Religion, politics, and historiography in Bulgaria

RELIGION, POLITICS, AND HISTORIOGRAPHY I N BULGARIA

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L I B R A R Y O FT H E

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IT C E N T R A L

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EUROPEAN

UNIVERSITY BUDAPEST

CARSTEN RIIS

East European Monographs, Boulder Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York 2002

CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 2. NATIONAL REBIRTH

i AND LEGITIMATION

9

J. Introduction

E A S T EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, N O . D C V I I I

Copyright 2002 by Carsten Riis ISBN: 0-88033-506-8 Library of Congress Control Number 2002112277

v-

9

2. Chronology o/Process of National Rebirth

10

3. Political-Ideological Causes

12

4. Political-Ideological Arguments

15

5. Religio-Historical and Historica\Legitimation

17

6. Politically Controlled Research: The History of Bulgaria

22

7. The History of Bulgaria; The Editors'Preface

24

8. The History of Bulgaria: Christianity and Islam

27

9. Ottoman Rule as "Yoke" and "Slavery"

31

10. Historiographie Analyses

32

11. True or False?

38

3. "PEOPLE OF THE BOOK" AND THE MILLET

SYSTEM

43

1. Islam and the "People of the Book"

43

2. The Decline of Christianity in Asia Minor

51

3. The Millet System & the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1454

54

4. The Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1454: Sources & Research

56

5. Conclusions

64

4. CHRISTIANITY BEFORE & UNDER THE OTTOMANS

Printed in the United States of America

sV

67

1. Christianity before the Ottomans

67

2. The Church under the Ottomans: A Review of Research

72

3. Christianity in the 14th to 16th Centuries

76

4. The Rila Monastery in the 15th Century

78

5. Two Neomartyrs from the 16th Century

82

6. Conversion and Demography

84

7. Conversion in the 15th and 16th Centuries

87

8. Explaining Conversion

92

9. The Persistence of Christianity

94

10. Summary

96

v

5. THE BULGARIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH UNDER SOCIALISM 1. Schism

99 99

2. The Legal Foundation

101

3. Georgi Dimitrov and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church

104

4. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church under Socialism

107

5. Interpretations of the Church's National Function

112

6. The Church and National Continuity

113

7. Summary

.119

6. SAN STEFANO A N D THE NATIONAL TRIUMPH

121

1. Peace and the Borders

121

2. The Bulgarian Exarchate

124

3. Orthodox Christianity and Nation-Building

129

4. Nation and Nationalism

134

7. CONCLUSION

143

There are countries in the world where it is precisely the duty of historians to abolish the past, and their own professional survival depends on their success in keeping it abolished and erecting in its place a socially convenient myth which it is their function to defend, embellish and generally keep up to date.

REFERENCES

147

— Sir Michael Howard

NOTES

175

VI

VII

is-', \

\ '

INTRODUCTION

T

H E FIRST STEP IN THIS WORK was taken in Sofia in the autumn of 1989,

while I was doing research at the Kliment Ohridski University. During this time Bulgaria, was marked by the socialist government's policy towards the country's Turkish minority, which since the mid-1980s had been subjected to a conscious policy of forced assimilation. Following the relaxation of emigration restrictions, Bulgarian Turks had chosen to emigrate by the hundreds of thousands to Turkey. Bulgaria's international reputation lay in ruins, along with its economy I had come to Sofia to carry out historical research on the effects of Ottoman (Muslim) rule upon the Bulgarian (Orthodox) population up to 1878, but my topic was now in the midst of a social and political minefield. Only with the palace coup of November 10th, 1989, when Bulgaria also joined the other East European upheavals, this situation started to change. A more detailed investigation of the relation between religion and national ideology as expressed in Bulgarian historiography convinced me that a fruitful perspective lay in taking the point of departure in the current political and historiographie situation. In Bulgaria I experienced how the country's history under the Ottoman Turks was a living legacy in the self-understanding of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, in the nationally coloured historiography and in the political system generally. This legacy revealed itself in the articulation of religious and national identity, and in the policy which Bulgarian authorities conducted towards the Orthodox and Muslim religious communities. After the momentous year of 1989, my research topic also became more relevant within a broader geographic framework. In Yugoslavia and in other parts of the Balkans, religious identity seemed to impose itself more openly onto the political sphere. It became normal to speak of "religious wars" in the area, to see maps setting off Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim civilizations corresponding to military front lines, to hear of an Eastern Orthodox Athens-Belgrade-Moscow

1

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

Introduction

axis, and to observe the involvement of Turkey and other Muslim countries in those former Ottoman provinces in the Balkans containing Muslim populations. The political changes in Bulgaria, the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia and national, ethnic and religious tensions and conflicts throughout the Balkans could not avoid making their mark on my own work. The results of my research were written and successfully defended as a Danish doctoral dissertation (roughly equivalent to a German Habilitation) in 1999 at the University of Aarhus. This book, a revision of the dissertation, does not include the introductory historical overview and a concluding comparative chapter on the instrumentalisation of history and religion in power politics and its relation to nationalist conflicts and wars in the Balkans.

as a phenomenon with two aspects: one is with a theory or world-view, the other in terms of processual aspects in which the ideas are transformed into action. The ideological significance of the reception of the religious encounters during the Ottoman era expresses itself in historical and national myths or ideas. Such myths can be falsified, as is brought out in the first part-of the work with historiography, and in this sense they are false. In another sense, however, the historical and national myths are uniquely real: when people believe them to be true and act in accordance with them, ideologies assume their own form of reality because the interpretation of th^ past, the understanding of the present and our perspective on the future all come together. In these cases, the criterion of truth or our search for the past "as it really was," with all the theoretical and methodological difficulties, can not help us understand the political and social impact of the reception of history. The national myths are thus the political and social operationalisations of language, culture, religion, history and symbols. In this connection, we will concentrate on the reception of Ottoman rule as expressed in the role of religion and the religious communities in the Bulgarian constitutive myth, where myth is here understood as the complex of ideas which enter into the formation and maintenance of ethnic and national identity. The national myth depicts the Church and Bulgarian Orthodox Christianity as synonymous with national self-consciousness, as that which saved the national and cultural identity from destruction under Ottoman Muslim rule. This national myth reflects the historical understanding which in modern Bulgaria has profoundly affected the attitude of the political power system to both the Orthodox community of believers as well as the Muslim population.

• Historical research and its dissemination help to enlighten and mark coming generations, to legitimate political power, policies and institutions and to create and maintain individual and social habits and attitudes. Hence, those who wield political power have a definite interest in the writing of history. The practitioners of academic history, for their part, can try to hold themselves aloof from the political organs' desire to control future developments via their control of historical knowledge and its dissemination in schools, universities, etc. The results of these efforts depend on both the researchers' own involvement and especially on the character of the political systems. An analysis of historiography can be conducted with a point of departure in two aspects of historical research and of history writing. The first aspect involves the goals which every scientific discipline sets for itself. The goal of historical research is to confirm truth or falsity using the most adequate, consistent and exhaustive analysis and interpretation of the selected data on the basis of a relevant theory. The second aspect involves elucidating the hidden or implicit functions of the political and national ideologies on historiography. In this book, both aspects are analyzed with a focus on the historical and religio-historical topics from Bulgaria, which in 1878 emancipated itself from the Ottoman empire and became an independent state with a Christian Orthodox majority population and a significant Muslim minority. The core of this presentation sites itself within the field demarcated by power politics, national ideology and historical/religio-historical legitimation. In the Bulgarian historical reception, the religious confrontation between Christianity and Islam under the Ottoman regime is marked by national ideology. Ideology is understood here in neutral terms, but also in a broader sense than simply a society's religious or political world-view. Ideology can be viewed

In making the goal and functions of historiography the objects of the investigation and analysis, it becomes imperative for us to try and understand history despite its elusive character. At the same time, we must have a critical and self-critical view of the organs of power who have the will and the influence to depict their own truth. The precondition for a credible analysis is an academic ideal that maintains a distinction between academic history and myth, but with a necessary understanding of the influence of the mythical and power dimensions on the discipline in concrete historical situations. This topic is linked with the recent debate on essentialism and social constructivism. On the basis of the data presented, it is argued that the past as history, despite the politicisation and ideologisation, can be made into an object for academically sound investigation and analysis. Our inquiry revolves primarily around the question of Islamisation and Islamic religious policy in the Bulgarian Christian areas in the 15th and 16th centuries. This historical perspective is developed alongside with and linked to the analysis of the conventions or ideologies which condition historical myths.

3

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

Introduction

To the oft-invoked observation that religion has political significance in the Balkans, we add another dimension: that the political power systems, parallel with the political significance of religion, have had strong interests in controlling the religious communities during the socialist period in Bulgaria. That the discipline of history during the socialist era were so politicised and so overtly ideological is due not only to the totalitarian system, with the communist party as the leading political force, but also to a deeper connection between political, religio-historical and historical discourses. The connection between political and historical discourses parallel the connection between past, present and future. In a political discourse, the question of "Who are we?" is essential for the answer to the future-oriented question of "Where are we going?" In a historical discourse, the answer to "Who are we?" is a result of the past-oriented question "Who have we been?" (Kafadar 1995:22). Herein lies the interest of the political system in the interpretation of the history of the religious communities. Moreover, the relationship between religion and politics is an aspect of the relationship between an institutionalised religious tradition and a state, i.e., of a state-church relationship, but it also has a broader perspective. Both religion and politics concern values, ideas and identities, and in this sense religion and politics can interact. They can influence, support or work against each other in a relationship and processual sequence. The formation and maintenance of ethnic, national and religious identities in southeastern Europe is an example of the gradual transition between religious and politically derived values, ideas and identities. Quite often the mutual relationship can make it difficult to distinguish between religion and politics. This study is thus a contribution to the elucidation of the general topics of religion, politics and history However, this is not the place to problematise the concepts of religion and politics as such. In this context, religion is understood as an institutionalised community revolving around the worship of God; while politics is understood as the process at the state or subordinate level by which ideologies and interests are converted into the exercise of power. A great deal of recent research in religion and politics revolves around the challenge posed by religious institutions and movements to secular political forms of government and principles. This research is often known under the rubric of "religious nationalism" or as different varieties of "fundamentalism" (e.g., Merkl and Smart 1985, Kepel 1991, Moyser 1991, Misztal and Shupe 1992, Juergensmeyer 1993, Ramet and Treadgold 1995. Westerlund 1996). These tendencies are indicative of the developments in various areas of the world towards an increasing religious consciousness and an accompanying desire among some religious communities to dominate the political system. Our perspective, in contrast, focuses on a political system's dominance over the social dimen-

sions of religion. The theoretical and ideologically analytical aspects of this study are therefore connected to the national state and political interests in religious affiliation with regard to the formation and maintenance of national identity. The empirically oriented part of the study elucidates the-relations between religious institutions, nation and national state in Bulgarian history We will see how religious identification becomes politicised: the Orthodox Church appears as a national institution, and the Muslim population is marginalised or becomes the object of direct assimilation campaigns. The interaction between formal religious affiliation and political events and processes has a long history in the Balkans. Over five centuries, the Ottoman Turks made this part of Europe an arena for a religious, cultural and political history resulting in the region acquiring an ethnic and religious composition unique in Europe. The consequences for the history of religion and for political life make themselves felt today. In the "official" historiography carried out by the Orthodox Balkan states, there is a characteristic reception and understanding of the Ottoman rule, which has become an identity-creating Feindbild, an image of the enemy Other. It is in opposition to islam and Ottoman rule that the national movements and nation states formed and maintained their self-understanding and national ideas. Religious affiliation, understood as a social category along with the mother tongue, were the key national classifications in the Balkan countries in the 19th century. Following this line of thought, contemporary Islam and the Muslim populations represented a hated religious and political foreign domination, and in contrast the Orthodox Christian churches were seen as institutions which maintained national culture, such as language, literature, art and material folk culture. This perception also marked socialist Bulgaria's policy towards the country's Orthodox Church. Independent of the contradiction between atheism and religion, Bulgaria's socialist regime privileged the Orthodox Church and marginalised Islam because Orthodoxy was viewed as synonymous with being Bulgarian, while Islam was equated with being a Turk, i.e., a legacy from the hated Ottoman rule.

4

Commentators and analysts of eastern and southeastern Europe have often linked the collapse of the socialist systems with nationalism, i.e., with the ideology and the political doctrine of the congruence between a people, a territory, and a sovereign state as expression of the people's political will. The connection between the collapse of socialism and nationalism has been depicted as a "pressure cooker" or "deep-freezer" by which national sentiments were repressed in the socialist countries. When communist parties could no longer withstand the pressure, they collapsed, one regime after the other, or had to reform themselves in such fundamental ways that they could subsequently not be termed socialist.

5

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

In terms of this explanatory model, the Balkans, after the political reforms of 1989-91, became an arena for innumerable ethnic, territorial, demographic, historical, and religious conflicts, which in one or another way can be traced back to a nationalism that after 1989 obtained a free reign and destabilized the entire region. The pressure-cooker or deep-freezer metaphors, however, capture only one aspect of the situation during the half century of socialist rule, and as causal explanations tend to overlook the communist parties' declining legitimacy because of the economic crisis. The weakness of these metaphors also lies in the fact that as an explanation for the collapse of socialism, nationalism ignores the fact that nationalist appeals were also utilised by several communist parties since the end of the 1950s, thereby creating a nationalist continuum between the period before and after the Second World War. This use of nationalist mobilisation was a prominent part of the communist parties' domestic political legitimisation and cultural policy. In the Balkans, the communist parties in Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania and Bulgaria came to power in countries all marked by interwar nationalism. Socialism introduced a state and society-bearing ideology by which the state was legitimated on the basis of the interests of the working class, with the ultimate goal of proletarian internationalism. In these countries, the national question was theoretically "solved." The legitimation of the socialist state differed from those contemporary national states which rested on a more or less homogenous national population (a Volk), and from the liberal democracies, whose legitimacy was based on the citizenship principle, without regard to class membership or ethnic/national differentiation. Despite their internationalist rhetoric, the socialist regimes, especially in Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, developed a variant of nationalism—national communism—whereby national ideology was integrated into power politics (Kemp 1999). A key instrument in the development of national communism was the writing of history, with a mrxture of nationalist and materialist perspectives, because the nation and the nation's history, with its kinship metaphors and unity thinking, could help nationallyminded regime appear as well-supported and strong (Verdery 1991:307). In several socialist countries, national ideology thus constituted a factor of continuity, more than might be assumed from a purely theoretical understanding of the socialist societies. Bulgarian religious policy towards the Orthodox Church and towards Islam are prominent expressions of this national communism. • In this study, we first discuss how the dominant research paradigm in socialist Bulgaria—with lines dating back to the 19th century—interpreted and depicted

6

Introduction

the history of Christianity during the period of Ottoman Muslim domination. The association of religious and national identity legitimated the religious and minority policy of the socialist regime. Next, a general national politicisation of religious affiliation and religious institutions is demonstrated. Several of the chapters in this study are therefore presented in reverse chronological-order, such that the consequences are brought up prior to the causes; hence, the history of the reception and socio-political impact is analyzed prior to the work with the historical sources. Herein lies an acknowledgment that studying history and the history of religious institutions takes qn its own life, more or less independent of a free academic disciplinary tradition. It is this kind of political surveillance and control over historiography that has had direct consequences for the political, social and economic conditions of the religious communities in Bulgaria. Chapter Two,"National Rebirth and Legitimation" describes Bulgarian policy towards the Muslim Turkish ethnic group during the 1980s. This policy is analyzed according to its ideological basis and in terms of the authorities' demands for legitimation via history. The legitimation activities of the 1980s had their roots in the "official" historiography's research paradigm which also lay behind the depiction of Islam and Ottoman rule as found in Istorija na Bàlgarija, the ambitious multi-volume national history which began publication in 1979. Chapter Three, "'People of the Book' and the Millet system," tests this research paradigm by investigating the foundations of Ottoman religious policy during Islam's constitutive phase in the seventh century. The chapter traces the adaptation of the normative Islamic legacy in the Ottoman territories of the Balkans up to and after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Chapter Four, "Christianity before and under the Ottomans," turns to the Bulgarian areas in order to describe Ottoman religious policy in practice during the 14th to 16th centuries. A variety of data is used concerning the institutional history of Christianity and the question of conversion to Islam. Chapter Five, "The Bulgarian Orthodox Church under Socialism," turns our attention to the church as a national institution under socialism. This church's status stood in sharp contrast to the official picture of Islam at the time and derived from a national ideologically influenced understanding of the Ottoman rule. Chapter Six,"San Stefano and the National Triumph," focuses on the transformation from religious affiliation to national identification during the 19th century. During this process, the organisational structure of Orthodox Christianity was linked to the question of national identity and national political objectives. This chapter reviews recent theories of the concept of nation discussing the connection between religion, history and national myths in Bulgaria.

7

\ NATION Beginning

A L REBIRTH

AND LEGITIMATION

in early 1985, Bulgaria's Turkish minority became the object of an

assimilation

campaign

spontaneous

breach with a religio-historicai

which the government

explained

During the summer of 19S9, what was officially termed the

al rebirth

led to a massive wave of emigration,

as the

minority's

legacy from the Ottoman

era.

process of nation-

where over 300,000

members

of the Turkish minority crossed the border into Turkey. By the end of the year, however, the attempt to change an entire group's collective

identity had col-

lapsed.

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N

O

N DECEMBER 29TH, 1989, the Central Committee (CC) of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), the Council of State and the Council of Ministers acknowledged an abrupt change of course towards the country's Turkish population. The new policy followed a CC plenum which took place after the November 10th palace coup had removed BCP General Secretary Todor Zivkov after his more than thirty years in power. The country was still led by the communist party, but its monopoly of power was no longer uncontested, as shown by large street demonstrations Sunday after Sunday. The first large antiCommunist demonstration took place on November 18th, 1989 in front of Sofia's Aleksandar Nevski cathedral, and the new leaders were forced to introduce reforms. Bulgaria's economy was under pressure, with rationing and shortages everywhere, and in foreign relations, the country's minority policy had become an obstacle to normal relations and obtaining assistance in economic recovery. Since mid-December, members of the country's Turkish population had been demonstrating in Sofia against being forced to take Bulgarian names, the prohibition on public use of the Turkish language and the suppression of Muslim rituals and traditional clothing. During the wave of political changes

9

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

National Rebirth and Legitimation

throughout eastern Europe in the autumn of 1989, the Bulgarian party elite was forced to change its minority policy. The right to the free choice of names, freedom of religion and public use of one's mother tongue were guaranteed, and the decrees which had limited Turkish-Muslim rights and imposed penalties for violations had been withdrawn. The ending of the assimilation campaign against the Turkish population did not occur without protests the following weeks from Bulgarian nationalist circles, who saw the end of the campaign as a capitulation to the Turks. When the parliament passed a "Declaration on the National Question" on January 15th, 1990, it contained, besides a repetition of the decision from the 29th of December, a series of guarantees to these nationalist circles, who were active and operating in areas with mixed populations (Troebst 1992:1780. In this way, the grandiose process of national rebirth (nacionalnovazroditelen proces) among Bulgaria's Turkish Muslims had failed.

Transsylvania in the 1880s, the Hellenisation of Slavic names in Greece in 1936, and the Albanisation campaign in Albania in 1975. In the Bulgarian towns, the name changing was often executed at the workplaces. After increasing resistance in areas with Turkish dominated villages, however the procedure was to use the military and the police, who in the early morning hours woulcl surround the villages, whereupon officials would go from house to house, or at a meeting with the residents on the village square, orient them about the name changes, distribute new identity cards and demand a signature as acceptance of the name change. In the course of the campaign,
The campaign had been intended to give the country's nearly one million Turks (about 10% of the population) a Bulgarian and atheistic sense of identity so as to strengthen the Bulgarian socialist society and nation. The following sections describe and analyze the evolution of this policy since the Second World War. It begins by discussing the chronology of the name-changing campaign {process of national rebirth), followed by a description of its forerunners and its political ideological background. Following this, the chapter then focuses on the historical legitimation basis of the assimilation campaign via a more thorough treatment of the publications associated with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAN) and of the Kliment Ohridski University in Sofia. Finally, the political influence on historical research is placed in its context since the end of the 1940s.

2

In the early spring of 1985, the international news media covering Bulgaria reported on civil disturbances and military repression of the Turkish speaking population. Because of the authorities' censorship, the reports were initially unclear and incomplete, but gradually there emerged a considerable amount of information. The Bulgarian authorities' behaviour was internationally condemned, and human rights groups became involved. In the autumn, the crisis culminated, when Turkey's president, addressing the UN General Assembly, raised the question of the repression of the Bulgarian Turks. However, because of Turkey's own minority policy, the president failed to receive the desired support. From early 1985, Bulgaria's Turkish-Muslim inhabitants were forced to change their Arabic-Turkish-Islamic family names to typically Bulgarian-Slavic names. Similar forced name-changing campaigns are known in other parts of southeastern Europe, e.g., the Magyarisation of Romanian family names in

The sharpening of the campaign coincided with several decrees which made it clear that the authorities had more in mind than simply "Bulgarianising" the Turks' names in line with earlier name changes among other Muslim populations in 1912-13,1941-44 and 1971- Use of Turkish in kindergartens ceased, Turkish language newspapers, magazines and radio programs were closed, speaking Turkish in public places was forbidden, as was the circumcision of male children, Muslim funeral practices and the use of traditional clothing. In addition, there was the elimination or year-long closing of mosques, with some of them being destroyed, and Muslim cemeteries being vandalized. The Muslim fasting month was outlawed, and Turks who sought to retain their names were excluded from public positions or refused access to their bank accounts. All these decrees were accompanied by penal sanctions ranging from fines to prison in case of violent resistance. From 1988, the Bulgarian Turks' resistance to the campaign increased, and small human rights groups—also including ethnic Bulgarian participation— were created. The authorities punished whole families with internal exile, and on the infamous Danube prison island of Belene several hundred Turks were interned. Demonstrations, hunger strikes and civil resistance showed that the campaign against the Turks' traditions, particular characteristics and religion was not successfully completed. The socialist government then chose to resort to expulsions, and Turkish activists were sent to Turkey. The expulsions increased until the summer of 1989, when the regime in Sofia sought to repress the resistance by allowing free emigration to Turkey, despite its earlier categor-

10

11

2. C H R O N O L O G Y OF T H E PROCESS

OF NATIONAL

1

REBIRTH

3

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

National Rebirth and Legitimation

ical rejection of this solution. The result was an emigration fever among the Turkish-Muslim population (Etniceskijat konflikt 1990). The autumn immediately brought a massive shortage of labour, and students at the universities had to delay their semester start to help bring in the crops. Prior to this, Turkey had guaranteed entry to all Turkish-speaking Muslims from Bulgaria, and during the summer of 1989 the Turkish embassy in Sofia had queues of visa applicants several hundred meters long. Over 300,000 Bulgarian Turks emigrated, but in Turkey the wave of emigration exceeded the authorities' abilities to house and find employment for them, and at the end of August the border was closed from the Turkish side. The situation remained tense until the upheavals of November, when new possibilities opened: exercise of one's religion became free, and a preliminary, but strongly bureaucratic procedure for recovering original names was introduced. The Bulgarian political system developed an incipient, but also continually uncertain, parliamentary democracy, under which the country's Turks could also utilise their possibilities to organise themselves and achieve legal and political improvements.

Less radical assimilation campaigns had been conducted since the break with Stalinism at the Bulgarian Communist Party's Central Committee April plenum in 1956, when a new line was also laid down in state and party policy towards minorities. The decision of the April plenum was first implemented and slowly realised after 1958 such that Bulgaria, using various means and with varying intensity, sought to assimilate ethnic and national minorities (Troebst 1987). Hence, the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) living in the Rhodope mountains had their names changed in the 1970s, and generally the authorities sought to remove any signs which deviated from the titular nation's characteristics (Bulgarians), whether these be language, cultural traditions or religion. In the decade between the socialist take-over of power, completed in 1946-47, and 1956-58, the communist party and the government had sought to realise the idea of Bulgarian socialism as national in form and socialist in content. The goals was to make the Turkish-Muslim group into a secular socialist nation (Hopken 1994:186-90), and in the first place emphasis was placed on emancipating the Turks from their economic and social backwardness in weakly developed agricultural areas. Large-scale literacy programs were initiated, the Turkish language press and literature supported, the infrastructure improved and efforts made to include women into the workforce. Recognizing that the Turks' sense of identity and traditions were associated with their Muslim faith, measures were taken for social, cultural and economic modernisation aimed at weakening Islam. The number of Muslim clergy were reduced and subjected to political control, but the attacks were gradual; instruction in the Koran, for example, was eliminated from public schools only in the early 1950s. It remained difficult, however, to include the Turks in the socialist developmental project, and the number of politically active communists in this group was very small. The first collectivisations of agricultural land brought a sharpening of the contradictions between the Turkish farmers and the government, and in August 1950, the government sought to solve the problem by pressuring the Turks to emigrate to Turkey. A total of 155,000 out of 675,000 Turks left their home between August 1950 and November 1951, but the drain on the population weakened the country's economy, the border was closed and a more Turkishfriendly policy again took over. The Turkish-language schools grew in number and Turkish theatre and libraries were opened. Under the shadow of Stalin-era nationality polity, the objective was still to integrate the Muslim Turks into socialist society in economic and social terms, but this did not necessarily imply an ethnic-national assimilation. The goal was to extend Lenin's national selfdetermination policy and the nationality policy which dominated in both the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia (cf. M. Todorova 1995=90)-

4

3. P O L I T I C A L - I D E O L O G I C A L C A U S E S

The sequence of political decisions behind the name-changing campaign is not entirely clear. Despite the traditional lack of transparency in the socialist political system, it nevertheless seems evident that the decision was taken by the supreme political circle around Todor Zivkov, and without a preceding discussion at a broader level in the communist party. The campaign from 1984 to 1989 against the Turkish population, though mixed with several religious and national policy initiatives and measures similar to previous campaigns, was more radical in nature with its use of violence and means of legitimation (Hopken 1992a, 1992b, 1994). The most important driving forces behind the forced assimilation policy were domestic politics, and these derived from the social and economic efforts of modernisation, demographic conditions and the desire to create a homogenous socialist nation. The government sought to eliminate the risk of demands for wide-ranging autonomy or even secession from the Turkish core areas. In foreign policy terms, considerations such as relations with the great neighbour Turkey, and its potential to interfere in favour of the Bulgarian Turkish population or direct irredentist demands and the international growth in Islamic fundamentalism since the Iranian revolution have also played a role. The state controlled press painted a horrific portrait of Bulgaria possibly degenerating into a situation such as Cyprus, Lebanon and Kosovo, with ethnic-religious tensions or civil wars with international implications.

12

13

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

National Rebirth and Legitimation

This line changed in 1956/58. The Communist Party now took measures to construct socialist society while at the same time forming a single socialist nation, within which the social, cultural and ethnic differences should assume increasingly less significance in favour of an ethnic-cultural and ideological melting together of the country's entire population. As a logical consequence of this line, the Turkish language schools, in 1958, were integrated into the Bulgarian language schools, and Turkish became an optional language with limited possibilities. Following the new political line, social development should occur as two parallel processes. The first process entailed social and economic modernisation with the construction of the socialist society; under the second process, the nationality policy should produce a unified socialist nation. The great obstacle for this parallel developmental sequence was the Turkish population. This group was more poorly educated than the Bulgarian majority population, and it stubbornly maintained its adherence to Islam and to the traditions linked to religious faith. The Turks therefore still constituted a socially and economically marginalised group which only slowly allowed itself to be integrated into the visions of the communist party and of a modern socialist society and unified socialist nation. The process of national rebirth with its name-changing campaign also had another cause: the Turkish population increase. Demographic projections showed that while the ethnic Bulgarian population was stagnating or even showing signs of decline, the Turkish population was growing rapidly. Not even the wave of emigration, with 155,000 Turks leaving in 1950-51 and an additional 130,000 between 1968 and 1971, had had any long-term effect in reducing the proportion of Turks in Bulgaria's population in relative terms much less in numbers, and areas with compact Turkish settlement exhibited very high birth rates (Hopken 1987:268). The problems of incorporating the Turkish population into the socialist society, of creating a unified socialist nation, the demographic prognoses, the relationship to Turkey and the fear of Islamic fundamentalism were so comprehensive that in 1984, Zivkov and his closest circle decided to solve them once and for all using a new argumentation and legitimation: to deny the very existence of Turks in Bulgaria. The administrative name changes were thus the first step in a process which at the same time adressed two traits with greatest significance for this group's sense of identity: Islam and the Turkish language. When after the winter of 1984-85 Bulgarian officials began to categorically deny the existence of a Turkish ethnic group in the country, they calculated with both foreign policy and domestic benefits. No foreign country, i.e. Turkey, would subsequendy be able to interfere into Bulgarian affairs under the pretext of maintaining the interests of a minority; and with the weakening of Islam, the risk of Islamic influence

could be reduced. Finally, no ethnic group could hereafter invoke special conditions and special rights or assert demands for cultural autonomy. 4. P O L I T I C A L - I D E O L O G I C A L A R G U M E N T S

X

In spring 1985, high-ranking party and state officials gave several-speeches in which they presented the political-ideological arguments behind the new assimilation campaign. In Burgas on March 8th, 1985, the president of the council of ministers and politburo member GriSa Filipov gave a programmatic speech. After an introduction praising the communist party's importance for the development of Bulgaria and after emphasising Bulgaria's unbreakable bond with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries and its contribution to peace and security in Europe, the prime minister turned to the question of the assimilation measures. Filipov emphasised the development of the people's moral-political feeling of unity, which had taken shape especially since the Central Committee's April plenum in 1956, and noting that Bulgaria is a mononational state, which contains no foreign areas within its territory, just as the Bulgarian people do not contain parts of other peoples or nations. The arguments in the speech then fall into three parts: the first argument is historical, the second ethnological, and the third political-ideological. The historical argument consists of references to the Bulgarian people's bitter and tragic fate under Ottoman slavery, which is described as a period when the people were violently and systematically Turkified and Islamicised. In this way the Ottoman state unceasingly and consistently sought to rob the people of its national self-consciousness. Filipov cites overwhelming historical evidence of this Ottoman policy. Filipov's ethnological argument is that even today we can trace among the Turkified and Islamicised populations customs, folklore, language and costume from an era when the group's ancestors were still Christian. The political-ideological argument is that the Turkified and Islamicised populations could first realise their true destiny under socialism, when they became economically strong, educated and culturally developed. The workers then cast off the Muslim fanaticism and liberated themselves from the conservatism of religion. After the forcibly Islamicised Bulgarians in the Rhodopes had voluntarily retaken Slavic-Bulgarian names in the 1970s, the prime minister argues that in late 1984 and early 1985 there occurred a spontaneous, comprehensive and voluntary movement to retake Slavic Bulgarian names among those people who until then had born Arabic-Turkish names. The explanation for this change was an impressive reflection on their own history, in which these people discovered the truth about their origins and their authentic national 5

15

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

National Rebirth and Legitimation

affiliation, and it occurred with profound confidence in the communist party's care for the welfare of the creative individual and the party's defence of the interests of the broad masses of people. Prime Minister Filipov concluded by declaring on behalf of the government that everyone who had retaken their Bulgarian names are Bulgarians and are therefore "flesh of flesh and blood of blood of the Bulgarian people." This is why there is no emigration to Turkey and why no such emigration will occur under any circumstances, he stated. All Bulgarians, as brothers of the flesh, will proceed on the common path towards communism and build the socialist society for happiness and welfare for the people. Similar ideas and arguments were formulated by chairman of parliament and politburo member Stanko Todorov, when on March 12th, 1985, in a village near Sliven, gave a speech on the national question and the assimilation campaign. The speeches by Filipov and Todorov were clearly co-ordinated, with long identical passages, and they derived from the current political situation and the increasing international pressure on the government sparked by the name-changing campaign. While the assertion that Bulgaria is a mono-national state and arguments in support of the spontaneous and voluntary name changes are the same in the two texts, Todorov's speech contained a section on the ideological contradiction between socialism and Islam and included several sharp attacks on Turkey. Todorov asserted that the class enemy in Turkey and its bourgeois reactionary circles were fabricating lies and smear campaigns about forced assimilation; instead, it was a case of spontaneous, voluntary name changes and consolidation of the Bulgarian socialist nation. However, this development does not occur without a struggle against those forces and tendencies which are foreign to socialism and act in a hostile fashion. The main opponent is the bourgeois Turkish nationalism, which in its own country was conducting a civil war against Kurds, Armenians and Arabs. In contrast, nothing similar was happening in Bulgaria, where no ethnic groups are subjected to violence or repression. On the contrary, we were seeing the return to the fold of a population which with blood and violence was ripped out of the Bulgarians' hearts under Ottoman slavery. In this situation, all emigration to Turkey was absolutely excluded. The hostile circles were also asserting, according to Todorov, that the retaking and reconstruction of Slavic names was being accompanied by the destruction of mosques and prohibition of Islamic rituals and religion. On the contrary, Todorov underscored, the party and the state have always respected the inhabitants' religious convictions, and the state financially supports the Muslim religious community. After this rejection came a warning: Todorov wished to make it entirely clear that anyone who violated the country's laws and

used religion as a shield for hostile activity towards socialism would receive the punishment he deserves. The speeches by prime minister Griâa Filipov and parliament chairman Stanko Todorov from March 1985 provide first hand insight irito the politicalideological arguments behind the forced name-changing campaign. In this connection, the religio-political aspects of the relationship between the official socialist nationality policy and the Turkish population is important because both politicians pointed to religio-historical and historical evidence in their speeches. The following section discussers the legitimation produced and disseminated in direct connection with the campaign's political needs and requirements.

6

16

5. R E L I G I O - H I S T O R I C A L A N D H I S T O R I C A L L E G I T I M A T I O N

On January 10th, 1990, the Bulgarian news bureau BTA diffused a message from 60 historians associated with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Kliment Ohridski University and the National Library in Sofia. In the declaration, the historians applauded the annulment two week earlier of the name-changing and assimilation policy against the Turkish population, declaring at the same time that they had been forced by the communist party to participate in the campaign. The researchers' most important contribution had been to provide proof that Bulgaria was a mono-national state. The best and most representative impression of this contribution is obtained in the two anthologies published during the campaign, containing contributions from leading ethnologists, Ottoman specialists and historians: Problemi na razvitieto na bâlgarskata narodnost i nacija (1988) (English title: Aspects of the Development of the Bulgarian Nation [1989]) and Stranici ot bâlgarskata istorija. Oëerk za isljamiziranite bâlgari in nacionalnovàzroditelnija procès (1989) (English title: Pages from Bulgaria's History: A Study of the Islamised Bulgarians and the Process of National Identification). These two books reveal the remarkably close link between the political-ideological background of the name-changing campaign and the religio-historical and historical legitimation. The historians' central position in helping to legitimate the name-changing campaign is due to the already mentioned new and surprising argument, which also distinguished it from preceding assimilation initiatives: the official assertion that Bulgaria's entire Turkish population was ethnically unrelated to the Turks in Turkey. By this line of thinking, the formerly accepted and unproblematised assumption that the Turkish-speaking Muslim population was of Turkish origin is considered false. As articulated in the speeches by Filipov and Todorov, forced religious and linguistic assimilation of Christian Bulgarians under Ottoman domination had driven these people and their descendants 7

8

17

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

from their ethnic group. In adopting Islam and the Turkish language, they had lost their Bulgarian national consciousness in favour of an Islamic and Turkish identity, which their descendants, now under the influence of the progress of socialist society, saw through and cast off by taking on new names as signs of their indisputable Bulgarian national self-identification. This was the core argument in the national process of rebirth. Problemi na razvitieto na balgarskata narodnost i nacija was published by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences under the editorship of Georgi Jankov (specialist in Marxism and Leninism), StraSimir Dimitrov (Ottomanist and head of the Institute of Balkan Studies) and Orlin Zagorov (Marxism-Leninism specialist and government advisor in cultural questions). The Preface, written by Academy member Pantelej Zarev, underlines the anthology's interdisciplinary character, its high scientific standard and its contribution to the understanding how the Turkish-Muslim portion of Bulgaria's population became spontaneously aware of their Bulgarian origins and changed their names as part of a national identification process. The Preface thus links the book together with the namechanging campaign and summarizes the desires for scientific legitimation (Problemi 1988:50, as also formulated in Filipov's and Todorov's speeches. Some of the contributions in the book limit themselves to a political-ideological argumentation about the integrating forces in the socialist national culture {nacionalna socialisticeska kultura), which the Turkish group now joins without reservation (Todor I . Zivkov, Nikolaj Mizov, Orlin Zagorov and Girgin Girginov). In this connection, scientific atheism and atheist propaganda as a means of achieving socialist national consciousness are mentioned in only cursory fashion (p. 202) or totally avoided. The focus in these contributions is not on the struggle against religion and religiosity as such, but on distinguishing national and religious consciousness among the Turkish population. The contribution from the historian Petar Petrov is an extension of his earlier publications (Petrov 1964,1975), in which he draws a black/white picture of a brutally oppressive Ottoman regime and the Ottomans' attempt to exterminate the heroic Bulgarian people (Problemi 1988:74-93).» Even though all the contributors sought to show that the Turkish population are actually converted Bulgarians and do not have their origins in Turkish immigration, there are differences in the tone of the articles and in the degree of unbridled support to the current political line; an academic realism is noticeable among the renowned Ottoman specialist StraSimir Dimitrov (pp. 33-56; see also S. Dimitrov 1980a). In his preface, Pantelej Zarev points out, as stated, the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to the complex phenomena of ethnic group and nation-

18

National Rebirth and Legitimation

al consolidation. Certainly, several of the authors touch on the these topics, but Georgi Jankov is most thorough in his discussion of identity: religious, ethnic or national (pp. 7-32). Jankov's contribution is informative concerning the fundamental basis for socialist Bulgaria's religious and nationality policy towards the country's Turkish population in the 1980s. ^ Georgi Jankov begins by asserting that every nation has a unique history with both general and special features. From here it follows that the foundation and development of each nation must be understood in scientific fashion, in accord with the general and specific historical factors and laws. According to Jankov, the Bulgarians were formed as V i ethnic community between the 7th and 10th centuries with their own state, written language and culture, and in the following centuries reached a high level of culture. The Ottoman conquest interrupted this development, with major political, economic, demographic, cultural, moral and psychological consequences. Here Jankov emphasises the most painful and not yet healed wound: the Ottoman forced religious and ethnic assimilation policy which, as part of a divide-and-conquer policy, divided Bulgarians into two groups. The misfortune was reinforced by the fact that the national movement, from the 18th century and up to the birth of modern Bulgaria in 1878, did not include the Muslim population. This historical development derived from the special relationship between ethnic and religious identity during Ottoman domination. The Ottoman political system, which rested on religious differences between believers and infidels, made religious affiliation decisive and at the same time downgraded ethnic self-awareness. The primary identification via religion applied to both Turks, who overwhelmingly called themselves Muslims, and to the Bulgarians, who identified with their Orthodox Christian faith. The social and psychological mixture of ethnic and religious identity meant that conversion to Islam and assumption of Islamic names entailed at the same time an exit from the Bulgarian ethnic community. Among converted Bulgarians, there arose an unconscious alienation in relation to the ethnic group to which they objectively belonged (Jankov's view of the concept of ethnic group is thus static and essentialist). Hence under the Ottomans, religious consciousness primarily overlapped with ethnic consciousness, which, however, was not eliminated, but assumed a secondary place; according to Jankov, this relationship was important during the national movement, which was based precisely on the priority of ethnic consciousness over religious identification. v

10

Jankov then describes the ethno-demographic changes after the establishment of the Bulgarian state in 1878. Many Islamicised Bulgarians chose to emigrate to the remaining areas of the Ottoman empire, and this emigration continued until 1978, when the last group who did not feel themselves bound to

'9

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

Bulgaria emigrated to Turkey. However, the majority of the Muslim population chose to remain because they felt themselves linked to their place of birth and had not entirely lost the memory of their forefathers' loss of Bulgarian national identity. Jankov mentions that this is confirmed by results from physical anthropological research, ethnographic sources and folklore, which point towards the Bulgarian origins of the Islamicised population groups and their not yet entirely snuffed out Bulgarian sense of identity in the period immediately after 1878. After 1878, a portion of these people thus sought a return to Christianity not only on the basis of religious motives, but also as a result of their reborn national feeling. Before the Second World War, the Muslim population in the Rhodope Mountains experienced a historical development which separated out the mixture between ethnic and religious consciousness. Many Muslims in these areas retained their Muslim faith, but unconditionally declared themselves Bulgarians in a national sense, whereby the modern secular national identification slowly suppressed the religious identity; it became possible to maintain Bulgarian nationality while at the same time having Islam as religion. While the development could already be discerned in the Rhodopes before the war, the situation was different among the groups who, aside from suffering Islamisation, had also endured Turkish language assimilation. Their national rebirth, according to Jankov, was consciously manipulated and held back by three dark forces: Turkish bourgeois nationalism, Islamic fanaticism and conservatism (p. 26). Finally, Jankov turns to the situation after the socialist take-over of power in the second half of the 1940s. The conditions of the Islamicised population greatly improved, and there were economic, social, political and historical grounds for this group to feel itself one with the Bulgarian socialist nation. To the extent that the ethnic group did not itself understand this, a political effort had to be made to cast off the last remnants of Ottoman assimilation through a strengthened effort to recreate its national consciousness. In this case, the objective community between the Bulgarians and the Islamicised Bulgarians would become clear (p. 29). At the same time, Jankov emphasised that it is not only a case of Bulgarian national consciousness, but of a Bulgarian socialist national consciousness which emancipates itself free from the restrictive chains and guarantees freedom of religion. He maintains that a religious community does not constitute a national characteristic. This had been acknowledged by the Islamicised population since 1984-85. Georgi Jankov's contribution gives a good insight into the attempt to propagate a scientific argument for the name-changing campaign. His interpretations of Ottoman religious policy and the background of these interpretations in a national ideological framework are elucidated further in the next chapters.

20

National Rebirth and Legitimation

Following the publication of Problemi na razvitieto na b&lgarskata narodnost i nacija there appeared in 1989 the more popularly written Stranici ot b&lgarskata istorija. Oterk za isljamiziranite balgari i nacionalnov&zroditelnija proces. This anthology, edited by the director for the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, Hristo Hristov, is written by the same circle who contributed to Problemi na razvitieto na btilgarskata narodnost in nacija and is supplemented by the Ottomanist Elena Grozdanova, the Byzantinist Dimitar Angelov and the historian Cvetana Georgieva. The editor names in the preface only the contributors' names, but not what each one has written among the book's chapters, which generally add nothing new to the already known and previously discussed arguments. The book's conclusion maintains that the rebirth of Bulgarian self-consciousness (v&zraidaneto na b&lgarskoto samos&znanie) among the descendants of the brutally assimilated Bulgarians under Ottoman rule has been difficult and marked by prejudices, stereotypes and misunderstandings (p. 117O. Several reasons for that are indicated, but the most important according to this book, is the assumption that a Christian was Bulgarian, while a Muslim was Turk. This alienated the Muslim population in modern Bulgaria and stood in the way of the consolidation of the Bulgarian socialist nation's unity, which was now taking place in the 1980s as an objective and natural process. The process towards a unified nation, the book concludes, is at the same time a precondition for a democratic and equal participation in co-operation with the modern world's nations and states. The book ends with three declarations. The first is a message printed in the Bulgarian press and diffused internationally via the official press agency (BTA) in July 1985 (pp. 119-22). In this message, several "renamed" intellectuals of Turkish origin declare their unbreakable solidarity with their Bulgarian fatherland, acknowledge their true identity as Bulgarians and appeal for an end to anti-Bulgarian propaganda from Turkish nationalist circles and their supporters. The second declaration, from 1988, derives from a meeting between Bulgarian Turks who returned home again after having emigrated (pp. 123-25). They tell of horrific conditions in Turkey and warn strongly against Turkish interference in their situation. Finally, the BTA published the declaration of seven Bulgarian muftis from March-April 1985. The declaration is directly connected to the first phase in the international critique of forced name change and the ostensible restriction of religious freedoms which were also referred to by the politicians Filipov and Todorov. The muftis declare their own and their community's full and unqualified freedom and accuse Turkey of untimely interference; they end by expressing their appreciation towards the socialist state, which ensures freedom and financial support so that the Muslim community

21

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

National Rebirth and Legitimation

can be maintained and function normally. The three concluding declarations emphasise how all the contributors, consciously or against their will, were part of a political-ideological legitimating initiative. The conclusions of both books are determined by political needs, and they demonstrate how the political system had the power to dictate the results of research. 6. P O L I T I C A L L Y C O N T R O L L E D R E S E A R C H : THE HISTORY

OF

BULGARIA

The political control of religious and historical sciences, archaeology, philology and ethnology, etc. in socialist Bulgaria was not limited to the second half of the 1980s, nor to the description of the relationship between Christianity and Islam during Ottoman rule. The key function of historiography in the formation and maintenance of the national consciousness and as means of legitimation under socialism made history into an ideological discipline subordinated to the state's needs and to the communist party's control (cf. M . Todorova 19923:1105,1115). An example of how this politically controlled humanistic research operated is found in the ambitious work of several volumes Istorija na Bâlgarija ("The History of Bulgaria") which began to appear in 1979. This national history was a major prestige project similar to the national histories published in the other socialist countries in eastern Europe. The work and the story behind its publication illustrate the humanistic researchers' working conditions under the ruling political dogmas and the national ideological bias which marked several socialist countries at the time. The communist party was involved not only in Bulgaria but also in Romania and in the Soviet Union in controlling historical research in order to define and control cultural symbols and national ideals (cf. Verdery 1991, Heer 1971). A 1968 issue of Istoriceskei pregled ("Historical Review"), Bulgaria's leading historical journal, contained a three-page editorial of immense importance for all the country's humanistic disciplines for the following twenty years. Under the title "Resenie na Politbjuro na CK na BKP za mnogotomnata istorija na Bâlgarija" ("The Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party Concerning a Multi-volume History of Bulgaria") readers are informed that the Politburo had taken its decision on May 21st, 1968, and that the national history shall be authored by the most prominent scholars, who enjoy the confidence of the Politburo and can assume the responsible task. At this time, the Politburo predicted that the work would come to include ten volumes, and that according to the plan it would appear in ten years, whereby it can enter into the celebration of the centennial for the creation of the principality of Bulgaria in 1878. The Politburo also provided concrete guidelines for the forthcoming work. The guidelines fell into two parts: theoretical-ideological and practical.

22

The theoretical-ideological guidelines consisted of an emphasis on Marxism and Leninism as the work's basic methodological point of departure; the highest scholarly standard is required in the form of including all scientific results and new source materials. The people's history is characterised as a heroic sequence of events from ancient times to today, marked by struggle against slavery and oppression and by social progress. The ideological guidance is built up through the Politburo's guidelines for selected periods in the country's history. Hence, the Bulgarians should be depicted as the successors to the Thracians, and for recent history it is required that at the centre should be the people's struggle under the leadership of the communist^arty against capitalism and fascism. The Politburo's practical support to the project will be comprehensive. The chief editors with responsibility for the practical organisation and guidance are to have their headquarters at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences. Hence, the coming years will see the release of increased funds for salaries for scientific and administrative staff, travel funds with "socialist and capitalist currency" will be established, and in the future the Politburo will make available new physical facilities with improved offices, library, and reading room. The practical help would also include the Politburo's commitment to provide unrestricted access to archives, not a usual condition for historians and other humanistic researchers (Friedrich 1981:414). Archival access was liberalized to include party and state archives, while access to archives outside the country would be assisted via the active participation of diplomats in contacting local authorities abroad. The editors of Istoriceski pregled briefly commented upon the Politburo's task. They emphasised the supremely great work awaiting historical researchers in a broad sense from the composition of a program of work until the appearance of the final volumes. Their comment also contained a commitment that the historians would be able to undertake the responsible task which the communist party, its congress and the Politburo had mandated to them. They noted that the researchers had already realised several important tasks along the country's socialist path, and pointed out that the new task, with its far more difficult and responsible nature, could be achieved only because the resources today go farther as a result of the increased number of researchers. The article ends with the promise that the historical researchers will happily be able to contribute with a depiction of the people's honourable history marked by heroism, patriotism and internationalism. The first volume appeared in 1979- The publication run was set to the rather high number of 50,000 copies, and each volume contained 400-500 pages richly illustrated in colour and printed in what at the time was an v

11

23

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

extremely high quality paper. Both in resources and in scientific ambition Istorija na Balgarija was to represent the summit of what the country's scholars could produce within the national historiography in a collective effort (Hering 1989:361-70). This milestone deserves closer investigation, in that it constituted the best collective and official image of the national self-understanding in post-war socialist Bulgaria. The analysis here will review the Preface to Volume One. The Preface, written by the main editors, clearly sets forth the methodology, objectives, purpose and periodisation, i.e., the central elements in the national-political ideology's interaction with historical research. I then discuss Volume Four, which covers the period of Ottoman rule up to the early national movements in the 18th century. This volume provides more detailed insight into the characteristic patterns and stereotypes used in Bulgarian historiography's investigations and analysis of Ottoman rule, and in the portrait and interpretation of the relationship between Christianity and Islam during the period. 7. THE HISTORY

OF BULGARIA:

T H E EDITORS' PREFACE

Each volume of Istorija na B&lgarija was in the hands of a scientific editorial board who would co-ordinate the authors' contributions. In addition, there was a main editorial board whose members consisted of prominent representatives of the country's humanistic research. The main editorial board, as mentioned, authored the preface with the publication of Volume One in 1979; this is a joint preface to the fourteen volumes. In the preface, the editors-in-chief begin by asserting that the need to write a multi-volume history of Bulgaria was already clear in the first years after the socialist revolution, as every people (narod) must know its past and its development in order to continue along the path towards a yet better future (p. 13). The history of historiography in Bulgaria can be traced back to the work of Paisij in 1762, whose significance is acknowledged together with that of the Russian Venelin and the Bulgarian Marin Drinov. However, it is especially the Czech Konstantin Jirecek who is highlighted for his scientific approach and his contribution to the liberation from the foreign yoke (cuidoto igo). Following the establishment of the Bulgarian principality in 1878, the discipline of history also experienced an institutional expansion within the university and with a scientific association, together with significantly increased access to and increasing numbers of archaeological and archival sources. The editors' assessment of the historiography of the bourgeois period (Zlatarski, Mutafciev, Nikov, Ivanov and Kacarov) is mixed. They note that the historians, working from an idealistic methodological position, produced a large amount of empirical and factual data, especially about the ancient period, the Middle Ages and the national 12

24

National Rebirth and Legitimation

rebirth ( Vazraidaneto),™ but they could not put together a composite national history because collective work was fundamentally alien to bourgeois historians. Similarly, they were blind to the history of the contemporary era, with its political struggles, lost wars and class contradictions (p. 14). With the socialist take-over after the Second World War, great changes occurred in the historical sciences. Marxism-Leninism became the ideological and methodological foundation, and the University in Sofia and the Academy of Sciences were reorganized. Periods and themes which the bourgeois historians had not touched upon now became objects of research interest: the modern and contemporary era, economic and sodal history, the working class, the communist party and foreign policy themes. Communist party leader Georgi Dimitrov had taken the initiative on the background of the altered social conditions and had commissioned a history of Bulgaria from ancient times to the present, to be written from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. The work initially appeared in two volumes and was later expanded to three, but the editors, following a few complimentary remarks, quickly skip over this work (p. 15), focusing instead on the background for the current work. The Tenth Party Congress had decided to initiate the writing of a new multi-volume history and were supported by the Central Committee and by Todor Zivkov personally. The work would elucidate the country's long, rich history via the true scientific methodology of socialism, which Marx and Engels had developed in their materialistic view of history, and through which they showed the objective laws of forces and relations of production in the development from primitive communism, through slavery, feudalism, capitalism and towards the first and current step in the communist social economy: socialism. Within this basic scheme, each country has its unique history; in Bulgaria's case a mixture of Thracians, Slavs and Proto-Bulgarians (p. 171"). v

The editors then map out the broad lines of Bulgaria's history. As early as the first state in the 7th century, as a result of the laws of history, a specific nationality (narodnost) was formed which continued to exist during the periods of subsequent foreign domination. The nationality was maintained via its high level of culture and by the adoption of the more contemporary and progressive Christianity as a replacement for pagan beliefs. In the Middle Ages several anti-feudal rebellions occurred, but the decisive change in the people's history came with Ottoman rule. The Bulgarian state, the feudal class and the independent church were destroyed, and the people lived under terror, oppression and religious fanaticism. Yet the Bulgarians did not accept the yoke of foreign oppression, as shown by spontaneous rebellions and resistance. They maintained their language, their faith, their customs and habits; even in the darkest times, the churches and monasteries continued the work of spreading enlightenment and

25

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

National Rebirth and Legitimation

literature. According to the editors, in this way the people created a spirit which under the harshest attacks awaited a better future, and for centuries looked forward to the national revival, even though the Turks made it difficult and delayed the transition to capitalism and the development of a nation (nacija). Some attention is also given to the national struggle as part of polemical attacks. First, the rebellion's democratic and patriotic character is described, in contrast to the violence and brutality of Ottoman rule. This view is maintained in opposition to unnamed Turkish and western authors, who presumably give a distorted, all too rosy picture of the Ottoman empire as benign to the Christian subjects. The editors reject the Turkish and western view as a distortion of the facts and poor reading of the sources, due to their having succumbed to the deceptions of sultans, viziers and western emissaries (p. 2if). According to the Bulgarian historians the liberation that followed the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-78 was one of the great moments in recent history; the Bulgarians have since shown the Russian people their eternal gratitude. The capitalist phase (1878-1944) is described relatively briefly as being characterised by class contradictions and the bourgeoisie's struggle against the socialist movement. The socialist party's early history and the formation of the communist party in 1919 is highlighted as a momentous event and the communists are praised for their struggle against fascism. The most joyous event in all of Bulgaria's history was on the 9th of September, 1944, when the people became masters of their fate under the leadership of the communist party, and a total social upheaval began. The improvement of living conditions began immediately with industrialisation, and through cultural development the country has since made its international mark on the development of civilisation (p. 26). Towards the end of the preface, the main editors state that they apply a territorial principle in the work, such that areas outside the republic but historically inhabited by members of the Bulgarian nationality are included on equal terms with areas within the existing state borders (p. 28). They conclude by noting that one of the main tasks of historical research is to contribute to the patriotic and international upbringing and enlightenment of the people, to implant the people with love towards the Fatherland and its glorious history, together with esteem for other people and their history. This task demands an objective elucidation of both the people's heroic past and their relation to other peoples through the centuries and under strict attention to the historical facts. These goals can be achieved only through a scientific work such as Istorija na Bdlgarija based on the newest knowledge and the best source materials. Even though errors and shortcomings cannot be avoided, say the editors, the work will stand as a basis for the continued development of the historical sciences towards new

heights. Finally, the editors-in-chief ensure that the individual volume editors will endeavour to follow these principles (p. 28Q.

26

8, THE HISTORY

OF BULGARIA:

C H R I S T I A N I T Y AND I S L A M

Volume Four of "The History of Bulgaria" appeared in 1983 anclSs entitled Osmansko vladicestvo XV-XVII v. ("Ottoman Rule in the i5th-i8th centuries"). The volume is edited by Hristo Gandev, Cvetana Georgieva and Bistra Cvetkova, who have also authored the text together with a collective of eighteen prominent researchers, including Petàr Petrcw, Georgi Nesev, Elena Grozdanova, Donka Petkanova, Petâr Dinekov, Konstantin Popov, Georgi Kozuharov and Ljuben Praâkov. In the preface to the volume, the editors provide a brief sketch of its content and main lines, demarcate the target readership and level of ambition and discuss the methodology. They wish the volume to appeal to both specialists as well as a broader circle of readers, and they seek to give the readers an original scientific synthesis based on the most recent historical knowledge and the best archival sources on the Bulgarians' history in the first centuries of Ottoman rule (p. 19). The scientific ambition is emphasised in the footnotes and in the comprehensive bibliography, which is divided into primary sources (pp. 375-82) and secondary literature (pp. 382-94). The methodology indicated is MarxistLeninist, as expected, and the editors emphasise that this is the first complete presentation of this period under the application of Marxist-Leninist method (p. 19). The geographic limitation of the Bulgarian areas includes the Dobrudja, Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia, whereas the presentation also covers areas in present day Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Romania, Albania and Turkey. In addition, it is emphasised that an ethnic-national criterion has been chosen for the presentation. The Bulgarian people under foreign domination are at the centre, while the Ottoman empire and other international relations are included only to the extent that they have significance for the people's history. From this it also follows that the Turkish population is treated in only cursory fashion (p. 14). Volume Four falls into two parts: (1) political, economic and social conditions (pp. 21-258), and (2) the cultural development (pp. 259-351)- The first part is introduced with a review of the political conditions in the region around the year 1400 and continues with a description of feudal land tenure and rent conditions, followed by a description of the political administrative and military system. The introduction is a macro level description of the historical conditions which dominated in the Ottoman parts of Europe, and it concludes with a general characterisation of Islam as the foundation of the Ottoman empire. In a section authored by Gandev, Georgieva, Petrov and Nesev, Islamic law (the

27

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

sharia/seriat) is cited as the basic idea for the sultan's absolutism, an aggressive foreign policy, feudal exploitation, the non-Muslim population's lack of rights and national discrimination and assimilation (pp. 54-61). Even though Islam is depicted as the social and political basis of the Ottoman empire, religion is accorded only limited attention, together with an equally brief description of Muslim religions institutions. Instead, the authors choose to focus on Islam and the sharia as repressive instruments directed against the non-Muslim populations, who are subjected to extra taxes and who suffer discrimination by the legal system (p. 55O. In the same chapter, Islam is characterised as a fanatic religion (p. 57), and the authors emphasise different ways in which the Ottomans presumably sought to support their rule by eliminating the specific characteristics of the autochtonous population. Colonisation and repression combined with an aggressive propaganda should in the first place promote the individual's conversion to Islam; but as the method did not produce adequate results, from the early 16th century, the Ottomans changed— according to the authors—to a systematic and conscious policy of forced Islamisation. This policy was facilitated by ever-increasing discriminatory pressure and was meant to strengthen the small number of Turks in the Balkan peninsula, because Islamisation at the same time entailed conversion to the Turkish ethnic group (pp. 58-61). On the basis of this description of Islam and Islamisation policy, the conditions for the local population in villages and towns are described. Especially comprehensive is the treatment of class differences and the discriminatory taxes which the Ottomans, according to the authors, imposed with the goal of achieving conversion (p. 71). In the same chapter, it is indicated that life in both the countryside and the cities at the end of the 15th century was normalised (p. 83, 91), with consequent growth in production and trade. In this way, there was a degree of restoration following the decline which followed the Ottoman conquest's destruction of the existing social structures and the demographic disaster (p. 63). This demographic disaster is discussed in more detail: war, deportations, Islamisation and emigration robbed the Bulgarian nationality of a third of its size, and the authors estimate that 680,000 persons were killed or deported (pp. 240-51). The peoples' religious institutions, i.e. churches and monasteries, were destroyed because they supported the national conscious¬ ness, and in this way the Ottomans paved the way for strengthening Islam and the assimilation of the oppressed population. In general, Volume Four of Istorija na Bâlgarija portrays the Ottoman conquest and the first century and a half of Ottoman rule as a violent destruction of the Bulgarian society's demographic, social, religious, political and cultural

28

National Rebirth and Legitimation

I |: lb | ;!

1 Ï F [

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structures and institutions. On the other hand, it is also stated that the Bulgarians succeeded in retaining their original Bulgarian characteristics through the people's will to struggle to live and work according to traditional patterns. Despite the blows to Bulgarian nationhood inflicted by the Ottomans, the authors believe that the people maintained their fundamental ethnic characteristicSVithin the historical state borders in Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia, with local communities and a religious self-consciousness. Even under conditions of foreign domination, the Bulgarians found the strength to live and fight for freedom (p. 64). These themes are followed to the i8tfc century, with a gradual turn towards a detailed description of the struggle for resistance and rebellions (pp. 164-239), and the first section of the volume ends with a summary of the political, social and economic conditions under Ottoman rule: feudal oppression and Islamic despotism confronted the Christian population's will to survive as a people (p. 250O. This interpretation of the basic features of Ottoman rule is expanded and reinforced in the treatment of cultural developments. Bulgarian cultural history is presented in three general themes: literature, folk poetry and material culture, i.e., architecture, painting, folk costume, household utensils, etc. The thread from the first main chapter is continued by repeating the phrases about Ottoman destruction, plunder and expulsion of the upper class and the intellectuals (p. 261); but again it is emphasised that the Christian culture again soon came back to life with monasteries as centres for development of the Bulgarian language, literature, calligraphy and history. After a characterisation of the frameworks for the survival of religious literature, there follows a review of the original literature from the period and the connections to especially Greek and Russian Orthodox centres of culture and literature (pp. 268-90). Alongside the religious literature, emphasis is placed on popular poetry with its epic heroic poetry genre, and evidence of the viability of the local culture (pp. 290-312). The chapter on architecture (pp. 313-22) depicts both secular and religious architecture. Ottoman architecture left its traces, for example, in bath constructions, caravan serays, mosques and bridges, while the housing architecture of the time is known only via travellers' descriptions. As for Christian architecture several church buildings have been preserved from as early as the last half of the 15th century. The same impression of a vital Christian culture appears within pictorial art, which reveals itself in church paintings, icons and book illustrations (pp. 322-32). Despite the Ottomans' attempts at obstruction, the Christians from the second half of the 15th century carried out entire church painting projects, built new churches and restored old ones, and this continued even though the preserved churches are chronologically unevenly distributed. The work of the

29

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

National Rebirth and Legitimation

painters and the monks in crafting religious ornamentation in churches, icons and books maintained their religious character, but beyond this, the activities fulfilled a historically important function in that the religious art helped preserve knowledge of the language, writing and tradition. The volume concludes with a summary characterisation of Bulgarian culture from the 15th to the beginning of the 18th century (pp. 342-48). For the first time, a research discussion is brought up. The occasion is that the authors, in light of the material presented and of recent research, believe that a view of the 15th to 18th centuries as the epoch of dark slavery (epoha na tdmno robstvo) cannot be maintained. According to the authors, Bulgarian culture continues to develop during the entire period of slavery, but the people are also subjected to many obstacles which in a tragic way impeded their historical and cultural development. The conclusion is that even though the development of Bulgarian culture was impeded, it was not eliminated in the 15th to 18th century. At the threshold of the Ottoman conquest, there existed a flourishing medieval culture comparable with the Byzantine, but under the Ottomans it was largely conservative and backward-looking with the Orthodox church and its monasteries as key institutions. As an idea for discussion, the authors assert in the conclusion that had Bulgaria not suffered foreign domination, it would have played a different and more prominent cultural and political role in European history. That Bulgarian culture maintained its own specific features under Turkish Islamic domination is due to its demarcation in relation to the culture of the rulers. The demarcation occurred, because of the ethnic difference and, because of the difference in religions, which never approached each other and were always in a contradictory relationship. Volume Four of Istorija na Bálgarija is plagued by two conceptual shortcomings. First, the interpretation of Ottoman rule as a momentous, destructive and direct attack on the Christian population means that the authors fail to explain why the Ottomans did not succeed in their policy. It remains inconceivable why the Ottomans, in the course of such a long period and with the methods described, did not succeed in assimilating the Christian population in its entirety. This lack of consistent explanation is also linked to the fact that there appears an internal contradiction insofar as a work based on a materialistic view of history attributes such wide-ranging significance to the religious contradictions between Christianity and Islam. In fact, the work's understanding of especially Islam is tendentious, just as the authors' analysis of the confrontation between Christianity and Islam goes no further than sketching out an irreconciliably antagonistic relationship. This interpretation is relied upon extensively in the conclusion, but without any refined or deep-going analysis of ethnic and

religious identity in the Ottoman social organisation. Therefore, the two extreme tendencies of oppression/forced assimilation and maintenance of original Christian culture are never brought together in a consistently (cf. Gencev 1988:89). The second shortcoming in the presentation derives frorn a distorted depiction of the fundamental features of Ottoman rule in the southern Balkans. A black/white picture of hostility between Christianity and Islam as well as the references to the people's heroic spirit is inadequate; this issue is discussed below in the fourth chapter.

30

9. O T T O M A N R U L E AS " Y O K E " AND "SLAVERY"

The authors of Volume Four of Istorija na B&lgarija seek to rehabilitate the impression of Bulgarian culture between the 15th and 18th century. They seek to distance themselves from the national romantic, pre-revolutionary historiography's idealised and embellished picture of the medieval Second Bulgarian kingdom as a Golden Age followed by the "dark centuries" (tamni vekove) under Ottoman despotism. This view caused the history of the Ottoman era to be put aside as uninteresting, and focus was instead placed on the medieval kingdoms and on the national political and cultural movements from the end of the 18th century to 1878, when, according to this interpretation, the people again realised its genuine potential. The question, however, is whether the presentation in Istorija na Balgarija actually constitutes a break with Bulgarian historiography's long and persistent paradigm of early Ottoman rule and the religious encounter/collision between Christianity and Islam. In fact, the authors' diligently used metaphors of "slavery" (robstvo) and "the Ottoman yoke" (osmanskoto igo) belong to the same historiographic tradition. The thesis of the "dark centuries" stems from the first major presentation of Bulgarian history, Geschichte der Bulgaren, written by the young Konstantin Jirecek {1854-1918) and published in Prague in 1876. Jirecek was inspired in his choise of topic by the Bulgarian historian and philologist Marin Drinov (1838-1906), who had researched the history of the Bulgarian church in connection with its efforts to form the exarchate in Constantinople (Drinov 1869)Because of his synthesis, Jirecek remains a significant figure in the early research on the history of the Bulgarians. Jirecek's Geschichte der Bulgaren became so influential because the author presented a periodisation, and in several well written chapters marked out the high points and main features of the Bulgarian history. One chapter of 30 pages entitled "Die Turkenherrschaft in Bulgarien im X V I - X V I I Jahrhundert" (pp. 448-78) is devoted to the early Ottoman period. Here he develops the notion of the "double yoke," i.e., the Ottomans political, social and economic oppression

31

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

National Rebirth and Legitimation

In 1942, the Medieval historian Ivan Dujcev pointed out that the main problem in the studies of the early Ottoman period are the sources, which are largely unpublished or inaccessible for linguistic reasons. That one can therefore observe a special historical interest in the period from the 18 th century is due to the regret-

table and inadequate lack of access to sources, the result of which has been that the early Ottoman period is virtually unexplored (1942:562-69; cf. also 1960:59-68). In a historiographic review article from 1937, Philip E. Mosely notes the same interest for 18th and 19th century history and its national revival and the heroes from the struggle for freedom. Because of lack of specialized literature on the early Ottoman period, Mosely must therefore limit himself to a passing reference to general works by Zlatarski, Hajek and Stanev. He adds a critique of the historians' lack of scientific standards, with the exception of Ivan Snegarov; for instance, that they leave out critical notes. More generally, Moseh/s critique is as follows: "While many periodicals are commendably hospitable to historical contributions, there is no recognized or vital center of historical criticism and discussion; without such support the synthetic and critical spirit in Bulgarian historical literature cannot be systematically fostered." (p. 366). When Bulgaria, in the years after the military collapse of 9th of September 1944 became, a socialist people's democracy, the political leadership took over from the Soviet Union a model for research organisation and for setting the theoretical-methodological lines of research. At the outset, there was only a small number of Marxist trained historians, and individuals such as Hristo Gandev and Ivan Snegarov continued their work. Because of the limited number of professional historians who could at all be found before the war, the problem to retrain the pre-war historians to the new research conditions was of manageable proportions, and the goal was therefore more to establish a new generation of historians. For this purpose, historical research was organised according to the model for general planning used within economic policy, and just as the economic policy was determined by the communist party, research was also run by the party. The universities should primarily take on teaching, while research was carried out mainly within the framework of the Academy of Sciences (BAN). The Academy of Sciences could trace its history back to the learned society (Balgarsko kniiovno druiestvo), formed in 1869 by the Bulgarian colony in Braila, Romania, from which it was transferred to the Bulgarian principality after 1878. Until its reorganisation in 1947> the Academy maintained the character of a learned society without the competence and economic administration which it received with the founding of the Institute of History (Institut po Istorija pri BAN). In 1964 this was supplemented with an Institute for Balkanology (Institut po Balkanistika pri BAN). In 1972 staff of the two institutes became part of a superior organ which would plan and manage the work of around three hundred historians (Kaser 1990:223, 235). BAN led and co-ordinated the research activities, and the historical institutes prepared and organised initiative areas, just as BAN selected research areas for the individual historian.

32

33

combined with the Greeks' religious and linguistic subjugation of the Bulgarians: Durch so viele Jahrhunderte hielten die Bulgaren die ganze Halbinsel in Athem, (heilten ihre Literatur und Cultur der übrigen orthodoxen Slawen weit mit und erschütterten durch die Lehre einer einheimischen Glaubensgenossenschaft ganz Südeuropa, und was war der endliche Erfolg aller dieser Mühen und Kämpfe! Leiblich fiel die einst so angesehene und gefürchtete Nation unter das Joch der Türken, geistig unter das Joch der Griechen, und blieb in dieser Botmässigkeit, bis es in unseren Tagen neuerdings bewies, dass seine geschichdiche Aufgabe noch bei Weitem nicht abgeschlossen ist, (p. 372). Here follows the presentation of the Ottoman rule as the "dark centuries": Die traurigste und dunkelste Periode der bulgarischen Geschichte ist die Zeit der Türkenherrschaft vom Ende des XV. Jahrhunderts bis zum Anfang der nationalen Wiederbelebung. Die Türken setzten sich im Lande fest, Städte entstanden und verschwanden, das griechische Element gewann in Kirche und Schule die Oberhand, und der kriegerische Volkscharakter schlug in das Gegentheil um. (p. 448). The authors of Volume Four of Istorija na Bälgarija distance themselves from any talk of "dark centuries." The research since Jirecek's day has significantly elucidated the period between the 15th and 18th centuries, but it is notable how much Jirecek's main lines and basic framework of interpretation in fact are maintained. The most striking expression of this is the use of the metaphors of "slavery" and "yoke" these being the most frequently used images of Ottoman rule in more than a century of history writing (cf. also already Hajek i925:sf and Stanevi928). 14

ls

The impression of a fundamental historiographic continuity since Jirecek, cutting across changing historical perspectives and methodological and theoretical distinctions, is confirmed in a series of analyses of Bulgarian historiography about Ottoman rule up to the 18th century. The analyses concern themselves with both the source situation and the more profound interpretive patterns in the national historiography and thereby with the organisational, methodological and ideological background for the research results discussed. 10. H I S T O R I O G R A P H I C ANALYSES

National Rebirth and Legitimation

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

Marxism-Leninism was based on historical materialism, political economy, and scientific communism. For the historical sciences, it entailed an interpretation of the course of history, periodisation and social development which stood in contradiction to "bourgeois" positivist history's research interest in political history, often in an idealistic-nationalistically coloured light, and the individual's history-creating power and significance. After the first organisational and methodological phase of construction, lasting about ten years, the results of the new view of history and methodology began to appear. Several new themes, such as interest for economic history and communist party and workers' history appeared, but there was also a special interest for revolutionary phases in the country's history, as these were interpreted as examples of the inherent tension and oppression of the non-socialist social formations. It is possible to trace the ideological motives for the choice of key research areas before and after the socialist take-over. Before the war, the young state had sought to meet a part of its need for legitimation among the small circle of professional historians' publications about the Medieval Second Bulgarian kingdom and the national struggle for freedom in the 19th century. After the war, the seeds of the revolutionary situation and the forerunners to the communist movement were made the object of deep-going investigations. The social and political changes after the war did not entail a complete replacement of historical research themes, however, as the "bourgeois" themes were also continued, though they were now analysed within the framework of the new methodology (cf. Hristov 1973). T.his is exemplified by the unbroken interest in national heroes from the time of the liberation war and by the more prominent place given to well-known southeast European research fields such as "ethnogenesis" The work with the early Ottoman period gradually intensified, but the close connection with the party and state apparatus entailed ideological bindings. A critical voice from abroad was heard in 1961 when Marin Pundeff, reviewing Bulgarian historical research since the communist take-over, provided insights into the communist party's role in the elaboration of a Marxist national history, i.e., the predecessor to History of Bulgaria (Istorija na Bdlgarija) from 1979, also entitled History of Bulgaria (1st ed., two vols. Sofia, 1954-55). Pundeff coneludes that the first period after the war had been a difficult one for practitioners of history. Their dependence on the communist party complicated their work and isolated them from the discipline's development outside the communist block. A very different and positive assessment exists ten yeas later from the first congress of the Bulgarian Association of Historians {B&lgarsko istoricesko druiestvo) in Sofia. At the meeting, present-day and a good many historians who would be leaders in the future discussed the discipline's general situation

34

under a basic acceptance of the party-controlled line. The congress papers were published in 1973 as Prohlemi na b&lgarskata istoriografija sled vtorata svetovna vojna ("Problems of Bulgarian Historiography after the Second^World War"). In this anthology, one finds no contribution concerning the Ottoman period, but the introductory article about the development of history s i n c e r e Second World War is of interest. The authors, an unnamed collective, point to the necessity of research on Ottoman feudalism and socio-economic conditions, and they also highlight historical demography and ethnography. The final pages (pp. 96-99) discuss requirements for future work. The Marxist-Leninist theoretical and methodological basis must be further developed, so that the historical sciences, together with the people, can be strengthened in the struggle for socialism and communism. Such formulations did not in themselves do anything to affect what in professional terms was the most essential problem: the poor archival base. Here the Czech scholar Josef Kabrda became an important figure. Kabrda's work appeared both before and after the war, in Prague and Sofia, and he was one of the first scholars to have a deeper knowledge of the value of the Ottoman sources. In 1954 he published a programmatic article containing criticism of previous research on the Ottoman era and an agenda for radical improvements. His critique is directed towards the "bourgeois" historians' methodological positivism, the few produced (and unsatisfactorily translated) Ottoman sources and the lack of understanding for the significance of economic and social topics (p. 178,186). Therefore, the pre-war historians' results about the first four centuries of Ottoman rule have been meagre. As priorities for future research, he mentions Ottoman feudalism, class difference and the administrative and juridical system (p. i86ff), and he argues for an expansion of philological knowledge of Ottoman Turkish for use in the source analysis. Kabrda's programmatic article converted the political, ideological and methodological demands into a concrete work program for a new generation of historians. One of these historians, until her death in 1982, was Bistra Cvetkova, who in the 1960s and 1970s was a leading Ottomanist. In an article from 1974. she focuses on the historical scholarship of the early Ottoman period. Cvetkova's analysis is both methodologically and thematically oriented, and like Kabrda, she begins by sketching out the contrast between Marxist and "bourgeois" historians with an emphasis on the advantages of the Marxist methodology and perspective of history. In her thematic description, she indicates four problem areas which should become objects for increased research efforts: the chronology of conquest, the dynamics of the Ottoman empire, the Ottoman feudal system and the relationship between Europe and southeastern Europe under the 16

> i

§ r: t I \ \\ I

35

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

Ottomans. Cvetkova's own research is not based solely on a historical materialist approach, but is also marked by a national spirit. Her point of departure is the fateful character (sddbonosen, p. 78) of Ottoman rule over the Bulgarians and the other Balkan peoples, entailing physical destruction, mass deportations, Turkish colonisation, Islamisation and forced removal of male children (devsirme, p. 90). In a more polemical tone, she therefore opposes the more positive assessment of the character of Ottoman rule (p. 83O. Cvetkova's materialist view of history is notable for her lack of interest in cultural and religion historical topics (p. 89). Her article is especially interesting because it reflects the line of the above-reviewed Volume Four of History of Bulgaria, where she was both contributor and one of the main editors. Two other prominent figures in Ottomanology and Bulgarian research into early Ottoman rule are Elena Grozdanova and Cvetana Georgieva. In her review of the 1970s research on the history of the 15th to 18th centuries, Grozdanova (1981) bemoans the lack of interest in the topic prior to the Second World War, but she emphasizes that the situation improved markedly after the communist take-over, and precisely in the 1970s there appeared the monographs by the first generation of Marxist researchers (among them Gandev 1972, Todorov 1972, Petrov 1975, Cvetkova 197) and Grozdanova 1979). This development, and a significantly higher standard of source publications, has in Grozdanova's view brought the research onto more secure ground. Thematically, the main line has been characterized by studies of the fate of the Bulgarian nation under Ottoman rule, and other themes have been the rebellion movements, trade and property relations, price formation and local communities (a research theme to which Grozdanova has herself contributed). Grozdanova underscores the value of these studies, as they connect the era of Ottoman rule with the adjoining periods and thereby provide the opportunity to study continuity and change. In 1979, Cvetana Georgieva published a lecture characterizing three main positions in the assessment of the Ottoman rule over the Balkans (p. 2150. The first position, derived from Turkish historiography but also regarded as being supported by European and American historians, sees the Ottomans as liberators of the Balkan peoples, who had suffered under feudal oppression, and who were now ensured order and social harmony by the Ottomans. In the successor states such as Bulgaria and Greece, a second view is promulgated whereby the Ottomans are seen as guilty of genocide and destruction of economic and cultural development (cf. for example Snegarov 1958 and Gandev 1972). The third position is a compromise which sees the Ottomans as aggressive conquerors who put a brake on the historical development (p. 236), but who also brought a certain degree of stability to the Balkans. Georgieva considers all the positions

36

National Rebirth and Legitimation

as expressions of fundamental difficulties in at all undertaking such assessments, but also as a result of a sometimes haphazard use of historical facts. Even though Georgieva's conclusion does not rest on more profound analysis ot the background of the three main positions, she clearly points out the decisive themes in the contradictory interpretations of Ottoman rule. ^ The work of Maria Todorova offers a critical reflection over some consequences of the materialist view of history (M. Todorova 1989. also 1996)- She characterises the research on the Ottoman era generally and elucidates selected themes in more detail. Although Todorova finds a certain continuity in historiography cutting across different historical methodologies and perspectives, she also highlights some distortions. The change in the choice of research themes is thus remarkable, noting the increased priority since the Second World War on socio-economic topics, while cultural- and idea-historical themes were less prominent, and historical research on Christianity has virtually disappeared. Todorova naturally cites Snegarov and Nikov from before the war for their research in the Ohrid archbishopric and the efforts to achieve an independent church in the 19th century, but in the period after 1944 the ideological turnabout, as mentioned, has left its unmistakable mark: 17

v

Nach dem Jahre 1944 stagnierte die Behandlung dieser Problematik für eine gewisse Zeit. Die Gründe dafür liegen sowohl in der Zuwendung der Forschungsarbeiten zu ununtersuchten Gebieten als auch im Vorurteil gegen die Kirchenthematik.... Einzelne Artikel und Studien leisten während dieser Periode gewisse Beiträge, doch als Ganzes war die Geschichte der Kirchenfrage kaum vertreten. Während der sechziger Jahre wurde dieses Thema wieder in den Werken von Wissenschaftlern der jüngeren Generation ... aufgenommen. Ihre Werke bestätigen erneut den Gedanken, daß der nationale Kirchenkampf in der Wiedergeburtsepoche vor allem eine politische Bewegung darstellte, eine der Formen der bulgarischen, bürgerlich-demokratischen, nationalen Befreiungsrevolution, (p. 147). This conclusion by Todorova is important because it indicates how the religio-historical and church-historical topics, to the extent that they are taken up, were part of the general historical research and must therefore be understood in light of this discipline's politicised situation and status. Finally, we should mention the American historian Dennis Hupchick's assessment of Bulgarian historical research on Ottoman rule prior to the 18th century (1983b). Hupchick first describes the contributions during the period from the formation of the princepality in 1878 to the 1930s with their romantic national history view, which entails that the researchers only superficially con18

37

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

cerned themselves with the Ottoman era and instead sought out the people's era of grandeur in the Middle Ages. This is well known. Hupchick argues instead for the utility of following in the tradition of Hristo Gandev by investigating the cultural and socio-economic factors behind the maintenance and development of Bulgarian culture under the Ottomans. For the period since the war, Hupchick is close to Pundeff's description (1961), but he deviates from Pundeff's conclusions in his acceptance of the new priorities under the changed political conditions. Hupchick's praise of Hristo Gandev (1972) and Peter Petrov (1975), bears the mark of an adherence to the official and political-ideological bounded Bulgarian historical perspective in the 1970s and early 1980s. 11. T R U E OR FALSE?

In the foregoing sections we have described the political-ideological working conditions for the historical disciplines up to the end of the 1980s via several historiographic analyses and with a view towards the situation before the Second World War. The concrete results, and consequences, of the politically controlled research were investigated in connection with the historical legitimation of the name-changing campaign (process of national rebirth) in the second half of the 1980s and in Volume Four of the national historical work (lstorija na Bdlganja). Here we see two paths opening: one a focus on the results, the other on the causes, i.e., conducting a scientifically based critical analysis the results of this research by describing the political and national-ideological interests served by the historical disciplines under socialism. The first path is followed by the Dutch art historian and Ottomanist Machiel Kiel in his 1985 dissertation Art and Society of Bulgaria in the Turkish Period: A Sketch of the Economic, Juridical and Artistic Preconditions of Bulgarian PostByzantine Art and its Place in the Development of the Art of the Christian Balkans, 1360/70-1700—A New Interpretation. Kiel convincingly criticises the idea that Bulgaria, from a highly developed artistically and politically economic stage, was crippled under Ottoman rule. Kiel's thesis is that the Ottomans did not cut off the possibilities for development of Christian art and architecture, that there was an economic basis for these activities, and that the relatively modest Christian artistic level was not the fault of the Ottomans. With his thesis, Machiel Kiel confronts the research paradigm he calls catastrophe theory, which he paraphrases as follows: the Ottoman hordes' conquest of Bulgaria occurred with an unparalleled brutality, blood-thirstiness, inhumanity and religious fanaticism. Cities were plundered and burned, villages razed, and fields made barren. In order to rob the people of its leadership, the Ottomans converted the upper and learned classes to Islam and took them to

38

National Rebirth and Legitimation

imprisonment in Asia Minor. But the Bulgarians, whose creative spirit had reached such a level within science and art that it forced Byzantium and the entire Balkans to tremble, never bowed their heads and were never assimilated. One main factor in explaining how the overwhelming part of the population maintained their national feeling in this terrible time was they pos'stssed a civilisation which found itself far above that of the conquerors; but for a time this civilisation lay burned under the ruins of cities and monasteries, while feudalism was replaced by the harshest form of Asiatic exploitation (Kiel 1985:33)This catastrophe theory arose as pa^t of the national mythology during the national movement's struggle for secession in the 19th century. However, this view exaggerates the conditions during the Ottoman rule because the experiences with the Ottoman empire in the 19th century, as it slowly dissolved under a combination of military inferiority, administrative decline and corruption, are transferred back to the preceding centuries. The picture of the Ottoman empire in the western research traditions contradicts basically the catastrophe theory and is in line with Kiel's analysis. Kiel's dissertation is an imposing and thorough refutation of the catastrophe theory as a research paradigm, and of the results it has generated. The critique is presented on the background of the author's special insight into the history of art and architecture, but as it appeared in 1985, Kiel was unable to include the connection between the catastrophe theory research paradigm and the forthcoming name-changing campaign. In his refutation of the catastrophe theory, he takes a point of departure in the paradox which follows from the theory: how could the Ottoman empire, if it had as its raison d'etre the spread of Islam, permit Christian religious architecture and art to exist and even to flourish (p. xvii)? Kiel's analysis thereby falls into three parts. First, the social structure and material basis for Christian art is investigated (pp. 56-142); this is followed by a brief description of the juridical framework for Christians in Islamic territory (pp. 143-47) and an assessment of the Christian Bulgarians' possibilities to maintain or construct new religious buildings and produce religious art (pp. 143-205). Finally, Kiel investigates the artistic preconditions before the Ottoman conquest in order to assess the state of Christian religious art and architecture under the Ottoman rule (pp. 206-349). At the time of its publication Kiel's dissertation strongly distinguished itself from the scarcity of critical positions among local researchers to the established view of Ottoman religious policy. An example of the critical analysis, however, is found in the work of the Balkan historian Antonina Zeljazkova. She chose to study the Islamisation process in the eastern Balkans and concludes that Islamisation was the result of a slow cultural and religious change not connected to a 19

20

39

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

National Rebirth and Legitimation

violent, centrally controlled forced Islamisation policy (1982,1985). This conclusion went against the official view as formulated in Istorija na Bâlgarija, and when her doctoral dissertation was ready for publication in 1985, the topic, now influenced by the events surrounding the name-changing campaign, had become so politically volatile that the manuscript was not published. The dissertation first appeared after the upheaval of November 1989 (1990a) and became one of the first important contributions towards resuscitating the historians' scientific reputation, which had suffered under political dependence and regime control. The picture and interpretation of Ottoman religious policy and Islam as an instrument of oppression and assimilation is a decisive and unavoidable component within the research paradigm which Kiel so precisely labelled the catastrophe theory. The next two chapters follow this path, which critically investigates the results of the political-ideological research conditions in Bulgaria under socialism. At the center stands the interpretation of the situation of Orthodox Christianity under the Ottoman religious policy. In addition, we discuss the relationship between Christianity and Islam in connection with the assessment of the extent of conversion to Islam in the 15th and 16th centuries. Chapter Three describes the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in early Islamic times and concerns itself in more detail with the religious policy of the Ottomans during the conquest of Asia Minor and the Balkans, including the consequences of the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Chapter Four turns to the Bulgarian sources describing the region's church history prior to the Ottomans and a more thorough investigation of Ottoman religious policy in practice. The leitmotif in these two chapters is to provide additional perspectives for a comprehensive interpretation of the basic situation of the Orthodox Christians under Muslim rule in the Balkan peninsula from the 14th to the early 17th century. After this path is followed in the next two chapters, we turn our attention in the fifth and sixth chapters to the second path (the causes): the political-ideological interests expressed in the historical disciplines during the socialist period and the lines back to the national movement of the 19th century. Among the topics within this multi-faceted field is socialist Bulgaria's religious policy and its roots in the country's Ottoman legacy. During the name-changing campaign, the confrontation with the Ottoman era was expressed in an official policy connecting religious and national identity among the country's Turkish population. The key to understanding the national political interest in the catastrophe theory's image of Christianity as preserver of national identity and Islam as the instrument of genocide lies in a national ideological interpretation of religion and nation. This interpretation also formed the background for religious policy in socialist Bulgaria, where the regime's goals in the Turkish-Muslim case

were to separate religious and national identity, while the connection between Bulgarian national history and the Orthodox church was accepted and supported as self-evident, also by the communist party.

40

x

41

X " P E O P L E O F T H E B O O K " A N D T H E MILLET Against the background

of his religious call, Muhammad

SYSTEM

founded

a society

which after the Prophet's death and with great success continued

to spread

Allah's revelation. From the outset, the question arose as to Muslim's ship to Jews and Christians.

During Islam's continuing

tionship to these non-Muslims

expansion

gradually became moredefined.

relationthe rela-

The Ottoman

Turks also had to deal with this tradition, when they finally took

Constan-

tinople in 1453 and proceeded

Christian

inhabitants

of the Ottoman

to create new frameworks for the

empire.

1. I S L A M A N D T H E " P E O P L E O F T H E B O O K "

O

N T H E 8TH OF JUNE IN T H E YEAR 632, Muhammad died in Medina. As a prophet, he had revealed Allah's will and his own demands to humanity. Under Muhammad's leadership, the nature and content of the revelations entailed a characteristic connection between law and theology in Islam (Schacht 1964:1). Islam appeared as a universal and all-encompassing order regulating religious teachings of duty, family, worship, juridical questions, politics and trade. Islam replaced the old tribal solidarity with a religiously legitimated solidarity. This also meant that Islam's commands, prohibitions and guidelines could apply only to persons and communities who via their religion had made themselves subject to the law and the revelations. Hence, early on the question arose as to what position should be taken towards people or groups who refused to subordinate themselves to Allah's will. The dhimma system was the answer to the question; dhimma means a form of legal arrangement with conditions and rights for non-Muslims permanently residing in Muslim territory, and the recipients are collectively known as zimmis (dhimmis). 21

In its classical form, the dhimma system developed in connection with the systematic work of legal codification which took place under the Umayyad

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dynasty and especially in early Abbasid times. Here the sharia took form, and the interpretations of the classical legal scholars were established; the later Islamic jurisprudence is to a great extent commentaries on positions which were established in this period. Muslim legal scholars, after discussions and without reaching ultimate agreement, developed the theory of the four "roots" of Islamic law: (1) the Koran, (2) the Prophet's custom (sunna) contained in the recognised traditions (hadith) which pass on information from Muhammad's contemporaries about the Prophet's actions which can help clarify or supplement in those cases where the Koran is unclear or does not provide information, (3) agreement (ijma) between the legal scholars in the entire believing world, and (4) conclusions by analogy (qiyas). The four roots of classic Islamic legal theory thus consist of two material sources, a principle of authority and a method. The following discussion begins with an account of the massive Islamic expansion which caused a need for a regulated and systematic attitude towards the other religions. I then describe the emergence of the dhimma system and its main features on the background of the sharia's material sources, the Koran and hadith; reference is made to Sunni Islam, the subsequent state religion in the Ottoman empire. Finally, the Ottoman millet system is described and compared with the dhimma system so as to assess the Christians' formal juridical status under the Ottoman Muslim rule. Already in the time of Muhammad, Islam revealed its expansionist dynamic. Most of the tribes on the Arabian peninsula subjugated themselves to the new community or were linked to it by alliances. The spread of Islam prior to 632, however, was not very great considering what followed. Muhammad's possibilities to diffuse his message had been limited to the Arabian peninsula, which came under Islamic domination under the first Caliph, Abu Bakr (AD 632-34). while further expansion took place under the second Caliph, Umar (AD 634-44). Over a period of about a hundred years, large land areas came under Islamic Arab rule. Towards the west, the entire North African coast was annexed, as was most of Spain; towards the north, the Byzantine empire lost Syria, and Damascus became the centre for the Umayyads (661-750), while the Byzantine army succeeded in holding onto Asia Minor. Towards the east, the Sasanid empire fell, and the Islamic conquest penetrated what is now Iraq and Iran far into Central Asia and the northern part of the Indian subcontinent.

the conditions of non-Muslims in the Muslim areas are a result of this historical situation, the Islamic legal texts treat the dhimma system in connection with jihad (Schacht 1964:130). The collective obligation to act for the cause of Allah, jihad, takes form in the development of the sharia in conjunction with the historical perspective and worldview which emerged among legal Scholars as a result of the expansion and the demand for universality. As Allah is one, there can and should be one ruler and one law on earth. This principle is fundamental to Islam's relation to non-Muslims. Similarly, the world is viewed as two spheres: dar al-Islam (^Abode of Islam") is governed by Islamic law, which contrasts with dar al-harb, the "Abode of the sword/war," where this is not yet the case. The view of the legal scholars was that dar al-Islam would expand at the cost of dar al-harb, until the entire world had bowed to Allah. Hence, between dar al-harb and dar al-Islam there exists a standing and fundamental state of war, but even though dar al-Islam is the area governed by the sharia, it does not imply an unconditional demand for religious subjugation. An inhabitant of dar al-Islam has the possibility to reside and live as either Muslim or zimmi, and the religious difference between Muslims and zimmis constitutes the basis for the entire dhimma order. The justification for this way of life, as mentioned, can be found in the Koran and in the hadith, but pragmatic considerations have clearly also made their mark during the legal work. Hence, there are limits to how one can understand the law's postulates about the dhimma order in light of the two material sources of Islamic law (the Koran and the sunna); this dogmatic-theological basis is inadequate if it is not supplemented by concrete historical conditions and experiences. There is a complex and ambivalent relationship between the ideal of the sharia as a divine, perfect and static law, and actual practice (Coulson 1964:20.

As a societal foundation and way of life, Islam was held together by the Prophet himself. After Muhammad's death and the overwhelming progress of the Islamic armies in cultural areas which deviated significantly from the Arabic, there arose situations and questions not known from the Prophet's lifetime, and for which answers were not to be found in the revelations. Precisely because

The concept of "people of the Book," which first appears in the late Meccan suras, denoted Jews and Christians who via their revealed scriptures are in a fundamental community of faith with the revelations in the Koran (e.g. Sura 5,44-49 and 29,46-47)." The idea is that all revelations stem from one and the same God, and that people who have received the foregoing revelations can live according to their own beliefs and cult and be saved on the Day of Judgement (Sura 5,69):"Juden und Christen waren für ihn (Muhammed, CR.) zwar Angehörige einer fremden Nationalität und Sprachgemeinschaft, aber in religiöser Hinsicht Glaubensgenossen. Er brachte ihnen deshalb von anfang an Sympathie entgegen." (Paret 1970:345). When Muhammad, around 610, came forth with his call from Allah, it occurred in an environment where Judaism and Christianity had already won a significant following. During their trading activities, the Arabs frequendy

44

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encountered the two monotheistic religions. The Koran also shows a close affinity with Judaism and Christianity. Muhammad's call to spread God's word, the revelations, the confession to God as creator of the world and future judge, and the Koran's extended use of narrative material from the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament are clear results of this influence. In the same way, the universalistic perspective exhibits connections to Christianity. Despite these traces, however, deeper knowledge of Judaism and Christianity seems to have been limited in Muhammad's Mecca. There existed no translation of the Bible in Arabic (Watt 1991:6,9-29) and only a few of the local Jews and Christians apparently had a deeper knowledge of the history and dogma of the religions. Therefore, the Koran contains erroneous or exaggerated impressions of the Jewish and Christian religions, their holy scriptures and the later dogmatic development. It is also difficult to determine the erroneous sources of, for example, Christian groups as Monophysites and Nestorians or to deviant Judaized Arabs. Muhammad viewed his prophet calling as a preaching of the same monotheistic basic truth as that possessed by the "people of the Book." What was special for Muhammad was the call now made to his countrymen and in the first place against the godlessness or polythesism of the Meccans, who placed other gods next to Allah (e.g., Sura 4,48; 12,41; 4,49; 31,13). Muhammad builds his authority by appearing as the last of the Jewish and Christian prophets and thereby guarantees the origin of the revelations from one and the same God. In early Meccan times, Muhammad called for conversion and prophesized that the infidels who rejected him would be punished by Allah (Sura 10,108; 109,6; 42,15) (Khoury 1980:17). However, after a negative reception of the message and several confrontations, the tone changed from the voluntary appeal to a demand tor conversion. In 622, after several times having advised his followers to go into exile, Muhammad went to Medina together with his faithful companions. Unlike Mecca, Medina offered new possibilities. Within a relatively short time, about half Medina's inhabitants joined Muhammad's community (Paret 1970:347), and with a base in Medina the Prophet changed tactics towards the rejecting countrymen. From an aggressive polemic, the confrontation became armed clashes which Muhammad's followers conducted with great success. Finally, he could not only see his old opponents in Mecca subjugated, but he could also subjugate the remaining Bedouin tribes in the western part of the Arabian peninsula. In the revelations, the tone towards the polytheists sharpened, and the late revelation in the beginning of the ninth Sura, from Muhammad's final year of life, reflects an uncompromising attitude towards the polytheists who, faced with demands to accept Islam, had to accept or fight for their lives and property (Sura 9,3-5).

While the Koran's attitude and stipulations towards the polytheists and pagans were unambiguous at the end of Muhammad's life, the situation was not clear for the "people of the Book." In Medina, up to half fhe^population were Jews, who Muhammad called on to join Islam. However, the Jews of Medina did not heed the Prophet's message, and a series of revelations reflects" the break with the Jews (cf. "Yahüd" in Encyc. Islam and Paret 1970:349)- Muhammad's earlier feeling of kinship with Judaism, for example, had revealed itself in the overlap between Muslim and Jewish rituals and fasting periods, but after Medina's three Jewish tribes had rejected Muhammad as a true prophet, and some Jews had collaborated with the Prophet's enemies, all the Jewish men had to choose between accepting Islam, going into exile or being killed. This development is reflected in the Koran (Sura 2,91; 4,46; 543; 5.4H also cf. 2,87-93), and the Muslims subsequently obtained their own fasting times and the daily prayers were directed towards Mecca, thus underscoring Islam's character as an independent religion. The same hostile attitude appeared in late Medinan times in relation to the Christians. Even though the Christians are assessed positively compared to the Jews, who in the Medina period were the main enemy among the "people of the Book" (Sura 5,82-83), the revelations about the Christians' distorted dogmas are unambiguously clear. The Christians are accused of polytheism, and Jesus' divinity and His death on the cross are denied (Sura 4.171; 5,72-77; 5,116; cf. also "Nasära" in Encyc. Islam). The Koran expresses the altered attitude to the "people of the Book" in the reference to Abraham's religion (especially Sura 2 and 3). The "people of the Book" originally obtained their revelations from the God of Abraham and Muhammad, but Jews and Christians have since distorted and falsified the revelations (Sura 2,135; 3,65-58; 3,71)- Therefore the "people of the Book" were also an object for Allah's demands of his Prophet and the Muslim community for jihad (Sura 9). In connection with this, Sura 9,29 is important: "Kämpft gegen diejenigen, die nicht an Gott und den jüngsten Tag glauben und nicht verbieten (oder: für verboten erklären), was Gott und sein Gesandter verboten haben, und nicht der wahren Religion angehören—von denen, die die Schrift erhalten haben—-(kämpft gegen sie), bis sie kleinlaut aus der Hand (?) Tribut entrichten!" (Der Koran 1979)Allah and the Prophet thus demand that Muslims conduct war against (1) the infidels, (2) those who violate the prohibitions of God and of the Prophet, and (3) those who have received the Scripture ("the Book"). This state of war shall continue until the enemy is subdued and pays tribute. As touched upon above, this practice was not applied to polytheists, even though they could be included in the first category. In sum, on the background of the revelations' probable chronological

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sequence, there is a development from the influence upon Muhammad and Islam by the "people of the Book," towards a growing tension which culminated in violent confrontation with non-Muslims—i.e., with both "people of the Book"and polytheists (Waardenburg 1992:43}. The original and positive assessment of the religions of the "people of the Book" gradually gives way to hostility towards these people as perverting the message of the revelations, which are therefore no longer authentic, but secondary in relation to Islam (Troll 1991:520. On this background, the "people of the Book" are not only to be despised, but must also be combatted.

alliance which consolidated the second rank status of the Christians and Jews, but also entailed their right to freely practice their religion (Bosworth 1982:400. In general, the attitude of the hadith literature towards the "people of the Book" is marked by Muhammad's suspicion, antipathy and struggle against these people, who distorted and weakened God's demands ("Ahtiil-Kitab" in Encyc. Islam). The hadith literature is important because it provides an impression of Muhammad's concrete actions towards the Christians and Jews. As in the Koran, we find here no uniform line but, rather, clear tendencies visible during the initial conquests made by the fii$t "Rightly Guided" caliphs. During the expansion of Islam, so Many Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians came under Islamic domination that they constituted the majority of the population. Scholars have debated whether the expansion of Islam was a part of a conscious holy war, or whether it was more a series of campaigns of plunder, which apparently reached a unique degree of success for a time, as the Sasanid and Byzantine empires were weakened by their mutual rivalry. In this connection, one can point to the fact that it is the early Muslim chroniclers who developed the notion of Muslims as Allah's warriors, but this portrait is an Islamic glorification of the actual situation (Noth 197&194O. The Muslims seldom encountered stubborn resistance from the local populations, and in some cases none at all, whereby the caliphs, or their military leaders, entered into several agreements with the "people of the Book," including the so-called "Umar Pact." In general, the agreements, as in Muhammad's lifetime, were marked by the specific situation, but they also contained several common features. As earlier, the agreements guaranteed the "people of the Book" security and religion, but also limited, for example, exercise of their cult in the public space. In addition, there were special obligations, which always contained an economic aspect (review of the agreements can be found in Khoury 1980:69-95)- hi general, there is a tendency towards stricter demands in the details, but since we do not know the extent to which the agreement was respected, we cannot know whether this reflects actual conditions or is more a formal specification of the "humility," which according to Sura 9,29 should accompany an agreement.

Beyond the passages about the "people of the Book" in the Koran, Muhammad's actions and decisions became a normative factor in the development of Islamic law towards non-Muslims. A critical analysis of the sources to Muhammad's practice shows that the accounts which have been passed on are composed, changed or directly falsified (review of source material in Khoury 1980:53-68). The source critical questions and the fact that the agreements made between the Muslims and the "people of the Book" are not preserved in the original, however, do not alter the significance of the transmitted Islamic tradition and its historical impact. The agreements which Muhammad entered into with the "people of the Book" emerged as a consequence of their military subjugation or voluntary submission. A well-known agreement is the Median constitution, parts of which presumably reflect the situation in Medina prior to the wars in 624 against Mecca and the consequent more hostile attitude towards the Jews. In the Medina constitution, Muhammad was more conciliatory but seems also to have foreseen the Jew's coming conversion to Islam. As mentioned, this did not occur, and two Jewish tribes were subsequently driven from Medina, while a third, accused of having been in league with Muhammad's enemies, was exterminated, an event which apparently occured only once. In Muhammad's final years of life, during several campaigns he entered into various agreements with Jewish and Christian tribes in the northern and southern Arabian peninsula (cf. Sura 3, 64). The agreements bear the mark of expediency and are typically connected with Muhammad's struggle against polytheists. The treaties demand services to the Islamic army and prohibition against giving aid to Muhammad's enemies. In addition, one of the few common features of the demands is that the subjugated peoples should make a payment/tribute. In return, the "people of the Book" could maintain their local organisations and leaders, and Muhammad and his Islamic conquerors guaranteed their life and property as well as freedom to practice a monotheistic religion. The agreements created the possibility for co-existence between Christians, Jews and Muslims on the basis of an

48

In their work on Islamic law, Muslim juridical scholars sought to systematise this material with its contradictory tendencies, an effort which took place from the second half of the 7th century and was largely completed around the year 800. On one side were the statements and traditions of merciless struggle against the infidel (Sura 9,5); extermination of the Jewish tribe in Medina and the idea of jihad seem to confirm the uncompromising attitude to other religions. On the other side stood the testimonies of kinship with the revelatory religions and the agreements made with the "people of the Book" in lieu of conversion. On

49

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

this background, and by comparison and judgements, the scholars stipulated policy and arrangement for the "people of the Book" in Muslim territories. The main rule became that non-Muslims in dar al-harb ("Abode of war") were unprotected and the object of jihad, but by residing in dar al-Islam ("Abode of Islam") they could be accorded protection for a specified period. With permanent residence in dar al-Islam, however, non-Muslims had to convert to Islam or be killed, if it was the case of an Arab, or be recognised by the Muslims as a part of ahlal-dhimtna ("peoples of the contract"). These contracts for protection were established with Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, and eventually also with Hindus and others. Joseph Schacht has summarised the dhimma system's mutual requirements and duties: This treaty necessarily provides for the surrender of the non-Muslims with all duties deriving from it, in particular the payment of tribute, i.e. the fixed poll-tax (jizya) and the land-tax (kharaj), the amount of which is determined from case to case. The non-Muslims must wear distinctive clothing and must mark their houses, which must not be built higher than those of the Muslims, by distinctive signs; they must not ride horses or bear arms, and they must yield the way to Muslims; they must not scandalize the Muslims by openly performing their worship or their distinctive customs, such as drinking wine; they must not build new churches, synagogues, and hermitages; they must pay the poll-tax under humiliating conditions. It goes without saying that they are excluded from the specifically Muslim privileges, but on the other hand they are exempt from the specifically Muslim duties; in principle, non-Muslims follow the rules of their own religions with regard to what is lawful for them. In particular, they are not subject to the prohibition of wine and pork, and can therefore trade in them. Neither offences against individual Muslims, including even murder, nor refusal to pay the tribute, nor transgression of the other rules imposed upon the nonMuslims, are considered breaches of the treaty; only joining enemy territory or waging war against the Muslims in their own country are regarded as such. (1964:1300 This Hanafite legal theory exhibits a clear kinship with the Umar Pact, which as a model treaty created the basis for these arrangements in large parts of Islam's history, including the Ottoman empire, whose rulers had introduced the Hanafite legal school in their realm. The sharia concerns itself mainly with zimmis only when Muslims are also involved. For example, the zimmis' status as court witnesses, was limited in relation to the Muslims' status, and in legal disputes involving a Muslim, the case had to be decided in an Islamic court. In cases of mixed marriages, no zimmi

50

""People of the Book" and the Millet System

man could marry a Muslim women, while a male Muslim was permitted to marry a female zimmi. In sum, the arrangement of protection, while it contained several conditions, limitations and obligations for non-Muslims, also allowed them to retain own institutions and congregations. A historical-critical analysis of the Koran and Islam thus shows that the Koran and hadith reflect a historical development which began with Muhammad's sense of community with the Christians and Jews, but in light of the disappointments over the Jews in Medina, his hostility grew, and in the time prior to Muhammad's death ended in a fonç of discrimination and perhaps only temporary protection. This historical-critical view is enlightening for the historical sequence of events, but Islamic juridical scholars have not viewed the Koran and hadith as historical source scriptures which contained a historical and context-determined development. Rather, they found that all the suras, all the verses and all the recognised hadith traditions possessed normative status: the Koran, because it was Allah's revelation, and the hadith, because the Prophet had been chosen by Allah and Muhammad's custom was therefore supremely important. For the juridical scholars in the recognised legal traditions, it was inconceivable that one revelation could replace another, as in their work they used the principle of consensus and analogy so as to create an operational legal theory on the basis of the Koran and the Prophet's sunna. The opposing tendencies, which several times have been cited, could create both a basis for repressive Muslim policy towards the "people of the Book," and provide justification for co-existence. In the concrete historical development in the Islamic states and empires, the sharia functioned as a framework containing possibilities for and limits on Islamic policy towards non-Muslims. The sharia was not a rigorous, unconditionally imperative. However, the demands for one or another form of subjugation and the poll tax appear to have been constant. Only historical investigations can provide insights regardinghow the Islamic norm was in fact practised. The dhimma system was not a single Islamic and ahistorical attitude to the "people of the Book." Muslim societies are also historically conditioned, and even though the sharia had an especially normative significance and status, it also reflects the ambiguity of the Koran and the hadith literature. Precisely this ambiguity is visible in the religious policy of the Turks and the Ottomans. v

2. T H E D E C L I N E OP C H R I S T I A N I T Y IN A S I A M I N O R

The history of the Turkic peoples as conquerors and builders of an empire constitutes a chapter in the development of Islamic religious policy. It exemplifies the significance of historical context for the concrete adaptation of the religio-juridical basis in the Hanafite legal tradition. The work of Speros Vryonis, Jr., has con-

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tributed significantly to the understanding of the religio-historical changes which followed in the wake of the Turkish conquest of Asia Minor from the end of the nth century. Vryonis' research is summarised in his The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization From the Eleventh Through the Fifteenth Century (1971), while his studies of similar conditions in the Balkans are published in several articles (1968-69,1972,1975,1976,1980,1990). Vryonis describes how Asia Minor, at the time of the immigration of the Turkic peoples, was profoundly affected by Greek culture and language; for centuries it was the core of the Byzantine empire, and Byzantine-Orthodox Christianity had left its mark on the province and its inhabitants with a network of dioceses, parishes and monasteries. This culture collapsed in two phases. First, in the wide-ranging eastern areas of Asia Minor, Turkish immigration led to the flight of parts of the population, the breakdown of the ecclasiastical organisation and the plundering of church property. This phase was completed with the relative stability and security under the Seljuk empire of Rum towards the east, while the western areas were reconquered by the Byzantines and the Franks during the Crusades. The second phase showed itself to be even more important for the processes of change. First, the Seljuk empire of Rum and then the Byzantine domains were dissolved under the Mongol conquests and the stream of Turkic nomads whom the Mongols pushed in front of them as they proceeded westwards. During the accompanying dissolution and anarchy, the Byzantine administration and Christian organisation collapsed. Vryonis also points out that the Turkish Muslim culture at this time had developed dervish orders and educational and welfare institutions, etc. which to a great degree converted and assimilated the remaining Christian population. When the Ottoman empire, in the early 14th century, began to emerge as an organised and wellordered empire, the cultural change from Greek to Turkish and from Orthodox to Muslim was already well advanced in Asia Minor.

in Asia Minor had been virtualy completed already in the beginning of the 16th century (cf. also Barkan 1957), i.e. in a shorter span of time than the Ottoman rule over the Balkans lasted. The answer must be found elsewhere. Vryonis points to a combination of four causal factors, two of which are the result of different historical developments, while two derive from structural-differences between the Balkans and Asia Minor. The four factors are: (1) the conquest of the Balkans was short-lived and not as destructive as the century-long wave back and forth in Asia Minor; (2) Turkish colonisation of the Balkans was less extensive; (3) the conquest of the Balkans and the limited colonisation was executed by a stronger centralised power Which could force obedience among the conquerors and ensure maximum exploitation of the subjugated territories' production; and (4) the Christian churches and congregations of the Balkans were not separated from the leadership and discipline of the church organisation for longer periods (1971:500; cf. also 1972:172-74,1975.1990). Here Vryonis focuses only on the major lines and tendencies. One can point to important exceptions, such as Balkan areas where the phase of conquest was prolonged, and where armies and marauders alternated back and forth for decades, and one can point to areas in Thrace where Turkish colonisation was comprehensive. But even these exceptions do not explain why some areas of the Balkans were Turkified and Islamicized to a greater extent than others. Hence, Vryonis' first two causal factors cannot explain developments in Albania, Bosnia, the Rhodopes and eastern Bulgaria; the concrete diffusion—or lack of diffusion—of Islam in the Balkans has its own contextually determined history which cannot be accounted for by long historical lines and structures. Vryonis' first two causes, while fundamentally well-founded, leave open several questions connected to the empirical data. Vryonis' third and fourth causes are linked together in the sense that the third causal factor is a precondition for the fourth. These factors point to the socio-economic preconditions for the structural change in Ottoman religious policy, in which the installation of a new patriarch in Constantinople in 1454 decisively changed the Christian subjects' church-institutional and ecclesiastical situation. In relation to Vryonis, whose articles have not delved deeply into the topic, there are reasons to elucidate the events in 1454 in more detail. The concordat-like agreement between Sultan Mehmed II and Patriarch Gennadios II (George Scholarius) following the fall of Constantinople in 1453 contains several source and research problems which are elaborated below, but regardless of these questions, it is clear that this event marked the decisive change in the conditions of existence of the Christian congregations in relation to the early phase of the Balkan conquest. The agreement laid the foundations for the millet sys-

23

The Ottoman empire heralded a new situation, and precisely here lies the difference with developments in the Balkans. In his monograph on Asia Minor, Vryonis anticipated several of the conclusions he further develops in his Balkan articles. The question he poses is, "why was the degree of Turkification and Islamisation so different in Asian Minor as opposed to the Balkans?" One cannot explain the difference in terms of the time span under which the Ottomans ruled over the areas; in Asia Minor it extended over nine centuries and in the Balkans only four to five centuries. With this difference, one can imagine that Turkification and Islamisation of the Byzantine provinces in Asia Minor penetrated more deeply, the transformative forces having had a longer time to affect developments in Asia Minor. But this conclusion is erroneous, for the changes

52

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

tern, the Ottoman variant of the classical Islamic dhimma system, and ensured an effective imperial administration, such that the Christians of the Balkans over the long term retained a church organisation and leadership which was recognised by the conquerors. This can be demonstrated using the historical sources to analyze conversion rates and by using evidence of Christian religion and Orthodox culture in the Bulgarian areas after the Ottoman conquest in the second half of the 14th century. Hence, the consequences of Ottoman religious policy towards the Christians and their institutions can be elucidated, and structural and juridical conditions linked to the historical and geographically demarcated empirical data. On this background, we can assess the religious policy of the Ottomans towards Christianity and the vitality of Christian religious life. 3. T H E MILLET

SYSTEM & T H E P A T R I A R C H A T E OF C O N S T A N T I N O P L E I N 1454

The millet system is the traditional designation for the administrative system of the Ottoman empire's recognised confessions. The system followed the Islamic tradition of allowing "the people of the Book" limited internal autonomy under the leadership of their own religious leaders (Gibb and Bowen 1957:207-61; for a recent and critical discussion, see Braude and Lewis 1982). A millet denotes a confessionally denned group having special status within the civic, penal and fiscal law; the group's status must be understood in relation to the dominant Muslim group's Islamic juridical order (Dzaja 1978:1320. From the 15th century, the Ottomans divided their non-Muslim subjects into three such millet groups: Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish—the Jews were first formally recognised in the 19th century—while the Muslims were part of the Muslim millet. As the millet groups were distinguished by their religious affiliation, responsibility for and leadership of a millet was placed in the hands of the religious leaders. As a form of social organisation, the millet system defined the individual's status by way of their membership in a religious group; the dividing line was confession and not ethnic, linguistic, historical or other differences. As a consequence of this social and religious organisational form, Orthodox Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians and Albanians were subordinated, after 1454, to the ecumenical patriarchate in Constantinople, while the three other ancient Eastern patriarchates in Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem and the churches in Ohrid, Pec, Sinai and Cyprus retained to a changing degree and over various periods different degrees of autonomy. Ohrid gradually became Greek controlled, while Pec, being the center of an archdiocese between 1557 and its demise in 1766, retained a Serbian character. Despite these local variations, there are grounds to emphasise that the Ottoman conquests again reunited all the Orthodox Christian churches, except the Russian; this situation was

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""People of the Book" and the Millet System

similar to that prior to the 7th century, when the Arab invasions divided the church in the Byzantine empire. The monophysite Armenians' millet also came to contain groups such as the Paulicians and Bogomils, as well as the Catholic communities after the conquest of the Peloponnesus, etc. This development continued with the incorporation of the Nestorians, Jacobites andjvlaronites, and because of its composite character, the Armenian millet did not function in such a centralised fashion as did the Orthodox. The Jewish millet increased greatly in the end of the 15th century after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain. The millet system demands special attention for two reasons. The first is linked to the events after the fall of Constantinople: How was the system created? Here we must distinguish between the millet system's background in Islam as normative framework, and the specific historical situation for the Ottomans. The millet system is unmistakably related to the Islamic dhimma system, but it was also affected by Ottoman practices and adaptations. This topic is discussed in the following sections. The second area of interest is the concrete effect of the millet system, discussed in the following chapters, as expressed in Ottoman religious policy towards the Orthodox Bulgarians before and after 1454. When Constantinople fell on the 19th of May, 1453, the city was but a shadow of its former self. Even though the Byzantine empire had for nearly 100 years been reduced to the capital, the nearby surroundings and small areas of the Peloponnesus and at Trapezunt, the event attained wide-ranging consequences. New power-holders and a new religion now dominated the Christian capital of Constantine the Great. The extent of the conquest was also clear for Mehmed II, subsequently known as Mehmed the Conqueror, who transferred his seat of power from Edirne (Adrianople) to Constantinople (Istanbul). With its unsurpassed strategic position, Constantinople was a self-evident choice as center for a new empire rising out of the ashes of Byzantium. The center of eastern Christendom for nearly a millenium fell without significant rescue efforts from the Roman Church and western Europe. The church union which was declared at the Council in Florence in 1439 had never penetrated among the population in the union-hostile Constantinople, nor had it brought the desired assistance to the Byzantines. For Orthodox Christianity and for the Christian peoples under the Ottomans, the victors' regulation of the church's conditions in the days and months after May 29th 1453. are of immense importance. The topic has preoccupied researchers, and much energy has been used to clarify the uncertain course of events. The only certain knowledge we have is the point of departure and the result. When Mehmed, after three days of plunder, could undertake his entry into Constantinople, he found no patriarch. The former union-friendly patriarch

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had fled to Italy, probably in 1451, and in 1453 a new patriarch had not yet been selected. It is also certain that after the Ottomans' conquest, the church again obtained a patriarch, the union-hostile George Scholarius, known under his monastic name of Gennadios, and that the Orthodox Church did not collapse with the conquest, as did the Byzantine empire. What was the nature of this arrangement between the Ottoman sultan and the Orthodox Church? How did the agreement come about with the new patriarch? And what motivations and precedents can have determined Mehmed's decision?

this same light that Pseudo-Sphrantzes sees the sultan's written guarantees to Scholarius, his successors and all bishops, in which they are promised immunity, freedom and tax exemptions. In this connection, Pseudo-Sphrantzes indicates that he sees through Mehmed: the sultan issues guarantees and promises, but in reality he was the enemy of Christianity who pursued his own-ends. A completely different view of Mehmed's actions and motivations is found in Kritovulos' Mehmed chronicle." On the basis of its editorial history, PseudoSphrantzes' Chronicon Maius is difficult to assess as a reliable source about the fall of Constantinople and the installation of the patriarch. Regarding the Byzantine Kritovulos, however, we know with certainty that he was not present during the conquest of Constantinople. He was there a short time afterwards and entered the sultan's service. Kritovulos was for some times close to Mehmed and followed his life closely, subsequently writing a laudatory biography of his benefactor. The second part of the Mehmed chronicle, covering the period from 1454 to 1457, provides the account of the sultan's initiatives towards the Orthodox Church in the months after May 1453- Kritovulos relates that Mehmed, immediately after the take-over of Constantinople, sought out Gennadius, whom he had long wanted to meet, having heard much about his wisdom and virtues. Mehmed found Gennadius at Edirne, where he was being held in prison but lived under good conditions. The sultan became personally convinced of Gennadius' wisdom, rhetorical abilities and religious mind, obtaining great respect for him. He granted Gennadius access to him any time and honoured Gennadius with freedom, conversations and expensive gifts. Finally, Mehmed made Gennadius the patriarch of the Christians. According to Kritovulos, the sultan gave him, along with several rights and privileges, the leadership of the church, with all its power and authority in the same manner and to the same extent as under the Byzantine emperors. According to God's will, the sultan gave the church back to the Christians together with a great share of its property. Gennadius could freely explain the Christian faith and its dogmas to the sultan, who also himself visited the patriarch in his new quarters and thereby pleased him. Kritovulos concludes by emphasising how Mehmed, by his actions, demonstrated that he respected every person for his true worth and not only the military, kings and emperors. The fall of Constantinople and Mehmed's era are also the object of additional diaries, letters, chronicles and histories, but none of the important sources to the events mention how the Orthodox patriarch was re-established. This is the case, for example, with Nicola Barboro's diary based on the author's own presence, and the historical works of Dukas and Chalcocondyles. The same is true for Tursun Beg's and Asikpasazade's Turkish chronicles

4. T H E P A T R I A R C H A T E OF CONSTANTINOPLE I N 1454: S O U R C E S & R E S E A R C H

With the conquest of Constantinople, the high-ranking official (protovestiarios) at the court of Emperor Constantine X I Palaeologos (1449-53), George Sphrantzes (Phrantzes), fell into Ottoman imprisonment. Between 1466 and 1477, Sphrantzes wrote his memoirs in the form of a chronicle, which from a Greek-Byzantine perspective portrays the decline of the Byzantine empire. The chronicle has been passed on and is known as Chronicon Minus. There also exists a Chronicon Maius, known as "Pseudo-Sphrantzes," which is a compilation probably carried out at the end of the 16th century by the monk Makarios Melissenos by joining the Chronicon Minus with a now unknown account of the fall of Constantinople. The account of the installation of a new patriarch is found in Chronicon Maius. * 2

In the section on the patriarch, Pseudo-Sphrantzes first reports of Mehmed's victorious entry into the imperial city, under which the sultan provides protection and freedom to those who had fled and to the hidden inhabitants. He therefore ordered the inhabitants to select a patriarch according to their own traditions, and the city's few bishops and priests then chose the wise Scholarius. There follows an account of the Byzantine ritual for the ordination of patriarchs, which Mehmed used with the investiture of Scholarius, and a description of the associated festivities. The new patriarch enjoyed many honours on the part of the sultan and was given the Church of the Apostles as his residence. On this point, Pseudo-Sphrantzes' assessment of Mehmed is negative, for the choice of the Church of the Apostles is because the "sinner Mehmed," as PseudoSphrantzes calls him, had annexed the earthly heaven, the St Sophia Church, for use by the Muslims as a mosque. The negative tone continues in the final words of Chronicon Maius, in which Pseudo-Sphrantzes summarises his assessment of Mehmed's motivations for resuscitating the patriarchate. He believes that it was a case of a cunning move on die part of Mehmed. The sultan had destroyed the Christians but would have Constantinople repopulated and therefore enticed them with promises. It is in

56

57

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

26

(cf. Babinger 1927). Several of the authors speak of Mehmed's efforts to bring Constantinople back to its golden age by resettling the empty stretches of land within the walls, but it is only Pseudo-Sphrantzes and Kritovulos who also speak of a concordat-like agreement with the Orthodox patriarch. This source material is important for clarifying the foundations of the Ottoman millet system and comprises a key foundation for several analyses of Mehmed's motivations and of the Christians' living conditions in the Ottoman territories. In 1924, the Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Paris accepted a dissertation by Cons. G. Papadopoulos, who in several areas has set the agenda for further work on this topic. Papadopolous' time horizon is broad and includes all 550 years of the Patriarchate of Constantinople's history under the Ottomans. His work is an important contribution to the study of the history of the ecumenical patriarchate and especially of the reforms of the 19th century. Basing his summary of the privileges given the Christian patriarch on PseudoSphrantzes and Kritovulos, Papadopoulos finds that Mehmed acted in accord with both Byzantine and Islamic traditions (pp. 28f, 31). Papadopoulous argues that alongside a religious motivation, two other factors lay behind Mehmed's decision: from a foreign policy standpoint he wanted to prepare the way for future Ottoman expansion and legitimate his right to Constantinople (pp. 76-80); in terms of domestic politics, he wanted to avert the flight of the Christian population, ensure the resettlement of Constantinople, ease the administration of the empire, obtain the confidence of the Greek subjects and consolidate the Ottoman empire's economic and fiscal basis (pp. 80-85). Papadopoulous' interpretation of Mehmed's motivations in relation to the sharia, however, was criticised in subsequent research. In an article from 1931, Friedrich Giese questioned references to the sharia as Mehmed's religious motivation, and the idea that the sultan, after the conquest of Constantinople, should have been practically forced to order the Christians' relationship to the Ottoman state. Instead, Giese seeks to show that Mehmed's actions were marked by realpolitical considerations. Pseudo-Sphrantzes and Kritovulos are exceptions in relation to the many sources which do not mention the patriarch, the church or any privileges, but rather exhaustively concern themselves with Mehmed's persistent, but difficult attempt to resettle and revitalise Constantinople. Giese argues that in this effort Mehmed appealed to the Christians, but they obtained their agreement with the sultan despite the sharia, when their city had fallen under armed assault. Hence, they did not fulfill the condition for protection of non-Muslims. Yet the sultan was influenced by other than religiousjuridical motives, and the Christians had also later to pay significant sums to changing sultans for the appointments of their patriarchs (p. 276).

58

"People of the Book" and the Millet System

Helmuth Scheel, in 1943, raises several objections to the erroneous or misunderstood views of the favoured status of the patriarchate and of the Christians after the fall of Constantinople. Scheel believes that these misunderstandings and erroneous interpretations have emerged because no one had read the Ottoman sources nor examined the appointments (berats) of GreeVpatriarchs and Metropolitan bishops made by the sultans. By including these sources, Scheel builds up his argument that the Orthodox Church and its clergy must be viewed as the sultan's extended arm in imperial administration, in which there is nothing odious, but simply an extension of Islamic juridical tradition (p. 19, cf. also Duda 1948/52). ^ Theodore H . Papadopoullos, in his 1952 contribution to this research, emphasises the social and political circumstances after the conquest of Constantinople. The sultan's need for consolidation resulted in the construction of a civil-political administration as a supplement to the military organisation, and it was therefore important to obtain an arrangement with the Christian population (cf. also Papadopoullos 1967:202). In extension of the Islamic tradition, it was natural to incorporate the Christians' leader and his organisation into the administrative system, and Mehmed therefore reinstalled a patriarch and continued with appointment of new ones, because the geographic spread of the church, its organisation and structure, was useful to the sultan (p. 6, 22ff). So far, this research review reveals basic agreement that the Christian Church achieved a form of recognition in the Ottoman empire, but that it is also difficult to more closely determine its status, duties and rights. There also exists a lack of clarity concerning Mehmed's motivations for recognition: were they determined by the sharia and Islamic precedents or by considerations of realpolitik? The various interpretations derive from whether or not one views Mehmed's initiatives towards the patriarch Gennadius and the Christians as a protection (dhimma) in accord with sharia. If so, this interpretation contains difficulties, as Mehmed in such case violated the sharia by granting a dhimma without the conditions having been fulfilled. And if one accepts the idea that Mehmed granted the patriarch and the Christians wide-ranging rights and privileges, and that this was not only an extension of the Islamic zimmi regulation, then what lay behind his decision? One explanation could be that Mehmed, after suppressing the last remains of the Byzantine empire, was worried about an attack from a new western crusade, which had come closer after the Council in Florence at the end of the 1430s, and which in 1443-44 had in fact resulted in the Varna crusade. Mehmed therefore willfully chose an anti-union patriarch in order to maintain the schism between the churches and reduce the Roman Church's interest in rescu-

59

Religion, Politics, and Historiography İn Bulgaria

"People of the Book" and the Millet System

ing Orthodoxy. Gennadius had originally supported church union, but eventu­ ally became a vocal opponent and continued this policy after 1454. According to this explanation, the maintenance of the patriarchate and the choice of the first patriarch was thus directly connected with Mehmed's concern about an attack from the West. Against this explanation, three arguments can be presented: the western kingdoms and the Roman Church were not prepared for a new crusade against the East, and Mehmed does not seem concerned about something like this; if the sultan had been motivated by such a danger, he should have with­ drawn his privileges, for the danger had clearly disappeared during the years that followed. In addition, he also gave privileges to Jews and Armenians, for whom no one would organise a crusade (p. 2of). The question of Mehmed's motivations are difficult to answer unambiguous­ ly, but the sequence of events points in the direction of a combination of Islamic traditions and the need for control of the Ottoman empire's internal order and administration. The difficult source situation allows no possibility to determine with certainty the concordat question itself (cf. also Runciman 1968:168-71; 1991), but the role which the church as an institution came to play in the Ottoman empire followed from a classical imperial logic, which in the Ottoman case rests on both Islamic tradition as well as specific historical circumstances. The broad lines of this interpretation can be found in the work of Gunnar Hering (1961), who takes up the topic with the goal of explaining the relation­ ship between the sharia and Mehmed's religious policy. As Constantinople was conquered by force, the privileges which are known from Pseudo-Sphrantzes are a riddle; how could the agreement emerge by leviating from the sharia. . In order to understand the background and purpose of the privileges, Hering argues that we must cease speculating about Gennadius' union-hostile person and the western crusades and instead turn towards domestic political condi­ tions in the Ottoman empire: 7 27

28

Jeder Plan einer administrativen Eingliederung der Christen in den osmanischen Staat musste von den Voraussetzungen ausgehen, 1. dass die islamischen Gesetze sich an die gläubigen Muslimer wenden und für die Regelung zivilrechtlicher und öffentlichrechtlicher Belange der nichtmuslimer ausscheiden.... 2. dass die Eroberer aus sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Gründen an einer Islamisierung der Christen nicht interessiert sein konnten; 3. dass die Türken über keine Behördenorganisation mit sprach- und landeskundigen Funktionären für die Regelung der Angelegenheiten der christlichen Untertanen verfügten; 4. dass die orthodoxe Kirchen mit ihrer seit Jahrhunderten überliefer-

60

ten Organisation, ihrem Recht und ihrer grossen Zahl von Geistlichen, denen Sprache, Sitten, Gebräuche und Territorium der Unterworfenen engstens vertraut waren, fehlende osmanische Behörden ersetzen und die Verwaltungsbelange weitaus besser und billiger als etwa eigensïu bildende türkische Instanzen regeln konnte. ^ Wollte Mehmed weiterhin Eroberungskriege fuhren und gleichzeitig materiellen Nutzen aus dem bezwungenen Gebiet ziehen, musste die Kirche als Verwaltungsinstrument in seinen Dienst treten. Dann konnte es ihm auch gelingen, die unterworfenen Christen durch Heranziehung ihrer Kirche als "instrumentum regni" zi^r Anerkennung der Eroberung zu zwingen und sein Reich innenpolitisch zu konsolidieren, (p. 244). According to Hering, the concordat should therefore solve an administra­ tion problem and ensure the revitalisation of the city which Mehmed had unsuccessfully sought to colonise with Turkish settlers: through the patriarch and privileges granted the church, the sultan obtained great advantages, and he chose not to take the sharia so seriously. This characteristic of Mehmed is demonstrated in Franz Babinger's Mehmed biography (1953) and can also be observed in the devşirme institution, with its removal and conversion of Chris­ tian boys for use in the administrative system and in the Jannisary corps. Mehmed's relationship to the religious law has thus posed a continuing research challenge, and Halil İnalcık has also followed the issue (1969-70): was it really the case that Mehmed, due to political expediency ignored Islamic law? When the inhabitants and defenders of Constantinople refused to surrender, and the city fell under the massive attack on May 29th, 1453, the Christian inhabitants ought to have experienced another fate than what in fact happened. The sultan should have allowed his men to plunder unhindered and should have turned the inhabitants into slaves (p. 232). Instead, the situation was clear­ ly different when the Ottomans took the city which would become the centre of their empire. İnalcık relies on Kritovulos and Tursun Beg as sources for Mehmed's activities in rebuilding and resettling Constantinople during the fol­ lowing years. Mehmed hereby overlooked the fact that the city had fallen by force and allowed the original residents to remain, calling in Christians, Jews and Muslims as new inhabitants. However, İnalcık argues that his co-operation with the Christian clergy was nothing new, nor in contradiction with the sharia or with Muslim state traditions (p. 237). Yet Mehmed's actions could leave the impression that he gave the Orthodox an unjustly favourable positions and spe­ cial treatment, and it led to friction with the Muslim population, for whom the historian Aşıkpaşazade was spokesman. The reaction against Mehmed's policy can also be seen during the reign of his successor Beyazit II (1481-1512), who as

ÓJ

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

"People of the Book" and the Millet System

sultan and whose legal scholars implemented a stricter interpretation of the sharia. İnalcık's interpretation of Mehmed's policies towards the patriarch and the Christians thus takes its point of departure in a distortion of the relative importance between the sultan's administrative authority and the sharia. He interprets Ottoman religious policy as based fundamentally on the sharia, albeit under continual adjustment due to the changing historical circumstances. In 1982, Benjamin Braude published an article in which he radically criticis­ es the research conclusions cited above (pp. 69-74). Braude does not attack the idea that the patriarchate and the church were maintained by Mehmed, but he wants to show that it cannot have been a case of an institutionalised policy in the 15th and 16th centuries. Braude thus rejects the millet concept and the idea of a millet system as a myth created in western orientalist circles in the 19th cen­ tury, from where it penetrated into Ottoman language use and conceptual understanding. According to Braude, there exist no Ottoman sources (tax reg­ isters, court archives, legal protocols, etc.) from the period prior to the reform initiatives of the 19th century, i.e. the Tanzimat era (1839-76), in which millet is used to designate non-Muslim subjects in a protected and autonomous posi­ tion. According to Braude, it is erroneous to view millet as ah! al-dhimma, for in Ottoman terminology (prior to the Tanzimat), the term is used in the opposite meaning to designate Muslims in contrast to zimmis. Braude thus rejects the notion that there existed any system, institution or fixed religious policy towards non-Muslims in early Ottoman history, pointing instead to several arrangements of local character with variations in time and place. According to Braude, a source of these misunderstandings is the idea of a concordat between Gennadius and Mehmed. Braude's challenging and provocative reassessment is a new interpretation of a difficult source material. While Ottoman religious policy certainly varied, as will be shown in the next chapter with empirical data from the Bulgarian areas, it is an exaggeration to characterise the entire millet system as a myth. Even with local variations, the imperial project of Mehmed II and Süleyman 1 (1520-66) led to centrally controlled change in the Ottoman religious policy. The concept of the millet system can be misleading if viewed in too institutionalised a per­ spective, but this does not change the fact that there existed a religiously-based regulation of non-Muslims' social and religious status in the Ottoman empire. The final research contribution to be discussed here is that of Kemal H . Karpat (1986). Karpat does not problematise the existence of an agreement between Mehmed and Gennadius but takes it for granted on the background of Pseudo-Sphrantzes' information in Steven Runciman's recapitulation (1968: 168-71). Karpat mentions that as a structural precondition of the concordat,

Islam and Orthodox Christianity both contain the idea of the primary role of religion in relation to ethnic affiliation (p. 139). Karpat focuses on the back­ ground for the millet system, its function and consequences, pointing out that the decimation and collapse of Byzantium in the preceding centuries prepared the way for co-operation between the sultan and the patriarch. The niemory of the conquest of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade in 1204 was still alive among the Byzantines, and the crusaders were followed by a Latin patriarch, imposition of Latin dogmatic and liturgical views and the closing of several Orthodox churches. These experiences wjth the Catholic west affected Ortho­ doxy's attitude to the Muslim Ottomans. In addition, Karpat emphasises that the Ottomans' incursion into the Balkans had been made easier by their religious policy and the elimination of feudal exploitation (p. 136). The Orthodox peoples had most recently been repressed during the campaigns of the Catholic armies deep into the Balkans up to the battle of Varna in 1444. and the Orthodox had to a large extent opposed the Council of Florence's agreement of union (p. 138). Karpat's portrayal of a community of interest between Mehmed and Gen­ nadius is augmented by an embellished picture of Mehmed as a just and toler­ ant ruler, who as a Muslim acted in accordance with Koranic and sharia stipulations regarding the "people of the Book" (p. 140). On this background, Karpat concludes that the sultan and patriarch could find a common interest, and he argues that it was really to the advantage of the Orthodox Church that it came under Muslim domination. The agreement with Mehmed afforded the Christians protection and freedom of religion, and the patriarch even achieved increased prestige and authority under the Ottomans (p. 142). Church proper­ ty, for example, was treated according to the pattern of Muslim endowments (vakıf): autonomous administration, tax exemption and immunity against con­ fiscation. Karpat contests the view of the patriarchate as a governmental instru­ ment and oppressor of non-Greek subjects; the patriarchate was not part of the bureaucratic apparatus and managed only those millet affairs connected with the cult and internal church jurisdiction and Karpat insists that talk of corrup­ tion and bribery in the frequent changes of patriarch is exaggerated (p. 1430Karpat argues that a harmonious relationship arose between the Orthodox Church and the Ottoman empire, because their political interests overlapped, and because both shared a fundamental view of religion, God and Eternity. Ottoman military might ensured the Orthodox Church an authority similar to what it had at the height of the Byzantine empire, and a brake was put on the Catholics' missionizing activities. The Orthodox Church's influence was forti­ fied through the Ottomans' cannons (p. 144). and the church enjoyed an insti­ tutional monopoly among the Orthodox population during the century-long

29

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

'People of the Book" and the Millet System

Pax Ottomanica (pp. 146,149). Karpat's assessment contradicts the well-founded and representative interpretations included in this review, and even though several of his ideas are inspiring, our assessment does not support Karpat's view of Ottoman domination as an unmitigated benefit to the Orthodox Christians. The character of religious encounters and the consequences were more complex, as will be shown in the following chapters.

In its way, the attacks in the 16th century against the church's position also reflect the research situation as reviewed in the foregoing discussion. On the one hand, researchers found agreement between Mehmed and Gennadms entailing clearly defined privileges with delegation of both political and religious power to the church, whereby it became a part of the Ottoman- administration On the other hand, there is a view of a loosely structured, undefined relationship between the church and the administrative apparatus, and following this interpretation, any so-called "privileges" belongs to a later period and must be seen in connection with the church's at.temptto legitimate its umque position One must consider the ^establishment of the patriarchate in 1454-and ot this there is doubt only about the content and extent of Mehmed's action-as a provisional arrangement, which with the results of the conflicts in the 16th century came into a more structured framework. As a consequence of these conflicts, the Orthodox Church's status was recognised as being in fundamental accord with the religious-legal basis of the Ottoman empire. The church found a modus Vivendi with the rulers, under condition whereby Islam became the dominant religion. This is confirmed by patterns of conversion and the social structure, whereby high status administrative positions from the 16th century were restricted to Muslims. Ottoman religious policy thus contributed to connecting the absolutist and military social order with a degree of cultural, religious and administrative autonomy for the subjects. The millet system became the structural framework for the Christians under the Ottomans, and historical investigations can demonstrate the consequences of this religious policy for the empire's Christian population. It is in this light that developments in the Orthodox-dominated Bulgarian areas will be discussed in the following chapter.

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5. C O N C L U S I O N S

Modern research is not alone in discussing the difficulties of clarifying the nature of the millet system, the motivations of Mehmed I I and the events in 1453-54 >n Constantinople. The problems appeared for the Ottoman administration when there emerged uncertainty regarding the status of the church and the Christians, and when voices arose regarding the violation of the sharia. Cases of the church's rights appeared in 1519 under Selim I , and in 1537 (or 1539) under Sûleyman I . They are known from the "History of the Patriarchate" and Dimitrie Cantemir (1673-1723) (cf. Mordtmann 1912, Patrinelis 1969). The cases occurred together with a strengthened Islamic influence on the leadership of the Ottoman empire at the beginning of the 16th century, when the conquests of the eastern territories, the Arabian peninsula and in Egypt brought the Ottoman sultan possession of the title of "Caliph" and the religious leadership of the entire Muslim world. As a result, after the death of Suleyman I in 1566, the sharia obtained greater influence at the cost of secular law (Gradeva 1988: 202ff ). Concerning the two cases, insofar as its not just two accounts of the same case, Muslim juridical scholars seem to have stood for a harsher line towards the Christian inhabitants. Selim I himself conducted a policy of razing churches or converting them into mosques, and supported a more active conversion policy. The grand vizier had to resolve the conflicts, but from its archives, it appeared that the patriarchate was unable to provide written privileges from the hand of Mehmed I I . If these ever existed, they had already disappeared by the 16th century. The episodes show that for a time in the first half of the 16th century, and perhaps in several instances, questions appeared as to the status and rights of the patriarch and of the Christians; high-ranking Muslims have found that there existed a disproportion between the status of the Christians and their defeat in 1453. Even though the cases in the 16th century were threatening to the church for a time, the result was, rather, a strengthening, as the church's uncertain position was clarified. The sultans maintained the status quo and legitimated Mehmed's policy by invoking the idea that some Christians and Jews during the siege of 1453 had entered into secret agreements with the attackers and turned against the Byzantine emperor.

64

65

\

V

.x 4 s» CHRISTIANITY

BEFORE & UNDER THE

OTTOMANS

The Ottoman

conquest of the Second Bulgarian kingdom destroyed its polit-

ical structure

and transformed

the church organisation

which had been so

closely linked to the old political power. The history of Christianity conversion

of the Bulgarian

reflects the Ottomans'religious bears evidence

Slavs through the period of Ottoman

from the domination

policy system in practice. This history not only

of the tensions

between

Christianity

and Islam,

reveals a significant degree of conservation

of Orthodox

religious

but also institutions.

1. C H R I S T I A N I T Y B E F O R E T H E O T T O M A N S

I

N 864 OR 865, khan Boris (852-89) was baptised at Pliska, his city of residence, together with several of the Bulgarian kingdom's boyars. The First Bulgarian kingdom was thereby officially Christianised and Boris, baptised Michael after his godfather, Byzantine Emperor Michael 111 (842-67), assumed the Slavic princely title of knjaz. Boris' conversion brought with it domestic and foreign policy benefits, although the khan was also probably personally taken by the Christian message; this can explain his involvement in a major churchbuilding project later on his life, before retreating to a monastery in 889 (Fine 1983:117-19). In the first place, Boris had appealed to the Franks for missionaries, but had to abandon this effort under Byzantine pressure. Instead he accepted Christianity from Constantinople, thus opening his country to Greek clergy. Among the newly converted slavs, Byzantine religious and political influence was significant, and Boris rapidly appealed to Patriarch Photius (858-67 and 877-86) in Constantinople in an effort to achieve an independent church. When this recognition was not granted, Boris, in 866, turned to the Pope in order to achieve greater religious independence under his jurisdiction. However, the Pope would not meet the wide-ranging demands made by the Bulgarian ruler. The result was that a church meeting in Constantinople in 870 placed the Bui-

6?

Christianity Before & Under the Ottomans

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

garian territory under the Patriarchate of Constantinople, but with a certain degree of autonomy, and a subsequent church meeting in 880 confirmed this status (O. Todorova 1987^50). The Byzantine clergy had brought with them Greek texts and utilised Greek in their religious activity. A turning point occurred in 886, when a group of, Cyril and Methodius' missionaries arrived in Pliska and were well received by Boris. Both Cyril and Methodius, "the Apostles of the Slavs," were now dead (in 869 and 885, respectively),and the mission in Moravia and Pannonia had failed after the Franks had expelled the Slavic missionaries. Instead the Byzantine Slavic-speaking missionaries took their activity to the south Slavs, and the missionaries would quickly come to play a decisive role in the diffusion of Byzantine culture and religious literature in the local language, Old Church Slavonic. The missionaries diligently translated from Greek to Old Church Slavonic, and an original Old Church Slavonic literature. The Bulgarians soon sought to consolidate the independence of their church in relation to the Byzantines. Many Greek clergy gradually left the country and were replaced by local clergy, and Symeon (presumably tsar, 893-927), exerted pressure to have his archbishop, in his new seat in Preslav, recognised as patriarch. We do not have complete information regarding the status of the Bulgarian church under Symeon's successor, Tsar Petar (927-67), but the tsar apparently succeded in making a peace settlement with the Byzantine empire in 927 so as to obtain canonic recognition of the church as autocephalous with its own patriarch. In the middle of the 960s, conflicts erupted with the Byzantines, who called on the Russians to plunder the Bulgarian territories. After the Russians had shown greater political independence than Constantinople could accept, Emperor John I Tzimiskes (969-76) took Preslav himself in 971, and the remainder of the First Bulgarian kingdom's history then unfolded in the southwestern region of Macedonia, which had been spared war. Here a new dynasty took over the tsarist authority, and under Tsar Samuel (ruling alone 986-1014), the kingdom expanded into the western Balkans. In connection with the altered political situation, the church obtained its center in Ohrid, but after 971 had probably lost its autocephalous status. From the beginning of the eleventh century, Byzantine Emperor Basil II (coemperor from 963, ruling alone 976-1025) initiated a long term plan to end Bulgarian domination of the western Balkans. Tsar Samuel's army was slowly pressed backwards, and after an overwhelming victory in 1014, the Byzantines could crush the final pockets of resistance, so that Basil I I , in 1018, could enter Ohrid. For the church, the immediate consequences of the defeat were limited, as the emperor chose to allow the Slavic church leader to continue with the title

68

loi archbishop. Basil would clearly utilise the church in his exercise of power in -"the newly conquered regions, and he incorporated the archbishop into the ^imperial administration. The Ohrid archbishopric was therefore not immediately subordinated to the patriarchate in Constantinople but was directly under the emperor, who also named bishops, etc. The Slavic element within-the church ? was thus partly maintained, and the Ohrid archbishopric could also maintain a certain jurisdiction over the eastern Bulgarian areas (Fine 1983:199)- This situa¬ tion persisted until Emperor Michael IV (1034-41) sought to implement Byzan- tine religious and cultural uniformity iji the Balkans. He installed a Greek as -Orthodox archbishop in Ohrid and selected Greeks as religious leaders in the other Macedonian and Bulgarian areas. Slavic Christianity and culture were subjected to pressure for the remainder of the century; the church was Hellenized. In 1185, the Bulgarians, Arumanians and Cumans in the central parts of the Balkan mountains rebelled against Byzantine domination, a year later proclaiming the Second Bulgarian kingdom under the leadership of Tsar Asen I (1186-96). After several military confrontations with the Byzantines, the kingdom was recognised as independent, but compared to the First kingdom the Second was much smaller, encompassing only the lands between the Balkan Mountains and the Danube centered in the residential town of Tarnovo. The new tsar also sought to achieve control over the church organisation in order to strengthen his kingdom through the church. Therefore, continued church linkage to the archbishopric in Ohrid was impossible, and in 1187 in conflict with canonic law, the tsar unilaterally broke relations. Tsar Asen now installed a Slavic church leader in Tarnovo and gave him the title of archbishop. The Tarnovo archbishopric soon succeeded in annexing several of the Ohrid archdiocese's western areas around Vidin, Sofia and Velbaid (Snegarov I924:88f). The Patriarchate of Constantinople, of course, opposed recognising the Tarnovo archbishopric's unilateral declaration of independence, and in 1203 negotiations between the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Bulgarian tsar and his church leader ended without result. Asen's successor. Tsar Kalojan (1197¬ 1207), then contacted the Pope with an inquiry about a union which would ensure church independence and his own legitimacy as tsar. The Bulgarian tsars again showed their ability to exploit the contradiction between the Pope and the Byzantine emperor and patriarch. In direct extension of the Fourth Crusade's conquest of Constantinople in 1204, a union actually took place between the Bulgarian and Roman churches. The Pope sent Tsar Kalojan a crown, and in the Second Bulgarian kingdom the union was viewed as a guarantee of full political and church independence. Tsar Kalojan expanded his influence into Thrace and Macedonia, and even though much of these areas were lost under his suc;

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

Christianity Before & Under the Ottomans

cessor, they were recaptured under Tsar Ivan Asen II (1218-41). With the Byzantine church weakened the Bulgarians, by extending their political territory, could incorporate more bishoprics, which found themselves under, respectively, Ohrid's and Constantinople's jurisdiction, and instead to install Slavic bishops. By the early 1230s, Ivan Asen II's relation to the Latins in Constantinople had become strained, and he now turned himself to the Byzantine court in Nicaea in order to achieve a co-operation. A part of this overture also contained a resolution of the church relations, which had constantly preoccupied the Bulgarians in their effort to achieve equality with the Byzantines. Nicaea had established itself with the demand for succession to the Byzantine empire and the ecumenical patriarchate, and at a meeting between the Nicaean leadership and the Bulgarians in 1235, the Bulgarians severed their links with the Roman Church and recognised the patriarch of Nicaea as ecumenical patriarch. In return, he granted the Bulgarian church autocephaly and awarded the archbishop in Tarnovo the title of Orthodox patriarch. The Bulgarians' wishes were thereby fulfilled, but as part of the agreement they had to renounce their demands for church jurisdiction over several areas in the eastern and southern parts of the Balkan peninsula. There exists uncertainty as to the full extent of this decision and the canonical authority whereby the Nicaean patriarchate recognised the Bulgarian church. The uncertainty centers on the extent to which the participants at the church meetings were authorised to take such a decision, or whether, it was a case of a Bulgarian-Nicaean church assembly without participation of representatives from the other orthodox patriarchates. The later history of the declaration of autocephaly provides little clarity over the extent of the decision. The Bulgarian church's autocephalous status was later challenged, and after the restoration of Byzantine rule over Constantinople in 1261, even by the Patriarchate of Constantinople itself.

churches and monasteries and the artistic and literary activities of learned schools. Clergy and laymen were preoccupied with the continued work of translating and working on the Byzantine literature, but they also produced original works of history, hagiographies and apocrypha. The Second Bulgarian kingdom's limited expansion in the i4trucentury was followed by a reduction of the Tarnovo patriarchate's domain. Especially in the second half of the 14th century, the Patriarchate of Constantinople made incursions into Tarnovo's domain; the Varna diocese was transferred to Constantinople as were the Dobrudja, Plovdiv and Mesembria dioceses. Internal Bulgarian conflicts contributed to this developirient when the parties, in their division of the empire, brought the question of church affiliation into their conflicts

31

In the second half of the 13th century, Ivan Asen II's kingdom collapsed under internal fragmentation between the pretenders to the throne and rival bojar lineages. Wars and campaigns against incurring Magyars, Serbs, Byzantines and plundering Tatars intermittendy dissolved every central authority. Some territorial unification was achieved again under Tsar Theodore Svetoslav (1300-20), but after the defeat of Tsar Michael Sisman (1323-30) at the hands of the Serbs at Velbazd in 1330, the Second Bulgarian kingdom never regained its prominent position in the Balkan peninsula. The remaining parts of the kingdom were devolved into small regional small kingdoms, but Tsar Ivan Alexander (1331-71). was fortunate to create a flourishing artistic culture around Tarnovo, with connections to the Palaeologian Renaissance in the Byzantine empire. Ivan Alexander was a generous patron who supported the building of

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(Markova 1976:14-16). The political weakness of the Second Bulgarian kingdom in the 14th century became manifest when the area became a relatively easy prey to the Ottomans during their expansion. The character of the Bulgarian church organisation and its institutions at the threshold of the Ottoman conquest, however, is difficult to determine on the basis of the complicated political situation and the scarcity of sources. In connection with the Ottoman conquest of Tarnovo in July 1393, the Patriarch Evtimij (1375-93) was banished to the Baàkovo monastery, and hereby the church's independence in practice ceased simultaneously with the political collapse. A year later, the patriarch in Constantinople named the metropolitan of Moldavia exarch over Tarnovo, i.e., without the patriarchal authority. Hence, the first step was taken towards the formal elimination of the Tarnovo patriarchate, but the actual moment of dissolution—presumably around 1400—is uncertain (cf. Tachiaos 1963; O. Todorova i987b:43-46). The dissolution had certainly taken place before 1438, as it was definitely a metropolitan in Tarnovo who was represented in negotiations on union in Ferrara and in Florence. In any case, the dissolution of the independent Bulgarian church organisation occurred in conjunction with the Ottomans' conquest of Tarnovo. The Tarnovo patriarchate's existence was irrevocably linked to the political power base in a tsarist kingdom, and the patriarchate in Constantinople reformulated the Bulgarian church organisation into a metropolitical See with limited geographic expanse (Papadopoullous 1952:103-22). The destruction of the Tarnovo patriarchate was a logical consequence of the church policy traditions and norms of the time, by which an autocephalous church organisation could only have been successfully established and maintained under an independent ruler. Therefore, as there was no longer any tsar in Tarnovo, while there was still an emperor in Constantinople, the patriarch in Constantinople assumed jurisdiction.

7J

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

This description of the Bulgarian church's institutional history up to the Ottoman conquest serves as a backdrop for the following description of the situation of the Orthodox Bulgarians under the Ottomans in the 14th to 16th centuries. We first review the Bulgarian research on the country's history of Christianity, then focus on the Rila monastery, the neomartyrs and the issue of conversion to Islam among the Orthodox population. 2. T H E C H U R C H UNDER T H E OTTOMANS: A R E V I E W OF R E S E A R C H

Historical research on Bulgarian Christianity under Ottoman rule up to the time of the independence movement in the 19th century has had an uneven development. More especially, one factor behind the limited research in the history of Christianity has been that the church historical research tradition prior to the socialist take-over of power focused on regions and periods other than the Ottoman, and especially on the founding of the Bulgarian exarchate in 1870 (Markova 1989; cf. also Nikov 1930). In the socialist period, the limited number of historical studies of Christianity were advanced only within the national ideological interpretive framework. The purpose of this review is to provide an impression of the specialised research which nevertheless exists, and to then summarise its results concerning the situation of Christians under the Ottomans, before outlining the situation with sources from especially the 14th to 16th centuries. Some of the relevant research themes are made the object of closer investigation in the fifth chapter. The historical research on the Bulgarian Church had its beginning with Marin Drinov, the 19th century's most important Bulgarian historian, and who was trained at renowned universities. In 1868, Drinov published in Vienna a dissertation entitled Istoriceski pregled na bàlgarskata cârkva or samoto i natalo i do dnes ("Historical Review of the Bulgarian Church from Its Beginning until Today")." Drinov's interest in the Ottoman period prior to the 19th century is sporadic and in line with the background upon which the work has been written: Since the middle of the 19th century, the Bulgarian colony in Constantinople had sought independent church recognition in relation to the ecumenical patriarchate, which the Bulgarians regarded as being involved in cultural Hellenisation of the Balkan Slavic populations. This background and inadequate sources caused Drinov concentrate his presentation on projecting a flourishing church under the two medieval kingdoms and especially highlight the Târnovo patriarchate. As a contrast to this, his description moves directly to the Phanariot era in the 18th century, which he depicts as direct Greek oppression of Bulgarian Christian and national culture. Drinov is markedly anti-Greek, and he thus stands within the previously mentioned tradition of a national struggle

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against an allegedly "Greek yoke," i.e., Greek-led church organisation's oppression of Bulgarian culture, corresponding to the political-economic and Islamic oppression of "the Turkish yoke." While Drinov left out the first centuries of Ottoman domination, the church historian Cuhlev, in the early 20th century, worked on a multi-volume history of the Bulgarian church. His projected study of the entire history of the church and Christianity from Boris' baptism in the 9th century and onward to the present appeared promising after the first monumental volume (1910). However, Cuhlev died before the publication of rnore than the first volume, which covers the era to Tsar Asen l's secession from the Byzantine rule and the establishment of the Second Bulgarian kingdom in 1186. Like Marin Drinov, neither did Stanimir Stanimirov concern himself with the church's history in the Ottoman period before the emergence of the national movements; the only exception was that he paid some attention to the so-called neomartyrs, i.e. Christians executed by the Ottomans (1925:136-54). Alexander Cuculain's study of the history of the Sofia diocese jumps from the Second Bulgarian kingdom onward to the exarchate struggle, stopping only in the intervening period at Paisij Hilendarski's Slavo-Bulgarian history from 1762 (1937)The lack of deep-going research of Christianity's history under the Ottomans prior to the Second World War has an exception in the Ohrid archbishopric, with its traditions going back to the associates of the Slav aposües. This research is closely linked to the name of Ivan Snegarov, but the seldom comprehensive source material has also attracted the attention of several nonBulgarian researchers (Snegarov 1924; Gelzer 1902; cf. also Péchayre 1936). Snegarov crowned his research with the monumental 1932 Istorija na Ohridskata arhiepiskopija-patriariija. Of padaneto i pod turcite do nejnoto unittolenie 1394-1767 g. ("History of the Ohrid's Archbishopric-Patriarchate. From Its Fall to the Turks until Its Destruction, 1394-1767"). Here Snegarov emphasizes the Ohrid archbishopric under the Ottomans as an inter-Balkan center and maintainer of traditions from the Bulgarian congregations, not as a tool of an aggressive Greek church and cultural policy. With reference to the controversial dissolution in 1767, Snegarov finds that in contrast to the view which sees evil intentions on the part of Constantinople's Greek clergy, it was the increasingly hopeless economic conditions that were decisive. He also provides valuable analyses of the Ohrid archbishopric's connections to other Orthodox churches and the Ottoman power-wielders, the monasteries, the cultural and religious life in the congregations, theological characteristics, etc. Ivan Snegarov authored his works as professor at Sofia University's Theological Faculty, and as church historian also published a series of lectures on

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general Bulgarian church history (1947)- In the latter work, the isth-iSth century is treated in only cursory fashion. The same priority is chosen by K. Dinkov in his church history, published by the Orthodox synod in 1954. For Marin Drinov, the contemporaneous struggle for establishment of an independent Bulgarian Church, as mentioned, clearly showed through. This connection to the current political or church policy goals or conflicts also marks several historical studies on the Bulgarian Church from the early 20th century, in which a part are connected to the sharpened struggle over Macedonia's future. Macedonia was at this time still in Ottoman hands, but a strong activity in the neighbouring countries was exerted, when the time would come, to be able to make his claim to the area. In the Bulgarian principality established in 1878 (since 1908 a sovereign tsardom) part of Bulgaria's efforts went towards demonstrating pre-Ottoman church organisational bonds between the Bulgarian medieval kingdoms and the Macedonian provinces; the historian and folk¬ lorist Jordan Ivanov (1982; orig. publ. 1908) and the historian and archaeologist Georgi Balascev (1901,1909) contributed to this effort. At the same time, increasing interest was shown in monastic history and especially studies of the preserved monastic libraries and the monasteries' role during the 19th century's national secessionist movement. Petar Mutafciev's work on the monasteries in the Balkan Mountains stands central in this research (1931), as does Hristo Gandev's works on the monasteries' significance for Bulgarian culture (1939,1943). After the reorganisation of the Bulgarian research system in the late 1940s and with the introduction of a materialist view of history and Marxist-Leninist methodology, history of religion and church-historical topics were marginalized; in 1950, the Theological Faculty was separated from the university One research theme which continued after the war, however, was the cultural historical interest for the monasteries and especially the Rila monastery, as its library and archive could elucidate the monastery's history under the Ottomans. Since Diamandi Ihciev's (1907,1910) and Georgi Balascev's (1907) publication of the Ottoman sources in the monastery's library, a stream of works have appeared on the Rila monastery's history, as well as lavish illustrative works on all of Bulgaria's monasteries (e.g., Cavrakov and Dobrev 1974). In the inter-war and post-war period, Josef Kabrda, as mentioned in the second chapter, contributed to the important work of making the Ottoman-Turkish archival materials more accessible. Kabrda was especially interested in sources from the 17th and 18th century, in which the most comprehensive mass of Ottoman documents on the Christian institutions have been preserved. In the Ottoman legal texts and sultanic documents he found rich sources for elu-

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cidating the church's economic and fiscal situation, which he combined with his other studies on social and economic conditions. Kabrda's analysis of the source material was published in several articles (1937,1940, i955> 1958) and culminated in a larger monograph (1969). The 1970s and early 1980s saw a renewed national historical interest in the church and its significance during the Ottoman era. The cultural historian Georgi Neâev published several works on monastic history up to the 17th and 18th centuries, shifting the focus from the generally emphasised architectural and art historical aspects towards the monasteries' connections with the social and cultural developments and their function as culture-bearing institutions (cf. 1974a, 1974b, 1977,1978a, 1978b, 1982). This new interest and emphasis also

stands in connection with the period's officially encouraged focus on national grandeur and on the church and Christianity as national historical institutions. In 1976, Zina Markova published a monograph on the history of Bulgarian Christianity up to the Crimean War, but because of Markova's primary interest for the national church movement in the 19th century, the description is very limited in its treatment of the foregoing period. In her description of the Ottoman era, Markova supports the thesis of an economic basis for the conflict between the higher Greek clergy and the general population (cf. 1976:26ft*). This thesis was originally developed by Hristo Gandev in his earlier studies, and he pursued it in his work on the situation of the lower clergy under the Ottomans (reprinted in Gandev 1976). Since Markova's book, Gandev has returned to the topic linked to the idea of the Greek-Turkish "double yoke" (1984). Orthodox Christianity and the church as preservers and protectors of Bulgarian national identity under Ottoman rule constitutes the most prominent theme in the Christian-related research in the 1970s and 1980s. The topic is elucidated and studied in innumerable publications of researchers from several disciplines; mention may be made of the theologian Radko Poptodorov (1970-71), the historian Petâr Petrov (i975:336-43)> medieval historian Ivan Dujcev (1978), the historian and Ottoman specialist Cvetana Georgieva (1981, 1984), the head of the Theological Academy, Nikolaj Sivarov (Schiwarov 1981), Marta Bur (1984), the historian Hristo Hristov (1982) and Zana Koleva with special emphasis on conditions in Macedonia (1989). This research theme is discussed in more detail in the next two chapters. Finally, mention should be made of two dissertations on the Bulgarian church in the early Ottoman period. In 1987, the historian Olga Todorova published an important dissertation: Pravoslavnata càrkva i bàlgarskijat narod prezXV—tretata èetvârt na XVIII vek ("The Orthodox Church and the Bulgarian People in the 15th to the Third Quarter of the 18th Century"). On the basis tne

33

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

of her dissertation, Olga Todorova has published several articles (1987a, 1988, 1989). Finally, the Ottoman scholar, art and architectural historian Machiel Kiel's previously discussed and very inspiring book, Art and Society of Bulgaria in the Turkish Period (1985) is included where relevant. 34

3. C H R I S T I A N I T Y IN T H E 14TH TO 16TH C E N T U R I E S

Following the Otttoman conquest of the Balkans the first consequences for the churches from the mid-i4th century show many similarities with developments in Asia Minor during the expansion of the Turkic peoples there from the end of the nth century. Even though the sources to the development of the Balkans are insufficient (Vryonis 1980:2850, we obtain no picture of an established and stable Ottoman-Muslim religious policy towards the Orthodox populations and their religious institutions; on the contrary, evidence points towards a varied and more unsystematic policy. As far as the Balkans are concerned, the preserved parts of the Patriarchate of Constantinople's archives (1318 until 1402) are a key source for the study of changes and gradual collapse of the church organisations in Asia Minor (Vryonis 1971; cf. Miklosich and Müller 1860-62). The patriarchate's archives, containing decisions which were made at the synod, concern largely church administration and disciplinary cases. In geographic terms, the data is limited to the bishoprics in those parts of Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly and along the Black Sea coast which belonged to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Thus the patrarichate's archives do not cover those areas subordinated to the Tarnovo patriarchate, from which corresponding source materials have not been preserved. This means that we cannot obtain precise information concerning the core areas of the Second Bulgarian kingdom, but there is nothing to indicate that Ottoman practice in the Tarnovo patriarchate would have deviated significantly from what we know from the Balkan areas under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Speros Vryonis, analysing archival sources from the patriarchate's archive, has concluded that the church organisation seems to have suffered a partial collapse (1980:288-94). After the Turks' pillaging and the Ottomans' conquest, innumerable church posts remained unoccupied because the clergy had fled, been deported or disappeared. Thereafter followed an economic downturn for the church, and the synod in Constantinople chose to amalgamate several dioceses. It was difficult to name new bishops, as the clergy could not traverse Turkish controlled areas. Especially well-documented is Adrianople (Edirne), where the entire church organisation was destroyed and the church estates confiscated. On the basis of this data, it is possible to gain an impression of how the church organisation in the southern Balkans—with the exception of Greece,

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which was still largely under Latin and Byzantine domination—was in the second half of the 14th century marked by chaos and confusion. The synod continued to administer, but only with great difficulty and with a weakened economic basis also expressed in the tensions between the clergy over falling or lacking contributions to the church; such cases reached the synocfS^ One can reasonably assume that similar conditions prevailed during the Ottomans' conquest of Bulgarian territories, as many clergy and scholars, after the first Ottoman campaigns north of the Balkan Mountains, chose to seek refuge in Russia and in the Serbian and Romanian provinces. They took with them comprehensive collections of books and manuscripts, and a good deal of these refugees achieved prominent posts in their new homelands (Fine 1987:444). The most important source on the Tarnovo patriarchate's situation during the Ottoman conquest in 1393 is Gregorij Camblak's panegyric on Patriarch Evtimi j . Under his leadership, Evtimij would see his patriarchate decline because of the aforementioned rival fractions but was nevertheless fortunate in building a renowned literary school and himself authored several lives of saints and episdes, while also working as philologist and translator (Kaiuzniacki 1901; modern transcription in Evtimij 1990). Camblak wrote his panegyric after Evtimij's death in the early 15th century, and the writing thus occurred about 10 years after the events in Tarnovo. As a source, the text suffers from several weaknesses: it is a panegyric which primarily fulfills the demands of literary genre; thus, all events are subordinated to the goal of glorifying Evtimij. In addition, Camblak himself was not present in Tarnovo at the Ottoman conquest but was residing on Mount Athos. 35

Despite these source problems, there is no doubt that Camblak is correct when he states that Evtimij, at the conquest of Tarnovo, was removed by the Ottomans. Evtimij was originally to have been condemned to death, but the verdict was changed to exile, and from 1394 he spent the rest of his days in the Baikovo monastery south of Plovdiv. Evtimij continued his literary activity, and the school and library was subsequendy continued by students. The course of events is interesting because it shows the technique used by the Ottomans at that time towards the church's leadership. Evtimij's fate thus indicates a change compared to the chaotic conquest phase from the mid-i4th century and a good hundred years onward. As a prominent church leader, Evtimij was apparently removed together with the ruling elites, but clergy, monks and scribes could continue their chores in the monasteries. Even though Camblak's panegyric describes Ottomans' gruesome behaviour, there is no evidence that the Ottomans conducted a direct policy of extermination towards Christians and Christianity. It is typical that Evtimij could resume his literary work at a monastery after his removal, for it was precisely the monasteries which had good possibilities to

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Christianity Before & Under the Ottomans

continue their activity and to achieve status in line with the Islamic religious endowments. This is well documented from Serres and in the Mount Athos monasteries archives (Zachariadou 1969,1971; Lowry 1991). In the Bulgarian areas, the Rila monastery is a characteristic example of this Ottoman religious policy towards the Christian population and its religious institutions. 1

4. T H E R I L A MONASTERY IN T H E 15TH C E N T U R Y

The holy Ivan Rilski (St John of Rila) is the center of a rich tradition of hagiography. Ivan was canonised in 950, and his life has been rendered in several ver­ sions, where the eldest preserved version stems from the 12th century. Ivan was born around 876 and as an adult sought out the monastic life, later becom­ ing a hermit. Far into the inaccessible Rila valley southwest of Sofia, Ivan found his solitude, but he was soon sought out by increasing numbers of people, as the reputation of the holy man grew, and gradually a small group of disciples joined him. When Ivan died in 946, he was buried outside his cave, but the rumours circulated of miraculous events at the grave site. Tsar Petar (927-67) had Ivan's remains exhumed in 950 and brought them to Sofia, where a church was con­ structed over his relics. After the defeat of the First Bulgarian kingdom by the Byzantines, the relics suffered a changing fate and were among other things a booty of war brought to the seat of the bishopric in Esztergom in Hungary. After being returned to Sofia, Tsar Ivan Asen I , at the creation of the Second Bulgari­ an kingdom, had the relics transferred to the residential town of Tarnovo. Ivan Rilski's life history and the fate of his relics thus follow an oft-repeated pattern in the genre of hagiography: the miracle-working strength is sought after, his relics are stolen and traded, and the rulers link themselves to them. 36

Tradition would have that at Ivan's cave and original grave there arose a per­ manent monastic community, but there is no certain evidence of a monastery in the Rila valley since the 10th century; not until the mid-i4th century do the preserved sources first confirm the presence of a monastery at Ivan's place of residence (Christov, Stojkov and Mijatev 1957:13); Hupchick 1993:143). In 1378, i.e., a short time before the Ottoman conquest of the area and of Sofia, Tsar Ivan Sisman granted this monastery several privileges and lands which are known from the preserved documents (published in Ivanov 1931:5970. From here it appears that it was not a case of the awarding of new land areas and privileges, but rather, that the tsar confirmed and possibly expanded an already established monastery whose monks had been granted several rights and tax exemptions in connection with their trading activities, as well as the property rights to the named villages, fields, fish ponds, beehives, forest areas, etc. In the document, the tsar emphasises the Rila monastery's unconditional rights to these values and prop-

7$

erties and warns anyone who might violate his commandment of punishment. The Rila monastery has preserved a unique collection of Ottoman docu­ ments which make it possible to follow how the Ottomans maintained these privileges and estates in their basic forms. The oldest document, which is only a preserved fragment, stems from 1402, i.e., a short time after the conquest of the area; this is followed by the sultan's decrees (firmans) from 1493,1508,1516, 1519,1520,1540,1549,1568,1575 and up into the 19th century (published in IhĞiev 1910). The eldest decree is issued following the battle of Ankara on 28th July, 1402, when the sultan was taken prisoner, but it is not possible to determine which one of his sons had issued it. TheHext contains a basic confirmation of Ivan Sisman's privileges, and the Rila monastery and its monks are taken under the sultan's protection with direct reference to both the sharia and secular law (Ihciev 1910:4). This status is confirmed in the aforementioned subsequent fir­ mans, which cite the monks' existing rights and privileges. Hence, Süleyman I issued a decree on 12th December 1520, i.e., shortly after his accession as Sultan, and the decree was touched off by the need for the monks to have their status confirmed with each new sultan. The decree is addressed to the local Muslim judge, kadi, who informed of the status of the Rila monastery and of the legal and fiscal regulations to which the monks are subjected. The monks acknowl­ edge to Süleyman that they possess privileges issued by Beyazit I (1389-1402) and Mehmed 1 (1413-21), privileges which exempt their fields, water mills, pas­ tures, etc. from tariffs, and they also present to the sultan's administration writ­ ten confirmations of these rights issued by Suleyman's father, Selim 1 (1512-20). In his decree, Süleyman specifies that the monks' information accords with the central registers and archives, and that the local authorities therefore assume an obligation to continue this favoured practice towards the monastery. The Rila monastery's status is also confirmed by sources outside its own collection of documents. Machiel Kiel has published a register from 1519 concerning special rights in the administrative zone to which the Rila monastery belonged, and this register also shows that the monastery came under the sultan's protection with extensive properties and tax exemptions (Kiel 1985:1600. Between the eldest of the Rila monastery's preserved firmans there is a 90year time span. During this period, the monastery burned down and was aban­ doned for 10 years. After being rebuilt, it again obtains its favoured status. These events are known from a key source for Christianity's history in the Bulgarian areas in the 15th century: Vladislav Gramatik's account of the transfer of Ivan Rilski's relics from Tarnovo to Rila. Vladislav Gramatik authored his account in 1479, while residing at the Rila monastery, but the transferral itself had taken place ten years earlier. He had apparently come to Rila shortly after 1470 37

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

(Dancev 1969:92), and his sources for the account had presumably been monks who had taken part in the transferral. Vladislav Gramatik was more a clever scribe than an original author, and in Rila he copied Evtimij's account of Ivan Rilski, to which he added an account of the relics' history since Evtimij's death. As literary genre, it is hagiography, and Vladislav's main interest was to depict the glory which came to the Rila monastery when after more than five hundred years it again came into possession of the holy Ivan's relics. Alongside this, however, the text contains a glimpse of the local Christian society which makes it valuable for elucidating the Ottomans' religious policy and the relationship between Christianity and Islam. Vladislav Gramatik explains the destruction of the Rila monastery as a result of the Ottoman conquest, but this is hardly correct if one examines the decree from 1402.« Vladislav then relates that during the time of Mehmed I I three brothers commenced a rebuilding. It was relatively quiet in the area, and supported by the population, the brothers erected a richly adorned monastery which was completed in the early 1460s. The new monks in the Rila monastery received information from a visiting priest from Plovdiv that Ivan Rilski's relics were still to be found in Tarnovo. They immediately sought out further information and obtained confirmation. They then began the work of getting their saint's earthly remains transferred to the monastery. What is remarkable here is that in pursuing this effort, they addressed the Ottoman authorities for assistance in the transfer. Initially, they contacted Mara (Maria), daughter of the Serbian despot Georgi Brankovic (1427-56), who had married her to Sultan Murad II (1421-51). After her husband's death, Mara had taken residence in a monastery in Serres, south of Rila. She had Mehmed II issue a written order to the Ottoman authorities in Tarnovo concerning the transfer of the requested relics, but the clergy and the Christians in Tarnovo did not agree with this. As the monks from Rila reached the town, an argument arose as to the relics. The monks first had them delivered under protection of the Ottoman authorities, after which the monks proceeded on their way towards the Rila monastery with their treasure. The account of the monks' further journey through the country provides insight into Christian religious life and the conditions under which Christendom existed. When the monks came to Nikopol, just north of Tarnovo, they were received with great honours by the local Christian leader, who has Ivan's relics brought into his house chapel, whereafter the assembled group receives communion. Later on, nearly all the city's inhabitants, including women and children, assemble in the leader's house to celebrate the happy event. Next morning, the city's inhabitants again gather around Ivan's casket, from which miraculously sweet smelling incense begins to emanate; the monks are sent off with lavish gifts.

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The account then proceeds to the monks' experiences in Sofia. They rest for a few days at the sarcophagus in the Church of St. George, and the city's Christian inhabitants flock to the religious services and thanksgiving in the church; a prosperous couple pays for a lavish casket and a beautiful relic adornment. The monks and the Christian inhabitants plan a large scale procession out of Sofia after six days with priests, torches and incense, but in anxiety that the lavishness should arouse the wrath of the local Muslims, the procession is somewhat reduced. Finally, and after some limited festivities on the way out of Sofia, Ivan's relics again find their place in the Rila valley. In his account, Vladislav Gramatik exhibits no sympathy for the Ottomans and does not attempt to render a positive impression of their rule. On the contrary, the Ottomans are blamed for the destruction of the Rila monastery, and during their journey, the monks express their anxiety about Muslim attacks. Even though Vladislav had no interest in giving a positive portrayal of the Ottomans attitude to Christianity and does not do so, one nevertheless obtains the impression of a vital Christianity in the second half of the 15th century. The account from Nikopol and Sofia and from the Christian congregation in Tarnovo shows that Christianity was widespread and vigorous and not just relegated to far-off monasteries. As the goal of the account was to depict Ivan Rilski's greatness and miraculous powers, it is not unreasonable to assume that Vladislav or his sources exaggerated the overwhelming reception in Nikopol and Sofia; it may very well have been more modest. In this context, however, the significance of the sources lies in telling us that the Christian monks could freely travel, address the Muslim authorities for assistance in a religious affair, carry the relics around the countryside, that they could be received openly by their fellow Christians, reside among them and could celebrate the event with them in their churches. After its reconstruction, the Rila monastery continued to function, and other monasteries or groups of monasteries also maintained their activities. This is the case for the monasteries on Mount Vitosa, in Etropole and Backovo (cf. Hupchick 1993:143-82; Cavrakov 1987:136-231)- Nor is Rila a special case as concerns the building of Christian churches or monasteries at the end of the 15th century. The return of normalcy after the chaotic phase of conquest enabled new activities. During the conquest, the churches and monasteries had also suffered, and a part of the church buildings in the towns, following traditional Ottoman custom, had been converted into mosques to be used by the Islamic soldiers and administrators. From the end of the 15th century, however, church buildings were built in monasteries, such as Dragalevci, Backovo, Kremikovci and Tarnovo. The painters got on with the execution of painting great mural programs in Late Byzantine style with aspects inspired by folk art,

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

and the copyists worked in the monasteries with their literary work. The Rila monastery and the account of the transfer of the relics are both examples of the continuity of Christian life and Christian institutions after the Ottoman conquest. However, there are also examples of conflictual relations between the Muslim powers and the Orthodox Christians. Ottoman society was stratified on the basis of religious affiliation, and in the difference between the Christian and Muslim millets lay both a power and status differentiation. Two martyr vita from the 16th century bring evidence that this difference was expressed not only in social stratification, differential taxation and the Muslims' general higher position, but could also obtain serious consequences. 5. Two N E O M A R T Y R S FROM T H E 16TH C E N T U R Y

In 1515, the young Christian goldsmith Georgi (born 1497) was burned at the stake in Sofia and immediately thereafter canonised. He is known as Georgi Novi Sofijski, and his hagiography stems from 1521, when the local priest (pop) Pejo, who had known Georgi and was present at his martyr's death, wrote a martyr's live based on the event. ' Georgi became the first known neomartyr from the area, and as a saint he soon achieved significant popularity. In Russia, a new live was authorised in 1539, and Georgi found a place among the Orthodox Church's martyrs in murals on Mount Athos, in Bulgaria and in Serbia (Kiel 1985:320-22). Pop Pejo's hagiography describes Georgi as a God-fearing Christian lured into a trap by the Muslim scholars in Sofia. This is followed by a long polemic about religious topics, on the basis of which the Muslims accuse Georgi of disparaging and downgrading Islam. The case is brought before the Muslim judge, who also—unsuccessfully—seeks to convince Georgi of Islam's advantages. At last, the Muslim population demands that Georgi be burned, and even though the Christian congregation and its priests are assembled in prayer for Georgi, nothing helps against the Muslims, who are in a seething rage. Miraculously Georgi does not feel the fire, but when a Muslim crushes the doomed man's head, he gives himself to Christ. Pop Pejo's account is a traditional hagiographie text with embedded dialogues, monologues and miracles. This makes it a difficult source to utilise for elucidating the relationship between Muslims and Christians generally, but it clearly reflects the unequal power positions which in the final instance existed between Muslims and Christians. Regardless of what Georgi might or might not have done and regardless which interest Pejo as a priest could have in composing an account which was hostile to Islam, Georgi's fate shows that the Muslim population, supported by the Islamic legal institution, had a position superior to the Christian population. 3

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A similar fate in 1555, again in Sofia, befell the Christian shoemaker Nikola, who originally came from Jannina in Epirus; Nikola was also rapidly canonised and is known under the name Nikola Novi Sofijski. Nikola's life was maintained in a hagiography by Matej Gramatik, who wrote his text shortly-after Nikola's execution. Matej's saintly life is a longer account, containing passages about the Bulgarian church's history and conditions in Wallachia, where Nikola resided for a time. Naturally the presentation culminates with the saint's death. Nikola was converted to Islam by a Muslim fellow shoemaker, but according to the text he had been fooled, and during t h | celebration of Easter in 1555. Nikola recanted and returned to Christianity. The "Muslim population attacked him for this apostacy; according to the sharia, apostasy entailed the death penalty, and the Muslims stoned him to death. Of the two neomartyrs from 16th century Sofia, Georgi became the most popular among the Orthodox when one judges according to the number of preserved life histories and representations on icons. Both martyrs' fates demonstrate Muslim repression of Christians, but this type of source is not a suitable basis on which to generalise. The martyr hagiographies are written by persons with a special link to Christianity and the Orthodox Church, and they both take place in Sofia, which as an Ottoman administrative center had a Muslim majority population at that time. This situation does not reflect the general diffusion of Islam in the Bulgarian areas, and therefore fails to reveal the general relationship between the religions. In widespread areas the structural inequality between Christians and Muslims was of a more theoretical character. Sofia and the other larger towns were special in terms of the population's religious composition and as centers of Ottoman Muslim urban culture. Also, Pop Pejo's and Matej Gramatik's biographies of saints, despite their primary scope were also evidence of a still vibrant Christendom in the second half of the 16th century. The church and Christians had generally not been victims of an Asiatic despotic regime of violence. This impression is confirmed by the German priest Stefan Gerlach, who in the summer of 1578 passes through Sofia on his way to Constantinople. In his diary, he noted twelve churches by name in Sofia and two Christian seminaries (1976 [1674] 1264). According to Gerlach, the Sofia bishopric contained three hundred churches, and the main church in Sofia had just been thoroughly restored with newly painted murals. In any event, the city's Christians in the 16th century were not only exposed to oppression and bloody punishments. The concrete examples cited here—the patriarchate in Tarnovo around 1393, the Rila monastery, Ivan Rilski's relics and the neomartyrs—each indicate differentiated conditions for the existence of Christianity under the Ottomans in the 14th to 16th century. As a supplement to these concrete historical examples, 40

S3

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

Christianity Before & Under the Ottomans

the diffusion of Islam, in contrast, contains the possibility to elucidate the Ottomans' religious policy more generally and in more quantifiable terms. As the question of conversion has an important place in the modern reception and historical impact of the Ottoman era in most of the Balkan successor states to the Ottoman empire—the process of national rebirth in the 1980s in Bulgaria was a noticeable derivative of this—conversion and demography are also key topics for understanding the relationship between Islam and Christianity in the 14th to 16th centuries.

Islam. The church buildings, saints' lives, religious monastic literature, etc. are not suited to quantitative analyses in the same way as the Ottoman registers. Only after the Second World War have the Ottoman registers been substantial­ ly included in the research, and the work of elucidating and utilising them is still far from completed. This situation is also due to the fact that accesstc^and pub­ lishing of Ottoman sources preserved in Turkey has been difficult. Due to polit­ ical tensions between Bulgaria and Turkey, Bulgarian researchers were for years forbidden access to the archives, but conditions of access were difficult for other European researchers as well (Kiel 1989)^The registers are the most significant new source material in the recent years' Research on the Ottoman history and social structure, since most chronicles and travel descriptions were already known in the mid-i9th centuries. The registers were drawn up according to fixed guidelines in intervals of thirty to forty years or when ever there were new conquests (İnalcık 1954:110i); they would be made in connection with the empire's tax demands and the military's needs for economic support. Hence, the registers also reveal the tax base and the tax revenues' distribution corresponding to the empire's social stratification into a producing group and a military and administrative group (Sugar 1977:31-55; Shaw 1976:112).The main part of the mil­ itary forces and the civil administration did not receive salary or payment in kind from the central authorities, The Sublime Porte in Istanbul, but directly from the producers. Hence, the sultan and the authorities had to have intimate knowledge of the tax base, which was therefore allocated to the officials and cavalry (sipahi) in the form offiefsin various size categories. This administrative system and the extensive use of Persian terminology would indicate that the Ottomans had founded their tax system on Persian or Seljuk models (İnalcık 1954:110).

6. C O N V E R S I O N AND D E M O G R A P H Y

The Ottoman conquest of the Balkans affected the distribution of religions in the area. The newly arrived conquerors and colonisers were Muslims, and con­ version of certain local Christian populations altered the previous situation characterized by Orthodox dominance in the central and southern half of the peninsula, Roman Catholicism towards the northwest, along the Adriatic coast and on several Greek islands, and marginal religious communities such as the Paulicians and Bogomils. Compared to the pattern of conversion in Islam's his­ tory since the 7th century, developments in the Balkans assumed a different character. The Christian population did not follow the general conversion pat­ terns from the Mediterranean regions and further east, where Islam after the Arab conquests developed from being the religion of the minority ruling group to the majority religion. In the Balkans, Islam, even after several centuries, never approached becoming the majority religion. When the Turks crossed the Dardanelles in the middle of the 14th century, the number of Muslims in the Balkans was insignificant. More sporadic con­ tacts between Islam and several Balkan peoples had existed prior to the Ottomans but without greater religio-historical consequences (Norris 1993). A process then began which, with significant regional variation, entailed that the Muslim population in the Ottoman Balkan provinces in the mid-i9th century constituted approximately or a bit over a third of the total population (Popovic i986b:3). Since the Muslims' relative and absolute share in the population showed significant regional variation, it is necessary to investigate the Muslim colonisation and the quantitative conversion to Islam in the concrete regions. In this connection, data is included from the predominantly Orthodox provinces in the southern Balkans. The most important source for the study of conversion and colonisation are the Ottoman land and tax registers. Neither the Orthodox communities nor the patriarchate in Constantinople have left us archives such as church records with which to quantitatively evaluate the extent of Christianity or conversion to 41

42

84

One of the first to utilise the registers as historical sources was the Turkish historian Ömer Lütfi Barkan: These registers (defter-i hâkemi) contain in thefirstinstance a listing of the empire's adult male population; the entry for each person states his father's name, his legal status, the duties and privileges of his economic or social position, and the extent of his land. The registers also give much informa­ tion regarding land use (arable, orchard, vineyard, rice-paddy), the num­ bers of mills, beehives, etc., and the estimatedfiscalvalue of these sources of revenue. Moreover, the information contained in the registers is not con­ fined to an agrarian inventory. There is information of the revenue from customs duties, markets, official weighing scales (with their locations, reg­ ulation and the volume of transactions effected),fisheriesand mines. The registers make it possible to establish the precise distribution of revenue as between imperial domain, military fiefs (timar), pious foundations and

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private property. In effect the registers were a cadastre offiefsand other land in which was entered the status of eachfiefwith a summary statement of its tenurial history. (1970:163).

Balkan area, just as crypto-Christianity in some areas and periods was a widespread phenomenon among ostensibly Muslim populations (Danova 1971; Kissling 1961; Skendi 1969).

Among the preserved Ottoman archives, two types of registers attract attention in connection with the study of the diffusion of the religions and patterns of conversion: the land and tax registers mentioned above and the frequently drawn up cizye registers which were kept by the local Islamic judge.« The cizye registers are found in two variants: (1) short summary calculations, and (2) detailed registers for each household. These two variants correspond to the land and tax registers, which also existed in summary and detailed forms. The registers are important for assessing the quantitative distribution of the empire's population according to religious affiliation, because the Ottoman administrative system distinguished between Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of juridical status and taxation. Non-Muslims were not subject to the sharia, but as zimmh were subjected to a poll tax, cizye. The early Ottoman cizye registers, however, indicate that the Ottomans did not demand the cizye as an actual individual poll tax, but as a tax imposed on each Christian household. A household did not constitute individuals under the same roof, but each family, even though several families lived together. In the rural areas, however, there is an observed tendency for the household head to be responsible for the poll tax payments of several cohabiting families (inalcik and Quataert 1994:25). The Ottoman registers mentioned here thus allow the possibility to follow changes in the taxable inhabitants' religious affiliation, as the chronology of the registers provides a portrait of the relative proportions of Christians and Muslims in a given area. However, the registers cannot contribute to an understanding of what conversion to Islam entails in a broader sense, i.e., beyond the formal act of conversion. This problem is especially interesting in connection with Islam, where the connection between the religious, social and political spheres emphasises the character of conversion as both a religious and social event. However, this limitation is a weakness of the source material. It is a source only to the study of quantitative tendencies and has a tendency to represent religion as a dogmatic, well-defined unity, and conversion as a similarly welldefined transition from Christianity to Islam. Conversion was a social and cultural process (cf. Vryonis 1972:168) under which a popular and Christian influenced religiosity could continue to exist among people who had formally converted to Islam. The theological and cultic distinctions between Christianity and Islam were in practice often less clear, and syncretic tendencies such as worship of common saints between Christians and Muslims is known from the

86

7. CONVERSION IN T H E 15TH AND 16TH C E N T U R I E S

The Ottoman land and tax register archives suffered heavy damages due to deficient preservation and due to cassation during periods of administrative and military decline, thus giving the preserved archives numerous geographic and chronological lacunae. The lack of care is also linked to the fact that after the drawing up a new register, the old on\ was without practical value for the Ottoman administration. Thus no regions within the Bulgarian territory contain unbroken sequences of records. However, on the basis of the existing registers and fragments of others, it is possible to form a general impression of the extent of Islam and to estimate the degree to which the registered Muslims were of Turkish origin or Christian converts. The Muslim population in the Bulgarian areas constituted in its entirety a proportion roughly corresponding to the average in the Ottoman core provinces in the Balkan peninsula, i.e., excepting Transylvania, Moldavia, Wallachia and Ragusa (Dubrovnik). The proportions range from a non-existent or entirely minuscule Muslim population prior to the Ottoman conquest to about 26% Muslims according to the somewhat uncertain census after the union of the Principality of Bulgaria and eastern Rumelia in 1885 (Sanders 1934. Crampton 1990 and Popovic i986b:70-79)- The statistics require two caveats. First, part of the Muslim population retreated together with the Ottoman administration and army following the Turkish defeat at the hands of the Russians in the Crimean War of 1877-78; their exact number is not known. Second, there is no clarity concerning the categorisation of the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) in the first census following the achievement of political autonomy. When the Ottoman administration departed from the lost provinces in 1878, it left behind several registers. The archives were increased in 1931, when the Bulgarian State Archives purchased a large amount of registers from the Turkish authorities. Most of the material is today housed in the Oriental Department of the National Library in Sofia, while smaller collections can be found in local archives and at monasteries, etc. The massive task of registering the 500,000 Ottoman items and making them accessible, not to mention the problem of publication, is not yet completed. The archives cover a time span of five centuries and a geographic area which extends towards the west, beyond the borders of modern Bulgaria. They contain much more than the registers mentioned here in the form of law books, legal protocols, decrees from the Porte and

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correspondence. Prior to the Second World War, work with these archival sources was limited because of the small number of researchers possessing suf­ ficient philological expertise, but this situation has since improved. Analysis and publication of the Ottoman sources has therefore proceeded slowly. Some of the first published documents from the 15th and 16th centuries were those from the Rila monastery on detailing land rights or offices and decrees from the sultan (Dzansazov 1891). The scientific standards in the early source publica­ tions and source translations vary in quality (Kabrda 1951:333; 1969:19 and Stojanov 1987:305; cf. also Mihajlova-Mravkarova and Stajnova 1987). The Ottoman source material is chronologically uneven with the early 15th century being generally poor in archival sources. This also applies to the taxa­ tion and land registers, where the eldest preserved from the Balkans stems from 1431-32 and concerns the sancak Arvanit in Albania; concerning the Bulgarian areas, two detailed tax registers from 1445 and 1455 are preserved only in frag­ ments (Turski 1966). From the era after the 15th century, the amount of pre­ served source materials increases, and the 18th and 19th centuries are the best covered. This situation, however, does not make it impossible to try and deter­ mine tendencies towards change in the diffusion of the religious affiliation in the early centuries of Ottoman rule. The eldest preserved poll tax register which includes the Christian popula­ tion in the entire Balkans is located in the National Library in Sofia. Nikolaj Todorov (1959-60) and StraSimir Dimitrov (1965,1980b), in elder works, have incorporated the register's information, and in the second half of the 1980s the comprehensive material became accessible in its entirety (Turski 1986:21-128; Todorov and Velkov 1988). The register was composed in 1489-91 and together with a tax register drawn up in the period 1520-30, provides a basis for assess­ ing the extent of conversion. The data show that the personal tax base in the first half of the 16th century in the Balkans consisted of 832,707 Christian and 194,958 Muslim households (the information on the Jewish community is left out here). The Muslim popu­ lation thus constituted under 20% more than a century after the most impor­ tant phase of conquest had ended. Information from the registers also shows the uneven distribution of Christians and Muslims. At this time, the Balkan territo­ ry was divided into 28 administrative districts (sancaks) and twelve larger towns. It should be remarked that 85% of the total Muslim population dwelled in only ten of the 28 districts. The Bulgarian sancaks were Pasa, Sofia, Kjustendil, Vidin, Nikopol, Silistra, Vize and Cirmen, and the towns were Sofia and Nikopol. The percentage distribution between Muslim and Christian households was: 44

45

88

SANCAK

CHRISTIANS %

MUSLIMS %

74-o 94.0 89.5 95-6 78.0 28.0 44-0 U-o

26.0 6.0 i°-5 4-6 22.0 720 56.0 89.0

33.6 62.3

66.4 37-7

Paşa Sofia Kjustendil Vidin Nikopol Silistra Vize Cirmen

X

v

TOWN

Sofia Nikopol

The figures show a high concentration of Muslims in the southern and eastern parts of the Bulgarian areas and also indicate that the Muslim population in Sofia constituted an urban culture located within a predominantly Christian district. Sofia was an administrative and military center located on the great army route between Constantinople and the Morava valley; it was the seat of the highest Ottoman official in the Balkans, the beylerbey. In Sofia the Muslim share of the population tended to increase. A register drawn up in 1570-71 indicates that the Christian population group's relative share had fallen further in the course of the 16th century; in 1570-71 they constituted 18% (Kiel 199^:506). The question of the population's religious affiliation in absolute figures is more difficult to answer because of the Ottoman practice of calculating in terms of households. Omer Lutfi Barkan calculates with a factor of five, assuming that an average household contained five persons (1957:21). The calculation factor of five has won acceptance, and the calculation of absolute figures takes place especially when the registers are used for historical demographic and ethnodemographic studies (Ivanova 1987). However, the records are not genuine cen­ suses, in that they indicate only an inventory of the tax base. In addition, there exists no basis of comparison because beyond uncertain estimates, one cannot determine the population's size prior to the Ottomans' arrival. That the registers are not censuses is also underscored by the fact that all the tax exempt groups are not included in it. Muslims with occupations connected with mosques, schools and the Juridical institution, the Janissaries and the cavalry troops, etc. were not required to pay taxes, and the same was true for those Christians with duties such as pass and road surveillance, voluntary armed forces, peasants on 46

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religious endowments, the higher clergy and slaves. It is difficult to estimate the ; extent of this tax-exempt share of the Christian population, but it has probably I constituted at least 10-15% of the total Christian population (S. Dimitrov • 19803:209; cf. also Grozdanova 1986, 1987). Another factor of uncertainty • derives from the fact that the Christians can have sought to avoid registration, as it was connected with tax payments {Istorija na Bdigarija 4:74); nor do we know how accurate the Ottoman officials were in registration, including whether they could have set the number of Christians too high in order to increase the tax base. These weaknesses in the source material only make it possible to estimate the relative distribution of the population's confessional affiliation, while calculating in absolute figures is too uncertain (cf. Todorov 1972:280. i Hristo Gandev's 1972 monograph on the Bulgarian people in the 15th centu- • ry, Balgarsk ata narodnost prez XV vek. Demografsko x etnografsko izsledvane ] ("The Bulgarian Nationality in the 15th century: Demographic and Ethno- ] graphic Study"), contains a notable example of the fallacious conclusions which ' can be generated when the necessary precautions with the sources are not observed. Gandev compares the tax registers with other sources on depopula- tion, and on this basis calculates that the Bulgarian population suffered a loss of 680,000 persons as a direct result of the Ottoman conquest. Gandev speaks of a demographic disaster which led to as much as 40% of the Bulgarian population either dying or disappearing from the area. He projects that without this loss, Bulgaria in 1972 would have contained around 13 million persons instead of the then current population of nearly 9 million (1972:117,131). Shortly after the publication of the book, Hristov Gandev was criticised for methodological weaknessses, and when in 1989 the State publishing house Nauko i izkustvo ("Science and Art") posthumously reissued the book, it was re-edited. In the new foreword, Cvetana Georgieva explains the book's merits as well as the uncertainty connected with the Ottoman registers such they are unsuited to precise demographic studies. Therefore, in the new edition the publishers reduced Gandev's calculation of population loss from 680,000 to 36o,ooo. All of Gandev's intermediate calculations are simply nearly halved (cf. the 1972 edition on p. 100 to the 1989 edition p. 110); passages where Gandev emphasises the demographic loss of 680,000 persons are entirely left out (cf. 1972 edition p. 103). In her foreword, Georgieva fully agrees that the registers cannot be used to calculate demographic changes in absolute figures. But cutting Gandev's figures in half does not change the fact that his study, in both the 1972 and 1989 editions, includes such calculations; the figures in the 1989 edition are simply lower. They can be 680,000 or 360,000 or something else; yet as mentioned, the sources are simply not sufficient to carry out the absolute calculations. ;

:

;

;

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The value of the registers, rather, is that they can be used to determine that the Muslim presence slowly increased in the 15th and 16th centuries, that the Muslims were unevenly distributed, and that the following centuries exhibited a continued tendency towards slow relative growth in the Muslirh population in the Bulgarian areas. With the exceptions of Bosnia and Albania, theNsame tendencies repeat themselves in the entire Orthodox area in the Balkans, a phenomenon confirmed by the research on religious change processes in the Balkans conducted in recent decades. Two topics emerge in this connection: the origins of the Muslims and the causes,of the Christians' conversion. The two topics are closely related because interest in the Muslim population's origins concerns how large a part of the Muslims were of Turkish origin and had arrived in the Balkans as soldiers, administrators, as part of religious institutions or as colonists. The remainder of this group, with a small margin of statistical error constituted by Jews, Bogomils, etc., must have been converted Christians and their descendants. The causes of the conversion can be discussed using a "push/pull" model: what attracted people to Islam, and what pushed them to renounce Christianity? In this connection, there is also the question of concrete conversion processes: mass conversions, degree of volition or force, and the removal of Christian boy children (devsirme), for service in the Janissary corps or the imperial administration. 49

30

The above-mentioned register from 1520-30 contains information on Turkish nomads and Tatars in the Balkans, i.e., Muslim population groups which with certainty stem from colonisation. At the time, they constituted 37.435 out of 194,958 Muslim households, and about 19% of the entire population (Barkan i957:33)- There is no evidence as to how the settlement patterns of these groups evolved, but they presumably did not renounce their nomadic life to any significant degree prior to the 17th century. In extension of these assumptions, the early nomads did not constitute any significant part of the remaining 81% Muslims. Naturally, a part of this Muslim population must be of Turkish origin, e.g., peasants, soldiers and administrators, but with the sizable segment of taxexempt households, it is difficult to determine the share any more precisely. Speros Vryonis estimates that about half the Muslims in the Balkans in the early 16th century were of Turkish origin, while the remainder were a result of conversions (1972:165). Nikolaj Todorov, in his analysis of the cizye register from 1489-91, refrains from making an estimate of the distribution between ethnicTurkish Muslims and converts, but concludes that the share of Muslims cannot be explained by the demonstrated number of Muslims transferred from Asia Minor, which means that a significant portion of the Balkan Muslims must stem from conversion (Todorov and Velkov 1988:33, cf. also Ivanova 1987:163).

Christianity Before & Under the Ottomans

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

The combination of colonisation and conversion can be found again in the i Bulgarian areas. StraSimir Dimitrov (1980b), in an important article in which he \ \incorporates several registers, has demonstrated how entire areas and villages : S disappear out of the poll tax registers during the 16th century. Analyses of the 1 f I registers provides indications as to the composition of the Muslim population \groups, but as only limited portions of the original number of registers are pre­ [ served, there exists uncertainly about general developments in the patterns of conversion. Small glimpses can be found, however. Ronald Jennings has calcu­ lated a conversion rate for the year 1490-91 for the entire Balkans of 0.04% ! : . (1978:241, note 30), and Machel Kiel, using a 1570 register about Sofia, has found 1_ İ an annual growth among the city's Muslim population of 0.91% and among the ; ?• Christians of just 0.32%; one of the causes of the lower Christian growth rate "< must be conversion (199^:506). The question of the origins of the Muslim population cannot be answered .; exhaustively on the basis of the existing sources, but it is clear that the Muslims were a mixture of immigrating Turkish and indigenous populations. The regis­ : ters also show that both the Turkish Muslims and the converts in the early phase of Ottoman rule over the Bulgarian areas were concentrated in the towns along : -. the military route from Edirne to Sofia, often in pockets in territories with pre- ? dominantly Christian populations, and in the southeastern regions. This is , linked to the location of these areas close to the Ottoman domains in Asia Minor, and that these areas and their populations had suffered heavy losses dur- , ing the Byzantine civil wars and Turkish campaigns of conquest in the 14th cen­ tury. Thrace was largely depopulated after the border wars between the \ Bulgarians and the Byzantines and the pillaging by Catalan mercenary soldiers \ I and by the Turks. The eastern Bulgarian territories lay in ruins after the Tatar : : incursions, and the steppes in Thessaly and Macedonia were thinly populated (Kiel 1979:19)- The decimation of the original inhabitants in these areas paved the way for the transfer of the Turkish populations, while Turkish colonisation of the other Balkan territories was much less extended. !" :

:

;

:

8. E X P L A I N I N G CONVERSION

On the basis of the information provided by the registers, the question arises as to why the Christians converted to Islam. One explanatory model takes its point of departure in the Christians' economic status. In principle, all land and prop¬ erty conquered by the Ottomans was transferred to the Sultan and to Muslim owners, and the Christians were subjected to an extra tax burden via the poll tax, cizye. The Christians' economic status could be improved by converting to Islam (cf. Vryonis 1972:167; I975a:i35:1990) though research has been unable to

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clarify the extent to which the poll tax was a heavy burden on the Christians, who in return were exempted from the Muslim religious tax, zakat. Conversion in order to ease the tax burden may seem to be a convincing argument, but it is notable that the tax system can also be used to explain lack of conversion. The weak degree of Islamisation in many areas could just as well be explained by Ottoman opposition to allowing the Christian populations to convert and avoid the poll tax (cf Kissling 1961:19; 1964:48; Filipovic 1978:313i)- The poll tax can thus be interpreted as both motivating conversion because Christians could avoid the tax, and preventing conversion because the Ottoman administration was dependent on tax incomes. As a structural cause which led to conversion, economic status is not convincing. However, this does not exclude that it could have been a causal factor in specific situations and regions. Another explanatory model emphasises the incentive to conversion derived from Christians' socialy and juridicaly subordinate position in an Islamic empire (cf. Vryonis 19753:135). Complete social equality was conditioned on being Muslim, and access to the military class and the leading social layers gradually became reserved for Muslims. There seems to be good evidence that this situation led to conversions. Immediately after the Ottoman conquest, a part of the Christian nobility entered the military and administrative system, and during the 15th century this nobility group converted (İnalcık 1954:116; 1973:1140. This is an important example of how a class in acculturation to new conditions could maintain its social position. According to this explanation, there lay within the social structure an incentive to conversion, and, it should be noted, ultimately a voluntary incentive compared to the forced conversion which occurred via the devşirme. The same structural element recurs in the leg¬ islation on marriage. Muslim men could have Christian wives, while Christian men were forbidden from having Muslim wives; their male children became Muslims (Vryonis 1975:143)Both the legal and social perspectives on conversion are important in eluci­ dating the social dimensions of the formal act of conversion (Bulliet i979:33)Alongside the structural explanatory models with their emphasis on social, economic and juridical differences between Muslims and Christians there exist more specific causes, such as a weak church structure as in Bosnia and Albania and Sufi and Bektashi orders among the Janissaries. With their syncretic fea­ tures such orders could attract Christians. Both types of explanations con¬ tribute insights, but they belong to different levels, and one can usefully combine the structural and specific explanations into historical and religio-historical analyses of concrete Islamisation processes. 51

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

9. T H E P E R S I S T E N C E OF C H R I S T I A N I T Y

The explanation for how Christianity and a Christian religious culture could continue under the Ottomans lies in the social and legal framework under which Christianity existed: i.e., the Ottoman juridical and administrative system with its limitations and possibilities. The administration and organisation of non-Muslims assumed fixed form only after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. The early phase of the Ottoman conquest of the Orthodox areas in the Balkans is thus characterized by the same chaos as in Asia Minor. In this period, the local political organisation collapsed and the Christian institutions were weakened. In Tarnovo, the nobility and patriarch were removed in 1393; but in 1402, for example, the Rila monastery had its earlier privileges confirmed, and after being restored the monastery was treated along the same lines as Islamic endowments. The striking lack of traces of Christian culture in the first half of the 15th century (manuscripts, architecture and murals) indicates harsh conditions for Christians and their institutions, even though it is difficult to determine whether the lack of traces is due to the depressing but predictable consequences of war or is more specifically associated with the conquerors' Islamic background. This period saw an Islamisation tendency among the Christian population in the cities, as indicated by the proportion of Muslims in the total population, which according to registers of the 15th century could not have derived solely from Ottoman colonisation. The situation in the towns deviated from the social situation experienced by Christians in the rural areas. In the towns, Christianity was accepted, but there was also a continuing encounter and collision with Islam, and many towns obtained Muslim majority populations. In the rural areas, on the other hand, it is more difficult to speak of a religious encounter/collision between Islam and Christianity, as they came into contact with each other to only a limited degree. Even with these local variations, the conversion tendency also became generally reduced in contrast to the foregoing Islamisation and Turkification process in Asia Minor. The explanation for this can be found in the decisive change in the status of the Patriarchate of Constantinople after 1453-54. During the conquest, the Ottomans had as one of their goals the elimination of churches which were organically linked to political powers. In the Bulgarian territories, until the conquest of Constantinople and the installation of the Patriarch Gennadius, the population was effectively without a religious leadership and functioning church organisation. Subsequently, what remained of the Tarnovo patriarchate was integrated into the ecumenical patriarchate, which after the fall of the Byzantine empire was no longer allied with a political enemy. From the sultan's perspective, the patriarchate had become an institution with

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which he could collaborate. This also changed the conditions in the Bulgarian areas: churches were again built, the Christian culture continued in public and conversion became a very slow process. From 1454 there be^an a transition from unstructured and random conditions to zimmi status within an ethnically indifferent, but religiously stratified social structure. " The possibilities for Christians within the Ottoman social, juridical and administrative system for non-Muslims was thus clarified in the mid-isfh century, but Ottoman religious policy also contained limits derived from the imperial structures' religious lines of division^nd the uneven power relations which existed between Christians and Muslims^nd their religious institutions. By the late 15th and early 16th centuries, the Ottoman empire's Islamic character was reinforced, and this was reflected in the stratification of the population along the two lines of demarcation: occupation and religion (Sugar 1977:31-33)- The first distinction set the sultan, the Porte, the bureaucracy, the military and the Muslim clergy and legal scholars against the tax-producing classes of peasants, merchants and craftsmen (raya). Access to the first group was conditioned on being Muslim and reflected the fundamental Islamic distinction between the power-wielding Muslims and the non-Muslims. The second distinction was based on religion, and could be found among the raya population, where nonMuslims were juridically disadvantaged and differentiated in taxation. Between the raya population and the bureaucracy, religious affiliation constituted the only distinction, and conversion therefore entailed the possibility for social mobility: most of the grand viziers, for example, were not of Turkish origin and especially the Janissary corps was in the early period composed of non-Turks. These social differences have operated to promote conversion. 52

v

The consequence of the Ottoman empire's religio-pohtical system after 1454 was that during the five centuries of Ottoman rule, the Balkans experienced large-scale waves of Islamisation in only geographically limited and historically specific cases such as Bosnia, Albania and the Rhodopes. The Balkans were not the arena for such comprehensive religio-historical changes as is known from the early Islamic conquests, and including Asia Minor. The explanation lies in the millet system, which along with its permanent character operated as a brake on conversions, or as Machiel Kiel formulates it: It was the relative tolerance of Islam, solidly anchored in Islamic theology, that allowed the survival of Christianity as such, including its ecclesiastical hierarchy, monasticism and religious art. The paradox between the ideals of the Ghazi state and the survival of non-Muslim religions and cultures is not a real one and rests on insufficient knowledge of the basic tenets of Islam.... Besides the officially allowed Ottoman tolerance

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towards other religions there was a 'soupless coutumiere' that varied with the political necessity of the moment and the friendly or hostile relations between the various communities. (1985:351)."

: sion towards the Christian subjects, who were viewed as objects of conscious forced Islamisation. In pursuing this theme, we ended up asking the question, "True or false?" Up to now we have followed the first of the two paths sketched out in the second chapter, i.e., that path which concentrates on the results in the form of a critical analysis of the historical sources. The conclusion here must be that the portrait of Islam and the Ottomans' religious policy described by the catastrophe theory cannot be maintained. Hence, the basis for the religio-historical and historical legitimacy behind the process of national rebirth also dissolves. The relationship between Christianity and Islam was more complex than the national ideological portrait rendered of the Ottoman empire and of Islam by Bulgarian historiography. We have especially concerned ourselves with sources from the 14th to 16th centuries, but the rates of conversion and indications of Christianity's continued vitality demonstrate that later developments did not substantially deviate from this, even though the dissolution of the Ottoman empire from the late 18th century due to internal and external pressures also brought difficult times for the Christian subjects. The catastrophe theory and the campaign behind the process of national rebirth were expressly opposed to Ottoman rule and Islam. In contrast, the Orthodox Church was depicted as a shield and maintainer of national consciousness and identity among the Christian Bulgarians. This aspect of the research paradigm thus points out to the connection between religion and national identity, which the political apparatus and the ideal of a single Bulgarian socialist nation embodied in the process of national rebirth sought to break among the Turkish population. This group was to cast off its Turkish sense of identity which was connected to its religious affiliation. The policy towards the Turks in Bulgaria can be contrasted with the attitude and concrete policy of the socialist regime towards the country's largest religious community, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. In harmony with the regime's church policy, official historiography supported the image of the church and of Orthodox culture as creators of national continuity and as bastions of the people's heroic struggle against the oppressors. During nearly 50 years of atheist rule, the socialist authorities thus followed a double policy towards the church: praising it as a national institution, while restricting the church as a religious community. As political ideology, socialism is wholly alien and fundamentally hostile to communities of believers and to religions. On closer examination, however, the relationship between socialism and Christianity shows more than this ostensible relation of contradiction. In examining socialist Bulgaria's process of national rebirth in the context of the church, insights are gained into the relationship between the political system, religion and national identity.

Here it is important to note that the millet system could not create the foundation for ethnic identity/survival, inasmuch as the system in its classical period was ethnically indifferent. The millet system created only the legal and social framework for continued survival of Christianity in an empire without nation¬ al or ethnic divisions. 10. SUMMARY

Research into the religious encounter/collision under the Ottomans has placed great priority on the question of conversion and on the origins of the Muslim population in the Balkans. Yet this has also entailed the neglect of another problem: what structural and historical causes lay behind the widespread maintenance of the Orthodox communities? While there is no doubt that conversion to Islam took place, it is highly relevant to inquire why so few Christians converted. This fact is more surprising than the relatively small numbers who actually did convert. With a point of departure in Speros Vryonis' qualified estimate that about half the Muslim population in the Balkans derived from converts, by the mid-ipth century under 20% of the total Balkan population had converted or were descended from converted ancestors. In the early 16th century, for example, less than 10% of the total original inhabitants in the predominantly Bulgarian districts had converted. This low rate of conversion is unique in the history of Islam. A century of Ottoman domination over the core areas in the Balkans produced a rate of conversion under 10%, after four centuries of less than 20%. In this light, we must conclude that with the powers at their disposal, the Ottomans did not consciously seek to convert the Christian Orthodox populations. The most essential structural explanation behind the low rate of conversion can be found in the Ottoman-Islamic social and religio-political system. Two chapters have now discussed the conditions for the "people of the Book" in the period whereby Islam was established and the adaptation of the Islamic normative legacy in the Ottoman empire's religious policy towards the Orthodox population before and after the fall of Constantinople. Ottoman religious policy was thereby viewed in its practice using empirical data from the Bulgarian area, including data on church structure, monastic history, martyrs and conversion. These chapters followed as an extension of the second chapter describing Bulgaria's process of national rebirth in the 1980s and the critique of the catastrophe theory research paradigm, which in Bulgaria's politically controlled historiography portrayed Islam as an Ottoman instrument of oppres-

96

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The socialist system's interference into the life of the religious communities was a means by which the regime denied and removed a legitimate role for these communities in politics, public debate and social policy (Ramet and Treadgold 1995:5)- Atheistic agitation was intented to eliminate the spread of religion and obviate the search for it on the individual level. At the same time as this fundamental rejection of religion took place, however, the communist party built up a special relationship to the Orthodox Church, a relationship that was closely connected with the development of a national socialism/communism (Ramet 1991:68). The party considered the church to be a national institution, and this ideological combination of socialism, national ideology and religion is a characteristic feature having its foundation in Bulgaria's history as an Ottoman successor state. The relationship between church and state in the post-war period followed a kind of secularised millet line of thinking. National and religious characteristics were linked as an expression of the Orthodox Church's national significance. As for the country's Turks, however, the regime's national homogenization strategy sought to break the link between religion and national identity. Here the communist party followed an attenuated and transformed variant of an idea which stemmed from the 19th century's millet system and nationbuilding, when Orthodox Christianity was a marker of Bulgarian national identity (Tafradjiski, Radoeva and Minev 1992:209), while Islam served to denote Turkish identity. In the 20th century, this idea has been expressed in the widespread overlap between religious and national affiliation in the Orthodox dominated Balkan. These are viewed largely as synonymous, and both the religious communities and changing political systems have acted in relation to this linking together of religion, politics and national ideology. In extension of this, the next chapter traces the causes behind the political ideological interest in the historical disciplines under socialism; the point of departure is the socialist regime's policy towards the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the means by which this policy sought national and religio-historical legitimation.

98

\

tx 5 s* THE

BULGARIAN

ORTHODOX CHURCH

UNDER

SOCIALISM

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Orthodox

Church

was separated from the state. After a period of transition, the church

With the communist

achieved

an accommodation

with the authorities,

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Catholics, Jews and Protestants. Church as an institution

and this distinguished

in the self-understanding

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cially during the period of Ottoman domination, function

the develop-

the smaller religious communities mission,

a view which found

of the church leadership. This interpretation

of the church under the Ottomans

reflects the strong

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between national identity and religious affiliation since the 19th century.

1. S C H I S M

N MAY 19TH, 1992, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church {BdlgarskaPravoslavna Carkva) fragmented. In the wake of the conflict in the synod in Sofia and in the church leadership, Metropolitan Pimen of Nevrokop and a smaller circle of metropolitans and bishops formed a dissident group. This fraction declared several members of the synod, along with Maksim, patriarch since 1971, to be occupying their offices illegally and the entire synod as being without canonical authority. With the approval of the National Assembly's Committee for Religious Affairs, the dissident group installed a competing synod, and a schism was a reality (Broun 1993; Stoyanowitsch 1996). Over the following weeks and months the conflict between the two synods, their leadership and followers was a major focus of public attention. Among the rebels, Hristofor Sabev distinguished himself. After receiving an education in the natural sciences, he had become a monk, and through his engagement in

O

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church Under Socialism

political opposition groups had since 1988 expressed his dissatisfaction with both the church's leadership and with the situation of Orthodoxy in Bulgaria. From the winter of 1989-90, Sâbev had been a colourful and prominent representative within the democratic opposition, known as the Union of Democratic Forces (Sàjuz na demokratiâeski sili, SDS), opposing the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) and its successor, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). In the spring of 1992, Sàbev and several supporters, with tacit support from the government, which by that time was no longer being led by the socialist party, initiated a* physical occupation of the Holy Synod building in the centre of Sofia. Later on, the Theological Academy was occupied, physical fights broke out between the groups, the courts became involved, Patriarch Maksim's participation in religious services was being disrupted by booing from the crowd, and vicious conflicts over church property, seminaries, and monasteries broke out. Before the eyes of an increasingly puzzled public, the confrontation between the synods accelerated, and along with it the conflict between the two Orthodox churches. These conflicts derived from a radical and deep-going conflict regarding the position, tactics and behaviour of the Orthodox Church and of the Holy Synod since the Second World War and especially after the communist take-over in 1946-47. The core of the conflict centred upon the consequences for the church's leadership due to the altered political situation following the fall of Todor Zivkov on November 10th, 1989, and on how the church should confront its past compromises and collaboration with the communist regime. Had the church betrayed its ideals and statutes? Had it gone too far in adapting to the ruling communists? Should church leaders ask for forgiveness? Or had the existing church leaders compromised themselves to such a great degree that they had to leave their posts? These and other critical questions arose in late 1989, while the patriarch and most other church leaders remained passive and were largely unprepared for and disoriented by the political changes. With the sharply antagonisms regarding politics and church policy in 1992, following the opposition's narrow electoral victory in the autumn of 1991, a small circle of critical church people found support in the leading oppositional movement, SDS. Beneath the personal ambitions and settling of accounts, there lay as stated, the fundamental conflict as to how the Orthodox Church had acted as a church during the socialist order in confrontation with an atheistic state. The basis of the conflict was that during most of the socialist period, the Orthodox Church and the state/communist party had not stood in a classical oppositional relationship between religion and scientific atheism. An analysis of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church's legal situation and of the relationship between the communists and the church leadership shows that the communists were in an

ambivalent relation with the church. The ambivalence, accepted by the church leadership, consisted of the state and party on the one hand valuing and treasuring the Orthodox Church as a national and patriotic institution in the people's history, while on the other hand opposing and subverting the church as a religious institution by measures such as reducing the number of priests, posing obstacles to the social and economic life of believers, and preventing the construction of church buildings in the rapidly growing suburban neighbourhoods, along with general state support and promotion of an anti-religious society.

54

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2. T H E L E G A L FOUNDATION

V

There are three key legal texts specifying the Bulgarian Orthodox Churches rights and limitations under socialism, and in a broader sense the rights of religious freedom and religious communities in general in Bulgaria. Firstly the Constitution of December 4th, 1947 (the "Dimitrov Constitution," drafted according to the Soviet model) laid the foundation for the socialist economy, ensured the leading role of the communist party, and eliminated the monarchy following the 1946 referendum. The second document is the constitution from May 18th, 1971, an adaptation of the Dimitrov constitution to a new phase in the development of socialist society. Finally the Law on Religious Communities was passed by Bulgaria's National Assembly in late February 1949- These constitutional and juridical texts reflect the political and ideological lines towards the Orthodox Church which communist leader Georgi Dimitrov (1882-1949) formulated in a programmatic speech at the Rila monastery in May 1946. For all the religious communities, the constitution of 1947 meant that Bulgaria followed the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries by constitutionally guaranteeing freedom of religious thought and practice (Bâlgarski konstitucii 1990:37-54; Blaustein and Flanz 1992). The constitution also separated church and state (art. 78) and herein lay the decisive break with the 1879 Târnovo Constitution, in which the Orthodox faith was termed the country's "dominant" religion and which established special relations between the ruling dynasty and the church. The Dimitrov constitution also forbid misuse of the church or of religion for political purposes and outlawed the creation of religiously-based political organisations (art. 78). The same article contained a paragraph which held out the possibility of a genuine law on juridical status, economic conditions and regulatory provisions for the religious communities. This paragraph was realised with the Law on Religious Communities, which took effect on March 1st, 1949. In addition, the constitution stipulated that only civil marriages were valid (art. 76), that the sole teaching authority was the state, that school instruction would be carried out secularly and in a democratic and

JOI

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

progressive spirit, and that private schools could operate only on the basis of more detailed legislation and under state control (art.79). With the Law on Religious Communities from 1949, the entire extent of the constitutional initiatives lay clear » While certainly more specific than the constitution, the law contained no definition of "religious community" or "church." It began by reiterating the basic conditions of religious freedom and separation of church and state. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church was cited as the traditional religious community in Bulgaria, as was its connection with the country's history. Only the Orthodox Church was mentioned by name. As such, in form, content and spirit, it could be a popular democratic church (art. 3) but beyond this, the Orthodox Church was in all other articles placed on equal footing with other religious communities. The articles that followed confirmed the right of the religious communities to hold religious services, the requirement to respect religious customs, organisational autonomy, right to build houses of worship, to conduct meeting activities and to carry out theological training of priests. Churches no longer operate hospitals, children's homes, or other charitable institutions. For all rights, the law required that the activities of the religious community should take place with attention to the public order and good customs, that they should follow the general laws and the authorities' administrative decisions This latter provision was an especially flexible paragraph which placed all rights and freedoms of the religious communities under the control of the authorities, The law established the Council of Ministers as the certifying authority for all religious communities, and it established a Directorate for Religious Affairs under the Foreign Ministry. The Directorate later became the Committee for Questions Concerning Bulgaria's Orthodox Church and the Religious Cults (Komiteta po vâprosite na Bâlgarska Pravoslavna Cârkva i religioznite kultove), and its chairman had the rank of deputy minister. These organs attained great importance for the subsequent activities of the religious communities. In this formulation lay a clear limitation on the formal separation of state and church, with the state ensuring its control over the internal and external life of the religious communities. All the religious communities had to register with the Council of Ministers or with a designated representative (art. 6), while day-today administration was left to the Directorate for Religious Affairs. The Directorate was responsible for certain matters which clearly limited the autonomy of the rehgtous communities and their free development possibilities, in that it had the power to certify priests in those religious communities having organisational links to foreign countries (art. 9), review all correspondence, circulars and other documents with the right to withhold or censor them (art. 15)! approve contacts and economic transactions with foreign countries (art. 22 and

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The Bulgarian Orthodox Church Under Socialism

24), review the budgets of the religious communities, and it is mentioned that the government could choose to support the religious community financially (art. 13). However, it was especially article 12 that ensured the government's and the state's influence on the religious communities. The article stated that every clergyman or other person employed by a religious community could4>e suspended or permanently dismissed on orders of the head of the Directorate. Such an order must be unconditionally followed and would be utilised in cases where the relevant individual, regardless of rank, violated the law, public order and acceptable behaviour or worked against the spate's democratic order and institutions. The 1949 Law on Religious Communities remained in force after the adoption of the new constitution in 1971. which did not fundamentally change the activities, rights or duties of the Orthodox Church within the framework of the socialist republic. However, the elimination of a passage on the rights of national minorities to develop their national culture had consequences especially for the Turkish-Muslim population. Articles 38 and 53 repeat the content of the Dimitrov constitution's articles 76, 78 and 79. hut beyond this, the 1971 constitution contained some amendments which pointed towards a stricter ideological line towards the church as a religious institution. Article 38 mentions parents' rights and duty to manage their children's upbringing and communist education. Article 39 stated that the upbringing of the youth in a communist spirit was an obligation of the entire society, and article 45 emphasized modern science and Marxist Leninist ideology as basis of the educational system. The new constitution also specified the state teaching system's ideological basis in relation to the 1949 Law on Religion, in which article 20 had mentioned that schooling was a state task which lay outside the sphere of influence of the religious communities. Finally, the right to participate in religious rituals was supplemented by an associated right to spread and attend anti-religious agitation. Moreover, it is stressed that the reference to religion could not free one from the obligation to uphold the constitution as well as all other laws (art. 53)56

The legal texts on the relationship between the state, the communist party and the Orthodox Church ensured the church's legality, but also introduced state administrative control and governance while simultaneously marginalising the church from social and political life. This marginalisation of the church from the public to the private sphere was apparently modified by the provision from the Law on Religious Communities regarding the church's possibility to become a popular democratic church. It is precisely here that we see reflected the aforementioned distinction, otherwise formulated through the lens of the communist party, between the church as historical and national institution and Orthodox religion as a suspect ideology. This is emphasised by the 1971 consti-

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

tution's more hostile attitude towards the church's religious dimension, in which the communist party and the state reaffirmed the right to follow an atheistic world-view and obligated both parents and society to practice a communist/ atheistic upbringing of children and youth. The distinction between the church's national and religious dimensions was formulated in 1946 by Georgi Dimitrov, when he laid the foundations for the socialist state's acceptance and even support of the church as a national institution. This acceptance and support occurred along with the efforts of the state, in harmony with the traditional socialist atheism, to limit the church's possibilities to spread the word of God and the Christian way of life. 3. G E O R G I D I M I T R O V AND T H E B U L G A R I A N O R T H O D O X C H U R C H

On May 26th, 1946, the millennial commemoration of the death of St Ivan Rilski was celebrated in the Rila monastery. The communist leader and president of the Central Committee of the Fatherland Front, Georgi Dimitrov, participated together with prominent guests in the commemorative event. On this occasion Dimitrov gave a speech which appeared under the title "The Bulgarian Church's Role and Tasks" (Roljata izadalite na bdlgarskata ctirkva).™ Only six months previously, Dimitrov had returned to Bulgaria from which he had fled in 1923 after the failed communist rebellion that same year. During his exile in the Soviet Union, Dimitrov had made a career within the communist movement, serving from 1935 to 1943 as General Secretary of the Comintern. Attending this commemorative celebration, besides the Bulgarian church leadership led by the Exarch, the most prominent clergyman present was Patriarch Aleksij I of Moscow and all Russia (in office from 1945-70). Georgi Dimitrov's speech set the agenda for the relationship between, on the one side, the state, the Fatherland Front and the communist party, and on the other side the Orthodox Church. The speech clearly bears the mark of his time in the Soviet Union. Dimitrov was personally closely linked to the USSR and had until recently held Soviet citizenship. The Fatherland Front's dominant communist party was politically-ideologically allied with the Soviet Communist Party, and the Orthodox Church was a sister church with the Russian Orthodox Church, which since the 1917 revolution had been operating within a socialist state. In view of the significance of the speech for the Bulgarian Orthodox Church's relationship to socialism and Dimitrov's direct approaches to the Church leadership, the most essential sections of Dimitrov's remarks will be discussed here. 57

Dimitrov began his speech by noting that the millennial commemoration of Ivan Rilski was not only a church festival but also celebrates a true son of the people (1954:186). After a direct greeting to Patriarch Aleksij, Dimitrov turned

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The Bulgarian Orthodox Church Under Socialism

towards more fundamental questions concerning the significance of the Orthodox Church for the history of the Bulgarian people. He praised the Orthodox Church for its historical effort in maintaining the self-awareness of the Bulgarian people, in contrast to the non-Orthodox churches in the cbuntry. During the years of the oppressive Ottoman yoke and during the struggle foVtiberation, the Orthodox Church and its monasteries maintained the people's national sentiment and deflected the strong Hellenizing forces which made Bulgarian merchants and the wealthy classes and large segments of the educated classes into agents of Greece and enemies of the people. Dimitrov asserted that there would exist no democratic Bulgaria if the monasteries during the dark slave past had not helped sustain Bulgarians' national sentiment, national aspirations and national pride and protected the nation from oblivion; the Fatherland Front and the communists would therefore express their gratitude towards the patriotic clergy in the national church. Dimitrov noted that even though the church had also had incompetent and treasonous representatives, this did not alter the fact that the church had generally played a supremely great patriotic role in the history of the Bulgarians (p. i86f). After these words of praise for the Church as a national institution with a historical mission in the life of the people during the Ottoman political and Greek clerical domination, Dimitrov then turned to the current situation, including the demands on the church and its leaders and more long-term expectations regarding the relationship between the new Bulgaria and the church. The current demands derived from the impending referendum in September on the monarchy, which Dimitrov and the Fatherland Front wanted eliminated as a precondition for building a new society on the basis of a republican constitution. Dimitrov therefore demanded in his speech, and with direct reference to the head of the church, the Exarch, that he and the church leadership should live up to the church's patriotic past and cease the chanting and liturgy in the church for the tsar's dynasty and the monarchy, which had been culpable for Bulgaria's misfortunes. According to Dimitrov, prayers for the dynasty violated the people's genuine longing for freedom and for a people's republic, and one could not have the people rejecting the monarchy while the church supported it (p. 187O. As for more long-term expectations, Dimitrov expressed the hope that the synod's honoured members and all the church's servants would understand that a new era was emerging, new in form, content and spirit, and that in this era the church should be a true church of the people, republican and progressive. This should occur not only by words and declarations of adherence. The Fatherland Front, and especially its communist members, also desired actions on the part

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The Bulgarian Orthodox Church Under Socialism

of the church in the great work which lay ahead: all branches of society had to contribute to the progress and welfare of the people (p. 188). Dimitrov then discussed the current synod: among the honoured guests it also contained people with ossified minds and deeply conservative views. It was not their own fault, but their misfortune, and Dimitrov expressed the hope that they would understand the need to go forward together with the people's strug-: gle for democracy and for a people's republic. How this should be understood in more detail was made unambiguously clear by Dimitrov in the remarks that followed. He first asked, rhetorically, who in this assembly was not interested in the great Russian church, and then continued by asserting that everyone who knew the history of this church knew very well that if its leaders after the socialist October Revolution had understood the spirit of the new era and had contributed to the freedom of the Russian people instead of supporting the counterrevolution, the Russian church would not have had to endure its unfortunate fate. The persecution of some church functionaries following the 1917 revolution is due to this counterrevolutionary activity on the part of the church leaders, but if the church leadership of the past had been like today's esteemed guest, Patriarch Aleksij, the church would have been on the side of the people, as it showed itself to be during the Great Fatherland War (p. 189). So that the point should not be missed by anyone, Dimitrov ended his speech by addressing himself directly to the religious leaders and representatives in attendance, encouraging them to learn from the Russian experience and the example of the Russian church. If they did so, there would be unity between the Bulgarian church and people in the Fatherland Front, and then the spiritual forces which the church was able to spread could unify the faithful for the benefit of Bulgaria. The history of the entire church and the connections between the majority of clergy and the masses of people showed that this could be achieved (p. 189O. The speech then concludes with Dimitrov toasting the friendship between the Russian church and the Bulgarian people's republican church, the friendship between the Bulgarian people and its Russian liberators, etc. Georgi Dimitrov's speech at the commemorative day for Ivan Rilski is characterised by an open-hearted attitude. Here it was very clearly stated what the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and its leadership could expect from the state, and Dimitrov unambiguously presented the limitations under which the church would come to operate. His words of praise for the church's national historical significance and his emphasis on the Orthodox Church in comparison with other religious communities came to determine the pattern of acceptance and support of the Orthodox Church as a national institution; this became one aspect of the state-church relationship under socialism. In addition, Dimitrov

demanded the church's loyalty, which in the first place should be expressed by the church distancing itself from the monarchy, and then by the church becoming a genuine, profoundly progressive people's church, serving the people whom Dimitrov self-confidently represented via the Fatherland Front. The other aspect of the state-church relationship under socialism was the church as a religious institution, and here Dimitrov was not as specific in his remarks as he was when he expressed his expectations of the church's loyalty and support to the demands of the new era. Dimitrov let the religious activity rest and acknowledged its significance fb* parts of the population, but unarticulated, in his remarks about the form, content and sprit of the new era and in his repeated references to himself as a communist, there can be no doubt that as a religious institution, the church was not in harmony with the visions of the new power-holders regarding the future society and the absolute superiority of scientific atheism vis-à-vis religious views. Yet Dimitrov did not proclaim any conflict about this topic, and this is due not only to the fact that the occasion could be regarded as being poorly chosen, as Dimitrov was in the church's domain at the Rila monastery. From his choice of words and unveiled threats, there is nothing which indicates that the venue should have held him back. The reason, rather, can be found in the Russian/Soviet example to which he repeatedly refers: during the Second World War, Stalin had halted his frontal ideological assault on the church, and it is here that Dimitrov obtained his inspiration.

106

Dimitrov's speech was the commencement of a first conflict-filled period in the relations between the State and the Orthodox Church. The conflicts emerged regarding the demands for loyalty and the demand of the Fatherland Front to separate state and church. After this, however, the relationship found a modus vivendi based on Dimitrov's acknowledgement of the church's national and historical mission combined with strong state control and limitation of the church's religious development possibilities. This status can be observed in the history of the Orthodox Church under the country's socialist regime, and along with this, a preoccupation with the Orthodox Church as a nationality-maintaining institution under the Ottomans remained a prominent research theme among historians during the socialist period. This is in striking contrast to the portrait of the nationality-undermining consequences of Islamisation and Turkification during the Ottoman rule. 59

4 . T H E B U L G A R I A N O R T H O D O X C H U R C H UNDER S O C I A L I S M

In the socialist countries, reliable statistics as to the size of the religious communities were not available, and this lack of official willingness to allow research on the topic also applied generally in Bulgaria. The last pre-war cen60

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

sus to include religious affiliation, taken in 1934, indicated that out of total population of 6,077,939,84-4% termed themselves Orthodox, 13.5% Muslim, 0.75% Catholic (of which a small portion were Uniate), 0.39% Armenian Christian, 0.8% Jews and 0.14% Protestants. An incomplete census from 1946 yielded similar proportions: 84.49% Orthodox, 13.55% Muslims and no significant changes as far as the other religious communities were concerned. Thus, both before and after the war. Orthodoxy was the dominant religion, with Islam as a significant, but far smaller community composed primarily of Turkish-speakers, Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks and Gypsies. 61

When the Red Army took control of Bulgaria in September 1944, and with Bulgaria having fought on the side of the Axis Powers, the government was immediately taken over by the Fatherland Front. As a defeated German ally, Bulgaria was subordinated to allied control, which in practice meant the Soviet Union. The communists gradually took full control over the Fatherland Front, but until the final peace treaty was signed in Paris on February 10th, 1947, the communist party moved cautiously on questions of the religious communities' future status. The Fatherland Front's political program from September 17th, 1944. already formulated a demand for the separation of state and church, introduction of civil marriage and elimination of the influence exerted by the religious communities, including foreign-based churches, on the teaching system and the operation of schools. In the first phase from 1946-47. until the communists' secured their grip on power, the goal of the governments' policy towards the religious communities was primarily to weaken the Catholic and Protestant schools which were being operated with foreign funds, and in some cases by foreign Catholic teachers and Methodist and Congregationalist mission institutions. The war had severed the connections to the mother congregations, which were located mainly in France and the United States, and the Bulgarian authorities placed barriers in the path of reestablishing the personal and financial contacts. After 1947, a reinvigorated campaign emerged against the small Catholic and Protestant congregations. The last foreign-supported schools ceased functioning in 1948, and in connection with the passing of the Law on Religious Communities in February 1949, fifteen Protestant ministers were imprisoned. In closed trials, they were accused of espionage for the United States and England, irregularities concerning the possession of foreign currency and anticommunist activity. In the first trial against the church communities having close links to foreign countries, all the priests were given prison sentences, including three life sentences. From 1950, the Catholics were also subjected to anti-religious and Stalinist-

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inspired persecution (Broun 1983). One of the many trials against the priests, nuns and laymen was carried out as a show trial, with standardised accusations of espionage and anti-communist activity, with four executions included among the punishments. This draconian procedure was stopped immediately afters Stalin's death in 1953. but it was not until the 1970s that the regime's isolation of Catholics and Protestants from their foreign mother churches was relaxed. The Roman Catholic Church received an unexpected overture from the Bulgarian regime when Todor Zivkov visited the pope in 1975. A grandiose 1300-year celebration of the Bulgarian state was being planned for 1981, and access to the Vatican's archives was considered valuable for Bulgarian historians, who were preparing several publications for the occasion. The Vatican granted Bulgaria permission to use their archives on condition that the plight of Bulgaria's Catholics be eased and their normal connections with the Vatican be reestablished. The Protestant congregations did not experience such a clear easing of restrictions, and a revitalisation movement among the small Pentecostal congregations in the late 1970s led to intervention by the authorities and the subsequent arrest and trial of five religious leaders. Yet this was an exception from the general atmosphere of the mid-1970s, when a more relaxed attitude to the spiritual movements and values dominated. Here the tone was given by Zivkov's powerful daughter, politburo member Ljudmila Zivkova (1942-81), who was openly interested in religion and mysticism while also strongly engaged in her country's national culture and history. The Armenian Christian congregations did not experience the same hostility on the part of the regime as did the Catholic and Protestant communities. The Armenians in Bulgaria were in relations with the Soviet-recognised Armenian Church in the Armenian Soviet Republic. Moreover, the Armenian Church collaborated to a certain degree with the Orthodox Church. Finally, mention should be made of the Jewish population. During the Second World War, the citizens and authorities refused to send the country's predominantly Sephardic Jews to German forced labour and concentration camps, though did nothing to prevent the dispatch of Jews from the occupied territories in Macedonia and northern Greece. In 1948, Bulgarian authorities allowed emigration to Israel, and a massive emigration wave began; a few months later, the number of Jews had been reduced from about 50,000 to some few thousands. The remaining Jews were for the most part strongly secularised, and Jewish religious institutions rapidly diminished to an absolute minimum. The major features in the authorities' post-war religious policy are well known from several of the eastern European counties in the Soviet sphere of influence. The small religious communities with connections to the capitalist counties were

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hindered in their activities, the Armenians were treated in accordance with Soviet policy, and the surviving Jewish communities dissolved as an active religious community due to emigration. The situation with the Orthodox Church was different, Under clear inspiration from Stalin's altered position towards the Russian Orthodox Church during the Second World War, which also emerged in Dimitrov's speech at the Rila monastery in 1946, the Fatherland Front supported the selection of a church leader, an issue about which the Holy Synod in Sofia had expressed interest already in 1940. Since the death of the last exarch in 1915, Bulgarian Orthodoxy had not had any leader. The reoccupation of the post had been postponed in the hope of being able to unify all the church provinces within the Bulgarian Exarchate's 1870 boundaries under a new religious leader. The core of the dispute here was Macedonia, but with the war now over, the authorities did not want the church to complicate the relationship to the new political allies in Tito's Yugoslavia. Hence, on January 21st, 1945, an assembly of clergy and laymen chose Bishop Stefan as exarch. Shortly thereafter, with the intervention of the Russian patriarch, the schism between the ecumenical patriarchate and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which had lasted since 1872, was successfully resolved. Exarch Stefan held his post only until 1948, when the government pressured him out of office for refusing to co-operate under the new conditions in the constitution; Stefan had apparently thought that he could utilise the separation between state and church to achieve renewed churchly independence and activism (Raikin 1984b). The period between the ratification of the new constitution and Stalin's death, was the period of greatest tensions between the authorities and the Orthodox Church. Orthodox priests were hindered in their work, especially when it came to work with the youth, and some priests were interned. As a consequence of nationalisations and restrictions of state subsidies, the church also endured some years of financial hardship, causing the synod to finally accept the authorities' demands and agree to co-operate. The co-operation was confirmed by the government's approval of the Orthodox Church's resolutions on December 31st, 1950, as stipulated by the Law on Religious Communities. Metropolitan Kiril from Plovdiv was installed as leader of the synod until May 10th, i953> when he became the first Bulgarian patriarch since Evtimij, who had been removed following the fall of Tarnovo in 1393. Approved in advance by the other Orthodox churches, the naming of a patriarch brought the Bulgarian Orthodox Church onto an equal footing with its sister churches. Following the investiture of Kiril, the head of the Directorate for Religious Affairs declared that the church had shown a willingness to support the new social order and work for peace, and that the church would henceforth concentrate itself on spiritual

no

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church Under Socialism

questions. For his part, Patriarch Kiril declared that the church would fulfill its patriotic duties and live up to the words to render unto God and to Ceasar each his due, i.e., to give faith and conscience to God and total loyalty to the state. This line of co-operation within the limits set by the governmenfand the communist party would affect the relation between the Orthodox Church.and the authorities for decades to come. The governments provided a limited degree of financial support to the Orthodox Church; churches and monasteries were renovated, services held and icons preserved and exhibited. At the same time, the authorities carried out atheistic agitation in the schools and youtfi-organisations, with several attempts to replace church festival days and rites of passage with socialist civil rituals (socialisticeski graidanski rituali). Here we see the socialist authorities' distinction between the church as a national historical force and the church as a religious institution. After the church's leadership had accepted the new conditions, there developed a modus vivendi between state and church. The church became an officially promoted actor in the so-called "struggle for peace" in international fora and was accorded a prominent role in the politically-control led representation of the national history. Clergymen took part in jubileums and commemorative days, and during the 1300-year state celebration in 1981, the church was hailed in both speeches and publications as a key factor in the ethnogenesis of the Bulgarians (Volker 1982). Characteristic of this dichotomy was also that the official formulations concentrated on the church as a national cultural factor, which during important phases of the country's and the nation's history formed the framework of the people's sense of identity or the people's struggle for political independence. The acceptance of the Orthodox Church as a national and cultural institution continued through the socialist period, and precisely the linking together of the church and the people's national history excluded a direct confrontation between state and church on a Marxist ideological basis. On this background, the Orthodox Church could continue its religious life in a formally atheistic social system. Yet, the consequence of this indulgent and restrictive policy towards the Orthodox Church and to Christianity was that the number of priests slowly decreased, the new large residential areas—as mentioned—obtained no churches, and secularisation and atheistic campaigns had their impacts. The number of active believers or religious ceremonies conducted is not known, but especially funerals still continued to take place to a large extent with participation by the clergy. The cause of the two-pronged attitude and policy of the socialist state authorities and the communists party towards the Orthodox Church can be found in the interpretation of Orthodoxy's function under Ottoman rule. Here

III

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church Under Socialism

one encounters a reception of history which consciously served the communist regime's priority on national ideals and values.

around the interpretation of the Bulgarian-Slavic Orthodox Church's social and ideological function under Ottoman rule. At the same time, the basic assumption of the interpretation—that the church made a decisive contribution to the preservation and protection of national identity—meant, as mentioned, that the Orthodox Church under socialism was not only confronted with a uniformly critical anti-religious and atheistic propaganda by the authorities, but that national-political interests allowed the church to function as a historically significant national institution. The following section discusses some representative examples of this research which emphasize the church's function as preserver of Slavic-Bulgarian national identity and self-awareness under Ottoman rule (cf. also Nesev 1974a, 1977,1978b, 1982; Gandev 1982; Kiel 1985:147-66). The discussion begins with Dimitâr Angelov's recent works on national continuity. Among many possible examples of how the relationship between church, Christianity, national continuity and identity was viewed, Angelov is chosen in his capacity as a prominent researcher, and because he summarises the contributions on this topic from several disciplines. The discussion continues with a presentation of several historical studies from recent decades, including an American dissertation which highlights the view of Slavic Christianity as preserver of a specific national identity. The paradigm underlying this research tradition may be termed the continuity theory. The goal of this review is to outline the theoretical and national ideological background behind the research carried out within the paradigm of this continuity theory. At the same time, it is important to remark that what is here called the continuity theory complements the catastrophe theory; i.e., the idea of Ottoman rule as a national catastrophe runs parallel with the view of Bulgarian ethno-national continuity. In the history of modern Bulgaria, the religio-political dimension of the continuity theory constituted the background for the Orthodox Church's privileged status, while the catastrophe theory legitimated the marginalisation of the Turkish population, with the name-changing campaign (process of national rebirth) in the 1980s as the most radical political implementation.

5. I N T E R P R E T A T I O N S OF T H E CHURCH'S NATIONAL F U N C T I O N

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church's formal juridical status under socialism did not essentially deviate from that of other religious communities. In practice, however, the Orthodox Church had a status which clearly distinguished it from other Christian confessions and especially from the Turkish-Muslim population, which was under the surveillance of the politically controlled imams and muftis and who as a minority were the object of an assimilation policy. The decisive factor behind this discriminatory treatment was the overlapping identity between church and nation and the interpretation of the role of the religious communities in the national history; here the Orthodox church occupied a special position vis-à-vis Islam and vis-à-vis other Christian confessions. This special position co-determined, as mentioned, the Orthodox Church's situation under socialism and was also reflected in the political and ideologically controlled Christianity-related research. To the extent that the historical disciplines at all touched upon the history of Christianity, the historiography, since the mid-1950s became part of the relationship between the authorities, the communist party and the Orthodox Church. The interpretation of the history of the Orthodox Church was thus also part of the party's ever more openly nationalcommunist expression and character (M. Todorova 1995). The view of the church's and Christianity's function as preserver of a religiousnational identity was a key topic in the historians' analyses of the period up to the beginning of the 19th century, when the Bulgarians manifested an ever-growing national consciousness. The core of this view is the idea of national continuity, and how the people's national specificities and characteristics were maintained (cf. Arnakis 1963; Petrovich 1980).« Within this conceptual framework, the church and its monasteries, with their Slavic-Bulgarian liturgy, literature and art, were understood as bridge-builders between the Second Bulgarian kingdom and the national revival (VàzraÈdaneto) at the end of the 18th and through the 19th century. The Slavic-Bulgarian local churches and monasteries were viewed as a shield against the Ottomans' Islamisation and the Greeks' Hellenization. Linked to the idea of national continuity, Bulgarian historiography reveals an interest in movements of rebellion and individual resistance against the Ottomans. In this view Ottoman rule was never an uncontested reality but was in conflict with people's natural unity in an independent kingdom. Whereas the catastrophe theory primarily drew a portrait of the onslaughts against selfidentification due to Islamisation and Turkification, the interest here revolved 63

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6. T H E C H U R C H AND NATIONAL C O N T I N U I T Y

In a 1992 issue of the Bulgarian Historical Review, the historian and Byzantinist Dimitràr Angelov published an article summarising the work of several historical disciplines concerning the history of the Bulgarians; in 1994 he published a greatly expanded version of his article in the form of a monograph; the article is entitled "The Bulgarian Nationality in the 9 t h - i 9 t h Centuries. Factors and Conditions of Development" and the subsequent monograph Bàlgarskata nar-

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64

odnostprezvekovete ("The Bulgarian Nationality through the Centuries"). Both publications are contributions to the classical historiographie question of continuity and change, where Angelov understands change as the political-economic changes which followed in the wake of the Byzantine and Ottoman conquests of the Bulgarian medieval kingdoms. Angelov seeks to demonstrate the maintenance of a specific and identifiable sense of national identity among the conquered people in these periods, and his interest therefore centers on demonstrating historical continuity (istoriêeskapriemstvenost) (1992:14; 1994:288; cf. also Cvetkova 1973:71). Here the focus is on Angelov's portrayal of national continuity under Ottoman rule and especially on his discussion of the church and Christianity Angelov takes his chronological point of departure in the union of the Slavic and so-called "proto-Bulgarian" populations in the 9th century, and his time horizon ends with the establishment of the principality in 1878; the monograph traces a time-span to the end of the 18th century. Within this time frame, Angelov follows the development of Bulgarian nationality, using the concept of "nationality" as an ethnic and historical category, which in the 19th century was replaced by the term "nation" (1994:297). Angelov's conceptual usage follows the Soviet tradition, according to which a "nationality" designates a population group with several ethnic characteristics, such as language, culture and traditions, while a "nation" is a state-bearing unit (Connor 1984:452). Angelov cites ethno-territorial and ethno-cultural unity as the decisive factors in the maintenance of national continuity: i.e., a territory inhabited by a people with national self-consciousness expressed in an ethnonym and common language, origin, history, present, as well as a specific culture expressed via customs, clothing and religion (1992:13. 22-24).«* That Angelov emphasises these factors is due, as mentioned, to the socio-economic and political discontinuity of Bulgarian history; hence, evidence of national continuity must be sought outside the political and economic history. 65

The first factor of continuity, according to Angelov, is the territory where the Bulgarians had lived since the Slavic immigration of the Balkan peninsula in the 6th and 7th centuries. In association with the territory, Angelov moderates his recapitulation of the fanatic and violent character of Ottoman rule in order to show that the ethno-territorial unity has not been altered during and after the Ottoman conquest: Nor was the ethnoterritorial integrity of the Bulgarian people violated under the fundamentally altered reality as a result of the Turkish conquest. Regardless of the mass killings of people in towns and villages, of the forced assimilation and the mounting mixture of an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous population in individual settlements, the Bulgarians continued to live

114

as the overwhelming population in Moesia, Thrace, Macedonia, the Morava valley, in Dobrudza and the Sofia region. (i99*:»5) The second part of the argument for continuity is the culture* for as Angelov states, a territory does not form the people (1992:18), and here he^mphasises the importance of a common language. He writes that language is the most important means of communication for a nationality and its most important tool with which to express itself intellectually, in that the language is literally the soul of the nationality and one of the clearest expressions of its essence (1992:15); there is an obvious connectior\to Johann Gottfried von Herder and German romanticism here. Angelov mentions the evolution, since the 9th century's Old Bulgarian language norm, through a continually increasing differentiation between the literary and the spoken languages, emphasising that the distinction was eliminated with the re-establishment, in the 19th century, of a common language norm which rested upon both ethnic and democratic principles, when the language reformers took into consideration the spoken variants. Despite these changes, the fundamental language continuity is far more important than the differences which have appeared through the centuries. Language unites the inhabitants in the entire territory and it therefore constitutes testimony to the historical continuity of Bulgarians' lives and destiny (1992:200. After discussing the issue of language, Angelov reviews several other ethnocultural characteristics. On the basis of studies of material culture (dwellings, clothing) from the 9th to the 14th centuries, and studies of the Christian-dominated elitist forms of expression within literature, art, theology, music and science, Angelov describes the fate of these cultural forms under the Ottomans: first, Ottoman rule was a terrible blow to further cultural development; second, the first two hundred years entailed a nearly total destruction of the elitist, material and spiritual culture (1992:210. It was then left to the folk culture, with its customs, tools, songs and rituals, to maintain the ethnic integration of the indomitable Bulgarians suffering under political, social and spiritual oppression. At the same time, this folk culture operated as a mechanism of differentiation in relation to the Ottomans (1992:22). Finally, Angelov turns to the question of the function of religion and its significance as creator of continuity. In contrast to the other ethno-cultural elements which created continuity between the Middle Ages and Ottoman period, the significance of religious affiliation was altered by connection between belief and nationality: ... a new element in the conditions of alien oppression was the increased role of the religious belonging as an important constituent of the national

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awareness of the Bulgarians. Along with the notion that the Bulgarians differed from other peoples in language, way of life, culture and past a strong accent was put on the notions that they were Christians and that this was one of their most distinctive qualities. The cause for this is clear: in this way stress was laid on their sharp differentiation from the enslaver, the carrier of a different religion hostile to Christianity. The enhanced role of the 'religious indicator' gradually led to the identification of the concepts 'faith' and 'nationality'. This mixing of the two concepts had been practically unknown during the Bulgarian Middle Ages, but now it was felt strongly as a component of the ethnic consciousness of the Bulgarians. (1992:25).

was not only a religious matter, but a defence of national identity. Georgieva also mentions that the fate of the neomartyrs would be of supreme importance and was utilised by church leaders to mobilise the people towards a political movement for liberation. In this way, the clergy became an organisational force in the Bulgarians' resistance and rebellion against foreign domination, and Georgieva concludes by emphasising that even though the church as an institution was weakened by the Ottomans and had no possibility to conduct its activities freely, it occupied a decisive role as the only means of struggle for consolidating the people's national identity and maintaining Bulgarian's as an distinct ethnic group (1981:101, iosf> Georgieva's article covers all those aspects of how the church and Christianity functioned as preserver of national identity highlighted by this research tradition: culture, monasteries, saints and the clergy. Georgieva has since continued her work in the form of an analysis of the cults of saints, such as those of Ivan Rilski, Gabriel Lesnovski and Petka Târnovska. The cults are viewed as a contribution to maintaining the memory of a free but bygone era in the midst of a period with religious and political oppression, and Georgieva concludes that this function was prominently expressed in the cult of the neomartyrs killed in the confrontation with Ottoman power (1984; cf. also Constantelos 1978)-

According to Angelov, the linking together of religious and national affiliation led to religion playing both a positive and negative role for the Christian Bulgarians under the Ottomans. The church and Christianity maintained and protected their sense of nationality, but the close connection between religion and nationality could also operate to weaken ethnic identity, because when Christians converted, they also lost their nationality and became Turks. Angelov's interpretation of the collision between Christianity and Islam thus unfolds within the research paradigm of the catastrophe theory (cf. also 1992:13), and his view of the significance of religion for the formation and maintenance of ethnic and national consciousness is reminiscent of the publications which appeared as part of the politically controlled research in connection with the name-changing campaign {process of national rebirth) (cf. 1994:292). According to Angelov's interpretation, the church and Christianity did not work in line with the other continuity-creating factors as direct bridge-builders between the Middle Ages and Ottoman rule. According to Angelov, it was only under Ottoman rule that religion and the church obtained a new and valuable function as bearers of national consciousness and self-identification. Angelov's depiction of the national continuity-creating factors and institutions rests on cultural historical research which in recent decades has concentrated upon the church as a social, cultural and national institution in the history of the Bulgarians under the Ottomans. It is in the framework of this research that we observe the unfolding complementarity and parallel between the catastrophe and continuity theories. In this connection, the historian Cvetana Georgieva has underlined the function of the church as preserver of national identity during the rebuilding of the church organisation after the destruction of the conquest phase. She interprets the transferral of Ivan Rilski's relics as part of a strengthening of the national identity, in that the monasteries conducted a conscious policy and did not just follow their traditions. Similarly, the church's resistance to Islamisation

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The church as a cultural institution and the transmission of the medieval literary heritage by monks, priests, copyists, and scribes is a classic topic within the continuity theory and has also preoccupied the medieval historian Ivan Dudcev and the cultural historian Georgi NeSev. In their work on the church's literary culture, they both make a direct connection to the nationality concept and to the view of the Bulgarian nationality's threatened status under the Ottomans. Dujcev argues that the church, with a rich spiritual culture, maintained the national consciousness (1978:850 and for his part, Nesev follows up the idea by emphasising the role of religion as creator of national identity (19783:128). Both Dujcev and Nesev, as well as the other contributions to this research tradition, reveal a clear distancing from the interpretation of the millet system as a religious classification and social organisation. Instead, they promulgate the view that the religious identification was identical to national identification. A subfield of these studies of the function of the Orthodox Church and Christianity as preservers of national identity is within a Marxist-Lenin 1st research tradition. Here the focus is on the Orthodox clergy as a social class. This tradition poses the question of whether the church was also an instrument of class exploitation. In this connection, Hristo Gandev has sought to show that there occurred a direct démocratisation of the church institution in the Bulgarian territories in early Ottoman times, i.e., prior to the growth of Greek influ-

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The Bulgarian Orthodox Church Under Socialism

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

ence (1984). He regards the Ottoman conquest and exile of the higher clergy as evidence that the path had been cleared for a démocratisation and popularisation of the local church. The people and those lower clergy, with origins and direct connection with the folk, themselves became responsible for their church and for Christianity. In this way, the clergy and the church did not stand in a class contradictory relationship to the local population, but, rather, acted as a shield protecting what was authentically Bulgarian (1984). The historian Olga Todorova has worked further on this idea by incorporating the lower clergy's economic status and its ethnic and social origin so as to determine whether the lower clergy contained a significant Greek element, which was the case among the higher clergy. Todorova is unable to confirm this, and even though she acknowledges the weak source basis for her study, she also rejects the argument that the lower clergy, in contrast to the leading church strata, should have belonged to those Christian groups whom the Ottomans favoured with privileges and tax exemptions (1987a, 19870:125-88). Todorova thus concludes that there existed no class differences or contradictions of interest between the lower clergy (including the Greek segment) and the Orthodox Bulgarian population. The incorporation of the church and of Christianity by the continuity theory as the factors which created national continuity, but most often without Angelov's distinction between the non-national and the national function, respectively, before and during the Ottomans, was not limited to the Bulgarian research tradition. We find the same view in the works of American historian Dennis P. Hupchick on the Slavic Orthodox culture and Bulgarian ethnic identity under Ottoman rule (1983b, 1993). Hupchick poses the question of how the Bulgarians as an ethnic group survived until the national awakening at the end of the 18th and early 19th centuries without having become Turks or Greeks, despite centuries of Turkish-Islamic political and Greek-Orthodox religious domination. Following recent western research tradition, Hupchick reserves the concepts of "nationality" and "nation" to the period of the emergence of the national movements in the 19th century. Inspired by his teacher and advisor, lames F. Clarke (1971:31"), Hupchick argues that the answer can be found in a collective self-understanding which had its origin in the church, the liturgy and iconography with its Slavic saints, who were identified with Slavic inscriptions (i993:ix). Hupchick's empirical study is based on data from the 17th century, and he chooses to concentrate on Orthodox art, education, and literature within a theoretical framework connecting identity, ethnicity and religion. The foundation and details of the study will not be discussed here any further, but the conclusions are enlightening." Hupchick concludes that there is a clear connection between Orthodox faith and Bulgarian identity, with Islam and

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non-Bulgarian identity as ethnic markers because Orthodox culture and the mother tongue provided the Bulgarians with their ethnic self-consciousness (1993:191. 196. 198). A comprehensive quotation from Hupchick's conclusion makes clear the mode of thinking and concludes this review of how various historical disciplines have interpreted the national historical functions ofrhe local churches and monasteries under Ottoman rule: The Bulgarians faced and repulsed these cultural threats by fortifying their sense of self-awareness through Slavic literacy and artistic cultural activity Both existed within the context of a Slavic Orthodox culture that, given the condition of foreign Turkish political and Greek religious domination, could only operate on a local level. Although ethnic awareness never completely died out among the Bulgarians thanks to the cultural activity of those who worked within the Orthodox church, that activity existed in a state of continous poverty right through the nineteenth century and the eruption of western-style nationalism. That it managed to exist at all was more a matter of the Orthodoxy of the Bulgarians—their belief in the Orthodox form of Christianity and the preservation of its Slavic cultural traditions—than of the established Orthodox church organization and the advantages afforded by the Orthodox millet. Orthodoxy ensured that the Bulgarians were able to distinguish between themselves and non-Orthodox peoples (e.g., Muslims, Jews and Catholics) and between themselves and other non-Slavic Orthodox Christians (e.g., Greeks and Armenians). Differences between themselves and other Slavic Orthodox peoples (i.e., the Serbs) were less well defined in the Orthodox context. It took Paisii and his exposure to western and Russian historical literature to commence the last phase of conceptual development within Orthodox tradition that would lead to a definitive Bulgarian self-identity as an ethnic and, ultimately, national entity, By the time that identity matured, it had moved beyond the purely Orthodox context into the realm of modern European nationalism. (i993:i98f)

7. SUMMARY

This chapter has elucidated the historiographie reception and impact of Ottoman rule as concerns the socialist state's policy towards the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The particular historical interpretation of the impact of Ottoman rule on Bulgarian ethnic and national consciousness derived from an interpretation of the church's historical mission which in the atheist context created space for the church as a national institution. It was on this basis that the regime could demand loyalty as a popular democratic and progressive church. The image of the church's historical mission stemmed from the national histor-

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

ical research tradition prior to socialism, and it is the continuity theory of this • tradition, which remained and was expanded. According to the continuity theo-i. ry, the local church and its monasteries under Ottoman rule, were national institutions, and the church, its monasteries and their cultural activities werecreators of Bulgarian national and cultural continuity; this laid the groundwork for the political liberation of the 19th century. The continuity theory's thus linked national identity and religious affiliation. The theory's subsequent" understanding of the function of Orthodoxy as identity-creating and ethnic boundary-maintaining under Ottoman rule is the reverse side of the assertion, propagated during the name-changing campaign, that the Turkish population were in reality Bulgarians. In conjunction with the continuity theory, the conse­ quences were interpreted only through a national ideological lens as a painful loss of identity. Common to both the catastrophe and continuity theories, then, is their refusal to acknowledge that the Ottoman empire's millet system, in its' classical phase prior to the 19th century, rested on religious classificatory prin­ ciples and did not contain ethnic or national preferences or criteria. Let us now take up the question of the Orthodox Church and Orthodoxy's national historical mission under Ottoman. Our point of departure is the sec­ ond half of the 19th century. Confessional affiliation now when the millet system began to collapse, obtained an indisputably meaning as a mark of nationality. Religion now obtained ethno-political significance, because the movements for national liberation and culture, quite contrary to the classical millet order, made church affiliation a consequence of national identification. It is only with the 19th century's political liberation struggle that religious affiliation is linked together with nationality, and not, as Dimitrar Angelov and other supporters of the con­ tinuity theory assert, due to the intrinsic character of Ottoman domination. The overlap of religion and nationality first begins with a national ideological inter­ pretation of the Ottoman rule and takes shape through a combination of the 19th century national idea, a transformed millet system and the Orthodox statechurch tradition. These three elements form the basis for amalgamation of reli­ gious affiliation with national identity in Bulgaria.

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1. P E A C E AND T H E B O R D E R S

N M A R C H 3RD, 1878,in San Stefano (Yeşilköy) outside Istanbul, the Rus­ sians and the Ottomans signed a peace treaty ending the war which had broken out between them the year before. The peace marked the end of several unstable years in the Balkans. In 1875. rebellions sparked by the intro­ duction of changed taxation systems spread through Bosnia, and the following year saw a minor revolt in the central part of the Balkan Mountains (the April Uprising). The poorly organised rebellion, regarded by exile-Bulgarian circles as the prelude to political independence, was quickly and brutally repressed by the Ottoman power. The same year, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman empire, but the Ottomans were still strong enough to handle the chal­ lenge from the Slavs, whose defeat caused Russia to enter the conflict in the role of protector of all Orthodox Christians. The Russians invaded the Ottoman empire via Romania, but the Russian forces were halted at Pleven (Plevna), where for five months over the summer of 1877 the Ottoman defenders resisted the Russian siege. Pleven first fell, with Romanian assistance, on December 10th, 1877, and in January, the now reinforced Russian advance forces, stuck in the

O

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San Stefano and the National Triumph

Shipka Pass, could advance southwards with virtually unhindered passage towards the defences of Istanbul. The Treaty of San Stefano was signed in the wake of the Russians' military success, and the sultan had to accept the loss of vast Ottoman territories. The most important new element was the establishment of a Greater Bulgaria, which beyond the areas north and south of the Balkan Mountains would also include nearly all of Macedonia and significant parts of Thrace. Among the other Orthodox Balkan countries, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro would be awarded smaller amounts of territory and at the same time achieve full sovereignty. The Ottoman empire's European possessions were thereby reduced to parts of eastern Thrace, Thessaly, Albania and—via a land corridor through Sandjak Novi Pazar—Bosnia. The Treaty of San Stefano was a disappointment for all parties except the Bulgarians. Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania felt themselves disfavoured in awards of territory. In a larger context, the peace treaty had violated secret agreements between the European Great Powers. Great Power co-operation was certainly weakened compared to the period following the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the century, but Austria-Hungary had agreements with Russia on spheres of influence and the distribution of land areas, following further decimation of the Ottoman empire. For the British, a Greater Bulgaria, which in all probability would become a Russian vassal state, was a step towards Russian control over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles and entailed a general strengthening of Russia's position in the eastern Mediterranean. The protests against the Treaty of San Stefano ended only with a renegotiation at the Congress of Berlin in the summer of 1878, with Reich Chancellor Otto von Bismarck as mediator. The Treaty of Berlin halted the establishment of Greater Bulgaria. The negotiations instead created a smaller autonomous principality, and south of the Balkan Mountains, Eastern Rumelia was created as a semi-autonomous Ottoman province under the leadership of a Christian governor. All of Thrace and Macedonia were returned to the Ottomans, and Austria took over administration of Bosnia and stationed troops in Sandjak Novi Pazar, between Serbia and Montenegro. Further border changes followed in 1881, when Greece, after agreement with the Ottomans, expanded its territory in Thessaly only to subsequently lose smaller areas following military defeats in 1897, when Greece and the Ottoman empire were at war after yet another crisis on Crete. The Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia were united in 1885, despite Russian resistance. The Russians had found it difficult to retain control of political life in Bulgaria, which in 1908 declared itself sovereign and independent of the Ottoman empire. At the same time, Austria annexed Bosnia and withdrew from

Sandjak Novi Pazar. Beyond this, in the decades following the Congress of Berlin and until the Balkan Wars and the First World War no new border revisions occurred in the region. The Treaty of San Stefano had fulfilled the Bulgarian nationalist circles' greatest hopes, and its total revamping at the Congress of Berlin therefore had enormous influence on the political life in the country. The Bulgarians' reactions operated to destabilize the conditions for the entire Balkans in the decades that followed (Crampton 1983; Perry 1993). The peace of San Stefano was a short-lived national triumph, which the nationalists viewed as an acknowledgement of their national-political right to trie unification of all Bulgarians in a sovereign state territory. In line with a definition of political nationalism as the effort to achieve a congruence between the political unit and the national unit, San Stefano had affirmed the nationalist idea that "ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones" and that the rulers of the political unit should belong to the majority of the ruled (Gellner 1983:1). Even though the Treaty of Berlin cut short the national ambitions, it did not weaken the dreams of achieving them. Rather, the failure only reinforced Bulgarians' struggle over the national identification process in Macedonia and Thrace. Compared to developments in the Danubian principalities and in Greece and Serbia, the national movements emerged rather late in the Bulgarian areas. Proximity to the imperial centre in Istanbul had always entailed a strong Ottoman administrative and military presence, and in contrast to other national movements, the Bulgarians were delayed in forming close relations to one or more of the Great Powers. From the mid-i830s, there had emerged a cultural political movement centred around a Slavic-language school system, but otherwise, the nationalist groups were divided, and the national idea did not lead to any clear political strategy. One group with its locus among the Bulgarian merchant families in Istanbul, worked for reforms and a form of autonomy within the Ottoman empire. Meanwhile revolutionaries and socialist-inspired groups operating out of Serbia and later in Bucharest agitated for and sought to stimulate popular rebellions (Pundeff 1969:1110. The revolutionaries' hopes of a comprehensive popular rebellion were never achieved, however. Before the Russians' military engagement paved the way for the creation of the Bulgarian principality, the national political efforts were channelled outside the small revolutionary circles largely into a conflict over the Orthodox church organisation. The church conflict was not simply religious, however, for the organisational structure of Orthodoxy in the course of the 19th century had become the theatre of struggle for national identification. National thinking had thus transformed the non-national millet system. Traces of this process extend

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68

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

themselves to Bulgaria's history under socialism, as the linking together of national and religious affiliation continued to influence the policy towards, respectively, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as a national-historical institution : and the attempt to weaken Islam as a factor of national identity among the = Turkish minority. :

In the 19th century church dispute, the political instrumentalisation of reli­ gion was manifested by the religious affiliation and church organisation becom­ ing a criterion of national identification. The national and political goal in forging together the nation, its territory and a sovereign state made the nation­ al identification necessary: who belonged to the nation and thereby to the group affected by the national political goals? In answering this question, the trans­ formation of the millet system's religious boundaries to the modern national identifications became epoch-making. The borders of Bulgaria set by the Treaty of San Stefano rested upon a conceptual fusion of history, religion, church structure and national characteristics, which since the 1850s lay behind the efforts and the initiatives to establish an independent Bulgarian church organi­ sation. These efforts came into conflict with the ecumenical patriarchate and with rival Greek and Serbian national and church political goals. The conflict evolved into a church dispute between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Bulgarian church dissidents, whose politics were crowned with success in 1870 with the establishment of the Bulgarian exarchate (Volker 1981; cf. also Jelavich and Jelavich i977:i28-4o). The Bulgarian exarchate's role in the period up to the Peace of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin raises the question of the extent to which the Ortho­ dox church and Orthodox culture were prerequisites to political nationalism, or conversely, whether the political nationalism itself created the idea that the church and the Orthodox culture were national markers of identification. After a short description of the processes by which the Bulgarian exarchate was estab­ lished, the following sections discuss the debates within recent nation and nationalism research which bear on this question. 69

2. T H E B U L G A R I A N E X A R C H A T E

During the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms of the 19th century, the Porte eliminat­ ed the institutionalised social inequality contained in the millet system's reli­ giously-based classification of the empire's population groups. The hatt-i serif reform program of 1839 recognized the fundamental equality of all inhabitants, at least in principle, and the government sought to hinder the separatist nation­ al agitation by increasing the millets.' rights, including the steadily more signifi­ cant right to control teaching institutions, these being linked to the religious

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institutions. However, the turning point of the Bulgarian church struggle first appeared with the hatt-ı hümayun reform initiative, which after the ending of the Crimean War in 1856 introduced a reorganisation of the millet system across the entire empire (Davison 1977)In 1856, the Ottoman government chose to continue the millet system in an attenuated form. The result was that those Orthodox populations in the empire who did not feel themselves represented or included within the ecumenical patriarch's Greek-dominated church could organise themselves as a millet. By 1875, the number of such groups had risen to nine, of which six were of signifi­ cant size (Karpat 1973:900. In the decades that followed, the number increased further with the formation of the Serbian and Arumanian millets. This initiative meant that the faction of the Bulgarian national movement working for a high­ er degree of political and cultural independence within the Ottoman state sys­ tem had to "clothe" their ambitions in church organisational "garb." The Ottomans, for their part, succeeded in deepening the already existing tensions between the empire's Greek and Slavic populations. Compared to the classical phase in the history of the millet system, the reforms of the 19th century introduced a gradual recognition of a type of national identification by which the Porte reacted to the nationalist challenge to the supranational empires of the time, e.g., the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. The religious distinctions among the inhabitants would now be sup­ plemented with the possibility to make geographic, linguistic or historically grounded distinctions. The ecumenical patriarchate resisted this development, but since the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s, the patriarchate had not recaptured its position in the Ottoman empire and was forced to watch as the Porte entered into direct negotiations over the division of the church's canonically- and territorially-based jurisdiction. These events helped consolidate the linking together of faith, church organisation and national identification as an inseparable part of the Bulgarian national revival. The revival, concurrently with the church struggle and via a stream of books, pamphlets and articles clear­ ly inspired by German national romanticism, sought out the national identity in folklore, language and history (Pundeff 1969:108). The changes in the Ottoman system of administration thus constitute the background for the church struggle. In 1856, as an extension of the reform initiative, a delegation of Bulgarians in Istanbul asked the sultan for permission to form an autonomous church organ­ isation. The request was yet another step in the attempt to separate the Greek and Bulgarian congregations under the patriarchate, attempts which since the 1840s had been hindered by the patriarchate and by Russian diplomacy, which did not wish to see the Orthodox Church fragment into smaller units, as this x

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would weaken Russia's own possibilities to exert influence in the Ottoman empire. In 1849, however, with the sultan's intervention, the Bulgarian colony in the capital had achieved permission to hold their own Slavic religious services. After the new request in 1856, which did not immediately bear fruit, the Porte demanded of the patriarchate that a church assembly be convened to discuss organisational changes. This assembly, as expected, was Greek dominated and convened between 1858 and i860. However, it did not reach a solution. In the same period, the Bulgarian colony continued its efforts to achieve church independence. During Easter Sunday services in i860, the deacon, with the blessing of both the congregation and of the acting Bulgarian bishop, avoided naming the ecumenical patriarch by name in the liturgy's prayer and instead invoked the name of the sultan. This breach of custom in the Orthodox liturgy and the open protest against the patriarch's resistance towards implementing organisational changes failed to produce any determined reaction from the patriarchate, which because of its precarious situation in relation to the Ottoman government could not intervene in any heavy-handed way. The disciplinary intervention against several Bulgarian bishops, who thereafter introduced the custom of naming the sultan instead of the patriarch, was thus limited, and instead the Bulgarian question came onto the agenda in a new series of church meetings and in commissions during the 1860s. Finally, in 1867, the ecumenical patriarch presented a proposal which would meet the Bulgarians' needs to establish a special status for a geographic area within the jurisdiction of the ecumenical patriarchate. The proposal contained plans for partial autonomy under the leadership of an exarch and synod, but the investitures would demand the approval of the patriarch, just as all contact to the authorities should go through the patriarchate. Even though the proposal did not meet the most wide-ranging Bulgarian demands for complete autocephaly, it clearly represented an opening on the part of the patriarch, and the subsequent negotiations were blocked mainly over a dispute concerning the geographic demarcation. The patriarchate would only allow dioceses north of the Balkan Mountains to enter into the jurisdiction of the new exarchate, while the Bulgarian side considered itself entitled to far more dioceses. At this point the Ottoman authorities intervened in the internal church negotiations and in 1868 presented two proposals. The two proposals resembled each other and were based upon the patriarch's proposal, though they extended the Bulgarian exarchate's autonomy vis-à-vis the patriarchate and increased its geographic extent. The Bulgarian bishops in Istanbul, Loveè, Sofia and Vidin applauded the authorities' proposal, but the patriarchate refused to accept either of the solution. A Greek-Bulgarian commission was then established by the Grand Vizier

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in 1869 and was given the task of presenting yet another solution to the crisis, but the patriarch rejected these proposals as well. The next step in the dispute was taken on February 28th, 1870, when the sultan issued a decree {firman), which unilaterally established a new Christian church organisation: the Bulgarian exarchate. The sultan's decree was j i compromise between the various interests and proposals which since 1867 had been submitted by the patriarch, the Bulgarian bishops and the Porte. According to the sultan's decree, the exarchate would not be an autocephalous church but would have autonomy under the ecumenical patriarchate. The sultan's decision regarding the exarchate's geographical ext\nt was especially important as a solution to the core of the dispute and attained wide-ranging consequences. The dioceses currently located in Bulgaria (i.e., Ruse, Silistra, Shumen, Tarnovo, Sofia, Vraca, Lovec, Vidin, Kjustendil, Samokov, Varna and Plovdiv) as well as the bishoprics of Nis, Pirot and Veles came under the jurisdiction of the exarchate. Excepted from this, however, were certain areas in the Rhodopes and along the Black Sea coast containing compact Greek populations, as well as several monasteries all of which remained under the direct supervision of the patriarchate. Finally, the sultan's^rman decreed that all dioceses where two-thirds of the Orthodox population so desired, should be transferred to the Bulgarian exarchate. This unusual initiative was the sultan's attempt to secure the loyalty of the Bulgarian-dominated territory and at the same time weaken the ecumenical patriarchate, which could become a dangerous focus of unity for anti-Ottoman forces during the unstable times in the latter half of the 19th century. Even though the direct diocese allocation led to disappointment in Bulgarian circles, the "two-thirds rule" was encouraging. The struggle for the adherence of the dioceses and the possibility to thereby affect the school system placed the Orthodox church organisations at the forefront of disputes in the coming decades, where the ecumenical patriarchate and Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians and their national churches would demand to be seen as sole representatives of the inhabitants' national feelings of identity and church membership in the geopolitically important territories of Thrace and especially Macedonia (cf. Stavrianos 1939)The ecumenical patriarchate protested immediately against the sultan's intervention and decision, accusing the Ottoman authorities of interference in their internal millet affairs. The patriarchate refused to cooperate within the framework of Xht firman and blocked its practical implementation. As a protest, the Bulgarian exarchate, in May 1872, seceded unilaterally from the patriarchate, which in turn, during a September church meeting, declared the exarchate to be schismatic under the accusation of "phyletism" (i.e., church separatist thinking or religious nationalism). 70

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San Stefano and the National Triumph

In the years following the declaration of ecclesiastical independence, the: exarchate leadership was largely preoccupied with organisational matters. However, with the outbreak of the rebellions in the Balkans in 1876, the December 1876 Great Power conference in Istanbul concerning the oriental question, and the outbreak of war between Russia and the Ottoman empire in 1877, the exarchate succeeded in becoming an internationally recognised political factor. With its organisation, it entered into the struggle over the boundaries and power domains in the southern Balkans. This role appeared clearly when the exarchate, after the creation of the principality in 1878, remained in Istanbul. From there it could legally operate in the Ottoman territories of Macedonia and Thrace, and with both the sultan's and the Bulgarian government's support, it succeeded in installing its own bishops in 1890 in Ohrid, Monastir (Bitola) and Skopje (Oskup) (Perry 1993:151). In the same way, the government in Sofia, under the improved relations between the exarchate and the Catholic Prince Ferdinand (ruling from 1887-1918), chose to offer support to the exarchate's schools in Macedonia. The events connected with the establishment of the Bulgarian exarchate in the course of the 19th century show how religious affiliation among the Ottoman empire's Orthodox population had obtained a political dimension. In contrast to the classical millet system, there triumphed an ethnic and nationally differentiated principle which for its part was marked by the even elder Orthodox tradition whereby a sovereign empire had to have an independent church. With the millet system, the Ottomans had unintentionally created an organisational framework for the operation of destabilising political forces, for the millet system formed the basis for the church politics of the national movements. These movements made use of millet thinking in a nationally transformed form in order to subvert the empire. Since the 1820s, the ecumenical patriarchate's geographical area was gradually decreasing. National Orthodox churches in Greece, Serbia and Romania had been organized according to each country's political secession and with international recognition (Suttner 1992). However, the Bulgarian church organisation had split from the ecumenical patriarchate before the political secession. Hence, the Bulgarians used the church issue as a first step towards achieving political independence (Vôlker 1981:720. This policy left the Patriarchate of Constantinople the loser. The various national movements demanded national churches. Affiliation to a national church was regarded as a question of national identification and political loyalty. The Patriarchate of Constantinople, on the other hand, being incorporated into the Ottoman social and political structure, was linked to no Christian nation-state power structure.

it relevant to investigate two key topics which were touched upon in connection with the description of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church under socialism. The first topic revolves around religious faith and ethnic identity under the Ottomans, and the second concerns the politicisation of religious affiliation during the spread of the national idea in the 19th century.

The events surrounding the establishment of the Bulgarian exarchate make

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3. O R T H O D O X C H R I S T I A N I T Y AND N A T I O N - B U I L D I N G

In a 1989 article entitled "'Imagined Communities'and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans" the Greek historian and political scientist Paschalis M. Kitromilides utilises results from research on nationalism to reassess the conventional views among Balkan historians regarding the function of the Orthodox Church under Ottoman rule and its relation to the history of the national movements. Kitromilides argues that nationalist mythology has obfuscated our understanding of the relation between Orthodoxy and nationalism (1989:149)Kitromilides' critical reassessment is directed towards general assumptions and stereotypical interpretations in the historiography of eastern Europe, which in connection with Orthodoxy and nationalism promote the view that: ... the Orthodox Church played a major role in preserving and cultivating the ethnic identity of the nations of south-eastern Europe under Ottoman rule and in guiding their national 'awakening . An explicit claim of this assumption is the identification of Orthodoxy with nationality, while an unstated implication points to the recognition of the Orthodox Church as a vanguard of nationalism. This assumption, whose intellectual origins are easily traceable to the second half of the nineteenth century, has prevailed in twentieth-century Balkan historiography.,. (i989:i5of 1

Kitromilides' reassessment builds, firstly, on what he regards as the theological and moral contradiction of values between Orthodox Christian and national communities. Second, he incorporates recent theories of the nation and of nationalism, including Anderson's (1991) concept of "imagined communities," into the analysis of the national identification process among the Orthodox Balkan populations. Here he criticises the interpretations which see Orthodoxy as preserver of collective identity under the Ottomans, i.e., the continuity theory's image of Orthodoxy as preserver of a collective identity, which created the basis for nation-building and political independence (1989:178). Kitromilides views the contradiction between the religious and national community as deriving from Christianity's biblical emphasis that in Christ "there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ" (Galatians 3,28). According to Kitromilides, this idea and Chris-

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tianit/s demand for universalism constituted the basis for Orthodoxy's ecumenism and operated to prevent the Patriarchate of Constantinople from being affected by ideas of national identity and national states, when these spread after the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Nationalist ideas soon began to cast a grip on the Orthodox populations in the Ottoman empire, leading the church leadership to initiate active resistance (p. 177O. According to Kitromilides, the nationalisation of the church organisation, with the Greek secession in the 1820s as the first example, thereby entailed a radical break with the Orthodox tradition. When the patriarchate and the synod in Constantinople, in the second half of the 19th century, condemmed this development as "phyletism," it occurred as a logical consequence of the theological and canonical antinomy between Orthodoxy and nationalism, even though certain circles in the patriarchate in the long run were eventually affected by national ideas (p. 179,181, i83f ). Kitromilides' criticises the uncritical way in which Balkan historiography has linked Orthodoxy with national identity, a link which we have followed on the basis of Bulgarian primary sources. He acknowledges that at a certain analytical level and in specific historical contexts, Orthodoxy could and did operate as a preserver of national identity, but that this occured is not to say that the Orthodox church has always fulfilled this function under Ottoman rule. Thus, one of the greatest anachronisms in Balkan historiography consists in viewing the Ottoman religious political system as based on a national difference. The difference, however, consisted of a religious distinction between Christians and Muslims, and only in a religious, i.e. non-national, sense did the Orthodox church as an institution contribute to maintaining a collective sense of identity among Christians in the Balkans. In this system, argues Kitromilides, the church, according to its own religious principles, was not national, and the conceptual mixing of Orthodoxy and nationality occurred only with the renunciation of the Orthodox Church's ecumenism and subsequent nationalisation of the church (p. 178O. Kitromilides' article is a thought-provoking contribution to the analysis of the Ottoman legacy in the Orthodox successor states. We have elucidated the reception of this legacy in the national political process, whereby religious affiliation and national identity became conceptually combined and several of Kitromilides' points found confirmation in the Bulgarian primary source material. The relationship between the political powers and the religious communities in the successor states thus showed themselves to be marked by a form of secularised millet thinking, and this perception is a child of modern national ideology. Nevertheless, Kitromilides' reassessments require additional comment. First, his presentation of the antimony between Orthodoxy's biblical foundation and the national communities is too idealised. It fails to incorporate the

church's relation to political powers prior to the emergence of modern nationalism and the resulting emergence of political units based on nation-state ideals. Since its recognition by the Roman empire in the beginning of the 4th century, the church has maintained a close, but not always unproblematic, relation to the political powers that be. In the eastern Mediterranean area, the relationship found its classical formulation and practice under the Emperor Justinian I (527-65). Justinian's formulation of the relationship between emperor and archbishop/patriarch in Constantinople is found in the preface to his sixth edict (novella) from 535:

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The greatest blessings of mankind are >he gifts of God which have been granted us by the mercy on high: the priesthood and the imperial authority. The priesthood ministers to things divine; the imperial authority is set over, and shows diligence in, things human; but both proceed from one and the same source, and both adorn the life of man. Nothing, therefore, will be a greater matter of concern to the emperor than the dignity and honor of the clergy; the more as they offer prayers to God without ceasing on his behalf. For if the priesthood be in all respects without blame, and full of faith before God, and if the imperial authority righdy and duly adorn the commonwealth committed to its charge, there will ensue a happy concord which will bring forth all good things for mankind (Geanakoplos 1984:136). The idea of harmony or symphony between the political and religious spheres derives from the premise that both offices and powers derive from God. In the earthly realm, the offices are installed so as to harmoniously transmit and realise God's will, and this Byzantine view of the association between Christianity and the ruler ideology found expression in court ceremony and iconography. The image of perfect cooperation between emperor and church in the Byzantine empire is contested by the term caesaropapism, an understanding of the church as subordinated to the political sphere, as a tool for the emperors in their exercise of power. Hence, the talk of harmony and symphony between emperor and church is viewed as an expression of the emperor's distorted image. Even in the classical Byzantine context, however, the relationship is more complicated, and there are good reasons to refine simplistic views of the power relations between the emperor and the church. The existence of serious conflicts between the emperor's power and the church, e.g., the iconoclastic controversy, indicate that the church was not always so pliable and subordinate, and the conflicts did not always end with the church being the losing and subordinate part. Yet i f we leave out the question of caesaropapism and the internal power relations, there is no doubt that in a Byzantine imperial understanding

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the emperor and the church were closely connected: a sovereign empire required an autocephalous church. Together with the Christianisation of the Slavic populations in the Balkans from the second half of the 9 t h century, there followed massive Byzantine cultural export to the Slavs, who quickly appropriated Byzantine ideas and traditions. Cultural export, however, did not succeed in making the Slavs into loyal political allies. Seeking independent domain or empires, they tried to loosen their bonds to Byzantium, with especially Serbian and Bulgarian tsars being successful in this enterprise. Their political goals were accompanied by efforts to create church organisations independent of the Byzantine patriarchate in Constantinople. We have followed the Bulgarian tsars' initiatives in this direction, and in connection with the development of the Serbian kingdom, the local church organisation in the same fashion loosened its bonds in 1219 and subsequently became an autocephalous Serbian patriarchate. The Slavs thereby demonstrated that they had also adopted the Byzantine model: a full independent political power required its own church organisation which should be autocephalous, albeit in theological and liturgical unity with the other Orthodox churches. This entailed that if the political power became divided or collapsed, church independence also collapsed. After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453- and the incorporation of the Orthodox inhabitants into a single church organisation, the Ottomans' millet system therefore became a logical consequence of the Byzantine imperial church ideal. Unified political organisation in turn required unity of the religious institution. The history of Orthodoxy does not contain an antimony between the church organisation and territorially delimited political units. On the other hand, Kitromilides is correct in his rejection of Orthodoxy as a synonym for national identification in the period prior to the 19th century. The medieval Orthodox churches in the Balkans were neither ethnically nor nationally defined. Rather, they were defined politically. The medieval churches were not national churches because the empires were not national; such an assertion, says Kitromilides, is anachronistic (1989:178). The empires were dynastic and power-based, and were therefore not based on national or ethnic legitimation principles; their church structures contained all believers in the territory controlled by the political power. This relationship changes only with the advent of the modern nationalism. The fragmentation of the Orthodox church in the Ottoman empire into smaller units during the 19th century occurred as a result of a radically new national ideological idea which transformed the millet system and Orthodox tradition into the idea that nation-building must be accompanied by church institutional independence.

The millet idea and the Orthodox tradition are part of the historical legacy which, combined with the modern nation-state and nationalism, are unique to the religio-political development in the Orthodox successor states. When the national idea and the confrontation with the Absolutist state transferred sovereignty and power from the regent to the nation-state's legitimating cëntre, the people/nation, the result in the Balkan Orthodox context was unique. The emperor or tsar could thereby no longer determine the kingdom's religion and church organisational situation, for here, too, the nation-bearing people had to be in the centre. This gave the question of nationally organised church structures a prominent place on the agenda of the national political movements among the Orthodox Balkan peoples in the 19th century. As a consequence of nation-building and the homogenous national state idea, the Orthodox church divided into smaller segments and often with a basis in language or history. The ecumenical patrarichate's resistance to these developments must be seen as a theologically founded rejection of Enlightenment ideas, and as an opposition which derived from the patriarchate's weakened position within the Ottoman empire, which was itself undergoing political dissolution and territorial decimation. The Ottoman empire's decline also became the decline of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The second of Kitromilides' reassessments which requires commentary is his critique of historiography's image of the Orthodoxy as a creator of collective identity and Orthodoxy's role as having created the basis for the national movements and political independence in Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria. Nation-building is the creation of a feeling of belonging between the inhabitants on the basis of common cultural characteristics. It develops with the help of language, schools, military, communication system, historical memories, the press, cultural policy, etc. Kitromilides' critique is based on results from the comprehensive and still ongoing debate on the concept of the nation and nationalism, and his arguments are connected to that most contentious of questions: Do nations and the nation-transforming processes have their origin in modern political, social and economic conditions, or should the roots be sought in more ancient ethnic-cultural raw material decisive for the formation of the modern nations? Connected with this stands the debate over the degree to which the creation of nations derives from objective factors or whether nations are subjectively determined by a state power apparatus' national homogenisation policy. The main positions in the debate are taken by the "modernists" contra the "essentialists" or "primordialists" ("from the beginning," here as a label for the view that the characteristics of nations have existed from all time), with variants in between. In other words: are nations constructions or given by nature?

U3

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

The nation and nationalism debate can be usefully included here because Kitromilides' critique raises two questions: Was Orthodoxy an institution which became politically instrumentalised in the national movements's nation-building and their effort to achieve nation-state sovereignty? Or were the church and Christianity institutions and collective identity creators on which natural communities had based themselves for centuries, before, during and after the Ottomans? The latter view is closer to the developments outlined in the foregoing chapter in connection with the discussion of Dimitrar Angelov and other contributions to the continuity theory. It is a question of the degree to which national characteristics are learned or acquired in a modern and conscious national construction process, or whether they are "eternal," as was generally assumed around the beginning of the 20th century, when the modern nation-states were viewed as organisational continuations of ancient or medieval kingdoms and the national peoples, i.e., as continually existing peoples (Smith 1996:109). This nationalism debate can therefore contribute to our understanding of the relationship between church and national movements in the Orthodox Balkans. 4. N A T I O N AND NATIONALISM

Through the 1980s and 1990s research connected with the concepts of "nation" and "nationalism" has attracted attention from a range of fields. Nationalism research has become an especially dynamic field (see for example Alter 1994; Guibernau 1996; Breuilly 1994; Smith 1992; 1998; Hastings 1997 and anthologies such as Hutchinson and Smith 1994; Wolff 1996; Balakrishnan 1996 and Augustinos 1996). Monographs and articles of theoretical and empirical character written from historical, sociological, political science or anthropological perspectives have contributed to the analysis of collective identities and their political forms of expression. The comprehensive recent academic interest in the concepts of nation and nationalism stand in contrast to the immediate postwar period, when nationalism was thought to have died together with Nazism. Nevertheless, political developments from the 1980s have shown that ethnic, regional and national questions and disputes can in no way be considered completed phases in social, economic and political development and history. In our context, it is relevant to incorporate the social anthropologist and philosopher Ernest Gellner's theory of the origin of nations, and to apply it to the analysis of eastern European and southeastern European history. Especially relevant is also Anthony D. Smith's important and on some points controversial contribution to ethnicity research in several publications (e.g. 1983; 1991; 1992; i999)> including his major work The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986). Smith's most important contribution is his development of a model for the

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emergence of modern nations on the basis of pre-national collective identities. In our context, his theory can be advantageously incorporated into elucidating the importance of the national idea for linking together politics, history and history of religion during the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, because it is precisely the pre-national characteristics which were decisive for thes.Uccessor states' interpretation of their Ottoman past. In Ernest Geller, the debate on the origins of nation had a prominent advocate for a theory of the nation's modern character and origins in industrial society, Gellner pointed out that industrial society had broken down the economic and family structures of agrarian society atad instead made demands for a flexible workforce with common values and language. Modern states fulfilled these demands by homogenising their populations into a single common national culture. In his main work on this topic, Nations and Nationalism (1983), Gellner defines nationalism as a feeling or movement which as a political principle holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. As an identity-creating ideology, nationalism connects peoples who due to industrialisation and urbanisation have lost their identity-creating factors once found in the kin group, feudal relations, landscape or religion. The national identity is the population's feelings, whereby the political system, territory and power apparatus are connected in the nation-state, and nationalism the glue which holds together the post-absolutist state and the modern national folk. Gellner emphasises that nation-states are a product of recent social and economic development regardless of what nationalist mythmakers might assert about the nations' antiquity. At the same time, he points out that nationalism and national states do not rest upon a natural ethnic basis. Nations are created from human groups by standardising the language, introducing uniform schooling and uniting the group through a common labour market; it is the nationalist project. Therefore nationalism, according to Gellner, is also a modern ideology and the nation-state a modern political organisation which has emerged as a result of the social conditions in the western world from the late 18th century Within nationalism research, this theory is known as the "modernist" position. The "modernist" position has wide-ranging consequences for our understanding of the concept of the nation, as nations thereby become a phenomenon which emerge out of the social and economic changes since the 18th century. Two short quotations from Gellner illustrate the extent of the theory: 71

1. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.

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2. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artefacts of men's convictions and loyalities and solidarities. A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members. (1983:7)

In this light, a nationalist view of history consists of a construction of the nation's and the country's history, which in turn builds upon a notion that the nation in question has always existed, and that its true essence and potential is realized in the nation-state. Nationalist ideology retrieves from history the symbols, myths and values which it uses to show who belongs to the nation, what characterises it, and which territory its members claim as theirs. The nationalist view of history is in this sense ideological, as the history of the people, often under desperation and foreign domination, always points towards the homogenous nation-state in which the people's cultural and civilisational potential is realized. The "modernist" position has diffused widely, and Benedict Anderson, with the term "imagined communities," has expressed the same idea (1991). Anderson argues that all communities are imagined; nations are imagined in the sense that they build upon the ideas and expectations of a political community invented by those who construct the nation, the folklorists, historians and propagandists. The "modernist" position is also found in the work of Eric Hobsbawm: "historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market. Nations without a past are contradictions in terms" (quoted in Balakrishnan 1996:255). Yet Hobsbawm also operates with the concept of popular protonationalism and thereby clears the way for a chronological predecessor for modern nation and nationalism thinking (1992). The theory's influence is also seen in innumerable empirically oriented studies which have appeared in recent years, studies in the "the invention of . . . " genre (e.g. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). This composite genre includes detailed and well-documented examples of how symbolic universes, stereotypes and world-views are constructed or manipulated in political and cultural discourses. The theory that the modern concepts of nation and nationalism, with the associated constructed national myth, have emerged as a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the west European socio-economic transforma-

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tion from the 18th century, however, has also been criticised and problematised. Anthony D. Smith has already been mentioned as a representative of the school which rejects the premise of the "modernists" regarding the pre-existing culture's presumed arbitrary significance. Paul James, too, has sought a middle path in the debate on the modern construction of nations versus their naturally given and "eternal" origin. With this objective, James outlines a social theory of the nation, in which he criticises the scholarship for focusing on nationalism, the nation-state or concrete national movements instead of proposing a theory without essentialising the past and fictionalising the present: Such a theory would, it is hoped, allow us to say that while nations do not come into being until they are lived as such (or at least abstracdy recognized as such, usually in the first instance by intellectuals or persons lifted out of the face-to-face) the social forms which ground national formation are already lived prior to the generalization of this new sense of historicity, (p. 122) Paul James also offers a critical analysis of Gellner's "nationalism before nation" theory (1996:126-50) and in an effort to bridge the"primordialist-modernist" gap, James argues for the need to consider pre-modern and modern nations as part of a continuity in the discontinuity. He thus argues that modern nations exhibit somecontinuities in social forms in relation to the medieval "nations" (1996:192). In general, the 'modernist' position is poorly suited to analysing nationbuilding and the emergence of nation-states in eastern and southeastern Europe because this area lay outside the west European economic and technological developmental trajectory on which the theory is based. Hence, from a predominantly historical perspective, typologies of different forms of nationhood and nationalism have sought to account for the fact that not all modern nation and nationalisms have emerged on the basis of identical socio-economic conditions, and that nations and nationalisms do not have the same characteristics in all places and at all times. Precisely these nation typologies are important for understanding nation-building and nationalism in southeastern Europe. The classical typology for modern nations has its roots in Friedrich Meinecke's distinction between Staatsnation and Kulturnation (1908), designating nations based on adherence to political institutions contrasted with nations based on cultural similarities such as language, folklore, religion, history, etc. English and French do not have entirely similar terms for Staatsnation and Kulturnation. Subsequently, Hans Kohn became the most well known representative of the historical research which continued Meinecke's distinction. Kohn distinguished between a west European (voluntarist, subjectivist) and east European (determinist, objective) concept of nation, and he established a chrono72

137

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San Stefano and the National Triumph

logical sequence between them. According to Kohn, the modern nation concept and the accompanying ideology of nationalism emerged in the west during the 18th century as a result of a popular will to community in a specific historical development and in a specific territory. With the transformation of the kingdoms/countries into nation-states, citizenship became synonymous with national affiliation. From western Europe the idea of nation penetrated eastwards, where the social and historical basis differed. The concept of nation instead became a mystical and historically fixated construction linked to seemingly objective factors such as language and common historical background (1961:339; cf. 1965). Elaborating on Kohn's evolutionary model, Theodor Schieder has proposed a three-phase developmental scheme of European nation-state forms. The first stage was the establishment of the modern national states in England and France, the second the German and Italian national unifications into nationstates and the third step was the formation of eastern European nation-states and nations in confrontation with the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires. Schieder's phases can be succintly characterised as, first, a chronological development within a state, then for a state and finally turned against supranational states/empires. Meinecke's Staatsnation-Kulturnation dichotomy and Kohn's and Schieder's west-east development and differentiation reappear in various incarnations with varying terminology in more recent historical and sociologically oriented nation and nationalism literature. Anthony Smith, for example, distinguishes been a western, "civic" national concept and an eastern, "ethnic" nation concept (1986:134-44) corresponding to modern legal concepts of citizenship, where French law is based on ius soli, territorial law, while German law is based on the right of blood, ius sanguinis. Liah Greenfeld also operates with the typological difference between nations which is created around a state, laws and citizenship, and ethnic nations, which define affiliation on the basis of cultural-historical criteria (1992:11). Inspiration from the ideal-typical forms of nation and of nationalism is also clear in the work of Peter Sugar, who distinguishes between a western political nationalism and a Central European cultural nationalism, while east European nationalism is classified as a mixed form with special expressions such as xenophobia and historical obsession. In the history of east European nationalism, Sugar further distinguishes between four types: (1) bourgeois (Czechs), (2) aristocratic {Poland and Hungary), (3) popular (Serbia and Bulgaria) and (4) bureaucratic (Turkey, Greece and Romania) (1969:19,35ff, 6 f f ) . Common to these types is that historical interpretations, in combination with cultural characteristics, are decisive in the east European constructions of national collective identity. Here we can observe the interaction of national pol73

4

¡38

itics, national historiography and national religious communities characteristic of what we have investigated in Bulgaria. As a logical consequence of this connection between politics, historiography and religion, the Orthodox church becomes privileged while the Turkish community is marginalised and oppressed. The axis revolves around historiography, i.e. national historiography's image of the deeds and defeats as a component in the creation of collective identities: So kreist das sogenannte "Erwachen der Völker"... um die Fixierung einer Schriftsprache, um die Erweckung eines nationalen Erinnerungsbildes, um die Überwindung des Bruches de\ nationalen Überlieferung; die Geschichtsschreiber gehören zu den Mitschöpfern des Nationalbewußtseins dieser Völker. Sie machen den Rückgriff in eine oft legendäre Vergangenheit, schaffen eine nationale Mythologie und führen den Kampf um den Nachweis der nationalen Autochthonie. (Schieder 1991 [ 956] :35o) ]

The nation concept used by social constructivists and "modernists" refines this insight, emphasising how national movements' constructions of nation are random in their use of historical traditions. The question, then, concerns how far this randomness can extend, and precisely in this context, Anthony Smith's research contains fruitful perspectives. Does the nationalist historiography see the past as "full" or "empty," to use Smith's terminology? To which he responds that it seems to be "fuller" than is often assumed by advocates of the "modernist" position (1986:177; cf. also Armstrong 1982; Hutchinson 1994:1-63)- A significant part of Smith's work therefore centers around discussing which raw materials of a cultural and historical kind must be possessed by a rising national movement in order to have any chance of realizing its fundamental political goal: a nation-state. Applied more directly to our topic, is the conventional historiographie tradition which asserts that the Bulgarians Orthodoxy was an ethnic or national identity-preserving factor historically justified, or is it an expression of a nationalist continuity-creating historical fiction? Smith acknowledges that there is no causal or necessary cultural continuity between pre-national ethnic groups and modern national communities, as the nationalists and nationalist historiography assert. However, he nevertheless maintains that there are clearly identifiable features behind the constructions which successful ethnic groups utilise in their national identity forming processes. Smith cites three reasons to seek the origins of nations in pre-national ethnic communities: The first is that, historically, the first nations were ... formed on the basis of pre-modern ethnic cores; and, being powerful and culturally influential,

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they provided models for subsequent cases of the formation of nations in many parts of the globe. The second reason is that the ethnic model of the nation became increasingly popular and widespread not only for the foregoing reason, but also because it sat so easily on the pre-modern "demotic" kind of community that had survived into the modern era in so many parts of the world. In other words the ethnic model was sociologically fertile. And third, even where a nation-to-be could boast no ethnic antecedents of importance and where any ethnic ties were shadowy or fabricated, the need to forge out of whatever cultural components were available a coherent mythology and symbolism of a community of history and culture became everywhere paramount as a condition of national survival and unity. Without some ethnic lineage the nation-to-be could fall apart. (1991:410

San Stefano and the National Triumph

The difference between an ethnic community and a modern nation (name, territory, culture, economy, educational system and law) is precisely that the nation is formed by modernity and springs from the nation's connection to the bureaucratic state and nationalism. As concerns western Europe>Smith in this sense acknowledges the correctness of the "modernist" position that nations are modern. But he then raises the question of whether there could also exist other forms of enduring cultural communities in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, and on the basis of comprehensive historical data, responds that these were indeed ethnic communities. Among the ethnic communities, it is necessary to distinguish between two ideal types, whereVthe first is: ... a type of ethnic community that can conveniently be termed 'lateral'. This type of ethnie was usually composed of aristocrats and higher clergy, though it might from time to time include bureaucrats, high military officials and richer merchants. It is termed lateral because it was at once socially confined to the upper strata while being geographically spread out to form often close links with the upper echelons of neighbouring lateral ethnies.... In contrast, the'vertical' type of ethnie was more compact and popular. Its ethnic culture tended to be diffused to other social strata and classes. Social divisions were not underpinned by cultural differences: rather, a distinctive historical culture helped to unite different classes around a common heritage and traditions, especially when the latter were under threat from outside. As a result the ethnic bond was often more intense and exclusive, and barriers to admission were higher. (Smith 1991:53)

For a theory of the nation, the problem thereby arises as to whether the difference between ethnic identity and nations is only a chronological one—that modern nations follows an ethnic group—or whether there is also a typological relationship (Smith 1986:1). For a nation, formation and maintenance of the sense of nationhood is decisive. The sense of nationhood constitutes and is normally diffused from a centre and an elite to other layers of the population, and the feeling of nationhood is expressed in common symbolic representations and historical narratives, myths and symbols. The possibilities for a nation to exist are thereby conditioned by myths and memories. Smith's working definition of a nation is "a named community of history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, mass education system and common legal rights" (1996:107). Ethnic communities, or to use Smith's preferred French term "ethnie" can be described as an ideal type, i.e., by a series of characteristics which mark the ethnic community, but these characteristics do not all need to be represented or to be equally important in order to designate a given population as an ethnic community. The most important difference between a nation and an ethnic community is that an ethnic community need not comprise an economic and political-juridical community, just as the definition of an ethnic community marks the difference from pure class communities, religious communities and solely territorially defined political units. According to Smith, ethnic communities exhibit the following common features: (1) a collective name, (2) a common myth of descent, (3) a shared history, (4) a distinctive shared culture (e.g., language, religion, customs, laws, institutions, architecture, clothing, food, art, skin colour or appearance), (5) an association with a specific territory, and 6) a sense of solidarity among significant parts of the population (1986:22-30; cf. 1991:20).

According to Smith, the two ideal types, aristocratic or popular, also determine the two main developmental trajectories which have formed modern nations. The first derives from an aristocratic upper class's incorporation of other population groups into a new and broader cultural unity via a bureaucratic apparatus (England, France and Spain). In contrast, the state and the bureaucracy were less important in the process by which popular ethnic communities became the basis for modern nations, which was frequently the case in eastern Europe. In the geographic and social diffusion of myths, symbols, memories and values, Smith finds that organised religion and the clergy often played a prominent role; but the transformation from popular ethnic communities to a nation was borne by a nationally aroused secular intelligentsia, who "rediscovered" the nation's ethnic past. The change from a popular ethnic community to a civic nation contains several processes. The historical trajectories of nation-building differ, but all nationalist movements dispose of a myth about the ethnic origin. And it is precisely this aspect of Smith's analysis of the concept of nation which is especially

140

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Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

relevant in connection with the Bulgarian national movement's and state's linking together of religion and national identity. The national movement's origin myths contain a series of common motifs: (1) a myth of origin in time, (2) a myth of origin in space, (3) a myth of ancestry, i.e. a symbolic kinship between all presently living members, (4) a myth of migration, (5) a myth of liberation, (6) a myth of the golden age, the heroes and the culture's era of greatness, (7) a myth of decline, and (8) a myth of rebirth which as a normative narrative reveals the authentic in the nation and how the nation shall be restored to its former glory in the golden age (i984:iooff; cf. I986:i92ff). The intellectuals in national movements often had to choose new myths, symbols and historical interpretations in order to complete the national portrait^ and to this extent Smith again offers support to the social constructivists and "modernists." His thesis, however, is that this could only have occurred within a limited selection of already existing symbols and memories in the ethnic community. Hence, Smith rejects the more radical social constructivist ideas about randomness and fiction in the formation of national identity and nations. Smith's model for how national movements rework historical symbols and memories constitutes a helpful framework for understanding the religio-historical dimension of Bulgarian nation-building. The formation of national identity in Bulgaria took place in the 19th century within the framework of the millet system, and the national myth was then created in interaction with a social organisation based upon religious criteria. At the same time, this meant that the modern national idea and the nation-state institutional frameworks transformed religious affiliation into national identity. Orthodoxy formed a background for the unfolding of the national myth, in that ethnic categories were blended together with religion. In the classic Ottoman millet system, a millet was not a nation. Yet, the national idea transformed the millet organisation into national categories. An eminent example of this development is found during and after the dispute about the independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church, where church and Christianity, in a remarkable way became instrumentahsed in the Bulgarian nation-building process. In the same manner, the church entered the struggle about national identification in Macedonia and Thrace. The Bulgarian exarchate thus became an instrument for promoting national political and territorial ambitions and demands. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church could play these roles because the national myth pointed to the church as the decisive continuity-creating institution in the Bulgarians' history during Ottoman rule.

142

\

\ C O N C L U S I O N

O

N T H E BACKGROUND OF BULGARIAN SOURCES, the preceding chapters

have shown how the national origin myths unfold within a framework which corresponds to Anthony Smith's description of the common features of national movements' origin myths. In conclusion, however, there are reasons to add a few commentaries germane to the special features of nationbuilding in an Ottoman successor state and its particular national perception of Orthodox state-church tradition and millet thinking. The chronological and typological connection between popular ethnic communities and modern nations is a model which must be treated cautiously so as not to reproduce the national movement's own ideas and often distorted view of the nation's history. Anthony Smith remarks in passing that the vertical, popular, type of ethnic communities correspond to the Orthodox peoples under the Ottomans, and he finds that among these ideal typical ethnic communities, religion and religious institutions could play a special role: It was organized religion and its sacred scriptures, liturgy, rituals and clergy that acted as the chief mechanism of ethnic persistence among vertical communities. (1991:61; cf. 1986:119) Religion, then, may preserve a sense of common ethnicity as if in a chrysalis, at least for a period, as was the case with Greek Orthodoxy for the self-governing Greek Orthodox millet under Ottoman Rule. (1991:35; cf. 198673)

Here Smith thus supports what we have labelled the continuity theory. We have in some detail described this continuity theory in chapter 5 as an supplementary theory to the research paradigm behind the catastrophe theory which was an integral part of the official Bulgarian historiographical tradition analyzed in chapter 2 and critically reexamined in chapter 3 and 4. However, in the

143

Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria

quotation, Smith does not take account of the fact that the Orthodox millet in the Ottoman empire was not ethnically homogenous, and that both the Slavic and Albanian national movements in the 19th and early 20th centuries broke with the G reek-dominated patriarchate in Constantinople as part of their own nation-building. How could religion provide a sense of ethnic identity when the Orthodox millet was not based on ethnic criteria? The process by which the Bulgarian exarchate was formed and the creation of the Greek, Romanian, Serbian and Albanian Orthodox national churches in the 19th and 20th centuries, therefore, points in the direction of a modification of Smith's interpretation. These processes demonstrate that Orthodoxy was not an ethnic church under the Ottomans. Rather, it became politically instrumen¬ talised within the modern movements for national self-determination. In the process towards national independence, Orthodoxy had to be "dressed up" in national garb in the form of a cultural and linguistically grounded and churchhistorical, but not theological, demarcation in relation to the ecumenical patriarchate. The patriarchate in the Ottoman capital was subject to strong pressure from political and church independence movements which in their struggle for seccession from the Ottoman rule also utilised the church as part of their national aspiration for sovereign nation-states. The national historiographical continuity theory which we have concentrated upon in the Bulgarian socialist research tradition portrays a connection between the political and the ecclesiastical structures dating back to the Bulgarian medieval kingdoms, thereby parallelling the 19th century national continuity thinking. Thus the medieval church history and the Ottoman millet organisation became the raw material for creating the national myth's selfunderstanding about the Bulgarian nation's continuity and identity. But in their depiction of continuity, the historians seem to ignore the fact that the medieval connection between a dynastic realm and an autocephalous church rested upon a medieval imperial legitimation basis and thereby on a fundamentally different basis than nation-church relations in the modern nation-state. In the political movements for a sovereign state on the ruins of the Ottoman empire, religion and the church became politically operationalised in order to achieve a national goal, and this development represents not continuity but a break with both Orthodoxy's Byzantine legacy and the non-ethnic character of the millet system. The Bulgarian national movement, with the exception of some small revolutionary groups, thus defined national characteristics by transforming millet thinking and emphasisinga cultural, linguistic and church historical difference vis-à-vis both the Muslim Ottomans and the Greeks. The idea of the nation's historical roots and unique cultural features thus marginalised all Muslims as

144

Conclusion

well as justified the will to pursue a singular national and religious identity and an urge for freedom. The same legitimation of the modern national idea is emphasized in descriptions of the Bulgarian medieval kingdoms political and religious efforts to secede from Byzantium and from the P a t r i a t e of Constantinople. Neglected was the fact that the medieval kingdoms *vere not nationally legitimated, as was the fact that Ottoman domination was reBgjoudy and not nationally organised. The national idea thus transformed both medieval history and Ottoman rule, first by placing the people (the nation) in the political centre and second, by transforming the concept of millet into the concept of nation. This turned national identity into a question of religious affiliation and vice versa.

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Osavkov, Z., red. 1968. Procesät na preodoljavaneto na religijata v Bälgarija: Sociolo gitesko izsledvane, Sofia. Oschlies, W. 1975. "'Überwundene Religion?' Zur Gegenwartssituation von Religion und Kirche in Bulgarien," Evangelische Theologie, 35. Jahrgang, nr. 5,

1975. Sàdbonosni vekove za bàlgarskata narodnost, Sofia. — —

1987-88.

Po sledite na nasilieto. Dokumenti za pomohamedancvanija i

poturëvanija, 2. izd. med undertitlen Dokumenti i materiali za nalagane na

München, 438-63.

isljama, I—II, Sofia

1983. "Kirche und Religion in Bulgarien," in Lendvai, P., Hg., Religionsfreiheit und Menschenrechte. Bilanz und Aussicht, Graz, 1 8 0 - 2 0 2 . Osmanski izvori za isljamizacionnite procesi na Balkanite (XVI-XIX Sofia.

v.) 1990.

Pantazopoulos, N.J. 1967. Church and Law in the Balkan Peninsula During the Ottoman Rule, Thessaloniki. Papadopoullos, T.H. 1952. Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People Under Turkish Domination, Brussels. 1967. "Orthodox Church and Civil Authority," Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 2, nr. 4, London, 2 0 1 - 9 . Papadopoulos, C.G. 1924. Les Privilèges du Patriarcat Œcuménique (Communauté Grecque Orthodoxe) dans l'Empire Ottoman, Paris. Papoulia, B.D. 1963. Ursprung und Wesen der "Knabenlese" im osmanischen Reich, München. Paret, R. 1970. "Toleranz und Intoleranz im Islam," Saeculum, Band 21, München, 3 4 4 - 6 5 .

Patrinelis, C. 1969. "The Exact Time of the First Attempt of the Turks to Seize the Churches and Convert the Christian People of Constantinople to Islam,"

164

(1.

izd.

1972)¬

1988. Sedem veka genocid, Sofia. —.

1989. Mohamedani—pobornici, Sofia.

Petrovich, M.B. 1980. "Religion and Ethnicity in Eastern Europe," in Sugar, P.F., ed., Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe, Santa Barbara and Oxford, 373-417-

Pohvalno slovo za Evtimij ot Gregorij Camblak 1971. red. P. Rusev 8t I . Gàlàbov & A. Davidov 8< G. Dancev, Sofia. Popovic, A. 1986a. "The Turks of Bulgaria vol. 5, nr. 2, Oxford, 1-32.

(1878-1985),"

Central Asian Survey,

1986b. L'Islam balkanique. Les Musulmans du sud-est européen dans la période post-ottomane, Berlin.

Poptodorov, R. 1970-71. "Pravoslavno-hrîstijanskata vjara i bàlgarskata narodna cârkva kato faktori za zapazvaneto na balgarskija narod, za formiraneto na nacionalnoto mu sàznanie i za kulturnoto mu razvitie prez vreme na petvekovnoto osmansko robstvo," Godiïnik na duhovnata akademija, Tom XX (XLI), Sofia, 65-261 (1-195). Poulton, H . 1993. The Balkans. Minorities and States in Conflict, new edition, London. 1995. Who Are the Macedonians?, London.

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References

1930. Vàzraidane na bälgarskija narod. Cärkovno-nacionalni borbi ipostizenija, Sofia (2. izd. 1971).

Actes du premier congrès international des études balkaniques et sud-est européennes, III, Sofia, 567-72.

Nitzova, P. 1994. "Islam in Bulgaria: A Historical Reappraisal," Religion, State and Society, vol. 22, Oxford, 97-102.

Péchayre, A.-P. 1936. "L'archevêché d'Ochrida de 1394 à \767"^Échos d'Orient, Tome XXXV, Paris, 1 8 3 - 2 0 4 , 2 8 0 - 3 2 3 .

Norris, H.T. 1993. Islam and the Balkans. Religion and Society Between Europe and the Arab World, London.

Periwal, S., ed. 1995. Notions of Nationalism, Budapest.

Noth, A. 1978. "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen islamischer Toleranz," Saeculum, Band 29, München, 1 9 0 - 2 0 4 . OSavkov, Z , red. 1968. Procesät napreodoljavaneto na religijata v Bälgarija: Sociolo gicesko izsledvane, Sofia. Oschlies, W. 1975. "'Überwundene Religion?' Zur Gegenwartssituation von Religion und Kirche in Bulgarien," Evangelische Theologie, 35. Jahrgang, nr. 5, München, 438-63.

1983. "Kirche und Religion in Bulgarien," in Lendvai, P., Hg., Religionsfreiheit und Menschenrechte. Bilanz und Aussicht, Graz, 1 8 0 - 2 0 2 . Osmanski izvori za isljamizaäonnite procesi na Balkanite (XVI-XIX Sofia.

v.) 1990.

Pantazopoulos, N.J. 1967. Church and Law in the Balkan Peninsula During the Ottoman Rule, Thessaloniki. Papadopoullos, T H . 1952. Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People Under Turkish Domination, Brussels. 1967. "Orthodox Church and Civil Authority," Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 2, nr. 4, London, 2 0 1 - 9 . Papadopoulos, C G . 1924. Les Privilèges du Patriarcat Œcuménique (Communauté Grecque Orthodoxe) dans l'Empire Ottoman, Paris. Papoulia, B.D. 1963. Ursprung und Wesen der "Knabenlese" im osmanischen Reich, München. Paret, R. 1970. "Toleranz und Intoleranz im Islam," Saeculum, Band 21, München, 3 4 4 - 6 5 .

Patrinelis, C. 1969. "The Exact Time of the First Attempt of the Turks to Seize the Churches and Convert the Christian People of Constantinople to Islam,"

164

Perry, D.M. 1993. Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modem Bulgaria, 1870-1895, Durham and London. Petrov, P., red. 1964. Acimilitorskata politika na turskite zavoevateli, Sofia. 1975. Sàdbonosni vekove za bàlgarskata narodnost, Sofia. 1987-88. Po sledite na nasilieto. Dokumenti za pomohamedanivanija i poturcvanija, 2. izd. med undertitlen Dokumenti i materiali za nalagane na isljama, I - I I , Sofia (1. izd. 1972).

1988. Sedem veka genocid, Sofia. 1989. Mohamedani—pobornici, Sofia. Petrovich, M.B. 1980. "Religion and Ethnicity in Eastern Europe," in Sugar, P.F., ed., Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe, Santa Barbara and Oxford, 373-417-

Pohvalno slovo za Evtimij ot Gregorij Camblak 1971. red. P. Rusev & I . Gàlâbov & A. Davidov & G. Danfev, Sofia. Popovic, A. 1986a. "The Turks of Bulgaria vol. 5, nr. 2, Oxford, 1-32.

(1878-1985),"

Central Asian Survey,

1986b. L'Islam balkanique. Les Musulmans du sud-est européen dans la période post-ottomane, Berlin.

Poptodorov, R. 1970-71. "Pravoslavno-hristijanskata vjara i bàlgarskata narodna càrkva kato faktori za zapazvaneto na bàlgarskija narod, za formiraneto na nacionalnoto mu sàznanie i za kulturnoto mu razvitie prez vreme na petvekovnoto osmansko robstvo," Godilnik na duhovnata akademija, Tom XX (XLI), Sofia, 65-261 (1-195). Poulton, H. 1993. The Balkans. Minorities and States in Conflict, new edition, London. 1995. Who Are the Macedonians?, London.

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References

1971. "Ottoman Documents From the Archives of Dionysiou (Mount Athos) 1495-1520," Südost-Forschungen, Band XXX, München, 1-35. Zeljazkova, A. 1982. "Etno-religiozni promeni v Makedonija i Osmanskata därzavna tradicija," in Bälgarija 1300. Institucii i dârlavna tradicija, Sofia, 427-34.

1985. "Social aspects of the process of islamization in the Balkan posses­ sions of the Ottoman Empire," Études balkaniques, vol. 21, nr. 3, Sofia, 107-22. 1990a. Razprostranenie na isljama v zapadnobalkanskite zemi pod osmanska vlast XV-XVIII vek, Sofia.

NOTES 2. NATIONAL

REBIRTH

AND LEGITIMATION

1990b. "The Problem of the Authenticity of some Domestic Sources on the Islamization of the Rhodopes," Études balkaniques, vol. 26, nr. 4, Sofia,

A selection of documentation can be found in Amnesty International (1986) and Helsinki Watch Reports (1986,1987). Other documentary evidence is available in Stidosteuropa, 34. Jahrgang, München 1985:359-67« 477"5°6, Hoppe (1986) and Poulton

105-11.

(1993:105-71).

Zientara, B. 1981. "Nationale Strukturen des Mittelalters. Ein Versuch zur Kritik der Terminologie des Nationalbewusstseins unter besonderer Berücksichti­ gung osteuropäischer Literatur," Saeculum, Band 32, München, 301-16. Zitija na bälgarskite svetci 1974. (v novo-bälgarski prevod ot Levskijski episkop Partenij), I , Sofia. Özoran, B.R. 1965. "Turks and the Greek Orthodox Churches," Cultura Turcica, vol. II, nr. I, Ankara, 28-41.

1.

2. Introductions to the history of the Turkish-Muslim population in Bulgaria since independence in 1878 are found in Popovic (1986a; i 9 8 6 b : 6 6 - i o 6 ) , Crampton (1990), Nitzova (1994), Stojanov (1994) and Höpken (1997). Strong opposition to the official Bulgarian view is found in several of the contributions in Karpat (1990); cf. also Eminov (1986,1997) and Şimşir (1988). From the Turkish side, efforts were made to demonstrate that since the 19th century, the Bulgarians had conducted a genocidal policy towards the Muslim, Turkish-speaking minority. Soon after the beginning of the name-changing campaign the Turkish Historical Society issued a refutation of the Bulgarian version in The Turkish (1986), An impression of the sharp and emotional polemic can be seen in Memişoglu (1989).

3. A historical overview of the changing measures toward the country's Muslims is found in Tafradjiski, Radoeva and Minev (1992). Earlier campaigns were directed espe­ cially toward Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks), and these campaigns contain the most important elements in the ideological justifications of the name-changing campaign which were further developed in the second half of the 1980s (cf. M. Todorova I992b:i54ff). 4. After 1989 several human rights and research centres (with support from the Euro­ pean Union and the United States) published seminar reports and analyses of the nation­ al question and the ethnic tensions: see for example Aspektİ (1992a and 1992b), Etniceskata kartina (1993) and Vrâzki (n.d.). For further discussion of the conditions of minorities, including the Turkish population's new political mobilisation, see Borisov and Zecev (1990), Riedel (1993), Stojanov and Höpken (1996) and Troebst (1996). Bulgaria's political development since 1989 has been described and analysed in Höpken (1996). 5. The speech was published in Ğernomorski Front in Burgas on March 9th, 1985; here it is rendered according to the text and retaining the value-laden words and concepts fol­ lowing the documentation in Hoppe (i986:A476-A478).

175

Notes to Pages 25-43

Notes to Pages 16-24

6. The speech was published i n SHvensko Deb i n Sliven on M a r c h 12th, 1985; here ren­ dered f o l l o w i n g the documentation i n Hoppe (1986: A478-A481). 7. Representative justification for the process is f o u n d i n Andreev, Lazarov a n d Ivano¬ va (1987), Istorijata

İ nie (1986), Petrov (1987-88; 1989). A t the 1986 International Con­

13. This is the conventional designation for the Bulgarian cultural a n d political move­ m e n t f r o m the end o f the 18th century to 1878, which must n o t be confused w i t h the process of national rebirth (the name-changing campaign) i n the 1980s. 14. Since the Second W o r l d War a n d u n t i l i 9 6 0 , Bulgarian historical publications were

gress o f Bulgarian Studies i n Sofia, this political agenda was reflected i n several o f the

registered i n the Jahrbuch für Geschichte der UdSSR und der volksdemokratischen

conference papers: Vtori meidunaroden

1989 (cf. Petrov and Gandev). The same agenda

Europas vol. 3,1944-55 (Berlin 1959:497-529) and vol, 7,1956-60 (Berlin 1963:645-706).

can be traced i n S. D i m i t r o v (1986) a n d i n the collection o f sources entitled Osmanski

Since i 9 6 0 , the w o r k has been continued under the editorship o f E. Kostova as Bälgars-

izvori (1990). The Bulgarian authorities published a stream o f pamphlets aimed at an

ka istoriéeska nauka. Bibliografija (covering five year periods).

international public and diffused t h r o u g h channels such as embassies a n d consulates justifying the policy being carried out ( w i t h o u t indications o f authors a n d all translated into major w o r l d languages, e.g., Qui s'inquite (1985) and Die Wahrheit (1986)), Begin­ n i n g i n 1986, the official foreign language press agency and publisher, Sofia Press, pub­ lished a series o f pamphlets including those b y Petrov (1988) a n d S. D i m i t r o v (1989). The same project is passionately p r o m o t e d i n Sagorow (1987). 8. Problemi was p r i n t e d i n 10.000 copies, a n d the sale price was an especially l o w 3.63 leva. Straniciv/zs p r i n t e d i n a massive press r u n o f 100,114 copies a n d sold at 1.19 leva can o n l y be characterised as a gift.

Länder

15. Via the national epic o f the author and, politician Ivan Vazov, entitled Pod igoto (1888), the "yoke" metaphor has diffused widefy i n t o Bulgarian historiography, popular w r i t i n g , teaching manuals, newspapers and literature. 16. "Osnovni etapi v razvitieto na balgarskata istoiiceska nauka sled vtorata svetovna vojna" ( " M a i n stages i n Bulgarian historical science after the Second W o r l d W a r " ) , pp. 13-99¬ 17. I n a later historiographie lecture, Georgieva expands on the ideological factors w h i c h lay b e h i n d the theses about the character o f O t t o m a n rule, a n d she is n o t b l i n d to

9. As evidence o f forced assimilation, Petrov includes a quotation f r o m 1878 b y the O t t o m a n governor M i d h a t Paşa. D u r i n g the name-changing campaign, the quotation was constandy repeated, b u t strongly abridged a n d taken out o f context. I n unabridged f o r m , the quotation can be f o u n d i n N o r r i s ( i 9 9 3 : x v i i i - x i x ) . 10. As evidence o f the O t t o m a n policy o f forced assimilation, Jankov also refers to the priest M e t o d i Draginov's chronicle o n the conversion o f the Bulgarians i n the Rhodopes i n the 1660s (p. 10). This source is cited innumerable times i n the Bulgarian scientific l i t ­ erature (and school textbooks) describing O t t o m a n rule, but there is considerable evi­

the fact that recent Bulgarian historical research may have made a mistaken interpreta­ t i o n . Georgieva praises the w o r k carried out w i t h i n the Marxist-Leninist framework b u t is also critical o n several points: the labelling o f local Catholics as agents o f the Roman curia and the Austrian court, the thesis o f the closed subsistence economy basis i n agri­ culture a n d unscientific aspects such as the attempts to study the Islamisation processes w i t h o u t familiarising oneself w i t h Islam as a religious and ideological doctrine (1983). 18. The research-historical chapter o f Hupchick's unpublished dissertation (1983b: 1-18) has been left out o f the revised a n d published version (1993).

dence that the source is a forgery f r o m the 19th century. I n western research, this source

19. Kiel provides many other examples o f the catastrophe theory as a research paradigm,

c r i t i c i s m was p r o m o t e d i n the first half o f the 1980s i n H u p c h k k (1983a) a n d i n Kiel

but also mentions (p. 35) a weak counterflow o f less emotional publications and c o n t i n u ­

(1985:5-7). I n Bulgaria, A n t o n i n a Zeljazkova raised the question i n July 1988 i n a c o n t r i ­

ally incorporates them into his work. One recognises the key elements in Kiel's paraphrase

b u t i o n to the Summer School for Historians; an English translation could appear o n l y i n

of the catastrophe theory i n the description above of Volume Four o f Istorija na Bälgarija,

1990 (1990b).

20. Shortly after 1989, Bulgarian historical circles began to openly criticise a n d revise

11. Since the 1989 changes i n Bulgaria, funds for the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the w o r k have

the catastrophe theory. A n analysis o f the precarious situation o f the discipline o f histo­

been l i m i t e d . Its political-ideological basis is gone, e.g., for the final volumes, w h i c h fol­

r y a n d its practitioners after the upheavals o f 1989 can be f o u n d i n M . Todorova (1992a)

l o w i n g indications o f the Politburo were to emphasise the p r o f o u n d and grandiose

i n w h i c h she discusses an article b y M i t o Isusov, director o f the Institute o f H i s t o r y o f the

socio-economic, political and cultural results after the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f socialism under

Bulgarian Academy o f Sciences, w h o assesses the heavy legacy w h i c h also rests on the

the leadership o f the communist party. By 1993 they had reached Volume Seven, w h i c h

historians and presents perspectives for the discipline's future (Isusov 1991).

covers the p e r i o d up to 1903; by 1999 they had succeeded i n publishing Volume Eight. 12. "Qb$t predgovor," pp. 13-29; i n the following, reference is made to page numbers. In the text, references to the authors' value-laden words a n d concepts are retained.

176

3. " P E O P L E OF T H E B O O K " AND T H E MILLET

SYSTEM

21. Similar arrangements were f o u n d i n the Near East, i n Byzantinum a n d i n the Sasanid empire p r i o r to the f o u n d i n g of Islam (cf. Bosworth 1982:37-40). T h e literature o n this

177

Notes to Pages 43-58

Notes to Pages 60-78

topic i n c l u d i n g the debate on Islamic tolerance, is comprehensive. The discussion here

27. H e r i n g is aware o f the Chronicon Maius's compiled character, b u t denies that this

has relied o n works b y W i s m a r (1927), Dennett (1950), Gauss (1968), Goitein (1970), Watt

should be any p r o b l e m , as its i n f o r m a t i o n , according to H e r i n g , accords w i t h the histor­

(1976,1991),Khoury (i98o),Ayoub (1983,1990),Sachedina (1990),Troll (1991) andWaar-

ical facts; his interest is actually n o t i n the content o f the privileges, b u t the conditions o f

denburg (1992). I n opposition to the prevailing line i n the above-mentioned literature,

possibility for a concordat, a n d i n this sense he can choose to ignoré the Sphrantzes

there exists an alternative interpretation o f the dhimma system w h i c h emphasizes its

problem.

repressive a n d d i s c r i m i n a t o r y features. This view and further literature can be f o u n d i n Ye'or (1985, esp. 43-77). I n addition, one finds an emphasis o n the conversion p r o m o t i n g

^

28. The basic features o f the argument are also k n o w n f r o m Papadopoullos, a n d Pan-

features o f the dhimma system i n Binswanger (1977, esp. pp. 8-39,326-53). For a critique

tazopoulos later supports b o t h Papadopoullos a n d H e r i n g i n the assumption that i t was

o f Binswanger, see Hans-Jürgen K o r n r u m p f ' s review i n Südost-Forschungen,

a case o f a genuine investiture w i t h privileges to the patriarch (Pantazopoulos 1967:19).

v o l . 39

(1980), pp. 49^-95-

29. Braude's statement o f the millet system's age and its o r i g i n as a m o d e r n m y t h is

22. Adel K h o u r y (1980) has assembled a n d analysed the Koran a n d hadith data o n the relationship between Muslims a n d n o n - M u s l i m s i n early Islamic times. Two i m p o r t a n t

also opposed b y Michael Ursinus (1989) and in\jrsinus* entry o n "Millet" i n the pedia of

Encyclo­

Islam.

monographs on the later developments are T r i t t o n (1930) a n d Fattal (1958). The various

30. Mehmed's overtures towards the O r t h o d o x patriarchate a n d his Christian subjects,

positions on Jews a n d Christians i n the Koran are i n this context n o t i m p o r t a n t ; see the

however, has also been the object o f other interpretations. Karl Binswanger, for example,

relevant articles i n Encyclopaedia

of Islam i954ff, i n c l u d i n g "Ahl al-Kitäb," "Banü Israel,"

"Yahüd" og "Nas ära I n the Koran, the t e r m "people o f the Book" {ahl al-Kitab)

denotes

demonstrates a "Turkophobic" interpretation o f the millet system i n parts o f his analysis, w i t h emphasis o n its repressive and conversion aspects (1977). Similarly, there exist exam­

Jews a n d Christians, a n d the concept appears frequenüy i n Sura 2-5. There also exist var­

ples o f propagandistic portrayals o f the Ottomans' tolerance and o f the relationship

ious other "people o f the Book," e.g. i n Sura 2,62; 5,69 a n d 22,17.

between the O r t h o d o x Church and the Ottomans (e.g., Usakligil 1964 and Ozoran 1965).

23. Vryonis follows the cultural, religious and political transformation process i n Asia M i n o r using Greek, Persian a n d O t t o m a n chronicles, travellers descriptions, hagio­

4. C H R I S T I A N I T Y B E F O R E AND U N D E R T H E O T T O M A N S

graphie literature, synod decisions a n d correspondence. There exists a general acknowl­

31. Gjuzelev (1993:25) recapitulates the widespread view o f f u l l autocephaly, b u t there are

edgement o f the value o f his study a n d analysis, b u t critical voices have noted that the

g o o d reasons to doubt this; cf. O. Todorova (1987^53-58).

topic is n o t exhausted, as Vryonis neglects n o n - O r t h o d o x and non-Greek peoples i n Asia M i n o r , a n d because he has i n some cases extrapolated the situation backwards f r o m the relatively well-documented 15th century; for a the critique see Claude Cahen' review i n International

Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 4 (1973), pp. 112-17. I n a comprehensive

article, Vryonis has defended his b o o k (1982). 24. Carroll (1985) provides English translation of the Sphrantzes' chronicle i n t r o d u c e d by a discussion o f its authenticity a n d history o f compilation (pp. 7-10). The Greek edi­ t i o n o f Maius is f o u n d i n Migne, PG, 156,637-1023; o f Minus i n M i g n e , PG, 156,1023-80! 25. A newer critical edition i n Reinsen (1983); English translation: Kritovoulos (1954). 26. Italian e d i t i o n i n Barboro (1856). English translation i n Barboro (1969). Dukas: newer critical text e d i t i o n i n Ducas (1958); English translation i n Doukas

{1975).

Chalkokondyles: Chalcocondylas (1843); the excerpt on the siege a n d the conquest o f Constantinople is also available i n English translation i n The Siege (i972:42ff). O n Tur­ sun Beg: facsimile a n d English translation i n Türsün Beg (1978) a n d i n t r o d u c t i o n to the chronicle i n İnalcık (1977); Aşıkpaşazade: German translation i n Aşıkpaşazade (1959). The O t t o m a n chroniclers' silence regarding the O r t h o d o x Church's conditions is gener­ al (cf, also Giese 1925).

32. Five years p r i o r to D r i n o v , Zachariae v o n Lingenthal i n Russia had published a comprehensive article o n Bulgarian church h i s t o r y (1864), w h i c h D r i n o v used diligent­ ly. Von Lingenthal's goal was p r i m a r i l y to clarify the diocese boundaries a n d the series o f archbishops a n d patriarchs, especially i n connection w i t h the archbishopric i n O h r i d . 33. I n addition, there is the historian Tatjana Haardt's smaller, unpublished s u m m a r y dissertation (1948). I n m o d e r n times, the theologian Teodor Sâbev has taken the i n i t i a ­ tive to a m u l t i - v o l u m e Bulgarian church h i s t o r y (1987). The first volume covers the p e r i ­ o d up to 1393. 34. Beyond his doctoral thesis, Kiel has developed a r i c h a n d well-founded authorship concerning the O t t o m a n Balkans (1990c collects fourteen previously published articles f r o m before 1983 o n architectural history); see also Kiel (1989,1990a, 1991a, 1992). 35. There exist several editions o f the text; e.g., the O l d Church Slavonic and m o d e r n Bulgarian commented edition i n Pohvalno slovo 1971 (on the conquest o f Tarnovo and the fate o f Evtimij see pp. 199-217). Camblak's life a n d career are treated i n Heppell (1979). 36. The discussion o f the sources is f o u n d i n Ivanov (1936). Evtimij's vita can be f o u n d i n K a l n z n i a c k i (1901:5-26); m o d e r n transcription i n Èitija (i974:i56ff). O n the r i c h l i t ­ erature o n Ivan Rilski a n d the Rila monastery, see Dujcev (1947).

178

179

Notes to Pages 79-89

Notes to Pages 89-95

37. The text is published i n two variants: Kafuzniacki {1901:405-31) a n d N i k o v

w o r k is also p a r t i a l l y connected to the process of national rebirth and the attempts to

(1928:165-87). The O l d Church Slavonic e d i t i o n is also accessible i n Dinekov, Kuev and

prove that the vast m a j o r i t y o f Bulgaria's T u r k i s h population were descendants o f Chris-

Petkanova (1967:463-76). Here i t is paraphrased f r o m Dinekov (1972:191-201).

t i a n converts (1989:5850.

38. Machiel Kiel proposes that the destruction can be the w o r k o f marauders as

47. A m o n g Bulgarian researchers, a cautious criticism is expressed by Ivan Undziev i n

revenge for the Bulgarians' aid to the Catholic crusaders, w h o i n the w i n t e r o f 1443-44

his review i n Bulgarian

had reached Sofia (1985:70).

etrating critique by Mutafcieva (1973); cf. also Ivanova (1987:159). Similar sharp c r i t i c i s m

39. Pop Pejo's biography and works are described i n Dinekov (1939,1941); cf. also the texthistory i n B. Angelov (1967:268-79). The text is available i n Zitija

(1974:43ft).

40. The text h i s t o r y a n d the sources are described i n Snegarov (1931-32). Matej Gramatik's biography and works are described i n D i n e k o v (1963:396-401). The text can be f o u n d , for example, i n Angelov a n d Genov (1922:565-74). 41. The uncertain statistical data is published i n Karpat (1985); cf. also Courbage a n d Fargues (1997:91-129)- The final large-scale Balkan census listing religious affiliation a n d prior to the loss o f great O t t o m a n areas i n the second h a l f o f the 19th century stems f r o m 1831.

Historical

Review, v o l . 2, no. 2 (1974), pp. 73-75 and a*more pen-

appears i n Karpat (1973:12). 48. Foreword to the republished e d i t i o n o f Gandev (1972) i n 1989, p. 11. The editorial changes were already undertaken i n connection w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the G e r m a n translation i n 1987 (Das bulgarische Volk im is*Jahrhundert. graphische

Charakteristik,

Demographische

und ethno¬

Sofia), i n w h i c h Gandev himself had w r i t t e n a new foreword.

The G e r m a n e d i t i o n does n o t m e n t i o n that his estimates have been changed. 49. The research effort has been comprehensive, as it is documented i n the b i b l i o g r a phies i n Alexandre Popovic's standard w o r k (1986b). Registers have been used as p r o o f of Islamisation as early as the periods 1464-65 and 1478-79 i n n o r t h e r n Greece by

42. I n t r o d u c t i o n to this source material is given i n Barkan (1970) a n d w i t h special ref-

Nàsturel a n d Beldiceanu (1978) and by L o w r y (1981; 1991) i n connection w i t h the

erence to the Bulgarian areas i n Kiel (1990b); cf. also Cvetkova (1975). A systematic

monasteries o n M o u n t Athos, etc.; see also Filipovic (1978), Vasic (1985) a n d Balivet

review o f the types o f sources for studies o f Islamisation i n the Balkans can be f o u n d i n

(1992).

Vryonis (1990:189-94).

50. The Ottomans generally respected the Islamic prohibitions o n forced conversions;

43. The legal protocols can also elucidate the Islamisation process, but f r o m the Bul-

cf. Kissling (1961:19). But the devsirme i n s t i t u t i o n is controversial, as i t was i n such open

garian areas they are an i m p o r t a n t source only f r o m the e n d o f the 16th century; cf. D u d a

contradiction w i t h this policy; cf. W i t t e k (1955), Vryonis (1965), Papoulia (1963), Ménage

( i 9 6 0 ) . F r o m the p e r i o d after 1648, there exist sources dealing w i t h prospective converts'

(1966) andGeorgieva (1973).

applications for conversions. Part o f these applications are published together w i t h other material f r o m the later O t t o m a n era (Qsmanski 1990:98-248; cf. also Gradeva (1988). 44- Gradeva (1988:122-25) contains a nearly complete record o f all published Balkan timar and cizye registers f r o m the 15th a n d 16th centuries. 45- The register's m a i n figures, w h i c h cover b o t h Asia M i n o r a n d the Balkans are utilised by Barkan {1957) i n an i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to the study o f the relative p r o p o r t i o n s between Christians and Muslims a n d the Balkan Muslims' ethnic background. 46. The terms "historical demography" a n d "ethnodemography" i n connection w i t h the early O t t o m a n p e r i o d are often used i n studies o f Islamisation, b u t the registers' i n f o r m a t i o n cannot f o r m the basis for demography i n the traditional sense o f fertility and

m o r t a l i t y rates, marriage patterns a n d lifespans (cf. Erder 1975; Todorova and

Todorov 1987). F r o m the 18th a n d 19th centuries there exists a far broader data base, w h i c h makes possible traditional demographic studies; cf. M . Todorova (1993). Comprehensive analyses o f the population's geographic a n d social d i s t r i b u t i o n , family and household size, religion, marital status, fertility a n d m o r t a l i t y rates and age and econ o m i c conditions i n the 17th century can be f o u n d i n Grozdanova (1989). Grozdanova's

180

51. I n a subsequent study o f conversion to Islam, Bulliet proposes that i n s t u d y i n g the Christian communities i n various "conversion situations," one can analytically d i s t i n guish between "process" a n d "status "Process" is the way i n w h i c h members o f one religious c o m m u n i t y are received i n another. "Status" refers to the view w h i c h societies have of each other i n a certain area a n d at a certain point i n time. I n this context, "process" connotes conversion a n d "status" connotes continuity; "process" points i n the d i r e c t i o n of d y n a m i c exchange a n d thereby diachronic analyses, while "status" focuses on reciprocal views (synchronic analysis); cf. 1990:4-8. Emphasis is thus placed o n the social a n d ethnic aspects o f conversion; this contrasts w i t h the registers' and the f o r m a l conversion's tendency to regard Islam a n d Christianity ahistorically a n d to view conversion as a purely religious act; cf. also the m o d e l for conversion studies i n Humphreys (1991:2750. 52. Karl Binswanger (1977) seeks to show the dhimma's repressive character, and it should n o t be denied that i n d i v i d u a l Muslims and O t t o m a n authorities persecuted Christians, such as, for example, i n the aforementioned cases o f the neomartyrs. However, zimmi status was basically a f o r m o f protection and left its clear traces i n the l o w rates of conversion a n d revival o f O r t h o d o x Christian activity i n literature, church a n d monastic construction as well as icon painting.

181

Notes to Pages 96-112

53. Here Kiel links O t t o m a n religious policy directly w i t h Islamic law a n d theology although he overlooks the question o f whether a dhimma i n this t r a d i t i o n was a permanent system or a temporary protection, w h i c h i n t i m e w o u l d become superfluous

Notes to Pages 112-18

nuit. Si la religion n'avait pas sauvé la nationalité, les Bulgares auraient alors complément disparu" (1913:3030. Furthermore, Tatjana Haardt also argued for a direct connection

because the "people o f the Book" i n dar al-lslam w o u l d convert. The latter view finds

between national consciousness a n d an independent church: "Es ist keine Uebertreibung zu behaupten, dass das Auslöschen jegliches Nationalbewusstseins i n Bulgarien auf die

support i n Islam's h i s t o r y and universalist character; cf. Gibb & Bowen (1957:258). This

Vernichtung der kirchlichen A u t o n o m i e i m Jahre 1393 zurückzuführen ist" (1948:43), and

leads to a conclusion that the O t t o m a n millet system rested to only a l i m i t e d extent o n an Islamic basis a n d deviated b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g n o n - M u s l i m religious communities i n the administrative system. I n this way, the millet system actually operated to m a i n t a i n religious boundaries a n d groups.

thus, the 19th national revival among the Bulgarians was so difficult i n comparison w i t h ,

5. T H E B U L G A R I A N O R T H O D O X C H U R C H U N D E R S O C I A L I S M 54. A n i n t r o d u c t i o n to the relationship between state a n d church i n the socialist republics, i n c l u d i n g c o u n t r y overviews a n d theoretical models, are the three volumes edited b y Sabrina Petra Ramet, w h i c h appeared just w h e n political upheavals were openi n g new possibilities for the churches and Christian life i n eastern Europe a n d the Soviet U n i o n (Ramet 1988,1990,1992); cf. also B r o u n a n d Sikorska {1988).

for example, the Serbs. Nevertheless, Haardt maintains that the church kept the national consciousness alive: "die Kirche var ja die enizige Trägerin der nationalen Bestrebungen diser Völker während der ganzen Zeit der Osmanenherrschaft" (1948:83). 63. Studying resistance movements, Bistralfvetkova was a nationally m i n d e d scholar w h o diligently concerned herself w i t h hajduk movements i n order to demonstrate the u n b r o k e n struggle w h i c h finally achieved success i n the 19th century; see Cvetkova (i960,1965,1968,1971 (sources pp. 75-387), 1982); cf. also Adanir (1982). 64. Subsequent references for the year 1992 refer to the article and for 1994 to the monograph.

58. The speech was published the same day i n the c o m m u n i s t p a r t y newspaper, Rabotniéesko Delo a n d was later reprinted i n G. D i m i t r o v (1954:186-90).

65. A n evolutionary perspective is thus placed on the concepts o f nationality (narodnost) a n d nation (nacija). Narodnost can o n l y approximately be translated as "nationalit y " a n d the concept corresponds more to the German Volksgeist. Angelov's use o f the concept can be traced back to Stalin, w h o defined "nationality" as a level i n the development o f social groups corresponding to a certain mode o f p r o d u c t i o n , i.e., the social organisation corresponded to stages i n the development o f the relations o f p r o d u c t i o n and the forces o f p r o d u c t i o n . This understanding does n o t stem f r o m M a r x or Engels, w h o connected the concept w i t h the 19th century's historical-political situation a n d defined a "nation" as a nation-state, supplemented by a distinction between historical and non-historical peoples, while "nationality" more imprecisely denoted the nation's characteristics or eventually an ethnic group w h i c h h a d n o t f o r m e d a nation-state (cf. Zientara 1981:306).

59- For a general treatment o f state-church relations i n socialist Bulgaria, see Pundeff (i975.1990) a n d Slijepcevic (1957); cf. also Oschlies (1975; 1983) and Spas T. Raikin's sharp critique o f the church's leadership (1984a; 1988; 1992).

66. I n his m o n o g r a p h , Angelov provides a general characterisation o f the ethno-territorial u n i t , language, culture, and the ethnic/national consciousness (1994:66-87). I n chapters devoted separately to each century, he then treats the individual topics more

60. The exception is a comprehensive sociological survey f r o m 1962, based o n over 42,000 interviews, the goal of w h i c h was to clarify the effectiveness o f atheistic propaganda, and, where a g o o d 35% o f the respondents termed themselves "religious" (OSavkov 1968).

exhaustively. The m a i n points are presented very precisely i n the English-language article quoted here, w i t h further references to the Bulgarian-language monograph.

55. The Law on Religious Communities was published i n Dàrzaven Vestnik (Official Gazette), no. 48, M a r c h 1st, 1949; for a German translation, see Stupperich (1971:5-11). 56. The o n l y exceptions were i n the penal code, art. 26-28, w h i c h had been replaced by articles i n the country's general penal code; cf. Pundeff (1975:349). 57. The Fatherland Front (Otecestven front) was a c o m m u n i s t - d o m i n a t e d coalition w h i c h included the Agrarian Party, the Social Democrats a n d others. The Front governed Bulgaria i n the interval between the capitulation o n September 9th, 1944, a n d the end o f 1947, when the communists i n practice assumed total control o f the Fatherland Front.

61. Pundeff (1975:347) compared w i t h Oschlies (1975:457). I n addition, there were v e r y small groups o f adherents o f Petàr Dânov's (1864-1944) " W h i t e B r o t h e r h o o d " a n d the Jehovah's Witnesses, about w h i c h knowledge was poor b o t h before a n d after the war. 62. This view is n o t l i m i t e d to the Bulgarian research t r a d i t i o n ; e.g., R.P. Guérin Songeon formulated this line o f t h i n k i n g w i t h the words. "La conquête turque, ce fut la

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67. H u p c h i c k first describes the Bulgarians' social position i n the towns and i n the countryside, as well as the questions centered u p o n conversion to Islam, Greek cultural dominance a n d Catholic missionary activity. He then concentrates on the Slavic O r t h o dox culture i n churches a n d monasteries. Several sections are too uncritical. This is the case, for example, i n his use o f Grozdanova's (1989) statistical data ( H u p c h i c k 1993:183-90) and his references to Petär Petrov's national ideologically coloured a n d anti-Islamic publications concerning conversion (e.g., H u p c h i c k 1993:59).

183

Notes to Pages 123-38

6. SAN S T E F A N O AND T H E N A T I O N A L T R I U M P H 68. I n none o f the countries d i d a popular national consciousness emerge p r i o r to the achievement o f political independence. National consciousness was an elite phenomen o n , while the scattered rebellions of the b r o a d population were n o t nationally inspired; rather, they were reactions to exhorbitant taxation a n d the social and legal instability (cf. L o n g w o r t h 1994:106,152). F o r m a t i o n o f a n a t i o n a l l y - m i n d e d intellectual g r o u p i n Bulgaria is described by Thomas Meininger (1987). O n the spread o f the national idea t h r o u g h o u t the Balkans, see Sugar a n d Lederer (1969) a n d Sugar (1995). 69. Richard v o n Mach (1906) has p r o v i d e d an i n t r o d u c t i o n to the h i s t o r y o f the exarchate using comprehensive statistical data about its diffusion and activities i n the early 20th century i n the disputed territories o f Macedonia and Thrace. Z i n a M a r k o v a (1989) has analysed the exarchate's role as a national i n s t i t u t i o n i n the years up to the ratificat i o n o f the Tärnovo constitution i n 1879. 70. O n the "Macedonian question" a n d the dispute about the Macedonians' national affiliation, see W i l k i n s o n (1951), Adanir (1979), Poulton (1995, c h . 1-4) a n d D a n f o r t h (1995, ch. 1-3). 71. Gellner's two w o r k i n g definitions o f a nation, one cultural, the other voluntaristic, read as follows: "Nationalism ... sometimes takes pre-existing cultures a n d turns t h e m into nations, sometimes invents t h e m , a n d often obliterates pre-existing cultures .,. But nationalism is n o t the awakening a n d assertion o f . . . m y t h i c a l , supposedly natural a n d given units. I t is, o n the contrary, the crystallization of new units, suitable for the c o n d i tions n o w prevailing, t h o u g h admittedly using as their raw material the c u l t u r a l , historical a n d other inheritances f r o m the pre-nationalist w o r l d . " (1983:49). 72. There exists no consensus as to a general t h e o r y o f the multifaceted a n d complex phenomena o f nation a n d nationalisms, nor has the question o f definition been clarified. Recent discussions o f nations a n d nationalism ("modernists," "primordialists," "essentialists," social constructivist a n d historical perspectives) can be f o u n d i n Seton-Watson (1977); Kemiläinen (1984); Kedourie (1993); C o n n o r (1994); Estel (1994); H u t c h i n s o n (1994:1-63); Llobera (1994); Jenkins (1995) and Periwal (1995). 73. The stages are described i n Schieder (1991:69-71, orig. 1966): "Typologie u n d Erscheinungsformen des Nationalstaats i n Europa" a n d i n "Der Nationalstaat i n Europa als historisches Phänomen" (1991:87-101, o r i g . 1964).

184