Relational Group Psychotherapy
of related interest Building on Bion: Roots
Origins and Context of Bion’s Contributio...
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Relational Group Psychotherapy
of related interest Building on Bion: Roots
Origins and Context of Bion’s Contributions to Theory and Practice Edited by Robert M. Lipgar and Malcolm Pines ISBN 1 84310 710 4
International Library of Group Analysis 20
Building on Bion: Branches
Contemporary Developments and Applications of Bion’s Contributions to Theory and Practice Edited by Robert M. Lipgar and Malcolm Pines ISBN 1 84310 711 2
International Library of Group Analysis 21 Two volume set ISBN 1 84310 731 7
The Group as Therapist Rachael Chazan
ISBN 1 85302 906 8
International Library of Group Analysis 14
Dreams in Group Psychotherapy
Theory and Technique Claudio Neri, Malcolm Pines and Robi Friedman ISBN 1 85302 923 8
International Library of Group Analysis 18
Circular Reflections
Selected Papers on Group Analysis and Psychoanalysis Malcolm Pines ISBN 1 85302 492 9 pb ISBN 1 85302 493 7 hb
International Library of Group Analysis 1
The Social Unconscious Selected Papers Earl Hopper
ISBN 1 84310 088 6
International Library of Group Analysis 22
Foundations and Applications of Group Psychotherapy A Sphere of Influence Mark F Ettin ISBN 1 85302 795 2
International Library of Group Analysis 10
INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF GROUP ANALYSIS 26
Relational Group Psychotherapy From Basic Assumptions to Passion Richard M. Billow Foreword by Malcolm Pines With an Introduction by James S. Grotstein
Jessica Kingsley Publishers London and New York
Reworked and excerpted material from the following journal articles I authored appears in the following chapters. Chapters l and 2: (2000) ‘Self disclosure and psychoanalytic meaning: A psychoanalytic fable,’ Psychoanalytic Review 87, 61–79; (2001) ‘The therapist’s anxiety and resistance to group,’ International Journal of Group Psychotherapy 5, 83–100. Chapters 2 and 4: (1997) ‘Entitlement and counter entitlement in group therapy,’ International Journal of Group Psychotherapy 47, 459–474; (1998) ‘Entitlement and the presence of absence,’ Journal of Melanie Klein and Object Relations 16, 537–554; (1999a) ‘Power and entitlement: Or, mine versus yours,’ Contemporary Psychoanalysis 35, 475–489; (1999c) ‘An intersubjective approach to entitlement,’ Psychoanalytic Quarterly 68, 441–461. Chapter 5: (2001a) ‘Relational levels of the container–contained in group,’ Group 24, 243–259; (2003a) ‘Relational dimensions of the “container–contained”,’ Contemporary Psychoanalysis, in press. Chapter 6: (2003a) ‘The Adolescent Play: Averting the tragedy of Hamlet,’ Contemporary Psychoanalysis, in press; (2004) ‘Working relationally with adolescents in group,’ Group Analysis, in press. Chapter 7: (2003b) ‘Bonding in group: The therapist’s contribution,’ International Journal of Group Psychotherapy. Chapter 8: (2003c) ‘Rebellion in group,’ International Journal of Group Psychotherapy, in press. Chapter 9: (1999b) ‘LHK: The basis of emotion in Bion’s theory,’ Contemporary Psychoanalysis 35, 629–646; (2001b) ‘The class that would not read: Utilizing Bion’s affect theory in group,’ International Journal of Group Psychotherapy 51, 309–326. Chapter 10: (2000a) ‘From countertransference to “passion”,’ Psychoanalytic Quarterly 69, 93–119: (2000b) ‘Bion’s “passion;” the analyst’s pain,’ Contemporary Psychoanalysis 36, 411–426: (2002) ‘Passion in Group: Thinking about loving, hating, and knowing,’ International Journal of Group Psychotherapy 52, 355–372. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any material form (including photocopying or storing it in any medium by electronic means and whether or not transiently or incidentally to some other use of this publication) without the written permission of the copyright owner except in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 or under the terms of a licence issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London, England W1P 9HE. Applications for the copyright owner’s written permission to reproduce any part of this publication should be addressed to the publisher. Warning: The doing of an unauthorised act in relation to a copyright work may result in both a civil claim for damages and criminal prosecution. The right of Richard M. Billow to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in the United Kingdom in 2003 by Jessica Kingsley Publishers Ltd 116 Pentonville Road London N1 9JB, England and 29 West 35th Street, 10th fl. New York, NY 10001-2299, USA www.jkp.com Copyright © 2003 Richard M. Billow Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Billow, Richard M., 1943Relational group psychotherapy : from basic assumptions to passion / Richard M. Billow ; foreword by Malcolm Pines p. cm. -- (International library of group analysis ; 26) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-84310-738-4 (alk. paper) -- ISBN 1-84310-739-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Group psychotherapy. 2. Group psychoanalysis. I. Title. II. Series. RC488 .B475 2003 616.89’152--dc21
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 1 84310 739 2 Paperback ISBN 1 84310 738 4 Hardback Printed and Bound in Great Britain by Athenaeum Press, Gateshead, Tyne and Wear
2002041106
To the groups that bred, fed, and led me. Most particularly, to my loving wife, Elyse, and to our children, Jennifer, David, and Brette.
Contents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS FOREWORD
9 11
Malcolm Pines, Institute of Group Analysis, London INTRODUCTION
13
James S. Grotstein, School of Medicine, UCLA PREFACE: PLAN OF THE BOOK
29
Chapter 1
The Authority of the Group Therapist’s Psychology
33
Chapter 2
The Therapist’s Anxiety and Resistance to Group
45
Chapter 3
The Basic Conflict: To Think or Anti-think – Applying Bion’s Theory of Thinking in the Group Context
69
Chapter 4
Entitled Thinking, Dream Thinking, and Group Process
89
Chapter 5
Containing and Thinking – The Three Relational Levels of the Container–Contained
110
Chapter 6
Containing the Adolescent Group
131
Chapter 7
Bonding in Group – The Therapist’s Contribution
152
Chapter 8
Rebellion in Group
172
Chapter 9
Primal Affects – Loving, Hating, and Knowing
193
Chapter 10
Primal Receptivity – The Passionate Therapist: The Passionate Group
215
BIBLIOGRAPHY
238
SUBJECT INDEX
249
AUTHOR INDEX
255
Acknowledgments It is wonderful to have a good friend, more wonderful still and rarer to have one with a brilliant mind that can understand the meaning behind an illogical thought, and provide the grammar to untwist it, a musical ear to improve its turn of phrase, a creative eye for its ideal expression, and a demanding character to insist upon its being good enough. Dr. Charles Raps has been with this project from its inception, and Relational Group Psychotherapy has benefited greatly from our many theoretical discussions and occasional arguments, from his original contributions, and from his encouragement, careful reading, and detailed editing of each draft of the manuscript. He is patient and giving beyond what I should have expected, certainly not asked for, although I asked and received with equal rapidity, and I am deeply grateful. Dr. Malcolm Pines, Editor of the International Library of Group Analysis, has been an enthusiastic reader of my writing and supporter of this project from the initial outline and plan of the book and has shepherded its publication by Jessica Kinsgley. I appreciate very much his welcoming Foreword to this volume. Dr. James Grotstein continues to be an inspiring explicator of Bion as well as one of psychoanalysis’ most creative forces. I am honored by his erudite Introduction, which represents a significant contribution in its own right. Dr. Earl Hopper perused the final manuscript and complimented me by providing a thought-provoking analysis. He also suggested some needed reorganization of material. Dr. Rosemarie Carlson read the final version to correct for theoretical inconsistencies and stylish infelicities. Drs. Michelle Berdy, Elyse Billow, Robert Mendelsohn, Joseph Newirth, Beth Raymond, and Bennett Roth, and Doris Friedman, M.S.W., have read and made helpful comments on various sections and chapters. The following editors have worked with me as I developed certain themes that first appeared in their journals: Drs. William E. Piper and Cecil Rice of the International Journal of Group Psychotherapy, Owen Renik of the Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Jay Greenberg, Donnel Stern, Ruth Imber, Sandra Beuchler, and Robert Langan of Contemporary Psychoanalysis, and Jeffrey Kleinberg of Group. Many generations of doctoral and postdoctoral students at the Gordon Derner Institute of Advanced Psychological Studies have shared my interest in Klein and Bion. They have been willing to read and think deeply, and it has been 9
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challenging to prepare lectures and engage in classroom and supervisory discussions with them. The candidates in the Adelphi Postdoctoral Group Program have been a particularly valuable resource, providing rich material from their own practices as well as participating creatively in experiential learning. Finally, I thank the inspirational sources of my thinking, and writing: the sensitive and articulate individuals I have been privileged to work with in my clinical practice and with whom I have suffered and enjoyed the group experience.
Foreword
I am very pleased to be able to present this monograph by Richard Billow in this series. In my opinion, Billow is the most able author in our field to present the theoretical and clinical thinking of Wilfred Bion. Bion’s writings are notoriously difficult to comprehend and Billow has made a significant contribution in bringing together Bion’s salient notions in a way which I am sure will be very welcome to readers. Beyond that, Billow shows how he has been able to use these seemingly abstruse notions in clinical work, in supervision and in teaching. I have immersed myself in Bion’s ideas for the past three years, whilst engaged in co-editing another monograph in this series, Building on Bion: Roots and Building in Bion: Branches, which shows the fertile application that many persons are able to make of his work. However, it is Billow’s book that brought many stimulating vignettes to life. I am glad to see that Billow has been able to make use of Foulkesian group analytic ideas and to make links between Foulkes and Bion. This applies also to his understanding of Winnicott. Psychodynamic group work with adolescents is a notoriously difficult area. Billow’s vivid description of his work with adolescents should give confidence to clinicians who are working in this area. Billow’s experience complements that already described by John Evans in an earlier book in this series, Active Analytic Group Therapy for Adolescents (1998). Malcolm Pines, Institute of Group Analysis, London
11
Introduction James S. Grotstein
The author has written an erudite, profound, and extraordinarily useful text, not only on group therapy, but also on the application of Wilfred Bion’s contributions to it. I am not a group therapist, but after reading Dr. Billow’s theoretical and clinical explications, I began to wish that I had been. I do know something about the works of Wilfred Bion, however, having written about them on many occasions, and, furthermore, having been analyzed by him. From this background I believe I am in a respectable position to evaluate Dr. Billow’s understanding of Bion’s ideas. I found his understanding remarkable. Bion’s works are hard reading for most. He, like Lacan, seems to write in ‘poetics,’ that is, in the style of evocation of ideas rather than in clarification, which to him amounted to closure. His ideas open up innumerable hypertexts or asides, rarely end in closures. In my own contribution here I shall epitomize and paraphrase Dr. Billow’s superb rendition of Bion’s work. Group therapy, like individual psychotherapy, once began as a stepchild to orthodox-classical psychoanalysis but ultimately grew into its own entelechy as a unique form of treatment in its own right. ‘Relational’ group psychotherapy is the next generational distinction in group therapy’s career in which the relational component began to assume a dominant role. The term ‘relational’ presupposes that the dyad, the smallest group, is indivisible – that we can no longer speak of the patient or the therapist as an isolate. Likewise, we cannot speak of the group leader as separate from his group. Each affects the other. The casualty in this evolution is the myth of the objective analyst. Wilfred Bion, who began his career in the study of groups, reminded us that man is basically a dependent animal and that the individual is composed 13
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of internal groups and that the external group may function as a cohesive individual. It is the concept of individuality itself that seems to be in need of a post-modern, relativistic redefinition. Sperry (1969) and his colleagues, Gazzaniga and LeDoux (1978), came to a similar opinion about the need for a redefinition of individuality from their brain-laterality researches. More recently the Norwegian sociologist, Stein Bråten (1993), suggests that the infant has an inborn propensity to experience a ‘virtual other’: ‘…[T]he observer is invited to view them [infants] as one self-organizing system, not two, and yet with a differentiated self–other organization’ (p.26). The title of his thesis is ‘Born with the Other in Mind’ (p.25). With these ideas in mind, Sullivan’s (1953) notion of ‘participant observation’ as a shared faculty – shared by therapist and patient and/or group member – becomes more cogent than ever. Yet a paradox exists. For individual analysts or for group leaders (therapists) to maintain their authority and to be able to be a container for their patients, they must achieve and maintain some considerable degree of separateness from their patients. Perhaps we can reconcile the problem by suggesting that the analyst, therapist, group leader must ultimately be separate and yet at the same time allow him or herself to be vulnerable to experiencing both the emotions emanating from their patients and from their own emotional states as well. Robert Fliess’s (1942) term ‘partial identification’ on the therapist’s part fits in well here. I believe this is one of the ideas that the author is trying to get across in this work. Put another way, the classical posture of the separate, neutral, objective, and unaffected therapist must exist alongside his or her emotionally-affected counterpart. I believe that Bion (1959, 1962, 1963) makes this point clear in his formulation of the qualifications of the analyst or group leader as container of his or her patients’ anxieties. While addressing the process of group psychotherapy from many vertices (Bion’s way of stating ‘points of view’), the author organizes the chapters of the book along lines that issue from the works of Bion, whom he puts forward as one of the prophets in the contemporary relational reformation. I concur. Bion was the first post-modern, relativistic Kleinian, the one who first transcended the Cartesian boundaries that had (and still do) encased so much of classical and Kleinian thinking. In my own contribution I shall expand on some of Bion’s ideas that the author has imported and thoughtfully applied to his study of the group psychotherapy process. Moreover, because Bion’s professional career began with the study of groups, he was able more than others
INTRODUCTION
15
to bring his social awareness to bear on psychoanalytic issues, as well as the reverse once he had undergone psychoanalytic training. Thus, his model of ‘socialism’ versus ‘narcissism’ (Bion 1992). When he was able to combine his experiences treating psychotics (narcissistically asocial) with his group experiences, he was able to forge a metatheory (his term for a metapsychology) that blossomed with fascinating and revolutionary changes in our concepts of epistemology, ontology, and phenomenology. Dr. Billow has brilliantly and effectively captured them and clinically epitomized them in this present work. Having said the above, I must hasten to add another of my impressions of Bion. Though thoroughly immersed in the theory of groups and group relationships, his main thinking centered on the individual, whom he considered to constitute a group in itself. He strongly espoused his belief that man was utmostly a dependent animal and was thus certainly relational in his thinking, but, in my view, he was a ‘relational Kleinian,’ not an ‘in-kleined relationist.’ While he keenly understood the importance and powerful effects of human interaction (‘emotional turbulence’), he at the same time believed that each individual needs to feel solely responsible for his or her own responses to others. He brought this principle home to me over and over again in my analysis. Here he rigorously followed Freud and especially Klein.
Does group psychotherapy (analysis) have a place in psychoanalytic training? In Chapter 2 the author brings up a subject that I believe has considerable merit. He states: ‘Psychoanalytic institutions bar inclusion of group therapy [I would say ‘group analysis’] in their candidates’ own training analyses, or presentation of patients in combined therapy as control cases’. I heartily agree. The group experience brings out dimensions of a patient’s character that all too frequently escape detection in individual treatment. Bion puts forward the idea that ‘narcissism’and ‘socialism’ are two significant tropisms in individuals and that individual analysis is better handling the former. Received wisdom suggests that group therapy seems better in dealing with character problems, habits, and problems in interpersonal relating. At the very least group therapy and individual therapy seem to complement one another. I for one believe that group therapy or analysis – as well as group process (i.e. Tavistock groups) should be a part of institute training.
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‘Abandon memory and desire’ Bion’s (1962) mantra to ‘abandon memory and desire,’ as well as preconceptions, understanding, and all forms of sensuous experience, has now become legendary. He carried the idea as far as to exhort the analyst to treat each psychoanalytic session as if it were the first. For his rationale Bion cites the contamination that sense-derived information imparts to the analyst’s mind. My own understanding of his rationale is as follows: our senses form images within us (representations, constructions) of the object, and we subsequently fail to distinguish the object as it really is (what he calls ‘O,’ unknown and unknowable) from the internal working model we have made of it (Bion, 1965, 1970). One is reminded here of Magritte’s famous painting of a pipe with the statement, ‘This is not a pipe.’ Bion was a Platonist. He believed that the quintessence of reality resided in the ‘ideal forms’ and that the objects of perception were a falsified or diluted reality. Hence, if an analyst were to eschew memory and desire, she or he would be undergoing something like a meditative withdrawal, a process not unlike a sensory-deprivation experience, in which the internal sense organ, the one that is sensitive to internal qualities, becomes activated – as intuition into the unconscious. For Bion memory, desire, and ‘understanding’ on the part of the analyst causes the analyst to imprison the patient in a static, devitalized conception, one that is not alive or generative. Bion (personal communication) derived his idea about abandoning memory and desire (the desire, for instance of wishing to cure the patient) from a letter Freud had written to Lou Andreas Salome. I recall that, following my analytic session with him, Bion reached for a volume in the bookcase in his office, retrieved the book that contained the Freud-Salome correspondence in German, and translated it for me. To the best of my memory his translation ran something like this: ‘When conducting an analysis, it helps to cast a beam of intense darkness into the interior so that elements that have hitherto eluded detection because of the dazzling illumination can glitter all the more visibly in the darkness.’ When challenged by other analysts about his seemingly radical suggestion, he would immediately retort, ‘I am only paraphrasing Freud’ – and he was. Perhaps another way of saying the above is to think of Bion as a serious post-Cartesian thinker, one who sought to bring psychoanalysis out of its confines in the certainty of logical positivism into the new era of uncertainty, where the best we can hope for is a transient glimpse, not of the object, but of the impression the object makes upon us. That was Bion’s creed.
INTRODUCTION
17
Countertransference issues in the group leader: Container–contained The author speaks of the ‘dread and fear of doing group therapy.’ We know from individual analysis that the analytic process acts like a poultice to summon bad demons from inside to the surface to be expressed – that the patient is unconsciously enjoined to regress, and from this regression to project his infantile anxieties into the analyst. Klein believed that this was an unconscious phantasy. Bion explicated that it was all too often an interpersonal fact. Now imagine a group of individuals who are undergoing a therapeutic regression. Recall also that in all therapeutic regressions such ideas as omnipotent expectations of the therapist as well as attribution of omniscience and intentionality (purpose) are attributed to him or her. She or he has become the leader who is now imprisoned by these expectations of omnipotent responsibility. When they fail, they intended to fail, the purpose being to persecute the patient or group. One also realizes that the number of individuals in the group offers a kind of leverage so that their attributions seem to undergo a geometric ratio of intensified urgency on the leader (‘emotional amplification and contagion’). Money-Kyrle (1956) speaks of the therapist’s ‘introjective counteridentification’ and Grinberg (1962, 1979a, 1979b) speaks of the analyst’s projective counteridentification which, to my mind, constitutes the extension to the former of the analyst’s own infantile neurosis. Mason (1994) refers to this phenomenon as ‘folie à deux’ or ‘mutual hypnosis.’ I myself term the realistic interpersonal process ‘projective transidentification’ to distinguish it from projective identification, which to me is only the unconscious intrapsychic phantasy (Grotstein 1995, 2002b). Bion’s (1959, 1962) conception of container–contained revolutionized Kleinian as well as classical thinking in so far as he formulated a pathway for the emergence of preverbal and nonverbal communication and for communicative impact – and designated the obligation of the receiver to withstand the emotional onslaught of the communicator long enough and patiently enough so as to enter into a state of reverie in order to apply his or her alpha-function (capacity to dream by day and by night) and thereby encode with meaning the infra-verbal communications from the communicator. The mother’sanalyst’s-group leader’s capacity to achieve reverie and to apply their alpha-function2 becomes decisive as a prophylactic to avoid collusion, counter-projective counteridentification, and subsequent retaliation.
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Ogden’s (1994) concept that the therapeutic relationship itself constitutes the ‘analytic third subject’ and his derivative concept of the ‘subjugating third subject’ is of relevance here. The subjugating third subject is a virtual subject that comprises the projective identification of the subjectivities of the analysand and analyst, and unconsciously orchestrates and subjugates both participants. One can only imagine what kind of bedlam is created when this potential monster is turned loose in a group. I have reason to believe that it is the sinister work of the subjugating third subject that causes splitting in the work group into the basic assumption sub-groupings, i.e. pairing, fight/flight, and dependency.
The caesura and the maintenance of boundaries Central to Bion’s thinking, both clinically and theoretically, is the idea of the presence of intact but flexible (not elastic) boundaries (Bion 1977). The individual and group therapist must each establish, maintain, and reinforce the existence of boundaries within his or her respective therapeutic frames. The rationale behind this is the need to protect the intactness and encourage the functioning of each domain, System Ucs. and System Cs. The boundary must be intact, as in theater, so that the play can go on. The therapist, group leader, and patients all seek consciously or unconsciously to cross the boundary because of a variety of fears, but the principal fear is that of ‘O,’ Bion’s (1965, 1970) enigmatic term for uncertainty, i.e. the Absolute Truth about Ultimate Reality,3 noumena, things-in-themselves, beta elements, ideal forms, and/or inherent preconceptions. In other words, when therapist, leader, or patient seeks to cross the boundary of the established frame, they are enacting collusion and huddling with one another in order to avoid an impact with evolving ‘O.’ Bion speaks (1977) often of the caesura, first as the semipermeable boundary between fetaldom and birth. He also speaks of a ‘contact barrier’ between systems Ucs. and Cs. that is formed and reinforced by alpha-function (dreaming). All logical thinking depends on the presence of boundaries so as to preserve the faculty of negation, which is of such quintessential importance for logical thinking. The contact barrier, on the other hand, must also be ‘selectively permeable’ to thoughts and feelings from System Ucs., thus a paradox. This selective permeability of the contact barrier must be orchestrated by a numinous intelligence that knows what to allow forth and what to disallow. That which is allowed forth constitutes revelation and epiphany,
INTRODUCTION
19
ultimately the ‘selected fact,’ the revealed unconscious element that coheres into meaning the hitherto unorganized yield from the unconscious. Thus, one can envision an underlying connection that runs from the model of the caesura of birth through the contact barrier between Systems Ucs. and Cs., to boundary and frame issues in psychotherapy. Further, we realize that Bion collapsed Freud’s (1911) notion of the distinction between the primary and secondary processes into his notion of alpha-function (‘dream-work-alpha’) which paradoxically ‘dreams’ one’s emotional impact with ever evolving ‘O’ into dreams and/or unconscious phantasies as preparation for their transformation into memories and logical thoughts (Grotstein 2002a). When one considers the issues of projective transidentification in tandem with boundary issues, we can readily understand their importance for the therapist or group leader whose task it is to maintain a mind of his or her own and, while allowing him or herself to develop countertransference feelings, albeit with partial, not total, immersion or identification, she or he must ultimately remain extra-territorial to these subterranean influences – as a separate object as well as subject in his or her own right.
Bion’s theory of thinking The author has done such a superb job in presenting Bion’s theory of thinking that I shall deal with the subject only summarily here and refer the reader to the forthcoming chapters of the text. Briefly, Bion brought three main streams of experience together to formulate his theory of thinking: 1. his experience in groups where the idea of ‘protomental elements’ emerged (later to become ‘beta elements,’ ‘O,’ and/or ‘thoughts without a thinker’) (Bion 1961b); 2. his experience in treating psychotics, where he witnessed their hatred for thinking and experiencing (Bion 1967a); and 3. his training as a Kleinian psychoanalyst, where he became familiar both with Freud’s ideas of epistemology and with Klein’s ideas of projective identification and splitting (of the self and the object), the early Oedipus complex, and the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. He then applied Klein’s concept of projective identification (which she held was an unconscious intra-psychic phantasy) to his experience treating psychotics and arrived at the conclusion that these patients, as infants, lacked the experience of having a mother who could tolerate their normal projective identifications. This conclusion heralded the following ideas: (a) that projective identification was normal as well as abnormal (defensive); (b) that projective identifi-
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cation constituted not only an unconscious phantasy but also a normal preverbal/infra-verbal mode of interpersonal or intersubjective communication; (c) with these two previous hypotheses in place, Bion had added the dimension of adaptation (Hartmann 1939) to Kleinian thinking, which had hitherto been exclusively intra-psychic in its clinical and theoretical focus; (d) from the above hypotheses he concluded yet another: that, as the normal infant projects his/her inchoate, unprocessed emotions (later to be called beta-elements, ‘O,’ or ‘thoughts without a thinker’) into his/her mother – and she receives them as container and processor-translator,’ employing her ‘alpha-function’ while in a state of reverie – the earliest rudiments of thinking can be detected (converting or transforming beta-elements into alpha-elements). Once the infant introjects or internalizes this model of mother-as-container, she or he thereafter begins to project into his or her internal container and thereby becomes a thinker in his or her own right;4 (e) in the meanwhile Bion was establishing that the individual is fundamentally an emotional being, i.e. one who not only emotes but who needs to feel his or her emotions and to communicate them to another, i.e. the individual is fundamentally dependent on communicating with objects. Bion (1965) then made (f ) one of the most startling discoveries about thinking in the history of epistemology: that ‘thoughts without a thinker’ were primary and required the development of a mind to think them to give them meaning and to reduce (contain) the ‘emotional turbulence’ inherent within and inseparable from them; (g) in so doing, Bion united epistemology with ontology and phenomenology. Transformations in ‘O’ became his way of designating ultimate phenomenology and ontology. Once he had established a theory of thinking, he then (h) repositioned Freud’s concept of the instinctual drives (libido and the death instinct) and united them in a triumvirate with the epistemological drive as ‘L’ (love), ‘H’ (hate), and ‘K’ (knowledge), all three of which are linkages to objects, act inseparably, and give dimension to all object relations and to all thinking and feeling. He then (i) extended ‘K’ into the truth instinct (Bion 1992) and thereby transcended Freud’s (1915) conception of the unconscious, including dreaming. Bion stated that the human mind needs truth similarly to the need of the body for food. Freud, we recall, believed that the purpose of dreaming was wish-fulfillment. Bion believed that while this may be true, it was true only defensively.5 Utmostly, dreaming is the instrument of the truth instinct, according to him.
INTRODUCTION
21
Bion’s (1965) (j) theory of transformations became a further extension of his epistemological metatheory. All the while he was constructing his metatheory, parenthetically, Bion, the polymath and autodidact, had been deeply immersed in varieties of mathematical theories ranging from set theory, intuitionistic mathematics (the ‘Dutch School’), infinity theory, algebraic geometry, differential and integral calculus (algebraic calculus), Cartesian coordinates, etc. Why? Bion wished to use notation symbols that were free of saturation, i.e. free of a vast penumbra of hitherto assigned associations that would collectively impair or confuse the employment of non-mathematical (ultimately unsaturated) signs. In defining transformations he listed ‘rigid-motion’ (a geometric term for self-sameness or concordance, as in the classical theory of reconstruction), projective (as in projective identification), and transformations in hallucinosis, which correspond to wish-fulfilling hallucinations proper or the superimposition of wishfulfillment images on to objects in reality. It was Bion’s extension of the theory of transformations into epistemology, however, that was to demonstrate its ultimate cogency. He conceived of transformations of beta-elements into alpha-elements in which the vehicle (carrier) of the elements would be altered (transformed) but the original truth that lay in the vehicle was able to resist transformation and thereby persevere as truth. In other words, when a beta-element was transformed into an alpha-element, it was only its ‘beta-ness’ that was transformed. The fundamental truth ‘O’ that was implicit in beta remained fundamentally true to its nature in alpha. It was Bion’s concept of (K) transformations in, of, and from ‘O,’ however, that was to impose what many have come to believe the foremost paradigm change in psychoanalytic theory and practice since Freud. First of all, he conceived of transformations from ‘O’ to ‘K’ in the instance where mother (or analyst) is able to receive the infant’s (or patient’s) ‘O’ and transform it through her alpha-function into ‘K’ (practical knowledge about the infant [or patient]. He then suggested, alternatively, that there was a rare class of individuals, geniuses or mystics in particular, who were able to be in direct contact with ‘O’ with serenity, being able not to be distracted by intermediary signs, images, or symbols, i.e. they did not need transformations from ‘O’ to ‘K.’ Transformations in ‘O’ became an act of self-transcendence into a domain that Western culture, aside from the religious mystics and Lacan6, had never conceived of. Put simply, until Bion the cosmological limits of psychoanalytic thinking were internal and external reality. Bion understood the latter,
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external reality, to be the consensual symbolic reality of ‘K,’ beyond which, as well as interpenetrating it, lay ‘O.’ Bion conceived of ‘O’ as the ‘analytic object’ in psychoanalysis, the ineffable truth that the analyst must look for – with sense, myth, and passion. In other words, Freud’s drives have been pushed to the side as ‘L,’ ‘H,’ and ‘K’ modes of relating to thoughts and objects of thought. What the analyst must look for is ‘O,’ which he equated with beta-elements, the Absolute Truth about Ultimate Reality, noumena, things-in-themselves, inherent preconceptions, ‘thoughts without a thinker,’ and godhead (man’s construction of an immanent deity to encompass the ineffability of the unknown and unknowable. With the formulation of ‘O’ psychoanalysis turned a corner and blindly peeked into the maw of uncertainty and infinity. From the group perspective, ‘O’ is the unannounced, invisible but regular and regularly felt extra member of the group. In further elaborating his concept of ‘O,’ Bion suggests (l) that we ‘learn’ knowledge but ‘become’ truth, ‘O.’ He means ‘become’ in the way that Plato meant it, i.e. ‘That which is always becoming’ (never achieving). It appears at first blush to resemble fusion, but that is not its meaning. When a patient seeks unconsciously to become his or her analyst, for example, the process entails an unconscious phantasy in which the patient projects him or herself into the analyst along with a breaching of the boundary between them. Bion’s epistemology presumes the presence of a ‘caesura’ or contact barrier of separateness not only within the individual but also between self and other. Consequently, it is only the analyst’s confidence in the intactness of his or her boundaries that allows him or her to ‘become’ the patient – because she or he is autonomous and can never really become the patient. What must happen is that the analyst, in a state of reverie, can so match up his or her own feeling state (not unlike Stanislavski’s [1936] concept of ‘method acting’) that a state of intersubjective resonance occurs. Whatever else, Bion formulated the phenomenon of intimacy as it had never been portrayed before. In retrospect it would seem that Bion’s ideas would have been better served if his first major book had been entitled Learning from Experience and Experiencing by Becoming. His discovery of transformations in ‘O’ also constituted a further journey for Bion’s journey into epistemology by boldly introducing the mystical vertex. Bion then came to think of psychoanalysis as a ‘mystical science,’ not in the sense of mystifying but in the sense of seeing through the camouflage images and symbols (constructs).
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Implicit in Bion’s epistemological considerations are such concepts as ‘binocular vision,’ ‘reversible perspective,’ and the ‘caesura’ (already discussed above). Binocular vision was his way of imposing a dual-track (Grotstein 1978) to the operations of the mind. Once again he transcended Freud by changing the focus of a direct relationship between the unconscious and consciousness (Freud’s theory) to one in which consciousness and unconsciousness are viewed as complementary but oppositional (not necessarily conflictual) partners in viewing ‘O.’ He extended this oppositional partnership to the relationship between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions as PS1 D, in which each had its own way of processing ‘O.’ His concept of shifting perspectives ultimately devolved into his idea of employing multiple vertices, i.e. the psychoanalytic, aesthetic, and scientific vertices. His quest was for ultimate stereoscopy. Dr. Billow clearly explicates Bion’s theory of ‘L,’ ‘H,’ and ‘K’ as basic affects and links them to premonition. Bion’s basic conception of the mind was one of affects, relationships, and being. He regarded emotions as the individual’s outer defense frontier in the internal world that intercepted the impact of ‘O’s evolutions and subjected them through ‘L,’ ‘H,’ and ‘K’ encoding along with transformation by alpha-function to change from proto-emotions to emotions that the mind could have feelings about.7 It is as if the proto-emotional frontier makes impressions of ‘O’ from its impact and processes, not ‘O’ per se, but ‘O’’s impact upon it. This idea brings forth another. ‘O’ in the first instance is indifferent or neutral circumstance. When we allow ‘O’ to impact us and do not shrink from the experience, it is as if we are allowing a transformation of our experience of ‘O’ from a neutral or indifferent external status to one where we ‘become’ ‘O’ and thereby render it personally or subjectively ours as our own experience. If the subject is not able to allow his ‘passion’8 to embrace his or her emotional experience with ‘O,’ then ‘-K’ (falsehood, lies) results, along with concomitant ‘-L’ and ‘-H.’
Bonding Dr. Billow has an evocative chapter on bonding. Psychoanalytic interpretations generally seem to recapitulate the act of the infant’s being weaned from the breast in so far as they impart truths, the acceptance of which promotes growth. Winnicott’s (1960) concept of the holding environment and Kohut’s (1971) idea of empathy constitute exceptions. Bion was strongly leaning this way when he conceived of container–contained. He had come to realize, for
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instance, that psychotic patients may have lacked what we might call a sufficient bonding experience with their mothers who, failing to contain their infant’s projective identifications, became malevolently transformed into internalized (within the infant) obstructive objects who thereafter attacked the infant’s thinking and relationships to good objects. It is my impression that Bion’s concept of container–contained closely approximates many aspects of the holding environment and is consummately empathic – but to the unconscious infant, not the conscious one that Kohut relates to.
The passionate psychoanalyst/therapist and his instruments I have referred to Bion’s unique conception of passion, a meaning he borrowed from another age in which passion meant the capacity to suffer – in the sense of being able to bear one’s experiences without outward or inward flinching. Captain Bion, the intrepid tank commander of World War I, learned about passion in battle. He realized that he had to be a model for the men under his command. The analogy to child-rearing and psychoanalysis is clear. The infant looks at the world through the veritable periscope of his or her mother’s eyes, and the patient looks to see if the analyst can bear, not only what she or he shares with (projects into) him or her but, additionally, the 9 fateful vicissitudes of his or her own life, i.e. if mother (analyst) can bear ‘O.’ Bion suggests that the analyst must abandon memory, desire, understanding, and preconceptions and be able to achieve negative capability (tolerate doubt and uncertainty) in order to create a mental space within him or herself that is optimally receptive for unconscious intuition. Another way of saying this is that Bion’s suggestions operate in a way that momentarily permits right-cerebral-hemisphere dominance, which is characterized, inter alia, by non-linear thinking and by field-dependency. Put succinctly, in a field-dependent situation, unconscious elements seek their counterpart in the external world, i.e. a depressed patient will tend to see images that exclusively match his or her depressive state. It is only a short step to make the next hypothesis. If the analyst is in this field-dependent state while listening to his or her patient, then, if she or he is able to be in a state of passion (passionate anticipation without an object) and reverie then, sooner or later, she or he will experience the arrival of the ‘selected fact’ (‘strange attractor’ in chaos theory), that which will give coherence to the randomness that was hitherto experienced, and which will be passionately suffered. Bion never said so, but it is my belief that the model he has given us closely resembles exorcism, the transfer of demonic pain from one individual to
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another. The arrival of the ‘selected fact’ seems to be a co-construction in the right-hemispheric unconscious of analyst and patient. In other words, the analyst must clear his or her mind so as to be able to be receptive to and to intuit the psychoanalytic object (the ‘O’ of the session). Bion suggests that the psychoanalytic object is detected by the evidence of sense, myth, and passion. In his writings Bion seems to be ambiguous about where the sense, myth, and passion lie, much as he is with the selected fact. Do they emerge within the patient, or do they emerge within the analyst – or both? Sense, which Bion is critical of elsewhere in terms of the senses being deceivers of intuition, in this instance seems to be the ‘sense or feeling’ of a hidden experience becoming palpable. Myth refers to the personal unconscious phantasy or phantasies that are operant with the analytic object but also refers to the collective myth that subtends it, i.e. the Oedipal myth, the Tower of Babel myth, etc. Thus, sense, myth, and passion constitute a triumvirate-tool that triangulates the analytic object. My own point of view would see the ‘analytic object’ as a subject, as the Kleinian conception of the unconscious infant or, more specifically, as the ‘ineffable subject of the unconscious’ whose task it is to be the passionate ‘existential registrar of agony,’ which mysteriously communicates its pain to the ‘phenomenal subject of consciousness’ and, failing that, to the analyst (Grotstein 2000). Returning to the concept of container–contained, Bion thought of the mother and infant as a ‘thinking couple.’ Having recently reviewed Bion’s unique contributions on dreaming, I would add the idea of the ‘dreaming couple’ (Grotstein 1978, 2000). One of the tasks that Bion adds to his suggestive repertoire of techniques is that of the analyst (mother) ‘dreaming’ the patient (infant). He believed that sanity depended, not only on truth, but also on the capacity to use alpha-function (‘dream-work-alpha’) to supply alpha-elements to restore the contact barrier between the unconscious and consciousness so that each might work effectively as separate processes in their own right. He also cautioned that the dream that the patient uses to evade truth constitutes an hallucination, and that the analyst should detect the difference. Another interesting innovation of his was his reorienting Klein’s paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions from a sequence of successions to a simultaneous dialectical interaction between them: PS1 D. In so doing, he changed the perspective of Freud’s (1915) topographic theory and Klein’s
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adherence to it from one in which there is a conflict between the unconscious and consciousness and between P-S and D, to one in which the unconscious and consciousness and P-S and D triangulate ‘O,’ which both interpenetrates them and is paradoxically extraterritorial to them. Bion also conceived of ‘alpha-function in reverse,’ a situation that occurs in psychosis when method infuses madness and things are turned topsy-turvy – with a disingenuously cunning agenda. One commonly sees the phenomenon of alpha-function in reverse in pathological organizations (‘psychic retreats’) and in the negative therapeutic reaction. The current state of world affairs also bears testimony to its pervasiveness. Dr. Billow has written a very important integrative work. He has diligently researched virtually the entirety of Bion’s contributions and skillfully applied them to the group therapy situation. In so doing, he has unwittingly presented a challenge for someone to follow with a counterpart for individual psychoanalysis. I feel the challenge stirring within me.
References Bion, W.R. (1959) ‘Attacks on linking.’ In Second Thoughts (1967). London: Heinemann. Bion, W.R. (1961a) ‘A psycho-analytic theory of thinking.’ International Journal of Psycho-analysis 43, 306–310. Bion, W.R. (1961b) Experience in Groups. London: Tavistock Publications. Bion, W.R. (1962) Learning From Experience. London: Heinemann. Bion, W.R. (1963) Elements of Psycho-analysis. London: Heinemann. Bion, W.R. (1965) Transformations. London: Heinemann. Bion, W.R. (1966) ‘Catastrophic change.’ The Bulletin of the British Psycho-Analytic Society 5. Bion, W.R. (1967a) Second Thoughts. London: Heinemann. Bion, W.R. (1967b) ‘On arrogance.’ In Second Thoughts (1967). London: Heinemann. Bion, W.R. (1970) Attention and Interpretation. London: Tavistock Publications. Bion, W.R. (1977) Two Papers: The Grid and the Caesura. Jayme Salomao (ed). Rio de Janeiro: Imago Editora Ltd. Bion, W.R. (1992) Cogitations. London: Karnac Books. Bråten, S. (1993) ‘Infant attachment and self-organization in light of this thesis: Born with the other in mind.’ In I. Gomnaes and E. Osborne (eds) Making Links: How Children Learn. Oslo: Yrkeslitteratur. Damasio, A. (1999) The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. New York, San Diego, London: Harcourt, Brace. Fliess, R. (1942) ‘The metapsychology of the analyst.’ Psychoanalytic Quarterly 11, 211–227. Freud, S. (1911) ‘Formulations of the two principles of mental functioning.’ Standard Edition 12 (1958). London: Hogarth Press. Freud, S. (1915) ‘The unconscious.’ Standard Edition 14 (1957). London: Hogarth Press. Gazzaniga, M.S. and LeDoux, J.E. (1978) The Integrated Mind. New York: Plenum Press. Grinberg, L. (1962) ‘On a specific aspect of counter-transference due to the patient’s projective identification.’ International Journal of Psycho-analysis 43, 436–440. Grinberg, L. (1979a) ‘Projective counter-identification.’ In L. Epstein and A. Feiner (eds) Countertransference. New York: Aronson.
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Grinberg, L. (1979b) ‘Countertransference and projective counter-identification.’ Contemporary Psychoanalysis 15, 226–247. Grotstein, J. (1978) ‘Inner space: Its dimensions and its coordinates.’ International Journal of Psychoanalysis 59, 55–61. Grotstein, J. (1995) ‘Projective identification reappraised.’ Contemporary Psychoanalysis 31, 479–511. Grotstein, J. (2000) Who is the Dreamer who Dreams the Dream: A Study of Psychic Presences. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press. Grotstein, J. (2002a) ‘Projective identification and projective trans-identification: A reassessment and proposed extension of the concept.’ Manuscript in preparation. Grotstein, J. (2002b) ‘"We are such stuff as dreams are made on" – Annotations on dreams and dreaming in Bion’s works.’ In C. Neri, M. Pines and R. Friedman (eds) Dreams in Group Psychotherapy. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Hartmann, H. (1939) Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (1954). D. Rapaport (trans). New York: International Universities Press. Kohut, H. (1971) The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders. New York: International Universities Press. Mason, A. (1994) ‘A psychoanalyst looks at a hypnotist: A study of folie à deux.’ Psychoanalytic Quarterly 63, 641–679. Matte Blanco, I. (1975) The Unconscious as Infinite Sets. London: Duckworth Press. Matte Blanco, I. (1981) ‘Reflecting with Bion.’ In J. S. Grotstein (ed) Do I Dare Disturb the Universe? A Memorial to Wilfred R. Bion. Beverly Hills: Caesura Press. Matte Blanco, I. (1988) Thinking, Feeling, and Being: Clinical Reflections on the Fundamental Antinomy of Human Beings. London/New York: Tavistock and Routledge. Money-Kyrle, R. (1956) ‘Normal counter-transference and some of its deviation.’ In D. Meltzer (ed) The Collected Papers of Roger Money-Kyrle. Strath Tay, Perthshire: Clunie Press. Ogden, T. (1994) Subjects of Analysis. Northvale, NJ and London: Aronson. Sperry, R.W. (1969) ‘A modified concept of consciousness.’ Psychology Review 76, 532–536. Stanislavski, C. (1936) An Actor Prepares. New York: Routledge. Sullivan, H.S. (1953) The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. New York: W.W. Norton. Winnicott, D.W. (1960) ‘The theory of the parent–infant relationship.’ In The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development (1965). New York: International Universities Press.
Endnotes 1.
Bion pointed out that memory is the past tense of desire and that desire is the future tense.
2.
Alpha-function designates an unconscious form of thinking that, according to Bion, derives from being able to dream. A suggestive way of looking at it is to compare it with the ‘method acting’ techniques of Stanislavski whereby the actor sought within him or herself those inherent attributes that match up (symmetrically) with those required for the role.
3.
Bion lists ‘Absolute Truth’ and ‘Ultimate Reality’ as if they were separate. I choose to unite them in so far as I believe that they are inseparable. This perspective becomes clearer when one applies Matte Blanco’s (1975, 1981, 1988) concept of bi-logic, infinite sets, and absolute indivisibility to both the issue of Absolute Truth and Ultimate Reality. Put another way, Ultimate Reality is total chaos. Matte Blanco states that Homogeneous Indivisibility (total symmetry) characterizes the unrepressed unconscious, and I state that it designates Bion’s ‘O.’
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4.
While I basically concur with Bion about the infant’s need to project into mother, I differ with him on the origin of alpha-function (‘dream-work-alpha’). It is my belief that the latter constitutes an inherent given for the infant – from his or her Kantian repertoire as a primary category and that mother’s alpha-function is a necessary accessory to his or her own until the infant is able to think on his or her own (Grotstein 2000).
5.
Elsewhere I have hypothesized that Freud’s concept of the id as wish-fulfilling constitutes the ‘psi column’ on Bion’s (1977) grid (Grotstein 2000). The psi column is the second vertical column, the one after ‘definitory hypothesis,’ the first step in trying to define beta-elements. The ‘psi column’ is ‘saturated,’ i.e. unable to accept new information and seeks to negate anything new. In Bion’s (1970) group theory it corresponds to the Establishment.
6.
Lacan’s concept of the ‘Register of the Real’ closely approximates Bion’s ‘O.’
7.
The terms ‘affects,’ ‘emotions,’ and ‘feelings’ are used variously in the literature. I prefer the perspective that Damasio (1999) proffers: affects constitute the overall term, whereas emotions emerge as bodily experiences, and feelings as mental experiences about emotions.
8.
Bion uses ‘passion’ in the sense of ‘suffering,’ as in the passion of Christ in the crucifixion. Dr. Billow is keenly aware of this usage and explicates it beautifully in the text.
9.
Here I mean the mother’s and analyst’s ability to have the passion that can contain (bear) primal ‘O’ (uncertainty with indifference, fate) and their own personal transformation of ‘O’ (personal fate). Bion did not make a distinction between impersonal and personal ‘O;’ I do.
Preface Plan of the Book Relational Group Psychotherapy: From Basic Assumptions to Passion emerged from my efforts to integrate Klein-Bionion conceptualizations, Bion’s early group theory, and his later metapsychological formulations, with contemporary relational thinking. At the same time, I wanted to offer a clinically relevant, generative experience, similar to my own. And this meant not overloading the text with theory or clinging to a single clinical point of view. The chapters relate to and build on each other, but no rigid linearity of thinking or organization is implied. My intention is to supply grit for thinking, feeling, and doing; if pearls are to be found, they will have been co-constructed by you. A brief description of each chapter follows. Chapter 1, ‘The Authority of the Group Therapist’s Psychology,’ orients the reader to my relational point of view, which confers on the therapist’s emotional experience a primary influence on the formation and evolution of the group structure, culture, and process. Bion’s early theory of group, and his later formulations regarding the structure of thought and the role of affect, presage and add metapsychological and clinical depth to a relational or intersubjective approach. In all chapters, clinical anecdotes are included to ground theory in the realities of clinical experience, with particular reference to the psychology of the group therapist. Chapter 2, ‘The Therapist’s Anxiety and Resistance to Group,’ discusses some of the personal difficulties that the therapist must bear in accepting the position of primacy in the mental life of the group. Our knowledge, training, and experience doing and thinking about groups offers partial control of our anxiety and resistances, which continue to operate. Anxiety and resistance contribute creative as well as disruptive influences to our work. Chapter 3, ‘The Basic Conflict: To Think or Anti-think – Applying Bion’s Theory of Thinking in the Group Context,’ introduces the reader to epistemological object-relations theory, and explains Bion’s expansion of ideas first introduced in Experiences in Groups (1961). Bion brought a special 29
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meaning to ‘thinking,’ emphasizing that its function is to establish emotional awareness of self and others. While thinking satisfies a basic need, it also stimulates painful realizations. Hence, we partially hate relational consciousness, and this is never more apparent than when a group is asked to think about itself. The therapist aids a group in thinking about its defenses against thinking, which may involve anti- or minus thinking (-K), bizarreness, and hallucination. Chapter 4, ‘Entitled Thinking, Dream Thinking, and Group Process,’ calls attention to a type of narcissistic thinking and resultant interpersonal behavior prominent in the waking and sleep life of all individuals and groups. The structure, process, and contents of group therapy reveal entitlement fantasies of being able to possess thoughts and control thinkers, rather than to think thoughts with thinkers. Characteristics of entitlement may be attributed, with accuracy, to the personality of the therapist. Chapter 5, ‘Containing and Thinking – The Three Relational Levels of the Container–Contained,’ presents Bion’s complex model of symbol formation, human development, internal and external object relations, and learning from (and resisting) emotional experience. There are three relational variations of the container–container: commensal, symbiotic, and parasitic interactions. They provide a framework for listening, processing, and formulating, which can be helpful in doing, supervising, and reflecting on groups of all types. Chapter 6, ‘Containing the Adolescent Group,’ brings a relational focus to adolescent theory and group technique. Bion’s formulations concerning thinking and communication, particularly the model of the container– contained, put a most interesting perspective on understanding and treating adolescents. Shakespeare’s Hamlet provides a vehicle in which to explore themes associated with adolescent thought, fantasy, and communication. Hamlet’s words and behavior illustrate the conflictual traversing of relational levels, as they function both to further and to destroy thinking and thinkers. Chapter 7, ‘Bonding in Group – The Therapist’s Contribution,’ describes a preverbal dimension of group experience essential to the work function (W). The therapist fosters constructive bonding through posture and technique, but the therapist must be emotionally authentic. This requires understanding the interactive forces that contribute as well as conflict with the therapist’s basic need to connect to other group members. Chapter 8, ‘Rebellion in Group,’ describes various pathways of social action: defiance, secession/exile, anarchy, and revolution. Rebellion focuses
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attention on the idea of the group: its basic premises and values are at the center of the controversy, to be addressed on that level, among others. Like other group members, the therapist has rebellious feelings and thoughts, and may traverse each pathway of rebellion, taking multiple roles of defiant instigator, exiled outcast, anarchist, and revolutionary. Chapter 9, ‘Primal Affects – Loving, Hating, and Knowing,’ introduces Bion’s structural theory of primal affects. Urges to love, to hate, and to know about (L, H, and K), which operate from the beginning of life and function out of awareness, are central in constructing intersubjectivity and undergird all subsequent meaning. The theory of basic assumptions, and our understanding of groups, is supplemented by the constructs of premonition, LHK, alpha functioning, and beta elements. Chapter 10, ‘Primal Receptivity – The Passionate Therapist: The Passionate Group,’ expands on a key concept in Bion’s later writing. Passion involves primal receptivity: an intersubjective process of bearing and utilizing the primal affects to reach self-conscious emotional awareness. Passion describes the necessary and sufficient conditions for a psychotherapy group to be a work group (W). As a dialectic position of connectedness and separateness, passion transcends the basic assumptions, and transference–countertransference. The concept of passion advances the historical consideration of countertransference by delimiting an independent area within the therapist’s subjectivity.
CHAPTER 1
The Authority of the Group Therapist’s Psychology In Relational Group Psychotherapy, I put the group therapist’s experience as center of the action. The major theorists have described groups as organic entities, evolving through stages, rebounding from one defensive position to another in accordance with developmental conflicts consequent to group membership. According to their theories, successful groups depend on the therapist’s effective performance in pretherapy tasks such as patient selection, composition and preparation, and in negotiating the novice group through its formative stages of boundary formation, structuring, resistance, and goal direction. It follows that the mature group more often treats itself, coming to appreciate the therapist as a consultant rather than as the continuing mesmerizer of transference (Agazarian 1997; Ettin 1992; Foulkes and Anthony 1965). Foulkes (1964) wrote that the group therapist ‘does not step down but lets the group, in steps and stages, bring him down to earth…[the group] replaces the leader’s authority’ (p.61). Along this line of thinking, Yalom (1995) presented the maxim: ‘Unlike the individual therapist, the group therapist does not have to be the axle of therapy. In part, you are midwife to the group: you must set a therapeutic process in motion and take care not to interfere with that process by insisting on your centrality’ (p.216). While the classic contributions in theory and in descriptive phenomenology are fundaments of every group therapist’s thinking and practice, their emphasis on member-inspired dynamics seriously underplays the enduring role of the therapist, most particularly, the authority of the therapist’s evolving psychology on what occurs and does not occur in group. The basic premise of the relational approach is that psychoanalytic data are mutually generated by therapist and patients, co-determined by their conscious and unconscious organizing activities, in reciprocally interacting subjective worlds (Stolorow 1997). 33
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The therapist who subscribes to the less relational view that the group maturates away from its unconscious relationship to its leader, and therefore, away from transference, may also suppose that, as facilitator, the therapist may reach and maintain adequate self-understanding, such that one’s own subjectivity is well in control. Racker (1968) suggested that a neglected aspect of the Oedipus complex was the analyst’s wish to be master or king, not only of other people, but also of his own unconscious. Racker described how the analyst’s verbal and nonverbal behavior continues to be variable and inconsistent, professional and personal, mature and immature, healthy and neurotic, and regulated by the emotional state of the relational matrix. The analyst’s ‘internal and external dependencies, anxieties, and pathological defenses… [respond] to every event of the analytic situation’ (p.132). The best the therapist can do is to eradicate, as much as he or she can, not anxieties, resistances, wishes, and fears, but their repression. In being receptive to the infantile, primitive, and neurotic aspects of one’s own personality, the therapist may more fully experience his or her own experience, and this is, I believe, the precondition that allows the therapist to help the group members do the same. All psychoanalytic psychotherapy is grounded on Freud’s belief that the understanding of others is based on self-understanding. However, selfunderstanding is an evolving, affective process, stimulating strong and often painful emotions that influence and are influenced by others. Self-awareness remains tentative and uncertain, and is revised according to the shifting currents of present-day reality. Inspection, introspection, retrospection, the longevity and stability of a group, these factors do not vouchsafe objectivity or inoculate therapists from the tendency to rationalize who we are, how we feel, and what we are doing. The clinician’s subjectivity cannot be tamed, cured, banished, or superseded by ‘psychoanalytic purification’ (Freud 1912b) via personal individual and group therapy, or meticulousness in theory, diagnosis, and technique. Reaching, challenging, and expanding self-consciousness is an intersubjective process. The group therapist, like other group members, develops by engaging others. Growth is not always immediate, or readily visible. Some relational theorists (Chused 1992; Renik 1993; Spezzano 1996) suggest that both patient and analyst do most of their thinking unconsciously, and learn only retrospectively about what has been going on mentally, when the derivatives emerge into preconsciousness or consciousness. By that time,
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words and actions have produced enactments, and these too are learned about with the benefit of hindsight and interpersonal feedback. While the therapist’s unconscious conflicts, character structure, and misunderstandings lead to inevitable iatrogenic resistances in the group and its members, they also provide vehicles for learning and transmitting information (Boesky 2000). From this point of view, we could characterize groups as taking place through the medium of the therapist’s progressive understanding of his or her own transferences and countertransferences. The assumption here is that transferences and countertransferences do not resolve but evolve, continuing to provide a rich source of potential meaning. In my thirty-five-year experience as therapist, supervisor, and member of long-term psychoanalytic groups, I have found that mutual interest, fantasy, and emotional involvement between patients and therapist remain intense and extensive, although, of course, significant relational changes occur. Transference and countertransference do not simply diminish, given length of treatment, maturity of the group and its therapist, or modality of treatment (group alone or combined). Group therapy continues to fuel transference and countertransference feelings and fantasies, and these remain invaluable in exploring intrapsychic and intersubjective phenomena in dyadic and small and large group settings. Transference–countertransference, as a prominent element in intersubjectivity – but as we shall see, not the exclusive element – may be conceived as an ego activity (Bird 1972) that functions at varying levels of pre and post consciousness, and is subject to mutual discovery. The therapist is not a blank screen, but a quite human presence whose subjectivity the group monitors and perceives with varying accuracy. Group members form valid and mutually significant insights regarding the therapist’s personality and the complexities of their therapist’s psychology, and respond accordingly (Gill 1994). Groups generate their structure, process, and meaning from the interaction between the conscious and unconscious emotional and intellectual strivings of the group members and the group leader. Like other group members, the group therapist’s communications are intersubjectively constructed; their intent and effect remain highly subjective and no final, or even fully objective, assessment is possible. Each group conductor plays his or her own music, as well as captures a particular version of the music of others. While some notes resound forcefully, others remain faint, distant, or unheard,
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and they await their development other occasions, other players from within and without the group. The therapist remains the figure of inspiration, and the most important member of any group, no matter its focus or duration. Therapist-influenced dynamics supersede the clinician’s theoretical or technical orientation, and we sometimes achieve more, or less, in our practice than what we preach. Our amiable, sincere, and patient efforts to reach the group count for a lot, and we fumble and are forgiven for our fumbling more than we know. Well-analyzed psychoanalysts are not conflict-free, interpersonalists are not always interpersonal, relational therapists may deny their own subjectivity, and self-psychologists may fail to accept and to provide. No school of thought owns exclusive or automatic rights to empathy, or to understanding of the self and others. And, in our striving for depth, psychoanalytic or otherwise, clinicians of all theoretical persuasions may miss what is timely and most relevant. The technical focus may be intrapersonal, concentrating on the individual, transactional or interpersonal, concentrating on the subgroups and dyads, group-as-a-whole, concentrating on group dynamics (Parloff 1968), or more likely, an eclectic mix of the three approaches. The clinician’s basic patternings of subjective experience influences, often determines, not only the focus, but also the group’s depth of functioning, even the particular process and contents of the session. Whatever the therapist is attending to, he or she is also reflecting upon and revealing him or herself, influencing other members in this process. Contemplating one’s evolving mental relationship to the group, and its influence on the group, brings layers of meaning to the here-and-now clinical situation, however conceptualized. All benefit from a group therapist unequivocally involved in personal discovery and growth. I agree with Foulkes (1964) that the specific therapeutic quality of a group ‘is embodied in the conductor…he has created the group and his influence remains decisive from the beginning to the end… His insight into his own emotional involvement as a member of the group, and even his individual reactions in this capacity, should be fully acknowledged and, on occasion, may have to be voiced for the benefit of the group’ (p.160, his emphasis). The therapist who consistently and openly pursues his or her varied significance in the members’ consciousness and unconsciousness – and the members’ significance to him or her – creates a powerful group experience. Whereas the focus of this book is on the therapist’s affects, thought, and clinical behavior, and the therapist’s influence on the group, subgroup, and individual members, I appreciate that not all therapeutic change flows from
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the efforts of the therapist. A restrictive focus on the leader, or for that matter any predetermined theoretical-technical focus, neglects other important group, subgroup, and intrapersonal factors, other ways in which experience may be generated and understood. Indeed, even when therapist-inspired dynamics are conceptualized as a prevailing influence behind all group interactions, the force of these dynamics may be modulated by the nature of the group situation. The resulting transferences and countertransferences may be deflected onto the group and its members, where their diverse manifestations may be fruitfully understood and interpreted. Patients and therapists derive benefit from multiple factors of group membership and from working with other members, who provide a wide range of interpersonal options and therapeutic effects. Finally, there are cultural, ethnic, and political factors that contribute to the group’s organization, functioning, and goals (Hopper 1999).
Appreciating Bion’s legacy The chair of a recent panel of the American Psychoanalytic Association declared, ‘In today’s world countertransference is God’ (Friedman 1997). Racker has been called the prophet of this God. Relational psychoanalysis does not represent a single theory or a consistent metapsychology, however, and has underpinnings in philosophy (Frie and Reis 2001). There are many prophets, including Hegel, Freud, Ferenzci, Sullivan, Winnicott, Fairbairn, Kohut, and Klein. Relationally oriented social constructivists, communication and systems theorists, and our English group analytic colleagues, claim forbears in George Herbert Mead, Norbert Elias, and Foulkes. In Relational Group Psychotherapy, I put forth Bion as another prophet in the contemporary relational reformation, for he too anticipated our current interest in intersubjectivity, perspectivism, and co-constructionism. His thinking extended past transference–countertransference, to postulates regarding the earliest and most basic elements of the human psychological experience. In Experiences in Groups, many of the important metapsychological constructs and clinical themes that Bion was to establish appear embryonically. His later writings attempted to systematize psychoanalytic theory and practice, based on an intersubjective theory of thinking, with particular reference to the social group. Bion conceptualized the psychoanalytic process as a dynamic field of mutual influence and interaction. He drew attention to how we hear and think about the other’s communication; how we convey our experience back, and how this communicative interplay
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influences the participants and the immediate future of the relationship. I join the ranks of a number of contributors (Gordon 1994; Grinberg 1985; James 1984; Nitsun 1996; Resnik 1985; Schermer 1985; Stiers 1995) who have utilized advantageously Bion’s post-Experiences in Groups constructs to enrich our understanding of groups, and the practice of group therapy. Bion presented his concepts in a manner that could be difficult for the reader, and the scope of his thinking is not immediately or easily accessible. As he developed his own metapsychology, he often did not delineate when and how he was challenging or modifying the grand metapsychologies of Freud and Klein. He also introduced the Grid and a series of alphabetical and mathematical symbols. His intentions included offering a shorthand for his relational epistemology, to make his ideas manageable, flexible, and practical for the working clinician. Bion (1967a) admonished the analyst to eschew ‘memory and desire,’ to participate within each hour with a minimum of intellectual and emotional assumptions. However, he also advocated intellectual exercises, introspective squiggle games played with signs and symbols rather than lines. Bion’s symbolic shorthand may aid the clinician’s thinking about emerging as well as dissociated thought and emotion, in oneself and in the group. Mentally playing with Bion’s metapsychological constructs provides an antidote for such leader- or therapist-based hazards as complacency, intellectual rigidity, and countertransference immersion, and heightens intersubjective awareness of ongoing group process. I will present means of using certain of Bion’s abstruse terms and symbols as tools, ways of thinking, processing, and formulating that can be helpful in leading, supervising, or reflecting on groups of all types. These tools are also helpful in framing how group members and group leaders interact at preverbal levels. Many of Bion’s ideas concerning intersubjectivity and clinical interaction are not well known; they are dispersed among his major works, and were never fully developed and integrated. In Relational Group Psychotherapy, certain Bionian formulations are extended and applied to the group and to the therapist’s situation within the group. I emphasize throughout Bion’s attention to the universal, existential conflict regarding tolerating emotional thinking, and how this conflict plays out in one’s relationship to oneself and others. Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10 are involved specifically with Bionian metapsychology. These chapters introduce the reader to the special meaning Bion brings to the term ‘thinking,’ and to the concepts of the container– contained (commensal, symbiotic, and parasitic relations), primal affects, or
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LHK, (loving, hating, knowing), alpha functioning and beta elements, premonitions and premonitory anxiety, and passion. Bion’s condensed, epigrammatical writing style is open to multiple interpretations, which seemed to serve Bion’s purpose: his work may be played with and utilized by others in developing their own ideas. In disembedding and extrapolating from his important ideas, and applying them to group theory and my clinical work, I sometimes reach implications at variance with how Bion probably understood his own formulations, more in keeping with contemporary relational assumptions, and reflecting my personality and temperament. Bion’s group theory hinges on the description and workings of the basic assumption group, as it operates in conjunction with and opposition to the work group. As many readers of this volume already know, ‘basic assumptions’ refer to three types or constellations of primitive object relations, fantasies, and affects, which individuals come to project and act out in social settings. In the basic assumption group, the members collude to avoid open-mindedness, because it could be painful. Basic assumptions are accompanied by characteristic patterns of defense that are utilized to evade intrapsychic and interpersonal tensions associated with emotional learning and productive work group activity (W). The basic assumptions are dependency (baD), fight/flight (baF/F), and pairing (baP). In dependency, the members are preoccupied with seeking ministrations from, or ministrating to, the leader. In fight/flight, the members mass against an enemy, within or outside of the group; or, members may maneuver to ignore or avoid underlying hostilities. In pairing, the group fastens on two members, one of whom may be the therapist, and they become the focus of group activity. Bion (1961) described basic assumptions as ‘duals,’ or ‘reciprocals of each other’ and not ‘distinct states of mind’ (pp.165–166). While one basic assumption is prominent, all three remain operative (as well as the work group function). For example, from one point of view the group can be shown to be expressing anxiety around giving up dependency, but from another, patterns of flight are evident, and these can be hidden behind the obvious pairing of two members. We may appreciate how the clinical task of assigning relative importance among the assumptions remains problematic. But from still another point of view – the one adopted in Relational Group Psychotherapy – a still larger clinical problem remains. According to Bion, basic assumptions represent an inevitable response to any leader who displays a
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‘questioning attitude.’ A leader stimulates a group to think, and the members react by shifting – slowly or quite frequently over the life of group – from one to another of the basic assumptions. However, as group therapists, we feel intersubjective tensions that relate to our own emotions, thoughts, and fantasies, activated by social participation, and representing the currency and history of our own intrapsychic and interpersonal struggles. The dynamic factor involving the group leader’s psychology is always prominent and influential, and often apparent to group members although not always articulated consciously or publicly. We must acknowledge that groups unify, collude, and project, not only to avoid thinking, as Bion emphasized, but also because they react to, and attempt to protect themselves and the work group from, the leader’s unavoidable vulnerability to, and inevitable participation in, basic assumptions. Many of the clinical examples in Relational Group Psychotherapy (and in other group texts, for that matter) could illustrate how a group’s characteristic modes of functioning develop partially from coping with the leader’s difficulties in thinking, the leader’s problems with learning from experience. Thus, a fourth ‘dual’ represents the leader’s subjectivity, one that influences the development of basic assumptions and their relative prominence vis-à-vis work group activity. In Relational Group Psychotherapy, I describe how basic assumptions, along with many other of the defining characteristics of group life, are co-created, maintained, and worked through intersubjectively. Bion’s early theory of group, and his later formulations regarding the structure of thought and the role of affect, presage and add metapsychological and clinical depth to my intersubjective approach. It remains for others to decide whether my formulations and applications represent a significant departure from his ideas and clinical intentions. Certainly, my style of intervention differs from Bion’s, in which the apparent abdication of leadership magnifies the leader’s importance and increases the group’s anxiety and reliance on basic assumptions. I believe that it is important to interact spontaneously and maintain a down-to-earth manner. After all, as therapists, we want this type of verbal behavior from our patients. The inexpressive leader may become an artifact that calls attention to itself. The infrequency of this type of leader’s interventions augments their strength and tendency to sound oracular. It is quite possible that the technique of minimalist intervention derives from the classical model of psychoanalysis,
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in which interpretations are reserved to associative blocks connected to transference (Halton 1999). I value the interpretative mode in group as well as in individual analysis, but do not limit myself to group-as-a-whole interventions, as did Bion. To be effective, group-as-a-whole interpretations should be made sparingly, couched in conversational language, and without sounding or being definitive. For example: ‘Everyone seems very careful tonight. Why so scared?’ Or ‘A number of you have talked about forestalling; it seems to be a theme, afraid of moving forward in your lives. At the same time, I take it as progress, the opposite of forestalling, to grapple with these difficulties here.’ We keep in mind that ‘an interpretation does not become a “group interpretation” because it is given in the form “we,” “all of us,” “the group this” or “the group that.” Neither does it become an individual interpretation because it is directed to and concerned with any particular individual’ (Foulkes 1964, p.163). An interpretation directed to the group may not be experienced as applying to all the members, and certainly, no therapist can be certain that the interpretation does apply to all, or reaches each member equally or in the same spirit. And on the other hand, interventions directed to an individual or subgroup are witnessed by the group at large, and are reflected upon and integrated by the entire membership to varying degrees. It is quite possible and often beneficial to make genetic or transference interpretations focused on an individual, and this can be done without disturbing here-and-now, member-to-member, and whole-group processes, or fostering a basic assumption. I believe that there are no clear demarcations between interpretation and other forms of interventions. A group therapist’s respectful silence or brief appreciative acknowledgment in the face of an apprehensive member’s challenge may be a powerful, even decisive interpretation. Conversely, verbal formulations that reach into the realm of unconscious phenomena, involving constellations of fantasy, desire, anxiety, character, and defense, rightly may be valued for their effort and concern as much as for their acuity and depth. As do most contemporary therapists, I give more emphasis than Bion did to patients’ developmental and ongoing needs, and accept the legitimacy of patients’ desire for noninterpretative activity involved in symbolic play and certain other forms of enactments. Of course, it was Bion who taught us about nonverbal containment: how the therapist’s reverie, patience, and inner security communicate something crucially important, even curative, furthering the patients’ capacity to develop and tolerate emotional thoughts.
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The variety and flexibility of the therapist’s activity, internal and interpersonal, exposes the qualities of the therapist’s care and establishes the therapist’s authenticity. Moreover, through his or her behavior, the group therapist defines the working group culture: how group relationships and experiences are to be regarded, and the depth to which seemingly unremarkable narratives and exchanges may be considered. A curious, empathic, and emotionally responsive leader secures an environment in which more can be said and examined, and thereby averts unnecessarily provoking anxiety and exaggerating basic assumption defenses. Bion emphasized that insight is a relational process that, while reducing suffering, produces anxiety and pain for all group members, including the therapist. A caring, receptive manner alone cannot overcome the resistance to hear, think about, and emotionally integrate other persons’ points of view. While almost immediate among some individuals, some of the time, empathy remains a hard won, precarious achievement, requiring a hovering, strategic, and interventionist therapeutic presence. Ultimately, what holds a group together is the therapist’s ever expanding understanding of the psychic reality of the group and its members, and the therapist’s success in interesting others in reaching and deepening such understanding, however painful and unwelcome. The achievement represents ‘passion.’
A disclaimer Using myself among others, as example, I will describe how the group therapist attempts to realize and respond to the divergent and evolving dynamics of group, while striving to understand how one’s own personality and therapeutic presence influence what one experiences, and fosters in the group. The clinical anecdotes, from my work as group therapist, supervisor of group therapy, case conference consultant, and group member, most often describe difficult situations that might have been understood and handled quite differently and more successfully by others, or by myself with the benefit of hindsight. I trust that they will illuminate the theoretical issues involved in the various chapters by grounding these issues, without implying that my reality represents clinical actuality, the only version of what took place. The following exchange with a group therapist in supervision lucidly calls attention to the wide latitude in the perceptions of a shared experience. I had written a paper (Billow 1997) that presented case material involving this supervisee and her group, the supervisee and me, her supervisor, and the
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parallel processes between clinical situations. I gave her a draft of the manuscript. She reported positive feelings, but also anger. Was this a document or a docudrama? she asked, referring to that low art form that is neither documentary nor drama, neither truth nor fiction. ‘My patient did not say that,’ she complained regarding one detailed exchange. Referring to another: ‘You got that patient down right, but not my part.’ She insisted that some of the comments I reported making in supervision I had not in fact made. Maybe I thought I made them but I did not, and of some of the comments I had made, she claimed I did not say them nearly as well as I did on the written page. Why can’t I be as clear when I am with her! Finally, she commented that in supervision I always seem so sure of myself, I do not seem to be uptight about patients or about issues that arise between us in supervision. But in the paper, I share my doubts and insecurities. Who is the real me, how honest am I with her, how do I really work in therapy? I should clarify that her anger was in the context of a friendly relationship in which we both felt safe to express a variety of feelings toward each other and our work. I appreciated her remarks, not the least for dramatically demonstrating to me the distance that may exist between the clinician’s memories of what happened and beliefs about what is revealed, and the patient’s or supervisee’s memories and beliefs. Where is fact, where is fable? Bion (1975) spoke to this issue when he wrote, in evaluating presentations by other analysts: ‘You are not obliged to say whether you regard the scientific papers as works of fiction or not. But you can form some opinion of the kind of fiction that those particular analysts write, or the kind of reality which they describe’ (p.185). My self-reports give some idea of how I think and feel while doing group psychotherapy and supervision, how I think I think and feel, and how I would like others, such as the reader, to believe I think and feel. Perhaps a disclaimer or ‘Surgeon General’s Warning’ is in order, regarding what follows and all clinical contributions: The clinician’s communications contain aspects of infantile as well as dissociated inner experience. Gross distortions due to commissions and omissions are to be expected, involving conscious and unconscious censorship, relating to the therapist’s emotional, cognitive, and psycholinguistic limitations, shame and guilt, fear of embarrassment, humiliation and ostracism, fear of the unknown, and fear of loss of livelihood. In clinical reports, any similarity to persons living or dead depends on the narrative talents of the reporter and the imaginative talents of the receiver. Your con-
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struction and deconstruction of meaning may be unstable, subject to further processing by waking and dream thoughts, and may be deleterious to the health of preformed opinions.
The case material in Relational Group Psychotherapy reveals my evolving emotional experience, including my emotional resistance to emotional experience. My words, at their best, will, I hope, convey what Ezra Pound defined as the successful poetic image: ‘That which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time’ (cited in Wellek and Warren 1956, p.18). By ‘image,’ Pound did not mean specifically a pictorial representation, but a captured moment of truth making, a potent verbal formulation that seeks to evoke an emotionally meaningful response. What follows may be understood as evocations of my intellectual and emotional experiences at particular instances of time. They do not represent, of course, the complex experiences themselves, or the only experiences that I and the other participants were having. My intention is to invite an object relationship, that is, to activate mental links with the reader. As in any human communication, meaning is an emotional experience, which remains ambiguous, unfinished and evolving; its success at conveying truth is incomplete.
CHAPTER 2
The Therapist’s Anxiety and Resistance to Group In this chapter, I will discuss some of the personal difficulties that the therapist must bear in accepting the position of primacy in the mental life of the group. Our knowledge, training, and experience doing and thinking about groups, offers some control of our anxiety and resistances, although these personal variables remain continual, their genesis only partially knowable, and they contribute creative as well as disruptive influences to our work. For therapists relatively comfortable in individual psychotherapy, new anxieties and fears are raised when they contemplate doing groups. Even for experienced group therapists, forming a new group, considering placing an individual within an existing group, or responding to the real and imagined emotional reconfigurations when members are added or replaced, may stimulate difficult feelings. Relative to individual therapy, the intersubjective field in group therapy is larger and more complex by orders of magnitude.
Anxiety raised by conflicting guidelines When contemplating whether to start a therapy group, the individual practitioner has to consider certain basic questions. These include: ‘Whom do I put into the group?’ ‘Who benefits and how should a group be constructed.’ ‘How would group treatment influence and possibly impinge on the patients’ individual work with me, and my work with the patients?’ Experienced and neophyte therapists seek comfort in definitive procedures, but our classic readings and texts offer conflicting theoretical rationales and technical recommendations. Empirical data do not offer guidelines on how most effectively to select group patients; even ‘risky clients sometimes surprise us’ (Piper 1994, p.107).
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Stein (1992), adhering to a traditional psychoanalytic model, did not advise group therapy for individuals capable of undergoing psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Groups were for out-of-touch patients with rigid character structures or for those who need to defend against and dilute overly intense, primitive transferences to the therapist. By contrast, Grotjahn (1993) and also Ormont (1992) advocated group therapy as ‘the basic model of treatment, the primary therapy’ (p.53). The question of ‘group or no group?’ became ‘which group?’ The selection of members hinged on composition variables, such as age, presenting symptoms, and diagnosis, and on setting (e.g. private practice, clinic, or hospital). In some cases, combining individual and group therapy is the treatment of choice, but others may benefit from individual or group therapy rather than a combination with the same therapist. According to Grotjahn (1993, p.4), analytic group experience dissipates and ‘does not invite any regressive transference neuroses’ to the individual therapist, but to the ‘group family’ (see also Kauff 1993; Stein 1992). In sharp disagreement, Kernberg (1977) observed intense transferences to the group therapist, as did Ethan (1978), Ormont (1992) and Yalom (1995). Kernberg (1976) advised against combining group and individual therapy, because the combination leads to hidden and unanalyzable split transferences to the same therapist. If one does, he recommends that combined treatment should be carried out with two different therapists, who also communicate with each other. But this recommendation does not eliminate the problem of interacting transferences between the two communicating therapists, further complicated by their respective relationships to the patients. Anxiety, transference, and resistance are basic and continual in the therapist, as well as patient and group. For the group therapist not to acknowledge and grapple with his or her emotionality promulgates what Racker (1968) described as the ‘myth of “analyst without anxiety or anger.”’ He saw this myth as a ‘great danger,’ a remnant of the traumatogenic ‘patriarchal order,’ an expression of ‘social inequality in the analyst–analysand society…and the need for social reform’ (Racker 1968, p.132). Psychoanalytic purification (Freud 1912b), resulting in ideal equanimity, detachment, and clinical objectivity, is impossibility. The core elements of classical psychoanalysis – neutrality, abstinence, and anonymity – may contribute to maintaining the static, ‘hierarchical arrangement of power and privilege in the psychoanalytic situation’ (Gerson 1996, p.626), constraining the therapist’s access to her or his own subjective experience. The therapist’s
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‘irreducible subjectivity’ (Renik 1995) cannot be eliminated; and this is not even a desirable goal. All therapists would do well to follow Grotjahn (1993) who routinely analyzes ‘the resistance to joining the group – in the patient and in me’ (p.58).
Anxieties and resistances of training institutions The decision to establish a new professional identity as a group therapist arouses apprehension, which may be understood and modified by study and group experience supported by training institutions. However, powerful institutional resistances and injunctions exist regarding groups that may contribute to rather than lessen the distress of the novice group therapist. Writing at the same time as Racker, Jaques (1955) described ‘how much institutions are used by individual members to reinforce individual mechanisms of defence against anxiety and in particular against recurrence of the early paranoid and depressive anxieties’ (p.478). In a critique of psychoanalytic education, Kernberg (2000) acknowledged the ‘regressive idealizations and split-off paranoiagenesis…that haunt psychoanalytic institutions’ (p.113). Kernberg recognized the striking avoidance of studying the essential literature of small and large groups. He did not go so far as to suggest structured and ongoing group experience among his proposals to address the authoritarian pathology in these oligarchic and parochial training organizations (Kirsner 2000). Bion (1961) held that the capacity to participate in group was ‘possible only to individuals with years of training and a capacity for experience that has permitted them to develop mentally’ (p.143). While stressing the importance of individual analytic work, and mileage doing groups, he did not seem to advocate personal group therapy in the training of the analyst or group therapist. Foulkes (1964), in contrast, trained group analytic therapists. Individual psychotherapy was indispensable, but not enough. Group therapists needed special gifts, ‘years of hard study, penetrating experience [group implied], before they may qualify and provided also they have proved to possess a sufficient degree of personal integration to stand up to the emotional storms and havocs they have to live through’ (p.99). Psychoanalytic institutions bar inclusion of group therapy in their candidates’ own training analyses, or presentation of patients in combined therapy as control cases. Few institutions, if any, even offer theoretical or clinical seminars in group therapy. We see that despite Freud’s curiosity and writings about groups and group process, group therapy remains taboo in many psy-
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choanalytic circles. Indeed, most psychoanalysts seem not particularly interested in group therapy, a contributing factor being the attitudes promulgated by their training institutes. They seem unaware of and resist attending group therapy conferences, and supply a languishing membership in the group therapy division of the otherwise thriving Division 39 (Psychoanalysis) of the American Psychological Association. Finally, the group therapy literature remains mostly segregated from mainstream psychoanalytic journals. Being an optimist, I expect that it is only a matter of time for the recently liberated, democratized relational psychoanalyst to recognize that group therapy is a wonderful equalizer and helps keep the analyst honest, humble, and on his or her toes with colleagues and patients. An ongoing process group should be an important segment of pre- and postdoctoral level training experiences. Large, median, and small group experience could enliven and personalize the often dry and repetitious conferences of the national and international psychoanalytic and psychotherapy associations. In sum, whereas the group therapist often considers and even prefers combined individual and group treatment, the typical individual practitioner surely does not. The concept of the individual in a group has been insufficiently incorporated into important subdisciplines of psychotherapy theory, training, and practice, and there are institutional resistances to be overcome.
Dread and fear of doing group therapy Symbolically, all therapy is an act of aggression, interfering, challenging, and undermining patients’ beliefs, values, and relationships, and perhaps even their sense of themselves. The possibility of group therapy introduces new ways in which the therapist aggresses on existing and potential members. I suggest that in being introduced to the idea of group, every patient, unconsciously and often consciously, feels the therapist is abandoning, exiling, and hating him or her by encroaching on their exclusive relationship and exposing them to others. The therapist also feels this to be so, and suffers from depressive anxiety and guilt. In addition, like the patient, the therapist suffers abandonment and persecutory anxieties and fears exposure. In starting a group or adding a member to an existing group, the therapist disturbs and destabilizes the meaning of preexisting relationships. The members must tolerate absence and loss of meaning, leaving a mental space to receive new experience. In breaking down existing meaning as well as confronting what is unknown and confusing, the therapist raises his or her own
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anxieties and accompanying feelings of persecution and depression. Thus, in the very effort to foster growth and development, the therapist aggresses against the self and other. The group – and not the nature of learning – comes to represent the source of danger. Therefore, the therapist hates and dreads the group and its members for subjecting him or her to the very group he or she has longed for and is creating.
Expressions of resistance to group Consider these remarks from candidates and recent graduates of psychoanalytic institutes, some of whom had contemplated or begun doing group therapy. I can’t start a group. I don’t have room in my office. Then I realized it wasn’t my office, but my life I was concerned about. Do I want to add this worry to my busy existence? I am imagining the first meeting, afraid I am not up to it, afraid I would not be in the clinical moment. I am worried I’m not ready for the big time. Not ready to live life, jump into the life of group. I feel anxious when asking patients to join my new group and I feel bad if they say no. I take it personally, and I also question my clinical judgment. I feel remiss. I can’t always predict. People I least expect say no; I’ve been more successful with people I don’t care about.
Many clinicians practicing individual therapy forthrightly acknowledge that they abjure group therapy for personal, not theoretical, reasons. Koenig and Lindner (1994) have described characterological issues in therapists that express resistance to group. The narcissistic therapist fears that an active group will undermine the clinician’s therapeutic uniqueness. The schizoid therapist fears invasion by patients. The depressive therapist needs to remain each individual patient’s universal supplier. The compulsive therapist fears a group would spread unconstructive attitudes and behavioral modes and must control how things should be done. The hysterical therapist fears being overwhelmed and controlled. Supervision, individual and particularly group therapy may aid the conflicted and ambivalent therapist in making a transition into becoming a group practitioner.
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Clinical examples of resistance to group 1. A gifted clinician, characterologically quiet and reserved, insisted that she did not have the personality to run a group. ‘I’m a follower, not a leader,’ she argued, ‘I can’t think that quickly when I’m under pressure.’ I do not believe ‘leading,’ meaning quickly responding, to be a requirement for the job of group therapist. A quiet, reflective leader who takes her time can be quite effective in containing anxiety and encouraging the evolutionary process of learning. In supervision we explored this woman’s history. We discovered many professional situations in which she led others quite capably. She also valued her own experience as a patient in group therapy, in which she actively participated. However, she adamantly maintained her belief that, as a group therapist, she would flee mentally, and retreat to the passivity and paranoid-depressive loss of confidence which she characterized as her position in her family of origin and which continued in certain social situations. She regretted not feeling able at this time to offer her patients what she considered a valuable option. 2. Preoccupied with his recently initiated group, a supervisee had difficulty containing his anxieties between sessions. He worried about each patient – was he or she sufficiently satisfied and not unduly disturbed by the process – and whether the group would stay together. He tended to be quiet in group, but steered patients in their individual hours to discuss group experience, and made constant reference to the group. I suggested that the therapist was projecting his own insecurity and fear regarding group participation on to the members. Our subsequent discussions alerted him to characterological obsessive defenses around his ‘need to know.’ He revealed difficulty in tolerating uncertainty. What really took place in group and how each member felt about it preoccupied his thoughts. We agreed he should more actively participate in the group process and connect with his patients there, and not use individual sessions to bolster his unrealistic fantasies and his striving for clinical certainty.
Fear of exposure I should be in a group and do a group, but I’m too fragile. I don’t think I could take it. So many eyes staring at me, no place to hide, even to think. Everyone would notice when I make a mistake. [Remarks from an experienced psychoanalyst, and psychoanalytic supervisor and faculty member]
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Group members see the group therapist from multiple perspectives. Previously unrevealed and undeveloped facets of the therapist’s professional and subjective self, including values, beliefs, character issues, unconscious wishes, feelings, and fantasies, are put into group play. The therapist may feel that, relative to individual therapy, he or she has less control and knowledge of how and what is being revealed. But self-disclosure is inevitable and continuous in any human interaction, certainly in individual as well as group psychoanalytic therapy. Greenson (1967) observed that, even in a classical psychoanalysis, ‘everything we do or say, or don’t do or say, from the décor of our office, the magazines in the waiting room, the way we open the door, greet the patient, make interpretations, keep silent, and end the hour, reveals something about our real self and not only our professional self ’ (p.91). An important question to consider is how the group therapist discloses (e.g. the verbal, paraverbal, and nonverbal manifestations), as well as what, when and why. Not only is self-disclosure unavoidable, but also the lines between its various forms – such as intentional or unintentional – are ambiguous and fluctuating. Vocal (and nonvocal) behaviors may range from spontaneous exclamation to measured revelation, from those that are seemingly consciously determined to those unconsciously enacted. Pragmatic meaning, that is, paralinguistic signification revealed by subtleties in timing, tone, and cadence, may contradict what is verbally spoken (Chused 1991; McLaughlin 1991). When the group therapist utilizes him or herself in an open, spontaneous manner, the therapist may be producing more obvious disclosures, or different types of disclosures, than those that are also inevitable in traditional individual or group technique. In moments when the group therapist is purposefully transparent, one may be consciously as well as unconsciously avoiding, and yet also inadvertently conveying other aspects of personal experience (Frank 1997; Greenberg 1995). Some group therapists gradually and purposefully reveal aspects of themselves, in an attempt to model for the patients as well as to propel patients to deal more realistically with the nature and basis of their beliefs. Yalom (1995) conceived the group therapist as busy in the early stages of group life with the development of the social system, while in later stages, he or she productively relates more personally and interactively with each individual. From this point of view, the expansion of self-disclosure facilitates greater openness among members, decentralizes the leader’s position in the group, and hastens the development of group autonomy and cohesiveness.
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A number of contemporary writers of differing psychoanalytic persuasions have argued that because the therapist cannot help being self-disclosing, why not consider the opportunity to make explicit that which reveals oneself to be emotionally involved with the patient? The contemporary group therapist may consider disclosing autobiographical material, as well as explicitly refer to the emotional experience with the patient, as in countertransference disclosure. Reports in the psychoanalytic literature include revelations of confusion, distraction, tears (Ehrenberg 1995); annoyance, dislike, envy, and murderous hatred (Jacobs 1991; Searles 1979; Winnicott 1949); humor and sarcasm (Bader 1995; Greenson 1967); sexual imagery, fantasy, and feelings (Davies 1994; Marcus 1997); error and its origin in unconscious countertransference (Jacobs 1991; Little 1951); day and sleep dreams about the patient (Marcus 1997; Wilner 1996); caring actions, such as borrowing a videotape and offering personal feedback (Hoffman 1996); touching and being touched physically (McLaughlin 1995); and various feelings expressed through acting-out behaviors, including (symbolic) sexual abuse (Frawley-O’Dea 1997) and lying to the patient (Gerson 1996). Analysts have talked to patients about their life crises and issues relating to their own character and identity; included here are the therapist’s illness (Pizer 1997), impending death (Morrison 1997), late pregnancy loss (Gerson 1994), race (Leary 1997), sexual orientation (Blechner 1996), weight difficulties (Burka 1996), and childlessness (Leibowitz 1996). While non-disclosure ‘makes the analyst into a mystery, and paves the way for regarding the analyst as an omniscient sphinx whose way cannot be known and whose authority, therefore, cannot be questioned’ (Renik 1995, p.482), the converse, that disclosure dissipates fantasies of the therapist’s omniscience, is not necessarily true. Bion (1961) prefigured the contemporary movement to share ‘inner experience’ (Jacobs 1991), disclosing certain thoughts and feelings in some of his interventions. For example: ‘It becomes clear to me that I am, in some sense, the focus of attention in the group. Furthermore, I am aware of feeling uneasily that I am expected to do something. At this point I confide my anxieties to the group, remarking that, however mistaken my attitude might be, I feel just this’ (p.30). But at the same time, Bion maintained a sphinx-like, nontransparent persona that stimulated his groups’ transference fantasies and irrational reaction tendencies. The group therapist must consider many factors in including deliberate self-disclosure within his or her theory and technique. How is self-disclosure
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possible and appropriate, and what kinds of self-disclosure are constructive? In attempting to systematize self-disclosure, one risks moving from authenticity to manipulation. In sum, self-exposure is inevitable in any modality of therapy, and volitional self-disclosure should not suggest that the therapist is fully aware or certain of his or her motivation, meanings, and effect. The rule for the group therapist seeking guidelines is that there are no hard and fast rules. One issue to consider is whether taking or avoiding the opportunity for self-disclosure serves to open or close things up, a question that may be answered only retrospectively, and even then without certainty that another way may not have been better (Aron 1996; Greenberg 1995).
Clinical anecdote involving exposure A young analyst reported in supervision that she felt ‘unmasked’ when one of her patients in combined treatment saw her in a restaurant with her husband and preschool children. ‘Now she knows I’m just a person,’ she exclaimed. ‘I’ve lost my specialness.’ I thought that if the patient saw her as special, as indeed she might, it was because of her personal qualities, not in spite of them. I advocated an investigation, preferably in the next session, which was group. Gathering her courage, the supervisee took an opportunity to inquire about the chance meeting. The patient, also a young woman, admitted feeling awed by what she discovered in the unexpected encounter. The patient’s fantasy was confirmed: her therapist was a well-rounded human being with a career and a family. The woman wished such a reality for herself. Ironically, until their discussion, both parties had felt a loss of confidence, whereas afterwards, they both felt enhanced. The patient seemed relieved of some of her suppressed feelings of inferiority by simply expressing them in the accepting group context. For her part, the therapist also experienced self-assurance from being seen, literally, as herself. She felt less dependent on an imaginary mask of anonymity and other ‘extrinsic’ (Gill 1994) features of psychoanalytic psychotherapy that she had relied on to give her the status to practice her profession.
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Emotional amplification and contagion in group Groups amplify emotional reactions, as laughter increases in a full movie house when compared to a relatively empty one (Koenig and Lindner 1994). Bion (1961) referred to this combustible process of emotional contagion as valency, describing a rapid formation of group uniformity of thought, feelings, and interactional behavior. Valency contributes to the power of group therapy to induce, stimulate, and intensify countertransference, as the group comes to represent a collection with a singular mind and personality. Valency or amplification may increase in frequency and intensity particularly as the group becomes structurally homogenous, regresses deeply, acts out, or becomes polarized. The group, vulnerable to emotional contagion, may influence the therapist who unconsciously provokes or colludes with the very process that is threatening to group life (Kauff 1993). The intersubjective pressure is either to join the group via overidentification or rigidly to oppose it. Roth (1980) described anxieties regarding over- or counter-identification with a group, and how the leader may fear being overwhelmed by collective group phenomena. The therapist may be tempted ‘to control or evacuate parts of the group in an attempt to ward off the painful task of analyzing [the therapist’s own] hitherto defended introjects’ (p.407). Therapists must cope with the group’s and their own intense feelings, including anger, rage, guilt, and neediness. They must also cope with the fear of losing ego boundaries, and even of being crazy.
Testimonies of fear of craziness I asked candidates in the Derner Postdoctoral Group Program whether they ever felt crazy from their groups. The responses were, in this order: [From a male candidate] I was having trouble with my first group. Two of the four women dropped out, and I felt responsible for bringing in a female member who would stick, although the group seemed okay either way. I had this dream the night before introducing a new woman: My [male] supervisor, the men in the group, and I were holding hands, in a circle. I think I felt I was falling apart and I needed the other men to keep me together. I sometimes get scared that people will fight with each other, so scared that I feel I wouldn’t be coherent if I had to talk. I feel like I can’t focus or process. I hear ‘fix it’ in my head, but I have no idea what to do. I drive myself so crazy that the room spins around.
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My mind can go blank, yet I will feel a painful imploding inside it. I can get up after a difficult session so uncoordinated I don’t know where my feet are. I don’t feel crazy, but feel that the group will think I am crazy, and I get scared after I make interpretive leaps. If they challenged me, what would I say? I can feel like a maniac, not a normal human being, that I pushed people too hard and exposed them. I criticize myself for wanting too much from them, for them, and then worry all week, sick with dread.
These feelings and fantasies were easily accessed by the candidates, which I considered to be evidence of their clinical maturity and sophistication. Interventions are often as difficult for clinicians to offer, as for patients or groups to receive, and sometimes we feel that we are mean or crazy for making them. Bion (1965) held that emotional acceptance of an interpretation includes the sense of being or becoming that aspect of the self to which attention has been drawn. This acceptance may entail violent feelings of madness, murderousness, and guilt. Such catastrophic feelings of becoming the person of the interpretation are also to be experienced by the analyst, who must become ‘reconciled to the feeling that we are on the verge of a breakdown, or some kind of mental disaster’ (1975, p.206).
Idealization of group treatment Therapists may defend against, and compensate their dread and fear of groups by idealizing this form of treatment and certain patients who participate enthusiastically in it. Consider, for example, these comments from postdoctoral supervisees: I am looking forward to it [initiating a first group] – like my high school graduation or [doctoral] orals, tremendously excited, nervous, like I was starting a new phase in my life. I’m psyched. Curtain going up, light the lights! I’m beginning next week. What should I do? I lose interest in those patients who aren’t also involved in group. I think of my groups as my family, and until patients are in a group, I don’t feel we are really engaged.
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I get angry and feel rejected when a patient refuses my invitation to join one of my groups. I told my patient that if he did not at least try group for three months, I would not see him.
In these examples, the clinicians betray difficulty in containing and acknowledging personal anxiety and ambivalence. They may have prematurely introduced the group option to unprepared patients or insisted on converting all patients to group patients. The therapists have not sufficiently analyzed their patients’ resistances (including compliance), or their own.
Fear of and allegiance to the basic assumptions From the first moment in its life, a group begins to unify around a predominant basic assumption, through which members express a group mentality that contributes to a group culture. The therapist is perceived and treated as antagonistic by that element of the group mentality that resists learning by experience. To the extent that the group is dominated by one of the basic assumptions, the therapist is fought against or eluded (fight/flight culture), unduly depended upon (dependency culture), or symbolically replaced by a pair or subgroup (pairing culture). Grotstein (1995) stated that individual therapy, like ‘any couple relationship constitutes a group entity as well as a dyad, and is subject to the laws of group formation and the inevitable development of basic assumption resistances’ (pp.489–490). Basic assumptions contain ‘features that correspond so closely with extremely primitive part objects that sooner or later psychotic anxiety, pertaining to these primitive relationships, is released’ (Bion 1961, p.189). The therapist’s countertransferences to patients and to the group reflect anxieties associated with basic assumptions, and resistance to analyzing such anxieties and these countertransferences may determine criteria for group selection or deselection. For example, a therapist resists placing a competitive, outspoken individual in group, thereby avoiding power issues. In consequence, the basic assumption of fight/flight may remain unexplored in the patient, the group, and particularly, in the countertransference. When therapists resist confronting and working through internally the predominating basic assumption, they become susceptible to engulfment by and absorption into the cohering group mentality. Resulting countertransference enactments serve to foster a static, emotionally inhibited basic
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assumption group culture. For example, a therapist reacts with exaggerated fear of personal or group destruction when a group or member first attempts to introduce aggression or flight themes (baF/F). Or, when members are competing relentlessly for the therapist’s ministrations, the therapist feels coerced to supply individual psychotherapy (baD). A third example occurs when group members form a subgroup or take turns to identify and treat other members’ (including the therapist’s) psychological problems. The therapist impotently joins the silent majority as a rotating leadership goes about ‘curing’ targeted members (baP). Under the guise of clinical choice and leadership style, the therapist may act out character pathology congruent with a particular basic assumption. For instance, leading homogenous groups composed of antisocial individuals may attract therapists with rebellious character structures and unresolved conflicts with authority, or conversely, therapists with rigid superegos (baF/F). A characterologically impulsive therapist may enjoy the immediacy and action of short-term crisis groups and miss opportunities for introspection, intimacy, and extended work (baF/F). A therapist may be overly supportive and encourage patients to relate to each other similarly (baD). A therapist may terminate unwanted patients from individual therapy, rationalizing that they would benefit from connecting to others in group (baP). The therapist’s adoption of a basic assumption mentality may cause the group to carry out therapeutic functions that rightly belong to the leader, such as recruiting new members or maintaining boundaries (ba/D). The therapist may symbolically abandon frustrating patients to be ‘killed or cured’ by group (baF/F), rather than protect difficult individuals from premature group confrontation. Additionally, the therapist may bask in a dependency or pairing group culture and resist analyzing the idealizing and sexualizing transferences.
Clinical examples: The therapist promotes basic assumptions 1. A well-respected senior clinician encouraged students at several analytic institutes to participate in one of his supervisory groups. A female analyst entered, only to find a harem of adoring women, including the analyst’s long-standing patients and former and present supervisees. Much of the group process involved fighting for the analyst’s attention. He passively satisfied his underlying hunger for idealization and had no motivation to offer the intellectual and emotional depth he provided in the analytic institutes.
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The unexplored pairing fantasy would be that he, the Divine Presence, would miraculously impregnate in each of his disciples a new Messiah. 2. A clinician referred to group as one’s ‘real family,’ meaning an ideal family in which she herself would be idealized. She regularly scheduled double sessions for several of her groups during holidays, even pressuring them to have annual or biannual holiday weekend marathons at her country home. (The members were to stay in nearby motels without socializing.) When members reported that their mates complained, the therapist suggested that the mates were jealous that they were not in one of her groups, and advised that they should appear for consultation. Her dominating and controlling personality contributed to group formation and cohesion around dependency, but stifled the members’ independent thought and behavior.
Anxiety stimulated by a new member The fluctuations and reconfigurations in group process and membership influence the therapist’s self/object, self/group representations. Each person represents an influence of immigration on the group culture, actual and imagined. A new member often stimulates the group’s reevaluation of itself. Who are we, what are we about? The new member awakens dormant group issues and activates dormant conflicts, for example, dependency, sexual and/or sibling rivalry (Brown 1998; Rabin 1989), and competition for special attention. A new member often stimulates exit fantasies. Therefore, the therapist may hesitate unnecessarily in bringing a novice to a sophisticated group or a problematic patient to a cohering group. ‘I resent having to start over again,’ a member complains, perhaps echoing the therapist’s unstated feelings as well. ‘Perhaps this is a good time for me to terminate, I have a replacement,’ a second member adds. Yet, a new member is more than a new, or repeat, set of problems. He or she is a fresh perspective who is valuable for the leader and group. A new member represents aspects of the group leader, as the baby represents aspects of parents. Whereas there may be no such thing as an ugly baby to its parents, therapists may be considerably less charitable in their feelings towards patients they are considering for group. The therapist may be proud of and wish to show off an attractive or status patient, or to hide one who is neither.
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Countertransference may involve anxiety in losing the exclusive and familiar individual therapeutic relationship, anticipatory fear in exposing the patient to group, and relief or disappointment in the patient’s consent. The anxious therapist may unnecessarily shepherd a patient through the inclusion and absorption phase, behaving like ‘an over-careful parent who discusses all possibilities with the patient [or with the group], as a mother would with a child going on a long trip when she thinks he cannot tackle possible difficulties’ (Koenig and Lindner 1994, p.123). When the patient integrates into the group, the therapist may feel suddenly useless, like the parent no longer needed by the child. In addition, in attempting to be fair and neutral to the entire group, the therapist may blot out intimacies already established with the patient from individual work. The therapist can also feel anxious about introducing the group to the new patient and exposing the therapist’s ‘other’ professional life. The beginning group therapist may be adopting and modifying a group persona, one that is more, or less, distant, dramatic, or active than the analytic self of individual work. How will the patient respond to the difference in the therapist’s personality and behavior? How will the patient respond to the therapist’s ‘group family?’ When a patient enters a group, unanticipated facets of the individual’s personality are revealed, and unpredictable group interactions occur. Countertransference surprise and readjustment are continual and inevitable.
Clinical examples: The new member and countertransference 1. The new member stimulates countertransference. ‘You treated me as a stranger in group,’ a patient complained after her first group session. Indeed, the therapist felt protective of other members and did not want to betray them by acknowledging her prior and intense relationship with the new group member. In supervision, the therapist associated to her experiences as a mother, not wanting to betray her older children by being too excited by the new baby whom she came to know in the privacy of the maternity ward. 2. The new member stimulates recognition of preexisting countertransference. A therapist hesitated to place in group a schizoid male patient who, though sufficiently intelligent, steadfastly remained concrete or silent in individual sessions. How could the therapist expose this frustrating and inglorious person to the group, and this lively, interacting group to this person? The therapist was surprised when the man revealed a charming, puppy-dog quality
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to the group, which quickly adopted him and stimulated his active participation. Subsequent individual sessions revealed that the patient felt that the therapist, like the patient’s parents, always wanted more from him than he could give them. In group, the patient did not feel forced to reveal himself because the members enjoyed whatever he did. He could participate according to his wishes and wants, rather than somebody else’s. The therapist realized how he had been trapped in a complementary countertransference (Racker 1968), becoming a superego figure representing the patient’s anxious and demanding parents. The therapist learned from the group members how better to accommodate the patient’s authentic need to be appreciated and enjoyed.
The anxiety of entitlement This brings us to the topic of entitlement, the wish to be and fear of being special, which is an important element in the transference and countertransference, and a topic developed further in Chapter 4. Whereas at one time entitlement was considered primarily a manifestation of a pathological insistence on being an ‘exception’ to reality (Freud 1916), contemporary psychoanalysts have recognized that the sense of entitlement represents a basic human need to feel loved, and to be recognized and affirmed (Billow 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999c; Dorn 1988; Kriegman 1988). When one feels thwarted in having these needs met, pathological attitudes of excessive as well as restricted entitlement may arise. Both the group therapist and the members are vulnerable to exhibiting variants of these unrealistic attitudes and resulting behaviors. Phenomena of entitlement may be subtle and ambiguous, with levels of normal, restricted and excessive entitlement interacting with and camouflaging each other. For example, excessive entitlement may hide behind overt humility, just as an inflated posture may hide underlying feelings of low self-esteem.
Clinical examples of entitlement 1. After several years of introspective vacillation, a therapist committed to forming an inaugural group, only to find his patients resisting. ‘I don’t want to share you,’ a chorus of patients exclaimed, each in their individual sessions. This exceedingly conscientious therapist realized that, in his diligence, he had covertly transmitted a fantasy of specialness. Each patient was exceptional, his
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favorite child, and he was the most important figure in each life. He had to work through, and help his patients work through, mutual attitudes of exaggerated entitlement before constructing a group. Even then, the early stages of the group were marked by intense, underlying competitiveness among the members, with many premature dropouts. 2. A supervisee found that in doing couples work, females looked to her to come to their side, but males felt castrated when she did so. She felt boxed in and adopted an unauthentic professional neutrality to defend against being overwhelmed by what she experienced as an emotional tug-of-war. How could she consider initiating a group, where these polarizations would happen? For her to proceed comfortably, she needed to understand more about her own restricted attitudes regarding her entitlements. She was susceptible to gender-based projective identifications and felt pressured to behave in certain ways. To function with ease, she had to trust her right to join either – or neither – side of a polarized group, as she found it appropriate. 3. A therapist, and recent member of one of my ongoing groups, hesitantly announced that she was commencing her own therapy group. She had resisted raising the subject to our group, since this would call attention to her special status as both a patient and a clinician. She believed the members would criticize and attack her, as they had done in previous sessions, for intellectualizing and for inflating herself by playing the therapist. Instead, the group encouraged her to continue to describe her new project and her concerns about their reactions. The members admired her courage in taking on a new role in her career and in broaching her fear of the group’s reactions to her. She hesitantly explained that she was terribly nervous in starting the group. She felt that way now, imagining us criticizing her for doing what she wanted, and for not doing it well. ‘I’m not a good group patient yet; how could I be a good group therapist?’ She felt that her individual patients were similarly disapproving of her efforts, and that they too would react negatively to her performance in group. In response to the group’s questioning, she acknowledged that her patients were for the most part pleased with her, interested, and quite excited by the prospect of group. But, she said, she could only think about and trust their criticisms, stated and anticipated. She minimized her patients’ warmth and encouragement, as she had minimized the many positive responses she had received since joining our group. We agreed that leading her own group, along with participating in ours, could contribute to working through diffi-
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culties in trusting others’ caring for her and in accepting and valuing herself as special.
The entitlement of leadership and power The therapist’s attitudes toward entitlement are put into play around such issues as assertion of power to establish and care for the group and its members, to feel a part of a group, and to feel and act separate from other group members. The therapist may struggle with both personal issues and technical decisions regarding power, monitoring memory and desire, zealous affects, and resulting impingements. Nevertheless, the therapist must feel entitled to influence individual psychotherapy patients to join a group, or else not maintain a group practice. He or she must believe that what is special and caring in individual therapy will not be lost in a group. Rather, the therapist must convey the conviction that groups, and the individuals who form them, are valuable resources for the patient in reaching therapeutic goals. Indeed, each member, each session, and each group is special, evolving in unique ways, in precious moments of time that cannot be replaced or recaptured. Analytic writers have identified the exercise of therapeutic power as the agent of change. Freud (1916–1917) wrote that: if the patient is to fight his way through the normal conflict which we have uncovered from him in the analysis, he is in need of a powerful stimulus which will influence his decision in the sense we desire, leading to recovery.
Freud went on to state that the powerful stimulus is not intellectual insight, but ‘simply and solely his [the patient’s] relationship to the doctor’ (p.445). According to Modell (1976), the analyst implicitly must possess ‘some powerful qualities so that change may be affected merely by being in his presence’ (p.494). Bion (1966) advised that the individual or group therapist must function with ‘the impact of an explosive force on a preexisting framework’ (p.37). In these quotations, the endorsement of power seems to be collapsed into the idea of effectiveness. There may not be a clear distinction between the two. There are, of course, many different ways to be powerful and many different ways to be effective, and the group therapist’s use of power is not always therapeutically effective. When group therapists describe what they do in clinical situations, different and even contrary approaches often are interesting and
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seem moving and powerful. And yet, it is not easy to delineate which elements in the interaction caused the experience to be therapeutically effective. The same words at different moments, or spoken by different group therapists, may vary in fostering the positive therapeutic relationship that Freud saw as leading to change. The therapist’s presence may create the empathic Kohutian mirror in one group, but may seem too mild in another, or too seductive in a third. An intervention calling attention to a group’s basic assumption may work in the explosive manner Bion described, or may fizzle into embarrassing bombast, cleverness, or naïveté. Whereas the group therapist needs to be powerful, no therapist feels powerful consistently. Working with individuals and with groups, I carry a feeling of powerlessness, even when I also feel powerful. Measuring therapeutic progress may be difficult, and there are no good measures of therapeutic skill. When group members stay year after year, I consider the possibility that I have wielded little effective power and much powerlessness. When an individual ‘gets better,’ I assume it is something he or she did in conjunction with the group experience, and which may or not relate to my efforts. Similarly, when one feels worse or leaves, I assume it relates only partially to my personal or professional limitations, and also relates to the larger question of our profession’s effectiveness. And, complicating matters further, the group therapist must deal with the reality that consensus on therapeutic power may not be apparent or immediate. A group member complained, ‘What you say may be true, but it is not helping. Nothing is changing!’ He seemed to be saying that I was powerless. I felt the sting of public humiliation in the man’s assertion of my therapeutic ineffectiveness. I evaluated my momentary pain as receiving something new from the patient, even representing success rather than failure on the power dimension. I suggested that something must have been changing for him to express himself with such force and directness. He assented dubiously, but with what I took to be a hint of self-satisfaction that I confess was similar to my own. Here the group seemed to have produced a powerful effect and, despite the patient’s initial protestations, a consensus between us as well. The group therapist draws on professional entitlements to predetermine, define, and enforce many of the essentials within the therapy, including boundary functions such as time, place, seating, duration of the session, and fee. In addition, the therapist’s theory and technique bring power, control, and directionality to the psychotherapeutic experience, which privilege and
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prohibit modes of patient–therapist interactions (Hoffman 1996; McLaughlin 1996). Symbolically, the group legitimizes and entitles the leader to lead and the members to be a part of the group (Alford 1995). ‘Patients come to group because of the therapist’s importance…as an object of cathexis and dependence’ (Slavson 1992, p.179). The therapist’s ambivalence regarding being special may interfere with the capacity to function creatively (Safan-Gerard 1997). To initiate and facilitate the analytic process, ‘a group seems to be more dependent on the therapist than is the case in individual treatment’ (Grotjahn 1993, p.29). The therapist stands in the center of the group process and must accept power and leadership, whether or not he or she likes such a position.
Accepting and utilizing countertransference Over three decades ago, Bieber (1971) declared, ‘if the therapist is undefensive in a group setting, he will not be perceived in a dramatically different light [from how he is perceived in individual therapy]’ (p.157). However, we now accept the reality that no therapist is truly undefensive. Experienced group therapists, like experienced actors, do not lose their stage fright. Therapists continually struggle with anxiety and resistance. It is often true that the anxieties and resistances of the group members reflect the therapist’s own. Therapists adjust and integrate different subjective self-states; these are dependent on the real and imagined, present and historical, relationship with the groups and their members. As with any countertransference signals, anxiety and resistance can be used to further psychoanalytic meaning, if not actedout or succumbed to. Sometimes one does succumb, however, and learns retrospectively about enactments, by reviewing countertransference, and listening ever more closely. Bion (1961) described how groups unify around a basic assumption and how the therapist may absorb or contain the group’s projections to understand the group’s emotional struggles. Indeed, the strongest source for interpretations lay not in the observed facts in the group, ‘but in the subjective reactions of the analyst… In group treatment many interpretations, and among them the most important, have to be made on the strength of the analyst’s own emotional reactions’ (Bion 1961, pp.148–149). One must strive to maintain an independent ‘mind of one’s own’ (Caper 1997), one which both identifies and disidentifies with the group’s allegiance to the basic assumption mentality. In effect, the therapist contains the basic assumptions
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to the extent that he or she internally acknowledges and deals with ‘subjective reactions,’ the unavoidable countertransference anxieties, resistances, fantasies, and affects that are in the very fabric of intersubjective experience. Groups unify and not only project, as Bion emphasized, but also protect themselves from the leader’s ‘subjective reactions,’ which include to varying degrees the leader’s unavoidable vulnerability to, and inevitable participation in, basic assumptions. Groups test and challenge the therapist ’s countertransferences, and monitor his or her resistances (Rosenthal 1994), for example, distortions, prejudices, favoritisms, and reaction tendencies. The contemporary therapist listens to the group voice, when it is faint and hesitant, or harsh and exaggerated, without assuming that it necessarily or solely represents the group’s, rather than his or her own, adoption of basic assumptions. The therapist no longer operates with confidence that patients’ evaluations are inaccurate or primarily reflect transference distortions (Gill 1994; Hoffman 1983). Patients have protested or affirmed certain behaviors and personality traits that they attribute to me in the group and that they found different from their experience in individual treatment. The beginning group therapist may dread such feedback, hearing an indictment rather than an invitation to explore previously resisted or undeveloped aspects of the transference, and quite probably, of the countertransference, and of the intersubjective process.
Clinical anecdotes: Working with countertransference 1. A resistant and repetitive patient, new to group, commented to me ‘I’m afraid of you in group. You seem impatient with me.’ The group seemed silently to concur. I first considered that his perception of my impatience related to my wish to protect him from the group’s anger and lack of interest (baF/F). But because the patient and his defenses were new to group, and they seemed interested and not annoyed, I concluded that I had been projecting my negative feelings about him onto the group, and acting them out. 2. A relatively new patient, a successful middle-aged career woman, felt she should ‘take her medicine’ and respond positively to my invitation to join a group. She was convinced that she would have trouble. ‘People don’t really like me, they respect me.’ She associated to her senior high school year, when she had been voted ‘Most Likely to Succeed.’ She longed to be ‘Most Popular,’ but was treated as far too serious, and not ‘really pretty,’ meaning socially attractive. I realized that I had the same mix of feelings toward her as had her
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classmates from so long ago, and that I had projected these feelings onto each of the several potential groups to which I had mentally assigned her. Her acknowledgment of her fears and vulnerability not only gave me important insight into her personality and conflicts, but also alerted me to these heretofore vague countertransference feelings. I now felt more compassion for this woman, and confident that I could facilitate her group placement and help her expand her range of interpersonal options.
Accepting the invitation for personal growth A well functioning psychotherapy group provides a culture of appreciation, caring, and personal growth, for the therapist and patients alike. Genuinely positive feelings develop toward the therapist, who becomes and is treated as special. The appreciation and love of the therapist’s insight, humor, and creativity may surpass the recognition received from the therapist’s family of origin. Therapists may feel anxious, guilty, and not worthy of their patients’ love and gratitude, mistakenly identifying such feelings as defenses against envy, or attributing them to positive transference or excessive idealization. The group is special too, and while it stimulates the therapist’s envy (Alonso and Rutan 1996), it also stimulates loving gratitude. Individual members display strengths of character, patience, insight, and empathic skills, characteristics in which the therapist sometimes feels personally lacking. The group and its members provide self object stabilizing functions, educate the therapist, and modify the therapist’s anxieties, impulses and reactions. Being human, the therapist sometimes distorts and projects personal attractions and repulsions onto others in the group, or finds an element particularly difficult to understand. Group members, not necessarily having the same difficulties, may at times have the greater wisdom. Therapist and patients use group productively, not just pathologically, to satisfy unresolved developmental needs. These include needs for attention, recognition, affect regulation, emotional nurturing, support, and guidance. The group stimulates and satisfies the therapist’s needs for growth and development, professionally and personally. The group is entitled to and benefits from expression of the therapist’s gratitude. I freely acknowledge to members that their group can reach them in ways that I cannot, or have not, and refer often to their contributions in improving my work, as well as personal qualities. For example, in group, ‘You put this much better than I did, thanks for translating me into English’ or, in individual or group treatment, ‘I didn’t
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see that aspect of my personality in our relationship, but I do now, thanks to our group. I’ll try to be more sensitive to my effect on you.’
Clinical example: Appreciating the group’s invitation for growth The chapter concludes with this clinical example. A patient casually commented: ‘I like you better in group, you’re more fun. You look like you’re enjoying yourself.’ I first assessed internally whether I was enjoying myself too much, employing manic or flight defenses in group, or too little in her individual treatment, employing masochistic or dependency defenses. I then explored the question of dual therapeutic identity. Did everyone experience me as different in group than individual therapy, and different in the same ‘fun’ way? I had asked similar questions at various times before, in other groups, and found that the members’ responses often led to interesting and quite divergent views of who I was and how I behaved. This occasion was no different. For, while several members concurred that I was fun in group, but not different from individual treatment, another member, relatively new to my practice, insisted I was hardly present in either modality. From her point of view, I rarely spoke at all. When I did speak, it was not to each individual, but to the group at large. She was satisfied with me, however, because she did not want a therapist ‘in her face.’ Her perception stunned many of the group members, me included, for I actively and frequently pursued her in both therapies, engaging her personally as well as supporting her often-confrontational connections to other members. As she was often in people’s faces, she apparently needed me to be different. Were we a couple, and whom did we represent in her transference? In short order, the group was introduced to her passive and withdrawn husband and father, both represented by me. Her outspoken group behavior revealed how she had conducted herself, earlier in her life as a rebellious daughter to a volatile mother, and presently as a wife, very much like her explosive mother. While she readily agreed with these interpretations, her view of me remained unshaken. ‘Are we having fun yet?’ I asked, in an attempt to extend our one-on-one conversation and demonstrate the reality of a dyadically present and not absent me. She enjoyed the question. However, it now became ‘evident,’ to her but not to any other group member, that I had skillfully turned the discussion back to the group. She had heard the ‘we’ as referring to the entire group, and not to the two of us. I could not shake off her image of me as
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another cop-out male who refused to pair with her. An individual’s transferences are not easily challenged by group consensus! In response to the woman’s naïve but revealing self-presentation, a subgroup of old-timers came up with three stages regarding the two treatment modalities. In the initial stage, after joining the group, they found two different therapists in me, one much less trustworthy in group, but certainly present and ‘out there.’ An intermediary stage involved feeling that they were two different patients, relatively secure in the individual therapy, and much less trusting of the group and of themselves in the group. At a third stage, where they were now, they reported having complementary therapies, each raising important issues and offering unique opportunities. Members who had not been in individual treatment now revealed feelings of jealousy, disparity, and curiosity. Some members, having ‘graduated from individual,’ voiced longing, while others voiced relief. As I listened to the group’s discussion, I introspectively reviewed my own changing sense of identity. Even as I have matured and become more consistent, nonetheless my sense of myself often changes in the group versus the individual context. I began also to experience and review the historical variations in my sense of myself, and in my sense of my own membership in group versus individual therapy. I thought about the group cultures that we had created and modified over time. Traces of past pleasure, pain, sadness, and gratitude – these were my emotional realizations of the group and its evolving, reconfiguring membership, which has contributed so much to my personal growth.
CHAPTER 3
The Basic Conflict: To Think or Anti-think Applying Bion’s Theory of Thinking in the Group Context Early in his writing career, Bion considered the frame of the group, the emotional and mental position of the members contained within it, and the role of the leader. Later, he delved more deeply into the frame of the individual, the position of the individual’s inner world, the social matrix, and the role of the analyst. As a group leader and analyst, he wished to understand ‘anything from a grunt to an elaborate contribution’ (Bion 1997, p.10). He intended ‘to make it possible to discuss something, or to talk about it, or to think about it, before knowing what it is’ (1997, p.10). The contemporary psychoanalyst follows Bion in assuming that an important level of intrapsychic and interpersonal communication takes place on a preverbal level in which thinking and feeling remain partially undeveloped, verbally unarticulated, and segregated from each other (Chused 1992; Renik 1993; Spezzano 1996; Stolorow, Atwood, and Brandchaft 1994). Bion emphasized that emotional meaning evolves over time, and that the process of coming to know and communicate experience is frustrating and involves tolerating pain and uncertainty. A basic conflict exists within the self, and within the group and its members, involving tensions between motives to tolerate, develop, and integrate thought and feeling, and motives to relieve frustration. To be released ‘from the bondage of inarticulation’ (Bion 1970, p.15), the individual must decide to endure the process of thinking.
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Thinking Bion brought a relational meaning to ‘thinking,’ emphasizing that its aim is emotional awareness of self and others. Thinking does not denote merely mentation, intellection, or cognition. Thinking is the process of establishing a ‘mental relationship with a personality – and of that personality’s emotional experience – either the individual’s own or that of another person’ (Bion 1962, p.53). Freud (1918) had formulated the goal of analytic treatment to extend to the patient this type of emotional thinking: ‘knowledge of unconscious, repressed impulses existing in him, and, for that purpose, to uncover the resistances that oppose this extension of his knowledge about himself ’ (p.159). Anticipating relational theory (e.g. Benjamin 1990; Carruthers and Smith 1996; Damon and Hart 1982; Fonagy and Target 1998; Mitchell 2000), Bion thus broadened Freud’s interest in self-consciousness to include affective awareness of other selves, and of the internal and external relations between self and others. Quite early he called attention to that which we might call, in contemporary jargon, relational consciousness-raising, in his writing on psychoanalytic group psychotherapy: ‘I believe that intellectual activity of a high order is possible…together with an awareness (and not an evasion) of the emotions… If…therapy is found to have a value, I believe it will be in the conscious experiencing of…activity of this kind’ (Bion 1961, p.175, my emphasis). Foulkes (1964) described a similar process of translation, which involves ‘the raising of communication from the inarticulate and autistic expression by the symptom to the recognition of underlying conflict and problems which can be conveyed, shared and discussed in everyday language’ (p.69). When our inner reactions, our vague feelings, precursory thoughts, and elusive fantasies about self and others, are captured and verbally represented, and not evaded, we may begin to think about them in a more conscious and unconscious manner. Relational-consciousness generates meaning; it is itself an emotional experience, and it influences unconscious thought. As Freud (1915b) conceived, ‘the Ucs. is alive and capable of development’ (p.190). Mental activity moves in two opposite directions: either it starts from the instincts and passes through the system Ucs. to conscious thought activity; or, beginning with an instigation from outside, it passes through the system Cs. and Pcs. till it reaches the Ucs… The second path must…remain traversable’. (Freud 1915b, p.204)
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The unconscious is not passive, merely receiving and eventually rebroadcasting repressed mental contents. Rather, unconscious thinking contributes an essential primitive, arational dimension to our transformations of experience. The systems conscious and unconscious together provide a ‘binocular’ or correlative perspective on emotions as they emerge, and on reality as it is experienced (Bion 1962, p.53; see also Matte Blanco 1988). The heightened level of consciousness and unconsciousness that I am describing requires a certain level of maturity and self-control. The original function of verbal thought, to provide restraint for motor discharge, has to be deflected ‘to the tasks of self knowledge for which it is ill-suited and for the purpose of which it has to undergo drastic changes’ (Bion 1962, p.57). Thinking is ‘embryonic even in the adult and has yet to be developed fully by the race’ (1962, p.85). Hence our biological need to understand emotional experience strains our current evolutionary limitation.
The basic conflict Like Freud and Klein, Bion postulated basic underlying emotional conflicts within the individual that, while contributing to intrapsychic and interpersonal difficulties, could also stimulate symbol and cultural development, the constructive group participation involved in talking, thinking, and knowing. Freud mythologized an antagonism between the pleasure and reality principles, and between the life and death instinct. Klein narrated a dynamic interplay between love and hate, and envy and reparative gratitude. Bion described, additionally, a deep tension between a basic need for knowledge of emotional experience, and the limited human capacity to bear it. There is a need for awareness of an emotional experience, similar to the need for an awareness of concrete objects that is achieved through the sense impressions, because lack of such awareness implies a deprivation of truth and truth seems to be essential for psychic health. The effect on the personality of such deprivation is analogous to the effect of physical starvation on the physique. (1962, p.56)
The human being needs to feel and think about emotional food for thought. However, meaningful emotional experience does not arise primarily from material experience, that is, with the milk itself, but from the source of the milk and the infant’s relationship to it. To satisfy the ‘need for awareness of an emotional experience,’ the developing individual must first depend on others
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to make sense of experience. Early in development, reality cannot be apprehended and constructed without others. Even for those whose reality sense has matured, frequent social validation remains necessary. The need to understand oneself and others – and its satisfaction – develops in a relational context. Indeed, our very ability to think depends in part on ‘the social capacity of the individual. This development, of great importance in group dynamics, has received virtually no attention; its absence would make even scientific communication impossible’ (Bion 1962, p.185). One motive to congregate in groups is to feel safe, and safety may depend on validating our thinking. In psychoanalytic group psychotherapy, other human beings help make manageable the need to understand and communicate that which we cannot or do not want to feel and understand alone. But, at the same time, there is an aspect of each of us that hates relational consciousness, and this aspect is never more apparent than when a group is asked to think about itself. ‘The group, as being the object of the inquiry, itself arouses fears of an extremely primitive kind…the group is therefore perturbed by fears, and mechanisms for dealing with them, that are characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position’ (Bion 1961, p.162). Thinking necessarily activates primitive, turbulent emotions, and reinstates powerful early anxieties involving separation and loss, and fear of new and unknown experience. Absence of needed objects (including objects of knowledge such as the complexities of one’s feelings, or another’s) stimulates thinking to the extent to which one tolerates frustration. All objects that are needed are bad objects because they tantalize. They are needed because they are not possessed in fact; if they were possessed there would be no lack… [Thoughts] are bad, needed objects to be got rid of because they are bad. They can be got rid of either by evasion or modification. The problem is solved by evacuation if the personality is dominated by the impulse to evade frustration and by thinking the objects if the personality is dominated by the impulse to modify the frustration. (Bion 1962, p.84)
Thinking hurts. The human being suffers from needing something painful. But fearful of pain, even the strongest sometimes evades what he or she needs, and often chooses instead ways of avoiding thinking.
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The painful nature of thinking Freud (1911a), in Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning, considered the problem of pain in relation to thinking. The failure of primitive repression or of hallucinatory gratification to dissolve unpleasant aspects of external reality leads to the development of thought and thinking functions. As trial internal action, thought contains but only partially modifies pain, rather than discharging it. Freud conceived of fantasy as the mode of thought activity subordinated to pleasure and not dependent on reality or real objects. Psychotics, borderline individuals, and to some extent all of us, continue to evade pain by evading thinking, by living in fantasy, or by discharging mental stimuli through impulsive behavior. Melanie Klein and her co-workers (Heimann 1952; Isaacs 1952) added to Freud’s formulations. Thinking is painful because it must deal with the unpleasant aspects of internal as well as external reality, those pertaining to the dynamics of the paranoid and depressive position. Klein emphasized that when thinking would be too painfully anxiety provoking, psychotics, neurotics, and ‘normals’ may evade thinking by hallucination, repression, and also by three other basic defenses. These are withdrawal of the introjective–projective processes that underlie thinking; splitting of the self, the object, the mental apparatus and its functions; and projective identification, through which the self disowns split-off elements and places in another (or in a dissociated part of the self ) that which upon consideration would lead to mental pain. These basic defenses may be put to constructive use, as for example, when in therapy the child uses projective identification to put aspects of its conflicts in the physical objects and actions of play, and gradually comes to understand what is represented. Similarly, individuals may verbally and interactionally enact intrapsychic and interpersonal struggles with other group members, and come to understand symbolic levels of meaning. Bion held that thinking inherently involves an exchange of painful, primitive feelings. This exchange involves a recapitulation of the earlier development shifts from paranoid-schizoid to depressive positions into moment-to-moment processes of oscillation between disintegration and reintegration, which Bion (1962) symbolized as PS1 D. As patterns of painful emotional-cognitive experience, PS1 D oscillations participate in all other learning experiences (in complex arrangements with container–contained processes, see Chapter 5, and with the processing of basic affects, see Chapters 9 and 10, on LHK and passion).
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Creative mental activity is not characterized solely by the incremental build-up of manageable experience. Thinking is inherently painful in that it involves intense episodes of emotional turbulence. Learning involves partial disintegration of what is known until a state of ignorance is regained, and meaninglessness and confusion is tolerated. Hard-won new understanding brings its own frustrations, for one has greater clarity about vast areas of the unknown. In striving for a mental attitude of openness, one must give up orienting memory and deprive oneself of the desire to possess knowledge. Words and facts may constrict the thinker to conventional ways of knowing ‘about’ experience, and prevent him or her from freshly experiencing experience. If experience is food for thought, one becomes what one eats and no longer is what one was. Thinking changes one’s identity, and hence also disorients and reorients the thinker to past, present, and future. The person who bears to think and to learn risks ever-greater separation from established, conventional relations with others, as well as with one’s previous ideas. Freud and Klein emphasized that self-knowledge brings forth the primacy of self-integration over repression and splitting; hence self-knowledge brings inner peace and social harmony. Bion emphasized that integration entails also the capacity and the courage for even greater levels of emotional turbulence, existential risk, and personal and social disharmony.
From Klein’s ‘epistemological instinct’ to Bion’s ‘K’ Klein had challenged Freud’s formulations by positing fantasy as an essential mode of thinking about, dealing with, and not evading reality, its painful as well as pleasurable aspects. She considered fantasy to be a mental operation that accompanied and was expressed in conscious and unconscious thinking such as that involved in children’s play and adult creativity, as well as expressed in pathological thinking and defenses against thinking (see also Chapter 6). Bion came to understand that primitive fantasy and other precursory forms of mental activity were important in infancy (and perhaps prenatally), as they expressed a drive to use experience for thinking. As we saw in a previous section of this chapter, Bion compared the hunger for thought content to satisfy the mental organ to the physiological hunger for food to satisfy the stomach. While both sources of hunger are rooted in instinctual need, their aims and objects are located within a psychological, initially maternal,
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context. It is the mental region particularly that is disturbed when material, but not psychological provisions, are offered in infancy. Klein had called Bion’s attention to the ‘epistemolophilic instinct,’ the urge to know, an urge which motivated and expressed a range of realistic and imaginative thought, and which at times required the active presence of other human beings. The importance of this basic drive, which he notated as K, led Bion to revise Freud’s dual instinct theory, and to place the drives within the context of object relations (see Chapter 9, on LHK).
Anti-thinking or minus K In analyzing Schreber’s autobiography, Freud (1911a) concluded ‘paranoia resolves once more into their elements the products of the condensations and identifications which are effected in the unconscious’ (p.49). Freud explained the ‘decomposition’ of mental products in psychotic states as resulting from the withdrawal of psychic energies (cathexes) from reality concerns. When Bion (1967a) turned his attention to the treatment of schizophrenic and borderline individuals, he articulated a ‘psychotic part of a personality,’ which functions actively as well as passively. This part of the personality hates reality, thought, and thinking, and attacks the mental linking processes by which we come to know and integrate our thoughts and feelings. One is not necessarily clinically psychotic when evincing this aspect of personality, of course. Rather that to the extent that one evades or perversely transforms thinking, each personality develops primitive or psychotic subselves, ‘twins’ (Bion 1967b) of our normal personality. To a greater or lesser extent, each of us – and each group in which we participate – hates reality, since it leads to unavoidable pain and anxiety, and hence hates thinking, thinkers, and thought that leads to reality. Bion (1967a) relegated Freud’s definition of the aim of Thanatos to the description of the psychotic part: ‘to undo connections and so to destroy things’ (Freud 1938, p.194). In effect, Bion construed ‘things’ as ‘mental things,’ or meaning. Hence, an element in the personality seeks to evade, forestall, halt, or destroy meaning, expressing the antipode to thinking (K), anti-thinking (- K). In this situation of minus K, that which is activated may persist without adequate mental transformation. Additionally, the individual or group may halt or even reverse the developmental process in which experience emerges into awareness and comes to be understood. Activated thoughts, feelings, and fantasies may be experienced as dangerous, even bizarre, and consequently,
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are denied, dissociated, and projected, where they may be attacked or otherwise controlled (see Chapter 8, section on attacks on links).
Hating thinking Kernberg (1991) usefully delineated levels of the psychopathology of hatred that suggest the extent to which the psychotic part of the personality is influential. In a mild form, the goal is to dominate and control the object, rather than to respond thoughtfully to the interpersonal situation. This occurred in one of my psychotherapy groups, when a member, Sydney, monopolized group process, complaining about his wife’s treatment of him, and pulled for emotional ransom, that is, our sympathy and consolation. He replicated in group the relentlessness that stimulated his wife’s impatience and anger. In a moderately intense form, the goal might be to make the object suffer a victim–victimizer relationship. For example, Sydney accused members who challenged him of being ‘hard-nosed.’ He was easily hurt, and drew attention towards how something was said, and away from its meaning. Feeling like a victim, Sydney tried to victimize others by inducing in them a sense of guilt and failure. In its extreme form, the goal involves a massive devaluation of the hated object and symbolic destruction of all thinkers, which, by extension, includes the self. A sad example involves Myra, a woman who entered group after being widowed at age thirty-eight. She had been a submissive, repressed wife, and came to realize after a few years of cooperative group effort that she had been extremely lonely in her marriage, as she had been in her childhood. She now felt explosive anger toward her parents and her deceased husband, and increasingly indulged in rebellious out-of-group behavior involving nightclub life, often with promiscuous sex, alcohol, and drug use. The group had been her ‘friend,’ she told us, but she was reevaluating us and deciding that we represented a moralistic and conventional point of view to which she could no longer subscribe. To the extent to which we challenged her to think about what she was doing and why, or merely advised her to slow down, we joined the ranks of id-suppressing, enslaving objects of her past life, which included her former self. She hated her past life, hated thinking about it, and came to hate the thought-provoking group and she self-destructed her participation in it.
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The role of excessive projective identification Bion developed the influential idea that psychotherapy patients and groups attempt to control thinking, particularly the analyst’s, by excessive projective identification, reinforced by gestural, paraverbal (e.g. tone and cadence), and verbal behaviors. The analyst may lose the ability to have the ‘moral freedom’ (Racker 1968) to think anything, and may instead feel trapped and ‘manipulated so as to be playing a part…in somebody else’s phantasy…being a particular kind of person in a particular emotional situation’ (Bion 1961, p.149). Likely, the analyst also feels that he or she is not functioning therapeutically. The analyst must ‘shake oneself out of the numbing feeling,’ to be able to think about and make meaning out of otherwise thought-destroying interactions (Bion 1961, p.149).
Clinical example: The dream of the red dress Sarah recounted a troubling dream: ‘I was back at my wedding. I remember my husband, my in-laws, and a lot of people. I thought I was having a good time, and then I noticed that I was wearing a red dress. I hate red dresses and I couldn’t understand why I had to wear a red dress at my own wedding, and why I was wearing it. I woke up very upset.’ Sarah told the dream with a palpable sense of hurt and confusion. But then her emotional status changed markedly, and she seemed no longer the perplexed and pained dreamer, but an assured dream interpreter. She described contributory weekend residues, dramatically detailing the pressures she felt from her husband and his parents to do what she did not want to do. The group’s accommodating compassion renewed Sarah’s sorrow, and her sorrow, the group’s sympathetic warmth. After awhile, I found the group process uninviting, yet felt pressured to continue to share in it. Given that I cared for Sarah and her situation, I first questioned my unanticipated desire to shuck off and rebel against the group’s warmth, and why I felt external pressure to be warm. I reasoned that like Sarah, at her dream wedding, I was feeling pressured to wear a therapeutic mantle – sympathy – not to my taste. Thus, I had the sense of being inside someone else’s fantasy of how I was to behave. I had received the dreamer’s projective identification, its force intensified by group resonance. I had to defy its numbing influence to accept the legitimacy of my therapeutic work I believed I should do. I took encouragement from Bion’s (1970) pithy statement that ‘the pre-verbal matter the
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psycho-analyst must discuss is certain to be an illustration of the difficulty in communication that he himself is experiencing’ (p.15). I said: ‘Everyone seems familiar with the difficulty in doing what one wants to do. This seems to be what Sarah was dreaming about, a difficulty that must exist in our group as well. Could we talk about it?’ A member, Gail, reminded us that during the last session Sarah had been angry with her, finding it effortful and tiresome to ‘read’ her. Perhaps she had read Gail when she didn’t want to, and dreamt about it by being forced to wear a ‘red’ dress. Gail’s attempt to relate the dream to the group process seemed obligatory and overly abstract, and seemed to turn the group away from her and from the further exploration of my request for associations to the group. A divorced man, Peter, volunteered that the dream made him think of his wedding. He loved his wedding, but he didn’t love his marriage because he was forced to do what he didn’t want to. Josh amusingly described his wedding where he did just what he wanted to do. There was an extended and increasingly animated talk of weddings, and then finally, the group turned back to the dreamer. How was Sarah feeling? they asked – and Sarah repeated and expanded on her sorrowful difficulties at home. We were back where we started! The members were doing just what I did not want them to do. I brought to the members’ attention that, since they were ignoring my question and me, they must not want to do what I wanted, but they did not want to think, much less to talk about it. Peter insisted that he respected and listened to me. He was getting ready to think about the question. ‘What question?’ Josh asked, professing not to have heard it. ‘I enjoy reliving my wedding, more than living my marriage!’ Gail reminded us that she had complied and had responded as I had asked but, as usual in her life, no one seemed interested in what she had to say. Was she boring? I said that if she merely complied she was not doing what she or I wanted. This would be boring, even to herself. Sarah became indignant. I was attending to everyone but her, and she was alone and abandoned, just like in the dream. No wonder she ends up doing what she does not want to do. She might as well just shut up and not participate. I protested affably that I was not ignoring her, but being ignored. I was thinking about her dream and encouraging the group to do likewise. But the group wanted either to give sympathy, or to party together. Sarah thought sympathy would be a good idea, but that since this was obviously beyond my emotional capabilities and against my principles, she might as well do what I
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wanted. I wondered why thinking was doing what I wanted, and not what all of us wanted. Peter acknowledged sheepishly that he would rather party first, and think later. Much later! When away from group he often ‘shelved’ us, as he once did with his schoolbooks, and indulged in doing what he knew he should not do, with the excuse that he would buckle down later. He was now approaching forty years old, he added sorrowfully, and maybe later should be now. Mike, who had not spoken, said that when a woman becomes upset, he does not think about what he wants to do, but often becomes panicked, and thinks what he should do to take care of her. ‘I was thinking of Sarah’s unhappiness, and not of your question.’ Another woman, Joan, said that she could not do what she wanted to do because all the men preferred taking care of Sarah! Her jealousy was greeted with good-natured groans, for it was quite familiar to the members. Josh, who had professed not to hear my question, volunteered: ‘I guess this is why I don’t hear so well! I don’t want to be controlled by you, Joan, or Sarah, or you Richard, or anyone.’ Sarah listened to these responses, and although she attempted to maintain a haughty defiance, an understanding smile broke through in my direction. The group was doing what I wanted them to do, and I believe profited from exposing, understanding, and overcoming their resistances to think. CASE DISCUSSION
Sarah’s verbal report and accompanying paraverbal and nonverbal behaviors formed a subtle yet forceful combination of distress and influence, and exemplified excessive projective identification. One effect was to stimulate a group of nonthinking cohorts. Individuals personified nonthinking in different ways. For instance, Gail became intellectually compliant, and did not think for herself. Peter ‘shelved’ his thinking. Josh professed not to hear and hence, without input, he would not be stimulated cognitively. Joan discharged her jealous thoughts through histrionic verbal behaviors. And finally, Sarah maintained her attitudes of inconsolable hurt and righteous indignation. Thus, mind-numbing sympathy, panic-based caretaking, and mental evasion epitomized group process. I had defined my job as bringing meaning to the situation, which meant revealing and exploring the group’s efforts at nonthinking and no meaning. I quickly became the receptacle of bad object projections, ‘being a particular kind of person in a particular emotional situation,’ ‘forcing’ the dreamer and
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the members projectively identified with her to do what they did not want to do, that is, to think self-consciously, and they did just the opposite. Eventually, individuals began to think about not thinking, and why and how they had done so. They made personally meaningful their contributions to a thought-resistant group subculture – the injustice-collecting, compliance, panic, reactivity, and habitual avoidance – their very difficulties necessitating psychotherapeutic treatment.
Thinking as dangerous and bizarre Bion related the Oedipus myth (also, other myths including the Garden of Eden and the Tower of Babel) to a pervasive unconscious fantasy that links thinking and verbal communication to loss and destruction of good objects. In the myth, the Sphinx is a bizarre object, with the head of a woman and the body of a lion. She is unnatural, but also fiercely antinatural, using her mind to destroy others. She incites interest and curiosity, tantalizing Oedipus with a riddle regarding the nature of the human being. (What walks on four legs, then two legs, then three legs?) Unlike all who preceded him, Oedipus solves the riddle and seems to survive the challenge. The Sphinx responds furiously, fragmenting her own mind and self into bits. But Oedipus’ experience with this bizarre object damages his relational consciousness. The tragedy unfolds as he loses the ability to think about and recognize himself and others until it is too late. Actions taken by the therapist or another member to provoke consciousness – which often involves uncovering areas of intrapsychic and interpersonal disturbance and conflict – may become confused or conflated with actions taken perversely to provoke or create turmoil. Unlike the monstrous Sphinx, where thought was an explosive object with tragic consequences, in group, thought can be explosive with therapeutic outcome. A group member complained facetiously: ‘I didn’t want to come back; you guys are destroying me, taking away my hero, my Dad.’
Clinical examples: Therapist as bizarre object 1. A man established a habit of breaking into the group process to ask me questions, such as ‘What do you think, Rich?’ ‘What would you do?’ ‘You think so?’ At the end of a session he would launch into a topic he felt pressing and needing resolution. He insisted that I was being unfair and arrogant if I ended the session on time, particularly if I did not first say something to help
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him along until the next session. At first, other group members, while taken aback, also found him charming and they were curious whether and how I would answer him. They soon tired of his behavior, and joined in my efforts to call attention to his conduct and his possible underlying motivations. But these interventions only gave him a headache, and he often departed with another unanswered question: ‘Is therapy making things worse?’ The patient’s demanding need-to-know was actually -K, since it served to frustrate his innate capacity to function psychoanalytically and impeded his growth and development. He experienced thinking as a distracting symptom, an intolerable ache to understand and to be understood. The cause of the patient’s pain was, in part, the unavoidably frustrating nature of reaching insight, which he did not want to tolerate. Because I subjected him to the reality of the learning process, rather than solving (or dissolving) the necessity of learning, I became personified as a spitefully withholding analyst, one who had no good reason to hurt him. ‘Come on Richard, be human,’ he would taunt me. From his perspective, he had no choice but to rebel against the bizarre outbursts of my capricious will. 2. A new member presented herself in an abstruse, unrelated manner. She tended to analyze other members, and could not bring in spontaneous, much less irrational feelings. She shortly exasperated some of the members, who developed a range of hostile responses from rage to disregard. Their reactions initially served a valuable function of informing her how she could alienate her husband and children, and she was grateful and vowed to work on her difficulties. However, progress was quite slow, and I began interceding more frequently, in an effort to move her along and avoid unnecessary frustration and pain. It took a while to realize that she was responding quite negatively to my interventions, for she would smile and struggle to get to the point. I took it as a sign of progress when she began to protest that when I asked her how she felt, or made an interpretation, she found me to be critical, even purposefully humiliating. She reported my interventions, and soon my very presence made it difficult for her to think. ‘You change from Dr. Jekyll to Mr. Hyde!’ The group supported both of us in this situation, encouraging her to express these feelings, but also defending my curiosity as therapeutic and caring. The deepening group work, supplemented with occasional individual sessions, did not dissipate the force of her feeling interrogated, microscopically cross-examined, even tortured, by the mere expression of my interest. ‘You need to be controlled,’ she laughed, but also meant what she said. For
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several years I was constrained to look and listen sympathetically, and even in silence, I could be perceived as critical and disapproving.
Clinical example: Dream segment of group members as bizarre objects Sydney, the group member discussed above in the section on hating thinking, reported the following: ‘I have to tell the group this weird dream: Josette and David are sitting where they are now, across from me on the couch, and I have a violent argument with Josette. I’m afraid to say it, but I even cursed at her. David thought I was right, but he didn’t support me, and I was very hurt. Josette and David looked very strange; their heads and bodies were tilted away from each other, very much to the sides, as if they were pretzels.’ The dream replicated a familiar group dynamic that had played out the previous session. Sydney provoked Josette, setting off an escalating verbal battle, from which she finally withdrew. Typically, Sydney felt hurt and puzzled by the group’s lack of support. The visual dimension of the dream was new, however, and stimulated a range of interesting associations from other members: ‘You bend people in group out of shape, and then you react like it’s their fault.’ ‘Your world is out of Picasso. Everything is disjointed and doesn’t quite fit together, yet it is also kind of familiar, but it still is very unsettling to you.’ ‘You see other people as strangely tilting away from each other, and from you, twisted and brittle. You don’t really get people, but we’re really available; even Josette and David care and would bend for you if you would act different.’ ‘You have to become more flexible, think what you are doing; you don’t have to turn yourself or anybody else into a pretzel.’ Sydney did not offer his own associations to his dream, or take up and carry further the thoughts of other members. I had the sense that he felt bizarre in constructing the dream, and the relief was in dispersing its contents into the group and receiving positive attention in its place. Advancing his self/other consciousness was not a motivating or rewarding aspect of the experience. Possibly, Sydney misunderstood the group’s very insistence that he should think, rather than merely get assistance, as demanding, unempathic, and bizarre.
Transformations in hallucinosis Freud (1920) observed that ‘most of the unpleasure we experience is perceptual unpleasure’ (p.11). To momentarily avoid unpleasure, individuals may exhibit ‘transformations in hallucinosis’ (Bion 1965). The receptive
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apparatus, rather than receive and integrate unpleasant reality, may also work ‘in reverse,’ to disperse, eject, and misperceive reality. Other group members, particularly the therapist, serve as the basis for visual, auditory, olfactory, or tactile distortions, illusions, negative or positive hallucinations. For instance, when the therapist unsuspectingly turns away, or registers blankness or lack of interest, bodily and facial movements may convince the member of having been perceived as wrong, stupid, and bad. The individual then may relate to the group with a baffling attenuation of self-confidence and trust. Such ephemeral, imagistic interactions may have enduring negative consequences, unless brought forth, articulated, and worked through. Hallucinatory transformations are common and frequent, particularly in moments of stress, such as during interludes of intense transference or countertransference. Transformations may be subtle and difficult for the clinician to appraise, and since they may be transitory, simultaneous with normal perceptual processes, they may evade recognition. For example, I fortuitously pursued a group member’s assertion that she did not like me right now. She responded with a relieved smile: ‘Oh, I thought you said that you didn’t like me. It’s okay if I don’t like you. Now I like you.’ The exchange became a salutary model, as the woman realized that she often did not like people because she quite literally perceived them as not liking her. She resolved, in her words, ‘to take a second look.’ I consider whether group members are describing phenomenological and not metaphoric experience when they report: ‘I’m dreaming, this couldn’t be real,’ ‘My eyes are deceiving me!’ ‘I don’t believe my ears!’ ‘This feels strange!’ and ‘My memory is playing tricks on me!’ ‘Did you say that, or am I imagining it?’ ‘When you moved that way, I saw you getting ready to hit me.’ Just like immune responses, which can cause more pain and damage than the disease that they are trying to relieve, transformations in hallucinosis, like other defense maneuvers designed to evade unpleasure, can become more painful than the dreaded thought. Hallucinations may become quite disagreeable to the perceiver, and also to the receiver. The therapist may become anxious or confused in response to a member’s defensive anxiety and hallucinatory transformations of the relationship. In terms of countertransference, when uncertain or insecure, the group therapist may rigidly draw upon theory, and upon hallucinatory relationships with authority figures that represent theory (see Chapter 4, on entitled thinking). Grossman (1995) described an underlying hallucinatory level of mentation, connected to the analyst’s professional identification and affilia-
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tion: ‘The fact that theory (along with related ideas about technique) is psychologically related to authorities who represent it gives it a status analogous to shared daydreams’ (p.889). Like other group members, I am liable to misperceive or mishear, and I am comfortable asking an individual to repeat him or herself, to ascertain whether I experienced momentary hallucination. I find it useful on occasions to disclose my misperceptions for mutual analysis, or utilize them interpretively. For instance, when a patient took an unaccustomed seat in group, I was visually surprised to discover him occupying more of a physical space than my image of him suggested. I interpreted his action as his resolve to become a larger presence. At different times, I may ask individual members or even an entire group, whether they are angry, confused, anxious, happy, or unhappy with me, ‘or am I just hallucinating?’
Thinking and non-thinking in group life One measure of the vitality of the individual and the group is success in stimulating and supporting thinking and accepting interventions regarding anti-thinking. Thinking and anti-thinking describe psychological dimensions of the individual’s consciousness and unconsciousness, and of group’s structure, culture, and process. In the following description of a group session, I apply this seminal concept of the basic ambivalence about emotional thinking.
Case example: Working through anti-thinking, bizarreness, and hallucination A group with five members present began with Bob reporting a confusing incident with his wife. Newly pregnant, she told him at a restaurant to please remove the potato chips from her plate, as they were making her nauseous. This suddenly and perplexedly reminded him of his bossy ex-wife. Then she exclaimed: ‘I didn’t get the pickle I ordered!’ Should he have gotten the pickle for her? She was perfectly able to ask the waiter for a pickle, but if she wanted him to do it, she should have asked directly. He wondered if he had been overly picky, as if talking to his bossy mother as well as ex-wife. He knew he got angry too easily, and he hated that he was slipping into his old ways. Marge empathized with Bob: ‘Maybe you don’t want to read her signals, if she doesn’t read yours.’ She added that she used to feel deprived in her marriage when her husband would not read her signals, since she easily antici-
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pated and accommodated his needs. Bob pressed her: ‘Used to?’ Marge said, ‘Okay, I still feel deprived but I don’t want to think about that.’ Mike, a new member, marveled: ‘I can’t believe how you [Bob] think about relationships. I would have just gotten my wife the pickle, not thinking about what she was doing, how I was feeling, and what I wanted to do. I’m just beginning to think the way people do here, but I find it doesn’t last all week, and I need the shot that group provides.’ Bob thanked Mike for the feedback. He explained: ‘First you think in group, then you take group with you, and then you start thinking that way in your outside life. But when you don’t want to think, you can just put the group out of your mind and go back to business as usual.’ Marge reassured Mike that she was not that far ahead of him. Bob just showed how she still avoided thinking about what troubled her, and preferred to deny problems and put them in the past. Her thoughts remained with Bob: maybe his new wife wasn’t up to his level, and he needed to give her time to relate to him, and to herself. Or was she talking about her husband, and not Bob’s wife, letting him off the hook? Mike returned to the subject of how people in group explored relationships with each other, and also were able to explore their own minds. He reflected that he must have spent much of his life out of it, not looking too closely at how he felt, and maybe that was because he didn’t like how he felt and couldn’t do anything about it. His parents were very controlling, loving but controlling. As he elaborated on his parents, a vocal flatness, now familiar to the group, began to assert itself in his communication. With a new sense of self-awareness, Mike stopped: ‘I feel dead-ended. I can’t think any more about the subject. This is usually when I sound dead and people accuse me of not expressing any feelings. I better stop while I’m ahead.’ The other members present, Ann and Lela, had remained quiet, and I asked them about it. Lela claimed that she could not get involved in group tonight. She wasn’t sure what she was getting out of it. Marge, unexpectedly brave, said that Lela wasn’t putting anything into it. Lela agreed, but insisted that what the men were talking about didn’t apply to her. She was pretty certain about what was going on in her own mind. She was worried for Bob, and hoped his new marriage would work out, but what else could she say? The group had warned him not to rush into marriage, and she didn’t want to be an ‘I told you so.’ Ann echoed Lela, claiming that she also wanted the best for both men. She hoped that Mike would catch on soon and begin to get it, because the
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group certainly had drawn his attention to how he repeated himself and remained out of it. Bob objected, pointing out that Mike had been different in this very session. Marge then continued: Lela and Ann could say plenty if they put their minds to it. She had spoken up, and had gotten something back from Bob that she would have to think about and bring into her marriage. She felt abandoned by both women; they weren’t appreciating what she was doing, or what Mike and Bob were doing. I offered that Lela and Ann seemed to have a purpose in not participating. They were quick to notice what wasn’t changing, but not what was. Lela dryly acknowledged that we all sounded like her husband, who had the same complaints. ‘He says I don’t appreciate how much he is trying, and that I accuse him of not relating, but it is I who doesn’t relate to him.’ Ann said that she had the same husband. ‘My husband is right, I don’t want to relate to somebody who isn’t relating to me. But I’m not being impatient and critical now. I’m here, I’m listening, and I can see that Mike is really trying.’ Mike turned to the two women: ‘Ann has an open mind, I have a chance, but with you, Lela, it’s “no sale.”’ Lela got teary and frustrated with herself. ‘I can’t do it right. If I speak I’m too negative, and if I don’t speak I get accused of being withdrawn. I don’t mean “accused;” there I go again.’ I suggested that Lela was struggling with a critical mindset that was difficult to change. ‘I know, I know,’ she smiled, wearily, ‘it is my mother’s mindset. I never felt I was doing anything right.’ ‘You were no sale,’ I reflected, then returned to the question of the purpose of the two women’s silence, which I felt hadn’t been explored. Did they think the silence had an effect on the three members who were participating? ‘Of course,’ Lela responded, impatiently, ‘they didn’t like it. I know that, they told me. There I go again, being hostile and negative.’ Mike said that when they were quiet, it made him feel bad about himself and he didn’t feel encouraged to talk. Bob said that he could get very angry with Lela, and give up and withdraw. He still does that at home, but doesn’t want to do that here. Marge continued the theme of feeling hurt and abandoned, and deeply affected, again asked why the women would want to treat her that way, just when she was being different? While Lela and Ann did not directly answer Marge’s question, they respected the feedback, taking note of the effects of their behavior on the group.
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CASE DISCUSSION
The movement and contra-movement of the group and of the individual members and their subgroups may be understood through reference to the conflict regarding emotional thinking. To review briefly. The nonpsychotic part of the personality carries out the thinking. In therapy, this element acknowledges self and other, and struggles with the emotional realizations that follow from introspection and interpretations. Similarly, the work group (W) recognizes and carries out the verbal activity involved in the need to develop mentally, and copes with feedback and other forms of group activity. The W group remains interested in reality and emotionally processes the group leader’s interpretations. A caveat is in order: a ‘pure’ W group becomes hyper rational and sterile, and needs the input of primitive emotion and thought. The psychotic part of the personality defends against significance by attacking the mental linking processes by which we come to know and integrate our thoughts and feelings. Similarly, the basic assumption level represents that aspect of group life wherein individuals preclude, evacuate, or suppress developing thought and feeling, and collude to defeat making meaning and meaning-makers. Bob first articulated the intrapsychic conflict between thinking and anti-thinking, describing his difficulty maintaining reality-based thought and behavior in relation to his new wife. Who was his new wife, and how should he think about her? Relational thinking includes recognizing and utilizing transformations emanating from the psychotic parts of one’s personality. Bob grasped that he was capable of calling up illusion/hallucination of his ex-wife and mother that affected his thinking, and utilized his self-report to reclaim a reality relationship to his own mind. Marge realistically thought about Bob’s marriage, but retreated to illusion when considering hers. Bob playfully confronted her mental evasiveness when he quoted her: ‘Used to?’ He brought to her mind her current and not merely past feelings of marital deprivation, to which Marge frankly admitted. Here we see a mutually receptive, thought-advancing W subgroup in action. Mike joined this subgroup, appreciating the entire group’s role in inducing and supporting his budding emotional self-consciousness. Bob resonated with Mike’s need for group, conceding that he diminished thinking by avoiding thought of the group. Marge expanded on the theme of not wanting to think in group, such that she might forestall dealing with the unpleasant but ongoing realities of her marriage.
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Mike demonstrated progress in relational consciousness, as he reflected on how other group members use their minds. He abstracted from the here-and-now, to put forth a personally meaningful hypothesis of the there-and-then that connected his previous mental inactivity to painful childhood experiences of powerlessness. He monitored the vitality of these thoughts, noting the effects of his communications on other members (‘This is usually when I sound dead’). Ann and Lela personified the anti-thinking dimension of individual and group life, which seeks to a ‘superiority in potency of UN-learning’ (Bion 1962, p.98, his capitalization). Their loud silences sought to ‘undo connections and so to destroy things.’ As Marge stated, Lela was not putting any thought into her experience. She was however, putting in anti-thought, and like Ann, ‘minus-ing’ the reality of the productive group work. In effect, the two women were demonstrating the very anti-thinking characteristics they had projected into the others. The mind-controlling ‘mindset’ of the psychotic part strives to make others believe that, in thinking, they are not thinking, never doing anything right (see Chapter 4, on entitled thoughtcontrol). As a bizarre combined object, Lela-Ann dispensed negative hallucination, hurt, and abandonment, discouraging talk and relatedness, at those very moments when individuals were being different, thinking, and thinking about thinking. In terms of the theory of basic assumptions, Lela and Ann formed a fight/flight subgroup (baF/F). The W group – Foulkes’ ‘group matrix’ – tolerated identifying, thinking about, and learning from the women’s efforts to sabotage the reality of the members’ progress. Thus, the movement and contra-movement of the group, in which the conflict between thinking and anti-thinking, between the sophisticated and the primitive, was played out intrapsychically and also between individuals and subgroups, ultimately benefited all the members. As in the previous example involving the dream of a red dress, a group or subgroup colludes to avoid emotional thinking, but in deciding to think, each member articulately represents himself and his relationships with others.
CHAPTER 4
Entitled Thinking, Dream Thinking, and Group Process Nothing hurts like absence. Absence signifies the ‘no thing,’ an anxious thought, and a space for thought, confronting member and therapist alike with the conflict over thinking described in Chapter 3. Let us review developmental postulates and hypothetical sequences. First confronted with the painful experience of missing, such as in missing a needed good breast, the infant hallucinates a good breast. When hallucination fails to provide adequate gratification, the infant does not initially organize this experience as an absent good breast, but the infant experiences pain in the form of a hallucinatory ‘bad breast present.’ To reduce the pain, the infant may attempt to reinstitute the fantasy of a good breast present, or it may choose to evacuate the experience by muting, numbing or otherwise closing off sensory, affective and cognitive processes. The dawning moment of the realization of ‘no breast’ or ‘no thing’ is the beginning of object permanence. Object permanence involves recognizing absence of the object – the object exists but is elsewhere – and thus tolerating absence as an idea. The capacity to achieve negative realization is a crucial cognitive and emotional milestone. ‘Missing’ is not a bad breast present, but an idea of an absent good breast. ‘Something is missing’ is, then, the first abstract thought, the first foray into meaning-making and the discovery of truth. The reality of separation is tolerated and is named, or titled. What follows from this thought is the possibility of other abstract thoughts. The individual develops a maturing ‘capacity to be alone’ (Winnicott 1958), to think about experience. The external world, and eventually the internal world, begin to exist as a not known, a space to be mentally discovered and explored (Boris 1994; Eigen 1995a, 1995b). Thus, absence provides the opportunity for meaning. But making meaning – the process of discovery as the individual thinks through 89
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experience – repeatedly confronts the thinker with awareness of one’s powerlessness in controlling the realities of separation, and of ambivalence toward those from whom one is separate. The self faces the essential aloneness and temporality of the human condition, the limits of knowing, of being special, and of having one’s wants and needs met. In suffering meaning, the self is susceptible to experiencing the no breast, signifying absence, as the bad breast of unsignified pain. In these circumstances, even mature individuals may seek relief through the path of hallucination and illusion. As reviewed in Chapter 3, Bion described a psychotic part of the personality implied in Klein’s writings. This immature or narcissistic aspect of the self defends against full participation in the meaning-making process, and instead cultivates defenses to forestall, evade, distort, or attack thinking and thinkers. This chapter calls attention to entitlement, a type of narcissistic thinking and resultant interpersonal behavior prominent in the mental life of individuals and groups. Pained by absence, nonpossession, and nonbeing, the entitled individual, subgroup, or group lives out the fantasy of being able to possess as concrete objects thoughts and thinkers, rather than to think thoughts with thinkers. Entitlement essentially involves then, possessing the ‘right’ to choose how, if, and when to think, combined with the right to pass judgment on what the others are allowed to think. Stemming from the word ‘title,’ entitlement has its roots in the context of rank, as in giving someone a title and special rights over others, and in the context of a right to a possession, as in having a title to a property. Entitlement may be inhibited as well as exaggerated. In inhibited entitlement, the individual, subgroup, or group may feel without rights to think, feel, and express an independent point of view, or powerless to assert these rights, in a world of powerful, possessive others. Like exaggerated entitlement, inhibited entitlement avoids absence by maintaining a mental attitude of presence, but the location of presence remains in others. The right not to think and generate fresh meaning is disguised, played out in depression, self-effacement, passivity, and social and mental withdrawal. Still, an interpersonal element of influence and control persists in the subtle expectations and demands of those who overtly renounce independent thought and behavior and suffer quietly. In entitlement, ideas, memories, and feelings are conscripted and possessed on an ‘as need’ basis, mentally manipulated as though they were material possessions, rather than considered denotations of psychological objects, the latter referring to tentative and changeable objects of and for
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thought. In exaggerated entitlement, these inner and outer concretized mental objects are hoarded and utilized by the mental apparatus as the infant once utilized hallucinations, to supply what is missing, and dispersed when they fail to satisfy (Coen 1988; Ladan 1992; Shabad 1993; Stark 1994). In inhibited entitlement, the individual, subgroup, or group forcibly or willingly submits to such treatment, in effect, playing a reciprocal part in an intersubjective fantasy of possessor–possessed, master–slave, sage–fool, and so forth. Entitlement involves, then, intrapsychic and interpersonal maneuvers that work to define, reify, and control feelings, ideas, morality, and certain behaviors. Freud (1921) called attention to this entitled process when he described how individuals and groups might unify under the standard of an ideal, with a cost of impairment of intellectual functioning. Freud (1930) observed that groups give rise to ‘a narcissism of minor differences,’ in which the group attacks that which falls outside it. By entitling their own group as ideal, and projecting hate and badness outward, group members feel compensated for the wrongs they suffer and the sacrifices they must endure within their own unit.
Adaptive aspects of entitlement The omnipotent bending or even subverting of reality may serve adaptive functions. The utilization of entitled thinking may protect the individual from fear, anxiety, or despair. By protecting the individual from an initial, overwhelming shock, gradual acceptance of unavoidable pain may be allowed. Entitled thinking may foster healthy optimism, rather than pessimism. A sense of being special, and an exception from life’s harsh realities, makes the impossible, possible, the improbable, probable. It contributes to the joy of fantasy, potentially to problem solving, and to creativity in general. The capacity to gratify entitlements based on partly irrational but not essentially pathological fantasies and desires motivates assertive behavior, bestowing aliveness and zest for living. Entitled thinking, while irrational, may also serve healthy and normal functions, and has its place in each stage of individual and group development. What may be pathological in one stage may be appropriate in another. A socialization process in which one continues to feel special, meaning loved, accepted, and understood, assists in establishing a ‘balanced feeling between one’s own needs and the slowly dawning realization of the desires and rights as defined by others’ (Dorn 1988, p.25). The confident toddler, child, or adult
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continues to express many needs and wants, but with an ever greater appreciation of the reality of the separate existence of others who have equal rights to feel, think, express, and expect.
The perception of the group therapist’s counterentitlement Shakespeare’s Richard III, whom Freud (1916) considered the embodiment of pathological entitlement, took particular pleasure in the interactional process of taking over Anne’s mind, not in seducing Anne herself, whom he promptly discarded upon marrying. Richard revels: ‘Ha! Hath she forgot already that brave prince,/Edward, her lord, whom I some three months since,/Stabbed… Upon my life, she finds…/Myself to be a marvellous proper [i.e. handsome] man’ (Richard III, Act I, Scene ii). An unfortunate fate of seduction and abandonment may await the group therapist whose mind and actions are overwhelmed by group members’ exaggerated and inhibited entitlements, or one’s own. It may seem to be a curious imaginative stretch to place the empathically inclined, dedicated group therapist in the clinical domain of such characters as the villainous Richard III, and to place patients in the role of Richard’s victims. I contend that group members (and supervisees, as in the example below) frequently make this unconscious association, experiencing their therapists as grasping for power and mental control, insisting on their way, and seeking revenge when thwarted or feeling constrained. This assessment of the group therapist’s thinking and unconscious, or even conscious, motivations may press upon members’ awareness precisely when the therapist approaches their entitlements. It is a given that the therapist and patient each have a view of what constitutes legitimate – or illegitimate – entitlements to certain ways of thinking and behaving. But neither view is necessarily invalid, or even transference dominated. Thus, the members’ or entire group’s reaction, while having a defensive aspect, also may be a thoughtful criticism of the therapist’s technical as well as personal contributions to the interactions. This understanding differs from traditional conceptualizations about entitlement, which emphasize narcissistic thinking and relational configurations of the patient, while neglecting the therapist’s dynamics and contribution to the interaction. To remind the reader, the basic premise of the relational approach is that clinical data are mutually generated, co-determined by the organizing activities of all participants in the reciprocally interacting subjective worlds of the group. Hence, it is important to consider contributing
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subjective factors of the group therapist, such as authoritarian and regressive tendencies, the bias of one’s diagnostic and technical orientation, as well as of countertransference, on what is perceived to be pathological entitlement, and the group therapist’s level of tolerance for perceived entitled thinking and behaviors in others. In some instances, there can be a conflict between values concerning entitlement, quite apart from transference and countertransference per se. Clarifying the difference in values may sometimes relieve impasses and stalemates in treatment or in supervision.
Clinical example: Entitlement controversy in supervision I discovered that a new supervisee, in her expressed desire to be fair and considerate of her group’s wishes, functioned as a bookkeeper-therapist. In addition to telephoning insurance companies and advocating for her patients, and filling out their many forms, she had developed an intricate system of exclusion of payment of fees. Each member was entitled to three weeks’ vacation plus no charge for legitimate absences, including illness, last-minute childcare, open school night, and so forth. This accord also necessitated extensive phone contact, as each patient’s monthly absences had to be discussed and accounted for. On questioning the therapist, I found that her arrangement bothered me but not her, and I wondered to myself what she was getting out of the bargain. Later, in attempting to return a telephone call from the therapist, I reached her answering machine, which conveyed an urgency regarding when and where she could be reached. The message ended with: ‘I will make every effort to return your call within the next two hours, and certainly within twenty-four hours.’ It seemed that the therapist bargained to establish an elaborate and quite defined relationship with each patient, who was to be treated as very special. Whereas the therapist’s manifest motives involved accommodation, in my opinion, they were directed, perhaps unconsciously, to preoccupy and control her mind and the minds of her patients. I could rarely break into the supervisee’s thinking, which I often found to be rigid and out of touch with the realities of sensible clinical practice. I suspected that she found my thinking equally untrustworthy, and for this reason, attempted to numb my mind by presenting her work in such detail that I had difficulty concentrating. I developed a fantasy that she was in supervision to supervise me, which I utilized by directly asking her for guidance. I said I felt not particularly useful to her; could she define an area of dialogue where my input would be of some value?
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She seemed taken aback, perhaps wounded by my request, which made me feel that I had gone too far. Was it what I said or my delivery? I wondered to myself. But then, she laughed, ‘I guess you’re saying I’m not letting you in.’ We entered on our first genuine discussion – a moment of mutual recognition – in which she acknowledged her fear of me, of what I valued in a group therapy, and of my taking her over and controlling her way of doing group.
Interacting dynamics of power, entitlement, and counterentitlement The group therapist’s appropriate expressions of power, to which he or she is legitimately entitled by the nature of the psychotherapeutic situation, are not always easily segregated from the irrational entitlements that relate to one’s anxieties in bearing feelings of power as well as of powerlessness (see Chapter 2). Freud (1916) himself implied a symmetry between patient and analyst when he candidly acknowledged the universality of entitlement: ‘We all demand reparation for early wounds to our narcissism, our self-love’ (p.315). When asserting professional prerogatives, as in intervening in the individual work to suggest group, analyzing resistances to group, making group interpretations, or remaining silent, the analyst may be influenced both by a realistic consideration of technique and by irrational attitudes of restricted and exaggerated entitlement.
Extended case example: ‘Monstrous’ entitlement Ralph, a member who quickly established himself as ‘co-leader’ of a group of a year’s duration, regularly brought from the waiting room a red chair, which he placed directly across from the therapist. His self-described ‘bad back’ made him an exception from the other members who sat on a semicircular beige sectional sofa. Like Ralph, other members had special problems that demanded sympathy rather than insight. One woman talked considerably about her family’s medical ailments; another obsessed about finding a mate; a third, recently remarried, remained unreassuringly ‘depressed.’ A fourth missed sessions when ‘too upset’ by her husband, but the group cooperatively brought her up to date. The fifth referred frequently to his ‘private psychoanalysis,’ a tantalizing but ignored reference to his special relationship with the therapist. Two silent members had special excuses: a graduate student professed excessive youth, whereas an isolated man claimed social inexperience.
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The therapist, bringing this situation to my supervision, felt unable to assert her influence. She felt she had created a Frankenstein monster: a twelve-step selfhelp program rather than a psychoanalytic therapy group. When the therapist tentatively attempted a discussion of a person, rather than of a person’s problems, she was met with confusion, protestation, or silence. She took the group’s reactions as a communication that she was being premature in her interventions, and would become inactive. The therapist’s reference to Frankenstein reminded me of Freud’s (1916) evocation of Richard III. Freud formulated that in Shakespeare’s drama, the protagonist’s physical deformity motivated and provided the rationalization for his monstrous behavior. He took compensation in following the pleasure rather than the reality principle in thought and behavior, irrespective of the negative consequences to himself as well as others. Jacobson (1959), in elaborating on Freud’s study, emphasized that Richard III, and individuals like him, in striving to be an exception, pursue a ‘revengeful wish for power’ (p.138), linked to ‘archaic, narcissistic destructive’ strivings (p.137). For Richard, his goal was the kingdom, symbolically, the paternal penis, and on a deeper level, maternal love and acceptance. I had the sense that each member, no matter how unhappy and masochistic, secretly strove to be king. Like Ralph, the ‘co-leader’ with the bad back, each was deformed with special problems that excused the necessity of responsive psychological functioning. I hypothesized that traumatic early experiences of psychic damage, rejection, and victimization were likewise left unsymbolized in language, leading to the symptomatic special problems which, like all symptoms, hide, displace, and discharge anxiety. The members collusively took turns being exceptions, compensating for underlying feelings of impotence with exaggerated entitlement claims. My technique of supervision is to invite, when appropriate and without trespassing on the therapist’s boundaries, consideration of the therapist’s countertransference, and of the supervisory relationship (Gediman and Wolkenfeld 1980; Lester and Robertson 1995). The therapist reported going crazy sitting in the group. Thoughts of murdering Ralph provided scant consolation for excruciating feelings of frustration. She also felt guilty for such reactions, and wondered about her professional competence and psychological balance. I commiserated and, with some irony, said that the group had become her ‘special problem.’ She seemed victimized by the members and did not exercise her professional entitlement to lead the group. She listened intently to what I
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had to say, but seemed unrelieved. Perhaps she was merely uncomfortable with group process, she wondered. She protested, apologetically, that my formulations seemed harsh and judgmental. She felt protective of her patients, and wanted me to help her help them. Because we were involved in supervision, and not in therapy, where I would have greater access to unconscious processes, I generally acceded to her manifest wish, and would work with her on patient and group dynamics, rather than on what might be transpiring dynamically in the supervision. I acknowledged that it was quite possible that I was unduly critical of the therapist’s technique and rejecting of her group’s level of development. Did I need her to conform to my ideas? I wondered to myself. Whereas I like to believe I democratically raise pragmatic possibilities, it is likely that I also convey autocratic expectations. In time we understood that our relational patterns had parallels in group. Although the members portrayed themselves as needy and helpless, each maintained preemptive power. Having special problems had distinct advantages over solving them. The exaggerated sense of being life’s victims camouflaged and provided the rationalization for an entitled refusal to think psychologically (see Chapter 3). Similarly, in the supervisory relationship, the troubled therapist, ostensibly the ‘needy’ one lacking in knowledge, attempted to control how we were to relate to each other. Unlike what occurred in her group, however, we struggled to put some of our uncomfortable experience with each other into words. I suggested that were she to encourage this type of interaction, she might find the group more interesting to her. ‘Why should the group have to be interesting to the therapist?’ she challenged. My comment revealed her suspicion that I believed groups existed solely for the narcissistic pleasure of the therapist. Her response seemed literal and moralistic, a state of mind quite similar to her group’s. I asked what I might be unleashing should she ever feel free to express what interested her. She suspected a ‘powerful monster’ existed inside her who wanted the group to function according to her image. Perhaps worse than having these feelings, I suggested, was evading knowledge about them. Maybe everyone has such a monster inside. She said she wished she could be more accepting of her monster, as I seemed to be of mine. I suggested that she did not believe anyone could accept even knowing about her monster, not herself, not me, certainly not the group.
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She had difficulty tolerating certain entitled feelings and fantasies and initially had attributed them to me. As she became confident in reflecting on the idea of entitlement, mine, and then her own, she began to foster a similar analysis in group. She reported with a combination of delight and anxiety that when she stayed steadfast in her interventions, the group accused her of personality deficits of dominance, selfcenteredness, and hypercriticality, similar to what she suspected in me. Ralph had initiated the expression of the group’s rising indignation: ‘I’m beginning to get angry. Are you happy now? Why do you want to find trouble? We support each other and don’t attack like people do on the outside.’ The group agreed that something had gotten into the therapist; she seemed bossy and not agreeable. One member’s challenge to the group’s moral condemnation brought unintended but relieving laughter: ‘This is her group, and she has the right to tell us what to do, even when we don’t like it.’ We may note a pattern that often eventuates in analyzing entitlement. The therapist’s critical assertions regarding the group’s entitlements were met with escalating counter-assertions regarding the therapist’s personality. Although accusatory and partially in the service of discharging tension, they were not necessarily inaccurate. The therapist was ‘happy’ to unfold the troubling anger that had been suppressed in group. The supervisory experience had ‘gotten into’ the therapist. Finally, she had expressed a ‘right’ to opine what her group should do. It would not be easy to resolve with certainty when her interventions represented a legitimate entitlement to professional power, a demand to be obeyed, or both. But the goal here is tolerating uncertainty regarding entitlement, and not ignoring or submitting passively to it. Left undisturbed, entitlement may grow into a Frankenstein monster. With patience and skill, one may lure entitlement into a meaningful dialogue, mitigating its destructive power, redirecting it towards constructive aims. From my point of view, the therapist needed to go further in asserting therapeutic power, sustaining the exploration of the group’s ambivalent feelings and the fantasies behind them. But a psychological dialogue had begun, although often in an intimidating vocabulary of the group’s indignation and initial condemnation. A propitious moment occurred when the group monster relieved itself of its ‘head.’ With the encouragement of the therapist’s skillful interventions, the members dethroned Ralph. He now resides on the couch with the others.
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The therapist’s vulnerability to entitlement Many aspects of the therapeutic relationship suggest the group therapist’s vulnerability to irrational entitlement. Traditionally, he or she is the special one with exceptional power and moral authority. As Michels (1988) has emphasized, the asymmetric nature of the therapeutic situation tends to promulgate the therapist’s rights over the patients’. ‘Both metaphorically and actually the therapist sits in the most comfortable seat, controls the time and place of meeting, receives payment, and is protected from discomfort’ (p.55). Michels took for granted that the therapist sits in the seat of the expert and is legitimately entitled to protection from discomfort. I have been suggesting the opposite. The therapist is affected by irrational emotional involvement (Renik 1996), anxiety, defensiveness, and discomfiting ignorance, all of which may contribute to as well as interfere with successful group treatment. At times, the therapist may be unwilling or unable to tolerate not being special, feeling his or her expertise rejected or ineffective. An anxiety situation may evolve in which the therapist’s primary experience is of the patient or group malignantly not caring about or understanding clinical ministrations, and perversely blocking the therapist’s efforts to love and to be loved. This was indeed the situation that Freud (1916) described. The ‘exception’ was the individual unresponsive to the analyst’s insights, ‘one of the components of love’ (p.312). Freud did not consider that the clinician, feeling unjustly deprived of love and narcissistically wounded, may respond to the patient’s perceived entitlements by drawing upon entitled attitudes of his or her own. Instead of mentally processing subjective pain, the therapist may resort to entitled signification, i.e. formulaic thinking, illusion, and fixed patterns of clinical behavior. Schwaber (1996, p.10), discussing the analyst’s predilection to draw upon theory when vulnerable or uncertain, made reference to an apposite quotation from Bertrand Russell: ‘[T]here is a tendency to use ‘truth’ with a big T in the grand sense, as something noble and splendid and worthy of adoration. This gets people into a frame of mind in which they become unable to think’ (Russell 1927, p.265). Rather than think, the group therapist may maintain an adoring relationship to ‘Truth.’ The therapist’s inner objects, the teachers, supervisors, and therapists who have contributed to his or her expertise and sense of professional self, may personify Truth.
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The group therapist’s involvement with and preference for his or her own inner objects would limit his or her availability to the patient, and also limit the patient’s availability to the therapist. Hence, the therapist’s tendency towards entitled thinking would contribute to his or her own pain, to the sense of abandonment, guilt, and persecution which, we have decided, are aspects of the therapist’s relationship to the separateness of the group members and the group. An authentic clinical experience entails the group therapist thinking thoughts about non-material others. Individuals cannot be captured, only momentarily contained in the therapist’s here-and-now formulations. Entitled signification spares the group therapist from the experience of thinking about the ‘no thing’ other. Any idea or set of ideas may be treated as if it were an object, an immutable fact, possessed, held on to and adored, or hated and rejected, rather than treated as a ‘no thing,’ an idea named, from which, by disengagement, may lead to further thought and creative work. The group therapist manifests entitled thinking and signification when the group members’ independent thoughts and feelings are translated into fixated ideas of transference, defense, and basic assumptions. For instance, a therapist who attends exclusively to transference or whole-group dynamics may fail to relate authentically to the members, or to appreciate the reality-based dimensions of the patients’ response to the therapist and to each other. The clinician’s tendencies to entitled thinking may play a significant role in assessing whether a member’s perceived entitlements are appropriate or inappropriate, intractable or workable, and contribute to the negative therapeutic reaction often reported in the literature on the difficult group patient. In the following two case examples, a member’s dream provides an impetus to advance group process, analyze individual and intragroup transferences, and confront entitled thought processes and attitudes in the group members, including the therapist. I use myself as an example of a clinician who initially believed he was behaving in a balanced, professional manner, inferring and analyzing entitled thinking apparent in the individual’s and group’s fantasies, symbolism and behavior. In response to these efforts, others revealed that they believed that I, and not necessarily they, harbored unconstructive entitlements. I tried to understand and reevaluate the emotional as well as theoretical basis of my decision-making, to identify my own tendencies towards entitlement influencing my clinical reality, and
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distinguish my thinking and feeling from my perception of the group’s, and to appreciate the mutual impact of our interaction.
Two case examples: Entitled thinking, dream thinking, and group process Case 1: Being ‘at home’ in group Session 1. Catherine, a member of a group of five years’ duration, commented early in one session that she did not feel ‘at home.’ Individual sessions were special because she felt free to be herself. George reported an opposite feeling. He feared acting ‘at home’ in group would mean behaving like a ‘selfish pig,’ putting his feet up on the furniture, eating junk food and making a mess. Another woman turned to me: ‘Do most people feel comfortable in your groups?’ The question implied that she too did not feel comfortable, and at this point I joined the growing ranks of uncomfortable members. For I regularly enjoyed the group and was taken aback by the ostensible dissatisfaction among some of the members. Also, I found unsettling the reference to groups as my possessions, and I inquired whether others agreed that this group was ‘mine.’ Many did agree: ‘I call it “the group,” but it is your group.’ ‘It is my group, but it is your group because you’re the exalted leader.’ ‘We’re spokes in the wheel, but it is your wheel.’ ‘And what kind of wheel is it?’ I asked. Previously unarticulated beliefs about the group culture emerged: not a place for light stuff, humor, play, or good news, which should be talked about before or after the sessions; one has to maintain an image; the spotlight is hot and harsh, and you have to be strong enough to take it without feeling stupid, and you might feel stupid the next time; get what you need in group and get out of the focus as soon as possible; other people may have a greater need, so don’t take up too much space; if you talk one week, you shouldn’t talk too much the next; everybody judges me, although I don’t judge anybody else. The participants moved away from group experience to exploration of their histories in families of origin. No one described a comfortable childhood; rather, many members related feelings of childhood anxiety and inhibition, and humiliation from parents when in the center of attention. At one point I involved Molly, who typically remained withdrawn. She immediately began to cry, explaining that her eyelid had swelled the day before and it was red and sore. ‘My eye is so ugly I don’t want anyone looking at me.’ People consoled her as she began to cry, reassuring her that her
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difficulty was hardly noticeable. Then Sarah turned angrily to me, declaring that Molly was interfering with the group process and taking unfair attention by making everyone feel sorry for her. Now everyone felt uncomfortable. Sarah’s self-righteous anger cowed the group, although indeed she was making a valid observation. I attempted to reengage the members without taking sides or becoming a peacemaker. I professed surprise that no one besides Sarah was angry at someone for breaking the rule about taking too much attention. I playfully stated that, as everyone was silent, Molly was not alone in fearing exposing an ugly I (‘ugly eye’). My comments seemed to free members to acknowledge fears of self-exposure, and then to explore their modes of seeking reparation from others by getting attention. Kevin admitted that like Molly, he tried to send ‘come and find me’ messages to group, but that he would be afraid to attract Sarah’s temper to himself. Sarah said she had to remain angry and vigilant, or else she would be ignored everywhere. George, who often was accused of rambling and remaining unfocused, said that he enjoyed being piggish in group, making a mess when he spoke and taking in all that negative attention. Molly had become quiet again, and Catherine returned to her theme that initiated the work of the session: ‘I don’t feel comfortable when you’re so involved with your hurts. I feel manipulated into being sympathetic.’ Molly began to swell up and I became alert to the probability of another round of tears and recrimination. But Catherine continued, reassuring Molly that this was her problem of taking care of everyone but herself. She needed to separate and not worry so much. Molly wasn’t her mother and even if she were, tough! It wasn’t Catherine’s fault that her mother married her father, and it wasn’t Catherine’s responsibility to make Molly happy, although she would like to. Whoops, was she doing it again? The next session. Molly began: ‘Before I lose my courage, I want to tell a dream. There was an office room, empty, dark, no windows, broken furniture, and a pillow by the wall. I entered the room, feeling very alone and scared, and sat by the pillow. Richard comes in, there is a bright glow of light. I get up and then the other group members enter the room and we start talking. The room had become a large banquet hall, with shiny wooden floors, and huge windows, which overlooked a cliff, with waves pounding below. We are all sitting around a table feasting on healthy fruits and veggies. And oh, the windows are open and sheer curtains are billowing in the breeze.’
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In responding to the dream, the members related my destroyed office to fear of Sarah’s anger in the prior session, my banquet-hall office to Molly’s wish to be fed, and the bright flow of light and the ‘billowing’ (a reference to my surname) curtain to my ‘sheer’ presence. I was Molly’s maternal provider as well as romantic protector. In the previous session, the members described themselves as spokes in my wheel. Now I was the bright light. Had I unintentionally been attaching members to me, rather than ‘bridging’ (Ormont 1992) members to each other? Could I not withstand absence and the uncertainties of human connectedness? I had worked with each member individually and indeed, members were connected in special ways to me and I to them. Was I insisting on being the most special, a light that blinded members from attributing ‘my group’s’ harshly judgmental qualities to me? Was I like the jealous primal father Freud (1913) described in Totem and Taboo, keeping the woman all to myself ? To foster the consideration of my possible contribution to the destructive havoc described in Molly’s dream, I inquired skeptically: ‘If I’m so powerful and protective, why are people afraid?’ The answers to the question revealed fantasies of a therapist whose patients existed to please him: ‘You are so powerful, that’s why I have to be careful not to get you angry.’ ‘We have to perform for you, so you’ll like us.’ ‘I’m afraid you’ll stop caring for me.’ ‘You know so much, you could make me look like a fool any time you wanted.’ ‘Are you going to punish us for saying these bad things about you?’ Far from my identity as the light, I materialized as a seductive, vengeful perpetrator of the culture of ever-looming humiliation and abandonment. I stood for all the self-centered parents who preferred to extract rather than give special attention. The members had feared exposing the ugly truth of these realizations, and their hurt and anger. The havoc that Molly imagined existing in my absence was inspired by my presence. The members could not live without me or with me. Deprived of needed psychological attention, members developed pathological modes of self-exposure and assertion, for example, by being helpless and hopeless (Molly), self-righteously rageful (Sarah), ‘piggish,’ and so on. Reflecting on my own anxieties and possible entitled thinking and behavior deprived me of the illusory comfort that goes along with the certainty that one’s therapeutic efforts are effective. The group and I did not come to immediate or full understanding of the ongoing dynamics of exaggerated and inhibited entitlement, or of our relative contributions to the intersubjective
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entitlement matrix. To reach certainty would be illusory, and simply another manifestation of entitled signification. However, I can report that these free-flowing discussions produced insight, diminished resistances, and increased bonding among members (see Chapter 7), including member– therapist relationships.
Case 2: Ambiguity in distinguishing transference illusions from countertransference projections Anna, a professional actress, reported to a group of eight years’ duration the difficulty her husband and family suffer when she volunteers for an arduous, but enjoyable, series of special Christmas theatrical performances. Should she accept an offer? She is getting older and will not have many more years. A person playfully commented: ‘You never seemed to care about your husband or his feelings before.’ Anna laughed. ‘I know, this isn’t me talking, but “Anita,” my evil twin.’ Another member advised Anna to acknowledge how difficult her holiday schedule is for all of them. They could decide as a family. Anna found this and succeeding remarks helpful and, without a pause, reported a dream. In the dream, Anna was supervising a group of nine or ten schoolchildren who are supposed to stand on a white line. (There are ten group members.) It was not apparent how the dream related to her current concerns, and she added no associations, instead looking expectantly toward the members. I had the impression that she had completed a magnificent performance and anticipated adoring appreciation. Instead of applause, however, one by one members came forth with supportive, if stilted, dream interpretations. The comments neglected what I experienced to be the salient element, her entitlement to control the mind and behavior of others. Anna’s mother was a schoolteacher and an authoritarian at home who demanded obedience. Anna felt her husband to be like her mother in her marriage, and felt me to be like her mother in group. She felt victim, not victimizer. I often attempted to show her how she played out both identifications and that she, not I, was like her controlling mother. I then took my interpretive turn, proposing that the group was living out Anna’s dream in obediently standing on the white line of therapeutic niceness. The members supplied the well-behaved interpretations I was supposed to provide. From my perspective, the group had consumed projective identifica-
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tions of Anna the victim, and adhered to the command of Anna the schoolteacher: ‘Behave and stay in your place.’ Anna often chafed angrily at my attempts at unraveling her complex of identifications and rebelliousness regarding controlling figures, and would insist that I was demonstrating only my similarity to her critical mother. But this exchange ended differently. Rather than becoming wounded and indignant, Anna turned to me with a playful smile: ‘You mean, I’m being bad again.’ I smiled back: ‘I guess so.’ ‘My evil twin, Anita,’ she continued. I commented that I thought Anita was the one who expressed interest in the thoughts and feelings of others. Wasn’t I talking to Anita now? Because this person seemed interested in what I had to say. I thought the group would feel relieved and encouraged, as I did. I had concluded that Anna’s initial presentation regarding her holiday schedule and dream, although expressed in articulate language, was a method of enacting influence and control so as to receive special attention. She signaled a shift to self-reflective processes in the Anna/Anita metaphor. The healing process was signaled in her willingness to express her split self-representations in language and to think about the response from another, even if not entirely agreeable to her. I was surprised when other individuals retrieved the flag of Anna’s indignant reactivity, which mercifully she seemed to have discarded. One member said, ‘I don’t think Anna is evil. How could you say that.’ Another: ‘You’re chastising us. You want us to stand on your white line. We’re not standing on what you said was Anna’s.’ When a member exclaimed: ‘We’re not bad, and I resent being told I sound like a therapist,’ I could not resist humor: ‘That is worse than being evil!’ I was attempting to reassure members that I could withstand aggressive attacks and also, I was offering an opportunity to evaluate me in a fairer, more realistic manner. The members had disregarded reality in attributing to me, rather than to Anna herself, the references to evil and bad. ‘We’re not bad,’ an individual had exclaimed, signifying the group’s identification with victimized Anna and implying I had accused them, which I had not. Several members clarified who actually said evil and bad, which I understood as a return to reality and my revival as a positive figure. I now felt confident to inquire why people were protecting Anna, who seemed not to need protection. My remark freed members of lingering protective feelings toward me, however: ‘Oh! He’s starting again.’ ‘You’re supposed to be sympathetic and not attacking!’
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Why were members defending the old Anna and resisting change? Apparently, some individuals wanted to use the occasion of therapeutic progress to express, with conspicuous enjoyment, my deleterious effects on them, past and present. ‘I don’t like it when you call us names.’ ‘I’ll never forget some of the things you’ve said to me.’ ‘I hate it when you’re sarcastic.’ ‘I like it when he makes fun, except when it is directed at me, then it hurts.’ Was the group, caught in Anna’s projective identifications, dreaming me up? I felt like the sorcerer’s apprentice, in Disney’s movie, Fantasia, pursued by splitting and multiplying persecuting brooms with their murderous buckets full of water. I was drowning in guilt. More and more Annas in the group, each one demanding me to behave and get in line. The dissonance remained between my sense of myself as a courageous leader, and the group’s sense of me as a combined sadistic dictator-misbehaving child. I had to consider that perhaps I had been dreaming that I was good and not a bad analyst (Epstein 1987). Had I grasped onto a moralistic theory of what the group needed, that is, the truth according to me? That would mean that my motivation had been not to name the group’s anxiety, manifested in the paranoid submissiveness to Anna, but that I had camouflaged my envy of Anna’s special attention, and my wish to dominate and control her, along with the other members of the group. I responded with: ‘The messenger has been chastised. But what of my message concerning your feelings towards Anna?’ This invited a discussion of Anna’s progress, without a hint that she was or remained a fearsome character. ‘I guess I’m cured then, huh?’ she volunteered. Her playful sarcasm confirmed that we understood that she was not cured totally. Anna alone seemed comfortable with my message of her ambivalent attachment to her exaggerated entitlement, that is, that she was both Anna and Anita. Following her lead, a subgroup of members timorously acknowledged that in the past they had taken special care in what they said to her, and how they said it. I attempted to explore current fear: ‘People are stuck in Anna’s dream.’ I was concerned that my intervention, rather than reveal unacknowledged group process, would set off a new round of resentful accusations. Did I need to have members fulfill the analytic dictum, ‘put it into words?’ I might have better appreciated the group’s ebb and flow, the slow working through. Again, I suspected myself of counter entitlement, that I was putting in their faces my exceptional prescience, demanding stroking, and compensation for the group’s mistreatment. But then, an interlude of silence, which I took to be reparative, convinced me that the group finally appreciated my
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interventions. It also occurred to me that my perception might be wish, a hallucinatory daydream of my own, and not fact. The reality is not certain. By placating Anna and challenging me, the group forestalled her need for retaliation. I was a safer, if not stronger, target than she. According to this version, rather than my protecting the group, the members had been protecting me from her, and also protecting me from the reality that I was less powerful than I thought, and less powerful than they wished. DISCUSSION OF THE TWO CASES
Traditionally, the patient’s images and dream images of the therapist have been presumed to include mainly transference projections and distortions, such as those involved in basic assumptions. We see in two cases, however, how the patients’ group dreams as well as ongoing group verbalizations, convey valid and important information regarding the reality of the clinician’s presence and its effect on the therapeutic process. It was useful and important to subject my ‘motivations and dynamics to scrutiny and so…[permit] a reciprocal process of growth and learning’ (Skynner 1984, p.216, his emphasis). In these two case examples, I sought to introduce ambiguity, to bring to group attention the interaction between the different perceptions of and reactions to entitlement. Together we evaluated how the expressions of control and domination might be the therapist’s, the patients’, at times jointly created ‘at the interface of reciprocally interacting subjectivities’ (Stolorow and Atwood 1992, p.1). The groups and I often disagree on the positive or negative quality of entitlement, and on its location, in them or in me. I cannot conclude my formulations are correct, and the groups’ are not. Moreover, who is correct or more correct is less important and therapeutically useful than the open-ended discussion. Clinical certainty or objective truth remains a ‘no thing.’ Pathological entitlement involves not tolerating ambiguity and genuine differences in feeling and point of view, combined with the right to control what other people must think about. In promoting the understanding of all types of entitlement, normal, inhibited and exaggerated, the clinician modifies entitled thinking and behavior, by thinking about them. Notice that when analyzing entitlement, individuals are often more than willing to turn attention from themselves to their therapist, who may become a focus of intense, often discomfiting mutual scrutiny. Self-evaluation is par-
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ticularly difficult in those moments when addressing others’ perceived entitlements. People feel entitled to their entitlement, and frequently feel defensive when it is challenged. As a mechanism of defense, entitlement may be protectively maintained, denied, or disowned, and also projected to make the leader feel entitled. In addition to projecting, group members also may make accurate forays into the therapist’s patterns of entitled signification, as revealed in his or her interpretive theories, techniques, and personality. Thus, group members may function as bad-objects-present for projecting entitlement and for stirring up the therapist’s pathologically entitled inner objects. The therapist may relive his or her personal history of subjugation to, rebellion against, and identification with mind-controlling figures. At these times, the therapist may move from productive thinking to illusion and hallucination, and come to feel guilty as charged, an embodiment of what is negative in human entitlement. Thus, at his or her own entitlement set point, when the process gets too painful, the clinician may lose a capacity to tolerate ambiguity as well as negative self-representations. He or she may insist that, like the students in Anna’s dream, the bad get in line and become good. The therapist may subvert temporarily the constructive but personally painful group process, contributing to troublesome entitlement while attempting to analyze it.
The therapy of entitlement: Two theories of entitlement, and common sense The therapist cannot always be sure when interventions constitute effective therapy, and to what extent they may escalate a battle between entitlements. In the clinical literature, there are two differing standpoints on treating entitled thinking and behavior, involving frustration versus gratification of the patient (Blechner 1987). The first perspective utilizes the interpretive technique originally promulgated by Freud (1916), in which the therapist maintains traditional psychoanalytic boundaries and analyzes the dynamic genetic roots of entitlement. Michels (1988), for example, advised ‘not to placate or mollify the patient by gratifications that grow out of a desire to dilute the patient’s resentment and disappointment or bribe him into pseudo compliance…[the therapist must interpret] resistances to expressing, or even experiencing, the frustration of the treatment’ (p.56). The second perspective utilizes the accommodative technique, exemplified by Winnicott and Kohut. Viewing entitlement as expressions of need, the therapist adopts a holding environment such that the underlying desire, aim
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and object of entitlement may be discovered and experienced without subjecting the patient to excessive frustrations involved in interpretive activity (Bromberg 1986). In practice, each clinician finds his or her own compromise between interpretation and accommodation, a compromise, I submit, partially predetermined by subjective factors in the therapist and hence influenced by the therapist’s tendencies towards and reactions against various forms of entitlement. Additionally, the therapist may avail him or herself of common sense. Bion (1970) called attention to a process whereby we sharpen our view of reality by considering contrasting modes of experience, such as love and hate, or presence and absence, and he named it common sense. In treating perceived entitlement, the analyst needs to tolerate a creative tension, even antagonism, which results from maintaining in thought two conflicting treatment potentials. Each approach provides its own legitimate rationales. But each provides as well material for entitled thinking and behavior, represented by premature certainty, hallucination, and compensatory enactments. To counter feelings of submissiveness in the face of what is experienced as the patients’ anti-representational attitudes, the clinician may intrude upon the group members’ psychic readiness, thoughtlessly disregarding intersubjective reality. Alternatively, in submitting to pressures for accommodation, the group therapist may collude in circumventing reality and creating an illusion of peaceful coexistence (Ladan 1992). The therapist thereby reinforces concealed dyadic bonds to individual members (Halton 1999). Not analyzing entitled thought and behavior may be a narcissistic defense rather than a necessary technique, indicating the group therapist’s mental evasiveness. Thus, analyzing or not analyzing may variously signify the clinician’s defenses against thinking, in particular, defenses against thinking about entitlement. The group therapist may achieve greater freedom to participate in a lively, appreciative, even humorous manner, when he or she owns personal entitlements as part of the ongoing action. This entails the group therapist accepting that, like other members, he or she needs to feel and to be treated as special, and that when threatened, characteristic defense patterns are likely to emerge in the interaction. The group members may quite accurately perceive aspects of the therapist’s psychology of entitlement, and may use and abuse such knowledge in the group process. At times, the positive trajectory of the work may seem to dissolve in a heated exchange of views regarding perceived entitlement. This dialogue may be expressed in a reactive vocabulary of unac-
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knowledged entitlement: denial, protest, rationalization, indignation, recrimination, appeasement, hallucination, accommodation, even interpretation (Case example 2). At the same time, these different expressions of entitlement and reactions against perceived entitlement may become constructive building blocks in the working, mutually empathic group. Progress is more likely to occur when the group therapist openly acknowledges subjective and interactive aspects of entitlement as they emerge and are discovered in the ongoing clinical work. As always, when the therapist is receptive to the group members’ view of reality, and is able to be relatively non-defensive and non-authoritarian, interpretive activity is more likely to be respected and integrated into the psychoanalytic work. The goal is, of course, to get beyond labeling, judging, submitting, rebelling, and retaliating, to the experience of mutual recognition. The therapist’s attempt to understand the experience of his or her entitlement with the group, and to put the experience into words, may inspire the participants to do the same (Case example 1). As the group learns to confront the intersubjective realities of entitlement, each participant may realize each person possesses entitlements, and that his or her entitlements are not more special.
CHAPTER 5
Containing and Thinking The Three Relational Levels of the Container–Contained The concept of containing has captured the psychoanalytic imagination, becoming an idiom in the contemporary clinician’s language of intersubjectivity, perspectivism, and co-constructionism. In this chapter, I lay emphasis on containing as a reciprocal interaction, involving the contained as well as container. The container–contained is a complex model which describes processes of human development, internal and external object relations, affect integration, symbol formation, group functioning, and learning from (and resisting) emotional experience. The model draws attention to how we hear and think about another’s communication, how we convey our experience back, and how this communicative interplay impacts the participants and the immediate future of the relationship. Referring as it does to wide-ranging psychosocial processes, the model calls for a versatile group technique employing diverse expressions of the group therapist’s subjectivity. Let us take as a starting point Bion’s statement that ‘the human animal…cannot find fulfillment outside a group and cannot satisfy any emotional drive without expression of its social component’ (1967a, p.118). The cornerstone of Bion’s theory of individual and group development is that, while thinking is a primary emotional drive, it matures in the context of social communication. He formulated an essential relationship among thinking, emotional development, and socialization in terms of the container–contained: The individual cannot contain the impulses proper to a pair and the pair cannot contain the impulses proper to a group. The psycho-analytic 110
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problem is the problem of growth and its harmonious resolution in the relationship between the container and the contained, repeated in individual, pair, and finally group (intra and extra psychically). (Bion 1970, pp.15–16)
This compressed passage pertains specifically to the inherent problems in human communication and the importance of others in supporting the individual’s drive to think about emotions and make them meaningful. To grow and mature the individual needs communicative containment by self, pair and group. The container–contained represents the transformatory process of the mind reaching emotional awareness. It is a model of ‘an emotional realization associated with learning’ (Bion 1962, p.93).
The container–contained in development Presaging current developmental theorists (e.g. Beebe, Lachmann and Jaffe 1997; Emde 1990; Seligman 1999; Stern 1995), Bion stressed the central role of relationships in the origin and maintenance of reflective thought. As a Kleinian, Bion accepted that introjective–projective exchanges (see Heimann 1952) formed the basis of the infant’s relationship to the mother, and continued to inform all relationships. The infant’s symbolic ‘sojourn in the breast’ (Bion 1962, p.183) first makes manageable the individual’s basic drives or needs, placing them – and their satisfaction – in the relational context. Thus, in human development, container–contained processes initially are symbiotic. The normally empathic mother gathers in (introjects), deciphers, and communicates back to the infant aspects of its affective and perceptual experience beyond its current emotional and cognitive capabilities. In effect, the mother communicates to the infant aspects of her own experience of the infant’s communicated experience. In Bion’s terminology (see also Chapters 3, 9, and 10 in this book), the infant projects undigested raw experience (beta elements), such as a fear of dying, into a receptive mother. Via the empathic, receptive process of reverie, she applies her own conscious and unconscious thought (alpha process) to the situation, divesting the infant’s experience of its disintegrating impact, and returns experience in a form (alpha elements) manageable for the infant to think about. By containing the infant’s primitive affective and perceptual reactions, and interesting the infant in them, the receptive (m)other fosters the development of a ‘normal’ part of the infant’s personality that concerns itself with psychic quality.
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To an increasing degree, the infant becomes able to contain affects and perceptions while in the mother’s absence, transforming them into images and rudimentary prototypes of sophisticated thought. These internal containers develop that which previously split off and/or projected. In other words, symbols and thoughts now serve to transform preverbal emotional experience, a function once provided primarily by others. The developing child gradually comes to tolerate and process its own emotional experience, developing a rudimentary consciousness of self and other. The child has formed a model of the thinking couple. Independent thinking has begun, as commensal relations are established between one’s own mind and the minds of others. However, as we know, psychic development and functioning do not at all times proceed smoothly. Thinking and relating may easily regress to the dependent level of symbiotic communicating. More pathological is the parasitic variation, in which blockages develop between the container and contained. Because of traumatic early failures in infant–caretaker relationships, the individual (or the traumatized part of the personality) comes to experience containing and being contained as untrustworthy, painful, and dangerous. When parasitic dynamics prevail, the container–contained represents a hostile and destructive process. Thinking – and thinkers – must be avoided or attacked. Bion’s (1970) definitions of commensal, symbiotic and parasitic communications are not saturated. When one thinks about them, they may develop in unexpected ways, which was Bion’s intention. Symbiotic relations may or may not lead to growth, and parasitic relations do not preclude growth, with proper clinical technique. Also, both parents in a loving relationship contribute to the child’s relational development: ‘There is absolutely no substitute for parents who have a loving relation with each other. No amount of talk or theory is going to take the place of parents who love each other. That seems to put something over to the child which is – to use some more long words – infra-verbal, preverbal’ (Bion 1975, p.128).
Container–contained: A model of intersubjective thinking The concept of container–contained describes relationships that are dynamic and fluctuating, cognitively multilevel, and interpersonally multidimensional. We come to learn about and represent intersubjective experience at various developmental levels of thought, from pre-concrete to abstract. The pattern of relationships may be modeled on vague interioceptive memories of
CONTAINING AND THINKING – THE THREE RELATIONAL LEVELS…
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mouth–breast relations or on dyadic, triadic, and group relationships. The pattern exists in the commitment to abstract religious, aesthetic, and scientific principles, which still represent object relations pertaining to one’s place in the family, society, and universe. ‘From such relatively simple beginnings the …[container–contained] abstracts successively more complex hypotheses and finally whole systems of hypotheses which are known as scientific deductive systems’ (Bion 1962, p.94). We may see how a nesting process is involved, for the container at one level of symbolic transformation may serve as the contained at another. On the level of the structure of thought, the symbol itself serves as the object or container of the individual’s unformulated ideas and emotions, which are the contained. On the level of self, the individual serves as the container of one’s mentality. On the interpersonal level, the pair, group, and political-cultural context serve as container, while the public expressions of the individual – symbols, emotions, thoughts, self-presentation, and action – are the contained. The nesting process must remain emotionally flexible, mobile and reversible. Like the empathic mother on whom the experience of being contained is based, the container must retain the capacity to remain integrated, while penetrable with fresh emotion. As mother to infant, the container and the contained are transformed in relationship to each other. The mother cannot function effectively as a rigid mold in which the infant’s emotional and intellectual projections are made to conform. The container gets shaped and reshaped with pressure from within and without. ‘On the replacement of one emotion…by another emotion…does the capacity for re-formation, and therefore, receptivity, [of the container] depend’ (Bion 1962, p.93). To develop emotions and learn from experience, one must exercise a social capacity and interact reciprocally with the containing minds of other human beings. The social container of the other (eventually, including the parental pair, family, and cultural groups) actively participates in making emotions and thoughts meaningful. While container–contained relationships pertain to characteristics of feeling, thinking, and interpersonal behavior, such relationships may require solitary activity, as involved in certain forms of creativity, or listening to music, reading, skill building, and so forth. Relatively remote individuals may contribute to and benefit from their social systems, while many extraverts produce noise and dissonance and remain inadequately educated by their
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interaction with others. (Bion even suggested that the most vocal members of his groups were the most disturbed.) Other people symbolically are always in our thoughts; however, the thinker does not necessarily benefit, and may be thwarted or even harmed by the participation of others. But at the same time, our need for others remains. The individual, impelled to think, is not always a sufficient container of his or her own developing thoughts. At critical phases, the child and adult require substantial interactive relationships on both the symbiotic and commensal levels to develop thoughts realistica