Rome and the Friendly King: The Character of Client Kingship

Rome and the Friendly King THE CHARACTER OF THE CLIENT KINGSHIP DAVID BRAUND

CROOM HELM London & Canberra ST. MARTIN'S PRESS New York

©1984 David Braund Croom Helm Ltd, Provident House, Burrell Row, Beckenham, Kent BR3 1AT Croom Helm Australia Pty Ltd, 28 Kembla, Fyshwick, ACT 2609, Australia British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Braund, David Rome and the friendly king: the character of the client kingship. 1. Rome - Foreign relations I. Title 327.937'06 DG271 ISBN 0-7099-3216-2 All rights reserved. For information, write: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010 Printed in Great Britain First published in the United States of America in. 1984 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Braund, David, 1957Rome and the friendly king. Thesis (Ph.D.) - Cambridge. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Rome - Foreign relations - 510-30 B.C. 2. Rome Foreign relations - 30 B.C.-284 A.D. 3. Kings and rulers, Ancient. I. Title. DG214.5.B7 1984 321.08*0937 83-40184 ISBN 0-312-69210-2

CONTENTS

Map Preface i Introduction PART 1. 2. 3.

I: THE MAKING OF THE KING Education Recognition Citizenship

PART 1. 2. 3. 4.

II: The The The The

THE REIGN OF THE KING King and the Centre of Power King and the Empire at Large • King on the Frontier King in his Kingdom

1 3 5

9 23 39

55 75 91 105

Excursus: Royal Gold Coinage and Munzrecht

123

PART III: THE END OF THE KING 1. Royal Wills 2. Refuge, Detention and Beyond

129 165

EPILOGUE Bibliography Index

181 193 217

PREFACE:

This book is a revised version of my Cambridge doctoral dissertation. In order to make it more accessible to the general reader I have made a variety of changes to the orig­ inal dissertation. I draw attention in particular to the epilogue. This is totally new and is intended to be a brief and relatively straightforward synopsis of my main conclus­ ions, accessible to the general reader and undergraduate with no knowledge of Greek or Latin. The main body of the book contains arguments of considerable detail, as is the manner of a dissertation: I make no apology for that. This book is the product of over four years spent at the universities of Cambridge, Leicester and Exeter, successively. I have benefitted in ways small and large from discussions with friends and colleagues at all three institutions. To acknowledge every debt is impossible, but it is a great plea­ sure to offer my thanks here to those whose assistance and advice have been exceptional. Throughout, my supervisor, Joyce Reynolds, has given generously of her time, patience and great learning. Her con­ tribution to this book is incalculable. John Crook and John Wilkes examined my dissertation and have offered particularly valuable criticisms and suggestions on individual points and on the work as a whole. Peter Garnsey and Peter Wiseman have each waded through my dissertation: their suggestions have significantly improved this book. Dick Whittaker, who guided me through my undergraduate years, has also read much of my postgraduate work with enthusiasm and discernment, much to my benefit. Michael Crawford has offered sound advice and searching criticism on more than the numismatic excursus alone. Roy Porter, John Rich and Richard Janko have assisted on particular points. Frank Walbank and Ted Buttrey have kindly made obscure publications available to me, while Terry Volk has put at my disposal the excellent facilities of the Coin Room of the Fitzwilliam Museum. To all these and others I am greatly indebted, though

3

Preface

it need hardly be said that they bear no responsibility for any omissions or errors I have perpetrated. Yet my greatest debt remains to be acknowledged - that to my wife, Su Braund.

4

INTRODUCTION:

In recent years scholars have begun to appreciate both the importance of friendly kings for the historian of the Roman world and the neglect that they have suffered at his hands (1). A considerable amount of valuable work has been done on individual kings and kingdoms: the largely prosopographical articles of Sullivan deserve a special mention. Much has also been done by those predominantly concerned with matters of law, most notably Mommsen and Bonn and, more rec­ ently, Dahlheim. Generalization has been attempted with some success, but only over limited periods: most notable are the works of Sands and Badian on the kings of the Republican period and those of Bower sock and Luttwak on the kings of the Principate. The purpose of this study is to attempt to fill the gap: to show how the friendly king functioned in the Roman world from the third century BC to the Severans. The aim is to provide what may be called a functional definition of friendly kingship. But who or what are friendly kings and why are they so important? Some introductory remarks may be helpful. As Rome expanded as an imperial power she encountered monarchies. Ultimately it was at the expense of. these nraiarchies that Rome built her empire: in one way or another all of the provinces of Rome had been, wholly or partly, monarchies before the Roman conquest. But the relationships between Rome and these monarchies were not simply relationships between conqueror and conquered. There was also diplomacy and what the ancients call 'friendship1. Rome was only able to build and keep her empire because she was able to build and keep - for some time at least - •friendship' with the monarchies of her world. Should Rome fail to maintain these friendships, her empire could not survive unchanged, for she could not withstand the size and strength of her enemies: a familiar explanation of the fall of the empire in the west has been developed along these lines./ The maintenance of friendship was so vital because friends contributed massively to the manpower and

5

resources upon which Rome could draw. They could not lightly be allowed to become enemies; certainly not all at once. Their contribution will be traced in more detail in the course ; of this study; in the epilogue we will be in a position to construct a balance-sheet for the relationship between friend-.' ly king and Rome. Throughout this study we are concerned with 'the friendly king1. It should already be apparent that this is no particular king; the friendly king is a figure constructed for analytical convenience from the histories of all the rulers under discussion to be their paradigm. The friendly king is therefore no one friendly king but the essence of all such kings. Of course, there are variables. These cannot and will not be brushed aside and ignored. In fact, the consideration of variables can shed revealing light on the paradigm. Two particular variables are so fundamental that they must be made quite explicit from the first. The monarchies under discussion are many and varied. Most significant are the differences between those monarchies of the Hellenistic type, largely situated in the east, which approximate to modern notions of monarchy and kingship, and, on the other hand, the monarchies of tribal societies which are nearer to modern notions of chiefships and where, as Tacitus appreciated, the term 'king1 needs qualification (2). How far the Romans distinguished between the two remains a problem, but it seems clear enough that, in formal terms at least, they drew fewer distinctions than we must. Moreover, among tribal and Hellenistic monarchies respectively, there were many important variations - the Jewish kingdoms are the most obvious example - and there were those who were more closely connected with Rome than others and there were those that were more powerful than others. The second variable is that of time and relates to Rome in particular. We are dealing with almost six centuries of history. Over these centuries conditions changed, though not in the manner or to the extent that conditions have changed over six centuries of modern history.yf For us the most important change is that at Rome from Republic to Principa^e* this affected the whole relationship between king and Rome. It is largely because of change over time that this study does not attempt to deal systematically with the kings of the Roman world after the Severans. But that is not to say that very many of the arguments developed here do not apply wholly or largely to what is conventionally regarded as the later empire. They most certainly do and, I would contend, they do so to an extent that is seldom realized! Therefore, in constructing and examining our paradigm, the friendly king, there are major variables which must be given due weight throughout. However, we should not allow these variables either to obscure our paradigm or to deter us from constructing it.

6

/ntroduction The notion of friendship (Latin, amicitia; Greek, philia) may require a little explanation. Throughout classical antiquity, from Homer onwards - and doubtless earlier -, friendship was totally central in both inter-personal and inter-state relationships. All such relationships were reg­ ularly conducted in terms of friendship and/or kinship. There was therefore already a widespread and deep-seated familiarity with friendship and an awareness of its norms in the Medit­ erranean world when Rome expanded through the Italian penin­ sula and beyond. Rome made friendships as others had done with states and rulers long attuned to the concept of friend­ ship. Of course, friendship, then as now, was a concept capable of many different interpretations and emphases: for example, friendship might be a relationship between powers of roughly comparable strength, but it could as easily be a relationship between dominator and dominated.' It was a very broad concept, though we should not be surprised to find states and individuals taking a narrowly-limited view of it on occasion. It is largely because of the importance and ubiquitousness of friendship in antiquity that I have followed normal Roman practice and described the kings under discussion as friendly kings. It has become usual to describe these kings as client kings. This is not without reason, for clientage (clientela) and friendship are closely related concepts. But, as we shall see, clientage, unlike friendship, is very rarely used by our sources in the context of relationships between Rome and kings. Moreover, discussion in terms of clientage can mislead and encourage an approach to their relationships through too close an application of the patron-client model. We shall see that this model has much to recommend it, but that it is not as appropriate as the broader concept of friendship. We may now proceed to construct and explore our paradigm, the friendly king. Notes to Introduction: (1) See especially Millar (1977) xii; cf. Bowersock (1978) 346-7. (2) Tac. Ann xiii 54.2.

7

PART ONE: THE MAKING OF THE KING Section 1: Education

From the second century BC onwards, we find kings sending their sons to Rome for their 'education1: it must immediately be stressed that, as will become apparent, this 'education1 was not primarily academic. The phenomenon has been seen as a corollary to Rome's victory at Pydna, but it is first attested a little earlier than this. According to Livy, Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia sent his son, the future Ariarathes V, to Rome just before the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War (1). His envoys are said to have stated that: '...regem educandum filium Romam misisse ut iam inde a puero adsuesceret moribus Romanis hominibusque, petere ut eum non sub hospitum modo privatorum custodia sed publicae etiam curae ac velut tutelae vellent esse.' (Livy xlii 19) Ihe manner of education involved is evident: the prince was to become imbued in Roman mores and was to form personal connections with individual Romans and the Roman state at large. Pleased with such aspirations, we are told, the Senate instructed the urban praetor to hire a furnished house where the prince and his retinue might live. The friends made at Rome during this stay may well have helped Ariarathes to obtain recognition upon his accession in 164/3 BC (2). Also in the 170's, thus before Pydna, the young Charops of Epirus was sent to stay at Rome. The purpose of his stay is said to have been specifically academic: to learn to speak and write Latin. But he also made many Roman connections, which he sought to exploit upon his return to Epirus. This was very probably as intended. Of course, Charops was not a king, but the mechanism is essentially the same as that oper­ ating in the case of Ariarathes (3). After Pydna we find a variation of the phenomenon. In 167 BC, Prusias II of Bithynia brought his son, the future Nicomedes II, and a large retinue to Rome. In the city

9

Education Prusias went out of his way to visit his Roman friends there: Nicomedes presumably accompanied him and was introduced to these friends. Subsequently, Prusias and his son were recei­ ved in the Senate where Prusias offered his congratulations for the Roman victory at Pydna, made a number of requests and formally recommended his son. In reply the Senate acknow­ ledged Nicomedes and asserted, we are toldr that the Roman People made a practice of supporting its friends' children (4). As with Ariarathes, a house was provided for their stay. Having been variously honoured, the Bithynians were escorted to Brundisium by a quaestor who defrayed their expenses. Nicomedes1 visit to Rome was evidently shorter than that of Ariarathes, but the purpose of his visit was essen­ tially the same (5). Similarly, in 153/2 BC, the future Attalus III, still a boy, was formally introduced to the Senate and made contact with friends of the Attalids at Rome. At the same time, the future Demetrius II of Syria also came to Rome, apparently for the same purpose (6). But what is surely striking about these cases is that they are so few: all known Republican cases have been cited (7). The very fact that the only prince resident at Rome specifically for his Education1 under the Republic was sent before Pydna tells not only against the importance of Pydna but also against the view that to send sons in this way was a 'custom1 (8). More common are short visits by kings-to-be, though even these are not abundant: the essentials of 'education1 could be achieved on such a visit - formal contact with the Senate and personal contact with leading Romans. Only with Augustus did the phenomenon become anything like a custom. Suetonius states that: 'plurimorum (sc.regum) liberos et educavit simul cum suis et instituit' (Suet. Au£. 48) Josephus provides concrete examples. About 23 BC, Herod sent his three sons by Mariamme I to stay at Rome: Alexander, Aristobulus and a third son who died there. The purpose of their stay is said to have been specifically to meet the emperor. At first they stayed with a certain Pollio, but were later brought to the imperial court to stay with the emperor, who received them with every honour (9). As the position of Alexander and Aristobulus in Herod's favours declined, Herod brought Antipater, his son by Doris, to the fore. At Antipater's instigation, we are told, his friends at Rome wrote to Herod advising him that Antipater ought to be sent to Rome and the emperor before very long. Herod despatched him immediately, in 13 BC (10). Again, two more of Herod's sons, Archelaus and Philip, were being 'educated' at Rome when Antipater moved against them in 5. BC

10

Education (11). Other sons, Antipas and the young Herod, were also brought up at Rome (12). How much Archelaus, Philip, Antipas and the young Herod had to do with the emperor, we are not told, but we may assume a visit to him at least. In all, Herod sent eight sons to Rome: without Joseph us, we would know nothing of their visits. Other dynasties did not have a Josephus: they too may have sent sons to Rome and Augustus as Suetonius1 generalisation suggests (13). Though once more Herodian, the case of Agrippa I and his son, the future Agrippa II, lend some support to the suggestion. At the time of his father's death in AD 44, the future Agrippa II was being brought up at Rome in the court of Claudius. Indeed, in his youth Agrippa I had been part of the court of Tiberius, with whose son, Drusus, he was particularly close (14). The despatch of kings-to-be outside the kingdom for their 'education1 was not an invention of the Roman world. Athens had long been a centre of education and culture. In the second century BC, At talus II and Ariarathes V, as they were to become, were taught there by Carneades (15). Massinissa's sons, Micipsa and Mastanabal, may well have gained a Greek education there: the latter certainly visited the city (16). Nicomedes III sent his more favoured son to Athens and another to Cyzicus (17). In the first century BC Ariobarzanes II sent his two sons - Ariobarzanes III and Ariarathes X, as they were to become - to Athens where they were enrolled as ephebes (18). As the presence of Ariarathes V shows, such a Greek education could be combined with an education at Rome. But Athens' dominance was purely cultural: a better precedent for the education gained by kings-to-be at Rome is the educ­ ation of Massinissa at Carthage, for it too had a major political aspect (19). That kings should send their sons to Rome is of the highest importance, for by so doing they sought to carry over their relationship with Rome into the next generation (20). In fact, there was an intimate connection between education at Rome and succession at home, as others have noted (21). That the phenomenon only became anything like customary with the Principate deserves particular attention. Like Suetonius, we must understand the development as part of the increased in­ tegration of kings into the Roman sphere at just this time: 1 (sc. Augustus) nee aliter universos quam membra partesque imperii curae habuit1 (Suet. Aug. 48). The concentration of power at Rome brought with it a greater cohesion within the empire at large: the role of the centre of power in the in­ tegration of the whole is a widely-recognised phenomenon, by no means confined to the Mediterranean world (22). In the light of this, it is most interesting to observe that where power was concentrated prior to Augustus, we some­ times find similarly extensive education. Sertorius in Spain had the sons of the leading families of various tribes taught Latin and Greek together at Osca. By so doing, Sertorius won

11

Education local favour: the families involved took it that Sertorius was grooming their sons for roles in authority as adults: the young Spaniards are said to have worn the purple-bordered togas and bullae of Roman boys (23). Similarly, Antony gathered the offspring of eastern royalty at Alexandria: of these Augustus returned some to their families, but kept others (24). But, unlike Sertorius and Antony, Augustus is not known to have actively encouraged kings to send their sons to him at Rome. Josephus1 evidence rather suggests that the initiative came from the parent-king, though the emperor duly played his part upon the arrival of sons at Rome, it seems. However, as the phenomenon became standard, or at least common, the king in­ evitably came under a degree of pressure to conform with the development (25). The cases of Sertorius and Antony are particularly imp­ ortant in that they highlight a central ambiguity: youths held at the centre of power, though nominally there for their education, were also inevitably potential hostages (26). In the same way, one kept nominally as a hostage would also receive something of an education, as Aymard has done much to show (27). The typological similarity of hostage and student is perhaps best illustrated by the case of the hostages sent to Augustus by Phraates IV of Parthia. Augustus himself states: 'ad me rex Parthorum Phrates (sic) Orodis filius filios suos nepotesque omnes misit in Italiam non bello superatus sed amicitiam nostram per liberorum pignora petens.' (RG 32.2) Strabo names the four sons sent by Phraates: Seraspadanes, Rhodaspes, Phraates and Vonones. He adds that two wives and four sons came with them (28). An epitaph from Rome shows that Seraspadanes and Rhodaspes died there (29). Vonones was later sent back to Parthia by Augustus to rule at Parthian request, as was Phraates by Tiberius (30). It must be stressed that even Augustus does not describe these Parthians as hostages: rather, he says that they were sent as pledges of good faith in a bid for amicitia (31)• If Augustus could reasonably have claimed to have extorted host­ ages from Parthia, he would surely have done so. In fact our other sources make it perfectly clear that, as Augustus imp­ lies, Phraates was under no compulsion to send his offspring and their families to Rome (32). Most "important is the fact that Tacitus, although he clearly recognises Phraates1 will­ ingness, persists in calling Vonones an obses. Nor is he our only source to do so. Furneaux long ago noticed that Tacitus' use of obses does not correspond to the translation 'hostage1 (33). We should examine the etymology of the word: it means basically 'one who remains'. Similarly, its Greek counterpart

12

Education homeros means, at root, 'one who joins' or 'accompanies'. It is evident that these words need not bear the modern connot­ ations of force and threat borne by the translation 'hostage1 (34). The gap between the ancient words and their modern translation is particularly comprehensible if we observe that the 'hostages' sent to Rome by kings were often chosen by the king himself: this provided an opportunity for the removal of a troublesome son for a while. There is a suggestion of this in the case of the Parthians: he may compare Izates of Adiabene, who, according to Joseph us, sent off his family to be 'hostages' for the very reason that he wanted them out of his court. Relations sent to Rome in such circumstances were hardly useful as hostages in the modern sense (35). But the fact that obses and homeros do not correspond entirely to the modern notion of 'hostage' does not of course mean that obsides and homeroi could not be used in this way, for they certainly could (36). The 'hostage1 whose circumstances are best-attested is the future Demetrius I Soter of Syria. In 163 BC, Demetrius had already been a 'hostage' at Rome for a long time: he may well have been there since 176 BC (37). Demetrius' father, Seleucus IV, had been succeeded by Antiochus IV in 175 BC. When, in 163 BC, news reached Rome that Antiochus had died, Demetrius went before the Senate and requested that he be in­ stalled on the Syrian throne in preference to Antiochus' off­ spring. According to Polybios, Demetrius declared in the Senate that he regarded Rome as his homeland and nurse, the sons of the senators as his brothers and the senators them­ selves as his fathers, since he had spent the years of his youth at Rome. However, despite these protestations, his request was refused because, says Polybius, the Senate pre­ ferred to have a weak boy ruling Syria (38). Upon the murder of Cn.Octavius, Demetrius made a fresh request before the Senate, against the advice of Polybius him­ self: again he was denied (39). Foiled again, Demetrius summoned his one-time mentor, Diodorus, who had recently arr­ ived from Syria: they plotted escape in a bid for the Syrian throne. Polybius engaged a ship for them (40). We should observe the apparent freedom of association enjoyed by Demetrius: his large retinue may have made such dealings easier (41). The extent of Demetrius' liberty to move about is further revealed by Polybius' account of his escape. A banquet was arranged for the day of the escape to provide a reason for Demetrius leaving his house (42): he evidently att­ ended social functions. In what follows we see that he could receive sealed messages and could make hunting-expeditions to the coast of Latium (43). Particularly striking is the fact that it was not until the fourth day after the escape that there was any response by the Senate: he had evidently not been closely supervised, if supervised at all (44). His relative liberty is further suggested by Diodorus Siculus who

13

r'.duoation says that when Demetrius heard that Ptolemy VI Philometor was approaching Rome on foot, he collected royal clothing/ a diadem, a splendid horse and a body of slaves and set off from Rome until he met Philometor 200 stades from the city. As with his hunting-expedition, there is no hint of supervision (45). There is no reason to suppose that Demetrius' relative liberty was at all extraordinary: rather the contrary (46). This is important for two reasons. First, the conditions in which Demetrius was kept hardly suit the modern notion of 'hostage' (47). Second, a young man able to move about in Roman society - to meet people, attend banquets, go on huntingexpeditions - would necessarily receive an 'education1 similar to that of the likes of Ariarathes V of Cappadocia. Once more, hostage and student come together. Further, Demetrius' claims of affection for Rome and Romans are scarcely conceivable if we retain the limited modern notion of hostage. It might be objected that Demetrius was going to absurd, hyperbolic lengths in order to achieve his ends. There may indeed have been an element of special pleading, but later examples sugg­ est that it was rather more than that. Under the Principate we find similar sentiments put in the mouths of Romans. Vitellius, governor of Syria, is said to have reminded the Parthian 'hostage' Tiridates both of his grandfather, Phraates IV, and Augustus, whom he terms his foster-father (48). Similarly, Claudius is said to have praised the Parthian 'hostage' Meherdates as a foster-son of Rome (49). There are slight indications that Rome demanded 'hostages' with some view to their 'education'. In a treaty with the Aetolians it is stipulated that those Aetolians who had prev­ iously served as 'hostages' should not be sent again. Simil­ arly, in the Treaty of Apamea it is stipulated that 'hostages' should be replaced every three years. One reason for this deliberate arrangement of a turn-over of 'hostages' could be that a broader section of the Aetolian or Syrian elite could thereby be exposed to Roman society: if this was not the intention behind such stipulations, it must have been the end result. It was perhaps for just this reason that Augustus was particularly willing that 'hostages' be replaced (50). Scholars have detected a particular case of the effect of 'education' upon 'hostages' at Rome: that of Antiochus IV Epiphanes of Syria. Sent to Rome as a 'hostage' in accordance with the Treaty of Apamea, he remained there until replaced by Demetrius in 176/5 BC: some twelve years, in all. Upon his accession, Antiochus' behaviour won him a reputation for lunacy. Having donned a toga he is said to have canvassed for votes in the market-place of Antioch: upon his inevitable election, he took his seat on a curule chair, whence he dis­ pensed justice (51) . We are told that Antiochus also planned to build a temple to the essentially Roman Jupiter Capitolinus, that he staged gladiatorial games on the Roman model and even

14

Education paraded troops equipped with Roman armour (52). It is comm­ only and plausibly held that such behaviour was the result not so much of lunacy but of his upbringing at Rome (53) . Indeed, the notion that one held at Rome received an 'education' which imbued him in Roman mores became something of a commonplace. The Romanised ways of the ex- 'hostage' Vonones are said to have been disliked and ridiculed by his Parthian subjects (54). Similarly, Tacitus says that the Parthians expected Tiridates to be a mild ruler because of his upbringing as a 'hostage' at Rome (55). Indeed, a Parthian embassy is said to have held that their kings sent their children to Rone as 'hostages' with the specific purpose that they should be improved by acculturation to Roman mores (56) . In fact, the 'education' of the 'hostage' had became so stan­ dard a notion that Juvenal could exploit it for satirical purposes (57). Particularly striking is the fact that, under Gaius, apparently close to the Rhine, a ludus litterarius was used for education of obsides (58). Perhaps the most famous instance of the effect of a stay at Rome upcn a 'hostage' is that of Demetrius, son of Philip V of Macedon (59). According to Livy, Demetrius1 return from Rome was accompanied by considerable speculation in Macedon (60). Most expected Demetrius to succeed to the throne upon Philip's demise: it was even thought, we are told, that the Romans might place him on the Macedonian throne. On Livy's account at least, we can therefore discern a connection bet­ ween hostageship at Rome and succession at home similar to that observed earlier between education and succession: yet again, hostage and student come together. Livy describes Demetrius as iuvenis incautus et amore nominis Romani: such an emotion is hardly what one might expect if Demetrius had been a host­ age in the modern sense (61). In fact, Demetrius' time at Rome had brought him closer to the Romans not farther apart: of course, as relations deteriorated between Rome and Macedon, Demetrius' position in Macedon was totally undermined (62). An emperor might make much of the obsides sent to him. Augustus displayed the Parthians sent by Phraates in the arena: he led them across the middle of the arena and sat them in the second row behind him (63). To this extent, Gaius therefore had a precedent when he displayed the Parthian obses Darius in his chariot as he drove across the Bay of Baiae (64). The presence of obsides evidently redounded to the credit of the emperor, but that need not imply the subjection of the obses: we should compare the imperial attitude to the reception of embassies (65). But perhaps the most important sphere of 'education' was not Rome at all but the provinces. In particular, the army. Sallust tells us that Micipsa sent Jugurtha as a youth to serve with Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia: there Jugurtha won a good reputation, became a friend of Aemilianus and made contact with many important Remans. It was at Numantia, it

15

Ligation seems, that Jugurtha learnt his Latin (66) . Most important, it has been convincingly argued that the Roman contacts he had made proved to be of the greatest use to him in the Jugurthine War and its prelude (67). Here again, we find a link between 'education1 and succession: when Jugurtha returned to Numidia with a glowing reference from Aemilianus, Micipsa immediately adopted him and made him an heir (68). We may compare the future Attalus II who had made important friendships among his Roman allies in the Third Macedonian War and was received all the more favourably at Rome after Pydna as a direct result (69). It may reasonably be supposed that such relationships were formed wherever Roman and royal forces fought together (70). Contact in the army must be set in the broader provincial context. Here there was regular contact between neighbouring kings and governors and their respective followers. Cicero's son and nephew were conducted to stay at Deiotarus1 court in Galatia by the king's homonymous son (71). Similarly, the young Caesar stayed at the Bithynian court and the son of Cato Minor at the Cappadocian (72). Ariobarzanes II of Cappadocia was particularly eager to place his son under the wing of Cato himself (73). Later, in Britain, Agricola act­ ively set about the education of the sons of British principes: the boys have been described as 'half students and half hostages' (74). Similarly, as at Rome, hostages taken in the field received a degree of 'education1, one may suppose. The importance of this form of 'education' becomes apparent when we comprehend the sheer scale of hostage-taking that might occur. In Gaul, Caesar took literally hundreds of hostages. Hostage-taking on this scale is not found in Rome's dealings with the Hellenistic kingdoms and is very probably to be explained as a response to the structure of tribal elites, with their widely-available chieftainships (75). Of course, by its very nature, the relationship between king and Rome was self-perpetuating, for the future king grew up in the context of a relationship which had constituted a leading factor in the reign of his predecessor: by the time of the Principate, the relationship with Rome had in many cases become the very core of the king's position. The mech­ anisms highlighted above are to be seen as functions of this wider relationship. Naturally, though they constitute the most important mechanisms, the future king might gain a Roman 'education' in other ways. After the murder of their father, the sons of Cotys VIII of Thrace were brought up with the future emperor Gaius to become kings in their turn (76). In the second century BC, Bithys, a Thracian prince captured with the Macedonian court after Pydna, gained an 'education' through being held as a detainee at Carseoli, whence he was returned to Thrace and his father (77). Similarly, the young Juba II walked in Caesar's triumph in 47 BC, but went on to receive an 'education' at Rome and in the army and, in 25 BC,

16

Education the Mauretanian throne (78). Finally, we should observe that, in addition to bringing future kings closer to Rome, time spent at Rome and with Roman forces would also have brought together the various royal individuals involved. For example, though it is nowhere ex­ plicitly attested, the sons of Cotys VTII who grew up with Gaius must surely have known Gaius1 other young companion, the future Agrippa I, while they were all together at the imperial court (79). Such feducation1 promoted the integration not only of king and Roman, but also of king and king. Notes to Part 1, section 1 (1) See Badian (1958) 105-6. (2) Pol.xxxi 3.4-5 sees the report of Gracchus1 commission on Ariarathes IV as the principal reason (cf. Pol. xxxii 1.2) : one wonders whether the young Ariarathes V had met any members of this commission while at Rome. On his accommodation there, cf.the house specially built for the obses Antiochus IV of Syria: lV^rkholm (1966) 39. (3) See Scullard (1945) with Walbank (1979) 522; cf. Scullard (1973) 213. On Charops' visit, Pol. xxvii 15. In the end he went too far, Pol. xxxii 5-6. (4) An allusion, in particular, to Rome's support for the heirs of Ptolemy V of Egypt against Antiochus IV of Syria. (5) Livy xlv 44. Sands (1908) 198 thinks that Nicomedes was sent to stay at Rome in 167 BC by Prusias: this seems to be a confusion with Nicomedes1 later visit. Badian (1958) 105 n.5 plausibly suggests that Prusias may have been following Ariarathes I V s example. On Nicomedes1 later visit, see Part II, section 1. (6) Pol. xxxiii 18. (7) This is not to forget of course that future kings might come to Rome for purposes other than education. By so doing, they would necessarily receive a certain 'education1. On these visits, see Part II, section 1. (8) Pace Badian (1958) 105. (9) Jos. AJ xv 342-3; BJ i 435, 445. On Pollio's identity, see Braund (1983b), where it is argued that Pollio is more likely to have been .a prominent Jew resident in Rome than Asinius or Vedius Pollio. Of course, any king could employ tutors in Greek and Latin for his sons: Smallwood (1976) 83 n. 72 suggests that Herod did just this. It may be allowed that, in the most general terms, Livy's version of the Senate's reply to Prusias and Nicomedes (above) constitutes something of a precedent for Augustus1 practice, but it could be the product of the Augustan author. (10) Jos. AJ xv 52-3; BJ i 573. (11) Jos. AJ xvii 80; BJ i 602-3. Jos. AJ xvii 20-1. Phasael, Herod's son by Pallas, is not said to have been brought up there. On Antipas' education,

17

education see Hoehner (1972) 12-7, with note 9 above on Pollio. (13) Suetonius may also have had in mind Juba II, Cleopatra's surviving children and the children of kings found at Alexandria, some of whom Augustus kept: Dio li 15.6 (on Juba); Plut. Ant. 87.1 and Suet. Aug. 17.5 (on Cleopatra's children); Dio li 16.1-2 (on the royal children at Alexandria). (14) Jos. AJ xviii 143: note Agrippa's connection with Claudius1 mother. (15) Syll. 3 666. (16) Died, xxxiv 35: Liv. Per. 50. Mastanabal took part in the Panathenaea there: IG I I/I 11 2_ 2316 41-4, recording his chariot victory. (17) Vitucci (1953) 107; Magie (1950) 318-9, who plausibly suggests that the young Nicomedes IV was an ephebe at Delos. (18) Sullivan (1980b) 1138 n.61. On earlier evidence for the education of royalty, see Preaux (1978) i 212-20. As late as the second century AD we find a Bosporan king visiting Smyrna to learn about Ionia: Philost. VS i 535. (19) App. Lib. 10; 37; 79. (20) We should recognise the danger for the king of a son too friendly with Rome: see Part II, section 1. (21) Badian (1958) 105-6: on the Herods, see Smallwood (1976) 102. (22) See Merritt (1974), esp. 188-90 and the literature he cites. (23) Plut. Sert. 14.2. (24) Dio li 16.2; cf. Suet. Au£. 48. (25) It is perhaps thus that we should interpret the fact that Herod was told that he ought to send Antipater to Rome: Jos. BJ i 573 (dein). (26) Plut. Sert. 14.2 with 25.4; cf.10.3; App. BC i 114. On Antony, Dio li 16.1-2. (27) Aymard (1961) 141-2. See now also Walker (1980), esp. 207-9. (28) Strabo xvi p.748-9; stating that they were housed basilikos at public expense; cf. vi p.288. (29) II£ 842. (300 K3 33.1 with Debevoise (1938) 151. Tac. Ann. vi 31; Dio Iviii 18 with Debevoise (1938) 117-8. (31) Ziegler (1964) 51-2 provides some discussion. (32) Tac. Ann, ii 1, where Phraates is also said to have wished to remove the potential threat constituted by his sons; cf. Strabo xvi pp. 748-9. On the palace intrigues involved, Jos. AJ xviii 39-44. We can have little confidence in the statement of Veil. Pat. ii 94.4 that Phraatea gave hostages through fear of Tiberius. (33) Tac. Ann, ii 1 with Debevoise (1938) 144 n.5; cf. previous note. (34) Chantraine s.v. homeros. (35) Jos. AJ xx 37. On the Parthians, see note 32 above. Note too the case of Jugurtha (below, note 68). However, this was a

18

Education

dangerous game for the king, for he might be arming his sons against himself: see Part II, section 1. (36) See, for example, Tac. Germ. 20.4; Jos. BJ vi 356-7; ii 379; cf. Walker (1980), esp. 205-7. (37) Walbank (1979) 465. Pol. xxxi 2.1; App Syr. 45. (38) Pol. xxxi 2.6f.; of App. Syr. 46; Zon. ix 25. On the age of Antiochus V, Walbank (1979) 466, who observes the interest­ ing but slight possibility that Antiochus IV had married while an obses at Rome. The marriage of Julia Axse is a matter of great uncertainty given the fragmentary nature of the crucial inscription: Priuli (1977) 332-4. We should note that Roman senators, as patres, were in a sense 'fathers'. (39) Pol. xxxi 11.4-12: that this was the historian is made clear by Pol. xxxvi 12. (40) Pol. xxxi 12. Iff. (41) Pol. xxxi 13.2. Cf. the entourage of Phraates1 sons (Str. xvi p.748) and the Carthaginian obsides at Livy xxxii 2.5. (42) Pol. xxxi 13.4. This need not mean that Demetrius needed an excuse: rather, such an excuse would only help the escape attempt by allaying any suspicions. (43) Pol. xxxi 13.9; 14.2-3. On the geography, see Walbank (1979) 481-2. (44) Pol. xxxi 15.6-7. (45).Diod. xxxi 18. (46) Cf. the Carthaginian obsides, Moscovich (1974) 425. Note also Servius' statement that obsides were not bound: obsides non ligantur (Serv. ad Aen. viii 651). Cf. also Dion. Hal. v 34.1; Caes. BG v 27. But note too Jos. BJ ii 379. (47) It should be allowed of course that even those detained were permitted considerable liberty: see Part III, section 2. It is worth noting however that Paltiel (1979a) 34, using the modern notion of hostageship, finds it very odd that Demetrius should have been held as a hostage for Antiochus IV: cf. Paltiel (1979b). Reasonably enough. (48) Tac. Ann, vi 37.6 (49) Tac. Ann. xii 11.3. Walker (1980) 211 n.9 notes that in Irish and Icelandic folklore hostages are described as fosterrelatives. See further, Chadwick (1970) 115; cf. 112. (50) Pol. xxi 32.10; cf. Livy xxxviii 11.6-7 Pol. xxi 43.22; cf. Livy xxxviii 38.15; App. Syr. 39. Moscovich (1974) argues that the practice was not common: certainly the evidence is lacking. On Augustus, see Aymard (1961). Cf. Walker (1980), esp. 67-72. (51) Pol. xxvi la-1.14 with Walbank (1979) 284-9, esp. 286 for sources: add Physcon FHG iii 186. Walbank remarks, quite rightly, that this was 'more than play-acting or crazy non­ sensef. (52) Livy xli 20. Pol. xxx 25.3. See further, Part II, section 4. (53) M^rkhoLn (1966) 40; Bunge (1974) 67. (54) Tac. Ann, ii 2. 19

Kducation (55) Tac. Ann, vi 41; cf. 43 (56) Tac. Ann, xii 10. Similarly, Italicus is said to have taken Roman ways with him to rule the Cherusci, though he was certainly not an obses: Tac. Ann, xi 16 contra Thompson (1965) 44. On Italicus, see Keddie (1975). (57) Juv. Sat, ii 166; cf. Suet. Cal. 36.1, for the notion of sexual relations with a hostage. We may compare the sexual relationship between Philip II and Pammenes, his host at Thebes, where Philip was a hostage: it is interesting to observe that Philip is thought to have applied important less­ ons learnt while a hostage at Thebes to his reign as king of Macedon: see Hammond and Griffith (1979) 204-6, 424-5. (58) Suet. Cal. 45 with Aymard (1961) 141, who plausibly suggests that they were German obsides. (59) It should be stressed that Livy's dramatic account must be handled with great caution, see Luce (1977) 109: Edson (1935) remains valuable; cf. now Greco (1980) and the literature there cited. (60) Livy xxxix 53. (61) Livy xl 5. (62) Compare the very much later case of the emperor Zeno, who was over-joyed to learn that an ex-doses, Theoderic, had become king of the Goths: Jord. Get. 57; Exc.Val. xi 49. (63) Suet. Aug. 43.4. (64) Balsdon (1934) 53 has suggested that Gaius" purpose was to impress Darius. This is not ruled out by the view ex­ pressed in the text and, if it were right, would count against the modern notion of what a hostage is. (65) RG 31.1. Anyway, RG 32.2 (quoted above) makes it abund­ antly clear that the emperor might take pride in sons sent to him who were evidently not hostages. We should note that Augustus describes the young Parthians as sent to himself personally: it is this personal connection between emperor and 'hostage1 that makes receipt of the latter a matter of pride for the former. On this personal link, cf. 115 846; Suet. Auc[. 21: on this, see Aymard (1961) 137ff.. (66) Sail. RT 7; 101.6.Cf. the Pannonians who learnt to speak and read Latin through service with the Roman army: Veil. Pat. ii 110; cf. Brunt (1964-5) 274. Cf. also Arminius: Tac. Ann, ii 10.3. (67) See Allen (1938) . (68) Sail. BJ 9.3. If Sallust is correct in stating that Micipsa sent Jugurtha to Numantia to get him out of the way, Micipsa had somewhat miscalculated. Cf. above note 35. (69) Pol. xxx 1.4. For his part in the war, Walbank (1979) 376. (70) E.g. Epiphanes, son of Antiochus IV of Commagene, Tac. Hist, ii 25; Jos. RJ v 560-5. Cf. also Amazaspus, brother of Mithridates of Iberia, who died serving with Trajan's army at Nisibis: IGR i 192; cf. Bosworth (1977) 228 n.43; Boltunova (1971) 220-2 is rather speculative. Such service seems to have

20

Education been especially important in the West, cf. below, Part I, section 3. (71) Cic. ad Att. v 17.3; cf.18.4 (72) On Caesar and Niccmedes, see Gelzer (1968) 22 and 30 n.l. Plut. Cat.Min. 73. Both attracted talk of a sexual relation­ ship: cf. above note 57 and Part III, section 2, note 79. (73) Plut. Cat.Min. 15: he was disappointed. Cf. in general, Part II, section 2. (74) Tac. Agr. 21.2 with Ogilvie and Richmond ad loc. for the quotation. Garnsey (1978) 252-3 sets Agricola's educational activities clearly in perspective. (75) Caes. BG ii 15 (600 obsides); v 4 (200); vi 4 (100). See Moscovich (1979-80). Cf. Octavian, who demanded 700 children from the Dalmatians: App. Illyr. 28. It must be allowed, how­ ever, that at least some of Caesar's obsides were left with the Aedui: Caes. BG vi 4; vii 55. (76) IGR iv 145 (77) On Bithys, see Syll 2- 656 with the literature cited in Part II, section 1, note 4. Pace Condurachi, it must remain most uncertain whether the Abderites lost their case: the inscription seems to suggest their victory. (78) Dio li 15.6 and Part I, section 3. (79) See above on the meeting of Demetrius I and Philometor. Magie (1950) 317-8 suggests that Niccmedes II met Massinissa at Rome, but there is no sure evidence for the meeting, as Magie seems to think.

21

Section 2: Recognition

It is now generally agreed that the term 'client king1 is not to be understood literally: clientela is a metaphor in the context of Rome's foreign relationships, a metaphor seldom used by our sources (1) . Another metaphor, at least as common, is servitium: the relationship of the king to Rome is compared to that of a slave to his master. Tacitus describes Antiochus IV of Commagene as inservientium regum ditissimus (2) . Of course, this metaphor is particularly appropriate to a hostile interpretation of the king's relationship with Rome: thus Sail us t makes the hostile Mithridates VI refer to Eumenes II as ex rege miserrimum servorum. Similarly, Josephus says that Aristobulus of Judaea held it beneath his dignity to 'play the slave' to Pompey (3) . We find the metaphor attached part­ icularly to those who had spent their youth at Rome (4) . Yet another* range of metaphors evoked family connections between king and Rome: such connections imply strong, close ties, involving mutual obligations. This sort of metaphor is therefore more appropriate to a benign interpretation of the relationship. Ihus Sallust makes Adherbal, requesting the Senate's help against Jugurtha, say: 'Micipsa pater meus moriens mini praecepit uti... vos mihi cognatorum, vos adfinium loco ducerem1 Such a metaphor could only be encouraged where the king had spent his youth at Rome (5) . Metaphors aside, the full formulation by which Rome des­ cribed what has become known as a 'client king' was rex soci usque et amicus. But our sources are notoriously imprecise: such a king is variously referred to as a rex, a socius, an amicus, or any combination of the three (6) . However, it has been argued that a distinction may be drawn between those kings recognised as rex and those recognised as socius et amicus: Badian holds that from the latter half of the second century BC "...it is the aim of every king within Rome's orbit to be 'called king' by her: it is better to be 'called friend and

23

!\\

roijnilion

ally,' but it is not by any means useless merely to have been 'rex appellatus'". Such a distinction must be a possibility, but it should be stressed that, pace Badian, we know of no king who was certainly 'called king1 but denied the title of 'friend and ally': the imprecision of our sources is a major stumbling-block (7). Under the Republic, recognition of a king as rex sociusque et amicus (appellatio) was almost invariably conferred by the Senate. The only known exception to this rule is a plebiscitum of P. Clodius of 58 BC, under which Brogitarus of Galatia received recognition. That this was indeed excep­ tional is borne out by the fact that Cicero, attacking Clodius and his measure, emphasises the point that Brogitarus had not obtained his recognition from the Senate (8) . As might be expected, recognition was often conferred upon a king in response to his direct request, as in the case of Perseus (9). For the king to be recognised without making such a direct request, as was Ariobarzanes III of Cappadocia, was considered a particular honour (10) . Otherwise, the Senate conferred recognition by formally ratifying the deeds of its magistrates in the provinces, as in the case of Massinissa, who was recognised by Scipio Africanus, but took care to have his recognition ratified by the Senate (11). The king's recognition was invalid until so ratified. A case in point is Demetrius I Soter who seems to have been recognised by the commission of Ti. Gracchus, but not by the Senate (12). Still more so, Antiochus XIII of Syria who was recognised by Lucullus, but not by the Senate and not by Lucullus' successor, Pompey, who annexed Syria despite him (13). Our fullest account of what was involved in the appellatio of a king is Josephus' account of that of Herod in 40 BC (14) . Herod had fled to Rome when the Parthians had installed Antigonus as ruler in Judaea. At Rome, Herod consolidated the support of Antony and Octavian. Messalla and Atratinus presented him to the Senate and dwelt on his good-will towards Rome and the beneficence of his father, Antipater, towards her. Antony added that it would be to Rome's advantage in the war against the Parthians to have Herod as ruler of Judaea. As a result, the Senate declared Antigonus an enemy and rec­ ognised Herod. According to Josephus, this was much more than Herod had ever expected: Josephus may well be right, for, it should be noted, Herod had no legitimate claim to be king of Judaea (15) . The meeting over, Antony and Octavian left the Senate House with Herod in the position of honour between them and processed to the Capitol, with the consuls and other magist­ rates leading the way. On the Capitol they sacrificed and deposited the decree by which Herod was recognised. Antony then feasted Herod on what Josephus calls 'the first day of his reign': Herod's coins confirm that, though 37 BC was the year of his actual accession, he counted 40 BC, the year of his

24

Recognition recognition, as the first year of his reign (16). After recognition, the CapitoJ. and especially Jupiter Optimus Maximus and his temple, where decrees - such as that on Herod in 40 BC - and agreements involving kings were stored, remained a focal point in the relationship between king and Rome. It was a focal point of the Roman world as a whole: Livy calls it the arcem ... imperil, caputque rerum (17) . Cicero was hardly exaggerating when he affirmed: 'multi reges ... habent in animo Capitolium sic ornare ut templi dignitas imperiique nostri nomen desiderat.' (18) Cicero describes an intended dedication there as ... in templo clarissimo, populo Romano monumentum ... societatis amicitiaegue (19). Gold crowns were regularly dedicated there by kings and cities (20). Sacrifices and other dedications were also made. The first king known to have made such a dedication is Hiero II of Syracuse, though it was essentially indirect: in 216 BC, he sent a gold Victory to the Senate as an omen of success against Carthage which the Senate dedicated on the Capitol in the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus (21) . The earliest known direct dedication by a king is the gold crown sent by Philip V of Macedon in 190 BC: earlier direct royal dedications are entirely probable (22). Royal contact with Jupiter and the Capitol continued well into the Principate: as late as Antoninus Pius, Pharasmanes, king of Iberia, was allowed to sacrifice there while visiting Rome. In thus per­ mitting kings to offer sacrifices and dedications to Jupiter Optimus Maximus, the Senate, however fleetingly, admitted kings to the core of everything Roman (23). A king who had received appellatio in his absence from Rome might send a letter of thanks to his Roman sponsor. That such letters were sent emerges from Cicero's complaint in 46 BC; '.♦.iam a regibus ultimis adlatas esse litteras quibus mini gratias agant quod se mea sententia appellaverim, quos ego non modo reges appellatos sed omnino natos nesciebam.' The context of his complaint suggests that, as might be expected, a copy of the decree of recognition was sent to the king concerned (24). It is apparent that Roman sponsors were crucial for the king, if he was to obtain recognition. But to have one Roman as a friend was to make an enemy of another. Cicero complains that Bibulus refused to allow Ariobarzanes III his royal title because it was Cicero who had moved the king's recognition and had been entrusted with his safety. Ironically, Cicero had taken much the same attitude as Bibulus towards Brogitarus'

25

Recognition recognition through Clodius (25). As Badian rightly stresses, appellatio was of the highest importance for the king within Rome's orbit: all the more so where the king was especially insecure. Demetrius I Soter, having escaped from Rome and installed himself in Syria flatly against the wishes of the Senate, had particular grounds for seeking Roman recognition (26). Similarly, Ptolemy XII Auletes, whose position was most insecure, for his predecessor had bequeathed his kingdom to Rome upon his death in 80 BC. When Auletes first sought recognition is not known, but he had little reason for delay. By 70 BC the recognition of Auletes - or, alternatively, the annexation of Egypt - was already a long standing issue at Rome. In 65 BC, Crassus, as censor, sought annexation; in 63 BC, Egypt was threatened again by the Rullan bill. It is immediately apparent why, when Diodorus visited Egypt in 60 BC, he found it in a state of apprehension because Rome had not yet recognised Auletes (27). The king's anxiety and eagerness for recognition is underlined by the fact that he was willing to pay almost 6,000t. to Caesar and Pompey for their support in obtaining it: this is said to have been the amount the king drew from his kingdom in an entire year (28) . Not that Auletes was the only king willing to pay for recognition: Brogitarus is said to have paid Clodius for his recognition in 58 BC, while Herod promised Antony money for his support in 40 BC (29). With the Principate, the focus of recognition changed: under the Republic, the king had (normally) needed senatorial recognition, but he now needed that of the emperor (30) . There is reason to believe that another change also took place. Under the Republic, the king first succeeded and then applied for recognition, but, under the Principate, the reverse seems to have been the case: the king applied for recognition before he assumed the throne. Under Herod's last will, Archelaus was to succeed him in Judaea. Even so, upon Herod's death, Archelaus was most care­ ful not to succeed until he had gained Augustus' sanction. The importance of his waiting is indicated by the fact that his opponents later urged against him that he had not waited as he should have. Yet Archelaus' case could be exceptional, for Augustus had been named bebaiotes in Herod's will (31) . But the case of Aretas IV of Nabataea suggests that Archelaus was not so exceptional. Aretas seized the Nabataean throne vacated by Obodas III in about 9 BC without first obtaining Augustus1 permission, in order to forestall Syllaeus. Josephus makes it plain that Augustus was most displeased at Aretas' failure to consult him in advance (32). The emperor claimed the right to control the succession among the kings: it is only against this background that we can understand the privilege which Augustus granted to Herod, that he could appoint his own successor (33). The ceremony surrounding appellatio also changed: under

26

Recognition the Principate, we hear no more of the senatorial procession to the Capitol that accompanied the recognition of Herod in 40 BC. The emperor took over such ceremonies. Augustus struck treaties with barbarorum principes in the temple of Mars Ultor he had built (34). Gaius staged a major ceremony in the Forum in which he conferred titles and lands upon several kings (35). Claudius staged a similar ceremony in the Forum: typically/ he followed ancient Roman practice in the process (36). There was therefore more precedent than often imagined for Nero's grand ceremony, again in the Forum, in which he recognised Tiridates in AD 66 (37). Similar ceremonies were staged in the provinces by Tiberius, Germanicus, Domitian and Trajan (38). II Gifts were often conferred upon kings together with recog­ nition: it is worth exploring the evocative range of these gifts (39). It has been quite properly observed that at least some of these gifts were thought to have been the regalia of the old kings of Rome itself (40) . Dionysius of Halicarnassus makes the connection explicitly in his account of the first attested case of the conferral of such gifts by Rome. Having made a treaty of peace and friendship with Rome, Lars Porsenna is said to have received an ivory chair, a sceptre, a gold crown and a triumphal robe, 'which had been the regalia of the kings (sc. of Rome)' (41). These items were therefore particularly appropriate gifts for Rome to bestow upon a king: especially at the time when she was recognising his very kingship through appellatio. But, although some stress this particular evoc­ ation at the expense of others, reservations must be made. Dionysius apart, no source shows any awareness of the relev­ ance of Rome's regal past to the conferral of such gifts upon kings: the fact that Dionysius had a special antiquarian in­ terest makes this general silence still more telling. Probably more significant than these evocations of Rome's past are the evocations of these gifts in contemporary Roman society. Dionysius describes the robe given to Porsenna as 1 triumphae': he seems to mean the toga picta of the triumphator (42). The relevance of the triumphal evocations of some gifts is underlined by the words Livy puts into the mouth of Scipio Africanus in 203 BC. Having bestowed upon Massinissa a gold crown, gold patera, curule chair, ivory sceptre, toga picta and tunica palmata, Scipio 'addit verbis honorem, "Neque magnificentius quicquam triumpho apud Romanos, neque triumphantibus ampliorem eo ornatu esse: quo unum omnino externorum dignum Massinissam populus Romanus ducat" ' (43)

27

Recognition Scipio's explicit comparison of his gifts to Massinissa with the paraphernalia of the triumphator is particularly apposite in its context: they were conferred upon Massinissa in the closing stages of a war in which he had made a significant contribution to Roman victory (44) . But again, qualifications must be made. The triumphator stood in a decorated quadriga, wearing a toga picta and tunica palmata. On his head he wore a laurel wreath, while over it was held a gold crown. In his right hand he held a laurel branch and, in his left, an ivory sceptre. He also wore a bulla and an iron ring (45). Yet,, as far as we know, no king ever received a quadriga. Laurel, which Versnel goes so far as to call the 'symbol of the triumph', is not attested as a gift to kings by any literary source (46). Further, only Porsenna and Massinissa are ever said to have received a gold crown from Rome (47). Nor did any king receive a bulla or iron ring (48). Moreover, such gifts were by no means only given in the aftermath of military success: we have seen that recognition is the more usual context (49). Furthermore, some of the gifts, notably the curule chair and the toga praetexta were no part of the triumphator's paraphernalia (50). But the latter were part of the paraphernalia of curule magistrates at Rome. It is the curule magistracies that pro­ vide a common factor. The triumphator was (or had been) also a curule magistrate: the paraphernalia of the curule magist­ rate also derived from the old kings of Rome. Dionysius, once again, is quite clear on these connections (51). Again, Livy points up the evocation. In addition to the gifts presented to Massinissa by Scipio, the Senate gave him 'sagula purpurea duo cum fibulis aureis singulis et lato clavo tunicis, equos duo phaleratos, bina equestria arma cum loricis, et tabernacula militaremque supellectilem qualem praeberi consuli mos esset' (52) These gifts evoke the military role of the curule magistrate. In addition to Livy's explicit comparison of these gifts with the paraphernalia of the consul on campaign, we should observe in particular the purple sagula: these cloaks, with their gold brooches, are the very particular attire of the Roman military commander, the magistrate at war (53) . Gifts presented to kings were therefore redolent both of kingship - in particular the kingship of-old Rome - and, prob­ ably more important, of high office irt contemporary Rome in both its military and civil aspect. Small wonder that Polybius describes them as 'the gifts most honoured at Rome' (54). But these are essentially the gifts of the Republic. When Ptolemy of Mauretania received an ivory sceptre and toga picta in AD 24, Tacitus regards their conferral as the re-enactment of ancient practice: repetitus ex vetusto more honos (55).

28

Recognition Under the Principate, from Gaius on, kings had gifts explicitly linked to the curule office evoked by the gifts of the Repub­ lic: ornamenta praetoria and ornamenta consularia (56). The first king known to have received either is Agrippa 1/ who held ornamenta praetoria in the reign of Gaius (57). At the beginning of the next reign, Claudius awarded the same king ornamenta consular ia and additions to his kingdom. At the same time, Agrippafs brother received ornamenta praetoria (58). A dedication from Heliopolis describes Sohaemus of Emesa as honoratus ornamentis consularibus: when he received them is uncertain (59). The last king known to have received the honour is Agrippa II of Judaea who was given ornamenta praetoria by Vespasian when he came to Rome in AD 75 (60) . Ornamenta triumphalia are nowhere explicitly attested as having been given to kings: this tends to support the sugg­ estion that, under the Republic, gifts to kings had been re­ garded as evocative of curule office more than of the triumphator alone. The conferral of ornamenta praetoria and con­ sular i a must have constituted a form of ranking among kings under the Principate: we have observed how Agrippa I received, first, ornamenta praetoria and, later, ornamenta consularia this looks like advancement. But it must be stressed that we can detect no concrete difference between the positions of, for example, Agrippa I with ornamenta consular ia and Agrippa II from AD 75 with ornamenta praetoria: the implied ranking is therefore not to be pressed. More important, the conferral of these curule ornamenta is to be understood in the context of the king's citizenship, which is discussed in the next section. Notes to Section 2 (1) Bleicken (1964); Harris (1979) 135 n.2. See also Dahlheim (1968) 2, esp.n.4 and (1977) 273 n.209; Cimma (1976) 234-5; Sherwin-White (1980a) 179; Lintott (1981) 61. Badian (1968d) 28 n.42 allows that clientela is extra­ legal, but persists in his view that Rome regarded kings as clients; cf. Badian (1958) 114. Nor is Badian alone: cf., for example, Errington (1971), esp.40 and 304; Wilkes (1969) 60, esp.n.8; Jones (1978) 134. The history of the term is traced by Harris (1979) 135 n.2: to the references he cites, add Plin. NH xxxiv 32; Flor.i 36.3; cf., much later, Anm. Marc, xviii 2.16; xvii 12.15. The notion of clientela is not to be rejected completely, but set in perspective. There can be no doubt that individual Romans might have foreign kings and communities as clientes: OLD s.v. 'cliens' (2) and 'clientela1 (lb). But they are essentially different from the Roman state: Barrett (1981) 124 confuses the two. As import­ ant, Brunt, after Badian, has observed that, in Roman society, amicus may be used as a polite synonym for cliens: Brunt (1978) 168-9. For an extended discussion of the terminology of pat-

29

ronage in Roman society, see Sailer (1982) ch.l. However, while all this must be allowed, there is nothing to suggest that the Roman state regarded relations with kings and comm­ unities in terms of clientela in any formal or systematic way. (2) Tac. Hist, ii 81. At a further remove, he describes kings as instrumenta servitutis (Agr.14.1). The notion of the king as slave was popular in antiquity: see Volkmann (1967). Note also Sail. BJ 102.6, where Sulla is made to tell Bocchus I of Mauretania that Rome always preferred to have amici rather than servi (cf. Sail. Cat. 9.5), and Sen. De Clem, i 1.2, where it is said to be in the emperor's power to decide f quos rogoc mancipia fieri quorumque capiti regium circumdari decus oijortcat*. Later, we are told, Tiridates presented himself as the slave of Nero, when recognised by him in AD 66: in accord­ ance, it seems, with Parthian custom: so Chaumont (1976) 11623, esp. 121. On the declaration of Prusias II of Bithynia that he was a freedman of Rome, see Braund (1982b) , where it is argued that his declaration has more to do with the rhet­ oric of freedom in the second century BC than with the present issue. (3) Sail. Hist, iv fg. 69.8; cf. BJ 31.9; Jos. BJ i 132: douleuein. (4) Tacitus makes enemies of the ex-obses Vonones describe him as one who had 'tot per annos servitutem perpessum': Ann, ii 2.4; cf. xiv 26.1. Similarly, Tacitus says that some Cherusci regarded Italicus, who had grown up in Italy, as 'infectum servitio': Ann, xi 16. Tacitus' tendency to depict foreign affairs in terms of slavery - though not confined to him, as we have seen - must be related to his broader concern with servitium and libertas in Rome itself: see Wirszubski (1950) 163-7. (5) Sail. BJ 14.1: on Demetrius I, see the previous section. This metaphorical usage is to be distinguished from inter­ state family connections derived from a legendary or histor­ ical shared ancestry: see Braund (1980a); Rigsby (1980) 242-8; Badian (1972b) 178-9. (6) On the imprecision of the sources, see especially Matthaei (1907); Sands (1908) 10-48; Dahlheim (1968) 163-70; Ziegler (1972) 88. The terms socius and amicus can even be used to describe the behaviour of a king, where he does not possess them as part of a formal title: so Cic. pro Sest. 59; cf. 57, where Cicero deliberately stretches the terms to make his point. On the term socius, see especially Wegner (1969). (7) Badian (1958) 106. (8) Cic. De Har. Resp. 29; pro Sest*. 56. See Lenaghan (1969) 132-4. (9) Livy xl 58.8. (10) On the recognition of Ariobarzanes, see Braund (1982a) 39. (11) Livy xxx 15.11 and 17.10. On Massinissa's recognition,

30

Recognition see Walsh (1965) 151 and the literature he cites. Badian comments, 'In the isolated earlier instance of Massinissa...the account is so rhetorical (and from bad sour­ ces) that we may probably ignore it': Badian (1958) 106 n.4. He adds, 'Livy xxx 15.11 is a tailpiece to the romance of Soph­ onisba; the details cannot be relied on (17. 8f. is not con­ firmation) ': Badian (1958) 295 Note M. But, so far from being an isolated case 'not (as far as we can see) repeated for generations' (ibid.) We know also of the case of Vermina and may suppose others still earlier (Livy xxxi 11.14 with Briscoe ad loc.) . We should also observe the appellatio of Spanish chieftains in the course of the Second Punic War: see Kienast (1968) 338-40. Further, Livy xxx 15.11, although it follows the story of Sophonisba, is essentially separate from it, pace Badian, and does seem to be confirmed by xxx 17.10, despite his assertion to the contrary. Nor do we really know Livy's source: De Sanctis even suggested Polybius: see Rawson (1975) 155, largely favourable to Badian's view. (12) Pol. xxxi 33.3 with Walbank ad loc: see especially Briscoe (1969) 52-3. (13) Justin xl 2.2-3: Seager (1979) 50 is useful. (14) Jos. AJ xiv 379-89; cf. BJ i 281-5. (15) Jos. AJ xiv 386-7. Cf. the French in Africa, who had a marked disregard for their appointees' local right to rule or lack of it: see Alexandre (1970). (16) See Meshorer (1967) 66-7. Note the role of the Capitol in Auletes' recognition; cf. Cic Rab. Post. 6. Herod's name was presumably entered in a list or lists (formula(e)). Most prefer to suppose only one formula but the evidence seems quite inconclusive, as Ziegler (1972) 89 seems to argue; cf. Sherk (1969) no.22; Marshall (1968) 54 n.35; Kienast (1968) 337-48; Lintott (1981) 61. (17) Livy i 55.6; cf. Tac. Hist, iv 54; Amm. Marc, xxii 16.2. Mellor stresses Jupiter's role as guardian of oaths and treat­ ies, but underestimates the possible relevance to kings of the centrality of Jupiter at Rome: Mellor (1975) 130 and (1978) 328-9. Fears (1981) gives some account of the latter but has very little to say of Jupiter's role in Rome's foreign relations. (18) Cic. In Verr. ii 4.68. (19) Cic. In Verr. ii 4.67. (20) Livy xxxvi 35.12 (Philip V in 190 BC); xlii 6.5f. (Alabanda in 170 BC) ; xliv 14.3 (Pamphylians in 169 BC) ; xiv 25.7 (Rhodes in 167 BC) . For the Hellenistic context of these crowns, see Magie (1950) 612. Livy traces the practice at Rome as far back as the fifth century BC: Livy ii 22.6. (21) Livy xxii 37; cf. xxiv 21, where Hiero dedicates spoils sent from Rome in the temple of Olympian Zeus at Syracuse; cf. Plut. Marc. 8.6 on Rome and Victoria, see Wiseman (1981) esp. 35 with note 2. Cf. also the case of Bocchus I of Mauretania: see below, note 23.

31

Recognition (22) Livy xxxvi 35.12. (23) Dio lxix 15.3, where it is also stated that the king, his son and other prominent Iberians displayed their military prowess before the emperor and that Pius erected a statue of the king in the temple of Bellona; cf. SHA Pius 9.6; see too Bosworth (1977) 230. Tiridates had similarly displayed his archery before Nero to honour the freedman Patrobius (Dio lxiii 3.2), while Caesar is said to have erected a statue of Cleopatra in his temple of Venus Genetrix (see Gelzer (1968) 286-7) . Royal activity on the Capitol in the period between Philip and Pharasmanes has left epigraphical remains: see Degrassi (1962); Badian (1968b) 247-9; Mellor (1975) 203ff. and (1978); Lintott (1978); cf. Sherwin-White (1977a) 64 n. 16. Further, the much-neglected literary tradition tells us that, recog­ nition apart, Massinissa and Prusias II sought to sacrifice there after Pydna (Livy xlv 13-4; 44), while, shortly before the Social War, Bocchus I of Mauretania dedicated Victories there with trophies and, beside them, gilded figures repres­ enting the surrender of Jugurtha to Sulla, much to Marius* displeasure: Plut. Mar. 32.2; Sulla 6.1-2; cf. Sail. BJ 113-6; App. BC i 77. On Bocchus' dedication itself, see Schafer (1979) and, on its wider political significance, Badian (1970) 11-2. In the mid-seventies, two Seleucid princes went to some lengths in their attempt to dedicate a magnificent candelabrum there: Cic. In Verr. ii 4.67; cf. Welles (1934) no. 5 lines 4 and 51-2 showing that their ancestor, Seleucus i, dedicated a great candelabrum at Didyma. Under Augustus, some British rulers made Capitoline dedications: Str. iv p.200. Of course, such sacrifices and dedications required formal senatorial approval: this was a privilege somehow regulated from 122 BC by a lex Rubria et Acilia: on this law, see Badian (1962) 206 n. 31. For further, non-royal, grants of this privilege, see Sherk (1969) nos. 2 lines 31-5; 16 lines 5-9, 11-2, 48-9; 20 E lines 7-8; 22 lines 25-6; 26 lines 17-23. On the appearance of Jupiter in kingdoms, see Part II, section 4. (24) Cic. ad Fam. ix 15.4. (25) Cic. ad Fam. ii 17.7; de Har. Resp. 29; Braund (1982a). (26) On Demetrius, see above note 12. (27) lhat this was the will of Ptolemy XI Alexander II is argued in Part III, section 1. Cic. In Verr. ii 2.76; Plut. Crass. 13.1; Diod. i 83.8; cf. 44.1. On the Rullan bill, see Seager (1979) 62-4 and the literature he cites; on Crassus and Egypt, Seager (1979) 60. The view that Crassus wanted to rec­ ognise Auletes in 65 BC rests on no^evidence and flatly contra­ dicts Plut. Crass. 13.1, contra Marshall (1976) 66. (28) Suet. EXJ 54.3; cf. Dio xxxix 12. On the royal income, Diod.xvii 52.6 with Rostovtzeff (1941) 1153. On Auletes1 wealth, PIin. NH xxxiii 136, after Varro. (29) Jos. AJ xiv 382. Cf. Sallust's statement that Bocchus I of Mauretania at first failed to gain recognition because he 32

Recognition did not use his wealth: BJ 80 4-5. Oost (1955) 101-2 suggests that Auletes' brother, the king of Cyprus, would have saved himself if he had had sufficient resources to 'buy' recog­ nition. Cf. also Timarchus, satrap of Media (Diod. xxxi 27a; Harris (1979) 90 n.3) and Caesar on Lentulus (Caes. BC i 4) . See further Part II, section 1. Our sources sometimes suggest that Rome only conferred appellatio upon those who had deserved it: so, in the case of Vermina (Livy xxxi 11.16). Klotz (1953) 63 takes this passage to be a borrowing from Caes. BG i 43.4, where the same notion is expressed. According to Klotz, it was a reality in Caesar's day, but not at the time of Vermina. But the notion is some­ thing of a commonplace (cf. Sail. BJ 104.5) and seems never to have been the reality. Despite the Senate's statement at Livy xxxi 11.16, Vermina was soon recognised: Livy xxxi 19.6 with Walsh (1965) 151, esp. n. 27. As for Caes. BG i 43.4, the whole burden of Caesar's statement is that Ariovistus had done nothing to deserve the appellatio he had been granted, while Sallust is himself cynical about the real reason for the Senate's refusal of recognition to Bocchus I (Sail. BJ 80. 4-5) . The case of Herod, outlined above, shows that, while the record of a king and his family might be taken into account in the conferral of appellatio, other factors were equally or more important: important friendships at Rome, cemented with wealth, and the promise of future advantage for Rome and in­ dividual Romans; cf. Seager (1979) 89 on the background to the recognition of Ariovistus. (30) Str. xvii p.840 ad fin.; Sen. De Clem, i 1.2. Thus, for example, when Cottius II was awarded the royal title, he is said to have received it from the emperor, Claudius: Dio lx 24.4 and below for further examples. Of course, this does not mean that the Senate did not take a formal vote on the matter: see Dio lix 12.2, which makes this clear; cf. Suet. Tib. 30. Jos. AJ xv 196 is also revealing. Cf. in general Millar (1982) 4. (31) On Herod's will, see Part III, section 1. (32) Schurer (1973) 581; Meshorer (1975) 41-2. cf. the Quadi and Marcus Aurelius: SHA M. Aur. 14.3. (33) See Part III, section 1. (34) Suet. Au£. 21.2; cf. 29. 1-2; ^ 29. On Augustus' temple of Mars Ultor, see Simpson (1977) . (35) Dio lix 12.2. Cf. Suet. Cal. 22. (36) Suet. Claud. 25; cf. Livy i 24; Varro RR ii 49 relates the practice. One king who took part in this ceremony was Agrippa I: Jos. BJ ii 215-6; AJ xix 274-7. It is recalled on his coinage, see Meshorer (1967) 80 and nos. 90-93(b) . (37) On this ceremony, see Chaumont (1976) 116-23. (38) The evidence is collected by Bonn (1877) 16-7. Note also Octavian's meeting with Herod on Rhodes (Jos. BJ i 387-93; AJ xv 187-96). Cf. Vitellius and Artabanus: Debevoise (1938) 163. Of course, provincial ceremonies had taken place under

33

Recognition the Republic: see below on Scipio and Massinissa. Note too, the coins featuring Roman dealings with kings: Belloni (1979); Gobi (1961). (39) Linked with appellatio were gifts to Syphax in 210 BC (Livy xxvii 4), Massinissa in 203 BC (Livy xxx 15 and 17), Antiochus I of Commagene and Ariovistus in 59 BC (Cic. ad Q.fr. ii 10.2; Caes. BG i 43.4), and Ptolemy of Mauretania in AD 24 (Tac. Ann, iv 26.4). Pace Rawson (1975) 155n. 77, there seems no reason to doubt the case of Ariovistus. Similarly, the tradition is that Lars Porsenna received gifts after he had made a treaty with Rome (Dion. Hal. v 345), while Ptolemy IV and his queen received gifts when Rome renewed her friendship with them (Livy xxvii 4: rejected by many, but, though some details are certainly wrong, there may be some substance to the passage: see Rawson (1975) 155 and, more positively, Huss (1976) 166-8). Thus Staveley (1956) 111 calls these gifts 'tokens of recognition'. But it should be stressed that such gifts are not always linked with appellatio. Nor were the gifts con­ ferred always the same, as will emerge. In 200 BC, Rome con­ ferred upon Massinissa gold and silver vessels, a toga purpurea, tunica palmata, ivory sceptre, curule chair and toga praetexta, when she sent to congratulate him upon his success in Africa and to request his aid against Philip V of Macedon (Livy xxxi 11.11). Pace Briscoe ad loc., this cannot be the confir­ mation of Scipio's earlier conferral in 203 BC (Livy xxx 15), for that had already been confirmed, with additional gifts (Livy xxx 17) . Nor does there seem to be any reason to supp­ ose Livy xxxi 11.11 to be an 'alternative version' of Livy xxx 17, as suggested by Rawson (1975) 155. Again, when Eumenes II came to Rome in 172 BC to warn her against Perseus, he was given a curule chair, ivory sceptre and (cum) dona amplissima (Livy xlii 14, who sees the gifts simply as the result of Roman favour for the king; cf. Died, xxix 34) . Further, in 160 BC, Ariarathes V of Cappadocia sent a gold crown and his good wishes to Rome and received in return a sceptre and curule chair (Pol. xxxii 1.3). (40) See especially Bonn (1877) 20; Kienast (1968) 336; Warren (1970) 59; Lintott (1981) 61. (41) hois hoi basileis ekosmounto: Dion. Hal. v 35.1; cf. iii 61. Of course, Porsenna's case may very well be legendary: see Weinstock (1957) 148 n.38; Ferrenbach (1895) 7-8. (42) Dion. Hal. v 35.1; cf. iii 61. Warren (1970) 59 notes the relationship between the garb of the triumphator and that of Jupiter Optimus Maximus.; cf. Versnel (1970) 56-93. We must remember the god's role in the relationship between king and Rome: above. It seems probable that the toga purpurea and the tunica purpurea were earlier versions of the toga picta and tunica palmata: see Weinstock (1971) 271 n. 9; Warren (1973) 611, 614. It is worth noting that the toga, normally the mark of the

34

Recognition Roman citizen, was given, under the Republic, at any rate, to non-citizens. (43) Livy xxx 15: the previous discussion shows that Massinissa was not quite the exception that Livy's Scipio suggests. For gold and silver ware as gifts to kings, cf. Livy xxvii 4; xxxi 11.11; xxxv 23.11; xliii 5.8; xliv 14.2; xlv 14; 44; Tac. Germ. 5.4. Such items seem to have been given as much for their intrinsic value as for any symbolic significance; see Strong (1966) xxviii, 127. Cf. also the trade/gift items suitable for a Yemeni king: Peripl. Mar. Eryth. 24. (44) It is generally held that Juba II received some gifts approximating to triumphal ornaments in AD 6 as a result of the victory he and Cossus had won over the Gaetuli in that year: notably, Fishwick and Shaw (1976) 492; Salzmann (1974) 179; Desanges (1964) 36; Lemosse (1967) 46. By contrast, Gsell (1928) viii 228 is cautious, while Bohn (1877) 21 n.42 is sceptical. Cossus was certainly awarded triumphal orna­ ments for his part: Veil. Pat. ii 116.2; Dio lv 28.3f.. But Juba's case is most uncertain. Much has been made of the fact that what have been considered triumphal ornaments only appear on Juba's coinage from AD 6. But the numismatic evidence may be misleading: these coins are extremely rare and, of the three types known, one is not securely dated and could be earlier than AD 6. Most important, it is not clear that the items depicted were items given to Juba by Rome: for the coins, Mazard (1955) nos. 193-5. It should also be stressed that the king might have his own regalia, similar to those of the Roman triumphator: Weinstock (1957) 148; Rawson (1975) 155-6; Dion. Hal. iii 61.3. The same difficulties are raised by the coinage of Rhoemetalces I of Thrace: Youroukova (1976) 57. Similarly, by the Bosporan coinage; see below. The most prob­ able numismatic depiction of gifts from Rome occurs on the coins of Ptolemy of Mauretania, for they are supported by Tac. Ann, iv 26: Mazard (1955) nos. 440-50. But see note 46 below. Leglay (1966) restores an inscription so that it shows both Juba and Ptolemy to have received imperatoria quattuor insig­ nia, but the restoration is highly speculative. (45) Versnel (1970) 56-7, inevitably synchronic: cf. Warren (1970). (46) Versnel (1970) 56. Some coins show laurel-wreaths, but no branches: but whether these were gifts from Rome is quite uncertain (above note 44): Mazard (1955) nos. 193-5, 440-50 (Juba II and Ptolemy); Frolova (1979) 97-8, 114-7, 123, 133, 136-7, 142-3, 181-2, 184, 194. Note in particular that, although laurel appears on the coins of Ptolemy, it is not mentioned by Tacitus, nor indeed is the sella curulis (as it seems to be) which also appears there: Ann, iv 26. On the sella curulis, see Wanscher (1980). (47) Dion. Hal. v 35? Livy xxx 15. (48) According to Appian, Lib. 32, Massinissa received a gold ring. This seems to be a different version of the gifts

35

Recognition listed by Livy. Such differences must warn that lists of gifts may not always be accurate: see above, note 46, on Tacitus and Ptolemy's coinage. (49) Appian describes gifts to Massinissa as charisteria tes symmachias (Lib. 32), but his account is dubious: see previous note. Rome's gifts to Ptolemy can hardly have been considered 'triumphes', as the context of Tac. Ann. iv 26.4 shows "(unless heavy irony is supposed). The point of Ann, iv 26.1-3 is that Dolabella was refused triumphal ornaments for his success against Tacfarinas because Sejanus wanted to ensure that the achievements of his uncle Blaesus would not be outshone. Tacitus can hardly proceed from this to narrate how Ptolemy, unlike Dolabella, was given 'triumphal ornaments'. In fact, although Ptolemy had attracted Roman attention in the war against Tacfarinas, he received gifts in the context of appellatio. Indeed, this could be what Appian means at Lib. 32. (50) It is held that the toga praetexta was given only to lesser rulers, largely because Livy records .that it was given to African reguli, while Syphax and Ptolemy IV and his queen received grander gifts (Livy xxvii 4): Sands (1908) 76: Rawson (1975) 155. But this is most uncertain. First, it requires that Antiochus I of Commagene be adjudged a minor ruler. Second, Massinissa himself received a toga praetexta as well as possibly more exalted gifts: Livy xxxi 11.11. Further, as the attire of the curule magistrate, the praetexta• was no mean gift, as Cicero's rhetoric bears out (ad Q.fr.ii 10. 2) . Nor, pace Rawson (1975) 155, was cavalry equipment a gift reserved for Gallic reguli: compare that given to Eumenes II and his brother, Attalus (Livy xxxv 23.11) and to Massinissa (Livy xxx 17.13) . Further, it should be stressed that the suggestion that each new Norican ruler received such equipment from Rome upon his accession is pure hypothesis: pace Alfoldy (1974) 33, 292 n.34. Cf. also Richardson (1980) 7. (51) Dion. Hal. iii 61; v. 35. (52) Livy xxx 17.13. (53) Warren (1973) 611. (54) ta megista tori par'aute nomizdomenon doron: Pol. xxxii 1.3; cf. dona amplissima (Livy xlii 14), dona ampla (Livy xxxi 11.12, munera amplissime missa (Caes. BG i 43.4). (55) Tac."Ann', iv 26.4 (56) MDmmsen (1887-8) i 457-9; Remy (1976-7) collects and reviews all conferrals of magisterial ornaments under the Principate. (57) Philo In Flaccum 40: almost certainly received from Gaius himself, who was the first to make Agrippa king: Schtlrer (1973) 317 n. 106. Pace Gage (1959) 247 n.3, there seems no reason to doubt Philo's evidence. (58) Dio lx 8.2-3. (59) IGLS vi 2760 ■ IIS 8958. These could be the insignia

36

cognition rogia of Tac. Ann, xiii 7, on which see Barrett (1977b) and (1979a); Sullivan (1978a) 216-8, against Stevenson (1939) 47; cf. Nicols (1978) 127-8. As Bonn (1877) 21 n. 41 notes, the identification is uncertain. On insignia regia, see ReyCoquais (1973) 53-5. (60) Dio Ixvi 15.3. Bosporan coinage has been taken to show that kings there continued to receive such gifts long after Agrippa II: Frolova (1979) 97-238; cf. Zograph (1977) 317-9; Gajdukevic* (1971) 337 n.6. But the items depicted on these coins need not be gifts from Rome.

37

Section 3; Citizenship

Although generalised statements have occasionally been made on the possession of Roman citizenship by kings, no full discussion of the subject has yet been attempted. The purpose of this section is to discover by detailed investigation, kingdom by kingdom, when the possession of Roman citizenship became usual among kings within the Roman sphere: it will then be possible to explore the rationale behind this development and its significance (1). As will become apparent, the evidence available on the Roman citizenship of kings is scarce: many kings entitled to the tria nomina often or always omit to use them, nor are they often accorded them by others. The situation is aggravated by the literary sources, which seldom mention grants of citizen­ ship. As a result, progress can only be made by close argument and deduction: arguments from silence are therefore inadmissable (2). First, Britain. The only evidence for Roman citizenship among the kings of Britain is RIB 91, which shows that Cogidubnus held" the tria nomina as Ti. Claudius Cogidubnus. His nomenclature implies that he derived his citizenship from a grant of Claudius (or, just possibly, Nero): further, that prior to Claudius the king's forebears had not possessed it. The last implication would be more valuable if we could cer­ tainly identify these forebears. Most recently, Barrett has argued that Cogidubnus was of the family of Verica. This view he bases on the general point that Claudius f...does seem to have been willing to go to some lengths to maintain the con­ tinuity of rule in the client kingdoms1. But Claudius1 supp­ osed energy to this end is illusory: thus no family connection between Cogidubnus and Verica need be supposed (3). Yet such a connection with Verica remains the best guess: Verica1s family may provisionally be represented thus:

39

Citizenship Commius

Tincommius

Eppillus

Verica

All three sons of Commius ruled as kings. If Cogidubnus was directly descended from King Tincommius or King Eppillus, it may be deduced that that king lacked Roman citizenship, for both ruled prior to Claudius: otherwise, Cogidubnus1 citizen­ ship would not have been derived from a grant of Claudius. Similarly, if Cogidubnus was a direct descendant of King Verica, perhaps a son, it may be deduced that Verica, though a king, had lacked Roman citizenship prior to Claudius' reign and perhaps even then. Therefore, it must be supposed either that one or more kings ruled in Britain without Roman citizen­ ship or that Cogidubnus was outside, or at best on the fringes of, the dynasty of Commius (4). Next, the Cottian Alps and the dynasty of King Donnus. The first ruler of this family known to have held Roman citi­ zenship is Donnus himself, whom the nomenclature of his freedman and freedwoman show to have been C. Iulius Donnus. The king evidently owed his citizenship to Caesar or Augustus, but which is not clear (5). Donnus' son, Cottius, lacked the royal title and had a different praenomen: he was M. Iulius Cottius. Cottius' own son, granted the royal title by Claudius in AD 44, had the same name (6). Of the same family was the Vestalis who held the rank of primus pilus on the Danube in Ovid's day (7). Velleius, in a difficult passage, seems to say that Arminius of the Cherusci held not only Roman citizenship but also equestrian status. Velleius describes him as 'adsiduus militiae nostrae prioris comes': it seems most probable that Arminius had obtained his citizenship and position through his military service. No doubt he was not the only ruler to benefit in this way (8). Another path to citizenship is indicated by the case of Verritus and Malorix: when a diplom­ atic mission brought these rulers of the Frisians to Nero at Rome, the emperor conferred Roman citizenship upon them, but refused their request. It may be that Nero granted them citizenship to soften his refusal, but we can only speculate as to his purpose. Yet it is clear that Verritus and Malorix had ruled the Frisii without Roman citizenship until their visit to Nero: the relative fluidity of primacy among these northern peoples might often bring to the fore rulers who had not inherited Roman citizenship. Evidently, not all such men had earned it with the Roman army (9). Moving east, but still in Europe, in an inscription from Carnuntum appears one Septimius Aistomodius, described as a king of the Germans: he is otherwise unknown. The inscription, his epitaph, was erected by his brothers, both also Septimii.

40

Citizenship From the nomenclature of the three, it has been deduced that they were granted citizenship by Septimius Severus, under whom Carnuntum was particularly prosperous. It is of course poss­ ible that they all derived their citizenship and nomenclature from a predecessor who had been granted it by Severus (10) , Similar is the case of P. Aelius Rasparaganus, king of the Roxolani, and his son, P. Aelius Peregrinus, who are only known from inscriptions from Pola. Their nomenclature sugg­ ests that they derived their citizenship from a grant of Hadrian. Hadrian made a treaty with the Roxolani: a grant of citizenship to their rulers may have gone with it (11). Next, to Thrace, where a Latin dedication by one M. Acculeius in honour of Rhoemetalces II accords him the names C. Iulius: the king, it seems, was a Roman citizen, who derived his citizenship from a grant of Caesar or Augustus. But since Rhoemetalces reigned from AD 19 to 26, it is prob­ able that he had inherited his citizenship from a predecessor upon whom Caesar or Augustus had conferred it. Thracian kings from Rhescuporis I onwards are all possible candidates (12). In the Bosporus, the first king attested with the tria nomina is Cotys I (ruled AD 45/6 to 67/8) , who had the names Ti. Iulius. His nomenclature suggests that he derived his citizenship from a grant of Tiberius. Since Cotys did not succeed until AD 45/6, he probably inherited his citizenship from a predecessor: most likely from his father, Aspurgus, whose reign spanned that of Tiberius (13). Of course, if Aspurgus was granted citizenship by Tiberius, he had not in­ herited it. Aspurgus1 father is now widely held to have been Asander (ruled 47-17 BC): if Asander was indeed Aspurgus1 father, the implication would be that Asander ruled in the Bosporus under Augustus without Roman citizenship. But the argument is most unsafe, for Asander was probably not the father of Aspurgus, despite the opinio communis: rather, Aspurgus was probably a usurper with no dynastic claim to the Bosporan throne, as Rostovtzeff long ago suggested (14). From Aspurgus1 son, Cotys I, onwards, the names Ti. Iulius persist among the kings of the Bosporus until the end of the kingdom. In Pontus, Polemo I had a daughter named Antonia Tryphaena. He also had two sons, one known as Zeno (later Artaxias, king of Armenia) and another whose name is not known: however, it has been suggested, very plausibly, that this last son was M. Antonius Polemo, a dynast of Olba in Cilicia (15) . If this is right, the most straightforward explanation of the nomen­ clature of the dynast and his sister - whose names are certain - would be that their father, Polemo I, was himself also M. Antonius Polemo. This in turn would suggest that Polemo I was a Roman citizen who owed his citizenship to a grant of Antony. Nor is such a grant at all unlikely, for we know that Polemo I was particularly close to Antony, to whom he owed his very

41

Citizenship kingship (16). Polemo I's grandson, Polemo II, is firmly attested with the nomen Iulius: his praenomen may well have been Caius. Further, this is precisely what might be expected in his case, for his father (Cotys VIII of Thrace) was almost certainly C. Iulius Cotys, while an attested C. Iulius Rhoemetalces could very well be his brother, Rhoemetalces III of Thrace (17) . However, for all that, the view is gaining ground that Polemo II, though attested as Iulius, is to be identified with M. Antonius Polemo, king at Olba in Cilicia under Nero and Galba (18). The attraction of this identification resides in the fact that there is evidence which suggests that Polemo II received land in Cilicia from Claudius in AD 41. But this evidence is at best questionable, Dio states that Claudius gave Polemo this land to recompense him for the loss of the Bosporus which the emperor bestowed upon Mithridates VTII (19). But it has been pointed out that numismatic evidence indicates that Polemo had never ruled in the Bosporus and that Dio's credibility can only be saved if he is taken to mean that Claudius compensated Polemo for no more than the loss of a claim to the Bosporus (20) . Alternatively, Dio may simply be in error: this would not be his first mistake concerning Polemo II, whom, in his previous book, he describes as the son of Polemo I, though he was in fact indisputably his grandson (21). But, above all, if Dio is allowed the benefit of the doubt, it must be stressed that even if (C?) Iulius Polemo did re­ ceive 'some land1 in Cilicia from Claudius, that is by no means sufficient reason to identify him with the M. Antonius Polemo who ruled there under Nero and Galba. Who then is this other Polemo? The best guess is surely that he was a descen­ dant, perhaps the son, of the M. Antonius Polemo who earlier ruled as a dynast at Olba and was probably the uncle of Polemo II (22). Further north in Cilicia, among the Tarcondimotids, were two Julias. The family-tree of the Tarcondimotids cannot be securely established, but of these two Julias, one seems to have been the daughter of Tarcondimotus I and the mother of the second Julia (23). But Tarcondimotus I, apparently the father of the elder Julia, died fighting for Antony at Actium: previously, he had fought for Pompey at Pharsalus, after which he had been pardoned by Caesar. It is tempting to suggest that Tarcondimotus named his daughter Julia in the context of his good relations with Caesar after Pharsalus: it is possible that Caesar conferred citizenship upon him, but the name Julia need not have been a nomen and, therefore, need not carry implications of citizenship (24). Our earliest evidence for citizenship among the kings of Commagene comes from AD 47, when Claudius named Antiochus IV as C. Iulius Antiochus. This nomenclature suggests that he derived his citizenship from a grant of Caesar or Augustus to his forebears (25). In 59 BC, Caesar had sponsored the gift of

42

Citizenship a toga by the Senate to Antiochus I of Cbmmagene. Since the toga is closely connected with Roman citizenship, it might seem likely that Antiochus I received Roman citizenship with his toga, but we have seen in the previous section that the gift of a toga to kings is part of a particular tradition and, surprisingly perhaps, does not imply anything about citizen­ ship (26). It has been argued that the first Commagenian king to receive Roman citizenship was in fact Antiochus III, who ruled from some time after 20 BC to AD 17. However, he seems no more likely a candidate than his predecessor, Mithridates III, appointed by Augustus in 20 BC (27). There are various scraps of evidence that kings of Armenia enjoyed Roman citizenship. If, as argued above, Polemo I of Pontus was M. Antonius Polemo, with a son of the same name and a daughter named Antonia, it may be deduced that his son Zeno, later Artaxias, king of Armenia, was a Roman citizen with the name M. Antonius Zeno (28) . Further, Armenian kings of the Herodian dynasty would have been Iulii, as we shall see: two inscriptions from Rome and one from the area of Falerii are some indication that other Armenian kings in the Early Empire may also have been Iulii, but the individuals concerned cannot be identified with anything like certainty (29). Another in­ scription, from Rome of the second century AD, is an epitaph erected for one Aurelius Merithates by Aurelius Paoorus, his brother, who describes himself as king of Armenia Maior (30). This epitaph apart, the only Paoorus known to have reigned in Armenia in the second century is the king appointed to rule in Armenia by Vologaeses III of Parthia and removed by L. Verus. Therefore, their identification has a certain attraction, though some prefer to follow Mommsen and posit an unknown king of Armenia called Paoorus. But if we identify the two, it seems improbable that Volagaeses' nominee would have been a Roman citizen: though this is not completely impossible, it seems easier to suppose that Paoorus and his brother received Roman citizenship after their expulsion and subsequent resid­ ence (if the find-spot of the epitaph can be taken to imply as much) at Rome (31). Paoorus' replacement in Armenia was very much a Roman citizen: Sohaemus, installed by Verus as king of Armenia, had been a Roman senator and had even held the consulship at Rome (32). In Iberia, a silver cup records the name of an Iberian king called Flavius Dades: evidently a Roman citizen whose citizen­ ship derived from a grant of a Flavian emperor. The derivation is entirely appropriate, for we know the Flavians to have been more active in Iberia than their Julio-Claudian predecessors (33). More puzzling is the appearance of one Publicius Agrippa as a high official (pitiax) in Iberia. He seems to be a Roman citizen, but how he came by his citizenship we can only speculate (34). Our first indication of citizenship among the kings of Osrhoene comes from the reign of Septimius Severus. Under

43

Citizenship Severus, Abgar VTII (IX) issued coins on which Babelon read BAS • L * AEL • SEP • ABGAROS and BASILEUS • AEL • AUKEL • SEP • ABGAROS. Abgar's full name seems to have been L. Aelius Aurelius Septimius Abgarus, whence it is inferred that 'the names Lucius Aelius Aurelius are derived from Commodus and Septimius from Severus' (35). Abgar, it is implied, received Roman citizenship from Commodus. This is most certainly a possibility, but it is not the only one: the central difficulty is our ignorance of the antecedents of Abgar. For this reason, it cannot be assumed on the basis of the nomenclature of Abgar VIII (IX) that earlier kings of Osrhoene lacked Roman citizenship (36). The case for citizenship among the kings of Emesa rests principally upon two Latin inscriptions. An inscription from Rome records a freedman of a King Sampsigeramus - who can only be a king of Emesa - named C. Iulius Glacus (37). Another, from the Roman colony at Heliopolis, honours C. Iulius Sohaemus, king of Emesa in the mid-first century AD (38). Roman citizenship among the kings of Emesa seems to have been derived from a grant of Caesar or Augustus to one of Sohaemus1 ances­ tors. Thus it is held that Augustus granted citizenship to Iamblichus II of Emesa, whom he appointed in 20 BC: Iamblichus was very probably the grandfather of Sohaemus (39). This may be so, but it is quite possible that citizenship had been gran­ ted earlier, to Iamblichus I, probably Sohaemus' great-grand­ father. Iamblichus I, encouraged by Antipater of Judaea was active on Caesar's side of the civil war: it has been very plausibly suggested that he was among those rulers of the area of Syria who met Caesar there in 47 BC. It is entirely con­ ceivable that Caesar granted Iamblichus citizenship on this occasion, just as he granted it to Antipater of Judaea (40). Caesar's grant to Antipater proved important, for from Antipater was descended the Herodian dynasty. Moreover, Josephus provides hard evidence: Caesar granted Antipater citi­ zenship in the course of his passage through Syria in 47 BC as a reward, says Josephus, for his support for Mithridates of Pergamum. In addition to citizenship, Caesar also gave him ateleia (41). Yet it is striking that, although Antipater's son Herod and his descendants inherited Roman citizenship, no Herodian is explicitly attested with the tria nomina until Agrippa I, whom a single inscription, an Athenian dedication to his daughter, Julia Berenice, names as Iulius Agrippa. Agrippa1s praenomen may have been Marcus like that of his son, but Caius is just as likely (42). Further, Roman citizenship among the He rods has implications for -kingdoms other than Judaea. In Armenia, the Tigranes executed by Tiberius was a grandson of Herod, through Alexander, while Tigranes' nephew, also called Tigranes, was appointed in Armenia by Nero (43). Ihe son of this last Tigranes, Alexander, was appointed by Vespasian to reign in Cilicia: as might be expected, Alexan­ der's son is honoured (in an inscription from Ephesus) as

44

Citizenship C. Iulius Agrippa (44). Finally, North Africa. Juba II and his son Ptolemy seem to have had Roman citizenship. Although we are relatively well-informed about these kings, the only evidence that they were Roman citizens is provided by the nomenclature of their freedmen and freedwomen: this reveals that they were Iulii and apparently, as might be expected, Caii Iulii (45). Evidently, their citizenship was derived from a grant of Caesar or Augustus. The nature of our evidence does not allow any pre­ cision as to the occasion of the grant, yet it is generally held that Juba II received his citizenship from Augustus. But Caesar cannot be ruled out, for he brought Juba to Rome in 46 BC and kept him there: we may compare the case of Aurelius Pacorus, who may have received Roman citizenship after he had been brought to Rome upon his deposition from the Armenian throne by L. Verus (46) . Juba's case illustrates a fundamental difficulty. It has been seen that Roman citizenship was widely held among the royalty of the Principate - very probably more widely than our meagre evidence allows us to trace. But we cannot be sure when kings were first awarded it. The dominant view is that Augustus began the practice, but the case of the Polemonids might suggest that it began at least with Antony. Moreover, as in the case of Juba, it has been argued above that grants usually attributed to Augustus may as easily be attributed to Caesar (47). In fact, the broad history of viritane grants of Roman citizenship tends to suggest that Caesar did grant Roman citizenship to at least some kings: it was after the war bet­ ween Caesar and Pompey, not that between Octavian and Antony, that citizenship began to be more widely distributed. The probability, therefore, must be that Caesar was the first to make a king a Roman citizen (48). He was followed in this by his successors, who conferred citizenship upon those kings who, like Aspurgus in the Bosporus, had not inherited it from royal forebears: as observed in the case of Verritus and Malorix, this was probably particularly necessary in the West, for the rulers of those peoples among whom firm dynasties were not established. The spread of Roman citizenship went to make the empire a more coherent whole (49) : of course, when recognised by Rome, the king had his own peculiar status within the Roman sphere, but when granted the citizenship, he was effectively brought into the imperial elite itself, whether as a ruling king or as a king - and his descendants - who no longer had a kingdom to rule. The relative silence of our sources on the citizenship of kings might seem to tell against so weighty a conclusion, but it is in fact particularly instructive on the subject. In the West, there is no clear sign of such a silence: in this case our sources1 silence may very well be simply symptomatic of our general lack of information. In the East, this silence

45

Citizenship must be set in the broader context of provincial attitudes to the possession of Roman citizenship: it has been most valuably observed that '...the Hellenistic Roman, as one may call the type for convenience, tended to regard his citizenship as a kind of honorary degree, which was of little practical use to him unless it was joined with other, separate privileges... The Hellenistic world was familiar with the exchange of honor­ ary citizenships... Men of substance tended to collect citizen­ ships...1 (50). While a provincial aristocrat might make much of such an 'honorary degree', it is not so very surprising that a king might not: his kingship set him above aristocratic rivals, whereas they too - not to mention lowly Romans - could boast Roman citizenship (51) . The significance of the king's possession of Roman citizenship was essentially functional and long-term, a landmark in the process of assimilation of king to Roman and Roman to king, the importance of which seems to have been grasped neither by Caesar and his successors nor by the kings they honoured (52). Notes to Section 3. (1) The fullest discussion is Bonn (1877) 24-6: Sherwin-White (1973) provides a most valuable general discussion, but says all but nothing on the citizenship of kings. (2) Kingdoms where there is no evidence of Roman citizenship are therefore omitted: the subsequent discussion should show that this is not a cavalier approach given the silence of our sources. Throughout, the tria nomina are taken to indicate Roman citizenship: in normal circumstances this is unsafe, but in this case the assumption seems permissible, for it is hard to imagine a recognised king unlawfully assuming Roman statusindications: see Sherwin-White (1973) 295; Alfftldy (1966); Reinhold (1971); Whittaker (1980). Latin status is not con­ sidered since no grant of Latin status to a king is attested. It is also assumed that citizenship was granted to the king and his family (or, at the very minimum, with conubium) : this is borne out by the regular inheritance of citizenship from one generation to the next. (3) On RIB 91, see now Bogaers (1979); on Cogidubnus, see Barrett (1979a),(1981) and (1982). It is just possible that Cogidubnus received his citizenship from Nero, but this seems unlikely, as Barrett (1981) 126 observes, for he would then have been recognised as king well before he was granted citi­ zenship. Barrett (1979a) 229 bases his generalisation upon two cases: Commagene and the Bosporus, r-n the former case it is indeed true that Claudius restored Antiochus IV to the throne, but this is no parallel to Cogidubnus1 case, for the issue was not whether to appoint Antiochus as king instead of some­ one outside the ruling dynasty, but whether to have a king in Commagene at all. Similarly with the Bosporus, as far as we

46

Citizenship know, there was no question of replacing Mithridates VIII with someone from outside the ruling dynasty: his brother, Cotys I, had warned Claudius of Mithridates1 secessionary plans and was the obvious candidate to replace him. (4) On Commius1 family-tree, see Allen (1944) 5-6, though note the reservations of Rodwell (1976) 277. Murgia's view that Cogidubnus belonged to the Catuvellaunian ruling dynasty is speculative in the extreme and does not seem to help: Murgia (1977) 339. (5) CIL V 7232; cf. 7231; Stein IMS V (1905) col. 1548; PIR 2 I 295. (6) 115 94; PIR 2 I 274, contra Amm. Marc, xv 10.2. 115 848; Dio lx 24.4; PIR 2 I 275. (7) On Vestalis, Syme (1978) 82-3. On the dynasty of Donnus, see now Letta (1976) with Mennella (1978). Despite Letta, the existence of a Donnus II between Cottius I and Cottius II must remain in doubt: the issue does not substantially affect the present argument. (8) Veil. Pat. ii 118.2 with Woodman ad loc, who explicates the textual difficulties of the passage. See especially Timpe (1970) 27-30 and, setting the case in a wider context, Saddington (1973) 188. Arminius1 brother, Flavus, may well have obtained citizenship by the same path: his citizen son, Italicus, was sent to rule the Cherusci by Claudius at their request in AD 47: Tac. Ann, xi 16; Keddie (1975) notes the obviously Italian/RDman evocations of the name. Cf. another Italicus, ruling in the Vannian kingdom in AD 69: Tac. Hist, iii 5 with Klose (1934) 99. Note too, less obviously, Scribonius in the Bosporus (Dio liv 24.4) and Iulianus of the Apsiles (PIR 2^ I 89) . Cf. Part II, section 4 on Roman cognomina among kings. (9) Tac. Ann, xiii 54, where Tacitus himself alludes to this fluidity. Cf. Dio lxxi 19.1, on which Oliva (1962) 93. (10) 115 856 with Dessau ad loc.; PIR S 314. (11) 115 852; 853; SHA Hadr. 6. So Klose (1934) 129-30. Garzetti (1974) 383 is more circumspect. (12) See Sullivan (1979b): Cotys VII (ruled c.42 - 31 BC) is, however, most unlikely. Acculeius' dedication: EJ no. 168. Note also an inscription from Rome in which a Julia Tyndaris describes herself as the freedwoman of King C. Iulius Rhoemetalces: which Rhoemetalces is uncertain: 115 849. On this question, see Sullivan (1979b) 206 (though at 211 he seems to prefer Rhoemetalces II: there are no grounds for so doing). Any connection with the Thracian Julia Phyllis of 115 846 is quite uncertain. The possibility must be allowed that Rhoemet­ alces II gained citizenship before he succeeded, perhaps through military service, but there is no reason to suppose as much. (13) Gajdukevic* (1971) 338-9 supposes Cotys to have assumed the names Ti. Iulius to honour the dead Tiberius: this seems un­ necessary. On the dates of Aspurgus' reign, see now Frolova

47

Citizenship (1977a). Again, theoretically, it is possible that Cotys won his citizenship, perhaps through military service, before his succession: again, there is no reason to suppose as much. (14) The view that Asander was the father of Aspurgus rests entirely on CIRB 40 (= EJ_ no, 172) , where Aspurgus is described by his governor as the son of a King Asandrochus. The latter is usually identified with Asander (see Boltunova ad loc. and the literature she cites). There is obviously a certain sim­ ilarity between the names of Asander and Asandrochus, but it seems most unlikely that they were the same man: it must be stressed that all the sources, including an inscription set up by his own nauarch, Pantaleon, name Asander as Asander, not Asandrochus: CIRB 30 (= EJ no. 170) ; so too a newly-dis­ covered text, Sokolfskij (1975). The plausible view of Rostovtzeff (1922) 152 is ignored by Boltunova. (15) See, most clearly, the brief family-tree given by Barrett (1978) 441 (cf. 447), after Hill (1899) 201. Barrett's argu­ ments against the orthodox identification of this Olban dynast with the later king seem conclusive. (16) On Polemo I and Antony, see Sullivan (1980a) 916-8. The alternative and orthodox view is that the Polemonids after Polemo I took Antonian naines to recall a claim to descent from Antony through the mother of Polemo Ifs wife, Pythodoris, who was named Antonia: see especially Sullivan (1979a) 13 and, more sanguine, (1980a). There may be something in this, for OGIS 377 records the name of Pythodoris' mother as Antonia: but nothing is known of this Antonia and her connection with Antony, if any, is quite uncertain: the rest is speculation. It should be stressed that pride in an Antonian ancestry in no way excludes an Antonian grant of citizenship to Polemo I. The possibility should also be noted that Antony conferred citizenship upon Polemo I's father, Zeno, most probably for his opposition to the Parthians in 40 BC: on Zeno's action, see Sullivan (1980a) 915-6. (17) Polemo IIfs Julian nomenclature is established by a rescript of Claudius dated to AD 47, wherein he names Polemo as Iulius: P. Lond. 1178. Barrett (1978) 445 seeks to emend the text to remove Iulius as a dittography from the preceding name, C. Iulius Antiochus. But this would simply create another problem: the evidently parallel formulations of the titles of the two kings would be upset: why should Antiochus be given his full name, but Polemo only his cognomen ? If we wish to emend the text, it would be better to insert the praenomen Caius to give Polemo his full name. On the Thracian connection, see above note 12. (18) For the identification, see Sullivan repeatedly: (1975), (1978f) 926-8, (1979a), (1980a) 926-9. He is supported by Barrett (1978) with important modifications; cf. also Barrett (1977a) , (1979a) . Note too Schlirer J1973) 450, 474 n. 10. (19) Dio lx 8.2: kai to Polemoni choran tina ant'autou Kilikias antedoke.

48

' f iizenship (20) Barrett (1977a). (21) Dio lix 12.2 with Barrett (1978) 437. (22) Pace Sullivan (1979a) 18, it is no great difficulty that no source makes the point that there were two Polemos in Cilicia: nor was Cilicia too small for them both. Moreover, contra Sullivan and Barrett, passim, Magie's point, that Josephus distinguishes between the two Polemos of Pontus and Olba respectively, is very powerful: Magie (1950) 1407 n. 26. In a list of kings who met with Agrippa I at Tiberias in AD 44, Josephus mentions a Polemo who ruled in Pontus, Polemo II (AJ xix 338). Not so very much later (AJ xx 145-6), he describes the marriage of Berenice to a Polemo apparently towards the end of Claudius1 reign (though the scope of his digression is not as definite as Sullivan and Barrett always suppose: cf. Schurer (1973) 450, 474 n. 10): he seems to go out of his way to indicate that this Polemo was a king of Cilicia, 'Berenice ...persuaded Polemo (and this man was king of Cilicia)...to take her in marriage1. But Polemo II still had his kingdom in Pontus (it seems): why are we to suppose that Josephus links him only with Cilicia, where, in Dio's words, he had only 'some land1? His possessions in Cilicia had no bearing on his marriage to Berenice, as far as we know. It seems very attrac­ tive to suppose with Magie (loc.cit.) that in these two pass­ ages Josephus is in fact describing two different Polemos: the first, Polemo II and the second, M. Antonius Polemo, king at Olba. Subsidiary arguments for the identification have no sub­ stance and may be briefly dismissed. The fact that Polemo II held games jointly with Antiochus IV of Commagene does not mean that they must have had contiguous territories, contra Sullivan (1979a) 11-3; the site of these games is not known; cf. the royal gathering at Tiberias, Jos. AJ xix 338-42. In fact, we shall see that honouring and worship of the emperor - as in these games, instituted in Claudius' name - might well bring kings together from various parts in joint activity: see Part II, section 4. Nor can we accept the argument that they should be identified because (i) Polemo II had territory in Armenia and (ii) King M. Antonius Polemo used the title 'Great King', redolent of Armenia: first, it is most uncertain that Polemo II had land in Armenia, as shown by Barrett (1979a), and,second, although the title 'Great King1 was certainly used in Armenia,it is not at all peculiar to that land: see Bogaers (1979) 253. Sullivan would identify not only these two but also the earlier dynast M. Antonius Polemo: Barrett (1978) 444 has pointed out the severe chronological difficulties this iden­ tification would entail. It may be added that Sullivan must assume that Polemo II lost his supposed pre-Claudian Cilician possessions in the reign of Gaius, though he retained Pontus (as Sullivan (1979a) 11 acknowledges) : total speculation. Finally, it must be noted that an inscription from Laertes

49

Citizenship contains a Iulius Pole ^mo 27: Bean and Mitford (1970) 95, no. 71, with Sullivan (1978f) 295 and (1980a) 926-9. His connection, if any, with Polemo II is unknown, but his nomen would accord with the arguments expressed above: cf. also the Iulius Cotys at Laodiceia, Sullivan (1979a) 13. Sullivan is forced to the view that Polemo II could call himself either Iulius or M. Antonius Polemo: (1979a) 13. As the case of Abgar VIII (IX) of Osrhoene shows (below) , this is not imposs­ ible, but it is difficult, for,unlike Abgar, Polemo's supposed Julian and Antonian nomenclature never overlaps but is firmly attested separately. In the face of this, it seems much more economical and more secure to adopt the alternative view set out above. (23) On the Tarcondimotids, see Hoben (1969) 195-211, esp. 210-11. The central text is IGR iii 901, on which see also Magie (1950) 1338 n.22; cf. 1240 n. 53. (24) Dio xli 62: as Hoben (1969) 200 suggests, he may have received his royal title from Caesar, not Antony (to whom it is usually ascribed). Bowersock (1965) 47 holds that the TarcondinDtids received citizenship from Augustus: it is not clear how he would account for the name of the elder Julia. On the possibility that Julia was not a nomen, cf. Part II, section 4 on royal names. (25) It is just possible that he received citizenship from Gaius, but our general picture makes inheritance from an ear­ lier grant more likely. Sullivan (1978d) 919 is in some doubt whether Antiochus was a citizen, but his is as secure as any case, for Antiochus is accorded the tria nomina by Claudius himself: P. Lond. 1178. (26) Cic. ad Q. fr. ii 10.2 and the previous section on such gifts. The possibility of Antiochus I's citizenship is envisaged by Sullivan (1978c) 783-4. (27) Dio liv 9.3. Sullivan ibid, holds both that those who succeeded Antiochus I held the citizenship and that it was first conferred upon Antiochus III. The relationship between Antiochus I and his successors is not as sure as Sullivan's presentation would suggest. Cf. Philopappus, who gives his tria nomina and his tribe: ILS 845. (28) On Zero, Sullivan (1980a) 923-5; but cf. the above argu­ ment on the Polemonids. Sullivan mistakenly accepts Tacitus' explanation of the name he took upon his accession, Artaxias (Ann, ii 56. 1-3), despite Furneaux ad loc.. (29) ILS 850 preserves the name of a Julia Ammia, the daughter of a King Tigranes: Nbmmsen's emendation to make her the king's freedwoman, followed by Dessau ad locJ and Halfmann (1979) 119, seems gratuitous. Ihe king's name suggests that he ruled Armenia. Pace Dessau, he could be the son of Artavasdes app­ ointed by Augustus (RG 27.2) . He could also be the Tigranes appointed by Augustus (ibid.) and executed by Tiberius (Tac. Ann, vi 40), or Nero's appointee (Tac. Ann, xiv 26). The latter two, as descendants of Herod, would have held Roman

50

Citizenship citizenship as Iulii: the first may also have been a Iulius as Augustus' appointee. An epitaph from Rome records a C. Iulius C f . Artabasdes (sic) , who describes himself as the grandson of a King Ariobarzanes (ILS 844): see PIR 2 I 176. A Capitoline dedication was made by one restored as C. Iulius Ariobarzanes, son of a King Ariobarzanes: again his identity is uncertain: see Degrassi (1962) 428-9 and PIR j2 J 175 - 0 n toth epitaph and dedication, see Chaumont (1976) 82 n.56. The royalty of Media Atropatene may well be involved in both cases: see Grosso (1957). It has been suggested that Tiridates I of Armenia had the nomen Aurelius, but this depends entirely upon epigraphic restoration and seems unlikely as early as the first century AD: he may have received citizenship from Nero in AD 66 - he would then be Ti. Claudius Tiridates: see Chaumont (1976) 123 n.279 on the restoration. (30) OGIS 382. (31) Birley (1966) 160-1, Chaumont (1976) 147-8 supports the identification. It is possible that Augustus conferred citi­ zenship upon his Parthian nominee, Tiridates: see Debevoise (1938) 138. Cf. Iulia Axse, a Parthian obses in Rome in the second century AD, who might have derived Roman citizenship from an original Augustan grant: also, Ulpia Vobrane, whose nomenclature - if she is indeed a Parthian - suggests a Trajanic grant. On both, see Priuli (1977). Cf. Ornospades, a Parthian who gained Roman citizenship through conspicuous military service with Tiberius in AD 6-9: Tac. Ann, vi 37; cf. Debevoise (1938) 160. (32) Birley (1966) 175; Chaumont (1976) 149-52; cf. Part III, section 2 ad fin.. (33) SEG xvi 782. Boltunova (1971) 221-2 argues that Dades ruled under Trajan: this may be so, but there is no real evid­ ence. On Flavian activity in Iberia, see also Bosworth (1976); cf. id. (1977) 226. (34) The most recent suggestion, that he may have been a Roman supervisor installed in the Iberian court, is improbable (pace Bosworth (1977) 230-2; cf. the literature he cites at 230 n. 56). Agrippa seems to have been fully integrated into Iberian high-society, so that, if installed as a supervisor, he seems to have abandoned the position: his son, who has a most un-RDman name, Iodmanganos, married the daughter of anoth­ er pitiax, evidently an Iberian, and became a great figure in the kingdom in his own right. Indeed, what we know of Iberian relations with Rome in the second century AD rather suggests that the Iberian king would not have accepted a supervisor imposed by Rome: Bosworth (1977) recounts these relations. (35) Hill (1922) ci, repeating (1916) 159. (36) Abgar could be the son of Mannus VTII, in which case he may very well have inherited citizenship: Mannus had been installed by L. Verus and, if he had also received citizenship from him, he might call himself L. Aelius Aurelius Mannus: on Verus1 nomenclature, PIR 2_ C 606. The apparent addition of

THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

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Citizenship Septimius to Abgar's name is without parallel (unless we accept Sullivan's views on King M. Antonius Polemo: note 22 above). It is just possible that Abgar changed his nomenclature in line with Severus' own change of name under his 'adoption1 of AD 196: on this, see Birley (1971) 184. (37) CIL VI 35556a, on which see Paribeni (1900). (38) IGLS 2760 = ILS 8958. (39) Dio liv 9.2. So Sullivan (1978a) 212; Bowersock (1965) 47; PIR 2 I 541. Bowersock is in some confusion on the dynasty (a good family-tree is provided by Sullivan (1978a) between 200 and 201): he erroneously takes the C. Iulius Sampsigeramus of IGR iii 1023 = OGIS 604 = IGLS 2212 to be Sampsigeramus II, father of Sohaemus. But this inscription was erected in AD 78/9: this Sampsigeramus must be a descendant of Sohaemus, not his father (on this text, see Sullivan (1978a) 218-9, contra Bowersock (1965) 47 n.5). That aside, Sampsigeramus II is revealed as C. Iulius not only by his son, but also by Glacus, who was surely his freedman (above). (40) Jos. BJ i 188; Bell. Alex. 65; Sullivan (1978a). (41) Jos. AJ xiv 136-7; BJ i 194. On grants of ateleia, see Sherk (1969) 129; cf. M. Aurelius1 grants: Dio lxxi 19.1. Smallwood (1976) 39, endorsed by Sullivan (1978b) 313 (cf. in similar vein Momigliano (1934) 26-7 (=208-9)), connects the grant of citizenship with what she sees as Antipaterfs role as Resident representative of Rome, safeguarding Roman financial interests1. The view rests on a misunderstanding of Antipater's role as epitropos: more balanced is Schlirer (1973) 271-2: cf. the Nabataean epitropos: Str. xvi p.799 with Schdrer (1973) 581. (42) Cimma (1976) 310 n.44 asserts without argument that Herod received citizenship from Antony: there is no reason to supp­ ose so. The Athenian inscription is OGIS 428. One wonders how Caius became replaced by Marcus in Herodian nomenclature: it is possible that it was taken from M. Vipsanius Agrippa, whose cognomen also appears in the family: see Part II, section 4. We should note that the only other dynasty wherein such a change is known, the dynasty of Donnus, seems to have had a particular link with Agrippa, as did the Herods: Letta (1976) 44-50. On the nomenclature of Agrippa II, who was M. Iulius Agrippa, see Schurer (1973) 471; PIR 2 I 132. (43) Above note 29. (44) On Alexander, see Sullivan (1978c) 794-5. (45) Most evidence is provided by freedwomen called Julia: CIL VIII 21086-8 (of Juba II) and 21095 (of Ptolemy). The praenomen Caius is suggested by a single freedman of Ptolemy, C. Iulius Montanus: VIII 21093. One might expect some indication of their citizenship on their numerous coins and especially in IIS 840; cf. 841. Indeed, even the names of their freedmen do not always suggest the kings1 citizenship: CIL VIII 9344; 9350 (of Juba II) and 9351 (of Ptolemy). (46) An Augustan grant is supposed by Gsell (1928) viii 207;

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Citizenship Lemosse (1967) 46; Bowersock (1965) 60. Jacoby R-E IX (1916) col. 2385 is tempted by the view that the Suda's mastigosantes is to be seen as a misunderstanding of the ceremony of vindicta libertatis (s.v. Iobas). But Juba was not a slave to be manumitted. Further, the Suda puts his whipping before his participation in Caesar's triumph: are we to suppose that he was granted Roman citizenship and then walked in triumph? The view is surely best forgotten. On citizenship among the principes gentium of North Africa, see Sherwin-White (1973) 394 n.3; Garnsey (1978) 251; Frezouls (1957) . (47) Bowersock (1965) 47, 49, 61 on various cases; cf. in gen­ eral Schurer (1973) 316. Bonn (1877) 24-6, followed by Sands (1908) 142, favours Antony. Gage (1959) 247 thinks that citi­ zenship was rarely held by kings in the Early Empire: perhaps an index of the sparsity of our evidence. (48) SherwinHtfhite (1973) 309; cf. 245-6, 291-306. Note too Brunt (1978) 185. (49) Sherwin-White (1973) 221-4. (50) Sherwin-White (1963) 178; cf. Part II, section 2. (51) The exceptions, the Bosporan kings, Agrippa II and per­ haps rulers of the West, are themselves therefore a puzzle: it may well be that their eagerness to express their connection with Rome through Roman nomenclature led them to use it: cf. Part II, section 4. It must be allowed, paradoxically perhaps, that a king might not have used his Roman nomenclature in his kingdom because it was essentially irrelevant in that context: we should note how Philopappus, Janus-like, separates his Greek and Roman titles in ITS 845. (52) The point is developed in Part III, section 2, ad fin..

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PART TWO: THE REIGN OF THE KING Section 1; The King and the Centre of Power

If the king was to enjoy a successful reign, he had to maintain favour at Rome. One strategy was a personal visit to the centre of power itself. Special circumstances there might make a royal visit particularly appropriate. Under the Principate, one such circumstance might be the accession of a new emperor, which brought embassies from all over the Roman world, provinces and kingdoms alike. Thus, on the accession of Galba, Agrippa II set off to congratulate the new emperor and learn his wishes with regard to 'the Jewish revolt. Though he learned en route that Gaeba had been replaced by Otho, Agrippa continued his mission: there was still a new emperor to meet (1) . Agrippa's case jshows that such a visit might have more than one purpose. Under the Republic, Rome's victory at Pydna attracted a flood of embassies to Rome (2). One such embassy came from Pergamum, led by Attalus - later Attalus II brother of its king, Eumenes II. Attalus not only congratul­ ated the Senate upon the Roman victory, but also sought the possession of Aenus and Maroneia in Thrace and Rome's support to quell the Galatians (3). Similarly, Prusias II of Bithynia came to Rome to offer his congratulations on the victory, but also laid claim to land held by the Galatians. While in Rome he also took care to renew contacts with his friends there and to introduce his son and heir to them and to the Senate as a whole (4). Again, Massinissa, who happened to have sent his son to Rome on another matter, sent instructions to him to add his congratulations for victory at Pydna and to obtain per­ mission for the king to visit Rome in person to sacrifice on the Capitol, as did Prusias on his visit (5). Such a journey to the centre of power and honourable re­ ception there was symbolic of Rome's acceptance of the king and the king's acceptance of the importance of Rome. It is only through an appreciation of the symbolic role of such visits that we can fully understand the case of Eumenes II. Upon his arrival at Brundisium in 167 BC, Eumenes was informed that the Senate had just passed a decree that no king should

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come before it. Polybius states that, although the Senate affected to be displeased at the visits of kings in general, this decree was a covert means of excluding Eumenes in part­ icular, a calculated insult (6). However, though there is good reason to believe that relations between Eumenes and Rome were bad, the Senate's decree need not have been quite as Macchiavellian as Polybius would have us suppose. A crucial indic­ ation that Polybius may be misleading is the case of Mass inissa. Only shortly before the Eumenes-affair Massinissa had been refused permission to come to Rome to sacrifice on the Capitol: the Senate declared that it was of no use to Massin­ issa nor in the interests of the Roman People that Massinissa should leave his kingdom and Africa. Unlike Eumenes, Massin­ issa1 s support for Rome in the war against Perseus had been unimpeachable: the Senate's refusal of Massinissa does not seem to have been intended as a snub (7). Massinissa's case must suggest that the rejection of Eumenes was part of a broader feeling at Rome against the visits of kings. There was certainly feeling against kings as such: it has been well observed that there was at Rome a para­ doxical attitude towards kings - they were objects of both distaste and attraction. The point is illustrated by an ear­ lier visit of Eumenes: the Senate received him with great honour and leading Romans strove to be closest to him, but Cato the Elder described Eumenes and his fellow-kings as 'flesh-eaters1 (8). A general hostility to kings in some quarters at Rome may have been a factor in Eumenes' subsequent rejection, but we should also consider the unparalleled flood of embassies that victory at Pydna had brought to Rome, de­ spatched not only for congratulation but also - in some cases at least - to raise a variety of complex issues. It is quite plausible that the Senate felt itself over-burdened by these embassies: such a reaction, combined with certain anti-royalist tendencies and, very possibly, a particular hostility towards Eumenes, may have been the rationale behind the Senate's ban on royal audiences (9) . For a king to send a son or another close relative as his representative on a mission to Rome was potentially dangerous for him. Attalus was tempted to rise against his brother Eumenes II while in Rome: Nicomedes was led to oust his father Prusias II after a later embassy there (10). But it was also potentially dangerous for the king to visit Rome in person. In the king's absence his throne was vulnerable: we shall see in Part III, section 1 how Physcon's visit to Rome in 162 BC allowed revolt to break out in Cyrenaica before he returned. The importance of this consideration is well illustrated by a recently-discovered inscription in which Aspurgus, king of the Bosporus, thanks the people of Gorgippia for not rising up while he was away in Rome visiting Tiberius (11). It may be in this context that we should understand the Senate's reply to Massinissa that it was not in the king's interest to leave his

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kingdom for Rome. Of course, the very journey to Rome held its own dangers: not yet king, Herod was nearly shipwrecked on his journey to Rome in 40 BC (12). The king was therefore caught in something of a trap: to visit Rome in person or to send a relative was dangerous, but not to do so was also dangerous and undesirable: we have seen that it was through such visits that the king made requests and built connections at the centre of power. But at Rome itself another trap awaited. Politics at Rome did not stand still. Under the Republic there was a continual struggle for supremacy within the ruling elite, escalating finally to civil warfare. Under the Principate, the struggle persisted within the changed framework: between the emperor and the rest of the elite, within the imperial family and within the rest of the elite itself. Conflicts among Romans were mirrored by conflicts among kings: thus while Cicero and Clodius struggled at Rome, so their respective Galatian friends, Deiotarus and Brogitarus, fought each other. In part I, section 2 it was shown how the fact that a king had gained recognition through one Roman might win him the hostility of another. With civil war, these tensions also came to a head: where neutrality was not an option, the king must decide which Romans he was to support (13) . This was not always a simple'matter of past form: the king might well have a foot in both camps. Thus, Herod, who supported Antony's cause, had also had friendly relations with Octavian, who had supported his recognition in 40 BC. Ihe Bellum Alexandrinum tells of an encounter between Caesar and Deiotarus, who had supported Pompey against him. Seeking Caesar's pardon, Deiotarus is made to point out that he had had little choice in the matter, since his kingdom lay well within the Pompeian sphere: it was not his business, he protests, to act as judge between contending Romans. Unimp­ ressed, Caesar is made to retort that the king owed debts of friendship to him: in particular, Deiotarus1 recognition had been granted in Caesar's consulship in 59 BC. Of course, Deiotarus' debt to Pompey was still greater (14). Yet, despite his support for Pompey, Deiotarus was allowed to continue his reign, albeit in rather reduced circumstances, while Herod was pardoned by Octavian and went on to prosper greatly under him. On the whole, Romans treated kings who had fought for their political opponents in civil war with considerable leni­ ence: Herod was not the only king to be pardoned by Octavian. One reason may be that to remove large numbers of kings from important thrones would risk major disruption within their various kingdoms and the Mediterranean world at large. It may also be that many took the view ascribed to Octavian by Josephus in his meeting with Herod on Rhodes: since Herod had remained a faithful friend to Antony, he might be expected to be the same to Octavian in future (15) . Under the Principate, a change of emperor could radically affect the king's position. The case of Antipas is particul-

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arly illuminating. Under Tiberius, Antipas had prospered: according to Josephus he was particularly close to that emperor (16). But upon the death of Tiberius and accession of Gaius, Antipas seems to have lost his special position at court, for he fell victim to an accusation of treason levelled against him by Agrippa I: it may well be that this would not have happened had Tiberius still been emperor. By contrast, the change of emperor was very much to the advantage of Agrippa, who was particularly close to Gaius: the new emperor released him from the prison to which Tiberius had consigned him and gave him the royal title and a kingdom, which was scon augmented by the addition of the tetrarchy vacated by Antipas. Gaius1 special regard for Agrippa is highlighted by the fact that he was prepared to pardon Antipas' wife because she was also the sister of Agrippa. Thereafter, Agrippa assured his position in the next reign by helping Claudius to the throne (17). By using his Roman connections, the king was in a position to manipulate the power of Pome to achieve his own ends. The paradox is worth stressing: a king who had become part of the Roman sphere might wield far more power than he could ever have done as a totally independent force. Notably, Jewish rulers repeatedly supported the case of Jews in the empire at large and to considerable effect. For example, Agrippa I. Under Gaius, Agrippa is credited with having caused the emper­ or to desist from placing an imperial cult statue in the Temple at Jerusalem (18). In the reign of Claudius, Agrippa1 s petition to the emperor, made jointly with Herod of Chalcis, was a significant factor in causing him to issue edicts aff­ irming Jewish rights at Alexandria and elsewhere (19). Indeed, in so far as they could influence those in power at Rome, kings could influence affairs at the centre of power itself. According to Josephus at least, it was Agrippa I who persuaded Claudius to aim at the throne in AD 41 and, after, to be merciful towards those senators who had opposed his accession (20). According to Dio, the fact that Agrippa I and Antiochus IV of Commagene were resident at Gaius1 court caused widespread concern at Rome: the two kings were regarded as 'tyrantteachers1, bringing the practices of oriental despotism into the imperial court (21). Central to the king's influence at Rome was his wealthor promise of wealth. It was shown in Part I, section 2, how a king could use his wealth to obtain recognition under the Republic. The king could also use his wealth to attain other ends: our sources contain many complaints that kings did just that. Speaking against a supposed lex Aufeia, whose purport is uncertain, C. Gracchus told his audience that those who opposed the proposition (himself excluded) were motivated by the prospect of money from Nicomedes III of Bithynia, while those who supported it were similarly motivated by the pros­ pect of money from Mithridates V of Pontus: those who took

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neither side, he alleged, were the worst of all, for they had money from both kings (22). Jugurtha's dealings with Rome are said to have been a catalogue of the bribery and corruption of leading Romans and others besides: Opimius and his colleagues, numerous unnamed senators, Bestia and his troops, Scaurus, the tribune Baebius, A. Albinus1 troops, Roman garrisons and even Moors (23) . In. 1Q3. BC, Mithridates VI of Pontus is said to have sent envoys to Rome to bribe senators wholesale, probably in connection with his seizure of Paphlagonia (24). Later, Cicero alleged that Hiempsal II of Numidia won a specific exemption under the terms of the Rullan bill for ager publicus he held by bribing those who moved it, through the agency of his son, the future Juba I (25) . Again, Cicero alleges that Brogitarus bribed Clodius to obtain not only recognition, but also the temple-state of Pessinus held by Deiotarus: the bribe is said to have involved immediate payments to Clodius' henchmen by Brogitarus1 envoys and the promise of money in the future to Clodius himself (26). When the future Ariarathes X of Cappadocia came to Rome in 45 BC, he came, says Cicero, to buy a kingdom from Caesar (27). One example of the bribery of Antony cited by Cicero is the case of Deiotarus, who, he alleges, bribed Antony in order to have Armenia Minor returned to him (28) . But all this must be kept in perspective: quite apart from the fact that these complaints and allegations cannot be properly substantiated, it should be understood that the exchange of gifts and favours was at the very heart of friendly relationships in antiquity. From the time of Rome's earliest contacts with the world of kings beyond Italy, kings bestowed gifts upon Romans: when Romans responded with favours, bribery was an easy charge - and in a sense it was true (29). But in this context the gift and the bribe are simply not distinguishable: more rewarding is an examination of the great economic and political ramifications of the fact that kings spent and promised large sums at Rome. It was shown in Part I, section 2, how, after seeking recognition for some twenty years, Auletes finally achieved it in 59 BC at great expense: no doubt he had also expended large sums in the course of the intervening years. But Auletes seems not to have paid with hard cash in 59 BC: he seems rather to have promised to pay in the future. In an attempt to do so he introduced stringent fiscal measures in his kingdom: but these measures contributed significantly to his expulsion by his subjects in the following year, 58 BC (30) . He returned to Rome, where he was supported by Pompey, one of his princi­ pal creditors after 59 BC. In the next few years, Auletes1 case was the focus of considerable political intrigue at Rome: his restoration to Egypt was an attractively rich prospect not least for his creditors (31). The king himself played a leading role in this intrigue, borrowing money which enabled him to buy the support of senators and to neutralise those opponents from Alexandria whom he did not have murdered (32) .

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Though Auletes himself left Rome for Ephesus in 57 BC, his agent remained there to distribute the king's borrowed money (33). From Ephesus, Auletes joined Gabinius, governor of Syria since 57 BC, who finally restored him to Egypt in 55 BC. Once again, Auletes had to pay: he is said to have promised Gabinius 10,000 talents (34). The king restored, his creditors swooped: a leading creditor, Rabirius, was made dioecetes so that he might milk the revenues of the kingdom. But, as before, Auletes1 subjects rose up: Rabirius and other credit­ ors who had descended on Egypt were forced to flee. How much money they had managed to realise must remain uncertain (35) . Caesar, for one, claimed that he was owed 17% million denarii after Auletes1 death in 51 BC and sought to exact 10 million from the king's successors, albeit cancelling the rest of the debt. In order to meet the demand the royal silver plate was melted down: Plutarch interprets this apparently desperate measure as a ploy designed to stir up resentment against Caesar, but it is quite possible that it was a real necessity (36). Auletes was caught in a vicious circle: in order to keep his throne he found it necessary to spend large sums of borrowed money and to make large promises which put him still further in debt. To pay his debts he could only draw upon the resources of his kingdom. But by so doing he further destab­ ilised his regime: to keep his throne, he was again forced to borrow, spend and promise at Rome, which could only increase his difficulties in the (not so very) long term. Auletes was not the only king to put himself in debt in this way: we may compare Brogitarus1 debts to Clodius (37) . Earlier, Nicomedes IV of Bithynia had put himself severely in debt by his promises to those Itomans who had effected his restoration and by his borrowing from others in their suite debts contracted, perhaps, to help fulfil his promises. Under pressure from his creditors, Nicomedes was driven to plunder Pontic territory and thereby bring the Second Mithridatic War upon his head (38). It is possible that Nicomedes had also inherited debts from his predecessor and father, Nicomedes III: that king had been dunned by his creditors to the extent that they even sold his subjects into slavery to raise money: this practice was only stopped by legislation, when Nicomedes clai­ med that it prevented him from furnishing Rome with the troops she required (39). Most famous is the graphic account provided by Cicero's letters of the bankruptcy of Ariobarzanes III of Cappadocia. The king's principal creditors, Pompey and, part­ icularly, Brutus, squeezed all they could from him, applying pressure through private agents, Deiotarus of Galatia and the governor of Cilicia himself. Like Auletes, Ariobarzanes' only recourse was the wealth of his kingdom: he therefore introduced more stringent taxation. How he had become so indebted is no­ where stated, but, in the light of our other cases, it must be probable that he had incurred his debts through spending money and/or making promises at Rome. Further, given the fact that

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he seems to have been heavily in debt from the very beginning of his reign, it is entirely likely that at least some part of his debts was inherited from his father and predecessor, Ariobarzanes II, just as the heirs of Auletes were expected to pay what their father owed Caesar. Indeed, one cannot but wonder how far the serious unrest within Ariobarzanes Ill's kingdom, which had brought about the death of his father and threatened his own life, was inspired by the kings1 attempts to raise money to pay their debts to Romans: Auletes' exper­ ience would certainly support the hypothesis (40). When, with the Principate, the emperor and his court became the focus of royal relations with Rome, there was correspond­ ingly less scope for the king to achieve his ends by gifts to the Roman elite. It was on the imperial court that the king now lavished his wealth: the case of the future Agrippa I shows the marked changes that had occurred since the Republic and the case of Auletes. Brought up at the imperial court itself, Agrippa spent large sums on extensive gift-giving and high-living (a necessity in court circles, one imagines): he bestowed gifts particularly upon imperial freedmen so as to gain their favour. Agrippa's wealth was soon dissipated by these outlays and poverty, together with Tiberius1 prohibition upon the friends of Drusus, caused him to leave Rome for Judaea. Yet he was not only in poverty, but also in debt. Having contemplated suicide, we are told, he was given a post at Tiberias by his brother-in-law Antipas and thereafter joined the entourage-of L. Pomponius Flaccus, governor of Syria. Denounced to Flaccus for taking bribes, he made for Ptolemais to take ship for Italy, having borrowed more money from a freedman of his mother. He was on the point of setting sail when soldiers arrived, sent by Herennius Capito, the imperial procurator of Jamneia: they had come to exact from Agrippa money which he owed to the imperial fiscus, a loan advanced to him by Capito from imperial funds. Evading Cap­ ito's soldiers, he made for Alexandria where he begged a loan from the alabarch Alexander. From there he sailed to Italy, where he was received at Tiberius' court on Capri. But a letter from Capito followed, reporting to the emperor Agrippa's debt and evasion: Tiberius banned Agrippa from his presence until the debt had been cleared. To do so, Agrippa borrowed again. Antonia, the friend of Agrippa's mother, Berenice, and mother of Claudius, with whom he had been brought up, lent him the vast sum of 300,000 t. so that he might retain Tiberius' friendship by paying his debt to the fiscus. Having paid it, Agrippa was completely reinstated, to the extent that Tiberius made him a companion of his grandson, Gemellus. But there remained the massive debt to Antonia: to pay her he incurred yet another debt, by borrowing from a Samaritan free­ dman of the emperor, who must have possessed considerable wealth. The residue of his loan from the Samaritan Agrippa spent on currying favour with the future emperor Gaius. The

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friendship of Gaius eventually brought Agrippa a kingdom, which seems to have enabled him to clear his debts at last. Agrippa has often been characterised as a spendthrift wastrel, but his expenditure, though large, was not without purpose: it was ultimately through such expenditure that he obtained a royal title and a kingdom. Josephus makes his sister Herodias express the point most vigorously (41) . Nor was Agrippa alone in currying favour with imperial freedmen: Narcissus was feted by kings, whose gifts no doubt made up part of his consider­ able fortune (42). In fact, anyone within the imperial circle, like freedmen, was a target for royal wealth: an extreme case is that of the senator M. Lollius, who was utterly discredited on account of the many gifts he had received while in the East in the entourage of C. Caesar (43). Approaches to such indiv­ iduals did not of course rule out more direct approaches to the emperor himself, upon whom all kinds of gifts were bes­ towed. Syllaeus distributed large sums to Augustus1 court and promised much to Augustus himself in his bid to replace Aretas IV of Nabataea; Aretas responded by sending a very valuable gold crown and other gifts to the emperor so that he might retain the throne he had seized without prior imperial sanction. But, on this occasion, Augustus returned the crown and gifts to Aretas and refused him, though the king was sub­ sequently recognised. Evidently, the emperor was not to be bought as easily as the principes of the Republic: it must be significant that, for all the vitriolic accusations levelled against emperors in our period, there survives no accusation that a king bribed an emperor to take a certain course of action (44). / The opposite is rather the case: 'bad' emperors are fre­ quently accused of bribing kings. Such accusations must be treated with extreme caution: the payment of subsidies was and still is - a common, effective imperial strategy. It is not at all the prerogative of 'bad1 emperors: Trajan himself gave subsidies to the Roxolani (45). Tacitus makes it quite clear that under the Principate the payment of subsidies to the Marcomanni and Chatti was the standard, generally accepted means of coping with them (46). When Rome first paid subsidies is uncertain: the practice has been traced back to the Republic, but there is no hard evidence before the Principate (47). Rather like gifts and bribes, the payment of subsidies was an essentially ambiguous act. Harshly interpreted, the payment of subsidies could be seen as bribery, payments for victory or peace. Sympathetically treated, subsidies are an integral part of skilful diplomacy. The latter estimation is undeniable, but that does not deny all validity to* the former: to seek to solve the essential ambiguity is to misunderstand it (48). Indeed, there was even room for doubt as to whether a subsidy was a gift or a loan requiring repayment: according to Dio, the procurator Decianus Catus sought to exact repayment of sums paid to leading Britons by Claudius, sums which the Britons

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had regarded as a simple gift (49). More controversial is the question of whether kings paid tribute to Rome: opinions vary from assertions that most did to assertions that most did not. All who have examined the matter in any depth have allowed exceptions to their broad view of the general practice (50). Attention has centred upon a small number of cases which require separate treatment, as do some other cases which are usually ignored. But two general points must be made by way of-preface, for they will prove crucial. First, the issue is whether kings or similar monarchs paid tribute: republican regimes, though often sim­ ilar to kingdoms, are essentially outside this enquiry (51). Second, too many scholars have invested too much faith in the words phoros, stipendium and vectigal as sure indications that a king paid tribute. It cannot be sufficiently stressed that these words need mean no more than 'payment': they do not indicate the nature of that payment. We can only be at all confident of this where the wider context of the payment is known: in such circumstances, they are often found to mean, for example, payments of indemnity, not tribute (52) . Hiero II of Syracuse made payments to Rome after he went over to her side in the course of the First Punic War in 263 BC. It is generally, and probably correctly, held that Hiero did not pay tribute, but an indemnity in the form of a fixed sum paid over a fixed period (53) . The case of Teuta of Illyria is more difficult. Having come to terms with Rome upon her defeat in the First Illyrian War, Teuta was obliged to pay stipulated phoroi. These payments have often been taken to mean payments of tribute, but they could as easily be pay­ ments of indemnity, as others hold: we simply cannot be sure (54) . In 217 BC, after the Second Illyrian War, Roman legates were despatched to Teuta's successor Pinnes to collect overdue stipendium. Badian has suggested, perhaps rightly, that this was part of a further indemnity imposed after the end of the war in 219 BC: but again, it is uncertain whether this was indemnity or tribute (55). Upon the conclusion of the Second Macedonian War in 196 BC, Philip V was to pay l,000t., acc­ ording to Polybius, half immediately in a lump sum and the rest in annual instalments over ten years. As with Hiero, the finite nature of these payments tends to suggest that they were an indemnity, but there is little in the sources to suggest the recompense involved in indemnity (56). In the course of the Third Macedonian War, Perseus offered to make payments to Rome at the same rate as his father had done. Again, the word 'indemnity1 regularly occurs in modern acc­ ounts - rightly so in all probability - but it should be ob­ served that there is nothing in the ancient texts to suggest an indemnity: Polybius describes these payments simply as phorous, while Livy uses the word vectigal. Again, these words are shown not to be diagnostic of tribute-payments (57) . With this firmly in mind, we may turn to Caesar and

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Britain. It is held that upon his departure from Britain in 54 BC, Caesar arranged that tribute be paid to Rome: the key text is that of Caesar himself: '...quid in annos singulos vectigalis populo Romano Britannia penderet constituit...' The annual payments fixed by Caesar could be tribute, but could as well be payments of indemnity: Caesar's vectigal quite inconclusive (58). It is regularly held that under Antony's arrangements the East in 39 BC, a number of kings were to pay tribute. only evidence is a passage of Appian (59):

they is in The

'And here and there he set up as kings those whom he approved on fixed phorois. Of Pontus, Darius, son of Pharnaces, son of Mithridates; and of Idumaeans and Samariansf Herod; and Amyntas of Pisidians and Polemo of part of Cilicia and others over other peoples.' But this need mean no more than that Antony appointed rulers on the basis that they make stipulated payments to him: whether these payments were anything like regular payments of tribute is entirely uncertain (60). The case of Meroe has hitherto been neglected in discuss­ ions of this question, but specialists have long held it as certain that its ruler paid tribute to Augustus - or was supp­ osed to do so - early in the emperor's reign. This orthodoxy is derived from Strabo who states that envoys from Meroe vis­ ited Augustus on Samos in 21/0 BC to negotiate a settlement after their defeat by C. Petronius: the emperor is said to have granted all their requests and to have remitted the phorous which he had imposed upon Meroe. When these imposit­ ions were made is a matter of some controversy, but it must be stressed that these need not have been payments of tribute (61). Luke 2.1-5 has been taken as evidence that Herod paid tribute to Rome under Augustus, but it has now surely been demonstrated conclusively that the evidence of Luke is quite unreliable on this matter, as Josephus' silence on this supp­ osed tribute can only suggest (62). Rather more difficult is the case of the Bosporus: it is commonly held that the Bosporan kingdom paid tribute to Rome in the second century AD. The only evidence is that of Lucian: 'Then I found some Bosporans sailing as envoys from Eupator the king to Bithynia, journeying in the conveyance of the annual sum.' As Sherwin-White has rightly observed, Lucian's testimony is totally ambiguous: he might mean either that Bosporan envoys

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were on a mission to bring tribute to Bithynia or that they were on a mission to collect an annual subsidy (63) . The latter is more probable, as Bosporan specialists have always held: a neglected passage of Zosimus states that, from some time down to the third century AD, Bosporan kings received annual 'gifts' from the Roman emperors which had played a sig­ nificant role in allowing the kings to hold back pressure from tribes to their north (64). Finally on this question, the case that Pompey's arrange­ ments in the East constitute a major turning-point requires examination. It is held that 'with Pompey the client princes became a real part of the empire in a sense in which they had never been before. They now pay tribute to the Roman People. The best known case is Judaea. How widely the prin­ ciple applied, we are not told'. Pompey is accredited with 'a consistent policy of taxing clients' (65). There are two props to this argument: one, that certain kings are known to have paid tribute to Rome under Pompeyfs arrangements, the other, that Pompey significantly increased Rome's revenues. As to the first prop, the evidence is simply not there: Judaea is not the 'best known case', but the only known case. It has been argued that Sampsigeramus I of Emesa constitutes another case, but the argument is completely illusory: it rests entirely on Cicero's: 'nunc vero, Sampsicerame, quid dices ? vectigal te nobis in monte Antilibano constituisse, agri Campani abstulisse ?' It is evident that this Sampsigeramus is not the king of Emesa, but Pompey, whom Cicero calls by this name elsewhere: Cicero is setting Pompey's annexation of Syria - which he understates - against his desire for Campanian land for his veterans. Once this is observed, one can hardly persist in the view that the Emesene paid tribute to Rome, as does Sullivan (66). By contrast, there can be no doubt that Judaea paid tribute to Rome after Pompey, collected by publicani (67). But Judaea is of dubious relevance to the present enquiry. Contra Lintott, there were no kings in Judaea in this period: Pompey had specifically denied the royal title to Hyrcanus II. Hyrcanus was left with the titles of high-priest and ethnarch: the nature of his position remains most unclear. It is a distinct possibility that Judaea was considered part of the province of Syria from 63 to 40 BC. It may well be signific­ ant that when a recognized king returned to Judaea in the person of Herod in 40 BC, no more is heard, Luke apart, of tribute paid to Rome (68) . As to the second prop, Plutarch tells us that a placard carried in Pompey's triumph proclaimed that Pompey had in­ creased Rome's revenues from 50 to 85 million denarii. But, as others have observed, this increase need not mean that

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Pompey had imposed tribute on kings: it could be accounted for by his annexations and Judaea. Nor are Plutarch's figures beyond question: Jones was prepared to reject them (69). In short, of the two props, the first is for the most part a mirage (though Judaea remains problematic), while the second is hardly more than a dubious inference- This is not at all sufficient to support the view that Pompey had a 'consistent policy of taxing clients'. Throughout, it has been necessary to search hard for evid­ ence that kings paid tribute to Rome: no conclusive evidence is to be found, despite potentially rich sources, such as Cicero's provincial correspondence and the detailed works of Josephus. The absence of conclusive evidence is made all the more significant by the fact that certain non-royal states notably the Macedonian and Illyrian republics - are definitely known to have paid tribute bo Rome. It seems most probable that, while kings might make more or less regular payments to Rome - particularly of indemnity - they did not, for the most part, at least, pay tribute. But they were expected to contribute troops and resources when Rome required: it seems that Itome preferred to leave the kingdoms as reservoirs from which she could draw on an ad hoc basis (70). For the most part Rome did not interfere in the day-to-day administration of the kingdoms (71). A striking exception is Claudius1 edict on Jewish rights: the emperor ordered that it should be set up in the kingdoms as well as the provinces (72). Of course, Rome would intervene where military security was involved: it was in the interests of imperial security that she sought to control the movements of the northern tribes under the Principate (73) . But this does not mean that in other respects the king enjoyed carte blanche in his kingdom. Before the advent of Rome, the king was always vulnerable to an uprising of his subjects. But as the king came further into the Roman sphere, it became increasingly difficult for his subjects to remove him from power by such an uprising. Yet the king did not become impregnable: Rome also brought his subjects a new method of removing him: discontented sub­ jects could ask Rome to depose him for them. Analogous is the way in which provincials could lay complaints at Rome against their governor (74) . This was the strategy employed by the leading Jews and Samaritans whose complaints caused Augustus to depose Archelaus (75). The potential for such complaints was always there: how far the king was checked by it is incalculable. When, upon the death of Herod, a Jewish deleg­ ation, urging that Herodian rule should'not be continued, made complaints about the reign of Herod, Nicolas of Damascus is said to have countered with the point that Jews could and should have levelled these complaints against Herod while he was alive and ruling (76). Again, at the outbreak of the Jewish War, a rumour spread that Agrippa II would be deposed and executed by Nero as a direct result of Jewish complaints

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against him (77). By entering the Roman sphere the king therefore exchanged one vulnerability for another. With an eye to this new vulnerability the prudent king would be careful to obtain Roman sanction before taking any measure within his kingdom that might generate serious comp­ laints against him at Rome. Within this framework we can understand why Herod was so very careful to act entirely in accord with Augustus1 wishes when acting against his sons. Herod had particularly good reason to be aware of the possible consequences of doing otherwise, for he had been tried by Antony for the murder of Aristobulus (78) . Antony had acquit­ ted Herod on that occasion, not because he was innocent, but because Herod had used his wealth to good effect. The senti­ ment attributed to Antony at this time represents the standard Roman attitude implied by Rome's actions: he is made to say that it was not right to expect a king to account for his reign, for, if he had to do that, he would cease to be a king - those who had made a man king, says Antony, should allow him to be king (79) . This attitude of benign neglect changed only when Rome received some special stimulus to intervention: the king's best defence was to maintain and build on the supp­ ort at Rome which had brought him recognition. Notes to Section 1 (1) Jos. BJ ii 498-9. See in general Millar (1977), esp. 363-5. (2) Pol. xxx 19.15; Livy xlv 19.1. (3) Pol. xxx 1-3; Livy xlv 20.1-3. (4) Livy xlv 44.4-21; cf. Eumenes1 earlier visit to various friends and gods, perhaps including Jupiter Optimus Maximus, though he is not specifically mentioned: Livy xlii 11. The most graphic account of what might be involved is a civic inscription which describes how the city's representatives touted their cause from house to house: Syll. 3 656 with Herrmann (1971) and Condurachi (1970). Under Nero, Vologaeses sought assurances that his brother Tiridates would not be required to go through any such degrading performance, accord­ ing to Tac. Ann, xv 31. (5) Livy xlv 13.12-14.7; cf. 44.8. (6) Pol. xxx 19; cf. Liv. Per. 46. (7) Livy xlv 14.4. (8) For the observation, see Rawson (1975) 152. Plut. Cato Maior 8.7-8 with Astin (1978) 269-70. On Eumenes and Perseus, see now Schleussner (1973); cf. Bernhardt (1971) 78-9. Antiroyalist attitudes accord well with a possible upsurge in traditionalism at Rome at this time: see Crawford (1977) 44-5. (9) Later in the Republic, embassies to Rome and the problems they caused certainly led to legislation: see Gruen (1974) 251-3. Of course, these were not just embassies from kings.

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(10) On Nicomedes and Attalus, see Magie (1950) 317-8 and 23 respectively. (11) For text and discussion, see Blavatskaya (1965) . (12) Jos. BJ i 280; AJ xiv 377. (13) For an attempt at neutrality, note the caution of Soter II when visited by Lucullus for Sulla: see Part III, section 1. (14) Bell. Alex. 67-8; cf. Cic pro Deiot. 9. (15) Jos. AJ. xv 187-96; BJ i 387-96. On Octavian's attitude towards kings who had supported Antony, see especially Bowersock (1965) ch. 4, who stresses that a rigidly harsh attitude would have caused chaos. Of course, not all kings were as lucky as Herod: Bogud of Mauretania was captured and killed by Agrippa at Methone - the details are lost to us: Dio 1 11.3; cf. Str. viii p. 359. Note too CAH x p.114. (16) Jos. AJ xviii 36. (17) For the narrative, see Smallwood (1976) ch. 8. (18) Jos. AJ xviii 289-301. (19) Jos. AJ xix 279, 288; cf. Smallwood (1976) 195-6. (20) Jos. AJ xix 236, 242, 265. (21) Dio lix 24.1. (22) Gellius NA xi 10; cf. Magie (1950) 1043 n.27. (23) Sail. BJ 13; 16.2-4; 40.1; Cic. Brut. 128; Plut. CG 18.1; Lucilius 450-2 (Warmington); Sail. BJ 27.2; 29.1-2; cf. 15.4-5; Liv. Per. 64; Sail. BJ 32.2ff.; 33.2; cf. 34.1; 38.3 and 6; 66.1; 102.15; Scaurus is also said to have received bribes from Mithridates V of Pontus: Val. Max iii 7.8; viii 1. ext. 10; Asc. pp.21-2 (Clark). (24) Died, xxxvi 15.1; cf. Magie (1950) 1093 n.57. (25) Cic. De Leg. Agr. ii 59. But it should be noted that it was probably these lands that had also been exempted under the lex agraria of 111 BC: see Fentress (1979) 54. Cicero's bene capillatus seems to be a pun on the name Iuba; cf. Sen. De Brev. Vit. 12.3; Stat. Silv. v 1.83-4; Mart, i 31.6. It was helped by the fact that Juba had a mop of hair and a beard as his coins show: it was by his beard that Caesar grabbed him, Suet. EXJ 71. Juba's physical appearance and Roman play upon it serves to indicate how kings might stand out in Roman highsociety: see in general Geertz (1977) . (26) Cic. Har. Resp. 28 with Lenaghan ad loc.. Cf. the tradition that Clodius was bribed to snatch Tigranes: Dio xxxviii 30.1 with Part III, section 2. (27) Cic. ad Att. xiii 2a.2. (28) Cic. Phil, ii 93; ad Att. xiv 12.1. Deiotarus claimed that one P. Valerius was totally dependent upon him financ­ ially: unfortunately Valerius1 identify is most uncertain (ad Att. v 21.14 with Shackleton-Bailey ad loc.). But poorer senators were evidently more vulnerable to royal wealth: Diod. xxxi 27a. (29) For the case of Pyrrhus, Diod. xxii 6.3; Dio fg.40. 33ff; Zon. viii 4; App. Samn. 10.4. Polybius links bribery and overseas relations, xviii 35.1 with Walbank ad loc. See 68

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in general Badian (1958) 154-67; Harris (1979) 90; on Sallust and Jugurtha in particular, see Allen (1938). (30) Dio xxxix 12; Liv. Per. 104. Plutarch recounts a meet­ ing between Auletes and Cato on Rhodes in which Cato warned the king that to seek restoration at Rome was to put himself in the hands of men of insatiable greed: the anecdote sugg­ ests that Cato, en route to Auletes' brother and Cyprus, sought to persuade the king to seek restoration immediately through him: Cat. Min. 35. 2-5. Gelzer (1968) 147 n.2 prefers to suppose that Auletes had borrowed from Rabirius to settle with Pompey and Caesar, but, though we know that Rabirius lent to Auletes before his flight in 58 BC (Cic. Rab. Post. 4), there is no reason to suppose as much. (31) On the 'Egyptian Question', see Shatzman (1971). (32) Dio xxxix 12; Cic. pro Caelio passim; Rab. Post. 5; cf. Dio xxxix 14.1-2. (33) Dio xxxix 16. On Auletes' agent, see Cic. ad Fam. i 1; the same man was to attend Cleopatra in Rome (ad Att. xv 15.2). Cf. Deiotarus1 agent, Blesamius, Cic. pro Deiot. 33. Agents like these no doubt played a much larger part in the king's dealings with Rome than our sources' lack of interest in them might suggest: cf. Gellius NA xi 10; Cic. Har. Resp. 28. (34) Cic. Rab. Post. 21; 31; In Pis. 48f.; Dio xxxix 55ff.; Jos. AJ xiv 98-9; BJ i 175; Plut. Ant. 3; App. Syr. 51. (35) Cic. Rab. Post. 22; 28; 38-45. • In this speech Cicero seeks to play down the sums realised in Egypt so as to further the interests of his client; but that little or nothing was realised finds support in ad Fam. vii 17.1. (36) Plut. Caes. 48. Gelzer (1968) 247 must suppose that Caesar had taken over the.role of creditor from Rabirius (cf. note 30 above) , but it seems best to suppose with the orthod­ oxy that the debt to Caesar was still outstanding from 59 BC: Auletes had had little time to pay the vast sum then promised, particularly given pressure from his other creditors. Cf. also Sulla and Alexander II, Part III, section 1. The silvercontent of Ptolemaic coinage in these years further indicates the difficulties of Auletes: Walker (1976) 150-1. (37) See above note 26; cf. Jolliffe (1919) 72-4. (38) App. Mith. 11-4; Glew (1977) 395-7; Harris (1979) 100; cf. 90 n.6 with McGing (1980); Sherwin-White (1977b). (39) Died, xxxvi 3; Badian (1972a) 87-8; cf. Harris (1979) 97. It may well be that Nicomedes connived at these enslave­ ments, if he was not directly responsible for them: Crawford (1977) 49. Note also Brunt (1973) 250-1. (40) On Ariobarzanes' plight, see most recently Sullivan (1980b) 1139-46; cf. 1136-9 on his predecessor. He states that Ariobarzanes III was in debt 'for reasons only to be surmised' (1141), but Jolliffe (1919) 70 long ago suggested the view advanced here: Magie's objection that 'it is scarc­ ely credible that so large a sum (3,300 talents) would have

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been paid for the usual formality of recognition' (Magie (1950) 1249-50 n.41) has little force, as Auletes1 case shows. Further, 3,300 t. is no more than an estimate: cf. Badian (1968a) 82-3, 86. We should compare C. Cornelius1 proposal of 67 BC, which was designed to stop money-lending to foreign legati at Rome: it was apparently inspired by the financial difficulties such loans generated in the provinces - one wonders whether kings and their legati were to be included. The proposal came to nothing: Asc. pp. 57-8 (Clark) with Gruen (1974) 251. Of course, kings might borrow money from Romans for purposes other than use at Rome: no definite case is known, but Sittius' loans in North Africa (and perhaps elsewhere) are possibilities: Cic. pro Sulla 58; cf. 56. Note also the loan made by a freedman of Caesar at the court of Nicomedes IV (it seems): Suet. E\J 2. (41) For Agrippa's story, Jos. AJ xviii 143-67; cf. 237. Herodias' observation: AJ xviii 244. (42) Dio lx 34.4 and, in general, Millar (1977) 72; cf. Brunt (1961) 222. (43) Plin. NH ix 118; cf. Veil. Pat. ii 97.1 (44) Jos. AJ xvi 295-6: for the context, Schurer (1973) 580-1. Syllaeus is said to have borrowed the money he spent: AJ xvi 296; 339-40. Agrippa's case shows that - particularly for one with his connections - there were those in the imp­ erial court and outside who were willing to make such loans; cf. Seneca and the Britons: Dio lxii 2, with Griffin (1976) 11, 232, 432. (45) SHA Hadr. 6.8 with Syme (1935) 98. (46) Tac. Germ. 42; cf. 15.3 with Anderson ad loc.. (47) Luttwak (1976) 33 regards it as an 'established policy' under the Republic, following Gordon (1948) 8-11: but Gordon fails to distinguish subsidies from the special gifts discussed in Part I, section 2, which, for all their intrinsic value, are not properly subsidies. These apart, he cites no Repub­ lican evidence: the nearest to hard evidence are Caes. BG viii 49; App. Mithr. 114 ad fin.; Sail. BJ 14.1. (48) See Whittaker (1970) on Herod, i 6.8-9. (49) Dio lxii 2.1. (50) Among those who hold that kings did pay tribute in some numbers are notably: Mommsen (1887-8) iii 683; Badian (1968a) 78-9; Lintott (1981) 62-3. On the other side stand: Bonn (1877) 55-64; Sands (1908) 127-35; Cimma (1976) 237 n.127; Dahlheim (1977) 261-73. MDre circumspect are Schtirer (1973) 317; Brunt (1978) 169. (51) Excluded, therefore, are: Macedonia and Illyria after Pydna (Livy xlv 18.7f. with Brunt (1978) 173) and the Sanni: Arrian makes it quite clear that this was a kingless people (Peripl. 11.1-2; Jones (1971) 172 is a gross exaggeration from this single case; cf. Bosworth (1976) 70; note too Plin. NH xxi 77) .

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(52) See OLD and LSJ on these terms. Note, for example, the case of Antiochus III and the Treaty of Apamea. Though it is not apparent from his account of the treaty itself, Polybius makes it quite plain elsewhere that Antiochus was to pay an indemnity under its terms (on the treaty itself, Pol. xxi 43.19; cf. Livy xxxviii 38.13; elsewhere, Pol. xxi 13.5; cf. 14.3; 17.4-5). Yet Polybius reports a clause in the treaty under which Antiochus was forbidden to sail beyond the Calycadnus except for the purpose of conveying envoys, hostages, or phoroi: these phoroi can only be the instalments of indemnity which, Appian tells us, Antiochus was required to convey to Rome (Pol. xxi 43.14; cf. App. Syr. 38. Pol. xv 20.7 refers to the payments of Philip V (below) and Antiochus together as phoroi). In his version, Livy describes these payments as (approximately, for the text is uncertain) pecunia in stipendium (xxxviii 38.9); elsewhere, he describes them simply as stipendium (xlii 6.6-7 with M^rkholm (1966) 65). Cf. Carthage after the First Punic War: she is generally held to have paid an indemnity (very probably correctly) but the terminology of our sources can be most misleading: Livy describes the agreement which ended the war as one by which the Carthaginians became vectigales stipendarios (xxii 54.11; the only explicit mention of indemnity in the sources Is Oros. iv 11.2; cf. App. Sic. 2.2 and (at an earlier stage) Dio fg. 43.22). Similarly, after the Second Punic War: Livy xxxii 2; xxxiii 46-7; xxxviii 53. Still more such cases will be rev­ ealed as the discussion progresses. Cf. also, from a rather different stand-point, Grelle (1963) 16-21. (53) For the issues involved and sources, see Walbank (1957) 69. Harris (1979) 64 holds that Hiero paid both indemnity and tribute - as did De Sanctis (cf. contra Walbank ibid.) - but gives no argument. (54) Pol. ii 12.3 with Walbank ad loc.; cf. Badian (1968d) 6; Harris.(1979) 64. (55) Badian (1968d) 27 n.21. (56) Pol. xviii 44.7; Livy xxxiii 30.7-8; the notion of in­ demnity occurs in Appian Mac. 9.2, but cf. 9.3 and Pol. xviii 39.5. (57) Pol. xxvii 8.2 with Walbank ad loc.; Livy xlii 62.10. Cf. Mithridates VIfs offer to Pompey, similarly ambiguous: App. Mithr. 107. (58) Caes. B G v 22; cf. Cic. ad Att. iv 18.5; Diod. v 21.2; Plut. Caes. 28.3; Dio xl 3.2. Frere (1978) 55; Hawkes (1977) 177; Stevens (1947) and (1951) 334 (for the eccentric view that the Whaddon Chase hoard was a waylaid tribute-instalment); Brunt (1978) 182. It is sometimes stated that the Iceni were required to pay tribute prior to their annexation (see, for example, Allen (1970) 2): but this is quite without foundation. (59) App. BC v 75. Sands (1908) 134; Rostovtzeff (1941) 1580 n. 118; SchTSrer (1973) 413; Bengtson (1977) 273; Syme (1939)

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272. (60) . See LSJ s.v. phoros and my forthcoming article in Klio (1983a) . The case of Attambelus III of Characene could also involve a single payment (to Trajan) -or possibly payments limited to the period of his Parthian War: Dio lxviii 28.4. Cf. also Jos. AJ xiv 382-3, where Herod promises Antony pay­ ment in return for his recognition in 40 BC: it must be sig­ nificant that Josephus says nothing of any payments of tribute to Antony by Herod. Irregular demands for sums of money - even temporary regular exactions - would be no surprise in so turb­ ulent a period: they need have no bearing on normal practice in more settled times. (61) Str. xvii p.281. Jameson (1968) 81; Demicheli (1976) 73; Kirwan (1977) 20. For similar imperial behaviour, cf. Marcus Aurelius at Dio lxxi 19.1. (62) Schurer (1973) 399-427. Also, Syme (1973) 598-600. (63) Luc. Alex. 57; Schurer (1973) 317 n. 108. Cf. SherwinWhite (1966) 648. (64) Zos. i 31 with Sherwin-White (1973) 459. Rostovtzeff (1916-18) 21; Minns (1913) 605 n.9; Werner (1957) 243; Gajdukevic" (1971) 348 n.42. (65) Badian (1968a) 78-9, attacked with considerable success by Dahlheim (1977) 261-73, but still popular: see Seager (1979) 54. (66) Cic. ad Att. ii 16.2; cf. 17.1 and 2; 14.1; 23.2. See Dahlheim (1977) 267 n. 178; cf. Sullivan (1978a) 202. Why Cicero should pick out the mons Ant.ilibanus is not entirely clear. (67) Jos. AJ xiv 74; BJ i 175; Cic. Prov. Cons. 10; Flacc. 69. For subsequent changes in the method of collection see my forthcoming article in Klio (1983a). (68) On the royal title in Judaea, see Part III, section 1, especially Jos. AJ xiv 41. On the status of Judaea from 63 to 40 BC, see Dahlheim (1977) 265-6; cf. Schurer (1973) 267; Smallwood (1976) ch. 2, esp. 27-30. Lintott (1981) 63 is erroneous. On App. BC v 75 and Luke 2.1-5 see above. (69) Plut. Pomp. 45.3: the figures involved are controversial: see Dahlheim (1977) 264 n. 165, who is surely correct, contra Badian (1968a) 78-9. Cf. Magie (1950) 366; Jones (1974) 115 n.8. The placards carried in Pompey1s triumph raise other problems: see Dreizehnter (1975), esp. 215-33. (70) See Brunt (1978) 173. Cf. the relationship between Rome and the Italian allies: North (1981) 6-7. Note also, on the provinces, Brunt in Jones (1974) 179-80. Lintott (1981) 62-3 makes a great deal of Dio xxxviii 38.8, but takes it out of context and mistranslates it: the passage is in fact quite in­ conclusive, as the Loeb translation shows. He also introduces Sail. Hist, ii fg. 80 into the debate, but the nature of the monies there involved (simply pecunias) is altogether uncer­ tain: so too Caes. BG i 45.2; cf. App. Illyr. 13; 16; 28, which are similarly problematic. As Lintott recognises, Varus' 72

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behaviour in AD 9 is outside the question for he acted as a provincial governor: Lintott (1981) 60; Wells (1972) 239; cf. Klose (1934) 137, who makes much of the tribute (in hides) paid by the Frisii from Drusus1 time (Tac. Ann, iv 72) . But the status of the Frisii is uncertain: in AD 28 at least, they were under the authority of a primipilaris, regendis Frisiis impositus (ibid). Cf. Wells (1972) ch. 6 and p.243 who plau­ sibly argues for their inclusion within the developing Roman province of Germany in this period. Garnsey (1978) 239 compares the praefecti gentium of North Africa. The corn given to Commodus by the Marcomanni (Dio lxxii 2.2) may well have been an indemnity, like that given by Antiochus III under the Treaty of Apamea: Pol. xxi 43.19 with Walbank ad loc. On gold crowns given to Rome, see Dahlheim (1977) 272. (71) The senatorial commissions of the second century BC are almost an exception, but they had much to do with imperial security: see in general Briscoe (1969). (72) Jos. AJ xix 291. (73) Tac. Germ. 41; Dio lxxi 11.3; 15.1; lxxii 3.2. Note also Scapula's disarmament of the Iceni and others: Tac. Ann. xii 31 with Barrett (1979c). Cf. Part II, section 3. (74) Millar (1977) 443-4; cf. Brunt (1961). (75) Jos. AJ xvii 342-4; BJ ii 111. (76) Jos. AJ xvii 315? cf. BJ ii 92. (77) Jos. Vita 52. (78) Jos. AJ xv 62-79. (79) Jos. AJ xv 76.

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Section 2: The King and the Empire at Large

As Rome expanded her sphere of influence, she moved into areas which had already developed inter-state relations of friendship and hostility. Ihe kingdom was one part of a comp­ lex web. Within the new situation brought about by Rome's advent, relations already formed tended to persist. But Rome added another factor: the Roman province with its successive governors. Nor was it only in the form of governors that Rome moved towards the periphery. The purpose of this section is to explore the way in which the king functioned within this new framework. Beneficence, or euergetism, had been at the very heart of Hellenistic kingship. Nor was it absent in the West. As Veyne has recently remarked, 'dormer est le geste royal par excell­ ence' (1). Within the Roman sphere, the phenomenon continued unabated. The list of those communities benefited by Herod is a long one. He built gymnasia at Tripolis, Damascus and Ptolemais, a wall at Byblus, halls, porticoes, temples and market­ places at Berytus and Tyre, theatres at Sidon and Damascus, an aqueduct at Laodiceia-on-Sea, and baths, fountains and colonnades at Ascalon. At Nicopolis, he helped in the cons­ truction of most of the public buildings. At Chios, he re­ stored p. portico that had been derelict since the Mithridatic Wars. In Syrian Antioch, he paved the main street, 20 stades in length, with polished marble and erected colonnades along its sides. At Rhodes, he re-built the temple of Apollq/ But his beneficence was by no means confined to the erection of buildings. On Cos, he endowed the annual gymnasiarchy to ensure its perpetuation. On Rhodes, he financed ship-building. In the case of Phaselis, Balanea and various small Cilician towns, he contributed to their annual tax-payments. On Chios, he paid the island's taxes and sums due to imperial procura­ tors. Perhaps the most striking of his benefactions was his endownment of the Olympic Games in perpetuity. In addition, Josephus also mentions by name Athens, Sparta and Pergamum as recipients of Herod's beneficience: throughout, Josephus

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makes it quite clear that the communities which he mentions by name are but a selection from all those to whom Herod gave (2). Similarly, Agrippa I also built extensively outside his kingdom, showing particular favour towards Berytus. There he built an outstanding theatre, an amphitheatre, baths and porticoes. He celebrated the dedication of the theatre with spectacles and musical performances and that of the amphit­ heatre with gladiatorial games (3). Again, Agrippa's son, Agrippa II, also showed a marked favour for Berytus. He built a theatre there at great expense and presented annual spec­ tacles. There too he distributed grain and oil to the city populace. Throughout the city he erected statues and replicas of ancient sculptures. According to Josephus, many of these art-works were moved to Berytus from Judaea (4). A fragmentary inscription from Berytus shows that Agrippa II and his sister Berenice repaired a building which Herod had erected there (5). As Jewish rulers, the Herods might be seen as a special case. Ihey were on the edge of Hellenism and potentially in conflict with it. It has been commonly argued that by be­ stowing these various benefactions, they were staking their claim to be accepted as Hellenistic kings. This is plausible enough as far as it goes, but we must look more closely at the reasons for Herodian benefactions to particular cities. It has been suggested that Herod chose the communities he benef­ ited by virtue of the fact that they had large Jewish commun­ ities. But this does not bear examination. First, we do not know that there were large Jewish communities in the cities so benefited. Further, cities which are known to have had large Jewish communities, such as Alexandria and Cyrene, are not mentioned as objects of Herod's beneficence. Moreover, Herod's building-activity outside his kingdom seems to have caused resentment among his subjects for the very reason that it was taken to indicate his greater affiliation to the Greeks than to the Jews. Hostility on these grounds would be rather misplaced if Herod had sought out cities with large Jewish communities. We must look elsewhere for Herodian criteria (6). Josephus states quite explicitly one reason why Herod benefited Fome, pit;ips; those cities which he^Benefited were at least in part simply those cities which he visited (7) . We are told how this happened in the case of Chios. Forced to stay there for several days by adverse winds, Herod received those Chians who visited him and bestowed gifts upon them. Learning that the city's portico had long been in ruins, he donated a sum of money which was more than sufficient bo cover the cost of repairs (8) . Ihis case is particularly valuable in that it shows that Herod's beneficence extended also to in­ dividuals in the cities. As the king moved from city to city, we are told, he bestowed benefactions according to the needs

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of those he met (9). Important as they clearly were, personal visits may well not have been the only stimulus to benefaction. Athens was an obvious, almost necessary, choice as a recipient of the benefactions of a Hellenistic king: the city has been termed a 'show-case1 for international ostentation (10). In con­ ferring benefactions upon Sparta, Herod may well have had an eye to the traditional brotherhood obtaining between Jew and Spartan, through common descent from Abraham. Herod seems to have been affected by this consideration in his treatment of Eurycles of Sparta (11). Also important was the Roman connection. The fact that Herod played so large a part in the construction of the public buildings of Nicopolis, the very heart of the city, deserves special attention. Nicopolis was founded as a completely new city by Octavian in 30 BC on the site of his camp before the Battle of Actium. It was highly symbolic of Octavian's vic­ tory and resultant rule. By contributing to its building in so large a fashion, Herod took part in the erection of a symbol, a symbol of special significance for Herod who had been on the wrong side at Actium, albeit at a distance: Herod's building-activity there thus marked his new allegiance. Syrian Antioch constitutes a similar case. M. Vipsanius Agrippa did a great deal of building there: it is possible that the young Tiberius was also involved. By building there himself, in so prominent a manner, Herod was indirectly assoc­ iating himself with the imperial court in the eyes of the provincials, and with Agrippa in particular. Indeed, Downey suggests that Herod and Agrippa formed some concerted plan in their building activities in Antioch (12). Berytus also deserves close attention. Herod himself did a considerable amount of building there, as we have seen, while Agrippa I and Agrippa II were especially well-disposed towards it. It seems likely that Berytus was so much favoured because of its Roman connection. Under Augustus, a colony was planted there. M. Vipsanius Agrippa settled two legions there with a vast accretion of territory. This was the great friend of Herod and it seems to have been after him that Agrippa I was named. It may well be that Berytus' special connection with Agrippa won it the favour of the Herods (13) . None of this, of course, rules out a combination of stimuli: for ex­ ample, Agrippa II and his sister Berenice spent much time in Berytus in the course of the Jewish War: no doubt previous Herodian relations with Berytus made it a congenial temporary residence. Euergetism was only part of the relationship between city and king: the city responded to the beneficence of the king by bestowingjiorjoxir-s upon him. Herod's gift to the Olympic Games is a case in point. In response to his beneficence, the people of Elis allowed him to preside over one year's festivities and made him president for life thereafter (14).

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Up to this point the Herods have dominated the discussion simply because Josephus provides ample information in their case.feufc,JJtiey^we^e^jiak ifra-xaily,Juja3sl£cucan t injie in their re­ within, the. toman framework,J though the lationship^^ scale of Herod's beneficence certainly seems unusual. Some­ thing of an antidote to the overbearing weight of Josephus is provided by the evidence for Athens, mostly epigraphical: Athens, the 'show-case1, gives a more balanced picture of the range of kings involved in such relationships (15). A statue of Juba II of Mauretania was erected in the gym­ nasium of Ptolemy there: it seems probable that Juba had made some benefaction to the gymnasium, which had been built by an ancestor of his wife, Cleopatra Selene (16). Later, a statue was erected in honour of Juba's son, Ptolemy (17). Moreover, a statue was also set up in honour of Juba II's second wife, Glaphyra, daughter of Archelaus I of Cappadocia (18). As for Cappadocia itself, Ariobarzanes II re-built the Odeon of Pericles, which had been damaged in Sulla's capture of the city (19). His son, Ariobarzanes III, was also a benefactor of the city, in which he had spent time as a young man (20). So too was Archelaus I of Cappadocia, who received two statues there (21). His son, Archelaus II, also received two statues there (22). The Commagenian kings too received honours at Athens: Antiochus III received a dedication, while Philopappus later ended his days there, having held office there, though not in his kingdom (23). As for Pontus, Pythodoris received a statue there in her own right (24). Thracian kings were also honoured at Athens. Statues were erected to honour Rhescuporis I (25) , and also his son, Cotys VII (26) . It is quite possible - though by no means certain, as usually imagined that Rhoemetalces III held the archonship there, for AD 36/7 (27) . It was also held by a Cotys, perhaps Cotys VII (28) . Herod's unspecified benefactions at Athens have already been mentioned: he duly received honours there (29), as did Herod of Chalcis (30) and Berenice, sister of Agrippa II (31). Herod Antipas received honours on Delos (32). It need hardly be said that kings other than the Herods had a similar relationship with cities other than Athens: thus Pythodoris of Pontus was honoured at Smyrna (33), while Antiochus III of Commagene was honoured at Ephesus (34). Nor was Athens the only community in which kings held office, if indeed a Thracian king was archon there. The tenure of office by a king in a community outside his kingdom- was not uncommon in the Hellenistic world and it persisted into the world of Rome, together, as we have seen, with trie rest of the matrix of euergetism (35) . Juba II of Mauretania was duumvir quinquennalis at neighbouring New Carthage and Gades. In the former, he was also patronus coloniae (36). It is possible that Juba's son, Ptolemy, was also duumvir there (37). At the other end of the Mediterranean, Sohaemus of Emesa was duumvir quinquennalis at neighbouring Heliopolis (38). Moreover, both

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Sohaemus and Agrippa I or II each received the title patronus coloniae there (39). Elsewhere, on Chios, Rhoemetalces III of Thrace, Antiochus IV of Commagene and his wife Iotape each held the stephanephorate. Antiochus IV of Commagene gave a gift to Chios sufficiently large to be commemorated upon its coinage: this gift and the stephanephorate may very well have been re­ lated (40) . By maintaining relations with provincial communities the king built up friendships upon which he could draw in time of trouble (41). At the same time, the king increased his renown through his beneficence. But particularly important for us is the fact that by maintaining relations not only with the centre of power at Rome, but also with the empire at large, the king was more fully and intimately bonded into the Roman sphere. Further, as a world-figure within the Mediterranean world, the king could not but be putting himself on a level with the most prominent among the Romans. Apart from the kings, the great benefactors of this world were the Romans, emperors and governors in particular (42). Athens again provides a valuable illustration. With the exception of the statue of Juba II, set up in the gymnasium of Ptolemy there, all statues of royalty were set up on the Acropolis. There they stood shoulder to shoulder with the statues of leading Romans (43) . Further, Herod for one is said to have refrained from still greater benefactions for fear that he would excite jealousy or the suspicion that he entertained some higher ambition by con­ ferring greater benefits upon states than they received from their own masters: these last seem to be the Romans (44). The very caution attributed to Herod must be indicative of the heights to which widespread beneficience might elevate the king. The wise king exercised a similar caution throughout his dealings with leading Romans outside Italy: those visiting the provinces or the king's own realm were cultivated at least as much as they were at Rome itself (45). An Egyptian papyrus reveals the painstaking arrangements made to accommodate a Roman senator, L. Memmius, when he visited the Arsinoite nome in 112 BC: it appears that his visit was solely for the purpose of tourism (46) . Again in Egypt, Soter II received Lucullus, Sulla's envoy, in splendid style. The Egyptian fleet went out to meet him, as it did when a king visited. Further, Soter lodged and fed him in the palace where no foreigner had previously been received, and gave him four times the sum usually allotted for expenses. Lucullus punc­ tiliously took only what was strictly necessary, we are told, and would accept no gift. By contrast with Memmius, he had no desire to tour up the Nile (47). The wise king was a lavish host when Romans came to visit him. When Octavian visited Herod's kingdom on his way to Egypt after Actium, the king received him with royal pomp; Herod gave gifts to his soldiers and provided them with supp-

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lies and comfortable lodgings. He banquetted Octavian and his friends and to Octavian himself gave 800 t.. At Ptolemais, riding beside Octavian, he reviewed the Roman forces. The lavishness of Herod is said to have strengthened Octavian1 s faith in the king's loyalty and devotion and to have encouraged Octavian to increase his kingdom (48) . Similarly, Herod in­ vited Agrippa to visit him in his kingdom and there showed him his new foundations and other buildings and entertained Agrippa and his friends with good food and luxury. He even took Agrippa to Jerusalem, where all the people met him in festive dress and welcomed him with acclamations. There too Agrippa sacrificed to the Jewish god and feasted the large populace. Upon his departure, Herod honoured Agrippa and the most dis­ tinguished men in his entourage with many gifts. The following spring, Herod set off to join Agrippa in his Bosporan campaign (49). Further, just as personal ties between king and Roman could be forged and strengthened at Rome, so they could be for­ ged and strengthened when leading Romans visited the kingdom. The visit of Agrippa to Herod shows this happening under the Principate, but it was nothing new, of course. When Scipio Aemilianus visited Attalus III of Pergamum and Antiochus VTI of Syria in 140 or 139 BC on a tour of inspection in the East, he promoted a relationship with these kings, who each sent gifts to him in his campaign at Numantia (50). The case of Herod and Agrippa also illustrates the ten­ dency for kings to visit leading Romans when they came at all close to their kingdoms, particularly if they came as conquer­ ing generals. Thus, as Pompey advanced into Coele-Syria, he was met by deputations from all Syria, Egypt and Judaea (51). Similarly, as Caesar was returning from Egypt through Syria, nearby kings and tetrarchs flocked to meet him (52). Further, where a link between king and Roman already existed, the king might actually be expected to pay a visit to his Roman friend, when he came at all close to the kingdom. Tiberius is said to have been angry with Archelaus I of Cappadocia, because, al­ though he had once defended the king at Rome, Archelaus did not visit him during his sojourn on Rhodes (53) . By contrast, Herod had taken the trouble to visit Agrippa on Mitylene when the Roman began his term in Asia and again at the end of his term: in the meantime he had joined in his Bosporus campaign, as we have seen (54) . Archelaus was not being stupid or de­ liberately perverse: we are told that he would have visited Tiberius had he not been advised by those close to Augustus that friendship with Tiberius might he dangerous, since C. Caesar was in the ascendancy and in the East (55) . Archelaus1 dilemma illustrates once again how difficult it was for the king to maintain favour at Rome as the political situation there changed. The wise king was similarly courteous and generous towards Romans in his area for a longer term, particularly Roman

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officials, such as governors and procurators. Tacitus descri­ bes a banquet hosted by Aretas IV of Nabataea, at which he entertained Germanicus, Agrippina and Piso, governor of Syria, as well as others who are not named. There Aretas gave heavy crowns of gold to Germanicus and Agrippina and lighter ones to Piso and the rest (56). Particularly striking is Agrippa I's response to the approach of Marsus, governor of Syria, at Tiberias. Agrippa and the kings he had been entertaining there advanced seven stades from the city in order to do honour to the Roman by coming to meet him (57) . Relations between the king and local Roman officials could only be facilitated where some relationship had previously been established between them before the Roman came to his post. Agrippa II travelled to Alexandria to congratulate Ti. Julius Alexander on his appointment as prefect of Egypt (58). This was not their first contact. Alexander had already been procurator of Judaea and was related to Agrippa by marriage (59). As we have had cause to stress before, gifts are most amb­ iguous: a gift from a king to a governor might therefore be readily interpreted as a bribe. Thus Cicero accuses Piso of taking bribes from a Thracian king while governor of Macedonia and of acting in accordance with the king's wishes as a result (60). But gifts were as central to the relationship between kings and governors as they were between kings and other Romans. Indeed, we repeatedly find kings competing for the favour of a Roman official by the size of their gifts (61). We have already seen that the wise king was a generous king where the Romans were involved. But it should not be imagined that relations between kings and Roman officials were always amicable. We have touched upon the relationship of Agrippa I and Marsus. After their meeting at Tiberias, their relations were notably bad. Sus­ picious of Agrippa's convention of kings, Marsus had perempt­ orily ordered the kings back to their own kingdoms and had thus won Agrippa1s hatred. There is reason to believe that they had already been at odds before this encounter. Marsus had caused Claudius to order Agrippa to stop his fortification of Jerusalem (62). It must be emphasised that the king in Agrippa's position, at odds with a local Roman official, was not without resort: Agrippa wrote constantly to Claudius urging that Marsus be removed from his position in Syria. Although it must be allowed that Claudius did not immediately respond to these requests, he is said to have replaced Marsus after Agrippa's death out of deference to the king (63). Much earlier, Gauda of Numidia is said to have played a part in having Metellus removed from his command against Jugurtha and replaced by Marius (64). We have seen that there was a certain parallelism between king and leading Roman as figures in the Mediterranean world. A further indication of this parallelism is also a direct

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result of it. Hostility between king and Roman could arise out of the very similarity of their position and their con­ sequent competition. It was said that Agrippa I made such a spectacle at Alexandria, when he visited the city, that the then prefect of Egypt, Flaccus, felt distinctly overshadowed (65) . We are told that Vitellius, governor of Syria, fell out with Antipas because Antipas deliberately pre-empted his report to the emperor on the meeting with Artabanus on the Euphrates (66) . Of course, a good relationship was to the mutual benefit of both king and Roman. We have seen that the king put much into the relationship, but it should be remembered that he also took much out of it. As the king did honour to Romans, so Romans did honour to the king. We have seen how, in Judaea, Agrippa responded to the honours paid him by Herod. Later, in Ionia, Herod sat in Agrippa1s consilium: nor was he the only king so to do, for Agrippa's consilium was composed entirely of Roman officials, kings and dynasts. Once again we find a parallelism between king and Roman official (67). But Herod had a particular interest in the case brought before the consilium: the Jews of Ionia called upon Agrippa to re-affirm their rights. We have already seen how the Herods used their connections at Rome to further Jewish causes: Herod did the same in this provincial context. The Jews were represented by Herod's man, Nicolas of Damascus, while Herod himself is said to have played a large part both in having Agrippa hear their case and in his granting it (68). According to Josephus, when the gathering dispersed after the hearing, Herod embraced Agrippa, it should be noted, in grate­ ful acknowledgement of the friendship Agrippa had shown him in granting the Jewish request. Moreover, Agrippa is said to have responded by embracing Herod in turn, like an equal (69). Shortly after this episode Herod returned to Judaea, where, before the populace of Jerusalem, he gave an account of his whole journey, dwelling especially on the benefits he had won for the Jews of Asia. This account, combined with an account of the state of the kingdom and a partial remission of taxes, is said to have greatly enhanced Herod's popularity with his subjects (70). This is a telling illustration of how a king's relationship with a Roman could significantly improve his standing both inside and outside his kingdom. We may com­ pare the way in which Agrippa I used his friendship with Petronius, governor of Syria, to protect the Jewish community at Dora against attacks from the Greeks, there (71) . We have seen how Herod supported.^a Jewish case before Agrippa: it should be stressed that this was only one of sev­ eral such instances: for example, Herod is credited with having reconciled Agrippa with the people of Ilium (72). There was not always a Jewish aspect. When Herod had won the favour of Antony, Antony honoured the king by having him sit beside him when he gave judgment and by entertaining him at

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dinner every day (73). Thereafter, as Antony moved eastwards to cross the Euphrates, Herod accompanied him part of the way, until he turned off for Judaea (74). There is reason to be­ lieve that a recognised king was normally allowed to sit be­ side a Roman governor in this way: so Metellus is made to inform Gauda of Numidia (75). The king could also derive more tangible benefits from friendships with Romans in the provinces. When Herod came before Octavian at Rhodes, his case was helped by a supporting letter from Didius, governor of Syria (76). Only a few years later, Herod was faced with a major famine in Judaea and the surrounding area. In desperation, he applied to C. Petronius, prefect of Egypt, for permission to export Egyptian grain^ to relieve the famine. Although Herod was but one of many whom famine had led to apply in this way, Petronius gave him pri­ ority because of the friendship between them: he actively helped the king to buy grain and transport it. When this grain arrived in Judaea, Herod made much of the solicitude he had shown for his subjects and won over many who had hitherto been hostile to him. Having fulfilled the needs of his sub­ jects he set about helping neighbouring communities, giving seed to the inhabitants of Syria. Not unnaturally, this dis­ tribution won him great praise both inside and outside his kingdom. One wonders whether Herod would have been able to do as much without the friendship of the Roman prefect of Egypt (77). Further, just as his subjects could lay accusations against the king at Rome, so they could appeal against him to leading Romans who came into their vicinity. Here again the friendship of such Romans paid dividends for the king. The case of the Gadarenes amply illustrates the security of the king in this position. Gadara had been given to Herod by Octavian but it was dissatisfied with his rule (78). Some Gadarenes brought accusations against Herod before Agrippa at Mitylene: the response of Herod's friend was to throw them in chains and send them back to Herod without so much as hear­ ing their case (79). When Augustus visited Syria in 20 BC, the people of Gadara accused Herod of tyranny. Augustus, un­ like Agrippa, duly held an inquiry, but after only the first day the Gadarenes saw that Augustus and his consilium were inclined towards Herod and so committed suicide. Their suicides were taken to reveal their guilt and shortly after Augustus actually increased Herod's realm: the Gadarenes had evidently done him little harm (80). At several points in this discussion we have observed similarities between kings and leading Romans in the provinces. Before this notion is developed, some crucial distinctions must be made. The more important the Roman and/or the less important the king, the less similar were their respective positions. It is evident that the gulf between a tetrarch and the emperor himself was far greater than that between,

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say, Herod and the prefect of Egypt. Dissimilarities are clear enough but they should not be allowed to obscure the similarities. From Caesar and Augustus onwards, the kings were - for the most part at least - also Roman citizens, as we have seen: many had spent their youths at Rome. At the same time, the Hellenistic world had long regarded leading Romans as akin to kings (81). We have seen, for example, how Soter II received Lucullus like a king and how, in the judg­ ment of Piso at least, Aretas IV of Nabataea treated Germanicus like a Parthian king (82). Both king and governor ruled areas within the Roman sphere: in the Eastern Mediterranean in particular, governors ruled areas which had previously been ruled by kings. The governor who replaced the king might even take over the royal residence as his own, as did the governor of Sicily at Syracuse (83). The central Roman authority might make a conscious decision whether to place an area under a king or a governor (84). A kingdom could be annexed and made a kingdom again at will (85). Further, kings and provinces were not neatly divided, as might be supposed* In the West, for example, the kingdom of Cogidubnus was an enclave in the Roman province of Britain: in the East, Syria was riddled with petty principalities (86). We have already seen how the king moved about the provinces and the Roman visited kingdoms. Through Augustus' generosity, Herod not only received the revenues from half the copper mines of Cyprus, but also man­ aged the other half (87). The essential similarities of the positions of king and governor come to the fore when the one becomes the other. It was said that Lucceius Albinus, governor of Mauretania in AD 69, assumed the royal insignia and the name of Juba, a name redolent of the dynasty his office had replaced. Albinus may not have done as much in fact, but that he could be thought to have done so underlines the point in question (88). The dynasty of Donnus is also illuminating. After Augustus1 conquest of the Cottian Alps - as they became known - the dynasty lost its royal status. Donnus' son ruled as a prefect, a Roman official: like Donnus he held Roman citizenship. But, in AD 44, Claudius bestowed the royal title on Donnus' grand­ son, Cottius II, together with an addition to his territory. The fluidity between kingship and Reman office is evident (89). It was long thought that in Cogidubnus we have a man who was at once king and Roman official, rex et legatus. However, recent epigraphical work has rendered this unlikely (90). But the case of Herod remains, though rather different. We are told that, in 20 BC, Augustus somehow associated Herod with the procurators of Syria: the arrangements are not as clear as one might wish. What is clear is that Augustus specifically instructed the Syrian procurators to keep in touch with Herod and follow his advice in all things (91). In his Jewish War, Josephus says that Augustus actually appointed

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Herod as procurator of all Syria (92). But in his fuller and later work, the Jewish Antiquities, Josephus says no more than that Augustus associated Herod with the Syrian procurators (93). If we are to understand this little problem, we must set it in context. This was not Herod's first appointment in the Roman administration of Syria, if it was that. As governor of Syria in 47/6 BC, Sex. Caesar had appointed Herod - who was then not yet king or even royal - as strategus of Cbele-Syria and Samaria (94). A few years after, when civil war took Cassius out of Syria, he appointed Herod as strategus of Coele-Syria and entrusted troops to him (95). The title was traditional for district governors of Syria, as elsewhere in the Hellenistic world (96). But this was not Herod's position in 20 BC. In his Jewish Antiquities, Josephus' statement of Herod's position is a tail-piece to his account of another change in Herod's fortunes in that year: Augustus' gift to him of the remaining territory of the deceased Zenodorus, between Trachonitis and Galilee: Ulatha, Paneas and the surrounding territory (97) . It is tempting to suggest that there is some connection between these two changes in Herod's situation. A glance at the map shows that the stretch of territory thus granted to him bordered the province of Syria. Once Herod had taken charge of this territory, liaison with the neigh­ bouring procurators of Syria would clearly be desirable: only shortly before, Herod had been granted the rest of Zenodorus' territory for the very reason that bandits from Trachonitis had been troubling Damascus (98). Whether Herod's new role amounted to anything much more than this may reasonably be doubted: it seems most unlikely that procurators operating in the north of Syria were to consult with Herod or that Herod handled the finances of all Syria (99). On this argument, we therefore have no king who was a Roman official while he ruled as king. But we have seen how a man might move between kingship and provincial position and that there was an intimate relationship between the king and his kingdom and provincial Roman officials. Finally, we should observe the full implications of Roman recognition. In so far as the king needed Roman recognition and operated, once recognised, within the Roman sphere, he was a Roman appointee. Particularly so, where, like Herod, he had no dynastic claim to rule. This, taken together with the parall­ elisms we have seen between king and governor, must go some way towards explaining why no king seems to have been both king and Roman official at once: in a very real sense, the king was already a Roman official. Notes to Section 2 (1) Veyne (1976) 228; thus Cicero lists the conferral of ben­ efactions among regiae laudes (pro Deiot. 26). On the Hell-

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enistic world in general, Veyne (1976) 228-71. The West is evidently different, but note the case of Luernius: on this and the West in general, see Drinkwater (1979) with the coun­ ter arguments of Duncan-Jones (1981). (2) Jos. BJ i 422-8; AJ xvi 146-9, 18-9, 23-6. On the arch­ aeological evidence in particular, see Smallwood (1976) 80-2. (3) Jos. AJ xix 328-30, 335-7. (4) Jos. AJ xx 211-2. (5) Smallwood (1967) no. 212 (b). (6) Contra Smallwood (1976) 82. (7) Jos. AJ xvi 146. (8) Jos. AJ xvi 18-9. (9) Jos. AJ xvi 24. (10) Veyne (1976) 229. (11) Jos. BJ i 515; cf. Braund (1980a), esp. 421 n.8. (12) Downey (1961) 169-84, esp. 174 n.48. Cf. Lassus (1978) 60. (13) See Lauffray (1978) 147, who points out that the date of the establishment of the colony is not as secure as often supposed, as, for example, by Smallwood (1976) 195 n.56. (14) Jos. BJ i 426-7; AJ xvi 149. Finley and Pleket (1976) 99 and 111 point out that such an appointment was unpreceden­ ted and that only one later example is known. Josephus (locc. citt.) stresses the renown of the Olympic Games in the Greek world; cf. the acute remarks of Hammond and Griffith (1979), esp. 691-5 on its importance in the fourth century BC. Archelaus I of Cappadocia, Herodfs friend (for the most part), received a statue from the people of Elis (QGIS 359) : he too may have contributed to the maintenance of the Games. Cf. Herod's Arab links, esp. Jos. BJ i 396; AJ xv 217. (15) For earlier Hellenistic cases, see Ferguson (1911); Thompson (1953). Later cases have been assembled by Sullivan, but only an abstract of his paper has been published: Sullivan (1978e), very brief. (16) Paus. i 17.2 with Graindor (1927) 82. (17) QGIS 197 with Graindor (1931) 48, who deduces a visit by Ptolemy to Athens. Note also J. and L. Robert Bull. Ep. (1963) 253, who plausibly suggest that this was the Ptolemy honoured at Soura in Lycia, as he was honoured by the Lycian koinon at Xanthus (QGIS 198), and that he passed through Athens while visiting Lycia. (18) QGIS 363 with Graindor (1927) 85, who deduces that she visited Athens with Juba early in the first century AD. On North Africa and the Greek world, see Kontorini (1975). (19) Vitruv. v 9.1; QGIS 354. (20) QGIS 356. (21) QGIS 357 and 360. (22) QGIS 362 with Graindor (1927) 85 n.l. (23) QGIS 406: so Sullivan (1978c) 783. Graindor (1927) 86-7 prefers Antiochus III, but must be right that Antiochus I is a possibility. On Philopappus, see Part III, section 2. 86

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(24) OGIS 376. (25) IG II/III 2 3442 with Sullivan (1979b) 194 n.28. (26) IG II/III 2 3443. (27) IG II 2 1967 and 2292. Pace Sullivan (1979b) 210, it must be stressed that Rhoemetalces is not accorded the royal title: it could be that this man was an Athenian called Rhoemetalces. (28) IG II 2 1070. Once more, there is no royal title. Oliver (1965) takes these inscriptions to indicate a very special link between Athens and Thrace at this time, perhaps with special regard to the corn-supply. (29) OGIS 414. (30) OGIS 427. (31) OGIS 428. (32) OGIS 417; cf. 416, from Cos. (33) OGIS 377. (34) OGIS 405. (35) For the Hellenistic practice, see the evidence collected and discussed by Walbank (1940) 67 n.5. Cf. Preaux (1978) 421, 464-5. (36) 115 840 (New Carthage), Festus Avienus Ora Maritima 27783 (Gades) . A coin suggests that Juba was duumvir at New Carthage together with one Cn. Attellius: see Mazard (1955) no. 397. On the links between Juba's kingdom and these comm­ unities, see Gsell (1928) viii 232. (37) Mazard (1955) nos. 512-4: these pair Ptolemy with a duumvir, but do not accord him the title. (38) US 8958 = IGLS 2760. (39) See the previous note and IGLS 2759. (40) SEG xvii (1966) 381. See in general Robert (1938) 12850, esp. 139-41. On the coin, Wroth (1899) xlvi. It may be Antiochus1 gift that is commemorated in SEG xvi (1959) 490. Forrest (1966) 198 suggests that the name Antiochus was used in the Chian elite on account of Chios1 relationship with the Commagenian dynasty: of course, the name was widespread, but, if correct, the argument would lend support to the above ob­ servation on Thrace and Athens (above notes 27 and 28) . For a survey, see Fraser (1978). Cf. also the son of a King Tarcondimotus who was duumvir at Antioch-near-Pisidia: Magie (1950) 1338 n.22. (41) Jos. AJ xv 327. (42) On benefactors in the Roman world, see Veyne (1976) , esp. 264: he ignores kings. (43) Graindor (1927) 81-2: this sort of symbolism was certain­ ly recognised in antiquity, as Cic. pro Deiot. 33 shows. (44) Jos. BJ i 428: Josephus may also have local elites in mind. (45) Of course, there are notable exceptions, such as the deaths of envoys to Teuta and Antiochus V of Syria, but there is no good evidence that the rulers caused these: they were against their own interests: see Harris (1979) 195 and Badian

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(1958) 108. (46) P. Teb. no. 33, discussed by Olshausen (1963) 6-11. (47) Plut. Luc. 2.5-6; cf. 21.7. (48) Jos. AJ xv 192-201; BJ i 394-7. Cf. Tigranes' 'donative' to Pompey's troops: Plut. Pomp. 33.5; App. Mithr. 104 ad fin.. In Pontus, Polemo I decreed that visiting senators should sit in the front row in all the theatres of the kingdom (Dio liii 25.1). Cf. Welles (1934) no. 50, lines 5-6: note the similar honours accorded kings in Rome (amongst others) Jos. AJ xiv 210; Tac. Ann, xiii 54; Suet. Claud. 25. Cf. also Deiotarus, whose lavish treatment of Caesar was advisable after Pharsalus: Cic. pro Deiot. 17. (49) Jos. AJ xvi 12-6. (50) Astin (1967) 117 for the chronology and some discussion: Micipsa, of course/ sent Jugurtha: Sail. BJ 7. (51) Jos. AJ xiv 34; cf. App. Mithr. 113. (52) Bell. Alex. 65. (53) Tac. Ann. ii 42; cf. Suet. Tib. 8. (54) Jos. AJ xv 350; xvi 16; 86. (55) Tac. Ann. ii 42. (56) Tac. Ann, ii 57. Piso's ungracious refusal is depicted as a sign of his hostility to Germanicusr inter alia: it is evidently not the norm. Cf. Shotter (1974), esp. 235-6, on Piso. (57) Jos. AJ xix 340. (58) Jos. BJ ii 309. In rather special circumstances, Pomponius Flaccus1 relationship with Rhescuporis III of Thrace is said to have caused his appointment: Tac. Ann, ii 66. (59) Jos. AJ xix 276-7. (60) Cic. In Pis. 84. (61) Thus, for example, Herod outbid Syllaeus for the favour of the imperial procurator, Fabatus: Jos. BJ i 575-6. (62) Jos. AJ xix 326-7. (63) Jos. AJ xx 1; xix 363. (64) Sail. BJ 65. 3-4. Cf. the dispute between Rhoemetalces III of the Bosporus and a Itoman curator under Antoninus Pius: Gajdukevic (1971) 351-2. Note also Plin. Ep£. x 63, 64 and 67 with Sherwin-White ad loc.. A king could also enlist the help of one Roman offical against another, as Archelaus of Judaea used Varus, governor of Syria, against the imperial procurator, Sabinus: see Smallwood (1976) 106-13. (65) Philo In Flacc. 30. (66) Jos. AJ xviii 104-5. (67) Jos. AJ xvi 30; cf. 50 and 57, making Herod's presence quite certain. (68) Jos. AJ xvi 29; 60. Agrippa is made to point out that the Jews owed their success to the friendship between himself and Herod. (69) Jos. AJ xvi 61. (70) Jos. AJ xvi 62-5. (71) Jos. AJ xix 300-12, where Josephus has Petronius twice

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refer to Agrippa as timiotatos to him, publicising the king's part in the affair (309 and 310); cf. P. Lond. 1178. (72) Jos. AJ xvi 26. (73) Jos. AJ xv 77. (74) Jos. AJ xv 80. (75) Sail. BJ 65.2. (76) Jos. AJ xv 195; BJ i 395. (77) Jos. AJ xv 299-316. Cf. Helena of Adiabene, who had corn brought from Alexandria and figs from Cyprus at great expense to relieve famine in Jerusalem (AJ xx 51 and 101). There is nothing to suggest either that she had any special relationship with the Egyptian prefect or that she received the sort of special treatment accorded to Herod. Cf. Rickman (1980) 70-1. (78) Jos. AJ xv 217. (79) Jos. AJ xv 351. (80) Jos. AJ xv 354-9. (81) See Richardson (1979); Rawson (1975). Note also Part I, section 2, especially Livy xxx 17; cf. xlv 44. (82) Tac. ton. ii 57. (83) Cic. In Verr. ii 4.118. (84) See, for example, Str. xiv p. 671; RG 27. (85) On the history of Commagene, see Sullivan (1978c). (86) See Part II, section 4 on Dexandros: note also Aretas' ethnarch at Damascus: Rey-Coquais (1978) 50-1. On Cogidubnus1 kingdom, see Barrett (1982) , who suggests that his kingdom was more fragmented than usually supposed: this is certainly poss­ ible, but evidence is lacking. On the similarities between kingdoms and provinces, see especially Harris (1979) 135-6. Lintott (1981) 56-7 makes the valuable observation that main Roman roads passed through kingdoms and provinces alike: on the significance of this, see further Merritt (1974) 190. (87) Jos. AJ xvi 128. (88) Tac. Hist, ii 58. Cf. the career of P. Sittius, espec­ ially his domain around Cirta: Teutsch (1962) 65-70; cf. Gruen (1974) 284-5; Fentress (1979) 55, 59 n.34, 64-5. On Sohaemus of Armenia and the entry of royalty into the Roman Senate, see Part III, section 2 ad fin. (89) IIS 94: note the lack of the royal title: pace Barrett (1979b) 236, Claudius' grant to Cottius II tells us nothing about Cottius I. On Cottius II, see Dio lx 24.4; ILS 848. On the dynasty as a whole, see above, Part I, section 3, note 7. (90).On Cogidubnus and RIB 91, see Bogaers (1979) and Barrett (1979b) 236-7, where he also discusses - after Bowersock (1961) - the case of C. Iulius Laco. But cf. contra Bowersock, Spawforth (1978) 254, esp. n.33. The career and identity of Laco must remain in doubt. (91) Jos. AJ xv 360; BJ i 399. (92) Jos. RJ i 399: the simple emendation of holes to koiles would make Herod procurator only of Coele-Syria.

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(93) Jos. AJ xv 360. (94) Jos. BJ i 213; AJ xiv 180 omits Samaria: see Smallwood (1976) 45 n. 4. See in general Hahn (1965); cf. Bammel (1968) . (95) _Jos. AJ xiv 280; BJ i 225 says that Herod was made epimeletes of all Syria, but see Smallwood (1976) 47 n.8. (96) See Hahn (1965) . (97) Jos. AJ xv 360. In the BJ Herod's appointment is sand­ wiched between his two gains at Zenodorus' expense. (98) Jos. AJ xv 343-8; BJ i 398-9. The addition of Ulatha and Paneas made Herod's northern territories much more coherent. (99) Contra Cimma (1976) 311, the epitropoi in BJ i 399,can only be those of Syria: AJ xv 360 makes this quite explicit. Cimma takes these passages to mean that the procurators of Syria needed Herod's permission to pursue bandits into his kingdom: this is, at the very best, only part of what was involved. Hitherto, Joseph us1 statements on Herod seem not to have been compared to the markedly similar statement of the Suda on Plutarch's position vis-a-vis Roman officials in Greece. It is particularly interesting to note that the interpretation of Josephus advanced here finds a counterpart among the sugg­ estions advanced with regard to Plutarch: see Jones (1972) 29-30 and the literature he cites, especially Barrow (1967) 46.

90

Section 3: The King on the Frontier

Much has been said with regard to the role of kings in the defence of the empire. Particularly popular has been ^he notion that the kingdom functioned and was intended te function as a buffer, protecting the empire from external attack (1) . Recently, scholars have thought again and have moved towards the view that kingdoms were not buffers and were not intended to be (2) . One scholar has claimed (erroneously) that only once in antiquity was a kingdom described in terms indicating its role as a buffer (3). The role of the king on the frontier is, however, much more complex and, indeed, more important than the simple buffer model would indicate. The first point which must be stressed against the tide of recent scholarship is that king­ doms did have a role as buffers. At the most basic level, the very geographical position of kingdoms on the fringes of the Roman sphere, as they were for the most part, meant that an invader would have to pass through one - or perhaps through several (4). But the king's part in the imperial defences was considerably greater than this. Royal troops could be the backbone of these defences: in his letters from Cilicia Cicero makes it quite clear that he relied heavily upon the troops of Deiotarus of Galatia in the event of a Parthian invasion (5). Further, royal troops should not be considered in isolation: the royal troops of a wide front could be com­ bined to constitute a powerful force - still more so when they were combined with Roman legions. This combination with Reman forces was particularly telling, because royal forces for the most part complemented the legions, since they were mostly comprised of light infantry and cavalry (6) . Nor should the"^ logistical value of the kingdom be underestimated: again and/ again kings provided Roman forces with essential supplies, < sometimes from a considerable distance. On occasion, they/ might even supply military hardware (7). In addition, the kingdom had a particular role in supp­ ressing banditry and piracy: what Luttwak calls flow-intensity threats' (8) . Strabo tells us quite explicitly that the Romans

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decided to leave Cilicia Tracheia under royal rule for the very reason that banditry and piracy were endemic there, a corollary of its social and physical geography (9) . A king was thought better suited than a Roman governor to deal with this particular problem, says Strabo, for two reasons: first, the governor would not be there always and, second, he would not have troops with him (10) . Strabo1 s meaning is not en­ tirely clear, but his point seems to be that only a king would be in his position on a long-term basis (11) with troops adequate for the maintenance of order (12) . We may compare the case of Massinissa, who is credited with the* stopping of banditry in Numidia (13) . There is reason to believe that Rome was particularly eager that kings should play a part in the suppression of banditry and piracy. The Piracy Law of 101/0 BC specifically ordained that the kings of Syria, Cyprus, Egypt and Cyrene should act to ensure that no pirates use any part of their respective kingdoms as a base. The implication of such a specific clause as this might be that kings were thought not to be doing all they could in this area: we should note that Strabo was critical of royal attitudes to piracy in the second century BC (14). Of course, a king was not guaranteed success against bandits: where Antiochus IV of Commagene succeeded against the Cetae of Cilicia, Archelaus II had previously failed (15) . More­ over, it should be noted that Archelaus II eventually won the day thanks to the intervention of Roman legionaries and aux­ iliaries: it is evident that the Romans too could suppress bandits, which must call Strabo's remarks on Cilicia Tracheia into some question (16). However, it was obviously to the king's advantage to keep down bandits, just as it was to his disadvantage to do otherwise. We should note how Herod, then governor of Galilee for Hyrcanus II, first came to the atten­ tion of Sex. Caesar, governor of Syria, by clearing bandits from the borderlands of Galilee and Syria (17) . Later, as king in his own right, Herod was granted the lands of Zenodorus by Augustus for the very reason that Zenodorus was thought to have encouraged the bandits of Trachonitis to prey upon Damascus. /Roman troops of Syria initially cleared the area and presented it to Herod who prevented further occurr­ ences (18) . One particular aspect of the suppression of banditry by kings deserves special attention, for it involves the very creation of monarchs. Hobsbawm has observed that a common method of bandit control was the legitimation of the bandits1 position (19). The career of Cleon of Gordiucome is a case in point. As a bandit-leader, Cleon proved most useful to Antony. After his last-minute change of allegiance to Octavian, he seems to have been no longer regarded as a bandit, but as a dynast (20). We can see, therefore, that the role of the kingdom in the defence of the empire was extensive: there is much to

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be said for the buffer model, as further evidenced by our sources1 characterisations of kingdoms according to this model. Cicero describes allied tribes of the Balkans as perpetuos defensores Macedoniae (21). Appian makes Flamininus argue that the preservation of Philip V's Macedonian king­ dom was to the positive advantage of the rest of the Greeks, since it protected them against the barbarians further north (22) . The Bellum Alexandrinum contains two instances of the notion. Caesar is said to have specifically ordered the kings tyrants and dynasts who were neighbours of the province of Syria and came to him there to watch over and defend the province (23). Again, when appointing Mithridates of Pergamum to rule the Bosporan kingdom, Caesar is said to have thereby protected the provinces by interposing a friendly ruler bet­ ween them and hostile barbarous kings to the north (24). We should note that Zosimus later traced the violent irruption of the Scyths into the Mediterranean world to the decline of the Bosporan kings, who had been holding them back down to the third century AD (25). Particularly eloquent on the subject is an inscription of AD 37 from Cyzicus which describes the kings as 'the bodyguards of the empire1 (26). Defence, as often, can be held to include offence. It is no surprise, therefore, to find kings taking active part in Roman offen­ sives (27) . But where the buffer model becomes entirely misleading is that it carries with it the implication that the defence was all one way, that kings and their kingdoms were regarded as readily expendable entities, designed to protect Rome at whatever cost to themselves. But this implication runs dir- v , ectly against the Roman notion of tutela; just as there is a ■ sense in which the kingdom was a buffer for Rome, so in a sense Rome was a buffer for the king and his kingdom. Polybius makes Eumenes II express a hope for the Roman annexation of Antiochus Ill's possessions in Asia on the grounds that such a move would make his frontiers more secure (28) . Sim­ ilarly, his successor, Attalus II, came to the view that if he acted with Reman approval, he could count on Roman support in the event of his failure (29). Confronting Caesar in Gaul, Ariovistus is made to assert that amicitia with Rome should be an ornamentum and praesidium for him (30). Cicero des­ cribes Rome as the arcem regum ac nationum exterarum (31) . Tacitus describes, amongst other rulers, the kings of Albania and Iberia as qui magnitudine nostra proteguntur adversum externa imperia (32). Of course, intervention on Rome's part to protect the king against incursive forces was very much in Rome's own interests. She would thereby stop further penetration into the Roman sphere and also strengthen the loyalty of her friends. It is therefore often impossible to distinguish definitely the Roman motive for such interventions. According to Appian, Rome only supported the Noricans against the Teut-

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ones in order to protect Italy against their onslaught (33). Dio says that when, in 29 BC, Crassus intervened to protect Sitas, the blind king of the Dentheleti, against the invading Bastarnae, he did so partly for the benefit of the king, but chiefly to protect Macedonia (34). But the king might also need protection against forces within his kingdom. For example, Hyrcanus II was protected by the troops of Syria against Alexander, son of Aristobulus (35), against Aristobulus himself (36), and against Peitholaus, supporting Aristobulus' cause (37). Small wonder that Josephus makes Antipater affirm that Rome would never allow her nominee to be ousted (38) . Opposition to the king might be concen­ trated in a particular part of his kingdom. We have seen how Archelaus II needed Roman support against the Cetae: simil­ arly, Juba II against the Gaetulians (39). But the hard fact was that the king could not count upon Roman intervention, as is shown by the case of Vannius. In his case, Rome seems to have been encouraged to acquiescence by the fact that those who ousted Vannius were ready and willing to maintain friend­ ly relations with her (40). * Where the king needed longer term support, the Romans might install a garrison for his protection. The earliest instance of this phenomenon is the garrison, under the centur­ ion Septimius, installed at Alexandria by Gabinius in 55 BC to protect Auletes, whom he then restored to the throne (41) . This force seems to have become fully integrated into the kingdom: it was still there to murder Pompey and fight against Caesar. Upon his eventual victory there, Caesar in turn stationed troops at Alexandria to protect Auletes' heirs, Cleopatra VII and Ptolemy XIV: these troops were under the command of a son of his freedman Rufinus (42). Similarly, when Roman arms brought Herod to the throne of Judaea in 37 BC, his position was secured for a time by a Roman legion stationed at Jerusalem (43). Under Claudius, when first Mithridates VTII of the Bosporus was replaced by Cotys I, the latter was supported by some cohorts under the Roman knight, Julius Aquila (44). Also in the reign of Claudius, Roman troops were stationed at Gornea in Armenia under the camp prefect Caelius Pollio and the centurion Casperius (45). A century later, another garrison of Roman troops was stationed in Armenia: on that occasion it was placed in the new Armenian capital, Caenopolis, in AD 164 to support Sohaemus, then in­ stalled as king. Sohaemus was nevertheless expelled, but upon his restoration by Martius Verus, probably in AD 175, the garrison was still there, albeit in some disarray (46). It should be stressed that the protection of the king was not the sole function of such a force. As the author of the Bellum Alexandrinum states quite explicitly, a Roman garrison could also be a check upon the king: the king surrounded by a Roman garrison was both protected and supervised (47). It has been suggested that Augustus founded 12 colonies

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in Juba II1 s Mauretania, colonies which performed the same dual function. That Augustus founded these colonies and that they may have played such a role is certain, but it is most uncertain that, as suggested, the colonies were founded during the reign of Juba II. This last would be totally without parallel: it seems much more likely that these colonies were founded between the death of Bocchus II in 33 BC and the accession of Juba II in 25 BC, as usually supposed. In these years Mauretania had no king (48). Further, Marius1 activity in North Africa, which has been adduced as a parallel, is still more obscure. There is no good reason to suppose that Marius settled any Roman or Italian veterans in the Numidian kingdom. Rather, he seems to have granted extra-provincial land only to Gaetulians who had served with him (49) . We can thus begin to see that the buffer model, though not invalid, is most inadequate. But its full inadequacy only becomes apparent when we realise that kings not only kept Rome and foreign peoples apart: they also brought them together. That is, the king on the frontier had a major role as an intermediary between Rome and other peoples. This role acc­ ords entirely with the very nature of a frontier./Despite the vast amount of effort now devoted to the study of the Roman frontiers, scholars are too often guilty of a terminol­ ogical imprecision that can seriously mislead. Too often, the words frontier and border, even limes, are used as if they were synonymous. In fact they are more like opposites. A border is essentially a line of demarcation, a border-line. A frontier is not a line but an area, a border-land (50). Moreover, as such, the frontier is a Janus-like creature, looking both ways: the king, ruling in this frontier area, had affinities - or, at least, some relationship - with those on either side of him, both Roman and non-Roman. Viewing this from the Roman side, Cicero, in a letter from Cilicia, comments upon the position of kings on the eastern frontier that, though friends of Rome, they do not dare to be open enemies of Parthia (51) . On Armenia, Tacitus observes that it had allegiances both to Rome and to Parthia, but more so to the latter (52). Symptomatic of this position is the fact that Izates of Adiabene simultaneously sent hostages to both the Roman emperor and the Parthian king (53). It was this intermediate position that allowed the king to bring Roman and non-Roman together. When L. Vitellius, governor of Syria, parleyed with Artabanus, they met in a pavilion constructed, signficantly, in the middle of a bridge over the Euphrates. /Their host was Antipas, who was suffic­ iently involved in the proceedings to be able to provide the emperor with a full account, so complete as to pre-empt Vitellius1 subsequent despatch (54). On Rome's southern frontier, Nero's explorers were helped to penetrate deeper into Africa by letters of introduction provided by the king of Meroe (55). In the West, Caesar's use of Commius is most

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instructive. Caesar tells us that prior to his invasion of Britain he sent Commius, whom he had made a king, across the Channel ahead of him. Commius was chosen for his reputed influence in Britain: his mission was to visit such states as he could, announce the imminent invasion and persuade them to come over to Caesar (56) . However, on his arrival he was thrown in chains by the Britons (57). Later Commius was more successful in mediating a peace between Caesar and Cassivellaunus (58). In the Balkans, Amynander of Athamania brought the the town of Ambracia over to Nobilior in 189 BC: he was en­ abled so to do by the connections he had forged while a resid­ ent Jbhe re previously (59). By virtue of his intermediate position the king could also supply Rome and her officers with valuable advice and infor­ mation concerning the frontier situation. As governor of Cilicia, Cicero received information that the Parthians had begun to cross the Euphrates, first from envoys of Antiochus I of Commagene and later from Tarcondimotus I of Cilicia and Iamblichus I of Emesa (60). In Gaul, Caesar's legate, C. Caninius, learnt from the letters of Duratius that a hostile force had gathered in the land of the Pictones (61). The special knowledge of the king also allowed him to act as guide for Roman forces-in unknown territory, as, for example, did Abgar II of Osrhoene for Crassus (62). In fulfilling these functions the king was also serving his own ends. By informing Rome of enemy attack the king en­ couraged, if he did not actually request, Roman help. Of course, the very performance of this intermediate role could only improve the king's standing with Rome, where she was successful in consequence. Just as important, the ability to mediate with Rome could also greatly enhance the king's position vis-^-vis other kings and states in his locality. The effect of Caesar's diplomacy in Gaul is a case in point: the Remi in particular greatly benefited in this way from their association with Caesar (63). Further, the role of the king as a mediator on the fron­ tier must be set beside his part as such within the empire. We have already seen Herod, for example, supporting requests to Romans and, in particular, conciliating Agrippa and Ilium. He is also said to have reconciled Titius, governor of Syria, with Archelaus I of Cappadocia (64). We shall see in the next section hew the king also mediated between Rome and his subjects. The king's ability to mediate in such a multiplic­ ity of ways is itself a function of his integration into the world around him and especially into the Roman sphere which formed so much of that world. However, advantageous as it might be to the king, his ability to mediate with those outside the Roman sphere had inherent dangers. The very fact that the king had connec­ tions with those outside and potentially or actually hostile to the Reman sphere made the king extremely vulnerable to

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accusations of treason, of plotting with that foreign power against Rome. On the Euphrates frontier, we find several examples of this phenomenon. We have already seen Antipas' part in the meeting between Vitellius and Artabanus. Shortly after this meeting, Antipas' enemy, Agrippa I, accused him of plotting with Artabanus (65). Similarly, a friend of Herod's son, Alexander, claimed under torture that Alexander was planning to bring the same charge against Herod (66) . The same charge was levelled against Antiochus IV of Commagene and his son Epiphanes (67) . It may well be that Archelaus I of Cappadocia also faced this charge (68). Of course, though common there, such a charge was not confined to the Euphrates frontier. The best-known case elsewhere is probably the Roman suspicions that Eumenes II had committed treason against her with Perseus of Macedon during the Third Macedonian War. In fact, as far as we can tell, Eumenes seems to have done no more than - significantly - attempt to mediate a peace between Perseus and Rome (69). We can never know how well-founded such accusations were. While the intermediate position of the king made the accusation of treachery easy, it also made the fact of it easy (70) . Further, through suspicion of treachery, the information provided by the king might be held in serious^ doubt. When Cicero heard from Antiochus I of Commagene that the Parthians were crossing the Euphrates, he took no action at all, because he doubted Antiochus1 loyalty: he simply waited for confir­ mation from sources he adjudged more reliable (71) . In the event, Cicero's suspicions were misplaced. But the wisdom of such caution is demonstrated by a case from Gaul, where Caesar's troops were led into a trap by a Gaul whom they trusted, Ambiorix (72). Where a king acted as a guide for Roman forces, he was particularly vulnerable should anything go wrong. So, for example, Abgar II of Osrhoene and Crassus, Artavasdes of Armenia and Antony, and the Nabataean viceroy Syllaeus and Aelius Gallus. Whether any of these guides deliberately misled the Roman forces they accompanied cannot be known, but one may at least be sceptical (73). The Roman anxiety that the king might prove treacherous serves to underline the importance and power of the king. We have seen how kingdoms were reservoirs of troops and supplies, strategically placed: some small, but others large. Moreover, they were also reservoirs of wealth: while some kings were in financial difficulties, many were wealthy. Upon the annex­ ation of Cappadocia, for example, Tiberius was able to use Archelaus' wealth to reduce taxation at Rome (74) . There is a tradition that Gaius1 murder of Ptolemy was caused by the emperor's desire for the royal wealth: this has been chall­ enged, but it suggests a tradition that Ptolemy was wealthy. When Cassius killed Ariobarzanes III of Cappadocia, who in Cicero's time was poverty-stricken, he is said to have gained

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a large sum of money as well as supplies. It is well-known that victory at Pydna made the abolition of land tax possible in Italy. Similarly, Trajan is said to have gained vast wealth by his conquest of Dacia. Furthermore, we have already seen how the king used his wealth to prosper within the Roman sphere: for a Roman the very word rex carried strong connot­ ations of wealth (75). This great reservoir of resources governed by the king made his rebellion a real threat, particularly if he combined with other kings, with an external power or with schismatic Romans. Roman anxiety, particularly in the distant capital, becomes entirely comprehensible. But these anxieties in turn generated tensions in Rome's relationship with the kings. Since the king was part of her military strength, Rome had vested interest in ensuring that the king was strong. Rome might even provide actual assistance to this end. At Harmozica in Iberia, Vespasian built a strategic fortress for the Iberians (76). There was a real sense in which a strong kingdom was appreciated by Rome: when Agrippa toured Herod's kingdom, the king proudly displayed the fortresses he had built (77). But a strong kingdom was also a potential threat: there was therefore an equally real sense in which fortific­ ation was a source of suspicion and disfavour. When Marsus, governor of Syria, wrote to Claudius that Agrippa I was fortifying Jerusalem, Claudius was suspicious that Agrippa was planning an uprising. His suspicion is particularly remarkable when one remembers that Agrippa had helped him to the throne and had been held in some regard by him both before this incident and after it (78). A similar tension existed in Roman attitudes towards the relations of kihg and king within her sphere. On the one hand, kings might be encouraged to come together and contract marriage-links, just as they had done before the advent of Rome: such is said to have been the attitude of Augustus. At the very least, kings friendly to Rome should not fight each other (79) . But against this was a strand of Roman opinion that it was to the Roman advantage that kings should be dis­ united: the old notion of divide the rule (80) . On this view, a conclave of kings was most suspicious: we have already observed Marsus' abrupt dismissal of the gathering of Tiberias (81). We have seen that the king's position rested upon his ability to gain and keep Roman friends both at Rome and in the provinces. However, even this, the very heart of the relationship between king and Rome, could give rise to sus­ picions. We have already seen how the conflicts of individual Romans ran in parallel with the conflicts of the kings friendly to them, ultimately breaking out into civil warfare. In civil war the value of a king's friendship was demonstrated most explicitly (82). I suggest that it was largely for this reason that, under the Principate, close relations between a

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king and a Roman, particularly one outside the court circle, could be interpreted as actually or potentially treasonous. Tacitus describes the Republic, by contrast, as a time when regna colere et coli licitum (83). This must imply the contrary for the Principate. This in turn would explain why Claudius degraded a governor for being comes regis in provincia (84). Under Gaius, one of the charges against Antipas was that of plotting with Sejanus (85). Once again we find the king caught in a series of traps: the difficulty of his position again becomes apparent. The more difficult was his position, the more important it was that he maintain his friendships with those in power at Rome. Notes to Section 3 (1) For example, Badian (1968a) 78 and (1968d) 21: LiebmannFrankfort (1962) 671-2; Richmond (1954) 52; Mann (1974) 522 and (1979) 179. (2) Brunt (1978) 170; Sherwin^White (1977a) 64ff.; the whole issue has been re-examined by Luttwak (1976), esp. ch. 1. (3) So Lintott (1981) 64. (4) Pace Luttwak (1976) 24, it may be doubted whether Armenia was much more a buffer than other kingdoms on the Euphrates, on the usual conception of the term 'buffer': Armenia stood essentially on the flank of the Parthian empire. (5) Cic.ad Att. vi 1.14. In partial contradiction to this, Cicero later argued, to support his client's case, that Deiotarus' troops were sufficient only for relatively minor tasks: Cic. pro Deiot. 22. Although Deiotarus' forces had been reduced by intervening warfare, this last is a deliberate understatement which should not be taken as fact, contra Luttwak. (6) Luttwak (1976) 27; Tac. Ann, xii 15 is quite explicit; cf. Livy xxii 37. (7) For the supply of Roman troops at a distance, note the grain sent to Macedonia by Massinissa in the Third Macedonian War: Walsh (1965) . For military hardware, note, amongst other things, the equipment provided by Hiero II for the Roman siege of Camarina: Eckstein (1980) 188-9, 195-9. (8) Luttwak (1976) 24. (9) On the social role of banditry, see, for example, Caes. BG vi 23. On the relevance of physical geography, see Str. xiv p. 671 with Levick (1967) 20. (10) Str. xiv p. 671. (11) And/or 'permanently on the spot', but this would not fit the facts, for kings were often away in Rome or some other part of their kingdoms, whereas a local Roman official would be on the spot. See also Sullivan (1978f) 938. (12) See above note 6. (13) This is to be seen as part of the tradition that he pro­ moted settled agriculture there: Str. xvii p. 833. On this

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tradition, see Fentress (1979) 20-1. Like most other special­ ists, she seems unduly sceptical of this tradition. For a more balanced view, see Camps (1979) 43-4. (14) Str. xiv pp. 668-9. On the Piracy Law, see Hassall, Crawford and Reynolds (1974). (15) Tac. Ann, xii 55 and vi 41. On the Cetae and their name, see Jones (1971), esp. 195-6. (16) Tac. Ann. vi 41. (17) Jos. BJ i 204-5; AJ xiv 159-60. (18) Jos. BJ i 398-9; AJ xv 344-8. (19) Hobsbawm (1969) 53. (20) Str. xii pp. 574-5; cf. Corocottafs pardon, Braund (1980b) . (21) Cic. In Pis. 84. Cf. the possible establishment of an 'empty' zone as a buffer: Dio lxxii 1-3. (22) App. Mac. 9.2. (23) Bell. Alex. 65.5 with Brunt (1978) 323 n. 40. (24) Bell. Alex. 78.2. (25) Zos. i 21, discussed in Part II, section 1. (26) IGR iv 145 line 3: doryphorous tes hegemonias. (27) Tac. Ann. xiii 7.1-2; 8.3. (28) Pol. xxi 21.8. On tutela, see Part III, section 1. (29) Welles (1934) no. 61. On this and other inscriptions from Pessinus, see now Virgilio (1981) . (30) Caes. BG i 44. For friendship as an ornamentum and praesidium, cf. Plin. E£. vi 18.2. (31) Cic. pro Sulla 33; cf. pro Sest. 57, where the unrecog­ nised king of Cyprus is described as fretus imperio populi Romani. (32) Tac. Ann, iv 5; cf., for example, Bell. Alex. 34 for Deiotarus' appeal to Calvinus for military support against Pharnaces II and Calvinus' reaction. (33) App. Celt. 13 with AlfSldy (1974) 35. (34) Dio li 23.4; cf. 25.3. On the role of the Dentheleti in protecting Macedonia, see Cic. In Pis. 84, discussed above. Cf. Brunt (1978) 182 on Caesar in Gaul. Cf. also Sands (1908) 154-6, especially 155 n.2, where he lists instances in which Rome did not choose to defend her satellite. Of course, attacks upon the king might constitute a most convenient casus belli; see Harris (1979) 228 and 232 on Abrupolis of Thrace and the Third Macedonian War. (35) Jos. BJ i 160-1; AJ xiv 82. (36) Jos. BJ i 171ff.; AJ xiv 92. (37) Jos. BJ i 180; AJ xiv 120. (38) Jos. BJ i 202. (39) Tac. Ann vi 41 on Archelaus II and the Cetae; cf. Ann, iii 38.4ff., for similar developments in Thrace. On Juba and the Gaetulians, see Dio Iv 28.3ff. with Desanges (1964). (40) Tac. Ann, xii 29. Vespasian is said to have replied in similar terms to Vologaeses: Dio lxvi 15.3. (41) Dio xlii 3.3, discussed in detail by Heinen (1966) 22 and

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48ff.. (42) Bell. Alex. 33 with Suet. OJ 76; App. BC ii 78; iv 59. These troops amounted to four legions: a considerable force. (43) Jos. AJ xv 71-3. (44) Tac. Ann, xii 15. (45) Tac. Ann, xii 45. It is just possible that a garrison was stationed in Cogidubnus' kingdom, but there is no real evidence: see Barrett (1982) 54-5. Bosworth (1976) 75 sugg­ ests that the defences strengthened at Harmozica (Mtf no. 237; cf. Boltunova (1971)) were also manned by a Roman garrison installed by Vespasian. Further, under Domitian, a Roman cen­ turion was active in Albania: he may have been part of a Roman garrison, as argued by Grosso (1954), reviewing Flavian act­ ivity on the north-eastern frontier as a whole: so too Bosworth (1976) 75 and Angeli Bertinelli (1979) 69. In the second century AD there were Roman cohorts stationed in the Bosporus, but the length of their stay and the numbers involved are un­ certain: see the sceptical Gajdukevic (1971) 352, citing CIRB 666 and 726; but he overlooks CIRB 691, which adds weight to the case; cf. Boltunova ad loc.. Earlier, under Nero, Gajdukevic (1971) 345 chooses to press Jos. BJ ii 367. (46) Dio lxxi 3; on the date, Magie (1950) 665 with 1536 n.14. Angeli Bertinelli (1979) 76-8 and 94-5, who sees this garrison as one facet of wider Roman activity; cf. Chaumont (1976) 150-1. (47) Bell. Alex. 33. (48) On the colonies, see Gsell (1928) viii 201-5 and Brunt (1971) 237-8 and 595-7 (cf. 591), contra Lintott (1981) 63 and Salmon (1969) 144. Brunt allows the possibility that once some colonies had been planted in Mauretania prior to Juba II!s accession, it may have been easier to plant others there during his reign: Brunt (1971) 237-8. At least one of the colonies was under the jurisdiction, not of the king, but of the neigh­ bouring governor of Baetica: it may well be that they all were (Plin. NH v 2) . This is a further indication of the intimate relationship between provinces and kingdoms. (49) Lintott (1981) 63 describes Marius' settlements as 'quasicolonies1, but see the magisterial discussion of Brunt (1971) 577-80. The territory allocated to the Gaetulians seems to have been outside the competence of the Numidian king until Sulla's victory: Bell. Afr. 56. Cf. Fentress (1982). (50) See Kristof (1959); cf. Jones (1959), esp. 246 on the terminology used by Pelham. Cf. also Soja (1974), esp. 61-5, where he highlights the modern Western obsession with 'formal' fixed borders, such as the Iron Curtain. Of particular value is Lattimore (1962a) 469-91. (51) Cic. ad Fam. xv 4.4. (52) Tac. Ann, xiii 34 with xiv 26; see further Angeli Bert­ inelli (1979) 81-2. (53) Jos. AJ xx 37; cf. 69-73 and Segal (1970) 69. (54) Jos. AJ xviii 101-5.

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(55) Sen. NQ vi 8.3. (56) Caes. BG iv 21. (57) Caes. BG iv 27. (58) Caes. BG v 22. (59) See Braund (1982b) forthcoming. (60) Cic. ad Fam. xv 1-2. (61) Caes. BG viii 26. (62) See below. (63) Caes. BG vi 12; cf. ii 12; v 53; vi 4; viii 6. (64) Jos. AJ xvi 270. (65) Jos. AJ xviii 250. (66) Jos. AJ xvi 253. (67) Jos. BJ vii 220-1. (68) See most recently Sullivan (1980b) 1160-1. (69) For sources and some discussion, McShane (1964) 182-6, to be read with care. (70) Hoehner (1972) 261 seems too sanguine on Antipas1 guilt. (71) Cic. ad Fam. xv 1.2; cf. Braund (1982a). (72) Caes. BG v 27-32. (73) On Abgar and Crassus, Dio xl 20; Plut. Crass. 21-2. Segal (1970) 10-2 pleads his innocence, as does Jameson (1968) 76 for Syllaeus. (74) Tac. Ann. ii 42. (75) On the wealth of Egypt and Augustus, see T. Rice Holmes (1928) 170ff.. On Ptolemy, Balsdon (1934) 192-3. On Trajan, Salmon (1936): note especially Iohannes Lydus De Mag, ii 28. On Cassius, App. BC iv 63; Magie (1950) 425. On Pydna and its results, Harris (1979) 70-1; but cf. Nicolet (1978b). Cf. also the behaviour of Sulla, App. BC i 102. In the face of all this it can hardly be denied that the Romans may have been encouraged to annex by the lure of a kingdom's wealth, despite Finley (1973) 157. That is 'not to say that gain was always everything, as shown by Jos. AJ xviii 108. On the evocations of rex, see, for example, Hor. Od. ii 14.11-2 with Nisbet and Hubbard ad loc.; cf. Rawson (1975). (76) m 237 with note 45 above. (77) Jos. AJ xvi 13. (78) Jos. AJ xix 326-7; xx 1. (79) Suet. Auc[. 48; Jos. AJ xvi 286-90; of course, Herod had been careful to obtain the prior sanction of the governor of Syria and was therefore soon reconciled to Augustus. (80) Tac. Ann, xii 48, referring to Armenia; cf. on Germany, Tac. Germ. 33 with Syme (1958) 634-5. (81) Jos. AJ xix 340-2; cf. Commodus' wish to keep the Quadi and Marcomanni apart, Dio lxxii 2.4. .. (82) See, for example, the royal support for Vespasian, Tac. Hist, ii 81. Of course, Juba I was a mainstay of the Pompeian cause, as was Cleopatra of Antony's: on kings in the civil wars of Rome, see Badian (1958) 271-2. (83) Tac. Ann, iii 55. At least one emperor, Tiberius, seems to have actively sought to counter this sort of complaint:

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Suet. Tib. 30; cf. Tac. Ann. ii 66; Lintott (1981) 63, out­ lining the situation under the Republic. (84) Suet. Claud. 16.2. (85) Jos. AJ xviii 250. It has been suggested that Ptolemy of Mauretania may have been involved in conspiracy against Gaius: Fishwick and Shaw (1976) .

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Section 4: The King in his Kingdom

We have seen how the advent of Rome greatly affected the position of the king in his kingdom in a wide range df ways. The purpose of this section is not to cover this ground again, but to show how the king represented his relationship with Rome to his subjects and, indirectly, to the world at large. We have seen that the king gave an extravagant public welcome to leading Romans who visited his kingdom. This was but part of the way in which the king advertised his Roman connection to his subjects. A king might advertise his friendship with Rome in his very titulature. From the early first century BC, the epithet philorhomaios began to appear in royal titulature (1). With the coming of the Principate, phi lorhomaios was joined by philokaisar and (rarely) philosebastos: this fact in itself must be a further indication of the way in which, from this time on, a king's relationship with Rome was especially a relationship with the emperor, philokaisar could be substitu­ ted by a variant formulation more specific to a particular emperor. .A particular royal friend of the emperor Gaius is thus found with the epithet philogermanikos (2), while another, who owed much to Claudius, issued coins with the legend philoklaudios (3). In fact, such personalised royal epithets are found as early as Antony (4). These epithets are to be understood in their Hellenis­ tic as well as their Roman context, philos-compounds are of course common in Greek: some of them came to be regularly used as epithets by the Hellenistic kings - for example, philade1phos, philometor, philopator. Against this background, the use by kings of philos-compounds evoking Rome and the emperor can be seen as a development from and a re-application of a long-standing feature of Hellenistic titulature. Where once a king's titles had brought out connections with the royal dynasty, his family, from the beginning of the first century BC they might evoke his connection with Rome. To this extent, the appearance of ph i lor noma ios at this time is an important indication of the increased power of Rome in the

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Hellenistic world: friendship with Rome had joined a dynastic claim to rule in the legitimation of the king. This had dev­ eloped over the preceding century especially: a trace of its development can be found in the mid-second century BC. The Cretan koinon describes Ptolemy VT Philometor in an honorific inscription as one with a special desire to curry favour with the Romans: what was later a title is expressed in a periph­ rasis (5) . But it should not be imagined that the rise of philor­ homaios was the demise of the older Hellenistic dynastic epithets. On the contrary, these lived on beside those evoking Rome (6). Moreover, like claims to Roman friendship, dynastic claims could be expressed periphrastically: for example, in the ruler's filiation. The Roman and dynastic elements were essentially compatible. In the Bosporus, during the Principate, a prospective ruler might base his claim to the throne upon the twin pillars of Roman support and descent from Mithridates VT Eupator (7) . However, at the same time, we find an expression of the view that the support of the emperor was better than a dynastic claim, since the emperor was a divine being (8). Together with this Hellenistic context we must apprec­ iate the Roman. The epithet philorhomaios may be seen as a translation of the Latin amicus populi Romani, which, in turn, as we saw in Part I, was a formal title conferred by Rome (9). But we also saw that it might be used as a mere description of a friendly attitude towards Rome on the part of the king. There are indications that philorhomaios was similarly used in this way. As ephebes at Athens, the sons of Ariobarzanes II of Cappadocia - the future of Ariobarzanes III and Ariarathes X -are accorded the epithet philorhomaios. It seems unlikely that these young men had been formally recognised as amici populi Romani at Rome (10). Further, Commagenian kings, though recognised, use the epithet philorhomaios as a counter­ part to philellen: the latter was evidently not a formal title and its pairing with philorhomaios might seem to suggest that this was not either (11) . philokaisar, still more obviously, might readily be translated into Roman terms as amicus Caesaris (12). It must be appreciated that the epithets had particular histories in particular areas. In the Bosporus, they became a standard part of the royal titulature. ph i lor noma ios was first used by Asander, who, we should note, like Ariobarzanes I of Cappadocia, had no dynastic claim to rule (13) . philokaisar was soon added: it is first attested under Aspurgus, though it may have been used earlier (14). Thereafter, both epithets were used consistently down to the third century AD. The use of these titles is not our only indication that the Bosporan kings were particularly eager to advertise their Roman connection (15). Elsewhere, philornomaios appears only intermittently, as

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among the kings of Cappadocia. Ariobarzanes I and his grandson Ariobarzanes III, are found to have used the epithet, while Ariobarzanes II, Ariarathes X (as king) and Archelaus I did not (16) . Ihe epithet was particularly appropriate for those kings of Cappadocia who used it. Ariobarzanes I was elected from the Cappadocian nobility under the Roman aegis, when the previous dynasty failed: thereafter, he kept his throne only with the active intervention of Roman forces. Ariobarzanes III acceded to the throne at a particularly dangerous juncture, his father and predecessor having been assassinated - so dan­ gerous in fact that Cicero was specifically instructed by a senatorial decree to watch over him. Of course, the other kings of Cappadocia might have borne the epithet, but they preferred others. Ariobarzanes II called himself Philopator, recalling his father, Ariobarzanes I, and thus his dynastic claim to rule. Ariarathes X similarly called himself Philadelphos, recalling his predecessor and brother, Ariobarzanes III: again this expressed his claim to the throne. But Arch­ elaus I called himself Philopatris. He was an outsider, of Pontic stock, introduced into the kingdom by Antony: it may be that his epithet was chosen to express a benign attitude to his new homeland. There are those who have taken Archelaus' choice of epithet to be an assertion of independence and a rejection of philorhomaios (17) . If Archelaus were a ruler of the Bos­ porus from a rather later period, this view might be tenable, but for a Cappadocian king it is not: we have seen that Capp­ adocian kings did not regularly use the epithet, so that Archelaus' failure to use it cannot automatically be interpret­ ed in this manner. Further, such a view, while it accords well enough with Archelaus' final years, does not accord with his many earlier'and successful years as king. The danger of taking the omission of the epithet as a sign of dissidence becomes apparent. Particularly so, where there was no trad­ ition of the title, as, for example, in the case of the Nabataean kings (18). It becomes apparent that the use of philos-compounds was spasmodic, from king to king and kingdom to kingdom. This in itself should be enough to dispel the once-popular claim that philorhomaios indicated senatorial and philokaisar eques­ trian rank in the Roman hierarchy (19). Such hard and fast rules are totally out of place here, though a tendency has emerged. We have noticed what might be expected a priori: that a king with a special debt to Rome or an emperor might be particularly expected to use these epithets. So, Mannus VTII of Osrhoene, restored to his throne by Rome, at the expense of the Parthian nominee who had ousted him: Mannus issued coins bearing the legend philorhomaios (20). Of course, titulature was not the only medium through which the king could express his Roman connection. Suetonius tells us that, under Augustus, each of the kings founded Caesareas urbes (21): that is, cities named Caesarea in honour

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of the emperor. Many such cities are known, though not all are strictly new foundations. Cities are known to have been named Caesarea by Herod, Archelaus I of Cappadocia, Juba II of Mauretania, Polemo I as king in the Bosporus, and by Herod1s son, Philip the tetrarch (22). In addition, it is quite possible that Deiotarus Philadelphus of Paphlagonia and Philopator of Cilicia also founded Caesareae (23). There were also cities named Sebaste: by Herod, Archelaus I and Pythodoris of Pontus (24). Also under Augustus, Cleon founded Juliopolis in his honour (25). To the same end, Antipas may have founded an Autocratoris (26). The founding of urbes Caesareae continued after Augustus. Antipas founded a completely new city in Galilee which he named Tiberias (27). Antiochus IV of Commagene founded a new city in Cetis which he named Germanicopolis, most probably in honour of the emperor Gaius (28). At Ninica, he founded another, which he named Claudiopolis after the new emperor (29)♦ Under Nero he built a new city in Lacanatis which he named Neronias (30). Agrippa II conferred the same name upon Caesarea-Panion (31). Further, when Tiridates returned to Armenia, having received its throne from Nero, he re-named Artaxata as Neroneia (32). However, cities were not only named after emperors: they were also named after certain members of the imperial family. Antipas named a city Livias after Livia, while his brother Philip named another after Julia, Julias (33). Cities were also named after Agrippa: Herod re-named Anthedon as Agrippias or Agrippeion (34), while in the Bosporus, Polemo I re-named Phanagoreia as Agrippeia (35). We should consider why these particular members of the imperial family should be selected for this honour. As empress, Livia comes as no surprise. Agrippa was very close to Herod and had helped Polemo to his Bosporan throne: he was also Augustus' heir. Julia is more problematical. Philip must have built the city before her banishment in 2 BC. No direct link between Julia and Philip is known but as the daughter of Augustus and wife of Agrippa she had a good claim to the friendship of the Herods: she was widely honoured, especially in the East (36). One common factor immediately emerges. Just as with the epithets philornomaios, philokaisar, and the rest, all the kings who founded urbes Caesareae were from the Greek East. The only exception, Juba II, is hardly an exception at all: his affinities to Greek culture are well-known. But this is no very great surprise, for the East was a world of cities with a tradition of city-foundation in a way in which the West was not. In the Hellenistic world, cities had been named after members of the local ruling dynasty: indeed, cityfoundation had become an integral part of Hellenistic kingship. As Romans came into contact with this world, the potential arose for the naming of cities after Romans: as early as 83/2 BC this potential became an actuality (37). But despite this,

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no king named a city after a Roman until the time of Augustus, or possibly Antony (38)- By so naming cities, the king was working within a Hellenistic tradition which had already come to assume a Roman dimension. Why no king had done so earlier - as far as we know - is not entirely clear, but one factor was doubtless his awareness of the shifting political sands at Rome: by naming a city after a particular Roman under the Republic, a king might exclude himself from other friendships at Rome. Within the kingdom, these cities stood as vast monuments to the king's connections with Rome and the emperor in part­ icular. At the same time, as great foundations, they were also monuments to the ruler's kingship, in the Hellenistic tradition. These cities were invariably important entities in their particular areas and some, especially the ports, were key centres in the Mediterranean world as a whole. However, for all that, we lack detailed evidence for most of these cities: the best-attested is Caesarea-Strato's Tower. In Herod's Caesarea, it was not only the city itself that was named after the emperor. The harbour of the city was called the Augustan harbour (39) . Moreover, the greatest of the towers in this harbour was named Drusus, after the brother of Tiberius (40). Why Drusus was selected for this honour is uncertain, for we know of no special link between him and Herod. A real possibility is that the city was completed around the time of Drusus' death in 9 BC and that the tower was named in commemoration of him (41) . Since Caesarea was above all a port, its harbour was evidently of the greatest importance in the city and in the eastern Mediterranean as a whole: it was therefore a fitting place to honour the imperial family in this way (42). But these honours did not stop here. On a mound overlook­ ing the harbour, Herod built a temple of Rome and Augustus, containing a splendid statue of each. Dominating the harbour and thus the whole city, the temple was visible far out at sea (43). Its domination further reinforced the fact that this was the city of the emperor. Upon the completion of building, Herod staged a lavish festival of dedication. As Josephus explicitly observes, it included shows like those at Rome, featuring gladiators and wild beasts. This festival, to be staged every four years, Herod dedicated, along with the city itself, to Augustus. It was a suitably grand affair, with people attending from far and wide: visitors came from those communities who had benef­ ited from Herod's munificence. All were housed and fed. The expense incurred, on top of the building-cost involved, was evidently massive. The cost was defrayed in part by Augustus and Livia themselves: Augustus sent all the paraphernalia required for the festival, while Livia sent in her own right many of her greatest treasures, amounting to at least 500 t. in value. She may have been encouraged to this generosity

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by the fact that not only her husband but also her son, Drusus, was honoured in the foundation (44). Whether Augustus or Livia had contributed to the actual building-cost we are not told, but by contributing at all they set their final seal of approval upon Herod1s creation. The festival survived Herod, for Agrippa I also celebrated it: in fact, he died while so doing (45). Josephus' account of Agrippa1s celebration of it highlights the religious dimension of such a festival: it was dedicated to the emperor, for his safety. As such it is reminiscent of imperial cult festivals in the provinces (46) . We have already seen that the city was dominated by an imperial cult temple: the fest­ ival must be seen as a celebration of imperial cult. Temples of Rome and Augustus were not confined to Caesarea: Herod built another at Sebaste, another urbs Caesarea. As at Caesarea, the temple was set in a prominent position, in a precinct in the very centre of the city (47). There is also reason to believe that Juba II built such a temple at his Caesarea and that he celebrated a festival like that of Herod there (48). Further, when the tetrarch Philip built his Caesarea, he did so at a place where Herod had already established a temple of Rome and Augustus (49) . These are indications that there was a cult dimension to the build­ ing of urbes Caesareae. In how many cases we cannot be sure, but it was entirely appropriate in these cities and Suetonius implies that it was a large feature, since he categorises the foundation of these cities among cult activities in the prov­ inces and kingdoms (50). In Judaea proper, Herod built no such city: to do so would have been to risk offending Jewish sentiment (51) . Even in a Greek city, such as Caesarea itself, a Herod might meet Jewish opposition (52). However, instead, in Jerusalem, the very centre of Judaism, Herod established a festival ded­ icated to Augustus, to be celebrated every four years: this was as close to the installation of imperial cult there as Herod dare go (53) . He went out of his way to ensure that the festival achieved international renown: this was to be another affirmation of his imperial connection. Around the theatre in which it was staged were inscriptions relating to Augustus and trophies recalling his victories, all specially made for Herod of pure gold and silver. Even this was too much for some Jews: Josephus regards this festival as a major stimulus to serious unrest among the Jews: the beast-fights featured there were regarded as contrary to tradition, while it was suspected that the trophies displayed were in reality graven images, in flat contravention of Jewish law (54). We have seen that before the advent of the Principate, kings would name their cities after members of their dynasty, including themselves. Although under the Principate a king might choose to honour the imperial family in this way, we should not suppose that the old Hellenistic practice ceased.

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On the contrary, Herod founded the cities Antipatris and Phasaelis, named after his father and brother respectively. His successor Archelaus named a small town, his only found­ ation, Archelais after himself (55). Elsewhere, Archelaus I of Cappadocia named Garsaura Archelais (56), while Polemo I of Pontus named Polemonium after himself (57). Antiochus IV of Commagene founded an Antioch after himself and a Iotape and a Philadelphia, both named after his wife (58). There is therefore every reason to doubt those who argue that for a king to name a city after himself or a member of his dynasty under the Principate was to incur the imperial wrath (59). As with philornomaios and the like, previous Hellenistic practice was continued within a range widened to include Rome. One particular implication of the foundation of urbes Caesareae deserves special consideration in this respect. Hitherto, cities had been named after the masters of the king­ dom: by naming cities after themselves and the imperial family, the kings announced that the kingdom had two rulers, the royal and the imperial families. Local dynastic and imperial names occurred side-by-side in other contexts within the kingdom. The Herods constitute our only evidence but that does not mean that they are atyp­ ical in this respect. First, we must observe the appearance of Roman names within the dynasty. Roman citizenship brought with it the tria nomina: though they were not regularly used outside the Bosporus, kings therefore had Roman praenomina and nomina. These were discussed in Part I, section 3. But among the Herods, we also find Roman cognomina, given to recall a certain Roman, it seems. Our earliest example is Agrippa I: it seems most likely that his name, neither Jewish nor Greek, was derived from, that of M. Vipsanius Agrippa, the friend after whom, as we have seen, Herod named a city. Agrippa I's children bear a mixture of traditional family and Roman names. Agrippa had two sons whom he named Agrippa and Drusus, and three daughters, named Berenice, Mariamme and Drusilla (60). After Agrippa I, Agrippa became a dynastic name (61) . Berenice was the name of Agrippa's mother, while Mariamme was that of, amongst others, his sister. But the names Drusus and Drusilla are evidently Roman in derivation. It seems very probable that Drusus was named after the son of Tiberius, with whom Agrippa had been particulary friendly (62). As for Drusilla, at the time of Agrippa I's death, she was six (63). She was therefore born and named in AD 38. This was the very year in which the emperor Gaius' sister Drusilla died. It seems likely that it was after her that Agrippa I named his daughter (64) . We have already mentioned the harbour-tower at Caesarea named after Drusus, Tiberius' brother: this was not the only lesser edifice named after a Roman within the kingdom. The earliest example relates to Antony, after whom Herod named a key fortress, Antonia, situated in Jerusalem itself (65).

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The prominence of this building in the Jewish capital must be stressed. It seems to have been Herod's residence at first. It abutted the very Temple and it was there that Herod housed the priestly vestments so important to the Jews (66). Also at Jerusalem, Herod built himself a magnificent palace. This building contained two extravagantly-decorated rooms, of which one was named after Augustus and the other after Agrippa (67) . But perhaps Herod's most striking use of Roman names was to have Agrippa's name inscribed on a gate of the Temple itself (68). Similarly, in Jericho, Herod named new buildings after Augustus and Agrippa. They were designed specifically for the reception of guests and as such would be known to all who visited him there. In short, observes Josephus, rather hyperbolically, there was no suitable place within his kingdom that Herod left devoid of some mark of honour to Augustus (69). To name buildings and the like in this way was in 'accord with Hellenistic tradition, as was the naming of cities. It seems very likely that other kings apart from Herod named buildings after the emperor. Further, also as with cities, kings continued to name such buildings after themselves. Above Jericho, Herod named a fortress after his mother, Cypros (70) . Others which he built outside Jerusalem and on the Arabian frontier he named Herodium, after himself (71). Again, towers Herod built in Jerusalem he named Hippicus, Phasael and Mariamme after his friend, brother and wife res­ pectively (72). It should be stressed that the way in which the king used a variety of Roman and royal names for places, buildings and people could only further suggest the intimate inter-connections of the royal and imperial families. Implicit also is the suggestion that the two were on a par, in so far as they stood as alternatives. The foundation of urbes Caesareae has raised again the religious dimension to the relationship between king and Rome. We have seen, in Part I, section 2, that Jupiter Capitolinus was a symbol of Roman power and influence, central to the relationship between king and Rome. Here we shall con­ sider the religious aspect of this relationship within the kingdom itself, for kings did not confine their interest in Jupiter Capitolinus to Rome. According to Livy, Antiochus IV of Syria planned to build a magnificent temple to him at Syrian Antioch, its ceilings and walls to be plated with. gold. But he died before it could be built. This was but one of his many building projects and was part of a wider development of the city. We may compare the incorporation of imperial cult temples into the urbes Caesareae (73). Ptolemy VIII did not plan any such temple as far as we know, but he did see fit to include Jupiter Capitolinus among the gods cited as witnesses in his will, a document put on public view in Cyrene in all probability by the king (74). It has been thought that a temple of Jupiter Capitolinus

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was actually built in one kingdom: the Bosporus. However, the argument is most unsafe. Bosporan copper coins survive bearing on the obverse a five-columned temple and the letters KAPE. This is plausibly taken to be an allusion to a temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. But that is not to say that a temple of the god was actually built in the Bosporus: the temple depicted could well be the temple at Rome, whose importance for the king has already been shown. Karyszkowski, observing that the temple on these coins replaces the usual imperial head, suggests that the coins were minted in AD 68/9, when the emperor's position - indeed who was emperor - was in grave doubt. Ingenious, but at best a guess. Moreover, a guess not aided by the difficulty of dating the coins on other criteria. As a symbol of the relationship between king and Rome, the temple would be a suitable type on any occasion (75). Finally, mention must be made of those altars dedicated to Jupiter Optimus Maximus in the course of local negotiations with the tribes of North Africa, though these fall largely outside our period (76). With the Principate and the imperial cult that came with it, a new area of religious connection between king and Rome arose. Under the Republic, we hear nothing of any royal in­ volvement in the provincial cults of individual Romans; nor, surprisingly, in the cult of Roma herself. But we do hear of involvement in the imperial cult. As might be expected, the descendants of royal families who had become part of the pro­ vincial aristocracy played an active part: we should note for example the offerings made to Augustus by the sons of Galatian royalty (77). Similarly, those who stood in the penumbra of royalty: a tetrarch of Syria, one Dexandros, seems to have been the first high-priest of the imperial cult in the prov­ ince of Syria (78). However, involvement in the imperial cult was not confined to deposed or petty royalty. Most striking is the case of the rulers of the Bosporus. From Cotys I in the mid-first century AD, at least, down to the third century AD, rulers of the Bosporus regularly describe themselves as high-priests of the Augusti for life. These and Dexandros are the only reigning monarchs known to have officiated in the imperial cult. If the Bosporan kings did indeed celebrate the imperial cult, we may reasonably posit a cult-centre, if not a temple, most probably at Polemo I's Caesarea and perhaps also elsewhere. We have observed the temples in other Caesareae and outside them, as at Panion (79). It should be added that a king might also be responsible for the erection of temples of the imperial cult outside his kingdom. So Herod seems to have built temples of Augustus (and Rome, one presumes) in prov­ incial cities: Sidon, Damascus and Nicopolis are likely candidates (80). Ruler-worship was yet another Hellenistic tradition which gained a Roman dimension. But it should not be supposed that

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the kings of the West were not also involved in it. In Brit­ ain, a temple of Neptune and Minerva - themselves Roman deit­ ies of course - was dedicated at Chichester on the authority of Gogidubnus pro salute domus divinae (81). The imperial cult was an essentially cohesive force: it bound the king and the imperial family together and the king­ dom into the imperial framework. Under the Republic, Jupiter Capitolinus had performed the same function to a more limited extent. The sanctity of the centre of power is a generally recognised phenomenon (82). As such a cohesive force, imper­ ial cult provided an area for joint-activity both between kings and cities and between kings and other kings. At Cyzicus, Antonia Tryphaena, widow of Cotys VIII of Thrace, celebrated the cult of Gaius' sister Drusilla, consecrated as the New Aphrodite: she was joined in the celebration by her sons Rhoemetalces III of Thrace and Polemo II of Pontus (83). It was Polemo II again who celebrated games in honour of Claudius jointly with Antiochus IV of Commagene (84). The height of such joint activity is the plan reported by Suetonius. He states that all the kings jointly decided to complete the temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens and to dedic­ ate it to the Genius Augusti (85). Writing at about the time of this plan, Livy is eloquent upon the kudos to be gained by the completion of this temple (86). Once again, we can see that by bringing out their friendship and allegiance to Rome and the emperor, kings also brought credit to themselves, as well as improving their relationship with Rome. We may reas­ onably suspect Suetonius of exaggeration: it is most improb­ able that all the kings were involved. Yet, for all that, we have seen that many kings were involved in building in the cities and have suggested a widespread involvement in imperial cult by kings: it is likely enough that many kings of the East were involved in this project. Of course, imperial cult was an expression of allegiance to a greater power. Indeed, imperial cult seems to have become connected with the very creation of the king, rather as was Jupiter Capitolinus, as suggested in Part I, section 2. The point is amply illustrated by the case of Tiridates, brother of Parthian Vologaeses. On entering Corbulo's camp, Tiridates performed a sacrifice before placing his crown at the feet of the imperial effigy (87) . Later, meeting Nero at Naples, he performed proskynesis before him, an act repeat­ ed in Rome in the theatre and in the For urn (88) . Prusias II of Bithynia had performed proskynesis in the Senate as early as 167 BC. In the Forum itself, according to Dio, Tiridates addressed the emperor as his god and promised to worship him as he did Mithras. Once again, Prusias II provides something of a precedent, for he had addressed the assembled Senate as 1 saviour-godsf (89) . With the case of Tiridates we should compare one aspect of the activities of Ti. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus on the

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Danube: 'ignotos ante aut infensos p.R. reges signa Romana adoraturos in ripam, quam tuebatur, perduxit* (90) The role of imperial cult in such encounters provides a con­ text for a passage of Dio which has caused some difficulty. Dio tells us that, about 2 BC, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus crossed the Elbe: on the far bank, he established friendly relations with the indigenous tribes and set up an altar to Augustus there. It seems plausible to suggest that this altar may have played a part in the very establishment of these friendly relations: there can be little doubt that it was intended to play a part in their continuance (91). We have seen therefore that the royal titulature, building -activity and nomenclature, and ritual were all media through which the king could express his relationship with Rome in his kingdom. Of course, the relationship could be expressed still more directly and unmistakably. Royal coinage under the Principate regularly bore the imperial head and other types recalling Rome: elsewhere we have discussed it bearing depic­ tions of ornamenta and the like (Part I, section 2). As well as through coins, the king could simply state his allegiance either verbally or in writing (92). Herod went so far as to have his subjects swear on oath of loyalty not only to him­ self but also to Augustus: this seems to have been a response to unrest in the kingdom, but Herod's motivation is not ent­ irely clear. There is no reason to suppose that Augustus had instructed him so to do: as far as we know, this is an entirely isolated case among the kings (93). In the West the advent of Rome meant the very creation of complex administrative structures. In the Hellenistic world of the East, there are slight indications that the kings occasionally introduced Roman administrative practices. It must be stressed, however, that these indications are very slight. In Part I, we discussed the curious behaviour of Antiochus IV of Syria at Antioch: it was suggested that he was acting in accord with practices learnt at Rome. Further, Tacitus tells us that Archelaus II compelled the Cilician Cetae to submit to a census and pay taxes on the Roman model (94). There are also some traces of a Roman influence on royal court practices. When Ptolemy VIII visited the court of Massinissa, he, found him banquetting in a fashion that he regarded as Roman. Such practices could be encouraged where connections existed between Roman and royal functionaries. By chance, we are told that Juba II's doctor, Euphorbus, after whom he named a plant, was the brother of Augustus1 famous doctor Musa (95). But the best-attested, and quite possibly the commonest, area in which the royal administration was modelled on the

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Roman was the royal army. We should not be surprised that the king should value Roman military structures and methods: after all, it was primarily her army that gave Rome her dominance. As early as the Second Punic War, according to Livy, the Roman centurion, Q. Statorius, trained the infantry of Syphax in the Roman fashion: that he should do so was very much the wish of the king, upon whose initiative the training book place (96). Nor was Syphax alone in this. Antiochus IV of Syria paraded troops equipped in the Roman fashion at Daphne (97). Further, Deiotarus of Galatia had two legions of his own men, trained and equipped as Roman legionaries (98). In North Africa, Juba I is said to have had four legions in 46 BC, presumably Numidians trained and equipped on the Roman model, while Arabio was able to defeat the forces of P. Sittius because his troops had been trained by Sex. Pompeius (99). There­ after, it has been plausibly suggested that Juba II and/or Ptolemy had not only bodyguards, but an urban cohort, based at Caesarea and modelled on the troops of Rome itself (100) . Beyond this, of course, Romans might always take service with a king: thus, for example, there were Romans in the entourage of Tiridates (101). Moreover, scholars have observed occas­ ions on which foreign peoples are said to have adopted Roman military tactics. They may indeed have done so, particularly where they had some experience of service with the Roman army, but we must be wary, for our Roman sources cannot be trusted to provide accurate accounts of the battles they describe (102). It becomes apparent therefore that, while our evidence suggests that, with the exception of the army in some king­ doms, the infrastructure of the kingdom remained for the most part unchanged, the king made his adherence to Rome and the imperial family quite explicit: we know of no case where the king sought to hide this adherence. Though it might generate resentment among his subjects, the king's relationship with Rome was the very foundation of his position (103). Notes to Section 4 (1) The earliest known case is that of Ariobarzanes I of Cappadocia, on whom see Sullivan (1980b) 1127-36. (2) Polemo II of Pontus: IGR iv 145. The epithet may also have been used by Mithridates VIII of the Bosporus: it is restored in CIRB 1123, dated to AD 41. For philosebastos, held by Sauromates I of the Bosporus, §ee SSG xxvii (1977) 445. (3) Herod of Chalcis: Schurer (1973) 571-2. (4) Tarcondimotus I of Cilicia: see Hoben (1969) 207. (5) proairoumenos en hois malista charizdesthai kai Rhdmaiois: for full text and discussion, see Holleaux (1957). Cf. Welles (1934) no. 61 with Virgilio (1981). (6) See below on the Cappadocian kings.

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(7) Dio liv 24.4. (8) IGR iv 145. (9) Note CIRB 46, where the colony at Sinope describes Sauromates I of the Bosporus as amicum imperatoris populique Romani praestantissimum. By contrast, the epithets are not translated, but simply transliterated in similar texts from the colony at Heliopolis: IGIS 2759-60. (10) Sullivan (1980b) 1138 n.61. The recognition of the son of Deiotarus tells us nothing: if these princes had been recognised, one would expect them, like him, to have the royal title. The probability that they were recognised is further diminished by the fact that there were two of them and that we know Ariobarzanes III to have been accorded recognition However, the arg­ upon his accession: see Braund (1982a). ument cannot be conclusive, for we know that the title of friend was regularly accorded even to envoys of friendly cities (e.g. Sherk (1969) n.9 line 16): it is not impossible that the sons of recognised kings might be allowed the title. Ariarathes later dropped the epithet in favour of philadelphos. (11) See Sullivan (1978c) and the literature he cites; cf. also CIRB 54. For adjectival use of philornomaios, see Str. xiv p. 652; Plut. Cato Major 8.8; Crass. 21.2; cf. Metrodorus of Scepsis, nicknamed misorhomaios (Roman-hater): Plin. NH xxxiv 34 with Balsdon (1979) 158. (12) On amici Caesaris, see especially Crook (1955), esp. 234; Millar (1977) 115ff. with Bowersock (1978) 348-9; Sailer (1982) passim. (13) CIRB 30. (14) CIRB 40. (15) This is matched by exceptionally consistent use of the tria nomina and marked involvement in the imperial cult: on the former, Part I, section 3, and on the latter, see below. (16) Though Ariarathes X was accorded the epithet in his youth by .the Athenians: above note 10. Whether Archelaus II used an epithet and what it was we do not know. (17) Sullivan (1978f) 920-1; also Schurer (1973) 582 on the Nabataeans. Cf. Jos. BJ i 633, where Antipater is made to claim that Augustus often called him philopator. (18) Schurer (1973) 582. (19) Lemosse (1967) 67. (20) Hill (1922) 92-3; cf. the appearance of philorhomaios on the coinage of the Parthian Tiridates: Wroth (1903) xxxviiiix, 135 with Debevoise (1938) 137. (21) Suet. Aug. 60. (22) None of these was totally new: Herod's was previously Strato's Tower: see Schurer (1979) 115-8; Lifshitz (1978) 498; Levine (1975), esp. 11-4. Archelaus1 was previously Mazaca: Jones (1971) 179. Juba's was previously Iol: Fittschen (1979). Polemo II's was previously Panticipaeum: Gajdukevic (1971) 328? cf. 477. Philip's was Panion: Schurer (1979) 169-70. Cf. Levick (1967) 34 and Bowersock (1965) 100

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n.2 for further possibilities. (23) Jones (1971) 168 and 204 respectively. (24) Samaria: Schurer (1979) 162-3; Elaeussa: Jones (1971) 205; Diospolis: Jones (1971) 169. (25) Jones (1971) 164. (26) Sepphoris: so Jones (1971) 276, but Schurer (1979) 174 n.485 is more cautious: the text is most uncertain. (27) Schurer (1979) 178-80; Avi-Yonah (1950-1). Cf. Thracian Tiberia: Levick (1976) 138. (28) Jones (1971) 211: Claudius and Nero cannot be ruled out. (29) Jones (1971) 211. (30) Jones (1971) 205. (31) Schurer (1979) 170. (32) Magie (1950) 561; Dio lxiii 6.5f. is the only evidence. (33) Livias (also known as Julias): SchUrer (1979) 176-8; cf. Liviopolis, a castellum in Pontus (Plin. NH vi 11). Julias: Schurer (1979) 171-2. (34) Schurer (1979) 104. (35) Gajdukevic (1971) 328; cf. 477. (36) See PIR 2 I 634f where the evidence is collected and discussed. (37) See Millar (1977) 396, who notes that in 83/2 BC L. Licinius Murena founded Licineia on the borders of Pontus. Cf. earlier, in the West in the second century BC, Brunt (1971) 215. Most famous are the foundations of Pompey: on these, see Dreizehnter (1975). (38) It is possible that a king founded Antoniopolis in Paphlagonia: Jones (1971) 168. It has also been suggested that Titiopolis and Domitiopolis in Cilicia were founded by Cleopatra in honour of M. Titius and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus: Jones (1971) 208 with 439. (39) Jos. BJ i 613; AJ xvii 87. (40) Jos. BJ i 412; AJ xv 336. (41) The date of the completion of Caesarea is a matter of some doubt: either 10/9 BC or 13/12 BC. See Levine (1975) 11. Cult of Drusus was established elsewhere: PIR 2 C 857. (42) Levine (1975), esp. 11-14. On cult of Augustus and sea­ farers- - especially those at Alexandria - see Robert (1980), esp. 6. (43. Jos. AJ xv 339; BJ i 414. (44) Jos. AJ xvi 136-41; cf. BJ i 414. (45) Jos. AJ xix 343; BJ ii 219. (46) Cf. Gytheum: SEG ix 923, with Price (1980), esp. 31. (47) Jos. BJ i 403; AJ xv 298. (48) Gsell (1928) viii 224-7 with Mazard (1955). There may have been a statue of Augustus prominent in the Forum: see Fittschen (1979) and, in general, Hopkins (1978) 221-31. (49) It is even possible that he also built his own temple there: Smallwood (1976) 182. But this seems rather unlikely. (50) Suet. Aug. 59 and 60 respectively. (51) Jos. AJ xv 328-30 is very explicit.

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(52) Note the activities of Simon at Caesarea: Jos. AJ xix 332-4. But it should be stressed that Simon was from Jerus­ alem. It is easy to forget that some Jews were more scrupul­ ous in religious matters than others, as the Jewish War makes clear. (53) On the brinkmanship involved, Smallwood (1976) 84. (54) Jos. AJ xv 276ff.: note especially those who remained disgruntled: AJ xv 281ff.. On the whole affair, Smallwood (1976) 84. (55) On Antipatris and Phasaelis, Schtirer (1979) 168; on Archelais, Jones (1971) 179. (56) Jones (1971) 179. (57) Jones (1971) 170. (58) Jones (1971) 211, for all three. (59) As argued by Avi-Yonah (1950-1). (60) Jos. AJ xviii 132. (61) For others, see Jos. AJ xx 143-4; xviii 137; Vita 5 and 427. Cf. Antoninus, son of Abgar IX (X) of Osrhoene, appar­ ently named after Caracalla: IGR i 179; cf. Dio lxxvii 12.1 _2. Note too Tarcondimotid Julia with Part I, section 3 above. Cf. also the name Italicus among the Cherusci and in the Vannian kingdom: Tac. Ann, xi 16 with Keddie (1975) > cf. Hist, iii 5. That Galba, king of the Suessiones, took his name from a Roman (if this was indeed his proper name) need not be supposed (Caes. BG ii 4 and 13) . (62) Jos. AJ xviii 143. (63) Jos. AJ xix 354. (64) For royalty and Drusilla, see IGR iv 145. It is possible that another royal Drusilla existed: Tac. Hist, v 9 with Part III, section 2, note 79. (65) Jos. AJ xv 409; BJ i 401. That Herod did not re-name the fortress after Actium must be a further indication that he made no attempt to hide his allegiance to Antony. Cf. Jos. BJ i 387-9; AJ xv 187-96. (66) Smallwood (1976) 73-4, noting that Herod's residence there is no more than an inference. (67) Jos. AJ xv 318; BJ i 402. (68) Jos. BJ i 416: the gate is not identifiable. (69) Jos. BJ i 407. (70) Jos. BJ i 417; AJ xvi 143. (71) Jos. BJ i 265; 419. (72) Jos. BJ v 167-75. (73) Livy xli 20; see I^rkholm (1966) 118-9. He relates the temple to Antiochus' youth in Rome: ibid. 39. (74) SEG ix 7: see Part III, section 1. (75) See Karyszkowski (1953); cf. Charko (1950). Also Gajdukevic (1971) 347, who follows Karyszkowski. Perhaps the largest difficult for his view is that it requires that we suppose the queen of Cotys I to have issued coins in her own right without reference to her husband. Of course, the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus at Rome did not have five

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columns, but Bosporan moneyers may readily be allowed a degree of laxity on so fine a point: the depiction may have been modelled on a local temple to another deity: Gajdukevic (1971) 404f after Charko (1950). Price and Trell (1977) 19 observe: 'It was not necessary for purposes of identification to show the exact number of columns on the facade of a temple; it sufficed merely to indicate that there was a columned portico1. Compare the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus on the coinage of Juba II: Salzmann (1974) 175. (76) See now Garnsey (1978) and the literature he cites. (77) EJ no. 109, on which see Bowersock (1965) 117. On the West, see Fishwick (1961). (78) For text and discussion, see Rey-Coquais (1973). On the petty rulers of Syria, see Schurer (1979) 91, esp. n. 15; Rey-Coquais (1978). Cleopatra's shrine of Caesar is excep­ tional: Dio li 15.5. (79) CIRB 41 is the earliest evidence, dated to AD 58/9. The very use of a Roman dating system deserves attention. Ihe title does not occur invariably in his inscriptions, cf. CIRB 69, nor in those of his successors: cf. CIRB 70 (Rhescuporis II). Cf. CIRB 1050 for a Kaisareion apparently at Hermonassa (Taman). (80) Jos. BJ i 407; cf. AJ xix 329. (81) RIB 91, on which see Fishwick (1961), who collects the main evidence for imperial cult in the West at this time: the establishment of the imperial cult at Cologne seems to have been part of the creation of the province of Germany: see Wells (1973) 157. Cf. in general for the West, Fishwick (1978). (82) On the centre of power and religion, see Shils (1975) 3; Strassoldo (1980) 40-1. (83) IGR iv 145; cf. 144. On this, Sullivan (1978f) 625. (84) P. Lond. 1178. (85) Suet. Aug. 60. Ihe temple was begun by Pisistratus, furthered by Antiochus IV of Syria and finally finished by Hadrian. Hadrian's part might account for the fact that Suetonius is our only source on this royal project under Augustus. Whether any work was done under Augustus is un­ certain. For the architectural history of the temple, see Abramson (1974). On Antiochus IV and Olympian Zeus, see now Rigsby (1980) 233-8. (86) Livy xli 20, on Antiochus IV of Syria. (87) Tac. Ann. xv 29; cf. xii 17.3; 37.5; xv 24.3; Suet. Cal. 14 with Debevoise (1938) 163. (88) Dio lxiii 2.4; 4.3; Suet. Nero 13.2. (89) Dio lxiii 5.2; cf. Pol. xxx 18.5 *on Prusias. (90) IIS 986: on the religious role'of standards in the army, see Nock (1952) 239-41. (91) Dio lv 10a.2; cf. Fishwick (1961) 159-60 for some dis­ cussions. (92) See Part II, section 2 on Herod and Agrippa. In the Bosporus, Dynamis erected inscriptions which are particularly

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explicit on her relations with Rome: CIRB 38; 1046; and, on Livia, 978; cf. Rhoemetalces III on Hadrian, CIRB 47. It is interesting that she uses language in these texts very similar to that used of her by her subjects: cf. CIRB 979; cf. 39 and 40. As one might expect, in honouring Romans, Dynamis con­ formed to the honorific terminology of her kingdom. (93) Jos. AJ xvii 42, discussed by Lemosse (1967) 65. (94) Tac. Ann, vi 41; cf. Cic. ad Att. vi 1.3, where Ariobarzanes III is said to have collected taxes on the model of Appius, but this seems to be an allusion to his harshness rather than his methods as such: see Part II, section 1. Note also that the term fiscus had become part of Bosporan financial terminology by the second century AD: Boltunova (1967). Cf. Plin. E££. x 63; 64; 67 with Sherwin-White ad loc; Gajdukevic (1971) 351-2. According to Dio, Abgar IX (X) of Osrhoene used a supposed programme of Romanization as a cloak for oppression: how far Abgar actively sought to Romanize must remain in doubt: Dio lxxvii 12.1a. (95) Physcon FHG iii 187. Plin. NH xxv 77; cf. the freedman Protos, bequeathed by Berenice to Antonia, Jos. AJ xviii 1567 with Millar (1977) 72 and Part III, section 1. On Publicius Agrippa in Iberia, see above Part 1, section 3. It is always tempting to trace particular influences: Segal (1973) argues that Herod's second Herodium was inspired by Augustus' mausoleum; cf. Schurer (1973) 307 and 328. Fittschen (1974) argues that the portraiture of Juba II was based on that of Augustus, while Ptolemy's was based on that of Gaius and Lucius. Picard (1975) goes so far as to suggest that the theatre at Iol/Caesarea was built by Juba II according to the precise instructions of Augustus. (96) Livy xxiv 48. (97) Pol. xxx 25.3. On these troops, see Bar-Kochva (1979) 55, 60, 181-3. (98) Cic. ad Att. vi 1.14; Phil, xi 33; Bell. Alex. 34.4. Cf. the Roman military structures used by Mithridates VI: App. Mithr. 87; 108; cf. Plut. Sert. 23.4; 24.2. Note also Syme (1973) 587. (99) Bell. Afr. 1 with Brunt (1971) 474 on Juba. App. BC iv 54 on Arabio and Sittius. Note also how Sertorius made Roman legionaries out of his Spanish followers: Plut. Sert. 12.2 with 14.1. Herod's case is dubious: CAH X p.327 with Plut. Ant. 71.1-2. As for Maroboduus, Veil. Pat. ii 109. 1 says only that he trained his troops almost to Roman standard. Cf. also Herod, iii 4.8 on the development of eastern fighting techniques after the desertion of Roman troops. (100) Speidel (1979) with Durry (1938) 22n.9. This should be set in a wider context: cf. Millar (1977) 62 and note Gauda's request for a Roman equestrian bodyguard (Sail. BJ 65.2). (101) Dio lxiii 2.1; cf. Part III, section 2 ad init. Roman military engineering - as well as civil engineering - also

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The King in his

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attracted kings: Decebalus received both sorts of engineer from Domitian (Dio lxvii 7.4), as Tiridates probably did from Nero (Dio lxiii 6.6). In the third century AD, an architect named Aurelius Antoninus - possibly a Roman - was active in the Bosporus: Gajdukevic (1971) 356. As early as the second century BC, Antiochus IV of Syria had a Roman architect, Cossutius, in his service (Vitr. vii praef. 15 with l^rkholm (1966) 58, 118-9). (102) Walsh (1961) 197-204; cf. Woodman (1979). (103) Note, e.g., Italicus among the Cherusci (Tac. Ann, xi 16) and Vonones among the Parthians (Tac. Ann, ii 2).

122

Excursus; Royal Gold Coinage and Münzrecht

Mommsen argued that: 'Im Grossen und Ganzen genommen kann wahrscheinlich schon für die letzte Zeit der Republik, sicher für den Principat die Regel aufgestellt werden, dass die Prägung der Werthmünzen den abhängigen Staaten entzogen und Reservatrecht des Reiches ist.f (1) His view was scon supported by Bonn and Lenormant: Sands in­ jected the first note of scepticism, but left the view virt­ ually unassailed. Sands1 reservations long went unnoticed only to be re-stated by Lemosse, who makes the crucial obser­ vation that a lack of extant gold coins need not mean that legal considerations prevented their being minted (2) . But Mommsen's view lives on. Frere comments, 'client kings did not usually retain the right of coinage1 (3). In a recent attempt to define the position of a 'client king', Mommsen's view is accorded some prominence: "They (sc. client kings) had only a limited right of coinage. Almost all of them seem to have been prohibited from minting gold coins, and many, among them Herod and his successors, were also forbidden to mint silver coins; at any rate only copper coins survive from the time of the Herodian princes. This fact is particularly instructive as it shows that Herod was by no means one of the most privileged of these kings, whatever may be implied by Josephus' (4). We have reached a point where Mommsen1 s view is not only accepted, despite the reservations expressed by some scholars, but even used to control the literary evidence that tends to contradict it. Similar is a tendency among archaeologists and numismatists to deny the authenticity of royal gold coins because their very existence tells against Mommsenfs view. Much the same approach is adopted by those who erect elaborate

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Gold Coinage and

Mnzveoht

hypotheses to explain away such coins (5) . Despite this array of scholarly opinion, it is here contended that the Mommsen view is a myth, doubtless generated in part by the smaller evidential basis available to Mommsen. This is to be demon­ strated by a twin approach. First, exceptions to the view must be isolated. Second, those coinages which have been taken to support the view must be re-examined. I Mommsen and those who have followed his view freely admit that the coinage of the Bosporan kings is an exception. Kings of the Bosporus regularly minted in gold and copper, just as they had done before the advent of Rome: in this kingdom, it was silver that was rarely used. Proponents of Mommsen1s view are forced to argue that, for some reason unknown, Rome was prepared to make a particular exception in this case (6). Next, North Africa, where gold coins are rare, but, not comp­ letely absent. Iwo gold coins survive which are not definit­ ely attributable, but may well be coins of Hiempsal II of Numidia. Since Hiempsal ruled in the Late Republic, Mazard finds his gold coins an unwelcome exception to the Mommsen view. In order to neutralise the exception, he is forced to the view that, !en ce qui concerne le monnayage des rois de Numidie, le probl£me est different puisqu'il n'y a pas de liens d'allegeance entre ces princes et Rome1: this is simply wrong. Nor is it significant that Hiempsal did not mint more gold coins, for the whole tradition of Numidian minting is one in which gold coinage, Hiempsal apart, has no place (7) . The numismatic history of Mauretania is very similar: in this case five gold coins have survived, two of Juba II and three of Ptolemy- At first, scholars were disposed to deny their authenticity for the very reason that they count against the Mommsen view, but, since their authenticity has been estab­ lished, scholars have sought to explain them away as very special cases. Mazard claims that they were not so much coins as 'pieces de plaisir1, to produce which Juba and Ptolemy had been granted special permission by the emperors; by contrast, Faur claims that Ptolemy's gold coins were a deliberate assertion of independence from Gaius. Both are trapped by allegiance to the Mommsen view which forces further hypotheses (8). When Caesar landed in Britain he found gold coins in use there, among other forms of currency. Gold continued to be used in Britain thereafter. Unfortunately, the relations between a particular British ruler and Rome are largely a matter of inference from meagre evidence, but it is clear enough that many maintained friendly relations with Rome: it is usually inferred from the appearance of the word REX on their coins that some kings, at least, had received formal Roman recognition. But, despite this inevitable vagueness,

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Gold Coinage and

MUnzrecht

it seems very likely that there are some exceptions to the Mommsen view to be found in Britain. The dynasty of Commius Commius and his sons, Tincommius, Eppillus and Verica produced gold coins in each reign: Verica in particular minted gold coins bearing the legend REX. Among the Catuvellauni, most kings known to have produced coins minted in gold: Tasciovanus, Andoco(mius?), Cunobelinus and Epaticcus. Among the Trinovantes, gold coins were minted by Addedomarus and Dubnovellaunus. The Dobunni, whose rulers1 names are not known, minted in gold, as did the Iceni, though the famous Prasutagus may have minted only in silver. The Coritani also minted in gold - coins previously attributed to the Brigantes (9). In the Danubian region, numerous gold coins survive, minted by King Coson: their obverse is a copy of a denarius of M. Iunius Brutus, while their reverse is a copy of a denarius of Pomponius Rufus: Coson is usually identified with Cotiso, friend of Octavian (10). Further east, in Galatia, the gold coinage of Amyntas seems agreed to be entirely forged, though, pace Wroth, the Mommsen view should not be levelled against it (11). II Having isolated these exceptions, which must tell against the Mommsen view, we may proceed to re-examine those cases which have been taken to support it: cases where kings did not mint in gold. The key point is that in all these cases there was no tradition of minting in gold before the advent of Rome: therefore, it can hardly be argued that gold was not subseq­ uently minted in these cases because of some supposed Roman regulation. By contrast, as we have seen, in those areas where gold coinage was usual before the advent of Rome, as in Britain and the Bosporus, it continued into the Principate. The Herods are a particularly clear example of the con­ tinuation of traditional minting practice, though they have been taken as a prime example in support of the Mommsen view. The Herods minted only copper. But when Jewish coinage began, probably under Alexander Jannaeus (ruled 103-76 BC), the Jews minted no gold or silver coins. This failure to mint in precious metals can hardly be regarded as the result of Seleucid domination, for the Jews had long been asserting their independence of the disintegrating Seleucid empire: nor can it be seen as the result of Roman influence at this stage. Meshorer is surely correct to describe this coinage as ' the first in the annals of the autonomous Hasmonaean kingdom1. The successors of Jannaeus - Hyrcanus II, Aristobulus II and Mattathias Antigonus - similarly omitted to coin in precious metals - particularly interesting since the latter two took a decidedly anti-Roman stance and can hardly have been obeying a Roman directive in so doing. The coins

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Gold Coinage and

Miinzvecht

of Antigonus are especially significant. He seems to have felt the need for a larger denomination than previously used in Judaea, very probably to meet the cost of the war which had brought him to the throne, but he did not mint in precious metals: instead, he simply minted larger coins on the trad­ itional model. It is no surprise that when Herod replaced Antigonus he followed traditional Hasmonaean practice by minting no coins in precious metals: there is no need to posit some specific Roman regulation preventing him from so doing. Indeed, it was always implausible to suppose, with the Mommsen view, that the Herods stood in the 'lowest categ­ ory1 of kings, those not even allowed to mint in silver: our literary sources heavily contradict such a supposition. Rather, the Herods minted what they wanted to mint, as had their Hasmonaean predecessors (12) . It may be objected that silver coins (though no gold) were used in Judaea during the uprising of AD 66-70 and in the Bar Kokhba rebellion: it might seem that production of coins in a precious metal was part of and symbolic of Jewish revolt against Rome. Some support might thus be gleaned for the Mommsen view, but the argument will not do. Ihe Bar Kokhba coins must immediately be set aside, for they were not minted by the Jews: they were a motley collection of available coins which were overstruck, so that the fact that some were silver can have no special significance. Ihe coins of AD 66-70 are indeed odd in the history of Jewish coinage, but the most attractive explanation lends no support to the Mommsen view: it seems very probable that the exigencies of warfare brought about a need for a larger denomination of currency and, whereas Antigonus had reacted to a similar need by producing bulky coinage on the traditional model, on this occasion silver coins were prod­ uced to meet the special need (13). Nor are the Herods unusual in following the local trad­ ition of coinage: precisely the same is true of other cases which have been taken to support the Mommsen view - Thrace, Osrhoene, Cbmmagene, Cappadocia and Nabataea. In short, there is no kingdom where a traditional use of precious metals in minting coins was abandoned with the advent of Rome. This, taken with the exceptions which have been isolated and which also suggest that traditional minting practice tended to persist, seems to deny any support to the Mommsen view: the view is therefore surely best rejected. To underline the point, it may be noted that the Arsacids, who minted in nothing but silver, could be taken to be a prime example of Mommsen's view, were it not so fundamentally unlikely that they were obeying some Roman dictate in not minting in gold. In the Later Roman Empire, Rome did indeed claim a monopoly of gold coinage: it may well be that Mommsen had this monop­ oly in mind, but, of course, the Early Empire was a different world - a world, it seems, wherein kings could mint as they wished (14).

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Gold Coinage and

Mtinzrecht

Notes to Excursus (1) Itonmsen (1887-8) iii 712. Cf. Ntommsen (1860) 693, 703 and (1865-75), which shows no change. It should be noted that Mommsen allowed that the gold coinage of the great Hell­ enistic kingdoms did not cease as a result of Roman influence: Mommsen (1887-8) iii 711 n.l. (2) Bonn (1877) 42-4; Lenormant (1878) ii 120-4, 194-9; Sands (1908) 120-2; Mazard (1952); Lemosse (1967) 63. (3) Frere (1978) 84. (4) Schurer (1973) 317. (5) Mazard. (1952); Faur (1973). (6) For the history of Bosporan coinage, see Shelov (1978); Zograph (1977) 261-340; Frolova (1979). The Mommsen view is widely held: Zograph (1977) 308; Frolova (1979) 74; Gajdukevic (1971) 332. It is worth noting that, from Aspurgus on, Bosporan gold coins weigh roughly the same as the norm for the Roman aureus (7.96 g . ) , though they tend to be a little heavier and main­ tain their original weight despite reductions in that of the aureus (Zograph (1977) 308; Frolova (1979) 7, 46, 50-1). The weights of royal coins can be matched with those of Roman coins in other cases: on the silver coins of Polemo II, Walker (1976) i 52 asserts that 'they ...are to be considered as denarii...'. Similarly, Mazard (1955) 49 argues that, from Juba I on, Mauretanian coinage was on the Roman standard. According to Zograph (1977) 315, Bosporan copper coinage was also on the Roman standard. Of course, such correspondence need not mean Roman involvement in royal coin-production or intentional influence over that production. Similarly, there is no need to suppose that kings were under any compulsion to place imperial heads on their coins: contra Bonn (1877) 45-9; cf. Part II, section 4 and Magie (1950) 728 n.8. Further, Zograph (1977), esp. 318-9 seeks to trace Roman in­ terference in Bosporan coinage, relying especially upon a break in Bosporan gold coinage under Nero; such gaps are characteristic in Bosporan history: see Golenko and Karyszkowski (1972); Gajdukevic1 (1971) 332 with Zograph (1977) 306-7; cf. 37 for an economic explanation. Gajdukevic" (1971) 345 prefers to press Jos. BJ ii 367. (7) See Mazard (1952) and (1955) nos. 76-7. For the quot­ ations, Mazard (1952) 1, against which see, for example, Sands (1908) 20, 87, 113-4, 179; Badian (1958) 271-2; cf. Mazard (1955) 45. (8) Mazard (1952) and (1955) nos. 297-8, 398-9; cf. Faur (1973). Mazard 1 s standard collection gives a false descrip­ tion of a fifth gold coin (of Ptolemy), Mazard (1955) no. 429 with Salzmann (1974) 181 n.49, after Head (1932) Plate 50, no. 60. I am most grateful to G.K.Jenkins, who has confirmed the existence of this fifth gold coin: it was first published by Hill (1912) 148 no. 31 and Plate vii, no. 15.

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Royal Gold Coinage and

Mttnzvecht

It seems that when Mazard visited the BM he saw only a copy of this coin and - reasonably enough, but falsely - assumed that the original was silver: the gold original had been set apart because it was part of the collection contained in Head (1932). (9) On British coinage, and Celtic coinage in general, see Allen (1980), esp. 185-7, providing a full bibliography of the major discussions, mostly by Allen himself. Cf. among the most recent literature, Mossop (1979) for a possible silver coinage of Prasutagus, and Nash (1982) on the silver coinage of Adminius: no coins of Cogidubnus have yet been identified. For the situation of Caesar's arrival, see Caes. BG v 12. (10) For an extravagant discussion, see Preda (1973) 353-61, with full bibliography: pace Preda, the monogram on these coins should be expanded to read Basileus not Broutes. The identification of Coson with Co,tiso is by no means secure. (11) See Wroth (1899) xviii-xx, followed by Head (1911) 747. (12) Meshorer (1967); cf. Schurer (1973) 190-1; Meshorer (1974) . (13) Meshorer (1967) chs. 5 and 6. (14) On these coinages, see Youroukova (1976); Head (1911), esp. 814 contra Bonn (1877) 45 n.96; cf. Youroukova (1976) 55; Wroth (1899) 104-12; Head (1911) 774-6; Sullivan (1973); Simonetta (1961) (his subsequent differences with Mfzfrkholm are of no importance for this discussion); Meshorer (1975). Cf. Sellwood (1971) on the coinage of Parthia. For the situation in the Later Roman Empire, see Procop. De Bello Gothico iii 33. Cf. Kent (1956).

128

PART III: END AND BEGINNINGS Royal Wills (1)

The purpose of this section is to consider how and why kings made wills involving Rome. Since such wills are both more numerous and more varied than usually imagined, we must briefly collect and discuss the wills in question before we can progress to face these broad issues more squarely. These wills may conveniently be divided as follows and are treated accordingly: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

Wills by which kings bequeathed their kingdoms to Rome under the Republic Wills by which kings appointed Rome as guardian of their heirs under the Republic The case of Massinissa Wills of the Principate

(i) The earliest known will by which a king left his kingdom to Rome is that of Ptolemy VIII (or VII) Euergetes II 'Physcon*. Physcon's.will is also the only royal will involving Rome to survive: the king had it inscribed on a large stele and set up in Cyrene in 155 BC for all to see. At this time Physcon ruled Cyrenaica. The text of this will is worth quoting in full. 15th yearf month of Loios. With Good Fortune. The following was decreed by king Ptolemy, son of king Ptolemy and queen Cleopatra, gods 5 manifest, the younger. A copy of what follows has been sent to Rome: May it be permitted to me, with the benevolence of the gods, to take vengeance in fitting manner upon those who have hatched against me the impious plot and have undertaken 10 to deprive me not only of my kingdom but also of my life. But if I should suffer the fate of mortals before I have left successors to my throne, I bequeath

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to the Romans my rightful kingdom, 15 with whom, from the first, I have genuinely maintained friendship and alliance. And I entrust to them the maintenance of affairs, calling upon them by all the gods and their own good name - if anyone 20 should attack either the cities or the countryside to help with all their might in accord with the friend­ ship and alliance obtaining between the two of us and with justice. As witnesses of these arrangements I cite Jupiter 25 Capitolinus and the Great Gods and the Sun and Apollo the Founder, with whom relevant writings have also been deposited. With Good Fortune. (SEG ix 7) This inscription is our only good evidence for Physcon1s will. Polybius is notably silent, though he may have mentioned the will in a lost portion of his Histories: pass­ ages in Festus, Ammianus and Jordanes may refer to this will, but they add nothing. Any interpretation must be based upon the extant text of the will itself (2). In lines 6-11, Physcon refers allusively to a plot de­ signed to take his kingdom and his life, while at lines 19-20 he envisages the possibility of attacks upon his kingdom after his death. The stated purpose of the will is to anticipate the success of this plot by leaving the kingdom to the Romans in the event of Physcon's dying without successors (lines 1116). All are agreed that the plot referred to is the plot of his brother, Ptolemy VI Philometor. This seems all but certain, for in the very next year, 154, Physcon went before the Senate to accuse Philometor of launching a murderous plot against him: according to Polybius, he even exhibited the scars of the wounds he had suffered. The affair was but another episode in the standing quarrel between the two brothers (3). Today it seems always to be assumed that such a plot existed and that Physcon really had such scars to dis­ play. It has been thought that Physcon1s will was inspired by an actual assassination attempt. But it should be noted that, while this plot may very well have existed - and we shall proceed on this assumption - it is-also possible that it did not (4). Discussion of the plot is usually limited to Philometor. We may look further, most obviously to Philometorfs sisterwife, Cleopatra II. Her involvement would help to explain Physcon1s reference to 'plotters1 in the plural, supposing the plural to be more than simple rhetoric. There is also the population of Cyrenaica, for we know that Physcon1 s rule

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was somewhat insecure within his very kingdom. While Physcon was absent, consequent upon his journey to Rome in 163 BC in a bid to gain Cyprus from his brother, the city of Cyrene revolted against him. Moreover, the revolt was supported by the other cities of the Pentapolis and by Ptolemy Sympetesis, the Egyptian whom Physcon had left in authority in the king­ dom upon his departure for Rome. At least some native Libyans also took part (Pol. xxxi 18.6-16). This uprising, evidently on a large scale and perhaps encouraged by Philornetor, must be an indication of serious instability inside Physcon1 s kingdom only a few years before the will was made. Therefore, the 'plotters' may very well have included forces within the kingdom as well as forces without. In addition, the borders of Cyrenaica were vulnerable to native incursions: it may also be these that Physcon envisages at lines 19-20. The presence of Jupiter Capitolinus among the witnesses to the will should not be overlooked. The god was central to the relationship between Rome and king. To this extent the presence of the god in Physcon's will is a re-affirmation of its recurrent theme: the friendship and alliance obtaining between Physcon and Rome. This theme of the will is to be the theme of our whole discussion of royal wills (5). Physcon's will was never executed, because, before he died in 116 BC, he had had sons and heirs. The earliest known will under which Rome actually received a kingdom is that of Attalus III of Pergamum, who died in autumn 134 BC, apparently of natural causes (6). The authenticity of Attalus' will is now generally accepted. It was once doubted on account of a fragment of Sallust's Histories which purports to be a letter from Mithridates VI of Pontus to the king of Parthia. In this fragment Mithridates is made to claim that the will was a Roman inven­ tion. We should not suppose this to be the view of Sallust, as is sometimes stated; rather Sallust, rightly or wrongly, gives it as the statement of Mithridates to the Parthian king. Mithridates' supposed claim cannot stand; it runs against the bulk of our evidence, including a contemporary Pergamene in­ scription which mentions a will of Attalus requiring Roman ratification (7). Although we know very much less about the contents of this will than that of Physcon, we know more than is known in the other cases in this category. The aforementioned Pergamene inscription shows that the will enjoined that the city of Pergamum should be free. The same injunction seems to have applied to the other cities of the kingdom (8). Florus seems to have preserved part of the will: 'populus Romanus bonorum meorum heres esto. In bonis regiis haec fuerunt'. However, though often accepted, the authenticity of this supposed extract is at least dubious. The formula used here approx­ imates to the standard formula for a will under Roman law and the extract is in Latin. But one might expect Attalus'

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will, like that of Physcon, to be in Greek and to conform to Hellenistic legal norms. It may well be that Florus' extract is a late and rather facile invention or, alternatively, the product of the propaganda that surrounded the Gracchi and their history: at least, it is unsafe to build anything upon it (9). Attalus was a young man to make such a will, but he had good reason to anticipate an early death. His health was uncertain, but probably more important was the fear of ass­ assination. The reign of Attalus III is marked by difficult­ ies within the kingdom. These seem to have been of a polit­ ical, rather than a socio-economic, nature: the problems of power-politics within the kingdom1s elite. It seems highly likely that the king's famous seclusion and executions are a function of these very difficulties and that the revolt of Aristonius is a further manifestation of them. In fact, the scenario bears a certain resemblance to that in which Physcon's will has been set (10). However, unlike Physcon, Attalus seems not to have sent a copy of his will to Rome in advance of his death: Plutarch states that upon Attalus' death Eudemus of Pergamum brought the will with him to Rome. As is well-known the will immed­ iately became part of the turmoil surrounding the legislative activity of Tiberius Gracchus. Ihat does not mean however that there was any very special connection between Gracchus and the king (11). Gracchus sought to deal with the bequest through the Assembly. His first concern was with the royal treasure which could be swiftly converted into hard cash; we know that at least some royal valuables were sold at public auction in Rome (12). As to the kingdom itself, Gracchus is said to have stressed the point that to decide upon its fate was the business not of the Senate but of the Assembly: he would therefore put the matter to the People. Many have thought that by interfering in Attalus' bequest, particularly in the matter of the fate of the kingdom, Gracchus was doing some­ thing very different from his other legislation which was confined to domestic matters. Thus, Badian observes: 'Hence­ forth he could no longer claim to be acting within the cons­ titution. Foreign affairs, as well as finance, had always been left to the Senate to deal with' (13) . There is cer­ tainly very much to be said for this view, but scholars seem to have lost sight of an essential connection between Gracc­ hus' interest in the will of Attalus and.his other legislative activity, a connection which serves tq. underline an important detail in royal wills involving Republican Rome. Attalus1 will, if it did not explicitly name the populus Romanus as his heir, will have named 'the Romans', like Physcon's: to the Roman mind, this could only mean the populus Romanus. Gracc­ hus' claim that to decide upon the fate of the kingdom was the business of the Assembly, of the populus Romanus, immed-

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iately becomes more intelligible. Attalus1 bequest not only entailed valuable and timely funds for Gracchus, but also although in one sense most certainly a new and dangerous departure - raised an issue of central importance for him: the power of the populus Romanus to decide upon matters of state, especially where, for the first time, it was named heir to a dead king. To this extent, at least, Gracchus' involvement in Attalus bequest is quite consonant with his other legislative activity. When Physcon's son, Ptolemy Apion, died in 96 BC, appar­ ently childless, he left a will in which he bequeathed his kingdom, Cyrenaica, to the Romans. Beyond that simple fact we know nothing of the contents of his will (14) . However, it is still claimed that we know Apion to have stipulated in his will that the cities of his kingdom be granted freedom. This is an error which Oost has traced back to a mis-reading of Liv. Per. 70, where it is stated, not that Apion made the cities free, as Luzzatto read it, but that the Senate did so. That Apion made such a stipulation is therefore only an un­ supported hypothesis (15) . Having declared the cities free, Borne seems to have taken no further action until 75 BC, when the decision was taken to annex (16) . It now seems generally agreed that annexation was brought about by a number of factors, most importantly, severe shortage of grain and money at Rome and the need to suppress piracy: the individual influence of Lucullus (cos. 74 BC) has been advanced as a further stimulus (17). Much less clear is the reason for Rome's failure to annex in 96 BC (18). Our ignorance of the contents of Apionfs will is comp­ ounded by our lack of detailed knowledge of his reign. We do know that the years following his death were greatly disturbed by piracy, the rise and fall of tyrants, hostilities between Greek and Jew and, quite possibly, Libyan incursions (19). These troubles need have no direct bearing on the situation in the kingdom during Apion's reign, but they at least serve to highlight tensions within his realm. More directly relevant is the apparent contradiction bet­ ween the evidence of Justin and an inscription dated probably to 109/8 BC (20) . According to Justin, Apion received Cyrenaica by his father's last will in 116 BC, but the ins­ cription shows Apionfs half-brother, Soter II, ruling in Cyrenaica in 109/8 BC. Caution is in order, for the date of the inscription and Justin's reliability are open to question. But if both are taken to be correct, it becomes likely that Apion and Soter II had clashed over the possession of Cyren­ aica: such a clash would be entirely in accord with this period of dynastic struggles among the Ptolemies, from the death of Physcon in 116 BC to the accession of Auletes in 80 BC. The possibility of such a dynastic struggle combined with the inferences that may be drawn from the situation in Cyren-

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aica after Apion's death, unsafe as they are, make it quite possible that Apion made his will in the context of a troubled reign, as did Physcon and Attalus (21). Next, the will of Ptolemy Alexander. I have argued at length elsewhere that the Ptolemy Alexander in question is Ptolemy XI Alexander II, not Ptolemy X Alexander I as usually supposed: this is assumed in what follows. The details of Alexander II's short reign are known only in outline. He soon fell out with his queen, Berenice, and murdered her: apparently incensed by her murder, the Alexand­ rian mob killed him. The reason for his break with Berenice is not known but we may speculate. Appian states that the mob killed Alexander because he had behaved in an offensive manner towards them, relying on the support of Sulla (BC i 102). Ihis suggests that the grievance against the king was rather larger than the single act of Berenice's murder. Appian also states that Sulla had appointed Alexander as king in the expectation that he would thereby enrich himself (ibid.). It seems that Sulla expected Alexander to pay for his support. If Alexander had attempted to fulfil this ex­ pectation by using the wealth of the kingdom to pay off Sulla, perhaps increasing the level of taxation to raise a sufficient sum, the swift and strong opposition to him becomes more comp­ rehensible: opposition from Berenice leading to her murder and opposition from the mob brought to a head by that murder. In the following reign, Auletes faced a similar need for money, tried these tactics to obtain it and had to flee for his life to avoid the same fate as Alexander (22). In a fast deter­ iorating situation such as this, Alexander might well decide to make a will. It seems most unlikely that the will was made and kept at Rome or that a copy of it was sent to Rome, for, if this had been done, the subsequent disputes over its existence would be readily settled by the production of the document. It must be stressed that these disputes concerned its very existence, not whether a document produced was a real will or a forgery (23). That the will was made and did exist is now generally assumed, but we cannot be sure. It seems that no document was produced and Cicero makes it clear that the existence of the will was challenged in his day. Given this uncertainty, we should not build very much on the case of this particular will. As a tail-piece to the case of Alexander we must consider the annexation of Cyprus. This annexation has been viewed by leading scholars as 'barefaced robbery' and as 'the most shameful act of Roman imperialism apart from the Gallic War' (24). There is some justice in these remarks arising as they do from the view that the main stimulus to annexation was Rome's and Clodius' shortage of money (25) . But at the same time, Rome's legal justification for annexation was strong enough (26). Cyprus was included in the will of Ptolemy Alexander - if he indeed made one -, for it was part of his

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kingdom. For some twenty years the question of the annex­ ation of Egypt had been debated at Rome: though nowhere ex­ plicitly mentioned in this context, the fate of Cyprus as part of the same inheritance was closely connected with that of Egypt, overshadowed by the greater prize. In 59 BC, Auletes temporarily settled the fate of Egypt by obtaining Roman recognition at considerable expense. Auletes' success may well have brought the question of the annexation of Cyprus to a head; it may be no coincidence that, after so many years of inaction, the decision to annex Cyprus was taken in the very next year after Auletes was recognised. Cato was des­ patched to remove Auletes' brother from the throne of Cyprus and to realise his assets: he returned to Rome with 7,000t. for the treasury. The controversy surrounding Alexander's will was thus finally settled (27). In 74 BC, the year after Rome had decided to annex Cyrenaica, Nicomedes IV of Bithynia died. He left a will in which he bequeathed his kingdom to the Romans. We know nothing more of its contents than this (28). As in the cases of Attalus III and Alexander II, there is ancient testimony that Nicomedes made no will in favour of Rome. A Ciceronian schol­ iast states that Rome inherited Bithynia because Nicomedes died intestate. In addition, Sallust's 'Letter of Mithrid­ ates' asserts that Rome should not have seized Bithynia upon the king's death because he had left a son. However, these two sources can be allowed no credence in the face of the bulk of our evidence from more reliable authorities: the authenticity of the will is secure enough (29) . But it is true that, contra Appian, Nicomedes left a child: a daughter named Nysa whom Caesar was later to champ­ ion in the Senate, perhaps in 60 BC (30) . Moreover, upon Nicomedes' death a man claiming to be his son appeared before the Senate to claim the kingdom as his inheritance: this is presumably•the individual to whom Sallust makes Mithridates refer. But the Senate rejected his claims not least because others flocked to Rome from Bithynia to denounce him as an impostor. Instead the Senate decided to annex Bithynia and appointed M. Iuncus, then governor of Asia, to the task (31). Rome's decision was taken comparatively swiftly. The factors which precipitated the annexation of Cyrenaica in the previous year must still have been significant. In addition there was Mithridates VI Eupator of Pontus. Since the acc­ ession of Nicomedes IV in 93 BC he had twice been expelled by Mithridates and subsequently twice restored by Roman arms. Moreover, in the mid-seventies, Mithridates is said to have been negotiating with Sertorius for the cession of Bithynia and Cappadocia. Nicomedes' death might encourage Mithridates to push into Bithynia once more: particularly if Bithynia were allowed to deteriorate as Cyrenaica had been. In fact, Mithridates did just this: probably in the very next year, 73 BC, he invaded Bithynia and thus set off the Third Mithrid-

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atic War. The Bithynian ambitions of Mithridates may there­ fore be seen as a major stimulus to prompt Roman action on Nicomedes1 will. At the same time, it is very likely that Mithridates was also in Nicomedes' mind when he drafted his will: Mithridates, who had so much wanted Bithynia in its king's lifetime, could hardly be expected to cease to want it after the king's death (32). Finally, to North Africa. Some scholars have thought that when Bocchus II of Mauretania died in 33 BC he left a will in which be bequeathed his kingdom to Rome or Octavian. However, for all its popularity, the view depends entirely on a misunderstanding of a passage of Dio and is therefore best forgotten (33). (ii) We may now turn to consider those royal wills which appointed the populus Romanus as guardian of the king's heir(s). Our earliest case of such a will is also the most problematic. A number of ancient sources state that M. Aemilius Lepidus visited Egypt c.200 BC as the tutor or guardian of the young Ptolemy V Epiphanes, who had succeeded his father, Ptolemy IV Philopator, in 205 BC at the age of 10. According to this tradition, Philopator had left a will naming the populus Romanus as tutor of Epiphanes: the Senate in turn appointed Lepidus to wield this tutela on its behalf. This tradition is problematic largely because Polybius and Livy say nothing of Lepidus' tutela, while the sources supporting the tradition are relatively late: Valerius Maximus, Justin and Tacitus, together with a coin minted in 61 BC (34). It is largely for this reason that the vast majority of scholars have totally rejected the tradition (35) . I have argued elsewhere in detail that the tradition may be accepted, albeit with minor adjustments. At least, the tradition cannot now be rejected out of hand. Our next case is more secure. At some time before his death in 51 BC, Ptolemy XII Auletes made a will. He kept a sealed copy of it at Alexandria and sent another to Rome to be placed in the treasury, the aerarium. But, says Caesar, the copy sent to Rome could not be placed there 'because of state preoccupations' (propter publicas occupationes): it was therefore left with Pompey (36). What Caesar means by this phrase is not entirely clear. The most likely period for the arrival of the will in Rome is the^late fifties, after Auletes' restoration through Gabinius in 55 BC and before his death in 51 BC, though the possibility of an earlier date cannot be excluded. Before the will could be installed in the treasury its installation would have to be sanctioned by the Senate. It seems probable therefore that Caesar means that when the will arrived at Rome the Senate was too busy to deal with it. Once it was placed in the hands of Pompey, then pre-

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eminent at Rome, the impetus for its being placed in the treasury would be reduced if not cancelled. Of course, Pompey was also the particular champion of Auletes at Rome, which in turn accounts for the will being placed with him faute de mieux (37). In the will, Auletes named his heirs: his elder son and daughter who were to reign jointly in accordance with Ptolem­ aic practice as Ptolemy XIII and Cleopatra VII. At the same time Auletes appealed to the populus Romanus by all the gods and the treaties he had made at Rome that his will be carried out (haec uti fierent; Caes. BC iii 108). He was thus asking the Romans to agree to and recognise the accession of his heirs. Auletes, who had struggled for some twenty years to achieve his own recognition at great expense against calls for the annexation of his kingdom at Rome was very well aware of the importance of recognition. As in the case of Philopator's will, the Senate appointed an individual Roman to wield tutela on behalf of the populus Romanus. Pompey was the obvious choice, both on account of his strong connection with Auletes and because the appoint­ ment of an individual tutor seems to have been left until 49 BC and a meeting of the Pompeian Senate at Thessalonica (38). That Pompeyfs tutela included Cleopatra VII can hardly be doubted (39) . But despite the appointment Pompey did not immediately visit Egypt. Of course, he had a war to fight, but his failure to do so could suggest that a tutor, once appointed, was not necessarily expected even to visit the kingdom of his ward. The notion of tutela may improve our understanding of developments after Pharsalus. It was then that Pompey did make for Egypt, only to be murdered off its shore. According to Caesar, Ptolemy's advisers later claimed that they arranged the murder because they feared that he would take over the kingdom. This claim is perhaps better appreciated if we re­ member that Pompey was technically the guardian of Ptolemy (and of the queen with whom he was then at war) , the role performed in practice by Ptolemy's principal adviser, Pothinus. Pompey had some claim to assume a significant position in the kingdom, possibly at the expense of Pothinus (40). Upon the death of Ptolemy XIII, Caesar appointed the late king's younger brother as Ptolemy XIV to rule jointly with Cleopatra. He is said to have derived his authority to do so from the terms of Auletes1 will and his office as dictator and thus agent of the populus Romanus named therein: that is, Caesar seems to have claimed the position of tutor over his appointees (Dio xlii 35.4-6). If this is correct, we can discern another level to the relationship between Caesar and Cleopatra: that of guardian and ward respectively. Next, to Thrace. Dio tells us that on his way back from Asia into Macedonia in 42 BC, Brutus took control of the land of Sadalas II of Thrace. Sadalas, he explains, had died

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childless and had bequeathed his land to the Romans (Dio xlvii 25.1-2), But Dio's testimony is problematic, for Sadalas seems to have left a son (41). If Dio's account is in error as to Sadalas1 childlessness, it is possible that he is also in error as to the existence of a will of Sadalas. If Sadalas had a son and heir, he is not likely to have left his kingdom to Rome. It is precisely for this reason that the existence of the will is usually denied (42). Yet, though Dio might easily be ignorant of Sadalas1 son, it is more difficult to suppose him to have in­ vented a will. An entirely hypothetical compromise solution suggests itself. We are told that Sadalas died fighting his enemies and that he left a wife and young son. In this sit­ uation the succession was evidently imperilled. It seems possible therefore that Sadalas did indeed make a will as Dio says, but a will appointing Rome as tutor of his heir. (iii) Of the Republican wills, there remains the case of Massinissa of Numidia. In 148 BC he died in extreme old age (43). Shortly before his death he had asked Scipio Aemilianus to visit him in order to discuss the succession. Scipio was then serving in Africa as military tribune in the Third Punic War. Scipio arrived to find the king dead. We are told that before he died Massinissa left instructions that his family was to abide by the decisions made by Scipio on the succession: these instructions were apparently followed (44). Of course, Scipio was an obvious choice for Massinissa. His physical proximity apart, he was the adoptive grandson of Scipio Africanus who had installed the king upon Rome's victory at Zama: our sources are entirely explicit as to the relevance of this connection (45). Moreover, Aemilianus was himself no stranger to Massinissa and his family. He visited Numidia in the course of the Celtiberian war in 151 BC, sent to fetch elephants. There he very probably met two of Massinissa1s principal heirs, Gulussa and Micipsa (App. Lib. 70-2) , and quite possibly the third, Mastanabal. If Cicero's chronology can be trusted, Scipio visited Massinissa again in 149 BC (46). The very fact that Scipio was chosen for the mission to the king in 151 BC is sufficient indication of the connec­ tion. The succession to Massinissa was to take place in the course of a war which was the culmination of half a century of hostility between Carthage and Numidia. Further, inter­ ference in the Numidian succession was a known Carthaginian tactic from which Massinissa had himself once suffered (47). The combination of these two facts made it crucial for Mass­ inissa to arrange his succession. This was made particularly difficult by the uncharacteristically poor state of relations between Massinissa and Rome at this time. According to Appian,

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Massinissa was angry with Rome because, by declaring war on Carthage, she was on his view taking a prize which he had earned: Rome had not even given him prior warning of her invasion of Africa (48). The attraction of a Roman adviser and, in the event, a Roman agent, in these difficult times is apparent. He was ostensibly outside the internal rivalries of the Numidian elite and could therefore function as an acceptable arbiter. At the same time he was in no position to usurp the throne for himself. Scipio would be both acceptable in Numidia and influential at Rome (49). How far Scipio was left a free hand in arranging the succession is unclear. Some scholars have assumed the exis­ tence of a will of Massinissa, but there is no evidence that he made one (50) . Scipio's division was not geographical but functional. According to Appian, Scipio gave each of Massinissa1s three principal heirs the royal title and joint control of the kingdom's wealth. In addition Micipsa received Cirta and the royal palace there, Gulussa was made arbiter of peace and war, while Mastanabal was given control of justice (App. Lib. 106; cf. Zon. ix 27). Though all three brothers are said to have received the royal title and important functions, Micipsa had the particular trappings of royalty: Cirta and the royal palace. If Massinissa did indeed designate Micipsa his main heir, as Zonaras states and Appian implies, we need not supp­ ose Scipio to have acted contrary to his wishes in dividing the kingdom: it may well be that Micipsa was made high-king among the three brothers, whether at the instigation of Mass­ inissa or that of Scipio (51). (iv) As to the wills of the Principate, the Herods constitute our best evidence: their wills are therefore treated first. The reign of Herod the Great, particularly in its latter years, was dogged by palace intrigue in which the succession to the ageing king was the dominant issue. As these intrigues unfolded, Herod changed his will on several occasions. His wills are therefore a more complex and changing affair than the other wills under discussion seem to have been. However, when comparing the Herods to other dynasties we must const­ antly bear in mind that we are especially well-informed in their case. It may be, therefore, that this complexity is no more than a function of our greater knowledge and that it was in fact matched in other cases. Certainly, where we have detailed information of a struggle for succession, complexity and fluidity are more the norm than the exception, particul­ arly where the king is, like Herod, polygamous (52). We are told that Herod was granted explicit permission to arrange his own succession by Augustus. The very grant of

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such permission is itself an indication of the extent to which royal successions were controlled by the emperor in the Early Empire. Such a grant is unparalleled and, although no king is as well-attested as Herod, it seems to have been at least unusual (53). Probably immediately upon his return to Judaea, having received this permission at Rome, Herod publicly named his successors (54) . Antipater was named as his principal heir and, after him, Alexander and Aristobulus (55). These public designations seem to have been intended to put an end to intrigues over the succession: it was perhaps with this in view that Augustus had granted Herod the privil­ ege. According to Josephus, Herod might have preferred to abdicate in favour of his sons, but Augustus forbade it: if there is anything in this story it is an indication of the burden constituted by the succession issue (56). But if these designations were intended to stop intrigue, they failed: intrigue continued apace resulting in the exec­ utions of Alexander and Aristobulus (57). This would leave Antipater as principal heir. It is possible - though a possibility usually ignored - that Herod changed his will at this stage, for we are told that at this time Philip was named as heir after Antipater until he was struck out of Herod's will (58) . But whatever changes may have been made Antipater remained principal heir (59). But Antipater was discredited in turn when the leading role he had played in the succession struggle came to light. Prompted by these revelations and by his own illness, Herod made another will. Although now his eldest eligible sons, with Antipater disgraced, Philip and Archelaus were not included: according to Josephus, their chances had been damaged by the calumnies of Antipater. In their stead Herod named Antipas as principal heir. To his other children he awarded legacies consisting of tracts of land and sums of money; whether Archelaus and Philip were in­ cluded in this category is not known. To Salome, his sister, Herod left a large legacy in return for her fidelity. Herod seems also to have left legacies to his grandsons (60). This is the first will of Herod given in any detail by Josephus and it is in this will for the first time that we find a Roman dimension to his dispositions. Whether the Romans had figured in his earlier wills we do not know, but it seems probable that they did: the same may be said of his legacies to his broader family. Augustus was to receive l,000t. and (according to BJ i 646) gifts in kind. The emp­ eror was not the only Roman beneficiary, under the will: 500t. (AJ xvii 146), or approximately that .amount (BJ i 646) , was to be divided between Livia, the imperial children, imperial amici and imperial freedmen. Having made these new dispositions and having received the imperial sanction, Herod had Antipater executed (61). With Antipater dead, Herod seems to have changed his attitude to the victims of his intrigues. Foreseeing imminent death,

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Herod changed his will once more. Now Archelaus, his eldest son, was named as principal heir, while Antipas and Philip each received tetrarchies. Salome received Jamneia, Phasaelis and Azotus with 500 pieces of coined silver. The other royal relatives received sums of money and revenues. Augustus was to receive 10 million pieces of silver, together with gold and silver vessels and precious clothes, while Livia 'and some others' were to receive 5 million pieces of silver. In this last will, Herod's dispositions with regard to the Romans seem not to have changed - there was no reason why they should: the 'others' who were to share a legacy with Livia are presumably the children, amici and freedmen of the previous will. Whether Salome's legacy had changed we cannot tell: there is no reason to suppose it to have done so. The essential change is the inclusion of Archelaus and Philip in this final will at the expense of Antipas. Shortly after making this will, Herod died (62). The will was read in public after a letter from Herod to his troops calling for their continued obedience. It is only at this point that we find for the first time that Augustus' role with regard to the will was more than that of legatee: Herod charged his heir with the task of taking his seal and documents relating to the administration of the kingdom to Augustus at Rome. The will was not to take effect until Aug­ ustus had ratified it (63). This suggests something of a contradiction, for Herod had long since received the privilege of appointing his own successor. But although it may be that this stipulation was not strictly necessary, it was most cer­ tainly prudent: Herod's heir could only rule with the support of Augustus. Such prudence was particularly well-advised since Herod was on the brink of death and could not obtain Augustus' approval of his changed will before he died. Further, it may be that Herod, who was well-versed in the intrigues of a struggle for the succession, realised that his final arrange­ ments would not stand undisputed. Of course, Herod's will was contested. Archelaus made the journey to Rome as instructed: others went too. Antipas went to argue for the validity of Herod's penultimate will whereby he had been named as principal heir. Both he and Archelaus were accompanied by entourages from Herod's household. Philip also made the journey. As well as members of the royal family, a Jewish and a Greek delegation also went to put their respec­ tive cases: the former urged that no Herod should be appointed king and that the Jews should enjoy autonomy under Roman rule, while the latter seem to have sought removal from the Herodian kingdom (64). Augustus was faced with two types of request: that embodied in Herod's last will (and supported in person by Archelaus and his backers) , and those contrary requests presented to him in person by these various parties. Augustus' final decision suggests a degree of response to both. Archelaus was to rule

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the largest part of Herod's kingdom, but without the royal title. Augustus allowed him only the title of ethnarchr with­ holding the royal title until he had earned it. This decision may have been conditioned by the appeal of the Jewish deleg­ ation that the monarchy be ended: Pompey seems to have respon­ ded similarly to a similar request, by withholding the royal title from Hyrcanus II and allowing him only that of ethnarch and high-priest (65) . Archelaus was also deprived of the Greek cities of Gadara, Gaza and Hippus, which were annexed to Syria. The annexation of these cities may well have been a response to the Greek delegation. Antipas and Philip received exactly what Herod had left them. Salome received her legacy from Herod, to which Augustus added the palace at Ascalon. The rest of the family received the legacies allotted them by Herod. In addition, Augustus gave 500,000 drachmas to Herod's two unmarried daughters and married them off to sons of Herod's brother Pheroras. On top of all this, Augustus distributed among the family the l,000t. left him by Herod (66). Augustus1 arrangements can therefore be seen as something of a compromise between the various claims upon him, not least the perpetual need to be beneficent (67). From all that Herod had left him, Augustus kept only a few mementoes of the dead king. Herod's is not the only will known from his dynasty. Upon her death in about AD 10, Herod's sister, Salome, left a will in which she bequeathed Jamneia, Phasaelis and Archelais to Livia. Augustus is not named as a beneficiary (68). It has been suggested that Salome was all but forced to make this bequest: that she may have only been allowed to receive her legacy from Herod, the palace at Ascalon and, later, Archelais, on the clear understanding that she bequeath it all to Livia on her death. But this is to misconceive the nature of Salome's bequest: it was a bequest to a friend and patron, for Salome and Livia seem to have been especially close. They are first connected at the time when marriage was mooted between Salome and Syllaeus of Nabataea: it was Livia who persuaded her against the match. It was precisely this link between them that made Salome vulnerable to a ploy of Antipater, who used Livia1s slave, Acme, to forge correspondence supposedly sent by Salome to Livia, denouncing Herod. The very nature of the plot serves to underline the connection between the two ladies (69). It is curious that Josephus omits Azotus and the palace at Ascalon from his list of the properties left to Livia by Salome. This could be a small oversight on Josephus' part or it could be that Salome bequeathed them to another: perhaps to her daughter, Berenice. Berenice herself made a will involving Rome, for we are told that she bequeathed a freedman named Protos to Antonia, the mother of Claudius (70) . We have no further knowledge of the contents of the will. Like Salome and Livia, Berenice and Antonia had been close. The connection

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comes to light as part of the early life of Agrippa I, Berenice1s son. Antonia had had him brought up in the circle of Claudius. It was for this reason and because she remem­ bered Berenice that Antonia later made Agrippa a vital loan (71). The wills of the Herods are not the only wills known from the Early Empire. It is generally held that upon his death in 25 BC Amyntas, king of Galatiaf left a will under which Augustus was a beneficiary (72). The case rests primarily on a passage of Strabo, who, when discussing the priesthood of Men at Pisidian Antioch, says that after the death of Amyntas the priesthood was dissolved by those sent to take charge of Amyntas1 kleronomia (xii p.577) . This kleronomia is usually taken to be a legacy left to Augustus by Amyntas (73). It is perhaps odd that neither Strabo nor Dio mention such a legacy at what might seem more appropriate points in their respective accounts. One wonders whether kleronomia might mean no more than 'what Amyntas had left upon his death'. But the standard view finds some support in the fact that a slave and a freedman, each with the agnomen 'Amyntianus', are known to have been members of the imperial household. This agnomen would be explained, if, as often supposed, they had been left to Augustus by Amyntas of Galatia (74). The bequest of slaves and freedmen to the imperial family is a well-known phenomenon. We have already seen that Beren­ ice, Herod's niece, left a freedman to Antonia (75). More­ over, in addition to these 'Amyntiani', three more agnomina reminiscent of kings are found in the familia Caesaris: Herodianus, Archelaianus and Iubatianus. It is usually held that these men were bequeathed by Herod the Great, Archelaus of Cappadocia and Juba II of Mauretania respectively (76) . That Juba left any such legacy is otherwise unattested. A neglected passage of Jordanes provides some very slight support for a will of Archelaus of Cappadocia, but a will bequeathing his whole kingdom to the Romans, not a legacy to the emperor (77) . The presence of a Herodianus must advise caution. As we have seen, Josephus gives detailed information on Herod's bequest to Augustus and what part of that bequest Augustus accepted: at no point does Josephus mention such an individual. It is possible that Josephus includes him among the items kept by Augustus, but these seem to have been orna­ ments (78) . Of course, Josephus could be guilty of a minor omission, but it may also be that Herodianus passed from Herod the Great to Augustus - which is in itself uncertain - during the king's lifetime (79) . Doubts which apply to the case of Herodianus can also be levelled at others like him. It must be concluded that an agnomen alone is insufficient evidence for a legacy to be assumed, though it is suggestive of one. Next, Noricum. Hassall has recently suggested that the annexation of Noricum, probably in 15 BC, may (his italics)

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have been consequent upon the will of its last king. Of course, the possibility of such a will cannot be denied, but it must be stressed that there is no shred of evidence to support the suggestion: the silence of our sources, poor as they are, must tell against it. In fact the only reason for annexation offered by any source is that given by Dio, who regards the annexation as a response to a Norican invasion of 16 BC. The annexation seems to have been part of the broader northern offensive of Tiberius and Drusus in 15 BC (80). Finally, to Britain and the Iceni. In AD 59 or 60, Prasutagus, king of the Iceni, died. He left a will in which he named Nero and his two daughters as his heirs. Our evid­ ence for this will consists entirely of a single passage of Tacitus, who is more concerned with the ensuing revolt of Boudica (sic) than with the will. But the will was no small matter, for, according to Tacitus, Prasutagus had long been famous for his wealth (81). At this point we meet a major problem which is too often passed by: we simply do not know how Nero and the king's daughters were to divide the inheritance, for Tacitus does not tell us (82). It could be that the king envisaged the succession of his daughters (or one of them) to the throne, as is often assumed. But it is equally possible that, like Nicomedes IV of Bithynia, Prasutagus had bequeathed his king­ dom to Nero and provided for his daughters in legacies. There seems to be no way around this problem, but one point deserves attention. In Tacitus' account of the revolt of Boudica and its origins, Tacitus does not say that Nero's agents were wrong to take the kingdom: this is not made an issue. Rather, Tacitus attacks the brutal manner of the annexation. Tacitus' line of attack must be some slight indication that Prasutagus had bequeathed his kingdom to Nero and that annexation was in itself justified. II It should now be apparent that the range and number of royal wills involving Rome is considerably greater than is usually recognised. As we have seen, each case is enmeshed in its own particular circumstances. These are fundamental to our under­ standing of the wills. But, while giving full recognition to their importance, we must generalise if we are to understand the rationale behind these wills: they must be treated as a single multi-faceted phenomenon. The most rewarding approach is through those wills of the Republic which conferred tutela on the populus Romanus. Our starting-point must be the awareness that under any monarchical system, the succession is an ever-present, potentially overwhelming difficult. The wills of Herod are a case in point. Filial succession, whereby the royal father is succeeded by his royal son, is the mode of succession most

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favoured in those cases with which we are concerned. Under this system, the king might well leave a successor who was still a minor. If the minor was to succeed successfully and thereafter retain his throne, he would need adult acquiescence and support: particularly valuable to him would be a guardian or regent. But the guardian must not seize power for himself. The selection of a guardian is therefore a matter of the high­ est importance if the royal son is to keep his throne. The royal father might well seek to control it. His will would be a powerful instrument of control. This is the mechanism that generates royal wills naming the guardian(s) of the royal heir(s). Of course, such wills are by no means confined to royalty: they are found at all levels of society where filial succession is practised (83). Once the decision to appoint a guardian has been taken, the king must consider his choice. One pair of alternatives open to the king is particularly important for us: he can choose a member of his kingdom or a foreigner. If he prefers a plurality of guardians, he can include both. The populus Romanus was such a foreigner. But this foreigner was no stranger. The populus Romanus was the king's friend and ally: upon this connection the king's position might very well depend. Ihis pre-existing link must have been fundamental to the king's selection of the populus Romanus. Closely related to this was the power and renown of Rome: Rome could be an author­ itative guardian. At the same time, as Rome began increasing­ ly to control succession in the Mediterranean world, she became the obvious choice (84). It must be stressed that the employment of an external guardian is not confined to the relationship between kings and Rome (85). Of particular interest to us is the fact that the practice is known to have occurred in Asia Minor well before the Romans.became a major force there. Ihis fact is illustrated by the will of Nicomedes I of Bithynia, who seems to have died about 255/3 BC (86), leaving a will which appointed five external guardians to his two young sons by his second wife; these he named as his heirs in preference to Ziaealas, his elder son by his first wife. The guardians so appointed comprised two kings, Ptolemy II and Antigonus Gonatas, and the peoples of three cities, Heracleia Pontica, Byzantium and ♦Cius (87). Heracleia and Byzantium had previously formed a coalition with Antigonus and Nicomedes against Antiochus I: nor was Ptolemy II a friend of the Seleucid (88). However, the might of these guardians did not prevent Ziaealas, with his own external support from the Galatians, seizing the throne for himself. The Bithynians opposed him with the help of troops obtained from the guardians of Nicomedes' young heirs, but to no avail. Under the eventual settlement, neg­ otiated, according to Memnon of Heracleia, by Heracleia, Ziaealas was left as king; but the repercussions of the will and the usurpation did not end there. One of the two young

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heirs seems to have settled in Macedon, the kingdom of one of his guardians. From there, another guardian, the Byzan­ tines, brought him in a futile attempt to restore him to the Bithynian throne in place of their enemy, Prusias I, son of Ziaealas (89). The case of Nicomedes' will is a valuable illustration of the role of external guardians. We should note that, as might be expected, Nicomedes seems to have appointed as guar­ dians those with whom he had already formed friendly links (90). Moreover, among these guardians were three cities more precisely, the peoples of three cities. There is a particularly close parallel and precedent here for the app­ ointment of Rome - more precisely, the populus Romanus - as guardian to royal heirs (91). Further, the whole affair amply indicates the uncertainties of succession even where such powerful guardians were appointed. In this case the guardians act as providers of military support against usurpation (though, one may suspect, not applying their full force), as intermediaries for their charges upon the failure of their cause, as providers of a place of refuge thereafter, and as active supporters of the cause again when it suited them. As Rome emerged as a dominant force in the Mediterranean world, at the centre of a web of alliances, a king might well name the populus Romanus as guardian of his heir(s), where previously he would have named other cities and kings (92). Further, we have seen that a king tended to choose as guarddians of his heir(s) cities and kings with which he had a particular connection. But where the populus Romanus is concerned, there is rather more to it than this. It must be stressed that the whole relationship between Rome and her kings was regularly conceived in terms of protection and guardianship, of the exercise of tutela by the populus Romanus over the king (93). Thus, when Hiero II joined the Romans in 263 BC, Polybius says that he placed himself under the protection of the Romans (Pol. i 16.10). Similarly Cicero asserts that kings and foreign peoples had always been under the tutela of the consuls, the chief magistrates of the populus Romanus (pro Sest. 64). When Cornelius Gallus set up his famous inscription, he claimed to have received Ethiopian legates at Philae and to have taken the king of Ethiopia into tutela (94). It is as part of this conception of Rome's position vis-a-vis kings that we should understand Velleius1 characterisation of the independence of Mithridates VI Eupator: he describes him as the last of all the kings (except the Parthians) to be sui Juris; that is/ not under the tutela of Rome (Veil. Pat. ii 40.1) . This conception can only have been reinforced where kings sent their sons to Rome in their youth and thus set them physically in Roman hands: according to Livy, the legates of Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia recognised and encouraged this conception when they petitioned that the future Ariarathes V, sent to be brought up at Rome at the

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beginning of the "Third Macedonian War, should be kept 'not only in the custody of private hosts, but also in the care and, so to speak, guardianship of the state' (95). Therefore when the king looked for an external guardian for his heir, Rome was the obvious choice not only because she was powerful and a state with which the king had friendly relations, but also because this very relationship was one which might be considered a form of tutela. By appointing Rome as tutor, the king strengthened the connection between Rome and his heir, a connection which became increasingly important as Rome's power grew. Something of a bridge between the narrower and broader senses of tutela is provided by the case of Cicero and Ariobarzanes III of Cappadocia in 51 BC. Cicero was commissioned by the Senate to protect the king, whose father had recently been assassinated. Cicero explicitly describes his role as tutela (96). In this case the tutor was appointed not as the result of a will but, apparently, entirely on the initiative of Rome: the commission was for Cicero a supplementary task added to his governorship of neighbouring Cilicia. Cicero makes much of the singularity of his commission and the fact that we know of no earlier case like it bears him out (ad Fam. xv 2.4). But though it may have been the first, it seems not to have been the last, for Suetonius states that Augustus appointed guardians over young or mentally ill kings: 'He held them (i.e. kings) all in his care, exactly as components and parts of empire: it was even his practice to appoint a manager (rector) for the young and those who suffered mental illness, until they . _ ,ON grew up or recovered.' /f. ^ ^ (Suet. Aug. 48) We should observe the notion that the emperor took care of kings: this is another aspect of tutela. However, only one case of such an appointment is known and this has been misin­ terpreted. Dio tells us that Augustus sent an epitropos to administer Cappadocia, because its king, Archelaus, was not compos mentis (Dio lvii 17.5). Dio gives no further details. The term epitropos has been taken to mean 'procurator'. But this is to miss the point for, although it can indeed mean 'procurator', it is also the Greek translation of tutor. The appointment of such a tutor would be entirely appropriate in the case of a mentally ill individual, as Archelaus is said to have been. Moreover, Dio clearly uses epitropos in just this sense only a little later in his narrative (Dio lvii 23.4). This appointment therefore provides some substantiation for Suetonius' generalisation, for, though Suetonius uses the term rector, he evidently has the role of a tutor in mind. Whether there is any more substance to the generalisation we do not know (97).

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An imperial tutor is also known to have been sent to Thrace by Tiberius in AD 19 or shortly after. He was sent to administer the kingdom of the sons of the murdered Cotys VIII, who were still minors. Once again the initiative for the appointment seems to have come from Rome: at least no will is mentioned (Tac. Ann, ii 67) . The appointment of this man, of Archelaus' tutor and of Cicero represents a practical manif­ estation of Rome's conception of her imperial role. A sense of proportion must be retained. Although the appointment of external guardians is a common enough phenom­ enon, instances of it in the Graeco-Roman world are rare: Nicomedes I and Auletes constitute the only definite cases. A sense of proportion is still more important when we come to consider the wills in which a king went a stage further and bequeathed his kingdom to Rome under the Republic. It must immediately be stressed that we know of no Hellenistic prec­ edent for this practice before the will of Physcon in 155 BC. But in the following eighty years or so we know of four more such wills besides (98). It is probably this lack of Hellenistic precedent that has led some scholars to argue that Rome actively encouraged kings to make such wills so as to gain their kingdoms. It is likely enough that individual Romans consorted with kings about their wills, much as Massinissa sought the advice of his Roman friend and patron Scipio Aemilianus upon the matter of his succession. But it is quite another matter to suppose that the Roman state actually worked for the cession of kingdoms by will. There is no evidence to support the view and the Roman reaction - or lack of it - to the bequest of Cyrenaica must tell against it in this case at least (99). At this point we must consider the case of Mithridates V of Pontus, the father of Eupator, for here, it might be thought, lies a precedent for such wills in the Hellenistic world. According to Justin, Eupator claimed that his father inherited Paphlagonia from its king, Pylaemenes (xxxviii 4.5): Eupator is made to advance this claim in order to counter Roman objections to his invasion of the kingdom: its validity is at best dubious (100). Later, Justin makes Eupator say that he alone of kings possessed not only his ancestral domains but also 'foreign kingdoms acquired by inheritances through his munificence' (Justin xxxviii 7.10): these he names as Colchis, the Bosporus and Paphlagonia, but his claims to Colchis and the Bosporus seem as dubious as those to Paph­ lagonia (101). However, invalid as they seem to be, these claims take on a more interesting aspect when set beside a well-known passage from Sallust's Histories which we have met before. In the letter to the Parthian king which Sallust attributes to him, Mithridates is made to claim that the will of Attalus III is a forgery, while Bithynia should not have been inherited by

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Rome, since Nicomedes left a legitimate heir. We have seen that these assertions, like the claims attributed to him by Justin, lack credence. But what emerges from Justin and Sallust is something of a tradition that Eupator concerned himself with the bequest and inheritance of kingdoms, espec­ ially in the context of his dealings with Rome. How far this tradition reflects the concerns of the historical Mithridates is unknown, but we must remember that as a leading king in Asia Minor, very probably with ambitions to become more than that, the arrival of Rome through the bequests of Attalus and Nicomedes was a matter of outstanding importance. That is, it seems more likely that the supposed inheritances of the Pontic kings were generated by the relatively frequent and essentially new incidence of wills from 155 BC onwards than that they constitute an independent Hellenistic precedent. Wills by which kings left kingdoms to Rome fall into two main categories. On the one side, the wills of the Ptolemies. It is hardly coincidence that three of the five wills by which kings left their kingdoms to Republican Rome were made by members of the same dynasty: Physcon, Apion and Alexander II. Nor is it likely to be coincidence that wills appointing the populus Romanus as tutor of the royal heir(s) - the wills of Philopator and Auletes - are twice found within the same Ptolemaic dynasty. Ihe number of wills involving Rome made by the Ptolemies is thus entirely disproportionate. It may very well be that each Ptolemy was stimulated to make such a will by the wills of his predecessors (102) . Ihe second category of wills by which kingdoms were be­ queathed to Rome is found in north-west Asia Minor, in the intimately related kingdoms of Bithynia and Pergamum. We may add the rhetoric ascribed to Mithridates and the will of Sadalas, for Thrace may readily be considered an area closely related to north-west Asia Minor. Here too the same phenomenon may be discernible. When Nicomedes IV drafted his will leav­ ing his kingdom to Rome, he must have been aware of the will of Attalus. It has already been suggested that Mithridates1 rhetoric (if it is indeed his and not that of Justin and Sallust) was encouraged by the bequest of kingdoms to Rome. If Sadalas did indeed make a will, he in turn may have done so with an eye to the wills of those who had ruled neighbouring kingdoms. Having observed thse two groups of wills, it is tempting to seek some connection between them. No very particular connection is to be found by which the practice of making such wills passed from one sphere to the other. But both the rulers of north-west Asia Minor and the Ptolemies were import­ ant figures in the Eastern Mediterranean: more important, both were connected with Rome. It is in terms of this very obvious common ground that we must start to understand why wills involving Rome start to appear with relative frequency from the late third and, especially, the second century BC.

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This was the very period in which Rome emerged as a dominant force in the Eastern Mediterranean, relying for her power and position largely on the friendships and alliances she had formed with the kings and communities of the area. This is the foundation, but another factor must be stress­ ed. All those kings who definitely left kingdoms to Rome, with the possible exception of Apion, had very troubled reigns. This much has been observed before and has given rise to what is now the dominant interpretation of the rationale behind these wills: that they were made as a form of 'insurance policy1 for the king. It is argued that the king made a will of this type in order to protect himself from his enemies. The will protected the king, it is urged, because it made it quite clear to the king's enemies that, should they succeed in killing him, they must next face Rome as his successor. At the same time, it is argued, the very act of making such a will could only improve the king's standing with the Romans and thereby strengthen his position on the throne still fur­ ther. The vital piece of evidence for this view is the will of Physcon, since, it is claimed, '...the basic intention (sc. behind this will) was to make it profitless for Philometor to murder his brother' (103). To some extent the view is attractive and no attempt will be made to deny it all validity; but, at the same time, it will be argued that the view entails certain difficulties and is at most only one facet of the rationale behind these wills. The insurance policy notion, as we may call it, depends entirely upon the contents of the king's will being known to his enemies (104), and preferably also to the Romans. In the case of Physcon this presents no problem since, pace Wilcken and Bickermann, it seems to have been published at the time of the king's difficulties in 155 BC. That it was known to Philometor and to the king's enemies within the kingdom is therefore probable enough. Its contents were presumably also known at Rome, whither a copy was sent: it seems unlikely that it would be published in Cyrene and kept secret at Rome. But with Attalus' will the situation is very different. There is no reason at all to suppose that the contents of the will were known in Pergamum until the king died. Moreover, it seems not to have been known at Rome until Eudemus arrived with it in 133 BC, which tends to suggest that it was not known in Pergamum either. In the other three cases of such wills under the Republic, we have no information as to their publication or secrecy. However, it is ^difficult to imagine Alexander II, sc soon after his accession, still in his youth and in a deteriorating situation, proclaiming at Alexandria that he intended bo bequeath his kingdom to Rome. On this crucial point of publication the 'insurance policy' notion requires a large measure of assumption, assump­ tion which, in the cases of Attalus and Alexander at least, seems unwarranted. But if the king's enemies were to be

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deterred by the terms of his will they must know these terms. Moreover, the 'insurance policy' notion depends not only on the will being known but on its having a deterrent effect once known. There are two problems here. First, the king was already closely aligned with Rome. Therefore, should he be killed, his killers must face the possibility of retribution from Rome in any case. Therefore we must suppose, on the 'insurance policy1 view, that the king made his will not simply as a deterrent but rather as a boost to the deterrent effect already created by his link with Rome. This is entirely plausible, but the deterrent effect of the will itself then becomes rather less significant. The second problem is more serious: the will would only deter those deterred by the prospect of war with Rome. Given this, the 'insurance policy' notion does not suit the cases of Alexander and Nicomedes. In the Late Republic the Alexandrian mob had scant respect for Rome as it showed by killing Alex­ ander and ousting Auletes: a will would hardly have stopped it and, in the event, did not. Similarly, Mithridates had fought two wars with Rome before 74 BC, caused in part by his designs upon Bithynia, and almost immediately upon the Roman annexation of the kingdom he invaded it to start a third. Nicomedes can hardly have expected to gain very much by be­ queathing his kingdom to Rome for the purpose of 'insurance': Rome had twice shown that she would support him against Mithridates. It has been suggested that Philometor spared Physcon's life in 154 BC because he was deterred by the prospect of Rome in Cyrenaica (and perhaps Cyprus) . Of course this is possible, but it is equally possible that Philometor spared Physcon in order to improve - or at least not make worse - his position at Rome: that is, Physcon's broad relationship with Rome, not simply his will, may very well have saved his life (105) . In short, there is no reason to suppose that a royal will ever deterred an aggressor: Attalus1 will evidently failed to deter Aristonicus, whose revolt seems to have broken out and certainly continued after the will was public knowledge. Similarly, we have seen that wills did not save Alexander or Nicomedesf Bithynia. If kings left their kingdoms to Rome to' ensure their personal safety from attack by instilling a fear of a Roman succession, they seem to have seriously mis­ calculated. But the notion of the will as an 'insurance policy' is not to be completely denied. In most circumstances the potential succession of Rome can only have impr6ved the king's position, but only where the king's will was known and then only to a limited extent. The notion seems most plausible in the case of Physcon, but even there it finds little support beyond the simple fact that Physcon mentions a plot against himself in his will.

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Another line of approach is suggested by another factor common to all these wills: all the kings who made them seem to have lacked a successor. Particularly striking on this point is the will of Physoonf where it is explicity stated that the will only applies while the king remains without a successor (lines 12-13). Further, it has been suggested that Nicomedes1 will contained a similar clause, since Mithridates is made to say that Rome should not have annexed Bithynia because Nicomedes left a son (106). We need not go so far as to posit such a clause; it is sufficient that Mithridates should be made to present such an argument. These were the wills of men with no son to succeed them. It has been observed that the ordinary private individual, if he lacked a successor within his family, might well look for a successor among his friends. That is precisely what these kings were doing (107). Particularly striking is the way in which Physcon harps upon his friendship and alliance with Rome in his will. This is especially the case at lines 15-16, where Physcon1s reference to this friendship and alliance is not otiose as Otto thought, but rather an explanation of the appointment of the Romans as heirs to the kingdom. At the same time, Physcon seems to envisage his will as an instru­ ment which carried over his friendship and alliance with Rome into the period after his death (esp. lines 20-22). Similarly, Auletes' rather different sort of will seems to have invoked the king's foedera with Rome in order that his arrangements be approved and carried out (Caes. BC iii 108). To compare the friendship of private individuals with that between a king and Rome is not as facile as it might at first appear. In the Hellenistic world in particular, interstate relations were understood and expressed on many occasions in familial terms: often states traced a familial link back to a common legendary or historical ancestry. Thanks to the legendary role of Trojans in the foundation of the city, Rome was very much a part of this phenomenon. Further, the notion of a familial link between Rome and her kings also existed on a metaphorical level. So, when a king looked beyond his family to his friend the populus Romanus as his successor, he was looking to a friend who might even be deemed part of the family (108). Moreover, Rome was a friend from whom the king may well have received large benefits, either in person or through his predecessors. A king thus indebted to Rome's beneficence can only have been encouraged to leave his kingdom to Rome where a suitable successor was lacking within*his family (109). Physcon had most certainly derived benefits from his assoc­ iation with Rome, who had supported him against Antiochus IV and Philometor in turn. Similarly Attalid power had grown with that of Rome, despite a temporary lapse under Eumenes II. Of Apion we do not know enough: it is sufficient that he was the son of Physcon. Alexander had been sent to rule by Sulla,

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while Nicomedes IV could only retain his throne with Roman military backing. Another notable feature of the wills of Physcon, Attalus and perhaps Apion is the king's apparent solicitude for his kingdom after his death. Physcon calls upon Rome to come to the aid of his kingdom should it be attacked: his appeal constitutes a quarter of the whole document (lines 17-23). Attalus provided for the freedom of the cities of his kingdom, it seems: certainly for that of Pergamum. Apion may have done the same. This sort of solicitude is paralleled in the wills of other Hellenistic rulers. Polybius thinks that Antigonus Doson was an admirable protector of his kingdom and his son both in his lifetime and after his death, because in his will Doson made detailed dispositions for everything in order to forestall the rivalries and quarrels that could accompany succession (Pol. iv 87. 6-8). Similarly, Antiochus IV of Syria, Physcon1s enemy, recognising the possibility of sudden death through illness or warfare, is said to have written a letter to the Jews in which he arranged the succession in order to forestall internal unrest and foreign invasions. Moreover, in the same letter, Antiochus says that his father habitually took this precaution, whenever he crossed the Euphrates (110). Such expressions of solicitude were not entirely disin­ terested. Through careful dispositions and a smoothly arran­ ged succession, whether by son or by Rome, the king could only increase his own renown. This would improve his standing both in life, if the will were known, and after death when it would be put into practice, winning praise for the king, like that bestowed on Doson by Polybius. But that is not to impugn the genuineness of the king's concern which may well have been a major factor in his decision to leave the kingdom to the Romans (111). Once again the conception of Rome's imperial role in terms of tutela becomes relevant, as does the fact that all the kings who made such wills seems to have had troubled reigns: their kingdoms were particularly in need of such care. We are now in a position to offer a general explanation of the rationale behind wills involving Rome. Where a king had an heir who was a minor, the populus Romanus could be appointed as tutor, but where the king had no successor, he might be led to name the populus Romanus as his heir by the variety of interrelated stimuli we have traced. These wills must be understood in the context of the broad relationship between king and Rome: it is from this symbiosis that they sprang. Under the Principate, the position of the populus Romanus with regard to the kings was taken by the emperor himself. The Roman half of the relationship was thereby personalised (112). Moreover, it was concentrated: the king's main point of contact at Rome, and certainly the most important, must be

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the emperor and the imperial family, amici and freedmen that made up his court. This is nothing new in principle: the special relationship between the royal house of Numidia and the family of Scipio Africanus adequately illustrates the fact that within the Republican elite a king could have a special connection with a certain individual or family. But the principle now operated on a higher and more exclusive plane. With this change in the nature of the king's relationship with Rome as a whole went a particular change with regard to the practice of will-making. Under the Republic, royal wills seem always to have concerned the Roman state, the populus Romanus or simply 'the Romans'. Remarkably, no king is known to have left anything at all to any individual Roman. But under the Principate we hear of legacies not only to the emperor but also to Livia, Antonia, the imperial children, the imperial amici and even the imperial freedmen, as in the case of the Herodian wills. As the king formed a relationship with the whole imperial court, so that relationship was re­ flected in his legacies. Moreover, it was not only the king who formed such a relationship: it was also members of his own family, who formed their own particular connections as did Salome with Livia and Berenice with Antonia. It may be that it was not only the type and direction of bequests that changed, but also their frequency. If other royal families made legacies as freely as Herod and his family, the making of. wills involving Rome and Romans must have be­ come a far more common phenomenon under the Principate. If we had a Josephus for every dynasty of the period we would be better placed to know whether the Herods' will-making was unusual. Some indication that the Herods were not exceptional are the scraps of evidence for legacies from Amyntas (the best attested), Juba II and Archelaus of Cappadocia. Of course, legacies could be left more readily than a whole kingdom, especially where a king wanted his son(s) to inherit: thus Herod could leave legacies to the emperor and his court and pass on his kingdom to his sons. Indeed, the bequest of legacies could only improve his sons' chances of being allowed to succeed by the emperor. In addition to all this, it must be remembered that under the Principate legacies to the emperor were not a prerogative of royalty. Rather the contrary: such legacies scon became a standard feature of the emperor's relationship with his sub­ jects. So much so that his attitude to the flood of legacies that poured in to him, as well as his attitude to those who did not leave him legacies, became a significant criterion in estimates of his 'goodness' (113). Royal legacies to the emperor and his court are therefore to be seen not only as a development of the will-making prac­ tice of kings under the Republic, generated by a changed relationship between king and Rome, but also as one facet of

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a much wider phenomenon (114) . That legacies to the emperor were so wide a phenomenon must tend to support the suggestion that kings now regularly left legacies to the emperor and his court. The case of Prasutagus, on the interpretation favoured above, shows that, while legacies were the order of the day, a king without sons to succeed him might still bequeath his kingdom to the emperor. It has been objected that a will of this nature is inconceivable under the Principate, since, in practical terms, the king was at the mercy of the emperor (115). Of course it is true that the emperor had the milit­ ary might to seize a kingdom, but so had Republican Rome. But that was not the way in which the relationship was oper­ ated. As we have seen for the Republic, the relationship entailed a number of interrelated concepts at the centre of which stood amicitia. With the Principate the relationship became more concentrated and personalised: Augustus' retention of mementoes of Herod and Antonia's treatment of Agrippa I are some indication that there was even room for affection. In the context of such a relationship the crude use of power by the application of brute force had a role in certain circum­ stances, but only where the relationship had broken down. Where the relationship functioned well, it was founded upon diplomacy and friendship. The royal wills of the Principate were both a part of this relationship and an expression of it, much as their less-personalised counterparts of the Republic. Ibis interpretation of the role of royal wills is best illustrated by a further corollary to the personalisation of the relationship between king and Rome. The populus Romanus could not die and therefore could make no will. The emperor could die but he could hardly leave his empire to a king. However, the emperor could leave a legacy to a king. Augustus did just that. A neglected passage of Dio states that in his will Augustus left legacies not only to senators and knights but also to kings (116). In doing this the emperor was re­ sponding from his side to his relationship with the kings, just a s kings did from their side: he was not led to make these legacies by any threat or crude pressure. Notes to Part III, section 1 (1) A more detailed version of this section is to be found in PBSR (1983) (the f elsewhere' of the present text)I specialist readers who wish to take up points of detail should refer to that article. (2) Fest. Brev. 13.2; Amm. Marc, xxii 16.24; Jord. Rom. 229. On these, see Eadie (1967) 126-7 and Winkler (1933) 58 n.103. On the inscription itself, the original publication of Oliverio (1932) is still valuable: for a re-publication and bibliography, see SEG IX 7 and Will (1967) 305-6. Notable

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among recent discussions are Scullard (1973) 231 and 236; Sherwin-White (1977a) 66-7; Applebaum (1979) 62-3. (3) Physcon in the Senate, Pol. xxxiii 11.1-3. Accounts of the relations between Physcon and Philometor abound; the fullest remains Bouche-Leclercq (1904) 1-54, to be supple­ mented by Will (1967) passim. (4) The notion that the will was inspired by an assassin­ ation attempt is very widespread: Piganiol (1933) 411; Roussel (1932) 288; Arangio-Ruiz (1936) 483; Guizzi (1962) 197; Applebaum (1979) 62-3. Philometor 1 s guilt was not pre­ sumed before the discovery of the inscription: see BoucheLeclercq (1904) 42 and Roussel (1932) 289, who takes the in­ scription to prove his guilt. (5) On Jupiter Capitolinus here, see Oliverio (1932) 59-60 and Wilcken (1932) 325. It is possible that the copy sent to Rome was housed in his temple there, though Auletes' will was destined for the treasury (Caes. BC iii 108) . On the role of Jupiter Capitolinus in the relationship between Rome and her empire, see Part I, section 2 and Part II, section 4. (6) On the date of Attalus' death, Sherwin-White (1977a) 68 n. 40, against the orthodox date of 133 BC; cf. Hopp (1977) 124, to be read with Badian (1980). (7) Sail. Hist, iv fg. 69.8, discussed by Raditsa (1969-70), who assumes that the letter was composed by Mithridates, rather than Sallust: this is at best unlikely. Preaux (1978) 101 thinks that Sallust contested the authenticity of Attalus" will; cf. the similar remarks of Liebmann-Frankfort (1966) 88-9. Africa (1961) 111 n.l is of the opinion that there may be something in the charge of forgery. Forgery, particularly forgery of wills, is always an easy accusation: see Calhoun (1914) for its use in the courts of Classical Athens. Hor. Od. ii 18.6 with its attendant scholion provides some scant support for the accusation in this case. But see Nisbet and Hubbard (1978) 295, who point out that the scholi­ ast has misunderstood Horace's ignotus heres. Support for the accusation therefore evaporates. Further, Vogt (1974) 96-7, followed by Hopp (1977) 126 n.22, is mistaken in identifying the heres as Aristonicus: see Nisbet and Hubbard loc. cit.: in fact it is the populus Romanus or an individual member of it. The inscription is OGIS 338 = IvPerg. 249. (8) Hopp (1977) 127: pace Hopp, Liv. Per. 59 must constitute some support, while Plut. TG 14.2 is of only marginal relev­ ance. See further Harris (1979) 148 n.2. (9) Florus i 35.2, accepted by Hopp (1977) 128 with the m a j ­ ority. The standard form of institutio was simply ! Titius heres esto': Gaius Inst, ii 117 with Kaser (1971) 687. Sen. Contr. ii 7.7 is usually cited to support Florus 1 quotation, most recently by Hopp (1977) 128 n.31. This passage has no direct bearing on Attalus 1 will whatsoever, though it con­ tains a formula similar to that in Florus' quotation. The mis-use of the passage goes back at least to Cardinali (1910)

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275. (10) On Attalus1 youth, Sherwin-White (1977a) 66. On his reign and health, Hansen (1971) 142-50; Hopp (1977) 107-20. TVo detailed points should be noted. First, the story of Daphidas need not be dated to the reign of Attalus III: Braund (1982b). Second, there is no support in the sources for the view that Stratonice and Berenice died at roughly the same time: Hopp's view that their deaths constituted a major turning-point in the reign must therefore be qualified: note too the comments of Badian (1980) 202. Carrata Thames (1968) has made out the fullest case for socio-economic difficulties in the kingdom. But see Hopp (1977) 135. (11) Plut. TG 14. On Attalus and Gracchus, see Harris (1979) 149, esp. n.2. (12) Why Gracchus wanted the money is not agreed. See Stock­ ton (1979) 68 with n.26 and Bernstein (1978) 207 and the lit­ erature they cite. Badian (1972c) 713 n.131 is probably correct to argue that no firm decision can be reached. (13) Badian (1972c) 713. Stockton (1979) 68 takes a similar view. Harris (1979) 148 argues that Gracchus wanted, unlike the Senate, to tax the cities. This is not excluded by the present argument. (141) On Apion's will and its aftermath, see Oost (1963), citing sources and earlier bibliography. Also important are: Reynolds (1962); Badian (1965) 119-21; Badian (1968a) 30, 35-6; Gasperini (1967); Perl (1970); Msretti (1976); Harris (1979) 154-5, 267; Applebaum (1979) 62-8. (15) Oost (1963) 22 n.6, ignored by Will (1967) 371 and Bagnall (1972) 364. (16) On the date of annexation, Harris (1979) 267. It is regularly held that Rome took over Apion's personal property, including the royal lands, immediately after 96 BC: most re­ cently, Applebaum (1979) 63. Further, the silphium said to have been brought to Rome in 93 BC (Plin. NH xix 40) cannot be assumed to be tribute: see Badian (1965) 119, esp. n. 65 and (1968a) 30 with 100 n.2. (17) See Oost and Badian locc. citt.. (18) On the delay, Harris (1979) 154-5. (19) On the first two factors, see Oost (1963). On the latter, see Moretti (1976). Cf. the involvement of Libyans in the story of Aretaphila: Plut. Mor. 257 a-b. Note also Lloyd (n.d.) 234-6. (20) Justin xxxix 5.2 and SEG IX.5 with Bagnall (1972). . (21) On these struggles, see Olshausen (1963). (22) See Bloedow (1963): note especially Dio xxxix 12. (23) On the deposition of wills at Rome see below on Auletes. For the suggestion, see Bouche-Leclercq (1904) 121; Olshausen (1963) 29. Even that any document was brought before the Senate (so Badian (1967) 187) cannot be assumed. (24) The standard discussion remains Oost (1955), with import-

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ant advances by Badian (1965). The quotations come respect­ ively from Oost (1955) 101 and Badian (1968a) 77. (25) On the financial aspect, Oost (1955) 99, supported by Badian (1965) 112 and 117. The removal of Cato from Rome was immaterial to the original decision to annex: Badian (1965) 116-7 contra Oost (1955) 100. On the possible relevance of piracy, Oost (1955) 100 with notes 21 and 22. On Cyprus and piracy, see also Hassallf Crawford, Reynolds (1974). (26) Oost regards the will merely as an 'excuse': ibid. It is no doubt as a result of this sort of estimate that Cyprus is usually omitted from discussions of kingdoms left to Rome in royal wills. (27) On Auletes, see Shatzman (1971); Bloedow (1963). (28) For sources and discussion, Magie (1950) 1200-1 and Vitucci (1953) 117-9. (29) Schol. Gron. 316 St.; cf. Sail. Hist, iv fg. 69.8. (30) App. Mithr. 71 erroneously describes him as childless; cf. below on Sadalas II. His daughter's age is unknown. For Caesar's speech, Suet. IXJ 49 3: on the date, Gelzer (1968) 30 n.l; cf. also Ward (1977) 31. It may well be that the will made some provision for her: cf. below on Prasutagus. Caes­ ar's Bithynian connections are well-known; see Gelzer (1968) esp. 29. (31) On the pretender, Sail. Hist, ii fg. 71. The mention of a son at Sail. Hist, iv fg 69.8 suggests that Mithridates may possibly have supported him; cf. Mithridates' use of Nicomedes' half-brother, Socrates Chrestus: Magie (1950) 207-8, 319-20. On Iuncus, see now Ward (1977) . The fact that opponents of the pretender flocked in from Bithynia suggests that the bequest to Rome was not unpopular in some quarters at least: perhaps especially when the pretender was the alternative. (32) For the narrative, Magie (1950) 207-33, 321-78; cf. Vitucci 107-19. On Mithridates1 invasion of Bithynia in 73 BC, see Liebmann-Frankfort (1969) 213 n.2. On Mithridates1 ambitions down to 88 BC, see Glew (1977); cf. McGing (1980) and Glew (1981). On the chronology in particular, see Sherwin-White (1977a) and (1977b). (33) Dio lxix 43.7 is taken as evidence of this bequest, but it is patently not, pace Romanelli (1959) 161; Lemosse (1964) 280 n.l; Garnsey (1978) 224; Fentress (1979) 65. Lemosse elsewhere recognises that this bequest is in fact pure con­ jecture: Lemosse (1967) 29; so too Alfoldi (1979) 69. Lemosse (1967) 29 asserts that Bocchus died without heirs, but we do not really know as much: see Romanelli (1959) 161; Gsell (1928) viii 157 and 200. (34) The literary sources are: Justin*xxx 2.8; 3.3-4; xxxi 1.1-4; Val. Max. vi 6.1; Tac. Ann, ii 67. For the coin, see Crawford (1974) no. 419. 2. No such will is anywhere explic­ itly attested: it is a deduction from the statement that Philopator had appointed the p.R. as Epiphanes' guardian postrends.. .precious (Justin xxxi 1.2 with Val. Max. vi 6.1) .

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The chronology of Epiphanes' succession is uncertain: see Walbank (1967) 435-7. The details of the diplomacy of 201/0 BC are even more so: see Briscoe (1973) 42-7; Balsdon (1954); Walbank (1940) 313-7 for a spectrum of views. (35) The tradition has been rejected most recently by Huss (1976) 168-70 and Cimma (1976) 158. A lone voice - apart from the credulous Cichorius (1922) 23 - in sympathy with the tradition is that of Heinen (1972) 647-50, opposed by Huss loc. cit.. (36) Caes. BC iii 108. (37) On the relevance of Pompey's pre-eminence, see Badian (1968c) 259. On Pompey and Auletes, see Seager (1979); Bloedow (1963); Olshausen (1963) passim. (38) Heinen (1966) 18-20f accepted by Badian (1968c) 259. (39) Heinen (1966) 17. (40) On the claim: Caes. BC iii 104. On Pothinus1 position: Caes. BC iii 108. (41) On all this, Youroukova (1976) 48. Contra Youroukova, the young Cotys was rather more than a 'small child1: he was a meirakion. Moreover, his absence from events leading up to Philippi is explained not by his extreme youth, but by the fact that, as Appian states, he was at Cyzicus. (42) Youroukova (1976) 48; Wiesner (1963) 160 does not mention the will, while Sullivan (1979b) 192 is non-committal. (43) On his age, Walbank (1979) 676. (44) App. Lib. 105-6; Zon. ix 27; Liv. Per. 50; Pol. xxxvi 16. 10; Val. Max. v 2. ext. 4; Eutrop. iv 11; Oros. iv 22.8. Important modern discussions are: Gsell (1928) iii 363-5; Badian (1958) 137-8; Camps (1960), esp. 231-4; Walsh (1965); Saumagne (1966) 100-4; Fentress (1979) 61; Alfoldi (1979) 57. From the Roman point of view, see especially Astin (1967) and (1978). (45) App. Lib. 72; 105; Val. Max. v 2. ext. 4; cf. Cic. De Rep, vi 9-10. (46) Cic. De Rep, vi 9. On Cicero's concern for historical accuracy in this work, see Rawson (1972) . Saumagne (1966) 101 accepts the story. (47) On" the tactic and Massinissa, Thompson (1981). (48)# App. Lib. 94. Walsh (1965) 155-6 plays down Massinissa's desire for possession of Carthage. On the relations between Rome and Massinissa at this time, see Scullard (1973) 289 and the contrary position of Astin (1967) 273-4. Hostility between Massinissa and Rome need not mean any barrier between the king and the Scipios: observe the role of Scipio Nasica in the debates over the war, in addition to Aemilianus' dealings in Africa. (49) Scipio's activities in Numidia seem to have been brought before the Senate only after the event: Zon. ix 27. (50) So Schur R-E xiv (1930) col. 2164 and thence Cimma (1976) 156. (51) For such a grading of kings, see Byrne (1973). As he

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observes, the Latin annals of Irish history 'are content with the title rex for all grades of kings': Byrne (1973) 259. A similar phenomenon can be found in the history of the Dinka of the Sudan. In Dinka terminology their great-chief and his two assistant-chiefs had different titles, but, in the Arabic terminology which they themselves adopted, the great-chief and his assistant-chief are not distinguished, all being referred to as nazir; see Deng (1973) 6 and 58. It may be, therefore, that our sources are using terminology which does not allow them or us to make important distinctions as to the precise status of Massinissa's heirs. It should also be noted that Massinissa!s many illegitim­ ate sons received their own inheritances. Zonaras says that Scipio assigned numerous districts and territories to them. These may very well be the doreai which Scipio is said by Appian to have given them in addition to those they had re­ ceived from their father. The word commonly means 'landed property': the Loeb translation ('gifts') is therefore prob­ ably misleading. Diodorus states that Massinissa left each of his sons 10,000 plethra (xxxii 16.4): see Fentress (1979) 53-4. Of course, it may be that murios is here used imprec­ isely, as often, to indicate a large number. Note also Fentress (1979) 78 n.3, who observes that Massinissa was by no means the only Numidian king to leave a plurality of successors. (52) The best account of Herod's reign is Schurer (1973) i 287-329. For a survey of relations between Rome and Judaea, see Piattelli (1971). On the complexities of succession, see Goody (1966). For a case study, Spence (1974) esp. 128-39. (53) See Cimma (1976) 297-330 and the literature she cites. (54) The earliest reference to this privilege is Jos. AJ xv 343: it is also referred to at AJ xvi 92. But neither of these passages is paralleled in BJ, wherein the privilege is first mentioned at BJ i 454 (paralleled at AJ xvi 129). This last reference seems to relate the grant of the privilege, but, according to the earlier passages in AJ, Herod already had it and therefore this can only be the confirmation of a pre-exist­ ing privilege. But then AJ would clash with BJ according to which this is the first grant not a confirmation. One solution is to suppose AJ xvi 129 (=BJ i 454) to be the occasion of the first grant, earlier mentions being anach­ ronistic. This solution is preferred here because the grant is thus set in an appropriate context: a hearing before Aug­ ustus arising out of succession intrigue, followed by his appointment of successors: AJ xvi 133; BJ i 458. (55) Antipater's priority is given by AJ xvi 133, though BJ i 458-65, esp. 458, might suggest that they were to be equal heirs. (56) AJ xvi 129. (57) AJ xvi 394; BJ i 551. (58) BJ i 600; cf. AJ xvii 78, where the text is unsafe. Of

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course, it is quite possible that Philip, previously included, simply rose a grade on his brothers' deaths. Archelaus pre­ sumably rose and fell with Philip. (59) AJ xvii 96; BJ i 625. (60) AJ xvii 146; BJ i 646. The former mentions legacies to grandsons while the latter does not. (61) AJ xvii 182-7; BJ i 661-4. (62) AJ xvii 188-91; BJ i 664-5. (63) AJ xvii 195; BJ i 669; cf. AJ xvii 202; BJ ii 2; AJ xvii 239. (64) Archelaus: AJ xvii 219-21; BJ ii 14-5. Antipas: AJ xvii 224-7; BJ ii 20-2. Jewish delegation: AJ xvii 300ff.; BJ ii 80ff.. We should note that this delegation had strong support both among the Jews of Rome and among members of the Herodian dynasty itself who opposed Archelaus: BJ ii 22; AJ xvii 227. The Greek delegation is omitted by Josephus: we rely on Nicolaus of Damascus FGH 90 F. 136.9. The compos­ ition of this delegation is not known: observe the caution of Jones (1967) 164, whereas Smallwood (1976) 108 assumes perhaps rightly - the absence of delegates from Caesarea and Sebaste. (65) On Hyrcanus' ethnarchate under Pompey1s settlement, see Smallwood (1976) 27 n.22, who notices the implication of AJ xx 244, overlooked by others. It seems likely that Pompey was responding to Jewish feeling that the kingship was not traditional and not to be continued: a case put to him by a Jewish delegation: M xiv 41 with 46. Cf. Beek (1959). (66) BJ ii 100; cf. AJ xvii 323, which gives the sum as 1500t., perhaps including the 500t. left to Livia and the others. (67) On this pressure, see Millar (1977) 153. It is evident that, contra Wachholder (1962) 35, Augustus made only relat­ ively minor alterations to Herod's last will. On the succ­ ession to Herod and its aftermath, see Momigliano (1934) 72-7. (68) AJ xviii 31; BJ ii 167. (69) The suggestion is that of Smallwood (1976) 108. On the Syllaeus incident: AJ xvii 10, where the Loeb translation of alios as !on other occasions' is misleading. The Acme affair: AJ xvii 137-41; BJ i 641-6, with Millar (1977) 72. (70) AJ xviii 156. (71) AJ xvii 165; cf. 143, where the reading is insecure. (72) See especially Levick (1967), esp. 219-20 and Magie (1950) 1304 n.3, who review previous discussions. On the subsequent annexation, Sherk (1951) 12-20. (73) So Levick and Magie ibid.. Hoben (1968) 137 follows, with­ out argument, the old view of Ramsay, against which see Levick and Magie ibid.. It should be noted, contra Hoben, that Dio liii 26.3 says nothing of a will. (74) For imperial Amyntiani: CIL VI 4035; 8894. Other Amyntiani are known from Rome, but there is no indication that they are imperial: CIL VI 4175; 8738; 10395. On these last, note the caution of Magie (1950) 1304 n.3 and Weaver (1972)

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213 n.l, whereas Levick (1967) 219-20 and Boulvert (1974) 256 treat all the known Amyntiani as imperial. This is not mere quibbling. If there are non-imperial Amyntiani, two alter­ native deductions can be made: either they were not bequeathed by Amyntas of Galatiar in which case the provenance of the other Amyntiani is put very much in doubt, or Amyntas left legacies to Romans outside the imperial circle in addition to his bequest to Augustus. Indeed, there is a distinct possibility that one of the two imperial Amyntiani was be­ queathed not to Augustus, but to Livia: observe his nomencla­ ture: M. Livius Aug. lib. Anteros Amyntian. (CIL VI 4035 with Boulvert 26 n.121). Some support for a connection between Amyntas and the Amyntiani is provided by the fact that Amyntas' son, Pylaemenes, may himself have bequeathed a Pylaemenianus found in the household of the emperor Gaius (IIS 1589; cf. KJ no. 109) . The identification of this Pylaemenes with that of Anth. Pal, vi 241 is insecure, pace Gow and Page (1968) 54. (75) Boulvert (1974) 18 observes: 'les legs constituent certainement un des modes les plus importants d'acquisition d'esclaves par 1■empereur'. On Protos, see Jos. AJ xviii 156. (76) Herodianus: LLS 1795. Archelaianus: CIL VI 4776 and, perhaps, 5872 (on which, see Boulvert (1974) 26 n.122). Iubatianus: CIL VI 9046. On the Archelaiani in particular, it should be noted that a connection with Archelaus of Judaea is no less possible than one with Archelaus of Cappadocia. Note also a Remothalcianus: KJ 156. (77) Jord. Rom. 225-6, but Tacitus and Velleius say nothing of it. There it is also stated that a Pylaemenes of Paphlagonia left his kingdom to Rome: this is found in no other source: a link with the son of Amyntas seems impossible. (78) Jos. BJ i 669 with 646, ii 100; AJ xvii 190; 323. (79) Compare the suggestion that Antiochus IV of Commagene gave a slave to Claudius, though it is quite uncertain: CIL VI 8633 with Boulvert (1974) 26 n. 130. Cf. also the concub­ ine given by Augustus (probably: the text is dubious) to Phraates IV of Parthia: Jos. AJ xviii 40. It must be stressed that the ending -ianus in these cases only tells us that they at some time probably belonged to an Amyntas or a Herod etc.. The identities of these masters and the manner in which their servants passed into the imperial household are ultimately matters of speculation. It is sal­ utary to recall the classification of Httlsen (1888), who regarded all but the Amyntiani as deriving their names from other slaves and qualified the connection between the Amynt­ iani and Amyntas of Galatia with a 'perhaps'. On the -ianus ending, see Boulvert (1974) 11-29; Weaver (1972) 212-23: Veyne (1962). (80) For the suggestion, see Hassall (1977) 232, who seems to have taken literally a figurative usage of inheritance in Alfbldy (1974) 43, On the date and nature of the Roman annex-

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ation, see Alfoldy (1974) 52-7. For another view, see Kniessl (1979), who argues for a Claudian annexation. Against Alfoldy (1974) 55 it must be objected that Festus1 accesserunt (Brev. 7) cannot be pressed in support of a peaceful annexation. (81) Tac. Ann, xiv 31. On the motivation there ascribed to the king, see below. Boudica seems to have been largely or completely omitted from the will, contra Collingwood CAH X 802. On the spelling of her name, see Jackson (1979) . For a possible coinage of Prasutagus, see MDSSOP (1979); yet the archaeological remains do not bear out Tacitus1 assessment of his wealth: Dudley and Webster (1962) 47-8. How long he had reigned is unclear: see Frere (1978) 84-5. (82) Note the entirely correct caution of Frere (1978) 104. (83) See the literature cited in note 52 above. (84) See Badian (1958) 105-6. (85) For African parallels, see Goody (1966) 6. (86) See Tarn (1913) 327 n.38. (87) Memnon FGH 434. F. (16) 22 is the only source. (88) Information on Cius is simply lacking, pace Will (1979) 139. It is doubtless through considerations of this sort that Will sees the dominant criterion for Nicomedes1 selection as opposition to the Seleucid threat: Will (1979) 246-7. On these connections, see Will (1979) 139 and 142. Note also Ptolemy II and Byzantium: Will (1979) 147 and 149. (89) Pol. iv 50 with Walbank adJLoc.. (90) See above note 126. (91) On the personification of the demos, see Richardson (1979) 8. (92) On the similarity of Rome's position to that of a king, see Richardson (1979) 10-1. (93) See Sherwin-White (1973) 187-8. (94) EJ 21: on the term in this inscription, see Demicheli (1976) 72. (95) Livy xlii 19.4; cf. Badian (1958) 105-6. Of course, the notion of tutela here may well have been the creation of Livy or his source, but that hardly diminishes its importance. (96) Cic. ad Fam. xv 2.4 (tuerer) and ad Att. vi 1.3 (tutela). (97) For the translation 'procurator1, see Gwatkin (1930) 12. Pace Gwatkin, I can find no trace of Roman creditors in this episode. Cimma (1976) 293 n.8 follows Pani's suggestion that Augustus sent his man into Cappadocia to prepare for the king­ dom's annexation. There is no support for this and it might seem less plausible to Cimma were she to date the annexation correctly to 17/8 AD rather than BC. (98) A Hellenistic precedent is sometimes sought in the will of Nicomedes I discussed above, but the will is no real pre­ cedent for it does not involve the bequest of a kingdom, as we have seen. (99) The notion seems to have originated with Piganiol (1933) 411. (100) Magie (1950) 197 reasonably takes it to be a trumped-up

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pretext, designed to add a semblance of legitimacy to Mithr idates' invasion. (101) On these acquisitions, see Magie (1950) 195-6, 1092-3; also Sherwin-White (1977b) 176-7. (102) Ihough somewhat different, the case of Massinissa may be taken together with those of the Ptolemies, his neighbours: note Physcon on Massinissa: FGH 234 F.7-8. (103) Sherwin-White (1977a) 66. Harris (1979) 149 is more circumspect. (104) The only scholar to have brought out this crucial ass­ umption seems to be Piganiol (1933) 422-3. (105) On this incident, see Walbank (1979) 553. While Preaux (1978) 155 relates Physcon's survival closely to the will, Scullard (1973) 236 prefers to understand it in the context of the broad relationship between Physcon and Rome. (106) Sherwin-White (1977a) 67. (107) For the observation, see Segre (1932) 429. (108) On this phenomenon, see Braund (1980a), esp. 421 n.8: Rigsby (1980) 242-8. We may note that Attalus was king of Pergamum, though this can hardly be pressed. (109) See most recently Applebaum (1979) 63. (110) II Mace. 9.18-29. The authenticity of this letter is not unimpeachable: see Habicht (1976), esp. 3-7, who argues that the letter is a literary invention based on a genuine letter of a Seleucid king. Cf. Doran (1981). (111) Harris (1979) 149 countenances this solicitude as a possible factor. (112) Str. xvii p. 840; cf. Suet Aug_. 48. Cf. above Part I, section 2. (113) On legacies to the emperor, see Millar (1977) 153-8, 297, and the literature he cites: cf. Sailer (1982) 71-3 and 124-5. See too above note 75. (114) This in itself illustrates the integration of kings and their families into the Roman elite: cf. Part III, section 2. (115) Levick (1967) 219-20 has raised this objection. It is not disputed that, as she argues, Amyntas did not bequeath his whole kingdom to Augustus, for Amyntas had sons: Dio liii 26.3, where Dio is conspicuously silent on any such bequest. On Amyntas' sons, see Levick (1967) 29 and 32. (116) Dio lvi 32.2: legacies to kings were made possible under Roman law by the fact that citizenship had become commonplace among kings, for only citizens could receive such legacies, as Crook (1957) 36 valuably observes: cf. above Part I, section 3.

164

Section 2; Refuge, Detention and Beyond

In this section we shall consider three ways in which the king might leave his kingdom. He might be forced to take refuge with Rome, he might be brought to Rome for trial and/ or he might be held in detention by Rome. Much has already been said of the role of Rome as the protector of kings: the flight of royalty to Rome was a fur­ ther manifestation of this role. For the king Rome was a potential haven of safety and might also be a springboard to restoration to power. "The notion of royal flight to Rome occurs early in the history of Rome's relations with kings. Demetrius, son of Philip V of Macedon and once an obses at Rome, is said to have contemplated flight to Rome in order to escape the palace intrigue that would end in his death (1) . Again, Livy makes an Egyptian envoy declare that the young Philometor and his sister-wife would quit their kingdom and take refuge in Rome, unless Rome supported them against the insurgent Antiochus IV of Syria (2). Later, ousted by Physoon, Philometor did flee to Rome, soon to return to his king­ dom (3). At the end of the second century BC, Massiva, a member of the family of Massinissa, fled to Rome from civil war in Numidia (4). In the next century, Auletes fled to Rome whence he was eventually restored to his kingdom (5) . The phenomenon persisted into the Principate. In his Res Gestae, Augustus lists those kings who took refuge with him as supplices: these came from Parthia, Media, Adiabene, Brit­ ain, the Sugambri and the Marcomanni and Suebi (6). It should be noted that - the royalty of Parthia and Media apart - our other sources tell us all but nothing of the flight of these rulers: it may reasonably be inferred that many more rulers took refuge with Rome than we know. We should also observe the very fact that Augustus saw fit to list these refugees in his Res Gestae: the flight of the king to the emperor was to the benefit not only of the king but also of the emperor who received him. We may compare Tiberius who made a very great deal of the fact that Maroboduus took refuge with him. But while the king himself might be received

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and Beyond

with open arms, his numerous followers were rather differ­ ently regarded. The followers of Maroboduus and his successor, Catualda, a refugee in his turn, were regarded as potentially too disruptive to be settled in the provinces: they were ass­ igned land beyond the Danube under a new king, Vannius, who was himself to become a refugee (8) . Those who followed Vannius into refuge were granted lands in Pannonia by Claud­ ius (9): whether Vannius resided with them we are not told. A king might also take refuge with a Roman commander in the field, particularly where he wanted a swift restoration. To Caesar in Gaul, for example, fled Mandubracius of the British Trinovantes. Mandubracius' father had ruled the tribe until killed by Cassivellaunus of the Catuvellauni. Upon his invasion of Britain, Caesar installed him in his father's place (10). Similarly, while Agricola was campaign­ ing in Britain, there came to him a regulus from Ireland (11). As Tacitus hints, if Agricola had subsequently invaded Ire­ land, the man would have been of considerable use to him as an intermediary with local knowledge, who could be placed in a position of power and whose involvement would constitute a certain legitimation of the whole enterprise: it was thus that Mandubracius had been of value to Caesar (12) . As with flight to Rome, a king's flight to a commander in the field was to the advantage of both parties (13). We have seen how the king's fate rested ultimately with Rome. An extreme manifestation of this fact was the trial of the king at Rome. The first such trial occurred under Caesar. Deiotarus of Galatia had fought for Pompey and was thus in a difficult position after Caesar's victory: his position was further imperilled by local enmities generated by his expansionism in Galatia. In 45 BC Castor II, son of Castor Tarcondarius and grandson of Deiotarus himself, accused the king of having attempted to murder Caesar in the course of their journey together from Zela to Nicaea in 47 BC (14). Deiotarus was subsequently brought to trial on the capital charge of Caesar's attempted murder, with the supple­ mentary charge of intended revolt (15). The trial took place in Caesar's house at Rome, where Deiotarus was defended by Cicero. In his defence-speech Cicero makes much of the ex­ traordinary nature of the trial: for a king to be tried for his life, he says, was quite unprecedented (16). But in the following years it ceased to be so extraordin­ ary. In 29 BC, Antiochus II of Commagene was condemned in the Senate and executed for having killed his brother's envoy to Rome. Antiochus1 royalty is beyond doubt, but it has been suggested that he may not have been a king (17). In AD 17 Archelaus I of Cappadocia was tried in the Senate apparently on a charge of treason (18). Archelaus' death, whether natural or suicide, ended the proceedings. Soon after, in AD 19, Rhescuporis III of Thrace was brought to Rome and tried in the Senate for the murder of his nephew Cotys VIII. By

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killing Cotys he had contravened Rome's arrangements in Thrace and had flouted a direct instruction from Tiberius to cease hostilities with his nephew: Tacitus says that he had intended war with Rome. Rhescuporis was condemned to detention at Alexandria (19). Again under Tiberius, in AD 36 King Tigranes was tried in the Senate: he had ruled Armenia for a short period under Augustus, but had long ceased to rule. He was now executed on a charge not stated, probably treason (20) . These trials are an important indication of the position of the king within the Roman sphere under the Principate: he was so much a part of it that he could be subjected to the Roman judicial system. Our previous discussions, particularly on the king's citizenship, neatly dovetail with the fact that the first formal trial of a king at Rome took place under Caesar. Royalty removed from the kingdom was often held in de­ tention by Rome. In the third and second centuries BC, kings so detained were invariably held not at Rome but in the comm­ unities of Italy. In 167 BC, Gentius, the defeated king of Illyria, together with his wife, brother and children was detained by senatorial decree at Iguvium: Spoletium had refused to accept them (21). At the same time, Bithys, son of Cotys, king of Thrace, who had been captured with the Macedonian court after Pydna, was held at Carseoli until returned soon after to his father (22). Andriscus, handed to Rome by Demetrius I of Syria, was also consigned to an (unnamed) Italian town (23). Oxynta, an otherwise unknown son of Jugurtha, occurs in Appian's narrat­ ive of the Social War as a detainee at Venusia (24). Indeed, Rome did not restrict the practice to those with a claim to royalty: we should compare the Achaean detainees, with the notable exception of Polybius (25), the Capuans detained in Latin towns (26), Minius Cerrinius detained at Ardea (27), and Caesar's suggestion that the Catilinarian conspirators be detained in the municipia of Italy (28). All other examples of the detention of royalty in Italian towns under, the Republic relate to the colony of Alba Fucens. In describing the towns of Italy, Strabo comments on Alba Fucens that the Romans often used it as a place of detention for two reasons: because it was situated well inland and be­ cause it possessed stout walls (29). We may add that Alba was also reasonably accessible from Rome, being 68 miles along the via Valeria. Three kings are known to have been detained there: Syphax, Perseus and Bituitus, king of the Arverni. We have no example later than the second century BC: this would account for the implications of Strabo's past tense, that Alba had ceased to be used as a place of deten­ tion by his day. Diodorus provides our fullest, though not necessarily our most accurate, account of detention at Alba. It seems that Perseus was first held in a career there with men on capital

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charges until the Senate decided his case (30). In these conditions, we are told, he remained for a week until L. Aemilius Paullus, his conqueror, persuaded the Senate to transfer him to a more suitable form of custody (31) . But this transfer seems not to have taken Perseus out of Alba. Livy says nothing of Perseus' confinement to a career, only that Perseus and his son, Alexander, were consigned to custody at Alba, where he was permitted to keep the friends, wealth and paraphernalia that he had with him (32). Given the fact that Diodorus stresses the degradation of the king, it may be that his story of Perseus' confinement to a career is at least embroidered. The fate of one of Perseus1 children further illuminates the nature of detention of Alba. Perseus' children seem to have been detained with their father. Livy mentions his son Alexander as a detainee at Alba, while Polybius mentions his other son Philip as another (33). Their importance is amply illustrated by the subsequent success of Andriscus, when posing as Philip (34). According to Plutarch, Philip and his anonymous sister soon died: Polybius puts Philip's death two years after that of his father. This must suggest that Perseus did not live long after 167 BC (35) . Particularly interesting is the statement of Plutarch that Alexander lived on to become skilled in metalwork, to learn to read, write and speak Latin and to become under-secretary to the magist­ rates at Alba (36) . It should be stressed that we do not know him to have been released from detention: it may well be that his detention was sufficiently open to allow such a career. We are less well informed on the fate of Syphax. Accord­ ing to Polybius he took part in Africanus' triumph and died shortly after in detention (37). Livy, who gives a rather fuller account, was aware of Polybius1 version, but preferred the tradition that, having been consigned to detention at Alba, Syphax did not take part in the triumph, but died just before at Tibur, where he had been brought from Alba: subseq­ uently the king was given a public funeral (38). His death at Tibur is certainly plausible enough, whether before or after the triumph: it was situated on the via Valeria between Rome and Alba. It seems unlikely that Syphax was intended to stay there for any length of time, though it should be noted that much later, in the third century AD, Zenobia was settled there after she had taken part in Aurelian's triumph (39). The last king known to have been detained at Alba was Bituitus of the Arverni. The precise'circumstances of Roman activity in Transalpine Gaul in the' late 120's BC are partic­ ularly confused: so too are the circumstances of Bituitus1 detention. But the sources do agree that he came into Rome's power through trickery and that he was held to prevent his rallying the Arverni to renewed warfare. His son, Congonnetiacus, was also detained, very possibly at Alba. Of their

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subsequent history we know nothing (40) . After Pompey's return to Rome in 62 BC, we find, for the first time, royalty held in detention at Rome itself. In Pompey's triumph walked members of several royal families. Two were kept in detention at Rome (41). Tigranes, the refractory son of Tigranes I of Armenia, and Aristobulus of Judaea, with his family (42). After his triumph of 61 BC, Pompey deposited Tigranes in chains with a friend, the senator L. Flavius (43). Tigranes was still with Flavius in 58 BC, when Flavius was praetor, apparently still in chains. His detention seems different to that of earlier royalty on three counts at least: it was at Rome, at a private house and involved the king being kept in chains, it seems. Flavius' qualification seems only to have been that he was a friend of Pompey. Paullus is said to have maintained an interest in the fate of Perseus, as we have seen, but the maintenance of the close link between Pompey and Tigranes through Flavius seems quite new. In 58 BC Tigranes1 place of detention was forcibly changed. P. Clodius, while dining at Flavius1 house, had the Armenian brought into the presence of the diners so that he might see him. But, once Tigranes had been brought in, Clodius would not allow him to be taken back, but sent him to his own house, freed from his chains. Pompey's subsequent request for his return was refused. On the contrary, Clodius put Tigranes aboard ship and, when Tigranes was forced into Antium by a storm, sent Sex. Cloelius to fetch him back to Rome. Mean­ while, Flavius, who had learnt what had happened, set out for Antium himself. The two rivals and their companions met just outside Rome: in the resultant fierce battle many fell on both sides, especially that of Flavius (44). Evidently, possession of Tigranes was regarded as a matter of considerable import­ ance by both sides. The details ar.e lost to us, but the episode must be seen as part of Clodius' broader involvement in the affairs of the East at this time, including Armenia itself. The eventual fate of Tigranes is similarly unknown (45). Aristobulus and three of his four children seem to have been detained at Rome, but whether they were kept in circum­ stances similar to those of Tigranes, we are not told. His fourth child, Alexander, had escaped en route to Rome (46). Five years after he had walked in Pompeyfs triumph, in 56 BC, Aristobulus and his other son, Antigonus, themselves escaped from custody and made their way back to Judaea, where they were both shortly re-captured (47). Returned to Rome, Aris­ tobulus was placed in detention once more, but his children were released as had been agreed with their mother (48). Aristobulus was still in detention at Rome in 49 BC, when Caesar released him and sent him to win over Syria and Pales­ tine for the Caesarian cause: he was poisoned before he could achieve anything (49). Caesar's attempt, combined with the

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struggle over Tigranes, amply illustrates that royalty detai­ ned at Rome in the Late Republic was caught up in struggles within the Roman elite. It may be that the importance that detained royalty thus acquired explains why Tigranes and Aristobulus were kept close at Rome itself and not in an Italian town. But the practice of detaining kings outside of Rome had not died: it appears again under the Principate. The place of Alba Fucens was now assumed, in part at least, by Ravenna, a city which was a base of the imperial fleet and thus enjoyed a permanent military presence and a concomitant degree of security. We shall see that such cities were rather favoured as detention-points under the Principate. After he had walked in Tiberius' triumph, Bato the Pannonian was consigned to Ravenna. Further, Tiberius is said to have presented him with great gifts because Bato had once allowed him to escape from a tight corner (50) . Arminius1 wife had been pregnant when Segestes brought her to the Romans. She subsequently had a son who was brought up, pre­ sumably with his mother, at Ravenna (51). Finally, Maroboduus, more a refugee than a detainee, was also sent there (52). It is interesting to note that Maroboduus' successor, Catualda, upon his flight to Rome, was settled at Forum Julii, another base of the imperial navy: thus two kings who had much in common were settled in cities that were essen­ tially similar (53). But, under the Principate, some kings were still detained at Rome itself, it seems. Of course, there was an element of detention in the cases of those kings tried at Rome. We may add the case of the future Agrippa I, while not yet king. Tiberius had him jailed because he had expressed the wish that the emperor might die and be replaced by his friend Gaius, whom he had preferred to court at the expense of Gemellus. At first, we are told, he was held in chains, short of water and with many other prisoners: a position reminiscent of Perseus' career (54) . As with Perseus, a Roman patron came to his aid. Antonia, mother of Claudius and long-standing friend of Agrippa's mother Berenice, who had lent him money in the past (55) , won him some privileges: he was allowed congenial guards, a daily bath, visits from friends and freed­ men and a number of material comforts. In these improved conditions Agrippa was held for six months until, upon his accession, Gaius released him. We are told that, otherwise, Agrippa would have remained in detention until he died (56). Conversely, Mithridates the Iberdan, whom Tiberius had sent to rule Armenia, was detained by Gaius, apparently at Rome. He may have remained there until returned to his king­ dom by Claudius upon his accession in AD 41 (57). Ptolemy of Mauretania was not so fortunate: Gaius executed him. Before his execution, Ptolemy was held in detention, apparent­ ly at Rome, for an unspecified period (58).

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Tacitus narrates Claudius' reception of Mithridates VIII of the Bosporus. Mithridates had surrendered on condition that he would neither be executed nor led in triumph (59). He was brought to Rome by Junius Cilo, procurator of Pontus, and put on public display in the Forum. That Claudius should display the king suggests that he, like Augustus and Tiberius before him, was making the most of a king who came into his power. This was not a triumph, as agreed, but it was some­ thing rather similar (60). He was still in Rome in AD 68, when his support for Nymphidius Sabinus caused his execution by Galba (61). Also under Claudius, Caratacus and his family are said to have been pardoned, but this may very well mean only that they were not executed: it seems most unlikely that they were left free to return to Britain. He too was made a public spectacle (62). Josephus tells us of the detention of Antiochus IV of Commagene and his family after the annexation of their kingdom in AD 72. When Rome invaded, Antiochus had offered no resis­ tance but had fled to Tarsus where he was captured. He was subsequently sent to Rome in chains, but Vespasian, thinking such treatment beneath the dignity of a king long friendly to Rome, had him released and diverted to Sparta. There Vespasian allowed him a large income, so that he might main­ tain a royal life-style. Meanwhile, Antiochus1 sons, Epiphanes and Callinicus, their attempted resistance having failed, fled to Vologaeses of Parthia, who negotiated their return to Rome with a promise of immunity. At Rome they were joined by their father from Sparta. According to Josephus, the family remained at Rome and enjoyed every honour there (63). Kings were still being detained at Rome under Caracalla. Dio tells us that he brought Abgar IX (X) of Osrhoene to Rome under false pretences and detained him there. At some time thereafter, Abgar's son, Antoninus, erected a tombstone at Rome for his brother, Abgar, who had died there (64). Dio says that he practised the same deception upon a king of Armenia and his sons (65). If the hostile Dio can be accepted, Caracalla's activities stand in a line of such deceptions from Bituitus of the Arverni through Archelaus of Cappadocia and Rhescuporis III of Thrace. Detention must therefore be in­ cluded among the dangers faced by the king when he visited Rome (66) . We are now in a position to make some broader observations. The choice of a place of detention for the king was evidently not completely random. In the third and second centuries BC, Rome's dominant concern seems to have been to keep the king secure: hence Alba Fucens was favoured for reasons of security. But from the end of the second century BC, Rome seems to have become more sophisticated in the placing of detainees. The case of Maroboduus provides an important clue, for, discussing it, Tacitus hints at a particular rationale behind the choice of Ravenna as his detention-point, quite apart from

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simple security. Tacitus tells us that in the twenty years which Maroboduus spent at Ravenna, he constituted a valuable tool of Roman diplomacy in her dealings with his erstwhile subjects, the Marcomanni and Suebi: his possible return, though it never materialised, was a constant threat to Marob­ oduus1 successors (67). By placing Maroboduus at Ravenna, a northern city, Rome could only sharpen this threat. It may be no coincidence, therefore, that the other detainees at Ravenna, Bato the Pannonian and the wife and son of Arminius, were also northerners. Moreover, we have seen that Catualda at Forum Julii and (possibly) Vannius in Pannonia were north­ erners kept in the north. Similarly, Rasparaganus, king of the Rhoxolani, and his son were residents of Pola in the second century AD: how they came to be there we do not know (68) . By contrast, Oxynta, son of Jugurtha, was easily the most southerly of the detainees held in Italy, for he was detained at Venusia. His potency is illustrated by the fact that he was able to bring over many Numidians from the Roman side in the Social War (69). Based well inland at Venusia, he was fairly secure, but also had easier access to Africa than would have been possible at Alba Fucens. On the present argument, Oxynta was the first royal detainee - as far as we know - to have been detained at a strategic point deliberately chosen. If this is right, it may be suggested that this new tactic was developed at Rome in the years since the detention of Bituitus of the Arverni at Alba. Similar to Maroboduus was Vonones. In fact a refugee, he was held in custody at Antioch, where he was allowed to keep his wealth and royal title (70). Subsequently, Vonones1 enemy, Artabanus of Parthia, wrote to Germanicus to remind him of Parthia1 s friendship with Rome and to seek its renewal in a ceremony on the banks of the Euphrates: in addition he specifically requested that Vonones be held somewhere outside Syria. It seems that from Antioch Vonones had been able to cause disruption inside Parthia by correspondence with the Parthian elite. Germanicus concurred and moved Vonones to Cilician Pompeiopolis (71). Vonones1 case amply illustrates the importance of a detainee's geographical propinquity to his land of origin. While he was at Antioch, Vonones could still play a part in Parthian affairs and may have hoped for restoration: this could explain why, on being moved away to Cilicia, out of this milieu, he attempted to escape (72). Further, we should observe another development of the Principate: kings were now also held in the provinces. That Rome was by now well aware .of the importance of a king's place of detention is further illustrated by the case of Rhescuporis III of Thrace: Tacitus says that Rhescuporis was detained at Alexandria for the very reason that it was far from his kingdom (73). As Vonones' case would also suggest, detention at a distance was as well understood as detention close-by. Nor was Rhescuporis the only northern

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ruler to be held at Alexandria: Marcus Aurelius had Ariogaesus of the Quadi held there (74). Quite apart from geograph­ ical considerations, movement to and from Alexandria - again, a naval base - was deliberately controlled under the Principate as a matter of course: the city was therefore an excellent detention-point. Just as northern rulers might be held in the South, so eastern rulers might be held in the West. Augustus consigned Archelaus of Judaea to Vienne in Gaul (75) . Archelaus1 brother, Antipas, was similarly consigned to Lugdunum Convenarum or, more probably, Lyons (76). Marcus Aurelius went further and sent an Armenian satrap to Britain (77). Throughout this section, it has been observed that, for the most part, kings were detained in relatively comfortable conditions and were allowed access to the local elite at their place of detention and even contacts with their land of origin. Alexander, Perseus' son, shows that they might even have careers of a sort at their place of detention: similarly, Mithridates VTII seems to have been able to play a role of some significance in Nymphidius1 bid for power. Of course, this relative liberty could only facilitate escape as in the cases of Andriscus, Aristobulus and Antigonus of Judaea (78). But the case of the Commagenians shows that escape could very soon cease to be an issue. Josephus states that Antiochus and his family received every honour at Rome: there is reason to believe that Antiochus' children contracted marriages among the Roman elite (79). Further, Antiochus' grandson, Philopappus, was adlected into the Senate by Trajan with praetorian rank: also frater Arvalis, he rose to be consul in AD 109. Yet, as his cognomen implies, Philopappus had not forgotten his royal grandfather: his monument on the Hill of the Muses at Athens shows him with both his Roman titulature, in Latin, and, in Greek, the titles of the king of COmmagene that, by birth at least, he was. Detention was far away (80). Nor was Philopappus alone: he was part of the wider phenomenon of the entry of the descendants of kings even kings themselves - into the Senate and consular office in this period, spearheads of the provincial aristocracy (81). Throughout this, study, parallelisms have been revealed between kings and members of the Roman elite. As Roman power and influence spread from the third century BC, kings came ever closer to this elite. With Caesar, Antony and the Principate, they came closer still, especially to the emperor and his court which tended to monopolise royal contact: kings were now also Roman citizens. Thereafter, where Rome annexed their kingdoms, kings and their descendants might take the final step, no longer very large, to become full members of the Roman elite itself: they were now membra partesque imperii to the full. Brunt graphically encapsulates the nature of the development with regard to the emperors them­ selves: 'From Trajan onwards most emperors came from the

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provinces and the eternal city celebrated its millennium in AD 247 under the rule of an Arab sheikh' (82). Notes to Part IIIf section 2. (1) Livy xl 23. (2) Livy xliv 19. (3) Diod. xxxi 18. (4) Sail. BJ 35. Jugurtha's successor, who certainly had contacts at Rome (BJ 65.4-5), may have done the same. (5) On Auletes1 complex history, see Part I, section 2 and Part II, section 1. (6) I& 32.1. (7) Tac. Ann. ii 62-3. Tacitus says that he read Tiberius' speech on the subject, still extant in his day. (8) Tac.ton.xii 29-30. (9) Tac. Ann, xii 30. It may be that some of the same men were involved. Compare the acceptance of Segestes and his kinsfolk (Ann, i 57-8). Cf. Marcus Aurelius' settlements: Birley (1966) 231-2. Cf. Ste. Croix (1981) 509-18. (10) Caes. BG v 20-2. Rodwell (1976) 248-9 argues that the Trinovantes were not in fact being engulfed by the Catuvellauni. But the fact that Mandubracius had fled to Caesar for help, together with Caesar's subsequent injunction upon Cassivellaunus that he should not attack the Trinovantes in future, can only suggest that the Catuvellauni were the dominant tribe, given the lack of secure evidence to the contrary. (11) Tac. Agr. 24.3 with Ogilvie and Richmond ad loc., who bring Irish material to bear. (12) See Rodwell loc.cit.. (13) It is worth noting that Romans might also flee to king­ doms: e.g. Livy xxii 53; xxiii 10; Tac. Ann, vi 14.3. Most striking is P. Sittius: see Sherwin-White (1972) 352; Gruen (1974) 284-5 and the literature they cite. Cf. also Dio lxxvii 19.1-2 with Chaumont (1976) 155. (14) For the antecedents to the accusation, see Hoben (1968) 89ff.;cf. Magie (1950) 425 on the accusation itself. Of course, Nysa, daughter of Nicomedes IV of Bithynia, was not put on trial at Rome: Suet. OJ 49.3 with Ward (1977) 31. (15) Cic. pro Deiot. 15ff.; 22ff.. (16) Cic. pro Deiot. 1 is quite explicit. If Caesar had not pronounced judgment by March 44 BC, his death settled the affair. (17) Dio lii 43.1. On his kingship or lack of it, see Sull­ ivan (1978c) 778 n.189, who ignores the entirely plausible reconstruction of Bowersock (1965) 57-8. That a king of Commagene was removed in 20 BC, whether Mithridates II (so Sullivan) or one unnamed (so Bowersock), is nowhere actually stated, nor is any trial in 20 BC mentioned: the only evidence is Dio liv 9.3. 174

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(18) Sullivan (1980b) 1160-1: on the accusation, see Part II, section 3. (19) Tac. Ann. iii 38.2; ii 67. (20) Tac. Ann. vi 40.2; cf. Jos. AJ xviii 139. The identif­ ication is most uncertain: see Magie (1950) 1345 n.50. This Tigranes may have been installed in AD 10 (RG 27). The cir­ cumstances of Caracalla's execution of Gaiobomarus of the Quadi are not known: Dio lxxvii 20.3. (21) Livy xlv 43.9; Died, xxxi 5. As a colony, Spoletium could refuse, whereas, it seems, Iguvium, a Latin town, could not: Sherwin-White (1972) 106. With this case in mind, Salmon (1967) 315 observes that the allies are unlikely to have relished the role of custodian. This is most attractive, but it sits uneasily with his view that the deposition of detainees at colonies is an indication of their more favoured status: Salmon (1969) 189 n.209. The latter view is probably best rejected since Latin communities, such as Iguvium and Venusia, were also used. But, given Salmon's former obser­ vation, it is tempting to suggest that there may be a connec­ tion between the fact that Venusia was both the only town known to have held a detainee at the time of the Social War and the only Latin town to have fought against Rome in that war. (22) Livy xlv 42.5. (23) Diod. xxxii 15.1: note the mild oikein. (24) App. BC i 42; Gsell (1928) vii 881-2. (25) Pol. xxxi 23.5 with Walbank ad loc.. (26) Livy xxvi 16.6. (27) Livy xxxix 19.2. (28) Sail. Cat. 51.43; 52. 14f.; App. BC ii 6.Cf. the distin­ guished Sugambrian envoys detained by Augustus in 'certain cities' of Italy: Dio lv 16.-3. Ravenna may have been one of these. (29) Str. v p.240. On Alba's walls, see MacKendrick (1960) 95: 'the pride of Alba is its walls'. For photographs, see Salmon (1969) Plate 25. (30) For possible archaeological remains of the career, see De Visscher and De Ruyt (1951) 72-4. On Perseus' last days, see Meloni (1953) 437-40. (31) Diod. xxxi 9.5: Aemilius' identity is confirmed by Plut. Aem. 37. (32) Livy xlv 42.4: note Livy's distinction between custodia and career in the case of Bithys. (33) Livy xlv 42.4; Pol. xxxvi 10.3. (34) Pol xxxvi 10.3. (35) Plut. Aem. 37; Pol. xxxvi 10.3. (36) Plut. Aem. 37; cf. Zon. ix 24. (37) Pol. xvi 23.6. (38) Livy xxx 17.2; 45.4-5. (39) SHA Tyr. Trig. 30.27; Eutrop. ix 13.2. For possible descendants of Zenobia, see Baldini (1978).

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(40) See the variant accounts of Liv. Per. 61 and Val. Max. ix 6.3. See Jullian (1921-6) iii 3-19; Ebel (1976) 71-4, On the difficulty of the whole campaign, Harris (1979) 248. On the subsequent foundation of Narbo Martius, see now Gayraud (1981). Identification of Oongonnetiacus with the Cbntoniatus of Diod. xxxiv/xxxv 36.1 seems unwarranted. (41) The fate of the rest is not entirely clear, though they seem to have been sent home: Plut. Pomp. 45; App. Mithr. 117; cf. Diod. xl 4. (42) Contra App. Mithr. 117, Aristobulus was not executed (see below): Appian's statement that Tigranes was later killed is therefore dubious. (43) On Flavius, see Gruen (1974) 109. The main source is Ascon. p.47 (Clark); cf. Dio xxxviii 30.1-2. (44) Ascon. p.47 (Clark); Dio xxxviii 30.1-2; Cic. Pom. 66; ad Att. iii 8.3; Schol. Bob. 17 St.; Plut. Pomp. 48.6. On Cloelius, see Shackleton-Bailey (1960). (45) On Clodius and the East, see Rawson (1973), esp. 235-7. (46) Jos. BJ i 157-8; AJ xiv 79. (47) Jos. BJ i 171-3; AJ xiv 96-7. (48) Jos. BJ i 174; AJ xiv 97. Despite Josephus' tekna, Smallwood (1976) 44 seems to think that Antigonus was not released at this stage, but at some time unknown. (49) Jos. BJ i 183-4; AJ xiv 123-4. (50) Suet. Tib. 20; Ov. Ex P. ii 1.45-8. (51) Tac. Ann. i 58.9. (52) Above. (53) Tac. Ann, ii 63. (54) Jos. AJ xviii 187ff.; cf. 233. (55) Jos. AJ xviii 165. (56) Jos. AJ xviii 203-4; 236-7. (57) Tac. Ann. vi 8.1; Dio lx 8.1; Sen. De Tranq. 11.12. (58) See Fishwick (1971), who presses Sen. De Tranq. 11.12; cf. Fishwick and Shaw (1976). (59) Tac. Ann. xii 19.4; the notion of royal hatred of the triumph is found elsewhere, e.g. Dio lx 32.4a; Hor. Od. i 37. 30-2 with Nisbet and Hubbard ad loc. (60) Mithridates is said to have behaved boldly, a common motif: cf. Caratacus (Tac. Ann. xii 36-7) and Dyteutus' brother (Str. xii pp. 558-9); note also Plut. Alex. 12 (a Theban woman and Alexander); Arr. Anab. v 19.2-3 (Porus and Alexander). (61) Plut. Galba 15.1; cf. Tigranes in AD 36 and perhaps Ptolemy in AD 40, both possibly killed for involvement in Roman politics (above). (62) Tac. Ann, xii 37.5; Dio lx 33.3c.' According to Dio, Caratacus went on a tour of the city of Rome. Cf. Bato, whose detention at Ravenna is described by Ovid as veniam: Ex P. ii 1.45-8. Note also Diodorus on Andriscus (above note 23).

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(63) Jos. BJ vii 219ff.; cf. IIS 9200. It is worth noting that Vespasian was renowned for his meanness. Cf. also the offers made to Ptolemy of Cyprus (Plut. Cat. Min. 35; Oost (1955) 99) and Cleopatra (Porphyrio ad Hor. Od. i 37.32, who cites Livy as his source.) . (64) Dio lxxvii 12.1a; IGR i 179. Cf. Aurelius Pacorus, Part I, section 3. (65) Dio lxxvii 12.1 2. On Caracalla's detention of the mother of Tiridates II, see Chaumont (1976) 156. (66) On the dangers of visiting Rome, see above Part II, section 1. (67) On Maroboduus, see above. Cf. also Aistomodius, Part I, section 3. (68) Could this be the context of the ludibrium involving Arminius1 son (Tac. Ann, i 58.9) ? On Catualda and Vannius, see above. On Rasparaganus, see Part I, section 3. (69) App. BC i 42. (70) Tac. Ann. ii 4.4? cf. Suet. Tib. 49.2. Note Vonones1 relationship with Piso and Plancina in Syria: see Shotter (1974), esp. 236-7. (71) Tac. Ann, ii 58. Tiridates may well have done the same under Augustus: Dio li 18.3 with Ziegler (1964) 46. (72) Tac. Ann, ii 68. The strong implication is that Vonones was free at Pompeiopolis to hunt outside the city. Cf. the case of Demetrius I: Part I, section 1. (73) Tac. Ann. ii 67; Veil. Pat. ii 129.1; Suet. Tib. 37.4. (74) Dio lxxi 14.2 with Birley (1966) 243-4. (75) Jos. BJ ii 111, Str. xvi p.765. (76) Jos. AJ xviii 252 says that he was sent to Lugdunum in Gaul, but BJ ii 183 that he died in Spain. A convenient com­ promise would be Lugdunum Convenarum in Gaul, on the Spanish border: see Hoehner (1972) 262 n.l and the literature he cites, to which add Ebel (1976) 1 and 100 and Schurer (1973) 352 n.41. But this compromise does not 'satisfy both pass­ ages' as Hoehner imagines. Rather, on this view, BJ would still be in error, though more pardonably, while AJ would be downright misleading, for 'Lugdunum in Gaul', unless other­ wise qualified, can only mean Lyons. Further, Lyons seems attractive on other grounds. First, Antipas' detention there would neatly balance that of Archelaus at Vienne, its neighbour and rival. Second, Antipas was despatched in summer AD 39 (Schurer (1973) 352 n.41): in the autumn of that year, Gaius set out for Lyons - coincidence ? Third, compared with the other provincial cities used as places of detention, Lugdunum Convenarum stands out as relatively insignificant in this period: Lyons looks much more like the others. Given all this, it seems best to take the abbreviated BJ's state­ ment to be an error, perhaps textual. Alternatively, Antipas may have left Lyons for Spain and died there: if so, there would be no contradiction in Josephus. (77) Dio lxx 14.2; Birley (1966) 236.

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(78) Note too the Achaean detainees who escaped: Paul, vii 10. Of course, not all were successful: Vonones and Rhescuporis died in the attempt. On the possible pleasantness of the life of Roman exiles, see Balsdon (1979) 108-13. (79) This is certainly so in the case of Antiochus' son, Epiphanes, who married the daughter of Ti. Claudius Balbillus, prefect of Egypt under Nero, in all probability: see Spawforth (1978) esp. 252. Philopappus was their son; their daughter, Julia Balbilla, wrote poetry in the entourage of Hadrian and Sabina in Egypt in AD 130 (ibid.). Stein argues that Epiph­ anes' wife may have been Claudia Capitolina who seems to have sported the title regina on account of her marriage to Epiphanes (PIR 2 C 1086; cf. Philopappus1 use of the royal title (below)). Iotape, Antiochus' daughter, at some stage married King Alexander of Cilicia (below): the marital hist­ ory of Antiochus' other children is not known, though a daughter seems to have married into the Euryclids: Spawforth (1978) 254. Such marriages as that between Epiphanes and Balbillus1 daughter are themselves indicative of the increased osmosis between Rome and royalty. Iheir history is therefore worth reviewing. The use of marriage to cement friendly relationships was standard In the ancient world of course: see especially Seibert (1967); Vatin (1976). Note in particular the marr­ iages between the Carthaginian elite and the royalty of Numidia: Thompson (1981) 122. The rarity of marriages bet­ ween Romans and royalty - indeed, the very fact that such marriages were a matter of opprobrium - must therefore be significant of distance between the two. Down to the civil wars, only once does such a marriage become an issue. A Ptolemy, probably Physcon, made a proposal of marriage to Cornelia, daughter of Scipio Africanus, who had been widowed upon the death of the elder Ti. Gracchus circa 150 BC: Cornelia refused: Plut. TG 1.4; see Seibert (1967) 86; Otto (1934) 118-9; Scullard (1973) 236-7; Pomeroy (1975) 149; Astin (1967) 36 n.l. On Physcon's complex marital history, see Heinen (1974). This great lady of Rome must have been a very attractive match for the king - particularly in the course of his struggle with his brother, Philometor, down to 145 BC. The proposal may have had some connection with Aemilianus1 visit to Alexandria in 140/39: on this, see Astin (1967) 258 no. 29. Further, it should be noted that, accord­ ing to Plutarch, Cornelia maintained relationships of giftexchange with 'all the kings' - an index,of the prestige of the daughter of Africanus and widow of-Gracchus: Plut. CG 19.2; cf. 2.3; TG 14.1. The notion of such a marriage does not arise again until 47 BC, when Pharnaces II 'foolishly' offered his daughter in marriage to Caesar, who refused (App. BC ii 91, hyp'anoias: she may have been Dynamis, later queen in the Bosporus. Bell. Alex. 70.8 does not mention the offer): particularly 'foolish' perhaps, in Roman eyes,

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because Caesar's prospective bride - like Ptolemy earlier ~ would not have been a Roman citizen in all probability. Also, because, like Ptolemy again, Pharnaces was using a standard Hellenistic strategy to which Romans would not subscribe in the case of non-Romans. Cleopatra, in her relationships with Caesar and Antony, raises insurmountable difficulties, for her case is shrouded in political propaganda: see especially Becher (1966); Scott (1933); Griffin (1977); Kraft (1967), followed by Carter (1979) 188. The nature of Octavian's propaganda is partic­ ularly illuminated by Mart, xi 20; cf. also Antony's ludicrous counter-claim that Octavian intended to marry the daughter of King Cotiso of the Getae, while Cotiso married Julia (Suet. Aug. 63.2). Note also Crook (1957), though it should be noted, pace Crook, that - startling as it might seem - Cleop­ atra may very well have been accorded Roman citizenship, either by Caesar or by Antony: see above Part I, section 3 and Rowland (1978), though Lucan x 67 (cf. 76) tells against it. Of course, it was entirely in Antony's interests to claim that Cleopatra had married Caesar and that Caesarion was their son: Dio xlix 41.2, set in perspective by Syme (1980) esp. 435. Such propaganda was facilitated by two facts. First, the notion of a sexual relationship between Roman and royal was a commonplace: see especially Griffin (1977) 21 n. 31 - to the cases he cites add: Plut. Cat. Min. 73 (Cato's son and Psyche of the Cappadocian royal house); cf. Antony and the children of Alexandra of Judaea (Jos. AJ xv 25ff.) ; Herod and Cleopatra (Jos. AJ xv 97); and above Part I, section 1. Second, the very nature of the conclusion of marriage: 'By the late Republic and in the imperial period Roman marriage required no formal ceremony to be valid: co­ habitation between eligible partners basically created marr­ iage1 , according to Rawson (1974) 279. The later case of Titus and Berenice presents much the same problems as that of Cleopatra: for a discussion, see Braund (1983c). Further, it has been powerfully argued that the statements of Dio and Herodian that Caracalla sought to marry the daughter of Artabanus V of Parthia should also be considered propaganda without basis in fact: Timpe (1967). But cf. Millar (1964) 158. The only certain marriage between a Roman and a member of a reigning royal family is that of Antonius Felix to Drusilla, daughter of Agrippa I of Judaea (Jos. AJ xx 141-4; Acts 24.24: their son died in the eruption of Vesuvius: a resident in the area ?). Felix is said to have married three queens in all (Suet. Claud. 28), but his other two wives cannot be securely identified: Tacitus (Hist, v 9) states that Felix married a Drusilla who was the granddaughter of Antony and Cleopatra. She cannot be the daughter of Agrippa I for that very reason: Tacitus may be in error: see Sullivan (1978b) 330; Schurer (1973) 461 n. 23. But Felix is no ord­ inary Roman. He was a freedman, probably of Antonia the

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mother of Claudius and friend of Agrippa I and his mother Berenice. We have already traced the connections between Agrippa and Claudius. There was therefore a broad background of contacts behind the marriage of Felix and Agrippa's daughter. The marriage took place while Felix was procurator of Judaea: the marriage was therefore advantageous for the procurator and Drusilla's family alike: Schiirer (1973) 460-2. It is worth noting that Felix himself could claim royal des­ cent: his brother Pallas claimed descent from the kings of Arcadia and found a measure of acceptance: Tac. Ann, xii 53; cf. Oost (1958) 115. The sole firmly attested marriage between a Roman and a member of a ruling dynasty is therefore revealed as hardly a case at all: the Roman was in fact a dubiously royal freedman. This marriage is better set in the context of royal relations with freedmen of the imperial household: see Part II, section 1. The royal marriages to Romans that followed annexations are all the more remarkable, therefore: they are further signs of the entry of royalty into the Roman elite itself. (80) 115 845; see Sullivan (1978c) 796-7 and the literature he cites. Sullivan observes the similarities between Philopappus' monument at Athens and the monuments of his forebears in Commagene. (81) The phenomen has been much discussed: see especially Sherwin-White (1973) 221-87, esp. 260; Halfmann (1979) esp. 42-50 with Mitchell (1981) and the considerable literature they cite. Particularly notable is King Alexander of Cilicia - son-in-law of Antiochus IV of Commagene - who rose to the consulship before AD 109, having apparently left his Cilician kingdom: Syme (1953) 154; Halfmann (1979) 119; cf. also the career of Lusius Quietus, about whose origins one could wish to know more (PIR 2 L 439) , and that of Sohaemus, who, though apparently of Arsacid stock, had been a senator and consul at Rome before L. Verus installed him as king in Armenia: Halfmann (1979) 175; Birley (1966) 175 and 236? Chaumont (1976) 149-52. (82) Brunt (1964-5) 274.

180

Epilogue

In conclusion, it remains to consider one final, very basic question: why did Rome have friendly kings and kingdoms? Every empire - unless it is utterly isolated by natural boundaries - has a frontier or frontiers. 'Frontier' is here conceived in its broadest sense, so that, for example, Deiotarus of Galatia may be considered as part of Rome's eastern frontier: in Part II, section 3 we observed his role as a frontier entity. 'Frontier' is also used to include what may be called 'internal frontiers': i.e. areas where Rome met intractable peoples dwelling well within her sphere, Cilicia Tracheia being an outstanding example. Empire without frontiers may be envisaged, but imperial frontiers can only disappear where an empire is co-extensive with the earth, or an entirely isolated part of the earth. In the modern world, a frontier would remain even for a world-empire: the so-called 'newJErontier' of space. The frontier is therefore ubiquitous. TAnd/by its verv existence the frontiertends to gene&aX&j^;!^^ t^^oinpei^L.,^^r~mus t maintain some relationship with neighbouring states and peoples beyond "the BorSers ofJ^ff^Terr i 65ry iT"'a^nlriisters directly. Permanent hostility is always an option, but it is mutually damaging ^nd draining and therefore to be avoided as far as possiblej a symbiosis of perfect equals is another option, in theory at least. These general observations help to account for the fact that friendly kings and friendly states are a commonplace throughout history. It should not be imagined that Rome was at all exceptional in having friendly kings. To name but a few, the Chinese, Hittite and Persian empires made extensive use of friendly kings and states long before the rise of Rome and, later, the phenomenon is entirely familiar in the Byzantine and Islamic worlds. Thereafter, friendly kings more familiar today in the guise of satellite states - may be found throughout the world down to the present day. Any attempt to explain why Rome had friendly kings must and should be conditioned by the fact that they are so widespread

181

Epilogue a phejaomenon. fThe key point that must be graspedi is_t^aJLJIrJ.endly kingdoms were tne Erontiej^j^Jji&JE^^ Once this is acce£tedf7 it should be apparent that to ask, as so many have done, whether kingdoms were inside or outside the Roman empire is to completely misconceive their position. They were in one sense inside the empire and in another outside it: in reality they were neither and both. That is doubtless why not only modern but also ancient theorists who have sought to resolve this essential ambiguity have found themselves in such difficulty (1). Of course, that is not to say that some kingdoms were not more closely assimilated to Rome than others: there is an obvious difference in this regard between the respective relationships of, for example, Herod and Phraates IV of Parthia with Rome, though it should by now be clear that their relationships were not as completely differ­ ent as is often imagined. At the same time, we should not be surprised to find that particular Romans chose to consider kings to be inside or outside the empire as it suited them. It is worth constructing what may be called a 'balancesheet' for the case of Rome and her kings. What did Rome put into the relationship with the king and what did she get out of it? Almost as important, what did the king put into the relationship and what did he get out of it? The importance of the king's point of view may not be immediately apparent to those who consider Roman imperial history only from the standpoint of Rome, bur it must be remembered that the relatf ionship between Rome and king could only operate successfully with the compliance ^preferably the willing and eager comp­ liance - of the king:/his aims and aspirations must therefore be given due consideration. This construct reveals what must be the overriding reason for the existence of friendly kings in all ages:T^ere the relationship functions^PisaaeElv-,, both ' imper ial power and_ j^r iendl^Jk^^ ip Rome provided the king with military support and protec­ tion.' We have seen how the king might be regarded as under Roman tutela, Roman guardianship. In fact the concept of tutela was far more usual and important in the relationship than the notion of clientela,clientage, so favoured by mod­ erns. If Rome were obliged frequently to furnish her numerous kings with military aid, she would be under an intolerable obligation. We have seen that, in practice, Rome might with­ hold active military support from a king,, but the options were seldom so stark, nor were kings so often in need of Roman military aid. /in fact, it seems to have been enough jin most circumstances that the king should be generally / understood to be a friend of Rome^ the potential aggressor was for the most part (but not of course always) deterred by the possibility, if not the probability of Roman reaction. For this very reason it was dangerous for Rome to abandon a

182

Epilogue friendly king when her help was needed, fIn most circumstances it was actually in Rome's own interests to support a friendly king as far as possible, not only to preserve her reputation and thus deter further aggression, but also, more pressingly, because the removal or subjection of her friend was likely to involve or threaten an attack upon other friends and, very possibly, imperial territory under the direct administration of RomeTj In fact we shall see that, so far from involving Rome in greater military commitments, friendly kings signif­ icantly reduced these commitments. The Roman state also conferred a variety of gifts upon the king. The honorary gifts discussed in Part I, section 2 cost Rome a negligible amount. Occasional ad hoc gifts might cost more: Augustus1 gift to Herod of half the revenues of the copper mines of Cyprus was certainly significant, but it is very much the exception (2) ./Also significant are the subsidies, as they have come to be called (today they are more familiar as 'foreign aid 1 ), which Rome gave to certain kings. But it must be stressed that, in our period at least, these subsidies did not constitute a major drain on the Roman treas­ ury, as sometimes imagined. First, the amounts of money were modest. Second, their use was relatively limited, being largely confined to the tribes of Rome's northern frontier and there only, it seems, under the Empire. Even within these limits, these payments can hardly be characterized as 'a systematic policy of subsidization': rather, payments were made more or less irregularly when occasion demanded and when Rome considered 'subsidization' the most convenient strategy. In our period at least, occasional payments were a cheap and cost-efficient price to pay for imperial security and influen^n-j(3) .

jLjSings were also given tracts of land: such, gifts varied in extent but were nothing unusual in principle./' In fact such gifts- are to be ranked with Roman decisions to give entire kingdoms to individuals. The matching of kings to kingdoms and kingdoms to kings was regularly expressed in terms of giving: the kingdom could be described as 'the gift of the Roman people' (donum populi Romani), while the king could be said to be given (rex datus) to his subjects by Rome. This in turn helps to explain the notion that the king was no more than a trustee, to whom (and to whose family) Rome had entrusted the kingdom over which he ruled (4). It was the fact that Rome had the power to give in this way and on this scale that established, confirmed and increased Roman prestige and influence. These gifts of land, of kingdoms and of kings were not drains on Roman resources, of course, but applications of an imperial ideology that accepted and emp­ loyed friendly kings: this was the creation of yet more friend­ ly kings and/or the increase of their domains. In sum, therefore, Rome had to invest a limited amount of military support (which need not be actually committed), to-

183

Epilogue gether with honours and gifts of various sorts. In addition, of course, Rome had to engage in diplomatic relationships with her various kings and cope with the disruption and various complex issues that this might entail. What did Rome cpt ^ n return for her limited investment? /frirst and foremost, the friendly king took^are,^. the a^inisgr^t^QrTof .'hlfe' "Rinnan:"t^niswas^particularInvaluable for Rome in^cases^wlTlere the kingdSm mightpresent special Strabo states difficulties ^££^r3^^ thal:T!iircia;''rracheia was placed under a king because of the difficulties it would present to a Roman governor (5). Borne's use of kings as imperial a^inistrators,..is,.,,entirely in keeping with her general tendency to concede.and encourage \ considerable local autonomy throughput her empire - mpst notebly^^tfirough cities - ancMlius pass to othersJbhe burden . have observed how seldom ^ of day-to^da^. ^ Rome intervene3"ln""tKe everyaay affairs of the friendly king­ dom. Unless there was a particular stimulus, there was simply no point in Roman intervention, for Rome had nothing trouble. to gain t^ J. t sa^^^ Tfie tendency of frontiers to generate friendly'kings TTas"^ already been noted. We have seen how,f^s^ frontier entities, fr-ionriiY kirrTe N*nofj,tted Rome both as Gutters and intermed­ iaries, main tainirg significant military resources7 T^L's0 doing, f rYehd^ to Roman" \ military power7"to be employed both* in defence and aggression, j even whej^ that involved the_annexation of other friendly kingdomgjnote, tor example, the~parT^TayecTBy"royal forces in the annexation of Antiochus I V s Commagene in AD 72 (6) . ^ "We have seen that most, if not all, friendly kings did^ ""'~ not pay tribute to Rome in the form of monetary payments on ., a permanent annual basis, but their kingdoms did constitute reservoirs of wealth and resources from which Rome expected to draw.. Trie 'logisti'^j=j'1' vaTn^ ^f'^Q?'0 r^?^rvoi X;JJL. situated ,, aaj-hfiy wpre on t-h^ Pr>m=>n frontiers, was immense. Jndeed,. men and resources could even be shipped some distance across ttfe~empire* wlltai Iyqult'^d:""Vrtriess~1ErTe'1feh "and resources, especially grain, sent by Massinissa of Numidia to the Roman forces engaged in the Third Macedonian War. I However, such gifts were charged with significance. The King wished to make , the gift to further his relationship with Rome and, indeed, as part of that relationship, but Roman prestige might be damaged if she should be seen or thought to need the assist­ ance of her friend. It was for this reason that Rome sought to pay for the grain she received from Massinissa and it was for this reason that the king would have preferred her to acc­ ept it as a gift: the king's desire to further his relationship with Rome threatened, paradoxically enough,to subvert it (7). """^ Moreover, we have seen how - particularly under the Prin- j cipate when certain kings were more closely integrated into I Roman society - the king might - like Herod - fill his king- >

-H.

Epilogue dom with buildings, objects and institutions redolent of everything Roman and, especially, of the Roman imperial family. In this way the kingdom could become not only a reservoir of wealth, power and resources, but also a focal point of allegiance to Rome and her empire, seen as such by the world at large. This impression was reinforced when the king was seen travelling about his kingdom and the provinces in the company of the emperor or members of his family - even visiting Rome itself to make a dedication on the Capitol. Rome therefore gained a great deal from her friendly kings in return for a relatively meagre investment./ To these gains by the Roman state must be added benefits accruing to prominent individuals within the state. A distinction must immediately be made between Rome of the Republic and Rome of the Principate. With regard to the former Badian in part­ icular has shown how individual members of the Roman elite benefitted in a variety of ways from personal relationships with friendly kings: we have seen that in this context of interpersonal relationships the term clientela is quite app­ ropriate (8) . In particular we have explored the matrix of debt among friendly kings and have seen how some Romans sou­ ght to make vast profits by lending money to kings and/or demanding money or promises of money in return for favours. Among these Romans were leading members of the elite, like Pompey and Brutus, but they also included lesser men, like Rabirius and his associates. Ihe benefits which individual Romans could derive from friendly kings can only have encour­ aged men who benefitted in this way to support the continued rule of their 'clients', though their political enemies might take the opposite view in individual cases. ___ ~£But, for all that/there was a certain tension between the interests of individual and state under the Republic. The usurious dealings of individual Romans threatened to bankrupt at least some kings. Bankruptcy meant destabilization and was therefore to the complete disadvantage of the Roman state, which,-as we have seen, derived considerable benefits from the smoothly-functioning king and kingdonu7 ftJnder the Principate, the tensions between the interests of state and individual were relaxed. The imperial court tended to monopolize personal relationships with friendly kings, much to the chagrin of those Romans, who, like Tacitus, realised the change that had occurred since the days of the Republic. Provincial officials necessarily had dealings with kings, but the imperial court was on its guard lest too close a relationship be formed. The civil wars from 49 to 31 BC showed quite clearly how important friendly kings could be when a Roman bid for power; Vespasian showed as much again in AD 69 (9)"T| ^ — T t f should now be evident that Rome and Romans benefitted greatly from friendly kings, but what did the kings get out of the relationship?

185

Epilogue A king who had no hereditary claim to kingship, such as Commius, Herod or Polemo I, and/or depended heavily upon Roman military support to keep his throne, like Nicomedes IV, obviously gained a very great deal from his connection with Rome: he owed his very kingdom and kingship to Rome. Indeed, in purely formal terms, any recognized king owed his position to Rome. We have seen how a king could call upon Roman milit­ ary support in time of crisis: this might not be given, but the king could at least count upon Rome as a haven of refuge, whence he might one day regain his throne. Within his king­ dom, the king enjoyed almost complete autonomy; his position might be further enhanced by the introduction of Roman engin­ eering, military and financial techniques. He might also receive gifts, even cash sums, from Rome. In most cases, the very fact of the connection with Rome enhanced the king's position in the eyes of his subjects, his neighbours and him­ self, though, of course, it might on occasion have the reverse effect. We have seen how kings increasingly became not only part of the Roman sphere of influence, but members of the Roman elite in their own right. In a world dominated by Rome this association and integration can only be regarded as a major benefit to the king, even though it might give a handle to his opponents. Of course, on the debit side, the king had to accept certain limitations. Though he enjoyed auton­ omy within his kingdom, Rome might be stimulated to intervene; he did well to guard against such intervention by forging and maintaining strong links with the powerful at Rome. Again, the king had to consider Rome's reaction in his dealings with other powers. The king was evidently free to conduct relat­ ions with provincial communities, but states which might be a threat to Rome, notably Parfchia, were a different matter. Familiar notions of a ban preventing kings consorting with the likes of Parthia are misleading: we have seen how Rome not only allowed kings to consort with such powers but activ­ ely exploited the kings' intermediary position. There was no ban, but Rome would act against a king where she judged that his dealings with another power or powers were prejud­ icial to her own interests: that is why the king's intermed­ iary position was so dangerous for him. Of course, Roman intervention on such grounds did not require the involvement of Parthia or the like: even a gathering of relatively minor kings might be regarded with suspicion, as was the gathering at Tiberias. Certainly the autonomy of the friendly king was circumscribed: he might even "be tried for his life at Rome, dethroned and/or executed. But to stress the negative side of the friendly king's relationship with Rome is profoundly misleading: provided that he kept within the very broad para­ meters set (albeit neither very clearly nor very explicitly) by Rome, the king could enjoy a long and successful reign, commanding substantial power and authority. In fact, as we have seen, the skilful, well-connected king could even

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Epilogue direct the Roman imperial power to achieve his own particular ends. The king was both exploited and exploiter. It cannot be sufficiently stressed that both king and Rome benefitted from their relationship: that is why the relation­ ship was so successful and why there were friendly kings of Rome and of so many other imperial powers through the ages. The position of the friendly king was still further cemented by the force of tradition, a potent force throughout Roman society. By the time of Augustus the friendly king was an established figure in the Roman world. The force of tradition encouraged his continued employment: in recounting his app­ ointment of a king in Armenia, Augustus asserts - rather optimistically - that he could have made Armenia a province but preferred to follow tradition instead and appoint a friend­ ly king there (10). But once it is agreed that the relationship between king and Rome was mutually beneficial, our basic question is changed: the problem is no longer the existence of friendly kings of Rome, but, rather, his replacement by a Roman pro­ vincial governor. Why was the king removed and his kingdom annexed? Two commonly-held views tend to cloud the issue. First, the view that the friendly king was only ever intended to be a transient stage on the road to annexation at some time in the future. Second, at its crudest, the view that under Ves­ pasian the friendly king disappeared never to return. These twin suppositions have dominated much modern discussion of friendly kings, but they are misguided and misleading. As to the first, it must have been recognised by Rome and king alike that a kingdom might possibly be annexed at some future date, but there is, to my knowledge, no evidence to suggest that any king was ever appointed or recognized by Rome as an explicitly short-term measure or as a stage on the road to future annex­ ation. In any case that sort of long-term planning is simply not characteristic of the Roman imperial administration. The residual truth, that a kingdom might be annexed one day, is not particularly valuable: it may also be observed that a province might become a kingdom one day (11) . The similarit­ ies between the respective positions of king and governor, which can only have facilitated annexation and de-annexation, have already been noted. The second supposition is a myth supported by the fact that Vespasian re-organized the eastern frontier and that, by his time, most of the familiar friendly kingdoms of Asia had become provinces. As Luttwak allows, friendly kings remained a feature of the Roman frontiers long after Vespasian, part­ icularly in the west and north, but also in the east and south: they were still very important in the Byzantine period (12) . Having recognized this, to some extent at least, but wishing to retain the notion, Luttwak has recourse to the first supposition and intangibility:

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Epilogue 'The difference (sc. between the relationship of king and Pome before the Flavians and that obtaining after them) was intangible but all-important - a matter of expectations. The old-style clients understood that the client-state system was a temp­ orary instrument of imperial control. Now it became a permanent substitute for that control. The ultimate intention - and capacity for annexation - was visibly gone, and with it went the principal incentive to obedience on the part of the client rulers intent on delaying the evil day.' (13) . The notion of transience has already been challenged. As to this idea of a change under the Flavians, it can hardly be denied that the relationship between king and Rome was likely to fluctuate with Roman military capacity, for that relation­ ship was conditioned by and ultimately founded upon Roman military might. But Roman military capabilities did not suffer any marked decline under the Flavians, as Luttwak's view seems to suppose, nor yet with Hadrian. It is true that in the mid-second century AD Rome was faced with some consid­ erable military demands, but she was still a force to be reck­ oned with and a power which might annex or forge new links with friendly kings. The Roman appetite for military ex­ pansion in the second century AD is shown not only by the campaigns of Trajan at the beginning of that century, but also by those of Marcus Aurelius in the middle and those of Septimius Severus at the end of it (14). We may now return to face the problem of annexation. This is not the place to attempt to develop a full-blown theory of annexation and its causes, but- seme lines of enquiry may be suggested. Terms as basic as 'annexation' and even 'province' are beset with difficulties of definition: here I take 'annex­ ation' to be the appointment of a Roman magistrate to govern an area and I take a 'province' to be an area so governed. Large problems remain, but these should suffice as working definitions. The Roman provinces were acquired in fits and starts: their annexation was an essentially piecemeal affair and circumstances obviously varied from one case to another. Yet some broad observations are possible and desirable. Harris, focussing on the period down to 70 BC, has drawn attention to the driving Roman urge for the profit and glory to be gained by imperialism. But imperialism need not mean annexation, though it is to be remembered that there was a particular kudos to be gained by extending the areas under direct Roman administration. We may proceed from the very simple assumption that Rome annexed a kingdom when it was thought to be to her advantage - or to the advantage of lead­ ing Romans - so to do. It is therefore the nature of this advantage that requires exploration. In considering the pros

188

Epilogue and cons of the possible annexation of Britain, Strabo weighs the cost of direct administration - principally the cost of maintaining sufficient troops to keep control there - against the income to be gained by direct taxation (15). Such cal­ culations must have been made whenever Rome considered annex­ ation: Rome's recurrent financial difficulties made them ob­ ligatory. A potential net profit could only encourage annex­ ation; a potential net loss would have the opposite effect, Strabo judged that the annexation of Britain was not financi­ ally viable. The fact that Claudius invaded Britain some 25 years later, when an invasion was likely to be no more prof­ itable , indicates how considerations of profit and loss and administrative efficiency could be outweighed by the desire for military success. Appian, writing in the second century AD, confirms these inferences: 'These emperors have added some provinces to the empire and have put down the revolts of others. By and large, in their wise administration, they possess the best part of land and sea and wish to keep it so rather than to extend their rule without limit over barbarous peoples who are penniless and unprofitable. I have seen some of the latter on missions at Rome, offering themselves as subjects and I have seen the emperor refusing men who would be of no use to him. To other peoples the emperors give kings, peoples beyond number, whom they do not want under their rule. And on some of their subjects they expend their money, considering it dishonourable to give them up for all their expense.' (16). A further stimulus to annexation was security: for example, Commagene is said to have been annexed in AD 72 because of Roman suspicions that its royal family was engaged in clandes­ tine dealings with Parthia (17). Once it was decided to remove the royal family, annexation was an obvious sequel. The instance of Commagene is but one example of the essential instability of a kingdom as opposed to a province, an instab­ ility which derived more from succession struggles than from any desire to subvert the relationship with Rome as such. The death of a reigning king was an obvious stimulus to annex­ ation, for the king's death - even where an heir was available - raised the question of what was to be done with the kingdom. Where a king died and actually bequeathed his kingdom to Rome, the stimulus to annexation was obvious and powerful. In addition to all this, it is far too easy to ignore the fact that, as Appian states, peoples might actively seek their own annexation. We should not allow modern obsessions with in­ dependent nationhood and the oppression of the Roman provincial administration to blind us to this fact (18).

189

EpiVogue It is only through consideration of such stimuli that we shall understand the dynamics of Roman annexation through the centuries. That is for another study. The enigma of annexation has done a disservice to the friendly king: scholarly discussion of his position has concentrated quite disproportionately upon the demise of particular kings. The present study will have served its purpose if it has done something to redress the balance - to show that the friendlyj king was a permanent and important figure, very much a part J of~Roman history in his own right. Indeffj JJV^"g harrily an I exaggeration to say,_that kings^and _kjrigdQms_were[ both the I ke^s^ne~~of^ffanB^ in the later Roman empire I and the meajis^bv^wj^c^ j Notes to Epilogue:

■

(1) See, for example, Cimma (1976) 221-39 and the texts and discussions she cites. (2) Jos. AJ xvi 128, to some extent offset by the fact that Herod was to administer the other half. (3) Gordon (1948) traces the history of Roman subsidization: see above all pp. 188-9, where he holds that subsidies had a minimal effect on imperial finances before the third century AD. The quotation is from Luttwak (1976) 37. (4) Tac. Ann, iv 5.3; xii 45.5. The demand that Armenia be received as a donum from Rome and Nero was at the heart of the Tiridates-affair: Tac. Ann. xiii 34.5; xv 25.2; 27.2. On coinage bearing the legend REX...DATUS, see Gobi (1961) . For the trustee notion, Livy xlv 13.15-6; cf. Sail. BJ 14.1. Saumagne (1966) presses this notion far too hard. (5) Str. xii p.567. (6) Jos. BJ vii 226. (7) Livy xlv 13.13-4 with Walsh (1965). A king who ruled a fertile kingdom was obviously in a particularly good position to make timely and invaluable gifts of food to Rome; thus also Hiero II of Sicily: Eutrop. iii 1 with Eckstein (1980); cf. Ptolemy IV: Pol. ix 11a with Huss (1976) 165. Of course other kings could make valuable gifts, though not of food from their own resources: cf. Jos. AJ xvi 128 on Herod, (8) See Badian (1958) and (1968a). (9) Tac. Ann, iii 55; cf. on Vespasian, Hist, ii 81. (10) Augustus Res Gestae 27.2. (11) See Luttwak (1976) 38-9; cf. Bowersock (1965). (12) See for example Gordon (1948) chs. -2-5; Gage (1959); Obolensky (1971). (13) Luttwak (1976) 114. The best critique of Luttwak's notion of 'grand strategy', of which this passage is essent­ ially a part, is Millar (1982). (14) See also Millar (1982) 13. (15) Str. iv p.200; cf. Dio lxxv 3.2-3 for similar calculat­ ions elsewhere. Note Millar (1982) 1.

190

Epilogue (16) App. Praef. 7 with Millar (1982) 12-3. (17) Jos. BJ vii 219-43. (18) Cf. Mocsy (1974) 184-5. Note also that Josephus is entirely explicit that most of the relatives of the dead Herod the Great were 'particularly eager for freedom and the rule of a Roman governor': annexation by Rome is regarded as free­ dom: Jos. AJ xvii 227 with BJ ii 22. For these relatives Roman rule was preferable to the rule of one of their family, who might be a personal enemy. Cf. also Ste. Croix (1981) 509-18.

191

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215

INDEX

N.B. Names are entered as they appear in the text: thus, Antony appears under Antony and C. Gracchus under Gracchus. Abdera: 21 n.77. Abgar II, Osrhoene: 96, 97. Abgar VIII (IX), Osrhoene: 44, 50 n.22. Abgar IX (X), Osrhoene: 119 n.61, 121 n.94, 171. Abrupolis, Thrace: 100 n.34. Acculeius, M.: 41. Acme: 142. Addedomarus: 125. Adherbal: 23. Adiabene: 13, 95, 165. Administration: 115-6. Adminius: 128 n.9. Aedui: 21 n.75. Aelius Gallus: 97. Aemilius Lepidus, M.: 136. Aemilius Paullus, L.: 168. Aetolia: 14. Agents: 69 n.33. Agrioola: 16, 166. Agrippa, M. Vipsanius: 52 n.42, 68 n.15, 77, 82, 96, 98, 108, 111-2. Agrippa I: 11, 17, 29, 33 n.36, 44, 49 n.22, 58, 61-2, 76-7, 79-82, 98, 110-1, 143, 155, 170. Agrippa II: 11, 29, 44, 53 n.51, 55, 66-7, 76-7, 79, 81, 97, 108, 111. Agrippeia, Agrippias,

Agrippeion: 108. Agrippina: 81. Aistomodiusi 40-1, 177 n.67. Alabanda: 31 n.20. Alba Fucens: 157-9, 171. Albania: 93, 101 n.45 Alexander the alabarch: 61. Alexander, son of Aristobulus: 94, 169. Alexander of Cilicia: 44, 178 n.79, 180 n.81. Alexander the Great: 176 n.60. Alexander and Aristobulus, sons of Herod: 10, 44, 67, 97, 140. Alexander Jannaeus: 125. Alexander, son of Perseus: 168, 173. Alexandra: 179. Alexandria: 12, 59-61, 79, 94, 134, 136-7, 150-1, 167, 172-3. Amazaspus: 20 n.70. Ambiorix: 97. Ambracia: 96. Amynander: 96. Amyntas, Galatia: 125, 143, 154, 164 n.115. Amyntianus: 143. Ando(comius?): 125. Andriscus: 167-8, 173. Annexation: 97-8, 187-90. Antigonus, son of Aristobulus:

217

Index 169, 173. Antigonus Doson: 153. Antigonus Gonatas: 145-6. Antioch, Syria: 75, 77, 172. Antiochus I, Commagene: 34 n.39, 36 n.50, 43, 86 n.23, 96-7. Antiochus II, Commagene: 166. Antiochus III, Commagene: 43, 78. Antiochus IV, Commagene: 23, 42-3, 46 n.3, 49 n.22, 79, 92, 97, 108, 114, 162 n.79, 171, 173, 184. Antiochus I, Syria: 145. Antiochus II, Syria: 80. 73 n. 70, 93. Antiochus IV, Syria: 14-5, 17, 58, 112, 115-6, 120 n.85, 122 n.101, 152-3, 165. Antiochus V Syria: 87 n.45. Antiochus VIII, Syria: 80. Antiochus XIII, Syria: 24, 32 n.23. Antipas: 11, 57-8, 61, 78, 82, 95, 97, 99, 108, 140-2, 173. Antipater, father of Herod: 24, 44, 94. Antipater, son of Herod: 10, 117 n.17, 140. Antipatris: 111. Antonia: 61, 142-3, 154-5, 170, 179-80. Antonia Tryphaena: 41-2, 114. Antoninus: 119 n.61, 171. Antoninus Pius: 25, 88 n.64. Antoniopolis: 118 n.38. Antonius Felix: 179-80. Antonius Pallas: 180 n.79. Antonius Polemo, M.: 41-2. Antony: 12, 24, 26, 41-2, 53 n.47, 57, 59, 64, 67, 82-3, 92, 97, 102 n.82, 105, 107, 109, 111-2, 173, 179. Apamea, treaty: 14, 71 n.52, 73 n.70. Arabio: 116. Archelaianus:162 n.76. Archelais: 111, 142. Archelaus I, Cappadocia: 78, 80, 86 n.14, 96-7, 107-8,

218

111, 143, 147, 154, 166. Archelaus II: 78, 92, 94, 115, 117 n.16. Archelaus, Judaea: 10, 26, 66, 111, 140-2, 162 n.76, 173. Ardea: 167. Aretas IV, Nabataea: 26, 62, 81, 84, 89 n.86. Ariarathes IV, Cappadocia: 9, 17 n.2, 146. Ariarathes V, Cappadocia: 9, 11, 17 n.2, 34 n.39, 146. Ariarathes X, Cappadocia: 11, 59, 106-7. Ariobarzanes, Armenia: 51 n.29. Ariobarzanes I, Cappadocia: 105-7, 116 n.l. Ariobarzanes II, Cappadocia: 11, 16, 61, 106-7. Ariobarzanes III, Cappadocia: 11, 24, 25, 60-1, 97-8, 106-7, 121 n.94, 147. Ariogaesus: 173. Ariovistus: 33 n.29, 34 n. 39, 93. Aristobulus, Judaea: 23, 94, 125, 169-70, 173. Aristobulus and Alexander: see Alexander. Aristonicus: 132, 151. Armenia: 43, 94-5, 99 n.4, 171, 173, 187, 190 n.4. Armenia Minor: 59. Arminius: 20 n.66, 40, 170, 172. Army: 15-7, 40, 47 nn.12-3, 51 n.31, 60, 66, 79-80, 91-9, 116, 181-90. Artabanus III, Parthia: 33 n. 38, 82, 95, 97, 172. Artabanus V, Parthia: 179. Artavasdes, Armenia: 97. Artaxias: see Zeno. Arverni: 168-9. Asander": 41, 106. Asandrochus: 47 n.14. Ascalon: 75, 142. Aspurgus: 41, 56, 106, 127 n.6. Ateleia: 44, 52 n.41. Athens: 11, 75, 77-8, 106, 114. Attalus II, Pergamum: 11, 16,

Index 55-6, 93. Attalus III, Pergamum: 10, 80, 131-3, 148, 150-1, 153. Attambelus III, Characene: 72 n.60. Attellius, Cn.: 87 n.36. Augustus: 10-2, 15, 26-7, 40-5, 62, 64, 66-7, 83-5, 92, 94-5, 107-10, 112-3, 114-5, 139-44, 147, 153-5, 165, 173, 183, 187. See also Octavian. Aurelian: 168. Aurelius Antoninus: 122 n. 101. Autocratoris: 108. Azotus: 141-2.

124-5, 144, 165-6, 171, 173, 189. Brogitarus: 24-6, 57, 59-60. Brutus: 60, 125, 137-8, 185. Buffer: 91-5. Byblus: 75. Byzantium: 145-6, 181.

Caelius Pollio: 94. Caenopolis: 94. Caesar: 21, 26, 32 n.23, 40-6, 57, 59-60, 63-4, 68 n.25, 70 n.40, 80, 88 n.48, 93-6, 120 n.78, 124, 166-7, 16970, 173, 178-9. Caesar, Sex.: 85, 92. Caesarea: 107-11, 113, 116, 161 n.64. Baetica: 101 n.48. Caesarion: 179. Balanaea: 75. Callinicus, Commagene: 171. Banditry: 92-3. Camarina: 99 n.7. Bar Kokhba: 126. Candelabrum: 32 n.23. Bastarnae: 94. Caninius, C : 96. Bato, Pannonian: 170, 172. Capitol: see Jupiter Bellona: 32 n.23. Capitolinus. Berenice, mother of Agrippa Cappadocia: 97, 107, 126, 135, I: 61, 142-3, 154, 170. 147. Berenice, daughter of Capua: 167. Agrippa I: 44, 49 n.22, 76, Caracalla: 119 n.61, 171, 175 78, 111, 179. n.20, 179. Berytus: 75-7. Caratacus: 171. Bibulus: 25. Carnuntum: 40-1. Bithynia: 135-6, 145, 149, Carseoli: 16, 167. 151. Carthage: 11, 71 n.52, 138-9, Bithys, Thrace: 16, 167. 178 n.79. Bituitus: 167-9. Casperius: 94. Blesamius: 69 n.33. Cassius: 85, 97-8. Bocchus I, Mauretania: 30 n.2, Cassivellaunus: 96, 166. Castor II, Galatia: 166. 31 n.21, 32 n.23, 32 n.29. Catilinarians: 167. Bocchus II, Mauretania: 95, Cato Maior: 56. 136. Cato Minor: 16, 69 n.30, 135. Bogud, Mauretania: 68 n.15. Catualda: 166, 170, 172. Bosporus: 37 n.60, 41-2, Catuvellauni: 125, 166. 53 n.51, 64-5, 93, 101 Cavalry equipment: 36 n.50. n.45, 106, 113, 121 n.94, Cetae: 92, 94, 115. 122 n.101, 124, 148. Charops, Epirus: 9. Boudica: 144. Chatti: 62. Bribery: 58-9, 61-3, 67, 81. Chios: 75-6, 79. Brigantes: 125. Chronology: 120 n.79. Britain: 16, 32 n.23, 39-40, 62-3, 64, 70 n.44, 96, 114, Cicero: 16, 57, 147.

219

Index Cilicia: 41-2, 44, 92, 181, 184. Cius: 145-6. Claudia Capitolina: 178 n.79. Claudiopolis: 108. Claudius: 11, 14, 27, 29, 33 n.30, 39-40, 42, 58, 61-2, 66, 81, 84, 94, 98-9, 114, 143, 162 n.79, 166, 170-1, 189. Claudius Balbillus, Ti.: 178 n.79. Cleon, Gordiucome: 92, 108. Cleopatra II, Egypt: 130, 165. Cleopatra VII, Egypt: 32 n.23, 69 n.33, 94, 102 n.82, 118 n.38, 120 n.78, 137, 177 n.63, 179 n.79. Cleopatra Selene: 78. Clientela: 23, 182, 185. Clodius, P.: 24-6, 57, 59-60, 134, 169. Cloelius, Sex.: 169. Cogidubnus: 39-40, 84, 101 n.45, 114, 128 n.9. Coinage: 113, 115, 123-8, 136, 190 n.4. Colchis: 148. Commagene: 42-3, 106, 126, 184, 189. Commius: 40, 95-6, 125, 186. Commodus: 44, 73 n.70, 102 n.81. Congonnetiacus: 168. Contoniatus: 176 n.40. Cornelia: 178 n.79. Cornelius, C.: 70 n.40. Coritani: 125. Cornelius Gallus: 146. Corocotta: 100 n.20. Cos: 75. Coson: 125. Cossutius: 122 n.101. Cotiso: 125, 179. Cottius I: 40. Cottius II: 33 n.30, 40, 84. Cotys I, Bosporus: 41, 47 n.3, 94, 113. Cotys VII, Thrace: 47 n.12, 78.

220

Cotys VIII, Thrace: 16-7, 42, 114, 148, 166-7. Crassus: 26, 96, 97. Cunobelinus: 125. Curator: 88 n.64. Cyprus: 33 n.29, 84, 92, 100 n.31, 131, 134-5, 151, 177 n.63, 183. Cyrene: 92, 129-31, 133-4, 148, 151. Cyzicus: 11, 93, 114, 159 n.41. Dacia: 98. Dades: 43. Damascus: 75, 85, 92, 113. Daphidas: 157 n.10. Darius: 15. Debt: 59-63, 185. Decebalus: 122 n.101. Decianus Catus: 62. Deiotarus: 16, 57, 59-60, 68 n.28, 69 n.33, 88 n.48, 99 n.5, 100 n.32, 116, 117 n.10, 166, 181. Deiotarus Philadelphus: 108. Delos: 78. Demetrius, son of Philip V: 15, 165. Demetrius I, Syria: 13, 24, 26, 167. Demetrius II, Syria: 10. Dentheleti: 94. Deposition: 66-7, 186. Dexandros: 113. Didius, Q.: 83. Dinka: 160 n.51. Dobunni: 125. Domitian: 27, 43, 101 n.45, 122 n.101. Domitiopolis: 118 n.38. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cn.: 118 n.38. Domitius Ahenobarbus, L.: 115. Domitius Calvinus, Cn.:100 n.32. Donnus I: 40, 52 n.42, 84. Donnus II: 47 n.7. Dora: 82. Drusilla: 111, 114. Drusilia, daughter of Agrippa I: 111, 179.

Index Drusus, brother of Tiberius: 109-10, 144. Drusus, son of Tiberius: 11, 61, 111. Dubnovellaunus: 125. Duratius: 96. Dynamis: 120 n.92, 178 n.79. Dyteutus: 176 n.60.

Gaetuli: 94-5. Gaiobomarus: 175 n.20. Gaius Caesar: 62, 80. Gaius, emperor: 15-7, 29, 50 n.25, 58, 61-2, 97, 99, 103 n.85, 105, 108, 124, 162 n.74, 170. ^ Galatia: 113, 125, 143, 145, 166. Egypt: 26, 59-60, 92, 134-7. Galba: 42, 55, 171. Embassies: 15, 55-6, 59, 64. Galba, Suessiones: 119 n.61. See also Agents. Garrison: 94-5. Emesa: 44, 65. Gauda: 81, 83, 121 n.99, 174 Engineering: 121 n.101. n.4. Epaticcus: 125. Gaul: 16, 96-7. Ephesus: 60, 78. Gaza: 142. Epiphanes, Commagene: 20 n.70, Gentius: 167. Germanicopolis: 108. 97, 171, 178 n.79. Germanicus: 27, 81, 84, 172. Epitropos: 52 n.41, 90 n.99, Gifts: 27-9, 58-9, 61-3, 65, 147. 67, 75-81, 152-3, 160 n.51, Eppillus: 40, 125. 170, 178 n.79, 183-4. See Ethiopia: 146. also Subsidies. Ethnarch: 26, 65, 89 n.86, 142. Glaphyra: 78. Eudemus: 132, 150. Gold crowns: 25, 27-8, 34 n.39, Eumenes II: 23, 34 n.39, 55-6, 93, 97, 152. 62, 73 n.70, 81. Gold vessels: 35 n.43, 141. Eupator, Bosporus: 64. Gorgippia: 56. Eurycles: 77. Gornea: 94. Fabatus: 88 n.61. Goths: 20 n.62. Governors: 79-85, 99, 101 n.48, Falerii: 43. Famine: 83. 187. Flaccus: 82. Gracchus, C.: 58. Gracchus, Ti., elder: 17 n.2, Flavius, .L.: 169. Flavus: 47 n.8. 24, 178 n.79. Formulae: 31 n.16. Gracchus, Ti., younger: 132-3. Forum: 27. Guides: 96. Forum Julii: 170, 172. Gulussa: 138-9. Freedmen/Freedwomen: 32 n.23, 40, 44-5, 47 n.12, 50 Hadrian: 41, 120 n.85, 178 n.79, n.29, 61-2f 70 n.40, 94, 188. 115, 140-3, 154, 170, 179Harmozica: 98, 101 n.45. 80. Helena, Adiabene: 89 n.77. French imperialism: 31 n.15. Heliopolis: 29, 78, 117 n.9. Frisii: 40, 73 n.70. Heracleia Pontica: 145-6. Frontier: 95, 181-90. Herennius Capito: 61. Fulvius Nobilior, M.: 96. Herod: 10, 17 n.9, 24, 26, 33, 44, 50 n.29, 57, 64-7, 72 Gabinius: 60, 94, 136. n.60, 75-7, 79-80, 82-5, 92, Gadara: 83, 142. 96-8, 108-13, 121, 123, 125Gades: 78. 6, 139-44, 154-5, 179, 182-

221

Index 3, 186, 190 n.7, 191 n.18. Herod of Chalcis: 29, 58, 78, 116 n.3. Herodianus: 143. Herodias: 62. Hiempsal II: 59, 124. Hiero II: 25, 63, 99 n.7, 146, 190 n.7. Hippus: 142. Host: 79-80. Hostage: 12-6. Hyrcanus II: 65, 92, 94, 125, 142. Iamblichus I, Emesa: 44, 96. Iamblichus II, Emesa: 44. Iberia: 43, 93, 98. Iceni: 71 n.58, 73 n.73, 125, 144. Iguvium: 167. Ilium: 82, 96. Illyria: 63, 66, 70 n.51. Imperial cult: 109-10, 112-5. Indemnity: 63-6. Intermediaries: 95-9, 166, 186. Intervention: 66-7, 93-4, 184, 186. Iotape, daughter of Antiochus IV: 178 n.79. Iotape, wife of Antiochus IV: 79, 111. Irish kings: 160 n.51, 166. Italian allies: 72 n.70. Italicus, Cherusci: 20 n.56, 30 n.4, 47 n.8, 119 n.61, 122 n.103. Italicus, Vannian kingdom: 47 n.8, 119 n.61. Izates, Adiabene: 13, 95.

Jubatianus: 143 . Judaea: 24, 65-6, 76, 110, 1256, 169. Jugurtha: 15-6, 23, 32 n.23, 59, 81, 88 n.50. Julia, daughter of Augustus: 108, 179. Julia Ammia: 50 n.29. Julia Axse: 19 n.38, 51 n.31. Julia Balbilla: 178 n.79. Julia Phyllis: 47 n.12. Julia, Tarcondimotid: 42. Julianus: 47 n.8. Julias: 108. Juliopolis: 108. Julius Alexander, Ti.: 81. Julius Aquila: 94. Julius Cotys: 50 n.22. Julius Laco, C : 89 n.90. Junius Cilo: 171. Junius Juncus, M.: 135. Jupiter Capitolinus: 14, 24-5, 34 n.42, 51 n.29, 55-6, 67 n.4, 112-4, 131, 185. Kings, early Rome: 27-8. Kings, Roman attitudes: 56, 589, 68 n.25, 98. Kinship: 14, 23, 77, 152.

Laodiceia-On-Sea: 75. Lars Porsenna: 27-8, 34 n.39. Lentulus Crus, L. Cornelius: 33 n.29. Licinius Crassus, M.: 94. Licinius Murena, L.: 118 n.37. Livia: 108-10, 121 n.92, 140-2, 154, 162 n.74. Livias: 108. Liviopolis: 118 n.33. Lollius, M.: 62. Lucceius Albinus: 84. Jamneia: 61, 141-2. Lucullus: 24, 68 n.13, 79, 84, Jewish rights: 58, 66, 82. 133. Juba I: 59, 102 n.82, 116, Luernius:' 86 n.l. 127 n.6. Lugdunum: 173. Juba II: 16, 35 n.44, 45, Lugdunum Convenarum: 173. 78-9, 94-5, 108, 110, 115Luke: 64. 6, 120 n.75, 121 n.95, 124, Lusius Quietus: 180 n.81. 143, 154. Lycia: 86 n.17. 'Juba': 84.

222

Index Macedonia: 66, 70 n.51, 93-4. Malorix: 40. Mandubracius: 166. Mannus VIII: 51 n.36, 107. Marcomanni: 62, 73 n.70, 102 n.81, 165, 172. Marcus Aurelius: 33 n.32, 52 n.41, 72 n.61, 173, 174 n.9, 188. Marius: 32 n.23, 81, 95. Maroboduus: 121 n.99, 165-6, 170-2. Marriage: 98, 173, 178 n.79. Mars Ultor: 27. Marsus: 81, 98. Martius Verus: 94. Massinissa: 11, 21 n.79, 24, 27-8, 32 n.23, 34 n.39, 55-6, 92, 99 n.7, 115, 129, 138-9, 148, 164 n. 102, 165, 184. Massiva: 165. Mastanabal: 11, 138-9. Mattathias Antigonus: 125-6. Media Atropatene: 51 n.29, 165. Meherdates: 14. Memmius, L.: 79. Merithates: 43. Meroe: 64, 95. Metellus Numidicus, Q. Caecilius: 81, 83. Micipsa: 11, 15-6, 23, 88 n.50, 138-9. Minius Cerrinius: 167. Mithridates II, Commagene: 174 n.17. Mithridates III, Commagene: 43. Mithridates V, Pontus: 58, 68 n.23, 148. Mithridates VI, Pontus: 23, 59, 71 n.57, 106, 121 n.98, 131, 135-6, 146, 148-9, 151-2. Mithridates VIII, Bosporus: 42, 47 n.3, 94, 116 n.2, 171. Mithridates, Iberian: 170. Mithridates of Pergamum: 44, 93.

Nabataea: 52 n.41, 107, 126. Names: 47 n.8, 84, 111-2. Narcissus: 62. Navy: 170, 173. Nero: 27, 32 n.23, 39-40, 42, 44, 51 n.29, 66-7, 95, 101 n.45, 108, 114, 122 n.101, 127 n.6, 144, 190 n.4. Neroneia: 108. Neronias: 108. New Carthage: 78. Nicolaus of Damascus: 66, 82. Nicomedes I, Bithynia: 145-6. Nicomedes II, Bithynia: 9-10, 21 n.77, 56. Nicomedes III, Bithynia: 11, 58, 60. Nicomedes IV, Bithynia: 60, 70 n.40, 135-6, 144, 148-9, 151-3, 186. Nicopolis: 75, 77, 113. Noricum: 36 n.50, 93-4, 143-4. Numantia: 15, 80. Nymphidius Sabinus: 171, 173. Nysa: 135, 174 n.14. Oaths: 115. Obodas III, Nabataea: 26. Octavian: 21 n.75, 24, 33 n.38, 57, 77-9, 83, 92, 125, 136, 179. See also Augustus. Office: 78-9, 84-5. Olba: 41-2. Olympian Zeus: 31 n.21, 114. Olympic Games: 75, 77. Ornamenta: 29. Ornospades: 51 n.31. Osrhoene: 43-4, 107, 126. Ostorius Scapula, P.: 73 n.73. Otho: 55. Oxynta: 167, 172. Pacorus, Armenia: 43, 45, 177 n.64. Pamphylia: 31 n.20. Pannonia: 20 n.66, 166, 172. Paphlagonia: 59, 148. Parthia: 12, 51 n.31, 95, 97, 126, 146, 165, 172, 186, 189. Peitholaus: 94.

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Index Peregrinus: 41, 172. Pergamum: 75, 131-3, 149-50. Perseus: 24, 63, 97, 167-8. Pessinus: 59, 100 n.29. Petronius, C.: 64, 83. Petronius, P.: 82. Pharasmanes: 25. Pharnaces II: 100 n.32, 178 n.79. Phasael: 17 n.ll. Phasaelis: 111, 141-2. Phaselis: 75. Pheroras: 142. Philadelphia: 111. Philip, son of Herod: 10, 108, 110, 140-2. Philip, son of Perseus: 168. Philip II, Macedon: 20 n.57. Philip V, Macedon: 15, 25, 63, 93. Philopappus: 50 n.27, 53 n.51, 78, 173. Philopator, Cilicia: 108. Philorhomaios: 105-7. Phraates IV: 12, 15, 162 n.79, 182. Phraates V: 12. Pictones: 96. Pinnes: 63. Piracy: 92. Piso, Cn. Calpurnius: 81, 84, 177 n.70. Piso, L. Calpurnius: 81. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus, Ti.: 114-5. Plutarch: 90 n.99. Pola: 41, 172. Polemo I: 41-2, 88 n.48f 108, 111, 186. Polemo II: 42, 114, 116 n.2, 127 n.6. Polemonium: 111. Pollio: 17 n.9. Pompeiopolis: 172. Pompey: 23-4, 42, 57, 59-60, 65-6, 71 n.57, 80, 88 n.48, 94, 102 n.82, 118 n.37, 136-7, 142, 169, 185. Pompey, Sextus: 116. Pomponius Flaccus, L.: 61, 88 n.58.

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Pontus: 41-2. Porus: 176 n.60. Pothinus: 137. Praefecti gentium: 73 n.70. Prasutagus: 125, 144, 155. Principes gentium: 53 n.46, 113. Protos: 142. Prusias I: 146. Prusias II: 9-10/ 30 n ? 2, 32 n.23, 55-6, 114. Psyche: 179. Ptolemais: 75, 80. Ptolemy II: 145-6. Ptolemy IV Philopator: 34 n.39, 136, 149, 190 n.7. Ptolemy V Epiphanes: 17 n.4, 136. Ptolemy VI Philometor: 14, 106, 130, 150-2, 165, 178 n.79. Ptolemy VIII Physcon: 56, 112, 115, 129-31, 149-53, 165, 178 n.79. Ptolemy IX Soter II: 68 n.13, 79, 84, 133. Ptolemy X Alexander I: 134. Ptolemy XI Alexander II: 134, 149-53. Ptolemy XII Auletes: 26, 31 " n.16, 59-60, 94, 134-7, 149, 152, 165. Ptolemy XIII: 137. Ptolemy XIV: 94, 137. Ptolemy Apion: 133-4, 149-53. Ptolemy of Mauretania: 28, 34 n.39, 35 n.44, 45, 78, 97, 103 n.85, 116, 121 n.95, 124, 170. Ptolemy Sympetesis: 131. Publicani: 60, 65. Publicius Agrippa: 43. Pydna: 9-10, 55-6, 98, 167. Pylaemenes, Paphlagonia: 148, 162 n.77. Pylaemenianus: 162 n.74. Pyrrhus: 68 n.29. Pythodoris: 48 n.16, 78, 108. Quadi: 33 n.32, 102 n.81, 173, 175 n.20. Quinctilius Varus, P.: 72 n.70,

Index 88 n.64. Rabirius: 60, 185. Rasparaganus: 41, 172. Ravenna: 170-2. Remi: 96. Remothalcianus: 162 n.76. Rex: 124-5, 160 n.51. Rhescuporis II, Bosporus: 120 n.79. Rhescuporis I, Thrace: 41, 78. Rhescuporis III, Thrace: 88 n.58, 166-7, 172. Rhodaspes: 12. Rhodes: 31 n.20, 33 n.38, 57, 69 n.30, 80. Rhoemetalces III, Bosporus: 88 n.64, 121 n.92. Rhoemetalces I, Thrace: 35 n.44. Rhoemetalces II, Thrace: 41-2. Rhoemetalces III, Thrace: 78-9, 114. Roads: 89 n.86. Roma: 113. Romans as kings: 84. Roxolani: 41, 62, 172. Rufinus: 94. Rullan bill: 26, 59. Sabinus: 88 n.64. Sadalas II: 137-8, 149. Salome: 140-2, 154. Samos: 64. Sampsigeramus I: 65. Sampsigeramus II: 44. Sanni: 70 n.51. Sauromates I: 116 n.2, 117 n.9. Scaurus: 68 n.23. Scipio Aemilianus: 15, 80, 138-9, 148, 178 n.79. Scipio Africanus: 24, 27-8, 138, 154, 168, 178 n.79. Scipio Nasica: 159 n.48. Scribonius: 47 n.8. Sebaste: 108, 110, 161 n.64. Segestes: 170, 174 n.9. Sejanus: 99.

Seneca: 70 n.44 Septimius: 94. Septimius Severus: 41, 43-4, 188. Seraspadanes: 12. Sertorius: 11-2, 121 n.99, 135. Sexuality: 20 n.57, 21 n.72, 179. Sicily: 84. Sidon: 75, 113. Silver vessels: 35 n.43, 141. Sinope: 117 n.9. Sitas: 94. Sittius: 70 n.40, 89 n.88, 116, 174 n.13. Slavery: 23, 53 n.46, 60. Smyrna: 78. Socrates Chrestus: 158 n.31. Sohaemus, Armenia: 43, 94, 180 n.81. Sohaemus, Emesa: 29, 44, 78-9. Soura: 86 n.17. Spain: 11-12, 31 n.ll. Sparta: 75, 77, 171, 178 n.79. Spoletium: 167. Statorius: 116. Statues: 32 n.23, 118 n.48. Stratonice: 157 n.10. Subsidies: 62-3, 65, 183. See also Gifts. Suebi: 165, 172. Sugambri: 165, 175 n.28. Sulla: 30 n.2, 32 n.23, 79, 134, 152. Syllaeus: 26, 62, 88 n.61, 97, 142. Syphax: 34 n.39, 116, 167-8. Syria: 13-4, 91-2, 120 n.78, 142. Tarcondimotus I: 42, 87 n.40, 96, 116 n.4. Tasciovanus: 125. Teuta: 63, 87 n.45. Teutones: 93-4. Theatre: 88 n.48. Theoderic: 20 n.62. Thrace: 41, 126, 137-8, 148-9. Tiberia: 118 n.27.

225

Index Tiberias: 49 n.22, 61, 81, 98, 108, 186. Tiberius: 11-2, 27, 41, 44, 51 n.31, 56, 58, 61, 77, 80, 97, 102 n.83, 144, 148, 165-7, 170. Tiberius Gemellus: 61, 170. Tibur: 168. Tigranes I: 88 n.48, 169. Tigranes II: 50 n.29. Tigranes IV: 44, 50 n.29, 167. Tigranes V: 44, 50 n.29. Tigranes, son of Tigranes I: 68 n.26, 169-70. Timarchus: 33 n.29. Tincommius: 40, 125. Tiridates I, Armenia: 27, 30 n.2, 32 n.23, 51 n.29, 67 n.4, 108, 114, 116, 190 n.4. Tiridates II, Armenia: 177 n.65. Tiridates II, Parthia: 51 n.31, 117 n.20. Tiridates, grandson of Phraates IV: 14-5. Titiopolis: 118 n.38. Titus: 179. Toga: 12, 27-9, 42-3. Trajan: 20 n.70, 27, 51, 62, 72 n.60, 98, 173, 188. Treason: 97-9. Trial: 67, 166-7, 170, 186. Tribute: 63-6, 184. Trinovantes: 125, 166. Tripolis: 75. Triumphator; 27-9. Tutela: 9, 93, 129-55, 165, 182. Tyre: 75. Ulpia Vobrane: 51 n.31. Valerius, P.: 68 n.28. Vannius: 94, 166, 172. Venus Genetrix: 32 n.23. Venusia: 167, 172, 175 n.21. Verica: 39-40, 125. Vermina: 31 n.ll, 33 n.29. Verritus: 40.

226

Verus: 43, 45, 51 n.36, 180 n.81. Vespasian: 29, 43-4, 98, 100 n.40, 101 n.45, 102 n.82, 171, 185, 187. Vestalis: 40. Victoria: 25, 31 n.21, 32 n.23. Vienna: 173. Vitellius, L.: 14, 33 n.38, 82, 95, 97. Vologaeses I: 67 n.4, 100 n.40, 171. Vologaeses III: 43. Vonones I: 12, 15, 30 n.4, 122 n.103, 172. Whaddon Chase: 71 n.58. Xanthus: 86 n.17. Yemeni king: 35 n.43. Zeno-Artaxias: 41-3. Zeno, emperor: 20 n.62. Zeno, father of Polemo I: 48 / n.16. Zenobia: 168. Zenodorus: 85, 92. Ziaealas: 145-6.