Representing India Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions
Niraja Gopal Jayal
Ethnicity, Inequalit...
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Representing India Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions
Niraja Gopal Jayal
Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance Series Series Editor: Yusuf Bangura The series on Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance is the first major comparative study on ethnic inequalities in the public sector. It examines the complex ways ethnic diversity affects the constitution and management of the public sectors of multiethnic societies under formal democratic rule. Contributors have analyzed the structure of ethnic cleavages, including variations within each group; collected detailed empirical data on four public institutions: civil service, cabinet, parliament and party system; examined the rules that determine selection to these institutions; analyzed whether the distribution of offices is ethnically balanced or uneven, and studied voter preferences in constituting these institutions. They have also examined the potential of ethnic inequalities to generate conflict and the effectiveness of institutions and policy reforms for managing diversity and inequality. The research on which the series is based employs a typology that classifies countries according to their levels of ethnic polarization: those in which one ethnicity is overwhelmingly dominant; those with two or three main groups; and those in which the ethnic structure is fragmented. 15 countries were studied in the project: Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Ghana, Fiji, India, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Switzerland, Tanzania, and Trinidad and Tobago. The research was funded by the Ford Foundation and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), in addition to UNRISD core funds. Michele Tan, Anna Hemmingson, Carl-Johan Hedberg and Toshihiro Nakamura provided research assistance at various stages of the project. Gabriele Kohler, formerly UNDP Resident Representative in Latvia, and Nils Muiznieks, Minister for Integration in Latvia supported the international conference held in Riga, Latvia, in which the research findings of the project and their policy implications were discussed. Titles include: Yusuf Bangura (editor) ETHNIC INEQUALITIES AND PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE Florian Bieber POST-WAR BOSNIA Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance Niraja Gopal Jayal REPRESENTING INDIA Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions
Forthcoming titles include: Jon Fraenkel ETHNIC STRUCTURE, PUBLIC SECTOR INEQUALITY AND ELECTORAL ENGINEERING IN FIJI Ralph Premdas TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Ethnic Conflict, Inequality and Governance Onalenna Selowane ETHNICITY, INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN BOTSWANA Karuti Kanyinga ETHNICITY, INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN KENYA Abdul Raufu Mustapha ETHNICITY, INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA Artis Pabriks IN DEFIANCE OF FATE Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance in Latvia
Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance Series Series Standing Order ISBN 1–4039–4971–9 You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
Representing India Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions Niraja Gopal Jayal
© UNRISD 2006 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–8612–2 hardback ISBN-10: 1–4039–8612–6 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jayal, Niraja Gopal. Representing India : ethnic diversity and the governance of public institutions / Niraja Gopal Jayal. p. cm. – (Ethnicity, inequality, and public sector governance) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–8612–6 1. Representative government and representation–India. 2. India–Politics and government–1977– 3. Multiculturalism–India. 4. Ethnicity–India. I. Title. II. Series. JQ231.J385 2006 323.154–dc22
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For the company of cheerful nieces: Richa, Shruti, Shagun, Mandira Bhavna, Nupur, Poonam, Riecha, Stuti Shivani and Malavika
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Contents List of Tables
viii
List of Abbreviations
xi
Acknowledgements
xiii
Foreword by Thandika Mkandawire
xv
Preface by Niraja Gopal Jayal Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7
xvii
Representing India: Democracy and Diversity Mapping Diversity in India Managing Diversity: Institutions, Policies and Politics Promoting Diversity and Protecting the Vulnerable Negotiating Diversity: Parties and the Electoral System Representing Diversity in Institutions of Governance Conclusion
1 15 42 71 89 114 185
Appendix
198
Notes
215
References
222
Index
228
vii
List of Tables Chapter 2 2.1 Official languages in India 2.2 Religions of India and key social indices of the major religious groups 2.3 Percentage distribution of household income by source across population groups 2.4 Scheduled Castes in India: distribution across states 2.5 The Mandal Commission: caste groups as a percentage of India’s population 2.6 Comparative tables of literacy rates incorporating the gender gap and the gap between the general population and SCs and STs (1961–1991) 2.7 Scheduled Tribes in India: distribution across states Chapter 4 4.1 Departmental distribution of staff in the NCSCST 4.2 Service related petitions processed by the NCSCST (1994–1997) Chapter 5 5.1 Vote share and seats: Congress and BJP (1952–2004) 5.2 Electoral performance of pan-Indian, Hindu revivalist and other ethnic parties: share of valid vote 5.3 Social bases of political parties (1996 and 1998) in % 5.4 National, state and registered parties since 1989 (Cumulative seats and vote percentage) 5.5 14th Lok Sabha: principal contenders in various states Chapter 6 6.1 Muslims in the Lok Sabha (1952–1999) 6.2 Reserved seats in Lok Sabha: state and regional summaries 6.3 Caste, class and tribe in the 10th Lok Sabha (1991–1996) 6.4 Caste, class and tribe in the 11th Lok Sabha (1996–1997) 6.5 Caste, class and tribe in the 12th Lok Sabha (1998–1999) 6.6 Caste, class and tribe in the 13th Lok Sabha (1999–2004) 6.7 Caste, class and tribe in the 14th Lok Sabha (2004) viii
18 21 24 29 30
35 39
75 78
95 97 99 107 112
116 117 121 122 124 125 127
List of Tables ix
6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 6.16 6.17 6.18 6.19 6.20 6.21 6.22 6.23
6.24
6.25
6.26
6.27
10th–14th Lok Sabhas: regional configurations of diversity (caste, class and tribe) Comparison of diversity (caste, class and tribe) by region 10th–14th Lok Sabhas Summary of the representation of Forward Classes, Backward Classes, SCs and STs 10th–14th Lok Sabhas Religion, caste and tribe in the 14th Lok Sabha Regional configuration of religion, caste and tribe: 10th–14th Lok Sabhas Regional configuration of religion, caste and tribe for each Lok Sabha (10th–14th ) Summary representation of religion, caste and tribe 10th–14th Lok Sabhas The Council of Ministers from 1947 to the present: a comparative overview of cabinet sizes Composition of the Union Cabinet by religious community (1947–1990) Composition of the Union Cabinet by caste (1947–1990) Regional representation in the Union Cabinet (1947–1990) Religious diversity in the Union Cabinet (1990–2005) Composition of the Union Cabinet by caste (1990–2005) Regional representation in the Union Cabinet (1990–2005) Muslim and Christian presence in IAS (direct recruitment + promotees) (1970–2000) Religious diversity of IAS officers (at Joint Secretary level or higher in select ministries of the Union Government) Recruitment pattern of candidates belonging to the SC, ST and OBC groups to the Union Civil Services (1981–1999) Recruitment pattern of candidates belonging to the SC, ST and OBC groups to Indian Forest Services (1981–1999) Recruitment pattern of candidates belonging to the SC, ST and OBC groups to the Indian Engineering Services (1981–1999) Religious minorities in the civil service (January 1, 1980)
130 132 134 137 139 142 145 147 152 154 155 157 158 159 164
165
166
169
170 171
x List of Tables
6.28 Representation of SCs and STs in IAS and IPS (January 1, 1983) 6.29 Occupational classification of main workers 1961–1991 (all numbers in percentages) 6.30 All India enrolment figures for SCs and STs at undergraduate, postgraduate, technical and professional education courses, (1977–1978 and 1995–1996) 6.31 Employment profile of SCs and STs in central government 6.32 Representation of SCs and STs in public sector enterprises (January 1, 1996) 6.33 Representation of SCs and STs in public sector banks (January 1, 1996) 6.34 Composition of the teaching staff of 13 central universities (1998–1999) 6.35 Composition of the Congress Working Committee (CWC) (1972–2002) 6.36 Composition of the Bharatiya Janata Party National Executive (1972–2002) 6.37 SCs and STs in the military
171 172
172 173 174 174 174 176 179 183
Appendix Chapter 5 5a Relative strength of political parties and alliances in the 9th Lok Sabha (1989) 5b Relative strength of political parties and alliances in the 10th Lok Sabha (1991) 5c Relative strength of political parties and alliances in the 11th Lok Sabha (1996) 5d Relative strength of political parties and alliances in the 12th Lok Sabha (1998) 5e Relative strength of political parties and alliances in the 13th Lok Sabha (1999) 5f Relative strength of political parties and alliances in the 14th Lok Sabha (2004) Chapter 6 6a Religion, caste and tribe: 10th Lok Sabha 6b Religion, caste and tribe: 11th Lok Sabha 6c Religion, caste and tribe: 12th Lok Sabha 6d Religion, caste and tribe: 13th Lok Sabha
198 199 200 202 203 205 207 209 211 213
List of Abbreviations AGP AIADMK BAMCEF BBM BJD BJP BJS BSP CAG CBR CPM CSDS CWC DGBCW DMK EER FPTP GOI HCR IAS ICS IPS IUML KHAM MBC MIM MP NCRWC NCSCST NDA OBC PR PRI RPI
Asom Gana Parishad All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Backward and Minorities Classes Employees Federation Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha Biju Janata Dal Bharatiya Janata Party Bharatiya Jana Sangh Bahujan Samaj Party Comptroller and Auditor-General crude birth rate Communist Party of India (Marxist) Centre for the Study of Developing Studies Congress Working Committee Director-General of Backward Classes Welfare Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Ever Enrolment Rate first-past-the-post Government of India Head Count Ratio Indian Administrative Services Indian Civil Service Indian Police Service Indian Union Muslim League Kshatriya, Harijan (SC), Adivasi (ST) and Muslim Most Backward Castes Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen Member of Parliament National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes National Democratic Alliance Other Backward Class proportional representation Panchayati Raj Institutions Republican Party of India xi
xii List of Abbreviations
RSS SC ST UPA USPC WPR
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes United Progressive Alliance Union Public Service Commission Work Participation Rate
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Yusuf Bangura, who led the UNRISD project of which this book is a part, for his untiring and indefatigable efforts in putting together this series of publications. I would particularly like to thank Ravindra Karnena who has worked hard and long on the tables in the book, an area of research rather far removed from his discipline of social anthropology. However, his disciplinary training was usefully deployed in the offices of political parties where he cheerfully hung about doing forensic work on the caste background of particular politicians. I am immensely grateful to him. I am indebted also to Neera Chandhoke and Philip Oldenburg who read and provided critical opinions on this manuscript. As always, Rakesh and Gayatri have been immensely supportive of my work. All of the above are, needless to say, absolved of all blame for the deficiencies of this book.
xiii
xiv Acknowledgements
The author, series editor and publisher of this volume gratefully acknowledge permission to excerpt and reproduce data and tables as listed below. • Table 2.3, p. 24: The National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi for permission to excerpt data from Table 3.5 on pp. 34–5 of India: Human Development Report: A Profile of Indian States in the 1990s by Abusaleh Shariff (ed.). Copyright © National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi. • Table 5.2, p. 97: Oxford University Press, Delhi and the author for permission to excerpt material from Table 1.1 on p. 6 of Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization by Narendra Subramanian. Copyright © Narendra Subramanian and Oxford University Press, Delhi. • Table 5.3, p. 99: Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, India and the authors for permission to use excerpts from Table 4.3 on pp. 134–5 of Democracy and Social Change in India: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the National Electorate by Subrata K. Mitra and V.B. Singh. Copyright © Subrata K. Mitra and V.B. Singh 1999. • Table 6.16, p. 152, Table 6.17, p. 154 and Table 6.18, p. 155: The President, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi for permission to use data from Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of The Indian Cabinet: A Study in Governance by V.A. Pai Panandiker and Ajay Mehra, published by the Centre for Policy Research and Konark Publishers, New Delhi. Copyright © Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. • Table 6.36, p. 179: C. Hurst & Co., London, Permanent Black, Ranikhet and New Delhi and the author for permission to use some data from Table 13.3 on p. 470, of India’s Social Revolution by Christophe Jaffrelot. Copyright © Christophe Jaffrelot.
Foreword India’s complex ethnic cleavages seem to defy classification as a single ethnic structure. The country is home to more than 1600 language groups and six major religions. Followers of the Hindu religion are further divided by a hierarchical caste system. In addition, about 10% of the population has been characterized as tribal. Despite this complexity, India is an established democracy and has registered high growth rates in recent years. These outcomes question notions that link ethnic diversity with low growth and authoritarian rule. A defining characteristic of India’s ethnic complexity is that its cleavages are largely crosscutting rather than reinforcing. For instance, not all Hindus are Hindi speakers and they may be further subdivided into countless castes and tribes. This makes it difficult to mobilize most Indians on a single cleavage, even though the appeal of caste and religious parties has been on the rise. Indeed, until the 1980s, the Congress party, which is a coalition of diverse interests, was able to govern India without building alliances with other parties. Niraja Gopal Jayal’s study suggests that federalism and multilingualism contained conflicts based on ethno-linguistic differences. There is relative ethno-regional balance in the composition of India’s public sector. However, two other cleavages – caste and religion – have been politicized in ways that have affected the fragmented nature of the ethnic setting. The discourse on caste divides the society into forward castes on the one hand and backward and scheduled castes on the other, even though there are five main castes and a large number of sub-categories within each. Affirmative action policies that seek to improve the visibility of lower castes and tribes in the public service have encouraged the proliferation of caste-based parties with an antiBrahmin message. These parties now account for about 15% of the popular vote. Religion has also tended to polarize Indian society, leading to communal violence. Hindus and Muslims account for 94% of the Indian population. Muslims, who are 12% of the population, are more than 100 million strong, making them the second largest Muslim group in the world. This bipolarity in the religious sphere was politicized during colonial rule and in the run-up to independence, resulting in civil war and partition. Right-wing politicians have lately exploited the religious xv
xvi Foreword by Thandika Mkandawire
cleavage. Jayal’s study suggests that the politics of Hindu revivalist parties threaten to convert India into a unipolar state using Hinduism as a vehicle of mobilization. These parties raised their share of the popular vote to more than 20% in the 1990s. They dominated the 1999–2004 government. Jayal’s study highlights the potential and limits of redistributive policies in situations of durable inequalities. Even though underprivileged castes have improved their presence in India’s public institutions as a result of reservation policies, these gains have not sufficiently transformed their social status and well being. Individuals of upper caste background still account for a relatively much larger share of parliamentary seats, as well as cabinet and civil service posts. In addition, underprivileged castes are concentrated in the lower levels of the bureaucracy and have been unable to fill reserved vacancies that require technical qualifications. Parties and MPs that claim to represent underprivileged castes have not been effective in influencing public policies. Muslims, whose socio-economic status is lower than that of Hindus and who are relatively less represented in parliament, are not entitled to reservation. Jayal evaluates India’s redistributive policies under three important yardsticks: policy outcomes, social outcomes and political outcomes. The relative position of underprivileged groups does not improve on each of these measures, underscoring the need, as she puts it, for ‘much more determined action from both state and civil society’ to tackle social prejudice and material inequalities. UNRISD is grateful to the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and the Ford Foundation for their financial support of the research on Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance. As is the case with all UNRISD projects, work on the project would not have been possible without the core funding provided by the governments of Denmark, Finland, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Thandika Mkandawire UNRISD Director
Preface This book started life as a long essay and the process by which it was transformed into a book was energetically led by Yusuf Bangura of UNRISD, whose ambition for this project and powers of gentle persuasion have resulted in the series of volumes of which this book is a part, and in a bunch of weary authors of whom too this is one. Being part of a series that has grown out of a multi-country project – albeit one addressing common research questions – has both strengths and limitations. For a start, not all the countries included in the study are comparable in terms of their size and the complexity of their history, society and polity. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and even Botswana are clearly not very similar to India. Nevertheless, the choice of countries was informed by the project design to generate comparisons that are contained in Bangura’s own essay in the edited volume Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance. There is nevertheless the possibility that this volume may be read and viewed as a coherent whole, and as such it has two limitations that need to be prefaced with a caution. Firstly, parts of the book may appear to be rather introductory in nature, which may suit those who are unfamiliar with the complexities of Indian history and society, but will make India-specialists impatient. Secondly, it will possibly not satisfy those who are looking for a narrowly defined focus, rather than for a comprehensive or broad-brush account of the big picture. This is not, it should be clearly stated, a book for those who know Indian society and politics well and are familiar with the debates on representation and identity politics in the Indian context. Even so, this book does seek to contribute something new to these debates. Firstly, it provides new primary data on the composition of the Lok Sabha (lower house) of the Indian Parliament, in terms of caste, religion, tribe and region, from 1991 onwards. This has arguably been the period in which the most tectonic and important shifts have taken place in Indian political processes. Similarly, the book provides new primary data on the Union Cabinet from 1990 onwards. Secondly, while there are more narrowly focused studies of particular groups – such as the dalits – and specific institutions – such as the electoral system – there is no single study which provides a comprehensive account of representation along the axes of caste, tribe and religion in xvii
xviii Preface by Niraja Gopal Jayal
the way in which this work does. The one dimension that is excluded is that of gender, which was outside the common terms of reference of the project. Finally, there is an attempt to mitigate the boredom of rather basic account of ethnic diversity (Chapter 2) by a discussion (in Chapter 3) of the overlapping nature of social and economic inequalities. This is a distinction frequently forgotten in the Indian academy, as the excitement of debates on multiculturalism has tended to occlude from scholarly vision the mutually compounding nature of cultural with material inequality, for instance, low caste status with low economic status. This book seeks to restore to the debate on ethnic inequality the centrality of the issue of material disadvantage, to suggest that a policy or political solution couched exclusively in the language of ethnicity and cultural identity is inadequate to the task of crafting a more equal society in which all groups – regardless of ethnic origin – enjoy the rights of citizenship in the fullest sense. Niraja Gopal Jayal
INDIA States and Union Territories
JAMMU & KASHMIR Srinagar
N HIMACHAL PRADESH
CHINA (TIBET)
ChandigarhShimla PUNJAB UTTARANCHAL Dehradun HARYANA DELHI
PAKISTAN
UTTAR PRADESH
RAJASTHAN Jaipur
NEP AL
Lucknow
SIKKIM Gangtok
Patna BIHAR
GUJARAT Gandhinagar
DIU DAMAN DADAR & NAGAR HAVELI
Bhopal MADHYA PRADESH
MAHARASHTRA Mumbai (Bombay)
A R A B I Panaji A GOA N S E A
Ranchi JHARKHAND
CHHATTISGARH Raipur ORISSA
Itanagar
BHUTAN
ASSAM Dispur Shillong
MEGHALAYA Agartala WEST TRIPURA BENGAL Calcutta
Bhubaneshwar
NAGALAND Kohima Imphal MANIPUR
Aizawl MIZORAM
MYANMAR
BANGLADESH
Hyderabad ANDHRA PRADESH
KARNATAKA Bangalore Chennai (Madras) MAHE (Pondicherry) TAMILNADU KERALA
LAKSHADWEEP
ARUNACHAL PRADESH
YANAM (Pondicherry)
PONDICHERRY (Puduchchery) KARAIKAL (Pondicherry)
BAY OF BENGAL
Port Blair ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS
Thiruvananthapuram
Map not to Scale
Copyright © Compare Infobase Pvt. Ltd. 2003
xix
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1 Representing India: Democracy and Diversity
This volume is part of a multi-country study exploring issues of inclusion, accommodation and cohesion in the way in which public institutions are constituted and managed in multi-ethnic societies. The framework of the project assumes that ethnic difference not merely shapes the identity of a state, but also structures the opportunities of access to institutions and the allocation of resources. The project explores the relationship between various types of diversity and representative opportunities in the governance of the public sector. The focus in on three institutions in particular: national legislatures, cabinets and the bureaucracy. Located in the overarching context of this research project, the present study is specifically about the Indian experience. In common with the other country-studies, it maps the landscape of ethnic diversity in broad brush-strokes, and provides an account of the institutional design to enhance representation for minorities and groups disadvantaged by virtue of ethnicity. It presents data on patterns of representation in institutions where there are safeguards specifically designed to guarantee representation, and in those where there are not. It attempts to explain the outcomes and to theorize the general conditions under which representativeness is enhanced. Finally, it also examines the tricky question of whether representation actually leads to better policy outcomes for disadvantaged groups, and reflects upon the politics of representation in the form of competitive and imitative ethnic mobilization.
Cultural pluralism, social inequality and the founding vision of citizenship in India Modern Indian nationhood was arguably a creation of the movement for freedom from British colonial rule. The geographical boundaries of 1
2 Representing India
India today bear little resemblance to those of British India, which was both more and less than what India is today: more in the sense that the erstwhile princely states which were outside the territorial jurisdiction of British rule are today part of India, and less in that the territories of modern Pakistan and Bangladesh were, at the time, part of British India. However, India’s vastness and diversity lies not only in its geographical spread but equally in the cultures that inhabit it. British colonial rule had contributed to the shaping of cultural identity, sometimes in divisive ways, and when the sun did finally set on the British Empire in India, it was partitioned into the two independent nations of India and Pakistan (which was subsequently also partitioned to create Bangladesh). India’s cultural diversity, and the politics of mobilization (along lines of caste and religious community) that it had spawned, with official encouragement in the colonial era, informed the social agenda of the movement for freedom, as also the constitutional design that was proposed for the new republic. The project of the founders of the republic was therefore the creation of a society whose citizens shared a strong sense of national identity despite cultural diversity; the protection of historically disadvantaged ethnic groups; and the management of diversity within a democratic framework. Unlike many nation-states, which are premised on the claim of a unique language, culture or race, the founding idea of India was an idea of the nation-state as intrinsically diverse and plural. There is of course some irony in the fact that while the identity of a nation is constructed on the premise of shared heritable characteristics (such as race, language or ethnicity), it is undermined only moments after the birth of the nation, as the latter embarks on a nation-building project, striving to transcend ‘divisive’ particularistic identities.1 Indeed, Bhikhu Parekh [1994] (2003) has reminded us of the transience of even national identity, as it is born out of interactions between historical experience and potentially endless future constructions and reconstructions. The conundrum between universalism and particularism can be recast and perhaps even resolved by postulating it as a distinction between a national identity defined in civic terms rather than in ethnic terms. (Beiner, 1995:8) In India, though national identity was defined in ‘national-civic’ rather than ‘national-ethnic’ terms, it remained a rather fragile construct, a somewhat complicated ‘national-civic-plural-ethnic’ combination that did not however seem to be chaotic or untidy, much less inconsistent. Thus, the Indian Constitution privileged the conception of universal citizenship, perceived as a critical dimension of the
Representing India: Democracy and Diversity 3
project of ‘nation-building’. At the same time, it consciously sought to accommodate the claims of minorities and disadvantaged groups on the grounds, variously, of protection or compensation for disadvantage, rather than on the grounds that these were distinctive interests that needed special representation in the political system.2 The normative weight, as between the universalist and particularist dimensions of citizenship clearly belongs to the former, with the latter merely facilitating the realization of the background conditions of equality, and so advancing the eventual accomplishment of the universalist ideal. Conflicts between these two dimensions were perhaps inevitable, even though the optimism of the time precluded any serious attention to the mechanisms by which these might be resolved. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph have pithily and correctly summarized this: ‘The contradiction in India’s concept of secularism was its simultaneous commitment to communities and to equal citizenship’. (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987:178) (emphasis added) The project of Indian modernity – and its approach to cultural diversity – is nowhere better exemplified than in Jawaharlal Nehru’s Discovery of India, which was unarguably the locus classicus of the unity-in-diversity approach. His understanding of communal conflict between the Hindus and Muslims was irreproachably Marxist (Nehru, 1989:466–7) and, therefore, poverty, backwardness, caste, region and religion were all viewed as different faces of the same retrograde phenomenon, which could be transcended only by the alliance of science, reason and economic development. Modernization, on this account, would provide an impetus to processes of secularization, and the conflict between universalist and particularist citizenship would be negotiated and ultimately resolved on this terrain. The mainstream secular nationalist position of the time echoed Nehru in holding up economic modernization as the answer. Minoo Masani’s Our India – 19533 was a manifesto of the new India as it embarked on the ambitious project of what was then called ‘nationbuilding’. It spoke of the diversity of India in every sphere, from the natural and physical to the economic and social, suggesting that this enormous diversity should be harnessed in the cause of planned economic development, which would lead to enhanced productivity and eventually the conquest of poverty. The new India was to be constructed, rather like the Soviet utopia on which it was modelled, through a variety of economic activities. Cultural differences, however, were cheerfully swept under the carpet, and a centralizing model of political and economic development was assumed to be the appropriate
4 Representing India
instrument through which the idea of India would, willy-nilly, get fashioned. On this view, the primordial identities of caste and language would gradually wither away as economic modernization and its concomitants – widespread literacy, urbanization, modern bureaucratic and managerial structures and social mobility – struck roots. It was, of course, intended that these processes would be facilitated by a strong interventionist state, and complemented by India’s role as a leader of the decolonized and decolonizing nations of the world. Thus, though the Indian Constitution – ‘openly and determinedly secular’ (Galanter, 1984:305) – privileged the conception of universal citizenship, it also consciously sought to accommodate the claims of minorities and ascriptively-defined disadvantaged groups. Instead of adopting an identical strategy of accommodation towards different cultural communities, therefore, the state in independent India has devised different institutional mechanisms for giving recognition to their interests. This is why the constitution makes different policy provisions for different types of ‘differences’, each justified in terms of some criterion of appropriateness. The constitutional attempt to balance the demands of universalist citizenship with the special needs of communities4 took the form, first, of a recognition that, along with equal civil and political rights for all citizens, it is important to secure and guarantee the rights of religious minorities. This was done through guarantees for the freedom of religion, including the freedom to practice and propagate it, as well as through providing for separate personal laws for members of minority communities, alongside a universally applicable criminal law. The promise of equality, secondly, was given greater content through constitutional provisions for affirmative action for the scheduled castes and tribes, both in public employment as well as in the central and state legislatures. Finally, at the macro-institutional level, a federal structure based on linguistic boundaries, was legislated. The overarching framework for all these was a liberal-democratic polity of the parliamentary type, with a multi-party system. The institutions of governance were thus intended to conform to the liberal-individualist conception of equal citizenship, encompassing equal rights for all citizens and upholding the principle of equality before the law. The only significant exceptions to this were (a) the recognition of certain categories of rights for which (cultural) communities rather than individuals would be the bearers of rights; and (b) the provisions for compensatory discrimination for historically disadvantaged groups. How were these exceptions justified? In the nor-
Representing India: Democracy and Diversity 5
mative argument that underpinned the departure from the principle of equality, the underlying assumption in respect of religious minorities was that the democratic principle of equality is an insufficient guarantee for minorities who will, in the presence of a dominant majority, always be insecure in the enjoyment of their cultural rights. In relation to members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, the normative justification was that equality of opportunity would be effectively denied to these groups as they could not, given their histories of marginalization, compete on really equal terms, and hence required special guarantees of access to education and public employment as enabling background conditions of equality. In other words, the reservation of seats in public institutions was not, as it seemed to be, a denial of equality; on the contrary, it was a measure designed to promote effective equality. The separate personal laws as also policies of compensatory discrimination were, it should be mentioned, viewed as interim measures on the path to a society in which greater social equality and processes of secularization would eventually lead to the universalist norms of citizenship becoming firmly entrenched, and render special provisions redundant. Thus, the long-term objective of a uniform civil code was quietly tucked away along with other good intentions in the chapter on Directive Principles of State Policy, to be realized when secularization processes would make its retrieval less contentious. The provisions for reservations for the scheduled castes and tribes were given an unwarrantedly optimistic ten-year term that has subsequently been extended by Parliament every ten years. As is only too well known, both these have been highly contentious issues in Indian politics in the 1990s. The first has created unexpected paradoxes, as when the endorsement of religious personal law by the state, also entails acquiescing in the violation of individual rights and principles of gender justice. Similarly, though policies of affirmative action have been extended to castes previously outside their fold, they have often led to the formation of new elites within the formerly excluded groups and generated imitative patterns of politicization. In recent times, the biggest challenge to this founding vision, based on cultural pluralism, has been the Hindu nationalism of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which led a coalition government at the centre from 1998–2004. This attempt to create a new unity, itself parasitic upon particularistic interests, also diminishes the currency previously enjoyed by the universalistic conception of citizenship and the commitment to political inclusion.
6 Representing India
Democracy, representation and quotas As we have noted, guaranteed representation, in the form of quotas, is constitutionally provided only to the members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Why was such representation assumed to be the optimal way of redressing social inequalities, and why was it not extended to all disadvantaged groups? When the desirability of a legislative body fairly representing all sections of the people in a political community is asserted, the conception of representation that is appealed to is microcosmic representation, as distinct from delegated or symbolic representation.5 In microcosmic representation, the main characteristics of a population should be mirrored in, say, the assembly, so reflecting the social composition of the nation in microcosm. (Birch, 1971:39) Further, the role the legislator is expected to play vis-à-vis her/his electors is central to the issue of who can and should represent a people. When James Mill said that ‘The benefits of the representative system are lost in all cases in which the interests of the choosing body are not the same with those of the community’, he was speaking of a political community rather than of an ascriptively defined social group within the larger political community. Today, in the age of universal adult franchise, universally defined rights of political citizenship are widely viewed as insufficient guarantees of the representation of acriptively defined social groups. As such, the question of making special provision for the interests and preferences of minority social groups has assumed great importance. The first assumption here is that a community needs to speak for itself and its interests if its potential is to be realized. This is accompanied by the assumption that only members of a particular community are capable of expressing the interests of, and working for the good of, that community and that nobody else can do this. The question of how a legislator can best represent the interests of her constituents finds varying answers in theories of representation within the liberal tradition. In the Whig theory of representation, for instance, the elected representative deliberates independently on national policies, and is obliged to consult only his own judgement and not, on every issue, the wishes of his constituents. The most famous defence of this position is found in Edmund Burke’s Address to the Electors of Bristol in 1774. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
Representing India: Democracy and Diversity 7
….Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors, from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You chose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. (Burke in Hill, ed. 1975:158) Diametrically opposed to this is the Levellers’ conception of representation, underpinned by a radical notion of popular sovereignty, viewing the political representative as an agent sent to Parliament by his electors to give or withhold their consent to measures of taxation and legislation proposed by the executive. It is evident that safeguarded quotas implicitly uphold the latter conception of the representative, sent to Parliament to represent the particular interests of the group. The denial of quotas to religious minorities was of course underpinned by memories of the divisive colonial institution of separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims, and the creation of the independent state of Pakistan on the basis of religion.
The imperfections of representation: normative and empirical Despite guarantees and safeguards in the form of quotas, representation is attended by two sets of imperfections, which we will here label as normative and empirical. It is possible to identify at least three normative imperfections in the representative ideal. Firstly, and most fundamentally, representation is a compromise with the democratic ideal in its fullest sense, which is perhaps realizable only in a direct democracy. As such, representation is the answer to the question of how to arrive at a practical second-best mechanism for representing the interests and preferences of individual members of a democratic polity. Secondly, representation presumes an identity between the represented and the representative. As we have already noted, the dispute between mandate (the idea that the representative is antecedently bound by the mandate of her/his constituents) and independence (the idea that the representative enjoys a certain independence of mind and judgement in assessing the public interest) remains, perhaps inevitably, unresolved. (Pitkin, 1989:142) But this issue can become contentious when
8 Representing India
we consider the problem of internal minorities such as women belonging to religious groups that are controlled by men and make claims for the rights of cultural community that may work to the detriment of women within those communities. Thirdly, it is widely recognized that individuals have multiple identities, and that one may be black, a woman and a Muslim, all at the same time. Can any one representative represent all these identities? The argument for guarantees of representative opportunities for groups that are likely to be disadvantaged does not however attend to the three normative imperfections listed above. The rationale for safeguarded quotas for representing particular social groups lies in the reality of the way representative institutions actually work: in that they do not ensure adequate policy concern for groups which are marginalized or excluded. It is this political exclusion of some that provides the best justification for what Anne Phillips has described as a politics of presence (in which women, ethnic minorities and other excluded groups are guaranteed fair representation) as opposed to a politics of ideas (a political choice between policies and programmes of political parties, rather than on the basis of group concerns and interests). (Phillips, 1996) Thus, a politics of ideas provides a choice between the political programmes of different parties in a democracy; a politics of presence works to represent all shades of opinion and interests through the assured presence in decision-making bodies of all groups in society. It is however important to distinguish between (a) the logic of affirmative action as it aims to provide access – through reservations – to opportunities of education and/or employment, and (b) the logic of quota-based representation which is aimed at providing guaranteed access to the process of decision-making through participation in elected legislative bodies. Unlike affirmative action, which provides access to essentially material goods and opportunities, representation in elected bodies provides those who come in through quotas with a voice in decision-making. As such, it invokes more fully the ideal of citizenship, of participation in the collective deliberation by members of a polity in matters relating to its future. In the Indian case, however, it is arguable that the objective was not microcosmic representation, nor even a politics of presence. The purpose of quotas was the enhancement of the capabilities of the disadvantaged groups through the equalization of background conditions. This is why the eventual phasing out of these was envisaged. In empirical terms, it may be observed that even when representation is guaranteed, the advantages do not always translate into desirable
Representing India: Democracy and Diversity 9
policy outcomes. How can we assess the outcomes of representation? This study makes a case for evaluating at least three types of outcomes: policy outcomes, societal outcomes and political outcomes. The first helps us to assess the extent to which quotas have actually expanded access to domains from which such groups were previously excluded, and the extent to which such access has been universalized within groups. Societal outcomes can be assessed in terms of the increased insecurity of minorities and their vulnerability to violence; the generation of resentment among other less disprivileged groups; the fragmentation of civil society; and the fate and future of the project of universal citizenship, nationhood and nation-building. Thirdly, and finally, political outcomes in terms of patterns of political mobilization, as well as state capacity and state discourse, are important. This study uses these broad categories to frame its conclusions.
Structure of the book Seeking an explanation for the representational outcomes in three institutions, this book examines the role of the constitutional framework; institutional design; laws and policies; and the political process. As such, this study has three major components: an analysis of social cleavages, informed by an understanding of their construction over time, as also the way in which they are shaped by the institutions and policies designed to manage diversity; the ethnic composition of three major public sector institutions, viz. Parliament, the cabinet, and the bureaucracy; and, finally, the party and electoral systems which mediate the relationship between the first two. In Chapter 2, an attempt is made to map ethnic diversity in India in the most basic descriptive terms, and to link the disadvantages associated with ascriptive identities with social and economic deprivation. Chapter 3 specifies and describes the constitutional mechanisms and institutions devised to manage diversity and redress inequalities. It shows how these have evolved in the course of the struggle for national freedom as well as through ethnic conflict after independence. The construction of identity forms a necessary part of this narrative, which also helps to nuance the ‘objective’ account of diversity that is provided in Chapter 2. The Indian Constitution provided safeguards for the rights of religious minorities, but guaranteed reservations in education and public employment for only two categories of historically disadvantaged social groups, viz. the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and the Scheduled Tribes (STs). In subsequent decades, these
10 Representing India
provisions were supplemented with additional institutions, laws and policy initiatives specifically designed to advance the welfare of these groups as well as of religious minorities. These ranged from essentially protective institutions such as the National Minorities Commission and the Commissioner (later National Commission) for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (NCSCST) to promotional initiatives such as rural and tribal development programmes. Most recently, constitutional amendments were enacted to revive the institutions of local selfgovernment, with provisions for reservation for these groups as well as for women. Chapter 4 describes and assesses the performance of some of these institutions. The first three chapters thus provide a snapshot account of linguistic, regional, caste and tribal diversity in India, and the institutional mechanisms designed to manage these within a democratic framework. It particularly emphasizes the overlap between what may be called symbolic or cultural inequalities and economic inequalities, to argue that neither the constitutional design, nor subsequent law and policy, have been adequately attentive to this overlap. There have been even fewer attempts to engage in an ongoing stocktaking of the actual distribution of advantages, insofar as these could be expected to address intra-group inequalities. Also, while the constitution and various official commissions have defined backwardness in social and educational terms, the same criteria have not been employed to take cognizance of the existence of backward groups within religious minorities like the Muslims. As far as the specific set of institutions being examined across countries in this research project is concerned, it is notable that quotas have been institutionalized in the lower house of Parliament (the Lok Sabha) as also in the bureaucracy, but not in the formation of Cabinets. Nevertheless, it has been customary to attend to regional and religious differences in Cabinet-formation, though many would argue that – given that Members of Parliament (MPs) from the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes generally become junior Ministers, but almost never hold important party or cabinet positions6 – this is little more than tokenism. Given these limitations of institutional design and state policy, in what way has the party political process contributed to the representational pattern in public sector institutions? In the constitution of the legislature, it is frequently assumed that the choice of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system generates representational outcomes skewed in favour of majorities. The Indian experience however belies this, to the extent that a more diverse national legislature has actually been achieved despite the FPTP system. This is largely
Representing India: Democracy and Diversity 11
attributable to the emergence, in the 1990s, of smaller parties whose strategies of electoral mobilization are based on social cleavages such as caste. Since 1989, the party system has become increasingly fragmented with the number of national parties remaining more or less constant, while the number of state parties have more than doubled. The carving up of parliament among a large number of parties has also led to another outcome that is generally associated with proportional representation (PR) systems, viz. coalition government. The role of political parties in mobilizing identity has been crucial not just to the processes of identity-formation and construction, but also to the many forms of political conflict that have besieged the Indian polity. Whether it was the sons-of-the-soil type of political articulation (as witnessed in Maharashtra and Assam in the 1970s and 1980s respectively, and uncannily resurfacing again today); or the sub-national, occasionally even secessionist, assertions of autonomy (as in Punjab in the 1980s); or the assertions of ‘social (as an euphemism for caste) justice’; all these challenges to the Indian state have been led by political parties of at least regional importance. They have severely tested the ability of the state to accommodate new demands based in ethnicity, with some – such as Kashmir – remaining unresolved to the present. How do political parties express the aspirations of particular social constituencies? In the current situation of a multiplicity of parties and greater political fragmentation of identity, is it more strategic for parties to seek to narrow rather than broad-base their appeal in ethnic terms? In particular, do the national parties work towards greater representation, e.g. in the distribution of tickets to winnable parliamentary seats, and in the formation of party committees and cabinets? Chapter 5 of this study explores in some detail the relationship between the electoral and party systems, on the one hand, and the representational outcomes, on the other. It argues that while, on the surface, the evidence appears to support the hypothesis that in ethnically divided societies, national parties are inevitably forced to broadbase their appeal, the Indian experience suggests some important caveats. For the first few decades after independence, the Congress itself – as the single dominant ‘umbrella’ party – represented a coalition of this kind, albeit by encompassing a wide range of diversity within its own fold. For this period, the hypothesis held true, even though there was of course only one dominant party on the political landscape. The erosion of the wide support base of the Congress was accompanied by the emergence of a large number of regional parties,
12 Representing India
many of whom claim to represent particular sections of society, such as the backward castes. The coalition that ruled from 1998–2004 was led by the BJP, whose way of broad-basing its appeal was the exact reverse of the Nehruvian-Congress model. Rather than seeking to build a social coalition on the basis of respect for diversity, it chose to posit an alternative construction of identity: an overarching Hindu identity, which can submerge multiple identities (of, for example, caste and language), to yield a potential jackpot of a four-fifths majority. The party system is arguably going through a transitional phase in which neither of the two so-called national parties is capable of forming a government on its own. The Congress, which once had this ability, has now lost it, partly through organizational attenuation and partly through the gradual loss of sections of its social base. The BJP has not yet developed such a capacity. Consequently, even as both these parties represent themselves as national forces, they are necessarily dependent upon the support of a variety of regional and state-level players that can deliver the seats required to make up a majority. In themselves, they have come to constitute the two poles around which parties may cluster and coalition governments become viable, though the Congress’s ability to lead a coalition is yet to be tested or demonstrated. The imperatives of coalition-building are, therefore, less about representativeness and more about government-formation. To the extent that the governments so formed are broadly representative is an unintended consequence of this imperative. Chapter 5 of the study extrapolates from Election Commission data, combined with recent political history and analysis, to provide an account of and explanation for, the nature of alliances and coalitions that have emerged in the 1990s, and the current transition the party system in the country is undergoing. In Chapter 6, we examine three public sector institutions in some detail, viz. Parliament, the Union Cabinet, the bureaucracy and political party executives, with some additional reflections on the judiciary, the military and political party executives. Most of the data in this chapter has been generated especially for this study, to document the shifts in the patterns of representation over time, and to analyse the possible reasons for the slower pace of change in, say, the bureaucracy as compared to the legislature. The composition of the lower house of the Indian Parliament over the last five terms is discussed through primary data that have involved the profiling of approximately 540 members of parliament in each of the last four Lok Sabhas, in addition to the current house, elected in May 2004. Since information
Representing India: Democracy and Diversity 13
about their ethnic backgrounds is not officially documented, this exercise has substantially relied upon interviews with expert informants from the various states of India. The data make it clear that this, more than any other sphere of Indian society, has witnessed a broadening of the social base. Though the percentages may not appear to be very dramatic, in real terms the character of Parliament has certainly changed, as many non-elite groups that were not formerly a part of the political process now are. Data on the Union Cabinet were already available from 1947 to 1990. However, the period since 1990 – following increasing backward caste assertions – is a period of more rapid change than the previous four decades, and this is captured in the primary data collected for this latter period, and organized by Prime Ministerial terms. This also coheres with the time-period chosen for the section on Parliament. In methodological terms, it should be clarified that, for this section of the study, one representative Cabinet of each Prime Minister was chosen, with the cabinet size being taken as the average of that Prime Minister’s cabinets at different points in time. On bureaucracy, the only existing diversity data was part of a study (Goyal, 1989) that used the raw data available as on 1 January 1985. In this study, we began our data collection exercise from the year 1975, taking the 10 most important Ministries of the Union Government, in addition to the Prime Minister’s Secretariat (later Office) and the Cabinet Secretariat, and identifying all the officers of Joint Secretary and above in each of these Ministries for every five years between 1975 and 1995 (i.e., 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995). Those belonging to services other than the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) were excluded, generating a sample of over 100 officers in each time-slice, all belonging to the IAS, institutional successor to the so-called heavenborn Indian Civil Service (ICS) of colonial times. The religious and caste diversity data of the higher echelons of the Union Government is supplemented here by official data following the extension of reservation to the other backward classes (OBCs); some data pertaining to the Indian Forest Service, abstracted from official reports; and data on Muslims in the administration from other sources. These data are interpreted to present a broad picture of the ethnic composition of the bureaucracy. There would be little or no disagreement about the fact that the panoply of institutions and policies created to manage diversity have failed to substantively address the disadvantages that mark the condition of the vast majority of these groups. This is only partially
14 Representing India
explained by the fact that elites within these groups have tended to corner the benefits and reproduce them inter-generationally. More alarming is the widely noted fact that despite quotas having provided for their presence in the legislature and the bureaucracy, the policy initiatives for these groups have been woefully inadequate. A more radical argument would, with some justice, blame this failure on the entrenched social hierarchies that underwrite the stranglehold of the upper castes and upper classes (and sometimes these are the same) on Indian society. It will be argued in this book that any explanation for the patterns of representation of ethnic diversity in public sector institutions in India has to be multi-faceted. It must take on board the nature of the institutional design as well as other policy initiatives, their promise and performance. The extent to which these have failed to address the material underpinnings of social and cultural difference may point us to the flaws in institutional design, or to the entrenched character of social hierarchies, and the interaction of both these with the political process, specifically the role of the party and electoral systems. As such, there is a need to historicize the Indian political and institutional experience, as much as we have noted the importance of historicizing various identity-constructions. This study will highlight the overlap between cultural and material inequalities and argue that any policy strategy which addresses only the cultural and symbolic aspects – through the politics of recognition – is likely to be deficient to the extent that it fails to simultaneously encompass economic inequalities – or the politics of redistribution – as well. Secondly, this work will describe the patterns of representation as they have emerged in three governing institutions – parliament, cabinet and the bureaucracy – in relation both to policies such as compensatory discrimination, and in relation to the political strategies of parties and the electoral system. Finally, the work will evaluate the usefulness of guaranteed political and administrative representation as a strategy for offsetting the effects of social and economic inequalities. It will do so through an examination of its societal and political consequences as well as policy outcomes.
2 Mapping Diversity in India
The President of the Indian republic today is a Tamil-speaking Muslim from southern India, the Prime Minister is a Punjabi-speaking Sikh, and the President of the ruling Congress Party is an Italian-born Catholic. None of this is particularly astonishing in a large country where diversity is almost a cliché, and where, though the boundaries of ethnicities cannot always be very clearly demarcated, claims couched in the vocabulary of ethnicity are regularly made and contested. The cultural diversity of the Indian nation is however not merely a composite of multiple ethnically distinct units. It is rather a product of criss-crossing and overlapping identities based in region, language, religion, sect, caste and tribe. Though India is a crucible of cultural diversities, it defies characterization as an ethnic structure. This is because the identities that have crystallized on the basis of these diversities have historically been invented and re-invented, through negotiation with each other and with political authority. These processes have, in no small measure, shaped our perception and understanding, indeed even our description, of these diversities. This study begins by mapping diversity in India in broad brush-strokes, in terms of linguistic, regional, religious and caste differences, though without losing sight of the fact that these descriptions cannot be seen as objective or definitive. The discussion of diversities in this chapter must however be prefaced by three caveats. Firstly, it is well established that identities are shifting and fluid, and subject to processes of invention and re-invention, making some of them more politically salient than others at particular points in time. It is in these terms that we may view the recent attempt by the forces of Hindutva, to construct a homogenized Hindu social order, to replace a plural society with one that is unipolar or, at best, bipolar. 15
16 Representing India
The interaction between shifting and fluid identities, processes of political mobilization, and state policy have contributed to fixing and reifying some identities, even as they overwrite and dissolve others. There is moreover a disconcerting lack of permanence about these. Consequently, any description of ethnic structure must be seen as historically contingent with respect to both the past and the future. Secondly, quite apart from the contingency of ethnic identity, there are also many overlaps such that co-religionists of different language groups may have less in common with each other than with other members of the same linguistic, but different religious, community. Thus, a Muslim in Kerala may have more in common with other Malayalam-speakers in his own state than with a Muslim in Bihar. In all likelihood, the two may belong to very different sects and be governed by rather different customary laws. This suggests that social cleavages in India are cross-cutting rather than reinforcing. The social universe of most Indian citizens is composed of multi-layered identities encompassing language, region, caste, religion, as well as the more ‘modern’ secular identities of being an Indian, a woman, or an urban professional. A third important aspect of ethnicity in India is that it frequently overlaps with other forms of disadvantage. Caste inequality is frequently – though not invariably – accompanied by economic deprivation, which makes it that much more difficult to address through policy initiatives. Traditional and historical forms of social inequality thus co-exist with, and are reinforced by, inequalities arising out of the sphere of production and economic activity. Alongside its description of ethnic diversity in India, this study provides some illustrations of the widely acknowledged overlap between, say, social marginalization and material disadvantage in terms of income levels as well as human development indicators. While identity is not a primordial given, and is subject to construction by political actors, the convergence between social and economic disadvantage cautions us against adopting a purely constructivist position and so dismissing the problem as a political artefact. The mobilization of identity for regional autonomy or for greater representation in governing institutions cannot be dismissed as altogether invalid simply because it has become an instrument of politics. The diversity of Indian society is very real and the imperative of making the structures of governance reflect this diversity was recognized by the Congress Party before independence1 and given formal expression in the Constitution of India in 1950. If the practice of the last half-century
Mapping Diversity in India 17
belies this expectation, it also begs the question of what explains the actual representational outcomes. This chapter attempts to map ethnic diversity in India in the most basic descriptive terms, even at the risk of some over-simplification. It does so along the four main axes of language, religion, caste and tribe, and keeping in view the major contestations around these categories. More importantly, and following from the discussion (in Chapter 1) of how the politics of recognition have often tended to eclipse the politics of redistribution, this chapter also emphasizes the importance of linking the disadvantages associated with ascriptive identities with social and economic deprivation.
Language Unsurprisingly, given the size of the country, India manifests immense linguistic diversity. The main source for data on languages is the Census of India, which determines the number of speakers of a particular language, on the basis of the language reported by individuals as their ‘mother tongue’. In 1961, the Census recorded a total of 1652 languages, of which it identified 197 as dominant languages. The 1981 Census recorded 106 dominant languages, with the drop in number signifying not the sudden disappearance of languages but the decision to record only those that were reported by more than 10,000 speakers as their ‘mother tongue’. All of these 106 languages do not possess the status of an official language. The Eighth Schedule of the Constitution lists the 18 languages accorded recognition as ‘official’ languages. The term official language is distinct from ‘national’ language, and merely denotes the language in which the State conducts transactions. The original Eighth Schedule listed 14 official languages, and was later expanded to include four others, including Sindhi, Manipuri, Konkani and Nepali. Among the ‘unwritten’ criteria for including a language in the Eighth Schedule are the following: that the language should have a literary tradition of its own, and preferably a separate script; or that it should have a sufficient number of speakers, preferably in a geographically contiguous area; or that it should be a classical language which is a root language for other modern languages. Sometimes, a language may gain admittance as the main language of a newly created state. It was in this way that Manipuri and Konkani entered the Eighth Schedule, as the languages of the states of Manipur and Goa respectively. Nepali or Gorkhali was given this status as a way of making political concessions to the large
18 Representing India
number of Nepalese people in India. However, there remain many languages which are spoken by over a million people but are not included in the Schedule, though claims have been made – and even protest movements mounted – for their inclusion. Examples of these are Dogri (spoken in parts of Jammu and Himachal Pradesh), Bhili and Gondi (languages of tribal peoples) and many others. The languages spoken by the people of India belong to five linguistic families: Indo-Aryan, Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic, Tibeto-Burman and Andamanese. The Indo-Aryan languages include Hindi, Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati, Oriya, Punjabi and Assamese, while the Dravidian languages include Tamil, Telegu, Kannada and Malayalam. The official languages, along with the number and percentage of their speakers, are indicated in Table 2.1 based on the Census of 1991.2 This does not include the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It is important to note that these figures do not include those who speak English (estimated at 2.5%, but an ever-increasing number). Further, on December 23, 2003, Parliament enacted the Constitutional (One Hundredth) Amendment bill, approving the inclusion of Maithili,3 Table 2.1
Official languages in India
Hindi Bengali Telugu Marathi Tamil Urdu Gujarati Kannada Malayalam Oriya Punjabi Assamese Sindhi Nepali Konkani Manipuri Kashmiri Sanskrit Other Languages Total: Source: Census of India, 1991.
Number
Percentage
337,272,114 69,595,738 66,017,615 62,481,681 53,006,368 43,406,932 40,673,814 32,753,676 30,377,176 28,061,313 23,378,744 13,079,696 2,122,848 2,076,645 1,760,607 1,270,216 56,693 49,736 31,142,376 838,583,988
40.22% 8.30% 7.87% 7.45% 6.32% 5.18% 4.85% 3.91% 3.62% 3.35% 2.79% 1.56% 0.25% 0.25% 0.21% 0.15% 0.01% 0.01% 3.71% 100.00%
Mapping Diversity in India 19
Dogri and two tribal languages, Bodo and Santhali, in the Eighth Schedule, taking the number of official languages in the country to 22. The inclusion of Bodo was part of the memorandum of settlement between the Bodos,4 the Government of Assam and the Central Government. Santhali was included because it was widely spoken by another tribal group in the north-east. In the debate on the bill, the Deputy Prime Minister stated that the government proposed to bring a comprehensive legislation to include more languages in the Schedule, as there were 35 more such demands pending, many of which were from various dialects of Hindi such as Rajasthani, Bhojpuri and Braj Bhasha. (The Hindu, December 23, 2003) Though the Constitution does not specify any particular privileges, the status of an Eighth Schedule language is much coveted, as it carries with it the privilege of simultaneous translation facilities in parliamentary proceedings; the possibility of taking the civil service examinations in the language; the allocation of central government funding for developing the language and its literature; the eligibility to compete for literary and film awards; the right to submit a representation for the redressal of a grievance to the state; and so forth. (Singh, 2003:743) Despite the privileges granted to the official languages, however, there are some constitutional provisions which inhibit their implementation. Article 348, for instance, stipulates that, until the Parliament by law so provides, the language of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts shall be English. It will also be the language of Parliament, in that all legislation shall be enacted in English, as will orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws. Finally, ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor of a state will also be in English. The next article stipulates that no such change may be contemplated for a period of 15 years (from the enactment of the Constitution) and even then only if the President is convinced of the need for such a change. At the same time, the Constitution states that it shall be ‘the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India…’ (Article 351) As we shall see, the issue of Hindi being given the status of a ‘national’ language has been a politically contentious one, that can now with reasonable confidence be declared dead. In the recent parliamentary debate on the inclusion of four new languages into the Eighth Schedule, for example, the Deputy Prime Minister (a BJP hardliner) said that English would retain its current status because ‘National unity is more important than the language issue’. (The Hindu, December 23, 2003)
20 Representing India
It has been argued that Eighth Schedule status gives a language clout, for Out of the 1650 languages spoken in India, only a handful dominate the language scene because the schedule empowers 18 languages in terms of access to recognition, prestige, education, judiciary, administration, trade, commerce, national communication networks, and access to funds for development. (Chandhoke, forthcoming:34) Four articles of the Constitution protect the rights of minorities to preserve their distinct language, script or culture (Article 29); to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice (Article 30); to make representations for the redress of grievances to the state or central government in any language (Article 350); and to receive instruction in their mother-tongue at the level of primary education (Article 350A). According to Article 347 of the Constitution, if the President is ‘satisfied that a substantial proportion of the population of a State desire the use of any language spoken by them to be recognised by that State, (he may) direct that such language shall also be officially recognised by that State or any part thereof for such purpose as he may specify’. This provision makes it possible for certain districts within states to have an additional ‘official’ language apart from the official language of the state. Official rules and notices can be issued in the specified language, even though it is a minority language, so long as its speakers constitute 15–20% of the population at the tehsil/municipality level, or 60% of the population of a district. The Constitution also establishes a Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities which functions as a watchdog for the rights of linguistic minorities. Speakers of a language listed in Eighth Schedule, who form a minority in a particular state, can thus exercise their right to be educated in their mother-tongue at primary school, and appeal against discrimination in this respect. It is, above all, the federal organization of the polity, with states based on language, that represents the institutional recognition of linguistic diversity.
Religion According to the 2001 Census (see Table 2.2), 80.5% of India’s population is Hindu. The remaining 19.5% is divided between Muslims (13.4%), Christians (2.3%), Sikhs (1.9%), with the Buddhists, Jains, Jews, Zoroastrians and others constituting less than 1% each. All the
Mapping Diversity in India 21 Table 2.2 groups
Religions of India and key social indices of the major religious
Religion
1. Hindus 2. Muslims 3. Christians 4. Sikhs 5. Buddhists 6. Jains 7. Others ALL INDIA
Population
Proportion
827,578,868 138,188,240 24,080,016 19,215,730 7,955,207 4,225,053 6,639,626 1,028,610,328
80.5 13.4 2.3 1.9 0.8 0.4 0.6 –
Sex Sex Ratio ratio 931 936 1009 893 953 940 992 933
925 950 964 786 942 870 976 927
Literacy Rate (0–6) 65.1 59.1 80.3 69.4 72.7 94.1 47.0 64.8
Female Work Literacy Participation Rate Rate 53.2 50.1 76.2 63.1 61.7 90.6 33.2 53.7
40.4 31.3 39.7 37.7 40.6 32.9 48.4 –
Source: Abstracted from the Census of India, 2001.
world’s major religions have a presence and following in India. Of these, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism are ‘Indic’ religions which took birth here, while the others – Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Zoroastrianism – came from outside. The category of ‘Others’ includes those professing the Jewish or Zoroastrian faiths. It should be noted that the category of the Hindu as employed in the Census is an artefact. It includes the dalits (formerly untouchable castes) who have for centuries been excluded from, or subsisted on the margins of, mainstream caste-defined Hindu society. It is arguable that if these groups were excluded from the category of Hindu, the proportion of Hindus in the total population of the country may come down to two-thirds from its present four-fifths. Similarly, tribal people are often counted as Hindus. Colonial ethnographers described them as practising ‘animism’, but many of them today practise folk Hinduism or Christianity. Despite recent attempts to construct a Hindu political identity, Hindu society has been and continues to be highly fragmented – and internally competitive – along lines of caste, sect, ritual and social practices, class, region and language. In terms of both doctrine and practice, Hinduism has been described as ‘a federation of faiths which has a horizontal as well as vertical distribution, rather than a single homogeneous religion. Not only do the religious beliefs and practices of Hindus vary from one cultural region of the country to another (say, between Bengal and Maharashtra), Hindu castes in each area are also characterized by similar differences.’ (Madan, 2003:775) Hindus are spread all over the country and outnumber people of all other religions in most states, with the exception of Arunachal Pradesh
22 Representing India
(where they represent 37% of the population), Punjab (34%), Meghalaya (15%), Nagaland (10%), and Mizoram (5%) (and 5% also in the Union Territory of Lakshadweep). In all these states, as indeed they would be in Jammu and Kashmir, Hindus are the principal minority. The only other religious community with a similar spread are the Muslims. The second largest religious community in the country, the Muslims – at 13.4% of the Indian population – account for two-thirds of all the religious minorities taken together. This is despite the fact that, at the time of the partition of India, the Muslims accounted for 24% of the country’s population, exactly double of what it is today. While the 1991 Census was not conducted in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, in the 1981 Census, the Muslims accounted for 64% of the population of the state. They also account for 94% of the Union Territory of Lakshadweep. Muslims are the main minority in the states of Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Kerala, in all of which their proportion in the population ranges between 15%–28%. They are also the chief minority – though with smaller proportions – in the states of Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Haryana and Delhi, in all of which states their number exceeds one million. (Muslim India 227, November 2001) The differentiation and heterogeneity noted in the case of the Hindus is characteristic of Indian Muslims too. Though just three states (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) account for more than half the population of Muslims in India, there are Muslim communities in many regions and, which is more important, there is considerable variation between them in terms of region, culture and language, making it difficult to speak in terms of Muslims in India as a monolithic or homogeneous category. Christians form the majority community in three states, all of which are located in north-east India: Nagaland (where they represent 88% of the population), Mizoram (86%) and Meghalaya (65%). They happen to be the biggest minority in the states of Manipur, Goa, Daman and Diu, the Union Territory of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. They are also internally differentiated, with about half of the approximately 20 million Christians – i.e., over 9 million – being Roman Catholic, and about eight million being Protestant (belonging to a variety of churches). (Larson, 1997:23) Of the other religions of India, Sikhs form the majority in the state of Punjab (63%), and are the principal minority in the neighbouring state of Haryana (6%) and in the Union Territory of Chandigarh (20%), which also happens to be the shared capital of these two states.
Mapping Diversity in India 23
Buddhists predominate only in the district of Ladakh – in the state of Jammu and Kashmir – where they account for three-quarters of the population, but have a significant presence also in Sikkim (27%), Arunachal Pradesh (13%), and Mizoram (8%). Jains are concentrated in Rajasthan, Delhi and in the southern coastal states. The category of ‘Other Persuasions’, which includes the Zoroastrians and the Jews, accounts for less than 0.4% of India’s population. The Zoroastrians – better known as the Parsis – are mostly located in the urbanized areas of Maharashtra and Gujarat. The Zoroastrian population of the world is estimated to number 120,000, and four-fifths of these live in India. The Jewish people in India are located in Calcutta (the so-called Baghdadi Jews); Cochin (the Cochin Jews); and Bombay (the Bene Israel Jews). In 1947, there were estimated to be about 25,000 Jews in India, and many are now believed to have left for Israel. (Larson, 1997:29–30) It is also important to remember that none of these religions is practised in a uniform or undifferentiated way across the country. Each has witnessed significant reform movements over the centuries; and each has conflicting theological schools and is characterized by internal sectarian differences. Above all, the way in which boundaries between people professing different faiths are experienced and transcended in everyday life can be very different from the scripturally given boundaries. People have, over centuries, learnt to live together separately. Many of the Indic religions are found also in the neighbouring states of Nepal (which is a Hindu state, both in terms of the faith professed by the majority of its population, as well as in terms of being a declared Hindu state), and Sri Lanka (Buddhism and Hinduism). Bangladesh and Pakistan are primarily Muslim, but also have Hindu, Christian and Buddhist minorities. Other than the agitation for a separate Sikh state of Khalistan in the 1980s, conflicts around religion in India have, for the most part, centered around the relationship between Hindus and Muslims. In Chapter 3, we shall examine the politicization of religious identity in colonial India leading up to the Partition; the constitutional protections for religious minorities after independence; and the nature of communal strife up to the present. Here, however, it is important to take note of the fact that large sections of the Muslim community in India suffer from social, educational and economic deprivation. The most recent and 55th all-India survey of the National Sample Survey Organisation (1999–2000) has shown that Muslims in India suffer substantially more than Hindus from economic deprivation. The difference between Hindus and Muslims in per capita income shows a
24 Representing India
percentage difference of 18.52%: while the per capita income of Hindus (Rs. 4514) is marginally higher than the all-India average (Rs. 4485), that of Muslims is considerably lower (Rs. 3678). Likewise, the literacy rate for Hindus is 53.5%, just marginally lower than the allIndia figure (53.5%), while that of Muslims is 49.4%. Similar differences are found in relation to access to civic amenities such as electricity and piped water. The access of Hindus to electricity is 43.2%, that of Muslims just 30%; likewise, 25.3% Hindus have access to piped water, while only 19.4% of Muslims do. (Razzack and Gumber, 2000:35–6) Likewise, the average consumption expenditure for each member of a family in rural India was less than Rs. 300 a month for 29% of Muslims, as opposed to 26% for Hindus. In urban areas, the divide was more marked, with 40% of Muslims belonging to the bottom 20%, as opposed to 22% for Hindus. Given that one-third of Muslims in India live in the urban areas, this clearly shows that poverty among Muslims is considerably higher than among Hindus. The India Human Development Report’s comparison of the various religious groups in terms of the percentage distribution of household income by source is revealing (Table 2.3). Compared to Hindus, Christians and other minorities, Muslims manifest the lowest share of income from agriculture, but double the share from artisanship and petty trade and business. However, their share of income from salaried and qualified professional work is the lowest. (ibid.:36) Unsurprisingly, then, Muslims constitute the poorest of all population groups, with the exception of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Their Head Count Ratio (HCR) is 43%, as opposed to
Table 2.3 Percentage distribution of household income by source across population groups Agr/ Artisan/ Petty Org Allied Ind Trd/Small Trd activity Work Bus. Bus Hindus Muslims Christians Other Minorities
56.1 44.1 46.3 60.3
Source: Shariff (1999:35).
4.3 8.3 2.9 3.1
4.6 9.9 4.1 3.7
1.8 2.9 1.9 0.6
Salaried Qualified Agr Nonempl profess. wage Agr wage 16.4 14.7 23.5 17.6
0.5 0.8 0.4 0.8
8.0 7.7 9.4 5.2
6.2 3.8 3.1 1.7
Mapping Diversity in India 25
that of the Hindus (39%), Christians (27%) and other minorities (34%). (ibid.:45) The Work Participation Rate (WPR) for Muslims is below that of Hindus. A study of five states (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Kerala and Maharashtra) has shown that the WPR for Muslims is below not only that of the Hindus, but also below the state average in all these states. The female WPR is lowest among Muslims: only 10%, as compared to 17% among Hindus and 25% among Christians, not to speak of 23% for SCs and 28% for STs. (ibid.: 85) Thus, while the differential between the all-India average male WPR (51.9%) and male Muslims’ WPR (48.0%) is only 3.9%, that between the female all-India average (18.4%) and the all-India Muslims female WPR (9.6%) is 8.8%. (Razzack and Gumber, 2000:29) Cultivation of land is an important indicator of status in rural India. The data show that access to land is harder for Muslims, and 51% of them are actually cultivating little or no land, the corresponding figure for Hindus being 40%. In urban areas, only 27% of Muslim families had one person in regular salaried employment, 52% being selfemployed and 15% working as casual labour. Hindus manifest lower rates of casual and seasonal employment. Unemployment rates for Muslims are high in both rural and urban areas, as are illiteracy rates. The all-India Muslim literacy rate is 49.5%, with the corresponding figure for Hindus being 53.3%. The Ever Enrolment Rate (EER) in education for Muslims is, at 61.6%, among the lowest, almost as low as that for SCs and STs. A Hindu child – especially boy – is considerably more likely to go on to college than his Muslim counterpart. The highest EERs, by contrast, are recorded by Christians at 91.3%, followed by Hindus at 72%. (ibid.:108–9) Consequently, Muslim (male and female together) levels of literacy at almost 50%, can be unfavourably compared with Christians at 81%, though they are somewhat higher than those for the STs and SCs at about 40%. Within this, gender disparities are also fairly high for all religious groups except the Christians. Turning to health indicators, we find that the crude birth rate (CBR) – generally associated with poverty and landless labour – is high for poor households and Muslims, and lowest for Christians. Immunization levels are also low among Muslims and STs.
Caste Caste is frequently taken to be the defining characteristic of Indian society. However, the way in which caste comes to be defined and acted upon by public policy is rather different from the way in which
26 Representing India
caste has, historically and socially, been experienced. This explains the rather curious phenomenon – observed and commented upon in recent years – that while the importance of caste in social interaction is markedly on the decline, its significance as a basis for political mobilization has dramatically increased. Any account of caste, therefore, must be sensitive to its sociological and political construction, both during colonial rule and after. The recognition of constructedness should not, however, lead us to believe that caste is purely an orientalist fiction. Indeed, those who have suffered, and continue to suffer, the indignities and oppressions of lower caste status would testify strongly to the contrary. It is a very real form of social inequality, both symbolic and material, encoded in the deeply inegalitarian and hierarchical structures of the Hindu social order. For the limited purpose of this exercise, the vast topic of caste must necessarily be circumscribed, and it is proposed to do this by providing only a brief and descriptive introduction to an extremely complex subject, along with some recent data on existing socio-economic inequalities, which illustrate the overlap between caste and material disadvantage in Indian society. It must be kept in mind that any description of caste in India that speaks to contemporary reality is already the product of more than a century of processes of identityformation, political negotiation, and official construction. These processes provide the context for understanding the interaction between caste categories and official policies, in particular the constitutional mechanisms and state policies of independent India designed to redress caste inequality. They also provide us with the tools with which to analyse and assess the failure of state policies to improve the social and economic welfare of disadvantaged caste groups. The following pages must therefore be read in conjunction with the section on caste in Chapter 3, in which a historical account of caste in the colonial period is followed by an account of the ‘official’ discourse on caste in independent India. This is then elaborated in terms of policy strategies for the amelioration of caste disadvantages, with a focus on two groups, viz. the Scheduled Castes and the so-called Other Backward Classes (OBCs). The dimension of caste representation in the institutions of governance is, of course, addressed in subsequent chapters which deal specifically with these institutions. Caste is the central principle of stratification in the Hindu ritual and social order, in which castes are social groups mutually ranked within a single hierarchy. This enormously complex structure can, at the risk of oversimplification, be described as a hierarchy consisting of the
Mapping Diversity in India 27
Brahmans at the top and the Dalits/Harijans/Scheduled Castes5 at the bottom. Implicit in this ranking is a certain occupational association, so that – in descending order – the Brahmans signify the priestly class; the Kshatriyas are the rulers and warriors; the Vaishyas are engaged in production and wealth-creation (including agriculture, commerce and trade); and finally the Shudras serve the superior castes. At the bottom of this social hierarchy, and outside this four-fold varna ranking, lie the various Untouchable castes, now called dalits. Notions of purity and pollution are central to this ranking, as the so-called untouchables were traditionally assigned the tasks of ritual cleaning and the removing of polluting substances. This apart, the link between caste status and actual occupation has – even in times past, let alone in the present – been an abstract and under-determined one. Every Hindu is born into a caste, signified by particular names that, at least locally, if not more generally, serve to identify the caste of the individual. The English term ‘caste’ tends to blur the important distinction between the concepts of varna and jati, though in some usages varna appears as an equivalent of caste and jati as an equivalent of subcaste. The distinction is, however, important, because all the varna categories are highly differentiated internally, and the reference-group for members of a particular caste would generally be a more local jati, an endogamous unit with its own traditions and rules as to individual conduct. Caste acquires different meanings in different contexts: dining, marrying, forming a political association, and so forth. Hence, the meaning of caste can be extremely localized in one situation (as in relation to kin group or endogamous group), but refer to a much broader cluster in another (such as political organization). Some anthropologists argue that the jati affiliation is the concrete one experienced in everyday social practice, as in deciding which groups an individual may marry into, while the varna affiliation is more symbolic. As we shall see, the political mobilization of caste has attempted to transcend this distinction at some moments, and self-consciously evoke it at others. Technically, the term caste applies only to the Hindu population of India, though in real terms caste practices have infiltrated Sikhism, and even Christianity as practised in India. There are estimated to be 2000–3000 castes/sub-castes (jatis) in India today, the size of each ranging between 5000–15,000, and though they are arranged in a broad four-fold hierarchy (varna), there are relationships of interdependence between subordinate and superordinate castes, important local and regional variations that subvert the hierarchy, and some mobility between the designated compartments. However, what
28 Representing India
has remained relatively constant over centuries has been the social and economic condition of the groups at the bottom of the caste hierarchy, once called the ‘untouchables’ because of their low ritual standing in Hindu society and the ‘unclean’ occupations (sweeping, scavenging, leather-working, etc.) to which they were condemned. The 2001 Census records the population of ‘scheduled castes’ as 166,635,700 or 16.2% of India’s population. Their regional distribution is as follows (see Table 2.4). As Table 2.4 shows, the state with the highest proportion – 28.9% – of Scheduled Castes is Punjab, while many of the largely tribal states of north-east India – such as Mizoram, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh – have less than 0.1% Scheduled Castes. These figures also make evident the diversity among the Scheduled Castes themselves. As Mendelsohn and Vicziany write, ‘the Untouchables are not a people of any single ethnic or cultural identity. They speak the language of their region….And crucially, Untouchables are divided into castes which are organised on a regional basis; they know little or nothing of comparable castes in other regions.’ (1998:9) Since data on caste has not been gathered after the Census of 1931, there is no reliable data available on the non-Scheduled Caste and nonScheduled Tribe population, including the OBCs. In the early 1950s, the Backward Classes were officially believed to constitute 31.8% of India’s population. The most recent valid data on this is that contained in the report of the Mandal Commission itself, which indicates that there are 3248 communities in the OBC category, accounting for 52% of India’s population (Table 2.5). In any case, it is important to remember that none of these categories has been fixed for any length of time even in the last 50 years, as different ‘communities’ have mobilized to be ‘listed’. An interesting aspect of the Mandal Commission Report is that, while it admits the existence of castes – especially backward castes – or caste-like entities within the non-Hindu religious of India, it treats caste as intrinsic only to Hinduism. It is this ‘official’ doctrine that has excluded – from the purview of reservation policies – the Sikh ‘untouchables’ or those dalits who, led by Ambedkar, converted and continue to convert en masse to Buddhism (also known as the neoBuddhists). This is because it is presumed that other religions, such as Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and Sikhism are essentially egalitarian, and that only Hindus practice untouchability. As such, all Scheduled Castes are assumed to be Hindus, and any such individual converting to, say, Christianity or Islam is no longer entitled to the benefits that accrue from being a Scheduled Caste.
Mapping Diversity in India 29 Table 2.4
Scheduled Castes in India: distribution across states
S.No. State/ Union Territory
India 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.
Jammu & Kashmir Himachal Pradesh Punjab Chandigarh Uttaranchal Haryana Delhi Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Bihar Sikkim Arunachal Pradesh Nagaland Manipur Mizoram Tripura Meghalaya Assam West Bengal Jharkhand Orissa Chhattisgarh Madhya Pradesh Gujarat Daman & Diu Dadra & Nagar Haveli Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh Karnataka Goa Lakshadweep Kerala Tamil Nadu Pondicherry Andaman & Nicobar Islands
Source: Census of India 2001.
Total population
Scheduled Castes population
%6
%7
1,028,610,328
166,635,700
16.2
100.00
10,143,700 6,077,900 24,358,999 900,635 8,489,349 21,144,564 13,850,507 56,507,188 166,197,921 82,998,509 540,851 1,097,968 1,990,036 2,166,788 888,573 3,199,203 2,318,822 26,655,528 80,176,197 26,945,829 36,804,660 20,833,803 60,348,023 50,671,017 158,204 220,490 96,878,627 76,210,007 52,850,562 1,347,668 60,650 31,841,374 62,405,679 974,345 356,152
770,155 1,502,170 7,028,723 157,597 1,517,186 4,091,110 2,343,255 9,694,462 35,148,377 13,048,608 27,165 6,188 – 60,037 272 555,724 11,139 1,825,949 18,452,555 3,189,320 6,082,063 2,418,722 9,155,177 3,592,715 4,838 4,104 9,881,656 12,339,496 8,563,930 23,791 – 3,123,941 11,857,504 157,771
7.6 24.7 28.9 17.5 17.9 19.3 16.9 17.2 21.1 15.7 5.0 0.6 0.0 2.8 0.0 17.4 0.5 6.9 23.0 11.8 16.5 11.6 15.2 7.1 3.1 1.9 10.2 16.2 16.2 1.8 0.0 9.8 19.0 16.2 –0.0
0.46 0.90 4.22 0.09 0.91 2.46 1.41 5.82 21.09 7.83 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.33 0.01 1.10 11.07 1.91 3.65 1.45 5.49 2.15 0.00 0.00 5.93 7.41 5.14 0.01 0.00 1.87 7.12 0.09 0.00
30 Representing India Table 2.5 The Mandal Commission: caste groups as a percentage of India’s population Caste groups
% of India’s population
Forward Hindu Castes and Communities
17.58%
Backward Hindu Castes and Communities
43.70%
Scheduled Castes
15.05%
Scheduled Tribes
7.51%
Non-Hindu Communities (including backwards)
16.16% (52% of these, or 8.40% of the total population, were identified as backwards among the non-Hindu communities)
Total
100%
Source: Government of India, 1980a:56
A Presidential Order of 1950 invoked Article 341 of the Constitution to say that ‘no person who professes a religion different from Hinduism shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste’. In 1956, the Sikh religion was brought within the purview of this Order, thus providing reservations for Mazhabi and Ramdasia Sikhs. The Buddhist Scheduled Castes were likewise brought on par with Hindus in 1990. (Ghosh, 1997:149) This essentially leaves the so-called Scheduled Castes within the two biggest minority religions – Islam and Christianity – outside the purview of reservation policy. If a Scheduled Caste converts to Christianity or Islam, s/he is automatically deprived of that status. However, if the convert happens to be a Scheduled Tribe person, s/he continues to be eligible for the benefits of reservation, because this is based on ethnicity rather than religion. Thus, the so-called Dalit Muslims and Dalit Christians remain excluded. In recent years, there have been appeals, including from the National Commission for Minorities, to amend the Presidential Order of 1950 such that the criterion for deciding the issue of SCs is not religion. The Dalit Muslims are critical of the fact that the largely ‘upper-caste’ Muslim leadership – comprising Sayyads, Shaikhs, and Pathans – do not endorse their claims, and ask for a quota for an undifferentiated Muslim community. Dalit Christians are those who converted from their previously untouchable status to the Christian faith. They comprise 60% (of 16 million) of the total Christian population of India, and are clearly economically backward, many of them being landless, with an average annual income of Rs. 903, and a high illiteracy rate of 65%. (ibid.:153)
Mapping Diversity in India 31
The Dalit Christians, too, have been demanding inclusion in the list of Scheduled Castes, but without success. In the mid-1990s, this demand was voiced more strongly, leading to many political parties incorporating it into their manifestoes in the 1996 elections. The United Front (UF) government that came to power had made a similar promise, but was unable to proceed in the face of BJP opposition. Some reconversions to Hinduism are believed to have resulted, chiefly for access to the status of SC. (ibid.:154) The category of OBCs, as we have seen, has been more accommodative and flexible. In 1971, for instance, the Backward Classes Reservation Commission in the southern state of Kerala recommended reservation for backward classes in professional colleges in the following proportions: Ezhavas (9%), Muslims (8%), Latin Catholics (2%), Other Backward Christians (1%), and Other Backward Hindus (5%). (Galanter, 1984:467) There are many non-Hindu groups, including those of Muslims, that are internally differentiated, endogamous and hierarchically ranked. The ranking generally remains the same as that of the caste before conversion. Among the two most well-known of such groups are the Meos in Rajasthan and Haryana, who are technically Muslims, but regard themselves as Rajputs, and follow rituals based on the distinction between purity and pollution. The Syrian Christians of Kerala claim descent from originally Brahman converts and have even been known to practise untouchability. The Sikhs are also conscious of caste, such that a marriage between, say, a jat Sikh (essentially belonging to a backward caste) and a mazhabi Sikh (a lower caste convert to Sikhism), would be virtually unthinkable. The technical question that is often raised is, of course, whether such internal hierarchical rankings should properly be called castes. This has also become a political and policy question in recent years, as with the Dalit Christian claim to reservations, which implicitly privileges their dalitness over their Christianness. There are similarly Muslim communities of aristocratic descent who also look down upon the low-caste converts to Islam. It has been argued that a sociology of Indian Muslims cannot be based exclusively on a study of religious values. The adoption of the practice of endogamy has imparted to Islam in India the distinct imprint of Hinduism, and indeed that the framework of caste domination is retained in Indian Islam. The caste system serves not only to mark rank among the nonAshraf, it serves also the Ashraf themselves, originally the conquerors and now the dominant, giving them the satisfaction that
32 Representing India
they continue to dominate lower levels. It allows the creation of a ‘barrier’ between themselves and local converts. (Gaborieau [1993] 2003:303–4) But, even as it creates distinctions within the society of Indian Muslims, it is also this that enables Hindus and Muslims ‘to co-exist and co-operate because at bottom they constitute one single society’. (ibid.:309) Indeed, a recent account of Muslims in Bihar society and politics speaks of the ‘forwards’ and ‘backwards’ among this community, and provides detailed data on the composition of various boards and committees of community organizations to show the overwhelming preponderance of the ‘forwards’. (Anwar, 2001:137) The Muslim members of the Legislative Assemblies from 1937 to 1995 are listed with their party affiliation and caste (the term used is jati), to show that upper class/caste Muslims predominate. In the state assembly (Vidhan Sabha) election of 1995, for example, the Congress Party put up 42 Muslim candidates, of whom only 13 belonged to the lower ‘castes’. Similarly, of the 24 candidates put up by the ostensibly more ‘backwards’-oriented Samata Party there were only five belonging to these groups. (ibid.:257–8) In all Bihar Assembly elections in independent India, between 1952 and 1995, there were a total of 245 Muslim candidates who won the election. Of these, 197 belonged to the Shaikh, Sayyad and Pathan jatis. The backward Muslims, on the other hand, got barely 19.2% of the seats. (ibid.:170–1) Anwar’s contention therefore is that Muslim society is divided into backwards and forwards in approximately the same proportion as Muslims and Hindus in India, i.e. 80:20. (ibid.:169) This is partly on account of the Partition, in which it was mostly the upper class Muslims who migrated to Pakistan. Claims for reservation have long been made by and on behalf of some of these groups. In 1939, Abdul Qaiyum Ansari of the Bihar Provincial Jamiat-ul-Momineen, for instance, wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru asking for reservation for the Momin community. In his reply, Nehru wrote: …I entirely agree with you in your remark that certain upper class groups among the Muslims have more or less dominated the Muslims in India, much to the disadvantage of the others. This applies even more so to the Hindus, as you well know, where some upper class groups have dominated vast numbers of other people. The problem is essentially similar in both cases. This dom-
Mapping Diversity in India 33
ination has been cultural, educational etc. but essentially it has been economic. (quoted in Anwar, 2001:229–30) As a secular modernizer, Nehru was convinced that ‘the kind of reservation we have today has not done us much good’ (ibid.:231), but – after independence – accepted the necessity of some reservation for the most socio-economically deprived groups in Indian society, for a limited period of time, to provide them with the background conditions of equality. Indeed, despite the fact that reservation policies have been in place for almost six decades, the Scheduled Castes (and Scheduled Tribes) remain worse-off than most other social groups in terms of social and economic characteristics. Many of the Scheduled Castes are agricultural labourers or unskilled workers,8 and hence it is not surprising that the proportion of the poor in these groups is also higher. The Human Development Report for India, produced by the National Council for Applied Economic Research, shows that the Scheduled Castes have a household income of Rs. 17,465 or 68% of the all-India mean household income. The per capita income of the Scheduled Castes stands at Rs. 3237, well below the national average of Rs. 4485, and 72% of the all India mean per capita income. Indeed, both total household incomes as well as per capita incomes are lowest among the Scheduled Castes, followed by the Scheduled Tribes. (Shariff, 1999:29–30) The proportion of SC and ST households in the lowest income category is over 70%, compared to only 50% of all Hindu households. (ibid.:32) The poverty parameters show that both the incidence of poverty, as also as its intensity, are higher among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as compared to the national average. The HCR9 is 50 for the Scheduled Castes, as compared with 39 for rural India as a whole. The Sen Index10 is as high as 0.24 among SCs, as well as STs, in comparison with only 0.18 for the rural population as a whole. The chief source of household income for the Scheduled Castes is agriculture and allied activities. However, ownership of land is lowest among the SCs than any other social group. Ownership of land is highest among Hindus (70%), lower among Muslims (57%), but lowest among SCs (only 47%). The same disparity is found in the ownership of durables such as television sets, radios and bicycles. Thus 37.7% of the SCs are dependent on agricultural and allied activities, while another 19.7% are dependent on an agricultural wage, a total of 57.4%.
34 Representing India
(ibid.:35) In 1991, only 19% of SCs lived in urban areas as compared to 29% for the general population. (Visaria and Visaria, 2003:200) On most human development indices, the Scheduled Castes fall far below the national average. Their literacy rate is 41.5% as against the Indian average of 53.5%. Comparing it to other disadvantaged social groups and minorities, we observe that only the literacy rate for the Scheduled Tribes is lower, while the Muslims (at 49.4%), and the Christians (at 80.8%) are higher. However, compared to 1971 – when the literacy rate in these groups was only 15% – it is a substantial increase. (Mendelsohn and Vicziany, 1998:35) Like other landless wage earners, the Scheduled Tribes and the Muslims have very low levels of school enrolment. The enrolment rate of the Scheduled Castes is only 62.5%, compared to 72% for the Hindus. The gender disparity in literacy is also high: only about 25% of women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are literate as opposed to 50% of men, and only about 50% of women in the other social groups are literate, as compared with about 75% of men belonging to these groups. The National Sample Survey data indicate that the WPR of women is also higher in the SCs than any other social group with the exception of the Scheduled Tribes. The higher levels of poverty in this group are accompanied by higher levels of mortality and morbidity, but also by higher levels of fertility (lower age of marriage and lower prevalence of contraception). (Visaria and Visaria, 2003:199) A comparative view of some important forms of deprivation is also revealing. Majumdar and Subramanian’s Capability Failure Ratio (drawing upon the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen) seeks to correct conventional measures of poverty by looking at the inter-group disparities within the distribution of particular forms of deprivation. Their all-India data measuring levels of educational deprivation for 1981 show that rural women belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes have an educational deprivation level of 0.937 as compared to 0.783 for rural women not belonging to these groups. The gap is even more marked among men in the rural areas: those belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes have an educational deprivation level of 0.717 (it is worth noting that this is slightly lower than rural women not belonging to these groups) while other men have educational deprivation levels of 0.458. The pattern for men and women in urban areas are very similar. (Majumdar and Subramanian, 2001:116) Thus, levels of educational deprivation are highest among rural female scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and lowest among urban males who do not belong to these social groups. The gender gap
Mapping Diversity in India 35 Table 2.6 Comparative tables of literacy rates incorporating the gender gap and the gap between the general population and SCs and STs (1961–1991) Year
1961 1971 1981 1991
Total Population
Scheduled castes
Scheduled Tribes
Male
Female Total Male
Female Total Gap
Male
Female Total
Gap
34.44 39.45 65.50 64.13
12.95 18.72 29.85 39.29
3.29 6.44 10.93 23.76
13.83 17.63 24.52 40.65
3.16 4.85 8.05 18.19
15.48 18.08 27.32 22.60
24.02 29.46 43.67 52.21
16.96 22.36 31.12 49.91
10.27 14.68 21.38 37.41
13.75 14.79 22.29 14.80
8.54 11.39 16.35 29.60
Source: Fourth Report of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (1998)
in literacy, as well as the gap between the general population and these groups, is further illuminated by data provided by the NCSCST. The additional significance of Table 2.6 is that it underscores the fact that the gap has not significantly diminished over a 40-year period. The infant mortality rates show similar trends, with infants being less ‘wasted’ in non-SC/ST communities than they are in SC/ST groups. Thus, Majumdar and Subramaniam show that the number of deaths of children under the age of one year (per 1000 live births) is 121.4 for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes living in the rural areas, as opposed to 110 for people not belonging to these groups. It is correspondingly high in the urban areas, with 88.9 deaths per 1000 live births for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, as opposed to 62.5 for others living in urban areas. (Majumdar and Subramanian, 2001:121) The Income-Poverty Ratios, finally, also suggest that the headcount indices of poverty are of a consistently higher magnitude among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes than the others. This is true across the Indian states, as well as for India as a whole. Thus, the headcount ratio of poverty for rural citizens of the SC and ST groups is 59.86 (39.99 for all other groups); and for those members of these groups living in urban areas, it is 55.34 (as opposed to 39.21 for others). (Majumdar and Subramanian, 2001:125) Given social indicators like these, what can we deduce about the success or otherwise of programmes and policies of compensatory discrimination? Have they completely failed to redress the social inequalities of caste? A recent study of the representation of some disadvantaged social groups in the middle class suggests that the middle class has today expanded to include members of lower castes as well as of religious minorities. On the basis of indicators such as level of education; whitecollar employment; ownership of house (made of brick and cement) and
36 Representing India
of other assets; and self-identification as middle class, the study shows that the domination of the upper castes in the middle class persists, though it has been reduced over the last 50 years. Members of the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the OBCs have also entered the middle class. These groups, together with Muslims, account for 75% of the sample population, and for half of the middle class population surveyed. They account for 56% among the high school educated; 47% among white-collar workers; and over 50% among asset owners. These are clearly indicators of social mobility, showing also that low ritual status has not obstructed the entry of these groups into the middle class, nor proved a hindrance in the way of their acquiring a self-identification as middle class individuals. (Sheth, 2002:228) Despite the cumulative historical inequality that characterizes their social position, the dalits have also begun to enter the middle class, albeit to a smaller extent than many other groups. Close to 12% have received higher education; almost 10% have white-collar jobs; and almost 21% own houses and other assets. These are, in all likelihood, attributable to the policies of affirmative action. However, it is notable that only 9% of these dalits identify themselves as being middle class. By comparison, the backward castes – much more numerous as well as heterogeneous – remain largely tied to their traditional occupation of agriculture, and are underrepresented on every indicator, including ownership of assets. This does not however prevent them from possessing a middle class self-identification in larger numbers. Tribals likewise are under-represented in white-collar employment, while Muslims occupy middle-class positions more or less in accordance with their proportion in the population. (Sheth, 2002:226)11 On the whole, then, Sheth’s study suggests that while caste continues to be consequential in Indian society, its role in political mobilization and as the basis for political representation has far outstripped its role as the signifier of ritual hierarchy. By setting up the colonial state as the arbiter of caste, colonial rule actually facilitated the creation of translocal caste identities, and eventually the forging of horizontal linkages and federative associations for representation and reservations. Even the quintessentially ‘modern’ discourses of rights, equality and justice were fairly early on, he argues, appropriated by and attached to caste identity. The ‘umbrella’ character of the Congress as the party of social consensus managed to combine nationalist ideology with caste politics without any apparent contradiction. Its central leadership – and therefore that of the Union government – was substantially upper caste (and
Mapping Diversity in India 37
upper class). Indeed, so complete was the fusion between caste and class that it was not clear whether the source of privilege was the westernization and English education of these elites, or their ritual superiority as upper castes. This leadership was vertically linked in a collaborative relationship with regional elites whose dominance derived from their status as intermediate or backward castes. These groups were instrumental in procuring votes for the Congress essentially through networks of patron-client relationships in the countryside. It was only with the decline of Congress hegemony, and the recognition of their numerical strength, that these latter groups began to mobilize, no longer as factions under the Congress umbrella, but independently, as interest groups and even political parties. The distinction between interests and identity was now conclusively blurred. (ibid.:217–21) As a result, Sheth argues, ‘the ritual hierarchy of closed status groups is being transformed into a relatively more open and fluid hierarchy among the new social groups’. (ibid.:223)
Tribe The category of ‘tribe’, it has been contended, is wholly a colonial construction, as opposed to that of caste which, apart from its particular construction by the colonial state, was also experienced as a way of life. Official colonial ethnography initially used the terms of tribe and caste interchangeably, even synonymously. In the last census of the nineteenth century, the social groups today described as tribes were labelled as ‘forest tribes’, suggesting that their distinctive characteristic was that they were forest-dwellers. (Xaxa, 2003:375) In the censuses of the early twentieth century, animism was believed to be the defining characteristic of the tribe, and among the labels used were ‘hill and forest tribes’ and ‘primitive tribes’. In administrative discourse as well as anthropological writings, there was a general assumption that tribes were definable as self-contained and self-governing endogamous societies, with distinct linguistic and cultural boundaries, and non-monetized economies, generally living in isolation in hill or forest regions. But this ideal-type came to be questioned fairly early, as did the view that tribes represented a stage of evolution that was ‘primitive’. (Beteille, 1977) The British in India ostensibly sought to protect these groups by a policy of territorial insulation, in enclaves called Excluded Areas and Partially Excluded Areas, where the general law did not apply and the executive was entrusted with powers to make orders of a protective nature. The Government of India (GOI) Act of 1935 was the first legal
38 Representing India
instrument that provided for representation for these groups in the Provincial Legislatures, to which end a list of Backward Tribes was announced in 1936 for all provinces excluding Bengal and the Punjab. This duality of control – representation in the legislatures along with substantively executive control over designated areas where there was a concentration of the tribal population – was maintained in the Indian Constitution of 1950. As in the case of Scheduled Castes, the President specifies, after due consultation with the governors of the states, which tribal communities will be on the list of Scheduled Tribes for each state. The President also has the power to alter/de-schedule the Scheduled Areas. (Galanter, 1984:148) The official definition of tribe has thus prevailed over that of the anthropologist, with the result that the term tribe merely describes the particular groups listed as Scheduled Tribes in the Constitution. Shortly after independence, in 1950, additions were made to the pre-existing lists of the 1930s, and the President promulgated an amended list of Scheduled Areas and of Scheduled Tribes. The contingent nature of these inclusions is well illustrated by the fact that some groups which had been previously listed as Scheduled Castes were now moved to the list of Scheduled Tribes. In 1956, following the 1951 census, this list was expanded by about a million tribespeople, on the grounds that they had been mistakenly omitted earlier. In 1976 again, another three million people were added to the list. (Galanter, 1984:149) Meanwhile, in 1951, the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes initiated an official search for the definitive criteria for identifying the characteristics of tribes, and the state governments were asked to make suggestions. The criteria so generated included physical/racial features, religion, language, occupation, ecology and extent of cultural exposure. Some of these criteria have also been deployed by The People of India project, the most recent such exercise, undertaken by the Anthropological Survey of India, which enumerates 461 tribal communities, of whom 174 are subgroups. (Xaxa, 2003:379) The assumption that tribes in India have lived without interaction with other social groups, and that caste and tribe represent two wholly distinct orders governed by different sets of principles, has now been interrogated by research showing the ‘age-old linkages – political, economic, and social – between tribal and non-tribal groups.’ (ibid.:384) The issue of definitional criteria thus remains unresolved, repeatedly confounded by the unpredictability of the empirical, which calls into question the neat boundedness of categories and suggesting overlaps and hybridities instead. The Census of 1991, for instance, showed that
Mapping Diversity in India 39
while many tribals reported as their religion the traditional form practised in their community, an equal number reported themselves as Hindu, Muslim or Christian. Even more surprising was the fact that more tribal people stated the language of the state to which they belonged as their language, instead of their dialect. (Stuligross and Varshney, 2002:445–6) Unlike the other categories of religion and caste, and much more than language, the Scheduled Tribes of India are geographically concentrated in three regions of India: the north-east, eastern India and central India. Approximately 90% of tribals are to be found in 9 states of the country. In 1961, more than one-third of the ST population lived in the Scheduled Areas (where they formed less than two-thirds of the population); and further, more than half of the STs lived in parliamentary constituencies where they formed a majority of the population. The Census of 2001 records the population of Scheduled Tribes in India as 84,326,240, which forms 8.2% of India’s population as a whole. Their geographical spread is as follows: Table 2.7
Scheduled Tribes in India: distribution across states
S.No. State/ Union Territory
India 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.
Jammu & Kashmir Himachal Pradesh Punjab Chandigarh Uttaranchal Haryana Delhi Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Bihar Sikkim Arunachal Pradesh Nagaland Manipur Mizoram Tripura Meghalaya Assam West Bengal
Total population
Scheduled tribes population
%12
%13
1,028,610,328
84,326,240
8.2
100.00
10,143,700 6,077,900 24,358,999 900,635 8,489,349 21,144,564 13,850,507 56,507,188 166,197,921 82,998,509 540,851 1,097,968 1,990,036 2,166,788 888,573 3,199,203 2,318,822 26,655,528 80,176,197
1,105,979 244,587 – – 256,129 – – 7,097,706 107,963 758,351 111,405 705,158 1,774,026 741,141 839,310 993,426 1,992,862 3,308,570 4,406,794
10.9 4.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 12.6 0.1 0.9 20.6 64.2 89.1 34.2 94.5 31.1 85.9 12.4 5.5
1.31 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 8.42 0.13 0.90 0.13 0.84 2.10 0.88 1.00 1.18 2.36 3.92 5.23
40 Representing India Table 2.7
Scheduled Tribes in India: distribution across states – continued
S.No. State/ Union Territory
Total population
Scheduled tribes population
India 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.
Jharkhand Orissa Chhattisgarh Madhya Pradesh Gujarat Daman & Diu Dadra & Nagar Haveli Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh Karnataka Goa Lakshadweep Kerala Tamil Nadu Pondicherry Andaman & Nicobar Islands
%12
%13
1,028,610,328
84,326,240
8.2
100.00
26,945,829 36,804,660 20,833,803 60,348,023 50,671,017 158,204 220,490 96,878,627 76,210,007 52,850,562 1,347,668 60,650 31,841,374 62,405,679 974,345 356,152
7,087,068 8,145,081 6,616,596 12,233,474 7,481,160 4,838 137,225 8,577,276 5,024,104 3,463,986 566 57,321 364,189 651,321 – 29,469
26.3 22.1 31.8 20.3 14.8 8.8 62.2 8.9 6.6 6.6 0.0 94.5 1.1 1.0 0.0 8.3
8.40 9.66 7.85 14.50 8.87 0.01 0.16 10.17 5.96 4.11 0.00 0.07 0.43 0.77 0.00 0.03
Source: Census of India (2001)
In terms of social and economic characteristics, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are worse-off than most other social groups, with a higher proportion of the poor. The Human Development Report for India shows that the Scheduled Tribes have a household income of Rs. 19,556 which is 76% of the national average. The per capita income of the Scheduled Tribes stands at Rs. 3504, well below the national average of Rs. 4485, and 78% of it. Indeed, both total household incomes as well as per capita incomes are lowest among the Scheduled Castes, followed by the Scheduled Tribes. (Shariff, 1999:29–30) The poverty parameters show that both the incidence of poverty, as well as its intensity, are higher among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as compared to the national average. The HCR is about 50 among these groups, as compared with 39 for rural India as a whole. The Sen Index is as high as 0.24 among STs and SCs in comparison with only 0.18 for the rural population as a whole. The source of household income for the Scheduled Tribes is mainly agriculture and allied activities. Thus 55.6% of the STs are dependent on agricultural and allied activities, while another 11.7% are depen-
Mapping Diversity in India 41
dent on an agricultural wage. Together, the total of 67.3% exceeds the corresponding figure for the Scheduled Castes, which stands at 57.4% (37.7% on agriculture and allied activities, and 19.7% on agricultural wages). (ibid.:35) Levels of urbanization are also lower, with only 7% of STs living in urban areas in 1991, as compared to 29% for the general population. (Visaria and Visaria, 2003:200) On most human development indices, the Scheduled Tribes fall far below the national average. The literacy rate is 39.3% as against the Indian average of 53.5%. Comparing it to other disadvantaged social groups and minorities, we observe that the literacy rate for the Scheduled Castes is 41.5%, the Muslims 49.4%, and the Christians 80.8%. Not surprisingly, the Scheduled Tribes have the lowest enrolment rate of 60.3%, compared to 72% for the Hindus. The gender disparity in literacy is also high: only a quarter of women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are literate, as compared to approximately half of women in the other social groups. Health data also show a higher Morbidity Prevalence Rate among Scheduled Tribes, including a high incidence of diarrhoea, fever and tuberculosis. Unsurprisingly, because this tends to be correlated with levels of literacy and general levels of village development, immunization levels are also low among these groups. (Shariff: Ch.7) In this chapter, we have sought to emphasize the overlapping and reinforcing character of cultural and symbolic inequalities, on the one hand, and material or economic inequalities, on the other. The next chapter presents a description of the institutions designed, both by the constitution and in subsequent policy initiatives, to manage diversity and redress inequalities. It will attempt to show that the institutional design has been rather less sensitive to material inequalities than to symbolic ones, which may account for the persistence of economic deprivation linked to ethnic status and also perhaps explain the vulnerability of such groups to political mobilization.
3 Managing Diversity: Institutions, Policies and Politics
The introductory chapter of this volume showed how, in the founding vision of the Indian republic, different institutional strategies were deployed to ameliorate different types of social disadvantage. This chapter describes and reviews the institutions and mechanisms provided for in the constitutional design to deal with the diversities of language, religion, caste and tribe discussed in the previous chapter. It also attempts a broad synoptic survey of the political articulation of conflicts around these cleavages, by instantiating a select number of important conflicts of this kind, and examining the way in which they have been managed by state agencies and the polity.
Language The settlement of the language question in the Constituent Assembly has its roots in two controversies in colonial India, the first of which related to the English language as a medium of instruction, and the second to the relationship between the Indian languages, most notably Hindi and Urdu. It was during the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon in the first decade of the twentieth century that the policy decision was made to allow the mother-tongue to be the language of instruction for primary school children. However, English was to be introduced at the middle-school level to prepare children for High School, at which level the education would be wholly in English. The National Education Movement, sponsored by the Congress, also endorsed the idea that while the learning of English would be compulsory, it was important for students to be versed in the language and literary traditions of their mother-tongues. Nevertheless, English continued to be the language of advantage. (Singh, 2003:744) 42
Managing Diversity: Institutions, Policies and Politics 43
The second controversy was that of the relative status of Hindi and Urdu, and the scripts – Devanagari and Persian-Arabic respectively – in which they are written. It was because the Hindi-Urdu controversy got associated with the communal polarization between Hindus and Muslims that this issue acquired such political significance. Among the issues at stake were the following: whether Sanskritized (and therefore written in the Devanagari script) Hindi should displace English as the official language of the new nation, or whether Hindustani, the mix of Hindi and Urdu commonly spoken across north India, should be written in both Devanagari and the Persian-Arabic script, and adopted as the official language. With the Partition of India, the presumed (though flawed) association between the Muslim community and the Urdu language was broken. Now the chief issue before the Constituent Assembly was that of determining whether India – with all its linguistic diversity – needed a single national/official language, and whether this could be Hindi or English or something else. For a nationalist movement that had just achieved hardwon freedom, to accept English was clearly difficult, partly, as Alok Rai has argued ‘due to reasons of prestige, significantly bruised by the colonial encounter’, but partly also because freedom and democracy would have little meaning for the millions of poor and unlettered Indians if it were to make sense only to the English-educated. (Rai, 2001:106) Hindi had the advantage of being spoken by a large number of Indians, and understood by many more. However, the designation of Hindi as a national language was resisted by those who came from areas where Hindi was not spoken. They were willing to accept Hindi as an official language, but not as a national language. This was therefore enacted prospectively, so that it would be implemented only after 15 years, till which time English would be retained as the official language. In the states, however, the governments could use the main regional language – as specified in the Eighth Schedule – as the official language for administrative purposes. Linguistic diversity in independent India has been politically contentious in chiefly two types of situations: first, when it was proposed that Hindi (spoken by 40% of the population) be designated as the official or ‘national’ language for the country as a whole; and second, in the reorganization of the states of the federation on the basis of language. The Congress Party had, fairly early in the national movement, begun to visualize a future and free India in terms of linguistic states, on the premise that language corresponded with particular types of culture, literature and tradition that could be identified in territorially bounded terms. Indeed, the Congress organization itself was based on such a
44 Representing India
proto-federal principle. In 1908, Bihar – which was a part of the Bengal Presidency – was given the status of a ‘province’ within the Congress party, and in 1917, the Sindh and Andhra units – which were part of the Bombay and the Madras Presidencies respectively – were awarded similar status. In 1920, at the Nagpur session of the Congress, Gandhi declared his support for linguistically based states. Consequently, the Congress party was organized into 21 units based on language. In 1928, the Motilal Nehru Report reiterated the importance of the linguistic basis of states, and this became one of the central principles that informed the future vision of the national movement. (Chandhoke, forthcoming) After independence, the demand for separate states for Tamil, Telegu and Kannada speakers was fuelled by the overlap between language and caste. For instance, realizing that they were marginal players in the politics of the predominantly Tamil Madras Presidency, the Teleguspeaking Kamma and Reddy castes demanded a separate state of Andhra Pradesh. A well-known Gandhian, Sri Potti Sriramulu went on a fast unto death for a separate Andhra state in 1952, and as Nehru hesitated – for fear of a hostile Tamil response – Sriramulu died. Language riots followed, as did the Prime Minister’s announcement of the formation of a separate state. For similar reasons, the Kannada-speaking Lingayat and Vokkaliga castes (land-owning, and often dominant, castes) demanded the separate state of Karnataka. At stake were the aspirations of these groups for better access to education, jobs and power, which the formation of the separate states was expected to fulfil. It is no accident that the Kammas and Reddys have dominated the political scene in Andhra Pradesh ever since, while the Lingayats and Vokkaligas have been dominant in Karnataka politics. For precisely the same reason, other groups resisted the formation of linguistic states. Political mobilization on the question of linguistic provinces contributed to the formation of the States Reorganisation Commission in 1953, which resulted in the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution (1956), and the formation of the first set of linguistic states. The creation of Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat all belong to this period. A decade later, the bilingual state of Punjab was also bifurcated on the basis of language, split into the states of Punjabi-speaking Punjab and Hindi-speaking Haryana, with some mountain areas being transferred to Himachal Pradesh (upgraded now from a Union Territory to a full-fledged state). The movement for a Punjabi Suba (state) ostensibly invoked language as the basis of its demand for a separate state, but it
Managing Diversity: Institutions, Policies and Politics 45
was clear that religious identity was very much at stake. The Hindus of Punjab insisted that the Punjabi language was merely a dialect of Hindi, and had encouraged their co-religionists in the state to report Hindi as their mother tongue in the Censuses of 1951 and 1961. Various compromise formulae of bilingualism were attempted but failed. The States’ Reorganization Commission also rejected the demand for a Punjabi Suba, on the grounds that the ‘majority’ were opposed to it. (Singh, 2000:90–1) Eventually, it was a series of political circumstances – both regional as well as national – that culminated in the bifurcation of the existing state of Punjab in 1966. The subsequent creation of states has been based on broadly ethnic factors – in some cases correlated with developmental neglect – but not on language per se. This is as true of the north-east, as it is of the most recently created states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh (created on the basis of tribal identity) and of Uttaranchal (based on the distinctive culture of the hill regions of Uttar Pradesh, from which this state was carved out). Arguably the most violent agitation on the issue of language has been that in Tamil Nadu in the 1960s. As we have seen, the issue of designating Hindi as the national language was contested in the national movement and hotly debated in the Constituent Assembly, which decided to make Hindi the official language but deferred its implementation to a later date (1965). The first anti-Hindi agitation had taken place as early as the 1930s in Tamil Nadu. The suggestion of the Congress leadership that the use of Hindi should be encouraged for purposes of inter-state communications and trade, was viewed as the imposition of Hindi, and stoked the fires of Tamil nationalism. This helped to focus Dravidianist mobilization not against ethnic outsiders (who accounted for less than 10% of the state’s population), but against the state and central governments. It also paved the way for Dravidian populism,1 which combined an anti-Brahmanical project with a Tamil nationalist one. (Subramanian, 1999:128–9) The violent anti-Hindi protests in Tamil Nadu were eventually resolved in 1967 by an amendment to the Official Languages Act, which provided that both Hindi and English would be used in Parliament; and that the Union Government would use Hindi only when communicating with the governments of Hindi-speaking states and English with the others. Language policy was also placed within the jurisdiction of states, with the constitutional protection for minority languages guaranteeing such protection for linguistic minorities within states where the majority speaks a different language.
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Apart from playing a role in communal politics (as the Hindi-Urdu controversy did in colonial India) and in regionalist demands (as in Punjab and Tamil Nadu), language has also been politically used to further nativist agendas. The state of Assam in eastern India witnessed immigration on a large scale from what was then East Bengal (later East Pakistan, and now Bangladesh) from the 1930s onwards. These immigrants, both Hindu and Muslim, were Bengali speakers, though they sometimes reported their mother tongue differently from one census to the next, to be protected against sons-of-the-soil politics. Thus, an increasing number began to report Assamese as their mother tongue rather than Bengali. This explains the extraordinary figure of 149.5% growth in the Assamese speaking population of the state between the Censuses of 1931 and 1951, while in the next decade the growth rate was 36.5%. (Ghosh, 1996:61–2) Bengalis also dominated employment in both the public and the private sectors. In the early 1980s, following the influx in the previous decade of a large number of migrants from Bangladesh (consequent upon its war of liberation), the Assamese began to express fears of being swamped, numerically and therefore politically and culturally, by the Bengali migrants. There was bloody conflict, which ended only with the Assam Accord signed between Rajiv Gandhi’s government at the Centre and the leaders of the Assam movement. This leadership of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), dominated by the Assamese Hindus, rode to power in the 1985 elections. This was a conflict in which language became the instrument and the basis of ethnic political mobilization for control over developmental resources, political and administrative control, and employment. Essentially, however, the conflict was over economic and political resources. (Das Gupta, 1991; Baruah, 1999) Effectively, as Paul Brass (1992:154) has argued, the languages of India are arranged in ‘a hierarchy of official status’, with Hindi and English (as official languages of the Union of India) at the top; the Eighth Schedule languages of the linguistically organized states next; the Eighth Schedule languages – such as Sanskrit or Sindhi – which do not have a territorial home below these; and, at the bottom of the hierarchy, the dozen or more officially unrecognized languages but spoken by more than a million people each. Linguistic identities in India were negotiated over more than half a century, through processes of political assertion and mobilization. This should not, however, blind us to the fact that state response to such mobilization has depended on its strength and potential for violent conflict. Some movements for statehood based on language – such as the
Managing Diversity: Institutions, Policies and Politics 47
Maithili movement – failed to accomplish their objectives, while many others which held out credible threats of violence succeeded. Despite this, it would be correct to say that the organization of the Indian polity as a federation, based on linguistic states, has substantially resolved and settled the issue of linguistic diversity. The management of linguistic diversity has indeed been among the more successful experiments of institutional engineering in the history of modern India.
Religion The politicization of religious identity in India, as well as the role of the state in its manipulation, suppression or fomentation, cannot be understood without taking a few steps back into history. In the late nineteenth century, the Aligarh movement,2 under the leadership of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, aimed at empowering the Muslim community through religious and educational reform, especially modern western education. Syed Ahmad Khan was, however, a nationalist who believed that the destiny of Indian Muslims was Indian, but that the community would stand to gain from being loyal to the British rulers. The Government of India Act of 1909 provided for separate electorates for the Muslims, a decision that was to have far-reaching, profound and enduring consequences. As Mushirul Hasan writes: Separate electorates, along with reservations and weightages, gave birth to a sense of Muslims being a religio-political entity in the colonial image – of being unified, cohesive and segregated from the Hindus. They were homogenised like ‘castes’ and ‘tribes’ and suitably accommodated within political schemes and bureaucratic designs. Self-styled leaders were emboldened to represent an ‘objectively’ defined community and contend with others for patronage, employment and political assignments. In this way separate electorates created space for reinforcing religious identities, a process which was, both in conception and articulation, profoundly divisive….The ideological contours of the future Pakistan were thus delineated by British opinion and policy-makers long before Jinnah burst upon the political scene with his insistence on having a Muslim nation. (Hasan, 1997:35) The space offered by the structures of governance for the articulation of the communitarian interests of Muslims was entrenched in subsequent
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reform legislation as well, especially in the GOI Acts of 1919 and 1935. Political safeguards in the form of separate electorates for communal representation were all along resented by the Congress Party which viewed these as a manifestation of the British policy of ‘divide and rule’. Recent research has demonstrated the construction of communalism in the colonial period, a process in which the colonial state played no small role. (Pandey, 1990: Ch.2) As the Indian struggle for independence approached its climax, the Muslim League’s claim for a separate nationstate of Pakistan became more insistent, and eventually the Mountbatten plan, announced in March 1947, provided for the division of India into the two independent states of India and Pakistan. At independence, the secular forces in the Congress were in the ascendant, but the formulation of the Constitution took place in the context of a bitter and violent Partition. The Constituent Assembly was faced with the difficult task of balancing the interests of groups and communities, on the one hand, with the claims of equal citizenship of a secular modern state, on the other. The concept of secularism that was adopted reflects this contradiction, which has been attributed to its ‘simultaneous commitment to communities and to equal citizenship’ (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987:38–9). In the nationalist view, separate electorates were the divisive legacy of the colonial period. The Constitution-makers therefore abandoned the provisions (in the GOI Act of 1935) for separate electorates and reserved seats for Muslims, Christians and Sikhs. However, a set of cultural rights for minority religious communities was enshrined in the chapter on Fundamental Rights. The chief ideological legacy that is embodied in the chapter on Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution is that of the Motilal Nehru Report of 1928, which in turn drew heavily upon the American and European constitutions. In particular, the Nehru Report expressed the importance of giving protection to minorities, providing for the right to freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion. Article 25 of the Constitution provides that ‘all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion’. While this article emphasizes the practice of religious freedom by individuals, the next article highlights the establishment of institutions. Article 26 thus is about the right of every religious denomination to ‘(a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law’.
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(Article 26) Article 27 follows this up with the freedom of the citizen in regard to religious worship or religious instruction at an educational institution. It stipulates that religious instruction cannot be provided at any educational institution funded wholly by the State. In institutions recognized by the state, or receiving aid from it, citizens are free not to take part in any religious instruction or worship. It is the provisions of Articles 29 and 30 that give minorities protection for their distinctive culture/language/script, and the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. A huge amount of case law has been generated around Article 30, especially in relation to the quantum of reservation of places for members of the minority that has established in the educational institution. On the whole, however, the effort of the constitution-makers was to lay the foundations of a secular and pluralistic society, in which the interests of diverse castes, religious communities, and linguistic communities could be reconciled. Though the Constituent Assembly decided that the criminal law of the land would apply to all citizens equally, it was decided to allow religious minorities to follow their separate personal laws in matters relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and so on. For Hindus, some standardization and uniformization of personal law was attempted in the Hindu Code Bill of 1950. However, conservative opposition to the Bill eventually led to the passage of a discrete set of bills (e.g., separate bills relating to inheritance, marriage and divorce, etc.), while the proposed comprehensive legislation was dropped. The long-term objective of a common civil code for members of all religious communities was placed in the non-justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy, Article 44 of which provides that the State ‘shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India’. This has been a contentious issue in Indian politics since the enactment in 1986 of a law on the right of Muslim women to maintenance after divorce. Feminists have also been in favour of a uniform civil code as this would enhance the prospects of gender justice. However, with the right-wing BJP insisting on a Uniform Civil Code for quite different anti-minority reasons, feminists have backtracked. Family law reform has also been occasionally contentious in relation to Christians, but nowhere more than with respect to the Muslim community. (cf. Parashar, 1992) The Minorities Commission was established by a Government resolution in 1978, but was a non-statutory body until 14 years later, when a National Commission for Minorities Act was passed in 1992, and
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appointments were made to the Commission. The stated function of this Commission is to evaluate the progress of the development of minorities all over India; to monitor the working of the constitutional and legal safeguards provided to minorities; to look into specific complaints regarding the deprivation of rights or any discriminatory practices; to undertake research into the socio-economic and educational development of minorities; and so forth. (The National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992:4) The Commission has been forthright in its condemnation of communal violence, as in Gujarat but is limited by its chiefly monitoring and advisory role. The Commission has, in its recent functioning, apparently upset the minorities more than it has allayed their anxieties. Its proposal for an inter-faith dialogue between the extreme Hindu right, on the one hand, and the Christians and Muslims, on the other, has provoked angry reactions from bodies like the All India Christian Council and community newspapers like The Milli Gazette, which have even demanded that it be disbanded. The central problem appears to be its lack of teeth, as also the lack of credibility of its members and chairperson, who are government appointees. Even where recommendations are made in good faith, they are rarely implemented. At least a few hundred thousand pages have been written on the nature of Indian secularism, and the relationship between religion and the state that is envisaged in the Indian constitution and law. Some have tried to show that the state’s approach has been one of benign disposition towards, but equidistance from, all religions, while others have argued that the Indian state effectively practices multi-theocratic secularism. Competing notions of secularism are also perceived to be at work: the Nehruvian idea of dharma nirpekshata (the separation of religion and politics, and state neutrality) vs the Gandhian concept of sarva dharma sambhava (the principle of equal respect for all religions). This historical and theoretical debate is, apart from being irrelevant here, also irresolvable. The important point to be noted is that political parties and leadership have consistently manipulated religious identity for political purposes. Hasan’s contention about the role of the colonial state (cited above) can easily apply to independent India as well. In the following paragraphs, we shall attend to three issues: first, the Shah Bano judgement and its aftermath, which illustrates the issue of gender in relation to religion; the question of Urdu, which highlights the interplay of language and religion; and finally, and most importantly, the issue of Hindu-Muslim relations and communal violence. In all these cases, we will observe the role of politics and the State.
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Shah Bano In 1985, the Supreme Court delivered a judgement in the case of Shah Bano v. Mohammed Ahmed Khan which has had a lasting impact on the national debate on religion and politics. Shah Bano was, at the time, a seventy-three year old divorcee, who had received a paltry maintenance allowance of Rs. 179.20 (less than $5) per month from the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. It was against this decision that her former husband, Mohammed Ahmed Khan, appealed to the Supreme Court. In doing so, he argued that he had paid her an allowance for the three lunar months after he had pronounced an oral divorce,3 and that under Muslim Personal Law, he was obliged to do no more. Indeed, it was his case that Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (being criminal, and not civil law, and therefore uniformly applicable to all citizens), under which he had been instructed to provide maintenance, conflicted with his rights under Muslim Personal Law. The Supreme Court was being asked – and not for the first time – to pronounce on this conflict. It upheld the judgement of the High Court, quoting profusely from Islamic texts to show why Khan must pay maintenance to his divorced wife. It also made a reference to Article 44 of the Constitution, and the importance of a common civil code, arguing that if communities would not bring about reform, it was the duty of courts to do so. (Engineer, 1987: 23–34) This judgement was widely acclaimed, but there was some mobilization around the counter-view that the Supreme Court had meddled with something that was outside its ken, viz. the right of a minority community to determine its own personal laws. The loss of some parliamentary seats in a series of by-elections in December 1985 alerted the Congress to the political potential of this judgement, and caused it to swiftly renege on its earlier position of hailing the judgement. Indeed, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi – after a series of consultations with the Muslim ulema, but disregarding completely the many representations from Muslim women and progressive community leaders – introduced a legislation, the Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Bill, which was subsequently passed. This Act, which Mushirul Hasan has described as ‘a significant and reckless departure from the informal consensus established by Nehru on non-intervention in matters of faith’ (Hasan, 1997:277), removed Muslim women divorcees from the purview of Section 125, thereby – for the first time – limiting the universal and uniform application of the criminal law of the land. Even as the rights of cultural community – the ostensible rationale of this legislation – were thus recognized, a sharp blow was simultaneously dealt to
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the cause of gender justice. By privileging the Muslim woman’s community identity over that of gender, the secular interests of Muslim women were sacrificed at the altar of the Muslim leadership’s right to control community affairs. The Muslim female citizen was doubly disadvantaged: both as a member of a minority religious community (vis-à-vis the predominantly Hindu majority) and as a woman (vis-à-vis Muslim men, the state and even other women in society).4 Urdu The Urdu language is the mother tongue of over 40 million Indians according to the Census of 1991. Though it has been identified with the Muslim minority, it is worth entering two caveats. The first is that only Muslims in north India speak Urdu, while Muslims in other regions of India speak the relevant regional language. In the states of Assam, West Bengal, Kerala and Jammu and Kashmir, which have a concentration of Muslim population, the majority of Muslims speak the relevant regional language. Even in the northern states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, Urdu speakers are limited to the small upper strata/castes of the population, while the vast majority of Muslims speak local Hindustani dialects. (Alam, 2003:4884) Secondly, prior to independence, Urdu was the language of upper-class everyday life in north India, regardless of religion. It was customary for primary education in undivided Punjab, Uttar Pradesh (then the United Provinces) and Bihar to be conducted almost entirely in Urdu. This despite the fact that Urdu (the word comes from the Turkish ortu, meaning military camp) is itself seen as a hybrid of Persian-Arabic and Hindi, a patois of the bazaars and the cantonment. In the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, however, Urdu had increasingly modelled itself on the Persian literary tradition, and evolved its own very distinguished literary tradition, particularly strong in poetry. Salil Mishra (2003) has traced the evolution, through the 19th century, of the ‘normative association’ of Hindi with Hinduism, and that of Urdu with Islam. His work demonstrates the cultural roots of this increasing identification between linguistic and religious identity. As the demand for a separate Muslim nation came to be articulated in the 1940s, Urdu was declared to be the language of the new Muslim nation. This had the peculiar consequence of Urdu being imposed as the official language on Pakistan in which, in 1947, Urdu was the mother-tongue of only 4% of the population. Even after the creation of the separate Bengali-speaking nation of Bangladesh in 1971, this proportion had risen to only 8%, with Urdu being ranked, in
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terms of number of speakers, the fifth language of Pakistan. (Mishra, 2003:21–2) In the Constituent Assembly, Muslim members pleaded for Hindustani – in either the Devanagari or the Urdu script, or with Devanagari as its primary and Urdu as its second script – to be made the ‘lingua franca’ of India. As Maulana Azad argued, the language spoken in north India effectively had three different names – Hindi, Urdu, Hindustani – and therefore Hindustani would be an appropriate compromise, avoiding the Persian-Arabic extreme of Urdu, on the one hand, and of Sanskritized Hindi, on the other. (Noorani, 2003:294–5) Gandhi too had always been in favour of Hindustani, the language he spoke as he travelled across India. The lack of acceptance of his proposal led to Azad’s resignation from the Drafting Committee. It was clear that the fuss over Urdu was actually an expression of hostility against the Muslims. Today, Urdu is the official language of only one state in India, the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir. In October 1947, the state government of the then United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) decided to make Hindi – written in the Devanagari script – the state language. In 1989, an attempt to make Urdu the second official language of the state sparked off some episodes of communal violence in the name of language riots. (Chandhoke, forthcoming:43) Concern is periodically expressed for the decline in the circulation of Urdu newspapers and journals, though in certain districts of some southern states, Urdu is an official language. Hasan has noted that even the defenders of Urdu abandoned its cause after being co-opted by the establishment, and were satisfied by the trivial sops of Urdu academies, literary awards and other forms of official cultural patronage. (Hasan, 1997:278) The policy neglect of the Urdu language is inextricably linked with its supposed identification with the largest minority community in the country, and has therefore been a casualty of communal politics. Communal violence The history of independent India is replete with instances of communal violence, from the bloody partition of 1947 to the brutal killing of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. Ashutosh Varshney’s study of HinduMuslim riots between 1950–1995, based on a compilation of newspaper reports, suggests that there has been a rising curve of violence since the mid to late 1970s, which peaked with the destruction of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya in December 1992. However, after this peak of
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1992–93, Varshney argues that the next two years witnessed a decline. His analysis of this data reinforces the commonly held view that communal riots are an essentially urban phenomenon. In the 46-year period under study, only 4% of the reported deaths were in rural areas. In terms of regional spread, contrary to the popular impression that Uttar Pradesh is the state most greatly afflicted by communal violence, it appears that Gujarat, Bihar and Maharashtra have higher per capita rates of death in communal incidents. (Varshney, 2002:95–7) In explanatory terms, Varshney rejects both essentialist/primordialist as well as instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict, to argue instead that ‘civil society is the missing variable’. (ibid.:39) As such, associational civic engagement – through business organizations, trades unions, professional associations and political parties – can promote inter-ethnic peace in urban settings. Varshney demonstrates this by contrasting three pairs of Indian cities, each pair having one city that has experienced communal violence and another that has not. It could however be argued that, despite the compelling nature of Varshney’s evidence, he has underplayed the role of the state. The Gujarat riots of 1992, which Varshney has claimed lend further credence to his thesis, actually show more starkly than at any previous point in Indian history the unabashed and blatant participation of the state in the pogrom in which almost 1000 Muslims were brutally murdered, while their homes and shops were looted and burnt. It is true that the silence of local civil society was palpable,5 but it is also the case that state agencies, state officials, the state machinery and even the head of the administration, the Chief Minister, were implicated in this violence. The victims found it difficult, if not impossible, to even file cases against their perpetrators at the police station, or claims for compensation with the administration. The complicity of political parties and administration is vividly illustrated in a recent work by Paul Brass (2003) on Hindu-Muslim violence in Aligarh, undoubtedly one of India’s most riot-prone cities. Viewing riots as theatrical productions in which many actors participate, and which manifest phases of rehearsal, of staging and of interpretation, Brass makes three important points. First, that ‘there is a direct causal link between riots and electoral/political competition’, as demonstrated by the fact that riots commonly ‘precede elections and intensify political competition’. (2003: 33–4) Secondly, Brass argues, riots are ‘functionally useful to a wide array of individuals, groups, parties and the state authorities’ (ibid.:34), as they provide political benefits. Finally, it is his contention that riots involve mass participation in the
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way they are enacted and this feeds on a discourse of Hindu-Muslim communalism ‘that has corrupted history, penetrated memory, and contributes in the present to the production and perpetuation of communal violence in the country’. (ibid.) The state and political parties have indeed played an important role in the construction of minority identity, in the creation of majoritarian discourses and politics, and even in brutal violence against minority groups. The marginality of minorities in governance structures is only partly a function of these, but partly also the result of the socioeconomic inequalities that mark the condition of at least the largest minority group, the Muslims. As a prelude to discussing the levels of social and economic deprivation that obtain among the Muslims, let us take stock of political and voting behaviour among the Muslims. The collapse of the Muslim League in the immediate post-Partition period did see a rush of Muslims towards the Congress. The Congress Party has historically projected itself as the protector of minorities, the guarantor of minority rights and a secular state. It is no surprise therefore that, till very recently, the Congress was the party most favoured by the Muslim voters. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph have, however, argued that since the shifts in Muslim voting patterns from 1977 to 1984 parallel the regional and national outcomes in these elections, this raises ‘the question of whether the minorities’ purported support for Congress results more from a special relationship based on Congress’s commitment to equal citizenship and secular values or from a perception of Congress as the dominant party and as such the likely winner and prospective governing party’. (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987:187) In fact, there is a distinct similarity in the voting behaviour of Muslims, the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes. However, the thesis that there is ‘a special relationship’ between the Congress and the Muslim voters, while it may have held true till Nehru’s time, is of doubtful validity from the early 1960s onwards. In the 207 parliamentary constituencies which have Muslim populations of 10% or more, the Rudolphs found that in three consecutive elections – 1977, 1980 and 1984 – the Congress received a lower percentage of votes in these constituencies, than in others. Further, in 1977 and 1980, it won a lower proportion of seats in Muslim constituencies than it did overall. (ibid.:194) As such, there is little evidence to support the thesis of ‘a special relationship’ between the Congress and the Muslims. Indeed, a recent study argues that it is the Congress that must take the blame for the under-representation of Muslims, because the percentage of Muslim nominations by the party has been consistently
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low. In the first five Lok Sabha elections (1952–1971), the Congress nominations for Muslims remained between 4.29% and 5.74%. In these elections, Muslim candidates belonging to the Congress managed to win even in constituencies where the Muslim population was only between 3% and 18%. (Ansari, 2003:134) It was in the 1977 (postEmergency) election that the Congress, for the first time, nominated 7.52% Muslim candidates. It is, however, interesting to observe that in this particular election, the Muslim vote conformed to the general pattern and went against even Muslim candidates if they were Congress nominees. (ibid.:18) In the next two general elections (1980 and 1984), the number of Muslims elected reached their highest number. Both these elections saw a massive pro-Congress wave which was echoed in the Muslim vote. Beginning with the 1989 election, there has been a downward curve of Muslim representation, repeated in 1991, 1996 and 1998. These elections have seen a spread of the Muslim vote, with – in 1998 – the 28 Muslim MPs representing 12 different parties. The corresponding figure was 6 parties in 1991 and for 7 parties in 1996. In the 1996 election – which, not unimportantly, was the first parliamentary election after the demolition of the Babri Masjid – the Congress lost Muslim support by just four percentage points, from 38% in 1991 to 34% in 1996. In the parliamentary elections of 1998 and 1999, it appeared that the Muslim anger had subsided and there was a return to the Congress, signalled by an increase in the Muslim vote for the Congress, to 43% in 1998 and 50% in 1999. (Yadav, 2003:65) The 13th Lok Sabha, elected in 1999, had 32 Muslim MPs, up from 28 in each of the previous three Lok Sabhas, and representing 11 different parties. In the current – fourteenth – Lok Sabha, elected in 2004, the number of Muslims MPs is 35, of which 25 were elected from constituencies with a Muslim population higher than 15%. Ten out of these 35 MPs are from the Congress Party and the rest are from 10 other parties.6 The vacuum of political leadership has been a genuine problem for the Muslim community, which has therefore been held hostage by a small set of mostly conservative leaders. Every major political party – including even the BJP – does have a token Muslim or two in the upper echelons of the party leadership. These individuals, however, are objects of criticism on two counts. Firstly, it is argued, they are seeking personal success, and so prefer to attach themselves to the major political parties from which they can obtain benefits such as ministerial office. Less dishonourably, it is argued that some of them prefer to project themselves as possessing broad-based appeal, and do not wish
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to be seen as only Muslim leaders. Secondly, though they win elections from Muslim-majority constituencies, and hence on the basis of their Muslim identity, these politicians choose to let the mainstream parties benefit from this. The potential for translating their electoral victory into empowerment for the community is thus lost. Muslim politicians in the Congress, the BJP, the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) alike have been blamed for dissipating the potential of the Muslim vote in this manner. Further, there are mainly two political parties claiming to represent the Muslims, both of which are essentially regional parties in south India. The first of these is the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), which is predominantly a Kerala-based party, that has been in alliance with the Kerala Congress for many years, and part of the United Democratic Front (Congress-led coalition) governments in that state. Its electoral base is in the Muslim-majority constituencies of Kerala. The second party is the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM) of Andhra Pradesh. As regional parties, the IUML and the MIM convened, in 1998, a meeting to push for the formation of a national political party of Muslims. In 1999, a number of Muslim organizations put forward a ‘Muslim agenda’ for the general elections, urging the secular national parties – evidently without success – to give them greater representation. (Noorani, 2003:279–82) Despite some recent discussion on the desirability of PR, however, the major concerns reflected by the public pronouncements of Muslim social organizations and political parties are unsurprisingly centered around the issue of the Ayodhya dispute and the security of Muslim citizens’ lives and property in the face of communal violence. In the last few years, the question of quotas – especially for Muslims belonging to the backward classes/lower castes has also become more prominent. Of course, this may presage divisions within the Muslim community, which has long – and sociologically incorrectly – been viewed by politicians as a monolith. Some leaders, such as Syed Shahabuddin, argue that the entire Muslim community in India forms a backward class and should be recognized as a Backward Class eligible for reservation. Others – such as the All India Muslim OBC Organisation – believe that Muslim society in India is divided according to castes. These positions clearly represent conflicts of interest, as those Muslim groups that have already received official recognition as OBCs, would obviously like to keep the ‘upper caste’ Muslims out of the lists to prevent a shrinking of the pie for those whom they believe to be truly deserving. The All India Muslim OBC Organisation is, however,
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demanding Scheduled Caste status for Muslim Dalits. (Jenkins, 2003:115–17)
Caste Historically, the stratificatory system of caste has, despite its apparently static inflexibility, been dynamic, fluid and changing. Colonial rule and the condition of modernity – political and economic – have been instrumental in transforming it beyond all recognition. The manner in which castes have been enumerated would make little sense to a visitor from some ancient time, well-versed in the textual and ritualistic aspects of caste. British colonial rule treated caste as ‘the institutional keystone of Indian society’. (Fuller, 2003:481) Beginning with the first decennial all-India census of 1871, the census became the main instrument of gathering information about the ‘caste system’ and classifying it. These exercises of data-collection also fed into the organization of, for instance, the British Army in India, whose regiments (e.g., the Jat regiment or the Sikh regiment) were caste/community based, depending on the colonial state’s stereotyping of certain communities as ‘martial races’. The measurement of castes and sub-castes according to size and number in the census contributed to the ‘fixing’ of caste identities in ways hitherto unknown. With their identities so fixed, caste groups began to form caste associations, some of which would periodically petition the colonial government to reconsider their ranking in the hierarchy! The arbiters of the caste system were thus no longer part of the ritual order, but rather external to it. Thus was a pre-existing set of social relationships shaped and moulded by the British rulers of India, which, even as it reinforced the Brahmanical principle of the hierarchy, gave it added ‘secular’ legitimacy, and imparted to it a certain fixity and inflexibility. In their attempt to fashion a modern, secular and egalitarian nation, the Indian nationalists condemned the evils of caste and caste practices, and advocated social reform and the ‘uplift’ of the untouchable castes, which were then called the Depressed Classes. From the 1920s onwards, under Gandhi’s leadership, the struggle for freedom also incorporated the issue of social equality for the untouchables, rechristened by Gandhi as Harijans (or children of God). In particular, Gandhi fought against the ‘sin’ of untouchability, and advocated the ‘upliftment’ of this section of society. Sharply critical of the Gandhian view was the more radical rejection of Brahmanical Hinduism articulated by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, ‘untouch-
Managing Diversity: Institutions, Policies and Politics 59
able’ lawyer, educated at Columbia University, who later became the President of India’s Constituent Assembly. In 1909, when the Muslims were granted communal electorates in the Morley-Minto Reforms, the Depressed Classes also became conscious of the politics of numbers. The caste Hindus were keen that they should be counted as Hindus, while the Muslims argued that they should not. (Pai, 2002b:4) In the Government of India Act of 1919, the Depressed Classes were given representation – albeit as non-official nominated members – in the Central Legislative Assembly as well as the Provincial Legislatures. This legislation was the first official recognition of the status of the Depressed Classes as a distinct and disadvantaged group. In different parts of the country, there was a proliferation of caste associations, caste conferences and a widespread expression of anti-Brahman sentiment, fuelled by the resentment against the Brahmin monopoly over public employment. The Justice Movement launched in 1915–16 in the Madras Presidency, for instance, pointed to the Brahman predominance in education, public services and politics. Despite accounting for only 3.2% of the population of the province, Brahmans held 55% of the positions of deputy collector and 72% of munsif posts in 1912. (Sarkar, 1998:159) A similar situation prevailed in the princely state of Mysore in southern India. The 1920s thus saw demands being made, in different parts of the country, for reservations in education and public employment, and for special representation in the various legislative bodies. The designation of some groups as ‘backward’ has its origins in such demands, such that, in 1921, Mysore state defined every single community except Brahmans as backward and provided them with educational reservations. The absence of such a movement in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) is explained by the influence, in this region, of the Congress and Gandhi, who used the language of ‘upliftment’ rather than the more radical Ambedkarite idea of mobilization. The devolution of powers to elected governments in the provinces, and the three-fold increase in the size of the Indian electorate, both mandated by the GOI Act of 1935, gave a new salience to the question of community identity. Ambedkar’s demand for separate electorates for the untouchables had already generated new fears among the (mostly caste Hindu) nationalists, since the backward classes represented between 15 and 20% of the population, not a proportion to be scoffed at in the electoral arithmetic. This was particularly the case in Bengal and the Punjab, in both of which the Hindu and Muslim populations were fairly evenly balanced in terms of numbers. The compromise
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formula arrived at in the Poona Pact was to keep Hindus and the Depressed Classes in the same electorates, but reserve a proportion of seats in the assemblies for candidates belonging to the latter group. This arrangement was formalized in the Communal Award of 1932, whereby a fixed number of seats in every provincial legislature were to be reserved for members of the Depressed Classes, as well as of the religious minorities. This was clearly an important precursor to the provisions of the Constitution of independent India, as was the procedure of creating Schedules for tribes and castes deserving of such reservation. Initiated in 1936, this task of ‘scheduling’ attempted to identify and list every depressed community in every province, and the initial list contained 400 untouchable groups apart from many tribes. This is the origin of the terms Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. (Bayly, 1999:260–3) The term ‘backward classes’ has its own distinctive genealogy, and has its origins in the dissensions within the anti-Brahman movements of the early twentieth century (especially in Madras and Bombay), in which members of low ranking, but ‘clean’ (as opposed to the ‘Untouchable’) castes, adopted the term Backwards as self-description, to distinguish themselves from the ‘Forward’ or higher-ranking non-Brahman groups who largely controlled these movements and organizations. (Bayly, 1999:241n) Galanter provides a list of ten different denotations of the term ‘backward classes’, ranging from its usage as a synonym for the Scheduled Castes to a term covering all communities other than the most advanced. (1984:155) Effectively, the term Backward castes has today come to denote caste groups – such as the Sudras – that are low in the caste hierarchy, though not as low as the dalits. Sometimes, this becomes virtually a residual category, excluding only the Brahmans and the dalit castes. As we have seen, some states like Mysore defined every single community except Brahmans as backward. By 1950, the all-India Backward Classes Federation had been formed, and four years later there were at least 14 organizations demanding reservations for these groups, both at the regional and the national levels. Indeed, long before this category became politically salient throughout India, governments in the southern states had promulgated lists of the OBCs, members of whom would be eligible for reservations. In Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, the reservations thus covered almost 75% of the states’ population. The Constitution drafted for the newly independent nation-state sought to enact a universalistic conception of citizenship. This is delineated especially in the chapter on the Fundamental Rights of citizens,
Managing Diversity: Institutions, Policies and Politics 61
which has two articles that specifically mention caste. The first of these is Article 15, which prohibits the State from discriminating between citizens ‘on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth’. In apparent recognition of the practice of untouchability, Clause 2 of Article 15 goes further to list a number of sites in which such discrimination may be practised (by private individuals and groups) and is therefore forbidden. These include access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment, as well as wells, tanks, roads, bathing ghats and places of public resort which are either wholly or partially funded by the State. The last clause of this Article specifies that, notwithstanding these prohibitions, the State may make special provision for ‘the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes’. Article 17 explicitly abolishes untouchability, and forbids its practice in any form, stating that it shall be an offence punishable under law. In the chapter on the Directive Principles of State Policy, finally, Article 46 of the Constitution enjoins the state to ‘promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and…protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.’ (The Constitution of India) It has been argued that the law, politics and government of the young Republic embodied a curious irony in the zealous promotion of the idea of a modern, casteless India, along with the recognition of caste as a social reality and the need therefore to remove the disabilities attached to it. (Bayly, 1999:266) The Constitution, it could be argued, similarly expresses a paradox in that, even as it legislates out of existence the practice of untouchability and discrimination on grounds of caste, it simultaneously recognizes and seeks to redress the special disadvantages arising out of caste oppression.7 While the idea of separate electorates was emphatically rejected for religious minorities, as well as for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, in recognition of the history of inequality and injustice suffered by the latter, an elaborate set of protective measures was devised. These included, above all, reservation of seats in legislatures, government service and academic institutions. The Constitution thus provides for reservation of seats in proportion to their numbers for the Scheduled Castes (and Scheduled Tribes) in the lower House of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, as well as the lower houses of the Legislative Assemblies or Vidhan Sabhas in the States.8 There are no reservations in the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of Parliament), or in the upper houses in those
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States that have them. This quota does not, however, constitute a separate electorate. In a separate electorate, a particular group is represented by a legislator chosen by an electorate that is composed solely of members of that group. Thus, both the electorate and the candidate belong to the same community. In a reserved seat, by contrast, the candidates must belong to the particular social group, but the electorate is a mix of all the social groups that happen to live within the area of the constituency.9 A number of ordinary laws attempt to strengthen the constitutional intention of encouraging the political participation of disadvantaged groups. They do so by, for example, requiring smaller election deposits from members of these groups. The Constitution makers had envisaged a time limit of ten years for these reservation policies, but they have been routinely extended every ten years since the enactment of the Constitution. Members of these groups can, of course, contest elections from an unreserved constituency. As we shall see later in this study, only a small number have actually succeeded in getting so elected. This underscores the critical importance of the quota in enabling the presence of the Scheduled Castes in legislative bodies, as does the fact that, in the absence of any reservation of positions in the ministry or committees of parliament, the levels of representation are rather low. Reservations are also provided for – in accordance with their proportion in the population – in government employment at all levels, and in State-funded educational institutions, especially in admission to medical and engineering colleges. Quotas are sometimes provided for in housing, allotment of land, and other such coveted but scarce goods. Since the passage of the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments in 1992, one-third of seats in the bodies of local governance – both urban and rural – are reserved for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. This encompasses three levels of panchayats – the village or gram panchayat, the intermediate block or mandal panchayat, and the district-level Zilla Parishad. The significance of these quotas is to be understood in the context of the revitalization, by constitutional amendment, of institutions of local governance by devolving powers to them that they did not formerly possess. It is another matter that the experience has not everywhere added up to effective decentralization. These constitutional provisions are buttressed by a wealth of statutory provisions that are not, like the ones mentioned above, of the ‘compensatory discrimination’ type, but rather intended to secure equal – as opposed to preferential – treatment of citizens. Most promi-
Managing Diversity: Institutions, Policies and Politics 63
nent among these are the Protection of Civil Rights Act and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, designed to protect members of these groups from violence and the indignity of untouchability. There are also a host of other laws seeking to regulate money lending, prevent the transfer of land from tribals to others, and to protect these groups from economic exploitation. While there was no constitutional provision of reservations of any kind for the OBCs, two articles of the Constitution make a mention of the term ‘backward classes’. The first is Article 16(4) which mandates the State to make ‘special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.’ This makes it quite clear that the two were not interchangeable terms. However, no further specification of ‘backward classes’ was made, except for the qualifiers of social and educational backwardness. The Constitution also envisaged the establishment of a Backward Classes Commission, to ‘investigate the conditions of backward classes’ (Article 340). In 1953, the GOI appointed an 11-member Commission, headed by Kaka Kalelkar (and therefore better known as the Kaka Kalelkar Report) which laboured for two years to produce an exhaustive ‘master list’ of all those groups which were neither untouchables nor tribals. It was then estimated that such groups (mainly backward castes) comprised 31.81% of India’s population. (GOI, 1955: 14–15) If, to this figure, were added the approximately 14% Scheduled Castes and 6% Scheduled Tribes (the percentages estimated at the time) already entitled to reservations, it seemed that over half the Indian population would be eligible for reservations. Everyone who did not belong to any of these three groups – for whom an argument of preferential treatment could be made – belonged, by default, to a Forward community. The decades of the 1970s and 1980s witnessed an increasing political assertiveness on the part of the backward castes in rural India, partly due to their increasing economic power. The programme of land reform, though far from adequate, did have the effect of breaking down the large landholdings of the upper castes, and so benefiting the tenant-cultivators, many of whom belonged to the middle castes (sometimes also referred to as ‘middle peasants’, but broadly, backwards). Most of these were farming communities, whose economic interests included the continuation of the subsidies – especially free electricity and the non-taxation of the agricultural sector – that had been provided to create an agricultural surplus. The Green Revolution increased not only their prosperity, but also their political stakes.
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The exact content and meaning of the term OBC has been differently specified in different states, and is partly a product of the particular circumstances of the competition for recognition. The term OBC does not therefore signify a homogeneous social group. Splits between upper and lower backward castes have occurred in many states historically, and new categories – such as, most recently, the Most Backward Castes (MBCs) in Uttar Pradesh – continue to emerge. Even in Karnataka, in the 1970s, there was intense competition between the two dominant castes (both backwards) for the inclusion of their own, and the exclusion of the other, from the list of OBCs. In some cases, such groups would emphasize economic backwardness as a criterion in order to exclude rivals; but, where convenient, common culture and social customs would be highlighted.10 In Tamil Nadu, the Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam, which led backward caste politics in the 1950s, initially emphasized ‘race’. But when it realized that this may entail alliances with the former untouchable castes, it shifted the emphasis to language, which created the possibilities of a common culture – and therefore political accommodation – between the party and upper caste Tamils, including Brahmans. (Shah, 2002b: 398) In what was clearly a reflection of the new political importance of these groups, several state governments set up Backward Classes Commissions (in the southern states, this had occurred as early as the 1960s) which collected a mass of data on such communities. The Backward Classes Commission of 1978–80 – better known by the name of its Chairman, B.P. Mandal, as the Mandal Commission – raised the banner of reserved quotas for the OBCs. In several states in southern India, as we earlier remarked, these were already in place. Here, state politics also reflected the importance of the caste configuration in electoral arithmetic. In states where such quotas were implemented in the 1980s, such as Gujarat, caste violence had erupted, and through the 1980s, the recommendations of the Mandal Commission were not acted upon by the Central Government. It was only in 1990 that the government of V.P. Singh – an erstwhile Congress politician who had quit a Cabinet Ministership in Rajiv Gandhi’s government on the issue of corruption – officially accepted the Mandal report. Apart from triggering off controversy and even violence (including the self-immolation of some upper caste students who feared that their prospects of acquiring an education or a job were endangered by such reservations), the Mandal reform also facilitated the emergence of new political parties claiming to represent the backward castes, such as the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh and the
Managing Diversity: Institutions, Policies and Politics 65
Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar. India has, in the 1990s, witnessed a greater regionalization of politics, in which the salience of backward caste parties in the states has been notable. In the era of coalition governments, this has also meant a greater voice for these parties in the formation of ministries at the Central level. The Mandal Commission’s operative definition of the term ‘backward classes’ was in terms of backward castes. Concluding a discussion of the inequalities and oppressions contained in the hierarchical structure of Hindu society, the Commission asked in anguish, Will it be too much to say that in the traditional Indian society social backwardness was a direct consequence of caste status and, further, that various other types of backwardness flowed directly from this crippling handicap? (Government of India, 1980a:17) The Mandal Commission laid down 11 indicators or criteria for determining social and educational backwardness, grouped according to three broad categories of social, educational and economic. In each of these, the term used was ‘castes/classes’. (ibid.:52) It was now clear that – as in all the provincial usages for the past several decades – the term backward class was merely a euphemism for caste, and indeed the Commission stated that ‘the classes, castes or communities identified as backward as a result of this survey belong to Hindu religion only.’ (ibid.:54) It did nevertheless examine the question of OBCs among non-Hindu communities, especially Muslims, Christians and Sikhs, and – because these religions were, in its words, ‘totally egalitarian’ – decided to evolve other criteria for identifying non-Hindu OBCs. In all, the Mandal Commission argued that the OBCs – 43.70% Hindu, and the remaining Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and Buddhists, excluding scheduled castes and tribes among them – constituted approximately 52% of India’s population. In terms of quotas, the Mandal Commission recommended a reservation of 27% of positions in public employment and educational institutions for the OBCs, in addition to the 22% already designated for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes together (15% + 7% respectively). This takes the total reservation to 49%. In 1992, the Supreme Court, in a landmark judgement (Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India), held that ‘caste can be and quite often is a class in India’, and if the caste in question happens to be socially backward, it is a backward class. (Frontline, December 18, 1992) However, the judgement
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held that reservations could not exceed the ‘reasonable limit’ of 50%, and therefore the Mandal Commission’s recommendation of 27% reservation was endorsed, as it kept the total proportion of reserved seats at 49%. The implications of this judgement for the states has been a central issue in state politics, since Karnataka has had 68%, Tamil Nadu 69%, and Bihar was clamouring for reservation to the extent of 80%. These developments have substantially recast politics in the states, with the occasional joining of forces between the parties claiming to represent the backwards and the dalits, especially when ranged against the forces of Hindu nationalism represented by the upper-caste BJP. Reservations have indeed become the stuff of political mobilization and competitive electoral politics.11 In the state of Uttar Pradesh, for instance, the 1990s saw electoral alliances being forged and broken between the BSP, claiming to represent the dalits, and the Samajwadi Party, claiming to represent the backwards. These two parties have been seen as rivals and competitors rather than allies and collaborators, given the difference in their social base. Hence, their alliance was always a matter of some surprise. And yet, the fact that in the past few years, the BSP has made common electoral cause with the upper-caste BJP is even more astonishing. The realpolitik explanation is probably the most credible, as the objective of democratic politics becomes not so much representation as the seizing of state power, whatever mode of opportunistic politics that may entail. The most recent example of this is the current promise by the Central Government to provide reservations for economically backward members of the upper castes. A decision to this effect was taken by the Union Cabinet on June 5, 2003, which has been advised that this would require a constitutional amendment. This announcement came in response to a promise made by the Congress government in the state of Rajasthan to include upper castes within the purview of state-level reservations. Some important states, including Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi were, at the time, on the verge of going to the polls, and the move was clearly a sign of the competitive populism that has marked the politics of reservations. Subsequently, after the national election of 2004, the demand for extending reservations to the private sector was also made, and there is currently some debate about whether corporations should be obliged to follow the path of reservations (which some criticize as undesirable and others as unimplementable) or the North American path of encouraging diversity.
Managing Diversity: Institutions, Policies and Politics 67
Meanwhile, a number of Muslim OBC organizations have also emerged in the course of the last decade, some of which are confined to the state of Bihar. They are also broadly ‘Mandalist’ in their orientation, and have been demanding that all backward communities among the Muslims be included in the state and central lists of OBCs and SCs. Some of these organizations are also seeking to forge alliances across the religious divide, as between dalit and OBC groups belonging to both the Muslim and Hindu communities. (Alam, 2003:4885) These are trends, it must be said, that are only just beginning to be noted in scholarly circles, and have not yet entered public discourse. The politicization of caste, thus, has given this ritual category a secular orientation first noticed in the work of Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph (1967) as well as that of Rajni Kothari and others in 1970. (Kothari, 1970) The assumption that castes vote en bloc for the particular political party they see as their authentic representative has however been empirically interrogated. Sometimes, castes identify with a particular political party not only because its leaders are caste-fellows, but also because it raises issues that they perceive as important. One such example of a party identification that fuses interest and identity is the support base of the Lok Dal in Uttar Pradesh, widely perceived to be a party of the Jat community (a backward caste). However, the fact that Jats vote for the Lok Dal is not solely attributable to the fact that its leaders are Jats, but also to the fact that the Lok Dal has been representing the interests of farmers, which is what most Jats in Uttar Pradesh happen to be. Likewise, middle-class voters from the Scheduled Castes have been known to vote for the BJP, while the poorer voters from these castes invariably vote for the BSP. (Shah, 2002a:24)
Tribe The policy debate on tribals in India after independence centred around the core question of whether they ought to be left in their state of isolation or assimilated. The anthropologist Verrier Elwin was seen to be associated with the isolationist camp,12 while the sociologist G.S. Ghurye was an assimilationist who believed that to redress the backwardness of the tribes they had to be brought into the mainstream. The earliest policy statement on the subject was arguably Nehru’s enunciation of the pancha shila (or five principles) doctrine, in which he argued that people should be allowed to develop along the lines of their own genius without any imposition from the outside; organize their own adminis-
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tration and development; and, above all, that their land and forest rights must be respected. (Furer-Haimendorf, 1967:217) Despite Nehru’s principles, however, a two-fold policy was followed towards the tribes. On the one hand, the policy envisaged protective measures for tribal culture, but on the other, tribal areas became subjects of official development, sometimes in the name of the national interest, and at other times in the name of tribal development itself. The pursuit of development in independent India has entailed consequences for tribal society that express a striking continuity with colonial practices of undermining the tribal dependence on the forest, which had customarily taken the form of usufructuary rights or collective ownership. British rule in India witnessed the process of large-scale alienation of tribal land (often through deceitful methods) and the introduction of the alien institution of private property. Though the state in independent India officially disallowed the alienation and sale of tribal land, it nevertheless continued this process, by the takeover of land ostensibly for public purposes, e.g. development projects. As a result, tribal areas have witnessed intensely extractive exploitation for mineral resources; and the construction of infrastructural projects such as dams and power projects, displacing large numbers of tribals. This has contributed to the uprooting and consequent impoverishment of tribal communities as they are thrown at the mercy of a highly exploitative labour market which they are compelled to enter as unskilled labour. Tribal movements have also emerged, to which the attitude of the state has been sometimes appropriative, and at other times repressive. On the whole, however, there has been a tendency for the central political leadership to either divide such movements, or to try and co-opt tribal leadership through the politics of patronage. (Brass, 1992:183) In recent times, tribal movements for autonomy have actually succeeded in their demand for separate statehood – the creation of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh states – and therefore control over the rich mineral resources of their regions. Policy measures for the Scheduled Tribes can be divided into broadly four categories. (i)
The first of these are frequently called ‘protective’ measures, but are perhaps more accurately described as developmental measures, as they seek to address the problem of the material development of these groups. Until the mid-1970s, the state approach towards the protection of tribal interests took the form of welfare mea-
Managing Diversity: Institutions, Policies and Politics 69
sures, in the areas of the economy, education, health and communication. From the Fifth Five Year Plan onwards, there was a discernible shift in emphasis towards development. This shift from the language of welfare to that of development ushered in a phase of development projects located in specific areas identified for the purpose, with a large amount of money being poured into these. In real terms, however, studies show that the development outcomes have been poor, as much of the spending has been concentrated on infrastructure. The exposure to modern education – especially due to the efforts of Christian missionaries in north-east India – has however facilitated some social mobility, and the creation of a small tribal middle-class. Most of this is accounted for by jobs in the government and public sector, as tribal people are much less visible in the field of business. (ii) This brings us then to the second component of the policy strategy for tribals, which consisted of provisions for compensatory discrimination or reservation – mandated by the Constitution – of places in legislatures (both Parliament and the State assemblies), state-funded institutions of higher education and public employment at all levels. They enjoy a quota in accordance with their proportion in the population. This is in a sense the most important component of the policy approach to the tribal question, and its outcomes will be assessed later. (iii) Thirdly, there are the macro-institutional structures designed to manage the specificity of the tribal situation. Six states together account for 70.83% of India’s tribal population: Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Bihar, Orissa, Gujarat and Rajasthan. These figures are from the 1991 census, and would doubtless undergo a change when the figures of the 2001 census are released, as two states in central India based on tribal identity – Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand – were carved out of Madhya Pradesh and Bihar respectively in the intervening years. The states of the north-east, including Assam, account for just 12.01% of India’s tribal population, and without Assam for just 7.7%. The significance of these states is not that the majority of tribes in India live here, but that the populations of these states are overwhelmingly tribal. Thus, tribes constitute 94.75% of the population of Mizoram; 83.53% of the population of Meghalaya; and 87.70% of the population of Nagaland. Some of these states – Meghalaya, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh – actually arose out of the institutional innovation of Autonomous
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(iv)
District Councils, devised to facilitate the participation of the people in determining developmental priorities. These Councils, which still exist in parts of West Bengal, Bihar and Jammu and Kashmir, possess powers of law-making, revenue extraction, as well as judicial and developmental powers. The fourth policy strategy could be described as remedial, as it seeks to provide avenues by which aggrieved members of these groups may approach state institutions. The NCSCST was specifically established for this purpose, and has recently been bifurcated to create a new Commission exclusively for the Scheduled Tribes. This has been done primarily in response to the complaint that the Commission was functioning mainly as a grievance-redressal mechanism for the Scheduled Castes, and that the inclusion of the Scheduled Tribes was purely nominal.
The inadequacy of these policy measures can be judged partly by looking at the socio-economic data on the Scheduled Tribes in Chapter 2 – which provides clear evidence of persistent deprivation – and partly by an assessment of the performance of other institutions created for managing diversity, such as the NCSCST (recently bifurcated into two separate commissions for these two groups) and the new institutions for local self-governance, which provide for quotas for their representation. It is to an examination and evaluation of these that we turn in the next chapter.
4 Promoting Diversity and Protecting the Vulnerable
Apart from the other safeguards intended to protect members of disadvantaged groups – such as reservations in legislative bodies, public employment and public education – which have been discussed in the previous chapter, the Constitution of India also made provision for a watchdog institution, originally called the Special Officer for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, to oversee the implementation of these safeguards. In 1990, this was redesigned, by constitutional amendment, as the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, a constitutionally mandated body designed to protect the interests of these groups. The NCSCST was intended to monitor, on a regular and ongoing basis, the implementation of the various provisions – social, economic, educational and political, provided in the Constitution for members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Similar institutions were subsequently set up for religious minorities and backward castes, the National Commission for Minorities (1992) and the National Commission for Backward Classes (1993), respectively. In this chapter, we examine the functioning of the NCSCST as an institution entrusted with the task of submitting to Parliament an annual report on the implementation of the safeguards constitutionally provided for these two groups. A second institutional innovation was signalled by the 73rd and 74th Constitution Amendment Acts (1993), which launched an ambitious experiment for decentralizing power to the local level (both rural and urban), combined with its democratization through reservations for marginalized groups in Indian society, including women. In rural areas, this was to be achieved through the mandatory creation of, and regular elections to, a three-tier system1 of local government from the level of the village to the district. A central feature of these 71
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Amendments was the mandatory reservation of one-third of all seats, at every level, including the position of the Chairperson, for women; and reservation, in proportion to their presence in the population, for members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The states were given the latitude to decide whether they wished to extend the reservation provisions to members of the OBCs, which several states did. The intention was to provide opportunities for direct and enhanced representation at the local level, and to especially empower disadvantaged social groups, including women, to have a voice in local politics. This chapter examines the performance of these institutions over the period of approximately a decade since they came into existence in this form.
The National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes2 The creation of this institution was mandated by the Constitution to ‘investigate and monitor all matters relating to the safeguards provided for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes…’ (Article 338) in both constitutional and ordinary law. In terms of the distinction frequently made between the institutional orientations of protection or promotion, it could be said that the NCSCST is predominantly a protective institution, albeit one that is supposed to monitor the progress of, and advise on, promotional policy initiatives emanating from other state agencies. Of course, it must be noted that neither the responsibility of promoting the welfare of the scheduled castes and tribes, nor that of protecting them against a variety of injustices, has been vested exclusively in this institution. Despite the fact that it enjoys constitutional status, moreover, the recommendations of the Commission are advisory rather than mandatory. This watchdog body to monitor the constitutional safeguards was arguably an institutional innovation. On November 18, 1950 an office of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was created, and the first appointment to this office was made. By 1965, the institution had grown substantially, with 17 regional offices across the country. Two years later, these were reorganized in the form of five zonal offices, delinked from the Commissioner’s office, and affiliated to the newly created office of the Directorate General of Backward Classes Welfare (DGBCW) in the Department of Social Welfare of the GOI. With the regional organizations reporting to the Department of Social Welfare, the Commissioner’s office was now deprived of access to the field organ-
Promoting Diversity and Protecting the Vulnerable 73
ization through which it could collect information on the working of the safeguards. Meanwhile, programmes for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes remained low on the list of governmental priorities. They were poorly designed and weakly implemented. The Commissioner’s office was poorly resourced. In terms of staffing, for instance, it had in 1977, precisely two Research Officers and two Investigators. As such, it possessed neither the capacity to generate its own data nor the authority to compel other government agencies to provide it. (Galanter, 1984:70) In the meantime, Parliament had set up its own Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in 1968. This 30-member Committee, with 20 members from the Lok Sabha and 10 from the Rajya Sabha, was given investigative powers which, at this stage, the Commissioner’s office did not possess. Unlike the Commission, the Parliamentary Committee has had an uninterrupted record of functioning since 1968, and has presented to Parliament as many as 479 Reports on a wide range of subjects.3 The Janata Party government that came to power after the Emergency had, in its election manifesto, made a commitment to bring about a socio-economic revolution. Barely two months into office, and partly in response to evidence of rising atrocities against dalits, it announced that it would set up an umbrella civil rights commission that could protect the minorities, backward classes, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes against discrimination and inequality. Six months later, there was speculation that the government was planning to set up two commissions – one for religious minorities and the other for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes – instead of a single commission on civil rights. The commission for minorities was appointed in January 1978, while for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, a constitutional amendment was proposed to merge the extant Commissioner’s office with a new, broad-based, multi-member body that would serve as the main constitutional authority to look into issues concerning the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Before the amendment was introduced, however, the Union Government created, by a resolution of the Ministry of Home Affairs, a Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, consisting of a chairperson and four members, including the Special Officer appointed under Article 338. The mandate of this body was to investigate the implementation of safeguards – especially in respect of job reservations – and the laws pertaining to social disabilities. The first Commission under this dispensation was set up in August 1978. The field offices of the erstwhile Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and
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Scheduled Tribes, which had been transferred to the DGBCW in 1967, were brought under this Commission constituted through an administrative decision. In August 1978,4 the GOI introduced the Constitution (Forty Sixth Amendment) Bill in the Lok Sabha. This bill was debated in May 1979 but it could not get enacted for want of the requisite two-thirds majority. (Austin, 1999:451) The GOI, however, did not nullify the 1978 home ministry resolution and the two organizations – the one brought into being by the Constitution and other through the resolution – co-existed till 1992. The functions of these two organizations overlapped considerably, and so in July 1987 the Government of India began the task of demarcating more precisely their operational domains. As part of this move, the office of the Commission was reinvented as the NCSCST-87 through a resolution of the Ministry of Social Welfare. In this new version, the Commission’s office became more of a think tank for welfare policy, while the Commissioner’s office retained exclusive rights over its original domain, namely, the monitoring of the working of the safeguards provided for SCs and STs in the Constitution. While it is difficult to prove that it was the radical nature of the 28th and 29th Reports of the Commissioner (B.D. Sharma) that provoked yet another reorganization, it is the case that these reports were highly critical of government policy – including the issue of the displacement of tribals in the Narmada Valley, and the impact of forest laws on the relationship of tribals to the forest – and as such extremely inconvenient. Thus, this arrangement was once again revised, paving the way for the creation – this time by constitutional amendment – of the NCSCST in its present incarnation. The Commission was constituted to give effect to the Constitution (Sixty Fifth Amendment) Act, 1990 and came into being on 12 March 1992, in the process merging the old Commissioner’s office and the old National Commission’s office. In this post-1992 form, there have been three Commissions so far, with the fourth having been recently appointed. In 2002, the Government announced its decision to have two separate Commissions for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. As we have seen, the administrative rationale of establishing a single commission for both groups was not premised on any presumption of likeness between them, but simply by virtue of their being the two categories of groups – as distinct from religious minorities – that were eligible for compensatory discrimination. The administrative rationale for separation is equally mysterious, but far from likely to be a belated recognition of sociological difference. The politics of bifurcation are less
Promoting Diversity and Protecting the Vulnerable 75
difficult to decipher. In a democracy, the pressure to homogenize and consolidate votes creates the imperative – for, say, the BSP – to link the Dalit-Bahujan samaj, in an inclusive conception of the SCs, STs, OBCs and Minorities. For others, who stand to gain from a separate electoral constituency of tribals, it makes good political sense to oppose such a move. The Scheduled Tribes themselves have been arguing that their problems are distinct, and that their relative isolation has prevented them from availing of the opportunities available, allowing the SCs to march ahead of them in education and employment. In organizational terms, the Commission’s headquarters are located in New Delhi, and its field organization of 16 state offices is spread across the country. At headquarters, the Commission is organized into four departments: (a) personnel and administration, (b) the atrocities and protection of civil rights wing, (c) the service safeguards wing, and (d) the economic and social development wing (see Table 4.1). While each of these departments has assistant directors, deputy directors and research officers, the largest number of staff at headquarters is engaged in the personnel and administration wing. Of the more functional wings, it is the services safeguards wing that is substantially better staffed, while the atrocities and protection of civil rights wing has the smallest number of personnel. This clearly indicates both the priority given to these issues within the Commission, as well as its institutional capacity for handling them. Turning to the mandate of the Commission, we find that its animating spirit is contained in the Preamble to the Indian Constitution, and the articles in Parts III and IV providing for social safeguards (abolition of untouchability, child labour, traffic in human beings, and temple entry); economic safeguards (preventing the alienation of land in the Scheduled Areas); educational and cultural safeguards (reservations, and the right to preserve distinct cultures); political safeguards (reservation in legislatures); and service safeguards (reservations in public employment and for purposes of promotion). Table 4.1
Departmental distribution of staff in the NCSCST
Personnel and Administration
29
Atrocities and Protection of Civil Rights Wing (APCR) 8
Service Safeguards Wing (SSW)
Economic and Social Development Wing (ESDW)
Total
19
11
67
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The Constitution further specifies the duties of the Commission, and gives it both the responsibility and the mandate to act on particular issues. According to these provisions, it is the responsibility of the Commission to • investigate and monitor all matters relating to the safeguards provided for the SCs and STs in the constitution and any other law in force at the moment; • evaluate the working of such safeguards; • inquire into specific complaints pertaining to the deprivation of rights and safeguards to these sections; • participate and advise in the planning process and evaluate the progress of development of these communities; • submit reports ‘annually and at such times as the commission may deem fit’ to the President on the working of safeguards, with appropriate and specific recommendations addressed to the various state governments and the Union government. This listing of the Commission’s duties is thus quite specific about its role, even as it gives the Commission a fair degree of autonomy as well as space for interpreting its field of action. It indicates the proactive role envisaged for the Commission in the amendment, combining the investigative, monitoring, evaluative, advisory and remedial roles of the Commission in matters relating to the SCs and STs. In its investigative role, the Commission has unlimited power to investigate any matter relating to the safeguards, protection, welfare and development of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as also specific complaints. The Commission possesses the powers of a civil court to summon and enforce attendance of any individual, including officials, and to ask for testimony on oath, documents, public records, and evidence on affidavits. Only matters that are already sub judice cannot be investigated. These provisions do sometimes lead to turf wars between the Commission’s central team/field offices and the local administration, on which the former depend for administrative and logistical support. In its advisory capacity, the NCSCST is supposed to interact with state governments as well as with the Planning Commission. Though it is mandatory for the state governments to consult the Commission, this does not in fact happen on a routine basis. The Commission’s interface with the Planning Commission generally takes place through a variety of committees and working groups on matters relating to the
Promoting Diversity and Protecting the Vulnerable 77
SCs and STs. The Commission is empowered to undertake research and commission studies to evaluate the implementation and impact of various government projects for the SCs and STs. The Commission has so far prepared four such ‘Special Reports’, three of which are statespecific (and therefore sent to the respective state governments), while one is the report on Services Safeguards, submitted in January 1998, and tabled in Parliament in the same year. (NCSCST, 1998) In its monitoring role, the Commission is supposed to ensure that all the provisions are being followed everywhere and at all times. It can ask any public authority for a report, or ask state offices to collect data on specific subjects. This is an extremely important activity, especially as it relates to atrocities against dalits, and enables intervention in such cases outside of the sluggish legal process. When an atrocity is reported, or even taking suo moto cognizance of an atrocity, the Commission contacts the law enforcement and administrative machinery of the state to ensure that the Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 is adhered to. It monitors every stage of this process, from the mandatory visit of the District Magistrate to the scene of the crime, through the appointment of special public prosecutors, to the last details of the handling of the case. It also determines whether adequate medical assistance and the mandatory compensation have been provided. Monitoring thus is not just about collecting data, but is actually intended to be a potent instrument of intervention. In some special cases, which are not strictly covered by the law, the Commission can resort to non-formal action in its capacity as the ‘protector’ of the interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This provision is sometimes used to, for instance, protect couples entering into an inter-caste marriage, from social hostility and threats of violence. Finally, the Commission is supposed to prepare an Annual Report, which is submitted to the President of India, and then placed before both Houses of Parliament, along with an Action Taken Report on the Commission’s recommendations, or – in the case of non-compliance – reasons for not accepting its recommendations. In sum, therefore, the Commission is designed to function as a watchdog institution that monitors the executive wing on behalf of the legislative wing of the state, while remaining autonomous of both. The Government is technically responsible to Parliament regarding its actions/inaction on the recommendations of the NCSCST. In design, the NCSCST was intended to be rather like the Comptroller and Auditor-General (CAG) of India or the Election Commission, similarly appointed by the President of India. The Election Commission enjoys
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considerable autonomy within its own area of functioning, while the CAG has power over the various departments of the executive, which it can hold accountable in certain respects. The Commission lacks the autonomy enjoyed by the former, as well as the control exercised by the latter. As an institution which monitors the functioning of state agencies with respect to the interests of certain disadvantaged social groups, the NCSCST was designed to be roughly analogous to the CAG, though in a somewhat more limited sphere. In its actual performance of this role, the Commission has been circumscribed not merely as a result of institutional design, but also by its own predisposition to be self-limiting. Of the four core areas of the Commission’s functioning – viz. service safeguards, education, economic development and atrocities – the SSW is arguably the most active. In the first year (1992–93), a total of 8858 petitions were received by the Commission; followed by 5220 in 1994–96 and 3388 in 1996–97 (Table 4.2). These complaints relate mostly to promotions, transfers to insignificant positions or distant places, harassment or discrimination at work, the institution of disciplinary proceedings on flimsy grounds, unfair departmental inquiries, adverse entries in annual confidential reports, delayed retirement benefits, and so forth. The SSW has the largest workload and, as we have seen, the largest workforce of all the functional departments of the Commission. In this area of its functioning, the Commission’s inquiries into complaints are on the whole effective, and its recommendations specific, pointing out exactly where the violations are occurring and the measures that should be taken to improve the situation. As such, it functions as a fairly effective mechanism for the redressal of grievances, and almost a Table 4.2
Service related petitions processed by the NCSCST (1994–97)
S.No.
Nature of complaint
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Appointments Promotion Transfer Harassment and discrimination Others (disciplinary cases, cases relating to adverse confidential reports, appointments on companionate grounds etc.) Total
1994–96
1996–97
1375 1480 485 940
723 873 292 606
940 5220
894 3388
Source: National Commission on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes: Fourth Report (1998):186
Promoting Diversity and Protecting the Vulnerable 79
form of endorsed unionization. Of course, this means that the wing caters primarily to the needs of the new elites of the SC and ST groups, created as a result of policies of compensatory discrimination, and hence works for those who have already overcome certain barriers and gained access. In the bureaucracy, there is a stark shortfall of 5% and 2.5% at the Class I and II level positions, while an overwhelming 44.34% of the sweepers in government service are still from among the SCs. Any temptation to conclude that the NCSCST may be pre-occupied with redressing service-related grievances for this group of employees is however not sustained, because in 1994, the Central Government set up a separate National Commission for Safai Karamcharis (cleaning personnel). While the Commission is reasonably active in redressing complaints on reservations in educational institutions, curiously enough, economic development is the least contentious area of the Commission’s functioning. The Commission routinely chronicles the tribal sub-plans, and monitors the various poverty alleviation programmes being administered by the central and state governments. More recently, it has turned its attention to the question of rehabilitation for the tribes, in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, displaced by large irrigation projects. However, the Commission’s recommendations for the regularization and rationalization of land records, the streamlining of land revenue administration, the enforcement of ceiling legislations and tenancy reforms, are neither heeded nor translated into policy. One of the most important areas of the Commission’s functioning is that of atrocities against dalits. The NCSCST collects and comments on data relating to cases under the Civil Rights Act and the Prevention of Atrocities Act, and its reports suggest a rising graph of atrocities and violence against these groups in the 1990s. When an atrocity comes to its notice, whether through a petition or through a media report, the Commission can ask the relevant state office to pursue it; or Commission member(s) may hold an on-the-spot inquiry, and remain in the area where it was committed to pressurize the district administration to act effectively. However, even though the Commission has extensive powers of investigation and inquiry in this area and can fix responsibility and recommend action, these recommendations are not binding. In the fairly extensive constellation of laws, policies and institutions relating to the Scheduled Castes (and, until recently, the Scheduled Tribes), the NCSCST appears to have been a marginal presence so far.
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Of all its ancestors and relatives since 1950, the NCSCST possesses the most wide-ranging set of powers. As a consultative body, it enjoys the status of the pre-eminent agency that advises the President, Parliament, the Union Government, the State governments and the Planning Commission on all matters relating to the Scheduled Castes and, until recently, the Scheduled Tribes. However, several factors diminish its effectiveness. Beginning with the internal factors, the Commission has, by choosing to interpret its constitutional mandate narrowly, laid itself open to the charge of elite bias. The fact that it is both most energetic and most effective in the area of service-related safeguards speaks for itself. Since the Commission, for the most part, acts on complaints, and it is the more upwardly mobile sections within these groups that are articulate and capable of mounting claims, it could be said to have been less than sensitive to the exclusions engendered by the lack of education or information, and has not used its powers of suo moto cognizance actively enough. The Commission’s competence in settling servicerelated grievances is clouded over by its inability to reduce the incidence of atrocities and violence against dalits, or to effectively fight the persistent scourge of untouchability. This predisposition to confront only the lesser challenge is apparent also in the readiness of the Commission to suggest ways of streamlining procedures or ensuring fairness in the implementation of reservations and development schemes, or even statutory changes. It appears reluctant, however, to play a role in making a stronger normatively informed case for fundamental change, or even a frank and sharp analysis of social realities. The Commission’s stand on the land question is perhaps the only exception to this. In its reports, the Commission has systematically presented statistics to show that the Scheduled Castes constitute the vast majority of wage labourers in the agricultural workforce. It has repeatedly highlighted questions of land reform, land records, the alienation of tribal land, and the need for streamlining land revenue administration. In all this, the Commission has clearly sought to go beyond its role as protector, to advance the welfare of disadvantaged social groups. It has, however, failed to bring about any concrete change in these areas, if only because the ostensible – and weakly articulated – consensus on such issues results in politically correct homilies rather than in concrete policy. An important constraint is the underlying tension between the Commission’s constitutional obligation of monitoring the working of
Promoting Diversity and Protecting the Vulnerable 81
safeguards, on the one hand, and its functioning as a body that redresses complaints of violations of safeguards, on the other. It is sometimes argued that the Commission is a paper tiger and should be given more teeth. However, to give the Commission additional powers, in criminal investigation for instance, would require it to follow the prevailing rules regarding evidence and procedures. Quite apart from the dubious consequences of creating a parallel judicial system, these may actually retard the effectiveness of the Commission, by rendering it vulnerable to litigation in the form of appeals to higher judicial bodies, thereby nullifying its operational effectiveness and, what is more, diluting its moral authority and stature. Indeed, such a Commission would be so inundated with legislation that it may be unable to perform its monitoring role. The Commission – as constituted in 1992 – is supposed to prepare an Annual Report for presentation to Parliament. The last such report tabled in Parliament was the Fourth Report of 1998. The Fifth and Sixth Reports were prepared and submitted to the President two years ago, but have not yet been tabled in Parliament. Such delays are usually on account of the requirement that the Action Taken Report be submitted along with the main report. This means that the President circulates the Report to all the Ministries and Departments which are mentioned in it, and it is only when they have all explained their actions, or justified their inaction, that the Report can be presented in Parliament. The Constitution does not fix any period within which the Report must be discussed in Parliament. There is usually a gap of two years between the Report being submitted to the President, and it being tabled in Parliament. Even when Reports are tabled in Parliament, they are frequently not discussed. Perhaps the most singular handicap that afflicts the Commission is, however, the fact that its decisions are not binding, but recommendatory. Though this is not explicitly stated in the Constitution (as amended), Article 338, with all its sub-clauses, is deeply ambiguous on this issue. It gives the Commission quasi-judicial powers of investigation, but does not mention the form in which the Commission’s judgement of a particular issue would be delivered and implemented. It makes it incumbent upon the Central and state governments to consult the Commission, but does not state that its advice would be binding. In practice, it appears that as and when the Commission is effective, it is its moral authority that is important, if not decisive. The Commission itself has registered this frustration in its Reports (Fourth Report, 1998:247).
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Democratic decentralization: the new Panchayati Raj Institutions5 In 1992, the Government of India enacted the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments, reviving and re-inventing the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) which had languished for neglect, ceasing to exist in some parts of the country, and becoming captives of dominant local interests in others. The enactment of these amendments was not, however, the result of a popular struggle for democratization. It was substantially inspired by the disappointment over the failure of development programmes, and the perception that these would be able to perform better with local participation which would help to better identify local needs as well as deserving beneficiaries. The 73rd and 74th amendments gave constitutional status to the PRIs and to the urban local bodies respectively. A panchayat was defined as ‘an institution of self-government…for the rural areas’. A new Schedule was added to the constitution, which lists the subjects on which powers may be devolved to the panchayats. The Act required that the states should pass conformity legislations within a specified timeperiod, and made some provisions mandatory and binding on the states. The mandatory provisions pertained primarily to the structure of the PRIs and the reservation quotas within them. Depending on size, every state would – according to these provisions – have a two- or three-tier system of panchayats, at the base of which would be the Gram Sabha (or Village Assembly), consisting of all members of the community above the age of 18. The lowest tier is the Gram Panchayat (Village Panchayat), above it is the Block or Mandal Panchayat (known by different names in different parts of the country), and above that the Zilla Parishad (or District Panchayat). Elections to the panchayats at every level are filled by direct election from territorial constituencies in the panchayat area, and the panchayat has a five year term. In the directly elected seats of members in all panchayats, there is reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to their total population in a panchayat area, and one-third of these seats are reserved for women belonging to these groups. All panchayats have to have not less than one-third of their seats reserved for women. Again, the offices of Chairpersons in the panchayats at all levels are also reserved for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women (as decided by the state legislature), so long as not less than one-third of the chairpersonships are reserved for women. Similarly,
Promoting Diversity and Protecting the Vulnerable 83
there is a reservation in the offices of the Chairperson in panchayats at all levels for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to their population in a state. The provisions left to the discretion of the state legislatures were concerned with the question of additional reservation for the OBCs, as also with the all-important question of the powers to be devolved to the panchayats. State legislatures were empowered to reserve seats – both as members and as chairpersons – for the backward classes. They were also empowered to give panchayats the authority to levy and collect taxes, and to furnish them with such powers as would be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government. The most important aspect of the discretionary provisions is the specification of the powers and functions of the panchayats, defined in Article 243-G: Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of selfgovernment and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to – (a) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice (b) the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule. (emphasis added) The Eleventh Schedule lists 29 subjects as a reference for the state legislatures when deciding the devolution of powers in their conformity legislations. These relate to agriculture; land improvement, land reform and land consolidation; minor irrigation, water management and watershed development; animal husbandry, dairy, poultry, and fisheries; social forestry and farm forestry; minor forest produce; smallscale industries; drinking water; fuel and fodder; basic infrastructure like roads and bridges; rural electrification; education, including primary and secondary schools, as well as technical training, vocational education, and adult and non-formal education; primary health centres, dispensaries and hospitals; cultural activities, markets, fairs and festivals; family welfare and social welfare, including welfare of the
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Scheduled Castes and Tribes; poverty alleviation programmes; the public distribution system; and the maintenance of community assets. By April 1994, all the states had completed the process of enacting conformity legislations. All states have, of course, provided for reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in accordance with their proportion in the total population of the area. All states have also provided for reservation of not less than one-third of the seats in the Gram Panchayat for women. Reservation for the backward classes, though discretionary, is provided for by Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Goa. There are, however, variations in the percentage of seats reserved for the backward classes: one-tenth in Gujarat, one-third in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, and 27% in Maharashtra. While structures undoubtedly predispose institutions to evolve in particular ways, the most stringent test of any exercise in democratic decentralization is the actual powers and functions that are devolved to democratic institutions at the local level, which must enjoy autonomy in the exercise of these. The relevant article of the Constitution describes panchayats as institutions of self-government, but if the scope of self-government is externally defined and circumscribed, the institutions will be limited in this role. Article 243(G) itself provides for such circumscription, as it permits the states to endow the panchayats with powers, without actually making it imperative for them to do so. Democratization of power, unaccompanied by real decentralization of powers and functions, is self-defeating. Moreover, even if local bodies possess powers and functions, but do not enjoy the administrative or financial control to give effect to these, the outcomes will again be less than satisfactory. An examination of the powers and functions actually devolved makes evident the fact that the implications of the constitutional amendment were perhaps more radical in reservation provisions than in the powers and functions which were left to the states to determine and finance. In fact, only three conformity acts – those of West Bengal, Bihar and Tripura – state that they aim to endow panchayats with powers and functions that can enable them to work as institutions of selfgovernment. The Haryana Act specifically states that the objective of the panchayat institutions is to administer rural areas better. With the maintenance of law and order remaining in the hands of the state government, and with it police and judicial powers (except in a few states where nyaya panchayats have been constituted), the devolved func-
Promoting Diversity and Protecting the Vulnerable 85
tions generally include those relating to the planning and implementation of some selected development programmes. There continues to exist duality of control in development, with the elected bodies only paralleling the existing state structures. The absence of adequate financial provision, moreover, makes difficult the performance of even the few developmental functions that have been devolved. Most of the conformity acts in the states give gram panchayats the power to levy taxes on rural property; non-motorized vehicles; profession, trades and callings. Another source of revenue for panchayats is the fee for water, lighting and conservancy services, to provide for public facilities. Some money is also raised by tax-sharing – most commonly, land revenue and stamp duty – between the state governments and the panchayats. However, the main source of income for the panchayats remains the grants provided by the government, especially through special schemes like the Integrated Rural Development Scheme or the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana. These are usually in the nature of tied funds, and are attached to schemes imposed from above, instead of being made available for plans evolved at the local level. These structural limitations notwithstanding, the experience of reservations in these institutions has been mixed. In an early survey of 100 members in seven panchayat bodies in Shahpur block of Muzaffarnagar district, G.K. Lieten (1996) argued that though the 1995 elections have brought about a numerical preponderance of agricultural labourers and small peasants, the new panchayats continued to function rather like the earlier ones: with large numbers of nominal or ‘namesake’6 members, extensive corruption in development works, rigging of elections through the ‘capture’ of polling booths, and an agenda that is devoid of social concerns because it reflects only the interests of the dominant local elite, represented by the pradhan. Lieten saw in this confirmation of Ambedkar’s cynicism about panchayats, as inappropriate instruments of rural development or of transforming landed power relations. Regarding the representation of women, Lieten wrote Some of the women even did not know that they were a member. Once or twice the pradhan had dispatched a document for signing, but they did not know what it was for. Without being derogatory towards women in general, the impression is that women stand a better chance of becoming a member of the panchayat if they are illiterate, frail of body and of mind and rather old. The women who at least knew that they were panchayat members very rarely went to the meetings. If they did, then they only did so in order to put their
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thumb impression or to sign and then came back. The usual procedure, however, is for the pradhan to send the document to be signed to their house. This procedure, as a matter of fact, applies not only to the women, but to most of the male members as well. (emphases added) (Lieten, 1996:2701) Another study by Sudha Pai in the same region provides a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of surrogate representation, though her survey of three villages in the green revolution area of Daurala block in Meerut district echoes Lieten’s in some respects. Like Lieten, she records the changed social composition of the new panchayats, with their predominance of lower castes and shows that the pradhanis who have been elected to the panchayats after 1995 are ‘namesake’ members. Their perception of the panchayat as a government organization does not encourage them to see their participation as necessary. Indeed, Pai found that ‘interviewing them for understanding the working of the panchayat was of little use as they are ignorant of local affairs’. (Pai, 1998:1009) In each of Pai’s villages, the 1995 election brought a dalit woman to the post of pradhan. Since these are also Ambedkar villages, their grants for development schemes were doubled for a two-year period, and channelized through the panchayat. This has enabled a great deal of developmental work to take place, and vested the pradhans with tremendous powers of patronage. However, Pai found that it is the husbands of the pradhanis – locally described as the pradhans – who take all the decisions. The pradhanis have never attended any meeting or made any decision about allocation of funds to individuals or schemes. They merely sign on the papers sent to their house after the decision has been made. (Pai, 1998:1010) Yet, the mere fact of having been elected to the post of pradhan has provoked the realization, among these women, of the need to acquire an education or at least literacy skills. Inspired by the example of Mayawati, the dalit woman who became Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, they are keen that the girls in the village attend school regularly. This phenomenon may be called proto-empowerment. Though it is apparent that discrimination is more pronounced in the case of women, panchayat representatives belonging to the scheduled
Promoting Diversity and Protecting the Vulnerable 87
castes and tribes are victims of discrimination and exclusion, irrespective of gender. In 1994, Manulal, a dalit panch in Barbatpur village (Raisen district, Madhya Pradesh) was beaten up, simply because he did not provide the whereabouts of his brother who had had a quarrel with a young thakur (upper caste) while playing dice. In another case, in Chhatarpur district (Madhya Pradesh), Sarman Ahirbar, a dalit who won the election to the post of upa-sarpanch (deputy head) against a rival yadav (backward caste) candidate (though with the support of a high-caste sarpanch) was tortured thus: They tied Sarman’s hands with a stick in the cross position and poured molasses on his head. The sweet molasses attracted black ants and he was viciously bitten. To add insult to injury, he was paraded around the village for an hour. Helpless and humiliated, Sarman thought he would die. No one came to his rescue. Later, an old man intervened firmly, and he was released. (Matthew and Nayak, 1996:1768) P. Sainath’s survey of several of the 104 dalit-led panchayats of Tikamgarh in the Bundelkhand region of Madhya Pradesh, shows how, after the first year, dalit sarpanches are regularly ousted by a variety of methods: rigged suspensions, manipulated votes of no-confidence, or forcing them into expensive litigation. Where there are two scheduled caste groups in a village, the upper castes support and prop up the smaller one, so that they can retain their control over the panchayat. The fact that all this invariably takes place only after the first twelve months have elapsed – because the rules disallow no-confidence motions in the first year – is clearly not a coincidence. (Sainath, 1998) Thus, despite the reservation of seats for women and members of the scheduled castes, it is clear that the domination of the upper-castes endures. In intra-family disputes and similar conflicts, it is the uppercaste leaders that village folk tend to approach, rather than the gram panchayat. These castes also tend to influence the choice of candidates for elections, as well as voting behaviour. Hence, to expect panchayat institutions to work in a way that is insulated from the inequalities of local society may be utopian, but is it also utopian to expect that, in the long run, these institutions will themselves become mechanisms for assertions by these marginalized groups? The two cases examined in this chapter – a constitutional body intended to promote the welfare of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and empowered to inquire into atrocities committed against
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people belonging to these groups; and an initiative for the decentralization of political power to the local level which provides for quotas for members of disadvantaged groups, including in many states the OBCs – both suggest a wide chasm between the promise of an institution and its actual performance. The next chapter turns to an examination of the electoral and political processes which mediate the representation of such groups.
5 Negotiating Diversity: Parties and the Electoral System
The management of ethnic diversity and potential ethnic conflict through democratic institutions is necessarily dependent upon an appropriate institutional design. The study of the so-called ‘third wave of democratization’ has made it abundantly clear that the best of constitutional designs can and do go horribly awry. No constitutional design – least of all the ready-made, off-the-shelf, and one-size-fits-all type – can be perfect, or even adequately anticipate the needs of a polity as it evolves.1 Indeed, the recent trend of drawing upon the expertise of specialists in the tasks of constitution-making,2 premised on the assumption that the tasks of institutional engineering are formidable and require technical expertise and experience, may be contrasted with the alternate view that constitutions are a product of the evolution of political processes and, as such, reflect the social and political contract between the state and its citizens. Despite the wide range of world constitutions closely examined by those who drafted it, the Indian experience of constitution-making clearly belongs to the latter category, insofar as the spirit of the constitutional document reflects the social and political consensus forged, along with national identity, in the course of the movement for independence from colonial rule. Electoral systems are a crucial element of constitutional design, and the designing of electoral systems for socially heterogeneous societies has been perceived as particularly challenging. The relationship between electoral systems and democratic outcomes is thus a muchtheorized one. Its antecedents are most famously traced to the argument of John Stuart Mill – in his Considerations on Representative
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Government (1861) – that democracy was virtually impossible in societies marked by ethnic – especially linguistic – differences. Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist. The influences which form opinions and decide political acts, are different in the different sections of the country. (Mill, 1971 [1861]:382) Since the decolonization process in the mid-twentieth century, we have seen the mushrooming of a huge literature discussing the tenability (or otherwise) of democracy in divided societies. Though the electoral system is only one aspect of the institutional design to manage ethnic diversity in a democratic polity, it is one that has, in recent years, received some scholarly attention. The dominant theoretical assumption regarding electoral systems has long been that ‘majoritarian, winner-takes-all solutions are particularly inappropriate for divided societies, because they typically underrepresent minorities and generate zero-sum competitions.’ (Belmont et al, 2002:8). In a broader sense, however, the chief virtue of the majoritarian formula is believed to be that it leads to the evolution of a twoparty system, generates a cohesive single-party cabinet, and thereby provides stable and effective democratic rule. The objections to the majoritarian formula are mainly two: (a) that, in the first-past-the-post system, the democratic principle itself stands violated when candidates win with less than a majority of the votes cast; and (b) that it generates disproportionalities between votes cast and seats won, and that this tends to work against the representation of minorities. Offsetting these disadvantages, however, is one perhaps unintended positive consequence of majoritarian systems: that while they increase the distance between citizen and government, they are more accountable. This is because – unlike in a coalition government – responsibility can, in majoritarian institutions, be clearly attributed, and accountability enforced. (Manin et al, 1999:47) In contrast to majoritarian systems, PR is credited with greater proportionality and the better representation of minorities, generally in the form of multi-party systems and multi-party coalition governments. However, PR is also flawed insofar as (a) it carries the possibilities of impasse and deadlock as a number of smaller players/parties are
Negotiating Diversity: Parties and the Electoral System 91
part of coalitions; (b) it tends to produce political instability, thereby making governments less decisive, viable and effective; and (c) in the coalitions so produced, responsibility is diffuse leading to lower levels of accountability. Despite the existence of a wide variety of voting system designs, it is between the votaries of majoritarian and PR systems that the debate has been most heated. Like many other countries that were part of the British empire, India too adopted the majoritarian system without much debate on alternatives. In this chapter, we seek to answer the following questions: how was the relationship between electoral systems and the inclusive political project of Indian nationalism envisaged in the making of the Indian constitution? What have been the consequences of the majoritarian electoral system adopted by India for the representation of minorities and other disadvantaged groups? Would a different electoral system make a difference to these patterns of representation? What does recent political discourse on this subject suggest? The chapter challenges the conventional wisdom of democratic theory by showing how the FPTP system that was adopted actually encouraged and accommodated representational aspirations in a way that was responsive to, and reflected with a fair degree of accuracy, the processes of ‘social churning’ that were at work. This protected the political system from ossification, giving it a certain dynamism as both a catalyst of change, and a cushioning force against extreme shocks to the foundations of the political community. In the pages that follow, we will suggest the merits of an approach that, instead of comparing the relative merits of two systems in the abstract, assesses the way in which a particular electoral system is worked, and its possibilities realized and reinvented. In the making of the Indian Constitution, it is arguable that there were two main legacies: the institutional and the ideational. The institutional framework, firstly, was substantially the legacy of the departing imperial power, as embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935. Even federalism – the chief strategy to negotiate diversity – was present in an incipient form in that document. Certainly, the GOI Act of 1935 and more generally the Westminster system of parliamentary democratic government, was considered by the leadership of the new nation-state to be the most appropriate and suitable form of government for India. The main ideational legacy, secondly, was the social and political vision contained in the mass movement that was the struggle for freedom. This was inspired by a vision of social and economic justice, political equality, and a respect for diversity, especially
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for minority rights. In the sections of the constitution dealing with the fundamental rights and the directive principles of state policy, the constitution-makers borrowed from many existing constitutions, ranging from the United States of America to the Republic of Ireland. For their skill in adapting and modifying this rather eclectic range of borrowings, the Indian constitution-makers have actually been admired as ‘the Assembly successfully played the alchemist, turning foreign metals into Indian coin.’ (Austin, 1999:321) It is notable that the Constitution of India has very limited provisions relating to the conduct of elections. Apart from laying down the principle of universal adult franchise and the institution of an Election Commission, the chapter on Elections has only four articles about the specifics of the electoral process, the most important of which (Article 325) endorses a general electoral roll for every territorial constituency and stipulates that no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in it on grounds of religion, race, caste or sex. The significance of this provision lies in its emphatic negation of the earlier practice of separate or communal electorates (discussed in greater detail below). For the rest, the constitution gives the lower house of Parliament the power to make laws relating to all matters concerning elections. It is for this reason that the rules adopted for the actual conduct of elections are to be found in the Representation of the People Act 1951, and the subsequent amendments to it. It is also this that explains why the debates of the Constituent Assembly contain only scattered references to the issue of electoral systems, and most of these occur in the context of the provisions for minorities and other disadvantaged groups. These silences of the constitutional document are explained by the animated discussion on issues such as joint electorates and reservations in the debates of the Constituent Assembly, conducted against a particular historical backdrop. In 1909, the British government in India had, in response to a demand from a section of Muslims led by the Aga Khan, introduced separate electorates for the Muslims, who would now vote exclusively in these electorates, while also voting in the general electorates. Gradually, this principle was extended to the Provinces as well, and eventually to Muslims, Europeans, Sikhs, Indian Christians and AngloIndians. (Rao, 1968:467) Even before independence, however, observers had begun to note that communal representation had not mitigated any of the communal tensions in India. It had also become apparent that ‘separate electorates penalised parties who could appeal across communal lines, and that this distorted party competition.’ (McMillan, 2001:9)
Negotiating Diversity: Parties and the Electoral System 93
Separate electorates had been criticized by a series of documents and reports of the Indian National Congress, which viewed them as essentially divisive and detrimental to the unity of the Indian nation. It was therefore an important concern of the nationalist leadership after independence to repudiate this legacy of separate, communal electorates – which in its perception were irrevocably associated with the imperial British strategy of divide-and-rule – in favour of joint electorates. Granville Austin, a leading historian of the constitution-making process, has argued that while the repudiation of communal electorates was widely shared, there were proposals to consider (a) reservations and (b) forms of proportional representation for the better protection of the interests of minorities. The representatives of the Parsi and Indian Christian communities had turned down the proposal for reservation for their communities, and only the Anglo-Indians asked for two members of the community to be nominated (the Indian Parliament still has two Anglo-Indian representatives). (Austin, 1999:150–1) The Sikhs were undecided and the Muslims divided on this issue. Ultimately, the Muslims decided to forego reservations, hoping for fair treatment from the majority community. It is notable that the decision on reservations was left to the community in question, though Austin suggests that Sardar Patel, who supported this position, also quietly put pressure on them to give up claims to special privileges. (ibid:151) The discussion in the Constituent Assembly came to be cast in the form of a debate between two alternatives, those of reservations and proportional representation. Some members argued that reservations could be abolished if PR was adopted. A few Sikh and Muslim members, in particular, favoured proportional representation on the grounds that it would mitigate the ‘tyranny of the majority’ of single member constituencies. The chief objection to this proposal was that it was too complicated a system for the large numbers of unlettered voters to comprehend. Eventually, though some element of reservation was adopted, it was restricted to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It did not apply to religious minorities, in whose case the Constitution provided for special guarantees of minority rights. It has been commented that the failure, in the Constituent Assembly, to give serious consideration to alternative voting systems suggests ‘a pronounced tendency to assume as somehow natural the familiar Anglo-Saxon FPTP system’. (Sridharan, 2002:355) The details of the electoral system adopted in India are thus only alluded to in the Constitution, and specified in the Representation of the People Act of 1950/51, which with all subsequent amendments,
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continues to form the basis of the Indian electoral system today. The Lok Sabha, or the House of the People, is the lower chamber of Parliament. It has 543 members who are elected from single-member constituencies, in which voters (citizens above the age of 18) cast a single vote to choose their representative. The candidate getting the highest number of votes wins by the rule of simple plurality, or the FPTP system. Separate electorates are precluded by Article 325 of the Constitution which provides that there shall be one general electoral roll for every territorial constituency, and ‘no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in any such roll or claim to be included in any special electoral roll for any such constituency on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them’. (Constitution of India) Till 1961, there were some multi-member constituencies, in which the extra one or two seats were reserved for candidates belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The same simple-plurality rule applied in these constituencies as well. However, in 1961, multimember constituencies were abolished, and some constituencies in areas predominantly populated by scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are now reserved for candidates belonging to these social groups. These constituencies are demarcated and designated by a Delimitation Commission, the law courts being debarred from interfering with this process. While the delimitation for the Scheduled Tribes is relatively easy due to the concentrated nature of the tribal population, the method adopted for the Scheduled Castes has to take their dispersal into account. In most reserved constituencies, the proportion of the Scheduled Caste population is between 10% and 30%. This does, of course, make the task of the legislator from a reserved seat complicated. On the one hand, this legislator is responsible to an overwhelmingly non-SC electorate while, on the other, s/he is also charged with the task of representing the special interests of the community that s/he represents. The adoption of the majoritarian FPTP system has had some expected, and many unanticipated, consequences. Contrary to some theories which believe that it helps a two-party system to evolve, it sustained for several decades a one-party dominant system, which has in more recent times given way to a highly fragmented party system. As expected, however, it has manifested a considerable disproportionality between votes and seats. Thus, in all the parliamentary elections between 1952 and 1998, the Congress Party never once managed to get a simple majority of the national vote, the highest it ever attained being 48.1% of the national vote in 1984, which gave it an incredible
Negotiating Diversity: Parties and the Electoral System 95 Table 5.1 S.No.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
Vote share and seats: Congress and BJP (1952–2004)3
Year of election
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004
Total seats
489 494 494 520 518 542 542 542 543 543 543 543 543 543
INC
BJS/BJP
Seats
% of vote
Seats
% of vote
364 371 361 283 352 154 353 415 197 232 140 141 111 145
45.0 47.8 44.7 40.8 43.7 34.5 42.7 48.1 39.5 36.5 28.8 25.8 28.3 26.69
3 4 14 35 22 – – 2 86 120 161 182 182 138
3.1 5.9 6.4 9.4 7.4 – – 7.4 11.5 20.1 20.3 25.6 23.8 22.16
three-fourths majority of the seats, with 415 out of the 542 seats contested. In 1998, the Congress Party won 25.8% of the national vote, with just 141 seats, while the BJP won 25.6% (0.2% less than the Congress) of the national vote but won 182 seats. This disproportionality has generated some dissatisfaction with the electoral system, not merely because a party can win a huge majority of parliamentary seats while obtaining less than 50% of the popular vote, but also because the FPTP system leads to the election of candidates who may represent barely 30% of the electorate but win only because they have the largest number of votes among all competitors. This means that the vote of 70% of the electorate in a constituency is wasted, and that the elected candidate is in effect the choice of a minority of the voters and, as such, hardly representative of the constituency as a whole. As Table 5.1 shows, in the parliamentary election of 2004, the Congress Party won 145 seats with 26.69% of the popular vote. The BJP won 138 seats with a vote share of 22.16%. Together, these two parties account for approximately half the seats and half the vote share, the remainder being distributed across the other political parties. Not only has the FPTP system belied the traditional expectation that, by encouraging single-party majority governments, it conduces to stability in governance, it has also proved that it cannot keep the party system from splitting, including along ethnic lines. (Sridharan, 2002:348–9)
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India has deviated from the expectation of a one- or two-party system that the majoritarian formula is traditionally supposed to produce. Since 1989, it has seen frequent elections, hung parliaments and minority or coalition governments with as many as 23 parties in the governing coalition. It is this inherent instability of coalition governments that has provoked some limited comment, in political discourse, about the need to rethink electoral systems. It is important to emphasize that proposals for reforming the electoral system are invariably motivated not by a concern for the less than representative character of the legislature, but rather by governance concerns about the instability of coalition governments. What is interesting is that, with its majoritarian system, India has already experienced, several times, the sort of impasse that is assumed to be a consequence of the PR system. This is the result of the fragmentation of the party system, which has to a considerable extent followed social cleavages such as language or caste. The political system in India was, in Rajni Kothari’s famous phrase, ‘the Congress system’, and a party system – properly speaking – only began to evolve after 1967, which signalled the end of Congress hegemony, at least in several states, where regional parties came to power in the state assembly elections. Initially, the regional parties were based on language, and their demands were essentially for greater cultural autonomy for the region. Such, for example, were the DMK, which appealed to the cultural specificity of language and caste in Tamil Nadu, and the Akali Dal which appealed to language and religion to mount its claim for separate statehood for Punjab. The only exceptions to this trend have been the two Communist Parties, which have been frequently voted to power in Kerala and West Bengal. The increase in the number of parties in the 1990s is associated with the rise of the socalled backward castes and the dalits, though the parties that represent them – the Samajwadi Party (along with its Bihar counterpart, the Rashtriya Janata Dal) and the BSP respectively – are still limited in their regional spread, and have also been trying to broaden their appeal to other excluded groups such as minorities. This has meant, above all, that the broadly inclusive social base of the Congress has got eroded, as the Scheduled Castes and Muslims do not necessarily perceive the Congress as the party which represents them and, in the states where they have other options, may prefer to vote for the latter. Two questions are relevant here. Firstly, what does the evidence suggest about whether or not the Indian electorate has used its vote to express a preference for ‘national’ parties over ‘ethnic’ parties? Secondly, what does the evidence suggest about who votes for which
Negotiating Diversity: Parties and the Electoral System 97
party? The first of these questions is more easily answered than the second. Table 5.2 suggests that from 1952–1996, the vote share of the Congress – as the national party par excel