Reinventing Revolution: The Renovation of Left Discourse in Cuba and Mexico

Reinventing Revo

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ng Revo The Renovation o Left Discourse in Cuba and Mexico

Edward J. McCaughan

W e s ~ i e wPress A Member of the Perseus Books Group

All ~ g h t reserved, s Print4 in the Unititrd States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form ox by any means, elemonic or mechanical, including photocopy recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in wrigng lrorn the pubtishec Copyfight 8 1997byW a ~ i e w Press, A Member uf the Pernew b k s Croup Published in 1997 in the United States of h e r i c a by W ~ W i e wPress, 55W Central kenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-28n, and in the United Kingdom by Weshriew Press, 12 Hid's Copse Road, Gumor Hill, &ford C1X2 9Jf A CIP cahlog rword for this bmk is available from the Library of Congmss. ISEM 0-813M907-X @C) ISBM 0-8133-3547-7 (fgbk)

The paper used in this publiation meets the ~quirementsof the h e r i c a n National Standard for Bemaneace of Paper far Prhted Librafy Matel.ials 239.48-1984.

The Revolution has not triumphed. In your hands is the will and the power to save it; but if, unfortunately, you do not, the shades of Cuauhtemoc, Hidalgo, and Ju6rez md the herms of all ~ m ewifl s stir in their Wmbs to ask: What have you done with the blood of your brothers?

FideX . . .Fide1. . . your coffin passes by thru lanes and streets you never h e w thru day and night, Fidel While lilacs last in the dooryard bloom, Fidel your futile trip is done yet is not done and i s not h ~ i e I give you my sprig of laurel

Lawrence Ferlinghet ti

This wind, born below the trees, will came down born the mauntahs; it whispers of a new world, so new that it is but arm i n ~ ~ ino the n colliec~veheart.

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Contents Preface: Loss, Renewal, and Frida's Blue House AcknourIedpen ts 1 Introduction: Gl&al Change, P a r a d i p Crisis, and the Renova~onof Left Discourse

2

The Backdrop: From the Revolutionary 1960s

to the Neobberal1980eMat" Left? 3

Democracy I: The Perjistence of Socialist and Liberal C)ritk\odoxies

4

Democracy 11: Renovative Perspectives on Democracy

5

Smialism I: State VS. Market

6

Socialism E: Renovative Perspecltives on Economic Altema tives

7

National Sovereignty I: The Nation-State in the Post-Cold War, Globalized World-System

8

Nafional Sovereignty II: Toward a Relative Autonomy of the Nation-State

9

Conclusions: Past Imperfect, Present Tense, Future Conditional

About the Book and Author f ndex

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Preface

LOSS, Renewa , and Fridais B ue House f awoke early on my frst moling of vacation in Oaxaca, Mexico to radio news Of a militaty coup irt the S w k t Union. Abmdonhg plans to sleep late, 1mshed .into the already crowded streets to buy a newspaper. There are only a couple of good d a ~ e in s Mexico, and h this nation of Kaflcaes~ecmtralization, the likes of wEch Soviet plamers only dreamed, s w h newspapers are flown in from Mexico City. The plane hadn't yet amived, so I had to settle for one of the lacal rags, which offered five-inch high, screarnhg headlines about the coup but no story to speak of. The paper did provide the official line on the "'avemhe victory" of the long-rulhg fnstitutimal Revolutimary Party (Pm) in the mid-tern elections that August of 1991. This was the first major electoral contest sjncte fraud robbed Cuauttt4rnoc 66sdenas of the presidency in 1988 and encouraged the formation of the Party of the Democratic Revolu~on(Pm),contexnporav Mexico's first viable left opposition party. I was soon m my way to Qaxacafs Pacific coast: for a couple of days in a remote beach tovvn with my new lover, so f would have to wait for my return to Mexico City for any more substantive analysis of the Soviet coup and the Mexican elections. Once back in the capital, I obsessivety read the papers and magazlnes and talked to many old friends tTying to sort out what was hapentary, as weZl as our conversations, penlng. Press coverage and c inevitably focussed on these hYo seernhgty elated events, the attempted overthrow of Gorbachev and the PRD's electoral defeat. The mood was decidedly glum. Gorbachev" reforms had kixrd1ed hopes among the world left that it might still be possible to democratize the Soviet Union while avoiding the headlong rush toward radical "free market" capitalism that seemed to be occurring in the other natiom of the old sctcialist bloc. The coup tjhreaterted a rchm to authoritarianism and or&odoxy. Left int-ellectuafshMexico that August did their best to find a silver l h h g behiSld the dark events in the East. Saciofogist J a h e Bsoriio brought me m opinion piece on the h m e r Soviet bloc &at he had just written for the Mexican daily La pm&. Jaime is a Chilean who, like so

mmy other Latin Annerican lef~sts,has made Mexico City his home. He fled mile, together with his yomg wife and infant daughler, after Pinochet's bloody takeover in 1973. His article facussed on the impressive civilian resistance to the Soviet coup, expressing great optimism for the democratization and mobilization of civil society t a h g place in Eastern Europe. Pablo Gonz4lez Casanova, one of Mexico's most scholars, shitarly held out hope; h e %vkt rnstitry had not r mass support it had counted on, m a h g any r e k m to the old mfe far less l&ely. Yet, in their h e a t of hearts, they h e w that the new leader, Boris Yellsin, was no democrat, and their eyes spoke the fears h t &eir words wouldn't or c o u l h ? yet express. The PM% declaration of victory in the mid-tern elections also proved disconcerting to my friends in Mexico City. The massive popular mwement orl;anizcrd around the f 988 Chrdenas presidential campaip and the subsequent unifica~onof most left currents into the PRD created great expectations for democratizing what Peruvian-born novelist Mario Vargas LXosa once called "the perfect dictatorship." After tZle August 1991 elections, however, democratization of Mexko seemed much hr2her away than many had hoped and expected, My old friend, Raixl Alvarez Carin, a promhent figure in the Mexican left sjnce his days as a leader of the 2968 shxdent movement, picked me up at my gloomy budget hotel near el Monumento de la Revolucibn; for the first time, I noticed s i p s of age and fatigue h the face of &is hvariably ebulXient orrganizer. As he honked and cursed our way through Mexico CiLy traffic, he described how the PM had puBed out all the stops to "win'9he elections t h r o q h "a tremendous' soghisticated baud," and how the regirne had bem aided, once agah, by splits within the left and by the incosnpetence of some of the PRDfsown "opportunist'kcandidates. A couple of days later, over coffee in the Bellas Arks cafeteria, Carlos Monsivais, Mexico's famous chronicler of popular cult-ure and one never h o w n to mince words, offered his succinct explanation of the PH's victory: "80 percent h-aud; 90 percent errors of the left." The election results, he feared, would contribute to ""cynicismand fatalism." And while Monsivais made no explicit comecti.on between the Mexican ents offered in the electiom and the Soviet coup, two separate c course of our conversation brought those events together. At one poir\t he declared that Mexico's then president, Carios Salinas, "is absolutely power-hungry and has placed all his eggs in Ceorge Bush% baskt." Later, s h h g h t o an even darker mood, he observed, 'The collapse of Gorbachev's power and the rise of Veltsin leave Bush absolutely unchallenged." M 3 e conversations and news coverage that week revolved mahly around these two developments, a third source of disquiet inevitably

Los, Renezual, and Frida's Blue House

xi

made its presence felt: Cuba. For the Latin American left, as well as for me, the Cuban Revolutim had long been a more importmt, and more ' ediate, point of reference than the Soviet Union. Several of the people I spoke with in Mexico City that August had also been with me in Havana earlier in the year attending a L a h American sociology coderence. There wexe same positive signs comhg from the is sense of "fresh air," as Gonzhlez Casanova put it, an ab stale old discourse of "scientific soeialismf'md an op and lmguage. h that regard, the collapse of C seemed to have a healthy effect on Cuba. But fiere were also the undefiabfe s i p s of crisis, particularly the grave economic situation provoked by the rapid disintegration of Cuba's main trading parbers and source of economic aid. Cfuestians about the fubre of the Cuban Revolution wove ~emseivesin and out of our conversations about the Soviet coup and the Mexican left. Nonsivais, for one, was hnrious with: Cuba" cautious declaratim that fie coup was a SoGet problem to be resolved by the Soviets; he &ought Castro should have minkally signaled to Corbacrhev that Cuba was critical of the coup, rat.her than leaving the impressian that a return of the military hardliners might actually be considered to Cuba" advantage. Other long-time of Cuba had begun to make severe public criticisms: Mexican t Pabla Crjxnez, far example, had writ-ten about the s "senility" in a acolu in h Jomada. Gonzdlez: Casanova, an about the island's future, the other hmd, stilt expmssed o g throughout the history of pointing to the legacy of moral ethi popular struggle in Cuba. After several days of such conversations, I was f r a d y at a loss. T h i n h g X wodd clear my head, T decided to be tourist for a day, and set off fox Frida Kahlds house-musm in Coyoacliin, the southern Mexico City neighbarhood where I had lived in the early 197Cts. Back then, relatively few people outside of Mexico had heard of Kahlo, the now intemationatly recofized painter and icon, X visited her hause frequently in 1973, since it was tree and only a few minutes walk from my apartment. Z was hschated by the hauntkg paintings of this pain-ridmist who seemed inclined to break ail taboos. T have always associated Frida's bright blue home wiih that defining period of my yout-h when I first became friends with. some of the brightest of Mexico's new left, first visikd Cuba, began to seriously sbdy Marxism, wrote my first pubfished research wi-th Peter Bltird for the North American Congress on Lat-in Aznerica (NAGLA), and helped organize a campaip to free my college classmate and dear friend, Olga Talamante, from an Argentine prison. Olga and her companion Patricia A m were with me when I returned to Fricfa" s h e house for the first: t h e ist nearly twenty

years, hophg, I suppose, that memories of those youthful days when wrong and right seemed crystal clear would lift the clouds of doubt h m g h g in the air that August of 1991. But Frida"s house was closed. After paundhg m We huge doors, we managed to get in with a hefty bribe to the guard. The house was in disaslay, mder renovation before reopenhg to Kahlds vastly enlarged public, who would soon pay a steep admissim fee beyond the reach af most Mexicans, Many of- Frida's painthgs had been removed for an ex. . ones were on the dusty floor, leaning hibit abroad and the against peeling wall?;. ,I was flooded with unclxpected memories of an old college friend, Eddie Escobedo, who had helped o r g d z e one of the first efibits of Frida Kahio's work in tos Angeles in the early 1980s. Eddie waged a battle to have F ~ d a fpaintings s displayed in the working class, Mexican banio of Santa h a , ra%er than exclusivefy h the elite haunts of postmodern LA. Eddie's life was cut far too short by AIDS, but at least he di have to wilness the subsequent crass cornmercialization of Frida lo, whose paintirtgs naw fetch the higkest prices of any Latin American artist, whose home can no longer be visited by Mexicans who can't afford the price of admission, and whom the Material Girl herself, Madoma, now wants to portray on the silver screen. , m k t militant to Hollywood vamp was not, I ~ o u g h twhslt mhd. The clouds had not lifted. From FridaPsblue house we walked the few block to the house-muof her old friend, Lean Trots.sky. Afkr being exiled from the Rusvolu~m he helped create, Trotsky spent the last years of his life in this house. The curators have pxeserved his study, his bedroom, evm a closet with a few drab dothes. Lmelhess and betrayal are the pervasive feelings generated by such surroundings. X walked outside into the extenshe gardens, trykg to picture the happier Trotsky porbayed in. a scene from Paul Leduc" f i h about Fridic, in which the aghg revsgutionary and the beautiful young artist stroll peacefully, even c o ~ e t t i s h l y though the woocls. The h a g e was wickly shattered as I found myself b e h Trotsky" ~ tomb: It had been exactly 51 years to the day since Trotsky was assassinated, apparently with the collaboration of Mexican mists, Now the Soviet Union was self-destruckg, in large part due to errors denounced by Trotsky, who p i d the price of dissent with; exile and death. h/Iy own history h the sectarian U.S. feft did not leave me predispoed to s p p a t h y for Trotsky, but I sat and wept. Early the next mom6ng, rrursislg a hangover from my msuccessful anempts to clcar away a naggling sense of loss, f learned that Gregorio Selfer, the great Argenthe journalist, had &own himself out a whdow in hifexito City the same day I visited Frida's blue house and Trotsky's tomb. Another exiled, brilliant, left hteflecbal who had fomd a second

Loss, Renmgl, and Frida3 BBllie Ho~rse

XUE

home in Mexico. Another creative, productive life cut short. Newspapers quoted friends as saying that Selser had found pain from a long-term, debilitating disease, that he could no longer write and therefore codd no longer five. M e n J a h e QsorEo m i v d at my hot4 later that morning, I assumed he had heard the m s , and X wondered aloud why Sefsez had made the decision to end his life on that particular day, that month of August in 1991. Frida had never chosen suicide, despite ddilitating pain. D i b 2 l.lselser's decision surely have somettning to do with the &ate of the world, the state of the left, as much as wi-l1?,tPle state of his health? f a h e , ,in. fact, had not heard about his friend's suicide, and as he absorbed what I was saying, he was left absolutely without words to explain the death ctr express his own sense of loss. ettlkg week. An histo~calera in eclipse, a super power self-destructing, the left's renewed electoral hopes dashed, friends disconcerted, mexpected memories reencountered, a life surrendered. Like Jairne Osorio, I famd myself without words to explain ar express nse of loss, When f said e to Gonz;iilez Casmova ithat er, he said, and with an, unc sabess in his voice, E &ought, "The next t h e you c m e , we'll have you and some otkers over to the house for taquitos. We need new fiends." TThe ambiguous statement; "we need new friends," seemed an apt, even poipant, expressim of what I was keling and of what X sensed my other friends on the left also felt. We were not yet able to clearly articulate the mtent to which the Ieft had lost an entire paradigm, a way of 1.hinhg about the world, of how it would change, of how we would intervene to change it, But we sensed that &ere was a void that needed ta be fi5led. It was not an altogether unfamiliar ache: we had all known loss before, when our homelands expelted us, -whensectarian disputes divided us, whm our best-laid plans failed us, when our enedes overwhehed us, when diseases devastated us. T h e and again, we had answered paint-ul loss with painful renewal. We knw what to do, h o s t instinctively. We needed to revisit same old friends and reaffim the too d e n machowledged value of certitin long-the cmpanims. We nedcd to give up finaIly on a few false, or s h p l y fickle friends. And, indeed, we needed some new friends, new ideas, new understandings, new plans, new actions. We understood, I thought, what the process of renewal demands, but X wondered if w e were still, again, up to tlhe task, Edward JI McGaughnn Ctcer~vaca,Mexico

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edgments This research would not have been possible wi&out the coopration of the seventy-four Cubans and Mexicans who generously gave their t h e and ideas for the interviews that f o m the heart of the data presented herein. h Cuba, X: am especially indebted to: Julio Carranza, Rafael Hemhdez, Santiago Pkrez, and Juan Valdes Paz of the Centro de Eshxdias Sobre Am&rica KEA), w h gmatly facilitated my retjearch; Elena Diaz and Beatrk Diaz of the Centro de Estudios Sobre d: Desarrallo (DES), who arranged a crucial six-week stay in Havana in 2993; and Juan Antonio Blanco, dkector of the Centro Felix Varela, who affered many invaluable insi&ts. fn Mexico, special thank must go to: Alejandro Alvarez, Raul. Alvarez Garh, and Cristha Laurell, compaiiem de siempw Pablo Gonzhlez Casanova, director of the Centro de hvestigaciones Interdisciplharias en Humanidades at the Universidad Nilcional Autbnoma de M&xico,who always made available his time and the facilities of his b t i k t e ; and f a h e , Patricia, Daniela, and Alejandra Qsorio for giving me a faamily and home away from home. Tfrads also to professors Walker Coldfrank, Sonia Alvarez, and f a d Lubeck at the Universiy of Cal2omia, Santa Cruz, for their criticat help in formulating this project and for reading the book's many drafts. Tony Platt, mder no obligation other than loyal friendship, also read every word, providing indispensable criticism and warm support. Long-tim@ comparieras Susame Jonas and Elizabeth Martinez also gave their valuable feedback an various chapter drafts, Harritzt Swift cspyedikd the manuscript and provided astute criticism in the process. And John Kaine, whose br2liant armork graces the cover, kept me dancing through it all, insisting that we hit the clubs at least once a month. Finally, I am grateful to the following institutions for their financial support: the Fulbright-Garcia Rables Program; the Cuban Studies Frogram of the Johns Hopkins University, in conjunction with the Ford Fondation; the Chicano/Latino Research Center at the University of Cafifomia, Santa Cruz; the University of California Consortium on Mexico and the United States (UC MEXIJS); the James D. tematimal Studies; and the Sociology Board and Division af Social Sciences of the University of California, Smta Cmz,

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CHAPTER 1. NTRODUCT

Change, Paradigm Crisis, and the Renovation of Left Discourse observed &at research sdentists fornulate their Wesand theories within a socially constructed paradigm, that is, within a broadly accepted framework of thought, language, and methodology. A given paradigm, proven hitful through practice and reinlorced by institutional resources, endures until a sufficient accumulation of problems, which are seemingly unresolvable within the prevailing pafadip' beghs to sow doubts and provoke cri~cismswi&h the discipline. A paradigm crisis thus ensues, leading to an overthrow of the long-accepted framework, a period of confusion, contestation, debate, struggle, and, evmt-uafly, the constTuction of a new paradigm.1 m a t fofiows is an exploration, based on tvva national case studies (Cuba and Mexico), of the paradigm crisis facing left forces throughout the world today.2 I am us "" to refer broadly to those (including Marxbts, smialists and c rsts, social democrats, revolutionary nationalists, populists, labor and social movements activists) who traditionally were guided by ideological and ethical principles that strcrssed sociaf eguality and social justice, This book preents an empki-

I. Thornas Kuhn, The Strzrefure ofSeimf@c Reuohlfions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 2. Cuban social scientist Juan Vafdbs Par has offered a definit-ion af what he calls "the substantive left," which is "constituted on the basis of a scale of values, among which stand out full human digniv, altruism, and equitiity. [The teft"s] interpretation of reality places it in opposition to a society based an refations of exploitation andfar domination among men [sic] and states. Its historical obj~tctivesare aimed at overcoming such relations, at the radical transformation of societies based on them. Its praxis is expressed in programs of struggle far the constitution of new social relations and to represent the interests of the exploited, marginalized, and dominated sectors of historical sctcic?ibies.'"uan Vald&s Paz, "La Xzquierda Hoy en h k r i c a Latina," manuscript (1993). PEe.ase note that quotes from Spanish-language texts and intewiews have been translated by the author unless hdicated othemise.

cal accomt, in a f o m rafier like a multi-voiced conversation based on intemiews with seventy-four hteHectuals in Cuba and Mexico, of how left discourse, ideolow, and stsatew in ~ e s eeawtries have been affected by major changes in the structures and practices of the worldsystem since the 1980s. More specifically, this book asks how the globalization of the wofld-economy, the rise of neofiberal ideology and paliq, and the collapse of state sociahm have challenged the left's longprevailing world view. Because the relationship behveen socioeconomic structures and disfursive rqreseniation is a WO-way s.t.feek this book also examines how the left's kaditional ideology and political culture mediate the ways it understands, assesses, and responds to these glsbal chmges. Additjonally, this book is about tfte current prmess of fomufat?inga new kft paradip8 a task dexribgd by Mexican wholar hquef %a Ekaga as "a colleclive affair of long duratione8*3It is an effort that reflects h e current state of the collectivity, its mode af living and mderstmding its contradktions, and the degree to which it has come to resolve t.hose c~ntradic~ons~4 These case shdies of Cuba m d Mexico allow us to examine in depth one part of a larger woridwidie process of alxticulakg critical opposition4 ideologies and strategies at have the potential to challenge the status quo of the capitaEst world-system more effectively &an did left movements of the last 150 years. We are &sewing two national cmponents of a global process understood by hnrmuel Wallerstein as a quest for the "fomulatim of a clear antisystemic strateg for an era of disintegra~on."%at quest has been undenvay for l it was given new h p e h s by the "world revolution of some ~ t ) years; 1%8" and wiXa likely require. at least another twenty years to complete.b As interpreted by Wallerstein: [Afbove all, 1968 had one crucial outcome. Xt lamched a skategicrr debate among the movemen& in the same =me and to t.he same degrm as had [the revolutions ofl1848. We'hcrw the outcame of the post-1848 debate. By the 1880s the movements had a g r e d on their basic middlerun strategy: they would seek to aMain state power by political means, The revolution of If368challmged this nineteenth-cenhry consensus an d d d g e - r w stratew. As a result, bday we are in the d d s t of a re-

3. Raquel k s a Etizaga, "'La llamada crisis de los paradigmas," M;emoria (Mexico), Na. 55, June 1993, g. 24. 4. Bid. 5. Xmmanuel Wallerstein, "The Collapse of Liberalism," in R. Miliband and L. Pantich, eds., Socialist Register 1992 (London: Merlin6 29921, p. 108. 6 , Bid.

Global Change and Paradkm Crisz"s

3

newed debate about fiddlerun s b a t e ~ .Xt is not. yet clear how and where this new debate will come out.'

The Semcfi fax Alternatives Did Not End with the Cafd War

fndeed the debate about how to create a more equitable, just, and democratic society is taking place throughout the world, although the these issues were settle reader ~ g hbet excused for ass ,poli.tiral kaders, and j md of the Cold War, Mmy aca particularly in the Unit4 States and Western Europe, see Francis Fukuyama" claim that history ended with the final of capitalism and electoral demwracy into a mmka, as thou* repeatmg it oft- ertough would make it kue.8 Yet events aromd the globe belie such aswrtims of consensus. h virtually all of the societies once associated with the b m e r Soviet bloc, for example, ktense pofi~cal and social struggles are being waged over whetfier and how to regulate the new market-oritmted economies so as to protect fmdamental social. rights. Having overthrown apareheid, Sou1.h African swiety is now grappling with how to create political md ecrono~cjnstitutim that will best a l h the poor, black majority finally to take hill control of its fu hdian smiety, a major potitical, cult-uraf, and economic force w Asia, is far from reconciled about abandoning its nationaEst and quasisocialist approach to social m d econadc issues in favor of en vogue knents of radical f ~ market e capitasxn. Throughout Latin America, hard-won and still frade transi~onsto demoeratie rule remah highly contested pmesses h w&ch mry dgferent conceptions of democracy vie for influence. To be w e , Latin Amrica in recent years has wi-ssed a flurry of neoliberal policies to end programs and instihztions that characterized the region" post-&at Depression nationalist development schemes, such as protective trade policies designed to promote national industry, state control over strategic resources and ecmornic sectors, and social welfare ainted at moderating the extreme inequality and c o d c t associated with capitafissn h the W r d Warld. Neofiberalism is still liberalism in its emphasis m t-he cm'al drive of the free hdividuaf, kafity of the market m d the entr but it is "neo" or new h its aba t of old hberal refoms which nuel Wallerstein, '"tisysteidc: Movements: Hista ir AMn, et al., Transforming the RevoEzitio~.Social M World-System (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1991)),p,40. 8. Erancis Fduyarna, "The End of History," "printed in S. EiafE, et al., Modernity and Ifs Fzitzlras, Modernity and Ifs Ftittires (Gambddge: Polity Press, 19921, p. 48.

4

Introduction

once sought to ameliorate the social and political upheaval produced by the expansion of capitalism. The implementation of neoliberal policies by technocra~cLath American gove ts faifikxl to the new d o c t ~ of e ational capital should not aken as a sign of consensus; to of:L a h America remahs me contrary, the moEbera1 rest popular and fiercely challenged by a great van'ety of social and political forces.' In all of the examples cited above, left political forces continue to play a sigruficmt role in shaping the debates over the future direction of society's economic and political systems. In the United States, where the left has very little impact on public discourse, it may be easier to accept has hdeed ended, that radical free-market capithat mean-spirited hdividualism has captured er, i i W take seriously what is m r i n g h the the semiperiphery world beyond the United States, particularly wi s evident that the for middle strata na~ons)of the world-syste an society is far from settled and that the debate over the future of left's cmtxibution remains mlevant, Viewed withk this global panorama of ongoing struggle, the following case studies of Mexico and Cuba take on significance beyond their national horizons. They help us shed light on what is a world-historic process of reassessing the shortcomings of old left paradigms and of articulating new visions of sotiety stiu informed by the desire for greakr social,equdity, justice, and democracy. This book fmuses on the left% efforts to fornulate &ose ntzw visions, but, as political scientist Sonia Alvarez wisely observed, the issues explored herein "are crucial for theorizing viable alternatives to the deep c r k s h a t affict not. only the left but also, hportantly, contemporary Latin American societies (and exploited and oppressed folb everywhere h general),"'@A few statistics but&essher poht: According to a recent study published at the Universiv of Miad"s North-%ulh Center, gross national income per capita fell by more than 14 percent from 1981 to 1991 in every Latin American comtsy (21 gercent in the Caribbean). The ranks of the poar (defined in t e r m af the money income sufficimt to cover the cost of basic foods, goods, and sewices) iwreased in evexy Latin American c o m v during the 1980s. Today, o v a half of the Latin American popula~anlives below the pov-

9. A dramatic example of opposigon to neoliberaf policies in the region was an international meeting held in Chiapas, Mexico, in August, 1996. The EntercontinentaiX Encowter for Humanity and Against Nmliberalism was called by the Zapatista Army of National Liberalion fEZLN) and attended by hmdreds of padicipants from throughout the Americas. 10. Sonia E. Alvarez, personal correspondmce with author, March 8,1955.

Global Change and P a v a d i p Crisis

5

erty line (630 to 90 percent in setveral countries). The share of the population livhg in Nabjmfp ~ v e r y i.e., , ~ unable to afford a basic diet, has also r i ~ substantially, n in some corntries includhg over twotkrds of the population.11

Xndeed, it is not only the left's old p a r a d i p s m d skategies that are h crisb, R u b g elite5 re are without alternatives to the deep so-. cial crises afflicting L ica and most of the wor1d"s peoples. Wallersteh has made the case, quite persuasively, that bberalism ~ and naGmal developmentalism have collapsed along w i co ism.12 Mexico" l m g - m h g Partido RevoIucimario Instihxciona having abandoned its decades-old dewlopmentalist s k a t e i~n favor of radical free-market policies, is deeply divided. The party shbbomly e h g s to power, while selhdestmcting- in spiraling scandals af corrup~on, drug traffichg, and assassinations. Memwile, the economy staggers and an ever greater porti population slips into desolate poverv. The fiirty-&e-year-ofd ist reginre in Cuba is desperately attempthg to apply old liber t-ions to ra, collapsed socialist economy, & k g the revolution's hpressive social ahievements, yet resisting fuller demwrathation, and watching national consensus erode. Havhg rtzjected &W Deaf liberalism, neither Democrats nor Repubhcans in the United States offer any alternative to the nation's social disintegation. IntemaGonalfy, the "last great superpower" appears semi-p codicts abroad and holds on the issues of an ina~tional, Mumane, m d heffective tra o against Cuba and more-of-thesame neoEberaGsm for Me summits are organized with great fanfare and hope, only to end with eaxted proposals." Such efforts s e m inelvitably hobbkd by ss of the wealthy and powerful. to cede even a smidgen of tf*lek wealth and power. g elites o&r no soluGons, but they Cry to convince us aIf that there is no alternative to the stakts quo. 12. Swame Jonas and Edward J. McCaughan, 'ktrodustion:The Quest for Transformtion in Latin America," in S, Jonas and E. McCaugktan, eels,, Latin A m t c a Faces the Twent-y-First Centw ry. Reconsfrwcting a Social Itrsf ice Agenda (Boulder:Westview Press, 19941, p. 1. anueE Wallerstein, "'The Catlapse of Liberalism,"ap. cit.; I. Wal!erstein, 'The Concept af National Development, 1917-1989. Elegy and Requiem,'" Amertcan Behvioral Scientist, Vol. 35, Na. 415, Marchlfme 1992; and I. Wallerstein, "Marxism A h r the Collapse of CO mism," "~conomic Revim, February/Narch 19512, 13. See, far example, William Felice, "The Copenhaaen Su for the World Bank?" Social Justice, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring l*?). k i a l

S o ~ Akarez a is quite right when she observes that the findings of fkis sktdy are "also a response to h e doom-sayers of both the right and the left who argue h a t tke left is dead, that there are no pathways out of Ithe current crises, that there are, in short, no alternatives to neoGberahsm and restricted dernocracy."l4 In fact, as we will see, out of the leftf$ paradigm crisis, there are emerging some renovative ideas that cantribute to alternative strategies for tr ending "m era of disintegration" and contributing to a more human rld order. 'The potential impact of these ideas is heightened by the crisis facing m h g elites, by which I mem &eir fadare, as yet, to replace the old cooptive st-rategies of hberalism (in the c m ) and development-alim (elsewhexe) with equally effective modes of domination, The conjmctural preference amang Western political leaders for neoliberalism will undoubtedly wane as the full impact of ~eoliberafism%ssocial and envixo ntal devasta~onis mare broadly achowkdged. As the neofiberal consensus breaks down, the many serious conflicts already evident among the world's ruling classes (on everything from trade policy to armed conflict settlement to boundary disputes to the role of the United Nations) will most likely deepen. Throughout history, as sociologist: RObert Wutknow has o b ~ r v e d ,the emergence of ncw, critical discouses has been facilitated by division among mlhg eliks."VTe left;, as this study suggestsf has already begm to serioudy reassess the failaxes of its old paradiws and to suggest the autlhes of alternative modes of subsistence and governance. mese new ideas, X argue, f o m the kernel of the new critical discourses that will likely gain influence as the ideology and strategy of the old ruling sbata lose coherence. Thus these two case shdies contribute to a clearer concephal understandhg of the pmcess by which MW dixourses emerge to challene old orthodoxies, as we11 as to a better practical mderstanding af potential, progressive alternatives to the crisis-prone capitalist world-system. Paradigm Crisis and the Latin American 'Left

g h e international Ieftfs old middle-rm The p a r a d i p inf strategy was shared by broad sectors of Latin America% progressive forces, from those of clear Mamist-Lmhist orientation, to social

14. %nia E. AIvarez, personal correspondence, op. cit. 15, Robert Wuthnow, Communities of Discottrse. Idealog?/ and Soczal Sfrzrcftrre in the Refimtzon, the Enlighfenmenl: and European Socialkm (Cambridge: Haward University Press, 198%.

Global Change and Paradigm Crisis

7

democrats, to those of more nationalist and/or populist persuasion. Despite important distinctions and conflicts among Latin America's various nationalist, populist, md/or socialist regimes and movements throughout the twentieth century, they embraced a developmental paradigm that placed the state at the heart of progressive change. The state was at the center of most projects for development and social or political change in Latin America from the 1930s through the 19&0s, whether it be the nationabt populim of Mexico's Lhzaro Cdrdtmas, XfrazSs Gehrlio Vargas, or Argctnthafs Juan Perbn, the e c m o d c reforms advanced by the E c s n o ~ Council c for Latin America (CEPAL), the more radical nationalism of the dependmcia school, the Cuban revolution's tropical version of state socialism, or the ecleclic ent or the Nicarapan ts of the Chilean Popular U~ty gove Smdinktas. , an active, hterventiodst state was seen by the omous d e v e l o p a t in a wdd-econmy dominated by the U ~ t e dStates and trmsnational capital. The hportance placed on the state's economic role was reinforced by the experrience of the Soviet Union's impressively rapid industrialization and rise to superpower stakxs, as well as by the generalization of Kepesian economic policies after the Great Depression. ,the radical left's attention was on proletarian revolution, understood as seizure of the state by the working class. Even the more social democratic left was preoccupied prixslar3y with increas;ing the w o r h g class" representation in gove ent m d Muence over the state, For most of the left, the state was the a h o s t exclusive focus of national poXitics, to be supporled, influenced, seized, r>r smashed, depmding on the conjwct-ure and particular skategic vision of a given left currmt. More recently embraced consideratioas; about the autonoq of civil society, fhcr many foms of political struggle outside of the state' md the imporlance of dmocratic procedures and rule of law tgenerab took back seat to the left's concern with overthrowing, constructing, or preserving a skmg state. This dimension of the left's p a r a d i p has loomed especiaXEy large in Latin Amerka, m d particularly so in Cuba and Mexico,given the realiv of joint hemisplneric tenancy with an often beEgerent, powerful Northern neighbor, whose presence seemed to demand a strong' mgied naticzn. W i t h the lefts of Western Europe and the United States, the old paradigm's statkm was substantially challenged from the late 1960s on by new poltical and ideological currents such as fexninim, new social movements theories, post-Marxism, poststnxcturalism, m d posmodem-

ism.'& mese cdhral &aUenges to the left's histori,cal s t a ~ m aXso ink3uenced progessive forces in Latin America to one d e p e or mother, In particular, important aspects of the "new social movements" paradigm were adapted by sectors of the Latin American kfi to the ir world, helping to broaden and emich h e left's tradiver state pobyer." HOWtional emphasis on the struggk of class ever, the stmctrural realilties of the Sou the extent to which the om: pos.t.modemism and more radicafty antistatist vctrsions of N postsmcbraffsm are directly appffcablct h nations such as Cuba and Mexico. The conthued relevance of: class analysis and state power are readily apparent in the tified and still relatively au&oritarian societies of Lath Amer qumtIy, the Lath American left ofien gave more aEentian to Mamism t%tmto emplayhg the various "post" paradips.18 This had the great advantage of helping to preserve Mamism as a useful tool of malysis that has been discarded by much of the U ~ t e d States zlnd European left. At the same t h e , it meant that many aspects of the left's old statist paradigm went unchallenged in L a h herica how left disclour% evolved in Cuba rough the world-shaking events of the late 1980s is presented in Chapter Two. For now, suffice it to say that the old left paradip, a h a d y shalcy since 1968, was then quite substan~auy d by thsee global developments that cuhhated at h e end of the 1980s: the restruebring of a gldalized world-economy, the rise of neoliberal ideology, and the collapse of the state socialist regimes in the Soviet Union and Easkrn Europe, The accelerated glabalizatim of e c o n o ~ pmesses c undermined the state's capacity to regulate or direct thc! national economy.. NeoliberaEsm's assault on swialist and even Keynesian notions about the interventionkt state posed a considerable

16. For a review of such deverapments, sett, e.g., the essays in Stuar-tHall, et al., Modernity and Its Ftilzrres (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). 17. Regarding the influmce of new s d a l movements theories sn the Lat;in American left, SW Arturo Escobar and S-cmia E, Alvarez, eds., The n/lalE-ngof Social Movements in Lnltin America, Identity, S tratea, and Democracy (Boulder: WmCiew ~ Norma St-alltz Chinchilla, Press, '11992). Regarding the influence of f e f i ~ i s mserz "Marxism Feminism, and the Struggle for Democracy in Latin America,'>in ibid.; lsabel Larguia, "Why Poli~calFeminbm?'Yin S. Tonas and E. McCaughan, b f i n America Faces the Twenty-First Gntury, op. cit.; and Margaret Randall, Gathering R a p . The Failure of 20th Centtry Rmolzrtions ta Deuelq a Feminist Agencla (New York: Montkly Review Press, 2992). 28. &,e.g., Agustin Cueva, ""E mmancismo Xatinoamerieano: historia y problemas actuales," Contraries (Madrid), No. 3, November 1989, pp. 22-34,

Gfof;raECFzange and Paradigm Crisis

9

challenge to progressive ideas about the state's social responsibilities. The sudden d e d s of the Soviet bloc seemed to t a ~ s the h legihacy even of lhose left forces that had consistently disavowed S t a l ~ s m . Combhed with events more particular to nalional developments in Cuba and Mexico, these global changes contributed to a critical acc of doubts among the broadly-defined left inthose nations. As I began to interview and study the current writings of left htellechals in Cuba and Maico in the eady 1990s, an acute awareness of crisis was frequently expressed, as rt;flected in the followhg

* From a high-level official h the Lntemational Rela~onsDepartt Party Central C ment af the Cuban Co speciaEzes in Ih@ Centrd American left: The Latin American left is facing a very difficult moment. %idom has the left had such a clear picture af the inability of capitalism to solve our problem and such prospds for pawer. But the left is facing many moral, political, social, ideological, and psychological problem. Until a few years ago, Latin America fomd in the socialist camp, in Mamism, in Marxism-Leninism, at Ieast an ideological point of reference. Now that's b e n shattered, leading to a left- crisis of identity.19

*

From a Cuban. inkeXlechal once associated with the Universiv of Havana's PMosophy Department, closed in 1971 for its heterodoxy :

There is a paradigm crisis, requiring a rencomter with Marxism. Marxlism as a theclxy is not finished, and its liberal hamework is not clear. Cuba doesn? have the amwers, but at least Cuba is now asking the qumGons. But the process is slow; orthodoxy dmsn't allow far such criGcism.20

*

From a Gubm po&ticdscientist and researcher:

Today the paradigm of ""real swialism" do not exist, and for the common citizen there remain few doubts that the suppas& superisrilry and irreversibility of the soeialisrn [of the Eastern bloc] were no more than a mythological construction.*"

19. R a d r o Abrec, interview with author, Havana, March 8,1993. 20. Aurelio Alonso, intenriew with author, Havana, February 23,1993. 21. Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, 'Cuba: La Crisis y la Rearticuladdn del. C o n ~ m Potitica o (Notas Para Un Debate biakista)," manuscript (19932,

* From a leading intellectual of Mexico's revolutionary nationalist tendency, who became a supporter of the neoliberal Carlos Salhas administra~on: Politically, the Mexican left had already abandoned political paradigm associated with the USSR. But economically, the left has real problem. We haven't taken up the lessons of, one, the collapse of the %viet economy and central planning, and, Wo, the crisis of the Mexican model of dwdopment. The left is very weak in the fate of nealiberal discourse. For the left, the collapse of the %vkt bloc has kd to a strnse of futility in trying to irnagne a future with a radical alternative to fur2fier intesad tion with the U ~ t e States.=

* From a Maoist-auenced sociolo@st active in the Mexican labor movement: There is no Marxkt dkcaurse in the left now. The fall of the Etc?rlinWall had a huge impad here became much of the left beliwed that t h a e socialism were reformable. Many have become exceedingly pragmatlc. Marxist r e f l e ~ o nis at its worst moment,a

*

From a Marxist professor at the University of Guadalajara, who has written extensively on the Cuban revolution and the Latin Americm left:

There is confusion and paralysis in the Latin American left as a result of the evmts in Eastern Europe. However, there is also a tendency to x e j ~ tthe thesis that mapifies the extent to which the problems of the Latin Anerican left clweloped in close relatiamhip to the crisis of the swialist paradigm in Eurape.24

22. Rolando Cordera, intervim with author, Mexico City, Sptember 2, 1992. 23. Enrique de la Garza Taledo, interview with author, Mexico City; August 20,1993.

24. Jorge Alonso, "Alternativas para m smialisma posible," manuscript (n.d.). An example of what Alonso means when he refers to a tendency to play down the sipificance for the Latin American left of the collapse of the Eastern European regimes is the following statement from a leading figure in the PRO: "My first experience with a socialist corntry was in Eastern Europe, and it was the first place I'd ever had a machine gun pointed at me, The experience left a lasting, negative impression. So I never saw the kviet bloc states as a, model, and in that sense their demise has no consequence for me." (Cristina LaureXI, interview with a u t b r , Mexico City, August 6,1992.)

Global Change and Paradigm Crisis

11

Utopia Unarmed or Renovated? The crisis facing the Latin American left has been documented and analyzed by several writers, most notably Jorge Castaiieda in his acclaimed book, Utopia Unarmed.% Castaiieda's synoptic, interpretative study of current trends and shifts in the political thinking of the Latin American left is an indispensable point of reference. This book, however, differs from Utopia Unarmed in terms of both methodology and findings. Castaiieda offers a sweeping, panoramic view of Latin America's left forces and tends to focus on the politics of parties in the formally political sphere. My study is situated within regional developments but focuses on the left in just two countries, Cuba and Mexico, and it examines a broader slice of the left, including social movements activists. Castaiieda provides crucial insights into the thinking of a number of prominent political players, based on his lifelong association with many of the Latin American lefts' most celebrated intellectual and political figures. My interpretations are drawn from interviews with nearly seventy-five leftists. Some of them are renowned national figures and others are lesser known movement activists, party cadre, or university researchers. More importantly than the methodological differences (elaborated below) between this study and Castaiieda's, the findings of my research differ considerably from those of Utopia Unarmed. Castaiieda emphasizes the extent to which a sigruficant current of the Latin American left has rejected the possibility of revolutionary change. Instead, he says, they have settled for what he considers a more viable, pragmatic strategy of reforming the region's political and economic systems into a Latin American version of social democracy: a decidedly more humane, more just, and more inclusive brand of capitalism, but capitalism nonetheless. My research also identifies this liberal-minded reformism as an important and growing tendency among left intellectuals in Cuba

25. Jorge Castafteda, Utopia Unarmed. "he Latin Amm'can Lt$ After the Cold War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). Other interpretations of the Latin American left's crisis can be found in: Barry Carr and Steve Ellner, The Latin American L+. From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Richard L. Harris, Marxism, Socialism and Democracy in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Marta Hamecker, A M c a Latina, Zzquierda y Crisis Acttul (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1990); Joan Aldzar Garrido, "La crisis hist6rica de las izquierdas latinoamericanas," Memoria (Mexico), No. 57, August 1993; Guillermo Zamora, La caida de la huz y el martillo (Mexico: Edamex, 1994); and Susanne Jonas and Edward J. McCaughan, Latin America Faces the Twenty-first Century, op. cit.

12

Introduction

and Mexico, which coexists with more orthodox socialist tendencies. However, in addition, my study identifies a third current of thought not clearly present in Castaiieda’s book, which is neither orthodox socialist nor liberal but rather renovative, and potentially far more sigruficant. I use the term renovative to refer to those leftists who still emphasize social goals and social, even collectivist, political and economic visions, and who are critical of both statist-socialist and liberal approaches. These three typologies (or ideal types), orthodox socialist, liberal, and renovative, do not correspond neatly to past political militancy or ideological orientation, but rather reflect the genuine shake-up of long-held positions and the process of renovation indicative of a true paradigm crisis and shift. The orthodox current of the left retains much of the traditional socialist discourse about the dangers of private property, market relations, and ”bourgeois” democracy. The renovators have much in common with the reform-minded, liberal left represented by Castaiieda. They embrace the democratic aspects of liberal political traditions and reject the extreme statism of the centrally planned economies of the former Soviet bloc. In the short-run, liberals and renovators within the left can agree on many of the reforms needed to make their societies more democratic, more just, and more egalitarian. However, as should become clear in the following chapters, the long-term vision of the renovators is still inspired by a belief in the possibility and the necessity of something more than reformed capitalism. The emerging renovative left is sustained by the ideal, utopian perhaps, of an egalitarian, socially just, and democratic, noncapitalist world-system. In this regard, the discourse and strategy of the renovative left remain what Wallerstein would call “antisystemic” rather than reformist. They are, as Car1 Boggs has observed of similar critical intellectual currents elsewhere in the world today, both post-(not anti-)Marxist and postliberal.26 I am inclined to agree with Wallerstein’s analysis that liberalism, ”the politics of constant rational reform,” the dominant ideology of this century, is as dead as Leninism. Liberalism gained very broad acceptance, according to Wallerstein, when growth and expansion of the capitalist world-economy made belief in inevitable progress and integration seem reasonable. However, he argues, it is no longer possible to continue to reallocate political power and economic benefits without disrupting accumulation within the capitalist world-system. Therefore, liberal reform is no longer a viable, long-term option.

26. Car! Boggs, lntellectuals and the Crisis of Modernity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 5-6.

GIobtlE Chng.e and hradigm Cris&

13

The period from 1968-1989 has swn the steady remained of the liberal consensus, . . . The world" doknartt sbata have lost any possibilit-y to conkol the world" svvorkng classes other than by force. Consent is gone, and consent has gone because bribery has gone. But force alone . . . i s insufficient to p e r ~poliSical t structures to sumive v e v fong.27

It is in this smse that I argue that the presence and growt-h of an antisysternic, renovative left tendency in Lath America is potentially more siwificant in the long run than the new refom-oriented pragmatism highlighted by Castafieda, whiCh, in essence, is little more than an attempt to revive GberaIism. (hdeed, the ~ v i v a of l iiberalism seems a rather utopian % h e m under the conditions of late wentieth-century Lath America.) Moreover, I expect that the same typolow identified in this shdyl orthodox, liberal, and renovative, can be accurately applied to left forces in other regions of the world-system, such as Eastem Europe or hdia, where sixnilar structuraf conditions m d conjunctclral t the applicabgity of meralism, even as contradictions prevail and left orthodoxy is rejected.28 Furthemore, the renovative ideas and evolving strategic vision explored herein are important beyond the left, particularly given the dearlfi of alternatives to neobberalism. being offered by anlJ other political farces. Mexican novelist Carios Fuentes wrote not long ago: Today, the program and activities of the left in Latin America are more important than ever. . . . Only the left can make sure that capitalism without safeguards, perpetuating our ancient social evils, is not imposed in Latin America. And only the left can prevent a bureaucratic and wproductive populist state frorn suffocating society.29

Despite repcated proclamations that 'The Left Is Dead,'hot only is the Ieft increasingly important in Lath America, the Latin American left is increasingly hportant as an inspiration for noncapitalist alternatives to crises that are global in scope. Note the co Arnericmist scholar Coran Thlerbom : 27. Irnmanuel Wallerstein, "The CoHapse of Liberalism," op cit., pp. 103-104. 28. The applicability of this typology to the Eastern European Iefts struck me as reasonable folowing personal conversations with European parlicipants in an intema~analconference on "Democ~acyin Post-Communist and Market Socialist Regimes," organized by the Cultural Studies Center, University af California, Santa Cruz, February 2996. 29. Carlos Fuentes, "'The Left 1s Not Dead,'Wln~orldPress Revkw, March 1992, p. 64.

The care value of socialist cultm~miversalequality and solidariv-remain inta&. The increasingly @obalnahre of social problemof poverty/~grat-ionand of the environment, for exampleand the aistence of global wica~onneworb, make it likely that these values wilf gain adherats and therefore sken@hrarther than, the opposite. The classical left is likely to be recam~tutedon that basis in the next cmtury. M a t it will look like we carnot say. But it s e m probable that the hture of the European sacialist left will be more h the image of the kfiof flze New Worlds of the Amrr'cm than in that cif the classical left of European industrial capi-talism, ft will be mare heterageneaus, both in its coneems and core idmtities, as wefl as in its longterm perspec~ves;more iduenced by exogenleus curbrail tendencies; lmser and mare demmratically organized; more pragma~cin practice*%

In the following chapters, we will explore in detail the ideas of the lefts that are being reconstituted in two nations of the Americas. Chapter Two will first prescnt a brief hislorical accomt of the evalution of the left's paradigm crisis in Cuba m d Mexico from the 1960s through the end of the 198Qs,highlighting thc irnpact of global chanps during the those currents af past detade. men, in Chapter Three, we will exa ft w%ch still fornulate their conceptions of democracy largcrly old socialist and liberal orthodoxies. Chapter Four then presents the renovative left's efforts to defhe a d m o c r a q that is fuller and broader than the restricted modeh offered by Eberal and socialkt doctrines and practices Chapters Five and Six explox these same tendencies with regards to their views on soci&sm, market ecmodes, and alternative economic models. Chapters Seven and Eight address the issues of n a t i o d sovereignty and the hportance of asserling the autonolny of the nation-state within Ihe worWsystem. Arowd tl-rese westions there remains considerable consensus m d thus fewer clear-cut ideological differences. The concluding chapter offers a muitidhensional explanation of the existence and U u e n c e of the o;rthodm, liberal, and renovative cunents and the trend of each toward ascendency ar decline in their resflectcive national contexts.

Cuba and Mexico were chosen as c a s shdies for several reasons. First, these nations produced the two most thorou& (in terns of socio30. &ran Therborn, "The Life and Times af %cialismtW Mew Left Reviezu, No. 194, July-August 1892, p. 32, (my emphasis).

economic and political transformation) and enduring revolutions in Latin America. They were revolutions guided by the old statist paradigm shared by mucln of the na~onalistand swiafist left. In many regards, the Mexican and Cuban revolutions are two of the most successful examples strategy: the popular classes were incorporated of the old middleinto the pnlitical syskm; left-associakd ethical vahes af social jus~ce m61 equaEty were substantidy incorporated into the poshrevolutionary national culture; state-led, economic development strategies Mted both nations out of the periphery; and national sovereignty was defended with relative success in the shadow of an aggressively expansive stlperpawer. The cohesiveness and stabiliv of their postrevalutiamr to avoid bmtal md societies allowed Mexico and ary dictatorships *at ru ruptures like thostz caused by Lath American nafims throughout much of the 197Els and 1980s. Clearly, there were hportmt cowtewailhg conskahts an their respeclive national-revolu-tiona'~"projects, The United States reasse&ed its islflumce over Mexico in the 1920s and again in the 1940s and "50s, and Cuba slipped into quasi-dependence on the Soviet bloc after the early 1960s. At the same h e , the historical trajectory of both revolutions awst to the most serious defidts of the old stat.ist paradip: the postrevolutiortary political systems evolved into increasingly autPtoritarian state-party regimes, and the st-ate-cmkred economies were ill-equipped to adapt to the sweeping global changes of recent decades. Today, the posbevolutionary reghes of both naliiam, Cuba with a left still in power and Mexico wifh a s&ong left in apposition, confront profound socioeconomic and political crises reflecting the deficiencies of the old strakgy and the difficuIt)r of creating a progressive alternative to neoliberal restmcluring. As case strudies Cuba m d Mexico will allow us to examine two historically important lefts that exhibit compositionaf integrity over time (mdishrrbed by the violent national traumas experienced etse.cvhere)and which are today facing *rims conjmct.ural crises and readjustnent. Furthermore, by focussing on the paradigm crisis and shift wnderway within the lefts of just these two c o ~ r t t ~ iite is ~ ,possibk to present a more nuanced analysis than that offered in Wtopta Unamedps sweeping, panoramic view of the Latin American left. Another methdological difference between this study and Castaiieda" book is that my research is based on a larger and broader sample of the left: I interviewed seventy-four Cubans and Mexicans for this book, a purposive sample selected to reflect the range of relevmt political and ideological currents and ge ions. Wi(h k w exceptions, the individuds interviewed are? not gav nt officials, but neither are they isolakd, "ivory-tower" academics. Their ideas and activities are

higMy relevant in the pofitics of theit natjms. %ox interviewed include members of the highest policy-making bodies of the ruling Cuban C 'st Party (PCC) and of Mexico's main left opposition Partido de la RevoluciCIn Democrktica (Pm). They include important Mexican opinion-makers who write regufar colu s in the Mexicm press, l a d moral authority as well as strategic vision to the opposition, serve as national mediators in the conflict in Chiapas and as opposition legislators in the national Congress, help set the agenda of national wiversities, m d advise labox unions, women's orga&a~om, and urban popular movements. The Cubans interviewed include poky advisers who have the ear of the nation" highest officiah on a broad range of issues f r m refoms of the economy, the Constitution, and the crhinal justice system to policies on culture and the a&. SpecificalXy, 1 intenriewed forty-th~e Cubans, kcluding: h e e members of the PCC Central C whom were part of the revolution's histaric leadership); four high-level PCC fmctimaries; five ministerial fmctimaries (including one mhister of stak); W O CO d s t You* cadre; six intellectuals from the arts/cultural sphere;t-tventy-five academics from various miversity departments and research centers; and two members of the small, social democratic opposition. 1 interviewed Chirty-one Mexicans, represenkg st, Trotskyist, Maoist, revolutionary nationalist, and independent socialist currents, former members of the mllng PRI and current PR1 sympathizers, left party m,ifitants as well as waffiliated acadedcs and other sectors of the inteiligentsjia. Fifteen of the Mexicans interviewed are currently active inthe main left opposition party, Partido de !a Revoluci6n Dernocrdtica, ten of &em h nationall IeadersEp positions. Many of these seventy;four pople we= intcllrviewed more than once. The inkrviews were based on a questiomake divided into five sets of issues: (1) h e inkmtional si-hna~on,partidarly the hplicatims of a post-Cold War order for traditional natianakst aspirations; (2) politicaf. economy and development, includkg the role of the stak, planning, and markets, as well as quest.ions regarding the viabiXity of sociafisrn and the meankg of- "development""and *"xogressM;(3) democratization, conceptions of democracy, and state-party-civil socieq relations; (4) the emergence of new social actors and changing concepts of who constihks Lhe "sujeto hist&ko'hof social chiunge; and (5) ideology per se, incfuding MarxisIm, Lenifnism, revolutionary nationalism, liberalism, and neof *eralism. Interview data is supplemented wi& an extttnsive bibliography of recent written materials from the Cuban and Mexican 1efts. This empirical data, essentially ideas and discourse, provide the heart of the study, which is a description and analysis of the cunmt process of

Global Change and hradignz Crisis

17

ideological r e d e f ~ ~ oand n reassessment among left intellectuals in Cuba m d Mexic0.3~

Theoretical Perspectives Although this is a study of ideas, it is primarily an empirical rather than a tfteoretical work. NeveAeEess, my analysis is dearly a o m e d by theoretical perspectives, particularly those associated with two distinct sociology; (1)-she sociology of howledge, ideology, and intellectuals, and (2) the historical political economy of world-systems theory. Tlne comb g of &ese WO traditims is somevvhat mre, m d this study reprflsents one of the few empirical studies of ideology and discome writkm from a world-systems perspective. The sociology of knowledge and ideology, dating back to Karl e h , attempts to explah how historical, s ternhe "the subject" whole mode of conceivin h e h f s words "the cmditions of existence affect genesis of ideas, but constitute an essential part of the products of thought and make &emselves felt in their cmtmt and farm, Marx's observations about "'false cansciousness," though M preference f'or the more neuhral fomulation of "'perspective," via the work of Georg Lukhcs, Louis Althusser, Clifford Geertz, and into the present, a great debate has persisted about the definition of ideology, which ulthatdy "revolves aromd om single quczstion: shsutd ideology be defined according to the criterion. of truth or falsehood?"3*l IR other words, does ideology merely reflect the current realities of society or is it distortion fconseiousor o&ewise)?

31. One reader of an earlier draft of this book was critical of what he considered my immersion in ""very parochial literature" and my inattention to the work of ""lading scholarly experts on Cuba and Mexico." Most of the literature cited herein is only parochiai by the most U.5.-centric standards, and indeed much of the work cited is written by leading experts an Cuba and Mexico, most of t h e r n h m Cuba, Mexico, or other Latin American countries. It is hoped that this study will help expose mare U.S. scholars to the important ideas of their Latin American colleagues. 32. KarX Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. An Introdtrctian to the SocioEoa of Knowledge (New York: Warcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 19361, p. 266. 33, %id., p,279, 34. Raymond Boudon, Tlze Analysis of Ideolc7gy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 24.

So many ~ e o r i s t have s added thix opfions to this debate, that the proverbial angels dancing on the pinhead have come to resemble a heavy-metal mosh pit, one into which I have neither the courage nor the inclination to hurl myself. Besides which, I am reasonably satisfied with the resolution to this debate suggested in a recent work by John Thompson, who claims to offer a "critical conception of ideology," which, "can be used to refer to the ways in which meaning serves, in stances, to establish and sustain relations of power . . . . Ideology, broadly speaking, is meaning in the service ofpower."35 I would add but one qualification, ideology may also be meaning in the service of u~lderminingpwer; that is, thew are mtisysternic (in Wa1Ierstein"s terns), or counterhegemonit. (inGramscian parlance), as well as dominant ideologies. This study is about both the decline of old ideologies that served to swain relatiom of power (ie., Eberalism and Marxismm), as well as about efforts to constmct new mtisystemic ideolo-

h recent years, discourse malysis has remhd hportance of measring and representation in sus sionalfy, however, h its tendency to read all social discourse analysis loses sight of the oher historical, struchrral cmdil.ions in which discursive representation is formed. Formately, Robert Wuthnw has provided a nrawelous, strucktraw-gromded, historical account of haw three major world ideologies emerged as critical disand then became institutionalized: the Reformation, the Enlightand Europem Socialism.36 u t h o w had the great advantage over this author of exa historically consolidated ideolwies, whercas the prescmt study is about a process Rf idealogicat change still v e ~ ymuch undernay. Neveraeless, many sf W u t h o w " general findings are applicable to the develoymenfs islsistence on described herein. Particularly helpful is W ties [in which] examhing the '"concrete livhg and b r c z a ~ h g discourse becorns memhghl": Discourse subsumes the wriEen as well as the verbal, the formal as well as the infomal, the gestural or ritual as well as the mnceptual. Xt occurs, however, within communities in the broadest sense of the word: mities of competing producers, of interpreters and critics, of

35. John B. Thompson, ldeolow and Modem C~ilture(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2 990), pp. 6-7, 36. Robert Wuthnow, Commt6nitiL.s of Discotrrse. I d e o l o ~and Social Strzrctrtre in tlze Reformation, the Enlightenment, and Etrropean Socialism, op cit.

Global Chnge and P a r a d i p Crisis

15,

audiences and consumers, and of paeans and other sipficant actors who become the subjects of discourse itself .37

merefore? "to understand how an. iderology is shaped by its social ts, one must . . . ex which these expressions come into being."% Among those stances, W u h o w KgM&hts two fact0 ed here: (1) divisions identisied as a prminent feature of the pobtical conditions giving rise to each of the culhral havations analyzed in Communities of Discourse, and (2) the availability of resources to support the diffusion of new ideologies. We wiff return to threse &sues in the concludjng chapter, when we explore (1)the ways in which divisions wit%lin,and the absence of viable alternatives from, rulixlg elites in Cuba and Mexico, as well as in core nations like the United States, have contributed to a conjuncture in which a renovative left discourse appears and asserts itself, and (2) how the different resources available in each national situation condition the relative strength of renovative, liberal, m d orthodox perspectives. The socialogy of i n k k h a l s provides another hpartant thread of the theoretical cloth in which this study is wrapped. Carl Boggsf recent book, lntellecluals and the Cris& of Nodeunity, pmsents hteEectuals as irnportant "agents of legitimation and delegithation.'"g After su ions of "modernity" and ""progress,'" understood h g th as technological control over nature and material in Enl abundance, Botggs argues that: The implications of aU this for the role of intelle-als are dual and contradictory: the rise of a hegemonic techocratic intelligentsia accompanied by its negat-ion in the social forces that grow out of the conditions [of the late tvrrentieth century]. The crisis of modernity generates an epochal conflict betmreen technocratic and critical modes of thought, bemeen structures of domination and embryonic form af apposition visible in the emergence of new social movements.40

The Gramscian-~uencedBoggs is particularly concerned with the h e g a m y exercised by hcreasingly t e h w r a t i c inkllectuals and the g rote of traditJonally critical intellectuals, because without

37". %id-,p. 16, 38. bid., p. 5 a . 39, CarX Boggs, oip cit., p. 2. 40. Ibid., p. xiii.

Introduction

20

"critical modes of &aught.

. .no effective social trmsfomation can oc-

CUI-,~~~

The critical role of intellectuals has been especially important in the history of Latin America. Latin Americanist scholar Jean Franco recently observed that Latin America's intelligentsia helped sustain utopian visions and ""shaped the idenaiity of nations." X t was they who acted as the critical consciousness of smiety, as the voice af the opgr~sed,as the teachers of future generagons. R e y were held-and held themselves-in hi& regard. Indeed, Cuban independence hero fast$Mhtlartr" is still referred to as "the apostle," the Mexican Jos4 Vasconcelos compared himelf ta Moses. . . . This prestige has to be understood in the context of swieties with high levels of iIliteracy. The intelligentsia were nat only major actors in the public sphere, but at least in public percept-ion-mediators for the popular classes and advocates of social change.42 That historical role is in question today, according to Franco, not only because of factors such as the disglusi ent with sociaEsnn, the ektorat defeat of (he Sandhistas in Nicaragua, and the coUapse of unism, but also because of the eclipse of the print media and thct gfobalization of the electronic media. "The extinction that &reatens the intelligentsia," notes Mexico's Roger Barba, "has caused great alarm in Latin America, possibly because this is one of the regions of the world that has best preserved these relics of the past that are the public or organic inteIiectuals."43 Bartxa is right, but why has the critical role of the intelligentsia been better preserved in Latin America? Most sociological works on intellectuals, including the excellent books by W u h o w and Boggs, fmr;ts largely, if not exclusively, an intellecbals of Western Europe md the United States, the core of the modem world-system. To understmd the particular role that left intellectuals canthue to play in Mmico and Cuba, and to appreciate the kkelhaod that a new antisystemic or cowterhegemanic discour= may emerge in such areas of the world, it is necessary to siktate this shxdy withh the framewosk nf world-systems malysis. 41. fbid.,p.xii. 42. Jean Franco, "Whafs Left of the Intelligentsia? The Uncertain Future of the Printed Word," NACLA Report an the Ameuims, Vol. XXVlIf, MO. 2 (%pt./Oct. 1994). An excellent Spanish &anslation of Franco" piece also appeared in La JornaLia SernarzaE (Mexico),No. 291 uanuary 8,1921). 43,. Roger Barlxa, "Cuatro Formas Be Experimentair la Muerte Intelectual," h Jornad~Semanaf (Mexico), No. 2% Ganuary 8,1995).

Clobg1 C h n g e and Paradigm Crisis

21

World-systems scholars argue that, since the sivteenth century, there has exi&ed a single world-systm, comisting of a poE6cal newark of nation-states and "one capitafist e c o n o ~ csystem Mii& d8ferent sec& perfaming different hctians."M Those sectors have been labeled core, periphery, and semiperiphetry. The c m , including the United States, Wstern Europe, and Japan, is characterized by the rnost advanced technologies of the world-economy, global d i t a r y power, strong states and stable political systems, and a large middle class. The periphery, hcluding rnost African states and many Lath American and Asian nations, reflect the opposite characteristics: poor, often single-crop agricultural economies, weak and unstable states, a small, extravagantly wealthy elite d o w i d e an extremely bpovesished, largely marghabzed majority. Semiperipheral sectors of the world-economy are generally charactexized by older hdustrial techologies fomerly Ihited to the core. Semiperipheral states are rctlatively strong and stable (often authoritarid, and the population of the semiperiphery includes a substantial middle class, generally associated with the public sectors, and a siNficant industrial working class, Much of the current discussion about "globaka~on,"a prctcess mtkipated by and cmtalned within the world-system analysis of capitalism gives tit.tle attention to the ways in which intershte competitim and the mequal division of tabor (represented by the core, periphery, and semiperiphery) render the nature and effects of globalizaticm quite different from one wgim to mother, That is why this analysis is situated within the world-system framework rather than within the less precisely elaborated nation of "globalization," The semiperiphery is a category of particular importance in worldsystems theory because sf its dual role as political buffer in the interstate system and as site of new, profitable inveshnent opportunities no longer available in the core. The semiperiphery includes large parts of Latin America, Soulheat Asia, South Africa, hdia, a d Eastern Europe. Mexico is one of the classic semiperipheral nations. Cuba, as I will argue, also exhibits many of the qualities associated with the semiperiphery, even though it has not c only been described in this way and currently risks being reperipheralized. l will contend that the semiperipheral status of Cuba and Mexico, which places them above the most extreme conditions of abject poverty that conkibute to the social disinkgratim so pervasive in the periphery but not within reach of the makrial abundance that tends to placate citizens of the core, helps explain the reluctmce of: the lefts in those nations to embrace bberalisnn and their efforts to renovate an antkystemic strategy. nuel Wailelrstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 198Q),p. 68.

22

Introduction

The structural position of Cuba and Mexico within the world-system also affects the very nature and role of intellectuals, distinguishing them from their counterparts in the core. Samir Amin notes that the intelligentsia outside the core is defined by: (i) its anticapitalism;(ii) its openness to the universal dimension of the culture of our time and, by this means, its capacity to situate itself in this world, analyze its contradictions, understand its weak links, and so on; and (iii) its simultaneous capacity to remain in living and close communion with the popular classes, to share their history and cultural expressi0n.G

In contrasting the twentieth-century history of traditional European intellectuals with that of Third World intellectuals, Ebggs observes that the latter "were more integral to political struggles of the post-War period, more keenly focussed on the unity of knowledge and powerowing in part to their sense of national subordination within the global order."& Thus when this book focuses on left intellectuals in Cuba and Mexico, it is not examining the ideas of isolated academics or technocrats. It is exploring the thinking of a politically influential and engaged intelligentsia closely associated with parties and social movements that intervene in national politics. The question of political struggle and its relationship to the role of intellectuals and the construction of discourse brings us to a final theoretical concern running throughout this study: the relationship between structure and agency. Elsewhere I have reviewed the contribution of some of sociology's greatest thinkers to our understanding of how human agency is exerted within and, at pivotal moments, against historical ~tructures.4~The question is relevant here regarding: (1) the power of discourse itself as subject, not merely as a reflection of existing structures, and (2) the critical role of political struggle in altering both ideology and material structures. Although dogmatic interpretations of Marxism have often zigzagged between extreme economic determinism and idealistic voluntarism, the founders of Marxism attempted to strike a balance. Marx believed that human beings make history, but he warned that they do not always do so under their conditions-of-choice. And Engels

45. Samir Amin, "The Social Movements in the Periphery: An End to National Liberation," in S. Amin, et al., Transforming the RevoZcition, op. cit., p. 136. 46. Car1 Boggs, Intellectuals and the Crisis of Modernity, op. cit., p. 13. 47. Edward J . McCaughan, "Race, Ethnicity, Nation, and Class within Theories of Structure and Agency,"Social Justice, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2 (Spring 1993).

Global Change and Paradigm Crisis

23

acknowledged that "ideological conception. . . reacts in its turn upon the economic basis and may, within certain limits, mod* it."& Wuthnow writes about the "reciprocal influence (a kind of feedback mechanism) of ideas on the social environment."49 Based on his historical studies, Wuthnow argues that, once institutionalized, an ideology "may play a decisive role in acting back on its environment."50 Regarding the role of intellectuals and associated political actors and movements, the important agents of ideology and social change, Wuthnow concludes from his study: [Hlistory is not determined by the invisible dynamics of capitalist development; it is made by actors who exercise choice on the basis of partial information; but it is also shaped within the constraints defined by tradition, special interests, economic conditions, and political circumstances. . . . In each historical episode the leading contributors to the new cultural motifs recognized the extent to which the institutional conditions of their day were flawed, constraining, oppressing, arbitrary. . . . The strength of their discourse lay in going beyond negative criticism and beyond idealism to identify working models of individual and social action for the future.51

What are the implications of these observations for this study? If the renovative left currents identified in Mexico and Cuba successfully institutionalize their discourse into viable political organizations, economic programs, social modes of existence, and cultural expressions, the future of those nations and of their relationship to the world-system could be sigruficantly altered. Whatever the ultimate outcome of their efforts, as the dust settles from the simultaneous collapse of socialism and liberal reformism, and as neoliberalism's sudden ascendancy continues to wreak social and economic havoc, the political intellectuals examined herein are most certainly responding to Wallerstein's call to help formulate "a clear antisystemic strategy for an era of disintegration."

48. Frederick Engels, "Letters on Historical Materialism," in Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co., 1978), p. 763. 49. Robert Wuthnow, Conimiinities of Discourse, op. cit., p. 548. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., pp. 582-83.

CHAPTER 2. THE BACKDROP

From the the Neoli

960s to hars Left?

In Cuba and Mexico, the left" historical, statist p a r a d i p took on added weight as a result of the. nationalist revolutions that constitute the key delining moments of their twentieth-cenbry fife (Mexico from 1H0 through the 1930s, Cuba from 1959 &rough the 1970s2). A quick review of major trends in left thought h these countries wit1 allow a better appreciation of the exknt to which gIobal events of the 1980s haltered the old paradigm. The Sovietization of the Cuban Revolution

In the fist years following the 1959 seizure of state p o w r , the Cuban rclvolution was not do ated by any one ideological current. Fidel Castro's Twenty-Sixth ly Movement was politically domhant as a resuft of Castro" charismatic leadership, the movement's successful guerrilla campaip against the Batista dictatorship, and the relalcive weahess of Cuba" domi-nant social c1asses.z However, Castxo" was an ideologicatly &verse movemmt, including socialists, various vaguely-defhed democrats. Cuba's histork c 1. The ending dates of both revolutions are debatable. For the Mexican revolution, the Lhzara Chrdenas government of the 1%0s marked a; period of: signif cant institutionafization and consolidation of the new regime and the last of the major social reforms sparked by the revafutian. Cuba" revolution carried oat the bulk of its most radical economic and social changes during the 1960s and underwent a substantial process of institutionatization in the 2970s. In that regard, X offer these decades as markers of the end of the actual revoilutionaxy periods of profound socioeconomic and political change. 2. See Marifeli Pkrez Stable, The Gltban Revolutio~. Brrgins, Cozrrse, and Legwcy (Qxford: Gxlsrd University Press, 1993) fur an insightful analysis of the failure of Cuba's upper dasses to articulate and carry out their own program for nonrevolutionary change, of the sort undertaken elsewhere in Latin America (e.g., under Getulio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Pex6n in Argentina).

the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), was far more cohesive but had played a less decisive role h the m a t a y campaip and was mabfe to dominate politically. The rocky process of g hew diverse forces into a singlt? p a m of the revolution wouf. more tfim five years, including the short-lived Organizaciones h v o l u c i m r tegradas (W)and eventually the foundkg of the new Cuban ist Party (PCC) in 1965. Partly as a result of the early divelsity of the revolution, the 1960s were a period of great effervescence, creativity, and debate. It would be a mistake to romanticize the 3 9 6 0 ~shce ~ they were also marked by biner disputes, purges, defec~ons,chaos, economic difficulties, and the threat of U.S. intewention. Nevertheless, the period also generated gred enthusiasm among the popuhr classes m d radical htelligentsia, as the Cuban revdtttion actively experheated with various econodc and political notions, in search of an independenl, uniquely Cuban socialism. Thc? agrarian reforms combined small private, collective, and state f o r m of property. EfforCs at ixnport-subslihtion isldustrialization accompanied an expansion and modernization of the &aditimal sugar econmy. The relative merits of moral and material incentives were endlessly arped, as were theories of value and system of accomting and pricing, h the political realm, utnpian notions of direet democracy gradually p v e way to an emphasis on popular participation through mass organizations of workers, peasants, women, artistsi and intellectuals. Literature and the arts flowered. New currents of progmssive thou@t from aromd the world influenced the academy, perhaps most notably at the University of Havana" Philosophy Depament, and were reflected in heterodox journals such as Pensamz'mto Critico. The camterculitural values of the "'world revolu.tion of: 196Ef""ech-d strongly wit"hin sectars of the Cuban revolution as well, according to philosopher Juan Antonio Blanco. But, he laments, the invasion of CzechoslovaZcia by Cuba's sew Soviet patrons ""destmyed the hopes of 1968."3 For Cuban historian Jarge %arra, ""The Cuban revolution was made during the first ten years. Since 1870, it has mainly lost t h e e f f 4 3. Juan htonia BIancclt, presentation an Cuba and the 1966s, Casa dc; las Am&ricas,Havana, February 9,1993. 4. Jorgcl &arra, interview with author, Havana, Februav 12,1993. For early assessments of the first decade of the Cuban Revaiutian, see Sheldon B. Liss, Roots of Revoltition: Radical Thatrght in GEL&(Lincoln: University- of Nebraska Press, 2987); Lionel Martin, The Early Pidel. Roots of Cczstro's Communism (kaucus, N.J.: Lyre Stuart Inc., 1978); Elizabeth Sutherland, The fitingest Revol~ttion(New York: The Dial Press, Inc., 1969); Leo Huberman and Paul M, Sweezy, Cuba: A n a t o q ofa Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968); james UComor, The Orig~uzsof Socialkm in Cuba (New York: Monthly Review

The Backdrop

26

Again, I do not want to suggest that the Cuba of the 1960s perfectly embodied the idealistic aspirations of that revolutionary decade. C u b a ~ s tscholar CaraHee Sengebdorf offers a sober assessment, particularly of the leadership's failure to establish a solid framework for democratic input into the diredion of the revolution: The Cuba of the 2960s had takn the emancipatory message of the classical Marxist heritage concerning the postcapitalist state and simply follawed its spirit. The sotugion to the problem of its silences and contradictions and, above all, to its incarnation in the poli~cafand econornic structures of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was, in t?ff(?ct, not to create any permanent state institutions*. . . The absence of form to insure any kind of popular input into decision making had led, by the end of the 1960s, to a siuation in which the Xeadershi concentrated around the figure of Fidel-had separated itself entirely from the population, a population that had been left virtually wil.fiout a voice and without a path by which to read this leadership.5

The period of institutionalization that followed, together with the relative stability md e c o n o ~ cwell-being of the 1970s, werg na doubt experienced by many Cubms as a much-needed order and respite from the upkaval of h e previous decade. But Che price of c a h and hstit-utionalkation may well have been a lost oppo ity to break with the more or&odox feahres of state soriabm. The discourse and strategy of' the Cuban revolution thereafter were increashgly confined within a relativefy more humme, more participatory, and themfore more popular version of the Soviet model. Several developments combined to cut short the rr?volution% early phase of diverse experhentatrim md move it increashgly h the direction of a more rigid, more authoritarian systm p a t t e d after the Soviet Union. h addition to the marnbiguous s i p a l to fall in step sent by the Soviets with the invasion of Czechoslovakia, at least five o&er factors contributed to the jelXhg of a m m stilltist society-: 1, The unreknthg h o s t a y of the United Stales, even after the defeat of the internal comterrevolution, seemed to just@ an m g h a s i s an defense, ty, discipline, and certah a u f i o ~ t a r i m Press, 1970). For m r e recent and more sobering Imks back on that decade, see Marifeli Pbrez Stable, n e Gzrban Revobltion, op. cit., especially chapters 3,4, and S; fiusan Eva Eckstein, Backfiom the Ft""zrture:Castro Under Cuba (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Universify PT(?SS,1994); and Carollee Eengelsdorf, The Problem of rSemocracy in C~tba,Between Vision and Reality (New York and Qxfard: Oxford

University Press, 2994). 5. Carollee kngelsdorf, ibid., p. 100.

2.

3.

4.

5.

measures. More-over, the economic dismptions caused by the U.5. htade embargo made central p the Soviet Union an o p ~ o nincreasingly difficult to avoid. The death of Emesto (Che) Guevara in 1967, and his hcreashg absence from Cuba in the preceding years, deprived the revolution" IeadersKp of a creative, un~rfiodoxvoice who was highly cri~cal of the S o h t system. and represented a comterbahnce to the orthodoxy of Cuba's historic Co and to the realpditik pragmatism of C a s h 6 In 1970, Fidel Castro and his supporters threw all of the hImdfs resources into attempting a =cord 10-million ton sugar harvest. This was mderstood as Cuba's last, best effort to pursue m independent path by maximizing its natural advanta&e and generakg the capital needed for autonomous devebpment. m e n the effort failed, m d in the absence of' Guevara, Casko was left without my clear alternative to a sbategic atlimce w i ~ the Soviets. Moreover, his awn authority was undemhed by the failure af the sugar harvest, opening room for greater influence by more orthodox, p-soviet leadas from the iomer PSP. Following the failure of the 2970 harvest, and in the face of the U.S trade embargo# Cuba decided to join the Sovicit bloc's scsnodc sysknn, the Cowcil far Mutual Economic Assistme (CMEA). Joining CMEA h p l k d m a h g the island's systems of economic plamhg, manawment, financing, pricing, and so on, compatible with that of the Saviet and Eastern European economies. A Soviet-style, five-year plan was adopted in Cuba, md criticism of the revolution's nevrr patrons was kcreasingly discouraged. As the revolution began a process of political instihtionaliization in i t s second decade, those with the achowledpd organizational skills and. experiences were largely cadre from the fomer PSP. The orgrznizaGon of the new C strucbre, procedures, educa~onal program, ideological mmuak, and the E&e, was left to a considerable extent in the

6. C h the thought of Ernmto (Che) Cuevara and his influence on the Ctlban Revolution, see Carlos Tablada, Che Ctravara: Economics and Politics in the Transition to Socialism (Sydney: Pathfinder Press, 1989); and Various, k n s a r Al Che (Havana: Centro de Estudios %bre Am&rica/Ediforiat Jss4 Martl, 19852). On the thought of Fidel Castro, see SheEdan 8.Liss, Pidel! Castro's Political and Social 15trozigkf (Boulder: Weshriew Press, 1994); Fidel Castro, Meologf~,cctnczencl'a y frabajo pll"ficoDS59-2986 (Havana: Editorial Puebfo y Educacic"zn, 2991); and Uonel. Martin, op. eit.

hands of proSoviet, o r h o d o x militants of the PSP. The distlourse of the Cuban =volution became hereasingly stamped with the Stale language of "scien~Pir

This combination of factors led to a more rigid, mare authoritarian ation of insfit-uthitl cent@=repsesenthg aftersystem and to the el the UniversiCy of Havana" PWosophy Denative perspecklives partment and Pensamimto Critico were both closed d o w n in 1971).8 That i s not to say that all efforts at autochthonnus h o v a t i n n w m e h l n a t e d . The fornation of Cuba's national potitical system of Poder Popular in 2975 reflected a c itment to genuine pogular partiripation, particularly a t the locat levels, that distinguished it from the Soviet model. Nevertheless, prevaiiing political discourse cmtinued t o spurn ""bourgeois" gr ""Iberal" dem cy as meaningless fomafititss, and a d as comterrevolutionary or a t best eaueratizalion, abuses of techocratic power, and corruption (the most recent of which was the "Rectification" begun in 1986) kept Cuba's economic enterprises more honest and participatory than their Eastern counterpart^.^ However, the d

7. According to forge Castageda, "Casks was forced to use PSP cadres as professionals fled the island en masse. And even after the purges of 1962 and 1968, PSP Commmists filled positions of responsibility weEl beyond what t-heir actual participaeon in the revolutrian entitled them to, Similarly, the policies Cuba fallawed domestically, particularly after 1968, came mcarmnily to r e ~ m b l r ? what the PSP would have called for if it had sunrived as a separate entiw." forge Casta5eda, Utopia Unamed (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1993), p. 32, 8, In Juan h t o n i o ErlancoEsaccount, through the Philosophy Degarment and Pensamiento Crftico, "we were trying ta create a Cuban Marxist school of thinking, using a nondogmatic approach to Marxism. . . , Throughout the 19605, we tried ta update the Cuban population on the major trends of thiding of our time . . . . All this was something totally %abnormal"or a proper, prudent Soviet socialist publication. . , . AIX of a sudden the direction of the department changed, a new curriculum was imposed, and Pensamiento Cvz"li(7o was shut down." Juan htonlio BIanco, "Cuba: Crisis, Ethics, and ViabiXiV," in S. Jonas and E. McCaughan, h l i n Americrr Faces the TwenEy-First Century (Boulder: Wetview Press, 39941, p. 192. 9. Qn "Rec~fication," see Fidel Castro, Rect$caciLin: Sobre el proceso de v e c t ~ e a c en i ~ ~C~rba1986-1990 (Havana: Editorial hlit-ica, 2990); forge Alo12~0, Cuba: La Rectificacirin (Guadalajara: Zfniversidad cle Guadalajara, 1990); Marifeli Pkrez Stable, The Cuban Revoltition, op cit.; Susan Eva Eckstein, Back From the Future, op cit.;and variom articles in Sandor Halebsky and John M. Erk, Tranqormatz'on and S t r w l e : Czlba X-'aces the 1990s (New York: Praeger, 1990);

cialist discourse did not allow any consideration of private property or market relafions. Even private snow-cone vendors were regarded as a potential threat to the revolution's goal of a classless society. On the cultural front, despite censorship and with considerable effort and courage, Cuba's f h makers, likrary co ,and a r ~ t generally s mmaged to produce in refreshing, often b r a a n t modes far removed from the stilted sociabst realism of the East.lo The revolution and its leadership continued to enjoy broad popular support, despite the lack of democracy and spa= for individual iniiiative, in large part because of the regime's real a ~ e v e m e n t sin the areas of universal health care and education. Perhaps to an even greater extent, the revolution and Fidel Casko retained legitimacy because they were seen as having finally secured Cuba's long fruskated national independence and sovereipv, particularly vis a vis the United States.11 M e n all was said and done, however, from the mid-1970s until the world-shahg events of t-he late-1980s, the Cuban revolution and the vast majority. of its intellectuals; never seriously challenged the a u t h a ~ tarian, paternalistic, and highly centralized statist paradigm that had emerged from both Marxist-leninist ;\nd nat-ionalist traditions. M a t began as a peoples' revolution evolved into a relatively monolithic stateparty reghe.Iz The term "state-party regime" perhaps has been most clearly defined by Adolfo Gilly in relation to the system that eventually emerged from the Mexican revolution and against which a majority of today's Mexican left is m o b i k d : [A state-party regime] is a. political regime in which the ruling party f o r m a single body with the adnr"xdtrative and caercive apparatus of --

-- - -

Sandor Halebsky and J o b M, Krk, Czrba in Transithn: Gris.is and Trgnsfornzati~n (Boulder: Weshiew, 1992). 10. %e, for crxample, tuis Camitzer, New Art of C~rbcz(Auslin: University of Texas Press, 1994) and the series of articles on Cuban culbre in S, Halebsky and J. Kirk (eds.), Cuba: 25 Years of Rmolztlr'on, 2959-1984 (New York: Praegex: Publishers, 1985) and in J. Criffiths and I?. Griffiths (eds.), Cuba: The Second Eft.cade(Britain-Cuba kientilic Liason C a m ~ t e e2,982). 11. %e Marifeli P6rez Stable, The Ctrban R m l u tion, ap,cit., for an insightful analysis of what she describes as Cuba" '"dated savereiwly," iden~fied along with Cuba's sugar-centereb dwttlspment, uneven modernization, a crisis of political authority, the weakness of the economic classes, and the relative strength of the popular classes as six factors in the Wentieth century which "inkraeted to render Cuba susceptible to radical revotution," p. 7. 12. On developments in the Cuban revolution in the 1980s and early 1990s, see the Halebsky and Kirk collections, ibid.; Marifeli P4rez Stable, n e Cirban Revoltition, ap cit,; and Susan Eva Eckstein, Back From the F~lfure,a p cit,

the state?acts as its pali~calorgan, obtains its resauces &an state finance and exdudes the possibility of alternation of other parties in. the executive branch or in the fa tion af a ma~orivin the legislature. Such a regime can take the form of a single party that is comtit-itu-tionally established [e.g., Cuba] or that af a state party with symbolic opposition parties that camatr de facto or de jure, aspire .to occupy the execu~veor to share the status and privileges of the ruling party [e.g., Mtrxicof.13 A large majolity of Cuba's left has remained loyal to the state-party r e g h e created by the ~ v o l u ~ and o n ~Cuba's dissident left is a small but growing minority. h contrast, while the Mexican left's relationship to its nation's postrevolutionary regime has always been fraught with contradictions, the great bulk of left foxes today are in the opposition, and only a small, albeit influential, of leftists remain sympathetic to the tihcional (PM).As a left-in-opposition, m l k g Partido Rr?volucim ke thek Cuban romterparts, broke with certain political aspects of the old paradigm and embraced more liberal notions about democracy. Like the Cubans, however, Mexican lef~stshave been slow to question the statism of the old e c m o ~ strategy. c

The Mexican Left: Democracy Revatued, Statism Unchallenged

Of the various historic currents making up the Mexican left today, three are pafticularly &portant: (I) the C h ' ts, whose parv was fomded in 1919, (2) the revolutionaty nationalists and cardenistas, who acfieved their greatest influence and clearest art.iculation during the L6zaro C&denasgove nt of the 2930s' and (3) the various strands of the new left h a t emexged from t%le 1968 sbdent movement. These currents remined shaxply divided through tjhe Igms, but during the 1980% a series of difficult, on-again-off-agah mergers helped crt?ate a more mifitsd left. The massive1 rted 1988 presidenlial campaign af Guauhtkmac GBrdenas, a p t center-left potitical figure (and son of Ldzaro) who broke w i ~ PM, was decisive in fur&ex tftese left currents t o g e ~ e with broad sectors of Mexico" ppopular and r social movemenb into the Partido de fa Revolucibn Berrrocr4tica (PRD) in 1989. the Lgzaro Cdrdenas ent in the 1930s, much of the CO and revolutionary n left in Mexico actively supported the progressive nationalism of the regimf?. Left support of the

13. Adolfa Gi_Xly, " R e Mexitan Regime and Xts Dilc?. l'nternational Afairs, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Winter 1990), p. 274-

what’s Lp?

31

PRI dwindled from the 1940s through the 1960s, as the state-party regime (the bases of which, ironically, were established by Lazaro Ciirdenas) became more authoritarian, more representative of national and international business interests, and less responsive to popular sectors. As a result, the question of democracy and democratization, including the formal and procedural issues of multiparty, electoral systems, took on a greater significance for the Mexican left than it has, until very recently, for Cuban revolutionaries. Particularly after the Mexican government’s bloody repression of the 1968 student movement, a watershed event for the nation as a whole, demands for democratization became an increasingly important component of the left’s discourse. As a left-in-opposition, the differences among Mexican leftists have been more transparent than the divisions within the highly disciplined Cuban Communist Party. As a result, there has never been one, official left discourse on democracy in Mexico. Different interpretations of the nature of Mexico’s postrevolutionary state produced quite different strategies for political and social change in contemporary Mexican society. Those differences were initially sharpened by the government’s limited political reforms of the mid-1970s (prompted by the fall-out of 1968) and by the worsening economic situation in the early 1980s, following the 1982 debt crisis. Differences within the Mexican left over political strategy can be seen in the important debates over the question of electoral politics. One position stressed the importance of the electoral arena from the beginning of the political reforms in the 1970s. The Mexican Communist Party (PCM), for example, argued that by participating in the state-engineered political reforms, the PCM was able to broaden the scope of the reforms. The fight for the Communists’ legal and electoral status became a primary focus of the PCM in the mid-1970s. Similarly, revolutionary nationalists grouped at the time within the Movimiento de Accion Popular (MAP) also emphasized the importance of the electoral arena, maintaining that, despite the government’s control over the electoral process, the 1977 reforms did substantially advance the conditions in which to consolidate political and ideological pluralism and help regularize political confrontation. Another position, held by various independent socialist formations of the post-’68 left, such as Punto Critico, maintained that the political reforms, in the context of economic crisis and vast impoverishment, offered little to the popular masses. Rather, these forces argued that the limited reforms threatened the independence of the left and encouraged it to abandon popular struggles and the struggle for socialism. Save specific exceptional cases, according to this position, conditions in Mexico were not appropriate for electoral contests in the late 1970s and early

1380s; these forces cmsequently wercl very selecfive in &eh ektoral participaGan. However, Mexico's changing political and economic context demanded new political practices, whi& in turn contributed to ever more Eulfy elaborated and nuanced strategies and tactics. By the mid-1986~~ difirences over whether or not to parkipate Fn elections had k c m e less important than differences over the relative importance given electoral work over mass orga&ing. Revolutionaq nationalists of MAQ saw the importance of the electoral arena expanding after the 1982 debt crisis, given divisions within the PRI and a resurgent right-wing FAN (Partido de Accirjn National). They viewed elecGms as an increasingly effective means of con the illegimacy of the FRI. Organizations such as Pmto Crftico me to view the potential of the ehctoral arena more favorably, but for quite different reasons. In their view, the emergence of new social movements and popular organizations, many of which had important ties with groups such as their own, changed the prospects for popular intervention in electoral struggle, at least on the local and regional level. Far each politJcal tendency w i t h the Mexican feft, the i n c ~ a s h g importance of the electoral arena was greatly underscored by Cuauht6moc CBrdenask 11988 presidentjal campaip, and seemed to be the logical outcome of its initial strategy. Those, like the PCM members, who participated in the political refoms from the beg ing could a r p e that h e y had indeed substan a~fenedup the electoral arena to progessive forces. n o s e of the who privileged Zhe stak as the key site of social struggle, felt vindicated by the fissures that were deepening within the state party, making electoral politics more effective. Those active in Funto Crftko, who had criticized the refoms and, emphasized mass organizing, could claim to have helped alter the social correlation of forces in Mexico, thereby changing the cmtext in which electoral work could be pursued. Thus, by the time Cuauhtkmoc Wrdenas and other PMistas of the center-left Comiente Democrgtica decided to break with the ruling party, most significant sectors of the Mexican left had already embraced electoral politics in one f o m or mother. Consequently, by the late 1985)s,the reality of being a left-in-yposition against a postrevolutionary, state-party regime led large sectors of the Mexican left to question important political aspects of the old left paradigm. Specifically, the Mexican left demonstrated an appreciation for the fomal, prwedural aspects of representative, electoral political systems that had Iong been discarded by much of the left, including the Cubans in particutar, as the meaningless trappings of "bourgeois" democracy. The Mexican left's revaluation of democracy had also been reinforced by the experience of South American leftists who suffered

What's Left?

33

terribly under the military dictatorships that mled most of the region in the 1970s m d 1 9 8 0 ~ mmy ~ of whom made their lives-inexile in Mexica. In reassessing the old, statist political paradigm, the Mexican left enjoyed at least one signlficmt advantae over their Cuban counterparts. Many social movements flourished inMexico inthe mid-f480s, hcluding a women's movement that an influential component of revitakzed left discourse. ay that consciousntrss about women" eequaliv has not in the Cubm Revolution; the stabs of Cuban women was cowiderably advanced owr the past: 35 years in terns of integration b t o the work force and m&iIi"fy, access to e)lilb care, bk& control and emllent health services, and fegidative But these reinforcement of men's ~sponsibiiity in the home. developmmts, not witjfiout theif contradictions, were not achieved as the result of an autonomous women's movement mided by a fe cri.Gque of authoritarianism at all levels of society. Women's gahs in Cuba came about within the paternalistic and authorilarian system of the postrevolutianary state-party reghe.14 Some&hg quite different began to occur etsewhere hthe region, Pncludhg Mexico, in the 1 9 8 0 ~As ~ a result of the izlfluence of new social movements, and feminism in particular, Noma Stoltz Clhinchilla argues that: There is a gowing cmvergence of thiding on issuw that once divided or were the source of serious tension: the importance of pluralism and democracy and its relationship to the idea of plural (potentially rwolutionary) social subjects or actors (such as women) and the relationship of democracy to the principle of aubnamy for poputar organiza~ons (such as those composed of wornm) in relationship to the state and to political parties.15

Consequently, by the late 1980s, the process of reassessing the left's old p a r a d i p s was more advanced in Mexico than in Cuba, in large part because of the strong prcxnce of autonomous popdar rnovernents and 14. Far a critique of the failure of the Cuban revolution, and other socialist regimes, r~ fully incovsrate women and a fednist perspecgve, see Maxgaret Randall, Gathering Rage: The hihire of Twcntieth Centit y Revollrfions to Develap a Feminisf Agenda (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1992). Randall, as well as Marfetti Pkrez Stable ( T k Ctibgn RevoEulr'orz, op, cit,), emphasize the critical Lack of autonomy far mass organizations in Cuba, which has prevented the emergence of broader social rnmernents there. 15. Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, ""Marxism, F e ~ n i s m and , the Struggle for Demacracy,'"n A. Escobar and S. Alvarez, eds., The Rllakzng of Social MovemenEs in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 19921, p. 39.

Never~eless,in mmy regafds, the critical d i x o u r ~ such s Mexicm left's '"dddle" c o n ~ u e dto be, as Wallersteh art cenby, "to attab state gues it has been the world over since Mexican left had onty power by political means."'s h that partially reassessed the basic political s of the old p a m d i p by the end of the 1980s. Moreover, before 1990, thexe had b e n an even less &orough reassessmmt by the Mexican kft of the acmomic aspects of thg dd garadigrn (associated both with the state sociitlist r e w e s and the nationalist developmentalism of cardmismo). The discourse of much of the Mexican left stiil reflected considerable codidence in long-hcld ideas about the central rake of the state g h the economy, the inevitably negative consequences of markets, competition and private le progress k o u g h the harnessproperty, and the kleolo ing of science and tehology, To be sure, criticism of the %viet system had been raiwd by refom kndencies witlnh the Mexican Co ist Party, by Trotskyist htelkctuals, and by sectors of the post-'68 left (although the Cuban Revolution rernahed a sacred cow m o n g the Mexican left until very recently). The most notable? critique of the dogmatization of C mist thought in Mexico was probably that made by the well-known writer and psli~cal activist Jose Revueltas in the early 1960s.I7 L i h i s e , the nationalist Liizaso CBrdenas guve ent subsequently had been criticized for establishing corporatist control over the working class and laying the bases for an mequal, industrial capitalism in Mexico. But the Mexican left had remained so far Erom power for so long that it had never been faced with h e need to elaborate a h i y viabte, alternative economic program for the nation. As a result, much of the economic aspects of the left's statist paradigm remained nearly as mexa ed in Mexico as h Cuba until the current decade. hdeed, as motiberal policies were implemented during the Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Sahas administrations (1982-1994), the Mexican left, more often than not, f o n d itself the most vocal defenders of state-owned enterprises and state intervention in the economy morcz gmeraUy.IB WaHerstein, "htisystemic Movements: Histafy and Amin, et al., Transforming t k Reuolttlion, Social klfouemnts rid-System (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990), p. $0. 17. St3e Jose2 RevueXtas, ""A Headless Proletariat in Mexico," translated and reprinted in Luis A. Aguilar fed.), Miauxbm in k t i n Anterrca (New York: Atked A. Knapf, 5368), pp. 240 ary of the Mexican left prior to the 1990s is based 18. The above largely on Edward f. Mdaughan, T k &ican Left Betwen the Fall of State Socialism and the Rise of Neolibaralbrn (Santa Crw, Calif.: Chicano/La~no

Global Challenges to the Statist Paradigm Until quite recently, then, much of the left's traditionally statist paradigm remained substantially undallenged in Cuba and Mexico. The most s i e i c a n t exception was the extent to which a tional developments in Mexico had broadened the left's strategy to include aspects of electoral, representative democracy, historically more associated with liberalism, and a greater appreciation of pluralism generated by the new social movements. However, sipificant changes in the economic, political, and cultural structures and practices of the world-system were accelerating throughout the 1 9 8 0 ~influencing ~ the mare s ~ c t l naLional y developments in. this brief sketch of the of globail changes evenlefts in Cuba and Mexico. The ac tually contributed to a genuine paradigm crisis, as expressed by the left hklleckrals quoted in Ghapter Che. This was not the first w e , of course that mjor changes in the world-system, conrbined cant regionat develogments to prawi&h the Lath Ame~canfee. The voke srious debate m d re ZEOs and 30s were rich wi& efforts by poK~calhtelleetuals to develop a more organic L a t h American leftism, such as Haya de 1a Torre's populist nationafism and fos6 Carlos Mari6teHs attempts at a more indigenous soeiafism.@ h m e regards, the palilicral-inteuectual work of these Research Center, University of California, Santa Crzsz, 1993). Far more detailed information and analysis about the evolution of left thought in Mexico since the ISCtOs, also see: Cua&t&moc CBrdmas, et al., Coviente Dmocrhtica: Alternativa Fwnfe a la Crisis (Mexico: Casta-Amic Editurrzs, 198T); Bary Cam, Marxl'sm and Comm~rnismin Twentieth-Centtry Mexico (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992); Jorge Casbrieda, Utopia Unarmed, op. dt,; RoXanda Cordera Campas, et al., hlkxico: El reclam denzocu4lico (Mexico: Sigla M , 3988); Rolando Cordera Campos and Carlos TeHs, htfbxico: La Disputa por Ea Wci6-n (Mexico: Sigla XXI, 2981);Joe Foweraker and A m L, Craig8Popular Movements and Polrfical C k n g e in Mexico (Boulder: Lynne EZiemer Publishers, 1990); Enrique %mop Viaje alrededor Ae la izqtrierda (Mexico: Editonlal Nueva Imagen, 19638); Jorge Tarnayo Rodriguez, "Los movifientos ssciales y el proceso electoral de 2988 en M4xico," in Memovia (Mexico), Vol. IV, No, 29 @an-Feb.1990). 29 William Rowe and Vivian 9helling revisit in a useful way the conkibutions and contradictions af Haya de la Tarre and Maridteugi in the o ideas about the "na~onal-popularcollective wily context of h t o ~ Gramsci" in Chapter 3 of their Memory and ModemiEy. Popular C~tlftrrein k t i n AmePl'ca (London: Verso, 1991). Other uxfuf sources on historical debates within L a t h American left thought are Luis E. Aguilar, W r x k m in Latin America, op. cit,; Sheldon B, Liss, Mmist Tkolrght in Lafin America (Berkeley: Universitry of California Press, 1984); and Michael Lijwy, El mrxismo en An-zc;'~ca ktina f Mexico: Ediciones E M , 1982).

men, which represents efforts to articulate a more distinctly Latin rican left discourse, can be seen as precursors to current developments h the Law A m e ~ c mleft. However, hese and other btoI-ical debates withh L a b Americm leftism (such as over Peronism or Rest Party) do not appear to be sipificant vueltas's critique of fie C pohts of rekrence in the reassessment t a b g @ace today, h part, I is because &ose earlier debates themselves remained eonthe sta&t wdd-view now being questioned. Moreover, there is a sense that the world has changed fundamentally in the intervening decades, necessitating a bolder departure from past ideological schemes. fisociated wi& the As noted earlier, long before the dramatic e fall of the B e r h Wall in 1989, chaUenges from the left itsetf had : particular@ the begun to fray same threads of the old statist p antiauthoritarian m d comtercult-ural movements of 1948 m d more recent social movements. However, Stoltz C m e h a a reminds us that "Democracy and ferninism were not topics of serious discussion" among ~ are quite new developthe Latin American left until the 1 9 8 0 ~These ments, Moreover, the variaus strands nf more radkalty antistatist ""decenkrhg of the posmodem and poststmtturalist theories abs subject" and the faduxe of r n o d e d v k Enligh t project, as weU as c l a h s that we have entered a postcapitalist era, were relatively 1- influential in L a w America than in Western Europe and the Unikd States.20 The struct-ural realities of the sedperiphery (extreme class inequatities, increasirrg povew, and national subordhatim ta core states and international capital) conthued to correspond m m closely to the traditional Marxist and nationalist p a r a d i p than to any posmadern, postisldustrial vision. Cmequendy, up k o u g h the 1980s, the prwess of renovzltian within the Latin American lefts was mly partial. Then, three conco~tant,global developments h pa&icuiar c u h i nated at the end of the 2980s to bring about a full-bhwn paradigm crisis among the left h Lath America: the accelerated globalization and restmeturhg of Ihe worldeconorny, the near-hegemonic rise of nesliberal ideology, and t-he sudden collapse of the fomer Soviet bloc. All of Latirt Amerlira has been deeply affected by the resmchxring of h e world-economy, wkch begm at the hitiative of core nations and

20. A particularly lucid and insightful analysis of: these developments and their chalenge to the paradigm associated. with modernity, and therefore with the left, can be famQ in Shart Hall, ""The Question of Culhxral Xdentity,'?~ S. Hall, et al., Modernity and I t s Ftlttrres (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2992).

eorr?-hsed capitali in response to tfie profit crisis of the 1WOs. As the restmcturing coincided with the exhaustion of national developmentalist projects in Latin America, severe financial crises emerged in the newly developing n a ~ o n of s the region. Even for the most successful nationalist developmmt models, such as Fvlexico" post-1930~~ hport-subs&tion industrialization, such resmchring m d financial crisis have gcmerally hvolved a rela~vesubordinatim of national policies to intemationaf fbancial ins~tutions. This often contributed to (1)devastakg declbes in wages and living standards ent of the htemai market in favor of gxport activities, (3) rza~onalwelfare states, (4) destruction of small m d med dustries, and (S) absorption of the most dynamic economic sectors by transnationaf capital. Since the couapse of Ule Soviet U h m , even Cuba"$ once protected economy has been gradually subjecte$ to restmcturing dong h e s mare acceptable to international ba* and investors. The ability of hdividual natim-states to regulate or ameliorate tt.lese developments has been fur&ex ed by the accelerated internationalizationof:capitd.21 Clobafization and restructuring of the world-economy also posed chaflenges to the strong national tullures of Latin Annerica, par~cularly in Cuba and Mexico where revolutions had been waged in assertion of national iden~ties.As Shart Ha8 has absewed: [A] nation is not only a political engtry but something which prduces meanings-a system of cullural representa~on. People are not only Iegal citizens of a nation; they partidpate in the idea of the nation as reprmented in its national cttfture.Z2

The global prmess of inkgrathg regional economies brought with it "'the consequent interpenetration uf cultures and customs,"" threatenkg the traditional nationahm of c o m ~ e slike Cuba and Mexico, Thus the chalenges posed to the Latin American left by global econodc restruchtring were cultuPat and ideobgical as well, wraveling the very "ideaf' of the na~on-state. 21. world econodc restructuring and its impact on developing nations, see, e.g., R. Jenkins, Transnational Co~oratiansand Ulmven D e v e f ~ m e n f The : lnternafioionalization of: Capitat and fhe Third Wwld (London: Methuen, 1988; A. tiptetz, Mirages and Mz'mcltrs: Tke Global Crisis of Fordism (London:Verso, f 987); A, Afvarez, La c 6 i s global del capilalismo en Illkxico, 1968-1985 (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1987); and Edward J. McCaughan, 'Wexica's Long Crisis: Toward New Regimes of Acccumutatrion and Domination,'" Lrxtin Amrican Pe7"specfives8 Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 1993. 22. Stuarl Hall, "The @estion of Cultural Idrmtity," op, cit., g. 292, 23. Adotfo Cilly, "The Mexican Regime in Ets Dilemma," oop cit., p. 276.

38

The Backdrop

One of the most unsettling ideological developments accompanying economic restructuring has been the aggressive neoliberal ideological offensive, which gained considerable strength during the Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher administrations and was supported by the intellectual and policy-making cadre of international financial institutions. Neoliberalism remains within the tradition of liberalism in its emphasis on free enterprise, the market, and individual initiative and responsibility. It is "neo" in its abandonment of twentieth-century liberalism's "politics of constant rational reform," which aimed at avoiding extreme social conflict through the integration of larger sectors of the population into the system, both nationally (through the welfare state and universal suffrage) and internationally (through national self-determination and developmentalism).24 The neoliberal offensive proved to be astonishingly successful and further undermined left confidence in the Latin American state's capacity to shepherd economic development and social transformation.25 In little more than a decade, broad sectors of intellectuals and policy makers around the world, including many leftists in Latin America, were apparently convinced that the eighteenth century ideologies of Adam Smith and David Ricardo would lead the way into the third millennium (even as nineteenth century Marxism was pronounced dead). This was particularly true in the Southern Cone nations of Chile and Argentina, where brutal military dictatorships devastated the hstorical lefts and ruptured strong national political cultures, leaving them particularly open to the influence of neoliberalism.26 Looking at the recent trajectory of the left in those nations, one might be tempted to accept Francis Fukuyama's now famous assertions about the end of history and the final universalization of free-market economies and restricted electoral dem0cracy.2~However, I will argue that, while radical "free-market" tenets 24. See Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Collapse of Liberalism," op. cit. 25. On the influence of neoliberalism worldwide, see, e.g., S. Hall, The Hard

Road to Renewal (London: Verso, 1988); J. Valenzuela FeijBo, Critica del rnodelo neoliberal (Mexico: Fac. de Economia, UNAM, 1991); F. Hinkelammert, "Our Project for the New Society in Latin America: The Regulating Role of the State and Problems of Self-Regulation in the Market," in S. Jonas and E. McCaughan, eds., Latin America Faces the Twenty-First Century, op. cit. 26. Rhoda Rabkin has written a persuasive analysis of the importance of "ideas" in influencing center-left forces in Chile to embrace neoliberal economic policies; see R. Rabkin, "How Ideas Become Influential. Ideological Foundations of Export-Led Growth in Chile (1973-1990)," in World Aflairs, Vol. 156, No. 1 (Summer 1993). 27. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," reprinted in S. Hall, et al., Modernity and Its Futures, op. cit., p. 48.

t's

kfi?

39

have been taken up more recently by some leftists in Cuba and Mexico, the nationiilist m d social jus.tice values of thew natims' deeply rooted political and popular cultures, as well as the shctural realities of the semiperiphery, continue to mediate the degree to which neoliberalism is accepted there. The Fa31 of State SociaHsm

Associated with both global e c o n o ~ cresmcSuring and the rise of neoEberagsm is the coflapse of the %vkt bloc, For Cuba, the dernise of ate, very mathe Soviet and Eastern Europm reghes terial cons.(3q~ences,hcludhg the Xoss of -fourths of its markets m d once ~ q u e l favorable y terns of trade. But the sudden fall of state swialism reverberated beyond socialist Cuba, *roughout much of the world's left, hcluding in countries like Mexico wKch were never part of the Soviet blm. The Eastfs debacle w e p t away any rema that m altema~vesocialist worldi k s i m s harbosed by some of system was in the m a h g . X ated the hope that state smialism rnight be refomed into a more dgnnocra~cand h me alternative to capitalism. For o ~ e r sthe , colfapse of the Soviet bloc was the nail in the c a f h of the state-centered models of ecornomic deveIopnrreftt and prochmge long embraced by the lef.t.28 uel LVallerstein has arped, because sodalist revolutions h the core. natians of the world-system but in the periphery and sedperiphery, the "construrtim of socialism" in practice "became the process by which (semi) peripheral states would catch up with the core zones od the capitalist world econorny."zg The Soviet far national development" was tly admired houghout World, wen by natimabt gove ts (like that of Lhzaro 28. Useful accounts of how the disintegration of the smialist bloc affected the world's left can be fomd in: David Held, "Liberalism, Marxism and Denrocrary," in 5. Hall, et al., M o d m i t y and Its Futures (Cambridge:Polity Press, 1992); Carf Boggs, fiztellecttrals and the C~szs of M0dernit.y (Mbany: State University of Mew York Press, 1993); anuel Wallerstein, "Manism AAer the w (February/March.1992); Xmmanuel Wallerst-ein, "The Concept of National Develapment, 1917-1989. Elegy and Requiem," Amevr'can Bebvkral Scientist, Vol. 35, No. 4/5 (March/June 1992); Sarnir Amin, et al., Transf~mmingthe Rmolution. Socr'al Movements and the WorldSystem (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990); and Carlos Anionia Agairre Rajas, "'1989 En Perspectiva Hist4rica," La Jomalta Semarzal (April 4,1993). anuel Wallerstein, "'Marxism After the Collapse of Co op. cit., p. 34,

40

The Backdrw

Cdrdenas) and left forces that remahed hi-y critical of the Soviet bloc. The Sovitrt Udon" sudden coUqse s p b o h e d far some of the left a p a t defeat for the very idea of natimal development, Moreover, &ough sectors of the Latin Ametican left were heartened by the "democratic revolutions" that w e p t through the East in 19891990, the mcertain posl-Cold War order appeared This was particulajrty true given how the collapse cohcided wiih disturbing events such as the Persim Gulf War and, regionally, the U.S. invasion of Panama and tfie electoral defeat of the Sandinstas in Nicaragua (following a pmishing war financed and directed by the United States). The dermise of the Soviet h i o n therefore afso suggested to many on the left the unplcasmt prospect of a unipolar world, of an unrestrained Ufited States wifi its long history of aggession h L a t h Amefica. AU of &ese changes clearly pose enomous challenges to the traditional paradigms of the Latin American left, particularly its emphasis on the state, Within Cuba and Mexico, the challenges of woxld-systemic clhanps appeared especially unsettling given the serious domestic prabl e m Saced by their respective state-party regkes. As G a y has noted, pressures from worldwide economic resmchxring contributed to a crisis of postrevolutionary political reghes, because, "beyond state coercion and farce, these reginres are also based on 'socialpacts."" "Their historic socjat pacts cannot be sustahed witfi neoliberal potiries. In Cuba, where ihe loss of Soviet support and a tightening of the US, trade embargo have farced the state to adopt austerity measures, the saciat pact of the revolution has been weakened, and divisions over policy and long-tern strategy have become more apparent w i t h tbre reghe, op for greater questioning of the old dogmas. In Mexic neslitzexal restruchring througlnout t-he 1980s far more seriously eroded thc; fang-stable social pact dating from the 1930s, ieadhg important center-kft farces to break with the regixne and greatly strengthen the opposition, but wi&in a context in whi& the left opposition" traditional program was in doubt. As the cenhry began its final decade, the old paradigm that had oriented m d given identiy to left intelletechrrals h Cuba and Mexico was shattered. le attending a play abo istopher Colurnbus in Mexico City in August, 1992, on the 500th ersary of his fateful mcounter with the indigenous peoples of the Americas, I unexpectedXy found this p a r a d i p crisis expressed in the prqram notes, Playwright Hkctor O&ega expbined:

30. Adolfo Gilly, "The Mexican Regime in Its Dilemma," ag cif, p. 277.

My melancholy refledions about utogias and their cotlapse were influenced by the sudden fall sf "real socialism," the loss of power from one day to the next ol Gorbachev, the creator of ""perestro&a and glasnast," that is, the proposal far a democratic socialism that never c a m to be. The effects of these changes on our corntry, as well as the Persian Gulf War with its fireworks that liquidated 250,000 human beings, wham we never saw and whose death we never learned about on television, the giobalization of "re planet, the birth or de6nition of its commercial nuclei as a threat to the concept of the nation, etc., have forced W to rapidly redefine ourselves.3'

The foUowing chapters examine in depth how the left's paradigm crisis has provoked serious redefinition and ideological reali key issues of democracy, socialism, and national sovereignty.

31. HCctor Ortega, program notes to ""IE fuevo Be Colan," Teatxa Juan Ruiz de Alarccin, Cerzbo Cultural Universitario, Mexico City, August 1992.

CHAPTER 3. DEMOCRACY

The Persistence of ist and Libera Orthodoxies The left's conceptions of democracy have long suffered from a Manichean Eberatism-socialism oppositim. The world-systemic discourses of liberalism, democracy, swialism, and natimalism tended to become reified and polarized in the power strvggles of the Cold War. Political and intellectuaX prolocutors af the Weskrn core powers successfully fused the Eberal ideology of the capitalist world-economy wi& the nation of democracy, when, in fact, as Chilean sociologist Jaimc?Qsorio remhds us: At least until the mid-19th century, the t e r m liberalism and democracy were in conflict The first called attention to liberties and gave special emphasis to econodc heedorn, Liberalism" defenders rejected democracy because they believed that the search for equativ under governments at:the majorities would call liberal principles into question.1

Neverfieless, as l anuel Wallerstein explains, following the emergence in Europe of a conscious workers movement and the revolutionary upheavals of 1848, a braad consensus emerged among the damhant classes in the core aromd iiberalim as a politics of "constant rational reform." If the capitaiist economy was to be stabilized, the '"dantyetous classes" had to be incorporated into the political qstern. Democracy, conceived i n terms of "me citizen-one vote" electoral part:icipation, seemd the best way of' integrat-ing the rebellious w o r h g dames without jeopardizing the capitalist nature aa" the economy. Liberalism, thus associated with gradual and 1hit.trd democratic reforms, became "the overwhehhgly domhant ideology" for the nmt hundred years.2 1. Jairne Qssrio, ""Ziberalism, Democracy, and SociaXism," in S. Jonas and E. MrCaughan, eds., b S i n America Faces llze Twenty-First Centtty: Reco~tslructinga Secid! Jzlslice Agenda (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p, 28. 2. XmmanueX Wallerstein, ""The Caflapse of Liberalism," in in. Miliband and L. Pantith, eds., Sosialkt Register 1992 (London: Merlin, 195121, pp. 98-100,

Soczalist and Ll"berafOrtfuldoxies

43

h the course of the ~ e n G e t hc e n h v , &era1 discourse, inadver,S t a h , and the expericmces of the Soviet blac, also tently aided by L effectively presented socialism and Marxism as the antithesis of democracy. Socialism, in practice and in ideological mutation, became identified with au&oritarian statism, and the nationalist, anti-bperialist shuggles of the South gradually suffered from guilt-by-a global ideological wars. In Latin America, for instance nationalists, like Guatemalan President Jacoba Arbem and removed by amies dispatched by Xiberal vmied as c democracies ited Stittes. If nationafist stmggles for independence and autonamous develapment generated strmg interventionist states that reshieted Ihe r e i p of transnatimal capital and core nation-states, then n i r d World nationalism, like socialism, was viewed as the enemy of iiberaIism m d democracy. Liberalism = capitahm = freedom = democracy. Socialism = mtionalism = statism = authoritarianism. There was just sufficient reallty to the democratic freedoms of Western capitalist societies and more than ample evidence of auhoritarianism in state socidist and nationalist rem e s to make the forced, dichotomous pairings stick, h e of the defining characteris~csof world hegemony , is that the hegemon's idcology appears not as idenlogy but as In Lath America, the gllarhg econ political hequalities of "really existing world capitalismf' were enou* to make the left wary of such shplistic fomulations. Indeed, liberalkm has never enjoyed v i t e the s a m popular acceptance in the South as it has in the North. Benito Juhrez, for example, the great liberal refomer who broke up Mexico's vast s e d e u d a l estata and church-owned landholdings in the mid1800s, is highly reverred as a national hero. At the same t h e , Mexicans generally achowledge that Ju&rezfsliberal refoms also he skoy the collective landholdings of ancient, indigenms c thereby aiding in the creation of a landless, mral work force to be exploited by the new Mexican and foreign haccsndados who quirWy reconcentrated the nation's best agricultural lands. This and many other historical experiences have made the fanus-faced nahre of liberalism a promhent feabre of Latin America's coUective memory. This did not mean, however, that Latin American thought escaped thot ideological duafisms of the Cold War, More often than not, and especially during the 1969s and f 9705, the Latin Alnerkan left was trapped by the same discursive sleight of hand that allowed liberalism to c l a h democracy as its own legithate child. The current process of rethinking democracy in Cuba and Mexico revolves around the tension of the liberalism-socialism, or more accurately, in practice, a liberalism-statism dicholomy.

Historically, the Latin American left, with a few notable exceptions, gave relatively less emphasis to the liberal ideals of political democracy than it did to the national and social goals of justice, equality, and deveiopment. Jorge Castaiieda" assessment of this history is shared by broad

currents of today" Latin American bft: Much of the lef wrongly disxn_issed representative democracy for many years as a sham: a bureaucrat-ic, comupt device hvmted by lwat elites and foreip agcmts to kick the Latin masses into tolerating f o r m of government and domination conkary to their interests."

Not ihat ithe left's dismissal of poliCica1 dernmracy warn%parl:1y jusMied by the misted doms it has taken h the region. Castaiieda is quick to

left has a point.. . representative democracy in Latin clar* that "h America has fwnctimed poorly at best, and mostly when reduced to a meaningles exercise."4 However, d u h g the clgficult struggles against brutal, auharitarian tay rctgimes that ruled much of the region kont the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s, l a w sectors of the La.tin American left develape$ a ncw appreciation for liberal pofitiral demcracy.5 As tens of lhousands of dernocrakic activists were jailed, torhred, disappeared, or murdered during the dark decades of military rule, it became starIdy clear that individual rights and parantees, independent judiciaries, and legislative checks on executive power do make a difference. Mme broadly, the left began to question a c only held assumption, xeinforced by the harsh realities of Latin American politics, that "the only power wor& w h h g was the one that sprang from the barreX of a gun,'" Writing in 1983 about the lessons drawn by the Brazilian left in its struggle against the generals, Francisco Weffort: explains: The discovery of the value of democracy is inseparable, within the opposition, from the discovery of:civil sMety as a politicai space, More 3. forge Castafieda, Utopia U~armed:n e h f i n American L+ Aft-er the Cold Wv (New York Alfred A. b o p f , 29932, p. 327. 4. kid., p, 357. 5, Robert Banes ("The Left and Democracy: Recent Debates in Latin America," TeIos, No. 68,19%, p. 49) began his widely discussed 1986 assessment of the Latin American leWs changing view of democracy by observing, "In Brazil, Chile! Uruguay, and Argentina the expe~encretof authoritarian rule during the past decade has produced a hdamentaX re-valuation of the importance of civil and poliitieal rights for protecting individual fives and the possibility af p~litics.'~ 6. Jorge Castafieda;, Utopia U n a m d , 017.cit., p. 335.

Socialist and Liberal Ortlutcl~xies

45

than the " e c a n o ~ cMxacle," the terror years prduced a reat "pofigcai miracle," by m d e ing tradigonal ideas 0x1 the relitt-ions bet-oven State and s d e w . . h d the concept of poli~cswas pIaced on its true foundations.7

Zn Mexico, thcl hcreasiatgXy authoritizrian nature of the prsstrevofut i m a q r e g h e was made painfulfy clear to broad segments of society during Ithe brutal repressim of the 1968 student movement, The Mexican left subxquently became ever-mare focus& on the smggle far democratization of state and civil sociely tXlrwghout the 1970s and 1980s.S C u b revolutionaries remained generafly skeptical about the longtern prospects for political liberalization in Latin America and frequently expressed concern about the left's growing preoccupation wi& electoral polifics. Nr>ne&eless, wi&in the very different emtext of their own sscialist reghe, the Cuban left also gave cmsiderabk attention in the 1970s and 1980s to e l a b o r a h g what it csnsidered the more substantive, part-icipttory democracy of Cuba's Poder Popdar.4 &spite the imp~ssiveearly efhrts of far-sighted &inkers such a s Francisco Weffort, PabXo GonzLilez Casanova, and Carlos Pereyrit,'@until recently mu& of the discussion and debate about d m s c r a c y was often limited to lining u p behind one or the other side of rigidly dichotomous labels: bourgeok v, socialist democracy, f o m a l v.. substantive d e m 7. Francisco Weffart, " m y Democracy?" in inked Stepan, ed,, Denzocratking Brazil: Problems #Transition a ~ Consofidation d (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19891, p. 345. 8. See Edward J. McCaughan, "The Mexican Left BetvJeen the Fall of State Socialism and the Rise of Neoliberalism: Same Obsewaitions," W o r ~ n gPaper Ma, 2 (Santa Cruz: Chicano/Latino Research Center, Universiv of California, Santa Cruz, 1993). 9. %ep for example, alga Fern6ndez Rfos and Caspar J. Garcfa GalXo, "The State and Demwacy in Cuba," Contemporary M~rxism,No. 1, Spring 1"380, pp. 81-88. A critical and thorough beatment of the Cuban regime's largely unsuccessful e-florts to address the demmracy quclstion, see Carolfee Bengelsdorf, The Problem of Democracy in Ctrh: Between Vzsion and Reality (New York and &ford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 10- %et, e.g., Francisco Weffo&, "Why Demacraq?," op,@it,;Pablo GonzAlez Casanova, Demcracy in Mexico (New York: &ford Unhersity Press, 2972); P. Gomdlez Casanova, "The Crisis of the State and the Struggle for Democracy in tatin America," Contemporay Marxism, No. 1, S p ~ n g1980, and "Foreign Debt, the Threat of Foreign Tntemention, and Dematracy in Latin America," Cantempor a y nliavxism, No. 24, Fall 1986; and Carlcrs Peyerat, Sabre fa democracia (Mexico: Cal y Arena, 19902, a posthumously published colledon of his writings on democrracy from the 19130s.

racy, fibera1 v. participatory democracy, ad ~ f ."i m e quaLity of the s a r & for a me gful Latin American dematracy was not hproved by the rapid ascendency of neoliberal notions of restricted, freemarket dernoeracy t-hat accamphed the economic crisis m d msbcturing of the 1980s. The Muence of &at perspective, backed by the econogzie and pob~calmuscle of the U ~ t e dStates and lfie intema~anaf financial systern, skewed the discussian toward me exkme pole.12 Advocates of a narrowly-defined electoral democracy, preoccupied almost exclusively with issues of order, continuity, and governability (ra&er than popular parti;cipation and representation), then gained age over left proponents of a fuller, fufier, at least momentary, un_ist reghes of Eastern Europe and social democracy when the the Soviet Union dishtegrat The debate was also o d by poorly mderstood or articulated disthc~aslsamong state, political reghe, and gave the fact &at such dgferen~agonis c Alvarez, a political scientist from that ram breed called the CubanAmerican l@&uses the strikingly visual metaphor of an edifice to iUrustrate these disthct-ions. The slate, she suggests, is like the buadhg's fomdation and tveighbbearhg f r m e , the sh.uchre that remains htact, defhing the corn shape and size of I-he m c t u t e , however much interior remodeling may be done. hcluding d h b t i o n s like tke mBitary, courts, and the bureaucracy, the state represents the fmdamental pact of class, m e , m d gender dominalion, wkch is xnaintahed through a variety of cwrcive, regulatory, and distribu~vefredistributive methods. It is the basic struck= of palitics m d the most difficult to transform. The political regime, according to AXvarez's metaphor, fmctions lik@ the dooways, corridofs, and stairways of the building detemhing vvho participates 11. For three interesGng coUec~omin Englhh af writings on demwracy from some of Latin America's most notable l& inteilffctuals in the 1980s, shte Contemporaly Marxism, No. l Spring 2980, Cczntmporary lCllccr;rzsm, No. 14 h l I 1986, and Latin American Perspectiulrs, Issue 65, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 1900. mese collections include some of the most mplsisticated thinking about democracy by the left from the late 1970s through the ~d-19&0s,demonstrating both the serious limitations imposed by some of the left's traditional discourse as well as the trvolution of new concepts. 12. Writing reflecting a mare restricted vision of dematracy, concerned mow with institutionality and govemabiliv than with popular representation and participation, can be fomel in Larry Diamond, Juan f. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Demcracy in Llezlel~ingCmjntries [Vol. 4): Latin Azne~ca (Boulder: tynne Rienner and Landon: Adamntine Press, 1989); and Robert A, Pastor, ed., Plem~ermcyrn Ike Ameuicas: Slopping fhe Pertdzrlzrrn (New York and London: Holmes (4s Meier, 1989).

Socialkt and Liberal Qrfhodoxiies

47

md LVho gains access tr, how much poE~cal,economic and d l u r a l power. The reg cludhg htitutimal. arrangements such as the political party system, trpes of labor unions, balance of legislative and executive power-mediates and shapes relatiw betvveen the state and society. Institutional and constitutional changes of the regime occur more frequently &an changes in the state, adjushg to md ace ing social and political struggles. Finally, the government is tfie building superintmdent, the incumbents of pokgcal power who try to make the edifice hction.13 At two exkerns of the left, the most orfiodox, statist perspectives, m b t s and revolutionary nationalists, and associated with some C the mast Eberaf-Muenced social demwratic views, &ere is often little appreciation of such distinctiom m d rc?lationsKps. The or&odox perspective tends to overemphasize the state and underestimate the importance af the political reghe. This has somethes cmbibuted to skpticism about the value of democratic refoms of the political system. For exam* a case has been m&by some Lath Americim lef~stsand left Latin Americdsts ;inthe United States that efne trmsitims to civilian r d e in counh.ies like Brad, Chile, and Argentina have been of lhited simificanftl because the dass nature of the s h k remained hdamentally unchanged. Such a critique tends to imor@ the real difference such tiberalizatim of the political system has meant h r the denacratic oppasition.I4 At the same t h e , this undr?resthatim of the political reghe's innportance relative to the state has led some orthodox leftis& to an uncritical defctnse of "revoIutionarymsrt-ates, such as those of socialist Cuba or cardenista Mexico in the 1930s. Skessing &at tlrtose states successfully restructured power relations in favor of a social pact encompassing the popular majority, such a perspeclive often fails to question why those revolutionary states also helped produce poIiticaX reghes that have proven to be authoritarian and resistant to dernocratization.15 To be fair 13. This summary of Aharez;" fornutation is based on a fwwe given by her at the Universily of California, Santa Cruz, September 27,1990. 14. See, for example, German SBnchez, "Probfemas d e Ia democracia en Nuestra America," R~evistaCasa de las Amtricas (Havana), M o January-March 1992; Tam&sA. Vascmi, "Democracy and *iaEism in %uth America," "tin Ameecan Perspectives, Issue 65, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 1990; james Petras, "The Redemocratization Prmess," Co~temporaryi\.iamzsm, No. 14, Fall 19886; Ronald H. Chilcotr?,""Post-Marxism: The Retreat from Class in Latin America," "tin Americalz Perspectives, Issue 65, Volt. 17, No. 2, Spring 1990. 15. Regarding Cuba, see, e.g., alga Ferndnda Ros and Gaspar J' . Garcia G a b , op. cit., or the editorial, ""lronias de Ia OEA," in the Mexican journal, Estrategla, No. 100, July-August 1992, that defends Cuba as the most democratic of

to the Mexican and Cuban lefts, distinguishing between state, regime, t has not been an easy task, given that the three have been attached at the hip like Siamese triplets in the state-party regimes that have ruled for more than 60 years in Mexico and for nearly 40 years h Cubai.16 Based 0x1 interviews and recent wrihgs in ico m d Cuba, X wiki now present a huer picture of two currmts wi the left of the 1990s to the kstoricail orwhose conceptions of democracy still a&ere cl thodoxies of socialism and liberalism. The following chapter examines the renovative current, which s e b ta trmscend the old dualisms. The liberal, orthodox, and renovative tendencies do not correspond precisely t with past political or ideological affiliations, or with t raaer reflect the leftYsp a r a d i p crisis and its s;hake-up in response to recent changes hside Mexico and Cuba and worldwide.

and gave

Orthodox Socialist Perspectives O f i o d o x left perspecltives from the traditions of statist socialism tend to define democracy in the broadest of terns, extending beyond the famaf pohtical arena to include t-he substantive goals of ecanarnic equab ity and social justice (not as prerequisites for democracy but as part of its vexy defhitian).I7 Moreover, in the experience of state socialism and the ideological kgacies of Le and Stalh, the left's historical concern with social and collectivist ideals has tended to become associated primarily

all Latin American countries, Similarly mcxiCical views of the state and political regime forged by Ldzaro Cdrdenas in the 1930s are expressed by Cuauhtkmoc Cdrdenas, Porfirio MuJictz Ledo, and Ifiigmia Martine2 in their intemiews with h d r e w Reding in W v l d &!icy fozrmal, VOX.V, Ns,2, Spring 1988; they are hardpressed to account, theoret;icatly or conceptually, for how the revolutionary state became ""increasingly divorced from the interests of the people," as CuaufitPmsc Cdrdenas puts it. 16. See Chapiter 2 for a definition of the concvt "state-party regime." 17. Three Cuban scholars, for example, have written that Marxist-leninist conceptions of democraq ""surpass the lidtations of democracy fmderstoud] in t e r m of government or participation in poli~caEactivit,ies and in the superstructuraE sphereI to include, besides government, popular participat-ion and citizen rights in economic ac~vity.That is, they consider economic democraq as consubstantial to democracy and give it its most complete, real, and legitimate meaning when also extending the analysis to the liberation struggles of the oppress& peoples." O k a Ferndndez Rios, Romefia Pino Freyre, and Hern$n Llanm, "Cuba: SociaXisma, dernczcracia y soberania," manuscript (Havana), April. 1991.

Socialist a ~ Libmt d Qrthdaxies

49

with Phe state, often to the exchsion of the politiral system or w e n civil society. Thus, the orthodox left's perspective on democracy is inclined to underplay the significance of refomhg the political system or enhancing the individual rights and obligations of dtims, focusing more on the class nabre of the state. DemmratkaGon is mderstood more in terns of @eater social equaliq and the state's deknse or advocacy of w o r h g class Interests This view, as sociolagist Walter Coldfrad points out, tends to conceal the party's dominalion and its privileges in acthg as the w o r b g class's fiiduciary.'g The participatory aspect of democracy is frequently emphasized but without reference to the need for civil society%autonomy from state and r u h g party. These more o&odox views encompass ideological positions that hold Leninist ideas about the state and vanguard party m d that justify rather than criticize ihe past. h Cuba, the arthodox, statist view on issues of the pofjtical system and: democracy remain very infiuential but no lone;c?rhggemonic among the revolution" hteliectualw In essence, this perspecljve says the Cuban political system is the most democratic, most participatory in the world, reguiring only fine-tunhg: "The Eastem European rq;irnes were perfectly democratic and it would be difficult ta come up with a more participatory system than Cuba's Poder Popular."l"T don't know of a better system. Besides, the youth, are not concerned with 'democracy,' which is a foreign discourse used against Cuba."z@As ultimate proof of the extent of Cuban democracy, individuals from ths perspective offer that the Cuban people are armed and therefore quite able to turn against the state if they think it is acting against their interests. For example, the distinguished Cuban intellectual and political leader Carlos Rafael Rodrigwz in his openhg address to a huge gathering of L a h Americm htelkctuals, challenged the "so-called" multiparty democracies to a m their w o r k s and peasants and then see what would kappen to their ~girnes.~~ For this tendency, the experience of lberal democracy has relatively little to offer Cuba: 'Qur experience with the Z1.S.-style political system has been mainly negative and not a point of reference."Zz "In Cuba, the 18. Wally Coldfrank, personal communication with author. 29. Herminio Carnacho, C ist You& offictal far Havana Province, interview with author, March 11 unist Youth branch, inter20. Cristina Pedroza, president of a local Co view with author, Havana, March 9,1993. 22. Carlos RafaeX Rodriguez, "Intervencirin en ta apertura del XVIIX Congresa de ALAS," manuscript (Havana), May 28-32,1991. 22. Rarniro Abre6, Central America specialist in the Central C o m ~ t t e e ' s international relatrians department, interview with author, Havana, March 8, 1993,

multipare project is inevitably comtenevolutionary."~ As CaxoUee Bengelsdorf has pointed out, such disregard for liberal conceptions of democracy stems not only from their reading of Marxist preceph but also from their experience with the ways in which Josd Marti's political ideals "had been corrupted in the ba pt political strucmres of the Cuban republic."2^" mere is a tendestcy to view liiberdism, but not Marxism, as a foreign ideslogy. Amando Hart, a nnember of the revolution" sstoric kadert tradition and is reportedly ship who did not come out of the Co a liberill hfluerace m the refam process, still shares the orthodox tendewy's dismissal.of Eberal democracy: Today there is an aeernpt to impose a model m us, one that is not our own. We have no liberal bourgeois tradition here. The @eat deficit of Western political cult-ure is that it does not take "he social" adequately into account. The great social drama is not at. the center of analysis in Western political culhre; even economic analyses lose the swial contat.25

The orthodox perspective in Cuba is also informed by an overriding concern with mder, govern%biliv,and the avoidance of radical ruptures in the political system. In this regard, some Cubans are bpressed with the ability of restricted liheral democratits to marginalize radirat, dissent by establishing the hegemony of liberal discourse. Juan Antonio Blanco, a philosopher and historian who is far from orthodox on most issues, leans in that direction on the cjiuestions of power and dissent: Bourgeois democracy is both things: democratic (a certain level of pluralism) and bowgmis. The limits of accc-pted pluralism, d e t e r ~ n e d either by force or by cultural hegemony, crxclude nonbourgeois alternatives, A socialist democracy should also be both things: democratic (tolerance of a pluralism of ideas), but within a socialist o p ~ o nand with the same posslbilitis of excluding bourgeois optiom. Ifswialist hegemony were sufficiently solid, as bourgeois hegemony is in the U,S,, you could probabfy talerate a bourgeois party (as in the U-$,, where litde left parties participate in eIeetions).zb

g dissent within instihrtiunal Xt is interestkg to note that conta frameworks, governability, the stability of the state, and avoidance of rupkre, are of particular concern to orthodox left forces in Cuba and, as 23, 24. 25, 26.

81ga Femhndez, interview with author, Havana, February 16,1993. Carollee Bengelsdorf, Tke Problem of Dernocuaq in Gzrba, op cit., p. 9.

Armando Hart, intewiew with author, Havana, March 11,1993, Juan Antsniol Blanco, interview with author, Havana, March 4,1993.

San'diIl'st and Libmal Qrfhadoxies

51

we shaH see below, fibnal left forces in Mexico. The or&&ox left has long enjoyed state power in Cuba, and Mexico's liberal left arguably sees its best hope for a bigger share of power in a negotiated pact for co-govwitEr the PM.It i s not that r e n a v a ~ v le e ~ tin s these clom.tTies are mconcerned with avoiding violent upheaval h the democracy, but they stand to gain little id tfid current slate-pasty reghes a m not &oraughly t r m s f o m e d or dismantied. m u s me's relatiomhip or potential relationskp to t a l pwef clearly helps deternine one's dissrznt md a s s u h g hstihtional contake on issues such as cont tinuity and g o v e r n a b ~ t y . rio Ma&ada, a member of the Cubm Hee, illusbate various elements of the CO most or&odox, slatist perspectives on demarracy inCuba: There has never been any sign of discontent with the structure of Poder Popdar [Cuba" sptemi of le@slative bodies]. %vereignty in Cuba rests where popular repmsentation is lmated (in the Poder Popular), mlike in a c o m v like the United States where a Supreme Court that can impose its wilt aver the President and the legislature. There is no supra-popular power in Cuba. We have a mare democratic system. The U.S. President has enormous power on the basis of being elected by the xnajsriv; he can declare war, name and remove ambassadors, etc. This is not true of the Cuban President [Fidel Castroj, who i s not elected diredly by the people. The President here has to rule coltegially; he dtoesn? cccsncentrate an enomous amount of power, brscause he has to share it with the rest of the ComciX of State. This is more democratic than a President who is able to declare war on his awn. Here there is a distribution of power, not a concentration in one figure.27

In addition to their uncriticai devotion to Cuba's political model, orst dwtrines. For thzodox h t e l l r r c t d s are reluctant t o give up key exampk, Gtadys Herndndez, a yamg economist, told me, "I don't agree? with the criticisms of Marxism-Le sm. The principles are objective. The dictatorship of the proletariat has worked in Cuba."zg ]In mother exaxnple, Dario Machado concludes his study of the probkms of bu" reaucracy by reasserting the hportance of democr;ltic ~ e n t r a l i s m . ~ 27. Dario Machado, intenriew with author, Havana, February 26, 1993. Of course, it should be noted that the U.S. presidcmt*in fact does not have authorily to declare war; only Congress can do so, which is not to say that U.S. presidents have not effectively done end-runs around Congress to prosecute tacal wars. 28. GXadys Hern6ndez Pedraza, interview with author, Havana, March 2, 1993. 29. Dario L. Machado, B~irocraciay Btlrcrcvafzsmo (Havana: Editorial Polltica,

a 990).

However, some reassessmat of such ideas is under way even among more orthodox intellectuals. The process of change is producing a range of attitudes that move from the absolute defenses of thodoxy cited above, to cautious reassessmnt of rars, to criticisms that are more thorough but still km. Tsabel h u b e r , for example, an Argentinian who has lived in Cuba for two decades and is married to a K g h - r m b g unist Party official, agrees that the Lath h e r i r a n left rmdewalued democratic and electoral b m s of struggle. But, she says, it did so for historically justified reasons, and the problem now is that the Right is able to use democratic discourse against the left.% h u b e r says she has rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat: "The problem is how form the theory into a political project. That's been the problem entietLtz-century Marxism, how to apply the theoretical model to realiv." Recent writings by Marta Hamecker, something of a living icon for Latin America" Marxist-Lenhist left; are indicative of a process of reflection and change that is still incomplete. Hamecker argues that the left's project must include political demmracy, social or substantive demmmcy, and partjcipatory dmocracy, which she mderstmds as t of, for, and by the people, respectively.32 Vet Marnecker still wants to uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat as a valid theoretical discourse, even if it is no longer viable as political discourse: From the t h w r e ~ c apoint l of view, in order for a democratic p o l i ~ caI system to reflect the interests of the majority of its people, it is necessary to limit the realization of the interesb of those who oppose measures benefi&al ta the people. . . . If the minoriv were to vdmtariIy submit to the interets of the popular majority in power, the majoriv could implement a democracy without limits. . . . The didatorship of the proletariat is simply the other side of the coin of broader popular demwracy, i.e., the strength of the major1v.33

30. Isabel Rauber, Proyecia, Sli$ta y Poder: Desfios Acfttaler; del Movinziento Popular Latinoamevicano (Santo Damingo: CollerciBn b b a t e Popular, 19921, pp. 35-36. 31. XsabeI Rauber, interview with author, Havana, Febmary 16,11993. 32. Marta Harnecker, ""Democracy and Revolutionary Movement," in S. Janas and E, MfCaughan, k l i n America Faces the Twmty-First Centtilq, op. cit., g. 64, 33. %id., p. 66, A. similarly flawed attempt to retain the conceptual notion of "class didatorship" as an essential component of the transition to sociafisrn can be found in Richard Waxris, Marxism, Soczalim, and Democrag in btzn Amerr"ca (Boulder: Westview, 19921, particularly in his chapter on the transitionaI state.

Socialist and Liberal Qrfhodoxz'es

53

However, n o ~ o n s of "class d i c t a t o r s h i p f ~ onot translate as "strength of the majority" when the majority has no autonomous form of representation. Marifeli Perez Stable and Margaret Randall, both sympa&@ticto the Cubm revolution's kst.ark goals, have emphasized in their cGtical assessments of Cuba% pofitical r e m e that =ss organizations such as the Cuban Women's Federation and the Codederahon of Cubm Woskers are seriously ted in their abilit_yto sewe as democratic instist Party and onomy from the Cuban Co hrtions by ~ e ilack r o the state." The critical issue of civil society's autonomy, as a necessaxy component of democracy, was brought to the fore of left political and ~eoreticaldebate by Lath Amerka's various shggles in the 197Qsand "80s against ~ l i t a r ydictatorsKp and t w a d democracy, Such ideas have had a, difficult h e findkg vwaf advocates within the still restricted intellectual c h a t e of Cuba. However, changing ideas about to influence even some of Cuba's demormcy are gradualIy be more orthodox thhkers. For e, Marnecker is now writing a book on the Brazifian Workers Party and col1ecthg testhanies from popularly-electtrd, left go ts h various Lath American cities, because she rtscowizes that important lessons to be learned from h s e non-orthodox experiences.35 dlustrates the tentaThe ewlvhg discourse of Fidcl Castro ns an the still quik tive but evident Muence of new democra statist views of Cuba"s o~hodoxtendency. Castro lamnts that Gmbachevk mf oms, intended to perfect socialism, strayed the very "pillars'kf socidism by mdemixn. mist Party and the Soviet state. The or&odox statism of this assessment seems stilf-evident. Yet, kdicatistg his own openness to necessary potitical refarm, Castro suggests that Gorbachev" error was not having taken a more gradual approach rather than trying to do it all at once.% Castra then ilnpXicitly accepts one of liberalism" fwdamental critiques of lEre Soviet polipjcal model when he idcntgies Stalin's violatlims of legafiv and abuses of power as grave errors.% Castro goes on to define democmcy in terms that tkorougfily mix liberal, nationalist, and Marxist discourse:

34. Marifeli Pbrez Stable, The Ctrban RevaEutim. Orkins, Course, and Legacy (New York and Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 19%) and Margaret Randafl, GatFzerrrzg Rage. The Failure oj20th Centtry Rmlutions to Daelop a Feminist Agenda (Mew York: Monthly Review Press, 1992) 35. Marta Hamecker, intemiew with author, Havana, February 9,1393. 36. Fidel Castro in Tsrn6s Borge, Un Crana de Maiz. Conversacirin con Fidel G s f r o (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econbrnica, 19(32),p, 48. 37, Ibid,, p. 61.

[Djemocraey, first of all, as Lincoh once defined it, is the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, . ., . Demmaey implies the defeme of all of the rights of the eithem, among them the right to independence, the right to all fredom, the right to na~onaldipity, the right to honar; for me demwracy means fraternity antong men, true equaliy among men, equal oppor-iq for all men, for each human that is born, for each intelligent being that exists.%

n democracy by sayhg it can never exist, in Casbo ends his c al capitalist societies. He criticizm dfosts to *ese terns, in hi impose "capitalist bourgeois democracy" on Cuba by calling on the nationalist, anti-hperiabt credentials of fas4 Marti and S h 6 n BoBvar, who, Casko says, "never conceived of this form of democracy for the contries of Lath America."" e Castro" ppreoccupa~onwith the authority of state and party, and his mequivocal dismissal democracy," indicate the extent to which his views remain ents also suggest an effort to recthe mare orthadox tendency, his c n o ~ o n sabout citizenship rights, liberty, oncile these views with the reluctance of this partial embrace of irnd legality, and ta kgi liberalism with the still powerfully popular discourse of nationalism. Willtih the broadest sectors of Mexican Left, because autfioritari~sm of both left and right has been so thoroughly discredited, orthodox perspectives on democracy and democratization are more visible in practice than in comcious intellectual fomulation. Such tendencies often reveal &emselves w i t b the Mexican left b o intet-nally ~ (e.g., top-dswn, bureaucratic, careerist behavior by some individuals wi and externally (e.g., uccasionally reproducing eorpoxatist relations with f i e mass movements)* As Fn Cuba, ort%todoxviews about democracy iamong the Mexican left also tend to reveal tf-temselves in assessments of the past. h a large gathering of the left in Mexico City in September, 1992, for example, defense of the Soviet Union remained firm in some quarters. A on=-cornm m justificalien for the Sovkls~undemoeraticpast was given by Arturo Bonilla following arguments by Andrea Revueltas, daughter of the famous Jos4 Revueltas.4 She rted that ere is much currency in Rosa and Trotsky's fear of democracy, beLuxemberg"~c r i ~ q u eof Le cause a viable model of swiaEm could only be built *rough mass, democratic participation. In response, Bonilla, another prominent left htellectuak objectrrd to her critical assessment of the Soviet Union, insist38. Ibid., p. 1%. 39. b i d , , pp. 2Q&L-107.. 40. Andrea Revrxeltas and Art.uro Bonilla, public comments at Foro Luchas Emantcipadoras de Fin de Siglo, Mexico City, Sptember 4,1992.

Soez'nlist and Liberal Q r t b d o x h

55

ing that the "bureaucratization" of the Soviet regime c m be explained by the davorable h t e tional context inwfich it emerged. who opposed the dissolution A small group of former Co famation of the PRD h 1989, of the Mexicm Socialist Parq as are now a s s ~ i a t e bwith the journal Socklismo, probably the clearest expression of the orthodox perspective within the Mexican left. Its editors are critieal of the Pm for strugghg mly for democracy but not socialism and call for "democracy that is not reduced to respect for citizen suffrage."41 In contrast to liberal forces who criiicize the PRD for its "politics of fupture," the editors of Socialismo are critical of it for not pursuing a genuine "democratic rupture."" Edmundo Jard6n Arzate criticizes khe Mexican left, and especially mists now inside the PRD, for having abandoned the class struggle. Citing passages from the U.S. Declaration of Independence md c-he French Declaration of the Rights o(Man and of the Citizen to demonstrate &at social classes are not fomaUy recognized in the famdislg statements of Eberal democracy, jardzin says of tke fomw Ca leadership: They deceived themelves and us with conceptions and objectives that were not those of the proletariat but rather those of clasws and sociat formatiom that dominate, as Marx affirmed, the world of produc~on,and they are the ones who dominate at the political Eevef and those who generate the doknant culhral ideas, contributing to the farmation af a false consciousness about the dass sihration, the h c G o n of which is not: to push the course of history foward, but to detain it, disguising everything, or almost everything, in the "struggle for democracy.'43

As in Cuba, there are ranges af opinion a m g orlhodox leftists in Mexico and an ongojng process of reassessing long-held doctrhes. Even among some left activist-intellechaIs who, on most issues, have more renovagve ideas, there is a certah reluctance to abandon elements of ism associated with pxeservhg Ihe power of the "revdution'hand its organizations. This is perhaps an mderstandable concern in light of the history of repression and intervation against 41. Editorial, "Ruptura y c o m p r o ~ s ademxrkticos," "cialisnzo (Mexico), A50 2, N6,5, fan.-May1990. 42. %id. For more on thekr critique of the left's emphasis on efclctoral

struggles, see Eduardo Monks, "Xzquierda sin br\ijula," SociafGm (Mexico), Afio 3, N6. 7, Feb..1932. 43. Edrnundo fardcin Arzate, " a u k pas6 con la lucha de clases?" Socialismo (Mexico), AlTto 2, N6.5, Jan.-May 1990, p, 56,

revofutionary orga~zations, movements, and gwe Alvarez Carin, for exawle, who, like Cuba's Juan Ant from orthodox on many questions, insists that ""dmwratic centralism" was not the problem in the past, but ratkrer the lack of hdividual m d social knowledge md educatisn among the rmk-and-fi1e.M &e of Mexico" most eminent Marxist sholars, Adogo Sb&ez VAsquez, offers mo*er example of this rctassessment-in-process. He is critical of the Latin American left for having long negated the value of democracy in the process of legihately denomcixtg the political, representative democracy.& Yet, like Marta Hamecker, he is reluctant to give up the "dictatorship of .the proletariat," Shnchez Vdzquez draws a d i s ~ c t i o nbeltveen Marx's conception of the dietatorship of the proletariat, which he finds "compatible with the broadest democracy,"' and Lenifl's concepGm of "power subject to no lawew46 Also like Hamecker, Sdnhez VBzquez never deals with the contradict-ions implied by tkte dictatorship of any "majority," defhed in class terns or ohrtvise, which is inevitably hekeragclneous*QBut in the 44. Ratjl Alvarez Garin, ents at Foro Luchas Emanicipadoras 992. de Fin de Siglo, Mexico City, S 45. Adolfa SSBnchez Vgsquez, "Rernocracia, revolucidn y socialismo," Sociali s m (Mexico), ~ Afio 1,PJ6.3-4,Iqct.-Ds, 1989, p. 25. 46. bid., p. 16. 47. Although a full assessment of the l e e s current thinking on the sipificance of social class is beyond the scope af this book, a few obsenrations can be made based on my interviews. More orthodox thinkers tend to focus almost exclusively on the category of class as the most relevant for understanding and predicting social and political aclrion. Their conception of democracy as defined in t e r m of the ""working class majority'9has not sipificantly taken into accamt issues of gender, race, e t h i c i v , and sexuaiitry. More liberal left intellectua2s have been far more infiuenced by fenninism, new social movements theories, and other discourses that are critical of overemphasizing social class. ,the that liberal tendency is to liquidate the problem by stressing democrati supposedly protect the rights of all individual citizens, regardless of social identity. The renovative left tends to reject the t-otalizing nature of arthodox class analysis and recognizes the critical importance of coexisting (and mutually contingent) sot_-ialidentities and demands. However, relatively little headway has been made toward reformulating a viable conception of democracy that effectively addresses both individual citizenship rights and the m u l ~ p l esocial demands that arise from heterogeneous, contemporary societies. The Chiapas uprising has greatly spurred the Mexican left's reasserfjsmentof indigenous peoples" rights and gut the issue of autonomy on the front burner of debates about democracy. In Cuba, there has been less progress in rethinking i s u e s of race, which still tend to be dissolved into uproblernatized notions of class andlor nation,

Socialist and Liberat Orfhdoxies

57

end his assessment of the practical experience of such formulations is critical: The exclusion of reprmentative demmracy in the name of real demwacy, understood as direct participation, didnates demwacy itself, i.e., ail farm of demmracy. This is the Iesson fram the historical experience of the October Revolut-ion when it dissolved tkte C o n s ~ b e n t Assembly and transfened all power to the Soviets.48

The views of Siinchez Viisquez are more representative of the direction of in the Mexican left today t h n are the more ortFtodox perspecd earlier. h Mexico, where the opposition faces what has been the lessons from the described as "the perfect dictatorship," the have genexally been reaI, historical experiences of Marxisnr-len taken to heart. h Cuba, where ort_hodoxleft forces stifl. dominate m c h of the state-party regime, there is greater reluctance to abandon the ideology, political doctrines, and state institutions that have helped them presewe power.

Liberal Perspectives Wile orthodox forces in Mexico still think largely in terns of dismantling the bourgeois state and ortk\odox Cubans concentrate on preserving the socialist state. more liberal-influenced sectors of the left lean toward privileging reform of the political system (or even merely of the ent). The liberal perspectjve often imores the economic and social power relations deeply embedded wit%tin the state, choosing to emphasize the importance of a vaguely defined "civil society" in advaneing the process of denno~rsltization.4~ h some L a t h American na48. bid., p. 17. 49, En a critique of the liberaE leM%current emphasis on civil society, Jaime Bsorio has cautioned that, "The autonomy of civil society vis a vis the state is one step on the path of demacra.tiza~on,but. it does not resolve the disparities that exist in t e r m of the capacilfyof different social sectors to express their points of view, to make known their visions of the world, and to propose their projects f-or the c o w t q and socie(y." Qsario argues that some left intelIech;rals, like Norbert k h e r , in misreading Gramcl" ideas about the gradual accumulation of farces within civil society, fail to adequately distinguish betbveen power as it exists in aff. social relations (e.g., within the family) and political power mare specificaUy residing in the state and reflecting particular dass interests. % Jaime 6 ~ 0 ~""L 0 , aciedad civil y ei asunto del poder," manuscript (Mexico), January 1995.

Democracy f

atic expePiences of military rule and trions, SWshaken from the tr bloody repression of the left, 1. left perspectives today often share with neoconservatives a preoccupation with governability and "pacted" bmsitions. A more reslsicted conception of demmracy became particdarly influential amang some sectars of the left in the Suthern Cone during the difficult transitions back to civihan rule in the 19I30s. In Argentina, i e f ~ s t scholar Juan Garlos Portantiera at one point urged a radical deparhtre from traditJonal left by suggesthg that "democracy as an abjcective is independ the sociwcanornic order which contains it,"w h Brazil, GuiUemo Q"E)omeUwas focussistg on how best to assure tion to civilian d e through elite-negotiated pacts soft h e r s and civilian politrical moderates." h CMe, er urged h e left to & d o n old ideas about pali~ral change through revolutim and instead to help construct a new order ~ o u g respect h for parliamentary instibtions and political realism about "what is possibk."52 ChiXean scholar J a h e Osaria, who has lived in hce his exile following the overthow of the Salvador Allende ent in 2973, cites various factors to explain the ascendency of ve ammg sectors of the left h the Southern Cone, Osorio's s include the severe smietal ruptures and trauma represented ry coups of the 1960s md 197Qs and the ~ e hpodance w of p~vately-fhanced hstitutional spaces wEch have helped shape the conservative direction d research.53 50. Juan Carlo5 Portantiero, quoted in Ronaldo Munck, Latin Anze~ca.The Transition to Dmocraq (London: Zed Bwks, 1989), p. 11 n o s e comments were first published in 1986. i t is worth noting that by 1989, following several years of nealiberal politics under Argenltina" s e w civilian regimes, Portantiero was writing about the need to dernmratize the sonomy and to "broaden classical representat.ive democracy with i n s t i h ~ o mof direct democracy, with referendums, pl&icites, recalls, and popular initiatirres." See Juan Carjtos Portantiero, "La rnrjlEiple fransformacih del Estado lat-inoamericana," hr~reva Sociedad (Venezuela) #IQ&, November-December 1989, pp. 88-"a. Apparently the experience of living under resctricted democracy, however much an improvement over mijitary dictatorship, encouraged Portantiera to reconsider some of his earlier, more classically.liberal fomulatians about democracy. 51. See Cuillerma VDomell, Philippe C. k h d t t e r , and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions fvom Authovialavian Rufe (Baltimore: J o h s Hopkins Universiq Press, 19%). Norbert Lechner, h Co~flr'ctr'va _y Nunca Acabada Canstrzlcci6n dd Or52. den Degado (Sangago: FLACSO, 19Efrfi);and N. Lechner, La firnocratiztrcicin en el Contmto de trna GzrlfzltraPas-Maderna (Santiago: FLACSB, 1"3&6). 53. Jaime Oscrrio, "Laos Nuevos Socibiagos,'hmanuscript (Maico) 1992.

Socialist and Liberal Orthodoxies

59

The views of these liberal left intellectuals are generally consistent with the historic ideology of liberalism as a politics of reform designed to stabilize capitalism and assure governability through the political and institutional incorporation of broader sectors of the citizenry. In some cases, this approach has led to left forces being elected to government only to find themselves administering the economic crisis and implementing neoliberal restructuring schemes (e.g., the Siles Suazo government in Bolivia, Socialists in the Patricio Aylwin govemment in Chile, and now, apparently, the Femando Henrique Cardoso government in Brazil). Thus, liberal perspectives within the left tend to define democracy primarily with regard to the political system, often leaving aside either the more permanent structures of state power or issues of democratic participation outside the formal political sphere. Democratization has come to be defined by the liberal left largely in terms of procedural, juridical, and institutional reforms to enhance citizen representation and/or participation in the existing political regime, regardless of whether one is currently in the opposition (e.g., more liberal voices within the Mexican PRD and “Democratic Socialists” in Cuba) or in power (e.g., leftists in Mexico‘s Carlos Salinas government and reformminded Cuban Communists). Among the Mexican left, liberal thinking is more dominant in political discourse than it is, as we shall see in chapters five and six, in perspectives about state-market relations (where concems about preserving national autonomy in the face of North American economic integration have moderated liberalizing influences). The Mexican left was far more incorporated into Latin American debates about democratic transitions than were their Cuban counterparts. Some of the Southern Cone intellectuals who have moved their discourse on democracy toward more restricted, liberal formulations worked in Mexico for many years and therefore exert more influence there than they do in Cuba. For many on the Mexican left, democratization of Mexico has become defined almost exclusively in traditional liberal terms of civil rights and a fair electoral system. Take, for example, the ”basic requirements of democracy“ offered by Jorge Castaiieda: “electoral competition for power, with free choice, fairness, and at least a moderately level playing field.”% Some of the intellectuals interviewed in Mexico expressed a certain complacency about accepting the limitations of liberal democracy. For example, one former Central Committee member of the now defunct Mexican Communist Party told me, “Witfun the process of economic modernization, there are political advances: military regimes were bro54. JorgeCastaiieda, Utopia Unarmed, op cit., p. 327.

ken. The worthy aspect of liberalism is that e c o n o ~ modernization c is accompanied by political mode a~sn."= Such n o ~ o n sare ~ c a s i o n ally offered as co on wisdom by Mexican leftists, even &ou& Mexico" recent record of economic: liberalization and pditical authoritarimism would =em. evidente to the contrary. Inded, a sig;nificant number state-pasty reaf leftists, a k r years spent in the opposi g b e , accepted positions in the Carlos Sa t and laud the ted political refoms undertaken Jot& Woldenberg, associated witL\ tfne revalutionary na(ionalist current of Mexico" ppost-1968 hft, argues that real headway has been made toward democratization of Mexico, despite h a t he comiders the "impatience" some leftists express for the slowness of refom. Woldenberg has clabed that, as a result of a series of pdi.ticaf refoms since the mid-1970s, Mexican elections are becoming h a t "the kxts on democratic theory say: famulas for camptition among diverse options that recognize and accept that the capacity to govern or legislate ctepcrnds m citizen support gained at the p0lls."5~ His predictions to the contrary, the August 1994 elections were marked by extensive fraud, irrepjari~es,and a slanted playing field that allowed the FM to c l a h a less-han-credible victory,"" Waldenberg also takes issue with ~ o s on st Parv leader e the left, like etkian Enrique Arnoldo Martinez Vedugo and fomer Sema, who insist that democralizatian af Mexico requires more than a refom of Ihe political system. Woldenberg maintains that refozm is in fact all that is needed and says, "I don%C o w what the fear is in callhg this by its name, 'a refom of the Mexican state,bf its institutions, of its 55. Am4rico Safdivar, intewiew with author, Mexico City, August 4,1993. 56. For an accomt of some Wen9 p r o ~ n e nMexican t fe&istswho worked

in the Salinas gavernmernt; see Carlos Acosta Cbrdwiz, "Ayer, opositores de izquierda; hoy dirigen y ejecutan programas de Pronasol," Proceso (Mexico),No. 827, Septeder 7,1992, pp. 18-21. 57'. Jos4 Woldenberg, ""Mhs vale prevenir que lamentar," in Jorge Alcocer, et al., El Fzrtuvo de la Izqnierda et1 Mkxicro (Mexico: CEPNA, 19921, pp. 64-65. In a public debate of left intellectuals in Mexico City in July 1992, Wczldenberg defended as sipificant the advances made in refoming Mexicofspoliglicai system and criticized ather participants far not hlly apprecialing the siwificance of the changes in the press, parUament, and electoral institutions, J. Woldenberg, "C6amentarios Finales," in f. Alcocer, ibid., p, 311. 58. n e r e are many sources documenting the 2994 electoral fraud; see, e.g., "Informe de Aliama Ci-vica Observacicin 94: La Calidad de la jornada electoral del 21 de agosta de 1994," special supplement in La Jornada (Mexico),September 20,lf3%; and "Informe de la Comisibn por la Verdad sabre las elecciones ;Federates de 1994," special,supplement in La Jarnada (Mexico),November 5,1994.

Sociczlist and Liberal Brtkodoxt'es

61

electoral legislation, of the parties' influence, of the significance of elee~ons. Such liberal notions about democracy may have restricted tfae vision of the Mexican left, but liberal values also have helped give red content to the left's democratic project, in contrast to the vague generalities that often plagued abstract notions of socialist or proletarian democracy. The P m ' s program for "democratization of the state and society," for example, is fitled with concrete reform proposals such as two-round voting in presidential and gubernatorial elections, specifics for altering the balance of legislative and exwutive powet, steps for democratizhg nts, nonpadisan electoral institutions, guarantees fo and other mass media, and more.@ However, as we wil see more clearly in the following chapter, renovative forces on the left support such liberal refoms as part of a broader and deeper process of demacratlzatim mderstsod as ""the socialization of politicaj power."61 The more liberal sector of the Mexican left, represented by inte11ectuals hike Jos4 Woldenberg, Rolmdo Cordrzra, Carlos Tello, and Adolfo Sjnch, Rebolledo, also shares the preoccupat7icfn with ord gsvemability, and cautious, pacted hansitions which have much of the debate about democratization in the Southe ous articles and editorials in the Mexican publications h Jamada and Nexcis during August 1993 made explicit or implicit critiq-ues of what they consider to be the PRD's "politics of rupture." One analysis of this debate elc-lirnsthat the PWUs rekrsal to negotiate electoral outcomes with the PRI cost the new party the support of several such influential intellechaIs.h2 Woldenberg, for example views the PRWs concept of "democratic revolution" as problematic,b%nd stresses the need for a pacted outcome of the pditkaX struggle: 'Tefhaps one of the greatest chaUenges facing all of the parties ;is to constnrct scenarios so that everyone wins (in differe ) or so that at least the 'game' is not ,Rolando Cordera warns of the exceszero-sum. Along

59. J. Wofdenberg, "Camentarios Finala," oop. cit. The contrasting views of Amoldo Martinez Verdugo and Emique %mo appear in the same volume Gorge Alcocer, et al., El Flldlrro de Za Izquierda en Mkxim, op, clit.) 60. Partido de la Revctlucicin Dernacrdtica, "La dernocratizacicin del Estado y la sadedad,'"in Pvqeefo de Program del PRD (pamphlet) (Mexico: CoAtC Ejecutivo Nacional PRD, 2993). 61. Ibid., p. 3. 62. Jestis Galindo Ldpez, "Para (re)pensaral PRD," &ce"tera(Mexico), N6.21, June 24,2993 63. J. Woldenberg, "Cornentarios finales," s p cit., p. 311, 64. J. Woldenberg, "M%svale preven;ir que tamentar," "p. cit., p. 65.

sive verbal polarization and lack of will to engage in dialogue that &aritcte~zesmu& of today's political stntgg1e.s e he does not directly point a finger at the Pm, he is extremely careful not to criticize the PRI or Salinas, whose program Cordera and Woldenberg have descrxibed as "swiai liberalism" and as a role model for the rest of Lath America.& Following the PH's clabed victory in various 1994 elections, the s popular mobilization and nrpdebate about pacts and dialog b e became increasingly sharp the PRD itseE. m e more lib wing of tfie party argued that th was ripe tu negotiate beMer te for electoral reform, a resolution of existing post-electoral conflicts, m r e pluralistic cast to Ernesto Zedillo g w 1994).g According to col st Joel Qrtega, h e pa insiskg on the iUe@ E the S a h a s presidenq and retyiflg m constant mass mobiiizatims in pursuit of a radical democratization had failed. Ortega was particularly critical of the "instrmsigence" of Cuauhtkmoc CBrdenas and that wctor of the Pm he refers to as "ul&as.'The t h e had come, he clahed, to negotiate with the g far mofe modest goals: "reformist and mdexate position was shared by a significant number of the P m ' s liiberal wing, as well as by center-left RI dissidents like Demekio Sodi de la Tijera, who urgtzd the and the ogposition alike to abandm e to find a political resolution of the nation" various conflicts." As we will see in the followkg chapter, a more renovative wing of the party, closely identified with mass movements and support for the Zapatista rebelfim in CMapas, did not reject diafope but insisted on the need for constmt, ongohg mobiliza65. Rolanda Cordera Campos, '"cos y recuerdos de la sucesi6n presidencial," Nexos (Mexico), A u p s t 1993. 66. Rolando Cordera and JosC Woldenbrg, "La Cumbre beroamericana," C~iadernode Nexos (Mexico), August 19993, p. iv. 67. The Zedillo government did end up nctgotiating a new electoral reform acceptable to the left and right apposition pa&es (PRD and BAN), but the ref o r m were subsequently bllwked in Congress by P E hardliners in 1996. 68. Jwl Qrtega, ""Cambiar Ua," I;a brnada (Mexico), November 6, 1994, and ""E cretinism0 parlamentaria y la posible," h Jomda,November 13,1994, 69. Demetrio %di de la Tijera, ''La hora del diafogo," h jornada (Mexico), October 28, 1994. %e of the more interesting phenomena tabng place within the liberal left has been the increasing radicalization of the discourse of those, like Demetrio %di de la TYera, who are moving away from the PIXI toward the opposition, and the increasing liberalization of the discourse of those, like Ro-. lando Codera and Jos&Woldenberg, who have b e n moving away from the opposition and toward a smtor of the PRX,

Socialist and Liberal Orthodoxies

63

tion of popular sectors to secure the fullest possible democratization and avoid co-optation70 To be clear, however, I include many of these liber lechals witkrin a broadly-defined left because of their c miment to social goals not offered by pure free-market, famally r repolitical liberalism. Jorge Castaiieda, for example, qualifies stricted definition of political democracy with the following Poverv and democraq don't ntix easily; since the posponement or abrogation of democracry is not an acceptable option [for Latin American democrats], only the elidnation of poverty will do. Failing ta bring this about is tantamount to democratic suicide: in the nnidst of destihrlion and exclusion, and absent any trend toward their eradication, democracy will. not survivee71

In a perhaps more cynical example, Rolando Cordera, who praised Salinas's "social liberalism," is critical that "the &ernes of equity, exploitaent af the masses, and social justice are ;absent from the discourse of the 'democratic revolution.'"R Cynical or not, the point is that even Mexico's liberal left remains concerned with the social themes that have historically distinguished the left from pure liberals. To a far greater extent than the Mexicm left, Cuban revolutionaries remained isolated from the liberalization of politicat discoufse about democracy that swept through most of Latin America in ftte transitions from military to civilian rule. Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, a degree of economic liberalization has been imposed in Cuba by the severity of its crisis (as following chapters descrilsa). Political liberalization, however/ has been less evident. Nonetheless, more liberal notims of democracy am emerging among some of Cuba" l& intellectuals as well. This is particularly evident among individuals associated with the social democratic opposition inside Cuba and among same left-kaning CuEzan American htellectuals. They have tended to-

70. This debate within the Mexican left about whether to directly confront or cooperate with the PM in the process of political reforms dates back at least to the Jos6 L6pm Portilfo administraeon (1976-1982). Sc?verat of the revolutionary national&-tswho favored colilabosatisn with the regime back then ended up working in the Salinas government. Many of those who refused are now inside the PRD, ironically perhaps, working with the left forces who broke with the PIU during Cuauht&mocCdrdenas' 1987-88 bid far the presidency. 71. Jorge Castafieda, Utspk Unarzned, crp, cit., pp. 338-339. 72, Rotando Cordera, intercliew with aut-hor, Mexico City, September 9, 1992.

ward a somewhat idealistic embrace of multiparty electoral politics as a silver bulkt to resolve the island" poEtical and econodc crises. In oversimplifying the complexity of the problem of power, they have largely ignored the real political and economic threat represented by the U.S.-sponsored, right-wing Cuban American CO At the same W e , among some refom-mh&d Cuban revolutionaries, an exaggeration of the importance of the political system relative to the stak somethes encourages an emphasis on prwedural and instibtional reforms to "perfect" the current system without addressing the absolutist nature of the state+74mese refomers look to liberal &adii~ons as one source of ideas for improving socialist democracy. For example, a Cuban swial scien ho has studied political and swial mwements in Lath America for years, observed that, ""CBerd &ought has been much more profound [than socialist thought] in elaborating the institutional foms needed to realize its project of democracy."75 A liberal-leaning political perspective among Cuban revolutionaries, then, emphasizes that exiskg political institutions have to be refomed, be made real because in the past they have remained only fomal. S e v e d people interviewed expressed a belief that the February 1993, secret-ballot, elections for the National Assembly were an important advance in the process of democratization, but cautioned that it remains to be seen whether the new Assembly will become a forum of real debate and decisian-mahg over real policy alternatives. In Cuba, the rethinking of democracy also involves a historical discussion of the Stalinist model, significant components of which were inrorporated into the Cuban poliiicd systcm durbg the institutimalizatinn of the r e e e in the 1970s. The influence of liberal ideas can be seen in the reassessment of the Soviet Union by a Cuban scholar, who admits to havFng only rc?cc?ntlyrecopized the fatal Raws of that system:

73. See the Cuban social democratic opposigon's 'Tuba: Proyecta de Programs Socialists Democrgtica (Sintesis)" "avana), December 1991-January 1992. In February 1993, a group of liberal-left Cuban Americans initiated an open letter to President Cfinton t%lat,on the one hand, czpposed the tightening of the embargo against Cuba and, on the other hand, candemed the lack af "freely contested elections" in Cuba and the Cuban gwernmentk '"epression and intalerance." %me of the initiators were leftists who actively supported the revoIution for many years. 74. See, e.g., Migue1 David Limia, "La labczral versus lo territorial en la representacibn estatal cubana (Prspuestas para ef desairolla de la democracia)," manuscript {Havana: Xnsti-t.trto de Filosofia, Acadernia de Ciencias de Czaba, January 1993). 75. Juan Valdds Paz, interview with author, Havana, February 25,1993.

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65

The lidtations of the model in the poli~calsphere were the hsion of the party; state, and government. Rather than refledng Montesqttieu's division of powers, in the USSR all were associated with one center of power, the party. In Cuba, with the Calf to the Fourth Pair9 Cangaess, t h e was a rejection of this model, theoreticalfy.76 Consequently, B e r a t perspectives in Cuba stress the need for a clearer delheation of legislative pawers and oversight. A lifelmg Marxist, who is m w a sympathizer of the social dernocra~ccurrent in Cuba expressed this concern in the foltowing terms: Some m ~ h a n i s mof Iegislative or parliamentahy power seem to me indispensable, There has to be a separation beftnrmn the parliament, as representa~veof the popular will, and the government, which leads for a gven period of time, so that the government wiU be obliged to constantly account for its actions. In the didatorships of the proletariat that existed in the ss-called socialist comkies al Europe, Asia, and Cuba, that mechanism disappeared. This aspect of bourgeois democracy, even if it may appear a little fomal, is necessary, in one form or anoher, in any socialist model: the obligation of the government and its institutiom to account for their actions before a parliament elected by the people or before the people directly," Lberal-leaning Cuban revolutimaries also call for the professionalizatisn of elected representatives, sa th-: legislatofs have the t h e and resources to do more than meet once c mice a year to mbber-stamp policy decisions atready made by the stale-paq's top leadership. As noted above regardkg Mexican leftists and as explored fur(her in the following chapters, there is also a renovative current of Cuban inlcelleetuals who support these same liberal refoms but see them as steps toward a still fuller dernocracy. More liberal-minded Cuban intellrrctuals also emghasize tkte need for pluralism in the revolution, but many still believe it is passible w i t h h a shgk party: ""Pturalism does not equal a multiparty This is one of the key paints that dishwishes liberal fams still loyal to the st Fa* from the social democratic opposition w i t h Cuba, s for a multiparty system md represents a more solidly liberal m i s t leader Blas perspective. Tdladimiso Roca, son of legendary C Roca and now an influential figure h Cuba's small social democralicr tendency, argues that "a ntultipary system is preferable, even if it's

-

76. JuXis A. Diaz VBsquez, interview with author, Havana, March 12,1993. 77". Cecilio D i m s , interview with author, Hawam, February 11,1993. 78. Aurelio Alonso, interview with author, Havana, February 23,1993.

imperfect, because it allows itself to be perfected and improved with the participation and the criteria of almost all strata of society."m Cuban intellectuals with more liberal views object to the regime's censorsKp of fiterature and film that rake criticisms of the revolution. Several Cubans interviewed were particularly disturbed by the controversy that erupted about the 1991 film by Daniel Diaz Torres, Aficia m el pueblo de las M~mzri'IIas@lice in Wonder Tom). A satire of bureaucracy and petty c &en-powerful politburo brmded as c o m t e r r e v a l u ~ o m ~ ideolawe, Carlos Aldana, Several C er struggk bet the national leadership. Reformers, including mando Hart, reportedly lost that ballfe, and the film was shown in very limited r e l e a ~ e .Many ~ Cubans were incensed and an international stir was created. Eventually, in ated scandal, Waz Torres Aldana was removed from power. Aficia and subsequently wre allowed to tour internationally and Cine Czrbanct, magazine of thcr Cuban F i h h s ~ b t edirected by Castro's OM friend Alfredo Guevara, gave extensive coverage to the conkoversy, presented afl points of view and at to repair seriously dam behveen the r e g h e and hdustxy and artists.8" perfectly illustrates an astute observation made by Margaret Randall that "The Cubm revolution is extraordinary in its ab%v to admit mistakes and rectify &ern; it is slower to pernit -a critical discour* that encourages real debate and may help prevent such errors from being made."82 Abel Prieta, a refom-oriented writer who heads Cuba's Ufion of Writers and Artists (UNEAG) and now sits on the PoXitburo, appears to 179. Vladi~ro Roca, interview with author, Havana, March 1993, 80. Hart was not re-named to the new Politburo approved at the 1991 Party Congress, but he retained his position as dnister of culture, The fall-out from the Alicia controversy continued in a bitter polemic involving Hart, Cuban novelist Jestis Pfiaz, and Uruguayan writer Eduaxdo Galeano. After Dfaz made public criticism of the revolution du*g a debate in Zurich in 4992, at which Caleano defended the revolution, Hart wrote a pubtic letter denowciing XXaz in the harshest of- term. Same Cubans interviewed awbuted f-fartFsextreme postzrre to his need to defend his revolutionary credentials afer AIdana" cri~cismof Alkza, which was made with Ha& at the helm of Cuba's cultural swtor, and his removal from the Politburo. For more on the Diaz-Gateano-Ha&polerrmic, ineluding a reprint of Hart's letter, see Brecha (Montevideo),February 5, 1993 and

February 26,1993.. 81. See Cine Cubano, No. 135, April-May-fme 19%. 82. Margaret hndall, Gathering Rage, op. cit., p. 138.

Soeialisf and LibeuaE Orflrodoxiies

67

mowage space for a

dtical discours, at least W of culbre and the arts. AC's journal, La Gaceta de has given coverage to young Cuban writers and artists criticaf of some r e m e policies. A ease in pobt is the yomg wrikr S n e l Paz, whose controverfial the troubled friendship that develops between a Ety member and a gay arht, El f o b el bosque, y el Ftombre numo (me Wolf; the fires&and the N m Man), was made into Cuba's smost widely publicized feature film of recent years, Fresa y Ghowlafe (Stmwbewy and Chocolate), Nominated for a 1994 Academy Award in the eTnited States as best foreign f i h , Fresa y Chocolate honestly addxsses ~ e m e sof social and pnlitical intalemm in the revalutiart. fn an interview h La Esrceta, Senel Paz spoke &out the repression of artists and gays in Cuba,in the late 1960~~ and warned: X hope we have acquired enough experience and wisdom so that such errors, which in no way serve either the cowtry or the Revolution, will not be repeated, But we have to be alert, because there persists in some the criteria that when the situa~onis normal m d relaxed you can @ve artists free rein, but when things get complicated, Iike ROW, we need to be reined in and cantrolled.83

Paz also exgressed concern that the r e g h e still seems to understand ""taleranemas some&ing condi.tioned by the international con~mcture, "ra&er than as a necessiv of art and the Revolu~on."a His concern is weU taken. bring moments of greater international tension the t has often tended to increase censorship and repression of among more liberal-oriented Cuban intellectuafs there is cmsiderabfe s p p a t t t y for the arwrnertt that the ma@tude of the economic crisis and the dangesous international context ~ t i g a t e against s a &oraugh d e m c r a t i z a ~ mof the rcrghe. &e yomg Cuban social scientist even went so far as to achowkdge that "'X have a m m neocmsemative position" on the issues of political democra~zation, "1 agree with the Cuban leadership very much in Ehis regad," he said, "because f lived the experience of the USSR and f experienced Che chaos and disorder."'% a, subdirector of m d u e n t i a l Cuban research ins~k;tte,

83. Snel Paz, interview with Magda Raik, "Escribir es m a sue&@nauf"ra@o,"h Laacefa de Cuba (Havana), Sptember-Odober 1992, M. %id. 85. Santiago Pkrez, intewiew with the author, Havana, March 4,1993.

58

Democracy I Cuba needs to respond not only to the econodc and social probXew, but also in t e r m of the political aspects of democracy. There is no agreement:on this, but there have been important changes. The Constitutional changes (electoral reform, decentralization of power) are a step in the direclion of rmolving the problem of our old Soviet model of ""popular democracy." Modon't like the term "perfecting democracy," because there is much mare required than s i q l y tinkering with what we had. But that is difficult in the context of U.S. hostility. We have to be very careful with any opening that the enemy might take advantage of. Look what the National Endowment for Democracy did in Nicaragua, creating a system of organizations that helped bring down the Sandinistas, while representing the interests of the Unikd States.86

As did other Cubans hterviewed, Carranza said that the debate about democratization opened up considerably right after the Call for the Fourth Party Congress was issued in March 1990, but the rapidly deteriorating international situation slowed the debate. There were also @conservativeforces," according to Carranza, who took advantage of the worsening crisis and "wanted to maintab the status quo for their own poXitical ends."" Gail Reed, the only foreign journalist to attend the pilrty's ccmgress in October 1941, described it as a five-day battle, in which Iiberal refoms allowing for direct elections to the National Assembly were won only agahst fierce opposition.% Efforts to frrstit-ute liberal reform of Cuba's political system, let alone fully democratize it, are indeed hampered by old left orthodoxy of "unicty at all cost." Carollee Bengelsdorfs study of "the problem of democracy in Cuba" names the importance of univ as "the single most prirnary factor infhenceing the Cuban revoluthnary leadership horn its earliest moments."g9 In Renglesdorf's asstrssment, "For Fidel Castro, u,nity stood above e v e r y ~ i n gelse,"g0 This apparently continues to be the case. A telling recent example is the way the first direct elections for the National Assembly were actually implemented in early 1994. Two weeks before the scheduled elections, Fidel Castro called on all Cubans to vote for the entire slate of candidates. Emphasizing the irnortance of uniting behind the whole slate in a time of crisis rather than the sipificance of using the electoral process to voice an ophion about the candidates, Castlru redefhed the elections as a national referend on the Cuban 86. Julio Carranza, intenriew with author, Havana, February 18,1993. 8'7. %idid. 88. Gail Reed, ed., Island I'M the Storm: The Ctlban Commz~nistParty's Fourth Congress (Melbourne: Ocean Press). 89. Carollee Bengeisdarf, The Problenz of Democrag in Cuba, op. cit., p. 73. 90, Ibid.

Socialist and Liberal Orthodoxies

69

Revolution.91 Several of those interviewed were highly critical of this development. Finally, liberal voices within the Cuban left are inclined to encourage dialogue between the regime and its critics and to warn against any violent rupture. Cecilio Dimas, for example, insists that "any political solution to the current crisis has to involve Fidel Castro." He assured me that the democratic opposition is fully committed to a peaceful, nondisruptive process of democrati~ation.~~ Similarly, Gustavo Arcos, a human rights activist who spent seven years in a Cuban prison in the 1980s, now draws the wrath of Miami's right-wing Cuban community because of his calls for a national dialogue among all Cubans, including the Castro government and the exiles. After many years of trying to leave Cuba, Arcos said in 1990 that he was committed to remaining on the island to contribute to his nation's "transition toward democracy."93 While the liberal Mexican left's calls for the opposition to negotiate with the PIU raise well-founded concerns about the age-old traps of co-optation and duplicity, the liberal left's calls for dialogue within the Cuban context surely can have only salubrious effects. The ideas expressed in the interviews and publications just cited do not add up to any coherent, organized liberal tendency within the Cuban left. Rather, they reflect the growing influence of liberal notions about political representation, division of powers, and individual liberties. Cuba clearly does not yet have a reasonably democratic political system, but the terrain of political debate (and to some extent practice) is shifting all the time, as it did in transitions toward relatively more democratic regimes in other Latin American nations, such as Brazil and Chile. Liberal notions about democracy are among the influences on that debate. Yet even the most liberal of left perspectives expressed during the interviews in Cuba, including by the social democratic dissidents, are clearly distinguished from mainstream liberal and neoliberal tendencies elsewhere in Latin America by their commitment to social justice and equality and their belief in the responsibility of the state to help ensure such social goals. As seen, even in the post-Cold War 1990s, much of the lefts' discourse on democracy still revolves around one or the other of the old 91. Margaret Randall (Gathering Rage, op. cit.) discusses a parallel example from Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas encouraged supporters to elect the "united slate" for its national directorate in 1991. She elaborates more on the "unity at all cost" danger, particularly as it has affected women. See especially pp. 82-85. 92. Cecilio Dimas, interview with author, Havana, February 11,1993. 93. Washington Post, July9,1990.

70

Democracy I

antimonies: orthodox socialism and liberalism. Marxist-Leninist formulations of political power remain quite strong in Cuba, where they still serve to jushfy the authoritarianism of the postrevolutionary regime and to preserve the power and privilege of many officials, bureaucrats, and intellectuals. While socialist orthodoxy stands in the way of full democratization in Cuba, it does have the merit of cautioning against an extreme liberalization of politics that could erode the revolution’s many social accomplishments. The orthodox left in Mexico is small and marginal. While its sectarianism does not serve further unification of the left opposition, its insistence on the class nature of capitalism and skepticism about the effectiveness of electoral democracy in class societies can also be a healthy reminder of the many obstacles to genuine democracy in neoliberalized Mexico. Liberal conceptions of democracy have been incorporated into the discourse and program of the vast majority of left forces in Mexico, who have come to appreciate the value of political rights, clean elections, parliamentary struggle, and judicial reforms. Mexico’s liberal left tends to settle too easily for limited political reforms and elite-negotiated pacts that do not substantially enhance the democratic participation and power of the popular classes, but they have encouraged the left to take on the often unglamorous task of elaborating and doggedly pursuing political reforms that are slowly but surely opening up Mexico’s political system. Liberal conceptions of democracy are far less influential among Cuba’s left intellectuals, but they have begun to inform the way some Cubans think about reforming their own political institutions, balancing executive power with real legislative power, giving more emphasis to secret-ballot elections, encouraging greater pluralism within the Communist Party, promoting dialogue between the regime and dissidents. Though they are relatively few, such liberal voices (both inside and outside the regime) are a healthy and necessary addition to the debate about the political future of the Cuban revolution, even if their focus on institutional reform may fall short of the task of complete democratization of state and society. The class position of these intellectuals certainly carries some explanatory weight here. The prevalant, orthodox defense of a Leninist conception of power in Cuba is undoubtedly related to a desire to defend the relative class privilege of the intellectuals associated with the regime. The desire of many liberal-left intellectuals in Mexico to promote a cautious, limited liberalization of politics certainly corresponds in part to their class interests, as they represent a technocratic strata of the petty bourgeoisie who are well positioned to play key roles in any pacted, transitional regime. However, class analysis is inadequate to explain the current ideological tendencies within the lefts of these nations. The

Socialist and Liberal Orthodoxies

71

seventy-four inteUectuals interviewed for this study, most of whom share the petty boupgeoisie, se1Ilar, refatively privitegcjd positions w select themselves into one or the other of thre different polil;ical cuments. meir class interests are skongly mediatd by other factnrs, such as pohticaf generational experience (e.g., me%sdationship to 19681, participation in social movements, and the stmcmaf realititrs of the se~periphery, Such factors are key to exptaining the exstence iznd relative strength of the m d ideological currat, the renovative .kit. The following chapter examims that renovative left, which seeks to transcmd the artificial socialism-liberalism dichotomy by p u r s m g a kfomed by both tradi~onsas well as by new g produced in the very strr,lggle for detmwrati-

CHAPTER 4. DEMOCRACY II

Renovative Perspectives on Democracy Orthodox ieft conceptions about democracy, such as "dictatorship of the proletariat" m a n d "democralic centralism" prsist in Cuba and Mexico, but they have been seriously discredited by the collapse of European socialism m d the setbacks of v a ~ o u T s k d World revolutions, Meanwhile, Eberal ideas about rest-ricted political r e b m have clearly fomd &eir way into the discourse of the left in Mexico m4 Cuba. However, they r@xnain far less influenlial in these countries &an they have been in parts of South America. In fact, a strong theoretical and political challenge to both sociaXist orthodoxy and Xibemlism is emerf5ing &am a renovative left in Mexico and, to a lesser extent, in Cuba. In part, this is because the social, inteuechal and hstitutimal ruptures that contributed to the new h@uence of liberal m d somethes even neoEberal ideas among some Southem Cme leftists have not been experienced so thoroughly in Mexico and Cuba. It is not that renovative left forces do not exist in comh.ies like Argentina and Chile. They do, but their n ers are stilt relatively m a l t their influence more marginal, and the national contexts in which they operate, until quite recently, have not been propiiious. Regarding Argentha, for example, scholar Ronald Hodges hits written: "The single most impartant factor in restruckring the Argentine Left was the historic defeat af 1976-1982. This sanguinary episode, which decimated .the Left, wmt hand in hand w i t h a system of state &norism aimed at eradicating Marxist cultural as well as poIi~caldlikary subversion. . . . The military dictatorship concentrated on stamping out not only the insurgent Left but also its Iegat and political struchres. Xn the conviction that armed subversion was nourished by the n a ~ o n aLeft l as m i s t and Trotskyist parties, the armed forces were d e t e r ~ n e dto cripple them.1

1. Bonald C. Hodgea, "The Argentine Le& Since Perbn," in Barry Carr and Steve Eilner, eds., The Latin Amerimn Left. From the Fall of AIIende fo Peresfroika (Boulder:Weshriew Press, 1493), pp. 156-157.

Renovative Pevspectiues

73

g to regroup and reassert itself in The Argenthe left is only n w be stronger prsence and sectors of naGonal pofitics. h C&, the . But the the left have participated in the first pashilit bruta1lfy of Ute dictatorship that followed the coup encouraged a cau~ous,even t M d approach by much of the C h h n left which has appeared hesitant to stray beyond Iiberal refor Loveman wrote about the postdictatorship Chilem left: Piecemeal reform has become resp&able, demmacy essential, pragmatism desirable, and moderation a virtue, The political culture of much of the Chilean h&has been bansformed. Pruden standable fear of direct confrontation with Pinwhet and the dlitarypermeated public discussion and government initiatives. Fear of "another Sptember 11, 1973" has been internalized; seeking consensus rather than imposition of revolutionary progam was the new motif.2 Despite the aufhoritarian nahre of the state-pafty regirnes in Cuba and Mexico, neither nation has experienced the generalized, violent reprctlssion and the sort of brutal ruptures described above, Even tdnougk the Cuban and Mexican rclgimr?s are in crisis, hpartant components of the political cultures spawned by their revolu~omremain more or less intact. There is still a broadly accepted mtionaf discourse that conthues to efnphasize social justice, social equality, and the leetimacy of '"evolutionary" ideals. Nationalist m4 Marxist left traditions have conthued to evolve, even if under somethes dgficult circumstances. Likewise, despite the nenlibctral restructuring of the Mexican state and h e severe fiscal crisis of the Cuban state, pubIic research insthtions, ersaies, and publications c o n k u e to be hportant spaces for Mamist-influenced intellectual prduction. The organizations of Cuban civil society certainly lack autonomy horn the state, but they have never been targeted for violent, generalized repression. h Mexico, civil society and new papular mavemcnts and organizations have experienced a resurgefice sincc the mid-198Qs, but even in their newness they reflect much of the historic traclitions and ideologies of the nation" nationalist and Marxist lefts. T h s , in many regards, left intellectuals in Mexico and Cub a better position to incorporate newly influential liberal political g without abandoning their historic social concerns, thereby cant-ributr'ng to a renovative approach to demratization. OR the other hand, the fact of greater cantinuity with the revolutionary past surely also helps account for the

2. Brian Loveman, "The Political Left h Chile, 11973-1990," in in. Carr and S. ElXner, ibid., p, 36.

ctogged persistence of more orthodox socialist perspectives among some sectors of the left in Cuba and Mexico, even as it mediates against a full embrace of liberaliism. Brazil, a country which suffered authoritarian military rule and yet today has a large and influential r e n w a ~ v eleft, might seem to cmbadl;ct &ese suggestions about the explanatory sipificanee of Mexico and Cuba having avoided similar a p t u r e a However, Brazil is more accurately the exception that proves the mle. Emir Sader has obsewed &at, kcause Brazirs military coup happened in 1964, a decade earlkr than those in Argentina, Chiler and Urnpay, &ere has been a longer period of h e for Brazilian society to rmover from, the tra a and for a new Brazgim emerge, orgmked along new lines.3 Thc wounds ai ~uphrrchave to keaf, allwing for the birth of a nonliberal, renovathe Brazilian hich generally efiibits even fewer orthodox influences than do the lees in Mexico and, especially, Cuba. This would suggest Ifiat, with time, stronger renovative left currents may emerge in other postmilitary r e g h e s of l-he Southern Cone, as they are clearly doing in Urnpay .4 hdeed, in much of Lath America, in addition to the shared s m c turaf reaiities of the semipriphery, there are imporhnt conjunctural factors in the 19% that foster renovative effafts to escape the blhd affeys of boih statistlsociafist and liberal orthodoxi Tnkrnationaffy, the Wexpectectfy rapid calapse of the Eastern c m i s t r e g h e s helped reveal the surprisingly weak mderbeUy of s s in which state, regbeI and party w r e difficult to untangle. The neoliberal pdicies of intemational finance capital are wreaking havac everywhere, and the late 1994early 1995 coHapse of the Mexican peso clearly reveated the house-& cards-like nahre af the global "'order" such poXkics have created. Regjonally, the pacted, electoral democrades of Latin America quickly have proven themselves incompetent or pmerless to resolve the presskg e.g., the fall of social crise they are supposed to manage. Venezuela% senter-hft Carlos h d r e s P4rez t in the face of angry citizens exhausted from the burden of '"shock therapy" and "restruchrring" and the rapid rise and fall of Femando Collar de Mello in Brazil.) Particularly wi*in. Mexico and Cuba, conjmchral developments are encouraghg the left toward fresh takes on old political p a r a d i ~ s -As recent PM a d m ~ s t r a t i m shave pursued new regimes of accumuXation 3. Em;ir Sader, "Brazil: Against the Winds of History," in Srrsame Jonas and Edward J. McCauglzan, eds., h t i n America Faces the Twenly-First Cenfnry. Recansfnlcting a Social JrfsliceAgenda (Boulder: Wesbiew, 19941, pp. 104-123. 4. %e Luis Stobvich, 'W~ruguay:The Paradoxes and Perplexities of an Uncommon Left," in S, fonas and E. McCaughan, ibid., pp. 170-1M.

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the historic social pact on which m d domina~onthat dbectfy m d s bust, the left has fomd itself the postrevolutionary Mexican s better able to distinguish between those elements of the old order worth fighting to preserve and those still requiring a "democratic revolution."S In Cuba, the abruptness and severity of the regime's post8oviet Union intellectual and political efaing to shatter old d o p a s an cri g about democracy in a for new, though still tentative, oP socialist society. In both nationt;, crisis has provoked serious divisions m h g elites, which in turn have altered the formes af renovative s by m a h g new politicaX md material resources available to nge the d d d a p a s . Tlrus, in a d d i ~ o nto the evolution of their postrevofu~anarycultures, m& Mexico and Cuba pa&icularIy ripe for

h many regards, the mment is propitious for renovat-ive reassessquotes suggesfc ment~of statist m d liberaX politic& models alikc?. -ee the possibaty as well as the dit facing the renovative lefts in their efforts to d e m ~ r a k eCuba ! and Mexico:

*

From Esteban Morales, palitical ecronmist and director of Cuba's Center for U.S. Shdies (CESEU):

The fall of Earapean socialism dotss not represent so much a crisis of Marxist theoy or methodology as a crisis of poli~csand practice, The excessively ideologized Marxism was related to the lack af democracy and par.tldpa~an,including of social scientists. The experiences in the %vie( Union have fed to a serious questioning of: dernmraq in Cuba, a renewed concern with popular participa~on..VVe need a new paradigm of democracl-y, which is especiaHy difficdt: now given the renewed hegemony sf the liberal democratic paradigm.6

From C ~ s t i r t aLaurell, a leading irntellectuat fipre in Mexico's Pm: Within neoliberalism, democracy is viewed with real suspicion, because it implies the ability of people to organize and fi&t for their interests and to force the state or government to accqt c o m p r a ~ s e sthat inIringe art the market. Democracy is a prwess of coqstruc;rion, in which

5. For an analysis of this process, see Edward J, Mdaughan, "Mex~ca's Long Crisis: Toward New Regimes of Accumulation and DoMnation," b t r n American Perspectives, Issue 78, Vol. 20, No. 3, Su 6. Esteban Morales, inte~viewwith authar, Havana, February 15,1993.

people gain experience# sskifk and confidence to r w l v e their own pr~blem.7

*

From Jorge Pbarra, an eminent C u b a historian:

Changes in the world have provoked changes in the concept of political power in socialism. But this discussion always revolves around two axes: one, market demwracy with multiple parties, and, wo, a singfepart-y state. This is naf the issue. "Pe question is whether it is possible for the distind classes to exert influence on political power through all of the existing institutions. To what e x t a t can the people govern-that is the issue., This implies a far more radical. revhion of the concept of democracy than that implied by adopting a bourgeois, muftipa- systexn.8

Such dissatisfaction witt? the old p a r a d i p s is leadlng to the emergence of a renovative tlendmcy in both Cuba and Mexico. The term "renovators" is meant to signify those leftists who still emphasize social goals and social, evcn colilectivist, psfitical and e c a n a ~ cvisions, m d who are crilical of both statist-socialist and liberal approaches. A renovative perspec~vet e d s to understand demwratizatim in terns of the and civil society, Renovators are state, political reghe, go inched neither to expand ept of democracy so broadly as to be virtually synmymous wi& Marx" utopian co mism, and thus meaningless in any practical sense, nor to restrict democracy to purely formal political rights that likewise become nearly meaningless in the real world of political, economic, and social inequa1it)l. A g o d part of the intellectual and political task of renovators i s t s break ihe old socialism-liberalism dichotomy and to reassert the cornpatibiliv of social equatity, individual liberty, and democrc7Gc rule. The emerging renovatiw perspective on democracy entails doing away with the f&e association between coHectivist, sscial goals and c a t r a k e d state power. Renovators also face overcoming the fear that democracy will always be used against the left by its enemies, and that the pluralism and heterogeneity of "really existing society" hevitably beaten the politjcal unity and cohesion reqrtired to tacue sociegf's enoxmotls tasks. Renovators seek a '%ociafization of power" freed from Ihe author-itarian constraints of past statist and vanguardist conceptions-g '7. Asa Cristina Laurell, public comments at Foro Luchas Emanicipadoras de Fin de Siglo, Mexico City, September 4,1992. 8. Jorge Ebarra, interview with author, Havana, February 21,1993. 9- An important example of a renovative efforts ta redefine power, broaden the clonception of demwritcy to gender rights as politicat rights, and to tackle the

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77"

The renovative left appears to be a stiu small yet a u e n t i a in Cuba, but I think thek numbers will grow as the bro American left debate about dt3mmracy is hcorporated h t o Cuba%ppolitical scenario.10 In Mexico, renovators represent a more substantial sector of the left but c ot be considered 6. ant. Tn any went; beyond their actual numbers in either country, the renovative tendency includes many highly respected left intellectuals who are in a position to Muence debates about the future of democratization. Cuban Renovators Among Cuban revolutionaries, a renovafive perspective on democracy emphasizes that the key issue is participation in decision-making at all levels of society, and that such participation has been very limited since the early 1960s. Femando Marihez Heredia was once affiliated with the U~versityof Havana's Philosophy Deparment and the unorthodox Marxist journal, I3'ensamiePzto Critieo, bolh of which were closed down by the regime in 1971 for their controversial perspectives. Like a number of other Cuban htellectuals from that circle, he is n w among the mare renovative voices in Cuba. According to Martinez Heredia, durhg what is considered as the second stage of the revolution (the period of btitut-ionalhation and Sovietization in the dd-19170~)~ Cuba's legislative system of Poder Popular was very successful at the local level, but "in general the political system was weighed down by ritualistic fomalism, a conservative expression that tried to take over soci* as well,"*%arthez Heredia desc~besit as a period of intolerance, during which critics were silenced and debate among revolutionaries was ated, a period from which Cuba's political system and civil society have never f d y recovered. Despite rhe hportancc and acfievements of Cuban mass orghzations, Marthez Heredia says theis tdencies tosed mity is offered by Margaret Randall" account of a womenfis conference held iin Managua, Nicaragua in January 1992, the final document of which was called 'Tor Univ in fliversi-ty." % M. %ndall, Gatherirzg Rage, f i e hil~tveof 28231 CLn?tury Revallr thns to Desrefap s Feminist Agenda (New York: Montly Review Press, 19921, pp. 6668. 10. For an interesting exampie of how the Latin American lelts" t h i n h g on democracy is being incorporated by renovative thinkers in Cuba, see Alberta Alvarez, "Amkrica Laeina: Crisis y Democratizacibn," Cuadernol; de Nirestra Amkrica (Cuba), Vol, fX, No. 19, July-Dec. 1992. 11. Femando Martinez Heredia, 'Tuba: Problemas de la Xiberacibn, la presented at the Latin h e ~ c a Congress n of dtlmocracia, e1 sdalismo,'"paper Sociology, Havana, April, 1991.

78

Democracy II

ward au&oritari&sm and patemabm have prevented civil society. from becomhg more than m appendage of the poEtical system.12 Other critichms of Cuba's ppol-i~calsystem horn a renovative pmspective are far more fierce, but hardly meral, as sugg~~sted by the fob lowing words of a still-loyal party militant and scholar who considers herself among "the pure flames of the revolution" (referring to the circle of ktelfectuais once asswiated with Pensamimto Critico): The Parv is the only isrstibtional space here. Small groups, like the one arowd [smial democratic dissident] Elizardo Shnchez, have created a little space, Yowg intellectuals in the ~ d - 1 9 8 0 sbegan to create if new space outside the party that was not oriented toward Miad-in theater, sculpture, and to some extent the social sciences. But then the Party moved in and closed that space, cs-opting some and leading others to move to Mexico. The Party is very verticalist, authoritarian, statist, and militarist. One is ever less able to participate. But pesonally, I don't t&eve in representative democracy, I don2 like the term demwracy, but weke stuck with i t X would simply that i s what it is really prefer to talk about ""prgc?ip&on,'"ecause about: "Do I or do I not participate in all decisions about power'?" E agrw with Pablo Gomglez Casanwa's concept of participatory democracy.l3

As this quote d & h t sug~fest,Cuban renovators see instihtimal innovation, like the recent emergence of Non-Gove tal Urganiza~ons, as innpartant, because it opens up new spaces ourside of the state and the party for dflrnacratie parkipation in society. Several Cubans interviewed expressed optfism about the potential conbibution to Cuba" democratization of the slew "Consejos PopuXares" (popular camcils). According to Sergio Baroni, a renovative urban planner: The Consejo Popular is the most important development in t e r m of democracy. The Councils are organized at the electoral precinct level, Each precinct chooses a representative to the Council for the daily government of the co mit-y. The Comcil deals with problem like housing and street repairs and water service, the problems of daily life. There are 93 Councils in Havana, each representing about 20,000 people. Each council has a paid professional, elected by the neighbarhood and important work places. Each month the represental-ive has to give an accounting before the electorate.14

12. %id. 13. Anonymous source, interview with author, Havana, March 1,1993. 14. Sergio Baxoni, interview with author, Havana, February 26,1993.

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One interviewee saw the popular councils as a key mediating link between the state and civil society: “They can be seen either as the government organizations closest to the masses, or as the community organization vested with the greatest governmental These new institutions could help ”deepen” (not ”perfect”) democracy in Cuba, if they are able to assert their autonomy from the state party, a problem renovators identify as key to having limited the effectiveness of governmental bodies and mass organizations in Cuba. Baroni told me: The basic idea of Poder Popular here was for society to control the state and government. But it is part of the state and has never been able to exert adequate control over government. That’s one of the biggest tasks of socialist society: how society controls the state. And there are elements of liberal traditions that are important to look at in that regard.16 A telling example of the problematic relationship between state and civil society in Cuba is that of the Cuban Women‘s Federation. Ostensibly one of Cuba‘s most important mass organizations created to represent women’s interests, it has never enjoyed any real autonomy from the Communist Party and recently has come under serious criticisms for not adequately representing Cuban women.” Several people interviewed mentioned a recently established network of women’s centers throughout Havana as a potentially important effort to respond more democratically and effectively to women‘s particular needs during the current crisis with more decentralized, local institutions. Now it remains to be seen whether the Communist Party will allow these new centers any effective autonomy and, just as importantly, whether Cuban women will demand and exercise control over them. While Cuban women made many gains in terms of health, education, and occupational mobility following the revolution, the lack of autonomous women‘s movements, such as exist in Mexico and elsewhere, has limited feminism’s mfluence. It was striking, for example, that many of the Cuban women interviewed expressed quite orthodox perspectives about democracy, while almost all of the Mexican women interviewed were among the most renovative thinkers. 15. Fernando Barral, interview with author, Havana, February 18,1993. 16. Sergio Baroni, interview with author, Havana, February 26,1993. 17. On the Cuban Women’s Federation’s origins and relationship to the ruling party, see Marifeli Perez Stable, The Cuban Reuohition. Origins, Course, and Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), espcially Chapters 5 and 6. For

more anecdotal but no less persuasive evidence of constraints on the Cuban women’s movements, see Margaret Randall, Gathering Rage, op. cit., particularly Chapter 4.

In addition to the emergence of autonamaus social movemeas and organizations, one see gly obvious d a n g e in the Cuban pofitical system that would address the problem of: the C tim of afX politics would be the adoption of a multiparty system. ffowever, for the moment, voicing support for a multiparv reghe is one of the h e s that sqarat-es "c~mterrevolutionax")p~~ socialists from "revolutionary"' ssocialsts. Xn my interviews, only the social democratic R to declare &emselves against the single-party dissidents M I ~ prepared model. This does not mean that renovators are not concerned with issues of pluralism, dissent, debate, and alternative programs, but for the moment they call only for democmtization v m recmcepbalization, of the singh party. Xt is difficuft to whe&er this position is based on prkciple or m a strateec of &e best way to push foward fclernocratization MI.i&~utr i s h g complete poli~calmarginalization. m e 3lustratke fomulatim of this posilion, voiced by a nunrrber of renovators, calIs upon the discourse of independence hero Jose5 Marti, who urged the fornation of a unified party af the natim in the late I8Ws to acheve hdependence from Spak. RafaeX FXernhdez, a proxninent f i p m at the Centro de Eskrdios Sobre America (CEA) who is well reacademic circles, says fiat the biggest challenge facing the mist Party i s to become a "parv of the nation," with space urrents of .thought. In Hemdndea's view, whe&er or not Cuba will need more than one party in the fabre depends on how well &at challenge is met.18 Qutside of C d a , this may seem a mild assessment, but wi&;in.the context of the current political conjmchre, even to sue;gest that the future may require more than the historic party of the revolution is a bold idea. The call to first attempt a genuine "party af the nation" is a soxnewhat persuasive positim given the political cdture, h i & allows all political stripes to image of Marti. Even a more Liberal-minded s p p a t h democratic dissidents acknowledpd that a shgle parq couXd conceivad a t e plsrralim, if it were organized along the lines envisioned by Maxti, who= party, the dissident asserkd, " h l y brought together a wide range of social sectors."lq But then Marti was not talking about a single party to govern Cuba, simply one that would unite the nation against its cafonial rulers. H a d d o Dilla, a political scientist at CEA, does not wmt the critical issue of plcutaksm side-tracked by debates about multiparty systems, 18. Rafae'i Hemdndcrz, 'Wltifirax a Cuba. Notas para una discusicrin." Draft manuscript (Havana, August, 1992). 19. Cecifio Dimas, interview with author, Havana, Febmary 11,1993.

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w&ch he says "coduse the prewnt with the fulure." Dala says the bigption that pluralism m d ger problem is to overcome the as unity, because unity has been distorted to mean a monolithic un The solulJon is to be fomd in what he describes as a shultmeous decentrdization and sociafiza~onof power, "the ideal mtsk for correc-ling what has been a deficit in Cuban politics: the maturation of pluralism mderstood as the recognition of the diversity and autonomy of the participant subjects, and consequently of con)lict as a moment in the creation of consensus."20 Addtting the necessity of conflidct is some&ing that distinguishes this renovative perspective from the more orthodox Cuban views on dissent within hegemony described in the previous chapter. From a renovaGve perspective, then, the issue of democratization cannot be reduced to a particular conception of political phralism defined in k m s of multiparty politics. Nor is it understood to be simply about elections. Rather, democratization is about ixlcreasing the degree of real power people have over the decisions that affect their lives, A prominent but herretical party jntellectual recalled: After the 1 9 6 0 ~ the ~ capitalist ruling classes were in shock because their children rebelled. Samuel Hunt-ingtonpresented an analysis of the danger that people were taking democracy seriously, that the system was overloaded with demands that couldn't be satisfied. So it was necessary to lawer expectations, which is what has happened since the 60s. In the 60s, democracy was associated with "'power" and power was in the streets-black power, Chicano power, etc. Now democracy is all about elections. It's s big myth. What could Cuban democracy be? 1 don't want Cuban socialist democracy to be what Huntington suggesk. Elections are a trap, The que"titon in Cuba now is how much power wit1 the people elected to the National Assembly [in February 19931 really have. The elections weren't really the issue. NOW, are we going to pass real shares of power from the centralized, self-appointed bureaucracy to the popularly elected representatives? Will elected delegates be able to give orders to Ministers of State? What will be the balance of power bettveen the selfappointed bureaucracy and the popularly elected delegattrs721

Cuban renovators also reject the arg ent made by s o m that a Chinese model might be viable for Cuba, i.e., ccononnic bberalization 20. Efaroldo Billa Alfonso, "Cuba: La Crisis y la rearticulacihn del consenso politico (Notas para un debate socialista)," manuscript (Havana, December 1992), pp. 22-23. An English translation of a version r3f this paper is Haroldo Ditla Allonso, "Cuba Beheen Utopia and the World Market: Notes for a Socialist Debate," Latin Ameuimn Perspectives, 22 :4 (Fall 1994), pp. 46-59. 21. Anc3nymous source, intemiew with author, Havana, March 4,1993,

without democrathation (a fomula ga x e g h e , as the following chapter demonstrates). Juan Vald4s Paz, anoher social x i e n ~ sfrom t the Bensamienlo Crz"tico circle, explahed: There are some frankXy liberal tendencies wit%rinthe national debate. 'The first manifestation of liberalism is to deny the relationship beWeen the monomy and politics, to want to implement econontlic liberalization and think it will have no political effects. Anather example are the proposals for econoMc decentralkation without accompanying democratization. These proposals are fmdamentaIly about the enterprises and the economic bureaucracy, not about greater dernocratization and popular control. There are also socialist farces arguing to liberalize the economy out of necessity but to compensate for the effms with greater democratization and social control by the msses over all sphers. You can't compensate far the risks involved in the nEessary crcon~micliberalization without a radical project of democratkaC-ion.22

Along s h i l a r lines, Elaroldo Dillit concedes that 1it;leralization af the economy may be necessary but certainly not stlfficient and perhaps even counterproductive if liberal economic r e f o m s ""arenot accompanied by policies designed to strengthen the spaces for participation and popular cmkollf'= Dilla regards the Iiberaf values of "'liberty" and "individualily" as "'organic to any genujne dmocracy," but he sejects hberalism "as a theoretical body and a sociapofitical practice designed to l e g i t h a & and reproduce capitalist acc Like Dilla, Valdks Paz also concedes the value of liberat clemwratic experiences as part of the historical legacy that the left must draw upon: Regarding democracy, there" a substantive question and an institutional quesliion. The substantive ques~on-what is ciemocrasy?*till has to be elaborated by the left. There are three requisites: more equality, more 1ibert.y' and more participagon* *iaiist democracy has to offer more of all three and in all spheres of society. Bourgeois democracy is restricted to the poli~cafsystem. Real socialism tried to rationalize the lark of democracy by pointing to the econornic sphere, Xn terms of the institutional quest_ion, liberal thought has been much more profound in elaborating the institutional f o r m ta realize its project of demgcracy. The left, socialist thought can't pretend that on either the substantive or the institutional question we have to start from zero. The left has to start from the insufficient but nwessary historical 22. Juan Vald4s Paz, intemiew with author, Havana, February 25,1993. 23. Haroldo Ditla Alfonso, op cit. p. 3. 24. bid., faohote 3.

discussion of democracy, and we have to banscend (in the Marxist sense), not reinvent, what has come before. The parliament m y be an insufficimt mechanism, but improvement has to be based on this experience. This is not to say that in the struggle for power and in defense of power, it won't be necessary to have rest~ctions. But we can't try to make such restrictions virtues. For example, the lack of multiple parties in Cuba, the lack of adequate space for minority opinions, etc.-these can all be explained but they cannot be seen as virt.ues.25

ent about "necessary reskictions" hpfies, in Cuba evert fhdl most renovative views on demwratiza~snarc conditioned by hvo factors. First, there are the dangers inherent in any severe moment of crisis: "There is a serious contradiction betr/veen the popular participation demanded by the people and the discipline required by the current erisis."'26 Secondty there is what most Cubans perceive to be an overwhehingly hostile international emir nt: "Socialst democrracy is viable in Cuba to the extent we can survive as a nation.'Q7 Those dangers strengthen the position of the more conservative farces who resist any democratization of the system. Accordhg to several people hterviewed, the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union seriously narrowed the democratic opening that had begun prior to the Octaber 1091 Party Congress: Presewation of the state and of political power became the overriding question, which is not to deny that there are conservative forces who f i g h t try to use the sibation to skmgthen their own posit-ions. But there are alsofieras aperfuuistas [forces supporting an opening up of the system] who have had to fight to make sure that the emergency is not used as an excuse to make no changes at all, wen the minimal changes necessary to remain faithful to the revolution" commitments. imum changes that are necessary

The construction of a participatory and pluralis~cdemocracy appears as a condztion for patriotic resistance and h r the articulation of consensus around a path filled with obstacles and sacrifices. . . . Probably the clearest message that we have received from the collapse of Eastern European bureaucratic sociafism is the need to reinterpret the relationship behveen democraq and governability in a socialist con25. 26. 27. 28.

Juan Vald4s Paz, intemiew with author, Havana, February 25,1993. Iiliurka PQez, intemiew with author, Havana, March 1,1993. Jorge Ibarra, interview with author, Havana, February 22,1993. Juan Valdks Paz, interview with author, Havana, February 25,1993.

text, in which only lengthening and accelerating the pace of cowtmcting democracy is capable of assuring the stabilit-yand governability of the system.29 Just how far the democracy debate has evolved in Cuba is evidunced by such calls, from f oyal revolutionaries, to reco@m Ula t demacrakatim is a condition for resolving the crisis and rescuing socia&sm,not a goal to be p o q o n e d for some wrdet-emhed hhxre. There is not a reasonable democratic political system in Cuba today, but thg opfions cited here suggest that there are influential voices calling for a process of democrathation c a b t e n t with goals of social equalily and justice, Mexican Renovators The renovative Mexican left's emerging view of state-society relatiom is infomed. botfi by the extensive critique of auehoritarw statism of the P M and the old Co mist reghes and by moliberalism's devastation of the welfare state. For all its Xhitations, Mexico" version of the welfare state was won anly as a result of popular struggle and did provide an hpartant saciaX net for large sectors of the poor majoriy* J a h e ents suggest the renovative left's concern with balancing the fessons of these experiences: In Latin America, we have to give careful thought to how the state recedes and how civil. society is strengthened. We have ta think about how we can aEfow societ)t-to strenghctn itself without necessarily reducing the state, which might simply reproduce a social disarticulatian rather than strengthening civil society, given the histarical weahess of civit society and social classes hercr.30 Pablo Gunzriltrz Casanova is particularly concerned about the dimantling of the Mexican state during the past ten to fifteen years of neoliberal restmctuPing, and he has outlined in very concrete te which the state has been stripped of the mast elemental ess the social crisis facing Mexico." This is a particularly fact when combined with Raquel Sosa's assessment that the ntore dramatic results of political and economic r e s t m c b h g throughout 29. Maroldo Dilla Allono, op. cit. p. 20. 30. Jaime Tamayo, intenriew with author, Guadalajijara, August 20,3992. 31. Pablo Gonzblez Casanova, "'M4xico: iHacia una democracia sin opcianes?" in forge Alonso, et al., eds., El Mzrmo Estada Mexicano., IV. Estado y Socl;edad (Mexico: Nuwa Imagen, 1992).

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Latin America in the 1980s were not the emergence of democratic regimes but rather generalized unemployment, underemployment, extreme poverty, marginalization, and the exclusion of the majority from any link with “the ~ystem.”3~ Given such conditions, the debate among renovative left intellectuals in Mexico is not so much about whether to further weaken or restrengthen the state as much as it is about the nature of the state and the quality of its relations with civil society. Ra61 Alvarez Garin, a leader of the 1968 student movement who has served as a federal deputy for the PRD, says frankly, “We need more state and less government.”” This view earns him criticisms from some leftists for being excessively statist and authoritarian. Perhaps, but listen more carefully to what he imagines the Mexican state might be: There are many more autonomous protagonists today than in the past and there is more possibility for self-directed organizations that understand their tasks and challenges. We need more autonomous state institutions, more self-governed, like the Universities, which have a high level of autonomy and self-government in Mexico. This should also be true for the Social Security Institute and other state institutions. To make sure they don‘t become places for doing private business, they need a management structure that is clearly defined and understood. We need institutions that are more directly accountable to the people, because their leadership is elected, but also more influenced by qualified professionals. I am insisting on the issue of professional qualifications because of the problem of political interference in the state bureaucracy.x

Cristina Laurel1 has begun to elaborate more fully how the democratization and professionalization of public health and education in Mexico 32. Raquel Sosa Elizaga, “Sujetos dominantes y sujetos alternativos en Ambrica Latina de fines del siglo XX,” Memoria (Mexico), December 1993, pp. 43-

45. 33. Raul Alvarez Garin, interview with author, Mexico City, August 27, 1992. 34. Ibid. As an example, he offers the problems of garbage collection in Mexico City, which require technical solutions. The problems remain unsolved, Alvarez argues, not because garbage collectors work for the state but because political corruption and incompetence leads the government to contracting eight different private companies to carry out studies of different aspects of the problem without any integration or coordination. The problems would be more effectively approached, Alvarez suggests, with a more autonomous and more democratic management structure for garbage collection combined with technical professionalization of state employees.

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offer a more effective and economically eficimt alternative to the neoliberal privatization schemes noty mder way.% A h g a similar vein, Pablo Chmez, a fomer general secretary czf the Unified Sociatist Party of Mexico (PSUM) and now part of the national leadership of the FRD, argues that democratization of pubiic productive enterprises is what resolves the problems of statism. He sees the central problem in Russia today k i n g not the slowness of econonzic liberahation but tack of democracy: "They have replaced onc3 absolutist state with ano&er." Moreover, he cmthues, h y % e been able to do so because there is not a demwratic movement from below as here is in Mexico. Like Alvarez Garb, G6mez is very concerned about the technological h o v a t i m Mexico requires to enter the '"ostinduskial world," but hp stresses that vation rewires democracy, the key element fomer Soviet Union and the key element missing in Mexico*s6 In the renovative view, then,the problem is not 'ttoo much or too little state." R a ~ e rthe , task is the demacratizatim and professionafiza~on of state hstibtiom and the concomitant democratization and of civil society, to allow for citizen participatjon and self-go informed by skills and knowledge. Reflecting this perspective, Casanova told a gath a's left that it had two important iat-e hhtre: first, the left an$ proweahesses to electoral struggfe or in terms of governing, but of demorracy in civil society, dem~cracyof '"Ios tie abajo'"; secondly, the struggle for hegemony must be understood not just in terns of propaganda but in terns of poljtical education and culhre.37 A sipificant prac~calexample of a Mexican social movement that vs's shit1enges is has attempted to respond to both of GonzBtez C the Worker-Peasmt-Stsndent Coalition of the f s (CCZCEX). The COCEI is Zapotec in its e h i c ideniliv and rooted in the Isthrnlrs of Tehuantepec's long history of indigenous smggles for autonomy; but it is also strongly influenced by the crass-fertilizatiast of Marxist class an@35. See Asa Cristina Laurell, "For An Alttrrnatitve Social Policy: The Production of Social Services," in in. Jonas and E. McCaughan, Latin America Faces the 'Twenq-First C"entury, op cit, Her study i s also available in Spanish in Eduardo Conzhlez, et al., Mkxico: la b&squedade alternat~vas(Mexico: Edieiones de Cultura Popular, Facultad de Econom'a, UNAM, 1990). 36. PabXa Chmez, interrview with author, Mexico City, August 19, 1992. Arnctldo Martr"nez Verdugo (intenriew with author, Mexico City, Sptember l, 1992) sees Russia's current problem differently than Gdmez, saying it is now a clernmratic country with the h e d a m to organize political parties, etc.; the problem, in his view, is the social regime, 37. BabIo Com&lez Casanova, mrnments made at the Faro Luchas Emanicipadaras de Fin de?SiiigXe, Mexico City, Sptember 4,1992,

sis and social movement activism characteristic of Mexico's generation of 1968 leftists. The Oaxacm-based organization was founded in the early 1 9 7 0 ~won ~ the municipal elections in the city of Juchithn in 1981, was removed from office by army and police forces in 1983, then made a conkoversial decision to participate in a coalition city gove t with the FRI from I986 to 1989, after whch COCEX again won Juchithn's s m i c i pal elections in 1989 and 1992. Despite its impressive electoral successes, however, GCXZEI: has never b i t e d itself to the electoral arena. It has conthued to use mass mot;rilizatian tactics aromd workplace and agricultural issues and has engaged in sophisticated cultural politics that have drawn upon local artists and writers. "COCEI supporters" one obxwer has noted, "do not procedural democracy, which occurs in some siwatians, to other of part-icipaGan and decision-mahg characteristic of the organization."g8 Victor de la Cruz, a poet and COCEI activist, provides an example of how Zapotec tradition has influenced the movement's efforts ta redefine a democracy of "loos de abrrjo": For CWEX, the Ifuchitecss [residents of fuchitdnj are not equal citizens under the law as in baurgeok-liberal i d e o l o ~ .Treating the mequal equalty is an inequality. For COCEI, the Juchitecos are bichi', brothers, . . .h e should not exploit, rob, or kill a brother. Citizens, becauw they are legally equal, must be treated as equaXs even though this p e r d t s the exploitation of some and the enrichment of others. . . . But a brather must be helped to go faward, to grow, to construct his house or educate his children. That is why we hold tightly to didxazh [the Zapotec language), because its experience in the past offers us solutions and points of departure toward the future and toward a type of modernity that is less unjust,%

Thus, in Mexico renovative voices on the left h i s t that meanhgful democracy must be more than liberal, electoral democracy. In doing so, they also face the challenges that radical democratization poses for governability, as the COCEI" difiieult experiences with local gove e saw in the previous chapkfs discussion of liberal tene Xeft, the PRWs call far a "democratic: revolution" has exposed it to charges of promoting a dangerous rupture, of refusing to negotiate a pacted transition with the PM, and of not taking seriously the 38. Jeffrey W. Rubin, ""COGEI Against the State: A Political History of Juchitrin," in Moward Campbell, et at, (eds.), Znpofec Strttgglm. Histories, filittcs, and Represmfafians from Jzichltdn, Oaxgea (Washington, D.C.: Sdthsonian Xnstitution Press, 1993), pp. 16T-168. 39. Vidor de ta Cxuz, ""Bothers or Citizens: Two Languages, Two Political Projects in the Xsthus,'?n Moward Campbell, et al., ibid., p. 248.

issue of governability. These questions are far more complicated for renava~vevoices thm the somethes facile cri.tic&msfrom the liberal left might suggest. Alejandro Atvarez, an economic advkor to the PRD, asserted in 1992, for hstance, that "no one in the PRD is w g to negotiate with the PM at whatever cost."" Far from an irresponsible, maximalist position, however, Alvarez, a leading figure in the now dissolved Pmto C r i t i ~ o ~ views such mistmst of negotiating power as a rational response to Mexico's fxistory of covoratist conbat. The essence of corporalism, according to Alvarez, is h a t the PM teUs you what your share of power will be. h d if you accept what they o@erjust once#youkre screwed for life. Instrsad, we%@ said, "No, we get whatever is refirtcted in the vote. If thatfs only five mangy cats, fine, but we keep what we WQR and we don't negotiate," The rule has to be, first we comt the votes and then we h o w haw many people we represent, not that you come and tell us how many.41

NeverthelessJ recall from the discussion of the bberal left that h late 1994 and early 1995, sectors of the PRD were, in fact, c a b g for a "dialogue" with the PRI gove ent to negotiate a resolution of vallious postelection conflicts h Chiapas, k r a C m , and Tabasco. Such calls for ent caused prolonged, occasionafly rancornegotiation with tt-le gove ous debate withh the PRD. Urban popular leader Tvlarco Rasccin was one of the most vocal critics of the liberal left's strategy. He argued that their caIIs for dialowe with the new Zedillo gov companjed by a Fogram of action f i a t responded to the demands of Mexico" many social movements and that they were desimed to marginalize Cuauhtkmoc Cdrdmas and other mortl radical PRL)leadership. Aecordhg to frZasc6n: The war in Chiapas pushed faward the social slruggle and the electoral struggle, creating legitimate conditiom for radicalizing both. In this context, the PRD has W0 basic options: become a party that Is part af the crisis of the political and wanornic system, or transform itself into an organizing pary that represents, in the political sphere, 40.

Alejandro Atvarez, interview with author, Mexico City, August 28,1992,

41. ibid. Asa Cristina Laurelli, a leading figure in the PRD, says that the pary has won some support for its principled stand but has also paid a very high price in terms of repression and fraud, A.C. Laurell, "Democratic Challenges in Mexica," paper presented at the XVfIf International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, March. 1"398p. 8.

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tic demands [and offers) an altema~veto , . . the COgovernment of the P H and the PAN. A paded eansition means that all parties, including the government, are willing, and that is not the case. Consequently, it:is necessary to generate organized, social and political force.42

Adolfo GiEy, closely allied with Cardenas, claimed that the debate inside the PRD was being presented in t e m s of a false antinomy: "No one od us onpose is opposes dialogue pr>li~:s is also dialowe. m a t beginning a dialogue about a future and improbable (yet one more?) electoral refom with the same people whO have not met any of lheir imentsY9romthe previmsly. negotiated refoms.43 Many renovative voices withh the PRD, pethaps the majority of the party, shared such concerns and said, "yes to dialogue, but with mobiliza~ms,"h order to strengthen the party's negotiatjng position and afsure that its mass constituency would not be excluded from the process." In maintahing a skepticism about negotiating w i tke ~ state-parv r e g h e and insisting on mabilization outside the fannal pohGcal r e a h , it is not that fhe renovators are mconcerned with govemabdilty and the need to canstmct a broad national pact. However, they view these issues in t e m s that are quite different from the historical experience of elitenegotiated, pacted transitions to restricted, electoral. regimes in countries like Venezuela, Colombia, or Chile." The need for a pact that can assure! governabitity is a concern of clearly nodiberal figures like Raljl Alvarez Garh and XJablo Gonzhlez Casanova. Alvarez Cariin worries that the PKD's program is not sufficiently developed on '"the it;sue oi govemabitity, neither in regard to the party's popular base, with its demands for dramatic nnalerial ch;tnges should the P W win, nor in regard

42. Marco Rasrbn, ""1895: M o del vuefo Be Xa serpiente," La Iowlada (Mexico),Januafy3,1995; also see M, Rascbn, 'Qtra D4cada Perdida," La fornada, January 47,1995. 43. AdoEfa CiUy, 'Et PRD en su hora cri~ca,"La fornada (Mexico), January 20,1995. 44. Rosa Xcela Rodriguez, ""E nuna semana se definir6 el PRD acerca del dihlogo," La Jornada (Mexico),December 4,1994. 45. %et e.g., Daniel H. Levine, 'Tenezuela Since 2958: The Consatidation of Democratic Pslitics,'" in J. Linz and A. Stepan, eds., The BreaMown of Democratic Rqimes: Latin America (Baltimore:J o h s Hopkins, 1978); Terry Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela," in in. VDonnell, et al., Transitions from Azlthorifarian Rttle (Ballimore: Jobs Hopkins, 1986); Alexander W. WiXde, "Conversations Among Genl-lemen: Ofigarchical Democracy in Colombia," in J. Linz and A. Stepan, ap, cit.; Artuxlo ValemueXa, The Breakdmon of %)enzacralz'cRegims: Chzle (Baltimore:J a b s Hapuns, 1978).

ta the oligarchy,"& But he is atsa op tic &oat tht;prospects for forging a national alliance, essential for governing, that i s far broader than that now represented by the PRD: There are many forces to be comteb on in Mexica. I have great confidence in the whale nationalist sector of the PRI, the PAN, and 'the PRB. A PRD pvemment will have to be a government of integra~on. There are same deveiopznenb along thme lines, like the Accord for Democraq, which brings together people from all the parties, who res p ~one t another, It is important to t r a n ~ e n didclologies and establish a. base on which there is recag~lionof one another" qualifications, skills, and h o w ledge.47

Gonz%lezCasanova is concerned that n e i ~ e the r opposition nor the ent currently offgrs a natianai and social praject that has ecorce and political viability,& The he advises, is not1and opposition, but shply one of extrerne positions held by gov sive QC p~puIargovalso of the lirnited options avaifatzle to any eni, especially given the state's erosion by neoliberal restructuring, in codranting the real destabilizing power of t-ransnational capital and U.S. ruling circles. In addition to developing the techical propasats needed for an alternative economic and social policy, GanzBlez Casanova says the oppasition needs to deal with the issues of politics and power required for 46. Ra6t Alvarez Garin, interview with author, Mexico City, August 6,1993, The issue of Mexico" snnilitary clearly comes into play in discussians of governability. Asa Crristina Laurefl (interview with author, Mexico City, August 6, 2992) says the army was very d i v i d d during the l088 presidential election, with the lower r a n k favoring Cuauhtbmw Cgrdenas, Laurel1 says Safinas subsequent1y gave the armed forces substantial wage increases and took other measures to secure their loyally, while CBrdenas tries to appeal to the army's nationalism by stressing the seU-out nature of Salinas' reform. Rallxl Benitez (hknriew with author, Mexico City, August 13, 29921, who has studied the military in Mexico and Central b e r i c a , says Cbrdenas's efforts have been ineffective and that the Mexican mikftary. is very antiK8rdenas, associating him and the PRB with the model that failed in the f-ormer SQviet Union and is now in crisis in Cuba. S r g i o de la PeAa (intemiew with author, Mexico City, August 16, 1992) fears there would be a coup if the BRD should win the presidenrry, because "the dlitary is at the heart af the stateM";nirnaHy, he argue, the PRB would be unable ta govern. 47. Ra6t Atvarez Garin, intefview with author, Mexico City, August 27, 1992. 48. PabIo Ganz6lez Casanova, "M&xica: ~Hacia unit dernocracia sin opciones?" oap cit., p. 267.

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viable implementation: "What struggles-of resistance, defense or offense-are required to apply a distinct economic policy, and [to secure] a real and universal democracy, that is, electoral and social, and not just for a few Mexicans but for the majority of Me~icans?"~9Achieving a "democracy with options," rather than simply another elected government forced to carry out the same neoliberal programs, requires "an accumulative politicu de msus, reflecting an increasingly democratic, popular, and national organization and consciousness."50 The sort of "national social pact" envisioned in this concept cannot be negotiated by elites. Nor are there any new "October Revolutions" in Gonzalez Casanova's scenario; it would be a gradual but not necessarily rupture-free process. Yet, within this long-term scenario, Gonzalez Casanova is equally concerned that the opposition and government find immediate, mutually agreeable reforms to avoid the destabilization and ungovernability threatened by the social fallout of neoliberalism. The opposition, he suggests, finds itself in a particularly difficult situation, given the real possibility that ruling forces may reject even a minimal pact.51 Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, former general secretary of the Communist Party and a leading figure in the PRD,says the reluctance of the PIU to accept any reforms "has to do with problems inherent in the form of the stateparty," a characterization he uses for the old Soviet Communist Party as well as the PIU. "These are institutions which find it very difficult to reform themselves, because what's being defended is not just the form of power but power itself."52 Nevertheless, "effective suffrage," argues Gonzalez Casanova, while not the panacea imagined by more liberal forces, could be the basis for a "constituent agreement" that would provide the conditions in which the long-term political struggles could evolve more fruitfully.53 That is a position shared by Martinez Verdugo and other renovative left forces in the PRD. The type of national pact conjured up by the comments of Alvarez Garin and Gonzalez Casanova, and the "politicu de USU US" required to build it, distinguish their views both from the elite-negotiated pacts accepted by more liberal left forces and from the revolutionary class struggle discourse of more orthodox left. Likewise, the idea of "effective suffrage" as the necessary first step in a more long-term and more radical 49. Ibid., p. 278. 50. Ibid., p. 280. 51. Ibid. p. 289. 52. Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, interview with author, Mexico City, September 1,1992. 53. Gonzalez Casanova, "Mexico: iHacia una democracia sin opciones?" op cit., p. 281.

process of democratization, is different from the liberal left's glorification of electoral demmacies m d the odhodox left's disdssal of "reformism." "Fair elections is the first priority on the political agenda," insists CrisLina LaureU, who, 15e Afejandm Alvarez and Raril Alvarez, was part of the Pmto Cdtico leadership for many years.% She says fair elec~ons are a demand taken up by many nonpartisan, civic organizations, which suggests "the emergence of a nascent identi(y as citkens with rights and capacity to act."55 However, she continues with a qualification that distmces her views from more liberal left voices: [Tlhe building of democracy in Mexico goes beyond granting fair elections that by themelves do not automaticalXy grant a part-icigatsry process capable of overcoming the social crisis. The chaflenga are extremely complex because the dismantling of a state-pary regime poses the urgent necessity to found new relations and institutions that substantiate the democratization of society. It implies, in that sense, a democratic revolution. What is at stake is the creation of conditions that make possible the organized participation of people in decisions that concern t-heir lives, be it through political parties, unions, producer organisations, neighborhaad assaciations, professional or student societies, etc. This implies initially the elimination cif carporatist control over mass organizations, particularly the unions, and the abolition of the speckurn of repressive practices used against independent organizations.56

"Unlike in many places h the LatFn America, the response in Mexico to a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m - that of the Latin American dictatorship and that of the socialist countxies-has not been shpXy to demand fomal demt>cracy,'bays Marco Rilscbn, a prominent leader of Mexico City's Asamblea de Basrios neighborhsods organization, ""There is an important social corztent to democracy in Mexico, based on the contcrnts of the Mexican revolution and cardenismo.""" Patricia. Ruiz, a PJXD acrclivist and grass-roots organizer, adds that "this fact distinguishes the left project here very clearly horn neoliberal democracy."58 The rebellion that began irt Chiapas on January 1, 1994, has helped erode the influence of traditional liberal cmeptions of: political democracy (and how to achieve it), and has encouraged the renovative current" attempts to reconcile the struggle for potitical rights with the 54%Asa Cristina LaurctX1, "Democratic Challenges in Mexico," "pp.cit. p. 18. 55. Ibid., p. 9, 56. bid., pp. 11-12. 57. Marco RascBn, interview with author, August 14,1992. 58. Patricia Ruiz, intemiew with author, August 14,19132.

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struggle fos social rights.% Carlos Monsivais has said that democracy is "hconceivabk" In the context of massive poverty. He credits the GhiaIhe social condiGons pas rebellion, which forced the nation to rec of its indigenous peoples, and the "moral" t of Subcornatndmte Marcos's discourse with having returned the issues of "poverty and hequality" t~ the top of Mexico" Elvira Concheko, an econ~mist famerly from the Mexican C st Party and notv active ir?. the PRD, believes tha& "The PRD, because of its origins in sosial mwements, cannot fall into a glorification of ekctoral democracy as an end h iPseff, becatlse the social demands of &ose movements are r e a l , " ~ role ~ e of popular and social movements and their relationship to the PRD was one of the must co addressed by the renovative left ist discussing m e r g h g ideas about democracy for this book. Many of ~ o s cjnterviewed l spoke to the FED'S acute awareness of the hislorkal legacy of the PM% scorpmatist cantrol of labor and peasant organizations, a legacy ironically dating back to LBzaro Cdrdenas, father of the Pm's most pronninent leader. "Cuauht4mm GBrdenas has the potential to forge a huge, powerful mass party," accordidzg to PabXo ComBlez Casanova, "'but only if the PRD learns to a l l w the masses to keep organizing themselves and only if the party establishes a respectfuX relationship with thern."62 Assessments of h w successful the PRD has been in ithat regard vary. Cristha Laurel1says, The PRB is kying hard not to recreate corporatism, That's s h y it is organized on a federal, territorial basis rather than on a sectorial basis (even though this weakms the pczt;sibili(ies of workers, peasants, and Indians being represented in the leadership). Along the same Incts, the party was organized as a party of citizens, not of organizations.63

59. The Zlapatista rebellion in Chiapas has sparked a flurry of publicatlans; two of the best English-language sources on the ELZN movement are J a b Ross, Rebellion From the Roots: Indian Uprising in Chiapas (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995) and Subcornandante Marcos, Shadows of: Tender F z r ~ :The Letters and Commzrniqzres of Stlbcomndante h/larcos and the Z a ~ t i s t aA v q of' National Liberation (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995). A useful colledion in Spanish, which fwuses on the discursive aspects of the rebellion, is Rauf Trejo Delarbe (ed.), Chhpas: La Gxlerra de las Ideas (Mexico: Editorial Diana, IW4). 60. Carlos Momivais, quoted in La Jovnada (Mexico), February 4,191;)$. 6%. EIvlra Cancheiro, interviw with author, Mexico City, August 5,199362. Pablo GonzhXez Casanova, interview with author, Mexico City, August 23,1891. 63. Cnrstina Laureli, interview with author, Mexico City, August S, 1992. The same concerns about territoriaf versus %ctoriaX representation were raised by Cubans as weX1, and considerable at-tention is being given by wrne in Cuba to

94

Democracy 11

The problem is not just one of territorial versus sectorial representation, however. According to PRD activist Nuria Femhndez, the party lacks "a strategic leadership to irtsbt on the participagon of the leaders sf social sectors." Instead, she and others observe, there are internal party struggles ov%r who will be the PM2 candidates for the Snate and House of Deputaes, positiom which are very hi8hl.y paid in Mexico.& The result is to sidetrack more important political issues, such as having the party's elected national legislators reflect the social movements that make up its base, and the need to buifd a much broader popular natisnal alliance. Political differences and tendencies within the PRD clearly complig netv approaches tz,building party-movement cate the process of de relations that are heal.tfry, respectful and mutually beneficial. Some within the party reportedly take a traditional corporatist approach to relations with the movements, while others are experimenting with direct demmracy.65 According to Julio Moguel, a fome active in the PRD, one sector (mainly former PRlistas and emphasizes strirtly citizen-based demwratic stmggles, sector (Maoists and Asamblea de Barrios kadership) is more cleaxXy identified with particular social movements and sectors.66 Others argue that the PRWs near total absorption with the electoral arena ha from addresshg t-he demands of the indigenous and envir ~n0vernents~6~ Despite the difficulties, there is real potential for a new relationship between party and popular organizations, and many point to the P W s relatimship with Mexico City's Asamblea de Bnrrios neighbarhood orations and to various local movements and oxganizations in states like Chiagas, Veracmz, and Tabasco as examples. The promise of "ne~cardenimo," as f a h e Tamaya describes the movement tltat gave e a ~ a representation l in the Pader Popular strurtzrre f% Mimel Lifia, ''L0 laboral versuns to territorial," ap cit.). Perhaps a more fmilfut imovation that would address representation of minority sectors is the " " c ~ u l a t i v evotingtf scheme proposed by Lani Guinier to ehance '"roportional representation" for unitim in the United States. See Lani Guinier, n e Tyranny of the Majority (Free Press, 1994). 64. Nuria Ferndndez, intemiew with author, Mmico City, Aumst 5, 2993, The problem she says, is not so much with the top leadership (Crirdenas and Porfirio M d o z Ledo) but "with tong-time left cadre who feel they've spent a lifetime struggliq and sacrificing and now det;enre the perks and privileges afforded by enky into the political class, which. are substantial," 65. Mejadro AIvarez, interview with author, Mexico City, August 28,1992. 66. Julio Moguel, intenriew with author, Mexico City, August 28,19132. 67. Enrique d e ]a Garza Toledo, an intellectual and labor acl.ivist, interview with autbr, Mexico Citly, A u w t f 0,1993,

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birth to the PRD, is "in the autonomy of social and popular movements."" Hktorical cardmismo, says Tamayo, "'becme increasingly co"poratist but it also included the experience of civil society organizing itseE, finding its own voice," and the existace of many autonomous social and popular movements in Mexico since the xnid-1980s has hefped the advance towad democracy. But, warns Tamayo, "the old authoritarim potitical ntlture, of the PRX and of the left, cmthues to reproduce itseu, even wi&in the social movements themseXves."68 In any event, the fact that &ere is marked cmcern and debate about the tension between Eberal notions of individual citizen-based politics and the need to incovmate the social demmds of popular movelnenls is part of what distinguishes the renovative left from the more Uiberal and orthodox tendencies h Mexico, From the renovative perspective, "the struggle for the democratization of our country is," in the words of for' t Elvira Concheka, ""theprocess of socializing power in How to move from step an ee elections and political r i g h t e t o the full sotialkation of power, presents a fo challenge to the renovative left. Recent politic& developments in the Mexican states of Chiapas and Tabasco offer interesting examples of how these challenges are being met in prac~ce. Mass movements, closely identified with but broader &an the PRDy nnobilized in support of gubernatorial candidates in 1994: Amando Avendafio in Chiapas and AndrOs Manuel L6pez Obrador in Tabasco. h both elections, the B N claimed victory, but, citing substantial evidence of fraud, the PRD candidates md their movements refused ta concede dekat. The Chiapas movement declared Avendaiio to be '"gabmrador m reMicinf~(govemor in rebellion), and Lripez C)bradar was recognized by his cms~hnmtsas ""gobernador popular" (the people's governor) in Tabasco. Mass mobilizations conthued for months folowing to pay taxes and participated in the the elections. Supporters efforts of these "parallel g nts" to create cancrete program and institutions independent of the officially recognized PRI governors (e.g., alternative health clinics, schools, centers for fruit and vegetable distribution, and employment services). These can be seen as examples of the broad left opposition's attempts to ""sialize power" outside the confines of the fomal political system. In a telljng example of how the renovative left's conception of political 68. Jaime Tarnayo, interview with author, Cuadalajara, Augwt 20, 1992. Also see Jairne T a m y o , "'NeoXiberalism Encomters PJ;eocardenismo," in J. Foweraker and A. Craig, eds., i"cptllar Mouemmfs and Political C h n g e in Mexico (Boulder and b n d a n : Lynne &emer Publishers, 1990). 69. Elvixa Concheiro, intesview with author, Mexico City, August 5,1993.

power and demwracy is changing in the course of such stmggles, PRD wbematorial candidate Mmuel L6pez Obmdor said, ""Te idea is not that I should govern at any cost. I m not fighting for the governorship but for demxracy."7@ S arly, in a complete departure from histaric g u e d a movements who% mah pufpose was to seise state power, Zapatista leader Marcos has stated repeatedly that he hopes the mass movement for "dmocracy, freedom, and justice" is so successful as to leave his a m y without a job. These are not movements about poltical power in the traditional understandings of either the orthodox or the fBeral lefts, but &out a '"sociafization of power," a notion yet to be fully defined in theory and practice. For many in the Mexican left today, this is the essence of:their "democratic revolution." Finally, is &ere an ~ e r e n contradiction t in the P W s support of liberal political reforms and its call for a "revolution," even a democratic one? L&ewise, is there a c a d i c t beween the P W s defense of the 1917 Constitution (the legal framework of what became a highly authoritarian, corporatist, and centralized state) and the pursuit of a democra~c revofution? Are thew contradictions adequately resolved by notions of the " d ~ s h e d , ""frozen," or ""betrayed 'Wexican revaluGon, which has been a &erne in the left for many years? Jose Woldenberg sees absolutely no place for a "revolution" in this proce~s.~lJorge Castafieda is certah that the era of revalu~onis over." Yet PaibXa Gomdlez; Casanova has eaUed the Chiapas rebelkon the "first revolution of the Wen@-first century,"" and Mexico's most viable left opposition calls itself the party of the ""dmocratic revolution." The ambivalence of the concept, ""democratic revolution," is not unlike the3 ambivalence of GramscYs ideas about hegernony and aecumulation of forces. CramscFs discourse has allowed social democratic forces to mwe gradually toward a m r e cautious emphasis on arder and con-

70, Andrks Manuet Lhpez Obrador, quoted in La fovnada (Mexico), February 23, 1995. Mpez Obrador was subsequently elected presidmt of the national PRD in 1996. C u a ~ t 4 m o cCi"irdc?nas has been quoted making s i d l a r statements, such as, "I am not b r b&ng president by force. That is not my objective. My abjerrtive is that we change the country" ssitua~on,that we e n k r a period in which we can effec~velyparticipate in the declsians that replate the political, e c o n o ~ c social, , and cultural life of the country." See Pascal BelkBn del Rio, "Las cifras electorales son Can falsas corno fas de 1988 . . .", Proceso f Mexico), Sptember 5,1994, p. '7. 71. Jose5Woldenberg, ""ComentariosFinales," "pp,cit. 7'2. Jorge Castaiieda, Utopia Llnarmtrd, op.cit. 73. Pablo GombXez Casanova, quoted in La fomada (Mexico), February 10, 1995.

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thuity over acc ulakd chmgt?.and rupbre,x Yet more radical left interpreters have seen in Gramsci an alternative to revolution defined as the abmpt usually amed seizure of state power, but nonetheless as a revolutiona~yalternative.% In this vkw, Grannsci's notion of ""nationalpopular collective will" as a process of building a bloc of social forces under the hegemony of the popufar classes is a gradual but revolutionary process.76 The latter interpretation h f o m s the renovative Mexican left's t l - t h h g on the &ationship behveen refam of the political system and evenhaf radical transfomatim of the state and sociev. Arnoldlo Cbrdova, for exampie, one of the feTN leadjng inteuectuals associated with the revolutionary nationalist MAP in the 1970s who is now In the PXID, concedes that eflo&s to democratize the poBIcical system from wi&h the system can tend to strengfhen the state, because such participation manifests one's adhesion to the system, But, he argues, that is not the only truth, because the smggle for demwratizatim of the political system can also strengthen t.hose farces who want to radically transfom society. As t b s e forces gradually gain influence: There is always a moment when the state can go no further in this diredion. At that moment, it becomes impossible for f i e state to continue 74. %e Jaime Osoxio, ""Los nuevos soci6logos," "p, cit* 75. The January 1994 armed uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, has reopened

discwsion about armed struggle its an instrrument of social and political change but not necessarily about the p r o s p ~ t sfor a revolutionary seizure of state ents at the March 1994 Latin American Studies power. forge Castafieda, in co Association meetings in Atlanta, distinguished beween armed struggle as a method of struggle versus a certain idea of revolution as sudden, radical transformation of society. He described the Zapatistas in Chiapas as "armed reformists par excellence," calling for land, dignity and lair elections. Even before the Chiapas uprising, Raquel Sosa noted that Latin America's ~ t r e m e l y polarized sscieties still provide candi~snsfor the emergence of new guerrilla msvemen~,but predict& they would have a less precise ideological perspective than in the past about long-term social change. See Raquel Sasa Elizaga, "Sujetos dominant- y sujetss alternatives en !a Amkrica Latina de lines del sigls," op. cit. Cuauht4moc Cdrdenas has stated that "the demands of the Zapatistas are the same we have fought for begiming years ago" (San Francisco Chronicle, Nay, 17, 1994)' again suggesting that the reappearance of armed stmggle in hqmico does not substantially alter the reassessment about the nature of revolutionary or reformist change, as much as about the form of struggle available to the opposition. 76. For a usehrl discussion of the relevance of Grarnsci's ideas to left thought in L a ~ nAmerica, see Witliarn Rowe and Vivian Schelling, Memoy and Modernity. PopzrEar GtlEtzrre in Latin America (London: Verso, 1991), especially Chapter 3 on ""Ppuular Culture and Politics."

to strengthen itself and, a t e a d , what occurs is that the state weakens until it ceascrs to carry out its Mctjom as the f o m d a ~ a nof the ruling social system.r

Understanding power as restkg nat s h p l y m force of a p v u l a r consmsus, C6rdova defines the s m g g k for democracy as "a struggle for the consensus of the majoriiy of society that can have no objective: stlner than the tevolu~anaryt r m s f o m a ~ o nof sock9 itseE."% rize, renova~veleft To S s h Cuba md Mexico are d both Eberal and Marxist drawhg but attemphg to t conceptiasrs of democracy. From liberalism, they have taken such tfadi~onsas the hprzrtmce of pob~calrights, the rule of law, and elected, representative, parliamentary institutions. PoEtical refoms, such as proposals for WO-round voting in Mexico or for paid, pro&simaf representatives in Cuba, are r e c o e z e d by renwators as h p o r tant but insufficient steps toward demwratizatim of: Zheir rctspective political systems. DPawing from the Marxist tradition, renovators in b& countries still mderstmd demwrasy as a proce "swializhg power." M i l e acknowledging that political democracy at be codated with is still tend to do, the idea of a sociaiist economy, as or&odox renovators beheve that democracy camat be fulty nzeanhgful wi*out a cancamitant redtistributim of wealth and greater popular control over the economy. Thus ideas about workers self-management and various so-ownershp schemes as well as democratization and professionalizatim of state enterprises are considered by renovators alongside refoms of Che potitjral system, For the renovative left, cratization must take place within the state, political reghe, g w e t, and civil society. Renovators tend to talk less about reducing &an they do about democrakkg and professionalizing state instibtions, whiich they believe also require pviding state ennployees and their public clients with the infornation and skills necessargt to assume dmocratie cmtrol. Renovators also give considerable a m t i o n to streng&enhg the autonomy of civil sscieiy yiis a vis the state and the parties of the left. Thus in Cuba, we bead references to the importance of new NGOs, women's centers, and local popular councils as spaces potentially more independent of the Go Party. In Mexico, the renovative left is particularly concerned with haw to build a left party that politically represent-s but does not replace or overshadow the nfttwork of myriad social movements andl orga~zations, 77. Arnaldo Cbrdava, La NaciBn y h Cmstitzrci6n. La tticha pclr la Democraeia en Irvlkxzco (Mexico: Claves Latinoamericanas, 19891, p. 386. 78. ibid., p. 387.

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The renovative left in Cuba and Mexico is exploring how to balance and/or combine territorial and sectorial schemes of representation legislative bodies) that reflect and (within political parties and w protect both hdividual citizen s and the social rights of particular groups. Fhally, while renovative stmggles for democracy demonstrate the renewd attention given by the Lath Amerkm left to Eberal pofitt:cal reform, they are not confined to the f o m cal sphere. In Cuba, the nation" political where the state-party stiU thoroughly do syskxn, si@ficant examples of renovalive es on democratizalion are often found in the cultural sphere, or in academic researeh centers, chutches, and various NGOs. In Mexico, the examples of how the struggle for democratization transcends the fomal political sphere are more visible m d dramatic; there, the renovative left" efbrts to redefine democracy range f m actims to k r e a s e the p cornmmity organizations, to attempts to buiId ""parallel in Chiapas and Tabasco, to the multifaceted struggle of the Zapotecs in Oaxaca, to a massive, national movement in support of a peacehl resolutian a f the armed Zapatista mvement's multiple demands. The lefts in Cuba and Mexico bolh enjoy certain advantages over t h s e in posmlitary countries like Chile and Argentina in terms af the continuity of sociallyoriented political cultures, but the presence of many, strong social movements and popular organizations in Mexico make that country parIriculdy conducive to a renovated left discourse on democracy. Cuban renovators remain considerably hannstrmg by the strong auhoritarian tendencies of the Cuban Go ist Party, Nevertheless, f share Carollee Bengelsdorf's assessment that the present crisis in Cuba holds promise as well as danger: "A vacuum has opened up: the old, imposed, rigid theoretical models are being discarded and experimentation with new ideas, methadslogies and approaches has become, hcreashg, the order of the day."79 A Postscdpt on Democracy and Leadership: Fidet, Fidel, d p e " gene fidel?

No doubt readers have noted an obvious omission in the previous h g of democracy: no word about prevailing ary of the left's re opinians in either camtry a f FideX Castro's role or about the Mexican left's current view of the Cuban revolution. In the 1 9 6 0 a~ popular ~ Latin 29. Carollee BmgeXsdcrrf; The Problem of Democracy in Ctrba: Between Vision and Reality (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 17'5.

American protest song wsly asked, in so man)l words, m a t it is about Fidel that uimnos erazy-e bplicit answer was that the U.S. g w t%extreme reaction to Fidd Castro was not altogether explainab Cianal terms. I found mysc3E up against a simifar a in trying to interpret and categorize the attitudes of progressive Cuban m d Mexican intellechats tsward Cas&o. The quesgon of his historic r d e and cunent leadership is so t%roraughIysabrated with emotions and spbolism as to defy any neat correlation with the orthodox s t a ~ s tlilaeral, , and renova~vetendencies outlhed above. Mexican kA's relationship to the Cubm revohlion is inv the love-hate tensfoxls of any hvo sibhgs raised in a dyshctional family. An additional problem in interpreting the interviews from Cuba. is that thcl somewhat strained political c h a t e does not lend itst2E to sofieiting views about Castro that are not self-censored. Because I could not take most verbal or written statements &out Cast-ro at face value, 1 detemhed that it was fmitfess to aHempt any meaningfully systema2ic interpretation of these issues. There are simply too many layers sI passible meaning to negotiate. Nevertheless, a few abservations are worth mabg. First, al&ough it was somewhat contradictory, I often found among Cuban intellectuals a more vigorous ar explicit defense of Fidel Cas&ofs leadership among pro-democracy Xiberal and renovative voices Ban I ritarian, or&odox &&ers. This was particuby various intellectuals who had directly exeom by the r e g h e when the Philosophy Weparment and Pmsamienlo Critic0 were closed down in 1971. Remembering how Castro used to drop by unamomced fox coffee and political debate with that circle of intellectuah in the 196Qs, one man told me he woul$ be etemaHy gateiul to Fidel Castro, who, he said, personauy made sure that tfie intellectuals targeted for ha& criticism by Casko's yomp;er brother Ralil in 1971, were allowed to continue " w o r h g for the revolution," rather than being jailed or compIetely marginalbed. A wornan f r m the same circle told me of her total disagreement with fhe official call for voters to elect the mtire slate of candidates nominated for the National Assembly in the Febmary 1993 elections. The demand to vote for the u ~ i t e dslate, she said, "represents Ekze do&nant authoritarian and vertiralist nature af the parv." She entered the p o l h g booth dete d ta vote only for those candidates she considered worthy to represent her. But at the Iast moment, she could not disobey Castm's plea for a d t e d vote. She did as her leadership had ordered, she told me, and then "went home and cried for t h e daysef' She tried to explain: "I have followed Fidel since I was a 16-year-old girl

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in 1956, when my grandfather, a Mambkm told me Fidel was going to save the c o m q . I would =&er die for the rvsvoiutjm than bekalg Fidel." Such amcdotes illustrate the extent to which personal political loyalties, forged over decades of stmggle, and the autl.lo~tyof genuinct charismatic leadership, which so fascinated Max Weber precisdy because it defied a purcly rational wderstanding, dominate Cuban political mlhre. These facbs make it nearly hpossible to offer an "oabjec~ve"'assessment of the Cuban left" view of Castro today. m a t same old prolest song from the 19CiOs also said, "The Americanas say ./ Well, if FideX, is a c "st,add me to the list." n had relatively littl particular ideology, and I suspect the s m e is hvtl now. On a less personal level, Rafael Hemdndez, who strongly supports a decentralization and democratkat-ion of Cuba, defends the record of Castro" leadership and says it is dispensable at the critical xnomttnt facing the nation: To steer the boat though these brbulent waters requires not only appropriate ideas about democraq and eclono~cpolicy. It requires a real autkoriv that will allow needed relief, as well as readjmtments; continuity of the social revolution" achievements and goals, as well as a bloodless rupture with old schemes; the necessaT delegalion of power to allow for a viable &ansition to a more decentralized and democratic system, as well as reformed st-ructures, economic and juridical reorganization, and more efficient mechanism. M o can lead this process in a manner that is the least costly and above a11 the least dangerous for the country" stability? Obviously, Fidel Casko.81

There are many possible hterpretations of such a stakment. Perhaps what we see is what we get: a polit-ical assessment that Castro is the "best man" for the job, based on his track record and h e au&orirc)l. he stiIX. ands, Or, perhaps it is an effort to l e g i h a t e and streng&en democmtic demands, and avoid political margins he; loyalty to Fidel, Given Castro" historic role litical arbiter and mediator more than ideologue, both inkrpl~tations could be correct. Even Cecilio D h a s , for examplef an intekrtclal considerably alienated from the r e g h e and sympatfietic to the views of the social democratic dissidents, islsists that na"y political solution to the current crisis must involve Fidel Castro." He even ventured that Casbo's 80. The nzambises were the guerrillas of the Liberation Army led by Antonio Macea during the Ten Years' War against Spain, 1868-1828. 81, Rafael HernBndez, "Mirar a Cuba. Notas para una discusiBn," Draft manuscript, Havana (August 19%).

102

Democracy U

renowned pragmatism might well eventually place him on the side of reformers, "if he is convinced that is the least dismptive solution" to the rent As to why more orthodox forces seemed less inclined to invoke or defend Castro's leadership, there are at least three plausible explanacons. Fkst, or&odox als may feel secure in c i a ~ o nwith the still y withh the party, a their views camy Ca d thus feel less c gitbize &eir ideas by i n v o h g his name. Scondly, several people I intenriewed told m that many upper- and middle-level party fmelianaries and state bureaucrats were still angy at Castro far d o k g away with some of their perks and privileges during the period of rectificatim in the late 1980s. Thus they may be in no mood to praise h h . A *rd possible explanation for these findings is that some of the support for Castro among liberats and renovators may be due to a bcllief that he is preferable ta any currently visible alternaGve, whereas the orthodox forces may seg themselves as the most 1aely alternative and hence be less concerned about losing Castro. The Mexican left" sultcrenh aBibdes toward Cashro and the Cubm revolution are somewhat easier to assess but are also ccznnplex. More bberal left voices, such as those frequently published in the journals Nexos and Plumt, are predictably critical of Cuba's recod on political rigfits m d htderance of dissident views.@ More orthodox publicatians, r CO ts critical of what they. such as Sociafz'snzo (edited md Timpo (often desc~bed consider to be the PRDfsre as a Mexican version of the arxist journal Monthly Rmiew) remah statlnch defenders of FideI Cas&om d tfie Cuban revolution, wKch they see as the most democragc natim h Latin America. R e r e are no big surprises the=, but within Be loose renova~vetendency, perspectives rmge wildly from fomer Co t Pablo Cbmez's scathing critique of the Cuban revolution" '"senifityU@to Bablo Gom61ez Casamva" belief that "Cuba is becornkg ever more demwratic."~An ernalionalfy heated debate about Cuba among various Mexicm a ~ s t sand intelleehals 82. Ceciltis Dimas, intexview with author, Havana, February 11,1993. 83. %e, for example, the July 1992 issue of Plural, ttdited by Jairne Labas~dit, wM& fwmsed on Cuba and wleashed a biger exchange bet-vveen Labastida and the leadership of ZINEAC, Cuba" writers and artists asmia-tion. Muck af the debate was published in the Mexican daily, Excelsio~;and in UNEAC" La Caceta de C u k (November-Dxember 1992). 84. Pablo Gbmez, "fiiniiidad de la Revolucibn?", serialized in La jromada (Mexico), Feb. 2 through February 213,1990. 85. PabEo GanzhEez Casanova, "Thinking About Cuba," h 5. Jonas and E. NcCaughan, ht-iurAmevzca Faces the Twenty-first Century, op cit.

raged in the pages of La j m a d a in July 1993, provoked by a but sharp critique of Cuba in the paper's cartoon supplement m a t there is debate about Cuba In the Mexican left i s itself sieicarrt because for many years any criticism of the revolution that successfully ed its nase at "Tio Sam" was considered htlre~cal. This change suggests m hcrtlasing appreciaGm for pluratism m o n g progressive foxes. However, Cke debates remain full of cmtradictims, axnbiguiv, and ambivalence. This is mderstmdable in light of the tremendous intellectual, political, and symbolic importance that the Cuban revolution and Fidel Castra have had. bar the Latin American left, m d &deed for broad sectors of tatin can society. M y does Fidel stiU make the Am&canos crazy? Be whenever he visits any cowtry in Lath America, where demmracy has arpably become a very generalized and h i e l y nthusiastieaUiy applaud his valued goal, he is greeted by m a s ~ s defiance of U.S. power and amogance. is true in Africa as well, h fr;outI.t Africa during Nelson Mmde w r a ~ o n ,wKle U.S. Vice President Al Core and First Lady Hillary Clinton carefuUy avoided being seen. on the same side of the room with Fidel Castro, crowds of Bhck sou^ af-rkans cheered his preserrce. The questian of personal poliical leadership is an bportant element in the left" reassessment of democracy, particularly @ven the legafy of Lenh, Stalk, and Latin America's own traditions of caudiflismo and caciguismo. There is certainly cowiderable scmsitivity, if not yet clarily, about the issue among the Mexican left. W 2 e some charge Cua&tbmoc Cdrdenas is just one mare authoritarian caudiflo, others speak of him in reverent kms.86 Cdrdenas is certainly not a charismatic leader, but his persona is tremendously ma@ied by some of Mexicof$smast enduring historical myths: son of the nation's most beloved presidmt and mmed after the A z t ~leader who defended his nation against the Spanish conquerors. Qne PRD FnteUectual from the Maoist tendenc example of this phenomenon, (elling me fiere is a sector that pushes a more radical vision of direct, mass democracy and yet 86. A significant dispute at the PRUs congress in su r 1393 was about how the part)rrscandidates far the 1394 cangessional ete&ons would be chosen. According to Cristina LaureH (interview with author, Mexico City, August. 1, 29931, after a heated debate, the majority agreed that Cuahtkmw: C6rdenas would be allowed to name SO percent of the candidates (the other 50 percent to be chosen by the party" sbte bodies). The argument was that this would allow the PRD Xeadership maximum flmibifiw in building broader nalional alliance by offering to support PR1 dissidents or local leaders who may not be in the par(y. The hnority. argued that this was mdemocratic and catrdiltkta. The issue is clearly not a simple one.

expresses not concern about Cbrdenas's great personal power within the party: A party militant can curse any number of personalist, paternalistic, authoritarian mcigties or catrdillos, but you don" touch Cardenas. "fhte's not necessarily a logical canntjc~onbeween one" political pas i ~ o and n one's action on this quest-ion. It's partly that CBrdenas is not seen as human. He is the history of' Mexico. He's the part of the cowtry you have inside you. We is your flag. Xt's a very musual thing, like having; a treasure. This is more a question for psychoXogists,s7

Alongside such reverence of individual leaders, there are examples in Mcxico of new attikdes and prackes clearly ainted at breaking with the cult-ure of cadiflknto. Note., for example, that bath Super Barda (a popular jeader m o n g Mexico City" spoor neighbarhoods movement who dresses like a cartoon super hero) and the Zapatistas' fjubcomandante Marcos are maskd, anmymous leaders. Their personal identities are not widely known and considered largely irrelevant.@ Do they perhaps represent new symbols of the still-necessaryfirnetion of leadership absent thc? personalization of leadership,? Are they reflective of efforts on the left to assert a new relationship between leader and rank-and-file? Ckarly, in assessing the l&% eevotving rxnderstanding of democracy, the questions of leadership and of Ue particular rofe of figures UCg Fi&l Castro and Cuauht6moc Cardenas deserve far greater atten.tim than P am able to give them here. But indications arc? that, on the issue of leadership too, changes arc! in the air.

87. JuXio Moguel, interview with author, Mexica City, August 28,1992. 88. In F&ruary 1995, the Mexican govmment announced with theatrical fanfare that it had learned the true identity af Marcos. Government spokesmen appeared confident that revealing Marcos to be a former miversity professor would strike a psychological blow against the rebeis, Public reaction was hardly what the ZedilXo government hoped h r . One columist wryly commented that the news was the equivalent of announcing that Superman was really Clark Kent, and tens of thousands of demonstrators chant-ed "TocZos Somos Marcos" ("We Are AII Marcos") in repeated mobilizations throughout the nation.

CHAPTER 5. SOC

State vs. Market Thoughout the h.venhe~century, debates raged wi&h the left over the nak-lre of socialism. Some of the most persistent questions wexe directed at the role of the state: Had the Soviet U ~ o restored n a f o m of state capitabm? Wasn't demucfa~ccontrol of the means af production more h p o d a n t than fomal state ownership? Wasn" worker self-management rather &an burearreratir central planning the key to socialism? Was socialist agriculture better served by distributing private plots of land to the peasantry, by organizix\g the cowtryside into cokctives, or ? All too often these debates became by establishhg large, state fa hopebssly hprisoned in a rigid opposition of state versus market. all was said m d done, the ass an remahed among broad se-ctors of the left that sociafism was closely asswiated wi&, if not precisely d e h e d by, state conbol of: the economy.1 For the Lath h e r i c a n left, this assoda~onwas furher rehforced by the tradition of nationalist deveXopmmtalism, which elevated nationalization of key economic sectors to a sine qua non of nationaf sovereignty and developmmt. In -the words of Rafael Galvb, Mexico's late Iabor leader and ideologue of revolutionary nationalism: "We grow and advance though our history b y ] nationalizing.'"' The identification of socialism with stateeconomy took on added weight far the Latin American left follwing Cuba's 1968 '"revdu~onaryoffemive," which 1. These observations are by no means meant to suggest that Marx's own writings justify such a stittist conception of swialism. %posing sides of the many debates on these issues were taken by people who camiderecl themselves Maxxist and justified their position by citing one or another of Marx" texts. Many Marxism have emerged in the 150 years since the Communist Manqestu was written. The intentJon here is not to uncover the "true" Marxism, but Ito suggest that amid a11 the variations there emerged a pervasive tendency to associate socialism with state control, 2. Rafael Cafvsn, quoted in Barry Carr, The Mexican L@, the Popular l"rlovemenks, and the politics of I"1zfster1ty (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of Califoda, San Diego, 1986), p, 12.

extended state ownership of the economy to e m the smallest consumer xmices, "from the womm ing a hamburger stand to the guy selling snow cones on the street corner.'"3 &spite h p o r t m t debates about the nrttum of socialism that c o n h u left inteUectuaIs in L a ~ America and elsewhere, the ovew lstorical wei&t of the Soviet bloc, reinfoxclcd by the experience of m i d WarId socialism and mtionalt;ism, tended to obscure altemat-ive n o ~ o n sof a nonstatkt s ~ i a l b t economy. As Marta Hameeker, one of L a h America's best-hown LenMsts, observed: If, indeed, no one declared that their model was the mdeE of Eastern European socialism, that was nonetheless the model in many r ~ p e c b . We cannot deny that for the left, s4aXism was best when the means of production were the most nationalized and most owned by the state, and when the party was the only party. This was f%Ee left's vision until just a short time ago."

Then, in the 1 9 8 0 ~as~ the neoconsewative "revolutions" of U,S. President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatchr restored classical econafists Adam Smith and David Rcardo to the high priesthood of global political economy, neoXjberafismrs ascendancy seerned to d e out alliythhng other &an the most radical versions of "free marketf' capitalism. Even Keynesianism, let alone Marxism, became a dirty word associated with the "failed" state interventionism of the past. h L a h America, the debt crisk m d N l o ~decadeN t af the 1980s Eur&er establisbred neoliberabm as the only acceptable economic model. Internatiaoal financial instihtions used the severiw of the region" s c o n o ~ c crisis to dictate policies favoring privatization, deregula~on,social service cutbacks, wage controls, and prioritizatian of exports over the internalxnarket The neomeral ideological offensive was remarkably successful in laying blame for Latin Anneriea's econornie woes at the doorstep of natianalist state econonnic regutation. Already melhg from the astonishingly rapid ascent af radical "free marketism," the socialist m d nationalist leEts were then dealt an additional blow with the quick disintegration and collapse of the state socialist reghes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As the dust settled from the Cold War, winners and losers seemed all too apparent. Jorge 3. Juan Antonia Blanco, quoted in Medea Benjamin, "Cuba: Tatking About Revolution. Conversations with Juan h t o n i o Blanco" (mwnuscript, 29%). 4. Marta Harnecker; "Democracy and Revafutionary Movement,"' in Susanne Jonas and Edward J. McCaughan (eds-),h t i n Amerllca Faces the TwentyFirst C e n f u q , Reconsfntct-inga Social Justice Agenda (Boulder: Wesl-\riew,113c)$), p, 75,

State vs. Mrket

Cztstarieda began his h p o ~ m assessment t of the mm& Littin h e r i c m left wi& an unequivacal aslser~on:

107"

state of the

The Cold War is over and Ca collapsed. The United States and capitafism have won, and in few areas of the globe is that vi&ary sa dear-cut, swwtf and sp~tacularas in L a ~ nAme~ca.5

Over the cacophony of cefebrato~yasserh~nsabaut capibfismfsnow indisputable, namal superiority, the voices of those wm*g to challenge neogberal orthodoxy with re sto~caffact were hardprctswd ta make tfiemselves heard, cts," seemed the smug reply of d o p a t i c free-markteem, who castvefiently imored the massive state interven~on(hthe f o m of d i t a r y spending and public bailo u t of ~ failing i n d u s ~ e sand fhancial institutions) that characterized the sirations in the U ~ i e dStates. The left fomd Reagan and Bush a itself codranted wi& what Fr ert calls "a metaphysicitt mtistatilsm.'" This an~staesmd o ~ n a t e the s current debate about the state and has became a Eeitmotq of today" stvarfdview. It appeamd first in the neolibmal. tl.xeories about the economy and society and has become today a $ewe af pubtic opinion the world over. It even appears in. the socialist cowtrim and dominattzs a majority of the international institutions that make palicy dmisions.6

Caught between the rise of neoliberalism and the collapse of state socialism, the X& experienced a serious paradim crisis. Far most of the century, the left's praject had given ovewhehing theoret-ical and strategic importance ta the state as the central protagonist in the consbctiisn of a noncapitalist alternative. Certainly, sectors of the lefh in Europe and the United States had already incorporated antistatist perspectives into their discourse by the 1970s and early 1980s. These lefis had been hfluenced sipificantly by the antiauthoritarian critiques of INS, as well ism, "new social movements" "tl-teories that stressed the importance of civil sociely, and emerging posknodenn analyses of a 5. forge Castafieda, Utopia Unarmed. The Latin American IRP After the Cold War (New York: Alfred A. h a p f , 1993), p. 3. 6. Fram X-IinkeEammert;"Our Prajwt far the Mew h i e t y in Latin America: The Regulating Role of the State and Problem of %If-Regulalion in the Market," in S. Jonas and E. J. Maitughan, b f i America ~ Faces the Twenty-First Genttrq, ap. cit., p. 13. Alsa see X-iinkela rt, "La simetria del neo-liberafismo y ef estatismo," Envh (Nicaragua), No. 123, February 1992, pp. 33-48.

fragmented world and decentered subjects. All of these ideological thcz Lath Americm lefts as well, nurrents made &emelves felt wi but did not contribute to a more generalized antistatism, as they had in Europe and the United States. This difference is partially explained by the distinct structural realities of the semiperiphery, where considerable importance is still attributed to the state in (a) mediating national sovereignty vis a vis the United States and bmsna~onalcapital, and @) providing a social welfare safety net in societies where large sectors of the population live in extreme poverty. Nevertheless, at the century's close, antistatism was riding the crest of the wave of capitalism's triumph over sociabsm, even w i f i h the Lath Americm leAs.

The Impact in Cuba and Mexica Ironically, as left political forces gahed strength m d inhence in some Latin American countries, many left intelfectuals seemed at a loss to offer a clear economic alternative to unattractive neoliberal prescriptions. As Srgio de La Pefia, a leadhg theoreti@ianof the fomer Mexican unist Party and now an economic adviser to the PRD, pat it: There has been an important redefinition of the ideological points of reference available to the left. Socialkm (above all, the European practices and experiences) and the various schools of the whole Marxist current offered alternative visions. They also represented real options, in the sense of socialist states that could offer aid, financing, military support. With this whole set of aptions now taken apart, there has been created a huge theoretical, ideological, concepbal vacuum, a vacuum of political projects.7

For the Cuban revolution, clearly the crisis was more than ideological. Some eighty-five percent of Cuba's trade was with the socialist bloc that proseeded to self-destruct almost overnight. Juan Antmio Blanco offers some slatistical evidence of the impact: The figures are dramatic. In 1989 we imported about 23 fillion tons of oil from the Soviet Union; in 1992 we could only import: 6 rnillion tons. In 1989 we imported. around $8.4 billion dollars worth of goods; by 1992 our impart capacity plunged to $2.2 billion, By 2992 we had only 30 percent of the resources for the sugar hanrest that we had in 1989, so

7. Sergio de la Peiia, intewiew with author, Mexico City, August 16,1992.

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209

sugar produceon has ben dropphg sharply. . . . fmaghe what would happen to Mexico if suddedy all kade with the UniW States ceased.8

Mexico, of cazlrse, did not suddenly lose all of its intematiimal econ o d e relations; in fact, a k r fiearly a decade of deep neo&beralrestmcWing, it was on the verge the Nor& h e r i c m Free Trade left opposition, the p a r a d i p criAgrczemgnt. But far much of sis prompted by such dramatic global changes was significant. Elvira Conheka, an econodst a Pmfand fomerty a leading figure h the defmct Mexican t Party, described the impact on Mrtxico" left: The majority of the left has taken refuge in pragmatism, Much of the debate that was developing since the early 1980s has been more or less suspended, The left hasn't redefined socialism. %cialism remins a point of reference, but little more. Some af the left has also lost ail confidence in its own discourse. Nevertheless, I have a x n s e that we%e finally pass& the first stage of: shack and are moving toward more refiectian.9

A shilar loss of confidence m m g Cuban intellectuals was noted by rriminologist Margarit.a Viera: Cuba copied so mu& from the S v i e t Union in every sphere; the %vie@were devated to idealized, near perfect beings. This led Cubans to deny their own abilities, to lose self-confidence and to fase touch with their own historical rscsts. Only in the past couple of years have Cuban intellectuals begun to regain their sense of self-confidence and to remember their potentia1.10

h negotiating their way &rough the paradigm crisis of the left's historical, state-catered sociafist;md nationalist prQjects, Cuban and Mexi8. Juan h t o n i a BIanco quoted in Medea ESenjam.in, a_p. cit., pp. 22-23. 9. Elvira Concheiro, interview with authort Mexico City, August 5,1993. IQ. Margarita Viera, interview with author, Havana, March 13,1993. Franz Hinkelammert has made a more general observation about the Third World left losing confidence to propose an alternalive in the aftermath of s~ialism's cstfapse and ntl.oXiberalism%rise; see his "La crisis de socialism0 y el Tercer Mmdo," Tareas (Panama), No. '78, May-August 1991, p.99. Ciro May4n sidlarly notes that for several years the left was somewhat paralyzed in the fare of neoliberaXisnnpsascendancy and socialism" collapse, but suggests that the defeat of' Ceorge Bush was an impartant lurning point in opening up space to challenge neoliiberalism; see his ""Una aftemativa de reforanil econti~ca," memo^ (Mexico), No. 57, August 1993.

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can intellectuals bring with them quite different assets and liabilities. Cuba's left intellectuals, largely incorporated into the state-party regime, enjoy the advantages of power (resources, real influence over policy, prac~calapplication of the& ideas), but they also suffer the disadvme n y (the caution and pra &m hposr?d by the desire to preserve power and ensure governability). The great majority of Mexico's left intellectuals are in opposition to their state-pariy regime and enjoy a h o s t inverse formes: their stabs as opposition frees them of some of the conskaints bposed by gav robs &em of the resources m d red power to hpkment man eaa Conjmctural circwstances also weigh differently in each country. The severity of Cuba's economic crisis has helped shatter nt orU.todoxy, crea(ing divisions among mlhg elites, and a fresh voices to be heard, That same reality, however, shultmeoudy demmds agement at the expense of longinordinate attention to daily cri ' . Mexico's left managed to avoid range strategic & h h g and pl the more extreme despair a lysis that afacted left forces elsewhere because the worldwide crisis of sxialism coincided hMexico e of the most powerful left coalitim since the 1930s. e long-ruhg PM, the CuauhMmoc: Chrdenas campaiw in 1988, and the subsequent unification of l a r g sectors 06 the left and popular movements in the PRD provided new energy, purpose, and historically-rooted national identity. At the same t h e , khe sudden real ing the state-party regirne with a broad-based, t through grasmots electoral stPuggjte tended to left inteIlectuals away from the rc?fomulation of long-tern alternatives to capitalism and toward the practical requkem n t s of day-to-day dectoral politics. Wi& these differences in mind, hwever, the responses to the strategic and co-njmctural crises facing left intellectuals in both Cuba and Wxico can be grouped into the same &ee d ant perspecPives identified in the previous chapters on democracy. As we will now examhe, some leftists rekated into sociatist orthadoxy md some accepted (if not fulfy embraced) liberal economie paradigms. And, as we will see in Lhe fuUotvFRg chapier, otht?ss atkmpted to rmouak the historical values of socialism within the realities of late mm*&-cent-rrry capitalism.

Orthodox Perspectives

In Mexico, orthodox socialists are a m a l i , hirly marginal tendency, though the s t a ~ s mof revolutionary nationalism remajns hfiuential.

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Socialist or&odoxy remahs strong in Cuba, though its fomex hegemony has been substantially eroded by .the urgency of resofvhg Ihe economic crisis, evm at the cost of ecoaofic liberahation, O&odox perspectives, both explicitly sociafist and stalist-nalionalist, reveal &emelves in the& defense of the past and in their prescripitions for the left's program. Orthodox socialists also c o n k u e to use the classic discourse al: MarxismLeninism. As an example of the orthodox MmJcan left's assessment of the past, the highly regarded Marxist economist Fernando Camona told me &at the csisis of real swialism was in essence the crisis oaf StaMsm, an assessment vvhich too easiIy disdsses other issues of the Soviet model's extreme statifm.'VSinrilarZy, when Soviet-style socialism was criticjzctd er of 1992, another wellin MexiCo City in the S intellectual quitMy offe familiar defense that the Bolshevik parv had been up against a hostile international enviro which facilitated bureaucratization, and that economic backwarhess had demmded industrialization ""a marchasforz-rdas."l~ There is a similar tendency to gloss over past errors among the mast ardent nationalist intellectuals as well. Ifigenia Nartinez, for example, a promkent economist fornesXy wifh the PWs left wjng and now a leading figure in the PRD, strongly disagrees with those vvXla claim that the nationalist policies of strong state participation in the economy an:d hport-substitution were failures: The Mexlcan government became both an investor and a banker, and its policies were pratecti~nist,in order to develop the national forces of production, Mexico then maintained a growth rate in the GNP of seven percent annually far more than 40 years. I wouldnrt call that a failure. The problem with the [Lhzaro] Cbrdenas made1 is that GArdenas left office in 1940. Since then the process of industriaXization and Bevelspment in Mexico created an enbepreneurial class which really hasn't responded to national interests. In 1982 there was what I call a silent coup dktat. A new class came to power, the financial, class, which changed the gaafs. Under the neoliberal model, the mast important goal. was to avoid the collapse of the international private banking industry. That's when the decision was made that the number one priority sl aXf e c o n o ~ c policy would be payment of the debt. The crisis was a crisis of stale

11. Fernando Carmsna, intewiew with author, Mexico City, August 25, 1992. 12. Arhrra Bonilla, comments made in response to Andrea Revueltas, at " b r a Ias luchas emancipadoras de fin de siglo," Mexico City, Sptember 4,1992.

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Socialism I financing. It's sot true that it was a crisis of stateled import subs~htion.13

Martinez's instinct to blame traitorous, self-interested actors md shy w a y from a critique of the state-centered model itself oflers d i s h c t e&aes of &ose Marxists who look no hrther than StaWs auithoritarianism h assessing the failures of Sovir?tsocialism. Regarding the left's present and fukure, o r ~ o d o xsocialists in Mexico mist comrades who "rcmomced tend to be critical.of &ek famer Co the socialist program" in order to join the Pm (a party they consider to be hopelessly p r a p a t i c and electoralist), arguing that the main task of the socialist current in Mexico is to "fornulate the program of Mexican socialism and thefeby lay the basis for reconstructhg Che party of Mexican socialim."ld Orthodox socialists tend to retain vmpardist fornufatims of what a left political party should be, even if its goal is no longer to seize state power: [Socialist parties] should be small minorities, with very weU trained, solid and active cadre, and their revolutionary perspec~veis not to take power, as parties, but rather ta politica'tly educate the [working] classes through the class struggle.15

This perspective has kept the orthodox socialist intellechxals largely marginalized from. Mexico" pprhcipd opposition movement. Orthodox socialists also uphold more traditiorral conceptions of sorialism and are hesitant to consider the possible benefits of private enterprise or a mixed econonzy w i t h a futzlrrl socialist society.16 Eduardo

23, Ifigenia Martinez, interview with author, Mexico City, August 27,1992. For a fuller elaboration af her analysis, see her series of articles on the Mexican economy in Sienzprt; (Mexico), No. 2034, June 17, 1992; No. 2035, June 24, 2992; No 2036, July 1, 2992; No. 203"j"JuIy 8, 1992; No. 2038, July 15,1992; No, 2039, July 22,1992; Na. 2041, August 5,1992; and No. 2M5, September 2,1992. 14. Eduardo Montes, "Tenernos historia y futrtrs,'Y~ocialismo(Mexico), Vol. 1, Nos. 3-4, October-December 1989, pp. 12-12. With the goal of fc3rming a new socialist party, a group of about 200 socialists met in November 1993; the purpose of the meeting was outlined by Eduardo Montes in "DFflsate %cialista,*' La jornada (Mexico), August 7,1993, 15. Octavio Rodriguez Araujo, "El socialisma no esth en crisis," Sociallsmo (Mexico),Vol. 1, Nos. 3-4, October-December 1989, p. 32, 16. For an articulate presentation by a U.S, scholar of an orthodox perspective on the transition to socialism in Latin America, see Rchard L. Harris, Marxism, Socialism, and Lltzmocvacy in Latin America (Boulder: Weslview Press, 1992). Harris discusses the transition to socialism as including the destruction of

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'st and editor of the journal SocialMontes, a fomer Mexican C s of soclia~smoutlined by Marx, ismo, beheves that the essent Engels, and Lenin, are as valid today as ever; among those features, he particularly notes "the abolition of private ownership" in favor of "the social ownership" of the "large means of produc~oion."l7 Finally, orihodox perspectives in Mexico adhere to the formal discourse of the Mamist-leninist classics, showing little inclination to incorporate liberal formulations or the language of the post-Marxist, poststructuralist schoois of thought*'& Cuban orthodoxy reveals the same hesitancy to understand past failures of sociahm in k m s of the state-centered mode&ra&er &an in of specik policy erro h s ~ b t i o n a lw e a h However, the Mexicm socialists" on Stalk, orit-krodax rs in Cuba give more attention to the errors of perestroika. Castro's view of the Soviet Union's collapse is t e h g : it sdf-destmcted, he arpes' as a result of leadership errors. Specifically, according to Castro, perestroika "w\intentimally" destroyed tEte autfiority sf the party, one uf the "pillars" of socialism, and with it the state.i9 Ramiro AbreG, a Central America specialist in the Central Com-mittee's international relations department, offers a shilar assessment: Can we talk about a failure sf the planncrd e c o n o ~ e s W would e have to ask which institutions really failed. Perestroika and related phenornena fed ta the collapse because af conceptual. errors, not because of planning. Russian perestroika proved to be a way to get to capitafism though soc=ialism.zo

Orthodox thhkers in Cuba tend to blame Soviet experhenbtim with market mechanisms rather than its authoritarianism or statism: "&e of the greatest defamations of Soviet socialism was its attempt to manage market relations with different foms of property.''z1 the capitalist state, establishment of a class dictatorship (pp, 192-93)' and the expropriation of "all large capital" (p. 212). 17. Eduardo Mantes, "Renmos hlstoria y futuro," "p. cit,, pp. 8-9. 18. For examples sf the cumrznt usage of classic Marxist discourse by left inteflectuafs in Mexico, see Afloffo Sdnchez Vbzquez, "Democracia, revolucidn y socialismo," "ciafr'smo (Mexico), Vol. 1, Nos. 3-4, October-December 1989; Adolfo Shncfiez VBzquez, ""E vafor del sscialismo," manuscript, August 1992; and Edur Armgui Ksba, ""Cuatro Criisis Socialistas," manuscript, n.4, 19, Fidel Castro quoted in Tamds Borge, U n Grana de Miz. ConversaczB~zcon Fiditiel C~stro(Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econbmica, 19921, pp. 46-48. 20. Ramiro AbreG, inteniiew with author, Havana, March 8,2"393. 21. German Sdnchez, interview with author, Havana, March 10,1993.

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Cubm orthdoxy also reveals a complacency with the Cuban revoZutionfs ckarly notable ackevernents and to blame the U.S. embargo md adverse intemat.ionalconditions for its shortcomhgs. A yowg, orthodox t lectured me: "You have to be vesy careh1 when you state f i a t has been able to meet the basic meds of the people and provide a level of education, health care, and social security that doem? exist in some developed comtries."'22 lin Castra"s famous t re""Socialism or DeaW speech, ddefivered as the Eastern C gimes proceeded to fall one after the other, he insisted that the problems of Cuban swialism were largely a result of the host-ile intematimal envient in wEch it was buift.23 Orlhodm hkllechals in Cuba fiercely oppose private property and even most non-state forms of social property and only begrudgingly and very cautiously accept the need to introduce some market-oriented reEoms. ""Capitalist refoms" camot solve the problems tro said just a fews year back,24 and socialist property ply the ownership of certain means of production workers; socialism must mean "the ownership by all the people of all the means of production."= ittee member and ideologue Dario Machado skilarty warns, ""We carnot defend ed prsjett if our people are divided, and private properv divides ."" Ano&er integecbal m d Central of collective ittee lunctimary rejects (like Castro) even the n o ~ m property, because "we need to preserve the revolution's advances in terns af ownership in favor of all the peopfe.""z7 The ideological rigidity of these positions, however, is being rapidly m d e m h e d by Cuba" urgent need to reinsert itself ket and attract foreip capital. Even ~ e s orthodox e ning to resign themselves to some compromises to Mile Machado asserts that social property is one of the main principles of Cuban socialism, he now rekrs to a "variation of soc3ia.l property, which is t-he mixed enterprise, comb g capitalist property and social property to meet the necessity of having to insert our national economy

22. Gladys MemBndez, intewiew with author, Havana, March 2,1993. 23. FideX Cashrtl, Socialism or Death (Havana: fos6 Marti Publishing Hause, 2889). 24. Ibid, 25. Fidet Caslro, ""L crisis del socialisma en Europa y su impacto en la IRevoIuclbn Cubana," El Elavibe Co~lempordneo(Mexico), No. 25, July-December 1990, p. 83. 26. Dario Nachada, interview with author, Havana, February 17,28533. 27. Germiin Sbnchez, interview with a u t h r , Havana, March 10,1993.

into a world economy regulated by the market."z8 Two Cuban econots make shilar arpments: it's not objective or prudent ta i p o r e the wehlness of market relatiom. But that doesn" mean it maka to begin a procws of destatiza~lian,which would lead to chaos. Instead, weke hying to promote new h r m of d x e d entevrisw, which dwsn't represent a decapitalizatianof the state.29 We lack mtrepreneurial sklls; our campanim are not prepared to compete on the market. But this d m n ' t necessarily mean changing our stak f a r m of property. We are now making some v e v fltsxible movr;s toward ~ x e ford of property in areas that can generate hard currency, but the htention is not to change the form of properq.N

Despite the refuctmce expreswd by mmy innrxential. ortfiodox intellectuals and officials,howver, in practice fiberal economic r e h s are now well mder way in Cuba, m d ~ b e r a ideology l is m a h g itself Mt. Some orthodox smialists attempt to acc date, and perhaps even torical discourse, Martit legihate, such chslnges in terms of Hameeker, for example, notes that m the datimship beween socialism and state-owned property evolved in practice: Xt is clear that in his dassic work, Slate and Rmlzrtian, . . . [Leninj thought that once the state gassed into the hands of the proletariat, social proptrrt-y would be identified with state praperq. . . . Later, h c a w e of the practical experience af the first prclletafian revolution and af the wforeseen new realities that emerged in the construction of sotlialism, k n i n Y s analysis of the role of the state b ~ a m emore nuanced. He began to distinguish betniven "stateizatian" and socializatian of the means af production. Later, during the New Economic Policy, he began to place ever greater value on ccroperative organization-31

28. Dario Machadcl, intewiew with author, Havana, February Ifi: 1993. Further elaboration of Machado's views on ""social ownership of the fmdamental means of production" as essential to ssocialism can be fomd in his ""E pprmeso de rttctificaci6n y la ide~lsgia de la RevoEuci6n Cubans," manuscript, 1993. 29. Cladys Herndndez, intewrew with author, Havana, March 2,2999. 30. Elena Atvarez, interview with author, Havana, March 5,1993. 31. Marta Harnecker, ""Democracy and Revolutionary Movement," op cit., g. 68.

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m e r Cuban hteuect-uals appear inclined to adopt liberal discourse and refoms on thek own terns, wi&out the blessings of Marx or his Lenin.

Liberal influence on left int-ellechalsin both Cuba and Mexico can be seen prharily in two tendencies: first, acceptance of certain economic "laws" about market competition#efficiency, and growth and, second, resipation to the idea of politics k i n g subordhated to wonodcs, What distinguishes such liberal perspectives from radical neoliberalism, and aitEaws them to be contained withbn the discourses of the left, is the conviction of their proponents fiat national economies can be rationally d o m e d within the contat of global capitalism while still prxrsuing the goals of greater social equality. In understanding how these liberal tendencies are expressed withh the particular circumstances of the Cuban revolution and the Mexican left, it is worth k e p h g in observation of Cubm social scientist Aurelia Ailonso: The rest of the Latin American left has to re-find its w a y on the basis of societies that have been Iiberalized t.s the max, Cuba, on the other hand, has been state-ized to the max. The rest of the Latin American left needs a process of de-liberaIization. Cuba needs the inverse.32

mists explicitly accept the inevitability of ecoSome Cuban Co n o ~ liberalism, c as the following staknnents iHustrate: "There is now anly one world economy and there has been a generalization of the rules of supply and. dernand.'"3 ""We ckarly have to consider the use of market relations and non-state foms of propmty, not only because of the failures of the East and of Lath American developmentalism, but in consideration of the Cuban model itseE-to inrrease efficiency arrd productivity."% Another Cuban CO unist offered the consistency of prices on the black market, in contrast to the variation in prices in the state-rm stores, as evidence that the market: sets prices very precisdy.35 Nst surprisingly, Cubafs social democratic dissidents, many of whom were Gmmunists themselves far many years, support economic X-iberalizatian: ''Of course the market produces social differences, but the 32. A u r e l i ~Alonsa, intenriew with author, Havana, February 23,1993. 33. JuIio Carranza, intewiew with author, Havanat, February 18,1993. 3.4, Santiago Peirez, intenriew with author; Havana, March 4,1993. 35. Rafael Hernhndez, interview with author, Havana, February 21, 3999. Sveral other Cubans intenriewed drew u p m their f r u s k a ~ n gexpe~encesas consumers to explain their growing support of econoMc liberalization.

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117

oher way hasn"t worked, and at least the market would produce gxeater wealth, Social justice can't be a ~ e v e dwi&crut wealth,"% Vlad Roca, son of the late Ca t leader Btas R x a md a leadkg figure in the social democratic opposition in Cuba, most clearly expresss the liberal acceptme of economic "laws": The ss-called smialist cout-ries, hcfuding Cuba, iwored the objective Iaws governing the economy. Those are the law of value and the law of supply and demand. They also ipore the principle of ekconornic efficiency. The role of the state in the economy should be reduced in order to achieve high Iwels af e r o n o ~ cefficienq needed to achieve appreciable levels of econadc growth necessary to overcome the current crisis as quickly as possible. The realities of the past dwade demonstrate that if we ipore the Iaws governing the m ~ o r n yand put man" sill over such laws, economic and social involu~onsare produced throughout sociev.37 What is the rationale for including such clearly liberal perspectives within a study of the "left"? S h p l y that the primary objective of the people expressing &ese ideas remajins a society in whch social justice prevaits, and they have come to believe that e r m a ~ liberalism r offers some advmtagtits toward that end. Moreover, 1&e t r a d i ~ o mKberal-left l to the belief that the state must play a key refomers, tkrey sti'lf hol ~ r o u g kregulation, fiscal poGcies, and inrole in assuring social j come redistribution. C ist htellechal Julio Carrmza desc~besthe role of the state in terns of (1) protecting the htel-ests of the low-&come population, preventing extreme inequality, guaranteeing social equality; (2) stimulating strategic sectors of the economy; and (3) defending the interest of the nation against f m i g n enemies. Wow, P asked, is that different f r m the role af the Keynesian state? He replied: The difference is that Keynesian policies seek to increase demand ~ n d redistribute wealth to serve capital acmmurXation for capital accmulatianrs sake, to Erne capital. h Cuba, redistribution of wealth to in-

crease demand is not to expand capital but to increase the well-being of the populalion. Thafs the key goal; increasing capital is a route to that goal.=

lar lines, I asked social democrat CeciEio D h a s , who described the role of the state as being to "'make sure no one bwomtits ex36. Cwilio Dimas, intewiew with author, Havam, February 13,1993. 37. Vladimiro Woca, intewiew with author, Havana, March 1993, 38. JuXia Carranza, interrtiew with author, Havana, February 18, f 9 3 ,

cessively rich," to explain the essence of a socialist economy. He answered: What dis~guishesa swialist society ham a capitatist sociep is the cantroX exer~sedby the state, which will never allow far huge inequalities to be groducczd, and would permit a much higher level af social justice than the capitalist comtris.39

The similarity of the responses from Carranza and Dimas suggests the extent to WE&Eberal-minded C mists share more in,c dissident social demofrats, in terns of economic policy, than they do with the orthodox members of their own party. The most significant mists and "c:onterrevcilutionary" dividhg line betvveen '"oyal"" C social democrats, as discussed h a previous chapter, is their stand on the single-party system. Indeed, some Cuban Communists who hold liberal v i w s on economic reform are quite or&odox in tlseir views about democratizing the political system. Santiago Pkrez, for example, who supports liberal refoms to make the economy more efficient, only half-jokhgly told m, "I have a more newonservative pasition'" on the issues of political democracy.@ The real influence of ecanomic (as oppmed to political) liberalism in Cuba is fomd less in discourse than in rapidly changhg practice. As of unist Party Congress, the Cuban leadership was still rejecting proposals to reopen the famers mark&, a popular but shortlived expclrimttnt with m k t refom in the eark 1980s that allowed In winter 1993, privitte farmers to sell their produce in city though many of the forty-some Cubans I interviewed supported the idea of reopening the farmers markets, no m e believed such a refom would be hplemented any time soon. Some cited pofitical resistance from orthodox hardhers, and others said that Cuba" resource scarcity and excess liquidity made such markets unworkable for the time being. NeverIheless, after another year-md-a-half of economic crisis and severe scarcity, in Sqtember 1994, Raiil Castro amomced the reapening of markds in which agricultural producers could sell, at prices "freely" deternine8 by supply and demand, any produce remahing after contracts with state

39. Cecilia Dimas, interview with author, Havana, Februafy 11,1993, 40. Santiago Pbrez, interview with author, Havana, March 4,1993. 41. Gail Reed, Island in the Storm. The Cttban C~mmunisth r t y ' s FottrCh Congress (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 19921, p. 130. The official reason given for closing the markets was that middlemen were becoming overnight millionaires, but some Cuban sbsewers suggest that the farmers markets' ssuccess posed too much of a threat to overall state control, econsmically and poXiticaHy-

State vs. h r k t

219

inslitutim had been met." m e n in October 199% the Cuban feadership gave the go-ahead for the establishment of similar markets for "industrial and artisanal" p r o d ~ c t s .The ~ new markets were justified in of the need to s w u l a t e producCion and hcrease supplies available comtsyfs h s k a t e d cons h o t h e r rapidly evolving elenaent of e c o n a ~ refam c is the opening up to foreign investment, in an attempt both to attract much needed capital and to facilitate competitive production for export. By late 1994, there were reportedly 165 mixed enterprises (partnerskps behveen Cuban state companies and foreign private or state capital from thirty-eight different comtries), operating in twenty-six different sectors of the ecmomy, but prbarilly in tourism h October of 1994, Vice President Cartas Lage, m e of:fhe go t's chief economic architects, o w e d that all of the island's productive sectors would be opened to foreip capital, hcluding sugar and real estate. Lage noted that the opening to foreign capital and tlhe e s t a b h h e n t of the new agricultural and industrial/ariisanal markets were seen as a "usefuf camplement" tta economic plamiscg. Me insisted that Cuba "'is not carrying out a capitalist devcrlopment strategy, but rather a flexible strategy capable af system."'" Despite lating many processes within the socia Lage's qualifier, the extent to which Cuban C mists were b a c h g away f r m a "'sacialism or deaW suicide pact was mderscored in October 1994 when Fidel Castro himself reportedly admitted in an hterview on French television that the conditions for developing socialism do 42. Josetxo Zaldlia, " h m c i a h61 Castro la prdxima liberadcin del ~ (Mexico), SE?ptember38,3994; Josetxo iSaXd6a, rnercado agropecuario," L LJornada "QperarBn desde octubre en Cuba Xos mercados agropecuarias," h Jornada (Mrsxico), September 22,1994. 43. Josetxo Zaldiza, "LW verde en la isla al. mercado libre Be productos industriales y artesamles,'" La Jornada (Mexico), October 27,1994. 44. La Jornada (Mexico), October 31,1994. 45. %id. For the transcript of an extensive interviw with Carlos Lage about Cuba" current economic strategy, broadcast on Cuban television in November 1982, see G r a n m (Cuba), November 10, '19"32,and November 14, 1992, Another key intelfczctuai player in Cuba" economic reform is economist Josk Luis Rodriguez, currently the government's minister af the economy and vice president of the Council. of Ministers; for some of his views, see his ""La inversidn extranjera en Cuba: mitos y realidades,'"oletin de Informcirin Econrimlcn Cltbana (Cuba), Vol. 1, No. 5, May 1992; "Las retaciones econicimicas entre Cuba y fa antingua LrE5 1959-19WfJ,"' Bolettn de Inforznacibn Econbmica Ctibana (Cuba), Vol. I, Na. "7 June 1992; and "Los carnbios en Ia poIftica econbmica y los resultadss de lai ecmomla cubana en el contexto del nueva orden mundiaI (1986-1989)"mannanuscript, April 1990.

I20

Socialism 1

not currently exist and Cuba is obliged to adapt to the reality of today’s world.& Economic liberalization in Cuba still faces serious political and ideological obstacles, however, as a tug-of-war within the party continues. Immediately following the series of new liberal reforms cited above, Cuba’s official newspaper, Grunma, criticized a “loss of revolutionary language” among Cubans, and warned that, despite the necessary economic reforms, “we cannot negate the essence of the revolution.” Alongside the editorial appeared a statement from Lage again clarifying that Cuba‘s economic strategy does not mean a transition to capitalism.‘’ A few days later Lage announced that there would be no privatization of stores, cafeterias, and restaurants, nor even a cooperativization of such commercial services, although there were persistent rumors to the contrary.Bs Despite orthodox opposition to the growing influence of liberal economic paradigms, the urgency of the economic crisis is clearly pushing Cuban Communists in that direction. However, as seen in the previous chapters on democracy, economic liberalization has not been accompanied by much political liberalization. If anything, with reports that Raul Castro (never known for his democratic instincts) and ”his loyalists in the military” are increasingly taking charge of Cuba‘s economic ref0rms,4~ there is some reason to heed Vladimiro Roca’s warning that, ”what distinguishes the Cuban government’s policies from neoliberalism is that while the governments of Latin America and other countries apply these policies with the opposition of the workers, the Cuban government applies them with no opposition whatsoever.”M If liberal ideas about economic reform are gaining influence among Cuban revolutionaries, they are viewed quite cautiously by most of the Mexican left and are wholeheartedly embraced by only a few, mainly those left intellectuals associated with the Carlos Salinas administration (1989-1994). This observation might appear contradictory at first, particularly in light of the extensive influence of liberal political discourse among the Mexican left noted in the preceding chapter. But keep in mind Aurelio Alonso’s observation that, except for Cuba, the Latin American left confronts societies that have been ”liberalized to the max.” After more than a decade of neoliberal economic restructuring by the 46. Josetxo Zaldua, ”Recibiriamos a Clinton con espiritu abierto: Fidel Castro,“ La Iornudu (Mexico), October 21, 1994. 47. La Iornudu (Mexico), November 6,1994. 48. La Iornudu (Mexico), November 10,1994. 49. Cathy Booth, “Fidel’s Brother Sets Up Shop,” Time (English-language, Mexico edition), November 14,1994, pp. 18-19. 50. Vladimiro Roca, interview with author, Havana, March 1993.

Stale vs. Market

221

state-party regime, the majority of Mexico's left intellectuals are more impressed by economic liberalization's devastating social consequences than by its success at mrbing inflation and reducing the budget deficit. Never&eless, &ere are some Muentiaf, hberal-le the Mexican left on the question of economic alternatives. Rolmdo Cordera, for example, readiiy acknowledges that even neoliberalism has its merits: What neoliberal discourse offers, in the end, is consitstency. h d , as a result of that comistency, it provides the opportmiv for many pragmatic options. This is very disconcerting for the left, which cioesn" understand the possible variants of nealiberafisrn that have been applied.51

Among hose varhnts is the Mexican model, whidh Cordera has supported. While most of the left attacks the economic refoms of the last three PRI presidents as radically neoliberal, Cordera and fellow fomernationalist fast2 Wolbmbag have praised fiem as a modet of "'social liberaEsmNfthat could be adopted by other L a h Anerican gove Cordera is now self-critical of some of his former views on the state, which wefe in the tradition of Mexico's revolutionary natimalism, and emcedes that he and others had ignored some of capitalism's basic lesW clariv about the importance of" the market, that izes social rela~ans,and that it is one of society's ication, for which no substibtes have been found .''S3 Shilar reassessments of fiberaIism%eeconomic pamdigms have been mists as well. Amkrico Saldivar, mdertaken by fomer Mexican Co for example, argues that "we need real economic growth based on a rational economic model in order to have social programs. Xf that model is capitalist, O.K., so be it."" Like Cordera, Saldivar believes that neoliberalism has its merits. Zn June 1993he gave a speech in Poland in which he reviewed the record of neoliberal refoms jn Mexico and suggested they could sewe as im example for Eastern Europds transition ta a market economy. A "prelkhary assessmnt" of Mexico's pprivatizatian pro51- Rolando Cordera, interview with author, Mexico City, September 2, 1992.

52. Rolando Cordera and fast5 Woldenberg, "La C ~ m b r eIber~americitna,~ Crkademo de Rlexes (Mexico), A u w t 1993, p. iv. 53. Rolando Cordera, intemiew with author, Mexico City, Sptember 2, 1992. For a fuller elaboration af Cordera's reassessment of the role of state and mrket, see his ""E fstado y el desarrollo: revisiones y reafirmaciones," Problems del Desarrotlo (Mexico), Vol. =XI, Januaq-March 1991. 54. America Saldivar, intemiew with author, Mexico City, August 4,1993.

ould have to consider it a '"success," ted excessive protectionism m d hdiscr Again the reader might reasonably ask, why are such perspectives comidered here as part af the kft? Because h e same intelleckxals reted to social jus~cea d a more equitable society md, in m e way or another, even retain "socialism" as an important point of reference. Cordera says that socialism remains on the agenda," as dws Woldenberg, who adds, "above all in poor cowhies that are profoundly unequal and serniauthoritarian/semidemocratic, 'like ours."s Saldfvar talks in terns of "a new pluralist socialist paradigm, very diverse and varied according to the parGcuhri~esof each c m Cordera and Woldenberg supported the S a h a s go restructuring, while Saldivar has advised coXXeape ist bloc nations on how to apply Mexico's experiences to Eastern Europe. This contradictian is partially exptained by the extent to which their new apreciation for economic liberalism has led to poliiical resipation before the partly feat, pa&ly irnagined power of global capitahm. The accelerated internationalization of capital over the past twenty years, tage*er with the disappearance of the sociaEst bloc, has encouripotence to global capiaged some leftists to a~ributea near divine talism. In arguing that the PRD"s economic: program has to take into account three "inevitabje restrictions" (adjusbent, compelitjveness, and globakation), CIro May6n asserts that "globalization is for everyane, wi*out escape, the religion."s An even rnorc extreme a m p l e of the degree to w ~ c hnea&erafism has contributed to reified conceptions about the global economy is found in the center-lefijournal Nexos: The rules of the global economy, whether we like them or not, are the rules by which we have to live. . . . "Te rules af the game of the international Etcoslomy are clear as water: everything to assure that the 55. America Saldivar, "Realidad y ft'dtes del neoliberalismo mexicano,'" Memoria (Mexico) Na. 57, August 1993, p. 48. 56. Rolando Cordera, "Notas sobre los socialistas, la izquierda y fa perspecGva won6mica," in Jorge Alcmer, et al., EX F~iturode la Izquieuda en Mkxico (Mexico City: CEPNA, 1992), p. 171, 57. Jos6 WoIdenberg, "Mesa Redonda. La Izquierda frente a1 siglo xxi: proyeitos y utophs," in Jorge Alcwer, et al., ibid,, p. 289. 58, h k r i c o Saldivar, "Dernocracia y marxismo," Memoria (Mexico) Mo. 30, July-August 1990, p. 159. For his analysis of the failures and crisis of socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, see A. %ldivar, El Ocaso del so&-ialism(Mexico City: Sigl-aXX1,1990) 59. Ciro Maykn, "Una alternativa de reforma econeinnica," Menzo~a (Mexico), No. 57, August 1993, pp. M-45 (my emphasis).

123

Stake vs. Market

sonomy fmctions, and nothisrg mare. The economy stands above all on goal that we all mmt pursue.@ else and its success is the co such prosbation before the allegedly absolute powers of the global economy is not typical of the Mexican left, the views expressed do afustrate a more co attitude of resignagon to the idea that ecanomics has triumphed definitively over politics. As Saldivar admitted, Until very rwentty, f was convinced that there was no alkmative to nealiberalism, that it was an error to oppose the market. neoretically, of cowse there are always alternatives, but practically speaking, are there political and social forces to push another altemittive"?"i As seen in Chapters m e e ;and Four, fiberaf polGcaf conceptions about r r ? s ~ c t e dforms of democracy have b e n especially inRuential among leftists in South American nations recently emerging from decades of bmtal d i t a r y dictatorships. Some of those l e f ~ t s once , hfZy ined to socialism, s h i l a r l y have now accepted liberal for even neoGberal) economic docfrines. ""Socialism. has gone out of fashion in the Sou&em Cone," wrote historim Peter W h a few years back: Years af military repression have left their mark upon the left and its largely working-dass supporters, teaching them the dangers of sscialist d r e a m or revolutionary demands. This Mlitary ktelage has b e n internalized, its lessons learned perhaps too well. Few are ready to tempt the same fate again. The regressive impact of the military's social. and economic policies and the loss of jobs as a result of: e c o n o ~ c modernization and capitalist crisis have been equally traumatic. As a consequence, leftist political and labor leaders are now willing to senltr for far less than their pre-coup program, while workers have lowered their sights to securing a steady job and a living wage.62 Thus in Chile, socialkt Carlos

arni Pascual sewed as minister of

ued neoliberal restrucbring of the Ch2ean economy, arguing that democratization depended on economic "modeMzation,'hhich he defined in t e r n s of g e a k r ecanornic disci-

60. Luis Rubio, ""L politica mexicana vs. la econonu"a global," Nexos (Mexico), Sptember 1994, pp. 71-75. 61. Amkriccr Saldivar, interview with author, Mexico City, August 4,1393. 62. Peter Winn, "%eiaIism Fades Out of Fashion," The Ngtion (New York), June 26,1989, pp. 882-883.

pline, productivity, competition, and entrepreneurial spirit." Likewise, in Brazil, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, one of Latin America's most d i s t h ~ i s k dleft ixlltellecbls m d a fomder of the radical "dependency school" of thought in the 1960s, is currently following similar neoliberal prescriptions for privatization, reduced social spending, and wage conh.ols. In Brazil, at least, it is not the case, as Saldivar suggested above, that "the political and social forces to push another alternative" do donot exist. As noted inChapter Four, t h e and other factors have allowed a renovated left to emerge with far greater strength in Brazil than in other Southern Cone nations. If anything, Cardoso was elected with the support of" the center and right prc3tisely b e c a u ~a more radical, nonliberal alternative was pwented by Luia da Silva and the Workers Party (PI"). Cardoso could have counted on a mass constituency to pursue an economic program a b e d at reducbg Brazil" hinfarnously extreme social inequality, but he has ei&er become cmvhced of the merits and hevitability of: the neoliberal economic model or is suinfficienctly fearful of analher military coup to challenge the status quo more forcefully. In Cuba and Mexico, despite liberal inftumces on the lefts' economic t h i n b g , and despite the persistence of old socialist orthodoxy among some, the left appars to have been less inclbed to invoke the current neoliberat mantra or to accept the oft-repeated assertions that there are no alternatives to radical "free market" policies. Tn Mexico, in fact, there is a very broad left: apposition that believes the political and sstial forces exist to pursue an alternative, and there are intelEeckxaXs w o r h g to elaboaate such an alternative. Likewise, many of Cuba's l& intellechals remain convinced that their society can still produce a more humme, mofe d e m ~ r a t i rm , r e just, and more: Cut?an version of socialism. The perspectives of these renovative tlhinkers are examined in the following chapter.

63. Carlos Qminami Pascual, "La via chilena a ta democracia," Mztndo (Mexico), June 1990, pp. 29-32. Xmacis Walker argues that the Chilean left has become increasingly influencd by mare c a n ~ m a t i v e European social democracy, largely in response to "the traumatic impact of rauthsritarianism." I. Walker, "Democratic Scrcialism in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 4, July 1991, pp. 439-458.

CHAPTER 6. SOC

Renovative Perspectives on Economic Alternatives In the process of trying to renovate socialist and nationalist values of the past, there are left forces in Latin America that accept the necessity of incorporating lessons from liberalism and the experience of market economies, but that are disinclinted to anribute metaphysical powers to the market, as do some of the more liberalized leftists. The liberal left's resalute faith in the market shares something in c on with socialist orthodoxy's mqualified rejection of the market: bo ore the fact that "markets themselves are deeply embedd@d in social ~lations."' &e camot expect the markrrt ta fmctian independently of capitalism's class kequali.ties, nsr can one ctisrniss the potential importance of market noncapitalist swieties marked by different social relations. The renovatjve l&"s attit-ude is reflected in the suggestion of Brazil's Francisco Mlcffort that, '"ocialists should marmy democracy out of love, but their m i m with the market need be no more than a 'marriage of c~nvenience."~~ What distinguishes renovators from their orthodox or Ijberal-leaning comrades is not necessarily their co i b e n t to sonnetha called '"socialism." XPI Cuba, exponents of all thrae perspectives, hcluding those in the "'democratic socialist" dissident current, explkitly identify themselves as socialists. In Mexico, as seen in the previous chapter, while ortftodox voices urge the left to drawup the blue prints for Mexicm socialism diakly, liberal-kfi inkllectuals refer vaguely to socialism wEle sonnethes obijectively supporting neolibexalism. Mexican renovators, meanwhije, hclude both socialists and non-

1. Rabert W u t h o w , Cammunzties of Biscszrrse (Cambridge: Haward University Press, X989), p,565. 2. Francisco Weffort quoted in forge Gastafieda, Utopia Unarmed (New York: Alfred A. h a p f , 29931, p, 432.

126

Socialism II

sociaEsts. There are many renovative ers in Mexico (hcluding Msts, Tratskyists, Maois d isrdependent socialists) who continue to give substm~alattmlion to recmstructiitg a new swialist paradip.3 At the s a m t h e , there are nationalists among the renavat-ive tendency, like Guadthmnc Cdrdmas, -whose radical discourse on democracy and papular participation h econofic pla fxom or&odox m d liberal Ieftists.4

3. Among some of the interesting new thinking about socialism among the Mexican left, see: jforge Alonso, ""Altemtivas para un socialismo posible," manuscript, n.4.; Jorge Alomo8 "En bwca de m a altetrnativa con equidad," Memoria (Mexico) No. 62, February 1994; Sot Arguedas, "Reflexianes acerca del h t u r o del socialismo," Tareas (Panam&) No. 80, January-April 1992; Elvira Conclheiro, "La herencia recuperada por los cornmistas," Memo& (Mexico) No. 61, December 1993; S r g i o de la Pefia, "La aitica a 10s criticas de Ia izquierda," Memoria (Mexico) No. 53, April 1993; Sergio de la kfia, "Tareas pendienttts del socialismo," Mtrn& (Mexico), Februasy 1991; Adolfo CiIly, "Socialismo," La j;ornaa"a (Mexico), February 15, 1991; Pablo Gomdlez Casanova, ""E proyecto sacialista b y , " manuscript, 1991; Fabb Eonz&lez Casanova, ""La crisis del rnundo actual y las ciencias swiales en Am4rica La~na,""nuscript, S p t e m k r 7,1990; Arnoldo Martinez Verduga, "La crisis del socialismo y el aniversario del PCM," Menzoria (Mexico) No, 29, January.-February 1990; Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, ""L renuncia del Corbachov y el fin de Xa pemstrsika," Memoria (Mexico) No. 38, January 19922; Jacquelne Ochoa Itlhndez, "La izquierda mexicana ante Xa crisis def sociafismo real," B Elotz*diano (Mexico), SptemberOctober 1990; Lucio Ofiver, "Estado y sociedad en la redeAnici6n sacialista," Mernoria (Mexico) No. 60, November 1993; Lucio Oliver Ccrstifla, "Marxismo y sociol;ogx"aetn Arnk~cilLahna," Memoria (Mexico) No. 32, Januaxfy-Februafy1991; Eduardo Ruiz Contardo, "Fal~dadcrs rapitalisltas, errores y visncia d d socialismof7' Estudios Latinoamericanos (Mexico) No, 82, January-June 1990; Itaquel Sosa Elizaga, "Los cambios en el Este y Amkrica Latina," Memoria (Mmico)No, 32, January-February 1991. In 1994, following the Chiapas uprising and in l g h t of the 1QOth amiversary of Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos MariAtegui8sbirth, Mexican intetetl~tualshave also shown renewed interest in the relevance of his writings for a renovated indigenous, Latin American socialism; see, e.g., Joaquin Sgnchez MacCregor, "=alismo indoarnericano," La jornada nal (Mexico), Sptember 25, 1994; and a caltection of papers presented at an October 1994 colloquium on "MariAtepi and the Latin American Left," published in Memoria (Mexico) No, 72, November 2994. 4, Cuauhtbmoc Chrdenas's views have been published in many forum. Three English-tanguage translations are: festjls Galindo Lbpez, "A Conversation Cdrdenas," Journal of Intmnatianal Aflairs, Vol. 43, No. 2, with Cuauht&m~c Winter 19W; Andrew Reding, "The h m o c r a ~ cCurrent: A New Era in Mexican Politics,'World Policy Jotimal, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 1988; Cuauht&mocCbrdenas, "The Continental Development and Trade Initiativef* in In. Jonas and E.

M a t most clearly distinpish the renovators from defenders of sod options available in cialist orthodoxy are their acceptance of the the afiemah 'S recent triumphs, their sense of obligation to offer reafistic Iternatives to alleviate the suffe*g of large wess to consider ideas fram tiberaf sectors of swkty, and their w poMcal ~ o n a m yin constructing that alternative. Mlhat most clearly distinguish them from the liberal-leaning left are their beliefs that an ediate alternative to neoEbera1 resfiuchhg and a long-tern altexnative to capitaEsm are necessary and possible, m d that political struggle in pursuit of social goals has not been overridden by reified nations of some aH-powerful '"hob1 economy." Moreover, renovators, mlike liberals, emphasize democratization as the most w o r t m t response to failed statist models of the past. h a & , t h e and again in inkrviews, renovative Mexicans and Cubans dismissed as pure ideology neo2beralismfsc l a h s about t%te market's magic and the state%evils, n o h g the =eve role of the state h irnposing neoliberal, policies. Renovators insist that market and state alike are Kstorical constrzlctions whose baltmce reflects the correlation of social and pditical forces and the social pact operative in a given saciev at a given mament. Wi these parameters, renovative ideas take on different foms or emphases in the distinct cantext-s socialism and the neofiberal reginres iJn most of L a accurately su. arizes the outthes of the lhited, Cem, ecmonnis alternative offered by the most viable currents of the: Latin American left in the 1913% inctudhg Mexko" PPRD: This a l t e m a ~ v einvolved more debt relief and ltrss debt servic-a difference of degree8 although with qualitativeiy dislinct effects. It included more social spending-ducation, health, housing, swage, drinking water, etc.-and a far greater senM of social justicebut again, witfin lirnits imposed by the scarciq of resources. It advocated less privatization and more honest, accomtable addnlistration by a nwessary stateowned sector of the economy-again, a sipificant nuance but a nuance nonetheless. Xt implied less trade opening and of a more selective nature, but certainly did not mean a re tectisnism, which had never really existed in the first place. It signified important role for the state in the economy, but of a mocratic, accountable, honest-and less dependence on the private sector, local or foreign. It required a new relationship with the business commwity, as removed from the baiGng and kos~lity of the traditional left as it was from the pandering of the right. Et also McCaugfian, eds., tatin darnerrca F~zcesthe Twenty-First Cenlzlry. Recclnstvtrcting a Social JusticeAgenda (Boulder: Wetview Press, 1994).

demanded a new mderdanding with the United States, distant from the tensiow of the aotd left and the subordinatim of the new right.5

Hardly a program for revolutionary socialism, but, as Alejandro Alvarez (a Mexican economist considmably to the left o_f Castaeda and still itted to a noncapitalist altemafive) explained, given the extent of neoliberal restructuring in Mexico, "one has to acknowledge that a e c m m y would be a phenarnmal advance. The movement to the rz has taken us so far that this is now our starting point."6 At least in terns strategy, this is a perspective shared by most renovators as well as many liberal-kft refamers. As the I994 presidential efections in Mexico neared, left inteliectuals associated with the FRD expended considerable effort in elaborating the specifics of such an economic alternative for Mexico, making up for several years in which much of the left seemed so unsure of its ability to challenge neoliberal dogma.7 Rather than a simplistic rejection of state in favor of market, a middle-rm economic allernative is sought b a s d on concrete examples in contemporary history where the market was effectively regulated and influenced by strategic state action. Castarleda, from a more liberat-wformist perspective, imagines some combination of Gemany" "&heland" "model and tke Japanese model fboth of which involve significant state involvment), as a warimt of "social market capitafi~m."~More clearly anticapitalist intdectuats like Pablo C6mez 5 . f arge Castafieda, Lltw&Unarmed, op. cit., p. 248. 6 , Alejandro Alvarez, interview with author, Mexico City, August 28,192. 7. Examples of such efforts include the following articles in Coyzrntura (Mexico) No. 47, April 2994: Arturo Huerta G., ""Crecimienta sastenida con equidad y baja infiacibn," Ifigenia Martinez, "Desarrollo agropecuaricl y suficiencia alimentaria," Felipe &rme5s, "Crisis agricola y desarrallo econ6~tow"he following articls in Coyzintzrva (Mexico) Nos, 50/51, fulylAugust 1994: Asa Cristina LaureX1, et aX, "Reforms de las politicas de salud en defensa de X a vida,'" Maria Fernanda Campa-Uranga, "Nuestro concepto Qe desarrsllo sustentable,'~figenia Martinez, "El skterna nadanali de planeacibn dernocr&tica,'Yalil Escobar Toledo, ""b)ez propuestas sclbre planeac16n dernocrdtica"; as well as, Arturo Huerta G., "Estabilidad, crecimienta econtirnlco y equidad," Memoria (Mexico) No. 70, %@&rtember 1994; Femando Carmona, ""is posible un capitafismo mexicano distinta?" Memoria (Mexico) No. 62, January 1994; Fernando Carmona, 5 ' Si hay un pragrama ~ c m 6 m i c occtntra Ia crisis,'" Memrla (Mexico) NO. 69, August 1994; Jorge A. Calder6n SaIazar, ""Potitica econ6mica para la transiciiin a Ia demscracia," Memoria (Mexico) No. 66, May 1994; Maris J. Zepeda Martinez, "Mexico 1994: X a lucha por el futuro wanSmica," Memoriiz (Mexico) Na. 62, January 1994; h t o n i o Gershenson, "Una pslitica ectmbdca para Mkxico," h jornada (Mexico), September 20,1994. 8. Jorge Castafieda, Utopia U~armed,op cit., particularly the final chapter.

and RaGl Alvarez Garin point to France as an effective example of strategic state intervention.9 Alvarez Garin, whose &a g as an engheer to practical solutions, also sees some viable alternatives its excessive ste&m; he suggests an agricultzlraf pragram for Mexico (inspired by Cuba's resident family doctor program), a trahed techicim/adviser would. live and work w i ~ the b ties of peasants and small farmers to help solve the urgent problems. It would be a centrally organized and funded state program, but its implementation would be decentralized and involve the a c ~ v e participa~onof the peasmhy.lO An illustrative example of how the tension behveen liberal and statist perspectives is being played out inpractice among Mexican renovators is a process of debate that occurred within the FRD over the party's economic program. Two proposals were presented to the party's July 1993 congress, one slightly more market-oriented and one s more state-orknkd, but both of tk.lem justifying their approach in of the best way to promote the national interests of social justice, equality, and sovereignty. The more liberal proposal described the state's role as being ta intewene h order to correct or balance relative prices (i.e., raising minimum wages, lowering interest rates, reducing excessive financial profits), in order for the various social actors to meet in the market place on fairer terns in pursuit of their social interests. The second, somewhat more statist proposal a r p e d that: the fmdamental economic responsibilities of the state are [to assure] sufficient jobs, the productivify and stability needed for solid development, the fairness n e d e d for a development with social justice, and the competitiveness needed for sovereip develapment.11

Neither proposal was acceptable to the majority of the FRD congress, whid, decided to hold a subsequent national meeting to ha differences. Through such debates and struggle, the renovative sector of the Mexican left has gone a long way to prescnt a socially progressive alternative to radical free-market capitalism that also meets the obtigation of any responsible left opposition to offer a program that is viable in the here and now. outlhe of this emerging alterna~vehas the The fact &at ists, independent socialists, nationalists, and supporf of forme 8, Their ideas about the French medel are explained mare fully in Chapter Eight. 10. RaGl AIvarez Catin, intemiw with author, Mexico City, August 6,1993. 11, Proyecta de Program de Ia Rcsuolticirin Democrbtica. Comt~nicaNo. 31 (Mexicar Camit4 Ejecutivo Nacional del PRD, July 1993).

130

Socialism B

social democrats should not obscure the importance of a qualifier offered by Alejjandro Alvarez: "Is tMs our maxim piration? Of course not."" For the short- to medium-range l version of what Castaiieda refers to as "sociaI market" capitali s a very broad@-defhed left, but there are difkrences amon tellechzals about the continued relevmce of a noncapitalst, perhaps socialist utopia that are poteslgally wry hportant for the long-range evolution of a renovative alternative. Cast*eda, far ~ s t m c eis , convhcec;t &at revolutionary socialism is dead in h e water and that even the most far-reacbg of the left's alternatives cannot transcend the parmeters of capitalism: "the so-called program . . . and the maximum program become indistin[and) the rest are numces: how much tramfornation of a democratic, market-basecl s x i e v inseded irt. the world economy does m e wmt?"13 This perspective is consistent with traditional liberakm, understood as the politics of constmt, rational, and more inclusionary refom of capitalkm.14 But others disagree with this apt?rooach. Jorge Alonso, for example, insists that the alternative needed h L a t h America is not to be fomd in choosing betmen different models of capitalism,'" Although there is broad agremmt on the short- to mediumchanges needed, the differences betvveen liberal and renovative feft visions of the evenhal outcome of eccono~crefoms are potentially quite sipificmt. Two artists may both be dissatisfied with the color of the bfue paint on their palette and botfi may determine to -rove the color by carehlly adding small amounts of yellow. The first artist may stop after only a few drops of yellow, satisfiect with the brightened but still visibly blue paint. The second artist may continue to add drops of yellow, knowing that what she wants is not s h p l y a different shade of blue but green. mough both arSists were dissatisfied with the original blue and both agreed upan the initid approach to changing the nahre of the paint, at some point the gradual process of kansfoma~on,continued by the second artist, results in a quafitatively d2feren.t color. Blue is not green, unless you are colorblbd. Refamed capitalism is not socialism. Renovative leftists like J o r e Almo, Akjandro Alvarez, and Cristina Laurel1 agree with the refo outlined by Castafieda, but tlrey =main convkced af the hportance of swialisnn, evcn as a perhaps wry distant 12. Alejandra Alvarez, intenriew with author, Mexico City, Aumst 28,1992. 13. Jorge Castafieda, Utopia Unarmed, ap. cit., pp. 153-54. 24. On the politics of liberalism and its demise, see I anuel Wallerstein, "The Collapse of Liberalism," in R. MUiband and L. P a n ~ e h(eds.), Socialist Register 1992 (London: Merline, 1992). 15. Jorge AIonso, ""Alternativas para un sacialisrno posibleJy'manuscript,

n,d.

Renwafive Perspectives

131

utopia, as a guide to the nature and extent of reforms to be pursued today. Alvarez explains his t h i n b g on this issue: The idea of a mialist economy, as a free assmiation of praducers, still maks sense. But events suggest that weke stilE a ways kom this! Bght now we need an altemat.ivrt for a kansition period, of at. least some ten years. In that period, we need to strengthen the prmas of participation, democratiza~on,collective action, political education. Same of the tasks aren? even so spedacular. For %ample, in Mexico City, with our brutal levels of pollution, there are many fairly simple, rational steps to be taken, simply to put things in some order. h d on the basis af those steps, we can begin to move toward the more profound changes. I'm not saying socialism is defened foreverI simply that the situation we are in means that the only way to get to smialism is on the basis of begiming ta address the problem that confront us daily. Sa the abstract, ideological, programmatic formulationof sseialism will have little importance.16

h C r i s k a Laurell" words, ""we need to rettrm to the basics of socialism-justice, equality, liberty--and seek practical ways to pursue those ends in cument conditions."" 7 a presentagon on ""the defense of sscial righb" at a left fomm in Mexico City, Laurel1 provided a sense of how today's struggles fox social refonns also plant seeds for a society organized around noncapitalist social values. She argued that neoliberalism opposes the very idea of social rights (such as those enshrined in the Mexican Constitution: work, wagr?, heal&, education, housing), beeause they interfere with the "free market." Therefore, the struggle for social rights has a particular strategic value. The left's alternative project, according to Laurell, must "view the economy as a means of providing social rights and benefits." Social rights must be consi$ered as that is, not deipendent on "a particldar ksertiort in society, such as waged labor," and the state must be seen as having the obtigation to warantee social rights to all members of society. "This is a project of social solidarity, when people demand that all be guaranteed their social rights,'"B LaurelX, a medical dsctor and sociologist who has served as editor of the PRD's journal#Coyunttrra, has elaborated these a very practical proposals (attentive to problem of curbing innation and 16. Alejandro Alvarez, interview with author, Mexico City, Aupst 28,1992. 17. Cristina Laurell, 'Tor la defensa y expansi6n de 10s derwhos s~ciales,'~ oral presentation at "Fom las luchas emancipaduras de fin de siglo," Mexico

City, September 4,1992. 18. Ibid.

132

Socialism XI

allowing for profits) to reorganize Mexico's production of social services, pa&icularlyh the areas of heaith care md educatian.19 M i l e the PRD" economic program corresponds closely to the limited reioms outbed above in Castafiedarssu ary, Ihe fanwage of the program's various platforms reveal clearly the socialist and Marxist ideals that h f o m its long-tern vision. A draft of the P W s platfom on "The World of Woxk," for exmple, contains the fobwing passage: [Our] vision of change recomizes labor, and not money, as the source of sacial progress and as an element uni9ing thoset-he absolute majariv-whose efforts guarantm society's existence and who constibte the world of work. The PRUs aspira~onis to represent this world and upan its base construct a free and egalitarian homeland.2@

Implied in the ideas of renovators, who are still inspired by socialist ideals, is a Gramscim-hke prwess of change, wkreby the noncapitafist values of the broad social forces represented by the left gradually gain hfluence, until the accumuIatim of forces is such that a new hegemony has been established. Some renovative sscialists emphasize traditiom rooted in Mexican history that make such a process imaginable within the nation's political culture. In her defense of social rights, Laurel] notes that the principle of "social solidarity" is deeply rooted in Mexican K ~ t o r y Social . ~ ~ movements chronicler and theorist Jainne Tarnayo points to Mexico's unique collective ejido system of land tenure: There are certain traditions, even certain commmit.ies in Mexico, which while far from what we could call modern or citizen-based, represent a form of socialism or include elements of socialism, The e j i h , for mample, was made with the campesino, not against the campesino, in contrast to the heed collectivization of S v i e t agriculture. Here &ere still exist very strong collective concep~onsof commmiCy, including some in which there is a dis-individualization of those who make them up. These perhaps offer an oppartuniv to salvage and update elements of a Mexican socialist left project. Neocaudenismo includes some such elernents.22

19. See Asa Cristina Laurell, "For An Alternative Social Policy: The Pradtrc~tianof Public Services in Mexico," in 5. Jonas and E. Mdaughan, b t i n America Faces the Twmty-First Centttry, ap cit. 20. ""E Xundo Qef Trabajo," draft platfbrrn of the PRD Program, manuscript, August 1992. 22. Crislina Liiurell, "Par la Befensa y expansidn de 10s derechos sociales," op cit. 22. Jaime Tarnayo, intewiew with authax; Guadalajara, August 20,19E.

Renovative Pmspectiw

133

A pract;ifstlexample of such efforts c m be seen in the skuggtes af t-he Zapotec CO s of Tehumtepec h Qaxaca to recover &eh traditional, coBecitvely-hekr land and ta retain the prhcipje of recipracity that has long infamed social relations. M m 4 L6pez Mateos, who has been acti\ae in the cultural projects of the Worker-Peasant-Strrdent CoaEtion of the Is us (CQGEX), explahed: The defense of our culture s i g ~ f i e the s d e f e of ~ a way of organizing social relations- This defense is based on the recovery and joint exploima1 resources, art fair interchange of the products of labor, and on cont-rol of the negotiating instruments ta m k e the decisions that affect us.23

Far the renomtors, the key is how to buifd upon such traditions and institu~ons,thruugh demwra~c,politic& stmale. h the process, the movement hopes &at tfie vitlues of solidariv, reciprociw, equaliv and democracy becoxne so thoroughly embedded in the institutims of stale, economy and satiety as to constitute a qualitgively differmt system.24 Even Castaiieda, who rejects the possibifity of revolution and of a socialist future, adnnits h a t what m y begk as "hadgepadge" refoms c m ktm into "'a EulX-fledged paradip."E

23. Manuel Ltjpez Mateas, " W e n Radio Become the Voice of the People," in Howard Campbel1, et al. (eds,), Zvalec Sfrtlggles. Histories, Bolifics, and RqresenfaCiol4sfrom fitchitda"n,0axactz (WashinGon, D.C.: Smithsonian Institu~on Fres, 2983), p-253. In the same volume, Sergio Zermeiio (""COCEE: Narodnik of Southern Mexico?", pp,194) questions the poten~atof COCEI ""C link culbral heritage with development.'" 24. Bjorn Herthe develops the notion of rslkterative, intermediate eonomic ins~tutians and practices as key to constructing a different m d e l of development in the Third World. He argues that, historicatfly, economic relations have involved a cambination of reciprociv, market exchangm, and redistribution, and that under capitalism, redprociv largely disappeared except within the household and some co i Hetke suggests that the proliiEc3ra~anof acvtivity within the sr;r-called informal ecanorny in the Third World may represent, in part, a resurrwgon of reciprociv as the basis of econoMlic activity in response to the failures of market exchange and redistribution. See Bjorn Hettne, Dmelopment n e o v y and the Three Wulds (Longman Devef opment Studis: Halsted Press, 1990). Indeed there are numerous examples frarn various sacia1 movements in Mexico, such as the CCKIEI in Oaxaca and Asamblea de Barrios in Mexim Civ, of grassroots efforts to construct such alternative, intermediate instit-tations and practices organized around reciproci~. 25. Jorge Castaiieda, Utopia Unamed; op cit., p. 428.

134

Socialism II

M i l e today's renovative Mexican left emphasizes national traditians as key to any new left p a r a d i p , several Mexican htellecbals expressczd belief that any evmhilal qualitative change representing a cleady noncapitafjst alternative will also h v d v e world-scale transfomations, ediatc refoms begh at the n a t i o d level. "'The great trmsition has to be intemaGonaLffaccording activist Nuria FemBndez; has described how world "it can't be comtxy by corntry."% %m capitalism emerged not full-blown, bu Uy, appearing first in the 3 it cmsolidated as a wmld-sysh t e r s ~ c e sof the old feudal tem.v kmhndez imaghes S shilar: "The intemationalka~on of tke relations of production is also a slow, gradual ernergace of a new mode of production,"28 As an example, she cites the way in which the incavoration of women into the w a e d work f-orce world-wide has contributed to changing modes of sexuality.29 Sergio de la Pefia offers a shilar vision: In developing an alternative project, we have to think very langterm. But I am certain that for environmental, material, social, and other reasons, capitalism cannot continue operating as it dims now, creating this level of polarizaGon. It is simply not pmsibie. I imgline that the way we can reformulate a truly world project, which at the same time has its nafrional a d d i ~ o n and s form, will be through some kind of a world part of all humanivt in which, for starters, the spaces and f o r m of competition would have to be limited. And perhaps, as capitalism adjusts to these limitations, it m y even give rise to the elements of some new, futzrre fam af socialism, a d n i m a l form of smiaXism,30

So Mexico" renovative left continues ta iinspire and sustah itself with long-tern visions of a new, smialist-oriented world-system, while engaging the wearying daily struggles to preserve what little remahs of a never very generous, Third World welfare state, which is increasingly whittled away by neoliberal restmcturing. Meanwhile, Cuban renovatars try to figure out how to find a niche for their natian in today'S brutal capitalist world-sptern without subjecting their society to a process of desacialization and renewed dass differentiation. Cuba's renovative inteffecbals find themselves in a particularly difficult situation. While supportkg some aspects of the reghe" economic liberalization (e.g., more flrsxibitity in the use of market mechanisms, 26. Nuria Ferndndez, interview with a u t h r , Mexico City, August 5,1993, 27. Samir Amin, Eurocentrism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989). 28. Nuria FernBndez, interview with author, op. cit. 29. bid. 30. S r g i o de la Pesa, interview with author, Mexico City, August 16,1992,

g of the farmers markets, decenbahat-ian of managemat, reop private initiative), they are g of the spaces for s csitical of: the social consequences of a state?-cmkoltedliberalization that is not accompMed by fuller demwrakalim. Vet, as a fairly small min ~ r l wof Cuban revolutionaries, renovators must make their voices heard the autkoritaridsm of stillpoEt.ica1 orthodoxy, U eir o&hodox comtevarts, r Cubm revslubonaxies are pleased with lfie reghefsinereased flexib%v toward the market, because, as Mexican ren they regard the state-market mthamy as arWeial, Various co reflect this view: '"The p f a m d ecmonnylfsee marlcet dicfiotamy is false and debates about the "free mapket' nnairht; are absurd.""" ""No socialist system can pretend to all it can do is try to set its ~ a n t ~ u r ~NMar ,"~ lpredate capitabm; the mrket is not antisocial,inits essence. SochII.smhas to use markets, but. plaming is the necessary element."33 "The market is perhaps the greatest discovery of h u m ~ vWe . need some codhation g and marktrt.""B On the nmd to combhe market mehanisms wi& p and state intewentim, then, &ere is broad agreement among re e c a n o ~ Eberals c in Cuba. m a t separates the sheep from the goats, so to speak, is the nahxre of the "state intervention" "half of this combination. Here Cuban renovatars and economic Liberals; part ways. Renovators are cancemd with democratizing the social and poll~caldbensions of the state" sole in the economy, which leads them into controversial refom ideas involving nonstate foms of praperty and genuine workers' c o n t d . "Thera is no fom of property that is hcompatible with pia argues political economist Esteban Morales. "Ihe problem isn't the form of praperty but the correlation of various foms of property. The tiawg capacity of the state doesn? todict wi* pri-vate property or ed entevrises.'"B In fact, however, it is precisely the possibili'ry that the state-party regime witl lose its cantrol over the prmess of economic

31. Juan h t o n i o Blanco, interiew with author, Havana, February 3,1993. 32. Aurelio Alonso, intewiew with author, Havana, February 23,1993. 33, Miguel Limia, interview with author, Havana, February 19, 19%. M. Esteban Morales, interview with author, Havana, March 10,1993. 35. Esteban Morales, intewiew with author, Havana, February 15, 1993. h a t h e r renovative take on the issue of ownership in Cuba was offered by philosopher Miguet Limia, which also implicitgy addresws concerns about dernmrat.ic conh.01: "Our socialist relations af property are not very socialist in the strict sense. Socialist property has to bring the producers claser to the means of produ&ion and (kteir administrat-ion." hterview with author, Havana, February 19,1993.

136

Socialism 11

restructuring that makes those now in charge of the refo some of t-he renovatars2ideas. The issues of genuine worker participation, autonomy, and control are central to the reanovatorshnswer to Cuba's exkeme sta~sm.Urban r SerlifioB a r o ~ suggests: We need more autonamow, worker-conkoiled addnistration. Workers collectives are the Birec~onto go. The inef5ciency of state-rw enterprises is basically that the worker is a campfetely anonymous cog, as in iluliarx" concept of alienat?ion. The worker has no s e w of the result of his work in the huge, state produdion facilities.36

Jam Antonio Blmco shares this assessment: "mat's the prsblem with a state-isized economy? The absence of collective creativity and will. But that doesn't mean the state sector should completely di~appear."3~ The choices are not between planning and market, between all state or all private property, Blanco insists. The question is, "How can the state indirectly plan the economy?" He cont-inues: What should the sbte administer directly and who should adnrinister what the state doesn"? The sbte is better than the private swtor in administering education, health, transportation. But when the state administers everything, it lieads to inefficiency and corrup~on.That" a valid observation for Mexico and for Cuba.38

Barmi" sand Blmco's observations may seem fairly hocuous, but among the Cuban leadershk who are directing the current economic liberalization, to question the dominant role of state property is still considered heresy. Blanco's suggestion that Cuba should consider ""franchises, like McDonalds, but with the state as the owner of the company and workers collectives as the owners of the franchise,"" is controversial because such refoms are pexceived as a threat to the power af state managers and p1 h r e l i o Aimso also recowzes that Cuba's statist society needs a process of liberalization, and that "the liberal space within Marxism has to be discovered."a "Real or historical socialism, by k m h g the state

36. %rgto Baroni, interview with author, Havana, February 26,1993, 37. JuanAntoni~Bfanca, interview with author, Havana, March 3,19513. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Aurelio Alonso, interview with author, Havana, Fdxuary 23, 1993. Alonse, continued with his thought, "There are important sources of 'liberalism

into owner and administrator, hypertrophied the reach of [gov ters m d ofier stak hstibtions, and rtrplaced the mtrep the h c t i ~ n a r y . " However, ~~ Alonso wams that "liberalization must not lead to desocialimfion,"a The dangers of deswialization may also be a concern among mare orthodox socialist tfrinkers, but it is the renovators in Cuba who propose full democratization as the only real antidote to the f d m t of necessaxy econodc liberalization. h one of the most tfiorou ri~caf,p&Ec analyses of Cuba" curlist, social scientist Harsldo DiEa is rent crisis from a still-loyal quite explicit about the potential dangers of desocialization and elite control b p k d h the current Zjiberal economic, refoms. He wams that &creasing pwerty and marginalizatim affect Cuban society" most vulnerable sectors, specifically women and yomg people just entering &e job market. He notes that Cuban women are employed disproportionately injobs, such as derical and bureaucratic posts, which are the first to be elhinated "under the logic ctf rationalizing employment." Dilla cites statisks showing that women represented 53 psrtent of: the unemployed in Cuba in 1985 and 60 percent in 1990- "It is precisely witktin this cmtext that it is iegihate to believe that the Cuban women's movement needs a bigger dose of a~tonorny.~'43 Yet Dllfla notes that mder the current economic refoms, instead of increased autanomy and democratic participation for women or workers in genefal, the state" economic managers (and increasingly fureip investors) wield e v a greater power. Liberal eeanmic refoms are necessary, Dilla agrees, but they are not sufficientf and are even counterproductive, "if they are not accompanied by pctlicigs desiped to strengthen the qaces of popdar participation and contml."M To incmase participation, DiIla is not prepared to settle for the labor-management srhclmes of other than Adam Smith. There is Rouswau and Montesquieue, both of whom have to b e included in the liberal traditions rediscovered by Marxism." 41. Aurelio Ajonsa, "La econornia Cubana: El relo de m ajuste sin desocializad6n,'%nnanuscript, 1993, p, 17. 42. Aurelio Afonso, intewiew, op d t . (emphasis ~ n e ) , 43. Haroldo Dilla Alfonsct., ""Cuba: La Crisis y la rearticulac;ibn del comenso politico (Notas para un debate socialista)," manuscript, 1993, pp. 27-28. An English transla~t-ianof this paper is Harolho Dilta Alfamo, "Cuba 8ehrrti.en Utopia and the World Market: Notes for a Sacialist Debate," "tin Ame~can krspectivm, 21~4,pp, 46-59 (FaXX 1994). CriMlinologist klargaxita Viera (interview with author, Havana, March 23, 7994) expressed a related conmrn about the desociallizing effects of the current ec~namic adjusments, noting that memployment could lead to a deactivization of work centers and thus to people losing a key point of reference and soci,al/politicaf integra-eion. 4, HaroXdo Dlla Alfonso, %id., p. 2.

the Japanese and W@s"temEurope creased attention in Cuba (espe Wthaut an extensive process of democratization and increased participation of workers in decision-mahg, Dilla worries that Cuba could reach a point where, Every morning Cuban. workers would sing the company's h y m with sincere enthusiasm, but without in a n y a y leading to the construc~on of a participatory democracy in wbch everyone involved-and not just the technocratic, entrqreneuriaf elitesenjsy effective participation in m k i n g the most relevant d~isions,ds Juan VaXdes Paz states the position clearly: "Ecmodc Eberalization and radical demmratization is the only combhation that can save the socialist revolution in Cuba."& Referring to the process of broad public debate preceding the 1991 Party Congress, Valdks Paz observed, "'The great majority of the proposals from the people called for both ~ o n o m i cliberalizatim and demoera~zation,That shows the great wisdom of the masses. Greater participation by society in all systems."47 M 2 e most debate about the crisis of Cuban sociahfism focuses on these issues of state-market relations, forms of property, demwratic participatim in the work place and in policy-mahg, renovators are also concerned by what they c a l the revolution" 'kthical crisis," a crisis not directfy resolvable through techical e c m m i c solutions or politital democratization. Juan Antoanio Blanc0 dexribes it as a codict between m " e ~ of c beinghand an "eefiic of kta~hg."~gSjnniXarly, Julio Carranza, whs is generally wite liberal on economic issues, talks about fhe need for tzllturaX change whereby "=&-realization does not happen through It i s a crisis with a particular national nmifestatim in consurnctri~m."~~ Cuba, but Blanco understands it in global terns, and his words recalf Mexican renovator Sergia de la Pe?larsmessage, cited earlier, about the need for a new world pact of humanity. According to Blanco:

45, Ibid., pp. 25-26. 46. Juan Vald&s Paz, interview with author, Havana, February 25,7993. For more of Valdes Pazfs thinking on these issues, see his "The Socialist Transition in Cuba: Continuity and Change in the 1990s," Social Jirstice, 22:3, pp. 92-110 (Fall:

1995),and "'La izquierda hoy en AmCrica Latina," manuscript, n.d. 47. Juan Valdks Paz, interview with author, Havana, February 25,1993. 48. Juan Antonio BIanro quoted in Medea Benjamin, "Cuba: Talking About Revolution" "mscript, 19931, p. 76, 49, fulio Carranza, oral presenta.E.ionto a small, Left forum in San Francisco, October 4,1992.

Two distinct concepts, civilization and mlbre, have k e n confused, collapwd into one anather. Civilkagon is the p r m s s of. human h h g s relating t-a nature via t o l o a , Culture is the p r w ~ of s humans relating to other humans within the c'ontext of a parlricular dvilization. The promise under socialism was to achieve civilization without the hhumaniv of capitalist cult.ure, Today both socialist and capitalist cultures are in crisis. Gulhres based on exploitation and dodnatian have reached their limit, bcfcause we have ackeved the ability to destroy the planet. We must move to a new afterna~vecd-e that is not based on selfishess and greed.%

For Cuba" renovative left, them, preservhg &c: ethics of social justice and sofiditrity once asswiated with socialkm and with the Cubm revoiu~m is ars hportant as figurbg out the precise balance of state plamhg and market, social property and private enterp , sohdarity and hdividual kberty. renovated socialist: prqect is gaining renewed attention ican left as well. In a s ~ t i e t ypememod& paid to a traffic polieman to circles by powerful drug lords, many have welcomed as fresh air the strong ethical content of the Zapatistas' discourse, with its emphasis on traditional indigenous values. GEkm Manuel Antonio Garretcin has captured the renovative left's growing appreciation of the importance of ethics, over and above any particular inorieatthg a socialist fubre: e c o n o ~ model, c The kmdamental of socialism is not a model a l smiev-with pred e t e r ~ n e deconomic, poli~cat,and cult-uraf foms-but rather the ethical and institutional crystalisation in each society of the principles of equality, Iiberv, fraternity or solidarity, which articulate the rejationship beWeen sonomy, politics, and culture a d allow each wciety to tramend its mmt Ragrant conkadictions.~~

With suek fomufations, the renavat.ive left is attempkg to reinforce the important e&ical guideposts of a noncapitalist alte tive without faUing into the historical traps of def economic institu~onsand models, The current con~mcture,inwhich global capitalism i s expanding and socialist and nationalist gains are being rolled back, is erodhg another cornerstone of the left's old worldview: "the idea of needing to progrr?ss SQ. Juan h t o n i o Blanco, oral presentation at the Universiv of California, Berkeley, April 28,1%3. 51. ManueI h t o n i o Garretbn M., "%cialismo real y smialismo posib1elr' manuscript, May 1990, p. 7.

linearly from one stage through to the next" as Hamecker puts it.52 Indeed, the idea of nearly inevitable progress to an imagined, superior socialist society informed much of the left's historic practice. Sociologist Walker Coldfrmk elaboraks the poht:

h Mamist theory, sscialsm is supposed to reprsent a higher stage of human development than capitalism, and of courw as applied to individuaf societim, most Marxists thought that the USSR, or China, or Cuba had made some leap into the future, so that they were not merely morally superior but also "more advanced" ("more scientific and raitictnal") than the decadent capitalist societies. HisEio~yand its presumed teleatog21 was a critical component of Marxists' self-csddence.53 'hfact, the setbacks experienced by the world's XeEts in the 1980s did seriously s h a h ttteis seff-codidence, as stlggested In fie quotes from Elvira Concheira and Margarita Vkra cited in the previous chapter. Moreaver, "far the an cilt-izen," as Haroldo Daa noted, "&ere ree supposed superiority and irreversibiliq of m a h few doubt~ [European] socialism were no more than a rnytfidogical constmctim,"~ Some of the people interviewed for this book occasionally expressed fieir smse that socialism or even social weXfare states are unquestionably more advanced forms of s ~ c i g t yin calls to ""pesenre the advances of the revolution," or ""stop the dhmantling of the welfare state," or "halt the privatization of the national patrimony." Ortf70dox socialist ktelleftuals tended to express traditional assumptions about the indisputable superiority af socialism rnose frequently than did thek liberal or renovative comterparts (e.g., "Socialism . . . can only be the highest expression and m ensmous exp ion of democracy in rdation to limited bourgeois demwracy.ss). However, there were fewer references to Marxism's teleology of progress than one might have expected, given the b r n of worid events. Golldfrank suggests that this m y be because "Latin Americans have always been more bmoraf' Mamists (defend the weak, fight injustice) &an "cientific"(advance historically into the fuhrre) ones."s6 Given the hportance of moral and ethical questions in the politicaf discourse of the 52. Marta Warnecker, "Democracy and Revolutionary Movement," in f onas and Mdaughan, Latin America Facef f he Twenty-First Centtrvy, op, cr't.. p. 75. 53. WaEter Goldhank, correspondence with author, December 7,195)$. 54, Haroldo Dilta, ""Cuba: La Crisis y la Rearticulacidn deE Consenso Pofftico," op,cit. 55. Marts Harnecker, "Democracy and Revolutionary Movement," op. cit,,

pp. SS-&. 56. Wafter CoIdfrank, correspondence with author, December 7, 2994.

left in Cuba and Mexico, I am inclined to agree with this observation as a partial explanation. Nonetheless, I suspect there is another, perhaps more important factor expl g why the recent reverses of socialist and na~onalist acMevements not provoke more reflecgms by the htellectuafs intexviewed about Masxist, and, more broadly, Enli#tenment, nogons of progress. As citizens of noncore socie~es,Cuban and Mexicm leftists tend to be mare acutely aware .than the European and U.S, lees of the =tent to which access to the benefits of '"progress" is &&mined by hi&ly mequal relations of global power. Cuba" sand Mexico" rise to the semiperiphery were more the result of arduous political and social stru indeed, national revolutions, &an of any nabral evolution of p r o p s s &mu& techdogical advances m d ongoing rationalization. Any social gains wan were always at risk of being lost again, to internal "class memies," to U.5, "rhnperialism," or to "'greedy" transnational corporations. Thus, just as the shcturaj, realities of life outside tfie care encourapd a skepticism among &ese left htellectwals aboul the possibilities or mctrits of "'rat-ional, bberal refoms,'"hey also moderated the extent of the Lath American lefts' faith in the Marxist kleology of pmgress. Liberalism and Marxism were both ideological products of care societies and both werc? only partially ernbraced by the Latin American lefts. n e s e lefts, consequently, are part.icubrly well positioned to produce renovative, noncapitalist econodc allernatives freed of old liberal m8 socialist orthodoxies, Among Cuban and Mexican leflists, many kcy aspects of socialist discourse have been seriously discredited, particularly those that tended to equate socialism wifi the rigid, authoritarian statism of the Soviet Union. The orthodox voices that still c h g to such discourse are few and marglnal in Mexico and are seeing their position eroded in Cuba, as the g economic crisis encourages further economic liberalization. Economic liberalism has clearly gaked influence among left inkllectuak in both eount~es,as seen in their acceptance of the need to incorporate cancepts of market competition and efd.iciency into their alternative economic programs, and in their recopition of the limitations of the state as economic pmtaganist. Liberal economic t h h h g tftnds to be on the rise among the left in still extremely statist Cuba and cautiously engaged by the left in now extensively 1;iberalizedMexito. Yet in both c o m t ~ e s ,liberalism's influence among the left is less thzm one might hagine based on Castafieda" account, or less than one mi@t expect if a more simplistic class analysis were used to predict and explain the ideological perspectives of these intellectztals. The histohc project af litseral refomism has collapsed along with co

242

Socialism II

does not represent d viable alternative for semiperipheral Latin American socie~esin fie bmtal, globabed capitaksm cif tf-te late mentie& ceng, the core ethical values of the old socialist project justice, and equality) have gained (not lost) relevance as the neolibaal restructuring of Latin America aver the past ttvo decades has swollen the ranks of the poor and &&er pdarized one crf the most sociafl.y unr;quaf regions of the world. Renovative left ideas have begm to transcend the bitatiom of libed and sociahst m~odoxiesmd to shallenge ncrotiberafism" ccunent ideological reip, a process &at can only benefit from the most recent series of debacles in Mexico, the showcase of neoliberitl refom. Moreover, despite predictions to the cantrary, nationalism remains a powerful discourse in both natians, where the left still (and perhaps increashgly) insists on the important national character of its social and pohtical project. Part of the explanation for these observatioras is Iomd in an editorial w1.itten in a Mexicm journal in early 1990, as the state socialist damhaes continued to fall, as the full sctcial hpact of La* America" "lost decassessed, and as the George Bush administration tary intenrentions abroad: The ideological crisis of soccrialism has not generated a new alternative i d - l o ~ nor fias it been able t.o sbengthen the old Americandemwratic-fiberalisnn. At the same time that the "socialist dictatorships," and supposedly sstliafist ideals, cslfapsed, the mast tradi~onal and archaic af imperialism presented ibelf in Panama, El Salvador and-mder the pretext of a wax against drug kaffickers-threatto intervene in Venezuela and Co1ambia.F

Zn attempting to renovate a left project, the irrtertvv ticc ethics md nationalist aspirations is particularly notable in Cuba and Mexico, homelimds of the region's most thorough and endurhg nationalist revolutions, prched on the edge of the century's most powerful na~on.The a d of the fold War may have altered bur did not end the historic tension between the regional hegemony of the United States and Lath AmericaYsa s p i m ~ m sfor Eull ecmomic and poG~calsovereipty, the topic addressed in the following chapters.

57. "Enee la "crisis de las ibtlalagias" No, 33, January-February1990, p. 36.

la hipocresia," El Elotidiano (Mexico),

CHAPTER 7. NAT ONAL SOVERE

Nation-State in the Post-CO obalized World-System In Wentie&-century Latin America, fufl national sovereipty came to be h a g h e d as w a l b g upon thc two legs of gditical independence and a u t o n s m s e c m o d c development. For the left, &ese goals are inextricably linked to the consmction of democracy and egalitasian econ m i c alternatives, the &ernes of thc previous four chapters. Full democracy, based on the representation and participation of the popular majority, is fie only guarantee that the nation& inrc~restsof the broadest social sectors will not be hocked by powedul eXites who perceive their inkrests to be closely tied to the formes of intmational capitaL Autonomous, self-s onal economic d e v e l o p m t is passible opulatim is able to participate fully in only if the great m the productiofl and of the nation" economic t v e a l ~ . Alt h a ~ g hthe left's ccur on the question of national sovereiwty cannot be completely separated from its reassessment of the political and economic alternatives available ta each natim's citizmsy, this and the fouowlrrg chapter focus more directly m the relationship of the nationstate to the modem world-system, understood as a capitalist worldeconomy organized politically as a group of internelated states dominated by the core powers. The Mexican and Cuban revolu.tions were cer2.ainly responses to internal inequities (vast social inequalities and undemocratic poliical sysy were also about national aspirations frustrated by the prescmce of the United Staks. Genuhe national sovereignty in the shadow of such a colossal power seemed possible only if Mexico and Cuba were able to achieve self-sustaining economic development. For Latin America's two most enduring revolutions, then, success and legitimacy became completely intermined nation's ability to assert its political and economic autonomy e worldsystem. efforts in this regard came during the LBzaro Mexico's t in Che late 1930s..Cdrdenas brilliantly used public CArdenas gov hostility toward the crudely exploitative and monopolistic practices of

I44

National Sover&gnt_yI

U.S. companies to help consolidak nationalist support for his domestic He simultaneously relied on mass mobilizations to strengthen his bid for increased independence from a United States temporarily preoccupied with recovery from the Great Depression and mounting conflict in Europe. A vision of national economic development through state-directed, import-substitution industrialization became the principal goal as well as the justification for nationalist unity and corporatist control of the masses. h carrying out this defining stage of thc? Mexican revolution, Cdrdenas was able to count on the support of the Mexican left." Cgrdenas's strategy was hpressively successhl relative to most t the Mexican left o&er Latin American nations. h s u b s e ~ e n years, complained that the revolution had been either betrayed or unfhisked, pointing to the persistence of social inequalities, the increasingly authoritarian political system, and Mexico's dependency on U.S. capital goods and advanced technology.2 Nevertheless, for more than thirty years, Mexico diversified its economy, developed a powerful industrial sectsr, and sustained high rates of economic growth. It accomptished this whae mahta g political stabikty and steering a cautious course between independence and collaboration with the U.S. in the international arena, By the 1960s Mexico had svccessfrxXly fought its way into the semiperiyzhery, the cherished middle cbss of the world's hierarchy of natian-states, certainly one measurement of success for the asserZion of Third World national sovereipty in the mid-twentieth century.3 That, of course, was before the unprecedented crises and restrurhrring since the mid-1980s.4

1, On the role of CBrdenas and cardenkmo, see Adolfo Gilly, El Cardenismo: Una utopia mexicana (Mexico: Cat y Arena, 1994); Arnofdo Chrdova, La ldeologk de la Revohrci6n Mexicam: ta Fomacidn del N t t m Rk'gimen (Mexico: Ediciones E M , 1073) and La Polfiica de Masas del Cardenismo (Mexico: Ediciones EM, 2974); Judith Adler Hellman, 2blexico in Crisis (New York: Halmes & Meier, 1988); and Nasa Hamilton, 77ze Limits c?f Sfate Autonomy: Post-Revolzr tionavy Mexico (PrJnceton: Princeton University; 1"982).Qn the left's relatianship to Cbrdenas, see Barry Carr, n/larx&m and Commzrnism in Twentieth-Centtlry Mexico (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1992). 2. There are many fine examples of such c r i ~ q u s including , W o classic2sr (Mexico: El Caballito, 1972) and fos4 AdallFo Giffy, La Ravallrcr'r-in f~zternr~nprifa Luis CeceAa, Mfixico en !is Orbila Imperial (Mexico: El Caballito, f 9790). 3. See chapter l far a brief description of the semiperiphery. 4, C)n the crisis and restructuring see, Edward J. McCaughan, "Mexico's Long Crisis: Toward New Regimes of Accumulation and Bominatian," Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 20, No. 3,1993.

?"'he Nation-State in the World-System

145

The Cuban revolution%effort to break a long cycle of fmsl+ated naeonal hberation took a different f o m in. a different world context; the substance of the goal, however, was arguably quite similar to that of MexicoP5Cbrdenas's strategy for Mexico's rise to the semiperiphery is an example of what Wdlerstein has called "seizing the chance."6 Cdrdenas mdertook his radical refams at a moment when the Ufited States was not yet hegemo~c,the world-economy m s in crisis, and the momting codict in Europe do at& the international agenda. Fidel Castro, however, initiated the Cuban revolution's first refoms at the height of U.S. global power, world economic expansion, and the Cold War. United States" hostility to ahe Cuban revolution encouraged its early radicalization and a rocky first decade of experbental efforts to jumpstart its o m industrialzation program h isolation from Cuba's historic, regional markets.7 Fearing that continued economic and poEtical hstability would jeopardize the revolution, Cuba's leadership then turned toward an alliance wi& the Soviet Union, a ""socialist" variation of what Wallerstein calls development "by invitation."s The Soviet Union would become the hostess setting a place far Cuba at the table of the semiperighery. Though the decision to join the Eastern bloc's CMEA (Comcil for Mutual Economie Assistance, f o m r l y COMECON) in the early 1970s was controversial even amang Cuban revolutimaries, it came to be accepted by many as Cuba's best hope for defending the revolution agaknst U.5. aggression and for articulating with new international markets, given what Cuba perceived as its expulsion from the capitalist world market by the United States. Despite the fact that ecorsomic reliance on the Soviet bloc forced Cuba to compX@teXyreorganize its productive apparatug many Cubans I interviewed regarded the generally favorable trade and aid relations with the Soviet bloc as an example of more equiS. For an excellent discussion of the history of Cuba's frustrated attempts at full national sovereignty, see Marfieli P4res Stable, "The Czlba~RevoEution, Origins, Course, and L e p q (New York and Oxford: Oxford Universiy Press, 19931, especially chapters 1 and [I?; on the radical nationalism of the Revolution, see chapter 4. 6. Xmmanueli Wallerstein, The Cayitafzst MlorEd-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19801, pp. 76-82. 7. On the early period of the Cuban Revolution, see Marfeli Perez Stable, The Czfban Revalutzon, op. cit., especially chapters 3, 4, and 5; Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Csrba (New York: Monthly Review, 1968); Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, Socialism in Grrh (New York: Monthly Review, 1969); and James OConnor, The Brigins of Socialism in Csrba (Ithaca: Cornell University, 197"0). 8. Xrnrnanuel WaHerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy,op cit.

table No*-South rela~onsthan t h e experienced by most noncore nations. As one Cuban, who was always critical of the Soviet model, put it: ""With the Ssvkt URion we achieved what was supposed to be the new international e c m o d c order far the Thhd World. That is, we achieved the agreement to index the prices of their products with the prices of our products."g In that sense, many Cubans saw integration with CMEA as havhg hproved Cuba's position in the world. Indeed, through the 1970s and early 1980s' Cuba prospered in many g higher levels of e c a n o ~ growth c Bar\ m s t of Latin America and achieving living standards far above &ose of comparable nations in the region.10 Although sugar remained Cuba's m a h export, much of the hamesting was done mechanically and the processing plants were modernized. The nation's dairy production was transfomed with genetic engineering techniques and modern, hybrid feed grains that increased output. Cuba developed a hgMy educated and skilled work force and an advanced scientific and kcholo&ical capaciq, Fncluding inrtpressive, if small, biotechoiogy, medical equipment, and phamaeeutical industries. Cuba also estabEshed a strong presenct: in world affairs, pursuing an active m d contraversial role in Latin American and AIricm politirs, includhg a decisive militar)r campaip supporting revolutionary forces in Southern Afaica. Thus, by many stmdads, although it has not generally been thought of in these terns, Cuba, like Mexico, had found its way into the semiperiphery, if less securely. Moremr, Cuba had done so in a far more egalitarian if n s less authoritarian mamer. FinaXly, Cuba demonstrated its independence f r m the U ~ t e d States, even if the price was occasional subordination to a more generous, but equally anogant, new Big Brother. That, of course, was bfffore the crises of the 1980s and the collapse of the Scvc.ict Union. Susan Echteh has argued persuasively that many of the hprovernents associated with the first decades of the Cuban revolution, "'proved by the 1990s to be contingent on a set of historical conditions that by then no longer existed.'ql 9. Juan Antonio fflanco, ""Cuba: Crisis, Ethics, and Viabili9,'"in Smame Jonas and Edward J. McCaughan (eds.), Latin America Faces the Twenty-First Century. Reconsfrziclinga Socrlal jtrsfice Agenda (Boulder: Weshiew Press, 14941, p. 186, 10. On the performance of the Cuban economy, see Andrew Zimbalist and CIaes ffrundenius, 7"he C~rban Economy: Meastlremenl and Analysis of Sclcialist P"erf;7vmnca(Baltimore: f o h s Hopkins University, 19891, 11. Swan Evil Eckstein, Back From the Future: Castro Under Cuba (Princeton, Eckstein presents an N.J.: Princeton Universily Press, 19941, p, 205, indispensable, cumprehensive ovenriew of the changes in Cuba since the revalulian and gives particular attention to the recent years of crisis. Also on the

The Nation-State in the World-System

147

Three sigruficmt developments in the international order climaxed 'S fhal ddecade began, higmghting the extent to w ~ & as the the world had changed since the Mexican and Cuban revolutions first began their attempts to secure long-elusive national sovereignty. Politically, the international correlation of forces was altered by the demise of the Soviet bloc. The United States, as a world power, was freed from the constraints previously posed by the countemeight of a Soviet superpower. The developing world was freed from even the illusion of an alternative to the capitaEst wotld-system (at least in the here and now). Economically, the ongoing internationalization of capital surged fonvard to new levels, as core-based capital continued the =organization begun in response to the profit-c of the 1970s. The m r d Wwld debt crisis forced many developing nations to accept economic and even political restrructuring under the neobberal guidelines of internalional fhancial instihtisns. Ideologically, neaiberatism attackd the tcraditimal cmcept of naGonal sovereipty. Marco hscbn, an h p o & m t leader of Mexico CityRsurban pogular movements, explained that while the neocardenisfa sector of Mexico" ddemwxatic opposition continued to insist that political sovereignty was hpossible wi&out ecmmic sovereignty; the Carlos Salhas adrniniska~msaw swereipty as a ""bekward concept that stood irc the way of globalization," According to Rascbn: The very essmce of nmliberalism was to redefine the concept of sovere opponent of eipty. . . . For the neoliberals, sovereignty had, b ~ o r n an modernity and was therefore fiercely combatted: sovereigny was the equivalent of the Wall of Cfina. . . . The sovereignty of [Latin American] na~on-stateslost sken@h in the face of: fecansrnic] integration, as the U.S. advanced across the southern hemisphere expanding its interests, given the weakening of the concept of s m e ~ g n t y ,Cuba, for example, was harshly pmished far stubbornly clinging to this concept and fox refusing to cede its sovereignty in =change for e c o n o ~ cdependc;mce,lz

How serious are the chaknges pmed by these changes to the Latin Amrican lefts"traditima1 notions of national sovereipty? Does the crisis of recent years, see Sandor Malebsky and John M. Kirk (eds.), Transformlion and Stnlggle: Cuba Faces the 1390s (New York: Praeger, 1990) and Sandor Halebsky and f o h M. Kirk (eds.), C~gba In Tr~nsilbn:Crisis and Transf;ormation(Boulder:Westview, 1992). 12, Marco Rasccin, "Lit soberiznia y Chiapas,'" [lovnada, February 21, 1995, In his article, Rasc6n gws on to point out the inconsistenq of Mexican President Ernesto &dilla7s justifying the government" military assault an the Zaipaesta rebels in Chiapas in the name of defending the nation" sovereignty,

now quite advanced intemationaliza~onof capital alter the conditions for pursuing autonomous economic: development? Has time Jorge Castaileda asks, "for many, if not all, of the developing countries . . . to csnstmct nations like o&ers: with their own national language, adminisk.ation, market, and currency, and with a truly autoch~onoaslocal l i n g elite"? In any event, according to Castaiieda, "Nation-building in Latin American proceeded ss slowly, is so mfMshed and ill-defined, that it will, probably not t a b place the way the left-md nearly everyone else-has supposed.'' In my intenriews with left inkllechxajfs in Cuba and Mexico, questions about the viabiliy of natim-building and defendkg natianal sovereipty did not provoke respanws tt\at correspond sa neatly to arkhodox, liberal, and renovative tendencies, as fomd on the issues of democracy and socialism. W i l e there wert different hterpretations m o n g aese intellectuals regarding tfte post-Cold War political order, there was also considerable consensus about the continued meaningfufness and viability of national sovereipe, even if on somewhat modgiedl terns* In light of the dramat?icchanges of recenr; years, argues Sergio de fa Peiia, "the ideas sf indlcpendence and nai~onalsovereipty ~ e r i t e dfrom the nhetrrenth centPXry have lost their content, It is necessary to redefhe &em under the new c~curn~trnces."~~ Assessing the Post-Cold War Political Order

As d g h t be expected, the change in the international correlatim of forces represented by ihe disappearance of the Soviet Union was felt much more shongly in Cuba than h Mexico, where the Soviets never had a strong presence. A Soviet-trained Cuban philosopher put it most strongty: "Cuba is &soh&@ more vulnerable today. There is a tendency in the world to reproduce a sitbxatian similar ta that tvhich preceded World War II. Tfiexe is a dangerous new dividhg up of the world into splneres of influence, whicrh is why Third WorH uniq is so critical."U A renowned Cuban histoxian with little sympathy fox the Earrner Soviet system expressed shilar concerns that Cuba is far more vulnerable in a post-Soviet world: "Cuba needs a more flexible p o k y today toward the United States, because our very survival as a nation and its a state is at 13. large Castageeta, Utopia Unarmed. Tke h f i n American Lefl Afier the Cold War (Mew York: Afked A. Knopf, 19"33),p. 287. 14. %rgio de la Pefia, "Tareas pendientes del socialism," Mgrndo (Mexico), February 1W1, p. 21. 15, Miguel Limia, intemiew w ~ t hauthor, Havana, February 14,1933.

The Nation-Stale in the World-System

149

ong those I inkerviewed, fewer Mexicans considered the al order to be clearly unfavorable to progressive forces in Mexim and ekwhere. The most negative assessment in Mexico was made by a sholar of social movements, who argued that the new international situa~on leaves far less mmeuverab%ty far my "democratic p ~ p u l a rgave t," vvhich at most can only hope to act with sufficient agilit)r so as to avoid " p m v o b g the ernpire."l? M 2 e such echws from m earEer era of the left's ddiifcourse on U.S. hperialism were rare in thc3se interviews, the U.S. invasion of Panama, U.S. inkwenlion in Nicarapa, the war agaltnst Xraq, and the United Satesf successful usc of the United Nations to k g i h i z e its actians were frequently raised as evidence of a dangerous new unipolarity in the world. Julio Casrmza, a Cuban social scienlist, told me: The correlation of forces has greatly worsened against the interests of progressive and revolutionary forcm in Latin America. The socialist camp was a source of support, politically and sometimes materially, in the period of the struggle for power and as an economic alternative (even with all its problem). The United States now has great space and Rexibiliv, which is reflected in changes at the United Nations. Poor and small countries like Cuba depend on an international rule of law to protect their interests. Xf the UN is not able to maintain a state of law, the situation for poor, small countries will be worse than ever.18

Ralando Cnrdera, a Mexican e e o n o ~ s tlong associated wi* t.he revolutionary nationalist tendency of the Mexican left, is also concerned a b u t the bplications of an unrestraisred United States. But he belie-ves that the collapse of the Soviet Union just confims s a m e t h g Mexicans had already concluded: G mnfrfrontation with the United States dwsn't have any prospects. Now, without a bipolar game, it" clear there" no one to referee. But I think Mexico was already learning this, before the loss of bipolarity. From its awn experience, in the very difficulv of the idea of a confrontation, which has never resulted in anything concrete but rather in a very aggressive rhetoric which is always counterproductive for Mexico. The loss of bipolarily forces Mexico to readjut its scheme of international relations.19

16. Jorge Ibarra, interview with author, Havana, February 21,1993. 27. Jaime Tarnayo, intemiew with author#Guadalajara, Augwt 20,1992.

18. fulio Carranza, intenriew with author, Havana, February 18,2993. 19. Rolando Cordera, intewiew with author, Mexico City, Sptember 2, 1992,

Particularly far Cubans, the grospct of a d i t a r y codrantation with the United States remains a real concern and is seen by some as hampering internal reforms. One fiercely loyal but heretical Cuban C suggestced h t the &eat of hvasion by US. Marines prevents tro from eho&ing the masses to force more radical refoms an a rctluctant bureaucracy.20 hot.her Cuban social scirtnlist explahed that the cautious approach taken toward reforms at the Fourth Party Congress in October 1991, wKch contraskd with the more open t-one of the Call to the Congress issued in Mar& 1990, resulted from the unexpeckdfy rapid deterioration of the htematimal situation following Lhe Persian Gulf War and Zrhe coflapse of the Soviet Union.2" Very few Cubans mentioned the political d e d s e of P r b e Mhister M h i l Carbachev as a factor negativdy influenchg l-he intema~onal context, ei&er because they wefe critical of his efforts ar hesitant ts broach what remains a sensiLive issue in Cuba. Several Mexican respondents, on the other hand, identified Gorbachev's loss of power as a pivotal event hfluencltng the character of the post-Cold War order. Mexican author Carlos Monsivajs, far examplc lamented h t the faU of: Gorbachev srnd the rise of Bsris kltsin had left President George Bush absolutely mchaIIenged.2 Marco bscbn, the urbm leader who has served as a kderat deputy for the PRD, Lik@wise regretted the internatianal iznpfications of Corbachev's failure: "Had Gorbachev succeeded, he would have created a very different country, rcrpresczntlng a clear alternative to neoliberalism in the worXd, but he didn%."zS Such gloomy assessments of the international situation, however, harcily reffect a consensus, Many respondents in both countries ufkred more b a k e d , masionafly even optMstic, assiessmenits of the benefits and fiabilities of a post-Cold War ortler. J o e e Casta3eda, for example, notes the advantegeous disappearmce of the c mist "boogiem" of: the East-West conflict. Moreover, he asserb that the leverage in Nor*-Sou& relations is actually g r o w , because glabal interdependence means that the effects of m r d World poverty are global.% 20. Cuban intellectual: who requested. anonymi.ty, interview with author, Havana, Februav 9,1993. 21. Juan Vald4s Paz, interview with author, Havana, Februar)l-25,1993. 22.CarXos Monsivais, intcrwiew with author, Mexico City, August 25,1991. 23- Marco Rascrin, intewiew with author, Mexico City, August 14, 1902. Also, recalf the program notes by Mexican p l a y r i t e Hkctor Ortega, quoted at the conclusion of chapter 2, which expressed a similar assessment regarding the conwquences of Gorbachev" fall tram power, 24. Jorge Castafieda, Utopia U n a r m d , ap cit., p. 443. Castaiieda ciks the 1992 Ria Earth Summit as an example of the new possibifitia, though one that did not jell (ibid., p. 4 4 ) . He warns that fit& can be accamplisfned along these

The rJlation-State in the WayId-Syslm

151

h another example, Alejandro Alvarez, a Mexican economist and er from the non-CO ist sociafist Xeft, maktahed that the disappearance of the Soviet Union presented no real change for Mexko, other than sacialism's loss of prestige; in fact, he maintained that there is greater multipolarity h the world today and that wMe s m e countewejghts to US.power have b e n lost, new ones have emerged, The multiipoiarity of economic power has increased. Japan and Germany are very important econonrtic powers, even if the U.S. econorny continues to be a decisive power in the world-economy. Mar am X convinced that there is that much dlitary unipolarity. The proof is that Saddarn Hussein is still in power. What" the mysterious factor that explains why the U,S, forces didn't end up removing Saddam completely? The fact that there i s a ctamterpower saying to the U.S-, this is as far as you can go. This is part af the Russian military strategy; despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the military continues to be a point of cohesion for the independent states. And; miltaw mipolarity i s not possible today without economic hegemony. The U.S. had to ask for money e v e v h e r e for the Gulf War, something imposslilble to imagine aher Word War El. In term of Latin America, any US. intemention here would be very costly far the U.S. And today the repercussions of such intewention would be very dirwt within U.S. domestic pditics. The point is that new counterweights are emergkg. The depening integration of the region is so great that,,now more than wer, the U.S. must be careful about its f o r m of intexvention, or it could mXeash uncontrolable processes. So, some countemeights are last but others appear.="

Cristina Laurell, who comes from the same political tendency as Alvarez and is now a leading figure in the PRD, agrees that the disappearance of the Soviet URion dws not greatly change the geof7oliCics in which the Mexican left must operate. But, she is less confident about new forces emerghg to counter hsstiliv from the United States and international capital in the event Cuauht4moc Czirdenas should ever become president of Mexico: If the U.S. could not tolerate Nicaragua or Et Salvarlsr, it is unlikely to tolerate a Cdrdenas government. The closest example we have in Latin America ta what a Cdrdems government f i g h t fmk like i s the

Iines unless there is significant ideological change in the United States (ibid., p. 446). 25. Alejandro Alvarez, intewiew with author, Mexiw City, August 28,1492.

Salvador Allende government [in Chile]. h d look how the L1.S. responded to AAllende!*6

y, Pablo Gonzdlez Casanova cites the whole combination of world s, including the collapse of the socialist camp, the setbacks suffered by various national liberation and non-aligned movements, and the expansion of neoliberal policies, as having reduced the options for "'alternative go~emments.'~z~ Respondents from the former Mexican Communist Party, for whom the Soviet Union more sipificant point of reference than it ever was for the nonist left, grant more importance to the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but also see certain advantages. A long-time Mexican to much of the old Communist mihtant who rernahs firmly agenda can see no ~ e t corn v to U.S. power in today's world; on the other hand, he argued, there is a great advantage for the left in what he sees as a dis e of superpower, bloc politics and the socalled ktemational c tfireat. "Class strzlggte is no longer segn as an kvention of Moscow."28 Enrique Semo, a well-known theorist once ist" "tendency of the defmct Mexican and cons in the new htemational conjrmcture. Afttlr tickkg off a list of "great defeats for the worfd fet in the 1980s'" (the defeat of the civilizational project of the Soviet bloc, the defeat of the post-World War IX befief in revolution in the West, the d World unity, and the disappearance of most of the st parties), Sema mustered a cautiously opthistic observation: "If this was all that had happened, we'd have to say capitalism had won the battle. But look at what's happening to capitalism; it's also in bad shape." The global crisis has affect& everything, stated Serno, and the left's defeats are simply part of "the death of the postvvar world, which will mew eventually a defeat for the United States and far ~apitaliisnn."~~ While I did not interview a single Cuban who felt substantidy less vuherable h the post-Cold War order, many Cuban respondents also saw some ameliorating factors in the new eonjunc.trrre: 'We have thirty years of building distinct social relations and a disthct way of life. These 26. Cristiina Lauceil, intenriew with author, Mexico City, August 6,1992. 217. Sect P. Gonzdlez Casanova, "M4xico: Hacia una democracia sin apcisnes?" in inforge Alansa, et al. (eds,), El Nxrevo Estada Mexicano. IV. Estado y Sociedad (Mexico: Nueva Imagen, 19921, pp. 273-74. 28. Eduardo Mantes, intemiew with author, Mexico City; August 31,1992. 29. Enrique %mo, comments at a public forum in Mexico City, Sptember 4, 1992.

values will allow Cuba to comter the new vufnerability"'30; "Cuba is still tady, even after the collapse of the USSR, and Cuba is to provide an excuse for intervention like Saddam Hussein uba can no langer coustt on the USSR to provide s m e measure of balmce, "but we also have to take into accamt the U.S. domestic situaition. The eat of U.S. intervention cm be geater or lesser depending on the internal contradictions in the U.S. An intenrention in Cuba would not be another Iraq; it would cost the lives of many Americans, of 'our boysCW32 le the collapse of the Soviet bloc means economic disaster, "this S situation actvally reinforces our political hdependente."% Cuban vice president md respected htefiectual Garlos Rafael Rodriguez told a gathering of Latin American scholars that for all of the Third World, regardless er a cowtry ever had ties with the Soviet Union, the poli~co bipolariv of the post-Wdd War IX era "was a guarantee of not t alone, abandoned to the deckions of contempmry bperiafism." Qn the o&er hand, eit-ing Paul Kmedy"s work m the declhe of world empires, Rodriguez also noted that the United States was now a weakened power, forced to seek finmcial and political support for the Persian Gulf War.% Several Cubans also mentioned increased sofidrtrity from Lath America in the post-Cold War conjmcture as a factor that makes Cuba somewhat less vufnerable to U.S. aggression. A retked social scientist igrated to Cuba at the time of the revolrution elaborated: 30. Stzrgio Barsni, intewiew with author, Havana, February 26,1993. 31, Estervino Montesislo %gul, interview with author, Havana, March 6, 1993. 32. Beatris Diaz, interview with author, Havana, March 5,1993, 33. R a ~ r Abrellr, o intewiew with author, Havana, March 8,1993. 34. CarXos Rafael Radriguez, presentation to the Latin American Socblogy Congress, Havana, May 28-31, 1991. Three other thoughtful papers on these issues presented at the same conference by Cuban scholars were: Pedrs Manreal, "Estados Unidos y AmCtrica Latina y el Caribe: GeoecanoKtia, Connicto y Coexistencia," ".S., n.d.; Juan Vafdbs Paz, ""filstas %bre c?l Nuevo Sistem Xnternacionaf, ef Tercer Mmdo y Amkrica Lat-ina," m.s., May 1981; and Luis SuArez Salazar, "Cuba: Aislarniento Xntemacional o Reinserclibn en m M w d o Cambiado," rn.s., January 1991. For two more official Cuban government perspstives an the new international order, see David Deutschmann, "Cuba, %cialism, and the 'New World Order': h Ifntenriew with Cuban Vie-President Cartcts Raiael Rodriguez," Focus on Ctlba Series, No. 2 (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1992);and Mary Murray, "Cuba and the United States: h lntewiew with Cuban Foreip Minister Rcardo Afarctjn," Foczts on Czrbia Series, No. 1 (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1992).

154

National Sovereignty X Cubap$alliance with the USSR weakened Cuba in t e r m of our natural alliances with the world's peoples and with hlin America. The USSR provided us with a ,but in reality it also put us in the d d d l e of a supevower conflict witlrout any guarantee that we'd be supported or protected rnilitarily in the event of an aggression, For many progressive~,Cuba came to be seen as a Soviet satellite, which undermined moral support for us. But international solidarity with Cuba has increased since the collapse of the USSR. Respect for Fidel among Latin b e r i c a n heads of state has increased. Cuba" early image as David against Gliath was a v e y important source of suppod; this was lost in our alliance with the USSR. We have to regain that and we can if we dm%t a k e serious errors and if the Cuban revolution doesn" distance itself from the people. In that sense#we aren" much more vulnerable than before.35

Ehoirzg the b d of opthism expressed by Mexico" Emique %mo, an apmism that stems from decades of left mifitancy through the best and the worst of tbes, togetSler with a strong dose of Marxist teleolou, Cuban philosopher Femanda M a r t h a H d i a answered my questions about the new htemational order as foflows: Today there is a period of profomd demoralization, Emperialism is working with all its strength, with a totalitarian production sf public opinion. But in Latin America, there's nno objective reason to believe that there wilt be wen a medium-term, peacefd r e i p of bourgeois rule. c of New civilian governments are continuing the same e c o n o ~ policies the dictatorships. There is no longer even a possibility of reformism, and without reformism it is not possible to reproduce hegemony, It's only possible to leave social demands outside of politics for a very short period of time. So there are Wo contradictory tendencies: more imperialist power and more potential for social movements.%

Thus, there is considerable diversity in the assessment of these Iekist intellrirtuals about the nature of the post-Cold War poll~cal,order. There may be broad general agreement that the U ~ t e dSates remains the major (and problematic) regional power, but there is a wide range af ophions about the geopolitical sieiicance of the Soviet blwrs collapse and about the balance of positive and negative elernents in the new gtobal politiral landscape.

35. Respondent who wished to remain anonymow, interview with author, Havana, Februay 18,1993, 34. Fernando Martinez Iiertzdia, intemiew with author, Havana, March 1, 1993.

Tke Mation-State in the World-System

1255

Facing the RmliZy of a Single Gapitdist Wozld-Econamy there is little consensus among the intellectuals interviewed nature of post Cold War political order, there seems to be genabo eral agreement, even among the Cubms, about one characteristic of ;the new economic order: m e r e is, indeed, as Wallerstein has long insjsted, only one world-economy, and i a b t one at that. As C u b a Minister of Culbre Amando b r t put it, 'We thought them was a socialist world, when infact &ere was anly a sphere of Muence.""g For Cubans, this rciabaGon came through the expetience of first being "expelled" from the world market by U.S. hostility, as several Cuban respondents characterked il;m d then w a t c h g what they thought was their alternative, the Soviet economic bloc, suddenly collapse." 80r Mexicms, tke h p a c t of globaEzation became increasingly evident throughout the 1980s as the debt crisis and political ing ceded ever peat.er power over the economy to e the cohpse of CMEA left Cubm socialism isolated and adrift in a sea of world capitatism, the fonnatim of the North Amerkm Free Trade Agreement (NAmA) hitched Mexico's Xukxre economic development ever more closely to the designs of U.S.-based capital.39 Julio Carrmza, reflecting the increasingly influential b r a 1 perspective among Cuban intellectuals described in p ~ v i a u chapters, s stated the situation most plainly: Rela~onswith the world market are necessary, espedaly for a country like Cuba with its scarciv of resources and rrsp~iallynow without the k v i e t Union and Eastern Europe. There is now only one world economy, and &ere has been a gcmeralizatiion of the rules al supply and demand. Cuba has tci deal with this rea1it;y.M

37. Armando Hart, intenriew with author, Havam, March 11,199338* For a mndid Cuban assmsmmt of how the %vis?t collIapse affected Cuba, see Juan h t o n i a Blanco, ""Cuba: Crisis, Ethics, and Viabilit-y," in S. Jonas and E. McCaughan, &fin America Faces the Twe~ty-FirstCmfzry: Recmstnlcting a Socz'aE JtisticeAgenrla, op..tit. 39. There are several good sources an NAmA; a fine place to start is Ricardo Grinspm and MaxweX1 A. Cameron (eds.), The Political Econonsy of North Amencan Free Trade (NW York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 40. Julio Carrama, intexlriew with au"ehor, Havana, February 18, 1993. For more of Julio Carrama's views, see his ""Cuba: 10s retos de 1st econoda," m.s. (Havana, 1992). h o t h e r liberal Cuban perspective on the need for Cuba to reinsert: i t s l f into the world market is fowd in Pedro Monreaf, "Cuba y la nueva econornia mudial: eE reto de fa insescibn en Am4~caL a ~ n ay el C a ~ k , " Cudernos de hltresfraAnzkrtca (Cuba), No, 16, Jan.-June 1991.

Na tiomt Sovereigntry I

1.56

Even mare or&odox Cuban conclusions, as suggested by thi member Dario Machada:

rs have been forced t

Cuba was practically expelled from the capitalist market by the ZJ.S.-such an example of intolerance of pluralism! Cuba then copied an economic model that turned out to bs inadrrqwte for the specific needs of our counby. We did this after a decade of attempts to elaborate and implement our own version of naGonal development. Cuba was once able to choose to relate to the socialist system; now it has no choice but to relate to the capitalist world.41

Two h e o ~ s t of s the famer Mexican C mist Party see globalization as having contributed to the failure of both state socialist and national developmentalist projects to create viable, autonomous national economies, m a h g full integration with the capitalist world market inevitable. In the view of America Saldiivar, Both crises are related to globalization and the tkird stage of the techological revolution. OnIy ten years later were we able to see that the new techological developments, such as biotechnolotgy and tramportation, would lead to the failure of the Stalinist moclel, bwause the authoritarian state hacln2 allowed for such technological developmat. In Latin America, from the 1970s to the 1980s, we went from underdevelopment to stagnation; we moved backwards, in t e r m of haeased povert,y and almost a l macrowonomic indicators. Elobafization, internationaliization of capital, and the tecbolagical revoIuGon at1 impasd the crisis and imposed neoliberalism. Conditions are not ripe for another alternative.42

Sergia de fa Peiia offered a similar analysis: To a large extent X think the fundamental reasons for the collapse of Eastern smialism are fomd in the transformationis of capitalism, which, since the Z9&, meant that socialism could not c o n ~ n u eto compete, compensating intzpltitude for competition in t e r m of living standards, with sacrifices at the level of consumption. But I don? think this is because socialism itself is so backwards, but because the qualitative leap made by capitalism is so great; it corresponds to an kstorical epoch. X think it's important to include in any new formulations of alternative projects in Latin America that not only has the scheme of ssciaf41, Dario Machado, intertriews with author, Havana, February 17 and 26, 1993. 42. Amkrico Saldlvar Valdhs, intemiew with author, Mexico City; Augwk 4, 1993. Also see SaIdivivar's El Bcctso dei socialismo (Mexico: SigIo XXI, t9E10).

T k Nation-Sta te in the World-Spfenz ism changed but also the scheme of capitalist nationalism, which have been the two great refuges and which had a similar historiciv. [In this] new world context, there clearly can't be capitalism in one cowtry, which is the comterpart of the historical possibility of constructing socialism in one comtfy or one region. Counhries like Mexico and Brazil can't develop in isolation from the world market. It's impossible. That" the great advantage of N A m A for Mexico."

Among Mexican XeWsts, one of the central debates about globalhatian and NAFTA has to do with whe&er such ptncesses are inevitable and irreversible. Conclusions one way ar the other have sieficant policy hplications. It seems somewhat ironic that Rolando Cordera, an d u e n t i a l intellechal who was associated with Mexico's revolutionary is~now one of the mast adanationagst tendency in the 1370s and 1 9 8 0 ~ mant proponents of globaljzation's inevitability: There is a reaction among the left to internationalization that has hoes of the crudest nationalism. Really, the left's discourses about internationalization sometimes somd like the nationalists from the 1940s. Internationalization isn't an option, it's a work3 phenomenon, a given reality. You can't denounce a done deed. You have to take a position on it, on how to deal with it. But the leM hasn't done that, and there is a price to be paid politically,*

Even among s o m yomg Cuban intellectuds, who were trained within a political culture that emphasized the invincibility of the revaiutimary nation's political will, there is a growing tendentry toward resignation to the nation that "processes of the world econolnic system can overcame "national' interest^."^ A slmilar pasitian is hgld by Ambrico SaXdivar, who observed that "in the debates about NAFTA within the PRD, there are those, like Alejandro Alivarez, who t h the?~ NAmA process is reversible. It's not. We simply have to strategize a means of survival and defense withjin it."" Saldivar was referring to economist 43, Sergio de la Pefia, interview with author, Mexico City, August 16, 1992. Also see de la Pefia" ''Los cambios del socialismo en M4xico,'"n Zrtrda (Mexico), Vol. 11, Aiio 5, No. 9 (1991). 44. Rolando Cordera, interview with author, Mexico City, %ptember 2, 1'392.

45. Pedro Manreal, ""United States and the New World Economic Order," manuscript, n.d., p. 5. 46. Am6rico Saldivar, interview with author, Mexico City, August 4, 1993. Regarding the PRUs debates on NPIFTA, Cuauht6moc Cdrdenas aMempted to steer a course betrvveen acceptance and absolute rejection, arguing "no to NAFTA" but yes to an alternative agreement, See Cuauht&mocCdrdenas, "The

158

National Soverezgnty I

Alejmdm Alvarez, a prominent fiwre in the now defmct Pmto Critico and an advisor to the PRD. Alvamz insists that globafization is nrri&er absolute nar imeversible: Globalization is presented in, neoliberal discourse as a world without borders, but in realily, while in wme cases conven~onal borders have been overcome, in other senses there are still many obstacles to the free movement of goods, peoplet and capital. %gether with globalization, there has been an intense process of regionalization, of for&ng trading blocs since the 1980s. This regionalization is not the same as gfobaliza~on,bclrcause the regionat blocs kagment the world e intense, Globalization economy, became compekitiion has b ~ o m mare is cantr-adictov with regionafization, which is an =ample of why glebalization shouldn" be mderstood as universal and irreversible. Nation-states have not completely lost their abilitry to conbol markets, to be able to infliuence na~onalmarkets. The state" tcapaciq for economic regulation remains more or less, relativdy in tact.47

This difference of opinion illustrates the extent to which the crisis af has been felt most strmgIy by those political forces e most extremely statist mod& in the past, the C m munists, as represented by Saldivar, and the revolutionary nationalists, as represented by Cordera. As the colXapse of state socialism and the ed their long-held fai& in advance of globalizaltion seriously mde the state to direct economic processes, some left ktellechals have accepted much of the logic of neoliberal discourse. As we have seen, Coristration, and Saldivar has leebred dera supported trhe Salinas ad Eastem Europeans on the benefits of Mexico's neoliberal reforms." 81varez, on the other hand, whose political and ideological orighs are in the 1968 stcldenl movement and the "'new left," which was innuenced by strands of critical Marxism and the new scxial movements af recent decades, was never as ideologicalZy committed to the statist paradiw. This helps explain why he feels less challenged by neoliberal assertions and more cadident in the nation-state"s "relative" capacity to mediate the Continental Dwdopment and Trade initiative," in 5;. Jonas and E. McCaughan (eds.), Latin Arnerzca Faclrs the 21sf Centtty, op, dt. Also s e PRD ~onomric: adviser A m r o Wue&a's " ~ P s rqu4 el Tratado de Libre Comercio," in Memo& (Mexico), XV:33 (May-jme 1991). 47. Ale~androAlvarez, "Integracidn econ6dca y globalizatih,'" oral presentation given to the Seminario Permanente de Eshdios Chicanos y Be Fronteras, Institute Nacional die htropalogfa e Histaria, SEP, Mexico City, Augmt 5,1993. 48. Amkrico Saldivar, "Realidad y limites del neofiberalisrno mexicano," lGlenzoria (Mexico City), No. 57, August 1993.

process of globalization. Moreover, Alvarez i s one of the notable left inteUectuals who have avoided academic or bureaucratic isolation by . . g very closely tied to the popular movements of the past quar,and who have emphasized the protagadstir role of popular social sectors rather than the importance of political divisions within the Mexicm state. As seen in previous chapters, close association with the popular stmggles and social movements of recent decades, more than formal political or ideological affiliation, is a notable c factor ammg the atimist tendency. left hteLtectuals in Mexico who today represent oots politics cantributes to a fait-h in being able wisdom. of dominant ideology, in recent years, opular pohtical struggle. An example of this nts of h ~Alvarez l Garh, a cousin of: faith is iuustrated by the co Alejandro Alvarez, a prominent leader of the 1966 sstudent movement, and a founder of Pmto Critics, who has served as a ftrderal depuv for the PRD. Asked wihether significant renegotiation of Mexico's foreip debt, a central plank of the PRD program, is a realistic option in the postCold War, globalized world, he replied: Renegotiation of the debt is possible as a political action, involving a political reorientation, clarification, and modification of the term. Xf workers and others are slfong protagonists in this effort, I think we could easily make sipificant social advances in Mexico.49

The dispute, then, between the activist Alvarez cousins, on the one hand, and intellechals like Cordera and Saldivar, on the other, is not over the fact that globalization and h n r ~ e rintegration of the North American economies have advanced and alkred the context for Mexico" ffuhre. Their differences are over the extent to which political struggle can still impose conditions on the powerful forces of transnational capital and the Ufited States.%

49. Rat51 Alvarez Garin, interview with author, Mexico City, August 27, 1992. 50. Cua&tkmoc Cdrdenas expresses a persprtct-ive similar to that of Alejanbro Alvarez and RaGl Alvarez on the need to confront an mfavorable international conjunc"rre with political will and mobilization of popular f m e s (as his father did in the 1930s under quite different circumtances), but without the corporatism that characterized the mass movements of the past. Ciirdenas presents his views on these questions in an interesting interview by Ren4 Villanuwa, "Loos ochenta-los noventa: 10s citmbios se hardn par respaldo popular,'' in Z~irda(Puebla, Mexico), No, 9 (2991), pp. 47-54.

For nnany Cuban inteII~hals,n a ~ o n a lpolitics &a mediate their views on b e realities of globalization, though in this case it is the century-old politics 05 an^-hperialist nalionalism. M i l e there is wi$espread acceptance of the med to rehsert Cuba into the world-econamy, there is relatively little opemess to the idea of subordhated rehtegatim with a U.S.-dominated regional economy. This partly reflects the reality of ongoing W.5.-Cuba hastility, but it is also indicative of many Cubans" deep pride in havhg broken dependence on the UAted States. &her than seeing a future integatirnn af Cuba into a hior& American trading bloc, mmy Cuban revafutionaries are more concerned about what t h q perceive as U.S. designs to ""recolonize" Cuba, par~cularlygiven the political and economic clout of the anti-Castro Cubans in Miami. Julio Biaz Vhsquen, a refom-minded Cuban economist with liberal k s Cuba's econofic reintegration into the wartrf market beheen Cuba is greatly compticated by potitks, the historical diffe~nces m d the United States. There are long-time contradictions bettveen Cuba" existence as a nation and its rela~onshipwith the United States. This is further aggravated today by the existence of: the Cuban American co which now has relationships with the U.S. establishment, This has led to a new project of reco;fonization.51

A rare exceptim to the Cuban position that age-old poIitical conflicts stand finnly in the way of futzlre economic ties with the United States of a o n e - b e member of the prerevolutionary Cam), who is n w a sppathizer of the "Democratic Swialist'koppositim group: The logic cif the current geopolitical/ economic situation is that Cuba become the fourth piwe of NAFTA. Cuba Etas to be prepared to soeen its anti-imperialist stand somewhat in order to allow the Clinton administration to ease up. Cuba" eventual integration into a North American economic:bloc is almost inevifa'able.-"2

51, Julio A. Diaz Vhsquez, interview with author, Havana, March 12,1993. 52. Respondent who requested anonymiv, intewiew with author; Havana, February 11, 1993 (my emphasis), Such comments, suggesting any possible subordination to the U.S., are part of the fine and very sensitive lines that separate "dissidents" who are deemed hostile Is the revolu~on,despite their commitment to socialism, from "revoXulionaries," who often have even greater differences among themelves over other issues regarding Cuba" hfure direction. Nonetheless, given the rapid liberalization of views on other economic issues, as we saw in previous chapters, X imagine many Cuban officials

Positions on whe*er polictics can or should bg hpased upon what some consider to be inevitable econodc prmesses are markers d k b wishing renovators from liberals and orhodox leftists. As seein in the previous chapters, Bberals on the left are somewhat m o ~ einclined to actept as mchallengeable the supposd "'laws" of world capitalism, wh2e orthodox rs remain mare convinced of the need ta stmggle for sociaKsm he now, citing its superiority and ""inevitable" evenph over capitalism. Renovators insist on the hpo&mce of politicaf and e ~ c agaals, l but attempt to adjust &eir strategy and vision to the nevv giobal ~alities,ancl tend to view no&Fng as inevitable. Such differences can also be found on the question of national sovereipty, but to a far less sipificant degree. With few exceptions, most left intellectuals Fnterviewed still uphold the notion of national. sovereignty, deq i t e the advances of econodc globalization. The foltowhg chapter examhes their efforts to refornufate the concept in terms viable in today" sorld.53

would also quickly change their ideas about the possibility of joining NAFTA were relations with the United States normalized. 53. in assessing the situation af the world and the nation thirty years after the formation of Mexito" National Liberation Movement, long-time left scholar Alonso Aguitar Monteverde concluded that the struggle for national. liberation was mare imperative than ever, but under very different, and generally worse, conditions, requiring different form of struggle. 'This is a perspective shared by most of the intellectuals intenriewed. %e A. Aguilar Montwerdcl, ""l;llucha por nuclstra liberacibn, keinta a5os despuk," Eslrategia, No. 100 UuIy-August, 2991), pp. 3&41,

CHAPTER 8. NAT ONAL SOVEREIGNN

Toward a Re ative Autonomy of the Nation-State In an increasingly globalized, capitalist world-system, absent the wee p o w e h l state socialist bloc, do intellectuals ol the Mexican left and the Cuban revolution offer any afkmatives to the traditional pillars of national sovereignty: political independence and autonomous econofie development? mere i s emerging among these intellect?Mals a more p r a p a t i c but nonetheless firm defense of a ~elativenational autonomy mediated by a variety of forces. Alone and isolated alter more than h m t y years of economic integration h t o the socialist bloc, Cuban intellectuals now strongly reject autarky, or even de-1hhg a la Samir Amin, as a viable option: Autonomy is not autarky. Autonomy means a nation's abiliw tcl choose the most useful and appropriate relations, to not accept economic relations that would reestablish capitalist relations of exploitation within Cuba,l We can't think in the extreme t e r m of the past about absolute aubnamy.. Reality confirm this. For example, Cuba has to rely on foreign companies to look for oil. But this doetsn? mean that the country has to be subordinated to tramnational corporations, because the revolution would no longer be possibie in that case.2

Independent national development is possible, but not an autarkic economy, which is not possible in the Caribbean. What is possible for Cuba is to achieve a certain level of broad reproduction on the basis of our awn producti-ve forces and resourca.3 l. S r g i o Baroni (Xtalian-born, Cuban urban planner), interview with author, Havana, February 26,19932. fulio Carrama, subdirector af the Cent-ra de Estudios Sobre Am&xica (CEA), intewiew with author, Havana, February 18,1993. 3, Miguel Limia, Soviet-educated Cuban philosopher, interview with author, Havana, February 19,1993.

After several decades of ongoing, and recently accelerated, economic integration with the United States, Mexican respondents increasingly emphasize that national sovereignty and economic autonomy have to be the realities of globalizaion: Autonomous national development is much more complicated n w , and especiaXly with NAETA, the level of integration will be very advanced. National enterprises and markets are very bansnationalized. h y n a ~ o n a lproject will have to take internationalization into accomt.4 The dangers today are global: the environment, poverty, memploynnent, mobili~yof capital. These are prOblem throughout the world. But we can't deny that the concepts of nation, region, territoriality, group rights still exist. So we should be concerned tivittn how to harmonize t h e e two things, which the neoliberal model cannot do." The levels of inequality, dispariv that exist are too great to think that weke at the stage where we should consider dismantling naeions and thinking about ourselves simply as one planet, The differences behvmn nations have become greater; there is polarization rather than homogenization. There's enormous opulence, and yet there"s a Third World even within the United States. In Mexico, the level of social stratification is brutal, barbaric. But that dwsn7tmean we should pursue autarky; that clearly hasn't worked.&

As the e c o n a ~ ccrises and h e a t s to national sovereif3nty in both nations became increasingly apparent in the early 1990s' there was a renewed sense of urgency ta find viable strategies and abandon hollow rhetoric. Novelist Carlos Fuentes captured the sentiments shared by many Mexicms and Cubms: A beautiful comt+y, of mapificent people and wintempted culture, could slip behnreen our fingers. We must recover the fatherland. The epoch of illusions, grandiloquence, and arrogant pride is over. Now is the time for work, modaty, and collective alka-seltzer.7

4, Enrique de la Carza Toledo, Maoist-influenced sociologist, interview with author, Mexico City, August 10,1993. 5. XAgenia MarCinez, PRD leader and wonodst, intewiew with author, Mexico City, August 27,1992. mist, PRD leader, intenriew with author, 6. Pablo GISmez, former Co Mexico City, August 19,1992. 7. Carlss Fuentes, "La hora del alka-seltzer,'" La fornda, fanuay 29,1995.

The emerging consensus m o n g Cuban and Mexican hteflectuals of

the left seems to be that, in the words of Cuban sociologist Niurka P4rez, "relative autonomy has always been the only option."g But what does that mean? For Nuria Femhndez, a leading figure in the PRD, there is a &eoretical as well as practical question, wxch is to mderstand "the relative autonamy of a nation, not just of a state,"' particuhrly in today's globalized economy. "We need a ~ e o ofv the relative autonamy of a natian vis a vis the aternal sector, whereas trilditianauy the notion of relative autonomy has been d e h e d only in terms of the state's relation to particular classes."g Cuban social scientist Juan Valdiis liaz shares these concerns: Is relative autonomy possiblewhe world- ono my globalizes and segments at the same time, and the Third Warld has to defend itself against both tendencies. Integration can happen in an autonomous mamer or in a subordinated manner. But the left has no idea what autonomous integration might be; the left has never considered it a possibilit-y.lo

hdeed, there is no fully fomulated conception of what relative autonomous national development might be under new world condihions, but respondents in both countries offered a variety of ideas about how such relative autonomy might be mediated. I. The State. Despite evident erosion of the state's control aver internationalized ecoinornic processes, most of tbose interviewed still place great imrportance on the state as a countc3meight to tTmsnatisnd capital. The severity of the financial crises facing both cowtries has made reliance on foreign capital seem necessary. However, most Mexican and Cuban leftists still view foreign capital witfit great suspicion, more a necessary evil than the savior partrayed h neoliberal discourse. Cristha Laurell, editor of the PRU" jjoumal Goytrnturn, expressed concerns shared by many in the Mexican left when she told me: Muck more relevant to Mexico than the collapse of socialism is the fact that big capital, tramnaganal and national, has more power, more control in Mexico than ever. Since [President Miguel] de la Madrid, the state" partial control over certain strategic sectors of the economy has been completely eliminated through privatization, and big capital now completely controls the economy. How is that sector going to respond

8. Miurka P%rez,interview with author, Havana, March 1,1993. 9. Nuria Fernbndez, intercriew with author, Mexico City, August 5,1993. 20. Juan Valdhs Paz, intewiew with author, Havana, February 25,1"393.

Relative Au tatzomy

165

to a CuaAternoc Chrdenas govermentW~7ecan%assume that it will canthue to invest. WiEE it boycon? If so, weke screwed.11

t now in the natrjmal Xeadership of Pabla Gdrnez, a fomer C has to atkact fareiv capit4 but the PRD, acknowledges that insists that it must do sa carefully and with state conf-rols.12 h u t is state regulation of tfte monomy still possble? As noted earfier, AIgimdro Alvarez insists that, contrary to neoliberal ideology, "The state's capacity for economic: regulation mmahs more or less, relatively intact."" It is a questjan of havhg the polirical wi S to take on the powers of transnatimal capital and h e U.S g Cuban revolutionaries seem even more resiped than their Mexicm countevarts to the necessiv of attracting hreigrt capital, given the neartotal collapse of their economy following the breakup of the Soviet bloc.14 a, a social scientist raised md educated mder the revolutionary reghe, is frank ist this regard: "Cuba has had to seek fore i p capital, &cause we don't thae the necessary capital, markets, and technology. Fareip capitaf is p ~ d p a l j l yinterested in m a h g a profit, so Cuba has to offer a profit;able o p e r a ~ ~ n , However, "'~~ because the Cuban state retains firm control over most enterprises, Cubans expressed less concern than their Mexican counterparts about ceding strategic control to fart?ip capjtal. A refom-orimted urban plamer, Sergio Baroni, for example, argues that foreign capital" theat to Cubm autonomy is "moderated because Cuba retains conbol over the enterprises." As a result, "it is possible to preserve autonomy over the setting of priorities and strategic decision-mabg, while develophg external relations. "l6 Discussion of the possible role of the state as a mediator of national autonomy is given added complexity when the question of democracy is intraduced. For many leftists in Mexico, where an authoritarian state is seen as f a i h g to defend nation4 autonomy, the kthre role crf the state is dependent on the outcome of ongoing stmggfes for democratizalim. Indeed, for many Mexicans, national scrvereipty is, as Pablo GonzBlez 11. Author interview with Cristina LaureII, Miczxico City, August 6,1992. 12. Pablo 66mez, interview with author, Mexico Cityy,August 19,1992. 13. Alejandro Alvarez, presenta~ongiven to the Sminario Permanente die Estudios Chicanss y de Fronteras, f n s ~ h f oNational de htropologia e Histaria, SEP, Mexico City, August 5,2993. 14. On the inaeasing reliance on foreign capital and ather "marketlike reforms," see Susan Eva Ecktein, Back From the Fztlure: Ctiba Under Castvo (Princeton, P4.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), especially chapter 4. 15. Julio Carranza, intemiew with author, Havana, Frr-bruary18,1993. 16. S r g i o Baroni, intenriew with author, Havana, February 26,1993,

166

National Sovneilpnty IX

Casanova hsists, hconceivabk wi&out a full democrakation based on the participation of the popular classes.17 Typical of ihis view is the nt made by a Mexican leftist during a discussion about the left's kaditional sta~sm:" M a t force o&er &m the state c m codront the power of bansnational corporations and monopolies? But it must be a democratic state, not a state like the one we have now,"" For the Mexican left, which is a growing but 5611 vulnerable opposition force, democratization also implies increasing its influence over state policies and therefore sbeng g efforts to defend naGonal sovereignv. In Cuba, on the other hand, where the left has been in power for nearly forty years, the severity of the current crisis and recent experiences in the former socialist bloc make democratization and its potential destabilizing effects more problematic. As discussed in earlier chapters, broad national discussion about issues of democracy and decentfalization h Cuba began following the March 1990 Call to the Cuban CornPartyts Fourth Gongress,lg but the discussion was qaieMy sias the Soviet Union began to self-destruct. As one Cuban political analyst told me, the ""Call gave great hpulse to such discussions," but with the disintslgration of: the USSR, ""preservation of the state and of political power became the overriding questionffin Cuba.2o Nevertheless, as we also saw in earlier chapters, there are same linhenlial Cubans who hsist &at demcxratizatim of the Cubm state is a precondition for saving the nation. It has become a h o s t c onplace, includidtg among many left intelfecbals in the trnited States and Europe, to argue that the sipgicance of nation-states will disappear because they no longer play an important ecanomic role. For Latin American leftists, acutely aware of the historical role played by the state in pram ic development and of the cunent rule played by activist in selling off stfategic state enterprixs at bargah-baseme h n o ~ o n sare far less credible. Mexican scholar and left activist Csberto Liipez y Rvas says that it is the nation-states conbolled by sectors of the financial oligarchy, tied to transnational capital, that are at risk of det&o d the majoriv of their cithens to nt made by Pablo Comhlez Casanova in respmse to my lmture on "National Savereiply in Today" World," at the Centro de fnvestigaciones Interdiscipiinariasen Humnidahs, Mexico City, Februaay 2,1995. 18. Comment made from the audience at a conference on the Left and popular movemen&in Mexico Civ, Sptember 4,1992. 19. Far key documents and analysis of the Fourth Party Congress, secs Gail Reed, Island in the Storm (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1992). 20. Juan Vaidks Paz, interview with author, Havana, kbruary 25,1993.

nalizaitim. mese mhg sectors, he argues, have become antinational forces md &erefore risk being displaced by popular, demwratic, anticapictalist movemmts, wKch would kr*ex: national devrtlopment beyond the h i t s of what has been dance in states under the fiegemmy of the bourgeoisie or the bureaueratic classes of "real ssciahm." Elripez y Rj,w warns that those who predict the rapid dedse of the natim-state and of the state's economic ro2@ in the face of globakatim are seriously underesbating the pawerhl resurgence in Latin America of a nationalism of resistance, sumival a d defense of the nation.21 2. htin American Integratim, fn additjon to a strong state, a commonly-cited saurce of sustenmce for national autonomy is Latin American regional integration.= In Mexicm activist Nuria Femhdez's view: h y relationship with the US, has to be mediated first by t a ~ n American integration in order to strenghen the position of Mexico vis a vis the United States. h y project to spur autonormsus national development is about how to integrate regonally, not about whether to. If Mexico is still going ta be a nation in the year 2000, it has to find a new form of association among rela~velyautonomous natiom, along the lines of Gorbachev's proposal for a Confederation of Independent States.23

Several others in Mexico echoed her concerns, hcluding Pablo Ccirnez: We have to have a policy of pursuing a union with countries sirnitar to Mexico, which have a certain level of industrialization, which have to f i p r e out how to join the postindustrial world, and which can do it. A country of a half-millon people can't do it alone, but a com&y of 80-100 dlXion, like Brazil, can. I ask myself, what would be the rec bettveen Brazil and Mexico? sults of a full, open e c o n o ~ cotlaboration There could be an immense mmplementary relationship beween Brazil and R4exico.X

21. Gifberto L6pez y Rivas, "Naci6n y neoliberalismo," Memoria (Metxico), December 1993, pp. 57-58. 22. For an excellent ovepview of' the history of attempts at Latin h e r i c a n i n t e g a ~ o nand its cuxrenq in the regan today, see Ruy Mauro Marini, "The Paths of Latin American Integration," in S. Jonas and E. MKau@an, h t i n Amevrt Faces the Twenty-First Cmtuvy, op. eit,. For Cuauht6mac CArdenas6s views on the need for Latin American integration in the face of U.S.-led nmliberal restructurmg, see C. Cbrdenas, ""Por Ia unidad lalinoamericana," CwunCura (Mexico Cit-y), July 1992, pp. 3-7. 23. Nuria Femsndez, intemiew with author, Mexico City, August 5,1993. 24. Pablo Cbnnez, intewiew with author, Mexico City, August 19,1992.

168

National SovereigntyII"

the conditions for Latin American integration h i i l Alvarez Garb 960s and that the proposds thmrielves have have irnproved sinc ted, ''the Lath American market offers intermatured. Alvarez c esting possibilities today, for example, to trade in the debt, to exc devalued debt on the secandary market."= forge Castafieda s rized the argments in favor of Latin American econamic integration as follows: [It] represents an intermediate solution betmteen a largely unsustainable status quo and a highly harmhi progression toward the dissolution of sovereiljrxllies and economic and social options for developing na~ o n s . .. . Regional integratjion broadens markets, pravides economies of scale, ehaances regional autonomy, and concentrates trade and investment arnang equab, diverting it ham other, far more economicalfy powerhl parhers.26

Many Cubans also view Latin American e c m o d c ktegration as a potentially important alternative. Fidel Castro has even called it the only hope for an kdependent future"z7 However, severd of the Cuban intellechals hkrviewed for this book were skeptical about conditions Eor such integration any t h e soon. R a ~ r Abreri, o an officiaf in the Cumist Party- Central Co ittee" htemationaf, relations deparment, said, '"Realistically, we can't expect in the near future any o&er exchange relationship Iike we had with the USSR, The best hope is Latin Americm htegration, which is still a distant prospect,""% h o t h e r Cuban social scientist achodedgedi that "the tendency of the conwent is to talk about Latin American integration," but warned that "the practical steps are not yet in sync."Zg A prominent Cuban historian agrees that regional "concerfaci6nffwould be a positive development for the island, but feels steps in that direction depend m r e on the rest of Lath Amrica than on Cuba.= Other Cubans were more explicit about the obstacles to 25. Raljl Alvarez Garin, interview with author, Mexico City, August 27, 1992. 26. forge Castafieda, Utopia Unarnred. The Latin American kfi ABer the Cold Wwr (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2393), pp. 313-314. 27. Fidel Castro in Tarnas Barge, tln Grane de h/lal"z. Conversae2n con Fidel Castro (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econbfiea, 29921, p. 156. 28. Rarniro Abreli, intewietv with author, Havana, March 8,1993. 29. Jose!. Bell Lara, intemiew with author, Havana, March 1,2993. 30, Jorge Ibarra, interview with author, Havana, February 21,1993. There is na exact English equivalent of conculaciin, a term widely used in Latin American in r ~ i r nyears t to refer to coordination or harmonizagon of interests or policies. At the March 2994 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association

Lath American integration. Social-pyschologist Beatriz Diaz, for example, cited U.S. economic influence as the main problem, pointing to Latin America's failure to create a debtorsf cartel in the face of U.S pressure.31 fulio Carrmza identifies five factors limithg Cuba's ability to increase e t o n o ~ crelatisns with, the hedsphere: (I) CubaPstrade with Latin America d e c l k d sipificantly after the 1950s; (2) Cuba's ~ a n o m y , still mahly characterized by p r h a r y goods exports, is not generally complementary to the regional Latin American economy; (3) in host; areas where the Cuban economy is complementar;r5 e.g., biotecholagy; phamaceuticals, and medical equipment, it has to cmpete with tranate those markets; (4) Cuba has corporations that a l ~ a d yd sna~onal a debt with the most hportant Lat erican nations; m d (5) the U.S. trade embargo particularly aff;eclts Latin American businesses and ts, who are more vuheraHe to U.S. pressures than are tfneir European counterparts.32 Carranza also plares much of the H a m for the difficulties fachg regional ixltegration squarely sn the shsulders of Latin Americm elites: The Latin American ruling classes have demonstrated their inability to defend national interests, Look at their acceptance of neoIiberalism, their acceptance of U.5, hegemony, their attempts to operate in a world market suboretinat& to the United States, Integration schemes like MERCOSUR aren%efforts at autonomous development, but simply attempts to get better treament from the United States in a subordinated relationship. Argent-ina w d e r Menem is the dearest case, If the forces that govern Latin h e r i c a were to change, then prospects would be different. But Latin America i s very weak and dispersed and not theoretically or practically prepared.33

in Atlanta, Cuban scholar Juan Vald& Paz spoke about the process of conccrrtaci6n polz'tica taking place in Latin America, which has excluded the United States, forcing it deal increasingly with multilateral actors around a variety of issues. He also noted that, thus far, Cuba has been absent from such efforts. 31. Beatriz Diaz, interview with author, Havana, March 5,1993, 32, Julio Carranza, presentation at the Latin American Studies Association meeting in Atlanta, March 11,1994. 33- Julio Carranza, intemiew with author, Havana, February 28, 1993. Regarding his assessment af MERCOSUR, there is considerable debate among leftists in the Southern Cone about whether it represents subordination or a challenge to the U.S. Other Cubans are equally skeptiral about the prospects of progressive forces coming to power andlor substantially changing canditions in the region. Rarnira Abretl thinks the Latin American Left is in very serious crisis, with the possible exception of the Brazilian Workers Party (PT) and the

Afejandro Alvarez is dubious about the importance of Latin American economic integration for Mexico because, he argues, the preponderance of Mexico" relations are with Nor& America.% This fact does not lead him to accept NAmA, however, because he views that trade agreement as desimed to fur&er four geopolitical goals of U.S.-based transnatimal capital: (1)c o n h u e to weaken trade unionism and social opposition to econodc restructuring in the U ~ t e d States;(2) weaken the ons inCanada and open up areas of the Canadian economy that remain protected; (3) lock-in the IMF-imposed restructuring in Mexico; a n d (4) use NAmA for negotiating a better GATT agreement,% Xlaw NARA may affect prospects for Lath Americm integration concerns some Cubans as well. E c o n o ~ s tHecbr Herrera notes that Mexico and Canada are two of Cuba's mast h p o r t m t trading parhers. He particularly wonders how NAFTA may affect Cuba's exports to Mexico: will it make Cuban products less competitive? Will Mexico be more vulnerable tn U.S. pressures to enforce the trade embargo? On the other hand, reasons Herrera, should NAFTA contribute to a more d p a m i c Mexican economy, it could increase demand for Cuban products,% Still, despite such concerns, most leftists interviewed place great importance on Latin American economic integration, rather than further integration with the United States, as a key means of rehforcing relalive national autonomy. 3. Transnati~nalSocial AlEia~lces. In addition to Latin American integration, and instead of NAFTA, Alejmdro Afvarez says the Mexican left has to "pursue alliances with social sectors in the United States and Canada that oppose the current model because they are excluded kom it."F Mexican PRD, "which have serious problems but good electoral prospects as fronts" (intemiew with author, Havana, March 8, 1993). Juan Antonio Blanco fears that even a poli.tical party like the PT runs the risk of simply nnanagng the crisis far the bourgeoisie if they are elected to government (interview with author, Havana, February 9,1993). 34. Comments made by Alejandro Alvarez during a seminar discussion at the Xnstituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, SET", Mexico City, August 5, 1993. nts made by Alejiiandro Alvarez to the Chicano/Latino Research Center, linivemity of California, Santa Cruz, September 2% 1993, 35. Elector Herrera, presentation at the Latin American Studies Association meeting, Atlanta, March 11, 1994. lt is interesting ta note that Herrera is a researcher at CfEM (Center for Research on the World Economy), an instihte that has provided the Cuban government with its current reform-minded minister of the economy and a prominent member of the National Assembly. 3'17. Alcljandro Alvarez comments at Instituto Macionat de Antropolugia e Histofia, op cit,

Relative Autonomiy

172

In other words, Alvarez be~eves&at defense Bf Mexico's possibility for autonomous econadc development rests to a large extent on poE~cal struggle by non-state actors, defined not so much in tems of a particular class protagonist but in tems of a btoad attimce against a clear class antaga~st,U.S.-based transnational capital. 1s this s h p l y a throw-back to 1940s-wle nalianaEst popuilism, as critics m e Rolmdo Cordem maintain? In its broad, cross-class appeal, perhaps. The new element, however, is &@ hsistence by Alvarez and o&em that today's " m t e d hont" must be cross-border, b r h e g toge&er all swial sectors in the region that are being hu~% by neoliberal restrucf-uring. The globalization of econodc prmesses, they a r p e , m k e s such alLiantes more possble as well as more necessary. U.S, labor unions, for example, fouglht hard against the passage of NAmA, wKch was also opposed by dissident (i.e., anti-PM) Eabor orgdzatims in Mexico. h on of book, music, recent years, with greater crosri-border d m d film, Mexicm htellecluals have dem bcreasislg appreciation for a c a n o cultural expressions, once derided by Mexican elites as mongrel. The 1994 battle aeinst Califoda's antigrmt Proposition f 87 also forged broad cross-border allimces. Arpably, pursuing such aXllances is easier for the Mexican left; wkch has ready access to the W t e d States, than it is for Cubms, given U.S.-Cuban hostilities. On the other hand, public sympathy for the Cuban revolution still runs deep koul;hout Lath America, where wild@ enthusias~ccrowds greet Fikl Castro on his visits. Even in the United States, grassroots efforts to defy gove nt @icy a d send humanitarian aid to Cuba have been b p r e s recent years, and h g numbers of U.S. busix7esses eager to get a foo&old in co, U.S. groups like Pastors for Pea- (not the traditional, anti-imperialist, North American leftists) have played an increasingly visibSe role in challenging the U.S. embargo agahst Cuba and calling for peace in Chiapas, hportant fipres fxorn U.S. cultural to show more hterest in Cuba and Mexico, as well. Robert Redford reportedly Xabbied hard for a 1994 Academy Award nomination for the Cuban film Fresa y Chocolate (Strawberry and Chocolate). Celebrities as diverse as linpistlwriter Noam Chomsky, novcrlist Tani Morrison, m d actor Edward James O h o s have visited Mexico, expressing concerns on a range of issues from Chjapas to tfie new U.S. 38. See the emer story on Cuba in the Februay 20, 2995 issue of Erne, which notes, "It is a testament to the size of the prize thak despite the risks, an increasing number of Americans are sneaking into Havana with the hope of workiing out arrangement under the table."

2 72

National Soverer;Inty I1

credit package. The trmsnational social alliances ha@ed by Alvarez remain embryo~c,but it is not mreasonable to h a g h e their growth, in the future, as the urtequal effects of globalhation cut a vertrticai breach crossing national frontiers. 4. Scientific-Technical Capacity and Cutting-Edge Industries. In worldsystems analysis, one of the hportant elements distinguishing core from ation of leadkg indushial techperiphery has been the nologies. Likewise, a de semiperipheral nations has been their ability to incorporate the industrial technologies that helped defhe the core in earEer historical periods. Thus, for example, production of steel and autos, once restricted to nations hke the United States and Gemany, became key components of industrialization in nations like Mexico, Brazil, and Ssuth Korea. Given the techological breakfiroughs of the past decade, it comes as no surprise that respondents in Mexico and Cuba cite national seientgic-techical capabilities and high-tech hdustries as essential to s e c u k g relative econodc autonomy in today's world. Cuba's Jos6Bell Lara, for example, believes that one of his c o m q ' s advantages relative to the rest of Latin America is its higfily regarded scient-tficinstitutions and biotshology industry: Pau have to define the notion of autonomous national development in relation to particular reali~esand conjwctures. It won't be the same for each country.. Cuba today is not the Cuba of the 1960s. Today we have an industrial structure, with some technological problem because of the Soviet model but also with some real possibilities. We have excellent education, scientific-technical development, a very highly skilled work force. Cuba is very much incorporated into the bowledge revolution. We have cutting-edge indwtriai sectors, such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. The question is how to use these to achieve autonomous national development. Wekre walking on two Iegs, one developed and one underdeveloped."

Several oiher Cubans likewise stresxd the hportance of Cuba continuing to develop its own techolagical capabilities, while others additimally emphasized the need to develop food and energy seu-sufficiency, if the ktmd is to maktain any degree of autonomy. Some Mexican ledtFsts gave shilar attention to developing their country" ttechological capacity. Raiil Alvarcz Garin, an engheer, suggested France as a possible role model for Mexico in this regard.

39, Jos&Bell Lara, interview with author, Havana, March 'l, 1993.

X have the impression that the Fren& m d e l of strategic plaming has very great virwes. Uou dm't have the possibility of compebg succeshlly in all sc3ctors of produc~onsimultaneously; this is a world by monopolies which control t ~ h a l o g y .But you may have the option to develop some leading industries and compete even with the m e nopolies. France had to rmrganke education, develop nuclear energ, the air bus, and all the projects wWch have kept it pargally comp&itive. X think this model makes certain sense in Mexico, We'd clearly have ta prioritize areas where you could have an important presence, One area, of course is oil, where you can develop a whole range of products that aHiaw you a place in the world markt in areas net yet developed. Obviously thlis rquires investment, including investment to develop educational and technical capacities. But it can be done, it just requires maEng some decisions.40

Pablo C6mez made a s h i l a r poht: m a t is it we don't have? The sofware, which is the property of a small n u b e r of companies in, the world. The new revolu~onof world production depends on them. How do we join the new world without the sofmare? Well, first there is same s o h a r e that we can produce. We need to develop a group of the highest level scientists here in Mexico, which is a task of Wen& years. Produce them and root them in Mexico, tied to production unib able to compete worldwide, The state should promote this, not direct it, because it would direct it poorly. But there is no national capital ta invest in this. National capitalists laugh at the idea of developing their own s o k a r e , because they say all you have to do is buy it from the Americans, the Europeans, or the Japanes63.42

G6mez says the main obstacle to developing Mexico's techological capacity is lack of democracy, because "in Mexico, society can't resolve problems; any problems that aren't resolved by the president aren't resolved by anyone." Like Alvarez, he points to France, "a society with a capacity for resolving its own problems.ff42 40, Ra61 Alvarez Garin, interview with autbr, Mexico City, August 27, 1992. The validity sl such an analogy bemeen Mexico and France may seem questionable at first glance. However, they are com&ies of comparable popula~onand natural resources. The French state has used st-rategic plaming to defend its core status and avoid slippage into the semiperiphery. Alvarez is suggesting the Mexican state can employ similar strategies to further secure Mexico" place in the semiperiphery and perhaps edge it closer to core status. 41. PabXo Gbmez, intenriew with author, Mexico City, August 19,1992. 42. Ibid. Afong similar tines, several Mexicans interviewed suggested that the %viet Union" uudemacratic system stifled scientific creativiw and thus

5, PJatioml Culture, Finally, mmy intekctuals look to the strong national cultures of Mexico and Cuba to defend the nation" relaeve autonomy in a globabed world. Amkrico Saldivar, a former Central C tee member of M e ~ e o "d e h c t Co t Party, r e r n a b a stamch defender of lo nacional, despite the fact that his perspectives on economic processes have been considerably "neoliberalized" in recent years. He explained:

Ecanornic nationalism is an anachronism, it's not viable. But in t e r m of politics, cultme, and discourse, nationalism and autonomy are relevant. But the left is still very confwed by, one, the hternationalization of capital, and, two, the need for reasserting lo nacionail in t e r m of culture and baditions.4"

In a world-system in which nation-states progressively cede control over economic m d even politjtal processes to transnatiud actors, contestation of what constitutes and who genuhely represenls lo nacional takes place increasingly within the cultural and ideological realm." As Arturo Escobar has written: It is essential to recopize the importance of econoAc factors and their st_ructuraldeterminants, But just as crucial as the reconstruction of economies-and indelibly linked to it-is the reconstitution of meanings at all levels, horn everyday life to national development.45

The Cuban Revolulim% renewed emphasis on the legacy of national independence hero Jos4 Marti and the Mexican left's reclaiming of the prevented that nation from k ~ p i n gpace with the technological revolution that swept through the advanced capitalist nations. Such an explicit linkage behveen political democracy and technological crtlativity is made less frequmtfy in Cuba, where the question of democracy remains sensitive and w k r e Cuba's own technological advances may suggest such linkage is less clear cut. 43. Ami.r.ico Saldivar, interview wi& a u t b r , Mexico City, August 4,1993. 44. Two interesting examples of this were discussed in papers presented by Andr4a a o u r i and Olga CelXe de Bowman at the March 1994 Latin American Studies Associations meetings. Zhouri, writing on environmentaIism in Brazil, and Celle, writ-iing about the changing meaning of ""cholo" in Peru, both decribed haw meaning, signification, and national identity are being contested and reconsbucted in two very different n a ~ o n a lcontexts which have been radically affected by processes of globalizatian. 45. Artura Escobar, "Cultwe, Econonnics, and Politics in Latin American Social Movements Theory and Research," in Arturo Escobar and Sonia E. Alvarez, eds., The n/lakirzg of Social hclovemenls in Latin America, Identity, S l r a t e g , and Democraq (Boulder: Westview Press, 19921, p. 49.

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175

ers of peasant revolutionary Emiliano Zapata and nationalist hero azaro Chrdenas are symbolic of the struggle to define and defend the meaning of lo national. dearest examples of the culh-lral wars behg waged over tPte the nation today was the e d i c t suxrounding the Carlos Salinas ahhistrationts attempts to h p o s e a new, official Mexican history text book for the public schools, in which the couxltry" kaditional nationalisnn was largely exorclised.46 Mexican historian Ensique Florescano noted recently that scholars are giving ever w a t e r attention to the inzportmce of cultural phenomena such as collective identities, national myths and horws, and the constructiun af a natim" coll:ec-tivef historic memory. He sees no reason to believe that "globalizatim" witl dilute the processes of constmckg national identities and memories; it will simply occasion the creation of new self-affimis\g myths: Groups, nations, and states are going to continue cultivating, defending, feeding their myths of origin and their myths of identity, And more so when they feel pressured from the outside. Mexico demonstrates this. Since 1821, when it became an independent: republic, it has had to face one of the world's smosf powerful nations. And instead of adapting t-cJ the myths of the dominant nation, Mexico always created more, new myths to difkrentiate itself from the neighboring country, from the great power, Today, many new, totally different myths are emerging along the border to differentiate itself from the U.S.47

Florescano cites the new Zagatista movement as one that draws upon histnrical myths but ""with a proposal for the fuhtre, not to go back."48 Along skilar lines, activist poet Victor de Za Cruz a q u a that the hsistence of the Worker-Peasant-Student Coalition of the f s t h u s (COCEI) on s p a k g Zapotec and recovering c unal lands is not about "a rehrn to the past, but a more equitable route to the future."" h Cuba, writer Cintio Vitier looks to the legendary figure of Jos6 Marti, not

46. See Enrique rVaza, ""E 10s libros de texto se resalfa Xo que quiere para justificar ef proyecto salinista," h~roceso(Mexico), September 7,1992, 47. Enrique Florescano, intenriew 14th Arturo Garda Hern4ndez, in Lnz Jomada (Mexico), March 9,1995. 48. Ebid. 49. Victor de fa Cruz, ""Brothers af Citizens: Two Languages, Two Poltical PGE~c~s in the Xsthmus," in Haward Campbell, et al. (eds.), Zapotec Strrrggles: Hktories, Politics, and Reftresenl"trtionsfrom f~tchl"fa"n,Oraxaca (Washington, D.C.: Srnithsonian Institution Press, 1993), p, 246.

Z76

National Sovereignty fl

with expectations of turning back the national clock but for key markers of Cuba's national identity in facing the challenges of the 1990s.B h light af the accelerated process of North Americm m o d e integration, Ra61 Alvarez Garin ended one of our conversations by asking, "Is Mexico going to survive as a mtion? And. in w h t canditims? Are we going to end up like Puerto Rico: 'quk bonita bandera, quk bonita bandera' [what a beautiful flag]?"51 On the one hand, Mexico's deeplyrooted scnse of national ikntity offers him some solace. It is b e that Mexican. cities receive cable television ch els dedicated to broadcas*g U.S. sports events and Hollyood movies, a fact wkich some cite as evidence of the so-called homogenization of global culture. But, Alvarez G a r h &axes Garlos Monsivais's belief that national identity will endure. Nationalism, Monsivais has argued, is the only language of micalt-ion for Mexiran swiety; it is simply becoming a alism, reflecting the hybrid culture produced by the encourtter between national cultzlw and the U.S. cultural industry in the prwess af globalizatim.52 In spite of the penetrat.ion by IJ.5. cons r culture, there r e m a b a strang' cohesive, dishi;tetly Mexican culkxre, with many co or collectivist values, even in an urban jmglie Ifke Mexico Ci. world"s fastest-growing megacities. lltustrative in this regard were the gmssroots "=&-h+" hitia(-ives and urban movements that Rourished followhg the tragic 1985 Mexico City earthquake." Those efforts, as welt as the emergence of new urban leaders like the cartoon hero-inspired Super Barrio, are evidence of the sense of co unit)..,belonging, and

50. Cintio Vitier, "Marti y ei desafio de los noventa," La LLZ~~aceta(Havana), Sptembetr-October 1992. 51. RaGX Alvarez Carin, interview with author, Mexico City, August 27, 1992.

52. CarXas Msnsivais, interview with Marta EIena Montoya Vklez, in La Jorraada Semnal (Mexico), September 13, 1992, On the issue of "bhrid" or "translated" national cuttures in the era of globaliza~on,see Nestor Garcia Canclini, "Cuktural Reconversian," in C. Uudi~e,et al., On Edgtr (University of Minnmota, 1992); and Sbart Hail, "The Question of National Identiq," in S. Hall, et al., Modernity and Its Ftrtztvet; (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). 53. Ch the impressive array af contemporary urban movements in Mexico, including those &at emerged around the 1985 earthquake, see flarlos Mamivais, Entvadcl Libre.. Crcinicas de 2a sociedad qrte se orpnlza (Mexico: Ediciones E M , 1987); and Vivienne Bennett, "The Evolution of Urban Popular Movements in Mexim BeWeen 1968 and 1988," in Art-urs Escobar and Sonia E. Alvarez (eds.), The Making of Social n/lawnrenls irz b f i n Amen'ca, op. clit.

citizenship among the urban popular classes in Mexico City, cultural factors often absent h urban mekopolises of the late twentieth cmW.58 O n the o&er hmd. Alvarez Garh fears *at tlne level of smial dishtegration caused by the past decade of crisis and restnrcturing could lead to a "worst case scenario h h i c k Mexico devolves into mofier Yugoslavia, with regions fighting one another. Already workers are amed. carnpcrsinos c a q machetes, demandkg xesponses ta &eir mbelievably miserabk conditions."~~Tellingly, the Z a p a ~ t aperriUa war on January 1,1994. by hdians in Mexico's southern state of Chiath mderscorrrs his concerns about regional conflict and illustrates the cultrxraf vitality of Mexico's revolutionary past as it acc today" realities by using Zapab's h a g e to press demands for democratic natiamt elections, Monsivais, a l o n g - h e chronicler of Mexico City% urban popular culhre, agrees that the NIexican revoluti foundly transfomed the national mind, and he has tremendous tion for the vitality of' Mexico's popular culture. However, be lieves that, after sixty years of corrupt and authoritarian rule by the PW, it will take an entire generation to build a new political culture. For the moment, he fears that even the social.movements, which he views as the great sources of resistance to neoliberalism, are concerned primarily with survival, not with trrn~fama.tion,~ NevereEzeless, Alejandro Alvarez is confidmt that the strength and m culbre, its nationalism, sense of identity and pride, ity, and social justice values, remain largely in tact. He considers them to be a very irnporiant integrathg factor that gives historical cohesion to the left's project and makes Mexicans less susceptible to neoliberaI discourse and to resipatjon before the supposedly inevitable forces of "globalization."57 Surrealist poet Benjamin Peret has made a 54. See Rabert Kaplan, "The Corrting harcEty,'Yin The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, for a provocative discussion of the role of culhre in determining which peoptes will survive Ihe ""scarcity, crime, ovefpopulation, tribalism, and disease [that] are rapidly dieslroying the social fabric sf our planet." Kaplan sees the "formidable fabric" of Turkish MusXim culture playing a role somewhat analogous to what I am suggesting about natimal culture in Mexico, and perhaps to a lesser extent in Cuba. 55. Ra6l Alvarez Garin, interview with author, Mexico City, August 6,1993, ents by Carlas Monsivais during a talk on '"ntellcrctuals and the State in Mexico," University of California, Santa Cruz, April 10,1991. 57. Author conversation with Altr-jandroAlvarez on a drive up the Northern California coast, Sptember 28, 1993. Far an insightful discmsion of the endurance of nationalism and national culture in the era af neoliberaliism, see Gilberto Lcipez y Rivas, "Naciizn y neoliberalismo,'Wh/lemoria (Mexica Qty), December 1993. A thoughtful assessment af the Mex-ican left's sattempts to

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ar assessment in w i h g about Mexico's enduring myths and legends, such as that of Fancho Villa. Believing that the reconquest of our ability to h a g h e is as intportrznt a s acfsieving equality mci mat-erial weU-behg, Peret has described Wxico as a place where the creative, lifemyths of the revolutionary past remairt '"prestznt in daily life, in the street, the markets, there where the people gather and talkemss Jorge Thosi, an Argentine-born journatist who has lived in Cuba for many years and no^^ semes in a hi&-level post at the Cuban M Culture, also stressed national culture as the key to &baps national autmoxny inthe new world order: We need to rethink how to conshrud an authentic nationalism, cleansed of pr9udices and old formulas. This needs to be done from a cultural point of view. The GDR [East Germany] was one of the socialist countries that had most resolved its economic problem. But it never thought through the national problem of culture. With the partitioning of the world after World War 11, we all took for granted the logic of the EZerIin Wall dividing communists and capitalists. But much of the culture remained the same, e.g., Xanguage and histol-ical traditions, Today, economic reconstruct-ion and reinsertion have to pasar por la cultzrm naci~ml[take place through the nat-ional culture]. Alang with the economy, culture is the other most important and problema.lic area affected by world changes. There, is no project today that cannot take into account the culture of the count-ry. For Cuba, this is fundamental. Had Cuba fallen into the error of sorialist realism, which it didn't because of its strong historical cultural traditions, things would have been infinitely worse. Because Cuba didn't, we now have an oppartunify to refind our way on the basis of our cdture. So today, autanomous na.ti;onaldevelopment depends greatly on reaonsh*uc~ngthe national cutture.59

Cultural Minister Armada Hart points to many intellectual traditions i n Cuban culhre that were not socialst but contributed to the essential values of equality, social justire and solidarity that pemeate the national culhrt?, I-le notes that the great Cuban poet Jos4 Lezma Lima construct a new nationalism is offered by Cristina Puga, ""Un nuevo nacianalismo para M4xic0," Mltlzrndo (Mexico Civ), July 1991, For the perspective on nationalism of a prominent intellectual who supported Carlos Salinas's "modernization," see H6ctar Aguilar Camin, "La invencidn de M4xico. Motas sobre nacionalisrno e identidad nacional,'' Ncxas (Mexico City), July 1993. 58. Lourdes Andrade, '"enjamin Peret: Magia, revolucicin y paesia," h La Jarnada Semnal (Mexico City), November 23,1934, pp, 23-26. 59. Jorge Timosi, interview with author, Havana, February 25,1993,

t writers associated with the respected literary jour1940s and 19505, opposed socialism but understood the ffideologicaland moral crisis" of prerevolutionary Cuba and were subsequently incorporated into the revolutionary process." Hart especially looks to the antislavery and anticolonid movements and ideologies of the nineteenth cenhrry as the most hpo&mt precursors of values jn Cuban culture today. In defending Cuban culture, Hart explains, "we are defending that which exists as Cuban where the national and the whole, That is what Jose Martr memt when miversal fuse into a he sad, '"Mycamtry The severity of Cuba's cunent e c o n o ~ crisis c wil certasy put the durabiby of the island's culhral fabric to the test, but Thosi md Hart are not the only Cubms whs betieve that national c d b w is one of Cuba's great skengtf-rs. Art critic Cerardo Mosquera says that, despite artistsYissatisfaction w i the ~ restrictive political c b a k of the early 1 9 9 0 the ~ ~ sibation h Cuba is wry different from what existed in Eastern Europe just before tfie fall of the Berlh Wall: "Cubm culture today is very critical, but . . . the spirit is quite socialist."62 The validity of his claim is demonstrated by the remarkable Cuban f i h , Fresa y Chocolale, a lovely testament to the resilience of Cuba's national culhtre in the midst of crisis.

60. Armando Hart DAvalos, "The Traditions Behind a Socialist World View," World Marxist R m S m ,Vol. 33, No. 1, January 1990. In my intewiew with Hart (Havana, March 11, 19931, he included himelf among those who held unist views engendered by the Cold War before joining the revolutionary sk-ruggte. Regarding Hart" assessment of Lezama Lima, there i s considerable controversy. In a recent book, Mea Gzibtl (New York: Farrar, Straw, and Giroux, 1994), exiled Cuban novelist Guilfermo Cabrera Infante maintains that k z a m a Lima was essentially suffocated by the Castro regimenever jailed, given his reputation, but never allowed to leave the camtry. However, Ciro Bianchi Rsss, a friend of Lezama Lima who has edited a new collection of the poet's pmeviausly unpublished letters, diaries, and other writings (Conzo las cartas no Ilegan, Mexico: Editorial E M , in press), insists that Lezarna Lima never repudiated the revolutionary regime and was never prevented kosn traveling % Alma abroad by anything other than his own idiosyncrasies. Cuilltemsprieta, "Cuba's Exquisite Martyrs," The f\rwYork Times Book Review, November 22, 1994, p 9; and EXomero Campa and Orlando PCrez, "Su aknitga Ciro Bianchi enfrenta b dtificaci6n de Lezanra Lima," Pr~ceso(Mexico City), October 3,1994, pp. 60-65. 61. Armando Wart DBvalas, "The Traditions Behind a Socialist WorId View,'kp. cit., p. 24. 62. Gerardo Mosquera, quoted in Jay Murphy, "Report fmm Havana. "X"sting the Limits," Art in Amrz"ca,Oct-aber 1992, p. 69.

Historian and philosopher Juan Antonio Blanco insists that "Cuban society, the nation, and the revolution will not be saved by economic changes but by culbre. We have to find an ethical, moral resolution of the crisis."63 He points to a consistent system of values, an ethical code, rooted in Cuban history and based on mtions of swial justice, solidarity, iment to "the responsibility of all for all." e Blanco counts these cultural values as strong assets, he offers no guarantees about the future of the Cuban nation. HistoricaUy, Blanco argues, this very set of values has led Cuba time and again into conflict with the United States as the fomer pursued independence and (fie latter manifest destiny, Moreover, as the current economic crisis deepens, Blanco foresees a growing conhct between two distinct ethical codes, one representing a project to save the Cuban nation and one a project of individualistic suwival hcreasingly inauenced by bourgeois values." The &erne of " e ~ i c a lcrisis" arose repeatedly in my interviews in Cuba. An hteresling xecent discussion of values and morais in Cuban political culture is offered by Nelson Valdes, who suggests that the most polemical arguments in Cuban history have not been about democracy, power, or markets. Rather, he observes, "The themes of personal duty, political morality, patriotism, and the historic mission of the nation engaged Cubans from all political perspectives."65 Thus while nationalism and patriotism give cohesion to Cuban society, Valdes wams that morafism an8 intolerance have often led to polarities and judgxnents rather than understancfing. Important disagreements emerged in discussing the options available in the globalized economy of the post-Cold war world-system for two nations who= old fomulas for defendhg the nation" sovereipty and ~ c u r h semiperipheral g status no longer appear workable* mere is significant debate, for example, in both Cuba and Mexico about the feashility of Latin American integration. There are substan.t-ialdifferenres, particularly among Mexican leftists, about the inevitability or advisability of economic integration with the United States. The Cuban intellec63, Statements m d e by Juan Antonia BIanco during a lecture on "The 1960s" at Casa de Xas Am&ricas,Havana, February 9,2993. 6%. Bid. For mare an Juan h t o n i a Blanco" view of the ethical crisis, see Blancs ""Cuba: Crisis, Ethics, and Viabilitny," op. cit. For a classic analysis of the role af ethics and morality in Cuban history, see Cintio Vitier, Ese sol del mzrndo moral. Pars tlna hisfork de fa eticr'aad cubana: (Mcrxica: Sigio XX6,1995), 65. Nelson Valdes, ""Cuban Political Culture: Betvvetfn Betrayal and Deathp'' in S. Halebsky and f. Kirk (eds.), Ctlba in Transition: Crisis and Transformtfon (Boulder: Westview, 19"32), p. 207.

t u b certaay do ntlt view the relatianship beheen democraliza~anand crisis resolution &ough the same lens as n/fexicots left opposi~m. Never&eless, there semed to be general agreement among all. the Cuand &xicans intefviewed that na~onal.sovereipy and autonomous national develapmmt remajn me;zning)ul concepts. Moreover, &ere is broad consemas that nafional sovereignty is not, and c the equivalent of autarky. Complete d e - l h h g from the world-economy no longer = e m a viabfe option. mough it is not yet a hlly defhed notion, relative national autonomy seems to be emerghg as successor to a once-hagined full national sovarized above, at least five elements were identified by respondents as key to media&g national autonomy in the new world order: a strong, democrallc stake acthg h the ixlterests of the majohty; s m e fom of Latin American regional integration; broad cross-border aIlimces with social seetors opposed to neo&beral restructuring; development of national s c i e n t i f i c - t e a capadty and industries in cuttjngedge technologies; and fhally, reconstitueion of national culture in defense of lo naeiona l. As Jmge Castar?eda has &served, "the yawning domestic chasms in Latin Amritan society, and the "denatimal2zatim' of elites, . . . are powerful hcentrives for the left to retain a nationalism so mfashionabk in &ese thes, yet so necessary.'"66 He regards craf'thg a m w nationalism in the context of a pat-Cold War, post-Marxist watld as one of the left" most hportant chaflenges. I wou.d suggest that the ideas offered hereh by many Cuban and Mexicm htellecfruals make an hportant contribution toward that goal.

CHAPTER 9, CONCLUSIONS

Past Imperfect, Present Tense, Future Conditional As seen in the previous chapters, the lefts in Cuba and Mexico have experienced a great paradigm crisis, provoked by a chain of world events from the “revolution of 1968” and the new social movements of subsequent years, through the reorganization of the world-economy and the eclipse of liberal reformism by neoliberalism in 1980s, to the dramatic collapse of state socialism. This paradigm crisis undid old political and ideological alignments and produced a new, still unsettled, constellation of left discourse. Three ideal type perspectives among today’s left on the questions of democracy and socialism have been identified: liberal, orthodox, and renovative. I have argued throughout this book that these three tendencies are defined largely around the degree to which they adhere to or depart from two world-systemic ideologies that dominated much of the past century: liberalism and socialism (in the statist form it took in practice). Socialist discourse is clearly on the decline, having lost much of its legitimacy when caught in the cross-fire of an ascendent neoliberalism and a defeated communism. In Mexico, orthodox socialist discourse is found now mainly among a relatively small number of left intellectuals and aging militants. However, the ideals associated with socialism, or perhaps more precisely, with Marx’s utopian vision of communism (full social equality among a self-governing “free association of producers”) remain an important point of reference for the renovative current in Mexico, which still imagines a humane alternative to capitalism. In Cuba, orthodox socialist ideology remains more firmly entrenched, particularly within the ideological apparatus of the state-party regime, and especially in regards to the political system. Renovative Cuban leftists still view socialism as a necessary and integral aspect of their national society, but they imagine a radically democratized and decentralized socialism. Nonetheless, socialist orthodoxy is in retreat even in Cuba. Severe economic crisis forces the island in the direction of liberal eco-

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, which, ironically. are being undertaken in an effort to hievements of Cuba"ssocialist revalu~an. Liberal ideology has clearly gained d u e n c e among leftists in both nations. W i h k the Mexican left, there are sipificant numbers of intelk h a l s who k v e adopted the mstricted Eberal notion of demwracy as a ltipary political system, n e y consider such representative, eletto demwracy to be me ul in and of itself, regadless of the social inequalities that may persist in their nation. Many intellectuals on the Mexican left also have come to befieve in the value of lree-market economies an$ fuller econonnic integration with the United States. These thinkers represent a liberal political tendency in the sense that Wallersteh has dexribed historic liberalism, as a strategy of cmstmt, rational rehm to avoid social c o ~ c m t d instability through hcorporation of larger sectors of the p o p u l a ~ mb t o the system. The liberal left in MWico genuinely believes that capitatism can be made more humane, lhat electoral demmracy can be made more meaningfd, and, more hportanay, that those goals are the best that can be hoped for. However, the liberal current wi&h the Mexican left is far from domhant. mere exists a very dtlential renovative tendency that accepts the bberaf left's agenda as necessaty but insuficient refoms. The renovatas do not a v e e that liberal democracy can be tmly meaningful in a socially polarized society and are not wiIfbg to settle for a version of capitalism that s h p b distrilrtutes some of the wealth more bmadly. Liberal efonomic tenets about the merits of market forces in promoting greater efficiency and productivity are also m a h g gains wiehin Cuba. h some regards, Cuba's emergency economic program resembles the a 4 u s b e n t s hplemented in Mexico and elsewhere: Less state, more market, more foreign invesment. But liberal economic r e b m s in Cuba are being attempted with great reluctance, more in the spirit that a cancer patient s u b ~ t to s chemotherapy, knowing it will kill some of the cancer cells and hoping it wan3 l11 the patient. In contrast to the way e been carried out in the rest of Lath America, has made serious efforts to preserve the great of the revolution: miversal, free heal& care and education. mere is considerable distress, even among the inklleckxals advocating the fibera1 refoms, about the inevitable social hcqttaility that accompanies them. h the political r e a h , liberalism has made only m h h a l hroads on the island, Fidel Castro, as well, as many of the ht.ellect;ualsX interviewed, c o n k u e to reject a liberalized, multiparty political system as a counterrevolutionary attempt to recolonize Cuba. important renovative voices, including left dissiNoneheless, n ere dents as weif as Go mist Party loyalists, who insist that liberalization of the economy must be accompanied by radical democratktion of

Cuba%political system- For tlhem, democratizagm does not necessarily begin, or even end, with a multiparty system, but it certainly entails a thorou& political reform of the part-y, state, and mass orgdzatiom, and a rwanstitution of civil saciev. To recap, in Cuba the renovatjve tendcncy is h p o r t m t but somewhat fiagile, liberalism exats its greatest influence over ideas about e c o n o ~ lrfjfom, c a d orthodox notions about democracy still prevail. Pn Mexico, Ihe renovative current is quite strong, liberalism has been most influential in terns of the leftss revaluatim of democracy, and orthodax e t g of many regarding economic statism still &do altema tives. If orthodox socialist: discourse is clearly on the declhe and liberal discourse rnodrgratcrly more influential, nationaGsm remains strong among the left in both nations and cuts across liberal, orhodox, and renovative currents. Possibly the greatest source of legihacy still refor the Cubm revolution m d its leadership is &eir asssciation deknse and preservation of Cuba as a nation. fn Mexico, trhe Pm% nationalist credentials have been fur&er tarnished by the popular perception that the r e g h e threatens to bartesr away the nationfs sovereignty ( s y m b o h d in its natimalized oil industry and independent fore i w polcy) for mother %@-Wbillon of debt to the United States. However, nationalist discourse also is hanging, challenged by the realities of globalizatim. There are new natians about the relative f the nation-state replacing older concepts of full, m e w sovereie;nv. A n y nation's irdentity is constructed and asgh discourse as well as political, struggle a d ecmornir relations, and the culhral representation of the nation is increashgly h p o r tant in Cuba and Mexico. En the post-Cold Wat, postrevolutimary, globafized world of the f 98&, much of nationalist discaurse revolves aromd wkat cons-titutes lo naciorzal vis a vis the outside world and who sepreseftts Io national within. Thus thft canthued, perhaps accentuated, insistence on the ttniquely Cuban and Mexican qualty of music, film art, literature, fosd, and language. Thus also the left% rrenewd efforts to claim, the natiorr" great hgroes as its own: Josk b r t i , Che Guevara, Emiliano Zapata, and t6zaro C&rdmas, even in dealh, remain m$or rary national politics. ized the m a k f b d h g s of ithe research, let me now offer some explanations for the relative irtRuence of the old and new idealogitat, ezlrrents identified among left intelfectuds in Cuba and Nexico. Five factors seem parlieularly useful for understandkg what has been described above: (1) the structural position of Cuba and Mexico within the sefniperiphery of the world-system; (2) the strength of the nationaiist poli2ical and populac rulhres that emerged from the Mexican

and Cubm revolutions; (3) the h p a c t of "the world revolu~anof 196&" on a generation sf left inteuetluals h both na~ons;(4) divisions wi the mlhg elites, which have resulted from the crisis confronting both state-party regimes and whi& affect the resources availabie for critical discourses; and (5) the reality of being a left-h-power vs,a left-in-oppasit.ion, combhezl. with the related question of papular movements and their Muence on left inteflechals, Let us now consider each of these factors. 1. Semiperipheval status in the world-systm, I have argued that the different discursive tendencies among left intellectuals revolve hrgt3ly around the degree to whi& &ey adhere to one or the o&er of two wosldsystemic ideologies: fiberalism and sociaEsm (inthe stalist f o m it took in practice). LibtraEsm has long been the do ant ideology of the capitatist world-system and, hegemmk in the core. It effectively clahed "democracy'hs its offspring. Socialism emerged as one of the m s t hfluential antisyste~cidealoees of the meteenth and twenlkth centuries. Gradually fomalked undational ideology and justification of real p m e s in the Ca t reghes of Europe and Asia, socialism became hcreashgly id it& statism and authoritarianism. The Cold War reinforced and indeed exaggerated the false discursive opposition in no less subtle a f o m tkan the nuclear forces of good and tight defended liberal capitalism in mocracy against a socialism presented as hevitably totalitarian, an evil so great as to jusllfy the risk of nuclear am&ilation in the pursuit of its ent or destruct.ion. Wi& capitalkm supposedly having won the Cold War, why is Gberalism not the fastest-growing influence among left htellectuals in Cuba m d Mexico? We have to take into accaunt how a nation's positjm wi&h the world-systrrmrs hierarchy of natjon-states medkfes and condifiavls the appropriation of: global discourses The East-West csnflict of the Cold War was not the only battk dividing the world-system of the tMIentieth century. As nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia attempted to eltallenge the unequal excf-lmge and unequaI power rela"rons bet.rveen the world-system" core and periphery, nationalism emerged as another powerful, potmtially antisystemic idealow. Et did not always direclly challenge the premises of capitahsm, as Marxisn and socialism did, but nationalism's assault on the struchres of core domislalion mobilized the masses af the p e ~ p h e qin wa;ys swiabsm never coukd.1

1. For a usehl discussion of the role of nationalism in mobilizing mss movements, see Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: Versa, 1981).

Lberalisnn never achieved hegemony in Cuba or Mexico, in part because their peripheral status in the global division of labor, imposed through violent European colonization, prevented them from acc ing the levels 05 suxpluses that have made libe more viable in fie core. Liberalism" scri~queof statism' ly, has been met with skepticism in two nations whi& effectively used state-centered strategies to mmeuver from the periphery into the more privileged status of semiperipheral states. Nationalism and partially successful nationalist development strategies played a ~ e r hy p m t m t role, I would argue, in steering left intelliectuals towardt privileging the state in their strategies far swia1 change. That tendency was reaorced by the irtflumce of Soviet-style socialism and Leninism, whi& made their ideological impact on the Cuban revolution, particularly after 1970, and influenced Co 'st and ssfialist sectow of the Mexican teM d a h g back at least to the lZOs. Recently, the left's more orthodox statist paradips have been dealt a sriaus blow by the c d a p w of state socialkm, the exhaustion of nationalist development strategies, a increasingly obvious udernoc r a ~ nahre c of both. However, re t liberalism alsa has couapsed, f "free mar-ket" economics and eclipsed by neoliberal doctrines of narrowly d e h e d electoral demosracies. Csnsl?quently, the left's p m d i p crisis in Cuba and Mexico has not given way to a generalized, hearty @&race of its old Cold War rival, the fiberal rgfom paradigm. To a simificant extent that is because bberalism" s b h s about th@ possibility of achieving prosperity, liberty, and democracy through gradual, rational refam are not credible w i t h the realities of late t-vventieth-century, semiperipheral capitalism. The leftJs skpticism about liberalism md recent neo&beralprescriptions is rehforced by the mounting socioecmsmic crises that are undemhi-ng the old liberal consensus even h the weal&y core. At the s m e t h e , because Cuba and Mexico managed to move into the selniperiphery through revolution and national development schemes, they have escaped the m s t extreme foms of social and politia ~ o ndescribed by Robert &plan in his h~rrgicaccount of g Anarchy" that is engulfing much. of the Third World perip he^.^ Left in(el1echrals of the semiperiphery operate within societies of material m d cultural conditions sufficient to nourish the pursuit of utopian dreams. The fitifu1~7 Of the old left and liberal strategies daes not mean the end of history or resiped defeat before a daily struggle sirnply to hold off starvation. h naeons like Cuba and Mexico, the %arch for 2. R ~ k r KapIan, t "The Coming harchy," The Atlantic Monthly, February (1994).

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new, humane social alternatives is sustained by culturally cohesive and moderately abundant societies. As I believe the findings of this research suggest, the semiperiphery of today’s world-system (including, for instance, much of Latin America, Eastern Europe, India, South Africa) is the most likely region to produce the new “antisystemic strategy for an era of disintegration” called for by Wallerstein. The seeds of such a strategy are present in the renovative discourse described in the previous chapters. 2. The strength of national culture. Among nations of the semiperiphery, Cuba and Mexico have the distinct advantage of strong national cultures. They are two of the world’s most notable examples of societies mobilized to revolutionary action by assertions of nationhood in the face of vast social inequality and aggressive U.S.expansionism. The deeply embedded nationalist and social values of these postrevolutionary political cultures condition the left’s discourse, weighing against the influence of liberalism and neoliberalism, and mediating the appropriation of European socialist traditions. Recall that even the most clearly “liberal” of left intellectuals in Cuba and Mexico still couch their arguments in terms of traditional left values and goals of social justice and equity. Similarly, even the most orthodox socialist voices on the left insist on the unique national quality of their project, legitimizing their stance with reference to the nation‘s historic struggles and heroes. National revolutions in Cuba and Mexico, for all their many contradictions and authoritarian outcomes, fostered traditions of solidarity, community, social rights, and the state’s responsibility for the well-being of its citizens. In both nations, these values permeate beyond the political culture into the broader popular culture, reflected, for example, in music and film. Two recent films in particular attest to the resilience of these national cultures. Fresu y Chocolate, with humor, compassion, and exquisite aesthetic qualities, treats various aspects of contemporary Cuban society. The film delineates the political and sexual intolerance, petty hypocrisy, censorship, and fear that erode the nation, but it also shows the qualities that hold it together: solidarity among neighbors, a creative daily appropriation of Catholic, African, and Communist traditions into a distinctly Cuban identity, and an irrepressible, sensual joie de vivre. Mexico’s Dunzdn, another celluloid gem of rare beauty, demonstrates the extent to which feminist sensibilities and changing attitudes about gender and sexuality are gradually transforming Mexico’s traditional culture, even while society attempts to reappropriate and reassert lifeaffirming musical and social modes of the past. The strong social, as opposed to individual, identity associated with the postrevolutionary cultures of Cuba and Mexico give added cohesion to their societies, mak-

188

Canclusions

ing them par~cutarlyf e d e gromd, wi the larger sedperiphery, for renovated utopian projects. The culhrt? of salidariv, very palpable stiU in Cuba and Mexico despite the pressures of severe e c w o d c crisis and natimal disorder, cmtrasts, for example, with recent accounts of life in Chile. There, the Pinochet dictatorship of the 1970s and '80s successfully ruptured the nation's once strongly dernofratic and socially conscious poEtical c d b e . Chilean leftists who have returned home after long years in exile express astonisbent md d ir at the prevalence of ruwess hdividualism and matet.ialist con rism h the Chile oaf the 199Os,"ome of the Chilean left itself, deeply traumatized by the bnttal repression mder Pinocherc; has abandoned much of the social and democratic tradihons it once so vafiantly pursued. A few Chilean socialists have helped design and implement the neoliberal restructuring of the Chilean economy, occasionaHy even defending the cminued repressive excesses of the postPislachet civilian re,rimes.4 My point is not that Chilean leftists are somehow less pure than kftists in Culaa or Mexiclo; that is hardly the case, as demonstrated by the efbrts of a Chilean Marxist like Manuel Antonia Cametiin to reconceptualize a socialism based on ethical principles.5 Moreover, there is evidence that the Chifem left is btzghing to revitalize itself, as environmentalism hcreases its Muence, as femislism is cm the rebomd, and as left parties conthue to attract their historic &ird of t%teChilean electorate. My critical observations are meant to underscore that, in the absence of a strong national political culture, footed in ideals of social equality, justice and solidarity, it is far more difficult for left hteHectuals to formulate and pursue pripular alternrztjves. The persistence of such culkrres in Cuba and Mexico help explain the resistance to neoliberalim, the hesitancy to settle fur Liberal reforms, and the s&ong presence of renovative voices wi&in the left.

3. This sbsemation is drawn born conversatjons with jaime Osorio and Patricia OXave, who only recently visited Chile after having lived in Mexico since shortly after the 1973coup. 4. Calo 66mez Ogalde recently wrote about Chile: "A socialist d n i s t e r of the past government . . . explained last year . . . that the police brutality against the left exercised white he was ~ n i s t e rcan be mplilinffd. by the fact that 'violence in Chile is a sociological problem."' He continued, "In Chile there is a law that allows for detention of any citizen simply for t-he fact that he appears suspicious in the eyes of the police." Gala GBmez Qgalde, "Sillencio, Chilenos en Transicicin," La Jortzda Semnaf, No, 280 (October 23,1994). 5. See ManueX h t o n i o GarretBn, "Sacialisma real and socialismo pasible'" (manuscript, May 1990).

3. The generation of 2%8. I have noted that the liberal, orthodox, and renovativtr tendencies of tfie left in Cuba and Mexico today do not conelate neatly with past organizational affiliation or ideological orientation, because the p a f a d i w crisis has shaken up old ali ts. Ch the other hand, there is some logic to the mment h e - u p o cies, m d one of the explanatorgr factors seems to be the relative hfluencct of the critical discourses md movements of 2968. The most or*odax, socialist views and the most liberal. perspectives w i t h the Cuban and Mexi oday are expressed prharily by ist parties or by ihe most ardently hdividuals from the historic nationalist thinkers, that is, b ce associated with the most statist the Left. I suggest that this reflects the severity of the traditions para d i p s it has been experienced by foxces Lhat once accepted the false dichotomies of kberalism and socialism discussed earlier. With their ideological foundations undemlned, they tend toward one or the other of two extrerne reactions: retrench and deny anything has changed, or abandm their leftist past and embrace liberalism, occasionally even neoliberalism, The renovators, on the other hand, tend to be peopfe who were most closely assmiated with th icaf,Marxist tendencies and newer antisystemic discourses of what nuel Wallerstein has called the worldwide '"revolutian of 1968." He considers it "me of the great, formative events in the kistory of our modern world-system."h The antisystemjc movements and discourses of the 1960s were of a different breed. They challenged the authmitarianism of state socialism as well as the inequality and cultural dienation of capitalism. Intellectual, and political events throughout the world in the 1960s influenced the Cuban revofution and Mexico" shdent movement, both of which, in turn, became emblematic of the revolutionary changes afoot in those years. Activist isttellechtals who embraced the new ethics of 1968 w r e critical of the old left" sigidity, antidemocratic nature, and kcreasing hefkctivcness. The antisystemic discourses of the 1960s contjnued to influence many intelfeckrals and activists of the era, long after the "revotutim of 1968" had been largely defeated. Note, for example, how many of the renovative Cuban voices cited throughout this book were associated with the unorthodox journal of the '60s, Pelzsamiento Cvitico. Clna member of that circle, Juan ARtoniu B%anco,says that the subversive vality of the '60s (the questioning of capitalism" and real sacialismfs ethics and models) had a sipificant Muerace m the Cuban revolution's first decade. Blanco recalls that while the Beatles sang, "better free your mind 6. frnrnanuel Wallerstein, "1968, rie\rslution in the Wsrtd-System: Theses and Queries,'hmanuscript (1988).

instead" and "money can't buy me love," Cuba's popular Silvio Rodriguez sang that "the era is giving birth to a heart." But, says Blanco, the baby was stiUbom for many reasons, hcludhg the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, an event that "destroyed the hopes of 1968."7 Cuban historian Jorge Ibarra believes that if Cuba proves able to overcome the current crisis, it will be as a result of "recon*uhg along the h e s of advances made in the first years of the revolution."& The critical perspectives of Cuban intellectulals who identified wilh Ihe ideologicaf currents of WSIS have been somewhat reMorced over the years to the extent &at many of these intellectuals have been able to travel abroad ;and remain h dialogue with progressive farces in Latin America and elsewhere, who c a n h u e d to renwate their discourse with the ideas of new social and popular movements of the 197Qs and 1986s. Similarly, in Mexico, many of the renovators came of age potiticauy and intellectually during the 3968 student movement. Sveral of &em were associated with Punta Critico, another unorthodox journal in%e n e d by critical Marxist-s like Antsnio Cramsci and post-Marxist ideas that emphasized a greater pturality of social subjects and political arenas other &an the state. Writhg about the effects of 1968 on the Mexicm left, former Mexican C mist Enrique Snno argues that it had two original and lasting contributions: (1) It gave rise to a new political culhire that insisted on liberty and democracy, which became diffused throughout journafisnn, novels, poems, fih, music, and even daily life; and (2) it produced a cadre of tf?lousmds af activists who became popular leaders, engaged in social and political movements houghout the country, and contributed decisively to broadening democratic spaces in M e ~ i c o .The ~ 1968 s h h t movement and its repression by the governo (literally, border year) in. Mexican ment is considered an a ~ fionterizo politics, and fie ~enty-fifthanniversary of the C)ctober 2 mssacre was emrated irt 1993by tens of thousands of Mexicm citizens. The sipificant number of renovators in bo& countries who w r e once radical young htellesbah associated with the revolution of 1968 suggests that a particular gemratimal experience, shaped by the watershed eveslts of the f960s, also conditiom haw these inteuechals process and appropriate world ideologies, t a h g them beyond the h i t s of old socialist and liberal paradigms.

7. Juan Antonio Blanco, presentation on Cuba and the 196Qs, Casa de las Am&ricas,I-Xavrma, February 9,1999. 8. Jorge barra, interview with author, Havana, February 21,1993. "3 Enrlque S m o , ""1968, phgina abierta, de unai agenda vigentet7,'" Memorig, No, 60 (November 195331, p. 9.

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4. Divaiolas within the xaling elite and the availability of resources. In Kis study of the Refornation, the ERjligh t and Eurapem socialism, Robert Wuthnow concludes that such periods of cultural innovation occurred under particular c m d i ~ o n sof ecanomic expansion that produced divisions among m h g elites and increased the resources available to support cri~caldiscourses. New growth in the capitalist economy, he arguc?s, led to a "transitimaf period in which the bomdaries between mhg-class fractions became blurred, a&mces became more fluid, temporary opp s to promote new ideas opened up, and exploitable resourcm to any shgle estabkshed fraction became availabXe."'O In my case studies, new app for export-ld economic expansion in thr; @abed worldpresented &emselves as an alternative to Mexko's stagnated import-subs~tutimbdustrialization m d Cuba's shattered alfimce with the now exthct sotlialist bloc. Neoliberal restrucbring in Mexico was actively pursued starkg h the midational capital and 1980s by a fraction of the rulhg dass tied represented by techoclrats trahed in elite rsities. This led to serious divisions wi.thin the mling party, evenhal abanent of the PRT by some af its most p ists, such as Cua&t&moc CArdenas, Porfirio Muiioz Ledo, and Ifigenia Marthez, who are now leading figures in the left apposition, Cuba's s l i n g circle d y reluctantly began liberal economic reforms and the aggressive pursuit of new export markets through partnerships with transnalionaf eapitaf after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The divisions created by such changes within the Cuban Co be less transparent than those of the higMy-publicized PM, but they exist nonetheless. hcreasingly, more techmratic intellectua'is like Carlos Lage and Jos4 Luis Rodriguez are t a h g over leadership areas from more traditional party ideologues. Moreover, important defections from the C have contributed to the fornation of a new social demo willhh Cuba. The resources and oppormities to pronnote new ideas have been increased as a result of such divisions, h Mexico, the democratic dissidents who left the PM made enormous materid m d political resources available to the opposition, combining them with the resources of Mexico's traditional left parties, like the Co sts, who bmed their electoral registration and substantial infrastmcme aver to the newly fomed 10. Robert Wuthnow, Conzrnunilifi of Discotrrse., IdeoEog and Social Stvrrclure tion, the Enlightenment, arzd Ezrvveg:an Socialism (Cambridge: Haward Univwsity Press, 1989), pp. 572-573.

PRD. Evisions among the elites also conkibuted to the fomdjng of the newspaper La Jornada in the 19805, which is now one of the most respected dailies inthe nation, gives constant and complete coverage to the left opposition, and regularly publishes opinion by many of san group of Mexico's most prominent left intellectuals. A large, ,several of them fomer PNistas or PM dissidents, as the "'San Angel Gro 29913: and provided an ice in ndimal pofitics. rly, divisjons with the Catholic Church hierarchy have allowed Bishop Samuel Ruiz G m l a to play a crucial role not only in mediating the conflict in Chiapas but in giving legitimacy to the new discourses emerging as a result of that codict. The inventory asrd $Ls;t.ributim of resaurces avaaabte to promote new ideas in Cuba is considerably different and less favorable to the renovative tendency. Nevefieless, the recent Changes are simificmt. Divisions withh the p a r 9 hadership, for exampk, allow for the offieial sponsorship of a wide variety of research hstitutes reaectistg very different ideological currents. The Academy of Sciences remains largely the domain of orthodoxy. The Center for the Study of the World Economy is the base of inRuential liberal e c m m i c voices. The Center for the Study of the Americas is the home of several of Cuba's renovators. &oher chmge resulting f r m divisions w i ~ the h Cuban rwolu that mist p r o m h a t fomer cadre, like Vladirniro &a, son af famed Blas Rma, have addcd cansiderable legitkacy to the social democratic dissident left on the island. The growing presence of foreign companies in Cuba has also made m w resources available in s m e h e s jinteresting and unexpected ways. intellectuals, for example, has been %e of Cuba's prominent able to support a m w non tal research center partly as a result of the income and khastructure avaaable firou the new joint enterprises. Divisions witfib Cuba also play an interesting role: a prombent Protesta to Cuba's National Assembly in 1993, and the court& church support by liberalizing its stand on the compatibility of religinus beliefs and revolutionary 1oyalry.H h a am remdane but critical example, extreme shortages of paper have made it very difficult far renovative Cuban intellectuals to publish; most of the written sourtes 11. Xt is interesting, given the typ~logicttsof left thought we have identified, that a rEent study of the church in Latin America notes the presence of two tendencies, "Cansenratives" ancl "Renovationists," the latter including the charismatic spiritualists, populists, and socialists. Carlas Alberto Torrres, The Ghztrch, SocieQ and Hegemony: A C~ticatSoc.l;oX~aof Reiigkn in b f i n America (Westport, Cow,: Praeger, l"322).

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193

from Cuba used for this reseasch were given to me in h e f o m of mmuscripts. In contrast, Mexico has several good jou Is avaihble to the range of left currents. The avaitabiliv of discursive resources is also &red by recent economic changes m d ruling class divisions. As the BM has lost legibacy flag-bearer, the left appwitim has as the Mexicm revolution" r been increasingly effet~veat g the heritage of the great national heroes. In addition to the ob anrpks of the neozspatisfa m d rreocar8miftamovements, peopk! costumed as legendary figures such as Jos6 Maria Morelos, Sor Juana h e z de la Cmz, and Father Widalgo frequently ent's austerity measures. appear at popular protests of the gove Amang Cubans, Jose? Mart$ is cbirned by all political f the extrerne right in Miami to Fidel Castro to renovative m d social democratic dissidents. However, because the Sovxekatlon o ore orthodox farces of: the Cuban Cuba is associated bms axe better able to reclah M nist Party, changeDiffElrences among Cuban acy than are orth over how to assess the early years af the volution and its subsequent Sovietization have also opened space for diffgrent political currents to assert aflegimce to the still much beloved Che. Divisions m o n g ntling elites in the United States also have altered the refil~veformes csf old and new discourses in these nations. Faced with the latest episode of Mexico's long escalating crisis inearly 1995, the U.S. gove kess sector, and academics were angrily divided over how . The PM could not automatically comt on a U.S. bail-out, and the left opposition found itself some st-rmge bedfellows in its unsuccessh1 efforts to block the contrac*g of additional debt. Some U.S. busisrssses appear increasingty eager to invest in Cuba, befox &eir Europgm and Japanese competitors completely shut h e m out of this new market, but many U.S. policy-mak ain fiercely opposed ta nomalizing relatims with Caslh.0" gave . The position of liberal refomers in. Cuba is sonnewhat strength the growing interest of U.S, sses, but ort-hodoxy also benefits from conthued U.S. h o s ~ l i vand tf-rreatsto Cuban sovereignty. gove Fhally, the collapse of the likreral consensus in the core, combined with the deep swial crises evolvhg in countries like the United States and England, birthplaces of neoliberalism, make it harder for nrling elites of' these world powers t s c f a h fthek model as ihe only reasonable option for peoples everywhere* Because transnational eEites offer no real solutim to the planet's devastating problems, renovative leftkts are in a better position to promote antisystemic alternatives as viable and necessary.

Thus h Cuba and Mexico, divisiom redistribution of resources has opened sp tive left in Mexico has benefited far more from these changes than has the renovative current in Cuba. Cuban orthodoxy still controls considerable resources, whereas Mexico's orthodox left must settle for a fairly ted distribution of its ideas. In both nations, liberal-leftists enjoy support from certain sectors of their respective regimes, and neoliberalism ernjoys only minimal support in either the Cuban or the Mexican lefts, 5. Left-in-power vs. l@-in-opposition and the role of popular movements. A sieiiicant. differmce between the left in these two cowntries has to do with the experience of being intellrzckals of the opposi;tim versus lintellectuats of the r u l e state-party. Orthodox socialist fihkttrs in Marxico tend to dismiss the possibgity of refom and cling to notions of destroying the "bourgeois state," while the orthodox perspective in Cuba mcri~cally defends the popular and democratic nature of the "revolutionar)~state." Mast Cuban renova tors, still fundamentally loyal to the social pact of the revolution" o roject, seek full democrilcy but are doubtful about the possibiliv diate rapid democratization, givm the severiq of the crisis th the nationfs cohesion. Mexican renovators, fundamentaU1y opposed to the that broke the old, postrevolutimary swial pact, see ratiza.tjm as the first necessary step toward r w l v one views power and the process of defending it, challenging it, or redistributing it, is clearly conditioned by one's current relationship to it. Overall, this difference has made the Mexican left far more determhed than its Cuban cowtterparts to pursue a renovated vision of full democracy. Many of the renavators in Mexica appear to have some on: regardless af their past organizational or ideological affiliation, they tend ta have remained very closely tied to the popular movements of the past quarter-century. Recaff S m i r A m s s observation about the Third World intelligentsia's "capacity to remain in living and close popular classes, to share their history and cultural sion hgrass-roots poliGcs has conkibuted to a faith 's renovative left intellectuals in being able to challenge isdom of doxnbant ideology (in recent years, moliberalism) .ehrou& popular poljtical stmggk. Lketvise, the dose association with the new social movements of recent decades has provided 12. Samir Amin, "'The Social Movements in the Periphery: An End to National Liberation?" in inS.Amin, et al., Trgnsfaming the Revoltctiour, op. cik, p. 136.

fresh experiences that allow renovators to avoid the retreat to past formulations typical of the more orthodox tendencies wi noted above, several fomer revofutionary nationabsts, Le,, &ose ookd in thc! statist parad i p of the past, h o orthodoxy or embrace liberalism in the face of paradigm crisis. However, notable exceptions to this trend are hdividuals who remahed closely associated witl-1 rnass arthez Verdugo, fomer general secretary of the t Party, for exmple, expresses renovative i&as mmics, and X suspect this has m c h to do with his consistent practice inpopular struggles over many dwades. These experiences give Mexican leftists a decided advantage over their Cuban countelparts, who have operated in a political system in wkch rnass orgmiza.lims have been tightly controued by the C nist Party and autonomous grass-roots orgmhirtg has bem stfongly discouraged. A disturbing illustration of this difference is that most of the w o m n I interviewed in Mexico expressed renovative ideas, MThilf3 m s t entrenched in or&oof the women X hterviewed in Cuba were doxy. X am convinced that this reflects the ly greater strength of ist movement in Mexico and the Cubm Women Federation's subordina~onto the state-pry regime. Thus an inkuechal's relationship to popular and social movements also conditions his/her discourse and political stanee. nt is also bslsttlred by develapmmts in the lefts of the Sou&em Cone, As X have noted, d i t a r y dicttatwhips ~Xeasedbrutal repression against the lefts and their popular constituencies. Yet in Brazil, where mmy vibrant new social movements emerged during the long process of transition back to civilian rule, a strong, renovated left was born in close relationship to those popular struggles. Regarding Argentina, mother nation whose left and popular movements were brutalized by the military's dirty war, it is interesting to note Donald Hedges' obxrvatian that wKle o&er sectOrs of Pero&m moved to the right, the Feronists' populist labor organization, the CGT, "made a left-turn" and became ""ahe nuckus of a united workers' fxont."l3 The Pkochet reghe was particularly successful at disarticulatingnot only the CMem left but also Chile" higMy orgdaed civil smiet.yr, The Chillem kft, after many years in jail, exile, or underground, and without the large, organized popuhr base that once existed, has had great difficulv ~navatinga new alternative, anticapitalist project. Yet even there, the gradual re13. Donafd Hodges, "The Argentine Left Since Perhn," in B. Caxr and S. Etlner, T h h t i n AmeTzlcwn From the Fall 1?( Allende to Pertcsfroika (Boulder: Wahirrw Press, 29931, pp. f 66-16?,

of social movements like sm and envir alism i s to rmew h e left. The exi md skengtk l movements is a critical condition for a renovated left project, and the prospects for resolving the crisis confronting the Cuban revolution could only be strengthened by the emergence of autonomous, popular organizations there. Clearly, statist perspectives and problematic, antidemocratic traditions, like corporatism, caudillismo, and centralized power, remain deeply rooted in the left and the broadrsr postrevolutianary political cdhres of Cuba and Mexico. Yet, there is also strong evidence that the left has listen to history, and perhaps it will not have to repeat itself so the fiature. f am h c h e d to predict that, in the long natimalism, collective identity and pride, and c justice, which also characterize political culture in Cuba and Mexico, will give cohesion to the left's project in these comtries. The struet.ural realities of lifk in the semiperiphery encourage the search for antisystemic alternatives but do not guarantee the outcome of such pursuit. Popular culture and political culture in Cuba and Mexico, products of the twentieth century's great nationalist revolutions, will help make the left in these countries less susceptible to neoliberal discourse and to surrenderkg before the allegedly bevitable forces of globalization and the limitations of free market, electoral democracy. At the same t h e , the manifest inability of r u h g eliites and old strate@esto resolve the crises they have helped to create open an important space in which new discourses can gain influence. Conditions are such &at the Cuban and Wxican lefts are in a better p o s i t h than some to rescue what remahs valid and worthwhile ad old left social values, while simultaneously incor-poratbg the best of Liberal political traditions into a new left paradigm of democracy and social equality freed from false dichotomies of the past and appropriate to realities of the new century.

About the Book and Author Based on in-depth interviews with seventy-four intellectuals of the lefts in Cuba and Mexico, Reinventing Revolution explores the rapidly changing thinking of progressives on the big- and enduring -questions of democracy, economic alternatives, and national sovereignty. Offering a unique world-systems perspective on the sociology of intellectuals and ideology, Edward McCaughan concludes that the collapse of state socialism, the rise of neoliberalism, and accelerated economic globalization have deeply challenged the old paradigms of Latin America’s socialist and nationalist lefts and have given rise to renovative ideas that defy both Marxist and liberal orthodoxies. The book’s findings are relevant not only throughout Latin America but in Eastern Europe, Russia, South Africa, India, and other regions of the world where political, social, and intellectual forces continue to defy predictions about the “end of history.” Reinventing Revolution will be an invaluable resource for anyone interested in Latin American politics and political theory, the sociology of intellectuals and ideology, and nationalism and revolution in the Third World. Edward J. McCaughan is assistant professor of sociology at Loyola University in New Orleans.

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Index Abre~,RaMro, 113,168,169(n33) Accamtabiliv, 6585 Agicultwe, 118,119,129,132 Apilrar Montezrercte, Alomo, ICil(n53) Aldana, Carlas, 66 Alkia en el pueblo de Eas maravilltas (film), 6% 66(n80) Allianca. See Tramnatknal social alliances Alonso, Aurelio, 116,120,13&137 Alomo, Jorge, 10(&4), 130 Althusser, Louis, 17 AIvarez, Alejandro, 88,92,128,130, 13f,151,157-158,158-159,1653

17&171 Alvarez, Sania, 4,6,4&47 Alvarez Garin, Raiil, X, 56,88Eit85(n3Q), 89,92,129,159,168,172-173,176,

177 A d n #Safir, 22,134,162 Arbenz, Jacobo, 43 Arcos, Gustavo, 69 Argenha, 38,47$58,72-73#99,169,195 A m 4 sbuggle, 97(n75) Art, 25,251 Asamblea de Barrios organhation, 94 Autarky, 162,163,181 Aut-horitarianism, 26,28,33,43,44,45, 47,%, @,70,74,78,92,95,99, 124fn),135,1$4,185 Autonomy, 53,79,85,98,136,163 and culWe, 178 regional, 168 relatke na.t-ional,162,1&180,lefl, 184 Avendafio, Amando, 95 B a r o ~Srgia, , 78, 713,536,165 Efanos, Robe&, U[n5) Bartra, Rogq ;10

Be11 Lara, JosC 272 Bengelsdorf, Carollee, 26,550,68,99 Bedtez, Kadl, 90(n&) Berlin Wall, 10,36,178 Bianhi Rags, Ciro, I7"E)(nSQ) Black m r k e t 116 Blanco, Juan htonio, 25,28(n8), SO, 56,108,135,138-139,17O(n33), 180,189-190 Boggs, Cad, 12,1%20,22. Bolivar, Simhn, 54 Bolivia, 59 Bonilla, Arhro, 5655 Brazil, M, 4% 58,59,69,74,112?4,11;7, 172,174(nM),l95 Brazilian M70rkers Party (PT), 169(n33) Bush, Gmrge, X, 107, 1Q9(n10),150 Cabrera Infante, Guillemo, 179(n60) Califorka, 17'1 Canada, 170 Capital, intemationafization of, 147, 148,174. See also Transna~onal capital Capitalism, 3,4,42,43,59,70,107; 110, 120,121,152,183 global, 116,122,134,139,143, 3,147, 155161,181, 185 social m r k e t I N Cdrdems, Cuadtgmoc, ix, 30, 3z862, 63(n70), 88,90(n4), 93,96(n70), 103-104,203(n), 110,11116,151, 159(n50),191 CBrdenas, LAzarq 24(n2), ?&,H,3940, 93,143,145,175,18ca Gardenismo~m~mrdenisrno, g&%, 147 Cardoso, Fernando Hemiquef 124 Camana, Fernando, 111

Carranza, fulio, 674,117,138, 149, 155,165,169 Casta&eda,Jorgct, 11,12,13,28(nn, 44, 59,63,96' 997(n75), 107' 127,128, 138,133,148,150,150(~4),168, IS1 Castro, Fidel, 24, 26,29,51,5%54,68, 99-103,113,11~119,150,154, 168,171 "Socialism or Death" speech, 114 Castra, brig, 1W8118,128 Caudillismo, 103,104,196 CeUe be Bowmim, Olga, 1?4(nM) Censorship, &,67 Center for Research on the World Economy (CIEM), lm(n36) Chiapas, Mexico, 4(n9), 94, 95,99. See alse Mexico, Chiapas uprising in Chicanas, 171 Chile, 38,47,58,59,69,72,8"3,99,1fL3, 124(n), 252,188,188(n4), 195196 China, 81 Chomsky Noam, 171 CXEM. See Centrtr for Research on the World Economy Cine Clabano, 66 Civil socieQ, 53,57: 57(n49),73,76,78, 86,95,98,1107,184,195 and the statef "i"9,85 Class issues, 49,56(n47), 7%71,76,112, 134,152, 163, See also Bites; Working class Clinton#Hllary, 103 CNEA. See C o w ~for l Mut-ual Economic hsistancle COCEI. See Mexicat Wrker-PeasantStudent Coalition of the Isthmus Cold War, 3,42,43,1&, 107,185 Colombia, 89,142 Conceriacilin,168,168(@) Concheiro, Elvira, 93#95,109 Conflict, 81,88,175,177 Consemus, 2,4,5,6,42, 73, 81,98,148, 164, 181,186,193

Cordero, Rolando, 6142,62(n69), 63, 121,149,157,159,171 Cbrdova, Amoldo, 97-98 Core/periphery; 21, 172, 185, See also Semiperinhery Corporatism, 88,92,93,94,95,196 Corruption, 5,28,85(d4), 136 Council for Mutual Economic Assktance (CMEA), 27,145,146, 155 Cuba Confederat-ionaf Cuban Workers, 53 Consdos Populares, 7&79 Cuban C ' t Party (PCC), 16, 25,27", 191,192 democracy in, Q9-5Ot6M9,70, 75, 77-84, 99#137,138,166,174(n.42), 283-184, See also Cuba, Poder Popular famers markets in, 21%119, 218(n41) and fareign capital, 165 Fourth P a ~ C y o n p s s in, 68,150, 166

irnportslexports of81W, 190 and Latin A m e ~ m168-169,171 , military; 120 National Assembly, 64, 68,81,192 Poder Popular, 28,45,49,51,77, ;"f3, 94(n63), 100 Popular Sacialist Party (PSP), 25,2fE7, B/ 28(n7) rmovative left in, 77-M, 99, 1%135,1368 182p189,192,194 research institutes in, 192 revotut-ionin, xi, 15,2&29,24(nl), 66,99,138,145,179,186,19Q as sedpe~pheral,22-22. See also Semiperiphery single-pa&ysystem in, 80,8& 118 socialist orthodoxy in, 113-116 Union, 15,2k29,39,40, 154

Index sugar hamests in, 27#l46 Twenlry;SixlE.lof July Movement, 24 Union af Wdters and Mists (WEAC), 6fi-67 Universiy of E-favam, 9,25,28 women in, 33,53,79,137,195 See also under United States Cuban Women's Federation, 53,79, 195 Culture, 37,38,99,171,1?&180,184, 187-188,196 and civilization, 139 global, 176 Czechoslovakia, 25,26,180

Danzdn (film), 187 da Silva, Lula, 124 Debt, 147,155,159,169, f 84,193 Drrsision-making, 138,165 de la Crm, Ssr Juana fnez, 193 de fa Crm, Victor, 87,175 de la Madrid, Migud, M, 164 de la Tefia, Srgio, 90(n46), 108,134, 148,156-157 Democracy, x, 3,26,28,36,38,44, 4(n5), 183,185,190,196 and class, 56(n47) democratic revolut.lion, 96 electoral vs, social, 46 Fidel Casbo on, 5%54,68 and leadership, 103 liberal perspectives on, 57-71 orthodox socialist perspectives on, 4%57 participatory, 77,78,82,83,86,138, 166 renovative approach to, 72-99 socialist, 82,83 as socializhg power, 98 and teclnnolo~,174(n42) See also Pluralism; Social democracy; under Cuba; Liberalism; Mexico Dwelopment issues, 5,6,7,15,37,39, 44,105,133(~24),143,156,172, 181,186 Di'az, Beatriz, 169

Dim, f es&, 66(n8Q) DJaz Torres, Daniel, 66 Diaz Vhsquez, fdia, 160 Dictatorsfip, See AuthoritaI.ianism; Military dictatorship DictabrsKp of the proletariat, 51,52, 56,65,72 Billa, Haroldo, 8041,82,137-138,240 Dimas, Cecilio, 69,101,117-118 Discourse, 1&19,22,66. See also under Tie& Dissent, 50,51, '70,80,103(n), 116,192 Eastm Europe, 10(d4), 13,49,83, 106,121,122 Eckstein, Susan, 146,146(nll) Econodc liberalization, 8142, 116-11 7,118,120,121,1&135, 136,137,138,141,183 Economic/ political re3.sh.ucturingt @45,90,123,135-136,142,147, 155,1170,188,191 E c s n o ~ c vs. s politics, 116,223, 361 Education, 29,136,172,183 El Ahuzofe, 103 Elections. See under Mexico Elites, 6,19,75,-I10, 169,181,185, 191-192,193,196 E1 Salvador, 142 Engels, Frederick, 22-23 Enlightenment, 18,36 Environmentalism, 188,196 Equality, 1,15, M, 48,49,54,69,73,76, 82,87,116,122,124,129,131,139, 142,144,178,182,183,187,196 Escobar, Arturs, 174 Escobedo, Eddir?,xii Ethics, 138,139,180,188,189 EZLN, See Zapatista Army of National Liberation Fednism, 7,8,33,36,56(n47), 79,107, 187,188,195,196 Pemzlndez, Nuria, 94,94(n64), 134, 167 Films, 29,66,Ci7,171,179,187 Florescano, Enrique, 175 Ranee, 129,172-173

Index

202 Franchises, 136 Franco#Jean, 20 Frea y Chocoktate (Alm), 67,171,179,187 Fuentes, Carlos, 13,163 Fukuyama, Francis, 3,38 Galeano, Eduardo, IjS(n80) Galvlin, Rafael, 105 GATT See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade G a r ~ t b nManuel , Antonio, 139,1188 Gays, 67 Gwrtz, Clifford,17 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (CA=), 170 Germny, 128,151. See a l w Berlk WaI Cilly, Adaffa, 29-3,40,89 Clobalization, 21,122,1217; 163,167, I n l ,172,174(n44), 175, 177,184, 196 of cultme#l76 and regionaliza~on,158 See also Capitalism, global; World economy[system Goldhank, Walter849,140 Gbmez, Pablo, xi, 86,302, 12&125), 165, 167,273 66mez Ogalde, Galo, 188(n4) GonzAlez Casanova, Pablo, X, xi, xiii, 45,&5,&6,89,9G91,93,96,102, 152,lG-165 Corbachev, M i ~ a i fix, , X, 41,53,150, l67 Gore, At, 103 Governability,89,90(n46) Governments, 47,76,98 Gramma, 220 Gramsci, Antanio, 9G97: 190 Guatemala, 43 Guevara, Alhedo, 66 Euevara, Emesta (Che), 27,184 193 Guinier, Lani, 94(n63)

Hall, Stuart, 37 Harnecke~; Marta, 52,53,57,10Q 115, 1443

Hart, Amando, 5Q,CZ(;,66(ngQ),155, 17%179,1[79(n60) Haya de la Tarre, 35 Health care#29,136, 183 Hernhetez, Gladys, S1 Hemgndez, Rafael, 80,101 Herrera, Hecltar, 170,170(n36) Hethe, Bjorn, 133(&4) Hidalga eather), 193 IIintnkelammert/ Franz, 107 Hhtor~ 23,38,140 Hadges, DonaXd, 72,195 Wuntington' Samuel, 81 aarra, Jorge, 2!5,76,190 Ideolam, 19,22,23,37,43,108, 115, 141,174,189 defined, 17-18 Imperialism, 142,14f),154 Import-substihfion industriaXllzati~n~ 25,37,111,112,144,191 India, 3 Individualismt 188 Industrialization, 111,172. See also Import-substitution industrialization Ins~tutionalizalion,26,27 Inteltecfualsand the Crisis ofModerni& ( B Q ~ ~ s19 ), InteIlectualsf role, 19-20,22,23 IntercontinentalEncowter for Humanity and Agaimt Neoliberaliism, (ri(n9) International financial hstitutions, 37, 38,744,106,147 InvesMents, 21,119,168,1";73,183,193 Japan, 128,151,193 Jard6n Arzate#Edmundo, 55 Ju&rez,Benito, 43 JuchitAn, Mexico, 82 Justice, 1,15,39, M, 48,69,73,117, 918, 122,129,132,139,142, 178, 180, l96 Kahlo, Frida, xi, xii

Lage, Carlos, 11%120, 191 La J o m d a , 61,103,192 Land issues, 43,132,175 Latin Pirne~ca,3-4,&5,(i-10,13,14, 35,43,885,1Q3,120i1478151,153, 1sg1s1 integration of, 167-1";70,180 national hcome in, 4 LaurelX, Asa Cxbtha, 75,85,88(n41), W(n46), 92,93,103(n), 130, 131-1311?, 1 5 1 , 1 W l 6 Leadership, 26,29,92,94,100,101,103, 104,113,190,191,192 Lecher' Norbert, 517(n49), 58 Left, xiii defined, 1(n2) discourse of, 2,8,26,28,34,46(n11), 62(n69), 72,1111,113,182,18?, 190 Mrrxican left and Cuba, 99,100,102 renovative, 12,13,19,23,36,51, 56(n47), 61,62,65,71,110,461, 189,196. See afso Cuba, renovative left in; Mexico, renova~veIeft in South American, 32-33 wolog, 12,13,182 See also Mexico, lee-in-opposition in Lenin, V, I., 115 k n a s r n #49,51,56#[email protected] alss Marxism-Leninism Lezama Lima, Jas4,l7&179,1?9(n60) Liberalism, 3, S, 111,12,13,35,50, S7-71,82,(d2,98,110,115,1[25, 130,141,183,185,186,187,193 and demomacy;42/43, 48, 56fn47) 5,6,8,23, M,36, nealiberalism, H, 38,40,46,59,74,75y84,90,91, 106,1O7,109(n10), 111,116,120, 147, 321,123, 124,127; 131, 156 186,189,191,293 and smialism, 43,7"0,71, E, 116-124, 182, P89 See also Economic liberalization Liber@ 82,131,139,190 Lida, Miguel, 135

Literacy; 20 Literalure, 25,29,66 Living standards, 146,156 Lfipez Mateos, Matnuel, P33 Lbpez Obrador, h d r b Manuef, 515, 96,96(n90) L6pez IPodlIer, Jot&, 63(n70) L6pez y Rivas, Gilbeda, 16&16? Loveman, Brian, '73 Luis Rodrfguez, Jose, 1191 Lukics, Cesrg, 17 Machado, Dario, 51,114,156 Madama, xii Majorities, 52,53' 3,,6,5,98 M a d e i m 8Kart, 17 Mash&, 94 MAP. See Mexico, Movimiento de Accibn Popular Marcos (Subcomndante), 93,96,104, 104(n88) Maribt-fzwi,Jose Carlos, 35 Markek 3,113,114,115,116,121,158 in Cuba, 12&119 free markets, 5,38-39,106,183,186, 19.6 Latin American, 168 regulated, 128 and social relations, 225 See also State, vs. market Marti, Jos&20,50,54,80, 174, 1'75, 179, 184 193 Martinez#Ifige~a,111-212,191 Martin= Heredia, Fernando' V-78, 154 Margnez Verdugo, Amofdo, 60, 8fi(n36), 91,195 Marx, Karl, 22,105(nl), 182 Marxism-hninism, 111,113,141 Mass organiza~ans,25,33(nl4), 53, 79, 1;2,95,195 Mq&n,Cira, 109(n10), 122 Media, 20 MERCOSUR, 169,1@(n33) Methodology; 11-12,111-17 Mexico, 39,40,43,57 and Brazil, 167

Chiagas uprising in, 56(n47),62,88, 92-93,96,97(n75), 147(n12), 177, 192, See also Chiapas, Mexico Constitution, 96,131 demacracy in, 30,31-32,33,35,45, 55,59,60,61,70,75,8&95f 165, 166, 173#183,190,134 economy in, 31,111,144,155,170 elatiom in#X, 31,32,6O, 62,87, 510(n46), 92,95,128,177 and France, 1'22-173,173(n&) fnstitutionaf Revolutionary Party (PRI), ix, X, 5,16,30,31,32,51,60, 62(n(;9), 63(n";"0),69,7&75,87-88, 91,95,103(n), 110,177,184,192 left-inapposition in, 30,31,32, a, 110,124,139,166,191,193. See also Left, Mexicm Xeft and Cuba; Mexico, renovative left in t Party (PCM), Mexican 31,32, m;ilitary,90(n46) M o ~ j m i ~ nde t QAcci6n Popular (MAP), 31,32 orthodox sditlists in, 110-21 3, 112(nl4) Partido de Accibn Nacianaf. (PAN), 32 Parv of the Democratic RevoIution (PRD), ix, X, 16,%, 55,6l, 62, 63(n70), 87-98,103,103(n), 110, 29,1132,157,170(n33) in, 31#5'7,tiO, EjO(n573,61, 43(nT0), 70,89,91,96,9"2;98, 22&1;?13,130,131,133,144,145, 194 renovative left in, %99,1&126, 129,13&131,132,1Ei98 1182,183, 190,134 revolution in, 15,25,225(~1), 29,526, 144,127" San h g e l Croup, 192 as emiperipheral, 21-22 and Soviet Union, 151,152 women in, '79 Mrorktiir-Peasant-Student Coalition of the Isthmus (CXEI), 8-7, 133,175

See also ~ ~ United d m States Mexico City 176177 Middle class, 21 Military dictatorsKps, 33,38,44,72, 123,195 Modemiw, 151,36,147 Moguel, Juf io, 94 Momivals, Carlos, x, xi, 93, 1 9 , 176#177 Mantes, Eduardo, 112-193 Morales, Esteban, 75,135 Morelos, jas4 Marfa, 193 Modson, Tod, 171 Mosquera, Cerardo, 179 Mufioz Ledo, Porfiria, 191 Myths, 175 NAmA. See North Amedcan Free Trade Agreement NaC;ianalism,7,30,35,39,42,43, 9Q(n46),105t120, 111,142,160, 1678171,174,175,1768178,181, 184,185,186,196 Nationalization#105,106 Na tion-building, 148 Nation-stales, 21,32',966,167,184. See also State Nexos, 61,102,122-123 N G B . See Non-CsvemmentaE Qrganizatiom Nicaragua, 4,68,69(n9X), 149 Non-Governmemtal Organizations (NGOs),78,98,99 North American Free Trade

1613,16l(n52), 163,370

Ntiestro Tiempo' 102 @DomeEl, GuiElema, 58 Oil, 119,162,1173,184 Qlmos, Edward fames, 171 O d n a d Pascuall, Carlas, 123-124 Qr@enes,l79 Ortegaf H4&or, 4 M 1 Ortega, Jml,62 Osoda, Jaime, h-X,xiii, 42,57(n49), 58

PAN. See Mexico, Parlrido de k c i d n Nacional Panama, &lf 142,149 Paradigm crisis, xiii, 1,2, &lO,12,15, 24,33,35,4M1, 48,107,109,182, 186,189,195 Pastors for Peace, 171 Paz, %nel, 67 PCC. See Cuba, Cuban Co Pady PCM. See Mexico, Mexican Peasantry, 129,175

Pmsamiento Cdtico, 25,28,78,82,189 Perestroika, l13 Peret, B e n j a ~ n177-178 , Pereyra, Carlos, 45 Pkrez, Niurka, 164 Pkrez, Santiago, 118 PCrez Stable, Marifeli, 53 P e r o ~ s m36 , Persian Gulf War, 46,41,149,250,151 Pem, 1746n443 Plural, 102 Pluralism, 31,33,35,50,65,70,76, 8M1,103,156 Political order, 148-154 Political par~cipation,See Democracy participatory Political power, 18,44,51,57(n."19),61, 70,76,81,91,95-96,98,166,196 Political regime, 4H7,76,98 Populismt 7,171 Podantiero, Juan Carlos, S8,58(n5Q) Postmodernism, 7,8,36 Poststucturalism, 7,8,36 Pove&y,&5,63,85,108,197,ZtiO, 156 Power. See Polilricail power PRD, See Mexico, Party of the Democratic Revolution PM. See Mexico, Xw~tutional Revolutionary Party f rices, 116,129,146 Prieto, Abel, GM7 Private property; 114,135 Privatizationt 121-122,124,264 Professionalism, 86,98

Profits, 37: 165 Progess, 140,241 PSP. See fuba, Popular Socialist Party PT. See Brazil, BraziIian Wrkers Party Public ectar, 21 Punto Cxitico, 31,32,92,159 Punlo Crt'tico, 190 Randall, Margaret, 53,66,69(n91) Rascbn, Marco, 88,92,147,147(n12), 150 Rauber, IsabeL 52 Reagan, Ronald, 38,106,107 Reciprociv, l133,133(n24) Redford, Robert, 171 Reed, Cail, 68 Reformation, l 8 Reform, 7,11-12,56(n47), 65,68,72, 73,114,115,116,118,119,120,135, 136,137,15Q,15.2,183,1&4,186 agrarian, Z,.43. See also Land issues See also tlrrder Mexico Religion, 192 Representation, territorial vs. sectorial, 93,93(n63), 94,953 Repression, 31,45,55,58,67,92,123, 188,190,195 Resource availability, 19,75,84,110, 127,191,192-193,194 Restructuring. See Economic/political xesbucturing Revolution, 39,55,96,97 Revolution of 1968,2,45,185, 18"3190 See also under Cuba; Mexico Revueltas, h d r e a , 54 Revueltas, Josk, N,36 Ricardo, David, 38,106 Rights, 3,44,44(n5), 54,56(n47), 59, 92-93,131,187 Roca, Vladimko, 6W6,117",120,192 Rodrr'gucrz;, Carlos hfael, 49,153 Radriguez, Silvio, 190 Ruiz, Patricia, 92 Ruiz Garcia, Samuel (Bishop), 192 Rwsia, 86,86(n36), 251. See also Soviet Union

Sadfsr;Emir, 24 Satdivar, Am&rico,121,122,123,156, 157,159,174 Salinas, Carlos, xf 34, GOt 62, 90(n46), 147#175 Shckez Reballedo, Addfat 621 Sgncfiez Vdsquez, AdoXfo, 5657 Scien~fic-tecmcalcapacity, 122-1 73 %her, Cregorio, xii-xiii Se~periphery,21,2;?, 36,38,108,141, 144,145,146,172,173(n40),180, 184,18%187,196 Semo, En~que,60,152, 190 Sexuality, 134 Single-pa- system. See under Cuba S ~ t hAdam, , 38,106 *ial demmaey, l%,&,65,80,117 118,124(n), 191,192 Socialism, It?,&, 4&57,1135,188 five-year plans, 27 renovative persp&ives on, 136 socialist orthodoxy, 110-.116,1lkfi, 140,182,184, 187 and state control af econamy, 105, 1@5(n1) See Democracy, ssciaitist; State *ialism; under Liberalism Socialismo, 55,102 Social movements, 7,8,33,33(n14), 86, 93,94,99,107,133(d4), 154,158, 159, 177,29&195,196 Social pacts, 40, 47, 91,127 Social relatiom, 1%' 133,152 Social spending 1127 Socialw, 17; 29 Sodi de fa Bjeril, Dernetrio, 62,62(n69) Soware#173 Solidarity; 131,132,139,142,153,178, 180,187,188 Sasa Elizaga8Raqzrel, 2# South Africa, 3,103 South America, 32-33. See glsa Suthenn Cone Southern Cone, 61,72,74,123,195. See atso Argentba; ffrazif; Chae South Korea, 1172

Sovereipty, 15,29, 108, 129,143, 147-198,161, 163,180,181,184 Soviet UAon, 34,86,111,Ilfi, 141, 173(n42), l90 collap= of %viet bloc, 36, &lI 106, 147,150,154,191 Stalin, joseph, 53,111 State, 46,C">i,69, 76, 97-98,lM-167 antistatism, 107-108 Keynesian, 117 vs. market, 10S1241135 role of, 117,118,127,12&123,131, 135,13G137,2,58,164t165,187 state-owned property) 115 state-party regimes, 29-30,32,33, 48,51,57f74801,92,11Q,135,182 statism, 7,8,12,15,26,29,30,34, 35-39,43,48,53,86,107-108,110, 129,141,158,185 184?2,185,186, 196 and tramnational capital, t 64,165, 166 See also Nation-states; State Socialism; VVelfaw state; under Civil society State and RmoEufion (kh) 115 , State Socialism, 39-41,48 Staltz Chinchilla, Norma, 33,36 Struc.trrrefagency,22, Stmggle, Z,97"(n75) Student movment, 30,31,45,158,190 Supply and demand, 116,1191,118,155 Tabasco, Mexico, 94,95 Talarnante, Ofga, xi Tamyo, Jairne, 84,9&95,132 Techology; 156,172-173,174(n42) Tello, Carlos, 61 natcher' Margaret, 38,1ft(i Theoy, 17-23 Therborn, Goran, 23-24 TErd World, 3,22,39,43,233(&4), 14Tf 148, 150,164

Thompson, John, 18 Erne, 171(n) Timosi, Jsrge, 178 Tourism?119 Tramnational capital, 164,165,171, 191. See galso Capital, intema tianalkation of Tramnational covorations, 166,169 Tramnational social alliances, 17&172 Trotsky, Leon, xii UNEAC. See Cuba, Union of Writers and Artists Unemploymcr;rrt, 85,132,137(n43) 149 U ~ t e Nations, d United States, 4,108,147,149 and Cuba, 5,2&27,29,40,64(n73), 100,103,143,145,146,148,150, 353,155,156,160,161(n52), 169, 180,193 Cuban community in, 64' 69,160 culture indusky of, 176 and Mexico, 5,10,15,128,143-14, 149,151-152,163,165,167,175, 176,180,183,lM presidency in, 51 Unity, 168,69(n91), 76,100,148 Universi~es,85,191 Uruguay; 74 Utopia Unamed (Castafieda), 11,15

ValdCs, Nelson, 180 Valcl4s Paz, Juan, 1[d), 82,138,164 Vasconcelos, Jod, 20 Venezuela, 74,89,142 kracruz, Mexico, 94 Viera, Margari-ta,10")1137(n43) Vitier, Cintio, 175 Walker, Ignaczia, 124(n) anuef, 2-3# 5,125-13, B,N, 39,42,155,189 Wealth, 117 Wefhrt, Francisco, 44445,125 Welfare state, 84,134,140 Wim, Peter, 123 W~ldenberg,Jas4#6 M 1 , 60(n57), 62, 62(n69), 96,121,122 Wmen, 98,134. See also Feminism; under Cuba; Mexico Working class, 7,13,21,42,49,56(n47), 123,136,138 World economy/system, 8,12,35, 3637,42,114-115,116,122-123, 134,145,151,1c;lli, 174,180, 18S187,189,191 wodd-system theory; 17,2&22,172 See also Capitalism, global; Clobalization; Political order Vltulhnovu, Rabert, 6,1&13,23,191