorist attacks in urban areas, especially since 11 September 2001. See also: Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear Strikes.

Routledge, in association with the Open University. Mu, Yi and Thompson, M.V. (1990) Crisis at Tiananmen: Reform and Reality in Modern China, San Francisco CA: China Books.

Cia (CenTRal inTelligenCe agenCy) The USA established the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, for use overseas in the Cold War. It supported the Bay of Pigs invasion against the regime of President Castro of Cuba in 1961, worked effectively in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, was behind the coup against the Marxist President Allende of Chile in 1973 and was involved in the restoration of the Shah of Iran in 1983. Some of its intelligence gathering was not very effective – for example, prior to the 1989 American invasion of Panama, the Gulf War, 1991 and the Gulf War, 2003, when it was controversially embroiled in the issue of Iraq and its ‘ownership’ of weapons of mass destruction.

Civil disoBedienCe Civil disobedience is a non-violent means of protest or to achieve political ends, such as a refusal to obey laws or pay taxes. It is considered permissible if it is taken for some higher moral purpose. There was civil disobedience in response to the massacre at the village of My Lai in Vietnam in 1968 by American troops, which violated the army regulations of the United States and also global opinions of what was right and wrong. The success of civil disobedience is measured by how far it prevents or delays the judicial process. In totalitarian states, civil disobedience might seem unthinkable as a strategy of political action because it is halted, often brutally, as soon as it is attempted. Despite that, it has been tried in many countries since 1945: Poland 1953 and 1981, Czechoslovakia 1968, Nepal 2005, Myanmar at regular intervals since the 1990s, Venezuela 2004 and intermittently during the troubles in Northern Ireland. When the My Lai massacre (March 1968) became public in November 1969, it fuelled outrage among the anti-war movement, which demanded withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam, and more draftees filed for conscientious objector status. The attitude of the general public also changed. People who had taken no interest in debates on peace/war began to analyse issues more closely. Horrific stories of

Bibliography Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

Civil defenCe Generally, civil defence is the organising of civilians to deal with enemy attacks. The idea is to protect civilians, maintain key services, preserve law and order, and support a nation’s war effort. Shelters may be built, food and medicines stocked, emergency communications and transport provided. Since the 1970s there have been civil defence programmes to protect against nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons of mass destruction. Two neutral states, Sweden and Switzerland, have put much effort into developing programmes of this kind, including nuclear bunker provision for all citizens. The 39

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other soldiers began to be taken more seriously and other abuses came to light. My Lai caused outrage around the world against the Vietnam War and reduced US support at home for the War. See also: Czechoslovakia; Governments and Conflict and Crisis Management; Northern Ireland; Poland.

movement came into existence to enforce rights guaranteed by the constitution but, through historical and political circumstances, denied to blacks. The Civil Rights Act of the 1960s contained provisions against discrimination in the United States. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and Eastern European governments suppressed such movements as being subversive and anti-socialist. This caused much tension with the West. In these Communist states, rights were supposedly guaranteed under written constitutions or by virtue of the Helsinki Accords of 1975. In Northern Ireland, civil rights movements had the appearance and reality of front organisations for dubious political activity. See also: Civil Disobedience; Helsinki Accords; Northern Ireland; United States.

Civil–miliTaRy RelaTions This is the study of the political and social influences on, and effects of, the armed forces in society. Such relations include the political control of the armed forces; the role of military officers as an elite in the polity; the armed forces as an interest group with potential influence on policy; the active intervention of the armed forces in forming and changing governments and regimes; the military as a development agency; and the effects of war on the political order of society. See also: Governments and Conflict and Crisis Management; Junta.

Bibliography and Further Reading Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press.

Bibliography Civil waR Defined as ‘war between belligerent factions seeking by organised violence to acquire a monopoly of force and political power in a state’, civil war is feared by most countries. It is by definition divisive and by its nature it channels energies and resources inwards, to the detriment of trade, state development and international relations. It is extremely destructive, not just physically, but (more important) morally, creating deep divisions within society, which may take generations to repair. It invariably creates a political vacuum when the rival centres of authority emerge, and this invites foreign interference, which may be difficult to shake off once the war is over. In short, civil war threatens the independence of the state and tears its fabric apart. Civil war means armed hostilities between two or more sections of society,

Diamond, L. and Plattner, M.E. (eds) (1996) Civil–Military Relations and Democracy, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Hinde, R.A. (ed.) (1992) The Institution of War, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.

Further Reading Snow, D.M. (1996) Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts, Boulder CO: Rienner.

Civil RighTs Civil rights are the personal rights of the individual citizen, in most countries upheld by law. If civil rights are constantly ignored, citizens may feel empowered to assert or obtain them, with the possibility of a civil war. In the United States the civil rights 40

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each possessing its own political organisations and each claiming the right to rule the society or, in the case of one group, the right to rule themselves. It is these claims to political power and legitimacy on the part of the insurgents that distinguish a civil war from a rebellion; and civil war is distinguished from revolution by the approximate balance of forces on each side, though a revolution can precede, accompany or follow a civil war. It is hard objectively to determine a boundary between different kinds of nontraditional hostilities: wanton destruction and death caused by terrorists, a guerrilla war (sometimes called low-intensity conflict) pursued by young national liberation movements, and a civil war fought by mature, stronger, national liberation movements. Yet in each case the actor using military capabilities as a tool or potential tool of violence is not a state. What all these non-traditional hostilities have in common is that two or more national actors – usually one state actor and one or more non-state actors, though the latter may be receiving support from abroad – are fighting for control of a state. The distinctions between war and peace have been blurred; but whether we call the absence of peace a civil war, revolutionary war, liberation war, religious or ideological revolt, or terrorism may depend more on our sympathies than on the facts. Since 1945, state authority has been challenged more often from inside the state than from outside. However, civil wars rarely lack an international dimension, either because one of the belligerents receives support from abroad or because an external actor has an interest in the outcome of the war. During the twentieth century ideology, economics, power and religion have internationalised virtually every civil war. Civil wars occupy a curious place in any typology of wars and violence. On one hand, they are often excessively violent.

Because of this, civil wars have been condemned as needless and senseless destroyers of life and property. On the other hand, civil wars have been defended as the last recourse against corrupt, outdated or unyielding social systems and governments. The world is divided into ‘states’ – geographical entities containing persons ruled by a recognised form of central authority, which enjoys at least a degree of independent decision-making – and each contains within its boundaries the seeds of conflict. The population is unlikely to be completely homogeneous, particularly if the borders of the state reflect the arbitrary decisions of outside powers (as with so many former colonies in the Third World) or result from a history of expansion by conquest. Thus there will always be groups within the state who do not owe natural allegiance to the central authority, preferring the traditions and beliefs of their own ethnic, tribal or religious background and this may lead to accusations of their disloyalty, as well as government-sponsored attempts to persuade or force them into conformity. Similar divisions may result from an uneven spread of wealth or power within the state. Some areas may be starved of resources and grow resentful of other, more favoured regions; other areas may hold a monopoly of a scarce resource and be loath to share their advantage with the rest of society unless they are given a corresponding monopoly of political power. In some states these divisions may be controlled by a strong central government, which exercises its power by means of accepted forms of democracy or effective totalitarian repression, but even then the potential for internal conflict remains. In extreme cases it may be manifested in the creation of an entirely new state through the secession of the disaffected areas. In 1971, for example, Bangladesh seceded from West Pakistan, with aid from India, 41

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after years of being treated as a ‘poor relation’ by the central authorities in Islamabad. However, the more common result is civil war. Civil wars have affected many states, but they have increased in number and importance since 1945. In part this is simply because the number of independent states in existence, and thus susceptible to civil war, has more than tripled after European decolonisation. The division of much of the world into rival ideological camps has pitted communism against capitalism in even the most sophisticated states, deepening existing political divides, sometimes to the point of violence. Improved communications have shown people that other groups have attained a much higher level of economic or political development, leading them to question government policies and drift towards conflict. Such groups may, of course, be exploited by outside powers. Many of the more intractable and longlasting conflicts since 1945 bear the hallmarks of civil war, even though they are not normally described as such. The Vietnam War was fought mainly by members of the same Vietnamese culture and, until the intervention of the USA and North Vietnamese forces, the combatants came from within the same state. In Northern Ireland, the ‘troubles’ of the 1970s and 1980s often seemed a species of civil war, with the British Army almost an outside force. Looking at the specific causes of civil wars since 1945, it is clear that the ideological clash between communism and capitalism has had a dramatic impact. It has been the direct cause of two of the most significant civil wars of the period, albeit with different results. Although the 1946– 49 war in China had its origins in the political chaos that had beset the country since the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, the communists under Mao Ze Dong

took the offensive to destroy the Westernorientated government of Chiang KaiShek; in the end the communists prevailed. A similar clash of ideologies fuelled the civil war in Greece in 1945–49, with the communist-led Democratic Army fighting the Nationalist government; in this case it was the Nationalists who won, not least because of Western commitment to their cause. The fact that events in Greece almost led to a general confrontation between the rival camps of East and West undoubtedly muted the direct support that the superpowers offered to factions in subsequent civil wars. This did not mean that ideology was no longer important, merely that the superpowers have been more circumspect, preferring subversion to open battle and using proxies to provide aid. Events in Angola in 1975 illustrate the point, with the communist insurgents receiving arms, advisers and equipment from the Cubans rather than the Russians in their struggle to defeat the South African-backed and CIA-funded forces of the pro-Western insurgents. In many cases, it is still local issues which cause civil wars. In Nigeria, for example, the civil war of 1967–70 had its origins among the Ibo tribe of Biafra, who felt that the federal government in Lagos was actively discriminating against them. Similarly in Chad after 1968, the tribes of the northern and eastern provinces, convinced that their rivals from the south and west were enjoying a monopoly of political power, revolted under the banner of Frolinat (the National Liberation Front of Chad) and began a civil war which has yet to be completely resolved. In Sudan a civil war lasted from the independence in 1956 until a partial reconciliation in 1972, between the Christian and animist inhabitants of the south and the Muslim-dominated government in Khartoum. The Lebanese Civil War of 1975–76 had its 42

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roots in the inevitable clash between the Maronite Christians of the governing elite and the disaffected Muslim majority. If the causes of civil wars are very varied, the results are often predictable. Although the superpowers may be deterred from giving direct support, few civil wars since 1945 have remained self-contained. In an interdependent world, beset by ideological and resource rivalry, too much is at stake for outside forces to stand aside. Their interference often decides the longevity or outcome of internal squabbles. The civil war in North Yemen was sustained by Egypt supporting the republicans while Saudi Arabia backed the monarchists; in Lebanon, Syrian and Israeli intervention fuelled the rivalries of 1975–76; in Chad it was the French and Libyans who offered aid. In each of these cases, intervening states stood to make substantial gains if their chosen allies won. For instance, the French sent troops to Chad to protect their valuable stake in its mineral resources. Such intervention makes a peaceful or lasting solution extremely difficult. Local issues disappear beneath wider pressures, the violence increases with more sophisticated weapons or more troops, and the fighting drags on until there is a stalemate (as in North Yemen and Sudan) or victory for the faction with the more effective outside support (as in Greece, Nigeria and Angola). This pattern will continue. In any civil war there are political, economic and personal incentives for violence. Civil wars are not just about incompatible identity, ancient hatreds or opportunities. Some violence may have a rational basis, and the contesting sides may be making rational decisions, even when others believe it is pointless to carry on. Leaders and their personal interests, problems of decision making, inability to assess military progress and the efficacy of continued combat all play a role in continuing the war.

Ongoing civil wars, unresolved internal disputes and areas of major internal unrest at the time of writing include those in Algeria, Congo, Georgia, Indonesia, Kashmir, Somalia and Sudan (Darfur). See also: Civil–Military Relations; Civil Disobedience. Bibliography Alexander, M. (2001) ‘The Global Civil War’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 6 (December), pp. 12–15. Brown, M.E. (ed.) (1996) The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. King, C. (1997) ‘Ending Civil Wars’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper, No. 308, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Snow, D.M. (1996) Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts, Boulder CO: Rienner.

Further Reading Bell, J. Bowyer (1985) ‘Terrorism and the Eruption of Wars’ in Merari, A. (ed.) On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism, Frederick MD: University Publications of America, pp. 41–53. Zartman, W. (ed.) (1995) Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, Washington DC: Brookings Institute.

ClimaTe Change: seCuRiTy issues Changes to the Earth’s climate are creating new anxiety. Apart from meteorological, geographical and scientific considerations, climate changes have impinged on strategic relations between states since the Second World War. Climatic perversity has on occasions been linked to dogged national resistance. The winter of 1946–47 was one of the coldest on record, triggering the coal crisis in the United Kingdom, causing doubts about a British military mission intervening in the civil war in Greece and slowing 43

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the economic recovery of Germany. In the Soviet Union, the intense cold followed a drought, and it may be no coincidence that the Cold War began that winter. Some observers argued that Russia needed obstinacy abroad and militancy at home to harden people’s resolve, because the adverse weather was making recovery from the material and social devastation of war all the more protracted. Global temperature trends also influenced regional policy. Russia had less use of the Northern Sea route to the Pacific through the Bering Straits, and there were cod wars between Britain and Iceland. Shoals of cod were smaller, perhaps because of changes in sea temperature balancing the cold East Greenland Current and the warm North Atlantic drift. There were shifts in climatic zone in the Sahel, that part of sub-Saharan Africa where desert becomes savanna. Summer rains receded in the area where Black Africa and the Arab world meet, and often conflict. The drought aggravated political tensions, from Mauritania through Chad and Nigeria to Sudan and Ethiopia. In the Soviet Union, recurrent shortfalls in rain held back the virgin lands drive, which Nikita Khrushchev had launched in 1954 to increase grain production. A decade later, repeated failure of the harvest was one reason for Khrushchev’s fall from power. China had similar grain crises between 1959 and 1961, as a succession of droughts interspersed with sudden floods hit hard. The Chinese had to purchase grain from Canada and Australia. The embarrassed Chinese tended to blame uneven regional distribution for the crisis. The impact of climate change tends to be greatest on people in marginal situations geographically, climatically, or politically (losing control internally or under threat of defeat externally). Ecological disruption has become more widespread and increasingly interacts with sources of insta-

1975–76

bility, control of arms, terrorism and social cohesion. From the 1980s onwards, concern grew about rises in mean air temperature, the prevalence of droughts in many parts of the world and depletion of the stratospheric ozone by chlorofluorocarbons. Any rise in temperature, even of one or two degrees, is likely to pose serious problems for the world. Some observers believe that, unless we can relieve the acute stress posed by global warming, there can be no secure peace and freedom. Yet, even with globalisation, there are acute political divisions that make a global survival strategy hard to agree and harder to achieve. Even in wilderness areas such as the Arctic and Antarctic, there are alarming signs of global warming; yet only fifty or so years ago nations had to be persuaded not to have nuclear tests in such places. Politicians, strategists and environmentalists have a wide range of opinions, with very little sign of long-term agreement. See also: Resources and Conflicts; Environmental and Ecological Security. Bibliography Brown, N. (1994) ‘Climate Change: A Threat to Peace’, Conflict Studies, No. 272, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Watt, D.C., Spencer, F. and Brown, N. (1968) A History of the World in the Twentieth Century, New York: William Morrow.

Further Reading Brown, N. (1992) The Strategic Revolution, London: Brassey’s.

Cod waR, 1975–76 Iceland and the United Kingdom had minor clashes in 1958 and 1972, but in 1975–76 Iceland sent gunboats to protect the home fisheries, while the UK sent in the Royal Navy to protect its fishing fleet. Iceland sought to safeguard fish stocks by extending its fishing limits to 44

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12 miles offshore in 1958, then 50 miles in 1972 – in both cases Britain was forced to accept limits on its catches – and finally to 200 miles in 1975. Iceland had six gunboats and two coastguard vessels; Britain deployed over twenty frigates – nine on duty at any one time. Shots were fired, but most clashes were bluff or double-bluff, the Icelanders’ intention being to make British trawlers pull in their nets and go home. Royal Navy frigates and ocean-going tugs tried to stop this happening, and collisions between gunboats and frigates became more frequent. Talks to end the dispute failed, but after seven months Iceland threatened to close down the NATO base at Keflavik, which was vital in the Cold War. The United States found this unacceptable and put pressure on the United Kingdom, which withdrew its forces. The British fishing fleet in Icelandic waters was cut by half as a result of an agreement signed in June 1976. By that time the UK was developing the North Sea oilfields, and decided to protect them by extending its own limit to 200 miles. At the time this helped to offset the loss of fishing grounds off Iceland. See also: Resources and Conflicts.

Allies had never been clear or united in their thinking since 1943, when things were in a state of flux. The roots of the Cold War were mutually incompatible definitions of national interest, as well as conflicting ideologies. The Americans saw Soviet Marxist ideology, aiming at worldwide revolution and victory, as a threat and blamed international communism for the war; the Soviet Union saw capitalism, especially American capitalism, as fundamentally hostile to Russian socialism. The Cold War had no particular moral connotation and produced no decisive military strategy. Eastern Europe entered a political ice age. The benefits from the Marshall Plan were denied to the countries under Soviet control, though this hit the Soviet Union itself at its weakest point, since it could not compete economically with the West. The Communists seized power in three phases. First, they used genuine coalitions, with several political parties committing themselves to joint national programmes. There was limited freedom of the press, and Communists ran the ministries of defence and interior. Second, there were still non-Communists in government, but they were selected for their subservience to Communism; peasant and bourgeois parties went into opposition. In the third stage, a monolithic Communist regime ended the coalition and suppressed all opposition, social democrats were purged or merged with Communists, and members of the opposition were arrested and sent into exile. In the first decade of the Cold War, western European countries were mainly governed by unsatisfactory coalitions and influenced by growing Americanisation. Wartime developments undermined the colonial authority of the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Portugal, and there were moves towards European unity. A bipolar world had emerged from the Second World War. The Cold War froze

Bibliography and Further Reading Krieger, J. (ed.) (1993) The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. The World Guide: See the World from a Different Angle (2005) Oxford: New Internationalist Publications.

Cold waR The Yalta Agreement of February 1945 was uncertain and ambivalent, with no detailed arrangements for tripartite control of occupied territories. Yalta showed that Stalin was thinking beyond spheres of influence, aiming at complete political control in countries occupied by the Soviet Army. In contrast, the Western 45

cold war

the two sides, with nuclear stalemate and international politics/relations beholden to the views of Moscow and Washington. In this global framework, peace was maintained, and this has led observers to argue that the multipolar world from 1914 to 1949 was less stable than the bipolar world that followed. The war and Soviet coercion diverted Eastern Europe from the path of development in the West, though nationalism was also a factor. The emergence of China as a great power and then its denunciation of the Soviet Union helped to reduce tension between the Soviet and American leaders. The result was détente, which lasted from 1969 to 1979. In the changed atmosphere of détente, summit meetings were increasingly regular and East–West trade expanded. For example, West Germany adopted a policy of Ostpolitik, which combined political friendship with the East and closer trading links. Measured confrontation returned with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and lasted until 1985. Among the resulting crises were the Soviet threat to Poland because of the growth of Solidarity and the shooting down of a Korean airliner, with the death of all on board, in the mistaken Soviet belief that it was an American spy plane. International security was seen as a supreme objective in the Cold War, and efforts to secure this grew apace with economic might and military strength. Paradoxically, the same motive favoured progressive policies such as arms control, an end to the Cold War and improved relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the two decades after 1985, SovietAmerican relations were at their most stable since 1945. The Russians gave priority to building up their economy and discovered the ideas of glasnost (‘transparency’) and perestroika (‘restructuring’) as meaningful policies at home and abroad. The

Americans began to see that the Soviet Union was no longer the evil empire and was in fact a country they could do business with. It was fear of violence that dictated Cold War politics. Since then, ironically, in states that used Cold War rhetoric, state authority has more often been dictated from within the state than by outside forces. Since 2007 there have been worrying signs that conflicts of values could occur again, with Russian concern about the Americans siting interceptor missiles in eastern Europe and possible NATO membership for former states of the Soviet Union and concern in the United States and the United Kingdom at Russian policy towards the Caucasus, Ukraine and Estonia, combined with a tightening control of free speech. The consequences of worsening conflicts can be seen in an apparent return to the Cold War situation: more civil wars, more strident nationalism and jingoism, more protectionism and less international co-operation. Ideologies and conflicts of values are potent forces for change, but they divert effort away from the clear challenges that confront the human race: population growth, food shortages, nuclear and conventional arms races, equitable distribution of wealth, trade and exchange, mineral and energy scarcity, and economic development. See also: Potsdam Conference, 1945; Soviet Union; Truman Doctrine, 1947; United States; Yalta Conference, 1945. Bibliography and Further Reading Ball, S.J. (1998) The Cold War: An International History, 1947–1991, New York: St Martin’s Press, and London: Arnold. Baylis, J., Wirtz, J., Cohen, E. and Gray, C.S. (2002) Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bradley, J.F.N. (1989) War and Peace since 1945: A History of Soviet-Western Rela-

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tions, New York: Columbia University Press. Crockatt, R. (1995) The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941–1991, London: Routledge. Dunne, T., Cox, M. and Booth, K. (1988) ‘The Eighty Years’ Crisis, 1919–99’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, Special Issue (December), pp. v–xii. Friedman, N. (2001) ‘The Fifty Years War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 3 (June), pp. 20–25. Garthoff, R. (1994) The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War, Washington DC: Brookings Institution. Gilbert, M. (1999) Challenge to Civilisation: A History of the 20th Century, 1952–1999, London: Harper Collins. Goodby, J.E. (ed.) (1995) Regional Conflicts: The Challenge to US-Russian Cooperation, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Oxford University Press. Halliday, F. (1983) The Making of the Second Cold War, 2nd edn, London, Verso. Judge, E.H. and Langdon, J.W. (1996) A Hard and Bitter Peace: A Global History of the Cold War, Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall. Kuniholm, B. (1994) The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Lieven, D. (1991) ‘The Soviet Crisis’, Conflict Studies, No. 241, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. McCauley, M. (2004) Russia, America and the Cold War, 2nd edn, Harlow, Essex: Pearson/Longman. Mackintosh, M. (1992) ‘The New Russian Revolution: The Military Dimension’, Conflict Studies, No. 247, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Morris, E. (1973) Blockade: Berlin and the

Cold War, New York: Stein & Day, and London: Hamilton. Pay, J. and Till, G. (eds) (1990) East–West Relations in the 1990s, London: Pinter. Pinder, J. (2001) The European Union: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schlesinger, A. (1967) ‘The Origins of the Cold War’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 22–52. Stone, D. (2004) Wars of the Cold War: Campaigns and Conflicts, 1945–90, London: Brassey’s. Thompson, R. and Keegan, J. (consultant eds) (1981) War in Peace: An Analysis of Warfare since 1945, London: Orbis. Williams, A. (1998) Failed Imagination? New World Orders of the Twentieth Century, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Young, J.W. (1996) Cold War Europe, 1945– 1991: A Political History, revd edn, New York: St Martin’s Press.

ColleCTive seCuRiTy Collective security is a system of maintaining peace and security by means of concerted action by most or all the nations of the world. It applied when one or two states dominated international affairs and it applies in today’s emergent transnational society. Collective security works best when a major power takes responsibility for it and other nations are willing to fall into line. The model of collective security underpins the United Nations. The model assumes that all or most states will come to the rescue of a state that is the victim of aggression and they will punish the wrongdoers through sanctions or even force. See also: Peace; Peaceful Co-existence; Peacekeeping. Bibliography Carr, F. and Callan, T. (2002) Managing Conflict in the New Europe: The Role of International Institutions, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.

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many countries the colonial administration had become weak, even bad, and its policies just deferred the day of reckoning. Unrest deteriorated into violence. Despite the warning signs, political action rarely ensued – often because police and security did not co-operate with the political arm of government. Once systematic violence had broken out, official measures tended to be drastic or even draconian. In democratic countries, repressive measures are exposed to public scrutiny; in totalitarian or authoritarian states this is rarely so. Many revolutionaries argued that colonialism was violence in its natural state and would only yield to greater violence. The theory and practice of revolutionary war are important in the study of conflict. It is linked with guerrilla and partisan warfare and terrorism, all of which can put much more political pressure on a colonial government than activists could exert otherwise. In the Cold War, there was a genuine fear of escalation from conventional to nuclear war, or from minor conflict into question of strategic concern. At the same time, indirect involvement in minor conflicts had big advantages for the strategic powers. Advances in technology have resulted in asymmetric war, so unconventional warfare has developed. It is an act, process or instance of waging war, conflict, struggle or strife by not conforming to accepted rules or standards. Civil wars occur between parties, factions or inhabitants within the same nation. Since 1945 they have undermined stability – and, in a pluralist society, the bulwarks of stability can be slender. Security, intelligence and the rule of law are maintained by the police and army, the intelligence services and the judiciary. If these are weakened or corrupted, the rising tide of drug abuse, crime, political violence, public disorder and civil war can lead to authoritarian government of the right, dominated by the army, or of the

Ciuta, F. (2002) ‘The End(s) of NATO: Security, Strategic Action and Narrative transformation’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 35–62.

Further Reading Arnold, G. (1991) Wars in the Third World since 1945, London: Cassell. Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury. Hough, P. (2004) Understanding Global Security, London and New York: Routledge.

ConCiliaTion This is a form of third-party intervention in conflict situations; it is nonpartisan, neutral and mediatory. The aim is to restore communication between the parties and help them to reach a greater understanding of each other’s position. If a conflict has a long history of mistrust, a stage of ‘talking out’ the conflict may be necessary before conciliation can attempt resolution. See also: Conflict Termination. Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

ConfliCT Militarily, conflict is a struggle between opposing forces in battle. Politically, conflict is a state of opposition between ideas or interests; it is disagreement or controversy. Psychologically, it is a clash between simultaneous but incompatible wishes or impulses, sometimes leading to a state of emotional tension and thought. After the Second World War, the colonial powers were forced to listen to demands for independence across much of Africa and Asia, leading to national selfdetermination and state-making. But in 48

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left, usually a professionally organised revolutionary party. Religious conflicts have developed on a wide scale since the 1950s in Ireland, the Middle East and South-East Asia. Such conflicts centre on the core values of a religion – conveyed by sacred text and imparted via clerical authorities claiming to speak for the divine – these core values serving as a legitimising force. Ethnic issues have led to conflicts in many parts of the world. They can be organised and made meaningful in various ways, thus becoming part of any number of identities. In the New World Order of the 1990s, much of the potential and actual conflict was ethnic. The principle of selfdetermination is more evident as a cause of fragmentation and turbulence than as a lever of human liberation. Nationalism has survived the collapse of Communism, and is often associated with religious revivalism. Nationalism has led to the disintegration of states and causes trouble between them. Ultimately, conflicts raise the threat of regional chaos. Domestic disorder or repression can create international conflict, particularly when a government violently attacks a large part of its own population. Throughout modern history states have clashed, usually because of incompatible nationalist claims. Modern warfare guarantees a disproportion between ends and means, or between the values saved and values destroyed. The innocent are inevitably the victims of conflict – whether they are civilians or soldiers drafted in against their will. See also: Conflict Behaviour; Conflict Perceptions; Conflict Termination.

Ciment, J. and Hill, K. (eds) (1999) Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, Vols I–II, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn. Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. FitzSimons, D.W. and Whiteside, A.W. (1994) ‘Conflict, War and Public Health’, Conflict Studies, No. 276, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Frankland, N. (Gen. ed.) (1989) The Encyclopaedia of Twentieth Century Warfare, New York: Mitchell Beazley. Institute for Study of Conflict Members (1987) ‘Issues of Conflict in the Contemporary World’, Conflict Studies, No. 200, London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies. Keegan, J. and Darracott, J. (1981) The Nature of War, New York: Holt Rinehart, and Winston. Laffin, J. (1997) The World in Conflict, London and Washington: Brassey’s. McCoubrey, H. and White, N.D. (1992) International Law and Armed Conflict, Aldershot, Hampshire; Brookfield CT; Hong Kong: Dartmouth. Mansbach, R.W. (1997) The Global Puzzle, 2nd edn, Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin. Parker, G. (ed.) (1995) Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio. Schilling, T.C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schwarz, U. and Hadik, L. (1966) Strategic Terminology, New York: Praeger and Pall Mall Press. Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press. Thackrah, R. (2001) Revolutionary Conflicts: Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Explained, Taunton, Somerset: Studymates.

Bibliography and Further Reading Aspects of Conflict [special issue], Conflict Studies, No. 100, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. Barringer, R.E. (1972) War: Patterns of Conflict, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

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ConfliCT BehaviouR Conflict behaviour consists of overt actions by one party in any conflict aimed at an opposing party, to make that party abandon or modify its goals. Conflict behaviour can become a form of bargaining, along with alternative strategies: a strategy of coercion (to threaten or impose an action), a strategy of reward (to offer or provide benefits) or a strategy of concession (by abandoning some goals). Since 1945 there have been attempts to resolve conflicts by some form of bilateral compromise, offering concessions in negotiations or through a third party. Bilateral conflict behaviour can affect interaction between the states verbally, using threats or promises, or physically. A country can stop completely an interaction that benefits an adversary, which can mean stopping aid or trade, or breaking off diplomatic relations. A country can intensify interaction that penalises an adversary (using armed forces to damage an adversary, its members or possessions); a state can slow down or reduce an interaction (by abandoning or slowing down a particular military tactic, as in a bombing pause); or a nation ultimately can stop military interaction (by calling for a general ceasefire or armistice). Persuasive behaviours that result in a limited conversion of an adversary occur mainly in social systems where there are opportunities for contact, open communication and a sympathetic consideration of the other’s point of view. Rival states can alter their behaviour to achieve some compromise solution through negotiation. States can also seek a long-term alteration of the values of the other party (conversion), getting it to recognise the underlying justice of the objectives sought. However, divisions in international society, the absence of any in-group solidarity or loyalty, and the absence of any socialisation processes make such a possibility remote.

Conflict behaviour has several elements: communication of intentions, communication of ability to implement these intentions, physical actions and the likelihood of future physical actions. Difficulties can arise when parties try to signal their intentions in conditions of conflict. They must convince the opposing party that the messages and symbolic actions are not bluff. There can be faulty reading of actual intentions as well as commitments. Appropriate messages and actions should affect a complex decision-making process of the opposing party in the desired manner, not counter-productively. Motivations within individual humans that pertain to aggressive behaviour are related to intersocietal warfare. Innate aggressive urges are the driving force behind belligerent political attitudes and give them their emotional basis. Not all leaders are aggressive: there are also those who vacillate and procrastinate. See also: Psychology and Conflict. Bibliography Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O. and Hall, P. (2004) Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Institute for Study of Conflict Members (1987) ‘Issues of Conflict in the Contemporary World’, Conflict Studies, No. 200, London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies. Kam, E. (1988 and 2004) Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Stoessinger, J.G. (1990) Why Nations Go to War, 5th edn, New York: St Martin’s Press. Thackrah, R. (2001) Revolutionary Conflicts: Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Explained, Taunton, Somerset: Studymates.

Further Reading Papp, D.S. (1988) Contemporary Interna-

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images of each other. The United States image of the Soviet Union’s leaders was that they were bold: aggressive, powerseeking, brutal, ruthless and above all actively sabotaging and spying on the West. The Soviet image of the United States was of a nation of bankers, politicians and militarists who wanted a war because they feared the loss of their wealth and power in any Communist takeover. The Soviet Union also believed the USA was surrounding it with military bases. Both sides saw each other as imperialistic, wanting to dominate the world and keep their empire in submission. Both sides saw each other as exploitative: the Americans believed the Russians deliberately kept people’s standard of living low, except for Communist bureaucrats, while the Russians believed that American capitalists lived in luxury by exploiting their workers, who suffered insecurity and unemployment. Both sides believed the other distorted the truth: the Russians were viewed as befriending colonial peoples in order to enslave them, and the Americans were seen as falsely accusing the Russians of a desire to impose ideology by force. The above perceptions during the Cold War have been echoed in other conflicts, where there is an increasing tendency to over-rationalise the adversary’s position and policy, and to assume that actions and statements are always intended and planned, rather than ad hoc or reactive. Blaming the other side for everything is a clear way to justify policy or inaction as inevitable and to shift the blame for any disaster onto the opposing party. See also: Conflict Behaviour; Conflict Termination; States and National Roles.

tional Relations: Frameworks for Understanding, 2nd edn, New York: Macmillan and Collier Macmillan. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio. Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press.

ConfliCT peRCepTions In any conflict, individuals identify with a set of similar individuals and with symbolic objects – and one of the most contentious symbols is ‘the national territory’. This is often seen as part of the national self. Unfortunately, one nation’s territorial self-image can overlap with that of another, and this can be the cause of constant dispute. The clearer the territorial dispute is, the more easily people understand the conflict in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Individuals find it comfortable to identify with an area of territory, and anyone who is an ‘outsider’ in that territory is viewed as an intruder. It becomes almost a duty to expel such intruders, as seen in Vietnam, Northern Ireland, Israel, Biafra and Eritrea. Selective perception is a common way for individuals to misunderstand a situation, and it has significant results. One only has to look at the Cold War to see the results of slanted views of a place, policy or event. For example, the Soviet role in Eastern Europe was seen by the Soviets as an example of strong leadership, but by the Americans as a form of subjugation. The Soviet Union viewed Berlin as an enemy outpost, a centre for dangerous espionage and propaganda; to the West it was an outpost of freedom. The Soviet public saw German rearmament and membership of NATO after 1955 as an alliance between America and German aggressors, whereas to the American public it was seen as making Germany strong enough to stand up to Soviet threats. In a way the superpowers had mirror

Bibliography Institute for Study of Conflict Members (1987) ‘Issues of Conflict in the Contemporary World’, Conflict Studies, No. 200, London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies.

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parties have a similar definition of the current balance of success and failure. Much of a party’s conflict behaviour consists of continuous communication meant to affect the perceptions, decisions and behaviour of the rival party. See also: Peace; Peaceful Co-existence; Peacekeeping.

Nicholson, M. (1992) Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thackrah, R. (2001) Revolutionary Conflicts: Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Explained, Taunton, Somerset: Studymates.

Further Reading Bibliography

Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio. Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press. Stoessinger, J.G. (1990) Why Nations Go to War, 5th edn, New York: St Martin’s Press.

Cimbala, S.J. (ed.) (1986) Strategic War Termination, New York: Praeger. Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O. and Hall, P. (2004) Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Institute for Study of Conflict Members (1987) ‘Issues of Conflict in the Contemporary World’, Conflict Studies, No. 200, London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies.

ConfliCT TeRminaTion Parties to a conflict are faced with the problem of ending their conflict: they have to work towards a settlement by an indeterminate, almost trial-and-error process. The key problem facing parties to any conflict is when to give up and start compromising. During the twentieth century, wars were fought to establish a lasting ‘peace’ or remove the threat from an adversary ‘once and for all’. Members of a party in conflict often demand that one of the results shall be the prevention of future conflicts, or at least future conflicts with the current adversary. The main condition that must be met for a termination process is that the leaders of the party confronting failure must all agree that they have failed. They must then take a decision to make the best of a compromise settlement rather than ‘fight on’. The central process of bringing a conflict to an end is actual negotiation of the terms of a settlement, bargaining to obtain the best compromise possible for one’s party, regardless of the balance of advantage in the conflict itself. However, it is also important that the leaders of both

Further Reading King, C. (1997) ‘Ending Civil Wars’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper, No. 308, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Whittaker, D.J. (1999) Conflict and Reconciliation in the Contemporary World, London: Routledge.

ConfliCTs in afRiCa The Second World War raised Africa’s self-awareness, but commitments to political change were only partly fulfilled in the years after 1945. The French Union in 1946 guaranteed ‘equality of rights and obligations’ between the mother country and the former colonies. The British Government also initiated constitutional reforms. As a result, African nationalist movements developed. Nation states developing within colonial boundaries were held together by national pride and had the army as a mainstay. State institutions – constitutions, parliaments, administrations and armies – were 52

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adapted from European models, but indigenous cultures continued to exert influence through secret societies, sects and tribal units. New states tended towards authoritarian government under Westerneducated politicians, nationalistic popular leaders and Communists. There was a tendency towards regional federation. Many of the newly independent countries of Africa were little more than puppet governments serving their former colonial power. Tensions arose between large urban centres and the countryside, because of ethnic, religious and linguistic differences, and also the contrast between an educated upper class and an illiterate mass. This resulted in political instability, revolutions, lack of law and order, racial discrimination and religious hatred. Problems of the emancipation of society, African leadership of the administration and army, and a relatively low level of education led in most states to enlightened dictatorship and governmental guidance of political, economic and social life. Leadership and tribal rivalries were marked by conspiracies, assassinations, unrest and mutinies. Many opposition parties went underground or set up headquarters in neighbouring states, where they were given not only sanctuary, but frequently funds, training and arms as well. This created a booming cross-border traffic in small arms, which led to political instability. Small arms violence has contributed to a precipitous decline and even collapse of economic activity in many African nations. Civil wars, banditry and other forms of armed conflict have caused a breakdown of the trust and confidence that are essential for trade and other transactions. Investors have tended to stay away from countries where people and personal assets are not safe. Endemic violence in many rural areas has compelled farmers to abandon their harvest. Coping with crime has diverted foreign aid and domestic bud-

gets onto the police, law enforcement and security guards, so that few resources remain for social services. Few wars in Africa since 1945 have escaped great-power involvement at some level; almost certainly many would have been far shorter and less devastating had the big powers not intervened. Most African countries were vulnerable to such interference, if only because of their poverty and general weakness. Even after the Cold War ended in 1990, the temptation remained for the powerful to intervene in pursuit of their interests. The large numbers of African refugees from various wars have been seen as an unwelcome and controversial problem for European nations to solve. Since the 1970s, Africa has been the site of many of the world’s deadliest conflicts. Wars in Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda took between half a million and one million lives each, either on the battlefield or indirectly through war-induced famine and disease. Conflicts in Burundi and Liberia took 100,000 lives each. At the start of the twenty-first century, five wars were being fought (in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan). Burundi, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo and Zaire were candidates for state collapse or civil war. In Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda, low-level ethnic and political conflict remained contained but unresolved. The Rwandan conflict centred around the main ethnic division between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi. After the 1994 genocide, in which millions of Tutsis and Hutus were massacred, many refugees fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo. By 2002, after disarming of the militias (especially the Interahamwe), many of the refugees felt able to return home. Rwanda faces a difficult period of reconciliation between its peoples and 53

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with its neighbours. Ethnic and regional tensions remain strong. There was civil war in Sudan from 1983 to 2005, pitting the Arab Muslim north (the government, its military and militia groups) against the black African Christian south (the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army and its allies, fighting for political autonomy). The 2005 power-sharing agreement allowed for the South seceding after six years. The conflict in Darfur in western Sudan dates back to the 1980s. On top of local strife and ethnic tensions, angry Darfurians want quick solutions to the lack of development and few resources. Since 2003 the Sudan Government and its allied Arab militias, the Janjaweed, have fought the Darfur rebels of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army. The war has been marked by extreme violence, grave human rights abuses and population displacement on a vast scale. The African Union Mission has not been able to lessen the violence and the Sudanese authorities have refused a UN peacekeeping contingent. Many African governments have faced a crisis of legitimacy, for lack of democratic reforms. In Liberia and Somalia, dictators refused to give up power in the face of armed challenges, resulting in state collapse and the spread of armed warlords. In Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Togo and Zaire, despots conceded demands for democracy, but then manipulated the process to retain power by corruption, coercion, ethnic mobilisation and other divisive tactics. In Ghana and Uganda, authoritarian leaders tried to build regime legitimacy from the top down. In Benin, Malawi and Zambia, authoritarian leaders ceded power to democratically elected forces. Zimbabwe has been dominated since 1980 by the increasingly autocratic rule of its Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe. He has brutally suppressed dissent and rejected international criticism of human

rights abuses. The appropriation of whiteowned farms from 2000 was marked by intimidation and violence, and led to an agricultural collapse and food shortages. Mass anti-government protests and a general strike provoked a crackdown in 2003. That year the country left the Commonwealth. Chronic shortages of hard currency, imported fuel and consumer goods have led to hyperinflation and estimated 80 per cent unemployment. Mugabe’s critics blame land reform. Mugabe himself blames financial isolation caused by US, UK and EU economic sanctions. International grants and loans were suspended because existing repayments were in arrears, though payments restarted in 2005. In 2006 the government revalued the currency and in 2007 forcibly lowered the prices of goods in an attempt to control inflation. The economy was badly hit by emigration of professional and skilled labour. Elections were held in March and June 2008 amid the worst humanitarian crisis in the country’s history, attributed in varying degrees to drought affecting the entire region, the HIV aids epidemic, government price controls and land reforms. Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the Movement for Democratic Change, won the parliamentary election, but the result of the presidential election was delayed. Agreement on power sharing was reached after long discussion in September 2008. Africa for four decades was almost synonymous with chaos, with constant images of civil war, famine and anarchy. Africa’s internal conflicts have had profound effects on neighbours, regions, the whole continent and the international community. Africa’s conflicts have prompted various responses: military support or intervention to lessen the effects of war (Somalia), mediation to bring conflict to a negotiated end (Zimbabwe, Namibia and 54

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Mozambique) and preventative diplomacy (southern Africa). The international community has devoted limited resources to Africa, where there is intense competition for resources between countries and between types of assistance. There is little that humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping operations can do in civil wars. Yet for all the weaknesses revealed in the administration of the post-colonial states, none has disintegrated or suffered a significant loss of territory except Ethiopia. In spite of all the conflicts, the legitimacy of boundaries inherited from the colonial period, based on ethnic, cultural or economic criteria, have been universally accepted. See also: Angolan Civil War, 1974–2002; Biafra; Liberia; North-East Africa; Rwanda; Sierra Leone; Somalia; Third World Insurgency.

1960–65

Furley, O.W. (1995) Conflict in Africa, London: Tauris Academic Studies. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio. Riley, S.P. (1996) ‘Liberia and Sierra Leone: Anarchy or Peace in West Africa?’ Conflict Studies, No. 217, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Valahu, M. (1964) The Katanga Crisis: A Detailed Account of Three UN Wars, New York: Robert Speller & Sons. Vines, A. (1995) ‘Angola and Mozambique: The Aftermath of Conflict’, Conflict Studies, No. 280, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Congo CRisis, 1960–65 The Congo became a Belgian colony in 1908 and was exploited for its natural resources. In the first half of the twentieth century, working conditions were harsh and military force was used regularly to suppress anticolonial opposition and to protect the copper-mining industry in Katanga (now Shaba). From 1957 African political parties were formed, but only the National Congolese Movement led by Patrice Lumumba had a national outlook, opposing secessionist tendencies and claiming independence. After attempts by the white population, mainly Belgians, to hinder the progress of the nationalists, independence was achieved in 1960 with Kasavubu as president and Lumumba as prime minister. Almost immediately, Moise Tshombe, the premier of Katanga, initiated a secessionist movement. Belgium sent in paratroopers and the UN, acting under American influence, intervened with a peacekeeping force (the first time the UN had done this). Lumumba resented the UN sending white troops rather than Africans, but the UN temporarily defused the situation in Katanga.

Bibliography Ali, T.M. and Matthews, R.O. (eds) (1999) Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution, London: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Furley, O.W. and May, R. (eds) (2001) African Interventionist States, Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate. Geldenhuys, D. and Gutteridge, W. (1983) ‘Instability and Conflict in Southern Africa: South Africa’s Role in Regional Security’, Conflict Studies, No. 148, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. Herbst, J. and Mills, G. (2003) ‘Africa and the War on Terror’, RUSI Journal, October, Vol. 148, No. 5, pp. 12–17. Riley, S.P. (1994) ‘War and Famine in Africa’, Conflict Studies, No. 268, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Copson, R.W. (1994) Africa’s Wars and Prospects for Peace, New York: M.E. Sharpe.

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Another secession movement appeared in the province of Kasai. The whole country seemed to be collapsing under the pressure of ethnicity, the personal ambition of local leaders and the claims of individual provinces to their mineral wealth. In late 1960, Kasavubu staged a coup and arrested Lumumba, delivering him to Belgian mercenaries in Katanga, who killed him allegedly for trying to escape; a UN report later insisted that Lumumba was handed over to Tshombe’s forces for execution. Worldwide protests sparked new violence in Congo. The UN authorised the use of force to disarm Congolese and rebel troops. Fighting broke out between UN and Congolese forces. In trying to sort out the deadlock, the UN launched a highly controversial assault on Katanga: this was the first time the UN had taken aggressive military action. The UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, believed it would help ensure the unity and tranquillity of the Congolese state, as called for by resolutions passed by the vast majority of UN member states. In personally trying to work out a truce with Tshombe, Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash in Zambia in September 1961. The civil war continued until 1963. Secessionist activity only ceased when Tshombe, who represented the neo-colonial interests, was appointed prime minister. With the help of Belgian troops, US logistical support and mercenaries, he defeated the revolutionary forces. In 1965, he was forced to resign by Kasavubu, who was in turn overthrown by army commander Joseph Mobutu. Mobutu, to deal with parliamentary deadlock and growing unrest, took on full executive powers and declared himself head of the Second Republic. He outlawed all political parties in 1966 and centralised rule even more by appointing his local supporters as governors. He consolidated his rule over the country and ruled it as a vir-

tual one-man state until 1997 when he was ousted by a former Lumumba supporter, Laurent Kabila. See also: Conflicts in Africa; United Nations. Bibliography Abi-Saab, G. (1978) The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960–1964, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kanza, T.R. (1972) Conflict in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Lumumba, London: Penguin.

Further Reading Arnold, G. (1991) Wars in the Third World since 1945, London: Cassell. Valahu, M. (1964) The Katanga Crisis: A Detailed Account of Three UN Wars, New York: Robert Speller & Sons.

ConvenTional foRCes see Cfe

in

euRope TReaTy

Coup d’éTaT A coup d’état is a change of regime brought about by illegal and unconstitutional action by a holder, or group of holders, of some political or military office. It involves limited forms of violence. It can be preceded by a conspiracy to orchestrate the mass support to effect such changes, though it may later seek to legitimise the changes by a plebiscite or mass demonstration. A putsch is a form of coup d’état. Figuratively speaking, a coup d’état has the same effect as binding the eyes, ears, mouths, hands and feet of those who exercise recognised political power, making it impossible for them to resist, flee or call for help and preventing any move on their behalf by the armed forces or police. The conditions that seem most conducive to coups d’état are centralisation of political power in the hands of a few individuals, minimising the number of arrests required; failure to take adequate preventative measures, whether physical, psychological, economic or political; and 56

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unresponsiveness to changes in domestic and international affairs or to public opinion. In a coup, the attitudes and actions of professional military officers (or past military leaders), who may be in a position to effect a coup, are critical. Governments are often aware that riots and mob action are often used to frighten those holding political power into abdicating their position, leaving a void for conspirators. A coup d’état differs slightly from a revolution, since the latter is effected by the people, or at least by those who hold no power at the time and perhaps represent themselves as ‘leaders of the people’ in order to gain it. Some observers even consider a coup to be part of a socially based revolution. See also: Violence.

No two negotiations with terrorists are alike, just as no two crises are alike. The keys to successful negotiation are a clearly defined strategy, knowledge of the opponent, experience as a negotiator and careful preparation. See also: Governments and Conflict and Crisis Management. Bibliography and Further Reading Winham, G.R. (ed.) (1988) New Issues in International Crisis Management, Boulder CO and London: Westview Press.

CRuise missiles Cruise missiles are small winged missiles that can travel thousands of miles to reach a particular target. They can be launched from ships, submarines, aircraft or land. Huge advances have been made since Germany produced the V1 flying bomb during the Second World War. Both superpowers possessed such missiles as nuclear weapons vehicles during the later stages of the Cold War. The advantages of such missiles are that they are pilotless, have precision guidance and can fly low to evade radar detection. Their disadvantage is that, travelling at subsonic speeds, they are rather slow compared with, say, intercontinental ballistic missiles. They are relatively simple and inexpensive technology, the earliest type of ‘precision guided’ or ‘smart’ weapon; cruise missiles have now been bought by a number of countries. The United Kingdom first became aware of these during the Falklands War in 1982 when French-made Exocet cruise missiles were used against the Royal Navy. During the Gulf War, 1991, they were used against specific targets in the centre of Baghdad. In the mid-1990s, American forces used them to attack Serbian forces in Bosnia. A high-profile attack occurred in 1998 when the United States decided to strike the terrorist training camps of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Cruise missiles have dual capability,

CRisis and Risk managemenT It is very hard for governments to manage crisis and risk in an effective way. Making a decision how to protect the public and organisations and enforce security is not easy. It is vital that the level of threat is verified and its analysis followed by response. Crisis management teams must have a focal point, they must be effectively managed and they have to include individuals with authority to implement plans. The task of risk management is to identify precisely the risks, and the probable effects of risks, to the personnel and organisation to be protected from an ever present terrorist threat. The nature of the threat will decide the scope and structure for recommendations. The important risks are property, liability, personnel, physical, social and market. Each risk must be measured by several criteria to determine its impact on the organisation and how the risk is to be handled. In the case of acts of terrorism, which often involve loss of life, the most important means of risk management are risk avoidance, risk acceptance and occurrence reduction. 57

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being able to carry either nuclear or conventional warheads. It is not possible to identify the type of warhead from the outside, which has implications for arms control because counting missiles is of little value if their nuclear or conventional status is unknown. See also: Falklands War; NATO; Serbia and Montenegro.

Bibliography Blight, J.G. and Kornbluh, P. (eds) (1998) Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Re-examined, Boulder CO: Lynne Reinner. Divine, R.A. (ed.) (1998) The Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: Markus Wiener. Kapcia, A. (1996) ‘Cuba after the Crisis: Revolutionising the Revolution’, Conflict Studies, No. 289, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

CuBa The 1960s established Cuba as an independent actor on the world stage in the wake of the Cuban Missiles Crisis, 1962. Under Fidel Castro, who came to power in a revolution in 1959, Cuba was loyal to the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991. Over the years, many asylum seekers left for the United States. The Cuban leadership believed that glasnost was irrelevant to the island and in the 1990s this fuelled a growing sense of isolation as the New World Order stabilised. From 1990 there was increasing détente by stealth with the United States. As a result of its extensive involvement in Africa, notably in Angola in the 1970s, Cuba saw its future security and identity in the Third World as being based on its wellearned privileged place in the political scene. The world that shaped the revolution has changed fundamentally but, despite numerous popular uprisings in the early 1990s, the situation in Cuba stabilised in the late 1990s. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba normalised economic relations with other Latin American countries, especially Bolivia and Venezuela, and improved relations with the European Union. China emerged as a new source of aid and support. In July 2006, as a result of serious illness, Castro delegated his duties as President to his brother, First VicePresident Raul Castro. In February 2008, he resigned and Raul became President. See also: Angolan Civil War, 1974–2002; Cuban Missiles Crisis, 1962.

Further Reading: Kennedy, R.F. (1969) 13 Days: The Cuban Missile Crisis, London: Pan. Thomas, H. (1998) Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom, revd edn, New York: Da Capo Press.

CuBan missiles CRisis, 1962 The crisis was a period of acute tension and potential military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union following the discovery of Soviet nuclear missiles sited in Cuba (despite Soviet assurances that they would not do so), less than 100 miles (160 km) off the coast of the United States. The sites had medium- and intermediaterange ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons to the United States. The United States intelligence services discovered the Cuban missiles on 18 October 1962, and four days later President Kennedy warned Khrushchev that any attack from Cuba would be treated in the same way as an attack from the Soviet Union. A naval blockade was imposed to prevent any more missiles being delivered to Cuba, but in reality the missiles were already in place. The United States insisted that all further shipments of offensive Soviet weapons to Cuba had to be halted, and they wished to force the Soviet Union to withdraw the missiles it had already placed there. The Soviet Union wished to reduce or eliminate American 58

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nuclear superiority by deploying intermediate-range ballistic missiles at sites where they could reach the United States. Time pressure was acute throughout the crisis, because the missile sites for which the Americans had photographic evidence were to become operational by the end of the month. This forced the United States into demanding compliance from the Soviet Union to de-escalate the situation in Cuba. For six alarming days – alarming for the whole world – the two superpowers considered their options before, on 28 October, Khrushchev agreed to Kennedy’s demands. Soviet ships crossing the Atlantic with missiles in containers on deck had been shadowed by US aircraft. The ships eventually turned round and returned to the Soviet Union. There was relief around the world. Apart from the potential for nuclear conflict, there had also been the prospect of an American invasion of Cuba, which would have brought them into direct conflict with the large Soviet forces on the island – soldiers, surface-to-air missiles, fighter planes and bombers. Khrushchev offered to remove such bases on Cuba if the United States pledged not to invade Cuba in the future. The crisis ended on 28 October 1962, with both sides making concessions for peace: the no-invasion pledge in return for dismantling of the bases. Throughout the crisis, both sides had been under pressure to take more decisive action. Fortunately, neither leader was prepared to risk nuclear war over the issue. The minds of both men had become increasingly aware of the danger that an accident or inadvertent military action might push them over the brink. The Soviet Union had called for the removal of American missiles from Turkey, a NATO member. The United States did not wish to appear weak or to betray a loyal NATO ally, so the Soviet demand was publicly ignored by the United States, but privately promised.

1962

The crisis is seen as an example of effective crisis management. Both leaders managed to prevent the conflict from escalating, while they sought and eventually found a solution satisfactory to both. The bargaining was simplified because only two actors were involved. Geographically the United States enjoyed strategic and local military superiority, with an advantage over its adversary in nuclear capabilities. A naval blockade (quarantine) of Cuba had proved effective, even if legally dubious. The United Nations provided good offices, a valuable communication channel and a public forum – the Security Council – where both sides could employ their own rhetoric and propaganda for the world to judge the rights and wrongs of the situation. After the crisis, relations between the superpowers began to improve, which came as a considerable surprise to many observers around the world. In 1963 a hotline agreement came into being – a link between Washington and Moscow permitting direct contact between heads of government in a crisis. It was developed out of a fear that nuclear war might be initiated as a result of misunderstanding, miscalculation, accident or failure to communicate. A Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed in August 1963, which banned nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Both superpowers worked out rules limiting provocative initiatives in areas that each regarded as being within its sphere of vital interest. There is evidence that there had been substantial misperception on both sides; the relatively quick defusing of tension in the subsequent period of détente goes some way to prove this. The two sides in the Cold War developed unwritten rules and procedures to manage the War, but on occasions they were flouted, as over Cuba in 1962. In the aftermath of this crisis, arms control played a leading part in helping to enhance 59

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confidence between the adversaries, which was vital considering that the Cuban Missiles Crisis had brought the superpowers to the brink of nuclear war and perhaps global Armageddon. See also: Cold War; Cuba; Soviet Union; United States.

Cypriots began advocating Enosis (union with Greece) and the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), a Greek Cypriot organisation, began guerrilla warfare against the British. In 1960 the island became a republic and a member of the Commonwealth, with the United Kingdom retaining sovereignty over the bases. In 1964, the United Nations sent a peacekeeping force to the island, but subsequent Greek and Turkish talks to resolve differences were unsuccessful. In 1971 General Grivas, leader of the militant wing of the Greek Cypriots which wanted union with Greece, accused President Makarios of failing the Greek Cypriots and instigated a revolt against him. The president was forced to escape to the British sovereign base area. In 1974 at the request of the Turkish Cypriots, Turkish troops landed in the north of the island. There was strong resistance, which resulted in many casualties, but the Turks established a bridgehead at Kyrenia and then advanced to Nicosia, creating a corridor between the two towns. A week later, the United Nations managed to arrange a ceasefire and established a buffer zone. The Turks stopped their advance while Britain, Greece and Turkey (the three guarantors of Cyprus’ independence) held unsuccessful talks in Geneva. After this failure, the Turks resumed hostilities until they had taken all of northern Cyprus – about 37 per cent of the island – up to what became known as the Attila line. Turkish Cypriots supported the invasion and the de facto partition of Cyprus. President Makarios was forced to accept Turkish autonomy in the occupied part of the island, but he would not agree to formal partition. It was a short war, overwhelmingly in Turkey’s favour, and no country was prepared to intervene. The island was virtually partitioned as no agreement could be reached, the Turks wanting a federal state and the Greeks a unitary one.

Bibliography and Further Reading Brogan, P. (1992) World Conflicts: Why and Where They Are Happening, London: Bloomsbury. Dinerstein, H. (1976) The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins Press. Divine, R.A. (ed.) (1998) The Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: Markus Wiener. Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin. Garthoff, R.L. (1989) Reflections on the Cuban Missile, Washington DC: Brookings Institution. Holmes, R. (ed.) (2002) Oxford Companion to Military History, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Holsti, K.J. (1974) International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 2nd edn, London: Prentice Hall International. Kennedy, R.F. (1969) 13 Days: The Cuban Missile Crisis, London: Pan. Krieger, J. (1993) (ed.) The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. McCauley, M. (2004) Russia, America and the Cold War, 2nd edn, Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education. Nathan, J.A. (ed.) (1992) The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, New York: St Martin’s Press. Stone, D. (2004) Wars of the Cold War Campaigns and Conflicts, 1945–1990, London: Brassey’s.

CypRus Cyprus, an island in the eastern Mediterranean, became a British crown colony in 1925. By the 1950s, Greek 60

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A third of the population was displaced: Turkish Cypriots in the Greek part of the island and Greek Cypriots in the Turkish part had to move to huge refugee camps in their own ethnic areas. In February 1975, Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus. Talks were held intermittently until 1983, when Turkish Cyprus declared independence, recognised only by Turkey. There were now two autonomous areas de facto: the Greek area covering 60 per cent of the island and the Turkish area 35 per cent. Since 1983, there has been an uneasy calm, with a UN peacekeeping force to oversee the demarcation line. Many mainland Turks moved into northern Cyprus after 1974, but there has been no inter-communal strife. However, the European Commission of Human Rights has found Turkey guilty of committing atrocities in Cyprus. The two groups of Cypriots are separated by language, culture, history and religion, and Greece and Turkey have supported the claims of their Cypriot compatriots. There are also tensions over the future of oil and gas fields found off the southern coast of Cyprus. Exiles have called regularly for constructive flexibility in talks between the Cypriot leaders. There was a call in the late 1990s for reunification before Cyprus joined the European Union. Turkish Cypriots wanted the whole of Cyprus to be admitted to the EU, but the political positions on the island’s future seemed irreconcilable. The EU said that, if the island were not reunited, the Greek area could be admitted as if it were an independent state, leaving out the Turkish area, which is what happened in May 2004. Not until 2001 did the Cypriot leaders, Glafkos Klerides and Rauf Denktash, actually meet and talk, for the first time since 1974. In 2002 the United Nations proposed a peace plan with a federation of the two sectors governing alternately. In 2003, Greek and Turkish Cypriots crossed

the green line in Nicosia for the first time. In twin referenda in April 2004, the Greek Cypriots rejected a UN plan to reunite the island, while the Turkish Cypriots backed it. Contacts between ordinary Cypriots have increased, helped by the opening of several crossings on the Green Line separating the two communities in Nicosia. In February 2008 Dimitris Christofias was elected President of Cyprus. He pledged to restart talks with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, to find a solution to the dispute and reunify the island. He also supported the closure of British military bases in Cyprus. Bibliography Brenchley, F. and Fursdon, E. (1990) ‘The Aegean and Cyprus’, Conflict Studies, No. 232, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. MacKenzie, K. (1974) ‘Turkey: After the Storm’, Conflict Studies, No. 43, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. —— (1983) ‘Greece and Turkey: Disarray on NATO’s Southern Flank’, Conflict Studies, No. 154, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. —— (1984) Turkey in Transition, London: Alliance Publishers.

Further Reading Hitchens, C. (1984) Cyprus, New York: Quartet.

CzeChoslovakia After liberation from Nazism at the end of the Second World War, Czechoslovakia had an uneasy co-existence with Communism. The Czechoslovak Government followed a pro-Soviet line on all major issues, but also tried to maintain ties with the West. This was a difficult balancing act amid rising Cold War tensions. In 1947 the Soviet Union instructed the Czechs to refuse Marshall Aid, concerned 61

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that Czechoslovakia would become dependent on the West. The Communists tried to subvert government workers and student organisations, to bring them on their side. In the general election called for 1948, the Communists were worried about the wisdom of a free election and started to use their powers to disrupt the activities of pro-democracy parties. The Communists, under Clement Gottwald, organised mass demonstrations in February 1948 and took over most of the media and government offices. In the election they won 51 per cent of the vote, compared to 38 per cent in the 1946 election, which had been contested on a more equal footing between Communists and democrats. President Benes refused to sign the constitution and later that year he died. The foreign minister Jan Masaryk had allegedly committed suicide by ‘falling’ out of a window in March 1948. Backed throughout by Stalin, the Czech Communists had the majority of organised workers on their side and were able to stage a coup, helped by the mistake of the pro-democracy ministers resigning from their posts. This coup showed the West that the Soviet Union demanded total loyalty from its eastern European satellites. For nearly 20 years, Czechoslovakia stagnated politically and economically under tight Communist control from its hard-line leader, Antonin Novotny. In the 1960s, industrial production grew more slowly, hindered by rigid state control. There was also growing tension with Slovakia, the other half of the partnership, which was poorer than the Czech half and received less state aid. Economic problems – compounded by ethnic resentments and intellectual murmurings of young party members against the ageing Communist elite – led Novotny to set up a commission to see if the economy could be made more flexible and decentralised. Some concessions were made, but there was reluctance to change

policies. Some liberalisation did occur for writers and intellectuals, who began to criticise Communist rule. In November 1967 Alexander Dubček, a Slovak, argued for a new policy for Slovakia and was immediately attacked by Novotny. But Novotny had lost the support of party leaders and was replaced in early January 1968 by Dubček as First Secretary of the Communist Party. Two months later Novotny resigned as president and was replaced by the moderate General Svoboda. Dubček and his reformers did not wish to end Communism, but to improve the system, give it flexibility and tone down its repressive nature. His government was aware of Soviet, Polish and East German antipathy to its reform programme. The Warsaw Pact manoeuvres in the spring of 1968 were in Czechoslovakia; when the exercises ended, the Soviet troops moved only slowly out of the country, as relations between Prague and Moscow worsened. By then, there were free and open debates in Czech newspapers. In April, an action programme was begun to give the people full civil rights, freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom to travel. Communist leaders in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were initially unconcerned, but soon became worried at the pace of the ‘Prague Spring’ – a comprehensive revival of political, economic and cultural life. Soviet leaders began to see the liberalisation as a threat to their sphere of influence. There were doubts about the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact and doubts were bound to multiply if Czech reforms proved ‘contagious’. Dubček faced thinly veiled threats and political and economic coercion, but he grew stronger at home and public opinion was behind him. In August 1968, Soviet leaders reached consensus on an invasion and Leonid Brezhnev, keen to make the force look multilateral, informed East German, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian leaders 62

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of his decision, and 400,000 Soviet troops and 80,000 East European troops took part in Operation Danube, under Soviet control. The Czechs could muster about 175,000 troops, but there was no resistance. The Czech army stayed in barracks: they did not co-operate with the invaders. Clandestine radio stations reported on the attitudes of Soviet troops and fought back with words as the Prague Spring reforms crumbled. Moscow newspapers published the Soviet version of events, and Dubček was taken to Moscow for interrogation. Although the West protested at the invasion, this was little more than a formality and no material assistance was offered. A UN resolution on the withdrawal of the Soviet forces was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia received verbal support from Romania and Yugoslavia, which both had ‘difficult’ relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders were perhaps lucky that the United States was preoccupied with Vietnam, just as the USA was preoccupied with Suez at the time of the 1956 Hungarian uprising. The Soviet Union thought it was dealing with an illegal uprising against Communist

rule, but in fact it was suppressing a popular democratic revolution. Dubček was allowed to return home, but the Czech Communist Party was put back in control and Czech reformers were removed from office. Jan Palach, a student, burnt himself to death in January 1969 at a protest against the end of reform, and his funeral became a day of mourning. In April 1969 Dubček finally stepped down, and anniversary demonstrations in 1969 were ended by Soviet tanks. The West and the Communists had tacitly accepted each other’s spheres of influence at a time of Cold War tension. See also: Hungary, 1956. Bibliography Renner, H. (1989) A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, London: Routledge.

Further Reading Korbel, J. (1977) Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia: The Meanings of Its History, New York: Columbia University Press. Szulc, T. (1971) Czechoslovakia since World War Two, New York: Viking Press.

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middle of the Ussuri River, which formed the border between them. In a series of clashes in March 1969, Russian and Chinese soldiers were killed, but the Russians retained control of the island. China argued that it was used a staging post for shelling targets in Manchuria. Relations between the two countries were strained. Six months later the Soviet Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin, had surprise talks with China’s Chou En-lai in an unsuccessful attempt to repair strained relations. See also: Sino-Soviet Conflict.

dagesTan Dagestan is a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, between Chechnya and the Black Sea. All ethnic groups in Dagestan are minorities, one being the Lezgin, who are mostly Sunni Muslims influenced by the Afghan Al Jihad. There are also Lezgin in Azerbaijan and their goal, like the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is to unify their homeland into one independent Lezgin state. For the Afghan Arabs in Dagestan who were fighting Russian troops in pursuit of their aim of turning Dagestan into an independent Islamic state, 1999 was a high point. In late 1999, Muslim rebel incursions into Chechnya from Dagestan were followed by a wave of terrorist bombings of apartments for civilians and military personnel. Russian federal forces repulsed the incursions. Chechens made incursions into Dagestan to try to capture key targets such as power stations, and the Chechen conflict also spilt over into Ingushetia and North Ossetia. See also: Central Asia and Caucasus; Chechnya.

Bibliography Rees, D. (1986) ‘Soviet Border Problems: China and Japan’, Conflict Studies, No. 139, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

dayTon aCCoRds, 1995 Peace talks to try to end the conflict in Yugoslavia were held in October and November 1995 on neutral territory at Dayton, Ohio. The Americans aimed to broker a ceasefire, end the siege of Sarajevo and draft a peace settlement for Bosnia-Hercegovina. No time limit was set on discussions between Bosnians, Serbs, Croats and Muslims. The agenda included a map for Bosnia-Hercegovina, elections for the union of BosniaHercegovina, ending sanctions on Serbia, lifting arms embargos and agreeing the composition of a peace implementation force. As a result of the Dayton Accords, Bosnia-Hercegovina remained a single

Bibliography and Further Reading Mandelbaum, M. (1994) (ed.) Central Asia and the World, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Siegel, J. (2002) Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia, London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co.

damansky island In the late 1960s, in a period of rivalry, the Soviet Union and China disputed over an island in the 64

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state that included a Muslim-Croatian Federation and a Bosnian Serb state known as Republika Srpska. Sarajevo remained the capital and refugees were encouraged to return to Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs were allowed to live in their own area of Bosnia, but had to give up their designated areas around Sarajevo. The Bosnian Peace Treaty was formally signed in December 1995, shortly after the London Implementation Conference, which aimed to give political endorsement and backing by the world’s nations to the NATO military deployment of an Implementation Force and to force all warring factions to comply with its terms. Those Accords that attempted to regulate armaments within Bosnia were international in the sense that a number of states were involved. Many observers viewed the Dayton Accords as a precarious peace, but they were unambiguously realistic. See also: Yugoslav Civil War.

nial powers used them as sources of raw materials (India, Africa) that would free them from worldwide competition and economic crises, maintaining the home country’s good standard of living, which was imperilled because of overpopulation. Supported by military and economic interests, imperialism spread Western culture (morals, ideology, customs and fashions) across the world. It developed infrastructure (railways, administration, harbours, schools, hospitals) and developed the economies of the colonies (plantations, industries, markets), in some cases by exploiting indigenous peoples. On occasion the colonial powers committed atrocities or destroyed local culture and heritage (as in India and China). Imperialism aroused new demands among the colonised peoples, but also feelings of resentment and hatred, which fed religiously inspired movements to rediscover and revitalise native history (or consciousness). This led to struggles for emancipation. Political emancipation from colonial tutelage was achieved after 1945. European theories of freedom and equality (human rights, the right of self-determination, and the Marxist idea of class struggle) were adopted by colonial peoples, and there was a transition in colonial policy to a sort of ethical imperialism, with participation of native elites in tasks of leadership. The major European powers had been weakened by two world wars, but the Anglo-Saxon concept of democratic co-operation between peoples (the Atlantic Charter) was realised in the United Nations. As the colonies gained independence, the UN became the political forum of the new nations. Despite their political differences, the new nations sought to unite in the struggle against white colonialism and to form a distinctive third way, between East and West but influenced by Socialism. At the Bandung Conference (1955), 30 Afro-

Bibliography and further reading Allcock, J.B., Milivojevic, M. and Horton, J.J. (1998) Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: An Encyclopaedia, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

deColonisaTion Even before the late nineteenth century, the great powers competed for economic and political control of territory outside Europe. Imperialism brought power and prestige, but it was also defensive. It was seen as a way of maintaining the balance of power. There were two main types of colony. The first colonies were settlements established by emigrants who had left their homes for religious or political reasons, or because their economic survival was threatened by overpopulation. The second type of colony was commercial, though many were actually foreign bases with trading concessions. The colo65

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Asian states condemned colonialism, racial discrimination and atomic weapons. Internal emancipation – the adjustment of pre-industrial living conditions to the modern world – became the major task of the new nations. The predominantly agricultural developing nations had socio-economic problems, resulting from a feudalistic social order with a rich upper class, technological backwardness, few industries and little incentive for enterprise or effort. Tensions arose between Western-educated politicians and officers, and the nationalistic popular leaders and trained Communists leading the illiterate masses in the fight for independence. This, when it came, was widely accompanied by political instability and authoritarian forms of government. Development aid continued the power struggle, while also pioneering a new ethical approach. Responsibility for social problems was no longer limited to the home nations. It became a worldwide problem affecting both rich and poor nations. Overlaid by the East–West conflict, it endangered general security and world peace. Aid aimed to encourage self-help by providing capital, technological aid and price stabilisation. Much of this help was nullified by the fact that the new countries adapted their forms from the European model (constitutions, parliaments, administrations and armies), while in the background traditional indigenous cultures continued to exert their influence through secret societies, sects and tribal units. See also: Bandung Conference, 1955.

World Peace, Austin TX: University of Texas Press.

Further Reading Fedorowich, K. and Thomas, M. (2001) International Diplomacy and Colonial Retreat, London: Frank Cass. McGrew, A. and Brook, C. (eds) (1998) AsiaPacific in the New World Order, London: Routledge, in association with the Open University.

demiliTaRisaTion Demilitarisation is a policy whereby military forces are prohibited from an area or zone, under the terms of a treaty or other international agreement. It may follow a withdrawal of forces or it may apply to an area free of military forces. Demilitarisation must include some arrangement for verification and observation of the situation. A demilitarised zone was created by the armistice agreement which ended the Korean War to separate the military forces of the belligerents and prevent any reason for the resumption of hostilities. Countries wholly demilitarised consider themselves neutral or non-aligned. This will be expected by the international community if a demilitarisation agreement is coterminous with the territory of a state. See also: Korean War, 1950–53. Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin.

Bibliography déTenTe Détente is the easing of tension between nations, especially superpowers, notably the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Détente was associated with rapprochement, peaceful co-existence and overall a more flexible diplomacy.

Darwin, J. (1988) Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World, New York: St Martin’s Press. Furedi, F. (1994) Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism, London: Tauris. Urquhart, B. (1989) Decolonisation and

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The near catastrophe of nuclear war as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 saw the beginning of détente, which had a chequered history over the next two decades reaching its greatest phase during the crisis over Afghanistan in 1979. Détente also applied in West Germany’s relations with the Soviet Union, when Willy Brandt was the German chancellor who instigated Ostpolitik, a policy of reconciliation between Eastern and Western Europe, in the late sixties. Détente also featured in the United States relations with China in 1972 to open up a dialogue started by a series of table tennis matches between the two countries – the so called ‘ping-pong diplomacy’. Even the UK actions as a ‘honest broker’ between the two superpowers during the Cold War can be viewed as a form of détente. Détente in a way brought the superpowers to their senses at a time of great tension to avoid the ultimate nuclear horror of mutual assured destruction. Détente can be established by formal treaty or may evolve out of changes in national strategies and tactics over several years. Some critics of détente however believe that a conciliatory style of diplomacy – almost akin to appeasement does not work, and that a confrontational style can better serve the national interest. Détente can be viewed in similar ways to rapprochement, which involves a reconciliation of interests of rival states after estrangement – with the ultimate aim of re-establishing normal relations. After 1945, for example, a rapprochement in France-German relations ended over 70 years of bitter hostility and rivalry. Entente is a form of overt, amicable détente in vogue long before détente became the accepted norm. With the emergence of new clusters of power in the 2000s, states have changed perceptions of the international system and are giving increasing priority to their domestic economies.

See also: Cuban Missiles Crisis, 1962; Ostpolitik; Peaceful Co-existence. Bibliography and Further Reading McCauley, M. (2004) Russia, America and the Cold War, 2nd edn, Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education. Simons, T.W. (1990) The End of the Cold War?, New York: St Martin’s Press, and Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.

deTeRRenCe One state can deter an attack by another simply by having a weapon or combination of weapons of overwhelming force, typically nuclear. In other words a policy of deterrence is a commitment to retaliate or exact retribution. Deterrence relies on the ability to inflict unacceptable damage, communication of the threat to do so and the circumstances in which the threat might be carried out, and the credibility of the threat in the mind of the adversary. It is hard to measure the effect of deterrence. Did NATO’s strength truly deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe or did the USSR never intend to attack in the first place? It is easier to see that one state has influenced another to take certain action, but very hard to judge when the other state has been deterred from taking some specific action. Mutual nuclear deterrence has come to dominate the strategic scene. In the Cold War the superpowers acted and reacted with great caution, which brought some stability. During the Cold War, deterrence became the basis of strategy because nuclear weapons had become so destructive that they could no longer be used purely as military weapons. Both crisis stability (no rapid escalation towards nuclear war) and relative stability in the arms race (very few sharp increases in spending) depended on the fact that neither side possessed a first-strike capability, meaning the ability to attack and destroy 67

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the other side’s retaliatory capability while suffering ‘acceptable’ damage. If each side had only a second-strike capability – the capacity to absorb a first strike and still retaliate, causing unacceptable damage – this brought greater stability. Any successful deterrence has to be credible. Stable mutual deterrence is when both sides possess survivable nuclear capabilities to threaten the other with a retaliatory assured destruction. International crises have often resembled games of brinkmanship. In nuclear diplomacy, brinkmanship assumes that both sides will be able to effectively control their forces so that war will not start accidentally and that at least one party will be sensible enough to avoid a potentially lethal collision course. Nuclear proliferation poses the risk that a nuclear crisis could be multilateral, making brinkmanship less predictable and harder to control. For example, China would find it hard to keep out of a conflict between India and Pakistan (two new members of ‘the nuclear club’) over Kashmir. Deterrence by threat of punishment aims to shape opponents’ decisions by indicating a potential cost that would outweigh any benefit they might derive from the unwanted action. Deterrence by denial uses the same mechanism but a different type of threat, by attempting to convince another state that if it undertakes a certain military action, such as an invasion, it will be prevented from achieving its military– political goals. Three different lines of nuclear deterrence were highlighted: deterrence of direct attack on a state; strategic threats to deter an enemy from engaging in very provocative acts (other than direct attacks); and graduated deterrence, meaning that acts are deterred because the potential aggressor is afraid that the defender will take limited military or non-military actions that make the aggression ‘unprofitable’. Western leaders became confident that

deterrence was reliable and that it could create and preserve ‘stability’. Soviet leaders did not accept Western deterrence logic. It was clear during the Cold War (and still is) that no deterrence threat is so severe that it can be certain of success; even nuclear deterrence may fail, or be irrelevant in a crisis. In considering deterrence since the Second World War, the assumption that opponents will be rational, reasonable and thus predictably deterred has always been debatable, because there can be an enormous variation in how different national leaders define reasonable behaviour. Over the last decade the international security environment has radically changed. Bi-polar competition has finished, and now for example a nuclear armed United States faces opponents of weapons of mass destruction ranging from nonstate actors and ‘rogue’ states to countries such as India, Pakistan and above all China, which are potential peer competitors. Although nuclear deterrence may or may not work, any state known or strongly suspected to be nuclear armed is certain to be treated with respect. There is obviously a huge potential cost if deterrence fails. See also: Balance of Terror; Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear Testing. Bibliography Menaul, S. (1980) ‘Deterrence and Defence in the Eighties’, Conflict Studies, No. 117, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

dien Bien phu This was a key battle of the war in Indochina between the French, trying to restore their authority, and the peoples native to the area, seeking independence or revolution. It took place in 1954 around the village and valley of Dien Bien Phu in northern Vietnam. As a result of the French decision to keep the Viet Minh forces from moving westwards into 68

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Laos, the colonial army made a classical military mistake of great magnitude. The fort at Dien Bien Phu was 190 miles (300 km) from the nearest French position; its isolation meant it could only be taken by paratroops and resupplied by parachute drop, or later from a rapidly constructed airstrip. Being in a valley, the position was tenable only if the French retained complete freedom to fly in supplies and equipment, and if the Viet Minh could not attack because of the terrain and their lack of heavy weapons. Neither turned out to be the case. Dien Bien Phu, far from demonstrating air supremacy, was the most vulnerable position ever occupied voluntarily in modern warfare. The Viet Minh had long-range artillery, supplied by China. Using brute force, determination and their great knowledge of the topography, the Viet Minh installed their artillery under clever camouflage on the slopes of the surrounding hills. The result was inevitable. On 7 May 1954 the central command bunker was captured, along with some of the best infantry and parachute regiments in the French army. These losses laid the French open to defeat by the Viet Minh, and a negotiated withdrawal was the only way out. This was officially recognised by the Geneva Agreement of 21 July 1954. Laos and Cambodia were given independence, and Vietnam was divided rather arbitrarily on the 17th Parallel. The French had made the mistake in Indochina of trying to restore colonial dominance, instesad of following the trend to self-determination and state making. They misjudged the nature and capability of the Vietnamese forces. They applied conventional concepts of war when they were dealing with a more complex war – revolutionary war. They did not understand the links between events on the battlefield and political perspectives, and

they were at odds with public opinion in Indochina. The political consequences of the Indochina war, and Dien Bien Phu in particular, were ultimately traumatic. They led to the fall of the administration and the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958. See also: Vietnam. Bibliography Knapp, W. (1967) A History of War and Peace, 1939–1965, London: Oxford University Press. Stone, D. (2004) Wars of the Cold War: Campaigns and Conflicts, 1945–90, London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers.

diRTy waR This term was used in Argentina to describe the 1970s ‘war’ by the military against the opponents of the regime. The ‘official’ number of reported deaths did not correspond with the unofficial tally of dead and ‘disappeared’. The military used their position to try what turned out to be disastrous economic policies, which led to massive inflation and rampant financial speculation. People wished for democracy and economic growth, but instead revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence escalated. The economic difficulties were not helped by the decision to invade the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. By the early 1980s, however, the politico-military struggle that had dominated Argentinian politics since Juan Perón came to power was over. The term ‘dirty war’ has also been used in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict and the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya. See also: Latin America; Northern Ireland; Mau Mau. Bibliography Ciment, J. and Hill, K (eds) (1999) Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, Vols I–II, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn.

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pause. Their frenzied struggle to outstrip each other was proving extremely costly. The deepening intensity of the war in Vietnam ruled out any serious progress on arms control and disarmament. In the 1970s there were unprecedented conventional arms transfers at a time when the international community, led by the United Nations, was considering further global disarmament. The problems of verification were highlighted by the Helsinki Accords of 1975. Even after these historic agreements on lessening tension, some suspicions lingered among the superpowers and their rival camps. Enduring problems arose in determining equivalence between different types of weapon and in verifying nuclear arms reduction treaties. Disarmament efforts have always to proceed within the context of deterrence, but states have not always seen this as the vitally important issue it is. Since the 1970s there have been increasingly complex discussions over whether to go for disarmament or arms control. The disarmament lobby argues that weapons cause wars and, to prevent wars, one must reduce the number of weapons or even eliminate them. The arms control lobby argues that some weapons are more likely to lead to war than others and, to avoid war, one must reinforce stability in deterrence relationships. Disarmers favoured eliminating short-range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, to reduce nuclear stocks there. Advocates of arms control agreed, because such weapons were vulnerable to enemy attack and, if not used quickly and effectively, would be lost in battle, so in effect they were destabilising. Disarmament and arms control can help in building confidence and lessening tension between adversaries. See also: Peace.

Krieger, J. (ed.) (1993) The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Waisman, E.H. (1987) Reversal of Development in Argentina: Postwar Counterrevolutionary Policies and their Structural Consequences, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

disaRmamenT Disarmament is the reduction of offensive or defensive fighting capability by nations. Since 1945, disarmament has usually followed defeat in war and has often been confirmed by a peace treaty or truce. State-sponsored disarmament implies the internationalisation of military force, which has not occurred since 1945. However, disarmament does not automatically reduce tension, and there are powerful temptations to cheat. States can take part in disarmament negotiations to achieve quite other aims – productively, to understand the other side’s point of view; or cynically, to engage in propaganda by talking about disarmament, to make the opposition appear intransigent and insincere about the issue. During the Cold War, superpower attitudes to disarmament were very disparate. For instance, in the 1960s the Americans had a plan to create a single nuclear force for NATO, which (the Russians argued) could lead to nuclear weapons in West German hands. However, technological changes were bringing changed attitudes. Arguments about U2 spy planes and open skies were becoming irrelevant with the conquest of space and the use of satellites in orbit to observe rival countries. The superpowers were concerned by the growth in the nuclear club: France and China tested atom bombs in 1963–64, and the manufacture of nuclear weapons was becoming a possibility for other states. This gave the superpowers reason to

Further Reading Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury.

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drugs see narcotics and conFlict

domino TheoRy This American-inspired theory alludes to a row of dominoes, each standing on end, all of which fall when one is pushed. It is the theory that a Communist takeover of one country, in a vulnerable region such as South-East Asia or Central America, will lead to Communist takeovers in all the neighbouring states. Some observers see ‘sovietisation’ as an aspect of domino theory. During the Cold War this meant bringing a country under Soviet control or influence, or putting pressure on a country to conform to the Soviet model in its social, political and economic structures. The Soviet satellites (satellites being countries or political units dominated by a foreign power) were sovietised in the years after 1945. Communist minorities joined nationalist groups in patriotic fronts to form provisional governments with Soviet support, exiled Communists were given key positions in the state and Communist Party, industries were nationalised and bourgeois parliamentary majorities were forced out by denunciation or intimidation. The Church was often persecuted and there were show trials of dissidents. The so-called people’s democracies were confirmed in power by closely controlled

general elections. Ultimately they became true Soviet satellites by collectivisation of agriculture, centralised economic planning and membership of the Warsaw Pact. President Eisenhower explained the domino theory in a press conference in April 1954, at the time of Dien Bien Phu. Thereafter it dominated US foreign policy throughout the Cold War and became a moral imperative for US presidents. They believed that if Indochina went communist so would Burma, Thailand, Malaya and the rest of South-East Asia. The next countries to topple would be Australia and New Zealand, followed by the remainder of the free world. The domino theory expresses a fear of ideological contagion; it was used to justify US intervention around the world, notably in Vietnam. See also: Conflict. Bibliography and Further Reading Ninkovich, F. (1994) Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

dRugs see naRCoTiCs and ConfliCT

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easT geRmany: RioTs, 1953 At the end of the Second World War, eastern Germany was occupied by troops from the Soviet Union, which was implacably opposed to any attempt to reunite Germany. The Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic upon the formal partition of the country into East and West in 1949. The issue of Germany’s future became a serious bone of contention between the two superpowers as the Cold War progressed. After the Berlin Blockade in 1948–49, there was another crisis in May 1950 over access to the city by air, road and waterway from the west. The internal border of the divided Germany was increasingly militarised, causing massive disruption to the population. In East Berlin there was growing disquiet over the situation in East Germany. In June 1953 an industrial dispute over production and pay rapidly became a source of major unrest in East Berlin and the whole country, with strikes and demonstrations. The civilian police could not control the demonstrations and Soviet Army units, with tanks, were ordered into East Berlin to suppress the rioting. The civilians could only respond with sticks and stones, and there were many casualties. Many people did not believe the official figures, believing the casualties to be far greater. Hundreds more were arrested and many died in prison. The strikes were portrayed by the Soviets as an uprising. Some Soviet troops refused to fire on demonstrators, which caused concern in Moscow. There was nothing the Western powers could do in the Soviet sector of Berlin.

The Soviet response to the strikes and uprising showed how the Communists were prepared to use overwhelming military force to maintain order. It also showed up Western impotence to respond. See also: Cold War. Bibliography Baring, A. (1972) Uprising in East Germany: 17 June 1953, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.

eisenhoweR doCTRine President Eisenhower held office at a time when the Cold War, in particular the delicate balance of nuclear weapons, dominated international politics. He was well suited to such tension, having been Commander in Chief of US forces in Europe during the Second World War and Secretary General of NATO in the early 1950s. The Americans had insisted that the British and French withdrew their forces from Egypt in 1956, but they had been worried about a power vacuum developing in the oil-rich Middle East. The Eisenhower Doctrine, spelt out in January 1957, gave assurance of American help, military or otherwise, to countries in the Middle East threatened by Communism. This concern was always close to the surface of American foreign policy. At the time, the position of President Nasser of Egypt as leader of the Arab world had been strengthened by the Suez crisis. By 1958 President Eisenhower was concerned at Nasser’s designs for Arab unity and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, claimed that Jordan was 72

environmental and ecological security

threatened by international communism and Nasser’s expansionist policies. Warnings were sent to Middle Eastern states not to use force against Jordan, and the American Sixth Fleet sailed to Lebanon ready to intervene on behalf of King Hussein if the necessity arose. The position of the USA as the predominant military power in the Middle East was enhanced during the Gulf War in 1991, when nevertheless they relied throughout on political and financial support from other sections of the international community.

severe environmental degradation and even violent conflict. Pollution has become a serious security issue with the recognition that the environment is the fundamental life-support system. Ecological degradation and scarcity of natural resources contribute to migration and conflict; they also deprive future generations of resources whose value we do not yet know. Unfortunately, environmental issues are slow to become a threat to human security, and a discourse of national interest tends to push the ecological agenda down the ladder of policy priority. Across the globe there appears to be a lack of urgency over environmental and ecological issues. The United States has spent billions of dollars to force a change in regime in Iraq; yet only tens of millions of dollars have been spent to stop the spread of SARS. A similar budget may not be enough to prevent the bird ‘flu pandemic spreading from China. Many observers believe that a new Marshall Plan for ecologically secure development is imperative for the welfare of people in the global South and for the global economy. Others suggest worldwide co-operation on socioeconomic development, with a moral dimension to globalisation based on eco-evolutionary values. Global governance can only flourish if it is based on shared values. So perhaps new interventions are needed, beyond the state level, to cope with the pace and scope of globalisation. Global peace requires ecological balance. See also: Resources and Conflicts.

Bibliography and Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin.

enviRonmenTal and eCologiCal seCuRiTy Environmental degradation has strong causal links to reductions in the standard of living, violence, security problems and unavoidable weakness of the state. Minimum force can help ensure personal security. Medium-to long-term deep reforms are required to deal with poverty and social problems. If a regime is unwilling or unable to push through necessary reforms, enforce law and order, and ensure national security, this can result in further weakening of institutions, leading to crises and ethnic conflicts, and possibly external intervention. Governments and states fail because they cannot manage the political, military social, economic, informational, psychological, moral and conflicts inherent in the exercise of power. Ecological security is closely linked with environmental security, and both depend on humans causing minimal damage to natural systems. Human populations tend to grow until they approach the carrying capacity of the land they occupy; in less industrialised countries, this can cause

Bibliography Diehl, P.E. and Gleditsch, N.P. (2000) Environmental Conflict: An Anthology, Boulder CO: Westview Press. Homer-Dixon, T.F. (1994) ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 25–37.

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Further Reading

The EPLF’s success owed something to brilliant leadership. With only limited support from the Islamic world, partly because of the Christian nature of the EPLF, the group was able to fend off a vastly superior army while retaining the loyalty of its own people. See also: North-East Africa.

Barney, G.O. (2006) ‘Ecological Security: A More Imaginative Response involving Youth’, Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 93–97.

eRiTRea In 1950 the United Nations declared that Eritrea, previously an Italian colony, should be a federated state within Ethiopia, whose demands to incorporate it were rejected. The process of Eritrean self-determination was not defined, but national groups asserted their claim to nationhood, leading to a rebellion. Potential rival factions were brought together as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), and during 1990 they succeeded in occupying almost all of what was to become Eritrea. In April 1993 a referendum gave massive support to independence from Ethiopia, and the EPLF formed a provisional government. In February 1999 fighting resumed and the war sucked in Nigeria (which supplied weapons to the Eritreans) and Kenya, which mobilised forces along its border with Ethiopia. Three months later the Organisation of African Unity ordered a ceasefire, which both sides accepted. In 2002 the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague decided the border dispute between the two countries and Ethiopia received a large part of its territorial claim. Eritrean secession had long been a threat to Ethiopia. Without control of Eritrea and with nothing to prevent Djibouti from falling into the hands of the Somalis, Ethiopia would be a landlocked state. For some years Ethiopia had been an ally of the Soviet Union, which provided military hardware until the Communist empire crumbled in 1989–90. Ethiopia always blamed Eritrean arrogance for the conflict, whereas Eritrea believed Ethiopia wanted access to the Red Sea, as well as territory.

Bibliography Iyob, R. (1995) The Eritrean Struggle for Independence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kendie, D. (2005) The Five Dimensions of the Eritrea Conflict 1941–2004, Gaithersburg, MD: Signature Book Printing.

Further Reading Duncan, A. and Opatowski, M. (2000) Trouble Spots: The World Atlas of Strategic Information, Phoenix Mill, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton.

esCalaTion Escalation is a gradual increase in the intensity or scope of a war. Conflicts are more likely to escalate into war when one party to the conflict is weak. Escalation can be quite dangerous: during the Cold War there was concern that a conventional war could lead to a nuclear war if the superpowers applied escalation strategies. The strategy of escalation can use the following steps: statements of condemnation, United Nations resolutions, the application of economic sanctions, and a military build-up with an implicit threat to use force; explicit threats of force may then followed by ultimatums threatening force after a specific deadline. Vietnam was an example of a policy of intensified military action. The United States believed that more of the same sustained action would achieve its goal. In the age of nuclear weapons, escalation poses a great danger that raising the tension in search of victory may become 74

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uncontrollable and result in mutual assured destruction. However, escalation can be limited to the use of ‘conventional’ weapons and observers believe that limited wars in which nuclear states are directly or indirectly involved can end in stalemate and political negotiations. See also: Conflict; Total War.

In the Cold War (1945–90) the potential conflicts were mainly ideological. In the (often fragile) New World Order of the 1990s, most potential and actual conflict was ethnic. The dimensions of ethnic and sub-ethnic conflict are varied. First, it occurs in failed or corrupt states: when an empire breaks up, as in the case of the Soviet Union and some of the units that resulted from its disintegration (in Russia, the war in Chechnya, in Georgia and Azerbaijan) or where the state structure was weak (Yugoslavia after Tito, Sudan, Rwanda) or weakened by war (Afghanistan, Iraq in 1991). Conflicts have also arisen when a minority puts up unexpected resistance, either when repression was ruthless enough to provoke collective resistance but not enough to wipe it out (Kurds in Turkey, Iraq) or when a minority received support from an outside power dominated by the same ethnic group (Turks in Cyprus, Albanians in Kosovo and pan Tutsism in central and eastern Africa). Second, ethnic and sub-ethnic conflict can disrupt international relations and domestic affairs. It destroys the status quo and may put the existing order into jeopardy, as with rebellions in Nigeria. It produces huge masses of refugees, which can provoke hostile or inhumane reactions in the affected countries. It fuels lasting conflicts between states, as with India and Pakistan, Greece and Turkey, Israel and Syria, or Israel and the potential state of Palestine. Third, ethnic conflict can be intractable and murderous. Warlords come and go, gang members melt away in the countryside, ideological armies may fade or compromise, but ethnic and religious feelings (as in Northern Ireland) have a way of surviving, even if they go underground for a while. Ultimately genocide may result from such intolerance. See also: Nagorno-Karabakh; Rwanda; Sri Lanka; Yugoslav Civil War.

Bibliography and Further Reading Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press.

eThniC ConfliCT In the twentieth century there were many ethnic conflicts. Some were the result of the collapse of an empire, as with the Soviet Union in Chechnya, Georgia and Azerbaijan, but all were in countries where the state structure was weak (e.g. Yugoslavia after Tito). The ethnic conflicts in Eritrea, Biafra and the former Yugoslavia disrupted international relations as well as domestic affairs. Collective intervention in internal ethnic conflicts presents a blurry picture, often limited to patchy humanitarian assistance with obstacles placed before relief and refugee agencies, but intervention may be triggered by narrow criteria and it may have a long-term political aim other than assistance. Ethnic feelings can appear dormant for many years, as can religious intolerance. Ethnic conflicts arise out of discordant definitions: for instance, Croats, Serbs and Bosnians can all be described as South Slavs, but do they have the same ethnicity? Predominance of one ethnic group in a state can create dangers for, and provoke revolt by, other ethnic groups, as with the Tamils in Sri Lanka, Hutus in Rwanda and Ibos in Nigeria. External interventions may be justified on grounds of ethnic solidarity, as with Serbia protecting Serbs in Croatia, or Armenia protecting Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. 75

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Bibliography

East Prussia), which borders Lithuania and Poland. The port is headquarters of the Russian Baltic fleet. The Russians are also concerned about the Americans placing a new series of anti-ballistic missiles in Poland. The Americans say they are to target rogue states such as Iran and the area of the southern Caucasus, whereas the Russians believe they are targeted at Moscow. In turn the Americans and the West are worried that the Russians are using their huge reserves of oil and natural gas, now on stream, as a political bargaining counter. Russia has temporarily cut the flow of gas and oil to Georgia and Ukraine to show displeasure at their Western political stance. The West has been worried by Russian support for its historical ally Serbia in the dispute over the future of Kosovo. Security in Europe is increasingly involved with the issue of immigration. Huge numbers of refugees and asylum seekers have moved into Europe from Russia, Asia and Africa, and many people in Turkey, eastern Europe and southern Europe wish to move west. Organised crime, particularly financial crime, carried out by global criminal gangs is causing increasing concern in Europe, with fears of a breakdown of social structures and support mechanisms in many European nations. Those states of the European Union that signed the Schengen Agreement in 1991 no longer have national control over their mutual frontiers. However, some checks have been kept on the rate of entry of migrants, to ease the pressure on member states and avoid conflict as a result of tensions. It is hard to see how effective the European Union can be in the long term in stemming the inflow of people fleeing from hunger, poverty or political persecution. There is increasing talk of ‘Fortress Europe’ and an urgent desire to reduce

Carment, D., James, P. and Puchala, D. (eds) (1998) Peace in the Midst of War: Preventing and Managing International Ethnic Conflicts, Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press. Combs, C.C. and Slann, M. (2002) Encyclopedia of Terrorism, New York: Facts on File.

Further Reading De Silva, K.M. and May, R.J. (eds) (1991) Internationalisation of Ethnic Conflict, London: Pinter. Duncan, W.R. and Holman, P. (1994) (eds) Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict, Boulder CO: Westview Press. Gurr, T.R. (1993) Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

euRopean union seCuRiTy In 2004 the European Union enlarged, with 27 nations now controlled from Brussels. This changed the EU’s geopolitical situation, bringing it into contact with historically nationalistic, ethnically diverse and unstable areas in eastern and south-eastern Europe. The attitude of Russia to these changes has been very lukewarm; the western half of Europe has been worried about increased immigration from the East. In 2003 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had also enlarged, bringing into its ranks three of the same countries as joined the European Union. To the Russians the expansion of NATO, and to a slightly lesser extent that of the EU, runs counter to their national interests. Russia faces a dilemma whether to integrate with Western institutions or rediscover her special mission as a bridge between East and West. Russia’s chief concern after the fait accompli of EU and NATO enlargement has been the future of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad (formerly Königsberg in 76

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the number of working migrants moving to affluent western Europe from poorer eastern Europe. See also: Central Asia and Caucasus; NATO; Russia.

Security in Europe’, Conflict Studies, No. 252, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Wright, J.B. (1998) ‘Enlarging the European Union: Risks and Benefits’, Conflict Studies, No. 312, Leamington Spa: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Bibliography Stewart, A. (1992) ‘Migrants, Minorities and

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landing on the main island, fought a brief battle at Goose Green, then began a threeweek charge or ‘yomp’ across East Falkland, fighting to secure Mount Longdon, Mount Kent, Mount Harriet, Two Sisters, Tumbledown Mountain and Wireless Ridge. They reached Stanley and, after a brief siege, the main town in the Falklands was taken on 14 June. The British had the initiative at all times over the Argentinian conscript army, who had not expected to have to fight for the islands. On the Argentinian side, only the air force performed well. After the war ended in June 1982, prisoners were repatriated. After the military junta in Argentina resigned, a new government was elected and retribution was started against those who had masterminded the so-called dirty war. In February 1990 Britain and Argentina resumed diplomatic relations. Britain ended the naval exclusion zone around the Falklands and opened negotiations on a new fishing agreement, concluded in 1991. The question of sovereignty was left, and remains, in abeyance. Britain is still very alert to the possibility of oil and natural gas, as well as rich fishing grounds, becoming sources of revenue. As long as the islanders wish British rule to continue, Argentina has a very long wait before any negotiations on sovereignty can start. See also: United Kingdom.

falklands waR, 1982 Argentina had long claimed this British crown colony in the South Atlantic. Its military government under General Galtieri did not believe that Britain would try to defend the Falklands. This view was based on a British defence white paper in 1981, which stated that the last naval vessel based in the South Atlantic, the converted icebreaker HMS Endurance, was to be scrapped. The Argentinians also believed they could take South Georgia without resistance, and indeed an Argentinian scrap merchant had contracted to remove an abandoned whaling station from South Georgia. Despite British protests, Argentina refused to withdraw. In April 1982, it invaded the Falkland Islands and its dependencies, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. US and UN attempts to mediate a diplomatic settlement failed. The United Kingdom sent a task force, which recaptured South Georgia on 25 May and the Falklands on 14 June. The two sides suffered nearly 1,000 casualties. Key moments in the campaign were the sinking on 2 May of the Argentine battle cruiser General Belgrano in international waters some distance from the Falklands, causing the biggest single Argentinian loss of life, and the air attack two days later on the British destroyer Sheffield, which was hit by French-made Exocet missiles and sunk, as later was the cargo ship Atlantic Conveyor. The landing ship Sir Galahad was bombed, caught fire and was beached, causing the greatest number of British casualties. On 21 May the British secured their

Bibliography Brogan, P. (1992) World Conflicts: Why and Where They Are Happening, 2nd edn, London: Bloomsbury. Hastings, M. and Jenkins, S. (1983) The

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1969

prevent the Indian minority from holding power. Hostages were eventually released, the rebels granted amnesty and a new President came into office. Racial divisions intensified, and the then military backed government was declared illegal. After much soul searching and political negotiation there was a slow return to democracy and an equally slow recovery of the economy.

Battle for the Falklands, New York: W.W. Norton.

Further Reading Sunday Times of London Insight Team (1982) War in the Falklands: The Full Story, London: Times Publishing, and New York: Harper.

fiji The republic of Fiji is an island archipelago in the south western Pacific. The ethnic make-up included native Melanesians and Indians almost equal in numbers but living very different lives. Tensions centred on land ownership, the Fijians owning more than 80 per cent of the land and defending their traditional rights and the Indians claiming greater security of land tenure. The Melanesians dominated governments, but during the late seventies adopted allegedly racial policies. In 1987 however, an Indian led administration took over, but a few days later there was a military coup to solve the ethnic problem. The real objective probably was the removal of the Indian government which believed in an independent foreign policy and the denuclearisation of the Pacific. Indian and Melanesian parties were united against the coup. An unsuccessful attempt was made to form a joint civilian-military government. Indians began to emigrate in significant numbers, as the number of attacks on Indian businesses and places of worship increased. By the mid nineties, attempts had been made to revise the racist constitution and a multiracial council was created for greater democracy for all ethnic groups. This was sufficient to allow Fiji back into the Commonwealth from which she had been thrown out at the time of the 1987 coup. However the attempt at greater racial integration led in May 2000 to an armed group entering Parliament and abducting the Prime Minister in an attempt to reform the constitution and

Bibliography Lal, B.V. (1992) Broken Waves: A History of the Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

fooTBall waR, 1969 In July 1969 a conflict between El Salvador and Honduras began, following incidents after two football matches in June, in the elimination round for the World Cup of 1970. After the first match was won by Honduras, the supporters of El Salvador complained they had been ill treated by Hondurans. When the return match was won by El Salvador, the Hondurans claimed they had been ill treated by the Salvadoreans. Relations between the countries were already poor; for example, there had been attacks on Salvadorean farm workers in Honduras. Diplomatic relations were broken off at the end of June and numerous border incidents ensued. In mid-July, Salvadorean forces crossed the border with Honduras and quickly gained the advantage because of their superior military equipment. The dead, mainly Hondurans, numbered about 4,000. The Organisation of American States (OAS) mediated a ceasefire, but El Salvador refused to withdraw its troops. The OAS declared El Salvador responsible for failing to comply with the ceasefire terms and threatened diplomatic and economic sanctions. At the end of July a compromise was reached, providing for the immediate withdrawal of all 79

Frontiers

Salvadorean forces and guarantees for Hondurans and Salvadoreans living in El Salvador and Honduras respectively. A demilitarised zone was established on the border. The war had serious effects in the two countries. Honduras felt the greater economic impact from the financial cost of the war and the loss of manpower, while El Salvador’s resources were strained by the influx of many refugees. A peace treaty was not finalised until October 1980. See also: Central America.

ingly they function as social and economic barriers. Since 1945 they have been drawn or redrawn for defensive, cultural, economic, legal, administrative or ideological purposes. Ethnic factors have increasingly been used a criterion. In a heterogeneous world population, there are ethnic minorities in almost every state, defined according to race, language or religion. Borders can be effective underground to protect resources such as mineral ores or oil, and above ground to protect air space. They have been drawn through unoccupied territory and superimposed on existing cultural patterns, often causing problems for the people living in border areas. Even natural boundaries following rivers, mountain ranges or escarpments can cause difficulties. Rivers tend to shift their course and, having breadth as well as length and depth, have led to many disputes over whether the boundary should be along one of the river banks, equidistant between the banks or down the centre of the navigation channel. The Shatt-alArab waterway remains a cause of tension on the Iranian–Iraqi border, just as the Elbe river formed part of the Iron Curtain in a divided Germany. Many of today’s borders are relics of past colonial conflicts. Even today many states are seeking to fix and demarcate boundaries that were not accurately defined in the past. International boundaries evolve continually in terms of definition, function and position. See also: Geopolitics; Political Geography.

Bibliography and Further Reading Ciment, J. and Hill, K. (eds) (1999) Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, Vols I–II, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn. Kapuścinski, R. (1990) The Soccer War, London: Granta.

fRonTieRs Frontiers or borders have always caused problems in international relations – whether they be natural or artificial lines of demarcation. Buffer states can be created between major powers. Historically, Afghanistan has been such a state and has been extremely sensitive to shifts in the configuration of world politics. Because a state is territorial, violation of its frontiers amounts to aggression against the state itself. A border is the mark of separate nationhood. International boundaries are likened to political fault lines, along which competing national aspirations are most likely to surface and come into direct contact. They mark the zones where political or economic shockwaves have often triggered military conflict. Borders have come about in a variety of ways, some marking the limits of a phase of political expansion and conquest, others being imposed by greater powers through acts of conquest or negotiation. Increas-

Bibliography and Further Reading Biger, G. (1995) The Encyclopaedia of International Boundaries, New York: Facts on File, and Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit.

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forces in Srebrenica in 1995, or the ethnic cleansing during the 1992–95 Bosnian War. The latter was prosecuted in a specially convened international tribunal. Since 2002 the International Criminal Court can exercise its jurisdiction if national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute genocide. The first such case involves Sudan. Genocide is human rights abuse and the international community should intervene to prevent or stop it. States that instigate genocide should be pressured to cease this malign policy, through coercive and peaceful means. Coercion can use psychological and diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, boycotts on imports and – as a last resort – military force. Military action amounts to war with the country, a situation which can mobilise civilian support against an invasion. See also: Bangladesh: War of Independence, 1971; Cambodia; Congo Crisis, 1960–65; Eritrea; Ethnic Conflict; Sri Lanka.

genoCide In 1943 Lankin defined genocide as a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming to destroy the essential foundations of the life of a national group with the object of annihilating the group itself. It may include systematically taking away children. Following the Holocaust, genocide became a crime under international law through the 1948 United Nations Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide. It is the deliberate and systematic destruction of an ethnic, racial, religious or national group, such as by killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, or by deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. Since 1945, there have been mass murders of Hutus by Tutsis in Burundi, 1972– 73; in Chile, 1973; by West Pakistan in East Pakistan (Bangladesh), 1971; by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, 1975–78; in Uganda, 1976–78; in Argentina, 1978–79; in the Central African Empire, 1978–79; in Equatorial Guinea, 1977–79; by Indonesians in East Timor, 1975–93; by Sudan against Eritreans in the 1980s; against the Kurds in Iran, 1990–91 and in Iraq; of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda, 1994; and by or against the Tamils in Sri Lanka (ongoing). The inter-ethnic strife in Congo is unresolved. Though killings have been limited, the extirpation of indigenous peoples in Australia, Brazil and New Guinea, and the fate of the Tibetans, may be considered as genocide. Bosnian genocide can mean either the genocide committed by Serb

Bibliography O’Halloran, P.J. (1995) ‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Genocide in Rwanda’, Conflict Studies, No. 277, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Lankin, R. (1943) Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Washington DC: Carnegie.

geopoliTiCs Geopolitics is the interaction between geographical factors and politics, 81

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especially as seen in international politics and political geography. Globalisation has had an impact on geopolitics: events in one part of the world can have profound implications for other parts of the world, and ideas of national sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction are increasingly problematic. States recognise that their sovereignty may be constrained by other actors, such as supranational and transnational organisations, including multinational businesses and environmental pressure groups like Greenpeace. The world is more unequal and hierarchical, with some states being better equipped than others to take advantage of trade opportunities and economic recession. States such as Japan, China and the United States enjoy greater influence over global events and processes than some entire regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and Central America. In this very unequal world, national governments such as those in the United States and Europe try to restrict the movements of people from Latin America and North Africa by the use of immigration policy and border controls. Citizenship has become problematic in tandem with sovereignty. Nation states still remain powerful actors in world politics, but for how much longer? In the face of advancing globalisation, the realist world of the sovereign state and national jurisdiction may be changed in the not-too-distant future. Geopolitics involves managing global political events for narrow and usually nationalist strategic ends. Since the late 1990s the term ‘geopolitics’ has included the search for strategic reserves of mineral resources across the globe. Global economics are exerting a decisive influence on the pattern of planning and decision making, in contrast to the Cold War when political and military considerations dominated. See also: Political Geography.

Bibliography Dodds, K. (2000) Geopolitics in a Changing World, New York: Prentice Hall (Pearson Education). Kidron, M. and Smith, D. (1991) The New State of War and Peace: An International Atlas, London: Harper Collins (Grafton Books). O’Tuathail, G. (1996) Critical Geopolitics, London: Routledge. Prescott, J.R.V. (1965) The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, London: Hutchinson University Library, and Chicago: Aldine.

Further Reading Blacksell, M. (2006) Political Geography, London: Routledge. Faringdon, H. (1989) Strategic Geography, London and New York: Routledge. Holsti, K.J. (1974) International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 2nd edn, London: Prentice Hall International. Kinder, H. and Hilgemann, W. (1995) The Penguin Atlas of World History, Vol. II, London: Penguin.

gloBal ThReaTs: Beyond TeRRoR During 2006–7 in the United Kingdom, an alternative view of ‘global threats’ began to circulate, especially in government circles. This view was linked with what is seen as a more progressive foreign policy, aiming to make the world peaceful and prosperous by putting more effort into development. Those who took this view argued that the world faces threats more serious and long-lasting than global terrorism. Even that threat is not going to be defeated by the ‘war on terror’ alone. The war on terror cannot be won by military means, because there is no single enemy with a clear identity and predictable objectives, but rather loose, shifting, disparate groups. In outlook, they have little in common apart from a distorted view of the world. Such people want to 82

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force their specific values on others by violence, without debate. Implying that these people are part of a war on terror makes them feel over-important. In the eyes of many observers, the war on terror is in need of an overhaul, as Al Qaeda is stronger than ever. Terrorist groups can only be persuaded away from violence if the developed world genuinely fights poverty and injustice. Not all terrorists will accede to reason, for ideological reasons, but their claim to legitimacy will be weakened. Terrorism has an economic impact too. In recent years it has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people, many poor and many Muslims. After 11 September 2001 it affected 10 million people, who were kept in extreme poverty by the global economic shock. Other challenges face the world. The poverty divide is wider than ever between North and South. This will continue to cause strong global migratory pressures, with violence and endemic insecurity. There will be greater competition and conflict over energy resources, since over two thirds of the world’s oil and much of its natural gas is found in the Gulf region. There is a growing and urgent need for greater fairness in sharing the benefits of globalisation, and the West should stop blocking its markets to imports from poorer countries. Climate change is another global threat where individual and national interests are bound up with global interests. Changes in temperature and rainfall affect agriculture and water supplies. More and more people in the developing world will need adequate water supplies, because urban populations in the Third World are expected to double to nearly 4 billion by 2040. By 2010, nearly a billion people in the Third World will be of working age. Energy conservation is now being taken up by many countries, at least in the developed world. Reducing dependence on

fossil fuels will curb climate change and reduce the risk of further wars in the Gulf region. Debt relief, sustainable development and trade reform will help to lessen global impoverishment. These could take another half century to come to fruition. Public pressure around the world will exist for short-term actions to prevent long-term problems. In an interdependent world this is the greatest challenge. See also: Environmental and Ecological Security; Poverty and Debt. Bibliography Abbott, C., Rogers, P. and Sloboda, J. (2007) Beyond Terror: The Truth About the Real Threats to Our World, London: Rider & Co. Rogers, P. (2002) ‘Political Violence and Global Order’ in Booth, K. and Dunne, T. (eds), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 215–25.

gloBalisaTion Since 1945, there has been increasing tension between the integrity of states and their growing economic, cultural and political integration – often called globalisation. The logic of globalisation is that of peace and democracy. Yet the world’s balance is continually being tipped by worrying counterweights: resurgent nationalism, religious fundamentalist violence, tensions and rivalries among the major powers, proliferation of nuclear weapons outside the ‘nuclear club’ (USA, USSR, China, France and UK), civil wars (as in the former Yugoslavia and much of Africa) and xenophobia. Economic globalisation can be seen as lacking social justice. It has led to growing strains between North and South – on issues of debt cancellation, fair trade and the role of the International Monetary Fund – and it is closely linked to the perceived sweep of Americanisation, and 83

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the growth of international and regional organisations. It has made tensions over trade more likely because of the huge changes in trade, international business and technology. Some multinationals have enormous financial clout and are wealthier than twenty or thirty nations in the Third World. Many nations in the poor South could say with some conviction that globalisation has passed them by. The South sees globalisation as driven by self-interest and ideology in the richer North, rather than humanitarian factors. The South would like to see a global regulatory framework in such areas as human rights, migration and refugees. Some see globalisation as unwanted uniformity across the globe. For example, many zealots in the Islamic world see Western culture as a threat to local religion and culture, in Afghanistan, Algeria or Pakistan. Yet, despite its growing influence, globalisation has not led to any lessening of regional conflict in the Middle East, parts of Africa or east Asia, places where international arms deals are often linked to money laundering. It is not surprising if the poor, uprooted and dispossessed seek salvation in terrorism. Even the terrible events of 9/11 were brought to the world by the communications grid of globalisation. The transmission of such dramatic pictures pierced America’s sense of invulnerability, sending out a ripple of terror that touched all aspects of intercontinental communication and commerce. In some cases global changes have weakened governments and strengthened the forces that seek to overthrow them. Any state that is weakened by global change provides an environment in which poorly-constituted insurgent forces can survive. Globalisation of insurgency leads inexorably to the globalisation of counter-insurgency. However, in many quarters people see a

new idealism, expressed in the notions of a benign new world order, ranging since the 1990s from new roles for the United Nations to the central role of the United States as the sole superpower. What has slowly emerged in the globalised world is a post-materialist global civil society. See also: Military Globalisation; Multinationals and Conflict. Bibliography Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (eds) (1997) The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Diehl, P.F. (ed.) (1997) The Politics of Global Governance: International Organisations in a Interdependent World, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner. Held, D. and McGrew, A. (2002) Globalisation/Anti-Globalisation, Cambridge: Polity Press. Nolan, J.E. (ed.) (1994) Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, Washington DC: Brookings Institution.

Further Reading Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformations Politics, Economics and Culture, Oxford: Blackwell. Mansbach, R.W. (1997) The Global Puzzle, 2nd edn, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

goRBaChev doCTRine When the Brezhnev Doctrine was seen to have outlived its usefulness, it was Gorbachev who saw that the huge need for reform in the Soviet Union meant that it must be free of external encumbrances. He made it clear that the Soviet Union would not intervene politically or militarily in other states, including its Warsaw Pact allies, and would withdraw troops stationed abroad. Mikhail Gorbachev became Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party in 84

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March 1985, and began to create new thinking about domestic and foreign policy. He was keen to bring about a democratisation of society. He called for glasnost (‘transparency’), to open up society and achieve internal democracy, and perestroika (‘restructuring’) to allow social, economic and political change. His policy of glasnost led to a growth in crime through the development of criminal gangs. The antagonism of the bureaucrats whose careers were endangered led Gorbachev to make his reforms more fundamental. In 1991, Soviet bureaucrats made an abortive attempt to turn back the clock. The failure of the coup meant the end of the Cold War and the end of the old order. Once in office, Gorbachev rapidly realised that his reforms could only succeed if he cut defence spending and overseas commitments. He wished to make Russia self-sufficient in nuclear weapons, reduce Soviet forces and adopt a non-provocative posture abroad. The price of being a superpower with ideological and political hegemony had too high an economic cost. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty signed in 1987 was the most significant arms control measure since the start of the Cold War. Soviet troops were recalled from Afghanistan, and military activities in southern Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf were scaled back. The Soviet Union spearheaded peace initiatives in the Middle East and recognised the state of Israel. Growing nationalist unrest, ethnic rivalries and economic dissatisfaction – all of them exacerbated by glasnost and perestroika – created secessionist movements in the Soviet republics, which ultimately led to the disintegration of the empire. Power had moved from the centre to the periphery. This disintegration led to concerns about the command and control of nuclear weapons and Security Council membership, which passed to Russia. The Gorbachev Doctrine had caused the col-

lapse of the Soviet Union, which ceased to be a geopolitical entity. Gorbachev had many unilateral initiatives during his first four years in office: halting the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe, a (regularly extended) moratorium on nuclear testing, a proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons (the Reykjavik Summit, 1986), a three-point plan to reduce conventional weapons in Europe (Moscow Summit, 1988), an announcement (made at the United Nations) that Soviet troops would be cut by 500,000, the withdrawal of 500 tactical nuclear weapons from eastern Europe and a 14 per cent cut in the Soviet defence budget. President Putin moved away from the Gorbachev doctrine. In 2007–8 he threatened to target missiles at the cities of former Warsaw Pact allies if US radar stations were set up in the Czech Republic and Poland. His successor in 2008, Dmitry Medvedev, has expressed concern at Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO. See also: Soviet Union; Cold War. Bibliography McCauley, M. (2004) Russia, America and the Cold War, 2nd edn, Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education. Young, J.W. (1996) Cold War Europe, 1945– 1991: A Political History, revd edn, New York: St Martin’s Press.

Further Reading Smith, M.A. (2000) NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

goveRnmenTs and ConfliCT and CRisis managemenT States have a strong interest in the governments of other states and use various means to influence who holds power. Conflicts over governments may be mild or severe, but whether they involve third parties or are more or less bilateral, 85

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such conflicts are likely to lead to the use of violence. They involve the core issues of the status and integrity of states, the stakes tend to be high and the interests of those involved are totally opposed. During the Cold War, both the USA and the USSR promoted changes of government in Third World countries through covert operations and support of rebel armies. In Nicaragua and Angola, both countries poured in weapons, money and military advisers, in the hope of influencing the composition of the country’s government. In the Third World, military governments are most common. The military may be the only large modern institution in the country, and the discipline of military forces makes them effective tools of state influence. A coup d’état is a seizure of power by domestic military forces – a change of political power outside the state’s constitutional order. The first to suffer are the civilian politicians. Such governments often find it difficult to establish their legitimacy because they acquire power by force, not by popular mandate. Whether conflict occurs, or not, can depend on government bargaining in which foreign policy decisions result from the bargaining process among various government agencies that may have divergent interests in the outcome. Multinational corporations may conflict with host governments on questions of security and stability. If a war or revolution takes away the ability of a multinational corporation to operate effectively, the company loses income and capital; it may uproot itself from the war-torn country, plunging the government into new crises. Information can be used against a government by other states or by domestic political opponents. Governments, especially repressive ones, fear the free flow of information. In Burma (Myanmar) and

Thailand, on and off since the early 1990s, protesters have outwitted repressive governments by using mobile (cellular) phones or short-wave radio broadcasts. During and after the Tiananmen protests in China in 1989, the authorities tried to stop the flow of information. In the Cold War, the Soviet Union restricted the use of international phone lines, photocopiers and (in later years) computers to reduce the influence of foreign ideas. In conflict situations, a government can gain international influence by spreading false as well as true information: disinformation was put out by both sides during the Cold War (by Radio Moscow and Radio Free Europe). Governments realise that violence or war is a tremendous obstacle to economic growth and satisfying people’s needs. Many a government starts out as revolutionary and over time realises that it has similar interests to other states, promoting national sovereignty and integrity. The rules of the international system work for the revolutionaries instead of against them, once they control a state. Poverty in the South has led huge numbers of migrants to seek a better life in the North, which has created international political friction. Millions of refugees have been and are on the move; under international law and norms, states are supposed to accept refugees but do not have to accept migrants. North–South relations, rooted in economic reality, reflect the close connections of economies with international security. See also: Crisis and Risk Management. Bibliography David, S.R. (1987) Third World Coups d’Etat and International Security, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Goldstein, J.S. (1999) International Relations, 3rd edn, New York: Longman. Klieman, A. (1976) ‘Emergency Politics: The Growth of Crisis Government’, Conflict

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tion of the invasion. Most Latin American states did not support the US position. This meant that the Rio Treaty (the interAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) was not invoked and the Organisation of American States did not take collective action. After the four-day campaign, the interim government set up under US auspices began dismantling the communist economic and social structures. The island, like many of its Caribbean neighbours, remains deep in poverty with high unemployment. See also: Haiti.

Studies, No. 70, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. Soyinka, W. (2004) The Climate of Fear – The Reith Lectures 2004, London: Profile Books.

Further Reading Brown, M.E. (ed.) (1996) The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Deutsch, K.W. (1969) The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control, New York: The Free Press. Hough, P. (2004) Understanding Global Security, London: Routledge.

Bibliography gRenada The small Caribbean island of Grenada gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1974. In October 1983 a hard-line Marxist cabal staged a bloody coup d’état against the repressive proCuban government of Maurice Bishop. Several Eastern Caribbean states requested US military intervention. On the pretext of rescuing American students, a decision was made to move quickly, which involved a high degree of improvisation. The main resistance was expected to come from Cuban military advisers, but little was seen of them. The US public approved President Reagan’s decision to take military action, yet his administration was accused of disregarding international law. The USA made great efforts to show that its actions were permitted within the rules of international war. Because of its close geographical location, Latin America and Caribbean security has historically preoccupied US policy makers. The United States invaded Grenada simply to change its government. It can be hard for such new governments to gain legitimacy domestically, and the international community frowns on such overt violations of national sovereignty. There was almost universal condemna-

Lewis, G.K. (1987) Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Sim, R. and Anderson, J. (1980) ‘The Caribbean Strategic Vacuum’, Conflict Studies, No. 121, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

gueRRilla waRfaRe The word guerrilla (‘little war’) is used of non-military fighting in support of a popular insurgency. Guerrilla warfare is an ideal outlet for personal aggression; it gives powers to those hitherto powerless, allowing them to settle accounts with their enemies. Organisation, propaganda and terror are essential in guerrilla war, but their importance has increased and become more sophisticated. Organisation implies a political party or movement giving assistance in the form of money, arms and intelligence. Propaganda is important in civil wars when the majority of the population takes a neutral attitude to the struggle between incumbents and insurgents. Terror is used as a deliberate strategy to demoralise the government by disrupting its control, so demonstrating the guerrillas’ strength and frightening collaborators. Guerrilla warfare is the struggle for the 87

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support of the majority of the people. It is often based on Guevara’s theory of revolution. Che Guevara was a guerrilla fighter of Argentinian origin. He was Fidel Castro’s right-hand man in the Cuban revolution of 1959, in the 1960s he went to South America to spread his revolutionary message and in 1967 was killed by the Bolivian Army. Since his death, ‘Che’ has become a legendary hero and cult figure among leftwing students and other radicals in the Western world. Guevara’s strategy of revolutionary activity – and hence the importance of the guerrilla – assumed that people’s forces would win a war against a regular army and should then wait until all conditions were favourable for a revolution. Options in the armed struggle included an insurrection, a rural guerrilla campaign and an urban guerrilla campaign. Because Guevara could not separate true Marxism from Communist distortions, he became impatient and looked for shortcuts to revolution. This led him to disdain other forms of class struggle, such as strikes. Another model of guerrilla warfare was produced by Carlos Marighela, a Brazilian revolutionary whose ‘Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla’ was widely used from the 1970s onwards. It had four stages. First, immediate guerrilla activity would lead to the growth of organisations unleashing revolutionary action, calling for extreme violence and spawning two forces: urban guerrilla warfare (proletariat and students), attacking government forces and attacking or expropriating sources of US finance and capitalism, and psychological warfare, which would involve low-level terrorism and propaganda. Second, the government would be provoked into repression, polarising social groups. Mobile rural guerrilla groups would emerge. Third, a people’s army would inflict defeat on government forces, and a general strike would follow. Fourth came

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seizure of power. A crisis point would be the stage when guerrilla activities needed central co-ordination. Another detailed model of guerrilla warfare was developed by Régis Debray, a French revolutionary theorist active among urban and rural guerrillas in South America in the 1960s. He argued that indigenous and foreign career revolutionaries would join forces in maximum secrecy and fight a guerrilla war in three phases. Jungle and/or mountain reconnaissance would be followed by a small training operation against the regime. Operational columns would be formed and guerrilla bases established, numbers would increase and regional guerrillas and urban squads would evolve. The resultant people’s army would go on the defensive, regional urban groups would keep government forces tied down, mobile forces would attack selected targets and there would be a general strike coinciding with a conventional offensive in the capital. Debray believed that intellectuals were invaluable to the success of any revolutionary cause, but that they took part in such activity with a bad conscience. For him, the struggle against oppression approached the status of a fight for a sacred cause. See also: Cuba; Latin America; Terrorists and Guerrillas: Differences. Further Reading Laqueur, W. (1998) Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study, New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers. Thackrah, J.R. (2004) Dictionary of Terrorism, 2nd edn, London: Routledge.

gulf waR, 1991 By the time of the 1998 ceasefire in the Iran–Iraq War, Iraq was virtually bankrupt and heavily indebted to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In 1989, in defiance of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas, 88

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Kuwait increased its oil production by 40 per cent. Oil prices collapsed, with a catastrophic impact on Iraq, which called it economic warfare, claiming Kuwait was also slant-drilling into Iraq’s Rumaila oilfield. Negotiations stalled between Iraq and Kuwait in July 1990, and Iraq massed troops on the border. The US Ambassador to Iraq signalled that the USA had no opinion on Arab–Arab border disputes. The US State Department denied this was the green light for an attack on Kuwait, but many think Saddam Hussein was led to believe the United States was not interested in the issue. In August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded and annexed Kuwait. UN resolutions and diplomacy had no effect, so the UN set a deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait and authorised the use of force. The coalition of nearly thirty nations was led by the United States; the other main contingents came from the United Kingdom, France and Egypt. A six-week air offensive began in January 1991, in which ‘smart weapons’ destroyed large amounts of Iraqi equipment, inflicting many casualties. A five-day ground war destroyed the remnants of the Iraqi army in or near Kuwait. Saddam Hussein responded by firing missiles at the Israeli cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa, hoping to bring Israel into the war and break up the Arab alliance against him. He was unsuccessful. He then set fire to the oil wells in Kuwait, threatening an economic crisis. The Iraqi missiles highlighted Israel’s vulnerability and undermined the self-confidence of the PLO, because missiles aimed at Jerusalem could hit the West Bank next door. The very fact that the USA had sent troops to Kuwait, in close proximity to the most holy Islamic sites, was anathema to many Arabs, who deemed it hostile to Islam and a Christian plot. Iraq was defeated, but Hussein kept his hold on power and relentlessly supported international terrorism. His use of missiles to

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attack cities without warning scared the rest of the world and inspired terrorists. In the aftermath of the Gulf War there was a surge in arms sales or transfers, especially in the Middle East. An abundance of weapons in an unstable region always increases the risk of new weapons being acquired by terrorists or their state sponsors. The war brought into the open the issue of biological agents and warfare. Terrorists had seen the fear generated by the threat of biological and chemical agents – which Saddam Hussein was believed to have stockpiled. The West feared an Iraqi-sponsored terror campaign, with hijacking and bombings. Ironically, the Gulf War was one of the safest times to travel abroad, since security at airports and on airlines was at its highest point; although, on the day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (2 August 1990), a British Airways flight was seized at Kuwait airport en route to Malaysia, and its passengers held as hostages against allied bombing raids on Iraq. From the Gulf War onwards the media played a significant role in the public’s concerns that terrorists might use weapons of mass destruction. The media kept the world well informed of the implications of the war on terrorism. Oil was at the core of the Gulf War and, as a vital resource for the global economy, has been an important factor in terroristguerrilla activity in the Middle East. Elsewhere, terrorism continued apace, for example in Germany, Jordan, Lebanon, Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Turkey; quite a few of these incidents involved US nationals. The IRA attacked in London – with a bomb at Victoria Station and an attempt in February 1991 to destroy 10 Downing Street with a missile during a Cabinet meeting. During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein made terrorist threats that were nullified by worldwide security and intelligence; moreover, he had no organised central 89

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command of terror networks. But his actions showed how unprepared the USA was to fight terrorism within its borders. See also: Iran–Iraq War, 1980–88; Gulf War, 2003; Iraq.

2003

gulf waR, 2003 After the end of the First Gulf War in 1991, the United Nations passed resolutions which imposed strict conditions on Iraq, to remove the threat Saddam Hussein posed to neighbouring countries. In 1992, the United Nations declared that it would no longer tolerate the Iraqi regime’s continuing defiance of international law. Despite this, Iraq continued to prevaricate over the role of UN weapons inspectors. The United States and United Kingdom wanted the Security Council to approve a new resolution authorising military action if Iraq did not comply with existing resolutions. They stressed Iraq’s potential to develop weapons of mass destruction and its supposed links to Islamic terrorists. Many other nations, such as China, Russia and France, were sceptical about the ‘threat’ to world peace posed by Saddam Hussein. Eventually, the United Kingdom joined an American-led coalition prepared to use force to secure Iraqi compliance. The main objective was to disarm Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction. The coalition promised that, if force was necessary, civilian casualties would be minimised and emergency humanitarian aid would be provided. In January 2003 the UN weapons inspectors returned to Iraq, but the Americans and their allies did not wait any longer for evidence of weapons of mass destruction or for a new UN resolution. They launched air and land attacks on Iraq on 20 March. In May, major combat operations ended and UN economic sanctions were lifted. See also: Gulf War, 1991; Iraq.

Bibliography Barnaby, F. (1991) ‘Arms Control After the Gulf War’, Conflict Studies, No. 240, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Bulloch, J. (1989) The Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences, London: Methuen. Khaddun, M. and Ghareeb, E. (1997) War in the Gulf, 1990–91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and its Implications, Oxford: Oxford University Press. O’Ballance, E. (1988) The Gulf War, London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers. Ryan, M. (2003) Baghdad or Bust: The Inside Story of Gulf War 2, Barnsley: Leo Cooper/Pen and Sword.

Further Reading Danchev, A. and Keohane, D. (eds) (1994) International Perspectives in the Gulf Conflict, 1990–91, London: St Martin’s Press, in association with St Antony’s College, Oxford. Freedman, L. and Karsh, E. (1993) The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, London: Faber & Faber. Halliday, F. (2002) Two Hours that Shook the World: September 11, 2001 – Causes and Consequences, London: Saqi Books. Kemp, G. and Stein, J.G. (eds) (1995) Powder Keg in the Middle East: Struggle for Gulf Security, Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Simon, Jeffrey (2004) ‘Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era’ in US Foreign Policy Agenda, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 28–34. Washington DC: US Dept of State, Bureau of International Information Programs.

Bibliography Cornish, P. (ed.) (2004) The Conflict in Iraq, 2003, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Eyal, J. (ed.) (2003) War in Iraq: Combat and Consequence, London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies.

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Matthews, K. (1993) The Gulf Conflict and International Relations, London: Routledge.

2003

Hiro, D. (1992) Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War, London: Harper Collins, and New York: Routledge. Williamson, M. and Scales, R.H. Jr (2003) The Iraq War, Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Further Reading Cordesman, A.H. (2003) The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons, Westport CT: Praeger.

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haiTi Occupying the western part of the island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean, Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the world. Ethnic friction, between Haitians of African descent and mulattos, and general political instability have prevailed since 1945. Several coups occurred until Dr François Duvalier came to power in 1956 – his regime soon degenerated into a personal dictatorship maintained by a private army, the Tontons Macoutes. He was known as ‘Papa Doc’ and made himself president for life. At his death in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude, known as ‘Baby Doc’, came to power, but democracy remained elusive. After his overthrow in 1986, military regimes were in control until in February 1991 a priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, won a landslide victory in Haiti’s first free election. In October 1991 a military coup overthrew Aristide, which brought global condemnation. There was a diplomatic campaign for Aristide’s return to power. The United Nations imposed a financial, oil and arms embargo on Haiti in 1993. An agreement was signed guaranteeing the return of Aristide and an amnesty for those involved in the military coup. Violence followed, which prompted the United States to send a warship to patrol the coast, enforcing a naval embargo. In October 1994, Aristide returned to power, and the country was occupied by a multi-national force led by the United States. A year later, this force was replaced by United Nations troops. President Preval replaced Aristide in 1996, but the UN troops stayed to prevent

further violence against politicians, kidnapping and murders. Violence continued to affect the country and tainted the 2001 elections, which returned Aristide to power. He disbanded the army, but exsoldiers and corrupt police participated in a spate of killings, and threats were made to dozens of journalists. Violence escalated and in 2004 Aristide went into exile in Africa, insisting he was still president. United States troops joined a peacekeeping army consisting mainly of French and Canadians. In disputed elections in 2006, Preval became president again, but the country remains politically unstable. See also: Grenada. Bibliography and Further Reading Ciment, J. and Hill, K (eds) (1999) Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, Vols I–II, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn.

haves and have-noTs This term is used to imply an unequal or hierarchical division in the world, especially the great disparities of wealth between the rich, industrialised North and the developing or underdeveloped South – sometimes called satisfied and dissatisfied nations – and this leads to conflicts and tensions. States struggle with each other to keep or expand their share of the world’s resources, and this diverts them from taking action on the long-term common interests of humanity. Many conflicts and civil wars since 1945 had their origins in the South, putting intense pressure on the better-off in these areas to move to the North. The North often feels threatened by the South and 92

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puts up barriers: to people, to trade and even to dialogue. See also: Globalisation; North–South Global Issues; Poverty and Debt.

1975

The Helsinki Accords were signed in 1975 by members of NATO, the Warsaw Pact and a group of neutral European countries. The Accords aimed to promote confidence-building measures, the free flow of people and ideas, and economic and scientific co-operation. They asserted the principles of inviolability of borders, non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for human rights and fundamental liberties. The Helsinki Agreements codified East–West détente in the Cold War. Human rights became a legitimate topic in negotiations for the first time, with basic rights of political dissent guaranteed in Communist countries. Although the Accords were often breached, they provided important standards by which governments’ behaviour was judged. Helsinki was part of a process to build confidence between the potential adversaries. The Accords were the start of a long period of slow relaxation of the Soviet grip in Eastern Europe, along with relaxation within the Soviet Union. Follow-up conferences were held regularly to make sure that the Helsinki Accords were being observed. Furthermore, at the 1998 Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, measures were put in place to reduce the risk of war in Europe: prior notification of military manoeuvres, invitations to states to observe military exercises, exchange of information on future military activity and the right to demand on-site inspection. The Accords were not a treaty, but a set of agreements that all parties undertook to implement. They were a sign of the end of bipolarity in Europe and the end of the Cold War. The new geopolitics was multipolar or pluralist, and traditional military/ security issues took second place to political, economic, social and humanitarian ones. Helsinki created almost binding

Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

hawks and doves This is a term used primarily in American politics. A hawk is a hard-liner, concerned with not appearing to be weak, and very keen on using power to maximum advantage. In the eyes of the hawk, a state needs firmness and resolution in the face of the enemy. Hawks prefer to use coercion in a crisis, even brinkmanship, which can lead to war. A dove prefers a cautious approach, avoiding provocation, working towards negotiation and mediation. They wish to be accommodating and try to avoid war at all costs. The less provocative one is, the more one is likely to achieve reconciliation. See also: Cold War; Psychology and Conflict; United States. Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

helsinki aCCoRds, 1975 Talks leading up to the Accords began in 1972 at ambassadorial level, and in 1973 the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe opened in Helsinki – the first such gathering of all European nations (except Albania) since the Congress of Vienna, 1815. 93

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expectations of the conduct of participating states. See also: Détente; Peaceful Coexistence.

by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, China and later other countries. Thus began the age of nuclear deterrence, in which peace was kept by the threat of nuclear annihilation, at least until the end of the Cold War – the first conflict between two nuclear powers, even though no nuclear exchange took place. The enormous destruction seen in the two Japanese cities concentrated the minds of would-be transgressors and led to enormous effort being devoted to arms control and disarmament, with hopes of ending the building of weapons for mass destruction, so far without much success. The vast arsenal of destructive power underlying the balance of terror, demonstrated in Japan in August 1945, made war a less attractive instrument for securing the political objectives of the state. For the nuclear powers, it eliminated war as a rational instrument of state policy and grossly increased the dangers of accidental war. See also: Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear Strikes; Nuclear Testing.

Bibliography McCauley, M. (2004) Russia, America and the Cold War, 2nd edn, Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education. Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press.

Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin.

hiRoshima and nagasaki These two Japanese cities were destroyed by the dropping of atom bombs by the United States Air Force in August 1945. These two bombs ushered in the atomic or nuclear age in international politics. The terrible destruction they caused has seared the global conscience ever since. In Hiroshima, 150,000 people were killed or wounded, and 75 per cent of the city’s buildings were destroyed or severely damaged. In Nagasaki about 75,000 people were killed or injured and a third of the city was destroyed. How far the bombing of the two cities actually precipitated the Japanese surrender, and the end of the Second World War, remains tendentious. There were plans to use atom bombs on other Japanese cities, but Hiroshima was the first and Nagasaki (so far) the last time that nuclear weapons were used against enemy targets. They changed the world and the nature of warfare forever, for no one could uninvent the atom bomb. In an atom bomb, energy is produced by nuclear fission, and the two common isotopes used are Uranium 235 and Plutonium 239. The United States was closely followed in building atom bombs

Bibliography and Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin.

hiv/aids and oTheR diseases: seCuRiTy impliCaTions AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) has been a major topic in discussion of the well-being of global society ever since the first cases, in the early 1980s. The global pandemic has created far-reaching human problems, including the destabilisation of societies, demographic imbalance in affected populations, slow economic growth in countries badly affected and the danger that their problems may be forgotten by the rest. AIDS symptoms include chronic fatigue or weakness, severe and sustained weight loss, lymph gland swelling, diarrhoea and 94

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the deterioration of the central nervous system to the point of dementia. Many people with AIDS die within the year of HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus). HIV is a retrovirus, reversing the usual biological process, and causes illnesses such as cancer. HIV attacks white cells, which are a key part of the body’s immune response. Opportunistic infections characteristic of AIDS can occur. In the Third World there is a strong tendency to allocate blame for AIDS: in Uganda it is believed to have been introduced by Tanzanian soldiers (who intervened in 1979) and traders, whereas the Tanzanians believe it came from Uganda. During the later years of apartheid in South Africa, the media emphasised the likely decimation of blacks, implying that whites were somehow immune. Many Africans believe AIDS is a conspiracy to wipe out the black population using a disease developed in the West. Some countries have placed travel restrictions on those who were HIV-positive. Many huge pharmaceutical companies have been working to produce vaccines and a cure, competing in a form of scientific nationalism. Research duplication has resulted and the waste of valuable finance has been almost unethical. Some observers have argued that HIV could affect the leadership and political stability of African countries. The view assumes that educated people and political leaders are among the first to be infected, because of their greater wealth. Second-tier replacements will give poorer leadership, increasing the likelihood of instability. Vested interests may dominate the government in the belief that they can govern better or more profitably. Since the onset of HIV and AIDS, there has been a real danger that Africa may be seen as unclean, and that the treatment, care and concern given to the wealthy will not be given to the poor. War and civil strife can lead to outbreaks of disease,

creating refugee disasters and a breakdown in public health care. Population movements destabilise, and weak societies are made weaker by the ravages of epidemics, causing existing tensions to become uncontrollable. The disease is one of poverty and underdevelopment. The spread of HIV is associated with conflict. Because they are more mobile, service personnel in affected countries have been found to have levels of HIV much higher than in the general population. In Burma (Myanmar), AIDS was a factor in the disintegration of the country. In Uganda, the spatial distribution of AIDS was found to be related to the ethnic composition of the army, coinciding with the overthrow of Idi Amin. War has often been accompanied by disease. Soldiers have spread disease in the field, and brought it back with them when they returned home. ‘Gulf War Syndrome’ – a cocktail of debilitating symptoms – occurred among soldiers who returned otherwise unhurt from the 1991 war against Iraq. Military forces can also help fight the spread of disease, by enforcing quarantine, moving supplies into regions stricken by epidemics or providing field medical facilities. From a strategic perspective, infectious diseases shape military strategy, because disease creates casualties just as easily as enemy fire. Historically, disease has killed more soldiers than enemy action. The seven deadliest diseases – HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, Hepatitis B and C, lower respiratory infections, diarrhoealinked disease and measles – can cause as much devastation as the deadliest wars. Bibliography Whiteside, A. and FitzSimons, D. (1992) ‘The AIDS Epidemic: Economic, Political and Security Implications’, Conflict Studies, No. 251, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

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Further Reading

ture Protection. The new Department is one of the Standing Committees in the House of Representatives. In March 2008, the first UK national security strategy listed the key threats as terrorism, nuclear weapons, global instability, international crime, civil emergency and espionage. Britain faces an unprecedented array of threats, from ambitious terrorist plots and cyber spies stealing state secrets to disease and flooding. A stark warning was issued: nowhere was safe and the country had to be vigilant. The problem is that a Homeland Security programme offers no context that allows people to judge how afraid their governments think they should be. See also: New Terrorism in the 21st Century.

Baylis, J., Wirtz, J., Cohen, E. and Gray, C.S. (2002) Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

homeland seCuRiTy This idea has developed fast since 2001, starting in the United States and now gaining credence in the United Kingdom. The events in New York on 11 September 2001 and in London on 7 July 2005 showed how unprepared both countries were to face terrorist attacks. New York epitomised the world’s and America’s business hub, London the centre of finance and an intelligence community. Both cities were iconic targets. As a result, the US Government unified its approach to fighting terrorism in a new, lavishly funded Department for Homeland Security, with Tom Ridge as Secretary. In the United Kingdom, many in security and intelligence want to see unified command and control, not just for London but for the whole country. Some observers have suggested one person to rule over all matters pertaining to homeland security and intelligence. More chemical, radiological and nuclear expertise is required, with better training and regular emergency exercises, all of which require money. To try to prevent any repeat of September 11, the USA increased the number of sky marshals on civil flights, and the UK could follow. Since September 2004, travellers to the USA from 27 industrialised countries have been photographed and fingerprinted on arrival. Tom Ridge said the aim was to prevent terrorist attacks within the USA, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and minimise the damage from potential attacks. The Department has five directorates: Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Science and Technology, Management, and Information Analysis and Infrastruc-

Bibliography Hasham, M. (2002) ‘The Shared Challenges of Homeland Security’, RUSI World Defence Systems, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 39–41.

hong kong From its inception in 1949, the government of communist China increasingly isolated the country from outside influence, and Hong Kong became its sole point of contact with the Western world. The colony was thrown into chaos by the riots of 1967 when pro-communist leftists, inspired by the Cultural Revolution on the mainland, turned a labour dispute into a violent uprising against the colonial government lasting until the end of the year. After the Vietnam War in 1975, the Hong Kong government spent 25 years dealing with the entry and repatriation of Vietnamese refugees. In 1984 the UK agreed to transfer Hong Kong back to China in 1997. Hong Kong was to be governed as a special administrative region, retaining its laws and high degree of autonomy for at least 50 years after its transfer. See also: China. 96

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humaniTaRian inTeRvenTion Having the interests of mankind at heart is as old as recorded history, but large-scale, international intervention to help fellow human beings is a recent phenomenon. It may involve the use of military force to take pressure off civilians. Some of these operations have suffered initially from a lack of consensus in the international community. Examples include India’s intervention in Bangladesh in 1971; Tanzania in Uganda in 1979; the overthrow of Emperor Bokassa by France in the Central African Republic in 1979; the United States in Grenada in 1983; the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia from 1990 onwards; the coalition operation in Somalia in 1992–94; NATO bombing of Bosnian-Serb artillery positions in Bosnia in 1995; the armed intervention of West African nations and the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone in 1997–2002; coalition forces supporting the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 2003; the French-led forces in Haiti from 2004; and even operations since 2001 in Iraq and Afghanistan can be seen as partly humanitarian. During the Cold War and the so-called New World Order period, refugee movements have ensured the growth of humanitarian intervention. This is because human rights abuse, genocide and ethnic conflicts cause foreign policy problems in neighbouring nations. Above all, refugees impose heavy economic burdens on the host, leading to domestic pressure, instability and interstate tension. The attitude of Western nations can be very different from those in the Third World: the West tends to think in terms of obligations to (and of) citizens, and adjust treatment on the basis of class, caste and ethnicity. See also: Genocide; Peacekeeping; Refugees.

1956

Violations’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 143– 77. Minear, L. and Weiss, T.G. (1995) Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community, Boulder CO: Westview Press. O’Halloran, P.J. (1995) ‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Genocide in Rwanda’, Conflict Studies, No. 277, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

hungaRy, 1956 After the Second World War, Hungary came under the Soviet sphere of influence. Democratic parties were disbanded. In 1953 amid a rise of terror and Stalinisation of many of the organs of state, Imre Nagy, the former interior minister and now Prime Minister proclaimed ‘a new course’ for the country. He fell from power, under pressure from the Stalinists, and this led to unrest across the country and an increasing number of demonstrations for greater liberalisation. In October 1956 there was a popular uprising when students demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops, the disbanding of the secret police, free elections and freedom of the press. The government was obliged, under pressure, to request Soviet aid. The Red Army, after bloody clashes with workers, students and Hungarian troops, retreated. As Prime Minister, Nagy formed a Cabinet with several parties and announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Soviet tank units intervened and protected the counter-government of Janos Kadar, which had Soviet support. Western aid did not materialise, largely owing to preoccupation with the Suez Crisis. Over 200,000 people fled the country. Many others were captured and executed, including Nagy, or went into hiding. Among the latter was the church leader Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty, who found

Bibliography and Further Reading Jongman, A.J. (2002) ‘Dimensions of Contemporary Conflicts and Human Rights

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asylum from 1956 until his release in 1971 in the US embassy in Budapest. The suppression of the Hungarian revolution was motivated by Soviet fears that the state would be lost to the rival ideological camp. The United Nations did not employ sanctions, but did produce a moral condemnation of the Soviet action. American support for anti-Communist uprisings had less effect after the United States had failed to intervene in Hungary. Similarly, whatever impression Soviet propagandists had made in Western Europe, particularly on the issue of anticolonialism, was probably destroyed after the Soviet Union’s actions in Hungary. It has to be said that direct military intervention by NATO in response to the Soviet action would probably have precipitated a full-scale war in Europe, leading to the use of nuclear weapons, but the passive attitude to events in Hungary was charac-

1956

teristic of Western policy in the 1950s. Containment and restraint were its fundamental principles, especially in relation to the Soviet Union and its satellites. Many Communists in Western countries began to rethink their attitude to Sovietstyle Communism. The Hungarian Communist Party was completely rebuilt, with much of its membership purged. At the time of the uprising, Imre Nagy was promised that he would be safe if he came out of hiding, but the promises were reneged upon. He was tricked into believing that he would be safe, was captured by Russian forces and, after refusing to admit his guilt, was executed in 1958. See also: Soviet Union; Cold War. Bibliography Lomax, W. (1976) Hungary, 1956, New York: St Martin’s Press, and London: Allison & Busby.

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ideologiCal waRfaRe This is the attempt to spread or impose a rival value system or way of life. Among its weapons are propaganda and foreign aid. In the Cold War the ideological struggles were East against West (totalitarianism versus democracy) and Soviet Communism against Chinese Communism. Ideological warfare brings unity by drawing together diverse peoples in a common cause; it causes disintegration by pitting true believers against one another in a holy war fired by fanaticism. Each side feels the rightness of its system as opposed to the warlike, imperialistic and decadent system of the other. With such cultural warfare there is a real danger of a military clash between those who show adherence to rival systems. See also: China; Maoism; Soviet Union.

shoot-to-kill policy, but people were able to carry on their lives much as usual. The multi-ethnic Indian state has kept a great deal of freedom, including freedom of the press. Nevertheless, people still need their political and cultural aspirations addressing. Outside the Punjab, there are other illegal movements, many of them separatist, mainly representing ethnic communities or left-wing movements. There are also many legal political parties, at national and state level. Defections from existing parties, splits and new parties have been frequent. Hindu movements are well established. The All Assam People’s Struggle Council was set up to oppose the inflow of ‘aliens’ – Muslim Bengalis who fled from East Pakistan in 1971, when that territory seceded and became Bangladesh. Many atrocities have been committed against Bengalis and three massacres were reported in 1985. The All Assam Students Group also campaigns against Bengali immigrants in Assam. Up to 10 million Hindus have been drawn to the paramilitary National Union of Selfless Servers, a communal group functioning as a secret society. It is an offshoot of the Jan Sangh sect and has provoked street violence with Muslims. Less military, but equally extremist, is the leftwing Hindu group Ananda Marg, which wishes to establish global unity on the basis of a new social economic theory, and regularly uses suicide as a way of expression. It has been active in Australia against Indian diplomats. Its political wing is the Universal Proutist Revolutionary Party.

Bibliography Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

india One of the most consistently unstable areas of India since Partition in 1947 has been the Punjab – a state rocked by the demand for independence for India’s 17 million Sikhs. As a strategic border area, the Punjab has had a large Army deployment. Also, 10 per cent of India’s soldiers come from the Punjab. Its political violence became world news with the Golden Temple incident in June 1984 and the assassination of Mrs Gandhi in October that year. The army, with close co-operation from the police, adopted a 99

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The word ‘Proutist’ is derived from the ‘progressive utility’ theory developed by one of its members, P.R. Sarkar. The best-known left-wing movement is the Naxalites. This extreme faction of the Communist Party of India (MarxistLeninist) was formed as a result of disagreements over operational strategy for the spread of communism in rural India. Originating in an armed revolutionary campaign launched in North Bengal in 1965, the Naxalites were committed to Maoist principles of people’s liberation warfare. In the 1970s some members, led by Satya Singh, rejected revolutionary Marxism to support parliamentary democracy. Others continue to carry out attacks in over half of India’s provinces, with membership around 15,000. The other chief left-wing movement is the Dalit Panthers, an organisation of young militant Harijans (untouchables) that took its inspiration in the late 1960s from the Black Panthers in the USA. They have encouraged conversions of Harijans to Islam, as a means of escaping from the caste system. In addition to the Sikh groups and those in Kashmir, India is troubled by other separatist groups. The People’s Liberation Army is a Maoist organisation operating mainly in Manipur, but advocating independence for the whole north-eastern region of India. Support comes from tribes who have rejected Hinduism as a faith identified with the cultural domination of New Delhi. The People’s Revolutionary Party of Kungleipak (PREPAK) is also active in Manipur, whose secession from the Union of India it seeks. In Mizoram, especially in the Mizo Hills in southern Assam, and along the border with Bangladesh, the Mizo National Front is active. Nagaland became a constituent state in the Union of India in 1972, since when the Naga separatist movement has pursued both armed and non-violent resistance to the incorporation. In recent years factional groups have been formed, which

have reduced its effectiveness. Also in north-eastern India are armed extremists campaigning for an independent Tripura. The radical, cultural and social organisation of Tripura Hill Youth has links with the Mizo National Front in its weaponry, training and logistical support. India has also had uneasy relation with its neighbours. In 1987, India sent troops to intervene in the conflict in Sri Lanka, to press for a ceasefire and an agreement between Tamils and Sinhalese. After suffering many casualties, they withdrew in 1990. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the Tamil Liberation movement in May 1991. Throughout the 1990s tension mounted with Pakistan, which increased its support for the Kashmir independence movement. Violence occurred during elections in various parts of India. In 1992 numerous acts of violence took place at the instigation of Hindu fundamentalists against the Islamic population in the cities of Bombay and Ayodhya. Unrest continued to simmer among the religious communities throughout the 1990s. The exploding of a nuclear device by India in May 1998 caused upset and outrage in Pakistan, which tested its own atom bomb a few weeks later. In 1999, Pakistani forces briefly crossed the UN-delineated border with Kashmir, followed by serious violations on both sides of the border. In 2002 Indian troops fired on Pakistani positions on the Kashmiri border, suicide squads attacked the Indian parliament and there were ferocious anti-Muslim attacks in Gujurat. Relations between the two countries have continued to be tense, but since 2005 there have been attempts to reach a lasting peace over Kashmir. See also: Bangladesh: War of Independence, 1971; Pakistan; South Asia. Bibliography Joshi, M. (1993) ‘Combating Terrorism in

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remained desultory, with neither side able to deliver a serious blow against the other, as neither had the weapons or men to do so. Alongside the 1949 Communist victory in the Chinese civil war and the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea, the deteriorating situation in Vietnam was just one more aspect of the Cold War. French military and political influence in the region quickly declined and the final surrender took place after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Giap’s men made better use of the local topography and resources, for example, by using bicycles and thousands of peasant porters to move dozens of heavy artillery pieces over the mountains and then dig them into place. The North Vietnamese forces were flexible, whereas the French treated the battle as a set piece. Later in 1954 the Vietnamese and French met in Geneva to negotiate an internationally monitored ceasefire in Vietnam. The Geneva Accords called for the French to recognise the independence of the Hanoi government and pull back their troops south of the 17th parallel, while the Vietminh would bring their troops back north of the demarcation line, which was to serve as a temporary line, bounded by a narrow demilitarised zone. Emperor Bao Dai, who had returned from exile in France, was head of the government in the South, but he proved to be very weak and was replaced in 1956 by a hardened anti-Communist nationalist, Ngo Dinh Diem. His policies pushed Communists and other opponents underground and they began a guerrilla war against the Saigon government, so drawing in the United States. See also: Vietnam.

Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis’, Conflict Studies, No. 261, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Qureshi, S. (1976) ‘Political Violence in the South Asia Subcontinent’ in Alexander, Y. (ed.), Terrorism: International; National; Regional and Global Perspectives, New York: Praeger, pp. 151–93.

Further Reading Leaf, M.J. (1985) ‘The Punjab Crisis’, Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 475–98. Tiwari, S.C. (ed.) (1990) Terrorism in India, New Delhi: South Asia.

indo-China, 1945–54 The first anti-colonial war after the Second World War was fought against the French in Indo-China. In 1945 the revolutionaries who controlled Hanoi in the north proclaimed independence and the founding of a republic. In 1946 France proclaimed Cochinchina (the area that later became South Vietnam) an independent republic and united it with the north, proclaiming the Associated State of Vietnam. The revolutionaries resented this action and began a guerrilla war. In neighbouring Laos, also under French control, the Pathet Lao anticolonial movement began active resistance from their refuge in Thailand. In Cambodia King Sihanouk, who had been installed by the French in 1941, gained greater independence from France in 1946. In 1953 French troops withdrew from Cambodia, forced out by the Vietnamese offensive, leaving the country fully independent in 1955. In Vietnam in late 1947, a guerrilla war began. Vo Nguyen Giap, head of the North Vietnamese forces, worked with the Communist leader Ho Chi Minh for victory over the French. The struggle

Bibliography Wintle, J. (1991) The Vietnam Wars, New York: St Martin’s Press, and London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

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Further Reading

1963–66

China was one of the few countries to support Indonesian policy. The Indonesian Army continued its campaign, but there was growing unrest at home, and the army became suspicious of Sukarno’s policies and wary of the campaign to ‘crush Malaysia’, which was as much rhetoric as military action – and a stalemate ensued. Malaysia stood firm in the face of a far greater force and ruled out talks with Indonesia until the confrontation ended. In September 1965, following a failed Communist coup in Jakarta, Indonesian military activity began to fall off. By March 1966 it was clear that the Indonesian military were tiring of the campaign. They seized power, Sukarno was succeeded by General Suharto and in August 1966 attacks ended. The Malaysians and their allies lost just over 100 men, mainly Gurkhas, while Indonesia lost over 600. The Indonesian army used the end of the war as an excuse to destroy the Communists. Later they even co-operated with Malaysian forces in Sarawak to hunt Communist bands. After this war, Britain was able to accelerate its military withdrawal east of Suez. See also: Decolonisation.

Dalloz, J. (1990) The War in Indo-China 1945–54, Savage MD: Barnes & Noble, and Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. Dunn, P.M. (1985) The First Vietnam War, New York: St Martin’s Press, and London: Hurst.

indonesia/malaya ConfRonTaTion,1963–66 This was a clash between Malaysia under Tunku Abdul Rahman, supported by Britain as its ex-colonial power, and Indonesia led by General Sukarno, pursuing a policy of ardent nationalism at the height of his power and influence. In 1961, the Malaysian leader put forward the idea of a federation of Malaya, Singapore and the British Borneo territories of Brunei, North Borneo (later Sabah) and Sarawak. The aim was to include Singapore in a wider political grouping to ensure democracy. The Indonesian leader, initially indifferent, then changed his position and denounced the proposed federation as a neo-colonial plot to maintain British interest in the area. He was also worried that the achievements of Malaysia and Singapore far outstripped the economic performance of Indonesia. Within days of the creation of the federation in September 1963, the Indonesians launched an attack on a Malaysian military base. It was repulsed with the aid of the ‘stops’ placed on the Indonesian border by helicopters to intercept the attackers’ retreat. The campaign reached a climax in 1964, with regular border incidents in Borneo and Sabah. Indonesian patrols were chased back across the frontier. British intelligence uncovered a plan for a nationwide campaign of civil disturbance and sabotage. Indonesia was condemned by the United Nations for this policy of confrontation. Shortly after Malaysia joined the UN, Indonesia cancelled its membership.

Bibliography Clutterbuck, R. (1973) Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–63, London: Faber & Faber. Cribb, R.B. (1995) Modern Indonesia: A History since 1945, London: Longman. Subritzky, J. (2000) Confronting Sukarno, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.

Further Reading Mackie, J.A.C. (1974) ‘Konfrontasi’: The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute, 1963–1966, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Vertzberger, Y. (1982) ‘The Malacca–Singapore Straits – The Suez of South-East Asia’, Conflict Studies, No. 140, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

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infoRmaTion waRfaRe This attacks information technology, by hacking into an enemy’s computer network to disrupt it, for instance by inserting a virus or false data. It can involve the manipulation, corruption, abstraction or denial of information. Information operations have a number of objectives – to protect the information infrastructure; to deter war; to disrupt enemy preparations of attack; to support peace operations and expose enemy deception; to subvert enemy morale by psychological means; and to degrade or destroy command and control systems. Attacks aim mainly to exploit the opponent’s information, deceive, disrupt or deny service, or destroy. Tactics include data and software attacks, hacking and physical attack. Advances in technology are always immediately integrated into warfare. The threat to military and civil information systems is a substantial risk to any state and calls for a national security strategy. Defence of information networks has to be organised as a single system, linking policy, doctrine, technology, assessment, valuation, training, simulation with a joint infrastructure. The main points of defence are firewalls, physical isolation and encryption, personnel security and operating procedures. Threats vary enormously in kind and magnitude, and not all are military. They include natural hazards and unintended threats, hackers, individual criminals or organised crime. Tactical military threats can be sophisticated in their technology and planning, using electronic warfare and counter-measures, stealth in military operations, arms control camouflage, concealment, deception, industrial espionage and organised crime. Strategic information threats can include extended terrorist campaigns, organised crime, industrial espionage and strategically targeted information technology operations.

All around the world, spies are trying to steal political, defence and commercial secrets by hacking into confidential data. China, Russia and other countries have electronically attacked UK Government computer systems. See also: Intelligence. Bibliography Bluhm, L.H. (1987) ‘Trust, Terrorism and Technology’, Journal of Business Ethics (July), pp. 333–41. O’Keefe, B. (1987) ‘Technology: An Introduction’, Terrorism, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 269–70. Wilkinson, P. (ed.) (1993) Technology and Terrorism, London: Frank Cass.

Further Reading Gantzel, K.J. and Schwinghammer, T. (2000) Warfare since the Second World War, New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers. Lynch, L. (1999) ‘Terrorism and Technology’ in New Millennium, Platypus Magazine, No. 65 (December), pp. 16–24. Shubik, M. (1998) Terrorism, Technology and the Socio-Economics of Death, New Haven CT: Cowles Foundation, Yale. Sprinzak, E. (1998) ‘The Great SuperTerrorism Scare’, Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Autumn), pp. 110–24.

inTelligenCe Intelligence is vitally useful in any conflict: building a database identifying the enemy personnel involved, at whatever level, and the personnel and property most at risk, therefore helping to save lives. A database can also be used to establish patterns of enemy tactics, and to improve decision-making in times of crisis. Good intelligence can be used in organising clandestine counter-attacks (covert action), by identifying supply routes, safe houses and sources of recruits, weapons and finances. It can be part of a counterpropaganda effort targeted at the support 103

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population or at those immediately involved, spreading black propaganda. It can be used to disrupt the solidarity of a enemy group, warn of impending attack and disrupt such attacks. It can inform the placement of police, military and specialist equipment. Specialist groups can disrupt the enemy’s communications network through interception or the fear of interception. Military leaders or governments can allow information to be selectively released, to win allies, dissuade hostile powers and influence decisions on political reforms which may isolate or discourage the terrorist. They can increase the amount of information available by exchanges with other services and help to manage crisis situations, offering ‘battlefield’ as opposed to strategic intelligence. See also: Information Warfare.

age a particular aspect of international affairs. A prime example is NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), which has wielded considerable influence in the world since the end of the Cold War and plays an important role supporting UN operations, for example in the former Yugoslavia. NATO has expanded its membership under the Partnership for Peace Programme, to include eastern European countries. See also: NATO. Bibliography Dodds, K. (2000) Geopolitics in a Changing World, New York: Prentice Hall (Pearson Education).

inTeRnaTional ConfliCT Incompatible goals, and the behaviours used to achieve the disputed goals, lie behind situations of international conflict, bringing together psychology and conflict. Issues in such conflicts vary widely and the parties may have different views about what the issues actually are. This, along with goal incompatibility, increases suspicion and mistrust. The adversary’s behaviour affects attitudes, and attitudes can affect situations by making it seem that the other side disputes more issues then it really does, so that a long drawn-out confrontation may develop. Destruction increases anger, and success or failure affects the sense of in-group solidarity. Conflicts widen because parties take up new issues and thus start new conflicts. New parties to the conflict take up existing issues, pursue their own goals and may be drawn in as protagonists. New issues can develop because the hopes and aspirations of the parties widen, or because there are more of them. Escalation of conflicts has often occurred since 1945. The parties to a conflict embark on a mutually destructive process of increasing coercion or violence,

Bibliography Cordesman, A.H. (2002) The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence and Force Transformation, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press. Dupont, A. (2003) ‘Intelligence for the 21st Century’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 15–39. Robertson, K.G. (1989) 1992: The Security Implications, London: Alliance, for the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies.

Further Reading Brown, S. (1994) The Causes and Prevention of War, New York: St Martin’s Press. Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

inTeRgoveRnmenTal oRganisaTion This is a body created by a group of states to man104

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threatened or actual. Destruction increases and affects more and more individuals. There is a repetitive pattern of ‘tit for tat’ exchanges over a long period of time. A similar pattern of exchanges of fundamentally similar propositions follows in disarmament negotiations in which there is no intention to disarm. Escalation is far easier than de-escalation. See also: Conflict; International Conflict Resolution.

ises, and maintaining patience. The success of any negotiation depends on the opponents having a common interest in avoiding violence. Compromises or successful negotiations are more likely if the issues or objectives under contention are specific and carefully defined, rather than vague or symbolic. Parties have to avoid the use of threats. In general, states in conflict have many other common interests. The issues need to be analysed to find a way to give both sides a pay-off and increase the rewards if they co-operate. In disarmament negotiations, if the parties are equal militarily, they need to know that similar previous negotiations have led to an acceptable compromise. International conflict may spill over into the territory or interests of a third party. In any social conflict between two nation states, the attitudes and patterns of behaviour usual in the crisis stage are those most likely to lead to violence and destruction. To avoid this, the third party (a party outside the ‘emotional field’ of the conflict) can help to restore communications between the disputants, impose cooling-off periods, investigate conditions in the area of conflict and, if necessary, help in other ways. At the bargaining stage, third-party intervention may allow governments to withdraw gracefully. A compromise yielded to a third party may be easier to accept than withdrawal in the face of the enemy. Distrust and suspicion are typical of policy makers’ attitudes in a conflict and a neutral third party can help to dispel them. The extent to which third parties ‘penetrate’ a conflict depends upon many variables, none of which alone can explain success or failure. Since settlements brokered by international bodies are based on the principle of voluntarism – both parties must accept the role and functions of the third party – it is the protagonists themselves, through their responses and willingness to be influenced, who ultimately

Bibliography Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury.

Further Reading Goldstein, J.S. (1999) International Relations, 3rd edn, New York: Longman.

inTeRnaTional ConfliCT ResoluTion The use of violence in international affairs usually ends in conquest, forced submission or deterrence, but it can be made to end with a compromise or an award. There are three main ways to achieve a compromise or award: bilateral or multilateral negotiations among the parties directly involved; mediation, where a third party with no direct interest in the issue acts as a go-between; and adjudication, where an independent third party determines a settlement which both sides agree to accept. Direct negotiations between opponents are as old as organised conflict itself, and the techniques of diplomatic bargaining have remained essentially the same. Bilateral discussions between special emissaries or professional diplomats have historically been the rule, but many conflicts involve more than two parties, so multilateral conferences have been used extensively as well. Bargaining involves clarifying the essential, non-negotiable positions, finding areas where concessions can be made, making only credible threats and prom105

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determine the third party’s success. Power does not seem to be particularly relevant in mediation efforts, though status is. One other procedure for resolving international conflicts is adjudication and arbitration, whereby the parties agree to submit the issues under contention to an independent legal tribunal. The court is supposed to decide the case on the basis of international law, and jurisdiction usually extends only to legal issues – defined loosely as the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of a fact that would constitute a breach of an international obligation, and the nature or extent of reparations. Where violence has broken out but the parties have agreed to a ceasefire or truce, the United Nations has acted to separate combatants by interpositionary forces or truce observation teams. This is usually the action taken by the Security Council or General Assembly after organising an investigatory body and appointing an agent to attempt diplomatic intervention. The high number of ceasefire violations and armistice-line incidents shows that many agreements are built on flimsy foundations. Others are at best truces, rather than real settlements. Of all the United Nations’ efforts to cope with crises, conflicts and disputes, mediation is the most difficult, and only about two out of five attempts succeed. Nevertheless, many crises and conflicts have been resolved in accordance with UN objectives because of the mediation of a commission or individual. Information-gathering and service functions of the United Nations have been on the whole more successful than mediation. Fact finding and reporting, in the early stages of conflict, have been hampered where governments have refused to permit investigations. Service and supervisory functions normally later, when the parties have already agreed to a ceasefire or substantive terms of settlement. All the

reporting, bargaining and supervisory activities of the United Nations have been aimed primarily at relieving or managing crises, not at resolving underlying conflicts, except for easing the transition from colonialism. Conflict resolution has had mixed success, being most likely in conflicts involving two small states or issues unrelated to the Cold War issues and resolved by a combination of bilateral negotiation and Secretary General mediation. Conflicts involving major powers and/or Cold War issues, with mediation outside or inside the United Nations, are those least likely to reach a successful outcome. ‘Open’ (democratic) states are more likely than ‘closed’ (totalitarian) states to use the major international structures for resolving conflicts, though ‘closed’ states use the United Nations slightly more often than ‘open’ states. In cases submitted to the courts, the initiator is usually the stronger of the two states in conflict. Most conflicts arise over incompatible values and positions. If both parties see these as fundamental, they will be hostile, distrustful and suspicious, and may well become violent. Unless resolved by stalemate, obsolescence or effective third-party intervention, the crisis is likely to end in conquest or forced withdrawal. Mild threats, pressure and reprisals can often be controlled, but if tensions are high enough and actions appear threatening enough, a critical point is reached where governments face a decision whether to use organised force. In a crisis, symbolic rhetoric often increases while bargaining and negotiation decrease; and policy makers may be adversely affected by the pressures of time, perceptions of threat and the need to act quickly. Violence often occurs. This is when the fact-finding, mediation, interposition and supervisory abilities of international organisations become important. One of the most discouraging facts about 106

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international bodies has been their inability or unwillingness to cope with conflicts before they reach the crisis stage. See also: Conflict Termination; Peace; Peaceful Co-existence.

(bilateral) or more (multilateral). Whether a treaty be one of codification (merely formalising existing practice) or of a legislative character (creating new rights and obligations), it represents the maximum explicit consent of signatories. The next level of international law, and until recently its largest positive element, is custom (customary rules). A usage becomes a national legal norm when it has been reported over a period by several states and when governments act in accordance with it out of a sense of legal obligation. General principles of international law are less clearly defined, partly because it is hard to prove widespread acceptance and partly because the distinction between a principle and a customary rule is obscure. Principles arise out of the theory of sovereignty and the legal equality of states. Rules have to be interpreted, giving rise to subsidiary sources of law in the forms of previous judicial decisions and the writings of legal experts. States rarely enter into formal international agreements unless they expect to benefit and intend to comply. Leaders wish to avoid reprisals and embarrassing criticism brought on by improper behaviour, except where the state’s perceived needs come first at any cost. Where international law is judged to be broken and all else fails, coercion takes over. Acts of retaliation are known as retorsions. These can be forceful or nonforceful. Forceful retaliatory acts that would otherwise be considered illegal are called reprisals. The ultimate sanction in international relations is war. Since the end of the First World War, international organisations have preferred non-forceful action and striven to replace unilateral sanctions by collective ones. Collective sanctions have been applied against Ethiopia, North Korea and Zimbabwe, among others, in recent years. The principle of ‘all against one’ – the

Bibliography and Further Reading Holsti, K.J. (1974) International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, London: Prentice Hall. Martin, L. (1982) The Two-Edged Sword, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Ward, H. (1985) World Powers in the 20th Century, London: BBC.

inTeRnaTional law International law governs relations between independent states. Independence means they choose to be bound by the rules of law of their own free will, either by signing an international agreement or by acknowledging generally accepted principles of law. It is therefore not safe to assume that international law restricts the independence of a state. International law has been accepted by governments with widely varying enthusiasm and performance for over three centuries. Its theoretical basis also varies. Positivist theory is based on an analogy with domestic law, and its rules and institutions. It understands the law to be a system of rules (norms) that specify rights and obligations governing the behaviour of states. Laws are based on consent and voluntary restraint. Neorealist theory sees rules as the centre of a legal order in which policy and values are the food. This theory is policy- and value-orientated. International law is not a system of rules, but a constitutive process of authoritative decision. In this view, the sources of law are laid down by the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the permanent judicial organ of the United Nations. International conventions or treaties are agreed and enforced by two parties 107

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entire world against the aggressor – is termed collective security. This differs from self-help (unilateral action) and collective self-defence, which is an alliance (a few states agree that an attack on one is to be considered as an attack on all). In the absence of a reliable system of collective sanctions, unilateral and group sanctions are accepted as legitimate within current international law. The effectiveness of international law depends on compliance, which is a function of several things: the subject, the motives and needs of governments, how far issues are politicised, whether the state can behave in a lawless manner with no real threat of adverse consequences, and the importance of the outcome. International law has norms at various political levels: the law of reciprocity, the law of community, the law of the political framework. The principles of peaceful co-existence are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, sovereign equality and mutual advantage. There are many urgent questions in international law, in particular the prevention and control of aggression, arms control and disarmament, the new international economic order, the law of the sea, terrorism, skyjacking and questions of jurisdiction. There are now diverse views on international law, because the fundamental distinction between law and ideologyplus-politics is no longer universally accepted. The practical distinctions between war and peace are widely ignored, and many states consider themselves peaceful if they merely desire peace. International acceptance of revolution as a legitimate basis for statehood has undermined respect for independent states. Some governments – such as rogue, failed or totalitarian states – may sign agreements only under duress.

The decline in common ground is because the West no longer dominates the world, but the future of international law is not bleak. Our multicultural world is leaving its mark on the international system, and material interdependence is fostering the wider acceptance of common legal principles. See also: International Relations Theories; Peace; Treaty. Bibliography Best, G.F.A. (1994) War and Law Since 1945, Oxford: Clarendon Press. McCoubrey, H. and White, N.D. (1992) International Law and Armed Conflict, Aldershot, Hampshire and Brookfield CT, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney: Dartmouth. Wedgwood, R. (2002) ‘The Law’s Response to September 11, 2001’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 8–13.

Further Reading Barker, J.C. (2000) International Law and International Relations, London: Continuum. Greenwood, C. (2002) ‘International Law and the “War against Terrorism”’, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300–317.

inTeRnaTional poliTiCal sysTem: sTaTes and poweR We can say that a state exists when people are settled in a country that has its own sovereign government. A ‘nation’ is defined by common characteristics of a people, such as language, race, religion and national character, and typically a nation is largely coterminous with a recognised territory. Its people have a common interest in the nation’s self-perpetuation and prosperity. Those who belong to a nation share a common history and identity – based on their heritage and culture – and (at least an aspiration to) unified government. Not all these charac108

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teristics will apply in every case – the theory is not precise and probably cannot be – but a nation is often easy to identify in practice. However, states may exist before there is any equivalent nation, as in Europe (Belgium, Czechoslovakia), Asia (Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia) and South America; and there are nations that existed before the modern state did – in Europe (Austria, Hungary, Ireland, Norway) and elsewhere (Georgia, and the Jewish nation). States can be multinational (the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, Malaysia). States can also be created by dividing a nation, as with East and West Germany, North and South Korea, and Vietnam. International relations in the twentieth century were based on the ‘nation–state’, ignoring the fact that the two seldom agreed precisely. The concept was particularly difficult to apply in former colonies. The state claims a monopoly of the use of legitimate violence, and violence after all is the supreme form of power. So, here is the crucial basis of the international system: there is no legitimate power or authority in the world that can tell a state what to do. States do not recognise any higher authority than their own. International relations is the interaction of states exercising their power. ‘Power’ is the ability to make people do what you want them to do – or at least do what they would not ordinarily have done – by intellectual persuasion and the threat or use of force. A state’s power can be measured by geographical factors such as population, raw materials or agricultural land (and thus potential for self-sufficiency); it may be limited by natural barriers (the Danube, the Himalayas) or climate. Economic factors (usually measured by gross national product) are important in assessing a nation’s power over sanctions, tariffs, trade, monetary policy and economic aid.

Military power is apparently much simpler to assess, but comparisons can be very misleading. We are only interested in effective power so a sea power that wants influence in Central Asia is unlikely to be very powerful in that area. Some small states exert influence out of all proportion to their apparent power, usually because of their strategic importance, as in Malta (position), the Middle East (oil), Zimbabwe (chrome) or Mauritania (phosphates). Many writers claim that the pursuit of power is the motivating force in international relations. This is a long and involved argument, but it is important to note that there are limitations on the use of power (not least moral and ethical). The mere possession of power does not mean that it will necessarily be used to its full effect. Power, of course, can be a force for good as well as for evil – it is not until it is deployed as a means to an end that value judgements of this kind can be made. The international system so far described is a rather simple model of the real world, which is complicated by the existence of various supranational organisations – the European Union, the United Nations, the Roman Catholic Church, World Jewry and International Communism. These organisations have had or continue to have influence beyond state boundaries. We are so used to the idea of independent states that it is difficult to imagine any other system. The essence of the system is that territorial integrity supplies a fundamental human need for protection. The nuclear age might, on the face of it, seem to have ended this quality of the state – does its territory still provide security? Since 1945 there has also been a trend towards international interdependence and integration. Globalisation has arrived, with all its implications for the future of international relations. See also: States and National Roles. 109

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ity and war, power politics, universal law of history – and semantic confusion may be one of the reasons why there are so many theories. Traditionalists, unlike behaviourists, are sceptical of applying prediction or probability analysis to human affairs. Unique events – a nuclear war or the sudden reversal of alliances – are virtually impossible to predict. Quincy Wright has suggested that a general theory of international relations means a comprehensive, coherent and self-correcting body of knowledge contributing to the understanding, prediction, evaluation and control of relations among states and of the condition of the world. Mahan related environmental theories to international relations. He believed sea power was crucially important to national strength and prosperity. The capacity of a state to achieve sea power depended on its geographic position, land configuration, extent of territory and population, national character and form of government. Mackinder spoke of the pivot area: a heartland surrounded by an inner crescent giving access to sea lanes. Ratzel coined the term geopolitics, meaning that a state’s land area indicates its power position, with states striving to extend their territorial frontiers. Morgenthau defined international politics as basically a struggle for power. Wolfers spoke of states setting themselves three goals: possessions, such as national independence; physical survival and territorial integrity; and milieu, designed to affect the environment beyond a nation’s boundaries. He spoke of three clusters of foreign policy objectives: national self-extension, national selfpreservation and national self-abnegation (meaning such aims as international solidarity, lawfulness and peace). The greatest prize for any nation was security. Kissinger believes that peace is not to be achieved as an end in itself, but instead emerges as the result of a stable (rather

Brogan, P. (1992) World Conflicts: Why and Where They are Happening, London: Bloomsbury. Carey, R. and Salmon, T.C. (eds) (1996) International Security in the Modern World, London:St Martin’s Press, and Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press. Stone, D. (2004) Wars of the Cold War: Campaigns and Conflicts, 1945–90, London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers.

Further Reading Grenville, J.A.S. (1994) The Collins History of the World in the Twentieth Century, London: BCA, in arrangement with HarperCollins. Mansbach, R.W. (1997) The Global Puzzle, 2nd edn, Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin. Papp, D.S. (1998) Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding, 2nd edn, New York: Macmillan and Collier Macmillan.

inTeRnaTional RelaTions TheoRies Theories of international relations show a gap between utopians and realists. Realists stress power and influence and interest, rather than ideals, in international relations. The pursuit of power has to be balanced – for example, political power against economic, psychological, social and cultural power. Three classes of knowledge are relevant to international relations theory: deductive reasoning, which leads to the logical and necessary truths of science; empirical knowledge, based on experience of causal relationships that are not really rationally necessary; and value judgements, which derive from an accumulation of historical facts as they have affected human emotion and intuition. Some terms have multiple meanings – distribution of power, equilibrium or balancing process, hegemony and the search for hegemony, stability or peace, instabil110

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than revolutionary) international system. He assigns an important role to diplomacy. Aron argues that international relations is about political units, which are often in conflict because two individuals, social groups or political units covet the same property or seek incompatible goals. Niebuhr believed governments could not create communities, because the authority of government is not primarily the authority of law nor of force, but of the community. Kennan argues that it is the lack of uniformity in the cultural, political, economic and social development of nations that contributes to conflict. Systems theory describes a theoretical framework for the coding of data about political phenomena. It can be an integrated set of relationships based on a hypothetical set of political variables, a set of relationships among political variables or any set of variables in interaction. A system can be loose or tight, stable or unstable. Closely related to systems theory is the term ‘interdependence’, which is used to characterise relationships in a global international system. The greater the level of interdependence, the greater the amount of interaction. Parsons argued that society is an interlocking network of action systems – personal, social and cultural. Coupled with these action systems, society needed goal attainment, adaptation to the environment and the reproduction of acceptable patterns, norms and values. Rosencrance spoke of an undeniably close correlation between international instability and the domestic insecurity of elites, which makes the prediction of future events difficult. Modelski referred to the need for bargaining, subtle coercion and manoeuvre, rather than recourse to war, as being useful in the pursuit of national goals. Kaplan emphasised the desire for allocation of rewards, the alignment prefer-

ences of actors, the scope and direction of political activity and the flexibility of unit behaviour. A balance of power had to rely on an international social system. Singer and Small maintained that the relationship between bipolarity and conflict was not necessarily true. Conflict is a universal, ubiquitous and recurring phenomenon in and between societies; it is not necessarily continuous or uniformly intense. Politics is a process for resolving conflicts. All forms of politicised aggression are undesirable and irrational. Angell believed war to be an anachronism. He believed it could be eliminated through the progressive application of reason to international affairs. Modern technical states could not benefit from waging war. Controversial views have been held on the just war, which may be used to justify state violence, but only if the force employed is proportionate to justified political objectives. Even if a state has a moral right to wage war, it must adhere to the law governing war. Leninist views blame all or most troubles of the non-Western world on its exploitation by a few capitalist states. Theories of imperialism subordinate international politics to international economics. The Cold War has resulted in orthodox and revisionist views coming to the fore – the former blaming communist ideology for being bent on the destruction of the Western capitalist system, the latter believing that Russia has been forced to act in the way she does because of capitalist hostility. Human motivations that underlie aggressive behaviour are related to intersocietal warfare. Innate aggressive urges drive belligerent attitudes and give them an emotional basis. Not all political leaders are aggressive: some vacillate and procrastinate. Functionalism is based on the hypothesis that national loyalties, which tend to 111

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result in rivalry and war, can be defused by redirecting them into a framework of international co-operation. Both functionalists and neofunctionalists rely on common welfare needs to stimulate cooperation, and both believe that co-operation confers more benefits than going it alone. Neofunctionalists are more aware of how controversial the economic and technical issues can be. They advocate selecting issues that are technical, but important to governments, and they are conscious that political constitutions must be built to facilitate co-operation. Political systems gain and retain cohesiveness because of widely shared values among their members and general agreement about the framework of the system. Deutsch has set out two kinds of security: amalgamated security, in which previously independent political units form a single unit with a common government; and pluralistic security, in which separate governments retain legal independence. Pluralistic security needs compatibility of values among decision-makers, mutual predictability of behaviour among decision makers and mutual responsiveness. The decision to proceed with integration, or oppose it, depends on the expectation of gain or loss held by major groups in the units to be integrated; this is neo-functionalism. The debate between the two views, functionalism and neofunctionalism, is really about coercion and consensus theories of community. There is uncertainty about the act of choosing between alternatives. Political decision making can be defined in the same way as politics – as ‘the authoritative allocation of values for a society’. International crises can be analysed in terms of the different situations that bring on a crisis (trigger mechanisms), the frequency of crises and their distribution according to various dimensions such as gravity, complexity, intensity, duration, communications pattern and outcomes.

Game theory is a mathematical tool that enables rational players to identify the optimum strategy which they ought to pursue. Game playing permits us to see what strategies players actually choose in specific situations. It must be used precisely in world politics. Unlike game theory, simulation is based on ‘let’s pretend’. The search continues for a theory or theories adequate to the needs of an ever-changing international system. Normative theory can suggest alternative goals and preferences for political institutions, and can also provide propositions for testing. Empirical-analytic theory can furnish guidance as to which kinds of political behaviour are essential for attaining desired goals. Over the last sixty years, theories have oscillated between these two views. The urgency of problems facing political systems – advanced and less developed – together with the need for a more developed field or relevant field of inquiry has given increasing impetus to the search for an international relations sub-field futurology to try to perceive what is likely to happen in the next decades. See also: International Law; Treaty. Bibliography and Further Reading Angell, N. (1914) The Foundations of International Polity, London: William Heinemann. —— (1972) War and the Workers, New York: Garland. Aron, R. (1958) On War, New York: Doubleday. Bullock, A. and Stallybrass, O. (eds) (1977) The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, London: Fontana/Collins. Burton, J.W. (1990) Conflict Resolution and Prevention, New York: St Martin’s Press. Deutsch, K. (1967) The Analysis of International Relations, Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall. Goldstein, J.S. (1999) International Relations, 3rd edn, New York: Longman.

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Griffiths, M. (1999) Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, London: Routledge. —— and O’Callaghan, T. (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts, Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge. Johnson, R.J. and Taylor, P.J. (1989) A World in Crisis? Geographical Perspectives, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kaplan, M.A. (1957) System and Process in International Politics, New York: Wiley. Kennan, G.F. (1952) American Diplomacy, 1900–1950, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kissinger, H.A. (1957) Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: Harper & Row. Krieger, J. (1993) (ed.) The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, New York: Oxford University Press. Mackinder, Sir H.J. (1904) ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, Geographical Journal, No. 23, pp. 421–44. Mahan, A.T. (1991) Mahan on Naval Strategy, Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press. Modelski, G. (1987) Long Cycles in World Politics, Seattle WA: University of Washington Press. —— and Thompson, W.R. (1988) Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993, Seattle WA: University of Washington Press. Morgenthau, H.J. (1962) Politics in the Twentieth Century, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Niebuhr, R. (1960) Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Parsons, T. (1991) The Social System, London: Routledge. Rosencrance, R.N. (1963) Action and Reaction in World Politics, Boston MA: Little Brown. Singer, J.D. (1960) ‘Theorying about Theory in International Politics’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, No. 4 (December), pp. 431–42. —— and Diehl, P.F. (eds) (1990) Measuring the Correlates of War, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press.

Singer, M. and Wildavsky, A.B. (1996) The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil, Chatham NJ: Chatham House. Wanklyn, H. (1961) Friedrich Ratzel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wolfers, A. (1962) Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Woods, N (ed.) (1996) Explaining International Relations since 1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wright, Q. (1962) A Study of War, 2nd edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wyn-Jones, R. (1999) Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, Boulder CO: Lynne Reinner.

inTeRnaTional sanCTions Sanctions are coercive measures, especially those taken by one or more states against another guilty of violating international law. When considering the likely success of sanctions, account should be taken of the relative costs sustained by both sides, who suffers or gains more, and the degree of unity within the imposing party about the issues in conflict. A party that is polarised over whether or not to pursue a goal in dispute – as the United Kingdom was over Rhodesia – can choose to withdraw some form of benefit as a compromise between complete inaction and the use of physical force. From 1965 to 1980, the United Kingdom gradually imposed sanctions on (Southern) Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Communications were severed and there was a complete trade embargo, except on medical supplies and educational material. The objective was to end the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Smith regime as well as white rule in Rhodesia. It failed because Rhodesia got support from South Africa and other ‘sanctions busters’. One of the longest-running cases of sanctions involved the United States and 113

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Cuba from 1960. The United States severed trade and diplomatic relations, and froze Cuban assets in the USA, with the aim of ending Cuba’s expropriation of US assets and altering the socialist direction of the Cuban regime. It failed to change the Cuban regime because the Soviet Union offered an alternative trading partner. Also very lengthy was the embargo on exporting arms or military vehicles to South Africa, imposed from 1961 to 1990 by the UN Security Council with the objective of ending apartheid. It failed because key UN members only partly observed the ban. The sanctions that caused the greatest controversy were those on Iraq after the Gulf War in 1991. As with many trade embargoes, the sanctions had more effect on the general population than on the leadership or elite who were its prime target. Iraq was allowed to sell up to $4 billion worth of oil annually, the proceeds from which were to be used to buy food and medical supplies, but the Iraqi leadership failed to distribute the imports fairly and there was misuse of the funds generated. The embargo was not lifted until 2003, when Saddam Hussein was removed from power. During Saddam’s reign, Iraq was naturally keen to be reconciled with its Arab neighbours. The sanctions could have been lifted if Iraq had been prepared to apologise for its invasion of Kuwait, accept the blame and pay the necessary reparations. A state’s conflict behaviour can contain a variety of elements: instrumental, designed to make adversaries abandon their own goals and lose the conflict; positive, intended to impose high costs on opponents as a punishment for holding unrighteous goals or daring to behave in an aggressive manner; or demonstrative, meant to avoid the impression that ‘our’ only answer to conflict situations is to reward opponents.

See also: Apartheid; Cuba; International Law; Iraq.

inTeRsTaTe ConfliCTs These are conflicts between, or involving, two or more states. The underlying causes and factors are many. Structurally, some states experiencing conflict can be weak, suffer from poor ethnic geography or have intra-state concerns. Politically, they can exhibit discriminatory political institutions, inter-group politics or elite politics. Economically and socially, they can be faced with economic problems, discriminatory economic systems or patchy, variable development and modernisation. On the social side, there can be patterns of cultural discrimination. Associated or proximate causes of interstate conflicts can include structural issues of collapsing states, changing demographic patterns and fluctuations in the intra-state military balance. Political transitions, with influential conclusionary ideologies and increasing competition, often occur. Economic/social factors include growing economic inequities and rapid modernisation. In relation to culture, there can be intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination and growing propaganda against ethnic groups. In short, proximate causes can be elite in origin – triggered by bad leaders and bad neighbours – or mass, triggered by bad domestic problems and bad neighbourhoods. Since 1945, elite-triggered, internally driven conflicts have included Iran, Liberia, Chechnya, Rwanda and Somalia; an example of an elite-triggered, but externally driven conflict is Afghanistan. Mass-triggered, but internally driven conflicts have occurred in India/Kashmir, Israel, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland; an instance of a mass-triggered, externally driven conflict was seen in Sierra Leone. The regional dimensions of internal conflicts can mean severe effects on neigh114

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bouring states, with problems caused by refugees, economic factors, military action, instability and inter-state war, particularly in Third World areas. The interventions of neighbouring states can be humanitarian, defensive, protective or opportunistic, the last being designed to exploit internal turmoil elsewhere, advance the neighbour’s political, economic and military interests and improve its regional position. See also: Afghanistan; Chechnya; Civil War; Intrastate Conflicts; Irredentism; Kashmir; Northern Ireland; Rwanda; Sierra Leone; Somalia; Sri Lanka.

has often taken the form of incursions by small states into adjoining territories. See also: Conflict. Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

IntIfada (‘upRising’) The West Bank was the obvious core for a future Palestinian state, but its future had been in abeyance ever since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. In December 1987 the issue entered a new phase as Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza began a campaign of resistance to Israeli rule, the intifada or uprising, which was a source of great pride for Palestinians and seemed to promise a brighter future. Israel sought to suppress the resistance, but found itself the target of critical world opinion. Israeli opinion was divided over the wisdom of making concessions; indeed Israel went on building Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Anything that happened in the West Bank or Jerusalem had security implications for Israel, because the country is so small. By 1989 over 600 Palestinians and 45 Jews had been killed. Huge numbers of Israeli soldiers were needed to keep order on the West Bank, especially after the intense anger following the dynamiting of some Palestinian private homes on the orders of the Israeli authorities. The uprising died down in the 1990s, but in September 2000 the second intifada flared up after the Israeli leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, a site sacred to both Muslims and Jews. Hundreds of people, mostly Arabs, died in clashes in the following months. The second intifada witnessed

Bibliography Brown, M.E. (ed.) (1996) The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Brown, S. (1994) The Causes and Prevention of War, New York: St Martin’s Press. Snow, D.M. (1996) Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts, Boulder CO: Rienner.

Further Reading Tillema, H.K. (1991) International Armed Conflict since 1945: A Bibliographic Handbook of Wars and Military Interventions, Boulder CO: Westview Press.

inTeRvenTion Intervention is the interference, usually coercive, in the affairs of a state by another state or group of states. It is meant to affect the internal policies of that state. Intervention is considered justified in law for self-defence, to protect a state’s citizens, to prevent the violation of international law or in response to the state violating an agreement by acting unilaterally. The Soviet suppression of the uprising in Hungary, 1956, the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 are some examples of ‘justified’ intervention. In the Third World, intervention 115

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more extreme violence than the first. There were increasingly frequent suicide bombings against Israeli civilian targets by groups such as Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hizbullah and the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade. On their part, the Israelis planned more assassinations of Palestinian leaders. After 11 September 2001, the Israelis stepped up their offensive against the Palestinian uprising, but with little benefit. In January 2002 the Israeli Army withdrew from the Palestinian territories but continued attacks on the headquarters of Yassir Arafat and on other Palestinian political targets. Under international pressure, Israel agreed in 2004 to pull out of Gaza militarily and dismantle all Jewish settlements. However, Israel built a wall around the entire West Bank to prevent terrorist incursions. This was greeted with international condemnation, but Israel refused to budge on this issue. See also: Palestine.

state conflicts require a disarming of factions or a willingness to share power. See also: Interstate Conflicts. Bibliography and Further Reading Brown, S. (1994) The Causes and Prevention of War, New York: St Martin’s Press. Evans, G. (1994) ‘Cooperative Security and Intra-State Conflict’, Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Fall), pp. 3–20.

iRan In 1941 the last Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, succeeded to the Peacock throne. In the 1960s he started a programme of economic modernisation, Westernisation and secularisation, which aroused much opposition and popular protests. The Shah had taken complete control of his government, and from 1965 to 1977 there was a period of political stability and economic growth based on oil revenue. Opposition to his regime grew, most effectively from the religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini, in exile in France, who campaigned for Iran to return to Islamic principles. Pressure increased on the Shah, who found sanctuary in Egypt in 1979. The Ayatollah returned to lead a non-party, theocratic Islamic republic, enthusiastically proclaimed in the Muslim world as an alternative to Western models. Muslim fundamentalists and revolutionary guards gave fanatical support to Khomeini, enhancing his popularity. From November 1979 to January 1981, the staff of the US embassy in Teheran were held hostage by students protesting at alleged CIA meddling in Iranian politics. The Americans tried and failed to rescue the hostages. Iran was an economic success, with a trade surplus from its oil revenue, despite the cost of the war with Iraq (1980–88). The death of the Ayatollah in 1989 did not lead to widespread instability, but it saw the beginning of a struggle for political dominance between conservatives and

Bibliography Mansbach, R.W. (1997) The Global Puzzle: Issues and Actors in World Politics, 2nd edn, Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin. New Internationalist (2005) The World Guide: A View from the South, Oxford: New Internationalist Publications.

inTRasTaTe ConfliCTs These are conflicts relating to, or confined within, a single state. Intrastate disorders almost always centre on rival conceptions of order and justice. The United Nations would resort to firm action only if internal troubles constituted a threat to international peace and security, typically by massive violations of justice or human rights. Many intrastate conflicts are fuelled by political gangs or ideological parties linked to personal ambitions and tribal rivalries, for example, in Angola, Liberia, Nicaragua and Mozambique. Settlements of intra116

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more liberal reformers. Reformers were in the ascendancy until 2004, but liberalisation was blocked by the religious authorities. In 1990 Iran condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but remained neutral when war broke out in 1991. It likewise condemned the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, but again remained neutral, though Iran has been accused of arming insurgents in Iraq since 2003. Iran’s relations with the West improved little in the 1990s, partly because of Iran’s links with armed groups like Hizbollah. Hardliners in the government wanted to eradicate Western influence, and clashed with those who had a more moderate vision of Islam. Relations with the West have since deteriorated over concerns about Iran’s nuclear power programme. Iran has always denied that its ability to enrich uranium is a step on the way to developing nuclear weapons and has continued with it in defiance of pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency. The West has argued that Iran must be held to account if the international community’s credibility is to be saved. The Islamic Republic of Iran is ruled by a Council of Revolution, consisting of (Shi’ite) spiritual leaders following the guidelines of Ayatollah Khomeini. In general, political parties and other bodies enjoy freedom as long as they do not ‘infringe the principles of independence, freedom, national unity and the bases of the Islamic Republic’. The Ayatollah had many political enemies – supporters of the late Shah, liberal politicians, nonfundamentalist Muslim groups and militant members of ethnic minorities, notably Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Baluchis, Kurds and Turkmans. Dissent was suppressed by the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran), who were directly responsible to the Council of the Revolution. Guerrilla activity increased during the Ayatollah’s years in power from 1979 to 1989, and it is esti-

mated that nearly 10,000 people were executed. Iran’s regional minorities have given rise to many separatist groups. The Arab Political and Cultural Organisation is based in Khuzestan province in the southwestern part of the country, and they resent the influx of Iranians attracted by oil finds in the region. In spite of the Ayatollah granting limited autonomy to the region, there have been regular clashes with the government, with many deaths and bomb explosions in Korramshahr. Other opposition groups, especially the Kurds, have supported the Khuzestan Arabs. Closely associated with the Organisation has been Black Wednesday, an Arab rebel force that has engaged in many acts of sabotage in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan. In London, six Iranian Arabs calling themselves the Group of the Martyr seized the Iranian Embassy in April 1980, taking 26 hostages and demanding that, in return for their release, 91 Arabs imprisoned in Iran should be set free. After the six had killed two hostages, members of the British Special Air Service penetrated the embassy, killing five Arabs and seizing the sixth, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1981. In another area of Iran, the Azerbaijan Autonomist Movement gains members from the nearly ten million Azerbaijanis, who are the largest ethnic group in Iran, mainly Shi’ite followers of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who rejected the leadership of Khomeini and the involvement of clergy in running the country. The Movement boycotted the referendum on the Constitution in 1979; some members of the Movement were placed under house arrest and within weeks a rebellion broke out in Tabriz, the chief city of Iranian Azerbaijan. In the south-eastern province of Baluchistan, Baluchis (who are Sunni Muslims) form the majority, while the 117

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minority Sistans (who are Shi’ites) enjoy a higher standard of living. There have been many incidents between these separatist groups, both opposed by the government. Baluchi demands for limited autonomy and economic concessions have been largely ignored. Baluchi separatists have intensified their guerrilla war. The two chief movements demanding autonomy for Kurdistan, on the frontier with Iraq, are the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran and the Kurdish Sunni Muslim Movement. Both seek a social revolution in Iran and stress that only armed struggle will overthrow the theocratic regime. Many believed that the Iranian offensives in the second Gulf War were, in fact, manoeuvres to encircle the Kurds. In north-eastern Iran, after the revolution in 1979 the predominantly Sunni Muslim Turkmans called for redistribution of land owned by supporters of the Shah, the right to set up their own police force, official recognition of their language and representation in the local revolutionary committees (dominated by Shi’ites). None of these demands has been met and the Revolutionary Guards actively seek to suppress the autonomists. Left-wing movements have for many years been dominated by the Tudeh, the outlawed Iranian Communist Party. The Forqan group, a Marxist underground organisation, claimed responsibility for the assassination of a minor ayatollah and an army general. The National Democratic Front is an offshoot of the Union of National Front Forces; both are essentially secular, anti-regime movements. The People’s Sacrificers are nationalist Marxists drawing support from students and the radical intelligentsia. Although Fedayeen theoreticians differ sharply over tactics, they all condemn what they consider to be capitalist and imperialist exploitation, and seek to build a radical socialist state. They are intensely ideologi-

cal and have a history of guerrilla warfare. In 1980 the Fedayeen split into three: the Fedayeen guerrillas (Cherikha), the Aqaliyyat minority and the Aksariyyat majority. While the guerrilla and minority splinters have pursued their radical goals independently, the majority group has been willing to compromise. A more extreme group are the Iranian People’s Strugglers, a party based on the major principle of towhid, a divinely integrated classless society, a society with total equality, in which there will be an end to exploitation of people. The group have attacked the rule of the religious leaders, whom they see as repressive, reactionary and revolutionary dilettantes. In the early 1980s they were a major armed force. Many of their 100,000 guerrillas, out of a reputed membership of 400,000, were trained by the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The Peykar and Union of Communists are small, pro-Chinese groups that have actively opposed the Khomeini regime. Monarchist groups had obvious motivations after the fall of the Shah. The government, in announcing that plots have been uncovered, has generally stated that those involved were members of the armed forces intent upon restoring the monarchy. The Armed Movement for the Liberation of Iran was led by a niece of the late Shah. In May 1981 some members of the Pars Group were arrested in connexion with an alleged plot to restore the monarchy, with the authorities accusing them of having links with Shapour Bakhtiar, the leader of the National Resistance Movement then living in France, and with the late Shah’s family. Externally based movements developed during the latter years of the Shah’s rule or after the Ayatollah came to power. The National Front opposed both leaders. The National Council of Resistance for Liberty and Independence initially supported the Ayatollah; then, after a disagreement over 118

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the powers of the government, the leader of the Council, ex-President Bani-Sadr, attacked the ruling Islamic Republican Party for worsening the condition of the country. The National Resistance Movement was led by Dr Bakhtiar, the Shah’s last Prime Minister, who set about a programme of liberalisation, including dissolution of the Shah’s secret police and granting a greater role to Muslim religious leaders in drafting legislation. The Ayatollah considered Bakhtiar’s government to be a betrayal, and Bakhtiar was forced to flee to France to continue his opposition. The main religious minorities in Iran are the Bahais, Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians. The last three of these groups are officially recognised in the Constitution whereas the Bahais are not, and they have been subjected to considerable repression since the 1979 revolution, before which they had held many senior posts under the Shah. Iran still continues to be on America’s list of the ‘axis of evil’. Iranian agents have been widely active and over 80 dissidents have been killed in Europe. The xenophobic nature of the government has appealed to many terrorists and there are many terrorist training camps in the country. Iran actively supports Hizbullah. The Pasdaran, a ‘cultural’ group within the government, supports the military, controls the secret police and has its own divisions of power – soldiers, fighters, officers and commandants. It also controls Iran’s nuclear programme. Pasdaran agents have recruited individuals for operations in Algeria, the Philippines and Sudan. Whereas the USA has kept its distance from Iran, countries in western Europe have close ties for business purposes. The main worry is the use to which Iran’s nuclear programme may be put. In spite of diplomatic meetings, relations with the West and with Iraq remain tense.

1980–88

See also: Iran–Iraq War, 1980–88; Irangate: The Iran–Contra Affair. Bibliography Amjad, M. (1989) Iran: From Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy, New York: Greenwood Press. Malek, M.H. (1991) ‘Iran after Khomeini: Perpetual Crisis or Opportunity?’, Conflict Studies, No. 237, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Sick, G. (1985) All Fell Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran, New York: Random House.

iRan–iRaq waR, 1980–88 In September 1980 Iraq invaded Iran, starting one of the longest, bloodiest and costliest conflicts since the Second World War. The West backed Iraq against the fundamentalist Islamic regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini, which had just taken power in Iran. At the time of the Iraqi invasion, the revolutionary spirit was declining in Iran, and this led its religious leaders to launch a new drive for national unity and Islamic revolution. The Iraqi leadership considered the new Iranian regime weak and disunited, militarily and politically. There was deep-seated popular antipathy between the two countries. Iraq’s initial aim was to seize disputed border territory around its access to the sea, the Shatt al-Arab waterway. This aim soon extended to seizing the oil-rich border province of Khuzistan/Arabistan, but Iraq was soon reduced to simply defending itself until Iran ceased fighting. Iran had a simple military aim – to expel the invading Iraqis – but it also wanted to see the end of President Saddam Hussein’s regime. Iran failed in its political aim, and Iraq failed to force the collapse of the Islamic regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. Iran seized the military initiative in 1982 but, despite increasing efforts, failed to 119

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breach the Iraqi defence lines. Iran retained the initiative until early 1988, despite Iraq’s use of poison gas. The Iranians launched a massive onslaught on Basra in 1988 and almost succeeded in taking the city. The Iraqi defence proved too much for the Iranians but, in defending the city, they left the northern front undermanned. Every year of the war, Iran mounted a new offensive against Iraq, and Iraq held the line. The Iranians suffered immense casualties, sending Islamic fanatics against Iraqi positions in scenes reminiscent of the First World War trench battles. Iran probably lost 600,000 dead between 1980 and 1988, and Iraq about 150,000 dead. Iran’s trump card was to blockade Iraqi oil exports going through the Shatt alArab, but other Arab nations – fearing Iranian Islamic fundamentalist dominance – came to Iraq’s rescue. In 1984, a tanker war started, with an Iraqi attack on the main oil terminal at Kharg Island. Iran retaliated by attacking tankers belonging to Kuwait and other Gulf states, because they were seen as supporters of the Iraqi government. Neither side was able to damage the other’s exports. In 1987 the United States began to patrol the Gulf to protect Kuwaiti tankers, and in May a frigate, the USS Stark, was hit by an Iraqi missile. The Iraqis thought the Stark was an Iranian warship. The ship was badly damaged and 37 sailors were killed. Just over a year later, an American warship shot down an Iranian airliner, in the mistaken belief that the plane was going to attack the warship. Iran immediately placed more mines in the Gulf; an American frigate was damaged, and the United States sank some Iranian warships and destroyed two oil platforms. In 1987 Iraq began firing missiles at Iranian cities; Iran retaliated with missiles against Baghdad. In the final year of the war, Iran attacked Kurdistan in northern Iraq, making big

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inroads – if the plains north of Baghdad had been reached, Iran might have achieved victory. Iraq retaliated drastically and unexpectedly in March 1988 by dropping poison-gas bombs on the Iraqi Kurdish village of Halabja, then under Iranian occupation. About 2,000 villagers were killed. In the south of Iraq, the Iranians were pushed back across the Shatt al-Arab waterway, and Iraq recaptured some oilfields seized by Iran earlier in the war. Iraq had benefited from Iran’s war-weariness. In July 1988, the Iranians announced they would accept the ceasefire that the United Nations had approved, with effect from 20 August. The UN sent a peacekeeping force to the Gulf. The war was over, but the quarrel between the nations continued, especially over sovereignty of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The whole war had been a stalemate and a futile military venture, with neither side able to knock out the other. It saw the first use of poison gas since 1918, the greatest attacks on non-belligerent shipping since 1945 and attacks on cities and economic targets. Iraq’s relations had slowly improved with the USA, while keeping the Soviet Union at arm’s length. The West began to supply Iraq and Iran with more weapons, and the arms race destabilised the whole region. See also: Iran; Iraq. Bibliography Chubin, S. (1991) Iran and Iraq at War, London: Tauris, and Boulder CO: Westview. Hiro, D. (1991) The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict, New York: Routledge.

Further Reading Karsh, E. (2002) The Iran–Iraq War, 1980– 1988, Oxford: Osprey.

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iRangaTe: The iRan–ConTRa affaiR ‘Irangate’ was the name given to a series of scandals in the 1980s over the propriety and legality of diverting profits from the secret sale of arms to Iran to fund the Nicaraguan Contras. The transactions involved President Reagan’s National Security Council and were the subject of inquiries by special prosecutors and congressional investigators. This was a major scandal for the Reagan administration. In January 1986 the President authorised the CIA to purchase 4,000 TOW missiles from the US Defense Department and sell them on to Iran via Israel. The President – wanting to secure the flow of Iranian oil, which was vital to the world economy – was desperate to restore good relations with Iran after the hostage crises of 1978–79. US officials used secret meetings to gain Iran’s support for the release of American hostages held by Islamic extremists in Lebanon. Many states in the Middle East were concerned about the US–Israel–Iran links revealed by Irangate. Between 1980 and 1988 Iran was embroiled in a very bloody war with Iraq, and the USA had supplied Iran with large quantities of military hardware. Not to be outdone, the Soviet Union quickly supplied Iran with advanced weapons to enhance relations between the two countries. It eventually became clear that Iran had been overcharged for the arms it had bought. The profits were used for a supersecret special operation, the Contra link. It did not help the Contras. No guerrilla movement can succeed against a wellarmed and determined government unless it has a solid base of support inside the country. The US President had been manipulated by William Casey, Director of the CIA, and by the staff of the National Security Council – in particular, Colonel Oliver North. See also: Central America; Iran.

Bibliography and Further Reading Stone, D. (2004) Wars of the Cold War: Campaigns and Conflicts, 1945–1990, London: Brassey’s.

iRaq Iraq became an independent kingdom in 1932, though British military control continued until the Second World War. The leading figure in Iraq was the strongly pro-Western General Nuri-elSaid, who was Prime Minister from 1930 to 1958. In 1955, Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact, a regional collective security agreement that saw the Soviet Union as the major threat. In 1958 the monarchy was overthrown by a left-wing military regime, which banned all political parties and formed links with Communist states. The Ba’ath Socialist Party came to power after a 1968 military coup inspired by Pan-Arabism, seeing the Arab world as a politicaleconomic unit where no state could be self-sufficient. The regime nationalised foreign companies and defended the use of oil as a political weapon. In 1979 Saddam Hussein, who had been the real power in Iraq for several years, became leader of the Revolutionary Command Council and state president. Under its 1968 Constitution, Iraq was a popular democratic and sovereign state with Islam as its state religion and an economy based on socialism, dominated by the Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party. It allowed a Kurdish Legislative Council with limited powers to pass legislation for the Kurdish region on social, cultural and economic development, as well as on health, education and labour matters, but the Council was not supported by the majority of Kurds, whose aim was full autonomy or even complete independence for Kurdistan. The Democratic Party of Kurdistan was founded in 1946 by Mustapha Barzani, who for over 30 years led the 121

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struggle for autonomy. This came to a temporary end in 1975 after the Shah ceased to support the Kurds and concluded a treaty with Iraq. Two years later, after Barzani’s death in exile, the Party resumed the armed struggle. An offshoot is the Kurdish Socialist Party, whereas the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is in conflict with the Democratic Party over ideological issues. The pro-Moscow Iraqi Communist Party has had a chequered history. It was a legalised party when it joined the National Front government in 1973. It sometimes criticised the regime’s domestic and foreign policy, including its handling of the Kurdish insurgency, with which elements of the party have been associated. In May 1978, the government executed 21 communists for political activities within the armed forces, and by the early 1980s members of the party had either fled the country or moved to the Kurdish areas. The predominantly Sunni Muslim regime encountered strong opposition from militant elements of the Shi’ite community, who constitute over half of Iraq’s population. They were in sympathy with, and supported by, the regime of Iran and have formed their own Dawah Party. The Ba’ath Party was actively opposed by dissident Ba’athists supported by the Syrian government. The National Democratic Patriotic Front was a coalition of eight opposition parties trying to bring down the government led by Saddam Hussein. The Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution, formed in 1982, aimed to provide a focal point for Shi’ite opposition to the war with Iran and wished Hussein’s government to be replaced by an Islamic republic led by a theologian on the Iranian model. In 1980 a border dispute over the Shattal-Arab waterway turned into war. Iraq’s Sunni regime feared that Iran was encouraging a Shi’ite majority uprising. The Iran– Iraq War, 1980–88, did not give victory to

either side. Iraq had inferior military strength and Iran gained little territory, but Saddam Hussein took advantage of the end of hostilities to turn his combathardened army against Kurdish separatists, many of whom had sided with Iran. Cyanide bombs were dropped on the Kurdish village of Halabja, which caused an international outcry. In the 1990 peace settlement with Iran, Hussein conceded everything for which he had fought the war. Within months, Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait, ignoring international and UN demands for it to withdraw. The United States launched an attack on Iraq in January 1991 and the Gulf War ended three months later in total defeat for Iraq. The Americans encouraged an internal revolt against Hussein by the southern Shi’a and the northern Kurds, but political differences meant it was unsuccessful. In late 1991 Iraq authorised UN inspections of military establishments. It was found to have been engaged in uranium enrichment, using German technology. The UN team destroyed warheads armed with sarin (a poisonous gas) as well as a nuclear complex, a chemical weapons plant and uranium enrichment installations. The UN-inspired total economic and military embargo – imposed in 1990 to force Iraq to leave Kuwait – was partly lifted in 1996 to allow restricted sales of crude oil to pay for food and medicines for the Iraqi population. By 1997 the UN Security Council threatened to enforce new sanctions unless Iraq allowed a new inspection to verify that it did not have the capacity to develop chemical or biological weapons. Iraq refused to have American inspectors and in December 1997 the United States launched missile attacks on several Iraqi cities. Saddam Hussein began to support terrorist groups. The Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC), also known as the Abu Nidal Organisation, became an instrument 122

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of his policy. Iraq lay behind incidents of terrorism against the USA. Iraqi intelligence was closely involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, but this was not fully obvious until the trial of the participants a few years later. US hawks maintained that the West should have acted earlier and more strongly against Al Qaeda and the regime that harboured it. Those who argued against war with Iraq believed it could destabilise the Islamic world and boost support for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. A pre-emptive strike would be illegal under international law. The Arab League had difficulty in co-ordinating its actions to stop the invasion of Iraq. Few leaders of Arab League countries believed that Saddam Hussein really wished to avoid war. In December 1999, the UN Security Council approved the resumption of weapons inspections, but Iraq did not cooperate. The United States stiffened its attitude and, after 11 September 2001, focused its attention on Saddam Hussein and Iraq, as part of the ‘axis of evil’. President Bush told the UN in September 2002 that Iraq posed a serious threat to world peace. In November 2002 the inspectors returned to Iraq and in January 2003 they concluded that no weapons of mass destruction existed in the country. Despite that, and without a Security Council resolution explicitly authorising the use of force, coalition forces led by the United States launched an attack on Iraq. The war was soon over, but an insurgency soon followed, threatening to turn into a civil war. Accusations surfaced in May 2004 of abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American and British soldiers. However, the coalition provisional authority handed over sovereignty in June 2004 to the Iraqi interim governing council. In January 2005 the first democratic elections to a Transitional National Assembly were won by the Shia-dominated United Iraqi Alliance. A new federal constitution was

approved in a nationwide referendum in October 2005 – without the support of the Sunnis. Insurgent violence continued in 2008 against foreign troops, domestic security forces and civilians. Federalism and regional distribution of oil revenues – favoured by the Shias and Kurds, but strongly opposed by the Sunnis – remain major issues. Saddam Hussein was the dominant figure in Iraqi politics from the 1960s. He was in power from 1968 and President from 1979 to 2003. He was ruthless in eliminating all opposition and pursuing his objectives. He fought the Iranians in the 1980s and invaded Kuwait in 1990. In the north, he used his army to crush the Kurdish rebels, committing acts of genocide. In the south, he bombed the Shi’ites and tried to eliminate the Marsh Arabs by destroying habitat. He became increasingly dictatorial and anti-Western, and was thought to have close links with Islamic terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda from 2001, but failed to persuade the Arab nations to participate in jihad. Saddam Hussein had a tense relationship with the UN weapons inspectorate and on a few occasions they were ordered out. In the second Gulf War, he went into hiding, but was captured in December 2003, put on trial and prosecuted for crimes against humanity – specifically, the mass killing of Iraqi civilians. In December 2006 he was executed. After the Gulf War, Iraq remained in a state of chaos and uncertainty, with civil war between Sunni and Shia, asymmetric warfare against a well-planned insurgency (known as the Iraq War, and allegedly aided by equipment from Syria and Iran) and Al Qaeda operations in Iraq. There have been civilian casualties, refugees, human rights abuses, kidnappings of Westerners and widespread infrastructure damage. The north has been least affected, and by 2008 Iraqi Kurdistan was relatively peaceful. The Ba’ath Party government 123

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was overthrown; Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003 and executed in 2006. Elections were held in January 2005 for a national assembly, followed in December by parliamentary elections, which showed the country split in three: Shia, Sunni and Kurd. Estimates range from 150,000 to more than a million killed since January 2003. By March 2008, 4,000 American soldiers and 175 British soldiers had been killed. The war has also cost the UK more than £4.5 billion ($9 billion) and the USA over $845 billion; the total cost to the US economy is $3 to $5 trillion. Members of the coalition began to withdraw their forces as soon as public opinion allowed, as Iraqi forces began to take up responsibility. UK forces are slowly being withdrawn from Basra, but US forces are probably there in the long term in key areas. The country today remains in danger of breaking up on ethnic lines in a civil war. See also: Al Qaeda; Iran–Iraq War, 1980–88; Gulf War, 1991; Gulf War, 2003.

iReland Until the end of the sixteenth century, Ulster was the centre of the most intransigent resistance to English rule. Radical change was brought by the Reformation, the defeat in 1603 of the anti-English rebellion led by the chiefs of O’Neill and O’Donnell, and the union in 1605 of England and Scotland. In 1608 the plantation of Ulster began, with Protestant settlers from the Scottish lowlands and England, expelling the native Catholic and Gaelic-speaking people to the poorer lands of the south and west. The old Gaelic order of Ireland had been crushed and Ulster became, in effect, a British province. After the Union of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801, Dublin had no parliament; Irish MPs and peers sat at Westminster. Catholic emancipation in 1829 was followed by the growth of militant Irish nationalism, Soon religion became the dominant and divisive factor in Ulster. At the passage of the third Home Rule Bill in 1914, Ulster Protestants loyal to the Union, with support from many leading members of the Conservative opposition at Westminster, threatened armed rebellion. Home Rule was suspended until the end of the First World War. After the victory of the nationalist Sinn Fein Party in 1918 and then a guerrilla war fought by nationalists against the British authorities, the Ulster Unionists reluctantly accepted the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which superseded the 1914 Act. Ireland was to have two parliaments, both subordinate to Westminster – one at Stormont, near Belfast, for six of Ulster’s nine counties, and one in Dublin for the other 26 counties of Ireland, including the rest of Ulster. Thus Northern Ireland, now a federal province of the United Kingdom, came into being against a background of civil war and sectarian disorder. The rest of Ireland – the Irish Free State – was accorded dominion status, but in 1949 it declared itself a republic.

Bibliography and Further Reading Chubin, S. (1991) Iran and Iraq at War, London: Tauris, and Boulder CO: Westview Press. Eyal, J. (ed.) (2003) War in Iraq: Combat and Consequence, London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. HM Government (2003) Iraq’s First Reflections Report, July 2003, London: Director General Corporate Communication for Ministry of Defence. Kelidar, A. (1975) ‘Iraq – The Search for Stability’, Conflict Studies, No. 59, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. Tumber, H. and Palmer, J. (2004) Media at War: The Iraq Crisis, London, New Delhi and Thousand Oaks CA: Sage. Williamson, M. and Scales, R.H. Jr (2003) The Iraq War, Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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Political movements have abounded in Ireland and they have been mostly radical and militaristic. The Irish Parliamentary Party was a major force at Westminster but, after Gladstone’s failure to pass the Home Rule Bill in 1887 and the death of Parnell in 1891, Sinn Fein took over the effective leadership of Irish nationalists. In 1921 there was an open split in the movement when the republican wing, led by Eamon de Valera, refused to accept the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and precipitated the Civil War of 1922–23. De Valera soon returned to parliamentary politics and the label of Sinn Fein was taken over by the dissident rump of intransigents. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is the military arm of Sinn Fein and the longestlived such organisation in history, perhaps because the roots of violence in Ireland are tangled and deep, and it shows remarkable continuity in goal and method. It had its origins in the National Volunteer Force and became the IRA in 1924. Its influence waned and it was declared illegal by the Irish Government in 1939, but engaged in some pro-German activity in the Second World War. From 1956 to 1962, the IRA conducted a bombing campaign in Northern Ireland, but the authorities confine this action to border areas. In the mid1960s, the Marxist wing of the IRA was recreated – it was more concerned with social issues than the armed struggle which emerged from the communal violence in Northern Ireland. After the breakaway of the Provisional IRA in 1969, the rump became known as the Official IRA; its political wing was Official Sinn Fein, known in Northern Ireland as the Republican Clubs. The Officials argued that class politics had superseded sectarian issues and that the violence of the Provisionals merely entrenched reactionary attitudes. Some Officials continued with violence, and indeed a violent clash between the two wings of the IRA occurred in 1975.

The Provisionals soon came to be seen as a direct-action organisation, using a guerrilla campaign to make Northern Ireland ungovernable and so force the British Government and Army to withdraw and relinquish all responsibility for the province. Their political arm was Provisional Sinn Fein, legal throughout Ireland, but a proscribed organisation in mainland Britain under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974. The Provos have a women’s section gathering information, planting firebombs and providing shelter in ‘safe houses’, and a youth wing gathering intelligence, acting as lookouts and transporting weapons. The Provos have used sniping, bombing, rocket launchers, letter bombs and parcel bombs. Their actions provoked ‘Bloody Sunday’ in 1972, when 13 people were killed by British soldiers, and internment without trial of suspects, which was in force for four years despite a civil disobedience campaign called by Catholic-based opposition parties in Northern Ireland. These events boosted recruitment to the Provisional IRA (PIRA), which also received weapons from abroad, especially the USA. In 1972 the Stormont Parliament was suspended indefinitely, along with the hopes of many moderates. From 1972 the PIRA has planted bombs in Britain and Ireland, attracting worldwide notoriety and revulsion despite some ceasefires. In England, it bombed a public house in Birmingham in 1974, when 21 people were killed and 120 injured. It caused the deaths of 18 British soldiers at Warrenpoint, Northen Ireland, in 1979. In August 1979, PIRA members in the Republic murdered Earl Mountbatten of Burma with a bomb placed on his yacht. He was one of the IRA’s most prestigious victims. In the early 1980s public support for the PIRA was increasing among the Catholics of Northern Ireland’s population, at the 125

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expense of more moderate parties. In 1980–81 many imprisoned Provisionals went on hunger strikes to try to obtain special treatment and ultimately political prisoner status. The most notable was Bobbie Sands, who died in prison in May 1981, a month after being elected a Westminster MP. More extreme than the PIRA is the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the political wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, created in 1974 with the aim of going to war to compel the British to withdraw from Northern Ireland, which would then unite with the South in a new socialist republic, which would withdraw from the European Community. INLA bombs caused the deaths of Airey Neave, a Conservative MP, in 1979, eleven soldiers and six civilians at a pub near Londonderry in 1981, eight soldiers in London parks in 1982, five people outside Harrods store in London in 1983, and five more at the Grand Hotel, Brighton, during the Conservative Party Conference in 1984. Protestant radical and extreme groups have also been active in fomenting discord. Prime among these is the Ulster Volunteer Force, a loyalist military group dating from 1912. It aims to defend the constitution of Ulster, by force of arms if need be. The membership base of the UVF has always been more important than its actions. The Ulster Defence Association has been seen as the strongest of the paramilitary organisations set up in response to the Provisionals. It was the UDA that manned the Protestant barricades in 1972, and later made explosives and planted bombs in hotels and IRA meeting places. It had strong links with Scotland, but suffered from factional infighting. The Protestant equivalent of the INLA was the Ulster Freedom Fighters, a loose-knit body of violent elements ready to take the law into their own hands. Members carried out assassinations on a wide scale.

Terrorism has had little effect on the political structure of the United Kingdom or Ireland – it is not an election issue in either country, though it has resulted in policy changes aimed at suppressing the IRA. Among the Protestants of Northern Ireland, terrorism has only stiffened existing attitudes of resistance to any compromise that hints of a drift towards Irish unity – as shown by the polarised reactions to the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. Among the IRA’s potential Catholic constituency, it seems that – even though terrorism did spark a brief Peace Movement, expressing strong revulsion at violence – residual support for the IRA (mainly the Provos) has remained constant. Power sharing was achieved only in Londonderry, with its balance of Protestants and Catholics. It seems the British will stay in Northern Ireland until the British population tires of violence or Protestants agree to a united Ireland. The lesson that violence pays has been well learnt by extremists, and the presence of the British army has caused discord. The Troops Out Movement of the mid1970s was more successful. Since direct rule in 1972, the security forces have succeeded in eroding terrorist movements by measures within the existing legal framework, though the conviction of terrorists cannot be taken for granted in a community intimidated by terrorists. No clear solutions to Ulster’s political problems have been found, any more than to the problems of security. Terrorism has consequences for the long-term prospects of democracy and stability; in particular, it affects quality of life, patterns of socialisation and political culture. Yet Northern Ireland has shown resilience – life goes on, despite high levels of violence. The controversial Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic was a first attempt to get nationalists and unionists to work 126

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together in a devolved local executive, which would erode support for political violence. Bitterly complaining that they were never consulted, unionists rejected the Agreement as an act of treachery. Two possibilities can occur. The first is that a majority of unionists will eventually grudgingly accept the Agreement. The dilemma was how to handle this. In 1998 Ireland disagreed with the British Government over its refusal to investigate members of the RUC accused of shooting at terrorist suspects before attempting to arrest them. In 1999 the Irish Government succeeded in persuading the British to review the Ulster Defence Regiment’s links with Protestant paramilitaries. Both governments agreed in 1996 to exclude Sinn Fein from any peace negotiations, as they believed IRA behaviour had made no contribution to peace, despite the IRA decision in February 1996 to end the two-year bombing campaign in mainland UK. After two months of power-sharing government, direct rule was re-imposed in Northern Ireland because crucially the IRA was not seen to be decommissioning its arms. Over the next few years Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair, the Irish and British Prime Ministers, worked to get peace talks restarted. In May 2007, Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party agreed to work together in the parliament at Stormont and a new chapter in Anglo-Irish history began. The 1990s were marked by an economic upturn, buoyed by economic subsidies and foreign investment. In December 1999 the Irish constitution was amended to remove the articles laying claim to Northern Ireland. In October 2002 the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended over allegations of the IRA spying at the Northern Ireland Office in Belfast. Direct rule from London was subsequently reimposed. Elections in November 2003 to the

Northern Ireland Assembly showed gains for the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein – two parties at opposite ends of the local political spectrum. In May 2007 a devolved Northern Ireland government replaced direct rule from London with Ian Paisley as Chief Minister and Martin McGuinness as his deputy. In March 2008 Paisley announced he was stepping down in May 2008. See also: United Kingdom; Northern Ireland. Bibliography Bruce, S. (1991) ‘Northern Ireland: Reappraising Loyalist Violence’, Conflict Studies, No. 249, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Hennessey, J. (1997) A History of Northern Ireland, 1920–96, New York: St Martin’s Press, and Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan. Messenger, C. (1990) Northern Ireland: The Troubles, New York: Gallery Books.

Further Reading Alexander, Y. and O’Day, A. (eds) (1984) Terrorism in Ireland, New York: St Martins Press. Kearney, R. (1997) Post-Nationalist Ireland, London: Routledge. O’Brien, B. (1999) The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein, Dublin: The O’Brien Press. —— and Alexander, Y. (1994) Dimensions of Irish Terrorism, Aldershot, Hampshire: Dartmouth. Smith, M.I.R. (1994) Fighting for Ireland? The Military Struggle of the Irish Republican Movement, London: Routledge.

iRon CuRTain The term ‘Iron Curtain’, for the frontier of the Communist world, became widely known after its use by Winston Churchill in a 1946 speech full of apprehension about the post-war intentions of the Soviet Union. The Iron Curtain 127

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was heavily guarded, with a system of fortifications over much of its length, including the 1961 Berlin Wall. Geographically, it was the entire border between Communist and non-Communist states from the Soviet-Norwegian border in the north to the Bamboo Curtain between China and India, and China and Hong Kong, and the 53rd parallel between North and South Korea. The Iron Curtain stifled freedom of movement, information and ideas, although there were failed attempts in Poland in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland again in 1981 to create or develop democratic processes. Yet the Communist world reserved the right to export its ideas to the Third World and developing nations, where wars of national liberation have aimed to suppress Western values and actively promote ultimate control by Communists. See also: Cold War.

former colonial powers mapped their boundary lines with little reference to the linguistic, cultural or communal integrity of African peoples. Irredentist aspirations have been actively pursued by Argentina claiming the Falkland Islands, Spain claiming Gibraltar and ethnic Greeks seeking enosis (union with Greece) for Cyprus. See also: Interstate Conflicts; Falklands War, 1982; Cyprus. Bibliography and Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press.

islam The essential creed of Islam (‘Submission to God’) is that there is one God, Allah, and Muhammad is his prophet. The Koran is the basis of Islamic belief and practice, and the source of a complex legal and social system. Five duties are incumbent on every Muslim: expression of belief in one God and prophet; observance of five daily prayer times; fasting during Ramadan; payment of a charity tax; and a pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). Islam shares some beliefs with Judaism and Christianity, and accepts the books of Moses and the gospels of Jesus as part of the divine scripture expressed in the Koran. Islam has never been simply a spiritual community. From its beginnings in the seventh century in Arabia, it was religious and political: the belief that Islam embraces faith and politics is rooted in its holy book, the Koran, and the example or custom (Sunna) of Muhammad, its founder and prophet. The recent Islamic revival has greatly enhanced the political significance of Islam. There is strong anti-

Bibliography Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press.

Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin Books.

iRRedenTism Irredentism is a movement to annex territory that was, or is considered to have been, once part of the country to which the members of the movement belong. The territory in question is usually inhabited largely by linguistic or cultural minorities the same as those within the state wishing to acquire the territory. It is a form of nationalism closely related to self-determination and can cause tension leading to conflict. It occurs where a political boundary does not match the linguistic or ethnic boundaries. This is a widespread problem in Africa, because the 128

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Western sentiment in many Muslim countries and attempts have been made in Iran, Pakistan, Sudan and other countries to impose strict Islamic law. Traditional sectarian enmities among Muslims have also intensified, notably that between Sunni and Shi’ite. The main division in Islam, between Sunnis and Shias, emerged from a seventh-century revolt. Shia is a puritanical sect that rejects materialism and appeals to the poor. Its aim is to expel all Western influence from Islam and to kill anyone who blocks the spread of Islam. Shi’ites believe that God vested the spiritual and temporal leadership of the Muslim world in the descendants of Ali (a seventh-century caliph) and that each leader is to appoint their successor by divine inspiration. There is a Shia majority in Iran and Iraq, with large minorities in Bahrain and Lebanon. Sunni is the mainstream religion, based in Mecca, and is generally more moderate. Sunni believers number about 800 million and are in the majority in all Islamic countries except Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain. However, the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood is Sunni. It has panArab links, with strong minorities in Egypt and Syria, which are opposed to the governments there. For Sunnis, success and power are signs of a faithful community and the validation of Islam, its beliefs and claims. For Shi’ites, history is the struggle of a few through martyrdom and protest to realise social justice and the righteous rule of the imam. The fundamentalist revolution in Iran owed its legitimacy to its secular success in overthrowing the regime of the Shah and replacing it with Ayatollah Khomeini’s version of an Islamic theocracy, based on a blend of radical Shi’ism, anti-Westernism, leftist radicalism and religious extremism. The success of Khomeini’s revolution in Iran provoked a resurgence of Islamic militancy. Islamic groups have been successful, but only where support for the existing

regime was already crumbling. In countries,like Libya, Iraq and Syria, autocratic military rulers bent on total domination at home and abroad have largely been able to suppress any Islamic group that appeared to be a threat to the regime, but they have also produced the phenomenon of state terrorism. Terrorism is employed by extremist Muslim fundamentalist factions, for whom the enemy or target is any non-Muslim or unbeliever. The purpose of terrorism is to murder political enemies, deter potential foes and destabilise society. The modern ‘assassins’, and the Muslim fundamentalists in Iran, decry the ungodliness and corruption of most contemporary societies. For them, man’s only hope of salvation lies in making society conform strictly to the word of God as revealed in the authoritative sources of Islam. Many terrorist incidents have been perpetrated by groups involved in political conflicts in the Middle East. Since groups like the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) are defined by their opponents and victims as terrorist bodies, their acts of war or violence are ‘terrorist’ by definition. Their supporters would say the PLO is fighting a war of national liberation and so is not a terrorist group. Conflicts between the West and Islam are less about territory and more about a broader clash of civilisations over weapons proliferation, human rights and democracy, control of oil, migration, Islamic terrorism and Western intervention. Most of the states seen in Western eyes as terrorist states are Muslim states – Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan. In turn Muslim states can be very reluctant to condemn terrorist acts against the West. Historically, terrorism is the weapon of the weak, those without conventional military power. In the past terrorists could inflict only limited damage, killing a few people here or destroying a facility there. The events of 11 September 2001 showed 129

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that a few terrorists could now cause massive destruction. If terrorism and nuclear weapons were to be combined, the weak would become strong, hence the global fears over weapons of mass destruction. Iran is the spiritual base of Shia, the deep-rooted influence of the mullahs and the cult of blood, martyrdom, suicide bombs and seizure of hostages. Russia fears the spread of Islamic fundamentalism to the former Soviet republics (now shakily independent) on its southern borders and Afghanistan, already infiltrated by Shia fundamentalists. Some observers see Islamic fundamentalism as more of a protest movement, with strong links in the Third World. Islam is a total civilisation, with practical commandments for all aspects of life. In some ways it is a political religion with a collectivist view, aiming to change the entire social system to conform to its ideals. This leads to an explicit idea of fighting for the faith. This is a ‘holy war’ – which is prominent in Muslim thought. Fundamentalism has had peaks and troughs. It is associated with failure, humiliation and backwardness, from which many Muslims are trying to distance themselves. The first Muslim cleric to be prosecuted in the British courts over his preaching was Abdullah el-Faisal (an associate of Abu Hamza, the extremist cleric ousted from the Finsbury Park mosque in January 2003) was found guilty in February 2003 of soliciting the murder of Hindus, Jews and Americans and of stirring up racial hatred. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison. ElFaisal was linked to members of Al Qaeda. See also: Iran; Religion and World Strategic Issues.

Huntington, S.P. (1996) The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, London: Simon & Schuster. Hyman, A. (1985) ‘Muslim Fundamentalism’, Conflict Studies, No. 174, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. Israeli, R. (1997) ‘Islamikaze and their Significance’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Autumn), pp. 96–121. Johnson, J.T. and Kelsay, J. (eds) (1990) Cross, Crescent & Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition, Westport CT: Greenwood Press. Kelsay, J. (1993) Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics, Louisville KY: Westminster and John Knox Press. Spence, J.E. (ed.) (2003) ‘Islamism’, Seaford House Papers, London: Royal College for Defence Studies, pp. 27–40.

Further Reading Ben-Dor, G. (1996) ‘Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Special Issue on Religious Radicalism in Greater Middle East. Horrie, C. and Chippindale, P. (1993) What is Islam? London: Virgin Books. Wright, R. (2001) Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam, New York: Simon & Schuster.

isolaTionism Isolationism is the deliberate avoidance of political, diplomatic or military commitments to other states. It is often seen as the best way to safeguard a state’s security and independence. After the Second World War, with the rise of the two superpowers, isolationism was replaced by containment and interventionism, but it retained many supporters in the USA. They have argued for the geographical, ideological and cultural separateness of the United States and are often called ‘neo-isolationists’. Many isolationist states are not indiffer-

Bibliography Fox, J. and Sandler, S. (2005) ‘The Question of Religion and World Politics’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 293–304.

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ent to the world around them; on the contrary, they may be realistically assessing the world around them and its potential threats. Countries remote from conflict, relatively independent economically and militarily, and keen to maintain their social, economic and political values, such as New Zealand and Chile, often prefer a degree of isolationism. There are worrying aspects to isolationism, for example, when an unpredictable country like North Korea or Iran aims to own nuclear weapons, but puts itself in purdah from the rest of the world and stops listening. Cuba has been seen as rather isolationist in its retention of Marxist policies, and Bhutan in the Himalayas has been described as a hermit kingdom. Ruined countries such as Somalia are perceived as isolationist, simply because there is no legitimate government.

Two men most associated with Israeli security have been Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon. Rabin was Prime Minister from 1992 until his assassination by a young, far-right Israeli in 1995. In 1993 he was instrumental in signing the Oslo Accords, and in May 1994 Rabin and Yassir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, signed an agreement in Cairo granting autonomy to Gaza and Jericho. The Israeli Army withdrew from Gaza, ending 27 years of occupation. However, in 1995 Israeli public opinion was growing more divided over the peace process with the Palestinians. This contributed to Rabin’s untimely death. Ariel Sharon rose rapidly in the Israeli Army, and then entered politics in 1973. He was a right-winger who encouraged new Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and masterminded Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, which was marred by alleged atrocities by Israelis in Lebanese refugee camps. On becoming Prime Minister in March 2001, he took a hard line against the Palestinian intifada, and effectively undermined the Oslo Accords. He laid siege to Arafat’s headquarters and in January 2002 the Israeli Army withdrew from the Palestinian territories. He was opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state, but in 2003 he supported a plan to ease tension with the Palestinians by agreeing to land concessions in Gaza and the West Bank – all Jewish settlers were to leave Gaza and their homes demolished. Israelis and Palestinians were ready to begin a dialogue, build mutual confidence and devise a ‘land for peace’ settlement. But the situation remains complicated by ideologues or religious nationalists in Israel and among the Palestinians. In December 2005 the Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffered a severe stroke and went into a coma. He had just formed a new centrist party, Kadima, under which he planned to run for a third term in office. His successor Ehud Olmert became

Bibliography and Further Reading Dzurek, D.J. (1996) The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who’s On First, Maritime Briefing, Vol. 2, No. 1, Durham University, UK: International Boundaries Research Unit.

isRael: seCuRiTy issues Israelis take a pessimistic view of their security, being very conscious of the threat from their Arab neighbours, but many also believe in Israel’s ability to overcome challenges to its security from within and without. In the Six-Day War, 1967, Israel took the West Bank and Gaza, both mainly populated by Arabs. Since then Israel has been increasingly threatened by Palestinian insurrection and Jewish nationalism. The status quo is only increasing the tensions. Israel is a prime example of a country whose peoples have conflicting aspirations for national identity, religion and politics. How does a Jewish state deal with the presence and claims of the Palestinians? 131

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embroiled in the invasion of Lebanon, started under the pretext of rescuing two Israeli soldiers that had been kidnapped by Lebanese militants of Hizbollah. The war with Lebanon was condemned globally and caused a split in Israeli public opinion over those who supported the war and those who blamed the army and said it had achieved little – even the two Israeli soldiers remained listed as missing. In late 2006 Israel renewed its onslaught on Gaza targeting Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants. Many civilians were killed in Gaza. In December 2006 Olmert seemingly confirmed his country’s nuclear weapon capability. In late 2008 he formally resigned to face corruption charges. He was replaced as prime minister by the foreign minister Tzipi Livni.

See also: Palestine. Bibliography Karsh, E. (2002) The Arab–Israeli Conflict: The Palestine War 1948, Oxford: Osprey. Schulze, K.E. (1999) The Arab–Israeli Conflict, London: Longman. Sicker, M. (1989) Israel’s Quest for Security, London: Praeger.

Further Reading Lerman, E. (1984) ‘The Palestinian Revolution and the Arab Israeli Conflict: A New Phase?’, Conflict Studies, No. 141, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. Tessler, M. (1994) A History of the Israeli– Palestinian Conflict, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press.

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joRdan: Civil waR, 1970 In 1946, Jordan won its independence from Britain, but quickly became enveloped in the turmoil connected with the rise of the Jewish state of Israel. In 1948 it took control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, only to lose both in the Six-Day War, 1967, after joining an anti-Israeli alliance which led to catastrophic defeat. Huge numbers of Palestinian refugees from the West Bank poured into Jordan, but they did not respect the King’s authority because of his refusal to allow anyone in Jordan to provoke Israel after 1967. However, Yassir Arafat began launching attacks on Israel from Jordanian territory. Israel retaliated and Jordan became a battleground. By 1970 the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), led by Arafat, had become an unofficial state within a state in Jordan, and some Palestinian commanders (fedayeen) attempted to assassinate the King. The Jordanian Army moved in to subdue them and a civil war broke out. The army withdrew its forces from around Amman, the capital and site of the PLO headquarters, to curtail the heavy fighting. Arafat called for a general strike while the more radical Palestinian units wished to overthrow the King, who proclaimed martial law. In late September, Syria entered Jordan to support the PLO. This threatened to widen the war. The following week, thousands were killed in spite of a number of ceasefire agreements. However, the King’s forces managed to slowly overcome the insurgents, without the need for support from the Israeli military or US air power.

The PLO realised that it could not win without external help, but there were deep divisions in the Arab world on how to deal with the PLO. The government in Amman and the PLO both wanted to regain the West Bank, but the civil war showed that their interests did not always coincide. As a result of the King winning the civil war, the PLO moved to Lebanon. See also: Israel: Security Issues; Lebanon; Palestine. Bibliography Kaufman, B.I. (1996) The Arab Middle East and the United States, New York: Twayne, and London: Prentice Hall International.

junTa A junta is a group of military officers who hold power in a country, typically after a coup d’état. A junta can also be seen as a small group of leaders – a cabal, faction or clique. Traditionally the term applied to Spanish and Latin American areas, but is now used generally for situations where military groups carry on government functions or form the decisive force behind a civilian dictatorship, as in Greece under the Colonels or in South Vietnam. See also: Civil–Military Relations; Latin America. Bibliography and Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

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jusT waR The concept of the just war was established in the medieval period of Christian history and was further developed in the seventeenth century by Hugo Grotius, the father of modern international law. There are two aspects to just war – the morality of waging war at all (jus ad bellum – the justice of a war) and the morality of the way you fight (jus in bello – justice in a war). The whole theory assumes that there are right or just circumstances under which going to war is morally acceptable. Decisions on war ought to be made and legitimised by duly constituted authority, and war has to be fought by a competent authority. One can fight a war in selfdefence, but not for revenge or for territorial expansion. War should help to restore just order. The loss of life in a war should be kept at a tolerable level. Jus in bello determines what military actions are acceptable in a war. Offensive action has to be based on an acceptable balance between means and ends. Warfare has to be conducted with immunity for non-combatants; it is immoral to kill innocent civilians. The justifiable use of violence in war is limited to a morally defensible cause. Grotius identified conditions that must be met if the resort to war is to be considered legitimate in the light of prevailing international norms. Two of these conditions, the need for a just cause and the need for war to be a last resort, were expressed in the United Nations Charter. In war, the basic constitutional rules of the state must be followed. The United States President is commander-in-chief but Congress must declare war. In the mutilateral world since the end of the Cold War, the expectation of joint response restrains any one powerful state on the United Nations Security Council from deciding that it has a just cause in defending someone else. The notion that in war the good sought

and the harm done must be proportionate suggests that discrimination alone – not targeting innocent civilians – is not enough to make a military action morally acceptable. Proportionality recognises that, in almost any war, some civilians will unavoidably be killed if military targets are hit, and this has to be accepted. The jus in bello version of proportionality is sometimes referred to as double effect – like wars as a whole, all military actions in wartime have both good and bad effects, but the good must outweigh the bad. Double effect requires that noncombatant immunity be observed and that the bad effect be unintended and proportional to the legitimate object of the military action. In Vietnam, the United States used toxic defoliants, which were perhaps legitimate to reveal enemy forces, but they caused long-term environmental contamination. In the Gulf War, 1990, the United Nations coalition claimed to have a just cause in repelling Iraq’s invasion and restoring Kuwaiti independence. Collective self-defence is legitimate, the liberation of Kuwait was authorised by the United Nations, and the war against Iraq was declared by a legitimate authority. Discrimination was upheld by the use of ‘smart bombs’ that precisely targeted Iraqi military facilities with very few civilian deaths. The concept of just war will need to be debated anew whenever military capabilities or geopolitics change. The world is very different since the end of the Cold War, and this will affect decisions about whether and how to fight in the future. See also: Gulf War, 1991; Gulf War, 2003; United Nations. Bibliography and Further Reading Walzer, M. (1977) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 2nd edn, New York: Basic Books (HarperCollins).

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kashmiR Kashmir is the northernmost region of the Indian subcontinent, bordered by China and Afghanistan, and occupied by India, Pakistan and China. At independence in 1947, the states in British India could choose whether to join India or Pakistan, and the Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir acceded to India. There was a Muslim revolt, Pakistan intervened and fighting with India ended in partition of the region. The two most populous parts came under Indian control. Jammu and Kashmir was integrated administratively into India and the fact that people voted in Indian elections was taken as evidence that they had opted to remain within India. Pakistan disputed this claim, and the countries went to war in 1965. This did little to resolve the dispute or shift the borders. Virtually isolated over Kashmir, Pakistan – which in the 1950s had accepted weapons from the United States, despite the then Indian Prime Minister’s wish for a neutral subcontinent – turned in the 1960s to Communist China, which also had a border conflict with India. Pakistan’s flirtation with China was met by a reduction in US economic and military aid. At the Simla Conference in 1972, Pakistan and India agreed to resolve all disputes, including Jammu and Kashmir, in bilateral negotiations. Pakistan’s irredentist position was weakened after its defeat in the 1971 war that led to the secession of Bangladesh. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslim militants of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), impatient at Pakistan’s inaction over Kashmir, intensified its campaign of

terrorism, strikes and civil unrest; India believed that Pakistan was training and arming the JKLF guerrillas. Pakistan wanted a UN-administered plebiscite to sort out the issue, whereas India wanted to resolve it by bilateral negotiation. Fighting continued between the Indian Army and the JKLF, but by the mid-1990s it had reached stalemate. The Indians were handicapped by the depth of disaffection in Kashmir; the insurgents, even with Pakistani support, could not defeat Indian forces, and had no unified strategy. There was a good turnout in most of Jammu and Kashmir in the 1996 elections, but Pakistan said India had put pressure on people to vote. In the late 1990s, sustained artillery duels left thousands dead – civilians, militants and security forces. India blamed all attacks on Pakistan. As a result of American and Russian intervention, there were far fewer incursions across the ceasefire line. From 2003, both sides improved relations at diplomatic and political level, and Kashmir became relatively peaceful. The British colonial authorities often found it expedient to maintain the differences between ethnic and religious groups to further its own objectives. The issues over Kashmir were brought to the surface by the apparent inconsistencies in British rule. Since then, there has been rapid social and political mobilisation against a background of institutional decay, a combination which can result in violent conflict. The Kashmir dispute has enormous significance for both sides. For India, the absorption of Kashmir would show its secular credentials; for Pakistan, the state 135

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could not be complete until it incorporated every area with a Muslim majority. As with many other crises since 1945, the Kashmir crisis arose essentially because one government attempted – by threats, subversion or outright attack – to incorporate into its own territory ethnically related people living in a neighbouring state. Limiting the scope of the Kashmir crisis is of great importance to the countries of the region and the wider world, because the secession of Kashmir could set off a domino effect. India believes that independence or autonomy for Kashmir would cause long-term problems, leading every Indian state to question its constitutional status, but improved Indian/ Pakistani relations could help promote a peaceful outcome for Kashmir. See also: India; Pakistan; South Asia.

1950–53

influence and became the Republic of South Korea. This artificial division became fixed in August 1949. In June 1950, with Soviet material support, the North Korean Army invaded, catching the South and the small American military group unprepared. Within days President Truman ordered US reinforcements to be sent and, almost immediately, the United Nations voted to provide military aid. In September and October 1950, the North Koreans were thrown back, but the UN force’s advance to the SinoKorean border prompted intervention by Communist Chinese ‘volunteers’ who recovered much of the land before the momentum of their offensive was checked. This led to 16 nations, including the United Kingdom and the United States, fighting the North Koreans (and some Chinese Communist forces) for three years. The United Nations forces suffered nearly 450,000 casualties and the Communist forces 1.4 million. An armistice on the 38th parallel came into effect in July 1953 and since then peace negotiations have gone on intermittently without success. South Korea became an economic power of international standing, while North Korea became a ‘hermit’ state having little contact with the outside world, Stalinist in its interpretation of Communism and a threatening to build nuclear weapons. The Korean War had polarised along classic Cold War lines, with the two great ideological powers facing each other, and led to an uneasy stalemate. It was broken only by the greatest crisis in the war when, in 1951, the UN Commander-in-Chief, General Douglas MacArthur, threatened to invade China. President Truman was annoyed: he wished to contain the conflict and believed that MacArthur was straying into political territory. He sacked him and began to look at ways to finish the war. Each side took advantage if a favourable situation arose, while world statesmen

Bibliography Lamb, A. (1966) Crisis in Kashmir, 1947– 1966, London: Routledge. Malik, I.H. (1993) ‘The Continuing Conflict in Kashmir: Regional Détente in Jeopardy’, Conflict Studies, No. 259, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Ganguly, S. (1997) The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wirsing, R. (1994) India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, New York: St Martin’s Press, and Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.

koRean waR, 1950–53 At the time of the Japanese surrender at the end of the Second World War, Russian troops in Korea stopped their advance at the 38th parallel. Korea north of this line came under Communist influence, and became the Democratic People’s Republic; Korea south of that line came under Western 136

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tried to find a satisfactory end to the conflict. Conventional battles in the war were severe, notably the fight for a small horseshoe-shaped hill, The Hook. It was captured, lost and recaptured by the Americans, but not without heavy losses. The British took the line to relieve the Americans and held out against the Chinese. A danger point in the war was in 1952 when US planes bombed power plants on the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and China. There was a fear that this could provoke a backlash if bombs fell on Chinese territory. By the end of 1952 fighting was taking place along a narrow line across the Korean peninsula (what became the Demilitarised Zone). Within two weeks of signing the armistice at Panmunjon, the United States signed a mutual defence treaty with South Korea. North and South Korea became a symbol of the East–West divide. Korea was a turning point in the Cold War. It brought the United States and its full potential against the spread of Communism and ended whatever possibility there might have been for accommodation with the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death in 1953. The Chinese proved they had the will and the military capacity to blunt a Western attack. The United States accomplished its original war aim: to preserve the sovereignty of South Korea. The nuclear arms race had seemed at times during the Korean War to be heading to the brink of another world war. See also: Cold War; North Korea.

Lee, S.H. (2001) The Korean War, Harlow, Essex: Longman Pearson Education. MacDonald, C. (1990) Britain and the Korean War, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Further Reading Dae Hwan Kim and Tat Yan Kong (eds) (1997) The Korean War in Transition, Oxford: St Antony’s College. Hastings, M. (1987) The Korean War, New York: Simon & Schuster, and London: Joseph. Lowe, P. (1997) The Origins of the Korean War, 2nd edn, London: Longman.

kosovo Kosovo was created in 1946 from parts of Serbia and Montenegro. It was made an autonomous region of Serbia within the state of Yugoslavia. It bordered on Albania and the majority of its population were ethnic Albanians, Muslim by religion. In 1981, 1988 and 1990 there were riots in Kosovo. By 1990, it was the poorest part of Yugoslavia, with unemployment at 50 per cent, and 90 per cent of the population of nearly two million were of Albanian origin. Most Serbs believed that Kosovo was full of separatist extremists, encouraged from abroad, whose aim was secession from Yugoslavia. Serbian repression of uprisings in Kosovo caused tension with Albania. In the early 1990s, Yugoslav republics voted for independence, which led to civil war between Serbia, Croatia and BosniaHercegovina. In 1997 Kosovan–Serbian relations took a turn for the worse after Slobodan Milosevic called for a referendum on foreign mediation in Kosovo. The vote was boycotted by Albanian-speaking Kosovars. Serbia accused Albania of arming the Kosovan Liberation Army. Serbia rejected calls for dialogue from the West, with strong support from its traditional ally, Russia. Further confrontation in the region led to NATO calling for

Bibliography Cotton, J. and Neary, I. (eds) (1989) The Korean War in History, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Kirby, S. (1988) ‘The Two Koreas – Conflict or Compromise?’, Conflict Studies, No. 207, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

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intervention. In March 1999, despite Russian objections, the Western alliance launched air strikes on Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. This led to revenge attacks against Kosovo, many of whose inhabitants fled to neighbouring countries. Albania became increasingly concerned about the fate of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Herein was a conundrum: if Kosovo became independent (or merged with Albania), Serbia would start to worry about the fate of the minority of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. Kosovars were probably lucky in that, from the outset of the bombing campaign, none of the NATO countries had over-riding national interests in the Kosovan crisis. The Allies took a cautious and incremental approach intended to minimise casualties and avoid any event that could make it difficult to exit if the need arose. It was the first time that NATO had conducted a military offensive to compel another country to accept its terms. After eleven weeks of conflict, the Serbians were forced to end their violence against the Kosovars, withdraw their forces from Kosovo, accept an international military presence in the province and allow the unconditional return of all refugees. One of the prime reasons for initiating military operations was achieved in the end, but at great cost to the Albanian Kosovars. NATO had also set itself the aim of reducing the Serb military capability to wage violence in the future. The crisis also saw the decline of Russia as a regional and global power: it was edged out by NATO and was unable to act militarily in the crisis. However, the future of Kosovo, now an international protectorate but legally part of Serbia, remained unresolved. In March 2004, Kosovo was again the scene of violent confrontation between the Albanian majority and Serb minority. Albanian Kosovar leaders announced that their aim was independence; the EU and the UN stated they were in favour of

autonomy within a federation; Serbian leaders wanted partition of the province between Serbs and Albanians, but this was resisted by the West. In February 2007 the United Nation’s plan for Kosovo’s eventual independence was announced, while NATO peacekeeping forces were still trying to maintain order. A year later, the parliament in Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. Serbia was deeply unhappy because it considered the territory as its historic heartland. Kosovo was a classic conflict between two national groups over political control of a single territory – each national group being mobilised to support the use of violence against the other national group. See also: Albania; NATO; Yugoslav Civil War. Bibliography Biberaj, E. (1993) ‘Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg’, Conflict Studies, No. 258, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Jokic, A. (ed.) (2003) Lessons of Kosovo: Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention, Peterborough ONT: Broadview Press. Nardulli, B.R., Perry, W.L., Pirnie, B., Gordon, J. and McGinn, J.G. (2002) Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo 1999, Santa Monica CA: RAND Arroyo Center.

Further Reading Latawski, P. and Smith, M.A. (2003) The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of PostWar European Security, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Malcolm, N. (1999) Kosovo: A Short History, New York: Harper Collins. Ministry of Defence (2000) Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Weymouth, A. and Henig, S. (eds) (2001) The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education.

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kuRds Kurds are a largely nomadic Turkic people living chiefly in eastern Turkey, northern Iraq and western Iran. They inhabit a large plateau and mountainous region covering parts of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia. With the end of the First World War and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, this area was split between different countries. Proposals to create Kurdistan came to nothing and subsequent attempts to form a Kurdish state have been only partly or temporarily successful. There was briefly in 1946 an independent Kurdistan state. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, a sect which has existed since the seventh century. They have been politically oppressed in Turkey until recent years, but Turkey is now keen to show its respect for human rights, in preparation for possible entry to the European Union. In Iran, Sunnis suffered from religious persecution at the hands of the Ayatollahs after 1979. The relationship between Kurds and the Iraqi state has been particularly tense. The Kurds’ failure to achieve autonomous status for Kurdistan in the 1970s resulted in hostilities between Kurds and government forces. In March 1974, the Iraqi Government re-defined the boundaries of the Kurdish territory so that all the oil installations fell outside them. The Kurdish guerrilla army, over 40,000 strong, retained some Iranian support, but the Shah did not want to risk a Kurdish victory in Iraq that could prompt Iranian Kurds to consider an uprising against him. Within three years the Shah was persuaded to end his support for the Iraqi Kurds, whose insurgency promptly collapsed. In 1991 their rebellion against Saddam Hussein was ruthlessly crushed. After the first Gulf War in 1991, Saddam managed to retain a battle-hardened army of a million men and he resumed his campaign against the Kurds. It became clearer during the 1990s that the removal of

Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship would be a good thing for groups in Iraq like the Kurds. United Nations humanitarian agencies were keen to see Kurdish refugees returning to their homeland in northern Iraq, freed from Saddam’s terror, keeping the domestic autonomy they had been given in 1970 and retaining official status for the Kurdish language. Kurds could never forget or forgive Saddam for dropping chemical bombs on their hill town of Halabja in March 1988, poisoning an estimated 5,000 civilians, largely Kurdish. Giving the Kurds a safe haven proved troublesome, because the Kurds wanted independence, which the Turks and Americans did not favour. In March 1995 Turkish troops invaded Iraqi Kurdistan – under allied military tutelage – to repress members of the Kurdish Workers Party; the Turks feared this group could arouse ideas of independence among Turkish Kurds too. When the second Gulf War started in March 2003, the Americans had responsibility for the control of northern Iraq. The only strong resistance that the allied forces in the Kurdish areas faced came from the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. In 2004 a Kurd, Ghazi Yacer, was appointed President of Iraq in the post-war Iraqi Government. In March 2004 disturbances occurred in Syria, started by Kurds there demanding increased rights. These were soon crushed by the authorities. In May the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey announced that its five-year ceasefire was coming to an end. This caused an outcry, especially in Turkey, desperate to show the world it was stable and ready for entry to the EU. The PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan had been imprisoned in Turkey since 1999. See also: Iraq; Gulf War, 1991; Gulf War, 2003; Millennial Violence. Bibliography Gunter, M. (1992) The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope, New York: St Martin’s Press.

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McDowall, D. (1992) The Kurds: A Nation Denied, London: Minority Rights Group.

Struggle for Recognition’, Conflict Studies, No. 214, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

Further Reading Hyman, A. (1988) ‘Elusive Kurdistan: The

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landmines A landmine is an explosive charge placed in or on the ground and usually detonated by stepping or driving on it. A mine can also be a tunnel dug in order to detonate an explosive charge under an enemy fortification. The landmine cannot distinguish between combatants and civilians. In areas such as Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Bosnia they were used extensively by irregular military forces and were never disarmed. Long after the conflicts ended, landmines continued to maim and kill civilians who tried to re-establish their lives in former war zones. Not surprisingly, global public opinion has pressed governments around the world to ban them. Diana, Princess of Wales led a high-profile campaign against landmines in Bosnia and Angola in 1997 to highlight the number of children’s lives that had been ruined by such inhumane devices. Landmines are cheap to deploy, but very expensive to find and disarm. Britain first became aware of their modern lethal potential during the Falklands War, 1982, when the Argentinians planted thousands of plastic landmines, immune from detectors, and after the war produced no maps of where mines had been laid. An Anti-Personnel Mine Convention was signed by a hundred countries in 1997, but the United States and China refused to sign, the former arguing that they were vital in defending the demilitarised zone between South and North Korea. Efforts continue to persuade the non-signatories of the treaty to sign up. By the end of 1999, when the Convention came into force, 136

countries had signed the treaty and 89 had ratified. Responsible states that have sound military arguments for the use of anti-personnel mines will record where they have been laid, along with the minefield boundaries, and then lift the mines when there is no longer a need for them. However, landmines can now be laid from the air, or from rocket- and artillery-delivered canisters, and maps of such fields cannot be drawn accurately. The 1997 Convention also bans ‘smart’ mines, which are deactivated after a set time. Nobody knows the exact number of mines still in the ground around the world: the United Nations estimated in 2000 that there were 110 million mines, whereas mine-clearing organisations said there were only 2.2 million. Many countries had large stocks of antipersonnel mines and the 1997 treaty signatories agreed that these would be destroyed by 2003, but there is no evidence that all have been destroyed. Some may have ended up on the black market, and some countries still export mines. It seems impossible to impose sanctions to stop them. Bibliography Vines, A. and Thompson, H. (1999) ‘Beyond the Landmine Ban: Eradicating a Lethal Legacy’, Conflict Studies, No. 316, Leamington Spa, Warwickshire: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

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laTin ameRiCa Latin America has long been dominated by United States interests. That has begun to change, with Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina adopting more populist policies centred on the national interest and adopting a more independent line on foreign policy: many states, for example, have opposing US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of the poorer societies on the continent are also very unequal. Tiny elites hold enormous concentrations of land and wealth, while the many live in poverty in urban shanties or on small rural plots. Cycles of chronic instability and spasms of political violence, extremism and military authoritarianism are the companions of inequality. The real cause of many Latin American civil wars, for instance in Haiti, El Salvador and Nicaragua, has been economic inequality, intensified by growing numbers of landless peasants and resistance by elites to any change. During the Cold War, Latin American states banned nuclear weapons by signing the Latin America Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1967, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The treaty committed signatories to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and not to allow their territory to be used for manufacturing or storing nuclear weapons. The North American Free Trade Agreement concluded in 1993 between the United States, Canada and Mexico has had an impact on regionalisation in Latin America, but this has been hampered by tensions within and between states, fuelled by environmental resource depletion and despoliation, social dislocation, poverty and debt, and trade in illicit drugs (narcotics). The fear of marginalisation – in a region dominated by US political and economic power and covert strategic involvement – has explained much regional activity in Central and South America. From the 1940s to the 1980s, the United States gave indiscriminate support to governments

and movements, whether democratic or not, if they were hostile to Communism. In the 1980s, a wave of civilian governments replaced military men and economic conditions steadily improved. However, flagrant human rights abuses have regularly caused political instability. Conflict potential has receded as populism has increased: non-proletarian regimes have been searching for support from the dispossessed (the ‘shirtless’) to defend the interests of the classes with money, power and influence that support the leader. The combination of massive propaganda and a leader with the people’s direct support is akin to fascism, which Latin America has suffered from in the past, with military leaders such as Pinochet in Chile adopting very right-wing policies. However, modern populism in Latin America appeals to the people to effect change, focusing their fervour around redistributive justice and demagogic nationalism. Some observers believe that democracy is being undermined, being used to decrease rather than protect people’s rights. There is a fine balance between non-threatening and radical populism. An equal concern for the international community is how much attention is paid to the military – and how, if and when they might regain power. See also: Central America; Chile; Civil War; Junta. Bibliography Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (eds) (1997) The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mansbach, R.W. (1995) The Global Puzzle: Issues and Actors in World Politics, 2nd edn, Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Further Reading The World Guide: See the World from a Different Angle (2005) Oxford: New Internationalist Publications.

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leBanon Since its creation as an independent state in 1943, Lebanon has struggled with the tensions among its ethnic and religious communities, especially between Christians and Muslims, tensions which eventually erupted into open hostilities between military groups and factions. With the arrival of the Palestinians, the balance between Maronite Christian and Muslim interests changed, so that by 1975– 76 the Lebanese state had collapsed in civil conflict. Until then it had been the only place in the Middle East where a nonMuslim minority was decently tolerated in a Muslim society. The delicate balance of Lebanese democracy had been established by a ‘covenant’, an unwritten formula that divided power among all the minorities – Christian Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Sunni Muslim, Shi’ite Muslim and Druze. The President was always a Maronite Catholic, the Premier a Sunni Muslim, the speaker of Parliament a Shi’ite Muslim, and the commander-inchief of the armed forces a Maronite. The covenant had worked and Lebanon was largely peaceful, though there had been a Nasser-inspired civil war in 1958, during which US troops had been landed, and another period of fighting started in 1968, caused by Palestinian terrorists. The left in Lebanon was and is Muslim; the right was and is mainly pro-Western Christians, including the Phalange, a group led by the Gemayel family seeking to preserve the country’s liberal, democratic and Christian character. After the Jordan Civil War, 1970, large numbers of Palestinian gunmen infiltrated Lebanon and set up not just their headquarters, but virtually a state within a state, ruled by the gunmen of Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. They began attacks on Israel and other targets. The security forces found it difficult to restore law and order, and the army was

kept out of it, as Muslim leaders feared its largely Christian officers would interfere on the side of the Phalangists or other Christian groups. At first the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) remained neutral, and the main part of the fighting was left to local groups. Leftist forces were far more numerous and better armed, but arms were easy to buy anywhere in the Middle East and both sides had funds. Palestinians took an increasing hand on the side of the Lebanese leftists, and the Christians were slowly forced back. Fighting was especially fierce in the south, and Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian guerrillas. The Syrians entered the north of the country to try to enforce some peace with their Popular Liberation Army (PLA). A series of truces broke down, there was fighting between the PLA and the extreme left, and fighting escalated between the Syrians and the Palestinians. Palestinian refugee camps grew and became the scene of bitter fighting, especially with the Israelis, who suspected the camps of holding terrorists. A newly created Arab Deterrent Force managed to enforce a ceasefire, but the Arab countries reduced their contingents, so it became purely a Syrian force. The United Nations established an Interim Force to help the Lebanese Government assert effective authority in the area. Christian forces in southern Lebanon were supported by Israel, which – to eliminate the persistent threat to it posed by PLO forces – invaded in 1982. Israel occupied most of the southern half of Lebanon, and Syrian forces withdrew from Beirut. Palestinian fighters were driven from the south, and then from West Beirut. Phalangist militiamen were held responsible for the massacre of Palestinians in two Beirut refugee camps. The Lebanese Government struggled to impose its authority in Beirut, and Israel would not withdraw its troops unless all non-Lebanese Arab forces were withdrawn and a demilitarised zone set up in 143

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southern Lebanon. The United Nations sent in a peacekeeping force of US, British, French and Italian troops, but after suicide car-bomb attacks against the US and French contingents, the force was withdrawn early in 1984. The attacks were instigated by Muslim fundamentalists fired by the revolution that had toppled the Shah in Iran, who were fighting to create a Shi’ite state. At the time of the Israeli advance into Beirut, after the assassination of Presidentelect Gemayel in September 1983, there were reports of armed men entering the Palestinian refugee camps at Chatila and Sabra in West Beirut in search of PLO guerrillas, and then killing civilians, including women and children. When journalists and relief workers entered the camps, they found a scene of devastation. Many bodies were found, some mutilated, of men, women and children who appeared to have been machine-gunned at close range, many of them while apparently trying to escape. Many houses had been blown up with their occupants still inside and bulldozed into rubble, and there was a mass grave on the edge of one of the camps. A commission of enquiry accepted Israeli intelligence estimates of 700 to 800 dead in the two camps. Eventually there was considerable evidence that the armed men responsible were Phalangist militiamen, whereas reports that Major Saad Haddad’s Christian Forces (based in southern Lebanon) had also been involved were unsubstantiated. It became clear that Israeli forces in the area had helped the gunmen enter the camps. In killing or kidnapping non-Muslims, Islamic Jihad aimed to end all Western influence in Lebanon. The TWA flight hijacked in 1985 was brought to Beirut and the passengers were held in Shi’ite strongholds in Lebanon, to be exchanged for PLO prisoners in Israel. Some of the US planes that bombed Libya in April 1986

were based in England, so Lebanese terrorists killed two British hostages and one US. In February 1984 the first Western hostages were seized in Beirut, and in January 1987 the Archbishop of Canterbury’s envoy, Terry Waite, was taken hostage. In February 1988 an American serving with the UN, Colonel William Higgins, was kidnapped. The last hostage to be released was an American journalist, Terry Anderson, who was held from March 1985 to December 1991. Hostage-taking in Lebanon attracted more attention in the media, and for longer, than any terrorist attack. The lives of ordinary people were at stake, and governments faced a choice: were they to protect individual citizens or discourage terrorism? The crisis ended with hostages being released by degrees – Israel exchanged prisoners with the PLO; the US, German and French authorities bartered for their citizens. By the mid-1990s, with increasing carnage and civil war, central authority was so weak that cantonisation of the country based on ethnicity was suggested: 8,000 Druze (a pro-Syrian closed community, an offshoot of the Shi’ites), 10,000 Shi’ites, and 10,000 Phalangists and Maronites (Syrian Christians in Lebanon) wanted power. Each wanted to gain as much land as possible, along with control of key areas – the port of Beirut, the city itself and the airport. In any further escalation, each group would look for help from outside – so the Shi’ites would look to Iran, the Christians to Israel. Yet both Syria and Israel were unwilling to send in more soldiers. In Israel particularly, the war had caused political bickering, huge spending and hyper-inflation. The Israeli army withdrew from Lebanon, ensuring that the Christian militia displaced Muslims from southern Lebanon, guaranteeing a ‘friendly’ population in the 10 km security zone they imposed. In the ensuing power vacuum, 144

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some moderate Lebanese were assassinated. Israel continued air raids against Hizbullah positions, targeting of PLO bases and refuge camps, and shelling of Shi’ite Muslim villages in retaliation for strikes against northern Israel. In 1997 fighting resumed between the Israeli Army and Lebanese guerrillas, but losses were high, prompting talk of a ceasefire. The difficulty lay with Syria, which was believed to want conflict in south Lebanon to continue, to strengthen its position in negotiations with Israel to recover the Golan Heights. After a period of relative peace – with isolated bombings and the assassination of some key political figures – Lebanon was invaded by Israel in July 2006. The Israelis were keen to eradicate Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, to stop rocket attacks on northern Israel and recover two Israeli soldiers kidnapped by Hizbullah, but this war was unplanned and unpredicted. After five weeks of intense aerial bombing of Beirut, Tyre and Sidon, and ground fighting in southern Lebanon, a ceasefire was arranged by the United Nations. Israel did not achieve its objectives, but it revealed military ineptitude and weak political leadership. Meanwhile, Hizbullah won a propaganda victory with the Hamas election victory in the Palestinian territories, and Lebanon was no safer from an Israeli point of view. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon has been policing southern Lebanon since 2006, beefed up by units from European and Muslim countries. In 2007, there were violent clashes in northern Lebanon, between Fatah militia and the police and security forces. Some observers believed Syria was aware what Fatah was doing, and perhaps supported it. The situation remains volatile. Lebanon fears another Israeli invasion and is also worried about Syrian intentions, despite Syrian troops having left the country. The

economy is in ruins and there is no political settlement in sight. See also: Israel: Security Issues; Palestine; Syria. Bibliography Abraham, A.J. (1984) Lebanon: A State of Siege, 1975–1984, Bristol IN: Wyndham Hall Press. Brogan, P. (1992) World Conflicts: Why and Where They are Happening, London: Bloomsbury. McDowall, D. (1983) ‘Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities’, Report No. 61, London: Minority Rights Group.

Further Reading Fisk, R. (1994) Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winslow, C. (1996) Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society, London: Routledge.

liBeRia This West African state was once a centre for the slave trade. The exploitation of its natural resources – rubber, oil, iron ore and diamonds – brought economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1980 Samuel Doe led a coup that overthrew the regime of William Tolbert, associated with corruption and food price inflation. Discontent was further fuelled in the 1980s by falling exports, increasing unemployment, wage cuts and a rapid rise in foreign debt. There were many conspiracies in the government. Amid the growing chaos an army officer, Charles Taylor, led an armed insurrection in 1990, but in the fighting for the capital, Monrovia, this rebel group split. President Samuel Doe was murdered and confusion reigned. The United Nations tried to form a settlement, aided by an African peacekeeping force, mainly of Nigerian troops, which however was still engaged with rival armed groups. In 1996 145

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a civil war broke out, but with the support of the peacekeeping force a new head of state, Ruth Perry, emerged. Rival factions were disarmed but half a million had been killed and over one million people displaced. Unrest continued after Charles Taylor won an election in 1997, Ghana and Algeria accused Liberia of supporting rebel groups in Sierra Leone, and Liberia accused Ghana of supporting armed groups in the Liberian countryside. Human rights abuses were rife and in 1998–99 the United Nations imposed an embargo on the import of arms and the export of diamonds. Abuses were still widespread in 2002 and armed violence intensified, leading to a state of emergency. Taylor was accused of crimes against humanity by Sierra Leone. Rebel groups dominated most of Liberia and hundreds lay dead in the streets. Taylor finally relinquished power in 2003 when Nigerian peacekeeping troops entered the country, backed by American marines. After a peace agreement was signed, the UN Mission in Liberia was set up, including troops from African and Asian countries. The force kept the peace, took humanitarian aid to refugees and in general helped to rebuild the social and economic structure of the country. Militia units were disarmed, but not all reintegrated into society. In 2006 a new president, Ellen JohnsonSirleaf, was democratically elected and an ambitious programme of reconstruction began. In June 2007 the trial of Charles Taylor, accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, opened in The Hague. What happened in Liberia mirrored events in other African countries before or since independence. See also: United Nations.

liBya After the overthrow of the proWestern King Idris in 1969, Muammer alKhaddafi (more commonly known as Gaddafi), a Muslim Nasserite and socialist, took over. He began to expel Western military personnel and restricted the Libyan oil industry’s dealings with the West. He concentrated on economic and social reform, and in 1977 Libya became a socialist people’s republic. Gaddafi opposed moderate Arab nations and any rapprochement with Israel. He supported the Polisario Front and Algeria against Morocco and participated in the civil war in Chad. President Reagan maintained that Libya was linked to world terrorism. The United States shot down Libyan fighter planes over the Gulf of Sirte in 1981 and in April 1986 made an unsuccessful attempt to kill Gaddafi by bombing Tripoli and Benghazi. That year the USA imposed an economic embargo on Libya. Gaddafi initially denied any involvement in the Lockerbie bombing of 1988, and in 1993 the United Nations intensified its trade embargo. The UN, US and EU sanctions were not fully lifted until 2003, after the suspects had been handed over for trial in 2001. In the eyes of Al Qaeda, Gaddafi made serious errors – having no Islamic credentials, employing un-Islamic female guards, refusing to back Iraq in the Gulf War, and handing over the Lockerbie suspects. Gaddafi’s diplomacy has moderated in recent years. His country is no longer viewed as a rogue state, trade embargoes have been lifted and diplomatic relations restored with Western countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. Libya acknowledged responsibility for Lockerbie and for the shooting down of a French aircraft over Niger in 1989, and agreed to pay billions of dollars in compensation. See also: Al Qaeda; Gulf War, 1991; Gulf War, 2003; Libya.

Bibliography and Further Reading Arnold, G. (1991) Wars in the Third World since 1945, London: Cassell.

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Bibliography

Bibliography

Blundy, D. and Lycett, A. (1987) Gaddafi and the Libyan Revolution, Boston MA: Little, Brown. Burgat, F. and Dowell, W. (1997) The Islamic Movement in North Africa, 2nd edn, Austin TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas.

Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

Further Reading Davis, B.L. (1990) Gaddafi, Terrorism and the Origin of the US Attacks on Libya, New York: Praeger. Sicker, M. (1987) The Making of a Pariah State: The Adventurist Politics of Muammar Gaddafi, Westport CT: Praeger.

loCal waR This is a geopolitical term for a class of violent conflict that is neither an internal war nor a regional conflict with very limited participation. There are four main types of local war. Border wars can occur where significant change has occurred through decolonisation. Anticolonial wars are rebellions where the level and spread of violence have escalated significantly. In communal conflicts and civil wars, polarised communities may spill over into violence and civil strife. Finally, proxy wars are local wars initiated by manipulation of one or both of the parties by outside interests. See also: Conflict.

limiTed waR Limited war is an armed conflict fought for objectives less than the total defeat and unconditional surrender of the enemy. Situations of limited war include conflicts between nuclear powers where neither side employs weapons of mass destruction, hostilities between small states with no outside interference, and military action by a nuclear state against a small state without interference from other large nations. It may also include domestic uprisings against a colonial power or established government, where both sides use conventional weapons but receive logistic and manpower support from rival nuclear powers. Establishing limits to war by tacit bargaining depends in the final analysis on the perception of parties. Only if there is sufficient overlap in their understanding can collaboration and co-ordination be possible. The limited war concept was first seen in the nuclear era during the Korean conflict of 1950–53, when neither the Americans nor the Chinese attacked the other’s main base (in Japan and Manchuria respectively). See also: Korean War, 1950–53.

Bibliography and Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

low-inTensiTy ConfliCT This is conflict where the commitment of capabilities is finite and limited. Support for low-intensity conflict requires flexibility and mobility. The concept dates from the early 1970s and describes a range of politico-military activities less intense than modern conventional warfare, within a limited area, and with the aim of achieving political, social and economic objectives. In such conflicts, massed firepower is not always successful, because there 147

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In the era of the ‘new world order’, lowintensity conflicts are more global and more far-reaching than national security issues that consist of one threat from one country, such as the United States tensions with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. See also: Cold War; New World Order; Third World Insurgency.

are seldom formal military encounters between uniformed armies along an identifiable front line. Military activities are circumscribed by political considerations: the main objective is to influence the perceptions and loyalties of the civilian population. Insurgency and terrorism are examples of low-intensity conflict. During the Cold War, low-intensity conflict was pioneered by the United States, but in the 1970s the Soviet Union began to intervene more vigorously in social conflicts in the Third World, and a series of bombings, kidnappings and air hijackings made international terrorism a priority for American policymakers. Low-intensity conflict poses more subtle and complex challenges than all-out war.

Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin Books. Thompson, L.B. (ed.) (1989) Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World. Lexington MA: Lexington Books.

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maCedonia In 1945 Macedonia was a divided region of the south Balkans, with segments of it belonging to Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. It had a history of changing borders and population movements, and indeed a very mixed population. The Macedonians in the Yugoslav Federation were certainly Slavs, but probably of the Bulgar line rather than the Serb. It is this part of Macedonia that has been a cause of tension, especially as a result of the Yugoslav civil war. In the Greek civil war of 1948, many Slav-speaking Greeks joined the Communist guerrilla army, ELAS, causing much bitterness afterwards among the Greeks, who feared that an independent Macedonia might set off separatist demands among Greek Macedonians. This was why the Greeks delayed recognition of the independent state from 1991 to 1995, and then insisted that it could not call itself Macedonia, but only the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). New tensions arose in 1999, with the NATO bombing of Serbia, when a stream of Kosovar refugees fled south. The Macedonian authorities tried to regulate the flow, as they feared any alteration of the ethnic balance, even temporary, would destabilise the country. When the bombing ended, many of the refugees returned to Kosovo. Sporadic violence by the Albanian minority flared into an uprising in 2001, but talks led to the Ohrid Agreement, by which the Macedonian Government promised greater autonomy for Albanian communities. The constitution was

amended in late 2001, and local government reforms followed in 2004. In return, the guerrillas disarmed. Macedonia’s frail economy was severely affected by the Yugoslav civil war and in 2002 the international community agreed to send substantial aid for reconstruction. Macedonia offered NATO the use of troops and air space at the time of the bombing campaign against Serbia; it expects to join NATO in 2008. It is also a candidate for accession to the European Union. See also: NATO; Syria; Yugoslav Civil War. Bibliography and Further Reading Rogel, C. (1998) The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia, Westport CT: Greenwood Press.

malaya: The emeRgenCy, 1948–60 After the Second World War, the movement to Malayan self-rule was hindered by differences among the population and the mixture of sultanates and crown colonies. There was also armed unrest, carrying on the animosity stirred up by the Japanese. Following the killing of three Europeans in June 1948, the British declared a state of emergency and martial law, with the death penalty for unauthorised possession of arms. The rebels were mainly ethnic Chinese. By 1954 British troops were waging guerrilla warfare against Chinese Communist partisans under their able leader, Chin Peng, who always followed Maoist guerrilla principles, attacking government 149

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posts or police and military patrols in the rubber plantations and tin-mining areas. The Malayan insurrection was limited to a minority among a distinct ethnic group; the majority of Chinese did not support the insurgents. The British strategy of sending soldiers into the jungle on foot patrol to seek out the guerrillas became increasingly successful. The British also won the psychological war, with propaganda and political warfare. Malaya became independent in 1957; the state of emergency ended in 1960. This successful resistance to Communist subversion in the early years of the Cold War, when world tensions were at their height, had an impact on military policy in the Far East. It possibly contributed to the domino theory, which became popular at that time in the United States. The Emergency showed that winning the hearts and minds of the people was just as important as the actual fighting. See also: Decolonisation.

Soviet and Chinese world communist parties. Maoism was at its most radical during the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1967 and was seen as a struggle between the technocrats and the ideologists (led by Mao). After Mao’s death in 1976, many of his ideological convictions, strategies and tactics were rejected by the new Chinese leadership under Deng Xiaoping. Maoism provided a model for communism in the predominantly agricultural Third World until the late 1970s. It resurfaced in the 1990s in Nepal, where guerrilla groups calling themselves Maoists launched an insurrection to eradicate what they saw as feudalism and the dictatorial powers of the King and Queen, who were murdered in June 2001 by the heir to the throne, who also died. Amid growing violence between the insurgent Maoists and the security forces, the Prime Minister resigned. The new King dissolved Parliament and declared a state of emergency in 2002. The Maoists wanted both acts reversed, the 1990 Constitution abolished, and free and fair elections held. After a stalemate, a series of general strikes and royal inaction, in 2005/6 the King’s powers were transferred to Parliament. Nepal apart, Maoism today has no significant long-term adherents in the Third World. See also: China; Ideological Warfare; Terrorists and Guerrillas: Differences.

Bibliography Arnold, G. (1991) Wars in the Third World since 1945, London and New York: Cassell. Brogan, P. (1992) World Conflicts: Why and Where They Are Happening, London: Bloomsbury.

maoism Maoism is Marxist Leninism as interpreted by Mao Zedong. It is distinguished by its theory of guerrilla warfare – often referred to as people’s war – and its emphasis on the need to mobilise the peasantry to achieve radical economic and social change in colonial and semi-colonial countries. Mao argued for permanent revolution. Maoists believed it was free of the oppressive bureaucracy and dictatorship of Soviet Communism and rejected Soviet appeals for peaceful co-existence. The result was a permanent split between the

Bibliography Bullock, A. and Stallybrass, O. (eds) (1977) The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, London: Fontana/Collins. Mao Tse Tung (1966) Basic Tactics, New York: Praeger, and London: Pall Mall Press.

maRshall plan This was a programme of financial aid, announced in 1948 by the US Secretary of State, George Marshall. 150

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Officially known as the European Recovery Program, it ran for four years and was strongly motivated by the threat of a Communist takeover in Europe. The Soviet Union responded by forming the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in January 1949, to integrate the economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Stalin ordered the socialist satellite states to decline Marshall aid, which was caught up in the Cold War. This heightened the already tense military and socioeconomic standoff between East and West. See also: Cold War; United States.

suggests 10,000 Mau Mau and 92,000 other Africans died; most of them were killed by other Africans. At the height of the campaign, 10,000 British troops were involved. The Mau Mau were able to exploit accusations about the security forces’ harsh treatment of civilians and misconduct. The trial in 1953 of Kenyatta and five others on charges of running the Mau Mau provided enormous international publicity for the nationalist cause. The vilification of the security forces was meant to lower morale, thereby making it harder for them to defeat the guerrillas, but there were atrocities on both sides. The worst Mau Mau action was the Lari massacre of 97 civilians. The British took over 27,000 Kikuyu into detention camps for screening in 1954. There was evidence of severe maltreatment of detainees and questions were asked in Parliament. From 1957 to 1960, military activity consisted of minor actions against gangs, pursuit, mopping-up operations and searches, particularly in the Aberdare forests. No victory was achieved, the uprising petered out and the state of emergency ended in 1960. The Mau Mau campaign was seen as hastening independence for Kenya in 1963, and more widely in East Africa. Britain had decided it would be better to grant independence rather than fight more uprisings. Many observers consider the state of emergency and what followed to be one of the last truly ‘imperial’ conflicts. It has also been described as a dirty war overlying a civil war. See also: Decolonisation.

Bibliography and Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

mau mau This was a secret organisation among the Kikuyu people of Kenya, which led a revolt from 1952 to 1957 against the British colonial authorities. Its members swore secret oaths and committed appalling atrocities against whites and uncooperative blacks. Jomo Kenyatta was widely acknowledged as the Mau Mau leader. He became the first President of Kenya in 1963 and stayed in office until his death in 1978. A state of emergency was declared in 1952. The authorities employed mixed forces of orthodox and unorthodox military and police, private armies, Europeans and African tribesmen to fight a guerrilla force supported mainly by the one million Kikuyus. The official death toll was 11,500 Mau Mau, 2,000 other Africans and 95 Europeans, even though the insurgency was against white rule. However, the official figure of 13,500 is probably half the true total of African dead, and one estimate

Bibliography and Further Reading Laqueur, W. (1997) Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study, New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers. Majdalany, F. (1962) State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau, Harlow, Essex: Longman.

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media A free people needs a free press; but terrorism needs a propaganda platform. So, in all Western countries, the news media face a dilemma: how can they keep citizens informed of daily events, including the often graphic tragedies of terrorism, without becoming, to some degree, propagandists for the perpetrators? The question of whether information is news or propaganda is very important. Even straightforward news stories about terrorism can involve agonising decisions. Should journalists concentrate on getting an ‘exclusive’ scoop or on saving lives? Do they contribute to a free market in ideas and information, helping people to understand the issues of the day? Or do they give terrorists a megaphone through which to spread their message of fear to their ultimate target – the public? Do the news media provide the oxygen of publicity on which terrorism thrives, and help in the spread of sedition? Does extensive coverage by the media make terrorists into folk heroes, or does it trigger public revulsion against terrorists and demands for tougher measures against them? Does journalism put so much pressure on the authorities that they act rashly, or does it provide valuable information, since reporters may go where decision-makers in government would not venture? Do the media, in an effort to captivate the public with high drama, cover all terrorist incidents whenever possible? Or do they, as they say, report verified facts, fairly and straightforwardly? These issues are put as questions because there is such disagreement on the answers. A consensus exists on three points. Television is the enemy’s medium of choice. It has the most immediate and the most terrifying impact. It no longer just reports the story; it has become part of the story and the centre of an ongoing controversy. In debates on the media’s role, the call

is often heard for self-regulation by journalists, to avoid censorship. One of the biggest victories an enemy could achieve would be to get a democracy to adopt the press restrictions of dictatorships. But satellite television can be received almost anywhere, so censorship would not work in most countries. In western Europe especially, television networks have evolved fairly high standards of editorial taste, along with agreements to withhold or delay broadcasts in some cases. It is not healthy for a society to be informed only by government sources. If the public are given access to all the information, no matter how dramatic it is at a given point, they will eventually reach the proper conclusions. But certain standards, concepts and precepts have to be imposed on the media. Journalists must be aware of the risk to society if they are exploited by terrorists; but a terrorist act is legitimate news and we cannot deny the media’s legitimate response. If events are repetitive, terrorists are faced with diminishing returns. This is what happened in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the spate of hijackings, which had few tangible results; even the publicity value of hijacking decreased. The success of a terrorist operation depends almost entirely on the publicity it gets. This was one main reason for the shift from rural guerrilla to urban terror in the 1960s: the journalists and TV cameras in the cities guaranteed a large audience. What terrorists want from the media is publicity, the kind that money cannot buy – and the smaller they are, the more they need it. They can so fool journalists that cells with perhaps a dozen members are described as armies and their press releases seriously discussed in countless broadcasts, articles and editorials. Even non-existent groups have been given a great deal of publicity. Publicity also affects the choice of target. An apparently illogical or senseless attack, if given wide 152

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coverage in the media, can be more effective than an attack on an obvious target that is ignored. Terrorists who desire legitimacy want the public to think positively about their cause. In hostage situations, and where state sponsors are involved, they also want the media to give details about any plans for military retaliation. These strategies work only in societies without censorship. Terrorists whose aim is simply to harm the enemy will seek maximum media coverage, negative in ‘enemy’ media and positive in ‘friendly’ territory. In conflict situations, governments seek understanding, co-operation, restraint and loyalty from the media, who are expected not to give the enemy a propaganda platform. In hostage situations, the authorities want a restrained approach by the media, perhaps even a long period of silence at the height of an incident. They are grateful for – may even rely on – information provided by the media. What the media want is to be the first with the story – and to make the story timely, dramatic and as accurate as possible. They want to operate as securely and freely as possible in society. The media believe even terrorists have a right to know. Depictions of terrorist devastation – in photographs, television film or reconstructions – are very powerful. Confronted by such images, people fear or detest the political cause behind the violent act. The images from Lockerbie (1988) and the World Trade Center (1993, 2001) bombings will be seared on the minds of many people for ever. Terrorism is an excellent vehicle for propaganda to arouse the public and engineer consent for a desired policy. Disinformation is easy because the event eliminates any sense or understanding of history, particularly history that might be embarrassing. What a news report defines as terrorism might seem very different to us if we knew more about it, and poli-

ticians can apply the term ‘terrorism’ to cover up what is really happening in countries like El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru. Also in South America, dissidents have been taken from their homes or off the streets and never seen again, leaving families with the agony of not knowing their fate. The media have a range of responses to genocide, violence, torture, disappearance and mass extermination of peoples. Depending on our quotas of ignorance, racism and xenophobia, we may see such news stories as ‘political propaganda’, ‘exaggeration’, ‘possibly true but nothing to do with us’ or ‘just the way things are’. Faced with conflicts around the globe, the public feel overwhelmed. The mass media rarely make the link between what is happening and what policy is being made in the leading parliaments of the world. This is because the news media are, or tend to become, instruments of state policy. Of course, the media must have trust in the government, and vice versa. It is in the interest of both parties to prevent the cause of terrorism from prevailing and to preserve democracy. Governments and media could be brought to closer co-operation by joint training exercises, information response centres and the promotion of voluntary press coverage guidelines – for example, limiting information about police and military movements during rescue operations. If terrorism sustains itself, freedoms are lost and a free press is one of the first to go. Censorship in a democracy is very difficult if the media refuse to be cautioned, leaned on or controlled. Current issues for the media are trends to more violent terrorist acts and attacks on media personnel and institutions. The media can also be wrong-footed by anonymous terrorism, where no one claims responsibility and no demands are made. See also: Conflict Perceptions; Psychology and Conflict. 153

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Bibliography

Bibliography

Carruthers, S.L. (1999) The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century, New York: St Martins Press. Miller, A.H. (ed.) (1982) Terrorism: The Media and the Law, Dobbs Ferry NY: Transnational Publishers. Tumber, H. and Palmer, J. (2004) Media at War: The Iraq Crisis, London: Sage.

Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin Books. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

middle easT Since the Second World War, this whole region (previously called the Near East) has been unstable. The turmoil results from dynastic rivalries, racial tensions, sectarian antipathies, tribal vendettas and deeply felt religious, familial, political and national loyalties, old and new, complicated by the impact of oil wealth, the ramifications of the ArabIsraeli conflict and the influence of radical political ideas. The strengths of the region – religion, pride, the family, and its position at the ‘centre’ of the world – have been weakened by the endemic problems. Since 1945 the Middle East has seen conventional wars, civil wars, inter-state conflicts, religious violence and terrorism. Since the New World Order succeeded the Cold War in 1990, power games have been played out by states in the region, which has immense economic importance. The region has some of the world’s most sought-after resources: oil and natural gas. It also has extensive deposits of copper, phosphates and uranium. The downside is that in most places agriculture is dependent on scarce water supplies or desalination. The standard of living is high in the oil-surplus states, but very low in the nonoil states. Middle Eastern socio-political systems have been various – socialist, free enterprise, republican, royal, progressive and reactionary. The structure of Middle Eastern geography and political rule is a legacy of the nineteenth-century imperial powers and the peace conferences at the end of the First World War. There have always been geopolitical undercurrents in

Further Reading Clutterbuck, R.L. (1981) Terrorism: The Media and Political Violence, London: Macmillan. Nacos, B.L. (1994) Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing, New York: Columbia University Press.

mediaTion Mediation is a way of reaching a peaceful settlement, where a third party offers substantive suggestions to help the disputants find a solution. Mediation can be requested by parties to a dispute or volunteered by a third state. In international politics, effective mediation often comes from other states in the same region or, in an anarchical system, from great powers, who may have leverage over the parties and can underwrite a settlement with guarantees and side payments. In today’s globalised, yet fractured world, consensus may be very weak and agreement reached only on trivial points. If even the United Nations cannot cajole disputants into substantive agreements, the UN is often left with the task of keeping the peace. Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State in the 1970s, was probably one of the most successful mediators, exercising his own brand of shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, even visiting Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Syria all in one day to try to bring about peace and concord. See also: Middle East; United Nations. 154

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the Middle East, arising from Arab relations with their non-Arab neighbours and the unpredictable nature of Arab nationalism. Within that is an integrative, secular and non-aligned movement that sees one Arab world with common heritage, interests and future. During the Cold War and then the new world order, there have been differences of opinion over relations with West and East, and over the growth of the nonaligned movement, but since 1948 the whole outlook for peace in the Middle East seems to have depended on the state of relations between Israel and her neighbours, especially the Palestinians. In 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organisation was created. Some of its members opposed its attacks on civil targets, while others supported them; in 1993 the PLO renounced terrorism. In Israel likewise, the Socialist party has endorsed peace plans while the Likud party has prepared for potential war. Trans-regional movements have encouraged violence and radical change. Until the 1970s, non-Arab nationalism filled this role, led by President Nasser of Egypt. Since then, Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism have been in the ascendancy. Revival varies between countries and between Sunni and Shia, and it lacks a single dynamic leader. Iran would perhaps like to take the lead; as long as its revolutionary embers smoulder, it will try to further its religious ideology. The Islamic movement has deeper roots in the Arab world than pan-Arab nationalism ever had. However, Sunni Islam does not have the ‘state within a state’ structure of Shia. In the Middle East, some traditionalists have interpreted Western culture and values to be alien to Muslim morality and values. Islamic revivalism is inherently anti-Western, resenting political and cultural domination by the West, dependence on its technology and perceived favouritism of the state of Israel.

In spite of a prevailing sense of gloom about the Middle East, its oil and gas remain a core area of the world economy, making the region subject to financial and economic fluctuations. Inter-state relations are governed by the calculations of states, factional interests within states, balances of internal and external state calculation and ideology. A complex array of political forces operates in the region, altering the relative weight of three factors: Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Arab relations and great power interest. In most Middle Eastern wars, the first factor was paramount. In the Six-Day War, 1967 and the Gulf War, 1991, interArab relations were a salient factor. Greatpower involvement contributed to the Suez Crisis and the Gulf War, 2003. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, symbols have been charged with modern identities. Jewish symbols – the menorah or sevenpronged candelabrum, the six-pointed star known as the Star of David – are from the Israeli flag, though the Star of David has also been used by Christians and Muslims. It was the Zionist movement that made it into a Jewish symbol. On the Palestinian side is the check head-dress worn by Yassir Arafat, derived from one used by the Arab Legion in Jordan. Symbols with political power perhaps characterise the Middle East and many of its apparent dichotomies. Continuity has co-existed with change, and there has been no new order since the end of the Cold War. Yet there has been a real possibility of the existing order collapsing, with further civil wars, inter-Arab conflicts, Arab-Israeli clashes and intervention by outside powers. Since the 1990s there have been signs of de-Arabisation, increasing acceptance of peace with Israel and growing assertiveness by Iran’s Islamic regime. There has been a distinct stratification in the Middle East. First are the oilproducing states with large populations 155

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and ambitious development plans – Iraq and Iran. In both countries, development has been set back by major wars. Second are the oil producers whose small populations have high incomes based on oil and the financial sector – Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Then there are the smaller, relatively well-off states that are not oil producers – Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and North Yemen. The weakest state is probably South Yemen. To many observers, Egypt has resisted such stratification by having a structurally complex economy with high-yield agriculture, a large industrial base, qualified manpower and a huge population. The country has the largest Arab military machine, and is pre-eminent politically, culturally and historically. Some states have sizeable minority populations who have on occasions been seen as a security risk – from immigrants in Saudi Arabia to Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis in Iran, Iraq and Syria. There is a wide gap between rich and poor, for example, over health and medical care, and in education – from very limited provision in some areas to traditional centres of learning in Egypt and Lebanon. See also: Israel: Security Issues; Palestine.

courage, strength, endurance, discipline, obedience within an established and rigid hierarchy and readiness for self-sacrifice as an end in itself. During prolonged periods of crisis, the unchecked influence of military leaders can lead to militarism through their efforts to militarise society and through the glorification of war. See also: Military Leadership and Power. Bibliography Calvert, P. and Milbank, S. (1987) ‘The Ebb and Flow of Military Government in Latin America’, Conflict Studies, No. 198, London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies.

Further Reading Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury.

miliTaRy gloBalisaTion Not only is the security of states more than ever interconnected, but the world military order has become more decentralised. Globalisation has made modern arms available anywhere in the world, bringing new concentrations of military power with new centres of arms production. During the Cold War, the USA and USSR dominated arms production. Although the USA is now the leading arms producer, every region of the world and every regional power has domestic military production capability. Arms production has become transnational. The arms trade has expanded and become increasingly commercialised. States also deal in arms, but so do private companies and individuals. The collapse of the Soviet Union released large quantities of modern weapons and plastic explosives into the market, in some cases unofficially. Sophisticated weapons, including missiles, are available to criminal gangs and terrorists as long as they can pay. Private deals have undermined the attempts to regulate the arms trade and

Bibliography Gresh, A. and Vidal, D. (eds) (1990) An A to Z of the Middle East, London: Zed Books. Parsons, A. (1993) ‘Prospects for Peace and Stability in the Middle East’, Conflict Studies, No. 262 (June), London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Halliday, F. (2005) 100 Myths about the Middle East, London: Saqi Books.

miliTaRism This is a policy that places great emphasis on such virtues as personal 156

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arms production, as have websites that advise terrorists and others how to improvise bombs. There has been an unprecedented level of information flow and connectivity across all military security domains. Sensitivities are higher and vulnerabilities are growing. Enormous advances have been made in universal communications, transport systems and military surveillance. As well as the growth in co-operative security and collective defence, there has been increasing rivalry, even among putative allies. Military globalisation is contributing to the reconstruction of sovereignty, autonomy and democracy. See also: Globalisation; Militarism.

Gorbachev brought the Cold War to a close because he saw that the Soviet economy was collapsing after decades of prioritising military spending. Before Gorbachev’s rise to power, the military– industrial complex had to some extent existed in the Soviet Union. Factory managers had incentives to promote the growth, power, prosperity and technical prominence of the state arms manufacturing plants they controlled. Such a complex can exert pressure on the government to maintain military spending at high levels even when foreign threats diminish, without regard to the economic cost to other sectors of the economy. Many states are governed by a power elite made up of individuals from politics, business and the military. Globalisation has expanded the possibilities for the military–industrial complex, with India and China, for example, also building up their military–industrial power base. See also: Cold War; United States; Soviet Union.

Bibliography Baylis, J., Wirtz, J., Cohen, E. and Gray, C.S. (2002) Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cottey, A. and Forster, A. (2004) ‘Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance’, Adelphi Paper, 365, Oxford: Oxford University Press for International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Bibliography Russett, B., Starr, H. and Kinsella, D. (2000), World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 6th edn, Boston MA: Bedford St Martins. Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Further Reading Holmes, R. (ed.) (2002) Oxford Companion to Military History, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

miliTaRy–indusTRial Complex This is a term used in the United States and other leading military powers to describe the conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry. During the Cold War there was almost a permanent war economy in the United States. Military expenditure generates employment and boosts the economy. It is not the only way, as can be seen in Japan, where there is little statistical evidence of a positive link between employment, growth and high levels of military expenditure.

miliTaRy leadeRship and poweR The power of a nation in military terms depends on the quantity and quality of men and arms, and the organisation of the military establishment. Military leaders have to excel in the strategy and tactics appropriate to the techniques of war, old and new. They may also be called on to validate a new government or political leader. Charismatic leaders can win conditional loyalty from the military, on the basis of 157

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their wide popular support. They may be identified with nationalism and even the state itself. However, when such rulers turn to oppressive measures or lose their symbolic character as the leader of a revolution, coups may follow. A charismatic leader can be a revolutionary, a warrior, a prophet, a demagogue and a national hero. They can come to the fore in times of great social change, to confirm or challenge the status quo, and to provide an inspiring vision for the future. In times of peace and prosperity, decision makers prefer leadership roles to be widely shared, whereas, during economic and military crises, a more centralised form of leadership often emerges. Leaders do influence how much societal cohesion exists. They must try to avoid widening the unavoidable gap between good foreign policy and public opinion. Many analysts of the role of power in international affairs believe that military capabilities are the only real determinants of a leader’s power.

even martyrdom in the case of the extremists confronted at Waco, Texas, in 1993. There are religious millenarians among Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus and most other religions whose scriptures predict or reveal ruin, revenge and judgment. Jewish groups use Torah, Christian groups use the Bible, and Islamic groups use the Koran to justify their actions. Aum Shinrikyo sought to bring about the millennium and some groups seek to replace secular law with religious war. Contrary to some expectations, no millennialists began a campaign of violence to fulfil a prophecy for the year 2000. But tensions remain as high as ever between Jews and Muslims, Europe and the Arab world, and an arrogant and missionary secular West and the wisdom of other cultures. With the world facing huge social, economic, political and environmental problems, with little consensus or solution, many people are turning away from conventional religion or secular ideology to seek solace and salvation in the simple truths of cults. Cults can be subversive, anti-social and potentially violent. Only a small minority of unorthodox religious groups represent any danger to society, but those that do are capable of wreaking havoc out of all proportion to their size or importance. See also: Religion and World Strategic Issues.

Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin Books. Morgenthau, H.J. and Thompson, K.W. (1985) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edn, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Bibliography millennial violenCe Millennialists believe that special dates, such as 2000, can trigger events like divine judgment, vengeance on wrongdoers or the end of the world. Such expectations may cause millennial agitation or violence by some extreme religiousideological groups, who divide humanity into absolute opposites like saved/doomed, human /sub-human or godly/demonic. Millennial violence is terrorism motivated by the belief that an other-worldly power permits or commands extreme measures,

Barkun, M. (ed.) (1996) Millennialism and Violence, London: Frank Cass. Hubback, A. (1997) ‘Apocalypse When? The Global Threat of Religious Cults’, Conflict Studies, No. 300 (June), London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Anthony, D., Robbins, T. and BarrieAnthony, S. (2002) ‘Cults and Anti-Cult Totalism: Reciprocal Escalation and

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economic, military and cultural – that will give minorities hope for long-term survival, with their dignity and livelihoods intact. Minorities have always suffered from conflict, threats and different kinds of violence: inter-state conflicts, state breakdown, civil war, human rights violations, terrorism and organised crime. At the time of writing, even for well-organised minority groups, their hopes of justice, equality, freedom and tolerance seem a mirage. See also: Cyprus; Ethnic Conflict; Kosovo; Kurds; Sri Lanka.

Violence’ in Kaplan, J. (ed.) (2002), pp. 211–40. Kaplan, J. (ed.) (2002) Special Issue on ‘Millennial Violence: Past, Present and Future’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 1–24.

minoRiTies Minorities are groups that are different in race, language, religion, politics or culture from the majority of people in the region or country where they live. This can lead to tension. In Northern Ireland for many years, the Catholic minority felt under threat from the Protestant majority, which supported union with the UK. National minorities were expelled from Yugoslavia (mainly Italians) in 1946– 47 and from Bulgaria and Greece (mainly Turks) in 1950–52. Some minorities may be seen as forming a class – a ruling class, such as the Turks in Cyprus before 1974, or a subordinate class such as the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Minority groups want freedom to gather and follow their own traditions in language, dress, worship, customs and way of life. The majority may tolerate such differences, they may force the minority to live separately or they may insist on integration. States often see minority groups as enemies of the state, especially if they seek autonomy. States may try to force all minorities to relinquish whatever makes them different and join the majority, or they may provide different rights in law excluding the minority from benefits claimed by the majority. Human security has to be inclusive. Minorities are often marginalised, and not just geographically. They are by definition seldom in a position to protect their vital freedoms effectively, so they need sympathetic support among the majority if they are to escape from poverty, insecurity and threatening situations. It is the creation of well-balanced, non-intrusive systems – political, social, environmental,

Bibliography Heraclides, A. (1990) The Self Determination of Minorities in International Politics, London: Frank Cass. McDowall, D. (1983) ‘Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities’, Report No. 61, London: Minority Rights Group. Stewart, A. (1999) ‘Migrants, Minorities and Security in Europe’, Conflict Studies, No. 252, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

mulTinaTionals and ConfliCT Businesses of all sizes have an interest in not taking sides in any armed conflict: they do not want to alienate potential customers or potential threats. It is perhaps natural for companies also to head off criticism and interference by adopting a positive view of their social and economic impact. They may also have ethical policies. Resource businesses may recognise the need not to make inequalities worse through their greed or by asking uneconomic rents. They can avoid helping to prop up poor governments by conniving in corruption. They can avoid impinging on human rights, if only by not supporting belligerents or hindering peace processes. Managements ought to adopt explicit policies on human rights, corruption and secu159

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rity. Many people believe that valuable resources such as diamonds need special protection and that the UN should create some international supervision for the resource sector. There is a rising demand for raw materials and increasing dependence on limited sources of supply. Armed confrontations and instability, in areas such as the Gulf, push the question of resources higher up the geopolitical agenda. In the 1990s, accessible, internationally marketable resources were used to finance twenty major conflicts. Civil conflict, in the form of protest movements or small skirmishes, can polarise communities and result in full-scale civil wars. The issue of illegal resource exploitation – notably that of timber in South-East Asia and the Amazon – requires particular attention. Resources have to be policed to allow for better developmental and security outcomes. See also: Globalisation.

and inflict unacceptable damage on the opponent. Whatever the size of their nuclear arsenals, neither side could win a nuclear war. A country with first-strike capability might be tempted to attack in the belief that the opponent could not retaliate. If each side had second-strike capability and so could retaliate, the deterrent threat of each was believable and neither was tempted to strike. The term ‘MAD’ implies that the strategy, though based on ‘rational’ military criteria, is insane because it could destroy both sides. The nuclear missiles of the two sides in effect cancel each other out. In the last decade the acronym MAD could be applied to the nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan. At first in the Cold War the United States had superior nuclear forces and relied on a strategy of massive retaliation against any Soviet conventional attack. This threat became less credible as the Soviet Union developed a second-strike capability. When the superpowers realised in the 1960s that MAD could not be avoided, they turned to nuclear arms control and directed confidence-building measures at the management of potential crises. Both sides ideally wished to go into talks with parity of weaponry. MAD assumed that the threat of near-certain, totally unacceptable damage could be achieved with finite forces and acceptable budgets, and would deter an adversary. MAD was not accepted by the Soviet Union as a plausible or appropriate doctrine because they viewed the United States as posing the greater range with its nuclear weapon systems. Nevertheless, a near-perfect system of nuclear deterrence had been created. This balance could have been altered by the development of new offensive or defensive weapons by one side or by an accidental war caused by human error or technical failure. President

Bibliography Mansbach, R.W. (1997) The Global Puzzle, 2nd edn, Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Further Reading Barnaby, F. (1991) ‘Arms Control after the Gulf War’, Conflict Studies, No. 240 (April), London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

muTual assuRed desTRuCTion (mad) This was a situation in the Cold War in which neither side could attack the other without suffering enormous damage from their retaliation. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had the ability to cause such devastation. Each side possessed second-strike capability: the capacity to absorb an enemy attack and have enough weapons remaining to retaliate 160

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Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative in the 1980s was seen as a move from mutually assured destruction towards mutually assured survival. See also: Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear Strikes; Nuclear Winter.

Bibliography and Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

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nagoRno-kaRaBakh The huge changes in the Soviet Union from 1980 onwards had repercussions in the southern Caucasus, which had long been riven by ethnic divisions. In 1987 an adviser to President Gorbachev urged him to change the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region, an enclave within Azerbaijan, and make it part of Armenia. As a result outbreaks of severe fighting occurred for the next five years over disputed territory. The movement to unite Armenia and NagornoKarabakh caused outbreaks of interethnic violence, which drove over 300,000 Armenians out of Azerbaijan between 1988 and 1990. Armenia eventually gained military control of the region. This was the first territorial/ethnic dispute in the slow break-up of the Soviet empire, after Gorbachev had come to power. See also: Central Asia and Caucasus.

cult to encourage farmers to move away from growing opium poppies, to produce tea or cotton. Some states, such as Myanmar, claim to be destroying drugs while at the same time expanding opium farming. Drug trafficking is smuggling and that in turn deprives states of revenue and violates their legal control of their borders. Trafficking supplies illegal products that are treated as a security threat because of their effect on national and military morale and efficiency. Furthermore, military forces participate regularly in operations against the heavily armed drug traffickers. Drug conflicts pit states against nonstate actors. In South America and South-East Asia, leftist guerrillas have funded their operations by controlling the peasants’ production of coca. Officials dealing with the problem can easily be corrupted by the huge amounts of money involved. For poor peasants in Bolivia and Peru, or for members of the Colombian cartels, the cocaine trade has been a huge source of income. Colombia also has extreme inequalities in land ownership, made worse by forced displacement. Paramilitary groups have financed themselves through extortion and drug trafficking. US policy towards illegal drugs there became militarised in the 1990s, using military aid, uniformed and private-sector military advisers and massive aerial spraying of illicit crops. Despite the decline in coca production in Colombia there has been no visible reduction in drug supplies in Western markets. The USA has often intervened militarily in Latin America, where co-operation with

Bibliography Duncan, A. and Opatowski, M. (2000) Trouble Spots: The World Atlas of Strategic Information, Stroud: Sutton.

naRCoTiCs (dRugs) and ConfliCT Drug trafficking and illicit drug sales have been increasing since the 1980s. They have been a major revenue stream for insurgent groups and terrorist organisations, and they have been a factor in many civil wars. In El Salvador, heavily armed gangs formed by some ex-soldiers and disaffected youth have been responsible for murders, kidnappings, robberies, and arms and drugs trafficking. In Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan it has proved very diffi162

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US forces, even in the area of fighting drugs, is politically sensitive. In Panama in 1989 the leader Manuel Noriega was taken to the United States and convicted there of complicity in drug trafficking through Panama. In Third World countries, black markets in drugs may make up a sizeable proportion of all economic activity and deprive governments of significant revenue. This is true in the golden triangle of the Shan states of Myanmar, Laos, and also in north-west Thailand, central Afghanistan, along the Afghan/Pakistan border, in Mexico and in Colombia. The heroin trade has been a particular problem in Afghanistan and Burma. It has not been eradicated in Afghanistan because of the Taliban and political instability, nor in Myanmar owing to its closed society and brutal military government. Drugs spread violence within countries and their neighbours. Colombia’s neighbours – Panama, Ecuador and Venezuela – have been used as safe havens and training grounds for Colombian guerrillas, and as refuges for Colombians escaping the fighting. Mexico is also bedevilled with drug cultivation in the south and east of the country – especially opium poppies – mainly under the control of the Zapatista Liberation Army. The Shining Path guerrilla group in Peru has obtained much of its cash from alliance with drugs cartels. See also: Central America; Latin America; Panama.

Chinese Crime’, Conflict Studies, No. 291, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Blakesley, C.L. (1992) Terrorism, Drugs, International Law and the Protection of Human Liberty: A Comparative Study, Ardsley-onHudson NY: Transnational Books.

nassau agReemenT, 1962 This was a settlement reached at Nassau in the Bahamas whereby the United States agreed to supply the United Kingdom with Polaris missiles for its nuclear submarines. The outcome of this meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan displeased de Gaulle, who saw Anglo-American nuclear collaboration as an indication that the United Kingdom was not sufficiently orientated towards Europe to merit admission to the European Economic Community. He therefore vetoed the British application in 1963. Bibliography and Further Reading Morgan, K.O. (1990) The People’s Peace: British History, 1945–1989, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

naTionalism An ideology based on the premises that states should be based on nationality and that, where a nationalist movement exists, some particular nation has either not yet achieved statehood or not achieved it as completely as it should. After 1945, anti-colonialism was important in stimulating nationalist movements, especially in Africa and Asia. In the late 1980s, nationalism revived strongly in eastern Europe. Nationalism can be an aspect of other doctrines and ideologies, like Communism in North Vietnam, apartheid in South Africa (and to a lesser extent Rhodesia) or religion in Iran and Afghanistan.

Bibliography Jamieson, A. (1992) ‘Drug Trafficking after 1992: A Special Report’, Conflict Studies, No. 250, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. ——(1990) ‘Global Drug Trafficking’, Conflict Studies, No. 234, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Yin-Kong, Chu (1996) ‘International Triad Movements: The Threat of Organised

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Far from nationalism making for peace, nationalistic aspirations have often resulted in xenophobia, rivalry and war. Over 150 new states have emerged since 1945, and nationalism and national selfdetermination are powerful ideas. Nationalism has been intensified by common racial, linguistic, historical and religious ties, and is associated with a particular territory. Its essence is the active sense of the uniqueness of a group vis-àvis the rest of the world. As a mass emotion, it is the most powerful operative political force in the world. As a mass social phenomenon, it promotes solidarity and a sense of belonging, but can also engender hostility, divisiveness, tension and war between rival nationalist groups and states. See also: Pan-Nationalism.

France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, West Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982 and various eastern European countries in the 1990s. It was formed at the height of the Cold War to protect the Western world against possible Soviet aggression. All member states are bound to protect any member against attack. The organisation has three strategic command areas covering the Atlantic, continental Europe, and the English Channel and North Sea. It seeks to encourage economic and social co-operation among its member states. Participation is voluntary. All nations take part in the process leading up to decisions. They have to make choices and compromises, in the best interests of all. NATO itself has very few permanent military forces: most ‘NATO Forces’ are national forces, which remain under national control and are available to the Alliance only in specific circumstances. Its members consult together on matters of common concern, but there is no central authority that tells them what to do. All NATO bodies are made up of representatives of the member countries whose role is to present and explain their country’s point of view to their allies. The decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council, a practical forum of senior officials; they represent the member governments, which actually make policy. The Secretary General of NATO is responsible for promoting and directing consultations and decision-making in the Alliance. Peace programmes are discussed with the governments concerned and decisions are also taken in appropriate forums such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The Military Committee is the highest military authority in the Alliance, but remains under the political authority of

Bibliography Duncan, W.R. and Holman, P. (eds) (1994) Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict, Boulder CO: Westview Press. Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

Further Reading Pamir, P. (1986) The Balkans, Nationalism, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. Pavkovic, A. (1996) The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.

naTo (noRTh aTlanTiC TReaTy oRganisaTion) The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was an alliance formed in 1949 by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 164

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the North Atlantic Council. Strategic commanders are responsible for identifying and requesting the forces needed to fulfil their tasks, preparing defence plans and advising NATO’s political and military authorities on matters within their competence. Threats have come from a number of areas. The northern flank included the rather porous border between Norway and the Soviet Union in a very sensitive area dominated by nuclear submarine bases and the resource-rich Atlantic. Finland – which retained its independence after 1945, but was strictly a no-go area for NATO members – and Sweden have remained neutral, a status they cherish. On the southern flank too, the threat was naval with the Soviet bases in the Black Sea, the US 6th fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and growing tension between Greece and Turkey, partly over the long-running Cyprus dispute. In Italy in the 1960s and 1970s, there was the everpresent threat of a Communist government or a coalition with other groups, which could have meant the disclosure of NATO secrets. Spanish ambivalence to NATO, before and after 1982, has always been an issue, especially for American bases there. Before and after the 1974 revolution, there was fear of Portugal going communist, or becoming unstable, which could have opened the way to Soviet control of the Atlantic gateway and threatened the use of the Azores as a naval base. America has remained unhappy with the level of financial help from the European members of the Alliance. Europe needs to play a greater role in defence, but lacks the capability because there is not enough money available. The Europeans use American assets, and are dependent on them for satellites and the transport of troops. The Western alliance’s raison d’être was vindicated in 1989–90, with the collapse of the Communist system in eastern Europe,

followed by the disintegration of the USSR itself. NATO’s relevance to the new Europe rests on its ability to adapt and transform itself into an agent of change that can effectively address contemporary security issues in their broadest definition. The relationship with Russia is a key one. NATO has encouraged Russia to the negotiating table, but Russia has not carried through the commitment. It remains wary of NATO enlargement eastwards and the reasons for it. Russian hardliners ask, when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, why wasn’t NATO dissolved at the same time? Since 1990, NATO’s agenda has been dominated by five key issues: first, redefining transatlantic relations with a more suitable division of burdens between America and Europe; second, crisis management and peacekeeping in out-of-area operations; third, developing co-operative relations with the former Communist bloc, and the question of enlargement to include the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and eight other countries, which reached fruition in 2004; fourth, the war against terrorism in the wake of September 11; and, fifth, the role of NATO in the Gulf War. NATO’s part in operations in the Balkans – namely SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo, and indeed in Macedonia – demonstrates the utility of military forces in the post-Cold War era. The future of the organisation depends on developing out-of-area operations. Its permanence depends on the continued existence of a threat or threats, and that is a matter of risk prediction, rather than risk perception. The concern for some is whether the European members can modernise their military forces to remain interoperable with the US military and thus a stalwart ally to the United States. Huge new security threats were revealed by the events of 11 September 2001. Next day, the nineteen NATO ambassadors met and for the first time invoked Article 5 of 165

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the Washington Treaty, the alliance’s founding charter, which states that ‘an armed attack against one ally in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all’. Those who framed Article 5 never imagined it would be first used in the wake of an attack on the United States. In October 2001, the allies agreed to extra measures to enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, bilaterally and within NATO bodies. September 11 showed the threat that non-state actors could pose on the modern stage and the impotence of nation states to defend themselves adequately. Generally, there was a decided shift in emphasis to surveillance and stealth; in the USA there was a more open espousal of regime change where states were seen to be tolerating or conniving in terrorism. US forces invaded Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to bring about regime change, especially in the urban areas. There was little more than declaratory support from other NATO states, except the UK, and the Americans did not succeed in capturing either bin Laden or the Afghan leader Mullah Omar. Not one Middle Eastern state, apart from Israel, openly backed regime change in Baghdad; the EU and NATO said they could not be counted on if the USA attacked Iraq without UN Security Council approval, as the Americans did when they attacked Serbia in 1999. Lack of consistency and integrity over past wars were soon mirrored in the West’s treatment of terrorism. For example, on the issue of Kashmir, both international law and many Western countries appeared to favour India; but, after September 11, the USA showed increasing sensitivity to Pakistan’s views, despite the growth in terrorist incidents in Kashmir, influenced by al-Qaeda operations based in Pakistan. Once the consternation associated with September 11 had subsided, EU states tended to carry on ‘business as usual’ with

many governments tainted by sponsorship of terrorism. Pressure for humanitarian intervention markedly diminished, with no repeat of the interventions by NATO in Kosovo and Australia in East Timor. Most states are no longer attracted to interfering militarily in the affairs of others purely on account of their repressive internal conduct. The ‘war on terror’ has not been sustained: for instance, the West has treated Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria and Libya with less vigour than Afghanistan, despite evidence of their governments having had equivocal attitudes to terrorism. The West distanced itself from Israel and appeased Middle Eastern anger over the Iraq and Gulf Wars by supporting Palestine. Regime change is still considered an option for the superpower and great powers, where states are actively promoting terrorism in other sovereign states or giving asylum to terrorists, but is rarely raised globally. Failed states are perhaps now seen as preferable to ‘rogue states’. Likewise, there is less willingness to break up states to accommodate ‘national self determination’ or ‘tribal autonomy’. Since September 11 there has also been increasing reluctance to reward terrorists by serious bargaining with hostage-takers. See also: Macedonia. Bibliography Brown, M.E. (ed.) (1996) The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Ciuta, F. (2002) ‘The End(s) of NATO: Security, Strategic Action and Narrative Transformation’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 35–62. Croft, S. (2002) ‘Guaranteeing Europe’s Security? Enlarging NATO Again’, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 97–114. Drew, S. (1991) The Future of NATO: Facing an Uncertain Enemy in an Uncertain Environment, New York: Praeger.

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Hough, P. (2004) Understanding Global Security, London: Routledge. Kaplan, D.S. (2004) NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of the Alliance, Westport CT: Praeger. Moore, R.R. (2002) ‘NATO’s Mission for the New Millennium? A Value-Based Approach to Building Security’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 1–34. Sloane, S.R. (1995) NATO’s Future: Beyond Collective Defence, Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, Hawaii. Shearman, P.J. and Sussex, M. (eds) (2004) European Security After September 11, Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Smith, M.A. (2000) NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Trades Union Committee for European and Transatlantic Understanding (1998) NATO, America and Europe – A Time for Vision, London: The Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom.

Campaigns and Conflicts, 1945–90, London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers.

negoTiaTion Formal bargaining, usually sitting at a table talking back and forth, is referred to as negotiation. International negotiations are sophisticated, and so are the participants, playing a game with longestablished rules and traditions. Most issues of contention find their way to a negotiating table, but there may be informal bargaining first. Before the Israeli–Palestinian peace talks in the early 1990s, both sides used various power capabilities as leverage in implicit bargaining. In Northern Ireland, both formal and informal negotiations took place after the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 before a formal agreement about power sharing was signed by the formerly implacable foes in May 2007. The essential tactic in negotiation has always been for a party to convince all others that its current offer is the best available and that there is no point in bargaining around the terms in order to improve them. The physical environment of negotiation is important – the venue, number of parties to the negotiations and the degree of secrecy or openness can make a significant difference. Neutral ground is vital, as are access to communications and the nature of issues under negotiation. Bilateral negotiations are more manageable, but, if third parties are excluded, their vital interests may not be consulted and they will not feel bound to support any agreement. Multilateral negotiations are more unwieldy, but allow all parties to be represented. See also: Summit Negotiation.

Further Reading The Economist (2008) The World in . . . an annual production about world events since 1986, London: Economist. Gormley, D.M. (2002) ‘Enriching Expectations: 11 September’s Lessons for Missile Defence’, Survival, IISS Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 19–35. Jones, C. and Kennedy-Pipe, C. (eds) (2000) International Security in a Global Age: Securing the 21st Century, London: Frank Cass. Lieven, A. (2002) ‘The Secret Policemen’s Ball: The United States, Russia and the International Order after 11 September’, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 245–59. Lowry, M. (1998) The End of the 20th Century: European Security and the Atlantic Alliance, 2nd edn, Special Briefing Notes, London: The Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom. Stone, D.J.A. (2004) Wars of the Cold War:

Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions,

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2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Goldstein, J.S. (1999) International Relations, 3rd edn, New York: Longman.

Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury. Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

neuTRalism This is where a state decides and announces a policy of refusing to join international military alliances. Such a policy may also be named non-alignment. India, Sweden and Indonesia are key examples of self-declared non-aligned states. Military security can be the reason for such a policy, or it may be adopted as a moral posture to allow the state to act as a mediator or a channel for communication. To countries gaining independence, neutralism has meant non-alignment with the Free World and the Communists: this was especially true of countries in Africa and Asia, which saw neutralism as protecting them from destruction in a nuclear war, but letting them receive economic assistance from both sides. The Bandung Conference of 1955 was an attempt to co-ordinate the foreign policies of non-aligned states. Neutralist countries primarily abstained from military alliances, and in other cases they assumed benevolent neutrality. Some, such as Yugoslavia, were Communist and some flirted with communism, as in Nkrumah’s Ghana; others, like Malawi, favoured the West. Some neutralists have shown mixed attitudes, being hostile to Western colonialism, but neutral on Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe. Some have violated neutralism’s principle of non-interference, as Indonesia did by campaigning against Malaysia in the early 1960s, embarrassingly since Indonesia had hosted the Bandung Conference. See also: Decolonisation; Neutrality.

neuTRaliTy This is a legal condition in international relations where a state declares its intention not to be a party to a conflict, either by hostile action against one of the belligerents or by extending privileges of trade to one side and not the other. In return, the neutral state expects its territory to remain inviolate and its trade and other activities to be unhampered as far as possible by the actions of the belligerents. A state may declare its neutrality either in advance of an expected conflict between stated parties or in respect of any external conflict. Established neutrality maximises opportunities for international trade, as in Switzerland. Neutrality can be imposed on a state as a condition of a treaty, as happened to Austria in 1955, through an agreement with the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. See also: Neutralism. Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

new TeRRoRism in The 21sT CenTuRy The latest technology is used to enhance the effect of terrorist tactics. Modern air travel provides unprecedented mobility, while radio, television and communications satellites bring terrorist attacks instantly to a worldwide audience. Weapons and explo-

Bibliography Mansbach, R.W. (1997) The Global Puzzle, 2nd edn, Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin.

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sives have become available to anybody with the money to buy them. Civil society has many vulnerabilities, notably in airliners. Terrorist attacks with technological sophistication are probable – especially by small, radical dissident groups. The statesponsored terrorists of the late twentieth century are being replaced by freelance extremists – individuals or groups unrestricted by national boundaries. Many of these freelances are religious zealots who take it upon themselves to commit acts of terrorism in the name of the deity. Tracking them is difficult because they do not necessarily align themselves with any specific group. The rage of fundamentalists is exceeding self-restraint, in the Islamic world in particular, and as a result democracy is under threat. The Patriot Movement came to prominence in the early 1990s, built on true American ideals of individualism, an armed citizenry and distrust of government, especially the federal government. The attack on the Federal Building in Oklahoma City on 19 April 1995 exemplified the terror that hard-core members of the Patriot Movement could inflict. They do not always admit to attacks, their strategy being the ‘propaganda of the deed’ whereby the target indicates the motive. Targets include media outlets, financial institutions, abortion clinics, gay establishments and civil rights groups. Such violence is likely to continue. Cyber-biotech terrorism is an entirely new phenomenon, made possible by computers becoming increasingly inexpensive, portable and user-friendly. Attacking high-tech crime with high-tech innovation is, in the long run, a no-win approach. The levels of data secrecy and spying on the populace that are needed, to get even a semblance of safety from terrorists in society, will replace one source of terror with another. The Internet and the World Wide Web

21st century

have caused an information revolution. Among other things, they provide a platform for extreme views, but they may also be used to simulate or legitimate terrorist activity. It is certain that the Internet in general, and the World Wide Web especially, will come to play a major role in our understanding of protest groups and how they function in society. The willingness of terrorists to engage in acts of mass destruction has increased. Self-imposed constraints still exist, but they seem to be eroding as the motives that derive armed conflict change. At some point in the future, the opportunity and capacity for serious nuclear terrorism could reach those willing to take advantage of it. Many new areas of military conflict are directly related to the spread of terrorism, which in the future will certainly persist and probably increase. Major incidents will become more common, probably using high technology to achieve mass destruction. Terrorist weapons and tactics will be for the foreseeable future a continuation of the past. States will continue to exploit terrorism for their own purposes, perhaps resulting in a protracted worldwide guerrilla war. Terrorists will create crises, forcing governments and corporations to divert more resources into combating them. Future targets will be much the same as today’s: representatives of governments and symbols of nations, notably diplomats and airlines, and representatives of economic systems, namely corporations and corporate executives. Symbols of policies and presence, such as military officials and political or other leaders, will also be targeted. See also: Terrorism; Terrorist States. Bibliography and Further Reading Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

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new woRld oRdeR/disoRdeR The ending of the Cold War in November 1990 did not usher in an era of peaceful international relations. The Gulf War of 1990–91 showed how a new world order might be based on international law, collective security and democracy. People hoped that more and more democratic governments would be open to public opinion. They also saw international institutions as a good way to draw states and peoples into a community of co-operation, but the UN, EU and OPEC and other such bodies had a rocky path through the 1990s and beyond. The four principles enunciated by President Bush (Senior) in 1990 – peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples – were a mixture of practical solutions and moral standards. This new world order was seen by some as a security ideal in which the great powers had strong expectations and rules for their behaviour. It looked like an impressive coalition dedicated to common principles and interests by stopping any aggression. Changes since 1990 have not increased the military security of the world’s states or people. Around the world, Cold War tensions remain. The Korean peninsula is firmly frozen in the Cold War, with two ideologically defined states. Relations between the United States and Cuba are still hostile because of the US economic boycott. United States–China relations are frosty, mainly because the Chinese consider Taiwan as just a renegade province, whereas the Americans feel it is ready to be truly independent. US relations with Russia have improved to some extent, but underlying tensions remain. Kosovo in 1999 was a bitter experience for the Russians, who considered that panslavism gave them the right to decide what happened in their backyard and that the West had no legitimate interest in it. Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan – increasingly

independent and democratic – also prove Russia’s fading influence, not just in eastern Europe but in countries that were part of the Soviet empire. The eastward expansion of NATO, despite the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, has worried the Russians. Despite NATO assurances that it no longer aims at containment and that no missiles now point at Moscow (matching Russia’s agreement that no missiles point westward), NATO is still seen in its 1949 antiRussian role. It still relies heavily on America’s massive financial and material strength, in spite of US threats to reduce its contribution if the Europeans do not do more. The Cold War was resolved by negotiation, with a voluntary climbdown by one side. The bipolar world and the balance of power became the unipolar world with an imbalance of power, which the Russians resent. Several unresolved issues live on. This is very evident in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the UN’s largest peacekeeping mission, where the gap between words and deeds by the international community was most striking. Ethnic Serbs were minorities in Croatia and Bosnia, but they seized a third of Croatia and two thirds of Bosnia, and joined the adjacent republic in a ‘Greater Serbia’. Serb forces killed hundreds of thousands of non-Serb Bosnians and Croatians, and expelled millions more, to create an ethnically pure state. Croatian militias in Bosnia copied these tactics on a smaller scale. The humanitarian urge has turned out to be more complex and problematic than liberals once thought, as events in the former Yugoslavia, and especially Kosovo, have shown. It can also be very difficult to manage co-operation between egotistical states. By 2000, states and people had new expectations in such areas as human rights, UN peacekeeping and the US role as sole superpower. Paradoxically, one problem with the new world order was that nobody 170

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knew what to expect. Among US rightwingers, the term ‘new world order’ is often used to describe a global conspiracy to neuter the United States. Many countries are now concerned over Russian policy on energy, because Russia is seen to be using its vast exports of oil and gas to exert its political muscle. Relations between East and West are again strained, on issues ranging from Russian admission to the World Trade Organisation, and the possibility of the West’s missile defence shield extending to eastern Europe, to policy on Iran and Kosovo. Worries are also being aired in public about the rolling back of Russian democracy. In turn, Russia says the United States is the leading warmongering nation in the world. See also: Balance of Power; Cold War; European Union; Korean War, 1950–53; NATO; Russia; United Nations.

Cold War to a New Era, New York: Touchstone.

Further Reading Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (eds) (1997) The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gutteridge, W. (1989) ‘The Case for Regional Security: Avoiding Conflict in the 1990s’, Conflict Studies, No. 217, London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies. Hauss, C. (1996) Beyond Confrontation: Transforming the New World Order, Westport CT: Praeger. Huntington, S.P. (1996) The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, London: Simon & Schuster. Keegan, J. (1998) War and Our World – The Reith Lectures, London: Hutchinson. Mackintosh, M. (1992) ‘The New Russian Revolution: The Military Dimension’, Conflict Studies, No. 247, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Patman, R.G. (ed.) (1999) Security in a PostCold War World, New York: St Martin’s Press, and Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press. Rogers, P. (1992) A Violent Peace: Global Security after the Cold War, London: Brassey’s, and New York: Macmillan. Starke, L. (ed.) (2005) State of the World Global Security 2005, London: Earthscan. Williams, A. (1998) Failed Imagination? New World Orders of Twentieth Century, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Bibliography Black, J. (2004) War and the New Disorder in the 21st Century, New York: Continuum. Bremmer, I. and Taras, R. (eds) (1997) New States, New Politics: Building the PostSoviet Nations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cox, M., Booth, K. and Dunne, T. (eds) (1999) The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics, 1989–1999, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dewitt, D., Haglund, D. and Kirton, J. (1993) Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security, Toronto: Oxford University Press. Ekins, P. (1992) A New World Order: Grassroots Movements for Global Change, London: Routledge. Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformations Politics, Economics and Culture, Oxford: Blackwell. Hough, P. (2004) Understanding Global Security, London: Routledge. Oberdorfer, D. (1992) The Turn: From the

nixon doCTRine Richard Nixon was President of the United States from 1969 to 1974. His policy of reducing American military forces abroad and helping smaller nations to develop and defend themselves became known as the Nixon Doctrine. For 171

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instance, he slowly withdrew American troops from Vietnam to try to cut back the American commitment there. He visited China in 1972 to seek rapprochement. Later the same year he went to the Soviet Union, where he signed the SALT 1 nuclear arms limitation agreements, plus a bilateral trade accord and plans for joint scientific and space programmes. See also: Cold War.

ceiving it as an important buttress to the international legal order and their sovereignty and independence. Non-alignment was attractive for newly independent states because it gave the appearance of an independent foreign policy on sovereignty, world peace and justice. The idea of an active and assertive foreign policy gave smaller states a positive diplomatic identity. The movement has become a coalition of very diverse states. See also: Bandung Conference, 1955; Cold War; Third World Insurgency; United Nations.

non-aligned movemenT States in the nonaligned movement seek to avoid associating with blocs, coalitions and alliances. After the Second World War, many states had become independent of their colonial masters. They did not participate in the Cold War, and sought to bring about a solution to superpower rivalry. They were committed to peaceful co-existence as enunciated by 25 Asian and African countries in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. They proclaimed themselves the third force in world affairs. President Tito of Yugoslavia and the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, emerged as leaders of the new movement. At the first formal conference of nonaligned countries, in Belgrade in 1961, they adopted four pillars of non-alignment: peaceful co-existence, non-participation in any multilateral military alliance, support for liberation and independence movements, and non-participation in bilateral military alliances. Basically, Third World nations wished to remain aloof from East– West conflicts. They combined their voting power and as a result were able to command effective working majorities in organisations such as the United Nations. The ending of the Cold War in 1990 robbed the movement of much of its rationale, since non-alignment was a reaction to the military and security activities of the superpowers and their allies. Non-aligned countries played a major role in the United Nations from the 1960s onwards, per-

Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin.

non-goveRnmenTal oRganisaTion (ngo) This is a political organisation that operates independently of any state or state organisation. It often seeks to pursue a radical political agenda separate from formal politics, in the belief that its goals are above, and should not be co-opted by, mainstream politics. NGOs tend to be flexible in their operations. Bibliography Dodds, K. (2000) Geopolitics in a Changing World, New York: Prentice Hall (Pearson Education).

Further Reading Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The Interna-

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the Americans in Egypt and (to a lesser extent) Sudan. The French in the meantime continued to exert some influence in their former colonial territories of Djibouti and Chad. For states in this area the superpowers have been an obvious source of arms, often for domestic security (or repression) as well as defence. During the Cold War, the West provided significant economic aid – bilateral and multilateral – through the IMF, the World Bank, the European Union and UN agencies. However, the famine in Ethiopia and Somalia in the mid-1980s showed that even superpowers and international aid could not produce economic development in the face of drought and conflict. Domestic strife and drought have given north-east Africa more refugees than almost anywhere in the world: at one stage there were over three million. Neighbouring states have sometimes tried to ameliorate, perhaps even mediate in, the internal conflicts that have caused instability, displacement and violence. There have been tensions between neighbours, ranging from the Somali irredentist claims on Ethiopia and Kenya, over a largely desolate area of the Ogaden desert, to the more minor dispute between Sudan and Egypt over the Halayeb region. Until the mid-1990s, Libya claimed the Aouzou strip, a belt rich in uranium deposits along the Libya–Chad border, which the rest of the world accepted should belong to Chad. People claimed that the former Italian colony of Eritrea should not have been given to Ethiopia by the United Nations in 1952. Guerrilla fighting began in 1962, fuelled by Arab states for ideological reasons. Eritrea gained independence in 1993, but Ethiopia still disputes the border, which is also the scene of separatist guerrilla fighting. In the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the major backer of Ethiopia, which

tional Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

non-violenT ResisTanCe This is resistance to the occupation of one’s country, but without the use of violence. The policy was advocated by Mahatma Gandhi, the Indian leader and pacifist who led the struggle for Indian independence from the United Kingdom. Such action however has been more or less ineffective when conducted against an occupying (rather than a colonial) power, as in Czechoslovakia after 1968. Gandhi also championed non-violent direct action to secure a political objective outside the constitutional framework. Passive resistance is another aspect of non-violent resistance, involving deliberate neglect of official or administrative functions, refusal to attend interrogations and non-participation in government activities. See also: Czechoslovakia. Bibliography Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Pan Books and Macmillan Press.

noRTh aTlanTiC TReaTy oRganisaTion see naTo

noRTh-easT afRiCa After the decline of Italian, French and British colonial power in the Horn of Africa, the superpowers committed more resources to this region than to anywhere else in the continent – an acknowledgement of the strategic importance of the Red Sea (as the approach to the Suez Canal) and the Indian Ocean. The superpowers wished to keep friendly regimes in power, and their military might encouraged coercion in domestic politics: by the Soviets in Somalia and Ethiopia, by 173

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adopted state control and collectivisation. The United States tried to ally itself closely with Somalia, but with limited success. This culminated in a disastrous period of American involvement in Somalia during the Clinton administration. There have been political tensions and clan rivalries between pastoralists and urban dwellers, out of which emerged the warlords who control much of the country. The government’s authority is disputed. Economic problems have contributed to political rivalries and bitterness. Arms sales in the area have encouraged the pursuit of military, rather than political, solutions to problems. There have been slender signs of greater co-operation between Somalia and Kenya, and between Egypt and Sudan. It is to be hoped this will alleviate the horrors of civil war and economic degradation. Throughout the Horn of Africa, the maintenance of peace has and will be influenced by the attitudes of neighbours, regional powers and the wider international community. See also: Eritrea; Somalia.

noRTh koRea North Korea is on the US State Department’s blacklist of states said to be officially supporting terrorism – the others being Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria. However, from about 1993 there have been signs that the North Koreans have taken a step back from direct support for terrorist violence and liberation movements. Kim Il Sung was the ruler of North Korea from the creation of the state in 1944 until his death in 1994; he was known as the Great Leader. He constantly campaigned for the reunification of Korea, though without making any progress. His son Kim Jong Il succeeded him, but talks stalled because of North Korea’s stance on nuclear weapons. North Korea has been described as Stalinist and a ‘hermit’ state, facing desperate economic and political difficulties, fighting for survival and therefore not able to engage in foreign adventures. However, North Korea regularly gave sanctuary to Japanese Red Army members after they had committed atrocities in Japan. In 1968 the US naval intelligence ship Pueblo was seized after it strayed into North Korean waters. The crew were tortured and held hostage for a year, and only released after admitting to spying. North Korea’s worst atrocity was in 1987, when a bomb planted on a South Korean airliner exploded in flight, killing 115 people. In the early 1990s, North Korea realised it was impractical to pursue international terrorism and engage in building longrange missiles and nuclear bombs. What has worried the global community has been North Korea’s aid in the proliferation of nuclear capacity in other countries. The situation is not helped by the fact that few countries have diplomatic engagement with North Korea. In January 2002 President Bush named North Korea as part of the axis of evil, implying that it might

Bibliography Iyob, R. (1995) The Eritrean Struggle for Independence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Legum, C. (1992) ‘The Horn of Africa: Prospects for Political Transformation’, Conflict Studies, No. 254, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Woodward, P. (1987) ‘Rivalry and Conflict in NE Africa’, Conflict Studies, No. 199, London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies. —— (1989) ‘War – or Peace – in NE Africa’, Conflict Studies, No. 219, London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies.

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become a target for military attack and coercive diplomacy. North Korea knows that weapons of mass destruction are the only effective deterrent to America. See also: Axis of Evil; Korean War, 1950–53; Nuclear Proliferation.

of the developing countries’ exporters. Aid levels have been to many people unjustifiably low. The North has rejected many proposals to make more foreign exchange available to the South. The multinational corporations in the North do not match development processes in the South (the Third World). Terms of trade have been against the developing countries’ export basket. Since the 1980s, there has been some differentiation, with growing wealth and development in the oil-rich states or the newly industrialised countries of the Pacific Rim sitting alongside perpetual stagnation as in sub-Saharan Africa. The persistence of economic and human underdevelopment is attributed by some to exploitative transnational and multinational enterprises. Until the mid-1990s, the North appeared to lack a coherent perspective on North–South relations. However, more people are now aware of the plight of those left behind. In an international system characterised by sovereign equality, some states are still more equal than others. There has been interaction to counter the stalemate, notably a permanent transfer of people from South to North and, in the other direction, a continuing flow of goods, services, and technical and managerial aid from North to South. The interaction has included raw materials, energy, manufactured products, industrialisation, services, agriculture, food and transfers of capital. Africa characterises the gap between the North and the South for a number of issues: the tribal factor, regional violence, ocean politics and the global power struggle, racial confrontation and Afro-Arab tensions. During the Cold War, SinoSoviet and US-Soviet rivalry for influence co-existed with the start of a North–South dialogue over the new international economic order. The continent has over three quarters of the world’s known resources of

Bibliography Cummings, B. (1981) The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947 Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Lowe, P. (1986) The Origins of the Korean War, London: Longman. Rees, D. (1972) ‘North Korea’s Growth as a Subversive Centre’, Conflict Studies, No. 28, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. —— (1976) ‘North Korea: Undermining the Truce’, Conflict Studies, No. 69, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

Further Reading Bermudez, J.S. (1990) Terrorism: The North Korean Connection, New York: Crane, Russak. Dae Hwan Kim and Tat Yan Kong (eds) (1997) The Korean War in Transition, Oxford: St Antony’s College. Kirby, S. (1988) ‘The Two Koreas – Conflict or Compromise?’, Conflict Studies, No. 207, London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies.

noRTh–souTh gloBal issues Many conflicts arise from development issues or under-development. Most of the globe’s developing economies are in the southern hemisphere; most industrialised economies are in the north. This economic discrepancy is the North–South gap – seen in life expectancy, literacy, calorie intake and child mortality. There has long been a North–South stalemate. Efforts at liberalisation through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have been biased in favour 175

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platinum, chrome, vanadium and gold and over a quarter of diamonds and asbestos. Yet countries such as Zaïre, Angola and South Africa have had political, social, military and economic unrest, often linked to mineral resources. Phosphates in Mauritania and Western Sahara, diamonds in Sierra Leone and oil in Nigeria have caused tensions in these countries with international repercussions. There is huge political and economic diversity in the South. During the Cold War, the Third World’s development potential was analysed as pro-Eastern, proWestern or non-aligned, by international economists working closely with military strategists. Nations such as Argentina, Brazil and South Korea (pro-Western), Libya (Eastern), Nigeria and India (nonaligned) largely fulfilled their potential. Other states had the potential to develop, such as Thailand, Egypt, Indonesia and Sri Lanka (pro-Western), Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Syria (proSoviet), Zambia, Zimbabwe, Iran and Tanzania (non-aligned). Inevitably, there were some with little or no potential: Somalia (pro-Western), South Yemen and Afghanistan (pro-Soviet), Niger, Chad, Mali and Bangladesh (non-aligned). Superpower interest has often sparked conflict in the South, from Central America to the Middle East, and from Central Africa to South-East Asia, especially among small nations powerless to defend themselves without external help. Wars of decolonisation predominated until the early 1960s: Malaya and Cyprus (British), Congo (Belgian), Angola and Mozambique (Portuguese), Lebanon, Chad and Indo-China (French), Indonesia (Dutch) and Western Sahara (Spanish). The borders of these countries, imposed across tribal lines, were a source of humiliation and bitterness at the colonists’ arrogance and lack of foresight. The bitterness lingers today. Civil wars have occurred in many Third

World states, fed by tribal differences, resources, frontiers, religion, genocide, rivalries, jealousies and corruption. Local wars can relate to military geography, some states being seen to have a strategic advantage over others. The military option has often been pursued instead of the economic and humanitarian options. Indeed, stalemate and dialogue, war and peace have all featured in North–South relations without any one factor predominating. See also: Globalisation; Poverty and Debt. Bibliography Adams. N.B. (1993) The North–South Divide and the International System, London: Zed Books. Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

noRTheRn iReland The province of Ulster was the centre of resistance to home rule for Ireland. As a result, the other three provinces were offered independence, but the nine counties of Ulster were excepted. In the end, this was reduced to the six counties with a Protestant majority, which became Northern Ireland, with its own administration at Stormont, near Belfast. It had the right to stay out of the republic, which it did as soon as the Irish Free State was set up in 1922. The threat to Northern Ireland’s stability came from the Republican demand for one Irish state for the whole island of Ireland. After a brief ‘border war’ in 1956, the conflict erupted in Northern Ireland in 1969, when people were killed and wounded in riots between Catholics and Protestants. The Catholics demanded equal political rights and better access to housing, schools and social security. The Northern Ireland Government sent in 176

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their armed police reserve against Catholic demonstrators. The British Government responded by sending troops to separate the two sides and taking control of the police and reserve forces. In 1971 the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland opened internment camps and authorised the detention of suspects without trial. Violent protests occurred. On 30 January 1972 British soldiers opened fire on what was meant to be a peaceful protest march in Londonderry (Derry to the Irish), killing 13 Catholics and injuring hundreds more; this became known as Bloody Sunday. Why this happened is still unclear, despite more than one official inquiry. The IRA responded with a wave of assassinations. The problem of Northern Ireland remains intractable. In a referendum in 1973, the people of Northern Ireland voted to remain within the United Kingdom rather than join a united Ireland. In 1998 yet more negotiations ended in another peace formula. In May 1998 in a referendum, 70 per cent of voters approved agreements by which Northern Ireland would have a directly elected legislative assembly with safeguards against domination by one cultural group. At the same time, in a referendum held in the Republic, 95 per cent voted to end its territorial claim over the North. The killing of 28 people by a car bomb in Omagh in August 1998 saw the peace process falter, compounded by bickering over disarmament and the decommissioning of weapons. A number of options have been considered since the 1950s:

•

•

•

•

•

•

reversing the trend to devolution and would not be acceptable to Northern Ireland Catholics, Dublin or world opinion. Independence for Northern Ireland – would lead to the loss of subsidy from the UK, and the majority government would be Protestant with no option but to take a hard line; the IRA would gain internal and external support, and civil war could follow. Devolved government like that from 1922 to 1971 – could be reactivated, but it would inevitably be sectarian, and the UK would not provide troops or money. A smaller Northern Ireland – revision of borders would reduce the Catholic minority, giving strongly republican areas to the Republic; in January 2003 it was disclosed that the Conservative government led by Edward Heath suggested this on sectarian grounds in 1972, but it did not progress beyond discussion stage. Condominium – even if joint sovereignty were agreed between London and Dublin, it would be resisted by IRA and Protestant paramilitaries. Power sharing as attempted in 1973–74 – would not work effectively, because it was assumed that the majority of Unionist politicians and people would not co-operate. Direct rule from London – would be ‘everyone’s second choice’ and ineffective, but the only choice until power sharing was accepted.

To satisfy some nationalists, in 2001 the Royal Ulster Constabulary was replaced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The police have worked to stem support for violence, from inside and outside the province, and reduce organised crime. About 2001 it was estimated that crime by paramilitary groups raised £18 million each year, much of it from armed robbery,

• A united Ireland – but the British would not agree unless the majority in the North consented; the security forces in Dublin are too small; and the majority of people and politicians in the Republic do not want it. • Integration of Northern Ireland with the UK – but this would be seen as 177

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fraud (benefit fraud, gambling, fuel, alcohol and tobacco smuggling and agricultural fraud, such as deliberate spread of disease or smuggling cattle), counterfeiting (CDs, clothes, currency, telephone cards, driving licences and bank letters of authority were reported by House of Commons Finances 2001–2), extortion (‘protection’ for the building trade, fast food outlets, restaurants, licensed premises and car dealerships), money-laundering and money-lending. The other main source of IRA funds was the Irish Northern Aid Committee, broker for the Provisional IRA’s transatlantic fund-raising. Irish-American supporters reacted to propaganda showing Northern Ireland as a place of colonial repression. Millions of dollars were sent to in the forms of cash, arms and pamphlets. The political momentum was stalled by 1990, when a web of political contacts began to form, aiming at significant change if the use of arms ended. The constitutional parties’ hope was that London and Dublin would sign a joint declaration recognising the right of self-determination in the North as well as for the whole of Ireland, to persuade the IRA to call a halt. Re-equipped loyalist paramilitary groups were threatening republican areas, putting pressure on the IRA, who wished to end the Unionist veto and bring Sinn Fein into negotiations. They took South Africa as the role model, where the ANC refused to give up armed struggle before entering talks. In 1992 two IRA bombs caused massive destruction in Belfast city centre, and another was detonated in the city of London in retaliation for a Conservative election victory. In 1993, for the first time since 1975, murders by loyalists outnumbered those by republicans. In 1994 the Combined Loyalist Military Command announced a cease-fire. Simply, they wished to oppose moves that might lead to a united Ireland. The movement’s new leaders had a more

realistic view of Northern Ireland’s place in the Union. Also in 1993 the US President, Bill Clinton, began speaking to Republicans and Unionists to try and bring about peace talks. Paramilitary operations ceased on 31 August 1994, when both sides accepted that a solution would only be found through negotiations. The first year of the agreement brought both optimism and disillusionment. The IRA faced full and verifiable decommissioning as part of an overall settlement. Activists saw a return to war as inevitable unless there was visible political movement. In 1996 huge bombs exploded at Canary Wharf in London and the city centre in Manchester, but in the long term these weakened the IRA’s negotiating position. At Drumcree there was a stand-off between Orange Order marchers and the police over the right of Protestants to march down a Catholic road. After 1994 both sides seemed to target people under 20. The IRA put more resources into their punishment squads, which inflicted more serious injuries than loyalists and were often witnessed, since many occurred in public. The vigilante campaigns were a form of surrogate terrorism; in fact, more people died as a result of vigilantes than in the pre-ceasefire years, with the danger that the hardwon ceasefires might collapse. The Ulster Defence Association was set up in September 1971 by merging a range of Protestant vigilante and paramilitary groups, with the motto, ‘Law before Violence’. It was organised on military lines and had about 50,000 working-class members. In January 1986 its political think tank, the New Ulster Political Research Group, called for a written constitution, with devolved government based on consensus and shared responsibility. In the early 1990s it threatened to intensify its campaign to a ferocity never imagined. It was involved in feuding in the 178

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Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Combined Loyalist Military Command, a combination of the UVF, the Ulster Freedom Fighters and the Red Hand Commando. There were allegations of collusion with the security forces. The Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) were a violent group attacking both Catholics and Protestants increasingly during the 1990s. In May 1999 their leader, Johnny Adair, was shot and wounded while on parole from the Maze Prison. He blamed Republicans but the media suggested loyalists had instigated the attack. With Tony Blair’s election victory in 1997, the IRA again ceased military operations and Sinn Fein was promised a role in negotiations if the ceasefire held. There was still a small amount of violence, but events were overtaken by the signing of the Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement. The Good Friday Agreement was signed on 10 April 1998 in spite of last-ditch brinkmanship by Sinn Fein and the Ulster Unionists. It gave the nationalist parties, the SDLP and Sinn Fein, guaranteed ministries in the new Northern Ireland Executive Government, and began structured North–South ministerial co-operation at all levels. Major police reform was promised. All political prisoners would be released within two years. Both governments would end their ‘claims’ on Northern Ireland, leaving the constitutional future in the hands of its people. Separate referendums would be held, North and South. The UDA and UFF endorsed the Good Friday Agreement, saying that it would not lead to a united Ireland. In May 1998 the leaders of the UDA in the Maze Prison announced ‘the war is over’ and apologised to all victims of UDA and UVF violence. Also in 1998, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) announced that the war was

over, perhaps influenced by the fact that the Agreement did not list its prisoners as eligible for early release. Cynics suspected that their ceasefire would last only until prisoners were released. The arms decommissioning body issued an arms immunity certificate allowing the LVF to move guns for decommissioning. In 1999 the LVF warned of ‘great strain’ on its ceasefire if the IRA did not begin decommissioning. In late 1998, implementation of the Agreement stalled. Over 200 IRA prisoners had been released without any signs of decommissioning, which the Unionists held out for before they would agree to set up fully the Executive Government. The Red Hand Defenders, a new paramilitary group, undertook its first killing in October 1998 and its first bomb attack two months later. In December 1999 the new Executive Government for Northern Ireland was formed and the North and South Ministerial Council had its first meeting. The IRA said it would consider decommissioning if police and judicial reforms occurred as well as British demilitarisation. The Agreement was still seen as a vehicle for lasting peace. Any agreement to end the types of political violence experienced in Northern Ireland is bound to be difficult, especially after the deaths of 2,000 civilians, 1,000 members of the security forces and 700 paramilitaries. Early release of paramilitary prisoners caused anger and disaffection among the bereaved and injured, even though it was clear that such a concession would form part of any agreement. People have to live with the past, so it had to feature in the peace process. There is now a rift between those who support the Good Friday Agreement and those who do not. There has been a fall-off in Unionist support for the Agreement. The Orange Volunteers were a group of about 20 hard-liners opposed to the ceasefire; they appeared in 1999. They attacked 179

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Catholics in order to subvert any political settlement, but they did observe a ceasefire in 2000 and 2001. The Continuity Irish Republican Army is a splinter group of up 100 members, created in 1999 as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein, which split from Sinn Fein in the mid-1980s. Its aim was to force the British to leave Northern Ireland and it attacked security targets and loyalist paramilitary groups. Some funding is known to come from sympathisers in the USA, and arms and material come from the Balkans. The group is opposed to weapons decommissioning. The Real IRA was a clandestine armed wing of the 32-county sovereignty movement, formed in early 1998 as a pressure group to oust British forces from the North and unify Ireland. It adopted the usual terrorist tactics of assassination, bombing and robbery. Its 200+ members had left the IRA after it declared a ceasefire. The Real IRA had a brief ceasefire after the Omagh bombing, but resumed attacks in 2001. Its targets included MI6 Headquarters and the BBC. Weaponry has been obtained from the Balkans and some funding has come from the USA. The Red Hand Defenders were a group of some 30 extremists, formed in 1998 out of hard-liners from loyalist groups observing a ceasefire. They were against a political settlement with Irish nationalists and attacked Catholic interests in Northern Ireland. Since Good Friday 1998 Protestant and Catholic communities have felt they shared a common goal. Since 11 September 2001, there has been less support from the USA for the Republican cause. At elections the Democratic Unionists under Ian Paisley have made gains at the expense of the Ulster Unionists led by David Trimble. Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness remain the dominant forces in Sinn Fein. The Irish and British Prime Ministers, Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair, had been in

power for over a decade and were determined to achieve a lasting settlement in Northern Ireland. In May 2007 agreement was finally reached. Ian Paisley became First Minister in Northern Ireland with Martin McGuiness as his deputy. Peace may have arrived. See also: Ireland; United Kingdom. Bibliography Bew, P. and Gillespie, G. (1996) The Northern Ireland Peace Process: A Chronology, 1993–96, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. —— (1999) Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles, 1968–1999, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.

Further Reading Bell, J.B. (1996) Back to the Future: The Protestants and a United Ireland. Dublin: Poolbeg Press. Bruce, S. (1992) The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— (1994) The Edge of the Union: The Ulster Loyalist Political Vision, New York: Oxford University Press. Morrisey, M. and Smyth, M. (2002) Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement: Victims, Grievance and Blame, London: Pluto Press.

nuCleaR aCCidenTs Public concern over the safety of nuclear reactors has been intensified by explosions and the accidental release of radioactive materials. Three major incidents have occurred since 1945. In the United Kingdom in October 1957, at Windscale (now Sellafield, Cumbria), fire destroyed the core of a reactor, releasing large quantities of radioactive fumes into the atmosphere. In the United States in March 1979, at Three Mile Island, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, a combination of mechanical and electrical failure, as well as operator error, 180

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caused a pressurised water reactor to leak radioactive matter. In the Soviet Union in April 1986, at Chernobyl in Ukraine, overheating caused an explosive leak from a pressurised boiling water reactor, one of the largest in Europe. The resulting clouds of radioactive material spread over much of northern Europe, 31 people were killed in the explosion and many more died later or became ill because of the long-term effects of radiation. Huge areas of land were contaminated by fallout and some were declared unsafe for human habitation or agriculture for hundreds of years. For days the Soviet Union denied that an accident had occurred; only under pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency did the facts come to light. As a result of these accidents, some countries delayed constructing new nuclear power installations, and some decommissioned their reactors, though others went ahead with new nuclear power stations.

international scene. Non-state actors – from multinational companies (which can constrain or empower states) to very wealthy individuals and terrorists – have increased the volume of illicit international commerce. With better communications and mass population movements, nuclear smuggling has become easier through more porous international borders. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a profound change in environment, wealth, status, funding and security in the nuclear industry. Iran, North Korea and the Soviet Union have allegedly benefited from selling Soviet nuclear equipment and the expertise of their nuclear personnel. Many older nuclear sites have poor security, making illegal entry and theft easy. Organised crime syndicates have been trafficking materials. Terrorists can now acquire either an actual weapon or the radioactive material needed to build a crude device and have the capability to execute an attack. See also: Nuclear Proliferation.

Bibliography

Bibliography

Grace, C. (1994) Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Effects and Survivability, London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers.

Sagan, S.D. and Waltz, K.N. (1995) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Further Reading

nuCleaR maTeRials: illiCiT TRaffiCking Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, there has been increasing concern over the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear material stockpiles in Russia, some former Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact members in Eastern Europe. Since 2000, growing fears have been voiced of an emergent illicit trade in nuclear materials via renegade governments and terrorist groups, a trade which is potentially lethal. Nuclear proliferation had been controlled through bilateral, multilateral and regional arms limitation agreements. The loosening of the bipolar world and the diminished power of the state has led to the emergence of non-state entities on the

Hoffman, B. and Claridge, D. (1999) ‘Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials’, Conflict Studies, Nos. 314/315 (Jan/Feb), Leamington Spa: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Jones, R.W. and McDonough, M.G. with Dalton, T.F. and Koblentz, G.D. (1998) Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide to Maps and Charts, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

nuCleaR pRolifeRaTion The spread of nuclear weapon technologies to different states, with all the associated tensions and concerns, began in 1945 when the United 181

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States, being the sole nuclear power, dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nuclear weapons, technology and testing then spread to the USSR, UK, France and China, who for many years formed a ‘nuclear club’. It later expanded to include South Africa, Israel, India, Pakistan and most controversially, North Korea and Iran. However, in recent years Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Taiwan and South Korea have relinquished their nuclear programmes. In the mid-1990s the nuclear weapon states affirmed their commitment to pursue effective nuclear disarmament. However, non-nuclear states see disarmament as a greater priority than those with nuclear weapons, who have appeared reluctant to consider total nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established in South-East Asia, the South Pacific and the Antarctic. Getting countries to agree to meet the threat of nuclear proliferation can be difficult. What many states want is security against nuclear powers, and local powers that are not yet nuclear, without having to build their own nuclear arsenals. Other states wish to obtain big-power prestige or the technical advances that nuclear technology can bring. It is virtually impossible to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons by restricting access to the substances and technology necessary for their production. See also: Mutual Assured Destruction.

Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Sagan, S.D. and Waltz, K.N. (1995) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

nuCleaR sTRikes A surprise nuclear attack can destroy, or decisively weaken, the enemy’s capacity to retaliate. If a successful first strike is possible, there is an incentive to attack first and defeat the enemy before they can attack. A first-strike nuclear attack undertaken on the assumption that the enemy is planning an imminent nuclear attack is a preemptive strike, which aims at seizing the initiative and the advantage of surprise while one’s own offensive power remains undamaged. With first-strike ability, one can attack and destroy the enemy’s retaliatory capacity while suffering ‘acceptable’ damage. It can be tempting to make an attack in this situation. Launching a first strike may be adopted as a strategy. If a state has the means to enable some of its nuclear forces to survive a first strike, it has a second-strike capability. That reduces the incentive to attack quickly or first, for any first strike will only cause destructive retaliation. A nation’s security from attack in the nuclear age may depend on its ability to threaten massive nuclear retribution. Under stable deterrence conditions, each side has only a second-strike capability (to absorb a first strike and still retaliate causing unacceptable damage), not a first-strike force. Each has an assured capability to inflict massive destruction on an attacker. See also: Mutual Assured Destruction; Nuclear Winter.

Bibliography Jones, R.W. and McDonough, M.G. with Dalton, T.F. and Koblentz, G.D. (1998) Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide to Maps and Charts, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Bibliography Further Reading

Reiss, M. and Luttwak, R. (eds) (1994) Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War,

Reiss, M. and Luttwak, R. (eds) (1994)

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Washington DC: Center Press.

Woodrow

1955, Britain in 1957, China in 1967 and France in 1968. Nuclear warheads are now far smaller and can be carried in a field artillery shell. Some areas of the world have been banned from nuclear tests, notably the Arctic and Antarctic; the French have controversially carried out nuclear tests in the South Pacific and been constantly disrupted by the environmental group Greenpeace.

Wilson

Further Reading Sagan, S.D. and Waltz, K.N. (1995) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

nuCleaR TesTing Nuclear testing has always attracted much controversy in international politics. The destructive energy harnessed and released by splitting or fusing atoms is the essence of nuclear weapons. Destructive effects include blast or overpressure, radiant heat, gamma or short-term radiation, alpha or long-term radiation and a firestorm. The developments needed to create a nuclear explosion were completed during the Second World War by the United States, which successfully detonated an implosion device in New Mexico in July 1945. On 6 and 9 August respectively, atomic bombs containing the U235 isotope of uranium were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, and ended the Second World War. The power of such weapons affected the strategic realities of the post-war world. Nations wanting superpower or great-power status felt the need to have them. In 1949, the Soviet Union – having obtained the secrets of making the bomb from spies in the United States – tested their first device. In 1952 the United Kingdom tested its own nuclear device, followed by France in 1960 and China in 1964. Other nations have since developed nuclear weapons, including South Africa, Israel, Pakistan and India; North Korea and Iran say they could produce nuclear weapons. This is very controversial, given these countries’ pariah or ‘rogue’ status. Thermonuclear devices or hydrogen bombs – using a nuclear fusion reaction at very high temperature – were tested by the United States in 1952, the Soviet Union in

Further Reading Cochran, T., Arkin, W. and Hoenig, M. (1984) Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vols I–V, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

nuCleaR winTeR This possible long-term effect of a widespread nuclear war was regularly discussed at the height of the Cold War. In the aftermath of destruction caused by nuclear blasts and subsequent radiation, it is thought that atmospheric pollution by dust, smoke, soot and ash could prevent the Sun’s rays from penetrating, for a period of time sufficient to eradicate most plant life on which other life depends. Ash would reflect the Sun’s rays and delay the planet’s return to normal warmth. The cold would be intense and there would be a great increase in snow and ice globally. There would not be enough heat to warm up the planet for some time. The hypothesis of a nuclear winter is unprovable and controversial. Some scientists believe much would depend on the intensity of the nuclear war. They believe there is a threshold below which nuclear war could be fought without total catastrophe. Others increasingly believe that the survival of human beings demands substantial reductions in nuclear weapons, to a level that would eliminate the threat of nuclear winter while providing for a minimal deterrent. See also: Mutual Assured Destruction. 183

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Bibliography

Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

McNaught, L.W. (1984) Nuclear Weapons and Their Effects, London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers.

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The OAU has regularly come up against the factor of militarisation, which is propelled by the insecurity of governments and the willingness of outside powers to arm them or their opponents. The OAU is willing to mediate among its member states, which often take action through, or within, intergovernmental organisations like the OAU. In conjunction with the United Nations, the OAU has been working on the issue of human security in international politics – that is, the possibility for an individual to live in peace, with access to the basic necessities of life, while fully participating in the affairs of society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights. Ultimately, in spite of its increased political importance and improved results in dealing with regional problems, the OAU has remained ineffectual over Zimbabwe (where the Commonwealth has played a role) and in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where the UN (and EU to some extent) has taken charge. See also: Conflicts in Africa; Third World Insurgency.

oRganisaTion of afRiCan uniTy (oau) The Organisation of African Unity was founded in 1963 to organise coherent policies among the non-aligned African nations and to help eradicate remaining colonial traces in Africa. Its main concerns have been in southern Africa, namely South Africa and Rhodesia, but it was not very effective there, nor in dealing with other crises such as the Biafran conflict and the war in Sierra Leone. The OAU has seldom got involved in civil wars. When it has, as in Chad, it has been criticised for being too closely linked to France and the USA. When the OAU was created, Africa had about 30 independent states; now there are over 50. Their relations with countries outside Africa are often stronger than relations with their neighbours. Many conflicts arise from the interstate borders, a legacy of negotiations and treaties between colonial powers in Europe, defined by poorly drawn maps and paying virtually no attention to African peoples. The OAU did not wish to cause further discord and so its Charter said that all borders were inviolable. Many observers now want to see border changes that take account of cultural identity, economics and self-determination. The refugee crisis has proved an intractable problem, threatening continental stability and economic growth. Many observers believe that refugees are a burden and a possible cause of further conflict. The OAU has been preoccupied with other issues, while many in the West have been concerned that little was being done to resolve this problem.

Bibliography Arnold, G. (1991) Wars in the Third World since 1945, London: Cassell. Furley, O.W. (ed.) 1995 Conflict in Africa, London: Tauris Academic Studies.

oRganisaTion of ameRiCan sTaTes (oas) The organisation was founded in 1948 by over 30 countries on the American continent. Its aim is to maintain peace and solidarity within the hemisphere; it is also 185

oslo Peace accords,

concerned with the social and economic development of Latin America. It encourages friendly relations among all nations in the region; for example, it organised a peace force to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to prevent another Cuba. The United States is the dominant power in the region, especially in security matters. The OAS has always faced the challenge of coping with indirect aggression and political subversion in hemispheric countries, without hindering political and social revolutions, which can be beneficial to any nation’s progress. See also: Central America; Latin America.

1993

cities, including Bethlehem and Jenin, plus parts of Hebron and 450 villages, while allowing Israeli-guarded Jewish settlements to remain. By 1999 – the end of the five-year interim autonomy in the accords – a final agreement should have been struck, but the accords appeared to be stuck in a rut. With Israel and the Palestinians locked in mutual recrimination, each fresh diplomatic initiative ran into the sand. Street protests became common as people vented their frustration. Palestinians were angry that Yasser Arafat had not declared an independent state on 4 May 1999, as he had promised. Israeli hardliners celebrated what they saw as the final demise of the Oslo Accords. The deal had not produced security for the Israeli people nor dignity for the Palestinians. Even water caused problems between the two sides, and in the Accords water had been given its own negotiating group. The management of water resources may be seen as a potential lifeline for continued dialogue and a key issue in negotiations to try to end the conflict. See also: Israel: Security Issues; Palestine.

Bibliography Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

oslo peaCe aCCoRds, 1993 The aim of the ultimately unsuccessful Oslo Accords was to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The accords – officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment – were negotiated secretly by Israeli and Palestinian delegations in Oslo in 1993, guided by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Johan Jorgen Holst. The Accords laid out the long-term goals, providing for the issues of final borders, Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem and the status of refugees to be settled in ‘permanent status negotiations’. They were signed on 13 September 1993 at a ceremony hosted by President Clinton at the White House, Washington, during which Yasser Arafat and the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shook hands, ending decades as sworn enemies. On 28 September 1995 at another White House ceremony, Israelis and Palestinians signed another deal known as the ‘Interim Agreement’ or ‘Oslo 2’. The deal allowed for a second stage of autonomy for the Palestinians, giving them self-rule in six

Bibliography Duncan, A. and Opatowski, M. (2000) Trouble Spots: The World Atlas of Strategic Information, Stroud: Sutton.

Further Reading Corbin, J. (1994) Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, London: Bloomsbury.

OstpOlItIk This was an initiative of Willy Brandt, the West German Chancellor, to reduce tension in Europe by opening talks with the (Communist) German Democratic Republic. The process of normalising relations with the Eastern 186

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bloc began in 1970. In 1973 the Basic Treaty between West and East Germany came into operation. West Germany also established diplomatic relations with Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The success of Ostpolitik can be seen in the way Brandt’s decision led to a change in American attitudes. The West had to accept the de facto division in Europe, but Brandt also saw a chance to make the Soviet Union pay heed to West German

interests. Since the Soviets were keen to see a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and it could not take place without East Germany, relations had to be normalised. See also: Peaceful Co-existence. Bibliography and Further Reading Krieger, J. (ed.) (1993) The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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paCifism This is the belief that violence of any kind is unjustifiable and so one should not participate in war. Pacifists believe that international disputes can be settled by arbitration rather than war. Non-violence is the best-known type of pacifism. As a method of gaining political and social objectives, it is associated with Mohandas Karamchand ‘Mahatma’ Gandhi, who led his nation to independence in large measure by the use of nonviolent techniques of civil disobedience and fasting. Gandhian principles were adopted by American blacks in their struggle for citizenship rights in the United States, starting with the bus boycotts in Alabama in 1956, led by Martin Luther King. Nuclear pacifism is a product of the nuclear age, since many individuals believe that the advent of nuclear weapons has produced a qualitatively new situation in international conflict. Nuclear pacifism commends itself to many Christians and non-Christians on humanitarian and commonsense grounds. In democratic countries, pacifism and non-violence have by and large been regarded as highly idealistic but politically impractical. It is thought that any attempt to meet a vicious tyranny by peaceful means would simply result in the complete loss of freedom to use non-violent methods or any others; it would be very ineffective. See also: Non-Violent Resistance; Peace.

The Road to Transcend, London: Pluto Press.

Further Reading Krieger, J. (ed.) (1993) The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

pakisTan The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is ruled by the Pakistan People’s Party. Since independence in 1947 it has had numerous political crises, alternating civilian and military governments. Instability, inefficiency, corruption, confrontations between political institutions and high military spending have inhibited economic development. The Dominion of Pakistan was divided into East and West. The smaller and poorer half, East Pakistan, hankered after separation and relations between the two deteriorated. In March 1971, military ‘pacification’ led to civil war; and in December 1971 the east gained independence as Bangladesh. Pakistan became an Islamic republic in 1956 and left the Commonwealth in 1972, only to rejoin in 1989. The country had been criticised for its attitude to democratic human rights and the imposition of martial law. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became head of a civilian government in 1971, but traditionalists thought his government was not sufficiently Islamic. He was later sentenced to death. In July 1977 there was an army coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq, who abandoned secular policies and began Islamisation, including the adoption of Shariah law. Zia died in an air crash in

Bibliography Galtung, J., Jacobsen, C.G. and BrandJacobsen, K.F. (2002) Searching for Peace:

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1988 and civilian government was restored. but there were several rapid changes of leadership. Benazir Bhutto, the first woman as head of state (1988–90, 1993– 96), tried to democratise the country at a time of the worst political and ethnic violence since 1971. Ultimately she was forced to resign after accusations of corruption. Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons, to the alarm of many Western countries, and in 1998 Pakistan and India tested nuclear devices within weeks of each other. Benazir Bhutto’s successor, Nawaz Sharif, was removed from office in October 1999 by General Pervez Musharraf (previously in charge of operations in Kashmir), accusing him of kidnapping, terrorism and attempted murder. This was the first time that a military regime had taken over an affirmed nuclear power. In June 2001 Musharraf was appointed President of Pakistan. After 11 September 2001, he aligned Pakistan with the West in the war on terror, providing support in the Afghan War. This policy angered militant factions, who are believed to be responsible for terrorist attacks in the country. Factional violence between Shia and Sunni fundamentalists has been a problem in many provinces for three decades and has led to thousands of deaths; several extremist groups have been banned. In Baluchistan, troops are fighting guerrillas seeking autonomy or even independence for the province. Three million Pathans have their own culture, language, legal code, traditions and calendar, and first claimed independence in 1946 for Pashtunistan. The issue appears no nearer solution. Pakistan has often been shaken by ethnic violence, especially between Sindhis and Muhajirs (former Indian refugees). There has been evidence of attacks on the Christian minority by Islamic extremists. The Islamic Democratic Revolution Party hope that their threat of an Islamic revolution like that in Iran will force the

government to make changes; many of its leaders have been detained under house arrest. The Jamiat-i-Jalaba is a rigidly orthodox, right-wing fundamentalist party strongly opposed to the emancipation of women and to liberal and Western influences in education. A similar party, the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (Association of the Religious Scholars of Islam), advocates a constitution in accordance with Islamic teachings. Harakat ul-Mujahedin is a Sunni militant group linked to Al Qaeda. It seeks Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan and was suspected of several fatal bombings in 2002. It has many armed followers across the world and is a distinct threat to Westerners in Pakistan. Lashkar e Toiba (‘Army of the Pure’) also wants Pakistani rule over Kashmir and the restoration of Islamic rule in India. It was accused of bombing the Indian Parliament and has admitted attacks in Indian Kashmir, perhaps helped by Pakistani intelligence, the ISI. The group is banned (its leader may be in custody), but still operates. India blamed Pakistan for some suicide attacks, notably one on the Indian Parliament by Islamic activists in December 2001. Tension over Kashmir was lessened in November 2003 when Pakistan declared a ceasefire, swiftly matched by India. In 2004 a nuclear scientist admitted that he had worked on secret projects developing nuclear weapons and that some of this technology had been transferred to Libya, North Korea and Iran. In 2007, after Musharraf’s attempt to dismiss the chief justice, global criticism and months of violent demonstrations put pressure on Musharraf to hold a general election. Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto returned from exile to contest the election, but the latter’s assassination in December 2007 once again threw the country into turmoil. The February 2008 election showed a large swing from Musharraf to the Pakistan People’s Party, formerly led 189

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by Benazir Bhutto. In 2008 a new Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani and a new President Asif Zardari were sworn in. The country faces serious challenges from the growth of the Taleban. See also: Afghanistan; Al Qaeda; India; South Asia.

ential in the Middle East peace talks and in 1993 reached an historic peace accord with Israel: the Gaza and Jericho first autonomy movement. From then on, Arafat’s struggle with Islamic fundamentalist opposition became increasingly violent. His inability as President of Palestine to control extremists cost him dearly, especially being unable to prevent suicide bombings in Israel, which led to the Israelis building a wall around the West Bank. In mid-2002 the Americans wanted to see Arafat voted out of office for his alleged support of terrorism. In 2004 Yasser Arafat died and was succeeded as President by Mahmoud Abbas. The Palestinian economy remained in a state of crisis, and terrorism still occurs, with the Israeli Army suppressing extremism at every level. Among the Palestinians there were increasing bouts of factional infighting between Fatah, the party of Mahmoud Abbas, and the Hamas movement, regarded internationally as a terrorist organisation. Hamas won the legislative election in January 2006. They refused to renounce violence, to recognise Israel’s right to exist or to abide by peace agreements with Israel, a stance which led international donors to cut off funds, causing severe hardship. A near civil war developed in June 2007, which left Hamas in control of the Gaza strip and Fatah in control of the West Bank. The President dissolved the unity government with Hamas, but Hamas refused to accept the dissolution and claimed its continued legitimacy. Palestinian independence still looks a distant dream. See also: Israel: Security Issues.

Bibliography Sadullah, A.M. (1986) ‘Terrorism: A Political Weapon’, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 91–97.

Further Reading Ghosh, P.S. (1989) Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi: Manshar. Hyman, A. (1990) ‘Pakistan: Towards a Modern Muslim State’, Conflict Studies, No. 227, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

palesTine Palestine is also known as the Holy Land, because of its historic and symbolic links with Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In ancient times Palestine extended east of the River Jordan, though today it refers to most of Israel and the two Israelioccupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Many Arabs refuse to recognise a Jewish state in Palestine, where for centuries Arabs constituted the majority of the population. Today, Jews form the majority of Palestine’s population. Arab people of Palestinian origin include nearly two million in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians’ most iconic leader was Yasser Arafat, co-founder of Al Fatah and president of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). He actively pursued the aim of an independent homeland for the Palestinians, which made him a prominent figure in world politics. His power diminished somewhat in the 1980s because of the growth of factions in the PLO. He supported Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War. In the mid-1990s he was influ-

Bibliography and Further Reading Duncan, A. and Opatowski, M. (2000) Trouble Spots: The World Atlas of Strategic Information, Stroud: Sutton. Quandt, W. (1973) The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

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panama Ever since the United States decided in 1901 to build a ship canal across the isthmus, and helped to separate Panama from Colombia, this area has been an important in terms of security. The Canal Zone was acquired by the United States in 1903 and finally ceded to Panama on 1 January 2000, on condition that Panama remained neutral, only Panamanian forces would be allowed in the zone and the USA could use force to protect the canal. In the 1980s the army chief and effective leader of Panama, General Noriega, let the Americans use the country as an intelligence, training, resupply and weapons base for campaigns against anti-American forces in Nicaragua and El Salvador. In 1987 Noriega was accused of corruption, and violence erupted. American aid – military and economic – was suspended, and US troops were harassed in the Canal Zone. An attempted coup was unsuccessful and in 1989 the United States invaded. Several hundred people were killed and US troops arrested many dissidents. Noriega surrendered and was taken to the United States to answer charges of drug trafficking. In 1992 he was given a long prison sentence. In 1997 the United States finally withdrew forces from the Canal Zone. See also: Central America.

operation and integration. In foreign policy, it has been used to justify expansion or irredentism. Pan-Arabism and PanAfricanism were part of the resistance movement against foreign rule, which culminated in the ending of colonialism. PanAfricanism was a movement attempting to unite black Africans behind a consciousness of their distinct identity and common political destiny. Pan-Islam has reemerged since 1990 as a movement to unite Islamic nations socially and politically, and has been predominantly antiZionist and anti-American. See also: States and National Roles. Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

paRTiTion Partition is the division of a territory between two or more sovereignties. It can be a result of defeat in war, as in the partition of Germany in 1945, a part of decolonisation (as in British India being divided into India and Pakistan), the result of internal upsets (as happened when Bangladesh split from Pakistan), perhaps aided by external forces (as in the partition of Cyprus), or it may be for specific ideological reasons as in the creation of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). In each of the examples cited, partition has led to friction, and often to tense relations between the superpowers during the Cold War. Peoples and minorities were divided, and borders and territories were disputed. The long-running regional conflict in Indo-China started with the partition of Vietnam into the Communist North and Democratic South in the 1950s and did not end until the peace treaty in

Bibliography and Further Reading Duncan, A. and Opatowski, M. (2000) Trouble Spots: The World Atlas of Strategic Information, Stroud: Sutton.

pan-naTionalism Pan-nationalism defines the ‘nation’ as something larger than any existing state. It seeks to join political units into a national whole. Pan-nationalists emphasise cohesive factors such as language, religion, shared historical experience and physical contiguity. It can be conducive to regional co191

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1975 and reunification. The affected nations’ armies, separated by United Nations peacekeepers, have often been deployed facing each other across the border line. See also: India; Indo-China, 1945–54; Pakistan; South Asia; Vietnam.

is much more a problem of mutual trust than of machinery or organisation. Globally there is a great desire for permanent peace, but no effective way has been found to assure it, or even to prevent nuclear or conventional war. See also: Pacifism.

Bibliography and Further Reading

Bibliography

Brown, J.M. and Louis, W.R. (eds) (1999) The Oxford Dictionary of the British Empire, Vol. IV: The Twentieth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Adler, M.J. (1988) How to Think About War and Peace, New York: Simon & Schuster. Galtung, J., Jacobsen, C.G. and BrandJacobsen, K.F. (2002) Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend, London: Pluto Press. Hassner, P., transl. Jane Brenton (1997) Violence and Peace: From the Atomic Bomb to Ethnic Cleansing, Budapest: Central European University Press. Ho-Won Jeong (2000) Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction, Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate. Lee Min (ed.) (1996) Larousse Dictionary of Twentieth Century History, Edinburgh: Larousse. Morgenthau, H.J. and Thompson, K.W. (1985) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edn, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Newman, E. and Schnabel, A. (eds) (2002) ‘Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 1–22.

peaCe Peace, logically, is an absence of war between two nations. It can also mean the ending of war by a treaty, preceded by an armistice temporarily halting hostile action. Historically, peace has been considered as a religious, philosophical and moral quest to prevent future war. So the tension that existed in the Cold War, particularly in the early years, did not satisfy the definition of a permanent, universal peace. The United Nations Charter envisaged a police force, organised by the major powers under the supervision of the Security Council, but the superpowers could not agree and an ad hoc force was created, excluding the five permanent members of the Security Council. At the time of the Suez Crisis (1956), the United Nations organised an Emergency Force; it was a full-scale international army, the first of many. United Nations members have since then, with varying degrees of support or reluctance, contributed personnel or finance to help maintain peacekeeping forces in places such as Cyprus and Yemen. International peace still depends on settling disputes between sovereign states through bilateral or multilateral diplomacy, based on the balance of power and collective security. Preventing future wars

Further Reading Renner, M. (1990) Swords into Ploughshares: Converting to a Peace Economy, Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute. Robertson, D. (1993) Dictionary of Politics, London: Penguin Books. Thompson, Sir R. (1981) War in Peace: Vietnam, London: Orbis. Turner, P.R. and Pitt, D. (eds) (1989) The Anthropology of War and Peace: Perspectives in the Nuclear Age, Granby MA: Bergin & Garvey.

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peaCeful Co-exisTenCe This doctrine was first enunciated in 1956 by the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, who called for both superpowers to avoid nuclear war and to stop promulgating revolution. It was seen by many observers as a new tactic by Khrushchev for spreading communism under the cloak of allowing continued competition between states with different social systems. The Soviet Union believed it needed to give aid to revolutionary groups to counter capitalist aid to reactionary regimes. The idea was based upon a realistic appraisal of the terror of nuclear war – one that was unwinnable, since it seemed bound to end in mutual nuclear annihilation. The Chinese Government, after early hostility to the idea, adopted their own version of peaceful co-existence in their relations with the United States. The doctrine did not stop states, during or after the Cold War, from building up their nuclear and conventional arsenals. China was probably the only nation that clearly set out the five principles of peaceful co-existence: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. These views were first referred to in the Sino-Indian Agreement in 1954 and later were adopted by the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned States. The doctrine of peaceful co-existence implied that conflict and competition would continue elsewhere, especially in the Third World. See also: Bandung Conference, 1955; Détente; Ostpolitik.

Converting to a Peace Economy, Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute.

Further Reading Annan, K.A. (2002) Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of Secretary General United Nations Department of Public Information. Whittaker, D.J. (1999) Conflict and Reconciliation in the Contemporary World, London: Routledge.

peaCekeeping Peacekeeping is an operation by military police and civilian personnel – and often soldiers too – usually to supervise and help maintain a ceasefire, to assist in troop withdrawals and provide a buffer between opposing forces. Peacekeeping must have the consent and cooperation of the parties involved in the conflict, and the peacekeepers must be impartial. They have no right of enforcement, only of self-defence. Most peacekeeping is undertaken by the United Nations, though individual countries have also been asked directly to intervene in this way, as in Sierra Leone. It has now become one of the UN’s most important activities and the most expensive in manpower and finance. UN peacekeeping operations have included boundary demarcation in Greece (1947) and Kuwait (1991), providing assistance to and repatriating refugees, for example, in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, mine clearing and mine awareness in Afghanistan and Namibia, disarming military and paramilitary forces in Haiti, and observation and separation of combatants along a more or less demarcated border such as between India and Pakistan. In some cases, as in Somalia and Bosnia, all the conditions needed for peacekeeping were not present. Peace enforcement therefore became necessary, which required a war fighting capability. United

Bibliography Galtung, J., Jacobsen, C.G. and BrandJacobsen, K.F. (2002) Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend, London: Pluto Press. Renner, M. (1990) Swords into Ploughshares:

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Nations peacekeepers and peace enforcers have also been deployed in humanitarian interventions to save lives endangered by civil strife. In both the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, the UN was forced for a time to serve as a de facto government for countries without law and order. The hazard in these situations is that one or both sides may claim that the United Nations is favouring their adversary. The relationship between consent, force and impartiality has been especially critical in peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War, when larger, more complex and more ambitious operations superseded the previously limited ambit of peacekeeping. The seemingly paradox for peacekeepers is that they must be prepared to use sufficient force to counter peacespoilers and yet induce consent for any operation if it is to succeed. Peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention pose unique problems for military forces, and seem to be on the rise now that the stability produced by the Cold War is fading. See also: Gulf War, 1991; Peace; United Nations.

Heldt, B. and Wallenstein, P. (2002) Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success 1948–2000, Stockholm, Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy. Renner, M. (1990) Swords into Ploughshares: Converting to a Peace Economy, Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute.

people’s waR This is a term used in the analysis and interpretation of revolution, derived from the experience in China under Mao Ze Dong (1949–76). Peasants were mobilised in support of the Communist leadership and its programme of economic and social change. The 1960s were the decade of the people’s war, with the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution in China. A notable feature of the Vietnamese version of people’s war was the high-profile initiative which would draw attention to the conflict, and by achieving strategic surprise would then prove militarily damaging or even decisive. Since then, observers and politicians around the world have claimed that almost any insurgency that appeared to have a popular basis was a ‘people’s conflict’. See also: China; Maoism; Vietnam.

Bibliography Hill, S.M. and Malik, S.P. (1996) Peacekeeping and the United Nations, Aldershot, Hampshire: Dartmouth. James, A. (1990) Peacekeeping in International Politics, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1999) Encyclopaedia of International Peacekeeping Operations, Santa Barbara CA: ABCClio.

Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

piRaCy Piracy is a felony, like robbery or hijacking, committed aboard a ship or aircraft. Since the 1980s, the threat of piracy has returned and grown. The areas most affected are the coasts of North-East Africa, the South China Sea, South America and the Caribbean. In the worst offences, merchant ships

Further Reading Galtung, J., Jacobsen, C.G. and BrandJacobsen, K.F. (2002) Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend, London: Pluto Press.

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1980–81

are hijacked complete with their cargo; smaller attacks are typically armed robbery from private yachts, often at anchor. Hundreds of millions of pounds and dollars are taken by pirates each year. Many acts of piracy are not disclosed to the authorities for fear, among other things, of paying higher insurance premiums or offending the host country. For obvious reasons, smugglers do not report themselves as victims of piracy. Governments are responsible for countering piracy in their own territorial waters. In the open sea, each government is responsible for the safety of its own ships. Little action is taken to prevent piracy on the ocean and many coastal states are reluctant to allow hot pursuit into territorial waters. Countries in South-East Asia like Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have established co-ordinated patrols, but this is relatively rare.

(Solidarność), whose strike committee demanded recognition of free trade unions, the right to strike, the abolition of censorship, access to the media and the release of political prisoners. Independent union activity was unexpected and unwelcome in the Communist state. This shipyard strike turned into a general strike. Soviet and Polish Communist efforts to curb the union’s popularity failed; the government was forced to negotiate and within months it recognised Solidarity, which by then had ten million members. Rural Solidarity was created, to represent three million peasants. The Soviet Union took a hard line, since Poland would be indispensable in a Warsaw Pact war against NATO. As a result, in February 1981 General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the defence minister, was made prime minister. In October, he became First Secretary of the Communist Party and in December he imposed martial law. Solidarity was proscribed and Wałęsa was imprisoned. Protests and strikes provoked the government into banning trade unions. Warsaw Pact forces had been training near the border all year, and many observers believe they would have invaded Poland had martial law not been declared. Martial law was lifted in 1983, but economic problems remained. When the government proposed unpopular economic reforms in 1987, supporters of Solidarity called nationwide strikes. Jaruzelski had no choice but to talk to Wałęsa and the Catholic Church, and agreement was reached in April 1989. Solidarity regained legal status and was allowed to fight elections in July, when the party won the majority of seats in the Sejm (Parliament). In 1990 Lech Wałęsa was elected President, but he found it very difficult to make changes. Under parliamentary pressure, he slowed the pace of reform and public support for him had waned by the time he stood down in 1999. See also: Civil Disobedience.

Bibliography and Further Reading Duncan, A. and Opatowski, M. (2000) Trouble Spots: The World Atlas of Strategic Information, Stroud: Sutton.

poland, 1980–81 Unrest had been growing slowly in Poland since the 1950s and limited reforms had not improved the situation. By the late 1970s the working class were insisting on greater control over their lives – politically, economically and socially – and depoliticisation of the workplace. In 1976 a Workers Defence Committee was set up in Radom to protest at food price increases; the government expressed disapproval, but took no action. In July 1980, higher meat prices led to waves of strikes, rippling across the country from the Ursus tractor plant near Warsaw, and culminating in August 1980 in a huge strike by 50,000 workers at the Lenin shipyards in Gdańsk, led by an electrician called Lech Wałęsa. He became leader of a new union, ‘Solidarity’ 195

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Bibliography and Further Reading

ability to maintain a modicum of control over their own lives. Nonetheless, the nation–state remains the basis of the international system. State and nation are not identical. Recognising difference and allowing for it are crucial if a state is to remain stable. Governments have sought to control language to strengthen national identity. It is language more than anything that shapes people’s world view, because it determines whom they listen to and speak to. This is an emotive issue, as the debate shows that has raged in the EU about which languages should be officially used. People have long been fascinated by territoriality – identifying, claiming and defending specific areas of land. Powerful minorities have used maps as weapons to assert their control over space. Maps have been used as propaganda, redrawing the world. However, international terrorists have in effect ignored political boundaries, since they can alter their line of attack at any time and are almost impossible to pin down, control or eliminate. Much political geography is based on topography – such elements as altitude, river systems, mountain ranges, plains and marshlands. These, along with other factors such as size, location, raw materials and climate, help to determine national power. The stability of political boundaries may depend on the ease or difficulty of ingress and egress. Mountain ranges like the Andes and the Himalayas form an effective boundary. Rivers can be problematic because they change size and shape – with meanders, ox-bow lakes, erosion and deposition – or even dry up, yet the border may remain unaltered. Buffer states are weak states that border strong states. They tend to serve the economic and military interests of their dominant neighbour and help to stabilise the balance of power by reducing the chances of direct confrontation between powerful states. During the Cold War, for example,

Ascherson, N. (1981) The Polish August: The Self Limiting Revolution, London: Penguin Books.

poliTiCal geogRaphy International relations take place in the context of geography, which is the most stable factor in a nation’s identity. The size of the national territory as a source of national power has been enhanced since nuclear war became possible. International wars are the result of unresolved power struggles between states, though sometimes in the form of irredentism. Most wars develop despite attempts by the world community to stop them. Once started, wars are hard to end because states need to control resources, and that means controlling the territory containing the resources. Any agreement on sharing is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. There are always wars being waged, but most wars are civil wars between factions within a state. Even these are often waged over resources, but they are always a fight for control. A stable state has a contract between people and state, political institutions in which individuals can express their views formally, legal statutes by which all kinds of disputes can be settled, and institutions that can repress or control. Not all institutions end at the state border and regional political initiatives can transform decision making. Few would have predicted a European Union encompassing former Communist states in central and eastern Europe. But India and China, both bigger than the EU in population and area, are now potential superstates that pose a real challenge to the global dominance of the United States. Globalisation has resulted in multinational companies and banks that are more powerful than some of the states that try to control their activities. This could be dangerous, if it undermines people’s 196

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the states of central and eastern Europe were regarded as a zone of buffer states separating Western Europe from the Soviet Union. See also: Geopolitics.

be its duration, the number of casualties caused and the amount of firepower and weaponry. Most violent states, movements or groups employ violence simultaneously at several levels for their political ends. For example, terrorist violence is a thread running through war, revolution and political struggles in the recent history of many countries. In many regimes, intercommunal violence, remonstrative violence, praetorian violence (used to force changes in government leadership or policy) and repressive violence are going on concurrently. The most serious threats of violence facing liberal states internally are those that directly endanger the survival and stability of the liberal constitution itself, or which indirectly and cumulatively undermine the state’s authority by a major defiance of law and order. In reasonably secure and well-established liberal democracies, these really dangerous levels of internal political violence are likely to occur only if there is mass disaffection among large sectors of the population, combined with large-scale popular support for a resort to violence in defiance of the state. Among the contributory causes of internal political violence that constantly recur are ethnic, religious or ideological conflict, hatred, oppression and discrimination; perceived political inequality, infringements of rights, injustice or oppression, and lack of adequate channels for peaceful communication of protests, grievances and demands; and a tradition of violence, disaffection or popular turbulence. Other contributory causes are a revolutionary leadership with an attractive ideology; weak and inept government, police and judicial groups; loss of confidence in the regime, its values and institutions affecting people at all levels, including the government itself, and deep divisions within governing elites and leadership groups. In strict terms, where a majority is

Bibliography Blacksell, M. (2006) Political Geography, London: Routledge. Faringdon, H. (1989) Strategic Geography, London and New York: Routledge. Taylor, P.J. (ed.) (1993) Political Geography of the Twentieth Century, London: Belhaven Press.

Further Reading Natkiel, R. (1982) Atlas of 20th Century History, London: Hamlyn Group. Prescott, J.R.V. (1965) The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, London: Hutchinson University Library, and Chicago: Aldine.

poliTiCal violenCe Political violence is either the deliberate infliction, or threat of infliction, of physical injury or damage for political ends, or else it is violence that occurs unintentionally in the course of severe political conflicts. Political violence is particularly difficult to classify and analyse because it involves the interaction of many persons and collectives, with very different motives and attitudes, and the effects of their actions. Most political violence serves both instrumental and expressive functions. Almost invariably, the ‘price’ of relaying a message to a ‘target audience’ is the death, injury or dispossession of victims whose rights and liberties have been arbitrarily curtailed. Political violence is often measured by its scale and intensity. By scale is meant the number of persons involved, the extent of their area of operation, the political stakes involved and the significance of the level of violence in the international system. Major indicators of intensity would 197

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subjected to tyrannical or despotic rule by a minority, the minority is imposing its sovereignty by violence and therefore can be legitimately opposed by force of just rebellion or resistance by the majority. By definition, such a purely coercive regime cannot be a lawful democratic state, so majority opposition to it cannot be regarded as seditious or violent according to liberal democratic principles. In two situations a prima facie case can be made for a morally justifiable resort to political violence by a minority in a liberal democratic state. One is the situation of a minority whose basic rights and liberties are denied or taken away by arbitrary action of the government or its agencies. The second situation arises when one minority is attacked by another minority and does not receive adequate protection from the state and its forces of law and order. In such circumstances the attacked minority community may have little alternative but to resort to violence to defend itself. Many variables exist in the study of political violence. Scale is of primary consideration – at first sight this may not appear to be a variable in itself, but the set of events being studied will need to be placed on a scale relative to previous acts of political violence. The size of the group behind the violence is important, whether it be an individual, small group, social class, institution, domestic state, foreign state or group of states. The power and legitimacy of the individual or group have to be borne in mind. Targets of violence can vary from a person, object or symbol, to a foreign state or a group of states. A variety of means can be used: the threat or use of loud noise, fists, sticks, Molotov cocktails, rifles, bombs, the deprivation of freedom of movement, direct injury or killing. Intentions can be wideranging – to gain publicity, deter attack, prevent an action, physically destroy a symbol (either person or object), change the policy of the institution or government,

replace government personnel, change the social, economic or political system, or destroy the state and cause international war. The effects can be felt by spectators, targets, opponents, and the domestic and international system. Time scales vary: incidents may be single, sporadic, frequent or continuous. Political violence can reflect historical or recent events, or it can take a new direction. Its cost depends on the economics of damage – this is not central to typologising, but it is an important measurement of scale from the point of view of perpetration and target. The state and security forces may respond by illegal or legal means, changes in law, detention, death and genocide. The respondent to violence may be another group in society, especially if they are (or feel they are) the target. If the perpetrator of political violence is the state, the respondents will be a group within society, who may emigrate, riot or plant bombs. There are numerous scenarios for the origin of violent groups. They can emerge from a previously unopposed campaign of violence by government, or by another organised group or community. The US Government in the 1960s responded to civil rights marches with violence, from which developed the city riots. From the 1968 Democratic Convention violence emerged the Black Panthers and Weathermen. At the same period in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Defence Association, Ulster Defence Force and Provisional IRA emerged from the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) marches and from Protestant violence. There are also scenarios where small violent groups, such as the Animal Liberation Front, have emerged from a single-issue campaign without being provoked by violence from anybody. A group may appear (or re-appear) that is attached to a cultural, religious or ethnic minority, demanding independence, autonomy, respect for religious practices 198

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or simply tolerance of activities declared illegal by the state, as with ETA, the Corsicans and the Shi’ites. New patterns of behaviour have emerged in Islamic fundamentalism. Auxiliary groups have been created by exile movements such as the Palestinians. The appearance of the urban guerrilla has led to new tactics being adopted by existing groups who wish to change the nature of a regime – this scenario is common in Latin America or in response to a military coup. This involves professional revolutionaries, such as the Montoneros and Tupamaros. Some groups are responding to violence by military regimes; others face regimes which are democratic but corrupt. Groups have appeared in response to new immigrants, and these usually have anti-Semitic overtones, as with Fédération d’action nationaliste et Européene (FANE) in France. The many urban guerrilla groups have not had the success that their rural or colonial counterparts have achieved. None has moved successfully from pinprick attacks to the use of large units. Towns and provinces have been overrun for short periods, but only in Nicaragua has there been any lasting success. Both right-wing and left-wing organisations have sprung up to oppose governments that impose sudden change, either on a revolutionary path or one imposed by conquest, as with the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan. More recently, groups have been formed to settle scores with their opponents, particularly among the Palestinians or at the behest of the Iranian and Libyan regimes. Anti-colonial scenarios are numerous: for example, the defeat of the occupying power or an example of liberation close at hand can inspire a population to violence after years of subservience. Finally, groups may be formed in attempts to create continent-wide insurrection, like Action Directe. Once a group exists, it may develop in

various ways, and splitting is the most frequent. This often arises from some members’ perception that violence has become counter-productive. It successfully publicised the cause, but it is now time to adopt peaceful tactics. Foreign sponsors may make unacceptable demands; thus, the Sino-Soviet split led to the appearance of Maoists, and splits among state supporters of the Palestinian cause have produced similar effects. There can be genuine ideological differences of emphasis, as among the IRA, Basques and Palestinians. Rightwing groups can split around individuals, and regional splits can develop. A second means of development is amalgamation: for instance, where groups may begin operating in a very specific area, as in Italy, and later amalgamate, even with groups on other continents. Some groups may dwindle numerically to the point where they have to join other groups to continue operating. Thirdly, there is generational change. Many European groups began with symbolic attacks on property, and the firstgeneration leadership was older, more idealistic and more sophisticated about its use of violence and when this could be counter-productive. The arrest of the first generation results in the leadership passing to a more hard-nosed group that favours hijacking and kidnapping. In turn, a third generation arises that is much more cold-blooded and engaged in more killing. This can result from a perception by activists, as in Italy, that the government responds more to kidnapping and killing than to symbolic bombing. Exiles have strong motives for political violence. The Jews were the first exiles to use violence to regain their homeland; in the process they exiled the Palestinians. Exile groups frequently become mercenaries – fighting for other groups, or for governments that wish to cause problems for other groups. As a result, they frequently split. 199

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Where there is more than one minority, the demands made by one minority threaten the position of any other minority, especially where religion or race is the root of their difference. Violence can be used by one minority to pre-empt or discredit another minority’s relatively peaceful campaign of protest. This produces counter-violence from more militant groups that emerge from the peaceful campaign, who may also use violence against the government and security forces. There are five main reasons why a group may collapse. There may be total victory, in which the terrorists become the government and its armed forces – as in rural anti-colonial sectors; there may be partial victory, where the government makes sufficient concessions to split the insurgents; there may be partial defeat, where the government concessions satisfy the insurgents’ constituency, but not the insurgents themselves, who fight on until they are killed or captured one by one; and there may be total defeat, with no concessions from the authorities and potential supporters alienated by the violence. Finally, the government may respond with state terror and arbitrary violence, which terrorises the population into submission. Loss of foreign sponsorship may take away a source of money or weapons, so the group will move back to logistical operations and lose the initiative. Another scenario is where the state sets out to wear down the insurgents and meanwhile new issues arise to capture people’s imagination. Most campaigns of political violence that existed in the 1980s continue today. The Weathermen, Tupamaros and Montoneros are the notable losses. European, African, Asian and Central American campaigns have proved more durable. Defence of one’s country is a commonly accepted justification of political violence, similar to the defence of one’s country against external attack. When the British

Government announced in the mid-1970s that it would not negotiate with terrorists in future, this amounted to a policy of criminalising political violence, playing down the notion that Northern Ireland was in a state of civil war requiring a political solution. Some political violence is hard to justify. Basic values can be ignored or eroded, and violence can take over the human mind. There has been a growing tolerance of violence, pitilessness toward victims and sometimes sheer pleasure in killing. State control that results in huge casualties has become more common. Radical groups seeking political changes have targeted elites, as seen in the events culminating in the attacks of 11 September 2001. US forces overseas have experienced political violence for decades. Political terror continues in many parts of the world, some of them countries supported by Western democracies. The attacks of 11 September 2001 showed the horrifying vulnerability of highly developed states to asymmetric paramilitary action, and these events could have set in train a spiral of violence between elites and radical anti-elite groups. The natural reaction of those under attack is to seek to regain control by reacting with greater vigour and expanded military force. To many observers, political violence and terrorism will only cease to be linked if there is an attempt to address the issue of global inequality. See also: Civil War; Violence. Bibliography Arendt, H. (1951) The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Aron, R. (1966) Peace and War, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Booth, K. and Dunne, T. (eds) (2002) Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

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widely used in Communist states. In Yugoslavia and China, national elites came to occupy positions of political power without the intervention of the Soviet Union. Many observers date the idea of polycentrism to 1948, when Yugoslavia broke off relations with the Soviet Union. The Yugoslavs resisted in a very successful way Soviet pressure, including diplomatic and economic sanctions, to get them to change direction. In Western Europe, polycentrism was seen as taking a line that was ideologically and diplomatically independent of Moscow. From the 1950s on, polycentrism was strengthened by three factors: rising European prosperity, which reduced economic dependence on the United States and Soviet Union, the rise of nationalism and the emergence of new states whose leaders saw their national interests in economic, social and political terms, rather than as part of a ‘balance of terror’ between the two superpowers, who in the lengthy tension of the Cold War almost forgot that other states were around. In the early twenty-first century, the establishment of numerous, relatively independent centres of power has become an important aim for many nations, especially in the Third World. See also: Cold War; Globalisation; North–South Global Issues; Third World Insurgency.

Clutterbuck, R. (ed.) (1986) The Future of Political Violence, London: Macmillan, Royal United Services Institution. Guelke, A. (1998) The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System, London: I.B. Tauris. Hoffman, J. (1994) ‘Is Political Violence Ever Justified?’, Occasional Papers on Crime Order and Policing, Leicester: Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester. Schechterman, B. and Slann, M. (eds) (1998) Violence and Terrorism, Guildford CT: Dushkin, McGraw Hill. Thackrah, J.R. (1987) Encyclopaedia of Terrorism and Political Violence, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Further Reading Crenshaw, M. (1983) Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence, Middletown CT: Wesleyan University Press. Crozier, B. (1974) A Theory of Conflict, London: Hamish Hamilton. Frey, R. and Morris, C. (eds) (1991) Violence, Terrorism and Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Han, H.H. (1984) Terrorism, Political Violence and World Order, Lanham MD: University Press of America. Leiden, C. and Schmitt, K.M. (1968) The Politics of Violence, Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall.

polyCenTRism Polycentrism means the fact, principle or advocacy of more than one guiding or predominant ideology or political centre in a political system or alliance. The term was first used in 1956 by the Italian Communist Party to describe and validate the growing independence of communist parties from the Soviet Communist Party. After the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the principle of polycentrism was no longer

Bibliography and Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

poTsdam ConfeRenCe, 1945 The leaders of the victorious powers in the Second World War, Stalin, Churchill and Truman, met at Potsdam near Berlin in 1945 to try to reach 201

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agreement on the future of Germany, Europe and indeed the world. There was a general air of mistrust. They disagreed about where Germany’s frontiers should be drawn and Stalin did not agree to free elections in European countries. Attlee replaced Churchill as the UK representative, as the result of the Labour party victory in the 1945 General Election; Truman was an untested President on the world stage, after the sudden death of Roosevelt in April 1945. This gave Stalin more power and influence while the two Western leaders distrusted the Soviet leader’s motives. The Soviet Union believed it would continue to be welcomed as the liberator of eastern Europe, but was worried that the Western powers would heavily influence any plans for German economic recovery. At the time of the Conference, few foresaw what would happen to Germany and its neighbours, with zonal demarcation, regional divisions and growing antagonism. Some agreements at the Conference were honoured, and others were not. For instance, a lot of factory machinery that had survived in the American, British and French zones was removed to the Soviet Union as war reparations, as agreed at Potsdam, whereas the agreement for the Soviet Union to send food from the agricultural areas in the Soviet zone of eastern Germany to help feed Germans in the western zones was not honoured. The arrangements over Germany were unsatisfactory and the resulting tensions between the Potsdam signatories continued until the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The West took the view that Germany should be rehabilitated rather than punished, whereas the Soviet Union tended to the opposite view. Potsdam set the pattern of international relations – and superpower tensions – for the next forty years. See also: Second World War: Consequences; Yalta Conference, 1945.

Bibliography and Further Reading Degenhardt, A.W. (1981) Treaties and Alliances of the World, 3rd edn, Harlow, Essex: Longman.

poveRTy and deBT Since the 1980s poverty and debt have become a global crisis. Many international agencies have realised that a large reduction in the debts of the worst affected countries seems essential for the social stability on which world order in the wider sense depends. The debt problem has major consequences for world order and the rule of law. Acute poverty in the population of any country can contribute to violent disorder. Poverty also ensures a ready supply of young men willing to leave their country. For example, young Africans are lured by the prospect of earning good money in the minefields of South Africa, Zaire or Sierra Leone. They can then easily fall prey to ambitious soldiers and publicans, with offers of adventure and profit, and end up drawn into military conflict. Furthermore, debt obligations reduce imports of necessities and, through pressure on domestic budgets, reduce the government’s ability to subsidise food and provide for healthcare and education. The cost to the developed nations is also increasing. Where conflicts require United Nations peacekeeping forces, these are very expensive and the cost is increasing as more sophisticated methods of conducting low-intensity operations are adopted. Relative deprivation fosters conflict. Inequality in health, education, employment and opportunities for social and political participation all cause and exacerbate poverty. Unequal distribution of wealth causes resentment when some classes see others prosper, while they themselves – though working hard – gain little or even slip backwards. Institutionalised inequality marginalises more people and groups. Inequalities can foster social 202

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disintegration, violence and terrorism. In 2008, international concern is being expressed about global rises in food prices, which could lead to unrest in many parts of the world. The diversion of social development funds to national security and military operations deprives and marginalises even more people, creating a vicious circle. Conflict can be especially acute in periods of stagnation and economic decline. Severe social tensions may give rise to radical urban guerrilla groups and then a military coup to improve order. This has happened in Latin America, and west and central Africa, on occasions since the 1950s – for example, in Uruguay, Bolivia, Honduras, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauretania and Mali. In less developed countries therefore, democratic governments will not be tolerated indefinitely if they cannot deliver the goods of relative prosperity. Without a better life, people lose faith in democratic government just as they did in dictatorships, and then the downward spiral to civil strife – and civil and regional wars – is inevitable. See also: Globalisation; North–South Global Issues.

tions, to assist or damage the cause of a government or movement. It is an effective instrument of policy used by governments around the world in a variety of situations. Because of the need for public support, even authoritarian governments spent great efforts on propaganda (the public promotion of their official line) to win support for foreign policies. The information disseminated by a government often closes international borders, intentionally or otherwise. Many governments create information channels to influence domestic and international audiences. During the Cold War, Radio Moscow broadcast to many parts of the world from the Soviet Union. This was countered by Radio Free Europe, transmitted from the West to the Soviet Union. Propaganda can be emotionally arousing and disturbing; it is often sensationalist, especially in conflict situations where tensions are heightened. Propagandists are more effective if they are the sole or main source of information for the target audience, especially if they inform people about a new subject or issue, where public attitudes are not fully formed and knowledge is vague. It is also more long-lasting if the audience shares the attitudes of the propagandist. People are more susceptible when in crowds or at political rallies. The objectives of propaganda are to win or strengthen support, to reinforce or alter attitudes and perceptions of ideas and events, to weaken or undermine unfriendly governments and to counter unfriendly propaganda. Propaganda can be factual but distorted by careful selection, or it may be based on outright falsehood. National leaders often dismiss the communications efforts of other governments as nothing more than propaganda, while they present their own official publications, news reports and comment as pure truth based on objective analysis. All foreign policy involves a struggle for people’s hearts and minds, and propaganda

Bibliography Dent, M. and Peters, B. (1998) Poverty and Debt in the Third World: Confronting a Global Crisis, Leamington Spa: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. The World Guide: See the World from a Different Angle (2005/6) Oxford: New Internationalist Publications.

Further Reading Russett, B., Starr, H. and Kinsella, D. (2000) World Politics: The Menu for Choice, Boston MA: Bedford St Martin’s.

pRopaganda Propaganda is the organised dissemination of information and allega203

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tries to do this directly rather than by manipulating interests or threatening violence. During the Cold War, Soviet foreign propaganda sought to form favourable attitudes to the Soviet Union and its policies, while the United States Information Agency spent more money trying to reinforce pro-American attitudes around the world. Governments have made more use of propaganda as electronic media have become easily available. States with aggressive, expansionist or revolutionary foreign policy objectives have put effort into external communication, agitation and propaganda. Televisions, computers and satellites have made propaganda ever more effective, since the scepticism and sophistication of audiences have not kept up. Telecommunications have shrunk the world in time and space and the propaganda front remains crucial. See also: Conflict Perceptions.

World, where they typically supplied and advised opposing factions in civil wars. They did this either because organising their own military operation was logistically impractical or because superpower confrontation risked escalation to nuclear level. In the 1970s, the United States backed Ethiopia and the Soviet Union backed its next-door rival, Somalia. When a revolution led the new Ethiopian Government to seek Soviet help, the United States switched to support Somalia instead. A proxy bomb is a terrorist tactic where an innocent civilian is forced by the terrorists to carry an explosive device or drive a car containing an explosive device up to a security target. The device is then activated by a timer or remote control. States can develop proxy terror as a weapon of coercive diplomacy against rival states. At the time of writing, proxy wars are developing in the Middle East. Iran is actively helping the insurgents in Iraq and Taliban units in Afghanistan, while Syria is providing equipment and moral support for Fatah and Hizbollah insurgents in Lebanon. See also: Angolan Civil War, 1974–2002; Middle East.

Bibliography Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press.

Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin Books.

Bibliography Goldstein, J.S. (1999) International Relations, 3rd edn, Harlow, Essex: Longman.

pRoxy waRfaRe Proxy or surrogate warfare occurs when a powerful nation gives financial and military backing to a smaller country, to fight wars on its behalf. For example, during the civil war in Angola in 1975, the Soviet Union gave the Cubans military equipment and cash to fight alongside the Marxist People’s Liberation Army. The Soviet Union was keen to obtain a share of Angola’s mineral resources, while not getting involved in the fighting. During the Cold War, the two superpowers jockeyed for position in the Third

psyChology and ConfliCT In any conflict there are bound to be feelings of mutual fear and hostility. Negative emotions and attitudes, prejudices and distortions accompany, exacerbate and prolong most forms of conflict. When individuals are ordered to act in a particularly unpleasant way, they need to be able to rationalise their leader’s order if they are to maintain their loyalty and their sense that the party and leader are doing this in pursuit of justifiable objectives. 204

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Military advisers in a conflict situation regard whatever problems they face from a professional and technical point of view, quite apart from any human suffering caused. It is left to civilian policy makers to inject, if they can, ethical and moral considerations in the use of violence, and to reject certain alternatives offered by their military advisers as morally, ethically or politically repugnant. Conflict, trauma and humiliation generate anger and bitterness that can last for years. Psychology suggests that people who see themselves as underdogs, pursuing a just cause against overwhelming odds, often look to the stronger party for a gesture that will change the direction of events. This can be seen in recent efforts to persuade Hizbullah, Hamas, and the Sunni resistance in Iraq to join a political process. The transition from conflict to politics is slow, requiring broad support and inclusiveness. In the Cold War, the Soviet Union kept up a psychological offensive of ideas, along with offers of co-operation. The West also had to maintain morale in the face of explicit Soviet threats and build up psychological defences against international blackmail, but never lost sight of its strategic aim: the erosion and final collapse of the Soviet system. In any crisis, decision makers operate under tremendous time constraints, and normal checks on unwise decisions may not happen. Communications are shorter, information that does not fit in with a decision maker’s expectations tends to be discarded because there is no time to consider it and, in framing options, there is a tendency to overlook creative options while focusing on the more obvious ones. Another psychological problem in conflict situations is a tendency for groups to validate wrong decisions, convincing each other that a wrong idea is right. For example, in the Iran–Contra affair of the late 1980s, a group of US foreign policy makers thought it would be a good idea to

secretly sell arms to Iran (which in exchange would arrange the release of US hostages held in Lebanon), and then use the Iranian payments to fund a covert war in Nicaragua at a time when Congress had banned US action there. They discounted any risks, but when the operation came to light it damaged the United States. In any conflict, leaders may employ people, civilian or military, who are inflexible and have closed minds, rejecting information that does not conform with their beliefs about certain countries (especially potential adversaries) or leaders, and their intentions – as in the Falklands War, 1982 – or that might go against their leader’s ideas. Psychological warfare uses political, military, economic and social activity to influence thoughts and actions. Its aims are to strengthen people’s resolve (in the home nation or its allies), to weaken an enemy’s will to fight or to achieve diplomatic objectives. In the Korean War, both sides did this, with varied results. The Vietnam War showed how critical psychological warfare was in guerrilla operations, where neither side could destroy the other militarily and each sought to win over people’s hearts and minds. Psychological warfare since 1945 has worked on the assumption that a victory is more lasting if people’s loyalty to a belief system can be won over, and this is more meaningful than winning territory. Such warfare has been a major influence on foreign policy and diplomacy, such as in disarmament negotiations and foreign aid. See also: Conflict; Conflict Behaviour. Bibliography Dixon, N.F. (1976) On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, New York: Basic Books, and London: Cape. Kam, E. (1988 and 2004) Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Lanning, M.L. (1997) The 100 Most Influential Military Leaders, London: Robinson.

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Norman, R. (1995) Ethics, Killing and War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Krieger, J. (ed.) (1993) The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Dictionary, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

Further Reading Crooke, A. (2005) ‘From Conflict to Politics’, The Guardian, 28 July.

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RapaCki plan In 1957 the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, proposed a nuclear-free zone in central Europe. The basis of the plan was the elimination of all nuclear weapons and their support facilities from Poland, Czechoslovakia and the two German states. Later the plan also included phased reductions in conventional forces. The West did not care for it, because NATO was committed to early and first use of tactical nuclear weapons in a future war. Therefore the Rapacki Plan was seen as an attempt to undermine the one strong weapon that NATO could set against the Warsaw Pact’s numerical superiority. Later the Polish leader Władysław Gomułka aimed to overcome Western objections to the Rapacki Plan by proposing only to freeze all nuclear weapons in central Europe at existing levels. The West also rejected the Gomułka Plan, preferring instead to reach agreement on a broader non-proliferation treaty. See also: Nuclear Proliferation.

often see a political problem that threatens their interests and think it needs a military solution. However, such a force can also give assistance to civilians caught up in a crisis, or it can be a response to calls by the United Nations for a peacekeeping force to intervene and separate warring factions. To be successful, such a force needs to have sufficient contingents already trained and equipped, the political support of parties in the target area and a clear centre of political decision making armed with a set of objectives and the authority to pursue them. See also: NATO.

Bibliography and Further Reading

Refugees Refugees are people who have been expelled or deported, or have fled from their own country, usually as a result of conflict. Refugees are by their very nature foreigners, and they are displaced people, wanderers, outcasts, rejects or escapees. When they reach another country, they have no legal or political rights. Their welfare has been a topic of deliberation in international bodies since 1945. Refugees have been repatriated, resettled or assimilated, where governments agree to accept them. In the Second World War, an estimated

Bibliography Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury. Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin Books.

Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Rapid ReaCTion foRCe This is a force ready to deploy at very short notice. In Europe there is a multinational combined services force under the command of the European Union with a primary role of peacekeeping. Proponents of such a force 207

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30 million people fled, were expelled, became prisoners of war or were deported for forced labour; many of them were still registered as displaced persons in the early 1960s. Since 1945, the tactic of terrorising civilian populations, combined with the ideological and nationalistic hatreds brought into the open by civil wars and revolutions, has produced millions more refugees. Some refugee problems from the 1940s are still with us today. People have continually fled areas where Communism has taken hold – from Eastern Europe after 1945, from Communist China to Formosa (Taiwan) in 1949, or from Cuba and North Korea more recently. The end of colonial rule created refugees in Congo, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Indonesia, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Refugee crises have multiplied and there has been a lack of willingness to resolve them, as in former Yugoslavia, Palestine and Cambodia. Other countries where wars have led to millions of refugees are Vietnam, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Somalia, Rwanda and Iraq. Whether refugees are driven from their homes by war, abuse or fear, over half of them have been fugitives within their own country. The state may create refugees, through war or its incidental effects, but groups may create refugees by discrimination short of systematic violence. Masses of refugees place a heavy burden on the receiving territory, which is often unable to cope. A major influx can alter the political and ethnic balance of a region or country, leading to crime and terrorism. Many refugees remain in the host country for years before going home, while others are unwilling ever to return and have to be assimilated by their host. Refugees from political persecution can be granted political asylum, which allows them to stay in the new state. The United Nations has always had an interest in this problem, and appoints a High Commissioner for Refugees. In 1951

a UN convention defined a refugee as a person ‘given to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion; is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself to the protection of that country’. Over half a century later, only a small proportion of refugees is now able to persuade the host country that they match that definition. Natural disasters – famines, cyclones, hurricanes, landslips and volcanic eruptions – have created a new status, that of environmental refugee, especially in Third World countries. Controversially, many refugees have been blamed for the spread of diseases like tuberculosis, malaria and AIDS in Africa and Asia. Refugees and the internally displaced have been the victims in 60 cases of genocide and mass murder involving over 70 ethnic or religious minorities. Internal conflict, one of the main factors causing refugees, also affects neighbouring states. In many internal conflicts, borders become very porous and refugees can cross without interference. Refugees can then pose ethnic, economic, political and security problems. A more serious security problem is guerrilla warfare. Since 1945 there has been evidence in many conflicts of fighters mingling with refugee populations and using refugee camps for rest, recruitment and reorganisation. Offering sanctuary to refugees has incited military reprisal, thereby drawing host countries into the conflict. Refugees can radicalise ethnic populations and provoke turmoil, as in Rwanda/Congo in 1994, and in Afghanistan/Tajikistan. Neighbouring states often take action – for humanitarian reasons, but also for national security – by ‘defensive interventions’ to bring cross-border problems such as refugee flows or military assaults to an end, to keep wars from spreading or to bring wars to an end. Thus, Israel invaded 208

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Lebanon in 1982, to neutralise Palestinian forces, and India sent peacekeeping forces to Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. The international community has tried, in Bosnia and Iraq for example, to prevent refugees becoming a regional problem by setting up refugee camps and safe areas in the country where the violence began. If internal conflict ends in a ceasefire and peacekeeping operations, there can be humanitarian assistance and independent monitoring of the refugees’ return home. The refugee crisis has increased since the 1990s. Refugees, who are desperate and often unwelcome people, are likely to settle in insecure places: many people have ended up in urban slums, by rubbish mounds or on mountainsides. This can cause a breakdown in public health and the rapid spread of infectious disease, as in the Darfur area of Sudan. See also: Humanitarian Intervention; Minorities.

unjustifiable. Islamic suicide bombers use religion to justify murder and suicide. Religious institutions can influence politics. Where they are accepted by a population, their moral authority and prominence gives their opinion weight. Institutions are also taken as authoritative arbiters of religious legitimacy – or heresy. In the Middle East in particular, the presence of religious issues in a conflict increases the level of violence – as seen in Iraq, and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan. Religion and ethnic identity often combine. It is this combination that has made the Israeli–Palestinian conflict so intractable. The Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir involves religious identity from the Indian perspective; from the Pakistani perspective the motivation is to defend Islam from India’s secular influences. The international law of war is based on religious doctrine, yet most theorists of international relations largely ignore religion, even after the events of 11 September 2001. Theorists still see culture, state, nationalism and ethnic group, rather than religion, as the basis for world conflict. Some see religious phenomena as having little influence beyond the domestic arena. Others see them as domestic in origin, with influence beyond the state borders, or as transnational in their origin and impact, with overlaps between fundamentalism, political Islam and religious terrorism. Religious motivations and causes of conflict are often linked with secular ones, with the religious aspects often being less important. Religious cults can be a lethal threat to their own members and the general public. Some of their actions are similar to those of organised crime groups. However, cults have aims and beliefs, which may be unrealisable. They can come into harsh conflict with a society which they view as sinful, lost or doomed to extinction. Cults can be a serious threat to society because their

Bibliography Zolberg, A., Suhrke, A. and Aguyano, S. (1989) Escaping from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin Books.

Religion and woRld sTRaTegiC issues Throughout history, religion has influenced individual behaviour and society. Religion is a basis for identity, which in turn influences politics. So does belief, and religion is among the sources of belief of many people. Religions have many complex doctrines and concepts that can be used to justify nearly any policy or action, within or without the law, even one that others consider 209

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aims are not rational, so bargaining with the authorities is not possible, and because they may be willing to use hitherto taboo acts of destruction. Once, conflict was between rational players; since the 1990s the threat from irrational cults, who wish to make the apocalypse real, has grown alarmingly. Small, unorthodox groups are capable of wreaking havoc out of all proportion to their size and importance. See also: India; Kashmir; Northern Ireland; Pakistan.

Georgia, to force them to accept Russian political demands. In developing countries, the economic benefits of mining and logging accrue to a small business or government elite and to foreign investors, while local people suffer from expropriation of land and environmental devastation, as in Nigeria and Indonesia. Many resource-related conflicts are being fought in areas of great environmental value. Zaïre, Congo, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Colombia account for 10 per cent of the world’s intact forests. They have suffered the world’s highest net loss of forest area. The pillaging of oil, minerals, metals, gemstones or timber allows wars to continue that depended originally on political support. Criminal entrepreneurs try to get rich through illegal extraction of resources and use violence to retain control over lucrative sources. The common objective in resource-based conflicts is to facilitate looting and criminal activities, and the bulk of the violence is directed against civilians. Armed groups intimidate local people and can cause terror. In some Third World countries, government forces are in decay and private security formations including paramilitary units and criminal gangs are on the rise. Many soldiers go unpaid or underpaid and turn to other sources of looting and extortion. Multinational oil and mining corporations rely on private security forces to guard their operations; in many cases they have helped to train and arm government security forces or made equipment and facilities available. Small arms and light weapons have proliferated, since they are cheap, easily available and can be smuggled. Some major international companies have helped to stoke up resource-based conflicts by providing revenue to governments that are at war or by facilitating shipment of illicit raw materials. Angola is a classic example of a country

Bibliography Fox, J. and Sandler, S. (2005) ‘The Question of Religion and World Politics’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 293–304. Hubback, A. (1997) ‘Apocalypse When? The Global Threat of Religious Cults’, Conflict Studies, No. 300, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Appleby, R.S. (2000) The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Johnston, D. and Sampson, C. (eds) (1994) Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Philpot, D. (2001) Revolutions and Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

ResouRCes and ConfliCTs As populations continue to grow rapidly around the world, increasing tensions arise over resources such as oil, gas and water, for the benefit of all wherever they may live. Massive development of Russia’s huge oil and natural gas reserves has led energyweak countries in Europe to become dependent on supplies from Russia. Energy exports have been used as a political weapon against Belarus, Ukraine and 210

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endowed with vast national resources that has been in conflict for many years. Its diamond and oil deposits have not been worked to the full because of civil war, which has displaced four million people and left over a million dependent on foreign food aid. Rebel forces have made money selling Angola’s resources and used it to buy weapons and become personally wealthy. The country has been bedevilled by resource-driven greed and corruption. In Afghanistan, opium trafficking helped to finance the anti-Soviet struggle and then the civil war among Mujaheddin factions. In Colombia, a ‘war tax’ was levied on foreign aid bodies to finance the army’s defence of oil installations against rebel attack. In Cambodia, Khmer Rouge rebels, following the end of help from the Chinese, resorted to resource looting to finance their operations. Many conflicts in developing countries are funded by the sale of natural resources. Sierra Leone, in particular, throughout the 1990s suffered from rebellion, banditry, coups and coup attempts. Here, a rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front controlled most of the diamond fields and thus was able to purchase arms. In the Congo basin, the opportunity to plunder the resource wealth in the context of lawlessness and a weak central authority was a powerful incentive for conflict. It is rich in gemstones, minerals and agricultural produce, and the country’s wildlife attracts poachers. The crisis has not been helped by the shipping and purchase of illegally obtained commodities. In Nigeria, oil development has enriched a small minority as well as the oil companies, but this has led to environmental devastation, health problems and impoverishment for the inhabitants of the oilfields, notably the Ogoni peoples of the Niger Delta. The island of Borneo has been the scene of over three decades of conflict between the indigenous people (the Dayaks) and the loggers and rubber- and oil-plantation

businesses. The devastation of the land has made the Dayaks feel marginalised and they have suffered military repression. Western governments have often been eager to turn a blind eye in order to protect the interest of their own corporations. Prevention of resource-based conflict is not easy, especially when trying to promote democratisation, justice and respect for human rights. A decrease in the quality and quantity of renewable resources combined with population growth and unequal resource access leads to scarcity, which in turn reduces economic productivity, leading to migration and expulsion. Other social effects of such events can be weakened states, ethnic conflicts, coups d’état and deprivation conflicts. In an ideal world every nation seeks environmental security in food, health and livelihoods. The political process suffers as a result of environmental stress, and outcomes can range from disasters and migration to crisis and conflict. Urban violence can result from hunger riots and disputes over access to water and land. Domestic instability and crisis lead to civil wars. Migration is the net result and clashes can occur on water and land in a battle of migrants versus nationals. Violent conflicts over resources such as hydrocarbons and minerals can lead to international disputes, typically North– South. Human security is a desirable goal for individuals and communities to escape two perceived threats. Global environmental change, linked to increased greenhousegas emissions, is causing water problems, climate change and land degradation, all causes of environmental vulnerability and resource conflicts. On the other hand globalisation can lead to food and health insecurity, inequality, marginalisation, poverty/livelihood insecurity and technological problems. Environmental scarcity is the result of reduced resource supply, 211

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increased resource demand (partly from population growth) and skewed resource distribution. International conferences on themes like pollution, population, health and human habits tend to have little lasting impact. Violence between and within communities and between nation–states could well increase. Conflict will diminish only if there is investment in human development, improving health and education services, and providing adequate jobs and opportunities for social and economic advancement. See also: Afghanistan; Angolan Civil War, 1974–2002; Biafra; Cambodia; Environmental and Ecological Security; Multinationals and Conflict; Water.

revolutions as violent but necessary transitions from one system of production in a society to the next, as from feudalism to capitalism. There have been three genuine revolutions in world politics since the end of the Second World War: the Chinese Revolution of 1949, the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and the Velvet Revolution in Eastern Europe in 1989, leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Revolution is a group phenomenon, with leadership and an ideology. The aim of any revolution is to achieve tactical objectives. Specialised conspiratorial and paramilitary cells within the revolutionary movement organise violence and terrorism. For fanatics, terrorism is the badge of their revolutionary virtue, but dedication is no substitute for competence and the desire to be a guerrilla has led some rebels to pursue a dream into a fantasy. However, a theatre of revolutionary deeds can be glamorised to help the weak believe they are strong and that revolution is on the way. Any revolutionary warfare requires cooperation and support from the populace. That is impossible in the long term if the people suffer under a campaign of terror, as Malaya in the 1950s showed. Some terrorist groups adhere to the theory of revolutionary warfare; some show nihilistic tendencies. Revolutionary governments have seized power in China in 1949, Cuba in 1959, Algeria in 1962, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola and Mozambique in 1975, Nicaragua and Iran in 1979, and Afghanistan in 1992. After many revolutions, the first task is to get the country back to normal, but this is often impeded by continuing political violence, usually backed directly or indirectly by a foreign state, or even civil war, as occurred in Angola and Nicaragua. Violent revolutions often lead to authoritarian rule – out of fear that counter-

Bibliography Renner, M. (2002) ‘Breaking the Link between Resources and Repression’ in State of the World, 2002, A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Towards a Sustainable Society, London: Earthscan, pp. 149–73. Westing, A. (ed.) (1986) Global Resources and International Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wolf, A.T., Kramer, A.C., Carius, A. and Dabelko, G.D. (2005) ‘Managing Water Conflict and Cooperation’ in L. Starke (ed.) State of the World: Global Security, 22nd edn, A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Towards a Sustainable Society, London: Earthscan, pp. 80–95.

Further Reading Danchev, A. and Keohane, D. (eds) (1994) International Perspectives in the Gulf Conflict, 1990–91, London: St Martins Press, in association with St Antony’s College, Oxford.

RevoluTion Revolutions are the overthrow or repudiation of regimes or political systems by the people governed. Marxists see 212

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revolutionaries may retake power – and not to multi-party democracy. Such regimes can have a monopoly of power for decades, and this can obviously lead to a certain conservatism. The relationship between revolution and war is often centred on the role and methods of the ‘revolutionary liberator state’. Revolutions can cause short-term shifts in foreign policy, especially towards the great powers, but generally the rules of international relations have a greater sustainability. Revolutions can promise great economic change, but overall economic conditions, and especially relations between North and South, have been resistant to change. See also: China; Cuba; Cold War; Second World War: Consequences.

1989

nology, and the weapons they can threaten to make, as a bargaining chip with other states and ignore international pressure to give up nuclear fuel production or the ability to make nuclear weapons. Since the early 1990s, Iraq, Iran and North Korea have been described as rogue states. The nuclear ambitions of the last two are viewed as regional challenges. Desperate or confident leaders intent on their chosen policy can be inattentive or impervious to the commitments or threats of their foes, regardless of how severe and clearly impressed they are. After the Cold War, Western countries still had absolute confidence in deterrence. Deterring rogue states was seen as similar to deterring Moscow. However, the West is less familiar with the forces and perceptions that seem to shape decision making in rogue states. Those critical of US foreign policy say that a rogue state merely means any state generally hostile to the United States, whether or not it poses a wider threat. See also: Axis of Evil.

Bibliography Walt, S.M. (1992) ‘Revolution and War’, World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April), pp. 321–68.

Rio TReaTy, 1947 Formerly known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Rio Treaty was signed in 1947 in Brazil by 21 American states, the only non-participating nations being Canada, Ecuador and Nicaragua. The treaty, entirely military in character, applied only in the American security zone. It provided for all member states to give aid to any of their number subjected to aggression, an armed attack against one being considered an attack against all.

Bibliography Baylis, J., Wirtz, J., Cohen, E. and Gray, C.S. (2002) Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further Reading Chomsky, N. (2000) Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs, London: Pluto Press.

Romania: upRising, 1989 Romania was the only country in Eastern Europe that had a violent revolution in the period known as the Velvet Revolution, which saw the end of Communism in the Soviet bloc and ultimately in the Soviet Union. Nicolae Ceaușescu, elected President in 1967, kept his distance from the Soviet Union – for example, Romania did not get involved in

Bibliography and Further Reading Degenhardt, A.W. (1981) Treaties and Alliances of the World, 3rd edn, Harlow, Essex: Longman.

Rogue sTaTes In the nuclear age, rogue states are those that use their nuclear tech213

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the invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968 – in the firm belief that the country needed to assert its independence. During his time as President, economic hardships and administrative corruption led to growing discontent. In the late 1980s, marches and strikes grew in number as people became angry about their difficult living and labour conditions. The security forces cracked down, and members of the government were tried and dispossessed. As Gorbachev’s reforms began to take effect in Russia, and the gathering crises in Eastern Europe showed a political way forward, Ceaușescu became a figure of hate in his own country. In late 1989, confrontation between civilians and the army in the city of Timisoara left many dead or injured. The government declared a state of emergency, but a faction within the regime carried out a coup d’état, which had tremendous support. On 25 December, Ceaușescu and his wife were secretly executed by members of the army, having being accused of genocide, corruption and destruction of the economy.

that the United States was no longer a strategic rival and he continued the policy of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (economic reform) started by his predecessor Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1993 the Russian parliament tried to limit Yeltsin’s powers, and in September he dissolved parliament. Communists and nationalists staged violent demonstrations in Moscow. With the blessing of the United States, Yeltsin put down this revolt. Tanks surrounded the parliament building, which was bombed and taken by force, causing the deaths of 138 people. Poor economic conditions and a disorganised change to the market economy fuelled the rise of the Russian ‘mafia’, who began to take over the banking sector and to traffic in nuclear material. Russian policy became less dependent on the United States and began to oppose American and British policy in the Middle East. Vladimir Putin came to office in 1999, when the country was suffering from rising poverty and dubious dealings in the business world. In 2001, the first non-deficit budget was passed, but internationally this was overshadowed by fears that Putin was attempting to gain control of the independent media. Russia opposed the United States intervention in Iraq on the ground that it would weaken the anti-terrorist coalition formed after 11 September 2001. Some Russians began to fear for their new-found democratic process and requested asylum in other countries. Russia continued to insist on withdrawal of all foreign forces from Iraq, while desiring greater co-operation with the United States to fight terrorism. The Russians suffered some appalling terrorist attacks in Moscow, South Ossetia in Georgia and Chechnya, which were blamed on breakaway Muslim groups. In 2004–5, Putin claimed that his country was in a state of war and announced reforms to entrench his own powers. In 2006–7, his relations with the West soured

Bibliography Deletant, D. (1995) Ceaușescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Roumania, 1965–1989, Armonk NY: ME Sharpe, and London: C. Hurst.

Further Reading Fischer, M.E. (1989) Nicolae Ceaușescu: A Study in Political Leadership, Boulder CO: Lynne Reinner.

Russia On 8 December 1991, President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine laid the Soviet Union to rest, five months after dissolving the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was proclaimed, taking the place of the Soviet Union. President Yeltsin said 214

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after the murder of some independentminded Russian journalists and the unexplained poisoning in London of a former Russian agent, Alexander Litvinenko. There were suggestions that other Russian security agents were implicated. After the inception of the modern Russian state in 1991, the strategic rivalry with the West collapsed and, as a result of arms control agreements, the United States and Russia are very near strategic nuclear parity, in terms of warheads and delivery vehicles. The Russian military have been less well funded than US forces, and thus Russia has been unable to achieve a higher level of military technology. There is also some uncertainty over the battlepreparedness of Russian forces, which has left the United States as the only superpower. However, since 2000, Russia has exploited its enormous reserves of coal, oil and natural gas, and is a prime energy exporter, which is increasing the wealth of the country. See also: Chechnya; Dagestan; New World Order.

lives. German and Belgian colonial rule emphasised social stratification, employing the European-orientated Tutsis at the expense of the more rural Hutus. The repression of the Hutus and the preferential treatment given to Tutsis led to a rebellion by the Hutus in 1959, and the Tutsi monarchy was overthrown. Many Tutsis fled to neighbouring countries. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, political and military power was in the hands of northern, hard-line Hutus under a Hutu President, Juvenal Habyarimana. He armed and strengthened the Interahamwe militia, who later committed many atrocities. In neighbouring Burundi, massacres also occurred in the early 1970s, and a Hutu uprising resulted in the death of several thousand Tutsis. A new conflict began in Rwanda when the President was assassinated in April 1994, his aircraft being destroyed by missile fire as he returned from peace talks in Zaïre (now Congo). This led to uncontrolled slaughter of Tutsis by government forces, as a means of uniting Hutus. In the civil war and genocide that followed, thousands were killed and millions displaced. From April 1994, there was no central authority in control until the establishment of a new government by the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The civil war was a result ultimately of colonial intrusion, fragile democratisation, ethnic diversity, economic decline, regional instability and lack of international interest, even by the United Nations. Many people felt the genocide in Rwanda should attract some form of intervention or give rise to questions in international law. The problem perhaps was deeper, in that ethnicity had become an element in government policy. The crisis created huge numbers of refugees, and this compounded already tense situations in Congo and Uganda. In fact, Uganda refused to naturalise the Tutsi refugees and Rwanda would not permit

Bibliography Mackintosh, M. (1992) ‘The New Russian Revolution: The Military Dimension’, Conflict Studies, No. 247, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Further Reading Bakich, S.D. (1997) ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Working Document or Anachronism?’, Conflict Studies, No. 301, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Rwanda Before independence, Rwanda’s multitude of economic, social and political frictions contributed to the character of the country and a situation in which civil war could take hundreds of thousands of 215

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their return, leaving them to turn to insurgency. See also: Ethnic Conflict; Genocide.

Information, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton. Furley, O.W. (ed.) 1995 Conflict in Africa, London: Tauris Academic Studies.

Bibliography Further Reading

Arnold, G. (1991) Wars in the Third World Since 1945, London: Cassell. Duncan, A. and Opatowski, M. (2000) Trouble Spots: The World Atlas of Strategic

Keane, F. (1995) Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey, London: Viking Press.

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trating on core issues. A limit of 12,400 launchers was agreed, reducing to 2,250 by 1982. The treaty was not signed until June 1979, by which time relations between the superpowers had deteriorated. As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the treaty was not agreed by the US Congress. SALT 2 examined the possibility of limiting the number of MIRVs. Although SALT 2 remained unratified, both superpowers agreed to abide by the treaty, and showed they had a mutual interest in avoiding nuclear war. This did not stop them accusing each other of cheating and non-compliance. Public opinion in the United States was very lukewarm towards the SALT process. Both superpowers’ strategies emphasised war fighting and this encouraged open-ended arms competition. SALT slowed down growth in the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals and defined ceilings that could not be exceeded by future deployments. SALT was the product of bargaining and negotiation within as well as between the superpowers. See also: Cold War; Détente; Treaty.

salT (sTRaTegiC aRms limiTaTion Talks) These talks began in 1969 with the aim of achieving ‘parity’ and/or ‘stability’ in the balance of armaments between the Soviet Union and the United States. They signed agreements from 1971 onwards, which sanctioned increases in arms while limiting the forces that could be developed in the future. The SALT 1 Interim Agreement of 1972 recognised the Soviet Union’s parity with the United States; from the US point of view, it made it easier to negotiate a comprehensive pact on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. The two sides disagreed on the definition of a ‘strategic system’. The Russians wished to include all US forward-based systems that could launch attacks on Soviet territory. The Americans saw forward-based systems as an integral part of the US nuclear umbrella. The Interim Agreement limited the Soviet Union to 1,618 ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and the United States to 1,054. The Soviets could deploy 950 ballistic missiles on 62 submarines, while the United States could deploy 710 ballistic missiles on 44 submarines. No restrictions were placed on MIRVs (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles), bombers or mobile ICBMs. Sidestepping the MIRV issue led to an acceleration of vertical proliferation – bigger nuclear weapons capabilities among existing nuclear states. The main form of verification was to be by intelligence gathering. The two sides were expected to move from mutual restraint to self-restraint. Talks continued and in 1974 the parameters of SALT 2 were agreed by concen-

Bibliography Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

saRajevo Sarajevo is the capital of Bosnia-Hercegovina. It is widely known as the city where the First World War was 217

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precipitated by the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir apparent to the Dual Monarchy of AustriaHungary. It is also remembered as a city which endured a siege during the civil war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In 1992 conflict broke out in Bosnia after independence was ratified by 99.4 per cent of Muslims and Croats in a referendum. Bosnian Serbs rejected it, and in 1993 Serb troops killed the Bosnian deputy prime minister in Sarajevo. The United Nations immediately called for a ceasefire in the city. Muslims found themselves cornered in Sarajevo despite the Serbian action against Bosnia. Later that year, Serbian and Croat leaders announced the partition of Bosnia into three ethnic entities, Serb, Croatian and Muslim, within the framework of a federal state. This coincided with a peace proposal by the UN and the EU to deal with the ethnic divisions. Each of the three sides tried to get the upper hand. In Sarajevo the situation worsened, with epidemics and no electricity, water or food. The 300,000 inhabitants survived on minimal rations, while international aid agencies faced difficulties getting supplies. During the siege, NATO bombed BosnianSerb positions. The pressure on the city was relieved after the 1996 Dayton Accords, which acknowledged two ethnically based mini-states (the Bosnian Serb Republic Srpska and the Croat-Muslim Federation.) The siege caused large-scale destruction and shifts in population. Reconstruction began as soon as fighting ended in 1995; by 2003 most of the city had been rebuilt or repaired. Since then, office blocks and other tall buildings have been built throughout the city. The crisis over Sarajevo caused tensions between NATO and Russia, which consistently supported the Serbs. The two sides were looking at wider security issues in the period follow-

ing the Cold War and each was keen to limit the other’s powers. See also: Yugoslav Civil War. Bibliography Malcolm, N., Magas, B. and Zanic, I. (eds) (2001) The War in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina, 1991–1995, London: Frank Cass.

saudi aRaBia The country is the world’s leading petroleum exporter, which fuels the Saudi economy. Its government rejects international concerns over human rights in Saudi Arabia. For many years Saudi Arabia was one of the USA’s closest strategic allies in the Arab world. Disagreements led to the Americans removing troops from Saudi territory, and Saudi Arabia has lost its position as the top supplier of oil to the USA. There is evidence that Saudi Arabia has encouraged a hard-line, puritanical and anti-Western brand of Islam, known as Wahhabism, which has financed religious schools (madrassas) in parts of Asia, Africa and even Europe. These schools teach what is seen as primitive Islam and have bred terrorists operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia has witnessed rebellions in parts of certain provinces among the young, uneducated and unemployed, who generally resent the opulence of the Saudi royal family. In June 1996, religious militants opposed to the Al-Saud regime bombed a US Air Force barracks in Dhahran, at the time when Osama bin Laden moved his base from Sudan to Afghanistan. Bin Laden probably gained moral support for the attack among other Islamic militants in Saudi Arabia, and provided advice and technical support. The American military presence on Saudi soil is resented by certain groups. This made the USA vulnerable to terrorist 218

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seaTo (souTh easT asia TReaTy oRganisaTion) This alliance was formed to protect South-East Asia from possible communist aggression. It was signed in 1954 by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Pakistan withdrew in 1973, and the organisation was wound up in 1977.

attacks in 1995 and 1996, when the American military suffered casualties in Riyadh and Al-Khobar. Among the hijackers of the aircraft that hit US targets in September 2001 were 15 Saudis, which shattered American confidence in one of its few remaining oil allies in the Gulf. The relationship with Saudi Arabia was commercial, with no attempt to form a deeper understanding of its society and people. This was the cause of some embarrassment when in 1995–98 both countries were lending some support to the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the Middle East, only Saudi Arabia can provide the spare capacity needed in case of oil-supply disruption. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saudi Arabia suffered from a rise in suicide attacks and terrorist violence. Growing unrest coincided with calls for political reform. In 2004 elections were held for the first time. Al Qaeda continued to attack targets in the country, at the time of a rapid rise in oil prices. See also: Gulf War, 1991; Gulf War, 2003; Middle East; Resources and Conflicts; Terrorism.

Bibliography Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

seCond woRld waR: ConsequenCes The human casualties in the greatest war in history were enormous: nearly 60 million people killed, 40 million wounded and 3 million missing. Never before had civilian casualties been so high: air raids took the lives of 2 million, mass extermination and partisan fighting about 5 million, and labour camps, concentration camps, deportations and expulsions probably another 30 million, most of them from the Soviet Union. The cost, nearly 2 billion US dollars, fell mainly on four countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Germany. Reconstruction, production and trade took up to a decade to recover, depending on the country. Europe lost its leading position in world trade, held back by massive devastation in central and eastern Europe. Marshall Plan finance aided recovery in western Europe, but the Soviet Union told states in eastern Europe to refuse this help. The global political system changed radically: the United Nations was created, and the former independent nations of eastern Europe became satellites, with strict production targets imposed by the Soviet Union, which rapidly became a superpower and posed a direct challenge to the United States in the Cold War. The

Bibliography Bell, J.B. (1973) ‘South Arabia: Violence and Revolt’, Conflict Studies, No. 40, London: Institute for Conflict Studies. Nanay, J. (2001) ‘New Friends, New Enemies and Oil Politics: Causes and Consequences of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks’, Middle East Policy, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (December), pp. 11–14.

Further Reading Reeves, S. (2002) ‘Is it Goodbye, Saudi Arabia?’ Jane’s News Brief, No. 2701 (22 August), p. 1.

sdi (sTaR waRs) iniTiaTive

see

sTRaTegiC defense 219

security For the Planet

East–West conflict was one of power politics and ideology. East–West divisions helped to weaken colonial ties between the developed and developing world. This encouraged political self-confidence in the Third World, especially Africa and South Asia and South-East Asia. Some of these economically underdeveloped nations set up the non-aligned movement. The United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and France were the first members of the ‘nuclear club’, which created a balance of fear. Within the world Communism, tensions gradually became apparent between the Soviet Union and China as a result of ideological differences. Peace treaties ending the war formally were not concluded until February 1947, when several European nations had boundary readjustments. Germany lost territory and was divided among the four great powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France. Japan was demilitarised and democratic reforms were introduced under the American military administration. The Communist victory in the Chinese civil war hastened the signing in 1950 of the Peace of San Francisco with Japan, which lost some territory to the Soviet Union. The effects of the Second World War dominated world affairs throughout the Cold War, born in 1945 out of the ashes of world war, for over forty years. See also: Cold War.

dominate our planet’s physical systems – climate, biodiversity, evolution – causing loss of species and habitats, and altering hydrological, carbon and nitrogen cycles. In geopolitics, the United States cannot claim to be the sole political or economic superpower. China, India and regional powers such as South Africa and Brazil are increasing their influence and economic weight in the world by benefiting from the improvement and spread of technology – the foundation of economic development. Global problems of water supplies, climate change, food production, poverty and disease will make problems more complex. For instance, the seeming intractable problem of Darfur in western Sudan is not just a military question, or even one of peacekeeping and sanctions; it start point is that Darfur is one of the world’s poorest regions, with droughts and little infrastructure. Global co-operation on many issues is at risk because of the ever-present threat of war, born of the darker side of human nature. If a ‘failed’ state or region faces collapse – Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Gaza – there are global implications, because such a collapse shows that cooperation can fail even in our interconnected world. A divided world can result in a view of ‘us and them’ – Jews and Arabs, Christians and Muslims, Hutus and Tutsis, Shi’ites and Sunnis, Bosnians and Serbs – and peaceful co-existence over centuries can break down in months. Co-operation also can collapse if states have been or are considered as pariah states or lumped with Al Qaeda, as with Libya, North Korea, Iran or Iraq. Huge sums of money are spent on fighting that could destroy the planet, rather than on fighting ignorance, poverty and disease. Self-fulfilling threats of conflict could arise in future – China’s increased economic, political and military power, the rise of India, the changing demographics

Bibliography Kinder, H. and Hilgemann W. (1995) The Penguin Atlas of World History, Vol. II, London: Penguin Books. Woods, N. (ed.) (1996) Explaining International Relations since 1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

seCuRiTy foR The planeT For the first time in history, human forces are able to 220

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of the Middle East and of our own societies. Many in Europe fear the number of ethnic minorities on their continent. Overpopulation in impoverished countries increases tension and undermines economic growth and well-being. This adds to poverty, unemployment, underemployment, despair, violence and mass migration. Extreme poverty causes a vicious circle of reduced food production, lack of disease control, weak infrastructure and burgeoning population. This applies all over Africa, which faces a poverty trap, being collectively too poor to put public money into projects of identifiable and proven benefit. Disarmament, when based on global trust and treaties, can save money that would be put into stockpiling weapons. There is a commitment in the nuclear nonproliferation treaty for all nuclear powers to work towards complete disarmament, but they tend to honour those parts of the treaty limiting the spread of the weapons to others, but to ignore the parts of the treaty that apply to themselves. The ‘war and peace community’ and the ‘development community’ rarely seem to share views or co-operate. This is worrying in a world on the brink of fundamental change. Globalisation of justice, peace and prosperity needs to take off in the near future and end our reliance on conflict – whether endemic, peripheral or neocatastrophic – to solve our problems. See also: Climate Change; Globalisation; Poverty and Debt; Peace.

right, which they have used as an ‘excuse’ to launch rebellions or revolutions against governments that have not granted them separate government. The doctrine helped to increase the number of states created after 1945 and after 1989. Some of these states could be considered hardly viable – for example, Moldova (1990) and Montenegro (2006). It was only after the First World War, under the impact of President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points, that the idea of national independence became known as selfdetermination. Internationally there has been uncertainty and disagreement over what groups of people may legitimately claim the right of self-determination. Military struggles have been justified by linking them with justifiable political ends – such as anti-colonialism, equal rights, cultural or racial emancipation, and economic, social and cultural development – but self-determination has been the most pervasive and successful rallying cry, which governments and the public find difficult to counter or resist. Thus states have felt obliged to accede to the Atlantic Charter (1941) and the United Nations Charter (1945). Self-determination is a widely supported principle today, but it does not give groups the right to change international borders, even those imposed arbitrarily by colonialism, in order to unify a population with a common national identity. Such unity has generally been achieved by violence, especially when the borders of the perceived nations did not match those of the states in the region. See also: Decolonisation; Minorities.

Bibliography Sachs, Professor J. (2007) ‘Bursting at the Seams’, BBC Reith Lectures.

Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Gurr, T., Marshall, M. and Khoslia, D. (2001)

self-deTeRminaTion Self-determination is the right of a nation or its people to determine their own form of government without influence from outside. National minorities see self-determination as a 221

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(Chechnya) and in former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo). In countries that were previously dictatorships, suppressed tensions flow freely. Democracies offer built-in protection to minorities and peaceful procedures for containing and resolving conflicts. Fullscale civil war is virtually unknown in established democracies. See also: Chechnya; Irredentism; Kosovo; Northern Ireland.

Peace and Conflict 2000: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination, Movements and Democracy, University of Maryland Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). Heraclides, A. (1990) The Self Determination of Minorities in International Politics, London: Frank Cass.

sepaRaTism Separatism is a movement aiming at secession from a state. Separatist groups and non-state liberation movements have challenged the military and political authority of nation–states. Since 1945, almost 150 sovereign governments have been created, and many of these states have multi-ethnic or multitribal populations. State sovereignty is the legal status that gives the state a monopoly on the internal and external use of force, but this status has been severely contested over the past few decades. Many of the world’s newer states are concerned that their population consists of diverse ethnic groups that lack strong feelings of national unity. Even the older states of Europe wish to make ethnic minorities feel a nationalist connection to the nation–state as a whole. At the beginning of the 1990s, two-thirds of the world’s countries were home to substantial ethnic groups that were politically active and, in about half of these states, ethnic groups constituted more than one-quarter of the total population. In Northern Ireland and the Spanish Basque country, for example, there have been campaigns of violence by people who wish to be rid of their present government and seek either independence (the Basques) or inclusion in another country (the Republic of Ireland). Many states in Eastern Europe have been beset by ethnic and nationalist rivalries, which led to the peaceful separation of the Slovak and Czech Republics, but to much violence and division in Russia

Bibliography Hewitt, C. and Cheetham, T. (2000) Encyclopaedia of Modern Separatist Movements, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

sepTemBeR 2001 On the morning of 11 September (‘9/11’ to Americans) 2001, hijackers took over four airliners above New York, crashing two of them into the towers of the World Trade Center. They flew another into part of the Pentagon (US defence headquarters) in Washington DC. The fourth aircraft was planned to hit a nuclear installation, but it crashed into a field. In the four attacks, 3,000 people from 80 countries died. A previous terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, in February 1993, used a car bomb below ground to cause a huge explosion. This was meant to make the North Tower topple into the South Tower, but the bomb was wrongly placed. Four of those responsible were convicted in 1994, two more in 1997; all were from the Middle East. The twin towers were state-of-the-art architecture in the late 1960s. A series of steel columns formed a tubular structure, inside which was a steel core containing lifts, staircases and service wells. The designers had allowed for impact by an aircraft, but not for the effects of the fuel: kerosene and plastic combined are hugely destructive. On 11 September a 200-ton plane crashed into each tower at over 400 mph, 222

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causing immense damage and blocking all escape routes for those above the 75th floor of the South Tower and the 93rd floor of the North Tower. Aviation fuel spilt into the lift shafts and fire soon spread. Fireproofing had been sprayed on the steel, but the impact blew it away; the windows were blown out; fire caused the steel to buckle and twist; the floor supports melted; the columns supporting the floors had weak joints; and the steel trusses, devoid of fire retardant, failed at their connections to the main supports. If any one of these structural elements gave way, the entire structure would fail. The South Tower burned for 53 minutes and finally collapsed in 11 seconds; the North Tower collapsed 30 minutes later. Their daring and innovative design hastened their destruction; nonetheless, most of the 50,000 people who worked there escaped. Terrorism feeds on publicity, and at least a billion people watched, with shock, dismay and outrage, live television coverage of the 11 September 2001 attacks. People have a right to full information, but that has to be balanced against giving terrorists a stage and turning the horrors of death and destruction into a live show. All 19 hijackers died in the aircraft, but Osama bin Laden was soon blamed as the person behind the attacks, which he admitted in 2004. He and his associates escaped from Afghanistan in autumn 2001 because of a series of blunders by the US military. The first person found guilty of aiding the 9/11 conspirators was a Moroccan student, in 2003. He was a founding member of the Hamburg cell that plotted the attacks. No warnings have been given for terrorist attacks attributed to Al Qaeda. The 9/11 attacks exposed the serious weaknesses of Western states in airport security, border and immigration controls and anti-terrorist surveillance, but the major weakness was a failure of imagination

2001

rather than a failure of intelligence. It was never foreseen that large commercial aircraft might be used as missiles. September 11 was a tactical victory for the terrorists. The danger is that other groups may try to equal or exceed these atrocities. However, terrorists willing to face suicide cannot be defeated by force. Their hatred is fed by their beliefs, but their support comes from humiliated, exploited or dispossessed peoples with political grievances. Starved of supporters and sympathisers, terrorism would shrivel. See also: Al Qaeda. Bibliography Burke, J. (2004) Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin. Campbell, K.M. (2002) ‘Globalisation’s First War?’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter), pp. 7–14. Combs, C.C. (2003) Terrorism in the 21st Century, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Cox, M. (2002) ‘American Power before and after 11 September: Dizzy with Success?’ International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 261–76. Hoffman, B. (2002) ‘Rethinking Terrorism and Counter-terrorism since September 11’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 25, pp. 303–16. Jenkins, B.M. (2001) ‘The Organisation Men: Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack’ in J.F. Hoge Jr and G. Rose, How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War, NY: Public Affairs. Shapiro, S. (2002) ‘Conflict Media Strategies and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism’, Politics, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 76–85. Thackrah, R. (2001) Revolutionary Conflicts: Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Explained, Taunton, Somerset: Studymates. Wedgwood, R. (2002) ‘The Law’s Response to September 11, 2001’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 8–13.

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attacks. The threat of air strikes by NATO resulted in a ceasefire brokered by the Americans. In nearby Bosnia, the NATOled Stabilisation Force maintained peace, while continuing to track down and capture war criminals. Inter-ethnic rivalry continued in Kosovo into 1999. The Contact Group of nations (USA, France, Russia, UK, Germany and Italy) worked to persuade the Kosovo Liberation Army to cease fighting and start negotiating, but to no avail. Serbia responded by laying anti-personnel mines on the border with Albania. In March, Milosevic refused to accept an international force of monitors on Serbian soil to back up assurances that Kosovo’s Albanian majority would be granted autonomy. Talks collapsed and NATO carried out air attacks on military targets across Serbia from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic and bases in Italy, along with missiles launched from US warships and a British submarine. NATO was determined to stand up for Kosovo and allow Kosovans to return home. Hostilities between NATO and Serbia ended in June 1999 when Milosevic agreed to withdraw troops from Kosovo. The NATO bombing had killed 5,000 Serbian soldiers and 2,000 Serb civilians. NATO put in place a peacekeeping force, K-For. Mass graves were found and the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague indicted Milosevic as a war criminal. In 2000 he was caught and handed over to The Hague authorities. From 2003 to 2006, Serbia was part of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the successor to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In May 2006, there was a referendum in Montenegro on its union with Serbia. There was a small majority in favour of separation, and in June 2006 Serbia and Montenegro became separate nations. In February 2008 Kosovo’s parliament unilaterally declared independence from Serbia with the backing of many NATO

Baxter, J. and Downing, M. (eds) (2001) The Day That Shook the World: Understanding September 11, London: BBC Worldwide. Latter, R. (2001) ‘After 11 September: CBW Threat Looms’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (November), pp. 30–31. Lewis, B. (1998) ‘License to Kill: Osama bin Laden’s Declaration of Jihad’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (Nov/Dec), pp. 14–19. Lieven, A. (2001) ‘The Secret Policemen’s Ball: The United States, Russia and the International Order after September 11’, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 245–59. Nanay, J. (2001) ‘New Friends, New Enemies and Oil Politics: Causes and Consequences of September 11 Terrorist Attacks’, Middle East Policy, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (December), pp. 11–14. Wedgwood, R. (2001) ‘The Law’s Response to September 11’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1.

seRBia and monTenegRo Since the fourteenth century, Serbs and Kosovans had viewed each other with suspicion and fear. During 1996 and 1997, Serbs were demanding reform by their government. For some years, there had been efforts to reach a compromise with the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo, but the Serbs were in no mood to offer self-government. Kosovan students demanded full autonomy and even independence. A Kosovo Liberation Army was formed and began to attack Serbian security forces. In April 1998, Serbian soldiers moved into Kosovo and killed many Albanians in the first of many attacks that year. Milosevic was told by his ally Russia to stop the attacks, but took no heed. Albanians exacted revenge and killed many Serb hostages. Over half a million ethnic Albanians were driven from their houses as they faced Serb vengeance and 224

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countries, but with strong opposition from Serbia and Russia. The following month, as a result of the growing rift between the President and Prime Minister over joining the European Union, and over Kosovan independence, the Serbian Government collapsed, and elections were called for May. In April 2008, Serbia offered to intensify dialogue with NATO, despite their diplomatic rift over Kosovo. See also: Albania; Dayton Accords, 1995; Ethnic Conflict; Kosovo; NATO; Sarajevo; War Crimes Trials.

in 1995 it extended its armed struggle to the rest of the country. A bloodless coup occurred in 1996, but a rebel coup a year later ousted the President. The Organisation of African Unity called for negotiations to arrange for the rebel leaders to step down. In September 1997, former President Kabbah asked the UN for help to reestablish his government’s authority. UN troops, mainly Nigerians, managed in 1998, through capturing the main cities and regions, to force out the military junta. After an unsuccessful rebel offensive in 1998, the UN managed to get both sides to agree to a ceasefire in January 1999. Fighting resumed in May 2000 and the UN became concerned that only half the rebel soldiers had turned in their weapons. The West Side Boys, an armed splinter group, took seven British soldiers hostage, but after only a month British forces freed the hostages and captured the group’s leader. The UN had more success in 2001 when they began a peaceful deployment in rebel territory, disarming over 50,000 rebel soldiers by early 2002, when the four-year state of emergency was lifted. In July 2003, British troops in the UN began to leave Sierra Leone and a short time later the UN, at the request of the Sierra Leonean president, decided to extend the military mission’s stay in the country. By early 2004, over 70,000 civilian fighters had been disarmed, but casualties had been high. Between 1991 and 1996, 10,000 died and two million refugees were created; from 1996 to 2005, another 50,000 died. High-profile suspects were arrested, to be put on trial before a UN-sponsored war crimes tribunal, which in March 2004 began hearing cases against the Revolutionary United Front and governmentbacked militias. See also: Guerrilla Warfare; Conflicts in Africa.

Bibliography and Further Reading Allcock, J.B., Milivojevic, M. and Horton, J.J. (1998) Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: An Encyclopaedia, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio. Silber, L. and Little, A. (1997) Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, New York: Penguin.

sieRRa leone Sierra Leone became a British protectorate in 1896 and achieved independence in 1961. Since then it has suffered political and economic turmoil as one military regime after another tried to take power. UN peacekeeping forces were unable to prevent atrocities. Sierra Leone became a republic in 1971, adopting a oneparty political system in 1978. In the 1980s, an economic crisis and declining standards of living coincided with government corruption and authoritarian measures. Smuggling grew, along with an active black market, and both handled gold and diamonds. In 1991, rebel forces crossed Sierra Leone’s borders and occupied one third of the country. In 1992, after a military coup, the constitution was suspended. Guerrilla warfare on the country’s borders led to a sharp decline in legal mining, and diamond exports dropped. The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone stepped up its guerrila war after the government refused to call elections, and 225

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sino-sovieT ConfliCT From 1960 to 1989 was a period of extreme tension between the Soviet Union and China. Mao Ze Dong objected to being treated as inferior and had developed his own type of Communism. The Soviet Union recognised the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 and a few months later they signed a 30-year treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance. In the 1950s, the Soviets gave significant military and economic help to China, but in 1959 after serious policy differences all Soviet military and civil personnel withdrew. During the 1960s problems continued, because both countries wanted support among Third World nationalist and socialist movements. China demanded revision of Sino-Soviet border treaties signed by China’s Republican regime, but negotiations were soon suspended. Minor border incidents led to the Damansky Island skirmish in March 1969. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union became concerned at China’s improving relations with the United States, a shift driven by Russia’s military needs and China’s security needs. Behind the border dispute lay serious territorial differences; the situation only improved after Deng Xiaoping launched China on an outward-looking reform programme in the late 1970s and early 1980s. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he promised negotiations with China on the border dispute. China agreed, but demanded that the Soviet Union must force Vietnam to leave Cambodia, must withdraw from bases in Vietnam and must pull its troops back from the Chinese border. Gorbachev visited China in June 1989, coinciding with the pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. Both sides wanted reconciliation, China for political reasons and the Soviet Union for economic. Economic – more than military – relations have dictated their policies over

Richards, P. (1996) Fighting in the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, Portsmouth NH: Heinemann, and Oxford: International African Institute. Riley, S.P. (1996) ‘Liberia and Sierra Leone: Anarchy or Peace in West Africa?’ Conflict Studies, No. 217, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

sinkiang see xingjiang sino-indian waR In October 1962, China sent troops across the Indian border; the war lasted a month before Chinese troops unilaterally withdrew to pre-hostility positions. It was fought high in the Himalaya frontier zone, which has always been geopolitically important. After the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1950, they came up against Indian forces along a poorly demarcated common frontier. Tension remained, and grew after the Chinese invaded and took over Tibet in 1959. China proposed a mutual withdrawal in the North-East Frontier Agency, but the Indians instead sought military aid from the Soviet Union. China responded by launching an invasion in the Ladakh region and in the north-east of the country. The Indians now approached the United States for help, but meanwhile the Chinese army withdrew. To many observers, the resulting agreements fixing the frontier could have been reached without any bloodshed. China increasingly sought Pakistan as its South Asian ally, and India actively sought Soviet help in military equipment. See also: China; South Asia. Bibliography Holmes, R. (ed.) (2002) Oxford Companion to Military History, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maxwell, N. (1970) India’s China War, London: Jonathan Cape.

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the past decade. Both have internal problems: Chechnya, the Caucasus, Tibet and Taiwan. In any global war, however, it is access and control of global markets that matter.

1967

three days the Jordanian Army was defeated, and Israel controlled the West Bank of the River Jordan and all of Jerusalem. Finally, Israel fought a series of engagements with Syria and seized the Golan Heights. The war produced an enlarged Israel, which still exists today. The occupied territories have been a cause of discord, conflict and terrorism in the Middle East, but they have also been used as an excuse for all those things. Israel had gained strategically viable frontiers, but its 2½ million citizens were surrounded by 100 million largely hostile citizens of Arab states – 1½ million of them in Palestine. There was no peace treaty and, for the Arabs, the state of war between them and Israel was suspended, not ended. The superpowers managed to cool down their suspicions over each other’s attitude to the stunning Israeli victory, and the UN Security Council with American and Soviet support passed Resolution 242, calling on Israel and its Arab neighbours to negotiate an exchange of land for peace. The resolution did not require that all land taken in the war be returned and it made any outcome subject to negotiation among the parties. No mention was made of ‘Palestinians’, referring only to the refugee problem. The meaning of this resolution has been disputed ever since. An uneasy peace and occasional war of attrition between the two sides continued until 1970. See also: Israel: Security Issues; Middle East; Palestine; Syria.

Bibliography Borisov, O.B. (1975) Soviet–Chinese Relations, 1945–1970, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press.

Further Reading An, Tai Sung (1973) The Sino–Soviet Territorial Dispute, New York: Westminster Press. Segal, G. (1983) ‘The Soviet “Threat” at China’s Gates’, Conflict Studies, No. 143, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

six-day waR 1967 This Arab-Israeli war blew up suddenly in June 1967, after a period of low-intensity conflict on the Israeli–Jordanian and Israeli–Syrian borders. Geopolitics did not favour Israel: it was surrounded by enemies, it had a 600-mile frontier to defend, much of its population and economy was vulnerable to attack from Arab positions, its access to the Red Sea could be disrupted and Syrian outposts on the Golan Heights dominated the Israeli settlements below. These facts explain Israel’s strategy of anticipating any Arab attack. On 14 May 1967, Egypt put its forces on maximum alert, beginning a build-up in Sinai, and shortly afterwards demanded that UN peacekeeping forces leave Egyptian soil. On 5 June, Israel launched successful pre-emptive air strikes on military airfields of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Syria. The Israelis invaded Sinai the same day and then Jordan as well after Jordanian artillery opened fire on Israeli positions. Israeli forces took just four days to annihilate most of the Egyptian Army in Sinai. In

Bibliography Mansbach, R.W. (1997) The Global Puzzle Issues and Actors in World Politics, 2nd edn, Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin. Stone, D.J.A. (2004) Wars of the Cold War: Campaigns and Conflicts, 1945–90, London: Brassey’s (UK).

Further Reading Dayan, M. (1966) Diary of the Sinai

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referendum in 2001 led to calls for independence and since then it too has functioned autonomously. However, it has struggled to gain international recognition and it has been unable to agree its border with Puntland. In 1992 US troops went into Somalia to encourage factions to disarm and to reestablish food supplies. In 1993 UN troops arrived, but the operation was not a success and they withdrew in 1995, a year after the Americans. Factions regrouped around the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) and Somali National Army (SNA), and chaos reigned. A peace conference in Djibouti in August 2000 elected a new Somali Parliament, whose members, from various clans and factions, formed a ‘reconciliation government’. In 2002 the 21 factions still at war agreed a ceasefire while talks continued in Kenya, where refugees fled from fighting between renegade militias on the border. In October 2004 Abdullahi Yusuf, a warlord backed by Ethiopia, was elected President of Somalia and called for help to disarm the militias. His Prime Minister, Ali Mohammed Ghedi, was the target of two assassination attempts in 2005. Parliament finally met on Somali territory for the first time in February 2006 at Baidoa. Even then, many warlords unhappy with the President refused to attend. The Islamic Courts militia, the strongest and most popular movement in Somalia, which had ruthlessly worked to impose Islamic law, took over Mogadishu, the Somali capital, in June 2006, when the United Nations organised a precarious ceasefire. The Courts were supported by Eritrea, Egypt, Iran and Libya. Ethiopia was determined to prevent arms supplies from these countries reaching the Islamic Courts, and also moved to prevent the Courts taking Baidoa, seat of the weak transitional government. Some Somali Islamic leaders threatened a holy war if Ethiopia refused to withdraw its troops,

Campaign, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, and New York: Harper. Ovendale, R. (1992) The Origin of the Arab-Israeli Wars, 2nd edn, London: Longman.

somalia Italian Somaliland was taken by British forces during the Second World War. In 1950, it became a UN territory under Italian control. By 1956 it had gained internal autonomy under the name of Somalia. In 1960 it gained independence, as did British Somaliland, which decided to merge with Somalia. The much smaller French Somaliland remained separate and eventually gained independence as Djibouti in 1977. By 1965, Somalia had broken off relations with Britain and was disputing its frontiers with Kenya and Ethiopia. In 1969 the elected Prime Minister was overthrown in a military coup, and the new leader, Siad Barre, made the country a ‘scientific socialist’ state, nationalising the economy. In 1974 Somalia joined the League of Arab States. In 1976, Somali soldiers crossed the border in support of a Front for the Liberation of Western Somalia to claim the Ogaden Desert, but they were repulsed by the Ethiopian Army, backed by Cuban troops. Because of this dispute, there were further problems with Ethiopia, refugees fled to Somalia, and war and drought brought the country to the brink of collapse. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, clan politics broke out into a form of warlordism and the country sank into civil war. It made peace with Ethiopia in 1998. The former British colony re-asserted its independence as the Republic of Somaliland in 1992, but inter-clan violence erupted there too. In 1998, Puntland in the north-east – formed from parts of the former British and Italian colonies – declared itself a federal state within Somalia and set up its own government. In Somaliland, a 228

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and in early 2008 Islamic militants in Mogadishu were still fighting the transitional government and Ethiopian soldiers. Puntland declared it would resist any attack by the Islamic Courts. It also faced hostility from Somaliland over the disputed region of Sool, resulting in a violent clash in October 2007. The territorial claims were more along clan lines than political ones. In December, the United States was still unsure whether to back the shaky transitional government in Somalia or acknowledge and support the less volatile Somaliland Republic. This is one of the poorest regions of the world, with mass poverty and drought. It lacks stable state institutions, agreed borders and international recognition, and its problems are exacerbated by warlordism, clan and religious militias, and external intervention. See also: North-East Africa.

Tamil tension in Sri Lanka has destabilised Indian–Sri Lankan relations. The Sinhalese are no longer willing to allow the Tamil minority to continue to dominate the country’s education, bureaucracy and economy, out of all proportion to their numbers. The Sri Lankan government resents the fact that Tamil extremists carry out activities in India. India also has growing problems with Nepal, to the north, where an open border has let many Nepalese cross into India, where there is more work. There has been a rise in Sikh consciousness in Punjab. India was and is the strongest power in the region, though in the Cold War and New World Order the United States and China did not share this opinion, unlike the Soviet Union; and Pakistan does not accept Indian dominance. The acquisition of nuclear power status by India and Pakistan has exacerbated the problems. See also: India; Kashmir; Pakistan.

Bibliography Bibliography

Lyons, T. (1995) Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.

Austin, D. and Gupta, A. (1990) ‘The Politics of Violence in India and South Asia: Is Democracy an Endangered Species?’, Conflict Studies, No. 233, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Ganguly, S. (1994) The Origins of War in South Asia: The Indo-Pakistan Conflicts since 1947, 2nd edn, Boulder CO: Westview Press. Manor, J. (1988) ‘Collective Conflict in India’, Conflict Studies, No. 212, London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies.

souTh asia Most of Britain’s Indian Empire gained independence just as the Cold War began. Regional friction was exacerbated by Soviet support for Pakistan and US support for India, which left other countries like Maldives, Bangladesh and Nepal on the periphery. Tension between India and Pakistan was endemic. The assertion of Muslim sectarian politics has confirmed Pakistan as an Islamic state, while the undercurrents of Hindu fanaticism have prevented India from becoming a fully secular state. Relations between Bangladesh and India have been stymied by the problem of migrants into India: many are Muslims, causing friction with Hindus. Sinhalese–

Further Reading Ghosh, P.J. (1985) ‘Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in South East Asia’, Conflict Studies, No. 178, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Hoffman, S.A. (1990) India and the China Crisis, Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

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Bibliography

McGrew, A. and Brook, C. (eds) (1998) Asia-Pacific in the New World Order, London: Routledge, in association with the Open University. Schofield, V. (2003) Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, London: I.B. Tauris.

Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury.

sovieT union The Soviet point of view had two core themes: the Russian nation with its long history of goals and conflicts, and Soviet Communism, an ideology whose beliefs and values were claimed to apply equally to all countries. After 1945, Moscow aimed to ensure that the belt of countries lying between Russia and Western Europe had socialist, Soviet-orientated governments. Germany must remain divided and neutralised. The military power of the Soviet Union must counterbalance that of Western Europe, which was part of a chain of capitalist encirclement. Believing itself surrounded by enemies, the Soviet Union felt justified in limiting its commitment to mutual force reduction (MFR); the West tried to weaken Soviet defences by calling for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) on the basis of a principle politically unacceptable to Moscow, which matched the West’s Ostpolitik by its own ‘peace offensive’ and a renewed call for a European Security Conference. Later, apparent thaws in East–West relations were the result of Soviet fears of China. The two Communist states have been in persistent conflict over ideological questions and national interests. Eurocommunism (the policies of Communist parties in Western Europe, especially nonalignment) loosened ties between Europe and the Soviet Union, and allowed closer ties between the EEC and Comecon, and better trade balances within Eastern Europe. Modernising its economy, agriculture and armed forces, Moscow saw the need for the superior technology of the United States, Japan and Western Europe. Détente, far from being an agreement to preserve the status quo in world power,

souTh easT asia TReaTy oRganisaTion see seaTo soveReignTy Sovereignty is the decisionmaking and decision-enforcing authority possessed by an independent state. The doctrine of sovereignty implies decentralisation of power in the community of states and the freedom of individual states to make their own decisions. Since the 1980s, increasing interdependence, the reciprocal nature of international law and membership of international organisations have between them led to acceptance of the doctrine of divided sovereignty, whose supremacy is qualified through consent. The United Nations recognises this fact. The desire for sovereignty leads to pursuit of the national interest, and can weaken and undermine international law. Many observers believe that interdependence has made sovereignty anachronistic, because sovereignty implies constitutional independence from other states. Sovereignty can be seen in instrumental terms as the power a society needs if it is protect itself from internal and external violence. Without legal sovereignty, as recognised by other states, a political unit such as a colony, protectorate or national movement has no legal standing among other states. States can govern as they wish within their own territory and formulate their own internal policies, except where limited by self-approved treaty obligations. See also: International Law; Nationalism; United Nations. 230

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was a theory of international politics that enabled the Soviet Union to fulfil its ambitions as a superpower and pursue its interests without direct military involvement in areas of North American dominance. Some observers argued that the Soviet Union – by overt and covert use of nonmilitary techniques, including terrorism, and by exploiting low-intensity conflicts around the world – was able during the Cold War to continue its revolutionary efforts against democratic pluralism and expand its influence across a wider target area. Others were sceptical about direct or indirect Soviet control of terrorist groups. While admitting that Moscow approved and helped some legitimate ‘liberation movements’, proponents of this view argue that modern terrorism is so uncontrollable that the Soviet leaders must have been ambivalent about the value of this form of warfare. Whether or not Moscow controlled terrorists and guerrillas, it supplied massive amounts of arms and money to them. Soviet involvement in terrorist activity was not obvious to many observers because it was fundamentally covert, ranging from the sanctioning of violence by propaganda to the supply of funds, training, arms and other operational assistance. It was not always easy to tell whether a particular terrorist action was home-grown or Moscow-inspired, but Soviet sponsorship of violence around the world gradually became clearer. The Soviet Union’s position as an undisputed superpower permitted it to control or strongly influence the foreign policy and international conduct of other socialist countries that subscribed to the Soviet ideological line, so Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Germany and North Korea, indirectly supported by Syria, South Yemen and Nicaragua, acted as Soviet surrogates in exporting violence. Broadly, the Soviet Union hoped to use terrorism to influence what happened in

neighbouring countries and to weaken the political, economic and military infrastructure of anti-Soviet alliances such as NATO. It wished to stir up trouble for the United States in highly visible regions of Central America, particularly if serious financial burdens and political risk could be avoided by the use of surrogates like Cuba and Nicaragua. It also waged a ‘secret war’ against individuals it considered as its ‘mortal enemies’. See also: Cold War; Ostpolitik; SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks); START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks); United States. Bibliography Alexander, Y. (1987) ‘Some Perspectives on Terrorism and the Soviet Union’ in W. Laqueur (ed.) The Terrorism Reader, New York: Methuen, pp. 363–68. Bradley, J.F.N. (1989) War and Peace Since 1945: A History of Soviet–Western Relations, New York: Columbia University Press. Friedman, N. (2001) ‘The Fifty Years War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 3 (June), pp. 20–25. Grau, L.W. and Gress, M.A. (transl. and eds) (2002) The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas. Lieven, D. (1991) ‘The Soviet Crisis’, Conflict Studies, No. 241 (May), London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Mackintosh, M. (1992) ‘The New Russian Revolution: The Military Dimension’, Conflict Studies, No. 247 (January), London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Pryce-Jones, D. (1995) The War that Never Was: The Fall of the Soviet Empire, 1985– 1991, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Wright, J.B. (1993) ‘Security and Cooperation in Europe: The View from the East’, Conflict Studies, No. 263, London:

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in arms control or discouraging military uses of space. The Soviet Union developed a rocket for placing nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth and both it and the United States developed orbiting military reconnaissance vehicles. No inspection schemes were created within the ambit of the Treaty. The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activity of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies bans deployment of nuclear weapons in orbit or on the moon, but in any case the military use of space has one big disadvantage: how do you hide anything in space? In the later stages of the Cold War, the Soviet Union could not match the United States’ 1984 ‘Star Wars’ project (the Strategic Defense Initiative), whose cost was estimated at over one trillion dollars. With the end of the Cold War, it was largely abandoned in 1991. No country has placed or used weapons in space that can disable or destroy other satellites or targets on Earth. No country has used technologies on Earth capable of effecting space-based missions, though such technologies are at an experimental stage. However, satellites provide valuable early warning. They are ideal for spying, not only by camera but by intercepting communications, which are vital to any military operation. The armed forces rely on the global positioning system to know where their units are and to guide airborne weapons. Space-based systems are also well suited to verifying arms-control systems. Anti-satellite weapons have been developed, including steerable killer satellites. To win any conflict, the use of communication and intelligence-collection satellites is vital. See also: Security for the Planet; Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars).

Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Valenta, J. (1987) ‘Terrorism and the USSR’, Terrorism, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 59–61.

Further Reading Bakich, S.D. (1997) ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Working Document or Anachronism?’, Conflict Studies, No. 301 (July–August), London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Crockatt, R. (1995) The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941–1991, London: Routledge. McCauley, M. (2004) Russia, America and the Cold War, 2nd edn, Harlow, Essex: Pearson/Longman.

spaCe: miliTaRy uses Space is the void beyond the Earth’s atmosphere, that is, more than 100,000 ft above its surface. There has been a temptation for superpowers and great powers to use space for military purposes. The astronomical costs have so far discouraged this, but they have not stopped the research and free flow of scientific ideas. Testing in outer space or under water of a nuclear-armed planetary defence system was banned by the wide-ranging 1963 Declaration. This ruled out, for example, rocket-launched nuclear weapons and rocket-propelled kinetic energy vehicles that could be used to deflect asteroids, but it left the possibility of space- or moonbased lasers to cut up, melt or deflect asteroids. By the Outer Space Treaty approved by the United Nations in 1967, all exploration and use of outer space must be for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. It forbade claims of national sovereignty in space and encouraged international cooperation in assisting astronauts and space vehicles and in the exchange of scientific information. The Treaty did not help much

Bibliography Baylis, J., Wirtz, J., Cohen, E. and Gray, C.S. (2002) Strategy in the Contemporary World:

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An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Duncan, A. and Opatowski, M. (2000) Trouble Spots: The World Atlas of Strategic Information, Stroud: Sutton.

Cowley, R. and Parker, G. (eds) (1996) The Osprey Companion to Military History, London: Osprey Military. Holmes, R. (2001) (ed.) The Oxford Companion to Military History, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

speCial foRCes These are highly trained elite troops who specialise in unconventional military activities such as covert operations, intelligence gathering, raids and sabotage. In Britain the Special Operations Executive (SOE) had been formed in 1940 as a secret service to liaise with resistance groups in continental Europe to disrupt enemy activity wherever and whenever possible. A similar group existed in the United States called the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Both SOE and OSS were closed down after the war. The Americans later resurrected OSS as the Organisation of Strategic Services, part of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the later 1940s, the Soviet Union developed secret services that incited dissidence, disruption and subversion in the capitalist world. In the early 1940s, the British created a rival to SOE, the Special Air Service (SAS) regiment, which consisted of commando troops, expert in the arts of fieldcraft and reconnaissance, and sometimes airborne, who operated with success in North Africa and north-west Europe. The SAS were active in the Falklands War, 1982, and the Gulf War, 1991, and are currently active in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russian Spetsnaz forces continued to operate after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; they specialise in operations in specific areas of the world. Many countries now have special forces units, including France, Germany, Thailand and South Korea,

speCial RelaTionship The special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom dates from the early part of the Second World War. It shows how a long history of good relations influences the present: a history of cooperation facilitates future co-operation. It is based on shared language, an overlapping culture and a commitment to capitalism, representative democracy and a common legal system. The Americans gave backing to the Falklands conflict in 1982, and the British eagerly backed the recent Iraq War, but there have been differences of opinion too, especially over Suez in 1956 and Vietnam in the late 1960s, and this has led observers to believe it is a continuing alliance by two Western nations, rather than a special relationship created out of necessity during a world war. Some question whether a nation such as the United States, intent on isolation in the 1930s, could then embrace such a relationship in the 1940s, and why the United Kingdom, with a rich history of Empire and Commonwealth, would welcome it, especially when the United States has seemed suspicious of the British Empire. Edward Heath made it quite clear that Britain’s future lay in Europe, not across the Atlantic. It was at its most intense during the Churchill–Roosevelt, Thatcher–Reagan and Blair–Bush Junior eras and perhaps at its weakest in the Johnson–Wilson, Carter–Callaghan and Major–Clinton periods. A special relationship is built more on personal chemistry between leaders rather than consistently converging views on international issues. It is regarded

Bibliography Beaumont, R. (1988) Special Operations and Elite Units, 1939–1988: A Research Guide, New York: Greenwood.

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by British policy makers as the United Kingdom’s most important bilateral relationship. See also: United Kingdom; United States.

Vietnam are the chief rival claimants. Malaysia and the Philippines also claim parts of the islands. The Paracels, occupied by China, are also claimed by Vietnam. The islands have huge oil and gas potential, with estimates ranging from one to over eighteen billion tons; about two million tons a year are extracted. Fishing grounds are very productive, with over four million tons being caught annually. The main claimants cite historical reasons for their desire to annex the sparsely populated island chain. Globally, the view is that the claims of sovereignty by all the interested parties are only possible because they all lack the necessary evidence of continuous, effective control. It would be difficult for any of the claimants to gain and keep control because of the huge distances involved. However, in 1998 and 1999 the Chinese did assert their authority on Mischief Reef, and built an installation complete with a helicopter pad, which upset many South-East Asian states. The Chinese are fully aware that they need good regional relations for continuing economic growth. The Spratly Islands dispute continues to pose a threat to peace in the region. If violence erupts between the rival claimants, the stability of the region will be seriously affected. Since 2000, the situation has improved. China has held talks with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries on a proposal for a free trade area between the countries showing interest in the islands: China, Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. Issues over oil, natural gas and fish are regularly discussed. China and ASEAN are also discussing the creation of a code of conduct to ease tensions in the disputed islands. See also: China; Resources and Conflicts; Sovereignty.

Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

spheRes of influenCe These are territories or regions where an outside state claims control, influence or preferential status. The preferred state does not claim sovereignty, but does claim exclusive military, political or economic rights and thus restricts the rights of other foreign powers. During the Cold War, the superpowers very much had their own spheres of influence and any overlap could cause international tension and conflict. The Third World at this time wished to steer clear of such spheres, avoid becoming an arena for superpower rivalry and obtain some freedom of action. Claims to spheres of influence may or may not be enshrined in treaty form, but in either case have usually been conceded on a quid pro quo basis with third parties. The legal status of such spheres can be ambiguous and cause unintended tensions. See also: Cold War; States and National Roles. Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin Books.

spRaTly and paRaCel islands These two disputed groups of small islands, reefs and sandbanks are spread over a wide area of the South China Sea. China, Taiwan and

Bibliography McGrew, A. and Brook, C. (eds) (1998)

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Tamils greater authority in the north and east, with Indian peacekeepers to oversee arrangements. This sparked rioting by Sinhalese in the south; and, as fast as the Indians disarmed groups in the north, new units appeared and committed terrorist attacks. By 1990, to appease the Sinhalese nationalists, the last of the Indian troops withdrew. The Sri Lankan Government announced it would recognise the political wing of the Tamil Tigers, but intense fighting continued for the next five years in and around Jaffna. The government troops made slow progress, and Colombo gave consideration to devolution and powersharing, yet an end to fighting was no nearer. Globally, Tamils were funding the liberation groups in the north of Sri Lanka, making the purchase of arms easier and exacerbated the fighting in the Jaffna Peninsula. In November 2001, the Tamil Tigers stopped demanding independence for the Tamil provinces, in favour of autonomy for the Tamil areas. In return the government raised the embargo on food and medicine for the north, imposed in 1995. In 2002 the highway to the south and the port of Jaffna were reopened. In September 2002, peace talks opened in Thailand, aiming to end the twenty-year civil war. In May 2003 they were suspended on the ground that the government was not really interested. After a general election led to the inclusion of four Tamil ministers, talks were restarted in June 2004. Six months later a huge tsunami struck and briefly united the whole island. The situation remains far from secure, with disagreements unresolved, for example, over the distribution of aid for the tsunami victims. Since then, civil war has re-emerged, resulting in increased lawlessness and a sharp decline in tourism. The resettlement of Tamils away from Sinhalese areas has proved difficult. The United Kingdom and the United States have suspended aid to

Asia-Pacific in the New World Order, London: Routledge, in association with the Open University. Dzurek, D.J. (1996) The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who’s On First, Maritime Briefing, Vol. 2, No. 1, International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University, UK.

sRi lanka Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) was a colony of Britain until it gained independence in 1948. At first it prospered on its exports of rubber, tea and gems. When world prices for these started to decline, a group of politicians urged the expansion of Sinhalese nationalism and culture. This antagonised the Tamil minority, mainly in the north and east of the island, which provoked counter-demonstrations and violence. The Prime Minister, Stanley Bandaranaike, was assassinated in 1959 and his widow took over – leading to further political polarisation and socialisation of the economy. The country became known as Sri Lanka in 1972, when Buddhism became the foremost religion and Sinhalese the sole official language. In the later 1970s an attempt was made at reconciliation between the ethnic and religious groups, and Tamil was again made an official language, having briefly been so in the mid-1960s. Despite such moves, violence increased. Tamil separatists were growing in numbers and gaining support from Indians – especially from the Tamil-speaking state of Tamil Nadu in South India. They formed guerrilla groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) to fight against government troops pushing north. In turn, the Tigers pushed south and attacked targets in the capital, Colombo. The Tamils were well supported, with supplies from India, and were able to held on to their ‘capital’, Jaffna, on the north-west of the island, against an onslaught from the Sri Lankan military. In 1987 a peace settlement gave the 235

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the country because they suspect human rights abuses. See also: Ethnic Conflict; Genocide; Separatism; Third World Insurgency.

Further Reading Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

Bibliography sTaR waRs iniTiaTive

Ciment, J. and Hill, K (eds) (1999) Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, Vols I–II, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn. Spencer, J. (ed.) (1990) Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, London: Routledge.

see

sTRaTegiC

defense

sTaRT (sTRaTegiC aRms ReduCTion Talks) These talks began in June 1982 and resulted in a draft Treaty in July 1991. START was bilateral (like the earlier SALT), so it did not include British, French or Chinese nuclear weapons. Bush and Gorbachev agreed Stage 1 at the Moscow summit in July 1991. START 1 set force limitations – in particular, a ceiling for deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers – with 1,600 launchers on each side. These were to carry no more than 6,000 warheads – 4,900 on ballistic missiles in silos and 1,100 on mobile ballistic missiles. START 2 built on START 1. The agreement was signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in Moscow in January 1993. There were two phases – the first was to be completed seven years after the START Treaty came into force, the second by 2003. Over the two phases, strategic warheads were to be reduced from 4,250 to 3,000 on each side. Multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) and ICBM warheads were to be reduced to nothing, and SLBM warheads were cut from 2,160 to 1,700. Heavy ICBM warheads were cancelled, mobile ICBM warheads stayed at 1,100; and total delivery vehicles, launchers and aircraft remained at 1,600. The START treaties had comprehensive arrangements for verification, using national technical means, imaging satellites, signal intelligence, twelve types of

sTalinism Stalinism was old-style communism as articulated and practised 1924–53 by Joseph Stalin. It was marked by totalitarian state control under the Communist Party, complete control of all the media, systematic elimination of all opposition, eulogies for the leader, five-year plans to secure production by force and unswerving dogmatism in all matters. Stalin demonstrated that military occupation by a communist great power, as in Eastern Europe after 1945, could give victory to communism if the conditions were favourable. Stalin largely achieved his foreign policy goals at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945. However, within three years of his death in 1953, destalinisation was the policy norm following the 21st Party Congress, which included the denunciation of Stalin’s policy in a ‘secret’ speech made by Khrushchev. Stalin’s foreign policies contributed to some of the most dangerous periods of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West. After his death, changes began in Eastern Europe where economic controls were loosened and economic pressures in the Soviet Union lessened. See also: Soviet Union. Bibliography Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press.

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on-site inspection and permanent inspections at mobile-missile production plants, along with reliance on operational constraints such as the deployment of heavy bombers and mobile missiles to certain areas, and strategic bombers to be at different bases to conventional ones. Both sides saw the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the need for inspection of each other’s nuclear sites. There was a problem of verifying limits as opposed to verifying bans. Inspections were more rigorous, and created considerable transparency in nuclear matters. Not only the USA and USSR ratified the agreements, but also Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which inherited much of the nuclear arsenal when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991. Ultimately the agreements were only possible when relations between the United States and Russia became more co-operative in the 1990s. Both sides seemed to be working towards a minimum deterrent. As a result of START 2 they agreed to dismantle two thirds of their strategic nuclear warheads. In 1994 they agreed to stop aiming nuclear weapons at each other. Discussions have taken place over START 3, but the Americans could not agree to the genuinely deep reductions that the Russians wanted and needed, because the USA saw itself alone continuing to extend deterrence on a global scale. Yet it had to realise that there was no security reason for keeping strategic forces at existing levels. Russia and the United States therefore reached a lesser agreement – the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (2002). This abandoned the notion of parity between the two sides, with Russia accepting the notion of American ‘flexibility’. Both sides can exceed their bilateral ceilings by bringing weapons out of storage in an emergency. See also: Cold War; Détente; SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks); Treaty.

Bibliography Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

sTaTes and naTional Roles The word ‘state’ has two meanings: it is either the law-making machinery for the control of people’s behaviour within certain recognised frontiers, or the society and national bodies of the people within those frontiers. A state’s authority is based ultimately on persuasion. States are the means of organising people and their relations internationally. They are defined territorially. States can be classified by the geography, extent and diversity of their interests. Certain classifications – economic, developed, developing; internal, political and constitutional structures; attitudes to the international status quo – are widely recognised. The security community is based on peaceful intercourse between states, with and between international political institutions, and with states not yet politically stable. War is an uncommon experience. No state can provide for the welfare of its people if it does not participate in the system and continually co-operate with other states. States are activated by national interest, but most take note of the pattern of others’ interests. States have spheres of power and a body politic; they have their usual functions, but they may also take on an international role. They may see themselves as bastions of revolution, based on ideology or ethnic unity. Many see their role as regional leaders or protectors, perhaps because of their strategic position or traditional standing. Some pursue an active independent role, avoiding bloc conflicts and developing 237

strategic arms limitation talks see salt

trade with all countries. For twenty years after the Second World War, many states saw themselves as supporters of liberation or as enemies of imperialism and colonialism. Some states see themselves as intermediaries because of their location or cultural-ethnic composition. Such powers pride themselves on non-involvement in conflict. Regional collaborator states have a sense of belonging to a region, where states share economic needs and political, ideological and cultural traditions. Some states play several roles at once – for instance, the Cold War superpowers and China – whereas others, like Sri Lanka, Niger and Myanmar, have only one role concept; many small states have none. National roles – which are linked to domestic needs, public attitudes and external conditions – outline the functions and tasks to which states see themselves committed internationally; they provide guidelines for actions in specific situations. See also: Conflict; Pan-Nationalism.

Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio. Thackrah, J.R. (1987) Encyclopaedia of Terrorism and Political Violence, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

sTRaTegiC aRms limiTaTion Talks salT

see

sTRaTegiC aRms ReduCTion Talks sTaRT

see

sTRaTegiC defense iniTiaTive (sTaR waRs) Work on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was begun by the Reagan administration in March 1983. It aimed to establish a defensive screen to protect the United States from a Soviet missile attack. Also known as ‘Star Wars’, it was a massive effort to develop new weapons such as lasers and particle beams to destroy Soviet missiles. The problem was always the cost: a staggering figure of a trillion dollars was mentioned. Those who were awarded research and development contracts believed SDI would work, whereas other scientists opposed SDI because they believed it was too costly and that ultimately an impregnable shield against incoming missiles was impossible. At its most grandiose, SDI was described as a multi-layer defence that would destroy incoming ballistic missiles, making nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. Proponents argued it would save lives if deterrence failed. At worst, SDI would undermine world stability by reducing Soviet leaders’ confidence in their ability to deter Washington, which would encourage them to deploy more warheads to penetrate American defences. In the late 1980s, there was a shift to a more realistic aim of defending some American missiles in a massive Soviet attack. After the end of the Cold War

Bibliography Baylis, J., Wirtz, J., Cohen, E. and Gray, C.S. (2002) Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brogan, P. (1992) World Conflicts: Why and Where They are Happening, London: Bloomsbury. Kennedy, P. (1989) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, London: Fontana. Payne, J.L. (1989) Why Nations Arm?, Oxford: Blackwell. Waltz, K.N. (1959) Man, the State and War, New York: Columbia University Press.

Further Reading Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury. Holsti, K.J. (1974) International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 2nd edn, London: Prentice Hall International.

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there was a further shift to protecting US territory from a very limited missile attack, perhaps caused by an unauthorised launch, an accident or an attack by a small state. Plans were put forward for deploying ground-based, non-nuclear missiles to try to intercept incoming warheads. See also: Cold War.

1956

In the United Kingdom there was a mixed reaction to the attacks. Some viewed them as Britain’s imperial might in action; others saw them as sheer gunboat diplomacy. There were demonstrations in the streets. At the time, the United States Government was more concerned about Soviet actions to stifle democracy in Hungary, but also at the possibility that the Soviet Union would use the turmoil at Suez as an excuse to act as Egypt’s protector. The Russians condemned the West’s action in Egypt. So did the United Nations, which called for a ceasefire, to which Israel agreed. Within two months all British and French troops had also been withdrawn. The blunt fact was that the United Kingdom could not operate militarily in the Third World if the Americans disapproved. It was a severe political defeat for France and the United Kingdom. They were incredulous that the United States, a Second World War ally and Cold War partner, had been willing to take action against them. The Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, was forced to resign, to add to British humiliation. The Soviet Union gained prestige by entering Middle East politics, it gave military and economic aid to Egypt, including the Aswan Dam, and it aided the Syrian economy. The United States had denied Egypt the finance to build the Dam. Britain and France had felt their prestige was at stake, and Britain had extensive interests east of Suez, for which the Canal provided a swift but vulnerable sea route. The United States was little affected, whatever happened to the Suez Canal, and was always opposed to military action. Much non-aligned opinion around the world was sympathetic to Nasser’s action. The whole operation marked a humiliating climb-down for the United Kingdom and many date 6 November 1956 as the moment it ceased to be a world power, becoming increasingly reliant on the

Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin Books.

suez CRisis, 1956 In 1956 the United States and the United Kingdom withdrew financial support for the building of the Aswan Dam in Egypt. Immediately, President Nasser nationalised the company that operated the Suez Canal, without warning or compensation. The 99-year lease, signed in 1868, still had twelve years to run. Britain and France had shares in the canal company. They and Israel wanted to curb the rising power of the Egyptian leader. Agreement to take action against Egypt had been reached at an Anglo-French meeting in Paris, which the Israelis secretly attended. The British and French met again later in Paris in great secrecy. Those who attended these meetings denied for many years that they had taken place. Israel launched an attack on Egypt on 29 October 1956. Britain and France demanded that both sides withdraw. When Egypt ignored the demand, the British and French launched air attacks. British paratroopers landed at Port Said at the entrance to the Suez Canal; French troops landed at Port Fuad on the opposite bank. Both forces had little difficulty in getting ashore and advanced down the canal. The Egyptians were already demoralised by defeats inflicted by Israel in the Sinai desert. 239

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United States and losing its ability to act independently on military matters. See also: Israel; Soviet Union; United Nations; United States.

lateral discussions, under stress or in crisis situations, or in more normal circumstances. Decisions must be taken on the time available for an open or closed session, the time for an ultimatum and the role of any mediator. First the rules for the game must be agreed in talks about talks, fixing the times and place for the meeting, the parties and size of delegations, the languages to be spoken, the seating arrangements and press coverage. Substantive bargaining is at the heart of summit negotiations: the presentation of positions, demands or conditions, symbolic acts or signals, persuasion, promises, threats, commitments and concessions. Outcomes can result in new possibilities or in maximum and minimum conditions being revised. Three possible outcomes can be a treaty or understanding, the postponement of negotiations or the ending of negotiations, leaving the problem unresolved. Summit negotiations usually take place after the early stages of conflict or crisis, which may involve escalating protests, rejections, denials, accusations, demands, warnings and threats. Then comes the settlement stage of the conflict. At summits, compromises or successful negotiations are more likely if: the issues are specific and carefully defined; the states in conflict have other common interests; rewards for both parties may increase through co-operation; and there is evidence that similar negotiations have previously led to compromise outcomes. See also: Conflict Behaviour; Negotiation; Psychology and Conflict.

Bibliography Tal, D. (ed.) (2001) The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East, London: Frank Cass. Thomas, H. (1967) Suez, New York: Harper.

summiT negoTiaTion Summit diplomacy is conducted at the highest level, in person by heads of government. The first such meeting between superpower leaders took place in Geneva in 1955; it was the first of many focused on the intractable problems of the Cold War. Summit meetings find areas of agreement; the details are then dealt with at lower levels of government. Leaders may meet regularly to discuss relations between their two nations. Summit diplomacy can also formalise agreements worked out in advance at lower levels. The heads of state and/or government of the European Union hold twice-yearly summit meetings, when a whole range of issues may be discussed: social, political, military, diplomatic and economic. G8 economic summits have been held annually since 1975 by the (previously seven, now) eight most advanced industrialised nations of the world. Unlike the usual heads of state summits, which initial treaties or agreements, the G8 nations seek to harmonise and co-ordinate national policies on such topics as globalisation, protectionism, debt, currency stability, economic growth and recession. Declarations tend to be issued at the end of such summits. Negotiations occur before and at summit meetings, between not only the leaders but also back-up teams, advisers and ministers. Negotiations may happen in open or closed meetings, bilateral or multi-

Bibliography and Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin Books. Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

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suRpRise aTTaCks Achieving surprise at all levels – tactical, operational and strategic – has always been seen as one of the main ingredients for success in war. But positive strategic surprise is seldom sufficient to bring about final victory in any war. Other factors – political, economic and military – play a large part. Decisive strategic surprise in the opening stage of a war destabilises the opponent. Fear of a surprise attack is a strong incentive to make the first move or launch a preemptive attack. The side planning the attack may cancel it if the defender is seen to be on the alert and mobilising troops. Many examples of surprise attacks have occurred since 1945: North Korea’s invasion of South Korea (1950); Britain, France and Israel on Egypt (1956); Israel on Egypt (1967); the Arab states on Israel (1973); the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979; and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A recent surprise attack and one of the most effective was that on 11 September 2001. It had similarities with conventional surprise attacks and showed up many instances of intelligence failure. Since 1998 the United States had been aware that Al Qaeda might attack the country, but the intelligence was sketchy and vague. There was information there to heighten alert and incite better defensive measures, but the general view was that Al Qaeda would attack American targets overseas, not at home. The USA had problems in judging a strategic threat and predicting the weight of an impending attack. The availability of weapons of mass destruction enhances the potential severity of a surprise attack, but is very hard to judge. Western intelligence communities faced this difficulty in estimating Iraq’s chemical, biological and missile capabilities before the Gulf War, 2003. The world has had little experience of non-conventional surprise attacks, so it is hard to iden-

tify warning indicators that can be used as alerts in the face of an impending attack. See also: Conflict; Conflict Behaviour. Bibliography Kam, E. (2004) Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Handel, M.I. (2002) Masters of War, 3rd edn, London: Frank Cass.

syRia This Arab Republic is a ‘socialist popular democracy’. The President is head of the predominant Arab Socialist Ba’ath party, which – like the government and the armed forces – is dominated by the Alawite sect of the Shi’ite Muslim community, yet most of the population are Sunnis. Sunnis demand the recognition of Islam as the state religion. The main opposition to the regime has come from Muslim extremists among the Sunnis, their strongest organisation being the Muslim Brotherhood. Violent actions against the regime have also been carried out by dissident Ba’athists supported by the right-wing historic Ba’ath party of Iraq. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria shares many aims with the Shi’ite revolutionaries who came to power in Iran in 1979. It propagates Islamic fundamentalist tenets, but also demands free elections, a more liberal economy and an end to Alawite dominance. The Brotherhood promises Christians and other non-Muslims their religious rights, and it promises a government satisfactory to the people, but full political rights will be given only to ideologies not contradictory to Islam. After the assassinations of Soviet military advisers and an attempt to kill President Hafez al-Assad, the Syrian army moved against the Brotherhood in 1979– 80. In violent clashes across the country in 1981–82, an estimated 25,000 Syrians were killed, with Aleppo and Hama the worst affected towns. In Hama, an armed 241

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Brotherhood insurrection in early 1982 resulted in the deaths of thousands more civilians. The National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria is an amalgam of 20 political and religious groups opposed to the Assad regime, within Syria and abroad. It offers a constitutional elective system in which freedom of faith, expression and association would be guaranteed. The Alliance has worked for the liberation of Palestine and for the long-term objectives of Arab unity. An Arab Communist Organisation has been outlawed for acts of sabotage on foreign buildings in Damascus. In 1991 Syria recognised Lebanon as an independent and separate state, but Syria troops stayed on. A former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, helped to push through a UN Resolution calling for the Syrians to leave. Syria, widely believed to be behind his assassination, finally withdrew its troops in 2005. They slowly came round to the view that they would have to negotiate with the Israeli’s in order to regain lost land. However, these talks failed on military issues. In the early 1990s, Assad (President, 1970–2000) refused to negotiate with Israel on the return of land because of Israel’s hard-line attitude to the Palestinians. Negotiations a few years later failed to make any progress over the Golan Heights, taken by Israel in the Yom Kippur War.

The Syrians strengthened their relations with Iraq in 1997. In 2000, President Assad died and was succeeded by his son Bashar. In October 2003 Israel bombed a site near Damascus, claiming that it was a terrorist training base for Islamic Jihad. During their invasion of Lebanon in 2006, the Israelis accused Syria of supporting Hezbollah. In September 2007 Israeli warplanes attacked what they claimed was a nuclear reactor being built by North Korean technicians. During the war in Iraq, Syria has been accused by the United States of harbouring terrorists and insurgents, and sending fighters into Iraq. Syria has consistently denied this, but American pressure is encouraging Damascus to look for a peaceful solution in Iraq. Diplomatic ties were restored between Iraq and Syria in November 2006. See also: Axis of Evil; Iraq; Israel; Rogue States; Terrorist States. Bibliography Bishop, J. and Harmon, K. (1987) ‘The Syrian Connection’, TVI Report, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 23–25.

Further Reading Tueller-Pritchett, D. (1988) ‘The Syrian Strategy of Terrorism’, Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer), pp. 27–48.

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Taiwan This island, previously called Formosa, has been a constant cause of concern ever since the Nationalist government fled there during the Chinese Civil War. Since 1949, China has claimed the island as a rightful part of Communist China. This claim became ever more insistent as Taiwan proceeded with spectacular industrialisation, strongly supported by the United States, which saw the defence of the island as imperative. China’s intervention in the Korean War to support the Communists in the North made it very difficult to normalise relations between mainland China and the United States. Taiwan and the United States agreed a treaty in 1954, hoping to get the Soviet leaders to dissuade Beijing from using military force to achieve foreign policy objectives. All the treaty did was to internalise the conflict. Early tensions arose over Taiwan’s military occupation of the small islands of Quemoy and Matsu, very close to the mainland. The Communist Chinese leaders saw the taking of these islands as a first step on the road to ‘liberating’ Taiwan. The Chinese Army shelled the islands repeatedly and Taiwan responded by bombing military bases on the mainland. In January 1955 China launched a major assault on the Tachen Islands, just off the coast, and held by the Nationalists. The Americans evacuated all personnel and persuaded Taiwan thereafter to give them a right of veto on any Nationalist attack. Later in 1955 the crisis subsided because China saw the US Navy as as a formidable force that it could not match. The USA, with its superior naval and air power,

might attack the mainland and ultimately it might use atomic weapons. However, in 1958 the Chinese began to shell Quemoy and instigated a blockade. Military garrisons on the islands had increased and the Americans declared them to be very important because their defence systems were integrated with those of Taiwan. The crisis eased that autumn, perhaps because the Chinese Government realised that, if it won control of Quemoy or Matsu, it risked war with the USA. The Russians managed to persuade the Chinese not to underestimate American power. Moreover, the Republic of China Air Force dominated the Formosa Strait airspace. In 1971 the United Nations voted to recognise Communist China, and the Republic of China lost its place in the UN Assembly. On Taiwan, some favoured self-rule, while others favoured selfdetermination. Mainland China’s desire to gain control over all the territories it perceived as Chinese remained as strong as ever after the death of Mao in 1976. His successor, Deng Xiaoping, suggested unifying China on the basis of ‘one nation, two systems’, with Taiwan becoming a Chinese dependency, but maintaining a socio-economic model like that of Hong Kong. Despite severe warnings from the USA, Beijing carried out a series of missile launches in 1995 close to Taiwan. The two broke off diplomatic relations. Chinese manoeuvres led the USA to send warships to defend Taiwan’s territorial waters. In July 1997, when Hong Kong returned to Chinese control, China made a show of military force off the coast of Taiwan. In 243

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1998, direct negotiations were reopened. Since then, there have been increasing calls for an independent way for Taiwan, but its efforts to be accepted in the UN have been in vain. Economic relations with China have grown stronger. After Taiwan’s presidential elections in 2000, both sides began to seek rapprochement and in 2001 after 50 years of isolation, the first direct talks between the two countries occurred. A law passed in 2003 allows Taiwan to hold a referendum if a foreign military threat seeks to change its status. China’s threat to use force to prevent Taiwan declaring independence motivated pro-independence groups to campaign for a new constitution. Most nations acknowledge the legal position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is a province of China. On Taiwan the result is polarised politics: the Pan Blue Coalition favours eventual Chinese unification; and the Pan Green Coalition, led by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, favours an eventual and official declaration of Taiwan’s independence. In September 2007 the Democratic Progressive Party approved a resolution asserting Taiwan’s separate identity from China and calling for a new constitution for a ‘normal country’. See also: China; United States.

the Mujaheddin movement. This fundamentalist group appealed to the young, especially to religious students (talib is a student). Their early progress was spectacular, especially near Kabul, and within three years they ruled the country, apart from the far north-east where Ahmad Masoud, one of the leaders of the United Islamic Front held out. The West disliked the group, but they were willing to co-operate with the Taliban to curb the opium trade, in spite of the Taliban’s extreme interpretation of Islamic law, for example, barring women from working and forcing all men to grow beards. Even more surprising, perhaps, an American oil company hoped that one faction – and it could be the Taliban – would take over in Afghanistan and end the civil war, so the company could negotiate to build a natural-gas pipeline across the country. The events of 11 September 2001 were traced back in part to the Al Qaeda organisation headed by Osama bin Laden. The Taliban had given sanctuary to bin Laden, so in late 2001 an American-led military campaign set out to get rid of the Taliban: it succeeded and captured hundreds of terrorist suspects. Indeed, the initial campaign in the war on terrorism was the bombing of Taliban strongholds. The wheel had almost turned full circle from the time when the United States had provided military equipment to antiCommunist insurgencies, including the one that became the Taliban. To change fundamentally the religion of a state, political control is required and these were the aims for which the Taliban fought. There is no doubt that bin Laden and the Taliban provided support for terrorism and insurgency around the world. The Taliban were never recognised by any Western state as the legitimate ruling authority and so it was difficult for these nations to put political pressure on them to give up members of Al Qaeda. When

Bibliography Chiu, Hungdah (ed.) (1979) China and the Taiwan Issue, New York: Praeger. Hickey, D. Van V. (1997) Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System, Boulder CO: Lynne Reinner. Roy, D. (2000) ‘Tensions in the Taiwan Strait’, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 76–96.

TaliBan The Taliban originated in Afghanistan: one of the main reasons behind their formation in Kandahar in early 1994 was the strife and corruption in 244

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the war came, it was fairly one-sided. However, though the Taliban were overthrown, it appears that Afghanistan’s volatile nature and its disparate peoples are such that true peace and democracy will probably continue to elude the country. In 2007, Taliban influence remained strong in western Pakistan near the border with Afghanistan. Taliban insurgents have executed people too aligned with the Pakistan Government or the United States. In Afghanistan in February 2008, poor military intelligence led to conflicting reports of a Taliban spring offensive. Observers suggest that poppy eradication, which destroys the livelihood of rural Afghans, and civilian deaths caused by coalition bombing campaigns have helped the Taliban resurgence. These observers believe that counter-insurgency should focus on the battle for the hearts and minds of the Afghan people and reconstruction of the Afghan economy, which could profit from licensing poppies to make medicine rather than eradicating them. Some commentators see Pakistan’s shift from war to diplomacy as implicit recognition of the growing power of the Taliban relative to American influence. See also: Afghanistan; Al Qaeda; Pakistan.

terrorists seek to launch indiscriminate and unpredictable attacks on groups (police, army, multinationals or nations) to change the politico-economic balance of the world. Some acts of terrorism now are directly or indirectly authorised by state policy. States can use proxy terror as a weapon of coercive diplomacy against rival states, and this may disrupt local power balances. Increasingly sophisticated weaponry is used and this has resulted in a growth in bilateral and multilateral co-operation. Recent terrorist violence in the Middle East has been surrogate terrorism. Thousands of men from the Islamic world have learnt the techniques of irregular warfare and used them in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Kashmir, Philippines, Algeria and Bosnia. Terrorist organisations may see themselves as separate from the world, but they have to live, they need money for weapons and equipment, and they are much like businesses in working to generate income and maximise profit. People come together to commit acts of violence because of psychological factors and a shared sense of ideological purpose. Since 2000, international terror has developed into transnational terror by autonomous non-state actors, with groups operating outside the frontiers of their home country. Self-imposed restraint appears to be breaking down as terrorists’ motives change, and they have become more willing to engage in acts of mass destruction. September 11 showed that terrorism now knows no bounds. At some point in the future, the opportunity and capacity for serious nuclear terrorism could reach those willing to take advantage of it. Cyber-terrorism – crime by computer – has become prevalent since the 1990s. It threatens the safety of millions of people if military computer networks are vulnerable to casual hackers. The year 2000 brought millenarianism – personal redemption,

Bibliography Baylis, J., Wirtz, J., Cohen, E. and Gray, C.S. (2002) Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hough, P. (2004) Understanding Global Security, London: Routledge. Marsden, P. (1999) The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan, London: Zed Books, and Karachi: Oxford University Press.

TeRRoRism Terrorism is organised intimidation using extreme violence to create instability in democracies. International 245

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often through violent means, where restraint is abandoned because terrorists believe in the absolute righteousness of their cause. Not all twenty-first-century movements are terrorist: they vary from the most violent attacks to the mildest pacifism and from the most ethereal spirituality to the most earth-bound materialism. Targets for terrorism remain the same as in the late twentieth century – government representatives, diplomats, national symbols such as airlines, symbols of economic systems such as corporations and executives, and symbols of policies and presence, such as military officials, political leaders and heads of state. See also: Terrorist States; Terrorists and Guerrillas: Differences; War on Terror.

Martin, G. (2003) Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage. Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. (2000) The Future of Terrorism, London: Frank Cass.

TeRRoRisT sTaTes With increasing frequency, acts of terrorism are being labelled as the direct or indirect products of state policy. A number of governments do assist terrorist organisations, though they do not usually plan or direct specific operations. If efficiently employed, the technological resources and knowledge of a state can dramatically increase the sophistication of terrorist actions and their effect against the peculiar vulnerabilities of advanced societies. What to date has been only an irritant could become a true danger to modern society. A number of Third World states unashamedly sponsor terrorism, with only the flimsiest attempts at denial: Iran and Islamic Jihad; Syria and various groups in Lebanon: Libya and several ‘rejectionist’ Palestinian and Egyptian groups. But the true extent of state-backed terrorism is obscured by propaganda charges and counter-charges. Furthermore, other factors can deceptively magnify the image of burgeoning state terrorism. Many of these are intellectual or semantic in nature. Violent retaliation by a state against enemies hidden in a civilian population inevitably takes a toll of those civilians, so Israeli attacks on Palestinian guerrillas in refugee camps, for instance, are ‘state terrorism’ to Palestinian supporters. Conspicuous support to insurgents who sometimes use terror tactics is also seen as state terrorism. Many Europeans considered the USA responsible in the 1980s for fostering sporadic terrorism by supporting Nicaraguan guerrillas. Soviet support of Palestinian factions, ostensibly similar,

Bibliography Hoffman, B. (1998) Inside Terrorism, London: Victor Gollancz. Ryan, C. (1991) ‘Tourism, Terrorism and Violence: The Risks of Wider World Travel’, Conflict Studies, No. 244, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Thackrah, J.R. (2001) Revolutionary Conflicts: Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Explained, Taunton, Somerset: Studymates. —— (2004) Dictionary of Terrorism Second Edition, London: Routledge. Thompson, L.B. (ed.) (1989) Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World, Lexington MA: Lexington Books. Wilkinson, P. (1990) ‘Terrorist Targets and Tactics: New Risks to World Order’, Conflict Studies, No. 236, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. —— (2002) Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal Response, London: Frank Cass.

Further Reading Harmon, C.C. (2000) Terrorism Today, London: Frank Cass.

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was perhaps unrelated to a Palestinian propensity to operate internationally. There is also a political imperative that tends to inflate the intensity of accusations of state terrorism. The desire to retaliate against or pre-empt terrorists is unfulfilled if no accessible target can be found. Most terrorists cannot be identified and removed without causing unacceptable civilian casualties. If a state sponsor of the terrorist group is identified, it can be targeted by a range of diplomatic, economic or military reprisals. As a result, policy makers bent on combating terrorism follow the human urge to find evidence of state complicity. To do nothing would be politically unacceptable. A guilty state provides one other advantage not normally found among terrorists: it responds more or less rationally to outside pressure to change behaviour, whereas terrorists and their organisations do not. Such terrorist states can become terrorist safe havens – ungoverned, undergoverned or ill-governed areas of a country where terrorists are able to organise, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance, political will or both. International sanctions on such states include embargoes, reductions in aid or economic help, bans on arms exports and sales, and financial and other restrictions. There may be controls on the exports of dual-use items – goods that could significantly enhance countries’ terrorist and military capabilities. See also: Axis of Evil; Terrorism.

Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. (2000) The Future of Terrorism, London: Frank Cass. Thackrah, J.R. (2004) Dictionary of Terrorism, 2nd edn, London: Routledge. Wilkinson, P. (2002) Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal Response, London: Frank Cass.

Further Reading Martin, G. (2003) Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage. Sproat, P.A. (1997) ‘Can the State Commit Acts of Terrorism? An Opinion and Some Qualitative Replies to a Questionnaire’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 117–50. Stohl, M. (1988) ‘States, Terrorism and State Terrorism: The Role of the Superpowers’ in Slater, R.O. and Stohl, M. (eds) Current Perspectives on International Terrorism, London: Macmillan, pp. 155– 205. —— and Lopez, G.A. (eds) (1988) Terrible Beyond Endurance? The Foreign Policy of State Terrorism, Westport CT: Greenwood Press. Tanter, R. (1999) Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation, New York: St Martins Press.

TeRRoRisTs and gueRRillas: diffeRenCes One can distinguish between terrorism and guerrilla warfare, though both pursue political or ideological ends by using violence against government property or persons. Terrorists tend to be urban and they operate in small bands, but occasionally as a single individual. They attack private or public property, civilians, the military or government officials, with the aim of changing a specific law, policy or practice, such as language laws, separatism, religion or research on animals. Terrorists make little or no attempt to control territory or to function as a government. Terrorism is

Bibliography Harmon, C.C. (2000) Terrorism Today, London: Frank Cass. Hoffman, B. (1998) Inside Terrorism, London: Victor Gollancz. Probst, P.S. (1989) ‘State Sponsored Terrorism: Present and Future Trends’, Terrorism, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 131–33.

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a form of psychological warfare with criminal violence and the threat of violence. Guerrillas are generally rural, and they aim to change the government. They attack the property or persons of the military, police and government; they do not attack civilians apart from ‘collaborators’. Their organisation can grow quite large and eventually take the form of a conventional military force. They aim to challenge the very legitimacy of the nation–state and demonstrate the power to set up a parallel government and all that it implies – taxation, law, policing and correction. They want their threat of violence to be seen as real, but based on popular support and using psychological strategies. See also: Terrorism; Terrorist States; War on Terror.

and create socio-economic and political opportunities along with efficient administration. Mass mobilisation can have a big impact. As well as recruiting members of the group, insurgents can organise rallies against the authorities, boycott polls, even control the flow of information and get support from the press. They may raise funds by siphoning off public money or by smuggling. They may forcibly take and redistribute land. An insurgency can paralyse an administration, leaving it unable to pursue development; and this can be compounded by insurgents infiltrating government services. Administrations in developing countries can counter insurgents by working to ensure a fair wage structure, solving land disputes and ensuring the proper use of money at local government level. They can help rehabilitate the victims of insurgents, improve the supply of water and electricity to the interior, and construct roads and bridges. They can make an impact with counter-propaganda, publicising the wrongdoing of insurgents, bans on insurgent groups, the achievements of the government and what is being done to redress public grievances. To hamper insurgent organisation, and reduce the levels of violence and destruction, security force activity has to be highly effective. Operations can include ambush, raids on training camps, nullifying insurgent attacks, area domination and mopping up. Intelligence, arms and ammunition have to be seized, dumps and explosives recovered, insurgents apprehended and disarmed, and suppliers and harbourers arrested. In the end, insurgents may have to be killed. See also: Poverty and Debt; Terrorism; Terrorists and Guerrillas: Differences.

Bibliography Hoffman, B. (1998) Inside Terrorism, London: Victor Gollancz. Laqueur, W. (1998) Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study, New Brunswick NJ: Transaction. Thackrah, J.R. (2001) Revolutionary Conflicts: Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Explained, Taunton, Somerset: Studymates. —— (2004) Dictionary of Terrorism, 2nd edn, London: Routledge.

Further Reading Thackrah, J.R. (1987) Encyclopaedia of Terrorism and Political Violence, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Thompson, L.B. (ed.) (1989) Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World, Lexington MA: Lexington Books.

ThiRd woRld insuRgenCy To some observers, insurgency and extremism are outcomes of neglect by governments and decision makers. They suggest the authorities’ unwillingness or inability to stop corruption and injustice, give people hope

Bibliography Arnold, G. (1991) Wars in the Third World since 1945, London: Cassell.

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stationed in Tibet, partly because it is the site of a nuclear missile base and of great strategic importance. The Dalai Lama long ago abandoned calls for independence and now seeks genuine autonomy and respect for Tibet’s human rights; this more modest aim is unpopular with the Tibetan governmentin-exile, based in northern India, and with younger Tibetans. In 2005, the Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, offered to hold talks with the 14th Dalai Lama if he dropped his demand for Tibetan independence. The Dalai Lama said he would accept Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, but insisted on genuine Tibetan autonomy over religious and cultural life. He repeated this view in 2007 and 2008. In 2008, Buddhist monks protested publicly in Lhasa to bring Tibet’s plight to world attention in the year of China hosting the Olympics. The Chinese reacted with curfews, strictly limited access to Tibetan areas and a crackdown on dissent in which several hundred people were killed. The international response was immediate and robust condemnation of the Chinese actions. Large protests took place in many Tibetan towns, while other Tibetans fled the country. The Dalai Lama has warned of ‘cultural genocide’. The Chinese face increased pressure since violence has spread to neighbouring areas, but they remain committed to control over Tibet. It has large deposits of copper, lead and zinc, which would reduce China’s dependence on foreign mineral imports. See also: China; South Asia.

David, S. (1991) Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Furedi, F. (1994) Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism, London: Tauris. Furley, O.W. (1995) Conflict in Africa, London: Tauris Academic Studies. Mazrui, A.A. (1985) ‘The Third World and International Terrorism: Preliminary Reflections’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April), pp. 348–64.

Further Reading Carey, P. (1996) ‘East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity’, Conflict Studies, No. 293, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. The World Guide: See the World from a Different Angle (2005) Oxford: New Internationalist Publications.

TiBeT Tibet is an autonomous region of south-west China. It declared independence in 1912, but China sent in troops and took control in 1950. Its historic ruler and religious leader, the Dalai Lama, was driven from the country and the monks were forced out of the monasteries. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army controlled Tibet, though the Dalai Lama returned as nominal spiritual and temporal head of state. Then, in 1959, a Tibetan uprising spread from border regions to Lhasa, supported by Tibet’s local government. It was suppressed by the Chinese army, and the Dalai Lama fled to India. In 1965, Tibet became an autonomous region of China. After Mao’s death in 1976, the Chinese adapted a more liberal and pragmatic policy. Pro-independence riots in 1988 were ruthlessly suppressed, but they proved that nationalist feelings ran high. Over 100,000 Chinese troops are

Bibliography Ciment, J. and Hill, K. (eds) (1999) Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn. Spence, J. (1990) The Search for Modern China, New York: Norton, and London: Hutchinson.

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TiToism Titoism was the form of Communism in Yugoslavia from 1948, when the country was expelled at Soviet insistence from the Cominform. The split was caused primarily by the resentment of Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party at Soviet tutelage and dictation in their country’s domestic and foreign policies. They were also angry at Soviet economic exploitation of Yugoslavia in the immediate post-war period. Chiefly because he had been a popular and effective wartime partisan leader, Tito was given powerful backing by his party and the armed forces and this allowed him to maintain his stance. In the years after Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet leadership made peace with Tito by accepting the Yugoslav view that peaceful co-existence could exist between capitalist and communist nations. The Soviet Communist Party did not need to control the international communist movement in all matters; each nation developing socialism could proceed to the common goal at its own speed by taking into account local conditions. Tito kept complete control of the traditional levers of power, but he established various institutions which permitted popular involvement in local government and channelled popular opinion to the republican and federal governments. A decade after his death in 1980, the Cold War ended and Yugoslavia began to disintegrate as a federal state. See also: Yugoslav Civil War.

and resources is harnessed to military effort. The last total war was the Second World War, which ended with a ruined Germany and Japan, both occupied by victorious powers. The goal in conquering and occupying another nation is to reach the centre of power, usually in the capital city, and force the surrender of the government, replacing it with one acceptable to the conquering nation. In some cases the victor may annex the defeated nation, as Iraq tried to do with Kuwait in 1990. Total war involves entire populations. Civilians are made to participate in the war effort, and terrorised through aerial bombardment and the use of the most destructive weapons available. Total war often implies the participation of many states, no moral scruples about violating international law or the conduct of war, and total control over many aspects of the life of the defeated nation. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear war entailed the risk of total extermination of belligerents and even of the human race. Total war as a concept has called into question the use of neutrality as a legal constraint on belligerents. In a total war any contact between a neutral state and a belligerent to the benefit of the latter can be viewed as aiding the enemy. Ideologies that despise compromise, especially those that present violence and warfare as natural and desirable, have contributed to a view that wars should be total. Many of these ideologies are linked with demands for revolutionary change. Nationalism has a powerful impact on the concept of total war, because it enables appeals to be made to individuals to fight primarily to defend or further the interests of the national group. Nationalism combined with demographic growth can enhance any war effort. Now that national economies are no longer self-contained, but rely on each other, such a war would risk the economies

Bibliography and Further Reading Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio.

ToTal waR Total war is either a war with nuclear weapons (or other exceptionally destructive weapons) or a war in which the broadest possible range of social energy 250

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of states involved. Global trade has emerged as a decisive factor in global stability. Even rival industrialised nations trade with each other and they risk much more than they gain in any conflict with a trading partner. China and the United States are power rivals in the Asia-Pacific region, but they are also economically dependent on each other and each nation benefits from the other’s economic success. See also: Ideological Warfare.

governs the entire associational life of society. The party or its leader is declared to be the source of truth, and no rival interpretation is tolerated. Such regimes govern with the help of laws and lawlessness, and they offer rapid upward social mobility for those who support them. In communist systems the entire economy is administered by the state. The ending of totalitarian rule can be deeply destabilising. In Eastern Europe, the end of Soviet-style Communism allowed the eruption of hitherto suppressed ethnic, national and class antagonisms. See also: Military Leadership and Power.

Bibliography Coker, C. (2004) The Future of War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the 21st Century, Maldon MD: Blackwell. Dunnigan, J.F. (1982) How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare, London: Arms and Armour Press. Hough, P. (2004) Understanding Global Security, London: Routledge. House, J.M. (2001) Combined Arms: Warfare in the Twentieth Century, Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas. Marwick, A. (1968) Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace and Social Change, 1900–1967, London: Pelican.

Bibliography Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury. Brooker, P. (1997) Defiant Dictatorships: Communist and Middle-Eastern Dictatorships in a Democratic Age, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press.

TReaTy An agreement between two or more parties representing distinct national entities, or the formal record of such an agreement, on the future relationship between these entities. In certain cases the agreement may cover other relationships, as with the treaty preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states, signed by several major powers. Treaties are binding in international law, as laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969. A treaty may be multilateral or bilateral, specific or indefinite in duration. Treaty making involves negotiation, signature, ratification, exchange of ratifications, publication, proclamation and execution. Multilateral treaties include the United Nations Charter, the Treaty of Rome on European Integration and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. See also: International Law.

Further Reading Ciment, J. and Hill, K. (eds) (1999) Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, Vols I–II, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn. Cox, M., Booth, K. and Dunne, T. (eds) (1999) The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics, 1989–1999, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Luttwak, E. and Koehl, S. (1991) The Dictionary of Modern War, New York: HarperCollins. Townshend, C. (ed.) (1997) The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern Warfare, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ToTaliTaRianism Totalitarianism is a tyranny exercised in the name of the entire citizenry with their active participation, voluntary or coerced. It is characteristic of fascist and communist governments, but it 251

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Administration with the onset of the Cold War. The Marshall Plan put into practice the Doctrine’s objectives. The Truman Doctrine represented a break with American foreign policy tradition and marked the beginnings of a containment policy. It was the first of a series of economic and military aid programmes that became a regular feature of American foreign policy. See also: Cold War; Marshall Plan.

Degenhardt, H.W. (1968) Treaties and Alliances of the World, 3rd edn, Harlow, Essex: Longman.

TRuman doCTRine, 1947 This was a policy expounded by President Truman in a message to Congress in 1947. He said that the USA should commit itself to support free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. The message was in support of his request for economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, to help them withstand Communist subversion, and it signalled a change to all-out anti-Communism by the Truman

Bibliography and Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

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u2 spy plane inCidenT In May 1960 an American U2 aircraft, on an authorised secret reconnaissance flight from Pakistan to Norway was shot down over the Soviet Union and its pilot, Gary Powers, was captured. The Russian view was that the plane had deliberately violated Soviet air space to wreck the summit talks between Eisenhower and Khrushchev which were due to take place that month in Paris. The Russians insisted that it was on a spying mission. At first the Americans maintained that the plane must have gone off course while carrying out weather research, but the evidence showed it had been spying. Khrushchev demanded an apology from Eisenhower for this incident before he would attend the summit. The President refused, the Summit was effectively ruined and his proposed visit to the Soviet Union was cancelled. In August 1960 Powers was given a 10year detention (three years in prison and seven years in a labour camp) for admitting to flying on a spying mission over the Soviet Union on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency. Powers was proved to have flown over Sverdlovsk, the Soviet armaments centre, photographing arms factories and missile sites. In February 1962 he was part of a spy swap in Berlin, in exchange for a former KGB Colonel, Rudolph Abel, imprisoned in the United States for spying in 1957. The U2 flights over the Soviet Union proved that high-altitude photography could yield considerable intelligence information. NATO strategy was modified after these events, which ushered in a danger-

ous period of nuclear stand-off between the superpowers. See also: Cold War; NATO. Bibliography and Further Reading McCauley, M. (2004) Russia, America and the Cold War, 2nd edn, Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education.

uniTed kingdom (uk) The United Kingdom emerged from the Second World War victorious, but almost bankrupt, which affected her foreign and domestic policy. Crippled by indebtedness, loss of capital and devaluation of the currency, she lost her position as a major power. However, the United Kingdom was a founder member of NATO in 1949 and tested its first atom bomb in 1952. The major Cold War campaign in which the United Kingdom participated was Korea (1950–53). Between 1945 and 1960, most of the United Kingdom’s colonies became independent. Most military campaigns in this period were part of the imperial rundown; by the early 1970s, conflicts linked directly to the end of empire were over. A major turning point was the Franco-British military intervention in the Suez Canal Zone in 1956, which failed because it lacked American support. In 1957, the UK announced that it had detonated its first hydrogen bomb in the Pacific. In the late 1960s the Prime Minister Harold Wilson withdrew British troops from Aden, evacuated all bases east of Suez except for Hong Kong and stopped purchasing arms from the United States. The government faced serious problems 253

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over its handling of the unilateral declaration of independence by a white Southern Rhodesian government, which led nine African countries to sever diplomatic relations with the UK. Nearer home, in 1969 the troubles began in Northern Ireland, where Catholics were demanding equal political rights from the Protestant-run devolved government. The troubles affected Britain, where terrorist outrages caused deaths, injuries and damage. In 1982 the United Kingdom fought a brief, successful war in the Falklands, and in 1984 agreed to pull out of Hong Kong when its 99-year lease ended in 1997. Since 1990, the United Kingdom has been drawn into wars in the Middle East. She fought alongside the United States in the first Gulf War, 1991 and more controversially in the second Gulf War, 2003 in the (mistaken) belief that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. After 11 September 2001, Britain did not hesitate to support NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. The 2003 war in Iraq consistently attracted strong international opposition. In fact, the United States and the United Kingdom were the only permanent members of the UN Security Council in favour of the invasion. As a loyal NATO member, the United Kingdom has been lukewarm to the idea of a separate European defence dimension, which she argues threatens the existence of NATO – and the United States’ involvement in particular. This ties in with the United Kingdom’s long-held view of the importance of its special relationship with the United States – a view arguably held more strongly in London than in Washington. On defence, the Europeans have long relied on the United States, where the real power is. All three British armed services are much smaller in 2007 than in 1945, to the extent that worries are being expressed about ‘overstretch’ in global commitments,

shortages of equipment, the reliability of some equipment and the rapidly soaring defence budget. In an increasingly globalised world, these issues have to be addressed. See also: Decolonisation; NATO; Northern Ireland. Bibliography and Further Reading Barrett, C. (1995) The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities, 1945–1950, London: Macmillan. Colville, J. (1977) The New Elizabethans, 1952–1977, London: Collins. Darwin, J. (1988) Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World, New York: St Martin’s Press. Deighton, A. (1990) The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press, and Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kitson, F. (1977) Bunch of Five, London: Faber & Faber. Morgan, K.O. (1990) The People’s Peace: British History, 1945–1989, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morris, J. (1979) Farewell the Trumpets: An Imperial Retreat, London: Penguin. Taylor, P. (1996) The European Union in the 1990s, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thompson, J. (ed.) (2002) The Imperial War Museum Book of Modern Warfare: British and Commonwealth Forces at War, 1945– 2000, London: Pan.

uniTed naTions (un) The United Nations was created in 1945 to maintain international peace and to foster international co-operation in resolving economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems. It replaced the League of Nations, which had failed to maintain peace. Of the founder members, the majority were European, whereas today the majority of members are from Africa and Asia. The Security Council bears the chief 254

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responsibility for maintaining international peace. The General Assembly meets three times a year and each member state has one, equal vote in the Assembly, which can adopt recommendations. As a body of independent sovereign states, it cannot impose its will on members. Member states make their armed forces available as peacekeepers. After the Korean War, the collective security principle on which the organisation was founded gave way – under the pressure of superpower rivalry – to a watered-down security concept of peacekeeping. Collective international intervention has not been a success, because of the great-power split in the Security Council and the fear of nuclear war. The UN has applied its pacifying and moderating influence to many disputes and situations. Even though its appeals and ceasefire ‘orders’ under peaceful settlement procedures are merely recommendations, and disputants cannot be compelled to obey them, many hostilities have been arrested by the timely intervention of the United Nations. Its prestige as a world organisation has allowed it to pressurise the disputants to accept pacific procedures. In a world of superpower rivalry, it has been difficult for the UN to play the role of impartial policeman, judge and jury to the world. Sanctions imposed on member states have sometimes been successful and sometimes not, depending on the prevailing international situation. In 1945 the major powers assumed that, whatever obligations were incorporated in the Charter, each member could hold on to the right to decide whether to be a party to any projected action relating to peace and security. Thus it was agreed that the Security Council could not decide on important, procedural or substantive matters without the concurrence of the five major powers (the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China). Should any of these

powers be opposed to the measure or act under discussion, and veto it, the Security Council would not go forward. During the early years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union used its veto in the Security Council many times, but many more draft resolutions failed to be adopted because the Western powers, headed by the United States, managed to muster the required majority to defeat these draft resolutions in the General Assembly. Many political conflicts since 1945 have been overshadowed by the major powers; during the Cold War, no international action was taken on any issue until the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union had been considered. China has had a place in the hearts of many Third World nations. France has been the friend of many smaller nations as a result of generally aligning with, but sometimes alienating itself from, the Western powers. The United Kingdom, though its role is diminished, is still significant because it is the headquarters of the Commonwealth. Since 2000, new nations have continued to join the United Nations, though there is only one superpower and of course a trend to a globalised world. The veto has played a role in debates on Yugoslavia, Iraq, Somalia and East Timor, to name but a few conflicts, and will continue to do so. The UN has played a central role in the legitimate, collective resort to force against threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression. The United Nations has many ongoing peace missions: a Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara; a Stabilisation mission in Haiti; an Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo; an operation in Burundi; a mission in Sierra Leone; a Disengagement observer force in the Golan Heights; a peacekeeping force in Cyprus; an Interim Force in Lebanon; a mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea; a mission in Liberia; an interim administration mission in Kosovo; a mission in support of 255

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East Timor; a military observer group in India and Pakistan; an operation in the Ivory Coast; an observer mission in Georgia; and a Truce supervision organisation in Jerusalem. Within the United Nations there are questions over the reform of the Security Council, which is seen as unrepresentative in that it has no permanent members from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa or the Islamic world. Reform is in the hands of the existing permanent members, and unanimous agreement has proved elusive. See also: Cold War; Haiti; Kosovo; Lebanon; Sierra Leone; Soviet Union; United States.

US foreign and defence policy. It lay behind US efforts to support free nations (the Truman Doctrine) by means of NATO and the Marshall Plan. Tense Soviet–US relations culminated in the Cuban Missiles Crisis in October 1962, the nearest the world has come to nuclear Armageddon. President Kennedy invoked the Monroe Doctrine (‘the Americas for the Americans’) to justify his warning to the Soviet Union to keep out of the western hemisphere. The Vietnam War dominated the late 1960s and early 1970s. As it escalated, it caused a wave of protests across the United States and indeed around the world. When North Vietnam effectively defeated the USA in 1975, it was a major blow to the American psyche. However, there were also more positive developments – the rapprochement with China, the SALT arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, and success in bringing together the Egyptian and Israeli leaders. The Iran hostages crisis in 1981, at the United States embassy in Teheran, and Irangate – the scandal of the illegal use of weapons to support counter-revolutionary forces in Nicaragua – were both embarrassments and setbacks for United States foreign policy. By the late 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union were achieving a meeting of minds on many issues. Presidents Reagan and Bush realised that the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, meant business in his desire to halt the arms race. The 1990s were dominated by the first Gulf War, 1991, the Yugoslav Civil War and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. After 11 September 2001, the United States identified North Korea, Iran and Iraq as enemy nations, an axis of evil. The second Gulf War, 2003, followed by the insurgency in Iraq, and the potential for North Korea and Iran to manufacture nuclear weapons proved to be some of the gravest and most difficult issues facing the

Bibliography and Further Reading Encyclopaedia Britannica Almanac 2005 (2004), London: Encyclopaedia Britannica. Luard, E. (1982) A History of the United Nations, New York: St Martin’s Press, and London: Macmillan. Meisler, S. (1995) United Nations: The First Fifty Years, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. Parsons, A. (1995) From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions, 1947–1995, London: Penguin. Patel, A.V. (1992) The UN Veto in World Affairs, 1946–1990, London: UNIFO/ Mansell. Pugh, M. (ed.) (1997) The UN, Peace and Force, London: Frank Cass. Weiss, T. (ed.) (1995) The United Nations and Civil Wars, London: Reinner.

uniTed sTaTes (usa) The Second World War energised the American economy. Afterwards, the USA moved to strengthen the global capitalist system by supporting international institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The United States also faced a global challenge from the Soviet Union. For many years after 1945, the Cold War dominated 256

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United States administration after September 11. In 1945 the United States emerged with her economy and country intact, and without the encumbrance of colonies. Americans have consistently shrugged off a prevailing global view that their foreign and defence policies are driven by capitalism, and argue that they are merely advancing political democracy, which means free elections, a free press and free speech. The country’s military and international responsibilities remain a major factor in the enhanced role of the federal government. The United States, as the only superpower since 1990, has perhaps reluctantly played a dominant role in two controversial issues: policing the New World Order and fighting the War on Terror. The United States has long been the primary target of many foreign terrorist groups; they are tempted by the publicity they receive from the US news media, which reach around the world. The main types of attack have been bombing and kidnapping, and the main targets American businesses or citizens. The largest number of attacks have been in Latin America, followed by Asia, Africa and western Europe. Yet the USA itself, despite having the highest crime rates (and the highest number of illegal weapons in circulation) in the Western world, has remained largely insulated from terrorist violence, and politically motivated crimes are rare. Unlike France, Italy or Germany, the USA has just two parties, which differ little in policy; there are no parties at the extremes of the ideological spectrum. Terrorism is also inhibited by the country’s unparalleled upward economic and social mobility, with plenty of opportunities for social and economic advancement. In addition, the US society is a melting pot, and immigrants have been readily absorbed by the two big parties and integrated into the American

political system. Many other Western nations have violent separatist groups, but there are none in the USA except for a Puerto Rican faction. Three types of terrorist organisation do exist in the USA: ethnic separatist and émigré groups; left-wing radical organisations; and right-wing racist, anti-authority and extreme survivalist-type groups. Two thirds of all terrorism in the USA is carried out by ethnic separatists or émigré terrorists, whose causes and grievances often have little or nothing to do with US politics, yet these groups have been the most persistent and violent. They often spawn successor groups of younger terrorists. But even if they have wide support among their own ethnic group, this is scattered across the country in tightly knit communities, so they have a far smaller constituency than ideological terrorists. Radical leftist groups have existed since the 1960s, when they originated in student movements protesting against the Vietnam War. When the War ended, their influence declined. In the 1980s, US Government attitudes to Central America and South Africa’s apartheid policy gave new life to the Weather Underground, or Weathermen, and the Black Liberation Army (BLA). Since the 1990s, new leftist groups have sprung up – the Revolutionary Armed Task Force, the United Freedom Front, the Armed Resistance Unit and others – focusing on specific issues. Right-wing groups are more violent than their leftist counterparts, and have been able to find new recruits. In some cases they try to enlarge their power base by ostensibly taking action on emotive and controversial issues like abortion. Rightwing terrorists tend to concentrate on specific political issues, apart from the traditional vengeance or ‘date’ groups. Several racist and reactionary groups have surfaced, among them anti-federalists, anti-Semites, racists, other extremists and Christian fundamentalists such as the 257

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Aryan Nations, the Order, the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord. The success of the FBI and other law enforcement bodies in tracking down and arresting wanted or suspected terrorists has undermined right-wing groups and cut the numbers of ethnic terrorists among Armenian and Cuban exiles; also, older members are tired and disillusioned, and there is waning enthusiasm among the young. Domestic left-wing radical organisations always have had trouble recruiting new members. In the 1980s the Jewish Defence League (JDL) used terrorism to draw attention to itself and its causes, to keep up momentum and get an image as an action-led, non-traditional pressure group. Jewish terrorism represents not only an escalation of violence, but a dramatic shift in targeting and tactics, hitting Arab targets in the USA and using assassinations as well as bombings. By these means they tried to gain wider support. The greatest threat to US security has been posed by Al Qaeda, a group which has targeted the USA and shown how vulnerable American society is to mega-terrorism. Countries that have suffered attacks by other Islamic terrorist groups, such as India, Israel and Russia, have proved responsive to American requests for help. But the USA also needs the cooperation of states whose leaders believe that they are not terrorist targets, or that they can easily redirect terror towards other states, and whose citizens may sympathise with Al Qaeda. Since 2001, its core group has scattered and its network has broken up. Al Qaeda seems to be alone in its aim of ridding the Arab world of all US influence or involvement, allowing Al Qaeda to take power in the Gulf and Egypt. Hawks argue that the war against terrorism must be prosecuted ruthlessly for as long as it takes, with follow-up action if necessary. Doves argue for retaliation

against those who planned 9/11, but also believe that the less the USA does in the world, the less it will be a target. Because recent international terrorism has targeted US citizens, most Americans – whether Hawks or Doves – believe the administration has an obligation to protect their lives and property from terrorism. US counter-terrorism policy has focused on preventing acts of terrorism and defending against such acts should prevention fail. Only recently have there been efforts to raise national domestic preparedness. Weapons of Mass Destruction could have catastrophic effects on American society beyond the deaths they might cause. Consequently, management aims to alleviate damage, loss, hardship or suffering caused by emergencies. Incidents of terrorism and tactical violence rapidly consume supplies and equipment. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) defines federal support procedures, which cover transport, communications, public works, engineering, firefighting, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, information and planning, hazardous materials, food and energy. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manages and co-ordinates federal consequence-management response in support of state and local governments. FEMA activates the appropriate FRP elements as needed. Immigration procedures have ranged from exclusion and expulsion to special courts and secret evidence. Under the criminal law, a hard line has been taken using surveillance (wire taps and information access), increased penalties, weapons confiscation and use of the Grand Jury. Other domestic measures have covered aviation security (sky marshals, baggage checks), domestic preparedness (exercises, military aid) and more efficient administration. Some observers argue that too many counter-terrorist measures 258

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affect civil liberties, alienating law-abiding groups and strengthening the resolve of terrorists. Friendly nations may give less help if they believe the measures are too stifling. The US mission to the United Nations has signed formal agreements on extradition and diplomatic security. Non-binding agreements have been agreed at G7/G8 summits. The USA has offered incentives, such as anti-terrorism training, debt reduction and conflict alleviation using facilitation and negotiation, and – against identified state sponsors of terrorism – it has used trade bans, confiscation of assets and import/export controls. There have also been military strikes, assassinations, foreign searches and surveillance. Overseas, security has been heightened at US embassies, there have been intelligence, infiltration, propaganda and rescue missions, negotiations, third-party agreements and the pursuit of suspects leading to formal investigation. Since the end of the Cold War, the USA has been seen as the strongest military power in the world, making it an obvious target for critics of military action or defence spending. America has also attracted criticism by repeatedly saying it does not need allies to win the war against terrorism, which not only goads terrorists into trying to prove it wrong but gives its allies little incentive to offer support. Some observers believe that the USA needs to re-examine its role in world politics and perhaps it was not entirely blameless for what happened on 9/11. Others believe it had little choice but to react as it did. Terrorists can choose to act where American intelligence and prevention are least effective and perhaps where the chance of arrest and punishment are minimised. Not all terrorists do so choose. In April 1995, a home-grown terrorist planted a bomb at a US Federal building in Oklahoma City, killing 160 people. This

was the worst terrorist attack in the country up to that point. Even after 11 September 2001, more Americans had been killed in terrorist atrocities overseas than in the USA. Many terrorists believe that the USA is hell-bent on global domination. It is seen as influencing the big international organisations, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with its hold over the Third World debt on interest, and using them to promote its own agenda for global economics and politics. To Muslim activists, America and Americanism are collective enemies. When Osama bin Laden issues a fatwa to kill Americans, there is always mention of the need to grab US money and assets. It is also resented because it is the home of many multinational corporations, perceived as exploiting the poor. Materialism does not sit comfortably with religious fundamentalism. Muslims fear that US business and culture will take over everywhere. President Bush argued that the Muslim world hates the United States because of its democratic freedoms. Where there is conflict between secular and religious life around the world, the United States is seen as supporting the secular side, yet many extremists are said to mention their hostility to Jewish influence in American news media, financial institutions and government. Fear and hatred seem to be mutual between Islam and the USA; despite this, many Muslims have chosen to live in ‘the Great Satan’. The Islamic world has become more and more angry with the USA. The war in Afghanistan seemed like a war against Muslims, who see themselves as an island of justice, compassion, tolerance, charity and humility in a violent world. Clerics are as important as politicians in many parts of the Islamic world. There is nothing in the Koran against modernity – indeed, young Muslims enjoy pop concerts and films – but, on many issues, Muslims see things 259

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include the Abu Nidal Organisation, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Hamas, Hizbullah, Al Jihad and the Real IRA. In response to threats of terrorist attacks on US territory, the Department of Homeland Security was created in 2001. The same year, Congress passed the controversial Patriot Act, which tightened restrictions on individual liberties in the name of national security. In 2006 President Bush gained an extension to the Patriot Act. Since 2006 the Iraq war – in which more than 4,000 American soldiers have died – has been increasingly unpopular. This was widely seen as the main reason behind the sea change among voters, moving from the Republican Party to the Democrats. American troops remain in Afghanistan and Iraq to help stabilise internal security. See also: Al Qaeda; Chechnya; Cold War; Marshall Plan; New World Order; NATO; Truman Doctrine; United Nations; Vietnam; Weapons of Mass Destruction.

very differently from the US Government. There was bewilderment and anger when the Americans attacked Afghanistan on the basis of allegations rather than international law. When Americans say of the war on terrorism ‘If you are not with us, you are against us’, it causes resentment. There is a perception in the Islamic world, in Pakistan in particular, that the Americans think they are culturally superior and therefore feel they have the right to tell Muslims what to do. The USA needs to understand the psychology of the Islamic world. The Afghan war in 2001–2 showed that many Muslims, even from other countries, were willing to fight the ‘infidel’ invader and if necessary die. They feel they have been humiliated in a fight not of their choosing, not just in Afghanistan but to a greater or lesser extent in Bosnia, Chechnya and Palestine. Globally 1.3 billion Muslims want the United States to adopt a fair and just foreign policy. American governments have maintained that any act of international terrorism is a threat to US national security, whereas domestic terrorism has been seen as a type of criminality. After the first World Trade Center attack in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the Americans became more proactive in countering terrorism at the tactical level of intelligence, security and diplomacy. But the events of September 2001 show there is still cause for concern whether the USA has the intelligence capability and resources to monitor international groups planning action on American soil. The American administration has named over thirty Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTO). The State Department has declared it is unlawful to provide funds or material support to an FTO, financial institutions must block funds FTOs and their agents, and representatives and members of a FTO can be denied visas or excluded from the USA. The groups

Bibliography Ahmed, Samina (2001–2) ‘The United States and Terrorism in South West Asia: September 11 and Beyond’, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 79–93. Booth, K. and Dunne, T. (eds) (2002) Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Falkenrath, R.A., Newman, R.D. and Thayer, B.A. (2000) America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Haass, R.N. (1999) Intervention: The Use of American Military Forces in the Post Cold War World, revd edn, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Heyman, P.B. (1998) Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Study, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Hoffman, B. (1998) Inside Terrorism, London: Victor Gollancz.

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Lowry, M. (1998) The End of the 20th Century: European Security and the Atlantic Alliance, 2nd edn, Special Briefing Notes, London: Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom.

Friedman, N. (2001) ‘The Fifty Years War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War’, RUSI Journal, June, Vol. 146, No. 3, pp. 20–25. McCauley, M. (2004) Russia, America and the Cold War, 2nd edn, Harlow, Essex: Pearson/Longman. Nash, J.R. (1988) The American Response to Terrorism – Terrorism in 20th Century: A Narrative Encyclopaedia from the Anarchists through to Weathermen, to the Unabomber, New York: M. Evans & Co. Trades Union Committee for European and Transatlantic Understanding (2000) NATO, Europe and the Transatlantic Alliance in the 21st Century, London: Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom. Tucker, D. (1977) Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism, Westport CT: Praeger.

Further Reading Bowman, R. (1998) ‘Truth is, We’re Terrorised because We’re Hated’, National Catholic Reporter, Vol. 34 (October), p. 17. Bowman, S. (1994) When the Eagle Screams: America’s Vulnerability to Terrorism, New York: Birch Lane Press. Crockatt. R. (1995) The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941–1991, London: Routledge. Donohue, Laura K. (2001) ‘In the Name of National Security: US Counter-Terrorist Measures, 1960–2000’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Autumn), pp. 15–60.

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vieTnam waR From 1954 a guerrilla war was waged against South Vietnam by the communist Viet Cong, reinforced by North Vietnamese troops from 1959. The war lasted from 1954 to 1975, South Vietnam being aided by the United States from 1961. In 1961 the United States, seeking to halt the spread of communism in SouthEast Asia, began sending troops to help the beleaguered South; by 1969 there were about 550,000. In August 1964, an American destroyer was fired on by North Vietnam patrol boats in the Tonkin Gulf. This resulted in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which gave President Johnson almost unlimited and unchecked authority to commit forces in Vietnam without seeking a formal declaration of war. In 1965, American air raids on the North began. President Johnson reduced American participation and started peace talks in 1968, but the war escalated after President Nixon started the invasion of Cambodia in 1970. A massive communist offensive in 1972, along with rising domestic opposition to the war, prompted the United States to reopen negotiations for peace. These led to the Paris Agreement of 1973 and the withdrawal of American troops. By 1975, the North was victorious, but 900,000 Vietcong and North Vietnamese, 400,000 South Vietnamese and 50,000 Americans had died in the war. Many more were injured. Vietnamese resistance to successive military governments in Saigon, and to the United States which backed them, had succeeded – but at a price. A larger tonnage of bombs was dropped on Vietnam

than during the whole of the Second World War, destroying topsoil, the resulting craters became breeding grounds for mosquitos, chemical and bacteriological weapons (including napalm and defoliants). These caused long-term damage, and over half the villages in the country were destroyed. The Viet Cong refused to fight a conventional war, but chose their targets carefully, launching attacks on isolated patrols and outposts, then quickly retreating. The Americans were forced to engage in a new kind of warfare, when killing became not merely the means of warfare but the end as well. There was also the battle to win the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people. The Viet Cong too saw the value of winning over the peasantry; where this failed, they used intimidation and assassination. In 1967, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese began to infiltrate men and material to the south, preparing for a massive offensive to spark a peasant uprising and force US troops to leave. The nationwide offensive began during Tet – the lunar New Year – a holiday in Vietnam, when southern defences would be at their weakest. Tet led to major losses for the North, but the Communists made it a propaganda victory, showing they could repel anything that was thrown at them. The Americans faced a stark choice: massive force, invasion of the North and possibly nuclear weapons – or withdrawal. The United States adopted Vietnamisation – arming and training the expanded army of South Vietnam, after which American troops would leave – but the situation on the ground did not improve. 262

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The Viet Cong and North Vietnam used Cambodia as a base for operations deep into South Vietnam, so the USA invaded Cambodia in 1970. The North, realising the value to the Americans of Vietnamisation, launched another huge attack in the south in the spring, but their successes were short-lived. Increased bombing, particularly of Hanoi and Haiphong, forced the Communists to the negotiating table, but it was not until 1973 that an agreement was signed. There were numerous ceasefire violations occurred. Nevertheless, the Americans cut back military aid to South Vietnam, undermining morale in Saigon and encouraging Hanoi to carry on fighting. An assault in 1974–75 on key areas in the south led to the final US withdrawal and in April 1975 the North Vietnamese capture of Saigon. In July 1976, North and South were reunited as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which found itself fighting a border war with Cambodia and a brief but bloody incursion by China. For the United States to lose a war to such a small opponent was a traumatic experience, and for the next decade or so the country was unwilling to commit troops to foreign engagements. The war cost American taxpayers over $200 billion, and it still casts a shadow over American foreign policy in South-East Asia. See also: Cold War; Ideological Warfare; Separatism.

violenCe Violence is the practice or an instance of physical force, usually effecting or intended to effect injury and destruction. Direct violence is a deliberate attack that inflicts harm, as in torture and kidnapping. Indirect violence is when violence is inflicted unintentionally or by omission, as when inaction contributes to genocide. Mediated violence can occur when individuals or institutions use weapons of war that damage the health and environment of others. Repressive violence is when people are deprived of their political, civil, social or economic rights. Alienating violence is degrading treatment such as racism, which undermines a person’s rights to emotional, cultural and intellectual respect. Force and coercion (even when coercion involves a threat to use force) should be seen as distinct, since the individual under considerable duress has a formal freedom that the victim of violence does not. Violence robs people of their freedom, and the destructive attribute is inherent in all violence, whether it is perpetrated by the state or against it. Violence can create problems for a state’s pursuit of order; for, after all, states need security against violence. This is when people see the state in action. The resort to violence, whether in tribal or international society, is occasional. States respect international law because they believe it to be in their best interests to do so. The usual cause of violence is that people lack a conception of a common humanity, or cohesive or positively defined common interests. As long as that continues, violence will continue unabated. Yet, normally the perpetrators of violence can be disabled only through counter-violence. So there can be a case for violence. Violence may have to be used not only against illiberal individuals who would otherwise attack their victims, but also against illiberal states. The problem is –

Bibliography Ciment, J. and Hill, K. (eds) (1999) Encyclopaedia of Conflicts since World War II, Vols I–II, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn. Maclear, M. (1981) The Ten Thousand Day War: Vietnam, 1945–1975, New York: St Martin’s Press.

Further Reading Young, M.B. (1991) The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990, New York: Harper Collins/ Harper Perennial.

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can the case for violence be sustained without undermining the case against violence? In the technological and nuclear age of warfare, disputes between states/ nations are assuming a no-win character. See also: Just War.

Approaches to the Study of Conflict, New York: Paragon House. Robertson, D. (1993) Dictionary of Politics, London: Penguin. Ryan, C. (1991) ‘Tourism, Terrorism and Violence: The Risks of Wider World Travel’, Conflict Studies, No. 244, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Bibliography Hassner, P. (1997), transl. Jane Brenton, Violence and Peace from the Atomic Bomb to Ethnic Cleansing, Budapest: Central European University Press. Rapoport, A. (1989) The Origins of Violence:

Further Reading Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury.

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walls Walls have been erected by nations throughout history to mark or protect their territorial integrity, and keep out peoples from another nation or area. Since 1945, walls have been erected in Berlin, Belfast in Northern Ireland, Nicosia in Cyprus and in Palestine. The Berlin Wall was built in 1961 around the Soviet Zone as a result of East German pleas to the Soviet Union about the haemorrhaging effect of thousands of Germans fleeing to the West, which was hurting the economy. This Wall became part of the ideological divide, the Iron Curtain, dividing Communist and capitalist Europe. The wall in Belfast was erected in the 1970s to try to prevent Catholics and Protestants, Republicans and Loyalists, from attacking each other’s houses and streets. The Cypriot wall was put up in Nicosia, the capital city, after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 created the Republic of North Cyprus, which was recognised only by Turkey. The wall effectively separated Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In March 2008 it was removed. Since 2001, Israel has been constructing a concrete barrier along its border with the Palestinian West Bank, in an effort to prevent suicide bombers from attacking Israelis and their cities. A tall fence has been erected along the Israeli border with Gaza. The legal consequences of building such a barrier in the Occupied Palestinian Territory have been placed before the World Court. In 2007–8, US forces in Iraq built ‘temporary’ walls within Baghdad to make it more difficult for urban insurgents to mount attacks.

India has built a very long fence (2,500 miles) around its border with Bangladesh to seal the world’s fifth largest land border. This has been done, according to India, to prevent Islamic extremists, insurgents and illegal immigrants crossing into India. Morocco has built a 1,000-mile barrier in the state of Western Sahara, which it claims. Walls and other barriers are not a success, and in the end the nations that have erected them have had to talk to the people that the walls were meant to keep out. See also: Berlin Wall, 1961; Cyprus; Iron Curtain; Israel: Security Issues. Further Reading Bowyer, R. (2004) Dictionary of Military Terms, 3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury.

waR CRimes TRials These are the trials of persons from defeated states to judge their individual guilt and decide their punishment for war crimes, which the Fourth Geneva Convention defines as ‘wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, . . . taking of hostages and extensive destruction . . . not justified by military necessity’. At the end of the Second World War, twenty-four prominent Nazi war criminals were tried, for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, by an international military tribunal of four judges and four prosecutors, one of each from the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France. Twelve defendants were sentenced to death, others received jail sentences and 265

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three were acquitted. Major Japanese war criminals were tried in Tokyo on similar charges, by judges from the eleven countries at war with Japan. Crimes against humanity are wider than war crimes, because they are not confined to wartime and can be committed against one’s own population. The Nuremberg judgment established the principle that neither officials nor soldiers following orders are relieved of responsibility for war crimes. This principle is now so widely accepted that in July 1998 a permanent International Criminal Court was created to try cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity (including rape and other sexual violence) and genocide. Leaders and military personnel from former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have been brought before this Court at The Hague in the Netherlands, the latest being Radovan Karadźić in 2008. The Yugoslav Serbian President Slobodan Milošević was placed under house arrest in January 2001, and later moved to prison in Belgrade. After much legal wrangling, he was extradited to the Court in The Hague in June 2001. His trial was lengthy and he died in 2005 before it was completed. One leading Serb, Ratko Mladić, still remains in hiding and is wanted in The Hague to face charges of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. In 1996, following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the International Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda was established. It started the proceedings against military officers, clergy, political leaders and directors of the state-run radio station, but it was slow in bringing people to justice. Many have fled to other countries to try to escape prosecution. In the future, the number of cases brought before the International Criminal Court is likely to increase as evidence of genocide and other crimes against humanity emerges in many war zones. See also: Rwanda; Yugoslav Civil War.

Bibliography Plano, J.C. and Olton, R. (1988) The International Relations Directory, 4th edn, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio. Russett, B., Starr, H. and Kinsella, D. (2000) The Menu for Choice, 6th edn, Boston MA: Bedford/St Martin’s.

waR on TeRRoR The report of the Long Commission, on the suicide attacks at the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1985, advocated a military response to terrorism in future. There was already a strong body of opinion within the US Government that terrorism had to be seen as war. Could the military respond? Defining terrorism as ‘war’ placed undue pressure on the military against an ever-changing protagonist – Shi’ite terrorists in the Lebanon, leftist groups in Europe, revolutionary organisations in Latin America or transnational suicide bombers. Even the USA military could not be everywhere at once. The Commission went on to say that fighting terrorism was not the same as planning for warfare against an invader. Terrorists did not pay much attention to military doctrines or structures. At least the report made people think about how to plan, organise, educate, train and defend against terrorists. Terrorism is certainly an alternative to destructive and expensive conventional war. Unlike in war, governments can cease to sponsor terrorism when it no longer serves their purpose, and extradition from a terrorist situation can be easier than from a war. Shortly after 11 September 2001, President Bush predicted a long war on terrorism around the world. Since then the struggle in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda has been seen as a clash between Islamic radicals and Arab governments, which the USA is trying to influence. It is clear that America needs the police and intelligence capabilities of 266

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other states to track and apprehend terrorists. Some observers believe the war on terrorism will have to be broadened to cover a larger group of Islamic radicals and Muslims for whom religious identity overrides political values. In 1991 George Bush senior said that the action against Iraq (the first Gulf War) would make possible a ‘New World Order, a world where the rule of law not the law of the jungle would govern the conduct of nations’. In any war between the civilised world and terrorism, Islam would be the scapegoat and this greatly concerns the many millions of lawabiding Muslims. Many countries in the West have large Muslim communities, so a more violent war on terrorism, with more deaths of Muslims and perhaps invasion of territory, would strain and might break multiculturalism. The September 2001 attacks aimed to destroy some of the symbols and substance of US primacy in the world, but also to kill as many Americans as possible. The USA’s initial response was a commitment to total victory over terrorism, but since then the American aim has been to frustrate, demoralise and beat back Al Qaeda and its associated groups. Victory is likely to be relative, not decisive; and even after a war on terrorism, with all its bloodshed and horrors, there may have to be negotiation and compromise. Yet Al Qaeda seems willing to go on fighting when all is lost. Perhaps one cannot fight a war against terrorists – one can only try to wipe them out, if one is strong enough. Since the First World War, states have made more effort to avoid war, by diplomacy and – in the nuclear-dominated Cold War – by deterrence. Nearly everyone will agree that terrorism can be stemmed only through concerted, sustained international effort. If it proves intractable, terrorism has to be fought with diplomatic, economic, political, military and legal instruments. The struggle should not be made to

serve narrow military objectives nor political, ideological or strategic interests. The war against terrorism is to protect the freedoms and tolerant spirit of pluralist societies. Terrorism rejects pluralism. Death replaces disapproval. Societies that breed terrorists are demoralised societies that have been radicalised. Different facets of political violence came together on September 11: the deliberate killing of innocent civilians for political ends; mass destruction, the deliberate killing of thousands of people because they were Americans or were travelling to the USA; and political suicide by the terrorists. This combination created a new kind of warfare. Since then, the United States has waged war against Islamic terrorists on two fronts: on the foreign front, against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other radical groups and regimes in or around the Middle East; and on the domestic front, beginning with measures against terrorist cells in the USA. All this has made the Arab world suspicious of US intentions. However, in an era of globalisation and multiculturalism, Western civilisations and those in the future may not be able to find effective means to defend themselves against terrorist networks of global reach. See also: Rogue States; Al Qaeda; Axis of Evil; Terrorist States; Taliban. Bibliography Booth, K. and Dunne, T. (eds) (2002) Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Camins, E. (2003) ‘War against Terrorism: Fighting the Military Battle, Losing the Psychological War’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice, Vol. 15, No. 1 (July), pp. 98–113. Carr, C. (1996/7) ‘Terrorism as Warfare: The Lessons of Military History’, World Policy Journal, (Winter), pp. 1–12. Herbst, J. and Mills, G. (2003) ‘Africa and

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the late 1940s had set out details of military co-operation between the Soviet Union and its satellites, but the Pact required agreements on the stationing of Soviet troops and these were signed in 1956–57. In 1987–88, Gorbachev abandoned the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine (giving the Pact a right to intervene in Communist countries) and he would not permit the use of Soviet forces to shore up the national Communist parties. This ensured that the revolution in Eastern Europe was bloodless. After the end of the Cold War, the Pact was weakened and it was dissolved on 1 July 1991. See also: Brezhnev Doctrine; NATO; Soviet Union.

the War on Terror’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 148, No. 5 (October), pp. 12–17. Kurth, J. (2002) ‘The War and the West’, Orbis, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Spring), pp. 321–32. Raufer, X. (1999) ‘New World Disorder, New Terrorism: New Threats for Europe and the Western World’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 30–51. Von Hippel, K. (ed.) (2005) Europe Confronts Terrorism, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Williams, G.L. (2002) Can Terrorism be Defeated?, TUCETU/Atlantic Council UK, Annual Conference, 9 February.

Further Reading Klare, M.T. and Kornbluh, P. (eds) (1988) Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Antiterrorism in the 1980s, New York: Pantheon. Livingstone, N. (1982) The War against Terrorism, Lexington: Heath. Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. (2000) The Future of Terrorism, London: Frank Cass. Rivers, G. (1986) The War against Terrorists: How to Win It, New York: Stein & Day. Whittaker, D.J. (2002) Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat, Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education.

Further Reading McCauley, M. (2004) Russia, America and the Cold War, 2nd edn, Harlow, Essex: Pearson/Longman.

waTeR In dry areas of the world, notably in the Middle East, water has become an increasingly rare and contentious resource. For example, the great Tigris and Euphrates rivers flow through Turkey, Syria and Iraq, but they cannot supply enough water to satisfy demand there. Allocating water is a problem in most river basins that are shared by two or more countries – there are 263 such basins, and they account for nearly half the world’s land area and 60 per cent of the freshwater supply. In the near future, the risk is from population growth, causing resource disputes within countries which then spread abroad. Water tends to be viewed as a community resource and disputes are often defused by water agencies or the courts. Water scarcity is just one of a complex mix of stresses that trigger mass movement of people – among the others are cropland loss, deforestation and soil erosion.

waRsaw paCT The Warsaw Pact was a military treaty signed in 1955 by the Soviet Union, Albania (which left in 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania. It set up the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, Communist counterpart to NATO (founded in 1949), with HQ in Moscow and led by members of the Soviet armed forces. The Soviet Union argued that the Pact was necessary because the West had declined to reach an understanding on the future of Germany and Europe. The Soviets argued that, once Europe had a system of collective security, the Pact would be dissolved. Bilateral treaties in 268

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Water is vital to development and, even though competing claims over fresh water may complicate efforts to resolve longstanding conflict, water can be the issue that begins a dialogue in bilateral conflicts. In politically unsettled areas, competing claims for water may be enough to start a conflict. Its allocation can be highly contested. The Indian states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu have disagreed over the use of river water for irrigation. In the Mekong river basin, the construction of the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand has reduced the productivity of upstream fisheries and other livelihoods. In the Okavango River basin, Botswana is claiming water to sustain ecotourism in the basin and its delta, whereas Namibia wants more drinking water for its growing population, and this has led to a dispute. Relations have been strained between Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan over the water from the Syr Danja, a major tributary of the disappearing Aral Sea, and its use for hydropower. ‘Water wars’ seldom lead to violence, but the tensions they cause are pervasive and intractable, resulting in the degradation of political relations, water management and ecosystems. However, there are many more examples of co-operation than conflict. Co-operation covers water quantity and levels, economic development and hydropower. Water can both irritate and unify. As an irritant, water can make good relations bad and bad relations worse. Insufficient access to water is a major cause of lost livelihoods, and thus fuels conflict. This is more likely if a river basin undergoes a large or rapid change, physical or political, such as construction of a dam or irrigation scheme, or territorial realignment, and if each nation is ignorant of the other’s rights and responsibilities. International waters can act as a unifier, since co-operation over extraction for irrigation and drinking

water, dams, flow management and navigation can generate goodwill and regular international contacts. See also: Resources and Conflicts. Bibliography Howard, M. (2001) ‘Mistake to Declare this “War”’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 6 (December), pp. 1–4. Starr, J. (1991) ‘Water Wars’, Foreign Policy, Vol. 82 (Spring), pp. 17–36.

weapons of mass desTRuCTion This is a collective term for three classes of weapons systems: nuclear, biological and chemical. They are distinguished from conventional weapons by the extent of collateral damage, deterrent potential and environmental damage. Such weapons distribute their effects over large areas, so they cannot be limited to military targets. The Cold War never became a hot war partly because the United States and the Soviet Union both had weapons of mass destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, they have increasingly figured in the minds of Western strategic thinkers and planners. The controversy surrounding weapons of mass destruction came to a head in Iraq between the Gulf War, 1991 and the Gulf War, 2003. The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom firmly believed that Saddam Hussein was seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction and that Iraq was part of an axis of evil. The United States advocated attacking Iraq to prevent such weapons getting into the hands of Islamic terrorists. United Nations weapons inspectors, on numerous visits to Iraq, could find no clear evidence of such weapons in Iraq. They reported this in January 2003. Two months later the coalition forces invaded. United Nations Resolution 1540 of April 2004 recognises the threat to international peace and security posed by 269

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nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the means of delivery. It calls for greater efforts to limit the proliferation of such weapons. In line with its dominance in military power, the United States has in recent years embarked unilaterally on a strategy for weapons of mass destruction, which are kept out of sight even in an age of satellite observation. They are rarely used because their use would invite retaliation with weapons of mass destruction, which

could escalate into a hugely destructive war. See also: Environmental and Ecological Security. Bibliography Hough, P. (2004) Understanding Global Security, London: Routledge. Russett, B., Starr, H. and Kinsella, D. (2000) World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 6th edn, Bedford: St Martin’s Press.

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X xenophoBia Xenophobia is the fear or hatred of foreigners, or even strangers, or of their politics and culture. It is closely associated with ethnocentrism and nationalism. It is about a clash between in-groups and outsiders, in which the in-groups emerge victorious. The insiders form perceptions of other people, not as individuals, but as stereotypes of something to be feared or hated. Xenophobes can harbour deep feelings of suspicion and resentment. Foreigners were made scapegoats for the problems of newly independent countries in the years after the Second World War. In the developing world, prejudice against anyone from a former colonial power can lie behind charges of ‘neocolonialism’, though their ostensible targets are those bent on economic exploitation. Xenophobia can also be focused on people living in the same country, as in the antipathy to Russians in eastern Europe, to Muslims in western Europe after September 11, to Asians in parts of East Africa in the 1970s, to Chinese in many parts of Asia and to Jews across the world. Xenophobia is closely linked to nationalism, which as a mass emotion is the most powerful global political force. It creates solidarity and belonging, but it also causes hostility, division, tension and ultimately war between rival nationalist groups and states. Since 1945, nationalism has been a cause of resentment, unrest and insurgency among dependent peoples in Asia and Africa. It is a powerful force in many Western countries and has seen a resurgence in eastern European states and Russia. Xenophobia can also be intercontinental or intercultural – anti-American,

especially since 9/11, and anti-European, especially for Arab and Islamic groups. In 1984 a UN committee on xenophobia said it was an endemic and growing problem in advanced industrial countries, where xenophobia has gained at the expense of tolerance – for instance, where migrant workers face indiscriminate hostility from an indigenous workforce anxious to preserve jobs for itself. See also: Ethnic Conflict; Minorities; Psychology and Conflict. Bibliography Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin.

Further Reading Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1992) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, 2nd revd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought, London: Macmillan Press.

xinjiang Xinjiang (Sinkiang) in the far north-west of China has been an autonomous region since 1955. China’s first nuclear test occurred here on 16 October 1964. Famine and political purges in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s caused many of its inhabitants to flee and take refuge in neighbouring countries. Tensions in the region centre on resentment at repression of Uighur culture – or any nonHan-Chinese culture – and Uighur aspirations to independence. Ethnic tension and acts of ‘terrorism’ by separatists continue to occur. 271

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yalTa ConfeRenCe, 1945 The summit conference in February 1945 at Yalta in the Crimea was attended by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. They agreed on the postwar occupation of Germany by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France, and decided that German surrender must be unconditional. After Yalta, it took many months for the wartime Allies to agree details of the post-war occupation zones in Germany. Signs of the discord to come were already very evident at Yalta, but it was at the follow-up conference at Potsdam in July that the seeds of future crises were sown. However, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, argued that political challenge to the Soviet Union over who should capture Berlin would have prolonged the war and damaged the agreements already hammered out at Yalta. It has been alleged by many historians that the Western Allies had in mind a policy of reducing tensions and averting further conflict by addressing the grievances of states, especially the Soviet Union, dissatisfied with the status quo. The charge of appeasement was levelled at Roosevelt for the concessions he made to Stalin at Yalta over Eastern Europe and China, but Roosevelt was ill at the time. Many believed he was unable to negotiate effectively, delaying decisions and giving in on some issues to bring gruelling bargaining sessions to an end. Stalin was probably aware of this and took advantage. At the time of Yalta, the defeat of Germany was imminent, and many complex

issues had to be resolved. To make this possible, the three leaders adopted bargaining through linkage, bringing together diverse questions so that compromises on one could be traded off against another in a grand deal. Thus, on the table at the same time were such matters as the terms of occupation in Germany, the strategy for defeating Japan and the creation of the United Nations. The Western allies acknowledged the Soviet Army’s presence in eastern Europe and allowed that area to remain under Soviet influence. After considerable bargaining, they agreed on German disarmament and partition, the Russo-Polish frontier, establishment of the United Nations and the composition of the Polish government (the latter being reneged on by the Soviet Union in 1947). In a secret protocol, they also agreed that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan after the war with Germany ended. See also: Potsdam Conference, 1945; Second World War: Consequences. Bibliography Degenhardt, A.W. (1981) Treaties and Alliances of the World, 3rd edn, Harlow, Essex: Longman.

yom kippuR waR, 1973 Yom Kippur (‘Day of Atonement’ in Hebrew) is a Jewish holy day of penitence and cleansing from sin and is marked by a 24-hour total fast. To the Egyptians, it was an ideal time to launch an attack on Israel. In great secrecy for over a year, President Sadat had been 272

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planning a war to reverse Egypt’s defeat in the Six-Day War, 1967. Neither the Israelis nor the Americans believed the Egyptians had the military capacity to cross the Suez Canal in sufficient force to take on the Israelis effectively. But on 6 October 1973 the army of Egypt showed sophistication and intelligence in its planning and, once engaged, its troops fought with tenacity and bravery. Sadat’s aims were to inflict high casualties on the Israelis and force the superpowers to look again at a lasting peace plan for the region. On that first day, the Egyptians destroyed over 100 Israeli tanks while the Syrians launched major tank attacks all along the Golan Heights, where they also broke through the Israeli lines. Israel responded with a rapid mobilisation of reserves. Other Arab countries mobilised and sent over 10,000 troops to fight. Jordan did not go to war, though it sent army units to fight on the Syrian front. Israel remained wary of Jordanian intentions. On the Golan Heights, bitter tank battles – costly to both sides – ended with the Syrians being driven back behind the previous ceasefire line. On the Suez front, the Israelis crossed the Canal to establish a bridgehead near the Nile delta, isolating the town of Suez. After the United Nations arranged a ceasefire, the Israelis extended their lines south of Suez. Egypt received arms from the Soviet Union, while the Americans gave huge supplies to the Israelis. At the height of the fighting, the Arab oil producers agreed to reduce oil production, stop supplies to the USA and the Netherlands (the most vociferously anti-Arab state in Europe) and reduce supplies to other European countries while increasing prices. This greatly weakened Israel’s bargaining position. By the end of October, though Israel had regained the military advantage, the Middle East balance of power had changed: in contrast to the three previous

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wars (1948, 1956 and 1967), Israel no longer seemed invincible. It had lost 3,000 dead, though Egyptian casualties reached 7,700. The oil boycott of pro-Israeli states had given the Arab states unforeseen power. Moreover, when Israel crossed the Suez Canal, African nations saw this as an invasion of their continent and almost all broke off relations with Israel. The United Nations in early 1974 created a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt, and forced Israelis on the Syrian front to withdraw to the pre-1967 line. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) emerged from the war stronger and more confident. The oil weapon gave new leverage to the Arab oil states. A new international economic order was created, based on more equitable North–South relations, an idea that grew out of a Conference on International Economic Co-operation in 1995. All this helped the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which became the crucial factor driving Middle East politics. In Israel, there was a split between those who put their faith in armed force as the surest way to hold the Arabs at bay and those in the peace lobby who wanted real negotiations with their neighbours. To Israel’s chagrin, Western nations were far readier to criticise its actions and side with the Arabs on some issues. Despite intense international pressure to withdraw from the annexed territories, Israel was very reluctant to do so. See also: Israel: Security Issues; Middle East; Syria. Bibliography and Further Reading Arnold, G. (1991) Wars in the Third World since 1945, London: Cassell. Creveld, M. van (1975) Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives, Beverly Hills CA: Sage. Sicherman, H. (1976) Yom Kippur War: End of Illusion?, Beverly Hills CA: Sage.

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yugoslav Civil waR Like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia started to disintegrate at the end of the 1980s. Tito’s communist rule had ended in 1980 and his successors had maintained the powers of the central authority for a further decade. But these had been slowly getting weaker, as too many ethnic and national aspirations began to re-awaken. In June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, the former peacefully. However, Serbs invaded Croatia and were halted short of Zagreb. In October, Bosnia Hercegovina voted to become independent, but no one minority had control and this allowed Croats and Serbs to take advantage of the situation. Towns and villages were devastated. In Vukovar, a Croat town, over 1,000 people died in an 86-day siege. The United Nations tried to broker a ceasefire and failed, but in 1992 they managed to get UN troops deployed. In April, the United States and European Union recognised Bosnian independence, but the new nation had problems with rival ethnic groups: 44 per cent Muslim, 31 per cent Serb and 17 per cent Croat. Backed by their compatriots in Serbia, Bosnian Serbs began eliminating Muslims in the first round of what became known as ethnic cleansing. Sarajevo also came under siege for the first time. By the end of 1992, Serbs controlled 70 per cent of Bosnia and a Muslim-Croat alliance the rest. After further reports of Serb ethnic cleansing operations in Bosnia, the United Nations Security Council established an International War Crimes Tribunal in 1993 – the first of its kind since 1945. Serbs attacked the Muslim city of Srebrenica. Although a United Nations humanitarian convoy reached the city, it later surrendered to Bosnian Serbs. Over 8,000 men and boys were killed by the Bosnian Serb forces in July 1995. An Anglo-American peace plan was rejected, as was a ‘mini-state’ plan whereby Bosnia

would be divided on ethnic lines; neither Serbs nor Muslims were prepared to give up land. The siege of Sarajevo continued into 1994 and NATO, after considering whether to intervene, started to enforce a no-fly zone to protect Bosnians from Serb attack. The first NATO offensive action in its history occurred when four Serb warplanes were shot down after breaching the zone. The United Nations declared Muslim enclaves safe areas and NATO took action to prevent Bosnian Serb aggression by bombing a Serb-held airfield in Croatia. By 1995 Bosnian Serb activity had intensified in northern Croatia around Bihac and Tuzla, and the Serbs started to seize unarmed United Nations military observers to use as human shields. On British and French initiatives, a Rapid Reaction Force was set up consisting of troops who could be moved wherever needed on the Bosnian battlefield. A large number of United Nations Protection Force troops and NATO planes were now based in the area and Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces were growing in numbers. In July, Srebrenica was attacked again and in the ensuing action against it and Zepa – a Muslim safe haven – over 15,000 Muslims were taken from under the noses of United Nations peacekeepers and eliminated (ethnically cleansed). The assault on Sarajevo was renewed. Bosnian Croat forces crossed from Croatia into Bosnia, driving the Bosnian Serbs away and killing hundreds in an attack on Knin. The Bosnian Serbs defied NATO by continuing to attack Sarajevo; NATO in turn attacked their units. The Serbian leader Milošević said they must obey NATO. After a meeting between the three warring groups in Geneva in September 1995, they all agreed to go to Dayton, Ohio, to try to iron out their differences under the watchful eye of President Clinton. Tentative agreement was reached that 274

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would allow Bosnia to achieve some peace. In December, the first American troops reached Bosnia to be part of a new NATOled Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). In the Bosnian conflict over 200,000 civilians had been killed and two million made homeless. The Dayton Accords brought an end to the ethnic fighting in former Yugoslavia and created a similar, yet partitioned Bosnia. In 1996 the first Serbs were indicted at the International War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague. UN peacekeepers found over 200 mass graves, including those of thousands of Muslims at the Sušica detention camp. In November, a Bosnian Serb soldier, Dražen Erdemovic, was the first to be indicted for mass executions and sentenced to death. See also: Albania; Dayton Accords, 1995; Ethnic Conflict; Kosovo; NATO; Sarajevo; War Crimes Trials.

Bibliography and Further Reading Allcock, J.B., Milivojevic, M. and Horton, J.J. (1998) Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: An Encyclopaedia, Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio. Biberaj, E. (1989) ‘Yugoslavia: A Continuing Crisis?’, Conflict Studies, No. 225, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Glenny, Mischa (1996) The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 3rd edn, London: Penguin. Pavkovic, A. (1996) The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan. Silber, L. and Little, A. (1997) Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, New York: Penguin. Zametica, J. (1992) ‘The Yugoslav Conflict’, Adelphi Paper, No. 270, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

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Amnesty International BBC News Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) European Union Genocide Watch International Boundaries Research Unit International Crisis Group International Institute for Strategic Studies North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OSCE Royal Institute for International Affairs Royal United Services Institute Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) UK Foreign Office United Nations UN Department of Peacekeeping UNHCR UN International Court of Justice UNWRA US Department of Homeland Security US Mission to NATO US Department of State Western European Union

276

www.amnesty.org http://news.bbc.co.uk www.cia.gov/index www.ec.europa.eu www.genocidewatch.org www.dur.ac.uk/ibru www.crisisgroup.org www.isn.ethz.ch www.nato.int www.osce.org www.riia.org www.rusi.org www.sipri.org www.fco.gov.uk www.un.org www.un.org/depts www.unhcr.ch www.icj-cij.org www.un.org/unrwa www.dhs.gov http://nato.usmission.gov www.state.gov www.weu.int

ChRonology of main evenTs

1945–48

1945 February 1945 8 May 1945 June 1945 July 1945 15 August 1945 August 1945 September 1945 1946–49 1946–54 1946–57 1946 March 1946 1947–48 1947–49 1947

March 1947 October 1947 1948

February 1948 May 1948 June 1948–May 1949 1949 April 1949 April–July 1949

Indonesia: colonial war Eastern Europe – communist takeover Cold War begins Germany divided into East and West Yalta Conference VE Day United Nations created Potsdam Conference VJ Day Atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki Second World War ends China Civil War Vietnam/Indochina war Columbia civil war ‘Kurdistan’ briefly independent Churchill’s ‘iron curtain’ speech at Fulton, Missouri, USA Madagascar colonial war Israel war independence India partition – Pakistan created Marshall Plan Rio Treaty – Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Truman Doctrine Cominform created Malaya – Communist insurgency (ends 1960) Kashmir tensions begin Organisation of American States founded Palestine struggle for independence begins (ongoing in 2007 – has been more active from mid-1960s) Yugoslav stand off with Soviet Union Czechoslovakia coup Israeli state created Berlin blockade USSR develops an atomic bomb NATO created Yangtse Incident 277

chronology oF main events

1950 May 1950 June 1950–53 1951

1952 May 1952–60 1953 March 1953 June 1953 1954–62 1954 May 1954 June–July 1954 September 1954 1955–60 1955

1956 February 1956 November 1956 1957 March 1957 October 1957 1958–59 1958 1959 1960–65 1960–75 1960 February 1960

Kenya – Mau Mau emergency begins Soviet Union announces it has ‘A’ bomb Korean War started when North Korea invades South Korea Korea – Battle of Imjin River ANZUS Pact (Australia, New Zealand and United States) Organisation of Central American States created Iran – nationalisation of oil fields causes tension in region Mau Mau emergency in Kenya Korean War ends with armistice Stalin dies East Germany – riots by workers over pay and conditions Algeria colonial insurrection German rearmament approved and joins NATO French garrison in Dien Bien Phu surrenders after a two month siege – ends French rule in Indochina Geneva Conference Vietnam divided into North and South along 17° parallel South East Asia Treaty Organisation created Cyprus colonial war Bandung Conference non aligned nations Baghdad Pact – Iran, Iraq and Turkey Warsaw Pact formed West Germany joined NATO Austria reunified Hungary: insurrection – suppressed by Soviet Union Suez Canal zone invaded after Egypt nationalises Canal Khrushchev’s secret speech at 20th Party Congress UN’s first peacekeeping force in Middle East Rapacki Plan for nuclear free zone in Central Europe Haiti coup Eisenhower Doctrine European Economic Union created Space age starts – Sputnik circles earth Cuban Civil War China-Taiwan tensions over Quemoy and Matsu Islands China invades Tibet Congo (Zaire) – civil wars Laos and Vietnam – second Indochina war Development of intercontinental ballistic missiles France explodes atomic bomb 278

chronology oF main events

March 1960 May 1960 June 1960 1961–63 1961–75 1961 May 1961 August 1961 1962–69 1962–65 1962

October 1962 1963–66 1963–72 1963 June 1963 November 1963 1964–67 March 1964 October 1964 1965–75 1965

1966–69 1966 May 1967–70 June 1967 1968

South Africa Sharpeville massacre American U2 aircraft shot down over Soviet Union Namibia – SWAPO founded Seven Central and South American military governments overthrown in military coups Angola colonial war Kuwait threatened with occupation by Iraq South Africa left the Commonwealth and became a republic Berlin Wall: building begins North Yemen Civil War Portuguese Guinea colonial war Indo-Chinese War Nassau Agreement by UK and USA over Polaris missiles Cuban Missile Crisis Indonesian-Malaysia border war Sudan civil war Organisation of African Unity founded ‘Hot line’ agreement between two superpowers President Kennedy assassinated Aden – full scale insurgency against British rule Military coup in Brazil China explodes atomic bomb Mozambique colonial uprising India-Pakistan border war Chad civil war Rhodesia – unilateral independence with white minority rule Tashkent Conference – India and Pakistan peace proposals over Kashmir USA sends 100,000 combat troops to South Vietnam to fight Vietnamese Communists Ostpolitik: East–West Europe reconciliation created by Willy Brandt China – Cultural Revolution begins Nigeria: Biafra secession attempts fail Middle East – Six-Day War Northern Ireland – latest troubles start Vietnam – massacre at Mi Lai by some American troops North Korea – US naval intelligence ship USS Pueblo seized by North Koreans Czechoslovakia: Soviet invasion to suppress ‘Prague Spring’ freedom moves 279

chronology oF main events

January 1968 May 1968 July 1968 October 1968 1969 March 1969 July 1969 September 1969 1970–75 1970–77 1970 1971–79 1971 1972–80 1972

1973–80 1973

January 1973 October 1973 1974–76 1974–91 1974

1975–76 1975–77 1975–78 1975–92 1975 1976–82 1976 June 1976

Tet offensive: Vietcong guerrillas and North Vietnamese regulars attack South Vietnam cities France – student riots in Paris spark virtual revolution Brezhnev Doctrine Northern Ireland Troubles start Nixon Doctrine USSR–China border fighting along Ussuri River in dispute over Damansky Island El Salvador and Honduras ‘Football’ War Libya coup by Colonel Gadaffi Cambodia – Indo-China war Oman – bloodless coup; Dhofar attacks across border Jordan – Black September formed: civil war occurs Uganda civil wars and massacres Pakistan civil war leads to creation of Bangladesh India–Pakistan war Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) colonial wars Northern Ireland – Bloody Sunday USA–China rapprochement First use of laser-guided bombs (‘smart bombs’) SALT 1 signed Western Sahara – tensions with Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria Chile – dirty war; military coup overthrows Marxist regime East and West Germany – Basic Treaty UK joins European Economic Community Middle East–Yom Kippur war Collapse of Portuguese rule in Africa Ethiopia civil war to 1991 Cyprus civil war and Turkish intervention – island partitioned Anti-Ballistic Missile Protocol SALT 2 parameters agreed Angola civil war UK–Iceland Cod War Netherlands – South Moluccans launch terrorist attacks Cambodia genocide instigated by Pol Pot Lebanon – civil war Vietnam – fall of Saigon to Vietcong Argentina – ‘dirty war’ Somalia – invasion of Ethiopia over claims to Ogaden Desert Uganda – Entebbe Raid 280

chronology oF main events

August 1976 December 1976 1977–78 1978–79 1978–89 1978–December 1989 1978 1979–92 1979–88 1979

1980s 1980

September 1980–88 1981–90 1981 December 1981 1982

June 1982 March 1983 September 1983 October 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 December 1987

Helsinki Final Act signed and entered into force Indonesia invades East Timor Somalia and Ethiopia: Ogaden War Tanzania and Uganda War Cambodia: Vietnamese Invasion Civilian rule re-established in eight South American countries Camp David Agreement: Israel and Egypt El Salvador: civil war Iran–Iraq war Iran: revolution brings Ayatollah Khomeini to power China and Vietnam: Chinese invasion Uganda: civil wars and banditry Rhodesia – end of white rule Afghanistan – Soviet invasion Vietnam invaded Cambodia USA: Three Mile Island nuclear leak Pakistan – growing Islamicisation ‘Solidarity’ trade union emerges in Poland Zimbabwe – independence under black majority rule UK: siege at Iranian Embassy – relieved by SAS troops Development of cruise missiles begins Iraq invaded Iran Nicaragua–Contra insurrection Belize independence Kosovo riots against Serbians control Poland: tensions with Soviet Union over Solidarity trade union – martial law until 1983 Falklands: war between UK and Argentina Lebanon – Israel invasion Sri Lanka – intermittent actions by Tamils against Sinhalese majority starts START talks commence Strategic Defence Initiative initiated by President Reagan Korean civilian passenger plane shot down by Soviet Union Coup in Grenada and American invasion India: Sikh and other insurrections Chernobyl nuclear leak Gorbachev comes to power in the Soviet Union South Yemen civil war Fiji: military coup Palestine intifada (uprising) begins 281

chronology oF main events

1988

1989

December 1989

1990–February 1991 1990–91 1990

February 1990 1991–96 1991–99 1991

March 1991 December 1991 1992–94 1992

1993–95 September 1993 1994

April 1994

Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict Kashmir – tensions resurface over Nagorno-Karabakh enclave UK: Pan Am jumbo jet blown up over Lockerbie Eastern Europe – Velvet Revolution: collapse of Communist rule Berlin Wall demolished Al Qaeda created in Pakistan by Osama bin Laden United States invasion of Panama to remove Manuel Noriega Romania – short bloody coup to topple Ceaușescu regime Kuwait – Gulf War as a result of Iraqi invasion New World Order begins German reunification Free elections: Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia Cruise missiles first used in combat in Gulf War South African government legalises African National Congress; Mandela released from jail Yugoslavia civil war: Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia Sierra Leone civil war Cold War ends Haiti military coup NATO’s first post Cold War strategic concept and force structure approved START draft treaty Guatemala recognizes Belize and ends border war Warsaw Pact disbanded USSR ceases to exist Commonwealth of Independent States created Somalia – US troops invade to restore order NATO forces enforce UN arms blockade on former Yugoslavia Macedonia – independence from former Yugoslavia USA–Russia Joint Understanding on Strategic Offensive Arms signed Eritrea independence from Ethiopia Sarajevo siege Israel and PLO sign Oslo Peace Accords NATO Partnership for Peace established South Africa: end of apartheid Afghanistan: Taliban come to power Rwanda genocide 282

chronology oF main events

December 1994– August 1996 1995–2007 1995 June 1995–96 September 1996 December 1996 May 1997 1998 1999–2002 March–June 1999

June 1999

2001–3 2001 September 2001 2002 January 2002

March 2003 2004–5 2005 June–July 2006 May 2007 2007–8

Chechnya civil war Dagestan unrest Somalia: intermittent civil war Japan – gas attack on Tokyo subway system Dayton Accords – to try to end conflict in Yugoslavia Saudi Arabia – attacks on American air bases Oslo Peace Accords Bosnian Peace Treaty NATO–Russia agreement clears way for NATO expansion to the East US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania attacked India and Pakistan nuclear tests Chechnya: civil war NATO begins prolonged air assault against Yugoslavia in response to continued attacks on ethnic Albanians in Kosovo NATO suspends bombing in Yugoslavia; peace settlement leads to peacekeeping forces and autonomy for Kosovo Liberia – civil war September 11 attack on Twin Towers in New York. NATO-led push in Afghanistan to oust Taliban Homeland Security System created in USA North Korea: nuclear weapons programme crisis starts President Bush cites North Korea, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Cuba and Iran as belonging to ‘axis of evil’ Guantanamo Bay (Camp X Ray) opened on US base in Cuba Iraq – Allied invasion led by US and UK Middle East/Africa: steps towards democracy in many countries Israeli disengagement from Gaza Lebanon – Israeli invasion Northern Ireland power-sharing agreement between Sinn Fein and Democratic Unionist Party Tensions with Iran over its nuclear programme Tensions USA/Russia over citing of early warning radar sites in Europe; and spheres of influence in the Caucasus region

283

index

index

(1954–62) 43; colons 9; Council of Revolution 10; refugees and 120; revolution and 212 Allende, Salvador 37 Al Qaeda (The Base) 6–8; bioterrorism and 28; Chechnya and 33, 35; global threats 83; Iraq and 123; Libya and 146; Pakistan 189; and September 11 223; America: Bandung Conference and 22–3; ceasefire in Bosnia 64; Cuban Missile Crisis 59; and Grenada 87; invulnerability 84; and missiles 238; nationals killed by Moslems 7; policy makers 148; rogue states and 76; Sixth Fleet 73; Soviet rivalry 45–51; technology 38; troops and civil disobedience 39; unhappiness with NATO over finance 165; vulnerability to terrorism 96 amnesty 10 Ananda Marg 99 anarchism 11 Anderson, Terry 144 Andropov, Yuri: and Brezhnev Doctrine 29 Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) 126 Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921) 125 Angola 12–13, 15, 53, 176; as intrastate conflict 116 Angolan Civil War (1974–2002) 12–13, 42–3; landmines and 149 Animal Liberation Front 198 Antarctic 14; and global warming 44; and nuclear proliferation 182; and nuclear testing 183 Antarctic Treaty (1959) 14 anthrax 28 Anti-American issues and Pan Nationalism 191 Anti Ballistic Missile Protocol 14, 22 Anti-Personnel Mine Convention (1997) 141 ANZUS (1951) 14–15 Aouzou strip 173 apartheid 15–16, 257

A.B.M. Treaty 14; and ballistic missile defence 22 Abdullah Azzam 6 Abdullah Ocalan 139 Abel, R. 253 accidental war 3 Action Directe 199 Adams, Gerry 180 Adair, Johnny 179 Aden 3, 7 Afghanistan: Afghan Arabs 64; Al Qaeda in 8; bioterrorism in nearby states 30; China and 38; deterrence 63; and drugs 163; ethnic conflict in 75; and frontiers 80; humanitarian operations in 97; landmines 141; mine clearing and mine awareness 193; Mujaheddin in 199; opium trafficking in 211; and refugees 208; religious issues in 209; revolution and 212; SALT and 217; Saudi Arabia and 218; September 11 repercussions 223; Soviet invasion (1979) 4, 17, 31, 46, 162, 220; Soviet troops depart 85; Special Forces in 233; Taliban and 244; and terrorism 130; United States and war 259–61 Africa: conflicts in 52–5; Cuban involvement 58; and international political system 109; longest civil war 13; and North–South global issues 175; peacekeeping forces 145; peoples 128; political parties 55; selfawareness and political confidence 52; Southern 55; Soviet influence in 26 Africa North East 173; piracy and 194–5 African National Congress 11–12, 15 Ahern, Bertie 127, 180 AIDS 94–5 Aksariyyat majority 118 Albania 9, 31; Albanian Workers Party 9; Kosovo and 75, 137–8; non-signatory Helsinki Accords 93 Al Fatah 143 Algeria 6, 9–10; child soldiers 36; Civil War

284

index

Aqaliyyat minority 118 Arab alliance in Gulf War 89 Arab Deterrent Force 143 Arab–Israeli clashes 155 Arab–Israeli conflict and mediation 155 Arab-Moslem north of Africa 54, 131, 190 and Jordan 133 Arab oil producers 272–3 Arab world 155 arbitration 16 Arctic: and global warming 44 Argentina 16, 37, 69; and Falklands 78, 141 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand 92 Armageddon 60, 256 Armed Movement for the Liberation of Iran 118 Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) 10 Armenians 162 arms production: globalisation of 17 arms sales and trade 16–17 Asia-Pacific region 251 Assad, Bashar President 242 Assad, Hafeez al President 241–2 asymmetrical warfare 17 Atlantic Charter (1941) 65 attitudes, conflicts and crises 17–19 Attlee, Clement 202 Australia 14 Austria 19 Austrian Neutrality (1955) 19 Awami League 23 ‘axis of evil’ 19–20, 119; North Korea and 174 Ayatollah Khomeini 116–17; Iran–Iraq War (1988) 119, 129 Azerbaijan: ethnic conflict in 75, 117; Nagorno Karabakh 162; Autonomist Movement 117 Ayodhya 100

balance of power: definition 21; and New World Order 169 ‘balance of terror’: and atomic bombs on Hiroshima/Nagasaki 94; definition 21; and polycentrism 201 Balkans and NATO operations 165 Ballistic Missile Defence 22 Baluchis 117 Baluchistan 117, 189 Bamboo Curtain 128 Bandaranaike, Stanley 235 banditry 52–3 Bandung Conference (1955) 22–3, 65; and neutralism 168; and Non-Aligned Movement 172; and peaceful coexistence 193 Bangladesh 41, 229; and border fence with India 265; Bangladesh War of Independence (1971) 23; and genocide 81; and Indian intervention 97, 99 Bani-Sadr, President 119 Bao Dai, Emperor 101 Barre, Siad 228 Barzani, Mustapha 121 Basques 199 Beirut 143–4, 266 Belarus 210, 214 Belfast 124; wall in 265 Belgium 164 Belize 24, 32 Benghazi, United States bombing of 146 Bering Straits 44 Berlin 51, 272 Berlin Blockade (1948) 24, 72 Berlin Wall (1961) 25, 34, 128, 265 Bhutto, Benazir 189 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali 188 Biafra 25–6; civil war in 42; ethnic conflicts in 75 bilateral conflict behaviour 50 bilateral international conventions 107 bilateral security agreements 26 biological agents 36 biological weapons 28 bioterrorism 27–8 bipolarity 29; and conflict 111 bipolar competition 68 bipolar system: and Helsinki Accords 93; and New World Order 170

Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party 122; government overthrown 123 bacteriological bombs and weapons 36, 39 Baghdad 57 Baghdad Pact (1955) 33 Bahai’s 119 Bahrain 129 Baidoa 228 Bakhtiar, Dr. Shapoor 118 Bakongo tribe 12

285

index

Black Panthers 198 Blair, Tony 127, 179–80 Bolivia 58, 162, 203 Bombay (Mumbai) 100 borders and frontiers 80 Border and Transportation Security 96 Borneo 102, 211 Bosnia 57, 260; arbitration with Serbia 16; and Civil War (1992–5) 81; and civilian deaths 272–3; and Dayton Accords 64; and genocide in 81; and landmines 141; and peacekeeping 193; and relations with Serbia and Montenegro 16; 224; and SFOR operations 165 Bosnian Croat forces and attacks on Bosnian Serbs 274 Bosnia Hercegovina 65, 137, 170, 274 Bosnian Peace Treaty (1995) 65 Bosnian Serbs 218; and attacks on Moslems 274; and war crimes 275 Bosnia Serb state (Republika Srpska) 65, 218 Botswana 269 Brandt, Willy 67; and Ostpolitik 186–7 Brazil 81, 142; and North–South global issues 176; and Rio Treaty (1947) 213; and Security for the Planet 176, 220 Brcko 16 Brezhnev, Leonid 29 Brezhnev Doctrine (1968) 29, 268 Britain and H bomb 183; and surprise attacks 241 British: Airways flight seized in Kuwait 89; Army in Ireland 125; colonial authorities in Kashmir 135–6; colonial authorities in Kenya 151; fishing fleet in Icelandic waters 45; forces in Falklands 78; forces in Korea 137; forces in Sierra Leone 225; India and Partition 191; leave Northern Ireland 180; sovereign bases in Cyprus 60; in Suez Crisis (1956) 239 British Honduras 24 Brunei 102 Buddhism in Sri Lanka 235 Buddhist monks protesting in Tibet 249 Bulgaria 62, 149, 187, 231; and Warsaw Pact 268 Burkina Faso 203 Burma (Myanmar) 31, 71, 86, 163; and AIDS 95

Burundi 53, 215 Bush, President George (Snr.): signs START I and II agreements 236–7 Calabar 26 Callan, Colonel 3 Cambodia 30–1; and genocide 81; and independence 69; and narcotic trade 162; and Paris Peace Settlement 30; and resource looting 211; and role of Prince Sihanouk 101; and role in Vietnam War 262–3 Cameroon 54 Camp David Agreement (1978) 31 Canada and North American Free Trade Association 142; and Rio Treaty 213 Canadian troops in Haiti 92 Canary Wharf 178 Caribbean Sea 24 Caribbean Security: among Eastern Caribbean states 87; and Haiti 92; and United Nations 256 Carter, President Jimmy 31; relations with James Callaghan 233 Caspian Sea 32 Castro, Fidel 13, 58 Catholics in Northern Ireland 126, 159, 176–80; and emancipation 124; and rights 254 censorship 153 Central Africa 176 Central African Republic 81 Central America 31, 82, 176, 257 Central Asia and Caucasus 32–3, and international political system 109 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 7, 20, 39, 121; in Chile 37; and Iran 116; and Iraq 39 Central Treaty Organisation 33 Chad 53, 146, 173; civil war in 42–3, 176; and Organisation of African Unity 185; and poverty and debt 203 Charter of San Salvador 31 Chatila and Sabra Palestinian refugee camps 144 Chechnya 32, 34–5, 64, 214, 227; and ethnic conflict 75; and separatism ideals 222; and United States foreign policy 260 Chechen Mafia 6 chemical agents 35

286

index

chemical and bacteriological bombs (CB) 36 chemical and biological weapons 28, 35–6 Cherikha 118 Chernobyl 3, 181 child soldiers 36 Chile: arbitration with Argentina 16; 1973 coup 37; and genocide 81; and isolationism 131; and Pinochet 142 China: relations with Albania 9; and attitude to Gulf War (2003) 90; and ballistic missile defence 14; and Bandung Conference 22; clash with Soviet Union over Damansky Island 64; and détente 67; support for National Front in Angola 13; and globalisation 83; and grain crises 44; and Hong Kong Issue 96; improving relations with United States 226; influence as potential superpower 220; influence on Third World 255; and information warfare 100; and Kashmir 135; and role in Korean War 136–7, 147; and national role of states 238; as nuclear power 94; nuclear weapons and START 236; and peaceful coexistence 193; and political geography 196; politics and world outlook 37–8; and polycentrism 201; post Second World War tensions with Soviet Union 220; as power rival to United States in Pacific 251; claims on Spratly and Paracel Islands 234; and rapprochement with United States 172, 256; recognition as state by Soviet Union 226; relations with Soviet Union and Japan 38; relations with Taiwan 170, 243–4; and issue of sovereignty over Tibet 249; testing nuclear weapon 70, 183; and Tiananmen protests 86; and Tiananmen Square demonstrations 226; war with India (1962) 226; and role in United Nations 255; in World Nuclear Club 182; and xenophobia 271; and Yalta Conference 272 Chinese Civil War (1945–9) 42, 220, 243 Chinese incursions India and Pakistan 23 Chinese People’s Liberation Army 249 Chinese Revolution (1949) 212 Christofias, Dimitris President 61 Christian/Islamic relations 128, 155; in Eritrea 74; in Iraq 89; in Lebanon 143–4, in Pakistan 189; in Syria 241 Christianity 9, 119 Christians and attitudes: to millennial

violence 158; to pacifism 188 church: persecuted in Soviet satellites 71 Churchill: relations with Roosevelt 233; at Yalta Conference 272 civil defence 39 civil disobedience 39–40 civil–military relations 40 civil rights 40 Civil Rights Act (United States) 40 civil war 40–3, 48; and guerrilla warfare 87; in Ireland (1922–3) 125; and local war 147; and political geography 196; in Third World 176 climatic change 43–4; and fossil fuels 83; and globalisation 83 Clinton, President 6, 174, 178; and Dayton Peace Treaty 274; and Oslo Peace Accords 186; and relations with John Major 233 Cod War (1975–6) 44–5 Cold War 3, 154; American–Soviet rivalry 45–51; and arms sales 16–17; and Austrian neutrality 19; and balance of power 21, and bipolarity 29; and climatic issues 44, and conflicts 48–9; and Cuban Missiles Crisis 58–60; end of (1990) 9; and deterrence 67; and disarmament 70; and domino theory 71; and Eisenhower Doctrine 72; and ethnic conflict 75; and fear of nuclear annihilation 94; and Gorbachev Doctrine 85; and Helsinki Accords 93; and humanitarian intervention 97; and Iceland base 45; and ideological warfare 99; ideology and 75; and Indo-Pakistan conflict 68; and Latin America 142; and low-intensity conflict 148; and mediation 155; and military globalisation 156; and military–industrial complex in both superpowers 157; and issues around Mutual Assured Destruction 160; and negotiation 169; never a hot war 269; and NATO 164; and position of NATO 104; and negotiation 170; and Non-Aligned Movement 172; and North–South global issues 175; and nuclear materials 181; and partition issues 191; and peace 192; and peaceful coexistence 193; and peacekeeping 194; political and historic developments 45–7; and propaganda 203–4; and proxy

287

index

warfare 204; and refugee crises 97; rhetoric 46; in South Asia 229; Soviet attitudes 231; and Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia 63; and Soviet psychological offensive of ideas 205; and spheres of influence 234; and Stalinism 236; and ‘Star Wars’ project 232; and Suez Crisis 239; and summit negotiations 240; superpowers 238; tensions 201; Titoism 250; compared with Total War 250; and United States 256; leaves United States as sole superpower at end of 259; and Warsaw Pact 268; and Weapons of Mass Destruction 269 Cole, USS 7, 8 collective sanctions 107–8 collective security 47 collective self defence 134 Colombia 36, 210; and narcotics trade 162–3 Colombo 235 colonial intrusion 65 Combined Loyalist Military Command 179 Cominform 9 Commonwealth 15, 233; and Fiji 79; and Zimbabwe 54 Commonwealth of Independent States 214 Communism 29 Communism in Eastern Europe 19, 29, 45–6, 98, 195; and Helsinki Accords 93; in North Vietnam 163, 262; in South Africa 11 Communist influence in conflicts: in Cambodia 30; in Indo-China 101; in Indonesia and Malaya 102, 150; in Korea 136–7; in Middle East 72 Communist Party of India (MarxistLeninist) 100; of Soviet Union 214 Communist parties in Western Europe 230 conciliation 48 condominium 177 Conference on International Economic Cooperation (1995) 273 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 33–4 Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe 93 conflict 48–9 conflict approaches and attitudes to 18 conflict behaviour 48, 50–1

conflict behaviour: bilateral and persuasive 50 conflict escalation 104 conflict and ethnic issues 48–9 conflicts and governments 86 conflict and HIV spread 95 conflict: low intensity 41 conflict and media role 152–3 conflict perceptions; between superpowers; interpreting Cold War events 51–2 conflict and poverty and debt 203 conflict psychology 104, 204–5 conflict resolution 105–7 conflict and resources 210–12 conflicts and tensions between nation states 52–3 conflict termination 52 Congo 36, 43, 53; and refugees and resources 210 Congo Crisis (1960–5) 55–6 Contact Group of Nations 224 Continuity Irish Republican Army 180 Contras 32, 121 Convention on Prohibition of Development, Production & Stockpiling of Nuclear Weapons 36 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) (1990) 33 Council of Europe 19 Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 151 Council of Revolution in Iran 117 coup d’état (putsch) 56–7; in Grenada 87 Crimea 272 crises and frequency, attitudes to 18 crisis and risk management 57 Croat-Moslem Federation 218 Croatia: and Dayton Accords 64; and ethnic issues 75; and independence referendum in Bosnia 218; and refugees 208; and relations with Bosnia and Serbia 170; and role in Yugoslav Civil War 274 cruise missiles; exocets; precision guided or smart weapons 57–8 Cuba 13, 31, 186; and exiles in United States 258; and international sanctions 113–14; and relations with Soviet Union 231; as supporter of Somalia 228; trade boycott by United States 169; viewed as supporter of terrorism 174

288

index

Cuban Missiles Crisis (1962) 3, 256; and biological attack planned by Americans 27; developments during crisis 58–60, 62, 67 Cuban Revolution (1959) 58, 212 Cuban troops in Angola 15; military support 42 cults 158, 209–10 Cultural Revolution 96, 150, 194 cyanide bombs 122 cyber-biotech terrorism 169 Cyprus 60–1; and irredentism 128; military tension in region 165; partition 191; tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriots 60–1; and treatment of Turkish Cypriots pre 1974 60; and Wall on island 265 Czechoslovakia: and Brezhnev Doctrine 29; and civil disobedience 39; and Communist Elite 62; Communists regain power 63; and international political system 109; and Iron Curtain 128; and non-violent resistance 173; and Ostpolitik 187; and Rapacki Plan 207; and reform 62; and relations with other Warsaw Pact members 268; relations with Soviet Union 231: and surprise attack by Soviet Union 241

deterrence 18, 67–8; and international conflict resolution 105; nuclear 94 Dhahran (1996) 218 Diana, Princess and anti-landmines campaign 141 Dien Bien Phu (1954) 68–9, 101 diplomatic relations: broadened in Albania 9 dirty war and Argentina 78 Djibouti 53, 173 Doe, President Samuel 145 Domesday scenario 28 domestic disorder 49 domino effect 136 domino theory 150 drug trafficking 32–3 Drumcree 178 Druze 143–4 Dubai Islamic Bank 7 Dubček, Alexander 62 Dublin 124, 177 Dudayev, Dzhokhar 34 Dutch and decolonisation of Indonesia 176 Duvalier, Francois (‘Papa Doc’) 92 East Berlin 72 Eastern Europe 93; and end of Cold War 25; and improving trade balances 230; and Stalinism 236; states beset by ethnic and nationalist rivalries 222; Velvet Revolution (1989) 212; and Warsaw Pact 268 East Germany 62, 109, 187 East Germany: riots 72 East Jerusalem 133, 190 East Pakistan 23 East Prussia 76 East–West divisions and conflict 220 Ecuador 163; and Rio Treaty (1947) 213 Eden, Anthony 239 Egypt 6, 228; dispute with Sudan over Halayeb region 173, 174; and North–South global issues 176; and ‘rejectionist’ groups 246 Eisenhower Doctrine 72–3 Elbe River 80 El Salvador 16, 31 142, 153, 208; and Football War 79–80; and Panama 191 environmental resources and scarcity 142, 211 Eritrea 51, 74, 75, 228; and United Nations mission 255

Dagestan 32, 35, 64 Damansky Island 64, 226 Danube 109 Darfur (Sudan) 54, 209, 220 Dalit Panthers 100 Dawah Party 122 Dayton Accords (1995) 64–5 de-Arabisation 155 Debray, Regis 88 debt issues in Latin America 142 decolonisation 42, 65–6 Defence White Paper United Kingdom (1966) 4 demilitarisation 66 demilitarised zone 137 Democratic Party Kurdistan 121 Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan) 244 Democratic Unionist Party (Ulster) 127, 180 Deng Xiao Ping 243 Denktash, Rauf 61 détente 46, 66–7, 93

289

index

Eritrean Popular Liberation Front 74 escalation 18, 48, 74–5; of conflicts 104; and violence 258 Estonia 46 Ethiopia 53, 74, 107, 204; and peace with Somalia 228; and strife in North-East Africa 173–4; and United Nations 255 ethnic conflict and environmental security 73; varieties of 75–6 Eurocommunism 230 Europe: and close ties with COMECON 230; energy weak countries 210; future discussed at Potsdam 202; and peace in Yugoslavia 218; and political geography 196; and reduction in conventional weapons 85; and Serbian membership 225; and spread of Al Qaeda 7, 8; and summits 240 European détente 9 European Economic Community 163 European groups and property attacks 199; campaigns of political violence 200 European Union 76, 139; and New World Order 169 Europeans: fled from Algeria 10 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 164 Executive Government for Northern Ireland 179

France 45; and atom bomb testing 70, 182, 183; and Austrian neutrality 19; and Dien Bien Phu 68–9; and globalisation 83; and Gulf War (1991) 89; and Gulf War (2003) 90; as member of Contact Group of Nations 224; post Second World War 220; shares in Suez Canal Company 239; and Suez Crisis (1956) 239; and War Crimes Trials 265; and Yalta Conference 272 Franco-British military intervention in Suez Canal zone (1956) 253 Free World 168 French Union (1946) 52 French zones occupation in Germany 202 Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) 10 Front for Liberation of Western Somalia 228 frontiers 80–1; and ethnic factors 80 functionalism in international relations 111–12 fundamentalist revolution 130 Gadaffi, Colonel (Muammer al-Khaddafi) 146 gaige (reform) 38 Galtieri, General 78 game theory 112 Gandhi, Mohandas (Mahatma) 188; and non- violent resistance 173 Gaza 131–2, 190 Gdansk 195 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 175 General Belgrano 78 Geneva Accords 101 Geneva Summit (1955) 240 genocide 81; and media reporting 153; and Rwanda 215 geopolitics 82; and planet security 220; and Six-Day War (1967) 227 Georgia 43, 75; open to energy import problems 210; relations with Russia 76 German Democratic Republic 25 German economic recovery post 1945 202; technology 122 Germany 25, 57; cost of Second World War 219; and total war 250 Ghana 146 Ghedi, Ali Mohammed 228 Gillani, Yousaf Raza 190

Falkland Islands and irredentism 128 Falklands War (1982) 78–9, 254; and landmines 141; and psychology 205; and Special Forces 233 Fatah Revolutionary Council – Abu Nidal Organisation 122, 204 Fedayeen guerrillas in Iran: Cherikha; Aqaliyyat minority and Aksariyyat majority 118 Federal Building Oklahoma City 171 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 258 Federal Response Plans 258 Fédération d’action nationaliste et européenne (FANE) 199 Fiji 79 First World War 154 Football War: Honduras/El Salvador (1980) 79–80 Foreign Terrorist Organisations 260 Fortress Europe 76

290

index

glasnost 58 global: environmental change 43–4, 73; temperature trends 44; threats beyond terror 82–3 globalisation: and environmental and ecological security 73; and insurgency 84; of justice 221; and geopolitics 82; and of resources 211 Golan Heights 227, 242, 273 Golden Temple incident (1984) 99 Good Friday Agreement (1998) 179–80 Goose Green 78 Gorbachev, President Mikail 29, 157; and Nagorno Karabakh 162; and reforms in Russia 214; and relations with United States 256; and START talks 236; visits China 226 Gorbachev Doctrine 29; aims and ideals 84–5; as alternative to Brezhnev Doctrine 29 Gottwald, Clement 62 Government of Ireland Act (1920) 124 Gowon, General 25 Grand Hotel, Brighton 126 Grand Jury 258 Greece 60; and boundary demarcation 193; and the Colonels’ junta 133; and expulsion of Turks 159; and Truman Doctrine (1947) 252 Greek Civil War (1944–8) and Macedonia 149 Greek Cypriots 60–1 Greenpeace 14 Grenada 97 Grivas, General 60 Grotius, Hugo 134 Grozny 35 Guantanamo Bay 20 Guatemala 24, 31; and Belize 24 guerrilla activity: and oil in Gulf War 89 Guevara, Che 80, 87 Gujurat 100 Gulf States and mediation 156 Gulf War (1991) 122; chemical and biological weapons 36; and cruise missiles 57; and Eisenhower Doctrine 73; and just war 134; and Kurds 139; and Libya 146; and mediation 155; and New World Order 170; and oil 89; and Palestine 190; and sanctions 114; and Special Forces 233; and

United Nations 254; and Weapons of Mass Destruction 269 Gulf War (2003): outbreak of war 90–1; and relations between Arabs 155; and surprise attacks 241; and United Nations 254; and United States 256; and Weapons of Mass Destruction 269 Gulf War Syndrome 95 Habyarimana, President J. 215 Haddad, Major Saad 144 Hafizullah Amin 4 Haiphong 263 Haiti 92; and civil war 142; and disarming paramilitary groups 193; and humanitarian intervention 97; and United Nations Stabilisation Mission 255 Halabja cyanide bomb, attack on (1988) 27, 139 Hama: insurrection in 241 Hamas 116, 131–2, 190 Hamburg 223 Hanoi 263 Harakat ul-Mujahedin 189 Hariri, Rafik 242 Harriet, Mount 78 haves and have-nots 92–3 hawks and doves 93 Hammarskjöld, Dag 56 Helsinki Accords (1975): and Albanian hostility 9; details 93–4; and disarmament 70 Hepatitis B and C 95 Higgins, Col. W 144 Himalayas: and Bhutan 131; as natural barrier 109, 196; and Sino-Indian War (1962) 226 Hindus 99; and fanatical elements 229; and millennial violence 158 Hiroshima 94 Hispaniola 92 Hizbullah 119, 132; in South Lebanon 145, 204 HMS Endurance 78 Holocaust 81 Homeland Security 96 Honduras: and Belize 24; and Football War 79; and poverty and debt 203 Hong Kong 96; and Taiwan 243 Hoxha, Enver 9

291

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humanitarian intervention details 97 Hungary: and international political system 109; and Iron Curtain 128; and repercussions of Soviet Invasion 201; Soviet invasion of 97–8; and Suez Crisis (1956) 97; and Warsaw Pact 268 Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV): epidemic 54; security issues 94–5 Hutus: in Burundi 81; and civil war in Rwanda 53–4; in power 215; tensions with Tutsis 220

intelligence 103–4 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and START treaties 236–7 inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts 32 intergovernmental organisation 104 Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty 85 International Assistance Security Force Afghanistan 5 international conflict 104–5 international conflict resolution: institutions and procedures 105–6 international conventions (treaties) 107 International Court of Justice 107 International Criminal Court: created 266; and genocide cases 81 international law: 107–8; and reciprocal nature 230; and sanctions 2; and total war 250 International Monetary Fund: and aid to North-East Africa 173; and globalisation 83; and Third World debt on interest 259 international politics and conflict 110 international political system: states and power 108–9 international relations theories 110–12 international sanctions 113–14 International War Crimes Tribunal 224; and Rwanda 266; and Serbs indicted at 275; and Yugoslavia Civil War crimes 274 Internet and World Wide Web 169 interstate conflicts 114–15 intervention 115 intifada (uprising) 115 Iran: and arms trade 17; and axis of evil 19; and child soldiers 36; and Council of Revolution 117; and development potential 176; and fundamentalist revolution 129; hostage crisis (1981) 256; and international politics 114; and Islamic Jihad 246; left-wing groups 118; and minority population 156; and nuclear testing 183; and potential nuclear issues 182; relations with the West 117; revolutionary seizure of power 212; as rogue state 213; and secret agents 119; separatists groups in 117; Shah of 39; and Shi’ite spiritual leaders 117; support for Islamic Courts Militia 228; and support for terrorism 174; and War on Terror 166

Ibo (Nigeria) 26 Iceland: and use of gunboats in Cod War 44 ideological warfare 99 India: attacks by Islamic terrorist groups 258; and Bamboo Curtain 128; and Bangladesh 23; and border with Pakistan 193; and child soldiers 36; conflict with Pakistan 68, 189; and ethnic conflict 75; and fence on border with Bangladesh 260; and humanitarian intervention 97; and Islamic activists 189; and Kashmir 100, 135–6, 166; and military–industrial complex 157; and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) analogy in nuclear stand off with Pakistan 160; and neutralism 168; and partition 23; and religious groups 99; and resources in states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu 269; and tensions with Pakistan endemic 229; and United Nations military observer group 256 Indian parties in Fiji 79 Indo-China 101 Indonesia: and civil wars 43; and international system 109; and neutralism 168; and North–South global issues 176 Indonesia and child soldiers 36 Indonesia / Malaya Confrontation (1963–66) 102 Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 96 information gathering by United Nations 106 information warfare globalisation 103 Inguish 34 Ingushetia 32 Inner Mongolia ‘alienated’ territory of China 38 insurgent types 4

292

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‘Irangate’ – Iran–Contra Affair 121; and psychological issues 205; and United States oil needs 121 Iranian Embassy Siege (1980) 117 Iranian–Iraqi border tensions 80 Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) 121; aims of both sides 119; ceasefire 88; stages of conflict 120 Iraq: and Al Qaeda 8; and annexation of Kuwait (1990) 250; and axis of evil 19; and Ba’ath Party and Syria 122; and biological weapons 27, 36; and collapsing oil prices (1991) 88–9; and Communist Party 122; and cost of conflicts 124; and ethnic conflict 75; and genocide 81; history 121; and humanitarian intervention 97; and inspection by United Nations of military sites 123; and international sanctions 114; relations with Iran 122; and Kurds 21–2; and military equipment and missiles (1991) 89; and minority population 156; not supported by Libya in Gulf War 146; and refugees 209; and relations with Russia 214; and religious inspired violence 209; as rogue state 213; and Saddam Hussein influence 123 and security since 2003 123–4; and Six-Day War (1967) 227; and Sunni Moslems 122; and support for terrorism 122–3; terrorism training area 245; and United Nations relations 122; and United Nations weapons inspectors 90; and Weapons of Mass Destruction 269–70 Ireland: and attitudes to Northern Ireland 177; and extreme groups both Protestant and Catholic 126; history 124; and international political system 109; and issues of a united Ireland 177; and political relations with United Kingdom 126–7; reaction to British military presence 126; relations with Ulster 126; and separatism 222 Irish Northern Aid Committee 178 Irish Republican Army: and activities in Northern Ireland 176–180; and attack on 10 Downing Street 89; development and growing influence 125 Iron Curtain 127–8 irredentism 128 Islam: and conflicts with West 129; fear and

hatred mutual with United States 259; and Moslem clerics 130; and power of clerics 259; and revival 128–9; and Shia group 129; and spiritual community 128; and Sunni group 129; and terrorism 129 Islamic clergy 7 Islamic creed; revival of 4, 128 Islamic Courts Militia: in Somalia 228–9 Islamic fundamentalism: and axis of evil 20; as protest movement 130; Islamic resentment to the West 20; and rise of 256 Islamic groups: and millennial violence 158; and xenophobia 271 Islamic Jihad 116, 242 Islamic law 5 Islamic movements 33 Islamic principles 116 Islamic radicals and War on Terror 267 Islamic secessionist guerrillas: trying to create Islamic state in Chechnya 35 Islamic terrorists 90 Islamic world 4; and Eritrea 74; and psychology 260; and Western culture 84 isolationism 130–1 Israel: and arbitration 16; and attacks by Arab nations (1973) 241; and Camp David Agreement (1978) 31; and child soldiers 36; and conflict perceptions 51; resolve to defeat Islamic extremism 20; and international politics 114; and intifada 115–16; attacks on by Islamic fundamentalist group 258; and Jordan civil war 133; and Lebanon 143; and mediation 154; and nuclear club 182; and nuclear weapons 183; and Oslo Peace Accords (1993) 186; rapprochement with Libya 146; recognised by Soviet Union 85; and relations with Palestine 190; and security issues 131; and settlements below Golan Heights 227; and surprise attacks on Egypt (1967) 241; and wall around West Bank 116; and war in Lebanon 144–5; and with United Kingdom and France attacks Egypt (1956) 241; and Yom Kippur War (1973) 272–3 Israeli–Jordanian borders 227 Israeli–Palestinian conflict: and negotiations and peace talks 167 Israeli–Syrian borders 227

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Italian colonial power decline 173 Italy 257

209; and separatist groups 100; and terrorism 245; and Western support and international law166 Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 135 Kazakhs 33 Kazakhstan 27, 32, 34, 237, 269 Kennedy, President John F. 58–9 Kenya: and conflicts in Africa 53–4; and Mau Mau 151; and North-East Africa 173–4 Kenyatta, Jomo 151 Khartoum 42 Kharg Island 120 Khmer Rouge 30–1; involved in genocide 81; and resource looting 211 Khomeini, Ayatollah: and effect on Iran (1979–1989) 116; and Iran–Iraq War (1988) 119; and Iranian revolution in 129 Khrushchev, Nikita 58–9; and Chechens 34; and peaceful coexistence 193; and speech at 21st Party Congress 236; and U2 spy plane incident 253; and virgin lands scheme 44 Khuzestan: Arabs 117; province 117 Kikuyu 151 Kim Il Sung 174 Kim Jong Il 174 King, Martin Luther 188 Kinshasa 13 Kissinger, Henry: and international relations theories implementation 110 Klerides, Glafkos: Greek Cypriot leader 61 Knin, many hundreds Bosnian Serbs killed 274 Koran 128 Korean War (1950–3): and Chinese intervention 243; course of conflict 136–7; and demilitarisation 66; instability in South and East Asia 101; and United Nations role 255 Korramshahr 117 Kosovan Liberation Army 137 Kosovan–Serbian relations 137, 224 Kosovars 137 Kosovo: and Albanian majority 224; and historical and political developments 137–8, and on interim administration in 255; and KFOR 165; and Macedonian links 149; and a NATO offensive 138; and Russian interest 170–1 Kosygin, Alexei 64

Jaffna 235 Jakarta 102 Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam 244; Islamic 115, 242, 246; Jihad warriors 7, 8; Pakistan 189; and participation 123 Jammu 135 Japan: and atomic bomb attacks 94; and consequences of Second World War 220; and globalisation 82; and military– industrial complex 157; and technological strength 230 Japanese Red Army 174 Jenin 186 Jewish nation 109; holy day of Yom Kippur 272; in United States media 259 Jewish settlements in West Bank 115, 186, 190 Jewish symbol: Star of David as a 155 Jewry, World 109 Jews: and religious millenarians 158; and use of violence in exile 199 Johnson–Wilson period and special relationship 233 Jordan: attack on airfields in Six-Day War 227; civil war (1970) 133; diplomacy 154; and Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy 154; and Lebanon 143 Jordanian army 133 Judaism: and Palestine 190 junta 133 just war 134 justice in a war (jus in bello) 134 justice of a war (jus ad bellum) 134 Kabbah, President: and request for United Nations role in Sierra Leone 225 Kabul 244 Kadima party 131 kaifang (openness) in China 38 Kandahar 244 Karadźić, Radovan on the run facing charges of war crimes 266 Karzai, President Hamid 5 Kasai province in Congo 56 Kasavubu, Joseph 55–6 Kashmir 68; and historical and political developments 135–6; and religious issues

294

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Kurdish: Democratic Party in Iran 118, 121; Legislative Council 121; Separatists 122; Socialist Party 121; Sunni Moslem Movement in Iran 118; Workers Party (PKK) 139 Kurdistan 120 Kurds 27, 97, 117, 120; and agitation in Syria 139; and international issues 139; in Iran and genocide 81; as minority in Iraq 156; and regional distribution oil revenues 123; role in Gulf War (1991) 139; as separatists 123–4 Kuwait: invaded by Iraq (1990) 89, 114, 122; and Iraqi surprise attack on 241 Kyrenia 60 Kyrgyz 33 Kyrgyzstan 169, 269

228; United Nations mission in 255 Libya: and Islam 129; and links to global terrorism 146–7; and North–South global issues 176; and oil 146; and sponsor of terrorism 246 Likud Party 155 limited wars and escalation 75; definition 147 Litvinenko, Alexander 215 Lobito 13 local war: definition 147 Lockerbie bombing (1988) 146; and media 153 London Implementation Conference: and Dayton Accords 65 London park, IRA bomb attack in (1982) 126; IRA bomb in City of London (1992) 178 Londonderry 126; and Bloody Sunday (1972) 177 low intensity conflict: compared to civil war 41; definition and development 147–8 Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) 179 Loyalists: in Northern Ireland 178; and stopped from attacking Republicans by a Wall 265 Luanda 13 Lumumba, Patrice 55–6 Luxemburg 164

Ladakh 226 landmines 141 Latin America 16, 58; American citizens kidnapped in 257; and American military interventions 162; and Caribbean 87; and juntas 133; and Organisation of American States (OAS) 185–6; and poverty and debt 203; reaction to Chilean coup (1973) 37; and role in international relations 142; and United Nations Security Council 256 Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1967) 142 League of Nations 254 Lebanese Civil War (1975–6) 42–3 Lebanon 19–20, 73, 129; and Christian forces in South 143; involvement in external/ internal conflicts 143–5; and Israeli incursions and invasions 144–5; and kidnapping and hostage taking 144, 205; and North–South global issues 176; and refugees 208–9; and Shi’ite terrorism 266; and terrorism 245, 246; and United Nations Interim Force 145, 255 Lenin shipyards in Gdansk 195 Lezgin: Sunni Moslems in Dagestan 64 Lhasa 249 Liberia: and conflicts in Africa 53–4; and human rights abuses 146; an internal conflict 114, 145–6; an intrastate conflict 116; and Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 185; pro Islamic courts in Somalia

MacArthur, General Douglas 136 Macedonia (FYROM, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia): historical and political developments 149 Macmillan, Harold and Nassau Agreement (1962) 163 Majlis al Shura (Consultancy Council) 7 Makarios, President: and Cyprus crisis 60 Malawi 53, 54, 168 Malaya: decolonisation 176; the Emergency (1948–60) 149–50; and revolution 212 Malaysia: and confrontation with Indonesia (1963–6) 102; as multinational state 109; and Spratly and Paracel Islands 234 Mali 53 Malta: and international political position 109 Manchester: IRA bomb in city centre 178 Manchuria: China feared Soviet shelling from Damansky Island 64; and limited war 147 Mandela, Dr Nelson 11, 15

295

index

Manipur 100 Mao Ze Dong 29; influence in China and globally 37–8; and Taiwan 243 Maoism as an ideology 37, 150 Maoist insurgency strategy and Indian Naxalites 100 Maronite Catholics 143 Maronite Christians and Lebanese Civil War 43 Maronites 144 Marsh Arabs: and attempt to eliminate them in Iraq 123 Marshall Aid: refused to Czechoslovakia 61–2 Marshall Plan: aim 150–1; and Cold War 45; and new plan for ecological development 73; and support for free nations 256; and Truman Doctrine 252 Marxism: influence in Angolan Civil War 12 Marxism-Leninism and Brezhnev Doctrine (1968) 29 Marxists: in Angola and proxy war 15; rule in Nicaragua 31 Maskhadov, Aslan: and Chechnya 34 Masoud, Ahmad: in Afghanistan 244 Matsu 243 Mau Mau – the organisation 151 Mauritania and phosphates; unrest over resources 44, 109, 176 Maze Prison 179 Mbeki, President Thabo 11 McGuinness, Martin 127, 180 media 152–4; response to international events 153; terrorists and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 89 mediation and attitudes to conflicts and crises 18, 154 Mediterranean and United States Sixth Fleet 165 Melanesians in Fiji 79 mestizos in Angola 13 Mexico 163 Middle East: and arms sales surge post Gulf War 89; balance of power 273; and CENTO 33; changing demographics 220–1; conflict and terrorism and Six-Day War 227; and Eisenhower Doctrine 72–3; and globalisation 84; and importance of oil 109; and mediation attempts 154; and oil supplies 219; and Palestine Liberation

Organisation 273; peace talks 190; possible links with Osama bin Laden 20; and proxy wars 204; radical groups and regimes in 267; and religious conflicts 49; settlement and Camp David Agreement 31; and Soviet Union peace initiatives 85; and targets in United States 258; tensions and conflicts 154–6; and terrorist violence 245 militarism 156 Military Committee of NATO 164 military globalisation 156–7 military–industrial complex 157 MI6: 8, 180 military leaders and intelligence role 104 military leadership and power 157–8 military security and neutralism 168 Milosevic, Slobodan 224; and International Criminal Court 266; and Sarajevo siege 274 Ministerial Council: North and South in Ireland 179 minorities: human security and conflict 159 Mizo National Front 100 Mizoram 100 Mladić, Ratko 266 Mobutu, Joseph: and Congo Crisis (1960–5) 56 Mogadishu 228 Moldova (1990): viability 221 Molotov cocktails 198 Montenegro: and Albania 9; and Kosovo 138; and referendum 224; and selfdetermination 221 Montoneros: and political violence 200 Moroccan student and September 11 223 Morocco and barrier with Western Sahara 265 Moscow 3, 213; demonstrations (1991) 214; hot line with Washington (1963) 39; ideological independence from 201; and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 230; and support for liberation groups 231; terrorist attacks in 214; and Warsaw Pact headquarters 268 Moscow Radio 86 Moscow Summit (1988) 85 Moslem: in Afghanistan 5; clerics 130; and fear of United States business and culture 259; and fighting infidel 260;

296

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fundamentalists in Iran 116; and Holy War thoughts 130; rebel incursions in Chechnya 64; majority in Lebanon 43; military groups in Algeria 10; and millennial violence 158; religious identity 130; revival in Chechnya 35; in Sarajevo 218; safe haven in Yugoslavia 274; spiritual leaders 129; state as terrorist states 129; symbols 155; threats 99; and War on Terror 267; and world strategic issues 209; and Yugoslav Civil War 274 Moslem brotherhood 33; in Syria 241 Moslem and Christian tensions: in Lebanon 143; ‘us’ and ‘them’ views 220 monarchist groups in Iran 118 Moslem Nasserite 146 Moslem world and Osama bin Laden 7; and level of support for Al Qaeda 8 Mozambique: and conflicts in Africa 53; and intrastate conflicts 116; and offer of independence 12; wars decolonisation 176 Mugabe, Robert: increasing autocratic rule as Zimbabwe President and Prime Minister 54 Muhammed the prophet 128 Mujaheddin guerrillas: in Afghanistan 199 multinationals: and conflict 159–60; corporations management 86; oil and mining corporations 210 multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) 217, 236 multipolar system and balance of power 21 Musharraf, President Pervez: actions as President of Pakistan 189–90; and Afghanistan 5 Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD): definition and development 160–1 Myanmar (Burma) and narcotics 162–3

in Iran 118 National Democratic Front: in Iran 118 National Democratic Patriotic Front: in Iraq 122 National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) 42 National Liberation Front (NLF): in Aden 4 National Resistance Movement: in Iran 118 National Unity Party for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 12 National Volunteer Force (1924) 125 nationalism: and total war 250 Nawaz, Sharif Muhammad 189 Naxalites: in India 100 Nazism: and Czech liberation from 61 negotiation 167–8 neo-functionalism 112 Nepal: and Maoist influence 150; on periphery in South Asia 229 Neto, Agostinho and Angolan Civil War (1974–2002) 12–13 neutral states: in Europe 93 neutralism: and Bandung Conference 22; definition 168 new terrorism: in 21st Century 170–1 New World Order: and conflict 49; and humanitarian intervention 97; and lowintensity conflict 148; and Middle East 154 New York 28 Ngo Dinh Diem 101 Nicaragua: and American military presence 31; anti-American forces in 191; and crisis management of conflict 86; guerrillas and terrorist states: 246; and guerrilla war 31–2; and intrastate conflict 116; and revolution 212; and Rio Treaty 213; pro Soviet viewpoints 176; and terrorism propaganda 153 Nicosia and a divided community 265 Niger Delta 211 Nigeria: and ethnic conflict 75; and nonaligned nation 176; oil 20; peacekeeping troops in Sierra Leone 193 Nigerian Civil War 42; 53–4; and Biafra 25–6 Nile Delta 273 9/11: Al Qaeda and 7–8; details 222–4; and effects on xenophobia 271; and NATO 165–6; and terrorism 245–6; and United States 256–7; and War on Terror 266–7 Nixon Doctrine 171–2

Naga: separatist movement 100 Nagasaki and atomic bomb 94 Nagorno-Karabakh 162 Nagy, Imre and Hungary (1956) 97 Namibia 54 narcotics (illicit drugs) 142 Nassau Agreement (1962) 163 Nasser, President Gamal 155; and Suez Crisis (1956) 239–40 National Congolese Movement 55 National Council of Resistance for Liberty:

297

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Nkrumah Kwame and neutralism 168 Non-Aligned Movement: and development of 172; role in Middle East 155 Non-Governmental Organisation: definition 172 non-violent resistance: definition 172 Noriega, Manuel General 191 normative theory 112 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: and actions in Kosovo 137–8; and base at Keflavik 45; bombing in Bosnia (1995) 97; bombing in Serbia 149; and conflict perceptions 51; and Dayton Accords 65; and eastward expansion 170; and Eisenhower Doctrine 72; enlargement of 76; and Helsinki Accords 93; participation, historical and political developments 164–7; and lead in Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) 275; and plans for a single nuclear force 70; and protection of Albania 9; and Rapacki Plan 207; in Serbia and Montenegro 224; and United Kingdom as a founder member 253; and U2 spy plane 253; and Warsaw Pact 268; and Yugoslav Civil War 274 North Borneo (Sabah) 102 North Korea: and accidental war 3; and arms sales 17; and axis of evil 19; and demilitarised zone 141; and an enemy of United States 256; indirect support from Syria 231; and international political system 109; and isolationism 131; and nuclear club 182; and nuclear issues 181–2; and partition 191; and political developments 174–5; and refugees 208; as a rogue state 213; security for the planet 220; surprise attack on South Korea 136–7 North Yemen and civil war 43 Northern Alliance and Central Asian nations 33 Northern Ireland: Assembly 127; and civil disobedience 39; and civil rights 40; and ‘dirty war’ 69; historical developments 124, 176–80; and interstate conflicts 114; and minorities 159; and North–South ministerial cooperation 179; start of troubles 254; ‘the Troubles’ 42 North–South global dialogue 175 North–South global divide: on finance 175;

on poverty 83 North–South global issues: and developments 175–6; and globalisation 83–4; and ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ 92 North Vietnam and nationalism 163 Norway: role in Oslo Peace Accords (1993) 186 Novotny, Antonin and Prague Spring (1968) 62–3 nuclear accidents 180–1 nuclear club 182 nuclear materials: illicit trading 181 nuclear pacifism: definition and aim 188 nuclear proliferation and accidental war 3; and deterrence 68 nuclear strikes: first strike; second strike 182–3; Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 251 nuclear testing 183 nuclear weapons testing: 182 nuclear winter 183–4 Nuri-el-Said, General 121 Öcalan, Abdullah 139 Office of Strategic Services and Special Forces 233 Official IRA 125; Sinn Fein 125 Ogaden Desert 173; and Somalia 228 Ohrid Agreement (2001) 149 oil wealth: Nigeria 176 Ojukwu, Lt. Col. Odumegwu: and Biafra 25–6 Okavango River basin, Botswana 269 Olmert, Ehud 132 Operation Danube 63 Organisation of African Unity (OAU): and ceasefire in Eritrea 74; and its growth 185; role in Sierra Leone 225 Organisation of American States (OAS) 185–6; created (1951) 31; and its development 185–6; and Grenada 87; organised ceasefire in Football War 79 Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS) 10 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): New World Order 170; and quotas 88; and Yom Kippur War 273 Osama bin Laden 20; and bases in Afghanistan and Sudan 57, 218; and bioterrorism 27; and fatwa to kill

298

index

Americans 259; and Saudi Arabia 218; 9/11 4 Oslo Peace Accords (1993): details 186; and Israel security issues 131 Ostpolitik 46; details 186–7; reconciliation 67; and Soviet reaction 230 Ossetia 32

partition 191–2 Pasdaran 119 Pashtans 64 Pathet Lao 101 Patriot Movement 169 peace: definition and global possibilities 192 peaceful coexistence: details 193 peacekeeping forces: definition and detail 193–4; in Congo 55; and their cost 202 People’s Liberation Army: in Manipur 100 People’s Revolutionary Party of Kungleipak (PREPAK) 100 People’s Sacrificers in Iran 118 People’s War 194 Peron, Juan: and dirty war 69 Perry, Ruth 146 phosphates: in Mauritania 176 Pinochet, General and Chile coup (1973) 37 piracy: definition and details 194–5 Poland: anti-Czechoslovakia reforms 62; civil disobedience in 39; and events (1980–1) 195–6; and Potsdam Conference 272; and Rapacki Plan 207; strikes and martial law 195; Walesa’s influence 195; and Warsaw Pact membership 268 Police Service of Northern Ireland 177 political geography and international issues 196–7 political violence: and conflict 48; details and variables 197–201; different types 197; and revolution 212; scale of 197; and terror 200 Pol Pot and influence in Cambodia 30–1 polycentrism: definition and growth 201 Popular Movement Liberation Angola (MPLA) 12 Port Fuad 239 Portugal: and Angola 12; its army in Angola 12 Potsdam Conference (1945) 201–2; seeds of Cold War sown 272; and Soviet influence 236 poverty: and debt 202–3; in South 86 Powers, Gary 253 Provisional IRA 125, 178, 198; Sinn Fein 125 Prague Spring 63 Preval, President 92; protectionism 240 propaganda: information and objectives 203–4 Protestants 126; vigilante and paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland 178

Pacific Rim 175 pacifism: definition and role in world affairs 188 Paisley, Ian 180 Pakistan: Afghan refugees settled in 5; and Al Qaeda operations in 166; and Bangladesh War of Independence 23–4; and border with Afghanistan 163; and border with India 265; and Central Asia 33; and child soldiers 36; and concerns over India nuclear ambitions 100; and creation of Al Qaeda by Osama bin Laden 6; and ethnic tensions 75; and historical and political development 188–90; and international political system 109; and Kashmir 135; and nuclear club 182; and nuclear proliferation 68; and nuclear weapons 183; and its role in South Asia 229; and Taliban 245; and threat to Western culture 184; and United Nations military observer groups 256 Palach, Jan 63 Palestine: and American attitude to 260; and ethnic conflict 75; forces 209; history of state of 190; and intifada 115; and refugees 208; ‘rejectionist’ groups and terrorist states 246 Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Arafat’s influence 190; created 155; and Gulf War (1991) 89; role in Jordanian Civil War (1970) 133; and tensions over Al Qaeda 6; and war of liberation 129; and West Bank barrier with Israel 265; and Yom Kippur war 273 Palestine forces 209; ‘rejectionist’ groups and terrorist states 246 Panama : American invasion of (1989) 39; and Canal Zone 191; and narcotics trade 163; recent military developments 191 Pan Africanism 191; Arabism 191; Islam 191 Papua New Guinea 210 Paris: and pre Suez secret meeting in 239

299

index

proxy warfare 204 psychological warfare 205 psychology and conflict: details 204–6; and international conflict 104 Puerto Rican separatist group 257 Punjab 99 Puntland 229 Putin, Vladimir 32, 85, 214

relations with United States in New World Order 170–1; and Russia and START talks 237; and scepticism regarding Gulf War 2003 90; and the West 111 Russian troops in Dagestan 64 Rwanda: and child soldiers 37; civil war 53; and development of conflict 215–16; and ethnic conflict 75; and interstate conflict 114; and war crimes 266

Quemoy 243 Sabra: refugee camp in Lebanon 144 Saddam Hussein: and Gulf War (1991) 89; and Gulf War (2003) 90; and international sanctions 114; and Iraq 121–4; and Kurds 139; relations with Yasir Arafat 190 Samakuva, Isaias: new Angolan leader 13 sanctions 107 Sandinistas 32 San Salvador, Charter of 31 Sarajevo 217–18; and Yugoslav Civil War 274–5 Saudi Arabia: and Afghan Mujahedin 5; developments since the 1980s 218–19; and immigrants 156; and North Yemen civil war 43; and War on Terror 166 Savimbi, Jonas 12, 13 secessionist activity 56 Second World War: ended by atom bombs 183; and new bipolar world 46; consequences of 219–20; and refugees 208; and revolution 212; in South and South-East Asia 220; and start of decolonisation 48; and War Crimes trials 265 security for the planet 220–1; and conflict 48 self-determination 221–2 self-determination and state making 49 Senegal and low-level conflict 53 separatism 222 Serbia: Albanians in 9; and Kosovo 137–8; and links with Russia 217–18; and Sarajevo 217–18 Shah of Iran 116–17 Sharm el Sheikh 8 Sharon, Ariel 131 Sharpeville 11 Shatt al Arab waterway 119, 120 Shi’as: in Iran 138; revival 155; tensions with Sunnis in Pakistan 189

Rabin, Yitzhak: meets Yasir Arafat 131 racial differences 15 Radio Free Europe 203 Radio Moscow 203 Ramadan 128 Ranariddh, Prince Norodom 30 Rapacki Plan (1957) 207 Rapid Reaction Force 207 Reagan, President 87; and Iran–Contra affair 121 Red Hand Commando 179 refugee crisis in Africa 53–5, 208–9 refugees: and developments since 1945 207–9; and economic burdens 97 religion and strategic issues 209–10 resources and conflicts 210–12; and multinationals 211 Revolutionary Government Angola in Exile (GRAE) 12 Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) 117 Reykjavik Summit (1986) 85 Rhodesia and Unilateral Declaration of Independence 113; and forms of apartheid 163 ricin 7 Rio Treaty (1947) 87, 213 Roberto, Holden 12 ‘rogue’ states 213 Romania: and uprising (1989) 213–14; and verbal support for Soviet Union in invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) 63; Royal Navy and Cod War (1975–6) 44 Ruacana Dam 13 Russia: and arms sales potential 16; and building up economy post 1990 46; and Chechnya war 34–5; and ethnic conflict 75; and European Union security 76; and germ warfare plans 27; and Kosovo 138; and relations with NATO 165; and

300

index

Shi’ite Moslem: in Iran 117, 122; in Lebanon 143; and Liberia 145; political violence 199; in Syria 241 Sierra Leone: and civil war 53; developments since the 1980s 225–6; and humanitarian intervention in 97; and mission in United Nations 255; and Organisation of African Unity 185; and refugees 208; and relations with Liberia 146 Sierra Leone: diamonds 176, 202; and resources 211 Sihanouk, King Norodom 101 Singapore and Indonesia/Malaya tensions 102 Sinn Fein 125; and negotiations 178; and split with Republican Sinn Fein 180 Sino-American relations (United States perspective) 38 Sino-Indian War (1962) 226 Sino-Soviet conflict 226–7; and Damansky Island 226 Sino-Soviet rivalry 38, 175, 220; and split 199 Sistans in Iran 118 Six-Day War (1967) 227–8; and accidental war 3 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 179 Solidarity (Solidarność) 195 Somalia: and arms sales 17; as axis of evil 19; and civil war 53; and deadly effects of conflict 53; as a failed state 220; and historical and political issues, 228–9; and humanitarian intervention 97; and interstate conflicts 114; and refugees 208; and relations with Kenya 114; and United Nations peacekeepers 194; and United Nations role 255 Somali: National Army 228; Salvation Alliance 228 Somaliland 228 Sool 229 South Africa: and Angola Civil War 13; and international sanctions 113–14; leaves Commonwealth 15; and low-level conflict in 53; and nuclear club 182; and Organisation of African Unity 185; and poverty and debt 202; and transition from armed struggle to talks 178 South America: and international political system 109; and marginalisation 142

South Asia 229–30 South-East Asia and domino theory 71; nuclear issues 182 South East Asia Treaty Organisation (1964) 14; and Bandung Conference 22; details of 219 South Korea: pro Western 176 South Pacific and nuclear weapon free zone 182 South to North: permanent transfer of peoples 175 South of world and globalisation 87 sovereignty: and Bandung Conference 22; and crisis management 86; definition 230; over Falklands 78; and territorial integrity 108 Soviet Communism and Chinese Communism 99; and Maoism 150 Soviet Union: and Angolan Civil War 13, and atomic bombs 94; and Berlin Wall 25; and Biafra 26; and bipolarity 29; collapse of and disposal of military equipment 156; and its collapse 212; and conflict perceptions 51; and Cuban Missile Crisis 61; and Ethiopia as ally 74; and foreign propaganda 204; and invasion of Hungary (1956) 97–8; and invasion ‘surprise attack’ on Czechoslovakia 61–3; and Marshall Plan 45, 65; and military aid to India 226; and Ostpolitik 187; and polycentrism 201; and proxy war 204; and psychology and conflict 205; and reaction to Chernobyl 181; and reaction to Poland and Solidarity (1980–1) 195; and reaction to Potsdam Conference (1945) 202; Soviet troops and East German riots (1953) 72; and thermonuclear test 183; and Third World conflicts 148; and Titoism 250; troops to North Korea 97–8; and U2 affair 253; and United Nations 255; and Warsaw Pact 268; and weather 44; and world events 1945–91 230, 231; and Yalta Conference 272 Space: military uses 232–3 Spain: and Basque country 222; and the junta 133; joins NATO (1982) 164; train bombing (2004) 8 Special Forces 233 special relationship 233–4; and United Kingdom 254

301

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spheres of influence 234 Spratley and Paracel Islands 234 Sri Lanka 235–6; and internal conflicts 114; and invites peacekeepers 209; and relations with Tamils 81, 159, 229; and role in world 238; and Sinhalese areas 235; and Western orientation 176 Stalin: and Czech communists 62; and Yalta Conference 45, 272 Stalinism 236 states: definitions 41 states: national role conceptions; faithful ally; mediator integrators 237–8 Stormont Parliament 125–7 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT): and Ballistic Missile Defence 22; details of 217 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START and START 2) 236–7 Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) (Star Wars) 22, 232, 238–9 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (2002) 237 Sudan: and Al Qaeda 7; and civil war 53; and dispute with Egypt 173; and genocide against Eritreans 81; and Janjaweed militia 54; and links with Iran 119 Suez Crisis (1956) and developments 239–40; Soviet invasion of Hungary 97; special relationship 233; and United Kingdom role 253; and United Nations Emergency Force 192 Suharto, General 102 Sukarno, General 102 summit negotiations 240 Sunni Moslem: in Iran 117, 122, 123; in Lebanon 143; revival 155; tensions with Shia’s in Pakistan 189 Supreme Council Islamic Revolution 122 surprise attacks 241 Sweden and neutralism 168 Syr Danja river 269 Syria: and Christians 144; classed as supporter of terrorism 174; and historical and political developments 241–2; and Kurds 139; and pro Soviet and foreign policy 231; and rivalry with Lebanon 43; and terrorist states 246–7; and water issues 268–9; and Yom Kippur War 272–3

Taba 16 Tabriz 117 Tachen Islands 243 Taiwan: and China 38; and New World Order 169; and nuclear programme 182; and political and military developments 234; and Sino-Soviet conflict 227; and Spratly and Paracel Islands 234 Tajikistan 33, 208 Talat, Mehmet Ali 61 Taliban 219; in Afghanistan 166, 244–5; and Al Qaeda links 8–9; in Central Asia 33, 163; and drugs trade 7; military attacks on 20; and United States 267 Tamil Nadu 235, 269 Tamils: and ethnic conflict 75; and genocide in Sri Lanka 81; Sinhalese agreement 100; and tension in South Asia 229 Tamil Tigers 235–6 Tanzania: and AIDS allegation 95; and Al Qaeda 7; and North–South global issues 176 terrorism: developments linked to global conflict 245–6; and Islam 129–30; and 9/11 166; terrorists and guerrillas differences 247–8 terrorist states 246–7 Tet offensive 262 Thailand 71, 101; and North–South global issues 176; and Pak Hun Dam 269; and Special Forces 233 The Hague: International Criminal Court 16; and International War Crimes Tribunal 275; Permanent Court of Arbitration 74 Third World: and aloof from East–West conflicts 172; confidence post 1945 220; and insurgency 128, 148; and Islamic fundamentalism 130; and spheres of influence 234; and Suez Crisis 239; and terrorist states 246 Three Mile Island and nuclear accident 180 Tiananmen Square protests (1989) 226 Tibet 38; developments since 1950 249; and genocide 81; and Sino-Indian War (1962) 226; and Sino-Soviet conflict 227 Tito 75; and Non-Aligned Movement 172 Titoism as an ideology 250 Togo 53 Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Vietnam 262

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Tontons Macoutes 92 Tora Bora ex-military base 6 Torah 158 total warfare: definition and concept 250–1 totalitarianism 251 TOW missiles 121 towhid (divinely integrated classless society) 118 Trimble, David 180 Tripura Hill Youth, India 100 Troops Out Movement 126 Truman Doctrine (1947) 252 Tshombe, Moise 56 Tsvangirai, Morgan 54 Tumbledown Mountain, Falklands 78 Tunku Abdul Rahman 102 Tupamaros 200 Turkey 33; and CENTO 33; and child soldiers 37; and Cuban Missile Crisis 59; and ethnic conflict 75; and European Union security 76; and Kurds 139; and oil 89 Turkish Cypriots 60–1; 159; divided from Greek Cypriots by a wall 265 Turkish invasion: Cyprus (1974) 60–1 Turkmans 117 Turkmenistan 33 Tutsis 53; and relations with Hutus 215–16, 220 Tuzla 274 Twin Towers, New York 222–3 Two Sisters, Falklands 78

proliferation 182; and START agreements 237 United Kingdom: and atomic bombs 94; and Austrian neutrality 19; and bio-terror 27; and CFE Treaty 34; and Cod War 44; and Cold War 45; and Contact Group of Nations 224; and cruise missiles 57; and Cyprus 60–1; and global threats beyond terrorism 82; and globalisation 83; and Gulf War (2003) 90; and international sanctions 113–14; and Ireland 124–7; and Korean War 136–7; and NATO 164–6; and attitudes to neutrality 168; and nonviolent resistance 173; and Northern Ireland situation 177; and testing nuclear device 183; political military developments since 1945 253–4; and Potsdam Conference 202; consequences of Second World War 219–220; and special relationship 233, 254; and Suez Crisis 239; and United Nations Security Council veto 255; and War Crimes Trials (1945–6) 265; and Yalta Conference 272 United Nations: and aggression 6; denounces apartheid 15; and arms embargo 92; and arms sales 16; and Berlin Blockade (1948) 24; and Cambodia 30–1; and CFE Treaty 34; and chemical weapons 36; and collective security 47; recognises Communist China 243; and conflicts in Africa 54–5; and Congo Crisis (1960–5) 55; and Cyprus 60–1; and Czechoslovakia 63; and decolonisation 65; as de facto government 194; and defence conglomerates 17; and disarmament 70; and escalation 74; and mediation in Falklands 78; and attitude to genocide 81; and Gulf War (1990) 134; and Hungary (1956) 98; condemns Indonesia 102; and Interim Force in Lebanon 143, 145; and International Assistance Security Force in Afghanistan 5; and international conflict resolution 105–6; and international law 107–8; and international sanctions 113; and international system 109; and intrastate conflicts 116; and Iran–Iraq War (1980–8) 121; relations with Iraq 121–4; administered plebiscite in Kashmir 135; key developments post 1945 254–6; and Korean War 136–7; and Kosovo 138;

U2 Spy Plane Incident (May 1960) 253 Uganda 53; and AIDS 95; and genocide 81 Uighur culture 271 Ukraine 210, 237 Ulster Defence Association126, 198; created 178 Ulster Defence Force 198 Ulster Freedom Fighters 179 Ulster Unionists 124, 179, 180; and veto 178 Ulster Volunteer Force 179 Union for Total Independence Angola (UNITA) 12–13 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): and Austrian neutrality 19; and Ballistic Missile Defence 22; and crisis management 86; and globalisation 83; and military globalisation 156; and nuclear

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and Liberia 145–6; and mediation 154; and New World Order 168–9; and NorthEast Africa 173–4; and links with Organisation of African Unity 185; and Outer Space Treaty 232; and Rapid Reaction Force 207; and Rwanda 215; and Resolution 1540 269; and Sarajevo 218; and Sierra Leone 225; and Somalia 228–9; and resolution on Syria 242; and Taiwan 243; and weapons inspectors 90; committee on xenophobia 271; and Yom Kippur War 273; and military observers in Yugoslavia 274; operations in former Yugoslavia 104; role in Yugoslav Civil War 274 United Nations peacekeeping 193 United Nations Charter (1945): and a just war 134; and peace 192, 221; and as a Treaty 251 United Nations Security Council 59; and American use of veto 255 United States and agreements, conferences and treaties: Anti Personnel Mine Convention 141–2; Ballistic Missile Defence 22; Contact Group of Nations 224; Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 34; Nixon Doctrine 171–2; North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 164–6; nuclear proliferation 181–2; Organisation of African Unity 185; Organisation of American States 186; Potsdam Conference (1945) 201–2; South East Asia Treaty Organisation 230; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 217; Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 237; Truman Doctrine 252–6; Yalta Conference (1945) 272 United States and consequences of the Second World War 219–20; and bipolarity 29; geopolitics 82; international politics since 1945 256–61; and New World Order 169; and polycentrism 201; relations with United Nations 255–9; special relationship with United Kingdom 233, 254; War Crimes Trials (1945) 265 United States and countries relations: and Afghanistan 4–5, 244–5; and Belize 24; and Biafra 26; and Central America 31–2; and Central Asia 32; and Chile 37; and China 37–8; and Cuba 58, 170; and Cuban Missiles Crisis 58; and Dominican

Republic 115; and Falklands 78; and Grenada 87; and Gulf War (1991) 88–9, 117–9, and Gulf War (2003) 124; and Iran Iraq War (1980–8) 121; and Jordan 133; and tensions with Libya 146; and NorthEast Africa 174; and North Korea 174–5; and Northern Ireland 178, 180; and Panama 191; and Saudi Arabia 218; and Somalia 228; and South Asia 229; and Soviet Union 175, 230; and Suez Crisis 239; and Taiwan 243–4 United States and global influence: against rogue states 213; attitudes to neutrality 168; conflict perceptions and civil rights 40; on détente 66–7; on deterrence 68; globalisation and crisis management 83; on humanitarian intervention 97; on military global and military–industrial complex 156; peaceful coexistence with China 193; and security of the planet 220 United States and 9/11: 222–3; and Homeland Security 96; and Special Forces 233 United States and types of military tension: asymmetric war 17; and atom bombs 94; attitude to total war 251; bio-terrorism 27–8; civil wars 42; cruise missiles 57; domino theory 150; drugs and conflict 162–3; low-intensity conflict 148; Mutual Assured Destruction 160; proxy wars 204; Star Wars and military uses of Space 232, 238; surprise attacks 241; thermonuclear wars 183; War on Terror 19, 246–7, 266–7; Weapons of Mass Destruction 269 United States and wars 42; Cod War 45; conflicts in Africa 54–5; and Gulf War (1991) 88–9, 117–19; and Gulf War (2003) 124; and Iran–Iraq War (1980–8) 121; and Korean War 136–7; and Yom Kippur War 273 United States Information Agency 204 Uruguay 203 USS Cole 8 USS Pueblo 174 USS Stark 120 Uzbekistan 33, 269 Velvet Revolution (Eastern Europe) (1989): influence on world politics 212; and Romania 213

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Venezuela 142; and drugs and conflict 163 VI rockets 57 Viet Cong 262 Vietnam: and role of CIA 39; and civil disobedience 39–40; and conflict perceptions 51; Dien Bien Phu 68–9; disarmament issues 70; and Domino Theory 71; links to Sino-Soviet dispute 226; and Peoples War 194; and psychology and conflict 205; and special relationship 233; and Spratley and Paracel Islands 234 Vietnam War: and Cambodia 30; as a civil war 42; developments in 262–3; and escalation 74; and student protests 257; and United States foreign policy 256 violence: in Haiti 92; political 212; 263–4

West Bank: and Gulf War (1991) 89; and intifada 115–6; and Israel 131; and Jordan 133; and Palestine 190 West Beirut 143; 144 West Germany 187 West Pakistan army 23 West Side Boys in Sierra Leone 225 Western allies: and Kosovo 137–8; and Potsdam Conference 202; and Yalta Conference 45 Western powers: and Berlin Blockade 24; and Berlin Wall 25 Western Sahara 176 Westerners: and kidnapping 123; in Pakistan 189 Westernisation: and Iran 116; and War on Terror 267 White House 186 Wilson, Harold 253 Windscale (Sellafield) 180 Wireless Ridge, Falklands 78 World Court 16, 265 World Cup football 79 world government 11 World Trade Centre Bombing, New York (1993) 122, 260; and September 11, 2001 222–3 World Trade Organisation 30, 171

Wahabbism in Saudi Arabia 218 walls in Berlin, Nicosia and West Bank 265 ‘War on Terror’ 83, 257 Warrenpoint (1979) 125 Warsaw Pact: and Brezhnev Doctrine 29; development of 268; disbanding of 169; and Gorbachev Doctrine 85; Hungary leaves 97; and NATO 165; and nuclear issues 181; and Poland’s role 195; and Rapacki Plan 207 Warsaw Treaty Organisation 268 Washington: accidental war 3; and Cuba 59; and special relationship 254 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): details 269–70; and Gulf War (2003) 90, 258 water and politics and ‘wars’ 268–9 Weathermen 198–200 West, the: and AIDS issues 95; and apartheid 15; asymmetric threats against 17; and attitudes to by Third World 176; and crime rate 257; Czechoslovakia dependent on 62; and decolonisation 66; and European Union security 76; and hostility to in many Islamic countries 128–30; and opening to Chinese trade 38; and passive attitude to events in the East and Cold War 98–99; radical thinkers in 88; and relations with Iran 117; and rogue states 213; and Soviet Union 230; thinking regarding anarchism 11

xenophobia: details 271; and the media 153 Xiaoping, Deng 243 Xinjiang 271 Yalta Agreement: and Cold War 45–6; discord and agreement 272; and Stalinism 236 Yalu River 137 Yeltsin, President Boris: influence in Russia 214; and START talks 236 Yemen: links with Osama bin Laden 8; and peace 192 Yom Kippur War (1973): cause of and results 272–3; and Syria 242 Yugoslavia: civil war and effect internationally 256; and Czech crisis (1968) 63; and Dayton Accords 64; and ethnic conflict 75; and international political system 109; and Kosovo 137; and leaders at International Criminal Court 266; and Macedonia 149; and neutralism

305

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168; and peacekeeping 193–4; and polycentrism 201; and revisionism 9; and Serbia and Montenegro 224; and Titoism 250; and United Nations veto 255 Yugoslavia Civil War 274–5

Zambia: and attitude to apartheid 15; and Congo crisis 56 Zapatista Liberation Army, Mexico 163 Zepa, a Moslem safe haven in Yugoslavia 274 Zimbabwe: attitude to apartheid 15; and chronic shortages 54–5; and international sanctions 107, 113; and mineral resources 109 Zionist movement 155; and hostility to 191 Zuma, Jacob 11

Zardari, President Asif 190 Zaire: and civil war 53–4; forces in Angola 13; poverty and debt 202; and resources 210; and Rwanda peace talks 215

306