Religion inside and outside Traditional Institutions (Empirical Studies in Theology)

Religion inside and outside Traditional Institutions

Empirical Studies in Theology Editor

Johannes A. van der Ven

VOLUME 15

Religion inside and outside Traditional Institutions Edited by

Heinz Streib

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2007

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ISSN: 1389-1189 ISBN 13: 978 90 04 15792 7 ISBN 10: 90 04 15792 1 © Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................ Heinz Streib

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Theoretical Perspectives: Account for Religious Praxis and De-Institutionalized Religion in Empirical Theology Three Paradigms for the Study of Religion .............................. Johannes A. van der Ven

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Empirical Theology: Dening the Task and Selecting the Tools .................................................................................. Leslie J. Francis

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From Action to Lived Experience: Considering Methodological Problems of Modern Practical Theology .............................. Hans-Günter Heimbrock

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Empirical Theology and Brain Research .................................. Tobias Kläden

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Practical Theology Theory-Building Based on a Pragmatic Notion of Weak Rationality ................................................... Chris Hermans

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Ritual Praxis. Dening Passage Rites from an Action Perspective ............................................................................... Hans Schilderman

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Religious Praxis—De-Institutionalized. Theoretical and Empirical Considerations ....................................................... Heinz Streib

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Rethinking Church in Liquid Modernity .................................. Kees de Groot Empirical Considerations in Religious Praxis and Reection in the Teaching Situation: A Conceptual Map ..................... Don Browning

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contents Empirical Results on Religious Praxis and De-Institutionalized Religion

Are Religious Beliefs Relevant in Daily Life? ............................ Stefan Huber

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Religious Development in a Lifespan Perspective ..................... Ulrich Feeser-Lichterfeld, Tobias Kläden & Anke Terörde

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Religiosity and Gender Identity of Female Adolescents. Narrative Religious Identity of Young Catholic Women ...... Angela Kaupp Adolescents and Computer-Based New Media. Paradigmatic Insights of an Empirical Field Study on the Structure of Empirical Theology ................................................................ Astrid Dinter

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Predicting Trust in the Pastor—A German Study .................... Carsten Gennerich

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Authors’ Biographies ................................................................... Index ...........................................................................................

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INTRODUCTION Heinz Streib We witness changes in the religious landscape in our societies which, in quality, quantity and speed, exceed, what has been grasped so far in theory and research on religion. It is challenging, but necessary to ask in this dynamics of change for the continuum which constitutes the identity of the eld of research. The concept ‘religious praxis’ is the common theme in all of the contributions to this volume. While religious praxis is a topic about which much has been written, the texts in this volume include a focus on contemporary challenges. Their theme is religious praxis; but with a special focus on deinstitutionalized religion. Approaching this theme, I recall the following well-known story from Gershom Scholem’s Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. It is a story about religious praxis. When Baal-schem had to accomplish a difcult task, some secret work for the benet of creation, he went to a specic place in the woods, made a re and, in mystic meditation, said prayers—and all came to be as he has intended it. When, a generation later, Megid of Meseritz had to accomplish the same task, he went to the same place in the woods and said: “We cannot make the re any more, but we can say the prayers—and all came, as he wanted. Again a generation later, Rabii Mosche Leib from Sassow should accomplish the task. Also he went in the woods and said: “We cannot make re any more and we don’t know the secret meditations which inspire the prayers, but we know the place in the woods where this all belongs; and this should be enough.” And it was enough. When however still one generation later, Rabbi Israel of Rischin had to accomplish that task, he sat down in the golden chair in his castle and said: “ We cannot make re, we cannot say prayers, we don’t know the place any more, but we can tell the story.” And, the narrator adds, his story alone had the same effect as the practices of the three others.

Can religious praxis reside into memory and into narration and still be effective? The story ends optimistically with a high regard for the narrative—to be as effective as the original ritual, the visiting of a specic place, performing of prayers and meditative praxis. Is this true? Is performing religious praxis of secondary importance? What does this mean for conceptualizing ‘religious praxis’?

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introduction

We readily agree—and empirical data demonstrate—that performance of religious rituals, prayer and meditation has declined. However in the contemporary religious landscape this decline is also an effect of the deinstitutionalization of religion. While it certainly would be a misreading of this story if we took it as justication of the present decline of religious performance, the question is put up for discussion: How important is the performance of religious praxis? While this story may stimulate a variety of questions, the special focus of the discussion here is on the empirical approach. The texts in the rst part of this volume thus unfold this thematic focus in a series of detail questions: What are the paradigms, what are the levels—macro, meso, micro—for the study of religion, when it wants to account for secularization? This is the question of J. van der Ven. L. Francis deals with this question of how we may sharpen our research instruments to account for religious praxis. H.-G. Heimbrock addresses the question, what it may involve to move from ‘action’ to ‘lived experience’ in empirical—phenomenologically oriented—theology. The relevance of brain research for the empirical study of religion is the focus of T. Kläden’s contribution. C. Hermans presents a proposal to conceptualize religious praxis in terms of practical rationality. H. Schilderman discusses the interpretation of religious praxis in light of ritual theory. H. Streib investigates the concept of deinstitutionalization as candidate for research on contemporary religious praxis. And nally D. Browning gives an account of how a focus on praxis, how empirical research can be incorporated in the study of theology. As a red thread, the empirical perspective runs through all of these contributions—the differences in methodological prole notwithstanding. And even though this volume includes a majority of contributions with a theoretical perspective, the question of how to proceed in empirical research is the horizon of their reection. Selected reports of quantitative and qualitative empirical research make up the second part of this volume. Are Religious Beliefs Relevant in Daily Life? asks S. Huber presenting an instrument to measure the relevance of religion. U. Feeser-Lichterfeld, T. Kläden and A. Terörde present results of their study on religious development in a lifespan perspective. A. Kaupp reports about her research about the religiosity and gender identity of female adolescents. Adolescents and computerbased new media is the empirical eld study of A. Dinter. Finally, C. Gennerich summarizes the results of his study on predicting trust in the pastor.

introduction

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It is my hope and expectation that the texts presented here are inspiring and provocative for the future discussion about research on religious praxis in the situation of deinstitutionalization. This volume has grown out of and includes contributions to the second conference of the International Society of Empirical Research in Theology (ISERT) which took place in April 2004 in Bielefeld, Germany. The conference was a signicant step to network and advance the discourse in empirical theology. We thank the University of Bielefeld for hosting the conference in the Center for Interdisciplinary Research, a well equipped place which is designed for interdisciplinary and international research. We also thank the German Research Foundation/Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for providing the essential grant for this conference, but our thanks go also to the Association of Friends and Sponsors of the University of Bielefeld, to the Protestant Church of Westfalen, and to the Chancellor of the University of Bielefeld for making contributions for this conference.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: ACCOUNT FOR RELIGIOUS PRAXIS AND DE-INSTITUTIONALIZED RELIGION IN EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY

THREE PARADIGMS FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGION Johannes A. van der Ven Anyone looking down on the earth from an imaginary helicopter and discerning the varying density and sparseness of religious populations on the landscape below cannot but ask where these differences come from. Why are European countries’ religious populations sparser than North American ones, and those in North America sparser than in Arab countries? And if one zooms in on individual countries, one cannot help wondering why some religious communities ourish while others are dwindling. Finally, if one acknowledges that all these communities consist of individual members, the question arises: why are some individuals religious and others are not? In short, where do religious differences between countries, within countries and between individuals come from? My concern is not with differences between religions (plural), like Judaism, Christianity and Islam, as with differences in religion (singular). Hence the question, more specically, reads: where do differences in religious density between countries, within countries and between individuals come from? In this article I do not propose offering an empirical answer—in a general sense that would be quite impossible; my answer is theoretical. I shall try to clarify a few paradigms, on the basis of which I shall indicate what routes we could follow to arrive at an empirical answer for a group of countries, for one country and for individual people. To this end I work out a threefold answer to my question. The question about differences in religion between countries is probed on the basis of the secularisation paradigm. The question about differences within countries I examine from the angle of the economic rational choice paradigm. Differences between individuals are explored by way of the cognitive paradigm. A few comments are called for. When we speak about paradigms, it must be acknowledged that it is not easy to pinpoint what a paradigm is. Thomas Kuhn, originator of modern paradigm thinking, lists 22 different meanings. He also offers a broad denition: “an overall constellation of concepts, values and techniques” (Kuhn 1970). Concepts comprise theories, denitions and models; values include guidelines like

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consistency, coherence, simplicity and transparency; and techniques consist of examples. The debate between schools of thought always centres on concepts, values and techniques. Often it is unproductive, because in practice researchers tend to opt for an eclectic approach. There is nothing wrong with that, provided the scientist is prepared to account for this eclecticism. The combination I make in this article is indirect rather than direct. I shall not try to interrelate elements from the three paradigms, but merely show how they presuppose each other in terms of the three social levels where they operate. By clarifying how phenomena at these three levels condition each other I hope to demonstrate how the three paradigms condition each other. Religious phenomena at the macro level of multinational relations, where the secularisation paradigm applies, those at the meso level of individual countries, which are subject to the rational choice paradigm, and those at the micro level of individuals, where the cognitive paradigm is pertinent, condition each other in both a downward and an upward direction. Downward conditioning occurs via the inuence of structural, macro level phenomena on institutional relations at meso level, which in their turn affect individual religiosity at micro level. Upward conditioning occurs because individual religiosity co-determines developments in meso level religious institutions, which in their turn inuence religious phenomena at macro level. Systems theory tends to emphasise downward conditioning, while action theory concentrates mainly on upward conditioning. In the following sections I examine the three questions under consideration from the perspective of the three paradigms, pointing out their various strengths and weaknesses. Secularisation Paradigm at Macro Level I have said that I shall examine the question of the origin of religious differences between countries at macro level in terms of the secularisation paradigm. That paradigm is under great pressure at present. Publications bearing titles like ‘return of God’, even ‘vengeance of God’ or ‘re-spiritualisation’ are appearing in scores. According to Thomas Luckmann secularisation is a ‘modern myth’ (Luckmann 1980). Is secularisation a dead duck? In my view scholars have been overambitious, trying to explain too many phenomena by means of this one paradigm; but that does not mean it must be scrapped altogether. It should, however, be critically reappraised (Pollack 2003).

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Apart from secularist phenomena in the distant past, such as Confucianism and Greek philosophy, ‘modern’ secularisation may be regarded as an age-old process dating back to the struggle between church and state. The historical date was 1122: that was when, in the Concordat of Worms (following the Concordat of London in 1107), the Roman patriarchate agreed, at least in principle, to put an end to both Caesaropapism (political power over religion) and hierocracy (religious power over politics). In their place two separate centres of power were established: the church and the state. In the one text of this concordat, the Heinricianum, the emperor guaranteed free election and consecration of bishops and ceded the right to invest them with sacred authority by presenting them with the episcopal ring and staff; in the other text, the Calixtinum, the pope granted the emperor the right to attend episcopal elections and give bishops worldly authority by presenting them with the sceptre (Kaufmann 1989, 78; Weber 1980, 691–692). In this perspective the original meaning of the term ‘secularisation’ applied, centuries later, to the state’s expropriation of economic goods previously owned by the church, especially in France in 1789, when the church may have owned as much as one sixth of the national territory (Rogier 1964, 166).1 The emerging separation between church and state, which started with the Concordat of Worms and became ideologically and politically effective in the age of the Enlightenment and the French revolution, was the judicial outcome of a process of functional differentiation that had been at work in Western society for centuries (Gauchet 1985). Functional differentiation meant that society was no longer organised in terms of social stratication—that is, estates and classes—but in functional terms. These evolved into functional systems (the economy, politics, family, education, science, religion) with functional communication media (money, power, intimacy, knowledge, validity, transcendence) in accordance with functionally reciprocal roles (producers/consumers, politicians/voters, parents/children, teachers/learners, religious leaders/ believers). As a result of functional differentiation the various systems developed fairly autonomously, albeit with some mutual inuencing. In the case of religion there are two possible perspectives. From the other systems’ point of view secularisation meant their emancipation from the religious system. From the religious point of view it meant that 1 Lübbe (2004, 35–45) explains that 19th century’s Germany welcomed secularisation as being a source of religious renewal.

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religion had less inuence over these systems. Thus secularisation is a consequence of functional differentiation (Luhmann 1977; 1998). The focus of the various systems was no longer on worldview-related issues and religious moral ideology but on rationality. This rationality was not so much what Weber called Wertrationalität but more particularly Zweckrationalität, characterised by an emphasis on cause-effect and means-ends relations and on efciency and efcacy. In the economic system this compound rationalisation found expression in the economy (marketing of land, production, labour, trade, consumption and money); politics (the constitutional state); social life (family, neighbourhood, associations); and culture (education, science and the arts). Rationalisation also penetrated the religious subsystem and led to the ‘disenchantment of the world’ (Entzauberung der Welt). Humankind’s natural, social and individual environment lost its divine aura, and faith in the self-revelation of the one God made way for a market of religious and nonreligious worldviews, with the latter gaining the upper hand. It was not so much a matter of scepticism about specic religious dogmas as a result of scientic explanations, although the effects of Darwin’s evolution theory on the doctrine of creation, for instance, should not be underestimated (Browne 2003). It was rather that the rational Zeitgeist permeated all culture and thus the whole of social and individual life, which led to the notion that fundamentally all problems are rationally soluble (Bruce 1996; 2001; Dobbelaere 1999; 2002; 2004). However appealing a hypothesis the secularisation paradigm may be, it is subject to serious doubts. One of these concerns its point of departure: is it correct to relate secularisation to functional differentiation? The cardinal counter-example is the USA, which is inarguably characterised by functional differentiation, but (apparently) not by secularisation. What is true is that traditional denominations are experiencing a decline in the USA, parallel to that in Europe. But at the same time conservative churches, such as evangelical, charismatic and Pentecostal communities, have a consistent following and some of them are even experiencing growth. While the outward phenomena in these churches may astound one, at a deeper level the substance of their proclamation and liturgy, Sunday schools and Bible study appears to be subject to inner secularisation. As a result traditional doctrine is adapted to the conventions of the dominant liberal culture, resulting in what is known as ‘easy-believism’ (Bruce 2001, 89–90). At all events, this (apparently) quite powerful religiosity is explained in terms of extra-religious factors. Firstly, the USA is said to have

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embarked on the process of functional differentiation and modernisation later than Europe, so that secularisation on that continent lags behind. Secondly, the demographic picture is said to be distorted: in absolute gures evangelical, charismatic and Pentecostal churches’ religious market share appears to be growing, but not percentage-wise. In addition the link between ethnicity and religion is considered an important factor. Religion is said to contribute to ethnic identity, a need felt by American migrant groups that are more numerous and extensive than their European counterparts. The separation of church and state, which is more rigid in the USA than in (many) European countries, appears to be a further factor. As a result there is erce competition between American churches, causing them to focus more on their members’ needs—an argument we shall encounter again in section 2 on the economic rational choice paradigm. In addition, the relatively poor development of the social welfare state in the USA compared to Europe means that American churches feature more prominently as centres of social interaction and cohesion and as a social safety net. Finally, the overall American culture, said to be more masculine than the predominantly feminine culture in Europe, allegedly contributes to religiosity: the more masculine, the more religious; the more feminine, the less religious (Bruce 1996; 2001; Verweij 1998; Hofstede 2005). But it is not just disparities between Europe and the USA that are at issue. The prominence of religion in non-Western countries and in the interaction between Western and non-Western countries in recent years raise the question whether the secularisation paradigm has not been done to death in the literature. One should also be wary of rash generalisations, as is evident in studies of secularisation in countries on the African continent, which is by no means as ‘incurably religious’ as it is said to be (Metogo 1997; Shorter & Onyancha 1997). Nonetheless, have we not been sadly mistaken ever since the Enlightenment, when “there was the honest conviction that churches must, after all, move with the times” (Gay 1966, 343). Is it not a matter of ‘exit secularisation’ rather than ‘religion R.I.P.’ (Stark 1999)? It is not America that is the exception, as Europeans sometimes think; rather it is Europe that is the global exception (Davie 1999; 2002). “There is no reason to think,” says Peter Berger (1999, 12), “that the world of the 21st century will be less religious than the world of today.” Sometimes this carries a rider: there is some hope even for Europe, but then religion would have to make a paradoxical choice. Instead of resisting functional differentiation, it should adapt to it altogether. If it does that, the argument goes, the

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privatisation of religion will be arrested and may well be turned around (Casanova 1994). Time will tell whether this hypothesis is correct. That secularisation is not an irreversible, linear natural process but a social one is evident in the anti-secularisation movements in many countries. To understand these one needs to consider a number of factors. The rst concerns the carriers of social movements and countermovements. By this we mean that social processes like rationalisation of the economic, political or cultural system do not operate like the ticking of an automatic clock but are always carried by socially stratied groups. If these groups are inuential, the process is facilitated; if they are a minority, society carries on more or less without them. Thus urban groups are more favourably disposed to rationalisation and rural groups are less so, if at all, just as highly educated people are more inclined to support such processes than less educated ones. It depends which groups are dominant in a particular era. The second factor concerns social conicts. These erupt when the carriers of social development are thwarted by emerging power groups. An example is the struggle between businesspeople and the petty bourgeoisie in 19th century Germany. The former favoured economic modernisation and were sceptical about religion. The latter were fearful of rationalisation in industry and cherished the (apparently) religious Middle Ages. The unresolved conict between these two groups continued until the rise of national socialism (Peeters 1984). Another example is present-day Iran. Under the last shah there was economic rationalisation, backed by businesspeople, scientists and technologists, also inasmuch as it included an a-religious cultural policy. With the 1979 revolution these groups changed sides, since they could no longer contain the rebellion of the lower strata of the population against the shah’s rule; today they support the theocracy (Bruce 2001, 95). The third factor, known as non-synchronicity, stems from the previous two. It means that each system develops at a different pace. Thus political democratisation may lag behind economic development, leading to social inequality and social unrest, as happened in Iran and is currently threatening in China. Or morality, under the inuence of religion, may get bogged down in absolute prescriptions and prohibitions of specic, concrete actions instead of developing rationally towards an ethics of responsibility (Schluchter 1979). A conservative morality can halt rational development in other systems such as the economy and politics (Weber 1978, 252).

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The crucial question in this section is: can differences in religion between countries be explained as differences in the degree of secularisation? To answer the question we need to distinguish between countries with a high or low degree of functional differentiation. The former are far more secularised than the latter. But this does not mean that secularisation is a linear, irreversible, natural evolutionary process. It is a social process, inuence by all sorts of societal—also nonreligious— factors, both conducive and inhibitory, such as demographic development, the relation between ethnicity and religion, separation of church and state, level of the social welfare state, and the masculine or feminine nature of the culture. One also has to allow for counter movements and the social conicts they cause, as well as the support they receive from conservative political and religious leaders, in whatever part of the world. Economic Paradigm at Meso Level When one views religious density on earth from a helicopter one is struck by religious differences not only between countries, but also within countries. Where do these come from? The economic rational choice paradigm could help to answer the question. However, this paradigm, too, is disputed, especially by proponents of the secularisation hypothesis. This is not surprising, for rational choice researchers came into the limelight because of their criticism of the secularisation paradigm. Hence they oppose each other ercely and vociferously. Yet the two paradigms cannot be viewed in isolation from each other. As noted already, functional differentiation in society led to the collapse of the sacred canopy of one, all-encompassing religion and its replacement by a plurality of religious and nonreligious worldviews. This pluralism forms the premise of the economic paradigm, since it leads to competition between worldviews, more particularly religious ones. Their rivalry prompts various developments, such as rational adaptation of the religious supply to human needs, application of the principles of efciency and efcacy, professionalisation of religious staff, and the resultant bureaucratisation of religious institutions.2

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The economic paradigm has several variants: see Chai 2003.

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The economic paradigm provides a conceptual framework for the study of these processes. It is based on certain assumptions that culminate in an empirically researchable hypothesis. These assumptions are as follows: (1) All people are driven by a religious need. (2) All societies have a natural, relatively stable set of ‘stalls’ on the religious market and there is an unvarying level of at least one potential religious need. (3) Religious organisations are distinguishable by the extent to which they adapt their supply of religious wares to a religious need. (4) This adaptation is promoted by the demolition of religious monopolies, separation of church and state, deregulation of the religious market and escalation of religious competition. (5) Religious pluralism does not weaken the plausibility of religious institutions but strengthens it, since the constant variation they have to introduce to secure current and potential clients leads to greater religious activity. (6) To the extent that a religious institution’s supply differs from that of another it becomes more attractive and religious consumption increases. This applies particularly to the sect-to-church process, in which the transition from a sect with high doctrinal, ritual and social thresholds to an established church with low thresholds is characterised by reduced religious consumption. (7) On such a religious free market individuals, on the basis of rational cost-benet analysis, can join the religious institution that offers them the greatest religious benet at the lowest cost, which satises their striving for religious prot maximisation. (8) Since the greatest religious benets, such as eternal bliss hereafter, are not immediately forthcoming, their attainment has to be deferred, which is made possible by offering compensation: the promise of eternal bliss. This is anticipated in religious experiences, backed up by religious counselling, celebrated in rituals and stimulated in community building.3 We have said that these assumptions culminate in an empirically researchable hypothesis. It reads as follows: countries with an open religious market have greater religious participation than countries with closed, monopolistic religious markets. In short, pluralisation and deregulation result in religious revival. On the basis of this economic paradigm we would posit that secularisation, particularly in Europe, is not attributable to functional dif3 Stark & Bainbridge 1987. Stark & Finke (2000, 84) avoid the term ‘compensation’ but not the underlying idea: the exchange relationship with God (88–96) presupposes trust fraught with risks that are insured against by ritual, prayer and mystical experience (106–113).

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ferentiation in society and concomitant rationalisation, but to overly regulated religious markets and the absence of healthy competition. Religious institutions that are protected and subsidised by the state lack efciency and efcacy, hence fail to attract religious clientele. This insight tallies, it is said, with the empirical fact that there is considerable religious faith in Europe but little church involvement—that is, believing without belonging (Davie 1990). In the USA, the reasoning goes, people move from one church to another rather than leave the church, because American churches ght for clientele—although this argument overlooks the decline of established denominations. There have been various objections to this paradigm, both its assumptions and the hypothesis. In regard to assumptions (1) and (2), it is a moot point whether all people are driven by a religious need and are aware of a religious need. In other words, the proposition which has to be demonstrated is taken for granted: a hypothesis turns into an assumption. Besides, as noted already, Europe presents an exception, which makes the issue of an innate religious need all the more cogent. All in all the human brain has no demonstrable area, or set of areas, where the talent for such ‘religious musicality’ is located (Thagard 2005, 69–72). Nor can such areas ever be located, for even if they existed, it would still require interpretation of the ring of innumerable neurons in these areas and this must perforce derive from culturally determined religious traditions. The point is, ring neurons do not communicate about God, they do not witness, they do not pray. Religion is a cultural rather than a natural phenomenon (Feith 2003), and in that sense is not a genuinely universal but a quasi-universal, mainly cultural phenomenon, as will be seen below (Brown 1999). There is a further point. Stark and Bainbridge, two of the founding fathers of the economic paradigm, dene religion as faith in an omnipotent actor, who, in exchange for the offer of eternal peace, demands an investment in a religious organisation (Stark & Bainbridige 1987, 39). This would make religion a barter transaction that merges into barter-oriented institutionalised religion. If assumption (3) is interpreted in a strict sense, it poses no problem. Religious organisations undeniably distinguish themselves from each other by the extent to which they adapt their supply to the contextually determined religious demand of human beings. But if one translates the descriptive character of this postulate into a prescriptive rule, in the sense that churches have to adapt maximally to human demands, then religion is reduced to a commodity. Businesses get rid of old products

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because they are not in demand on the market, and replace them with new ones. But churches cannot and must not do that: they are bound by their religious identity, origin and tradition (Bruce 1999, 124–129). This realisation is not conned to religious leaders and professionals; it is shared by church members. The hermeneutically experienced continuity with sources and a religious tradition is intrinsic in religious institutions. If assumption (4) is read in conjunction with (5), one is caught up in the economic and political debate that has raged ever since Adam Smith and Alexis de Tocqueville. The rst assumption posits the economic hypothesis that competition on the religious market will lead to religious growth; the second posits the political hypothesis that the abolition of a state church or an established church is conducive to religious growth. The two hypotheses need to be tested separately. That this does not always happen is evident in research based on the economic paradigm that was conducted in Europe (Iannaccone 1991). In this study testing of the political hypothesis led to conclusions about the economic hypothesis—erroneously, since the abolition of a state church or an established church does not automatically result in religious competition (Chaves & Cann 1992). Assumption (6), too, is debatable. The sect-to-church theory may hold water for Protestant churches, especially in the USA, but not for the Catholic Church, because its doctrinal, ritual and social structure does not t the identity of a sect. It may display certain sectarian features, as when it seeks to manifest itself forcefully from a marginal position, for instance in the Netherlands after 1853 (restoration of episcopal hierarchy) and certainly after 1870 (Vatican I), but even then there was no question of a sect in the strict sense of the word.4 The objection to assumption (7) concerns the way human beings, hence believers, are reduced to calculators that rationally balance costs and benets, settling for prot maximisation. Firstly, one could question whether people in fact make choices when it comes to religion, since in this respect they are motivated by ascription rather than achievement. Secondly, if they do make such choices, are these based mainly or even

4 According to Sengers (2003; 2003a), the Catholic Church in the Netherlands displayed the features of a sect with high religious consumption from 1870 to 1960. Thereafter it underwent a sect-to-church process with dwindling consumption. In his view more vigorous intervention by the Vatican after 1970 could have triggered a church-to-sect process with higher religious consumption.

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exclusively on their assessment of costs and benets? Are they not based more on psychological processes, such as emotional attraction and identication, and social processes like imitation and convention? Besides, if choices are made by balancing costs and benets, does it not lead to equilibrium between costs and benets rather than prot maximisation (Cosmides & Tooby 2005, 617–619)? Finally, if this appraisal is made, is it as rational a process as the economic paradigm would have it? For the most part appraisal occurs unconsciously, driven by emotional motives, incorporated rule systems, social customs and social desirability, without any rational explication, let alone rational monitoring (Welten 1991; 1992; Bruner 1990; Yates & Estin 2002). On the whole conscious processes are the exception rather than the rule, as will be seen when we deal with the cognitive paradigm (Hagoort 2005). Finally, assumption (8) likewise denigrates the value of religion. It is quite bizarre to speak of religious processes like religious experience, counselling, rites and community building as compensations, as though they merely offer a surrogate for the eschatological promise hidden in the end-time. It disregards the intrinsic value of these religious processes, which represent ends in themselves. The compensation idea also does not do justice to the human existential constitution based on the dialectic between present and future. This dialectic stems from the polarity between promise and hope, desiring and anticipation. Rational choice theory reduces all that to what is attainable—or rather, for sale—here and now, while what will be attained later, not here and now, must be compensated for. This is religious bookkeeping taken to the nth degree. That brings us to the hypothesis in which rational choice theory culminates. It posits, as noted already, that deregulation, competition and pluralisation will result in religious revival. In the early 1980s its validity was tested in countries with a Catholic population of more than 80 percent: Ireland, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Austria and France. According to the economic paradigm one would expect them to have low ‘religious consumption’, but it turned out that they vary greatly: from extremely high (Ireland) to extremely low (France) ‘consumption’ (Chaves & Cann 1992). Among Protestant countries, too, one nds examples that appear to falsify the hypothesis, namely the USA, Canada, Australia, and in Europe, especially Britain and the Scandinavian countries (Bruce 1999, 58–120). An even greater reason for rejecting the hypothesis is the religious density in Islamic countries. On the whole this is not a result of religious pluralism, even though there may be other, socially peripheral

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religions, and certainly not by serious religious competition. Yet religious density is extremely high. This may be ascribed, however, to mutually advantageous alliances between religious and political leaders in these countries (Kepel 2004). Does all this mean that the economic paradigm is totally worthless? No, that would not be true. One can cite examples of countries where it does have limited validity, as in Africa and Latin America, where the independent churches are experiencing turbulent growth. Even though the two continents differ greatly—in Africa they are reacting against pagan society, while in Latin America they spring from Christian soil—there are parallels, most notably that their members are living in a situation of economic poverty, political oppression, social uprootedness and cultural alienation. The churches offer a refuge, in that they represent a community of fellow sufferers, try to offer a way out of destitution and above all afford faith and hope, so their members do not drown in total despair ( Jenkins 2002, 72–78). In Brazil, for instance, there are signs of the operation of a religious market, reinforced by competition with the charismatic movement in the Catholic Church. While it adapts itself to the needs of the poor, its share in the ‘religious market’ lags behind because of its links with the traditional church hierarchy. We should be wary of distortion, however, for in Brazil only eight to ten million Catholics belong to the charismatic movement, as opposed to the remaining 122 million Catholics who practise a form of traditional folk Catholicism (Vásquez 2005, 525). The question in this section, then is: should differences between religions, churches, denominations within countries be seen as differences in intentional the religious market? I am not inclined simply to swallow the economic rational choice paradigm’s forceful insistence that pluralism and the concomitant competition leads to religious vitality. Human beings cannot be reduced to organisms driven by prot maximisation and religion to a machine set by default on competitive barter relations between religious production and consumption.5 Instead of this forceful position I would propose a more moderate one: within the framework of their hermeneutically explicable continuity with their origins and traditions, religious institutions indeed differ in their sensitivity to the

5 Thus Cameron (2002) maintains that the ‘market of sin’, whatever its contents, is characterised by greater religious consumption among conservatives and lower consumption among liberals.

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specic requirements and needs of specic groups, such as youths and the aged, educated and less educated people and cultural minorities, which leads to greater religious engagement. Cognitive Paradigm at Micro Level At the outset of this section it should be noted that the question about differences in religion cannot be answered exclusively in terms of macro level secularisation processes or economic rational choice processes at meso level. This does not alter the fact that macro level secularisation has a very real inuence on the micro level, for instance individual secularisation as a result of the compartmentalisation of religion in relation to the rest of the personal life world (Dobbelaere 2002, 169–172). Deregulation of the religious market at meso level likewise affects the micro level, evidenced by the religious revival in Italy (Introvigne & Stark 2005). But these explanations are not exhaustive; individual persons are not swallowed up by their environment. The question is: could it possibly be attributed, in part, to processes in individuals at micro level? If so, which processes, and in what sense do they differ from one person to another? I have said that I shall try to answer these questions in terms of the cognitive paradigm that is peculiar to cognitive science of religion, a discipline that developed from cognitive neuroscience ten to fteen years ago. First we must look into the term ‘cognitive’. It may be misconstrued as a synonymous with such terms as ‘conscious’, ‘knowledge-oriented’, ‘rational’ or ‘rationalistic’. In general one could say that the cognitive paradigm relates to the information, communication and meanings generated by the interaction between the brain and lower and higher cognitive functions. This interaction entails processes such as sensation, perception, automatic responses, emotion, motivation, frames, scripts, memory, thought, imagination, volition, evaluation, planning, decision making and action. Studies of this interaction have shown that traditional concepts like experience, meaning and thought have a neurological basis, so that their conceptual purport can gradually be focused and enriched by empirical research.6 We must reiterate: many of these processes occur unconsciously: “Our brains are constantly 6 For an introduction to a ‘biology of meaning’, see Den Boer 2004, 223–240; cf. Damasio 2004.

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processing information that does not penetrate consciousness but does direct our behaviour” (Hagoort 2005, 108). That is not what is taught in idealistic philosophy and theology. How are these processes coordinated? What agency directs them? The literature gives diverse answers, each more complex than the other. One thing is certain, the brain has no central agency that functions as a director or general, a homunculus, an ‘I’ that regulates its processes. Neither does rationality full a directive function, as philosophers and theologians have supposed for centuries. Here, especially in view of religious experience that will be our next focus, I fall back on Tooby and Cosmides, who maintain that emotions full a coordinating function. According to them emotions direct and orchestrate the coordination programme. Through the emotions the processes of sensation, perception, motivation, cognition, thought, planning, et cetera are assimilated into the human neuropsychological architecture, where they are harmonised (Tooby & Cosmides 2005, 52–61). A much simplied input-throughput-output model would explain the interactions thus. Emotions are stimulated by sensations and perceptions in a given situation that affect the person’s ideas, interests and values (input), on the strength of which these emotions stimulate memory and thought processes and imaginative and interpretive processes (throughput), whereupon planning and decision-making processes are triggered and action is taken (output). In other words, environmental input is regulated by emotional throughput to culminate in a particular action aimed at effecting equilibrium between persons and their environment for the sake of survival (Lazarus 1991). I have said that the model is much simplied, and moreover suggests a linear process with, as it were, three separate phases. Nothing could be further from the truth. Not only does environmental input affect throughput; the latter in its turn retroacts on the input and the relation between throughput and output is similarly interactive. There is no question of a linear process because of these constant feed-forward and feedback interactions (Damasio 2000, 55). That is why the by now traditional computational models, such as Pinker’s (Pinker 1999; 2002), which entail serially linked processes, have been replaced by a connective model that allows for parallel links between mutually inuencing processes (Den Boer 2004, 123–190). Below I try to clarify religious experience within the cognitive paradigm by making a selection from the diverse processes involved. The selection is conned to sensation, perception and response processes,

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feeling and processing of emotions, spiritual experience and actual religious experience. Although this list suggests that we have empirically validated knowledge at our disposal, we know very little as yet about the interaction between neural and cognitive processes and much of it is speculative. To my mind, however, it presents a promising prospect (Hagoort 2000). First of all, every religious experience arises from an event in our environment that triggers a particular sensation. Bending over a cradle arouses tingling excitement, sitting by the deathbed of a loved one causes gnawing pain. These sensations stimulate perception, as do looking at a person we feel committed to, listening to the sound of his voice, touching his hand, inhaling his familiar smell, tasting his skin when kissing him. Such perceptions trigger a complex of electro-chemical processes that evoke automatic responses, resulting in four possibilities: approach, withdrawal, freezing where we leave off, or remaining contentedly where we are. The particular automatic response will depend on the pleasantness or threat ascribed to the perception. Seeing a baby attracts and makes us bend even lower over it. The sight of the wasted body tends to repel, although we surmount that response through the ensuing emotion. Emotions are important, especially primary ones like positive emotions of joy and surprise and negative emotions of fear, revulsion and grief, all of which are probably universal and innate (Damasio 1994, 149–164; 2000, 279–295). Secondary emotions are complex, comprising elements of primary emotions; they include embarrassment, shame and guilt, which are similar in that they make one blush and try to hide one’s face. Guilt entails the realisation that one has harmed the other and shame is felt when that guilt is discovered by others (Darwin 1999, 250–277, 310–344; Ekman 1999). Emotions are important because they provide nonverbal information and assign meaning to our situations, which we communicate to others. In addition they impart a sense of personal involvement: I am the one feeling these emotions, it is my body in which they are expressed. Even primary emotions are not purely a result of genetic disposition, for they are inuenced by culture, particularly as regards the situations in which they are felt or repressed and the manner in which they are expressed (Ekman 1999, 392; Winston 2003, 52–55, 225–227). Feeling of emotions is followed by processing of emotions. The difference between the two processes is that the former is largely unconscious

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and the latter partly conscious, partly unconscious.7 Once processed, emotions become material for higher processes like attention, cognitive framing, memory, imagining, scripts and the like. The interplay of attention and framing intensies them. Interplay with memory deepens and enriches them, and blending them with imagination opens up a broader horizon of ctional conceptions, unsurmised perspectives and possible, hitherto undreamt of worlds, which broaden one’s behavioural repertoire. Spiritual experience may be located in the processing of emotions. This experience could happen in the aforementioned situations—the birth of a child or the death of a loved one—but not only there. It is also triggered by situations of moral self-sacrice, the grandeur of nature, the tone of music or scientic wonderment. It leads to partly unconscious, partly conscious reection that, according to Darwin, distinguishes humans from all other living beings: reection on life and death, origin and goal, transience and nitude (Darwin 2005, 105). When we bend over a cradle we are moved by the vulnerability of the infant, the uncertainty of its future life; when we moisten the lips of a dying loved one we are aware of the helplessness attending both living and dying. Not that life is sein zum Tode, but at any rate it is ‘living until death’ (Ricoeur 1995, 236; 2000, 459–480). At a more abstract level such spiritual processing of emotions entails the dialectics between contingency and absoluteness, between nitude and innity (Ferry 1996; Ferry & Gauchet 2004). According to the psychiatrist and geneticist Cloninger such experiences, which he calls experiences of self-transcendence, have three aspects: absorption, identication and mysticism. Absorption means that one is so fascinated by the infant in the cradle that one as it were forgets oneself. Identication implies a strong sense of solidarity so that one virtually merges with the other, yet without losing oneself, as at the bedside of a dying person with whom one has shared one’s life. Finally, mysticism means that one is mesmerised by the inexpressible, unfathomable wonder of it all, as in the novel Knielen op een bed violen by Jan Siebelink, which poignantly depicts the religious tragedy of identity and difference. According to Cloninger such experiences happen (irrespective of gender, ethnicity and age, albeit more powerfully after the age of 40) when we are confronted with the paradox of life (Cloninger 1993).

7

Damasio (2000, 36–37, 279–295) calls the former ‘feeling of emotions’ and the latter ‘feeling of feeling of emotions’.

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Spiritual experiences of self-transcendence may be regarded as a condition—not sufcient but necessary—for religious experience. That implies that they should be distinguished from each other more clearly than usually happens. In some instances spiritual experience is annexed as anonymous religious experience, in others religious experience is claimed as spiritual experience. Following the neuro-geneticist Hamer (2004), the distinction can be described as follows. Spiritual experiences, at any rate when conceived of as experiences of self transcendence, are neuro-genetically determined. That means that they occur throughout our lives, to a greater or lesser extent, more or less intensely and more or less frequently, in many situations or only rarely. At all events, they are inherently part of human life. They may be regarded as universal experiences, even though they are undeniably subject to cultural inuence as regards their intensity and expression. But they are primarily innate. Religious experience builds on spiritual experience but is not conned to experiences of self-transcendence, since it entails experience of the transcendent itself, the deity, God. These experiences are not just a matter of absorption, identication and mysticism of the kind described above, but go beyond these. They are experiences in the presence of, in Judaism for example, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob as recounted in the Old Testament; in Christianity of the God of Jesus the Christ as recounted in the New Testament; and in Islam of Allah, the God of his prophet Mohammed, as taught in the Qur’an. They are not primarily innate, but are the result of knowledge and especially familiarity with a culturally determined religious tradition, of which one is part and in which one lives. Hence they are primarily cultural, even though they presuppose a neuro-genetic foundation. The point is, spiritual experience is something that can happen to anybody, but religious experience is not, because inner connectedness with the culture of the relevant religious tradition plays a crucial role.8 This is not to deny that the disposition to become conversant with a religious culture is traceable to the person’s genetic makeup. But actually becoming conversant with a particular 8 Hamer (2004) wrongly refers to ‘the God gene’ instead of ‘spirituality genes’ (p. 13). But the confusion between the two experiences is understandable, since despite their substantive difference, they have the same structure. This comprises a combination of positive and negative emotions, which, according to James (1961, 47–55, 75), give them an atmosphere of solemnity. Because of this bipolarity these experiences are never crude or raw, but delicate and gentle, never simple but always complex. Thus their sweetness is always permeated with bitterness and their sorrow always mitigated by intimate experience. That makes the joy silent and the grief comforting.

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religious culture among a host of other religious cultures and getting to understand its language from the inside are not primarily natural but cultural processes.9 The difference between spiritual and religious experience becomes even more apparent when one looks at the specic function of the latter, namely religious attribution—a function not found in spiritual experience. I dealt with this aspect elsewhere but want to amplify it with a comment that strikes me as pertinent to the argument in this article (Van der Ven 2005). Attribution generally is part of what is known as information processing, which relates to the interpretation of events in everyday life. To this end people look for information to enable them to put the events in a meaningful perspective. Attribution is a special form of information processing, in that the events are ascribed to a particular cause or causes. Thus phenomena in the physical, biological, social and psychological domains are attributed to physical, biological, social and psychological causes. But how does attribution work when people are confronted with experience of an existential nature, such as questions concerning the origin and goal, the meaning of existence, of life and death? According to the evolution psychologist Bering this is where domain thinking ends and meta-attribution takes over, in which the events that triggered these existential experiences are related to God or ascribed to his causation. This divine causation may be seen as an efcient cause (causa efciens), a teleological or nal cause (causa nalis) or an appealing exemple-related cause (causa exemplaris). That is how religious attribution works (Boyer 2001, 196–202). As I have said, this element is not present in spiritual experience in the sense of self-transcendence, but is the hallmark of religious experience. Some cognitivists believe that such religious experience is marked by an ‘attribution fallacy’ that leads people into a ‘cognitive illusion’, in which they yield to ‘over-belief ’ (Guthrie 1993; Slone 2004, 58). But how will they respond to nonreligious people’s experience when they say, ‘this is my lot, I must bear it’, ‘that’s how it’s got to be’, ‘this is my task in life’? What is ‘my lot’, ‘how it’s got to be’, ‘my task’ if not a sign that the person is rising above the immanent domain and reaching out for that which transcends it? Without it their lives would be void and meaningless, which would be intolerable (Bering 2005; Bering & Johnson 2005). 9 The same distinction applies to the disposition to learn a language and actually learning a particular language among a host of other languages (Popper & Eccles 2003, 48).

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Or does this make God a ‘God of the gaps’ (Lückenbüsser) who is gradually eclipsed as science forges ahead in the immanent domains? This strikes me as an untenable proposition, however frequently it crops up in the debate, for the simple reason that the existential questions raised in the religious domain can never be answered fully by science. However much it may enable us to intervene in human life, to shift the boundaries of birth and death, maybe even to ‘make life’, the fundamental questions about origin and goal, chance and destiny, freedom and conditioning, vocation and determination continually hover round the enigma of human existence—in religious terms, the mystery of people and their God. The signicance of religion is that it enables them to deal with these questions explicitly in ritual and prayer rather than repress them, however insoluble they may be, as is evident in religious people’s tales about bereavement. When they complain that God has forsaken them and express it in lament or even accusations against God, they bring it into their relationship with God (Zuidgeest 2001). Once again I give a global answer to the question of where religious differences come from, this time between individuals at micro level. To this end I mention three conditions for people’s varying religious experience. The rst concerns emotions that play a major role in religious experience, for instance joy, sorrow, gratitude, shame and guilt. People differ not only in the way they feel their emotions, but also in their processing and expression of emotion. It is a result of both genetic disposition and cultural inuences. Some cultures encourage the experience and expression of emotion, others repress it. Anyway, the differences between individual people depend on the extent to which they are predisposed to the feeling and processing emotions. Some people are good at it, others less good. The second condition concerns spiritual experience as an experience of self-transcendence, which is a necessary condition for religious experience. The three processes involved—absorption, identication and mysticism—should be seen as three scales. One pole of the continuum is a low degree of intensity, the other a high degree. People vary on these three scales: some assimilate the experience of self-transcendence easily, others nd it difcult. Again the difference between people’s religious experience depends partly on the extent to which they are predisposed to absorption, identication and mysticism. The third condition concerns the extent to which people have appropriated the religious culture of a particular tradition and are conversant with it, for there can be no religious experience unless the stories, images and concepts of a religious tradition have been internalised. Here, too,

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individuals differ. It is said that the decline in religious knowledge is responsible for the fact that the younger generation have fewer religious feelings and that these leave them indifferent: “They don’t even know what Christmas and Easter are about.” But what they lack is not so much knowledge, although such knowledge may well be necessary, but familiarity with a religious tradition, and this is precisely where people differ. Some genuinely base their lives on their religious tradition, others are lukewarm, yet others more or less indifferent. In secularised countries the last category is, of course, growing. At all events, differences in people’s religious experience depends on familiarity with their religious tradition. In the foregoing discussion I have taken a theoretical decision that warrants separate mention, since it is based on a fundamental choice. It concerns the perspective from which one should approach the operation of (some of ) the higher cognitive functions, which include religious experience. There are three possible points of departure: (a) the area of the brain; (b) the interaction between brain and mind; or (c) the interaction between brain and the surrounding culture. Applied to religious experience, these perspectives raise the question: do these functions occur in the area of the brain, in the interaction between brain and mind or in the interaction with the surrounding religious culture? The problem in choosing between the alternatives is that it is not clear what is meant by ‘mind’. Some cognitive neuro-scientists settle for the rst option, but keep silent when they are unable to describe and explain certain higher functions, such as faith, hope and love, or more mundane matters like goal setting and planning, in terms of brain functioning. It applies even more to complex problem solving, writing a book, making a sculpture, composing a fugue—even delivering an inspired sermon. This is not to deny the need for the infrastructure of brain processes in these sublime areas. On the contrary, there can be no faith, no hope, no love, no recital, no sermon without the brain (Hagoort 2000, 5). But this condition, although necessary, is not sufcient. Yet these scientists prefer to close their eyes to the problem, hoping that research will advance to a point where it is possible to provide the required explanations.10

10 Hagoort (2005) concludes his article on a related problem with the sentence: “And that, to my mind, offers sufcient food for thought”.

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Other cognitive neuro-scientists choose the second alternative. They believe that mind should be seen as the conversion of the third-person perceptions involved in brain research into the rst-person experiences of people executing the aforementioned creative and artistic activities. These are said to ‘emerge’ from brain processes—hence the term ‘emergentism’. But how does one understand this emergence of rst-person experiences and how do the experiences, once they have surfaced, inuence the brain in their turn? Another term used is ‘supervenience’, but again one must ask whether this means more than the metaphor that rst-person experience builds on neurological processes without explaining what such ‘building on’ actually entails. At this stage one cannot prove more than that the processes correlate. Certainly there is no variation in religious experience without variation in neural processes, but co-variance is not the same as causality. On the contrary, Donald Davidson would say, mental activity is not systematically caused by neural activity. Other scientists introduce the concept of self-organisation. But what exactly does it mean if one argues that the connectivity of neural processes results in a mental system of higher cognitive functions that is self-organising and not reducible to individual neurological functions? It sounds tempting, but the empirical meaning of this sheer speculation remains hidden for now (Kim 1998; Stephan 1999; Pihlström 2005). The reader will have noticed that for now I have chosen the third option—albeit not blindly and dogmatically, for as yet the research results are inadequate to make a nal choice, if that is ever possible. But at this stage I would say that without the culture of a religious tradition, in which the person concerned participates more or less intensely, it is not possible to have a religious experience, dened as an experience of transcendence and distinct from spiritual experience, dened as self-transcendence.11 I base this on the view that religious experience, like many other higher cognitive processes, are not merely embodied in people, but are also embedded in cultural wholes. Some researchers believe that cognitive processes occur wholly in the mind and that culture is simply an extension of these, a kind of dependent variable. But in a

11 Changeux (in: Changeux & Ricoeur 2002, p, 254) emphasises the relation beween natural evolution on the one hand and cultural evolution and cultural history on the other, arguing that such concepts as mind and spirit are not justied by such a relation.

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connectivist approach culture also contributes input to these processes in the form of stimuli, examples, models and strategies, inspiration and challenges—a kind of independent variable. After all, are higher cognitive processes such as imagination, creative thought, composing music and poetry, as well as religious experience, not expressed specically in culture and language? In other words, do they not emerge from brain processes in interaction with culture? These questions are not gratuitous. In cognitive science of religion, for instance in the work of McCauley and Lawson, two leading scholars of ritual, one encounters a cognitivist limitation, albeit in the guise of a naturalistic form of religion among non-literate peoples, which they consider to be a model for all religion and which they set up in opposition to a culturalist approach (McCauley & Lawson 2002, 38–88).12 McCauley (2000, 80) goes so far as to claim that religion antedates history. But surely religion cannot exist without prescribed rituals, conducted in pre-existent communities, in designated social venues, at socially set times, which exert the necessary inuence on the participants’ intra-psychic experience. The problem, clearly, is how to balance (neural) nature and culture—probably by alternately treating them as independent and dependent variables.13 Again I conclude the section by asking whether interpersonal differences in religion can be explained in terms of differences in cognitive functioning. In view of the foregoing debate on whether and in what sense one can conne oneself to neural processes when it comes to religion, or whether one should view them as interactive with culture, some caution is called for. My answer, therefore, is conditional. If and inasmuch as religious experience is in part culturally determined—which is my assumption at this stage—interpersonal differences in religion, here religious experience, are not dependent solely on their disposition to all kinds of perceptions, feeling and processing of emotion and spiritual experience (dened as an experience of self-transcendence), but also on the extent to which people participate in and are conversant with the culture of a particular religious tradition.

12 Flood (2006, 49–51) rightly objects to McCauley and Lawson’s naturalism and stresses the ‘tradition-internal reasoning’ of religious traditions. 13 This is the signicance of Popper’s ‘three worlds’, the material (neural), cognitive and cultural worlds, and his notion of a ‘self anchored in world 3’ (Popper & Eccles 2003, 36–50, 144–147; cf. Deacon 1997, 409–410; Jensen 2003, 258, 273; Day 2004; Paden 2004).

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Conclusion I have tried to clarify differences between countries in terms of secularisation at macro level, with due regard to nonreligious factors inuencing their range, profundity and rate, as well as the counter movements and conicts to which they give rise. Secondly, I tried to explain differences within countries in terms of the economic rational choice model at meso level. However, since its strong thesis of religion as a compensatory barter relationship with God aimed at religious prot maximisation contradicts the essential nature of religion, I defended the more modest position in which differences between religious institutions are conned to differences in sensitivity to the ‘religious market’ within the hermeneutically reconstructible continuity with the origins and traditions of religions. Next I tried to account for individual differences at micro level in terms of the cognitive paradigm, and traced these to differences in disposition to perception, feeling and processing of emotions and spiritual experience, and participation in and familiarity with the culture of a particular religious tradition. Finally, I pointed out the interaction between phenomena at macro, meso and micro level. In so doing I provided three broad outlines for future research projects. References Antes, P., Geertz, W., Warne, R.R. (Eds.) (2004). New Approaches to the Study of Religion. Volume 1: Regional, Criticial, and Historical Approaches. Volume 2: Textual, Comparative, Sociological, and Cognitive Approaches. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. Berger, P. (1999). The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overwiew. In: P. Berger (Ed.), The Desecularization of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1–18. Bering, J. (2005). The Evolutionary History of an Illusion. Religious Causal Beliefs in Children and Adults. In: B. Ellis & D. Bjorklund (Eds.), Origins of the Social Mind. Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development. New York: Guilford Press, 411–437. Bering, J.M. & Johnson D.D. (2005). “O Lord . . . You Perceive my Thoughts from Afar”: Recursiveness and the Evolution of Supernatural Agency. In: Journal of Cognition and Culture 5 (1–2), 118–142. Boyer, P. (1994). The Naturalness of Religous Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Religion. California: University of California Press. ——— (2001). Religion Explained. New York: Basic Books. Brown, D. (1999). Human Universals. In: R. Wilson & F. Keil (Eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press, 382–384. Browne, J. (2003). Charles Darwin. Voyaging. Volume I: Of a Biography. The Power of Place. Volume II: Of a Biography. London: Pimlico. Bruce, S. (1996). Religion in the Modern World. From Cathedrals to Cults. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ——— (1999). Choice and Religion. A Critique of Rational Choice Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Bruce (2001). The Curious Case of the Unnecessary Recantation: Berger and Secularization. In: L. Woodhead (Ed.), Peter Berger and the Study of Religion. London/New York: Routledge, 87–100. Bruner J.S. (1986). Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge. ——— (1990). Acts of Meaning. Cambridge. Cameron, S. (2002). The Economics of Sin. Rational Choice or No Choice At All? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Casanova, J. (1994). Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chai, Dun-Kai (2003). The Many Flavors of Rational Choice (and the Fate of Sociology). Paper Department of Sociology. University of Hawaii. Chaves, M., Cann D. (1992). Regulation, Pluralism and Religious Market Structure. Explaining Religious Vitality. In: Rationality and Society 4 (3), 272–290. Changeux, J.-P., Ricoeur P. (2002). What Makes Us Think. A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain. Princeton: University of Princeton Press. Cloninger, C. et al. (1993). A Psychological Model of Temperament and Character. In: Archive of General Psychiatry 50(1993), 975–990. Cosmides, L., Tooby, J. (2005). Neurocognitive Adaptations Designed for Social Exchange. In: D. Buss (Ed.), The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. Hoboken: Wiley, 584–627. Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Putnam. ——— (2000). The Feeling of What Happens. Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt. ——— (2004). Looking for Spinoza. Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. London: Vintage. Darwin, Ch. (1999). The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Introduction, Afterword and Commentaries by Paul Ekman. London: HarperCollins. ——— (2004). The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. London: Penguin. Davie, G. (1990). Believing without Belonging: Is This the Future of Religion in Britain? In: Social Compass 37, 455–469 ——— (1999). Europe: The Exception That Proves the Rule? In: P. Berger (Ed.), The Desecularization of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 65–84. Dawkins, R. (1998). Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder. Boston: Houghton Mifin. Day, M. (2004). The Ins and Outs of Religious Cognition. In: Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 16 (3), 241–265. Deacon, T. (1997). Symbolic Species. The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain. New York: Norton. Den Boer, J. (2004). Neurolosoe. Hersenen, bewustzijn, vrije wil. Amsterdam: Boom. De Waal, Fr. (2005). Our Inner Ape. The Best and Worst of Human Nature. London: Granta. Dobbelaere, K. (1999). Towards an Integrated Perspective of the Processes Related to the Descriptive Concept of Secularization. In: Sociology of Religion 60 (3), 229–247. ——— (2002). Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels. Frankfurt: Lang. ——— (2004). Assessing Secularization Theory. New Approaches to the Study of Religion. Volume 2: Textual, Comparative, Sociological, and Cognitive Approaches. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 228–253. Ekman, P. (1999). Afterword. In: Darwin, Ch., The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Introduction, Afterword and Commentaries by Paul Ekman. London: HarperCollins, 363–393. Feith, J. (2003). Probing Neurotheology’s Brain or Critiquing an Emerging Quasi-Science. Paper for the Critical Theory and Discourse on Religion Section. The American Academy of Religion Convention 2003. Atlanta, Georgia.

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EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY: DEFINING THE TASK AND SELECTING THE TOOLS Leslie J. Francis Introduction The purpose of the present paper is to examine two issues of fundamental importance to the development of empirical theology as an innovative and core activity of the theological academy. The rst issue concerns the justication for empirical techniques to be fully incorporated within the range of academic tools available to theologians. The second issue concerns the selection and critique of empirical tools appropriate for use within the theological academy. Dening the Task The case for recognising the legitimate place of empirical theology within the theological academy is grounded here in analysis and reection on ve pertinent problems. The rst problem concerns the nature of theology. The second problem concerns the origin of the academic tools generally available within the theological academy. The third problem concerns the ongoing relationship between theology and the other disciplines with which it shares its academic tools. The fourth problem concerns the place of the human factor in religious experience and in theological enquiry. The fth problem concerns the fundamental issue of theological normativity. Each of these ve problems will be addressed in turn. The Nature of Theology The rst problem is fundamental and was well voiced by the title of Maurice Wiles’ classic book (written when he held the Regius Chair at Oxford), What is Theology? (1976). Wiles approaches this problem by developing analogies with what he regards as less elusive and more transparent disciplines. He takes as his fundamental analogy the work of the geologist who studies the earth (gÏ). At least as simply understood,

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the subject matter of the geologist’s trade is clearly tangible and readily open to scrutiny, and the tools or instruments of the geologist’s trade are easy to recognise (for example, chisel and hammer). Nonetheless, it must also be acknowledged that these instruments were not initially invented by geologists within the domain of their own academic faculty. The instruments were manufactured in the rst place for an altogether different trade (for example, building houses, castles, churches and instruments of war). Etymologically speaking the theologian studies God (theos). At least as simply understood, the subject matter of the theologian’s trade is clearly somewhat less tangible and less readily open to scrutiny. The tools so useful in the hands of the geologist (chisel and hammer) seem at rst glance to be of little practical value in the hands of the theologian. Given the elusive and intangible nature of God, compared with the more tangible and more accessible nature of earth, many nd themselves studying something somewhat different but of considerable importance, namely the human experience of God, or systematised reection on the human experience of God. Precisely what is meant by the human experience of God and the extent to which this experience is coloured by human subjectivity varies from one theological tradition to another, according to hard or soft theologies of revelation. In this sense biblical scholars may be dealing with the way in which God may be made known in scripture, church historians may be dealing with the way in which God may continue to be made known in the history of the church, and systematic theologians may be dealing with self-critical and coherent understandings of this knowledge of God within the community of faith. In response to reection on the rst problem, I conclude that much of the activity of some theologians is properly concerned with making sense of, testing and scrutinising reection on experiences of God. The empirical theologian shares in this venture. The Tools of the Theologian The second problem follows from the rst and is concerned with the nature and the origin of the tools or instruments that are appropriately found in the hands of theologians. Just as the chisel and hammer appear not to have been invented exclusively (or even primarily) for the use of the geologist, so many of the instruments now so well established within the theologian’s tool-kit appear to have been borrowed (or stolen)

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from some other domain. For example, when I see the biblical scholar at work I sometimes observe language skills (especially Hebrew and Greek) which I would expect to have been rened in departments of ancient languages. On other occasions I observe skills in source criticism, form criticism, redaction criticism, and a whole range of other approaches. My mistake would be to imagine that my able colleagues in biblical studies had been wholly responsible for inventing and rening these tools themselves. When I see the systematic theologian at work I sometimes observe philosophical skills which I would expect to have been rened in departments of philosophy. When I see the empirical theologian at work, I observe a range of skills which may well have been developed and rened elsewhere in the academy, as illustrated by the following examples. In his analysis of the precursors of church decline in The ‘Empty’ Church Revisited, Gill (2003) makes extensive use of historical statistics, building on techniques developed by social historians. In his analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the rural church in Church Watch, Francis (1996) makes use of participant observer reports, building on techniques developed by social anthropologists. In their analysis of the health of the Catholic clergy in The Naked Parish Priest, Louden and Francis (2003) make use of self completion questionnaires, building on techniques developed by sociologists. In their study of religion during childhood and adolescence in Drift from the Churches, Kay and Francis (1996) make use of psychometric assessment instruments, building on techniques developed by social psychologists. The multivariate data modelling strategies used by empirical theologians in handling quantitative data build on techniques developed by applied statisticians. Clearly my colleagues within the theological academy working in biblical studies are not, for example, doing their work in Hebrew and Greek as outsiders to the faculty of theology (as linguists studying religion). Clearly my colleagues in systematic theology are not, for example, doing their work in philosophy as outsiders to the faculty of theology (as philosophers studying religion). Within the same tradition I would maintain that I am not doing my work as an empirical theologian, for example, by applying tools borrowed from psychology as an outsider to the faculty of theology (as a psychologist studying religion). In response to the second problem, I conclude that the tools of the social historian, the social anthropologist, the sociologist, the psychologist, and the applied statistician have a fully legitimate place within the

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faculty of theology, alongside the tools borrowed from other disciplines which have enjoyed a longer history of acceptance by theologians. Intra-Disciplinary or Inter-Disciplinary The third problem follows from the second and is concerned with the relationship between empirical theology and the disciplines which have helped to shape the tools used by empirical theologians (say the social sciences and applied statistics). There are two somewhat different perspectives on this relationship as emphasised by the Nijmegen school of empirical theology shaped by Johannes van der Ven (see van der Ven, 1993) and by the Wales school of empirical theology shaped by Leslie J. Francis (see Francis, 2002). The contrast between these two perspectives has been described and evaluated by Cartledge (1999). Van der Ven’s pioneering work seems to have been keen to establish his approach to empirical theology as a legitimate activity within the theological academy. One of his strategies for achieving this end was to emphasise the proper independence of empirical theology from the social sciences. Accordingly, van der Ven placed weight almost exclusively on the intra-disciplinary perspective, whereby the empirical theologian operated with tools borrowed (or stolen) from the social sciences but in relative independence of other social scientists. Empirical theology is responsible for generating its own theologically grounded theories and for operationalising these theories independently of competing theories and perspectives being developed in the social sciences. In this way boundaries can be drawn more clearly between empirical theology and the social scientic study of religion. My difculty, however, on relying too heavily on the intra-disciplinary perspective is this. Returning to Wiles’ friendly geologists, I fully recognise that they are properly employing the chisel and hammer in an intra-disciplinary manner. I would be disappointed, however, if, at least from time to time, geologists did not engage in real and fundamental debate with those craftspeople from other disciplines who had invested so heavily in rening those very tools. Such debate and dialogue is benecial in two ways. On the one hand, by returning to the blacksmith geologists may learn things to their advantage about recent developments in chisels and hammers. On the other hand, and of equal importance, geologists may have important information to convey to blacksmiths about ways in which their tools perform in specialised contexts, and about developments which have been pioneered

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within the faculty of geology to make even better instruments. This is where the intra-disciplinary perspective is properly complemented by the inter-disciplinary perspective. The inter-disciplinary perspective requires appropriate aspects of the work of empirical theologians to be subject to peer review and scrutiny by social scientists as well as by theologians. The inter-disciplinary perspective requires studies in empirical theology to reect the best research in the social sciences as well as the best research in theology. The inter-disciplinary perspective requires a two-way trafc through which empirical theologians can advance debate in the social sciences as well as invite social scientists to advance debate in empirical theology. This is also why I hope and expect to see empirical theologians playing their full part not only in the International Society for Empirical Research in Theology, but also in the Society for the Scientic Study of Religion, the International Society for the Sociology of Religion, and the International Association for the Psychology of Religion, as well as in the parent bodies like the American Psychological Association. In response to reection on the third problem, I conclude not only that the tools of the social scientist have a fully legitimate place within the theology faculty, but that they should be operated there in both an intra-disciplinary perspective and inter-disciplinary perspective. The Human Factor The fourth problem concerns both a closer analysis of what some theologians might mean by claiming to have a primary concern with reection on human experience of God, and also a more careful examination of what tools might be most appropriate for undertaking such investigation. The very notion of experience places emphasis on the human receptor of experience. A theological examination of the experience of God cannot be properly conducted, I would maintain, without recourse to the human and social sciences. Talk about personal and individual experience of God necessarily raises issues of primary concern to the psychologist. Talk about social and community experience of God necessarily raises issues of primary concern to the sociologist. Proper intra-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary perspectives on these issues, drawing on tools fashioned in the social sciences, can be of immense value both to the theologian studying the experience of God and also to the social scientist whose study of human experience would be inadequate and incomplete without reference to the subject

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matter taken seriously by the theologian. In an intra-disciplinary sense, the theologian may appear ill-informed and misled if the best-tested instruments and tools of the social sciences are ignored. In an interdisciplinary sense, the social scientist may nd tools of their trade further rened, developed and sharpened in the hands of theologians so concerned with examining the very frontiers of human experience such as the interface between immanence and transcendence. I will illustrate this question further by reference to a well-discussed issue in contemporary theology, namely biblical hermeneutics. As I understand the issue, biblical hermeneutics can be concerned with the dialogue between the text and the reader (the preacher or the listener). Dialogue clearly involves two partners. Biblical hermeneutics is concerned not only with interrogating the word of God in the text (in whatever sense that is intended by different theological traditions) but also with interrogating the reader. In a recent paper on biblical hermeneutics and psychological type (Francis, 2003a) I have argued the case that current theological scholarship in biblical hermeneutics (and in preaching the word) places disproportionate emphasis on instruments and tools appropriate for examining the text and insufcient emphasis on instruments and tools appropriate for examining the reader (the preacher or the listener). It is precisely those tools employed by empirical theology (and originally shaped in the social sciences) that are not only appropriate but necessarily required for such theological activity. In response to reection on the fourth problem, I conclude that many branches of theology cannot claim to be properly informed about their subject matter without taking seriously the work of empirical theology. Theological Normativity The fth problem penetrates further behind the fourth problem and confronts the fundamental issues of theological normativity. Here the issue to be examined concerns the extent to which the instruments of empirical theology are able to access and to assess theological information, or put another way, information about God. I offer two approaches to this problem, both rooted in the Christian tradition. The rst approach builds on implications derived from Christian doctrine. The second approach builds on implications derived from the methodological perspective developed by Jesus to reveal insights into the nature of the Kingdom of God.

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Christian doctrine purports to offer a coherent and integrated view of God and the universe. Classically a Christian view of God and the universe begins with notions of the eternal pre-existence of God and the creation of the universe ex nihilo, and then includes the special creation of human beings (whether or not construed in the context of evolutionary theory), the fall, revelation, the person of Jesus, soteriology, ecclesiology and eschatology. Clearly the pivotal doctrine of creation shapes the opportunity for natural revelation as alluded to classically in Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. In theologically skilled hands, the geologists’ tools of chisel and hammer can provide insight into the creator God. It is the doctrine of the creation of men and women in the image of God which provides a special place for the human and social sciences within the theologian’s tool kit. Of course, the theologically literate are unlikely to draw crude conclusions about the nature of the creator from scientic observation of the human creature. In this context the doctrine of creation has to be read in light of the doctrine of fall. Yet at the same time, the doctrine of fall has to be qualied by the doctrine of redemption and by the anticipation of the eschatological fullness which will be manifest in Christ. There are key clues derived from the doctrine of the creation of men and women in the image of God (Genesis 1:27) which provide insights both about what it means to be human (created in the divine image) and about the nature of God (reected in the human creature). The rst of these clues concerns the concept of individual differences so familiar in psychology. The fundamental individual difference reected in the doctrine of creation ‘in the image of God’ is ‘sex difference’. Laying aside the problematic account of the generation of Eve from the body of Adam (Genesis 2:21–24, subordinating women to men), the doctrine of creation of both men and women in the image of God conveys important normative insights into the parity and equality between men and women. This doctrine also conveys important normative insight into the nature of God who embraces diversity and who rejects gender stereotyping as either male or female. Closer investigation of the ‘nature of humankind’ by the tools and instruments of the social sciences draws attention to other key individual differences which must be respected as a consequence of taking seriously the presence of diversity which follows from the doctrine of creation in the image of God. Alongside the individual difference of sex needs to be placed

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the individual difference of ethnicity. The doctrine of creation in the image of God conveys important normative insights into the parity and equality between people of different ethnicities, colours and languages. This doctrine also conveys important normative insight into the nature of God who embraces diversity and who rejects ethnic stereotyping as white, as western, or as European. Alongside sex and ethnicity, the tradition of psychology concerned with individual differences opens up the whole eld of personality research as conveying important insights about what it means to be human and about the nature of God. For example, the doctrine of creation in the image of God conveys important normative insights into the parity and equality of individuals who display fundamental differences (say introverts and extraverts). This doctrine also conveys important normative insight into the nature of God who embraces diversity and rejects being characterised as either the God of stillness and isolation (introversion) or the God of busyness and social engagement (extraversion). The methodological perspective developed by Jesus to reveal insights into the nature of the Kingdom of God is based on an empirical method of observation clearly consistent with the activity of empirical theology. When people asked Jesus to reveal to them insights into the nature of the Kingdom of God, Jesus invited them to become empirical theologians and to observe the patterns and laws in the world around them. Become participant observers, commands Jesus the teller-of-parables, and observe the sower. See how this method of farming distributes the seed evenly and fairly, but recognise how the nature of the soil determines the outcome (Mark 4:3–20). The Kingdom of God works in precisely the same way. Become participant observers, commands Jesus the teller-ofparables, and observe how the president of the feast deals with guests at the wedding banquet (Luke 14:7–11). The Kingdom of God works in precisely the same way. Become participant observers, commands Jesus the teller-of-parables, and observe how the father responds to his two sons (Luke 15:11–31), one going off into a far country to squander his inheritance, and one staying at home to look after the farm. The Kingdom of God works in precisely the same way. Become participant observers, commands Jesus the teller-of-parables, and observe how the landowner treats the labourers in the vineyard (Matthew 20:1–16), some of whom have borne the burden of the day and the scorching heat, and some of whom were hired only at the eleventh hour. The

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Kingdom of God works in precisely the same way. Real theological information is generated by close observation, intelligent interpretation, and appropriate reection on such data. In response to reection on the fth problem, I conclude that empirical theology is right at the forefront of the generation of theological knowledge in the twenty-rst century. Selecting the Tools The range of tools available for use by empirical theologians is wide and diverse. In the following analysis the focus will be restricted to those kinds of instruments which are appropriate within the quantitative traditions of empirical research (as distinct from qualitative traditions) and which are considered sufciently robust to play a proper part in multivariate statistical modelling. If empirical theology is to operate both as an intra-disciplinary and an inter-disciplinary activity, instruments employed in empirical theology must satisfy two sorts of criteria (criteria proposed by theology and criteria proposed by the social sciences), and involve two steps. Because the social sciences themselves constitute such a broad eld of enquiry, I propose to focus on one major tradition within the social sciences (psychology) and to restrict concrete examples to that discipline. The rst step concerns the extent to which the concepts being operationalised themselves make sense within the theological academy. The second step concerns the extent to which the operationalisation of the concepts reach the recognised criteria of the social scientic (psychological) academy. These two steps provide the foundation for quality control. In the design of empirical research in theology (using the quantitative tradition) there are (at least) three different kinds of instruments which hold a key place. Moreover, there is a sense in which these three kinds of instruments need to be approached in a certain sequence. The rst kind of instrument is to do with the empirical exploration of fundamental human differences. Such fundamental human (psychological) differences, standing alongside factors like biological sex and ethnicity of birth, may in their turn help to structure and to shape the ways in which the religious response of humankind is expressed. In today’s intellectual environment we cannot reect theologically on the nature of humankind (and on the nature of the God in whose image humankind is fashioned) without taking such factors into account. Moreover, there

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are clear implications for theology owing from such reection. The second kind of instrument is to do with the empirical exploration of the human religious response to God. It is here that the social scientic study of religion and empirical theology may come into strongest conict. Constructs generated in the social scientic study of religion (psychology of religion) need to be subjected to proper theological scrutiny, while constructs generated in empirical theology need to be subjected to proper social scientic (psychological) scrutiny. Moreover, there are clear implications for theology owing from reection on such analyses. The third kind of instrument is to do with the exploration of the human consequences of experience of God. It is here that theological accounts of the impact of the experience of God on individual lives can be properly tested in the public arena by the publicly agreed criteria of the social sciences (psychology). The instruments employed in the development of such causal models need to be properly tested, interrogated and agreed by theologians and social scientists (psychologists) alike. Once again, there are clear implications for theology owing from reection on such analyses. Fundamental Human Differences In psychological discourse fundamental human differences are discussed in terms of models of personality and the measurement of personalityrelated constructs. At least four different models of personality continue to dominate the scientic literature: the sixteen personality factors proposed by Cattell (see Cattell, Eber and Tatsuoka, 1970), the three major dimensions of personality proposed by Eysenck (see Eysenck and Eysenck, 1985), the big ve personality factors proposed by Costa and McCrae (see Costa and McCrae, 1985), and the four constructs of psychological type proposed by Jung (1971) and operationalised, among others, by Myers and McCaulley (1985) in the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. I have argued elsewhere that such models of personality provide a key resource for empirical theology (Francis, 2002). These models, however, require proper and thorough critique. The debate is already well-established and rich in the psychological literature (see, for example, texts such as Hogan, Johnson and Briggs, 1997; Funder, 1997). Tests of reliability examine the stability of measurement. Tests of validity examine the relationship between the observed measurements and the underlying theoretical constructs. Tests of item analysis and factor analysis examine the structure of the

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individual models and the relationship between the models. In the eyes of many psychologists the most vulnerable of these diverse models of personality is the model of psychological type, operationalised, for example, by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Recent studies in psychology, however, have done much to re-examine and to defend this instrument (see Bayne, 1995). The critique of these instruments in the theological literature is much less well-established (see Leech, 1996), although the questions which they raise are of crucial theological signicance (see Francis, 2005). For example, a major theological criticism of personality theory concerns the apparent determinism within the assumption that certain personality features are part of the biological giveness with which people need to operate. This theological objection results, I believe, from a failure to listen carefully to personality theory and to distinguish between the two very different constructs of personality and character. The construct of personality is generally employed on the same level as sex and ethnicity, as part of the raw materials with which an individual needs to operate. The construct of character, on the other hand, is an altogether different notion. When Jesus observed the tax collector and the Pharisee who both went to the temple to pray (Luke 18:9–14) it was their character, not their personality on which he commented. If personality theory gives us real information about what it means to be human and to be created in the image of God, research using personality theory may give real information of relevance to practical theology. I will illustrate the point by three examples from the current agenda of my research group. The rst example concerns church leavers (see Richter and Francis, 1998) and the coincidence between church leavers and psychological type as constructed in Jungian terms. New research is drawing attention to ways in which many church congregations in England and Wales tend to make some psychological types feel at home and to alienate other psychological types. Theological principles concerning God’s inclusivity (only so recently asserted to embrace men and women, white and black on equal terms) need to interrogate the covert discrimination of psychological types. The second example concerns preaching. New research is drawing attention to ways in which individuals of different psychological types respond to different messages within the same text of scripture. Theological principles concerning the active role of the listener in biblical

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interpretation need to be alert to the needs of different psychological types (Francis and Atkins, 2000, 2001, 2002). The third example concerns the understanding and treatment of burnout and stress among clergy (see Francis and Rutledge, 2000). Repeated studies are now showing that burnout is more powerfully predicted by internal personality factors than by external contextual factors. On the basis of such knowledge pastoral theologians charged with the care of clergy could be in a much more informed position to prevent burnout. Human Religious Response The social scientic study of religion has developed a wide range of categories and of operationalisations intended to access and to assess different dimensions of religiosity (see, for example, Hill and Hood, 1999). On the one hand, the temptation may be to integrate such categories too uncritically within empirical theology. On the other hand, the temptation may be for social scientists to fail to appreciate the theological assumptions of their instruments. I propose to examine ve conceptualisations in turn, concerning religious afliation, religious practice, religious belief, religious orientation, and religious attitude. The rst category of religious afliation is one that was brought into particular salience in England and Wales by the wide-ranging debate leading up to the introduction of a religious question into the national census for the rst time in 2001. In terms of sociological categories the Ofce for National Statistics debated the case between including check boxes for the six major faiths recognised in the United Kingdom (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jew, Muslim, and Sikh) or to extend the categories to give space for nine major faiths (including Baha’i, Jain, and Zoroastrian). The Ofce for National Statistics saw no sociological case for subdividing the Christian category into major denominations. Given the value of the data for planning major areas of economic and social life the Ofce for National Statistics remained oblivious to the enormous theological differences between the Christian denominations and the consequent differences in personal and social outcomes. As a consequence the sociological categories provided by the census are inadequate for the empirical theologian (Francis, 2003b). The second category of religious practice is often measured in sociological studies by the single question concerned with frequency of church attendance. Theologically, however, it is recognised that the

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signicance of church attendance is conceptualised differently within different church traditions. In some traditions attendance equates more highly with inward devotion, while in other traditions it equates more highly with outward observance. Such differences themselves may be a function of ecclesiology, authority, and soteriology. The third category of religious belief is often measured in sociological studies by a single continuum characterised at the high scoring end as ‘conservative belief ’. Theologically the problem with such scales is to know how to characterise the low scorers. Low scorers on an index of conservative belief may reect liberal belief, agnosticism, or unbelief. There is also a further problem to distinguish between the content of belief and the manner in which belief is held. Liberals, agnostics, and atheists may tend toward dogmatism as much as conservatives (if not more so). In one of my own early studies (Francis, 1984) I tried to distinguish between six different positions in respect of twelve areas of belief (conservative belief, liberal belief, agnosticism, atheism, dogmatic belief, and dogmatic unbelief). Here, I argued, was a theologically informed attempt to measure Christian belief which was shown to function among theologically informed subjects and to distinguish between future clergy training in different seminaries. The fourth category of religious orientation has become very well established in the social scientic study of religion since the pioneering work of Allport and Ross (1967) and the developments presented by Batson and Ventis (1982). Clearly the distinctions between intrinsic religiosity, extrinsic religiosity, and quest religiosity have generated a considerable theoretical and empirical literature. From a psychological perspective current research continues to open the conceptualisation and the assessment of these constructs to scrutiny (see Hills, Francis and Robbins, 2005). From a theological perspective it remains far from obvious how these constructs map onto issues which are of primary relevance to theology. The fth category of attitude toward religion is the one which has engaged my own attention for over thirty years as the category of central concern both for the psychology of religion and for empirical theology. The scale of attitude toward Christianity which I developed in the early 1970s (Francis, 1978a, 1978b) has now been translated into a number of languages and used by colleagues in well over 200 separate studies. More recently parallel instruments have been developed to measure attitude toward Hinduism (Francis, Santosh, Robbins and Bhanot, in press), attitude toward Islam (Sahin and Francis, 2002), and attitude

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toward Judaism (Francis and Katz, in press). The attitudinal dimension appears particularly attractive both to the empirical theologian and to the social scientist of religion for four reasons, especially when theological theories or social scientic hypotheses are being tested among less theologically literate samples. First, at a conceptual level, social psychologists have developed a sophisticated and well-established understanding of attitude as a deep-seated and relatively stable and enduring covert predisposition, in contrast with more volatile surface behaviours and opinions. To access attitude toward religion is to get close to the heart of religion in an individual’s life. Second, following the pioneering analysis of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), Francis (1978a, 1978b) argued that attitudes are concerned primarily with accessing the affective dimension of religiosity. The affective dimension is distinguished from the cognitive dimension (concerned with beliefs) and from the behavioural dimension (concerned with practice). The affective dimension is able to transcend the divisions between denominational perspectives, while beliefs tend to polarise such divisions. In a Christian context, for example, Catholics may believe one thing about the nature of God and Protestants may believe another, but both Catholics and Protestants may agree on the assessment of the extent to which their faith exercises a positive or negative inuence on their lives. The affective dimension is less likely to be distorted by personal and contextual factors, while practice tends to be subject to all kinds of personal or social constraints. Whether an individual actually attends a place of worship or church may be inuenced by personal factors (like state of health) or social factors (like pressure from parents), but negative and positive feelings about faith are much less likely to be contaminated by such factors. Third, the affective dimension of religiosity can be accessed by instruments which can function in a comparatively stable manner over a wide age range. While the sophistication with which beliefs are formulated and tested clearly develops over the life span, attitudinal statements concerned with positive and negative affect can be formulated in ways which are equally acceptable during childhood, adolescence, and adulthood (Francis, 1989; Francis and Stubbs, 1987). Fourth, at an operational level, social psychologists have developed a range of sophisticated and well-established techniques for assessing and scaling attitudes, including the pioneering work of Thurstone (1928),

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Likert (1932), Guttman (1944), Edwards (1957) and Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957). By testing the performance of these various methods among different age groups, Francis (1978a, 1978b) identied the Likert technique as providing the most reliable and consistent scaling properties from the age of eight upwards through childhood and adolescence into adulthood. If the psychological assessment of attitude toward religion gets anywhere near to the heart of what it is that theologians discuss when they speak about the experience of God, research using such instruments may give real information of relevance to practical theology, especially in relationship to assessing the consequences of different strategies in mission and ministry. Consequence of Experience of God Theological discourse is rich in claims about the ways in which experience of God impacts, changes or transforms human lives. A third set of instruments needed by empirical theology are instruments which can properly reect and assess such claims. It is in this area of research that I have deployed the scales of attitude toward religion, and I have done so in respect of a series of theologically informed outcome variables. For the purposes of the present discussion, I will draw attention specically to the construct of happiness. From a theological perspective, there is much within the Christian tradition to link religion and happiness. In the Old Testament, Psalm 1 proclaims: ‘Happy are those who reject the advice of evil men. Instead they nd joy in obeying the Law of the Lord.’ According to Psalm 128: ‘Happy is everyone who fears the Lord, who walks in his ways.’ Similarly, the book of Proverbs: ‘Happy are those who keep my ways’; and ‘Happy are those who trust in the Lord.’ In the New Testament, the words attributed to Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount proclaim: ‘Happy are those whose greatest desire is to do what God requires; God will satisfy them fully.’ According to Luke’s gospel, Jesus exclaims: ‘How happy are those who hear the word of God and obey it.’ In the letter to the Romans, Paul writes, ‘How happy are those whose wrongs God has forgiven, whose sins he has covered over.’ In order to test the claim that there is an association between happiness and religion, I and my colleagues have established a series of studies to examine the association between attitude toward Christianity and happiness as assessed by the Oxford Happiness Inventory, developed

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and published by Argyle, Martin and Crossland (1989). The rst study, reported by Robbins and Francis (1996), was conducted among 360 undergraduates in the United Kingdom. The second study, reported by Francis and Lester (1997), replicated the original study in a different cultural context among 212 undergraduates in the United States of America. The third study, reported by French and Joseph (1999), was conducted among 101 undergraduate students in the United Kingdom. The fourth study, reported by Francis, Jones and Wilcox (2000), employed three separate samples drawn from the United Kingdom: 994 secondary school pupils during the nal year of compulsory schooling attending four state-maintained secondary schools in the north east of England, 456 rst-year undergraduate students attending one institution in Wales, and 496 members of a branch of the University of the Third Age in the south of England, a relatively informal education network for senior citizens. The fth study, reported by Francis and Robbins (2000), was conducted among 295 participants attending a variety of workshops and courses on the psychology of religion, ranging in age from late teens to late seventies. The sixth study, reported by Francis, Robbins and White (2003) was conducted among 89 students in Wales. All eight samples employed in these six studies demonstrated a signicant positive correlation between happiness and attitude toward Christianity, after controlling for the possible contaminating inuence of personality. In order to establish the extent to which the correlates of the attitudinal dimensions of religiosity established within a Christian or postChristian context by means of the Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity held true within a context shaped by Judaism, Francis and Katz (2002) administered the Katz-Francis Scale of Attitude toward Judaism alongside the Hebrew translation of the Oxford Happiness Inventory and the Hebrew translation of the short form of the revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire to a sample of 298 female Hebrew speaking undergraduate students. In a second study Francis, Katz, Yablon and Robbins (2004) administered the same three instruments to a sample of 203 male Hebrew speaking undergraduate students. These data conrmed a small but statistically signicant positive association between attitude toward Judaism and happiness. Within the domain of empirical theology the value of these studies needs to be critiqued seriously from the perspective of establishing the extent to which the Oxford Happiness Inventory actually assesses a view of happiness consistent with a theological discussion of happiness.

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Within the domain of psychology the value of these studies needs to be critiqued seriously from the perspective of establishing the construct validity and reliability of the Oxford Happiness Inventory. If the Oxford Happiness Inventory’s assessment of happiness gets anywhere near to the heart of what it is that theologians discuss when they speak about human happiness, practical theology may wish to build on this research tradition to examine more seriously the objective evidence for the benets of faith in individual lives. Conclusion The present paper has examined the notion of empirical theology. The case has been argued that the future of empirical theology is best conceived both in intra-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary terms. Then a review and critique has been offered of three kinds of empirical tools which have a place within empirical theology: instruments concerned with fundamental human differences, instruments concerned with the human religious response, and instruments concerned with the consequence of experience of God. As more scholars begin to engage with this way of doing theology, so the empirical grounds for theological discourse will be strengthened. References Allport, G.W. & Ross, J.M. (1967). Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5, 432–443. Argyle, M., Martin, M. & Crossland, J. (1989). Happiness as a Function of Personality and Social Encounters. In : J.P. Forgas & J.M. Innes (Eds), Recent Advances in Social Psychology: an International Perspective. Amsterdam, North Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers, 189–203. Batson, C.D. & Ventis, W.L. (1982). The Religious Experience: A Social Psychological Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press. Bayne, R. (1995). The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator: A Critical Review and Practical Guide. London: Chapman and Hall. Cartledge, M.J. (1999). Empirical Theology: Inter- or Intra-disciplinary? In: Journal of Beliefs and Values 20, 98–104. Cattell, R.B., Eber, H.W. & Tatsuoka, M.M. (1970). Handbook for the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF). Champaign, Illinois: Institute for Personality and Ability Testing. Costa, P.T. & McCrae, R.R. (1985). The NEO Personality Inventory. Odessa, Florida: Psychological Assessment Resources. Edwards, A.L. (1957). Techniques of Attitude Scale Construction. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts.

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Eysenck, H.J. & Eysenck, M.W. (1985). Personality and Individual Differences: A Natural Science Approach. New York: Plenum Press. Fishbein, M. & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behaviour: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. Francis, L.J. (1978a). Attitude and Longitude: A Study in Measurement. In: Character Potential 8, 119–130. ——— (1978b). Measurement Reapplied: Research into the Child’s Attitude towards Religion. In: British Journal of Religious Education 1, 45–51. ——— (1984). Dimensions of Christian Belief. In: Educational Studies 10, 103–111. ——— (1989). Measuring Attitude towards Christianity During Childhood and Adolescence. In: Personality and Individual Differences 10, 695–698. ——— (1996). Church Watch: Christianity in the Countryside. London: SPCK. ——— (2002). Personality Theory and Empirical Theology. In: Journal of Empirical Theology 15, 37–53. ——— (2003a), Psychological Type and Biblical Hermeneutics: SIFT Method of Preaching. In: Rural Theology 1, 13–23. ——— (2003b), Religion and Social Capital: The Flaw in the 2001 Census in England and Wales. In: P. Avis (ed.), Public Faith: The State of Religious Belief and Practice in Britain. London: SPCK, 45–64. ——— (2005), Faith and Psychology: Personality, Religion and the Individual. London: Darton, Longman and Todd. Francis, L.J. & Atkins, P. (2000). Exploring Luke’s Gospel: A Guide to the Gospel Readings in the Revised Common Lectionary. London: Mowbray. ——— (2001). Exploring Matthew’s Gospel: A Guide to the Gospel Readings in the Revised Common Lectionary. London: Mowbray. ——— (2002). Exploring Mark’s Gospel: An Aid for Readers and Preachers Using Year B of the Revised Common Lectionary. London: Continuum. Francis, L.J., Jones, S.H. and Wilcox, C. (2000), Religiosity and Happiness: During Adolescence, Young Adulthood and Later Life. In: Journal of Psychology and Christianity 19, 245–257. Francis, L.J. & Katz, Y.J. (2002). Religiosity and Happiness: A Study among Israeli Female Undergraduates. In: Research in the Social Scientic Study of Religion 13, 75–86. ——— (in press). Measuring Attitude toward Judaism: The Internal Consistency Reliability of the Katz-Francis Scale of Attitude toward Judaism. In: Mental Health, Religion and Culture. Francis, L.J., Katz, Y.J., Yablon, Y. & Robbins, M. (2004). Religiosity, Personality and Happiness: A Study among Israeli Male Undergraduates. In: Journal of Happiness Studies 5, 315–333. Francis, L.J. & Lester, D. (1997). Religion, Personality and Happiness. In: Journal of Contemporary Religion 12, 81–86. Francis, L.J. & Robbins, M. (2000). Religion and Happiness: A Study in Empirical Theology. In: Transpersonal Psychology Review 4 (2), 17–22. Francis, L.J., Robbins, M. & White, A. (2003). Correlation Between Religion and Happiness: A Replication. In: Psychological Reports 92, 51–52. Francis, L.J. & Rutledge, C.F.J. (2000). Are Rural Clergy in the Church of England Under Greater Stress? A Study in Empirical Theology. In: Research in the Social Scientic Study of Religion 11, 173–191. Francis, L.J., Santosh, R., Robbins, M. & Bhanot, S. (in press). Assessing Attitude toward Hinduism: The Santosh Francis Scale. In: Mental Health, Religion and Culture. Francis, L.J. & Stubbs, M.T. (1987). Measuring Attitudes Towards Christianity: From Childhood to Adulthood. In: Personality and Individual Differences 8, 741–743. French, S. & Joseph, S. (1999). Religiosity and its Association with Happiness, Purpose in Life, and Self-Actualisation. In: Mental Health, Religion and Culture 2, 117–120.

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Funder, D.C. (1997). The Personality Puzzle. New York: W.W. Norton. Gill, R. (2003). The ‘Empty’ Church Revisited. Aldershot: Ashgate. Guttman, L. (1944). A Basis for Scaling Qualitative Data. In: American Sociological Review 9, 139–150. Hill, P.C. & Hood, R.W. (Eds.) (1999). Measures of Religiosity. Birmingham, Alabama: Religious Education Press. Hills, P., Francis, L.J. & Robbins, M. (2005). The Development of the Revised Religious Life Inventory (RLI-R) by Explanatory and Conrmatory Factor Analysis. In: Personality and Individual Differences 38, 1389–1399. Hogan, R., Johnson, J. & Briggs, S. (Eds.), (1997). Handbook of Personality Psychology. London: Academic Press. Jung, C.G. (1971). Psychological Types: The Collected Works, volume 6. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Kay, W.K. and Francis, L.J. (1996). Drift from the Churches: Attitude Toward Christianity During Childhood and Adolescence. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. Leech, K. (Ed.) (1996). Myers-Briggs: Some Critical Reections. Croydon: The Jubilee Group. Likert, R. (1932). A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes. In: Archives of Psychology 140, 1–55. Louden, S.H. & Francis, L.J. (2003). The Naked Parish Priest: What Priests Really Think They’re Doing. London: Continuum. Myers, I.B. & McCaulley, M.H. (1985). Manual: A Guide to the Development and Use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, California: Consulting Psychologists Press. Osgood, C.E., Suci, G.J. & Tannenbaum, P.H. (1957). The Measurement of Meaning. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press. Richter, P. & Francis, L.J. (1998). Gone but not Forgotten: Church Leaving and Returning. London: Darton, Longman and Todd. Robbins, M. & Francis, L.J. (1996). Are Religious People Happier? A Study among Undergraduates. In: L.J. Francis, W.K. Kay and W.S. Campbell (Eds.), Research in Religious Education. Leominster: Gracewing, 207–217. Sahin, A. & Francis, L.J. (2002). Assessing Attitude toward Islam among Muslim Adolescents: The Psychometric Properties of the Sahin Francis Scale. In: Muslim Educational Quarterly 19 (4), 35–47. Thurstone, L.L. (1928). Attitudes Can Be Measured. In: American Journal of Sociology 33, 529–554. van der Ven, J.A. (1993). Practical Theology: An Empirical Approach. Kampen: Kok Pharos. Wiles, M. (1976). What is Theology? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

FROM ACTION TO LIVED EXPERIENCE: CONSIDERING METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF MODERN PRACTICAL THEOLOGY Hans-Günter Heimbrock Practical Theology as Action Theory Throughout medieval and modern times, the concept of action has played a major role within Christian theology and philosophy. It has served as a tool to clarify, for example, the understanding of God in medieval scholastics and reformation theology (opus proprium—opus alienum), to describe the function of Jesus Christ as savior and redeemer, or to explicate the very nature of human faith and human sin. ‘Action’ has been a central concept used to express the ideal of monastic life or vita activa. After the development of modern religion critique, it has also been a specic intellectual challenge for contemporary dogmatic thinkers to make sense of the traditional notion of “God’s actions as a person” (Deuser, 2004; Schneider 2005). Also for modern practical theology, action seems to be crucial. The specic label “theologia practica”, coined in 13th century scholastic theological discourses, has been used in reference to the question of whether the overall interest of theology should aim at knowing or at acting (cognoscere or operari). Regardless of the medieval answers to this speculative dispute, professional pastoral activities in Christian churches for a long time precluded theoretical reection about the nature and form of action as a phenomenon in itself. However, the rise of modern practical theology as a discipline of its own has intrinsically been linked to a twofold endeavor. First, it aimed at clarifying the professional activities of pastors. Secondly, it implemented empirical analytical research strategies and instruments for investigating the current praxis of church life. Both tasks were primarily developed by the Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher in his most ingenious concept of a “praxis theory” of theology (Schleiermacher, 1821). Following this 19th century twofold orientation action centered practical theology was further elaborated in recent times by the introduction of social scientic instruments and concepts. The introduction of

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action theory into practical theology implied a major methodological shift. In medieval and early modern times, the hermeneutic oriented type of theology approached faith and faith-life by way of interpreting texts about faith. Now, in the late modern era, theology combines the classical hermeneutical approach to church life and individual piety in light of traditional texts, with a new focus on the analysis of actual practices in the Christian Church. Consequently, late modern practical theology, coupled with action theory, reorganized itself similar to modern sociological research. This theoretical shift initially introduced social scientic analysis into practical theology and suggested the use of conceptual analysis and research strategies. Thus, as conceptual tools are concerned, ‘action’ was taken in accord with the sociological tradition of Max Weber (1922). From this perspective, social action is different from physiological motor movements or behavior. It seems to have been formulated as rational behavior or meaningful action, which is in service of certain goals. Additionally, action, according to this perspective, presupposes a subject which is carrying out activities and, by way of performing these activities, is intending a specic goal. Therefore, understanding action implies an understanding of the relation between choice or volition and performance. In this way, the actions of other people might be perceived exactly or, what is even more important, they might be approached in their internal cores or intention, either through an individual’s empathy or through scientic investigation. In both ways, however, it is open to interpretation, because action is not chaotic nor accidental, but meaningful. It makes sense. This scientic approach, however, needs valid ways to verify the assumed meaning of other people’s action by way of empirical proof in order to determine a causal explanation. For example, based on Weber’s concept of action, the US sociologist Talcot Parsons elaborated his structural-functionalist social theory by interpreting social action as enacting norms alongside the patterns of social roles (Parsons 1937). Given this long history of philosophical and theological discourses on action, it is not easy to introduce a new social scientic conceptualization of action positioned in theological examination of specic elements of action. A concept of action in theology would need further clarication in order to distinguish and to relate anthropological insights about religion as human activity to the classical theological notion of God’s action. At least in Protestant theology, especially in Martin Luther’s reformation theology, the process from sin to faith has been described

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as changing from an “active” to a “passive” mode. Obviously this is a different conceptualization, compared to the notion of action in contemporary social science. Nevertheless, action as a conceptual import provides an opportunity for a new anthropological and thus for a new scientic description of religion. Picking up this theoretical shift from hermeneutics to action theory enables practical theologians to describe and to investigate religious praxis in an innovative way. Instead of taking religious praxis as consenting or rejecting semantic propositions about faith and belief, it becomes possible to conceive it as elements of human social activities, which have explicit or implicit intentions embedded within social contexts. Religious actions, therefore, like any other human acts have an agent performing them. The subject of this new type of research is not the tradition or ‘faith’ or the Holy Spirit, but concrete human beings, living in a certain socio-historical frame. From this point of view, religion, taken as human activity, does not only follow a religious rationale about belief or unbelief, but depends also on other factors which might be conditioned by group attachment, depend on biographic experiences or be motivated by psychic dynamic forces like desire or feelings of guilt. In this way, the perception of religious activities of people motivated practical theology to focus on new issues. Thus, with the disciplinary objective to guide and initiate better praxis by the impulses of professionals, the theological education of pastors asks for an updating of its curriculum. A request, which alerts to the need for empirical knowledge about the specic social dynamics that inuence or even determine the whole eld of pastoral activities, might it be the classroom situation or the homiletic interaction within a Sunday service. The German Catholic theologian Rolf Zerfass was the rst to develop an elaborated model for a theological praxis theory of religious action in 1974, picking up ideas of the US-American pastoral theologian Seward Hiltner (Zerfass 1974). In his circular model, Zerfass outlined the task of practical theology as a theoretical endeavor of rationally addressing crises and troubles in church praxis and of inventing new steps to improve church activities. Consequently, such action centered approach to reality opened new ways for theology and enabled people working in the church to plan and to control the effects of their activities. Zerfass not only motivated many Catholics to reformulate traditional ways of living the (Catholic) Christian faith, but also he encouraged theology based means to cope with the challenges of modernity.

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This reshaping of methodological orientation did not only allow new theoretical understanding of religious praxis, but gave new momentum to empirical research. As example of this new development, see Klaus Wegenast’s (1968) proclamation of an “empirical turn” in theology which was initially directed to religious education. This turn became manifest in the establishment of church directed social research in many countries and resulted in production of well-known surveys investigating religious praxis. For the sake of consistency, this overall model of early empirical theological research tried to follow a ‘hard’ social sciences rationale in measuring religious activities. Based on this rationale, Zerfass’ rst model was structured in a logic of cause and effect and proceeded in strict adherence to empirical methodology. The methodology for this rather circular empirical research proceeds in the following way: we start with exact hypotheses about the accessibility of human religious activities; we continue with testing them through operationalizing the theoretical constructs; we enter data collection about human activities in a structured way; we proceed with the interpretation of that data; and nally conclude with an evaluation and the identication of predictable activities which effect church praxis. Based on these evaluations of action and based on theses predictions, the expectation was that practical theology would formulate practical pastoral advice which is able to reshape church praxis by maintaining the aims of the gospel. A Closer Look at Human Activities and Divine Agency This early pattern of practical theology as action theory aiming at effective praxis has been greatly inuenced by Habermas’s theory of communicative action. And fundamental theologians, such as H. Peukert, E. Arens O. Fuchs, J.A. van der Ven and others, contributed to this understanding of “religious action” and practical theology. This discourse however brought about both the closure of possibilities and the widening of gaps in action theory as empirical investigation of human religious action within specic theological research is concerned. For example, Zerfass, in his later contributions, opened his model to theories of communication, thus, reinterpreting religious activities rather as communicative praxis than as instrumental praxis. However, this correction did not change the logic of this new type of ‘reality’-oriented practical theology. Its continued focus was the analysis of current church praxis,

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its aim was a renewal of this praxis predominantly in terms of professional ministerial interventions. Other interdisciplinary efforts of practical theology enlarged the overall action theoretical model of the discipline. To mention the most important attempts: understanding and empirical analysis of the preaching process in homiletics was enlarged by introducing, among other perspectives, socio-linguistic instruments of speech theory from Austin and Searle (Lerle, 1974). The analysis of symbols based on action theory and Mead’s model of symbolic interaction (Helle, 1968) also provided new insight into the dynamics of religious praxis. Aesthetic theories opened insights on religious activity beyond instrumental behavior (Grözinger, 1987; Mette, 2001). Piaget’s general theory of cognition advanced empirical knowledge about faith development and transformation of an individual’s religious worldview as a product of “cognitive operations”. Likewise, theories about religious experience made use of attribution theory (Van der Lans 1979). All of these interdisciplinary contributions helped to advance explanations of practical theological domains on the general assumption of action theory which understands religious activities as mindful and as intentional expressions of the human subject. The discussion about the appropriateness and limitation of a specic theological action theory in practical theology, as well as in ethics, continues. Based on the analysis that ‘action’ is an explicit conceptual import from the humanities, some theologians emphasized the difference between empirical and theological analysis of reality and expressed concern that the critical theological notion of God’s action as fundamental to any human praxis could reside in the background. How can we understand religion not only as the human action among others, but relate human religion in a non reductive way to the theological notion of God’s activity? This is, for example, Fowler’s (1991) concern. Others insisted on the twofold task and perspective of practical theology. They assume that, besides the analysis of social empirical realities, a theological understanding is needed; thereby they declare the hermeneutical task as pertinent for the discipline (Dingemans, 1996). Others questioned that the concept of action is useful for understanding the core and the nature of religion as it is expressed in rituals, especially in worship—particularly when we understand it as the human admission of failure of one’s own capacity to face the boarders of life ( Josuttis, 1985). Others who were in favor of the empirical turn, nevertheless, emphasized, based on a christological perspective, the intimate relation

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between active and passive elements within Christian existence. They reason that, if practical theology remains in touch with Christian faith, it should not ignore that the experience of faith is rooted in suffering and pathetic experiences, rather than in unlimited capacities to be active as put forward in the work and the life of D. Bonhoeffer. Also H. Schröer (1974, p.) states, “Suffering is the particular reality, the gospel is referring to . . .”. Parallel to these discussions, we observe ongoing revisions of the issues and scientic standards in Empirical Theology. Not only were the research instruments modied inspired by the development of new empirical methods in the social sciences, but also developments in cultural anthropology had their impact on Empirical Theology. The revision included the methodological evaluation of basic concepts and of the rationale in Empirical Theology as an enterprise connecting combining social scientic and theological tasks. An advanced methodology for Empirical Theology with emphasis on the need for theoretical clarication of empirical methods has been developed during the past 20 years by the Nijmegen, Netherlander theologian Johannes van der Ven (1990; 2002). Van der Ven denes the overall task of Empirical Theology as a process designed to acquire exact and empirically valid knowledge about religion, instead of the examination of pure assumptions. Religion, in his approach, is conceptualized in an epistemological frame that combines Weberian sociology and Habermasian theory of communication, as this author developed his approach through the 1980ies. Notwithstanding necessary modication of basic concepts in order to understand religion as communicative action, he resolutely insisted on the necessity to put action and praxis—and nothing else—at the center of Empirical Theology. With the theological interest of contributing more reliable knowledge about the reality of religious life to the theological discourse, van der Ven relates the essential basis and aims of Christian faith to empirical insights, in order to help the church promote realistic perspectives on better praxis in accordance with basic theological values, such as they are expressed in the metaphor of the Kingdom of God. He refers to and continues the discussion about the tradition of practical theology of the 70es which adopted action theory; thereby, he emphasizes the challenge to develop theology, or at least substantial parts of it, as empirical theology. At the same time, his model is inspired by the theological conviction that the gospel demands enculturation and embodiment in the

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praxis of life. In his scrutinized reection, he especially emphasizes the need for methodological clarication of empirical research, in order to overcome positivistic approaches. His reection on these issues results in the thesis that empirical theology is “normative not despite but because of its empirical character” (van der Ven, 2002, p. 5). These and many other contributions helped to develop a scholarly practical theology which maintains its proper place within the discipline of theology—with a critical role however. To put it in a nutshell: this means to keep theology oriented to both, to reality and to God. It asks for developing further appropriate instruments for professional empirical analysis of (religious) action, but likewise for interpreting human existence and reality in general coram deo. Religion as Mindful Action Action Based Theological Theory Van der Ven’s insistence on further clarication about the conceptual foundations of an action based theological theory reasons that ”a more detailed explanation of the praxis concept in terms of action theory is essential. This would require a syncretistic choice from action theories in at least 40 disciplines and sub-disciplines, ranging from psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology, ethnology and ethnology to mathematical, natural and medical science. Without fundamental reection on the concept of praxis on the basis of a chosen action theory, practical theology will remain bogged down in either exhortatory or practical allusions.” (van der Ven, 2002, p. 43). Van der Ven also recently made a new attempt to give further clarication to the particular conceptual approach of practical theology centered in the sociological concept of “action”. His new contribution tries to introduce and to adopt current theoretical and empirical progress on brain research into Empirical Theology (van der Ven, 2004). Before I discuss elements and arguments of this text, I would like to underline that again his overall focal interest is to contribute with these new ideas to the interpretations of fundamental issues of action theory centered on theological praxis. This is evident, if one considers the basis criteria which van der Ven presupposes for his entire reection. He presents three, and all of them are linked to action. The criteria practical theology should take into consideration are according to van der Ven: “(a) the criterion of conceptual clarity

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about human action; (b) the criterion of conceptual clarity about divine action; and (c) the methodological criterion of empirical researchability in a comparative perspective” (van der Ven, 2004, p. 332). His new approach follows the same overall methodological model to develop the logics of empirical theological research. However it gives a fresh look at the well known problems from another empirical perspective. The creative and original interest of the new contribution utilizes brain research for practical theology. His propositions and conclusions follow a clear structure, elaborating human action, divine action, and empirically researchable action. The rst part on human action is the most extended one, dealing with ve aspects of brain, mind, and action by evaluation of the senses, automatic reactions, feeling emotions, and mindful action. The prerequisite for a theory about these issues is to deal with clear concepts with the strategic aim of enhancing the possibility to do empirical research. The whole article catches the reader’s eye not only by its conceptual clearness, but also because theoretical arguments about God, action and human religion are combined with the particular life story of a South African person, Jacob. It elaborates on his experiences, ideas about his suffering and dying brother, comments on their relation in cultural contexts, and nally Jacob’s comments on God. The main theoretical argument of van der Ven however, is to describe the research object of empirical theology as mindful action in order to enhance the possibilities for research. For this purpose, the paper draws heavily on both brain research and cognitive science. The core theological question asks, in van der Ven’s terminology, about the relation between human praxis and God’s action. In other words, how to relate experience and revelation to each other? The implicit argument reasons that brain research contributes to empirical theological tasks in a substantial way. The article addresses the overall issue of practical theology to bridge theology and empirical science. Van der Ven emphasizes the necessity to understand this challenge as a theological task. It displays his scrutiny to clarify this methodological problem of current practical theological discourses bridging Aristotelian and scholastic perspectives with modern theories. Nevertheless, to a great extent the logic of Van der Ven’s model shows a dominantly modern methodological path. As so: – Key concepts of action and experience follow a typical modern paradigm. It is a human being, that acts, and the theories which are used, are theories about intentional activities of human being.

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Thus, at the bottom lies a theoretical perspective of modernity linking subject to identity via the image, the idea, as well as, the feelings of a subject human being. A conceptualization which starts with the emergence of a rudimentary self from a Ricoeur or Levinas identity theory perspective. – The approach to religion is described via an experiencing and interpreting human subject. This is an experiential path to reality, not an ontological way in which, practical theology engages in a praxis theory for professionals. A practical theology that was invented in 19th century for the purpose of relating its knowledge to reality. It is not unimportant, however, that van der Ven puts a historical link back to Aristotelian theory and its interest in experience and praxis. – Another important and therefore explicit criterion, for the whole model, is the concentration on empirically researchable phenomena. Religion and Action Theory In order to evaluate this new proposal as regards the issue of understanding religion from the action theory perspective, let us have a closer look at van der Ven’s attempt to clarify the matter by way of particular anthropological theories. The rst section the paper makes use of brain research and cognitive psychology. He explicates the theological value and legitimacy in the second passage. Using this methodology, human psychic structures and their functioning are to be understood by theology as enactments of divine manifestations. This argument opposes a schizophrenic and scientically fruitless way to distinguish between something like a “reality of religion” and a “reality outside”. It rather claims that all, or at least some, of phenomena theology as human scientic enterprise, are approached within the social sciences and humanities. In this fashion, the key concept to approach religion empirically is action as respondent activity. As concerns this matter, van der Ven states, “If one accepts that a religious experience is a human activity based on the feeling of emotions and structured by religious cognitions, one can conclude that the revelation of God’s compassion only occurs in and through such human experiences, which are cognitively mediated by one’s religious memory, lled, reinforced and given access to by religious rituals.” (Van der Ven, 2004 p. 7). In order to understand human action and religious cognitions, van der Ven suggests to apply several theories: brain research, cognitive psychology, and at least elements of philosophical phenomenology. Combining

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them, he proceeds from “brain” to “mind” exploring ve aspects. At an interesting point, however, the text marks an essential difference between brain and mind. Mindful action is connected to intentionality. That is being aware of ones own intentions to do something in reection about a self-willed action chosen by a human subject. To illustrate this intimate connection between mindful action and intention, van der Ven draws on the particular case of Jacob. Van der Ven interprets important steps of his mourning and dealing constructively with crisis via a methodological application of action theory. For example, he reasons that: After this reection Jacob carried out his decision. He turned to his brother, took his hands, embraced him and kissed him. Then he stayed with him, looked after him and cared for him. Why is Jacob’s act of compassion a mindful action? It is mindful because, even though his decision to stay with his brother and care for him during the last days of his life was constrained by the chemical and neural processes which functioned as a kind of infrastructure for his thought, reasoning, valuing and planning, he used the degrees of freedom theses processes left to him to perform the action he had in mind as his own action, he himself being its author: it was his action, for which he was responsible. There was no external cause directing him to do what he decided on: it was his self-caused, self-willed action ( Juarrero, 2002; Libet, 2004); there was no external ‘efcient’ cause (causa efciens), it was his interal ‘nal’ cause (causa nalis). This is the difference between brain and mind: I consciously experience the working of the brain as my brain and thereby transcend it, which implies an experience of self. Put differently: the difference between brain and mind is that the mind is the experience of one’s own intentionality. (van der Ven, 2004 p. 348f.)

This theoretical reconstruction of the events quite clearly shows the signature and heritage of Weber’s theoretical approach to human action. A human subject is sketched, which has intentions, makes choices and carries out actions. In this fashion, van der Ven addresses the problem of religion, action, and intentionality. Stepping into the discussion with this interesting and most creative contribution to methodology of practical theology, I would like to underline rst that I fully share the centrality of the problem which is said to lie at the bottom of current practical theology and especially at the bottom of a suitable Empirical Theology. Given recent developments of methodological discussions, it is actually of crucial importance to continue the debate about the theoretical task, in order to give a description of religion and action which combines

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a theological and an anthropological approach—which, nota bene, does justice to both sides. Only this attempt will provide the interdisciplinary means to secure theology as a discipline in the academy which is dened by both internal partnership and external partnership with other disciplines, especially the social sciences. However, there seem to be some open places and unsolved problems in the answers van der Ven offers concerning the way brain research relates to practical theology. And discussing these questions will lead to the very issue of my article: the concept of action. Van der Ven’s approach positions practical theology in new neurobiological research, which presents a refreshed sight on religious behavior. On several points van der Ven draws attention to the involvement of the body in human action, as well as, in religious experience. In order to arrive at an appropriate understanding of human action, we have to leave behind the centuries old intellectualistic reduction that also theology has followed. Meanwhile, to reject a Cartesian dualism between the intellect and the body is common in theology. However, van der Ven does not sufciently clarify, where his argument combines brain and mind or where it switches from brain to mind. In van der Ven’s interpretation of Jacob’s encounter with his sick brother, however, the body plays an important role. Bodily sensations and feelings are evoked initially. Van der Ven’s theoretical intention is to overcome the separation between body and brain and between body and mind, and to highlight the importance of the senses and emotions as rooted in the body. In Van der Ven’s view, even knowledge might not be reduced to mental processes. It may be fruitful for the discipline to follow van der Ven on the importance of the body for acting, knowing and religious experience. On this point he is in good companionship: It was Piaget, the founder of modern cognitive psychology, who demonstrated the proposition that the process of knowing starts in the body, through bodily movement. From this perspective, the essential question ist this: Does the structural model of religious experience and human behavior really t with an empirical analysis of phenomena based upon action, body and intention. To this question, van der Ven assumes a specic difference between automatic reactions and emotions: automatic reactions result from the interplay between the brain and the rest of the body, while emotions are felt as one’s own emotions. “Feeling these emotions gives rise to the self. This relates to the consciousness that it is me feeling these emotions; it is my body feeling the visceral processes of

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turning pale, ushing, sweating, becoming nauseous or excited: it is not somebody else’s body, it is min.” (van der Ven, 2004, p. 341). Therefore, it is obvious that the crucial supposition of the whole argument reasons that religious activity is intentional activity, interpreted in a particular way. This way obviously includes theoretical elements from several sources. If I understand Van der Ven correctly, he tries to overcome the pure intellectualistic interpretation developed by Aristotle as syllogismus practicus. That’s a strong reason to also consider the body. When van der Ven (2004, p. 341) says that “It is the conscious but nonverbal emotional response of my body that constitutes what might be called the rst-person subjective experience of the nonverbal presence of emotions in the body, which is the basis of the singular, individual self ”, he repeats an important conceptual distinction between two approaches to the body. He specically positions the body as object and the body as subject. With this, he draws upon P. Ricoeur’s philosophy to clarify the interrelation between physical human life and the emergence of the self. Thus, the underlying idea suggests that empirical theology is able to reconstruct the human side of religion, if it is successful in describing how a human subject experiences him or herself as an individual self with mind and body. The individual, thereby, performs conscious religious cognitions, which enacts the intentions of the human subject. The content of these religious activities, taken as processes of cognitive structuring, are related to religious traditions. But despite particular contents, the presupposed structure of intended cognitive activities is the ruling gure. Of course, this structure is not the individual’s nonreected personal memory about his or her religious life. Rather, it is identied by the researcher, on the meta-level of theoretically valid description. If this summary gives a suitable reconstruction of the logic of the proposed model about religious experience, human mindful action and intentions, I would like to evaluate these three points in the light of empirical as well as theoretical arguments. Religion and Embodied Mind Given the proposals about “mindful action” so far, the methodological issues for empirical theology, as discussed so far, could be translated in several interrelated questions:

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– If one takes a closer look especially at the relation of mind and body, does the underlying structure of intentionality t empirically to human behavior? – How can we approach an empirically sound examination of the inner intensions of someone else? – How can we approach an empirically sound examination of the specic intentions of bodily gestures? – Does the object of empirical theology, in all the variety of its phenomena, t to the model of intentional action and other forms of behavior? Of course, these questions do not only address issues of empirical theology, they also touch on essential epistemological questions about action, knowledge and intentionality (cf. Tomberlin, 1990; Malle, 2001). Likewise they also address theological problems, which have been heavily debated in dogmatic discourses of the past and present centuries. For example, the possibility to act according to one’s own intentions or not, the forces which intervene in a human subject as actor, as well as, the very nature of religious acts as volitional activity or as experiences of being affected, even determined, in one’s own activities by other forces, were highly debatable for theologians like St. Paul, Luther (against Erasmus) and Kierkegaard, just to mention a few gures. This perspective opens narcissistic wounds representing long standing arguments against an understanding of human beings as subjects of their actions in modern sciences. As Freud proposed, this gives reason for serious intellectual irritations towards a conventional ideal of anthropology which is centered in action. But, because of the limitations of this article and the practical theological focus, I need to restrict my further remarks to specic anthropological and empirical theological arguments. The expectation, however, is to make a contribution not only to internal discussion about how to design practical theology as empirical theology, but also to contribute to the fundamental theological discourse. Admittedly, a prominent stream of philosophical reection from Aristotle to Descartes and Hegel connected the understanding of human action strictly to the idea of a subject mind and its free choices to act in a certain mindful way. Nevertheless, alternatives to this intellectualistic pattern have been developed from St. Augustine up to Nietzsche, Sartre and Levinas. It was the special merit of the French phenomenologist M. Merleau-Ponty, to elaborate a new perspective on the concept of

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human behavior—an elaboration, which avoids, ab novo, a mechanistic concept of the body. Instead it provides a thorough and empirical description of mindful behavior (Merleau-Ponty, 1942). From his rst written contributions in 1930 and 1942, Merleau-Ponty drew heavily on contemporary empirical psychology, neurology, Gestalt psychology, as well as on psychoanalysis. His basic model of mind-body-existence marked a considerable shift from Husser’s early consciousness centered analysis of the human subject. Whereas, Husser started with a rather Kantian concept of intentionality which reasoned that all consciousness is consciousness of something, Husser’s pupil Merleau-Ponty made some important adjustments on the concept of intentionality by stressing the co-relation of the human being, of his or her body, and emphasizing the bodily fundament of human co-existence with the world. This essential thesis, which is overcomes Cartesian dualism, runs as follows: “The perceiving mind is an incarnate mind” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 4). Evaluating the empirical approaches of his time, Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical achievement includes the reformulation of the anthropological analysis of the human situation which is also important for practical theology. According to Merleau-Ponty, the basic anthropological category is not action, instead he demonstrated the “primacy of perception”. “By these words ‘The primacy of perception’, we mean that the experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values are constituted for us”. As so, he maintains that “perception is a nascent logos, that it teaches us, outside all dogmatism, the true conditions of objectivity itself . . .” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 25). Based on philosophical arguments as well as on empirical evidence, Merleau-Ponty puts forward a specic concept of human perception as bodily perception. On that point, he marks an essential difference between phenomenology and the older English sensualistic tradition of perception (cf. Wiesink, 2002). His phenomenological concept of perception is based on the bodily foundation of every perception. That includes the specic ambiguity to have and to live in a body, while, at the same time, making a distinction between the body as object (in German: “Körper”) and the body as living subject (in German: “Leib”) which is also subject to perception. The human body-subject with its emotions, desires and sensations might well be mediated by physical and social conditions. Nevertheless, the body is at the basis and the transcendental prerequisite of any perceiving about any knowledge about ourselves and about objects within the world. The body in itself can never be fully perceived nor never be reduced to a pure physical object.

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It is not a mechanistic body moved by secondary activity intentions, which are set up rst in cognitive activities without participation of the body. Specically human perception does not take place in an abstract or intellectualistic way, nor in a causal-mechanistic way, but rather in a situated connection to a nite bodily subject of perception which is living and perceiving the world in a specic spatial situation. Through one’s body, one understands the other and becomes aware of things through the body. Perceptions grounded in the body, as meaningful gestures, are like the subject to be understood through the body, even though these meaningful gestures occur in situations of daily life. As so, they are not the results of previously and conscious taken decisions to act. This analysis has heavy impact on the structure of intentionality. Of course, intentionality is always about taking something as something. However, the phenomenological reconstruction of intentionality essentially differs from what is referred to in the previous passage. Intentionality cannot be simply restricted to intellectual or other cognitive intentions of a reasoning subject. The corporal existence has an intentional structure. Therefore, in every single situation, human beings always live their bodies towards the world, (Van Manen, 1990, p. 182). Thus, considering lived human experience, one has to admit: “Against the notion of intentionality as a voluntary, primarily cognitive act, Merleau-Ponty lays great emphasis on Husser’s notion of functioning or operative intentionality (fungierende Intentionalität) . . . Our bodily intentions already lead us into a world constituted for us before we conceptually encounter it in cognition.” (Moran, 2000, p. 402). Thus, sensual perception cannot be restricted to active perception, neither in observation nor listening behavior, but rather it originates from things that attract us. In consequence, “actions are . . . more staged than produced . . ., running through phases of hesitation and rehearsals.” (Waldenfels, 2002, p. 4). Thus, intentionality empirically as well as logically does not, in any case, presuppose an independent subject according to the Cartesian res cogitans which deliberately directs the senses to a something. Intentionality has to be conceived in a more complex1 1 For another more detailed analysis of intentionaly cf. P. Ricoeur (1992) Ricoeur distinguishes between three levels of praxis, from which he derives three levels of intentionality. “The rst level is that of the objectives of daily life as enacted in day-today-activities in the areas of family, profession, recreation and civil society. The second level is more abstract, namely the goals of one’s life plan that covers a period of, say, ve years and that refers to goals like becoming a good spouse, father, grandfather, or a rst class teacher, researcher, pastor, administrator, or a good tennis player or pianist,

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model. It also includes instances of being affected or even overwhelmed by external reality. As Waldenfel states, “In any case, . . . behind intentional acts ascribed to a subject as their author or source, there appear events that we undergo, something which happens to us. Those events belong neither to a rst-person perspective as an act I perform, nor to the third-person perspective as an objective process registered from the outside.” (Waldenfels 2002, p. 5). This approach to intentionality seems to be more open and, therefore, more appropriate to empirical reality, because it also takes account of the everyday encounter with reality which takes place prior to reexive and conceptual understanding. It points to a layer of pre-conceptual bodily rooted experience which is not fully accounted for when we see it as purely mechanistic behavior of a body-machine and a system of mechanic sensory apparatus. We have to take in account an ontological and epistemological “more” of living experience ( James) which is placed above reective cognition. As B. Meland (1976, p. 135) puts it, “We live more deeply than we can think.” However, it contains already the initial step to mindful behavior. Put in terms of general empirical methodology, we could say, there are at least two possibilities to approach the empirical realm: one could be called the “distinctive” pattern, the other I would label the “relational” pattern. In the distinctive approach, empirical data are taken as distinct and detached things, the research starts with clarifying the research object as clearly as possible. In this logic, a concrete object is taken as “a case of ” representing general principles. The ideals and rules of an inductive apporach follow this distinctive way of conceiving knowledge and getting data about the experiential realm. In the relational approach, the empirical basis is likewise conceived of as something “given” beyond the perceiving individual, and only accessible through sensual experience, But, in this model, the research process is situated within an experiential eld and experience is linked to the perceiving human being and its remaining involvement. In sum, the reconstruction of human behavior from the second, relational pattern focuses on intentionality, it implies need for enlarging the understanding of human actions on several points:

civil rights ghter or town councillor. The third level is the most abstract of all: that of life cohesion and the cohesive meaning of life between birth and death, between natality and mortality”.

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– First: Bodily movements and gestures are by no means only an external secondary accompany, or a side effect, of intentional human actions, as it is often portrayed.2 – Second: Human behavior which is directed to express meaning to others and to gain knowledge contains much more elements than intentional cognitive activities of an ego that is ruling its thinking and acting. Rather it is evoked and co-determined by a passive element, by sensations and affections, passions, drives, and unconscious memories etc.. These do not only irritate or darken conscious activities, but provoke, start and enforce them (cf. the ancient Herodot concept of pathemata mathemata). – Third: The human subject, in all his or her mind-bodily relations to others, to things, and to the world in general, is not only the doer who caries out well reected intentions, it is not a thinking ego, but rather, the human subject is an “incalculable subject” (Waldenfels 1996, p. 82). Research in Empirical Theology This general anthropological basis does not only provide enlarged hermeneutic tools for clarifying intentional and mindful human activity, it also allows to reconstruct the empirical side of human religion in a renewed perspective. Thus, it enables perception and conceivement of all those elements within religious life that reach beyond explicit interpretive activity in the sense of attributing meaning. Likewise it goes beyond the scope of religion in terms of Habermas’ older theory of communicative action. Examples are the act of becoming fascinated by the encounter with the holy in experiencing nature or specic sacred buildings, or being overwhelmed by disclosure experiences, or being caught by ow experiences (Csikscentmihalyi, 1990), or having dreams and nightmares like the prophet Zechariah, or being caught by ecstatic forces and feeling oneself outside one’s own body like St. Paul, or shaping the personal religious world view by transforming everyday encounter with computers (Dinter 2005) or with material objects (Mädler, 2006). Further examples are experiences which also include

2 Even Habermas, in his theory of communicative action, presents this underestimation of mindful bodily gestures, dealing only with body-movements (“Körperbewegung”), focussing on verbal language (Habermas 1981).

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living together with articial robots that are experienced by a human subject as machine and, at the same time, as something like a subject being (Scholtz, 2005b). These and other religious or cultural phenomena that reach beyond a practice can be fully identied as activity of a particular individual. Not every human religious activity essentially deals with the production of meaning and, even more important, not all religious phenomena are best categorized in terms of intentional cognitive activities of human beings.3 Taking these empirical phenomena as challenges for empirical theology proposes an enlargement of the material objects of theological research, thereby, taking account of the structural duality of material and formal research objects of theology (Ziebertz, 2004). This is a process with many consequences which concern the role of action theory in theology. Without any doubt, the introduction of action theory in practical theology during the 1970’s has been an enormous progress, because it enabled researchers to describe and conceive religious praxis in terms of structural sociological categories. It also opened research to valid empirical methodical processes. Likewise, empirical theology has proted from the phenomenological point of view, since it allows to conceive religious phenomena beyond a narrow category of action. Based upon the enlarged analysis of human subjectivity and intentionality, it is possible, to revise the categorical framework of empirical approaches to life in general and religion in particular. In recent discussions, other categories have been tested such as forms of life (Heimbrock, 2005b) or “gestalt” (Heimbrock 2004b). Seen from a phenomenological perspective, neither life nor religion is fully conceived of as mindful action (sensu Weber). Bodily behavior, aesthetic praxis, art and many other phenomena which occur in various religions in past and present reach far beyond the realm of useful or communicative activities; they deserve attention from empirical research. In order to reshape the formal object of practical theology according to the phenomenological analysis, the concept of ‘living religion’ is useful (Heimbrock, 2005). Living religion is conceptualized in accordance with a broad consensus of recent theories of religion. It is, thereby, used as a strategic and perspective concept. While it does include things in 3 It is noteworthy that Habermas, in his recent works, gave way to a broader understanding of religion, when he says that “true belief is not only a doctrine, believed content, but a source of energy that the person who has a faith taps performatively and thus nurtures his or her entire life” (Habermas, 2006).

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reality that are associated with religion, like everyday language might presume, it simultaneously points to specic perspectives on life. It is fruitful for theoretical, as well as, empirical progress in theology to relate the broad concept of ‘living religion’ to the phenomenological principle of givenness within a life world encounter. This enables empirical theologians to study different qualities of involvement or entanglement of subjects in everyday life and culture, as well as, ther religious implications. Given the interdisciplinary character of empirical theology, when we understand it as a branch of practical theology, it seems impossible to base research upon a monolithic concept of religion. Of course, researchers can accept religions in terms of social institutions, thus dealing with religion as traditions, institutions, or as collective symbol systems. Even phenomenologists need to recognize this phenomenon because religions are denitive phenomena in the social sense. At the same time however, the phenomenological perspective of life world enlarges the theoretical perspective of empirical theology: On the one hand, it encourages the discovery of new phenomena. On the other hand, it broadens the formal concept of religion with the inclusion of ‘living religion.’ Thus, this life world approach enables empirical theological research to not only deal with distinct and predened religious matters, but to begin and end with a broader perspective on life as connected to everyday culture (Heimbrock, 2005a). The importance of evaluating human life from the perspective of empirical theology is clear. But to avoid misunderstandings I emphasize that the project of a phenomenologically inspired empirical theology is not to develop a “better” or “more effective” social scientic empirical methodology by drawing on overlooked phenomena; rather it models phenomena of lived experience in order to address new questions, and thus, it follows new intentions in the analysis of experience with particular focus on elements and dimensions of the experiential side of reality. If the phenomenological analysis does not only examine pure assumptions, but also evaluate phenomena which belong to lived reality, to a reality oriented empirical theology, it has the duty to enlarge its research program. Thus, the question ‘how to perform such type of research?’ remains empirically valid. It questions the key concepts and research methods of phenomenology from a specic prole. In this way, phenomenology, as a non-theological endeavor, can contribute to basic theological tasks in connection with empirical research. However, to use phenomenological methodology within empirical theology

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would call for theological reection on all those notions, principles and assumptions that are at stake in empirical sciences—that means: on theological principles and assumptions, such as reality, praxis, action, objectivity, validity, and life. Within theology, it is the task of practical theology to insist on a distinction between empirical research and speculative reasoning. However, since there is no universal authority which sets the rules for empirical sciences, the debate about the essentials of empirical sciences continues—a debate reecting a wide range of different epistemological options, including early positivistic positions, but also present constructivist positions. Therefore, the initial impulse of philosophical phenomenology formulated by Husserl (“Back to the things themselves!”) continues: protecting living reality against abstract reasoning in different sciences remains imperative (Husserl 1936; 1970). After almost half a century of carrying out ‘hard’ empirical research in theology, phenomenology might become a helpful partner by opening a new interdisciplinary discourse on fundamental concepts like reality and life. Its epistemological reasoning provides secular arguments to contest an understanding of reality that is associated with modern ideals of conceiving reality in terms of cause and effect, quantitative or even determinative correlations. The phenomenological notion of otherness within life itself is not natural theology or an empirical proof for the theological proposition of God’s transcendence. However, it could serve as an understanding of reality in accordance with the dynamic and mysterious structure of life in theological interpretation beyond the categories of cause and effect. Three decades ago, when European practical theology discovered the usefulness of social sciences, and of action theory in particular, the Chicago theologian Leland Meland addressed the question, asking whether empirical theology can learn something from phenomenology (Meland, 1969). In his answer, he made a plea that theology could and should prot from this type of reection on reality, which distinguishes semantic and logical explications from the awareness of an immediacy of lived experience. Based on this distinction and its conceptual background, he proposed that practical theology is capable of doing both analytical and normative evaluation. In other words, “carrying the act of faith beyond linguistic preoccupations to an experience of grace and judgment within this vital immediacy” (Meland, 1969, p. 305).

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Malle, B., Moses, L. & Baldwin (Eds.) (2001). Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. Cambridge: MIT. Meland, B.E. (1969). Can Empirical Theology Learn Something from Phenomenology? In: B. E. Meland (Ed.), The Future of Empirical Theology. Chicago, 283—305. ——— (1976). Fallible Forms and Symbols. Philadelphia. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1930). Projet de travail sur la nature de la Perception (rst printed version in Th. F. Geraets, Vers une nouvelle philosophie transcendentale. The Hague 1971, 9f.) ——— (1942). La structure du comportement. Paris. ——— (1945). Philosophy of Perception, 1962 ——— (1964). The Primacy of Perception (trans. Arleen B. Dallery). Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Mette, N. (2001). Practical Theology: Theory of Aesthetics or Theory of Action? In: P. Ballard & P. Couture (Eds.), Creativity, Imagination and Criticism. The Expressive Dimension in Practical Theology. Cardiff, 49–63. Moran, D. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. London; New York: Routledge. Parsons, T. (1937). The Structure of Social Action. New York: Free Press. Piaget, J. (1951). Play, Dreams and Imitation. New York. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1821). Kurze Darstellung de Theologischen Studiums zum Behuf einleitender Vorlesungen. Reprint Darmstadt 1973. Searle, J.R. (1969). Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Schneider, M. (2005). Wie handelt Gott? Intertextuelle Lektüre zu 1Kor10. In: St. Alkier & R. Hays (Eds.), Die Bibel im Dialog der Schriften. Konzepte intertextueller Bibellektüre. Tübingen, 35–55. Scholtz, Chr. (2005a). Fascinating Technology: Computer Games as an Issue for Religious Education. In: British Journal of Religious Education 27, 173–184 ——— (2005b). Leben mit dem Roboter—Leben im Roboter? Zur theologischen Dimension der alltäglichen Wahrnehmung des Roboterhundes Aibo. In: TheoMag http://www.theomag.de/ Schröer, H. (1974). Forschungsmethoden in der Praktischen Theologie. In: F. Klostermann & R. Zerfaß (Eds.), Praktische Theologie heute. München; Mainz, 206–224. Siller, P. (1984). Biographische Elemente im kirchlichen Handeln. In: O. Fuchs (Ed.), Theologie und Handeln. Beiträge zur Fundierung der Praktischen Theologie als Handlungstheorie. Düsseldorf, 187–208. Tomberlin, J.E. (Ed.) (1990). Philosophical Perspectives: Action Theory and Philosophy. Ridgeview. van der Ven, J.A. (2002). An Empirical or a Normative Approach to Practical-Theological Research? A False Dilemma. In: JET 15 (2), 5–33. ——— (2004). Towards A Comparative Empirical Theology of Mindful Action. In: C. Hermans & M.E. Moore (Eds.), Hermeneutics and Empirical Research in Practical Theology. Leiden: Brill, 331–388. Waldenfels, B. (1996). Order in the Twilight. Athens: Ohio University Press. ——— (2000). Das leibliche Selbst. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Leibes. Frankfurt/ Main. ——— (2002). Bodily Experience between Selfhood and Otherness (Lecture given on September 12, 2002 at the ofcial opening of the Danish National Research Foundation: Center for Subjectivity Research (http://www.cfs.ku.dk/Waldenfels-opening-lecture.pdf (download 09/06/2005). Weber, M. (1922). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Edition Opladen. Wegenast, K. (1968). Die empirische Wendung in der Religionspädagogik, new print in: ders., Religionspädagogik. 1. Bd. Der evangelische Weg. Darmstadt 1981, 241ff. Zerfaß, R. (1974). Praktische Theologie als Handlungswissenschaft. In: F. Klostermann & R. Zerfaß (Eds.), Praktische Theologie heute. München, Mainz, 164ff.

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——— (1988). Gottesdienst als Handlungsfeld der Kirche. In: LJ 38, 30–59. Ziebertz, H.-G. (2004). Empirische Forschung in der Praktischen Theologie als eigenständige Form des Theologie-Treibens. In: Praktische Theologie, 47–55. Zonne, E. (2005). Interreligiöses und interkulturelles Lernen an Grundschulen in Rotterdam-Rijnmond. Münster: Waxmann.

EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY AND BRAIN RESEARCH Tobias Kläden Introduction Since its beginning, practical theology is in need of a clarication of its key concept, namely practice. Therefore, practical theology has often been in dialogue with scientic disciplines that deal with human practice, which above all means human action. The aim of these dialogues is always to work out a satisfying theory of action, which could provide practical theology with an underlying theory of its object in a broad sense, which is human action in its interplay with divine action. Such a theory should also allow for the determination of empirically researchable action. For a number of reasons, relevant action theories in sociology and psychology do not satisfy: Sociological action theories, for example, cannot explain the psychological processes inside the human person that are taking place when somebody experiences the authorship of his actions. Psychological theories, however, if they have any positive interest in the phenomenon of religion at all, like humanistic psychology, tend to explain the essence of religion away by their functional analysis of religion. So why not turn to brain research in the perspective of cognitive science in order to explore its contribution to a theory of mindful action? Brain research is regarded as one of the current leading sciences from which fundamental insights about the foundations of human behaviour and human action are expected. Of course, it is not necessary in this context to give a detailed description of the neuronal processes taking place in the brain when a human person performs an action. But one can try, and this is relevant for the goal to develop building blocks for an empirical theology of mindful action, to clarify the relation between brain, mind, and action. At the outset a clear and very important remark has to be made about this relation (cf. van der Ven 2004, 335): The brain (resp. certain brain states) is a necessary, but not a sufcient condition for the mind (resp. certain mental states). Religiousness and morality do not belong to the brain but to the mind; therefore, it would be useless to search for a specic location or locations of religiousness in the brain in order to

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specify certain “God modules” or “religion modules”. What we might nd is the neuronal basis for religiousness and morality, which is the necessary but not sufcient condition for these phenomena, but not these phenomena themselves. However, according to everything we know about the human mind, there must be a neuronal correlate of any mental state, including religiousness and morality. Mental states in human beings can only be manifested by certain brain states, as far as we know; thus it is reasonable to presume the existence of a certain brain state corresponding to any religious mental state, even if we might not be able to specify this brain state. Van der Ven (2004) has made a proposal how to develop a “comparative empirical theology of mindful action”: First, he deals with ve aspects that are important to clarify the relation between brain, mind, and action and that are taking place in a chronological order; they form a “cognitive spiral”: (1) sensations and perceptions; (2) automatic reactions that happen involuntarily and mostly unconsciously; (3) the feeling of basic, primary and of more complex, secondary emotions; (4) the processing of emotions, during which higher cognitive functions like memory, thinking, and planning emerge; and (5) nally the mindful action as the execution of thoughts, plans, and decisions, accompanied by the experience of one’s own intentionality: I perform actions as my actions, I conceive of myself as being the author of my actions. In a second step of hermeneutic-theological reconstruction, van der Ven describes the interplay of human and divine actions; so the aforementioned aspects can be seen as manifestations of divine actions in human actions. Above all, the three aspects of feeling and processing emotions and of mindful action are relevant in this context. The rst two aspects are not theologically irrelevant, but no possible object of empirical theology according to van der Ven. They are objects of brain research, while only the last three aspects are open to empirical research in practical theology. Van der Ven closes with a reection on the quantitative, qualitative, and comparative approaches in empirical theology which have to be seen as an integrated whole. As regards van der Ven’s conception of integrating aspects of cognitive science into empirical theology, three core questions can be put: (1) What is the exact benet of brain research for empirical practical theology (in its attempt to understand human action), especially when the rst two aspects of brain research mentioned before (sensation/ perception and automatic reactions) are irrelevant for empirical theology? Such an exclusive area of brain research and cognitive science would

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also contradict—or at least weaken—the methodological assumption of understanding the different aspects of human mental life as divine manifestations. (2) What specic contribution can brain research make in the eld of religion and religious experience? (3) What would be the best way to justify the interest in overcoming the separation not only between body and brain, but also between body and mind, as we nd it in Cartesian dualism? Which theory is the most capable to overcome the Cartesian dualism—and why should we overcome it at all?1 In the following, I will very briey try to give answers to these three questions, also reecting on their philosophical foundations. The paper will be structured according to the three questions. I am not sure to what extent van der Ven would agree with them, but nevertheless, they are meant to support his conception to integrate the ndings of brain research and cognitive science into an empirical-theological theory of action. The Benet of Brain Research for Empirical Theology Why should empirical theology be interested in the questions and results of brain research? At rst sight, these two disciplines do not share an overlapping area of research objects. Although both use empirical methods, they seem to deal with totally different things. Brain research examines—by neuroscientic methods—the anatomy and physiology of the human brain as the central organ controlling the human behaviour. In contrast, empirical theology as part of practical theology analyses—by empirical methods used in the social sciences—different forms and expressions of religious practice and evaluates them with theological criteria. Thus a peaceful, but mutually disinterested relationship between these disciplines seems to be the only adequate and desirable consequence.

1 I owe the stimulation to reect on these questions to the paper by Hans van der Ven and the response by Hans-Günter Heimbrock at the Second Conference of the International Society of Empirical Research in Theology (ISERT) at Bielefeld, Germany, 22–24 April 2004. (This means that I do not refer to van der Ven’s and Heimbrock’s contributions in this volume, which differ from their papers at the conference.) Regarding the last question, Heimbrock proposed a phenomenological justication, referring to the difference between subject-body and object-body (in German: Leib vs. Körper).

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Conicting Relationship between Brain Research and Theology? But this peaceful situation can be destroyed very fast if the results of neuroscience contradict the basic postulates of theological anthropology. Practical theology, dealing with human religious practice, usually assumes that human beings have a rich mental life and that they are subjects of their decisions and acts and possess a free will (at least in some of their actions). This gives them a specic dignity that cannot be lost. Neuroscience, on the contrary, sometimes pretends and is often understood to be capable of giving a full explanation of human behaviour and human actions solely based on neuroscientic knowledge, theories, and vocabulary. Therefore, there will be no room for the aforementioned characteristics of human beings presupposed in everydaylanguage, philosophy, and theology—according to at least some brain researchers, but also philosophers (cf. e.g. Roth, 2001). Apparently, the potential for conicts between brain research and theology, including empirical theology, cannot be neglected. This challenge should already be enough reason for theology not to ignore the results of brain research, and it puts the task for theology to show if (and how) this potential for conicts can be solved and apparent contradictions can be reconciled. At least brain research urges theology to clarify basic anthropological concepts used in empirical examinations of religious practice and their relationship to empirical science. Without being able to give a complete answer to this question, I can just very roughly sketch out an important point that might help in this discussion (for further statements see Kläden, 2005, ch. 1). The question of the ontological status of mental states in human beings, especially his free will, his subjectivity and other features characterising the homo sapiens as a human being, touches deep philosophical problems. It is important to note that philosophical problems, at least deep problems in theoretical philosophy like, for example, the mind-body problem or the problem of free will, exhibit a different problem-structure compared to problems in logic or in science. The latter kind of problems can be solved—formally spoken—by an operation from a state of beginning (A) to a goal (B), and the problem being that you may not know how to proceed from A to B, or that you may not know how B is dened exactly (or both). If you nd an appropriate operation to go from A to B (or several appropriate operations) without overlooking any mistakes, the problem is solved. Deep philosophical problems, on the contrary, do not exist to be solved, but to be understood. This means that the

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task in dealing with these kinds of problems is to demonstrate why something is a problem, to analyse the abundance of aspects connected with it and to evaluate the different proposals for its solution and their implications. As a consequence, you will not be able to nd a solution which will be accepted by any human being at all times to come. (If this were the case, there would not exist a deep philosophical problem in this respect any longer.) This is not meant to support a relativistic view as if there were no need to take a point of view, rather the opposite holds true: Human beings as rational and moral beings have the task to develop solutions to the existential questions of their lives and to make them fruitful for conducting their lives—knowing that a mandatory solution is not possible. In the context of brain research, this difference between philosophic and scientic problems leads to the conclusion that empirical research cannot achieve a solution for the conceptual philosophical problems of the relationship between mental and neuronal states, the so-called mindbody problem, or the problem of free will. Brain research can establish stable and systematic relations between mental and neuronal states, what surely is very important knowledge; it can determine certain neuronal states as necessary conditions for mental states, if experimental designs in the stricter sense are applied. But brain research cannot decide the adequacy of ontological interpretations of the data it produces. Empirical data do not determine theories about them, they are ontologically underdetermined. It needs philosophical reection to nd criteria for the ontological interpretation of data, but these criteria cannot be found by means of scientic research—they can only be found on a more abstract, namely, the philosophical level (cf. Brüntrup, 2003). A Positive Contribution of Brain Research to Empirical Theology? Beside this negative reason for empirical theology to deal with brain research (i.e. to show how the conict about basic anthropological concepts could be solved), there are also positive theological reasons that make it difcult for empirical theology to ignore the ndings of brain research. Although it cannot be denied that there are basic methodological and methodical differences between theology, even empirical theology, and sciences like brain research, these differences in method should not lead to a conception of several ways to conceive of reality that cannot be reconciled. From the perspective of the Christian theology of creation, a coherent and integrated view of reality should be

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aimed at, because the Creator is understood as the being characterised by unity to the highest degree, and therefore also the reality created by him and orientated towards him is to be understood—besides all creatural plurality—as unity, at least tentatively. Thus a theory of a unity of sciences (not of a unitary science) would mean that science and theology describe the one and only reality by different methods, but in a coherent and complementary way. Nevertheless, it is true that the ways theology and natural science conceive of reality differ basically, so that it is difcult or even impossible to correlate these two disciplines directly. Theological consequences cannot be drawn out of scientic results without further reection. Because it is the task of the natural sciences to give systematic descriptions and classications of phenomena that can be recorded by the senses (directly or by appropriate instruments), to explain, and to predict the observed qualities and events using models and lawful connections, the investigated objects are characterised in a functional way by putting them into a causal connection. Theology, on the other hand, has a more extensive object and a more extensive type of problem, because theology deals with the whole of reality not regarding causal-functional relations, but in a substantial respect: the formal principle ‘God’ and the perspective of a totality of sense. It is the task of theology as a science of faith to interpret the biblical and historical documents of the Christian faith, to reect upon the faith with regard to philosophical questions and to consider the adequate form of Christian practice. Looking at this incommensurability of natural-scientic and theological problems and methods, it can easily be seen that—for methodical reasons—both cannot be related to each other directly: theology is not able to intervene immediately in natural-scientic debates; the other way round, the results of natural-scientic, but also mathematical research are of no direct relevance for the questions about the reality or the question about God. But they obtain this relevance at that moment in which they are interpreted against the background of a certain ideological (i.e. philosophical or theological) comprehension. This is the case if natural scientists comment on the relevance of the results obtained with natural-scientic methods for our understanding of reality. In doing so, they leave the territory of natural-scientic argumentation and come to the level of philosophical reection. Here, assumptions and convictions about a greater whole play necessarily a role. They cannot—per denitionem—be decided empirically, because human interpreting and action as such is beyond the experimental-empirical access (and on the

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other hand, normative implications are unavoidable in the course of interpretation of empirical results, cf. van der Ven, 2002). So it cannot be avoided in the reection on themes like evolution and creation, determination and freedom, or matter and mind to use a language with philosophical implications, because—already by the mere use of these terms—the area of natural-scientic methods is abandoned. But in order to avoid the mere clash of ideologies and opinions and to bridge the gap between the methodically incommensurable areas of natural science and theology, a third, meta-theoretical quantity is needed. As regards the theoretical reection, such a missing link is offered by philosophy as an intermediate area between the natural laws and the totality of sense, because philosophy makes the very question of a totality of sense possible. Philosophy can be understood as the attempt to proceed from the bare opinion to true and reasonable knowledge; therefore it criticises ideologies and asks different ways of conceiving reality about their basic assumptions and implications. This also means that it is predestined to serve as a mediator for the dialogue between natural science and theology. It offers a common ground on which this dialogue can take place and—from the perspective of theology—has to take place, because for theology it cannot be unimportant if it conicts with recognised results of natural sciences, in case it wants to stick to the claim of a universal truth ability of its statements. Now for the issue of a satisfying action theory in empirical theology emerging from the knowledge of brain research a philosophical platform, as being offered by e.g. the philosophy of mind, will certainly not be sufficient. It surely serves for the clarification of the basic anthropological terms that are implicated in empirical theology, but alone it is not enough to dene researchable areas and hypotheses for empirical work. This means that in the practical respect another mediating quantity is needed. What this quantity could be, can already be inferred from van der Ven (2004): in fact, he does not really base his analysis on results of brain research; he does not speak of neurons, synapses, neuronal arousal, action potential, brain areas, lesions of the brain or diagnostic techniques that yield to pictures of the brain, e.g. positron emission tomography (PET) or functional magnet resonance tomography (fMRT). All these objects or methods of brain research in themselves will not help to explore human action. Instead, he refers to cognitive psychology, when he speaks of sensations and perceptions, automatic responses, emotions, consciousness, cognitive processes and the feeling of authorship of one’s own actions. Cognitive psychology

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itself can be interpreted as being based on brain research, insofar as the cognitive psychologist assumes that the human being he examines has a working neuronal system responsible for the human being’s behaviour and experiences. In fact, the cognitive psychologist in general will leave the examination of the relation between behavioural-experiental modules and brain modules to the cognitive neuroscientist who carries out psycho-physiological or neuropsychological studies. The ndings of cognitive neuroscience will of course help the cognitive psychologist to gain a better understanding of the human behaviour and experience and give him useful hints where to look for crucial differences and how to formulate his hypotheses and theories (and, of course, it works the other way round, the cognitive psychologist is able to help the cognitive neuroscientist to formulate his hypotheses and theories). Furthermore, the ndings of cognitive neuroscience may sometimes rule out certain possibilities or hypotheses the cognitive psychologist elaborates. But cognitive neuroscience does not make the work of cognitive psychology superuous, because the mental side of human life can—for conceptual reasons—be fully grasped only by means of psychological vocabulary and methods (e.g. observation or questioning); in brain research alone there are plainly and simply no concepts to grasp human mental life. The consequence for empirical theology is that it should make use of the results, but also of the methods of cognitive psychology in order to get to a comprehensive theory of human action which, in turn, is theologically relevant. Hence, on the one hand, empirical theology should take note of the results of cognitive psychology and interpret these ndings in practical-theological respects, but it should also question cognitive psychology and thereby stimulate new research; all this can be called interdisciplinary cooperation. But, on the other hand, it could be even more fruitful for empirical theology to cooperate with cognitive psychology in an intradisciplinary form (cf. van der Ven, 1990, 117s). This would mean for empirical theology to adopt the variety of methods of cognitive psychology and to examine all the sensational and perceptional, emotional, motivational, cognitive, and volitional stages of information-processing that work together in human actions if they are connected to religious contents. All of these processes can obtain a theological relevance, and, what is even more: an empirical theological relevance, because not only emotional and volitional processes that are closely connected to actions are important from a religious and (practical-)theological perspective, but also sensational-perceptional and automatic processes can be linked with questions put by practical

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theology: e.g., how do people perceive pictures with religious content? How do they respond automatically to religious stimuli like sermons or sacral buildings? In this respect, I contradict the opinion that the prior stages of human information-processing are of no empiricaltheological relevance. What Specic Contribution Can Brain Research Make in the Field of Religion and Religious Experience? Although it was said in the previous section that brain research in the technical sense cannot contribute directly to the understanding of theologically relevant aspects of human mental life, it nevertheless has its value when brain states are correlated with mental states. This happens in cognitive neuroscience (‘cognitive’ is to be understood in a broad sense and refers to all stages of information-processing) and is possible in a twofold way: in psycho-physiology, human mental states as dependent variables are experimentally inuenced by psychological stimuli, and the following changes in brain physiology are measured as independent variables. In neuropsychology, it is the other way round: changes in the physiology or anatomy of the brain (e.g. lesions of parts of the brain) serve as dependent variables while the following changes in the behaviour and the experiences are measured as independent variables. The guiding assumption of cognitive neuroscience is that to any single mental or behavioural state there is a concrete brain state assigned and the other way round. As a consequence, if a mental or a brain state is changing, the corresponding brain or mental state also changes. But neither brain research nor cognitive psychology can give reasons for the ontological priority of one of the two levels. Instead, it is more appropriate to conceive of the mental and the neuronal states as different aspects of one single, complex phenomenon (cf. the following third section for this philosophical assumption). If religious states belong to the mental states of human beings, then any religious state also has a corresponding brain state. Hence, human experiences with God have a biological basis in the structure of the human brain, too, or put differently: any human experience with God can only be mediated by brain processes. Apparently, the human brain is of such a quality that human beings can have religious experiences. Of course, the signicance of brain states (or processes) for religious experiences does not entail any statement about the existence of God:

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for logical reasons, research on the neurological basis of religious states can neither disprove nor prove the existence of God. A discipline called neurotheology (the term was rst used by Ashbrook, 1984) deals with these questions and tries to examine the relationship between religious experiences and the brain activity (therefore the term ‘theology’ is slightly misleading). It is far from being a homogenous discipline and is characterised by a variety of research questions and approaches. The neuropsychologist Persinger (e.g. 1999) already presented ndings in the eighties—including a self-experiment— according to which spiritual experiences (e.g. of the presence of a higher being or of an out-of-body-feeling) are correlated with transient electrical instabilities in the left temporal lobe of the human brain. They can take place during epileptic seizures of patients with temporal lobe epilepsy, but can also be evoked articially by transcranial stimulation of the temporal lobe by a magnetic eld. Also Ramachandran, a neurologist, (cf. Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 2001) conducted research on the “God module” behind the left ear, an area in the left temporal lobe, which is closely connected with the limbic system, especially the amygdala region, that assesses perceptions and experiences according to their (emotional) value. Another well-known book was written by the radiologist Newberg and the psychiatrist d’Aquili (2003; English title: Why God won’t go away) who took “snapshots of the Nirwana” during the peak of contemplation by single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT). During these peak states the meditating persons experience a special kind of feeling: the boundaries of the inner and the outer world are dissolving, and the person feels being united with God or with the whole universe. The orientation-association-area in the parietal lobe, which is responsible for the body’s orientation with respect to the outer world, has a very low activity during these experiences. Of course, these studies still cannot give a full account of human religiousness: apart from the fact that the knowledge about the neurobiology of religiousness is yet too little to really explain the processes taking place during certain spiritual experiences or to single out a special brain area responsible for religiousness, religiousness surely cannot be reduced to single peak experiences during meditation or prayer. A central problem is that the studies mentioned do not take the socio-cultural and the everyday aspect of religiousness into account. But despite these shortcomings, the neurotheological research is able to give hints about the neurobiological basis and also about the possible origin and the function of religion. Furthermore, practical theology is challenged by

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these ndings to develop a integrative and satisfying theory of human religiousness, which is still far from being existent (cf. Angel, 2002). The Relation of Mind and Body The last section deals with an appropriate theory of the relation of mind and body as a necessary fundament for any theory of human action. In theology there is often agreement on the necessity to overcome the separation between body and mind established in the line of Cartesian dualism. Why is a dualistic image of the human being inappropriate and should not serve as the basis for a theory of human action in empirical theology? And how could an alternative theory be developed? Of course, I cannot deal exhaustively with this large topic, but only give some very brief remarks (for a more detailed discussion cf. Kläden, 2005, especially ch. 4). Cartesian dualism can be characterised by the serious splitting of res cogitans and res extensa, which still extensively inuences the everyday attitude in western cultures. It assumes a dichotomy between the area of the mental things, which are immaterial and intellectual, and the area of physical things, which are three-dimensional and corporeal. Such a dualism runs the risk of separating the two dimensions which essentially make up a human being and of disturbing its integrity. Furthermore, the coherence of dualism is endangered by its difculty to make the interaction between the mental and the physical understandable, which seems to be natural for us. In this way, dualism leads to the myth of the mental as ghost in the machine: mental phenomena like e.g. thoughts, ideas, feelings or wishes are—without justication—considered as things and provided with causal efcacy within the body-machine. Apart from these problems, dualism contradicts the biblical image of man: already the semantics of biblical anthropological vocabulary does not allow for a dualistic analysis of different ontological areas. They rather show that both areas are closely connected, because they always include both perspectives simultaneously (e.g. nefesch can be translated with ‘throat’, ‘desire’, ‘soul’, or just ‘man’, always meaning ‘man as desiring being’; or leb can be translated with ‘heart’, however not in the exclusive meaning of the corporeal organ, but rather of ‘man as a deciding being’). Naturalistic or physicalistic philosophies of mind try to get rid of the problems of dualism by the reduction of mental phenomena to the activity of the brain; therefore, only physical phenomena are thought

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to be real. However, this assumption not only contradicts our everyday experiences and our deep intuitions, but also has to be charged of the same problem dualism has: like the latter, naturalism or physicalism has to start from a previous dichotomy between the physical and the mental area. They have to identify the area of mental phenomena conceptually, in order to declare this area in a second step as dependent on and capable of being reduced to physical phenomena. This means that the Cartesian dualism still inuences its counter approaches, even if they try to overcome it; the conceptual instruments of physicalism remain in the dualistic scheme. Now the brain as central controlling organ in the human body becomes the ghost in the human body-machine. An alternative position avoiding the discussed problems can be found in an approach that goes back to the Aristotelian-Thomasian tradition of hylemorphism. According to hylemorphism, anything corporeal is constituted by the principles of form and matter: form is that principle which makes a thing being the thing that it is and thereby gives this thing its characteristic structure and gestalt. Correspondingly, matter is the principle that enables a thing to receive this form. Therefore, matter and form are no quantitative parts of a single being, but represent different ways to look at it. The hylemorphistic view works for human beings, too: the human soul (level of the mental) and the human body (level of the physical) are related to each other in the relationship of form and matter. By this, the reication of mental and of physical phenomena is avoided in advance, because both do not exist for themselves, but as constituting principles or ontological aspects belonging to the compositum ‘human being’. Thomas Aquinas puts a sharp distance between himself and the dualistic view. Dualism assumes a mere accidental connection of body and soul, the body just being a vehicle for the soul, which represents the true human being. This dualistic way guarantees the independence and immortality of the soul and therefore seems to be attractive for a Christian reception. But the widening of this pessimistic tendency towards the bodily dimension leads to the opinion that the body is the prison of the soul and the origin of sin. Aquinas, however, emphasises that body and soul are in an equal way integral parts of the one human being. Accordingly, the human being is an integrated being that can be looked at under the aspect of the mental or under the aspect of the physical. Both these aspects neither are ontologically separate areas nor can they be reduced to each other.

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In the context of brain research, the hylemorphistic view helps to clarify the logical relationship between brain states and mental states: physical phenomena, or more exactly, certain brain states, are necessary for the explanation and for the existence of mental phenomena—against the claim of dualism, which considers the mental to exist separately in principle and to be independent of its physical basis. But—against the claim of physicalism—the physical basis is not sufcient for the explanation and the production of mental phenomena. Rather, a level going beyond the mere physical phenomena has to consider e.g. the attribution of meaning. From the rejection of a deterministic or reductionistic image of man a Christian view need not draw the consequence that it would not be necessary to rationally argue with the philosophical positions that reect on the ndings of neuroscience; neither is a condemnation of a natural science of the mind, carried on by the neurosciences, appropriate. The other way round, the results of brain research can exert the function of an external prophecy towards the theological doctrine of man by demonstrating the importance of the human being’s bodily dimension and—in all clarity—the necessity of the incarnation of all mental states in brain states. But whatever theory is used to overcome the unbiblical separation between body and mind, it should be valuable for a more satisfying denition of the overall object of empirical practical theology. References Angel, H.-F. (2002). Neurotheologie. Die Neurowissenschaften auf der Suche nach den biologischen Grundlagen menschlicher Religiosität [Neurotheology. The Neurosciences in Search of the Biological Foundations of Human Religiousness]. In: Religionspädagogische Beiträge 49, 107–127. Ashbrook, J.B. (1984). Neurotheology. The Working Brain and the Work of Theology. In: Zygon 19, 331–350. Brüntrup, G. (2003). Gibt es einen genuin philosophischen Kern des Leib-SeeleProblems? [Is there a Genuine Philosophical Core of the Mind-Body Problem?] In: I. Koncsik & G. Wilhelms (Eds.), Jenseits, Evolution, Geist. Schnittstellen zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaft [The Hereafter, Evolution, Mind. Interfaces between Theology and Science]. Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, 227–247. Kläden, T. (2005). Mit Leib und Seele . . . Die mind-brain-Debatte in der Philosophie des Geistes und die anima-forma-corporis-Lehre des Thomas von Aquin [With Body and Soul . . . The Mind-Brain Debate in the Philosophy of Mind and the anima-forma-corporisDoctrine by Thomas Aquinas]. Regensburg: Pustet. Newberg, A., d’Aquili, E., & Rause, V. (2003). Der gedachte Gott. Wie Glaube im Gehirn entsteht [Why God won’t Go away]. München: Piper.

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Persinger, M.A. (1999). Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs. New York: Praeger. Ramachandran, V.S. & Blakeslee, S. (2001). Die blinde Frau, die sehen kann. Rätselhafte Phänomene unseres Bewusstseins [Phantoms in the Brain. Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind]. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. Roth, G. (2001). Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert [Feeling, Thinking, Acting. How the Brain Controls Our Behaviour]. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. van der Ven, J.A. (1990). Entwurf einer empirischen Theologie [Practical Theology: An Empirical Approach]. Kampen/Weinheim: Kok/Deutscher Studien Verlag. ——— (2002). An Empirical or a Normative Approach to Practical-Theological Research? A False Dilemma. In: Journal of Empirical Theology 15 (2), 5–33. ——— (2004). Towards a Comparative Empirical Theology of Mindful Action. In: C.A.M. Hermans & M.E. Moore (Eds.), Hermeneutics and Empirical Research in Practical Theology. The Contribution of Empirical Theology by Johannes A. van der Ven. Leiden: Brill, 331–388.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY THEORY-BUILDING BASED ON A PRAGMATIC NOTION OF WEAK RATIONALITY Chris Hermans Introduction This chapter focuses on epistemological questions of theory-building within practical theology. How can we construct practical theological theory on the basis of empirical research of religious practices? I will use the term empirical theology as a shortcut for the empirical paradigm within practical theology. In the Catholic academic community, we put the start of practical theology with the rst chair of pastoral theology at Vienna (Austria) in the year 1774 (based on the advice of Rautenstrauch). But one could also argue, that it can be traced back to that line within Chistian theology that denes itself as ‘scientia practica’. For example, Pannenberg distinguishes between theology as an intellectual way towards knowledge of God, and a way to practical wisdom and religious practices towards God (such as moral actions, contemplation, rituals, mystical experiences) (Pannenberg 1977, pp. 227–232). Pannenberg points at Thomas Aquinas and neo-scholasticism as examples of the rst approach; for the second he refers to Augustine, Bonaventura, Dionysius de Kartuizer and Duns Scotus.1 Practical theology focuses at the study of religious praxis in view of the development of theories about actions (such as ritual, preaching, care) of persons, groups or institutions (Churches). I will skip the question of the origins of practical theology and focus on the epistemological question how to study religious praxis within practical theology. In history, theology has always developed its epistemology in interaction with philosophy. For practical theology as an academic discipline, a major shift in its development was the incorporation of a practice-to-theory epistemology (Browning 1991) 1 See for example: Picht, G. (1973). Die Dialektik von Theorie und Praxis und der Glaube: Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 70, pp. 101–230; G. Sondag (1996), Duns Scot. La théologie comme science pratique (Prologue de la Lectura). Paris: Vrin; Moehle, H. (1995). Ethik als scientia practica nach Johannes Duns Scotus. Eine philosophische Grundlegung. Münster: Aschendorff.

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in the middle of the 20th century. This was done by incorporating different forms of practical philosophy, such as developed by Gadamer (hermeneutics), Arendt (political theory), and Habermas (societal theory; universal pragmatics). In the turn to the 21th century, the philosophical debate is shifting again. At the fore of this debate is the question of otherness and historicity within practical philosophy. Habermas is criticized of having a strong conception of rationality connected with his transcendental approach of universal pragmatics (Margolis 2002; Rockmore 2002). Gadamer is criticized of having a strong conception of the force of tradition (Wirkungsgeschichte) which holds its grip on the interpreter (Caputo 2001). This shift has profound consequences for the theories on religious practices within practical theology. In this chapter, I will explore pragmatic perspectives on rationality of inquiry into religious practices (Stout 2004). Pragmatism offers a possibility to sail between the Charybdis of strong rationality and the Scylla of relativism. This seems to be especially fruitful in a time in which the shape of religion is changing. Religion as we know it (cfr. the world religions) takes new forms and also unknown forms of religion are emerging.2 The empirical paradigm in practical theology can fulll the promise which it holds from the beginning namely to build theological theory from the empirical study of religious practices. This theory building can be grounded on a pragmatic notion of weak rationality. In section two I will argue that a notion of weak rationality combines a principle of fallibalism and a principle of traditionalism. In section three, I will draw some consequences for practical theological theories. I start this chapter with an analysis of two scholars which have been inuential social scientic theories of practical rationality (Gadamer and Habermas). Did they overcome the so-called Cartesian anxiety of absolute knowledge, which they tried to overcome? If not, can a pragmatic account of scientic theory-building keep this promise and not slide into relativism?

2 In a globalisering world, religion is transforming through processes like homogenization, de-traditionalisation, de-institutionalisation and privitisation (Hermans 2003, chapter 1). According to Roof (2001) this leads to new forms of religion: more individual spirituality, based on a quest orientation, which needs an emotional validation. Heelas and Woodhead (2005) speak of “subjective-life forms of the sacred” that are most likely to grow at the expense of “life-as forms of the sacred”. The rst one emphasizes ‘inner sources of signicance and authority and the cultivation or sacralization of unique subjective-lives’ (Heelas & Woodhead 2005, p. 6).

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Contested Theories of Practical Rationality In this section, I start with thesis that practical theology made a decisive step in the development as a discipline by the incorporation of theories of practical rationality in the sixties and seventies (of the last century). This concerned especially the hermeneutical theory of Gadamer and the theory of communicative action of Habermas. Both authors develop a theory of rationality of the human actor in which they try to overcome the so called Cartesian anxiety of absolute knowledge. The question is however, whether they succeeded in building theories of practical rationality based on weak rationality. Later in this chapter, I will refer to the philosophical debate on both authors in which their intention to overcome the Cartesian anxiety is not challenged but the question is whether they succeeded in it. Theories of Practical Rationality: Gadamer and Habermas In history, theology has developed its concepts in interaction with philosophy. In the middle of the 20th century different forms of practical philosophy emerged, such as developed by Gadamer (hermeneutics), Arendt (political theory), and Habermas (societal theory; universal pragmatics). Persons are not viewed as epistemic subjects but as human actors involved in concrete, historical praxis. Human practices contain meanings which cannot be appropriated without participation in these practices. This has had a strong inuence on the development of practical theology in Europe. In the work of practical theologians in the seventies and eighties especially the inuence of Habermas and Gadamer can be traced back: – In Germany: Zerfass, Greinacher, Mette, Fuchs (Habermas, see inuence by Peukert) – In the Netherlands: Firet, Heitink (Habermas/Gadamer), Haarsma (Gadamer), Van der Ven (Habermas, later Ricoeur) – In the USA: Farley, Don Browning (Gadamer/Habermas) – In the UK: Forrester, Pattison This inclusion of practical philosophical theories in practical theology is a major step in the development of practical theology of today. For example, Karl Rahner, as one of the editors of the Handbook of Pastoral theology (in the sixties), has an orientation on the praxis of faith but no praxis-theory. His theology is based on a transcendental

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openness of persons for transcendence. In Catholic theology, Rahner is one of the theologians of the so called anthropological turn, e.g. a turn to the human experience of God (oikonomia versus theologia). The Handbook is considered to be a break with the model of practical theology as applied theology. This is certainly the case, but at the same time one has to be aware of the fact that at least some of its major authors lack a theory of practical rationality.3 What is then characteristic of a theory of practical rationality? Richard Bernstein gives us a criterion for the difference between a practical philosophy and a theoretical or speculative philosophy (see also Welsen 1996/97). The core thesis in his book ‘Beyond objectivism and relativism’ (Bernstein 1988) is that modern practical philosophies like the ones developed by Gadamer and Habermas (but also Arendt, Rorty) break with the opposition between objectivism and relativism (subjectivism). According to Bernstein, objectivism refers to a disinterested spectator knowledge. Relativism refers to a purely subjective knowledge, contextual, incommensurable (see Rorty). Interpretation of reality is itself praxis or phronesis/practical wisdom, as Gadamer would say. Knowledge of reality is achieved through action, e.g. active involvement of a subject in reality (Bernstein 1971, 176). As result of this, theories of practical rationality break with a spectator theory of knowledge (Bernstein 1988, ix), which is favored by the natural sciences (see also Peukert 1984). Theories of practical rationality (like Gadamer, Habermas, Arendt) start from the perspective of the human actor. They generate theories about how people come to understanding in action, which is something different than what-is questions of an epistemic subject. For example, the question “What is religious experience?” is different from “How do people experience a situation religiously within certain contexts?”. What-is questions are oriented towards the essence of religion. What is revelation? What is the trinity? What is the moral good from the perspective of the Kingdom of God? How-to questions

3

For a reection on the role of Rahner for the development of practical theology, see the second issue of the journal Pastoral-theologische Informationen. The title of this issue is: “Theologie aus pastoraler Leidenschaft. Karl Rahner und die Grundfragen der Praktischen Theologie” (transl. Theology from a pastoral passion. Karl Rahner and the foundation of practical theology). Points of criticism that can be put foreward against the position of Rahner are: his ecclesiological curtailment, his focus on rst order discourse, his transcendental method, and his idea that all theological disciplines should contribute to the execution [German: Selbstvollzug] of the Church (Hermans & Scherer-Rath 2004).

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regard the patterns, processes and procedures of religious actions. How do people understand a historical event as revelation of God? How do Christians judge a situation morally from the perspective of the Kingdom of God? According to Bernstein, what unites different forms of practical philosophy epistemologically is the movement beyond objectivity and relativity. Human understanding needs to go beyond the dichotomy of an objective world which exists an sich and human subjects that stand over against them. We can only understand the meaning of the world when the world emerges in the praxis of understanding (Bernstein 1988, 166). Understanding is thinking in praxis, that is through involvement in the world we appropriate meaning. Meaning is not something ‘out there’ which we assimilate, nor is it something ‘subjective’ to which we accommodate the world. We appropriate meaning through human praxis which is embodied, intersubjective, involved, open. Whatever differences among practical philosophers like Gadamer, Arendt, and Habermas there may be, they all share idea that understanding comes through intersubjective praxis with the world. Whatever the differences between them, all share a claim of autonomy of practical rationality. This is not the place to give an elaborative account of the theories of Gadamer and Habermas. I will only point at some central elements in their theory which made them especially interesting for practical theologians. For Gadamer, there is a unity between hermeneutics and praxis.4 Every human experience in which people learn, grow, or otherwise allow themselves to be transformed in signicant ways, is an occasion of hermeneutical interpretation. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is relational, ontological and universal. The interpreter is inescapably related to the object of interpretation, and grounds the interpretation likewise on his or her prejudices of the cultural work (see also Bernstein 1988). Hermeneutical interpretation is not just an alternative method from the methods used in natural sciences (as Dilthey suggested) but the fundamental mode of being-in-the-world. Hermeneutics ‘denotes the

4 Until the 20th century, hermeneutics was understood as a subdiscipline of humanistic studies concerned with the interpretation of texts, or a characteristic method of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). The unity of hermeneutics and praxis refers to the fundamental conception of human existence as being “thrown” in the world as beings who need to understand and interpret themselves. This praxis of self-interpretation is who we are as human beings.

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basic being-in-motion of Dasein that constitutes nitude and historicity, and hence embraces the whole of its experience in the world’ (Gadamer 2000). We are interpreters of our being-in-the-world because we lack an immediate knowledge of ourselves. Hermeneutics can also be characterized as universal in several ways. It is universal in the sense that it effects all our understanding of the world. There is no understanding of the world which is excluded from hermeneutical experience. But it can also be understood as universal because of the fact that understanding is mediated through language. All we know about the world, and our existence in the world is through language. There is no understanding beyond language.5 The object of knowledge is mediated through language. For Gadamer, language is not just the verbal form but also a worldview. Form and content cannot be separated in the hermeneutic experience. To have a language is to have a world, i.e. an orientation towards the world. Not only is the world only insofar as it comes into language, but language, too has its real being only in the fact that the world is presented in it. Thus, that language is originally human means at the same time that man’s being-in-the-world is primordially linguistic (Gadamer 2000, 443).

The theory of communicative action of Habermas can be understood as an attempt to develop a theory of society from a theory of language. A communication-theoretical concept of society hinges on a social space created by an intersubjectively shared life world. Language, world view and forms of life are interwoven. I will return to this connection later on with regard to the fact that Habermas does not leave hermeneutic behind but supplements it. The core problem that Habermas addresses is: “What makes human action rational?” His intuition is that rationality is founded in unharmed intersubjectivity, or communicative interactions which are not disturbed by outside inuences. This intuition is grounded by a non-absolute form of transcendental philosophy (Widershoven 1987). This form of philosophy reects on the necessary conditions of rational understanding.

5 Which does not imply that everything in the world can be reduced to language. Gadamer is only referring to our process of understanding of the world, not to the existence of something independent of language. In German this sentence reads: ‘Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache’ (Gadamer 2000, 450). There is also a volume with the same title which has been published in honour of the one-hundredth birthday of Hans-Georg Gadamer, with contributions of Rorty, Vattimo, Theunissen, Habermas (and others).

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In the line of Kant, one can call this a process of reconstruction. At the same time one needs to be critical towards disturbances of the communication in which persons try to reach understanding. In the history of philosophy, this is strongly argued by Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. In order to criticize interaction, one needs a criterion. This criterion is precisely the idea of unharmed intersubjectivity. In his weak transcendental or quasi-transcendental philosophy, Habermas seeks to justify this criterion of unharmed intersubjectivity trough reconstruction. Examples of reconstructive sciences are the genetic-structural theory of cognitive development of Piaget and moral development of Kohlberg. According to Habermas, reconstructive sciences have a specic ground in the human experience. Or to be more precise, reconstruction reects on a level that transcends the distinction between transcendental and empirical, between what is necessary and what is contingent. Habermas explains this specic experiential ground as follows (Habermas 1981, 191–193). In the rst place, reconstructive sciences do not rest on direct observation, but on maieutic procedures which disclose the rules working in the consciousness of competent speakers. The correctness of these rules can be judged by competent speakers themselves, and are not superimposed on them. In the second place, there is no distinction between object-language and meta-language. The language which reects on the object of communicative interaction does not explain this interaction but only makes the rules of action explicit. An explanation is on a different level as the explained object. An explication happens on the same level as that which is reconstructed. In the third place, reconstructions can not refute the every-day knowledge of competent speakers. In the fourth place, reconstructions have an essentialist claim, i.e. they claim to reect truly the rules of action within the communicative interaction between competent speakers. The above may have given the wrong impression that reconstruction has a theoretical orientation. But this would be wrong. Reconstruction has a practical, critical and goal orientation (Widershoven 1987, 121–122). It is practical because it is focused on rules which guide human action and interaction, such as the rule of justice in moral judgment. It is critical, because one can criticize actions and interactions that contradict these rules, such as moral relativism (Habermas 1981, 41). It is oriented towards a goal (telos), namely mutual understanding, which is grounded in the idea of unharmed intersubjectivity. What makes the action theory of Habermas so interesting for practical theology? I will restrict myself to three aspects of the theory

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of Habermas which can be seen as supplements, but at the same time critique on the hermeneutical theory as developed by Gadamer. Before I develop these aspects, I like to stress the fact that according to Habermas hermeneutical understanding is essential for communicative acts. When speaker and hearer try to understand one another, they do so on the basis of a shared life world. A life world is a reservoir of unchallenged communalities and unshakable convictions grounded in cultural transmitted patterns of explanation, which are used by speaker and hearer for achieving mutual understanding and the coordination of their actions (Habermas 1981, 189). There is a double relation between communicative action and the life world. On the one hand, the life world is a given horizon of meaning which makes communicative action possible; on the other hand, the life world is maintained and reproduced through communicative action. Ordinary, unproblematic understanding which is grounded on the prereexive background of the life world, is also for Habermas a form of hermeneutical understanding of experience (see Habermas 1991, 230). But there are three points in which Habermas supplements this theoretical notion. In the rst place, he stresses the fact that understanding does not only imply agreement but also disagreement and criticism. Therefore understanding needs to be supplemented with ideology criticism. When speaker and hearer do not agree in their understanding of a situation or action, they need to shift to the reective level of discourse in order to justify their statements. I do not only learn something of the self-understanding of the other, but the other can also learn something of my interpretation of his or her actions. The understanding by the other can be wrong, and therefore needs to be criticized. In the second place, Habermas supplements action integration with systemic integration. Social integration and system integration are two forms of societal integration but must be considered analytically different. ‘Mechanisms of social integration are related internally to structures of action oriented toward reaching understanding, whereas mechanisms of system integration remain external to the structures of action’ (Habermas 1991, 252). Social integration works on the basis of consensus-forming mechanisms; system integration works on the basis of the steering media of ‘money’ and ‘power’. Habermas explains how the process of mutual understanding can be disturbed through the colonization of the life world by systems (economy, bureaucracy). This idea can help us to be critical when social integration is based on non-linguistic criteria. At the same time, we have to be aware that his system theory does not make hermeneutic under-

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standing redundant (Widershoven 1987, 142). In the third place, the theory of action of Habermas comprises a theory of development which put different forms of communication in order. This opens up the possibility to judge which degree of communicative rationality a specic society has reached,6 or to which degree of rationality a certain moral judgment has reached (Habermans 1981). This logic of development supplements hermeneutic understanding, in the sense that it gives a critical tool to comprehend the reasons that speakers give for the justication of their statements. Overcoming the Cartesian Anxiety The theories of Gadamer and Habermas try to overcome the ‘Cartesian anxiety’ (Bernstein 1988, 166) which looked for absolute certain knowledge. Descartes’ search for a foundation or xed point is more than a device to solve epistemological and metaphysical questions. It is a life-threatening question in view of the vicissitudes that threaten us. Either there is some support for our being, a xed foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos (Bernstein 1988, 18).

Both Gadamer and Habermas develop theory of practical rationality beyond a foundation in absolute knowledge. According to Gadamer, experience is an open process. There are no absolute beginnings or endings (Gadamer 2000, 337). Our very existence is to interpret reality and who we are living together with others. We are always ‘in media res’, i.e. involved in a never-ending process of interpretation. There is no point outside this interpretative process from which one would have a privileged point of view. And Habermas focuses on criticism in practical discourse. Communication as a rational practice allows for the formation of a freely achieved consensus among interlocutors. Acknowledging that both Gadamer and Habermas want to overcome the ‘Cartesian anxiety’, one can ask if they have succeeded in it. I will turn to critics of both authors which point in this direction. As practical theologians we need to be aware of this, because when we incorporate their ideas about practical rationality, we also incorporate their epistemology. The reection on Gadamer and Habermas in this section is very modest, and in no way suggesting a complete evaluation 6

See also Nijhuis, Hermans & Wils 2005.

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of their theories. I only want to draw attention to possible elements within their theories which suggest an absolute truth beyond historical contingency.7 Contra Gadamer Is there a rest of epistemological absoluteness in the hermeneutical theory of Gadamer? Has Gadamer really overcome the Cartesian anxiety? I shall reect on this question in terms of how Gadamer deals with historical niteness and the politics of difference. One of the rst critics on Gadamer with regard to the historical niteness of understanding was Habermas. According to Habermas, the hermeneutical theory of Gadamer rests on a presupposition of historical continuity which is constituted by the great works of human culture, such as the bible for Christians. Culture is mediated through language. Language, in the hermeneutical theory of Gadamer, is hypostasised in forms of life and tradition. Behind this lies the ‘idealist presupposition that linguistically articulated consciousness determines the material practice of life’ (Habermas 1977, 361). For Gadamer, hermeneutical understanding is grounded on the transcendental conditions of historicity. Gadamer fails to see that there is an ontological difference between transcendental conditions and empirical conditions of history in which these transcendental conditions are constituted. Is Gadamer not still caught up in residues of Kantianism? This theme of overcoming the ontology of historicity is articulated very strongly by post-modern thinkers. According to Caputo, one cannot understand Gadamer without Heidegger who has argued for a radical (i.e. nite) limitation of understanding. People cannot escape the limits of history.8 Facticity is an ontological structure of human existence. This human nitude should not only be understood as a limitation. It is also the way by which we can understand ourselves and our existence. Because we belong to history and have our own prejudice of understanding, we can understand. ‘Finitude does not only limit, but also enables our understanding’ (Caputo 2000, 44). So far, Caputo would agree 7 I skip other problems that have been raised against Gadamer such as a neglect of the possibility that hermeneutic understanding cannot be succesful; a neglect of the critical force of reection over and against the historically affected consciousness (Wirkungsgeschichte); a lack of analysis of societal causes that deforms the praxis of understanding; and a lack of insight into the method of hermeneutical interpretation (see Habermas 1977; Bernstein 1988). 8 Heidegger speaks of the ‘Geworfenheit’ of ‘Dasein’.

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with Gadamer. But, according to Caputo, Gadamer tries to combine a Hegelian perspective on understanding history with a Heideggerian perspective. In what sense? There is a difference between the process of understanding and the object which is understood. Gadamer wants to underline: both (1) that the act of understanding is always nite (the Heideggerian side); and (2) that what is understood—the artwork, the historical event, the work of language—has a certain innitude (the Hegelian side) (Caputo 2000, 46).

It is not the subject (author) who created a work that we try to understand as a romantic hermeneutic would state. It is the work itself seen as a text that we could read, which we try to understand. This work has an innite richness of meaning which keeps unfolding in time. The depth of meaning of a work is not grasped by the original protagonists, nor by a specic understanding in time. It gradually unfolds itself through every act of understanding in the course of time. The text for Gadamer represents an innite potential of which every new understanding is a new actualization. The act of understanding is nite, but what is understood is potentially innite. To the noetic nitude of understanding (factual Dasein) there corresponds a noematic innity of what is understood, a kind of innite spirit (Caputo 2000, 47).

The question is, whether this combination of Heideggerian nitude and Hegelian innity is not combining the irreconcilable? The radical facticity of understanding is subversive to any pretension of absolute meaning. However, is this absolute meaning not presupposed in the idea of the innity of the work waiting out there to be unfold? Is there not a kind of essentialism luring behind the claim that we are already in touch with the innite meaning albeit in an imperfect way?9 Is Gadamer not escaping the facticity of existence through a (quasi-) Hegelian backdoor of the innity of meaning of the work? Is not all interpretation questionable and should we not hold it there? The second issue, in which the problem of absoluteness of the practical rationality of Gadamer has been discussed is the politics of difference. The plea of Gadamer for the construction of the universality of

9 ‘By “essentialism” I mean the various claims to be in on The Secret and thereby to have surpassed the limits of offering a mere mortal interpretation’ (Caputo 2000, 3).

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hermeneutical reection has elicited the red ags of essentialism and totalization ( Jones 2000, 16). Is the claim of universality of hermeneutics by Gadamer not blocking the possibility of strangeness in the experience of traditions, both within cultures and between cultures? This critique, which has been raised in the Habermas—Gadamer debate at the end of the sixties (see Habermas 1971; 1977), has been posited very strongly by postmodern theorists. Following Derrida, Caputo stresses the fact that the alterity of the other would be destroyed if I had access to it. ‘How to address and respond to the “other”, who by denition is a shore we cannot reach, a domain we cannot inhabit, a terra incognita, not only unexplored but unexplorable’ (Caputo 2000, 56). The treatment of the other is a test case for every hermeneutic. Behind this test case is a concern of deconstruction (Derrida). Caputo understands deconstruction as thinking on the limits of what is otherwise than the present (Caputo 2000, 131). Deconstruction wants to take the risk of the coming of the other, who puts my home at risk by his or her alterity. The alterity of the other shakes my foundations. Because it is the other, I cannot be prepared for his of her coming. There cannot be an adequate preparation for what is unexpected, unknown. Or to state it shortly: the complete other is complete other (in French: “le tout autre est le tout autre”) (Caputo 1999; 2001). There is no fusion of horizons to be expected by the coming of the other. It is only in breaking my horizon that the other is to gain a hearing. There is an innite dissymmetry of the other whom we can not know or cannot possess. Contra Habermas Is there an element of Cartesian anxiety (i.e. epistemological absoluteness) in the theory about practical discourse of Habermas? The rst thing to keep in mind is that Habermas himself wants to overcome the separation of empirical and transcendental analysis, which Kant has introduced. As mentioned above, Habermas criticizes Gadamer for failing to ground his claim of universality in historical reality, or, to be more precise, to neglect the ontological difference between transcendental analysis and historical reality. What about the universal pragmatics which Habermas has developed? Can this model overcome the Cartesian anxiety in looking for an absolute ground? There is a long debate on this issue, which I can only summarize very briey.10

10

Recently, Habermas has been expressing himself very clearly against forms of

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In his model of universal pragmatics, Habermas seeks for criteria which are implied in a communicative situation. He looks for criteria that are presupposed and anticipated in communicative action. However counterfactual to the ideal speech situation a concrete situation may be, the criteria of communicative action needs to be anticipated and presupposed in order to be rational. Once we commit ourselves to practical discourse, we already commit ourselves to the possible argumentative redemption of universal normative validity claims. The theoretical grounds for Habermas for this argumentation is not transcendental analysis, because that would put him in the same position as Gadamer. Habermas thinks he can avoid the critique on transcendental argumentation by reconstructive analysis. Two exemplars par excellence of reconstructive science are the theory of cognitive development of Piaget and theory of moral development of Kohlberg. On the basis of empirical data on children’s mastery of necessary outcomes Piaget has constructed cognitive structures which are seen as a necessary outcome. His constructivist approach views these outcomes as ‘inevitable’ more than ‘innate’ (Bookman 2002, 71). Habermas still glimpses the danger of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in Piaget, whose conclusions tend to become biological and functional. This danger is avoided by Kohlberg, who judges more advanced stages of moral development as morally adequate by moral philosophical criteria (Habermas 1990). Reconstructive theory does not argue transcendentally (a priori) but from what is implied in the construction of the life-world (a posteriori). Universal normative validity claims are seen as unavoidable implied in the diverse forms of practical discourse. The difculty of this thesis with regard to the

totalitarianism in connection to his own experiences of Nazism during the second world war (see Borradori 2003, 25–44). This experience of Habermas in his formative years is one of the driving forces in his work. The experience of Nazism seems to pust him towards an ‘universalist call for freedom and equality that cannot be relativized in any form’ (Borradori 2003, 79). When asked in a public forum what was the most difcult aspect of his philosophy to defend, Habermas answered his quasi-transcendentalism (see Aboulaa 2002, 4). On the question why he thought he needed to defend it, Habermas answered: the Holocaust. This needs to be not just an psychological motive for him, which can be overruled. He thinks that it is needed ‘to have some sort of intellectual ground, even if only a quasi-transcendental one, in order to counter irrationalism and the moral barbarism that follows in its wake’ (Aboulaa 2002, 4). It seems as if Habermas wants to have as strong arguments as possible to be able to say ‘Never again’ (German: Nie wieder). I mention this not to discard his arguments for universal pragmatic conditions. But it can help to understand why Habermas is so persistent to hold his quasi-transcendentalism which seems to run against other elements in his theory.

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theory of moral development of Kohlberg are massive (see Van der Ven 1998). One problem is that the underlying Kantian orientation of moral development have been criticized as being one-sided and restricted (cfr. Gilligan). Another problem is that there is none or poor empirical evidence for the last stage which orients the whole process of moral development. A second concept in Habermas, which he wants to give an absolute foundation is the ideal speech situation as criterion from which we can judge communication. The ideal speech situation species a set of formal properties, that discursive argumentation should possess if the consensus they produce is to be sharply distinguished from a mere compromise or an agreement of convenience. The conditions are pragmatic universals of discourse, i.e. they are supposed to be universally true.11 One of these conditions is the fact that all participants in a discourse have an equal chance to bring in assertions, recommendations, explanations, and to challenge justications (see Habermas 1990). There is a paradox in the claim for universality of the pragmatic conditions of communicative actions. Either they are a priori in the traditional sense of being absolute, i.e. beyond agreement or disagreement. A strong view of rationality presupposes a privileged faculty or absolute rational telos (Margolis 2002, 32). Or, they only set the stage for a conversation, which allows for differences. But if the universal conditions are just procedural of character, this still leaves us with the problem of consensus (Aboulaa 2002, 11). Can proceduralist argument ever give foundation to more substantive notions of the good? Do procedural arguments not lead to different, even contradictory moral choices? A third problem which I want to mention, is the use of fallibalism by Habermas. For Habermas justication of arguments refers to the fact that we ‘know the rules for an argumentational game within which 11 Habermas holds a consensus theory in which truth is based on unconstrained consensus. According to Rockmore, there is a confusion between truth and knowledge behind this concept. One cannot confer from consensus, even unconstrained consensus, to truth (Rockmore 2002, p. 57). Consensus refers to the meaning of a concept; truth refers to reality. For Habermas, we cannot know a mind-independent reality. This is something to agree with him. But why then imply truth in intersubjective agreement? Is Habermas not looking for a kind of objectivity of a Cartesian type which he is trying to overcome? Following Peirce, I would take reality to be a limiting concept. We cannot state anything we like about the world. There is a resistence of the world over and against our statements (see category of secondness of Peirce). This is something different from the meaning of a statement (concept) which lies in its consequences in practice.

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validity claims can be redeemed discursively’ (Habermas 1991, 231). Falsication refers to the fact that we cannot exclude the possibility of rejection of our conceptions or theories which we have been accepting as valid. ‘The fallibalist meaning of an argumentational game take into account only that universal validity claims have to be raised factually—namely, in our respective context, which does not remain stationary but rather will change’ (Habermas 1991, 232). But how can there be a fallibalistic approximation of universal conditions? How could we justify a universal claim under fallibalistic conditions? Either we accept the fact that all our arguments all fallible, or we claim universality for them. There is no way to reconcile fallibalism with justication based on universal claims. ‘Habermas fails to see that fallibalism applied in short-run practices cannot approximate to any universal or necessary long-run norms beyond formal consistency’ (Margolis 2002, 43). If one accepts fallibalism (as Habermas does), there is no way back to a Cartesian certainty. The Epistemological Promise of Pragmatism If I am right in my analysis of Gadamer and Habermas, there is still a residue of Cartesian anxiety left in their epistemology which shows itself in their theories of practical rationality. Is it possible to develop a theory of practical rationality which can overcome this Cartesian anxiety? According to Victor Anderson (1998), pragmatism can offer a fruitful venue out of the dilemma in which academic theology nds itself. On the one hand, academic theology has no meaning for the public debate on moral issues with regard to our society unless it is truthful to the religious community and its tradition to which it is afliated (Anderson 1998, 6). But on the other hand, academic theology cannot be a source in the public debate if it remains a function of church dogmatics and professional ministerial education. When dened by church dogmatics and professional ministerial education, academic theology becomes parochial and irrelevant to the secular and public discourses which govern our public debates on multiculturalism, abortion, same-sex unions, gun control, and the like (Anderson 1998, 7).

Pragmatism is a label for many different thinkers who share a concern for knowledge after foundationalism (Rockmore 2002, 50). They look for this knowledge under practical conditions, and are suspicious to

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all forms of speculative knowledge. Apart from this general concern there are many epistemological differences between them. I will draw especially on one of the founding fathers of (classical) pragmatism, namely Charles Sanders Peirce. First, I will elaborate the principle of fallibalism from a pragmatist framework, and connect it to the Peircean concept of the innite community of inquiry. The epistemological principle of fallibalism seems to run against the possibility of being an advocate for a specic religious tradition (or traditions) in a public debate (both within society and within the academy). I will therefore later on examine the possibility of connecting the concept of fallibalism with traditionalism. Fallibalism and the Innite Community of Inquiry According to Aboulaa, pragmatism is ‘the philosophy that has an aversion to all forms of absolute certainty. Fallibalism is its totem’ (Aboulaa 2002, 5). The question of foundation can take many different forms in philosophy, whether it consists of sense impressions, matters of fact, a priori truths, et cetera. ‘In such diverse philosophic positions as rationalism and empiricism, there is an underlying conviction that there is such a rock bottom foundation’ (Bernstein 1971, 174). The problem is then to nd such a foundation and then build more complex knowledge on this foundation with the help of rules and procedures which are tted for this task of theory building. On this ground we are able to ‘legitimize’ our knowledge claims. From a pragmatist perspective, both the “foundations metaphor” of knowledge and the “spectator” view of the knower are to be criticized. All pragmatist share this epistemological critique, although not all share the same view on what criteria to build knowledge.12 I will follow the critique formulated by Peirce in a famous series of articles in 1868 in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (Peirce CP V, 213–258). In the rst article, his objective is to show that there is no intuitive knowledge. The quest for an epistemological foundation based on immediate knowledge or knowledge by intuition is misguided. Intuition is dened as ‘signifying a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object, and therefore so determined by something out of the consciousness’ (Peirce CP V, 213). An intuition is a cognition, but it is a cognition not being determined 12 Rockmore (2002) distinguishes six different strands within American philosophical pragmatism, of which classical pragmatism (including Peirce) is just one.

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by other cognitions but directly by the transcendental object. Because of this origin, i.e. outside the act of knowing, an intuition claims to be infallible. What is right in the foundation metaphor is that all cognition starts with pre-existent knowledge. Peirce credits Aristotle for making clear that there must be certain rst principles of knowledge, because there must have been a beginning of the process of reasoning and this beginning must be a general principle (Peirce CP II, 27). But this logical starting point of knowledge does not need to be grasped directly by some intuitive faculty. ‘Our claims to knowledge are legitimized not by their origins—for the origins of knowledge are diverse and fallible—but rather by the norms and rules of inquiry itself ’ (Bernstein 1971, 175). All knowledge is fallible which is not a sign of its weakness but rather an essential characteristic of knowledge. Every knowledge claim is open for interpretation and public debate. In a continuous process of inquiry our knowledge can be tested and revised. This is not a weakness, as Descartes was thinking, but a strength. Through inquiry as a self-corrective process, our knowledge can be tested and rened. By what we have said, it will be clear that there can be no ‘spectator’ view of knowledge. If inquiry is the necessary road to knowledge, man can no longer be seen as a spectator from something outside the process of knowing, but is a participant in this process of inquiry. But because man is included within the process of inquiry, all our knowledge must be fallible. Where does this lead us in the end? The process of inquiry is continuous, i.e. without a rst principle which is not itself a conclusion. Is this not leading us to epistemological skepticism? The rst thing to be aware of is that there is a difference between strong and weak skepticism. Susan Haack argues that fallibalism is indeed connected with weak skepticism but not with strong skepticism. Strong skepticism implies the radical thesis that absolute knowledge is impossible. Weak skepticism not only denies this radical thesis, but also holds that some of our beliefs may well be true (quoted in Sanders 1995, note 25). Fallibalism needs not give up the matter of truth, as the strong skepticist does. At the end of the second article in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (titled: “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”), Peirce attends to the grounds of the inferential process of inquiry, namely the notion of truth, the notion of reality and the notion of community. Truth and reality are related concepts for Peirce. Truth on the one hand refers to cognitions about the real. If not, there is no escape to relativism, or, as Peirce would say: ‘the vagaries of me and you’ (Peirce

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CP 5, 311).13 On the other hand, truth is what is destined in the long run to be agreed upon by the community of investigators (Potter 1996, 109). The real is what a community at the long run does afrm and re-afrms. It is not necessary that we already know the truth about reality, but that we know it on the long run. Peirce rejects the idea that there can be reality which is incognizable. A proposition whose falsity can never be established, contains no error. For how would it be possible to establish this error? This is the ground, why reality and truth are two connected, even convertible terms for Peirce. But, truth and reality suppose the notion of community ‘without denite limits, and capable of a denite increase of knowledge’ (Peirce CP 5, 311). The truth about reality presupposes a state of complete information. There is truth in what we know here and now of reality. But truth as the limit case of absolute knowledge is something to be reached in the future through continued investigation. What we know about reality can always be falsied through further investigation. We cannot claim absolute knowledge, but we have only knowledge which is fallible. Truth is what can stand the test of falsication on the long run. Therefore Peirce states, that ‘the existence of thought now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community’ (Peirce CP 5, 316). The question, whether this future completeness can ever be reached is not something that can be claimed in an absolute sense. To quote Peirce: this very assumption involves itself a transcendent and supreme interest, and therefore from its very nature is unsusceptible of any support from reasons. This innite hope which we all have (for even the atheist will constantly betray his calm expectation that what is Best will come about) is something so august and momentous, that all reasoning in reference to it is a triing impertinence (Peirce CP 5, 357).

To resume this point, I think that we can only hope for the possibility to reach the truth on the long run within a community of inquiry without limit. This hope is not something beyond the knowing experience, but immanent in every act of knowing. At this point Peirce and Habermas converge. But for Peirce, it remains an act of hope, and there

13 I see Peirce as a social constructionist avant la lettre. His focus is on the community, seen as a community of inquiry without denite limits. ‘The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation’ (Peirce CP 5, 317).

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never will be sufcient or necessary reasons pro or con to ground this hope. Margolis points to the fact that this hope is not something that belongs to the phenomenal matters which are studied by science (Margolis 2002, 39). Innite hope belongs to the domain of practical matters and is not a theoretical difculty of the sciences. Hope belongs to the category of voluntary acts and the admirable ideal (summum bonum) on which one wants to act (Peirce CP 5, 130). Being a practical matter, Peirce can only give a conjecture that man is not just selsh but acts for the good of the community. He gives three arguments for this conjecture: The immense self-sacrices which the most willful men often make, show that willfulness is a very different thing from selshness. The care that men have for what is to happen after they are dead, cannot be selsh. And nally and chiey, the constant use of the word “we” (…) in cases in which no personal interests at all are involved, show conclusively that men do not make their personal interests their only ones, and therefore may, at least, subordinate them to the interests of the community (Peirce CP 5, 355).

Fallibalism and Traditionalism In the previous paragraph, I stressed the role of the community of inquiry in testing the truth of conceptions of reality. This idea is in congruence with the need for theology to be part of the public debate about moral issues in our society and in the academy about theories of religions (see Anderson). But the idea of fallibalist knowledge within an unlimited community of inquiry seems to contradict the second demand formulated by Anderson, namely that theology has to bring in the values and convictions of a religious community, to which it is connected to. How can one at the same time comply with the critical canon of scientic inquiry, and do justice to the specic tradition of a religious community? The above formulation supposes a contrast between fallibalism and boundedness to a tradition (religious or non-religious). However, the question is whether there needs to be a contrast? The rst thing to be clear of is that religious traditions can include absolutist truth-claims. ‘Faith includes total commitment and this implies a dogmatic element’ (Sanders 1995, 204). Between fallibalism and, what Sanders calls, a foundational brand of dogmatism there is indeed a contrast which cannot be reconciled on pains of total inconsistency. The thesis of fallibalism builds on the fact that human knowledge cannot escape the

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inescapable fact of our human nitude, namely our fallibility. Every assertion is conceivably mistaken, but at the same time corrigible. As stated above, the alternative of foundational dogmatism is not necessary strong skepticism. A weak form of skepticism leaves room for the possibility to reach the truth on the long run within a community of inquiry without limit. But this idea of a community of inquiry without limit still seems at odds with the specic perspective of a religious tradition of a religious community, and the theological scientic reection of that specic tradition. Within the theory of scientic inquiry, there is a principle that it is reasonable to hold an idea or theory from a specic perspective. This is the principle of tenacity, as formulated by Peirce, and later adopted by Popper. This principle prescribes that one should stick to one’s theories as long as it is reasonably possible (Sanders 1995, 205). If one gives up an idea or theory too soon in the face of counter-arguments, this would deprive persons of the possibility to nd out their strength. Also in the so called critical rationalism of Popper the role of tradition in inquiry is recognized. According to Popper, we always our bound by our background knowledge, and without it knowledge would not be possible. But in Popper’s view, we should not accept this knowledge ‘neither as accepted, nor as fairly certain, nor as yet probable’ (Popper 1963, 238). Background knowledge is just something to work on in the context of discovery. It is only accepted as unproblematic for the time being. But it needs to be mistrusted, and, what is more, we can take a critical position beyond our background knowledge. In the context of justication of our ideas, through the method of scientic inquiry we should leave all our ‘givens’ or ‘presumptions’ behind. But is this total and comprehensive (self)criticism possible, or even needed when accepting the criterion of fallibalism? Are there rational standards of inquiry beyond specic traditions and communities of inquiry? I think there are good epistemological reasons to reject this position and to defend a position in which fallibalism and traditionalism in inquiry are connected. I think that Jeff Stout is one of the strongest pragmatist defenders of this position (Stout 2004). In theology, this position is defended by some authors who sail under the ag of post-foundationalism (Van Huyssteen 1997; 1999). The Dutch philosopher of religion, Sanders has named it a ‘traditionalist fallibalism’ (Sanders 1995). There are all kind of differences between these authors, which I will skip in this essay. I will restrict myself to the main characteristics of an epistemology that integrates traditionalism with fallibalism.

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Firstly, all knowledge is local in the sense that it depends on a language that has been learned in and through participation in communal practices. This local knowledge implies conceptual schemes and the know-how of using them in specic contexts. ‘On a traditionalist reading, people are born into languages, frameworks of thought and communities and except on very special occasions, as in sudden conversions, this is not normally a matter of choice’ (Sanders 1995, 206). This does not reject the idea that people can become acquainted with other frameworks, and even can reect on their own ideas from these frameworks. But this process of reection is always caught up in the conceptual schemes that belong to the practices of the community in which they live: both within the theological level, and the level of the religious communities. Referring to Wittgenstein, one can say ‘that many beliefs are such that we would not know how to justify them in a noncircular and informative way even if we tried’ (Stout 2004, 234). Secondly, ‘we begin our conversations by bringing our fallible views and judgments to those who traditionally make up our epistemic communities’ (Van Huyssteen 1999, 265). Each judgment takes place within the context of a specic community, and is based on arguments and ideas which are excepted in this community. We cannot abstract from a conversational context in the justication of beliefs, ideas and viewpoints. According to Stout, this implies three things: (a) The conversational context determines what sort of information is being requested in order to count as a justication; (b) The conversational context determines the audience of the justication process; and (c) The success of the justication can only be appraised in relation to this audience (Stout 2004, 235). All justication is bound to a conversational context, and the audience which accepts or rejects the justication of certain beliefs or ideas. This audience is always limited to the class of people who understand the vocabulary in which this justication is cast and who have mastered the patterns of reasoning which are required to follow it. We need to broaden this limited audience, because of the fact that we are aware of the fact that our knowledge is fallible. Therefore, we should extend our individual judgment or evaluation to communal evaluation to trans-communal evaluation (Van Huyssteen 1999, 265). But this does not imply the demand that we should include all rational agents in all context, regardless of time and place. If we would demand this, it would make the success of our justications impossible to determine. Our justications are fallible, and we should not require them to be infallible, because they are not. ‘Justications are successful if they

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eliminate relevant reasons for doubting. The reasons future generations might have for doubting, being necessarily unknown to us, hardly count as relevant in out context’ (Stout 2004, 236–237). We also do not know the epistemic context in which future generations have to make a judgment. An innite community of inquiry (Peirce) is a limit-notion that is grounded in hope.14 We should not demand to judge from this perspective in actuality. A God’s eye view is not ours! We need to seek ever wider audience for justication of our claims, but this will always be bound to the discursive practices of traditions which we have learned to understand and are committed to.15 Thirdly, what do we ask when we ask for justication? Justication is an activity, which consists in answering the claim ‘Why believe that P’? A justication is successful when it eliminates reasons for doubting ‘that P’ (Stout 2004, 235). In the foregoing argument, I have stressed the fact that this process of justication always implies a limited audience. ‘Relevant reasons for doubting P have been eliminated when everyone in the audience is justied in believing that P’ (idem). Justication is never complete, all-encompassing, but always partial. As soon as doubt has been removed, the process of justication ends. Does that mean that all the arguments of all viewpoints have been presented and reviewed? Not at all, but there is no reason to argue after all the participants in the inquiry are convinced of the justication. ‘When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end, and, if it did go on, it would be without a purpose’ (Peirce EPI, 115). It is not necessary to presuppose complete and absolute knowledge in the process of justication. One would not know what to look for beyond actual doubts, which are part of the discourse of concrete traditions of religious communities. Fourthly, the combination of fallibalism and traditionalism implies a recognition of diversity and pluralism, and the rejection of a consensus approach. A contextual approach of human rationality gives room to epistemic tolerance. We learn of schemas of interpretation different from ours. Not from an alleged God’s eye point of view (Sanders

14 Stout refers of the moral law as a limit-notion: ‘an innitely large set consisting of all the true moral claims but not a single falsehood or contradiction. Being innitely large and including truths cast in myriad possible vocabularies we will never master, this set boggles the mind. We will never believe, let alone be justied, more than a tiny fraction of the truths it encompasses’ (Stout 2004, 240). 15 Traditie overstijgend—hoger niveau van classicatie.

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1995, 207). People live in different contexts and different traditions, and based on these differences make different evaluations of situations. ‘Constructive interaction should therefore be possible as we learn to acquiescence in difference, i.e. come to term with the fact that others will not only differ from us in their opinions, customs, evaluations, and modes of action, but that it is perfectly rational for them to do so’ (Van Huyssteen 1999, 271). A traditionalist fallibalism gives room to a legitimate diversity in conversation, where cooperation and coordination would still be possible and rational.16 Theory-Building in Practical Theology In this last section, I want to draw some conclusions with regard to the kind of theory building of practical theology. What is the type of theory which practical theology as a discipline aims to develop? I started this contribution by locating the origin of practical theology as an independent academic theological discipline in the assimilation of modern theories of practical rationality (especially Gadamer and Habermas). Whatever the discipline of practical theology may be, its focus is on practical rationality in religion (especially the Christian religion). The argument of this chapter is that we should construct theories of “weak” practical rationality. Weak rationality implies an epistemology that combines the principle of fallibalism with the principle of traditionalism. What does this mean for theory-building within practical theology? (1) First, all knowledge is local, learned in specic contexts. Theory-building within practical theology should be based on a criticalhermeneutical understanding from religious practices which it studies. Can this critical hermeneutical understanding do justice both to the principle of fallibalism and the principle of traditionalism? I want to distinguish theory building from the rationality of religious practices from two other types of theory building namely in religion and about

16 Is a refusal of a consensus epistemology not in contract with the natural sciences, and the social sciences? Are these sciences not grounded on the justications of truth claims through the reproducibility of experiments which should yield to the same outcomes? According to Van Huyssteen, this is indeed the case but does not opposes the rejection of a consensus epistemology. Consensus in natural and social sciences focuss on methodology as safeguard for eliminating errors in theory building. However, this leaves ample room for disagreement and diversity (Van Huyssteen 1999, 273).

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religion. The distinction between these three types of theory building is crucial for the understanding of practical theology as an academic discipline, but also for theology in general. For practical theology the distinction between theories in religion and about religion has been used to distinguish practical theology from the social sciences that study religion. For theology in general it marks the difference between theology as teaching in religion, and religious studies as teaching about religion.17 If I am correct about the denition of practical rationality as beyond the distinction of objectivity and relativism, the distinction between in religion and about religion does not sufce to characterize practical theology. Theory building in religion is essentially the same as ‘religion-in-the-making’ (Strenski) (quoted in Cady 2002). A Christian practical theologian builds theological theories with regard to the promotion of the Christian tradition in our time. The problem is not to build theories of professional actions of ministers, but building theories on confessional assumptions of a specic Christian community as truth claims, which are taken for granted. It assumes that there is some special, intuitive, or privileged knowledge in a religion which cannot be challenged or be object of methodological testing. Practical theology as confessional theology (see Cartledge 2003, 4) builds theories in the rationality of religious practices of a specic religious community. This position cannot do justice to the principle of fallibalism. The opposite position is theory building about religion, which is the dominant position of the social sciences or religious studies. For example a religious study scholar like McCutcheon would also study religious practitioners but he only regards them as informants to produce data for theory building (McCutcheon 2003, 14). ‘We study how it is that they believe and behave, and, having gathered this descriptive information, we go on to theorize as why it is that they believe and behave as they do’ (idem). Scholars in this position do not see themselves as caretakers of (a specic) religion, but constructors of objective theories about religion. One would rarely nd practical theologians in this position.18

17 In the US there is even a Supreme Court ruling from 1963 distinguishing “teaching about religion” from “teaching in religion” (Cady & Brown 2002, 4). This ruling institutionalized the place of religious studies within public universities. 18 I am not sure where to put Leslie Francis on the map of these three positions, because he does not situate his theory building inside the theological realm (see Cartledge 2003).

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And I am not denying the possibility of this approach for the social sciences or religious studies, although not necessarily all scholars in this eld would take this position (especially those who would take an interpretative approach in the study of religion).19 This position is not able to do justice to the principle of traditionalism. I think that the third option ( from) is best tted for building theories of practical rationality.20 Building theories of the practical rationality, that is working within religious practices, is in itself praxis. One needs to take the perspective of the human actor within religious practices, for example in the practice of praying together with other people or celebrating a religious feast. One could build all kinds of theories about praying, but in order to reect the rationality of the praying person the theory of prayer should be constructed from the practice of praying. This implies a hermeneutical understanding of the religious practice which is the object of inquiry. This means that some form of access or participation in this practice is needed. Or, to put it differently, we need to get an insider perspective. But the aim is not the execution of religious practices but building theories from the practical rationality in religious practices. Theory building needs critical reection on the basis of methodological distance to the object of inquiry. In an empirical inquiry of religious practices, one follows a scientic method (whether more interpretative/descriptive, or more explanatory/testing). The aim of scientic inquiry is not preserving the worthiness of ideas by practicing a method of inquiry that can produce beliefs that coincide with the ideas. The members of the community of scientic inquiry are committed to follow the rules of the inquiry. ‘The test of whether I am truly following the method is not an immediate appeal to my feelings and purposes, but, on the contrary, itself involves the application of the method’ (Peirce EPI, 121). Practical theological theory about practical rationality is not the same as the rationality in religious

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It would be arrogant for me as practical theologian to dene other disciplines that study religion. It is possible to study the working of the brain in religion (as is done by the neuroscientists), or to study social processes and patterns in religious communities (as is done by sociologists of religion). But this is different from the study of practical rationality that works in religion, or, more specic, in religious practices. However, there are also interpretative approaches in the eld of the social sciences and religious studies that would come close to what I am advocating for practical theology. 20 Browning (1991) is a wellknown proponent of this position from religious practices.

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practices. Theory building is second order reection in distinction with rst order reection within religious practices.21 (2) Secondly, weak rationality makes practical theology more t for an interdisciplinary debate within the academy than strong rationality (see Van Huyssteen 1999). The place of theology in general, and of practical theology in particular in the academy is being contested. Some theologians want to challenge the idea of the academy, instead of theology (Tanner 2002). Of course there is a conversational context in which this position can be defended and in which it will nd support. But I do not think that this strategy is very wise, nor that it will be very successful. But apart from strategic considerations, practical theology does not need to challenge the criteria of the academy of theory building on fallibalist criteria. Fallibalist presumptions can be combined with a traditionalist stance. On the one hand, theology can hold the same claims of empirical, historical and literary testing as other disciplines at the university (Van den Brom 2003, 43). The method of scientic inquiry recognizes that the truth is public and available to all who follow the scientic methods of inquiry. This community of inquiry is open to everyone, including researchers of other disciplines. Theology should be open to criticism from others. If a practical theological theory on a rule of action in religious practices is not reected in reality, this theory has to be rejected. On the other hand, practical theology needs to bring in the understanding of a specic (e.g. Christian) tradition. All understanding of religion (such as rituals, symbols, acts of violence, prayer, proselytizing) starts from the understanding of religious practices of a specic religion. Every research starts with a problem denition. This problem does not come from nowhere, but 21 My argument rests on the fact that the rationality of religious practices is not reducible to any other human phenomena, while at the same time being distinctive from all other experiences in personal and communal life. If it would be reducible to other facts of life (social, psychological, cultural, et cetera), theories about rationality in religious practices could do the whole job. There would be no practical rationality specic to religious practices. This would be the same as reducing the praxis of music making to other phenomena (e.g. psychological health, social processes) and denying esthetic experience as something unique. On the other hand we should avoid to make the Christian religion a sui generis category, as has been done by theologians but also by scholars in the study of religion (such as Rudolf Otto with the category of the sacred). When religion in general, or Christianity as such is a sui generis category it would be a phenomenon that is isolated in the whole of human life. Practical theology could only be theory in religion or confessional theology because there would not be another perspective on religion which could make this phenomenon understandable (see also Hermans 2003, 157–159).

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draws on doubts from the understanding of religious practices in a specic tradition (e.g. the Christian). We justify our theories about practical rationality towards a certain public. Because of the fallible nature of our knowledge, we should try to enlarge this audience (e.g. social scientists but also scholars in religious studies). At the same time, our justication is never complete, all-encompassing.22 Traditions not only work within the context of discovery but also the context of justication. (3) Thirdly, a practical theology that works on the basis of a weak rationality is more t for the public debate on religion, and the function of religion within society and in the life of persons and communal life. If we (as practical theologians) would claim to have some privileged knowledge about religion in general, or the Christian religion in particular, it would put us outside the public argumentative debate. Our arguments as practical theologians could not be understood, or, will even simply be shifted aside as being biased and dogmatic. At the same time, we need to be aware as practical theologians that due to the strong growth of religious pluralism and emerging forms of new religiosity we can not pretend to already have the knowledge of religious praxis of people today (Dyrness 2003, 59). In a pluralist society, individuals are aware of the fact that they can choose (Berger 1979). The taken-for-granted character of religion is gone, and people are searching for personal experience and personal truth (so called “quest orientation”) (Roof 2001). In a situation like this, practical theology puts itself outside the public debate if it adopts an epistemological position of strong rationality (see also Anderson 1998). (4) Fourthly, practical theology has a role to play as care-taker of the Christian tradition and the religious community to which it is committed. Practical theology can be more helpful for the Christian community if it works on the basis of a weak rationality. There is no backdoor for practical theology to claim absolute certainty of the theories which are developed. For certain theological audiences, it is needed to claim certainty about a hermeneutic continuity with the origins of the Christian community. An example of this is given by Cartledge (2003) who develops his practical theology from a charismatic and empirical 22 This could only work in a justication based on a sui generis denition of religion: either theological (such as the Barthian tradition) or within religious studies (such as Otto, Eliade). Albeit in different ways, they both defend a God’s eye view (with an absolute truth claim).

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perspective. In his chapter on truth and epistemology, he starts with a reection on correspondence theories of truth and coherence theories of truth. Cartledge is especially attracted to correspondence theories because they focus on reality as something independent of the process of knowing. From the perspective of a Pentecostal epistemology, he opts for a so called yada approach for knowledge which is a kind of personal, participatory, encountered knowledge of God.23 From a correspondence theory of truth he assumes that the yada experience of today corresponds with the original experience of the early Church (idem, 54). Cartledge takes a critical realist position with regard to the hermeneutic continuity, which include a continued adjustment of the experience of God. But adjustment presupposes a continuity between the present testimony of encounter with God, which is inextricably tied to the person of Jesus Christ, and the testimony of the early Church as found in the Gospels (idem, 61). This claim demonstrates a view of strong rationality, and as such can only rest on foundational grounds. But for practical rationality in religious practices (such as the testimony of personal encounter with God) this kind of absolute knowledge is not possible. There is no ‘objective’ position from which to judge the hermeneutical continuity outside the subjective process of participating in the understanding of this practice of testimony. Perhaps is the only possible form for hermeneutics from a (pragmatic) perspective of weak rationality “abductive hermeneutics”. The claim of religious truth is an eschatological claim. Deep and broad understanding is not something to be reached by oneself, but only within a community of inquiry. Abduction is the term that Peirce is using to refer to the process of idea generation:24 ‘Deduction proves that something must be. Induction shows that something actually is operative; abduction merely suggest that something may be’ (Peirce CP 5, 171). Abduction is a kind reasoning that involves a conjecture towards what is possible. Abductive hermeneutics want to help people at reaching deeper and richer understanding of God or In/nity from a framework of weak rationality. Perhaps this is

23 ‘This knowledge being experiential and relational is compatible with human praxis that is judged and transformed by the word of God; that is an encounter with God through personal yada’ (Cartledge 2003, 47). 24 Instead of abduction, Peirce also uses the term ‘retroduction’. ‘Retro’ refers to a backwards-movement in the reasoning process which distinguishes it from deduction and induction which start from “certain” premises leading to a conclusion. In abduction of retroduction, the “consequence” is grounded backwards from unknown “antecedents” (Peirce CP 7, 218).

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the best help practical theology can offer to the advancement of the Christian religion in a (post-)modern time.25 References Aboulaa, M. (2002). Introduction. In: M. Aboulaa, M. Bookman & C. Kemp (eds). Habermas and Pragmatism. London: Routledge, 1–14. Anderson, V. (1998). Pragmatic Theology. Negotiating the Intersections of an American Philosophy of Religion and Public Theology. Albany: Un. of New York Press Berger, P. (1979). The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities for Religious Afrmation. New York: Doubleday. Bernstein, R. (1971). Praxis and Action. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. Bookman (2002). Forming Competence: Habermas on Reconstructing Worlds and Context-transcendent Reasons. In: M. Aboulaa, M. Bookman & C. Kemp (eds). Habermas and Pragmatism. London: Routledge, 65–80. Borradori, G. (2003). Philosophy in a Time of Terror. Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Browning, D. (1991). A Fundamental Practical Theology. Descriptive and Strategic Proposals. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Cady, L.E. (2002). Territorial Disputes: Religious Studies and Theology in Transition. In: L.E. Cady & D. Brown (eds.). Religious Studies, Theology, and the University. Conicting Maps, Changing Terrain. New York: State University of New York Press, 110–125. Caputo, John. D. (1999). God is Wholly Other—Almost: “Différance” and the Hyperbolic Alterity of God. In: O.H. Sumerell (ed.). The Otherness of God. Charlottesville: Un. Press of Virginia, 190–206. ——— (2001). More Radical Hermeneutics. On not Knowing Who We Are. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana U.P. ——— (2001). On Religion. London & New York: Routledge. Cartledge, M.J. (2003). Practical Theology. Charismatic and Empirical Perspectives. Carlisle: Paternoster Press. Dyrness, W. (2003). The Church, the University and Culture: Can Theology Find its Way? An American Perspective. In: M.E. Brinkman, N.F.M. Schreurs, H.M. Vroom & C.J. Wethmar (eds.). Theology between Church, University and Society. Assen: Van Gorcum, 47–60. Gadamer, H.-G. (2000). Truth and Method (2nd revised edition; transl. J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall). New York: Continuum. Haack, S. (1979). Fallibalism and Necessity, In: Synthese 41. Habermas, J. (1971). Knowledge and Human Interests (trans. J.J. Shapiro), Boston: Beacon Press. ——— (1977). A Review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method. In: F.R. Dallmayr & Th.A. McCarthy (eds.). Understanding and Social Inquiry. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 335–363. ——— (1979). What is Universal Pragmatics? In: idem, Communication and the Evolution of Society (trans. Th. McCarthy). Boston: Beacon Press. ——— (1981/1984). Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I/II (trans. Th. McCarthy). Boston: Beacon Press. ——— (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.

25 For a more extended introduction of abductive hermeneutics, see Hermans (2004).

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——— (1991). A Reply, In: A. Honneth & H. Joas (eds.). Communicative Action. (trans. J. Gains & D.L. Jones), 230–233. Heelas, P. & Woodhead, L. (2005). The Spiritual Revolution. Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality. Malden USA: Blackwell. Hermans, C.A.M. (2003). Participatory Learning. Religious Education in a Globalizing Society. Leiden: Brill. ——— (2004). Abductive Hermeneutics. A Pragmatic Key to the Learning Paradox. In: H. Lombaerts & D. Pollefeyt (eds.). Hermeneutical Religious Education. Leuven: Peeters. Hermans, C.A.M. & Scherer-Rath, M. (2004). Interdisziplinarität in der Praktischen Theologie. Epistemologische Grundfragen einer hermeneutisch-empirischen Begründung der Praktischen Theologie. In: Pastoraltheologische Informationen 24(2003), 200–234. Hookway, C. (2002). Truth, Rationality and Pragmatism. Themes from Peirce. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Jones, L. (2000). The Hermeneutics of Scacred Architecture. Experience, Interpretation, Comparison. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsication and the Methodology of Scientic Research Programmes. In: I. Lakatos & Musgrave, A. (eds). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 91–196. ——— (1978). The Methodology of Scientic Research Programmes (Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Margolis, J. (2002). Vicissitudes of Transcendental Reason. In: M. Aboulaa, M. Bookman & C. Kemp (eds). Habermas and Pragmatism. London: Routledge, 31–46. McCutcheaon, R.T. (2002). The Study of Religion as an Anthropology of Credebility. In: L.E. Cady & D. Brown (eds.). Religious Studies, Theology, and the University. Conlicting Maps, Changing Terrain. New York: State University of New York Press, 13–30. Pannenberg, W. (1977). Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Peirce, C.S. (1935–1966). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Hartshorne, Ch., Weiss, P. & Burks, A.W. (eds.). Cambridge M.A.: Harvard Univ. Press [abbreviated as CP]. ——— (2001). How to Make Our Ideas Clear, In: M.P. Lynch (ed.). The Nature of Truth. MIT Press, 193–209. Peukert, H. (1984). Was ist eine praktische Wissenschaft? Handlungstheorie als Basistheorie der Humanwissenschaften: Anfragen an die Praktische Theologie. In: O. Fuchs (ed.). Theologie und Handeln: Beiträge zur Fundierung der Praktischen Theologie. Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 64–79. Popper, K.R. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations. London. Potter, V.G. (1996). Peirce’s Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Fordham University Press. Roof, W.C. (1999). The Spiritual Marketplace. Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion. Princeton N.J.: Princeton U.P. Rockmore, T. (2002). The Epistemological Promise of Pragmatism. In: M. Aboulaa, M. Bookman & C. Kemp (eds). Habermas and Pragmatism. London: Routledge, 47–64. Sanders, A. (1995). Traditionalism, Fallibalism and Theological Relativism. In: Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 49, 194–214. Sein das Verstanden werden kann ist Sprache. Hommage an Hans-Georg Gadamer (2001). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Stout, J. (2004). Democracy and Tradition. Princeton: Princeton UP. Van den Brom, L.J. (2002). Freedom of Theology and the Bounds of the Church. In: M.E. Brinkman, N.F.M. Schreurs, H.M. Vroom & C.J. Wethmar (eds.). Theology between Church, University and Society. Assen: Van Gorcum, 36–46. Van Huyssteen, J.W. (1997). Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

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——— (1999). The Shaping of Rationality. Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Welsen, P. (1996/97). Over Ricoeurs praktische losoe [About the practical philosophy of Ricoeur]. In: Wijsgerig Perspectief 37(5), 158–152. Widershoven, G. (1987). Handelen en rationaliteit. Een systematisch overzicht van het denken van Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer en Habermas [Action and rationality. A systematic overview of the ideas of Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer en Habermas], Amsterdam: Boom.

RITUAL PRAXIS. DEFINING PASSAGE RITES FROM AN ACTION PERSPECTIVE Hans Schilderman Conceptual Problem Ritual is a primary expression of religious praxis. In that respect it has always offered a normative signicance for the reection of the faith. Since ages hence, the public expression of faith in liturgy may not always have occupied a cardinal position in reection on faith, but it has always been focal to it.1 From a perspective of empirical theology, this offers one of the obvious motives to study ritual practice in liturgy with regard to its overt forms; its attitudinal foundation in belief and the actual ways in which people gain signicance from liturgy for their faith and daily lives. Liturgy can be regarded as the public expression of religious attitudes in ritual actions, in which the meaning attributed to the ritual is explicitly and performatively embodied in ritual praxis (Bell 1997, 76–83; Garrigan 2004). Thus liturgical studies—taken as an empirical discipline—should at a basic level clarify both value orientations and ritual orientations and explain the processes of religious meaning according to which these values come to be ritualized. At the same time however, one has to include in this explanation the changing liturgical scenery in terms of the ritual actors in their respective context. In various modern countries liturgical practices undergo a process of religious de-institutionalisation that puts to debate the value and ritual orientations on the one hand and the processes of meaning giving on the other. Moral and religious values are questioned by processes of pluralisation and individualization and increasing numbers of people may look upon ritual as an irrational t to contemporary norms of modern behaviour. Moreover, the processes of meaning giving are affected by the secularization process, leaving to doubt whatever signicance religious

1 This was traditionally expressed in aphorisms like ‘Legem credendi lex statuit supplicandi’ (let the rule of worship determine the rule of faith; Pope Celestine I to the bishops of Gaul in 422) and ‘lex orandi, lex credendi’ (the rule of prayer is the rule of faith; Prosper of Aquitaine, also 5th century).

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ritual may have had. To many people their reasons to participate in liturgy have grown unclear, as is illustrated by the sharp decline of church participation in the last decades in various countries of Europe. Thus one of the likely objects of empirical research in liturgical studies focuses at the issues that are at stake when participating in religious ritual located in modern contexts. In this particular research effort, liturgical studies may benet from an interdisciplinary cooperation with scholars from sociology, anthropology, ritual and performance studies. What can we learn from this interdisciplinary discourse when we aim for an insight into what can be called a liturgical crisis of modern churches? In this contribution, we will clarify and answer this question from a conceptual perspective by focussing on key rites: rites characterised by both great personal relevance for participants and great signicance for the social structure of which these individuals are part. Among these key rites, the so-called rites of passage feature prominently, marking transitions such as those at the start of life, the choice of a marriage partner, and death. This article deals with these transitional rites, more particularly in relation to the process of de-institutionalisation in which they are caught up. A focal issue is whether classical denitions that describe such rites as rites of passage are still adequate. The classical term ‘rites of passage’ is well established. In several languages the French term ‘rites de passage’ has actually become part of colloquial speech. It refers to all kinds of ceremonial customs that mark transitions in the course of life. In scientic literature, too, the concept is entrenched. Yet anyone who traces its origin to the book Les rites de passage (1909) will nd that the author, Van Gennep, does not really link it with theoretical or conceptual notions. It is simply an umbrella term without any great taxonomic pretensions, and Van Gennep uses it cautiously rather than with analytical fervour for classication. Although ‘rites of passage’ is a classical term in liturgical and ritual studies, its theoretical usefulness for contemporary research is questionable. This applies particularly to ritual studies based on empirical research, which is where conceptual validity—that is, the use of terms that describe empirical phenomena as accurately as possible—is especially important. In addition to these conceptual comments there is also a strategic motive for exploring the term’s applicability to research. Liturgical studies, which are increasingly conducted in the framework of religious studies, requires proper integration of the approaches of theology, religious studies and the social sciences. That is yet another tting reason for theoretical debate

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on the concept of rites of passage. Hence this article is to be seen as an invitation to such interdisciplinary debate. One could ask what rites of passage actually are. What concept does the term refer to, and does that concept really convey what the empirical study is designed to measure?2 Of course, the question can be answered ex post facto. In that case we assume that our knowledge is incremental and that a clear image of the attributes of liturgical experience emerges in the course of the research. However, such an answer is rightly accused of inductivism: it generalises from the particular by dispensing with logical (rule-governed) explanations of the knowledge one has gained. That is why ex ante answers are so important: clear conceptual analysis at the outset ensures the feasibility of an empirical test that could falsify rule-governed assumptions. Put simply, every study requires clear formulation of the problem beforehand, even if only to preclude third order errors, that is, solving problems that were mis-conceptualised.3 In the rest of this article, therefore, we explore what rites of passage are and in how far denitions prior to empirical study enable us to gain proper understanding. In so doing we distinguish between the goal, form and meaning of rites of passage, and discuss their relationship in a short reection on their institutional function. Dening Goals of Passage Rites What is the goal of rites of passage? Some authors maintain that rites have no goal at all: they are activities with intrinsic meaning that cannot be reduced to some function beyond the rite itself. But if one regards liturgical studies as an action science, the notion of a meaningless rite is a contradiction in terms. Liturgy is ritual behaviour that is by denition meaningful, and reconstructing that meaning is a primary goal of liturgical studies. The question of the goal of rites crops up regularly 2 We adopt the accepted terminology that regards rite (ritual action) and ceremony (ritual action process) as action entities, and ritual and ceremonial as the concomitant prescriptions for action. For a survey of anthropological classication and denition problems see Bell (1997, 93–137). For such problems in regard to rites of passage see Snoek (1987, 57–89). 3 A third order error corrupts research by mis-conceptualising empirical reality before undertaking research, as distinct from rst order errors which entail rejection of a valid null hypothesis, and second order errors that entail acceptance of an invalid null hypothesis (Dunn 1994, 184).

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in research, since it is not always clear what transition is ritualised in the liturgy of baptism, marriage or burial. Does baptism ritualise new church membership, or the start of life and concomitant nurture? What is the real focus in a marriage ceremony—the institution of marriage or the quality of the relationship? Does a funeral service ritualise the deceased’s transition from life to death or the grief of the relatives? The question underlying such obscurities concerns the inuence of culture on the rite and the values motivating it. That is also the key question when it comes to the constant factor in rites of passage: what transition does it refer to? A classical goal associated with rites is that of regulating status. Rites of passage are said to mark changes in the statuses and roles that people full in the course of their lives. Status indicates the rights and duties associated with a given position in society. A role is such status in action, that is, a person’s practice regarding rights and duties that more or less correspond with social expectations of a particular status. A rite of passage publicly recognises the transition from former to new status. The goal is to give the rights and duties associated with the new social position both a personal or attitudinal character and social recognition by the group which assigns that status. Ultimately, then, the goal of a rite of passage is socialisation. A pertinent point here is that such authors as Van Gennep, Eliade and Turner consistently use the term ‘rites of passage’ in a typically anthropological, and more specically ethnological, conceptual context. They study rites of passage in the context of ‘primitive’ (in the sense of non-Western, premodern and institutionally more or less undifferentiated) cultures.4 This research strategy of studying rites of passage mainly in primitive cultures has diverse motives. One is that a focus on primitive peoples makes it possible to study the origin of cultures, and specically of rites, in situ, thus affording insight into the phylogenesis of ritual behaviour. Or it represents what Durkheim explicitly calls a ‘simple case’ that does not unnecessarily complicate the already difcult process of ritual research. Whatever the reasons for conceptualisation based on the study

4 In religious studies the assumption that the adjective ‘primitive’ also means ‘underdeveloped’ has proved untenable. Tylor’s view that primitive religion is based on logical (attribution) errors has been refuted by anthropologists like Levi-Strauss and Eliade, who prefer to speak of concrete thinking without losing sight of the complexity of primitive cultures.

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of primitive cultures, the question is whether knowledge and insight generated by such research is relevant to the study of rites of passage in Western, modern and institutionally highly differentiated cultures. If rites of passage are regarded as social status regulation, one cannot but conclude that primitive and modern cultures differ fundamentally in this respect. In the 1930s Linton made a distinction between ascribed and achieved status.5 According to him status is culturally ascribed on the basis of social points of reference like gender, age, family relationship or class. Ascribed status is culturally determined. It expresses occupation of more or less xed social positions and is marked by highly predictable role behaviour. Status ascription occurs in all cultures but is particularly prevalent in primitive and traditional cultures. An achieved status, by contrast, is expressive of individual qualities and initiative, of competition and excellence. These statuses are readily changeable, which makes the normative character of social positions less unambiguous and the concomitant role behaviour less predictable. People are born, get married and die in social and cultural positions adapted to the requirements of time and place. In modern cultures status is variable and exible. It is acquired and inuenced by personal effort. A person’s status is not primarily dependent on belonging to a community, tradition or language group, but on what he or she does with it through personal conduct. If—as we are assuming—rites of passage ritualise status transitions, then Linton’s distinction is highly pertinent. In cultures predominantly characterised by ascribed status rites are a means of formally regulating and effecting social status transitions. In cultures that put greater emphasis on personal achievement of social statuses, on the other hand, rites of passage have primarily expressive signicance: a change in status is morally or aesthetically stamped. In primitive and traditional cultures, the assumption goes, rites of passage have a regulatory purpose: they regulate previous and new statuses in the social structure of that culture. The complementary assumption is that in modern societies rites of passage have an expressive purpose:

5 ‘Ascribed statuses are those which are assigned to individuals without reference to their innate differences or abilities. They can be predicted and trained for from the moment of birth. The achieved statuses are . . . those requiring special qualities . . . They are not assigned to individuals from birth but are left open to be lled through competition and individual effort.’ (Linton 1936, 115).

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they depict social statuses in a variable social structure that is constantly on the move.6 Rites of passage as we know them from traditional Christian liturgy derive from a cultural era that was pre-eminently characterised by ascribed status. Not only were the role requirements of gender, age, family relationship and class relatively xed, but the religious point of reference was itself unassailable, providing a divine canopy for the social strata of the culture. The contemporary cultural context of Christian liturgy in modern nations is characterized by strict separation between church and state. This makes the signicance of religious rites for social status transitions debatable, at any rate in the sense that rites no longer fall under a divine canopy. Because the present-day cultural context is marked by a typical achievement orientation, the role requirements of social strata are no longer xed. As a result the religious orientation ipso facto disappears. This puts traditional rites under pressure: they are gradually disappearing or adapting to new procedures of status achievement. That is clearly reected in contemporary experience of rites of passage. Infant baptism is a rite of passage which confers the status of church membership on a child. But this practice conicts with the values of autonomy and self-determination. Hence it is sometimes said that children should decide for themselves whether they want to be Christians and church members when they are old enough to make such a choice on their own. You are no longer born a Christian or member of a church, you have to make that decision for yourself. This view has some theological legitimacy, in some respects reected in the conrmation ritual, but at the same time it raises questions about infant baptism. At rst glance marriage is a different proposition. It is based on a carefully considered personal decision by the couple and the marriage ceremony ritualises that choice. Yet here, too, the status transition is less self-evident than it seems. In the rst place the ritual institution of marriage is increasingly preceded by a protracted spell of cohabitation; and secondly, the bond appears to be less indissoluble afterwards because of the more or less common practice of divorce and dissolution of marriage. In modern social contexts the institution of marriage is increasingly dependent on the couple’s own efforts to 6 The distinction is naturally not meant to classify cultures, but to distinguish between ideal types of ritual goals. This raises an empirical question: in how far and under what conditions do combinations of ascription rites and achievement rites actually occur in certain cultures?

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maintain the quality of the relationship, and hence of the marriage itself. Finally even death turns out not to be immune to the personal control to which an achievement orientation disposes us. The funeral liturgy does not mark the deceased’s transition from life to death and a possible afterlife, but is more of a farewell ceremony commemorating the person’s acquired status. This is particularly evident in the focal position of the deceased’s curriculum vitae in the liturgy. Gradually funeral liturgy is becoming less standardised and is tailored by relatives, who use it to express their own status. Even more explicitly, liturgical forms are chosen according to the deceased person’s dictates in a ritual testament. Thus even after death the deceased maintains a ritual hold—albeit proactively ‘in memoriam’—on the status achieved in his or her lifetime. Both traditional and modern societies have status transitions, characterised sometimes by ascription, sometimes by achievement. But in traditional contexts roles and positions are signicantly more resistant to change than in modern societies. This does not leave the cultural factor of ritual unaffected. Whereas in traditional societies the rite appears to intervene in the social order in the sense of regulating it apparently independently of the efforts of the actors, status transitions in modern contexts are expressive and are thus more directly linked with the actors’ efforts and their own interpretations of the transition. By using the term ‘rite of passage’ generically with reference to baptismal, marriage and funeral rituals such major differences are camouaged. Indeed, one might ask in how far one can still speak of a ritual transition in the case of achieved statuses. It is also debatable whether one can assume ascribed statuses among a modern public without allowing for the way they are interpreted by the primary and secondary ritual actors.7 Hence instead of referring generically to rites of passage it makes more sense to distinguish between goals of ascription and achievement. Ascription rites express the ritual actors’ ties with a community; the accent is on being part of a given history and culture and on speaking a common language. Achievement rites refer to the importance of the person’s own actions in attaining a particular social status. They express

7 Whereas the religious codes of traditional liturgy put the accent on the primary actor (the child, the bridal couple, the deceased), new liturgical texts also refer to the secondary actors (parents, peer group, the bereaved). Such differences in liturgical form not only indicate changed liturgical goal orientations, but also suggest a different position for interpretation of the ritual in the liturgy.

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the personal prot or loss of a social status. Ascription and achievement rites are not mutually exclusive: both goal orientations are encountered in the rituals of modern societies. But one can justiably hypothesise that they are based on different value orientations, each relating to the social points of reference (strata) where the statuses apply. This calls for research, in which the distinction in ritual goal orientation is examined in relation to traditional and modern value orientations, with due regard to differences in the social location of participants in the liturgy. Dening Forms of Passage Rites A second, more complex issue to be considered in regard to rites of passage is the relation between the various rituals of which such a rite is composed. What determines the form of a rite of passage? It is generally accepted that rites of passage have a form comprising a sequence of rites of separation (‘rites de séparation’), transition (‘rites de marges’), and incorporation (‘rites d’agrégation’). This leads to the supposition that there is a sequential form for certain ceremonies, which on those grounds can be classied as rites of passage. In the ideal type of these rites, it is assumed, the rst phase detaches actors from the status they have hitherto occupied in the social system. In the second phase they reach a ritually intermediate stage: they are divested of every kind of status attribute and are not bound by the role requirements of any social position whatever. Finally, in the third phase they are incorporated into their new status and the concomitant role expectations are ritually installed. But the assumption that rites of passage possess a denite form that may be described as a ritual phase model is an unfortunate one. Van Gennep himself, who describes rites of passage as a formal pattern, is none too explicit about the phase attributes of the pattern he categorises.8 In some ceremonies the accent may be mainly on rites of separation, as in the case of death, whereas in others like marriage ceremonies incorporation rites are focal. Sometimes the emphasis is on a rite denoting separation, sometimes on a no man’s land, sometimes

8 Van Gennep makes his distinction in the framework of a ritual classication problem (séquences cérémonielles) and as a ritual pattern (schéma). But he does not refer to a phase model; on the contrary, he shows that the various rites are differently accentuated in different ceremonies, which makes it problematic to demonstrate the form of specic ceremonies according to a generic or universal phase model of rites of passage (Van Gennep 1909, 13–15; 275–279).

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on incorporation, but not always in that order. The rites do not display the same incidence, frequency, intensity or sequence. That means that, strictly logically, one cannot speak of rites of passage at all. There is, moreover, a suggestion that ‘something’ in the ritual effects the separation, transition or incorporation, but this dynamics is not developed into concepts or propositions. That makes the classication less discriminating: one observes what is done (ritualised)—and anthropological literature provides many detailed, colourful descriptions of ritual activity—but the authors tend to assume rather than expound its meaning. At rst glance there seems to be a much simpler explanation for the form of rites of passage, namely the course of history. Every culture has a tradition history, in which ritual forms gradually evolve in relation to the functions of the social system. Thus the order of service in liturgical practice does not observe a logic of ritual phasing according to the three dimensions of rites of passage. Instead it conforms to the normative logic of liturgical codes as these have crystallised in the religious tradition and church order. But this genetic argument based on historical and institutional determination of the coherence of ritual forms is unsatisfactory in empirical liturgical studies. Thus it fails to explain the varying value attached to ritual forms and affords no insight into processes responsible for changes in these forms. An explanation in terms of increasing institutionalisation does not adequately account for the mental, social and cultural dynamics of ritual expression. And a historical explanatory model offers no insight into the motives for liturgical participation, the decline in such participation, the enormous international disparities in this regard or the emergence of new rituals. We are not referring only to manifest differences between cultures but also to processes within the same culture. How does one account, for instance, for the massive decline in ritual participation according to the religious/ecclesiastic canon in secularised cultures and the increase—albeit mainly associated with specic incidents—in mass ritual participation at secular public ceremonies?9 Here one nds that the formal aspects of rituals as spelled out in canonical texts, codes of conduct and conventional metaphors are becoming less meaningful, whereas informal rites occur more or less spontaneously in the public domain.

9 Cf. the more or less spontaneous ritualism prompted by the death of victims of mindless violence and of public gures like Princess Diana in England, or Fortuyn, Hazes, Van Gogh, in the Netherlands.

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The relation between formal and informal aspects of rituals is also a fundamental debating point when determining the object of research in ritual studies. The point at issue is whether it is scientically more protable to study established rituals which, by virtue of their institutional incorporation into social and cultural systems, present stable, fertile research objects, or whether it is actually better to study rituals in statu nasciendi. In the rst case, as in Bell’s work, the accent in describing rituals is on formalism, more particularly the relation to traditionalism and unvarying, rule-governed actions (Bell 1997, 139–155). In the second case, as in Grimes’s work, the emphasis is on informalism, at any rate in the sense that it is better to study rituals at their inception (‘e-merging ritual’), because that is where rites acquire their own meaning in the real-life, creative reconstruction (‘performance’) of the ritual by the actual participants (‘re-invented ritual’) (Grimes 1990; 2000). Such emphases of formalism and informalism need not be seen as antithetical if they are treated as aspects of a dynamic, interactive process. Then formalisation and informalisation are social processes that not only put rites in historical and cultural context, but also offer a socio-scientic explanation for the form they assume. How should this social dynamics be interpreted when it comes to the form of rites of passage? To answer this question we refer to the description of liturgical studies as an action science. To this end we narrow it down to a social action science. Rites in liturgy are social actions. Their meaning resides not only in the framework of personal meaning but also in the social interaction during ritual actions. More than that, social meaning is the condition, substance and purpose of the interactions in which ritual actions take shape.10 In his formal sociology Simmel explains an aspect of social behaviour that is relevant in this context. He uses the term ‘Geselligkeit’ (sociability) to convey the social nature of behaviour. It refers to the meaning that characterises behaviour as a typical group orientation, dynamically related in the concerned involvement of the individual with the group (‘Taktgefühl’) and of the group with the individual (‘Diskretion’). Simmel denes this dynamics in terms of an almost Kantian maxim as the need to offer everybody else the maximum of social meaning that is compatible with extracting maximal personal

10 ‘Soziales Handeln . . . soll ein solches Handeln heißen, welches seinem von dem oder den Handelnden gemeinten Sinn nach auf das Verhalten anderer bezogen wird und daran in seinem Ablauf orientiert ist’ (Weber 1976, 1).

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meaning.11 In Simmel’s sociology sociability does not represent a legal remedy but is more in the nature of a game: a social expression of ultimate meanings of fellowship that can be exchanged disinterestedly for the very reason that it does not accentuate the link with specically personal meanings. The social meaning of actions is manifested in etiquette and other behaviour that the relevant culture seeks to develop. The indeterminacy of sociability is important to maintain the continuity of this dynamics. As soon as meaning becomes particular (subjective in the Weberian sense) the actions start serving personal or group-specic interests. That is very relevant to status transitions, since they pertain to specic positions (strata) in a society. Hence rites of passage may be dened as a dynamics of informalisation, in which status differences are played down, and formalisation, in which they are emphasised. Simmel’s notion of sociability may be seen as a demythologisation of Turner’s notion of communitas. Both concepts stress liberation from the normative restrictions imposed by social statuses, social positions and personal roles, but there is little reason to assume that sociability is linked with the liminal state that Turner claims to discern only in the second phase of transitional rites. In contrast to communitas, sociability is not a ‘contingent’ experience at the interface of social contexts, but is more of an intentional game in which the essential meaning of those contexts is developed. Hence it is not an anti-structure that interacts dialectically with a ‘normal’ societal structure, as Turner would have it, but actually a normal structure that makes itself the theme of community life without any self-interest. That dynamic character precludes rigid phasing, such as conning liberation from status to the second phase only. In the rst place, social context becomes the theme of rites of passage by disinterestedly expressing that context’s intrinsic meaning. Secondly, rites structure context by regulating and managing status positions. The formal attributes and conditions that determine interaction in the course of a ritual can be identied through empirical observation. The obvious means for studying the dynamics of formalisation and informalisation is social interaction theory. Simmel’s concept of sociability is very compatible with theories on the development of social

11 ‘. . . jeder soll dem andern dasjenige Maximum an geselligen Werten (von Freude, Entlastung, Lebendigkeit) gewähren, das mit dem Maximum der von ihm selbst empfangenen Werte vereinbar ist’ (Simmel 1984, 56).

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conventions, which Elias and Goffman made the object of their research. Here interactionism refers to theories that connect the development of behavioural direction through psychological functions with the historical construction of social functions (Elias 1969, 434–454). According to interactionist authors ritual forms evolve in a subtle dynamics of formalisation and informalisation. Whereas formalisation refers to the identication of role and person in behavioural codes, social contracts and institutional rules, informalisation denotes diverse, always highly personalised interaction styles that allow some latitude for interpreting role requirements. Modern societies are characterised by increasing interplay of these dimensions. On the one hand the civilising process results in more and more procedures to regulate social interaction, particularly the formulation of rights in the public domain; on the other hand social life is becoming amorphous and unpredictable as a result of the ‘outlawed’ area permitted in the private domain. Informalisation corrects this by appealing to trust relationships. The proliferation of divergent, highly personalised interaction styles leaves more scope than before for interpreting role requirements in the face of the dominant process of formalisation. Informalisation manifests in changes in the interaction between the private and public domains; in the emotionreason polarity; in the harmonisation of spontaneous and calculated behaviour; in relations between community and bureaucracy; and in the interplay of particular and universal value orientations. Cultures, more particularly national cultures, manifestly differ as regards the dynamics of formalisation and informalisation. Comparatively speaking, at least, it is justied to hypothesise that social boundaries between formal and informal behaviour are uid in modern societies. If it is true that the demarcation of the public and private domains differs between countries, this should be particularly evident in rites of passage. Comparative, cross-national research would reveal that. If the form of rites of passage should indeed be studied in terms of the dynamics of formalisation and informalisation of social behaviour rather than the sequence of the transition, what determines the form of these ritual interaction styles? To answer this question we cite an interaction theory that focuses on social regulation of behaviour. In her conceptual study of the informalisation process Misztal identies three principles that regulate a growing dynamics of formalisation and informalisation. The rst principle is respect. It regulates everyday social intercourse through a mixture of personal freedom and convention

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that expresses decency, civilisation or civility.12 The second principle is reciprocity, which arises whenever relations are aimed at conscious exchange from different social positions and roles are regulated by social expectations. Here the dynamics is in the nature of sacrice in return for gain, in which a combination of instrumental and non-instrumental behaviour gives the actions social signicance. The third principle is responsibility, in which the dynamics is typically intimate. Interpersonal ties are marked by direct identity display with a high emotional quality characterised by mutual concern (Misztal 2000, 68–103). According to Misztal’s hypothesis these principles regulate the harmonisation of formal and informal aspects of social behaviour in individualised, de-conventionalised modern societies. According to our hypothesis, such principles apply particularly to the performative form of social interaction styles that make up ritual behaviour. In that case the best way to research the form of modern rites of passage would be in terms of such interaction styles and can be guided by subsequent research questions. Form in such research would relate, rstly, to respect, in the sense of assigning ritual actors shared value orientations that at the same time discreetly shield their private lives because of the normative demarcation of the private from the public domain. When, how and in regard to which value orientations does such respect assume ritual form? Secondly, the form of rites of passage can be studied to determine what social contract is implied. Which status requirements are abandoned and which are incorporated, and how is the ‘social price’ of the social contract determined and paid? Finally, how intimately is the identity of the actors depicted in the ritual, and how are responsibilities dened in this regard? Such questions naturally call for more detailed conceptual and empirical research into the way in which formalisation and informalisation of social behaviour inuence ritual interaction styles. By researching rites of passage in terms of interaction styles, as opposed to a phase model, the theoretical focus shifts to their connection with social and cultural reality. That strikes us as a more fruitful approach to studying the concrete form of rites of passage in modern societies.

12

Elias’s notion of respect should be construed as protection of privacy. Privacy upholds the legitimacy of social regulation of the public domain by invoking the freedom of action of all individuals in the private sphere.

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Besides the goal and form of rites of passage we have to consider a third question: that of their meaning. More particularly we want to know whether and to what extent rites of passage are assigned religious meaning. The question is pertinent, since religious aspects of rites of passage, while highly relevant in primitive cultures, have manifestly lost some of that meaning in modern cultures. Anthropological literature consistently highlights the close connection between religious and social aspects of rituals, in which rites of passage nonetheless tend to intervene. Van Gennep refers to ‘le pivotement . . . de sacré’: the pivot of the sacred shifts through the secular domain and in its passage imparts a sacred character, whereafter its profane nature is restored (Van Gennep 1909, 15–17). Hence rites of passage themselves are continually in transit between the profane and the sacred domain. Anyone making a social status transition always traverses the sphere of inuence of the sacred. This offers typical support for Durkheim’s claim that religion is very much a ‘social thing’: God and clan are one.13 A remarkable feature of anthropological literature on primitive cultures is that the difference between sacred and profane is always described topically in terms of times, places and artefacts. Sacred and profane represent domains that can be located in space and time, and are then cordoned off by taboos. But in (transitional) rites the sacred also appears to be mobile: it is not absolute but dependent on ritual rules bound up with particular situations, territorial domains and moments or phases in time. Sacredness thus is variable: what was once profane can become sacred, and what was sacred in one context becomes profane in another. Ritually, then, the sacredness or profanity of something is both self-evident and contingent. At least, it is connected with changes in social position, role and status which, to an outsider, appear fortuitous. By the same token the social structure reected in a rite of passage is sacred or profane depending on its position in the course of the ritual. Primitive rites of passage, therefore, are rituals to which people submit at a particular time and place by virtue of an identication of their sacred social character.

13 Durkheim refers to totems uniting God and the clan: ‘Si donc il est, à la fois, le symbole du dieu et de la société, n’est-ce pas que le dieu et la société ne font qu’un? . . . Le dieu du clan, le principe totémique, ne peut donc être autre chose que le clan lui-même, mais hypostasié et représenté aux imaginations sous les espèces sensibles du végétal ou de l’animal qui sert de totem’ (Durkheim 1909, 108).

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Whether this also applies to religious rituals in modern societies is a matter for debate. This debate is relevant if one considers that in modern societies secularisation has eroded the sacred, while ongoing individualisation has weakened social bonds. The rationalisation that characterises modern societies has disenchanted (‘entzaubert’) the relation between sacred and profane. The term ‘disenchantment’ (‘Entzauberung’) derives from Weber. One observation that is rarely made is that Weber’s somewhat metaphorical concept of ‘Entzauberung’ refers not so much to the loss of certain propositions about reality as to the new condence in the possibilities of human action. It is not increasing scientic knowledge or rational insight as such that is taking its toll of religious belief, but the resultant realisation that human intentionality has a far broader range than it was initially assigned. Secularisation has less to do with the death of metaphysics than with the triumph of freedom. Ultimately Weber’s point is that it is not chance that reigns supreme but faith in the normativeness of the human will.14 Weber’s notion of disenchantment tells us two things about religious meaning. Firstly, the social and religious domains are not interchangeable in the modern mind. Enchantment of social reality by religion conicts with rationality, which presupposes that only a disenchanted worldview has any claim to realism. As a result the ritual process of naive—because regulated exclusively by actions and convention— identication of sacred and profane aspects of reality has become suspect. Secondly, on the basis of the same rationalising process the sacred is seen as a characteristic of intentions rather than of topical realities. If the sacred does feature in the modern mind, it is not so much as a replication of reality according to a metaphysical scheme of nature and supernatural reality, but as meaning assigned to one’s own actions according to a scheme of immanent and transcendent action. In the case of transcendence religious reality surpasses human capacities, while in the case of immanence it interacts with human actions. To understand modern rites of passage these viewpoints are

14 ‘Die zunehmende Intellektualisierung und Rationalisierung bedeutet also nicht eine zunehmende allgemeine Kenntnis der Lebensbedingungen, unter denen man steht. Sondern sie bedeutet etwas anderes: das Wissen davon oder den Glauben daran: daß man, wenn man nur wollte, es jederzeit erfahren könnte, daß es also prinzipiell keine geheimnisvollen unberechenbaren Mächte gebe, die da hineinspielen, daß man vielmehr alle Dinge—im Prinzip—durch Berechnen beherrschen könne.’ (Weber 1919, 23).

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highly pertinent. In modern rites of passage Van Gennep’s ‘pivot of the sacred’ should be seen as conscious attribution of religious meaning to social actions. According to this notion of secularisation, ritual is the conscious expression, freely chosen from other possibilities, of what is experienced as sacred at a given moment. Empirically this meaning is obviously variable, especially in regard to value orientations and ritual orientations. In the case of value orientations we can distinguish between social (or secular) and religious value orientations. The distinction is important because, in view of our secularised modern culture, we cannot take ritual participants’ religious value orientation for granted. In the case of ritual orientations we can distinguish between immanent and transcendent features of rites. Since our concern is with liturgy, we can take religious features as our point of departure, but in so doing we must take account of the implications of a distinction between immanent and transcendent action. A major implication of such an approach relates to elements of meaning in the liturgy: the signs, texts, codes and metaphors in which meaning is ritually expressed. These elements can have immanent or transcendent points of reference. In the case of Christian liturgy this can be explained with reference to the three pre-eminently meaningful gures in liturgical ritual—God, Jesus and the Spirit. Liturgy presents various images of the one God, each with its own theological implications for human intentionality. Theistic God images put the accent on a transcendent God, creator and ruler of the universe, who can therefore intervene unilaterally in, or counter to, human actions. Deistic God images present God as the origin of human existence, but are dubious about supernatural doctrines and the revelation of absolute divine attributes. A deistic God image is open to natural theology, which recognises God in human intentionality. Pantheistic God images, which identify God with all reality, put the accent wholly on immanence. Human intentions remain intact but are not readily distinguishable from divine intentionality. Panentheistic God images allow for a dialectic between immanence and transcendence and treat intention as a challenge, possibly also an enigma, to religious meaning. These God images may be found not only in Christian tradition and the history of the church and theology; they are concretely present among people here and now: God images vary empirically (Van der Ven 1998, 171–204; 143–169). Differences in assumed or implied intentionality apply to Jesus images as well. Thus one can distinguish between a ‘descending’ and an ‘ascending’

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Christology (Schoonenberg 1991; Haight 1999). A descending christology contains Jesus images that emphasise Christ’s transcendence via the metaphysical conception of Jesus descending to earth from his supernatural state and assuming a natural form in order to accomplish his salvic work among human beings. Christ may be accepted or rejected, but human intentionality does not really play any other role. An ascending christology, by contrast, has manifestly immanent aspects. It entails Jesus images which express God’s closeness to humans in terms of salvation history rather than metaphysically, with the theological emphasis on the religious and moral choices that God presents to people in Jesus’ life, death and resurrection. Such differences in Jesus’ salvic signicance are also empirically observable and relate to social location (Van der Ven en Biemans 1994, 89–93). Finally, the Spirit represents an important meaning in liturgy. The Spirit may be seen as God’s activity or power. This divine intentionality can be experienced in God’s call, either through Jesus or otherwise, or in the experience of personal response to that call in moral behaviour or prayer, which is its religious expression. Various images of the Spirit, like those in the New Testament, display a dynamics of call and response (Dingemans 2000; Dunn 1998). That dynamics has both transcendent aspects (God’s intention) and immanent aspects (human intentions), and may be linked to experiences of ‘grace’ such as salvation, justication, affection, transformation and celebration (Schillbeeckx 1977, 436–468; Schilderman 1998, 153–167). In liturgy the foregoing images of God, Jesus and the Spirit have not only referential and regulatory meaning but also, in an empirical sense, pre-eminently performative meaning. The transcendent and immanent images vary in liturgical valence, that is to say, in their positive or negative appeal to participants’ various value orientations. Addressing this liturgical valence without striving for effect is a rhetorical skill: it relates to the art of inuencing or persuading. That implies the importance not only of the qualities of ritual ofciants (‘ars celebrandi’) and proper selection and expression of elements of ritual meaning (‘ars liturgiae’), but also of assigning signicance to the suggestibility (‘ars imaginandi’) of ritual actors.15 This raises a complex theoretical problem regarding the 15 Suggestibility here refers to openness to images rather than the truth claims of such images. Hence the debate need not be conducted in the classical terms of suggestio falsi and suppressio veri: suggestion is interpreted only in the formal sense of an idea prompting action.

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concept of imaginary actions. One facet of the problem is the relation between perception, cognition and intention. Unlike perception, which is bound up with propositions that explain the perception, imagination pertains to the possibility of adopting a perspective in which belief and perception to some extent interact freely. Liturgy is aimed at this interaction; it appeals to people’s freedom to be convinced of the religious reality it depicts through its ritual, textual and musical images. Liturgy offers a focus for drawing inductive and abductive conclusions, based on religious customs, that conrm the belief expressed in the ritual (Raposa 2004, 113–127). This rhetorical art is particularly important in rites of passage: do the religious images in the liturgy, both immanent and transcendent, acquire positive or negative valence for the value orientations that participants associate with the social occasion? From the point of view of empirical studies in liturgy this raises the basic issue of the relation between value orientations and ritual orientations, and the way in which the context of ritual actors inuences or fails to inuence that relation. Redening Passage Rites So far we have commented on the denitions of goal, form and meaning in rites of passage. In doing so we hope to have offered a revised concept of passage rites that is t to address the problems that appertain to a modern understanding of religious ritual. Do these denitions facilitate a new understanding of the institutional crisis of established liturgies? An answer to this question goes far beyond the scope of this contribution. We therefore limit ourselves to a short indication of those research questions that locate the concept of liturgy in one exemplary theory of institutional functions. What are the institutional functions of liturgy? This question is important, because we know that the church—albeit with many national and cultural variations—is undergoing a process of de-institutionalisation. Modernisation has affected the institutional form of the liturgy, in which the accepted goals, forms and meanings of rites of passage are embedded. De-institutionalisation may be regarded an institutional dysfunction. Depending on one’s choice of a theory one can indeed identify various institutional functions and dysfunctions of liturgy. By way of illustration one could cite the sociologist Parsons’s institutional theory. He describes institutional functions in terms of his so-called LIGA model, which

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distinguishes between value orientations like beliefs, values and norms (latency); social integration, which is what gives a group structure and cohesion (integration); goal development, being the programme and activities through which goals are formulated and pursued (goal-attainment); and adaptation, being the stafng, material and nancial means to realise the goals (adaptation) (Parsons 1965, 30–79). Van der Ven applied Parsons’s LIGA model to an analysis of the church, referring to liturgy as one of the ecclesiastic sectors in which these functions are realised in concrete actions (Van der Ven 1993, 81–83). By following his suggestions, we can indicate the deinstitutionalization processes that affect liturgical praxis. The declining meaning of liturgy may be described as an erosion of key functions fullled by liturgy. Liturgical latency may be regarded as the subjective and social meaning associated with ritual actions. If ritual fails to express or evoke that meaning, liturgy will deinstitutionalise. Liturgical integration refers to the cohesive force that liturgy exercises on a group, which also structures the group. If the social bond is lacking for whatever reason or if a ritual fails to forge that link, liturgy will de-institutionalise. Liturgical goal-attainment refers to the liturgical programme, that is the order of service and the various forms in which the religious meaning of the ritual is pursued, partly for the sake of its social cohesive power. If these forms do not serve that purpose, they exacerbate the dysfunction of liturgy. Finally, liturgical adaptation is important: the means to attain liturgical goals have to be created and utilised. If that does not happen, for reasons inherent in liturgy or external reasons, it undermines the institution of liturgy. Of course Parsons’ theory offers but one of many possible ways of analysing and explaining institutional functions and dysfunctions of liturgical praxis. Nevertheless, taking into account this theory raises questions of research that are crucial to understand the changing setting of passage rites. Thus, a liturgical practice should be based on actually present—though laten—values and convictions that are associated with the major events in human life, such as birth, marriage and death. In order to deal with this latency-function, liturgical valence is crucial: rites of passage may not be effective at all if they fail to address the actual values that are related to a contemporary understanding of status and the social requirements of their transition. That is especially relevant to the integration-function of liturgy. If, for instance, achievement-aspects are not taken into account in liturgical practices and solely ascription aims are implied, and furthermore, a proper mix of formal and informal requirements is not pursued, group-identication

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may well fail to be present at all. That is especially relevant to our case, since passage rites are always attended by participants who, for all their mutual differences, maintain close ties with the primary liturgical actors. Their mutual bonds have to be re-established in the very acts that liturgy invites to participate in. The religious goals of passage rites—as they are framed in the sacred imagery and gestures of liturgy—do not work simply by following ritual rules of conduct but also depend on the capacities of the participants to be welded together exactly because their latent values are being touched upon and put in a shared perspective of the new statuses into which the primary actors are being introduced. The question of adapting liturgy to its respective environment should therefore not be put in negative terms, as if it would be detrimental to its perennial signicance. Although the actual practice of harmonizing the sometimes dissimilar values and expectations of ritual participants and meeting the practical requirements of local contexts can be painstakingly difcult, it also offers a basic key for the interrelationship of the previous functions of liturgy that we mentioned. It takes seriously the evident fact that statuses have to be understood in the personal, social and cultural contexts in which they gain signicance. The ‘pivot of the sacred’ tolls through this landscape to the extent that ritual ofcials authentically and effectively reach to and raise the latent values through the community that is congregated to celebrate the new status that is to be attained. Thus there is every reason to pursue further conceptual study and empirical research into a main question of liturgical praxis: what is the relationship of the goals, forms and meanings of rites of passage on the one hand and the aforementioned institutional functions of liturgy on the other? The effort to answer this question requires both a redenition of passage rites and a keen view of the practical implications of the institutional function of liturgy. For this answer this contribution offers a rst step and an invitation to further exploration. References Bell, C. (1997). Ritual. Perspectives and Dimensions. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dingemans, G. (2000). De stem van de Roepende. Pneumatheologie. Kampen: Kok. Dunn, J. (1998). The Christ and the Spirit. Collected Essays II. Pneumatology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Dunn, W. (1994). Public Policy Analysis. An Introduction. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Durkheim, E. (1912). Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Paris: F. Alcan 1912. Vol. 2.

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Elias, N. (1969). Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und Psychogenetische Untersuchungen. II. Bern/München: Francke Verlag. Garrigan, S. (2004). Beyond Ritual. Sacramental Theology after Habermas. Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate. Gennep, A. van (1909). Les rites de passage. Ètude systématique des rites. Paris: Libraire Critique Èmile Nourry. Grimes, R. (1990). Ritual Criticism. Case Studies in its Practice, Essays on its Theory. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press. ——— (2000). Deeply into the Bone. Re-inventing Rites of Passage. Berkeley, Calif., [etc.]: University of California Press. Haight, R. (1999). Jesus, Symbol of God. Maryknoll/New York: Orbis. Linton, R. (1936). The Study of Man. An Introduction. New York: Aplleton-CenturyCrofts. Misztal, B. (2000). Informality. Social Theory and Contemporary Practice. London/New York: Routledge. Parsons, T. (1965). An Outline of the Social System. In: T. Parsons et al. (eds). Theories of Society. Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. Raposa, M. (2004). Ritual Inquiry. The Pragmatic Logic of Religious Practice. In: K. Schilbrack (Ed.). Thinking Through Rituals. Philosophical Perspectives. New York/ London: Routledge. Schillebeeckx, E. (1977). Gerechtigheid en liefde, genade en bevrijding. Bloemendaal: Nelissen. Schilderman, H. (1998). Guidelines for a Research Programme. In: T. van Knippenberg (Ed.). Between Two Languages. Spiritual Guidance and Communication of Christian Faith. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press. Schoonenberg, P. (1991). De Geest, het Woord en de Zoon. Theologische overdenkingen over Geest-christologie, Logos-christologie en Drieëenheidsleer. Kampen: Kok. Simmel, G. (1984). Grundfragen der Soziologie. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. Snoek, J. (1987). Initiations. A Methodological Approach to the Application of Classication and Denition Theory in the Study of Rituals. Pijnacker: Dutch Efciency Bureau. Ven, J. van der (1993). Ecclesiologie in context. Kampen: Kok. ——— (1998). God Reinvented? A Theological Search in Texts and Tables. Leiden: Brill. Ven, J. van der; Biemans, B. (1994). Religie in fragmenten. Een onderzoek onder studenten. Kampen: Kok. Weber, M. (1919). Wissenschaft als Beruf. München und Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. ——— (1976). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Tübingen: J. Mohr (Paul Siebeck Verlag).

RELIGIOUS PRAXIS—DE-INSTITUTIONALIZED. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS Heinz Streib The word ‘deinstitutionalized religion’ does not produce a high number of references in literature data bases; it does not seem to be frequently used in scientic research on religion. I have not explicitly used it as analytic category before in my research and writing. But there are quite a number of other terms by which colleagues and myself have addressed the phenomena under consideration: ‘un-churched religion’ (Perry, Davis, Doyle, & Dyble 1980; Fuller 2002), ‘vagabond religion’, I have coined the metaphoric term ‘off-road-religion’ (Streib 1999); with a somewhat heavier interpretative load, the phenomena are also addressed by the term ‘invisible religion’ (Luckmann 1967); also, terms such as ‘lived religion’ (Ammerman 1997; Grözinger & Lott 1997; Hall 1997; Heimbrock 1998; Orsi 1997) or ‘everyday religion’ (Bukow 1984; Streib 1998a) are considered to include forms of religiosity which have no obvious roots in established religions. And nally, with the pretension to gain inclusiveness and accuracy, the term ‘spirituality’ has experienced some popularity, especially among psychologist (Emmons 1999; 2000; Pargament & Mahoney 2002; Piedmont 1999; Zinnbauer, Pargament, & Scott 1999). This brief semantic problem description indicates that there is some need for clarication. I will do this by testing the term ‘deinstitutionalization’. I want to approach this task by . . . 1. looking at some statistical evidence for deinstitutionalization of religion; and 2. reecting on the signicance of ‘deinstitutionalization’ as concept for understanding the phenomena, but interpreting this term with a typology of religious organizations and with help of a conceptualization of ‘deconversion’ in order to arrive at a more conclusive understanding. 3. Then, attention is focussing on the question what kind of religion is left after the deinstitutionalizing processes and how we best describe ‘de-institutionalized religion’. 4. Finally I ask how we should proceed further in investigating deinstitutionalized religion.

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Thus I seriously consider ‘deinstitutionalized religion’ as candidate for naming the phenomena under consideration. Statistical Evidence for Changes in the Religious Landscape with Special Attention to Deinstitutionalization Deinstitutionalization describes a change, a transformation. Modernization has been the most prominent paradigm to interpret the changes which have inuenced the religious domain. As one of the major effects of the modernization processes, it has been argued—and has become almost consensus among sociologists of religion—that religion has undergone a very fundamental transformation: from religion as fate to religions as choice. And people increasingly appear not only to join the religious organization of their choice, but also leave. The Drift from Religious Institutions Worldwide We do not have good enough data which is comprehensive and detailed enough to document the deinstitutionalization of religion in every detail. We are far from being able to draw a map of religious institutions, organizations and milieus and keeping track of religious migrations. But we have at least some data. In Table 1 and Table 2, I present results from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 1991; ISSP 1998) which indicate the drift from organized religion cross-culturally. The percentage of respondents who have answered the questions “In which religion have you been raised?” and “What is your current religion?” with “None” differ greatly from country to country. The enormous differences in Great Britain and the Netherlands may be due to a much more open wording of the question (“Do you consider yourself to belong to a particular religious group or church?”), but the differences also display a different religious climate. To escape the criticism of comparing inconsistent data, however, I reduce my selection to countries in which the questions were asked with more consistency. The difference between the two answers may lead us the way to quantify the numbers of leave-takers. We have calculated the subjects who responded “None” to the question for current religious afliation, but say they were raised in a specic religion. The result is the life-span disafliation rate.

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religious praxis—de-institutionalized Table 1. Raised without religion/Today without religious afliation

U.S.A. New Zealand Great Britain Ireland Italy Austria Netherlands Germany-West Germany-East Russia

Raised without religion (1991)

Today without religious afliation (1991)

Raised without religion (1998)

Today without religious afliation (1998)

3,5% 11,7% 5,6% 0,0% 0,4% 2,7% 22,0% 5,5% 41,9% 88,5%

6,7% 30,2% 32,8% 1,7% 6,1% 10,1% 55,4% 10,6% 64,3% 68,2%

5,2% 15,8% 10,3% 0,1% 1,5% 3,5% 23,7% 7,4% 52,7% 85,1%

13,8% 29,1% 45,8% 5,6% 7,6% 11,8% 58,1% 15,3% 68,7% 35,3%

Table 2. Life-span disafliation rates and secular continuity rates in cross-cultural comparison Today without religions afliation, but raised in a religion (life-span disafliation rate) 1991 U.S.A. Italy Austria Germany-W. Germany-East

5,4% 5,8% 8,7% 7,8% 24,6%

Today without religious afliation and raised without religion 1991

Today without religions afliation, but raised in a religion (life-span disafliation rate) 1998

Today without religious afliation and raised without religion 1998

1,3% 0,3% 1,4% 2,8% 39,7%

10,9% 6,9% 10,1% 10,5% 18,3%

2,9% 0,7% 1,7% 4,8% 50,4%

While we see a somewhat lower rate in Italy, we have about 10% of disafliates in the U.S.A., Austria and West-Germany. We can take these gures as indication for a deinstitutionalization process in the religious eld. The results for the East-Germany are exceptional; but they are less surprising, when we take into account that they include all subjects who have left the church under the former East-German regime—and also interesting: the disafliation rate has dropped within two years,

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perhaps due to East-West migration, but perhaps also due to other changes in the religious landscape. But taken together, the very large number of East-Germans who are alienated from organized religion, whether they grew up in secular milieus or disafliated themselves from the churches, is indeed troublesome in respect to the future of religion in East-Germany. Growth of Secular Milieus—Observations in Germany East and West The exit rates from the two main religious institutions in Germany, the Protestant and the Roman-Catholic Churches, have risen from 1945 to the turn of the century up to an average of about 0,7% or 0,8%. Thus every year adds to the number of people without religious afliation. Even though we do not know exactly where church-leavers are going, we see no equivalent growth of other churches or religious organizations in Germany. It is especially the analysis and conclusion of Pollack (1996; Pollack & Pickel 2003; cf. also Pollack & Hartmann 1998; Pollack & Pickel 1999) that new religious groups are by far too small in number and not growing fast enough as to account for this disafliation process from the main-line churches in Germany. For a more detailed account on Germany, we can refer to the data from the Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS 1980–2000; ALLBUS 2002) on current and former religious afliation and a-religious upbringing to visualize the continuously growing deinstitutionalization of religion in two decades (see Table 3). From the perspective of church and theology, the problem of course is not only the growing disafliation rates in the West, but also the high number of secular families, especially in East Germany, from which we hardly can expect to nurture institutionalized religion. Table 3. Drift from the churches in Germany East and West Have you been previously a member of a religious organization? 1982-W 1992-W 1992-E 2000-W 2000-E

2002-W 2002-E

Previously member: Yes

6,6%

9,3%

33,1%

9,3%

24,1%

10,6%

21,4%

Previously member: No Presently member

1,1%

3,1%

33,3%

3,5%

46,9%

4,5%

41,5%

92,3%

87,6%

33,6%

87,2%

29,0%

84,9%

37,1%

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Self-assessment of being religious on a 10 point Likert-Scale obviously conrms the extraordinary difference between East and West Germany. But when we pay attention to the tendencies over two decades, we can see relative stability in West Germany—with a slight upward movement between 2000 and 2002; and we see an even smaller gain in East Germany. This may raise doubts whether indeed we have a progressing secularization process in Germany. We get a different picture if we ask people for their self-assessment of being religious, instead of asking for their institutional afliation. Leave-taking from the Churches in U.S.A. Concluding this portrait of changes in the religious landscape, I would like to move briey to the situation in the U.S.A. to highlight another aspect of deinstitutionalization of religion. What insights can we gain from research on religion there? Religious switching is probably most popular in the U.S.A. As the research shows (Hadaway & Marler 1993; Loveland 2003; Sherkat 2001; Sherkat & Wilson 1995), there are many different reasons for switching behavior; but research documents a total of 37,5% U.S. Americans who say in 1988 that they have had a different religion before their current afliation. A question has been included in the General Social Survey (GSS 1972–2002) in 1988 (but unfortunately has not been repeated in the following years) which may shed some light on repeated deconversion. Out of 37,5% who say that they have had another religious afliation before, 23,8% speak of one previous religion, but 9,1% report two and 2,2% even three previous religious afliations. This not only reects the afuent religious market in the U.S.A., but also the individual inclination to make a new choice and commitment. Where did this freedom of choice lead? How did it change the religious landscape? The extent to which it did promote the deinstitutionalization of religion, can be seen from the growth and decline of churches over the decades. If we follow the data collected by the Hartford Institute for Religion Research (Dudley & Roozen 2001), moderate Protestantism has declined in the last century from 30% to 7%; Liberal Protestant churches have a similar decline; and also the Catholic and Orthodox churches. The growth is mainly on the part of Evangelical churches and on non-Christian religious communities. We may take this as indication of the deinstitutionalization of religion within the landscape of religious organizations in the U.S.A. Thus it may be

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the case that the U.S.A. has a clear process of deinstitutionalization of religion—which in this case means the decline of institutionalized religion, but at the same time an enormous growth of churches and religious organizations which do not meet and do not desire the status of an institution. To sum up this rst part: What I have presented so far is some selected statistical evidence for, and preliminary attempts to quantify, the disafliation processes in selected countries. They speak—this is my interpretation—to the question of deinstitutionalization of religion on a cross-cultural scale, indicate the disafliation rates, but also the direction in which this processes may be going. Research on religion in cross-cultural comparison is not strong: Even though some authors, e.g. Greeley (1989; 2003), Zulehner and Denz (1993) or Höllinger (1996), analyze data from both sides of the Atlantic ocean and compare Europe and the U.S.A., they use mostly the same survey results—and these results lack in consistency and in precision and depth by which religion in the various countries has been investigated. Thus they are insufcient for a solid and detailed portrait, e.g. for mapping religious migration. They also have blind spots, because deinstitutionalization may involve more than afliation with, or disafliation from, a religious organization in terms of membership. This may become more obvious when we now ask how we could conceptualize deinstitutionalization of religion. Deinstitutionalization as Concept for Interpreting the Changes in Contemporary Religion The understanding of ‘deinstitutionalization’ rests on the understanding of ‘institution’. But what is an institution? While we do not have a precise and consensual denition (cf. Berger & Heintel 2001), certain features are expected from an institution: societal stability, social obligation, authority, legitimacy. An institution, in a process perspective, integrates the individual and his or her biography into a societal system of values and rules. From a conict perspective, an institution provides answers and obligatory solutions to irresolvable conicts and contingencies (Schülein 1987). Applied to the social reality of religion and combining these features, I understand ‘religious institution’ as a highly stabile, obligatory, authoritative and legitimate religious organization which integrates the individual biography in a system of beliefs, values and rules which are answers to specic religion-generating conicts and contingencies.

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Against the background that institutions own self-referential and unquestioned authority, sociologists have afrmed the decay of the power of institutions: with the “invention of the political” (Beck 1993a), the “super-ego of the institutions resolves itself into decision” (Beck 1993b, 26). For the individual biography, this means, on the one hand, that it is detached from prescribed xations, and open, dependent on decision-making, a task of the individual (Beck 1992, 216); on the other hand, the individual is at risk, due especially to the ambivalent inuence of the media, of becoming the “plaything of fashions, circumstances, trends and markets” (1992, 211). Going one step further, Kohli (1988) even claims that we have come into the situation that individuality, or the search for individuality, has taken the place of the institutions; norm-biography has been replaced by individuality; according to Kohli, there is a tendency toward the deinstitutionalization of biography, a “coercion to subjective conduction of one’s life” (44). Somewhat more cautiously and with reference to her empirical research, Wohlrab-Sahr (1992; 1993) reminds us that the more or less hidden inuence of an institutionalization of biography has not come to an end—which may become visible also in the withdrawal of individuals from taking a teleological perspective at all. But these authors give us strong notions of the deinstitutionalization processes. Deinstitutionalization—A Concept Arrives in the Sociology of Religion Besides its use in other elds,1 deinstitutionalization has become also a term used by sociologists of religion—at least in the discussion in Germany (Ebertz 1993; Tyrell 1993; Feige 1994; Pollack et al. 2003). While the term itself is not used very frequently, the discussion about the declining inuence of religious institutions has become lively in the last decades. Berger’s (1967) Sacred Canopy and Luckmann’s (1963) Das Problem der Religion in der modernen Gesellschaft—which later became The Invisible Religion (1967)—have inuenced the discussion. Both however are among many critics of the secularization hypothesis in the sense of the simple expectation that religion will decline and eventually evaporate 1 ‘Deinstitutionalization’ of course—and I mention this in passing, but with an ironic side-glance to its implication for religious institutions—has become a frequently used term in a specic debate: the discussion about the de-hospitalization of the mentally ill (cf. e.g. Forster 2000; Fakhoury & Priebe 2002; Krieg 2003). In this eld, ‘deinstitutionalization’ has the connotation of hope that de-institutionalized people may nd a better home in communities and neighborhoods and are better cared for by community service than inside their institutions—an assumption that is discussed controversially.

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together with the declining plausibility and legitimacy of religious institutions. It is Luckmann’s thesis that despite the fact that people in modern societies may differ in their lifestyle from other cultures, the fundamental religious constitution of their life has not been lost. . . . The fundamental social and cultural transformations did not change anything at the constitutive religious nature of human life.2

But religion has changed with the loss of the monopoly of the churches to present, communicate and mediate the ‘sacred universa’ and with the rise of competition in the religious market. Berger (1979) claims that no one in our age can escape the “heretical imperative.” With the Greek verb ‘hairein’, Berger does not want to invoke the judgmental or even condemnatory connotation which this word has assumed in part of church history, but wants to specify, alluding to the original Greek meaning, that everyone has the obligation to make a choice. Imperative heresy may perhaps sound rather radical, but it resembles the analysis of Beck and Kohli about the deinstitutionalization of biography and the “coercion to subjective conduction of one’s life.” One could assume that, after these processes of deinstitutionalization of religion, there is no room for religious institutions at all and that individual religion can only exist deinstitutionalized. This would be an overstatement, as we see in Berger’s work itself. His analysis, while certainly reckoning with the end of monopolized institutionalized religion, suggests that religion will differentiate itself—and thus reect the differentiation process in society. Instead of one form of religion, Berger expects three options: (1) the option of an orthodox deduction which is the escape into neo-orthodoxy or neo-traditionalism; (2) a modernizing reduction which Berger sees in the contemporary theological ‘irt’ with modernity and bargaining away any mythology; and (3) the option of experiential induction which takes human experience as the starting point for religion as Berger sees this represented in liberal theological thought. These three options are not only the sociologist’s contribution to the theological debate thirty years ago, it is also the attempt to specify

2 “So sehr sich aber die Menschen in den modernen Gesellschaften in der Lebensart von anderen Kulturen unterscheiden mögen, die grundlegend religiöse Verfassung ihres Lebens ist nicht verloren gegangen. . . . Die grundlegenden sozialen und kulturellen Wandlungen änderten nichts an der konstitutiv religiösen Natur des menschlichen Lebens.” (Luckmann 1991: 164)

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the coordinates of a map of organized religion—which Berger seems to understand as being transformed by deinstitutionalization. This portrait by Berger is helpful, but needs precision and clarication. I will suggest this by drawing attention to a typology of religious organizations which has recently been introduced by Bromley. First Interpretation and Differentiation: Bromley’s Typology Bromley (1998) has proposed a typology of religious organizations which distinguishes between three types of religious organizations according to their tension to the societal environment.3 Bromley’s basic category is legitimacy. Thus he distinguishes religious organizations according to the degree of legitimacy which they attain in relation to society. Also Bromley identies the roles of people who have left a religious organization as a function of the social location of the religious organization. Table 4. Bromley’s typology of religious organizations and exit role Type of religious organization

Type of exit role

Allegiant organizations – high legitimacy; – interest coincidence with surrounding organizations

Defector – presents no serious challenge to the organization; – negotiates exit with authorities; – has a sense of personal failure; – is likely to reafrm the organization’s values and goals

Contestant organizations – medium legitimacy – competitive tension with surrounding

Whistleblower – forms an alliance with external regulatory unit – offers personal testimony about practices in the organization which is then used against it

Subversive organizations – low legitimacy; – high tension with society

Apostate – presents serious challenge to the organization, e.g. through – captivity narratives; and/or – alliance with oppositional coalition

3 In the analysis of new religious movements, Bainbridge (1997) distinguishes between ‘high-tension’ and ‘low-tension’ groups.

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What can we draw from Bromley’s typology? His typology clearly assumes that institutionalized religion does not exist any more in its pure and monopolistic form, but has fallen apart into a variety of organizations. Bromley cautiously speaks about religious organizations, rather than of religious institutions. This is obvious and even necessary in talking about the subversive, new religious type of religious groups; because of their regional and quantitative marginality, they cannot be addressed by the term ‘institution’. This is plausible also for the contestant type of religious groups, since, by denition, they do not earn nor aspire the high degree of legitimacy and societal validity. It is more difcult with Bromley’s allegiant type of organizations: Are there religious organizations in the U.S.A. which are institutions in the full sense? If we use the term ‘institution’ here, then with the qualication, that they have only regional authority. From this perspective, we also get a grasp on the differences between the U.S.A. and Europe. Perhaps we do not nd institutionalized religion in the proper sense in the U.S.A. at all, but at most a number of institutions with regional authority. So Bromley may be correct that, especially when focusing on the U.S.A., the most we have is a variety of allegiant religious organizations with a very high degree of legitimacy. This is still different for Europe where, in many countries, we have only one or two religious institutions—which, of course, had to adapt to the societies. ‘Deinstitutionalization of religion’ can however be specied in light of Bromley’s types. His typology suggests that we have to take into account a variety of organizational forms as effect of the deinstitutionalization process. Second Interpretation and Differentiation: Deconversion A second differentiation needs to be introduced: Berger’s three options appear rather inconsiderate of the more strongly self-willed processes such as “leave-me-alone”-disafliation on the one end, and the spiritual patchworkers on the other end of the religious spectrum, which I have called the ‘accumulative heretics’ (Streib 1998b; 1999; 2000; 2002). The same is true for Bromley’s types. Because he focuses on institutional afliation and disafliation, exit, for him, means leave-taking; and in his description of exit roles, Bromley does not pay attention to, but rather ignores, the religious beliefs or practices of the leave-taker.4 Also, 4 For defectors, as in the case of nuns and priests who have left their communities, he explicitly acknowledges that these defectors remained devout Catholics. Whistle-

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because he has in mind a specic image of religious ‘organization’ with rather clear boundaries, leadership structure, and membership status, Bromley does not account for religious groups, milieus and scenes in which these characteristics are less strongly developed or even absent. Thus, similarly to the necessary changes in sociology to include the analysis of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization of biography, I see the need for further differentiation which pays special attention to the individual’s faith and belief, ritual practice and value system—to religious praxis. This is the special focus of our International Study of Deconversion project.5 Thus, I suggest to interpret the concept of deinstitutionalization with the concept of deconversion. In order to elaborate a working denition of ‘deconversion’, we (Streib & Keller 2004) suggest to take Barbour’s (1994) criteria for deconversion6 as a start, reect and improve them in light of Glock’s (1962; 1966) ve dimensions and arrive at the following list of criteria. Deconversion consists in: 1. Loss of specic religious experiences (Experiential Dimension); this means the loss of nding meaning and purpose in life; the loss of the experience of God; of trust and of fear; 2. Intellectual doubt, denial or disagreement with specic beliefs (Ideological Dimension); thus heresy (sensu Berger) is an element of deconversion; 3. Moral criticism (Ritualistic Dimension) which means a rejection of specic prescriptions and/or the application of a new level of moral judgment; 4. Emotional suffering (Consequential Dimension); this can consist in a loss of embeddedness, of social support or of a sense of stability and safety; 5. Disafliation from the community which can consist in a retreat from participation in meetings or from observance of religious practices; nally, the termination of membership which eventually follows. blowers are regarded to have, at least at rst, no intention of exiting the organization. In the strict sense, Bromley does not speak about deconverts, his types are not types of deconversion. 5 See our web site at http://wwwhomes.uni-bielefeld.de/religionsforschung for results and publications. 6 Barbour (1994, 2) distinguishes four characteristics: (1) Intellectual Doubt or Denial in regard to the truth of a system of beliefs, (2) Moral Criticism: rejection of the entire way of life of a religious group, (3) Emotional Suffering: grief, guilt, loneliness, despair, and (4) Disafliation from the community.

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These characteristics of deconversion can be used to structure empirical research and as criteria of what characterizes biographical accounts as deconversion stories. Certainly, these criteria have been developed for use in the analysis of deconversion trajectories from any type of religious groups or organization. But they hold true also for withdrawals from religious institutions. Thus, these criteria of deconversion can be used to highlight and determine the deinstitutionalization of religious biography. Empirical Research on Deconversion and Deinstitutionalization Processes of Religion For empirical investigation of deinstitutionalization of religion, it is inspiring to evaluate what has been completed so far in the research on deconversion. Of course, deinstitutionalization and deconversion are not simply identical, but rstly, as I have tried to make the case above, the two have a solid area of intersection, and secondly, the qualitatively oriented research designs may inspire and improve research on deinstitutionalization. Therefore, I briey refer to selected studies of deconversion. The empirical study of deconversion has emerged as part of the scientic study of new religious movements. The 1980s have been a relatively productive decade, as the studies of Skonovd (1981), Levine (1984), Jacobs (1987; 1989), and Wright (1987) demonstrate. These studies have the merit of bringing to light some of the dynamics of deconversion from new religions which have been viewed with special concern in public discussion, in the courts, and in politics of the time. The results of these research projects are not perfect.7 Some of their decits are overcome in more recent research. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1997) have studied religious socialization of more than 4.000 college students and have identied, in this large sample, 24 “amazing believers”, subjects who come from non- or anti-religious backgrounds and nd faith, and 46 “amazing apostates” who come from religious backgrounds and “convert” to atheism or

7 We need, in respect to present-day desiderata for research in deconversion, to point to some short-comings: Deconversion is studied as a turning point phenomenon involving crisis and conict; efforts to conceptualize deconversion or linking this concept to the discussion on conversion are rather scarce. We do not see an integrative effort to situate deconversion in theories of faith or religious development. Deconversion is predominantly linked to adolescence and young adulthood, while data on the second half of life are restricted to rare cases.

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agnosticism. According to Hunsberger (2000), the process of becoming an amazing apostate is “strongly intellectual and rational, and seems to result from a slow, careful search for meaning and purpose”, resulting in “a dramatic transformation of self in ‘becoming one’s own person’ ” (245f). The picture that Hunsberger draws is one of hard-won freedom, independence and personal identity and self-condence—and of tolerance, since amazing apostates, in sharp contrast to the amazing believers, refrain from proselytizing. The “amazing apostates” have deconverted in a rather gradual process (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1997, 232). The process of deconversion can be characterized here as individuative-reective gain over a period of socialization in and before the college years. Richter and Francis (1998) have explored the reasons for leaving mainline churches in Great Britain. They started by interviewing 27 church leavers who were mainly recruited by clergy, and followed with a questionnaire survey with more than 400 church leavers located through an extensive telephone screening. Richter and Francis found that many church leavers claim to believe in and experience God without belonging to a church, “their spiritual quest persists” (p. 38). Richter’s and Francis’ discussion of inuences leading to the decision to leave church is structured partially along familiar lines: social change, change of values, critical life events, childhood socialization. But they also attempt to account for changes in faith development. The authors address the question of t between stage of faith of church goers and the ‘modal level’ of their churches and, consequently, of their possible common growth and mutual advancement. Jamieson (1998; 2002) is the rst to study deconversion predominantly in association with faith development. His study includes interviews with 98 church leavers (and 54 interviews with church leaders) of evangelical Pentecostal and charismatic churches in New Zealand. Jamieson has outlined a typology of leavers from Episcopalian Pentecostal churches which he aligns to Fowler’s model of faith development. These people, while leaving the same type of religious group which Jamieson identies as being on Fowler’s Stage Three of Synthetic-Conventional Faith, move in different directions, which also differ in terms of stages of faith. This illustrates the need to look at the interactions of social context and individual motives and biographical trajectories involved in leaving religious groups. These questions also concern mainline traditions. The Enquete Commission of the 13th German Parliament on “Socalled sects and psycho-groups” has invited biographical research on

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members and ex-members of Christian-fundamentalist groups.8 Of the 22 interviews conducted, 12 were selected for analysis according to the rule of maximal contrast. In our analysis, we did not nd (what some in the Enquete Commission had expected us to nd) a typical ‘sect biography’, neither of converts, nor of deconverts. What we found was a variety of biographical trajectories. Important in regard to our theme of deconversion is our observation that the attraction toward fundamentalist afliation is due to ‘themata’ which derive from earlier experiences and belong to a biographically older layer of the person. Not only the afnity towards the group, and thus the stability of membership, appears to be the effect of a ‘t’ or resonance between the themata of the convert and the mental, ritual and moral setting of the fundamentalist group, but also deconversion nds an explanation: If such a ‘t’ does not emerge or declines for whatever reason, disafliation is the most likely consequence. Contrastive comparison of the cases allowed us to locate them in a typology. Three types of fundamentalist biographies or ‘careers’ could be identied: (a) a ‘type governed by tradition’ who, innocent of alternatives, has been born into or grown into a fundamentalist orientation; (b) the ‘mono-convert’, who converts as it were once in life-time into a religious orientation which he or she did not have before, and (c) the ‘accumulative heretic’ whose biography is a tour through different religious orientations and who represents a new type of religious socialization. Finally, a developmental perspective has been applied and we found developmental transformation and progress during membership and precipitating disafliation especially in the accumulative heretics, while tradition-guided deconverts and mono-convert type deconverts engage in developmental transformation only after their disafliation. Based on this research for the Enquete Commission, we have expanded research on deconversion on a crosscultural scale: The International Study on Deconversion project compares deconversion trajectories in Germany and the U.S.A. We can conclude that empirical research on deconversion has made some progress, since it has opened the eld of research to include a broader spectrum of religious orientations and organizations and has

8 Results have been published in the Final Report of the Enquete Commission (Streib, 1998c) and as a separate research report (Streib 1998b; 2000); a brief summary is included in an article (Streib 1999), and a summary report is published on the internet (Streib 2002).

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made attempts to include a developmental perspective in the analysis. However, decits remain to be resolved, one of them is that the concepts used and the methodological designs across the studies are not consistent and make comparison of the results difcult. But I hope that it has become visible how research on deconversion can contribute to and encourage the research on deinstitutionalization. The Variety of Directions of Deinstitutionalization of Religion Bromley’s typology and also research on deconversion suggest that we have to take into account a variety of deinstitutionalization avenues and directions. I present a list of several possibilities. The starting point are religious organizations, and, for our purpose, allegiant organizations and religious institutions in particular. Besides religious switching that does not fall in the category of deinstitutionalization, deinstitutionalization may include one or more of the following developments or actions: 1. Secularizing exit: Abandonment of (concern with) religious belief systems (secularization) 2. Change to higher tension: Adopting a different belief system of, or engaging in different ritual praxis in, or afliation with, a highertension, more subversive religious organization (conversion, e.g. in fundamentalist or new religious group) 3. Change to lower tension: Adopting a different belief system of, or engaging in different ritual praxis in, or afliation with, a less institutionalized, e.g. a contestant religious organization 4. Privatizing defection: Deinstitutionalization as termination of membership or participation, but continuity of deinstitutionalized private religious belief and private religious praxis 5. Heretical defection: Individual heretical and possibly accumulative appropriation of new belief system(s) or engagement in different religious praxis—for which subjects use words like ‘spiritual’ and ‘inter-religious’ orientation. Of course, there are, below and long before ofcial defection, ‘silent’ changes which we may call ‘internal deinstitutionalization’, a tacit-centrifugal momentum which makes the variety of deinstitutionalization avenues even more diverse. Also, I want to mention at least that I include—and suggest to incorporate this in the empirical investigation—a perspective of faith development. Deinstitutionalization trajectories and deconversion trajectories are biographical movements which

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we may be able to describe also in terms of stage or style transitions. Of course, we have to reckon with the possibility that there is no stage or style transformation associated with deconversion or deinstitutionalization. But in many of our cases, we see a movement from one stage or style to another.9 Results from our study of deconversion indicate that deconverts score higher on the faith development scale compared to the members of their religious communities from which they have disafliated. Concluding Theses I conclude my approach to the concept of ‘deinstitutionalization’ with the following theses: 1. The concept of ‘deinstitutionalization’ is necessary for understanding religion in contemporary culture, the more the taken-forgranted authority, legitimacy, obligation and stability of religious institutions declines and religious orientation follows the heretical imperative; 2. The concept of ‘deinstitutionalization’ is a promising candidate for a plausible description of the processes of departure from religious organizations and the loss which contemporary religion suffers in the public domain. It has the potential of contributing to a consensus, since it rests on a clear and easy sociological perspective, but is open for considering an open variety of causes and effects. The candidate however is not perfect and needs clarication; 3. The concept of ‘deinstitutionalization’ would be insufcient for fully understanding religion and religious disafliation in contemporary culture, if it exclusively focused on organizational afliation and rather demonstrative departures; it needs expansion to include the biographical dimension and attention to the individual’s faith, its diversity of forms and its dynamics of change. Deinstitutionalization thus has to be interpreted by deconversion.

9 However, I do not have theoretical reservation and, less so, empirical prejudice against transformations which disappoint strict structural-developmental expectations, developmental transformations which display “downward” movements or “regressions” such as we see in in fundamentalist revivals.

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Deinstitutionalized Religion—Toward a Conceptualization So far, I have paid attention mainly to the process of deinstitutionalization of religion and have left aside the question of the result of this process. Now it is time to take up this question and discuss the question of what is left after the process of ‘deinstitutionalizing of religion’? What kind of religious praxis can we expect? What is left after the ‘Deinstitutionalization of Religion’? One can deduce from Luckmann’s analysis that, after the process of deinstitutionalization, religion is transformed into ‘invisible religion’. Invisibility means not less, but also not much more than the loss of institutional visibility—or, as we can say, publicly explicit obligation, legitimacy and authority. Luckmann’s claim, however, that religion does not disappear, but only becomes invisible, has not gone unquestioned and has provoked contradiction. Thereby, Luckmann’s invisible religion sometimes gets confused with alternative religion, new religion or even superstition. Pollack and Pickel (2003) for example have correctly observed in their re-analysis and own investigation on religious migration in Germany that the net loss of church members is by far larger than the growth of new religious groups and also greater than the rise of what they understand as alternative religious beliefs and practices. From this, Pollack and Pickel conclude that the secularizing defection is greater than the rise of unchurched alternative and new religion. It is then Pollack’s and Pickel’s nal conclusion that Luckmann’s assumption does not withstand empirical scrutiny. While there can be no doubt that the disafliation rate from the churches does by far exceed the rise of new religious groups, and while it cannot be ignored that a portion of disafliates chose to quit concern with any religion, Pollack’s and Pickel’s instruments for analyzing ‘invisible’ religion are inadequate. It requires more to measure ‘invisible religion’ than including, in a questionnaire, some items which ask for the practice of yoga and meditation, for belief in magic, astrology and reincarnation and for new age values. The range and depth of Luckmann’s concept of invisible religion is more comprehensive: It includes not only private beliefs, values and rituals, but also ‘invisible’ equivalents of religion. No doubt, here we enter a complex eld; and the more individuals take the deinstitutionalizing avenue, the more variants of ‘deinstitutionalized

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religion’ may emerge. We would need to search for a more intelligent way to assess deinstitutionalized and invisible religion. And there is a rather recent avenue in the scientic research on religion which deserves attention: the research on “spirituality”. Research on Spirituality and Spiritual Quest It is perhaps one of the most interesting advancements in the scientic study of religion of the last years to include items for spiritual selfassessment in research instruments. Marler and Hadaway (2002) report results from various studies in the U.S.A. on the spirituality/religion question. Comparing the results of previous studies (Marler & Hadaway 2002; Roof 1999; Scott 2001; Zinnbauer et al. 1997), we see an overall correspondence: Besides a majority of about 2/3 who say they are both religious and spiritual, we see segments of almost 20% who say “I am spiritual but not religious.” In a study in 2001, we have collected data on young adults simultaneously in Germany and the U.S.A. (Streib 2005).10 Results show 20,7% of German and 31,3% adolescents in the U.S.A. who identify themselves as being “more spiritual than religious.” Comparing the U.S.-American and German adolescents, it stands out that almost one third of the German adolescents describe themselves as “neither spiritual nor religious”, and the number of subjects who describe themselves as “more religious than spiritual” is 29,8% in the German sample—twice as large as in the U.S. sample. Thus, the percentage of self-identied more spiritual adolescents in the U.S.-American sample is signicantly higher than in the German sample. I add an interesting detail from the result of our study on deconversion which also allows the comparison of deconverts from new religious fundamentalist groups (NRM) and members of those groups: While the majority of NRM members regard themselves as “more religious than spiritual” and at the same time appear relatively cautious toward

10 The sample consisted of 202 German university students who had just taken up studies; the U.S. sample consisted of 295 freshmen. The questionnaire included 158 questions: some demographic questions, the ve personality factors (Big Five, IPIP), the Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992), the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer 1996). In the demographic section, we asked our subjects to mark one of the following statements: “I am more religious than spiritual”, “I am more spiritual than religious”, “I am equally religious and spiritual” and “I am neither religious nor spiritual.”

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the self-assessment of being spiritual, over 40% of the deconverts identify themselves as being “more spiritual than religious.” We may interpret this as signicant development of spiritual quest in deconverts from NRMs. Of course, the question remains what the research participants really mean when they identify themselves as being ‘spiritual’ rather than religious. The meaning of the word ‘spirituality’ is rather fuzzy, and it may signify something different in the U.S.A than ‘spirituell’ in German usage. But, taken together, research results on spiritual selfassessment pose the question of whether self-declared ‘spiritual’ subjects have been invisible to research so far, since they have asked only for the self-assessment of ‘being religious’. Looking back on the statistical research, the type of ‘spiritual seeker’ who describes him- or herself as ‘more spiritual than religious’ could be identied, but this would suggest to sharpen our research instruments. Changes in the Religious Landscape Support for the assumption that deinstitutionalized religion has gained ground and may have changed the religious landscape comes from empirical research. Beaudoin’s (1998) study and Roof ’s (1993; 1999) research suggest ‘spiritual quest’ as label for changes in the religious landscape in the U.S.A. which can be focused on the baby boomer generation or the cohort called Generation X. Roof presents results from a very large number of interviews, partially in longitudinal research. And he suggests that the boundaries of popular religious communities are now being redrawn, encouraged by the quest of the large, post-World War II generations, and facilitated by the rise of an expanded spiritual marketplace (1999, 10).11

11 His characterization of the new situation reads as follows: “A great variety of terms now in vogue signal such a shift in the center of religious energy: inwardness, subjectivity, the experiential, the expressive, the spiritual. Inherited forms of religion persist and still inuence people but, as Marty says, ‘the individual seeker and chooser has come increasingly to be in control.’ Nowhere is this greater emphasis upon the seeker more apparent, than in the large chain bookstore: the old ‘religion’ section is gone and in its place is a growing set of more specic rubrics catering to popular topics such as angels, Susm, journey, recovery, meditation, magic, inspiration, Judaica, astrology, gurus, Bible, prophecy, Evangelicalism, Mary, Buddhism, Catholicism, esoterica, and the like. Words like soul, sacred, and spiritual resonate to a curious public. The discourse on spiritual ‘journeys’ and ‘growth’ is now a province not just of theologians

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Roof ’s new map of the religious landscape includes several subcultures: Dogmatists, Mainstream Believers, and Born-again Christians, but also Metaphysical Believers/Spiritual Seekers and Secularists. But interestingly, Roof explicitly distinguishes the different types of religious orientations along the axes of ‘religious identity’ and ‘spiritual identity’.12 Beaudoin aims at a ‘thick description’ of the type of spiritual seeker. He does not present a single statistic, but provides an excellent characterization of Generation X’s spiritual quest. He (1998, 36) maintains that ambiguity is central to the faith of Generation X, “Xers make great heretics” (121).13 However, in the midst of such heretical adventure, Beaudoin identies a search for a unique spirituality, a ‘spiritual quest’ which is nevertheless characterized by irreverence and bricolage.14 With the focus of their research, Roof and Beaudoin have put forth an interesting thesis for discussion, a question which we may need to investigate further in the framework of deinstitutionalized religion: Is it especially the generations of baby boomers and the Generation X in which greater numbers of adolescents and young adults have departed from the religious ways of their parents and transformed their religious orientation and practice? It can be hypothesized that the irreverence and bricolage model has inuenced ways of dealing with religion and spirituality in the wider society in the U.S.A. and in Europe.

and journalists, but of ordinary people in cafes, coffee bars, and bookstores across the country.” (Roof 1999: 7) 12 Spirituality, Roof says (1993, 64) in way of a denition, “gives expression to the being that is in us; it has to do with feelings, with the power that comes from within, with knowing our deepest selves and what is sacred to us”. 13 “When Madonna—and Xers—practice their religiosity with sacramentals, from prayer cards and holy water to ripped jeans, piercings, crucixes, and dark makeup, they challenge the authority of the ofcial sacraments and the institution that ‘dispenses’ them. They threaten to displace the center with the margins. This is just the beginning of a larger blurring of what is considered orthodox with what was considered heterodox, or heretical.” (Beaudoin 1998, 122) 14 “A central dynamic and challenge emerging for Generation X is that of ‘bricolating’ their own spirituality and carrying forward religious traditions. Bricolage means making do with the materials at hand to solve particular (in this case religious) problems and questions. This term describes the way GenX pop culture brings together diverse religious symbols and images, forever recombining and forming new spiritualities. GenX pop culture does not respect the boundaries of tradition or religious dogma. At the same time that such bricolating and reassembling become even more widespread in GenX pop culture, Xers are challenged to renew their own spiritualities and those of their religious traditions by giving the concept of tradition itself a fresh look.” (Beaudoin 1998, 178)

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Contours of a Conceptualization of ‘Deinstitutionalized Religion’ In preparation of my conceptualization of ‘deinstitutionalized religion’, I would like to state, what I do not propose: I resist the proposals to accept ‘spirituality’ as scientic concept, as some colleagues in psychology suggest. Some even envision that, in the future, we will rename our departments, societies and textbooks and combine or even substitute ‘religion’ with ‘spirituality’ (Zinnbauer et al. 1997). I have some doubt that this project of conceptual and even organizational substitution will stand theoretical, philosophical, let alone theological scrutiny. Unless someone writes a convincing theory of spirituality,15 I regard ‘spirituality’ as self-description of the subjects in research who indicate that they are looking for something else than traditional and established religion. But theoretically, ‘spirituality’ is all but a well dened concept.16 Since, in the conceptualization of ‘spirituality’, the overlapping of religion and spirituality is increasingly acknowledged and denitions of spirituality as “a search of the sacred” (Pargament 1997; 1999; Zinnbauer et al. 1999) or response to the numinous (Elkins 2001) are put forward, I see less reason to re-invent the wheel. Instead, I suggest taking into consideration proposals which continue to work with the concept of ‘religion’, but may add certain adjectives. I nd this procedure more promising, because it allows for an inclusion of the century old controversial, but intelligent debate on the conceptualization of ‘religion’. The suggestion to endorse the adjective ‘deinstitutionalized’ to identify specic forms of religion, appears promising to me. ‘Deinstitutionalized religion’ covers to large extent what ‘spirituality’ is expected to signify. But ‘deinstitutionalized religion’ could prove as a more solid and more comprehensive concept. But, nevertheless—or exactly therefore—, it is necessary to interpret and qualify this concept. For a qualication of the concept of ‘deinstitutionalized religion’, however, it is not wise to draw exclusively on the monothetic theories and denitions of religion which we derive for example from 15

I doubt that Emmons’ (1999) Psychology of Ultimate Concerns meets such criteria. One of the major problems, from my perspective, is that ‘spirituality’ belongs to the kind of collective psychological maneuvers in modernity by which we desire the denial of negativity, of the shadow, the dark side of human experience, of terror and destruction. Or are there studies on psychological or social destruction associated with ‘spirituality’? What we nd increasingly and what receives extensive funding are studies on the positive effect of religion or spirituality on health, well-being. I am concerned that we are poorly equipped for an analysis of terror and destruction through religion and spirituality. 16

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Luckmann’s (1967) or Luhmann’s (1977; 2000) works.17 Polythetic approaches are more helpful such as Kaufmann’s (1989) or Thomas’ (2001) who has developed a theory of implicit religion mainly on the basis of Kaufmann’s perspective.18 Kaufmann’s perspective may be especially helpful for an understanding of deinstitutionalized religion. In his approach to conceptualize religion in its functional multi-dimensionality, Kaufmann lists six problem zones in which religion has a stake and plays an active role: 1. Binding of affect and coping with anxiety 2. Conduct in the non-everyday realm in form of ritual and moral praxis 3. Processing of contingencies 4. Legitimation of community building and social integration 5. Cosmization of the world or the construction of frames of meaning 6. Distanceation from the established social state of affairs—leading to resistance and protest. These problem zones, in which religion has a stake and is active, correspond to great extent to Glock’s ve dimensions and to my criteria of identifying deconversion. For a conceptualization of religion and deinstitutionalized religion, however, Kaufmann’s six zones appear adequate, because they are more comprehensive and, at the same time, more specic: They embrace, in a rather cumulative or multi-perspective manner, and can be associated with, a variety of theoretical conceptualizations of religion, but these are not taken as mutually exclusive. When these zones of religious concern are covered by a single religion, we have a stable and homogeneous religious situation with a

17 Nevertheless, Luckmann’s concept of invisible religion has an important contribution to make for the analysis of religion in an age of individualization in which the taken-for-granted authority, and legitimacy of religious institutions has declined. Thus deinstitutionalized religion, its invisibility, is characterized by withdrawal from the established religious institutions and the development of individualized forms of religion. This process is also understandable in Luhmann’s framework of differentiation of social systems. 18 Of course, Thomas’ work takes up the term ‘implicit religion’ which has been coined by Bailey (1997), but Bailey is mentioned only as a starting point in the introduction. Thomas, in his voluminous work, goes through much of the sociological conceptualizations of religion from Weber and Durkheim, Luckmann and Luhmann to dene religion in a polythetic manner with special reference to Smart and Kaufmann.

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visible religious praxis. But, the more these functions are not fullled anymore by one religious institution, but rather other institutions in society have taken on some of theses functions, we cannot identify this as religion in the full sense as it used to be. But ‘religion’ is still identiable, when at least a number of theses zones or functions are covered by a religious praxis or system of beliefs. This opens a new perspective for analysis of deinstitutionalized religion: to identify the components or fragments of religion. Deinstitutionalized religion, I conclude, can be identied only by fragments of religious functions—even when they are not identiable as religion on the rst glimpse, but are derivates from visible religion. Concluding Remark: Research and Desiderata in Deinstitutionalized Religion I conclude with remarks on research. Certainly, it is necessary to continue investigation of religious afliation and disafliation, in order to arrive at a better statistical account of religious migrations—and perhaps be able to draw maps of the religious landscapes in many countries. But the survey instruments need improvement which rstly means to ask consistent questions across the cultures, but secondly, and more important, to investigate not only formal religious afliation and assent to traditional doctrinal beliefs, but also and especially religious experiences, religious functions and religious praxis. Deinstitutionalized religion is more than loss of membership and dissent with central beliefs. Kaufmann’s zones could be of great help in identifying new items. And, as I have tried to make the case: Research on the self-assessment of being ‘spiritual’ or ‘more spiritual than religious’ should be continued in the U.S.A., but should also spread across the continents. Furthermore, it would be very helpful for understanding the processes of deinstitutionalization of religion and of deinstitutionalized religion, if we engaged in studying milieus within and outside religious organizations. First milieu studies in German churches—I am aware of the studies in the Protestant Church of Hannover (Vögele, Bremer, & Vester 2002) and the Fourth Investigation of Church Members in the Protestant churches in Germany which has included a milieu aspect (Huber, Friedrich & Steinacker 2006)—seem promising. Finally, research on deconversion could help to understand the deinstitutionalization process of religion and, at the same time, the dynamics of deinstitutionalized religion. In our study of deconversion, we have

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begun with a special focus on qualitative biographical-reconstructive investigation, including the faith development perspective and a battery of quantitative instruments, and we aim at a typology of deconversion trajectories.19 I would wish for an expansion of this research to include not only the U.S.A. and Germany, but more countries and religious cultures. In the 21st century religious situation, I regard research on deinstitutionalized religion as an important project not only because of concern for the individual religious person and his or her development, but also because of concern for organized religion. Perhaps the people at the periphery and beyond the margins of organized religion may have important messages to convey toward the center. References ALLBUS 1980–2000 (Ed.) (2003). Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS 1980–2000). Codebuch. Köln: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln. ——— 2002 (2003). Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (Codebuch, ZA-Studien-Nr.3700). Köln: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln. Altemeyer, B. (1996). The Authoritarian Specter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Altemeyer, B. & Hunsberger, B. (1992). Authoritarianism, Religious Fundamentalism, Quest and Prejudice. In: International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 2, 113–133. ——— (1997). Amazing Conversions. Why Some Turn to Faith and Others Abandon Religion. New York: Prometheus. Ammerman, T.N. (1997). Golden Rule Christianity: Lived Religion in the American Mainstream. In: D.D. Hall (Ed.), Lived Religion in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196–216. Bailey, E.I. (1997). Implicit Religion in Contemporary Society. Kampen: Kok. Bainbridge, W.S. (1997). The Sociology of Religious Movements. New York; London: Routledge. Barbour, J.D. (1994). Versions of Deconversion. Autobiography and the Loss of Faith. Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia. Beaudoin, T. (1998). Virtual Faith. The Irreverent Spiritual Quest of Generation X. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications. ——— (1993a). Die Erndung des Politischen. Zu einer Theorie reexiver Modernisierung. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. ——— (1993b). Subpolitik. Der Machtzerfall der Institutionen. In: J. Hohl & G. Reisbeck (Eds.), Individuum, Lebenswelt, Gesellschaft. Texte zur Sozialpsychologie und Soziologie. München; Wien: Prol, 11–26. Berger, P.L. (1967). The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. Garden City: Doubleday.

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For results, see our web site at: http://wwwhomes.uni-bielefeld.de/religionsforschung/.

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——— (1979). The Heretical Imperative. Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Afrmation. New York: Doubleday. Berger, W. & Heintel, P. (2001). Art. ‘Institution II. Sozialwissenschaftlich’. In: RGG4. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 175–177. Bromley, D.G. (1998). The Social Construction of Contested Exit Roles: Defectors, Whistleblowers, and Apostates. In: D.G. Bromley (Ed.), The Politics of Religious Apostasy: The Role of Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements. Westport: Praeger, 19–48. Bukow, W.-D. (1984). Kritik der Alltagsreligion. Ein Beitrag zu den Regulations- und Legitimationsproblemen des Alltags. Frankfurt/M.: Haag+Herchen. Dudley, C.S. & Roozen, D.A. (2001). FAITH Communities TODAY. A Report on Religion in the United States Today. Hartford: Hartford Institute for Religion Research; Hartford Seminary. Ebertz, M.N. (1993). Deinstitutionalisierung und Formwandel des Religiösen in Europa. Bestand und Wandel der Kirchen. In: 26. Deutscher Soziologentag. Lebensverhältnisse und soziale Konikte im neuen Europa. Leverkusen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 459–467. Elkins, D.N. (2001). Beyond Religion—Toward a Humanistic Spirituality. In: K.J. Schneider, J.T. Bugental, & J.F. Pierson (Eds.), The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology—Leading Edges in Theory, Research, and Practice. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 201–212. Emmons, R.A. (1999). The Psychology of Ultimate Concern: Motivation and Spirituality in Personality. New York: Guilford Press. ——— (2000). Is Spirituality an Intelligence? Motivation, Cognition, and the Psychology of Ultimate Concern. In: International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 10, 3–26. Fakhoury, W. & Priebe, S. (2002). The Process of Deinstitutionalization: An International Overview. In: Current Opinion in Psychiatry 15, 187–192. Feige, A. (1994). Vom Schicksal zur Wahl. Postmoderne Individualisierungsprozesse als Problem für eine institutionalisierte Religionspraxis. In: Pastoraltheologie 83, 93–109. Forster, R. (2000). The Many Faces of Deinstitutionalisation—A Discussion of Sociological Interpretations. In: Psychiatrische Praxis 27, 39–43. Fuller, R.C. (2002). Spiritual, but not Religious: Understanding Unchurched America. Oxford; New York: Oxford UP. Glock, C.Y. (1962). On the Study of Religious Commitment. In: J. Matthes (Ed.), Kirche und Gesellschaft. Einführung in die Religionssoziologie, B. II (Research Supplement 57,4 ed.) Reinbek: Rowohlt 1969, 98–110. Glock, C.Y. & Stark, R. (1966). Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism. (1st ed.) New York: Harper & Row. Greeley, A.M. (1989). Religious Change in America. Cambridge; London: Harvard UP 1996. ——— (2003). Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium: A Sociological Prole. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers. Grözinger, A. & Lott, J. (Eds.) (1997). Gelebte Religion. Im Brennpunkt praktisch-theologischen Denkens und Handelns. Rheinbach-Merzbach: CMZ. GSS 1972–2002 (2004). GSS 1972–2002 Cumulative Datale. http://sda.berkeley. edu:7502/archive.htm [On-line]. Hadaway, C.K. & Marler, P.L. (1993). All in the Family—Religious Mobility in America. In: Review of Religious Research 35, 97–116. Hall, D.D. (Ed.) (1997). Lived Religion in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Heimbrock, H.-G. (1998). Gelebte Religion im Klassenzimmer? In: W.-E. Failing & H.-G. Heimbrock (Eds.), Gelebte Religion wahrnehmen. Lebenswelt—Alltagskultur— Religionspraxis. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 233–255.

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Höllinger, F. (1996). Volksreligion und Herrschaftskirche: Die Wurzeln religiösen Verhaltens in westlichen Gesellschaften. Opladen: Leske+Budrich. Huber, W., Friedrich, J., & Steinacker, P. (2006). Kirche in der Vielfalt der Lebensbezüge. Die vierte EKD-Erhebung über Kirchenmitgliedschaft. Gütersloh: Güterloher Verlagshaus. Hunsberger, B. (2000). Swimming Against the Current: Exceptional Cases of Apostates and Converts. In: L.J. Francis & Y.J. Katz (Eds.), Joining and Leaving Religion: Research Perspectives. Leominster, England: Gracewing, 233–248. ISSP 1991 (1995). ISSP 1991. Religion (Codebook of the International Social Survey Programme, ZA Study 2150). Köln: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln. ——— 1998 (2001). ISSP 1998. Religion II (Codebook of the International Social Survey Programme, ZA Study 3190). Köln: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln. Jacobs, J.L. (1987). Deconversion from Religious Movements. In: Journal for the Scientic Study of Religion 26, 294–307. ——— (1989). Divine Disenchantment. Deconverting from New Religions. Bloomington: Indiana UP. Jamieson, A. (1998). A Churchless Faith. Faith Outside the Evangelical Pentecostal/Charismatic Church of New Zealand. Ph.D. Diss., University of Canterbury, New Zealand. ——— (2002). A Churchless Faith. Faith Journeys Beyond the Churches. London: SPCK (Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge). Kaufmann, F.-X. (1989). Religion und Modernität. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Kohli, M. (1988). Normalbiographie und Individualität: Zur institutionellen Dynamik des gegenwärtigen Lebenslaufregimes. In: H.G. Brose & B. Hildenbrand (Eds.), Vom Ende des Individuums zur Individualität ohne Ende (pp. 33–53). Opladen: Leske+ Budrich. Krieg, R.G. (2003). A Social Contract for Deinstitutionalization. In: Journal of Social Philosophy 34, 475–486. Levine, S.V. (1984). Radical Departures: Desperate Detours to Growing Up. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Loveland, M.T. (2003). Religious Switching: Preference Development, Maintenance, and Change. In: Journal for the Scientic Study of Religion 42, 148–157. Luckmann, T. (1963). Das Problem der Religion in der modernen Gesellschaft. Institution, Person und Weltanschauung. Freiburg: Rombach. ——— (1967). The Invisible Religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society. New York: Macmillan 1967. ——— (1991). Die unsichtbare Religion. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Luhmann, N. (1977). Funktion der Religion. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1982. ——— (2000). Die Religion der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 2002. Marler, P.L. & Hadaway, C.K. (2002). ‘Being Religious’ or ‘Being Spiritual’ in America: A Zero-Sum Proposition? In: Journal for the Scientic Study of Religion 41, 289–300. Orsi, R. (1997). Everyday Miracles: The Study of Lived Religion. In: D.D. Hall (Ed.), Lived Religion in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3–21. Pargament, K.I. (1997). The Psychology of Religion and Coping: Theory, Research, Practice. New York, NY, USA: The Guilford Press. ——— (1999). The Psychology of Religion and Spirituality? Yes and No. In: International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 9, 3–16. Pargament, K.I. & Mahoney, A. (2002). Spirituality. Discovering and Conserving the Sacred. In: C.R. Snyder & S.J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of Positive Psychology. Oxford: Oxford UP, 646–659. Perry, E.L., Davis, J.H., Doyle, R.T., & Dyble, J.E. (1980). Toward A Typology of Unchurched Protestants. In: Review of Religious Research 21, 388–404.

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Piedmont, R.L. (1999). Does Spirituality Represent the Sixth Factor of Personality? Spiritual Transcendence and the Five-Factor Model. In: Journal of Personality 67, 985–1013. Pollack, D. (1996). Zur religiös-kirchlichen Lage in Deutschland nach der Wiedervereinigung. Eine religionssoziologische Analyse. In: Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 93, 586–615. Pollack, D. & Hartmann, K. (1998). Gegen den Strom. Kircheneintritte in Ostdeutschland nach der Wende. Opladen: Leske+Budrich. Pollack, D. & Pickel, G. (1999). Individualization and Religious Change in Germany. In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 28 (6), 465–483. ——— (2003). Deinstitutionalisierung des Religiösen und religiöse Individualisierung in Ost- und Westdeutschland. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 55, 447–474. Richter, P. & Francis, L.J. (1998). Gone but not Forgotten: Church Leaving and Returning. London: Darton, Longman, Todd. Roof, W.C. (1993). A Generation of Seekers: The Spiritual Journeys of the Baby Boom Generation. San Francisco: Harper&Row. ——— (1999). Spiritual Marketplace. Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Schülein, J.A. (1987). Theorie der Institution: Eine dogmengeschichtliche und konzeptionelle Analyse. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Scott, R.O. (2001). Are You Religious or Are You Spiritual: A Look in the Mirror. In: Spirituality and Health, 01/2001, 26–28. Sherkat, D.E. (2001). Tracking the Restructuring of American Religion: Religious Afliation and Patterns of Religious Mobility, 1973–1998. In: Social Forces 79, 1459–1493. Sherkat, D.E. & Wilson, J. (1995). Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in Religious Markets—An Examination of Religions Switching and Apostasy. In: Social Forces 73, 993–1026. Skonovd, L.N. (1981). Apostasy: The Process of Defection from Religious Totalism. Ph.D. Diss., Ann Arbour. Streib, H. (1998a). Alltagsreligion oder: Wie religiös ist der Alltag. Zur lebensweltlichen Verortung von Religion in praktisch-theologischem Interesse. In: International Journal for Practical Theology 2, 23–51. ——— (1998b). Milieus und Organisationen christlich-fundamentalistischer Prägung. In: Deutscher Bundestag. Enquete-Kommission “Sogenannte Sekten und Psychogruppen” (Ed.), Neue religiöse und ideologische Gemeinschaften und Psychogruppen. Forschungsprojekte und Gutachten der Enquete-Kommission ‘Sogenannte Sekten und Psychogruppen’. Hamm: Hoheneck-Verlag, 107–157. ——— (1998c). Teilprojekt ‚Biographieverläufe in christlich-fundamentalistischen Milieus und Gruppen‘. In: Deutscher Bundestag.Enquete-Kommission “Sogenannte Sekten und Psychogruppen” (Ed.), Endbericht der Enquête-Kommission ‘Sogenannte Sekten und Psychogruppen’. Neue religiöse und ideologische Gemeinschaften und Psychogruppen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, 416–430. ——— (1999). Off-Road Religion? A Narrative Approach to Fundamentalist and Occult Orientations of Adolescents. In: Journal of Adolescence 22, 255–267. ——— (2000). Biographies in Christian Fundamentalist Milieus and Organizations. Report to the Enquete Commission of the 13th German Parliament on “So-called Sects and Psychogroups”, translated by Ella Brehm. Bielefeld: University of Bielefeld, Evangelische Theologie [online at: http://isert-network.com/hs/pdfs/Enquete-Report.pdf ]. ——— (2002). Biographical and Religious Development in Christian-Fundamentalist Converts and Deconverts: A Narrative Approach. Universität Bielefeld Electronic Publications in Theology [On-line at: http://wwwhomes.uni-bielefeld.de/hstreib/ ResearchNote.pdf ].

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RETHINKING CHURCH IN LIQUID MODERNITY Kees de Groot Introduction A specter is haunting the Christian world—the specter of the liquid church.1 Solid churches try to expel it or to contain it; nevertheless, a movement is starting to appear. New manifestations of being church are taking shape, whereas the old institutions are eroding continuously. Websites, festivals, religious publications, and gatherings suggest a network of Christian believers, characterized by a positive evaluation of ‘postmodernity’, and transcending the distinctions between Conservatives and Liberals. This Church movement appears under various names (Price 2002): Emerging Church, Next Wave, New Paradigm, and Liquid Church. This paper addresses the concept of liquid church, which may be tentatively dened as de-institutionalized Christian religion that still bears some resemblance to the church as we know it, or the communication of Christ in a network. Drawing on the distinction between early, or ‘solid’, modernity and late, or ‘liquid’, modernity, this concept promises to open up possibilities to interpret and evaluate forms of religious praxis outside the institutionalized church as manifestations of being church, nonetheless. Religious praxis that takes place outside the regime of religious institutions is often interpreted at an individual level. The concept of liquid church may serve to hold on to an analysis of religion on a social level, even when it has emigrated from the church as an institution. Pete Ward is a lecturer in Youth Ministry and Theological Education at King’s College London. His Liquid Church has been well received within the Christian community. It started a global debate,2 and has been translated into the Dutch language (Ward 2004). In Fall 2004, in a search for ‘liquid church’, Google provided 378 ‘most relevant’ hits. This score provides a rough indication of how widely discussed 1

See De Groot (2006a) for an earlier version of this article. For one of the many reviews, see Andre Perriman at www.opensourcetheology.net. For an interview with the author, see www.youthspecialties.com. 2

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this book is. Although, in the introduction, I have used revolutionary imagery, Ward’s intention is not to overthrow, but rather to reform. Contemporary church life, Ward argues, is moulded around an institution that rewards institutional participation, uniform behavior and dedication to the club. Ward imagines what the church would be like if it conceived of itself as part of contemporary culture, where people see themselves as individuals rather than members of a community, as buyers rather than producers. Liquid Church provides a sociological and theological exploration of the idea that the church should reect important features of late modernity, as it has done in the past with early modernity. It presents a practical ecclesiological vision and connects its message with the insights into contemporary (religious) culture both of contemporary sociological and theological authors. (Each chapter deals either with a sociological or a theological discussion.) This short, accessible, and provocative book raises three questions. Firstly, there is a sociological question. In the course of the Christian tradition, it is fairly new to conceive of the church as something that ‘happens’ in the context of the market. Is it not sociologically inevitable that this liquid church will mix with other religious traditions and vanish as something unidentiable, unless there is a solid church that supports it? Solid church, so to speak, was the key to the successful rise of early Christianity (Stark 1996). In a contemporary market approach to the church, one cannot ignore the ‘rational choice’ thesis that, in a context of pluralism, only churches operating as exclusive rms will be vital (Stark & Finke 2000). According to this theory, the liquid church would inevitably be ‘a sell out’, not because it ‘embraces the believer as a consumer’, but because it uses an ineffective marketing strategy. Ward acknowledges that solid church is a successful form of marketing (Ward 2002, 62). He does not, however, address the critical thesis that in a volatile environment only strict churches are strong. I take it as Ward’s hypothesis that in late modernity uid structures may be successful means to put the Christian message across. A more theological question is the following: is this really church—or are we merely talking about some of the activities that the church should promote? Although the author states more than once that a true church is marked by authentic communication of the Word and the sacraments, he does not indicate in what way the liquid church provides ‘the right administration of the sacraments’ (Ward 2002, 67–68). This is especially intriguing since the author radically criticizes

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the usual focus on the local gathering on Sunday morning. Of course, there is a theological reason behind this gathering: the remembrance and representation of the resurrection. Contrary to my expectations, I did not nd an alternative approach to the sacramental nature of the church. Authors who are inspired by liberation theology are more sensitive to this aspect of church ‘happening’ in the world. Their concept of ecclesiogenesis may be a critical counterpart to liquid church (Van der Kolm 2001, 126–146). Apparently, this liquid church is more evangelical than sacramental. Central to my critique is the appreciation of liquid modernity. This analysis of liquid church is at the same time a call for a late modern Christian revival. Ward does not discuss critically, however, what it means to live in late modern society. Although ‘liquid church’ appears to be a variation on Zygmunt Bauman’s ‘liquid modernity’ (2000), Bauman’s own ambivalent attitude towards liquid modernity has been left aside. This becomes particularly clear in one of the two examples Ward provides of networking in a solid church environment: the deregulated cluster of connections that causes new worship songs to be included in a service. This brings to mind the Christian music industry in the United States, which is regulated by the laws of the market economy. Attractive young men and women are pushed to sell a simple message that is wrapped up in a commercial musical package. In this way, young individuals are seduced to buy a Christian identity. Ward does not criticize such developments, as long as the Christian message is put across. What counts is the ow of images, symbols, songs, and stories. It is interesting that Ward pays serious attention to Christian music in his ecclesiological thinking. Nevertheless, it is naïve to ignore the laws of consumer culture. Ward certainly understands the need to ‘regulate the ow’. That is why he is concerned about orthodoxy: a liquid church should communicate the good news of Christ. But what does this mean? Does it imply that the Gospel is just one of the avors that are available on the spiritual market place? In the expectation that the theological value of ‘liquid church’ might benet from a more encompassing understanding of liquid modernity, I confronted Ward with Zygmunt Bauman (2000; 2001), the sociological author who coined ‘liquid modernity’, asking the question: what does this condition of liquid modernity mean for churches, and what is the role that churches should play? The rst part

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of this theoretical question is intended to serve the empirical study of a new religious phenomenon, whereas the second puts theology’s normative engagement back on the agenda. Embracing Liquid Modernity Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of liquid modernity was a major source of inspiration for the concept of the ‘liquid church’. The drift of his analysis and that of other sociological authors, such as Anthony Giddens (1991) (‘disembedding’) and Manuell Castels (2000) (‘network society’), is well known. Usually, however, the contrast between late modernity and the church is accentuated. In social theory, particularly in the anticlerical work of Pierre Bourdieu (1985), liquid modernity implies the dissolution of institutionalized and organized religiosity. Theologians, especially European authors, tend to agree with this views, although their evaluation is quite different. Martina Blasberg-Kuhnke and Ulrich Kuhnke (2002), for example, argue that Churches put their identity at risk when they go along with Erlebnisgesellschaft (experience society). Rather than promoting a consumer religion, the churches should build religious communities characterized by an attractive communicative climate. It seems that churches are bound to suffer from or protest against late modernity. Ward, however, makes a theological plea in favor of a liquid church. He argues that a truly Christian church is possible right in the center of this dynamic context. Ward bases his argument on current reappraisal of the (orthodox) notion of perichoresis (divine movement) within the Trinity (Volf 1998), and on the contemporary downplaying of the congregational focus in Paul’s concept of church (Ziesler 1990). It is not attending the Sunday morning service that makes a church a church, but individuals who are in Christ and participate in the ‘liquid dance of God’.3 The opposite of liquid church is solid church, corresponding with solid modernity. Ward rightly states that the church as a theological concept

3 The preference for the Kroation-American author Miroslav Volf is signicant. Although Volf (1998, 23) is “looking for the so-called postmodern forms of ecclesial relationships”, in fact, he provides a theological justication of congregationalism. According to Volf (1998, 145–154) the local gathering for a service is constitutive of being a church. Ward, on the other hand, protests against the dominance of this criterion in practical ecclesiology.

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has undergone a process of reication. ‘We’, that is, church people, the author argues, have to stop focusing on the institution. In doing this, we are in fact sacralizing early modernity. Activities and attitudes promoted by the congregation, such as attending church services (‘gathering in one place to do the same thing’), supporting the church organization as volunteers, participating in the parish organization, loyalty and support, are typical of behavior patterns and an institutional mentality that are required by modern institutions. Instead of mourning for the decline of the church as an institution, Ward points to more or less de-institutionalized Christian religion. He invites the reader to discover and promote the mysterious ways of being church that exist within contemporary culture: small groups of Christians who support each other, read the Bible, and praise God; events such as the British Greenbelt Festival, where church happens in music, meetings, and worship; Alpha courses; activities in youth ministry; and the presence of the Gospel in the old and new media. What then, does Ward regard as church? In his ecclesiological program, Pete Ward takes up an issue that has also been addressed by others engaged in youth ministry and evangelism: we have to get used to the idea that what we are doing is church, we can no longer be content with the modest assumption that youth ministry is building bridges to the ‘real’ church. The church is where Christ is communicated and saving grace is at work. Youth ministry can be, and often is (liquid) church. This conceptualization has interesting implications for the praxis of church development. Since liquid church is not a program, church leaders cannot control it. Nevertheless, Ward wishes to promote liquid church. How can this be achieved? Central to his thinking is discovering the value of the already existing networks (lines of communication that connect a series of nodes, be it individuals, organizations, communication systems or political structures (Ward 2002, 41–42). Ward provides three clues to let these networks ‘work for us’ (Ward 2002, 98). The rst is to expand the opportunities for particular ways of meeting, that is, in the name of Christ; the second to develop products to stimulate the connection between people; and the third to organize and invite people to exciting events. Above all, in evangelism, one has to appreciate the implicit desire for God that is already there. This doesn’t mean that church ‘happens’ (to use a favorite phrase of Ward’s) wherever religious communication takes place. According to Ward (2002, 85), liquid church must prioritize ‘special grace’ and remain focused on the work of God’s Spirit toward salvation. However, he does not develop new ideas about

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what this means in the late modern context. In this respect, his appraisal of postmodernity, though challenging, lacks theological and sociological imagination. A more selective appreciation is necessary. The suggestion to develop products is the most provocative of Ward’s advices. Following Laurence Moore, Ward calls this commodication. While ‘modularization’ (Blair 1988) referred to the tendency to break down systemic unities into separate parts that can be re-combined, even using parts that originate from another system, commodication explicitly refers to the selling of religious products using modern marketing techniques. The Marxist nightmare is that capitalism turns people, relations, and feelings into commodities. Ward considers this process essential for late modern evangelism. An alternative denition of liquid church may be: network based communication of salvation in Christ. Contrary to a major concern of both congregational studies in the United States4 and of the movement for the open church in (European) practical theology,5 the advocate of liquid church does not wish to vitalize or strengthen religious congregations. Existing forms of being church are described, informal, ephemeral, and commercial though they may be, and whether or not they are loosely connected to one or more religious institutions. In this approach, they are of value, regardless of their effects on solid church. Solid church, however, is more interlinked with liquid church than Ward makes it appear. For one thing, participants in the Christian religious network, buyers of religious products, and visitors of events are often socialized in congregations. Revivalism presupposes an existing, institutionalized religion. Moreover, innovative initiatives may become standard procedure. Part of what’s at stake here are the issues that O’Dea, from a functionalist perspective, termed ‘the dilemmas of institutionalization’ (O’Dea & O’Dea 1983). Institutionalization, de-institutionalization, and re-institutionalization are inherent in the dynamics of the religious eld. Nevertheless, I share Ward’s intuition that religion abandoning the institution is not only a cyclical phenomenon, but also a structural trait of the current phase in the modernization process.

4 A central publication in the eld is Nancy Tatom Ammerman et al. (1997). For an overview, see John W. Stewart (2002). 5 See, for example, Rolf Zerfass (1991).

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Evaluation Our common concepts of church may be too ‘solid’, too institutional, to grasp the ‘disembedding’ of religion in late modernity. Thus, it seems appropriate to develop concepts of uid forms of late modern religiosity. Unlike concepts such as ‘implicit religion’ (Bailey 1990) that concentrate on the function of religion for the individual,‘liquid church’ focuses on the social, namely network based, forms of religion. In this way, non-institutional and de-institutionalizing religion appear as interesting phenomena for empirical theological study of the interaction of social form and theological content. Ward’s concept however, seems to suffer from a poor reception of Zygmunt Bauman’s liquid modernity. In order to discover hidden potentials of a ‘liquid modern’ perspective on the church, I have contrasted Ward’s intriguing vision with the original project of Zygmunt Bauman to come to grips with liquid modernity. Being Church under the Conditions of Liquid Modernity It is hard to imagine that anyone reading Zygmunt Bauman’s almost gloomy picture of liquid modernity would become inspired to promote a liquid church. The cover illustrations of the editions I used are signicant. While Liquid Modernity is embellished with a sinister picture of oil on water, Liquid church has a photograph of bright, blue, sparkling water on its cover. Bauman, following social theorists such as Ulrich Beck, Manuell Castells, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu, sketches a world where xed class and status boundaries are vanishing, people have more choice than ever, and identity is no longer prescribed, but to be constructed. Free at last, one might be inclined to react. But that is not the message that is put forward here. Sociology is a discipline that has a rich tradition of pointing to power structures, mechanisms and patterns that the general public and specialists are likely to be unaware of, but that nonetheless inuence them pervasively. Authors such as Bauman argue that, contrary to what the ideology of the free market, neo-liberalism, and hedonism urge us to believe, we are not free at all. In solid modernity, people were determined by their role in the production process; now, they are determined by their role in consumer society. The market has become more powerful than the state, the church, or the family once were. We are tempted to buy the products that provide

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elements of an ‘authentic’ identity. The task of building an identity has become a burden. Because people participate in many social networks, fullling different social roles, they ask themselves, who am I? Who is this individual? There’s no escape from the reexive project of the self (Giddens 1991, 70–109), as there is no escape from choosing. We have to choose: what to wear, what to do, what to eat, what to believe. Even leading a traditional life, and clinging to a religious tradition must be by choice. We are forced to be ‘autonomous individuals’, exible and mobile: free to work at home or at the ofce, to work full time or part time (how come we are all so busy?). We are no longer attached to one place, and that’s why we long to be home.6 Meanwhile—and this is one of the points where Bauman’s analysis shows its inconsistencies (Nijhoff 1998; Best 2002)—speaking of ‘we’ is deceptive. It is a manner of speaking that reproduces the dominant ideology of the successful, who have managed to take advantage of the condition of being an individual, while in fact large proportions of the population don’t have the capacity to practice individuality de facto (Bauman 2001, 58). They don’t have much choice at all. They have to take life as it comes. These are only individuals de jure. Their ascribed identity is that of autonomous individuals, while in fact they are completely dependent on structures that are beyond their inuence. The picture Bauman draws evokes the desire for a xed community where everyone knows his or her place, and where people know each other and are not driven by interests. According to Bauman, however, this utopia of Gemeinschaft (community) is not an alternative to the dystopia liquid modernity may become. A real, self-evident community is no longer possible. Instead, on the one hand, there are the gated communities of the wealthy: beautiful havens in a world that is perceived as insecure. On the other hand, we are faced with the ghettos of the new poor, of the different men and women who are marginalized, inhabiting the same district, but not forming a neighborhood. Here, brotherhood is absent as well: stigma and humiliation do not turn sufferers into brothers (Bauman 2001, 121; Bauman 2004b). Bauman’s analysis has an undertone of commitment and provocation, and inhibits easy solutions (Beilharz 2002 and 2001). His essays reect a protest against the misery of the world. They do not offer an

6 Bauman recently has elaborated the harsh consequences of liquid modernity for romantic relationships (Bauman 2004a).

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alternative ideology, but neither do they leave the reader without hope, or without an impetus to act. In the end, what Bauman stands for is the continuation of classical socialist ideals of social justice, translated to the current phase of modernity. He advocates the redistribution of the means to participate in society, including the collective means such as insurances against incapacities and misfortunes, and he defends the right to pursue social esteem under fair conditions of equal opportunity (Bauman 2001, 149). The power politics ‘exible man’ (Sennettt 1999) experiences and the limitations of the new poor to make any choices at all promote a widespread experience of insecurity in late modern society. Rather than seeking safety solutions, Bauman asks us to take seriously the desire for ontological security, while at the same time promoting social solidarity. His wish is ‘the blend of distributive justice and a policy of recognition’ (Bauman 2001, 78). Surprisingly, regarding this concern with salvation and solidarity, Bauman himself hardly addresses the role of religious institutions. In fact, the British sociologist of religion James Beckford (1996) has criticized Bauman, and, more mildly, Giddens, for neglecting the religious factor in their analyses of contemporary society. It seems that religion is bound to play the role of a countermovement. Nevertheless, the work of both authors offers opportunities to understand the current role of religion in general, and of the Christian churches in particular. In the words of Ulrich Beck, the church may be considered another example of a ‘zombie institution’, like family, class and neighborhood. Nowadays, these institutions are both dead and alive (Bauman 2000, 6). Their authority as structuring patterns of society is clearly declining. Families are breaking up, class distinctions are vanishing, and neighborhoods are disintegrating. On the other hand, people may choose to give meaning to these institutions. Families, for example, even those which are newly composed, can be and are made important—by choice. The difference is that the importance of the institution is no longer ascribed, as in an earlier phase of modernization, but chosen for. The attitude towards institutions is individualized. The church, as one of the modern institutions, can be understood in this way. The institution still exists, but no longer provides a given symbolic universe and social structure for the population of a nation state, a region or a particular social network. The task of constructing and maintaining a (sacred) world (Berger 1967) has become a private task. A church may, or may not, play a role in performing this task. People may choose to make use of an institution.

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Strictly following Bauman’s analysis, it seems that only two options are left for churches in liquid modernity. Firstly, the church may serve as an institution where a community of equals is invented and imagined in religious rituals, beliefs, and ethical behavior. Like an ethnic community, this religious community does not address the actual social networks. In the real world, people of different backgrounds and of different religions are interdependent. The unication of one segment of the population means segregation, a ight from reality, as long as the existing inequality is not addressed. This church provides the experience of belonging. It is a surrogate community, however, since the people in the church are not the people one works with, lives with, exists with. Ward (2002, 27–28), writing about the ‘refuge church’, acknowledges this position as a mutation of the solid church. The critical question is, how can the network of Christian communication and relationships he promotes avoid establishing another ‘refuge church’? The second option for a church is the aesthetic, ‘instant’ community. Gathering to participate in a spectacular event may provide a sense of being part of something that transcends the individual. For a moment, the togetherness of individuals may provide a sense of community without ethical commitments and long-term commitments (Bauman 2001, 69–70). Community, however, cannot be found in these cases. According to Bauman’s judgment, a person does not join a community temporarily. Therefore, ‘cloakroom’ communities and ‘carnival’ communities are not ‘genuine’ (comprehensive and lasting) communities, but symptoms and, sometimes, causal factors of the social disorder of liquid modernity (Bauman 2000, 199–201). In this respect, Ward (2002, 22–25) describes the mutation of solid church into ‘heritage site’ and ‘nostalgic community’, as opposed to his up-to-date liquid church. Nevertheless, the latter runs the same risk. How can the organization of spectacular events and the development of fancy products, however ‘orthodox’, avoid the risk of constituting ‘cloakroom communities’? There is a third option. This option is implicit in Bauman’s own vision of how people can live together in less misery or no misery at all. The moral commitment that Bauman displays might be as interesting for theology as the sociological analysis that is driven by it. If there is to be a community in the world of the individuals, it can only be (and needs to be) a community woven together from sharing and mutual care; a community of concern and responsibility for the equal right to be human and the equal ability to act on that right (Bauman 2001, 149–150).

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Clearly, there are parallels between his concerns and those of Christian theology. The community of individuals that is needed, according to Bauman, reminds the church of its mission. The Mission of the Church in Liquid Modernity The comparison between the critical aims of Bauman’s project and Ward’s embracing of liquid modernity reveals a radical opposition, both with respect to the factual and potential consequences of liquid modernity for the churches, and with respect to the role churches should play in this context. Firstly, there is a difference in their evaluation of liquid modernity. Bauman points to the conditions of liquid modernity in order to address its structural impediments to a just society. In his view, liquid modernity is not a condition to be taken for granted, but one that has to be taken up critically. Although Bauman marginalizes the role of religion, his work offers opportunities to understand the current interest in religion. Indeed, the desire for ontological security and the search for social solidarity can be associated with the classic functions of religion. Bauman’s analysis can even be considered an invitation to Christian theology to reconsider its own view of contemporary culture. Theology may benet from Bauman’s almost religious plea against a culture of fear, and in favor of community development. Ward’s project, however, is not to understand man in liquid modernity, but to perceive liquid modernity; he asks why New Age is growing while the churches are waning, and answers that the church is not addressing the desire for spirituality. He does not deal with the social causes of this spiritual desire, nor does he give a theological evaluation of liquid modernity. His argument is that the spiritual desire is there, and that the church should deal with it. Ward incorporates Bauman’s analysis of liquid modernity, but in his own strategy the critical evaluation has been left aside. Ward explores liquid modernity, pleads for a positive evaluation, and poses limits to the extent the church can go along, primarily falling back on early reformation theology. Bauman says, Watch out! Liquid modernity! Ward says, Behold, society is liquid! Church should be likewise! Secondly, there is a difference between Ward’s concept of liquid church and the notions of how to react on the conditions of liquid modernity that are implicit in Bauman’s analysis. Ward’s concern is

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to make Christianity attractive to people living in today’s consumer society. This is basically a marketing issue. The church has something to offer; how can we reach a new public? Although, earlier in the book, the metaphor of the boat has been rejected (Ward 2002, 15), it appears again towards the end: the waters are full of sh, but ‘others’ are catching them: “(. . .) in Christ we have the way, the truth, and the life, the genuine gospel, and yet we still can’t get people to take the bait” (Ward 2002, 76). Ward’s opponent is ‘heavy institution’ thinking. Nevertheless, he continues to make use of its underlying scheme. People need ‘us’, that is, the church, for their salvation. It is not unjustied to see the church as an institution carrying the Christian tradition. However, the church does not ‘own’ Christ, nor are the two identical. Despite Ward’s appraisal of liquid modernity, the basic formula that informs his analysis is the antithesis between church and society. (It is signicant that Karl Barth and Abraham Kuyper are among his theological advisors.) Christian faith is seen as external to society; therefore, the challenge is to build bridges. ‘Liquid’ meetings, products, and events serve to make the church more attractive. The basic approach is that the church should t in better with contemporary society, so that it is available to all those seeking salvation. The tacit assumption is that people need to get into the church. It is clear that this is good for the church. It is not so clear, however, why this is good for people. A theological approach that acknowledges God’s presence in his creation, and that does not posit so great a distance between church and society, would be less inclined to regard the church as a safe haven. Such an approach would challenge the church to explicate its purpose in this world. In organizational terms: Ward focuses on survival, not of the church with its current structure, but of the church per se. My reading of Bauman, however, suggests another route. In his work, the experience of insecurity, the growing social inequality, the quest for community, and the search for safety are linked in one analysis that challenges the churches to reformulate their mission. Bauman’s critical analysis of contemporary society may be a useful background theory that can be used in a hermeneutic reconstruction of at least the social and political mission of the church (Schüssler Fiorenza 1984, 164–223). It is easier to criticize than to present an alternative. My suggestion for such a reconstruction is as follows. A common element of the four canonical Gospels is that there is no need to be afraid. The life, death, and resurrection of Christ signify that God loves his people. This is

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an invitation to love one another, which is considered equal to loving God. The promise of the Kingdom coming (Mark, Matthew, Luke), and that of eternal life ( John), challenges believers to act as if it is already here among us—and, in a way, sometimes, it is. In liquid modernity, Christ’s church fullls its mission to the extent that it seeks to connect the desire for one’s own ontological security with the struggle for social justice. Providing salvation to those who desire spirituality could be merely the service of Kontingenzbewältigung (mastering contingency) (Steinkamp 1997). A sociologically informed church will see the structural causes of individual desires and will promote solidarity as well, not just between believers, but between all those who are interdependent in this globalizing world. A careful reading of Bauman’s sociological analysis challenges theologians to reconsider their task. If theology is supposed to answer the question of ‘regulating’ (which is, in fact, Ward’s fundamental position), it is like an iron chain that keeps the ship in the harbour. If theology, on the other hand, is to serve the church in doing its mission in the context of liquid modernity, it should provide the tools to deal with the times and the rising of the sea level. It should accompany the processes of disembedding and re-embedding while relating faith and reason, and thereby serving the lecture of the Bible, the celebration of the Liturgy, the care for one another, and the solidarity with those who represent Christ. Discussion One of the challenges of practical theology is to organize the confrontation between the social sciences and the theological disciplines in such a way that it promotes the understanding of religious praxis. Making a sharp distinction between sociology and theology involves the risk of delegating the descriptive task to sociology and the task of critical evaluation to theology. Ward does not escape the pitfall of disregarding the already existing critical engagement of sociological work. He used contemporary sociology to interpret the society we are living in, but failed to take up the critical evaluation that went with it. It appears that his main question is, how to promote the Christian tradition in contemporary culture? The answer is, by adapting to consumer culture while remaining rooted in what the author calls orthodoxy. This strategy, reminiscent of the old Youth for Christ slogan ‘Geared to the times, but anchored to the Rock’, implies

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making use of modern communication technology, organizing attractive events, and taking account of the mobility of nowadays. In view of his call for reformation, this sounds like a plea for that ‘oldtime religion’, though organized in a highly modern way. The hermeneutic task of reconstructing the mission of the church in liquid modernity remains. Empirically oriented theology can learn much more from the sociology of liquid modernity. Sociology challenges theologians not only to work empirically, but also to reect on their theology. The search for new ecclesial concepts should be accompanied with fundamental-ecclesiological reections. After all, it is not church growth, nor the ow of the liquid church, that constitutes the mission of the church. Its mission is entailed in the difference a church makes in a world where salvation and solidarity can be absent or present. Thus, it is time to move on to the next phase while taking into account what both Ward’s appraisal and Bauman’s critique of liquid modernity have provided. This exploration points to the following directions for empirical research and its relevance for theology. As far as empirical research is concerned, liquid church may serve as a sensitizing concept that draws attention to network based forms of religion, such as religious events, small communities, global religious networks and virtual communities, as well as religious meetings and collective activities outside the religious sphere, such as the cultural, economic, medical and educational sphere. The concept stimulates questions on the following four dimensions: context, culture and identity, structure and leadership (cf. Ammerman et al., 1997, 36–62; Brouwer et al., 2007). Firstly, how do these phenomena relate to their context? Does their uidity entail a cognitive surrender to modern consumerism? Do these liquid forms of being church constitute a refuge for the Christian species, or do they rather operate as the starting point for a Christian crusade? Or, is there indeed a critical liquid church that seeks an understanding with contemporary culture (cf. Berger 1992, 41–46)? Secondly, liquid church challenges to rethink the relation between church and culture. Ward’s conception of liquid church corresponds with the blurring of the boundaries between church and culture in the evangelical milieu (cf. Stolz & Favre 2005). Yet another example of liquid church is constituted by networking on the basis of church based initiatives in a secular milieu, such as a hospital (Steinkamp 1997). And it may even prove fruitful to use the concept to consider secular initiatives that ‘communicate Christ’, such as a stage play that seeks to evoke religious experience or a performance of musica sacra in a concert hall that invites the audience to sing a long (cf. Post 2005, 85–87). Thirdly, what is the

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relation between theology and structure; for example, what is the inuence of an exclusivist soteriology on uid structures, or, of uid structures on soteriology? Ward urges to regulate the ow; in reality, the limits of the liquid church may be less strict. Contrary to his position, theology may try to follow Bauman’s analysis and stress ‘the salutary character of not knowing’, locating the disclosure of God at the limits, rather than within them (Oosterveen 2005). Fourthly, ‘liquid church is not a program’, Ward has claimed. Yet, the emergence of these uid types of being church is inuenced by certain actors and factors. Which are the driving forces behind the liquid church? How is leadership practiced? As to the theological relevance of liquid church, the concept points to several related questions. Firstly, as far as the context is concerned, is it possible to do justice to the Christian ideal of community within network society (Van der Kolm 2001)? Does Christian ecclesiology require ‘real’ communities, or is it there a theological justication for ‘imagined’ communities? Secondly, as far as culture and identity is concerned, what is the theological evaluation of assemblies where people experience a momentary sense of belonging? Does the concept of church require a foundation in a solid community? The theological concept of koinonia seems to correspond to the experience of taking part in a collective ritual that binds people together in their commitment to transcendence. A ‘liquid’ conceptualization of koinonia would open up the possibility to value momentary types of community, in which people take part in various degrees (De Groot 2004; 2005; 2006b). Thirdly, regarding the structural dimension, what is the status of the Church in Christian soteriology? How much solidity is required, how much liquidity allowed for? Fourthly, what is the theological evaluation of ‘backstage’ leadership? How do uid styles of leadership relate to theological thinking about ministry? The concept of liquid church with all its ambivalences—praised by Ward, criticized by Bauman—opens up wide horizons for future empirical theological research. References Ammerman et al., N.T. (1997). Congregation and Community. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Bailey, E. (1990). ‘The Implicit Religion of Contemporary Society’. In: Social Compass 37(4), 483–497. Bauman, Z. (2001). Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World. Cambridge: Polity Press.

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——— (2000). Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity. ——— (2004a). Liquid Love. Oxford: Blackwell. ——— (2004b). Wasted Lives. Modernity and its Outcasts. Cambridge: Polity. Beckford, J.A. (1996). ‘Postmodernity, High Modernity and New Modernity: Three Concepts in Search of Religion’. In: K. Flanagan & P.C. Jupp (eds.), Postmodernity, Sociology and Religion. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 30–47. Berger, P.L. (1992). ‘A Far Glory. The Quest for Faith in an Age of Credulity. New York: The Free Press/Macmillan. Blair, J.G. (1988). Modular America. Cross-cultural Perspectives on the Emergence of an American Way. New York: Greenwood. Blasberg-Kuhnke, M. & U. Kuhnke (1997). ‘Szene oder Netzwerk? Bedingungen und Aufgaben der Pfarrei in der Erlebnisgesellschaft’. In: A. Schifferle (ed.), Pfarrei in der Moderne? Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder, 83–93. Bourdieu, P. (1971). ‘Genèse et structure du champ religieux’. In: Revue française de Sociologie 12(3), 295–334. ——— (1987). Choses dites. Paris: Minuit. Brouwer, R. et al. (2007). Levend lichaam. Dynamiek van christelijke geloofsgemeenschappen in Nederland. Kampen: Kok. Castells, M. (2000). The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. Groot, C.N. de (2004). ‘Kerkelijk management met een missie’. In: Praktische theologie 31(3), 299–333. ——— (2005). ‘Religieuze gemeenschap in een tijdperk van individualisering. Opstellingen van rooms-katholieke parochies in een keuze-cultuur’. In: St. Gärtner et al., Bandeloos? Zoeken naar samenzijn in een individualistische cultuur, Nijmegen, Valkhof Pers, 26–48. ——— (2006a). ‘The Church in Liquid Modernity: A Sociological and Theological Exploration of a Liquid Church’. In: International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 6(1), 91–103 (www.tandf.co.uk/journals). ——— (2006b). ‘ “Wij zijn de kerk!” Maar wie zijn wij? In discussie met het congregationalisme’, Collationes 36 (3), 303–320. Kolm, G.J. van der (2001). De verbeelding van de kerk: Op zoek naar een nieuw-missionaire ecclesiologie. Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum. O’Dea, Th.F. & J. O’Dea Aviad (1983). The Sociology of Religion. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Oosterveen, L. (2005). ‘Ambivalentie als contrastervaring. Zygmunt Bauman’s analyse van de moderniteit’. In: Tijdschrift voor Theologie 45(1), 32–53. Post, P. (2005). ‘Ritual-liturgical Movements. A Panoramic View on Ritual Repertoires in Dutch Catholicism after 1950/1960’. In: E. Sengers (ed.), The Dutch and Their Gods. Secularization and Transformation of Religion in the Netherlands since 1950. Hilversum: Verloren, 75–100. Price, M.J. (2002). ‘After the Revolution. A Review of Mainline Protestant Clergy Leadership Since the 1960s’. In: Theology Today 59(3), 428–450. Schüssler Fiorenza, F. (1984). Foundational Theology. Jesus and the Church. New York: Crossroad. Sennett, R. (1999). The Corrosion of Character. The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism. New York/London: W.W. Norton. Stark, R. (1996). The Rise of Christianity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stark, R. & R. Finke (2000). Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley: University of California Press. Steinkamp, H. (1997).‘Gemeinde jenseits der Pfarrei’. In: H.-G. Ziebertz (ed.), Christliche Gemeinde vor eineme neuen Jahrtausend. Weinheim: Deutscher Studienverlag, 233–346.

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Stewart, J.W. (2002). ‘The Emergence of Congregational Studies in Oldline American Protestantism’. In: International Journal of Practical Theology 6(2), 253–287. Stolz, J. & O. Favre (2005). ‘The Evangelical Milieu. Dening Criteria and Reproduction Across the Generations’. In: Social Compass 52(2), 169–184. Volf, M. (1996). Trinität und Gemeinschaft: Eine ökumenische Ekklesiologie. Mainz/NeukirchenVluyn: Grünewald/Neukirchener. Ward, P. (2002). Liquid Church. Peabody/Carlisle: Hendrickson/Pater Noster. ——— (2004). Kerk als water. Kampen: Kok. Zerfass, R. (1991). ‘Christliche Gemeinde—Heimat für alle?’. In: G. Koch & J. Pretscher (eds.), Kirche als Heimat. Würzburg: Echter, 29–58. Ziesler, J. (1990). Pauline Christianity. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN RELIGIOUS PRAXIS AND REFLECTION IN THE TEACHING SITUATION: A CONCEPTUAL MAP Don Browning My lecture has a complex agenda, perhaps too complex. I rst want to describe an exercise I have used with rst-year ministry students in a course called Practical Theology and Public Ministry. I also will set forth the hermeneutical theory behind this exercise and what it implies about the relation of practical theology to the so-called empirical social sciences. Second, I will describe the continuity between that classroom exercise and the twelve-year long Religion, Culture, and Family research project that I administered at the University of Chicago. It too was a practical-theological project that both generated and freely used socialscience data. Finally, I will summarize what I have gleaned from these teaching and research situations for our main topic—the role of the empirical in practical theology. In short, I will try to show how our practical-theological teaching and our practical-theological research can fruitfully inuence each other. Because of the size of the agenda and the complexity of the issues, what I say on some of these topics will be necessarily brief and condensed. A Teaching Exercise In my book A Fundamental Practical Theology (1991), I briey describe an exercise that I have used for 12 years in a class for rst-year ministry students (Browning 1991, 7). In many ways, the entirety of that rather thick book was designed to amplify the theory behind this relatively simple exercise. The class was on practical theology and what it offers for clarifying the public role of Christian ministry. Here is the exercise. In the rst week, students were asked to do the following: 1) Choose a practical issue pertaining to the church’s ministry to the world that had motivated the student to seek academic preparation for ministry. As a part of this rst step, the student also was asked to convert that issue into a researchable practical-theological question and make a preliminary description of his or her “preunderstanding”

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of both the description of the issue and its possible answers or resolutions. 2) Interview a leader representing a sector of church or society also struggling with that same question. This was to help the student deal with the issue as a public matter as well as a personal concern. 3) Select two major scholarly theological books or biblical texts (plus commentaries) that also are addressing this practical-theological question. 4) Advance a comparative critical analysis of both the description and the answer to the question advanced by both the two major sources and your interviewee. Indicate which of the three positions is the strongest, both on description and on normative answer. 5) Write a 20–25 page paper covering all of these steps and concluding with several paragraphs written not to the professor but to the interviewee about which position best describes and addresses your practical-theological issue. 6) Provide a sufciently rich description of the thickness of the interviewee’s world—his or her practices, analysis of contexts, view of relevant goods, moral principles, and narrative vision—to be able to convey your emerging point of view persuasively with an eye toward inspiring change. 7) Finally, the student was asked to recall his or her original “preunderstanding” (in Gadamer’s sense of the term) of the issue and assess how this exercise had changed it. I am pleased to report that I would invariably get outstanding papers from highly motivated students. These rst-year students did a light reading of the rather challenging A Fundamental Practical Theology; they did this primarily to give themselves condence that there was a rather elaborate theoretical basis for what might, at rst glance, appear to be a trivial, nuts-and-bolts exercise. You will easily recognize the theoretical frameworks behind this exercise. It draws heavily on the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and the use of this perspective in the hermeneutic sociology of the widely read book titled Habits of the Heart by Robert Bellah and his colleagues (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton 1985, 301–306). Gadamer’s hermeneutically oriented understanding of Aristotelian phronÏsis framed the entire exercise (Gadamer 1982, 278–280). Gadamer’s view of “effective history” (ibid., 267–268) and “preunderstanding” (ibid., 235–237) were behind asking the students to choose a practical-theological question that emerged out of their own history and to advance a tentative description of their preliminary hunches about how to describe and answer that question. Gadamer’s rejection of the separation of application from understanding also was implicit in the assignment; we read and discussed his brilliant argument

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claiming that understanding should not add application at the end but should be driven by an interest in application from the very beginning (ibid., 289). His view of the “classic” as both formative of history and thereby latent in our effective histories was behind the request that students use two different scholarly texts that might function as guides to these classics (ibid., 255). This was a manageable way to help them gain critical understanding of how their present interpretive praxis gains normative orientation from the monuments of the past. We used Ricoeur’s view of knowing as a dialectic of understandingexplanation-understanding (Ricoeur 1982, 87–90). In close connection with this, we also discussed his brilliant concept of distanciation which relativizes social-science objectivity by placing it within a larger framework of historically embedded and conditioned understanding. To demonstrate the role of social-science distanciation, students were encouraged to use the explanatory perspectives of the social sciences in analyzing their chosen issue, but always as a subordinate part of a wider framework of understanding and phronÏsis as these concepts are developed by Gadamer and Ricoeur. We demonstrated the link between a hermeneutically oriented practical theology and the hermeneutical-social sciences as illustrated by Bellah’s Habits of the Heart. I emphasized that to describe a problem meant rst to interpret it from the perspective of one’s effective history and only secondarily from the viewpoint of the explanatory interests of economic, social systemic, class, educational, or psychological variables. Of course, describing from the perspective of one’s naïve rst grasp of one’s effective history needed correction by the second and more critical grasp that comes from serious historical-critical and hermeneutical retrieval of that history, especially the normative classics of that history. Although papers were of unusually high quality for rst year ministry students, they did have difculties with two features of this assignment. First, they found it challenging to convert their selected issue into a focused practical-theological question that was sufciently limited to be researchable. I would often have to meet with each student several times before the question could be formulated into a written research proposal. Second, students had difculty writing the last sections of the paper to the interviewee rather than to the professor. Getting into another person’s symbolic world and crafting a rhetorically attractive argument that would be convincing was a challenge for students socialized into the live-and-let-live culture of American society. It is much easier to write upward to the authoritative professor than laterally and convincingly to the neighbor at your side.

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Of course, this is not only a problem for our students; it is a fundamental deciency of contemporary theological scholarship. Theologians write for their academic superiors and not for the social and cultural person on the street. Practical theology as a discipline, however, should do better than this. But in order to write for people in various sectors of common life, we should both describe their effective histories and use scientic distanciation to identify the social and cultural forces that shape their lives. In other words, we need to know how to use the empirical in both its hermeneutic-descriptive and explanatory forms. I conclude my description of this exercise by pointing out that this same methodology was followed by many of these students three years later when writing their senior ministry papers. In other words, many did this exercise twice—their rst year and their last. The second time, it generally would be on another topic—some issue that grew out of their ministry experiences while a student. The second time, their paper would benet from the historical, ethical, and theological work done in the intervening time. But the paper would still have the same practical-theological structure. Students were asked to think of their papers as a scaled-down version of a fundamental practical theology. Those of you who are familiar with my book by that name know that there I systematized the Gadamer-Ricoeur view of understanding and phronÏsis into a view of theological reection that sees it as moving through the four steps of descriptive theology, historical theology, systematic theology, and strategic-practical theology. The two manifestations of the empirical, i.e., the empirical as hermeneutic-descriptive and the empirical as distanciated explanation, have roles to play in each of these four movements. First, fresh theological reection begins with a rupture in traditional practices; descriptive theology begins theological reection by advancing an initial, and probably relatively naïve, hermeneutic-descriptive and explanatory analysis of that rupture, i.e., the problem or issue. Second, historical theology is an act of self-understanding whereby we move back in history to examine our inherited norms, ideals, or classics. Once again, hermeneutic-description is the primary mode of inquiry governing historical theology. Even then, we cannot fully understand the meaning of the text, monument, or event—what Ricoeur and Andre Lacoque call the “trajectory” or meaning “in front” of the text—unless historical-critical explanation is employed to grasp its conditioned background (LaCocque & Ricoeur 1998, xi–xii). On the other hand,

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although discovering the historical-critical background may help clarify this meaning or trajectory, it does not itself determine that meaning. Third, the step of systematic and critical reection, often associated with the tasks of systematic and moral theology, needs to hold together the dialectic of understanding-explanation-understanding much better than it has in the past. Even these systematic moments of theology need to comprehend the sociocultural contexts from which theological visions are generated as well as the contemporary situations that these scholars are addressing. They also need to grasp the way theological ideas shape, for both good and ill, actual unfolding economic, socialsystemic, and psychological processes. Finally, the fourth step of strategic-practical theology requires the understanding-explanation-understanding dialectic with all the more power and precision. This is the place where practical theologians must nally show what they have to offer but without renouncing full responsibility for the earlier three steps. Unless the practical theologian moves into the strategic moment by taking responsibility for the earlier three steps, she will then fall into the trap of taking the theories of systematic and moral theology and applying them to the situations at hand—the error of the older theory-application model. As Ottmar Fuchs suggests (Fuchs 2001, 7), the strategic-theological moment must critically compare the trajectories of meaning gained when the understandingexplanation dialectic is applied to the classic texts with the trajectories discovered when it is applied to the situations of contemporary church and society. This is a monumentally complex process and probably requires the efforts of nely tuned research teams. Students also were invited to use the ve dimensions of practical reason or phronÏsis that I outlined in A Fundamental Practical Theology. Without boring you with how I rst derived and named the dimensions or levels, I have been happy to nd them implicit in Paul Ricoeur’s recent analysis of praxis (Ricoeur 1987, 99–103). Ricoeur distinguishes his theory of praxis from all behaviorist, functionalist, and communicative models of action that fail to grasp the full multidimensionality of praxis. Take, for example, the simple descriptive statement, “The farmer is plowing his eld.” A full analysis of this praxis can be subdivided into roughly ve dimensions—1) a technical means-end practice designed to refer to the moving of dirt in order to plant some seeds, 2) the goods aspired for in the practice of plowing, e.g., food, health, and wealth for self and loved ones, 3) the ideals and narratives about the purposes

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of life that make plowing and the teleological pursuit of these goods a meaningful action, 4) some higher-order principle which solves conict (e.g., by what principle does the farmer act if his neighbor steals his seeds or diverts water needed to fertilize them), and 5) nally, a hermeneutic-descriptive and explanatory analysis of both the original context of the farmer as well as a return to that same context after the rst four dimensions are submitted to more critical reection. This multidimensional view of our practices reveals the full fact of praxis as really a form of phronÏsis; it demonstrates that a horizon of practical wisdom, adequate or inadequate as it may be, surrounds our various actions. This is an insight that Hans van der Ven has perceptively used to order the entire eld of moral education in his outstanding Formation of the Moral Self (van der Ven 1998). Because Ricoeur sees narrative as an unavoidable aspect of praxis, religion itself can easily t into his model. There is a narrative fringe to all praxis, and this fringe invariably has implications for the ultimate context of experience. Time and time again, while reading the corpus of great theologians as diverse as Thomas Aquinas or the rabbinic Nachmanides, especially on issues pertaining to marriage and family, I have seen these ve dimensions of praxis leap out with startling clarity with the narrative level playing a distinctly dening and framing role. I will give illustrations of this later in the lecture. Students would use these ve dimensions both descriptively and normatively. They would use them to analyze descriptively and explanatorily the situation of their issue or question. Then they would later often frame their own critically achieved normative arguments in terms of these levels as well, although that was sometimes too complex to adequately accomplish in a single brief seminar paper. A simple descriptive or normative narrative theology, such as that associated with the thought of Stanley Hauerwas, is from my perspective inadequate for the task of practical theology. Because Hauerwas and his followers do not chart how the narrative dimension interacts with the other four dimensions of praxis, their views have little lasting value for any of the tasks of practical theology—its confessional, correlative, transformative, apologetic, or public roles (Hauerwas 1982). In what follows, I will say more to illustrate what the empirical understood as distanciating explanation has to offer to the clarication of these ve dimensions.

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The Religion, Culture, and Family Project There are signicant similarities between this classroom exercise and the practical-theological research venture called the Religion, Culture, and Family Project that I led from 1991 to the end of 2003. This project has generated 20 volumes either presently in print or soon to be published as well as a major documentary lm shown nationally on our Public Broadcast Station (PBS).1 The project was funded by a series of generous grants from the Lilly Endowment, Inc., one of the few major private endowments that supports research on religious issues. Like every practical-theological research project, this one started with a question, but not, I confess, a very adequate one. We asked, is it possible to form an alternative liberal and critical Christian theology of families to counter the dominant perspective proffered by the American religious right? But, as was often the case with my students in the classroom, the rst formulation of the question was neither adequate nor nal. As we began to look more carefully at the social and cultural contexts of modern families, the question became this: In light of the rapid changes besetting modern families (more divorce, more nonmarital childbirth, more nonmarriage, more cohabitation), what is an adequate practical Christian assessment of and response to these trends? This formulation put more weight on describing and explaining the trends and provided more openness in our critical-hermeneutical retrieval of the various strands of Christian marriage and family thinking. The rst moment of practical theology—the moment of descriptive theology—is always naïve and uncritical but still very important. It was difcult to avoid the initial impression that Christianity throughout its history has been skeptical of divorce, discouraged nonmarital births, and frowned on cohabitation. From Augustine to Aquinas to Luther and Calvin, the goods of marriage were seen to be so vital that all family formations should occur within it. The integrations that occurred within marriage were then given the reinforcements of a theology of sacrament or covenant, both modeled on Christ’s unbreakable love for the church. The question became, however, whether this preliminary horizon of interpretation should hold up in light of a more serious

1 The title of the documentary was “Marriage—Just a Piece of Paper?” and was accompanied by a book of the transcripts edited by Kathy Anderson, Don Browning, Brian Boyer (Anderson, Browning, & Boyer, 2002).

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critical-hermeneutic retrieval of the classics of Christian marriage and family. Bringing an empirical-explanatory perspective into the rst movement quickly complicated this essential step of naïve description. We found that many of the specic social-science studies could be nicely ordered by the Weberian-Habermasian theory of how the technical rationality of the systems world was colonizing, and thereby disrupting, the lifeworld of face-to-face relations in family, marriage, neighborhoods, and communities (Habermas 1987, 333). As Robert Bellah has argued, this impingement into the dependencies of intimate life by the systems world was also further energized by the rise of cultural individualism since the Enlightenment (Bellah et al., 1985, 35). Many family social scientists such as Larry Bumpass (Bumpass 1990, 493), William Goode (Goode 1993), and Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1992) believe that this process is inevitable and that family disruption and the decline of marriage are irresistible features of modern and postmodern life. Rational-choice theorists such as Gary Becker and Richard Posner supplement these predictions with additional theories. They claim that as the technical rationality of free-market economies spreads into the lifeworld, it increasingly reduces intimate relations to cost-benet calculations and shifts economic dependencies away from the husbandwife relationship toward job, government, and welfare transfers (Becker 1991; Posner 1992). Friedrick Engels in his The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State (1972) predicted that market rationality would undermine families (Engels 1972). But his hope that socialist countries would do better on family has not proved to be the case. Once again, Habermas, along with sociologist Alan Wolfe, shows how technical rationality can take the form of government bureaucracy and welfare interventions that, if not accurately administered, also undermine the dependencies of civil society and families. We should not be surprised to learn that the family disruption rates of the United States, which Wolfe calls the leading example of the market family, and more socialist Sweden, which he dubs the leading example of the state family, are surprisingly parallel (Wolfe 1989, 52, 133). Furthermore, a recent exhaustive Swedish study of a million children demonstrates that, in spite of the excellent welfare and government support of families present in that country, the children of disrupted families have signicantly higher rates of morbidity, addiction, injury, suicide, and psychiatric problems than did those raised in intact families (Weitoft, Hjern, Haglund, & Rosen 2003).

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This research paralleled the mounting evidence in the U.S. that the health of both children and adults was negatively affected in signicant ways by increased rates of divorce and out-of-wedlock births. Sara McLanahan’s and Gary Sandefur’s research probably got the most attention. They demonstrated that children not raised by their own biological parents were, on average and when all relevant variables were controlled, two to three times more likely to drop out of school, have children out-of-wedlock, and have difculties attaching to the job market (McLanahan & Sandefur 1994, 32–38).2 In short, the benets of increased reliance on technical rationality in modern societies was having ambiguous consequences for families and the institution of marriage, and this in both market and more socialist countries. Sharpening the Question Hence, the explanatory perspectives on the descriptive theological moment were both signicant and limited in their meaning. Without the normative horizon of Western theology and a legal tradition signicantly inuenced by that theology, both the sociological facts and the wider theories would have little meaning. But deepening our rst naïve descriptions of the situation of families in modern societies did lead us to reformulate our initial question once again. We gradually began to ask: In view of the almost inevitable increase of technical rationality in modern society with all of its ambiguous effects on families, should the church, in both its ecclesial and public ministries, try to, 1) resist these family changes, 2) support the increasingly fragmented families that are the product of these changes, or 3) do some combination of both resistance and support? Framed this way, the issue was not just a question about families; it was a question about the church’s attitude toward modernity itself. In order to deal with this emerging question, our research traveled the hermeneutic circle from descriptive theology, to historical theology, to systematic and moral theology, to strategic-practical theology. I will not list and discuss the many books that came from the project and how they tended to specialize on one or another of these steps around the practical-hermeneutical circle. Two biblical books were commissioned that proved to be path breaking. Carolyn Osiek and David Balch wrote 2 Loss of income is a contributing factor but only accounts for half of the differential between children raised in intact and disrupted families.

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the seminal Families in the New Testament World (1997) that helped open the growing eld of family biblical research (Osiek & Balch 1997). A team led by Leo Perdue wrote Families in Ancient Israel (1997) and demonstrated how central families were for mediating the covenant between God and Israel (Perdue, Blenkinsopp, Collins, & Myers 1997). Legal historian John Witte helped round out our critical retrieval of the Christian classics on marriage and family in his outstanding review of the interaction between Christianity and the law in the formation of Western marriage and family institutions—a history, by the way, which very few people, religious or secular, understand. In short, Western society is relatively ignorant about its effective history—that which already has formed it—on marriage and family matters. The third step in the practical hermeneutical circle is exemplied by the summary book called From Culture Wars to Common Ground: Religion and the American Family Debate (1997, 2000) which I co-authored with Bonnie Miller-McLemore, Pamela Couture, Bernie Lyon, and Robert Franklin (Browning, Miller-McLemore, Couture, Lyon, & Franklin 2000). This book follows the full circle of the practical-theological project but specializes in a group of descriptive and normative arguments about family, children, and marriage. In the last chapters, it advances 16 strategic-practical theological proposals aimed at both the inner life of the ecclesia as well as the public worlds of politics, government, and business. Other books in our series move into the strategic area as well. Of the three alternative strategies mentioned above—to resist the family changes wrought by modernity, to support and include them, or to both critically resist and selectively support, we chose the last. This is the view I have developed in From Culture Wars to Common Ground and in two subsequent books, Reweaving the Social Tapestry: Toward a Public Philosophy and Policy for Families (Browning & Rodriguez 2002) and Marriage and Modernization: How Globalization Threatens Marriage and What to Do about It (Browning 2003). To resist these changes is, in effect, a countercultural stance on the mission of the church to families. It says that the conspiracy between cultural individualism and technical rationality is neither entirely good nor inevitable. A prophetic ministry must critique these trends. On the other hand, my colleagues and I have taken the stance that there are some features of modernity that are indeed good for families and worth preserving, e.g., more equality for women, better and more universal education, and generally higher standards of living and health

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care, at least for those who do not have these benets jeopardized by family disruption. Hence, our response of resistance was not totalistic; it was selective and not without supportive elements. It followed from the reconstructive and critical hermeneutic retrieval of the marvelous and multidimensional marriage and family tradition of Christianity. On the remaining portions of this lecture, I will try to illustrate a few points about how our reconstruction and critique came about. I will illustrate this reconstructive interpretive process by discussing two important and interrelated issues—1) the role of patriarchy in Christian marriage and 2) the nature of an adequate theology of love for families in the 21st century. Patriarchy We soon discovered new research on the honor-shame cultural background that surrounded early Christianity. It threw light on the role of patriarchy in early Christianity and helped us understand the emerging new trajectory, to use Ricoeur once again, on the nature of love and marital commitment that was opening in the nascent days of the Jesus movement. New Testament scholars Bruce Malina (Malina 1993), Halvor Moxnes (Moxnes 1993, 167–175), and Karl Sandnes (Sandnes 1994) have all employed in their studies the anthropological scholarship on honor-shame cultures developed by J.G. Peristiany, Julian Pitt-Rivers (Peristiany & Pitt-Rivers 1966), David Gilmore (Gilmore 1990), and others. This view sees marital relations in ancient Hellenistic culture, including the Roman-Hellenism in the urban centers of Israel, as dened by a popular ethic that associated male honor with dominance and agency. If a free Greek male’s wife, mother, sister, or daughter were assaulted or insulted, a dominant and honorable Greek male would respond with riposte—with an aggressive defense that might lead to a duel. If he failed to do this, he would be shamed—rendered weak, submissive, and without agency. On the other hand, in this culture it was honorable for women to have or exhibit shame (Osiek and Balch 1997, 38–41). This meant restricting their lives as much as possible to the domestic sphere and submitting to the protection and guidance of husband, father, brother, or uncle. This ethic was pervasive in the civic culture of the Mediterranean world, including the urban centers penetrated by the earlier Christians. There is little doubt that disciples of Jesus and the apostle Paul were to

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some extent inuenced by the surrounding honor-shame culture. But there is also evidence that early Christianity resisted it and fractured it to some extent. The model of servant husband and father found in Ephesians 5:25 reverses the image of the dominant and agentive male. The injunction for husbands to love their wives “as they do their own bodies” (Eph. 5:28) brings the principle of neighbor love into the very interior of marital and family relationships and ies in the face of the aristocratic understanding of husband-wife relations found in Aristotle. The Christian symbols of sacrament and covenant gradually began to develop around the model of the servant husband and father. By the time of Thomas Aquinas, it was used to solidify the virtues of kin altruism, paternal recognition, and paternal care in contrast to the inclinations of male tentativeness about bonding with and caring for the children they bring into the world (Aquinas 1928, 84–94). In reviewing the history of the Christian theology of marriage, time and again one notices that the theologies of sacrament and covenant were used to counter male tentativeness about commitment to the products of their reproductive labor. The collapse of these theologies may have something to do with the emerging worldwide increase in the absence of fathers from the lives of their children, probably the major international family problematic of our time (Browning 2003, 75–76). The central theological and cultural task of an adequate practical theology of families may entail nding ways to maintain the image of the committed servant father without carrying with it the patriarchy that frequently hovered around it. A New Love Ethic In Culture Wars to Common Ground and my other family writings, I have argued that a love ethic of equal regard was the emerging trajectory— the emerging meaning in front of the text—of family and marriage theology in early Christian families. This could be seen in countless little ways—women’s participation in the love feast in the house church (Barton 1986, 74), the emergence of women evangelists, and even in the denials of I Peter that Christians were upsetting the civic culture by giving their wives more freedom, a denial that would have been unnecessary had it not in fact been happening (Balch 1981). The honorshame literature helps illustrate the useful role of the historical-critical method for providing explanatory insights into the background of the

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mode of “being-in-the world” that opened in front of the normative New Testament texts. My colleagues and I developed a normative ethic for marriage around the ideal of love as equal regard. This concept was elaborated more with the neo-Thomistic insights of Louis Janssens than the neo-Kantian insights of Gene Outka, the scholar who rst coined the term for love as “equal regard” (Outka 1972; Janssens 1977). This view requires a strenuous equal regard for the dignity of both husband and wife and equal efforts to open for each the teleological goods of life (Browning et al., 2000, 276–279). This view sees the self-sacricial love required by the cross as a means to the renewal of love as equal regard rather than an end in itself. This ethic provided us with a critique of the impact of modernity on families and marriage as well as an appreciation for some of modernity’s value. Insofar as modernity has helped open the public world of politics and paid employment to women, we saw it as a good. But insofar as modernity absorbs marriage and family into the cost-benet logic of the market or the control mechanisms of the state, we mounted a critique and resistance. We did not recommend a withdrawal of the church from modernity, but advocated introducing a whole range of curtailments to its expanding cultural logics. For instance, we recommended that a 60-hour work week should be provided in the paid economy for couples with children; this 60 hours would be divided exibly between them as a way of relieving the pressures of the market economy on parenting (ibid., 316–318). We advocated a bill of rights for parents who temporarily leave paid employment to care for children that would guarantee tax supports and reentry into the market (ibid., 331). We promoted a variety of marriage education programs, supported by both civil society and the state, that would take marital preparation as seriously—even more seriously—than learning to drive an automobile (ibid., 328–329; Browning 2003, 191–210). Our strategic practical theology, however, did not place all of its constructive emphasis upon curtailing the dynamics of modernization and the systems world. Even more important is the renewal of the marriage and family cultures of Western societies. This, we grew to believe, must be primarily the task of the institutions of civil society, especially its religious institutions. More than anything, the renewal of family and marriage in Western societies must be accomplished through a critical retrieval of our marriage and family traditions, both religious and legal. For the most part, that history and tradition has been lost to

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consciousness even though it still continues silently to function in our effective institutional and personal histories. There is little doubt that Judaism and Christianity have vigorously interacted with Greek, Roman, and German law as well as Aristotelian philosophy to signicantly shape the marriage and family traditions of Western cultures. The fact that mutual consent by the couple, in contrast to arranged marriages by coercive families, became the mark of marriage in late medieval Roman Catholic canon law, is an example of an inuence most of us would value. The fact that Christian missionaries discouraged polygyny amongst the royal families of northern Europe, and hence the hoarding of women by powerful men, had much to do, as historian David Herlihy has pointed out, with the democratization of marriage in Western societies; poor men left out of the marriage market gradually had access to women, married and established families (Herlihy 1985). Most of us would value that accomplishment as well. The historical story of Christian marriage and family is not always a pretty one, but principles for internal critique and reconstruction can be found within the tradition itself. Furthermore, as I point out in my recent Marriage and Modernization, the critical retrieval of the Christian marriage tradition must now go hand-in-hand with the critical retrieval of the other major religious traditions—Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. This should be, in my view of things, a critical-correlational and comparative scholarly endeavor. This conversation is essential both to highlight the distinctive and possible lasting contributions of the Christian tradition but to protect these religions from the public marginalization of their inuence during a time when economic, health, and legal perspectives increasingly are taking over the eld of public discourse about marriage and family. Rightly understood, practical theology in conversation with the empirical sciences should inform our classroom teaching. This conversation should also help us form our practical-theological research projects. In this lecture, I have tried to argue for and illustrate these two points and their interrelation. References Anderson, K., Browning, D.S. & Boyer, B. (2002). Marriage—Just a Piece of Paper? Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans. Aquinas, T. (1928). Summa Contra Gentiles III, ii. London: Burns, Oats, Washbourne.

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Balch, D. (1981). Let Wives be Submissive: The Domestic Code in I Peter. Chico: Scholars Press. Barton, S. (1986). Paul’s Sense of Place: An Anthropological Approach to Community Formation in Corinth. In: New Testament Studies 32, 225–246. Becker, G. (1991). A Treatise of the Family. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bellah, R., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W., Swidler, A. & Tipton, S.M. (1985). Habits of the Heart. Berkeley: University of California Press. Browning, D.S. (1991). A Fundamental Practical Theology. Descriptive and Strategic Proposals. Minneapolis: Fortress. ——— (2003). Marriage and Modernization: How Globalization Threatens Marriage and What to Do about It. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Browning, D.S., Miller-McLemore, B.J., Couture, P., Lyon, B. & Franklin, R. (2000). From Culture Wars to Common Ground: Religion and the American Family Debate. (2nd ed.) Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press. Browning, D.S. & Rodriguez, G.G. (2002). Reweaving the Social Tapestry: Toward a Public Philosophy and Policy for Families. New York: Norton. Bumpass, L.L. (1990). What’s Happening to the Family? Interactions between Demographic and Institutional Change. In: Demography 27, 483–498. Engels, F. (1972). The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. New York: International Publications. Fuchs, O. (2001). Relationship Between Practical Theology and Empirical Research. In: Journal of Empirical Theology 14, 5–19. Gadamer, H.G. (1982). Truth and Method. New York: Crossroad. Giddens, A. (1992). The Transformation of Intimacy. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Gilmore, D.D. (1990). Manhood in the Making. New Haven, London: Yale UP. Goode, W. (1993). World Changes in Divorce Patterns. New Haven: Yale University Press. Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action. Boston: Beacon Press. Hauerwas, S. (1982). A Community of Characters. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University. Herlihy, D. (1985). Medieval Households. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Janssens, L. (1977). Norms and Priorities of a Love Ethics. In: Louvain 6, 207–237. LaCocque, A. & Ricoeur, P. (1998). Thinking Biblically: Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Malina, B. (1993). The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press. McLanahan, S. & Sandefur, G. (1994). Growing up with a Single Parent. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Moxnes, H. (1993). Honor and Shame. In: Biblical Theology Bulletin 23, 167–183. Osiek, C. & Balch, D. (1997). Families in the New Testament World: Households and House Churches. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press. Outka, G. (1972). Agape: An Ethical Analysis. New Haven: Yale University Press. Perdue, L., Blenkinsopp, J., Collins, J.J. & Myers, C. (1997). Families in Ancient Israel. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press. Peristiany, J.G. & Pitt-Rivers, J. (1966). Honor-Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society. United Kingdom: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Posner, R. (1992). Sex and Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ricoeur, P. (1982). Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ricoeur, P. (1987). The Teleological and Deontological Structures of Action: Aristotle and/or Kant? In: A.P. Grifths (Ed.), Contemporary French Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sandnes, K. (1994). A New Family: Conversion and Ecclesiology in the Early Church with CrossComparisons. New York: Peter Lang.

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van der Ven, J.A. (1998). Formation of the Moral Self. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Weitoft, G.R., Hjern, A., Haglund, B., & Rosen, M. (2003). “Mortality, Severe Morbidity and Injury in Children Living with Single Parents in Sweden”: A Population-based Study. In: The Lancet 361, 289–295. Wolfe, A. (1989). Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON RELIGIOUS PRAXIS AND DE-INSTITUTIONALIZED RELIGION

ARE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS RELEVANT IN DAILY LIFE? Stefan Huber The concept of practice is used in different meanings and contexts. It can denote socially dened actions, which serve specic ends and require expertises. Examples are medical practice, business practice or juridical practice. However, practice can also denote the whole activity of an individual, his or her daily “practice of life”. In considering religious practice, we should keep in mind both meanings of practice. First, the religious character of practice depends on the fullment of specic socially dened actions, for instance church attendance or personal prayer. Second, the religious character of practise depends on the relevance of religious contents for the subjective “construction” of reality, including processes of perception, of evaluation, and of experience. The more these processes are mediated by religious concepts and beliefs, the more daily “practise of life” can be characterized as religious. The most extreme case is that all personal constructions of reality are affected by religious constructs. Saints, like Mother Theresa, may be examples of such cases. The article presented is concerned with the second meaning of religious practice. The focus of interest is on the discussion of a measurement method for the investigation of the relevance of religious beliefs in daily life. It discusses three main topics: 1. First, a psychological model of religiosity will be sketched. It is inspired by the “Psychology of Personal Constructs” by George Kelly (1955). The core of the model is the distinction between centrality and content of religiosity (Huber, 2003). The central thesis proposes that the practical relevance of religious beliefs depends on the position of the religious construct-system within the hierarchy of all construct-systems of a specic personality. Only if the religious construct-system is situated in a central position, religious beliefs can be powerful enough to inuence subjective experience and behavior. 2. Second, the measurement of the centrality of the religious construct-system is discussed, referring to the ve core-dimensions of religiosity as dened by Glock and Stark (1968). It is rst argued

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that these dimensions are a representative cross-section of the activation of an individual’s religious construct-system, and, second, that with increasing frequency and intensity of activation the religious construct system can be assumed as being more central in personality. 3. Finally, two examples of applications of the model and its operationalisation are presented. The rst example depicts that religious beliefs have a high and consistent self-reported inuence on diverse areas of life such as family, career and sexuality only if the religious construct-system is in a central position, both in theological and non-theological students. The second example reveals that the specic religious content “experience of a forgiving God” substantially correlates the willingness to forgive other people only in subjects with central religious construct-system. A Constructivist Model of the Practical Relevance of Religious Beliefs The model for the investigation of the practical relevance of subjective religious beliefs refers to the “psychology of personal constructs” by George Kelly (1955). Kelly’s approach to psychology of personality is fruitful for empirical research in theology as it allows considering the psychological function of religious contents in a non-reductive way. Kelly’s phenomenological and constructivist model emphasizes the personal perspective of the individual. His fundamental postulate is that a person’s experiences and behaviors depend radically on his or her constructions of reality. In this framework, faith and religious beliefs are considered as specic ways of construing reality. The constructivist model of personal religiosity refers to the following basic concepts: – Personal construct: A personal construct is a pattern or schema antic pating events. Psychologically, it works simultaneously on a conscious and an unconscious level of personality. An unconscious process is the structuring of the personal eld of perception. Hereby remain specic alternatives of action conceivable whereas other alternatives of actions become inconceivable. Conscious processes, in contrast, serve two purposes: They assess the conceivable alternatives of action and determine which course of action are taken. – Personal construct-system: A personal construct-system is a group of personal constructs with a common range of mutually interrelated

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meanings. One example is the “family construct-system”. It consists of all personal constructs related to family life. Another example is the “religious construct-system”, consisting of all personal constructs related to personal religiosity. – Personality: In the perspective of the psychology of personal constructs, personality depends on the mutual relations of all personal constructs and construct-systems. In these relations, Kelly assumes hierarchical structures. This means that some construct-systems are in central or super-ordinate position whereas other construct-systems are subordinate. If a construct-system is in super-ordinate position, it inuences the function of subordinate construct-systems. I.e., the super-ordinate construct-system determines the activation of a subordinate construct: it determines rst in which situations, second to what means, and third to what intensity a subordinate construct is used for the anticipation of future events. In this constructivist perspective, religiosity is considered as an expression of the individual’s religious construct-system. This construct-system consists of all personal constructs which are related to the realm of religion and religiosity. It is fruitful to differentiate between the aspects of centrality and oft content of the individual’s religious constructsystem: – The concept of centrality overlaps with concepts like intrinsic religious orientation (Allport and Ross, 1967), salience, and importance of religion. They all deal with the efcacy of religion in personality, which denotes the impact of religious contents on subjective experience and behaviour in general. – The concept of content is related to the behavioural direction of religion. Religious contents can be beliefs, schemas, styles, and orientations. They are always related to a certain direction that religion leads a person’s actions and emotions into. For instance, it can be assumed that the belief in a merciful and forgiving God causes different emotions as the belief in a wrathful and punishing God. In the framework of the “psychology of personal constructs”, the practical relevance of religious beliefs depends on the positioning of the religious construct-system in the cognitive architecture of personality. If placed in a central position, personal religious constructs have an intense and broad inuence on experience and behavior. First, religious constructs have an intense inuence because there are hardly any

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Religion

Family Nature

Sexuality

Foreigners

Career Fellows

Figure 1. Central position of the religious construct system (ideal typical depiction)

construct-systems in a relative super-ordinate position which could restrict the religious construct-system. Therefore, it inuences other constructsystems in a genuine way. In Figure 1, this is symbolized by bold arrows, which are drawn from the religious construct-system to other constructsystems. Second, religious constructs have a broad inuence because there are many construct-systems in a relative subordinate position. Thus, the personal elds of perception, of action, and of experience often appear in a religious light. In Figure 1, this is symbolized by the broad variety of different areas of life, which are marked in the same light grey as the religious construct-system. In contrast, if placed in a subordinate position, personal religious constructs only have a weak and restricted inuence on subjective experience and behavior. First, inuence is weak because there are many construct-systems in a relative super-ordinate position which restrict the religious construct-system. In Figure 2, this is symbolized by three construct-systems in dark grey (family life, relation to nature, and another non-religious construct-system, for instance the personal morality). Second, the inuence is narrow because there are only a few construct-systems in a relative subordinate position which are exclusively

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non-religious system

Family Career Nature Sexuality Foreigners

Fellows

Religion

Figure 2. Subordinated position of the religious construct system (ideal typical depiction)

determined by the religious construct-system. Thus, in contrast to Figure 1, the personal elds of perception, of action and of experience mostly appear in a non-religious light. In Figure 2, this is symbolized by the narrowness of the region in light grey. The Measurement of the Centrality of the Religious Construct System Theoretically, it seems evident that religious believes should have much more practical relevance if they are part of a central religious constructsystem than if they are part of a subordinated religious construct-system. Therefore, empirical research concerning this distinction appears fruitful. However, to conduct such research, a well validated method for the measurement of the centrality of the religious construct-system in personality is needed, which is proposed below. The operationalisation of the measurement of centrality of the religious construct-system in personality can refer to the ve core dimensions or basic expressions of religiosity as dened by Stark and Glock (1968): The ideological, experiential, devotional (prayer), ritual

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(church attendance), and intellectual dimension.1 In the Centrality Scale presented here, each of these dimensions is operationalized using two indicators (see Table 1), with all ve dimensions being equally weighted. This approach is theoretically based on two assumptions: – First, the ve core dimensions of religiosity indicate a representative cross-section of the activation of the individual’s religious constructsystem. This means that by measuring the ve dimensions we cover religious behavior extensively. – Second, the higher the frequency and intensity of activation of the religious construct-system of a individual is, the greater is the likelihood that the religious construct-system is central in personality. Therefore, by measuring these ve dimensions, we can justiably estimate the grade of centrality of the religious construct-system of a individual. Table 1. Centrality Scale (Cronbach’s Alpha = .93; N = 806) Dimension Ideological

Experiential

Devotional (prayer) Ritual (church attendance) Intellectual

Items In your opinion, how probable is it – that God truly exists and is not simply a product of human imagination? – that there is life after death? How often do you experience situations where you have the feeling – that God wants to tell something to you? – that God intervenes in your life? How often do you pray? How important is the personal prayer for you? How often do you take part in religious services? How important is it to you to take part in religious services? How often do you think about religious questions? How interested are you in learning more about religious questions?

1 In the discussion of the multidimensional structure of religion, a minor shift can be observed from Glock (1962) to Stark and Glock (1968). Glock (1962) discussed the intellectual, ideological, experiential, ritual, and consequential dimension as basic expressions of religion. Stark and Glock (1968) changed two aspects of this multidimensional structure of religion. First they excluded the consequential dimension from their reection of the inner structure of religiosity. Second they split the former ritual dimension in prayer as private religious practice (i.e. the devotional dimension) and church attendance as public religious practice (i.e. the “new” ritual dimension).

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The crucial point of this measurement strategy is the construct validity or specic wording of the indicators. Wording should cover the dimensions in a very general way, as to minimize confoundations with specic forms and contents of the ve dimensions. This requirement has to be met in order to ensure that most of the diverse possible specic activations of the religious construct-system are captured by the measurement of the ve dimensions. – The ideological dimension is constituted by the expectation that a religious person holds to certain beliefs. Possible relevant beliefs for the personal construct-system are of broad variety and can be contradictory, e.g., belief in a personal vs. impersonal God, or belief in a merciful and forgiving vs. a wrathful and punishing God, making the design of a general measurement of this dimension difcult. However, the restriction of the wording of the indicators to the mere plausibility of a transcendent reality offers a possibility to overcome this problem. Especially appropriate for this purpose are questions about the probability of the existence of God and life after death. These measures of the ideological dimension reveal the individual’s accessibility to a transcendent frame of reference. The more plausible the existence of a transcendent reality is, the easier is it to use a transcendent frame of reference without cognitive dissonance. – The experiential dimension is related to the expectation that the religious person has some kind of direct contact to an ultimate reality. This contact comprises a variety of feelings, perceptions, and sensations, e.g., positive feelings like trust, joy, and gratitude, but also negative feelings like fear, guilt and anger. A general measure of the experiential dimension thus should refrain from any mention of specic forms of contact to an ultimate reality. The wording of the indicators therefore focus only on the abstract description of two typical situations of contact with an ultimate reality, measuring the extend of personal validation of a transcendent frame of reference. The more frequent religious experiences a person has, the more his or her transcendent frame of reference is enforced. Hence, it can be assumed to be more stable. – The devotional dimension primarily concerns personal prayer. Like the ideological and experiential dimensions, the devotional dimension involves a variety of different contents, for example petition, thanks, lamentation, and accusation. A general measure of this dimension should refrain from any content of prayer and focus on the intensity and frequency of this private religious practice only. This measure reveals

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a person’s actual use of a transcendent frame of reference, because prayer is one of the most obvious constructions of a transcendent reality. The more a person prays the more he or she approaches the full potential of a transcendent frame of reference. – The ritual dimension primarily concerns church attendance. A general measure can refer to questions about the frequency and importance of this type of religious practice. The dimensions of ideology, experience and devotion can be practiced on one’s own. They are primarily related to individual piety. In contrast, the public practice of church attendance indicates the integration of a person’s religiosity into a social network and the social stabilization of a transcendent frame of reference. Thus, this dimension is an important complement to the other, more private, dimensions of religiosity. – The intellectual dimension is related to the expectation that a religious person has some knowledge about his or her faith and religion. Glock restricted this dimension primarily to the aspect of religious knowledge. He differentiates between different kinds and qualities of knowledge. For instance, knowledge about the Bible, on the one hand, and knowledge about critical literature on religion, on the other and. It can be argued that the intellectual dimension is broader than the aspect of knowledge. In a more general sense, it is related to “religious literacy”—that means the ability to apply the vocabulary and grammar of religious symbols to specic situations in daily life. Religious literacy also includes the competence to reect religious questions and the ability to apply religious meanings to specic situations. Thus, the intellectual dimension is connected to the theoretical construct of quest-religiosity (Batson & Schoenrade, 1992). A general measure of this dimension can refer to questions about the frequency and the importance of a behavioral intellectual approach to religion. In three items the Centrality Scale explicitly refers to the concept of God, whereas in the remaining items God is more or less preconditioned. This restricts the applicability of the Centrality Scale to construct-systems which deal with a transcendent frame of reference but excludes other types of religious construct-systems. Its scope of application includes especially the religious cultures of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.2

2 The applicability of the Centrality Scale for other religious cultures is a question which should be investigated empirically. One rst step in this direction is the study by Anthony (2004 April) which was conducted in the multireligious culture of Tamil Nadu

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The Centrality Scale was validated rst in 1999 in a study with a random sample of 806 students of the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). 49 percent of the participants were female, the mean age was 26 (SD = 5). 111 studied theology, 695 other topics. In this study, the Centrality Scale was found to have good psychometric properties. First, its reliability is very high (Cronbach’s ƣ = 0.93).3 Second, as shown in Table 2, the constructvalidity of the scale is also very good, as it correlates strongly with the religious self-concept and with daily consequences of religiosity. The religious self-concept measurement was operationalized by means of one-item (“Overall, as how religious would you describe yourself ?”). The daily consequences of religiosity were operationalized through a scale questioning the personal relevance of religious beliefs in different areas of life as family, politics and so on. Both measures can be seen as complementary ways of the operationalisation of measurement of the centrality of religiosity.4 Table 2. Correlations of the Centrality Scale with validation criteria (N = 784) Validation criteria Religious self-concept Consequences of religiosity Centrality Scale

0.87***

0.84***

***: The correlation coefcient is highly signicant with p < 0.001.

(India) with more than 1900 students belonging to Christian, Hindu and Islamic religious traditions. In this study, a modied version of the Centrality Scale was tested. 3 Meanwhile, the psychometric quality of the Centrality Scale has been tested among numerous samples with more than 7,000 respondents (for a rst review, see Huber, 2004, for a detailed discussion of the psychometric properties of the Centrality Scale and its ve subscales, see Huber, 2003, pp. 223–303). On the level of the subscales, the measurement of the ve dimensions of religiosity by two items each is very reliable (.79 < ƣ < 91). The discriminant validity of the ve subscales is proved as well. Thus, the Centrality Scale not only measures the centrality of the religious construct-system, but also provides reliable and valid information about the multidimensional structure of religiosity by means of its ve subscales. This inner structure of religiosity has also been tested by a series of conrmative factor-analyses on the level of latent variables (Huber, 2003, pp. 270–301). First of all, a model consisting of ve oblique factors outclasses a one-dimensional model. Therefore, the ve dimensions of religiosity are relatively autonomous. Secondly, it is shown that the covariance of the ve relatively autonomous dimensions can be explained by a secondary factor. This secondary factor represents the centrality of the religious construct-system. Therefore, the ve dimensions are also relatively dependant on the centrality of the religious construct-system. 4 These extremely high correlations emphasize the relationship of the centrality concept with Gordon Allport’s concept of an intrinsically motivated religiosity (Allport & Ross, 1967). Since the religious self-concept and the daily consequences of religiosity are crucial elements of Gordon Allport’s theoretical construct of intrinsic religiosity, the Centrality Scale can also be used for the measurement of intrinsic religiosity.

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The Centrality Scale delivers a linear and continuous measurement of the degree of the centrality of the religious construct-system. However, based on theoretical considerations the raw measurement can be transformed to deliver a categorical and discontinuous measurement of distinct positions of the religious construct-system in personality. Respondents can be divided into three groups, either with a central position (see Figure 1), or with a subordinate position of the religious construct-system (see Figure 2), and nally into a group where hardly any religious construct-system exists.5 – Group I (central position of the religious construct-system): In the outline of the constructivist model of religiosity, we postulate that the religious construct-system is not restricted by super-ordinate construct-systems if it is in a central position in personality. Then, the religious construct-system alone controls the intensity and frequency of the ve dimensions of religiosity, thus leading to a homogenization of the ve dimensions. Resulting, most of the dimensions should be consistently high. Hence, a high score on the Centrality Scale (approximately 30–40 points) should reect a central position of the religious construct-system. – Group II (subordinate position of the religious construct-system): If the religious construct-system is in a subordinate position, its function is restricted through other super-ordinate construct-systems. The activation of the ve dimensions of religiosity is therefore not under the exclusive control of the religious construct-system, but rather under the control of alternating non-religious construct-systems. This should lead to different sets of values in the ve dimensions

5 A theoretical explanation of the measurement of different categorical grades of the centrality of religiosity gives Wimberley (1989). Wimberley assumes that performance on the ve religious dimensions depends on two factors: rst on the salience of the religious identity and second on the relations between costs and benets. Moreover, he assumes that with increasing salience the inuence of the cost-benet relation decreases. In the borderline case of a highly salient religious identity, the second factor of inuence should loose its impact almost completely. In this case, one can expect the forming of the ve dimensions to be consistently high, since only the rst factor should still have impact. There is a great intersection between the concepts of “religious identity salience” and “centrality of the religious construct-system”. Therefore, Wimberley’s argumentation can also be applied to a theoretical explanatory statement about a categorical measurement of religious construct-systems in a central position in personality. The two other positions of the religious construct-system (marginal and subordinated) can be dened analogously. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Huber (2003, pp. 153–157, 199–201 and 253–264).

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because each individual dimension should be inuenced by a different super-ordinate construct-system. Hence, a medium score on the Centrality Scale (approximately 11–29 points) should reect a subordinated position of the religious construct-system. – Group III (marginal position of the religious construct-system) involves people having no or only a marginal religious constructsystem. Here it is assumed that this person scores consistently low on most of the ve dimensions. Hence, a low score on the Centrality Scale (approximately 0–10 points) should reect a marginal position of the religious construct-system. The resulting categorical measure enables a empirical research strategy concerning the dialectical relationship between the aspects of the centrality and the specic content of the religious construct-system. It allows the empirical test of the hypothesis, that religious beliefs are only then relevant for the individual’s general experiences and behaviors if the religious construct-system is in a central position in personality by contrasting groups with central and subordinated positions of the religious construct-system. Two Applications of the Constructivist Model and its Operationalisation In the following, two applications of the constructivist model of religiosity and its operationalisation are discussed. It focuses on the question if the religious construct-system has enough power to inuence individuals’ general experiences and behaviors. As discussed above, the following general hypotheses are proposed: – If the religious construct-system obtains a central position in personality, religious beliefs inuence daily life very intensely and take on a broad scope (see Figure 1). – If the religious construct-system obtains a subordinate position in personality, religious beliefs inuence daily life with only moderate intensity and take on a narrow scope (see Figure 2). – If there is no religious construct-system or only a marginal one in personality, religious beliefs hardly inuence daily life.

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The Self-reported Inuence of Religious Beliefs on Diverse Areas of Daily Life First, the constructivist model of religiosity is used to investigate the self-reported inuence of religious beliefs on diverse areas of daily life. In the study mentioned in the last section, the students of the University of Fribourg in Switzerland additionally were asked to report secular consequences of their religious beliefs by posing the following question: “To what extent do you allow your religious beliefs to inuence your life?” Response categories with regard to seven areas of life were provided: family, nature, foreigners, fellow students, career, sexuality and politics.6 This allows the analysis of the self-reported inuence of religious beliefs on daily life in dependence of the categorical measurement of the position of the religious construct-system. The intensity of the self-reported inuence of religious beliefs were measured by the means of the responses of the students over the seven areas of daily life (results are depicted in Tables 3 and 4). The higher the mean, the higher is the intensity of reported inuence. Likewise, the scope of the inuence of religious beliefs can be evaluated by the standard deviation (SD) of the mean of the respective groups (see Tables 3 and 4). The lower the SD, the broader is the scope of religious beliefs. Further the impact of religious beliefs on the specic areas of daily life is depicted in Figures 3 and 4. All results will be displayed separately according the categorical measurement of the three positions of the religious construct-system (marginal, subordinated, central). Further, the results concerning the theology and non-theology students will be discussed separately, because for the students of theology a special relationship to the subject of religiosity can be assumed due to their professional role model. The results from the non-theology students can be interpreted as follows (see Table 3 and Figure 3). – Marginal position of the religious construct-system: 26% of the nontheology students scored very low on the Centrality Scale; therefore only a marginal religious construct-system can be assumed. Religion played such a negligible part in their seven areas of life, that the students received scores near zero concerning the self reported inuence

6 For their answers they had a scale from zero to four—that means from “not at all” to “very”. The complete wording of the scale: 0 = not at all, 1 = hardly, 2 = a bit, 3 = quite a lot, 4 = very.

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Table 3. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the self-reported inuence of religious beliefs on six different areas of life among non-theology students (n = 6 87). Position of the religious construct-system (proportion of students in percent)

Non-theology students M SD

Marginal (26%)

0.28 (0.31)a

0.19 (0.19)a

Subordinated (62%)

1.13 (1.20)a

0.44 (0.44)a

Central (12%)

2.55 (2.65)a

0.35 (0.22)a

M and SD if the life-area “politics” is excluded from the analysis.

Inuence of religious beliefs

a

4

Position of the religious construct system in personality: subordinated (62%) marginal (26%)

central (12%)

3 2 1 0 family

nature

fellow career students Areas of life

foreigners

sexuality

politics

Figure 3. Inuence of religious beliefs on different areas of life among non-theology students.

of religious beliefs in daily life. This conrms the prediction that in this group religious beliefs do not inuence daily life. Additionally, the low standard deviation indicates that this result uniformly applies to all of the seven areas investigated. – Subordinated position of the religious construct-system: 62% of the non-theology students can be classied as having a subordinated religious construct-system, in the score of the Centrality Scale being high enough to indicate the existence of a religious construct-system but not high enough to postulate a central position. Regarding the questions concerning the seven areas of life, this group achieved an average mean of 1.13, indicating religious beliefs being hardly relevant for daily life. Nonetheless, the relatively high standard deviation indicates that in some of the seven areas, religious beliefs may have some relevance for life. Figure 3 reveals that religious beliefs had the greatest inuence in the areas of nature, family and foreigners.

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In these three areas the mean rises to approximately 1.7—tending towards the next answer-category of “a bit”. On the other hand, the weakest inuences of religious beliefs are found in the areas of career, sexuality and politics with a mean value of only 0.7. These results conrm the hypothesis that religious beliefs inuence daily life with moderate intensity and a narrow scope when the religious construct-system is in a subordinate position. – Central position of the religious construct-system: 12% of the non-theology students yielded a score of the Centrality Scale high enough that a central position of the religious construct-system could be assumed. In this group, the mean over the seven areas is very high between the answers “a bit” and “quite a lot”, revealing religious beliefs to be relevant to daily life. In addition, the relatively low standard deviation indicates that this result applies to most of the seven areas. The data for the seven areas of life reveals that the religious construct-system has actually a very broad scope. In six out of seven areas, the mean varies between 2.6 and 3.0 tending towards the answer category “quite a lot”. An exception is the area of “politics” with a mean of only 1.9. If we exclude this area from the calculation of the standard deviation, this coefcient decreases from 0.35 to a very low 0.22. Table 4. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the self-reported inuence of religious beliefs on different areas of life among theology students (n = 106). Position of the religious construct-system (proportion of students in percent) Marginal (0%)

Theology students M

SD

–

–

Subordinated (14%)

a

1.55 (1.59)

0.57 (0.62)a

Central (86%)

3.00 (3.05)a

0.21 (0.18)a

a

M and SD if the life-area “politics” is excluded from the analysis.

Let us now consider the results of the students of theology (see Table 4 and Figure 4), generally indicating the same pattern as for the other students. – Marginal position of the religious construct-system: Not surprising, none of the theology students displayed a sufcient low score to be classied as having a marginal religious construct-system.

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Inuence of religious beliefs

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4

Position of the religious construct system in personality: subordinated (14%) central (86%)

3 2 1 0

family

nature

fellow career students Areas of life

foreigners

sexuality

politics

Figure 4. Inuence of religious beliefs on different areas of life among theology students.

– Subordinated position of the religious construct-system: Anyway, 14% of the theology students could be classied as having a subordinated position of the religious construct-system. Regarding the questions concerning the seven areas of life, this group achieved an average mean of 1.5, a value being somewhat higher than the one of the non-theology students, but low enough to conclude that, on average, religious beliefs are hardly relevant for daily life. In addition, the standard deviation of 0.57 indicates that there is a big variation in the relevance in daily life. Figure 4 reveals that religious beliefs have the greatest inuence in the areas of nature, family life, and in relation to foreigners. On the other hand, the weakest inuence of religious beliefs was found in the areas of fellow students, career, sexuality and politics. This is a pattern similar to the non-theology students with a subordinate position and indicates that even for some theology students religious beliefs inuence daily life with medium intensity and a narrow scope only, if the religious construct-system has a subordinate position in personality. – Central position of the religious construct-system: The assumption that most theology students have a central position of the religious construct-system is supported as this is the case for 86% of the respondents. In this group the average mean of the self-reported impact of religion on seven areas of life is very high and the standard deviation is very low, conrming the hypothesis that a religious construct-system in a central position inuences daily life with high intensity and a broad scope.

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In sum, the results conrm the hypotheses presented in the beginning of this section, showing the dependency of inuence of religious beliefs on daily life on centrality of a person’s religious construct system. This results hold both for non-theology students as well as for theology students indicating the stability of the proposed constructivist model of religiosity and the validity of the categorical measurement of the position of the religious construct-system in the cognitive architecture of the individual. This strengthens the model as general psychological model. The Inuence of Experiencing the Content of a “Forgiving God” The second application of the constructivist model of religiosity is the investigation of the relation between the experience of the specic religious content of a forgiving God and the willingness to forgive other people. Is the experience of a forgiving God substantially correlated with the general disposition to forgive other people? Based on the constructivist model of religiosity, it is predicted that the inuence of the experience of a forgiving God depends on the positioning of the religious construct-system in personality. – For subjects with a central religious construct-system a substantial correlation between the experience of a forgiving God and the disposition to forgive other people is predicted. – For subjects with a subordinate religious construct-system, a low correlation between the experience of a forgiving God and the disposition to forgive other people is predicted. In addition to the Centrality Scale, the following two scales were used to investigate the hypotheses: First, a four-item scale for the measurement of the intensity of the “experience of a forgiving God” with high reliability (Cronbachs-Alpha = 0.93) and second, a eight-item scale for the measurement of the general disposition to forgive other people with high reliability (Cronbachs-Alpha is 0.92). These scales were additionally administered in a pilot study of the Structure-of-Religiosity-Test (S-R-T)7 in 2003 with 101 respondents, who belonged to a convenience 7 The basic idea of the S-R-T is the differentiation between centrality and contents of religiosity (Huber, 2003 August). The S-R-T provides mutually independent measures of both factors of religiosity. The centrality-factor is measured by the Centrality Scale. The content-factor is measured by a variety of other scales, capturing the following contents of religiosity: religious quest, images of God, fundamentalism, parish as a

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sample. 52 percent of the participants were female, the mean of the age was 36 (SD = 15). To test the hypotheses, only these respondents with a subordinate or a central position of the religious construct-system were selected for analysis. Respondents with a marginal religious construct-system were excluded for two reasons: rst, this group with only nine respondents was very small. Second, the assumption that there would be experiences of a forgiving God from respondents with a marginal religious construct-system seemed very implausible. The results conrm the hypotheses (see Table 5): – In the group with a subordinate position of the religious constructsystem, the correlation between the experience of a forgiving God and forgivingness of r = 0.16 was not signicant. – In the group with a central position of the religious constructsystem, the correlation between the experience of a forgiving God and forgivingness was substantial and very signicant—it amounted to 0.41. Table 5. Correlations of the experience of a forgiving God with forgivingness by a central and subordinated position of the religious construct system (N = 83).

Degree of the experience of a forgiving God

Position of the religious construct system in personality

Degree of forgivingness (general disposition to forgive)

Subordinated position (n = 39):

0.16ns

Central position (n = 44):

0.41**

ns

The correlation coefcient is not signicant. ** The correlation coefcient is very signicant with p < 0.01.

social resource, and themes of personal prayer and religious experience (approach themes: help, guidance, praise, forgiveness, granting of prayers; avoidance themes: punishment, fear, quarrel, wrath, guilt). The S-R-T is already tested in German and Turkish. Translations of S-R-T-Scales are available in Arab, Czech, Dutch, English, French, Indonesian, Italian, Polish, Russian, and in Spanish.

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The article proposes a measurement model to investigate the practical relevance of religious beliefs (cf. Huber, 2003). It distinguishes between the aspects of centrality and of specic contents of religious beliefs. Psychologically, religious beliefs are dened as “personal constructs” (Kelly, 1955). According to Kelly’s theory, the centrality of the religious construct-system in the cognitive architecture of the individual is decisive for the practical relevance of the specic contents of personal religious constructs. It is assumed that in a central position, the contents of religious constructs determine self-image and structure diverse areas of life, such as family, career and sexuality. Conversely, in a subordinate position, religious constructs are not relevant for the self-image of a person and inuence life only insignicantly. The operationalization of this model refers to the intensity and consistency of ve core dimensions of religiosity, as dened by Stark and Glock (1968). This approach relies on a substantial denition of religion. Thus, the “Centrality Scale” can’t be used for every kind of religion, its scope of application is restricted to the Abrahamitic type of religion with an explicit transcendent frame of reference. Other types of religion, e.g. Buddhist, “new age” or implicit religiosity are not covered. While this may be regarded as a disadvantage of the scale because of a reduced potential of possible inter-religious comparisons, it can be argued that the restriction to the Abrahamitic religions leads to a very high validity of the Centrality Scale within these religious cultures. The extreme high correlation with the content free question concerning the self description as being religious (r = .87, see Table 2) underlines this. Thus, the Centrality Scale suggests itself as powerful tool for further research in the eld of (Abrahamitic) religion. The most important innovation the article proposes is the categorical measurement of distinct positions of the religious construct-system in personality. This opens the door for empirical analyses of the dynamics of religious contents on these distinct positions of the religious construct-system, especially for comparative analyses of the central and subordinated position. This new measurement strategy was applied in two studies. In the rst study, religious beliefs had a high and consistent self-reported inuence on diverse areas of the students’ lives, only if the religious construct-system was central in personality. The generalizability of this result is rather high for three reasons. First, the sample was a random sample of all students of the University of Fribourg in Switzer-

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land; thus it can be generalised not only for students’ religiosity in this part of Switzerland, but supposedly for students’ religiosity in Western Europe too. Second, the result holds both for students of theology and for non-theology students; thus it can be seen as a general psychological model, which is not inuenced by religious roles. And, third, predictions of the proposed psychological model were not only assured by the results regarding the intensity of the inuence operationalized by the means over different areas of life but also by the specic pattern of the standard deviation over the seven areas. Thus, two different predictions of the model were approved successfully by measurements of independent parameters. On the other side, a weakness of the results consists in the fact that they are based on self-reported inuence of religious beliefs on daily life only. Thus it could be argued that the responses of the highly religious respondents are primarily driven by expectations how a religious person should answer and not by the real inuence religious beliefs has on their daily life. As it is the case with all questionnaire studies, the actual inuence may be different from the self-reported inuence. The second study portrays a research design, which is more robust against socially originated expectations. Of course, the answers to the items of a scale are under the conscious and direct control of the respondent. Thus, the sore of a scale often reects social expectations. However, the correlations between different scales are hardly consciously controllable by the respondent. Because of this reason, the comparison of correlation coefcients as displayed in Table 5 allows a more objective empirical test of the validity of the categorical measurement of distinct positions of the religious construct-system. The result of the second study met the theoretical expectations. The content “experience of a forgiving God” signicantly correlates with the willingness to forgive other people only in the group with a central position of the religious construct-system (see Table 5). Further, the high effect size (r = .41) underlines the psychological relevance of religious contents in the group with a central position of the religious construct-system. Thus, further research should pay more attention to this group of respondents. Of course, the sample size in the latter study was small. Therefore the reported result should be replicated in studies with other samples in future. These studies should not only investigate the relevance of the content “experience of a forgiving God” but also the relevance of other religious contents, e.g., the role of religious anxiety which supposedly could be correlated with anxiety as a general psychological

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trait. The systematic continuation of research in this way promises the emergence of a comprehensive picture displaying the dialectical relationship between the centrality and specic contents of personal religious construct-systems. The Centrality Scale and the research design of study 2 can be powerful tools in this endeavour. References Allport, G.W., & Ross, J.M. (1967). Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5, 432–443. Anthony, F.V. (2004, April). Empirical Analysis of Religious Praxis in a Multireligious Context. Presentation of the Conceptual Framework, Tools and some Results of an Empirical Study of the Religious Praxis of College-going Youth in the Multireligious Context of Tamil Nadu, India. Paper presented at the second Congress of The International Society for Empirical Research in Theology (ISERT) in April 22–24, 2004 at the University of Bielefeld, Germany. Batson, C.D., & Schoenrade, P. (1991). Measuring Religion as Quest: 2. Reliability Concerns. In: Journal for the Scientic Study of Religion 30, 430–447. Glock, Ch. Y. (1962). On the Study of Religious Commitment. In: Religious Education: Research Supplement 42, 98–110. Huber, S. (2003). Zentralität und Inhalt. Ein neues multidimensionales Messmodell der Religiosität [Centrality and content. A new multidimensional model for the measurement of religiosity]. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. ——— (2003, August). The “Structure-of-Religiosity Test” (S-R-T). An Instrument for Measuring Centrality and a Variety of Contents of Religiosity. Paper presented at the Congress of the International Association for the Psychology of Religion in August 28–31, 2003 in Glasgow, Scotland. ——— (2004). Zentralität und Inhalt. Eine Synthese der Messmodelle von Allport und Glock [Centrality and content. A synthesis of the measurement models by Allport and Glock]. In: C. Zwingmann & H. Moosbrugger (Eds.), Religiosität: Messverfahren und Studien zu Gesundheit und Lebensbewältigung. Neue Beiträge zur Religionspsychologie [Religiosity: measuring strategies and studies about health and coping with life. New contributions to the psychology of religion] (pp. 79–105). Münster: Waxmann. Kelly, G.A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. New York: Norton. Stark, R., & Glock, Ch. Y. (1968). American Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment. Berkeley/Los Angeles. Wimberley, D.W. (1989). Religion and Role-Identity: A Structural Symbolic Interactionist Conceptualisation of Religiosity. In: The Sociological Quarterly 30, 125–142.

RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT IN A LIFESPAN PERSPECTIVE Ulrich Feeser-Lichterfeld, Tobias Kläden & Anke Terörde Research on the development of religious attitudes and religious practice throughout an individual’s lifespan has drawn attention to an interesting phenomenon: while cognitive dimensions undergo signicant changes right up to old age, behavioural dimensions show a higher constancy throughout life. This is an important result of the research project “Religious Development in Adulthood” (“Religiöse Entwicklung im Erwachsenenalter”; see Fürst, Wittrahm, Feeser-Lichterfeld & Kläden [Eds.], 2003), in which 135 biographical interviews were carried out with women and men from birth cohorts 1930–35 and 1950–55 respectively. Contrary to the widespread opinion “religiousness increases with age”, it showed a variety of different—often still changing—individualised types of religious beliefs in these cohorts. After preliminary remarks on the relevance of gerontological research for practical theology we will present the theoretical framework as well as main results of the research project “Religious Development in Adulthood”, which was conducted from 1999 to 2003. In a second step we will give a short insight into the planned research project “Religious Rituals in Late Life in a Pluralistic Society”, which will focus on describing the practice of religious rituals (as well as their varying cultural forms) of older people in pluralistic societies. Furthermore, the development of ritual practice throughout life and the specic meanings and functions of religious rituals for the process of ageing will be examined. This project aims at investigating the possibly existing phenomenon of “desire for rituals” during the process of ageing by exploring related attitudes, practices and symbolic actions—especially considering the socio-cultural position of rituals between “traditional custom” and “modern events”. This paper will conclude with a short summary and an outlook on the theoretical as well as practical implications which result from the research projects.

232 ulrich feeser-lichterfeld, tobias kläden & anke terörde Why Should Practical Theology Focus on Gerontological Research? Three preliminary remarks will explain the focus on gerontological research at the Department of Pastoral Theology at the University of Bonn: a) Statistics of the demographic development indicate the relevance of the topic. For example, the population of Germany will decrease from at present 82,5 million to approximately 75 million inhabitants by the year 2050. Half of the population will be more than 48 years old, every third inhabitant 60 years of age or older. While today there are 44 pensioners for every 100 gainfully employed persons, this ratio will shift to 78:100 by the year 2050. Without any doubt the rapidly increasing average age of the population poses a great challenge not only to the German society but also—to a certain extent—to all of the countries in the western hemisphere. Although these societies can, on the one hand, be described as “turning grey”, they are, on the other, characterised by a continuous youth cult and the maintenance of a stereotyped and often negative perception of older adults. This dramatic development, which is increasingly becoming part of everyday life, seems to be one of the reasons why these societies are only insufciently able to meet the challenges caused by an ageing population. Thus, a theology which is embedded in this ageing society has to take into account the overall life-situation and—as part of this—the religious development of the people. b) Despite the demographic development of western societies during the last few decades, the prime of life is still regarded to be around 40 years of age, while late life is mostly associated with negative age-based stereotypes such as sickness, loss and nancial burdens. However, a more detailed look at the lives and fates of older women and men reveals the diversity of ageing and its “many faces”. According to modern concepts within gerontology research one may state: “Burden and pleasure, joy and sorrow, giving and receiving, gaining and losing—and behind everything the search for meaning” (Kleinemas & Rudinger, 2003, 139). From the point of view of modern gerontology, the process of ageing does not take a unidirectional course and is not characterised in a one-sided way by a decline of physical and mental resources. Rather, one has to proceed from the assumption that the development throughout a person’s life is multidirectional and characterised by experiences of loss as well as gain in the different areas of personal performance (including various ways of mutual compensation). Furthermore, the

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life-long development of individual abilities and personality does, to a large extent, depend on contextual factors, which may present chances as well as limits of growth. c) To reect upon the situation of older adults and the process of ageing from a theological-anthropological perspective presents a signicant challenge for the discipline of practical theology. Even though the church has invested efforts into re-framing the pastoral care of older adults there is still all too often a gap between reality and ideals, and the pastoral care of older adults is understood as pastoral care of a fringe group. Considering the age-structure of those taking part in church services, as well as of priests, one may well speak of an “ageing church”—which might even be considered as growing older faster than society itself. In the face of this “ageing church” pastoral care, theology and the church itself are strongly called upon to enter into a dialogue and make a constructive contribution to shaping a “culture of ageing”. These reections mark the starting point of the research program of the Department of Pastoral Theology at the University of Bonn: Our research projects—conducted in an interdisciplinary framework—aim at investigating religious development over the lifespan and especially in later life. The Research Project “Religious Development in Adulthood” Theoretical Background and Research Questions The research project “Religious Development in Adulthood” (“Religiöse Entwicklung im Erwachsenenalter”) was carried out jointly by the Department of Pastoral Theology at the University of Bonn (W. Fürst) and by the Diocese of Aachen (A. Wittrahm) with funding from the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). It takes as its starting point certain shortcomings of stage theories of religious development (e.g. Oser & Gmünder, 1984; Fowler, 1991). It showed that they can only assess the religiosity of adults in a limited way because empirical data revealed that many adults seem to stagnate in their religious development—or even return to lower stages. These ndings contradict the overall agreement within gerontological research of the last two decades that one cannot conceive of a general trend of deterioration in later life. Furthermore, the stage theories exhibit a normative picture of (religious) development and presume a linear

234 ulrich feeser-lichterfeld, tobias kläden & anke terörde and inherent logic of development. From our point of view, they are therefore unable to portray the conditions of religiousness in later life in a comprehensive way (cf. Feeser-Lichterfeld & Kläden, 2004; Kläden & Feeser-Lichterfeld, 2006). The lifespan model (e.g. Baltes, 1987, 1997; Baltes, Staudinger, & Lindenberger, 1999; McFadden, 1999) offers an alternative approach to assessing religiousness in later life. It regards development as a lifelong process which is multidimensional and multidirectional. Thus, a person might simultaneously experience gains and losses in different areas of life, so that development implies both change and constancy. At an early age the ratio between gains and losses is tipped into a positive direction. Beginning from late adulthood and certainly in very old age, losses outnumber gains and the balance becomes more negative. Furthermore, individual development must be understood as being inuenced by multiple contexts (e.g. biological, historical, social and cultural) in which it is embedded. These contexts reect age-based (normative), history-based and idiosyncratic inuences. From the perspective of the lifespan approach, development is characterised by great intra-individual plasticity. Individuals play an important role in shaping their own development. Last but not least, the lifespan theory considers a multidisciplinary approach to be paramount for a comprehensive understanding of human development. The research project applied these lifespan postulates to the eld of religious development, with particular reference to the second half of life. One principal research question was whether the lifespan approach can be transferred to the study of religious development. A second—more theoretical—question was whether it would be possible to measure religiousness by a ve-dimensional model, the so called “religious gestalt model”. Method and Instruments The research project was designed as a retrospective collection of remembered and current biographical and religious data through biographical exploration (cf. Kruse, 1987; Jüttemann & Thomae [Eds.], 1987). In the main part of the study, 135 half-standardised interviews— most of them between two and three hours in length—were held at six locations in Germany. The interview partners were asked to subdivide their biographies by means of signicant caesuras. They were then questioned about the development of their religiousness at these points

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in time. They were also asked to recall an important critical life event in a microperspective (a so called “intensied challenge”) and describe the signicance of their religiousness while coping with this challenging event. The usable sample of altogether 121 interview partners was a random sample, stratied by the variables age (birth cohorts 1930–1935 vs. 1950–1955), sex and urban vs. rural living space. Referring to the fact that interview partners aged 50 were included in this study on religious development in late life it needs to be mentioned that no scientically binding relation exists between the terms ‘young’, ‘middle’ and ‘late adulthood’ and chronological age (cf. Filipp & Schmidt, 1998). In order to ensure that the longitudinal data were not solely based on retrospective recall, one and a half years after the main study one third of the sample (38 respondents) was interviewed a second time. The subject of these interviews was the biographic and religious development that had occurred in their lives since the rst interview. This follow-up study also served as a consensual validation of the data explored in the interviews in the main part of the study with regard to the development of their “gestalt of religiousness”. The hypothetical construct of “religious gestalt”, which was rst used 1994–1997 in a pilot study (cf. Fürst, Severin & Wittrahm, 1997; Wittrahm & Leicht, 2003), plays a pivotal role in the research project. With the aim of achieving a well-differentiated perception of religious attitudes and behaviour and their dynamic transformation throughout life, the religious gestalt was operationalised with ve dimensions: ‘Image of God’, ‘subjective understanding of religion’, ‘afliation to a religious community’, ‘religious practice’ and ‘religious knowledge’. The assumption guiding the research was that the unit that is made up of these ve dimensions possesses “gestalt quality” or “gestalt order” and can be characterised by the properties of over-summativity and transposability. Thus, the religious gestalt is not composed of arbitrarily selected individual variables. Rather, it forms an ensemble which is more than the mere sum of its parts (over-summativity). Depending on the particular expression and combination of the variables it generates discrete, mutually delimitable forms that can be reduced to a workable number or set. A distinction is made between the individual expression of this form as a concrete gestalt of religiousness, and forms that occur in more than one person, which become a collective gestalt type. Drawing on the lifespan approach, we further postulate that in different periods and situations of life, the religious gestalt will be modied by and adapted to changing environmental conditions. If the religious

236 ulrich feeser-lichterfeld, tobias kläden & anke terörde gestalt is to remain in harmony with the individuals’ biography and if it is to remain useful for coping with biographic challenges, changes to the religious gestalt are not only possible but in fact inevitable. In this sense the religious gestalt is transposable or transferable to changing life situations, without its quality or order necessarily also being changed by the modications that this entails. Changes to the quality of the religious gestalt are nonetheless possible as a result of certain signicant changes. In this case we speak of a “change of religious gestalt”, a phenomenon that nearly 60 percent of our interview partners reported to have experienced at least once during their adult life. The gestalt typology was created using a hermeneutic circle method. First, pastoral theology experts from the research team and the project’s academic advisory panel were asked to describe the gestalt types they would expect to nd. Against the background of existing analyses of contemporary religiousness they also described respective expressions in the ve dimensions. These theoretical gestalt types were compared with the empirically generated gestalt types and modied until they represented as many as possible of the gestalts identied at the various caesuras. At the same time the new gestalt types had to offer sufcient differentiation between the various forms of individual religiousness. In consequence the large number of religious gestalts identied in the empirical study was reduced to a workable number of types. Certain individual expressions of these dimensions can be identied as crucial for differentiating between the various gestalt types, while other dimensions or expressions do not achieve this criteriological character. Determining factors were found to be the dimensions ‘image of God’, ‘afliation to a religious community’ and ‘religious practice’. Main Results of the Study The results of the study conrm the assumption that the concept of religious gestalt is a useful construct for understanding religiousness and its development. It showed that certain combinations of the variables making up the ve dimensions occur with more than random frequency, i.e. as a concise gestalt. The gestalt concept enabled us to distil the many variables, forms and expressions of religiousness down to seven types of religious gestalts. These are: ‘Traditionally church-oriented’, ‘communally church-oriented’, ‘culturally Christian’, ‘culturally church-oriented’, ‘postmodern-religious’, ‘religiously indifferent’, and

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‘non-religious’. On the whole, the religiousness of around 95 percent of the interviewees could be categorised as belonging to one of these seven gestalt types (at the various retrospectively explored caesuras of their life). In the follow-up phase the characterisation of the individual religious gestalt was conrmed by the respondents (consensual validation) with a low error rate of seven percent. The successful application of the gestalt model represents an important outcome in itself and is likely to be of interest for empirical studies on religiousness. In addition, some other ndings—reported here in only the briefest of terms—were (cf. Kläden, 2003): only 40% of our respondents maintained a stable religious gestalt over their entire adult lifespan; 60% experienced at least one overall change of gestalt in adulthood and several signicant changes in the dimensions of the religious gestalt. The traditional church-oriented type predominating in childhood and youth (60%) loses ground to all the other types in the course of adulthood and declines to 30%; in the younger cohort (1950–1955) this process of pluralisation is even accelerated. Within the religious gestalt the behavioural dimensions exhibit a greater stability than the cognitive dimensions: while patriarchal images of God are predominant in childhood and youth, images of God as partner become more important in the course of life as well as apersonal and vague images. On the other hand, ‘afliation to a religious community’ and ‘religious practice’ show a greater constancy: between 70% and 80% of the interview partners recall at least one unchanged feature of religious practice at the different caesuras, and between 3/4 and 2/3 of the interviewees report at least some kind of afliation to a religious community—even though this afliation may not be very pronounced. Discussion: Religious Development in a Lifespan Perspective These very brief statements must sufce to suggest that religious development in adulthood can be understood from within the theoretical context of the lifespan developmental approach. We observed changes in the religious gestalt at any point in life, especially in connection with critical life events, and the different dimensions of the individual’s religious gestalt may also develop anti-synchronously (cf. the difference between cognitive and behaviour-based dimensions). Moreover, variations in the religious gestalt seem to depend on historical and cultural conditions: for example we observed that the younger cohort turned

238 ulrich feeser-lichterfeld, tobias kläden & anke terörde away from traditional religiousness in an accelerated way—in West Germany towards more liberal and in East Germany towards more indifferent or non-religious forms of religious gestalts. Finally, we would like to discuss in detail the results of our study against the theoretical background, the lifespan developmental approach. As point of reference we will take the approach’s seven axioms: 1. Lifelong development: We nd changes in the religious gestalt at any point in adulthood. The majority of our interview partners (60%) reported at least one change of gestalt during their adult lifespan (after the rst caesura); this percentage increases to 70% if one takes into account the time “before the rst caesura”—which mainly lie in childhood and youth. Regarding the separate dimensions, we observe even less stability: only 28% of the respondents show absolute stability in their religious gestalt over their adult lifespan, i.e. they remain stable in all ve dimensions of the religious gestalt. It is true that the ratio of change is higher at the beginning of adulthood, but changes remain possible even up to old age, especially in connection with critical life events. To sum it up, religiousness may not be described as a feature which ceases to develop with the entry into adulthood; on the contrary, stability of religiousness is the exception in the adult lifespan. 2. Multidirectionality: The different dimensions of the religious gestalt do not necessarily develop synchronously, they can diverge into different directions and even oppositional developments are possible. The main evidence for this claim is the difference between the cognitive and behavioural dimensions: the rst exhibit frequent changes, the latter show a higher stability over the course of life. 3. Development as gain and loss: To transfer this axiom to the eld of religious development is a difcult task, as religiousness is no feature of achievement which can easily be assigned to categories of gain and loss. To still do so, criteria for the normative judgement of religiousness would be needed, but these cannot be deduced from empirical data (see Englert, 2003; Feeser-Lichterfeld & Kläden, 2004). Anyway, we can infer from the narrations of our interview partners that religious development does not exhibit linearity—a return to an earlier gestalt type or dimension of religiousness is possible at any point in time. 4. Plasticity: The possibility of changes occurring during the entire adult lifespan—even up to old age—and the plurality of develop-

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ment patterns denitely conrm the axiom of individual plasticity of the religious gestalt. 5. Historical embedding: The results of our study also conrm the axiom of the historical embedding of developmental processes. Historical and cultural inuences also affect the variation of religiousness. This can best be demonstrated by the difference between the older and younger cohort: while the latter experienced (at least in the west) a climate of liberalisation in church and society with the consequence of an accelerated rejection of traditional gestalts of religiousness, the younger cohort in East Germany grew up in a social climate that was defensive towards religion and the church. This atmosphere is reected by the high amount of religiously indifferent and non-religious gestalt types. 6. Contextualism: Apparently the concept of three factors inuencing lifelong development can also be applied for religious development: from what was described above it should have become evident that the religious gestalt is inuenced by age factors, historical factors and non-normative factors (factors that do not necessarily appear in any biography, cf. critical life events). However, it seems desirable to clarify the specic contributions of the different inuencing factors and their possible interaction. 7. Multidisciplinarity: The importance of studying religious development from a multidisciplinary perspective has apparently been afrmed by our study. The theoretical background was provided by the lifespan approach from within developmental psychology, the practical realisation required rules of psychological diagnostics and methodology, the assignment of the gestalt of religiousness required practical-theological models and for the consideration of the historical background we needed knowledge from elds such as the sociology of religion as well as from ecclesiastical and civil history. To sum it up, the results of our study suggest that religious development in adulthood can be well understood from within the lifespan developmental approach, according to which religiousness develops over the entire lifespan in a highly plural and multidirectional manner as a result of interaction between the individual and his environment.

240 ulrich feeser-lichterfeld, tobias kläden & anke terörde “Religious Rituals in Late Life in a Pluralistic Society”—An Outlook on Future Studies The ndings of the above mentioned research project—especially the result that behavioural dimensions show a relatively high constancy within the construct of “religious gestalt”—will be further examined in a research project which aims at describing the practice of religious rituals (as well as their varying cultural forms) of older people in the pluralistic society of Germany. Furthermore, the project will focus on the development of ritual practice throughout life and the specic meanings and functions of religious rituals for the process of ageing. As the study is conceptualised in cooperation with the Department of European Ethnology at the University of Bonn we will also take into account questions of cross-cultural comparison–mainly between European countries. Socio-Cultural Context and Main Questions of Research The socio-cultural pluralism and biographical dynamism of lifestyles lead to a continuously growing variety of individual forms and degrees of religiousness even in later life. These different types of religiousness can often no longer be integrated into those social forms and ways of life propagated by traditional institutions concerned with essential life issues—such as the churches. Only a few years ago it seemed to be self-evident that men and women—especially during the second half of their lives—tend to express their faith (resp. their religiousness) through rituals that were mediated by the churches or by culture in general; this was most obvious with regard to church attendance, the reception of the sacraments and the wording of traditional, often ritualised prayer texts. On the contrary, the former basic rule stating that “religiousness increases with age” tends to present itself in a far more differentiated way–probably also due to the manifold offers of religious practice in pluralistic societies. The changes within the religious landscape of the 21st century also effect the “culture of ageing” which was already portrayed in the introductory part: facing the dissolution of solid, fundamental traditional structures, the search for purpose and meaning in old age turns out to be an enterprise becoming of ever increasing complexity. From our point of view it is of great scientic relevance to examine how the general socio-cultural change—the development from a traditional society towards one that is pluralistic as well as highly

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complex—inuences the attitude of its members towards religious rituals. In this context it seems especially interesting to focus on the question of how the socio-cultural change is reected in the individual’s biography and the process of ageing. Starting out from the concept of lifespan development the biographical aspect of religious and ritual practice will thus demand our special attention; for it is the individual biographical aspect that mirrors general social and cultural changes and processes of development. In addition, the actual or potential relevance of religious rituals for later life as well as the underlying cultural measures of values or systems of interpretation will be taken into account. Considering the often stereotyped image of older adults we will also examine whether it is valid to claim the existence of a “desire for rituals” during the process of ageing. To sum up, the following general questions of research arise: – What forms of religious and ritual activities are really practised by older adults? – What meanings and functions do these rituals have for older adults while experiencing the process of ageing? – What role do religious rituals play while coping with critical lifeevents such as sickness, death of a spouse or being confronted with the end of one’s own life? – How far have traditional patterns of behaviour, which might be classied as religious customs or rituals, become “individualised”, “privatised” and “pluralised”? Remarks on Current Research During the initial stages of the project, classic ritual theories as well as recent research papers on rituals concerning different focal topics in terms of contents and terminology (cf. Fürst et al., 2003) were thoroughly analysed and evaluated. Before the background of a generally observed “expansion” of the term “ritual”, but also in the face of growing tendencies of secularisation and religious individualisation in modern societies, it is especially important to further clarify the relationship between ritual and religion. During the past decade one could observe a steadily growing scientic interest in the research-subject of “rituals” in general. However, a different picture presents itself for the specic aspect of ageing: there is a signicant decit regarding research on the religious rituals of older

242 ulrich feeser-lichterfeld, tobias kläden & anke terörde adults amongst the German-speaking population—such as is the case with the extensive complex of religiousness and ageing as a whole (cf. Terörde & Feeser-Lichterfeld, in preparation). Results of the Pilot Phase and Research Design of the Main Study As part of a pilot study 13 biographical interviews were carried out with elder persons from 67 to 88 years of age (cf. Terörde, 2004). The theoretical background, resp. lifespan developmental approach, and methodology of this study were based on the above described project “Religious Development in Adulthood”. However, the pilot interviews focused primarily on the development of ritual practice and the assigned meaning of religious rituals. Here the relatively small number of conducted interviews allowed an in-depth analysis, on the other hand it must be born in mind that results from such case studies can only be generalised to a certain extent. Nonetheless, some main results may be summarised: already within this small sample the existence of a wide range of religious beliefs and religious ritual practices among older people became evident. It has to be pointed out that two interview partners described themselves as non-religious and emphasised that their attitude towards religion and ritual practice did not change with their own process of growing old. In correspondence to the above described research project this indicates that one should not jump to the conclusion that religiousness inevitably increases with age. As to the religious interview partners, the way prayer practice takes shape shows a relatively high constancy throughout life—also in times of critical life events. While such forms of private ritual practice are moderated by biographical experiences which can be traced back to early childhood, the development of public ritual practice, such as church attendance, is inuenced by rather general socio-cultural changes. For example, the catholic interview partners described how the Second Vatican Council strongly affected and in consequence also changed their own attitudes towards church attendance and ritual practice. Religious rituals referring to the course of life—so called “rites de passage”—are relevant to the elder interview partners, especially as far as their children and grandchildren are concerned. This result could also be conrmed for the group of non-religious interview partners. Religious celebrations within the course of the year—especially at Christmas—take a special position within the general ritual practice. In this context even non-religious interview partners carry on religious as

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well as family customs, the origins of which can again be traced back to their own childhood. The pilot study implies different theoretical and methodological assumptions for the main study: 1. Theoretical implications: The pilot study conrmed that the lifespan approach is a suitable framework for describing and understanding the individual’s development of ritual practice. It became especially evident that research on ritual practice has to consider the axioms of historical embedding and contextualism. Furthermore, the analysis of ritual practice in the context of the prevailing type of “religious gestalt” seems to be a valuable approach. Depending on the specic “religious gestalt” the attitudes of the interview partners towards religious ritual practice differ mainly in the grade of personal relevance assigned to them. Finally, the pilot study revealed that “chronological age” may not serve as a causal explanation for changes in ritual practice. It is reasonable to claim the inuence of age-related events, such as the birth of a grandchild or retirement, on the development of religiousness, but a “desire for rituals”, which is related to chronological age itself, could not be identied. Nonetheless, within empirical research chronological age can be used to structure an individual’s biography. 2. Methodological implications: Concerning methodological questions of “ritual studies” the pilot study showed that biographical interviews present a sensible approach for exploring religiousness and ritual practice. In this context an observation regarding the speed of narration seems noteworthy: all interview partners spoke relatively quickly and reported many details when asked to recall how Christmas was celebrated in their childhood. This result indicates that certain singular, but ritualised events which lie in the past are remembered in a very vivid manner. Apart from data about personal ritual practice the interviews also revealed important information about the historical background, such as ritual practice in post-war Germany. However, biographical interviews cannot entirely be regarded as useful for the study of religious practice. For example, it was difcult for the interview partners to verbalise certain types of everyday ritual practice such as their prayer practice. For future studies interview techniques will have to be developed which help the respondents to recall more easily elements of their everyday ritual practice.

244 ulrich feeser-lichterfeld, tobias kläden & anke terörde In consequence, the design of the main study is guided by the assumption that rituals can only be studied comprehensively in a multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary manner. We will therefore apply a research design which combines both qualitative and quantitative methods. Biographical-narrative interviews will be analysed with methods of hermeneutical text analysis as well as quantitative answers scheme. Inspired by principles of “Visual Anthropology” we also plan to conduct standardised observations. Concluding Remarks With regard to the methodological consequences of the two research projects it can be summarised that the lifespan approach proved to be a suitable theoretical framework for empirical analysis as well as the description of religious development. It also showed that the vedimensional model of “religious gestalt” is a sensitive concept for an interindividual and intraindividual comparison of processes of religious development. Concerning the specic development of religious practice the studies brought up the interesting result that behavioural dimensions exhibit a greater stability throughout life than cognitive dimensions. Furthermore, the above outlined pilot study stressed the importance of differentiating between various forms of religious practice and that it is not legitimate to speak of religious rituals in general. Future studies will have to take a closer look at the relationship between “religious gestalt types” and the different forms of religious practice. Finally, the research projects also bear consequences for practical theology. The social as well as pastoral relevance of an intensive—also scientic—investigation into the topic of “ageing” and demographic change was initially emphasised. The above outlined research activities of the Department of Pastoral Theology at the University of Bonn have this as their aim. Perhaps they will also inspire others to conduct further studies with the same objective: a multi-disciplinary approach to the dynamics of lifespan development and its religious implications.

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References Baltes, P.B. (1987). Theoretical Propositions of Life-Span Developmental Psychology: On the Dynamics Between Growth and Decline. In: Developmental Psychology 23, 611–626. ——— (1997). On the Incomplete Architecture of Human Ontogenesis. In: American Psychologist 52, 366–380. ——— Staudinger, U.M., & Lindenberger, U. (1999). Lifespan Psychology: Theory and Application to Intellectual Functioning. In: Annual Review of Psychology 50, 471–507. Englert, R. (2003). Von der Deskription der Religiosität Erwachsener hin zu Kriterien erwachsener Religiosität [From the description of the religiosity of adults to criteria of adult religiosity]. In: Fürst et al. (Eds.) (2003), 89–100. Feeser-Lichterfeld, U. & Kläden, T. (2004). How “Adult” is the Religiosity of Adults? Normative Implications of Empirical Theological Research into Religious Development in the Second half of life. In: J.A. van der Ven & M. Scherer-Rath (Eds.). Normativity and Empirical Research in Theology. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 161–177. Filipp, S.-H. & Schmidt, K. (1998). Mittleres und höheres Erwachsenenalter [Middle and late adulthood]. In: R. Oerter & L. Montada (Eds.). Entwicklungspsychologie [Developmental psychology]. Weinheim: Beltz, 439–486. Fowler, J.W. (1991). Stufen des Glaubens. Die Psychologie der menschlichen Entwicklung und die Suche nach Sinn [Stages of faith. The psychology of human development and the search for meaning]. Gütersloh: Mohn. Fürst, W., Severin, B. & Wittrahm, A. (1997). Glaubensentwicklung in der zweiten Lebenshälfte und die pastoralen Konsequenzen—eine qualitative Pilotstudie [Faith development in the second half of life and pastoral consequences—a qualitative pilot study] (2nd, revised edition). Bonn: Universität Bonn, Seminar für Pastoraltheologie. Fürst, W., Wittrahm, A., Feeser-Lichterfeld, U. & Kläden, T. (Eds.) (2003). “Selbst die Senioren sind nicht mehr die alten . . .”. Praktisch-theologische Beiträge zu einer Kultur des Alterns [“Even senior citizens aren’t what they used to be” . . . Practical theological contributions to a culture of ageing] (Theologie und Praxis; 17). Münster: Lit. Fürst, W., Hirschfelder G., Hänel, D., Feeser-Lichterfeld, U., Pletsch, S. & Terörde, A. (2003). Religiöse Rituale im höheren Erwachsenenalter in einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft [Religious Rituals in Late Life in a Pluralistic Society]. In: Fürst et al. (Eds.) (2003), 181–200. Jüttemann, G. & Thomae, H. (Eds.) (1987), Biographie und Psychologie [Biography and psychology]. Berlin: Springer. Kläden, T. (2003). Zentrale Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojekts “Religiöse Entwicklung im Erwachsenenalter” im Überblick [An overview of key results of the research project “Religious development in adulthood”]. In: Fürst et al. (Eds.) (2003), 67–84. Kläden, T. & Feeser-Lichterfeld, U. (2006). Stages or Lifespan? An Alternative Approach to Religious Development in Adulthood. In: Journal of Empirical Theology 19, 96–116. Kleinemas, U. & Rudinger, G. (2003). Auf dem Weg zu einer Alternskultur? Entwicklungspsychologische Hinweise zu einer nicht nur theologischen Diskussion [Towards a culture of aging? Remarks of developmental psychology about a not only theological discussion]. In: Fürst et al. (Eds.) (2003), 139–152. Kruse, A. (1987). Biographische Methode und Exploration [Biographical method and exploration]. In: G. Jüttemann & H. Thomae (Eds.), Biographie und Psychologie. Berlin: Springer, 119–137. McFadden, S.H. (1999). Religion, Personality, and Aging: A Life Span Perspective. In: Journal of Personality 67(6), 1081–1104.

246 ulrich feeser-lichterfeld, tobias kläden & anke terörde Oser, F. & Gmünder, P. (1984). Der Mensch—Stufen seiner religiösen Entwicklung. Ein strukturgenetischer Ansatz [Stages of human religious development. A structural genetic approach]. Zürich: Benziger. Terörde, A. (2004). Religiöse Rituale im höheren Erwachsenenalter. Eine explorative Studie. Unveröffentlichte Magisterarbeit, Seminar für Vergleichende Religionswissenschaft der Universität Bonn. [Religious rituals in late life. An explorative study. Unpublished Master thesis, Department of Comparative Religious Studies at the University of Bonn]. Terörde, A. & Feeser-Lichterfeld, U. (in preparation). Religiöse Ritualpraxis im höheren Erwachsenenalter. Eine Pilotstudie als Annäherung an ein Forschungsdesiderat. [Religious rituals in late life. A pilot study as an approach to a research-decit]. Wittrahm, A. & Leicht, B. (2003). Gestalten und Gestaltwandel erwachsener Religiosität. Von der Pilotstudie zum Forschungsprojekt “Religiöse Entwicklung im Erwachsenenalter” [Gestalts and gestalt change of mature religiosity. From the pilot study to the research project “Religious development in adulthood”]. In: Fürst et al. (Eds.) (2003), 21–39.

RELIGIOSITY AND GENDER IDENTITY OF FEMALE ADOLESCENTS. NARRATIVE RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OF YOUNG CATHOLIC WOMEN Angela Kaupp Until now there is only little (empirical) research on the connection between religion/religiosity and gender in the German speaking eld. The following article rstly presents the concept of ‘gender’ and its reception within theological study and sketches the current stand of research in respect to the topic “Gender and Religion” within practical theology. In the second part, a qualitative empirical study focussed on connections between biography, gender and religiosity of young women aged between 16 and 25 is presented. The results received indicate a variety of connections between biographical and faith patterns. Interestingly, gender based discrimination in (religious) socialization processes are at work in a very subtle way. Introduction The fact that women and men behave differently in many social contexts has, in the last few decades, lead to the question how signicant gender is in (religious) development of identity. The systematic research of this connection is yet at its beginning in the eld of (Practical) Theology. A few years ago, Ursula King (1995, 24) remarked: “The study of women is still marginalized in the study of religion, and the comprehensive study of gender as a category with even larger connotations has hardly begun”. In the meantime, some empirical research on women and religion/religiosity has been undertaken in the German-speaking area (see paragraph 3.2). But the relationship between gender and religiosity during youth still is extensively unstudied. This is due to following reasons: – The development of religious-pedagogical theory has only recently begun to consider the gender specic dimension of religiosity.

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Currently there are only few empirically examined attempts at explanation.1 – Feminist theology examined until recently only the religiosity of adult women (cf. Klein 1994; Franke/Matthiae/Sommer 2002). This is also true of the few publications about both genders and religion (cf. Lukatis/Sommer/Wolf 2000). – General research on youth increasingly explores the problems of gender specic aspects (cf. Flaake 1998; Breitenbach 2000; King 2002); the religiosity of youth however is only described as religious practice, or not described at all. Religious development is not discussed—and especially not gender specically (cf. Jugend 2000; Jugend 2002). – Another difculty in this respect is that German-speaking research on women or gender in the humanities generally does not consider religion or religious socialization to be a topic that should be included. Psychological theories usually have neither gender differential nor religious dimensions in view. Research Question This research situation has lead to the necessity of describing the religious development and progress of young Catholic women in the context of modern society that is extensively inuenced by Christianity.2 The following qualitative and empirical study (Kaupp 2005a) researches along the following guiding questions: – What kind of relationship is there between the life story of an interviewee and the story of her belief ? – How do young women characterize their religosity? – Is there an influence from the church institution and/or other socializing instances (family, religious youth work, school-lessons in religion and catechesis in responsibility of the parish) on the feminine development of religious identity? What effects do andro-centric

1 Often step-theories of religious development (cf. Oser/Gmünder 1988; Fowler 1991) exclude an explicit research in respect of the dimension of “gender”. Regarding aspects of feminine religious socialization cf. Klein 2000; Religionspädagogische Beiträge 1999. Regarding the current state of research cf. Lehner-Hartmann/Lehner 2000; Becker 2002; Wuckelt 2002. 2 The results must not be understood as descriptions of a specic feminine religiosity since talking about a specic feminine religiosity runs the risk of explaining an aspect of femininity biologically.

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leadership and language forms within the Church have on young women? What is the effect of an andro-centric image of God on the (religious) development of identity of girls? Gender and Religiosity—the State of Research in the German-Speaking Practical Theology Denition of the terms Sex, Sex Category and Gender In everyday life, the division between the sex of men and women seems to be a biologically given category. But the discussion on which aspects are innate and which are developed during the process of socialization put this natural constellation into question. The scientic discussions of anthropological categories distinguish between the terms sex and gender: sex is understood as something that is biologically or physiologically rooted; gender, on the other hand, as something that is socio-culturally developed.3 The distinction between sex and gender is opposed to the biological argumentation that certain features or roles can be attributed to biological sex and abolishes the idea of a causal connection between biological sex and socio-cultural gender.4 Another even more distinguished model is that of Candace West and Don Zimmerman (West/Zimmerman 1987). They assume that certain gender-specic role-behaviour does not necessarily allow the conclusion of the fact of biological sex. It is not possible to infer biological sex from certain sex-typed appearances, rather they lead to a gendered interpretation (e.g. transvestites). Because of this West and Zimmerman propose the use of the term sex category to describe this sex-typed appearance. This can be illustrated too by the example of the image of God: even when God is portrayed as masculine, his role-behaviour is often not to be qualied as masculine (detailed see Riegel/Kaupp 2005).

3

Cf. the synopsis by Becker-Schmidt/Knapp 2000, 69 and Pohl-Patalong 2002. The distinction originates in medical-psychiatric sexual research. Often Simone de Beauvoir’s statement “one doesn’t come to the world as a woman, one becomes it” (de Beauvoir 1960, 94; french original 1949) is cited as the rst distinction between sex and gender. 4 During the last few years feuilletons and popular-scientic literature assumed more and more a connection between sex and gender referring to biological studies. As an example see Pease/Pease 2001. It is to be examined if gender stereotypes should be strengthened or made secure through this.

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The Category Gender in Theology In scientic theology the category gender has only recently begun to receive attention.5 Following the model of reference to the category gender in humanities and social sciences, the consideration of gender as a structural category is also occasionally required in practical theology.6 Philosophical discussions on categories are missing in most approaches of systematical theology (“Systematische Theologie”). Exceptions only appear in theoretical concepts of Feminist Theology. Explicit studies on men are missing largely in theology (exceptions: Zulehner/Volz 1999; Prömper 2003). This cautious reception is due to the challenge theology is facing in the discussion about gender: rstly, social-scientic concepts have to be examined regarding their compatibility with theological categories. Secondly, the reception of the category gender requires a “relecture” on a 2000 year-old tradition of philosophy and theology and its terms of sex for being woman or being man (cf. Klinger 1995; Maihofer 1995). The meaning of gender, understood as a socio-cultural construction, has a role within the far reaching changes of interpretational patterns. This venture is terminologically and methodically difcult and “becomes even more difcult on the background of postmodern trends, which proclaim the death of the occidental term of subject” (Meyer-Wilmes 1990, 122), because such theoretical concepts cannot easily be correlated with theologically appropriate talk of God and men/women. (Empirical) Research of Gender and Religion/Religiosity in Practical Theology Historical studies on the 19th century show interrelations between being a woman and the xed shaping of religiosity (cf. Heller et al. 1990; Lukatis/Sommer/Wolf 2000). In practical theology empirical research on gender topics consists of separate studies and has not yet reached a methodological or theoretical consensus. A comprehensive

5

In the Anglo-American area there are religious-historical publications which refer not only to the Christian religion (cf. King 1995; comprehensive view on research cf. Juschka 1999). For the German-speaking area cf. Siegele-Wenschkewitz 1995. Summarizing the recent state of research in Christian theology cf. Pohl-Patalong 2002; Kaupp 2003. 6 Cf. Kohler-Spiegel 2000; Lehner-Hartmann/Lehner 2000; Becker 2002; PohlPatalong 2002; Ross 2002; Lehmann 2003; Riegel/Kaupp 2005. Up to now only a few empirical studies use a multi-dimensional concept of gender as a category for analyses (cf. for example Francis 1997; Riegel 2004).

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theoretical discussion of ‘gender’ and religious educational and socialization processes in regard to sociological differentiating processes is still lacking in Germany. However, studies show several links between feminine gender-role and religiosity (cf. Heller et al. 1990; Klein 1994; Sommer 1998; Reese 2006). One example for gendered forms of religious socialization is the presence of certain feminine role-models, i.e. typical images of girls or women important at liturgical celebrations such as Holy Communion or Conrmation (“Firmung”). Altogether, women seem to experience their religious socialization ambivalently. On the one hand religious education intensies antiquated ideas of femininity. On the other hand, however, women often remember their rst religious experiences fondly, i.e. songs or the atmosphere during services, and they are able to summon up courage out of this to create their own religiosity today. That means the possibility and ability of experiencing religious situations and interpreting them depends on whether the women have been socialized in a religious way or not. What needs to be researched is whether this is also the case concerning female post-adolescents. Sample and Instrument of The Qualitative Empirical Research In respect to their age, development and social conditions, young women stand between being girls and being women. Therefore, it can be supposed that coping with gender identity and role is a central task in their development. Using the autobiographical interviews, what will be analyzed is how young women describe their gender identity and which conclusions can be drawn from the construction of gender based on their life stories. Sample In order to specify the field of research, the group analyzed was restricted according to the following characteristics: – Only female youths and young women were researched; this was meant to facilitate a certain comparability within the research group as well as with results of other female social research. – Aged between 16 and 25 years; this ensures the attainment of an appropriate level of development so that those questioned can reect upon their life stories.

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– Girls and women who have participated in a religious socialization process within the structure of the Catholic Church (baptism, communion, conrmation, religion class), in order to exclude possible confessional socialization differences from the analysis. – Originating from the western German states, because the conditions of religious socialization and development should be examined in the east separately. Instrument: Autobiographical Interviews Autobiographical interviews were carried out and later analyzed according to interpretative approaches taken from discursive psychology as well as from narratology in the framework of the social sciences (cf. Lucius-Hoene/Deppermann 2000 and 2002; Fischer-Rosenthal/Rosenthal 1987; Rosenthal/Fischer-Rosenthal 2000; Rosenthal 1995; Schütze 1983 and 1984). Altogether, 25 biographical interviews were lead, 5 of which were chosen according to the maximal contrast criteria and were therefore analyzed as case studies (“Einzelfallstudie”). In order to compare whether the presentation during the interviews correlated with a survey done by questionnaire, the interviewees were given a questionnaire taken from the Hartmut Beile’s research (1998, 252–255), which discusses the concepts of “the image of God,” “attitudes in Christianity” and “the parents’ methods of raising children religiously” after the interview. The qualitative empirical approach was organised into the following steps: – Assessment and literal transcription of autobiographical interviews; – Structural-sequential analysis and literal analysis of detail. Evaluation is methodologically based on narration analysis (according to Fritz Schütze, Gabriele Rosenthal and Wolfram Fischer-Rosenthal) and reconstruction of narrative identity (according to Arnulf Deppermann and Gabriele Lucius-Hoene); – Case studies (“Einzelfallstudien”); – Comparison of the case with the results of the questionnaire; – Comparison of the cases with each other as well as with the research results of religious pedagogy and youth research.

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Theoretical Suppositions of the Biographical Research Design The Concept of “Narrative Identity” In order to distinguish between “the identity story as it is lived, and the story as it is told” (Polkinghorne 1996) the term “narrative identity” is used referring to the concept of the psychologists Gabriele LuciusHoene and Arnulf Deppermann: “reconstructing narrative identity” (cf. Lucius-Hoene/Deppermann 2000 and 2002).7 They make a clear distinction between the I who is telling and the I who is told. This means that the story in its entirety is not taken to correspond to historical reality in all aspects. It is, however, informative about the self-image of the story-teller and the development of her identity. Narrative identity is understood as “the narrator’s solution of the task to make his own person understandable and accountable in his life story given in a special, socially meaningful situation.” (Lucius-Hoene/Deppermann 2002, 55) This approach reveals strategic aims of self-presentation and of contradictory or complementary relations between the propositional level of the story and the discursive performance of the narrator. Accordingly, the different schemes of communication (narration, argumentation, description) and further language and language-like (“para-sprachlich”) phenomena will be analyzed. The Concept of “Structural Processes” of Life Course in Narrative Interviews In autobiographical narrative interviews, specic modes of biographical experiencing, (“Prozessstrukturen”), can be identied that differ according to their “fundamental attitude toward life story occurrences.” Schütze (1984, 92) distinguishes a) “biographical action schemes” (“biographische Handlungsmuster”), b) “institutional patterns of the life course” (“institutionelle Handlungsmuster”) such as phenomena of family cycles or career patterns, c) “metamorphoses” (“Wandlungsprozesse”) i.e. unexpected developments and “biographical trajectories” (“Verlaufskurven”). Trajectories “are biographical processes of long-term

7 Lucius-Hoene (2000, paragraph 7): “Whereas a good deal of systematic work has been done on the philosophical, epistemological and psychological aspects of narrative identity [. . .] the empirical substrate of narrative identity remains to be clearly specied.” For the description of narrative identity” cf. Ricoeur 1991; Polkinghorne 1996; Streib 1994.

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suffering (. . .) of being overwhelmed by outside forces which lead to a successive loss of control of one’s life circumstances” (Riemann 2003, paragraph 29). The question of research concerns which “structural processes” are contained in each life story and whether these processes are present in the presented religiosity. The Concept of “Doing Gender”—The Reproduction of Gender Gender is to be understood in the sense of “doing gender” (Candace West and Don Zimmerman 1987). This term describes the process of “creating the difference between girls and boys and women and men, differences that are not natural, essential or biological” (West/Zimmerman 1987, 137). Doing gender is “a returning, routinized, methodical reproduction of gender” (Wesely 2000, 38) in everyday life’s interactions. The centre of attention is not the biological fact of being a man or a woman, but it is the usual model of gender role, perception and representation in everyday life. In these, the reality of gender-afliation or gender-identity and relationship of sexes is built up (cf. Becker-Schmidt/ Knapp 2000, 75). These routines can be described by the structure of perception (cf. Pohl-Patalong 2002, 218, following Ursula Pasero 1999): the concept of sexual dualism structures perception in a binary way and identies human beings as being either men or women. The “distinction of the sexes”, that means, the distinction of the dualistic structure of the sexes, is formulated anew or reworded again and again. Unlike the “distinction of the sexes”, the “identity of the sexes” is dened as a biological and social assignment of individuals to one of the two sexes (cf. Becker-Schmidt/Knapp 2000, 16f). Due to the identication of gender stereotypes becoming signicant, these stereotypes bind the role of “typical feminine” and “typical masculine” with certain roleexpectations. This logic of perception serves to reduce complexity and is therefore a socially very successful model of order. Helga Kotthoff (cf. 2003, 134–146) distinguishes between ve levels on which processes of doing gender become relevant: a) doing gender in voice and intonation; b) differences in language style; c) doing gender as an element of etiquette and stylization of the body; d) local neutrality of gender in the sense of irrelevance of gender referring to action; e) unconscious perception in media as an omni-present gender-transparency.

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The Concept of “Doing Religion” The conceptual spectrum of “religion” can be differentiated into four parts: a) religion as an objective form, b) religiosity as a subjective form, c) church commitment and d) (Christian) belief/faith. In concordance with James W. Fowler (1991), one can also distinguish between faith as a comportment, lived religiosity and belief as ‘trust in something’. In the German-speaking area the often-used term “lived religion” (“gelebte Religion”) reects a (religious) sociological manner of perception that inquires into the function that the institutionalized religion plays in the routine life of the subject. This term has been received in theological biographical research with the aim to examine the extent of individual religiosity and the reciprocations this has with institutionalized religion and society.8 I regard the concept “lived religion” not to be quite precise, for strictly speaking, it is not so much religion that is being described as religiosity or “religious performance” (Hemel 2002, 33), i.e. which develops in the interaction with religion and institutionalized interpretational patterns. This is why I will speak in the following of “lived religiosity” (“gelebte Religiosität”) or “lived faith” (“gelebter Glaube”).9 By means of the concept doing gender, lived religiosity can be described as doing religion, since it is also dependent on the individual and social conditions. The narrative religious identity is studied in regard to the following dimensions: religious sensibility, religious content, religious manner of expression, religious communication and religious motivated way of living (cf. Hemel 1988; 2002). Summary Identity, religiosity and gender are understood as narrative constructions within the context of the interview. The concept of “positioning” (cf. Lucius-Hoehne/Deppermann 2002, 196–212) allows analysing the sometimes implicitly formulated discursive practices by which the interviewees position themselves and others. This approach allows looking at the person’s self-image, their specic characteristics and their images of others. Furthermore, the study on individual religiosity and sex category or gender is also possible.

8 9

On the processes of reciprocity of religion and biography see Alheit 1986. On the concept of “actual lived faith” (“faktisch gelebter Glaube”) see Klein 1994.

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The comparison between the interview-analysis and the questionnaire revealed considerable agreement between the two, and therefore the following analysis draws solely on the information gathered through the interviews. The research of autobiographical extempore narratives assumes that “the narrator is driven to nish the depiction of an experimental pattern“ and that the sequence of the presented events is not coincidental. In order to analyze this structure, a strict sequential procedure was chosen. This method, however, cannot be explicated fully here; the following sections serve to give the reader an impression of various methods of presentation of the girls and women interviewed.10 The Connection between Religious Identity and the Structure of the Told Life Story The life stories in the interviews were mostly told in chronological order according to the following segments: kindergarten, primary school, puberty/youth and actual situation. Marking events such as illness or change of residence are described as turning points. Although the routine of everyday life and the religious life story don’t seem to have meeting points at rst glance, the interview’s structural processes correspond to religious processes in life stories since religious key stories cohere to biographically signicant experiences. These experiences and development processes are sometimes judged as a starting point for religious processes of change, which lead from the world view of a child to one of an adolescent. Puberty is experienced as a crisis (similar cf. Erikson 1981; Flaake 1998; Haußer 1995; King 2002; Krappmann 2000): considerations which are typical at that state of development concerning the denition of one’s own position can be recognized. Interestingly, the women experience the challenge at the beginning of puberty as something coming from the outside rather than an element of their own development. Yeah, and then puberty came and it all turned around suddenly, then I couldn’t really nd a way to relate to the church anymore. (Barbara, 45/47; in Kaupp 2005b, 293).

10 The text has been somewhat modied and the transcription simplied for the English translation. For the German original see Kaupp 2005b.

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Regardless of the similarity of the chronological congurations, the presentations differed according to their “structural processes” (Schütze 1984). Two of the interviewees (Tanja, 17 years old, and Michaela, 19 years old) presented their stories predominantly in the form of institutional patterns of the life course: they tried to full the expectations that their parents or school had on them. In the foreground was the attempt to digest expectations coming from the outside, one after another. The kindergarten (. . .) was directly beside the church, and so the relation was always there and we always prepared our own children’s mass and that sort of thing and in the autumn organized the festival with the kindergarten and, yeah, it was always really great (Michaela, 30/35; in: Kaupp 2005b, 151).

The third interviewee (Karin, 19 years old) presented her early childhood and actual situation largely as model of “biographical action schemes” (“biographisches Handlungsschema”). She portrayed herself as the subject of her story, who is mature enough to full the expectations that come from the outside. The phase of late childhood and early youth is portrayed as an insertion, in which the process-structure is illustrated almost like a “trajectory” (“Verlaufskurve”): the story approaches the event of a change in residence that is experienced as a crisis, from which the story-teller has a hard time to free herself and to nd a new balance. While suffering this time of disorder she is not able to believe in God. And with the move I lost that completely and all of a sudden. (. . .) All of a sudden I lost all my old friends, was to a new town, and everything was terrible and I only wanted to go back. (. . .) and in respect to inner religiosity that was somehow a break, I could no longer have anything to do with it (Karin, 128/133; in: Kaupp 2005b, 39).

The fourth and fth illustration (Ursula, 19 years old, and Barbara, 24 years old) display elements of “metamorphoses” (“Wandlungsprozesse”): puberty is a surprising occurrence that changes possibilities of experience and action. Barbara describes two actual experiences almost as religious conversion experiences that change earlier attitudes. One example: I was in a kind of panic because of university and everything, so, well, I just started to pray. I hadn’t done that in a really long time. And it really helped so I felt better, I even slept well, yeah (laughs embarrassed) that was really great. (laughs) The total experience. Since then I do it every pretty often (Barbara, 110/114, in: Kaupp 2005b, 298).

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In respect to their current lives as well as in respect to their futures, all ve interviewees understand themselves as active designers of their lives (cf. “biographical schema of action”—“biographisches Handlungsschema”). The process-structures of the life stories convey that the young women only look back to a short period of life. During the interviews tendencies could be determined but no continuous attitudes toward occurrences in life story. As I don’t know of scientic reections on the question of in which particular age stable process-structures are built up, new information concerning this may be acquired through further studies on youth and young adults. The Perspective of “Religion” and “Religiosity” Although life topics and the dimension “religion” seem to be separated to a large extent for adolescents’ routine life (similar cf. “Jugend 2000”) the process-structures of the interviews correspond to religious processes in their life-stories. Also, religious key stories are coupled with signicant biographical experiences. The age of the interviewees is important regarding the ability of showing their own religious life stories in a narrative and reective way. The older the interviewees are, the less aggressive their criticism on the church. Examined Dimensions of Religiosity Referring to Ulrich Hemel (1988; 2002), religiosity was examined according to four dimensions: a) Religious sensibility: all interviewees describe themselves as religious in the sense of faith. Personal religiosity is described as an inner home (“Yeah, I’ve always experienced faith, or God, as a kind of support, I could always retreat into it,” Ursula, 66f; in: Kaupp 2005b, 226). But there are differences in what is believed concerning religious content (belief ) and how religiosity is lived in practice. b) Religious content: analysing religious content shows a separation of Christian dogma and the women’s ideas in terms of content. The trinity of God is replaced by the idea that God is one person (“I always had the feeling that God directs a lot of things, but more like a person, like a superperson and not like some ghost,” Michaela, 733/737; in: Kaupp 2005b, 192). They do not believe in the Christian hope for resurrection and do not understand the Bible as the word of God. The women seem not to be aware of these signicant differences between Christian tradition

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and personal ideas. At least it seems as if they do not have to give reasons for their ideas of their faith. They merely deal with the Bible argumentatively. c) Religious communication: (religious) persons are important insofar as one can relate to them. Their communicative abilities are emphasized. That does not necessarily mean that contents are unimportant, but they are less remembered by the women while they are telling their story spontaneously. Beside parents and further family members, other communication partners of great importance include priests and school teachers of religion. It is crucial that the partner’s authenticity is comprehensible and that they are willing to engage themselves with critical questions. Persons and opportunities to communicate are of much greater importance than concrete local conditions. The women remember more strongly the atmosphere and aesthetics of religious places for communication rather than contents of the liturgy or religious teaching. Important places for communication are religious youth work or events like Taizé, which are experienced as great events providing opportunities to communicate with people of the same age. We went to Taizé and that (. . .) somehow gave me a lot. I always reached some sort of (grins) amazing realization for myself and found the atmosphere just so great and the masses and I just didn’t ever want to leave (Karin, 173/177; in: Kaupp 2005b, 43).

Even in religion as a school-subject, the importance of atmosphere must not be underestimated. d) Religious expression: Comparing examples of narrative religiosity and typology of biographical action schemes (“Handlungsmuster”) described by Peter Alheit (1986), the religiosity of young women appears mainly in biographical patterns of action in “communicative atmosphere”. The Connection Between Life Story and Religiosity Because of the analysis of the interviews and the comparison that transcends each particular case, the following contexts must be kept in mind: The thematic consistency of the image of God throughout biographical change: regardless of changes throughout the years, the fundamental thought of the presented image of God from their childhoods remained as an image of friend and support, as conversation partner or nal assistance. In her examinations on religiosity of women, Regina Sommer (1998, 292–298) found out that women attach themselves to rituals

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that they experienced as a child. It would be interesting to research whether also the image of God and the kind of relationship to God remain constant throughout the life course. The nearness between the topics in one’s life and the image of God: during the analysis of the interviews a specic strength belonging to the method of narrative interviews became apparent: it is possible to work out a contextual nearness between the told image of God and the particular life topics and performance intentions of the interviewees. For example, the interviewee was engaged in questions concerning what is just and what is unjust following the death of a friend in an accident and during the subsequent trial processes and when she was a child God as the protector of the law was important: They always told me that I had to be good, that good God sees everything, (laughs). Otherwise you won’t go to heaven, they always said, he’s in hell (Tanja, 115–119; in: Kaupp 2005b, 111).

Another interviewee imagines God quite abstractly and says that as a child she was already a little philosopher; still today she likes to deepen herself in thought labyrinths and discussions. A comparison concerning life topics and images of God among masculine youths may reveal some possible gender differences. Perspectives of Gender Identity While analyzing the interviews, it was signicant that the interviewees do not question their own gender identity in their biographical story. The psychological theory of the “spontaneous self-concept” (“Spontanes Selbstkonzept”) of a person (cf. Hannover 1992 following McGuire 1984) can help to illuminate this situation: It is assumed that the “spontaneous self-concept” decides which aspects of a person are emphasized in any particular situation (Hannover 1992, 34). During the interview the young women attached more importance to being adult than being a woman. This could be due to the fact that the scientist, as well as the interviewee, were both female. Consequently, explicit topics on gender did not seem worth telling. In the second part of the interview the women described their gender identity after having been asked to do so explicitly. Following aspects were described: a) Looking back on their gender identity as girls it turned out that some of the interviewees had to deal with a devaluation of their sex: “I should have been a boy”; or they described themselves by delimiting themselves

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from their own sex: “I wanted to be a boy” or “I was not a typical girl” (Karin, 824; in Kaupp 2005b, 73. Similar cf. Becker-Schmidt/Knapp 1995; Beck/Nikodem 1999; Breitenbach 2000, 308;). In English the term “tomboy”11 is used to dene this delimitation of one’s own sex. Social appreciation is secured by contact to boys: “I always had more guy-friends than girl-friends, I was in a group where all the others were guys, the neighbourhood kids, that was lots fun” (Karin, 821/823, in: Kaupp 2005b, 72). This narrative description portrays the valid gender hierarchy in society. b) Recent gender identity as an adolescent: several women described a development from a shy girl to a self-conscious young woman. In the last two years I’ve changed a whole lot, I’d say. Before I was always (. . .) really shy and never said anything. Inside I always had a lot to say, but I just never dared to—and then, all of a sudden, I don’t know where this (grins) self-condence came from (. . .), I nally dared to express myself: and then, I realized, hey, it isn’t that hard, I can do this (Michaela, 968/974; in: Kaupp 2005b, 201).

This conrms the specic crisis of female adolescence connected with low self-esteem at the beginning of puberty (similar cf. Brown/Gilligan 1994). c) Future gender identity is shown in the anticipated role of women: different models of future career/profession and family serve as aims for these women. For some women, the future is vague and distant. Results in social sciences conrm that there is a growing variety of female lifeconcepts. But concrete decisions about life-concepts are often missing in this age (similar cf. Seidenspinner/Keddi 1996; Geissler/Oechsle 1996; Mey 1999; Gross 2000; Cornelißen/Gille 2002). The Connection between Religion and Gender The inuence of the church and its socializing instances on religious and gender development is decreasing. Despite recognizing genderspecic differences in dealing with male and female adolescents in church, personal relevance is denied: “A friend of mine had such an experience, I didn’t” (Ursula, 858f; in: Kaupp 2005b, 264). It is conspicuous that the interviewees rather criticize the church’s dealing with money than the women’s role in church. A critical preoccupation with hierarchical role stereotypes is seldom. Places to experience faith obviously

11

The theory of tomboyism quoted from Woltematte/Lucius-Hoene 2002.

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do not discriminate against girls today, but they strengthen implicitly traditional role clichés. There is no reection on the importance of a person’s sex or gender concerning one’s own religious development, although the women tell more often of religious talks with (adult) women. The analysis of the interviews shows that contents and forms of communication differ according to the sex category of a person. Religious forms of expression—apart from going to services—are liked mostly by women. The personal image of God is most often described in male terms. A personal structure of relation can also be found in adolescent age. This marks a difference between other studies, which emphasize the development of abstract images of God (cf. Kuld 2001, 62–78). Possibly it is necessary to distinguish between the image of God and the relationship to God. The relationship to God is partly similar to the friendship to their “best girlfriend” (detailed see Riegel/Kaupp 2005, 104–108), which is a central form of relationship for female adolescents (cf. Breitenbach 2000; Brendel 1999; Kolip 1994). Conclusion The area of “religion” is conveyed by the interviewees with many positive aspects, but religiosity doesn’t seem to be experienced as a form of structuring routine life or a method to overcome personal obstacles. Perhaps the traditional forms of religious practice are felt to be foreign and not very helpful. The results show clearly that women socialized through Catholic Church distinguish between religiosity and being church-oriented. Contrary to the lower class young women that Kristina Augst (2000) examined, these women, who mostly belong to the middle and higher class, express their religiosity with the help of Christian/Church-like language. Religiosity is less a pieced together quilt of various religions than it is a selection of the Christian supply of beliefs and traditions. In respect to both institutionalized and non institutionalized forms of religious learning it became clear that the degree of open communication possibilities decides to what extent the young women evaluate the processes positively. It is possible that schools for girls could promote a communication space that supports the development of feminine youths and their identities, but under the condition that the essential and communicative needs of the girls are not understood as subordinate

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within some general didactical processes (see Hannover 1992). In the biographical experiences of learning, people and the quality of relationship to them are crucial for the development of competency in religious discourse. What became even clearer than expected before the study was the signicance of the atmosphere of religious spaces: these rooms must radiate atmosphere and take youthful ideas of aesthetics into consideration. A comparison of young women’s presentations of aesthetics and those of young men could discover whether there are different needs according to the different sexes. The range of the examination does not allow an analysis of familiar communication structures. Some fragments in the narrations suggest that there are possible relations between family and religiosity regarding the perspective of communication and atmosphere. Research on how communication structures and atmosphere within the family inuence religious communication and religious processes of tradition are further research desiderata. The analysis shows that religious life story and the gender identity of young women only have few explicit points of over-lap. Perhaps it is a logical consequence of a Christian Church tradition that is hostile to the body that these young women do not or cannot reconcile religion and gender in their narrated life stories. The research results show that a gender based distinction or discrimination in socialization processes are working in a more subtle way today and are not perceived by all women (similar Oechsle/Geissler 1998; Cornelißen/Gille 2002). Young women do not feel obviously disadvantaged within the family, at school, professional training or in church. Women do not start thinking about their traditional role until they start to work or have children (similar Kraus 1996, Mey 1999; “Jugend 2000”). But the aspects listed above show that social gender-roles and the processes of doing gender are also visible in religious practice and that they sometimes reproduce the devaluation of the female sex. References “Jugend 2000”. Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell (2000). Jugend 2000. (= 13. ShellJugendstudie.) Opladen. Leske & Budrich. “Jugend 2002”. Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell (2002). Jugend 2002. (= 14. ShellJugendstudie.) Opladen. Leske & Budrich. Alheit, P. (1986). Religion, Kirche und Lebenslauf: Überlegungen zur Biographisierung des Religiösen. In: Theologia Practica 21, 130–143.

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Augst, K. (2000). Religion in der Lebenswelt junger Frauen aus sozialen Unterschichten. Stuttgart/ Berlin/Köln: Kohlhammer. Beauvoir, S. de (1960). Das andere Geschlecht. (frz. Originalausgabe: Le Deuxième Sexe). Reinbek: Rowohlt. Beck, R.M. & Nikodem, C. (1999). Jedenfalls will ich kein Junge sein: Anmerkungen zu Interviews und Interviews. In: Beiträge zur feministischen Theorie und Praxis 22 (51), 13–34. Becker, S. (2002). Geschlechtsspezische religiöse Sozialisation. In: G. Bitter, R. Englert, G. Miller & K.-E. Nipkow (Ed.), Neues Handbuch religionspädagogischer Grundbegriffe. München: Kösel, 460–463. Becker-Schmidt, R. (1995). Von Jungen, die keine Mädchen und von Mädchen, die gerne Jungen sein wollten. Geschlechtsspezische Umwege auf der Suche nach Identität. In: H. Becker-Schmidt & G.-A. Knapp (Eds.), Das Geschlechterverhältnis als Gegenstand der Sozialwissenschaften. Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 220–246. ——— & Knapp, G.-A. (2000). Feministische Theorien zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius. Beile, H. (1998). Religiöse Emotionen und religiöses Urteil. Eine empirische Studie über Religiosität bei Jugendlichen. Ostldern: Schwaben-Verlag. Breitenbach, E. (2000). Mädchenfreundschaften in der Adoleszenz. Eine fallrekonstruktive Studie von Gleichaltrigengruppen. Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Brendel, S. (1999). “Wir haben alles zusammen gemacht, ne . . . das war immer so die gleiche Wellenlänge.” Zur Bedeutung von gleichgeschlechtlichen Freundschaften und “Peers” bei Mädchen. In: Beiträge zur feministischen Theorie und Praxis 22 (51), 37–45. Brown, L.M. & Gilligan, C. (1994). Die verlorene Stimme. Wendepunkte in der Entwicklung von Mädchen und Frauen. (Original: 1992) Frankfurt/New York: Campus. Cornelißen, W. & Gille, M. u.a. (2002). Junge Frauen—junge Männer. Daten zu Lebensführung und Chancengleichheit. Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Erikson, E.H. (1981). Jugend und Krise. Die Psychodynamik im sozialen Wandel. (Engl. Original 1959) Frankfurt/Berlin/Wien: Ullstein. Fischer-Rosenthal, W. & Rosenthal, G. (1997). Narrationsanalyse biographischer Selbstpräsentation. In: R. Hitzler & A. Honer (Eds.), Sozialwissenschaftliche Hermeneutik. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 133–164. Flaake, K. (1998). Weibliche Adoleszenz — Neue Möglichkeiten, alte Fallen? Widersprüche und Ambivalenzen in der Lebenssituation und den Orientierungen junger Frauen. In: M. Oechsle & B. Geissler (Eds.), Die ungleiche Gleichheit. Junge Frauen und der Wandel im Geschlechterverhältnis. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 43–65. Fowler, J.W. (1991). Stufen des Glaubens. Die Psychologie der menschlichen Entwicklung und die Suche nach Sinn. (Amer. Original 1981) Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. Francis, L.J. (1997). The Psychology of Gender Differences in Religion: A Review of Empirical Research. In: Religion 27, 81–96. Franke, E. & Matthiae, G. & Sommer, R. (2002). Frauen Leben Religion. Ein Handbuch empirischer Forschungsmethoden. Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln: Kohlhammer. Geissler, B. & Oechsle, M. (1996). Lebensplanung junger Frauen. Zur widersprüchlichen Modernisierung weiblicher Lebensentwürfe. Weinheim: Deutscher Studien Verlag. Gross, M. (2000). Junge Frauen, Identität und Elternhaus. Münster/New York/München/ Berlin: Waxmann. Hannover, B. (1992). Spontanes Selbstkonzept und Pubertät. Zur Interessenentwicklung von Mädchen koedukativer und geschlechts-homogener Schulklassen. In: Bildung und Erziehung 45, 31–46. Haußer, K. (1995). Identitätspsychologie. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer. Heller, A. et al. (1990). Religion und Alltag. Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zu einer Sozialgeschichte des Katholizismus in lebensgeschichtlichen Aufzeichnungen. Wien/Köln: Böhlau. Hemel, U. (1988). Ziele religiöser Erziehung. Frankfurt: Lang.

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Schütze, F. (1984): Kognitive Figuren des autobiographischen Stehgreiferzählens. In: M. Kohli & G. Robert (Eds.), Biographie und soziale Wirklichkeit. Neue Beiträge und Forschungsperspektiven. Stuttgart: Metzler, 78–117. Schweitzer, F. (1993). Religiöse Entwicklung und Sozialisation von Mädchen und Frauen. Auf der Suche nach empirischen Befunden und Erklärungsmodellen. In: Der Evangelische Erzieher 45, 411–421. Seidenspinner, G., Keddi, B. u.a. (1996). Junge Frauen heute. Wie sie leben, was sie anders machen. Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Siegele-Wenschkewitz (1995). Die Rezeption und Diskussion der Genus-Kategorie in der theologischen Wissenschaft. In: H. Bußmann & R. Hof (Eds.), Genus. Zur Geschlechterdifferenz in den Kulturwissenschaften. Stuttgart: Kröner, 60–112. Sommer, R. (1998). Lebensgeschichte und gelebte Religion von Frauen. Eine qualitativ-empirische Studie über den Zusammenhang von biographischer Struktur und religiöser Orientierung. Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln: Kohlhammer. Streib, H. (1994). Erzählte Zeit als Ermöglichung von Identität. Paul Ricoeurs Begriff der narrativen Identität und seine Implikationen für die religionspädagogische Rede von Identität und Bildung. In: D. Georgi, H.-G. Heimbrock & M. Moxter (Eds.), Religion und die Gestaltung von Zeit. Kampen: Kok, 181–215. Wesely, S. (2000). Gender Studies in den Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften. Einführung und neuere Erkenntnisse aus Forschung und Praxis. Bielefeld: Kleine. West, C. & Zimmerman, D. (1987). Doing Gender. In: Gender and Society 1/2, 125– 151. Woltemate, I. & Lucius-Hoene, G. (2002). “An mir sei ein Bub verlorengegangen”. Rhetorische Gestalten des “tomboy” — Topos in weiblichen Lebenserzählungen. In: E. Cheauré u.a. (Eds.), Geschlechterkonstruktion in Sprache, Literatur und Gesellschaft. Gedenkschrift für Gisela Schoenthal. Freiburg: Rombach, 305–334. Wuckelt, A. (2002). Artikel “Erziehung/Sozialisation”. In: E. Gössmann, H. Kuhlmann, E. Moltmann-Wendel u.a. (Eds.). Wörterbuch der Feministischen Theologie. 2., vollständig überarb. und grundl. erw. Au. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 117–121 Zulehner, P.M. & Volz, R. (1999). Männer im Aufbruch. Wie Deutschlands Männer sich selbst und wie Frauen sie sehen. Ein Forschungsbericht. 2. Au. Ostldern: Schwabenverlag.

ADOLESCENTS AND COMPUTER-BASED NEW MEDIA. PARADIGMATIC INSIGHTS OF AN EMPIRICAL FIELD STUDY ON THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY Astrid Dinter The following is an overview of the results of a larger qualitative empirical research project on “adolescents and computers”. It shows that adolescent computer usage has much deeper implications than just having specic technical skills. Dimensions of individual identity-formation, self-formation and of “uid” forms of religion concerning adolescent computer usage have to be brought out. The qualitative empirical research project on “adolescents and computers” leads to paradigmatic insights on the structure of empirical theology and on the notion of religious praxis, which will be presented at the end of the paper. Introduction “It is thinking . . . that I am better than the computer. And also that it is even more difcult . . . there are several grades of difculty. And that it is difcult to win, that you have always new forms of strategy and so on. . . . Also being in a network it is fun”.1 This quote from 16-year-old Peter shows how fascinating computers are for adolescents. Peter is part of an adolescent elite that has adequate forms of hard- and software and its own internet-access. This elite is able to operate the multiple forms of usage offered by the computer in an adequate way and has the competence and the nancial resources to do so. Adolescents like Peter decide in a sovereign way about their chosen virtual relationships and have global relationships operated through the medium computer. Peter plays internet-based role plays, where he uses the opportunities of identity-simulation and gender-switching. He also designs web-sites for commercial purposes. As can be seen in the case of Peter, computers

1 See also articles published on this project (in German) in 2003 and 2004 (e.g. Dinter 2003a; 2004a). Statements by adolescents in this paper have been translated from German.

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and computer-based new media2 play an important role in adolescent lives at the beginning of the 21st century. Adolescents have integrated multiple dimensions of computer-usage like playing computer games, programming and designing both commercial and individual web-sites, chatting, writing emails, participating in newsgroups and mailing-lists, shopping within virtual3 platforms like e-Bay, using the internet as an information-tool and a lot more other forms of computer usage in their everyday life. These forms of adolescent computer usage have much deeper implications than just having specic technical skills and being able to use this medium in a certain way. Dimensions of individual identity-formation, self-formation and of “uid” forms of religion concerning adolescent computer-usage have to be focused on when reecting on the relation of adolescent subjects with the computer. But what is still missing—from a perspective of theological research—is a differentiated analysis of these phenomena of individual identity-formation, self-formation4 and of “uid” forms of religion concerning the relation of adolescent subjects with the computer. So there is some focus on issues related to computers and new media within theology and Religious Education, that will emphasize practical applications of thematic content through new media (Brenner 2003).5 One can also nd contributions from media ethics and media critique concerning the computer (Beuscher 1999). The possibilities of biblical learning with computers are discussed (Brenner 2003; Vogel 1997) and computer-mediated forms of collaborative learning are emerging (Vogel

2 According to Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan 1964), media are corporal extensions that help to overcome biological restrictions of human being. Media operate as interaction coordinators, in so far they help to coordinate human action. The notion “new media” is not used in literature in only one way. Often one can nd the position that new media are further developed forms of old media and that they are “new forms of distribution of well-known and already developed media”. So the notion of new media is related to new methods of multiplying, transferring and distributing information. The digitalization of media brought with it broad innovations of media structures. Information is now not only transferred in an analog way, where there is a relation between the information and the information-object, but also in a digital form, so that information is translated in the numbers 1 and 0 (Koring 2000). 3 Virtual Reality is used as notion for differentiated forms of computer-based constructions of reality. The notion of virtual reality is closely related to the idea of cyberspace, a realm that exists behind the interface. 4 The term “formation” is used within this article to translate the German notion of “Bildung” that focuses on subject development. 5 The following results are related to the German speaking theological discussion on computers and its relation to RE. This discussion is paradigmatic for the wider European perspective (Price 1986; Bakker 1994; Bakker & Bakker 1995).

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2001; Sander-Gaiser 2001). The global phenomenon of computers is analyzed (Herrmann 2000) and the surface-semantics of computergames are an aspect of research (Abesser 2000; Scholtz 2004). All these contributions are important for helping to understand and to handle the changes within the eld of computers and new media. But what is still missing within theological research is an empirical analysis of the on-going forms of computer-usage within youth-culture and their implications for processes of adolescent identity formation, self-formation and the construction of meaning. These life-world related aspects have necessarily to be taken into account to successfully develop perspectives for religious learning. Learning is only possible in relation to the pupils’ experiences and has always to be interconnected with them (Klafki 1985). This orientation towards the life-world of adolescents is signicant for research within the phenomenological paradigm (Failing & Heimbrock 1998; Biehl 1998). Following this line, the focus lies on the everyday-life of the adolescents and on the question which role computers play in these forms of everyday-life (Dinter 2003a). A phenomenological approach tries to parenthesize the presuppositions in the sense of “Epoche” and focuses on “the things themselves”. This approach is not oriented towards a positivistic form of neutrality, but tries to focus on the researcher in a new way by knowing about his or her subjective, intentional relatedness to the subject of research. A phenomenological approach is characterized by taking serious the perspectives of adolescents on their own life-world and by letting these perspectives stay in their own context, when doing research on it. Because of that, a phenomenological approach towards the usage of computer-based new media is necessarily connected with asking the question about its relatedness to and inter-relatedness with everyday-life, its “Sitz im Leben”. Related to that approach, eld research concerning everyday-life is a necessary part of research within theology and RE. A phenomenological approach is always part of the larger perspective of empirical theology (van der Ven 1994). The Structure of Field Research On Method When operating within a phenomenological paradigm that focuses on a complex life-world approach (Failing & Heimbrock 1998) one has to nd an adequate research setting for analyzing the usage of computers

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by adolescents, its value for and its effect on the life and development of adolescents. It is important from a phenomenological perspective that the research focus should not be to narrow, to get an impression of the net-like structure of life-world itself (Dinter 2003b). Therefore if one analyzes processes of subject-development and “uid” forms of religion concerning the relation of adolescent-subjects to computers one has to operate within a broader perspective that also takes into account the wider situation of the adolescents lives. Biographical dimensions have to be integrated into the research setting. To be able to analyze processes of identity-formation, self-formation and of a personal construction of meaning, qualitative-empirical and ethnological methods are especially of relevance. Quantitative methods are not that useful to analyze processes of identity-development. But also when operating within a qualitative research setting, a triangulation (of data and methods) is necessary, because experiences in qualitativeempirical research have shown that mainly language oriented forms of methods are not useful for analyzing the individual media-perception of subjects, because they do not touch the hidden sub-semantic aspects. That means that a language-only set of methods had to be enlarged. A choice of methods which takes into account these facts for analyzing the relation of adolescents and computers was developed as follows: participant observation, expert-interviews, ethnographic-interviews, problem-centered interviews (Witzel 1985), that were interpreted oriented towards “thematic codication” (Flick 2002; Strauss 1991) and web-site-analysis. Web-site-analysis made it possible by comparison to recognize the relation of the virtual and real presentation of the adolescent subject and integrated non-semantic language-based forms of self-presentation like pictures and lms. Ethnographic interviews, characterized by a non-formal style of conversation as is signicant for ethnographic eld-research, were especially important to get in contact with socially underprivileged adolescents, who refused to give tape-documented interviews. Also expert-interviews were conducted with the pedagogical staff of internet projects on the computer-usage of male and female adolescents, as well as concerning the pedagogical program of the internet projects. Relevant expert documentations as well as information material concerning the internet-projects were part of the analysis. Such an integration of diverse data-resources in form of participant observation, ethnographic interviews, expert documentations as well as

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specic information material is characteristic of an ethnographically oriented way of research that aims towards a “thick description” in the sense of Cliffort Geertz (Geertz 1973). Before doing the research as described, I did a pre-study with a questionnaire as well as participant observation in order to get an impression of the research eld and to focus the main research questions for the following research process. I also did a re-interpretation of two classical qualitative studies from the nineties, that also followed a modied form of “thematic codication”. These studies are “Jugendliche Computerfans: Stubenhocker oder Pioniere?” edited by H. Baerenreiter and others (Baerenreiter 1990) as well as “Computer oder Stöckelschuh?” of M. Ritter, a qualitative eld study about the computer-usage of female adolescents (Ritter 1994). By so doing, I got a basic impression of the eld and developed a basic typology focusing on my main aspects of research. This re-interpretation was then correlated with my own research-results from the beginning of the 21st century. And I did a comparison of the results of my own qualitative study with the results of a quantitative large-scale study on the media usage of 12–19-year-old adolescents ( JIM 2002. Jugend, Information, (Multi-) Media). The Sample Since this qualitative empirical research project takes into account a specic gender-differentiation in adolescent computer usage, it differentiates within the sample between male and female adolescents. This aspect of gender-differentiation has necessarily to be taken into account if an empirical analysis of adolescent computer-usage is made, because male and female adolescents do have a different approach towards computers. A gender-differentiation is necessary for qualitative as well as quantitative empirical research projects and was not always recognized within the eld of research on adolescent computer-usage (Baerenreiter 1990; Noller & Paul 1991). The chosen age group of the adolescents was 12 to 18, since during this period we witness very process-oriented forms of identity formation as well as certain forms and phenomena of media usage concerning computers and computer-based new media. Two church based open internet projects were observed, which had a gender-mixed character, but were mainly frequented by male adolescents. These projects were situated in towns in Germany in BadenWürttemberg and Hessen. I have chosen especially small towns, to show that the described phenomena were not only part of a sub-cultural

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setting. Research was also made in an open public internet-project for female adolescents in a middle-size town in Bavaria. Also ve expertinterviews with the pedagogical staff of the internet projects were held, concerning the computer-usage of male and female adolescents as well as concerning the pedagogical program of the internet projects. Relevant expert-documentations and information material concerning the internet projects were part of the analysis. An observation of female adolescents during a Halloween Chat-Night was especially analyzed. This chat-night was developed as a female-oriented program instead of the wide-spread LAN parties, parties during which mainly male adolescents play with connected computers, which do not nd the interest of most female adolescents. The female individual interviews were made in the open internet project for female adolescents in Bavaria and in a Gymnasium in a smaller town in Hessen. These interviews were related with the personal web-sites of the female adolescents, when existing. The male individual interviews were made in a gender-mixed internetproject in Baden-Württemberg as well as in a Gymnasium in Hessen. They were also, if possible, related to the individual web-sites. To get an impression of the recent male youth culture concerning the aspect of computer-usage, a LAN party was attended. Basically the sample represents a gender-differentiated structure and a geographical variety and is also characterized by a variation of different types of schools. Also the group of socially under-privileged adolescents was recognized. The main sampling strategy is oriented towards theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss 1967). This strategy—within the concept of “grounded theory”—is directed towards a construction of theory. To develop that theory you decide during the process of collecting, codifying and analyzing data which data will be collected next and where it can be found (Flick 2002). So theoretical sampling is a dynamic process. The sample was satised when no more data could be found. The Validity of Results The described empirical eld study is in a rst step focusing on the individual case in its whole complexity. This is especially signicant for a phenomenological perception-oriented perspective and is also related to the interpretation strategy of thematic codication. Within this individual case-study more universal aspects could be found. For example,

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types of adolescent computer-usage are reconstructed. These types resulted from a vertical individual case-study-analysis as well as from a horizontal analysis, taking into account the whole eld of cases, and a permanent comparison of types and cases through contrasting them with each other. The strategy of theoretical sampling tried to achieve as broad a spectrum of types as possible. Because of the net-like structure of life-world itself, overlapping types could be reconstructed within an individual-case study. But one type was always characteristic of an individual case or several individual cases. Since the described eld study is of a qualitative character it does not focus on being representative, even it constructs knowledge that focuses on the universal. This is also true for developing prognoses about the future. Secure prognoses about the future are not possible, but the results of the described eld study are relevant for explaining future forms of adolescent computer usage and their relevance for processes of identity formation, self-formation and a construction of meaning within adolescence. To assure the relevance of the results of the described eld study and to guarantee their reliability and validity, several strategies were used, that cannot be described in all their dimensions within this article. These strategies are characteristic within qualitative empirical research to help to guarantee the reliability and validity of results (Flick 2002). For example, the attempt was made to nd an adequate form of discussing the data and the strategies of interpreting the data with other researchers. A broad documentation of data was provided, as well as a reective presentation of the whole research process. The Field of Adolescent Computer-usage at the Beginning of the 21st Century In the following, types of adolescent computer usage shall be presented (Dinter 2004a). They show the eld of adolescent computer-usage resulting from the described eld study. The focus lies on processes of identity formation and self-formation of adolescents in relation with the medium computer and the internet. Since a phenomenological life-world-oriented analysis always focuses on the complex net-like structure of life-world itself, it was important not to operate with too narrow a focus on these issues of research. For the female adolescents the following types can be described: The Divergence of Real and Virtual Self Presentation Related to adolescent usage of computer-based new media for female adolescents forms of playing with the own external self-representation

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can especially be found within chats and also in relation with specic individual web-sites. The virtual performance is often totally different from the female subject’s real everyday-life existence. So it is possible to perform a certain form of role taking in virtuality, which in real life is impossible for the adolescent subject. It is also possible to perform certain aspects of personality, which the adolescent subject does not have the courage to do in real life. The main goal is to develop certain forms of performances that help to overcome the restrictions of the adolescents’ everyday-life. In that sense the computer especially in its character of new media gets an instrument for identity simulation and presentation. Computer-based New Media as an Instrument for Distributing Choices in a Society Oriented towards Consumption The computer in its form of new media delivers a broad spectrum of offers and possibilities of choices for female adolescents that they use in their every-day life. In that sense it becomes a catalyst of a post-modern form of multiphrenic subject-structure that misses a stable status (Keupp 2002 a, b). What is important for some female adolescents is the multiple forms of offerings and choices accessible to them through the computer. Especially the approach towards multiple forms of commercial goods through this medium, as can be found e.g. within a virtual platform like e-Bay, seems to be very attractive. The Computer as a Medium of Anonymous Communication in a Difcult Situation within Everyday Life The computer becomes in the context of chatting an important area for anonymous communication that helps female adolescents to handle their problems within their families. For some female adolescents their virtual friends have nearly the same status as their real ones. The Relation of Fantasy and Virtuality The computer usage of the female adolescents is in several cases related to fantasy-topics. Cases could be found, in which computer-related forms of new media—within chat-areas, certain internet role-plays and websites—are used to participate in certain fantasy worlds. Within these fantasy worlds the female adolescents have a specic virtual peer-group. Virtual background horizons in relation to everyday life can be found when focusing on closed-structured computer games with fantasy topics. Also even more complex structures of virtual background horizons

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can be seen in which the female adolescents use the possibilities of new media to construct a fantasy-world with their virtual friends or to participate actively in an already developed fantasy-world through the internet or within LAN. In several cases of female adolescents these virtual background horizons are related to coping with difculties in school or with difculties within their families. Both forms of difculties are for the female adolescents connected with losing control within their everyday life. The Computer as a Medium of Adolescent Elites Female adolescents coming from well-established families are capable of developing global forms of social relationships. These are in most cases connected with real meetings before. These female adolescents use the computer for school as well for everyday-life as an information- and working-tool and have developed content-oriented forms of self-formation by themselves. By knowing how to use the computer in the described way, they enlarge their competence and possibilities concerning their future professional perspectives. In that sense these female adolescents from privileged families present themselves as sovereign users of new media with good possibilities to use computer hard- and software. The Computer as a Medium of Transition The computer is also a medium that accompanies the processes of identity development of female adolescents. So several changing phases of computer usage could be found that were related to certain phases of development during adolescence. For example, chatting is part of both early and middle adolescence. The phenomenon of gender-switching is mainly practiced during early adolescence and has a quite playful character. Gender-oriented Approach Concerning female role-performance the adolescents prefer to be in genderhomogeneous groups, when using the computer and feel disturbed by male adolescents. Most female adolescents show a certain uncertainty concerning the computer at the beginning. They have to overcome this uncertainty. That phenomenon is different for these female adolescents that focus on male-oriented role-patterns. They use the computer from the beginning as part of their male-role performance. With growing selfcondence concerning the computer, the female adolescents change their

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form of computer usage from acting in groups towards an individual form of usage. Specic gender-related forms of preferences can be seen concerning the female adolescents. Female adolescents prefer chatting, computer-related forms of communication and playing certain forms of computer-games (e.g. solitaire). Female adolescents try to nd forms of computer usage that t with their personal interest. Related to that aspect, it is also possible for female adolescents not to be all that interested in using the computer—then it plays a secondary role within their lives. It is signicant, that the spectrum of types describing the relationship of female adolescents with the computer—when focusing on issues of identity formation and self-formation—is characterized by a wider range of individual types compared with the male adolescents. This might result from the fact that the computer as a technical artifact is a necessary part of male adolescence, whereas female adolescents rst have to dene their relationship concerning the computer and new media. For male adolescents the following types were found concerning their relation with the computer and computer-based new media: The Relevance of Computer-games The classical type of player of computer-games that could be found in the 80s and 90s can still be identied. But the variety of games has changed and virtual worlds are much more complex, because of elements of articial intelligence. Because of that, new possibilities of action have evolved for male adolescents. Especially the possibility to create new worlds attracts male adolescents when using new forms of computer-games. Some male adolescents use computer-games for developing virtual background-horizons in relation to their frustrating everyday-life. These players of computer games try to achieve success in the virtual world, which is impossible for them in their everyday-life. Others are just trying to avoid being bored or try to relax from their stressful everyday-lives by playing computer-games. When focusing on the choice of computer games the experience of power is the main reason for being fascinated by computer-games. This experience of power is contrary to the fact that male adolescents often experience a loss of control in their everyday-life. It is not the specic content and semantics that is important for the male adolescents concerning computer-games, but the function the games have for the players in a performative way. That means that a game should not be too easy or too difcult in its structure to make it possible for the player of the

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computer game to experience success. New possibilities are offered within the eld of computer-games when playing in LAN (Local Area Networks) and within the internet. It is now possible to play against each other in virtuality and to participate in strategically planned social processes within these game-areas. These social processes in virtuality related to playing computer games in LAN or within the internet are most interesting for the male adolescents. The Computer as a Medium of Adolescent Elites Cyber-elites within the group of male adolescents participate in the articial virtual worlds of MUDs (Multi User Dungeons) in which they act in an interactive, textual or graphical environment. Within these areas the male adolescents intentionally perform forms of identity simulation. In some cases they even practice forms of gender-switching. These elites of male adolescents have an optimum of possibilities of using computers as well as the internet and are very competent in this eld. Also within this group of privileged male adolescents, forms of global relationships are practiced through the internet. They also use the computer and the internet as a tool for getting information. This aspect is especially important for school issues. The Computer as a Medium that Accompanies a Main Peer Interest during Adolescence Also for interests concerning leisure-time the internet is used by the male adolescents. So they present themselves on certain web-sites concerning their specic peer-group interests (skate-boarding; base-ball) and they download lms and music. In some cases the computer plays a secondary role as a tool that helps to organize the favorite activity of the male adolescents in their leisure-time. Web-site Design as a Way of Enlarging Someone’s own Commercial Resources Designing web-sites is very important for the male adolescents, as it enables them to make some money and to have better nancial resources. By earning money through designing web-sites they do have more possibilities of buying consumer goods. The Computer as an Object of Transition Specic phases of interest concerning computer usage can be found within the group of male adolescents. In that sense, both forms of computer usage and the computer hardware used are changing. That

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means that the computer is an object of transition accompanying certain phases of subject development (Winnicott 1973). The phenomenon of extreme computer usage could be found here. After a while, this phenomenon disappears in most cases. This transitional structure is also true for chatting. As described for female adolescents, chatting is mainly practiced in early or middle adolescence. During this period the male adolescents practice free chatting in an explorative way. This is also true for gender-switching within chat-rooms. Gender-oriented Approach The computer is a typical artifact of male adolescence, and its usage by the male adolescents is characterized by specic gender-related forms of interests, e.g. the interest in certain computer-games in the eld of action games and the developing of complex forms of web-sites. Also some male adolescents are very much in favor of simulations that are closely related to reality (e.g. ight simulations). Free chatting seems to be not that attractive for the male adolescents and can in most cases only be found during early and middle adolescence in the explorative way described. A comparison of adolescents’ computer usage from the late 80s and early 90s with the results of eld research from the beginning of the 21st century—focusing on identity formation and self-formation—shows that a lot of possibilities of identity simulation were developed through the internet and the opportunity to interrelate computers. Multiple forms of virtual communication can now be found. Global relationships are practiced by adolescents. Especially for female adolescents computer usage became attractive through chatting, e-Bay and individual web-sites. Also the structure of programming computers moved more towards web-site design.6 Dimensions of Religious Value within the Field of Adolescent Computer-Usage Related to adolescent computer usage, there are forms of religious value which can be described as “uid” forms of religion. They result from the fact that traditional forms of religion have dissolved and are

6 More results could be presented, concerning the comparison of adolescent computer usage during the 80s and the beginning of the 21st century, especially in a perspective of gender differentiation, which is not possible within this article.

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now showing up in secular processes. These “uid” forms of religion are of great importance for the life of adolescents and youth culture (Dinter 2004a). These forms are also part of “game-areas”, including performances that can be described by game theory (Adamowsky 2000; Huizinga 2004). These performances show the close relationship of play and festivities, and play and cult, thus being related to the notion of religion. Three types of dimensions of religious value can be seen concerning adolescent computer usage. 1. There are also metaphysical interpretations related to adolescent computer usage for both male and female adolescents. Asked to report on the way they use computers in everyday life, adolescents ask questions about the basic cause of reality as well as about the relation between mathematics and technological creation. They admire the beauty of the virtual worlds created by technology, draw conclusions about their own work as creators and describe how they try to follow technical rationality when handling problems in their everyday lives. These issues touch upon basic themes of cosmology (Geertz 1966). 2. Ritual-like structures are especially signicant for the described phenomena concerning adolescent computer usage, and are mainly related to ow experiences (Csikszentmihalyi 2000). There are virtual background horizons, used by adolescents for self-stabilization and for coping with often difcult experiences in every-day life or with being bored or frustrated. Within the ow experiences the computer users merge with their games, their programming or chatting; they get totally involved, have difculty stopping and forget the time. In that sense the adolescents leave the time of everyday life for a virtual realm that is not within time. Physical reactions are correlated with this merging process within ow experiences. So there is an involvement of the body within these ritual-like phenomena concerning adolescent computer usage. In that sense, there is no “secondary ritualization” (Thomas 1998), a ritual-like structure of the relation of subject and medium, with no involvement of the body. The body gets involved in these processes; also there is a transformation of experiences. For example, dying within the medium has to be differentiated from dying in reality. The described processes are of religious value, since the ow experiences are secular forms of phenomena that can also be described within ritual structures (“liminoid phenomena” to quote Victor Turner (Turner 1969, 1982)) and are mainly individually oriented. With the opportunities offered by new media—such as in chatrooms, in MUDs (Multi User Dungeons) and when playing in LANs—forms of ecstasies can be found within

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larger social groups. These can be described with Victor Turner (Turner 1969, 1982) as “communitas” experiences. 3. The case of a semantic content-oriented religious background in relation to adolescent computer usage can especially be found for female adolescents (but not only). Virtual fantasy worlds gain in importance. These fantasy worlds are characterized by motifs resulting from archetypal myths and the dualist struggle between good and evil (Röll 1998). Elements of religious value that do not necessarily have to be related to media (fantasy, magic, witchcraft) can thus now be found in relation to the computer. And the personal computer-usage is understood by adolescents as a ght against a demonized technique. Concerning these phenomena related with adolescent computerusage, it has to be asked, how these forms of a performance-oriented way of a construction of meaning have to be judged from a theological perspective. How are they related with the question of truth? In the words of Victor Turner: “Are all ‘ows’ one or are the symbols showing towards different modes and depths of ‘ows’ ”? (Turner 1982). The question of truth has to be described as a question of certainty in relation with the described phenomena of religious value within the eld of adolescent computer-usage. So in modernity there is a transformation of the question of truth towards the question of certainty. This transformation can be observed when focusing on the different truth-claims of religions as well as when focusing on the transformation from the content of belief ( des quae) towards the performance of belief ( des qua). According to Schleiermacher, certainty is related to feeling and the question of truth is touched when the content of these feelings is focused on (Linde 2004). Related to the phenomena of religious value concerning adolescent computer usage, similar structures can be described. So functional performance-oriented forms of religious value can be found concerning adolescent computer usage that have much more relevance than just being of a aesthetic dimension; also they are related to the realm of feelings and not to a xed form of religious semantics. Connected with that is the fact that it is the question of certainty that matters concerning adolescent computer-usage. Exemplary Case-Study Although the differentiated and wide-ranging structure of the empirical material cannot be indicated in this article, one case that of 16-year-old

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Tamara—will be presented as an example of the analysis described. Even this case cannot be developed in detail. Tamara’s parents are divorced and she lives with her mother, who sells shoes although she was originally trained as an artist. Tamara’s father lives in a different city. Her relationship with him is quite difcult. The nancial situation of Tamara and her mother is rather restricted. Tamara will have to leave the Gymnasium (senior secondary school) for another school (Realschule: a less academic secondary school) because she is having problems with Latin. She says: “A Gymnasium. It is a question of how long, because I’m a disaster at Latin . . . I have only six (the lowest grade) in Latin and I will probably not pass”. The problem with Latin and the change from Gymnasium to the Realschule threatens her plans for the future, as does the difcult situation in her family. She actually wants to become a teacher in art and history. For that she would need the best secondary school qualication. She is hoping that in the end she will succeed, although she now has to go to Realschule. In her self-presentation she tries to present herself as a winner, although she admits to having problems. Concerning the computer, Tamara likes to play strategy games and uses the internet in a public internet project for female adolescents. She mainly spends her time with developing her web-site as well as with chatting. Tamara’s web-site and her chatting activities relate to fantasy themes. The thematic eld of Lord of the Rings is particularly fascinating for Tamara. She wears a copy of “the one ring” around her neck and has a highly elaborate web-site, on which she works every afternoon. There she has developed an imaginative diary of her “loved ones”. Tamara identies herself with Eowyn, a princess who fell in love with a man she can’t have and ghts dressed up as a man without fear in the nal battle. Eowyn in the end nds another love. Within the motif of Eowyn we nd the structure of disappointment, struggle and success, which seems to be attractive for Tamara. On her web-site Tamara also presents her virtual friends, with whom she plays virtual role-plays in fantasy mediated through the computer. The computer plays an important role in Tamara’s life. She says “It is difcult to explain. Yes, because—lets say it like this—there are some days on which I feel totally stressed. I can’t stand this world, this reality anymore. Then—it might sound stupid—it is a good possibility to escape for a few hours. Yes, and just to forget and to talk with other people in a chat-room or so. That I would miss. Also, just to relax for a while, not needing to think about anything that makes you feel depressed, or so”.

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As can be seen in Tamara’s case she is living in a difcult situation concerning school and her family. Her plans for the future are threatened. To handle these problems within her real life and to cope with the contingency in her everyday life Tamara has developed a virtual background horizon within the eld of fantasy. To create and elaborate this background horizon she uses the multiple possibilities offered by the computer. She makes “fantasy journeys” and has a virtual peer-group. As we can see, the strong relation with fantasy topics is connected with an extended usage of new media. In her case we have a phenomenon of a double structured virtualization: a imaginative realm closely related to fantasy topics and mystery themes, which she participates in and elaborates on, is now interrelated with the forms of virtual worlds developed by computers. Paradigmatic Insights of an Empirical Field Study on the Structure of Empirical Theology The described qualitative empirical research project on “Adolescents and Computers” shows several paradigmatic insights on the necessity and structure of empirical theology. 1. The research project showed that only an abductive relation of theory and empirical eld study, made it possible to achieve theoretical progress and to change the structure of only deductively constructed theories.7 This relation of theory and empirical eld study within the researchproject had an oscillating spiral-like structure (Hitzler 2002). Within such an abductive spiral-like structure of theory and empirical eld, the meta-theoretical horizon—like the notion of religion—had to be developed in relation with research-eld and had a cluster-like structure involving several theoretical approaches. This shows that it is not possible to operate with a priori dened theoretical notions for analyzing all subjects of empirical research. 2. The research project made it possible through the described abductive relation of theory and empirical eld study to revise theoretical claims from empirical insight. So the decision whether the performative ritual-like phenomena within adolescent computer-usage are just of aesthetic character or do have religious value could only be made in 7 An abductive structure within the theoretical hypothesis development related to the empirical eld is analyzed by Heil and Ziebertz (Heil & Ziebertz 2003). For the abductive operation described above deductively operating meta-theory and inductively operating material theoretical elements are combined at a medium theoretical level.

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relation with an appropriate form of eld research. Only knowledge about the biographical background of the adolescents made it possible to understand the close relationship of virtual performance and coping with contingency in everyday-life. The same was true for the analysis of and judgment about the relation of body and medium. In this case, too, eld research made it possible to understand that a “secondary ritualization” (Thomas 1998), a separation of all corporal relations during performative ritual activities concerning adolescent computer usage, does not t with the phenomena found to be related to adolescent computer usage. This was also true for the complex theological problem of the distinction between certainty and truth. Here, too, empirical research has shown that within youth culture and its forms of “living religion” a transformation of the question of truth towards an achievement of certainty was described, as seen in relation to the ritual performance of the adolescent subjects to cope with contingency through computer-usage. This shows that eld research is a necessary part of all theological theory development. So there necessarily has to be a relationship between Grand Theory and Grounded Theory. 3. A phenomenological perception-oriented form of research—as was characteristic of the following research project—is part of the paradigm of empirical theology. Like all empirical theology it is a normative approach towards the empirical research eld (van der Ven 2002; Heimbrock 2005). This phenomenological perception-oriented form of research—as part of the paradigm of empirical theology—is oriented towards a perception of the strange other, the marginal and the strange elements within the known. This orientation towards the strange, and especially towards the stranger, results from a basic theological belief in the primacy of the stranger, as can be seen in the Bible. It is related to a necessary form of acceptance that results from the theological paradigm of justication and its anthropological relevance. These basic theological notions are not only paradigmatic for eld research but also for adequate forms of theological praxis resulting from the insights of empirical research. Handling normativity within the described approach is necessarily related to the task of being critical about any positivistic truth-claims and aware of basic “implicit axioms”, which are characteristic of all basic forms of world-views and symbolic forms (Whitehead 1988; Cassirer 1987). They are also part of a methodological approach towards reality, in a sense that methods are in some cases part of the symbolic forms (like experiments within the natural sciences). Being aware of and uncovering these implicit

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axioms is necessary during theory development and also for developing an appropriate form of practice (Dinter 1999; 2003b; 2004b). These hidden forms of “implicit axioms” in any case need reection on the background of Christian doctrine. In some cases a reformulation of “implicit axioms” might be necessary. 4. This form of orientation towards perception refers initially to the relation of practical theology and RE to praxis. It is a practical form of perception, focusing on the relatedness of everything in contrast to a merely positivistic closed perspective (Failing & Heimbrock 1998). This understanding of praxis also implies a complex understanding of the notion of action. Compared to a restricted understanding of action, focusing on both a simple relation of purpose and medium, and a norm-regulated form of action, this understanding of praxis focuses on an understanding of action that takes into account the close relation of perception, understanding and creating. In that sense this understanding of action can be understood as an expressive-performative act (Habermas 1981; Biehl 1998). 5. Empirical research within the paradigm of empirical theology differs from empirical research within the social sciences. The personality of the researcher and the relationship between the researcher and the person who is the subject of research plays a more important part within empirical research done within the paradigm of empirical theology than within the social sciences. As already shown, the dimensions of the stranger and of acceptance play a basic role in this form of research. So within the paradigm of empirical theology—as could be observed within the research project on “Adolescents and Computers”— there is a close relationship between forms of research, like interviews, and forms of pastoral practice such as counseling. But also restrictions of these forms of research like interviews could be seen. Within the empirical research process it is impossible to seriously work on the problems that could be seen within the life of the person who is the subject of research; also it would be quite easy to lay them open. At this point the borderlines of empirical research within the paradigm of empirical theology necessarily do need reection. This point shows the difference between an empirical research approach within the paradigm of empirical theology compared with empirical research done within the social sciences. There the main goal is to achieve as much information from the person who is the subject of research, not reecting about what this unrestricted form of research does to this person. This non-restricted attitude is not an appropriate form of doing empirical research within

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the paradigm of empirical theology, and again shows its basic normative character. Conclusion: Computer and New Media as a Challenge for Practical Theology and Religious Education The described research project on “Adolescents and Computers” showed that processes of identity-construction—as it can be seen for the relation of adolescent subjects to the medium computer and computer-based new media—are a big issue within adolescent self-development at the beginning of the 21st century. Related to this identity construction is the necessity of coping with fragmentariness and of constructing meaning (Keupp 2002a; 2002b). That means that identity construction—as a balancing of the inner and the social aspects of the subject within time—has necessarily to be connected with a construction of meaning as well as a form of acceptance (Taylor 1992). Accompanying these complex processes of subject development—also in correlation with the medium computer—has to be a prime concern of Practical Theology and RE at the beginning of the 21st century. It has to be accepted that religion has departed from traditional forms towards other areas of society like media. These forms of “religious praxis” are not only of relevance for Practical Theology and RE concerning youth culture, they also mark a necessary focus of Practical Theology and RE towards everyday life. Within this orientation towards everyday life, media especially the computer and new media—have necessarily to be taken into account by Practical Theology and RE in theory development. This also applies to developing appropriate forms of praxis for the different elds of theological action within society, church communities and school. That is the challenge for Practical Theology and RE at the beginning of the 21st century. References Abesser, B. (2000). Wer erlöst die Welt? In: T. Klie (Ed.). Darstellung und Wahrnehmung. Münster: Lit, 133–149. Adamowsky, N. (2000). Spielguren in virtuellen Welten. Frankfurt: Campus. Bakker, C. (1994). Media in het Godsdienstonderwijs. Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum. Bakker, T.C. & Bakker, C. (1995) Godsdienstonderwijs en multimedia. Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht. Baerenreiter, H. et al. (Ed.) (1990). Jugendliche Computer-Fans: Stubenhocker oder Pioniere?. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

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Beuscher, B. (1999). Remedia. Norderstedt: BOD. Biehl, P. (1998). Der phänomenologische Ansatz in der deutschen Religionspädagogik: In: H.-G. Heimbrock (Ed.). Religionspädagogik und Phänomenologie. Weinheim: Beltz, 15–46. Brenner, Ch. (2003). Der Computer als Medium im Religionsunterricht?. Münster: Lit. Cassirer, E. (1987). Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen (Vol. 2: Das mythische Denken) (8th Ed.). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Das ow-Erlebnis (8th Ed.). Stuttgart: Klett. Dinter, A. (1999). Vom Glauben eines Physikers. Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag. ——— (2003a). Informationstechnologie, Virtualität und Lebenswelt. In: S. Dungs & U. Gerber (Eds.). Der Mensch im virtuellen Zeitalter. Frankfurt a. Main: Peter Lang, 91–103. ——— (2003b). Religiöse Erziehung im genetischen Zeitalter. In: Bioethik (RU 3), 101–105. ——— (2004a). Identität, Religion und neue Medien. In: Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaften 7 (3), 344–358. ——— (2004b). Models of How to Relate Science and Theology and Their Implications for the On-going Debate on Genetic Engineering. In: Synthesis Philosophica 19 (1), 245–257. Failing, W. & Heimbrock, H.-G. (1998). Gelebte Religion wahrnehmen. Stuttgart & Berlin & Köln: Kohlhammer. Flick, U. (2002). Qualitative Sozialforschung. Reinbek: Rowohlt. Geertz, C. (1966). Religion as a Cultural System. In: M. Banton (Ed.), Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion. London: Travistock Publications, 1–46. ——— (1973). Thick Description. In: C. Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books, 3–30. Glaser, B. & Strauss, A. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago: Aldine. Habermas, J. (1981). Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Vol. 1). Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Heil, St. & Ziebertz, H.-G. (2003). Eine Religions-Stunde—abduktiv erforscht. In: D. Fischer, V. Elsenbast & A. Schöll (Eds.), Religionsunterricht erforschen. Münster: Waxmann, 65–84. Heimbrock, H.G. (2005). Given Through the Senses. In: H. van der Veen, M. SchererRath (Eds.). Normativity and Empirical Research in Theology. Leiden: Brill, 59–84. Herrmann, J. (2000). Erlösung durch Kommunikationstechnologie. In: T. Klie (Ed.). Darstellung und Wahrnehmung. Münster: Lit, 77–95. Hitzler, R. (2002). Ethnographie—Die Erkundung fremder Lebenswelten. In: A. Grimm (Ed.). Mit der Jugendforschung zur besseren Praxis? (Loccumer Protokolle 63 (00)). Loccum, 15–36. Huizinga, J. (2004). Homo Ludens. Vom Ursprung der Kultur im Spiel (19th Ed.). Reinbek: Rowohlt. Keupp, H. (2002a). Jeder nach seiner Façon? In: Ethik & Unterricht 4, 5–11. ——— (2002b). Identitätskonstruktionen (2nd Ed.). Reinbek: Rowohlt. Klafki, W. (1985). Neue Studien zur Bildungstheorie und Didaktik. Weinheim & Basel: Beltz. Koring, B. (2000). Probleme internetbasierter Bildung. In: W. Marotzki et al. (Eds.). Zum Bildungswert des Internet. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 137–158. Linde, G. (2004). Der Begriff der Gewißheit als Zentralbegriff evangelischer Theologie (Dissertation). Frankfurt: Universität Frankfurt. McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media. London, Routledge & Paul. medienpädagogischer forschungsverbund südwest (Ed.) (2003). JIM-Studie 2002: Jugend, Information, (Multi-) Media. Baden-Baden. Noller, P. & Paul, G. (1991). Jugendliche Computerfans. Frankfurt & New York: Campus. Price, C. (1986). Computers and Religious Education (Dissertation). Bradford: Bradford University. Ritter, M. (1994). Computer oder Stöckelschuh? Frankfurt & New York: Campus.

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Sander-Gaiser, M. (2001). Lernen mit vernetzten Computer in religionspädagogischer Perspektive (Habilitation). Leipzig: Universität Leipzig. Scholtz, Ch. (2004). Religionspädagogisches Lernen mit dem Computerspiel Zelda? In: M. Pirner & T. Breuer (Eds.). Medien—Bildung—Religion. München: kopaed, 145–153. Strauss, A. (1991). Grundlagen qualitativer Sozialforschung. München: Fink. Taylor, Ch. (1992). Sources of the Self. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press. Thomas, G. (1998). Medien—Ritual—Religion. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Turner, V. (1969). The Ritual Process. New York: Aldine. ——— (1982). From Ritual to Theater. New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications. van der Ven, H. (1994). Entwurf einer empirischen Theologie (2nd Ed.). Kampen: Deutscher Studienverlag & Kok. ——— (2002). An Empirical or a Normative Approach to Practical-Theological Research. In: Journal of Empirical Theology 15 (2), 5–33. Vogel, W. (1997). Religion digital. Innsbruck & Wien: Tyrolia. ——— (2001). Religionspädagogik kommunikativ-vernetzt. Münster: Lit. Whitehead, A.N. (1988). Wissenschaft und Moderne Welt. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Witzel, A. (1985). Das problemzentrierte Interview. In: G. Jüttemann (Ed.). Qualitative Forschung in der Psychologie. Weinheim: Beltz, 227–255.

PREDICTING TRUST IN THE PASTOR—A GERMAN STUDY Carsten Gennerich “The clergyman can not conduct his ministry successfully without trust,” says Schleiermacher (1850, p. 515) in his lectures. And Achelis (1911, p. 7) claimed that “the pastor only can gain effectiveness in pastoral counseling, when he comes to be a man of trust in his congregation.” We can conclude with Karle (2001) that trust is the conditio sine qua non for the professional praxis of pastors. In worship service the pastor’s style of preaching inuences the religious experiences of people attending. In ceremonies accompanying life transitions (i.e. baptism, weddings and funerals), families pay attention to the style in which the pastor conducts the ceremony. Even people without religious afliation have expectations in regard to the pastor’s role, for example how he or she cares for the local community. The pastor is an object of hopes and expectations, but also of assessment and evaluations. This includes and can be focused on the question of trust in the pastor. In contrast to the practical-theological emphasis on trust in the pastor, we have only few empirical studies. Most of these studies apply contemporary approaches of leadership effectiveness to the eld of parishes (cf. Nauss, 1989; 1995; Onnen, 1987) or use expert assessments (i.e., laypersons in leadership positions). Thus, the perspectives of church members have not been included in extant research. It is my thesis that research on religious praxis has to take into account the perceptions, behavior patterns and theories of ordinary people. Thus, it is the aim of this article to model parish member’s practice of trust. More specically, we will ask which (perceptual) patterns lead parish members to trust or mistrust their pastor. A model of members trust will be introduced in three steps. First, two fundamental dimensions of pastoral relationships are introduced, constituting the pastoral circle. Second, common roles of a pastor will be localized in the circle. Thirdly, based on expectancy-value theory, consequences for the development of trust in the pastor will be predicted. After the introduction of the model, results of an empirical test of the assumptions will be presented. Did the model predict the distribution of trust and mistrust in the perception of the members?

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Two Fundamental Dimensions of Relationships For a pilot assessment of what is important for parish members to trust their pastor, I have conducted explorative interviews with 43 parish members (Gennerich, 2000). The interviews focus on characteristics of trustworthy pastors and on behaviors which disrupt a trustful relationship. These explorative interviews show that the expectations concerning the pastor are rather diverse: Some wish a friend for theological conversations, but reject the position of the pastor as expert, because it would violate their sense of equality and partnership. Others would like to keep some distance and limit the relationship to occasions of baptism and funerals, but expect a good sermon. Furthermore, not all community members assess themselves as religious. Some members wish to be addressed as Christians, others refuse any religious identity. Thus, an empirically based model of members trust in the pastor has to describe these diverse relationship-expectations. To approach the construction of a theoretical model, two dimensions of relationship have to be distinguished and are assumed to adequately represent the diversity which I found in the explorative study. The rst was elaborated by Luhmann (1968) in his theory of system trust and the second is based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981). Sociological approaches to the concept of trust distinguish between personal trust and system trust (Luhmann, 1968; Giddens, 1990). Personal trust is established through reciprocal self-disclosure and emotional involvement. It can be dened as the generalized expectancy that the other acts consistent with his self-presentation. Due to the private nature of personal trust, the wishes and interests of both individuals are assumed to be equal. The themes of relationship (e.g., love, leisure activities or gossip) are freely selected by the individuals because of personal motives (termed ‘individually selected theme’ in Figure 1). System trust refers to the reliability of professional behavior performed by experts with approved competencies in a special domain of knowledge. System trust is incompatible with personal trust because of specic characteristics. The expert must control the “backstage” of his self-presentation to mask the impact of imperfect skills. Furthermore, personal feelings are ignored or should at least not be confounded with professional objectives (e.g., everyone can be a client if he or she can provide a case in the experts domain of knowledge; the expert is

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objective and steady). In other words: the theme of communication in the relationship to the layperson is dened professionally as a “case” (termed ‘professionally-dened theme’ in Figure 5). Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981), and more recently Self-Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987), allows to determine a second dimension of relationship independent of the rst. Relationships can be based on personal vs. social identities, leading to corresponding forms of trust (Brewer, 1981; Kramer et al., 1996). Personal and social identities are dened in these theories as situational changing modes of self-categorization and self-understanding. Personal identity is characterized by the salience of individual aspects of the self (e.g., I care for my mother-in-law; I love theological discussions) as foundation of self-esteem. Relationships with salient personal identities are based on personal interests (e.g., being understood; having pleasurable leisure time) and a sense of reciprocity. This is the case in the majority of friendships. Social identity is characterized by the identication with a social group (e.g., “we Germans” or “we from St. Paul’s congregation). Social identity theory postulates that, as a consequence of a salient social identity, individuals gain positive self-evaluations or a collective self-esteem and act in accordance with their group norms or sacricing personal for common advantages (Kramer & Brewer, 1984). Combined, the two dimensions form a circle which can help us understand the possible relationships of a pastor and the parish members (see Figure 1). All desired characteristics and actual behavior patterns of a pastor are represented in the circle. To attain a more condensed description of the possible behaviors of the pastor in relation to lay persons the concept of pastoral roles is used in the next part. Pastors’ Roles in the Pastoral Circle Based on the sociological analysis, on the explorative interviews and the variety of pastor roles as described in literature (cf. Engelhardt et al., 1997; Nauss, 1994), I have identied ten roles which describe possible relationship types of members with their pastors. These roles can be classied according to the extent in which they include the aspects of the two dimensions.1

1 See Figure 1; see also Table 2 for a denition of the roles used here; cf. Gennerich, 2000 for more details.

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close

Friend

Leader to the Sacred Model Evangelist

Therapist Social Worker

Personal Identity

Social Identity

Pastoral Counselor

distant

Ritual Companion

Organizer

Professionally dened theme

secular

Figure 1. Pastoral Circle

The ‘Friend’ and the ‘Therapist’ are close to the poles ‘individually selected theme’ and ‘personal identity’ because the themes of conversation are not determined by ceremonies and do not demand social identities. Because of his professional role, the ‘Therapist’ is placed closer to the pole ‘professionally dened themes’ than the ‘Friend’. The ‘Social Worker’ and the ‘Organizer’ are characterized by both, ‘personal identity’ and ‘professionally dened theme’; religious functions implying social identity as congregation member are not indispensable, and normally the pastor is more distant to the members in these roles. Contrary to the ‘Therapist’, who is expected to care for the individual, the ‘Social Worker’ is responsible for people in the local community, and the ‘Organizer’ is also localized more on the congregational level (Engelhardt et al., 1997). The ‘Ritual Companion’ who manages the ceremonies (weddings, funerals etc.) can be seen as prototype of a role, focused on an exclusively ‘professionally dened theme’. Family transitions are necessary to activate this role. The ‘Evangelist’, dened as a leader of a living Christian community, represents the pole ‘professionally dened theme’ based on system trust. The parish community is a system. But in addition, the role of the ‘Evangelist’ is characterized by the social (i.e. Christian) identity of his adherents (Nauss, 1994). Thus, the role of the ‘Evangelist’ has its placed in the middle between the two poles of ‘social identity’ and ‘professionally dened theme’.

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The ‘Leader to the Sacred’ is introduced as role of a pastor by Josuttis (1996) who describes this role mainly with concepts which are typical for a collective Christian identity. Therefore the role can be placed on the extreme ‘social identity’ pole. Representing the explicitly Christian counterparts of the ‘Friend’ and the ‘Therapist’ (Thurneysen, 1946), the roles of the ‘Fellow Christian’ and ‘Pastoral Counselor’ are to be placed on the ‘social identity’ side close to the pole ‘individually selected theme’. The role of a ‘Model’ is placed in the middle of the pastoral circle with a tendency to the more religious side of the circle. Parish members are free to choose any behavioral characteristic of the pastor as a model. Thus, this role should not be connected to any particular pole of the pastoral circle. In addition to the two theoretical dimensions (personal vs. social identity and individually selected vs. professionally dened theme), I introduce two new axes, a horizontal and vertical axis. In Figure 1 the horizontal dimension is named ‘close vs. distant’ and the vertical dimension ‘religious vs. secular’, the latter indicates that the ‘Organizer’ and ‘Social worker’ is without religious connotations and the ‘Fellow Christian’ and ‘Pastoral counselor’ refer to the religious tradition (see Table 2).2 It is obvious from the placement of these pastor roles in the pastoral circle that the roles are in conict with the roles on the opposite side of the circle. It is difcult to perform opposite roles at the same time, because the underlying theoretical dimensions are of a bipolar or conicting nature. This can lead to conicts in the relationship between pastor and parish member when the pastor adopts a role contrary to the one desired by the parish member. Using expectancy-value theory this can be described as follows. The Expectancy-value Model: Connecting the Perceived and Desired Relationship in the Process of Trust The pastoral circle as developed above describes the role behavior of a pastor. The described behavior is, from the member’s perspective, important for a trustful relationship. However, the circle is characterized by a bipolar structure. The actualization of a specic role is in conict with the

2 For a theoretically more elaborated account of these labels see Gennerich (2000, pp. 79–80).

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roles of the counterpart of the circle. As a consequence, the performance of a specic pastoral role does not always lead to trust. There is no prototypical pattern of pastoral behavior which guarantees trust in all situations and in all relationships. Thus, the content structure of pastoral role behavior affords to differentiate between the pastoral relationship desired by the parish members, on the one side, and the relationship as it is actually perceived by the members, on the other side. According to the circle, trust is only possible when the role behavior of the pastor leads to a perception of the pastoral relationship which ts to the desired relationship by the members. A motivational model which can account for such an interaction between the perceived and desired relationship is expectancyvalue theory. Expectancy-value theory holds that persons strive for goals (values) and evaluate their environment whether it is in accordance with their purposes (expectancy). Objects, events and the behavior of other persons can lead to these goals or they can hinder them. Thus, expectancy-value theory explicitly presupposes conicting qualities of the environment and requires a model to describe these qualities (cf. Heckhausen, 1991). The model in Figure 1 fullls such requirements. Attributes typical for a ‘Friend’ conict with the attributes of an ‘Evangelist’, because both roles represent different poles of the two theoretical dimensions. For example, when a congregation member desires an ‘Evangelist’, the model predicts that the attributes of a ‘Friend’ are misleading and consequently evoke mistrust. In a more formalized description, three important cognitions about the pastor can be differentiated on the part of the parish members. First, the ‘desired relationship’ (value) which is probably determined by the situation. For example when a family member has died, the parish member desires the pastor to be a ‘Ritual Companion’ with his specic support to cope with death and the competence to organize the funeral. Second, the ‘perceived relationship’ (expectancy) which is represented by the member’s image of the pastor. The member may ask, if the pastor is sensitive enough to acknowledge the unique lifecourse of the deceased. The t of perceived and desired relationships then mediates the emergence of trust. Figure 2 represents the supposed relationships between the ‘perceived relationship’, the ‘desired relationship’ and ‘trust’ as outcome. The model also explicates that the ‘desired relationship’ depends on the situation of the parish member.

predicting trust in the pastor—a german study Perceived Relationship

297

Trust

Desired Relationship

Situation

Figure 2. Expectancy-Value Model of Trust

In sum, the pastoral circle as content model of trust was developed on the basis of sociological and psychological perspectives on trust. The pastoral circle describes similarities and differences of various pastoral roles to one another. The bipolar structure assumes that religious roles are in conict with secular ones and close roles are in conict with distant roles. Because of these possible conicts, it is necessary to differentiate between the pastor’s actual role behavior as perceived by the member (‘perceived relationship’) and the member’s ‘desired relationship’. Only when the desired relationship is matched by the perceived relationship trust can develop in the pastoral relationship. Thus, the content model and the expectancy-value model need to be combined to give a full theoretical account of member’s trust in the pastor. Method Variables Ten items were formulated to measure the ‘desired relationship’, using denitions for each role of the pastoral circle. All items started with: ‘Currently I wish a pastor who . . .’. The answers were scored on a ve-point scale of agreement varying from 1 (currently disagree) to 5 (currently agree). All items are presented in Table 2. The ‘perceived relationship’ was measured with 92 items which describe images of the pastor that are assumed to be relevant for the development of trust in different roles in the pastoral circle. They varied from ‘Confession and forgiving are very important to him in pastoral care’, to ‘He supports volunteers’. The answers were scored on a ve-point scale of agreement varying from 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree).

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Trust was measured on a general level with ve items: ‘I trust in our pastor’, ‘I am satised with our pastor altogether’, ‘I have a good impression of our pastor’, ‘I mistrust our pastor’ and ‘I am often angry with our pastor’. The formulations were based on the responses of the 43 members in the explorative interviews, describing their degree of trust in the pastor. The answers were scored on a ve-point scale of agreement varying from 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree). The high reliability ( = .88, see section 3.1.2) shows the consistency of these formulations in the member’s experience. For measuring the inuence of the situation on the ‘desired relationship’, a list of 12 problems was constructed, varying from ‘nancial problems’ to ‘legal problems’. The answers started with ‘How much are you preoccupied with the following problems’. The answers were scored on a ve-point scale of agreement varying from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Analysis To eliminate response biases in the perception of the relationship to the pastor, all items of the ‘desired relationship’ and ‘perceived relationship’ were ipsatized. Therefore each item was subtracted from the mean score of the two constructs.3 To compute the empirical circle, factor analysis of the ‘desired relationship’ has been used. A two factor extraction should lead to factor scores representing the two theoretical dimensions. To conduct the expectancy-value analysis, the factor scores are used to compute the interaction terms for regression-analysis. Regression-analysis was used to predict members trust in the pastor and to test the expectancy-value model (Figure 2). There are two possibilities. First, the data can prove that the assumptions of the expectancy-value model are not necessary and only specic images (i.e. the perceived relationship) will be relevant for predicting trust (i.e. independent of the member’s desired relationship). The z-standardized images of the pastor can be used to test this main effect of the perceived relationship. The second possibility is that the interaction between desired and perceived relationship is relevant for predicting trust. To test this expectancy-value model, specially computed interaction terms are to be introduced in the regression (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 3 For more details on the necessity of elimination of response biases see Tracey et al. (1996) and Gennerich (2000, Chapter 5.4.2).

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Each factor score of the ‘desired relationship’ is multiplied with the standardized images of the pastor to compute the interaction term. Thus, the supposed interaction of the desired relationship and the perceived relationship according to the expectancy-value model (Figure 2) was operationalized.4 As mentioned above, the assumption of the expectancy-value model (i.e. what is good in one case, can be inappropriate in another) can be mathematically expressed by a multiplication. However, only when the desired relationship is matched by the perceived relationship, the product is positive (indicating trust). But when the perceived relationship is inappropriate for the desired relationships, the multiplication leads to a negative product (indicating mistrust). Thus, the computed interaction terms which are introduced in the regression, represent the assumption of the expectancy-value model. When the interaction terms show signicant effects in predicting trust, the assumptions of the expectancy-value model are justied (see appendix and Figure 5 for the results). The inuence of the problem situation on the ‘desired relationship’ was computed by simple correlations of the degree of occupation with the problem with the two factor scores. Because the factor scores represent the ‘desired relationship’ the correlations show the situational dynamic of the desired relationship (Figure 2). To visualize the results of analysis, the correlations with the factor scores are plotted in the two dimensional space of the pastoral circle (Figure 4). Table 1. Example of the interaction of the desired and perceived relationship: The multiplication (u) can express the theoretical interaction assumed in Figure 2 on the mathematical level Desired Relationship Past. Counselor Past. Counselor Organizer Organizer

(+1) (+1) (–1) (–1)*

Perceived Relationship u u u u

Past. Counselor Organizer Past. Counselor Organizer

(+1) (–1) (+1) (–1)

Outcome = = = =

(+1 (–1) (–1) (+1

Trust Mistrust Mistrust Trust

* Note: (–1) is not pejorative in the case of the desired and the perceived relationship, but it marks the position on the pastoral circle (see Figure 3 for an example).

4

See Table 1 for an example.

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Procedure The questionnaires were distributed between March and April 1998 in a wide range of mainly Protestant parish members in Germany. 132 Persons out of 200 returned the questionnaire: 104 Protestant, 16 Roman Catholic, 1 other confession, 11 without confession. 78 lived in a city, 54 in a village. 46 Persons were male, 85 were female, 1 without sex-(and age-)data. 35 were of 14–29 years of age, 60 were of 30–59 years of age and 26 were older than 60. About 90 pastors were assessed by means of the questionnaire. Results Data Reduction and Construction of Scales Desired Relationship The 10 items measuring the desired relationship are shown in Table 2. All roles are desired on a considerable degree, but differences are also obvious. The means indicate that the ‘Therapist’ is least desired in the sample. The ‘Evangelist’ is the most desired pastoral role. Furthermore, all items show considerable variance. The ‘desired relationship’ is not a stereotype. Simple interpretation of the mean-scores can be misleading, because not all participants desire the ‘Evangelist’—thus indicating that the ‘Evangelist’ is not always the best self-presentation for a pastor. Further, the moderate score of the ‘Pastoral Counselor’ does not indicate minor importance for pastoral practice, because some members have strong desire for this role, others totally disagree. Thus this role should probably be focused on. Another way to reduce complexity is represented by the pastoral circle, leading to the following questions: Which roles are perceived as being similar? Which roles are perceived as incompatible? What are the consequences for the pastor who is trying to manage multiple role-relationships in accordance with different member expectations in a variety of situations? Factor analysis of the ‘desired relationships’ is a rst step to answering these questions.

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Table 2. Means and standard deviations of the ‘desired relationships’ Items

M

SD

. . . with whom I can have private meetings and reciprocal self-disclosure: Friend

2.69

1.23

. . . with whom I can share reciprocal spiritual support: Fellow Christian

3.31

1.23

. . . who is interested and provides support based on psychology for my problems: Therapist

2.59

1.20

. . . who prays with me and gives spiritual-based answers: Pastoral Counselor

3.11

1.28

. . . who is close to my ideals and a prototype for orientation: Model

3.21

1.25

. . . who takes care of persons with problems in the community: Social Worker

3.25

1.23

. . . who organizes leisure activities in the community: Organizer

3.22

1.16

. . . who provides a solemn ceremony at family-celebrations: Ritual Companion

3.41

1.12

. . . who leads in worship to God: Leader to the Sacred

3.58

1.28

. . . who forms a living Christian parish community*: Evangelist

4.05

1.14

Currently I wish a pastor

* The German ‘Gemeinde’ has the meaning of both ‘community’ and ‘congregation’.

Factor analysis with varimax rotation of the ipsatized ‘desired relationships’ items was used to compute the factor scores, representing the pastoral circle. The series of eigenvalues (2.82; 1.95; 1.34; .98; .78; .66; .58; .50; 40; .00) do not show a signicant gap, so based on theory two factors were extracted explaining 47% of the variance.

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carsten gennerich 1‚0

Religious

Fellow Christian

‚5

Pastor Counselor

Leader to the Sacred

Model Evangelist

Friend Therapist

Ritual Companion

–‚5 Social Worker

Secular –1‚0 –1‚0 Close

–‚5

Organizer

0‚0

‚5

1‚0 Distant

Figure 3. Content structure of the ‘Desired Relationships’, i.e. the empirical Pastoral Circle (plot of the factor loadings of each role-item on the two extracted factors)

Figure 3 shows the desired relationships in the two-dimensional space of the factor loadings. The two factors can be labeled ‘Religious vs. Secular’ and ‘Close vs. Distant’ to characterize the various roles. The postulated structure of the roles is quite well represented. The roles of the ‘Fellow Christian’ and the ‘Pastoral Counselor’ are not desired simultaneously with the ‘Organizer’ and the ‘Social Worker’. The participants of the study perceive the ‘Friend’ as incompatible with the ‘Evangelist’. The two roles seem to work for divergent social needs. Interestingly, the role of the ‘model’ is associated with the ‘Friend’ and the ‘Fellow Christian’. The role of the ‘model’ is localized between the ‘Fellow Christian’ and the ‘Friend’. Some kind of personal relationship with the pastor seems to be supportive for this role in member’s perspective.

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Table 3. Frequencies for the trust scale Scale* Frequencies

Disagree < 2.00 2

rather disagree Undecided rather agree Agree < 3.00 < 4.00 < 5.00 5.00 25

21

51

32

*: disagree = 1, rather disagree = 2, undecided = 3, rather agree = 4, agree = 5

Trust Members’ trust in their pastor was measured with the ve items making up the trust scale (D= .88; M = 3.96; SD = .98). The high D-value shows that the scale is consistent and useful for measuring members trust. The distribution of trust (Table 3) indicates that by and large the pastor is a trusted person. But there are also 48 members indicating trust below the average (M < 4.00) who don’t reach a full ‘rather agree’. Why are there differences in trust in the pastor? The expectancy-value model claims to explain these differences. Perceived Relationship and Problem Situation The mean scores of the 92 image items measuring the perceived relationship are presented in the appendix. The typical image of a pastor is that of a honest, serious and respectable person, who lives with the feeling to be in God’s hand. However, looking only on the image of the pastor (resp. ‘perceived relationship’) is not enough according to the expectancy-value model (Figure 2). Thus, as described above, an expectancy-value analysis is conducted to predict trust in the pastor, using the single image items (see Figure 5 for the results). The problem situations were also used as single items for correlational analysis. Table 4 shows means and standard deviations of the ‘problem situations’. The results indicate that problems with nance, job, and illness are most common in the sample. Legal problems and problems with parenthood (i.e. children) seem to be not represented in the sample, thus showing a limited variance.

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carsten gennerich Table 4. Means and standard deviations of ‘problem situations’

Items Finance Job Illness Close relationship Children Family Community Death & Grief Psyche Faith Lone Legal problems

M

SD

2.36 2.34 2.37 1.97 1.46 2.08 1.72 2.09 1.99 1.99 1.81 1.29

1.08 1.26 1.01 1.08 .79 1.13 .93 1.07 1.05 1.04 .98 .83

Problem Situations as Determinants of the Desired Relationship According to Figure 2, the desired relationships should be determined by the dynamic of the situation. For different kind of problems, parish members expect of their pastor functionally appropriate role-taking. The plotted correlations in Figure 4 show that problems with faith, death and grief and also with illness are associated with the ‘Pastoral Counselor’ as a desired relationship (compare Figure 3). Problems with close relationships seem to lead to the desire for a ‘Therapist’ or a ‘Friend’. In this problem area, the religious functions of the pastor are not perceived as helpful. Job and nancial problems correspond with the role of the ‘Therapist’, but also the ‘Social Worker’ and ‘Organizer’ are desired. A possible interpretation is that these problems are often not shared with a pastor. If the pastor present him or herself as ‘Organizer’, they seem to distract themselves from employment related problems (e.g., participating in social circles organized by the pastor). No problems are localized in the quadrant bottom/right. The ‘Ritual Companion’ seems to represent the common sense function of the pastor which is desired, when no other needs are salient. The Interactions of Desired Relationship and Perceived Relationship as Determinants of Trust in the Pastor As most important result, the theoretical model predicts an interaction of desired and perceived relationship with the pastor in the development of trust. To test the model, a specic image of the pastor (perceived

305

predicting trust in the pastor—a german study Religious ‚5

Faith Death & Grief

‚3

Loneliness

‚1 0‚0

Illness

Family

‚2

Community

Children Close Relationship

Legal Problems

Psyche Finance

–‚1 –‚2

Job

–‚3 Secular –‚4 –‚4 Close

–‚3

–‚2

–‚1

0‚0

‚1

‚2

‚3

‚4

Distant

Figure 4. Correlations of problem situations with the factor scores of the desired relationship

relationship) and the products of this image with the two dimensions of desired relationship are introduced in regression analysis. An additional contribution of the interaction terms to predict the members trust in the pastor justies the supposition of an substantial expectancy-value effect. Figure 5 shows the standardized regression coefcients E for the interaction terms. Figure 5 is a plot of the regression coefcients E of the interaction terms. The exact items and coefcients are presented in the appendix. In the middle of this Figure, images of the pastor without interaction effects are localized. Their inuence on trust in the pastor is independent of the desired relationship represented by the factor scores of the two dimensions ‘religious vs. secular’ and ‘close vs. distant’. The more marginally the plotted images of the pastor are localized, the bigger are the interaction effects. The images of the pastor which are especially important for each desired role are circled. For example, for a person who desires the pastor mainly for ceremonies at major events of the life-cycle, it is especially important that the pastor can foster solemn

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,3 Religious

Fellow Christian

Pastoral Counselor

prayer at Leader to visits organizes meetings the Sacred for the elderly organizes meetings assumes a common confession and forgiving in pastoral 5) 1a) belief in Christ not biassed for youth clear 4a) counselling 6) emphasizes goals Model open prayer in the belief good counselling 3a) no standard-advice 2a) self“sheltered in conversations in conversations sacricing tries to convert the hand of God” lead to God no Evangelist in discreet rejection counselling no exhortation present when chaotic worship not needed services Friend sincere authoritarian keeps a distant to empathic the village Christian life-style

,2

,1

0,0

no high standard of living

Therapist

open ear

participative decision making

ne voice, sings well

gives has direct shows meaning to life contact to God is creative concern not detached his visit is tries not to convert knows secrets to trusting Model 2b) 3b) something burial in a reafrm comfort seeks no very special personal 7) no confession advantage and hope 4b) manner and forgiving in share private fosters 1b) supports pastoral experiences participation volunteers counselling Ritual you can have similar whole values family can some fun with him has power of God Companion participate when blessing no prayer Socialworker during visits evokes solemn feelings at marriages

–,1

–,2

Secular –,3

Organizer

–,3 Close

–,2

–,1

0,0

,1

,2

,3 Distant

Notes. The items represented by numbers are the following: 1a) Oriented to Christian knowledge. 1b) He is more oriented to psychological than Christian knowledge. 2a) He believes in the resurrection. 2b) He does not believe in the resurrection. 3a) He tries to understand personal problems in the light of the word of god. 3b) He do not try . . . 4a) In favor of social concern, he would not accept illegal employment. 4b) In favor of social concern, he would accept illegal employment. 5) He shows no concern for the congregation. 6) He respects the social order. 7) He do not emphasize the belief “sheltered in the hand of God”.

Figure 5. Regression coefcients of the interaction term (desired u perceived relationship) for the prediction of trust in the pastor

feelings at weddings. On the other hand, for someone, who would like the pastor as a Friend, it is most important, that the pastor is empathic, discreet and not authoritarian. Reecting the bipolarity of the pastoral circle the consequences of the data can be stated in this way: For a person who desires the ‘Ritual Companion’, an empathic and discreet pastor is less important than for the member who wants a ‘Friend’. In the case of a low main effect of the image item, it can be stated that the image has reverse effects on trust depending on the desired relationship.

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This is the case for items marked with the little black boxes. Their effects on trust are exclusively mediated by the desired relationship (e.g. prayer during visits, confessions etc.). Person who wish the ‘Organizer’ are impaired in their trust by explicitly religious images of the pastor. Persons who wish the ‘Pastoral Counselor’ gain trust in the pastor, when he or she is oriented towards Christian knowledge. Discussion Trust in the pastor is assumed to play an important part in religious praxis of members. The aim of this article was to provide a model of this praxis based on in the member’s perspective. The model is complex in nature as is religious praxis in itself. Two important questions should nd an answer. First, what kind of relationships to the pastor are desired by the members? And second, how do these normative expectations and desires interact with the actual work of the pastor in the congregation, as perceived by the members? To address the rst question of the content of desired relationships to the pastor in detail, two possible dimensions of relationship were proposed on a theoretical basis. One dimension is associated with the conict of personal trust vs. system trust and is determined by the range of themes which can enter into the relationship. This dimension is labeled by the conict of ‘individually selected vs. professionally dened themes’. The other dimension of ‘personal vs. social identity’ focuses on self-categories used in the relationship with the pastor, especially if the member is willing to adapt a collective Christian identity or not. Because of the two dimensional and bipolar structure, the dimensions can be visualized as a circle and the possible roles of the pastor can be localized within the circle. Empirically the pastoral circle is operationalized with a measure of ten potentially desired pastoral roles (‘Desired Relationship’). Factor analysis of the ‘desired relationship’ support the theoretically postulated content structure, which can explain conicts between closeness and distance and between religious and secular orientations in congregation work. What does this mean for the praxis of the member-pastor relationship? Obviously, people seek very different goals in their relationship with the pastor, ranging from ‘Evangelist’ to ‘Friend’, and from ‘Social worker’ to ‘Leader to the Sacred’. From the perspective of the pastor, this can be difcult to handle.

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Seen from the perspective of religious praxis, we have to take the life dynamics into account. Depending on the specic problem situations, different roles of a pastor are helpful for the member. The correlation pattern of the measure of problem situations with the two dimensions of the ‘desired relationship’ demonstrates the determining effects of actual experienced problems on the preferred role prole of the pastor. Especially, problems including religious questions such as death and illness lead to the preference for more religious roles of the pastor. Thus, from a pastor’s perspective, the situational variability of the desired relationships can demand even more role-taking exibility. From the perspective of the member’s religious praxis, the variability of desired relationships must not necessarily be a problem. To gain more insight, we have to consider the members’ perception of the pastor’s work in the congregation. The second question concerns the interaction of the desired relationship with the actual role performance of the pastor. In accordance with expectation-value theory, it is assumed that the impact of the pastor’s behavior depends on the pastoral roles desired by members in specic problem situations. Thus, the difculty in gaining member’s trust is not restricted to the quantum of performed roles, but is determined by the direction on the conicting poles of the pastoral circle. In short, when a member desires the ‘Pastoral Counselor’ and the pastor performs the ‘Social Worker’, then the pastor generates mistrust. Empirically, the proposed trust model predicts a moderator effect of the ‘desired relationship’ on the trust building effects of images of the pastor (i.e., perceived actual relationship). These expectancy-value effects in trust constitution can be demonstrated with regression analysis. Depending upon the desired relationship various images of the pastor have different effects on members trust. Especially trust in the ‘Pastoral Counselor’ emerges from the religious behavior of the pastor. The same behavior diminishes trust for parish members on the counterpart of the pastoral circle, when the expectation toward the pastor is that he of she is a good ‘Organizer’ or ‘Social Worker’. This demonstrates the dilemma of modern pastoral work, resp. the difculties with which members must cope. Which possible consequences for pastoral praxis can be drawn? First, the pastoral circle claries the structure of roles in the relationship between pastor and congregation. For example, a pastor can localize herself or himself in the circle where even she or he feels most comfortable. Then she or he can recognize which relationship-desires are

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matched by her or his preferred role-prole and which are not. This way, role ambiguity, a source of stress and burnout, can be diminished (cf. Grosch & Olsen, 2000; King & King, 1990). How does this work? The pastoral circle provides evidence that the resources of the pastor are restricted. He or she can not satisfy all desired relationships, because it is impossible for one person to develop all roles fully. Furthermore, the dimension ‘religious vs. secular’ represents ideological differences, which can hardly be performed simultaneously without loss of credibility.5 Thus the pastoral circle can help to clarify pastoral identity, because it leads to increased self-consciousness about the personal role prole. The gains and losses which correspond to each pastoral role behavior can be claried. The pastor is in the position to more easily interpret feedback from the congregation. Especially, criticisms on the pastor’s role performance can be interpreted without a reduction of the selfesteem of the pastor, because criticisms are not diffuse anymore (e.g., “I work all day long—I can’t understand this criticism. I’m a miserable pastor”), when they can be interpreted as a result of a mature pastoral identity (e.g., “This criticism is the necessary consequence of my role prole. This criticism is okay with me.”). Second, a claried role prole can provide a feeling of being justied, when Ruth Cohn’s ‘magic security-formula’ is adapted, i.e. the 50:50rule (Cohn, 1994, p. 205). “I can match at best 50% of the desired relationships of my congregation” or “I can achieve something, but not everything!” Perhaps the pastor can even explain the consequences of his or her role-prole in the presbytery. This justifying perspective is especially needed when pastors suffer under high normative expectations of their congregations. Third, starting from the preferred corner in the circle, pastors can draw an arrow to the counterpart of the circle to dene a possible direction of professional growth. Such a personal development can possibly help to develop new competencies to match desired roles from member groups which are in the shadow of the pastor’s actual roleprole. Insofar as this developmental strategy has its limits, the next options can be considered. Fourth, the model enhances feelings of responsibility for those members localized on the counterpart of the preferred pastoral role identity. Recognizing the restrictions of each personality, the pastor can keep

5

For more empirical evidence, see Gennerich, 2000.

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carsten gennerich The pastor has not enough resources for personal relationships and pastoral counseling, but . . .

Religious 1,0 Pastoral counselor

he/she can initiate structures which facilitates social support and personal relationships in the parish Close –1,0

• Fellow Christian •

• •

•

Leader to the Sacred

Therapist Teacher

•

Friend

1,0 Distant • Evangelist

• •

Pastoral Companion

Social worker

Organizer

Prole • Motivates people to volunteer • Facilitates faith • Gets many people to participate • Has pep and humor

–1,0 Secular

Figure 6. The ‘Evangelist’ in the pastoral circle, where most of the parish members like to see their pastor (cf. Table 2)

these members in mind for balancing intervention of his own (cf. Schleiermacher, 1985, 515f ) or have volunteers work in his or her weak area—conceptualizing the pastorate as a team. (see Figure 6). Fifth, changing ‘desired relationships’ probably requires a type of exible role adaptation to maximize members trust. The problem of such a exible role-taking behavior is dened by the conicting dimensions of relationship as introduced above. When a pastor has established a role relationship on the left side of the circle, the inherent properties of the existing relationship (e.g., a personal commitment to each other) are in conict with demands of pastoral roles of the other side (e.g., objective judgement). A solution to this problem is not easy to nd, but can probably based on Goffman’s (1959) ‘denitions of the situation’. So far as both, member and pastor, can commit to a common ‘denition of the situation’, they can ‘play’ roles, which would lead to conict in other social contexts. Because one situation is clearly distinguished from another, the conicting roles are not confounded. Thus, trust in multiple situations can be established. Finally, the pastoral circle can be used as a method of (self )-feedback in pastoral training courses without speaking about good or poor pastors. One can think about improvements without looking at the general level of trust a pastor has in his/her parish. Especially in groups where the pastors are familiar with each other, the potential of the pastoral

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circle for justifying individual role-proles can support a climate of appreciation and helpful interactions. To conclude, the empirical evidence reects that pastors are confronted with leadership dilemmas which can not easily be resolved. The pastoral circle suggests and the results show that no single best role solution exits for the management of the pastoral relationship. However, it may be a major step when we can differentiate more or less appropriate pastoral behavior. References Achelis, E.C. (1911). Lehrbuch der Praktischen Theologie, Vol. 3. Leipzig: Heinrichs. Baron, R.M. & Kenny, D.A. (1986). The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Consideration. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (6), 1173–1182. Brewer, M.B. (1981). Ethnocentrism and Its Role in Interpersonal Trust. In: M.B. Brewer & B.E. Collings (Eds.), Scientic Inquiry and the Social Sciences. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 345–360. Cohn, R.C. (1994, 12th Ed.). Von der Psychoanalyse zur themenzentrierten Interaktion : von der Behandlung einzelner zu einer Pädagogik für alle. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. Engelhardt, K., Loewenich, H. von & Steinacker, P. (Eds.) (1997). Fremde Heimat Kirche: Die dritte EKD-Erhebung über Kirchenmitgliedschaft. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. Gennerich, C. (2000). Vertrauen: Ein beziehungsanalytisches Modell—untersucht am Beispiel der Beziehung von Gemeindegliedern zu ihrem Pfarrer. Bern: Huber. Giddens, A. (1990). Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, CA: University Press. Goffman, E. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday. Grosch, W.N. & Olsen, D.C. (2000). Clergy Burnout: An Integrative Approach. In: Journal for Clinical Psychology/In Session 56 (5), 619–632. Heckhausen, H. (1991). Motivation and Action. Berlin: Springer. Josuttis, M. (1996). Die Einführung in das Leben: Pastoraltheologie zwischen Phänomenologie und Spiritualität. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. Karle, I. (2001). Der Pfarrberuf als Profession: eine Berufstheorie im Kontext der modernen Gesellschaft. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl.-Haus. King, L.A. & King, D.W. (1990). Role Conict and Role Ambiguity: A Critical Assessment of Construct Validity. In: Psychological Bulletin 107 (1), 48–64. Kling, F.R. (1958). A Study of Testing as Related to the Ministry. In: Religious Education 53, 243–248. Kramer, R.M. & Brewer, M.B. (1984). Effects of Group Identity on Ressource Use in a Simulated Commons Dilemma. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 46 (5), 1044–1057. Kramer, R.M., Brewer, M.B. & Hanna, B.A. (1996). Collective Trust and Collective Action: The Decision to Trust as a Social Decision. In: R.M. Kramer & T.R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 357–389. Luhmann, N. (1968/1989). Vertrauen: Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexität (3. Ed.). Stuttgart: Enke. Nauss, A. (1989). Leadership Styles of Effective Ministry. In: Journal of Psychology and Theology 17, 59–67.

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——— (1994). Ministerial Effectiveness in Ten Functions. In: Review of Religious Research 36 (1), 58–69. ——— (1995). The Pastor as Leader: Shepherd, Ranger, or . . .? In: Journal of Psychology and Theology 23, 115–128. Onnen, M. (1987). The Relationship of Clergy Leadership Characteristics to Growing or Declining Churches. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Louisville, KY. Schleiermacher, F. (1850). Die praktische Theologie nach den Grundzügen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt. In: J. Frerichs (Hrsg.), Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sämmtliche Werke, Vol. 13. Berlin: Reimer. Taifel, H. (1981). Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thurneysen, E. (1946). Die Lehre von der Seelsorge. Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag. Tracey, T.J.G., Rounds, J. & Gurtman, M. (1996). Examination of the General Factor with the Interpersonal Circumplex Structure: Application to the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems. In: Multivariate Behavioral Research 31 (4), 441–466. Turner, J.C., Hogg, M.A., Oakes, P.J., Reicher, S.D. & Wetherell, M.S. (1987). Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorisation Theory. Oxford: Blackwell.

Appendix Images of the pastor (resp. perceived relationship): Means of row scores (M) and interaction effects (IE, i.e. E coefcients) of ipsatized imagescores with the two factor scores of the pastoral circle in regression analysis

M Items (1) Our pastor is a role model, which you can follow. (2) He understands how to bring faith close to my heart. (3) With our pastor you can have some fun. (4) In events and groups with our pastor there are good talks. (5) Our pastor is there, when I need him. (6) Events with our pastor are with pep and humor. (7) Our pastor motivates, to contribute to the parish in its entity. (8) He develops his own fantasy and creativity. (9) Our pastor can show empathy with people. (10) Our pastor is a clear example, of what it means, to lead a Christian life. (11) At weddings, leaded by our pastor, the atmosphere is icy.* (12) Our pastor has an ability, to engage a lot of people. (13) Our pastor has an open ear and shows active listening.

IE IE Religious Close vs. vs. Secular Distant

3.22 3.48

–.14 –.02

–.06 –.06

3.71 3.79

–.19 .13

–.07 –.24

3.83 3.28 3.75

.04 –.09 –.02

–.14 –.08 –.06

3.79 3.58 3.54

–.11 .02 .22

–.15 –.22 –.16

1.94

–.04

–.14

3.22 4.12

–.16 –.03

–.05 –.24

predicting trust in the pastor—a german study M

IE Religious vs. Secular

2.03 3.92 4.26 3.81

–.15 .14 .03 .16

–.08 –.10 –.14 –.03

3.54 3.15 3.70 2.44 2.56

–.18 –.18 .10 –.05 –.09

–.08 –.11 –.06 –.11 .02

3.50

–.04

.00

3.89

–.10

–.09

3.79 3.18

–.26 –.06

.09 .01

3.52 3.43

.17 .01

–.10 –.03

3.99

.01

–.03

1.98 2.73

–.11 .01

–.10 –.05

1.85

.05

–.12

1.86

.16

.01

3.60

.03

.02

3.82 3.57

–.16 –.10

–.12 .22

3.59

–.01

–.11

1.96 4.15 3.25

.06 –.14 –.24

–.14 –.08 .11

1.73 3.39 4.03 4.45

–.04 –.05 –.12 .00

–.09 .13 .11 –.06

Items (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44)

He seeks his own advantage.* Our pastor is open minded. Our pastor is honest. Our pastor has a clear aim for the parish. He organizes events, in which the whole family can participate and the children have fun. I have similar values as our pastor. He leads the parish with a clear vision. Our pastor neglects the youth.* He prefers some people in the local community to others.* Our pastor has sometimes good advice to solve a problem. Our pastor shows inner peace. When he pastors a wedding, there are ceremonial feelings. At feasts in our local community our pastor is an enrichment. Our pastor plans events and groups for the youth. Our pastor promotes cohesion in the local community. Our pastor is reliable. His preaching is worldly innocent and incomprehensible.* Our pastor and I make similar experiences in every day life. Our pastor thinks he is superior to the members of the parish.* He seeks a convenient life and shows no activity for the local community.* Our pastor organizes events and groups for the middle generation. Our pastor talks of his private experiences too. Our pastor teaches Christian faith in a way, so that the world seems an integral whole. Our pastor shows respect to all members in the same way. He blocks conversations.* He trusts me. When our pastor is spending the blessing, the power of God is transfered to the assembly. Our pastor plays to the mouth.* Our pastor has a pleasant voice and can sing well. Funerals are leaded very personally by our pastor. Our pastor is a respectable person.

313 IE Close vs. Distant

314

carsten gennerich M

IE Religious vs. Secular

3.18

–.04

.09

2.08

.04

.17

4.24 2.44

.09 .04

.02 –.20

3.95 4.15

–.11 –.06

–.11 .10

2.48

–.13

.01

2.02 4.04 3.09

–.02 –.16 –.15

.12 .09 .07

1.73 3.71

–.03 –.06

–.14 .05

3.61 3.92 2.40 2.74 4.18

.16 .21 .13 –.02 –.06

–.14 .06 –.05 –.20 –.03

3.89 1.66

.16 –.09

.07 –.03

3.48 4.16 4.29 2.30

–.11 .06 .01 .00

.16 –.25 –.12 –.06

2.79

.01

.16

3.53

–.04

.05

4.41 3.61 4.31 2.74 3.60 3.76

–.03 –.08 .14 .21 –.09 .12

–.01 –.10 .03 –.05 –.03 .12

2.91

–.11

.12

Items (45) When our pastor leads a funeral, then I believe in the resurrection of the death. (46) Services of our pastor a sometimes chaotic.* (47) In speeches at weddings and funerals he takes in account the individuality of the person. (48) When our pastor is speaking you hear a lot of admonitions.* (49) Our pastor shows respect and is interested in me. (50) He visits the elderly and ill people, even in the hospital and in nursing homes. (51) Our pastor is susceptible to gossip in the local community.* (52) Our pastor often ignores me.* (53) Our pastor offers support for the honorary. (54) When the pastor visits me at home, it is something very special. (55) At funerals he is badly prepared.* (56) I have a conjoint style of faith with my pastor. (57) Our pastor can solve problems in an objective way. (58) Our pastor plans events and groups for the elderly. (59) In pastoral care he offers quick xes.* (60) Our pastor makes decisions by him self.* (61) Our pastor makes a visit at important birthdays. (62) The shared belief is for our pastor the basis for his work. (63) He condemns my behavior.* (64) The pastor knows secret areas of consolation and hope. (65) Our pastor is discreet. (66) He lives with the feeling to be in God’s hand. (67) Our pastor communicates his political attitude.* (68) Our pastor keeps distance to the local community.* (69) It is important for our pastor to share commune experiences of faith. (70) In preliminary talk for baptisms and weddings he takes the ofcial act seriously. (71) He accepts advice from parish members. (72) He shows respect to law and order. (73) He has a high standard of living.* (74) Our pastor organizes help for the needy. (75) For our pastor the prayer is very important in pastoral care. (76) Our pastor has something like a ‘hot line’ to the God almighty.

IE Close vs. Distant

predicting trust in the pastor—a german study M

IE Religious vs. Secular

1.46 3.58

.00 .12

.08 –.04

4.14 3.69 3.62

.14 .09 .14

.02 –.05 .05

3.54

.14

.01

2.59 2.19

.11 .16

.04 .02

2.71 1.66 3.24

.22 .10 .15

.04 –.01 .20

3.95 3.32 3.42 3.31

.08 .03 .11 .15

.11 .03 .17 .00

3.59

–

–

Items (77) Our pastor retells entrusted words.* (78) He is willing to bring nancial sacrices for the parish. (79) He beliefs in the resurrection of the death. (80) He ghts for people who suffer injustice. (81) He emphasize, that I’m taken care of in the hands of God with all my insufciency. (82) Our pastors tries to understand personal problems in the light of God. (83) Our pastor is free from inner conicts. (84) Our pastor trusts more in psychological insight than in Christian wisdom.* (85) At home visits he speaks a prayer. (86) Our pastor offered his rst name to me.* (87) Confession and forgiveness of sins are very important for him in pastoral care. (88) In pastoral care he tries to lead the people to God. (89) Our pastor enjoys life. (90) Our pastor seeks to convince others of faith. (91) For social reason he would accept illegal employment.* (92) His wife is engaged in the parish.

315 IE Close vs. Distant

AUTHORS’ BIOGRAPHIES Don Browning is Alexander Campbell Professor of Religious Ethics and the Social Sciences, Divinity School, University of Chicago, Emeritus, where he also received his PhD. In addition to the books discussed in his chapter for this volume, he is most recently the author of Christian Ethics and the Moral Psychologies (2006). He is presently involved in the Emory University project on the Child in Law, Religion, and Society. Kees de Groot is lecturer in practical theology at Tilburg University. He has studied sociology at the University of Amsterdam and theology in Tilburg and received his PhD (Naar een nieuwe clerus. Psychotherapie en religie in het Maandblad voor de Geestelijke Volksgezondheid, 1995) from Leiden University. His current research is in organizational transformations of the care of souls. In 2005, he published (with J. Kregting and E. Borgman) an article on “The Positioning of the Parish in a Context of Individualisation”. Astrid Dinter belongs to the research team on religious education and practical theology in the Department of Protestant Theology of Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University Frankfurt/M. Currently she serves as pastor in the Lutheran Church of Bavaria. Her dissertation (Adoleszenz und Computer. Von Bildungsprozessen und religiöser Valenz) will be published in 2007. Ulrich Feeser-Lichterfeld is research assistant at the Institute of Science and Ethics in Bonn since 2005. The years ago, he was research assistant and lecturer in the Department of Pastoral Theology at the University of Bonn. He has received a Diplom (M.A.) in theology and psychology and a Dr. theol. His publications include: (as co-editor) Selbst die Senioren sind nicht mehr die alten. . . . Praktisch-theologische Beiträge zu einer Kultur des Alterns (2003), “How ‘Adult’ is the Religiosity of Adults? Normative Implications of Empirical Theological Research into Religious Development in the Second Half of Life” (2004) and Berufung. Eine praktisch-theologische Revitalisierung einer pastoralen Grunddimension (2005). His current project: “Life prolongation and deceleration of human aging. Individual assessment, social consequences, ethical analysis and normative judgement”.

318

authors’ biographies

Leslie J. Francis is Professor of Practical Theology at the University of Wales, Bangor, UK. He received his PhD and ScD from the University of Cambridge, and his DD from the University of Oxford. He is an Anglican priest and Fellow of the British Psychological Society. His recent books include: Faith and Psychology: personality, religion and the individual (2005), and Urban Hope and Spiritual Health: the adolescent voice (2005). His current research projects include work on religion and values during adolescence, the work-related psychological health of clergy, and the application of psychological type theory for research in religion. Carsten Gennerich is post-doc researcher and lecturer for religious education at the Department of Theology, University of Bielefeld. He received his PhD (Dr. rer. nat.) 1999 in Social Psychology from the University of Göttingen with a dissertation on Vertrauen. Ein beziehungsanalytisches Modell—untersucht am Beispiel der Beziehung von Gemeindegliedern zu ihrem Pfarrer (2000). He also published (together with N. Ammermann): Ethikberatung konkret (2003). His current research (habilitation project) deals with the application of Schwartz’ value conception in religious education. Hans-Günter Heimbrock is Professor in practical theology and religious education at Goethe-University Frankfurt/M. since 1990. He received his PhD in 1976 with a thesis about the dialogue between theology and psychoanalysis on fantasy. In his habilitation (1980), he has worked on Spinoza and the history of the psychology of religion. He was professor in the theological faculty at Groningen University 1987–1990. His current research foci include: contextual and empirical theology, homiletics and liturgics, religious education and an empiricaltheological approach based on life-world and phenomenological philosophy. His recent publications include: “From Data to Theory. Elements of Methodology in Empirical Phenomenological Research in Practical Theology” (2005) and: “Voll im Leben”—“Herausforderungen und Instrumente einer kulturoffenen Theologie” (2006). Chris Hermans is Professor of Practical Theology, especially Empirical Theology and Director of the Institute of Catholic Education at the Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Stefan Huber is research fellow at the Department for Theology, University of Bern, and at the Center for Intercultural Studies, University of Mainz. From the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), he received his Master in Theology in 1987 and his PhD in 2002 in Psychology of Religion.

authors’ biographies

319

His works include Dimensionen der Religiosität. Skalen, Messmodelle und Ergebnisse einer empirisch orientierten Religionspsychologie (1996) and Zentralität und Inhalt. Ein neues multidimensionales Messmodell der Religiosität (2003). He is currently involved in research projects in empirical theology and comparative religion. Angela Kaupp (PhD in Theology, Diploma in Pedagogics) is tenured lecturer (‘Akademische Rätin’) in practical theology at the University of Freiburg (Germany). Her publications include: Junge Frauen erzählen ihre Glaubensgeschichte. Eine qualitativ-empirische Studie zur Rekonstruktion der narrativen religiösen Identität katholischer junger Frauen (2005); “God in the Mirror of Sex Category and Gender. An Empirical-Theological Approach to Representations of God” (2005). She is currently engaged in her habilitation on the signicance of space within religious learning and teaching processes at school. Tobias Kläden Dr. theol. (PhD in Theology), Dipl.-Psych. (Diploma in Psychology), is assistant lecturer at the Department of Pastoral Theology and Religious Education, University of Münster. His publications include: Mit Leib und Seele . . . Die mind-brain-Debatte in der Philosophie des Geistes und die anima-forma-corporis-Lehre des Thomas von Aquin (2005) and (as co-editor): Selbst die Senioren sind nicht mehr die alten . . . Praktisch-theologische Beiträge zu einer Kultur des Alterns (2003). His current research project has a focus on psychology in practical theology. Hans Schilderman is Associate Professor in Empirical Studies of Religion at the Radboud University in Nijmegen. He received his PhD in Theology 1998 from the Catholic University of Nijmegen. He has published on issues of religious occupation (Religion as a Profession, 2005) and theological methodology (“Blazing the Trail of Empirical Theology”). His current focus comprises comparative research on ritual an solidarity. Heinz Streib is Professor for Religious Education and Ecumenical Theology at the Universität Bielefeld. He received his PhD 1989 from Emory University, Atlanta, and completed his habilitation 1995 at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt/M. His publications include: “Faith Development: A Way Beyond Fundamentalism” (2006); “Faith Development Research Revisited” (2005); “The Variety of Deconversion Experiences” (2004) and “Faith Development Theory Revisited: The Religious Styles Perspective” (2001). One of his current theoretical projects is faith development theory and method. His more recent empirical research had its focus on deconversion.

320

authors’ biographies

Anke Terörde (M.A. in Comparative Religious Studies: Diploma in Psychology) is research assistant at the Department for Developmental and Pedagogical Psychology, University of Bonn, where she has been research assistant at the Department of Pastoral Theology 2001–2005. Her most recent publication is: “Religiöse Rituale im höheren Erwachsenenalter—ein Blick auf intergenerationale Beziehungen” (2006). Johannes A. van der Ven Ph.D. Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands, Doctor honoris causa University of Lund, Sweden, occupies the chair of comparative empirical theology in Nijmegen and the extra-ordinary chair of practical theology at the University of South Africa. He has written 13 books, edited 17 books and has written 300 articles in refereed journals in ten languages.

INDEX action theory 8, 55–61, 63–64, 72, 74, 85, 99 ageing 231–233, 240–242, 244 culture of ageing 233, 240 biographical research 159, 253, 255 body 21, 41, 65–71, 81–83, 88–91, 254, 263, 281, 285 embodiment 60 brain research 2, 27, 61–63, 65, 79–83, 85–87, 91 centrality 211, 213, 215–216, 218–224, 226, 228, 230 cognitive psychology 63, 65, 85–87 content 47, 66, 72, 87, 98, 179, 181, 211–213, 217, 221, 226–230, 255, 258–262, 270, 277–278, 282, 296–297, 302, 307 deconversion 147, 151, 156–162, 164, 168–170 de-institutionalization 2–3, 143, 147–158, 161–163, 169, 180 de-institutionalized religion 1, 147–148, 163, 165–170 demographic development 13, 232 devotion, devotional 47, 215, 216–218 emotion, emotions 19–23, 25, 28–29, 62–63, 65–66, 68, 80, 85–86, 88, 94, 136–137, 157, 178, 213, 292 empirical research 2–3, 19, 39, 43, 58, 61–62, 72–74, 80–81, 83, 93, 126, 137, 144, 153, 158, 160, 165, 188, 212, 215, 221, 243, 247, 250–251, 269, 273, 275, 284–287 faith development 59, 159, 161–162, 170 forgivingness 227 gender 2, 22, 41, 129–130, 247–251, 254– 255, 260–263, 269, 273–274, 277–280 gerontological research 231–233 hermeneutics 40, 57, 94–95, 97–98, 104, 120 hylemorphism 90

ideology

10, 100, 181–183, 218

late modernity 176, 178, 181 lifespan 2, 48, 148–149, 231, 233–235, 237–239, 241–244 liquid modernity 175, 177–178, 181–182, 184–188 liturgy 10, 125–128, 130–132, 134, 140–144, 187, 259 liturgical studies 125–127, 133–134 measurement 44, 211, 215, 217, 219–220, 222, 226, 228–229 mind-body 68, 82 narrative interview 244, 253, 260 naturalism 28, 90 neuroscience 19, 82, 86–87, 91 neurotheology 88 new media 2, 179, 270–273, 275–278, 281, 284, 287 normativity 35, 40, 285 parish member 291–293, 295–296, 300, 304, 308, 310, 314 personal construct 211–213, 217, 228 personality 42, 44–46, 50, 211–216, 220–221, 223, 225–228, 233, 276, 286, 309 phenomenology 63, 68, 73–74 rational choice 7–8, 11, 13, 17–19, 29, 176, 200 religiousness 79–80, 88–89, 231, 234–240, 242–243 religious construct-system 211–230 development 2, 158, 231–235, 237–239, 242, 244, 247–249, 262 differences 7–8, 13, 25 education 58, 251, 270, 287 experience 14, 17, 20–21, 23–28, 59, 63, 65–66, 81, 87–88, 96, 157, 169, 188, 217, 227, 251, 291 practice 46, 81–82, 93–94, 115–120, 157, 211, 216–218, 231, 235–240, 243–244, 248, 262, 263

322

index

praxis 1–3, 57–59, 72, 93, 119, 125, 157, 161, 163, 169, 175, 187, 269, 287, 291, 307–308 rites of passage 126–140, 142–144 ritual companion 294, 296, 301–302, 304, 306 studies 126, 134, 243

secularisation 2, 7–14, 19, 29, 125, 139–140, 151, 153, 161, 241 self-concept 219, 260 social networks 182–184, 218 spirituality 23, 94, 147, 164–167, 185, 187 spiritual quest 159, 164–166 stage theories 233