REVISITING TALWAR
A STUDY IN THE ROYAL INDIAN NAVY UPRISING OF FEBRUARY 1946
REVISITING TALWAR
A STUDY IN THE ROYAL INDIAN NAVY .UPRISING OF FEBRUARY 1946
Dipak Kumar Das
I
AJANTA
ISBN 81-202-0349-6
Published 1993 AJANTA PUBLICATIONS P.O. Box 2192, Malka Ganj, Delhi-ll0007 A Publishing Unit of AJANTA BOOKS INTERNATIONAL 1 u.B. Jawahar Nagar, Bungalow Road, Delhi-llOOO7
(PRODUCED IN INDIA) ..
r~
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LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS Shore Establishments on Strike 'Storm Centres' in Bombay Karachi Harbour and Islands Route of HMIS Kathiawar Rough Plan of Positions of 37th MS Flotilla in Semaris Bay, Port Blair Appeal to All RIN Personnel by NCSC Leaflet Issued by Secretary, Bombay Committee of CPI
To Buddhadeva Bhattacharyya and Mohit Bhattacharya to whom I am most indebted
CONTENTS Acknowledgements Abbreviations
xi
Briefing on Talwar
xv 1
1
Under the White Ensign
2
'Tide' Turns
30
3
'Silence' Broken
61
4
Aggrieved Lower Deck
90
5
A Hell-Hole
130
6
A Tale of Three Ships
159
7
Rebellious Lower Deck
189
8
Faces of the Elite
234
9
The Other Responses ,
288
In Sum
341
Bibliograpliy
347
Index
354
CONTENTS Acknowledgements Abbreviations
xi
Briefing on Talwar
xv 1
1
Under the White Ensign
2
'Tide' Turns
30
3
'Silence' Broken
61
4
Aggrieved Lower Deck
90
5
A Hell-Hole
130
6
A Tale of Three Ships
159
7
Rebellious Lower Deck
189
8
Faces of the Elite
234
9
The Other ~esponses
288
In Sum
341
Bibliography
347
Index
354
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writings of Ranajit Guha, Dipesh Chakravarty, Gyan Pandey and David Arnold among other 'subaltern' historians have been a great source of inspiration for me. I ~sh to take this opportunity to acknowledge that I have borrowed quite a number of ideas from them. Gautam Bhadra's advice on source material was useful for me. He has been kind enough to read the manuscript and offer his comments. I am grateful to Supriyo Chatterjee and Mihir Ranjan Purkayastha for their editorial assistance. A word of thanks is due to Tarun Kumar Mukhopadhyay, Sanjay Prakas Nanda, Alok Das, Tapan Kumar Chattopadhyay, Pradyumna Banerjee, Santanu Rakshit and Sunil Kumar Dhar for taking special interest in the work. To the librarians, archivists and other members of the staff of National Library, National Archives, Historical Section (Ministry of Defence, GOI) and Archives on Contemporary History (Jawaharlal Nehru University) goes my deep gratitude. Of them Dilip Kumar Mitra, Santanu Mukhopadhyay, Shankar Bhaduri, Sunil Kumar Ghosh, N.P. Sharma and Ajit Kumar Dey deserve special mention for their excellent cooperation with me. Grants from the research fund of the Department of Political Science, Calcutta University, enabled me to meet parts of my research expenses.
ABBREVIATIONS ...
AA C-in-C
Allied Air Commander-in-Chief
AB
Able (rate)
ABP
Amrita Bazar Patrika
AIR
All India Radio
AOC-in-C
Air Officer Coinmanding-in-Chief
AS
Active Service
BAFSEA
British Air Force, South-East Asia
BBC
British Broadcasting Corporation
BC
TIle Bombay Chronicle
Bl
TIle Bharat lyoti
BORs
British Other Ranks
BVO
Base Victualling Officer
BW
Bombay Witness
CCO
Central Communication Office
C-in-C
Commander-in-Chief
CMG
TI,e Civil & Military Gazette
CNA
Controller of Naval Accounts
CO
Commanding Officer
CPO
Chief Petty Officer
CSO
Chief Staff Officer
CW
Collected Works
DO
Divisional Officer
DSQ
Depot Sick Quarters
DSS
Dockyard Signal Station
DW
I'elhi Witness
EO
Executive Officer
ERA , ETE
Engine Room Artificer Emergency Tf!mporariIy Employed (Civilians)
xi
xii FOB
Flag Officer, Bombay
FOCRIN
Flag Officer Commanding RIN
FPJ
17ze Free Press Journal
GHQ (I)
General Headquarters (India)
GI
American soldier. (from gi - general issue or government issue)
GIPD/S
Government of India Press, Delhi/Shimla
GOC-in-C
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
GOI
Government of India
GTCoy
Ground Transport Company
HM
His Majesty
HMI/S
His Majesty's Indian/Ship
HMS
His Majesty's Ship
HO
Hostilities Only
HS
Hindustan Standard
HT
17ze Hindustan Times
lA
Indian Army.
fAR
17le Indian Anllual Register
ICO
Indian Commissioned Officer
ICSD
Indian Canteen Stores Department
INA
!ndian National Army
IORs
Indian Other Ranks
LAD
Legislative Assembly Debates
LCM
Landing Craft Mechanized
LCT
Landing Craft Tank
LCW
Landing Craft Wing
Ldg. Sig.
Leading Signalman
Ldg.Tel.
Leading Telegraphist
LH
Leading Hand
LS
Leading Seaman
xiii MG
The Manchester Guardian
ML
Motor Launch
MP
Member, Parliament
MS
Mine Sweeper
MSA
Mine-Sweeping Allowance
MT
Motor/Mechanical Transport
MTE
Mechanical Training Establishment
NAAFI
Navy Army Air Force Institute
NC
Negotiation Committee
NCO
Non-Commissioned Officer
NCSC
Naval Central Strike Committee
NHQ
Naval Headquarters
NL
Naval Law
NIT OD
17le /Yew York Times Ordinary (rate)
OOD
Officer on Duty or Officer of the Day
OOW
Officer on Watch
PA PD
People's Age
PO
Petty Officer
RAF·
Royal Air Force
RAMC
Royal Army Medical Corps
RIA.F
Royal Indian Air Force
RIASC
Royal Indian Army Supply Corps
RIM
Royal Indian Marine
Parliamentary Debates
RINFR
Royal Indian Naval Fleet Reserve
RINR
Royal Indian Naval Reserve
RINVR
Royal Indian Naval Volunteer Reserve
RN
Royal Navy
RNR
Royal Naval Reserve
xiv RNVR
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve
RO
Regulating Office/Officer
RP
Rocket Projectile
RPO
Regulating Petty Officer
RT
Radio Telephony
SB
Sick Bay
SBA
Sick Berth Attendant
SCO
Staff Communication Officer
SEAC
South-East Asia Command
Sig. Bos'n
Signal Boatswain
SNCO
Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
SNLR
Service No Longer Required
SNOPG
Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf
SS
Short Service/Special Service
SW
Selected Works
TOI
The Times of India
TOP
17le Trallsfer of Power
VCO
Viceroy's Commissioned Officer
VS
Visual Signal/Signalling
WAC (I)
Women Auxiliary Corps (India)
WO
Warrant Officer
WRINS
Women Royal Indian Naval Service
WT
Wireless Telegraphy
BRIEFING ON TALWAR
Ta/war here stands for the rebellious Royal Indian Navy of February 1946 in its entirety. A colonial armed service built to protect British interest, RIN sought to impose on its men a sense of devotion and loyalty to the alien rulers and, immediately, to their representatives in the upper deck. The barriers around naval units were to distance them from civilians and prevent any influence from outside that could dilute their allegiance. Aboard ships, duty and space for Indian men were divided so as to suit the specific requirements of the service. Any violation of this arrangement invited punishment. Every aspect of lower-deck life was regulated by 'standing orders'. An occupant of the bottom tier of the naval hierarchy, the I:.ating was required to abide unquestionably by the command of his · superiors. The latter had to be saluted at all times and places. The rules of etiquette demanded that the rating must spring to attention · whenever addressed by the officers and answer submissively any of their queries. On enlistment he was allotted an 'official number'. After that he had no other identity. His privacy and individuality were the first casualties on signing up. Everything, his body, apparel or belonging, was open to scrutiny by RO or RPO. Even while off duty or on 'liberty' the rating could not cross the boundary of his unit unless permitted to. Out on the civvy street he was under the surveillance of the naval police and liable to be punished for any 'deviant' behaviour. Routine and regimentation sought to reduce him to a cog in the wheel,an automaton with neither intelligence nor a capacity · for judgeme~t, doing only what he was programmed to. Punitive djscipline, enforced with iron hand, sought to dull his mental abilit.i~s. Isolated from the people and reared on a heavy dose of training and militarization under British direction, the rating was expected to be wholly loyal to the Raj. He was to be so even under uI).bearable service conditions or in the face of blatant racial discrimination. Except for an insignificant section the entire naval elite believed that Indian lower ranks could be made to behave as it wished through coercion, deprivation and ill-treatment. But oppression and injustice generated among the lower-deck subalterns a sense of moral outrage xv
xvi
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
and undermined their loyalty to the service. Tension surfaced time and again in individual units. At such moments the men threw off allegiance to the upper deck. Andjn early 1946 the entire. RIN lower deck did so. Defiance of authority, in contrast to the unquestioning obedience in other circumstances, became the hallmark of their action during those tumultuous days of 18-23 February. The mutiny on Bounty, the one on Potemkin or even some of those elsewhere,' in between or later, given the corpus of historical writings and film classics, are more familiar to us than what happened aboard Talwar. We do not have an Eisenstein or a Frank Lloyd. Our historians have ignored, marginalized or distorted the phenomenon. On their part the rating-rebels hardly left any written testimony of their action and perspective. Ahmed Brohi, a leading striker at Talwar, told the RIN Commission of Enquiry: 'We did our job.... Nobody has any evidence. All records have been burnt... Nobody will speak anything.' Neither the witness nor, for that matter, any of those who deposed before investigating teams could be made to reveal anything beyond why they launched the movement. This makes our visit to Ta/war arduous. The access to it lies largely through the upper~deck discourse. Broadly, Ministry of Defence/NHQ· records under the series 'RIN Mutiny'I'Naval Law' comprise (i) COs' reports written a day or two after the ratings' surrender, (ii) proceedings and findings of the boards of investigation, held in March-April, into the 'mutiny' aboard individual ships and establishments, (iii) 'mutiny charges' 'levelled subsequently against category 'A' rebels for trial by courts martial and (iv) proceedings and reports of the Commission submitted in July. The commanding officers of quite a number of units under Bombay command tried, in their reports and evidence, to pass the buck on to the neighbouring ships or establishments which figured prominently in the strike. It was endlessly repeated in their statements that their men were 'perfectly loyal', 'quiet' and 'orderly' until 'hooligans' from the latter incited them to 'mutiny' and 'rowdyism'. The explanations by officers in command of the more turbulent units were nothing but an improvisation on the old bogies that had suited the counter-insurgents so well. The men had no grievances. No complaint was reported to them before the outbreak. Nor was any 'request' suppressed by officers under their command. No 'active mutiny' was contemplated by the bulk of the ratings. There
Briefing on Talwar
xvii
was no 'pre-meditation', 'pre-planning' or 'pre-organization' on their· part. The development was essentially external to them. To argue otherwise was difficult for the officers: it might amount to admitting their part in the aggravation of lower-deck discontent, their ignorance of the 'state of morale' among the men and lack of contact with them. More precisely the upper-deck response produced a plethora of conspiracy theories and obliterated the ratings' role as the wiIIing subjects of their own action. The departmental boards upheld this perspective and absolved the officers of any responsibility for creating the 'state of mind that led to the mutiny'. A few spoke of a 'tacit understanding' among officers as well as men as to what they should divulge. While the latter refused to leak any information that might implicate their comrades or themselves, the former were anxious to underplay the disturbance aboard their units, prove their vigilance before' the outbreak and save their reputation as 'strict disciplinarians'. The officers' evidence was attuned to a logic of selfdefence, an effort to protect their rank and position. However most of the boards understood from the directives of the higher authori-. ties the kind of 'opinion' the latter would like to hear from them. The reports they wrote whitewashed the existing regime in RIN and named the 'ring-leaders' for punishment. Excepting a honourable few the entire body of officer-witnesses, in their depositions before the RIN Commission, reiterated the external manipulation theses, as usual, with no concrete evidence to substantiate them. Quite a number of ratings who were likely to give ullpalatable evidence were threatened and' prevented from making any statement. Many more had been dismissed or discharged from the service and thus removed out of the Commission's view. Still those who were allowed to ap- . pear in its witness box made the officers' arguments look hollow. The grievances they voiced, the Commission had to admit, were not foisted on them from outside. Even then the report it submitted did not, in substance, deviate from the dominant explanation as above: it echoed in fact a subtler variant of it. The event was attributed to a small 'educated' and (therefore) 'politically conscious' nucleus in the lower deck. It was mediated through the ratings' grievances but, still, was external to the bulk of them. Enough hints of the ratings' conditions in RIN and their perception of the structure of authority that made such conditions possible are contained in the transcriptions of their depositions before ,
xviii
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
the investigating teams. To find out why they rose in revolt one need not rely on the upper-deck discourse (which reveals its own assumptions rather than their motivations). But when it comes to knowing how, dependence on it becomes unavoidable .. The rebels were too uncommunicative to answer the question. Given the absence of wrjtten testimony or a substantial body of oral evidence by them outlining the rebellion as they viewed it, one must tap the records thatthe naval elite produced in the exercise of its official function and, at the same time, be on guard against its bias. The 'narrative of events' in COs' reports and officers' statements to the Boards and the Commission of Enquiry provide clues of the rebellion, its flash point, spread and end, forms and methods, organization and leadership and its tensions or contradictions. The ratings' actions and the utterances that matched them, galling as they were to their officers, were detailed in the 'charges' that the latter framed to have their adversaries punished. The reconstruction of much of what the rebels did aboard ships and establishments in Karachi is bedeviled by the absence of sources other than the one of this kind. The NHQ records on the 'mutiny' can be supplemented by -the Home-Political (Internal) files, civilian officials' papers, nationalist leaders' speeches and writings, assembly proceedings an,d newspaper reports. The latter simultaneously throw light on the elite response other than that of naval officers. In the early writings on late colonial India scholars spared little attention for the affairs of the rebellious ratings. In referring to their uprising en passallt in his multi-volume History of the Freedom Movement in India R.C. Majumdar reproduced a passage from the bureaucrat-turned-historian V.P. Menon's Trallsfer of Power ill India. To him as to the latter the situation that developed out of the strike by a 'section' of Indian ratings was very 'ugly'. For ships were seized, guns mounted and preparations made to attack the military. The ratings went 'completely out of hand'. Contrary to the advice of Congress and League, strikes and hartals were organized. 'Unruly crowds' went about looting and burning, particularly in Bombay. The military had to be called in to assist the police in restoring order. While some conspired to fish in the troubled waters, Vallabhbhai Patel contributed to the efforts to bring the situation under control. The entire development was thus reduced to a problem of law and order and explained in the same terminology as that of its guardians.
xix
Briefing 011 Talwar ,
The naval ratings' action and the mass upsurge that followed were divested of their anti-colonialist content and rendered free of any political meaning. These had no significance except as a phenomenon creating lawlessness· and disorder and impeding the measures taken by British rulers to settle India's problems constitutionally. More recently Amales Tripathi and a couple of historians of Bipan Chandra's persuasion have paid a little more attention to the RIN revolt. But this hardly makes any difference for those who willed the event. While their predecessors saw the action as a problem of control for the colonial state and part of its life, these scholars view it as an event within the domain of Congress nationalism and seek to appropriate it as such into its history. For the latter the task of assimilation was not unproblematical. The spirit behind the revolt has to be lauded, in most general terms, to the exclusion of its more concrete achievements, as was done by Congress leaders. A fearless act of collective defiance in an armed force, it has a 'dramatic impact' on the minds of the people. But nothing more. Nothing more than a 'symbolic significance' should be attached to the event. The revolt was unable to rally round itself all sections of society, especially 'liberal and conservative groups' and small town - and villagefolk, as Congress-led movements had done before. The response it evoked, unlike the latter, was confined to the more militant sections of the people in a few urban centres, that is, the organized working classes. Underlying this jll;dgment is a predilection for an all-ornothing position, a movement by the whole people or none. By the same token the communal unity witnessed during the upsurge was more of organizations than of the people. It was limited in purpose and short in duration. It was forged for a specific agitation and disappeared as soon as the requirement was over. The 'unity at barricades' had. little 'realized potential' and showed hardly any prospect for the future. A battalion of Mahratta troops was enough to confine the ratings to their barracks and one m·ore battalion to subdue their civilian sympathizers. It is as if the protests would have appeared seminal had these been more extravagant and had forced the authorities to deploy more troops to tackle them. But then our scholars show stubborn reluctance to look at the evidence that is extant and relevant to their assessment. When all is said about the failures of the naval rising and the mass upsurge in its wake they are out to prove the relations~ip between Congress and these protests to
Xt"
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
be one of integral association rather than of opposition. In their explanation Sardar Patel exerted himself for the restoration of peace because, aware of the British mobilization of repressive forces, he wanted to save all those. in the fray from inevitable extermination. This echoes word for word the apology that Congress offered later (and conventional historiographical wisdom readily accepted). The overwhelming evidence as to its conscious subversion of the actions that the naval ratings and their civilian supporters initiated on their own is conveniently glossed over. These protests are in fact presented as an 'extension' of the Congress nationalist activity. Understandably it is difficult for scholars trapped within the paradigm of elite discourse to admit the existence of any anti-colonialist politics outside the urbit of the latter. To do so is to question the notion of Congress hegemony over all such politics as well as that of a unified nationalism. . Of the few monographs on the naval uprising one was written by B.C. Dutt who served RIN as a communication rating until his dismissal allegedly for 'subversive activities' on the night before FOCRIN's visit to Ta/war on 2 February 1946. Contrary to the general impression about it his is not a participant's account. It is a 'personal narrative', rather a narrative of events to some of which he was a witness. When the Talwar ratings struck work, he was inside the Signal School, confined to his barracks, and played no part at that time or 'later. Presented as a leading participant's work Dutt's Mutiny of the Innocents soon came to be treated as 'the most au. thoritative' of all accounts. Ironically its author who claimed to have, along with few others, led the rebellion fell back upon, after a lapse of two and half decades, the view of some of its adversaries. Behind the uprising, Dutt wrote, was a conspiracy hatched by a few Talwar ratings (including himself) who called themselves 'Azad Hindi' or 'Free Indians' and received 'some guidance' from left-wing Congress leaders. It is these conspirators whom Dult credited with whatever pre-meditation or pre-planning underlying the uprising. They roped in the 'likely candidates' for the Azad Hindi work by means of flattery, offering food, tea and other drinks. A 'comprehensive. plan' was drawn up by them to channel the discontent among lower ranks through a 'whispering campaign' and to create a sense of instability in their minds through widespread sabotage. Navy Day, 1 December 1945, was chosen as the 'curtain raiser' for the first of a series of acts
xxii
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946
consciousness other than theirs, either that of a scheming few among them or of the nationalist elite as its motive force. The view inclined to the left moved away from the conspiracy thesis, like that of Dutt, but not very far from the perspective of nationalist historians on the event. To the radical commentators the naval uprising was the 'logical culmination' of the anti-imperialist mass movement rather than of Congress nationalist activity. E.M.S. Namboodiripad, in his 'Preface' to Subrata Banerjee's monograph 171e RIN Strike, wrote: the revolt was an 'inseparable part' of the struggles which different sections of the people, especially workers and peasants, had waged to force the British to quit the country. These struggles showed a great deal of initiative, resourcefulness and militancy. Yet the hegemony of Congress and League over them was nearly total. That was why the ratings, having pulled down Union Jack and White Ensign, the symbols of British domination over the service, hoisted in their place Clzarka and Crescent. This act of appropriation by men of Congress and League symbols for a project of their own signified here their loyalty to the 'parties of the bourgeoisie and the landlords'. It was this 'weakness which the British exploited to bring the movement to its knees. Of course these writers did not forget to add: Congress and League flags did not fly alone. Together with them flew Hammer and Sickle. This indicated the direction in which the struggle tended to move. The individuality of the rating-rebel or the specificity of his action escaped the radical writers' attention. They found in his place some other with an identity or consciousness different from his. Perhaps for this reason Subrata Banerjee heard a rating say: 'We are working people ... we must put up the Red flag as well'. To lay claim to the (revolutionary) heritage of the rising and assimilate it to the history of the 'working people' our commentators invented Hammer and Sickle on the flagmast of every naval unit in stream or . ashore. What we question here is the exclusion of ordinary ratings as the principals of their own history, the representation of ordinary rebels as innocent victims of some others' machinations or the view of their uprising as an extension of elite nationalism or the culminaaim tion of workers' and peasants' struggles for independence. is to explore and emphasize the initiative that naval subalterns took on their own and the consciousness that informed their action. In drawing out these spccificities we need to look at what constituted
Our
Briefing on Talwar
xxiii
the backdrop to the ratings' uprising. The stream of incidents that contributed to the creation of an elemental preparedness for a collective defiance on the scale it took place deserves special attention. It is necessary to examine what conditions within RIN brought about ratings' disenchantment about the moral standing of upper-deck authority which underlay their will to overthrow it. The growing willingness to resist oppression, arbitrariness or injustice is clear from the series of protests that preceded in point of time. Apart from the context and development of the rebellion in the unit where it originated, the 'narrative of events' in ships and establishments which shot into prominence for the intensity of their conflict with the authorities is interesting and instructive for us. To analyze the action in all its essentials is the only means by which to grasp the message It contained or the cognitive scheme of its subjects. The rebels' identity as revealed in the moment before an alternative structure of authority came up in place of the one they had overthrown and the crisis it faced thereafter is particularly noteworthy. The response that racings' action or that of their civilian sympathizers evoked from either the alien rulers or the nationalist leaders is not unusual. What seems to be so is the extent of complicity between their respective positions. This is understandable in terms of the tendency of such protests to go beyond their original objectives by switches.
1 UNDER THE WHITE ENSIGN The British Indian Navy had a long, chequered career. Its history spans three hundred and thirty-odd years.! It began with a group of British ships arriving in Surat in 1612. From its foundation to the middle of this century the navy 'had a history of alternate expansion' and contraction 'in the face of emergency, the successful accomplishment of its tasks and subsequent retrenchment, sometimes almost to the vanishing point. It .. had ... been built up when required.'2 It flourished and wilted depending on the needs of British. trade and interest in the region. I
Soon after the foundation of the East India Company in 1600 Hector, one of its ships commanded by Captain Hawkins, reached Surat with a letter to Emperor Iehangir seeking permission to trade with India. The permission was duly granted, and the Emperor promised trading facilities to the Company. But the Portuguese whose trading stations were already well established in India made it clear that they would resist any encroachment on their preserves. Unable to trade freely with the Indian mainland due to the presence of the Portuguese in all principal ports and especially their fleet of some twenty vessels at Surat, the Company sent out a squadron of warships comprising Dragon, Osiander (or Hoseander), lames and Solomon under the command of Captain Thomas Best. The vessels arrived in Swally, the roadstead of Surat on 5 September 1612, the date to which the British traced the foundation of the Indian Navy. It had its baptism in fire in October. Later through successive engagements in Swally off Surat the Portuguese were overpowered by the Company's ships assisted by a fleet of small Indian craft known as Ghurabs (the British called them Grabs) and galivates.3 The latter were officered by volunteers from the Company's ships, and their crew consisted mainly of HIndu fishermen from the Konkan coast. This 'Grab service', as !t was called for many years, formed the nucleus of the Indian Marine, and fought to establish British supremacy over
2
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
. ,-Indian waters by eliminating Portuguese and other European competitors from there. Larger ships came out from England and went back as the Company deemed fit. After the acquisition of Bombay in 1668 from King Charles 11 and the transfer of its headquarters from Surat to this island about two decades later, th.! Company's trade tended to flourish. Appointed in 1685 Admiral of the Company's land and sea forces between Cape Comorin and the Gulf of Persia, Sir John Child decided, contrary to the advice of his counsellors, to. attack the Mughals. The latter, with the support of the Sidis' fleet, captured most of Bombay island and besieged Child in Bombay Castle. Bombay was redeemed subsequently on payment of a huge sum. A year after the transfer of the Indian Navy in 1685 to Bombay (where it remained till 1941 when FOCRIN thought it necessary to shift NHQ to Delhi and direct the naval force from the banks of Ju:mna) its nomenclature 'Honourable East India Company's Marine' changed to 'Bombay Marine'. By the time the Portuguese and the Sidis had been reduced to insignificance the British faced a serious challenge from Admiral Kanhoji Angre's Mahratta fleet which extended its control throughout the west coast. The size, manoeuvrability and firepower of Angre's navy continued to grow, and consequently the British decided to build corvettes for the Bombay Marine which would convoy merchant ships and protect them from the former's wrath. In 1717 a strong English fleet under the command of Captain Barlew attacked the Mahratta garrison at Gheria but had to beat a hasty retreat with severe losses. The sucq:ssive attempts to defeat Angre failed. The Mahratta fleet had the unique record of maintaining supremacy over the waters off the Konkan coast for many years, and it could only be suppressed much later, after Kanhoji's death and with a combined operation with Peshwas (led by Admiral Watson with his ships and Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Clive with his army contingent). It would not be irrelevant to mention here that Clive's mission in Bengal was in no small way assisted by Admiral Watson and sailors of the Bombay Marine. Meanwhile in 1740 another sea power capable of challenging the British entered the Indian ocean. From their naval base in Mauritius, the French sent a strong fleet into the Bay of Bengal to inter-
Under the White Ensign
3
cept and capture British merchant ships. Co~manded by La Bourdonnais it scored a few victories over the British but these were short-lived. The French were eventually defeated, and the British gained almost undisputed control of the sea. The eighteenth century saw an increase in the strength of the Marine. The expansion of the Company's trade and interest in this region increasingly demanded its assistance. This in turn called for addition of ships and personnel to the service. Already in 1635 the Company built pinnaces and other larger vessels including Queen at the shipbuilding yard at Surat. Bombay being a safer harbour and closer to the scenes of action, the yard was shifted there in 1735. The site for shipbuilding was selected by Lowjee Nusserwanjee Wadia, ancestor of a long line of Parsi master-builders of ships, naval and commercial. In a little over 100 years no less than 115 men-of-war and 144 merchant vessels were built in this dockyard, which included gunships for the Royal Navy. The first half of the next century and the opening years of the second witnessed among other things the defeat of Joasmis4 and the capture of Rangoon and Bushire. Meanwhile in 1830 the Company's marine was constituted as a combatant service and rechristened 'Indian Navy'. In the same year Hughes Lindsay, a 411-ton ship of the Company, sailed under steam. The Indian Navy became active during the siege of Multan and, above all, during the great mutiny of 1857. Two highest decorations, the Victoria Cross, were awarded to its personnel for their role in the suppression of the mutiny. A naval brigade comprising 78 officers and 1740 Itlen were assigned shore service during the u p r i s i n g . ' , Soon the Company's rule came to an end, and in 1863 the Indian Navy was abolished, the 'naval protection' of Indian waters having been taken over by the Royal Admiralty. The service was reorganized on a non-combatant basis and renamed 'Bombay Marine'. For fourteen years it ::>erformed various non-combatant jobs, including trooping and the laying of submarine telegraph cables from Bombay to Suez and from Karachi to Basra. In 1877 the service became 'Her Majesty's Indian Marine' with two divisions at Bombay and Calcutta. The duties assigned to it were: transport of troops and government stores; maintenance of station ships at Aden, the An-
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 damans, Burma and the Persian Gulf for political, police, lighting and other purposes; maintenance of gunboats on the Irrawadi and the Euphrates; repair and maintenance of all government launches and vessels, and marine survey. The service underwent yet another change in nomenclature: in 1892 it was assigned the title 'Royal Indian Marine'. Until the outbreak of the world war RIM did not need to assist the British in any significant way. Its role remained one of marine survey, maintenance of light houses and transportation of troops. During the war RIM ships served as auxiliary cruisers with the Royal Navy in various theatres of operations, They carried troops and war materials to Egypt, Iraq and East Africa. The RIM ship Hardinge, while on patrol in the Suez, fought off the Turks attempting to block the canal. Its vessels also played an important role in landing troops in Mesopotamia, and smaller craft, designed for operations in inland waters, did a very useful job in the Euphrates and the Tigris. Three other ships, Northbrooke, Millto and Dufferin, were engaged in patrolling duty in the Red Sea. The total temporary enlistment was 240 officers, 60 warrant officers and 2000 men. 11
The Indian navy was organized by the British in the early seventeenth century to protect its commerce from other competitors and pirates. Later, as occasions demanded, it acted as adjunct to the 'army of occupation' at home '- it assisted in the quelling of civil disturbances like the mutiny of 1857 and the Mopilla rebellion of 1921, and fought Britain's wars in alien waters. At the termination of the first world war RIM reverted to its non-combatant role. It was reduced to a small force entrusted with minor coastal duties and its manpower drastically cut down by demobilization. The 'naval protection' of Indian waters Was once again assigned to the Royal Navy. For its service towards the 'naval defence' of the country and 'protection of her trade in alien waters' India had to pay a staggering sum of £ 100,000 annually to HM's government in addition to a. series of miscelhneous charges. Following the report of the Inchcape Committee in the early twenties the drive towards retrenchment gathered momentum. Con-
Under the White Ensign
5
.' sequently RIM reached its lowest ebb.·It was converted into a luxurious yacht for high officials, with hydrographic, buoyage and lighting duties being entrusted with and paid for by the provincial governments. The troopers were sold out, the transport work being left to private contractors, and the marine was virtually reduced to a survey department and a dockyard. Finally the service was left with Clive (sloop) for lighting and buoying duties on the Burma coast (where she also carried out political duties), Lawrence (sloop) doing similar duties in the Persian Gulf, Minto serving as the station ship for the Andaman and Nicobar islands, Comwallis (sloop) lying in the dockyard unconverted and two small ships, Pathan and Ba/lichi, for local training at Bombay. Elphinstone, an old sloop of the Royal Navy, ·was employed as a relief ship until her loss in 1926. The Royal Navy continued to 'guard' the oceanic highway and the coastline of India on payment of a huge sum annually. But as before in its long history a virtual eclipse of the naval service was followed by a revival of its strength (ill both man. and material) and activity. Time and again this happened in response, at bottom, to the needs of the empire here as elsewhere. In 1925 a departmental committee was set up ul'der the chairmanship of Lord Rawlison, Minister of Defence and Cummander-inChief, India, with the purpose of preparing a scheme for the reorganization of the service. The Rawlison Committee. recommended the conversion of RIM into a combatant force with an initial strength of four sloops or escort vessels, two patrol vessels, four minesweeping trawlers, two surveying ships and a depot ship under the command of a Rear Admiral of the Royal Navy on the active list. Accordingly the Naval Discipline Act was introduced as a bill in 1928. But it failed to pass the Central Assembly and was shelved. In February 1934 it was revived with a few minor amendments and, finally in August was passed by both the Assembly and the Council of States. On 2 October the Royal Indian Navy came into being. Meanwhile in 1928 RIM had been restored to combatant standing and like the ROYCl.I and Dominion Navies, permitted to fly the White, Ensign on board all its ships. But very little progress was made towards its reorganization, the priority being given to the army for understandable reasons. Subsequently in 1937 FOCRIN advanced a five-year plan for
6
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946
the expansion of RIN. The scheme proposed, among other things, the opening of a boys' training establishment at Manora (Karachi) and increase in the strength of personnel, both officers and men. But the plan was referred back for redrafting so that the expenditure for reorganization in a year did not exceed the sum hitherto paid annually to the British government for the so-called naval defence of India. In January, next year, HM's government agreed, after protracted negotiations with its Indian counterpart, to forego the annual subvention of £100,000 and also the miscellaneous charges of £32,000. But this was agreed to on condition that India would maintain a seagoing squadron of no less than six modern escort vessels for cooperation with the Royal Navy in the 'naval defence' of the country \ and, in addition, undertake the responsibility for the protection of its ports. Accordingly the contributions ceased from 1 April 1938. Shortly afterwards FOCRIN prepared a nine-year plan to fulfil the conditions on which the annual subvention had been discontinued. The scheme provided for completing India's local naval defences, establishing training depots, acquiring motor torpedo boats and for all the measures recommended later by the Chatfield Committee. This plan was examined by the authorities in India as well as by the. Royal Admiralty. Subsequently the whole problem was studied afresh by the Chatfield Committee (February 1939) which recommended the expansion of RIN with the construction of four 'Bittern' class 19-knot escort vessels (in replacement of Comwallis, Lawrence and Clive which were to be scrapped), four 'Mastiff class trawlers, the acquisition on loan from RN of four 'Halcycon' class minesweepers, the rearming of Indus and Hindustan with modern high and low angle guns, and the provision of depots and instructional equipment and of local naval defence equipment. Naturally all these proposals were intended to suit the British government, and in anticipation of the war the Committee insisted on the implementation of the scheme in five instead of nine years. The outbreak of the war in September 1939 overtook action on these proposals, and a "mad rush' towards the expansion of the service became inevitable. Shortly before the war RIN was permitted to establish reserves. RINR consisted of serving officers of the mercantile marine. Originally RINVR had two branches, executive and accountant. A third, engineer branch, was added on the outbreak of hostilities. Its
Under the White Ensign
7
offIcers were recruited from the qualified members of the general p·ublic; they received six months' intensive training at the depot and subsequently instruction at sea. As for ratings a special procedure was set up: in addition to the regulars special service ratings were recruited, who served for five years before being transferred to RINFR, and 'Hostilities Only' ratings were drawn from the personnel of the mercantile marine, principally froni the trained crew of requisitioned merchant vessels for service during the war. At the outbreak of hostilities the strength of naval personnel was 152 officers (inclusive of reserves), 46 warrant officers (inclusive of those on loan from RN) and 1475 ratings (inclusive of special service and 'hostilities only' cadres). The Royal Indian Navy had at the time six. ships and two tenders in commission. Table 1 gives partiLtl1ars of their displacement and armament in addition to their nam(:", and types. Except for these vessels RIN was in fact confined within the
TABLE 1 Name
Class
Ciive
Date of commission
Displacement in tons
Sloop.
1921
2,021
COl71waf/is
Sloop
1917
1,383
JIindustan Indus Lawrence
Sloop Sloop Sloop
1930 1934 1919
1,190 1,190 1,225
Investigator
Survey ship Targettowing trawler Patrol vessel
1924
1,572
Madras
Path an
413
G95
Main armament
Two 4", four 3-pdr., two 2-pdr. Three 4", four 3-pdr., two 2-pdr. Two 4"; four 3-pdr. Two 4.7", four 3-pdr. Two 4", four 3-pdr., two 2-pdr. 1 OF 4" MK IV (low angle) 10F 12-pdr. 12cwt (low angle) 2QF 12-pdr. 12 cwt (low angle)
Source: RIN Mutiny Sr. No. G, p.G. Also Collins, op. cit., p. 13.
8
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
walls of the dockyard, Bombay. All its shore establishments (naval barracks, signal school, gunnery school, mechaniCal training establishments, naval offices and Fort WIT station) were concentrated there. Only a WiT station was situated at Mahul. Its ordnance was in the hands of the army. Its medical staff was provided by the Indian MediCal Department and administered by two part-time officers of RAMC. There were no schools for training ratings in torpedo, radar and electrical disciplines and also no facilities for training officers who had to be deputed to the Royal Navy establishments in UK for basiC and advanced training in all disciplines. When the war broke out, NHQ was situated in Bombay. Preoccupied with operatior..al and organizational work at the port FOCRIN was less in a position to visit New Delhi, the seat of decision-making at re~lar intervals. Naval matters were thrashed out in the capital between two civilian officers innocent of the 'special naval point of view' and with no experts to advise them. The bulk of exchange between Delhi and NHQ concerning important matters was carried out through correspondence or signals. Hence the delay in obtaining urgent clearance could hardly be avoided. In October 1939 a naval liaison officer was posted in the capital to ensure the early di~posal of important matters but the situation did not improve. On the other hand, FOCRIN Was unable to improve his contact with the central government. Eventually he had to do it at the expense of his contact with the naval personnel, ships and establishments in Bombay. In 1941 NHQ was shifted to Delhi. With the outbreak of the war - India being dedared a party to it and committed to joining the Allies by the ViCeroy _. the expansion of RIN needed to be carried to the utmost within the shortest possible time. Prompt steps had to be taken to get ships. Immediately a number of merchant vessels belonging to Indian shipping concerns were commandeered and converted into men-of-war. Orders for ships were placed with Australia and England. Some trawlers (of 'Bassett' class) were built in Vizagapatam. Among the vessels made in India were Travancore, Baroda, Agra, Poona, Lahore and Patna. The ships received from England included Sutiej, Jumna and Narbada and those from Australia Bellgal and Bombay. During the first few months of the war RIN had to do minesweeping, patrolling and other duties! with the merchant vessels converted (in Bombay and Calcutta) into auxiliary warships.
Under the White Ensign
9
RIN, it may be remembered, entered the war with five sloops, a survey ship, a patrol vessel and a steam trawler. With the exception of Indus and Hindustall all were old and none was capable of steaming at 16-knots. Even "these two relatively modern sloops were overdue for rearming and refitting. In the course of the war the number of ships in commission multiplied severalfold. The growth of the service in terms of the strength of each class of vessels on 31 December of each year during the war is indicated in Table 2. The expansion of the RIN fleet and the multiplication of its duties involved a rapid increase in the intake of personnel, specially technical hands. In fact by the end of 1939 the number of personnel in the service was nearly doubled and by the turn of 1942 it was increased over six times its pre-war level. With more manpower the number of naval establishments multiplied. Several new establishments came up at Jamnagar, Cochin, Mandapam, Madras, Coconada, Vizagapatam and Calcutta. To cope with training an increasing number of personnel in specialist as well as in general tasks and to equip the growing fleet the existing facilities were expanded and modernized. HMIS Bahadur was commissioned at Karachi to augment the training of boys at HMIS Dalhousie at Bombay. To train officers and men two more establishments, one, gunnery and the other, radar (namely, HMIS Himalaya and Ch amak) , were set up at Karachi. The other facilities that were established at the time were HMIS Shivaji, a mechanical establishment at Lonavla, HMIS Akbar, a ratings' training establishment at Thane, HMIS Talwar, a signal school '. at Bombay and a mechanical training establishment at Pilani. Clearly more shore establishments were set up with the greater intake of personnel during the war. By the termination of· hostilities in August 1945 the actual strength of ratings shot up to 27,651 (which fell to 21,193 by December owing to demobilization). This was nearly twenty times what it was at the start of the war. Additional officers were recruited from the merchant navy and from various trades and professions in civil , life. During the first four months of the war ratings were drawn almost entirely from the merchant ~avy but for reasons of pay and allowances the best elements did not join RIN. Later men from the civvy streets 'volunteered' in thousands to swell its ranks. Table 3 shows the increase in the strength of officers and men in various cadres of the service as the war progressed.
......
0
TABLE 2 Class
31.12.39
31.12.40
31.12.41
31.12.42
31.12.43
31.12.44
31.12.45
~
~
"<: t:;.
Sloop
2
2
4
3
7
7
Corvette
7 3
Frigate
3
Fleet Minesweeper Trawler
1
Persian Gunboat
13
14
14
16
8
13
14
16
4
5
5
5
3
3
3
Motor Minesweeper Survey Ship
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Escort Patrolship "
4
3
3
3
3
3
2
33
35
34
13
Auxiliary
33
25
20
Landing Craft Depotship
1
1
1
AuxilialY Petrol Carrier
2
2
2
2
Motor Torpedo Boat
7
12
16
25
Motor Launch Harbour Depot Motor Launch
18 8
11
22
18
s:
~ ~
~
:"'!
~
~
~
S·
So ~
~
~
~. ~.
.Q, ~ -=r
i:!
Source: RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 532.
"!:l
~
.....
~
0\
TABLE 3
Dec.'44
Dec.'45
170 261 880
220 301 1671
241 335 2104
269 250 1919
1311
2192
2680
2438
Dec.'42
Dec.'43
Dec.'44
Dec.'45
181 25
187 34
198 16
206
221
214
Sept.'39
Dec.'39
Dec.'40
RIN* RINR RlNVR
114 9 29
117 65 52
132 108 163
161 155 387
Total
152
234
403
703
Sept.'39
Dec.'39
Dec.'40
RlN On loan from RN
35 11
125 12
141 9
151 21
180 23
Total
46
137
150
172
203
Sept.'39
Dec.'39
Dec.'40
1313 162
1449 1400
2253 1463
Warrallt Officers
Ratings
Continuousjnoncontinuousjspl. service 'Hostilities Only'
Dec.'41
Dec.'43
Officers
Dec.'41
Dec.'41
4396 2056
Dec.'42
Dec.'42
Dec.'43
Dec.'44
Dec.'45
9258 3506
14679 4783
18668 4698
18610 1678
2089
In9
905
21551
25145
21193
Transferred from the Army Total
1475
2849
3716
* Includes Midshipmen, Cadets and RN, RNR and RNVR Officers. Source: RlN Mutiny Sr. No.6, pp. 7-8.
6452
12764
~
~
Se\)
~
~.
...~ O§.
I-' I-'
12
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
Before the war RIN recruited its ratings mostly from the Punjab ,and Konkan areas. Like the army it had to look further' afield for recruits on the outbreak of hostilities. In fact the war-time urgency for manpower led to recruitment from all parts of the country, leaving little scope for discrimination between seafaring people and the rest. With the rapid increase in the intake of personnel communal and regional composition of the naval service changed greatly. In 1939 Muslims constituted 75 per cent and Hindus 9.25 of the lowerdeck strength but in 1945 the percentage of the former came down to 35 and that of the latter rose up to 42.5. The percentage of ratings from the Punjab fell to less than half its earlier strength and that from Bombay came down from 38 per cent to a mere 8.25. The 'representation' of other parts of the country, particularly that of Bengal and southern India increased greatly and the recruitments from these regions largely met the requirements in the higher educational grades. Deck crew from Portuguese India became difficult to recruit, and their representation in the service declined. Table 4A & B indicates the changes in the percentage of ratings with different religious and regional backgrounds. About six months after the end of hostilities and on the eve of the 'mutiny' in F~bruary 1946 the percentage of ratings from different religious communities changed slightly. Of the total strength of ratings on 1 February Hindus and Muslims constituted approximately 40.3 and 37.8 per cent respectively. The former were in a majority in some and the latter in some other trades and rates in the service. Significantly, for example, Muslims turned out to be the overwhelming majority among Seamen, Engine Room Artificers and Cooks and Stewards while Hindus happened to be so among Communication ratings, Writers/Store Assistants, Topasses, Sick Berth Addendants and Schoolmasters. Among the Stokers both communities were almost equal in strength. Table 5 is instructive in this context. Interestingly, after the hostilities began, foreign nationals other than British were offered a number of commissions in RIN. This was a curious index of war efforts in India following Japan's aggressive moves in the east. In fact with the entry of Japan in the war it became necessary to expand the service further. Given the acute shortage of officers with adequate knowledge of the sea, the recruitment net was cast wide across the British empire and even beyond.
Under the White Ensign
13
Among the foreigners recruited as officers were 1 American, 9 Dutch, 1 French, 1 Turk, 1 Goan, 5 Iraqis, 11 Norwegians, 2 Russians, 2 Swedes, 1 Yugoslav, evacuees from Singapore, Malaya and Burma as well as men from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa.s As shown in Table 7 there were 70 officers of 'other nationalities' in 1945. TABLE4A Religious Communities Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Miscellaneous
1939 per cent 9.25 75 13 0.25 2.5
1945 per cent 42.5 35 19.5 1.5 1.5
TABLE4B Region Kashmir N.W.F.P. Delhi Punjab Sind Rajputana & Central India United Provinces Bombay Madras Travancore Cochin Hyderabad Mysore Bihar & Orissa Bengal Assam Others Goa & Portuguese India
}
Note:
1939 per cent
1945 per cent
0.5 3.25 0.25 44.75 0.25 0.25 3.25 38 4.25 0.25·
1.25 3 0.5 21.25 0.25 3.25 7.25 8.25 25.25
0.25
1.5 1.75 11.5 1 3 0.75
0.5 0.25 2.25
9
These percentages do not add up to 100% as they are only shown to the nearest 0.25%. Source: RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 8.
14
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946 TABLE 5
Trades & Rates
Hindus
Muslims Christians
Others
Total
Seaman
2771
3751
1129
183
7834
Communication ratings Engine Room Artificers
1536 228
596 626
812 70
142 51
3086 975
Stokers
1052
1146
489
61
2748
399
309
316
114
1138
Artificers/Artizans Writers/Store Assts.
740
191
268
33
1232
Cooks & Stewards
564
1305
669
10
2548
Topasses
950
29
139
1
1119
Sick Berth Attendants
290
111
120
12
533
83
47
26
8
164
33
8
14
Bandsmen
6
13
Photographers
4
Schoolmasters Coders Cinema Operators
9
2
11 55
8
6
33
3
2
9
59
10
48
19
136
Boys
326
400
131
126
983
Total
9050
8542
4242
770
22604
Apprentices
Note: Included in the above 2834 ratings under release order but not written off. Source: LAD, Vol. IV, No.2 (19 March 1946), p. 2536.
However, officers drawn into different cadres of the service were mainly British and Indian, and their relative strength varied during the war years. At the start of hostilities there were about three British officers for everyone Indian in the commissioned ranks. By the beginning of 1943 the number of Indian officers increased to half that of their British counterparts. At the end of the war the number of Indian and British commissioned officers was roughly equal. This change in their relative strength was mainly due to the recruitment of Reserves: in the regular cadre of the service there were still about 25 British officers for every 10 Indians. On the other hand, in the warrant ranks the number of Indians was over three times that of British at the outbreak of hostilities. By the beginni9g
15
Under the White Ensign
of 1943 the proportiOIi of Indians to Britons changed to 4:1, and by the time· hostilities ended there were· more than six Indians for every British warrant officer. Table 6 shows their relative strength in the various cadres of the service during the war. Below is given the classification, according to 'nationality', of the officers who joined RIN during each of the war years. It is clear from table 7 that though between 1939 and 1943 there was a steady intake of Indian officers their number still did not compare favourably with that of the Britons. recruited at the time. The number of Indians entering the service was only a fourth of the Britons in 1940, and it was only half in 1942. The situation changed in favour of the Indians only from 1944 onwards. Next year more than three Indians joined RIN for every British officer. But at the same time the number of Indians in the senior ranks of the service was negligible. The first Indian to join RIN as an officer (Engineer Sub-Lieutenant) was D.N. Mukherji. He was commissioned in 1928 but reached the rank of commander about 16 years later. At the end of hostilities no more than two Indians reached the same rank in RIN. All key positions in the service were held by the British officers. This revealed continued British distrust of Indians and their TABLE 6
Date
Commissioned Officers Indian
British
Regular ReseIVe Regular ReseIVe Total *3.9.39 *1.1.41 *1.1.42 *1.1.43 1.1.44 1.1.45 1.9.45
40 117 218 438 53 56 68
Warrant Officers
774 1151 1287
139 155 159
112 286 485 873 1176 1293 1252
152 403 703 1311 2142 2655 2766
Indian 36 119 136 161 156 171 187
Br. Total 10 31 36 42 45 51 28
46 150 172 203 201 222 215
* Breakdown between Regular and ReseIVe officers for these years not available. Source: Prasad, Expansion of the Anned Forces and Defence Organisation, p.186.
16
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprisilig of Febntary 1946
conviction that only a rigid system of white supervision could keep a large number of indigenes in the lower deck in control and order. Even as it accepted the need to man the intermediate ranks with Indians, the navy made the maximum use of available white manpower by concentrating it in key posts at all levels, leaving little initiative to the former. The increasing scarcity of white recruits with the progress of the war persuaded the Bri.tish top brass to allow Indians a larger share in the navalohierarchy. But it was still decidedly a subordinate share, and the basic principle of white domination and control remained institutionally inviolate. TABLE 7
Officers
1939 1940 1941 (Septo-Dec.)
1942
1943
1944
1945 Total
British Indian Anglo-Indian Others
57 29 4 1
165 42 4 1
240 77 17 10
309 168 45 26
430 233 99 21
140 280 48 8
36 120 39 3
1377 949 256 70
Total
91
212
344
548
783
476
198
2652
Source:
RIN Mutiny Sr.No. 6, p. 9.
As in other fighting services so also in RIN officers were recruited from different walks of life. 6 There were sharebrokers, merchant navymen, clerks, telegraphists, managers, men of Burman civil service, foremen, stores officers, Bengal pilot service personnel, overseers, landlords, insurance agents, railway employees, postal officers, Burman pilots, jute traders, planters, sugar process operators, shipping assistants and so on in the ranks, indicating the sense of urgency that prompted the induction into the service of men from such a wide variety of professions. The same urgency led to the revisions of the officers' pay and allowances more than once from 1942 onwards.? Although a certain difference between the pay of commissioned officers of non-Asian·· domicile and that of their counterparts of Asian domicile was always maintained (the former being paid a rate equal to that of RN officers plus an Indian element for service in this country) the disparity
Under the White Ensign
17
in marriage and some other allowances was substantially reduced. Similarly by 1945 the basic pay for Indian warrant officers was raised to the level of their British counterparts, less Rs. 75 per month representing Indian allowance. This allowance was made available to the former while serving afloat outside certain geographica1limits,and the rate of their marriage allowance was increased to the amount admissible to the warrant officers of non-Asian domicile. Another effect of the various revisions was that the pay of RIN commissioned officers (who were initially at a disadvantageous position compared to the officers of the other two services, army and air force) was brought more or less to the same level with the latter (this 'equilibrium' to be disturbed once again in 1945). The difference between the pay of RIN ratings and that of the ratings of RN and Dominion navies, however, persisted. Not only that, the difference with the Indian mercantile marine also increased. It did so even more with the British merchant service. Before the start of hostilities ordinary seamen in RIN and those in the Indian merchant navy received the same monthly pay of Rs. 20 and some allowances. Soon after the war broke out the situation changed: the mercantile rates of pay increased rapidly due to the competition between shipping companies to enlist enough men to fill the vacancies. In the tug-of-war between RIN and the mercantile marine for competent seamen the latter had more rope. In September 1939 the shipping concerns granted a bonus of 25 per cent to their ordinary seamen. This was soon followed by a similar rise in the pay of 'Hostilities Only' ordinary seamen in RIN. But their Active Service counterparts continued to draw Rs. 20 per month. At the end of . December the same year the merchant service basic pay was increased once again, and the comparative rates were: the merchant service - Rs. 30 a month; RIN HO - Rs. 25; RIN AS - Rs. 20. As the rate war continued between the shipping companies the HO ratings in matters of pay and allowances lagged far behind their counterparts in the merchant service from which they had been drawn. There was no inducement for them to renew their .contract on its lapse. To overcome this difficulty a new procedure was set up in May 1942: the system of contract between each ship and her crew for 12' months was replaced by that of an agreement between the government and each man for the duration of the war.Under this arrangement a man could not claim release as a matter of right but was
18
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
subject to discharge at 24 hours' notice. Glaring differences in matters of pay and allowances and this new system created much discontent among the HO ratings. The rapid increase in the size of RIN fleet and the burden of its tasks with the intensification of war efforts called for a large intake of Active Service ratings. But in 1941-42 there were serious recruiting difficulties. In fact the RIN rates of pay failed to attract suitable men to this cadre. The Director of Recruiting feared that unless rates were immediately revised to compare favorably with those offered to technical hands in the army, naval recruitment would come to a standstill. This warning served to increase the rates of pay for the seaman, stoker, communication and accountant branches in February 1942. The 'unilateral' increase for some branches, in the opinion of the Commanding Officer, Depot, provided 'a fertile ground for fifth column activity'. The doses of increase were considered unequal and lacking in proportion. The domestic and instructor branches which felt aggrieved for being left out of the pay revision were later granted increased rates. In May another revision was made, notably increasing the pay of 'boy seagoing' in all branches. The rates for 'artificer apprentices' were also raised. Before the year closed yet another increase in the pay of artificers and artj~ans was granted at the instance of recruiting authorities. In 1944 a general revision of pay was undertaken, recruiting again being the principal reason behind it. Particular attention was paid to the pay scales of junior ratings in order to draw young men into the service. The pay of senior ratings was increased but not at all proportionately. In the course of successive revisions between 1942 and 1944 the ratings of certain tranches had an edge over others ostensibly on technical grounds. Table 8 shows the increases in the monthly rates of pay in rupees for two branches during the period. On the whole the pay revisions proved unsatisfactory in terms of their effect on men in different branches of the service. As they served together on board ships or otherwise came into close contact with one another, many could hardly reconcile themselves to lhe diserepancies in their rates of pay. Above all during the war RIN ratings had occasions to work with men of other navies and became aware that they were the most ill-paid, getting the lowest rates_ for equal work.
~
&s-
TABLE 8
~
Seaman Branch
Ratings
Pre-war to 31.1.42 1.2.42
Boy (first 12 months)
15
15
Boy (remaining 6 months)
15
15
Boy seagoing Ordinary rate
1.5.42 15
~
Communication Branch Pre-war to 31.1.42 1.2.42
1.9.42
1.12.44
15
15
15 15
15
15
20
25
25
30
40
40
40
1.5.42
1.9.42
~.
1.12.44 15 20
25
25
30
60
60
60
60
20
30
Able rate
25
35
45
45
45
34
65
65
65
65
Leading rate
34
45
60
60
60
44
70
70
70
70
Petty officer
50
65
80
80
85
55
80
80
80
95
Chief petty officer
70
80
90
90
110
80
95
95
95
115
Source:
26
~ ..., ~.
File No. 601/10892/H.
..... \0
20
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN rIprising of Febntary 1946
The sudden increase in the strength of personnel created problems of accommodation, training, messing and other domestic arrangements. The naval establishments and barracks became overcrowded, and training facilities and staff proved inadequate. As for instance, the Radar School, built to train and accommodate 120 ratings, was burdened with 300 men at a time. Cooking, sleeping and sanitary arrangements deteriorated sharply in entry establishments in particular. Supplies of clothing and canteen stores could hardly keep pace with the intake of men into the service. The manning position in RIN during the wars reveals that at the end of December 1939 there was a deficit of only 105 between the target figure and the borne strength. It continued to increase as the war progressed. On 31 March 1944 it reached the figure 5,265. Despite all recruiting efforts9 the deficit was not bridged. The naval authorities realized that the target would never be achieved. In fact between 31 March 1944 and 15 August 1945 the target registered an increase of only 1,574. Still at the end of the war RIN was left with a deficit of no less than 2,055 men. This shortfall was largely due to unattractive service conditions in RIN. The reports sent home by ratings in the first weeks of their entry affected recruiting in the areas of their habitat. There had indeed been recurrent complaints among recruits of harsh discipline, bad food, unsympathetic treatment and other 'teething troubles'. The great disillusioning factor was the glib sales talk indulged in by recruiting agents for commission per head of the recruits produced. The agents presented totally false pictures about service conditions and prospects of advancement in the navy to meet their recruitment targets. Promises on matters of food, accommodation, pay, leavetravel facilities and career were soon belied.Io This created a great deal of resentment among new entrants, and there were many desertions in protest. Wastage remained a serious problem for RIN all through the war. Its proportion against intake increased in the later years of hostilities. In some months the wastage figures even exceeded those. of the intake. By the end of the war a total of over 43,000 men had been recruited to obtain a .borne strength of 27,651 against the target of 29,706. The wastage was over 55 per cent of the borne strength. A
r.
Briefing on Talwar
xxi
of sabotage. By the middle of February the situation appeared ripe for the. final stroke. On 17 February night it was decided to incite the Talwar ratings on the most emotive issue, bad food. The 'Azad Hindi' conspirators secured their commitment. NeXt morning the 'innocents' 'crossed the line': they refused food and struck work. Dutt's narrative is quite faithful to the upper-deck thesis that the bulk of the ratings were unwitting puppets of crafty backstage men. The latter drafted them into the rebellion by all means, from deliberate instigation to downright lie. Although by early 19 February morning the ratings of almost ..11 other units 'broke ship' to express solidarity with Ta/war, Dutt said the Signal School stood alone and helpless. Its leaders felt somehow the support of ratings from the neighbouring establishment, Castle Barracks, had to be secured. A trick enticed a thousand-strong body of non-English speaking, 'rustic' (because of theIr peasant background) but 'tough', 'skilled' seamel1 'into the most dangerous of subversive activities'. They were told the lie that British soldiers were killing their brothers aboard Ta/war. It worked: the 'less sensitive' seaman ratings rushed to the Signal School; they joined in the fray and 'readily accepted' the leadership of their 'more educated', communication comrades with their superior airs. No explanation was offered for the hoax. Nor was any demanded. Solidarity here was the product of a manipulative design by the latter rather than a conscious act of participation on the former's part in a common struggle. Again the armed resistance that Castles ratings organized on 21 February morning was nothing but an 'instinctive reaction'. The same instinct of self-preservation which impelled them to match the military fire restrained the men aboard ships from using their big guns even in the face of provocation. Contrary to all evidence Dutt wrote 'the actors in that tragic drama known as the Indian Naval mutiny' 'wanted', after failure, 'to hide ... [their] humiliation and shame'. It is as if the ratings had done something immoral to be so much ashamed of. What the men embarked on, in theil own perception, was not a crime but political action intended to overthrow the authority of the naval elite, to put an end to foreign domination over the service and to establish their identity with those engaged in the same task outside. The ratings' belief in the morality imd necessity of their struggle was unshakeable. Clearly these writers have read into the ratings' action some
21
Under the White Ensign
fairly large number of recruits were lost due to desertion. In the course of the war over 9,000 HO ratings were recruited, and wastage claimed approximately 4,600 of them, of which desertions were over 1,800.11 Added to desertions were many acts o( coUective protest against poor pay and insufficient ration, ill-treatment and colour bar, duties of 'disagreeable character' and denial of the right to perform religious rites. On several occasions during· the war and before. the ratings on board individual ships and establishments defied authority and faced its consequence. But no 'mutiny' on the scale of the entire navy took place before February 1946. In official view the RIN subalterns remained 'loyal' to the King and rendered 'commendable' service wherever called upon to do so during the war. Ill,
From a small nucleus with a few ships and tenders, negligible shore facilities and with less than 1,500 men at the outbreak of the war RIN grew by· its end into a much bigger organization with a large number of ships and craft (some designed and built as naval vessels and the rest commandeered from all possible sources and converted into men-of-war), many shore establishments and with about 30,000 personnel including officers. Besides performing routine duties near home this greatly expanded navy assisted the British in more remote theatres of operation. Soon after the start of hostilities RIN sloops were placed under the command of C-in-C, East I:t;ldies, for service in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf. Later they played an important part· in the operations which led to the downfall of the Italian empire in east Africa and in the Iranian campaign. lfMIS Jumna and Sutlej participated in the Battle of Atlantic in 1941. In March, the same year, the first combined operations by the Indian Army and RIN made the reoccupation of Berbera in the Gulf of Aden possible. During the advance of Allied forces from Sudan into Eritrea RIN vessels played a vital role. HMIS Clive was prominent in the campaign to open the coast road leading from Port Sudan to Massawa. In the final attack on Massawa and the annexation of the port from the Italians HMIS Hindllstan, Indus, Parvati
22
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
and Ratnagiri took the lead. During the brief campaign which followed Nazi intrigues in Iran RIN ships played their part in the transportation of troops and in the combined operations leading to the capture of Abadan and Bandar Shahpur. HMIS Lilavati and Lawrence were engaged in the campaign, and the latter distinguished herself in the action at Bandar Shahpur. After Japan's entry mto the war Burma waters became the main field of activity for RIN. Its vessels took part in patrolling and cooperated effectively -in combined operations. Early in May 1945 37th MS Flotilla, HMIS Cauvery and Sutlej participated in the assault on Rangoon. Its ships undertook hazardous journeys through tricky chaungs and along the highly indented coastline of Arakan. They provided dose support to land forces. After the capture of Rangoon RIN ships acted as searching patrols off the Tenasserim and Tavoy coasts and assisted the occupation forces. Some among them moved eastward to Malaya and Dutch East Indies rendering such assistance. Some others proceeded further and did 'commendable' work in operations off Batavia (Jakarta) and the Java as well as in Sunda straits After the war with Japan ended RIN vessels were employed in mopping up operations, transportation of troops and prisoners arid sweeping large areas for mines and other sunken hazards in and around Indian waters. The Royal Admiralty certified the part that RIN played in the Burma operation as 'unprecedented in the. annals of naval history'.12 What happened to the service then was a repetition of the same old story: retrenchment in spite of and for its 'unprecedented' contributions to the victory of His Majesty's forces in the war. Its rapid expansion on the outbreak of hostilities was followed by a rapid contraction on their cessation, quick flourishing by quick wilting. This occurred time and again, caused by the change in Britain's needs. In return for the 'loyal' service they rendered during the critical war years in spite of their many grievances (and many outbursts of discontent) RIN ratings received a shabby treatment. They were huddled in overcrowded demobilization centres, transit camps or drafting barracks, and service conditions, food, messing and other
23
Under the White Ensign
basic amenities deteriorated further. Naval routine was enforced by overzealous officers mindful only of their 'power of command'. Demobilization proceeded without any provision for resettlement-rehabilitation. The long delay in settling accounts or denial of much expected payments and compulsory return of kits aggravated the discontent among naval subalterns. The entire system seemed unjust and intolerable to the lower deck. This feeling conflicted with their sense of loyalty to the service and was well reflected in the poster that was found in HMIS Kak(lwl, a demobilization centre at Versova, which housed over 1400 ratings. A Poster in HMIS Kakawl
AN EYE HERE ALSO, PLEASE Visit The Most Glorious Hell in Bombay - VERSOVAOll r Demob. Centre Witness there Our sufferings HUNGER INJUSTICE OPPRESSION Witness also The Broom and Bucket Parade at 6.30 every morning WHY DO WE SUFFER? Is this the REWARD Of our loyalty and service during the War? DOWN WITH THESE ENGLISH DOGS Source: RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 598.
24
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
The agitated RIN subalterns did again accomplish something 'unprecedented in the annals of naval history'. This time, much to the chagrin of the Admiralty. They revolted, took possession of ships at anchor or on sea and establishments ashore here or abroad - they established their authority on the quarterdeck. The 'sudden' changes in their 'collective frame of mind' were at first incomprehensible to the colonial elite. The RIN Enquiry Commission later noted with alarm: 'Loyalty disappeared, the team spirit [noticed during the war in the obedience of the commanded to the commanders] vanished ... bad discipline [resulted],P The Talwar ratings first defied the authority of the upper deck, and others quickly followed in their footsteps. The defiant mood indeed pervaded the entire service in February, 1946. Notes and References
1.
For the history of the British Indian Navy from its foundation to the outbreak of the 'mutiny' in February 1946 the author has relied on Low, HistOlY of the Indian Navy 1613-1863; Richmond, The Navy in htdia 1763-1783; Walker, Historical Background of the Royal Indian Navy; Vaidya, The Naval Defence of htdia; Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Anned Forces and Defence Organization .1939-45; Collins, The Royal Indian Navy 1939-45 and Sundaram, India's An1ties and their Costs. Also Papers on the India GOI'emment's Militwy Policy Officially Contributed to the Newspapers; Some Facts and Figures About Indian Defence 1934-35; A Summary of hnp0l1ant Matters Connected with the Defence Services in India, 1933-34, 1934-35; A Summwy of Important Matters Conceming the Defence Services in India 1935-36, 1936-37, 1937-38, 1938-39 & 1939-40 and Two Yeal;s of War Being a Summary of Important Matters Connected with the Indian Defence Sen'ices with Special Reference to the Year 1940-41.
2.
RIN Mutiny Sr.No. 6, p. 1.
3.
The Ghurabs were heavy beamy vessels (about 300 tons) of shallow drought, armed with six 9 to 12-pounder guns, while Galivates were smaller craft (about 70 tons) mounting a dozen 2 to 4 pounders.
4.
The Joasmis were a powerful Arab tribe which, leaving its original profession as merchant and pearl-fishers, took to piracy and, with its headquarters at Ras-el-Khaima, held sway over the entire Persian Gulf.
5.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 248.
6.
ibid., p. 9.
Under the White Ensign
25
7.
For details see File No. 60U10892/H.
8.
The table here shows 'RIN Manning Progress' during the war. Target
1939:
3 31
1940: 31 30
September
1,722
Borne Strength
Deficiency
1,475
247
December
2,954
2,849
105
March
3,325
3,133
192
June
3,460
3,340
120
30
September
4,388
3,568
820
31
December
5,316
3,716
1,601)
March·
5,861
4,521
1,340
30
June
6,486
4,950
1,536
30
September
8,128
5,819
2,309
31
December
10,124
6,452
3,672
7,813
4,053
1941: 31
March
11,866
30
June
13,661
8,661
5,000
30
September
15,585
10,585
5,000
31
December
16,185
12,762
3,423
1942: 31
March
21,121
16,326
4,795
30
June
23,745
19,176
4,569
30
September
23,042
20,183
2,859
31
December
25,274
21,528
3,746
March
28,132.
22,867
5,265
June
29,081
24,228
4,853
30
September
28,241
24,526
3,715
31
December
28,534
25,143
3,391
March
28,903
25,925
2,978 1,014
1943: 31
1944: 31 30
1945: 31 30
. June
28,448
27,434
15
August
29,706
27,651
2,055
20
September
27,933
26,532
1,401
Source: Collins, op.cit., p. 561. 9.
Below are the intake figures 31 December 1939 and 30 ..-)eptember 1945.
~
Special Setvice Ratings Date
1939 31 December 1940 31 March 30 June 30 September 31 December 1941 31 March 30 June 30 September 31 December 1942 31 March 30 June 30 September 31 December 1943 31 March 30 June 30 September 31 December
RIN Direct Recruitment
Recruiting Thro' InterSetvice Recruiting Org.
Personnel Transferred to RIN from Army (L.e. Wing)
H.O. Ratings
Boys and Apprentices AttainingMan's Rate
Recovery of Deserters
Total intake
~
~
.::
/:;.
~:
~
~
125
1367
49
1541
166 278 263 261
279
42 18 32
487 381 682 498
85
387
785
446 843 556
292
290 345 1297 1849
367 130 150 83
2394 1784 1614 1707
863 319 322
3
234
930 647 546 183
197 261 332 328
21 34 2 52
1
499 645 698 601
11 139 51
2
929 289 495 542
1004 741 1177 936
85
7 39
1665 1448 2375 2866
46 60 13 81
48 89 116 129
4714 2999 2934 2725
~
:'! ~
~
~ S·
So ~
~
~ i:;. S·
~
.Q. ~ i:!
""
~
~
~
~
~ .... .... ::.-
Special Service Ratings Date
1944 31 30 30 31 1945 31 30 30
RlN Direct Recruitment
Recruiting Thro' InterService Recruiting Org.
Personnel Transferred to RlN from Army (L.e. Wing)
H.O. Ratings
Boys and Apprentices Attaining Man's Rate
Recovery of Deserters
Total intake
~.
~
'"
71 55 12 28
2014 2428 1883 1673
284 118 127 227
87 57 84 83
100 107 96 150
2556 2765 2202 2161
March June September'
24 8 21
1653 2070 2089
178 63 36
71 87 42
215 223 310
2141 2451 2498
6468
25090
9201
1247
1635
45947
2306
~
~.
March June September December
Total:
~
• Recruitment was suspended immediately on the cessation of hostilities, but certain recruits already in Reception Camps continued to be enrolled for a few weeks. Source: Prasad, Expansion of the Anned Forces and Defence Organization, p. 459
~
28
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febrnary 1946
10. 11.
For a detailed discussion on 'broken promises' see chapter 4 below. The figures for recruitment and wastage of AS and HO ratings during the war were: Active SelVice Ratings
Date
Recruitment
31.12.39 31.3.40 30.6.40 30.9.40 31.12.40 31.3.41 30.6.41 30.9.41 31.12.41 31.3.42 30.6.42 30.9.42 31.12.42 31.3.43 30.6.43 30.9.43 31.12.43 31.3.44 30.6.44 30.9.44 31.12.44 31.3.45 30.6.45 30.9.45
125 166 278 263 261 785 446 843 556 1153 664 1619 2145 2765 1923 1770 1790 2085 2483 1876 1701 1677 2078 2110
31.12.39 31.3.40 30.6.40 30.9.40 31.12.40 31.3.41
1183 228 86 453 415 217
Discharge
Desertions
29 9 25 10 43 23 75 14 50 19 72 37 126 28 112 44 66 112 63 37 77 117 134 190 134 291 128 354 305 396 388 790 481 690 384 544 574 402 1179 528 772 563 339 675 ,380 400 802 563 Hostilities Only Ratings 120 158 101 342 268 72
9 10 7 13 11 18
Total Wastage
Borne Strength
38 35 66 89 69 109 154 156 178 100 194 324 425 482 701 1178 1171 928 976 1707 1335 1014 780 1365
1451 1612 1852 2058 2253 2953 3277 3967 4397 5463 6072 7375 9258 11671 13033 13777 14697 16041 17707 18068 18668 19595 21202 22291
129 168 108 355 279 90
1104 1167 1095 1333 1408 1535
29
Under.the White Ensign Ret ruit-
Date
fner\i
-
30.6.41 30.9.41 31.12.41 31.3.42 30.6.42 30.9.42 31.12.42 31.3.43 30.6.43 30.9.43 31.12.43 31.3.44 30.6.44 30.9.44 31.12.44 31.3.45 30.6.45 30.9.45
2m
349 355 527 556 915 539 910 255 610 507 268 105 100 62 137 21 5
Discharge
Desertions
111 129 102 153 139 58 64 129 160 130 62 78 87 80 58 51 81 1093
Total Wastage
47 23 23 55 303 77 143 136 112 94 42 63 135 107 106 141 82 55
158 152 125 208 442 135 2)7
215 2~2
224 104 141 222 187 164 192 163 1148
Borne Strength 1644 1846 2044 2331 2590 3153 3506 4158 4228 4606 4783 4926 4822 4760 4698 4650 4549 3437
Source: RIN Mutiny Sr.No.6, pp. 14-5. 12.
'Report on the Royal Indian Navy, Jan.-June 1945', NHQ (India), 1945, p. 1 cited in Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns, p. 93.
13.
RIN Mutin.y Sr.No.6, p. 18.
2 'TIDE' TURNS As the guns fell silent on 15 August 1945, the demobilizationrepatriation of troops overseas immediately became a potent source of trouble for the allied powers, especially the United States and Great Britain. The need for occupation forces was not to be over soon, yet tremendous pressures built up both at home and abroad for quicker redeployment of 'veterans'. Just as to American Gls so also to British airmen demobilization and repatriation home was a matter of vital importance. With the cessation of hostilities they no longer seemed inclined to tolerate the privation and regimentation they had accepted under combat compulsion. About the same time the 'lower .echelons' in RIAF turned restive though for different reasons. The RIN lower deck 'mutinied' on board individual ships and establishments even under combat compulsion. I
The first half of January 1946 saw an unprecedented wave of protest demonstrations by American troops in Europe as well as Asia. 1 After several months of wait-and-see since Germany's capitulation and Japan's surrender they burst into anger over the slow pace of their release from the service. Immediately the 4th January War Department order slashing down the monthly rate of discharge from 800,000 to 300,000 men set off the outburst. All over the world American Gls took the 'wildfire' slogans 'We Want to Go Home' and 'Service Yes, But Serfdom Never'. Protest demonstrations began in Manila and soon spread to Korea, Yokohama, Howaii, Guam, Le Harve, Frankfurt, Vienna, Paris and Calcutta. Almost all the major stations where American troops were retained for occupation tasks witnessed soldiers' mass meetings in public places and marches on the military headquarters, actions which, many in the army's higher echelons said, dangerously bordered on 'mutiny'. The GI"agitators hurled taunts and abuses at their commanding officers and openly denounced the army's redeployment policy. In Frankfurt they clashed with the men on guard duties at the headquarters of the US forces.
'Tide'Turns
31
The GIs in Paris went a step further than their brethren elsewhere: they did not confine themselves to the plea for acceleration in the pace of demobilization-repatriation. A 'revolutionary reform' in the army was demanded by the hundreds of soldiers at protest meetings in the city. In a three-page statement called 'Enlisted Men's Magna Carta' they insisted on the abolition of special privileges enjoyed by their officers, reform in court-martial procedures and the Inspector General's office. The army authorities were alarmed at the men's 'incursions' into the field of officers' rights and privileges. The GIs in Manila and Paris who were in the forefront of the protest, felt that the Philippines and France did not belong to the same category as did Germany and Japan and there was scarcely any need for occupation forces in these countries. It was still less necessary to keep US forces in India, maintained the American soldiers here. They could· not understand why so many troops should be retained in this country nearly six months after the cessation of hostilities. In the second week of January several thousand GIs thronged more than once at 'Get Us Home' meetings in Calcutta and demanded quicker demobilization-repatriation of all non-essential men from the India-Burma theatre. The men stationed in camps in and around Calcutta felt that they were detained here for non-technical jobs of salvage and disposal which could easily be done by Indian civilians. 'Double talk' about shipping space, red tape and 'imaginary' job resulted in the bungling of the redeployment programme. The delay in demobilization on flimsy grounds deprived them of their right to be with their family and live a normal healthy life at home. Emotion;;uly upset a soldier said: 'My mother is seriously ill, probably about to die, and they won't let me go even after 42 months' service overseas'. Just as elsewhere, GIs in Calcutta also formed a committee consisting of representl!Jives from different camps to air their grievances and to bring home to their countrymen their anxiety to be repatriated. More importantly they insisted on the immediate release from the 142 US General Hospital and reinstatement in his former rank of Sergeant of Norman Owen who was confined for psychiatric examination and demoted to the status of a Private for duplicating and distributing handbills in connection with the protest meetings. An enquiry was demanded into the Owen case to fix the responsibility for this 'gross intimidation'. Soldiers' protests soon spread to Panagarh, eastern-India airbase depot about 90 miles away
32
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
from Calcutta and elsewhere in the Indo-Burma theatre. The GIs resented the substitution of drills, formations, routine and regimentation for educational and recreational programmes and quicker demobilization-repatriation. The GIs' perspective on the events was: they did nothing undemocratic and wrong; they only exercised the right of assembly and protest guaranteed constitutionally to all citizens to protect their interests. Soldiers were quite justified in holding mass demonstrations because their individual complaints about demobilization delay were seldom heard or their requests in this regard heeded by the authorities. They had been let down. The promise of rapid redeployment on the termination of hostilities was a fraud on the GIs. The slow-down in the pace of discharge was virtually a breach of trust with the army personnel. The 'Uncle Sam's forgotten men' protested against it in a proper democratic manner. Any attempt to muzzle the soldiers in the name of discipline was to relegate them to the status of serfs or deprive them of citizenship. On the other hand, the top mil\tary leaders argued that inequities, irregularities or inefficiencie.s were inevitable at a time of redeployment on a scale such as the present one but these could hardly justify the kind of actions the American Gls overseas embarked on. Such actions were by no means a proper way of airing grievances or seeking their redressal and impermissible in any military organization worth its name. Far from being manifestations of democracy the Gls' protests shook its very foundation. The 'we-want-to-go-home' sentiment developed into a service-wide 'psychosis', a sort of mental epidemic that threatened to turn the world's most powerful army into a stranded, armed mob. Signs of degeneration were writ large: soldiers dressed sloppily, griped openly about the inefficiency of their superior officers and seldom said 'sir' or paid any respect to them. Military morale vanished in 'a miasma of suspicion, bellyache and returning self-interest'. Soldier-agitators failed to realize the implications oftheir actions. What was right for a citizen in a democracy did not hold in the case of a soldier. The demonstrating GIs seemed bent upon reverting, without warrant, to the status of civilians. They forgot they were soldiers and not yet citizens. The military bosses sought to remind tl?-em of America's 'international commitments', its responsibility to impose 'firm peace' on the conquered nations, its
'Tide'Turns
33
occupation tasks there and its duties in the non-occupied countries' like France, Philippines and India. Any premature withdrawal of us troops from abroad would upset the balance of power in others' favour. Any further increase in the rate of discharge would deprive the army of its operational efficiency and of the knowhow of experienced troops so essential for meeting its responsibilities overseas. The slow-down in redeployment, the army authorities said in justification of the 4 January order, became inevitable due to the failure to receive replacements for veterans in the number needed and to the earlier hasty speed"up in demobilization under public pressure. To allow the unequal ratio between redeployment and recruitment to continue was to allow a virtual disintegration of American armed forces. General McArthur, Styer and other leading lights of the army took refuge in psychologism/pathologism to explain the discontent of its 'lower echelons'. Soldiers' protests were said to be largely the product of post-war let-down, ennui, boredom, home-sickness and, above all, of 'native American psychology' which chafed under military discipline in a non-combat situation. To the top bosses the protesters seemed out and out 'hysterical' and 'irrational'. But as is clear from the 'Enlisted Men's Magna Carta', the 'malaise' was much deeper than this. The troops abroad suffered from an acute sense of injustice; they did brood over cases of discrimination and contrast their lot with that of officers. GIs lived in surroundings of ruin, scarcity and hostility. They felt shut in with the vanquished in dull penal colonies. They were vehemently opposed to police duties abroad, opposed to any plan to use them for suppressing civil unrest in the Philippines, China, the Netherlands-Indies or, for that matter, in any other country. The men were disgusted with the triviality and pettiness characteristic of military life. There were repeated references in their talk to its undemocratic and inegalitarian aspects. The soldiers were indignant over false statements about shipping space, broken promises and apathy of their superiors towards. their problems. Many felt that they were detained not for the benefit of the country but for the convenience of commanding officers. The latter deliberately im. peded their release in order to protect their rank and pay as long as possible. The top political executive seemed to be behind the army's 'empire builders'. Officers got all the comforts and luxuries while their men were deprived of the basic necessities of life. While gener-
34
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
als fed on caviar and champagne and lived in plenitude, waited on by enlisted men, the bulk of the latter ate 'c' rations. The best buildings were vacated to house officers' clubs, and planes and motor vehicles employed prodigally, with GI pilots, to transport officers' liquor. Once free from combat compulsion the men overseas gave vent to their bitterness over excess and plenitude which distinguished the life style of officers from theirs. Faced with mass GI demonstrations following its 4th January announcement the War Department at first decided not to budge an inch from its stand on the monthly rate of discharge overseas. GIs were accused of serious breaches of discipline and disorderly behaviour. Punitive actions including psychiatric examination were taken against them. But the people at home could not be restrained. They seemed to have been carried away by the 'hysteria' of getting veterans out of service. The War Department felt that the 'we-want-togo-home' campaign blinded them to the nation's 'world commitments'. In fact Acting Secretary Kenneth C. Royall deplored 'America's hysteria' to get the boys back home. 'Vote-seeking' Congressmen were accused of encouraging and abetting the 'bring-the-boyshome' movement in total disregard of the country's 'international responsibilities'. They seemed to be more interested in the coming election than in the 'overall interests' of the nation. Some leaders went further in asserting that the 'unmilitacy demonstrations of protest overseas and 'bring-them-home-campaign' at home were stirred by a 'lot of hot heads' and 'extremists'. Ernie Adamson, counsel for the House Committee on Un-American Activities, said that some of the mass demonstrations were the result of a 'well-laid ... plot'. He discovered behind them the hands of communist agitators. However, pressures for quicker demobilization mounted on the authorities. The 4th January announcement not only touched off GI demonstrations overseas but also led to an uproar at home by the veterans' families and soon after by the 'vote-seeking' Congressmen. The number of petitions, telegrams and memoranda addressed to the legislators increased daily. Letters from GIs with the message in red ink 'No Boats, No Votes - Get Us Home' poured in their postal boxes in what was considered to be the greatest volume of mail in the Congressional history. The Congressmen reacted steadily favourably to the pressures from veterans and their families. Wives of GIs
'Tide'Tums
35
overseas sent them pairs of baby shoes with the tag attached 'send my daddy home'. They once crowded General Eisenhower and demanded their husbands back. Under the combined pressure of widespread GI demonstrations overseas and public opinion coupled with Congressional threat at home the War Department had to relent. It felt eventually that nothing short of putting every dissatisfied GI oil a home-bound plane or ship was going to be effective in dealing with the avalanche of 'want-to-go-home' or 'bring-them-back-home' sentiment. And accordingly it decided to recast its entire demobilization programme and, pending this revision, authorized the threatre commanders to abandon the points system of qualification for release in the case of men not needed for the occupation tasks.
* The spectacle of American troops clamouring for quicker repatriation home was most disturbing to the British military authorities. GI demonstrations, it was feared, would have a corrosive effect on the discipline and morale of British troops overseas. They had set a bad example. From the start of demobilization at the end of the war the British soldiers contrasted the slow progress of their repatriation with the speed of American GIs' homeward movement. Already in Germany the British troops nursed a grouse at their disadvantageous position compared to their American counterparts. The US army, felt the British authorities, drifted into a hasty, disorderly and unbalanced demobilization because the leadership in America, both political and military, was not strong enough to resist the 'instinctive' reaction of a people yet to be accustomed to living up to a 'great' place they were supposed to fill in in the post~war world. It was neither possible nor desirable for Britain to follow the American example of allowing her armed forces to melt away, and those who favoured this with an eye to the brief boom in civilian employment showed little sense of reality. The British press maintained that USA had placed an 'unfair' burden on the United Kingdom by conceding the demands of GIs for speed-up in the pace of redeployment. Many British service personnel had stronger claims to release than their demonstrating American counterparts. Besides labour shortage for post-war reconstruction was quite acute in Great Britain. The press resented the US army's decision to withdraw men from all parts of the world where their presence was not essential for occupation
36
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
tasks. Its intention to repatriate troops from the south-east Asia command was especially questioned, and it was expected to play a much larger role there. 'Spectacularly' demonstrating GIs in Asia, it was apprehended , would 'infect' the British service personnel stationed in the continent. 11
The last few days of January 1946 indeed saw considerable unrest in the Royal Air Force. Its lower formations went a step further than the American GIs in their protest. They struck work in widely dispersed stations under the various commands in Asia, especially India. 2 On 22 January 2,000 RAF personnel below the rank of sergeant went on a 'stay-in-strike' at Mauripur, near Karachi, the main air-trooping centre in India. The Inspector General of RAF, Air Chief-Marshal Arthur Barratt, who was on tour in south-east Asia and was passing through Mauripur warned the strikers that nothing could be gained by threat and told them to resume work. The appeal went unheeded. While an attempt was being made to persuade the airmen at Mauripur to return to duty, several hundred members of the ground staff at Almaza (Cairo) station and airmen at Lydda (Palestine.) downed tools. Similarly the men of 32 Staging Post at Negombo, Ceylone, refused to carry out the servicing of aircraft. The explanation offered by Air Commodore C.E. Chilton in response to their complaints failed to satisfy the airmen. The 'disaffection' soon spread to the rest of the station including communication and meteorological flights and further afield. The airmen .at Koggala, Ratmalana and Colombo also joined in the fray. As soon as the information of unrest at the RAF base, Seletar,Singapore reached him, Allied Air Commander-in-Chief Keith Park rushed to the spot to defuse tension. The strike also affected the RAF station at Kallang, and AA C-in-C visited that place too with the same intention. But all without result. Dissatisfied with his explanation on demobilization progress Cymbalist, an airman, exhorted his colleagues to unite with their brethren at Seletar and release by force those who had been arrested. He later faced the charges of inciting 'mutiny' and gross insubordination. About the same time the men of No. 194 (Transport) Squadron at Rangoon stopped work, and thereby brought Burma
(Tide'Turns
37
into the wave of strikes that had hit the RAF units elsewhere. They took part in a 'Forces Parliament' which discussed 'high level service matters' and seut the minutes of the meeting to MPs in Britain. In view of what happened and the undesirability of inviting further trouble by punishing the 'bad elements' Air Marshal Commanding Air HQ Burma Hughes Saunders recommended early disbandment of the unit. In the meantime the 'strike fever' which broke out at Mauripur affected other RAF stations in India like the ones at Palam, Dum Dum, Kanchrapara, Poona, Cawnpore, Vizagapatam, Allahabad, Madras and Lahore. To the RAF pathologists, just as to their counterparts in any other service, the strike was a 'contagion'. It infected groups after groups of men dispersed over a wide area like an 'epidemic disease'. The virus came from outside and worked through the mediation of their home-sickness at the end of the war. The British airmen's desire to return home quicker than the release scheme permitted them to was said to have been stimulated by the American GI demonstrations, particularly in south-east Asia, for speedier demobilization. The RAF lower formations were encouraged by the latter's success in speeding up repatriation. This explanation was later supplemented by a variant of the conventional manipulation thesis. 'This impatience and unsettled state of mind ... was exploited by a wellorganized minority [of eXperienced political agitators] ... in causing "strike" - something unknown in His Majesty's Service - and using the alleged slow rate of demobilization ... as their major complaint.'3 The fact remains, however, that the RAF lower formations had repeatedly expressed their discontent over the official release scheme since the end of hostilities and made specific demands at every meeting with the authorities. Time and again they complained that the release of technical grades was not progressing in accordance with the government promises, the corresponding groups at home had been released before those under overseas commands and the large number of class 'B' releases - releases of comparatively unskilled men with a very short length of service - affected the rate of class 'A' releases. Another grievance was that the RAF personnel were being employed in the servicing of civilian aircraft (belonging to Quantas and BOAC). This was straining the already overworked men and providing the aviation companies with chief labour. The
38
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
skilled tradesmen considered it a breach of faith to divert them, after the collapse of Japan, to Hongkong and Malaya. Besides the men complained of unfair discrimination in terms of the length of service and release between the Air Force and the other two services. They refused to believe the explanation offered by the Air Ministry as to the state of release in the service. This discontent over the official demobilization programme was aggravated by the deteriorating service conditions, viz. bad food, high prices of canteen stores, shortage of clothing, poor accommodation and domestic arrangements. Considerable irritation resulted from bad administration and unsatisfactory 'spit and polish orders'. The substitution of routine and regimentation for basic amenities, sports and entertainment facilities was universally disliked. The British airmen, like the American GIs, were clearly unwilling to have any more faith on officers in the RAF hierarchy, whom they suspected of delaying their release to save their rank and pay and thus breaking the trust they had reposed in them. The men wanted to be assured by someone with sufficient independence and status to challenge the service decisions on their behalf. Only a member of Parliament could do this - he seemed to them the only link, though remote, in the long chain of democratic influence. They were for the intervention of an MP who could take up their case with government and impress upon Parliament their bitter feeling _over the existing rate of release and unsatisfactory service conditions. Normally the lower formations were afraid of using the official machinery to air their grievances. If they had any complaint to lodge about any 'big' matter affecting many, the only legal course was for each man to make a personal issue of the same and risk his career by taking it up with CO himself against whom he, together with others, might have nursed it. This was perhaps the reason why during the recent outbreaks RAF lower ranks kept away from official meetings, assembled elsewhere after 'lights out' to avoid recognition, discussed and debated their problems and formed committees to represent their case to the higher authorities. What the RAF subalterns wanted was some kind of a recognized organization similar to that of a trade union with elected representatives through which their major complaints could be routed to the authorities, and sorted out by means of negotiations. There was an urgent need, they felt, to introduce real democracy into the service. They were citizens of a
'Tide'Turns
39
democratic state and therefore deserved respect for this feeling. As was the accepted practice in other walks of life they should be given democratic representation in the administration of their units. The RAF lower ranks found no reason why some equivalent of a joint production committee representing management and workers or a Whitley Council as in civil service could not be made available to them. For the loyal service they had rendered during the war the RAF men claimed to deserve it. But to the authorities this was pernicious. Whatever might be their earlier record, the moment the airmen struck work they proved themselves disloyal. From this point of View the men were there to serve, and once enlisted in the service they forfeited the rights admissible to civilians. Any expression of grievances other than through official channels was 'mutinous' on their part. To the higher echelons most of the men's grievances were 'imaginary' and 'unfounded'. It was the news of strike at one station that helped to spread the unrest to others. The men played in the hands of 'professional 'agitators' by airing 'imaginary' grievances in an 'improper' manner. 'The outbreak of disaffection', some wanted to establish, 'had been carefully organized' by a small group of 'exp~rienced political agitators whose aim appeared to be that of taking airmen away from the control of their officers and SNCOS'.4 Though there was no evidence to support.this suggestion they stuck to it obstinately. 'The fact that these ... "strikes" had spread systematically from India to Singapore [itself] suggested that they had within their origin something of the work of professional agitators'.s Although they 'carefully kept in the background'6 and could not be identifi~d, some senior officers were sure, these 'ringleaders' exploited for their own ends the desire of airmen to return home as quick as possible to pick up the thread of normal life. The RAF security and intelligence officers in fact asserted that a 'well-laid plot' was the source of unrest in air force stationed overseas. The strikes were 'organized over a period of weeks either by agitators who contacted each other in code using the RAF wireless system or by airmen travelling between stations ... [these] took ... officers in stations completely by surprise'.7 Just as in the official explanation of GI demonstrations so also here the conspiracy theory figured prominently. The spread of the strike 'systematically' from one station to another under the various commands in Asia conveniently served as its basis. By attributing the unrest to the secret
40
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in tlte RIN Uprising of February 1946
design of a small number of malefactors the authorities denied the airmen any initiative of their own. The attitude of the authorities towards the strikers, their grievances and demands is implicit in the foregoing diagnosis. The government, said Air Marshal John Slesser, Air Member for Personnel, was loath to do anything which would bf; taken as its weakness towards 'acts of indiscipline' instigated by 'professional agitators'. It was ready, he added, to investigate into complaints if the airmen passed them through proper channel and avoided being misled by a handful of 'trained agitators'. For Air Marshal Slesser it was deplorable to invite an MP or, for that matter, any other civilian to mediate between 'mutinous' troops and lawful commanders. The government alone, he asserted, could judge whether the promised rate of release was maintained. The Air Member added: the rate of· release was under review and the government wished to accelerate it. But any acceleration, if possible at all, would be the result of an ordered process of balancing many factors. Industries at home required extra manpower but this could not be met at the risk of endangering the 'safety of the world'. Any revision in the present policy would be made on a careful balancing of civilian requirements against service commitments and not as a concession to the airmen led astray by a small group of 'trained political agitators'. Prime Minister Attlee's statementS in the House of Commons in reply to a question by Harold Macmillan repeated these arguments and promised no immediate acceleration in the rate of release. On 4 February the Air Ministry detailed a high-level court of enquiry to go into and report on the strikes by airmen under the various commands in Asia. Meanwhile to ensure that there were no more outbreaks of collective disobedience, Air Chief-Marshal I<;eith Park sent a message to all COs, explaining that the serious troubles which had broken out at various stations in India, Ceylone, Burma, middle-east and, to a lesser extent, the far east were· the handiwork of a small but 'well organized group of experienced political agitators' who took advantage of the airmen's homesickness and 'indifferent' living conditions in certain cases. The COs were asked to take a number of counter-insurgency measures at the first signs of further outbreaks. '1946 is going to be the most severe test of the abilities of an officer in command,. and leadership· and team work are. even
41
'Tide'Turns
more important than during active operations', concluded Keith Park's message.9 Already on 28 January in reply to his signal the Air Member for Personnel assured AA C-in-C that the Air Ministry would support him in whatever action he took to suppress the strikes. 'You can, of course, call on the Army to give you any assistance you, in consultation with the Dimpsey, may consider practicable and necessary'.lD Although the strike by 194 Squadron at Rangoon was the last mentioned in the official report on the series of strikes in RAF units under SEA command in January, considerable unrest was still apparent, and the authorities feared more outbreaks . ...
The strikes at RAF stations in India, the British authorities were afraid, would have a harmful, if not subversive, effect on the Royal Indian Air Force personnel. Shortly after the outbreak of 'troubles' among RAF lower formations in India Air Marshal Roderick Carr, in a signal to all RAF groups, units and stations in southeast Asia and those in 224 group, indicated the impact the strikes could have on the situation in India: There are still·defence problems in India. The public press has recently maqe it clear that a political crisis is approaching, a crisis which may only be solved by little short of civil war. ~ .. The government at home are now fully aware that conscripts in the RAF hav~ little or no pride in their servke. I do not believe that those misguided airmen who took part in the recent socalled strikes appreciate that their actioIl may be endangering the safety of India. Already their example has been followed by the RIAF. Such actions can only encourage civil disturbances and may lead to grave consequences for everyone in India including those airmen who are not due for repatriation in the near future. ll
III Hard on the heels of strikes at RAF stations in India, it was said in official reports, came the work-stoppages by RIAF subalterns. As soon as RAF lower formations downed tools in this country, the 'infectious' idea of strike, it was diagnosed again, '.caught on'
42
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
among Indian air~en. The 'bad' example set by British air-force personnel was immediately followed by their Indian counterparts. The authorities had this to say notwithstanding the fact that RIAF lower formations had ceased work at Drigh Road and Avadi before the RAF strike at Mauripur. There were differences between the two services in terms of their problems at the end of hostilities and, by extension, their men's grievances and demands. While the British air force considered its main problem to be one of planned demobi, lization-repatriation, one of balancing growing industrial manpower requirements at home with 'service commitments' overseas, the RIAF authorities were expected to solve an almost different set of problems, a number of them being quite old and so also the discontent over them. The task before the lafter, from the point of view of Indian airmen, was not merely one of speeding up demobilization but, more crucially, that of arranging resettlement-rehabilitation and redressing the long-standing grievances over pay and allowances, leave and travelling facilities, gratuity and pension, racial discrimination and colour bar. The strike by RIAF personnel began at Drigh Road, Karachi, on 20 January 1946 and recurred at various camps, units, stations or offices throughout the country right up to the outbreak of the 'mutiny' in RIN.12 Table 1, based on a statement byPhilip Mason, Joint War Secretary on the floor of Central Legislative Assembly on 18 February, throws some light on it. One example would suffice to illustrate the kind of grievances the RIAF lower formations nursed and their attempts at seeking redressal. On 6 February several hundred airmen at Marine Drive Camp, Bombay, boycotted food and struck work in protest against the insulting behaviour and colour prejudice of the Camp Commander, Flight Comdr. Bone. For some time Indian other ranks had been going to the dining hall in civilian dress. When this 'indiscipline' came to his notice, the Camp Commander issued an order strictly enforcing the rule relating to uniform. The order, however, was found missing soon after it was put up on the notice board. A few days earlier an IOR, found in civilian dress, was placed under close arrest. On the 5th another airman was punished for the same 'offence' in keeping with orders from the Camp Commander. Next day a number of men entered the dining hall in civilian dress, and one among
'Tide'Tunts
43
Table 1 Place Drigh Road Avadi Mauripur Cawnpore DumDum Trichinopoly Kankinara Lahore 1. 306 Maintenance Unit 2. No. 1 Demob Centre Yelahanka 1. No. 4 RIAF Squadron 2. HQs No. 228 Group
Number of Personnel Involved
Date
700 500 450 750 100 250 600
20-21 January 21 January 23 January 26-30 January 29 January 1 February 2 February
350
4-5 February
150 200 80
11-12 February 5 February 6 February
1000 400 50
6-9 February 9 & 11 February
400
16 February
Bombay 1. Marine Drive Camp 2. RIAF Records 3. Base Personnel Office
Delhi
Source.' LAD, Vo!. I1, No. II (t8 Feb. '46) p. 1053.
them was clad in 'khaddar jibba'. Immediately Flight Comdr. Bone ordered the officer-illcharg'~' Flying Officer Singh, to put all of them under close arrest. When asked to leave the dining hall or put on uniform, the men pon)f:cd out that ·British other ranks were allowed to wear civilian dress and never punished, whereas Indian personnel were brought to book for their choice of dress while on off duty or off days. The Officer-in-Charge told the Camp Commander that as batches of men apPf,ared in civilian dress, it was impossible to put all ofthem under close arrest. Thereafter Flight Commdr. Bone himself accosted a man and ordered' him to put on uniform or clear out. A hot t:xchange of word~ followed. It was then all those present in the dining hall got up and centered round. The Camp Commander again
44
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in tlte RIN Uprising of February 1946
asked the 'offender' to obey the uniform rule and not to argue. In connection with Flying Officer Singh's inability to enforce his orders, Fright Comdr. Bone remarked that Indian Officers were inefficient and could not maintain discipline among their men. This was taken. as an insult to the Indian community as a whole. The men decided to boycott food and cease work. Around 6 p.m. the incident was reported to P.D. Cracroft, Air Commodore, Bombay. Within a few minutes he came down to the camp to hear the men's grievances. None came forward to talk to Cracroft. He then ordered a parade for the next morning with a view to addressing and hearing them. Again nobody obeyed despite the Indian NCOs' best efforts to get the men together. Air Commodore Cracroft waited for some time and invited anyone willing to come forward but none did so. Wing Comdr. Engineer visited the camp the same morning with the same intention but in vain. In his opinion many would have come forward but were deterred from doing so by a few 'ringleaders'. To Air Commodore Cracroft the airmen appeared quite 'adamant' in their resolve to continue the strike until their grievances were redressed. They were in no mood to listen to him. Any attempt by local British officers to pacify them was met with boos, catcalls and shouts of 'go back'. They refused duty and took no food at the canteen; they 'broke out' of the camp, went round the city in 'mufti' and had their meals at restaurants there. Air Commodore Cracroft admitted in his press conference that BORs, in contravention of the dress regulations, came to their mess with civilian clothes on. The strikers' immediate complaint was that this liberty to wear civilian dress, this privilege enjoyed by BORs, was denied to their Indian counterparts. This, they felt, was openly discriminatory and unfair. The men seemed reluctant to place their grievances before any local authority. Their experience in this regard was bitter: the representations made in the past had failed to evoke any response from the local officers. They were, however, prepared to submit their grievances to the Air HQ and the government at Delhi. Even as they protested against the' local officers, the airmen seemed to have retained faith in the justice and benevolence of the distant authorities. Some of the RIAF men's grievances such as poor and monoto- . nous food, acute shortage of accommodation, awful domestic arrangements and l~ck of recreational facilities were much like those facing the RAF personnel. These are often said to be 'local' in
'Tide'Turns
45
nature, aggravated by the fresh influx of men at the end of hostilities. But the other grievallCf: s were older and peculiar to a colonial armed force. In fact Indian ai:men's sentiment, in British officers' admission, was: they did a splendid job during the critical war years and proved themselves as good and efficient as their RAF counterparts, yet they were meted out a shabby, discriminatory treatment. Their service conditions were incomparable with those of British airmen. The demands they submitted to C-in-C and other authorities showed how deep-rooted and diffe:ent their discontent was. The Indian airmen preferred a non-official 'impartial' enquiry into their problems. Besides the strikers wanted elected representation for the airmen in Central Legislative Assembly and demanded the same rights as those enjoyed by civilians. Some among them met Abul Kalam Azad, Congress President, apprised him of their grievances for the redressal of which they embarked on a countrywide strike-action, and sought his intervention in the matter. But, like their British masters, the Maulana advised patience and forbearance. To be patient, the men understood, was to forego relief for themselves. Initially the authorities seemed reluctant to look into the RIAF lower formations' grievances and tended to explain away their strikes as stray incidents 'arising from purely local circumstances' which had to be tackled locally. In fact on 4 January the Joint War Secretary, in answering an adjournment motion in Central Legislative Assembly, declined to consider the Karachi strike as a 'matter of urgency' or a 'matter of public importance'P But when RIAF strikes spread throughout the country the authorities issued a number of statements saying that 'minor' things like accommodation, sanitary arrangements and other living conditions were being improved as far as local circumstances permitted in the present difficult times, some of the 'major' grievances were baseless and unworthy of consideration, and still others difficult and complicated, requiring careful investigation and their redressal would be a time-consuming affair. On charges of racial discrimination C-in-C observed that there could be no such thing in RIAF as it was 'a wholly Indian force'.14 To the authorities the 'true reason' behind this seemed to be an unhappy comparison by Indian airmen of their pay and other conditIons with those of BORs of RAF. It was based on the 'theory' that such conditions
46
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
should be in all respects identical with the latter. This could never be accepted by the government because, if carried to its logical conclusion, it would have the gravest repercussions on other services and professions, both military and civil. The RIAF personnel, argued the Joint War Secretary, were 'already paid, fed and usually accommodated better than the Indian Army' and 'to put them on the same level as the RAF would involve corresponding increases in the pay of the other two services and would either enormously swell the Defence Budget or reduce the size of the armed forces which can be maintained in peace'.IS This apart such an increase would have repercussions on civilian wages throughout the country. The authorities denied there was any discrimination between IORsand BORs in medical care, canteen services and entertainment facilities. The present allowances, rations and travelling facilities for RIAF men were based on the country's economy, and any further improvement of these would have to be extended to the other two services, which would involve huge expenditure and therefore called for careful consideration. Already a committee had been appointed to examine the question of the post-war pay of the three services including family allowance. These statements which virtually rejected the airmen's demands and were silent on the cruci~l question of post-war resettlement-rehabilitation were accompanied, as usual, by threats and warnings. Air Marshal Roderick Carr said: 'I must make it clear to all concerned that I cannot condone the serious breaches of discipline that have taken place ... and any improvement in conditions that I may be able to make will not, repeat, not be a concession to indisci,pline'.16 At the same time the British authorities were seriously dis. trirbed over the growing disaffection among Indian rurmen, which ., they, of course, did not admit openly. They realized fairly quickly that RIAF could not be depended upon, in case of emergency, for bombing any target involving military or civilian insurgents. In fact when the RIN lower deck revolted, seized the ships at anchor in Bombay and Karachi and broke open their armouries and magazines, the military authorities thought it urgently necessary to complete all arrangements for reinforcements from RAF to meet any exigency. It was considered likely, at one time, that the RAF, in a series
47
ITide'Turns
of R.P. attacks, would be called upon to sink the RIN ships in the hands of mutineers. In this connection, the AA C-in-C signalled Air Marshal Sir Roderick Carr, BAP SEA, stating that according to cables from Bombay, the RIAF had gone out on a sympathetic "strike". Accordingly, BAP SEA would not be able to count on the Indian Squadrons to support in stamp. ing out the troubles with the RINP IV Undeniably the strikes and demonstrations in allied armed forces and above all in RIAF in the opening days of 1946 were inspiring for the seething lower ranks in RIN. Broadly, among the developments that took place outside RIN but contributed to creating the background in which the naval strike broke out in February were included the protests by lower formations in other services. But in no other sense can these actions be said to have any relevance to the RIN outbreak. Like the RIAF men the Indian ratings had their own grievances largely different from those of American GIs or RAF lower ranks. There was enough in RIN subalterns' conditions to make them feel discontented. No 'infection' from outside (GI, RAF or RIAF agitators) was needed to cause disaffection and unrest in the naval service. Many times before the February strike, in seeking redress for their grievances, the Indian ratings rose in protest on board individual ships and establishments. The RIN Enquiry Commission in the final draft of its report mentioned at some length nine such cases of protest between 1942 and 1945. In addition reference was made to two other 'mutinies' early in the war, the papers of which were not available to or seen by the Commission. ls Interestingly the first draft it prepared contained a brief description of two more cases which were omitted in the final reporU 9 Table 2 presents a list of the 'mutinies' which preceded the February 1946 strike. The 'ostensible reasons' behind these 'troubles', according to the Commission, were menial duties, pollution of edibles in the galley, denial of the freedom to perform religious rites or facilities for it, ill-treatment (amounting to physical assault), colour bar, poor service and living conditions. On many occasions the ratings venti-
48
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 Table 2 Name
1. 2. 3. 4.
Type
HMIS Lawrence Ship HMIS C/ive Ship HMIS Bahadur Establishment HMIS Castle Ba/Tacks Establishment 5. HMIS Mechanical Training Est!. Establishment Ship 6. HMISKonkan Ship 7. HMIS Otissa 8. HMIS Khyber Ship 9. HMISAkbar Establishment 10. HMIS Hamlawar Establishment 11. HMIS Shivaji Establishment 12. HMIS Himalaya Establishment Establishment 13. HMIS Shivaji
Place
Date
Bombay Bombay Karachi
31.10.'35 1935 1940
Bombay
DO
3.3.'42 Bombay Tobermory, UK 22.6.'42 East London, S. Africa -9.'42 DO UK 27-8.6.'44 Kolsett (Bombay) 30.7.'44 Bombay Lonavla (near Thana) 29-31.7.'44 16.3.'45 Karachi Lonavla 17.4.'45 & succeesive days
Source: RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, pp. 20 ff. Also RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 4, Part I.
lated their grievances in the 'proper service manner', by individually lodging complaints with superior officers. The latter seldom cared to attend to them. Any 'joint request' by two or more ratings came to be looked upon as a collective violation of 'lawful commands' of officers, and the 'requestmen' were dealt with as 'mutineers'. Once in late 1935 a rating of HMIS Lawrence's company (accommodated at the time in RIN barracks ashore, Bombay) brought in a guest at 12.15 a.m. The Officer of the Day instructed the Regulating Petty Officer to ensure that the guest stayed out until 1 p.m., the visiting hour for guests as per barrack orders. The host later complained that RPO in carrying out this instruction assaulted his guest. About 30 ratings refused duty in protest. Immediately four were given 90 days' rigorous imprisonment and discharged, their service being no longer required,nine got 60 days' rigorous impris-·.' onment, of whom five were discharged 'SNLR' and ten confined to
'Tide'Turns
49
cells for 14 days. The RIN Band whose eleven members figured prominently in this protest was disbanded. The ratings' notion of a just order was linked up with their sense of collective honour or dignity. Under the latter was subsumed the question of honour of an individual. This is clearly in evidence in the protest against the ill-treatment of a rating's guest above. Simi~ larly in the case below the insult to a rating's religion was taken by his coreligionists as an insult to their whole community. The act, though trivial in appearance, elicited strong collective reactions from them precisely for its being viewed as offensive to their sense of communal honour and violative of their notion of justice or fairness. Leading Seaman Niaz Gul of HMIS Hamlawar alleged: When I am reading the Holy Ouran at 1000 hours today the 30th July 1944, Sub-Lieutenant got in the barracks and asked me "where is Dil Hussain?" I replied at the sitting position that he was on parade (because I can't give up seat at the time of reading Ouran). At this he got fired and blowed me from the back and thus insulted my religion.20 There is another version of the same incident in FOCRIN's directive dated 23 September 1945. The italicized words here indicate the subtle differences with the foregoing. The officer was in a hurry to find the leading hand in charge of his duty boat's crew, entered the barracks of the establishment ... and asked a rating, who was sitting on a charpoi and reading a book, where the leading hand was to be found. Tlte rating paid no attention to the officer who then slapped him across tlte head with a sou 'wester. The rating jumped up and let fall the book which he was reading. 21
Still another, earlier version by the Board of Enquiry which investigated the incident is noteworthy, especially the words in italics. On arriving at the barracks Sub-Lieutenant went inside and asked if anybody has seen Leading Seaman Dil Haussain. This question was addressed to Leading Seaman Nawab Khan and
50
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946 Leading Seaman Niaz Gul, the two nearest ratings. The former was sitting on the edge of the barracks doing nothing while the latter was sitting crossed legged on the back reading a book. The first rating stood up and said that he was not aware of the whereabouts of ... Dil Hussain and the second rating, however, took no notice of Sub-Lieutenant at all and went on reading, whereupon the question was again addressed to him by the SubLieutenant; but still no reply was given. Sub-Lieutenant then struck the rating across the back of his head with his sou'wester to attract his attention. At this Leading Seaman immediately stood up on the bed and the book he was reading dropped out of his hand on to the bed. The book happened to be the Quran, a fact which Sub-Lieutenant ... did not know or realize at that time. Sub-Lieutenant then admonished the rating for not standing up when spoken to and thereafter left the barracks.22
As soon as the Officer left Ldg. Seaman Niaz Gul went to the Regulating Office to 'submit' a complaint in a proper service manner. His fellow Muslim,ratings took a very serious view of the incident and were unwilling to accept meekly the insult to the holy Ouran. They awaited the return of the officer to the shore. As soon as he came back the ratings 'assaulted him in a group'. For his offence to the Ouran the Sub-Lieutenant apologized publicly at divisions on 3 August. He lost three months' seniority, was transferred ti;om this establishment and reprimanded by a court martial. On the other side, 13 ratings were brought to trial on charges of joining in a mutiny accompanied by violence, striking a superior officer and behaving in a disorderly manner; 10 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment ranging from 1 to 4 years. Performing religious rites was an essential duty of the Indian rating. Even if it amounted to violating his officer's command, that was not unfair. For the latter's authority was by no means superior to that of God. Whoever or whatever prevented him from attending his religious duty was unfair. Time and again the ratings protested against such acts of unfairness. As for example, three Ldg. Seamen of HMIS Hima/aya put in a request to leave the establishment for noon-prayer on Friday 16 March 1945. Their request was turned down, and the ratings 'broke ship to go to the mosque' in protest. They were later sentenced by a court martial, on charges of joining
'Tide' Turns
;.
51
in a mutiny, wilful disobedience of lawful command and absence without leave, to one year's rigorous imprisonment and dismissal . from the service. Fears about the pollution of daily food (media being pork and beef) and the consequent loss of faith caused a protest in HMIS Shivaji on 29 July 1944. 17 Muslim ratings of the establishment refused to take food from the galley, apprehending that mutton, while being cooked, was contaminated with pork. Next day two more ratings made a similar complaint and expressed their unwillingness to have mutton. The day after 26 men (22 Muslims and 4 Hindus) declined to take any food from the galley, the reason being the same as before. Officers, including Muslims, assured the ratings about the purity of mutton but the latter were far from convinced and refused to have any dish, even the vegetarian one. Some of the men were then summarily 'punished and discharged 'SNLR'. Sweeping decks or lavatories or painting ships or acting as messengers or sentries were duties of disagreeable nature to many in the lower tiers of the naval hierarchy. Such duties were considered to be violative of their social or religious injunctions. Acting in keeping with these injunctions meant refusing official duties and negating institutional subordination. Even then apprehensions about the loss of social or religious standing induced many to do so. There are indee.d instances where their loyalty to community or religion proved to be weightier than the duties officially assigned to them. On 17 April 1945 and the days immediately following 50 Direct Entry ratings of Shivaji iticluding Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, refused to clean the 'ship', as ordered to, on religious ground. 23 Punitive action was taken against them. Some time in September 1942 a similar trouble broke out on HMIS Khyber. A number of greasers declined to carry out messenger-duties. It was their belief that such duties ran counter to their social customs and the violation of the latter involved the risk of their being outcast from the community they belonged to. A few other ratings expressed their inability to act as sentries on defaulters and some more to paint the ship. The board of enquiry into these incidents recommended, besides a reshuffling of staff, removal of the
52
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
accused from the ship and, on its return to India, their dismissal from the service. The fear that the entry of men with certain communal ties or religious identities would interfere with the efficient functioning of the navy .led to some changes in recruitment strategies. The decision was taken to reduce the recruitment of Chittagonians. to a minimum because pf their involvement in large number in the trouble aboard Kltyber. Similarly instructions were issued to the recruiting authorities, after the 'religious outbreak' on HMIS Akbar in June 1944, to restrict the entry of 'unsuitable types' of Pathans (the term to be understood in a broader sense) who 'were likely to produce impossible religious demands on arrival as recruits'. About 100 ratings of the establishment participated in demonstrations to voice their protest against the menial duties they were assigned and their leaders were mostly North-West Frontier Pathans. The men refused to sweep mess decks as being contrary to their religious customs, and demanded the construction of a mosque inside the establishment. All those involved in the trouble were discharged. In late 1935 there was a 'mass refusal of orders' on HMIS Clive. The officially identified cause behind it was 'fanaticism'. An Able Seaman, allegedly a religious fanatic, 'arranged to have himself proclaimed at a mass meeting of ratings a prophet second only to Mohamed'. It was he who was said to have aroused fanaticism among the men and inclined them to flagrant insubordination to the authorities. An attempt was thus made to divest the incident of any other significance and establish the irrational, perverse nature of all those involved in it. Besides quite a number of protests were related to the ratings' grievances over pay, food, leisure, living arrangements and racial discrimination. On the pay day, 2 March 1942, the apprentices of Mechanical Training Establishment, Bombay discovered that instead of an anticipated rise their pay had been slashed. An amount varying from Rs. 5 to Rs. 7 was deducted from their salary supposedly for overpayments of war mess allowance in the preceding months. The dissatisfaction over the pay-cut turned into anger when it was lel.'l.rnt that the signallers, inferior to them in training and qualification, had received a wage-rise. That evening at about 6 p.m., after a hard day's
(Tide'Tums
53
labour, the boys were instructed to report for boat drill. These 'inroads' into their pay and leisure were strongly resented. Indignant the boys refused to turn up for drill. Again at 8 p.m. when they were· asked to report for 'Duty Watch' none fell in. Late at night the apprentices, after considerable discussion, decided to strike work until their grievances regarding pay and service conditions were redressed. Early morning 'up beds' was sounded but no one stirred. A little later when 'out pipes' was ordered, still no one moved. The order to 'fall in .downstairs' at 6 o'clock was not obeyed. Officers visited the ratings' quarters to persuade them to fall in but without success. At about 4-30 p.m. the Commodore came down to the establishment and informed them that unless they immediately resumed duty, their action would be considered as 'mutiny in wartime'. Despite this threat the apprentices stood firm, and decided not to budge from their decision to continue the strike until their demands were conceded. Shortly afterwards the officers attempted to split their ranks by announcing that 'Direct Entry Artificers' who comprised 20 to 30 inmates of the establis.hment could go ashore on -, 'liberty'. The boys understood this manoeuvre quickly, and decided to avail themselves of the opportunity. As they were marching out of the barracks, the sentry at the gate attempted to blow his whistle to summon aid. This was prevented - the whistle was snatched away from him - and the apprentices walked down towards the Gateway of India. The next morning the barracks were surrounded by a large posse of soldiers of the Royal Berkshire Regiment. A number of troops entered the living quarters and beat up the boys they found first. The apprentices were then taken under heavy military escort to a detention camp. They were caught off guard by the sudden and violent attack by the soldiers but regaining their wits the boys started fraternizing with the latter. During their stay in the.detention camp awaiting trial the officers attempted to break the morale of the ratings threatening them with years ·of imprisonment. Pressure mounted on them to name the ringleaders. They were kept in the camp for 25 days without change of clothes, a wash or a shave. One or two among them succumbed to the threats and gave away the names of three who had led the strike. Eventually 120 apprentices were courtmartialled and dismissed from the navy. All of them were sentenced to two months' rigorous imprisonment with the exception of the three named as ringleaders. Of the latter one got 15 months' r.i. and the other two 12 months'.24
54
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
In June the same year there was troubl~ on board HMIS Konkan at Tobermory, UK. On the 22nd several Ordinary/Able rates among the ship's company 'refused to work and obey the lawful commands of their superior officers and went on a hunger strike' for the redress of their grievances over rations, cooking, working hours, sleeping arrangements and other daily n.eeds and problems. All the ratings involved were subsequently punished - they were sentenced to 90 days' detention. But on investigation most of their complaints, espe~ dally those· about the quality of supplies and cooking, were found to be genuine.2S On the night of 16 September 1942 the ratings of HMIS Orissa clashed with the manager of Clarendon Hotel, East London, South Africa, over colour bar. It resulted in the arrest of nine men. Next day the ship's company declined to surrender their passes when ordered to by the Executive Officer. The senior officers of Orissa were latter court-martialled for 'negligent performance of duty and not endeavouring to suppress the mutiny' and lost seniority by 3 to· 12 months. On the other hand, 13 men were disrated and 3 tried for joining in a 'mutiny'accompanied by violence and confining certain officers of the ship in the wardroom. All of them were imprisoned for 3 to 7 years. The RIN authorities were perturbed over these incidents, especially those which took place during the war years, and appointed a number of committees to investigate the circumstances behind them. The investigating officers tried' in their own way to comprehend the underlying causes and suggest measures to prevent such disturbances from breaking out again during the critical war time. The board of enquiry into the 'mutiny' on HMIS Konkan in UK recommended increased rations for the ratings serving in cold climate, training for cooks prior to their appointment in ships, promotion opportunities for the lower-deck ,;ooks similar to those offered to the officers', proper domestic arrangements for ships sent abroad, provision of bedding bins instead of racks to conserve space, organized visits and entertainments for the 1 atings on leave, etc. Again the enquiry board for HMIS Khyber suggested transfer of certain staff inorder to overcome the complaints againt them and thereby strengthen the morale of the lower deck. Both the boards emphasized that 'extra-caution' must be exercised in the selection of ratings for draft
'Tide'Tums
55
overseas, steps must be taken to ensure constant watch over them by their complement of officers and their continuous training from the delivery of every ship to its commissioning, and that, if practicable, the new tonnages should be delivered to RIN by the Royal Navy ratings. Drafts, it was suggested, should Dot remain in the United Kingdom longer than necessary as they were supposed to be highly susceptible to 'infectious' ideas from outside. One board of enquiry had no doubt that a number of English speaking ratings developed some 'large ideas' owing to their contact with RN p~rsonnel and as a result demanded pay and rations equivalent to those of their ~ritish coutnerparts. The board failed to trace the presence of any subversive element but it was pretty sure that some 'marginally noted' ratings exercised a bad influence on the remainder, and incited them to defy the 'lawful command' of their officers and indulge in 'mutinous' actions. Effective and timely propaganda, it felt, could have combated the undersirable influence of such elements. Some boards insisted that recruitment from a particular religion or community from which the 'bad' elements had been drawn must be restricted. The investigating officers, including those belonging to the agitators' religions, were unanimous that the religious grounds advanced for refusal of cleanship duties and others of the same nature were fraudulent. It was in their opinion an excuse unscrupulously used by .the ratings dissatisfied with the service conditions to secure their discharge from RIN. Even in taking steps to implement their limited recommenda- , tions like increased rations in cold climate the COs of 'mutinous' ships and establishments, insisted the investigating authorities, must make it clear to the agitators that these were no concessions to their acts of indiscipline. Officers-in-charge of ships and establishments must be very firm in tackling every act of indiscipline. It must be dealt with 'completely' at the beginning; it should be nipped in the bud.pnder no circumstance should such trouble be allowed to brew up because of inadequate measures taken at the outset. On the whole the officers were found to be negligent of duty and lacking in firmness and efforts to suppress the 'mutinies'. Of course they alone were not to blame: the way such troubles originated showed that basically many of the ratings were prone to indiscipline and had exaggerated notions about their rights, which corroded their sense of duty and loyalty to the service.
56
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the·RIN Uprising of February 1946
The investigations into some of the 'mutinies' spoke of defects in the administration of ships and establishments and the scope for its improvement. Much of the discontent was attributed to the failure of officers to maintain close contact with the ratings under their command. The lack of contact between lower and upper decks, and the indifferent attitude of the latter towards problems facing the former were held largely responsible for much of the disturbance. In the contextof'the unrest in MTE Bombay in March 1942 Vice-Admiral Fitzherbert concluded that had the officers maintained proper contact with the ratings, the outbreak would not have occurred. In January next year he expressed alarm over the state of discipline in the navy and thought it necessary to issue a confidential circular to the commanding officers of all ships and establishments: 'I am disturbed over the number of cases of insubordination... in HMI ships. The frequency with which these cases have occurred points to the fact there is something inherently wrong with the way ships' companies have been handled by their officers'. Vice-Admiral Fitzherbert was convinced that 'in nearly all cases the root causes' had been 'the mishandling of the situation by the officers usually at a very early stage'.26 Napoleon was quoted to have said: 'There are no bad men, there are only bad officers.' The truth of the statemf
'Tide'Turns
57
subalterns. The over-elaborate hierarchy indeed stood in the way of direct communication with the lower ranks. The officers who ought to be in direct touch with them were confined to the work of administration. Such structural bottlenecks acted perennially as a check on the penetrative and regulatory power of the naval elite. Created as a colonical institution and cast in a colonial mould RIN never succeeded in overcoming them. While the naval officers viewed any collective action by their men as a disease of lawlessness, the latter regarded it as a collective bid for justice. From the upper-deck perspective any such action was a mutiny, a punishable offence. Whereas the ratings thought it well within their right to rise out of an urge for justice or the restoration of justice. In the discussion that preceded their action in MTE, Bombay, the apprentices of the establishment preferred to call it 'strike', to consider it a legitimate way of seeking redressal for their grievances. Generally the ratings felt their discontent with the service was just because they had been misled by the recruiting authorities about the conditions in RIN, their reservations about certain duties were just because they had been misinformed about the nature of their job at the time of enrolmentY In his letter to FOCRIN in connection with the 'mutiny' aboard HMIS Shivaji in April 1945 Comdr. Cover dale Smith wrote: the ratings were quite sincere in their religious belief, and they would not have joined the service if it had been mentioned that the 'clean-ship' would be one of their essential duties.28 The dissatisfaction with the terms and conditions of the service was accompanied by a feeling that the authorities were not inclined to consider seriously their grievances which had been represented officially on many occasions. 'Their state of mind is such that they were prepared to go to jail rather pin any further faith in the possible redress of their grievances by higher authority'.2.9 Punishments inflicted on the ratings for disobedience of orders were seldom accepted as such. As stated already, three leading seamen of HMIS Hima/aya were punished for 'breaking out' of the establishment for Friday noon-prayer contrary to the order of the Gunner Pay. The ratings refused to accept it as punishment for 'wilful disobedience of lawful command'. They were not willing to recognize the priority of man's command over god's. Moreover what rankled in their mind was that facilities to observe their religion were denied to them despite the naval instructions to the contrary.30 The ratings argued it
58
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in tlte RIN Uprising of February 1946
was a matter of common knowledge that Friday prayers were strictly enjoined upon them by Islam and was no less important to a devout Muslim. than attending Sunday school was to a devout Christian. But this simple truth was not appreciated by the officer who refused to grant their request for 'liberty'. Some of the questions put to him by the prosecution it;l the court-martial proceedings betrayed his complete ignorance of what should be known to every officer. Under such circumstances the ratings were bound to come to the conclusion: 'though we belong to the Indian navy ... the tone of the administration is entirely foreign because those who command us are not cognizant of even matters of common knowledge as a result of which the ratings were punished for offences which could not have taken place but for the officers' ignorance and perversity.'31 This argument, whatever might be the officers' view, was quite sound from the lowerdeck standpoint. Following the incident in HMIS Hima/aya FOCRIN issued at the instance of C-in-C a circular to the effect that COs should provide reasonable facilities for everyone to perform ~s religious duties according to his belief. But this order was issued after the men had been punished, and a bitter feeling continued to simmer in the minds of the ratings. In regard to the incidents in HMIS Sltivaji. Comdr. Coverdale Smith in his letter observed that the average rating would not pause to consider that those who suffered sentence were justly punished for their disobedience of orders. He would continue to believe that the punishment meted out to them was unjust and unfair; he would remain 'disgruntled and discontented' and affect others by his feeling. Sometimes the upper deck created on slightest provocation or at the smallest excuse situations in which the ratings must either allow themselves to be abused verbally or physically without retaliation or, if they retaliated, expose themselves to severe 'disciplinary' punishment on charges of violating their superior officers, disorderly behaviour and mutiny. As noted, in HMIS Hamalwar the ratings were put into such a situation. They decided not to bear the. insult to their religion, and assaulted the offender in retaliation instead.
* The 'mutinies' in RIN, like the protests, on a larger scale, in allied armed forces and RIAF, had specific causes and contexts, and no infection or manipulation theory or, for that matter, any variant
'Tide'Turns
59
of it, could explain their origins. In this sense each of them was distinctive by comparison with others. Still the forms these protests assumed, the way their protagonists looked at them and the responses their actions evoked from the authorities had some similarities. Again these anticipated, to a degree, the RIN subalterns' action on the scale of the entire service in February 1946, their perspective on the event and the naval elite's reactions to it. Notes and References 1.
For the following account the author has heavily drawn from NIT, 730 January 1946; The Times, 10-11 & 15-16 January 1946; MG, 9-11, 14-15, 17 & 31 January 1946 and The Statesman, Calcutta, 11-14 Jamiary 1946.
2.
For details of RAF strikes see The Times, 24-30 January and 1 February'1946; MG, 25-26, 28-29 & 31 January 1946; The Statesman, 24-27, 31 January and 2-4 & 11-12 February 1946 and BC, 24-25 &28-30 January 1946.
3.
File No 601/9768/H, p. 3.
4.
ibid., pp. 3, 31.
5.
ibid., p. 12.
6.
ibid., p. 15.
7.
Cited in The Hindu, 27 January 1946.
8.
PD,Vol. 418, No. 7 (29 January 1946), Col. 697.
9.
File No. 601/9768/H, p. 23.
10.
ibid., p. 17.
11.
ibid., p. 10.
12.
For details of RIAF strikes between 20 January and 16 February 1946 see BC, 23 & 29 January and 3,7,8, 11-13 & 18 February 1946; The Statesman, 3,8,13,15 & 19 February 1946; TOI, 8,11, & 18 February 1946; FP!, 7-8 February 19'46 and PA, 17 February 1946.
13.
LAD,Vol. I, No. 10 (4 February 1946), p. 408.
14.
Council of State Debates, Vol. I, No. 2 (19 February 1946), p. 70.
15.
LAD, Vol. II, No. 4 (18 February 1946), p. 1053.
16.
File No 601/9768/H, p. 10.
17.
ibid., p. 24.
18.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, pp. 20 ff.
60
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
19.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 4, Part I.
20.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 25.
21.
Letter from FOCRIN to COs of all HMI ships and establishments, 23 September 1944, File No. NL 900l.
22.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 25.
23.
For further details of th,e incidents in Shivaji, ibid., pp. 139ff.
24.
FP], 3 May 1946.
25.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 165.
26.
ibid., p. 28.
27.
For a detailed discussion on recruitment promises see Chapter 4 below.
28.
RIN Mutiny Sr; No. 6, p. 33~
29.
ibid., p. 145.
30.
A number of Muslim ratings, in their evidence before the RIN Enquiry Commission, narrated how they suffered 'for the prayers' sake'. They referred particularly to the incident which took place in HMIS Bahadur, the boys' training establishment in Karachi. Back in 1940 during the month of Ramzan the boys were. forbidden to move out of their bed after the 'pipedown' at 9 p.m. They felt that 'man's command cannot have priority over God's prayer'. Moreover they were allowed by the previous Commanding Officer, Lieut. Comdr. Watt, to offer night prayer (Ishaqui Namaz). The ratings decided to ignore Lieut. Comdr. Nott's order and go by the riwaz. After their prayer was over, they found themselves surrounded by the officers with pistols in their hands. BW 22: A.K. Khan and BW 51: Rahmat Khan, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol."I, p. 254 & Sr. No. 3, Vol. 11, pp. 533-4. See also BW 19: P.G. Bokil and BW 24: Abdul Gaffoor, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, pp. 206 & 293.
31.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 32.
3 'SILENCE' BROKEN The ratings accommodated in Talwar, RIN's Signal School in Bombay, refused to have their food on the evening of 17 February 1946 and, again, the next morning. 'Beggars', as they were often called by the upper deck, insisted on being 'choosers'. They declined to take the same badly cooked dal served thrice daily, dal at breakfas.t{ dal at lunch and dal at supper. This exercise of choice on their part, from the upper-deck point of view, was a serious 'act of in discipline'. And it was followed by still more serious ones. Divisions were piped as usual ih the morning of Monday the 18th. None cared to fall iJ,l. A handful of CPOs, POs, Instructors, RN ratings and WRINS were the exceptions. Officers-on-Duty were surprised by the audacity of the ship's company,l by their collective refusal of orders. But many' more surprising things lay in store for them. Within no time the lower deck went completely out of their control - shouting, jeering and moving about freely. This was quite unexpected of the men of the 'silent service'. The 'mute', routine-bound, regimented naval subalterns could now afford the luxury of unending, open discussions and debates. They were in a defiant mood, no longer willing to show the upper deck 'usual marks of respect' or pay them 'habitual obedience'. Some officers tried to 'reason' with the ratings but were booed and hooted out. The former perceived the danger. The RN personnel were returned to HMS Braganza, WRINS ordered to leave Talwar and small arms and ammunition removed to Castle Ban·acks. The Flag Officer Bombay came down twice to the establishment and tried to speak to the lower deck but without success. In the evening Commander F.W King had to leave Talwar handing over charge 'temporarily' to Captain Inigo-Jones. By the time the rebellious ratings established their control over the establishment: officers were confined to the gateway and the vacillating elements among CPOs and POs to their barracks. The latter were made to do 'cleanship' duties. There was indeed none to give the ratings orders. No sentries could be produced in the afternoon. The lower-deck personnel were at liberty to 'break out' of the establishment as and when they pleased.
62
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 I
From the evidence before it the Talwar Board of Enquiry arrived at the conclusion that the incidents which took place 'prior to the mutiny were symptomatic of deep-seated unrest and discontent within the service' and had a bearing on it 'in that their cumulative effect was that of a detonator which set off the explosion on the morning of the 18th February 1946'.2 Here then are those incidents. Comdr. King assumed command of HMIS Talwar on 21 January. While taking over from his predecessor it appeared to him that 'the general situation in the establishment was not satisfactory', the state of discipline and morale being 'definitely bad'.3 From the beginning 'he had to labour under certain disadvantages.'4 The establishment was crowded beyond its capacity. It was built to accommodate 700 people, and on 18 February no less than 1,192 ratings were huddled in. Talwar, in one officer's description, was 'like a piggery compared with normal naval permanent establishment'.5 It was grossly understaffed: no officer could devote adequate time to his divisional duties. This apart Comdr. King started off under another serious disadvantage: he was a non-communication officer, innocent, to use a mild expression, of this highly specialized branch and the ratings who manned it. His appointment as CO of this establishment was naturally resented by its personnel. Comdr. King knew it very well. Moreover the fact that he was sent in to replace Lieutenant Commander A.T.J. Cole who seems to have been very popular among the communication ratings was an additional reason for his unacceptability to the latter. It was generally believed by the ratings that Lieut. Comdr. Cole was removed because of his 'pro-Indian' views and his 'leniency' towards those who harboured 'anti-authority', 'antiBritish feelings'. Implicit herein was a reference to what happened in the establishment on the eve of Navy Day in 1945. In Lieut. Comdr. Cole's own description: During the night of 30th November a serious outbreak of sabotage and slogan writing occurred in "TALWAR." ... All the halliards of both masts were cut and the englefield clips .. [and]
'Silence' Broken
63
valves from the amplifier to be used for Navy Day were removed. The following slogans ... in green paint ... [appeared] in profusion on the buildings surrounding the parade ground. QUIT INDIA REVOLT NOW KILL THE WHITE DOGS DOWN WITH THE IMPERIALISTS KILL THE WHITE BASTARDS6 Lieut. Comdr. Cole considered this a 'carefully planned and well organized' affair by a small group of ratings, their intention being to embarrass the higher authorities on Navy Day. It was not directed against the officers. in Ta/war. Rather it was 'part of the political problem of India'. He had 'no doubt about the virulence of feeling behind it'. Every effort, he informed FOB, was being made to trace the offenders but so far without success. The constant influx of ratings, largely unknown elements, to this establishment and the absence of adequate officers to supervise them made the task of detecting the offenders all the more difficult. Lieut. Comdr. Cole was reluctant to take 'normal disciplinary action' because he felt this would 'only result in further outbreaks and probably in violence as the outcome of a personal grudge'.7 FOB was requested to inform him of the policy to be adopted towards occurrences of this nature and the action to be taken if the offenders were apprehended. But no instructions were issued to him during the remaining period, about two months before he was relieved of his command. However, a rating named Deb was held responsible for the slogan writing and halliard-slashing incident. But this allegation could not be proved, and he was discharged 'SNLR'. Lieut. Comdr. Cole incurred the Admiral's wrath as the latter considered this an act of 'hooliganism' having nothing to do with politics.8 Eventually the Commanding Officer was replaced by Comdr. King. The latter was expected to tackle the situation by 'normal naval methods'. He was told by FOB that a strict disciplinarian like him was needed to tighten the grip over the establishment. What Comdr. King did on his joining Ta/war as CO in the
64
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febrnary 1946
name of toning up the sagging discipline and morale in the establishment earned him notoriety very soon. He was never a man known for suave manners or mild temper. His acts were more often than not stamped with insolence, high-handedness and vulgarity and were perfectly in keeping with the tradition set by Captain Bligh of Bounty in the late eighteenth century. One such act was referred to by Lieut. Comdr. W.F. Lisle-Taylor: Two ratings were brought before me for absence without leave, I ... placed them in Captain's report. When they came before the Captain all that happened was that the Captain looked at their service documents and then said "40 days No. 12" to one of the ratings and to the other "40 days No. 12 and 6 days No. 14".9
Comdr. King did not care to hold any enquiry before he punished the ratings put up before him. This high-handedness on his part aggravated the discontent among the men he commanded. 'A rating gets very annoyed about unfair punishments'. So one could hardly wonder, added Lieut. Comdr. Lisle-Taylor, if unfair treatment was 'one of the grievances that the strikers had'.1O Around 25 January, a week before FOCRIN's inspection and march past, a notice under the heading 'AGM No. 108' was found pinned upon the ratings' notice board. It was im innocuous-looking 'Admn. General Message' but the text was in fact an order to all ratings not to greet each other with 'good morning' or 'good evening' but to say 'Jai Hind'.u When Comdr. King's attention was drawn to this notice, he could take no immediate action but decided to put an end to this sort of 'nonsense' at once. It was apprehended that something might happen before FOCRIN's visit on 2 February. Accordingly on the evening of the 1st before he left the establishment CO called Lieut. H.L. Verma, Officer of the Day and Signal Boatswain A.M.!. Surve to his office and wanted them 'to be on the look-out for any man who might be doing the mischief or rather repeating the mischief that was already done' before Navy Day. At night 'Quit India' and 'Jai Hind' slogans were pasted on the saluting hase on the parade ground. Next morning Leading Telegraphist B.C. Dutt was apprehended allegedly for this 'act of sabotage' and palced under close arrestY He was not caught red-handed pasting slogans on the
'Silence' Broken
65
saluting base,13 and the only incriminating evidence against him was a gum bottle reportedly found along with some papers in his locker which were not at all of a subversive nature. 14 Dutt's arrest, however, caused considerable excitement in Talwar, and overnight he becaIlle a 'hero' and 'martyr' in the eyes of its rati.ngs. This offensive measure did· not put an end to the slogan-writing in the establishment as Comdr. King had expected. Slogans reappeared indeed on 6 and 7 February, and this time they were directed at the Commanding Officer himself. The words 'Quit India' were written behind Comdr. King's car and its tyres deflated. This undermined his prestige as a strict disciplinarian. Added to his irritation was the stream of anonymous letters in the form of ill-spelt threats he received ever since Dutt's arrest. These were prompted by the senders' perception of the collapse of the British Raj. Here is a specimen. You are forgetting that the India is free now and if anything happening to ldg/tel Dutt, think that will be the last few days for your death. You try against to this and see the result. But don't blame any body no body will come to save you, Desi your self and make hasry oh, you fool. You bastet', don't try to behave improperly. Jai Hind. ls Close on the heels of these events came what was described by a number of officers as the spark that kindled the fire of'mutiny'. The incident took place at about 9 a.m. on 8 February in the Hawkins Barracks of Talwar occupied by certain ratings of the Central Communication Office. The ratings had returned from their duty at CCO and after having their breakfast were getting ready for divisions at 9.20. At th~t time Comdr. King happened to be passing the barracks and noticed several ratings inside. He thought that they were Talwar people abstaining from their divisions, and entered the barracks to check it. His presence was not noticed as the ratings were busy preparing for their divisions. This enraged CO, and he shouted at the top of his voice, 'Get up, you sons of bitches, coolies and junglies'. 'You Indian bastards', he threatened, 'whenever I come inside you must all stand Up'.16 Comdr. King's shouts made them stand at attention and salute him. He asked them who they were. The nearest ones said that they were CCO ratings. Thereupon he withdrew and, ignorant of the separate routine for CCO ratings, immediately enquired why the ratings he had abused were not at divi~
66
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
sions. Lieut. Comdr. E.M. shaw, Staff Communication Officer, was contacted over telephone, and CO expressed his displeasure over the behaviour of CCO ratings and. their routine. It was later alleged by Comdr. King that he entered the barracks because some of its inmates at the time were whistling and making 'cat-calls' at the women on parade. Inside the barracks he found some ratings smoking or lying on their cots and some leaning out of the windows. His presence was ignored. He had to repeat his order to stand up and stop smoking before it was obeyed. Thereafter he reprimanded the ratings for their 'bad manners' in 'normal' naval termsP On the other hand, the ratings said that there was no cigarette in the hand of anyone or any 'cat-call' was made as there were no WRINS on parade at the time and neither did they deliberately show any disrespect to Comdr. King. In their version CO walked in so suddenly that very few saw him. Those who did notice his arrival stood to attentipn, and the rest went on shaving and dressing. In a fit of anger Comdr. King started showering abuse on them indiscriminately for their 'disrespectful' behaviour and absence from divisions in accordance with the Talwar routine. This incident created a great stir in the establishment. That very day Lieut. Comdr. Shaw sent for som~ of the ratings concerned to reprimand them in keeping with Comdr. King's whishes. When one of those summoned was about to say something he stopped him. Lieut. Comdr. Shaw later admitted his mistake. He realized 'in the light of subsequent events' that had the ratings been given a hearing, they might have spoken their mind. In fact they did narrate their feelings to certain other officers.18 . Next day on the morning of 9 February a number of ratings approached Warrant Telegraphist Ashirvadam to forward their complaints to the higher authorities. The Warrant Officer in turn tried to 'make them see reason' and agree to drop the matter. The 'requestmen' were asked to 'forgive and forget'. Narrating his personal experience Ashirvadam added that nothing would come out of their requests while, on the other hand, they would get into fresh trouble. So it was better to withdraw them. But the ratings insisted on their complaints being forwarded to the appropriate authorities and were prepared to face the consequences. They felt they had been sub-
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jected to enough humiliation and ill-treatment and it was too much to expect of them now to 'forgive and forget'. To do so would encourage the officers to be more rude towards them.19
i'
Eventually, however, the majority of the ratings were seen by SCO Shaw that day, and the rest, who were off duty, on Sunday 10 February. Thereafter he wrote a letter marked 'important and confidential' stating the facts and requesting CO to inform him at what time it would be convenient for him to see the 'requestmen'.2O The letter reached Comdr. King about Sunday noon. But, as Lieut. Comdr. Shaw said before the Talwar Board of Enquiry, it was not opened by CO until the next morning. On Monday Comdr. King rang up and informed him that he would see the ratings at 10 a.m. on Saturday, his normal day for hearing requests. Lieut. Comdr. Shaw saw CO and discussed the matter at some length. In the latter's opinion the whole thing was a 'frame-up' and so he was in no hurry to see the requestmen. Lieut. Comdr. Shaw tried to impress upon him the seriousness and urgency of the matter. He suggested that in view of the nature of the complaints and the ratings' strong feelings it would be better to see them before next Saturday. The delay seemed too long to him. But Comdr.King declined to act in keeping with this recommendation. On Saturday the 16th Comdr. King saw the requestmen, warned them that it was a serious offence to make a false complaint against a senior officer, and said that in accordance with 'regulations' he would give them 24 hours' time to think over the matter, after which they could, if they so desired, state their complaints in writing. But the ratings could no longer be cowed down: they presented their complaints in writing on the morning of the 18th, the day the strike began. The RIN Mutiny Enquiry Commission found no reason t9 disbelieve the ratings' version of the vitriol that Comdr. King indulged in. Of the complainants 'some were Hindus, some Christians and the rest Muslims, and this motley group had no apparent motive to combine against their CO. They cited in their individual written statements the actual words used by Comdr. King in his address, and waited for about two weel\s to channel their complaints in the proper service manner. On the other hand, Co nowhere spelt out what he
68
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
actually said. The Commission admitted that Comdr. King failed to impress it as one of the witnesses who carried conviction. He seemed reluctant to answer questions on most occasions, and even when he did, it remained either evasive or revealed his scant regard for truth. 21 Faced with the question what words were actually used as he walked into the barracks all that Comdr. King said before the Talwar Board was: 'I cannot remember word for word what 1 said except that the ratings were reprimanded in normal naval fashion'.22 What he meant by reprimanding in 'normal' naval terms was not explained. By implication to call names like 'bastard' or 'son of a bitch' did in no way amount to abuse; rather it was exactly what was called 'reprimand' in normal naval terminology!23 However, during his conversation with Lieut. Comdr. Shaw immediately after the incident CO said that when he entered the barracks no one took any notice of his presence and he had to order aloud 'stand up'. Discrete silence was maintained on whether he said anything else. Lieut. Comdr. Shaw in his statement to the Talwar Board mentioned that in the course of his discussion with him in the presence of Lieut. S.M. Nanda and WO Ashirvadam between 12 a.m. and 1 p.m. the same day Comdr. King used the expressions 'sons of bitches and buggers' with reference to the ratings in question.24 When asked to testify by this board Lieut. Nanda said that 'he could remember the word "bugger" being used in connection with the ratings'. Later in the witness box of the RIN Commission Lieut. Nanda sided openly with Comdr. King, and was bent upon diluting the following statement made to the Talwar Board: 'I have had a lot of contact with Comdr. King and I have heard him very often using bad language which comes to him unintentionally'.2S Lieut. Kohli in his evidence before the same board stated that he saw Comdr. King on the 8th and the exact words used were: 'Not a son of bitch took any notice of me'.26 He added that some bad words must have been used for 14 ratings to lodge a complaint at once. It was his impression that Comdr. King was not used to dealing with communication ratings and meted out to them the same treatment as he accorded to seamen. When asked to comment on the statements by Lieut. Nanda or Kohli whom he liked so much, Comdr. King, instead of giving a straight answer, said that in talking to his fellow officers he often used 'friendly terms, unorthodox language' and 'expressive' words 'which were not found in the dictionary',27
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Notwithstanding Lieut. Comdr. Shaw's strenuous efforts to hammer home to Comdr. King the importance of dealing with the ratings' complaint at once, the latter held fast to his decision to see' the requestmen on Saturday the 16th. The result of this delay, in Lieut. Nanda's words, was that resentment among the ratings increased further, and it became fairly widespread in the establishment by the time. 'It was the general talk amongst the ralings that no action was being taken against the alleged language which they thought was an insult to all of them.'28 That ComJr. King's address was viewed as an insult to the Indian personnel in general by the ratings in other establishments as well was borne out by Lieut. Comdr. Shaw's statement. The latt"cr told the Talwar Board that when he visited the Dockyard Signal Station on Monday the 18th, after the 'mutiny' had started, to address the ratings there, one among them came forward and raised the point: It is nearly 14 days and nothing has happened, but if I
were to call you an English ''bastard'' I should be palced under arrest almost immediately, why then should this officer be allowed to call us Indian "bastard" and nothing is done?29 Lieut. Comdr. Shaw added: the ratings of this establishment felt that Comdr. King insulted the entire race as he called some of their fellow signalmen 'Indian bastards'. They were hurt, and for that reason decided to stop work in sympathy with the Talwar ratings. The ratings throughout the navy felt that they were looked down on by members of the European services simply because they were Indians. One example was Signal Boatswain Shead telling a number of ratings in the context of their complaints about food that 'beggars cannot be choosers'.3o The men objected to this remark, and the incident was widely discussed. It was a common sentiment among the ratings that if an Indian committed an offence he was immediately brought to book but no such promptness was shown in the case of an European 'defaulter'. Comdr. King's version of what happened at the 'defaulter table' _ on 16 February was that he gave the requestmen a warning in accordance with the naval regulations. On the other hand, the ratings who
70
Revisiting Talwar: A Study ill tlte RlN Uprising of February 1946
threat and not at all as a warning. With reference to this incident Lieut. Nanda in his statement to the Commission tried to justify Comdr. King's 'warning' as absolutely innocent and procedurally correct. But the same witness admitted earlier before the Talwar Board that CO's attitude was quite threatening inasmuch as he informed the ratings of the serious consequence of lying against a senior officer. This attitude worked up their feeling. 31 They had not only been subjected to insults but were now staggered to hear from him that their complaint was false, and as such it would land them into fresh trouble. The ratings resented the threat; CO was going to make it appear to the higher authorities that they were lying and therefore must be punished. Comdr. King was not the man to realize that the way he was putting the matter to the communication ratings" would not enhance his prestige or raise him in their estimation. The 'warning' of Comdr. King might have been technically correct from the upper-deck point of view bat could have only one implication in the circumstances of the case for the ratings: he was holding out a threat so as to make them withdraw their complaints against him. The events that had taken place in HMIS Talwar since November 1945, if considered in isolation from one another, would appear trivial and irrelevant. But all together constituted the context in which the February strike originated. Seen as such they become meaningful and significant. Added to them was another incident on 17 February evening. 11
At 7.35 p.m. two vegetarian messes in Talwar refused to have their supper. They were served" a curious mixture of dal and vegetables, and it looked like cattlefeed and was inedible. The matter came to the notice of Lieut. A. Batra, Officer-on-Watch. He promised that the mixing up of dal and vegetables would not occur again, and wanted to give them tinned food or liberty to buy something from outside but the ratings refused the offer. That night they ate nothing, went hungry and slept over their grievance. Understandably during the night and early in the next morning the matter was much talked about in the establishment and must
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have caused a lot of comment, criticism, sympathy and discontent. Around 7.30 a.m. breakfast was placed on the mess tables and a large number of ratings refused to have it. The same dal was served again. The ratings ga~hered round the messes, making a lot of noise and 'indulging' in heated discussions. Lieut. S.N. Sachdev, Assistant OOW of 17/18 February tried without effect to make them sit down and have their breakfast. Lieuts. Kohli and Nanda in their joint report on the 'mutiny' accused Lieuts. Batra and Sachdev of inaction and complicity in the disturbance: the latter made no efforts to arrange fresh food for the ratings who refused to take the already served items nor did they inform CO or any other 'responsible' officer of the development the previous night itself.32 On the other hand, it appears from Lieut. Sachdev's account that Lieut. Kohli, OOW for 18/19 February was present in the establishment and already took over charge when many more ratings abstained from having breakfast. The situation was fast becoming tense. Instead of making any alternative arrangement for breakfast and reporting the matter to CO he 'wasted time' in mustering all the leading hands of messes and gathering information from the same 'who could only say that the ratings refused to eat because of persisteQtly bad quality of food' .33 Lieut. Sachdev found no justification for fresh investigation why the ratings did not have their breakfast when the complaints about food were so well known to everyone for a long time.34 In his message about the previous night's development Lieut. Batra stressed that the cooking of vegetables had deteriorated and the same dal was being served thrice a day for some time now.35 A few other officers concerned with catering and welfare expressed similar opinion in their reports earlier. In the morning of the day the strike began and the evening before the ratings found the food served in their messes unfit for human consumption. Their refusal to take it, in Lieut. Batra'sview, could by no means be an offence for this reason. Most others disagreed. Comdr. King himself was aware of the ratings' complaint abou't ,food but never considered it genuine. OOWs concerned hurled accusation against one another for failing to inform CO in time of the ratings' refusal to take food. Even if it had been so reported, it is
72
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
doubtful whether he would have taken any step to redress the ratings' grievances. Reference to some of his statements would reveal what view Comdr. King held in regard to their complaints. His opinion on the food complaint ran counter to the evidence of most other witnesses and was, even in Lieut. Nanda's view, 'callous'. 'The ratings', he told the Talwar Board, 'would gladly accept overcrowding in Ta/war for the privilege of enjoying the excellent food served in the establishment.' As to the discrimination between RN and RIN personnel in this or any other matter he 'can think of no service case,' but, in his view, it 'is inevitable'.36 Later in his evidence before the RIN Enquiry Commission Comdr. King asserted that food preparations in Talwar, e.g., c/tapatis, 'are better than what I get in my house' .37 He would have the Commission believe it. The latter had enough evidence before it to show that British officers seldom enquired about f90d served to Indian ratings, let alone taste it at regular intervals. Then asked about the Talwar ratings' refusal to take food Oli the 17th evening and 18th morning and their 'mutinuous' actions later, Comdr. King said: by comparison with other naval establishments the standard of living in Ta/war was far better. So it was very difficult to understand why the 'mutiny' should take place in such an establishment. It would have been easier to guess the reason if the 'mutiny' had broken out in establishments where facility, especially the standard of living, was pretty low or comparatively unsatisfactory. 'I cannot see why it should break out in an establishment which I believe to have maintained the highest standard of living'.38 By implication, then, the complaints that were made about food were cooked up. Behind the ratings' discontent and its outburst, Comdr. King felt, were the hands of some 'ill-disposed persons' or 'politicians', nay, 'revolutionaries'. Such elements 'got away with all this revolutionary nonsense for quite a long time', and his arrival put an 'unwelcome check' on it.39 'On many ... occasions I had noticed that while going round the establishment the general bearing of the ratings was hostile and disrespectful and sometime cat-calls and slogans were shouted behind my back.'40 By references to the 'principle' that 'history repeats itself Comdr. King explained: 'there was a general effort in the establishment to embarrass any senior officer, and at the time I was the most senior officer available. ... the sloganwriting started off before I got there. It may be an astonishing coincidence, but it only happened when a senior British officer was avail-
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able to be embarrassed.'41 Soon after he took over the command of Talwar slogan writing and other 'acts of sabotage' occurred again. Comdr. King attributed this 'anti-authority' and, as a corollary, 'antiBritish', attitude to the elements who did not like 'some action being taken' against such 'revolutionary nonsense'; It was his firm belief that hardly any of the complaints put forward by Talwar ratings 'were genuine from ... [their] heart ... they were inspired under outside influence'. The ratings were 'excited' by 'subversive' elements from outside to defy any form of authority. So in the face of such defiance all that he could do 'was to wait for them to cool down' and then try to 'get hold' of those complaining and 'deal' with them.42 While on the 18th morning a large number of ratings refused again to take the dal served at breakfast and walked out of the mess decks in protest, no efforts were made by the officers on duty to arrange alternative food for them. Instead divisions were sounded at 8.45 a.m. By that time the words 'no food, no work' went round and no one proceeded to the parade ground except the worried officers. 'Quit Talwar', 'Quit India', 'Down with British White Rats', 'Jai Hind' slogans reverberated throughout the establishment. 'That was the first indication of the mutiny', said Lieuts. Nanda and Kohli in their joint statement. As the situation was turning serious, Lieut. Comdr. Lisle-Taylor, Executive Officer, sent a telephone message at once to Comdr. King. But the latter did not come to the establishment until 9.05 or 9;10 a.m., and then only for a few minutes. EO reported about the situation, showing him Lieut. Batra's signal as well as the statements from mess leading hands compiled by Lieut. Kohli. He told CO that Divisional Officers, CPOs and POs had already gone round their divisions trying to find out why the men had refused to fall in but got no answer. Comdr. King was requested to go and address the ratings personally but refused to do so. He was unwilling to listen to their 'cooked-up' grievances or speak to the elements 'excited' under 'outside influence'. CO said he had not had his breakfast, and so went for it, without giving his subordinate officers any definite orders beyond sanctioning an attempt by them to persuade the men to resume duty. By the time CO came back to the establishment 'the feeling had run very high' and anti-authority, and anti-British, slogans (,Comdr. King Murdabad' being tJrominent among them) were being shouted.
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
The ratings 'had formed groups and were indulging in heated argument'.43 The officers on duty attempted to contact the men and pacify them but were booed and shouted down. On his return Comdr. King informed the Flag Officer Bombay of the situation over telephone, and advised him not to come down at once to Ta/war, because he thought that FOB could do no good and only his rank would be compromised. At 10.15 a.m. CO held a· conference of all officers under him to discuss the situation but no definite line of action emerged. Comdr. King felt that any attempt by him just as the one made by other officers would be equally futile. Nevertheless the overenthusiastic Lieuts. Nanda and Kohli volunteered to act as his troubleshooters; they made yet another attempt to speak to the inen. By the time 'the ratings had sufficiently united themselves', and again 'these officers were hooted down'.44 Contrary to the evidence of Lieut. Comdr. Lisle-Taylor, Lieut. Kohli and other witnesses Comdr. King made a statement which shows his little regard for truth. He said before the Talwar Board: 'To the best of my knowledge I had breakfast before I came to Talwar at 9.5 or 9.10 a.m.' To the subsequent questions by the members of the Board his replies were most evasive. When asked what orders he gave on his arrival in the establishment Comdr. King said in answer: 'I cannot remember'. To the question 'can you give us any more details than we already had from you about the conference of officers that was held at 10.15' he replied: 'I have forgotten the details.'4s Comdr.King had to admit, however,that FOB was advised by him not to visit the spot because he wanted to put off a matter in which his own prestige was involved. In fact Rear Admiral Rattray was reluctantto step in over CO's head and did not come down to Ta/war until around 12 noon. One can guess the depth of the lower-deck resentment against Comdr. King from the latter's own statement: 'At about 1145 while I was waiting for FOB at the junction of the roads near the Guard Room I was subjected to considerable violent abuse by a large party of ratings shouting repeatedly "Quit India" white bastard.'46 Clearly in their slogans the ratings returned the abuses hurled at them by Comdr. King. When Rear Admiral Rattrary arrived in the establishment 'the situation appeared to be completely out of hand' and CO 'was unable to make any contact with his ratings'. Accompanied by
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his Flag Assistant, Lieut. Kohli and a senior PO the Flag Officer proceeded to the main barracks where most of the ratings had gathered. The latter were found to be 'in a state of great excitement'. Rear Admiral Rattray tried to ascertain their grievances but could hardly get. any· hearing because of the 'shouting' that was going on there. The chief complaint, however, appeared to him 'the alleged conduct ofComdr. King himself. Eventually FOB told them 'that before anything could be done to enquire into their alleged grievances they must return to their duty', and 'left the barracks' .47 Obviously he was unwilling to do anything to mitigate the lower-deck discontent. Despite his awareness of the Commander King incident and its impact48 FOB did not as~ure the men that their complaint would receive due consideration. Instead he. stuck to a policy of 'wait-and-see'. Rear Admiral Rattrary's attitude in the forenoon of 18 February could be inferred from Lieut. Comdr.Shaw's statement before the TalwarBoard: I went over to Vithal House at about 1125 and met ... Admiral Rattrary who was c~ming doWn the stairs with his Flag Lieut. I asked him what I should say to the watch who were on duty his words as near as I could remember them were "well you must tell them the truth and tell them what happened". I re.::. plied "Tell them; sir, that Talwar had mutinied" to which the Admiral replied "Good God, no Shaw, what an awful thing to suggest - tell them they have refused duty" .49 By the evening Talwar was completely under the control of ratings, with officers' movement having been restricted to the area of the gateway. Indifference or vacillation on the part of CPOs or POs was regarded as tantamount to hostility. They were confined to their barracks and made to do the work of junior ratings. The lower ranks had free exit from the establishment, to be controlled later by the leaders elected from among themselves. In the meantime Comdr. King employed Ldg. Tel. Dutt to pacify the strikers and bring them under control. In his statement to both the Talwar Board and the RIN Commission Dutt said that up to 4 p.m. no one among officers or men spoke to him. He was alone in his barracks, either reading books or lying on his cot and under the constant -watch of the Regulating Officer,50 'After that Comdr.
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febnlary 1946
King sent for me'. When Outt entered his room, CO said, 'Come on, sit down'. 'Listen, Dutt. I have helped you when you were in trouble. I am in trouble [now]. I want you to help me. If you ... help me I promise to give you another chance in the navy' .51 After all it was he who had caused the arrest of Dutt. His intention was to 'obtain maximum amount of information' which would help him to tighten up discipline in the establishment.52 He was authorized by FOB to try Dutt summarily, and could have punished him according to his will. Not only he did not do that but got Dutt out of the difficult situation.53 Comdr. King was also aware of Dutt's wish to continue in the navy, of his prayer for commission made just before his arrest for his alleged involvement in the slogan-writing on 1/2 February night. 54 CO now wanted him to pay back his due and held out the promise of giving him 'another chance'. Dutt appeared quite willing to cooperate with him. Comdr. King asked him to influence the ratings to stop 'mutinying' and explain to them that 'they would gain nothing' by it and would 'only spoil their lives and chances'. He added: 'I am afraid I cannot go'. 'See what you can do'. Dutt 'promised to try to persuade' the ratings 'to be reasonable' and send their representatives to CO for discussion which the latter had avoided so far. Accordingly he went to meet the strikers and 'found them having a meeting in one of the class rooms.' When Dutt approached them with his proposa~ the strikers simply snubbed him: they said that he had 'got money from Comdr. King', and would not step in the latter's trap by sending their representatives to be packed off to jail.55 Comdr. King later commented that though he wished sincerely to help him out of the trouble. Dutt did not appear to have much influence over the bulk of the ratings.56 The RIN Enquiry Commission, in its post-factum analysis, expressed the firm belief that though the complaint about dal was genuine, it could not have brought things to such a pass on 18 February in the absence of the Commander King incident. It was convinced that but for the mishandling of the situation by Comdr. King and his superiors 'this great catastrophe might never have happened - a catastrophe which caused so much damage, suffering and blooshed, which .. ruined so many young lives and careers, and which ... left so much unhappiness and bitterness in the service.'S7 Lieut. R.F. Meredith in his statement to the Talwar Board said: 'The events and behaviour of the men showed clearly that the only real and immediate griev-
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an,ce was the alleged i,nsulting language of Comdr. King.'58 In his opinion if Lieut. Comdr. Cole had .been recalled the men would have resumed work and 'subsequent tragic events' could have been avoided. Others like Lieut. Nanda, Ldg. Tels. Dutt and Madan Singh, a Talwar strike leader, speculated that if Comdr. King had been a bit more tactful, had he appeared before the ratings and said to them a few words in an apologetic manner in spite of their 'unruly behaviour' he could have put an end to the 'mutiny' in the morning of the 18th itself.59 But to go and talk to the lower deck was infra dig for Comdr. king. As Lieut. Sachdev remarked, it would have 'hurt his feeling of pride and arrogance'.60 And to apol(IJgize publicly was beyond him under any circumstances. Above all neither Comdr. King nor his superiors were willing to do anything that they could about the ratings' longstanding service grievances. Their attitude was best reflected in the remark of Lieut. Comdr. AA.H. Campbell, E.O of Talwar till August 1945: 'The ratings should not be pampered and they were much better fed, clothed and paid than they could eVer hope outside the service~'61. At about 5 p.m. on 18 February Rear Admiral Rattray Came again to Talwar. Findirig that Corndr. King was unable to establish any contact with the men through his troubleshooters, Lieut. Nanda, Lieut. Kohli or Ldg. Tel. Dutt62, anJ restore a semblance of order in the establishment, he decided, ostensibly for this reason in addition to theconsideratiori for his personal safety, to relieve him temporarily of his command and appoint Captain Inigo-Jones in his place. Thereafter FOB proceeded along with the new Commanding Officer to the barracks and endeavoured to inform the ratings of this change in command and persuade them to state their grievances. Again he found it impossible to get any hearing from the men, numbering over 1,000, 'shouting' at the top of their voice. Rear Admiral Rattray then suggested that they should appoint representatives for a meeting in the next morning at which he would listen to their grievances. The ratings were unwilling to accept this suggestion because of the strong possibility of their representatives' being picked.out as 'ringleaders' and punished as had been done before. Instead, they demanded the intervention of a 'national leader', preferably of Aruna Asaf Ali, on their behalf. This was, of course, refused by FOB. They were assured by Rear Admiral Rattray that their representatives would be taken just as such and not as ringleaders. He gave them his
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Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
word of honour that there would be no victimization. of their leaders for making 'requests' on their behalf. FOB tried again without suc- ~ cess to impress upon them that 'they must return to duty unconditionally'.63 Rear Admiral Rattray thought that the replacement of Comdr. King by Capt. Indigo-Jones would assuage their feeling to a great extent. In fact he expected the ratings to contact the new Commanding Officer and inform him of 'exactly what their grievances and complaints were'. But contrary to this expectation they appeared to be extremely unhappy with Capt. Indigo-Jones' appointment as their CO. Th~ ratings knew his antecedents: he was another officer known for his anti-Indian sentiments. According to Helmes, a rating, Capt. lnigo-Jones was so ruthless in penalizing men that he came to be known as the 'butcher of the RIN'.64 He it was who had mercilessly suppressed a similar outbreak at the Mechanical Training Establishment earlier. Capt. Inigo-Jones was fully aware of the ratings' sentiment, as he stated before the Talwar Board: 'I do not think that they had a great deal of confidence in me'. 'One of .. [their] demands', he learnt soon, 'was that Lieut. Comdr. Cole. should be reappointed their Commanding Officer'.6S From the upper-deck point of view matters went from bad to worse. III
By the evening of 18 February the strike begun by Talwar ratings was joined in by almost all communication offices and stations in and around Bombay, namely, the Remote Control Office which was the most important branch of RIN for its day-to-day administration, the Central Communication Office which handled all signal traffic for naval authorities in Bombay, the Colaba Station which was a wireless receiving centre, and the Dockyard Signal Station. Next day noon the Mahul WIT Station in Trombay, 14 miles away from Bombay, which housed all naval wireless transmitters, went on strike. As a result there was considerable· dislocation in official channels of communication. Signal traffic had to be minimized and in some cases all communication suspended. The RIN authorities tried to man all communication establishments, except DSS, by RN ratings. But the latter proved incapable of handling this
'Silence' Broken
79
specialized job. The Dockyard Signal Station was partially immobilized and had to be left in the hands of strikers and the Central Communication Office was later closed and abandoned. Overnight the lower-deck personnel appeared to have changed beyond recognition. Comdr. S.G. Karmarkar told the Talwar Board: the ratings would not 'see reason'; they 'behaved disrespectfully towards officers' and 'disobeYf"d orders'.66 At the 19th morning meeting with FOB and other officers, 'it was marked' by the new CO, Capt. Inigo-Jones 'the word "sir" was nevl!r used' by the ratings. The latter 'behaved as if it were a discussion between men and not between ratings and officers'.67 The meeting began shortly after FOB's arrival around 9.30 a.m. and was continually interrupted by the 'unruly parties' of ratings which started arriving in from other establishments in hundreds, shouting 'Quit India', 'Down with Imperialism', 'Jai Hind' slogans, waving flags of Congress or Muslim League or whatever they could lay their hands on, and armed with sticks. The ratings from outside 'were received at the gate by a howling mob from Talwar', and addressed by the Strike Committee members.68 To the annoyance of naval officers the latter came out of the meeting several times to explain their stand to the new corners. The ratings' representatives at the meeting with FOB demanded protection of all the strikers from victimization; release of Tel. R.K. Singh confined in the Arthur road prison for his open protest against ill-treatment by officers; speedy demobilization according to age and service groups; immediate disciplinary action against Comdr. King for his inhuman behaviour and vulgar ll'.nguage; RN scale of pay, family allowance, travelling facilities and access to NAAFI canteens; permission to retain clothing kit at the time of release; immediate grant of more gratuity and treasury pay to the men being released; quick regular promotion to higher ranks and cessation of officer recruitment from abroad; and a new CO for Ta/war, specifically, the reappointment of Lieut. Comdr. Cole. In addition the strikers' representatives protested against the detention of political leaders including INA personnel like Capt. Rashid, firing on public all over the country and retention of Indian troops iri Indonesia and the middle east. Above all the ratings present at the meetit;lg insisted that all their demands 'are to be decided by the authorities concerned through the nationalleader'who would be named by 1700 hours.(/} As noted earlier, they wanted Aruna Asaf Ali to negotiate for them.
80
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in tlte RIN Uprising of February 1946
On the other hand, FOB tried to assure them that their grievances would be looked into and those beyond his power to redress forwarded to NHQ. An attempt was made by the naval officers present to make strike leaders see the 'folly' of their action and the magnitude of the danger. The former expected the latter to trust them, give up the idea of drawing in outsiders to meddle in affairs which were after all theirs own, and call off the strike. Both during the 'mutiny' and afterwards some of these leaders appeared to Comdr. Karmarkar 'bloody-minded' and distrustful of all officers, European and Indian. 'Their distrust was so great that they called all Indian officers traitors and ... refused to listen to any logical proposal put .. -.., forward by me', added Comdr. Karmarkar.70 During the whole of 19 February as on the previous day the ratings were in command in Talwar. All semblance of upper-deck authority vanished. The strikers moved about freely, and the sentries posted by the local strike committee controlled their exit at the gates. A number of Talwar ratings joined in a procession with the men from other establishments and paraded the streets of Bombay. Naval transport was used by lower-deck personnel whenever required. In the morning the White Ensign, symbol of British authority, was removed by the ratings. From Monday afternoon FOB maintained close contact with Colville, Governor, Major General Beard, Area Commander and the Commissioner of Police and kept constll.nt watch over the situation. On Tuesday he came twice to the establishment, last time accompanied by the Area Commander and the Commissioner of Police. As things seemed drifting, they decided to post military ·pickets at (!ertain positions outside the establishment. Around 2.30 p.m. next day, the 20th, military guards were brought in and posted at 'preconsidered positions'. The guard commander ordered the gates to be closed. The intention clearly was to prevent the free exit of strikers from Talwar and reestablish the barriers, on the one hand, between this establi$hment and others and, on the other, between its barracks and the civvy streets. But far from fulfilling this purpose the deployment of troops touched off the 'outburst of feelings', admitted Comdr. Karmarkar. The ratings turned furious. They resented their being confined to the barracks and interned like prisoners. The ratings remembered what had happened in the
'Silence' Broken
81
Mechanical Training Establishment earlier and were bent upon preventing its repetition here. 'The already frayed tempers, and the seed of mob hysteria grew up, and the balloon went up'. The ratings inside Talwar adopted a threatenir.g attitude and attempted to rush towards the gate and break through it. 'It was a case of touch and go'. The officers present there tried to persuade the ratings to remain inside for their 'safety' and 'security'. Attempt was made by some to explain the reasons behind army deployment and the policy of C-in-C. The explanation offered was not only 'misbelieved' but Comdr. Karmarkar among others who were trying to keep the ratings inside 'was called a traitor - a bastard (colour grey eyes) and a perfect shit', 'doing all this to get another stripe'?1 The ratings indeed had no good word for the Indian officers after they were found to have acquiesced in the deployment of military guards. They demanded that the gates ~ust be left open and military guards in front of .them be removed. After some time the gates were thrown open and sentries placed out of view. In reply to a question by the Talwar Board Capt. Inigo-Jones said that after the deployment of military guards 'traffic or communication of ratings over the walls with ... outside organizations, press or public' started.72 In the evening naval transports were used to return the ratings from outside to their individual ships and establishments. The strikers maintained full control over the establishment. Next morning the situation turned explosive. Around 9.30 a.m. the military guards opened fire on the ratings trying to force their way out of Castle Barracks. This was immediately replied to by the ratings from inside the barracks. Orders to ships in the harbour to get ready for action were transmitted from Tqlwar. CPO Tel. Mohammed Hanif originated the message to HMIS Narbada to stand by to open fire. All ships were instructed to raise steam and load their guns. The message passed from one ship to another through visual signal. Attrmpt by officers to get near the communication equipment room was foiled by the ratings who blocked their passage. Later in the afternoon it was found that R/T and WIT equipments were being used to communicate with ships and establishments which had receiving sets A second attempt was made to put the communication equipment out of commission but this proved impossible.?3 Soon after the gunbattle commenced at Castles Ldg. Sig. M.S.
82
Revisiting Talwar: A Study ill the RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946
Soon after the gunbattle commenced at Castles Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan and two other members of the Naval Central Strike Committee left for the 'trouble-spot'. Till late in the evening they did not return, and the Talwar ratings were restless. Meanwhile a signal from FOB promising certain food items like fruit, cake and jam for men reached the establishment?4 Immediately Capt. Inigo-.T ones spoke to a member (with pockmarked face) of NCSC in Talwar and pleaded, 'now that you have got ... the rations you asked [or and you have been informed that a full and impartial enquiry would be held into the alleged grievances against Comdr. King ... you [should] ... stop all this trouble and make everybody return to duty'. The reply from the strike leader was clear 'no'. He added: 'This is impossible at this stage. Things had gone too far, we must carry on'.15 In fact FOCRIN's ultimatum to the ratings for an unconditional surrender broadcast from the Bombay AIR Station had a devastating impact on the lower deck: his threat to destroy the entire navy in case of their refusal to submit enraged the ratings.76 The firing on Castles followed by ViceAdmiral Godfrey's threat appeared to have made the men all the more determined to carry on the struggle through to the end and face the worst. The naval elite's 'carrot and stick' tactic seemed to have failed. At about 11.30 a.m. Friday, the 22nd, FOCRIN came down to Talwar and stayed outside its gate. He called Capt. Inigo-.Tones and, on a hurried consultation with him, aimounced that the latter· was going to be replaced by Comdr. Karmarkar as CO of Ta/war. Lieut. Comdr. Lisle-Taylor who was well known for his anti-Indian feeling was advised to leave the establishment, as his presence, it was feared, might aggravate the situation.77 Vice-Admiral Godfrey thought that this change in command met still another demand of the ratings, viz. the appointment of a new CO for the establishment. But far from it. The ratings wanted Lieut. Comdr. Cole and not Comdr~ Karmarkar as their CO. It has already been noted what opinion the ratings had about the Indian officers. Comdr. Karmarkar, like Capt. Inigo-Jones' predecessor, received severe warnings fr0111 them. The former admitted in his evidence before the RIN Commission: 'I was told that if I did not behave as the ratings wanted my life would not be worth living ... they would make ... another Commander King out of me. Take heed; otherwise we will kill you'.18 The ratings gave these warnings for the 'safety' of his life as well as for that of 'Hinclust.an's
'Silence' Broken
83
'guardian' if he left 'the way of getting excited by the white dogs' instructions' . Now ... try to think your Indian and don't be misled to be a second King to be kicked out of this establishment. Behave Normally and try to put an example to other Indian officers and in the event of that we will keep you on our head but on the contrary we will not allow you to live in this world with such a cowardise mentality, when we are looking the fine dawn of "AZADI".'J9
* HMIS Talwar began the strike and remained its headquarters till the lower deck surrendered on 23 February. Initially the establishment was the 'storm-centre'. Later it shifted to Castles in Bombay and Hindustan in Karachi. At one point of time HMIS Narbada, the flagship of RIN, became a convenient site for operational purpose. The example set by the Signal School was emulated by the ratings aboard almost every ship at anchor or on sea and establishment ashore at home or abroad. To the utter surprise of the naval elite the lower-deck personnel established their authority over almost all the urus of the navy in an amazingly short time. Everywhere they sought redress for their grievances. The actions they initiated were intended to put an end to their sufferings on account of bad food and uncomfortable accommodation, lack of minimum facilities and post-retirement benefits, racial discrimination and ill-treatment, in short, an oppressive and unjust system. These were a clear reflection of their will to work with honour and dignity, with freed"Om from privation and misery. The end of foreign domination over the service along with that over the country was supposed to mark the establishment of a national navy in which there would be no oppression and regimentation, inequality and injustice. This expectation was bound up with their perception of a breakdown of British authority and 'dawn of Azadi' in the country the signs of which seemed visible all round them, in the strikes in armed forces and the mass upsurges over INA trials coupled with political rhetoric and exuberance. Notes and References. 1.
In naval parlance even shore establishments were referred to as ships. They were regarded as 'ships' on land.
84
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
2.
Section n, File No. NL 9930.
3.
Exhibit Al: Report by Comdr. F.W. King, ibid..
4.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 476.
5.
Exhibit Bl: Report on Grievances and Causes by Comdr. ·S.G. Karmarkar, File No. NL 9930.
6.
Exhibit Dl: From CO to FOB, 1 December 1945, ibid.
7.
ibid.
8.
Exhibit B 3: Repo:t on Initial Causes by Lieut. Comdr. Lisle-Taylor, File No. NL 9930.
9.
ibid.
10.
ibid.
11.
ibid.
12.
12th Witness: Lieut. H.L. Verma, File No. NL 9930. In his evidence as -a defence witness before the Court Martial trying Comdr. King Lieut. Verma said that as instructed by CO to lay a trap and catch someone, he traced his 'missing' gum bottle in Dutt's locker and arrested him on the morning of 2 February. 'As I had received previous instructions from Comdr. King ... I called the Petty Officer on duty to make hourly rounds and saw in the darkness someone moving in white shirt, near the Hawkins Barracks. Next morning when I found my gum bottle also missing, that made me suspect Dutt, as I had seen him on the previous evening in white shirt .... When I went to search the Hawkins Barracks I found the gum bottle together with some other papers in his possession.'. FP!, 17 July 1946. Thus Lieut. Verma . who was a Volunteer Reserve Officer and yet. to get permanent commission carried out Comdr. King's instruction possibly to please him. P.N. Nair, 'The RIN Mutiny in Retrospecr, FP!, 18 February 1947.
13.
1st Witness: Comdr. F.w. King, File No. NL 9930.
14.
The following were the documents found in Dutt's locker: 2 diaries, 'Indian Mutiny' by Asoke Mehta, a receipt from INA Release Fund, 'Azad Hindi Pledge', a poster from the Secretary of the Ex-Services Association (with which some ex-navy personnel like Lieut. P.N. Nair and Y.K. Menon were connected), 2 English letters between Dev and himself, 2 Bengali letters from Nab Kumar Sait, a pamphlet entitled 'Thought for the Day', 'Important Speeches of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru' and 'Communist Answer to Congress Charges'. No clear evidence as to Dutt's contact with any subversive organization was found either by the board of enquiry investigating into the slogan-writing incident on the eve of FOCRIN's inspection or by the one into the 'mutiny' in Ta/war. Sections IV and IX, ibid.
'Silence' Broken 15. 16.
17. 18. 19.
85
Exhibit A 2: Letter to Comdr. King, ibid. Exhibits C 3-16: Complaints by 14 Ratings, ibid. Also BW 25: M.G.K. Moorthy and BW 31: Rodrigues, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vo!. I, pp. 310 and 416; BW 43-47: Jabbar, Naidu, Krishnan, Swami and David and BW 52-56: Edwards, Baskaran, Raju, Shekar and Solomon, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vo!. Il, pp. 503 ff and 544 ff. Exhibit A 1: Report by Comdr. King, File No. NL 9930. RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 479. BW 31: Rodrigues, op.cit., p. 416 and BW 55: Shekar, op.cit., pp. 5467.
20. 21. 22. 23.
24.
25.
26. 27.
28. 29. 30.
Exhibit C 1: letter from Lieut. Comdr. Shaw to the CO, HMIS TALWAR, 10 February 1946, File No. NL9930. RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, pp. 481, 486. 1st Witness: Comdr. King, File No. NL 9930. This implication can be drawn from Judge-Advocate Lecoque's question and Lieut. M.P. Singh's answer. BW 27: Lieut. Mahendra Pal Singh, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vo!. I, p. 358. 7th Witness: Lieut. Shaw, File No. NL 9930. 6th Witness: Lieut. S.M. Nanda, ibid. In an effort to modify his earlier statement in the light of what had been said by Comdr. King Lieut. Nanda added that CO used bad language in the course of his conversation with fellow officers which 'was mo~tIy of a friendly character'. 'I have never heard Comdr. King using bad language in front of the ratings'. Besides 'in the navy the expression of words "bloody" or "bugger" or something like that does not mean very much. No meaning is attached and quite a number of officers use these words'. BW 85: Nanda, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vo!. Il, pp. 970-1, 973. 5th Witness: Lieut. S.N. Kohli, File No .. NL 9930. BW 84: Comdr. King, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vo!. Il, pp. 962 ff. On the basis of evidence before it the Talwar Board, however, arrived at the conclusion: 'Comdr. King was in the habit of using bad language without appearing to realize that he was doing so ... and ... in discussion of the incident with officers later on he referred to the ratings in similar terms. The Board is satisfied that he did use these terms at the discussion and the fact that he denies this seems to bear out the suggestion that he is unaware of using such language.' Section VII, File No. NL 9930. 6th Witness: Lieut. Nanda, ibid. 7th Witness: Lieut. Comdr. Shaw, ibid. BW 25: M.G.K. Moorthy, op.cit., p. 309.
th~
86
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in
RlN Uprising of February 1946
31.
6th Witness: Lieut. Nanda, File No. NL 9930. In his evidence before the RIN Commission Lieut. Nanda said that Comdr. King took up an attitude which appeared to be a threatening one. 'To my mind it appears that the ratings took it to be a threatening attitude, and it was a wrong thing that the ratings did so. But their frame of mind was such that they could not have taken it differently at that time'. 'As an official I knew that it was a service procedure to warn- a rating that the consequences of making a false complaint against officer would be serious.' BW 85: Lieut. Nanda, op. cit., pp. 975-6.
32.
Exhibit B4: Report from Lieut. Kohli and Lieut. Nanda on the Mutiny in HMIS TALWAR, File No. NL 9930.
33.
BW 83: Lieut. Sachdev, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. n, pp. 905-6.
34.
In fact the grievances of ratings relating to various matters including food were duly emphasized in the quarterly morale reports rendered by HMIS Ta/war. Thp. authorities evidently failed to grasp the seriousness of their complaints as no timely or effective measures were taken to remove these grievances. Instead these reports formed an object of 'ridicule' in NHQ, as Lieut. Sachdev was told by Lieut. Comdr. Cole before he left Ta/war. The reports so submitted went from one officer to another, and all that was said was that 'he was a fool'. ibid., pp. 900-1.
35.
Signal from Lieut. Batra, OOW to the Victualling Officer (R), EO and Welfare Officer, attached to Exhibit Al, File No. NL 9930. Batra wrote the message at about '8 p.m. on the 17th, stating the incident and asking for an immediate mess meeting. This message was handed over to Lieut. Kohli at 7.40 a.m. on the 18th. BW 81: Lieut. Batra, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. n, p. 872.
36.
1st Witness: Comdr. King, ibid.
37.
BW 84: Comdr. King, op.cit, p. 942.
38.
ibid., p. 950.
39.
ibid., p. 954.
40.
Exhibit A1: Report by Comdr. King, File No. NL 9930.
41.
BW 84: Comdr. King, op.cit., p. 947,
42.
ibid., pp. 951, 952, 953. When asked whether he thought that 'people from outside had put up certain people inside the establishment ... the outside people- revolutionaries from outside - excited certain revolutionaries inside the establishment to bring about this mutiny', Comdr. King answered in the affirmative. ibid., p. 958.
43.
Exhibit B4 : Report from Lieut. Kohli and Lieut. Nanda, File No. NL 9930.
'Silence' Broken
87
44.
BW 83: Lieut. S.N. Sachdev, op.cit., p. 906.
45.
1st Witness: Comdr. King, File No. NL 9930.
46.
Exhibit Al: Report by Comdr. King, ibid.
47.
69th Witness: Rear Admiral A.R. Rattray, ibid.
48.
Lieut. Comdr. Shaw sent a copy of his letter to Comdr. King to the Chief Staff Officer, and FOB must have come to know of this incident of the 8th February soon after it happened. Exhibit Cl: Letter from Lieut. Comdr. Shaw to the CO, HMIS TALWAR, 10 February 1946, Copy to CSO, ibid.
49.
7th Witness: Lieut. Comdr. Shaw, ibid.
50.
For further details see Section I, Chapter 8 below.
51.
BW 59: Dutt, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol.
52.
BW 84: Comdr. King, op. cit., pp. 954-5.
53.
Comdr. King in his evidence before the RIN Commission said: 'I took really no action about Dutt's case.' His intention was not to punish him but to extract maximum possible information. For that purpose a board of enquiry was appointed. He said to Dutt: 'I do not think it will be necessary to punish you or send you to Andamans and make you a criminal'. Though Dutt 'was caught with all ... evidence', Comdr. King only recommended his discharge without 'disgrace'. ibid. Also BW 59: Dutt, op.cit., p. 567.
54.
Comdr. King had a very high opinion about Dutt: the latter 'had more than average intelligence'. He was a 'very clever man' and 'would do credit' to any navy. Dutt was an 'honest, good man' led astray by 'some revolutionary organization'. If officers had been able to give him proper guidance he would have proved an 'excellent rating'. Comdr. King hoped he 'would be able to get hold of Dutt and make him into a good naval rating' but could not. He was 'sorry to see him leave'. JUst as Dutt wanted to continue in the navy, so also Comdr. King wished him to do so but 'circumstances' stood in the way. 16th Witness: Comdr. King, File No. 9930 and BW 84: Comdr. King, op.cit., pp. 947-8, 955-6.
n, pp. 792-3.
A day or two before the slogan-writing incident Dutt saw Lieut. Batra, Officer of the Division to which he belonged, for getting his application for commission forwarded and recommended. As he did not know him well or had no idea about his performance Lieut. Batra gave him 'an ordinary report'. Dissatisfied with it Dutt pleaded with the Welfare Officer, Lieut. Sachdev for stronger recommendation. On the latter's suggestion and consultation with Lieut. Cooper, Officerin-Charge of the Watch~Keeping class·to which Dutt was attached,
88
55.
56. 57.
58. 59.
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 Lieut Batra gave him a 'satisfactory', rather an 'above average' report. BW 81: Lieut. Batra, op.cit., p. 880. Lieut. Nanda had a long talk with Dutt after his arrest. The latter lamented that he had served the government faithfully, and now he was going to be thrown out of the service with 'little prospect of civilian employment'. 13th Witness: Lieut Nanda, File No. 9930. BW 59: Dutt, op.cit., pp. 792-4. Also Exhibit Ai: Report by Comdr. King, File No. NL 9930. When Dutt was contacted by Comdr. King in the afternoon of t)1e day the mutiny broke out, the fornier said that he had nothing to do with the trouble. The 'mutiny' started in spite of himself, against his wishes. He could not 'be happy' with any rebellion in the armed forces. BW 59: Dutt, op.cit., pp. 743, 792, 794-5. When asked by the Talwar Board 'if you had known that there was a possibility of a mutiny breaking out would you have tried to stop' it', Dutt replied 'I would have informed my immediate senior officer about it'. In response to the question 'do you consider that the men were justified from the complaints they had in taking this extreme step' he said: 'The mutiny was not justified at all'. 21st Witness: Dutt, File No. NL 9930. In addjtion he did not agree with many of the ratings' demands. In reply to the question 'do you believe in the fact that your pay should be the same as that of the RN' Dutt answered: 'No, I do not believe that'. On the point of 'Indianization' of the service he observed that 'as far as training is concerned there should be European officer'. 24th Witness: Dutt, ibid. Quite a large number of ratings faced more serious charges of mutiny than did Dutt but hardly anyone made remarks so damaging to all that the lower deck stood for as the ones above. 16th Witness: Comdr. King, op.cit. RIN Mutiny Sr. No.6, pp. 489, 494. While the RIN Mutiny Enquiry Commission found Comdr. King guilty of both abusing the ratings and failing to investigate their complaints at once, the Court Martial trying ·the officer acquitted him of the first charge and found him guilty of the second. The Defence Counsel, Capt. M.H. Nott, Chief Staff Officer to FOB, described the charges against Comdr. King as 'a trumped-up allegation and a frame-up committed by dupes for political motives, by young immature men led astray by unscrupulous persons'. FP!, 18 July 1946. . Exhibit B6: Report of Lieut (S). RF. Meredith, File No. NL 9930. 6th witness: Lieut Nanda and 54th Witness: Ldg. Tel. Madan Singh, ibid. Ldg. Tel Dutt said: 'If I were Commander King, I would have finished the matter in the morning itself definitely. Commander King
'Silence' Broken
89
63.
finished the matter ~n the morning itself definitely. Commander King did practically nothing, as far as I know. He never went to the boys. He could have called the boys and apologized to them for what he had said. He could have done anything about food. This matter would not have been so much - on such a large scale.' BW 59: Dutt, op.cit., p.794. BW83: Lieut. Sachdev, op.cit., p. 906. Quoted by Lieut. Sachdev, ibid., p. 903. All the three were rewarded, in a sense, for their service to the higher authorities. Lieut. Kohli was promoted to Lieutenant Commandership and Lieut. Nanda who belonged to RINVR was awarded permanent commission.P.N. Nair, op.cit. Ldg. Tel. Dutt was spared from the ordeal of court-martial proceedings. He was tried byComdr. King, and could have been punished seVerely but that was not done. He was only discharged from the service and eventhat without disgrace. 69th Witness: Rear Admiral Rattray, File No. NL 9930.
64. 65. 66. 67. 68.
Witness 16: Helmes, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 149. 2nd Witness: Capt. Inigo-Jones, File No. NL 9930. 3rd Witness: Comdr. S.G. Karmarkar, ibid. 2nd Witness: Capt. Inigo-Jones, ibid. Exhibit B2: Report of Comdr. Karmarkar, ibid.
69.
Exhibit B8: Minutes of the Meeting at 0938, 19 February in Ship's Office, ibid.
70. 71.
Exhibit B2: Report of Comdr. Karmarkar, ibid. ibid.
72. 73.
2nd Wi~ness: Capt. Inigo-Jones, File No. NL 9930. 3rd Witness: Comdr. Karmarkar, ibid.
74. 75.
Next day the 22nd the signal authorizing the issue of additional rations were cancelled. RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 517. 2nd Witness: Capt. lnigo-Jones, File No. NL 9930.
76.
BW 72: Ahmed, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. Il, p. 608.
77.
BW 77: Lieut. K.W. Hasan, ibid., p. 805; BW 78: Comdr. Karmarkar, ibid., pp. 840-1 and Sub-Lieut. TA Tousif Lodhi, RIN Mutiny Sr. No.
78. 79.
BW 78: Comdr. Karmarkar, op.cit., p. 827. Exhibit B16: From RIN Ratings to Comdr. Karmarkar, File No. NL 9930.
60. 61. 62.
13.
4 AGGRIEVED LOWER DECK
The Commander King incident was one of the constituents of its context, perhaps the most important of them, but by no means the 'only real cause' of the 'mutiny' as some officers would have us believe. His removal as CO of HMIS Talwar on the evening of 18 February could not put out the fire lit that morning. Ofthe demands that the lower-deck representatives placed before FOB at the 19th morning meeting only one related to this incident and the rest to the grievances rooted deep in the ratings' cOliditions in RIN. The postwar· mass upsurges or related propaganda by nationalist leaders and press to which many in the upper deck attributed the rebellion certainly contributed to forming the background in which it made its appearance. But nothing more. Even in the absence of such external stimuli 'abnormal numbers' of ratings deserted the service in the war years, and many acts of 'collective. disobedience' broke out aboard individual ships and establishments both during the period and before. Discontent was rife in RIN, and the ratings' grievances had been accumulating for some time. This was not unknown to the authorities but no action was taken to remove dissatisfaction among the men and defuse tension mounting owing to it. As soon as the Talwar upsurge began, the ratings of almost all other units were part of it. For they had so much in common against the conditions in RIN. Neither the Commander King phenomenon nor the'extraneous causes' in: reference could singly or collectively unite the men of different communities from different parts of the country as they actually did combine in the 'mutiny'. The explanation for this remarkable cohesion has to be sought in the lower ranks' conditions in the navy. I
The masses of ratings were recruited in the service on promises of interesting job and good food, attractive pay and comfortable accommodation, rapid promotion and a bright future. One such rat-
Aggrieved Lower Deck
91
ing stated. before the RIN Enquiry Commission: 'The Recruiting Officer told me that it is a very good job and that in 15 years I would become an Admiral. He said: "You will travel in first class and then you will have plenty of leave facilities. As the name indicates 'Royal Indian Navy' you will have a royallife".'l The young impressionable recruits could hardly guess that.none of these promises was intended to be fulfilled. Later they expressed their resentment at the frauds perpetrated on them by the recruiting agents for commission.2 The charge they brought against the latter, that of wilful misrepresentation of facts vitally important to them, was corroborated· by the statements of FOCRIN and a number of his subordinate officers and, above all, by the recruitment literature and propaganda materials. The average rating felt that he was let down by the authorities. He was enticed into the service by the 'glowing tale' of life in RIN. In fact all possible methods, from attractive posters to systematic deception, were used for recruitment. Much of the recruitment propaganda was conducted on the lines of 'join the navy and secure yourself a post-war job' or 'join the navy and learn a job for after war'. True in the text of such advertisement no specific promise was made but it definitely held out the prospect of post-war employment. Recruitment posters, pamphlets and booklets of the war years indeed had the effect of making specific representations and suggestions to the recruits on important m:atters relating to the conditions of life and career in the navy. To take a few examples: One poster contains the picture of a sailor on guard. On the margin it is written among other things: 'Many hundreds of young m~m are today building their career in the navy'. Another poster appeals to the parents: 'Let ... [your son] join the RIN ... Give him your blessing. The navy will give your son a healthy open-air life with good fellowship, good pay and plenty of food and good clothes. He Will meet the best of his countrymen and be a real man. The RIN has a great tradition and a glorious future. Let him join up'. There are 13 pictures of a recruit in various stages from his entry into the service to his· going home on leave. The significance of this poster could not have been missed by the prospective recruit and his par" ents or family. He would have a fine career in the navy, a navy not likely to be wound up at the cessation of hostilities. A youth in his
92
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
. ' teens is expected to· become a real man during four or five years of temporary service. Facilities for leave-travel are also hinted at. It is added that as he has few expenses to meet, the recruit would be able to save most of his pay. On the reverse side of the poster are the words written at the top: 'A sailor's life is a happy one.' Pictures of seven days' rations and of articles of clothing for a rating are shown prominently. The picture concludes that initial pay would be around Ri;. 40-60 per month, depending on the branch of the service plus 'many allowances? Included among pamphlets is one issued in 1943 under the title 'The Story of Kishore and Khalil'. It contains the pictures of Kishore, a rating in naval uniform, and Khalil, his friend in civilian dress. The story is told in the form of a dialogue. Kishore, a lawyer's son, ran away from home and joined the navy as a communication rating on a monthly pay of Rs. 60. He has come back home on leave and met Khalil in a cinema hall. The latter is advised to join as an artificer and earn Rs. 40 more. Later Kishore tells his parents about the service in RIN and its advantages. Both try to persuade them to agree. Khalil's father tells his son that the present war would not continue for long and as soon as it is over, he would be asked to leave. Khalil replies: 'No, sir, the contract is for ten years and it is believed that after the period is over, a great majority would be retain~d in the permanent service. I have seen an article in a newspaper saying that India has a coastline of 4,000 miles and it must have an adequate navy'. In reply to a further query from his father Khalil added: 'I believe the pay goes up to Rs. 460 p.m.'.4 Parents and their wards here are given to understand that a recruit would have a 'good' career in the navy least likely to terminate with the war. His pay as an artificer rises quickly from monthly amount of Rs. 90 to Rs. 460. Facilities for good food, vegetarian and non-vegetarian, are available. 'Officers are sympathetic and helpful? Kishore left home without his father's consent and now feels happy. He is very much fond of the service. By implication other teenagers can do the same thing and benefit themselves. Otherwise they might lose the opportunity of an attractive career in the navy. It is doubtful whether the actual position was ever explained to short-service ratings who were taken in on a five-year contract.· In any case many left their schools or colleges and native, places, signed contract on the strength of assurances like the ones here and ruined their careers.
Aggrieved Lower Deck
93
A booklet entitled 'The Navy and its Jobs' opens with the statement: 'The Royal Indian Navy is moulded on the lines of the Royal Navy because without exception the Royal Navy is the oldest, the most efficient and the finest fighting service in the world.'6 The passage recurs in many other booklets, and it is hardly surprising that RIN ratings relied among others on this statement for their demands for pay, promotion, treatment and other facilities same as to those of RN personnel. Another booklet called 'India's Navy' sets out first the duties of seamen, stokers, artificers and shipwrights, ratings of communication, accounts and medical branches separately, and then the terms and conditions of service for such personnel. Notably, except for seamen, duties of 'disagreeable character' were not included among those of even artificers and shipwrights. That part of the booklet which deals with the futurj;of special service ratings may seem ambiguous but, read with <;l~:rt;1 parts regarding advancement, definitely conveys the impression to a recruit that he can stay on with good prospect of promotion and qualify for a pension. If this booklet is considered together With other posters and pamphlets which promise a fine career in a fast-growing navy with a 'glorious' future, this impression would be confirmed. In fact recruitment literature such as the one above makes a special appeal to smart, intelligent young men who have passed the matriculation or equivalent examination or studied up to a similar standard to enrol in the communication and engineering branches of RIN. Of these branches communication is said to be the eyes and ears of the navy. It offers training in visual signalling and wireless telegraphy, training which would be of great value after the termination of the war. For ordinary signalmen or telegraphists the starting monthly pay would be Rs. 60 and for CPO Tel. or Chief Yeoman of Signal Rs. 110. For Radio Mechanic it would be Rs. 90 and (or Chief Radio Mechanic Rs. 180. 'Opportunities exist for promotion to Warrant Ranks'. On promotion to such ranks the initial rate of pay would be around Rs. 300 and rise to Rs. 460 p.m. and Rs. 2 would be given in lieu of ration while serving afloat. One poster addressed to intelligent young men says: 'there are good opportunities ... for you in the RIN ... It will pay you well and train you at the same time .... Interesting work, good pay and excellent prospects ... Free food,
94
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
clothing, accommodation and medical attendance',1 With regard to communication ratings a pictorial pamphlet adds: 'The Wireless Operators ... are the men upon whom vital communication depends. The Communication Branch provides an invisible link between ship and ship and between ship and shore, and the link with the future (in letters underlined), promotion (in big letters) is quick for keen intelligent men. Ratings who display a high sense of responsibility and leadership may be selected for commissioned ranks'.8 Still another poster says: 'Permanent careers in the RIN. Earn while you learn. Promotions to Warrant ... and Commissioned· ranks .... Pay during training at Civil Naval Centre, Pilani - Rs. 70 and all found. Pay :luring advanced training - Rs. 100 - rising to Rs. 250 and all found.'9 A special service rating was thus led to believe in the prospect )f his promotion to warrant and even commissioned rank. It was lever disclosed to him that Within his short tenure of service he ~ould not even rise to the status of a CPO. II
Lured by promises as above thousands of young men walked into the trap. Many were disappointed on their first encounter With the service. As Leading Signalman M.S. Khan, President of the Naval Central Strike Committee, said in his evidence before the RIN Commission: 'I did not like the service from the very day I stepped into the Department'.lO The experience of the great majority of ratings belied the 'extremely rosy pictures' drawn by recruiting agents about the conditions of lower-deck life in the navy. The promised land of 'milk and honey' appeared to be a veritable hell. Deliberate lies and misrepresentations led to discontent among men, soon after they joined. In protest some deserted and some others refused orders or resorted to hunger strike on individual ships and establishments. In consequence mass arrests, court martial, imprisonment and dismissal With disgrace followed. Both oral and documentary evidence establishes beyond doubt the truth in ratings' complaints that they were deceived about the duties they would be required to perform, duties (encompassed by the umbrella term 'clean ship') such as sweeping decks, cleaning utensils and lavatories, giving officers personal service and acting as
Aggrieved Lower Deck
95
messengers or errand boys. The men recruited for technical :work were led to believe that their duties would be strictly confmed to it. The recruiting agents argued that if the actual nature of duties was made known, none would join the technical branches. Hence the justification for misrepresentation. As the 'clean ship' was not among the duties of even artificers or shipwright~, they felt irrepressibly aggrieved on being asked to do it. Some refused such duty and were punished; others felt helpless at the moment and did w~at they were ordered to against their will and with· 'bad grace'. In referring to the recruitment muddle· Lieut. M.RA. Rao said: 'In some cases men were actually led by their hands and made to put their thumb impression on a piece of paper which led them into virtual bondage as topasses.'l1 These rates were mostly Hindus and quite a few belonged to the upper castes. Ordered to· do the duties of scavengers aboard ships and establishments some deserted and were later caught and sent to jaiJ.12 Besides a number of ratings,both Hindu and Muslim, complained of misinformation about messing arrangements and grumbled over food cooked in common galley. Serious though these grievances were and led to 'breaches of discipline' on several occasions during the war years, complaints about food and pay, leave and travel facility, medical care and canteen stores; promotion and pension, demobilization and resettlement were more general and widespread.
* Historically food had been a potential source of discontent among service personnel deprived of much of home comfort. Especially in RIN it was an explosive issue. Evidence of this, both oral and documentary, is voluminous and overwhelming. Witness after witness appeared before the RIN Commission and narrated his tale of woe. A number of officers in their correspondence before the 'mutiny' and statements to the Commission admitted the truth in the ratings' complaints over ,food.' At the time of enrolment men were promised good food but what was served in the lower-deck messes, far from being so, failed to satisfy them. One gave expression to his bitterness: What is the use of service if we cannot get food properly? Let us be shot if we do not work as disciplined soldiers and sailors, but let us be given good foodY
96
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of FeblUary 1946
In their messes and mess meetings men often complained about the quality and amount of food. Seldom did the authorities take note of it. Some ratings protested. Refusal on their part to take bad food, from the upper-deck point of view, was an offence, and they were punished. 14 Others put up with it with the expectation that once the war was over, the situation would improve. The war came to an end but the food got only worse, and grievances over it began to mount up. Many of the higher-ups were aware of the discontent but very few, if any, seemed to have an ~dea of the seriousness of the situation that had almost reached a breaking point. Officers, on the spot, when approached by ratings, were deaf to their complaints, and frequently adopted an attitude which, even Lieut. Nanda had to admit, was at best callous. The standard reply was: 'Nothing could be done' or 'when you get out of the service you will not even get this.'15 Quite a number of officers in fact held that the food in RIN messes was far superior to what the ratings were accustomed to.16 Some refused to listen to their complaints and if they did at all, it was done very rudely. When a rating of HMIS Rajputana made, in the proper service manner, a complaint about the bad quality of food, the CO shouted at him 'you think yourself a bloody King Kong' .17 Another got the reply from his officer: 'You son of a monkey, you talk too much. If you do not want this kind of food, why do you join the navy?,18 Still another was warned, 'Don't report about these rubbish things.' 'If you complain about food again, I will consider it a mutiny.'19 Sympathetic colleagues were told not to 'pamper' the 'boys and buttlers' who were far better fed than they could ever expect outside. The pre-war ration scale for Indians consisted largely of aUa or rice, dal and potatoes. It was supplemented by a messing allowance of ten annas per man per month. The rate for British troops was six annas per man per diem. The ration for them was made tip of approximately 16 ozs. each of bread, bee~ and milk, 8 ozs.of vegetables, 10 ozs. of potatoes and 4 ozs. of onions, in addition to sufficient sugar, salt and tea. All that was given to Indians by way of free ration was approximately 24 ozs. of atta or rice, 3 ozs. of dal, 2 ozs. of potatoes, 20zs of ghee (milk), 1Yz ozs. of sugar and Yz oz. of salt. The difference in the rates of messing allowance is too obvious to need any comment. The same is true of the ration scales. The British troops in India were brought on to a full field service scale in Octo-
Aggrieved Lower Deck
97
ber 1942. But the government did not make any such dispensation for their Indian counterparts. Only their messing allowance was raised to Rs. 3 per month. The absence of provision for vitamins and proteins in the Indian scale led to the outbreak of deficiency diseases among IORs. A slight upward revision of messing allowance could not help. Eventually the allowance system was abolished and a modified field serVice scale of rations was introduced for Indians. The scale came into effect in July 1943, that is, almost after four years of war. Again in the next year a new standard basic scale of rations was introduced. As shown in table 1 it includes only half the items provided for in the scale for BaRs. It is incomparably poor. In 1945, because of food shortage, especially of cereals, rations for Indians were reduced: an emergency cut of 2 ozs. of cereals and 1Y2 ozs.of dal was imposed. Later in 1946 there was an additional cut of 1 oz. of cereal. The British troops' rations were also reduced,from 4500 to 3600 calories. A cut of 2 to 4 ozs. was imposed on items like bread, meat, vegetables and milk. The difference between the two scales, however, persisted~ The Indian ratings complained of meagre ration, that too of poor quality. The provisions ordinarily required by RIN were atta or flour, rice, dal, meat, vegetables and condiments. Each of these items was unsatisfactory. Before the outbreak of ·hostilities the victualling of RIN was done through contractors at each port chosen for their reliability. This system worked without much trouble till 1941. In fact for the rust two years of the war the danger was remote from India's' shores and the expansion of fighting services was yet to straip. the supply position. But with the progress of the war the situation deteriorated. The demand for food increased sharply with the rapid expansion of the armed services, and contractors were unable to cope with it. Food became difficult to obtain. As the war came closer to India's shores in 1942, the contract system failed in the forward areas. Deliveries to ships were seriously hampered. Rumours of bombing on ports upset the contractors and their men who, in some cases, fled. Under such circumstances RIN called upon the Army for the supply of its needs. The Royal Indian Army Supply Crops took over provisioning for naval requirements from April 1943. Under the new system RIN had to obtain its supply from RIASC and make its own arrangem~nt for distribution to ships and estab-
98
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
lishments. This task was entrusted to Base Victualling Officers. The efficient working of the system depended upon the degree of care ' and diligence exercised by RIASC officers at the time consignments were received by them and by RIN BVOs at the time they drew their quotas. Negligence or indifference at either of these stages (including storage and turnover arrangements) was bound to affect the quality of supplies, and the authorities would argue in self-defence that the accepted provisions were up to standard, whatever their quality really was. Table I Field Service Scale of Rations of British Troops (Cooking) SLNo Articles
Scales
Daily issue 1.
Bacon tinned
or Eggs . 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Beans/peas dried Bread Curry power/baking powder Briqueted almonds and raisins Fresh fruit Fish tired or smoked
8. 9. 10.
Marmalade/golden syrup Margarine unfortified ~ aIt erna te. or . Butter Issue
11. 12, 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.
Meat, fresh Milk, tinned Mustard Oatmeal Onions Hydrogenated oil Pepper Potatoes, fresh Rice Salt Sugar Tea
or Eggs
Ozs.2 Nos.2 O:l;s.l Ozs.14 Ozs.1/30 Ozs.4/7 Ozs.4 Ozs.6/7 Nos.2 Ozs.l Ozs.1¥z Ozs.l Ozs.14 Ozs.2 Ozs.I/IOO Ozs.l Ozs.2
Ozs.lYz Ozs.I/IOO Ozs.12 Ozs.l Ozs.Yz
Ozs.3Yz Ozs.5/8
Remarks
Aggrieved Lower Deck SI. No 23. 24.
Articles Vegetables, fresh Flour
99 Remarks
Scales
Daily issue Ozs. 8 Ozs. 1 Weekly issue
25.
Matches, safety
26.
Tobacco or Cigarettes ' Paper, toilet
27.
28. 29. 30.
Ascorbic acid tablets (25 mgs.) Marmite Cocoa or tea with sugar and Milk tinned or Rum (25 U.P.)
Boxes 2 (smokers) (non-smokers) Box 1 Ozs. 2 Nos. 50 Sheets 35 To be issued on medical recommendation Tab. 1 Ozs. Ozs. ozs.
3/28 Vz (to meet special fatigue or bad weather 1 condition)
Ozs. Ozs.
1 2
(to be issued in most exceptional circumstances only or when cocoa or tea is not available)
Source: File No. 601/9734/H
The new arrangement was expected to improve the quality of supplies which had already begun to fall but, instead, led to its deterioration. Complaints increasingly came to the surface: Already in June 1942 some ratings on board HMIS KOllkan at Tobermory, UK, protested against bad provisions and insufficient food. But it did not seem. to have made any impression on the authorities. Only an increase in rations for those serving in cold climate was effected. Early in 1944 the censor intercepted two letters, one of a CPO, HMIS Hamla and the other by a communication rating in Cochin. Both disclose their grievance. The first letter reads:
100
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febntary' 1946 Table 1B Field Service Scales of Ration for Indian Troops (Cooking)
Sl.No. Articles
l. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Atta or rice Dal Ghi Milk, fresh Meat, fresh
6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 1l. 12. 13.
Potatoes Vegetables, fresh Onions Gur or Sugar Sugar Salt Tea Condiment
Modified
Basic
Daily issue Ozs. 24 Ozs. 41,02 Ozs.2 Ozs.6 Ozs.2
Daily issue Ozs. 24 Ozs. 41,02 Ozs. 23/4 Ozs. 6 Ozs. 2
Ozs.4 Ozs.6 Ozs.2 Ozs. 21,02 Ozs. Ozs. 1,02 Ozs. 1/3 Ozs. 3/4
Ozs. Ozs. Ozs. Ozs. Ozs. Ozs. Ozs. Ozs.
Remarks
or 6 ozs. every third day
4 4 2 21,02 Vz 1/3 4/7
Thrice weekly on medical recommendation 14. 15. 16.
Fruit, fresh Marmite Ascorbic acid tab.
Source:
Ozs.4 Ozs.1f.t mgs. 25
Ozs. 4 Ozs. 1f.t mgs. 50
ibid. Also Moharis, History o/the Anny Se/vice Crops, p. 55.
I am afraid I have given up hopes of ever tasting decent food in this service. It is only by buying tin stuff and what we can get outside that we keep our strength. How the devil they expect the men to fight, god only knows. The second one says: Cochin seems to be a fine place. But the food that we can have is of the worst variety ... I am not in a position ... [to save a] single pie. You know well what kind of food we are getting here. So I am taking my meals in the hotel. Somehow we have to survive.20
Aggrieved Lower Deck
101
Enquiries into these complaints were held by the naval officers-in-. charge in keeping with the instructions from NHQ. aut no 'rectifications' seem to have been made. It was quite unlikely for the ratings to have made false complaints in their private communications but these were set aside as the usual 'sailors' moan'. Again in May 1944 the Officer-in-Charge, MTE, Bombay, received a report from its Victualling Officer that the supplies from RIASC were of such poor quality that the food served in: the lowerdeck messes was badly affected. It was forwarded through CO, Depot, so that the matter could be taken up with RIASC. The forwarding authority added, however, that the complaints about the bad quality of rations had been received from MTE only, from its ratings who came of well-educated families and were accustomed to western food. No complaints came from seamen and stokers in other establishments who appeared to be quite contented. Judging by the 'distressing waste' of food, the ratings seemed adequately fed. The wastage was never considered to be due to its bad quality. While the genuineness of men's complaints was thus doubted, the Quartermaster-General .admitted that for the purpose of turnover old stocks of RIASC were issued to RIN against its demand. 21 Its requirements should have been met from fresh stocks. This was seldom done. Clearly from the time RIN had to look solely to RIASC for victualling, complaints about rice, atta and dal which constituted the staple food of Indian ratings became insistent. Atta, the main item of Indian ration, was old, musty and weevily and chapatis made of it tasted bitter. Rice was no better. It was dusty and broken and contained husk, mud and stone. The parboiled rice issued to RIN emitted offensive smell and unpalatable. Similarly dal was full of husk and small stones. Moollg andarltar were supplied despite repeated 'requests for other varieties and universally disliked. Carcasses of ill~fed, skinny and stingy animals had a much higher proportion of bone to meat and were supplied in unhygienic gunny bags and often stank. Potatoes were invariably tiny. A large percentage was pulpy and a fair amount bad. The removal of skin and rotten parts left little more than half the daily ration of 4 ozs. per man. Vegetables were largely made up of brinjal, pumpkin, marrow and cabbage. Most of these, besides being of poor quality and tasteless,
102
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
contained a great deal of water and lost much in substance after cooking. Tomatoes, peas, beans, turnips, cauliflowers or carots were seldom supplied. Badly packed and carelessly handled' vegetables reached the galley door in bruised conditions and gave off rancid odour. The ratings never received 4 ozs. of vegetables per man per diem provided in the existing ration scale because of the loss in transport and decomposition in stores. Condiment power, as supplied to RIN units, was highly unpopular. It contained a large quantity of turmeric, a certain proportion of flour, little of chillies and nothing else, and did not permit any variation in the preparation of curries. A look at the minutes of the Standing Ration Committee gives the impression that the NHQ representative raised his objections over the quality of RIASC supplies in a half-hearted manner. He in fact did not attend its many important meetings. Eventually a food inspection direCtorate was created to keep a vigilant eye over the supplies but there was no perceptible improvement in the situation. No doubt by sieving and cleaning a certain percentage of 'foreign matters' could have been removed from rice and dal but supply depots refused to do it before issue. On the other hand, BVOs asserted that they had never sieved and cleaned the units' rations nor was it pos~ible with the available staff. At no stage was there any arrangement to employ local labour for the purpose until after the 'mutiny'. Generally RINofficers at the base level seldom scrutinized the proviljions supplied by RIASC for their quality and accepted the bad stuff and passed them on to stores and messes impervious to complaints from the ratings. Those detailed for victualling never went to RIASC depots personally. The stores ratings brought in supplies which they were not competent to refuse. 22 Desk work was given priority over victualling. The task of looking after provisions was regarded by most officers as the least important of jobs. More importantly corruption at the source of supply and at the point of checking resulted in bad stuff getting through. The military contractors in fact grew fabulously rich during the war years ultimately at . the expense of lower formations. No one from DOs upward seems to have any concern about
Aggrieved Lower Deck
103
man's food. They seldom tasted it. If they ever did, it was quite unlikely that the officers theinselves chose samples from the dishes to be actually serVed in lower-deck messes. This was true not only: of British officers23 but also of their Indian counterparts. Indifference marked the conduct of both. There was hardly any supervision. over the cooks. The latter were overworked. The military finance department sanctioned only one cook for every 30 men. The cooks not only had to prepare foodstuff for cooking like chopping off meat, pealing off vegetables and kneading flour, but often had to serve meals, wash utensils and clean galleys. Seldom could they devote time to wash the huge quantity of rice and allow the mud sediment at bottom. The dough prepared for making chapatis could not be left long enough to 'prove'. The cooks were never helped or encouraged to vary the type of food served. They were looked upon as an inferior people. It was not uncommon to hear the phrase 'cooks and topasses'. The rating of cook was denied the status of a tradesman. While at breakfast the RN ratings got bread, butter or jam, egg and a mug of tea, their RIN counterparts were given dal, bread and half a mug of tea. At lunch the latter got rice full of stones, dirt and chaff and either equally bad mutton (often with putrid stench) or dal and vegetables, and at dinner they were given two half baked or overbaked chapatis, mutton full of bolies or bone splinters or dal and vegetables. This was the India.n ratings' daily fare. The dal would be the same. for all the three meals as it was cooked once only in the morning. There was a marked tendency everywhere to begin cooking early for want of staff and a pr,oper programme of work according to menu. Rice was often cooked as many as 5 hours' before consumption. Similarly chapatis were baked hours before they were required, resulting in their getting cold and hard. 2A In almost all ships and establishments the evening meal was cooked before noon. Bread was not properly baked and was distasteful. The ratings' complaints were turned down on the plea that nothing could be done as the supplies were from RIASC.2S· Often the RIN ratings demanded that like RN personnel they should be given butter, jam or marmalade and egg at breakfast. This, the upper deck felt, was an unusual request on ,the part of Indians. In
104
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febrnary 1946
fact one member of the RIN Enquiry Commission asked a ratingwitness: 'Do you like their [RN men's] food or your own?' The witness Abdul Gaffoor was quick in repartee. He said: 'This egg and butter is not their food. Hen in our country lay eggs and the milk which our cow and buffalo gives produces butter.'26 True, some argued, Indian ratings were not habituated in eating English pudding which RIN cooks were trained to prepare but certainly they did take sweet dishes like jidni, halwa or payasam at home or in native places. The officers in general refused to believe in this logic: they made fun of it and 'used to taunt about it'.27 The upper deck attributed the demand for RN facilities to 'Direct Entry' artificers or communication ratings with some western .educational background or familiarity with western food or to those who received such facilities during certain operations.28 Others who had hardly anything to compare them to, appeared quite satisfied with the rations supplied and seldom complained about food. Except for a honourable few all RIN officers, both British and Indian, thus sought to explain away the evil. Comdr. King told the Talwar Board of Enquiry that the food served in his establishment was excellent and there was absolutely no reason for the ratings to refuse it. The Indian officers like Lieut. Kohli and those decked in his feathers, with penchant for their foreign masters,sang the same tune. 'I consider it frivolous that if I had the same chapatis at home, I would kick up a fuss and row with my mother. It does not happen every day', said Lieut. Kohli.29
* The promise of good pay (ranging between Rs. 40 and Rs. 460) and allowances was equally fraudulent. The suggestion that RIN, as it was modelled on RN, would grant its men the same facilities as in the latter, was ill-intentioned. The Indian ratings were paid half the wage of their British counterparts. Their pay was revised more than once during 1942-44 but only in small, often insignificant, doses. In no way could it compare with that of RN and dominion navies. The RIN ratings' pay was even lower than that of their counterpart$ in Burma and Ceylone navies and of those in Indian shipping companies. Table 2 shows the monthly pay of ratings in rupees in two branches of RIN, RN, Dominion, Burma and Ceylone navies as well as of Indian and British merchant services. Whenever thrown together with RN ratings the men of RIN
Aggrieved Lower Deck
105
proved their worth. The standard of discipline in RIN was far better than that among RN men. During the war years Indians worked side by side with British personnel in various theatres of operation, and their performance, say in the coastal atta'ck in Arakan or minesweeping in Malaya, was by no means inferior. The RIN ratings did the same amount of work as did their British counterparts or even more in certain situations. Vice-Admiral Godfrey admitted this: RN ships under tropical conditions worked a routine which started in the morning and stopped around 1200 hours whereas RIN ,maintained normal hours of work which continued till late in the afternoon. Still the RN ratings received twice the pay of the RIN lower deck, hot weather allowance and other facilities. This, the Indians felt, was an unjust and unfair discrimination. Lieut. Sheppard, Flag Lieutenant to FOCRIN, in his statement to the Commission, observed: Our ratings have done extremely well in this war. They quite naturally consider tbemselves professionally superior to their .. [counterparts] in the Royal Navy, whom they saw out there, be it in coastal forces, communications, landing craft or minesweepers. They also see the slovenly British sailors, badly dressed, not saluting, slouching about Bombay and other ports while they themselves were kept up to the mark. In the lower-deck language their reaction must be "why the hell".30 Besides the disparity between the pay of higher grades and that of lower ones in RIN, felt its ratings, was greater than anywhere else. The difference between a CPO's salary and a Sub-Lieutenant's in RN was marginal. Whereas the pay of a CPO in RIN was about a quarter that of a Sub-Lieutenant in the same service. The latter might have one year's service to his credit and yet could draw around Rs. 450 per month, while the former after as many as 16 years' service could r~ach a pay of Rs. 110 or Rs. 115 per month. A boy joining RIN got Rs. 15-30 which did not compare to what an officer entering the same navy as Sub-Lieut. received per month. In the ratings' opinion there should be difference in pay between officers ::md Men but the existing one was too great. Herice the demand that .ii:.hcir "ay should be raised to reduce this discrepancy. As regards the demand of 'equal PJy for equal work' the British authorities argued that it was the economic conditions of a country which determined the wages of its men. The British sailors got
Table2A Ratings
RIN (existing)
RN (existing)
RN (w.e.f. 1.7.46)
Royal Canadian (existing)
~
Royal Australian (existing)
Royal NewZealand (existing)
Burma (existing)
Ceylone (existing)
0 0\
::tl
~
..:
1:;'
~:
Seaman
Branch Entry Ordinary rate Able rate Leading rate Petty officer Chief petty officer
15-30 40-42 45-50 60-75 85-100 110-120
61 61 86-113 133-140 167-184 197-203
81 101 121-131 152-182 18~-213
212-268
51 127-52 188 213 243-264 284-330
53-57 89 138-146 157-162 181-192 203-211
35-6 114 154-158 173-177 199-210 224-233
~
50 50-90 95-125 135-165 180-195
60 70 95 207 218
:, ~
~
~
S·
So ~
Artificer Branch Class V Acting class IV Cass IV Class III CassII Class I Chief artificer
[
70 100 110-5-115 125-5-140 150-5-170 180-10-200 220-10-250
133 182 182 210 217 233 248
152 202 212 248 268 278 298
113 309 309 319 330 355 385-411
177 214 214 227 235 243 252-268
181 241 241 248 257 265 273-289
Note: The above statement was compiled by the RIN Enquiry Commission (on its appointment in April 1946) from the latest available data. The rates mentioned here are exclusive of marriage and children allowances which were admissible as separate items in most cases except RIN.
~ a·
~ ~.
~
~ 0i:!
~
...... ~ 0.
Aggrieved Lower Deck
107 Table 2b
Indian Merchant Navy'" Seaman Branch
British Merchant Navy'" Seaman Branch
Lascar class II
140
Lascar class I Tinal class II Tinal class I Serang
150 171 204 261
Ordinary rate (depending on months of sea service) 246/266
Boatswain's mate 333-340"'''' Boatswain 346-376"''''
Altijicer Branch
Al1ijicer Branch
Carpenter's mate 261 Carpenter 426 Fitter 426
Painter Carpenter's mate Carpenter Plumber
331 350-376"'''' 363-416"'''' 376-416"''''
Note: ... The figures are exclusive of War Risk Money
"' ... Varies according to the tonnage of vessels. Source,' RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, pp. 560-1.
more than the Indians and the Americans more than the British for economic reasons. It was added that different standards of living justified different rates of pay for RN and RIN personnel. One Indian Officer went further when he said: 'If you gave ... RIN ratings the same rates ... as given to RN ratings, you have got to pay other services also increased rates. It is not a practical proposition' .31 But the Indian sailors were not impressed by these economic arguments. No amount of such reasoning could convince them that their proposition was impractical or their logic unsound. They had their own principles to justify the demand for 'equal pay for equal work'. In fact when asked' how they could expect the same pay as that of RN men in spite of their different standards of living or economic conditions, one rating retored: That our wages are low because of our low standard of living ... is absolutely wrong.... I admit that our living standard is low but I do not admit that our pay is low because of ... [this] ... I do not think that our living standard is lower than the people
108
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946 of Cylone and Burma. Another point is that when our ratings go to England their pay is increased, and when they come back their pay is decreased again. It is not the case with the RN ratings. When they come from a country where the standard of living is high to a country where ... [it] is low, such as India, instead of decreasing ... their pay is increased. I think that it is not the living standard ... which .. decided our pay ... our pay is low because we are a subject nation.32
Another rating parried the question: why did the British officer·s in RIN draw more than others and why did not the 'economic argument' affect their case? Sub-Lieut. Qasim asked: 'Did they ... merit that payor could they get that much in civil life?'33 The ratings argued that if BORs who were in this country for occupation purpose could be paid fat salaries by the British Indian government, there was no reason why it could not afford to pay Indian men decent wages. It was beyond their capacity to understand how naval ratings in Burma and Cylofi~ could be paid higher wages than those in India if economic conditions were their sole determinant.
* Whenever it was pointed out that RN ratings were much better placed than their RIN counterparts, the response from the authorities invariably was the same irritating comparison between British and American forces. 'This annoyed the ratings all the more because RN and RIN were both His Majesty's navies; they belonged to the British empire.'34 The facilities, they felt, should be the same in poth. As a matter of fact the Indian ratings took the difference in pay and allowances between RN men and themselves as discriminatory. In their argument so long as both served the same King-Emperor, 'there should be no discrimination between the twO'.35 But it persisted. For Example: the RN men engaged in minesweeping together with RIN personnel were given MS allowance. But the latter did not get it. An Indian rating in his evidence before-the Commission said: For practically a year and a half I was serving on HMIS "Carnatic", a minesweeper of the 37th, Minesweeping Flotilla ... Both RN flotillas and RIN ships were employed on these minesweeping duties in the Malacca straits, the RIN ships kept
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regular hours, namely ffl-.n 0630 to 1800, and swept on Sundays, thus reaping the benefit in mines and not in money, the RN ships swept for a lesser period and hence coming into anchorage earlier, yet their entitlement was minesweeping allowance.36 In October 1945 the Royal Admiralty sent a signal about MS allowance for RN ratings: this could not be paid together with the Japanese campaign pay. The latter was payable to RN ratings throughout the far-east, and as it was more than the former none among them in the East Indies or Pacific area drew MSA. The Admiralty message was no doubt intercepted by the 37th MS Flotilla and other RIN ships. The Indian ratings who learnt of it felt that an allowance was being paid to the RN men which they, doing the same work alongside, were being denied.
-
Besides in the Royal Navy men received family allowance in lieu of the facility to have their families with them when drafted to shore establishments. The lower ranks of the Indian Army were not given a!ly such allowance but were provided with family quarters 'on a recognized scale'. It was the same with the British Army. Butthe RIN lower deck got neither of these benefits. The official explanation for this discrepancy was that the pay of RIN ratings included an element of family allowance. The men refused to accept the argument: they considered that their pay was too low, compared to other navies and other ranks, to include such an element. One said: Practically an RIN rating is not supposed to marry, I think. Because they were not givehany facilities to keep their families with them ... On the other hand ... suppose the wife of an officer is expecting a baby, and ... when he produces a certificate' an allowance for that baby is started. God knows whether that baby has come in this world or not. The allowance is equivalent to [an] Able Seman's pay, e.g. Rs. 40.37 Another rating argued: I have always wondered if marriage and producing children are the sole monopoly of officers only. Ratings also marry and ~ produce children.3S
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Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
Still another added: In navy we are encouraged to lead an immoral life, such as going to prostitutes ... No marriage allowance and free quarters are provided for mt'·n in the Indian navy and thereby we are discouraged to get married and to lead a moral life ... Otherwise we have to lead a life of a "saint".39 The RIN ratings demanded some form of family allowance apart basic pay, as provided for RN men or family quarters, in lieu of that allowance, in shore establishments.
* While medical attention was provided for 'local half-caste or even temporary wives' of RN personnel no effective arrangement, alleged Lieut. Comdr. AK. Mookerji, was made for the treatment of Indian ratings' families. 40 The official position in this regard was: (i) medical attendance at home allowed only for such families as occupied government quarters; (ii) admission to service hospitals in case of serious illness allowed provided accommodation was available and (iii) families of RIN ratihgs in the same circumstances as those of Indian soldiers, eligible for medical facilities provided under the provincial government schemes. But the regulation as in (i) was less favourable toRIN ratings -than to army men as very few of them were accommodated in gov~rnment quarters. The Indian ratings were resentful that RIN provided better treatment facilities for the families of British sailors thim for theirs in their own country. The medical aid for the ratings themselves was a hoax. As far as possible they"avoided the service doctors who often accused them of 'malingering'. The patients were told that they were feigning illness ro abstain from duty. Once a rating of HMIS Bahadur went. to the doctor for stomach pain. Instead of giving him medicine the latter said: 'you are not suffering from anything. Go back; otherwise you will be reported'.41 The fate of Ghulam Hussain was well known to others. He was not given any medicine for his ailment he was, instead, asked to run round the compound of sick bays. He had to opey the order and died in the second round.42 Another rating in Calcutta contracted malaria and was sent to hospital. Nobody paid any attention to him though he was running a high temperature. The· rating had to move from one room to another and carry the whole
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111
kit. Eventually he was seen by a lady doctor who asked him to go again to another room. When the patient said he just could not, she , : almost slapped him and said 'you cannot refuse orders', 'you must obey my orders and you cannot do anything else.'43 Sometimes patients were given medicine as punishment. Once when a rating complained of backache, the doctor accused him of malingering, and prescribed castor oil.44 Another told the Commission that he fell on the ground during a game as it was very slippery. He saw the doctor who said, 'I am playing daily but I don't fall'. How he managed to fall, the doctor asked. After some argument the latter called a sickberth attendant and told him, 'Give him some iodine and kick him out' .45 Then, the rating continued, I came to HMIS Khyber. There my foot Wew swollen. Next day I went to SBA and he washed my foot with very hot water so that I got blisters on my foot. I informed the CO who sent me to Castle Barracks. The ... doctor [there] told me that I was pretending. The next day my foot was more swollen and I was drafted to HMIS Talwar on my re"uest by CO, Khyber. In Talwar the doctor told me that it was self-inflicted. I did not want to argue with him as I was afraid that he will put me on report. About the same time I had some ear trouble and I reported to the doctor in Talwar. The doctor gave me treatment for some days but unfortunately my ears went from bad to worse and I was hard of hearing. When I reported the fact ... I was put on report. I made a request to go to a specialist. ... I was sent before a medical board. When I was awaiting result, I was drafted to HMIS Bombay. I think the' usual practice is that unless the report of the medical board is received, the patient cannot be drafted to another establishment or ship. Later on I was transferred to mideast.46 The rating was disgusted with the navy, and felt that it was 'useless' to continue in the service. In fact the atmosphere in hospitals and dispensaries was sickening. The doctors at times were brutal. A.G. Sigamany of HMIS Godavari wrote to the Commission: Our hospitals and sick-bays should have the real hospitable atmosphere [and] not .. [that] of concentration camps [as] they
112
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in tlte RlN Uprising of February 1946 are. If a man is in hospital for whatever sickness, he is a patient and should be treated as such. He should get his medicine and food right to his cot; not be told to go to the dispensary for medicine and to the galley for food. The cots should be rid of the bugs that infest them and the SBAs and surgeons should be taught to be conscious of doing some humanitarian service [and] not a charity they fling out of their generosity to beggars. The doctors and SBAs speak to ratings as if the ratings were dogs ... There should be enough benches to seat all the patients at sick-parades. The mere term 'sick-parade'. is revolting... Military discipline and routine should be discontinued in hospitals and sick-bays.47
* Similarly leave/travel facility was another myth. Urgent prayers for leave were seldom entertained. Even request for a few days or few hours' leave was turned down peremptorily. Such requests often drew ridicule and lewd comments from officers. To take a few examples: One rating was having his 'mother's ceremony' and asked his white officer to grant him six hours' leave. The latrer said 'if you do not perform your mother's ceremony what happens? Suppose you are in any ship or in a foreign country, say, England, \\ :lat will you do? Even if you are at liberty, you cannot get leave.'48 Once a stoker requested the Chief Engineer to permit him to go home to see his wife. He was asked by the officer: had he 'not got another brother to husband the wife?'49 Even in emergency situations like the illness of parents or a close relative's death, ratings were denied leave until the information was confirmed by the police. The latter took long time to respond, and sometimes ignored queries from the navy. The immediate response from officers to ratings' request for leave in emergency situations was something like this: 'My mother died in the air raids. I never went- home. It is war'.50 Or 'It is your training period. Your cannot get any leave' .51 Sometimes, finding no alternative, the ratings left for home without permission, and were later accused of desertion and punished. Signalman Md. Khuddus received four telegrams, the first, informing that his only son was gravely ill, next that his son was dead and then his wife was ill and her condition was deteriorating. When he approached Lieut. Sofa to grant him a few days' leave to see his child or wife, the officer asked back 'why should you go? What benefit will come out of your Ivisit]?'52 On
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receiving the last telegram he posted a registered letter addressed to CO, stating his helplessness, and went home. He had to face its consequence. It is not unnatural for a rating placed in a similar situation to say: 'It shook me like anything ... I fully realize what is the meaning of "service"; and what one· has as value for working under somebody.'53 The ratings who appeared before the RIN Commission as witness complained bitterly that Indians, whether an ordinary seaman or a CPO, had to travel on most occasions in overcrowded, unreserved third class railway compartments while BORs, including RN ordinary seamen, travelled in second class and sometimes in first class coaches when accommodation was not available in the former. In addition RIN ratings were entitled only to one way fare whether going on war leave, short leave or otherwise. 'Why should we not be placed on the same footing', asked one rating. He argued: 'We want the same treatment in regard to facilities for travelling ... we serve the same government and therefore we should be placed on the same footing as the RN'.54 Until the. strike of February 1946 the RIN CPOs, POs and Leading Hands were entitled to inter-class accommodation only when they travelled on duty in parties of four or less and to third class facility on all other occasions. The grievance of CPOs and POs in this respect dated much before the start of hostilities. NHQ admitted this was a genuine grievance. It came through particularly in comparison with VCOs and WOs of army and air force who were eligible for second class railway travel. Table 3A gives the position of travelling facilities before the uprising. Table 3A Class
RIN
First
All Officers
Second
IA Officers
Officers
VCOs WO~
Third
RIAF
POs & Ratings
(I & 11)
All IORs
Source: RIN Mutiny, Sr. No. 6, p. 365.
WOs Other than WOs
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Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febmary 1946
The CPOs could not understand why they were deprived of the travel concessions granted to YCOs and WOs especially when they received in many cases higher substantive pay than the former or almost equal one to that of the latter. They considered their responsibility no less than that of YCOs: Table 3B illustrates their point. Table 38 RIN
Branch
CPOs
IA
VCOs
RIAF
WOs
Pay
Rank
Pay
Group
Pay
1.
Seaman/ stroker
Rs. 110120
Jamadar
Rs. 80105
V/II Rs.120-240
2.
Schoolmaster Artificer
Rs. 150200 Rs. 220250
Subedar
Rs. 140180 Rs. 200260
E
Rs.200-240
I
Rs.225-265
3.
Source:
Subedar Major
ibid.
On the other hand, in Military Finance Department's view, the status of CPOs and POs was lower than that of YCOs, and it was the status and not pay which should decide the class of travel. It was laid down in RIN regulations that a CPO had the status of a Battalion Havildar and PO that of a Havildar. This argument based on the relative status of CPOs and YCOs did not impress the seinor RIN rates.
* Both at home and aboard the Indian ratings were denied access to RN or rather NAAFI canteens and allied services clubs. This they considered racial discrimination of the worst form. The Indian Canteen Stores Department provided facilities to personnel of all branches of the armed forces under C-in-C, India, including, of course, British units and establishments. There was no discrimination on this count. The fact that RN opened in India canteens for its personnel did not affect it. But the position in regard to RIN men was different. They visited ma ly places where there are NAAFI canteens but none was provided by ICSD. In most cases the number of ratings
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115
involved or the period they stayed did not justify separate provisions for their own canteens. They expected permission to use NAAFI canteens catering to RN personnel but they were not allowed to. This occurred at several places. A lUmber of ratings narrated their experience before the RIN Commission. One said: In Rangoon ... we were given ... coupons to draw beer from the canteen. When we went to buy beer we were kicked in pants, beaten and abused ... by RN chaps.ss Another rating spoke about a canteen in Singapore where 'Asiatics were excluded.'S6 The 'Trincomalee episode' was still fresh in the minds of these ratings. The RIN ratings there were not allowed access to an RN canteen which was the only one at that port. They also referred to incidents in Durban and Mombasa where 'blackies' were debarred from restaurants and service clubs which, they were told, were the exclusive preserves for whites. One rating added: when in Calcutta he went to the 'Allied Service Club' run by Americans, he was turned away, although it was meant for all allied forces. The rating reported the matter to the CO of HMIS Baluchistall who said ,that 'we cannot help'.S7 Similar treatment was meted out to the Indian ratings in an RN canteen in Travancore. In fact the ratings preferred NAAFI stores to Indian ones because they were stocked better and cheaper as well. A number of Indian canteens, run by private contractors, charged prices higher than fixed by ICSD and passed on to black market items like 'Cuticura' powder, thermos flasks, fountain pens and cigarettes.58 One, rating made a specific complaint against Lieut. Nanda who was in charge of the canteen in HMIS Talwar. Bhujias ... were selling in the canteen for one anna and if bought from outside ... [they] will not cost more than two pices ... Rexona soap costs six annas from outside but in the canteen six and half annas. Instead of getting cheap, we are getting dearer than outside. It is only because it is run by the hands of an officer for the last two years, and nobody can speak about it, if anybody says anything, he is getting reverse reward.59 Another rating alleged that flour, sugar, ghee and milk supplied for men were pilfered from stores or galleys and taken to
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Revisiting Tt.iwar: A Study ill tlte RIN Uprising of February 1946
canteens and 'bhujia', 'somosa' and sweets made from these were sold to them. 60 The ratings felt the pinch because they had to spend most of their pay in canteen, given the bad food in lower-deck messes. Often they had to pay as much as officers. Wherever canteens were under the control of the latter, the better articles were cornered by them and hardly any such thing was left for the ratings. 61 Before Cornwallis Fleet club was built for RIN, the ratings thought it a 'grand idea' and expected that they would get things as cheap in this club as in an English Canteen. The British ratings could have a 'first class dinner' in their canteens for 8 annas. The Indian sailors wanted their club to be like this. But when it was opened they found that things were costlier there than in the market outside. 'It was just a show. It had no use for us', said a rating. 62 What the RIN men wanted was a canteen which would sell a wide range of articles cheaper; whether it was run by NAAFI or ICSD did not bother them.
* Attracted by the prospect of quick promotion in RIN hundreds of young Indians left their studies or secure jobs and joined what they later considered to be a big 'racket'. The recruiting authorities did not tell even tell those who enlisted themselves in 'short service' cadres that in a space of 4 or 5 years they could hardly hope to become cros, let alone warrant or commissioned officers. As one rating-witness said in his evidence: 'When I was recruited I was promised that after four or five years I shall become a Warrant Officer ... We were not told about the real conditions in the navy'.63 There wa:, i.ndeed no scheme before 1942 for promotion to commissioned rank directly from the lower deck. In August that year it was announced that a number of selected ratings from seaman, stoker, communication and engineering branches would be entitled to regular commissions in RIN. The scheme, however, was a failure, for the number of commissions offered were too small, one per month, to be con.peted for by men from all these branches, and writers, electrical artificers, ordnance artificers and shipwrights were excluded from it. It·was cancelled in 1944. In July that year another scheme was introduced to grant RINVR commissions to selected ratings from all branches. Under this scheme 81 ratings appeared
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before preliminary selection boards. Out of them only 16 passed the final stage and were promoted to commissioned rank. With the termination of hostilities the scheme was scrapped because no further recruitment of temporary officers was thought necessary. There no longer remained any opportunity for RIN ratings to obtain commissions. In the matter of promotion from the lower deck to commissioned rank RIN lagged far behind o~her navies and even the Indian army, and the number of temporary commissions granted was negligible, less than one per thousand of ratings. The 'secondment' of a sizeable number of men from RN as warrant officers in RIN also reduced the scope of promotion for Indian ratings to the rank. On many occasions during the war, in working alongside the RN ratings they proved themselves more hard working and no less efficient. Still men from the RN lower deck with few years' sprvfce were preferred to senior POs and CPOs of RIN. 'Considerable and very justifiable resentment was caused' by the 'import' of the former and their being given promotion immediately over the heads of the latter.64 Their main qualification seemed to be that they were 'Britishers'.65 When an Indian officer asked a white man about his qualification, the latter replied, 'I am an Englishman' and hastened to add Oh! don't worry about educational qualification. We know we won't be kept as ratings because in India they do not make an En!!,lishman a rating. He must be an officer.66 It was considered racially demeaning to employ whites as ratings, to expect them to perform menial duties. It was considered too racially demeaning to put Indians in positions of authorit" even over 'poor whites'. The latter with minimal qualifications were, for racial reasons, placed better than 'superior' Indians. Actuall~1 senior Indian ratings were given to understand that qualification or efficiency by itself would not take them far. They must have the capacity to 'get on' with their 'superiors' and 'bark and howl' at their 'inferiors'. Unless they could bully the latter their 'power of command' would be considered nil. A rating expressed his feeling on the matter:
For promotion ability, sympathy to inferiors and efficiency of work ... [are] disregarded. The man who can do musca polish
118
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946 [flattery] well to the superiors, is an efficient, able and good disciplinary man. On the other hand, the man ... [does] the job properly, but not doing musca polish, unnecessary shouting and chasing the inferiors, is not a disciplinary man. There are so many examples about this that the ratings who were efficient in their work, and were doing the work of in-charge ... were not promoted because they could not do the musca polish, and the rat'ngs who were good in musca polish, although ... not efficient in work, were given quick promotion. lam obliged to say ... "Honest labour never brings true reward."67
In other words. a rating must be able to curry favour with his officers, especially his British masters. He had to be not only efficient , but, more crucially, "tactful'. He had to be on the 'right side' of his \, superiors, ready even to 'pocket insult' at times. 68
* This was not all. After long years of service the ratings got a "' meagre pension that did not even compare with what was offered in other branches of the Indian armed forces, let alone the Royal Navy. This point was raised by an European member from Madras on the floor of Central Legislative Assembly during a discussion on the Finance Bill for 1944-5. The record of the RIN has been second to none in this war .... [still] there is a serious differentiation in the treatment accorded to its CPOs, POs and ratings from that accorded to land forces. ... why it is that the pensions of naval ratings are still so low? Why it is that they had not changed since the last war? Why it is that the pensions of the naval ratings are in all "cases no greater than half and in some cases as little as one fourth of the pensions for the Indian Air Force? How is it that a government with such great resources at its command can yet be content to pay a family pension to a CPO after 25 years of service of Rs. 8 a month? ... the CPO ... is the equal in social position, in intelligence, in training, of lamadar or Subedar. Yet he is not treated on the same terms.... Is that the V(ay to treat men who have deserved well of their country, who 'have done magnificent service in the RIN and who are equal of those of corresponding rank in the land forces who are treated differently?(/}
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Till the close of 1943 the rates of retirement pensions for RIN men were based on those introduced for the Indian Army back in 1920. These are given in table 4. Table 4 Ratings
Years of qualifying service
Rupees per month
OD/AB
15 18 18 21 18 21
6 10 12 15 20 25
LS
PO PO CPO CPO Source:
File No. 601/10892/H.
From 1 November 1943 temporary increases were sanctioned in the scale above. Pensions not exceeding Rs. 20 were raised by Rs. 3 a month and those exceeding this amount but not Rs. 40 increased by Rs. 4. Again from 1 January 1945 this scale of temporary increases was revised: pensions not exceeding Rs. 20 were raised by Rs. 4 a month and those exceeding this amount but not Rs. 60 increased by Rs. 5. Family pension (of Rs. 8 for all ratings) was revised in 1945.70 Still the pension for ratings was very poor. To illustrate: a PO (seaman branch) got Rs. 16 after 18 years' qualifying service and Rs. 19 after 21 years. That is, he received, on an average, less than Rs. 1 per month for every year of service. This was the same as the one paid to a Havildar (non-tradesman) in the Indian Army. A PO drew a monthly pay of Rs. 85 to Rs. 100 while a Havildar received Rs. 45 only. The pension indeed had no relation to the pay. III
The process of demobilization began with the termination of the war on Japan's surrender in August 1945. The wartim,e strength of RIN persomiel reached the maximum figure: 27651 ratings and approximately 2,700 officers. The service expanded about twentyfold during the war. The demobilization of this force on the conclusion of
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febmary 1946
hostilities was 'totally unplanned and clueless'. Vice-Admiral Godfrey, FOCRIN argued in self-defence that 'the end of war caught us unaware. The war ended a year earlier than was expected'. The failure on the part of the government to· announce a 'settled policy' in regard to the peace-time strength of RIN had an unsettling effect on the entire service. NHQ, he added, had to plan demobilization all of a sudden and did not know the ultimate strength to which it had to be reduced. The demobilization that it planned in this 'unsettled state of mind' was bound to be 'haphazard and clueless'.71 Initi~lly it was decided that the interim strength required for operational purposes of the service was to be a cadre of 18,000 men by 1 May 1946. That is, out of 27,651 ratings 9,651 were to be discharged by that time. It was not at all a big task. For this number includpd 4,048 'Hostilities Only' ratings who were .liable to be discharged at 24 hours' notice and 1,725 men borrowed from the army who were to be sent back to their original units. The 'Short Service' ratings numbered 19,587 in all and the 'Continuous Service' 2,255. The latter were kept outside the release scheme excepting those who were called to active service from the reserve. Out of 19,587 SS ratings 4,184 were recruits under training of whom those fell short of the required standard were liable to be eliminated. From November 1945 no release, it was decided, would be made otherwise than in accordance with age and service groups.
The demobilization in keeping with this principle began in November but soon a decision was taken to reduce the operational strength of the service to the 'lower limit cadre' of 11,000. The rate of release at that time was 1,000 men a month. It was decided to raise this rate to 2,000. By the time 2,500 men had been released and a further 8,)00 had to be discharged in addition to the HO ratings who were being gradually sent away. If the revised rate of release was maintained, the demobilization, it was estimated, would be completed within 6 to 8 months. But in the absence of planning and 'efficient' arrangements it caused considerable dislocation in the serVIce. Soon after the lower limit was fixed at 11,000 it was felt that the age and service group system could not be adhered to because this way the service would lose a large majority of its higher rates. So
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it was modified to enable the service to retain a certain number of such rates capable of manning the lower limit. The authorities decided to retain 9,000 and discharge about 10,000 out of 19,000-odd SS ratings. On the other hand, only 2,000 SS ratings applied for deferred release and 800 for continuous service and the rest wanted to leave the service. While the admInistration wanted to retain the best of the lot, the latter, already disillusioned with the service, wanted to go. The senior rates demanded that the release should be strictly in accordance with age and service groups. There was another class of ratings who asked for discharge on compassionate grounds and claimed priority in the matter of release. NHQ took long time to investigate their cases, angering them. This apart there was enough cause for discontent among the personnel selected for demobilization. In the last days of their service the lower-deck personnel were treated even more shabbily than before. The situation in RIN release centres was worse than that of prisons or enemy 'concentration camps', as many ratings said. Hundreds were accommodated in establishments built for few fifties. Arrangements for messing, sleeping and sanitation were dreadful. The ratings had to endure cramped living conditions, eat bad food and do hard manual labour. Even then there was no respite from routine and regimentation. They were to undergo this drudgery much longer than they were supposed to, not due to any fault of their own but because either their service documents were not ready or accounts had to be settled. The HO ratings drafted from the merchant navy were eager to quit. They demanded gratuity for their service during the crisis years. This was not conceded until much later. Meanwhile hundreds were slung out without an anna of war gratuity, railway fare back home or their dues. The accounts of many were kept pending by the Controller of Naval Accounts months after their release. The HO ratings were dumped out on the civvy streets without what was called nullies (continuous discharge certificates). At the time of entry into the service they deposited them with the Drafting Officer, Bombay. When their turn for release came, these vital documents were 'not in place' or missing. It was almost impossible for the ratings to get the nullies issued before they left. Either they never got them or it took considerable time for their issue. The result was: they could not make use of employment opportunities in civilian life. The ratings asked them-
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of FebTUary 1946
selves why - they had fought other's war, yet received in return nothing as gratuity or even nullies so essential for post-war employment. The return of kit or final settlement of accounts was inevitably a 'supper-muddle'. CNA took weeks, even months to clear the accounts of the personnel released or about to be released. The accounts were not complicated, and the office had supposedly all the records with it. At the time of release the ratings were told to surrender their kits. These consisted of suits of blue clothings, white shorts, undergarments, boots, shoes, bedding rolls and a number of minor items.72 Most of these articles were to be returned and, if not, their cost was deducted from the last pay. This was so even in cases where men were never issued with a full kit. There was almost nothing to verify whether the full kit was supplied or not. The 'clothing accounts' were not kept properly in many cases, and on being asked to surrender the full kit the ratings stated that it had never been issued, and they could not pay for the 'missing' articles. On investigation such statements were found to be true. Nevertheless the ratings were compelled to pay any ainount up to Rs. 90 from their dues. It was the duty of the supply officer or divisional officer to maintain the clothing history sheets. The ratings had to suffer for their negligence. Even where full kits were issued, to expect the ratings to return them after a lapse of, say, 5 or 10 years, was a bit too much. To force a rating who was being discharged to shell out money for the kit he had used 'is to suck blood out of stones.... to make him pay for the few togs which he has worn from his meagre savin~s is the highest of absurdity'.73 Captain P.R. Learmont produced before the RIN Commission some samples of the 'rubbish' the ratings were required to surrender, viz, a torn blanket, an old pillow and a bit of canvas given to cover their bedding. If they could not return them, their 'full rate book value' was charged.74 The ratings considered the regulation concerning kit too harsh as the burden of proof on the non-supply of full kit! lay with them. It was almost impossible for them to, prove.this to the satisfaction of CO in the absence of documentary evidence which was supposed to be in possession of the navy. It was unfair that the ratings should be required to furnish the proof which was lost because of the callousness of their officers. Many of them were sent home almost naked or penniless through no fault of theirs.
Aggrieved Lower Deck
123
Lieut. McRae, as a welfare officer and as one closely connected with the RIN Benevolent Association, came across countless cases where ratings invalided from the service were without their disability pension for months together. In his evidence before the Commission the officer referred to the men who were discharged straight from RIN Depot or RIN Hospital at Sewri. Most of them were literally dumped on the pavement outside and told to 'go'. A great many of these men drifted to various parts of the country, and civil liaison officers or collectors pleaded their case. Some came on their way back home to Delhi to take up the matter with NHQ. Lieut. McRae citecl among others the 'classic' case of Lal Din, a seaman rating of HMIS Rajputana whose one leg was badly injured in a gunnery accident. The rating had to launch an individual campaign in order to hammer home to NHQ his grievances. Lal Din arrived in Delhi on discharge after 18 months in hospital, without a penny of his back pay, with no service documents, no pension, with nothing to show that he was an exserviceman, and wearing only cotton singlet arid pants (the only naval kit he had been permitted to keep), although it was December and he was travelling to his home in Jammu. The eventual explanation was that Depot had never received the man's service papers or medical board papers; his CO (incidentally an Indian Regular officer) having been so interested in the man that he had sailed from Bombay with the rating's papers still on board.7s The files of the RIN Benevolent Association contained an 'astonishing number of such pathetic cases in which the service had similarly failed to do its duty by the discharged personnel'. With reference to the men who were being released from HMIS Kakauri and Cheetah Lieut. McRae added: Ratings were being discharged in hundreds from the release centres in Bombay with nothing but. a dirty slip of paper to show that he [they] had served in the RIN. Employers flatly refused to believe that this dirty chit is a genuine discharge certificate from India's senior service and in consequence men remain out of work, are discontented and write back in that frame of mind to ratings still in the service.... the Drafting Office Bombay holds the service documents of some 1,500 rat-
124
Revisiting Talwar: 1 Stt
0, ~n tlte RIN Uprising of February 1946
ings who had alreau,' left the service and ... it would be several months before these couh' be sent out to their owners. Without them no employt.· is lIkely to look at a discharged rating, and the streets of Bo. nbay and Calcutta are full of released naval ratings, still out al' work, who bear silent testimony to the fact26 The discharge distribution centres, Fort Barracks and Castle Barracks, were instructed that the ratings on draft to them should be got ready and sent to the release centres, HMIS Kakauri and Clteeta, the same day they arrived. The drafting and discharge personnel pushed the ratings out without complete service documents. No request was entertained, no grievance looked into. Most of their complaints related to promotion and pay. The navy owed them either a certain amount of money or discharge certificates. They had either passed certain examinations or had been recommended for promo'I tion. But for the negligence of their officers they did not get their due and had to leave the service wi~h the scale of pay of junior rates. The attitude of the authorities was: 'Let us give them a kick and take them out of the navy',17 The whole affair embittered the released personnel. A feeling of disgust also gripped the ratings still retained in the service with or without their consent.
* At the time of enrolment the average rating was led to believe that on demobilization he would be found a job by the service itself, and failing it, would be given adequate subsistence allowance. The propaganda about post-war job resettlement schemes in fact said that a certain proportion of vacancies in government service would be reserved for ex-service personnel. This promise, like others, was thrown to the wind at the end of the war. The realization that on release they had to fend for themselves, helpless as they were without money or certificate, came as another shock to the ratings. The released personnel were in fact offered nothing, n~ither job nor allowance. They were advised to register their names with employment exchanges. The resettlement assistance ended there. In this the naval subalterns suffered more than the lower ranks in the Indian Army. The ratings still in service began to feel insecure. They were no more in a mood to pin faith on government assurances. They
125
Aggrieved Lower Deck
were witness to the 'parting kick' that ruined the lives of so many they had fought next with.
* The foregoing is a rough sketch of the ratings' service conditions from enrolment' to demobilization or discharge. It is incomplete without an overview of RIN administration and lower-de,ck grievances, naval regulations and upper-deck authority, discipline and punishment, and treatment of Indian lower ranks vis-a-vis BORs. The picture drawn in full reveals what made the entire regime appear unjust and unfair and why the ratings willed to overthrow it. Notes and References 1.
BW 23: HA. Akram, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I,p. 259.
2.
Each officer was paid Rs. 5 per recruit produced. DW 5: Vice-Admiral J.H. Godfrey, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. I, p. 110.
3.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, pp. 128-9.
4.
ibid., p. 129.
5.
ibid., p. 130.
6.
ibid., pp. 130-1.
7.
ibid., p. 134.
8.
ibid., p. 135.
9.
DW 3: Col. Rudra, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. I, p. 44.
10.
FP!, 29 May 1946.
11.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 126.
12.
See BW 27: Lieut. Mahendra Pal Singh, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, pp. 332-3.
13.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 236. Also BW 26: AlIa Ditta, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 323.
14.,
Stoker H.L. Bakshi in his evidence before-the RIN Commission said that the ratings were compelled to take food seIVed under 'pain of punishment'. Once the witness himself refused to take rice at dinner and 'had to work for two extra hours.' BW 1: Bakshi, ibid., p. 20.
15.
BW 27: Lieut. Singh, op.cit., p. 343.
16.
The average Indian rating resented this attitude on the part of the officers, and could not accept the argument that he was not used to better food at home. The rating felt that if he had at all to fight for' the British he must get the same food as BORs did, for whom also Indian people paid.
126
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprisin¥ of February 1946
17.
DW 9: Manzoor Elahi, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. Il, p. 111.
18.
FP!, 3 May 1946.
19.
BW 90: B.M. Tiwari, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. Il, p. 1027. Relatedly, one PO was told by his officer: 'Don't bring such men to me regarding this food trouble. Press them there. Can't you maintain discipline?' BW 51: Rahmat Khan, ibid., p. 541. RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 166. There is ample proof in official documents of the genuineness of food complaints. ibid., pp 170 ff., 582 ff. Signal Boatswain Sulaiman Faquir, when asked by a member of the Commission whether he was aware that 'if rations were not suitable they can be refused at the time of drawing', answered: 'Yes, I am aware of that. And the reply at RIASC was usually of the order "take it if you want it; if you don't want it, then don't take it." The writer had no option. The writer was afraid that if he did not bring the ration, he would be blamed by the officer ... The officer never went to bring the ration from the RIASC.' BW 20: Salaiman Faquir, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 215. One communication rating alleged that British officers did not even understand what their ratings' complaints regarding food items were about. He cited an instance: 'Once I took a chapati which was burnt on both sides to Lieut. Hyder - a British officer - and he said "what is this?" He had never eaten a chapati before.' DW 9: Manzoor Elahi, op.cit., p. 113. T.L. Saigal in his evidence emphasized that 'chapatis ... we get in the navy, even if thrown to a dog, will refuse to eat it. I have tried that several times and I can give a demonstration ... The chapatis given are half-baked; we 'can only eat half of it and the rest is thrown to the dog who refuses to eat it.' BW 13: Saigal, RIN M!Jtiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 126. BW 51: Rahmat Khan, op.cit., p. 534. BW24: Abdul Gaffoor, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 276. BW 6: Mohd. Nasrullah, ibid., p, 78. For evidence see File Nos. NL 9907, 9919 & 9946. BW 5: Lieut. Surendra Nath Kohli, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 41. DW 30: Lieut. Sheppard, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. Il, pp. 244-5. BW 5: Lieut. Kohli, op.cit., p. 51. BW 24: Abdul Gaffoor, op.cit., p. 268. BW 76: Sub-Lieut. Qasim, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. I1, p. 720. RW 27: Lieut. Singh, op.cit., pp. 343-4.
20.
:h. 22.
23.
24.
25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.
Aggrieved Lower Deck 35. 36. '."' '37.
BW 62: Sh. Shahadat All, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. H, p. 585. BW 75: A.C.M. Street, ibid., p. 709. BW 24: Abdul Gaffoor, op.cit., p. 295.
38. 39.
A.p. Nair, RINMutiny Sr. No. 13.
40. 41.
liT, 27 Apri11946. BW 22: A.K. Khan, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 251.
42.
ibid. Also BW 51: Rahamat Khan, op.cit., p. 536.
43.
BW 25: Moorthy, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 311.
44.
Letter from A.G. Sigamany, RINMutiny Sr. No. 14.
BW 51: Rahmat Khan, op.cit., p. 536. Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan complained. 'Salt water was invariably given as medicine for almost every ailment. For stomach pain, for headache, for pain on foot - the same salt water treatment. ... Some time, when a rating with a real com. plaint went to see the doctor ... he got ... punishment. The doctor would recommend him for two hours' doubling in the hot sun.' FP!, 29 May 1946.
45.
BW 23: HA. Akram, op.cit., p. 260.
46. 47.
ibid., pp. 262-3. Letter from Sigamany, op.cit.
48.
BW 11: V.B. Rao, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 116.
49.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 302.
50. ····51.
127
BW 27: Lieut. Singh, op.cit., p. 336. BW 51: Rahamat Khan, op.cit., p. 537.
52. 53.
BW 48: S.R. Banerjee, RINMutiny.Sr. No. 3, Vol. H, p. 509. BW 51: Rahamat Khan, op.cit., p. 537.
54. 55.
BW 15: Bansilal, RIN Mutiny Sr. No.t, Vol. I, p. 141. BW 61: Y.D. Sharma, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. H, p. 587.
56. 57.
DW 9: Manzoor Elahi, op.cit., p. 112. BW 58: B. Ramanathan, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. H, pp. 559-60.
58.
DW 18: P.c.P. Nair, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. n, p. 136:
59.
BW 21: Alif Uddin, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 242.
60.
BW 24: Abdul Gaffoor, op.cit., pp. 284-5, 288-9.
61. 62.
DW 20: Ahmed Khan, RINMutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. n, p. 139. FP!, 30 May 1946.
63.
DW 9: Manzoor Elahi, op.cit., p. 116.
128
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
64.
BW 74: Lieut. McRae, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. n, p. 702. Also BW 16: Helms, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 151 and Statement of Amir All, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 14. As Ldg. Sig, M.S. Khan said, 'the government ... was always bringing more and more men from England ... Able Signalmen and ... Leading Signalmen of the Royal Navy came into the RIN as lieutenants just because they had a. white skin. They had no other qualifications, and in the RIN educated and capable men stagnate, because their skin is black'. FP!, 29 May 1946. BW 27: Lieut. Singh, op.cit., p. 359.
65.
66. 67. 68. 69. 70.
BW 21: Alif Uddin, op.cit., p. 242. BW 28: Lieut. Rarnnath Vasudev, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 371. lAD, Vol. I, 29 Feb.-27 March 1944, pp. 1295-6. The rates of disability and family pension as revised under RIN struction No. 358/1945 are given below.
In~
Table 5 Ratings
Years of service
Rupees per month
OD, AB, LS & PO OD&AB LS
Less than 15 15 and above 15 and above but less than 18 18 and above 15 and above but less than 18 18 and above but less than 21 21 and above Below 15 15 and above but less than 18 18 and above but less than 21 21 and above.
15-30 15-32/8 17-33/8
"
19-34/8 19-34/8
"
22-38
"
26-40 15-30 19-34/8
"
LS PO PO PO CPO CPO CPO CPO
Source: File No. 601/10892/H.
Depending on the percentage of disability
" "
"
31-46 37-50
"
Aggrieved Lower Deck
129
71.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 413.
72.
The clothing supplied to the ratings on their entry were loose or did not fit them properly, and they had to spend a lot for their alteration. The montrJy allowance for their maintenance and purchase of new ones was found to be insufficient. Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan said: 'he was given a short pant which was tailored in a peculiar way, the like of which he had never seen in all his life. It was called the "Admiralty Patent" and nobody used it and the ratings had to buy their uniform from the bazaar. The official attitude was "Let them take if they want it or leave it" ... If the Members of the Commission had a look at [the beddings, shoes and caps the ratings were supplied with] ... they would know what stuff these are made of.... The shoes that were given were made of "rotten" stuff and so the ratings had to buy shoes fr.om the market at high prices'. FP!, 29 May 1946.
73.
-K\lsum Nair, The Anny of Occupation, p. 38.
74.
BW 73: Capt. Learmont, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. 11, p; 677.
75.
Witness 74: Lieut. McRae, op.cit., pp. 704-5.
76.
ibid.
77.
FP!, 27 May 1946.
5 A HELL-HOLE
The strike of February 1946 was basically an anti-authority outbreak. The British ruled over Indian lower ranks within the naval hierarchy more directly and immediately than they did over indigenes outside. They manned the key posts and dominated the administration at all levels in the service. The fact among others gave the RIN strike so ve.hy.tIently an anti-British character as British domination se)dd'mdid an anti-authority outbreak in colonial society at large. The British top brass sought to explain away the 'mutiny' as a 'war mortality'. As Vice-Admiral Godfrey said in his statement to the RIN Commission, 'we must accept the mutiny as a casualty ... [of) the war'.1 That is, it could ultimately be traced to factors for which those in charge of the ~aval administration bore no responsibility. But the war and the sudden expansion of the navy in its wake or the problems arising on its 'unexpected' termination such as the rapid contraction of the service, the general restlessness the world over and in India in particular and the 'strike fever' affecting the fighting forces in this country as elsewhere, had hardly anything to do with the system that had long bred indifference towards lowerdeck grievances and encouraged their suppression, condoned brutal treatment by officers or their zulum and perpetuated racial discrimination or inequality to the bitter resentment of Indian lower ranks. The 'bottling up' of complaints was so common in RIN units that the entire system was stifling to all in the lower deck. The ill-treatment of ratings was so pervasive that it soured the mind of everyone without exception. The feeling of racial bitterness among the Indian lower ranks was so overwhelming that it alone might have been the sufficient reason for an anti-British outbreak on the scale of the entire service. This, together with the deteriorating service conditions, produced an 'explosive mixture', and long before it burst into flames. I
There was little opportunity for ratings to ventilate their griev-
A Hell-Hole
131
ances. Redressal was a far cry. As the Board of Enquiry into the 'mutiny' aboard Feroze admitted: The regulations not only do not provide machinery for the airing of general complaints, but under the guise of "combinations" actually discountenance them. Further ... the present channels for the voicing of even individual complaints have become clogged with an apathy engendered by frustration from the lower deck upwards. la The ratings felt that no purpose would be served by making individual complaints or 'requests'. Many feared that it would invite troubles: they would be marked 'defaulters' and punished. 2 In most cases the complaints were suppressed at the point of origin itself. In some establishments as in Valsura each division was awarded marks inversely proportional to the number of complaints arising from it. The fewer the complaints the higher the marks. Under such a system complaints were suppressed so that the Divisional Officers could earn more marks and more credit. Generally in RIN making a request or a complaint itself was discouraged.3 Junior officers were unwilling to back these up fearing their seniors' wrath. Even in cases where complaints were forwarded the way they were handled by the higher authorities caused a great deal of dissatisfaction in the lower deck. Days and weeks passed before the complainants could see their captain or CO. The delay in the disposal of complaints or eliciting a response eroded faith in the official channels of redressal. This was exemplified by the express reluctance of many rating-witnesses to state their grievances to the official boards of enquiry. It was futile to do so, they thought. This feeling was engendered by the indifference towards lower-deck welfare of officers from the highest to the lowest. Theoretically the divisional system4 was supposed to remove 'all sources of discontent by providing a ... machinery for the quick and just disposal of complaints and grievances'.s But it never worked. A large share of blame for this was apportioned to the junior officers, CPOs, POs or LHs, the persons who under the system were in immediate contact with the ratings. But the higher echelons could hardly escape their responsibility. The latter never bothered to acti-
132
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946
vate the system. There was rather a cheerful acceptance of inaction, disinterest and inefficiency in matters of divisional welfare and management. This was true of the entire administration from NHQ down to local command. As for NHQ, Delhi, it was a 'hot-bed of chaos, muddle and ineptitude'. So said Captain Learmont of HMIS Kakauri. 'It would seem that a colossus has been built up which has got completely out of control. In fact machine has taken charge'. The efficiency of NHQ could be judged by the fact that replies to even the most ordinary correspondence took months. To initiate a policy change or alter a regulation might take a year or more. The cumulative result was: 'the majority of the service ... are filled with a sense of frustration, dejection, despondency, if not disgust'.6 Captain Learmont and a few others in their evidence before the Commission cited instances of delay in the handling of matters affecting the welfare of the ratings. In fact NHQ hardly made any effort to win the trust of lower-deck personnel. The visits to or inspections of ships and establishments by its officials were generally perfunctory. Many of them had little contact with the personnel at the unit level except through paper work. And even in such work there was considerable inertia. Many of the letters from ratings were never answered and some not even considered? Decisions on immediate, urgent problems· of the men were kept pending indefinitely. There was no dearth of written instructions in this respect, and the question was a simple one of applying them. The staff officer on getting a document was supposed to study its implications and decide which branch besides his own was involved and take the responsibility of passing it on to the section concerned. This was seldom done. No attempt was known to have been made to introduce a 'human touch' in NHQ's style of work. Nor was it possible in view of the fact that for many years staff appointments in NHQ remained confined to the coterie of people known in the service as the 'John Company'. It was the same in FOB's office in Bombay. Here in Vithal House things were as bad as in NHQ: the same mechanical approach, callous indifference and long delays characterized its functioning in relation to the various ships and establishments under FOB's command. COs of these units and officers under them including DOs were no different from the top brass in NHQ or Vithal
A Hell-Hole
133
House in their attitude towards the problems of lower-deck personnel,8 They came into contact with their men only at defaulters or requestmen's tables or at routine times of falling in or mustering divisions. Distance from the lower deck was a status marker, a measure of prestige for the officers. All from 'burra sahibs' to 'chota' ones kept the ratings physically or otherwise at what they called 'respectable distance' to inspire awe among the latter. The only exceptions to this rule, the men said, were the women of WAC(I) and WRIN. Lieut. McRae and Col. Rudra, Security Liaison Officer in GHQ(I), pointed to the deep, overwhelming lack of contact between officers and ratings in RIN. With few exceptions all officers, European and Indian, Regular and Reserve, had no touch with their men. This was not unnatural given the physical division between upper and lower decks and the kind of relationships established in ships and estAblishments. Officers and men indeed lived 'in two worlds'.9 The few among the former who maintained contact with the latter:, were discouraged, warned and even reported against. According to ' Lieut. McRae 'it was [the] naval policy that officer and rating should not mix'. Intentionally or unintentionally it 'succeeded in imposing an almost impenetrable "cordon sanitaire" between the loWer deck and the quarterdeck, and the few ... officers who tried to break through the cordon were at once made to feel that they were doing the wrong thing'.lO A number of lower-deck witnesses submitted that the upper deck was normally out of bound for the ratings. ll One among them oomplained that once while stealing a look at an upper-deck officer,the RPO caught hold of him by the neck and banged his head against a table. l2 The ratings were constantly reminded of their inferior status not only by their situation in the lower deck but, more crucially, by the arrogant, overbearing manners of their officers. They were subjected to bad and, at times, butal treatment. This created among them a feeling of hostility to the upper detlt and eventually eroded their loyalty to the service as a whole. The RIN Enquiry Commission in its report said with hindsight: The evil could have been nipped in the bud, and prevented from developing into a festering cancer which indeed it did, had the officers in the RIN, high and low, paid proper attention to the rules of behaviour and discipline especially prescribed for their benefit in the navy.l3
134
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
Actually for the guidance of officers, apart from the 'Regulations,' clearer and more concrete instructions were given in the pamphlets 'Your Job in the Navy' and 'Leadership and Discipline'. All were expected to study these closely and abide by the code of conduct prescribed in them. But seldom they did it. None of the salutary instructions seem to have been remembered, much less practised by the overwhelming majority of officers, British and Indian, notwithstanding the advice that they should literally carry them in their pockets wherever they went. Back in 1942 this state of affairs came to the attention of Vice-Admiral Fitzherbert. He felt considerably disturbed over the frequent outbreaks of collective disobedience in individual ships and establishments and attributed it to the irresponsible behaviour of officers. As stated already, his directives to the officers concerned, intended to put things right, 'failed to have the desired result. On the whole COs of HMI ships and, ~stablishments continued to act in disregard of RIN regulations and instructions. As a rating put it, 'the officers do not act according to printed regulations but make their own rules and act according to that.'14 They were above any formal code of conduct or discipline. Every officer thought himself a lord. If ever any rating tried to draw his CO's attention to the 'regulations', he was told: 'My ship, my order, I don't care about regulations.'ls Once when a telegraphist reqliested his Captain to verify his complaint about food from others, the officer said: 'The Captain is the lord of the ship. My ship, my order. Captain is the officer of the ship, not the telegraphist.'16 His words were law, final and binding. The officer's power derived from his status. It did not flow through the grid of naval rules or regulations. Its exercise at the quarterdeck level was indeed governed by the kind of law just referred to. Rewards were distributed and punishments awarded according to it. Rewards often came to the ratings as personal favours from their officers.17 The men were given to understand that their welfare would only come through the 'benign benevolence' of the higher-ups. Similarly punishment followed nothing other than the latter's personal whims.ls Often it was unjust, and the ratings were expected to accept it without a murmur. As arbitrariness and injustice multiplied the officers' claim to _ their men's obedience floundered. Their orders ceased to bind or restrain and bred resentment. 'Men do not resent discipline; they do
A Hell-Hole
135
not resent just punishment, but they do resent injustice.'19 The upper-deck response to their resentment against undue punishment; 'punishment not known to regulations', was: 'We are the people who made these regulations and we can do what we like.'20 A notion prevailed in the naval hierarchy that 'if an officer charges a man with an offence, the officer must not be let down irrespective of the justice attached to the case.'21 His 'prestige' had to be upheld. The rating did not have to be given a hearing or an opportunity to defend himself before being punished for the alleged offence.22 For example: once a store writer was sleeping outside his barracks as he had to get up at 3 a.m. for his early morning duty. The quartermaster was scheduled to come to awake him, and he was supposed to avoid causing any disturbance to other inmates of the barracks at that hour of the night. Lieut. Gulati, the rating said in his evidence, 'came and straightway started abusing me because I was sleeping outside'. The writer tried to explain it was the usual practice but the officer would not listen. He was marked 'defaulter' and given 'No. 11 and No. 12 punishments'.'13 Again a signalman of Investigator found his sleeping space in the mess deck flooded with sea water and lay down on the lower bridge. The 'ship regulations' did permit it but Lieut. Comdr. Bond was not bothered: he kicked the rating out of the place without giving him a chance to explain himself.24 The lower-deck witnesses cited many such cases but, as they said, usually the wrong-doer was not punished. Often the complainants got the stick. The signal rating kicked by Sub-Lieut. Lawrence had a taste of this. Commander Karmarkar, when approached by the man, told him that he could take no action because 'the officer had not kicked him hard enough'.2S 'Discipline' was a lash to gag complaints and keep the lid on 'heightened atrocities'. It meant punishment. The officer who could inflict the maximum punishment in disregard of regulations was upheld as a strict disciplinarian. In addition to Comdr. King and Capt. InigoJones, Lieut. Coltham, Lieut. Sutherland, Lieut. Comdr. Kilburn, and Sub-Lieut. Hill,26 figured prominently in this history-sheet of 'fame'. To strike terror into the minds of lower-deck personnel and extract their unquestioning obedience the officers exhibited every now and then what they called 'power of command'.27 It was the capacity to shout the loudest, abuse in the filthiest and hit the hardest.. The frequent demonstration of this power was taken as an indi-
136
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
cation of the toughness of their character, considered so essential to im.press the ratings. The indiscriminate showering of filth and indignities on the lower-deck personnel was regarded as the proof of their possession of the power of command. Generally it was typical of the British officers, said Lieut. Sachdev, to use in their address 'piercing words' like 'bloody fool', 'bastard' 'swine' or 'baboon' and expect the ratings to bear it.28 These were not abuses, just 'normal naval terms' in their view. A number of deshi officers outdid their foreign masters in this. For Warrant Schoolmaster Rashid 'bloody, behan chod' was the 'usual way of addressing the ratings'.29 The officers believed that to get work done the men had to be cursed and treated 'like pariahs'.30 A great deal of shouting and bullying was considered useful for the purpose. Senior rates, CPOs, and POs did not escape the abuses and assaults which were more the lot of lower rates. Once a young officer commanding an auxiliary vessel in Calcutta told Captain Learmont that 'he had got his men completely under his thumb, and illustrated his remark by pressing his thumb on the table' .31 Tha.t was how the lower deck was to be kept under control, opined most of the officers. Those few who thought of other methods of control, preferred persuasion more often to coercion were called 'wet' and 'very soft'. They were told not to talk to the 'menials' and lose their 'personality and dignity' thereby.32 'The keen divisional or executive officer who wanted things for his men and ... mixed with [them] ... was frowned at [and] reported as "agitator types" or verbose types'.33 If a junior officer gave his aggrieved men a hearing and tried to explain things to them he would be told by his senior 'why so much talk, why so much reason, why don't you say - do it or go to jail'.34 He must say 'shut up', 'fuck off and thus turn them away. Those CPOs ·or POs could not howl and shriek at their 'inferiors' were seldom certified as having 'power of command'.
If a PO or CPO does his job 100% ... but he does not shout at ratings unnecessarily or takes the side [of] or looks after the ratings' welfare, or listen to rating's grievances, then that PO or CPO is not.liked and appreciated and he will not be kept for long time. Remarks to such PO or CPO are given: "very efficient, hard working, very popular among the ratings but power of command not good.... So to have the remark - "power of command good" [so essential for their promotion and good posting] POs and CPOs [must] treat the ratings badly.35
137
A Hell-Hole
Good officers were those who could maJce their men behave like 'sheep', bereft of 'all initiative and thinking power'.36 They had to be able to enforce 'servile discipline'. Free thinking and initiative, it was feared, might result in disobedience or mutiny. It had to be killed. And it could be done through constant abuse, both verbal and physical. Through it alone the 'boys and butlers' could be rendered into an unthinking, manageable conglomerate paying unquestioning obedience to their superiors.
* A clue to this lies in the colonial cultural background of officer-recruits, foreigners or 'natives'. Quite a number of them were in their civilian life estate managers, planters or coolie supervisors.37 They were used to starting their day with alcohol and to bullying and harassing Indian labour.38 They were not required to change their habits after entry. Those from other professions soon acquired these . vices from the upper-deck life. On the other hand, the recruits from England underwent a metamorphosis as soon as they reached the shores of the colony. There was an 'overnight change' in 'their sense of v..aJues.and ... standards of morality - their very dust is turned into gold by the alchemy of the Indian atmosphere'.'YJ All of a sudden the Englishman found himself in the position of a sahib and in no time imbibed his attitude towards the natives. It was the attitude, high and mighty, condescending and insulting, of a member of the ruling race towards the ruled. He behaved like one who had kindly consented to shorten his precious life by living in the 'blasted' climate to lead the 'slaves' in a naval service, hitherto his national monopoly. In England he might have lived in a tenement and survived on tips in a restaurant or a hotel or worked as a junior clerk or belonged to the RN lower deck. But out in the colony he had to be able to lead a sahib's life and get enough dough for it. Often he had to deal with men superior in education, technical proficiency or manners but he was their 'lord' and had to maintain his 'superiority' as such. His prestige was what mattered. Extra pay and allowances, better living conditions and a host of other facilities were the props to show up his prestige, and 'discipline' was its protective shield. The average British officer in RIN as in the Indian Army showed utter disregard and contempt for his men's sentiments and susceptibilities. He was igitorant of Indians, their culture and tradition. This
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was a matter of great pride. Seldom did the British officers try to learn Hindustani beyond a very crude version of it consisting mostly of abuses. The men's social customs and religious practices were openly ridiculed. Drinking and debauchery were often their only pastime. The exceptional few like Capt. Learmont and Lieut. McRae who showed some considerations for their ratings fell out with the higher authorities, were 'chopped off and transferred from one ship or establishment to another and finally sent home invalided or otherwise.40 The rest contributed to making the lower-deck life a 'hellhole on God's earth'. The Indian officer was supposed to be perfectly loyal to the' . Crown which adorned his cap, button and baton. Several times a day he had to salute the Union Jack or White Ensign and chant 'God Save the King'. He had to fall in line with or imitate -the British officers in every respect, especially their taste and outlook. While a British officer would fly into a rage if Indian music was played within his earshot41 , his native counterpart was expected to appreciate and sing western music. If he could not handle knife and fork properly, the Indian officer was declared unfit for company at the mess table. Liquor might not be part of his social life but in the navy he had to form the habit. Otherwise he would be considered unsocial. He had to parrot his white superior's wholesale condemnation of freedom fighters or of whom they called 'Jai Hind bastards'. Those who did not join in were politically suspect and were blacklisted, and their advancement was blocked. To 'get on' well in the service the Indian officer had to labour hard to speak 'propah' English and outdrink, outdance and outsing the British. He had to judge Indian politics with the same 'impartiality' and insist on -'discipline' with the same vehemence as did the laUer.42 Efficiency was never the prime consideration in matters of promotion and posting. The capacity to please\ the white superiors and compromise his izzat was what mattered most. The best way to cross all hurdles was to make onself 'popular' at 'Gin' time.43 Excepting a few like Sub-Lieut. Qasim, Lieut. Mahendra Pal Singh or Sub-Lieut. Hasan the average Indian officer'was not bothered about the welfare of his countrymen in the lower deck. He was more keen about managing an extra stripe or wangling a shore appointment. He spent most of his time in nattering his white superiors, in mixing drinks and getting good reports for promotion and
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position. 'The mess atmosphere in "Dhun Raj Mahal",' wrote Kusum Nair, 'reminds one of any cheap pub where small talk is the order of the day. In the rounds of "Canadian Club Whisky" and "Dry Gin" the voice of half-starved ratings is completely drowned. Drink and WRINS dominate the talk'.44 The sole aim of an Indian climber in the service was to play 'safe' and remain loyal and ever-ready to pick up the crumb that fell from his white superior's table. He would feel obliged to bow down to the latter's insulting taunts or remarks in mute self-deprecation. As Lieut. Vasudeva told the Commission: 'The few Indian officers who did succeed in getting on in the service did so only by making strained efforts at currying favour with British officers. Self-respect was often the price for admission into the charmed circle' .45 The extent to which an Indian officer could go in running down his countrymen comes out through the public remark of Comdr. Karmarkar: 'no Indian officer [excepting himself, of course] is fit for permanent commission.'46 He disgraced even the imperial opinion in this respect. The Indian officers of his tribe indeed played an abominable part both before and after the February strike. They carried tales, spied on their men and even punished a number of them for their anti-British feeling. As one contemporary wrote, they preferred 'to play the role of master detectives and hounds and unnecessarilY attribute [extraneous] political motives to the genuine discontent of the ratings which ... [took] the form of cutting the halliards of the signal masts or hoisting shoes in the place of the White Ensign' .47 After the strike they were most insistent on handing out stiff punishment so that men in the navy never dared to rise again. Deshi regltlarwallas attempted to be as British as they could: they aped and at times outdid their foreign masters in brutality. 11
The story of lower-deck life as revealed through the evidence of ratings before the RIN Commission was a harrowing tale of racial discrimination and humiliation. The harsh treatment by the whites was taken as their racial arrogance. A few Indian officer-witnesses admitted that colour bar was present throughout RIN. In speaking of the highest office in Bombay Comdr. S. Gill commented: Vithal . House, with the exception of Rear Admiral Rattray, could boast of quite a number of officers who furnished 'as good example of antiIndian bias as that of Natal' .48 Another Indian Officer added:
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Coupled with inefficient organization was a negative spirit which pervaded the entire service. There was a high and mighty attitude on the part of British officers from top to bottom. I think only a self-deceived fool could deny that there has been a spirit of racial hostility and at times contempt in varying degrees throughout the service. ... In any naval ship or establishment the British officers tended to form separate cliques. Exclusivenes~ has been the rule; healthy mixing the exception.49 It is not necessary to multiply such statements to affirm that racial discrimination was rampant in RIN. A British officer explained: it was bound to be so as long as the 'colour and race types' existed in the service.50
The evil of racial prejudice took many forms and exhibited itself in many ways. Broadly the Indian ratings' complaints in this . , respect were two-fold: (i) they were held in contempt by their white superiors and treated as inferiors and (ii) certain privileges enjoyed by their British counterparts were denied to them. These grievances could not be dismissed as being sentimental. They had a strong basis in facts. The abuses frequently hurled at them, such as 'Blackies', 'Kala Indians', 'Black Bastards' or 'Yellow Bellied Swines' had a direct reference to their colour or race. The Indians were inferiors this was sought to be rubbed into their mind by their white superiors. Often they were slighted, insulted and discriminated against on this ground. The entire RIN regime was affected by colour prejudice, and many of their troubles were due to the white domination over it, felt the Indian ratings. When the hostilities began, the British government appealed to Indians to join the navy and fight against the Nazi cult of race superiority, for the equal rights of all nations and the establishment in the world of four freedoms set out by Roosevelt. The discriminatory treatment meted out to them on enrolment seemed, in the context of these appeals, treacherous. It could hardly be justified on grounds of merit performance. Whenever during the war called upon to serve together with RN ratings or men of other navies, the Indian ratings proved they could hold their own. Their performance in various theatres of operation could indeed compare with that of others. Even the imperial opinion testified to the achievements of RIN rat-
or
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ings in all departments of war such as attack on enemy submarines, communication or mine-laying or sweeping. But they got none of the facilities of their RN counterparts. When they staked their claims, they were insulted or assaulted. The Indians could not explain the disabilities they suffered except in terms of racial discrimination. It is not that they resented being 'kept up to the mark' or made to work longer but that RN ratings for no other reason than the colour of their skin received preferential treatment. Lieut Sheppard, when asked by the RIN Commission whether this was exactly what Indian ratings felt, answered promptly: 'it represents the feeling I would have had in their position.'51 Both during the war and after a good number of Indian personnel were sent abroad, and their experience was bitter. The immigration laws in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and other countries were a glaring example of the existence of colour bar. The treatment they got in UK, South Africa and elsewhere was indeed outrageous. R. Charles was one among the ratings selected for a 'UK party' in 1943. In a statement to the Commission he described his experience on the way to England and disembarkation there. Aboard S.S. Afouretania Lieut. Jones forced some seamen to clean lavatories and bathrooms and others to clean officers' dining hall and recreation rooms, wash their plates and polish their shoes.52 At Port Suez they were not allowedto :~se the ship's crane to lift huge rations for six months. It was not meant for the Indians, they were told by Lieut. Jones. At Alexandria at 2 0' clock at night the RIN ratings were forced to carry about 200 Polish girls' luggage. In the 'home of democracy' England they faced th,e worst. Charles continued: Once ... on weekend leave to Perth ... I went to a YMCA where I was pushed by an RAF sergeant and all the British sailors and soldiers shouted "Blackie". The whole night I slept in the [Crewe] station. Several times I was abused by many British forces in England such as in train, bus, cinema ... even on roads. Once I took some time to stake the wire in Scapa Flow. For that Lieut. Erwin said "what makes me to join the Blackie navy."53 Another rating, C. Kumar, was part of a group that left Bombay on 13 June 1942 in a merchant ship. On way to Durban they were ordered to clean toilets, polish the white officers' shoes and wash
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their clothes. All those who protested against such duties of 'disagreeable nature' were given No. 11 punishment for 15 days, especially the 'ringleaders' more serious one. On 5 August they boarded Manchester and sailed for UK. This time also we were opposed to do [the] same work as before. The RN ratings and BORs ... in the same ship got 2nd class accommodation, and "Blackies" got lowest class journey. When we refused to clean lavatory and to polish white personnel shoes, the authorities appointed British soldiers to charge beyonet against us. ,.. Everywhere in London we were treated like dogs and were called "BIackie Indians" - especially in the Union Jack Club. When we arrived in Portsmouth 110 Indian ratings were packed into two small rooms, and there we got the work of cultivators. The~ food we got was uneatable, and after complaining 20 ratings got rigorous imprisonment.54 From Portsmouth these ratings were drafted to HMIS Camatic under the command of Lieut. Hamilton. The Red Cross supplied for them 110 blankets which the Captain refused to distribute and kept in his cabin. On arriving at Gibraltor they requested CO to issue the blankets. The officer replied: 'These are not for the Blackies'. Some ratings insisted, because they were unable to stand the cold. For this 'offence' 20 of them were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Already in Durban they were subjected to many indignities and disabilities which the men of RN or Dominion navies never sUffered. C. Kumar added: We got down in Durban and were handed over to RN officerin-charge of the Rest Camp; the work we got there was to clean RN tents, wash their clothes, and to make garden for them. After a great deal of hardship, we refused to do these works and were awarded 20 days' "liberty stop";. further we were warned that in future if we fail to carry out these works we will be given rigorous imprisonment. We were not allowed to draw any ... article from RN canteen as because we were "Blackie". There was ticket concession for RN ratings but not for RIN Imen] ... When we complained about it, we got the reply from Lieut. J.B. Blacket, RN
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if c of the Rest Camp, "The slaves are not entitled to get any ticket concession."ss In Durban Indian ratings found benches and seats in the railway station marked 'only for Europeans,.s6 There was a restaurant on the seaside where they were not allowed to enter, and, again, a cinema hall where admission was restricted to Europeans. In travelling with BORs they were made to fall in line with aluminium plates in hands, and food was served that way, whereas the former were provided with chairs and tables for messing. In Mombasa RN ratings got second class accommodation in East African railway while their RIN counterparts were given the worst facility. Both at that place and Massawa the service clubs were out of bound for 'black Indians' and the doors of stores closed to them.57 Another rating-witness, Abdul Gaffoor, told the RIN Commission that he was abused and assaulted by RN ratings in Khoramshahr and Bahrain. It took him long time to lodge complaints with the authorities and meanwhile the culprits were sent away. Gaffoor found RN hospitals abroad averse to admitting Indian lower ranks and giving them necessary medical care and attention. In the hospital of HMS Emphrates, Khoramshahr, an RN SBA refused to change his bandage and give him other services he needed.s8 Nearer home ill Colombo and Rangoon RIN men were treated no less shabbily. Able Seaman Abdul Latif was admitted to a hospital in Colombo. All its other patients were Englishmen, and he alone was forced to clean his bedding and other things.59 A few days after the capture of Rangoon the Indian ratings were chosen out of the men of different nationalities for the most unsavoury work. Here is an account by an Indian officer: The Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia Command, ordered a Victory Parade there. Ships in [the] harbour were given various jobs of work in order to make the parade a success. "KISTNA" had to send a party of 40 ratings in the mornings and in the afternoons ... to sweep the streets of Rangoon, clean thedraills, remove dead bodies and to get rid of stagnant waters and foul smell. ... these boys of the RIN who were already browned off on account of discriminatory treatment ... in Colombo and Trincomalee were now to clean the
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streets ... [they] cleaned the streets as [they] ... were told to do and were made a laughing stock of [themselves] ... in the eyes' of BORs who were stationed ashore and were watching [them] ... with contempt. One of the BORs actually came forward and started "pissing" in one of the drains which was being cleaned by one of [the] men a few yards away down stream. This irritated my men still further ... My men refused to work any further and came back on board leaving the work half undone. 60 Even under the pain or threat of punishment the RIN ratings aboard ships at anchor or on steam outside home waters or shore establishments abroad did not accept such humiliations without protest. Their pent-up resentment and anger surfaced again and again even during the critical war years.
* The discrimination, humiliation that the Indian rating suffered abroad, galling though it was, was nothing compared to what he faced daily at home. He could not put up with the indignities heaped on him in his own country by the British officers who drew fat salaries from the contributions raised from his people. He could not understand why RN personnel should be given preferential treatment in India or why should they even here enjoy certain privileges denied to RIN ratings. He put the discrimination to racism. The differential treatment, he concluded, was due to no other reason than the fact that RIN was managed and controlled by the white officers with strong anti-Indian bias. Otherwise why should he be made to suffer the disabilities which RN men were never subjected to ot placed in a comparatively disadvantageous position in RIN itself? He felt indeed that the British personnei camouflaged their ignorance and unsuitableness by the superiority they arrogated to themselves. Many a British officer scarcely attempted to conceal his contempt for Indian subordinates and freely discussed his dislike at mess tables. the latter as a race were ill-born, uncultured and unfit for service - such an anti-Indian feeling was expressed without restraint and often in the presence of native officers. The mess leading hands or stewards passed on this to the lower deck, causing great resentment there.
I
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Very few among the British officers had any sympathy for their (Indian) men. It was rare to catch on them a genial smile or hear them talk without arrogance. Haughty bossing and senseless abuse took the place of politeness and civility.61 Vice-Admiral Godfrey's warning that Indian ratings intensely disliked what were called normal naval terms went unheeded.62 Often they misbehaved in utter disregard of the regulations, and their conduct fell far short of the standards expected of them. Technicaliy, as a seaman with long tradition behind him, the British element might be superior to his Indian counterpart but he could make no such claim as regards courtesy and manners. On the contrary he appeared to lack elementary gentlemanly qualities. A good many among the white officers indulged in excessive drinking and womanizing. There was hardly any adherence to the letter of the law, and they used their discretionary power without limit. The bar was kept open beyond the normal hours and the women brought in remained on board till late night. The officers were often found drunk and disorderly in the wardroom or on the .quarterdeck. Their behaviour under the influence of alcohol was unruly and disgraceful. They would break furnitures, electrical fittings and glass wares and attack Indian personnel. The parties on board ships and establishments were not always innocent fun. There were brawls and even nude dances. Lieut. Vasudeva said in his evidence: 'I was personally present in many of these parties. Subsequently I heard of the utterly contemptuous remarks of the ratings at what the officers did the night before.'63 Another spoke in details of the 'rule of drunkards' in HMIS Circars. I have been watching with disgust and shame the behaviour of officers throughout these months. The chief actors in this shameful drama ... [have] been the overwhelming majority of Europeans ... Almost every Sunday officers got drunk and badly misbehaved. On the farewell dinner to Lieut. Parker ... officers got drunk, sang dirty songs and took each others pants off and ran about in the parade grounds and billets of the officers at midnight. ... That was not the end of it. Officers naked as they were walked into others officers cabin and woke them up. ... Even the president of the mess Lieut. Comdr. Currie who looked to be rather sober was a party to this show and easily agreed to the young officers enthusiasm to tear his slacks off.64
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To gorge in liquor and indulge in carnal pleasure, to go naked and dance wildly or to behave indecorously and create noisy scenes that was what was culture for their white superiors, thought the Indian ratings. Otherwise how could the former, after all these shameful acts, go on boasting about their culture and cursing the latter as 'junglees', 'mannerless bastards' or 'uncivilized barbarians'?6S The Indians indeed resented the incomparably greater personal freedom granted to the white personnel. More so because the latter often misused it. It was argued that if the British personnel could do whatever they liked, the Indians should be allowed to enjoy their spare time or 'liberty'. But this was never permitted. The white officers had almost unlimited facility to go ashore, bring in girls and arrange parties. They often did this in full sight of their men who could not invite guests and have a 'good time' with them on board. Ill-fed as they were the Indian ratings saw the officers entertaining themselves and their friends or 'sweet hearts' in a lavish style. This accounted for their caustic remarks about the officers' 'gay drink and dance parties' and the manner in which they behaved in them. 66 The men detested the work they had to do for such parties. Mohd. Ismail said: The officers used to bring girls from the shore ... booze during nights and make merry on upper decks. This [deprived] ... the ratings of their sleep. Some of us had to do boat pulling throughout the night for these officers and their girls 67 That was not all. After the parties the Indian ratings were ordered to clean the cutlery, dining hall or wardroom. The RN ratings were no better. On pay day and for some time thereafter they would return to barracks at the end of an evening's debauchery and make a racket under the influence of alcohol. They would sing and dance till late night, and would not be bothered about disturbing the RIN ratings sleeping in their barracks or bunks. They were free to enjoy their 'liberty'.68 The RN men, found in a drunken condition or with girls, were never brought to book while, on the other hand, their RIN counterparts caught in a similar situation by the service police, were dealt with seriously, their liberty was stopped immediately.59
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The Indian witnesses (including a few officers), in their evidence before the Commission, cited numerous such instances of discrimination. In many ships and establishments while the British officers and men played bridge or had a nap, the Indian ratings were detailed to chip paints or gun crew to drill in the hot sun.70 The British ratings had easy access to the 'charmed circle' in which the white officers moved. The latter often entertained the men in their wardrooms. A RN rating, no matter whether he was an ordinary seaman or a PO, was permitted, if necessary, to eat in officers' mess. Whereas an Indian rating, Sub-Lieut. Oasim mentioned, received a severe warning for taking a cup of hot water from the officers' galley, and even the cook who supplied it was not spared by the white officer.71 The RIN men were prohibited from on-duty smoking. But this did not apply to their RN counterparts. Once a senior Indian writer could not return to his residence because of bad weather and started smoking in his office. He was immediately pulled up by his European boss. The same officer was found lighting up cigarettes for his RN subordinates. On one occasion Sub-Lieut. Mehta complained to his white superior about an RN rating smoking on the deck. The reply he got was: 'Oh Mehta! Leave the RN people to me'.72 The RIN men were forced to wear full uniform even in sultry weather. They could not go without topees from the place of duty to their residence or vice versa. Whereas RN ratings were found in shorts, without topees or anything else. They dressed slovenly, and senior British officers themselves cared little for dress regulations. One CO used to come to his office in all manners of rig including multicoloured dress. But the Indian ratings were punished for the slightest violation of clothing regulations.73 The high standards of 'discipline' required of the RIN men were not applicable to their RN counterparts. In one establishment the former were asked to double from the gate to CO's office but the latter were exempted from this order. The British ratings need not salute, if at all, properly.74 They were not required to talk to their superiors or behave with them as submissively or serviley as was considered to be essential in the case of Indian ratings.15 Further RIN POs and CPOs were told not to bother about RN ratings. The latter's misconduct was dealt with leniently. 'No. 11 punishment' awarded so frequently to Indian ratings were seldom inflicted on their British counterparts. Sub-Lieut. Oasim once reported to Lieut. Durnford in writing against an RN rating for disobeying his orders in the presence of some Indian lower ranks.
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Some days went by before he was told by Lieut. Fleming, SCO, that 'no action could be taken against the rating, and it was a great favour. of the RN to loan a few of their staff.'76 Had an Indian rating done the same thing while on loan to RN, he would not have been spared, Sub-lieut. Qasim was sure. Another witness deposed that if there were two personnel, one European, and the other, an Indian, and both were guilty of the same offence the latter was sure to be punished while, on the other hand, the former might not even be reprimanded. Quite a number of British officers believed they could illtreat the Indian ratings with impunity.77 Lieut. Coltham, for example, used to smack the Indian ratings whenever he felt like. Others abused and beat them for minor faults. One among them, Lieut. Elliot, / boasted of giving an Indian rating fifty kicks at a time.78 Such maltreatment of RN men was unimaginable. The average British rating got away with many things simply because of his being British. He got undue preference in promotion and posting over the heads of more deserving Indians. The resentment among RIN lower-deck personnel at the sight of RN promoted products was justifiable: the latter behaved most atrociously. The ' RIN ratings were supposed to put up with humiliations at their hands and never to grumble over them. Those who complained were the 'defaulters' and punished. The average RN rating seldom compared favourably with his RIN counterpart on counts of working hours and discipline but he got far better facilities. The differences in their service conditions were obvious. The living arrangements for RIN lower ranks were horrible. The sleeping space was so inadequate that many had to lie on the floor in verandah or drill sheds. Similarly in ships the Indian rating had to sleep on the deck, locker or table. His bedding consisted of a rough blanket and a straw pillow. Whereas the RN rating was given spacious accommodation and comfortable bedding everywhere. The kits issued to BORs presented a sharp contrast to the ones meant for their Indian counterparts. All stocks of turkish bath towel, tooth brush and shaving kit were reserved for the former. Similarly stark was the discrimination during travelling. In a troop train BORs would be comfortably stretched out with only legitimate number in each coach. On the other hand, it was a common thing to find the Indians herded together in one or two compartments. At times RIN ratings including POs and CPOs were . forced to vacate their reserve seats and remove their bedding from
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the bunks.'79 In travelling together they never shared a common canteen with BORs. Often important stations did have service canteens for the white personnel but none for their Indian counterparts. Besides games were arranged every now and then for RN men and transports were provided to take them direct from ships or establishments to the fields and back again. No such arrangements were made for RIN lower deck. so They could not demand transport facility. For, as one British officer said, 'Indians are not soft enough to sit in carso'S1 To cap all disgrace the RIN ratings were thrown out from allied service clubs and stores in Calcutta, Travancore, Mandapam and elsewhere in their own country.
* The men's gall rose at this, and increasingly they began to fret and fume against such a state of affairs. Harsh treatment, excessive punishment and gross discrimination, in addition to recruitment frauds and broken promises about the nature and conditions of service, breached the ratings' notions of justice and fairness. Bullying, abuses, insults and assaults broke the norm of behaviour their officers were expected to abide by. The enforcement of discipline or infliction of punishment as such was not unjust in their view. But the atrocities perpetrated in their name were .gefinitely so. The naval subalterns' relations with upper deck, in their belief, were bound by certain norms of reciprocity. The men's obedience to their officers was contingent upon the latter's fulfilment of their obligation to be just and fair to them. Its non-fulfilment was a breach in the norm, and entitled the ratings to act to secure its fulfilment. Besides the men's idea of fair treatment entailed a principle of parity with the ratings of the Royal Navy, and its violation called for protest. To the utter chagrin of the British brass hats the Indian ratings argued that so long as they served the same King-Emperor, any discrimination between the RN men and themselves was unfair. Their sense of fairness was injured whenever they found themselves being denied or deprived of something that was granted to their British counterparts and therefore rightly due to them. The RIN lower ranks considered the inequality between the latter and themselves at home more outrageous and revolting than what they experienced abroad. A sense of moral outrage lay behind much of their indignation at the treatment meted out to them by the naval elite. The officers' acts of arbitrariness and injustice undermined the moral standing of their authority
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with the men. The latter resented and protested against such acts. And by February 1946 this crystallized into a service-wide phenomenon. References and Notes 1. la.
Cited in RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 18. 'Findings', File No: NL 9978. Also 'Findings', File No. NL9974 and 'Findings', 'File No. NL 9909.
2.
'Findings', File No. NL 9920.
3.
'Findings', File No. NL 9939, Part I.
4.
The system was so called because the ship's company in any naval unit was 'divided into divisions, each ... being under a Divisional Officer . responsible to the head of his department for the conduct and wellbeing of his division'. RIN Mutiny Sr. No .. 6, p. 261.
5. 6.
ibid., p. 262. BW 73: Capt. P.R. Learmont, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vo!. Il, p. 669.
7.
DW 27: Lieut. Comdr. A.K. Mukerji, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vo!. Il,
8.
In the witness box of the RIN Commission accusations were flung by officers from FOCRIN· down to COs of ships and establishments in all possible directions. FOB and other officers under him blamed NHQ. The latter blamed the Military Finance Department which retaliated by attacking NHQ. FOB's office was accused by COs of ships and establishments under Bombay Command, of maladministration and favouritism. Then there were mutual recriminations among Regular, Reserve and Volunteer Reserve officers, one caste tending to run down another in the manner of 'the pot calling the kettle black'. The Regulars complained that most of the Reservists were incompetent, while the latter said that upon them fell the donkey-work of the service but the final direction and control of policy lay with the former. Similarly British and Indian officers attributed to each other deficiencies of character and capacity. On the other hand, in the eyes of lower-deck personnel the 'straight-stripers', regulQ/Wallas were more guilty than Reservists or Volunteer Reservists, and the deshi officers were no less to blame than their foreign counterparts. The usual method adopted by all was to shift the burden of responsibility from one's own shoulders and lay it at others' doorstep. Meanwhile the ratings' grievances continued to remain unredressed or their requests unheeded. BW 27: M.P. Singh, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vo!. I, pp. 3401; DW 27: Lieut. Comdr. Mukerji, op.cit., pp. 206-8; BW 74: Lieut. McRae, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vo!. Il, pp. 698-9, 703; letter from
p.209.
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Sigamany, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 14 and Sub-Lieut. TA. Tousif Lodhi, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 13. 9.
DW 3: Col. Rudra, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. I, p. 43.
10.
DW 74: Lieut. McRae, op.cit., pp. 698,701. As Welfare Officer Lieut. McRae tried his best to maintain close off-duty contact with the ratings borne locally in HMIS India. But before long he was given to understand that evening visits to the lower-deck recreation room was strongly disliked by CO of the establishment. He was then left with the only alternative, to invite ratings to visit his home, and did so. The officer was again cautioned by his senior that he was lowering the position of an RIN officer and 'was bluntly charged with immoral motives'. Lieut. McRae referred to the case of another officer who drew his senior's wrath the same way. The officer in question was told by his CO that he was 'currying cheap popularity'. ibid., pp. 699-700.
11.
BW 65: H.L. Khosla, RIN Mutiny Sr. 3, Vol. H, p. 574.
12.
BW 2: AK. Mitra, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, pp. 8, 14.
13.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, pp. 7..60-1.
14.
BW 4: Izhar Mohd, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 25. Also Abdul Gaffoor, ibid, p. 277.
15.
Ldg. Tel. M.S. Khan illustrated this statement by reference to an incident in which he was involved. FP!, 30 May 1946. Sub-Lieut. Oza told the Commission that once an officer wanted to go ashore and asked one of his ratings to pull ropes. The man's hand was injured, and he pleaded his inability. Sub-Lieut. Oza himself offered the officer a lift but the latter said: 'Look here, Chum, it is my ship and my orders. The rating must come'. BW 94: Sub-Lieut. Oza, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. H, p. 1053.
16.
BW 51: Rahmat Khan, ibid., pp. 534-5.
17.
As noted in the previous chapter the grant of leave, promotion and so on depended largely on the sweet will of the upper-deck people. In addition an officer mentioned in his evidence: 'decorations wee drawn out of hat' and allocated among the favourites. Cited in RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 328.
18.
At Massawa Ldg. Tel. Abdul Gaffoor W;iS put in charge of W/T office on board HMIS Indus in the absence of his senior. One day he was ordered by the First Lieutenant of the ship to detail one rating evety morning to clean food rations. According to 'General Service Instructions' no telegraphist could be engaged in any other job except W/T. While cartying out his order Gaffoor made a 'request' to the officer, stating that as he had to maintain the W/T office it was difficult to
152
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
19.
spare a rating every morning from duty. Not only his difficulty was not taken into consideration,. he was made 'CaptaL'1's defaulter'. At the defaulter table the rating told CO that the First Lieutenant changed his 'request into a defaulter' in violation of regulations. CO dismissed his argument and applied on him his personal law rather than any regulation, applied what he called 'Ohm's law'. The officer said 'Do you know Ohm's law -'- IX == VfR. You people got a lot of resistance i1i. your body and you do not allow small currents to flow through you. I am therefore going to disrate you.' Abdul Gaffoor was terribly aggrieved: the officers could turn down his request but the regulations did not permit them to punish him like this. He did all he was ordered to and moved through the proper channel to make a request. On his return to India he pursued the matter but no action was taken against the officers. BW 24: Abdul Gaffoor, op.cit., pp. 277-8. RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 295.
20.
ibid., p. 299.
21. 22.
BW 73: Capt. Learmont, op.cit., p. 672. Let us take a few random examples: T.L. Saigal stated in his evidence: 'Once while I was in Cochin a rating was given punishment and his liberty was stopped. The Squadron Officer did not want to stop the liberty of the rating but he had to do it on the insistence of the officer who suggested that if that was not done he will lose his prestige'. BW 13: Saigal, RIN Mutiny, Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 132. Once a communication rating was asked by his First Lieutenant who was on watch with him, to prepare tea. He went down to the special mess and told one of th~ stewards that OOW wanted tea. When the rating came back to his place the officer said: 'I did not ask you to go and call the steward; I asked you to prepare the tea yourself.' The rating pleaded his inability to do so. OOW told him, 'All . right, you have disobeyed my orders'. He called CO through the voice pipe. The latter 'came straight on the bridge'. Immediately the rating was accused of slackness in duty, absenteeism and disobedience of orders. Later two more charges were added: he was drunk and unable to carry out his duty. The rating was allowed no self-defence and given No. 11 punishment for two weeks. He approached his DO and lodged a complaint but nothing came out of it. Finding no alternative the rating refused to carry out the punishment. He was then handcuffed and put in a room near the steering gear 'full of steam'. After he lost consciousness the rating was taken out and kept in detention for 7 days. Finally he was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment. BW 52: A. Edwards, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. 11, pp. 548-9.
153
A Hell-Hole
Helms in his evidence dwelt on the atrocities committed by the 'Butcher of RIN', Capt. Inigo-Jones. The latter jailed countless num·ber of ratings just for appearing before him as defaulters. Helms cited the instance of a boy who got two months' pay cut for returning late from leave. Like everyone else the rating was supposed to appear in divisions neat and clean. But he could not; he did not have a single pie; he could not buy soap or pay dhobi for washing his clothes. He was denied monthly clothing allowance along with his pay. When the rating appeared before Capt. Inigo-Jones as defaulter, the latter did not allow him to say anything on his behalf, and sentenced him to jail. BW 16: Helms, RIN Mutiny St. No. 1, Vol. I, pp. 155, 156, 158. ~IN
23.
BW 6: Mohd. Nasrullah,
Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 81.
24.
BW 19: P.G. Bokil, ibid., p. 207.
25.
DW 28: K.G. Khullar, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. 11, p. 229.
26.
What Comdr. King did to tighten up 'discipline' in Ta/war has already been mentioned in chapter three. As for the 'Butcher of RIN' Capt. Inigo Jones Tei. Helms stated before the Commission that many ratings, unable to put up with the atrocities he perpetrated in the name of discipline, deserted and many others who did not found themselves within prison bars. BW 16: Helms, op.cit., p. 149~50. Another rating, Ldg. Tel. Akram, cited an instance of Capt. Inigo-Jones' high-handedness: a number of ratings including the witness demanded the increment in wages due to them and in consequence were put in cells by Lieut. Comdr.. Bird. When they were produced before Capt. InigoJones, the latter did not ask anything and gave them si.'{ 'cuts'. BW 23: HA. Akram, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, pp. 260-1. Lieut. Mahendra Pal Singh in his statement to the Commission alleged that Lieut. Coltham used to pounce upon his men and assault them for the slightest mistake. With reference to a firing practice he said: 'If the gun misfires ... the man pressing the trigger ... does not do it intentionally - then he [Lieut. Coltham] says: "Why the hell ... " and he catches hold of the man and he kicks[him].' BW 27: Singh, op.cit., pp. 333-4. Similarly Lieut. Sutherland was accused of abusing and smacking the ratings on one pretext or another. DW 10: Mahabat Khan, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. 11, p. 118 and DW 20: Ahmad Khan, ibid., p. 139. More serious allegations of ill-treatment ·against Lieut. Kilburn and Sub-Lieut Hill were reported to the RIN Commission. RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6., pp. 341 fr.
27.-
V.B. Rao in his evidence said: 'During my ... service I have not seen the officers cooperating with the ratings but only give an exhibition of powers.' BW 11: Rao, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 113.
28.
BW 83: Lieut. Sachdev, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. 11, p. 905.
.154
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
29.
'MA. Khan, one of the store-writers was taking a supply and on the road he was stopped by Warrant Schoolmaster Rashid who wanted to be given a lift. The store-writer told the officer that under the orders of the CO he could riot do so, and besides there was no accommodation as the lorry was full of supplies (patotoesetc.) ... When the store writer went back to his establishment he was sent for by Rashid who abused him. He started' the talk with the preface "bloody, behan chod" ... The store-writer was rriarked a defaulter'. BW 6: Mohd. Nasrullah, op.cit., p. 81.
30.
Sub-Lieut. Oza cited in RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 303.
31.
BW 73: Capt. Leannont, op.cit., p. 672.
32.
BW 27: Lieut. Singh, op.cit., p. 336. Interestingly an RAF Signal Officer issued to his white colleagues an 'order' re treatment of Indian subordinates: 'Be familiar with your (Indian) 'servants and you will need to kick their bottom to make them obey you.' It was added: 'All the servants should be handled with firmness that had made the European a highly respected resident in India'. In reply to. a question on the floor of Central Legislative Assembly on 15 April 1946 P. Mason, Joint War Secretary, said that his governrnent was aware of the order~ LAD, Vol. V, No. 10 (15 April 1946), p. 3944. Though the context is different it reinforces our argument.
33.
DW 27: Lieut. Comdr. Mukerji, op.cit., p. 210.
34.
BW 27: Lieut. Singh, op.cii., p. 340.
35.
M. Suleiman, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 14.
36.
BW 27: Lieut. Singh, op.eft., p. 334.
37.
ibid., p. 359. Also DW 5: Vice-Admiral Godfre'y, RIN Mu~iny Sr. No. 2, Vol. 11, p. 110 and M.P.K. Raman, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 15.
38.
Kusum Nair, The Al7ny of Occupation, p. 34. The authoress' views were based chiefly on her personal knowledge of the life in the army and the navy. She had close contact with the fighting forces: her husband, Lieut. P.N. Nair, formerly belonged to the navy and she herself was in WAC(I). FPJ, 24 May 1946. .
39.
Ravi, 'The Truth About RIN: An Inside Story', BI, 10 March 1946.
40.
BW 15: Bansilal, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, pp. 139, 145; BW 93: Lieut. Comdr. Balwant Singh, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. 11, p. 1035; Comdr. J.S. Ramdas, R~N Mutiny Sr. No. 14; DW 27: Lieut. Comdr. Mukerji, op.cit., p. 217. For his pro-Indian views Capt. Learmont's legitimate higher promotion was blocked. CO of HMIS Kakawi, a demobilization centre, the Captain himself ·was demobilized soon after
A.Hell -Hole
155
he gave upalatable evidence against NHQ in the witness box of the RIN Commission. Of course prior to his removal a medical board declared th\! veteran seafarer 'unfit' for further service in RIN. FP!, 1 & 6 June 1946. 41.
\
Lieut. Sobhani, the only officer who openly joined hands with the ratings on strike, said in a statement to the Commission: 'It was a common practice with the British officers on entering the ship wardroom to immediately switch off any Indian music that might be play. ing on the wireless even though an Indian officer would be sitting at the set.' They would not allow 'any of this "Bloody OHH OH" going on in' the wardroom or mess. FP!, 25·May 1946.
42.
KlIsum Nair, op.cit., p. 31.
43.
DW 27: Lieut. Comdr. Mukerji, op'.cit., p. 210.
44.
Kusum Nair, op.cit., p. 35.
45.
DW 28: Lieut. Vasudeva, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 369.
46.
DW 5: Vice-Admiral Godfrey, op.cit., p. 134. Comdr. Karmarkar himself got promotion because of 'favouratism'. He did not appear before the selection board for interview. Not only so. He was eventually made vice-president of the board. BW 76: Sub-Lieut. Qasim, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vo!. 11, p. 734.
47.
Ravi, op.cit.
48.
Cited in RIN Mutin~ Sr. No. 6, p. 473.
49.
BW 28: Lieut. Vasudt..'Va, op.cit., p. 368.
50.
Cited in RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 330.
51.
Cited in ibid:, p. 298.
52.
The same was the experience of Manzoor Elahi and others who were proceeding to UK on board Castle Lilies. DW 9: Elahi, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. Il, pp. 110, 1~5.
53.
Statement of R. Charles, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 12.
54.
Statement of C. Kumar, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 14.
55.
ibid.
56.
DW 9: Manzoor Elahi, op.cit., p. 116.
57.
BW 15: BansilaI, op.cit., p. 142. Also BW 22: A.K. Khan, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 250.
58.
BW 24: Abdul Gaffoor, op.cit., pp. 271, 274-5.
59.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 316.
60. 61.
Cited in ibid., pp. 319-20. Letter from Sigamany, op.cit.
"-
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
62.
BW 27: Lieut. Singh, op.cit., pp. 339, 358.
63.
BW 28: Lieut. Vasudeva, op.cit., pp. 369, 375. Also BW 77: Lieut. Hasan, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. 1I, p. 808.
64.
Sub-Lieut. Lodhl, op.cit.
65.
BW 16: Helms, op.cit., p. 162; BW 19: Bokil, op.cit., p. 209 and BW 67: Samuel William Ray, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. lI, p. 593.
66.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 506.
67.
Mohd. Ismail, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 12.
68.
BW 57: B.V. Abhyankar, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3,Vol. 1I, p. 555.
69.
BW 4: Izhar Mohd, op.cit., p. 27.
70.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 301. Also BW 15: Bansilal, op.cit., p. 143.
71.
BW 76: Sub-Lieut. Qasim, op.cit., p. 723.
72.
BW 57: Abhyankar, op.cit., p. 553.
73.
BW 30: Lieut. Ranjit, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 410. Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan in his evidence said: once when his party landed at Akyab, the CO 'ordered all of them to wear dress No. 6 day and night. The Z· RN ratings were subjected to no such restrictions. To wear this dress, when the temperature was very high, was extremely uncomfortable, and the RIN ratings felt miserable' in that attire. If anyone was found without that constume on even for five minutes, he was punished. Ldg. Sig. Khan himself had to double for 7 days as punishment once. FP], 30 May, 1946. On one occasion a 'boy' appeared in his watch duty without belt, and was kicked out by Signal Hawlis who was on loan from RN. Worse was the fate of Naseem, another boy, who was found at the mess table without proper dress on. BW: HI Helms, op.cit., pp. 153-4.
74.
Whereas Indian ratings were punished if they did not salute even after dusk. Once M.P.K. Raman and his friend V. Sequira were standing near RIN Barracks, HMI· Dockyard,. Bombay. They were busy 'reading the Morse Code, signalled by the Flasher lamp on the Flagmast at the Breakwaters'. At that time Sub-Lieut. Lane was passing along that way. It was dark, and they did not see him. In Raman's words: 'We felt somebody was pushing. We saw it was Sub-Lieut. Lane who gave a hit on the face of my friend callmg him a "black bastard". His complaint was that we did not salute him, though according to the custom of service there was no need to salute after sunset.' Raman, op.cit.
A Hell-Hole 75.
157
The Indian ratings who refused to meekly submit to their officers' dictates and argUed with them were punished. Once after hoisting colours in the morning P.G. Bokil tied the halliard. Lieut. Coltham came to him and said: 'This is not the proper way of tying the halliard'. The rating answered back: 'This is how I have been taught'. Angry Lieut Cottham told him: 'You are a mannerless bastard, yOI,l do not know how to speak, and unless you do it in the proper way you cannot go down and have breakfast'. He was made to stand there for two hours, and missed his breakfast. BW 19: Bokil, op.cit., p. 209. Another rating, Ramanathan, when asked by Engineei"-Lieut. Burke to do something which was not his job, argued with the officer. He maintained:· 'It is not my normal work. If you want me to do it I shall do it'. Li~ut. Burke told him: 'It is not a question whether I want you to do it or not. It is my order. You Indian dogs have no better business than to follow what we say'. Lieut. Burke reported this case of 'insut-nrdination' to Commodore Lawrence, and soon the rating got a transfer order as punishment. BW 58: B. Ramanathan, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. 11, p. 560.
76.
BW 76: Sub-Lieut. Qasim, op.cit., p. 723.
77.
In fact seldom any action was taken against a British officer for his illtreatment of (Indian) men. Once a pair of shoes belonging to a steward were missing. Quite a number of ratings were punished and their liberty was stopped. SA. Ali was one among them. He put in a request on 16 September 1944. The matter came to the notice of FOCRIN a few months later. He expressed surprise over the fact that for a pair of shoes so many ratings were punished, and ordered a probe into the matter. Still no action was taken. On the contrary FOB suggested the dropping of the matter. Till May 1946 no investigation was held. DW 1: Commodore Lawrence, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. l,p.65.
78.
BW 76: Sub-Lieut. Qasim, op.cit., p. 722.
79.
BW 65: H.L. Khosla, op.cit., p. 576. Also statements of Suleiman and Amir Ali, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 14. This happened not only in trains but in other places and on other occasions as well. Once an English ESNA show was arranged. The RIN ratings were allotted only one row of benches in the extreme rear, which could accommodate only a fraction of their strength. A PO who sat somewhere in the last row was forced to vacate the seat. Whereas BORs below the rank of PO and LH had the 'honour' of being seated with the Commissioned Officers. M.P.G. Menon, ibid. After the Delhi Victory Parade some ratings of HMIS Akbar
158
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 and Di/war were invited to a 'dinner party' hosted· by the Viceroy. When they went to attend it the men found that most of the seats allotted for them were occupied by BORs. They were told to sit on the ground and eat that way. The· ratings resented this shockingly differential treatment and refused to take anything. The RIN officers present there did nothing but to ask the police to see that the ratings accepted what they were offered and were seated on the ground. Amir Ali, op.cit. Lieut. Comdr. Balwant Singh in his evidence stated that back in 1942 he was forced to vacate his cabin aboard a ship to accommodate an European officer, and had to stay in the passage for a fortnight. Apart from lodging a complaint he requested CO to permit him to share a double-bunk cabin with another British officer. The reply he received was that 'there was not enough elbow room'. A few days later an RN CPO was accommodated in the same cabin where the Indian Officer of Lieutenant Commander's rank was refused a hunk. BW 93: Lieut. Comdr. Singh, op.cit., pp. 1036-7. The RIN ratings felt that if the Indian officers were placed in such a disadvantageous position, they themselves stood no chance so far as fair treatment was concerned.
80.
V.B. Rao recounted an incident that took place at Bhusaval station. A senior writer was turned out of a service canteen at the station which was serving tea and snacks for the British personnel. A British sergeant told him: 'You cannot get any tea here. ... You can buy it anywhere'~ The rating was warned: 'If you stay here, you will be necked out'. BW 11: Rao, op.cit., pp. 115-6.
81.
BW 21: Alif Uddin, ibid., p. 237.
6 A TALE OF THREE SHIPS
No matter whether the ratings' grievances were just or unjust, the naval law required every sign of resentment over them to be quelled forthwith. T.he regulations in fact made it impossible for men to voice their grievances effectively. No one could forward a complaint bypassing his immediate superior, the very person against whom he might have it to make. Nor could he combine with others to put up a joint 'request'. If two signed a complaint, it would be considered as mutiny and they would be punished accordingly. Under the rules a rating could not resign on any ground either. If his intention to leave the service was made known to the authorities, he would inevitably find himself within prison bars. Under the circumstances the officers_ could afford to remain indifferent to their men's grievances (represented by means of individual requests) and yet expect no protests on their part. But the ratings did protest even under combat compulsion. They protested as and when the conditions in the service seemed too_ oppressive and unjust to bear. Their protest took either the form of 'desertion', refusal of orders, avoidance of duties and so forth by individual ratings or that of collective defiance of authority. Both pointed to the ratings' will to protest out of their faith in a just order (which, they believed, provided for certain rights and facilities as minimum conditions for their service). The notion of justice and fairness permeated both - it was central to the ratings' recognition of the necessity of protest. Desertions reflected, if negatively, their indignation at the unfair means adopted by the authorities to recruit them or their breaking of promises about the nature and conditions of service in RIN. A rating had to register his protest 'against a regime that had perpetrated frauds on him and breached the trust he reposed in it. In deserting he did so - he sought to break out of the unjust system in protest. More 'positive' than this or other individual actions were those which the ratings initiated collectively out of an urge to restore justice, to erid injustice. The lower-deck response to
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
the atrocities of the naval elite was not as simple as mindless, instinctive reaction to its sufferings on account of them. It was predicated on a will to resist such atrocities and informed by an awareness of their violation of the code of morality. The recurrence of collective protests on board individual ships and establishments during the war years was indicative of a growing propensity on the part of the ratings to challenge and defy the authority of their· officers responsible for so many acts of arbitrariness and injustice, unbearable degrees of oppression and humiliation. But as usual the latter took no cognizance of the signal and learnt no' lesson from these 'mutinies' - they did not relent in their atrocities. Grievances and complaints piled up. Discontent engulfed the entire service. It soon caught fire and exploded into a formidable defiance of authority.
* On Monday 18 February 1946 the Talwar ratings woke up as usual in the morning. It looked as if nothing had happened the last evening. All went well till breakfast was laid on· mess tables. Fourteen more messes abstained from taking food. By the time divisions were sounded, the words 'no food, no work' passed through mouth, and no one fell in. The men of the 'silent service' turned vociferous discussing, explaining, arguing aloud. They were not as 'innocent' as Ldg. Tel. B.C. Dutt called them in his memoirs. Their shouts of 'Jai hind', 'Quit Talwar', and 'Down with British White Rats' rent the air. They picketed throughout the establishment, and plastered its walls with these siogans. The officers-on-watch were startled. The men themselves were surprised by the success of their audacious actions. Worried as they were, OOWs and EO could do little more than report the matter to the Commanding Officer and hang about in the wardrooms. Comdr. King was unwilling to face his men. At the first indications of 'mutiny' RN personnel undergoing training in the Signal School were withdrawn, WRINS sent away and ammunition removed from the place. Comdr. King's feelers, Lieut. Kohli, Lieut. Nanda and Ldg. Tel. Dutt, failed to pacify the ratings. The top brass of Vithal House, Rear Admiral Rattray, visited Talwar twice during the day but could not cut the ice. FOB's decision to remove Comdr. King as CO of the establishment could not appease the ratings. The latter stuck to their preference for Lieut. Comdr. Cole; they opposed
A Tale of Three Ships
161
the 'butcher' of RIN, Captain Inigo-Jones' appointment, and later that of its 'master-hound', Comdr. Karmarkar's. The entire administrative machinery in Taiwar was in complete disarray. The command structure collapsed. The lower-deck personnel had no one to obey. Talwar started the strike alone on the 18th morning. By sundown all communication organizations, except for Mahul W IT station and CCO, had joined in. The RN personnel brought in to maintain wireless communication failed to do the job. Within 48 hours or so the strike spread to almost all ships at anchor and on sea and establishments ashore here and abroad. Even the units at far-flung Aden and Bahrain· did not remain unaffected. 1 In all 74 ships, 4 flotillas and 20 shore establishments including three major naval bases joined the strike.2 More than 20,000 men were involved. It was near total and in that sense an entire wing of the Royal Indian armed forces went out of control for a number of days.
Here is a chronicle of events in three ships, one on land in Bombay, and two in stream, one in Karachi harbour and the other on the Arabian sea. Our choice is not wholly arbitrary. These seem to be the most prominent sites where the ratings' conflict with the naval elite or British armed might reached its height. I
In the afternoon of 18 February itself the ratings of Castle Ba"acks got the news of Talwar strike. Those who went ashore on 'liberty' returned with the information and spread it to the others in the barracks. In the evening many saw RN personnel going up the signal tower in Castles and understood that the ratings of the Dockyard Signal Station had refused to man it.3 But none including EO, Comdr. Streatfield-James, knew that things in Talwar had come to such a pass that Captain Inigo-Jones, CO of RIN Depot (which included among others Castle Ba"acks and Fort Ba"ocks) had to be transferred temporarily to the Signal School to relieve Comdr. King. Around 6.30 p.m. Comdr. Streatfield-James rang up Capt. InigoJones from his house t() ask if he had any specific order for him in view of what had happened in Talwar..The Captain told him that he was no longer in command of RIN Depot nor did he know who had been appointed in his place. Comdr. Streatfield-James then returned to Castles, and told the Officer-on-Duty, Sub-Lieut. Nisar Ahmed
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
Sayed to inform him if anything unusual took place at night. Nothing, however, happened after his departure.4 Early on Tuesday, 19th, morning many a copy of The Free Press loumalreached the Castles ratings. The news it carried about
the Talwar strike under banner headlines stirred the lower-deck personnel in Castles. The 'trouble' first broke out in the Drafting Reserve (old MTE) Barracks. None among their several hundred men took breakfast. TheY,came over to the main barracks and started picketing. Soon men from these barracks came down and joined in the fray. In the meantime a number of ratings from Talwar rushed into Castles and posted the picketers with latest information. Till breakfast time ODD had no inkling of trouble brewing anywhere in Castles. At about 7-45 a.m. Sub-Lieut. Sayed gave the Guard Commander rifles for colours. A little later he heard an unusual noise from the galleys and mess decks. After finishing with the colours he went straight to the trouble spot and asked several ratings .. what the noise was all about. No one answered him. Sub-Lieut. Sayed then came down to the quarterdeck and met Master-at-Anus Sher Alam. The latter told him about the trouble in Ml' Shed. By the time they reached the Shed none was inside. Wherever he approached the ratings to persuade them to have breakfast, ODD was hooted out. Helpless and puzzled Sub-Lieut. Sayed phoned up Comdr. Streatfield-James and informed him about the state of affairs in Castles. At about 8.15 a.m. he noticed a number of ratings coming out of the Drill Shed and heard them shouting 'bahar chalo'. A PO was surrounded by the ratings when he tried to stop them from 'breaking out'. Somehow he managed to extricate himself. 000 then 'stood in the gangway and dodged in their way'. He was overpowered by the men and thrown aside. On getting up Sub-Lieut. Sayed shouted for the gate to be closed. But a group of ratings led by Able Seaman Basimt Singh had already gone out. ODD and two POs tried to close the gate from either side. Those who were already out forced it open, pressing them between the gate and the wall. ODD then came back to the quarterdeck and appealed to the ratings assembled there not to break out of the establishment. About this time one PO came to inform him that Comdr. Streatfield-James was IO<;lking for him.5
A Tale of Three Ships
163
Comdr. Streatfield-James passed Cin to Capt. Inigo-Jones the information he received fromSub-Lieut. Sayed, and on the Captain's advice, rang up FOB. Rear Admirai Rattray then asked him to take over temporarily the command of RIN Depot and proceed to Castles immediately. At about 8.20 a.m. Comdr. Streatfield-James left home and took a taxi. Getting off near Town Hall he walked down towards the main gate of Castles. There was a bedlam there. The, Commander was 'received with stones' and had to jostle through the crowd to enter Castles. No one cared about him or paid him the 'usual marks of respect'. The situation appeared 'terrible' to him, and he did not dare to issue any orders to the ratings. Instead his first attempt was to persuade as many men as possible to gather around him and to talk to:them. He asked the Master-at-Arms to tell the men over the microphone that he was their CO, he had always been very good towards Indians, their requests should be conveyed to him and would be met as soon as possible. A number of ratings gathered round him but before Comdr. Streatfield-James could begin speaking the men were pushing towards him, and he found it hard to get out of the melee. 6 The situation was 'completely out of hand', and the strikers dominated the scene. At about 8.40 a Ldg. Torpedoman and a 'Hostilities only' CPO asked in a 'menacing manner', in official expression, all to follow them into a procession. They urged the men not to listen to the 'foul words' of 'white liars'.7 Thereafter several hundred ratings formed themselves into a procession and left for Talwar. It was then 9 a.m. Around this time Lieut. Comdr. Homer and England arrived on the scene. It was now their turn to be sl).rprised. They ordered the ratings to close the gate but no one obliged them. Thereupon the officers themselves tried several times to do so but all their attempts were foiled by the men. In the meantime Lieut. Comdr. Soman, Lieut. Kale and two or three other officers reached Castles. As they were walking into the gate, the ratings crowded around them and shouted in Hindustani 'topi utaro'. The disrespectful 'turn' in which the men were normally addressed was now hurled back at the officers. The latter meekly obeyed: they took off their caps and were then allowed to enter Castles.8 After the departure of the procession for Talwar the situation inside the barracks seemed t6 have 'eased considerably'. Comdr.
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Streatfield-James thought it an opportune moment to open a dialogue with the men and accordingly instructed his officers on the spot. Shortly afterwards the latter reported back that the ratj"gs were in no mood to listen to anyone. 'The Indian officers too had a very poor hearing from the men'.9 The Commander's announcement that Lieut. Comdr. Bhaskar Sadashib Soman had been appointed as his relief in the Drafting Office had no impact at all. The ratings refused to give this officer any hearing at all. 'Kuch bat nahin hai' they told him.lO CPOs and POs were ordered to isolate 'loyal men' from rebels but they found it impossible as all were mixed up in the crowd. Thereupon Comdr. Streatfield-James considered it 'inexpedient to attempt any segregat.ion or separation of the sheep from the goats'.u At about 10.30 a.m. the Commander reported the situation to the Chief Staff Officer to FOB over telephone, and retired in his office. But he could not work or rest in peace. A number of ratings entered the establishment shouting slogans. Comdr. Streatfield-James feared that any effort in this state of unrest to restrict access to or exit from Castles would result in violence. About noon the naval ensign was hauled down. The officers were afraid of taking any step which would offend their men. The afternoon appeared to be quieter than the morning though slogans and picketing did not cease. The ratings felt that the 'white dogs' had got a 'good thrashing' in their hands. Throughout the day the officers could not enforce any order and prevent any act of insubordination. They were unable to remove arms and ammunition from Castles. Nor could they post any sentry' over the armoury and magazine. In the afternoon Comdr. Streatfield-James saw FOB in Vithal House and pleaded for military aid. On return to Castles the Commander detailed his officers for duty at night. Around 9.30 p.m. Capt. Beamish offered his service to act as relief for CO to enable him to get some sleep. But soon 'alarming' news started pouring in from Fon' Barracks: there were disturbances on the roadway outside and the 'temper' inside was rising. Lieut. Comdr. Khan, Executive Officer of that establishment, telephoned to say that he considered it inadvisable for any British officer to come to the place as it might aggravate the situation. This request notwithstanding Comdr. Streatfield-James decided to send
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Capt. Beamish to Fort Ba"acks to take over its command. The situation there was reported to be far from satisfactory. Around 11 p.m. the Area Commander, General Beard, accompanied by Brigadier-Southgate, FOB and his Flag Lieutenant and a host of top police officials visited Castles and discussed the question of mili~ary deployment with the Commanding Officer. Shortly after midnight Rear Admiral Rattrary came again to give CO specific iostructions regarding the summoning of military aid. Meanwhile two HO-POs rushed into Castles and demanded the release of all prisoners from the cells. On being refused the ratings threatened that unless they were set free, their release would be secured by force. About 2 a.m. on 20 February a large number of Hamla ratings led by Lieut. Sobhani forced their entry into Castles. Immediately military aid was summoned. The men inside the barracks were woken up by the noise and joined the party. Lieut. Sobhani behaved 'in an impudent and a truculent manner'. He was carrying a .- "leather-mounted cane which he swung 'in an uncivil manner' before CO. He wanted Castles ratings to follow him into what Comdr. Streatfield-James called an 'open mutiny'. By 2.40 Lieut. Sobhani and his Hamla party left Castles and the men returned to their bed. Shortly afterwards the Area Commander decided, on consultation with FOB and CO, to place military guards at CCO, Colaba and Mahul W IT Stations, one platoon in strength at each point. At about 6 a.m. Mahratta Light Infantrymen took up positions around CCO, and then the officers ventured to haul down the broom that had been hoisted on the flagstaff. But the naval routine ground to a halt on Wednesday morning. Standing orders were not obeyed. 'Clean-ship' was not done. 'Topasses and cooks' refused duty. The ratings discarded uniforms and many went ashore in civilian clothes. At about 8.05 a.m. a lorry full of men drove into Castles and one of their spokesmen addressed all hands on the quarterdeck. Thereafter two representatives were elected from the Castle ratings and sent to Talwar to join the Naval Central Strike -Committee. The situation was tense. Comdr.·Streatfield-James turned away
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the civilian clerks who came to attend their duty in the Drafting Office and told them to wait until orders. The Drafting Officers were asked to return home, and WOman workers were escorted back to their residence. In the meantime the military authorities had decided to despatch armed guards for all RIN establishments. Two more platoons of the Mahratta Light Infantry arrived in Castles around 2.30 p.m. As soon as military guards were posted at the main gate of the barracks and inside on the guardrooms, ar:moury and cells, FOB's signal that the ratings must remain in their establishment and thos~ who went ashore return by 3.30 was con-. veyed over a loudhailer. This infuriated the men. A large number of ratings rushed towards the military guards. Some snatched rifles and bayonets from them and others threatened to eject them. Wireman Sheikh Shahadat Ali told the Indian troops: the ratings were their brothers who had embarked on· strike action not merely for their own good but for that of all servicemen, and hence they should not open fire on them. The officers were unable to stop this fraternization. The sentries were decided to be withdrawn from inside Castles. The men paid no attention to the Indian officers who were trying to persuade them to return to the barracks. They were addressed by Sheikh Shahadat Ali: Bhaiyo bhaiyo do bat hai. Hem seb log ko inder band ker daiay hai. Ham apni jan bhei dey dain gay aur baher jainga. Koi admi barrak main wapas·met jai. Ya hindustaniofficer jo ab duty per hai Government ka Kuta hai. I2 The ratings then congregated on the parapet overlooking the main entrance, and started throwing stones, iron-balls, flower pots and any other missile they could lay their hands upon towards the gate below. The intention was to frighten the officers rather than to hurt the Indian troops. The ratings succeeded in forcing the withdrawal of military guards from the main gate. After the troops were moved out of Castles Able Seaman Basant Singh led a number of ratings up to the cells and ordered Warrant Master-at-Arms Samuel to release the prisoners. On the officer's asking him to leave the place, Basant Singh said 'Tumara bap ka order naihai', pushed him aside and told his men to break open the cells.I3 The prisoners were set free.
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Meanwhile Comdr. Streatfield-James' HQ was evacuated to CCO. The upper deck lost control over Castles, and, the local strike leaders took over. CO was alarmed by the news of pandemonium in Fort Bamlcks. He decided to leave that establishment as it was, and withdrew all officers from there. Fort Ba"acks like Castles went under the command of rebellious ratings. Pressures mounted on the Commanding Officer for the removal of the military. He was instructed to contact the Preside-nt of NCSC and as\c him to exert his influence iri calming the men. Around 4 p.m. Ldg. Signalman M.S. Khan came in and addressed the ratings. Thereafter the situation eased slightly. On an assurance from him· and other leaders that no attempt would be made by the men to leave Castles if the military was withdrawn, the sentry posts. fell back on CCO so as to be more or less out of their sight. But the machirtegun posts covering all points' of erttrance to and exit from Castles were still manned. Soon after Ldg. Sig. Khan had left the establis1iment, the irowdy elements', in ca's expression, gained the upper hand. He was summoned again to pacify them. As the situation improved a little the authorities arranged a cinema show and announced that the ratings' demand concerning food, particularly an increase in rations, would be met soon. But this sop could not appease the men. By 5.30 p.m. batches of ratings started coming form outside. FOB's order that such persons should be collected from streets and segregated in Sewri could not be carried out. The ratings in civilian dress could not be distinguished from civilians. They brought back inspiring news of strike and demonstrations, and soon the 'temperature' inside Castles was again ori the boil. Within an hour or so persistent demands 'backed by 'noisy' demonstrations were made for the withdrawal of military guards. The latter had in the meantime been.posted at the entrance to Castle Park (Families Canteens). The ratings had nothing to eat inside their barracks and wanted to go ashore to procure food. They m.oved towards Castle entrance. It was about this time Ldg. Sig. Khan arrived again. Every time he spoke to the ratings there was a lllI~ followed by a sUrgeJorward. Capt. Beamish and Lieut. Sassoon who tried to push them back were 'abused' and -assaUlted. On instruction from the higher authorities CO warned the ratings that unless "they returned to barracks forthwith, fire would be
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opened. The men decided to retreat but not without 'considerable stone throwing' and an attempt to break into Comdr. StreatfieldJames' office in CCO. Within a few minutes FOB rushed to the spot but did not enter Castles on CO's advice. After his departure the ratings closed the main gate and posted their oWn pickets. Thursday 21 February saw more determined attempts on the part of several hundred besieged men to break out of the establishment for food an4 other necessities. Everytime they tried to force their way through a particular point of exit, the military authorities plugged it. Around 8 a.m. the first attempt was made by a number of ratings to rush out through the gate adjoining the gun-mounting depot. Within a few minutes the depot was cleared of all civilians, the gun gate closed and a military post established. Later most of the telephone connections were cut off. At about 9 when 'a. selected few ratings were taken out in a lorry, there was a concerted move by the 'rest to break out. Shortly afterwards the demonstrators who thronged at the main gate tried to force their way out. The military guards stopped them at the Castle Park entrance, and immediately posts at the gun gate and the southern approach to Castles were strengthened. A huge civilian crowd gathered along Mint Road between Town Hall and Red Cross Depot. The ratings from Castles attacked the military posts with all 'missiles' at their disposal, and the civilian crowd joined in. The Guard Commander, a British Major, among several others, was wounded. CO warned the ratings that unless they went back to their barracks, the military would fire. The men were in no mood to accept the barriers reestablished between barracks and civvy streets. Still another attempt was made by them to break through the Families Canteen, and then the order to open fire was issued. As many as 18 rounds had to be fired before the ratings retraced their steps. The British Major in command of Mahratta guards gave .the order to open fire with one shot from his revolver in the direction of the Families Canteen where the ratings were trying to turn their flank. Comdr. Streatfield-James in his evidence before the Castles '.. Board of Enquiry admitted that there was some delay in carrying out the order. The Mahratta guards were expressly reluctant to open fire. Several ratings rushed towards them -- they 'bared their stomachs and endeavoured t,o scratch them on the beyonets' of the guards,
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169
A Tale of Three Ships
crying out 'spill our blood on India and let it fall on Indian soil'Y The guards had to obey the order of their commander finally. They shot in the direction he indicated but took care not to harm the ratings. The shots 'appeared to strike the ground'. It was then the ratings closed the gate, placed motor vehicles across it, rushed back to Castles and. broke open the armoury and magazine. They soon started firing from the ramparts. Initially ·it was in the nature of sniping. No casualty was suffered by any side as a result. Soon afterwards the Mahratta Light Infantrymen were replaced by the troops of the Leicestershire Regiment. The firing from inside Castles intensified. Immediately there was a casualty in CCO, an RAF other rank was wounded. The ratings started using light automatic guns and hand granades. From this moment things moved fast. The RIN Drafting Authorities evacuated their building to turn it over to the military. Around 12 noon the ratings aboard ships in the harbour w~rned that if firing was opened on them they would not hesitate to retaliate. Some time later the evacuation of CCO commenced, and the most vital organization handling signal traffic for naval authorities in Bombay was abandoned. Comdr. StreatfieldJames was directed ~o return home and await orders. A senior military officer on the spot assumed command, and no naval control was sought to be n;established until the surrender of strikers on Saturday 13 February. '
* When Castles were abandoned to the military, five naval officers were trapped inside - Lieut. Comdr. Divan, Assistant Drafting Officer on Special Duty, Sub-Lieut. Ledward, CO of ML 1263, SubLieut. Williams, Officer in Charge, General Forms, Surgeon Lieut. Comdr. Martin, Senior Medical Officer and Surgeon Lieut. Choudri. The first four entered Castles some time before the firing began. On way through the gate everyone had the experience of facing a 'host~le crowd', and being ordered to take off his cap Sub-Lieut. Williams who refused to oblige them had his cap knocked off by Able Seaman Basant Singh. Lieut. Comdr. Divan thought it wiser to take off his cap than to invite trouble from the 'threatening mob' around. IS Soon after he got to his office, Sub-Lieut. Ledward came in with a query about drafts. By the time things had become serious on the quarterdeck, and
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Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febrnary 1946
neither dared to go out. Around 9.30 a.m. the first shot was heard. A little later the ratings were seen throwing up a barricade across the main entrance and running back to their barracks. In no time they took up positions along the ramparts with firearms. The officers feared that the armed ratings would peep through the windows any moment and they would be found out. Soon three sh~ts pierced the office, and Lieut. Comdr. Divan and Sub-Lieut. Ledward hid themselves behind tables. At the time hectic activity was going on the ramparts and the ratings vied with. one another to occupy vantage points. About 11 a.m. when RPO Master-at-Arms Sher Alam along with two other POs came to his office, Lieut. Comdr. Divan said he wanted to see FOB to bring about a reconciliation. He was asked to seek permission from the ratings who had gathered on the quarterdeck. The latter, on being informed of hidntention, refused to let him out. Lieut. Comdr. Divan had to return to his office and stay there With CO of ML 1263 until about 2 p.m. All this time the firing was going on. At about 2 PO Meherban Shah, leader of the Castles ratings rushed into Lieut. Comdr. Divan's office, and ordered both the officers to proceed to the cells with their hands up. In walking down accordingly Lieut. Comdr, Divan received two prods from Shah's rifle and so also did Sub-Lieut. Ledward. Both were locked up in the cells for some time. Later they were taken by the armed guards across the quarterdeck to Depot Sick Quarters for detention. 16
* On the other hand, picking up his cap Sub-Lieut. Williams crept inside Castles. He found none of his colleagues in the Divisional Office or in the mess. After the firing began Sub-Lieut. Williams took shelter under a desk in the Sports Office, and peeped out from time to time to see what was going on down below without showing him up. Initially the armed ratings were a bit confused about targets, and paid more attention to the main gate than elsewhere. Later they became more organized, and all post& were covered. Around 2 o'dock Sub-Lieut. Williams heard a commotion from the quarterdeck. What he could gather from the snatches ofconversation among the ratings clustered there was that they had caught two officers and locked them in cells and there was another upstairs. Sub-Lieut. Williams realized that it was him they were talking about. Soon a party of ratings came to the sports office and took him out. The officer was escorted to DSQ where he found Lieut. Comdr.
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Divan and CO of ML 1263 under detention. Later Lieut. Comdr. Divan was taken away. Around 3.30 things seemed to have quietened down considerably outside. But Sub-Lieuts. Williams and Ledward were still in DSQ. After dusk they became desperate: they thought of letting themselves down the wall into the Mint with a rope made out of 'sheets' from the Sick Bay. Finding it impossible they requested the rating-guard to permit them to see his leader. Eventually it was allowed. When they approached PO Meherban Shah near the cells he asked them to stand to attention. 'This was emphasized with a prod from behind'. The officers sprang to attention, and pleaded that as everything seemed to be quiet they should be set free. On consultation with ratings standing by him PO Shah said that 'my committee has excused you', 'thank them and then you may proceed'. After they thanked them the officers were ordered 'to about turn' and 'double match' P Doing so they reached the gate, and were searched and allowed to go out.
* Lifting the cap off his head Surg. Lieut. Comdr. Martin passed through the gate and went straight to DSQ. As on the last two days, he found the regular complement of SB staff absent and only volunteers detailed by SB/CPO Raza Ali on duty. None of these ratings paid him the 'usual marks of respect', and everywhere prevailed 'an air of indiscipline'. Even the patients' behaviour did not conform to the hospital routine. After exchanging a few words with Surg. LieutChoudri who was already on duty in the outpatient department, Surg. Martin walked into his office and was about to go through some correspondence. He then heard shouting down below and went out on the verandah to see what it was all about. Many of his patients were also out of their wards, looking at the trouble-spot. Soon after the exchange of firing began -a rating with scalp wound came up to the outpatient department. Surg. Martin dressed his scalp and told him to stay inside lest his wound excite other ratings. The patient did not pay any heed to his advice. Instead he grabbed a rifle from another rating, rushed out and proceeded to the ramparts. About 11.30 a.m. or 12 noon a number of armed men came into the surgical ward and started manning its back -verandah as they suspected that British troops would encirc~e the barracks from that _end. Realizing that DSQ was now exposed to fire from both sides, Surg. Martin pleaded with the ratings to spare the hospital. The latter
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
were quite willing to, provided they were given an assurance by the authorities that the troops would not fire in the direction of DSQ. The Surgeon contacted FOB over telephone, and hoisted Four Red Cross flags on different parts of the hospital building. The ratings decided to leave DSQ after getting an assurance from Vithal House at 12.25 and went to the other side. They periodically sent round small parties to check that the Mint area was clear, of troops. By the time Surg. Martm attended to several cases of gunshot wounds. While treating one such case' a rating with field dressing over his face and neck was brought to him. Someone mentioned that he was his Ldg. SBA Krishnan. The doctor removed the dressing and found a gaping wound on the leftside of the neck. The rating was dead. The men who brought him to DSQ kept his body in the operation threatre and left for their posts. There was constant firing outside. Surg. Martin then visited the ramparts in the rear of DSQ, and found armed ratings manning the positions there. PO Thomas warned him that he was liable to be shot on any attempt to escape, and so he returned. Surg. Martin'was all through under the watch of a few armed ratings who followed him wherever he went, particularly when he went near the telephone. Soon after Lieut. Comdr. Divan, Sub-Lieuts. Ledward and Williams were brought to DSQ, PO Meherban Shah accompanied by a number of ratings came in. All of them were heavily armed. They suspected the officers of spying on them, and in fact Sub-Lieut. Williams admitted to have maintained telephone contact with the naval authorities until his removal from the Sports Office. PO Shah asked Lieut. Comdr. Divan what he was doing in Castles. The officer replied that he had come to attend his duty. PO Shah remarked: 'Dogs of Indian officers were coming to duty when there was an RIN strike'. He then looked at Surg. Martin. The'latter, frightened as he was, hastened to add: 'I have come to duty toO.'l8 He was told to shut up. Subsequently both Lieut. Comdr. Divan and Surg. Martin tried to persuade PO Shah to agree to a 'peace move' by them. The strikers did not like the idea. They went out leaving the officers under the guard of an armed rating who was instructed to use violence if necessary. A little later they received the message that 'peace talks' were going on between NCSC and the naval authorities. This was followed by an instruction for 'cease fire'. Nevertheless intermittent firing continued for some more time. Soon after receiving the
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frrsrmessage from NCSC PO Shah's party came again to DSQ. Surg. Martin was ordered to accompany them. The surgeon hesitated and was ordered out again. The party then whisked him away into the dental department and closed the door. PO Shah asked him what he meant by peace. Surg. Martin explained: he would contact FOB over telephone and ask him to stop frring from outside. He would then expect them to do the same from inside. Thereafter a parley could be arranged between the authorities and the strikers. The ratings argued among themselves over the proposal for a while and then agreed to let Surg. Martin contact Vithal House. All of them followed him into his office. He had to talk over telephone in their presence and relay back to them the answer he received. On being informed that FOB was already in touch with Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan, President of NCSC and was planning to send a 'truce party' to Castles, the ratings left Surg. Martin's office. But they returned within five minutes and declared that the gate would not be opened and the truce party would have to come by boat. It was suspected that once the gate was thrown open the troops would rush in and take them by surprise. Surg. Martin informed Captain Payne, CSO to FOB, accordingly. The latter replied that no naval boats were available as all had been commandeered by the strik~rs. PO Shah then insisted that a private boat be hired. The Captain said that none was available. Eventually PO Shah agreed to open the gate. The ratings then went out, and Surg. Martin informed Lieut. Comdr. Divan of the development. On arrival of the truce party PO Shah told the officers that he would not let any of his men go out first, and they would have to proceed alone with' white flag. Both Lieut. Comdr. Divan and Surg. Martin agreed to do so. The firing by then had stopped. As the officers went out of the barracks, PO Shah and two or three other local leaders came out and started discussing the terms of 'conciliation' with the truce party which included Lieut. Inder Singh, SubLieut. S.S. Choudry, Ldg. Sig. Khan and a Congress leader, Hatim Darbari. PO Shah was reluctant to surrender arms to the military. It was decided after considerable discussion that arms and ammunition would be locked away and the key kept with PO Shah who would post his sentries around armoury and magazine. The whole party then walked into the barracks and proceeded to inform their inmates about the agreement. After Ldg. Sig. Khan explained its terms there
a
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
was silence for a moment or two, and the ratings then spoke their mind: they were unwilling to part with the arms. The officers feared that the negotiation would break down. It was Darbari who came to their rescue. He warned the men that by their obstinacy they would lose not only the 'support' of Congress and Muslim League but also that of the general citizens of Bombay. Eventually they agreed to collect aJI arms and ammunition for storage under the control of their leader PO Shah. It was then dusk, and Surg. Martin and Lieut. Comdr. Divan were permitted to leave Castles. 19
JI The ratings aboard ships anchored in Keamari and establishments ashore at Manora came to know of the strike in HMIS Talwar on J9 February. It was HMIS Hindustan which took the lead in Karachi. The sloop was ordered to proceed to sea the next day. While the preparations for sailing were being made, a number of its men walked out on the Keamari jetty shouting slogans. Later a few more followed in their footsteps. They all picketed in front of the ship demanding the removal of its Captain and Executive Officer hated for their insulting behaviour towards the lower deck. The entire ship's company struck work. HMIS Travancore which was due to sail with Hindustan followed suit. Twenty eight of its men left the ship to join their brethren in the sloop.20 During the day ratings from HMIS Himalaya,Gunnery School, visited, together with the Hindustan strikers, hotels in Keamari and urged their owners to down shutters. With the cries of 'Hindustan Azad', 'Jai Hind' and 'Inqui,lab Zindabad' about 150 strikers marched to Jackson Bazar in Keamari and the}} the railway station. On the way the processionists de~lared that 'they were proceeding to Delhi'.20a The incidents were received with excitement and jubilation by crowds in the bazar and harbour area. On the 21st morning the Manora island was astir as the ratings of the establishments on its beach swung into action. HMIS Bahadur, Boys' Training School, was already agitated over the supply of weevily aUa to its lower-deck messes. At colours that morning its ratings jeered and shouted slogans. Many later rushed towards the flagmast, pulled down the white ensign and destroyed it. A 'J ai Hind' flag was hoisted in its place. Thereafter a large group broke out of
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the establishment and proceeded towards HMIS Chamak, Radar Training School.. Most of the Chamak ratings refused to obey the 6.15 pipe to turn out of; their bed and the 6.45 pipe to fall in. They were shouting 'Hindustan Zindabad' and 'Chamak in Unity'.21 Later these slogans appeared on the walls of the establishment. 'Clear lower Deck' was sounded at 9. a.m. None but a few higher rates responded to the pipe. CO, Lieut. Comdr. A.K. Chatterji then asked his officers to persuade the lower deck to fall in to hear him. It was tried but nothing came out of it. The ratings gathered in groups round the living blocks off the parade ground, and were found talking among themselves. Lieut. Comdr. Chatterji personally approached them to come on to the parade ground, and eventually the ratings agreed. But before CO began his speech Ordinary Telegraphist A.K. Roy shouted how long he would speak. 'About five minutes', replied Lieut. Comdr. Chatterji. The rating then said in an authoritative manner, 'all right we will give you five minutes.' When CO was half way through his speech, the Bahadur ratings, armed with sticks, were seen approaching the establishment, and the assembly was impatient to join them. Ord. Tel. Roy shouted out again to CO 'how much longer is your speech going to last'. Lieut Comdr. Chatterji answered back 'about a minute more'. Before he could finish, the rating told the gathering 'he has nothing useful to say, come on'.22 Immediately the assembly broke up and many ran towards the Bahadur 'boys'. On their way to Himalaya the latter attacked the Radar School and damaged its building. At about 8.30 a.m. the Himalaya lower deck was ordered to assemble in the cinema hall of the establishment. Officers turned up. The ratings were absent. They later collected near the sea wall. CO, Comdr. G.W. Gush followed by other officers went up and told them Keamari had been cordoned off by the military and none would be allowed to enter Karachi. While Comdr. Gush was addressing the ship's company, words passed round that the Bahadur ratings were coming to the establishment through Cliamak. Soon the assembly dissolved, and the men rushed to join up the incoming party. Some proceeded to the quarterdeck and tore down the ensign. From there they went straight to the Regulating Office and released the prisoners.
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The assorted party of ratings then decided to go to Keamari and take out a procession from there to Karachi. They proceeded towards the jetty but noticed a number of officers and senior rates trying to take away the two landing craft from its vicinity. The ratings understood that it was to thwart their reaching Keamari.23 In fact Lieut. H.R. 'Claudius, on instruction from the authorities, tried first to start LCM Mark Ill. But its battery terminal was disconnected. Then Lieut. Claudius'"and a couple of senior ratings tried to start LCM Mark I to tow Mark III away from the jetty. At the same time he detailed Midshipmen Hamilton, Agate and Beards to slip away the non-power boats from there. The latter were obstructed by the ratings who had gathered on the jetty. On the other hand, Lieut. Claudius with the assistance of CPO Ghulum Dastgir could after some initial problems start the only working engine of LCM Mark I and took it fast alongside Mark III which had been slipped away from the jetty by the senior rates detailed for the task. While the officer was trying to turn the craft towards the entrance of the creek, a number of ratings commandeered a skiff and rowed out to them. The LCMs were about 20 yards or so away from the jetty. -", Some ratings swam across from the jetty and boarded them, while others waded across from the land and clambered abroad. Lieut. Claudius then ordered CPO Dastgir to stop the engin(! of LCM Mark I. Dastgir did so and was about to come out of the engineroom but went back finding a large number of ratings on board, and detached the distributor wire and removed the throttle lever, putting the engine out of order. He then came up. Among the ratings who had come aboard Ldg. Seaman Hira Lal of Himalaya asked CPO Dastgir if the engine could be started. When the latter said 'no' Hira Lal went down to the engineroom but came out, having failed to start the engine. He had a talk with Able Seaman Akbar Ali of Himalaya and two Bahadur ratings, and threatened CPO Dastgir with a winch handle: 'Engine start karo, nahin to jan se mar dunga'.2AThe latter argued that the engine was out of order. The ratings did not believe him, they had heard it working even a few minutes ago. Hira Lal caught CPO Dastgir by his hair, hit him on his shoulder with the winch handle and forced him down to the engineroom. Once they were inside, the other ratings put the hatch cover down. Hira Lai again ordered CPO Dastgir to start the engine. Otherwise, he told him, it would be set on fire. Hira Lal had
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a match box in his hand and appeared to be 'very angry'. CPO Dastgir carried out the order Meanwhile Lieut. Claudius had taken over the wheel to keep the LCM as far away as possible from the jetty. Soon, however, Able Seaman Akbar Ali removed him by force and turned the course of the craft towards the jetty. Displaced from the wheel Lieut. Claudius tried to run the anchor down but it fouled. LCM Mark I proceeded towards the jetty leaving behind Mark III which had already been detached from it. As soon as the craft came along the jetty, the ratings awaiting there boarded it.:15 LCM Mark I left for Keamari. Ldg. Seaman Hira Lal was at the helm and a Bahadur rating was put in charge of the engine. Able Seaman Akbar Ali started raising slogans like 'Hindustan Zindabad' and 'Englistan Goondabad' which were taken up by other ratings aboard. Half way down the creek the engine developed trouble and the craft lost its speed. CPO Dastgir who was standing near the engineroom hatch was ordered to rectify the trouble. He was a bit hesitant. Akbar Ali struck him again and forced him back into the engineroom. The craft neared Keamari. Just about 200 yards from the shore it was intercepted by two motor boats with British parachutists. The Army Captain in command of the boats ordered the craft to proceed down China creek and threatened to fire if anything was done to the contrary. The boats closed on the craft from both sides, and the latter could not proceed towards landings in Keamari. Ldg. Seaman Hira Lal then steered the craft alongside Hindustan lying in the eastern wharf, disregarding the Captain's order. The ratings intended to use the ship for passage to the shore. On climbing aboard Hindustan they moved down the gangway on its portside to go ashore. One of the boats astern then opened fire in the direction of the gangway. This was followed by firing from the quayside. The ratings on board Hindustan did not hesitate in retaliating. Its Oerlikon guns were seized and loaded. Nothing could prevent them from returning fire. Immediately the attack from the coastside stopped.26 Lieut. Claudius, his junior officers and CPO Dastgir had already jumped into one of the armed boats for protection. The boats took cover behind a large ship and made off up China creek to Napier Mole. The firing from Hindustan wounded two BORs and damaged the Embarkation Buildings.27 It was then quarter to eleven or so.
178 . Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febnlary 1946
The ratings took control of the ship - the officers were removed and the white ensign was torn down. The men who occupied the quarterdeck and officers' cabins carried the latter's small arms. None other than Indian ratings were allowed to board the vessel without permission. To prevent the repetition of what the rating-demonstrators did in·the streets of Bombay, the authorities took·certain precautionary measures. One among these was the military and police cordon across the bridge connecting Keamari with Karachi. This proved successful in preempting any close contact of the ratings with civilians which created a difficult situation for the authorities in Bombay. Though the government of Sind-received no warning, the knowledge of the events in Bombay served its purpose. As Governor Mudie wrote to the Viceroy soon after the strike was over, 'the most disquieting feature of the whole affair to my mind is the lack of warning that we had. If Bombay had not blown up a day or two earlier we would have been taken completely by surprise and I have no doubt that the ratings would have. marched through Karachi and that, due allowance being made for the difference in size and turbulence of the two cities, the events in Bombay might have been reflected here.'Z7a The authorities indeed made it impossible for the ratings who boarded Hindustan to march into Karachi. A large number of men formed into a procession and tried to break through the cordon but were not successful. They were turned back by the military picket and eventually had to return to the ship. The sloop then signalled an ultimatum to the authorities to immediately withdraw British troops from the harbour area. But the military authorities planned to seize Hindustan next noon. They decided to strike as soon as the ebb tide began and the ship sank to a strategically disadvantageous position. Necessary arrangements were made in keeping with this calculation. Early on the 22nd morning the restive IORs of Embarkation HQ were removed, and more British replacements brought in.28 A few platoons of airborne. troops took up position on the terrace of the buildings situated near the wharf Hindustan was lying along and mounted artillery. A few others manned the strategic points virtually covering the sloop in a semicircle. A senior naval officer sent out to
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A Tale of Three Ships
the ratings in control of Hindustan the ultimatum that the military action to recover the ship would begin unless they surrendered. They must leave the ship by 9.30 a.m. There was no response. Again at about 10.00 a.m. the ratings were called upon to lay down their arms failing which, they were warned, anyone found on the deck would be fired upon and the ship seized by force. The ratings' response was to man all the ship's guns. Unlike their brethren in Bombay the ratings aboard Hindustan were almost alone. Nevertheless they decided not to surrender without a fight. At 10.30 a.m. on the expiry of the. 'grace period' the British troops opened artillery fire. The ratings on board Hindustan retaliated with the whole ship's armaments including 4" guns. But soon the ebb tide began and the vessel in no time went below the level of the dock. The military took full advantage of it. They used mortars and 75 mm howitzers most effectively. The situation was hopeless for the ratings. Because of the low tide they could not raise the ship's guns sufficiently to bring them on to the target. It was suicidal for the gun crew to man them in the face of heavy field gun and mortar fire. Still they were unwilling to give in to the British troops, and fired back as long as possible. The ratings did not surrender until the gun emplacements were blown up and fire broke out on the vessel. In an unequal battle lasting about half an hour eight of the ratings aboard, one each from Hindustan, Travancore and Chamak,· two from Bahadur and three from Himalaya laid down their lives and many more were injured. 29 III
HMIS Kathiawar was on a goodwill cruise when the strike broke out in Bombay. In the afternoon of Wedne·sday, 20 February, the vessel anchored at Porbandar. The Diwan and other state officials came aboard and informed CO of the entertainment programme arranged for officers and men for the following day. That the ratings were already aware of the 'Talwar episode' was not known to the upper deck. In the course of Thursday's programme a section of the lowerdeck personnel marched past the Maharaja, did a sightseeing tour and participated in a cricket match with the state team. The ratings
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
returned to the ship by 8 p.m. While ashore they gathered information about the happenings in Bombay. The communication personnel on 'listening-watch' duty heard the news broadcast on their wireless set. By bedtime most of the ratings knew that their brethren in Bombay and Karachi had taken up arms to defend thems~lves from British troops. They decided to wait for an opportune moment to express their solidarity with them. On the other hand, the upper deck was sure that the men would not cause any trouble. CO, Lieut. R.J. Ward, when asked by the Maharaja whether he feared any 'mutiny' on the ship, was confident that nothing of the kind would happen. 22 February began like any other day. The morning routine worked well. Standing orders were obeyed. To the upper deck everything appeared normal until the ship sailed offPorbandar. PO Mohd. Sabir assured Lieut. Ward that the trouble elsewhere had had no visible impact on the ship's company. The forenoon was devoted to entertaining visitors from the shore. A demonstration of Oerlikon firing was carried out for them. About the same time the lower deck received messages about Hindustan's refusal to submit to the official ultimatum for surrender
and firing on the ship in consequence. The ratings gathered in small groups and discussed the situation in Karachi. Some time in the forenoon they made up their mind to proceed to Karachi to assist their beleagured comrades. None let the officers know of their intention until after the ship left Porbandar. The upper deck was caught unaware when the trouble broke out on Kathiawar. The next port of call for the ship was Veraval. At about 11.50 a.m. it weighed anchor, and CO and Lieut. E.C. Paul were on the bridge busy laying off a course for Veraval. Soon there was a bedlam in the mess deck. Without any order from the officers someone among the ratings piped 'clear lower deck'. Immediately the ship's company mustered on the foredeck and started shouting slogans. CO and his officers came down to enquire why they assembled on the forecastle ignoring 'Standing Orders'. There was a general cry from the ratings that the ship be taken to Karachi. They wanted to rush to the assistance of Hindustall which was under fire from the shore. This, they felt, was urgent, and no amount of persuasion on the part of CO could convince them otherwise. Lieut. Ward then asked the
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ratings to send their representatives to him and returned to tile bridge. Other officers joined him there. Almost immediately the majority of the ship's company gath.ered on the bridge, and Ordinary Seaman K. Nagaratnam, beating his chest, declared 'I am the leader'.30 The ratings reiterated the demand that the ship's course be changed and turned around for Kafachi. CO pleaded his inability, and said that as per orders from the higher authorities the ship must call at Veraval. To him the ratings appeared 'to be in a boisterous frame of mind'. They 'adopted a threatening attitude'. On Lieut. Ward's refusal to take the ship to Karachi some ratings shouted, 'chuck the European officers over the side' .31 Ordinary Seaman Abdul Karim then dragged the Quartermaster off the steering wheel, and some others started 'interfering with engineroom telegraphs'. ERA Kulbir Singh came forward and told Lieut. Ward that the ratings were determined to go to Karachi. They expected an Indian officer to navigate the ship to that port. But since none among the officers agreed to take the ship there they would do it themselves. Kulbir Singh ordered CO and his officers to leave the bridge and confine themselves to the wardroom. Shipwright K.K. Menon who was standing nearby expressed his satisfac,tion over the order: 'All these days we were putting requests to the officers and now officers would listen to us.' Now that officers were deprived of the command of the ship they 'will take order from ratings', others said.32 The officers, puzzled· and overawed, hesitated for a few moments before. leaving the bridge. A seaman rating then shouted in Hindustani: 'Ye sala log officer bridge se niche nahi athe hain; ham log abi rasse se bandke niche wardroom me band karenge.'33 CO regained his wit and asked the officers to go to the wardroom and followed himself. After the Quartermaster was pulled off. the wheel OOW SubLieut. Norton stepped in his place. He was crowded round by the ratings and· driven away from the bridge. Once the men took command of the ship, its course was reversed. The ship proceeded with full speed in the opposite, northerly direction. CO later said in his evidence: 'This was quite obvious to me as the land was now on the opposite side'. The increased speed eould be guessed 'from the sound of the engines and the wake of the ship'.34 The ratings who occupied the bridge passed dpWD orders below through the voice pipe and the
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
engineroom staff acted in accordance with them. The authority behind such orders was not questioned by anybody, and it was evident from the Tri-colour which had been hoisted at the flagmast in place ' of the White Ensign. CO Lieut. Ward was out of touch with the higher authorities after the 'mutiny' broke out in Talwar. Frantic efforts were made to contact Bombay W IT stations but there was no response. CO understood that all channels of communication were under the control of the strikers. HMIS Kothiawar had since been on the 'listening watch'.3S With the outbreak of the trouble in the ship even that ceased, and its W IT set passed into the hands of the ratings. Some time after the officers were confined iD the wardroom, things became quiet on the quarterdeck. It was the; that Lieut. Paul, accompanied by others, came out and tried to convinct [he ratings of the futility of going to Karachi. 'This had no visible effect' .36 His speech was interrupted several times, and the men appeared as'adamant' as before.37 Lieut. Paul made another attempt to persuade them to give up the idea of navigating the ship to Karachi. Tl,tis time he played on their sentiment: the present CO had long been with them and had always looked after their welfare. In view of the good CO they had, the ratings should desist from what they had been doing so long, and hand over the ship to him. There was silence for a little while. CO mistook this as their tacit approval of what Lieut. Paul had said, and rushed towards the bridge to take over. Immediately he was stopped by the ratings near the boatdeck and had to retrace his steps. It was not until the news of Hindustan's surrender reached the ratings that Lieut. Ward could resume command. Even then CO was allowed to take over on condition that he would cancel the remainder of the goodwill cruise and proceed straight to Bombay, calling at Veraval just to inform the state of the change in the programme.38 The ratings of Kathiawar were in touch with NCSC, and pending further information, from it they decided to remain on strike in pro-, test against the indiscriminate military firing on the naval personnel and for the' redressal of their grievances. 'In view of the serious situation involving the death of several ratings and many ... wounded at the hands of firing squads, we by virtue of common consent and
A Tale of 171ree Ships
183
popular approval, participate in the general strike.'39 At a time when thousands of their comrades were undergoing untold sufferings and hardships the Kathiawar ratings could not afford the luxury of participating in a 'good-will cruise' programme; they would return to Bombay, and decide the next course of action on a probe into the situation there. By the time Kathiwar reached Bombay on 23 February everything was over: NCSC had already decided to surrender unconditionally. References and Notes 1.
For details of the events that occurred at Aden and Bahrain between 21 and 23 February 1946 see File Nos. NL 9902 and 9906. Also File No. Home/Poll(I) 5/16/46.
2
Apart from Talwar the major establishments and ships involved in the strike were: BOMBAY Shore Establishments: RIN Depot comprised Castle BQ/Tacks which housed 900 ratings belonging to the ships in the Naval Dockyard and those awaiting appointment to other ships or to the release centres, Fort BQ/Tacks which accommodated the HO ratings, Central Communication Office, Colaba Receiving Station, Mahul Wireless Station, and RIN Hospital at Sewri which had provisions for 300 patients and a 220 strong staff including Sick Berth Attendants. HMIS Machlimar was situated at Versova, 12 miles away from Bombay, accommodated about 300 ratings and imparted them training in anti-submarine operations. . I HMIS Hamla, Marve 20 miles away from Bombay, housed the Landing Craft Wing with about 650 ratings. HMIS Kakauri, Versova, was a demobilization centre housing over 1400 ratings. HMIS Cheetah was another demobilization centre on Trombay island, 15 miles away from Bombay. HMIS Akbar was situated at Kolsett, 28 miles away from Bombay, and comprised a cookery school, a physical training centre, a few units to conduct miscellaneous courses and a school which could undertake the basic training of 3000 SS recruits (500 ratings were there at the" time of the mutiny) at a time. . HMIS Feroze, situated on the Malabar Hill, initially undertook the
184
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 training of Reserve Officers and later became the demobilization centre for officers. The ship's company consisted of 120. ratings. HMIS Shivaji, Lonavla, 100 miles away from Bombay, was RIN's Mechanical Training Establishment which trained artificers and stokers and could accommodate about 800 ratings. HMIS Valsura, situated in Jamnagar, was the Electrical and Torpedo Training School which accommodated 300 ratings. Ships: (a) Sloops - HMIS Narbada and Jumna. (b) Frigate - HMIS Dhanush. (c) Corvettes - HMIS Gondwana, Assam, Mahratta and Sind. (d) Fleet Minesweepers - HMIS Kwnaon, Kathiawar, Khyber, Punjab, Bombay, Madras, Orissa and Oudh. (e) Old Sloops - HMIS Clive and Lawrence.
(j) Trawlers - HMIS Agra, Cuttack, Karachi, Lahore, Madura, Nautilus, Nasik, Palna, Poona, Rampur, Berar, Amritsar and Cochin. (g) Ex-Persian Gunboats - HMIS Ni/am, Moti, Lal, and Hira.
(h) Auxiliary Vessels - HMIS Kalavati, Ramdas, Dipavati and Bhadravati.
In addition- there were a few Motor Minesweepers. KARACHI Shore Establishments: HMIS Bahadur, Boy's Training Establishment, Chamak, Radar School and Himalaya, Gunnery School. ' Ships: HMIS FHndusian and Travancore; Motor Launch 1262.
MADRAS Shore Establishment: HMIS Adyar.
·CALCUITA Short EstablishlJ1ent: HMIS Hooghly. Ship: HMIS Rajputana.
COCHIN Shore Establishment: HMIS Vendurthy. Ships: HMIS Baroda and some launches, etc.
VIZAGAPATAM Shore Establishment: HMIS Cirr:ars. Ships: HMIS Sonavati, Ahmedabad and Shillorig and certain flotillas.
A Tale of Three Ships
185
MANDAPAM Shore Establishment: HMIS Tengra.
ADEN Shore Est~blishm(mt : WIT Station. BAHRAIN Shore Establishment: WIT Station.
ANDAMANS Ships:
Minesweepers - HMIS Rohilkhand, Hongkong, Deccan, Bengal, Bihar, Baluchistan and Kistna. NEW DELHI Shore Establishment: HMIS India.
The following few ships and establishments remained unaffected by the strike: HMIS Shamsher, a frigate being the solitary exception at Bombay; HMIS Dilwar, a Boys' Training School, and Motor Launch 1261 at Karachi; HMIS Godavari, a sloop at Madras; HMIS Bmracuda, a depot ship at Calcutta; Motor Minesweeper 154, a laun~h at Cochin; HMIS Tir, a frigate at Vizagapatam; HMIS Investigator, a survey ship and Llanstephen Castle, a depot ship at Trincomalee; HMIS Cauvery and Sutlej, both sloops in the Pacific and HMIS Calcutta at sea. RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, pp. 41-5. 3.
Sher Alam, 'Proceedings', File No. NL 9939, Part I.
4.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 66.
5.
Nisar Ahmed Sayed, 'Proceedings', File No. NL 9939, Part I.
6.
Sher Alam, ibid.
7.
Commander E.C. Streatfield-James, File No. NL 9939, Part 11.
8.
While all other. officers admitted to have put off their caps, Lieut. Comdr. Soman fancied to have told the ratings: 'Tomhari ijazat say topi nahin panhi hai, or tumhary hukum say nahin utaraonga'. Lieut. Comdr. Bhaskar Sadashib Soman, ibid.
9.
Comdr. Streatfield-James, ibid.
10.
Lieut. Comdr. Soman, ibid.
11.
Comdr. Streatfield-James, ibid.
12.
Lieut. Arjan Singh, ibid.
13.
Circumstantial Letter to FOB, Rear Admiral Rattray, 1 April 1946,
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.
File No. NL 9984. Also Statement of Leading Stoker Mohd. Ayub, ibid. Comdr. Streatfield-James, File No. NL 9939, Part H. Statement of Lieut. Comdr(S).K.C. Divan, File No. NL 9984. Lieut. Comdr. Divan, Fil~ No. NL 9939, Part H. Sub-Lieut. P.C.E. Williams, ibid. Surgeon Lieut. Comdr. B.H. Martin, ibid. Lieut. Comdr. Divan, ibid. From CO, HMIS Travancore, 26 March 1946, File No. NL 9915.
2Oa. Intelligence Bureau Report, FileNo. Home/Poll/(I) 5/14/46. 21. Evidence of Lieut. M.RA. Rao, File No. NL 9984. 22.
Evidence of Lieut. Comdr. A.K. Chatterji, Lieut. T.W. Brown and Lieut. R.J. Hayward, ibid, 23. Statement of Mubarak (Ahmad), RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 15. 24. Statement of CPO (Motor Engineer H) Ghulum Dastgir, File No. NL 9984. 25. As the LCM came alongside the jetty Sub-Lieut. Wilby was about to go out of the craft. Ldg. Seaman Hira La! got hold of his hand and said 'Chullo Sahib, Hum logue ka sung raho'. The officer replied, 'No as an officer I would not'. Statement of Sub-Lieut. G.M. Wilby, Appendix I, File No. NL 9936. 26. Statement of Mubarak Ahmed, op.cit. Also statement of Radar W.H. Saleem, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 14. 27. Intelligence Bureau Report, op.cit. 27a. E. Mudie to Wavell, 27 February 1946, TOP, Vol. VI, p. 1072. 28. 29. 30.
SitJ.lation Report No. 3, 22 February 1946, File No. HomejPoll(I} 5/ 21/46. RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 100. Statement of Lieut. E.C. Paul, File No. NL 9984.
31. 32.
FOB to FOCRIN , 24 April 1946, File No. NL 9958. Fifth Witness: Lieut. Paul, 'Proceedings', ibid.
33. 34.
11th Witness: Kulbir Singh, ibid. 1st Witness: Lieut. R.J. Ward. ibid.
35. 36.
'Report', ibid. 1st Witness: Lieut. Ward, ibid.
37.
'Report', ibid.
187
A Tale of Three Ships 38.
Like HMIS Kathiawar the 37th MS Flotilla had to return to Bombay abandoning its minesweeping operations in the Andamans. When the 'mutiny' broke out, the ships of the flotilla were anchored in Semaris Bay, Port Blair, in a line one cable apart with Deccan and Bengal lying alongside each other astern of Rohilkhand and engaged in 'boiler cleaning'. They were scheduled to complete the sweeping of the remaining minefields in the Andamans and the Nicobars after the boilor-dearning ~as over. On both 19 and 20 February the ships' companies heard BBC and AIR new bulletins on the RIN strike in Bombay. About the same time they received W messages asking all to join the strike. The ratings aboard the ships were most indignant to learn on the 21st that British troops opened fire on their brethren in Bombay and Karachi. Most of the officers were unaware of their feelings. When on the 21st morning COs got together to discuss the situation the general feeling was that the events. elsewhere would have no repercussions .00 the ships of the flotilla. The same afternoon Vice-Admiral Godfrey's ultimatum to the ratings was heard on radio. It had a tremendous impact on the 'tempers' of the ships' companies. They all took it to mean that the entire navy would be destroyed.
rr
Next morning HMIS Kistna struck work. Its motorboat moved around, and the news spread to all other ships of the flotilla. In the;_ afternoon 'liberty' was stopped in some of them. Later in the evening CO of Deccan arranged a concert aboard the ship to keep the men occupied. It was attended by a number of ratings from other vessels also. When the concert was on, Writer Nair suddenly appeared on the stage and said that it was shameful for the ratings to enjoy themselves when their brethren in Bombay were being killed. His speech was interrupted by shouts of approval. The concert was stopped. Before long all joined in slogan shouting and 'creating disorder'. The other ships,in the vicinity followed suit. The men everywhere showed great reluctance to obey the commandS of their officers. Early in the morning of 23 February the ratings of almost all ships of the flotilla refused to fall in. Efforts by officers to make them obey orders were of no avail. TIle daily routine was not carried out. Shortly after colours at 8 a.m. the ratings aboard all ships hoisted the Tricolour amidst shouts and slogans. Official communications between the vessels of the flotilla snapped. Messages between them encouraging each other to participate in the strike were passed by visual signals, loudhailers and shouting. COs' 'prerogatives ceased to exist': they could no longer issue any order to -their men. Comdr. Bailey, Senior Officer of the flotilla, later paid visits to the ships to restore
188
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946 order. He played on the lower-deck sentiment, exhorting all to complete the job in hand for the sake of their 'good name' but it did not work. The ratings were then assured that he would arrange for their representatives to return in a ship to Bombay. The proposal was turned down. The men insisted: the entire flotilla must be sent back so that they all could lend 'physical support' to their brethren in trouble. The commanding officers realized that it was impossible to carry on minesweeping under the circumstances. The only way to satisfy the 'adamant' ratings was to take the entire flotilla back to Bombay. Comdr. Bailey had to do it. For further details see File No. NL9937.
39.
From Ratings to the Commanding Officer, HMIS KATHIAWAR, Annexure Ill, File No. NL 9958.
7 REBELLIOUS LOWER DECK
The same day the Talwar ratings struck work the men in almost all other communication stations in and around Bombay downed tools. The radio news bulletins spread the story all over the country. The ratings in shore establishments in the city and its suburbs and aboard ships at anchor in the harbour too heard the news broadcast by AIR. The non-duty 'libertymen' brought back latest information about the developments in the Signal School. It passed through mouth down to the last man in all units, causing a lot of excitement everywhere. The ratings gathered in small groups after 'lights out' and discussed "the situation. Everyone agreed that something had to be done next morning to express solidarity with the strikers in Talwar. The men talked in whispers lest the officers-on-watch overhear them. Arguments and counter-argurilents started, and proposals and counterproposals came up. It was decided eventually that they too would join in the strike, and a tentative programme of action was chalked out. The ratings in barracks and bunks passed a sleepless night thinking of avenging the years of sufferings and humiliations. The upper deck remained in the dark, and got no 'pre-indication' of the trouble that was brewing. ,They were taken off their guard when the ratings in almost all the eleven shore establishments in and around the city and forty-five ships in addition to eleven miscellaneous vessels and four flotillas anchored in the harbour struck work in the morning of 19 February. All of a sudden the officers were confronted with a revolt by those whose loyalty they had taken for granted. What came as a shock to them was not only its abrupt beginning but also its rapid thrust, its brief but extensive violation of the hitherto accepted code of domination and subordination. I
Early that morning the bugle was sounded as usual. But the ratings in most places refused to turn out of their bed. Around 6.30 a.m. the pipe was sounded again. No one fell in on the quartei"deck
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Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
for 'clean-ship' duties. The 'broom ard bucket' dance, as the ratings· called it sarcastically, was not rehearsed. Later daily morning inspection was piped but not a single rating turned up. On board HMIS Narbada, the flagship of RIN, Chief Boatswain's Mate Mohamed Ishak noticed some ratings throwing paint buckets over the side. As soon as he got hold of one, the rest surrounded and assaulted him. They dragged him up to the 'A' gun, threw his cap overboard and left him there. l Officers found their men in clusters of fours or fives dispersed all over the quarterdeck and mess deck. There was much of jeering, shouting and whistling. Naval ships were continuously hooting sirens. The men broke 'silence', a sign of their subordination to' upper-deck authority. Their servility now gave way to self-assertion. To the officers the lower deck appeared to be in a different mood: when they passed by their men, no one took any notice of them. Nor did anyone spring to attention. The ratings were busy talking among themselves. Everyone had something to say about the sufferings he underwent and plans to avenge them. There seemed to be no end to discussion. It was to be so until the men became silent again after their surrender. Usually they did not indulge in any discussion even at mess tables. They simply could not afford it. The ratings could not take food as leisurely as their officers. The naval routine left them no time to think of anything except what they were ordered to do. la On the 19th morning the ratings had no orders to carry out. They had dismantled the command structure. They were free and could behave as they pleased. Men were indeed discussing and deciding, shouting slogans and moving about freely. They seemed to be celebrating their newly gained freedom. In CO of Assam Lieut. Sexton's description the ship's company were 'coming and going as if it was ... their recreation'.2 The OODs indeed noted that 'things were not going on ... as before'.3 Their authority was openly defied. Worried they went round their divisions to pacify the men and ask them to state their grievances. But no one would confide to them. The ratings had tried out all forms of supplication before. They made individual 'requests' and complaints on many occasions but their officers seldom paid any attention to them. They had now taken a 'drastic measure' to 'get their grie\ances redressed' - the 'overthrow' of authority.4 The offi-
Rebellious Lower Deck
191
cers failed in their pacifying mission - their trick to get the men back to duty on promise of official reiief did not work. They could do nothing thereafter but to bang around the wardrooms of ships or the gateways of establishments and await COs' intervention. The latter tried to gather the men around them and address the assembly on the lines their juniors did. Most of the lower-deck personnel 'appeared to be disrespectful' and th,? leading ones among them kept on interrupting their speeches. The norms of deference 'due' to their officers were violated by the men. In one case, for example, someone shouted: 'Don't stand round' the CO and 'better come away'. He 'had come to give one of his usual speeches' and was 'trying to break up this strike'.s Immediately the assembly dispersed. In most cases COs could take no action, could do nothing to stop the 'indiscipline'. The men seemed to be 'in a very excitable state' and COs feared that any action on their part would touch off 'a free for all fight' in which officers would suffer the most and their authority would be undermined even more. 6 COs waited for the initial 'excitement' to pass off and expected concrete guidelines from Vithal House to meet the situation. But none of the expectations was fulfilled. 'Mob hysteria grew up' and tempers frayed in Comdr. Karmarkar's words.7 Vithal House was yet to recover from the paralysis that ·set in there on the outbreak of the 'mutiny'. The chain of command to the ratings broke down.7a The men lost no time in destroying the symbols of upperdeck authority and establishing their own in their places. Left to act on their own responsibility COs in some cases avoided conflict with the lower deck. For example: in LCTs the commanding officers thought it advisable to declare a holiday for their men, themselves ordered to strike the ensign and abandoned the craft.s In some other units officers tried to prevent the hauling down of Union Jack or White Ensign and clashed with their men. On board Narbada the ratings struck the 'Jack' amidst the slogan 'Down, DoWn Union Jack' and loud cheers from the ships in the vicinity. Chief Bos'n's Mate Mohamed Isliak who wanted to stop it 'was manhandled. He was bruised'. Lieuts. Kochar and Upton came to his rescue and somehow 'brought him out of the crowds'.9 Later a number of ratings moved towards the portside of the quarterdeck to strike the ensign. They were stopped by Lieuts. Tealle, Mantle and Joshua. The latter asked them not to tamper with the ensign. It was
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British, authority with their own the ratings shouted 'bahar chalo'. The barrier that separated the men from civilians disappeared. There were no sentries to restrict their movement. The wall between ships and shore, or that between barracks and civvy streets crumbled down. The ratings aboard ships in the harbour commandeered naval boats and came ashore. Their counterparts in establishments trooped out in batches and started marching on in a body.16 Their destination was Ta/war. Many of them did not have caps on, others had torn shirts and were in civilian dress. l6a They discarded the uniforms that bore the signs of their subordination. So long as they were in their ships and establishments the ratings shouted anti-authority, and, as a corollary, anti-British, slogans - 'Down, Down Union Jack', 'Down with British White Rats', 'Quit India' and the like. Out on the civvy streets they adopted popular slogans, 'Down with British Imperialism', 'Release the INA Prisoners', 'Withdraw Indian Troops from Indonesia', 'Jai hind', etc. As they paraded the public thoroughfares the processions carried at their head the flags of two major political parties, Congress and League. One or two added Hammer and Sickle to Charka and CrescentP Understandably the ratings collected them from local shops. In shaking off their habitual docility and subservience the lower deck made a public show of its defiance of authority. Hundreds of ratings who manned sloops, minesweepers and miscellaneous vessels anchored in the harbour joined hundreds of their brethren attached to the shore establishments in 'noisy' and 'violent' demonstrations for nearly two hours in the Fort area. This caused 'utter confusion and complete holdup of traffic' in the heart of the city's business centre. Anything foreign incurred the wrath of the demonstrators. The Indian ratings had long suffered insults and humiliations by the white personnel. The racial hatred fostered by years of sufferings was reflected in their actions. Everything foreign was attacked. Every symbol of foreign domination was sought to be removed. White men, both civilian and service personnel, who came within the sight of processionists, were chased.ls The former ran helter-skelter for safety. British soldiers in uniform were belaboured. 19 One among them lay prostrate where he was struck doWn. Motor cars with white civilians were stopped and allowed to proceed on their occupants' shouting 'Jai Hind'. Along Hornby Road a number of shops owned by Europeans that hesitated a moment or two to down their shutters
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Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
were attacked by the demonstrators. Their window panes were shattered. Outside the Prince of Wales Museum petrol cans were seized from lorries, emptied on tram lines and set ablaze. Foreign mail vans parked outside the British military-base postoffice were attacked,· their contents removed and strewn all over the streets. The 'Star and Stripes' at the United States Information Service was pulled down and burnt.20 Thus the ratings proceeded towards the Signal School with banners at the head of their processions and shouting nationalist slogans. As the day wore on, more men poured in from everywhere and swelled their ranks. On arrival at Talwar every batch was greeted by a 'howling mob' from inside. All were led· to the parade ground. Every time a procession came in, one or two strike leaders broke off from the meeting they were having with FOB to tell the newcomers about the developments in Ta/war. The ratings started arriving from 11-30 onwards. Everyone was in a 'boisterous' mood. Discussions in groups continued till all were collected together and addressed by the Talwar leaders. They were told that the ratings of the Signal School had elected a committee the evening before to formulate demands on their behalf and place them before Rear Admiral Rattray. It was suggested that they should also form strike committees locally to list their specific grievances and elect a representative from each ship to constitute a central committee. All were told to observe strictly the following code of conduct: strike should be the 'first and last concern' of everyone. They must close their ranks and maintain perfect discipline. No one should communicate or negotiate with any official in his personal capacity. Every matter for individual representation should be conveyed to the elected spokesmen. 21 It was then announced that Aruna Asaf Ali was scheduled to come in the afternoon and address the ratings. The assembly broke up, and most of the ratings returned to their units. Those who stayed back roamed about freely in the city. In the afternoon a procession was taken out of Ta/war. It marched on through Colaba Causeway to Flora Fountain and came back to the establishment by Back Bay. The ratings from different units gathered again to hear Aruna. One leader after another addressed the meeting. The huge crowd awaited Aruna's arrival in all eagerness but she did not turn up. Eventually the meeting was dissolved,
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and the ratings trickled back to their respective ships and establishinents. On return they had to pull together and decide much for themselves. The men in many a unit gathered together to set up an alternative structure of authority, to form a local strike committee and elect one among them to represent their ship or establishment on the Naval Central Strike Committee. In a few units they chose as their representatives the best educated among them who could converse in English and would be able to match their officers.22 The ratings reserved the right to recall them and, at least in one case, exercised it later.23 The naval routine remained largely suspended since the morning. Cooks did not do their galley duty. Topasses refused work. Sentries left their posts. No one did watch-keeping duty. Engineroom ratings stopped work and shut down dynamos. There was no power for lighting. The strike committees now decided to organize certain works, the ·bare 'essentials only', such as cleaning living spaces and Il,1ess decks, preparing and cooking food, auxiliary watch-keeping for the maintenance of power and light and quartermasters' duties. 24 Officers and senior rates were ordered to clean their cabins and living quarters. Those CPOs and POs who did not join the strike were harassed. They were asked to stay in their living places, take the food as.and when supplied by the strikers and not to come out. 25 Indifference, hesitation or 'neutrality' on their part was considered to be a breach of solidarity. Harassing the'racalcitrants or vacillators was not whimsical - it had a unifying function. The situation was no better for the officers. Their galleys ceased work. No food was cooked for them. They had to depend on biscuits or dry rations. They were denied all services by their men. Local intelligence was organized and sentries were placed over all entrance and exit points to keep an eye over the movement of officers and other hostile elements. Fatigued some ratings went to bed and the rest discussed plans for the next day and spent another sleepless night. Among the 'acts of mutiny' committed so far the upper deck considered the following most serious: mass refusal of orders, forming 'mutinous' body, 'unlawful' picketing, intimidation, tearing down
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of Union Jack or White Ensign and 'breaking out' of ships and establishments. The last could not be restricted until military guards were posted. The establishments in the suburbs of Bombay were a bit late in reaching the city. In HMIS Hamla at Marve things took a serious turn late in the 19th evening. Around 11 p.m. a large number of ratings led by Signalman R. Misra and Leading Stoker K. Singh rushed towards the Regulating Office. Everywhere ROs drew the ire of lower-deck personnel because they represented the tyranny of the upper deck and perpetrated the worst atrocities in the name of discipline.26 Ldg. Stoker Singh shouted, 'This is the place of RPO's', and immediately everyone gave a hand in destroying its electrical wires, furniture and, above all, files, papers and other graphic instruments of upper-deck dominance. One PO asked Singh to stop it: 'This is not your property to destroy but government's'. Sig. Misra snubbed him. From a belief that the final moment of the free"dom struggle had arrived he announced: 'We will go to Bombay now. All the forces are going on strike and this will be the best moment for British imperialism quit and beginning of Swaraj':n The ratings shouted in chorus 'Bombay Chalo'. So they moved on. Meanwhile CO Comdr. W A.W. Aubery was woken up by the noise. 'It sounded as if a mob was approaching' his bungalow. He dressed up hurriedly and went out. On the way the Commanding Officer met EO, Lieut. Comdr. Quayle and RO, Lieut. Kapoor - he asked tpem to pacify the ratings with whom they were more acquainted than himself. CO kept himself at a safe distance from the Regulating Office as his presence amid the men, he feared, 'might anger the crowd and provocate them to violence'.28 The officers failed in their mission. What they could report back to the Commander was that the crowd consisted mostly of stokers and communication ratings in addition to a few writers and domestics. They soon noticed the ratings running towards the garages and understood that their intention clearly was to 'break ship' in lorries. CO could do nothing to stop it. The ratings drove out of the establishment for Bombay. Comdr. Aubery wanted to contact the police and military authorities but the telephone 'exchange' had been smashed by the ratings. The latter, before they left the 'ship', wrote slogans on the walls of the establishment. The men returned from Bombay early on 20 February. The Royal marines had in the meantime placed a cordon round Hamla and posted strong pickets round the causeway to arrest any rating attempting to enter or leave the establishment. On their way back those 'who had
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broken ship' were apprehended by the Royal Marine Patrols but had to be returned to their barracks later. Similar patterns were noticed in other shore establishments in the suburbs as well. In Akbar at Kolsett the situation 'worsened' on the 20th morning. The 'Headlam' Division took the lead in challenging the upper-deck authority. Soon the whole of the ship's company joined in. A large group headed by Assistant Steward MA. Khan proceeded towards the Guardroom. When they were just a few yards away from it, Khan told the ratings: 'Rush to the cells. Break it and release all the prisoners'.29 Accordingly the Guardroom was ransacked, the cells were broken open and the prisoners freed. A cell containing oakum was set ablaze and the fire spread quickly. The crowd then moved to the football ground arid from there to Thana. About the same time another group stopped a lorry that was coming in with provisions for officers, 'wantonly destroyed the contents' including fresh eggs, and drove it to Bombay.3D Likewise in Versova around 8.30 a.m. several hundred ratings from HMIS Kakallri 'invaded' Machlimar breaking down part of its outer perimeter fence. A number of Machlimar men joined them in no time. The 'mob' then tore down the White Ensign, broke windowpanes, pulled down notice boards, smashed the windscreen of a lorry and forced open the cell. At about 9.30 the ratings marched out of the establishment.31 So the men from suburbs proceeded towards Bombay. Around quarter past ten hundreds of them arrived at Churchgate station by local trains. All through the journey they shouted themselves hoarse. There was a recrudescence of trouble in the city. This time Churchgate was the scene of 'disturbances'. Again the British servicemen who happened to be within the sight of the ratings were booed and chased. Some were assaulted. An army despatch rider was stopped and his motorcycle tyres were punctured. Later the demonstrators assembled at Oval maidan opposite the University and were addressed by Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan, President of the Talwar Strike Committee.32 The 20th morning saw the complete cessation 'of naval routine. Not even the pipes were sounded - the buglers stayed away from
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
duty.32a Only those whom the local strike committees had detailed for essential duty did their work. As in the morning before most of the ratings walked out of the establishments and stationed themselves outside the gates, shouting slogans and cheering loudly. The officers-on-duty looked on helplessly. The ·strikers imposed silence on them which they would find difficult to break almost until the former surrendered. What surprised the officers ~ost was the fearlessness of their men. The sight of white sahibs ceased to promote awe among the ratings. Far from being fear~d they were mocked and addressed in disparaging terms. Instead of placating them by springing to attention and saluting the men greeted the sahibs with what the latter would have in other times considered intolerable insolence. That morning senior British officers were indeed received with the cry 'Quit India' 'White Skins'. They faced brickbats in some units and a shower of abuse in most. Torrents of hatred and anger born of long years of humiliation poured out from the ratings' mouth. Insults - 'bastards', 'liars', ~dogs' and so on - were flung at the officers, which under ordinary conditions would· be addressed the other way round to the men. The latter· indulged in language and behaviour tha~were conspicuously violative of the norms of address and etiquette hithettoconsidered unbreakable. The British. officers had to jostle through· the crowds at the entrance of establishments. No one dared pause anywhere near them. Abuses hurt the officers no less than brickbats. Still they had to accept without murmurs the frontal assault on the code of deference and walked in meekly. In many units the officers were ordered in disrespectful 'tum' instead of reverential 'ap' to take off caps, raise hands and say 'Jai Hind'. Those who refused to do so had their caps pulled off, hands raised and were thus forced to obey. Sub-Lieut. Williams of Castle Ba"acks and Lieut. Victor Siga of Machlimar had this experience. The Commanding Officer of the latter faced a peculiar situation. As the last batch of ratings was going out through its main gate, some one among them saw Comdr. Ridley coming from his bungalow with his cap on. He immediately suggested that they should ask CO to take the cap off. By the time Comdr. Ridley reached the gate the crowd turned back and shouted at him 'off with the cap'. He either did not hear or pretended not to, and went straight to the Regulating Office. The ratings ran behind him, and CPO Chandran tried to control I them but with no success. Lieut. Siga then rushed to the office and' told CO that the ratings were uncontrollable and wanted to see him
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with his cap off: Comdr. Ridley had to come out and show that he had taken the cap off.33 Everywhere the men thus gave their officers a taste of lower-deck authority. Thereafter they marched out of their units leaving some on essential duty. Very few officers cir their loyal senior rates had the courage to ask the men on their return, 'why you went out?' Ldg. SBA Krishnan of Akbar, when so asked by PO Yakub, questioned back, 'who the hell you are?' The rating silenced and turned away the PO in the same manner as the officers had always dealt with their 'requestmen': 'You shut up and fuck off from here' .33a The ratings asserted that since the upper-deck authority had ceased to exist, no one should come to them with any such questions. The few who did were called 'government ka bachha' or 'kutta' and treated as such. The strike had reversed the termS of relationship between officers and men. It had turned the naval world upside down. The officers had no longer the 'prerogative' to order about their men; they could at best request them and nothing more. Lieut. Comdr. Jamil of Akbar wanted to take some of its ratings with him as their representatives to CO's l bungalow. The Commanding.Officer, he said, had got something to tell them. One among the men 'turned round and said "let the Captain come down here" , if he h,ad any request to make. 33b In fact until local strike committees were formed, no one had authority to issue orders to the rebels; none could control them. The city of Bombay witnessed man; more processions on the 20th morning than the day before. From early morning batches of ratings started pouring in not only from establishments in the neigh~ bourhood ·but from those in the distant suburbs as well. The city streets reverberated to the slogans they shouted. Soon after reaching Talwar they all gathered on its parade ground. The assembly looked more organized. It was addressed by many, the foremost among them being Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan. While the session was on there, the members of NCSC left for its first meeting in one of the classrooms of the Signal School. NCSC was formed to coordinate and direct the actions of the various units in and around the city. It was expanded to accommodate the elected representatives as sent in by the units. ~ In the first meeting of NCSC its officebearers were chosen. The Talwar leaders figured prominently in this respect. President, VicePresident and Secretary - Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan, Ldg. Tel. Madan
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
Singh and Hamid Akhtar - all belonged to the Signal School.34 Apart from the election of officebearersthe demands formulated by the Talwar Strike Committee were approved, and a negotiation' committee was constituted. NC was empowered to contact the leader$ of the major political parties in an effort to enlist their support, to place before FOCRIN the character of demands and conduct negotiations with the naval authorities and government for their immediate fulftlment. Around 12 noon the meeting of NCSC was over. The speeches still continued outside on the parade ground punctuated by loud cheers. The situation soon changed. The naval authorities launched their first offensive against the lower deck. Vithal House had already recovered from its initial bewilderment and placed military pickets over CCO, Colaba and Mahul WT stations. Around 1.30 p.m. FOB issued the order that all ratings must 'return to their ships and establishments' by 3.30 and those found outside after this deadline 'will be liable to arrest'.35 This was conveyed to the men who gathered in the Talwar parade ground over a loudhailer. Soon after came the news of military deployment around all major establishments in Bombay and the dockyard. Clearly the intention was to reerect the wall between barracks and civvy streets. The ratings flew into a rage and were reluctant to give up the newly gained freedom of mov~ ment. But NCSC leaders advised them to retreat, asking them to go back to their ships and establishments and await the results of negotiations with FOCRIN for the withdrawal of military. The ratings had to bow to organizational discipline. Most of them returned to their own places grudgingly~ Among those who stayed back a few were found wandering about in naval uniforms and picked up by the military police from the city streets. The rest ,being 'out of the rig of the day' could hardly be distinguished from civilians. They slipped back into the major establishments in the city.35a FOB's intention of segregating those who 'broke ship' from 'loyal' ratings was not fulfilled. Apart from pickets at the main gates of Talwar and Castles military sentries were placed inside the latter over guardroom, armoury and magazine. Some ratings star~ed fraternizing with the Mahratta Light Infantrymen, and the rest got ready to fight back with whatever missiles they had at their disposal. The British guard
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commanders were not sure of the loyalty of Indian troops and feared counter-offensive any moment. Eventually in the -face of mounting pressures from the ratings they decided to withdraw the guards and place them out of their view. The authorities awaited the arrival of British reinforcements and deferred their next offensive till then. Once the guards were removed the ratings placed their own pickets on all strategic points. Assured of full backing from the government and assistance by the military Vithal House overcame its inertia. In the afternoon of 19 February Rear· Admiral Rattray m.et Colville, Governor, General Beard, Area Commander, Bristow, Governor's Adviser and Butler, Commissioner of Police at Government House. FOB 'admitted that he was unable to cope with the situation from his own resources'. All agreed: 'It was a matter for the troops to deal with, supported if necessary by the armed police'. The Area Commander disclosed that the forces at his disposal were half a battalion of the Leicester Regiment and one Mahratta battalion. It was felt that these would be inadequate to meet the situation. Hence the decision to summon strong reinforcements. FOB signalled for warships to come to Bombay, and General Beard asked for military reinforcements.35b By the evening Vithal House abandoned the wait-and-see policy followed so far and planned to strike. At night FOB along with top military and police officials visited the major shore establishments in the city and chose the places around which military sentries would be posted. The next day several platoons of Mahratta Light Infantry were despatched to occupy those 'preconsidered positions'. But the commanding officers of ships anchored in the harbour had no knowledge of the decision about military deployment around the dockyard and establishments ashore. They were isolated from the beginning of the strike. The Dockyard Singal Station had ceased to function since the 18th evening. So did the communication ratings aboard ships from the next morning. Similarly most of coxswains and boatcr:ew stopped work. Almost all forms of water transports were under the control of the strikers. COs had no means to contact the authorities ashore. In fact they did not receive any instructions from the latter on how to act. All official channels of communication having broken down everyone was 'left to work on his own responsibility'.36 Some declared holiday routine for their men and deserted their
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 .
posts on 19 February itself. Next day many more went ashore leaving behind junior officers or deck CPOs or POs in charge. Most of those who left for the shore stayed back at RIN officers' mess or elsewhere and decided not to return until they were ordered to or saw the White Ensign flying on their ships.37 Though FOB's prohibitory order reached the ships late in the afternoon of the 20th nothing could be done to stop the movement of ratings from one vessel to another or on the breakwater. By the time COs lost all control over their ships and could initiate no action to stamp out 'indiscipline'. The 'initiative' passed into the hands of the men, which had hitherto been denied to them. Very few commanding officers later admitted this. One among the few to do so was Captain Learmont who found himself in a similar situation in HMIS Kakauri at Versova.37a In his evidence before the Machlimar Board of Enquiry the officer said: 'I had ... lost the the initiative ... no CO out here held the initiative at any time, the initiative was completely lost through the ... failure of Bombay [which] ... passed no information whatever'. Like many other COs Captain Learmont decided to make what he called a 'strategic .withdrawal' until overwhelming forces were sent out to stop indiscipline.3S Most of the commanding officers in the suburbs, like those on board ships at anchor, were unaware of the offensive being planned. Until the deployment of military guards the strikers aboard ships in the harbour and establishments in and around Bombay were in 'physical'rcontact with one another. In most cases naval transports, both water and ground, were at their disposal. There was constant flow of men from ship to shore and one establishment to another. Initially information was passed round and action coordinated thus.39 In addition messages from one ship to another were conveyed through loudhailers and signal flags. On the 19th morning, for example, 'Pennant III Strike'. was hoisted on many.39a The strikers had free access to telephones which they used, apart from naval transports, to contact establishments in the suburbs.W /T and R/T gears were used mainly for communication with far-flung establishments and ships anchored elsewhere or on sea.40 Once military pickets were placed over establishments and around the dockyard the movement of ratings from ship to shore and barracks to civvy street became restricted. The strikers in Talwar avoided the main gate and went over a point of the surrounding wall chris-
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tened 'Azad Hind Gate' for communication with outside organizations, press and public. Increasingly NCSC came to depend more on means other than 'physical' contact. Signal communication, both visual and wireless, was organized to meet the situation.41 The synchronization of action on the fateful day of 21 February was effected mainly through this channel. After the firing was opened on Castle Barracks the signalmen stationed on the roof of the establishment began sending semaphore messages to ships lying alongside the breakwater. The latter in turn passed them on to others. NCSC intimated everyone which ships were to keep RjT watch and which were not.42 Accordingly Talwar transmitted messages to the ships on R/T watch which, in turn, relayed them to others through visual signals and loudhailers. 'The whole thing', in Staff Communication Officer, Lieut. Comdr. Shaw's opinion, 'was extremely well organized, call signs were allocated, correct procedure used.'43 A code of 4 letter group was evolved.44 The strikers began transmission on 2000 kilocycles bu~, subsequently to avoid interception,shifted to 8 megacycles. For the same reason they switched over from English to Malayalam for the texts of their messages. The strike caused considerable dislocation in the official communication system. Attempts were made to man by RN personnel some of the communication stations in and around Bombay, which stopped work by the evening of 18 February. But these ratings, behig most1ynon-~ommunication people, failed to do the specialized job. DSS passed into the hand.s of the strikers in the afternoon of the day the 'trouble' began, and CCO had to be abandoned in the afternoon of the 21st. The RN VS ratings who were on duty in place of their RIN counterparts in the Ballard Pier Signal Station had to leave it as the Port Trust Signalmen objected to their presence which caused the training of HMIS lumna's guns on them. Subsequently a small emergency VS station was established atop Vithal House. Officers in Talwar attempted more than once but failed to get anywhere near the wireless equipments, let alone put them out of commission. Eventually the army was called in to monitor the strikers: at Colaba a receiver was put on to the frequency on which the latter were transmitting, and messages intercepted were passed on to Vithal House by telephone. In fact Lieut. Comdr. Shaw himself had a receiver there but it did not help him much. The reception was poor. None of the attempts to improve the flow of signal traffic was successful.4S
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
Communication with ships at anchor or on sea and establishments ashore here or abroad remained largely suspended until the RIN ratings resumed duty.46 II
The strike in Bombay reached its high-water mark on the morning of 21 February when the ratings confined within Castle Barracks clashed with the military guards posted at the outer entrance. The naval authorities planned to starve the besieged· men into submission. Food and water supply to the establishment was cut off. The ratings had to break out of the 'ship' for these necessities among others. At about 9 or 9.30 a.m. a large number of men attempting to force their way out were stopped by the military sentries at the entrance and; on their refusal to go back, were fired upon. A little later BrItish reinforcements were rushed to the spot, and the unreliable Indian troops withdrawn. The ratings went back to their barracks but would not take the offensive lying down. They put up a barricade across the gate, and seized the armoury and magazine. inside Castles and began to match the firing. The military authorities cleared the road passing along the Mint, Town Hall and Castles of all pedestrians and traffic. The entire area was cordoned off by the troops. Several offices and establishments round about it were closed. The Mint workers were sent away at midday. The dock labourers had earlier been warned and turned back. The Reserve Bank was open but could hardly transact· any business. The entire area was rocked by gunfire for well over six hours. The ratings did not store away firearms until a truce was called. Even after the 'cease-fire' came into effect, fresh reinforcements and supplies of ammunition were moved into the Town Hall, the temporary operational headquarters of military forces. Large contingents of British troops and Royal Marines were deployed to guard all approaches to Castle Barracks and the long waterfront at the Gateway of India. The sound of firing ashore brought out the men aboard ships on their portside. While looking across anxiously they received a , number of signals from Castles informing them that the military had opened fire on the' barracks and the ratings inside had broken open
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the armoury" seized all weapons and begun retaliating.47 At about the same time the Talwar message 'stand by for action' reached the ships which had been detailed to maintain R/T watch. This combined with Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan's speech from the breakwater, 'set all the ratings completely out of 'control'. The President of NCSC came in a motor launch around 10.30 a.m. Words about his arrival had already passed around, and many rushed to the breakwater to hear him. Ldg. Sig. Khan boarded HMIS Kumaon lying alongside and harangued the crowd from its bridge in both Urdu and English. It was said: 'we have been absolutely non-violent' but the authorities 'posted armed sentries' outside the major establishments ashore. 'Th~ir pur:' pose is to choke our voice so that we cannot contact each other for pressing our legitimate grievan~s and getting them redressed.' The ( strike committee had a long discussion with the naval authorities but it was fruitless as the latter 'refused to withdraw the military'. Not only so; 'this morning soldiers under the order of authorities bave opened fire on some of our brothers who wanted to go out. 'rIW. authorities are concentrating huge forces of mortar and artillery. In case they attempt to exterminate us, we should be prepared to resist ... and retaliate. If we are to die we will die like men and not like cowards. So stand by for action, get hold of all arms and ammunition of the ships, and organize yourselves. You all know how to organize your action and action station - you have worked in escort vessels and fiLets. If they attack us we will reply to them.' All British officers should be asked to leave the ships and their Indian counterparts who wanted to follow them, added Ldg. Sig. Khan. 'We need no help' from them. 'We know how to get work out of machine guns and arms ... [we] know lot of navigation ... and we can do so for ourselves'.48To the upper deck Ldg. Sig. Khan seemed to have delivered the speech 'in a frenzy and chest hearty manner'. CO of Jllmna thought him 'mad'. For he spoke ofresistance, of the need to reply violence with violence. His speech had more than the 'desired' effect'.49 Amazingly promptly the ratings armed themselveswith whatever weapons they could lay their hands upon, with everything from, rifles, revolvers, cutlasses, tommy's bars, sticks, fencing wires to brooms. ' In fact as soon as they received the signal 'stand by for action' or Ldg. Sig. Khan asked them 'are you ready' for retaliation,SO the ratings seized ships' arms stores. They ordered the officers still on board to hand over the keys to magazines and leave the ships. On
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
the' flagship of RIN, Narbada, the ratings did not ask for the keys" they broke open the magazine, loaded and manned guns. Panicked as they were none of the officers dared interfere; they hurriedly got into the ship's boat. CPO Gulum Nabi who followed them was ordered to come back to the ship, and the First Lieutenant advised him to obey. The officers had to act as their boat's crew as none of their men would help them. The ratings made it clear that anyone who ventured to get near the Royal Navy ship would be shot at. The officers noticed with alarm that the starboard Oerlikon and Pompom were trained on their boat.51 On board HMISBombay several ratings entered into CO's cabin and demanded the magazine key. While' the officer was trying to reason with the leading rates among them, some pushed him down. The others took away the key from his, cabin. CO wanted to store away all small arms but found a few ratings sitting on the hatch, making it impossible.52 SimilarlY-in HMIS Khyber CO and his Engineer Officer rushed to the after-magazine (which contained all small arms) to flood it But reaching there they ,discovered that it had already been opened. It was the same with the forward magazine and the gunners' stores. Interestingly the doors of, these magazines and stores had not be,en forced open, nor were their binges and locks damaged. There were no signs of theirs being tampered with and the keys remained with CO. Able Seaman Hussain' was believed to have opened the locks without keys. On the deck the ship's guns, both Oerlikons and Bofors, were readied for firing. SubLieut. Pershad who attempted to prevent the ratings from loading' ' the guns was knocked out. The officers' passage ashore was not without incidents. While rounding the breakwater several small arms shots were fired at them from the ships lying alongside. These passed over their heads, and they came near Jumna. Just as one among them was about to board the ship, the 'report' of a 12 pounder or 4" gun was heard in the vicinity. The officers could proceed out only after the ratings on watch were informed of their intention.53 The ship's company in HMIS Dhanush were very much annoyed with Lieutenant (Engineer) Bostock and Lieutenant (Supply) McOnnel who threatened to shoot them or turn on gas or steam in the mess deck on their refusal to take rice instead of bread at breakfast. On , the 21st morning the ratings cleared the ship's armament, opened its magazine and passed up ammunition. As the situation appeared to be 'deteriorating' fast CO decided to arm as many officers as possible. They went to the wardroom where pistols were not stowed but
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were afraid that the ratings might attempt to imprison them there . .So putting the pistols in their pockets as unabstrusively as possible the officers moved hurriedly to the quarterdeck to secure the motorboat and the skiff kept there. The ratings were quick to understand their intention, and rushed towards the rifle rack. Sub-Lieut. Abdul Wali who was on the bridge tried to stop them, and was struck by one. Armed with rifles the men stood round the officers on the quarterdeck. They would not permit anyone to take ashore any firearm from the ship's stores, and hence ordered the officers to surrender the arms before they left. The officers refused to obey, and wanted 'to take to the skiff as a last resort'. Meanwhile 'a nearby Basset trained its Oerlikonon the quarterdeck'. The men aboard Dhanush threatened to fire. About the time a NCSC launch came alongside, instructed the ratings not to do so, and asked the British officers to lay down their arms. Finally the officers had to surrender them, and were then allowed to go ashore. Some among the Indian officers were about to follow their foreign masters to the boats but the ratings forced them to come back at gunpoint. Thereafter all of them were confined in the wardroom.54 Threatened with violence the First Lieutenant of HMIS Nasik, Sub-Lieut. DeSilva, handed over the key to CO's cabin to his men. Thus the latter gained access to the ship's armament. Unable to get ashore the officer remained below the decks for 'his own good' and listened to what was going on outside through the port hole of his cabin. Similarly the CPOs and POs of HMIS Poona stayed below and dared not come up as they feared that the 'mutineers' might throw them overboard.55 Once they got hold of the ships' armament stores the ratings hoisted the 'ready-to-fire' flags. The ships were indeed cleared for retaliation: stokers flashed up boilers and gun crew occupied action stations and trained guns on the shore. Those who did not have ammunition aboard received them from others with an excess of these in the neighbourhood. As soon as a few tatings aboard Silld were hit by bullets from the dockyard at noon, the ships nearby swung into action with retaliatory fire. 56 Again at night small arms fire was directed on the suspicious movement of troops ashore.57 Throughout the day the ratings aboard ships remained alert: they were ready to defend themselves from any attack. Instructed by the central leadership the· ships gathered steam to hoist and operate their heavy guns. Some manoeuvred to repulse any attack from the
208
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946
shore and some others to surround the RN ships in the'harbour.ss Though the exits from Castles were guarded by British troops, direct communication with ships was still possible over the seaside wall. It was planned that if the ratings inside Castles were attacked at nig1lt in spite of the 'truce' 'they would be evacuated to the ships, and the barracks would be destroyed by naval guns. After dusk a number of ratings were detailed to man defence posts inside the dockyard as a precaution.59 The ships in stream, however, did not have to use their big guns which covered the whole of Bombay. The British military authorities did not venture to mount any attack on them as on Hindustan. They were not vulnerable to attack from the shore as those in Karachi and elsewhere. Numerically and strategically the ships in Bombay harbour were in an enviable position. The ratings' behaviour at the crucial moment of their struggle, in upper-deck diagnosis, bordered on 'madness'. The men were not amenable to reason and control. There was a rush for arms - no one could be dissuaded from arming himself or organizing action stations: The ratings seemed to be acting in a 'frenzy' or fit of mindless fury. Aboard Assam Able Seaman Biswanath Bose was found handling ammunition. When Sub- Lieut. Rekhi asked him what this 'madness' was all for, the rating turned round and said 'this is our affair and you mind your own business'.60 CO of Gondwana, on asking his men to desist from breaking open the magazine, was 'rudely' told not to interfere, ordered to clear off.61 Similarly the Commanding Officer of Bihar who was trying to convince his ratings of the 'foolishness of their behaviour' was snubbed by Stoker Nair. The latter said that he had no faith in the officer and would assert this with rifle in his hand.62 When cautioned about the consequence of his mutinous behaviour by a PO, Able Seaman Biswanath Bose asked him 'who is there to punish me?' Like others in the lower deck he felt: 'the authority which' could punish' them 'had ceased to exist'.63 It now rest with the men who themselves 'have become officers'. A rating of Akbar asserted, 'In this third war [it] was just ,possible I shall wear 6 stripes.'64 As it reached its climax, the 'mutiny' , crossed its previous limits - the breaking of, the code of deference, verbal or otherwise, the destruction of graphic instruments of upperdeck dominance and so on. It expressed itself in sartorial, spatial and other terms as well. It extended to the violation of the norms' of dress differentials and spatial distances between upper' and lower
Rebellious Lower Deck
209
decks and to the appropriation of the insignia of the former's power. In fact after the officers were pushed out a number of naval subalterns donned their uniforms, occupied their cabins or the quarterdeck and brandished their weapons. The reallocations of dress, space and arms were indeed an expression of the turning of things upside down. On board Hindustan Ldg. Seaman R. Charles walked on the quarterdeck in an officer's (Lieutenant's rank) blue uniform coat with two stripes.6S More significantly inside Castle Barracks, of all ratings; a cook was seen in 'court-martial dress' with a commander's cap on and an officer's sword drawn. Seaman PO Ramannarai met the rating near the Master-at-Arms Quarters. The latter asked the former in the same tone as an officer would, 'why do you come here?'. The Petty Officer replied, 'I want to see Master-at-Arms.' The cook thundered: 'Here there is no Master-at-Arms. This is my post'. The place was out of bound for the Petty Officer, and hence the rating asked him to get out.66 Ramannarai had to obey. Aboard Dhanush Radar A. Hamid, with a be,ard and brandishing a pistol, lold Lieut (E). Bostock that he was no longer the Chief Engineer of the ship, and ordered Chief Stoker M. Khan 'to raise steam to take the ship to the sea'.67 On his refusal to gather steam the Engineer of Cuttack was told that he would be locked Up.68 The officers who could not get ashore had to remain below the decks and were forbici~ den to come up. A brief reign of terror was unleashed by the lowly as an assertion of their, authority. As mentioned earlier the upperdeck personnel trapped inside Castles were made to suffer the punishments which had been inflicted every now and then on the ratings on one pretext or the other - they had to.-proceed to the cell with their hands up, stand to attention in front of the local strike leader and 'double up' before their release from detention. Every order from the leader was enforced with a prod from his or his followers' rifle butts. Clearly the right to punish was one of the attributes of the men's authority as it was of any other. For over six hC'l.lfs the Castles ratings braved British armed might, FOCRIN Vice~Admiral Godfrey's threat of annihilation in action. A 'truce' was called around 4.30 p.m. but they did not surren. ~er. An eerie silence prevailed after dusk. For men aboard ships the night was one of w&tchful anxit"t:y. The ratings were still in high ,spirits - they were' quite hopeful that next day the people would come out on a general strike in their support. They believed it would
210
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Feb11!-ary 1946
be the day of reckoning. Food ran short everywhere, and the ratings' parties that attempted to land ashore in search of food were turned back by Royal Marines. 9J Nevertheless no one questioned the decision to hold out. In fact the lower-deck control over ships in the harbour and establishments ashore remained unchallengeable till the morning of 23 February. In one or two establishments in the suburbs attempts were made to reestablish upper-deck authority but these failed. As for example in Hamla the officers employed few loyal CPOs and POs to break the strike and enforce naval discipline. One such loyal element was PO Gonsalves. On his way back from Lieut. Petz's cabin he was warned by Leading Stoker Raj: 'If you try to get orders [from officers] and put the men to work, you better be careful of the consequences'.70 Similarly, Jaffrey, who on instruction from his officer, went to the PO writers' barracks to call the men for work was threatened by CPO Dalgado: 'If anybody comes like a messenger ... we will kick him'. CPO Writer Singh was more blunt - he shouted at CPO 1affrey, 'Chief, if you come to call us for work, we will break your head.>7l Thereafter Iafrey left for his office. On the 22nd morning too officers were unable to enforce any order. Raher their men went about ordering them. The Victualling Officer, Sub-Lieut. Kanwar was about to leave Hamla in a truck. He was stopped by RPO Fakey and ordered to fetch rations for his men - he was addressed in disrespectful 'tum': 'ralion ka bundaboost karo, nai toh malum hai hia ke kia haja'.72 ,About the same time instructed by CO, Lieut. Belcourt and Sub-Lieut. Jamaji went to address their respective divisions to wean them away from the strike. But in vain. They were told by the leading rates: 'you cannot address your [men] .... unless you submit a written request to the [strike] committee'. In accordance with the strike committee'reguJations' none of the officers could be allowed to speak to their divisions separately and thereby disrupt the lower-deck unity. They could address the ship's company collectively and that too on permission from the local strike committee. On the way back to his office Lieut. Belcourt was ordered by RPO Razzak to take off his cap and shoulder straps.73 The slogan everywhere was 'koi kam par mat jao' and 'hartal jari· rakho'. The ratings made it clear to their officers that no one would resume work until they were. told to by the Naval Central Strike Committee?4
Rebellious Lower Deck
211
III
By the dawn of 23 February NCSC had made up its mind to surrender unconditionally. It decided to do so on the advice of the 'national leaders' whose mediation it had sought from the beginning. On the very first day of their strike the Talwar ratings demanded of FOB to invite a national leader, preferably Aruna Asaf Ali,7s to negotiate on their behalf and underwrite the official promises about redressal of their grievances. When asked by a journalist why they insisted on outside leaders' intervention, their reply was: 'our demands will have the usual official run of several months in the name of investigations, while, as we know, within ten minutes orders can be issued by the Naval Headquarters in Delhi to direct a whole fleet to bases fraught with risks and scenes of danger'.76 Unwilling for this reason among others to leave the matter to the discretion of naval authorities, the ratings wanted national leaders to take up their cause and mobilize the support· of popular masses for their struggle. In fact on the 18th February itself the Talwar leaders called upon Aruna to 'iJtteIvene on their behalf'. 'They even wanted' heno be their spokesman to FOB next morning. But reluctant to associate herself with . the 'trouble' she gave them some gratuitous advice. 'Remain clam', separate service grievances from political demands, take up the former with the naval .authorities and refer the latter to political leaders, she told them. As for 'the support of national forces' for their cause she advised 'them to see the highest Congress authority in Bambay, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel'.77 The Sardar, when contacted by Aru~a, told her that 'the ratings did not resort to ... [the strike] under his advice,' and so it was 'no business of his or hers to interfere.' Th"(fstrikers, he did not forget to add, must abide by discipline. ArUna tried to impress upon the ratings the same thing: 'discipline should be their watchwotd.'78 The Bombay Provincial Congress Committee upheld this policy of non-intervention, and its Secretary, S.K. Patil similarly asked the ratings 'to observe perfect peace and discipline in their conduct and maintain an atmosphere of non-violence in all circumstances':79 Most of the Ta/war leaders. tried their best to act in keeping with this advice. Nevertheless there was violence. The 19th morning saw violent demonstrations by the ratings from ships at anchor and establishments ashore. Some time after the news reached Ta/war 'peace bri-
212
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
gades' were sent out in RIN lorries (bedecked with Tri-colours and their nameplates changed to read 'Indian National Navy') to go round the city and bring the stragglers under control. The ratings who approached the Signal School with sticks in their hands were disarmed by some Talwar leaders before they were allowed to enter the establishment.so The same day NCSC issued an appeal calling upon the men to abide by the code of conduct - desist from violence and respect the sanctity of life and property 'in any circumstances or even under the gravest provocation,.sl Still again in the next morning there was a repetition, though on a smaller scale, of violent demonstrations in front of Churchgate station by the men from establishments in the suburbs. Afterwards when all gathered at Oval the central leadership in its eagerness to atone for the previous day's acts of 'indiscipline', deplored the burning of the American flag at USIS and formally recorded its apology. The lull that followed was deceptive. The naval authorities had already emerged from the state of initial bewilderment and indecision. Preparations for an offensive were afoot. The leniency still being shown towards the 'mutineers' was a ploy to gain time. Reinforcements of men, bombers, cruisers and battleships had been requisitioned. Troops from nearby cantonments were on their way to Bombay. So was FOCRIN. He arrived in the evening. The authorities had already struck by confining the ratings to their barracks and posting military pickets to guard them. Puzzled by the sudden turn of events the negotiation committee decided to take up the matter with FOCRIN, and in the meantime beat a retreat. The deployment of military guards enraged the ratings - they took it as an insult to India's ~senior service' and its personnel in general; they could not reconcile to their being interned like criminals. More crucially the war had taught them to fight back and not to bow before enemy offensive. To yield, they knew, was to perish. So the Castles ratings in particular forced the British guard commander -to withdraw his- sentries form within the barracks and their main entrance. Several times they att~mpted to break out of the establishment - everytime they did so,. I,.dg. Sig., M.S. Khan was summoned to restrain them. The centra.leader-ship:ulid~rstood .the reason why the ratings were so 'perturbed and annoye'dover.the action of the authorities in calling' in the army to guard them. It was,
Rebellious Lower Deck
213-
the men sensed, 'an attempt to isolate them and prevent them from having access to food from outside' and thereby to force them into submission. As they felt the pulse of the ratings the members of NC headed by Ldg. Sig. Khan proceeded again to FOB's bungalow to meet FOCRIN. The message was left behind for the ratings: While the committee feels that it will do everything in its power to impress upon the authorities the need to immediately withdraw the armed guards, it strongly appeals to the comrades wherever they may be ... to maintain complete calm and solidarity and refuse to be stampeded into any kind· of vioient action on their part. It appeals to all comrades to remain nonviolent and. disciplined under the gravest provocation or even upon being done violence to.82 Aware of the national leaders' attitude and NCSC's vacillation . FOCRIN could afford to turn down the latter's demand for the withdrawal of military guards. The naval authorities had already scored a victory over the strike leaders: the latter adopted a defeatist tactic in the face of their first offensive. Vice-Admiral Godfrey refused to withdraw military sentries on the plea that it was up to GHQ to do so. lie could recommend it if the ratings surrendered and resumed duty unconditionally. In spite of the strike leaders' threat that they would not be able to restrain the angry ratings unless armed guards were withdrawn, both FOCRIN and FOB refused to budge from their stand. The authorities tried out a ruse: while they turned down the demand for the withdrawal of troops, the top naval brass gave a sop to the strike leaders. Vice-Admiral Godfr~y promised to provide them the food they demanded, and give other grievances a sympathetic consideration. He suggested thereupon: now that theirprincipal demand had been met the strike should be called off. FOCRIN'S strategy was quite clear to the members of the negotiation committee: he was subtly manoeuvring for time - he was waiting for reinforcement to begin the next offensive. More importantly his offer of better food was intended, on the one hand, to bring home to the national leaders how reasonable he was about the men's grievances ., and, on the other, to drive a wedge into the lower-deck unity and break their strike thereby. / On return from Rear Admiral Rattray's bungalow the NC
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Supp(irt The Demands Of Naval Ratings! Protest Against Racial Discrimination And Barbarous Treatment Of Indian Naval Boys ! YcsltHlay 5,000 mell in the Indian Navy went on strike. Among them arc Hindus, Muslims. Christians. men from all provinccs of our great country. speaking all languages. They all stanri united behind their demands. J':VCI'Y lndian knows that thc cOlllliUom; of 01lr brothcrs in thc Navy al'C vcry ba(l. Racial discrimillation dominatcs cVC\'y bra11(:h of thc scrvice, thc pay is VCI'y Jow, 100(1 is ofl.cn uncatablc. It ;:; also a fact that although thousands of these men arc due to be demobilised in the near future. no arrangementll worth the name have been made for finding them adequate and satisfactory cmploymcnt in civil ure after demobilisation. Worst Of. all is the .maltreatment of the Indians by superior omt'ers. parl.lcularly Bntish olUcers. There are terriblc talcs of I.hill . p •• rLicularly one instance when a :;ick man was forced to do laboul' which resulted in his death. There are also storic:; of suio'ides a.nd desertions, many of which are said -to spring-Crom such 111~1:trcatmcnt. . ThiS is why they have put forward the following demancls : 1. DecenL food and' adequate ration:;. . 2. Ac.t.ion to be taken against I.he Commanding Omcer of HMIS Talwar 'for abusing Indian raLings. :1. MaiLreatment of ratings by officers to stop. . 4. The sa.me facilities that the rnLings in the Royal Navy get rc"ardll1g pay, travelling. family and Children's allowances ;;hould also be given to RIN ratings. 5. Speedy demobilisation, resettlement 'and gratuity. P.T.O.
6. Thc rule I.hat clothing kit should be ret,urhed at the. tlll1l1
of dcmobilisation should be cl1.l1cclled, 7. Indlanisation of officers in the Indian· Navy shoulcl be l:alTicd through immediately and no new British officers should be recruited into the Indian Navy. G. It. K. 81ngh (a victimised rating) should be immediaLely dischD.rr;ed from Arthur Road Jail. 9. ImmediaLe release of all political prisoncrs, lncluding the INA prisoners. . lO. lillll1cdial;e withdrawal of all Indian troops from IndoneSIa. 11. ImparLial Judicial enquiry inl:o the police shootings that nave Laken place al1 over India. . .Everyonc of our countrymen knows thcs(l. demand:; :l;r!) Jusl•. Everyolle will surely respond to our appen.ithat 'all .1.'l'!l1m lUust. ulliLcdly supporl. these demands, that diIIerences of parl.y ami poJic:y m other Helds should not be aJlowcd to comc in the way of SIlPpurt of I.hcsedemands of'our 5.000 brothers. We 11.llllcal to Icallcrs of all Ilolitical' llnl·tics in Bomhay to S1I11110I·t these Ilcmands, particularly wc ask I.he Con~rcss :LI1(I L~agll(~ lcaders to take liP thc issue in the Ccntral Assembly and sce I.bat the ilemands of these mcn are met . . ],e~ I.hc Oilvcrnment on its llart realisc that no vi1ulictivcllcss against thc :;,000 will be \.olcrat·ed by any Indian, whatevcr thc Ilarty to which he may bclong. Lcl1.lulGovcrnmellt hmJlediaLely set in motion·the machinery to satisfy the (lemands of the men 011 stril<e. 10'",' ·C.he Unity of all citizcns or Bombay al1d pcollle of Il1dia behind tbe Ilcmand or the 5,000 I
D. S. Vaidya, Secretary. Bombay Committee of the Communist Party of India' N.A.P. Domllay 4.
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214
Revisiting Talwar:A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
members sat with other NCSC leaders in Talwar to take stock of the latest· development and determine their next course of action. It was decided to reject FOCRIN's offer: even if rations were provided in keeping with his promise none would accept them unless they were sure that all ships. and establishments received similar supplies. It was suspected that the naval authorities would discriminate between them and disrupt their solidarity.83 Accordingly NCSC transmitted to the ratings aboard ships and establishments a message cautioning them against false rumours being spread by the naval authorities to break their strike. All were reminded that they were under the leadership of NCSC which would cha~el its instructions through the Dockyard Signal Station, and asked them to keep complete calm, peace and· non-violence until further orders.84 Clearly NCSC in Talwar was reluctant to- go beyond the rejection of FOCRIN's offer for better food. Although none or'the na,n tional leaders on which it banked so much cared to intervene, the central leadership stuck to their advice of non-violence. Hunger strike which was so unpopular among the -ratings generally was the only course of action it could conceive against the persistent refusal to withdraw military guards. Instructions were issued to the effect: if the guards were not withdrawn by the next morning all should go on 'lying down hunger-strike' from 7.30 a.m. and commit no violence in words or deeds. Just as in the evening before t~ey evicted the military sentries from inside Castles and later rushed towards the outer entrance to break out of the establishment, similarly again on the 21st morning the men charged them with the sanle intention. The moment they were· fIred upon by the armed guards the Castles ratings threw the advice of non-violence overboard. In fact they never had any faith in it and, for that matter, in hunger strike. Those who were interned within the establishments were mostly seaman 'desperadoes' of whom the majority, we know, were Muslim. Combatants they would not retreat in the face of enemy attack. Trained to man battleships they would die fIghting rather than survive yielding. Within minutes of the fIrst shots being fIred they ran back to their barracks to retaliate they killed an RIN offtcerstationed on the Reserve Bank building to watch their movement and wounded many BORs. The ratings confmed within Castles had their own leaders - they did not wait for any
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.instructions from. NCSC in Talwar for retaliation. The British guard commander was taken aback by the counter-offensive the Castles ratings organized in an amazingly short time. He could not rely on the Indian sepoys to repulse it effectively, and had to wait for the arrival of British troops. The sound of firing was heard in Talwar just as in ships anchored in the harbour. Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan rushed to the spot to study the situation for himself. Apparently his faith in non-violence was shaken. For the first time the President of NCSC in his speech from Kumaon openly spoke of the need to combat violence with violence. The ratings aboard ships were asked to raise steam, load guns and stand by for action. They, cautioned Ldg. Sig. Khan, might have to take battle positions to defend themselves and the dockyard. At the same time he asked them to allow British officers to quit and their Indian counterparts who wished to join them. The men on board ships did not abide by this instruction in toto. The local strike leaders exercised their autonomy as the situation demanded. They disposed of the officers as they deemed necessary - some were forced to jump into boats and themselves had to act as their crew, some were fired at, some were provided no water transport and still others detained in their wardrooms or cabins. NCSC arranged safe passage for some - some were escorted in boats and'delivered to the shore. Meanwhile the operational headquarters of the central committee had been shifted to the flagship of RIN, Narbada. In one of its first sessions there the tentralleadership considered the possibilities of attack on ships from the shore - it chalked out battle plans and transmitted a signal accordingly to all concerned. Positioned as they were in the harbour the ships could cover the entire city of Bombay with their guns. They were asked to get ready to fire back if they were fired upon by the military. The other question which NCSC seriously considered was that of food and water supply to ships which· had been cut off by the armed pickets all along the seafront. Necessary instructions were issued to ensure proper distribution of food and water - all were asked to use dry rations as far as possible; those who· had excess told to share it with the deficient ones, and DSS was instructed to supply water to the ships. Arrangements were quickly made for the distribution of arms and ammunition. The men
216
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febnlaty 1946
on board ships assured the Castles ratings that they were not lone fighters - all were ready to come to their aid. The ships at anchor resorted to firing after some were attacked from the shore. The NCSC strategy was essentially defensive: not to fire unless fired at. At 2.20 p.m. came FOCRIN's broadcast from the Bombay AIR station telling the naval subalterns to submit or perish. ViceAdmiral Godfrey threatened to raze, if necessary, the entire Royal Indian Navy to the ground. It was said: 'the overwhelming forces at the disposal of the government ... will be used to their uttermost even if it meant the destruction of the navy.'8S Similarly in the House of Commons Prime Minister Attlee announced that certain battleships including a cruiser of the Royal Navy were speeding towards Bombay in re~ponse to an urgent summon from India.86 Reinforcements, men, equipments and bombers were being rushed to the city to suppress the 'mutiny'. But the threat thus held out could hardly cow down the men behind their guns. Unlike their brethren aboard Hindustan in Karachi they could not be subdued by force without considerable damage being caused to life and property in the city.87 Hence the strategy to disarm the ratings barricaded inside Castles and persuade them to release the officers in detention. If this was successful and a 'cease-fire' was accepted, the men could be starved into submission. Simultaneously the show of British armed might would continue to overawe them. Accordingly a trap was laid for NCSC, and it *alked into it. Soon after the naval chiePs radio broadcast the central leadership was contacted and a 'peace parley' began. At about 4.30 p~m. ships and establishments received from Ldg. Sig. Khan a signal for iinmediate 'cease-fire'. He seemed to have regained the faith in nonviolence; all were expected to remain completely non-violent and peaceful until he let them know the results of his meeting with FOB and FOCRIN.88 The 'truce party' (which included none of the top naval brass) on arrival in Castles told the ratings that talks were going on between the government and the national leaders, and meanwhile they should give up their belligerent attitude: It had a tough time in dealing with the local strike leaders. Th.e latter were reluctant to consider the question of surrendering arms. When the parley was about to break down, Hatim Darbari cautioned the men: their 'obstinacy' would result in loss of support from Congress and
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Muslim League (which they never extended to the ratings) as well as from the people of Bombay (who never hesitated to stretch out their helping hand to them). Eventually the ratings agreed to store the arms in the guardroom and release the detained officers. By dusk peace was restored. But the authorities showed no sign of relenting or any willingness to negotiate with NCSC. Food and water supply was not restored.89 Nor were the troops withdrawn. Ldg. Sig. Khan met Rear /i\dmiral Rattray to demand their withdrawal again. FOB was no longer in a position to concede it even if he had wished so. Lieutenant General Lockhart, GOC-in-C, Southern Command, under instructions from C-in-C, Claude Auchinleck, superseded all othet commands"army, air and navy, in the Bombay area. He alone had the authority to consider the question of withdrawal .but NCSC members could not meet him. The 'initiative' .slowly passed into the hands of the enemy which had by the time mustered considerable strength. The bombers had arrived at Santa Cruz, a regiment of 12-pounder guns, 2 British infantry battalions and armoured cars reached the city. Two 6-inch fortress guns had been manned. And naval reinforcements including the cruiser Glasgow were expected soon:898 Helpless NCSC in Talwar sat down to review the situation and decide its next move. An appeal was fmally drawn up with a call to the people and all political leaders to come to their aid. For the last five days we have been op a peaceful, disciplined, organized strike. The authorities, however, have refused to listen to us. Instead, they have called up the military, particularly British troops, since naturally they could not trust our Indian Army brothers. They opened fire on us in Castle Barracks and forced us to take to arms to defend ourselves. Now the Flag Officer is threatening us with total destruction, using the overwhelming forces of the empire'. No Indian could expect us to surrender on such humiliating terms, to bend so low before the threatening jack-boot of our imperialist rulers. We shall not surrender to threats, though we are always prepared to negotiate about our demands. But we know ~ that the Flag Officer will carry out. his threat unless you, our people and our respected political leaders, come to our aid. You do not want
218
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 your Indian brothers to be destroyed by British bullets. You know our demands are just, you must support us. We appeal to you all, particularly to the leaders of the Congress, League and Communist parties: Use all your might to preve~t a bloodbath in Bombay! Force the naval authorities to stop shooting and threats and to negotiate with us! Rally our people to support us, through a peaceful hartal and peaceful strikes! We appeal to you, brothers and sisters, to respond!90
The 21st night was the most tense. There lurked the shadow of a fresh British offensive with 'the overwhelming forces of the empire', while, on the other hand, the lower-deck personnel were determined to fight back - they expected popular support to counter this offensive. The NCSC leaders in Talwar issued the appeal and hoped for a favourable response. The people came out neXt morning in 'hundreds of thousands to express their solidarity with the ratings. Whereas the national leaders to whom NCSC looked for support openly opposed its strike call. From a safe distance Aruna Asaf Ali offered her service as a 'peace-maker' - she was ready to address the ratings to ensure that their indiscipline which was, by implication, the cause of violence last day, did 'not give ground for further violence' .91 Her telegram to Jawaharlal Nehru requesting his immediate presence in Bombay to control the strikers and their supporters and 'save the situation' was an unique instance of leftist intervention in the 'mutiny'. The Communist leadership looked to Congress in particular for its support to the cause of RIN strikers and their call for a hartal.92 Sardar Patel and S.K. Patil in turn commended non-violence to the naval ratings facing British violence, and disapproved the call saying, the Congress leaders had already got in touch with the higher authorities in Delhi and were trying to bring about a prompt termination of the naval strike. Meanwhile all should keep patience and peace.93 No such demand was made of the British, of those who opened fire first. The authorities knew the mind of national leaders quite well - they could count upon their approval of what was being done to suppress the naval 'mutiny'. The NCSC's instruction to the ships that they must be ready to take up battle positions round the whole city of Bombay to defend themselves and the dockyard against any
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attack from the shore was intercepted by the authorities. It was twisted to suit their propaganda purpose: a bunch of young, 'excitable' elements who had 'lost their heads' were planning to blow up the entire city. The national leaders swallowed it willingly - they demanded of the ratings facing British jackboots to be non-violent. Sure of their 'neutrality' the authorities threatened to mount the final assault. The following message from FOCRIN was delivered to the 'mutineers' over a loudhailer around 11 a.m. of 22 February: I told you yesterday that ample forces are available to restore order. The GOC-in-C, Southern Command, has been ordered by His Excellency the C-in-C to resume supreme control in Bombay. To show you that ample forces are available he has ordered a formation of RAF aircraft to flyover the harbour today. These aircraft will not ... take any offensive action, provided there is no action taken against them. Should you. now have decided in accordance with my warning to surrender unconditionally you are to hoist a large black flag or a blue flag and muster all hands on deck on the side facing Bombay city and await further orders.94 The show of British armed might continued: around 2.30· p.m. a formation of bombers flew over the harbour menacingly. While it emboldened the authorities to demonstrate the forces at its disposal, the national leaders' 'neutral' stance disheartened NCSC in Talwar. The strike leaders had expected too much of them. They still persisted in their effort to enlist the 'respected' political leaders' support for their cause. Served with a fresh warning by FOCRIN all they could do was to call upon the ratings to hold out against all odds and not to surrender unconditionally.95 And at the same time to seek the national leaders' intervention in their favour.· But as the day wore on pressures mounted on NC from all corners to resolve the 'deadlock'. The ratings were being constantly reminded by the authorities that they had 'ample forces' at their command to break the strike. More crucially the disposition of troops indicated that none would be allowed any access to food from outside. Everywhere the strikers were hungry and thirsty - no relief could be provided unless the military cordon was broken. No one
220
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
had any excess food to share with others. The ratings aboard ships and establishments threatened that they would break through the cordon to obtain necessary supplies.96 The strike leaders in Talwar were not sure of maintaining discipline amongst 20,000 men whom they could not contact except through wireless.97 The NC members were desperate - they made frantic efforts to end the 'impasse', they knocked at the doors of all important political leaders in a fmal attempt to persuade them to ititervene and prevent the 'inevitable bloodbath' . Ultimately the national leaders intervened. But only to advise the ratings 'to surrender on such humiliating terms' as dictated by the authorities. Of colirse the members of NC were assured of 'nonvictimization' of the strikers. When Ldg. Sig. Khan, in the course of his talk with Vallabhbhai Patel, requested him to give his assurance in writing, 'the worthy Sardar flew into a rage and thumping the table said "when you don't trust my words, how can you trust my writing. I assure you on behalf of ... Congress that not a single one of you will be victimized" .'98 The NCSC President could no longer stick to his earlier instruction to the ratings to hold out defiantly. Along with other NC members Ldg. Sig. Khan came-back to the breakwater in the evening and read out the message fromSardar Patel: In the present unfortunate circumstances that have developed, the advice of the Congress to the RIN ratings is to lay down arms and to go through the formality of surrender which has been asked for. The Congress will do its level best to see that . there. is no victimization and the legitimate demands of the naval ratings are accepted as soon as possible.99 Ldg. Sig. Khan added that having decided at the beginning to be guided by the national leaders and now being asked by them to surrender unconditionally all must abide by this advice. This shattered the ratings' dream of a common front with the people against the common enemy, a dream which had almost come true. Already in response to their call hundreds of thousands of civilians had come out on the streets and put up barricades to fight in their defence. None among those shedding blood for their cause,
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the ratings were sure, would expect them 'to bend so low' before the threatening jackboot. Hence their protest against the surrender advice. Soon there emerged 'two schools of thought': one, the minority, in :.favour of surrender and the other, the majority, against it. loO For the first time a large number of ratings openly expressed their lack of confidence in the·members of NC who 'had almost come to an agreement with Sardar Patel to resume work'. The ships which were not represented on NCSC felt that the central leaders 'had sold the pass'. They would in no circumstances agree to 'unconditional surrender' as advised by the Sardar. On the other hand, those who had representatives in NCSC argued that the negotiation committee had no right to decide their fate. lOl All were for carrying on the struggle till their demands were met. Dejected and tired the leaders returned to Ta/war. A little later the NCSC members present in the establishment met to discuss the situation arising out of the opposition to the 'surrender advice' of those whom the naval officers called 'unruly elements'. It was decided to send for the representatives from other units. The permission to collect them was obtained from the authorities. Around ·midnight Lieut. Kanwar and Sub-Lieut. Choudri, along with some NCSC members, left for ships and establishments to fetch their representatives. After all were brought to Ta/war the officers tried to convince them of the futility of continuing the strike 'but were shouted down'.!02 The last, fateful session of NCSC began soon. Ldg. Sig. Khan reported in some detail the negotiation committee's talk with Congress and League leaders. None of them, he said, wanted the ratings to carry on their struggle. On the other hand, the naval authorities had warned that unless the men surrendered immediately the 'ample forces' available to them would be used 'to restore order'. Ldg. Sig. ~an informed the representatives from other units that the Talwar Committee had already decided to call off the strike, and asked them to make up their mind. As soon as his speech was over an angry majority sprang to their feet, and gave vent to their resentment. Accusations were hurled at the minority which had agreed to acCept Patel's advice. Acrimonious discussions followed. Shortly afterwards came Jinnah's message wherein he, like Sardar Patel, called upon the ratings to resume duty. It finally enabled the 'surrender party' to sway most of their opponents. The League President in his message offered his 'services unreservedly for the cause
222
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
of the RIN men' to persuade them to give up the fight for it. Jinnah promised to see that justice was done to them. 'I give them my assurance that I shall do my best to see that their grievances are redressed ... I urge upon them to restore normal conditions and ... to call off the strike' .103 On reading it out Ldg. Sig. Khan appealed again for surrender. He pleaded: now that both Congress and League promised to take care of their interests no one should hesitate any more. The majority at last gave in to the 'surrender party'.l04 Except for a few more radical elements who still insisted on the strike being carried through to the end, all agreed to surrender. By 6.15 a.m. of 23 February it was all over. The decision to call off the strike was conveyed to FOB. 105 Before they went back to their respective units the NCSC leaders sent out their last message to the people, and burnt all papers relating to the strike.
IV The rank and file hardly expected that the strike would be over so soon. Few were prepared for such a denouement. Officers returned to preside over the surrender ceremony and to resume command. When they read out FOB's signal about the NCSC's decision, the men in many units simply refused to believe their words. Aboard HMIS Narbada the ship's company asserted that the signal must be originated by the central organization of the strikers itself.1 06 The Fort Barracks ratings would not return to duty until Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan came to the establishment to confirm the decision. 107 Similarly the men on board Bhadravati refused to surrender before they consulted the central leadership. lOB Of the shore establishments in the suburbs Cheetah was unwilling to go by FOB's signal - the' ship's company said the news was false, and they would surrender only if their messenger on return from Talwar corroborated itYl9 The local strike leader aboard Nasik told CO, Sub-Lieut. Jones, that the men would not resume duty until they received 'definite' instruction from NCSC· to the effect. Thereupon the Commanding Officer did not issue any. order to them - he thought it better to keep quiet until the next day. The Mahratta guards came aboard on' Sunday the 24th afternoon. Still the officer was unable to enforce the naval routine. He declared the bridge structure occupied by t~e'
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military sentries out of bound to the ship's company. In defiance of the order the men mustered there and began fraternizing with the Mahratta troops - they took the latter as their 'reinforcements' rather. than as their enemy.uo CO Jones could do nothing. HMIS Akbar, a shore establishment at Kolsett, outdid the others in this respect. Its CO informed his men of the NCSC's decision but none was willing to believe it. The ship's company said they would not surrender until a NCSC member, preferably its President, came down from Bombay to confirm the signal. Attempts were made to get one such leader in Kolsett but none was available. Lieut. Comdr. Jamil thereupon stressed in his talk to the ratings the futility of continuing the struggle when it was all over elsewhere. An able seaman interrupted. him: 'what the First Lieutenant said is wrong. We have received' 'instructions from Gandhiji and Jinnah Sahib' that 'we should not call off strike until our demands are satisfied'.1I1 Nobody resumed duty that day. The 'Delhi Guards' scheduled to proceed to the capital refused to do so. On the 24th morning a large number of ratings broke out of the establishment in civilian clothes as they did the day before. The 'external' telephone connection was cut off by the men. CO somehow contacted the higher authorities and was informed that military sentries would reach the establishment by 5 p.m. He then ordered that the division would be sounded in the afternoon and all must fall in in the correct rig of the day. 'Disturbing' information reached him soon: ·the loyal CPOs and POs had been threatened by their juniors that if they obeyed the order their barracks would be set on fire. Frightened the Commanding Officer deferred the division until military assistance was available. At 4.45 the pipe to fall in was sounded but none except for the officers appeared on the parade ground. All the ratings stayed back in their barracks. The military guards were then ordered to clear them out and escort them to the parade ground. This was done but the ratings were reluctant to obey any order. About 300 of them were then segregated in the gymnasium. After two hours of futile efforts to make them see 'reason' they were returned ~o their barracks. The next morning at 8.20 a.m. the division was piped but none again fell in. Later when others agreed to resume duty after much persuasion by the Indian officers, the Headlam Division which had taken the lead from the beginning held out defiant. Its 'ringleaders' were rounded up and sent to the Mulund Detention Camp.112
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
Eventually COs took over command of their ships and establishments. With the assistance of military guards they enforced the navai routine. The .lower-deck persQnnel had to resume duty. But they, felt their officers, were not in the 'same frame of mind' as before. To the upper deck the ratings seemed 'sullen' and 'surely'. Few were particular about their uniform - many did not put on caps. The men were slow in obeying orders and less amenable to discipline. They did not pay their officers 'due' respect as before. ll3 The ratings were not repentant for what they had done. Rather they felt that the 'mutiny' was the legitimate and right course of action for them. 'ney had done nothing wrong, nothing criminal in defying the upper-deck authority, and had significant civilian support. To the officers a large segment of the lower-deck personnel was no longer reliable. Even the loyal few were now through 'force majeure', inclining towards the 'mutineers' and their grievances. To the latter the strike was the expression of their identity with the popular struggle for freedom. To the militant section the 'pride of service' mattered little - they were not willing to put on badges, caps and uniforms stamped with signs of British domination which had been abandoned during the strike. For them the 'voyage' with RIN was over. They were not eager anymore to serve under the White Ensign. 1l4 Already they had given the navy a 'parting kick' and were now ready to face official revenge. Earlier the official carrot-and-stick policy failed to promote defection and treachery in the strikers' ranks. Similarly when the hunt for 'ringleaders' began soon after the strike, the official promise of reward or threat of severe punishment caused few to act as informers. In contrast to the loyal Indian officers who vied with one another to cook up evidence against their countrymen in the lower deck, most of the latter showed amazing self-dignity during interrogation.
* The naval 'mutiny' began everywhere with attacks on the upper deck. These involved conscious acts of violation of its authority and destruction of the symbols dear to it. In breaking the existing structure of command the ratings freed themselves from its chains and symbolized this by means of the flags they hoisted. The language and behaviour the men indulged in instantaneously reversed the daily signs of their subordination, abuse and assault. Indeed they seemed determined to settle scores with their tormentors. In that moment of
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. liberation their words and actions were permeated by a spirit of . ,. defiance as well as festivity. Till an alternative structure came up there was none to restrain the ratings: they freely asserted their identity as rebeis. The authority structure they set up, especially at the central level, to further the cause of their rebellion sought to impose limits on its course and establish certain norms of behaviour for them. Apart from attempts to control the ratings' movement out of ships and establishments a number of leaders made strenuous efforts to bridle their actions both inside the units and outside on the civvy streets. Prominent among them were a section of Talwar / NCSC leaders (in the Signal School) who, unlike their 'bloody-minded' counterparts here as elsewhere, in Comdr. Karmarkar's appreciation, tried their best to maintain discipline and order.11S The naval elite, unable to exercise any control over the lower deck, came to depend much on them. Especially when the ships at anchor readied and trained their guns on the shore the British brass hats, aware of the presence of 'an irreconcilable element among the mutineers', perceived the danger, contacted 'the more responsible leaders' in Ta/war and supported and relied on 'their endeavour to keep the mutiny non-violent' .116 At crucial moments of their struggle the great mass of ratings (including the bulk of their local leaders) were found unwilling to attend to the passivity preached by these 'responsible' leaders, either went against it in their actions or, when they submitted, did so quite grudgingly. This tension persisted till the last. Reference and Notes 1. la. 2.
Mohamed Ishak, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', File No. NL 9942. BW 81: Lieut. A.P. Batra, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. 11, pp. 885-6 and DW 8: Channa, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vol. 11, p. 109, Lieut. E.R Sexton, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9974.
3.
Sub-Lieut. R.V. Jones, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9920.
4.
BW 62: Sh. Shahadat Ali, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. 11, p. 584. Also BW 82: Capt. Innigo-Jones, ibid., p. 896.
5.
Fourth Witness: Wt. Stores Officer D.B. Peters, File No. NL 9901.
6.
Comdr. J.C. Mansell, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9942. Also his statement, File No. NL 9965.
7.
Exhibit 2: Report of Comdr. S.G. Karmarkar, File No. NL 9930.
7a.
When Lieut. K.W. Hasan approached FOB with a request to do something 'to c{)ntrol the situation', the latter expressed his helpless-
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Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
7b.
ness. 'Absolutely puzzled' Rear Admiral Rattray said: 'I do not know what to do'. BW 77: Lieut. Hasan, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. H, p. 801. Statement of Comdr. Mansell, File No. NL 9965.
8.
1st Witness: Lieut. J.S. Randawa, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. 9968; First Witness: Lieut. SJ. Brander, File No. NL 9971 and 1st Witness: Lieut. EJ. Azar, File No. NL 9972.
~
9.
Lieut. W.J. Tealle, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', File No. NL 9942.
10.
Circumstantial letter from Comdr. Mansell to Rear Admiral A.R. Rattray, FOB, File No. NL 9984. Also Evidence of Lieut. Tealle, File No.NL9965.
11. 12.
Lieut. Tealle, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', op.cit. Statement of Yeoman of Signals M. Razaq, File No. NL 9965.
13.
First Witness: Lieut. Mactavish, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL9955. 1st Witness: Lieut. R.J. Ward, 'Proceedings', File No. NL 9958; Witness: E.P.K.S. Nair of HMIS Bihar, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9937, Part I and BW 27: Lieut. M.P. Singh, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 331.
13a.
14.
Evidence of Lieut. Malia and 'Opinion of the Board', File No. NL 9908.
15.
8th Witness: Lieut(S). Victor Siga, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', File No.NL9967.
16.
The Commanding Officer of HMIS Shivaji 'himself tried with folded arms to stop the procession from going out but without success'. 'Prevention and Suppression of the Mutiny', File No. NL 9950, Part VI. When the ratings of HMISAdyar in Madras took out a procession from the estabiishment, Port Signal Communication Officer Lieut. Payne barred their way and addressed them. He ordered the men to march back to their barracks and asked them, 'is that understood'? Someone among the ratings answered in the negative. The officer told him: 'shut up, keep quiet'. The ratings then swarmed round Lieut. Payne, and Signalman Mani whipped out a belt and hit him on his forehead. For. details see File No. NL 9938.
16a.
'Report of the Board of Enquiry', File No. NL 9943. Also Lieut. Comdr. Khalid Jamil, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9907; Sub-Lieut. Jones, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit.and Circumstantial Letter from Captain Imiigo-Jones to Rear Admiral Rattray, FOB, File No. NL 9984.
Rebellious Lower. Deck
227
17.
Reports from Lieuts. S.N. Kohli and S.M. Nanda, File No. NL 9930.
18.
A whiteman travelling in a taxi was halted in front of Fort Bamlcks by the ratiJ1gs stationed on the pavement, and all gave hand in beating him up. Lieut. Comdr. Khan noticed it and rushed out to save the civilian. He w€'!nt back to the barracks on being warned by a rating: 'Khuda ke waste koi Hindustani officer bakr mut au verna mar jaoge'. Statement of Lieut. Comdr. AH. Khan, File No. NL 9965. Also Lieut. Comdr. Khan, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL9956.
19.
Frightened as they were the British service personnel later abandoned caps, badges and uniforms to save themselves from the attack of RIN ratings as well as from civilians. As one officer of Assam admitted in his evidence: 'We were wearing civilian clothes because officers who were wearing caps and badges their badges were knocked off and they were disgraced'. Midshipman AS. Nalwa, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9974.
20.
FP! and HT, 20 February 1946.
21.
Appendix C: 'An Appeal to All RIN Ratings from Naval Central Strike Committee', File No. NL 9939.
22.
Lieut. DlP. King, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9920; 11th Witness: ERA IV Sharma of Camatic, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', File, No. NL 9937; 9th Witness: Signalman Joginder Singh, File No. NL 9966; ERA IV Chandra Nath Ghosh, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9974 and DW 29: Mohd. Ayub Khan, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2;Vol. 11, p. 233. . .
23.
Report from CO to FOB, 9 March 1946, File No. NL 9907.
24.
9th Witness: Joginder Singh, op.cit. and letter from CO to FOB, 25 February 1946, File No. NL 9946. Also 'Proceedings' and 'Report', File No. NL 9943.
25.
CPO Adalat Hussain, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9920.
26.
For 'RPO menace' see BW 24: Abdul Gaffoor,RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 280 and letter from AG. Sigamany, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 14. Another target of attack in many places was WRINS. The reasons are not difficult to find: the woman ratings were apampered lot. They enjoyed facilities and amenities far in excess of those of their male counterparts. Many of them were insolent and were seldom punished for any offence. 3rd Witness: Comdr. Karmarkar and 60th Witness: Lieut. Comdr. E.M. Shaw, File No. NL 9930.
27.
Ldg. Stoker T.K. Iyenger, File No. NL 9965.
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
28. 29.
Statement of Comdr. WAW. AubeI)', File No. NL 9984. Statement of CPO Nuruddin, File No. NL 9907.
30.
Lieut. Comdr. Jamil, 'Minutes of Proceedings' and Report from CO to FOB, 9 March 1946, ibid.
31. 32.
Letter from CO to FOB, 25 FebruaI)' 1946, File No. NL 9967. FP] and HT, 21 FebruaI)' 1946.
32a. 33. 33a. 33b. 34.
Second Witness: Lieut. Richard Reeves, File No. NL 9901. 8th Witness: Lieut. Siga, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit. Statements of SB POs Yakub and George Raymond, File No. NL 9907. Statement of Lieut. Comdr. Jamil, ibid. Here is the list of strike committee ratings from HMIS Talwal7 Name
Rate
Status
M.S. Khan S. Ali Ahmed Murthy G. Woods J.G. Thotam P.S. Bedi A.S. Hara Sadique Madan Singh Narayan ChoudI)' Behari Hamid Akhtar
Ldg. Sig. T.O. Sig. T.O. TeI. Ldg. TeI. T.O. TeI. Ldg.TeI. T.O.Tei. Sig. Tei. Ldg. Tei. Tei. Sig. T.O. Tei. Ldg. Tei.
President
Vice-President
SecretaI)'
Exhibit B 12 (Appendix 'E'), File No. NL 9930. Ldg. Tei. B.C. Dutt in his memoirs claimed that he was a member of NCSC. There is no evidence to support it. Dutt, Mutiny of The Innocents, p. 130. 35. 35a.
Appendix 'D', File No. NL 9939. In the course of his morning rounds Comdr, Streatfield-James advised the Castles 'ratings who were going ashore in civilian dress' 'to don. naval uniform' ostensibly in their own interest, to avoid being implicated in any disturbance and interfered with by the police. Most of them ignored this advice, went out in plain clothes and escaped detection by tile militaI)' police in the afternoon. Comdr. E.C Streatfield-James, 'Proceedings', File No. NL 9939.
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229
35b.
J. Colville (Bombay) to Wavell, TOP, Vol. VI, p. 1080. Also Tel. 'No. 03640 from HQ 108 (Bombay) Area to Southcom, 19 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll(I) 5/21/46.
36.
Lieut. Sexton, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit. Also First Witness: Lieut. Brander, op.cit. and 'Findings of the Board', File No. NL 9953.
37.
Sub-Lieut. Jones, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit. No officers were yet 'manhandled or pushed out' from their ships. 'There was no reason to leave their post'. According to the service tradition the commanding officer 'should be the last man to leave the ship, dead or alive', when it was in danger. But in certain cases here 'cas were the first people to leave'. BW 27: Lieut. M.P. Singh, op.cit., p. 347.
·37a.
Another Officer to make such an admission was the CO of HMIS Narbada. Statement of Comdr. Mansell, op.cit.
38.
14th Witness: Captain P.R. Learmont, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', File No. NL 9967. At one stage, on receipt of an ultimatum from Kakauri ratings, Capt. Learmont decided to evacuate the officers' families from the establishment. 1st Witness: Comdr. E.W. Ridley, ibid.
·39. . 39a.
'Findings', File No. NL 9974 . 'Findings of the Board', File No. NL 9946 and Second Witness: J.W. Helmes, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9955.
40.
7th Witness: Lieut. Comdr. Shaw, File No. NL 9930.
41.
BW 27: Lieut. Singh, op.cit., p.p. 351-2, 354.
42.
Second Witness: Helmes, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit.
43.
7th Witness:· Lieut. Comdr. Shaw, op.cit. Lieut. Mactavish of Ni/run heard Ord. Tel. Helmes talking over radio telephone. 'He was calling "unknown, unknown, this is A. Back calling over to you".' Lieut. Mactavish inferred that 'unknown' was a RT call sign or a code word for a station. 'May be a ship or may not be'. First Witness: Lieut. MaCtavish, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit.
44.
'Attempt was made to get at least a part of this code but the mutineers had burnt the papers'. 3rd Witness: Comdr. Karmarkar, op.cit.
45.
7th Witness. Lieut. Comdr. Shaw, ibid.
46.
Added to this dislocation in the official communication system was the deliberate 'mischief done by the ratings: on one occasion during the strike Capt. Innigo-Jones wanted to pass on an important piece of information to Comdr. Karmarkar and phoned up Talwar from Vithal House. The latter was impersonated on the telephone. Second Witness: Capt. Innigo-Jones, ibid. Again false distress signals were reported to have been sent out by RIN ratings, which made British
230
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febrnary 1946 naval and merchant ships east of Ceylone (in the port of Trincomalee) rush to positions near Akyab and other points in the Bay of Bengal. The search for 'distressed ships' continued for three days before it was called off. The Statesman (Delhi), 25 February 1946.
47.
Lieut. A. Kimulis, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9920; 9th Witness: Lieut. D.M. Shrivastava, File No. NL 9923; 10th Witness: Sub-Lieut. N.P. Datta and Report from CO to FOB, 25 February 1946, File No. NL 9944; First Witness: Sub-Lieut. G.D. Krishnan, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9945 and First Witness Lieut. Mactavish, op.cit.
48.
Speech by the President, Strike Committee, File No. NL 9924. Also 9th Witness: Lieut. Shrivastava, op.cit.
49.
Report from CO to FOB, 25 February 1946, File No .. NL 9924.
50.
1st Witness: Lieut. J.E. Ross, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9954.
51.
Lieut. Tealle, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', op.cit.
52.
1st Witness: Lieut. Comdr. A. Choudhary, File No. NL 9951.
53.
1st Witness: Lieut. EA.F. Weller, 'Proceedings' and 'Report', File No. NL9943. Also Statements of Lieut. Weller and Sub-Lieut. Kishan Pershad, File No. NL 9965.
54.
3rd Witness: Surgeon Lieut. B.C. Bhoil, 'Minutes of Proceedings' and 'Findings', File No. NL 9946. Also Statement of A.B. Kelly, File No.NL9965.
55.
Sub-Lieut. D.B. DeSilva, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9920. Also CPO Adalat Hussain, ibid.
56.
1st Witness: Lieut. Comdr. F.W. Kent and 5th Witness: Ldg. Writer A.L. Sahni, File No. NL 9975. Also Report from CO to FOB, 27 February 1946, ibid.
57.
Commissioner of Police to Secretary, Home Deptt (Special)., Govt. of Bombay, 22 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll(I) 5/21/46.
58.
'Opinion of the Board', File No. NL 9923.
59.
Intelligence Bureau: Secraphone Message from Rodger, C.LO., 3.30 p.m., 21 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll(I) 5/21/46. Also Situation Report No. 4, 22 February 1946, ibid.
60.
AB Biswanath Bose, 'Minutes of Proceedings', File No. NL 9974.
61.
Report from CO to FOB, 25 February 1946, File No. NL 9944.
62.
Witness: E.P.K.S. Nair of Bihar, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', op.cit.
63.
AB Biswanath Bose, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit.
Rebellious Lower Deck
231
64.
Statement of PO Gustasob, File No. NL 9907.
65.
CPO H. Nuruddin: Appendix Ill, File No. NL 9938. Also Statement of Ldg. Seaman K.N. Rao, ibid.
66.
PO Cook O.D. Pereira and PO Seaman B.G. Ramannarai, 'Minutes of Proceeding', File No. NL 9939.
67.
Statemynts of Lieut(E). J.I. Bostock and Chief Stoker M. Khan, File No. NL 9965.
68.
Lieut. King, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit.
69.
Situation Report No. 3, 22 February 1946, File No. Home-PolI(I) 5/ 21/46.
70.
Stoker PO Gonsalves, File No. NL 9965.
71.
CPO Writer Jaffrey, ibid.
72.
Sub-Lieut. H.I.S. Kanwar, ibid.
73.
Lieut. Belcourt and Sub-Lieut. Jamaji, ibid.
74.
PO Writer Mahadevan, ibid.
75.
A number of ratings believed that whilst 'underground' Aruna worked as a 'WRIN in HMIS Talwar.' 1st Witness: Lieut. Ross, 'Minutes of Proceedings', dp.cit.
76.
FP!, 20 February 1946.
77.
FP!, 25 February 1946.
78.
Commissioner of Police to Secretary, Home Deptt (Special)., Govt. of Bombay, 20 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll(I) 5/21/46.
79.
FPJ, 22 February 1946.
80.
3rd Witness: Comdr. Karmarkar and Second Witness: Capt. InnigoJones, op.cit.
81.
Appendix 'C': 'An Appeal to All RIN Ratings', File No. NL 9939.
82.
FP!, 21 February 1946.
83.
In fact the signal about additional rations was received by a few major units which were in the forefront of the strike. It was cancelled a day after it was issued. RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 517.
84.
Cited in Subrata Banerjee, The RIN Stlike, p. 42.
85.
FP!, 22 February 1946.
86.
PD, Vol. 419,' No. 88 (22 February 1946), Col. 1446.
87.
That the ships in the harbour might open fire, in retaliation, on the dockyard and other areas of the city was a 'contingency' which the
192
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
then Able Seaman MA. Khan shouted 'Come on and charge at the officers'. Immediately the ratings knocked Lieuts. Tealle and Joshua out of their way, rushed towards the ensign and hauled it down. 10 Thereafter the Captain ordered the Yeoman of Signals to hoist another ensign at the starboard yardarm. The ratin~ went to the flagdeck and Able Seaman M.S. Uddin climbed up the bridge and cut the halliard with a knife. Later he slashed all· other halliards to make sure that none could use them further,u The Chief Yeoman of Signals 'wanted to intervene' but was afraid of the knife in the rating's hand,12 Aboard HMIS Ni/am the ship's company did the same thing: they assembled on the quarterdeck and struck the naval ensign. CO, Lieut. Mactavish, tried to reason with the leading rates, Stokers Shaukat Ali and Abdul Majid. While he 'was attempting to get some sense out of them', the others shouted, 'Don't listen to him, carry on.>l3 They were unwilling to listen to the upper deck. CO then rehoisted another ensign but that too was torn by his men. CPO Abdul Kader attempted to dissuade his juniors from doing so but was threatened that if he took any part in the suppression of the strike his life would be in danger. Similarly in HMIS Khyber and Assam the officers who tried to rehoist ensigns were cautioned by their men. The latter pushed them aside, tore the ensigns and halliards into pieces and threw them· over the side. Aboard shore establishments like Machlimar and Cheetah the ratings having pulled down the ensigns formed a circle around the flagmasts and the officers found it impossible to break through the cordon and rehoist them. After they had removed the symbols of British domination over the service the naval subalterns rechristened it 'Indian National Navy' and hoisted Tri-colour in most places, Crescent in a few and 'Jai Hind' flags in still others to the sound of bugles. These were improvised on the spot, made from the buntings of naval flagspa They seldom corresponded fully to Congress, League or any other party banner in colour combination or symbols. In HMIS Cheetah CO, when he saw the Tri-colour fluttering on the flagmast, directed Lieut. Malia to haul it down. But the ratin~ crowded the officer and warned him that they would behead him if he tried to approach their flag. 14 The men of HMIS Mchlimar, before they broke out of the establishment, told the officers: 'Don't ... pull that [Jai Hind] flag down as soon as we leave. we'll come and see it' .1S Once they replaced the symbols of upper-deck, and necessarily
232
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febntary 1946 authorities in their own interest wanted 'to avoid at '~ll costs'. It was felt: 'There was an irreconcilable element among the mutineers which might have gone to any length'. Though they continuously demonstrated their anned might the authorities were afraid of using it. The. policy they adopted was one of keeping 'the more responsible leaders' in good humour and making them play their game. Section 11, File No. NL 9930.
88.
Cited in Banerjee,op.cit., p. 57.
89.
Situation Report No. 3, 22 February 1946, op.cit.
89a. 90.
Colville (Bombay) to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., p. 1081. FP!, 22 February 1946.
91.
ibid.
92,
FP!, 23 February 1946.
93.
FP!,
94.
FP!, 23 February 1946.
22 February 1946.
95.
Cited in Banerjee; op.cit., p. 67.
96.
Situation Report No. 4, 22 February 1946, op.cit.
97.
cf. Second Witness: Capt. Innigo-Jones, 0ll'cit.
98.
Hans Raj, 'Echo of RIN "Mutiny" of Feb. 1946: The Ratings Demand their Immediate Reinstatement', File No. NL 0220.
99.
FP!, 23 February 1946.
100.
HMIS Narbada appeared to be among the 'moderates' and HMIS Khyber the 'more violent'. Situation Report No. 4,22 February 1946,
101.
FP!, 23 February 1946. Also Lieut(E). T.N. Kochar, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', File No. NL 9942.
102.
Report ofComdr. Karmarkar, op.cit. Also Section I and Exhibit B 13, File No. NL 9930. cf. 9th Witness: Sig. JoginderSingh, op.cit.
103.
ABP, 23 February 1946.
104.
Lieut(E). Kochhar, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', op.cit.
105.
About the time the Valsura ratings made up their mind to begin the strike. The Torpedo School was the solitary exception under Bombay command till an AIR bulletin announced the same day that Valsura 'has taken no part in this strike'. Immediately the establishment made good its 'fault'. For details see File No. NL 9901.
op.cit.
106.
Lieut(E). Kochhar, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', op.cit.
Rebellious Lower Deck
233
107.
Lieut. Comd •. Khan, Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit.
108.
'Report and Fi"i1di1\gs', pile No. NL 9948.
109.
CPO Dutt, File No. 'NL 9908.
110.
Sub-Lieut. Jone .•, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit.
111.
Statement of PO Gustasob, op.cit.
112.
Lieut. Comdr . .Tamil, 'Minntesof the Proceedings', op.cit. and Report from CO to FOB, 9 March 1946, ibid.
113.
Lieut. O.H. Mantle. 'Minutes of the Proceedings', File No. NL 9942; Report from CO to FOB, 9 March 1946, File No. NL 9907; Lieut. Comdr. Khan,'Minutes of l".roceedings', op. cit.; Sub-Lieut. Jones, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cu; 1st Witness: Lieut. Comdr. A R~shid, File ·No. NL 9944; 'Opinion Of the Board', File No.NL 9923 and Statement of Saleem; RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 14.
114.
'Report on Findings', File No. NL 9976. Also 'Report and Findings', File No. NL 9948 and Report from CO to FOB, 9 March 1946, File No.NL 9901.
115.
Exhibit B2: Report of Comdr. S.G. Karmarkar, File No. NL 9930. Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan later told the RIN Commission that he along with his strike committee worked hard to restore 'peace and order' and the Talwar officers 'appreciated his work'. FP!, 27 May 1946.
116.
See Note 87 above.
8· FACES OF THE ELITE
In the context of the naval mutiny at Spithead in 1797 Sir Geofrey Calender in his Sea Kings of Britain observed: 'Had the government given the mutineers credit for honesty of purpose all might ... have been well'.l But it did not so happen - seldom does it so happen. Seldom does the ruling elite give its adversaries credit for honesty of purpose. In most cases the former sets itself 'to discover by a priori reasoning' the 'real' and 'effective' cause underlying the latter's mutinous actions. Inevitably it is attributed to manipulation by evil-intentioned external agents or internally by 'vicious ringleaders', to the 'natural aptitude' of men in any armed service to grouse over imaginary grievances or to anything other than a genuine effort on their part to get the abuses they were subjected to corrected. Based on such reasoning is the standing instruction to all concerned to suppress any incidence of collective defiance, accompanied by violence or not, immediately and mercilessly. The RIN law rested on no different principles. The colonial elite here, naval or otherwise, looked at the 'mutiny' of 1946 no differently - it too refused to consider it an honest attempt on the part of lower-deck personnel to redress their grievances. The latter were seen as victims of some o~hers' conspiracy rather than subjects of their own actions, as instruments in some others' hands rather than participants in a project of their own. What is more noteworthy is the convergence of the views of the colonial rulers and the nationalist leaders on the 'mutiny'. StilLmore so is the mutuality of their interest in its suppression. I
Let us first turn to Comdr. King's perspective on the events that took place in Talwar after he had assumed its command. Behind much of what happened in the establishment he saw the hands of some 'ill-disposed' persons or 'unscrupulous' politicians.2 He was of' the opinion that such elements from outside incited the Talwar ratings to behave in the way they did. It was on Ldg. Tel. B.c. Dutt's
Faces of the Elite
235
case Comdr. King hung his conspiracy theory. The rating, in the latter's view, was an 'honest, good man' led astray by 'some revolutionary organization':] The only tangible evidence in support of this explanation was the papers found in Dutt's possession. Neither the board of enquiry into the slogan-writing incident on the night before FOCRIN's inspection nor the one held into the 'mutiny' in the Signal School was able to adduce any further evidence of Dutt's contact with subversive elements outside. From a study of the documents found in his locker the Talwar Board concluded that he had some contact with Lieut. P.N. Nair (who formerly belonged to RINVR) and a few others connected with the formation of the Ex-Services Association. 'Attempts were ... made to enrol ratings in some such organization ... sponsored by some outside source. The political origins of this source are doubtful.' It 'does NOT appear to be orthodox Congress'. Nor was it Communist. It 'appears to be' that wing of the nationalist movement which was dominated by the 'radical' Congress elements like Aruna Asaf AIi or Congress Socialists. 'Little concrete evidence has come before the Board to support this theory.'4 Ddttis activities, whatever their exact nature, bore little fruit. That as an 'Azad Hindi' he could make little headway in a space of a month or so is borne out by several entries in his diary for January 1946 and letters he exchanged with his friends. 'Things', he wrote, 'are taking a gloomy shape'. Except for one or two the ratings appeared to him hopelessly foolish and 'losing interest' in the 'Azad Hindi' work. They understood almost nothing of what went on round them - they were 'born as kids' and would end up as such. He knew from the beginning that the life of an 'Azad Hindi' was not going to be a 'bed of roses', and was determined not to lose his wits so soon. Still he found it 'impossible' to concentrate on the 'great' work he embarked on in view of the 'doubtful' future. Impatient and 'pleasure-loving' as he was, Dutt could make no sl'''tained effort to build a large following. He described himself as an idealist but Seth, one of his close friends, called him a 'sychophant' and a devoted follower of Mirjafar' (i.e. a traitor).s Just before his arrest allegedly for sloganwriting Dutt applied for a commission in the navy.· Doubtful of his advancement in the service he was already on the lookout for a job outside and put up a request for release. Those who knew him felt that his 'mind will change' after he was released. He 'appears to have some influence' over a few ratings but it is doubtful whether they
236
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in tlte RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946
trusted him fully.6 His evidence before the RIN Commission reads that when he went to reason with the strikers at the instance of Comdr. King, they unceremoniously dismissed him, and disdainfully called him a paid agent of the Commandipg Officer.? Ldg. Tel. Dutt was appreherided on 2 February, and was under close arrest and restraint until the 16th instant. During this period he 'must be presumed to have been unable to communicate with other ratings in HMIS "Talwar".' Under instructions from FOB he was tried summarily by Comdr. King on the 16th and CO's recommendations were forwarded to the higher aunlOrities. Pending orders from NHQ Dutt was released to open arrest around 1 p.m. that very day, and confined in CO's unoccupied bungalow under the watch of a sentry. Next afternoon he was sent back to his barracks and allowed no liberty. 'All the evidence goes to show that L/Tel. Dutt during this period kept very much to himself.s He deliberately avoided others' company lest the authorities should suspect him to be a 'ringleader'.s, Apart from the ratings who noticed him on the eve of the strike the Talwar Board examined several officers inclu!;1ing Lieut. Comdr. Lisle-Tay-Ior, Lieut. Nanda and Headmaster Lie~t. Bamji (none of whom can be said to be favourably disposed towards him) in an endeavour to ascertain whether Dutt during 16-18 February took any part in 'organizing', 'fomenting' or executing the 'mutiny'. It was convinced that he did nothing of the sort. It had evidence to show that the rating tried twice, though unsuccessfully, to exercise a 'moderating influence' on some of the 'more turbulent' elements among the strikers.9 On 18 February itself before acting as Comdr. King's trouble-shooter he urged a few who thronged near CO's office not to create any trouble. Two days later he tried again to pacify the ratings who turned furious on the appearance of military guards at the establishment. Captain Inigo-Jones who succeeded Comdr. King and Comdr. Karmarkar the former as CO of Ta/war chased the ghosts that were supposed to have planned the 'mutiny' and executed it through their agents inside the service but caught none. Everyone had in mind Ldg. Tel. Dutt whose role in the planning or organization of the strike was doubtful even to the official investigators, and still refused to go beyond the usual preconception of manipulation and conspiracy. These officers were joined by the top brass of Vithal
Faces of the Elite
237
House. In appearing before the RIN Commission Rear Admiral Rattray stated that from the end of 1945 'subversive elements' from outside 'got to work ... to undermine the discipline of the ratings' .10 FOB produced an undated, anonymous letter addressed to C~in-C, which, in addition to Dutt's papers, was said to lend support to the conspiracy theory. On a careful reading of the document the Commission concluded that even if it was taken at its face value, all that could be inferred from it was that there had been certain grievances in all the three services, some among their ~en 'had put their heads together' and produced the letter, demanding their redressal by 15 February· and threatening otherwise '100% indiscipline' after this deadline. The document 'does not bear any political complexion'. It proved no connection with any subversive elements outside. The fact that the strike broke out in Talwar on 18 February was, in the circumstances of the case, ' a mere coincidence'.u Still the effort to track down such elements began. Ahmed Brohi who figured prominently among the Talwar strikers stressed the futility of such an endeavour in his evidence before the Commission. Anyone who believed that the strike was organized by an 'outside party', the witness was convinced, 'will have to get disappointed. To search for any clue that it was planned by outsiders is just like a blind man who is searching for a missing needle in a dark room' .12 Unable, on their witch-hunt, to pin down the blame on any particular organization or its agents the officers of Comdr. King's variety harped, in more general terms, on their belief in some extraneous 'infection', 'instigation' or 'direction' behind the 'mutiny'P Unless it was so caused or stimulated the whole phenomenon, according to them, remained incomprehensible. Looking back a few maintained that the· political issues which cropped up soon after the surrender of Japan afforded the nationalist leaders a splendid opportunity of inciting civilians as well as service personnel to violence through their fiery speeches in public meetings and the press through its inflammatory articles. Of the lower-deck personnel stationed in Bombay in particular a few regularly attended such meetings at Shivaji Park or on' the Chowpatty sands and read 17le Free Press Journal, The Bombay Chronicle or Blitz, imbibed subversive ideas from these 'sources and disseminated them among others.14 Unless the men's loyalty was thus impaired, it was difficult to explain the defiance of upper-deck authority which had been obeyed so unquestioningly
238
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febrnary 1946
before. The spread of the strike from one end of the service to the other in an amazingly short· time was the function of an infectious epidemic or some pre-arrangement from outside.1s Otherwise the simultaneity of the outbreak could not be accounted for. The argument was stretched further to say: unless there had been some direction and coordination from outside, the uprising could by no means have assumed the same fonn everywhere. 16 The ratings shouted the same anti-authority and anti-British slogans and pasted them on the walls of their units; they broke the norms of deference, verbal or otherwise; they ripped up Union Jack or White Ensign, the symbols of British dOlllination over the service and hoisted Tricolour or Crescent in their place; they attacked ROs, forced open cells and released prisoners; they destroyed the graphic instruments of upperdeck rule; they broke out of their units in a body and paraded in public thoroughfares crying nationalist slogans and waving party banners; they sought the intervention of national leaders and formulated service grievances together with some political demands; they used signal communication, both visual and wireless, for the synchronization of their actions - units on R Twatch followed correct procedures, used call signs and codes .. Underlies this argument. the assumption that the ratings' action could not be self-led. The naval subalterns were passive and powerless supplicants; they had neither the will nor the capacity to resist. The men were thought incapable of acting. on their own, planning and organizing protests independent of any elite initiative from outside. The morale (intelligence) reports, as submitted by the commanding officers of ships and establishments between May and December 1945 dwelt, among other things, on the reactions of naval personnel to political developments outside or their exposure to political influence. These never failed to add that the morale of the lower deck was goodY In the quarterly abstract for May-July the morale was reported to be high especially in ships and among their personnel. The ratings stationed in non-operational zones were keen to serve in operational and forward areas. There were no remarks under the headings such as (i) effect of subversive literature, (ii) subversive activity among personnel on leave or in shore establishments and (Ui) response to current developments. The morale reports of 44 ships and establishments for the period ending on 30 September show that the naval personnel were 'indifferent' to 'politics' or the
Faces of the Elite
239
average rating had very little interest in political matters. In the report relating to Talwar where the 'mutiny' originated there was no reference to politics or political views. And subversive influence was said to be absent. In a summary of the morale reports for the quarter closing on 31 December the paragraph devoted to politics said the ratings had shown interest especially in the iNA affair. It added, however, that 'they do not give their political feelings priority over their duties to the service'. Generally 'political views held by ratings were healthy and rationalistic and not extreme'. The summary concluded with the remark that the morale of RIN lower deck appeared 'to be satisfactory' and 'their loyalty to the service is unquestionable'. It is instructive to read together with these extracts the report of Colonel Haq Nawaz who visited various ships and establishments in Bombay and Karachi to ascertain the state of morale among the personnel who manned them. On investigation in Karachi in January 1946 he wrote: 'I do not notice any undue interest being shown in politics by any ranks ... Although the personnel are aware of the political situation in the country and follow events with keen interest, they do not give this priority over duties'. In dealing with 'RIN and Politics' the same officer on his visit to several units including Talwar and Kakauri in Bombay in December 1945 remarked that the ratings were frank and above board about their interest in political matters 'but by no means fanatic'. It was added: 'Although I do not notice any subversive tendency in them, I dare say they need careful handling at all times'. Already in the summary of morale reports for the last quarter of 1945 it was hinted tha~ the ratings were not satisfied with the service conditions in the navy.1S In other words, none of the morale reports pointed to any subversive activity, propaganda or tendency in RIN ships and establishments. None reported any deterioration of morale among the lower-deck personnel. Even in the last quarter of 1945 when the ratings evinced keen interest in current political events, their loyalty to the service was in no way impaired. Clearly what many officers later said in explanation of the 'mutiny' was not supported by the morale reports for the months immediately preceding it. The emphasis they laid on extraneous 'political causes', the ratings argued, was intended to hide their responsibility for the rising discontent among their men. The political issues in question definitely formed part of the backdrop to the ratings' action in February 1946 but
240
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
could hardly account for their perception of authority and will to overthrow it. A Chamak rating told the RIN Commission: the INA episode inspired the naval strikers 'a lot' but to say their action 'had its cue from the INA is ... groundless, because long before we in India had known about the INA'.19 The suddenness, extensiveness and simultaneity of the 'mutiny' took the naval elite by surprise and made it look desperately for germs of 'infection' or traces of 'pre-arrangement'. It refused to come to terms with the fact that the unifying factor lay in nO,thing other than the conditions of lower-deck life in RIN. It was their subjection everywhere _to the same regime of oppression that enabled the men to combine in protest against it. No infection or prearranagement was enough to stimulate the strike on the scale it took place. What did so was the unjust and unfair system prevailing in RIN. The solidarity that the latings expressed everywhere was a conscious act of collaboration on their part in a common project. It was political in so far as it aimed at overthrowing the authority of the upper deck, reversing the existing relations of domination-subordination as a precondition of redressal of their grievances. The naval subalterns had so much at stake that they could not embark on such a project in a fit of absentmindedness. Fairly long discussions and consultations among them, much weighiDg of pros and cons and planning by them preceded the inauguration of the strike and every step taken thereafter in all units. The consciousness that informed these actions derived from the ratings' perception and day-to-day exPerience of authority. Everyone in the lower deck knew who had SUbjected him to untold sufferings so long. For the ratings it was not at all difficult to identify the enemy and coin their slogans accordingly. It was obvious that British domination over the service was responsible for the discriminatory and humiliating treatment meted out to them in their own country. At the first opportunity they attacked the white officers verbally or physically, and replaced the symbols of their authority with their own. The flags they hoisted were improvised, made of naval buntings, and resembled, even if not exactly, the banners of Congress and League. The ratings appropriated the symbols of mainstream nationalism on their own terms for a politics that was basically their own. At one stroke they demolished the walls that sepa-
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241
rated them from civilians. In demonstrating on public thoroughfares they expressed their unity with the people in the slogans they shouted and banners carried. At a crucial stage the naval subalterns decided to use the service channels of communication, seize armouries and magazines and man action stations. The ratings were in the know of the jobs - it was not difficult for them to organize any of them. In fact NCSC was constituted to plan, direct and coordinate actions almost on the scale of the entire service, and local committees were to organize or execute them at the unit ievel. The ratings who took over ships and establishments indeed showed remarkable capacity for organization. In standing by for action aboard ships they managed everything, communication, gunfire and internal coordination. In reply to a query from a FP] representative as to why they insisted on the national leaders' intervention the strikers said: it was sought not at all for 'mternal organization'; here they were competent enough to require any external assistance. 'We have learnt the art of how to defend ... we know how to organize - life in the navy has taught us to be on the job with perfect discipline at a few minutes' notice', they said.20 The national leaders' intervention was sought for altogether different reasons. They were expected to mobilize popular support for the strike, especially its demand for the indianization of the service, an ideal so dear to the ratings. The latter wanted them to link their cry for a 'nationalized' navy with the popular demand for freedom - they wanted them to forge these into a inighty weapon for the overthrow of British rule in India. The end of foreign domination over the country, the ratings hoped, would give birth to a popular navy where everyone would. be able to serve with self-respect and dignity. It was largely for this purpose that the national leaders were called upon to intervene in otherwise entirely an affair of their own. Elite nationalism was completely irrelevant to the planning of the strike or its execution. In refuting one of his officers, Lieut. Arjan Singh's argument that the strike was assisted by outsiders, Wireman Sheikh Shahadat Ali,a Castle-strike leader, said the Indian sailors needed no assistance in the movement they launched.21 It was organized and conducted by the ratings themselves, and the credit or discredit for what was done in the course of the strike should go to them alone. To apportion this to outsiders was to take away from them the responsibility for their actions, right or wrong. While many a naval officer ascribed whatever premeditation or
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organizational spadework the strike required to outsiders, a few maintained that this was done by the 'educated' ratings in the lower deck who manned commuriication, artificer, schoolmaster and writer branches of t4e service. The latter argued, in an interesting variation of the manipu:lation thesis, that the bulk of the naval subalterns were unthinking and incapable of looking after things for themselves and must have been mobilized and led by the 'enlightened' few among their colleagues. A number of officers who appeared otherwise sympathetic towards their men's grievances shared with others the upper-deck contempt for 'illiterate' seamen, stokers, cooks, stewards and topasses. One of them, Lieut. Mahendra Pal Singh, said: an 'uneducated' rating was stupid and servile. He was led by instinct or emotion rather than by reason. On the other hand, an educated rating was incomparably more rational, self-respecting and sensitive. He would resent racial discrimination, ill-treatment, abuses and wretched living conditions. He was far more advanced in ideas and beliefs.22 The degree of consciousness, in this view, was directly proportional to the standard of a rating'~ general education.23 Others bent this argument to suit their explanation: the educated ratings were less amenable to discipline and more apt to grouse over grievances, real or imaginary. They were more argumentative, and acted as 'sea lawyers'. Their knowledge of English made them more susceptible to subversive propaganda.24 Commodore Jefford, Chief of Personnel, NHQ, said that these ratings with 'a veneer of book learning overlaying their gullible nature' were 'God's gift to the unscrupulous politicians', especially 'left-wing' Congress and Communist. 25 Unable to fulfil their ambition in the navy or doubtful about their future the discontented educated men absorbed subversive ideas from nationalist propaganda and infected others by them. It was they who manipulated their uneducated colleagues, undermined their loyalty and led them astray. The bulk of the latter, in this explanation, were easily excitable, and were said to be during the strike 'in a state of mass hysteria ... beyond reason'.26 They were thus banished to a domain of fanaticism and irrationality. Whatever consciousness was attributed to the strikers went to the credit of their few educated leaders. It was this sort of elite consciousness which was seen as the motive .force of the strike. Additionally the argument was given a provincial and communal twist: the educated leaders mostly hailed from the south and belonged to the Hindu community while the uneducated led came from the north and were Muslims.27
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The naval unit to begin the strike was Talwar, the Signal School which accommodated communication ratings. It could have broken out anywhere. For the entire service was simmering with discontent. The dal incident occurred coincidentally in Talwar, which its inmates seized as an occasion for a collective protest. On a number of such occasions during the war the 'uneducated', non-communication ratings made similar protests at their units. Under the combat situation none developed into a service-wide 'mutiny'. Although the Talwar ratings initiated the protest in February 1946, the lowest of the lower deck, seamen, strokers, cooks, stewards and topasses elsewhere in Bombay surpassed them in militancy, organizational spirit and resourcefulness.28 The uneducated ratings in Castle Ba"acks did not wait for any· signal from Talwar to organize their armed defence against the military attack. This was also the case in Karachi. The ratings of the non-technical, seaman and stoker, branches, whose company many a 'superiority flaunting' communication rate disdained, played a leading part everywhere except at Talwar and a few units of its class.29 That these uneducated leaders numbered more than their educated counterparts aboard ships and establishments which came to the forefront of the strike is clear from the list in table 1 of category 'A' strikers against many of whom the most serious charges were framed for court martial. Almost all the Talwar leaders vacillated between violence and non-violence. At times they tried hard to restrain the ratings of other units and drum into their ears the mantra of non-violence.3D Quite a number of educated rating-leaders of units other than the Signal School acted similarly hesitantly - they used their 'influence on the side of moderation'. ERA IV Chandra Nath Ghose (? Bose) of Assam, CPO Schoolmaster P.B. Dutt of Cheetah, Telegraphist A.K. Roy of Chamak, CPO Schoolmaster Mir Niaz Abmed of Fort Barracks and Signalman S.C. Roy of Dhanush, for example, tried to peg down the strike to a non-violent form in their units.31 Just as it cannot be said that the strike leaders were mostly educated ratings of communication, artificer, schoolmaster and writer branches, so also there is no evidence to suggest that they belonged to any particular region of the country or religious community.32 Among the 'A' category 'trouble-makers' listed in table 1 more than half were Muslims. A number of enquiry boards on investigation
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 Table 1
Ship or establishment
Name
Rate
Castle BamIcks Castle Barracks Castle BamICks Castle BamIcks
Sheikh Shahdat All Meherban Shah Basant Singh S.N.Misra
Wireman Seaman PO Able Seaman Ldg. Seaman
Y.D. Sharma R. Singh MA-Khan B. Hussain M.S. Uddin
Radar Operator Able Seaman Able Seaman Able Stoker Able Stoker
Dhanus Dhanus Dhanus Dhanus Dhanus Dhanus
C.Albert C.Anthony S. Krishna 1. Raj H. Hussain H. Hamid
Signalman Stoker Stoker Stoker Able Seaman Radar
Khyber Khyber Khyber Khyber
M. Nazir Md. Iqbal Abdul Ghani Inayatuliah
PO Able Seaman Able Seaman Able Seaman
Kathiawar Kathiawar Kathiawar Kathiawar
K. Nagaratnam Kulbir Singh Yusuf Hussain Qazi. AbdulKarim
Ordinary Seaman Actg. ERA CPO Ordinary Seaman
Himalaya Himaiaya
Hiralal Akbar Ali
Ldg. Seaman Able Seaman
Narbada Narbada Narbada Narbada .. Narbada
Source: File Nos. NL 9965 and 9984. Also File No. Home-Poli(I) 21/8/46
reported: the majority of 'ringleaders' were from the Punjab and Madras presidency; they· were almost equally divided between the north and the south.33 The Muslims played as prominent a part as the Hindus, if not more, in the strike. No less active were the Sikhs. On board a few units the strike leaders were almost entirely from the Punjab and NWFP.34 Table 2 which relates to Fort Ba"acks is in-
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structive in the context of the communal/provincial bogey raised by the upper deck. Table 2 Name
Religion
District
Mir Niaz Ahmed H. Singh Ghaus Mohd. Khan R. Charan B. Tal KK Nair S. Din J. Singh H.S. Khosla A. David
Muslim Sikh Muslim Christian Hindu Hindu Muslim Sikh Hindu Christian
Lahore Ludhiana Punjab Bareilly Punjab (Chakwal) Travancore Amritsar Ambala Punjab Bangalore
Source: Appendix 'A', File No. NL 9956.
Any suggestion that the. strike was due to the oppressive service conditions in RIN was dismissed by most of the naval officers. For to accept it rather than to attribute the outbreak to some secret designs was to admit the system to be unjust and own their responsibility for the same. Among the few in the upper deck who considered the men's grievances genuine and worthy of serious attention were Lieuts. Ghatak and Sachdev. They admitted that 'a background conducive to a mutiny' existed for long. Discontent, in their view, was 'smouldering ... due to manifold grievances' and was fairly 'widespread'. The slightest 'trouble' like what happened in Talwar was enough to serve as an occasion for a great rising. The men shared so many grievances in common that they exploded in anger on a little initiative from the communication ratings.3S Except for these few all in the upper deck stuck to the conspiracy theory so dear to their heart. To the latter any interest in the men's conditions beyond what the needs of control demanded was suspect and those who showed such interest were indulgent to the 'sailors' moans'. To them the conditions seemed always satisfactory. The ratings, in their view, could not have any serious grievances because they made such obviously impossible demands as parity of treatment with BORs in mat-
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
ters of pay and allowances. The grievances they expressed were foisted on them by self-interested, manipulative elites. The attitude of the upper deck generally was one of unconcern with the men's grievances until they posed a problem for repression. Even then these never acquired priority over the question of control. Soon after the end of the February strike the authorities said that the ratings did not formally make any complaints prior to its outbreak. The complaints, therefore, did not exist at all and were 'ex post facto'. Further the ratings everywhere advanced grievances same as those of their brethren in Talwar, and these, therefore, were not genuine.36 The upper deck thus sought to blur the fact that complaints were put up in a formal manner many times before and were the same in all units because the same conditions prevailed everywhere. The ratings had no ground for a 'mutiny'. Even if they had any, none, from the standpoint of counter-insurgents, was sufficient to cause a collective defiance of authority on the scale it did in February 1946. This was emphasized by all, COs through FOB-FOCRIN to the Viceroy of India and the Prime Minister of England. It informed their attitude towards the the rebellion and the rebels' demands. The naval top brass dished out a promise for better food, a promise attuned to the time-honoured colonial policy of 'divide and rule'. As the ratings saw through the game, the signal issued in keeping with it was withdrawn immediately afterwards. All other demands, the men were informed, had been forwarded to the authorities in Delhi. In reply to a question in Central Legislative Assembly on 22 February Philip Mason, War Member, lied when he said the demand 'for improvement in the quality of food was met as soon as it was made known, although the standard of rations in this service [RIN] is already considerably above the Army standard' .37 As for other demands, especially those relating to pay and allowances, the War Member repeated the argument that had been advanced in connection with the RIAF strike, an argument based on the principle of 'political economy'. Next day when the situation changed greatly on the ratings' unconditional surrender, Mason in a statement in the Assembly spoke his mind clearly: the men struck work 'on the most frivolous ground', 'for reasons which were very insufficient and which I do not think ought to be taken very seriously.'38 This was exactly the attitude of Claude Auchinleck and Wavell
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as, well. Both ruled out any negotiations with the 'mutineers' over their 'fancied' grievances. The Viceroy in his diary of 21 February wrote: 'According to C-in-C there was some suggestion of parley, buthe and I entirely agreed that there could be no question of parley and that nothing else than unconditional surrender would be accepted'.YJ They both believed the 'trouble' was due to 'political instigation' or 'influences'. The Secretary of State for India, Pethick-Lawrence, in his communications with Wavell, spoke of redressing genuine grievances, if any, in RIN. 'I realize that politics plays a big part, but political excitement needs suitable soil to grow in'.40 This he said out of his anxiety to plug in advance every possible source of 'trouble' in the services. In view of the recent developments in the British Indian armed forces Pethlck-Lawrence suggested the desirability of an urgent investigation into whether there were any unredressed grievances which 'might provide material for disaffected persons to work on'.41The Viceroy informed the higher authorities in England: 'I do not believe there is any really serious material ... for agitation'. The grievance over racial discrimination, for example, could not be said to be 'serious'. 'Unless Indian soldier is paid at same rates as British, which is not possible, agitators may always allege racial discrimination'. In Wavell's view it was not service grievances but 'instigation' by 'political agitators' which caused the 'mutiny'. A bunch of 'young', and 'excitable' men had been worked on by such elements 'from inside and outside' .42 This was 'undoubtedly' clear from 'the expression of any grievances there were took the form it did' .43 Besides the 'hero worship' of INA officers, 'inflammatory speeches and articles in the press' and the 'legacy of strikes inherited from the American Army and the RAF were responsible for the RIN 'mutiny'.44 By implication the 'instigation' by agitators or external 'influences' hardly needed the mediation of any 'suitable' 'material' (let alone the sciousness of men) inside the service to produce effect.
con-
In apportioning the blame for the 'mutiny' the Viceroy made it clear to Attlee and Pethick-Lawrence that the 'top leaders' of Congress and Muslim League 'had nothing to do with inciting this ... and ,did not wish it'. They 'dissociated themselves· at a fairly early stage' from what happened in RIN. Wavell pointed the needle of suspicion to 'leftwing' Congress elements and Communists: 'I think some of
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Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
smaller Congress fry had a great deal to do with it and probably also Communist agitators'. It was they who seemed 'to have fanned the flames'.4S The authorities in England held no different views. The statement that Prime Minister Attlee made in the House of Commons is an example: 'The Congress Party officially disclaimed participation in the mutiny' but left-wing Congress and Communist elements did the contrary in their action.46
11 Soon after the termination of hostilities the Congress leaders found the prospect of coming to power brighter than ever before. Elections were announced for the winter, and the promise of 'early realization of full self-government' was reiterated by Wavell. The trial of INA prisoners, the use of Indian troops against the Indonesians and the food crisis accompanied by post-war problems of unemployment and rising prices, which seemed to have brought the rulers on to 'the edge of a volcano', afforded the Congress'leading lights an excellent opportunity of fishing in the troubled water. The former were afraid of a recrudescence of 1942 coupled with disaffection in the British Indian armed forces. Judging by Nehru's 'disquisition' on 'inevitable' revolution, his and other leaders' 'violent speeches' championing the cause of 'Quit-India' martyrs and INAheroes, a fresh trouble seemed imminent. That much of the Congress hype glorifying 1942 and INA was part of its election strategy became clear to the British soon. The Congress seemed determined to do as well as it could in the elections, andwas intent upon making the fullest use of any issue for the purpose. General Auchinleck among other officers in India understood that INA was essentially its 'election cry' .47 And the higher authorities in England felt: 'Much of what these [Nehru, Patel and other Indian] leaders had said [on the issue] could be regarded as electioneering exuberance.'48 The Congress indeed lost no time in exploiting the INA episode and popular sentiment over it for all they were worth. Before long its leaders, however, realized that the unintended consequence of this action might be to encourage popular outbursts independent of their initiative or leadership. The Calcutta explosion in the last week of November was an eye-opener to them. It 'proved
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a turning point' in the -Congress' recent tactic and brought about a fresh 'detente' with the British.49 Sardar Patel denounced the 'popular excesses' in no uncertain terms, and Gandhi who seemed to have favoured 'a much mote cooperative line' but had been 'hybernating for some time' reasserted his authority in favour of 'moderation'. Citing-some recent utterances of the top Congres~ leaders, including Nehru, Wavell wrote to Pethick-Lawrence in early December: 'There have ... been indications that the Congress... want t,o reduce the political tension by making it clear that there must be no mass movement until after the elections'.so Similarly G.D. Birla, 'the strong capitalist element behind the party' who, like British officials here, 'was alarmed at the virulence of Congress speeches',si informed Parliamentary Under-Secretary Arthur Henderson about the same time: 'There is no political leader including J awaharlal who wants to see any crisis or violence. Whatever they may be speaking - and one should .try to understand the reason for these strong speeches ... everyone is anxious for a settlement.' The need to accommodate the prevalent mood of the masses was 'responsible' for such speeches of the leaders. However 'unrestrained language will be heard less and less in the future', Birla was sure.S2 By the turn of 1945 the 'danger' from the Congress end receded. In view of the mass upsurges in the wake of INA trials the British thought it necessary to make some conciliatory gestures. Accordingly the trial of INA personnel on the sweeping charge of 'waging war against the King' was abandoned. The decision on parliamentary delegation was taken. And it was followed by a more crucial one of sending a 'cabinet mission' to negotiate with Indian leaders. This, together with the fear of popular 'excesses' which the Congress leadership was determined to curb, made it hold on all the more firmly to the path of negotiation and compromise with imperialism.53 No less firm was Muslim League in its faith in the legal means of settlement. In preaching passivity to the masses both began to prepare themselves for a fight against each other at the constitutional front, nay, the bargaining counter.
* What the top 'national' leaders were up to must have been clear to the left-wing 'smaller fry'. Especially the Communist leaders should have harboured no illusion about the Congress leadership in \
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
view of its increasingly bitter attack on them. Still when the RIN -' strike broke out they could do nothing but appeal to it for interven- " tion in favour of the naval subalterns. For the armed forces never counted for anything in their project and no serious attempt was ever made 'to' build lines of communication' with them. The discontent among service personnel and its manifestation in a series of strikes that preceded the February one seemed to have little significance for the Communists leaders. In fact like Congress and League the left looked at IORs as 'mercenaries'. This attitude was inherited from the nationalist mainstream within the womb of which it was born.54 In its memorandum to the RIN Commission the Communist Party refuted the charge that it acted as 'the instigator of the mutiny'. It was too flattering for its leaders to accept. It was stated in the memorandum that there were a few men in the lower deck 'with Communist sympathies as there were Congress and League sympathizers also'. But the party cultivated no link with these personnel which it could use to instigate the 'mutiny'. Together 'with the rest of the men they took part in what was a movement' by the entire lower deck. 'These individual sympathizers received no instruction from the party; they acted on their own as did all other ratings'.ss The only proof of Communist 'involvement' was a leaflet issued on 19 FebI,'uary under the signature of D.S. Vaidya, Secretary of the Bomb~y Committee of CPI, and two statements by G. Adhikari, member of the Central Committee of the Party. But these were essentially ap'" peals to Congress and League to support the demands of the ratings, , "to raise the issue in Central Assembly and organize hartals and strikes 'as a mark of their disapproval of government repression'. Of the statements in reference the one issued on 22 February urged upon the Congress leaders in particular to take up the cause of RIN lower deck and 'call a general hartal and strike to give a peaceful expression' to popular protest against the military atrocities in Bombay.56 The party made this appeal a day after the Congress authorities had openly opposed NCSC's call and asked the people 'to go about their normal business as usual'. Again after the victimization process started on the RIN strikers' surrender it appealed to Congress and League to redeem their pledges, called upon them to join hands to stop it and to enslire the settlement of lower-deck grievances on the basis of justice anq equality.57 A firebrand leader of August 1942 Aruna Asaf Ali ranked higher
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251
than any other 'Socialist' Congressman in the ratings' estimation. The image they built of her compared with that of none. But it crumbled into pieces in the course of their interactions with her during the strike. In a press statement intended to end all speculations about her 'part in its origin and development' she said quite unequivocally: on the first day of the strike the ratings approached her 'to intervene on their behalf, 'address a meeting' of theirs and act as 'their spokesman' to Rear Admiral Rattray next day but all that she did was to advise them 'to remain calm' and not to mix their service grievances with politi,cal demands, which she found they had done, confine themselves strictly to the former and leave the latter to political leaders whose exclusive preserves these were. Expressly unwilling to be involved in the 'trouble', she directed them to see Sardar Patel 'the highest Congress authority' in the· city. In her explanation to the press Aruna said: the advice stemmed from her belief that 'what they sought for was the support of the national forces' for their demands. A secular leader Aruna 'did not want to give it a wholly Congress complexion' as there were some among them 'with leanings towards the Muslim League' .58 Hence her advice also to see the President of its Provincial Committee. On the 19th afternoon a large number of ratings waited outside the Signal School in the hope of hearing her but she did not come to address them. Next morning Aruna went to Poona ostensibly on an urgent piece of business there. Before leaving Bombay she did not forget to ask the ratings to conduct their strike with 'discipline' and 'dignity'. 'Care should be taken to eschew injury to person or property in the action.'59 Implicit herein was her anxiety to prevent the recurrep.ce of what had happened the morning before in the Fort area. Aruna was heard again after the gun battle at Castle Barracks on 21 February, offering her 'service as peacemaker'. 'I am prepared to address the ratings ship by ship and barracks by barracks', she said. The intention was to make it sure that their 'indiscipline' which, implicitly, caused violence that day did 'not give ground for further violence'.60 Alarmed by what happened in the city on the 22nd Aruna wired Nehru, requesting him to come down to Bombay immediately to 'control and avoid tragedy'.61 Finally, when the radical elements among NCSC members informed he:'" of their strong n*ervation about Patel's 'award' which the majority acceptetl, she advised them to 'follow suit' and 'avoid a split'. They were told that the ratings could 'think of a strike again' should 'the authorities go back on their word'.62 It is as
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
if like industrial workers the ,men in armed services could resort to strike whenever necessary to bring pressure to bear on the authorities to keep their promises. Just a few days after she had so assured the militant ratings, Aruna in giving the Congress President an 'eyewitness' account of the strike said: 'In seeking redress of their grievances, by resorting to strike and wanting Congress intervention they [ratings] ... overstepped conventions and regulations governing armed services'.63
All through the strike Aruna kept a safe distance from the scene of 'trouble', and handed out her advice underlining the need for discipline and non-violence. After all was over, fiery words poured out of her mouth on certain generalities: she began a verbal duel with Gandhi on the questions of violence, Hindu-Muslim unity on barricades and so on. Similar was the part played by other Socialists. In his presidential address at the second annual conference of the Indian Students' Union in Madras Asok Mehta referred to the incidents during the strike and in its aftermath as 'stage rehearsals of impending fight against imperialism'.64 But none of the Socialists of his tribe was seen anywhere near the scene of action. Purshottamdas Tricumdas, who was in Bombay at the time, carefully avoided any association with the strikers. Approached by the latter to address a meeting of ratings he refused them with a flimsy excuse.6S The left-wing 'smaller fry' were said tu have egged on the young 'excitable' ratings to 'mutiny' or directed its course notwithstanding the facts that Communist leaders left initiative to Congress and persisted in their appeal to its good sense even at the crucial moments of the strike and mass fury in Bombay, and Aruna Asaf Ali among Socialist Congressmen in particular stayed away from the city when the. struggle was 'climaxing to a grim close' and solicited first Patel's intervention and then Nehru's out of her anxiety to control and discipline the naval subalterns and their civilian sympathizers. Aruna was for holding down the unrest to a permissible form, and her advice to the RIN lower deck, minus its populist streak, hardly differed from that of the Congress High Command in Bombay. Like the top party bosses she felt that the ratings violated the naval discipline regulations by striking· work and giving it a 'political complexion', and commended to them non-violence against British violence. While they made it clear to the authorities that Congress .was
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totally opposed to the strike, Patel and Patil's public stance was one of non-intervention. On being sounded by Aruna on 19 February whether he would intervene in the matter, the Sardar said that the ratings did not strike work on his advice and hence it was none of his business to 'interfere'. It was more so after they had indulged in gross acts of 'in discipline' that morning in the city streets. Again on the 21st evening Patel turned down a request from the ratings for support to their hartal call in protest against the military attack on Castles. Unmoved by the day's' incidents he observed: they should not have taken to arms, and were ill-advised to give such a call which would only help the 'unruly elements' on the lookout for an opportunity to create disorder and exploit it to their advantage, which might even result in communal strife and would not do them or their country any good. 66 Out of his concern for 'peace' in the city Sardar Patel sent Governor Colville a message offering 'to do anything which he could' to prevent disorder.67 Simultaneously he put out a. statement asking the people not to observe hartal, to plunge the city .~ into trouble and disturb its peace. In an effort to play down the significance of the day's battle at Castles the Sardar called it an 'unfortunate' event and essentially a clash between armed ratings and military guards, rather 'military police'. Though the official communique. stated clearly that the troops opened fire on the besieged men on their attempt to break out of the barracks which were running short of food and water, Patel was not sure about 'the immediate cause of the firing'. 'Who was responsible for the unfortunate turn of events which led to these disastrous consequences and what was the actual provocation which led to them' he did not know. Nor was this 'an opportune moment to assess the relative responsibilities or to apportion the blame between the parties concerned', he felt. 68 It would only fuel tension, he argued. Till the popular explosion took place Sardar Patel could afford a neutral stance and stick to the policy of non-intervention. But what happened on the 22nd seemed ominous to him. Alarmed he intervened at last, intervened to induce the ratings to surrender. unconditionally and thereby to take the wind out of the protesting people's sails. On behalf of his party Patel promised to see that none of the strikers was victimized and their grievances were redressed. Maulana Azad and Asaf Ali were in contact with the authorities in Delhi, and the Sardar himself with the Governor of Bombay. The ratings were assured that the Congress Legislative Party would raise the issue in Central Assembly, .and all
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
would try to help them out of their difficulty. But as it was a delicate case, its solution would take time, and the ratings must meanwhile keep patience and peace. Significantly at the same time the League High Command sent them a message couched in similar terms. Hinting darkly at the machination of 'professional agitators' Jinnah, like Patel, asked the ratings 'not to play into the hands of those who want to create trouble and exploit those on strike for their own ends'. Urging them 'to call off the strike', 'create no further trouble' and 'restore normal conditions' he said: 'let us handle the situation, which will surely result in their welfare and will be in their best interests'.69 This was a unique example of Congress-League unity for 'peace' which Gandhi preferred so much to the one for 'violence' against imperialism! Even as Maulana Azad and Liaquat Ali Khan were, on C-inCs authority, assuring there would be no victimization of strikers or vindictive action against any of them,1° Philip Mason, intervening in the discussion on an adjournment motion on the 'mutiny' in Central Assembly, declared: 'I shall give no assurance that punishment would not take place'. 'Government', he reasoned, 'should reserve to themselves the right to punish' the persons who 'misled' the 'young', 'excitable' ratings. The men who took the lead in 'rowdyism' and 'violence', these 'ringleaders' must not go unpunished. Now to censure the government for it, said Mason, was to put a premium on acts of 'indiscipline' in the armed forces. It was to make those guilty of such acts feel that they were 'right -in taking the course they did'. Moreimportantly, it would encourage service personnel to resort to such a course whenever they felt they had a grievance and thereby violate regulations governing the services. Mason cautioned his Indian friends now in opposition: they would form a government shortly and need the aimed forces very much, and hence should not do anything which might undermine their discipline in the meantime.71 Far from doing anything to undermine it, the representatives of Congress in the Assembly spoke of its importance even more emphatically than did the War Member. Concerned perhaps more than Philip Mason about the ·'grave situation' that had arisen out of the naval strike Asaf Ali, Deputy Leader of Congress in the House, proposed to refer the issue to the Defence Consultative Committee (which was yet to be constituted to include the political leaders) for
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deliberations at a later date and drop the motion he himself tabled for discussions in the Assembly. In giving reason for this suggestion, which Mason described as 'excellent', Asaf Ali said: 'It is not a suitable occasion for questions, quick-firing replies and retorts; it is a matter which requires deep, deliberate and very serious consideration'.72 His desire to avoid a discussion on such a matter of public importance on the floor of the Assembly was coupled with a sense of 'restraint' born of the realization that freedom was round the corner. Emphasizing the need for restraint on the part of all in the situation he told the House: 'We are going through a travail and it is through this travail that we have got to steer our bark as carefully as possible'.73 Next day, 23 February, when the motion was taken up for discussion the naval strike was over. Mason reported: 'I am very glad to be able to say ... that the situation as regards the indiscipline in the RIN has practically come to an end'.74 But Asaf Ali remained as reluctant as before 'to say anything which may... contribute to the deterioration of the situation.' This time .he explained the reason for his restraint with a 'simile' borrowed from Sardar Patel: 'My restraint is due to the fact that I realize that today India's ship [of freedom] is nearing the shore ... the ship has to be piloted carefully out of the shoals and rocks which lie ahead. It must be piloted as tactfully ... and as cautiously as possible to the shore' .75 The nearer the shore the greater the danger. The greater the danger the more the need for self-restraint. The same perception of the danger persuaded the Socialist Congressman Masani to exercise as much restraint as did Asaf Ali. He was all praise for the 'national leaders' (of both Congress and League) for their approval of the (foreign) rulers' call for discipline in the armed forces and their cooperation in the latter's effort to bring the situation under control. Masani's anxiety to keep the armed forces intact prompted him to appeal to the British to leave the country before there was any further deterioration of discipline among their personnel. No less aware of the 'gravity' of the situation and the restraint it demanded, Liaquat Ali Khan, Deputy Leader of League urged the members of the House last (22nd) afternoon not to indulge in any propagandist speech. Conscious of the future need for armed forces he, like Asaf Ali, now endorsed 'the desire of the War Secretary that there should be maintained complete discipli.ne' in their ranks.76 The restraint which the members of both Congress and League had shown, the agreement they had expressed with his 'homily' on the subject of discipline plea-
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sed Mason so much that he thanked them unhesitatingly. 'It is quite clear', he concluded, 'that all sections of the House are at one on this question, and do wish to preserve the discipline of the armed forces'.77 The agreement of the leaders of the ruled with the rulers on the question in reference is even more evident in the observations of top ones among the former. On a talk with the Congress President Wavell wrote in his 'Journal' of 10 March: 'He fully realized the danger of undermining the morale of the armed forces.' When the Viceroy emphasized the implications of 'indiscipline' for the future Maulana Azad said that he was aware of the necessity of maintaining discipline among the service personnel. Naturally Wavell 'was very glad to hear it'.78 Vallabhbhai Patel was more uncompromising in this respect. Soon after the naval strike, in meeting the Governor of Bombay to convey a message from the Sardar, S.K. Patil told him that Patel felt 'indiscipline must be punished'.79 Around the same time the Sardar himself wrote in a letter to Venkatappayya 'we cannot object to the enforcement of discipline in the defence forces', and in another to Viswanathan, 'discipline in the army cannot be tampered with. To do so would be to court disaster'. Explaining the reason he said: 'We will want army even in free India'.80 Similarly in polemizing with Aruna Asaf Ali on a related issue Gandhi added: 'Discipline will be ... as necessary under Swaraj as it is now.'81 The leaders were equally emphatic about it in their public utterances as well. The reason why they all cried themselves hoarse over 'discipline' was not merely their concern about its future need. It was also their immediate fear that the spread of 'indiscipline' to other wings of the armed forces and 'popular excesses' in response to it might retard the process of a negotiated settlement with the British. They were afraid of losing their grip over the situation and missing the chance. of coming to power early. Already by the turn of 1945 they all came round to the view that 'swaraj' would be achieved quite soon by peaceful means, and under the circumstances to stir up trouble, to create disorder, would be suicidal. Aday after the RIN strike began Prime Minister Attlee announced in the House of Commons that a cabinet mission would visit India shortly to negotiate a peaceful transfer of power. This was coincidence no doubt but it succeeded in making the national leader oppose anything that tended to
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upset their calculations about it. They lost no time in welcoming Attlee's announcement and reaffirming all the more strongly their faith in a non-violent settlement with the British. That the leaders were eager to come to terms with the British and avoid any clash with them is explicit in their statements on the naval strike. For Maulana Azad the strike was 'unexpected': It 'led to a sequel which has assumed distressing proportions'. It took place at a time when 'a calm and peaceful atmosphere' was most needed for the 'immediate purpose', negotiations with the cabinet mission.82 Elaborating the point in a statement on 2 March the Congress President 'said: 'transfer of power from foreign to Indian hands ... is now only a matter of short time. It is, therefore, most essential that all should ... desist from creating situations which may ... prejudice the early realization of Indi'!'s aspirations'. Describing those in power now as 'temporary authority', as 'caretakers' Azad dismissed strikes, hartals or any other protest against them as being 'out of place'. There was no 'immediate' reason for joining 'issue with the foreign rulers' of the day. 'It is in abeyance until the refusal to transfer power'. He promised a struggle in future: 'the Congress will not hesitate to sound the bugle call' for it should the negotiations fail. Meanwhile the people should cooperate with the 'temporary government' despite its recent atrocities in Bombay in particular. 83 In addressing a number of public meetings, a few for election propaganda, Vallabhbhai Pate! expressed his resentment over the way the people ignored his advice against the hartal in support of the ratings. The Sardar, and for that matter the Bombay Provincial Committee of his Party, stuck firmly to a policy of non-intervention in the strike and maintained a studied silence over the ratings' demands until NCSC appealed to the people to come out on a hartal in their defence. Late on 21 February Patel issued a statement, on the one hand, promising (for the first time) Congress intervention at the 'appropriate' level for the redressal of their grievances and, on the other, opposing the call for bandh. The Sardar did not speak the whole truth when he maintained later that as Congress had been seized of the question of the men's demands from the beginning, it would have been wise on the part of the people to leave the matter to the party which could use its position and influence to secure relief for the 'unfortunate lot'. Instead of heeding his advice the
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people responded to the call of some 'misguided' persons for a hartal and thereby spoiled the chance of a 'proper settlement'. The main item on the agenda of the day, Patel said, as freedom, and hence smaller issues like, implicitly, the RIN strike, should not be allo ed to distract their attention from it. Like his other colleagues the Sardar declared India ould be free before the year as out. As the 'ship of freedom' as approaching her shores, 'it ould be rong to go out and sink it'.84 Precisely a delegation of ministers as coming to finalize the details of the transfer of po er. At such a crucial moment the slightest indiscretion ould hinder the process. Hence the Sardar's counsel for the people to ait patiently and prepare, say, by using assemblies and councils, for the final struggle if forced on the country. By the time Nehru came to Bombay the situation had cooled off considerably. Aruna's telegram gave him an idea of the job he as anted for in the city. On detraining at Byculla station to avoid the large cro d aiting at Victoria Terminus for him, Nehru drove straight to Patel's residence. Before the Sardar briefed him on the recent happenings he did not utter a single ord in public. Initially , Patel as a bit apprehensive that his ords might kick up a fresh trouble. But Nehru allayed his fear: he as quite iIIing to condemn the ' ild outburst' of violence in Bombay. ss Similarly the local authorities ere afraid of his 'unrestrained language'. The ban on public meetings as lifted to allo Patel and Nehru to address a gathering at Cho patty on 26 February only on the understanding that they ould confine themselves to 'the tragedy from hich the city had just emerged', on the indication that they ould unequivocally decry the outbreak of violence and condemn those ho caused it. A day after the meeting the Governor in his report to Wavell rote that judging by its immediate impact it ould have been un ise to refuse perm ission. 86 TIle Economist as a are of the 'pattern' of Nehru's speeches, of his 'blo iog hot' in times of quiet and blo ing 'cold' in times of trouble. 87 In bet een, in the situation like that hich prevailed in the aftermath of the RIN strike he, one may modify this observation to say, ble hot and cold simultaneously, rather ble colder than hotter. The reasons are not difficult to seek. Nehru could not afford the image of Patel's - he must protect his 'reputation' as a 'revolutionary'. He as keen on exploiting the issue of RIN unrest like that of
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1942 or INA for elections and bargaining with the British for power. .;., -The accommodative spirit of his speeches was informed by this intention. Simultaneously Nehru was aware of the overriding necessity of curbing the violent outbreaks of popular discontent at a time when his party, including himself, was anxious to settle the question of 'swaraj' by negotiations. Naturally his rhetoric about the awakening of service personnel was accompanied by a condemnation of their actions. Short of its populism Nehru's perspective was no different from that of his more 'sensible' colleagues like Azad and Patel. 'The RIN episode has opened an altogether new chapter in the history of the armed forces of India', said Nehru at the Chowpatty meeting presided over by Patel. He spared a few more words for the 'boys': they smashed the wall between the civilians and themselves and thereby 'rendered the country a very great service'. But he was quick to bridle his eloquence and came round to the 'responsible' line taken by Azad and Patel: the ratings were denounced for what they did after the demolition of the barrier. In his inimitable way Nehru performed the same jugglery wherever he dwelt on the theme. Just as Asaf Ali wanted the service personnel to be 'patriotic', 'impartially patriotic' and 'disciplined', implicitly, as per colonial service codes, he also made the same demand of them: they ought to be 'fully conscious politically' and mindful of their duties to the nation. They 'have to be citizens' and as such 'have to discharge certain responsibilities to their people'. They 'have every right to revolt against the foreign ruler' and should be approached 'to fall in line with the fighters for the freedom of India'.88 In the same breath Nehru said: 'We al~ want discipline in the army, for any army without discipline is no army'.f!B He readily agreed with C-in-C's view that there should be no 'political intrigue' in the armed forces and that 'there should be absolute discipline in the ranks of the services'. Naturally he could not approve of any of the ratings' actions that smacked of 'illdiscipline'. What they did in an effort to destroy the symbols of foreign domination and establish their own in their place was ridiculed. J...ikewise their attack on the symbols which they considered identical with British imperiaism was not spared. 'The pulling down of the Union Jack or the burning of the American flag is ... childish. You [the ratings] have no right to pull down a foreign flag from a private premises. While their success in demolishing the wall that had kept
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them away from the people appears to have drawn Nehru's praise, the ratings' attempts to prevent its re-erection and to foil the plan to starve them into submission raised his ire. The latter were considered dangerous and foolish. The 'boys' provoked the military pickets and thereby walked 'into the enemy's trap'.90 Nehru took a lot of pains to prove the impossibility of armed action against the British. He launched into an exegesis in 'superior violence' and 'inferior violence', 'big-scale violence' and 'small-scale violence'. To Nehru it seemed obvious that 'if one thinks in terms of violence, one must think in terms of superior violence. It is folly to put up inferior violence to oppose superior violence. No general of an armed force does that'. One could not match a pair of nail scissors with a gun and a gun with a machine-gun. Again Nehru maintained: 'If there is going to be violence, it should be on the biggest scale possible ... Small-scale violence comes in the way, not only of non-violence, but of big-scale violence.' In other words 'inferior violence' could not develop into 'superior violence' and 'small scale' into 'big scale'. After expending so much 'dialectics' Nehru came to say 'I have not a shadow of doubt that .,. the right policy is nonviolent policy'. To Nehru, just as to Patel, the firing at Castles had little significance: it caused 'a great deal of excitement' and 'made the people think that a pitched battle was being fought in the Bombay harbour which it was not'. It was small gunfire. Pitted against it was a superior force. Against the heavily armed British troops with adequate supplies the ratings had no provisions and little ammunition. Just as Vice-Admiral Godfrey considered it 'the height of folly' to fight against the 'overwhelming' forces at the disposal of the government;similarly Nehru thought it a grave mistake to challenge such an enemy.90a Then, nothing drew so much of Nehru's ire as the Central Strike Committee's call for a hartal in the city. This was considered an encroachment on the preserves of political leaders, and frankly he would riot 'tolerate' it . The central strike-leaders whom Nehru contemptuously referred to as 'fifteen men' 'had no business to issue such an appeal'. Ignorant as he supposed them to be of 'the situation .in Bombay, in India or the world', they should not have gone over the heads of all 'recognized leaders' and called upon the people to observe a hartal. The right course would have been to leave the
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matter to the leaders of the 'recognized parties'.91 Even if they were of League besides Congress, a fair-minded, secular politician like Nehru would not mind despite his reservations about the former. Such leaders alone had the authority to give a direct call to the people. The reason for so much irritation over NCSC's appeal was the support that the people extended to the strikers notwithstanding Congress' advice to the contrary. 'Foreign rule in India is now a thing of the past'.92 In saying so Nehru went a step further than Azad or Pate!. The country, he continued, had 'reached the door of Swaraj' and would open it sooner than one could imagine. Now that India was 'on the threshold of independence' all 'must act judiciously'.93 Any expression of the urge for freedom in violence, Nehru felt, would negate the possibility of an early agreement with the British. There was absolutely no need for violence when freedom was so 'near at hand', he argued.94 Nehru would have the people believe that should the need for violence arise he would 'be the first to give the call' for it,9S and wanted them to preserve their fiery spirit for the future and direct all energies into the channels of 'constructive work' in the meantime. The country, in his words, was 'sitting on the edge of a volcano' which might erupt any moment. The lava flowing out of it, he feared, would bury all chances of a negotiated settlement to which both the British and his party, including himself, were committed, and 'plunge the country into fiery ordeals' which both were determined to avoid.96 While almost all the Congress lea4ers in their public utterances paid lip service to the cause of RIN strikers, Gandhi was opposed to it. This, he thought, might be construed by the men in other services as their approval of what the ratings did to get their grievances redressed, might embolden them to follow in the latter's footsteps and encourage the civilians to give a hand in it. Gandhi could not forget that in the past many un-Gandhian things were done in his name. Even in cases where he had himself planned and initiated. movements it often became difficult to prevent their radicalization eventually.96a It would be more so, Gandhi realized, at a time when disaffection was more widespread than e¥er before. He felt even more strongly than Azad or Patel that nothing should be said, sti11less done, which might in any way contribute to exacerbating it. Both during the strike and after he did not utter a single word
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in sympathy for the aggrieved ratings. Significantly after the civilians came out on the streets Gandhi broke his silence. On 23 February he broke it to denounce what had happened in Bombay over the last two days. In a statement to the press at Puna he denounced it as 'thoughtless orgy of violence'. Next day Wavell gladly reported to Prime Minister Attlee: 'Gandhi put out good statement condemning violence' .97 To the 'father of the nation' just as to the alien rulers the action of the Indian ratings was a 'mutiny'. It was 'disloyalty' to the British government in whose pay they were. It was 'unlawful'. More so because it was accompanied by violence. 'In resorting to mutiny they were badly advised', said Gandhi.98 'It must be remembered', he added, 'that the RIN was founded not for the benefit of the ruled'. It was organized in the interest of the rulers. 'Discrimination' was glaring in the service. But it was bound to be so. 'It cannot be avoided'. Nor could it be corrected. The men entered the service "With their eyes open', and should accept it as such.99 The other course open to them was to leave the service, according to Gandhi. He failed to understand why the ratings continued to serve if it was too humiliating for them to do. loO Instead of 'mutinying' they should have 'manfully given up their job'. They would not have lost anything thereby. On the contrary 'they would have gained honour and dignity', taught the civilians how to defend it and saved the city from 'senseless destruction oflife and property'.lOl In short the alternative that Gandhi held out to the oppressed and humiliated ratings was simple: reconciling to the situation or resigning from the service but no protest in any form, violent or non-violent. Gandhi argued here as if he was unaware that resigning was a privilege the ratings were not entitled to. They could not leave the service on any ground whatsoever. Neither. was it a fact that all of them joined the navy voluntarily. Many were lured by false promises, and those who left their job on this ground were caught and punished as deserters. In fact cas were forbidden to use their power of discharge against the men who wanted to leave the service and made any effort to secure their release. 102 Hence the alternative actually was protest or reconciliation. 'Discriminatioft stares one in the face' in RIN, said Gandhi himself.1 03 Like -any other Indian he was aware of the humiliating treatment meted out to IORs in HMI services. The men's grievances over it or others were 'nothing new', admitted Nehru.104 Many of these grievances were discussed in Central Assembly in the context
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of the strikes that preceded the one in RIN or before in the course of debates on finance bills. The charter of demands that the naval strikers submitted to the authorities was publicized by the nationalist press. Still Gandhi was not sure whether their grievances were genuine or wherher they had struck for their redressal. He maintained that if it had been for grievances, 'fancied or real', they should have contacted 'political leaders of their choice' and waited for their 'guidance and intervention' .105 The resentment of national leaders that they were not consulted before the strike was begun is ridiculous. No one had ever shown any interest in the armed forces so that they could expect the service personnel to run to them with their griev-ances before initiating any action independently. There was no contact with the 'boys' nor was any effort made at establishing it either. The ratings were 'impartially patriotic': they approached both Congress and League leaders on the very first day of their strike for support and intervention, and next morning demanded of FOB to invite one of them for arbitration. This was reported in all major dailies including the pro-establishment The Times of India. It is difficult to believe that the news escaped Gandhi's attention. For he himself said, 'I have followed the events ... with painful interest' .106 The strikers waited till the last moment expecting that the national leaders would intervene in their favour, that they would come forward to link and coordinate their action with the popular protest and harness this to the overthrow of foreign rule. The ratings were fully aware of their capabilities and limitations. Left to themselves they could organize and synchronize actipns within the spatial limit of the service but hardly anything beyond it. Hence their repeated appeal to the national leaders to raise their struggle above localism and merge it into a nation-wide campaign for freedom. Nevertheless their patrioti m drew ridicule and admonition from Gandhi: 'If they mutinied for t e freedom of India, they were doubly wrong. They could not do so ·thout a call from a prepared revolutionary party. They were thougness and ignorant, if they believed that by their might they would deliver India from foreign domination'.107 Clearly Gandhi's contempt fcir naval subalterns, initiative was deeper than anyone else's in Congress. The ratings enlisted themselves in the service for money and served as 'mercenaries' of an occupation force. Even if their strike had been successful it would have benefited themselves and their kin
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and not the country, said Gandhi apparently in drawing out its implications for the nation. Actually this argument was based less on any concern for the country than on an awareness of the need for armed forces, the need for 'discipline' and 'order' in them. Gandhi did not wish them to be disloyal to the foreign rulers. For he felt: 'If they are disloyal to the present government today, by the same token they may be disloyal to the national government tomorrow' .108 Therefore the heritage of the naval strikers had to be renounced. They set Sa bad and unbecoming example for India' by their acts of indiscipline. 109 A pragmatic politician Gandhi would not countenance any such thing in the armed forces. Mindful of the indispensability of loyal forces for a national government in the near future, Gandhi wanted the service personnel to be perfectly loyal to the colonial government. At the same time he seemed very particular about the need for them to be patriotic. Gandhi did not think that loyalty to the British rulers conflicted in anyway with their patriotism. 'The soldiers should declare that they will do soldiering not for their bellies but to make India free and to keep her free .... it is no disloyalty for a soldier to go and tell his superiors that he will be their man only so long as they stand for his country's freedom and that he would never bear arms to crush the liberty of his own people'. Instead of resorting to 'indiscipline and violence or rowdyism', the service personnel should make such puerile declarations (to be accused again by Gandhi of mutinous utterances) and brave their consequences. None should mind 'if they were disbanded, cashiered or even court martialled'.n° Besides they should learn 'constructive activities', such as spinning wheel, paper making or any other village craft and thereby keep the love of freedom bUrning in their mind.ll1 Thus laboured Gandhi, like his trusted lieutenants, to explain how the men in armed forces could simultaneously remain true to their'Spirit of patriotism and loyal to the foreign rulers avoiding conflict, indiscipline or violence. Again like them he considered the country was passing through a 'critical period in her life'. The British had 'declared their intention to "quit" in favour of Indi;m rule'. Still the people seemed unwilling to listen to the counsel of their leaders for patience. Gandhi noted with alarm the outbursts of discontent, especially in the armed forces. The way the ratings demonstrated in the city streets and gave expres-
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si on to their hatred for the British on the morning of 19-20 February was disturbing to Gandhi. 'Inasmuch as a single person is compelled to shout "Jai Hind" or any popular slogan, a nail is driven into the coffin of swaraj in terms of the dumb millions of India'.112 In his scheme of things there was no room for it. The 'exhibition of distressful unrest which has been lying hidden in the breast', Gandhi feared, would delay the transfer of power. But the people were in DO mood to abide by his advice to trust the British and sit still with folded arms. Gandhi called their distrust 'unmanly'. 'Emphatically it betrays want of foresight to disbelieve British declarations and precipitate a quarrel in anticipation'. He did not think that the cabinet ministers were 'coming to deceive a great nation'. To think so was neither 'manly or womanly', implicitly, beastly.ll3 Gandhi himself had not 'the slight~st doubt as to the bona fides of the cabinet mission' .114 And he wanted the people to take at face value the declarations of British ministers and get ready to welcome them. To treat the 'usurper' with insult and humiliation or to inflict injury on him in remembering his past would be inhuman.11S Gandhi was convinced that the British had 'finally made up their minds to withdraw ill toto' and the question confronting them was 'how to effect the withdrawal in an orderly manner'. This was not the time 'to rake up old sores'. Rather 'gentlemanliness' demanded of the people to forget them and assist the British to quitpeacefully.t 16 Sardar Patel echoed Gandhi when he said: 'We should help them to pack up quickly'.117 'the Indian leaders were eager to give the British what they called the last chance to prove their trustworthiness. If the latter failed to act according to their professions, Gandhi assured he would give the call to turn on their fiery spirit. Till then they must keep off it and 'maint:ain dignified silence'.118 Thus tried the national leaders with fingers on their lips to quiet the people, service personnel or civilians, lest the pre~ carious balance be disturbed in the meantime. III
The promise of not victimizing the strikers was made to ensure the national leaders' assistance in getting the ratings back to their barracks and their civilian sympathizers to their 'normal business'. That it was not meant to be kept is clear from the statement which Philip Mason made on the floor of Central Assembly just a few hours after the ratings had decided to surrender. The kind of indisci-
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pline that broke out in RIN, he told the members of the House, could not be treated as a trade dispute and must be dealt with fIrmly.119 For some grievances, 'fancied or real', the ratings took the law into their hands - they seized warships, guns and ammunition. Aware of its implication for the existing relations of power the War Member said: 'A very great danger' arose not merely in terms of loss of life and property but crucially 'because in the ultimate resort power does depend upon the use of force, and those who command that force may get power into their own hands.'l20 In view of this danger it was essential to punish the ratings who had misled the bulk of their colleagues, mostly 'very young' and 'excitable'. This statement was not only not opposed but virtually endorsed by both Congress and League members. Once the ships and establishments were reoccupied and degunned· General Auchinleck felt free to offer further clarifications. In keeping with the colonial tradition of quibbling in matters of public importance C-in-C in a broadcast on 25 February said: there would be no victimization in the sense that there would be no collective .punishment, no vindictive infliction of penalty or indiscriminate retribution. The word 'victimization' afforded him an excellent opportunity of showing his verbal legerdemain. He could deny having ever made any promise that offenders would not be punished. On the contrary, they would be, he said now. Like the War Member C-in-C wa.s opposed to 'any attempt to whitewash collective di~obedience by using the civil term "strike".' 'The word "strike" is dangerous in 'that it suggests something less serious than mutiny and implies that the armed forces can be excused if they indulge in such direct action as is legally open to those in civil employment.' To General Auchinleck it did not matter what form collective disobedience took, refusal of food ot violence. All were mutinous irrespective of their natur~ and must be dealt with as such. He was convinced that 'politics' (in the sense of an intrigue by unscrupulous politicians or subversive elements from the organized sector) was behind much of what happened in the services. As C-in-C he claimed to 'have nothing whatever to do with politics' and would not tolerate 'political intrigue in the armed forces'.121 Any attempt to undermine discipline in the ranks would be resisted, and that would be done in the interests not of British empire but of India, present and future! as C-in-C went back on his words, so did the national Just . .
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leaders who had on his authority assured non-victimization. Aware of this possibility Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan requested Vallabhbhai Patel to give his assurance in writing. The Sardar turned furious and said emphatically that his 'words' were more than what they wanted. I22 Ironically Patel was among the fIrst few leaders who readily concurred with what C-in-C said in his broadcast on 25 February. In his speech on the Chowpatty sands next day th~ Sardar said that the British military policy seeking to punish the 'ringleaders' was legally 'souncl'.IZJ Under the service rules a 'strike' or, for that matter, any act of collective disobedience, was a mutiny and a punishable offence. The authorities, he certifIed, were well within their rights to enforce discipline in the ranks of the service. About· the same time Patel informed Colville of this stand. His messenger, S.K Patil, agreed with the Governor when the latter said: 'I could not accept the view that no victimization meant no punishment' .124 In his private correspondence the Sardar was even more explicit:'We must not allow .any impression to be created in the defence forces that they can take 'collective action and break the army rules with impunity'. The ratings might 'have their grievances but they should not be allowed to be exploited by political parties' nor should these 'be mixed up with politics'. To allow this would be 'dangerous' for alJ.l2S The alien rulers as well as the national leaders here spoke in the same language and meant the same thing. Anyone who indulged in 'acts of indiscipline' in the services was their common adversary. Meanwhile the victimization machinery had been set in mo" tion, and all hell let loose on the men. Immediately after they surrendered, ships and establishments were combed for their leaders. Except for a honourable few the offIcers, both British and Indian, sought revenge and competed with one another in apprehending the 'boys' believed to have organized the strike. Even those remotely connected with them were not spared. Commander Karmarkar was said to have paraded all the ratings of Talwar, looked at the face of each one of them, picked out the ones he did not like and packed them off to Mulund. l26 In a short space of time about four hundred ratings were removed to Muland camp in the suburbs of Bombay and quite a large number to Malir camp in Karachi for detention under military guards pending 'enquiry' and 'trial'. The Naval Headquarters indeed lost no time in directing the
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officers in command of ships and establishments about how 'to deal with the persons involved in the mutiny'. Just a day after the strike ended instructions were issued to the effect: 'Apparent ringleaders' should be picked out and segregated quickly for trial by court martial or for 'summary award' of punishment. It might be difficult, the authorities anticipated, to produce evidence sufficient to secure their conviction. In such a situation, it was suggested, 'a definite order will be given in front of reliable witnesses to a picked man or picked men to perform a definite task. In the event of refusal there is an obvious case for immediate disciplinary action. If this process causes the men to resort to violence the same principle holds good, namely, segregation and punishment of ringleaders who are likely in this event to be more radically obvious'. Thus an opportunity was to be created to punish the persons against whom evidence was insufficient. The entire process could 'be continued as necessary until the bulk of the men, that is, those who have been misled see the futility of their ways,.m Clearly the intention was to punish the 'ringleaders' and at the same time to terrorize the others. Of the Congress leaders Nehru, in particular, was aware of these instructions. In a press interview on 27 February he admitted 'that there is going to be a great deal of victimization, in every sense of the word, not only victimization but a measure of terrorization'.128 But he proposed nothing concrete to prevent it. The Congress, he suggested, would organize legal defence if public trials were held. Nothing more. For him as for others in his party a few 'young men' in RIN went 'astray in a moment of excitement'. To the national leaders just as to the British the ratings seemed immature, subject to passion and incapable of rational behaviour. Technically what the naval.subalterns did, Nehru said, was mutinous, and he had no objection, implicitly, to punishment in the 'technical' sense of the term. Nehru washed his hands off, saying: 'we can make no promises and give no guarantees, for only a free India can do SO.'129 In an effort to disown any responsibility on behalf of his colleagues he added: 'Neither the Sardar nor the Maulana is in a position to give any guarantee in the present stage of our slavery. It is the government alone which can do SO.'130 In his view the ratings' plight was a function or consequence of foreign rule and, on the changeover to a free government, would vanish. Once such a government was established, their demands, Nehru pledged, would be dealt with.
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While the top leaders virtually acquiesced in the victimization of strikers,the lesser fry literally feasted on their defeat. HMS Glasgow which entered the Bombay waters the day the strike was called off threw aboard a cocktail party on the evening of 1 March. Among the Indian invitees K.M. Munshi and his wife. Mirchandani, Municipal Commissioner and Chundrigar, President of the Bombay Muslim League Committee joined. Butler Cominissioner of Police and Charles Bristow, Adviser to the Governor, to celebrate the defeat of the 'mutiny'. Glasgow was summoned from Trincomalee to suppress the strike. The guests were taken round the cruis(:r and regaled with its wartime feats, besides drinks.l3l Objectively the national leaders' attitude suited the authorities well. The latter could pursue their policy in regard to the strikers unopposed. Under the veil of secrecy the naval elite began to work out the plan to crush the rebellious spirit of the lower deck and break its unity. The detenues were sought to be cajoled or terrorized into submission. Rewards were offered, mercy was promised and threats were held out in an effort to extract information about their comrades. But nothing worked. Hardly anyone was willing to divulge anything beyond what he considered advisable. Even in defeat the sense of solidarity which had developed among the men during and since the strike remained almosf unbreakable. The ratings in detention camps were treated worse than the ordinary criminals. The authorities were determined to make their lives unbearable. The same atrocities as had stimulated the strike recently were perpetrated with vengeance. No resistance was expected from the leading rates, now isolated from the bulk of their comrades in ships and establishments and under the surveillance of military guards. But it did occur, puzzling· the camp officials, and proving that even after defeat their spirit of resistance, courage and conviction were as strong as before. On 12 March in protest against the ill-treatment of their colleagues, the ratings confined in the Mulund camp went on a hunger strike. That morning they had their breakfast as usual. Later when the representatives from different barracks went to the canteen to fetch food for lunch one from 'H' block found the quantity offered insufficient to feed 50 men in his mess. On complaining to a PO he
270
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febmary 1946
was advised to see the officer-in-charge of the canteen, one Lieut. Singh. The latter caught him by the ear and dragged him out of his office. Immediately the whole block decided. not to take any food until the officer apologized for his action and it was given enough to eat. Afterwards the rest of the camp, except for few, joined in the strike. Next morning FOB accompanied by a senior army officer visited the place, and was told by the ratings that the strike would be called off only if their demands were fulfilled. After his departure the situation became tense. Two Indian lieutenants made every attempt to break the strike - they tried to take out ratings in batches and tempt them with fruits and sweets. But not a single one was taken in by the flattery. Later in the evening the officers decided to arrange a cinema show. The strikers were unwilling to cooperate in any way but when the authorities persisted in their effort, some among them rushed to the screen and tore it down. That night the few blacklegs who wanted to take food earned the contempt of their colleagues and were frightened by jeers and shouts directed at them. They pleaded with the officer-in-charge of the camp for protection, and were eventually kept in a separate block with a special armed picket round it. Early in the morning of 14 March forty ratings suspected of intimidating the blacklegs were rounded up and removed to a 'hutted building' some distance away. That evening they were taken to a jail at Kalyan. Some time in the morning the strikers attempted to rescue their comrades, and retraced their steps only under the threat of being fired by troops. Soon after this a naval officer went to the camp to persuade the men to give up their strike. The attempt failed, his shoulder straps were torn off and he had to flee. The strike continued in spite of the most militant elements among them having been removed. It continued right up to the 16th. Some fell ill and were force-fed. The men were divided into batches of eight and forbidden to communicate with one another. Eventually the strike petered out. l32 The number of military guards around the camp had already been doubled. It was out of bound for all, and its doors were bolted fast. Still the news of the strike trickled out, and reached the naval units in and around Bombay through the press. HMIS Talwar and Cheetah went on a 'sit-down' strike in sympathy. Others were ready to follow suit. But by the time the strike was over at Mulund. Such incidents occurred in Karachi too. The ratings· in deten-
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tion at the Malir camp did" not take the atrocities lying down. The" resistance they offered was as stiff as at Mulund.133 Apprehensive of further trouble the authorities $peeded up the punishment of 'offenders'. Already a number of service courtS" of enquiry had begun functioning. Supposed to investigate into the causes and circumstances of the 'mutiny' in individual ships and establishments the officers serving on them tried hard to gloss over the existing conditions in the service and pin the blame on 'ringleaders' in an effort to bring them to book. Any evidence that did not suit their purpose was rejected. Tremendous pressures were brought to bear on the 'accused. But the men resisted boldly, refusing to succumb to them and to bend so low as to implicate their comrades. The officers of the worst affected units accompanied by the loyal POs visited detention camps, asked the latter to identify the prmcipal 'ringleaders' and other 'violent' elements and took down their statements against them. The intention was to frame suitable charges for their trial by court martial. The appropriate area authorities had been instructed to divide the ratings into three classes in terms of their offences for punishment. Those who acted as principal 'ringleaders' and indulged in violence, assaulting officers, using firearms and endangering life were to be classed into category 'A' and 'remanded in custody' for trial by court martial. The ringleaders who did not figure so promip.ently but committed acts such as threatening officers, striking ensigns and damaging buildings and fittings were to come within class 'B' and shoul~ be summarily dealt with a sentence of dismissal with or without disgrace or imprisonment or remanded in custody if a punishment higher in the summary scale was considered necessary. The rest whose retention in the service was deemed undesirable but against whom the eVidence of specific offences was insufficient should be treated as belonging to category 'C' and discharged as being 'unsuitable'. The commanding officers were asked to make the fullest possible use of 'summary powers' in dealing with the ratings held in detention so long ostensibly for investigation and triaP34 Although the trial by court martial of the most 'dangerous' elements was approved in principle and necessary papers were prepared, the idea was eventually given up. It was done not out of any
272
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febroary 1946
waekness for them but because of certain practical considerations. The decision was unpalatable to the officers, especially in regular cadres, at the unit level - they felt that such offenders should not escape severe punishments which courts martial were likely to inflict. But the higher authorities considered it undesirable politically and inexpedient from the service point of view. Like C-in-C and FOCRIN the Viceroy was convinced of the necessity of stern actions but at the same time determined to avoid the mistakes committed in the case of INA personnel. l35 The latter were tried 'unwisely' in the full glare of publicity despite the advice of the Home Member to the contrary. The court martial of RIN 'mutineers', it was feared, would be 'a focus of public interest' and would 'create the same unfortunate atmosphere as did the INA trials'.136 The RIN strike had already had too much 'undesirable publicity'. Hence the decision to finish the whole business without any fuss. The Congress too thOUght this the wisest course to adopt. Though it promised to provide legal aid to the men in case of their public trial the· party did not want their 'episode' to receive any more publicity, the main reason being its possible impact on other wings of the armed services and on the civilian population. It was a 'mutiny' to Gandhi as to C-in-C. It was an 'unfortunate' incident to Sadar Patel as to FOCRIN. Its repetition was unwanted. They all were for closing the chapter as quick as possible. The national leaders, including 'Socialists', favoured the summary trial for 'technical offences' 'to satisfy regulation-formalities'.137 In an interview to UNI Masani expressed his fear that the trial by court martial would involve the government in 'a long and cumbrous procedure'. 'The history of the INA trials, with all their unforeseen consequences, will be repeated'. The·people might again explode in anger. The government, argued Masani, should 'in their own interests as well as in those of keeping the atmosphere congenial for the impending ... negotiations', should desist from the 'venture' to try any man publiclyYs The rulers did so to the satisfaction of the 'leaders' of the ruled. Unwilling to give the accused any opportunity of self-defence which might attract public attention the authorities punished them summarily by warrant. As many as 523 ratings were thus dealt with by sentences such as 'dismissal with disgrace and imprisonment', 'dismissal with disgrace only', 'dismissal and imprisonment', 'dismissal
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only', 'discharge unsuitable' or 'imprisonment and discharge unsuitable'.!39 The punished were deprived oftheir legitimate dues and any certificate that might entitle them to concessions in education and employment. Those who were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment were sent off under military escorts for a distance and then under police escorts to jails in their respective districts. 14o The others, penniless, without clothes and food, were taken under armed escorts to stations and put on homc·-bound trains. The stigma of 'imprisonment', 'dismissal' or 'dis.:li;uge' was a bar to their settlement in civilian life. Apart from them, more than 16,000 ratings were involved in the 'mutiny' in an official estimate. 141 Although no 'disciplinary action' could be taken against all of them owing to their sheer number the authorities were determined to flush out from the service as many 'devils' as possibk. 1n the months immediately following the strike the number of men rek::lsed from the service far exceeded the previous monthly rate of 2000. Around 3300 ratings were discharged in March alone. 142 This was done without much ado. The men with excellent service records, 'Very Good' for conduct and 'Superior' for ability, found that those changed overnight to 'Fair' and 'Indifferent' .143 Thousands were literally thrown out of job before the RIN Commission was convened_ Consequently it had much of the evidence away from its sight.
* Complicit to the victimization thus being visited upon the naval subalterns, the national leaders on whose.promises of protection the strike was calld off had no compunctions in backsliding from them. Practically their condemnation of the acts of 'indiscipline' in the service legitimized the vindictive infliction of punishment on the men. The leading lights of both Congress and League soon got busy bargaining with the British for power and turned deaf to the ·reminders from RIN ratings. The prospect of power induced in them a desire to keep well with the coercive arms of the colonial state and a wish to preserve their strength_ Within six months of the strike an interim government dominated by Congress and headed by Nehru was installed in Delhi. But nothing changed for the men. The officers of Comdr. King's tribe carried on unhindered the same regimen of tyranny and discrimina-
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Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febrnary 1946
tion against which the ratings rose in revolt in February. The interim government did not protect the latter from the Blimps who still ruled the navy. Of course on assumption of office as Defence Member of the Nehru cabinet Sardar Baldev Singh, in a message to the service personnel, spoke of his government's determination to indianize the armed forces. But ironically he looked to the British officers, then engaged in purging the service of the men who showed the rare courage to raise the standard of freedom, for presiding over the process of 'nationalization'. The Defence Member had nothing to say about the victimized ratings. In fact his departJjnent issued a press note on 10 October dispelling the rumour about his government's intention to reinstate the men dismissed, discharged or punished otherwise.l44 For several months the interim government sat silent over the report of the RIN Commission perhaps in an effort to save the British brass hats from being exposed. The truncated version of it released to the press late in January 1947 disclosed almost nothing about their misdeeds. In the statement that .accompanied the brief handout, the February strike which, Nehru in its immediate aftermath said, had 'opened an altogether new chapter in the history of the armed forces of India' was referred to by his government as 'tragic' in the annals of RIN:- In declaring its intention to redress the lower-deck grievances the interim government uttered not a word
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as it had always been, that is, an Indian Navy of the British, and no change was visualized in itsregulations. 148 Two days after this blatant assertion came Baldev Singh's announcement on his promotion as ·C-in-C of RIN from 1 March. 149 In less than a year and a. half after the RINstrike Congress attained the goal of a transfer of power. The time came to redeem the pledges it had hitherto made, Nehru said on t~e night of 14 August 1947. But the rebellious ratings of 1946 among others proved an unhappy memory for the nationalist elite including Nehru. The leaders conveniently forgot their 'pledges' to the RIN lower deck. The change over to a national government, contrary to the hope that Nehru had held out to them, made no difference for the men who had been dumped on the civvystreets like heaps of garbage by the British. ·On the other hand, the Indian officers who had actively collaborated with their foreign masters in crushing the spirit of resis. tance among their fellow countrymen in the lower deck, spied on them and framed evidence for their conviction and thus aided and abetted the dirty game of victimization were handsomely rewarded. These 'jee-huzoor' elements were granted promotions which they could never have attained otherwise. By contrast none among the hundreds of men who had been weeded out of the service for seeking an end to foreign domination over it found any place in the national navy which they had long cherished to serve. NHQ would not trust any of them. In the opinion of Indian naval bosses these elements, if taken back, would be a potential source of danger to the navy as well as to the country. . Unlike the personnel of the Azad Hind Fauj the naval 'mutineers' were never accorded the status of national heroes or considered for rehabilitation~resettlement. l"he men of the Indian army who went over to INA escaped a difficult life in Japanese POW camps. On return to India many declared their allegiance to the party of potential winners, Congress and received 'royal welcome'. They assured Gandhi that in keeping with SubhasChandra Bose's last message the INA personnel would 'serve the country as soldiers of non-violence under the guidance and leadership of the Congress' .150 The party, in turn, organized legal aid for the INA prisoners and indeed engaged its best legal brains for their defence, established an INA relief committee and raised funds for the protection and wel-
276
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
fare of the men on their release. In fact when the British authorities decided to reinstate in· the service only those INA personnel who were classified as 'Whites' and to discharge 'Greys' and dismiss 'Blacks', Congress expressed its concern. This was reflected clearly in Nehru and Patel's correspondence in particular. Out of his anxiety over the question of their resettlement Nehru wrote to I.R.D. Tata on 21 August 1946: 'We have opened an INA office at Iamshedpur to help in finding employment for ex-INA men. I hope your people will keep in touch with this office and give them such help as they can'.ISI The Congress tried, not without success, to secure employment for the ex-INA personnel. Shortly after his interim government was sworn in, it was made 'clear to provincial governments that there should be no bar at all to the employment ofINA personnel except in so far as the army or the police services were concenled'.ls2 Actually a number of them were employed in civil departments under some provincial governments. About the same time Patel initiated a proposal to reconsider the ban on re-employment of INA personnel in view of the classification above. Soon after independence the question of their reinstatement came up again, and the Defence Minister stated that it was under consideration at a high level. In that context some officials in the Defence Department argued in their notes that the general policy all along was that a service member, once discharged or dismissed, could not be reinstated. To that ,extent the policy in regard to ex-INA personnel and RIN 'mutineers' had to be similar. But the circumstances in which the naval strike broke out were somewhat different. The RIN Commission of Enquiry brought out the grievances of the ratings and the administration'!! responsibility for them. Moreover there was no question, so far as the RIN 'mutiny' was concerned, of active assistance to the enemy as was the case in regard to INA. So while a review of INA cases was being undertaken, the position relating to RIN 'mutineers' might also be reconsidered. Besides the need for building a strong navy was greater than 'the sentinlents of the service'. As it was short of experienced ratings, particularly in technical branches, the potential source should be tapped. The officers suggested that a screening board should decide each case on merit. lS3 NHO did not agree with the view that any policy decision taken in respect of ex-INA personnel should also apply to RIN 'mutineers' removed from the service. It did not think that the latter
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should be treated on 'the same footing as the former. It considered the backgrounds and circumstances attending the two different. The Subhas Chandra Bose-Ied INA was a political movement, and its members acted from 'patriotic motives'. Further the enemy powers exercised 'considerable and continuous pressure' on them. What they did under the circumstances should be excused. On the other hand, the RIN strikers' action had no politiCal meaning for NHQ. It fell outside the domain of elite nationalism with whiCh the politiCal was viewed as coincidental. rhe naval strike could not be regarded as anything other than a 'service offence', it crime. It did not take place under enemy pressures, and dangerously centered round the home port of Bombay. Tlie ratings 'mutinied' for certain grievances, some real and some 'imaginary'. The politiCal situation obtaining at the time might have aggravated t4em but basiCally it was an inexcusable offence under the naval regulations. NHQ considered futile any attempt to examine individual cases of 'mutineers' for future employment. Whatever discrimination these cases demanded had already been made in connection with the classification of 'mutineers' for disciplinary action against them. Judging by the standard of service discipline the decision to abandon the trial by court martial of ratingmutineers was 'dangerously generous', and had left its mark on the navy. NHQ made it clear that building a strong navy was a matter of primary importance and no sentiments would be allowed to stand in its way. But such a navy could be built only on a solid foundation. In laying this it was primarily important to instil a sense of discipline in the service. All other considerations such as experience or technical ability were secondary. NHQ feIt that in spite of the shortage of experienced and teclinical hahds things had not come to such a pass as to drive the navy to look to the 'ex-mutineers' for recruitment. In its logic, if the men responsible for the acts of 'indiscipline' in February 1946 were taken back, one could not guarantee that the same thing would not be repeated in future. NHQ had no doubt that the reinstatement of 'ex-mutineers' would be a constant encouragement to others to mutiny, a 'potential source of indisciplille' in the service. l54 Hence its opposition to any suggestion to the effect. Among the victimized ratings a few sent in petitions to the Congress leaders after they came to power, reminding them of their promises to the men, emphasizing the contributions of the RIN strike to the achievement of freedom and demanding their reinstatement.
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Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
Their attempt at arousing the leaders' 'compassion' for the 'sufferings' of 'poor', 'innocent and patriotic' 'souls' proved futile. The victimized ratings found no one among the rulers to back up their case. In fact the Nehru government held fast to the British military policy that a service personnel; once removed on account of his 'mutinous' act, should not be taken back. The replies the petitioners received from the Ministry of Defence were on the same line. Dismissal with disgrace involved an incapacity to serve the government in any way, military or civil. The ban on re-employment in military services operated in the case of those who were dismissed without disgrace as in the case of those dismissed with disgrace. Dismissal without disgrace involved no legal bar to employment in any civil service. But this did. not mean that the government could impose no ban as a matter of administrative policy. The ratings who no longer expected re-employment in public services but wanted the govern-· ment to pay them war gratuity, deferred pay, pension and other legitimate dues and expunge 'bad remarks' from their records were told that the. dismissed personnel were not entitled to any release benefits or 'clear conduct' certificate. l55 Besides acting in keeping with this policy the Nehru government scrupulously implemented the measures which the British had recommended from certain long-term considerations. The navy was systematically reduced to a body of loyal officers and men content with the existing conditions of service to form a nucleus .on which to build the naval force of the future. The process of dismantling shore establishments in their present locations was begun. Actually in assessing the lessons to be learnt from the 'mutiny' Colville, Governor of Bombay, suggested their removal to sites safer from the point of view of the maintenance of law and order. In a report to the Viceroy of 27 February 1946 he argued: 'The disaffection of the RIN' raised a serious question. 'The two shore establishments which mutinied are situated In the south of the city, and the police problem, already a difficult one, becomes an almost impossible one if the loyalty, or at any rate the good behaviour, of these forces cannot be counted upon. I therefore most earnestly urge, whatever administrative action is taken following on the enquiry, that these two establishments, as well as other RIN establishments in Bombay city, should either be pruned down to small numbers or moved to stations outside the city.'156 Subsequently a number of official boards of enquiry recom-
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mended the same thing from another a1:1gle - they insisted that shore establishments situated in large port cities should be closed down and shifted to places where the contact of their personnel with civilians, especially 'subversive' elements, could be reduced to a minimum, the contact which, in their view, was largely responsible for the strike in February 1946.157 The government did not lose time in acting upon these suggestions and recommendations. Clearly the spatial-temporal matrices of the 'm utiny were sought to be obliterated. The Signal School was removed from Talwar where the protest began, and renamed. Castle Barracks which emerged as the storm centre in Bombay was struck off the list of naval establishments. Again HMIS Hilldustall, the most prominent site of conflict in Karachi, was decommissioned. Although th(; sloop was not so old as to warrant this, the authorities did not wanl to see the symbol of lower-deck resistance afloat. Any pilgrimage to the sites where the men's action crystallized and reached its height was thus made difficult. Soon after their heroic struggle failed, the rating-rebeJs faded into oblivion. The authorities ensured it.
* Unlike the INA 'heroes' the rating-rebels were not admitted to the roll of honour for freedom fighters. Theirs was a movement in which elite nationalist intervention was nil. It belonged to a domain of anti-colonialist politics outside mainstream nationalism. Its protagonists hardly found any place in the historiography of late colonial India in their own right, as the makers of their own rebellion, seeking redressal for their grievances and attempting to put an end to foreign domination. Few among the nationalist leaders .med the heritage of the RIN 'mutiny'. As Teodor Shanin said in another context, 'political losers have few loyal kinsmen, while the victors monopolize press, cash and imagination.'158 Included among the few who staked their claim to the heritage of the naval strike are Communists. The latter did so, subtly, for another purpose, did so to appropriate it as a 'contingent element' into another history with another subject, that is, the 'hypothetical' proletariat they represented. References and Notes 1. 2.
RIN Muntiny Sr. No. 6, p. 496. BW 84: Comdr. F.w. King, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. 11, p. 954.
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Revisiting Talwar: A Sfl:dy in the RJN Uprising of February 1946
3.
See Note 54, Chapter :'.
4.
Sections IV and IX, File l'lO. NL 9930.
5.
Dutt sought to explain it away thus: 'Seth used to befool me and pull my legs.' BW 59: RC. Dutt, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. II, p. 769.
6.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, pp. 447-9. See also Appendix 'G', ibid.
7.
See Note 55, Chapter 3.
8.
Sections I and VIII, File No. NL 9930. Also 14th to 23rd Witnesses, ibid.
8a.
Sig. Bosn. Surve told the Talwar Board that 'during the mutiny I always saw Dutt sitting, reading a book and not mixing with others. I asked him why he was sitting alone, he answered "If I go and talk to, the ratings, they will suspect me of being a ringleader".' 20th Witness: A.M.!. Surve, ibid.
9.
Captain H.L. Davis, President of the Board of Enquiry, HMIS Ta/war to FOB, 16 March 1946, Section VII, ibid. Also 18th Witness: Headmaster Lieut. Bamji, ibid.
10.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 436.
11.
ibid., pp. 455-6.
12.
BW 72: Ahmed, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. II, p. 606.
13.
3rd Witness: Comdr. S.G. Karmarkar, File No. NL 9930; Comdr. E.C. Streatifield-James, Proceedings and Findings (Parts I and II) of the Board, File No. NL 9939; Lieut. E.H. Sexton, Minutes of Proceedings, File No. NL 9974; 1st Witness: Lieut. Comdr. V.V. Pegoretsky, Minutes of the Proceedings and Opinion of the Board, File No. NL 9976; Opinion of the Board, File No. NL 9908; General Summary, Part I, File No. NL 9950; BW 18: Lieut. Arjun Singh, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I,pp. 192-3 and BW 85: Lieut. S.M. Nanda, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. II, pp. 991-3. None of the official boards of enquiry could produce any direct evidence of outside influence, instigation or direction. Their opinion in this respect was based on suspicion and guess. The Narbada Board, in pointing the needle of suspicion to Able Seaman R. Singh among others, said that the rating was popular because he was previously in a circus, could play musical instruments and knew tailoring. The man might have been 'sent to the navy with an ulterior motive, due to his abilities he could be in a position to exercise influence and spread any l'ropaganda amongst the ratings'. Findings, File No. NL 9942. According to the Kathiawar Board of Enquiry, the letter in which the ship's company asked their CO to cancel the vessel's good-will
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cruise' and proceed straight to Bombay was very 'well-worded' and 'much above the average of ratings' production'. Hence its suspicion: it might have been written by a trained political agitator planted, implicitly, with an 'ulterior motive'. Report of the Board,FOB to FOCRIN, 24 April 1946, File No. NL 9958. Lieut. Arjun Singh of Castle Banncks was of the view that 'the mutiny was aroused from outside or assisted by outsiders'. For he saw on 20 February a poster on Museum wall 'saying that the Indian soldiers are brave people and are doing this for their motherland' and calling upon all to support them. And next day,. while going home by Mint Road, he met two civilians who asked him to remove his cap and shoulder strap; When asked by the RIN Commission whether he based his opinion on 'these two incidents only', Lieut. Singh added another reason for his suspicion: the ratings could not tell him !j.nything about their grievances Oil the 19th. It did not occur to him that they were unwilling to do so. BW 18: Lieut. Singh, op.cit., pp. 193, 202, 204. 14.
Report of Board, File No. NL 9907; Findings, File No. NL 9909; Finding of the Board, File No. NL·9920; Second Witness: Captain Inigo-Jones and Section IV; File No. NL 9930; Findings of the Board, File No. NL 9945; Findings of the Board, File No. NL 9947; Causes of the Mutiny, Part 11, File No. NL 9950; Findirigs of the Board, File No. NL 9953 and Findings, File No. NL 9978. In his evidence before the RIN Enquiry Commission Lieut. Nanda alleged that the nationalist leaders and press 'inflamed the feeling of the ratings'. To substantiate it he referred specifil.ally to a speech by Aruna Asaf AIi at Chowpatty on the eve of the strike. The meeting was said to have been 'attended by a large number of ratings from Ta/wm). Wi,en asked by the Comll1is~ion 'what was there' in her speech, 'did you read that', 'how many [Talwar] people attended this meeting', 'can't you mention a single name' or 'lU)w do you reach the conclusion that it affected Ta/HIm), the officer answered all in the negative. BW 85: Lieut. Nanda, op.cit., pp. 991-2,994.
15.
1st Witness: Captain A.H. Wett, File No. NL 9950; Lieut. A.R. Siddiqi, Min~tes of the Board, File No. NL 9978 and DW 24: Lieut. Comdr. Webster, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 2, Vo!. H, p. 152.
16.
3rd Witness: Comdr. Karmarkar, op.cit.; Comdr. J.C. Mensell, Minutes of .the Proceedings, File No. NL 9942 and his statement, File No. NL 9965; President) Naval Board of Enquiry, Cochin to the Naval Offit:er-in-Charge, Cochin, 18 March 1946, File No. NL 9940 and BW 18: Lieut. Arjun Singh, op.cit., pp. 172 ff.
17.
RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 6, p. 267.
282 18.
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febntary 1946 ibid., pp. 436 fr. See also Appendix 'J', ibid., 596 ff.
19.
S. Vedantan, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 14.
20.
FP], 20 February 1946.
21.
BW 62: Sheikh Shahadat Ali, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. II, p. 584.
22.
BW 27: Lieut. M.P. Singh, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, pp. 349 fr. Also BW 83: Lieut. S.N. ,Sachdev, RIN Mutiny Sr: No. 3, Vol. II, p. 900.
23.
Findings, File No. NL 9909; Findings, File No. NL 9974 and Findings, File No. NL 9978.
24.
Findings, File No. NL 9901; Report of Board, File No. NL 9907; Opinion of the Board, File No. NL 9908; Proceedings of the Board, \ File No. NL 9919; Findings, File No. NL 9942; Findings, File No. NL 9947; Witness No. 1: Lieut. Comdr. A Chowdary, File No. NL 9951; Findings of the Board, File No. NL 9953; File No. NL 9966 and BW 5: Lieut. S.N. Kohli, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, pp. 62-3.
25.
HT, 25 April 1946.
26.
Part VI, File No. NL 9950. Also Lieut. Comdr. C.W. England, Proceedings of the Board, File No. NL 9939; Report of the Board, File No. NL 9958 arid Comdr. F.F.W. Harvey and Lieut. Mehta, Minutes of the Board, File No. NL 9978.
27.
BW 5: Lieut Kohli, op.cit., pp. 59 fr. Also BW 80: Lieut. Comdr. E.M. Shaw, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. II, p. 867 and Sub-Lieut. TA. Tausif Lodhi, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 13.
28.
The 'uneducated' ratings of non-technical branches outnumbered their 'educated' counterparts of technical streams in the service and the Muslims outnumbered the Hindus in most of the non-technical wings. For figures see Chapter 1.
29. . B.C. Dutt lent his support to the official theory of manipulation by educated ratings. See Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, pp. 120 fr. 30.
3rd Witness: Comdr. Karmarkar and his Report, File No. NL 9930.
31.
File No. NL 9908; Part II of the Findings of the Board, File No. NL 9939; Finding of the Board, File No. NL 9946; Lieut. Comdr. AH. Khan, Minutes of Proceedings, File No. NL 9956 and Findings, File No. NL 9974. Of these leaders Tel. AK. Roy tried, not entirely successfully, to persuade his Chamak colleagues to return to their barracks when the latter saw the Bahadur ratings entering the establishment on the morning of 21 February. Later in the evening Tel. Roy called on Lieut. Comdr. A.K. Chatterji, CO of Chamak and sought his permission to transmit a signal to Hindustan asking its
Faces of the Elite
283
ratings 'not to open fire and observe complete non-violence '" next morning'. The officer thought this to be 'a good idea; and gladly 'gave permission'. Evidence of Lieut. Comdr. A.K. Chatterji, File No. NL 9984. Also Statement of Sub-Lieut. P.B. McFarlane, ibid. 32.
Opinion of the Board, File No. NL 9920; Report of the Board, File No. NL 9958 and Sub-Lieut. Lodhi, op.cit.
34.
Report of the Board, File No. NL 9943 and File No. NL 9956.
35.
BW 29: Lieut. L.e Ghatak, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 380 and BW 83; Lieut. Sachdev, op.cit., p. 900.
36.
Findings, File No. NL 9901; Finding of the Board, File No. NL 9920; Part I1, File No. NL 9950; Report of the Board, File No. NL 9958; Part I1, File No. NL 9967 and Comdr. Harvey, Minutes of the Board, op.cit.
37.
lAD, Vol. I1, No. 8 (22 February 1946), p. 1348.
38.
ibid., Vol. I1, No. 9 (23 February 1946), pp. 1397, 1404.
39.
Wavell, The Viceroy's Journal, p. 215.
40.
Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 22 February 1946, TOP, Vol. VI, p. 1047.
41.
Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, (felegram), 22 February 1946, ibid., p.l049.
42.
Wavell to Attlee, 24 February 1946, ibid., p. 1055. Also Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 22 February 1946, ibid., p. 1048.
43.
Wavell to King George VI, 22 March 1946, ibid., p. 1234.
44.
Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 27 February 1946, ibid., p. 1076.
45.
Same as Notes 42 and 44.
46.
PD, Vol. 419, No. 88 (22 February 1946), Col. 1446.
47.
General Auchinleck to Wavell, 24 November 1945, TOP, Vol. VI, p. 531.
48.
India and Burma Committee IB(45) 7th Meeting Minutes, ibid., p . .501.
49.
Wavell to King George VI, 31 December 1945, ibid., p. 713.
50.
Wavell to Pethick-Lewerence, 5 December 1945, ibid., p. 602.
51.
Wavell, The Viceroy's Jot/mal, p. 185.
52.
G.D. Birla to Henderson, 6 December 1945, TOP, Vol. VI, p. 615.
53.
Sumit Sarkar, Modem India, p. 414.
284
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
54. 55.
This was admitted by Subrata Banerjee in his The RlN Stdke, p: viii. Towards A People's Navy, p. 18.
56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.
ibid., pp. 20-2. PA, 3 March 1946. FPJ, 25 February- 1946. ibid., 20 February- 1946. ibid., 22 February- 1946. ibid., 23 February- 1946.
62.
68.
ibid., 25 February- 1946. BC, 14 March 1946. FPJ, 28 February- 1946. Commissioner of Police to the Secretary-, Home Department, Govt. of Bombay, 20 February- 1946, File No. Home-P.oll(I) 5/21/46. Also Intelligence Bureau: Secraphone Message Received .from Rodger, 3.30 p.m., 21 !':ebruary- 1946, ibid. . BW 85: Lieut. Nanda, op.cit., p. 1001. Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, TOP, Vol. VI, p. 1081. FPJ, 22 February- 1946.
69. 70. 71.
ABP, 23 Fe~ruary- 1946. BJ, 24 February- 1946. Also FPJ, 25 February- 1946. LAD, Vol. Il, No. 8, p. 1347 and No. 9, pp. 1403-5.
72. 73.
ibid .., Vol. Il, No. 8, p. 1351. ibid., p. 1353.
74. 75.
ibid., Vol. Il, No. 9, p. 1397. ibid., p. 1407.
76. 77. 78. 79.
ibid., p. 1421. ibid., p. 1423. Wavell, The Viceroy's Journal, p. 22. Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., p. 1084.
80.
G.M. Nandurkar (ed.), Sardar's Letters pp. 167-8.
81. 82. 83. 84.
M. Gandhi, CW,Vol. 83, p. 206. FPJ, 24 February- 1946 and BC, 27 February- 1946. HT, 3 March 1946. BC, 27 February- 1946. Also ibid., 4 and 11 March 1946; FPJ, 4 March and BJ , 10 March 1946.
63. 64.
65.
66. 67.
Mostly Unknown,
Faces of tlte Elite 85. 86.
87. 88. 89.
90. 9Oa. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 96a. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115.
285
Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., p. 1084. Fortnightly Report for the Sec;:ond Half of February 1946, Bombay, File No. Home-Poll(I) 18/2/46 and Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., p. 1083. Cited in FP!, 2 Mareh 1946. J.L. Nehru, SW, Vol.15, pp. 2-4. ibid., p. 17. ibid., pp. 2-5. ibid., pp. 10-2. ibid., P 13. ibid., p. 22. ibid., pp .. 28-29, 32. FPJ, 27 February 1946. Nehru, op.cit., p. 4. ibid., pp. 21, 28. Sumit Sarkar, 'Popular' Movements and 'Middle Class' Leadership in Late Colonial India, pp 44 ff. Wavell to Attlee, 24 February 1946, TOP, Vol. VI, p. 1055. Gandhi, op.eit., p. 184. ibid., p. 206. ibid., p. 171. ibid., . p. 207. File No. NL 9982. Gandhi, op.cit., .p. 206. Nehru, op.eit., p. 3. Gandhi, op.cit., p. 184. ibid., p. 170. ibid., p. 184. ibid., p. 205. ibid., p. 171. ibid., p. 205. ibid., pp. 219-20. ibid., p. 171. ibid., p. 183. ibid., p. 403. ibid., pp. 183, 243.
286
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in tlte RlN Uprising of February
116.
ibid., p. 403.
117.
BC, 11 March 1946.
118.
Gandhi, op.cit., p. 243.
119.
LAD, Vol. II, No. 8, p. 1348.
120.
ibid., Vol. II, No. 9, p. 1404.
1~ 1.6
121.
JAR, Vol. I, Jan.-June 1946, pp 304-5.
122.
See Note 98, Chapter 7.
123.
BC, 27 February, 1946.
124.
Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., p. 1084.
125.
Sardar's Letters -Mostly Unknown, pp. 167-8.
126.
P.N. Nair, 'The RIN Mutiny in Retrospect', FP!, 18 February 1947.
127.
File No. NL 9982.
128.
Nehru, op.cit., pp. 7-8.
129.
ibid., p. 18.
130.
ibid., p.4.
131.
FP!, 2.March 1946.
132.
ibid., 14-15 March 1946. Also PA, 24 & 31 March 1946 and LAD, Vol. IV, No. 2 (19 March 1946), pp. 2565 ff.
133.
File No. NL 9959.
134.
FOCRIN to FOB, Commodore, Bay of Bengal, Naval Officers-inCharge, Karachi, Cochin, Madras, Vizakapatam, and NFC Andamans, HMIS Kistna, 23 March 1946, File No. NL 9901.
135.
Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 27 February Wavell, The VicelVY's !oumal, p. 281.
136.
~946,
op.cit., p. 1076 and
FOCRIN to FOB and Commodore, Bay of Bengal, 20 March 1946, . File No. NL 9001.
137.
BC, 14 March 1946.
138.
FP!, 4 March 1946.
139.
File No. NL 9987. Also LAD, Vol. II, No. 4 (24 February 1947), p.1049.
140.
FP!, 24 April 1946.
141.
File No. NL 9987.
142.
PA, 17 October 1946.
143.
Nair, op.cit.
Faces of the Elite
287
144.
PA, 20 October 1946.
145.
FPJ, 21 January 1947.
146.
The Statesman, 31 March 1946.
147.
PA, 23 February 1947.
148.
FPJ, 10 February 1947.
149.
PA, 23 February 1947.
150.
Gandhi, op.cit., p. 371.
151.
Nehru, op.cit., p. 101.
152.
Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Pate/'s Con-espondence, V01 t1I, p. 204.
153.
File Nos.·NL 0220 and 9987.
154:
File No. NL 9987.
155.
Same as Note 153.
156.
Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., pp. 1083-4.
157.
A(i;ting Comdr. J.E. Cornish t~ Commodore, Bay of Bengal, 6 March 1946, File No. NL 9903; Finding of the Board, File No. NL 9920; Findings of the Board, File No. NL 9947; Findings, File No. NL 9974 and Findings, File No. NL 9978.
158.
Teodor Shartin, Late Ma/x and the Russian Road, p. 8.
9 THE OTHER RESPONSES
1946 saw India in a state of great tension. The political barometer that year, in Prime Minister AttIee's perception, showed an altogether different reading. It was different from that of '1920 or of 1930 or even of 1942'. The 'tide of nationalism' had spread much beyond its earlier limits. It ran right across the Royal Indian armed forces. l Even during 1942 the services. were almost wholly loyal. But they no longer seemed so to the rulers. The 'old loyalty' seemed to have given way to a new spirit of defiance. This aggravated the already tense political situation in the country. The food crisis, INA trials and labour unrest, especially the threat of a showdown· by the postal and railway workers were a source of great anxiety for the rulers. Added to this were an unprecedented 'strike wave' that hit the armed forces and the popular response it evoked. The Viceroy's private observations, however ironically put, disclosed· his worries, fears and pessimism over these .developments. Wavell wrote in his loumal a day after the outbreak of the RIN strike A day of alarms but not excursions. I saw Porter, all for capitulation to the INA; Bewoor, about a postal strike; Carr, the AOC-in-C, about RIAF mutiny; Griffm and Coman-Smith about a railway strike; finally the C-in-C; most gloomy of all about the RIN mutiny at Bombay and the INA trials ". What a cheerful day - prospect or reality of three mutinies and two strikes!2 and to King George VI about a month later The last three months have been anxious and depressing. They have been marked by continuous and unbridled abuse of the government, of the British, o.f of~cials and police ": by, s~ri~us rioting ill Bombay; by a mut10Y m the RIN, much 1Odlsclpl1Oe in the RIAF, some unrest in the Indidn ArmYjby an unprecedented drought and f(lmine conditions over many parts of In-
The Other Responses
289
dia; by threatened strikes on the Railways, and in the Posts and Telegraphs; by a general sense of insecurity and lawlessness. It is a sorry tale of misfortune and folly.3 The growing tendency among seething Indian service units to break out of barracks into civvy streets·to express solidarity with one another and to establish theiridentity with the people around was 'ugly' for the rulers. Equally 'uglY was the parallel tendency among civilians to reCiprocate, to join hands with their service brethren iri· an 'unusual' manner. The unreliability of Indian forces in the event of any major outbreak, military or Civilian, and 'popular excesses' in such a situation were the matters· that troubled the British much despite their 'detente' with Congress and League.
.I By raising the standard of revolt in February 1946 the RIN subalterns forced themselves on the attention of all like which the service personnel had never done since 1857. The 'mercenary automatons' of an occupation force, as they were called by the nationalist elite, rose as an one man. The publicity their action received in radio news bulletins and press compensated for thdr inability to contact IORs in other wings of HMI services. The story of their initiative, daring and zeal reached the latter. Theirs was an anti-authority, anti-BriHsh struggle; it was a fight for a common cause against a common enemy, understood the men in RIAF and lA. But the ratings were not sure of the impact of their action on the lower formations in these two services. It was when the most critical moment in their struggle arrived that they came to know their mind: the JORs would not allow themselves to be used for suppressing the naval strike. The reassuring news of their protests in and around Bombay started pouring in. In the wake of the RIAF strike, and inspired by it among others, came the 'mutiny' in RJN. NCSC said in a statement: 'Following the example of the brothers in the RIAF we decided to go on strike.'4 And in doing so the ratings sought redress for grievances broadly similar to those of lower formations in the other two Indian services: It was now the latter's turn to come to their aid. Among the first few units to do so were the RIAF camps at
290
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
Marine Drive and Andheri in Bombay. On the fateful day of 21 February when the gun battle at Castles rocked the harbour the Indian airmen from these lmits came out on strike· to express their solidarity with the besieged ratings. They broke .camps anci marched in a procession through the city streets with a blood-stained white flag at its head.s In the morning the service police made a lathicharge on the agitators at Marine Drive. Later they attempted to arrest a few but were stoned and forced to withdraw. By noon the airmen stationed at Santa Cruz downed tools and joined the strike. The agitation spread fairly quickly to various units dispersed all over the country. This time the strike became far more extensive than the one that started at Drigh Road oil 20 January. More significant was the refusal by Indian officers of RIAF to fly. In prepar·ing for an offensive against the ratings who seized warships at anchor in Bombay General Beard, Area Commander, summoned rcinforcem:ents induding bombers; An Indian squadron was then ordered to proceed to the city. But its officers were unwilling to go for such a mission. Those who agreed eventually to pilot the aircraft grounded them halfway at Jodhpur. The ostensible reason was their 'engine trouble'. The flight had to be cancelled in consequence. 6 The communications betweeJ? Air Chief Marshal Keith Park, AA C-in-C and Air Marshal Roderick Carr, AOC-in-C, India, reflected their serious concern over this development. The latter could no longer count upon RIAF squadrons for support in target bombiJ:1g to put down the unrest in the Bombay harbour. In fact; on the morning of 21 February, when the ratings aboard ships seized magazines, loaded guns and got ready for action, the. authorities felt: that bombers might any moment be required to sink the, RIN ships 'in a series of RP attacks'. Though he was· assured of reinforcements by the AA C-in-C, Air Marshal Carr had to raise as many serviceable aircraft as possible from Nos. 45 and 82 RAF squadrons (of which the latter was in a process of disbandment and the former was to be removed to Ceylone) to meet his requirements in Bombay in particular. 7 The RAF bombers did not reach Santa Cruz until late that afternoon. s Had the authorities ventured to mount any' assault on the ships in the meantime, the ratings would have reduced to ashes the whole seafront of the city covered by.big naval guns. It was not
The Other Responses
291
before the neXt afternoon that the RAF bombers carried out the reconnaissance of the harbour area.9
* And like the RIAF personnel Indian troops too could not be trusted for suppressing the strike. The ratings aboard a number of ships and establishments looked to the latter as reinforcement to their cause rather than enemy and fraternized with them. Soon after the deployment of Mahratta Light Infantry guards inside Castles on the afternoon of 20 February a group of ratings were found talking to them. The British guard commander could do nothing to stop it, and eventually had to withdraw the Indian troops from inside the barracks. Next morning the Mahratta soldiers, on being asked to open fire on the ratingS, refused to obey. Finally when they did, tht; shots did not injure or kill the 'mutineers'. Comdr. Streatfield~James in his evidence before the Castles Board of Enquiry said: 'the shots appeared to strike the ground closely in front of the guards'.lO Consequently British troops had to be called in to replace the Indians. The sam~ morning a few Indian army units refused orders in KarachiY Failing to goad them into action against the ratings aboard HMIS Hindustdn the authorities brought in British troops of the Black Watch Regiment and placed them over the jetty alongside the s100p.l2 Latei' a few more units of the Royal Army were concentrated around the wharf. . To the authorities 'the most disturbing feature of all' was the spread of the unrest to those units of the Indian Army which had till then 'been most commendably steady.'l3 At about the same time the RIAF units in Bombay downed tools, the sepoys of RIASC Supply Depot at Kurla stopped work. In the evening that day, 21 February, they commandeered four trucks and 'invaded' the nearest naval establishment HMIS Akbar to convey their support to the ratings on strike. A large number of men came out of its barracks and greeted the sepoys lustily. The situation was disquieting for the Commanding Officer of the establishment. The 'intruders' were 'in truculent mood' and 'insolent' .14 :To his men the arrival of Indian sepoys was a pleasant surprise. It made them feel that they were not lone fighters,
292
Reyisiting Talwar.~ A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
forsaken by their brethren in other services. The ratings took the sepoys inside their barracks and offered them tea. They were promised all possible help and support by the latter. That night a more serious incident took place at RIASC camp atWorli, Koliwada. Already in sympathy with the naval strikers, the sepoys.of GT Company seized the armoury and decided to break out of the camp. Before leaving for the city the party, comprising about 450 men armed with rifles, had an. altercation with Captain Paull who abused them. The officer was chased, and somehow managed to escape on his motorcycle. Thereafter the sepoys ransacked the camp, set fire to many of its tents and drove away in military trucks,15 Following in the footsteps of the men of these camps the sepoys of the Kalyan Supply Depot refused duty from the 23rd morning. But the strike was not confined to RIASC units alone. A case of 'collective insubordination' occurred in a Mahratta Battalion which had just returned from SEAC and disembarked at Bombay. Immediately a number of men including the 'principal ringleaders' were rounded up. Still the rest of the battalion could not be cowed doWn. They appeared as 'adamant' as before, and refused to guard their colleagues under detention. 16 The earliest unit to turn restive in Karachi was the IORs of the Embarkation HQP They learnt about the RIN strike in Bombay on 19 February and heard of the unrest at Manora and Keamari the. next day. Early on' the 21st morning the Embarkation unit struck work. Other Indian units were not unaffected. That night the Embarkation HQ wasdeared of IORs.18 For the next morning offensive against Hindustan the authorities had to depend almost .exclusively on British troops. The spirit of revolt touched many lA units spread .over different parts of -the country besides those near the storm centres of the RIN uprising in Bombay and Karachi. One such unit was the 1386 Indian Pioneer Company at Majerhat" near Behala, Calcutta. 19 It refused work on 24 February. In its defiance of autliority the unit outdid its neighbour, 1519 Indian Pioneer Company which had gone .on strike a day before. 20 . Just a day or two after the ratings surrendered at Bombay
The Other Responses
293
about 300 IORs including all NCOs and 800 ETE civilians of the Secunderabad Command Workshop ceased work, and so did 700 clerks of the Military Finance Department at Ferozepore.21 Later towards the end of the month the same kind of unrer!it affected the army units at Nagpur (military district). It culminated in the men refusing to guard those under arrest for 'military offences' and 'mutinous' assembly in the city.22 Still later the most trusted soldiers of the Indian Army, the Gurkhas, revolted at Dehra Dun. About 800 men including 500 due for release (all belonged to the Ninth Gurkha Rifles Regiment) were involv,ed. At the kit inspection parade Major Wilds and another officer made certain remarks which the men resented. The whole Regimental Centre joined in a protest demonstration."It was then the Adjutant came out with a rifle and threatened the men with violence. This resulted in a melee in which five officers were disarmed and the British ones among them assaulted. The angry Gurkhas burnt out the kit-history documents.23 Among the strikes in lA which came close on the heels of the RIN 'mutiny' and inspired by it, the one by Indian Signal Crops at a Camp near Jubbulpore shot into prominence and received wide publicity. On 27 February after breakfast about 300 men got together and decided to go on strike. In airing their grievances they condemned the firing on RIN strikers, Vice-Admiral Godfrey's haughty attitude towards them and C-in-C's move to victimize. the socalled ringleaders. At about 9.30 a.m. the sepoys' broke out of their barracks and left for the city, four miles away, in a procession with Congress, League and Communist flags at jts head. Hardly had they gone a mile when their officers intercepted them and threatened to fire. This. proved counterproductive: the men refused to turn even a step back. Undaunted they marched ahead. Th~ sepoys had not moved 20 yards further when the officers -'dashed' a 1S-cwt. lorry against them. Two were injured, one seriously on the bead and the other on the hip. Still they did not falter. Failing to drive them back the officers withdrew. On reaching the town the strikers contacted the local political leaders and sought their help. Later in the afternoon they held a meeting at Tilak Maidan and then returned to the lines. All were put under arrest, and the Area Commander came down and asked them to hand over their leaders unconditionally. But the men refused to oblige and placed guards around their comrades for the night.
294
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
Next morning the officers, inCluding the Area Commander, again visited the camp and demanded the unconditional surrender of their 'ringleaders'. The men again refused. Later in the afternoon the officers came, accompanied by British troops. The sepoys resisted the attempt made to segregate their leaders and take them away by force. The British tommies in turn resorted to a bayonet charge and firing. Many were seriously injured. In the scuffle that followed the barbed wire fence around the enclosure where the sepoys were confined gave way, they escaped and made their way into the city. The strikers again approached the 'political leaders with the same request as on the day before but received no different advice: they were asked to return to the lines and maintain peace. The sepoys were assured on the authority of the Divisional Commissioner that if they went' back no action would be taken against them. And then the inevitable happened. Contrary to the promise the men were rounded up immediately on their return and removed to the 27/9 Jat Regiment Field Detention Barracks, six miles away. By the forenoon of 1 March many more sel-JYs from other units stationed at Jubbulpore joined in the strike. A total of 1716 men were involved. Similar 'acts of mutiny' were repeated. Next day those under arrest were taken to another detention camp. The local Congress leaders visited the place to persuade them to give up resistance. The men were shown a letter from Maulana Azad wherein. the Congress President asked them to resume work. They did not return to duty before 6 March, all the while fighting against many odds. Fifty-five men were then segregated for court martial or summary trial. 2A
* The post-RIN wave of unrest affected yet another coercive arm of the colonial state, the police; It led to a series of strikes in the force in late March and April in Delhi, Bihar, Madras, Sind and Bengal. A 'tri-.ial incident', in official version, sparked off 'trouble' in the capital on the evening of 20 March. One among a batch of policemen, on their way back to the lines from duty, had an altercation with the head constable who asked the former to march properly. When the matter was reported to a senior British officer, the accused was assaulted. The incident created much. resentment in the
The Other Responses
295
police lines and the constables decided to protest. Preparations for action were completed during the night: posters were written and distributed, demands formulated and contacts with the colleagues elsewhere established. In the morning the constables boycotted food and refused duty. A number of men broke out of the lines and rushed to the city. Military guards were placed over the armoury and around the police lines. About a dozen men who were believed to have taken a leading part in the day's action were dismissed. By the next morning the 'strike-fever' spread beyond the lines. The men in police stations joined in. The strike was total in the city, "and affected also the suburbs. British troops were called out to do police duties, and they began street patrolling. They took over a number of police stations and occupied strategic points in the capital. Unperturbed the strikers took out a· procession and marched through the city streets. To disperse them the military fired teargas shells and made a bayonet charge. Eventually 86 policemen were rounded up, taken to the Delhi's District Jail and ·made to take off. their uniforms. The hunger strike, nevertheless, continued f()r some more time.2S Towards the end of March and in early April the strike caused a serious disl()cation in the police serviCe in many places of Bihar. The constabulary in Patna, Dinapore, Muzaffarpore, Ranchi, and Bhagalpore went off duty in protest against the existing service cpn,ditions. The Congress ministry was seriously disturbed over the breakdown of the 'law and order' machinery. Party volunteers were asked to step 'into the breach created' by the police constables' strike. 26 Clad in Khadi uniform and Gandhi caps, carrying tri-colour. and proudly displaying INA badges, they joined hands with the authorities to break the strike. A company of the Malabar Special Police Force stationed in Madras went on strike in mid-April. It. was surprising to the authorities given the force~s 'past good record' of service. The government considered the company a 'danger' and decided to disband it. Z7 The police constables in Pacca city, Munshiganj and Bakerganj refused orders as also their counterparts in Karachi.28 EveryWhere the strik~ ers demanded rise in pay and allowances, better rations arid other basic facilities. The source of inspiration for all was the RIN strike. The authorities, however, found, as usual, behind these nothing but the hands of 'scheming malcontents' and sought to tackle them no
296
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
differently from other service strikes.
* In their press communiques or public statements the authorities, civil or military, dismissed as 'malicious and false rumours' much of the discontent and unrest mentioned above. The news of 'mutinous actions' which spilled over the boundary walls of barracks into the civvy streets or took place in full view of the public could not be suppressed and were therefore twisted in a manner that suited them. The best method of verification is to look into the secret official communications, notes or private papers ofthe rulers wherein they were most likely to speak the truth. Much of the foregoing discussion is based on such sources and could be supported further by the secret records which contained official assessments of the reliability of the Indian forces or their various wings. That only those units which turned restive were marked 'unreliable' is clear from what follows. the strikes in the services and police forces made the rulers feel that they could not be depended upon to the s,ame extent as before. In the situation General Auchinleck,. C-in-C, instructed the Director of Intelligence (Military)' to prepare a note on the 'degree of the reliability of the three fighting services' to act in aid of the civil power in the event of widespread anti-government disturbances. The report that Brigadier O'Brien, Director of Intelligence, submitted on 25 ~pril 1946 concluded: First, the great bulk of the Indian Ar-, moured Corps, Guriners, Sappers and Infantry could be depended upon provided their ICOs remained loyal, the standard of pay, amenities and accommodation was high enough to keep the men satisfied and the supply services did not crumble. Clearly the reliability of these units of primarily combatant arms was subject to conditions which were not easy to fulfll. Besides it was considered inadvisable to bring other wings of the Army into direct contact with 'rioters'. The Indian Signal Corps could not be regarded as reliable, as also the Ancillary Services of the Army. No attempt should be made to press them into action against rioters. A number of thein would refuse to do normal duties during anti-government outbreaks. Extra care, it was suggested, should be taken .to ensure the comfort of those engaged in supplying the troops, particularly MT drivers. Sec-
The Other Responses
297
ond, RIN could not be considered reliable, and should not be asked to deal with rioters. Certain elements in shore establishments might prove actively hostile while individual ships' companies might refuse, if called upon, to transport troops. Moreover ICOs in shore establishments in big cities would tend to be less reliable than those aboard ships. Third, the 'staunchness' ofRIAF was doubtful. Its ground crew particularly in or near large towns were unreliable, as also Indian Officers as a class. ~ Some time earlier on a request from the cabinet mission, J A. Thbrne, Home Member, prepared a brief appreciation of the 'staunchness' of the Indian' services if called upon to quell civil disturbances. It was based on his personal knowledge supplemented by various intelligence inputs, including some military intelligence assessments. The picture he painted was 'on the gloomy side': the services which 'were nearly 100 per cent staunch' in the 1942 disturbances 'will not be so on a future occasion'. Loyalty on their part could no longer be taken for granted. In similar disturbances 'qy no means all units could be relied on' and 'there would be a lot of disaffection, and downright mutiny e.g. RIAF, RIN and Signal units'. In\such a situation the police, Thorne added, would not remain unaffected. 'In several provinces there is discontent among the rank and file'. In the event of widespread disturbances 'the police over a large area would . be likely to crack.'30 For the rulers the report of the Chiefs of Staff of 12 June was no less gloomy than the foregoing prepared at a time when the strikes in arined forces were not yet over. The reliability ofRIN and RIAF was assessed in terms similar to thos~ of Brigadier. O'Brien'!i report in late April. The Chiefs were more pessimistic in vi~w of the disaffection in army units which had hitherto been so adinirably 'steady': 'We consider that the reliability of the Indian Army as a whole, including those in garrisons outside India is open, to serious doubt. This even applies to Gurkha units' .31 About two months later a note of the Joint Intelligence Staff on the internal situation in India came up for consideration at a meeting of the Chiefs of the Staff Committee. Asked to comment on one of its conclusions, 'that in the event of civil war, the Indian Armed Forces as a whole cannot be relied on', General ~uchinleck
298
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febnlary 1946
said: as for the current situation in India it was not 'any more dangerous to-day than it had been si?c weeks ago, indeed, it was perhaps a little better'. Still there was no scope for complacence, he added. 'The general situation in India was unpredictable and there were serious potential dangers'. By comparison with the other two services RIAF was 'in the worst position'. A large proportion of the force was 'undisciplined and politically-minded'. General Auchinleck admitted that in the event of serious trouble the entire service 'might collapse'.32 Though the opinion he expressed about the state of morale of the Indian Army at the aforesaid meeting in London was less 'on the gloomy side', C-in-C's note of 5 September attached to the Viceroy's letter to Pethick-Lawrence three days later said: 'the steadiness of the RIN and the RIAF is of lesser import but any general disaffection in them is likely seriously to affect the reliability of the Army.m .
* The strikes by service personnel and police in early 1946 alarmed the British most, and struck hardest at their self-confidence. In fact the rulers admitted that their ability to maintain 'order' in the country which depended largely on the loyalty of Indian troops and police had been seriously impaired. At a meeting with the cabinet delegation on 26 March Edward Benthall said clearly on behalf of the Viceroy's Executive Council: It is not possible for the present government of India to face
the present position with the same confidence as in the past owing to doubt whether the forces behind law and order will do their duty as they had done hitherto in the event of a large scale ... anti-British outbreak. They felt this lack of cpnfidence for the· first time. It is due to the uncertainty of Indian troops and police to whom they must look for defence and support in the future. 34 '{here were few options for the rulers.35 They would have either to try to hold the country by force, using British troops or withdraw from it immediately and unconditionally or to attempt a peaceful settl~ment through negot;ations. Of these alternatives im·mediate and unconditional withdrawal seemed' 'unthinkable' and
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'impracticable' to them. It was considered 'disastrous' and 'even more fatal' to their interests than a policy of repression.36 The difficulty with the latter course was that even if disorders in the form of labour unrest,strikes in vital communication systems or service mutinies were put down by the British troops it would be difficult to govern the country for 'administrative' reasons. Not only considerable reinforcement· of British troops, warships and bombers would be" required but all positions of responsiljlity in the civil administration would have to be in the hands of Bntish officials. Initially the rulers thought that necessary reinforcements from abroad would be forthcoming but soon it became clear that it would not be SO.36a The need to man all important administrative posts by Britons would involve 'British recruitment on a scale never before attempted'. It would be impossible to attract fresh British recruits to Indian services in the present situation. The British officers in HMI services, civil or military, were already 'weary and depressed?7 'A natural pessimism about the future'gripped their mind.38 The administrative machine· .here was 'badly rundown' . Under the. circumstances the alternative to 'sc}lttle' and 'repression', the rulers felt, was to obtain.a political settlement with Congress and League and, pending it, co-qpt their leaders into the government for the intervening period. Its advantages were that the interim government would be better able to maintain law and order. The responsibility of power, Wavell felt, 'would tend to steady the more irresponsible elements of Congress' in particular. It would make t~e leaders more 'realistic' and prevent any violence against the British.39 At the provincial level Congress had already begun to demonstrate its sense. of responsibility and capability as a government party and thereby to' establish itself as the undisputed heir of the present rulers. However the British were more or less convinced that neither Congress nor League had at present any plan for 'dired action', even a non-violent one. Especially 'the danger of a Congress mass movement has receded' .40 Still they could ~ot dismiss the possibility of anti-British outbreak of a much broader and 'worse' variety than that of 1942, independent of the nationalist parties .or leaders or contrary to their wishes. Fearing the breakdown of the administrative machin. ery and the collapse of 'loyalty' in the Indian forces in the face of a large-scale civil disorder the Viceroy spoke more than once of the need for a conti~gency plan involving a, total' British evacuation by
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way of insurance against any such eventuality. Wavell himself drew up plans fo" the safety of British civilians if the worst crisis came about. '
I
There was indeed 'enough material' in the situation for a great conflagration. But pliant and compromising the nationalist leaders preferred negotiations to using this material for a settlement with the British. Like the latter they were afraid of any outbreak and determinded to prevent it. Nevertheless the lower formations in HMI services 'mutinied' time and again in early 1946. The men in the forces knew their limitations: they could riot coordinate the actions. by units of different services dispersed all over the country and link ," , them with popular protests. The national leaders were expected ,to perform the task which they could not. The naval strikers, a rating later said, offered the leaders freedom on a 'gold plate' but it was not to their liking.41 The Congress leaders, orthodox and 'left', Patel and Aruna like, admonished the RIN subalterns for having given their demands a political complexion, asked them to keep peace and ,non-violence and preferred 'neutrality' to intervention in their affair. And when at a very crucial moment of their strike the ratings appealed to the people to come out on a hartal in their support, Congress gave up its 'neutral' stand and advised the people to ignore the call. II
The people of Bombay ignored the advice of Congress leaders instead. So (lid their counterparts in other cities, Calcutta, Madras and Karachi. But what happened in Bombay on 21-23 February 1946 had' few parallels in the history of the country's freedom struggle. Those three days indeed witnessed an unprecedented demonstration of fraternal solidarity by common men on the city street!;. While the Congress High Command in Bombay threw its weight behind the administration, the people rallied unhesitatingly and solidly behind the naval strikers. They paid for it in blood. The toll levied on the city for demonstrating its solidarity with the RIN subalterns was heavy. In a conservative estimate about 270 people were killed and 2,000 wounded. In the words of NCSC's last message: 'For the first time the blood of men in the services and in the streets flowed together in a common cause'.42
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The interest of common men in the affairs of naval strikers goes back to 19 February when the ratings demolished the wall that separated them from the civilians'. On that day hundreds of ·ratings came out of their units and paraded the city streets. They raised slogans for Hindu-Muslim unity and symbolized it with the banners they carried. The people were amazed: they had seen service personnel out on the streets mostly to crush popular protests. Just as the men In uniform had been taught to hate the civilians, the latter looked at them as 'hired assassins' of the government. The ratings, the people understood, were in the midst of a struggle against the common enemy. They lined up the streets and greeted the ratings jubilantly. Many joined them. Next morning the ratings were again on the public thoroughfares. The people out on the streets watched the uprising unfolding , before them and discussed it in small clusters. They.cheered the processions and joined them in more numbers. The city was astir with the slogans they shouted in chorus: 'Hindu-Muslim Ek Ho', 'Down with British Imperialism' and 'Inquilab Zindabad'. In the afternoon the same day the British offensive against the strikers began. The naval authorities sought to confine the ratings in their barracks and posted Mahratta troops at their gates. As soon as the military guards appeared at Talw,!:r its ratings went over a point of the back wall for communications with outsiders. It was christened 'Azad Hind Gate' and a ladder was let down. The Mahratta sentries saw it but did nothing. The news of military deployment had gone round, and sympathetic outsiders knew that no food was being cooked or taken in the messes inside. They did their best to feed the . interned men. Early on the 21st morning the Castles ratings made several attempts to break out of the establishment. Every till.le they tried to force their way through a particular point of exit, the authorities jammed it. In the meantime a large civilian crowd thronged on Mint Road between Town Hall. and Red Cross Depot, and watched the proceedings anxiously. When the ratings rushed towards the' Castle Park entrance, the military stood again in their way. It was then that . the besieged men attacked the military posts with whatever missiles they could lay their hands on. And the civilian crowd joined in. The
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British Major in command of the force, among others, was injured. On the ratings' refusal to bow to Commander Streatitield-l ames' warning firing started. The prolonged exchange of tire· between the inen inside Castles ~nd the besieging troops caused intense excitement in the city. The thud and rattle of rifles and machineguns and the detonation of hand grenades brought more and inore people near the. spot. Ctowds gathered round Town Hall, anxious about the fate of the ratings behind the barricade. While the fighting was raging at the establishment, the military authorities cleared Elphinstone- Circle, the Town Hall area and roads round about Castles of all civilians and traffic. The entire place was cordoned off, and the mint and dockyard workers were sent away. By the time the news of the pitched battle in the harbour reached the areas beyond Fort. In the afternoon the people saw further preparations to' put into action Vice-Admiral Godfrey's . threat of blowing up the entire navy; they saw British military' rein'forcements pouring in at. Town Hall which had been turned into the 'Advance Headquarters' of the Southern Command. Annoyed with it 'the people plunged headlong into action. They did not wait for the national leaders to intervene; they could and did act for themselves. The British offensive that began the day before was intended to isolate the ratings and 'prevent them from having any access to food from outside'. But the people of, Bombay. saw through the game. They rushed to the ,aid of the beleaguered ratings. The 21st afternoon witnessed a remarkable scene ofi fraternization on the seaf~ ront around the Gateway of India. The civilians from all walks of life crowded the place', with food packets, and the shopkeepers offered them whatever they could for the rat.ings. The men from ships came ashore in naval boats, exchanged greetings with the people and went back with gifts from them. The Mahratta troops patrollihg the seafront from Colaba to Ball~rd Pier saw it but did l1(~f object. Next m9rning the civilians again brought. food for the ratings but were driven away by ,the British tommies wholl~d· in the meantime replaced the Indian troops. The strikers who tried to land ashore were turned back. The heat cif the gun battle at Castles on the 21st morning spread to the civilian part of the city by the evening. While the day's' battle Scene and the waterfront looked quiet, the Fort area was in a
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different mood. It turned restive, with the people and the police clashing. While negotiations were on at Castles, the dockyard workers and others in sympathy with the naval strikers took out a procession. As they marched on, more and more people joined them and the procession swelled up. Vehicular traffic came to a halt. The demonstrators appealed to the shopkeepers to put down the shutters of their establishments and observe a hartal in protest against the military attack on Castle Ba"acks. The arrival of the police changed the situation. It ignited the violence it was supposed to quell and had no dearth of justification for the use of guns. It opened fire ostensibly to disperse the crowds in three places, Kalbadevi, Girgaon and Dhobi Talao. Many were hit by bullets and one was killed. This enraged the people. Barricades came up and the police were attacked from behind them. Street lights were smashed and window panes of shops, still open, broken. Public vehicles were set on fire. A government grain shop was looted and a post office attacked. Tram tracks were ripped llP and bonfires lit. The workers on night shift duty in 14 textile mills struck work. 43 An uneasy calm prevailed after midnight. Late that night the people came to know of Sardar Patel's appeal to them not to observe hartal the next day. But they were in no mood to listen. The bonfires and boulders on the roads indicated clearly that the people were not going to submit to force. 22 February was Bombay'sD-Day. Nearly 300,000 millhands downed tools in support of the naval strikers. All factories, railway workshops and tramway depots were empty. The workers came out 'voluntarily and marched through the streets. They went round the city from Muse',\m in the south to Matunga in the north, a distance of 10 miles, shouting slogans and calling upon the people to make the hartal successful. Office employees, small shopkeepers, students and men from other walks of life including beggars and urchins joined in the protest marches. The city transport system, rail, tram and bus services; collapsed. By noon the hartal was total. The Fort area which had remained unaffected during the previous hartals turned out to be the storm centre of the morning's .disturbances. The trouble began on Pherozeshah Mehta Road, a prominent business centre, when a military lorry with a British soldier at its wheel drove into a procession of dock workers, knocking down two. A crowd collected and attacked the police party which ap-
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peared on the scene soon after. The latter fired, injuring two more persons. Infuriated the crowd set fire to two military lorries parked on Waudby Road. White civilians were assaulted and their cars set ablaze on Hornby Road. The people in European costumes drew the wrath of the crowd: their hats and ties were snatched away and burnt. The situation at the junction of Pherozeshah Mehta Road and Hornby Road turned very serious around mid-day. Here the police resorted to firing at short intervals. In retaliation the crowd attacked them with what they could. They smashed the windowpanes of European-owned shops, establishments and banks, and burnt their furniture, books and ledgers. Around 11.30 a.m. a battalion of British troops was pressed into action: mobile columns including armoured cars appeared on the scene.44 Business houses; offices and shops in the area closed before mid-day. Banks stopped transactions, declared half holiday and put down their shutters. By then the news of policemilitary atrocities spread everywhere. For several hours Bombay witnessed an unending and one of the most fierce mass furies, involving frequent clashes with the police and military. The disturbances gradually spread to the congested part of the city, all the way from Fort to Mahim.The Muslim loc(!.lities, which had been relatively quiet during the disturbances before, came to the forefront of agitations this time. The united actions of Hindus and Muslims frightened the authorities. Government grain shops were looted. Post offices were set on fire. Police chowkies were burnt to ashes and military vehicles gutted. Trams and buses were set ablaze. Policemen were assaulted, stripped of their uniforms and their arms snatched.45 By the evening two battalions of Br~tish troops went into action,46 and this brought about an intensification of popular violence. In fact the military lorries ran amok through the city streets, firing indiscriminately. Even women and children standing in milk queues, men sitting at tea stalls, tailors working at sewing machines and cobblers mending shoes were not spared. Mass shooting took place at Lal Baug and Poibawdi, an working-class area of Parel.47 The people did not take the brutal assault lightly. At many places they put up determined resistance in spite of heavy firing. 48 Barricades were erected with everything that was found on the streets. Most of the roads from the north of the city to Fort lay blocked.
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i Barricades once removed by the military were erected again by the . crowds. While the authorities sought to crush the protest by force, . the people resisted, trading stones and brickbats for bullets. The armed forces attacked the unarmed people from speeding lorries and left. Initially in contrast to this cowardice the crowds in a number of places gave frontal battle to the enemy armed to the teeth. At De Lisle Road, for example, the angry workers engaged a large posse of armed police in a head-on collision for three and a half hours. Later the people increasingly took to hit-and-run attack. In a short space of time nearly a hundred laid down their lives and a thousand suffered injuries. It was a story of unparalleled heroism on the part of workers and common men of the city.
Curfew was clamped on the disturbed areas of the island .between 9 pm and 6 am, arid armoured cars, bren-gun carriers-r'and tanks patrolled the streets. Still outbreaks of popular violence took place in more than one district at night.49 From one end of Bombay to the other fires smouldered in the middle of the roads, and the city presented a beleaguered and battle-scarred look. . Next morning the streets were deserted and eerily silent. Only a few stray pedestrians and cyclists were seen straggling along them. Shops and stores were closed, and there was no traffic even in posh localities. The quiet, however, was shor:t-lived. Slowly crowds began to collect on the streets. The curfew prevented many localities from getting their morning papers until very late, and the people lined up the road eagerly awaiting the first newsboy. The papers reported that NCSC had decided at the instance of Sardar Patel and Jinnah to call off the strike. The news was unbelievable for many. Some rushed to the Gateway of India to verify it for thems~lves, and found black flags flying on a number of ships in the harbour. But no one was willing to resume normal activities. The labourers stayed away from their workplaces. They were determined to avenge the wound or death inflicted on their friends and relatives. A cry rose from the crowds everywhere: 'On to barricades'. Hindus and Muslims, workers and common men, all moved on to barricades, and began their battles with the military and police again. As the day advanced disturbances occurred at many places in the city. Unlike the day before Fort was relatively quiet. The storm
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centres shifted from the southern part of the island to the workingclass areas in the north. The trouble enveloped the entire stretch from Crawford Market to Khar Road, a suburb of Bombay. Fresh battles raged in the most densely populated localities. More disquieting for the administration was the concentrated attacks on foreignowned textile mills, railway stations and trains, over and above the last day's targets. Barricades were raised on trunk roads and reinforced with iron railings, telegraph and lamp posts, huge boulders and uprooted trees. 'Shoot-at-sight' by the military and dauntless resistance by the people characterized the day's proceedings~ From the morning till late at night the distance ·of about a mile and a half from Tilak Bridge to the Mahim Bus Terminus was the scene of a 'regular warfare' between the military and the people. The people blocked the highway leading to several military barracks in the north. Many police and military vehicles, banks and government grain shops were attacked along Sandhurst Road, Ripon Road, Northbrooke Gardens, Abdus Rehman Street and Kolbadevi Road. Shivaji Park at Dadar was the focal point of disturbances at mid-day. Tensions mounted in the locality after 11 0' clock. Angry over the last day's firing in the mill area a huge army of labourers, several thousand strong, smashed a petrol pump, fetched oil from it and set fire to Kohinoor Mills (No. 3) and Usha Wollen Mills owned by Killick Nixon & Co. Mayer Sassoon and Century Mills were also attacked. The entire area up to Dadar railway station presented the appearance of a blazing furnace as military lorries, gunny bags of shops and furniture of the railway station were set on fire. The military opened fire repeatedly on the crowds that reassembled after each volley of shots. A crowd of 3,000 people attacked a police party near Mahim, half a mile north of Shivaji Park. Inspector Thomas of the Mahim Police Station was caught, severely belaboured, tied to a tree and was about to be burnt alive with kerosene. Some other officers and men were stripped naked, forced to part with their weapons and beaten up, while still others were made to crawl. The police quarters at Two Tanks were attacked by a crowd. The tenements were sacked and furniture and utensils thrown Into the streets. A similar incident took place at Null Bazar.5o A number of trains on the BB and Cl lines between Dadar and Mahim were set on fire. The railway stations at Mahim and Matunga were attacked and set ablaze. As the evening advanced the situation in many localities wors-
The Other Responses
307
ened, and disturbances spread to Khar Road near J uhu, 15 miles away from Fort. At Kamatipura crowds placed barricades on fifteen different lanes and bylanes to prevent police and military vehicles from entering the locality. The shops of Marwari moneylenders were burnt thereafter. The Hindu and Muslim working-class and lower middle-class people inhabiting the area between Kamatipura and Madanpura manned the barricades to defend the honour of the killed or wounded. The military fired here wildly as elsewhere to strike terror but the people did not seem to be pimicky or confused. The troops were held back by roadblocks and faced stones, sodawater bottles and other missiles. The street lamps were broken, and the task of the troops was made difficult at night. Baffled the military sprayed bullets all round and went away. Three battalions of British troops, in addition to the huge police force, were out to tackle the unarmed people on the third day of the disturbances.sl No less than 150 deaths were added to the last day's toll of civilian life and the number of injured rose to over 1500. The police too suffered heavy casualties: four constables died and 175 were wounded of whom 40 were officers. The service casualties were not disclo'sed. Superseding the previous day's curfew order the Commissioner of Police issued another for eleven hours from 7-30 pm to 6.30 am The aritish troops with armoured cars, brengun carriers and tanks were on ro~ds at night. The ~ill area was particularly heavily guarded. Still for several hours after the curfew came into force the unrest continued. The approaches to public thoroughfares remained bottled up in the north. Fires raged in many areas in that part of the city. Roads were strewn with rubbles, stones, drums, dustbins, wirefencing and furniture. Gutted cars, lorries, railway coaches and tram sheds stood as evidence of the mass fury which had no precedent in the city's living memory. The 24th morning' was quieter than the last. But tension was yet to subside, and the authorities feared fresh disturbances in the northern part of the island. A virtual 'steel ring' was placed around the entire city in the morning. Large contingents of troops arrived in Bombay from outside. Lorries full of British tommies with drawn bayonet patrolled the city. Tram and bus services were still paralyzed outside Fort. Streets were empty of pedestrians. Towards mid-day and again in the afternoon the police and military fired at Dadar, Shivaji Park and Thakurdwar.
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The workers' protest against the military atrocities in the north continued. An overwhelming number of millhands abstained from work. Only 16 mills worked in the morning, five with full comple,ments arid eleven. partially. Out of them one working fully closed down at 11 am and five working partially" after about an hour. The workers picketing in front of Spring Mills were fired upon by the police. The situation in mill areas became tense after noon-recess. By the time the rest of the mills closed down.52 For the last two days the Bombay police were on the run and under the protection of British troops. Now as the danger of popular violence seemed to be receding they came out with a vengeance. They forced passers-by to remove roadblocks and harassed those who were unwilling. From noon they started swooping on the chawls in mill areas, beating up their inhabitants indiscriminately and arresting anyone they felt like. Police terror notwithstanding many workers refused yet again to resume duty next morning. Not all the mills could work with full complements on 25 February.
* The people's response to the call of the naval strikers went far beyond the latter's expectations. It was not confined to a hartal. The popular protest overflew its original objective and merged with others. The boundary between different demands and struggles tended to dissolve. The people seized the occasion for mounting a massive, violent assault on the symbols of enemy authority. In so far as it aimed at demolishing the insignia and instruments of colonial power the popular protest was political and anti-imperialist in esse,nce. The police chowkies symbolized in the minds of the people the presence of an intrusive, coercive state power. They attacked and destroyed as many of them as they could. Policemen's arms were seized and their uniforms, stripped from them, burnt. They were beaten and tied up. The harassment,zulum and cruelty the policemen perpetrated often at the prompting of their European bosses were now practised on' them. The less conspicuous 'symbols of state power like post offices, banks and railway stations and their flies, records and other instruments were not spared by the crowds. Official statistics give a rough
The Other Responses
309
idea of the extent of mass fury oil 21-23 February 1946. Around a dozen police chowkies were burnt down. Out of a total 77 post offices in the city 17 were gutted and 7 damaged otherwise.53 About a dozen banks were damaged or destroyed.54 Included. among 300 vehicles, both public and private, destroyed during those tumultuous days were a fairly large number of military and police lorries and vans.ss Of the railway stations attacked by the crowds the stationmaster's office, booking-counter and passengers' shelter at Matunga were destroyed and of the bogies two gutted.56 The scale of popular violence in Bombay in those three days, said an official report, was 'without parallel in the history of the city'.57 The people enlarged the scope of their protest to include. everything connected with foreign domination and detestable to them. All that symbolized this connection indeed came in for attack. Foreign-owned mills and business establishments were among the tar~ gets of popular violence. Foreign-owned shops and showrooms were stoned and smashed. Foreigners, civilian or service personnel, were chased and assaulted; their cars were attacked or destroyed, and their hats and ties were torn and flung into bonfires. The selection of the objects of attack or the sense of discrimination shown by "the crowds in this regard was striking. Not all those who drove through the city streets (on the first day of disturbances) were attacked indiscriminately. Every passing vehicle was intercepted by the crowds. The Indian occupants were allowed to proceed if they shouted 'Jai Hind' and often warned of the dangers ahead.ss But the foreigners were not spared. Only in cases where the crowds were informed of their nationality they let the non-British white men go unharmed.59 What was more disturbing to the rulers as also to the rich was the looting of foodgrains and cloths. As many as 64 government grain shops were looted in Bombay in three days. Added to them were 30 other shops. The list included government-approved cloth stores and shops owned by Marwaris and wealthy merchants. 60 In official communiques much of the looting was immediately attributed to gangs of habitual criminals. They were said to have taken advantage of the disorder and indulged in senseless looting and destruction. This explanation was disputed by an 'eyewitness' who wrote in The Bombay Chronicle of 2 March 1946: it was not the 'goonda' elements but the 'hungry and starved' who were chiefly responsible
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for the looting. It was these 'unfortunates' who raided grain shop after gr~in shop 'systematically' and distributed the loot among themselves. 'The compelling force in their case was the urgent need to satisfy their hunger. With our hard-worked yellow "pagries" often looking the other way in sheer helplessness when the avalanche of grain-lifters swarmed a shop, hungry mouths had temporarily a joyful time of it'.61 The 190ting was different from common crime in the sense that it was public and collective in its modality. Moreover, the number of people involved in the cases of looting of grain shops and cloth stores suggested that these were acts of popular protest against food scarcity, ration-cut and rising prices of cloth. The incidents of looting 'were definitely associated with such harsh conditions but were by no means an automatic reflection of the same. These were conscious acts on the part of the people intent upon punishing those who were responsible for scarcity and profiteering and protecting their interests. These were acts of destruction, reprisal and selfdefence on their part. Those who had mos~ to loose from these soon grasped their significance. To them the looting was not mere a crime but something more. They sensed the threat it posed to their property or interests. 'The rich ... were definitely afraid that should the food situation become acute their houses will be looted and there will be a disastrous orgy of mob violence in Bombay', said an intelligence report. 62 Against the dastardly attack of British military hooligans on unarmed men, women and children the workers and lower-class people of Bombay put up a heroic resistance. In fighting off these forces they showed marvels of initiative, daring and resourcefulness. Faced with an enemy incomparably superior in arms and supply the crowds organi:z;ed themselves in small groups and operated from widely dispersed 'action stations'. They developed their own warning systems: shrill whistles from men posted at the corners of streets warned of the arrival of military and police, and the crowds vanished into the lanes. Except for barricades the roads were free of obstruction and the 'formed bodies' of troops on foot or in lorries walked or drove into the traps. Suddenly stones came whizzing by but no one could be spotted. The enraged troops let loose a hailstorm of machinegun fire and then left. The barricades that the people threw up were well sited and covered by supporting 'fire' (in the form of sodawater bottles and brickbats). The military lorries again came
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311."
rumbling along, and the troops smashed a barricade or two. In no time they were attacked from all sides and particularly from rooftops. It was impossible for the soldiers to stand in their lorries in the midst of exploding bottles and a rain of stones. The 'enemy' was invisible. The manhunt in nearby buildings proved futile: the people hit the troops and disappeared down the side-streets or lanes. No sooner had the military left than the crowds reassembled, reerected and reinforced the barricades and stood ready in their improvised 'fortresses'.63 At sunset they destroyed street lamps (2200 of them in an official estimate64), plunging many areas into darkness. While it was impossible for the military to negotiate the narrow lanes and bylanes and act effectively, the people in the know of the terrain operated as easily as in daytime and hardly missed their targets. Military vehicles parked on the streets were set ablaze and police chowkies destroyed. Bonfires were lit, among other things, with wooden planks from the walls of the police outposts. It was as if the people were celebrating the cremation of the enemy.
* 'The Bombay riots', in a military assessment, 'arose suddenly' and were of ... fierce violence'. They were 'unusual' in the suddenness with which they became intense.6S More so, for the crowds could not be said to have been led by communal instincts or ethnic or kinship loyalties. They seemed to have transcended all such barriers, if only for a tiple, and identified themselves with the naval 'mutineers'. To the authorities crowd mobilization or action was incomprehensible except in terms of rumours spread by mischief-makers, their manipUlation or conspiracy. The guardians of law and order were caught unprepared. The forces at their disposal were inadequate to put down 'disorders' in the harbour and outside simultaneously. They were baffled by the· swiftness and inteasity of popular violence. This, 'combined with the fact that the RIN commitment had used up trQ.ops who would normally have been immediately available to assist the police', admitted the authorities, 'allowed the initiative in the early stages to pass to the rioters'; The problem war; compounded by the unreliability of' Indian troops. All this called for the deployment of a large number of British troops later to 'restore order'.6S a Struck by the virulence of
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attacks from the civilian sympathizers of the RIN strikers the authorities gave the incendiary police and military free hand in suppressing them. The forces acted hysterically; they indulged in wanton killing and reprisal. The panicked military deployed tanks, besides armoured cars and brengun carriers, to tackle an unarmed people. The British authorities understood in the forenoon of 21 February itself that the naval 'mutineers' in possession of the men-ofwar could not be subdued by force without the life and property in the city being exposed to their fire. The disposition of the ratings manning the 'action stations' aboard them suggested that they were ready to repulse any attack from the military ashore. The ships, as they were positioned in the harbour, could blow up a considerable portion of the city with their big guns. The authorities therefore refrained from mounting any assault on them like the one on HMIS Hindustan in Karachi. They planned to starve. the ratings into submission and accordingly posted British troops in place of their Indian counterparts all along the seafront. At the same time the show of their might to overawe the naval subalterns continued. But with the people coming out in defence of the RIN strikers the situation changed greatly. It became urgent to ensure the ratings surrendered so that the civilians did not have to be fought simultaneously. The strategy hence was to end the naval strike quickly and then crnsh the popular protest. In this move the British found a wilting collaborator in the . Congress leadership in particular. The Congress leaders had been in touch with the British authorities in Delhi and Bombay since the beginning of the naval strike. While they let the rulers know of their disapproval of the ratings' action, their public stance until 21 February was one of 'neutrality' and 'non-intervention'. After the naval strikers took to arms and appealed to the people to support them through a hartal, the Congress leaders, especially Patel, in abandoning this stand, asked the people to desist from any 'stoppage' of 'normal business' and maintain peace. At the same time the Sardar sent Colville a message informing him of the advice he gave to the people and assuring all help to prevent disturbances in the. city.66 Notwithstanding Patel's 'injunction' the people supported the naval strikers in an unprecedented manner. Hindus and Muslims, workers and common men in Mad~mpura, Bhendy Bazar and Shivaji Park, in fact everywhere in the city embarked on a united defence of the ratings' cause. The entire me-
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tropoIls, especially its labour areas were afire with a unique spirit of resistance. So far the Congress leaders assisted the rulers by refusing to intervene in the ratings' favour and opposing their hartal call. Now after the people came out on the streets to fight battles with the police and military, the authorities urgently needed their help in getting the ratings back to work.To facilitate their effort to persuade them to surrender C-in-C made a non-victimization assurance to Maulana Azad. On the 22 evening Patel intervened to induce the ratings to lay down arms on the same terms as demanded by the authorities. That very day the Sardar's trusted lieutenant PatH met the Governor and so did Chundrigarh, provincial chief of League, to convey 'their anxiety to allay disturbances' and offer 'the help of volunteers to assist the police'.67 Next morning as soon as NCSC's surrender decision came to be known, several lorry loads of Congress 'peace' volunteers went round the city exhorting the people to call off the hartal, resume normal work and eschew violence. 68 A similar appeal was made by the League National Guards. Neither dared to call what was going on in the city 'hooliganism' or 'goondagiri'. The crowds in many places asked them to preach peace and non-violence to the military and police.{/} The 'peace brigades' of Congress and League were not effective but made an encouraging 'gesture' to the authorities which" had unleashed a reign of terror in the city. The greatest service was rendered by Patel who made the ratings surrender unconditionally and sought thereby to kill the issue before the eivilian protesters. The people were told: now that the ratings had gone back to work and their grievances were being attended to, they had no reason to continue the protest. The end of the RIN strike enabled the authorities to settle scores with the ciVilians separately. It largely freed the military from the 'RIN commitment' - it could now go ahead full steam with repression. In fact 23 February was a field day for the military: its atrocities increased in intensity. One more battalion was added to the two of the day before, and they were given liberty to 'shoot at sight'. A bullet or more for anyone within sight became the rule of the day. Later in the House of Commons Tom Driberg, a Labour MP, asked the Under-Secretary of State for India a number of questions about the indiscriminate firing, particularly its incidence near the corner of Elphinstone Road and Suparibaug Road in the afternoon of 22 February. Arthur Henderson, on the basis of C-in-C's report,
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replied: 'Throughout the incident the civil police and troops acted in the right of self-defence, and for the purpose of checking looting and arson'.70 Driberg considered C-in-C's testimony 'naturally whitewashing' and refused to accept it 'weightier ... than the statement of an eyewitness officer'.71 He pursued the matter doggedly, and persuaded Henderson to make further investigations. Subsequently in a letter to him the Under-Secretary admitted that 'there was no looting and arson' anywhere near the place of shooting and apologized for 'the House being misinformed'. More significant and revealing was the last paragraph of his letter: You may like to know that representations have been made locally to the present government of Bombay regarding the alleged indiscriminate use of firearms during the disturbances on February 22, but that the government have informed those concerned that they do not propose to institute a further enquiry into the firing. Henderson addressed the question to Driberg and others like him, who insisted on a thorough enquiry into the Bombay firings: Why do you fellows keep saying the firing was indiscriminate and demanding an enquiry, when the elected government of the people of Bombay 'itself turned down the demand for an enquiry?72 The British rulers had no difficulty in defending their policy by reference to the views of the Congress ministers in Bombay. RC. Kher and Morarji Desai were safely quoted to silence their critics at home. The Congress leaders now in office had indeed no wish to undermine the efficiency and morale (as per colonial codes) of the repressive forces by holding any enquiry into their excesses or to cause any rupture in their policy and practice by introducing any reform in these organizations. They had no qualms to defend the atrocities committed by these forces and consolidate their hold over them (in their non-transformed colonial form) as independence neared. III
The mass upsurge behind the RIN strike in all major cities 'and in the countryside too in a lesser degree>73 again proved that the people are determined to resist imperialist violence against any sec-
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{ion of them, be it in the services or outside, even if none of the nationalist parties called upon them to. The popular masses did so repeatedly since the end of the war. Consequently, the British faced the legitimacy crisis on a scale and frequency as never before. The rulers could no longer handle the situation with the same cop.fidence as in the past and their grip over the country was weakening fast. Immediately 'a change of government at the centre' was considered imperative. A 'more representative' government 'was necessary both to deal. with the law and order situation and to tackle economic problems'. In so speaking to the cabinet delegation on behalf of his colleagues in the Viceroy's Executive Council Edward Benthall maintained emphatically that 'negotiations must succeed and we must refuse to permit a breakdown'.74 Later Wavell expressed himself similarly in favour of a political agreement. This insistence came of the realization that if the country lapsed into 'chaos' Britain would lose investment, trade, strategic advantages and 'prestige' .75 The reasons behind British commitment to 'peace' and negotiations are obvious. The rulers intended to withdraw with the least loss;76 they were anxious to secure the best possible terms for an honourable retreat. Congress and League were as anxious to have power for themselves and wanted an atmosphere suitable for it. Convinced of the imminence of British withdrawal they were eager to take over intact the apparatuses of the colonial state, repressive or otherwise. Understandably to plunge the country or its services into disorders ran counter to their interest just as to the British.77 Anyone who seemed out to do so was their common foe. In fact when the British let loose repression on the civilian sympathizers of the RIN strikers, both Congress and League concurred readily and willingly. Their role amounted to a conscious subversion of autonomous popular initiative. 'The present policy of the Congress', declared its President, Maulana Azad in December 1945, 'is to maintain peaceful undisturbed conditions in the country and to fight the elections',18 After Prime Minister Attlee announced in Parliament his government's decision to send out a cabinet delegation to negotiate a transfer of power to Indian hands, the Congress leaders began to speak of the need for peace more strongly than ever before. Sure of the sincerity of the mission they urged the people not to do anything that might prejudice the success of negotiations with it. The Congress indeed
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ruled out demonstrations, strikes, processions and hartals as being totally unwarranted. In the past it used such forms of struggle to the extent these were necessary to put pressure on the British for concessions. But this tactical requirement no longer existed. Any antigovernment outbreak now irritated the Congress leaders extremely, and they reacted to it much like the British. As hinted before, stunned by the extent and intensity of the popular protest the British officials came to stress a conspiracy behind it. They called the civilians who rose to defend the naval ratings 'dangerous mobs', 'hooligans' or 'riff-faft" of the streets. Prone to crime these elements, in their view, perpetrated the .various acts of violence which caused the loss of life and property in Bombay. Susceptible to manipulation they were 'incited' by 'leftwing Congress and Communists against the intention of more responsible leaders.>79 No wonder the explanation offered by Patel and Gandhi among these 'responsible leaders' was attuned to the same preconception of conspiracy. They too reduced the popular action in defence of the RIN strikers to the level of street hooliganism or goondaism committed at the instigation of left-wingers within their party or outside. But facts tell us a different story. On 21 February CPl sponsored NCSC's call for hartal but the next day appealed to those who had reacted violently to the military atrocities 'to give a peaceful expression' to their protest.so It looked to the Congress leaders particularly for support even after the latter's public disapproval of the ratings' call for bandh. Later the CPI leadership stated very categorically that the party organized 'political' propaganda and demonstrations in support of the naval strikers and nothing else. To say that the protest of hundreds of thousands of people all over Bombay was. their work, besides being a travesty of truth; was too adulatory to the Communist leaders. They decried much of this protest and approved of only 'political demonstrations'. They claimed credit for the latter and distanced themselves from the 'excesses'. Dange's statement of 25 February strongly condemned what he called 'anti-social hooliganism'.SI The Communist leaders indeed found no expression of protest in the attacks on banks, burning of post offices or looting of grain shops, and were opposed to such acts of 'hooligaism' much like the other 'responsible' leaders. Amid disturbances in the city G. Adhikary proposed the formation of a committee to restore peace
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and arrange relief.& In Karachi the Communist leaders sat with their Congress and League counterparts at Swaraj Bhawan on 23 February to decide on the measures for restoring peace there. Their 'peace vans' went round the city as did the latter's. The CPI leaders abandoned their programme of protest that day in deference to the alarm raised by the authorities and apprehending popular excesses.83 But the workers and. common men of the city carried on despite DM's prohibitory order and repressive measures and their leaders' hasty retreat. The Bombay Committee of CPI knew the mind of the workers of the city and dared not to ask them to return to duty until 24 February. That day it joined Congress and League in asking their resumption of work. Aruna Asaf Ali's telegram to Nehru gives a hint of the role the leftists of her variety wanted the party leaders to play in the Bombay disturbances. She solicited their intervention 'to save the situation'. On 23 February Aruna pleaded for the lifting of the ban on public m~etings so that the leaders could explain to the people why they should desist from what she called provoking military violence'.84 Next day at a press conference she clarified her position: the workers were determined to go on strike, and under the circumstance she wanted the party to direct their protest through peaceful channels. If Congress had been in it, the 'goonda elements' would not have been able to begin looting, burning and destruction. Aruna resented that even after the people defied its 'mandate' the party did not intervene. Had it deployed its 'peace brigades' much of the 'hooliganism' could have been prevented.ss But, as stated before, the Congress High Command in Bombay did send out 'peace brigades' in an effort to stop violence. So did the League leaders. B.u~ in vain. The people began their protest against the advice of Congress and League and continued it in spite of the efforts of their 'peace volunteers'. The rapidity with which popular violence spread in the city and the extensiveness of the 'damage' done by it in a very short time, said an official report, frightened the leaders.86 The 'prosperous' localities which had hitherto been free from 'trouble' saw a lot of it this time. 'The scope of the distur:bances in Bombay and the very serious threat to property', wrote Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence on 27 February, 'have ... alarmed a good many in the Congress and the Muslim League'.87 The volunteers of both the
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parties did the rounds of the city, especially its working-class areas, calling upon their inhabitants to keep peace. In addition the Congress labour leaders tried. to get the millhands back to work. But it proved 'totally ineffective'.BB An important Muslim Leaguer was quoted, in an intelligence report, to have said that 'he has never known such extreme bitterness in Bombay and that the disturbances prove that the Congress and the League no longer have any real control over the lower classes'.f!B Among the Congress leaders Patel in particular exerted himself most to prevent the hartal and then to bring the situation under control. The Sardar in company with a few of his colleagues moved round the city, personally appealing to the people to restore 'order'. But Patel; Patil and others were 'evidently out of touch with the mood of the public' who decided· their own form of protest.90 Later in a statement to the foreign press the Sardar expressed his resentment thus: 'The populace ... brushed aside the wise counsels of leaders who love liberty no less than they'.91 In Patel'sview it was sheer 'infantilism' to indulge in violence now. Still the people turned violent against the authorities to his utter chagrin. Anti-British outbreaks occurred time and again over the last few months, and the Sardar repeatedly censured the people for the 'disgraceful exhibition' of violence.92 The Congress leaders' anxiety over the situation stemmed from their fear of losing gi-ip over it. Sardar Patel's apprehension was reflected in his letter to Khurshedbehn Naoraji of 24 February: 'The more we are approaching near freedom, the more troubles we see coming over the surface. It is difficult to say where this will lead to'.93 Power, so near at hand, might slip out of its grasp. Determined to put an end to 'indiscipline and violence' at a time when the transfer of power seemed so imminent Sardar Patel and, for that matter, the Congress High Command in Bombay supported the authorities in their efforts to stamp out 'lawlessness' in the city. The SardaI; was in full agreement with the rulers' stand that 'wild mobs', unamenable to law, would have to be subjected to it by force. What the civilian sympathizers of the RIN strikers did in Bombay, Patel felt, could not be tolerated. The police proved unable to tackle them and had to be 'replaced by a heavy military force'. The latter had to be deployed to stop the 'ghastly crimes' of burning, wrecking and looting. The Sardar wrote to Gandhi: 'If, under such
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circumstances, they had to call for military, futile it was to lay blame on them.'94 In his public utterances Patel equally bluntly justified the military action.9s Just as the government attempted to whitewash its .sin in the name of suppressing disorders, similarly the Sardar sought to explain it away as the inevitable consequence of 'ugly hooliganism'. In his logic the hartal led to violence which in turn caused the military firing. Thus he legitimized the mass murder in Bombay and excused its real perpetrators. Patel's wrath was rather reserved for the people who refused to sit in cowardly silence when the authorities began a military offensive against the ratings and threatened to rage the entire navy to the ground, the people who in utter disregard of his 'wise counsels' came out on an all-out-strike and hartal and braved its consequences. Although he, like the Socialist Masani,96 accused the Communists of giving a 'wrong lead', the Sardar knew that the popular protest broke out on its own. The initiative and organizational capacity shown by the workers, common men and students 'alarmed and surprised' the Congress leaders most. Angry and disturbed, Patel issued a stern warning to them all. They were forbidden to initiate any action independent of 'recognized leaders'. All were asked to scrupulously follow the lead of Congress 'which knew when to fight and when to negotiate', and abide by its instructions in spirit as well as in letter.97 Nehru was no less aware than a 'sensible' Patel of the danger of autonomous popular initiative and the need to kill it. He was no less convinced of the necessity of curbing the frequent outbrust of popular unrest in the country. Together with the Sardar from the same platform on the Chowpatty sands Nehru deprecated the incidents in Bombay. But in a slightly different manner, in a manner characteristic of a radical of his persuasion. His condemnation was covered with a thin layer of praise for the RIN 'boys' and their civilian sympathizers. He lauded their spirit of unity in a few words and then toed the 'responsible line' of Pat el's. India, he too said, reached the gate of independence, and the people need not initiate any action to force it open. Any lapse on their part would wipe out the 'valuable work' done by Congress for the achievement of 'swaraj'. The 'unsocial elements' would exploit the situation to their advantage and British troops would intervene to tackle them by force. 98 This would delay swaraj which seemed to be round the corner. Hence the need of the hour was 'discipline' and self-restraint, Nehru re-
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minded the people in another meeting in Bombay.99 He cautioned them against taking any initiative in the 'political field' which, he quite often said, was the exclusive preserve of Congress and its leaders. Everywhere in his public talk in Bombay Nehru sought to make .the same point as Azad or Patel's. But in all cases in a roundabout way. At a press int~rview in the city on 27 February he maintained insurrectionary types of action would create situations of such instability that it might take a long time to restore the equilibrium and initiate any kind of social change. Political freedom, he argued, had to be viewed in terms not of a sudden seizure of the 'citadel occupied by the enemy' but of the 'measures of social change' that could be effected in its aftermath. In Nehru's logic political change brought about (by insurrections) suddenly would delay or render difficult social transformation. This might so upset the balance that it would be impossible 'even to think in terms of social changes'. Many valuable years might be lost, which would be the 'testing time' of deciding whether the country was 'to survive or not as political entity'. So one could not 'take too narrow a view of the immediate result', could think of nothing except in terms of 'more or less the whole world context' .100 It is as if insurrections aimed at a rapid political change stand in the way of a protracted, thorough-going social transformation ·and Nehru opposed them out of his commitment to the latter. In embarking on a disquisition into the question of violence and non-violence Nehru asserted that it was 'infantile' to pit 'inferior violence' against 'superior violence', 'small-scale' against 'big-scale'. Any violence other than the superior, large-scale violence of the armies was 'infantile'. The argument, if carried to its logical end, would mean: the oppressed should never take to arms against their oppressors. For they could never match their arms with the enemies'. The violence of (a handful of) oppressors would always triumph over that of (the vast number of) oppressed and never vice versa. Non-violence was then the only possible method of struggle open to the latter. Nehru laboured so hard only to convey this counsel of non-violence to the people who matched British military violence with their own from behind barricades. He argued so circuitously only to insist that they should desist from any armed action against the enemy. In an effort to undermine the significance of popular actions in defence of the naval strikers Nehru said that barricade
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fights were as anachronistic as the methods of the eighteenth-century French revolution. 'Sinall insurrectionary' actions of the past, he added, were futile in the present epoch and the present situation in India and the world alike. All that took place in Bombay, in his assessment, was nothing but 'small sporadic violence' by 'all manners of groups in the city.'lOl To think of such violence as a means to speed up the revolution was absurd. It was just 'a hindrance to it.' A revolutionary like Nehru would not mind if its removal required cooperation with the alien rulers. Finally, he came to argue: NCSC gave the hartal call over the heads of 'all ,recognized political parties' and the people supported it despite the latter's advice to the contrary. The hartal encouraged the 'anti-social elements' to indulge in violence which in turn provoked the military to shooting and machinegun fIre. So Nehru deviated in no way from Patel's explanation of the development in Bombay. At the Chowpatty meeting he told his audience 'my heart bled when I read reports of the mounting death toll.'l02 He seemed to shed a drop of tear or two for the killed but hardly got anything, to say in condemnation of the killers. For the latter's action had justifIcation too. The Congress leaders' stand indeed meant a clean bill for them. Gandhi surpassed all others in the virulence of attack on the people who initiated actions against the British in defIance of the 'recognized' leasders' authority. The rulers gleefully noted the statements that the Mahatma put out during the disturbances and after in condemnation of what he called 'thoughtless orgy of violence'. 'Thoughtless' was used deliberately to distinguish it from 'thoughtful. violent action' l$1JThe looting of foodgrains was a glaring example of thoughlessnes~ in Gandhi's view. It was 'senseless' and did not help the people. Such actions were 'suicidal'. More crucially Gandhi felt that it was not enough to denounce incendiarism, looting and assault on Englishmen or ascribe 'such ugly manifestations' to the activities of 'hooligans'. Such condemnation or ascription, unless accompanied by an active resistance of hooliganism, was hardly better than taking refuge in 'moral alibi'.l04 One's non-participation in the 'disgraceful happenings' would not entitle one to Gandhi's congratulations. He wanted all to protect the 'threatened' enemy even at the cost of their life.1os The Bombay Provincial Committee of Congress remained faithful to this ideal of 'satyagraha' and deserved his congratulations: Patel and
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Patil spoke out the 'whole truth' to Governor in the face of the popular. protest and acted accordingly. While the people were bleeding on the city streets, they were busy helping the enemy to get out of its difficulty. The Cgngress 'peace volunteers' fanned out in all directions in the city 'to allay the disturbances'. In assisting the enemy to restore 'peace' four or five of them fell victim to its bullets.106 The people of Bombay drew Gandhi's ire for not having done so and lived up to his ideal. While Patel disapproved of popular initiative and Nehru of barricade fights in addition, Gandhi decried the unity that Hindus and Muslims forged in a heroic resistance against the British military. The rulers wanted 'at all costs' to avoid being 'embroiled with both Hindu and Muslim at once'.107 The Mahatma was as anxious to pre-empt the unity of these communities in anti-imperialist violence. He reasoned: 'A combination between Hindus and Muslims and others for the purpose of violent action is unholy and will lead to and probably is a preparation for mutual violence - bad fOl;: India and the world'.108 On the contrary an alliance for bargaining with the British would be holy by implication. In polemizing with Aruna Asaf Ali Gandhi clearly stated his preference for communal unity on the 'constitutional front' to one on the barricadesYl9 The slogan that the people of Bombay raised, 'Hindu-Muslim ek sath,Delhi chalo ek sath' was ominous. The unity through militant anti-imperialist struggle from below was dreaded by the rulers as well as by the leaders of the ruled. Gandhi wished to perish in flames than to live to witness its achievement thus. During what Summit Sarkar called his 'fmest hour', 'the last few months of his life, the Mahatma sought to carve out an alternative path of unity through peace march, after the outbreak of communal strife, in the affected areas and fast in protest. Gandhi outdid others in refusing to condemn the British military violence and rationalizing it by reference, again, to the principle of satyagraha. By declaring 'its use beyond requirement' to be 'unworthy,nO the Mahatma accepted implicity as worthy the employment of force by the government within that limit. Apart from his desire to make allowance for official violence it is also clear that he left it to the government to decide how much violence its 'bare requirement' demanded in a given situation. Even after a lapse of about three weeks since the Bombay disturbances Gandhi denied to
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have 'got sufficient material' to judge military excesses. But he had no such paucity of 'material' in assessing the 'excesses' committed by the people. Besides he considered it 'out of place' to say anything about the brutality of British troops 'when condemning popular excesses'. More importantly Gandhi argued: 'People have no right to commit excesses whereas the military is the very embodiment of madness. Condemnation of military madness would be meaningless when the very institution of the army is condemned.' So in a sense military excesses were excusable. But the same view could not be taken of popular violence. The people went wrong when they indulged in violence. Gandhi was for their turning the 'searchlight' inward toward their own wrongs rather than brooding on those of the military. For to 'expatiate' on the wrongs of others was likely to lead them 'imperceptibly to act likewise'.l11 As for the duty of a Congressman in this regard Gandhi said that he should not allow political expediency to stand in the way of condemning the wrongs of the people. To refuse to denounce popular excesses was to encourage them. 'He who panders to the weaknesses of a people degrades both himself and the people and leads them not to democratic but mob rule'. And mobocracy in turn 'leads to ... death, pure and simple'.11Z The duty of a satyagrahi, Gandhi added, was to reform his people rather than the enemy. To do so was to sterilize 'the power of the , opposing force.' And if the process continued over a sufficiently long . time the heart of the enemy would 'ipso facto completely' change.113 Gandhi's colleagues in Congress had already effected a 'change of heart' in the ruI'ers: the British had been declared to be 'acting as caretakers' and to have agreed to quit in favour of an Indian rule. Hence their policy was one of utmost possible cooperation with them, especially the cabinet ministers who were said to be coming to finalize the details of a transfer of power. The people were cautioned by the Congress President that certain elements within the party or outside were hatching a conspiracy to force a movement on the country before the arrival of the cabinet delegation contrary to its policy. They were asked not to suspect the bonafides of the mission in advance. They were urged upon not to distrust its intention and kick up a quarrel in anticipation. It was their duty to welcome the ~debtor' who had expressed his desire to repay what he owed them. It would be inhuman, beastly in fact to heap insult and inj!lry on him in remembrance of his past. Gandhi said so and Nehru readily agreed.
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Sardar Patel added that the British asked for assistance in quitting. The people should help them in rolling up their bedding and packing up their luggage and escort them safely to the waiting ship. The prospect of power impelled the Congress leaders to disapprove anything that smacked of 'disorder' or 'indiscipline', anything which, they feared, might spoil it. So their severe reprimands for the students, workers and common men who rose to defend the naval ratings. Not only so. They literally lined up with the alien rulers on the wrongside of the barricade in defence of 'order'. and 'discipline'. In fact Congress exhibited no elation for those who failed to realize that 'swaraj' was knocking at the door and it was not the occasion to join issues with the British or organize any protest, even a peaceful one. It was not the time to do or talk of anything outside what Nehru called 'the whole world context'. In the days immediately following the mass upsurge in solidarity with the RIN strike the leaders were at pains to explain to the people the superiority of non-violence over violence, and drive home to them the responsibility they bore for the maintenance of non-violence and its breakdown in any circumstances. Azad counselled for 'caution and restraint', Patel for 'patience', Nehru for 'discipline' and 'constructive work' and, above all, Gandhi for 'dignified silence'. They all promised a struggle should the British go back on its promise and the need arise to bring pressure to bear on them for keeping it. Aruna Asaf A1i who among other 'left-wing elements' was suspected to be 'stirring up-1rouble' or fanning its flame argued for Congress' joining the popular protest to transform it from a real attack on the colonial state into a mere- symbolic opposition and killing the movemenr·by formalizing it~ She too was for a negotiated settlement with British and quite willing to give the 'orthodox' Congress leaders sufficient time for it. Failing this Aruna would launch a struggle through boycott of foreign goods so scarce in the couritry in the aftermath of the war. IV Except for a small insignificant section the entire British press paid rich tributes to· the leaders of both Congress and League for the 'restraint' they had shown throughout the disturbances, rather the cooperation their organizations extended to the government in stamping out the 'mutiny' in RIN, tackling the 'mob fury' and restormg calm. in Bombay. What they did during those few days was de~cribed
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as an 'act of genuine leadership' in its columns. The Conservative Yorkshire Post and the Labourite Daily Herald had special bouquet for Gandhi. The Economist did not lag behind them. For the most 'direct indictment' of 'thoughtless orgy of violence' came from the Mahatma's mouth, the most uncompromising attitude towards those who allegedly perpetrated it was adopted by him.n4 Although some papers were critical of the 'pattern' of Nehru's speeches on the Bombay 'tragedy', the others did not miss their spirit. It was no different from that of a 'wiser' Azad or Patel's. The British press in fact apportioned 'the credit for the restoration of order' among the police, military and the nationalist leaders. To The Times the principal interest of these leaders, whether they stood for one India or two, seemed to be to cooperate with the government during the difficult transitional months 'in preserving conditions which will enable them to take over India as a going concern, with the machine of government and. defence intact';US The 'responsible leaders of Indian opinion' who looked forward to assuming the reins of administration soon were 'quick to appreciate the danger of subversive movements masquerading under the guise of patriotism'.116 Pending the transfer of power their task seemed to avoid any conflict with the authorities and restrain the impatience of their countrymen. Just as they were afraid of the consequences of losing control over the people, similarly the British· press expressed its apprehension: 'If in the midst of this crisis authority should pass from recognized leaders to incaluable passions aroused in the streets by riots and counter-action, no one could prophesy the outcome'.117 The left-wing Reynolds News saw behind the RIN 'mutiny' and popular protests in its wake the hands of 'reactionaries' bent upon creating a situation which would 'make any peaceful settlement impossible'.us 'On the positive side', the Liberal Manchester Guardian wrote, one could depend upon 'Gandhi's vast influence' and 'the realization by Congress leaders of the front rank' of the responsibility they had to shoulder in the near future.l19 This, hoped the British press, would continue to act as an element of stability during the 'dangerous' period lying ahead.
'" The Anglo-Indian papers cried more hoarsely on the 'mutinous' outbreak in RIN and popular violence that followed it. The Times of India screamed in the headlines 'Reign of Terror by Ratings on "Strike", and 'Unprecedented Orgy of Arson and Looting';
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Evening News, 'Ratings Run Amuck' and 'Unbridled Mob Violence'; 17le Statesman, 'RIN Strike Develops into Hooliganism' and 'Bombay in the Grip of Mob Violence' and Civil and Military Gazette, in editorials 'Orgy of Lawlessness' and 'Mob Fury'. What the men of the 'silent service' did to obtain redress for their grievances, in their view, was 'mutiny', plain and simple, 'madness' in the prevailing conditions of the country and unpardonable for the 'ugly shadow' it cast on its tradition of 'loyalty' and 'discipline'. Neither the RIN outbreak nor the popular protest that came close on its heels, the papers wrote, could be dismissed as the outcome of emotions spontaneously aroused on some immediate issues or others or, of 'unprecedented ebullience of anger or resentment' over them. l20 The explanations they offered of the disturbances seem to be nothing but paranoid flourishes of the official conspiracy theory. CMG argued that the incidents in RIN suggested that 'political agitators had been at work' inside the service. The fact ·that the 'mutiny' was followed by an 'unprecedented' outburst of 'mob fury' was indicative of the conspiracy. The erection of well-sited barricades and the extensiveness of disturbances provided further proof.l21 In TOTs diagnosis certain 'unscrupulous' politicians 'most grievously misled the general body of ratings', goading them into 'mutinous' actions. These 'political extremists' sought 'to promote disorder by calling on workers to strike' and giving a 'direct incentive to hooligans and badmashes to resort to all the worst features of mob rule'. Their goal was 'to destroy the stability of the state' and prevent the 'transfer to Indian hands of a sound working administration commanding public confidence and confident in itself.'l22
For the Anglo-Indian papers the only hope in this dismal situation. was 'India's most respected leaders', their determination to stop anarchy and violence in the country. No one hesitated to express its gratitude to the leaders of Congress and League for the 'courageous' stand they had taken on the disturbances in Bombay. Tire Statesman appreciated their anxiety over acts of in discipline or lawlessness born of the realization that these were opposed to their interest.l23 CMG reiterated Sardar Patel's warning to the people of the danger of following the lead of anyone other than Congress'.l24 TOI was more outspoken and blunt: it insisted that all must obey the 'leaders of our great political parties.' It commended to the attention of every 'responsible citizen' the 'wise' counsels of Congress with the
The Other Responses
327
expectation that he would scrupulously abide by them. The Britishowned daily felt that these counsels, if 'properly publicized', would 'have a salutary effect on the country'. In contravention of its usual practice the paper printed in full the Congress leaders' statements against NCSC's hartal call. Later it lamented that the popular proc test began against the 'responsible' leaders' 'express instructions'. The way in which Pat el's advice or Patil's appeal was ignored by the people seemed alarming. Tal cautioned the national leaders that unless the people were disciplined the negotiations for a transfer of power would be hampered, and their violence might lead to what Gandhi called 'mutual violence.' Every argument it advanced, the paper said, was underlined in the statement that the Mahatma issued from Poona. 'Every word of that statement is a warning and rings true'. The slightest deviation from Gandhi's principle of strict nonviolence would expose the country to mobocracy, terrorism and anarchy.l25 Following the Mahatma closely the Anglo-Indian press declared that what the leaders of the two 'great' parties did to discourage violence or to quell it was commendable but not enough. Verbal disapproval of violence or appeal for non-violence, organizing peace brigades or peace committees - all these were necessary but needed to be reinforced by more 'active', more 'constructive' measures. CMG suggested the formation of 'anti-riot squads' in every quarter of the towns and cities to strengthen the hands of the 'forces of law and order' which were always one step behind the rioters. l26 Tal went a step further: it pleaded that the political leaders should 'place all the resources, both moral and physical, at the disposal of law and order for the simple reason that law and order, like the armed forces, are outside political controversy'.127
* The reactions of the nationalist press betrayed a parallel perception. It too accused the naval strikers of indiscipline and lawlessness and their civilian sympathizers of goodaism and vandalism. Violent assertions of rights abroad or in the past had often been extolled but the one by ratings was deplored by almost all the nationalist dailies. They published many an inflammatory article on 1942 or INA but had no moral compunction to condemn the naval revolt. All paid lip service to the ratings' cause and yet disapproved the actions ~ey initiated to advance it. 17le Bombay Chronicle wrote in its editorial. columns: 'There is no Indian who will not sympathize with ... the
328
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
strikers' but 'much in ... [their] conduct ... is regrettable'. Their indiscipline was repellent to the paper. It appreciated the government's determination 'not to allow indiscipline in the ranks of the services and never to give in to violence'. It was for 'sternness in dealing with men' in addition to tact. l28 The same language issued from Dawn. It was of the opinion that the ratings, as far as their grievances were concerned, deserved sympathy but the manner in which they chose to agitate for their redressal merited 'equally unequivocal public condemnation'. No 'sensible' person, it said, could congratulate them on having dragged political issues into what was nothing but 'a conflict with their departmental superiors'.l29 The Hindustan Times appeared to laud the nationalist spirit that permeated the armed forces but resent its dissipation.To it the incidents in which RIN ratings got involved were 'tragic' and dangerous. l30 Tribune and 1he Hindu joined in the chorus.l3l To the nationalist press the outburst of popular anger was more reprehensible than the strike by naval ratings. It was so to the .'radical-nationalist' Amrita Bazar Patrika as to other dailies. The former expressed full agreement with Gandhi's condemnation of destruction, looting and racial fury. These were 'symptoms of a dangerous malady' for it. It could not close its eyes to such developments and refuse to deplore them.l32 Out of its abhorrence for disturbances and riots which caused more sufferings to the people than to the government Moming News could not but sympathize with the latter in its present difficulty despite its differences with it. 133 The situation which developed in the wake of the RIN outbreak had a distinctly 'ominous look' for Hindustan Standard. Its editor had to denounce it because no 'right-thinking person' could do otherwise.l34 BC excelled others in this respect: it condemned the popular expressions of solidarity with the naval strikers in the same terminology as that of the police. To it these were nothing but outbursts of 'rowdyism' and 'hooliganism'. There could be 'no greater disservice to the country' 'than for mobs to take the law into their hands' and indulge in wrecking, burning and looting. This was 'most thoughtless on the eve of grave negotiations', at a time when the country needed .to be 'scrupulously non-violent'. The paper approved the measures that the government adopted to curb 'mob violence' and the support Congress lent to·it. l3S The nationalist press' commitment to the country persuaded it to stress the need for active cooperation with the
The O!her Responses
329
alien rulers in order to prevent the 'wild outburst' of popular discontent. The Congress leaders' role in this regard and their counsels for· the people were commented on in glowing terms in most of the nationalist dailies. The Hindu wrote in an editorial soon after the 'trouble' was over: 'Few who have watched the course of trouble ... will have had any difficulty in concluding that it might have ... [assumed] far more formidable proportions but for the restraining influence of the politicalleaders.'l36 HS played the same tune: it gratefully pointed to the part that Sardar Patel played in retrieving the situation. 137 HT in its columns recorded unmixed praise for the Congress leading lights for exerting themselves to discipline their countrymen. It argued none of these leaders favoured· any form of direct action at present. If and when they did and said so, that would be the time for the people, especially students and young men to show their enthusiasm and 'prove their mettle' .138 The daily was clearly opposed to any independent popular initiative. To BC it was most lamentable that mob violence on an unprecedented scale should have broken out especially as the Congress got in touch with the higher authorities in New Delhi and was trying to solve the ratings' problems, and continued even after they decided to surrender on Patel's advice. A 'fair settlement' of the men's grievances would have been greatly facilitated had the people heeded the Congress counsel for discipline and non-violence. Here this Bombay daily faithfully echoed Patel's views. It complimented Asaf Ali for suggesting postponement of a discussion on the 'sensitive' RIN issue in Central Assembly in favour of one in Defence Consultative Committee. The paper was most lavish in its tribute to Gandhi. For his condemnation of violence was the most 'uncompromising' of all; it was not couched in vague, general terms; it related to the specific forms that it assumed in Bombay and he disapproved. Like the Anglo-Indian papers BC repeated Gandhi's words when it wrote that 'it was necessary for Congressmen not only to be party to [violence] ... but actively to denounce and work against it.' Just as TOI reiterated the Mahatma's admonitory statement against those who, disbelieving Britain's declaration of its intention to quit, sought to precipitate a conflict with it, similarly this nationalist daily quoted Nehru, in addition to Gandhi, to denounce any effort to discredit the cabinet delegation in advance as 'bad diplomacy.>139
330
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
Much like the British and British-owned papers the nationalist press sought to prove the existence of a conspiracy behind all this. It Was difficult for Dawn to believe that the ratings 'ran amok in the manner they did merely to obtain redress for ... [their] grievances'. This, in addition to the quick spread of the strike wide across the service, led it to the inference that ~extraneous forces' had pulled the strings and brought about the 'mutiny'.140 The Hindu was more specific in its charge: it accused the Communists of creating trouble 'to make political capital for themselves'. It was on their call for hartal that the workers launched the protest which caused 'grievous loss of life and destruction of property' .141 In an effort to refute this contention the Communist People's Age sought to establish that workers' demonstrations or, more broadly, demonstrations in working-class areas, did not lose their 'political character' or lapse into hooliganism. It fixed the responsibility on 'anti-social elements' who were said to have organized 'orgies of loot and senseless burning' mostly in non-labour areas. 142 For the Commwlist organ as for the nationalist dailies much of this had no other significance than being a crime and was equally condemnable. Here again BC spoke in the same voice as Gandhi's: it alleged that there had recently been 'considerable condonation in several quarters of thoughtless Violence' and, more crucially, 'too much encouragement of ... thoughtful violence'.143 In both official and (orthodox) nationalist circles this was attributed to Congress radicals like Aruna Asaf All and to papers like The Free Press Journal. But FPJ, though far more sympathetic towards the naval strikers and their civilian supporters, did not 'approve of the forms their protests assumed. This was reflected in both its news and editorial columns. In an editorial on 26 February it said that· there would be 'universal agreement' with Gandhi's denunciation of 'thoughtless violence'.144 The papers did not condone 'noisy demonstrations' by the strikers, especially in the Fort area, 'marred by acts ofviolence'.I4S In fact when the Congress leaders intervened to get the ratings back to work, FPJ called the news 'heartening'.146 A day after the men surrendered it wrote that the city had seen 'enough' demonstration by the people and the time came to restore normalcy. Patel appealed for resumption of work, Aruna Asaf Ali asked it and the Communists too did so. Everyone shOUld therefore return to duty. 'The object of the demonstration has been secured in the Sardar's inter-
171e Other Responses
331
vention itself.147 Any more agitation would distract attention from the ratings' problem to 'skirmishes' and 'sideshows' and would be a 'disservice' to their cause. FP] was critical of the Congress attitude towards the popular protest. But why? In its explanation had the Congress leaders associated themselves with the agitation and guided it from the beginning, 'the ugly scenes that marred the peace of the city' could have been averted, and the military would not have that much sought-after excuse to indulge in firing. It was largely because Congress stood out of the demonstrations that the 'anti-social' elements took 'charge in the vacuum' so created and things went.out of control. Once public feeling was roused, only an organized agitation could keep it within bounds.148 This was exactly the reason why Aruna subjected the (orthodox) Congress leaders' position to much criticism. To strengthen its argument further FP] cited Serge Chakotin who in his Rape of the Masses pointed out that 'the first task undertaken by the Soviet government on coming to power was to study the technique of mass propaganda, to learn how to divert attention along the proper channels of agitation, to prepare for intervention at strategic points to control the crowd's temper'.149 By comparison with ., other national dailies its line was a more subtle one of restraining and holding down popular protests into peaceful forms.
* In a space of six days, 18-23 February 1946 the naval subalterns grew wiser than ever before. Nothing had exposed them so much to the reality outside 'lower deck' as their strike and the response it evoked. The events of those few days were strong enough to shatter the image they had built of the nationalist leaders and press. These showed them up in stark er relief. All those who had before distributed freely and frequently sacks full of inflammatory messages from the Chowpatty sands or Shivaji Park now beat a hasty retreat into the shells of non-violence. Non-violence was the most convenient peg on which the leaders hung their explanation of the attitude they adopted towards the naval strike and popular actions in its support. They were instrumental in containing and defeating the greatest service 'mutiny' that the Raj had faced since 1857. That they had hitherto raised a lot of ideological dusts only to camouflage their real aim centred entirely on electoral gains and bargaining with the British .' for power suddenly became clear to the ratings. While the foreign
332
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
rulers and the nationalist leaders alike came to consider them their adversary, the people did not abandon the men as such. On the contrary, they supported their strike abundantly and extravagantly. The people did not wait for any call from any leaders nor did they have any reason to: they could organize a protest, on their own initiative, in defence of the Indian ratings facing the British jackboot. They were calumniated as 'mobs' or 'rabbles' devoid of a will of their own and rationality, incapable of independent initiative and manipulable by evil-intentioned conspirators, and their protest was stigmatized as a 'wild outburst' of hoolignism or rowdyism, as an exclusive handiwork of Communists or Congress leftists. But facts give the lie to the canard: the people launched the struggle and continued it without any guidance or assistance from the 'recognized' leaders, rather did so in spite of opposition, open or covert, from them all, orthodox or radical. Thus they entered straight into the portals of history in their own right. What a rating said in his evidence before the RIN Enquiry Commission seems to be a better assessment than any nationalist historian's, R.C. Mazumdar or Bipan Chandra's, in . this context: INA trials ... attracted Indian public and press roared with vigour. As the elections are to be contested all the political parties threw in their lot on INA trials. ... our national leaders ... keep the entire atmosphere tense and hot with fiery speeches of freedom. Press goes on roaring on its highest pitch and ... papers play havoc with our feelings and madden us by provoking publications but when the actual moment came they go oh harping non-violence, and when it is over they condemn us .... Every national leader in Bombay was approached by the RIN personn~l put with no result. They remained dumb like Egyptian mum~ies, 'and if they moved their lips they were reciting the National Anthem or Non-violence, a confusing theory which cannot be practised especially by the fighting forces, who.were only taught gunnery, torpedoing and bombardment - in short all means of violence - not spinning wheels. No [leader] ... came forward to guide us. ... we carried on ourselves ... the authorities took wrong steps in the beginning - they put at our disposal all mobile transport, all machinery and means of communication, arms and ammunition and all men-of-war. Finally they forced us to take up arms by cheap third rate and threat-
The Other Responses
333
ening means. ... Our deep-rooted hatred took the shape of open rebellion. We became united and ready to face the worst. The Admiral's threat made us adamant. Our blood connected ones came to our rescue - they helped us. From age grey hairs to school children gave us moral and material assistance amounting from grams to blood - blood through which the RIN personnel can swim ... and of which a minute particle was a million times more valuable than the whole cost of RIN. But individual national heroes remained aloof. They took us to be drunkards under the influence of canteen liquor. They ordered us to surrender. ... They said there will be no victimization. Hundreds were sent to jail; hund:reds discharged; the remainder are awaiting court martial. We offered a chance; they missed it, being too much busy with elections and reception of Delegation. It needs no knowledge of astrology to foresee what would have been the case if we were to continue for a week more. But then we were ready for months. Our celebrated politicians prefer begging to fighting. ISO Notes and References
1.
PD, Vol. 420, No. 103 (15 March 1946), Col. 1421.
2.
Wavell, The Viceroy's Journal, p. 215.
3.
Wavell to King George VI, 22 March 1946, TOP, Vol. VI, p. 1233.
4.
FP!, 22 February 1946.
5.
Commissioner of Police to Secretary, Home Deptt (Spet:i~l)., Govt. of Bombay, 21 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 5/21/1:l6.
6.
.Subrata Banerjee, The RIN Stlike, p. 139 and B.C. Dutt, Mutiny a/the Innocents, p. 164.
7.
File No. 601/9768/H, pp. 23-4.
8.
Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, TOP, Vol. VI, p. 1081.
9.
Situation Report No. 3,22 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 5/ 21/46.
10.
Comdr. E.C. Streatfield-James, Proceedings of the Board (Part II), File No. NL 9939.
11.
See Banerjee, op.cit., p. 87. Similarly the Indian sQldiers refused to fire on their RIAF brethren at Ambala. See PA, 10 March 1946. Also Fortnightly Report [Punjab]
334
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 for the Second Half of February 1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 18/2/ 46.
12.
Situation Report No. 3, 22 February 1946, op.cit.
13.
Wavell to King George VI, 22 March 1946, op.cit., p. 1235.
14.
CO Akbar, to FOB, 9 March 1946, File No. NL. 9907.
15.
Commissioner of Police to Secretary, Home Deptt (Special)., Govt. of Bombay, 22 February 1946; Situation Report No. 3 and Intelligence Bureau: Secraphone Call from CIO, Bombay, Rodger at 3.40 p.m., 22 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 5/21/46.
16.
ARMINDIA to Various Commands, Originators Nos. 222113 and 222117/M02, ibid.
17.
Situation Report No. 3, 22 February 1946, ibid.
18.
See Banjerjee, op.cit., pp. 120ff.
19.
ARMINDIA to Various Commands, Originators No. 222111jM02, File No. Home-Poll (I) 5/21/46.
20.
See Banerjee, op.cit., pp. 115 ff.
21.
ARMINDIA to Various Commands, Originators No. 222113/M02 and Situation Report Nos. 8 & 9, 24 -25 February '1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 5/21/46.
22.
ABP, 1 March 1946.
23.
BC, 18 March 1946. Also LAD, Vol. IV, No. 5 (22 March 1946), pp. 2781-2.
24.
ABP, 1-3 March; BC, 4 March and PA, 7 April 1946. Also Fortnightly Report [CP and Berar] for the Second Half of February 1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 18/2/46 and LAD, Vol. IV, No. 1 (15 March 1946), pp. 2483 ff.
25. . Fortnightly Report [Delhi] for March 1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 18/3/46 and LAD, Vol. IV, No 5 (22 March 1946), pp. 2782 ff and No. 6 (25 March 1946), pp. 2878 ff. Also BC, 22-23 March and FP! 23 .. March 1946. 26.
ABP, 2-6 & 20 April 1946. Also FP!, 28 March and BC, 4 April, 1946.
27.
Fortnightly Report [Madras] for March 1946, op.cit. and ABP, 18 April 1946.
28.
ABP, 22-24 April 1946 and Fortnightly Reports [Sind] for the Second Half of February and March 1946, op.cit.
29.
Enclosure to Letter from General Auchinleck to General Mayne, 3· May 1946, TOP, Vol. VII, pp. 406-7.
The Other Responses
335
30.
Enclosure to Letter from Thorne to Abell, 5 March [April] 1946, ibid., p. 150.
31.
Defence Committee Paper DO (46) 68, 12 June 1946, ibid., p. 892.
32.
Chief of Staff Committee COS (46) 125th Meetiflg, Minute 3, Confidential Annex, 13 August 1946, TOP, Vol. VIII, pp. 225-7.
33.
Appendix III to Letter from Wavell to Pethick Lawrence, 8 Septem~er 1946, ibid., p. 462.
34.
Note of Meeting Between Cabinet Delegation and Viceroy's Executive Council on 26 March 1946, TOP, Vol. VII, p. 7. At a later date Wavell expressed the same feeling to King, his The Viceroy's Journal, Appendix VIII, pp. 494, 496.
35.
ibid., p. 285.
36.
Wavell's Appreciation of Possibilities in India, May 1946, Appendix IV, ibid., p. 485.
36a
Wavell's to Pethick Lawrence, 23 October 1946, TOP, Vol. VIII, p. 797.
37.
Enclosure to Letter from Thorne to Abell, 5 March [April]· 1946, op.cit., p. 151.
38.
Enclosure to Letter from General Auchinleck to General Mayne, 3 May 1946, op.cit., p. 408.
39.
Defence Committee Paper DO (46) 68, 12 June 1946, op.cit., p. 896 and Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 13 July 1946, TOP, Vol. VIII, p. 50.
40.
Note by Wavell [For Cabinet on the Present Position in India], 29 June 1946, TOP, Vol. VII, p. 1084.
41.
Cited in V.M. Bhagwatkar, The Role of the RIN Mutiny of Febnlary 1946 in tlte Indian Freedom Stntggle, p. 263.
42.
BJ, 24 February 1946.
Unless indicated otherwise the following account of the popular protest is based on BC, 22-23 & 25 February 1946; FPJ, 20-23 & 25 February 1946; BJ, 24 February 1946;ABP, 23-24 February 1946; PA, 3 March 1946 and JAR, Vol. I, Jan.-June 1946, pp. 308 ff. 43.
Commissioner of Police to Secretary, Home Deptt (Special), Govt. of Bombay, 22 February 1946, op.cit.
44.
Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., p. 1082 and Secraphone Call from CIa, Bombay, Rodger, at 3.40 p.m., 22 February 1946, op.cit.
45.
Commissioner of Police to Secretary, Home Deptt (Special), Govt. of Bombay 23 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll (1) 5/21/46.
336
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
46.
Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., p. 1082.
47.
For details see File No. Home-Poll (I) 21/2/46. Also FP!, 26-27 February 1946; APB, 8 March 1946 andPA, 10 March and 10 November 1946. .
48.
Same as Note 46.
49.
Same as Note 46.
50.
Secraphone Call from CID, Bombay, Rodger, at 3.30 p.m., 23 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 5/21/46.
51.
Same as Note 46.
52.
Commissioner of Police to Secretary, Home Deptt (Special)., Govt. of Bombay, 24 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 5/21/46.
53.
JAR, Vol. I, Jan.-June 1946, p. 317.
54.
Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., p. 1083.
55.
BC, 25 February 1946.
56.
JAR, Vol. I, Jan.-June 1946, p. 314 andABP, 24 February 1946.
47.
Fortnightly Report [Bombay} for the Second Half of February 1946, op.cit.
58.
FP!, 23 February 1946.
59.
Commissioner of Police to Secretary, Home Deptt (Special)., Govt. of Bombay, 23 February 1946, op.cit. Also An American, 'It Happened in the City', FP!, 27 February 1946.
60.
Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., p. 1083. Also FP!, 23 February and BC, 26-27 February 1946.
61.
BC, 2 March 1946.
62.
Secraphone Call From CID, Bombay, Rodger at 11 a.m., 25 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 5/21/46.
63.
Some Lessons from the Bombay Riots (Feb. 1946)· Issued by HQ Bombay Area, File No. Home-Poll (I)No. 33/4/46. Also PA, 3 March 1946.
64.
Govsecbom to PSV, 25 February 1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 5/21/ 46.
65.
Some lessons from the Bombay Riots (Feb. 1946) Issued by HQ Bombay Area, op.cit. Also FP!, 23 February 1946.
65a.
ibid.
66.
Colville to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., p. 1081.
The Other Responses 67.
ibid., p. 1082.
68.
BC, 24 February 1946.
69.
PA, 3 March 1946.
70.
PD, Vol. 421, No. 119 (8 April), Col. 1656.
337
Many years ago a senior officer of the Indian Anny prepared a note ,entitled 'The Conduct of Army Officers during Riots'. It contained 'some simple formula ... which, if acted upon, would not only b~ a correct guide to any officer dealing with a riot but would also steer him through the many legal pitfalls that might await him after the riots'. One among such formulas was that firing by troops could be justified by the 'great legal principle' of 'SELF DEFENCE' in the face of looting, arson and danger to their safety. This note was reproduced in an 'Army (India) Training Memo' issued in December 1945 to assist the officers who had 'no knowledge or experience of the most unpleasant of all military duties', military aid to civil power, in the aftermath of the war 'with its inevitable economic and political upheavals'. File No. Home-Poll (I) 33/4/46. Cin-C's report was based on such a ready-made formula rather than on any investigations. 71.
Torn Driberg to A. Henderson, 10 April 1946, File No. Home-Poll (I) 21/2/46.
72.
Cited inPA, 10 November 1946.
73.
Wavell to Attlee, 24 February 1946, TOP, Vol. VI, p. 1055.
74.
Note of Meeting between Cabinet Delegation and Viceroy's Executive Council, 26 March 1946, op.cit., p. 7.
75.
Enclosure I to Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 13 July 1946, op.cit., p. 51.
76.
Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 23 October 1946, op.cit., p. 796.
77.
ibid., p. 797.
78.
Cited in Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 5 December 1945, TOP, Vol. VIip·602.
79.
Wavell to Attlee, 24 February 1946, op.cit., pp. 1055-6.
80.
Towards A People's Navy, p. 21.
81.
PA, 3 March 1946.
82.
Towards A People's Navy, p. 21.
83.
Report from the CID Officer, Intelligence Bureau, File No. HomePoll (I) 5/14/46 and Fortnightly Report [Sind] for the Second Half of February 1946, op.cit.
338
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febrnary 1946
84.
BJ, 24 February 1946.
85.
BC and FP], 25 February 1946.
86.
Fortnightly Report [Delhi] for the Second Half of February 1946, op.cit.
87.
Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 27 February 1946, TOP, Vol. VI, p. 1076.
88.
Secraphone Call from CID, Bombay, Rodger 3.40 p.m., 22 February, 1946, op.cit.
89.
Secraphone Call from CID, Bombay, Rodger at 11 a.m., 25 February 1946, op.cit.
90.
Fortnightly Report [Bombay] for the Second Half of February 1946, op.cit.
91.
BC, 5 March 1946.
92.
Fortnightly Report [Bombay] for the Second Half of February 1946, op.cit.
93.
G.M. Nandurkar (ed.), Sardar's Letters -Mostly Unknown, p.158.
94.
ibid., pp. 160-1.
95.
I1R, pp. 306-7, 314-5.
96.
lAD, Vol. 11, No. 9 (23 February 1946), p. 1413.
97.
JAR, Vol. I, Jan. - June 1946, pp. 306-7, 314-5.
98.
Nehru, SW, Vol. 15, pp. 4-5.
99.
FP], 21 February 1946.
100. Nehru, op.cit., p. 11. 101. ibid., pp. 9-12. 102. ibid., p.2. 103. Gandhi, CW, Vol. 83, p. 171. 104. ibid., p. 242. 105. ibid., p. 259. 106. JAR, Vol. I, Jan. - June 1946, p. 313.
107. Wavell's Appreciation of Possibilities in India, May 1946, op.cit., p. 485. 108. Gandhi, op.cit., p. 171. 109. ibid., p. 183. 110. ibid., p. 171.
The Otlter Responses 111. ibid., pp. 259-60. 112. ibid., p. 293. 113.
ibid., p. 160.
114.
Cited in FP!, 26-27 February and 2 March 1946.
115.
The Times, 26 February 1946.
116.
ibid., 27 February 1946.
117.
Cited in FP!, 26 February 1946.
118.
Cited in BC, 25 February 1946.
119. MG, 25 February 1946. 120.
TOI, 22 February and 4 March 1946 and CMG, 26 February 1946.
121. CMG, 21, 26 and 28 February 1946. 122.
TOI, 22 February and 4 March 1946.
123.
The Statesman (Calcutta), 24 February 1946.
124. CMG, 28 February 1946. 125. TOI, 22, 25, 27 & 28 February 1946. 126. CMG, 9 March 1946. 127.
TOI, 4 March 1946.
128. BC, 21-22 February 1946.
129. Dawn, 23 February 1946. 130. HT, 22-23 February 1946. 131.
Tlibune, 24 February and The Hindu, 28 February 1946.
132. ABP, 24 February 1946. 133. Morning News, 24 February 1946.
134. HS, 25 February and 1 March 1946. 135. BC, 22 & 25 February 1946. 136.
The Hindu, 28 February 1946.
137. HS, 1 March 1946.
138. HT, 22 February 1946.
339
340
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946
139. BC, 22-23, 25 & 28 February and 13 March 1946 . • •;140. Dawn, 23 February 1946. 141.
The Hindu, 28 February 1946.
142. PA, 3 March 1946. 143. BC, 25 & 28 February 1946. 144. FP], 26 February 1946. 145. ibid., 21 February 1946. 146. ibid., 23 February 1946. 147. ibid., 25 February 1946. 148. ibid., 23 & 27-28 February 1946. 149. ibid., 28 February 1946. 150. BW 72: Ahmed, RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 3, Vol. Il, pp. 604, 606-9.
IN SUM
Generally protests in any armed service underr;ombat compulsion are dealt with unmercifully. Even in such a situation the RIN subalterns rose against what they called 'oppression', 'injustice' or 'unfairness'. The form it assumed was either desertion and such other individual actions or defiance of authority in groups. Desertion was an expression, if less conspicuous, of an individual rating's anger over recruitment frauds and false promises on the nature and conditions of service in RIN. By deserting he sought to record his protest against the authorities that indulged in deliberate lies to enrol him and broke his trust. The wastage of recruits had indeed troubled the naval elite throughout the war, its proportion to intake increasing towards its end and its figures exceeding those of recruitment some times. By the termination of hostilities the wastage amounted to more than half of the borne strength, a fairly large portion of it being due to desertions. During the war more than half of the HO ratings recruited in the service was claimed by wastage and more than onethird of wastage by desertions. Those who stayed back did not take oppression or injustice lying down. Many protested and braved the punishments. The cases of such resistance by individual ratings were quite frequent, occurred almost daily but were less documented than collective protests. Only the statements that lower-deck witnesses made before the RIN Enquiry Commission concerning their grievances contained some accounts of those individual acts of protest besides desertion-refusal of unjust orders, avoidance of disagreeable duties, refusal to take inedible food or to give officers personal service, leaving for home in case of a nearest one's illness or death on permission being refused and so on. Less frequent but more open were the actions that the men embarked on collectively in individual units to obtain redress for their grievances over pollution of edibles in the galley, denial of freedom to perform religious rites, ill-treatment, colour bar, poor living and service conditions besides the ones above. Behind both the forms of action lay a will to protest and, more crucially, a sense of moral outrage. Neither was mindless, in-
342
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946
stinctive reaction on the lower ranks' part to their sufferings in the service. In the combat situation none of the collective protests aboard individual units turned into a service-wide phenomenon. Until 1946 that rare moment in the history of RIN did not arrive. On 18 February Talwar broke silence. And in a surprisingly short time the ratings aboard almost all ships and establishments threw off this sign of subordination. The inarticulate became articulate; the servile self-assertive. His silence gave way to vociferance and docility to defiance. His words and actions amounted to an extensive violation of the existing relations of domination-subordination. The naval elite was shocked more by the reversal of these relations than by the abruptness and simultaneity of the outbreak. It was faced with a rebellion by the men whose subordination to its command it seldom doubted despite their many protests before. Immediately the rebellion was aimed against the naval elite responsible for so much injustice and unfairness. Its beginning everywhere was marked by the violation of its authority and destruction of all that it held dear. By dismantling the existing structure of command the naval subalterns liberated themselves from its yoke, and hoisted Tri-colour, Crescent or Jai Hind flag to symbolize their freedom. The rebels redirected towards their tormentors the insults and assaults which had been before their lot. The officers had to accept this without any fuss in view of the silence imposed on them. Carefree the men shouted, jeered and moved about as never before. A festive and defiant mood was reflected in whatever they did at that moment. . Until the 'mutiny' neared its climax it involved violation of the norms of deference to the upper deck, destruction of the symbols valuable to it or of the instruments of its rule, public show of the defiance of its authority, attack on ROs, ransacking Guardrooms or breaking open cells and releasing prisoners, punishing officers, harassing recalcitrant or vacillating elements among the senior rates and so on. At the height of conflict the rebellion went beyond these forms. Its scope widened: it resulted in the breaking of the rules enforcing dress differentials and spatial distances between officers and men; it led to the rebels' seizure of the insignia of their adversaries' power. The redivision of space, reallocation of uniforms and
In Sum
343
redistribution of arms by the ratings were yet another manifestation of the reversal of the relationship between upper and lower decks. This was prompted by the rebels' perception of the end of British domination over the service or of alien rule in the country. The moment-when the ratings' discontent exploded into such a formidable defiance of authority-was not tension-free. Until an alternative structure of power was substituted for the one that had been overthrown, the men's identity as rebels stood out in sharp relief: they could decide freely and act accordingly. Once they formed an organization, especially at the central level, in keeping. with the rythm of the movement's growth and in order to achieve their goal, it came to discipline the rebels, enforced a code of conduct for them, and attempted to peg down their protest to the forms it approved, cease work, hunger strike and the like. The local strike committees in a number of units posted sentries at their entry and exlt points to restrict the rebels' movement in and out of them. Besides attempts were made to keep them on leash both inside the units and outside. A section of Talwar /NCSC leaders of that establishment figured prominently in the efforts to harness their action. The naval administration was in total disarray from the first day of the outbreak: the chain of command from FOB through the unit-level officers to the ratings broke down completely. In the situation the naval elite looked to these leaders for control over the lower deck. Significantly, when on the deployment of military guards the angry Castles ratings made repeated attempts to break out of the unit, M.S. Khan, President of NCSC, was called in more than once to control them. Next day, some time after they had taken up arms to repulse the enemy offensive and their comrades aboard ships in the harbour pointed their Oerlikons or Bofors on the shore, the British officers grasped the danger. Apprehensive about the behaviour of 'irreconcilable' elements among the strikers, they activated their contact with the 'more responsible' leaders, backed their efforts to prevent further incidence of violence and depended upon their 'peace mission' to Castles to disarm its men and secure the release of officers under detention. At tiines the bulk of the ratings including many of their local leaders were expressly reluctant to act in keeping the mantra of non-violence chanted by these leaders. Despite the latter's injunctions to the contrary violence 'marred' their protest demonstrations on two consecutive days and a gun battle took place at Castles a day after. This
344
Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946.
tension surfaced again and again as the central strike committee sought to remind the ratings of their subordination to it. One of the reasons behind the Talwar /NCSC leaders' decision to call off the strike was the uncertainty whether they would be able to maintain discipline among a huge number of men any longer. Quite a number of units were indeed unwilling to surrender even on receipt of NCSC's message to the effect. The quality of popular response evoked by the naval uprising was in sharp contrast with the one it elicited from the nationalist leaders. The latter's perspective on the event had much in common with the colonialists'. Neither were willing to break with the usual preconception of conspiracy, manipulation or any mediation external to the bulk of the ratings. The extent of the commuonality of their interest in stamping out indiscipline and lawlessness in naval units or outside on the streets was remarkable. The reason is not difficult to understand. The ratings' action or that of their civilian sympathizers tended to cross all limits by transformations. The naval subalterns did not confine themselves to airing their service grievances: they struck work and made, in addition, political demands including the indianization of the service, solicited Congress leaders' intervention in their affair, urged upon them to mobilize the 'support of national forces' for their cause and wanted their struggle to be raised above localism and combined with the popular cry for freedom. In the face of the military offensive they organized armed resistance and, threatened with annihilation by the authorities, went over the heads of all 'recognized' parties to call upon the people to come out in their defence. To the nationalist leaders the lower deck, by advancing political demands instead· of leaving these to them, by stopping work and seeking their intervention for the redressal of its grievances instead of taking these up with its 'departmental' superiors, by taking to arms and giving a hartal-call instead of heeding Patel and others' advice and so forth violated all norms or conventions, encroached upon their exclusive preserves and wanted to lodge itself in the domain of nationalist politics. On the other side, the popular protest against the British military assault on Castles turned into an extensive attack on the symbols of colonial authority including the less conspicuous ones. Nothing that represented any connection with foreign domination was spared by the people. Be-
In Sum
345
sides, the urban poor seized the occasion to puw.sh- those responsible for their hardships, those responsible for scarcity, ;rising prices and profiteering. They looted quite a large number of grain shops and cloth stores and destroyed many a Marwari moneylender's establishment. Different demands and different struggles tended to merge together. By such transgressions the naval strike and the popular protest in its wake posed a serious threat to all that the colonial or the nationalist elite stood for at that time. Immediately for the Raj these were a threat to the already precarious law and order situation and for th ~ Congress leaders a threat to the tasks they set before themselves, fighting elections and maintaining peaceful, undisturbed conditions for negotiations. They cried in chorus for discipline in the services as well as in civilian life. Especially in much of what the nationalist leaders had got to say on the unrest in RIN or the mass upsurge in its support discipline figured as a recurrent, obsessive theme. }=1or its breakdown seemed to disturb all their calculations about the transfer of power. It was indicative of ~heir apprehension that power, now almost within reach. might elude their grasp. What worried them most was the kind of initiative that workers, students and city poor took independent of their control or contrary to their injunctions. Pat el, Azad and other leaders repeatedly condemned the people for frequent, violent outbursts of their discontent since the end of the war and commended to them self-restraint, caution and patience. Gandhi shared with them all a contempt for what he called 'thoughtless' violence by 'mobs' or 'mob rule'. Often he expressed his aversion for it in the same spirit as that of the guardinas of law and order. Certainly no one scored better than Gandhi in deprecating autonomous popular initiative. But their reproaches and admonitions were of no avail. These pointed to their frustration over the way the people ignored their counsels. Interestingly Aruna Asaf Ali among the Congress leftists and FP! among the nationalist dailies spoke of the need for crowd control, of the.need for the party's intervention in the protests for regulating and directing them through channels under its command and thus destroying their autonomy. The Congress leadership in Bombay did employ volunteer guards to discipline the crowds and maintain order but this proved totally ineffective. It lost no time in throwing its entire weight in support of the administration's efforts to tackle the disturbances, Patel inducing the 'more re-
346
Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RlN Uplising of Febntary 1946
spoilsible' rating-leaders to call off the strike and thereby taking away the issue before the protesting people and freeing the military from its 'RIN commitment' to deal with the crowds ruthlessly. For the Sarder felt strongly that 'wild mobs' which defied law had to be tamed by force. Gandhi reinforced this argument when he said that the condemnation of the excesses committed by the people had to be accompanied by active resistance because pandering to them would inevitably result in 'mobocracy'. What Maulana Azad said meant that Congress considered, as a inatter of policy, all forms of protest, hitherto used to put pressures on the British for the 'national good', totally unnecessary. The requirement of harnessing them to that end had been over since Attlee's announcement on a cabinet mission. Gandhi warned the Congressmen about the danger of being embroiled in any protest by the masses, about its unwanted consequence in encouraging their independent initiative. His trusted lieutenants Nehru and Patel and he himself were for storing up popular energy through constructive work for a 'struggle' if forced on the country by the British. None had any need for the mass mobilization in the kind of politics they were engaged in at the time. Eventually the naval subalterns came to understand the arithmetic of this politics: its protagonists preferred immediate gains in the electoral front or narrow bargaining at the negotiation table to using the explosive material so near at hand for the overthrow of imperialism root and branch. A rating put it quite bluntly: they preferred toadying to protest. The people followed the latter course unbridled by elite control or counsels. Soon after this wisdom dawned on the rating everything was over. Those thrown 'retained in the service became silent again and a few of those out turned supplicants having only the power to play upon the pity and compassion of the new rulers.
Bibliography Only those works which have been referred to in the course of this study are listed here. It is by no means a complete record of the works the author has consulted. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES
Go~'em11lellt Records
National Archives of India Ministry of Defence: RIN Mutiny Sr. No. Brief Description
1.
Vo!. entitled Bombay Witnesses
2.
Vo!. entitled Delhi Witnesses
3.
Vo!. entitled Bombay Witnesses
4.
Vo!. entitled 'RIN Commission of Enquiry First Draft Report'
6.
Vo!. entitled 'Report of the RIN Commission of Enquiry 1946'
8.
A bundle of old newspaper cutting bearing on the mutiny
12.
Folder containing some memos etc.
13.
Folder containing 'Memos of Witnesses Submitted to the Commission'
14.
Folder entitled 'Karachi Statements'
15.
Folder entitled 'RIN Commission Statements'
Naval Headquarters (Naval Law Directorate) File No. Subject NL 0220
Reinstatement of ratings removed from service for participation in the RIN mutiny of February 1946
NL 9001
Directive concerning discipline in the mutiny.
Bibliography
348 NL9901
Board of Inquiry - HMIS VALSURA
NL9902
Board of Inquiry - ADEN W IT Station
NL9903
Board of Inquiry - HMIS HOOGHLY
NL9906
RIN Mutiny - SNOPG's Report
NL9907
Board of Enquiry into Mutiny in HMIS AKBAR
NL 9908
Board of Enquiry into Mutiny in HMIS CHEETAH
NL9909
Board of Enquiry into Mutiny in HMIS MADRAS
NL9915
Discharge of ratings involved in the Mutiny in HMIS TRAVANCORE
NL9919
Board of Inquiry into Mutiny in HMIS ORISSA
NL9920
Board of Inquiry of 11 HMI Ships convened to investigate the circumstances of the Mutiny
NL9923
Mutiny in HMIS KUMAON
NL9924
Mutiny in HMIS JUMNA
NL9930
Report of Board of Inquiry into the causes of the Mutiny in HMIS TALWAR
NL9936
Courts-Martial of Mutineers at Karachi
NL9937
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in 37th MS FLOTILlA
NL 9938
Board ofInquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS ADYAR
NL9939
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in Castle BARRACKS
NL9940
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in COCHIN
NL9942
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS NARBADA
NL9943
Board of Inquiry into. the Mutiny in HMIS KHYBER
NL 9944
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS GONDWANA
NL9945
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS MOTI
NL9946
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS DHANUSH
NL9947
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in KAlABATI
NL 9948
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS BHADRABATI
NL 9950
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS SHIVAJI
NL 9951
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS BOMBAY
Bibliography
349
NL9953 NL9954
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS LAL Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS HIRA
NL9955
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS NIlAM
NL9956
Board of Inquiry reg. the Mutiny in FORT BARRACKS
NL9958
Board of Inquiry relating to the Mutiny in HMIS KATHIAWAR
NL9959
Petition made by ratings in Malir Camp awaiting courtsmartial
NL9965
Charges and evidence of all ratings in category 'A' belonging to HMI ships, DALHOUSIE, NARBADA, HAMlA, KHYBER, KATHIAWAR and DHANUSH
NL9966
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS lAWRENCE
NL9967
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS MACHLIMAR
NL9968
Board of Inquiry reg. the Mutiny in LCT 1310
NL9971
Board ofInquiry into the Mutiny in LCT 1360
NL9972
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in LCT 1315
NL9974
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS ASSAM
NL9975
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS SIND & MAHRATTA
NL9976
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS CLIVE
NL9978
Board of Inquiry into the Mutiny in HMIS FEROZE
NL9982
General Instructions to deal with the persons involved in the Mutiny
NL9984
Details of mutiny courts-martial for the information of HE the Viceroy & Governors of Bombay and Sind
NL9987
Mutiny Petitions
Home Political (Internal) Department File No. Subject 5/14/46
Mutiny in the RIN and Communal Disturbances in Sind
5/16/46
Mutiny in the RIN (Feb. 1946) Bahrain
5/21/46
Distur,bances in Bombay arising out of RIN Mutiny
350
Bibliography
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Fortnightly Reports for the month of February 1946
18/3/46
Provincial Fortnightly Reports on the situation for the month of March, 1946
21/2/46
Correspondence with the Secretary of State for India and Provincial Govts. about RIN Mutiny
21/8/46
Courts-martial arising out of the RIN Mutiny
33/4/46
Communist Publications - People's Age - Questions of the action to be taken against it for publishing objectionable articles and secret documents - policy regarding Govt's advertisements and grant of newsprint
Historical Section, Ministry of Defence Subject File No. 601/9734/H
Index Ration Scales
601/9768/H
'A Brief History of Events Associated with the Disaffection and "Strikes" among Personnel in RAF Units of Air Command, South East Asia'
601/10892/H 'Historical Survey of Pay & Allowances & Pensions in the Royal-Indian Navy' PUBLISHED SOURCES Banerjee, Subrata 1he RIN Strike (with a preface by E.M.S. Namboodiripad), People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981 Bhagwatkar, V.M. 17te Role of the RIN Mutiny of Feb. 1946 (Royal Indian Navy Uprising) in tlte Indian Freedom Stnlggle (thesis approved for Ph.D. by Nagpur University) Chandra, Bipan et al. India's Stntggle for Independence 1857-1947, Penguin Books (India) Limited, New Delhi, 1988 Collins, DJ.E. 171e Royal Indian Navy 1939-45 (ed. Bisheshwar Prasad), Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India & Pakistan, 1964 Council of State Debates, 1946, Manager of Publications, GOI, New Delhi
Das, Durga (ed.) Sardar Patel's Comspondence, Vol.III, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1972
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(Central) Legislative Assembly Debates, 1944, 1946-47, Manager of Publications, Gal, New Delhi Low, C.R. History of tlte Indian Navy 1613-1863, 2 Vols., Richard Bentley and Son, London, 1877 Majumdar, R.C. History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol. Ill, Firma KLM Private Limited, Calcutta, 1977 Mansergh, Nicholas (ed.) 17,e Transfer of Power 1942-7, Vols. VIVIII, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1976-9 Menon, V.P. 17le Transfer of Power in India, Orient Longmans, Calcutta, 1957 Moharir, V.J. History of the AmlY Services Corps (1939-1946), Sterling Publishers Private Ltd., 1979 Nair, Kusum 17,e Anny of Occupation, Padma Publications Ltd., Bombay, n.d. Nandurkar, G.M. Sardar's Letters - Mostly Unknown, Vol. I, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Bhavan, Ahmedabad, 1977 Nehru, Jawaharlal Selected Works (ed. S. Gopal), Vol. 15, Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1982 Papers on the India Govemment's Military Policy Officially Contributed to tlte Newspapers, GIPD, 1934 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Commons, 1946, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London
Prasad, Nandan Expansion of the Amled Forces and Defence Organization 1939-45 (ed. Bisheshwar Prasad), Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India & Pakistan, 1956 Richmond, Herbert 17,e Navy in India 1763-1783, Earnest Benn Limited, London, 1939 . Sarkar, Sumit Modem India 1885-1947, Macmillan India Limited, Delhi, 1983
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