Reinventing Accountability Making Democracy Work for Human Development
Anne Marie Goetz and
Rob Jenkins
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Reinventing Accountability Making Democracy Work for Human Development
Anne Marie Goetz and
Rob Jenkins
International Political Economy Series General Editor: Timothy M. Shaw, Professor of Commonwealth Governance and Development, and Director of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London Titles include: Leslie Elliott Armijo (editor) FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN EMERGING MARKETS Robert Boardman THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURE Environmental Debates and the Social Sciences Jörn Brömmelhörster and Wolf-Christian Paes (editors) THE MILITARY AS AN ECONOMIC ACTOR Soldiers in Business Gordon Crawford FOREIGN AID AND POLITICAL REFORM A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality Matt Davies INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND MASS COMMUNICATION IN CHILE National Intellectuals and Transnational Hegemony Martin Doornbos INSTITUTIONALIZING DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND RESOURCE STRATEGIES IN EASTERN AFRICA AND INDIA Developing Winners and Losers Fred P. Gale THE TROPICAL TIMBER TRADE REGIME Meric S. Gertler and David A. Wolfe INNOVATION AND SOCIAL LEARNING Institutional Adaptation in an Era of Technological Change Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins REINVENTING ACCOUNTABILITY Making Democracy Work for Human Development Mary Ann Haley FREEDOM AND FINANCE Democratization and Institutional Investors in Developing Countries Keith M. Henderson and O.P. Dwivedi (editors) BUREAUCRACY AND THE ALTERNATIVES IN WORLD PERSPECTIVES Jomo K.S. and Shyamala Nagaraj (editors) GLOBALIZATION VERSUS DEVELOPMENT
Angela W. Little LABOURING TO LEARN Towards a Political Economy of Plantations, People and Education in Sri Lanka John Loxley (editor) INTERDEPENDENCE, DISEQUILIBRIUM AND GROWTH Reflections on the Political Economy of North–South Relations at the Turn of the Century Don D. Marshall CARIBBEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY AT THE CROSSROADS NAFTA and Regional Developmentalism Susan M. McMillan FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THREE REGIONS OF THE SOUTH AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY James H. Mittelman and Mustapha Pasha (editors) OUT FROM UNDERDEVELOPMENT Prospects for the Third World (Second Edition) Lars Rudebeck, Olle Törnquist and Virgilio Rojas (editors) DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE THIRD WORLD Concrete Cases in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective Benu Schneider (editor) THE ROAD TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STABILITY Are Key Financial Standards the Answer? Howard Stein (editor) ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION AND AFRICA Studies in Policy Alternatives to Structural Adjustment
International Political Economy Series Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71708–2 hardcover Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71110–6 paperback (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and one of the ISBNs quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
Reinventing Accountability Making Democracy Work for Human Development
Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins
© Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins 2005 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Parents Act 1988. First published in 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–0624–6 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Goetz, Anne Marie, 1961– Reinventing accountability : making democracy work for human development / Anne Marie Goetz, Rob Jenkins. p. cm. — (International political economy series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–0624–6 (cloth) 1. Administrative agencies – Management. 2. Public officers – Professional ethics. 3. Government productivity. 4. Civil service ethics. 5. Political corruption. 6. Poor – Services for – Cross-cultural studies. 7. Economic assistance – Cross-cultural studies. I. Jenkins, Rob, 1965– II. Title. III. Series. JF1351.G58 2004 352.3⬘5—dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
2004053908
For Max and Nate, to whom we are jointly accountable
Contents Acknowledgements 1
viii
Introduction
1
2 Where Accountability Meets Governance: Globalization, Participation and Corruption
16
3
Accountability Failures and Human Development
45
4
New Roles for Accountability Actors
77
5
New Methods and Shifting Accountability Jurisdictions
110
6
New Standards of Accountability
134
7
Gender and Accountability
158
8 The Politics of Backlash: Critiques of the New Accountability Agenda
180
Notes
198
Bibliography
224
Index
241
vii
Acknowledgements We are indebted to many people who helped us in the writing of this book. Much of our initial thinking on this project resulted from participation as consultants for the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (Oxford University Press). We gained many insights through our interaction with the HDR 2002 team. Particularly helpful were Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Omar Noman, Kate Raworth and Ngaire Woods. Research assistance by Aaron Griffiths and Clare Waddington in the early stages of the work was very valuable. Certain lacunae were addressed thanks to comments provided by Rumel Mahmood. We subsequently engaged on many of the ideas in the book with Barbara Hendrie and Stefan Mniszko, to whom we are grateful. Fieldwork examining some of the experiments in accountable governance discussed in the book was supported by the Ford Foundation, the UK Economic and Social Research Council and the UK Department for International Development. We have presented work associated with this book at seminars at the UNDP, the International Development Research Centre (Ottawa), the World Bank, the Carnegie Endowment, the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration, Transparency InternationalNorway, the US Department of State, the Institute of Development Studies, the International Political Science Association and the University of Toronto. We would also like to thank our supportive colleagues at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, and the School of Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck College, University of London. Critical administrative support was provided by Julie McWilliam, who assisted with the bibliography and other matters. We are grateful to the editorial team at Palgrave. In particular we thank Amanda Watkins, Kerry Coutts and Jennifer Nelson, and of course Tim Shaw, the series editor, who was highly receptive to the idea of this book from the outset. A project of this kind is of course highly time-consuming, and has demanded great forbearance and understanding of the people closest to us. We would like to thank our families for their support for this and other work, and we especially thank our two sons for putting up with this for so long. We are also grateful for the hospitality and warmth of friends – both in the United Kingdom and in the countries in which we have conducted field research. We especially thank Lynsey Adams for her tirelessly cheerful assistance. Finally, our thanks go to the people whose work has inspired some of the thinking in this book. These are the people reinventing accountability in practice. We owe a particular debt to the activists of the Mazdoor Kisan viii
Acknowledgements ix
Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan, India. We are grateful to Aruna Roy, Nikhil Dey, Shankar Singh, Ram Karan and many other members of the MKSS for allowing us to observe their work, and for their willingness to share their thoughts with us. We are grateful to other friends of the MKSS such as Kavita Srivastava, Harsh Mander, Prem Krishna Sharma, Jean Dreze and Neelabh Mishra for their patience in discussing the implications of the various movements for accountability with which they are associated.
1 Introduction
Accountability is a perpetual struggle when power is delegated by the many to the few in the interests of governability. To complicate matters further, in most systems of government the task of holding accountable those to whom power has been delegated is itself delegated – again, to a relatively small number of individuals: senior judges, auditors-general, members of legislative public accounts committees. The question of who will watch the watchdog is as old as it is unavoidable. To these perennial problems, globalization and political liberalization have added new ones. Powerful non-state actors capable of influencing the lives of ordinary people have multiplied, often act with impunity across borders and can evade the reach of conventional state-based accountability systems. The late twentieth-century wave of democratization has inflated ordinary people’s expectations that governments will be held accountable, yet many democratic institutions cannot deliver on this promise. Poverty, insecurity, environmental degradation and social exclusion have persisted despite the demise of authoritarian rule in many parts of the developing world. Liberal political institutions have become discredited in the eyes of many who once placed their faith in them. It is significant that critiques of democracy have, in many cases, been framed in terms of a pervasive lack of accountability. That the focus has been on the injustices visited on poor and marginalized communities represents a sea change in popular understandings of what democratic governments should be answerable for. Impatience with biased, ineffective and outright corrupt institutions has led people to seek new forms of engagement with existing accountability systems – and to invent new ones when necessity seems to dictate it. Where they cannot participate directly in closed official oversight processes, civic groups have often mimicked their functions through, for instance, people’s audits of government spending or public hearings on the environmental impacts of proposed infrastructure projects. Technological change has helped: cyberspace provides new tools and arenas for the investigation and exposure of malpractice; even something as simple 1
2
Reinventing Accountability
as photocopies of local government accounts in rural India, or the use of cell phones to report crime in urban Pakistan, can alter the nature of information exchange between citizens and public servants, undercutting the secretiveness that disguises incompetence and enables corruption to flourish. Through citizens’ efforts to hold powerful actors to account, the meaning of accountability is changing. This book reflects on a huge range of contemporary experiments around the world that cast themselves as efforts to hold the powerful to account. It sets out to describe, not prescribe. It does not specify even what an optimal level of accountability might look like in theory, let alone provide a practical remedy for the age-old dilemma of how busy ‘principals’ may exercise effective control over their far-flung ‘agents’. It does not offer a primer on building good governance, particularly in newly democratizing countries, though its analysis of accountability failures may help to expose some of the limitations of conventional public-sector reform programmes. The book’s purpose is not to declare definitively that some accountability initiatives adhere more genuinely to the essential meaning of the term accountability than do others, much less to insist that one or another method of achieving accountability is better. Its aim is both less and more ambitious: to make sense of the trend towards accountability-seeking in societies throughout the world. What can this amorphous mass of initiative – united only by a belief that the powerful must be held to account – tell us about changing perceptions of accountable governance? Clearly people mean different things when they use the word accountability, or when they express the urge to hold someone or some institution accountable. This is almost inevitable given the plasticity of the term itself. But because holding delegated authority accountable is integral to the idea of government subject to popular control – to democracy – there is no escaping the idea of accountability. And because efforts to reshape democracy are found everywhere, so too are efforts to reinvent accountability. With this in mind, the book’s underlying premise is that there is a contemporary global upsurge of efforts to reinvent accountability in practice, and that this requires us to rethink the place of accountability in theories of democratic governance. Imperfect democratization and uneven globalization have highlighted the failures of conventional accountability mechanisms and the need for substantial institutional renewal. Nowhere is the task more urgent than in the developing world: this is where democracy faces its most serious crises, and where people will turn away from democracy most quickly if it continually fails to deliver accountable governance. However, in a globalizing world – with its diffusion effects and jurisdictional uncertainties – our analysis must encompass the many concerns that have been voiced about the future of liberal republican democracy in the advanced capitalist world as well. So while the book focuses on the poor in developing countries – those
Introduction 3
for whom accountability failures have the most dire consequences – the analysis necessarily covers a broader canvas, occasionally examining accountability experiments in the north, and reflecting upon the evolution of ideas about accountability in the ‘democracy and governance’ sector of the development aid industry. This chapter serves two main purposes. It previews, in the first section, the book’s six main arguments, in the process outlining the structure of the chapters that follow. The second section introduces the idea of accountability – its component parts, the many meanings attached to the term and the distinctions that must be borne in mind when assessing efforts to operationalize it.
Summarizing the book’s main arguments Our first argument, on which the others must necessarily be built, is that something we call a ‘new accountability agenda’ is in the making. Despite the undeniable diversity among governance experiments that have sought to improve accountability, and the widely differing contexts in which they have been undertaken, it is possible to discern the defining characteristics of this new agenda. The three key elements of the new accountability agenda are explained in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, respectively, through an analysis of case study material drawn mainly from developing countries. Many readers will question whether anything so grand as a new accountability agenda exists – a view that reflects a healthy scepticism about such bold claims. There are, after all, a great diversity of policy and advocacy agendas related to governance reform, and these are constantly in flux, changing in response to the unfolding of events. We argue that something like a new agenda is in the making, and we set out to identify its core features. Existing mainly in fragments of conceptual innovation and practical experiment, the basic elements of this agenda are nevertheless increasingly visible. Still largely an aspiration rather than a concrete reality, efforts to put the elements of the new agenda into practice are, however, more widespread than ever. In their most promising forms, these experiments offer disadvantaged people opportunities to operationalize rights and to shift the terrain of governance from technical solutions to a more immediate concern with social justice. The new accountability agenda represents an expansion of accountability along the many dimensions of this concept. To put this slightly differently, there is now a wider spectrum of legitimate responses to the five fundamental questions that must be asked when seeking to understand the reality of accountability. The defining features of the new accountability agenda emerge from the answers to the questions: 1. Who is seeking accountability? 2. From whom (or what) is accountability sought?
4
Reinventing Accountability
3. Where (in which forums and over what extent of geographic coverage) is accountability being sought? 4. How (through what means) are the powerful being held to account? 5. For what (which actions, and against which norms) is accountability being sought? Elaborating the contours of an emerging agenda along five dimensions is a daunting task. Fortunately, its inherent logic reduces the number of analytical categories considerably. For while the impetus for a new accountability agenda emerges from these five questions, its actual manifestation contains, in fact, only four key elements: (1) a more direct role for ordinary people and their associations in demanding accountability, across (2) a more diverse set of jurisdictions, using (3) an expanded repertoire of methods, and on the basis of (4) a more exacting standard of social justice. These four elements of the new accountability agenda correspond to the questions ‘who’, ‘where’, ‘how’ and ‘for what’. The fifth of the original questions (‘from whom’) becomes less relevant when we recognize that the actors from whom accountability is being sought are, more or less, the same as they have always been, and that it is the new roles being played by those who seek to hold them to account that is the most significant change underway. Thus New Roles for Accountability Actors is the subject of Chapter 4. The nature of the accountability-seeking experiments allows us to reduce further the number of the new agenda’s defining characteristics – from four to three. Two of the questions – where accountability is sought, and how – can be addressed in tandem because it is primarily in response to the changing nature of accountability jurisdictions (the ‘where’) that an expanded repertoire of tools has evolved (the ‘how’). Chapter 5 thus elaborates the emergence of New Methods and Shifting Accountability Jurisdictions. This leaves one of the original five questions remaining: For what are the powerful being held to account? This is arguably the dimension along which accountability is being most dramatically reinvented, and therefore where its implications for how democracy can be made to work for the poor most require fresh analysis. Chapter 6, on New Standards of Accountability, focuses on the changing norms against which the actions of power-holders are being judged. Making sense of something as diverse and amorphous as the sometimes ill-defined pressure for greater justice in the world – which, arguably, is what this new agenda is all about – is a task fraught with methodological difficulties. Choices must be made. Accountability initiatives could, for instance, have been sorted according to the specific activities for which power-holders are being held to account, such as public spending, corporate behaviour and the promotion of national security, or the instruments used to promote accountability, such as market mechanisms and global treaties, or even the actors involved in these processes such as international organizations and
Introduction 5
transnational civil society networks. But for their larger relevance to be grasped, it is necessary to situate them first within the currents of thinking and practice that comprise the emerging agenda. We use a range of real-world examples – ordinary people seeking improved public services, or cleaner elections, or exposure and punishment of corruption – to illustrate the importance of each of the new agenda’s key features. These are not necessarily typical of new accountability-seeking methods in general or in a particular context. In some cases they involve extraordinary risk-taking, such as when ordinary people expose the misdeeds of bureaucrats and politicians who can hit back and make their lives miserable. We examine these cases because they capture an emerging phenomenon that might be built upon to allow poor and marginal people to improve their lives. None of the experiments is ideal, either in conception or execution. Some of the most promising will be difficult, if not impossible, to replicate exactly. And while all are capable of helping to orient accountability towards the objectives of human development, some will be of more help than others. While each of the three characteristics of the new accountability agenda is analytically distinct, in practice they tend to bleed into one another. In mid-2003, for example, the British government announced its intention to honour one of the ruling Labour Party’s 1997 election manifesto pledges: to introduce legislation that would create a new category of criminal offence – ‘corporate manslaughter’. Corporate executives have always been held legally accountable for financial outcomes, and firms have in recent years become increasingly accountable for environmental impacts. Executives have long faced the possibility of being sued individually for actions and decisions taken in their professional capacities – by shareholders, employees, and so forth. But the corporate manslaughter offence would allow company directors to be ‘held to account for deaths caused through gross management negligence’. One lawyer who lobbied for the legislation bluntly described the changing standard involved: ‘Fining companies is not enough. It is essential that directors can be prosecuted’.1 This example exposes the blurred conceptual boundaries between the new roles facing accountability actors, the new methods employed to constrain them and the new standards against which they are being judged. The power-holders targeted by the corporate manslaughter legislation were familiar enough, but were to be held accountable in a different forum (criminal rather than civil proceedings). The corporate manslaughter law is indeed a new mechanism, but of a classic type: national legislation implemented by the executive. At first glance, the novel aspect of this example is the higher standard of accountability to which corporate executives are being held; and yet, upon closer inspection, it becomes almost impossible to disentangle this new, more exacting standard from either the new roles into which the actors – courts, firms, executives – have been cast, or the shifts in the legal techniques employed. This essential ambiguity afflicts almost all of the case
6
Reinventing Accountability
study evidence discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Examples cited to illustrate new methods could, in some instances, have been as easily used to highlight the shifting roles of new actors. That many of the new agenda’s manifestations display two or more features of the new accountability agenda demonstrates the tendency for these trends to reinforce one another. The book’s second main argument, elaborated in Chapter 2, which addresses a number of the theoretical concerns of the book, is that the role of globalization in generating the current wave of ‘accountability-seeking’ has been misunderstood. Democratic deficits have clearly resulted from the compromising of state sovereignty, the rise of corporate power and the indeterminacy of multilevel governance – all features associated with globalization, defined generically as ‘the growth of worldwide networks of interdependence’.2 But two refinements to this narrative are necessary. First, there is an issue of sequencing. Blaming globalization for the world’s democratic deficits ignores the existence of flaws inherent in the two basic channels of democratic accountability – the vote and civil society pressure – both of which pre-date globalization. The second refinement arises in part from an awareness of the first: the need to draw attention to the role played by other aspects of globalization – that is, beyond simply its tendency to deplete sovereignty and blur jurisdictional boundaries – in driving demands for accountability. Globalization has been at least partly responsible for the worldwide proliferation of democracy in recent years – through the work of both intergovernmental organizations and transnational movements. This has brought democratic institutions to many poor and divided societies, precisely the types of environments in which democracy’s inherent accountability shortcomings are most clearly visible. So, paradoxically, one of the main ways in which globalization has contributed to the worldwide wave of accountability-seeking is by spreading democracy – warts and all – not by undermining it. The book’s third argument stems from our analysis of the way that conventional institutions of democratic accountability fail the developing world’s poor. By tracing a variety of deprivations back to systemic malfunctions in key accountability institutions – judiciaries, legislatures, human rights commissions, ombudsmen – we gain insight into how the resulting deprivations in one area of ‘human development’, such as access to basic services, can imperil the ability of poor people to protect other aspects of their well-being, such as livelihood security. This analysis, in turn, enables us to take issue with the existing literature, which tends to attribute institutional failure to ‘capture’ by elite interests. Our argument is that the preoccupation with capture obscures a second key reason why accountability institutions fail to work for the poor – that is, systematic ‘bias’ against marginalized social groups. The theoretical case for recognizing bias as an additional ingredient in analysing accountability failure is made in the latter part of Chapter 2, while the empirical analysis of the
Introduction 7
causes, mechanics and human-development outcomes of institutional failure comprises Chapter 3. Our fourth argument follows from the previous three. We contend that (a) an awareness of the key features of the new accountability agenda, (b) improved understanding of the reasons why this agenda has come into being and (c) a more complete appreciation of why conventional accountability institutions fail – that these three insights combine to reveal a more nuanced relationship between accountability and the ‘human development’ paradigm. Our point is that, when viewed in light of the accountabilityseeking innovations analyzed in this book, certain facets of Amartya Sen’s conception of ‘development as freedom’ can be further refined. Sen portrays accountability (the ability to sanction poor performance by rulers in an effort to improve it) as one of two core benefits of political liberty. The other benefit of what is also termed ‘voice’ is a ‘constructive’ one: the shaping of shared values through deliberation.3 The case studies discussed in this book suggest that voice is not only a mechanism for directly holding powerful actors to account, but also contributes to accountability indirectly, by allowing communities to arrive collectively at the standards against which the actions of power-holders are to be judged. This is introduced in the discussion of theoretical issues in Chapter 2, and its further implications are addressed in Chapter 8. The book’s fifth claim – which emerges in the analysis of the case study evidence in Chapters 4 through 6 – is that those elements of the new agenda that are consistent with this understanding of accountability’s place in the ‘development as freedom’ paradigm – particularly those promoting a more direct form of accountability – are engaged in a battle with other, more conventional and restrictive understandings of accountability. Many of the initiatives that profess to promote accountability target only very ‘soft’ aspects of accountability, or cling to traditional notions of how the powerful can be held to account, treating the structural difficulties of democratic systems as temporary glitches requiring the application of technical expertise. Such initiatives side-step institutionalized anti-poor biases that prevent accountability institutions from recognizing and responding to injustices that disproportionately, or even exclusively, afflict marginalized groups. The further implications of this argument are a key feature of Chapter 7, which treats the theme of ‘gender and accountability’ as a lens through which to view the changing nature of accountability in general, as well as some of the specific claims of this book. Our sixth main argument is that various aspects of the new accountability agenda are fuelling a growing political backlash. The motives vary widely, and are expressed in numerous ways. We address three streams of criticism: (1) that the design of new accountability initiatives tends to depoliticize the activism of the poor, or at least to channel it into activities that fail to challenge the structural power of political elites; (2) that accountability
8
Reinventing Accountability
experiments stunt the growth of formal democratic institutions; and (3) that they further erode trust in public officials, stifling both initiative and the development of a professional ethos, both of which are necessary to produce better outcomes for the poor. These concerns, and some of the factors that may or may not affect their validity, are the subject of Chapter 8.
Introducing the idea of accountability These days, no fiery demand for social justice – or, for that matter, sober discussion of public policy – is complete without an insistence that the powerful heed the voices of ordinary people, or that ordinary people be empowered to hold the powerful to account. Over the past decade, trailing in the wake of an amorphous ‘governance agenda’, the elastic concepts of voice and accountability have come to dominate not just the development discourse, but also the language of international politics, business and activism. But the more talk there is of the importance of voice and accountability, the less these terms seem to mean, and the less relevance they appear to have for disadvantaged people. In the discussion that follows, we seek to define accountability and to illuminate some of the many usages of the term. In Chapter 2 we examine, among other issues, the meaning of voice and its relationship with accountability. Accountability is often derided as a cure-all development buzzword, a fit subject for exhortation, but something that in most parts of the world is rarely achieved because it demands too much compassion of the powerful and too much undiluted civic virtue from ordinary citizens. To people weary of hearing about accountability – movements demanding it, governments promising to deliver it, aid agencies promoting it – the concept lacks both practical relevance and analytical content. The sheer ubiquity of the term means that there is much truth to these criticisms, but significantly less so if the virtuous connotations presumed in popular usage are replaced with a more clinical, value-neutral definition. Simply put, accountability describes a relationship where A is accountable to B if A is obliged to explain and justify his actions to B, or if A may suffer sanctions if his conduct, or explanation for it, is found wanting by B.4 Accountability is thus a relationship of power. But it denotes a specific variety of power: the capacity to demand someone engage in reason-giving to justify her behaviour, and/or the capacity to impose a penalty for poor performance. Crucially, this process is as much about public debate and discussion as it is the sheer imposition of will. In formal accountability relationships it is often the less powerful ‘principal’ that holds the more powerful ‘agent’ to account: ordinary citizens vote political leaders in and out of office, the legislature acts as a watchdog over the activities of the executive, a tiny audit office demands explanations about the workings of a large public bureaucracy. Accountability institutions
Introduction 9
are designed to support the rights of these less powerful actors in the accountability relationship. On the basis of this rudimentary definition it is possible to discern two key conceptual distinctions. The first is the distinction between the two aspects of accountability: (1) having to provide information about one’s actions, and justifications for their correctness; and (2) having to suffer penalties from those dissatisfied either with the actions themselves or with the rationale invoked to justify them. These aspects of accountability are sometimes called answerability and enforcement. They can also be thought of as weak and strong forms of accountability. Being accountable in the sense of having to explain one’s actions is a lot less onerous than being subject to sanction.5 But, as indicated above, there is more than one component to answerability. A less demanding form would require a power-holder simply to furnish a rationale for his or her actions. But when this explanatory component to answerability is combined with an informational component – for instance, an obligation of full disclosure that requires the power-holder to reveal the evidentiary basis upon which decisions were taken, such as supporting documentation and testimony from people consulted – then the range of plausible rationales available to explain his or her actions can be dramatically reduced. In practice, answerability and enforceability are equally important. Both are necessary; neither is sufficient. A system that provides for sanctions alone, without a formal process of reason-giving, can make judgements about either the validity of conduct or the appropriateness of sanction both less good and less fair. The ability to learn from mistakes is then also diminished. Moreover, there are often complicated divisions of labour in accountability relationships. Those entitled to demand answers from power-holders are not necessarily the same as those put in charge of deciding on and doling out penalties. In some instances, government agencies can enforce sanctions against politicians on the basis of explanations supplied to private agents in civil litigation. In other cases the information a firm provides to a regulatory agency can, when made public, stimulate a sanction in the form of a consumer boycott. The second key distinction is between the two key actors in the accountability drama, between the target of accountability, the one obliged to account for his or her actions and to face sanction, and the seeker of accountability, the one entitled to insist on explanations or to impose punishments. Reality has a way of complicating definitional precision. Many public bodies, for instance, are both seekers and targets of accountability. Legislators are accountable to voters, but are also legally empowered to hold executive agencies to account. In the standard ‘principal-agent’ model of accountability, the principal is trying to keep tabs on his or her agent, who has less (or no) stake in the outcome of the endeavour and so tends to pursue his own interest at the
10 Reinventing Accountability
expense of his principal’s. In the version of accountability used in this book, the target and seeker correspond, respectively, to the agent (the one to whom power has been delegated) and the principal. Different terms are used in this book precisely because a key element of the new accountability agenda is the recasting of roles in accountability relationships. Many people seeking accountability do so without a clear legal standing as principals. Instead, they highlight their moral claim to demand answers or impose sanction on holders of power. Much of the accountability-seeking discussed in this book aims to empower a greater range of ‘principals’ to scrutinize ‘agents’ more effectively. An example is the way Public Interest Litigation provisions enable actors other than directly affected parties to bring cases to court. In short, the principal-agent framework is based on a formal contract model and thus does not help us to understand accountability relationships – or how to bring accountability to relationships – where power is not explicitly delegated. A consideration of the practical operation of accountability systems highlights four further distinctions crucial to understanding how the concept of accountability is evolving in response to changes in the relationships between states and citizens, between public and private sectors and between states and global institutions. First, actually existing accountability systems force us to confront the difference between de jure and de facto accountability. In the real world there is very often a difference between who one is accountable to according to law or accepted procedure, and who one is accountable to because of their practical power to impose a sanction. This is why the stripped-down definition of accountability is shorn of moral content: it does not specify who plays the roles of A and B, the targets and seekers of accountability. In principle politicians are answerable to citizens; in practice they are often more immediately concerned with the sanctions wielded by corporate interests, such as the withdrawal of campaign finance. In aid-dependent developing countries, governments are, de facto, more accountable to external donors than to domestic institutions such as parliament, since the withdrawal of international grants and loans, or the threat of doing so if certain policy actions are not taken, constitutes a serious sanction. But, again, the reality is more complicated: when aid conditionalities are not fulfilled and donors do not deliver punishments as promised, developing country governments come to realize that their accountability to aid donors is less strict than it might seem on paper. Such governments might, in practice, only be required to ‘answer to’ aid donors – that is, to inform them of their actions (and inactions) and to explain the reasons for them, including the circumstances that led to non-compliance with conditionalities. When we hear people talking about the need to increase accountability, they are usually referring to one of two things – either ways of making de facto accountability relationships correspond more closely with those stipulated in law, or else insisting that moral claims be encoded into law, or
Introduction 11
at least followed in practice. Either way, the emphasis is on placing a check on the power of those whose actions affect people with relatively less power (who nevertheless possess certain rights). In common usage, then, ‘accountability’ is shorthand for democratic accountability – accountability to ordinary people and to the legal framework through which governance is effected. Accountability is conventionally conceived as a way of providing citizens a means to control the behaviour of actors, such as politicians and government officials, to whom power has been delegated, whether through elections or some other means of leadership selection. That actors in the private sector have come to assume many more powers than they once did in large part explains why they have come to be seen as legitimate targets of direct, rather than mediated, accountability. Their manifest power over the public sphere – as well, of course, as the sense in which their capacity to act derives from the legal provisions defining permissible corporate activity – has subjected firms to a demand that they be treated as holders of the public trust, and therefore a growing insistence that they answer to ordinary people, not just state institutions, for their actions, and perhaps suffer direct sanctions as well. The concept of accountability can also be firmly located within the framework of democratic rights and obligations. As one writer put it, ‘[g]overnmental accountability – that is, the duty of public officials to report their actions to citizens, and the right of citizens to take action against those officials whose conduct they consider unsatisfactory – is an essential element, perhaps the essential element, of democracy.7 Because of its renaissance over the past decade, the term accountability is explicitly used in recent constitutions like South Africa’s. But its basic components – such as the obligation on governments to inform citizens of their actions and to justify them – have been prominent at least as far back as the US Constitution, which, to take but two examples, requires the president, ‘from time to time’, to provide Congress with ‘Information on the State of the Union’ and, when vetoing any bill, to state publicly his objections to the bill, which are then to be published in the congressional journal. The second distinction of relevance to the practical operation of accountability systems is between vertical forms of accountability, in which citizens and their associations play direct roles in holding the powerful to account, and horizontal forms of accountability, in which the holding to account is indirect, delegated to other powerful actors.6 Elections are the classic form of vertical accountability. But also in this camp are the processes through which citizens organize themselves into associations capable of lobbying governments, demanding explanations and threatening less formal sanctions like negative publicity. Vertical accountability is the state being held to account by non-state agents. Horizontal accountability, on the other hand, consists of formal relationships within the state itself. It exists when one state actor has the formal
12 Reinventing Accountability
authority to demand explanations or impose penalties on another. Horizontal accountability takes a large variety of forms. Executive agencies must explain their decisions to legislatures, and can in some cases be overruled or sanctioned for procedural violations. Political leaders hold civil servants to account, reviewing the bureaucracy’s execution of policy decisions. Bureaucracies are themselves constituted according to accountability relationships, subordinates answering to their superiors in a chain of command that ultimately leads back to political representatives, who wield a variety of sanctions. Accountability systems also empower independent agencies, such as regulatory bodies, auditors-general and anti-corruption commissions, to engage in detailed scrutiny of the actions and decisions of bureaucrats and politicians. The judiciary subjects all of these entities, and the relations among them, to further mechanisms of accountability by assessing their conformity with legal norms and the constitutional division of powers. In short, governments constrain themselves, at least in theory, through a complex web of accountability relationships in which the right of seekers to demand information and explanations is matched by the obligation of targets to provide them, under threat of sanction. The third key distinction that must be borne in mind when examining the operation of accountability systems is the difference between ex post and ex ante accountability. Ex post accountability is, in a strictly definitional sense, the only true form of accountability. Holders of power are expected to take actions, the impacts of which can be assessed only after the fact by accountability seekers, who may choose to impose sanctions if explanations for the decision, or its outcome, are deemed insufficient. But ex ante accountability does exist – for instance, when the decision-making process is subjected to questioning before a proposed action is finally approved, as when government spending plans must be defended under cross-examination by legislators, in which case the exercise of sanction can take the form of parliamentary rejection or substantial amendment. The distinction between ex ante and ex post accountability underscores the degree to which the frequency of scrutiny, and therefore the frequency with which power-holders must engage in public reason-giving, affects the capacity of accountability systems to alter the incentives facing power-holders.8 Pratap Mehta argues that one of the problems of associating accountability too closely with democracy is the failure to appreciate ‘a series of tensions internal to the concept of accountability’, such as the ‘inter-temporal tradeoffs’ that arise in the process of trying to operationalize accountability. ‘Policies that seem harmful in the short run may secure a better future in the long run. By which time horizons should we hold those in power accountable?’ This is a good example of how reconceiving accountability can help to alter the criteria against which power-holders are judged.9 Fourth, accountability is not synonymous with either the widely used term ‘responsiveness’ or with a subjective sense of responsibility. Responsiveness
Introduction 13
is the desired attitude of power-holders towards citizens: we wish them to be responsive to the concerns and problems of ordinary people, to listen with impartiality and fairness to divergent views and to subject all expressions of need and interest to publicly agreed rules for weighing the merits of competing claims. Conventionally, public-sector actors have a duty to be responsive to the members of the public with whom they interact, but to account for their actions to their managers, who in turn account to the legislature and the executive, to financial auditors and to higher court judges.10 The responsiveness of public-sector actors is not governed by the same set or intensity of rules, checks and constraints as is the accountability of these actors. The idea of responsibility is also closely related to accountability, and is also distinguished by the lack of formal compulsion. In other words, an actor may feel responsible for taking action to improve the lot of poor people, but may not be required, technically and legally, to account for her actions or non-actions. Responsibility, then, corresponds quite closely to the notion of moral accountability – being accountable to other people by virtue of a shared humanity rather than because of some formally stipulated contract that can be enforced according to an agreed set of standards. That businesses speak, mainly, of corporate social responsibility rather than corporate accountability is not a mere difference of terminology. It reflects a belief that measures taken to mitigate the ill-effects of business activity fall into the category of voluntary action. The boundaries of accountability are, however, in a constant state of flux. Political engagement of late has been geared towards pushing voluntary selfregulation into enforceable commitments – though not necessarily through state regulation. The objective is to transform the grudging admission among powerful actors that their influence over the lives of ordinary people amounts to moral responsibility into a more concrete set of mechanisms for achieving accountability. This last development moves beyond the issue of the accountability of market actors to the question of preventing abuses of power in a wide range of non-state institutions. There is a tendency in political science to reduce accountability to either a state-citizen or intra-state relationship, with accountable parties restricted to elected politicians and public officials. The result of this state-centric view has been a profound divide between the ‘high’ politics of the state and the ‘deep’ politics of society, with profound injustices in the latter arena – for instance in gender or race relations – escaping the accountability norms governing relations in the former. Thus Lonsdale notes: [i]t is quite possible to have accountability in … the high politics of the state, honest rulers and free elections, and yet profound injustice or irresponsibility in the deep politics of society, that is, the relations between rich and poor, powerful and weak.11
14 Reinventing Accountability
Power-holders in non-state relationships stubbornly resist the application of the concept of accountability to their actions. Accountability is not seen as relevant in relationships in the family or the religious or ethnic community where the mantle of authority is conferred by age or gender or kin hierarchies or spiritual conviction, not delegated by popular choice. If it is ‘nature’ or divine ordination, not popular choice, that justifies authority, dominant actors in these relationships hold themselves answerable to no person, certainly not to their subordinates, envisaging at best perhaps a temporally distant final accounting to a divine authority. Struggles by feminists, religious reformers and human rights activists to check abuses of power in non-state arenas are complicated by the reluctance of public authorities to intervene in ‘private’ matters such as intra-family relationships or religious practice.12 The subordinate members of these relationships, however, are increasingly subjecting the actions of power-holders to critical scrutiny. That this often involves references to human rights and to shifting standards of public probity demonstrates how far the idea of accountability has seeped into institutions beyond the public arena. While reforms to formal institutions may have few tangible spillover effects in these other domains – allowing power abuses to continue unchecked – informal power relationships do appear to spillover in the other direction, undermining formal accountability relationships, and thus preventing anticorruption agencies, judiciaries and merit-based recruitment systems in the public administration from working effectively. In Chapter 7 we argue that the injustices in non-state social institutions must be addressed if formal accountability institutions are to serve the cause of human development. * * * Having defined accountability, we are now in a position to analyse how and why it is being redefined. Chapter 2 sets forth the theoretical underpinnings of our central argument – that a new accountability agenda is in the making. In the process we examine the complex causes of failure in conventional accountability institutions. After then examining – in Chapter 3 – the consequences of these failures for human well-being, the remainder of the book analyses a range of accountability experiments in many countries around the world. Through all the conceptual ambiguity one thing is clear: ordinary people and their associations are demanding more direct and meaningful engagement in accountability systems. Voting at election time is no longer enough, if ever it was. The result of these pent-up demands has been widespread experimentation with novel techniques for demanding answers and enforcing sanctions. Accountability jurisdictions are also in flux – simultaneously expanding across national boundaries and contracting to cover, in some cases, very small local areas. Perhaps inevitably, these trends have combined
Introduction 15
to alter the standards against which the behaviour of powerful actors is judged. Popular understandings of accountability and the practices used in seeking it are undergoing profound change. The new accountability agenda is expanding the range of legitimate accountability-seekers. It is expressing dissatisfaction with weak or consultative versions of accountability that downplay the element of enforcement. It is exposing elite biases in the workings of conventional accountability institutions. It is promoting broad-based deliberation on changing standards of probity and justice in the actions of power-holders. It is also provoking a backlash, a topic covered in Chapter 8.
2 Where Accountability Meets Governance: Globalization, Participation and Corruption
Having outlined the book’s main arguments and introduced the conceptual distinctions that must inform any analysis of accountability, we now situate accountability within three key debates in the study of governance in developing countries. This chapter’s main purpose is to advance further the set of theoretical propositions set forth in Chapter 1. These concern three relationships: (1) between globalization and the upsurge in accountabilityseeking; (2) between accountability processes and participation (or ‘voice’), including the implications for conceptions of human development; and (3) between different types of accountability failure.
Globalization and the emergence of a new accountability agenda We argued in Chapter 1 that the new accountability agenda is broadly characterized by three elements: an insistence on (1) a more direct role for ordinary people and their associations in obtaining accountability, using (2) an expanded repertoire of methods, sometimes in new accountability jurisdictions, in the pursuit of (3) a more exacting standard of social justice. These three elements will be clarified in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, respectively, by examining a large body of case material. But what is driving this new agenda? There is no uniformly applicable answer. The people and institutions demanding new approaches to accountability represent a diverse array of perspectives, their views shaped by the specific nature of the issues that most concern them and the unique contexts within which they operate. There is, however, a common thread: a core belief among accountability-seekers that contemporary politics is suffering from a democratic deficit, which stems – to a greater or lesser degree – from globalization. 16
Where Accountability Meets Governance 17
Globalization can be defined as the progressive reduction of barriers to the flow of goods, services, ideas, people, capital and cultural practices across state boundaries. But two aspects of globalization in particular have informed discussions of accountability. The first is interdependence – the tendency for decisions or actions taken in one place to have impacts on people elsewhere. Interdependence is nothing new, but arguably its effects are more acute than they once were, and are felt with ever-greater speed. The second aspect of globalization that often arises when new accountability mechanisms are discussed is the tendency for gaps to emerge between national jurisdictions. As Michael Johnston put it, a ‘world in which capital, people, information and enterprises move freely and rapidly from place to place offers new development opportunities of many sorts, but also makes accountability more difficult. Because the agents of cross-border corruption are capable of doing business almost everywhere, it is difficult to hold them accountable anywhere’.1 Much of this is a reflection of concerns about the viability of sovereign states in an increasingly borderless world – and thus the efficacy of traditional, state-led accountability systems. In this discourse, fears for the future of democracy are never far from the surface. History provides ample grounds for worry. Liberal representative institutions were forged within the confines of nation states and are associated with a territorially bounded definition of citizenship. Yet the increased intensity and velocity of cross-border interdependence, combined with the inability of national jurisdictions to coordinate their regulatory activities, have empowered a new range of actors – particularly multinational corporations, but also guerrillas and criminal syndicates – whose actions affect greatly the survival prospects of the poor. The influence of the IMF and the World Bank, or the disciplines of global capital markets, can severely limit the range of policy options facing governments – or are at least seen to be limiting them. The proliferation of transnational and multilateral actors poses enormous challenges for conventional accountability institutions. State-centred oversight mechanisms are therefore increasingly viewed as unsuitable, particularly when it comes to protecting the interests of people thus far denied the benefits of this globalizing world. It would be foolish to deny that globalization has made the challenge of accountability even more challenging. And to the extent that people believe that declining state sovereignty is primarily to blame, then globalization is almost by definition responsible for the rise of the new accountability agenda – that is, for demands that accountability be reconceived and reordered in response to new forms of interdependence, to the cracks between national jurisdictions and to the seeming impunity with which transnational actors defy democratic controls. It would be equally foolish, however, to take these arguments too far. To do so would be to obscure salient features of both globalization and democracy, both of which must be understood if there is to be any chance
18 Reinventing Accountability
of reinventing accountability so that it serves the poor. We must therefore interrogate further some of the reasons why the spread of democracy over the past quarter century has not resulted in the degree of accountability for which many had hoped. In the process, we hope to demonstrate that democracy and accountability have a much more ambivalent relationship than is often assumed by advocates of this new agenda, and that the emergence of a new accountability agenda is as much reliant on globalization as a reaction against it. These arguments are advanced in four parts. First, to blame globalization for the democratic deficits that allow powerholders to escape accountability – especially for decisions and actions that adversely affect the poor – is to assume an unwarranted degree of equivalence between democracy and accountability. As it happens, many of the shortcomings of democracy that have been attributed to the malign influence of globalization are inherent in the faulty mechanics of democratic institutions themselves. Put starkly, representation, and particularly the ability to hold representatives accountable, is a mirage at best. This holds for two aspects of vertical accountability: voting as a form of expressing preferences, and the exertion of pressure on elected representatives through civil society organizations. Pratap Mehta has argued that observers of democracy ‘now recognize elections to be, at best, very blunt instruments of accountability’.2 Despite ‘heavy anti-incumbent voting [in India and many other countries], elections seem to discipline politicians less than we would like’. There is a large theoretical literature examining why this may be the case. A volume edited by Przeworski, Stokes and Manin is perhaps the most comprehensive and conceptually rigorous account of the frequent divergence between different versions of representation, accountability and responsiveness.3 Some of the reasons why elections cannot produce the types of accountability that everyday views of democracy might lead us to expect are relatively easy to comprehend. In the absence of a popular referendum for each policy decision – or even each policy domain – voters must select governments that take actions on a huge range of controversial issues. A voter might agree with one or another contending party on some of its policy positions, but is unlikely to agree on them all. There are also problems of information asymmetry that skew the relationship between democratic representation and democratic accountability. Voters are almost by definition not fully aware of the conditions under which government decisions are made, or even about what governments actually decide, to say nothing of the lack of clarity concerning the outcomes of these decisions. This is an issue that political scientists have long recognized, and which continues to plague efforts at pro-poor reform. One study of British welfare reform began from the premise that ‘[g]overnments face pressures to [simultaneously] improve services and … ensure that their decisions are accountable to increasingly well-informed and challenging
Where Accountability Meets Governance 19
citizens’. But based on data from a national survey, which measured public knowledge in key policy areas, the study found that in many (though not all) areas – but particularly with respect to issues of ‘redistribution, increasing taxation of the better-off, or expanding provision for those on low incomes’ – the public generally ‘hold inaccurate beliefs about policy impact and the policy context in these areas’.4 The conclusions that can be drawn from such a finding are ambiguous at best. On the one hand, the lesson appears to be that more decision-making power in the hands of citizen-empowered bodies would be the wrong way to ensure the sought-for accountability. On the other hand, there are few grounds for expecting continued reliance on conventional democratic mechanisms – the informed choices of voters – to improve the accountability of officials for their decisions in these key areas of concern to the poor. Perhaps the most radical view on these questions is taken by Fearon, who argues that elections are not primarily a mechanism of retrospective accountability at all.5 When voters exercise their franchise, he argues, they are selecting what they believe will be a good government rather than enforcing a sanction on the incumbent government. This is partly because of an implicit or explicit understanding on the part of voters that the circumstances under which government policy is made is likely to change between the successive ‘mandates’.6 Mansbridge’s dissection of the concept of representation nicely encapsulates some of the intrinsic difficulties of equating democracy with accountability. She distinguishes between ‘representation as promising’ – where politicians make campaign pledges to attract votes, and sanctions for non-delivery are meted out at the next election – and ‘anticipatory representation’, in which representatives think ahead to the preferences that voters are likely to hold at the time of the next election and seek actively to shape those preferences. This second conception of what takes place in modern political systems – a view that crystallizes the work of many social scientists and political theorists – completely reorders the conventional view of democracy. Mansbridge puts it this way: The temporal shift produced by anticipatory representation has three implications: it undermines accountability, directs normative attention to systemic rather than dyadic interaction, and focuses that attention on deliberation rather than aggregation.7 The reason for mentioning this alternative conception of representation here is to highlight the first of the three implications Mansbridge has identified: while in theory accountability is central to democracy, in practice the two are substantially de-linked. This explains why in a range of countries people increasingly seek channels of accountability beyond the electoral system. The second and third implications of ‘anticipatory representation’
20 Reinventing Accountability
that Mansbridge identifies – that it moves beyond the citizen-state dyad (and thus includes ‘systemic interaction’), and that it encourages public deliberation about values – are issues also pursued in this book. In the latter section of Chapter 1, we introduced the notion that accountability is applicable to relationships other than that between the citizen and the state, an idea that is further elaborated in the discussion of gender and accountability in Chapter 7. And in the next section of this chapter we examine the influence of accountability mechanisms on public deliberation. If elections are the formal element of vertical accountability, then civil society – and the pressure it can bring to bear on holders of power – can be said to constitute its informal aspect. The ability of civil society to contribute to accountable governance – providing an informal and diffuse ‘watchdog’ service – has been wildly oversold during the past 20 years, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Nowhere is this more true than in the field of development. The aid-industry’s faith in civil society as a channel of accountability would be touching if it were not so unfounded.8 As with the flaws inherent in electoral accountability, the problem with the relationship between civil society and democratic accountability is not simply one of constructing better versions of civil society. This is the chimera that the aid industry has been chasing. The difficulty is one of overloaded expectations, and a failure to recognize the faulty assumptions on which the relationship between civil society and accountability has been conceived. A good example of this misplaced optimism comes from Argentina. A recent study found that Argentina’s financial and political crisis, which struck in 2001, was ‘fuelled by the unfulfilled promise of a democracy in which political leaders are accountable to society’. Prior to that crisis, development agencies had ‘hoped that the growing number of grassroots civil groups would contribute to democratization, particularly in the interior provinces where clientelism and patronage have long been thought to hamper local development …’. Hopes for a more deeply democratic Argentina ‘faded as social unrest broke out in Argentina’s interior provinces in the mid-1990s and the country began its slide towards collapse by the end of the decade’. While civil society was expected to promote accountability and consolidate democracy by undercutting patronage, it was often the case that civil society groups were themselves neutralized by non-democratic forms of politics. Occasionally, civil society organizations become entrenched within networks of patronage. The study concluded that ‘[c]lientelistic and patronage-based societies … condition the types of grassroots groups that arise, the scope of their activities and their potential for contributing to democratic change’.9 The idea that it is possible for development actors to check the power of elites by transforming identity-based forms of political organization into those built around modern/interest-based solidarities is a dangerous myth.10 The purpose of this discussion is not to dismiss civil society, much less elections. They are essential ingredients in the construction of a political
Where Accountability Meets Governance 21
order in which ordinary people are empowered to assert their sovereignty.11 But the vertical channels of accountability found in democratic systems are inherently flawed. They always have been and always will be. New forms of interdependence and the ease with which certain actors have exploited jurisdictional gaps has made globalization a convenient scapegoat for democracy’s failure to benefit the poor. This tendency can be avoided if we recognize that democratic deficits are inherent to democracy. The second reason to think that globalization’s adverse impact on democracy has been overstated – and it is this adverse impact, let us recall, that has catalysed at least some of the demands for increased accountability – has to do with historical sequencing. Even if we grant that democracy is beset with internal contradictions that have always made it a flawed instrument for delivering accountability to the disadvantaged, it is still hard to deny that advanced capitalist societies have suffered a wave of discontent with the once-unassailable institutions of liberal representative politics. But how recent a phenomenon is this? Short memories – and an obsession with the transformation of state sovereignty – have placed far too much emphasis on globalization, particularly on the liberalization of trade, the deregulation of capital markets, the spread of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes throughout the developing world and the implications all these trends are alleged to have had on the policy autonomy of democratically elected governments, north and south. In fact, the crisis of representative democracy in advanced capitalist societies became a high-profile issue well before the worldwide wave of market fundamentalism that began at the end of the 1970s, at the dawn of the Thatcher/Reagan era. Even prior to the 1971 collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the first oil crisis of 1973 – two milestones in conventional narratives of globalization’s rise – hand-wringing about democracy in the OECD countries had become a common fixture of political and academic debate. Theodore Lowi’s The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority, published in 1969, was symptomatic of this tendency. Much of the crisis that Lowi and others described was associated with the cultural upheavals of the 1960s, which had little to do with global economic integration and much to do with social transformations within societies. A related sequencing issue concerns what Neera Chandhoke has called the ‘pluralisation of the state’, in which globalization has facilitated the emergence of ‘network governance’. Chandhoke argues that a new image of public authority has emerged, in which ‘the state is now represented as just one of the many agencies, organisations, or associations that dot the landscape’. The state ‘now shares power with sub-national governments, proliferating forms of network and partnership organisations, a variety of quasi-public and private organisations’ and other actors. Among the latter are ‘international agencies and other forms of supranational governance’.12
22 Reinventing Accountability
The important point for our argument is that this is just one aspect of the shift towards ‘network governance’, though the tendency has been to portray globalization (in its many aspects) as either the primary element in this phenomenon, or as the driving force behind it. And yet, as Chandhoke points out, there are at least four aspects of network governance: firstly [it] pluralises and decentres the state, by making it part of a network, which stretches not only from the global to the local but from the market to civil society. Secondly various levels of governance engage in partnerships that are based on cooperation rather than conflict. Thirdly, they (the relationships) connect to each other via horizontal linkages rather than through vertical chains of command. Fourthly, the relationships between different partners are flexible rather than bureaucratic.13 Network governance or, to use a slightly different formulation, the ‘decentred state’, has indeed given rise to questions of accountability: ‘which of the organisations which have been rightly called simulacra of governments are answerable to the citizens or even accountable to elected local and central governments?’14 But, crucially, the shift to governance was itself the result of a perceived failure on the part of the state to produce ‘efficiency and accountability’. The underlying problem was that ‘[t]he state, which by the middle of the 20th century had taken on too many tasks, suffered from both a crisis of governability as well as a crisis of legitimacy. It suffered from a crisis of governability because it was overloaded … It suffered from a crisis of legitimacy because it was not performing’ (emphasis added).15 So, to put it more directly: even if global actors participate in network governance, the faulty operation of which has no doubt partly fuelled the attempted reinvention of accountability, the rise of network governance was itself a product of an earlier wave of discontent with democratic states’ lack of substantive accountability, rather than being the result of globalization. The case of India highlights another sequential issue that helps to support the argument that globalization is less of a threat to democracy than we are often led to believe. What has contributed to India’s problems of democratic ‘governability’16 over the past 20 years (at least) is not the hollowing out of the state, or the decline of state sovereignty in the face of encroaching multilateral disciplines, but rather the success of democracy itself. India’s most exalted representative institutions – its parties and legislatures – were until the 1970s still largely the preserve of the same English-educated, upper-caste elite that led the movement for independence. The transition to a more demotic political discourse, and the entry into high politics of leaders from a much wider array of social groups, took place slowly during the 1960s and 1970s, and then accelerated rapidly during the 1980s and the 1990s.17 The emergence of pent-up demands by formerly marginalized
Where Accountability Meets Governance 23
groups – for economic goods, for government jobs, for cultural recognition – began to overwhelm the capacity of India’s democratic system to process them. It was not globalization – in the form of economic liberalization, which came late to India – that threatened the stability of India’s democracy, but the logic of democratic competition itself.18 Third, to the extent that globalization has contributed to democratic deficits, this has been largely because it has been deployed as ‘a necessary myth’, to use Hirst and Thompson’s evocative phrase – that is, as a means by which politicians evade accountability for unpopular decisions.19 Blaming capitalism or neoliberal economics does not obscure the fact that the global market is as much a product of intentional creation as it is a force of nature. And yet politicians have benefited from the ability to claim helplessness in the face of the ‘electronic herd’,20 the disembodied investors who allegedly stand ready to penalize any government that deviates from marketgovernance orthodoxy. Hirst himself was willing to concede that ‘in a multilevel system’, of the sort that currently characterizes global governance, but which is also a feature of network governance, ‘it is very, very difficult to say who is responsible for what decisions … So for the public, it is as if nobody made them’.21 This clearly impedes accountability. But the extensiveness or salience of this phenomenon is open to question. The few genuine cases of untraceable lines of accountability obscure the many other instances in which politicians intentionally blur accountability relationships. In the security field, for instance, Krahmann has observed how the shift from ‘government to governance’ (in other words, to diffuse network governance, including the contracting-out of service delivery to private providers) implies a ‘dissolution of clear lines of responsibility’.22 Rather than resting ultimately ‘with the legislative and executive’, today accountability is distributed among a multiplicity of public and private actors. Since these actors cooperate in the making and implementation of security policies … no single actor can be held accountable for the outcomes of this process. Moreover, governments, international organizations, NGOs, armaments corporations and private security companies are accountable to different agents. … Only the former three are in some sense accountable to the general public … But, as Krahmann points out, this suits the political interests of elected leaders: ‘some governments take advantage of the fragmentation of security policy making to avoid public debate over controversial international interventions’.23 And as one report on the US-led occupation of Iraq noted, the contracting out of military functions ‘enables the Americans, in particular, to wage wars by proxy and without the kind of congressional and media oversight to which conventional deployments are subject’.24 Far from
24 Reinventing Accountability
globalization subverting democracy, it is the natural democratic impulse to avoid accountability that is driving politicians to scapegoat globalization. Another example of intentional shirking of responsibility comes from the relationship between the IMF and member-governments, whether rich or poor. When the IMF takes a decision in an aid-recipient country, the IMF’s officials hide behind the truism that they are acting merely as advisors. As George Monbiot put it, ‘the lie the IMF tells is that it simply approves the “letter of intent” written by a government, in which the new economic policies are contained. This story relieves it of all responsibility for what happens’. Everything thus happens in ‘total secrecy’ – the recipient government blaming the IMF for the enforced confidentiality, and the IMF returning the favour – and as part of a pattern of ‘institutional deceit’.25 Fourth, we must recognize that, not only has the extent to which globalization short-circuits domestic processes of democratic accountability been exaggerated; in fact, globalization has itself contributed to the worldwide proliferation of democratic political systems during the past quarter century. That is, in addition to increasing interdependence and creating gaps between national jurisdictions, globalization has other, more democracysupporting dimensions that must at least be taken into account when assessing its overall impact. Though the magnitude of such democracy-supporting effects is always open to question, their existence itself is not. By increasing information flows across borders, globalization has – to at least some degree – contributed to a ‘demonstration effect’, whereby elements from successful democratic experiments in one jurisdiction are seen and interpreted elsewhere, and often suitably adapted for local conditions. This is at least part of the explanation for ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, as Samuel Huntington has called it.26 Globalization has arguably heightened expectations of accountability by creating a convergence of standards (most notably, despite continued disagreements, in the area of human rights), by extending the geographic reach of legal regimes and by bringing misdeeds to the attention of the global media audience. Democratization, moreover, has raised the ability of publics to voice their discontent with the current arrangements for delivering accountability. There is no doubt that globalization is an element in what is driving increased accountability-seeking, but to focus on globalization’s democracydepleting side is to paint an incomplete picture. Though there is by no means unanimity as to whether it was right for the international community to have acted in Kosovo,27 the intervention is widely regarded as having been one of globalization’s better moments. State sovereignty was violated, but in the name of upholding human rights recognized in international law. Even so, the result has been calls for greater accountability in the way in which the post-war multinational administration has been conducted. The UN Mission in Kosovo has prompted ‘concern [about] the impact that
Where Accountability Meets Governance 25
accountability of international actors might have on the local political and legal culture’.28 It is global actors whose accountability is being called into question, but as a result of a situation in which they have acted to halt war crimes. The latest great wave of transitions from authoritarian rule saw scores of countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe adopting more or less liberal, representative systems of governance during the 1980s and 1990s. These political changes were accompanied by heightened expectations about the ability of representative government to improve respect for human rights and redress past inequities. But the extent to which democratic systems in developing countries have resolved problems of social inequality, poverty and conflict has been highly uneven. Democracy has not necessarily reduced social inequalities. Poor people, women and other socially excluded groups usually do not find themselves or their interests represented in politics. The role of traditional political parties in shaping inclusive policy platforms is undermined by corruption, a loss of faith in party politics, or by identity politics designed to advance the interests of narrowly defined social groups. In many new democracies citizens’ expectations of responsive governance are left unfulfilled. Low voter turn-out, declining party membership and pervasive distrust of politicians are also expressions of public scepticism about the responsiveness and accountability of public actors. The failures of liberal democracy are seen to have broken the direct link between people’s voice and the accountability of public office-holders. Institutions that are part of conventional accountability systems in representative democracies, such as political parties and legislatures, are seen to have become less reliable as instruments for articulating and aggregating voice or for enforcing sanctions against improper public-sector actions. Many accountability failures in third-wave democracies stem from their particular histories, especially the processes by which ruling parties were formed during periods of struggle. These have spurred the widespread concern with accountability at least as much as globalization has. Kenneth Good cites South Africa as a case in which the political leadership had become, even before the end of apartheid, merely ‘accountable to themselves’.29 Good’s argument is that the ‘popular, participatory struggles of the 1980s associated with the United Democratic Front (UDF)’,30 the movement that spearheaded resistance within South Africa, were ‘brought to a sharp end after the return of the nationalist leaders’ from exile (and prison) in the 1990s. Furthermore, the institutions of South Africa’s ‘liberal, representative democracy have also suffered under the rise since 1994 of a predominant party system and elitism’.31 A political culture of deference to senior leadership figures, and the habit of forging pacts among elite groups (something carried over from the days of negotiating with the apartheid regime), not only muffled criticism within the party, but also severed the link between ordinary people and their representatives.
26 Reinventing Accountability
One of the manifestations of this was the policy shift that resulted in the South African government embracing a fairly orthodox form of neoliberal economic globalization, carried out in part through private agreements among senior political figures, as well as between government officials and transnational firms, multilateral financial institutions and other international actors. But to blame globalization for the forms of non-accountability that Good identifies would be to confuse cause and effect. Indeed, Good indicts South Africa’s democratic institutions, particularly its proportional representation electoral system. Citing several examples of elected ANC politicians who had been ‘redeployed’ by the party, Good observes that ‘[o]ne of the implications of the list system … is that an MP who resigns from his or her party, or who is dismissed by it, may be removed from the National Assembly … with no reference by the party elite … to the voters … .’32 This was just a symptom of a larger malaise, in which ‘the political traditions of the ANC’ meant that the ‘responsibility, or rather loyalty, of ANC Ministers moves upwards to the leadership, and when this is supported by a record of devotion, the leadership extends its support downwards to them’. Given this dynamic, it was not surprising that the ANC’s national chairman would be quoted as saying that ministers should not regard the constitution as ‘more important’ than the ANC.33 The pooling of sovereignty through the creation of supranational institutions has, to date, gone furthest in the European Union (EU). The EU is an embodiment of certain trends associated with globalization: policy andinstitutional convergence, the integration of national economies, the reduced importance of national borders and the creation of ever-more-dense networks of interdependence. It is therefore not surprising that the EU, as the poster child for at least one type of globalization, has been heavily criticized for its non-accountability. This has emerged both in allegations that parts of the EU bureaucracy are hopelessly corrupt, as well as in the arguably more serious charge that Europe-wide institutions suffer, systematically, from a democratic deficit: decision-making that is increasingly remote from ordinary people, multiple layers of bureaucracy that blur lines of accountability, an elected European Parliament whose role is highly circumscribed (allegedly the reason why turnout rates for European elections are so abysmally low), and so forth. But this negative image has been robustly challenged, and not merely by officials with a stake in the system. The EU, the vision of what globalization could or will be, is not suffering a democratic deficit, argues Moravcsik.34 In fact, Moravcsik goes so far as to call the EU’s democratic deficit a ‘myth’, and a dangerous one at that.35 The EU, he contends, is a force for increased democratic accountability. The EU is not a superstate, practices ‘limited government’, has few powers of coercion, requires large majorities in order to pass legislation, is more transparent, and is a better reflection of public opinion than are most of the EU’s member-states. One reading of Moravcsik’s argument could
Where Accountability Meets Governance 27
be that the EU, despite his arguments, is less responsive than most domestic institutions; but, by his reading, it is certainly not less accountable. Even if late twentieth-century democratization can be decried as hollow in substance – low-intensity, semi-authoritarian, or illiberal – these attributes have been a feature of new democracies since long before global trade flows and transnational capital markets began to exercise their disciplinary functions. India’s political system – formally democratic since 1947 – has long had its democratic credentials called into question. Ayesha Jalal, in a play on the bureaucratic authoritarian description applied to many Latin American countries during the 1960s and 1970s, referred to India’s post-independence political system as a form of ‘democratic authoritarianism’,36 thus showing it to have more in common with its counterpart political system over the border in Pakistan than many may previously have realized. The point is that, while over the past 20 years globalization may have increasingly constrained the leaders of fledgling democratic states in some respects, for poor and marginalized people democracy reneged on its promises quite a bit earlier. So while globalization can be blamed for many things, it is not always and everywhere the cause of decreased accountability. As we have maintained, there is a clear case for seeing the disaggregation of the state and the blurring of jurisdictional boundaries as part of the reason why concerns about accountability have been on the rise. But this is just part of the story. Movements demanding greater accountability – and innovative experiments attempting to furnish it – are in many cases a reflection of the heightened expectations on the part of ordinary people and their associations that globalization has also carried in its wake – through the increased flow of information and awareness across borders, and the promotion of worldwide standards of human rights. To repeat, we do not claim that globalization has had no impact on democracy, just that the impacts are more complex than often appreciated. The new accountability agenda displays many features that are a reflection of globalization’s diffusion of ideas about acceptable modes of governance. Proponents of new forms of accountability have experimented with techniques that can either reach across, or work at levels below, national jurisdictions. These are discussed in Chapter 5.
Voice, accountability and human development We now turn to the relationship between accountability and a term with which it is often paired – voice. In the World Bank’s ‘Voice and Accountability’ index, for instance, political systems that score highly are deemed to be more democratic than those that score less well.37 Our aim is to critique some of the ways in which the idea of accountability has been conceived in relation to voice, and to advance an alternative view of the role of accountability in advancing human development.
28 Reinventing Accountability
As liberal representative political systems replaced authoritarian regimes throughout much of the developing world during the late twentieth century, hopes were raised in the power of free expression, democratic deliberation and political choice to improve the lot of poor and vulnerable people. But neither constitutional checks and balances (the machinery of accountability) nor the sanction of the ballot (the definitive expression of voice) are proving sufficient to make governments live up to their promises. All too often their decisions on how to spend public funds, administer justice, deliver services, promote national security and regulate economic activity favour more powerful social groups. Even worse, more and more of those groups seem to operate from beyond the reach of national politics. Multinational firms, transnational religious movements, international NGO networks, multilateral economic institutions – all are engaged in activities that affect the lives of ordinary citizens, but are not easily subjected to state, and therefore popular, control. More recently, attention has shifted from the establishment of democratic institutions to the task of making them produce better outcomes, particularly for disadvantaged people. Conventional forms of political voice and accountability – two of the defining features of liberal democracy – have not been able to safeguard the interests of the poor. Voting in elections, joining political parties and seeking to influence their agendas, expressing preferences in community forums – none of these channels of voice has been adequate to the enormous task of sanctioning governments for failing to promote human development. Not only has the direct link between people’s voice (the legally protected expression of preferences) and the accountability of public office-holders been broken, the indirect mechanisms for enforcing accountability (through, for instance, the courts and public auditors) have also in most developing countries failed spectacularly. Indeed, what some people have called a crisis of representation – the breakdown in the relationship between non-elite citizens and representatives who act on their behalf – is a widespread phenomenon, north and south. Regardless of the role played by globalization, there is no denying the proliferation of demands for new ways of making powerful actors, within and beyond the state, accountable for the impact of their actions on poor people. The response has often taken the form of efforts to increase ‘participation’, most notably through a proliferation of consultative exercises to bring the ‘voices of the poor’ to the ears of policy-makers. Initially welcomed, these initiatives have increasingly been dismissed as tokenism. They rarely come with measures obliging officials to take action or even to supply citizens with the basic information they need to make judgements about the appropriateness of government decisions and actions. A growing chorus of critics has sought to shift the focus from capturing the voices of the marginalized to holding the powerful accountable.
Where Accountability Meets Governance 29
But how is accountability different from ‘voice’, and why do they matter for human development? Voice is a metaphor for the variety of ways in which people express beliefs, articulate preferences and advance their interests. Voice can be expressed individually or collectively. It can stake out original claims or react to official decisions. Moreover, any of these variants may be peaceful or socially disruptive, and may take place within the arenas of civil society, between and inside political parties, through interactions between citizens and state institutions or within the state itself. The voice of socially excluded groups may be elicited as part of consultative exercises conducted by public and private power-holders, with no promise that their views will be acted upon, or it can be asserted by right, with an expectation of consequent action. These distinctions do not exhaust the range of conceptual quandaries associated with the term, but are suggestive of the many factors that must be considered when seeking to understand the concept of voice or its application to problems of human development. The term ‘voice’ is drawn from Albert O. Hirschman’s classic study Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.38 Hirschman classifies voice as one of three strategies through which people seek to exert influence. The other two – when they exist as practical options – are exit and loyalty. Exiting denotes seeking an alternative to the existing organization, when one is formally available, or else making do with some informal substitute. Loyalty denotes improving one’s prospects through attachment to the centres of power. In the context of governance, voice describes how citizens express their interests, react to governmental decision-making or the positions staked out by parties and civil society actors. Over the past two decades, many citizen voice initiatives, undertaken in a huge variety of developing countries, have sought to expand consultation between officials and ordinary people over policy-making. There are parallels in advanced democracies: citizens’ juries, consultative forums, local social audits. While there is much deserved scepticism surrounding these initiatives, a number of studies indicate that they have had at least some accountabilityenhancing impacts in poor countries. Fiszbein found that in Colombia citizens’ direct participation in service delivery, combined with instruments for surveying local opinion, ‘promoted accountability’ by increasing citizens’ awareness of local governments’ actions and inactions, thereby enhancing their ability to assess the validity of justifications for decisions offered by officials. Increased participation led to increased demands for effective local government, which increased the political costs of inefficient and inadequate public decisions. One result was that local authorities began punishing errant bureaucratic personnel (mainly through transfers) in response to local expressions of voice.39 However, through sheer repetition, the plea that decision-makers must hear the voices of the poor has lost whatever resonance it might once have
30 Reinventing Accountability
commanded. Simply listening to these voices, and doing little to respond to their insistent demands, has discredited the idea that promoting voice is central to improving human well-being. Behind well-meaning efforts to broadcast the concerns of the poor40 lies an overestimation of the willingness of politicians to respond to what is, after all, a constituency that rarely exercises decisive influence in electoral politics. There is an assumption that more ‘voice’ for socially excluded groups will strengthen the moral and social claims of the powerless and result in a better representation of their interests in decision-making forums, and thence to a tangible influence on politics. Why this should occur without concrete compulsions for elite actors to change their behaviour (and to forgo patterns of decision-making that have long enriched them and their clients) is left unexamined. The notion that ‘voice’ will lead to interest representation and to influence over policy-making not only reveals a highly voluntarist (and classically liberal) perspective on political participation, it obscures the fact that the institutions of political competition and of governance may internalize elite biases to the point that they contain and diminish the voice of certain social groups. For instance, intervening between the expression of voice and the representation of interests in government are electoral institutions whose rules can restrict the representation of diverse interests, and thus return to office only politicians drawn from a narrow social category. Between the representation of interests and the implementation of policy a range of institutions of public oversight likewise often work to screen out non-elite interests. Front-line service delivery agents often fail to implement top-level policy directives to include the poor in their work, and do so with impunity because performance-monitoring systems are not geared to detect abusive treatment of poor clients. Judicial institutions may be closed to would-be litigants from the ranks of the poor because of high knowledge and financial access barriers, or because there are no provisions enabling the poor to act as a class in public interest litigation cases. Chapter 3 details these and other forms of institutionalized bias. The point is that too exclusive a focus on voice obscures the unequal power relationships embedded in the electoral process and public oversight functions – the basic institutions of formal accountability systems. The voicing of preferences or judgements divorced from the necessity of consequent action is akin to shouting in the void – somewhat cathartic perhaps but ultimately ineffective. This has led critics to dismiss the ‘participation industry’, by far the fastest growing sector of the aid and development business, as little more than purveyors of a sophisticated form of faithhealing.41 There is much truth to this. The vast majority of participation exercises empower people only by default – by indirectly disseminating information about government initiatives and beneficiary entitlements, or by bringing isolated people together into self-help groups or users’ associations required
Where Accountability Meets Governance 31
under programme guidelines. But the information provided is selective by nature. And the groups formed under such externally imposed circumstances are not easily sustained. Nor do they readily adapt themselves to other collective purposes. Arguably, the most empowering effect of exercises designed to capture voice is completely unintended, which is to catalyse indignation at their failure to produce action. Whether initiated by government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private-sector businesses or party pollsters, attempts to elicit the voices of ordinary or marginalized people are ultimately conducted on terms dictated by the organizers. They are ‘by invitation only’. They are the powerless answering to the powerful. Genuine accountability reverses this relationship, making the powerful answer to the stifled majority in whose name they act, under threat of sanction. Hence the growing desire to demote voice and focus on accountability. It is a logical progression. Or is it? The fact is that voice and accountability are conceptually distinguishable, but inseparable in practice. For there to be answerability – the obligation of power-holders to justify their decisions and actions – someone has to be asking the questions. And if these questioners are to be drawn from beyond the ranks of government itself, then ordinary people must be endowed with voice. But the voice presumed in accountability relationships is very different from that of the focus-group participant. The genuinely ‘questioning voice’ has access to information about the context in which decisions were taken, including the legal requirements governing the actions of power-holders and the public promises made prior to action. Information is never ‘perfect’, and asymmetries will always be a feature of the relationship between accountability targets and the actors that seek to hold them accountable. But the obligation that power-holders engage in reason-giving, that they rebut charges of incompetence and ulterior motive, forces a crucial transition from passive to active voice. Participation, within a relationship of accountability, becomes interrogation. This highlights the need for participation to be accompanied by a range of instrumental rights – to information, to litigate, to issue dissenting reports through mechanisms that mimic the state’s public judicial function. We gain a greater understanding of the complex relationship between accountability and voice – the freedom to express opinions and to have a say in leadership selection and policy choice – by considering Amartya Sen’s work on the connections between political liberties and development outcomes. Sen’s ‘Development as Freedom’ paradigm identifies three benefits that arise from the bundle of political freedoms of which voice is an integral part.42 The first is the inherent value of liberty. The ability to express beliefs and to share in the management of one’s own community is a good in itself. Voice is thus integral to human development. The second benefit of political freedom (including the right to free expression, to assemble, to vote, and so forth) is its ‘instrumental value’. This
32 Reinventing Accountability
corresponds to the voice-accountability linkage described above, in which voice – expressing an electoral preference at the ballot box, or exposing misconduct through access to information – disciplines power-holders by forcing them to respond to their constituencies. Sen’s path-breaking work on the role of democracy in preventing famine, and in particular the space democracies create for a free press, is a constant point of empirical reference in his analysis of voice and political freedom. The instrumental value of voice is also manifested through other accountability channels, such as courts, where citizens and their associations are free (in theory) to litigate against the state and other powerful actors. The third benefit Sen ascribes to free voice is its ‘constructive’ role. This is distinct from its ‘instrumental’ value in that the focus is not on using voice to sanction errant officials, either through elections or through the horizontal (state-to-state) channels of accountability. Instead, Sen refers to the ability of political freedom to foster deliberation – the interplay of many different voices. Freedom of voice allows citizens to engage in open debate over social goals and the trade-offs that collectivities are willing to make in order to achieve them.43 It is the first of these benefits of political liberty – its instrumental value – that has to date attracted the most attention in discussions of the relevance of Sen’s work to improving accountability. Bhargava’s account of Sen’s conception of the ‘instrumental’ and ‘constructive’ roles of political freedom focuses almost entirely on the former. Political freedoms, Bhargava argues, have instrumental value, particularly in poor societies. They make governments accountable and responsive to ordinary citizens, prevent rulers from privately consuming a large share of resources or squandering them publicly, protect us from poor governance, help governments to take correct decisions, and by providing a space for people to come together and act publicly, they help ensure the provision of essential services and monitoring their functioning. This instrumental value in poor societies extends also to prevention of catastrophes. Despite severe crop failure and massive loss of purchasing power, there has been no recurrence of famine in India since 1943.44 Barely a sentence in Bhargava’s analysis is devoted to the idea that political freedoms also ‘have a constructive value because through dialogue, discussion and debate, we come to understand what our real needs really are’.45 In short, both Sen and his interpreters associate accountability solely with the ‘instrumental’ category. And yet the ‘constructive’ role of political freedom is just as crucial, if not more so, in holding the powerful to account. While instrumental voice allows people to judge the performance of powerholders, and to determine whether they deserve to be sanctioned, it is voice’s ‘constructive’ role that makes possible the creation of standards for making
Where Accountability Meets Governance 33
these judgements. The ability to sanction poor performance is immeasurably degraded when norms concerning public conduct reflect a very narrow range of voices. Open dialogue allows societies to arrive at more inclusive values about justice, obligations, rights and needs. Voice, in its contribution to free and public discussion, helps to forge public norms – or what we call in Chapter 6 ‘standards of accountability’. Above all, voice permits political communities to arrive at a shared understanding of the norms and values that should govern the conduct of public life. There is another link between accountability and the ‘constructive’ role of freely expressed voice. The very accountability institutions that are used in the process of instrumentally applying voice to sanction substandard performance themselves become forums for the type of constructive interaction among voices that is essential to redefining the public standards against which accountable actors will be held in future rounds of scrutiny. Public judicial proceedings – whether in the formal legal system or, as we shall see in Chapter 5, in informal efforts to mimic otherwise inaccessible legal processes – are among the great forums through which values are constructed, challenged and reformulated to adapt to changing expectations of social justice. To put our argument slightly differently, the two consequential benefits of free political voice for human development are complementary – or synergistic – in ways that have not been recognized. Societies must define standards in order to decide what to hold governments accountable for. And it is in the process of demanding accountability that we find the most impressive kind of constructive voice issuing forth: the questioning voice. The articulation of belief that takes place in the process of public judgement – when great cases are on trial, representing huge issues – is the form of voice in which standards are ultimately set. And it is participating in this way that is perhaps the most fulfilling manifestation of citizenship. This is why people become fixated on particular trials (from the Dreyfuss Affair to the Nuremburg Trials to the Watergate Hearings). This happens not just because of an obsession with personalities and salacious details – though that is part of it – but also because ordinary people (in the form of juries, but also the public at large, reflected in the ubiquitous public-opinion polls) are involved in handing down a verdict. In doing so, they are shaping – not just reflecting – public standards of accountability. There have been both positive and negative assessments of judicial activism throughout the world – that is, of judges whose constitutional interpretations expand the scope of rights, and thereby increase the state’s obligations to its citizens. Some claim it increases justice to the poor; others that it hijacks legitimate democratic power. One analysis of India’s Supreme Court argued that, regardless of these instrumental impacts, the trend towards judicial activism in India has enhanced the possibilities of voice playing a constructive role – that is, in helping, through open deliberation, to shape the standards that public actors are expected to uphold. As Indian
34 Reinventing Accountability
judges began to admit public interest litigation, and to formulate rulings in ways that addressed the concerns of social justice, [a] wholly novel conception of judicial power and process began to emerge. Adjudication emerges as a form of social conversation among the activist judiciary and social/human rights movements … on the nature and future of India’s potential for just constitutional governance. Social conversation on issues of law, rights, and justice is no longer a matter of cultivated discourse by, of, and for the professional managerial classes. … It now becomes a form of conversation among multitudinous narrative voices through which [subordinated social groups] represent the power of the oppressed no longer as power of exit but as power of speech.46 Regardless of the limits of this trend – its reversibility, its tendency to create social-activist middlemen, etc. – Baxi argues that ‘[i]t is simply undeniable that a remarkable, even profound, transformation of social conversation concerning governance, rights, justice and development … has occurred’.47 So, not only is voice used to interrogate power-holders for their decisions and actions, or to render a judgement on the need for sanction or the form it should take; the freedom to express opinions – the interplay of many voices – is the means by which societies collectively evolve the standards of justice and morality against which the actions of the powerful are to be assessed. It is this constructive role of voice – often exercized through accountability institutions themselves – that has been particularly evident in the emergence of a new accountability agenda. Benjamin Goldfrank’s work on decentralization and participation in Montevideo highlights these different approaches to voice. Goldfrank observes that ‘mainstream developmentalists’ view citizens as either: (a) suppliers of raw material used by experts to improve public policy design, or (b) volunteer labourers in limited development projects. He thus distinguishes between participation as information-provision, and participation as deliberation – the latter involving a substantive engagement in decision-making. Citizenled accountability procedures can foster these skills; they can prepare people to derive full value from the constructive benefit bestowed by political liberty. Even conceding most criticisms of the weakness of voice-based governance experiments, there is nevertheless always the possibility that even where voice has not been ‘heard’ in the design of programmes, it can be a latent force activated towards instrumental objectives. The rise of accountability-seeking demonstrates that demands are often: (a) driven by groups other than the poor, or (b) for motives other than the most altruistic. The question of how and why demand for accountability is generated is controversial.
Where Accountability Meets Governance 35
Sometimes these rights-seeking outcomes are unintentional. The chief minister of the Indian state of Goa had intended to muzzle the press when in 1997 he passed a so-called Right to Information Bill that contained several draconian provisions. This generated pressure, which in the end proved successful, for a revision of the legislation. Goa thus ended up with what was, for a time, India’s most liberal information regime, as well as a new civil society constituency committed to using these new rights to scrutinize more closely government decisions and spending patterns. This was an unanticipated consequence, but one that competitive democracies tend to produce.48 In a similar vein, Caseley observes that the governance reforms introduced in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh during the 1990s were largely motivated by Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu’s desire for political control. While only partially successful in actually improving accountability, these reforms resulted in increased accountability-seeking. Caseley notes, however, that a prerequisite for this trend was the prior 20 years of democratic mobilization that had taken place in Andhra Pradesh.49
Beyond corruption: alternative causes of accountability failure This third part of the chapter lays the basis for the analysis of human development deprivations found in Chapter 3 by examining the relationship between accountability and corruption. It makes a case for moving beyond corruption as the sole reason why accountability institutions fail to deliver justice to the poor. Accountability failure can thus be seen to derive from two sources: capture and bias. The category of capture consists mainly of corruption – the illegal use of public power for private gain – but also other forms of undue influence that do not, technically speaking, constitute corruption in that they stem from the intimidation faced by officials (from, for instance, politicians and the criminal underworld) rather than from an interest in direct pecuniary gain. Bias refers to practices that are not illegal or motivated by the desire for private benefit, but nevertheless involve allocative or regulatory decisions that benefit already advantaged groups. The literature on accountability, especially quantitative literature, tends to attribute accountability failure to corruption. We argue, however, that bias-related failures are equally important in explaining why accountability institutions have not worked for the poor. When analysing the nature of a corruption-related accountability failure – which must be undertaken if a remedy is to be devised – it is necessary to consider the ways in which corruption affects poor people’s well-being, particularly the longer-term impacts on their (mainly political) capacities to obtain or preserve welfare gains. Corruption adversely affects the poor along three dimensions of citizenship. Each corresponds to one of the three critical relationships in which citizens must engage – with the state, with the
36 Reinventing Accountability
market and with civil and political society. First, pilfering of state resources intended to benefit the poor (such as subsidized food) is the most obvious example. Resources available for targeted schemes are reduced ex ante through tax evasion by the rich. And when resources devoted to programmes intended for universal provision (for poor and non-poor alike) are diverted through corrupt practices, this has a disproportionately negative impact on the poor, since unlike many other segments of society they are ill-prepared to substitute private provision. Second, corruption impairs the ability of the poor to achieve market gains. Not only does the draining of public resources for education and healthcare harm the market prospects of the poor; the state’s failure to enforce laws regulating market behaviour has dire consequences for many of their number. In the industrial sector, labour and environmental health standards are routinely flouted. In rural settings, land-tenure guidelines, credit-market regulations and minimum-wage laws pertaining to agricultural workers are subverted by the corrupt practices of officials charged with enforcing them. While these examples concern the economic relationships of the poor as producers, it is essential to recognize the ill effects that can also befall them as consumers. When policing of the market is lax, collusive relationships between firms and other organized economic agents (such as agricultural cooperatives) can impede whatever scant benefits poorer citizens may have been able to derive from their productive activities or from redistributive programmes implemented by the state. The third dimension of citizenship through which corruption affects the poor concerns participation in civil and political society. This is clearly related to the first two dimensions insofar as these forms of participation are undermined by resource-deprivation and a hostile market environment. The skimming of state resources at local levels tends further to enrich those groups in rural society responsible for denying social and economic opportunity to the poor in the first place. Their collective prestige and influence, combined with the collusive relationships they forge with state officials, can thwart the nascent self-help activities of poorer groups in the political sphere. For instance, state officials whose services have been bought by social elites to rig agricultural markets and evade taxation are not likely to call out the police against their powerful accomplices when the latter engage in violence or intimidation to prevent poorer people from attending village assemblies or organizing their own public meetings. It is through such sustained relationships between local elites and the state administration that networks of corruption – spanning the domains of developmental activity, market transaction and organized politics – have their most devastating impact on the poor. It is also important to take note of the longer-term impacts on poor people’s political capabilities. Corruption undermines movements for
Where Accountability Meets Governance 37
accountability. First, corruption contributes to creating an environment in which potential political allies of the poor become compromised by institutionalized corruption within the arena of civil and political society. Corruption is also an impediment to changing the relationship between citizens and corporations so that firms are more directly answerable to and sanctionable by citizens and their associations. Accountability institutions also fail the poor due to non-corrupt, but nevertheless biased, official decision-making. Bias-related accountability failures occur when the poor or other socially marginal groups remain disadvantaged because of built-in (or institutionalized) impediments to the reduction of the deprivations they face. We distinguish two main varieties of bias that have particularly adverse impacts on disadvantaged people. First, accountability institutions may simply have no formal remit for addressing injustices experienced by marginal groups. Biases in the wording, interpretation and enforcement of laws allow perpetrators who violate the rights of disadvantaged people to escape punishment. One example is the law of provocation in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, which does not penalize men who kill in self-defence, but imposes a maximum penalty on women who premeditatedly kill abusive husbands. Other laws and judgements can have built-in biases against the poor. Bureaucratic reporting systems – another internal accountability institution – may similarly fail to protect the poor. This is manifested in the criteria against which bureaucratic performance is measured. Many personnel procedures neither punish officials whose actions discriminate against disadvantaged people, nor reward those who achieve positive outcomes for the poor. Behaviour that is procedurally correct may disguise aspects of policy or programme design that are biased against underprivileged sections of society. Dominant social groups often receive higher levels of public services because of unexamined assumptions about their greater efficiency or desert. Staudt’s study of agricultural extension services in east Africa found that men were favoured over women, both because men were considered more likely to increase agricultural productivity, and because male extension workers found it more convenient to interact with male farmers.50 Health services may be oriented to the needs of better-off members of society, with medical research and clinic treatment protocols privileging attention to the illnesses of the urban middle classes. Front-line medical staff therefore routinely fail to diagnose or treat the ailments of the poor, and public health budgets neglect investment in rural and preventative services. The accountability systems within health service bureaucracies and the professional bodies charged with upholding scientific and ethical standards may not take action, or at least may perceive themselves to be impotent to intervene, because staff have followed formally sanctioned procedures and met standards stipulated by the medical profession.
38 Reinventing Accountability
While this first ‘no remit’ variety of bias denotes the incapacity of accountability systems to react to failures of public actors to act in the interests of the poor or social justice, the second variety prevents the poor from demanding accountability on their own behalf. There are a range of antipoor biases built into the mechanisms through which citizens are entitled to use accountability mechanisms directly, such as the access restrictions that face litigants who might wish to seek judicial remedies against powerful state or non-state actors. The first kind of bias is a failure to treat inequities in public-resource distribution as unjust and intolerable; the second prevents those most affected by these inequities – the poor themselves – from challenging elite-biased standards of accountability. These two varieties of bias – in the standards against which the performance of public actors is measured, and in the terms of access to accountability institutions – may simply reflect assumptions made by policy-making elites about client needs and rights, and about which kinds of citizens possess the resources and skills necessary to engage in accountability processes. These assumptions reflect not only class biases, but also other forms of bias based upon ethnicity, religion, race, age and gender. These are largely unintended biases, and all the more insidious for being so. Indeed, they are harder to expose and to excise than sheer corruption or capture because they are often internalized and normalized. In the process of arguing that accountability is ‘the hardest governance reform’, Stiglitz lends indirect support to the idea that bias (rather than simply capture) is part of what makes it so difficult. Asking who ‘the IMF is directly accountable’ to, Stiglitz reminds us that it is not just national governments in general, but finance ministries and central banks in particular. This means that the standards against which the IMF’s performance is judged by national governments has a built-in institutional bias. Were national governments represented at the IMF by labour or social welfare ministries, Stiglitz argues, the nature of accountability would be substantially different.51 An example of the intersection of both forms of bias is the failure of many legal systems to prosecute gender-based violence adequately. For instance, until 1995 Bolivia’s judicial institutions had no formal remit (the first type of bias) to prosecute cases of domestic violence. It was not defined as a crime. Women who suffered from domestic violence had no means of challenging this bias, because of the second type of bias: they had no locus standi in court because wives were denied the right to take legal action against husbands. This constituted a built-in barrier to married women’s access to justice. It reflected institutionalized biases, which presumed their consent to the loss of certain rights. In Chapter 7 we explore specifically gendered patterns of capture and bias in more depth because these expose a particularly resilient form of accountability failure.
Where Accountability Meets Governance 39
Another illustration of the complexity of the relationship between capture and bias is the case of Shiv Bachan Ram, a north Indian Dalit (exuntouchable). Ram was the victim of violence inflicted by a member of the middle-ranking Ahir caste. His crime was seeking to draw water from the village well, something that social prejudice has long prevented Dalits from doing in many parts of India, though things have progressed considerably over the past few decades.52 Currently, violence against a Dalit requires a case to be registered under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The accused, however, claimed that the atrocity charge (a more serious violation than common assault) could not apply in this case: the victim was not a Dalit, the accused insisted, because his father was born an Ahir, and it was only as an adult that he was excommunicated from the Ahir community for having married a Dalit woman. Even though Ram’s father had thenceforth lived among Dalits, and had assumed a Dalit identity – and therefore his son, Ram, was regarded by the village community as a Dalit (which was why his attempt to use the village well earned him a beating) – despite all this, the alleged assailant claimed that Ram was not a Dalit because he was the son of a man born an Ahir. An individual’s caste status, legally speaking, is determined according to the rule of patrilineality. In the end, there was no legal remit for holding the accused accountable for the hate crime in which he had engaged. That Ram’s father had himself been a victim of social prejudice became the reason for allowing an even worse form of prejudice to be visited upon his son. This form of bias – which in fact also included the gender bias of patrilineality – made the type of accountability envisaged by those who drafted the legislation impossible to secure. Moreover, another form of bias – the tendency of law-enforcement officials to discount the pleas of lower-caste complainants – meant that Ram and his family were effectively prevented from pursuing the matter further. It is altogether possible (in fact probable) that the police officials involved accepted a bribe from the family of the accused in order to cement the verdict that the assault did not fall within the purview of the Atrocities Act. But even were the police inclined to grant Ram’s claim that it was as a Dalit that he was attacked, regardless of his technical status under the law, it is unlikely that they could have done so without incurring the wrath of the locally dominant Ahir community; so even without accepting a bribe, the police would have been responding to the other main form of capture, whereby officials are subjected to intimidation. Thus do multiple varieties of capture intermingle with multiple types of bias. As it turns out, bias (rather than capture) is one of the main reasons why India’s National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (NCSCST), the accountability institution responsible for, among other things, overseeing the implementation of the Atrocities Act, has failed to fulfil its
40 Reinventing Accountability
potential. As Niraja Gopal Jayal has shown, ‘instead of contributing to the welfare of poor Dalit communities, it has tended to work fairly systematically as an organization for the more privileged sections of these’.53 The NCSCST was ‘designed to function as a watchdog institution that monitors the executive wing on behalf of the legislative wing, while remaining autonomous of both’.54 Though it was supposed to be ‘roughly analogous to the CAG’ – the Comptroller and Auditor General – ‘in its actual performance of this role … the Commission has been circumscribed not merely as a result of institutional design, but also by its own predisposition to be self-limiting’.55 Its four areas of competence are ‘service safeguards’ (concerning the application of rules governing the recruitment and employment conditions of SC and ST publicsector workers), education, economic development and atrocities. Focusing on the internal workings of the commission, Jayal found that the Commission has, by choosing to interpret its constitutional mandate narrowly, laid itself open to the charge of elite bias. The fact that it is both most energetic and most effective in the area of service-related safeguards speaks for itself. Since the Commission, for the most part, acts on complaints, and it is the more upwardly mobile sections within these groups that are articulate and capable of mounting claims, it could be said to have been less than sensitive to the exclusions engendered by the lack of education or information …56 The problem of bias in accountability institutions directs attention to its sources in non-state arenas, in the social institutions that create and sustain inequalities based on class, racial, ethnic, gender, age and other differences. As mentioned in Chapter 1, growing concerns with abuses of power by dominant actors in these institutions – the family, the traditional community, the religious establishment – are focussing attention on the accountability of these actors. Attention to biases in formal accountability systems exposes the way in which norms that exist in non-state arenas – for instance, regarding group loyalty – seep into public deliberations about the distribution of resources, and about what is right or fair in social relations. This ‘spillover’ from traditional ascriptive communities into public arenas is much stronger than is the flow in the other direction. The enduring nature of social prejudices against poorer groups, women and ethnic minorities highlights the difference between ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’ in popular understandings of people’s rights and social status,57 and the uneven evolution from traditional communities based upon familial or other solidarities to notions of modern citizenship based on equal rights and the rule of law.58 While there are very few contexts in which the norms and affections developed in the private arena are fully excised from public deliberations, in developing countries the authority of the state in asserting the legitimacy of norms of equality or impartiality is particularly weak because it
Where Accountability Meets Governance 41
is often not the only (or even the dominant) form of political organization. It may not be perceived to have jurisdiction over relationships between castes or between women and men, and no legitimate remit in the non-state arenas where injustices are perpetrated – like the family, the community or the religious establishment. In many parts of Africa, where communal land-use systems are deemed beyond the control of the state,59 state authority has not been convincingly established. Non-state groups – such as traditional leaders – retain considerable social and coercive power. This further entrenches the ‘no remit’ form of bias. The existence of dual legal systems enables state authorities to absolve themselves of responsibility for addressing inequalities in non-state arenas. The difficulty of challenging biases stemming from these social institutions is explained in part by the fact that accountability to less powerful members is rarely a part of the implicit contracts or compacts underlying uneven power relations in non-state institutions. In familial or community relationships, roles, rights and obligations are ascribed by age, gender, lineage, race or ethnicity. Because these are seen as ‘natural’, immutable or ‘God-given’, they are extremely difficult to challenge on the grounds of their inherent injustice, even when the relative economic and social power of some of the actors changes. For instance, when men cannot fulfil their breadwinning role, their sense of entitlement to subservience from women and children does not necessarily diminish. Beyond the family, community relationships are in many cases characterized by a patron-client model in which reasonably explicit contracts for services – for instance, between a landlord and tenant farmer – become blurred with the addition of complex and asymmetrical obligations. Community norms of solidarity and reciprocity, lineage loyalties and patron-client relationships can also suffuse non-governmental institutions, including development NGOs and political parties. Membership in such organizations is often based on ascribed characteristics such as ethnicity, and leadership may be passed on through a family dynasty rather than earned through a struggle for the confidence and votes of members. Religious traditions such as Islam, Judaism and Christianity include an important role for answerability (providing an account to God) and enforcement (retribution and penance). In some religions, temporal representatives of divine authority – imams, priests, rabbis – are expected to be held accountable not by their congregations but by a higher moral authority, a process of self-governance beyond the bounds imposed by formal rules. The flaws in this system, at least in the Catholic Church, have come to light in the scandals about sexual and other forms of abuse by church authorities, prompting more open debate about the dilemma of reconciling a ‘sacred calling’ with the need for ‘secular accountability’.60 Improvements in accountability relations in one arena can spill over into others, though not always in predictable ways. Women who are freed from
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the constraints of unequal marriage contracts or unequal family relationships (through, for instance, obtaining the right to initiate divorce, or to inherit equally with their brothers) may be able to act more autonomously – on the basis of their interests as women – within civil society. This increases the likelihood that civil society will contribute to holding the state accountable for actions that affect women. Workers who receive better wages as a result of collective bargaining are more able to fund parties that seek to advance their specific interests. On the other hand, the powerlessness of some groups within non-state institutional arenas may undermine voice and power gains they make in the public sphere. Women who shift their rate of market engagement as producers through, for instance, access to micro-credit, may not always be able to translate this success into increased bargaining power in relation to men within the household. Ethnic minorities who gain access to policy-making forums through affirmative action may find that this public power does not diminish the contempt in which they are held by unenlightened neighbours. Thus efforts to tackle accountability failures in formal institutions must be attentive to the ways in which they can be undermined by the biases produced through enduring inequities in informal institutions. * * * We have suggested in this chapter that the language of accountability has come to embody a desire for greater social justice. This is a consequence of a range of developments since the last great wave of democratization. But we have also argued that the impetus for a reassessment of accountability can be seen as emerging from two main sources. The first is the legacy of institutional failure in democratic systems. The most notable failure is that of state institutions: there are now arguably more opportunities than ever for ordinary people to express voice, but in many states public institutions cannot offer a credible response in terms of either accountability or practical improvements to public services. Accountability institutions in democracies fail for a number of reasons. Most obviously, they may be captured by narrow interests and made to serve a particular political agenda. Relations of corruption are another variety of capture. At times, of course, accountability failure is also produced by technical incapacity and resource scarcity. Venality is not necessarily the problem (though corruption may itself account for some of the scarcity): it may simply be that there are insufficient financial and human resources for an audit office or court system adequately to review the vast array of government actions requiring scrutiny. These state failures have produced a second reason for rethinking voice and accountability: the proliferation of new actors, operating in a more diverse set of arenas – created simultaneously by globalization and localization – and engaged in a broader array of tasks. These state and non-state
Where Accountability Meets Governance 43
actors – the security services, private-sector firms, and international organizations, to name three that come in for closer scrutiny in the coming chapters – must, it is increasingly felt, be held more directly accountable to the public interest. As we argued in Chapter 1, many of these ‘new’ actors are not in themselves particularly new. Security services have been around a long time, and so of course have international business enterprises. And both have long been subjected to state regulation and oversight, so they have also been targets of past accountability initiatives. What is new is that the actions of these state and non-state agents are now increasingly scrutinized in terms of their impacts on the opportunities for poor people to realize substantive freedoms, and that the conventional mechanisms through which these and other actors account for their actions – via state-run oversight mechanisms – are seen as insufficient to produce pro-poor outcomes. On the other hand, if accountability institutions are seen as having failed to address the problems faced by disadvantaged people, and if these failures are not directly caused by capture or incompetence, then we must identify forms of bias that distort their operations. By focussing on bias as well as capture, accountability failure can be seen as a more complex and deeply rooted problem, reinforced by informal social institutions. We have suggested that bias operates at two levels. Accountability institutions may not see it as their mandate to promote social equity, poverty reduction or human rights – either because of the formal rules that govern their operation or the informal practices through which they function. Their procedures and mandates may be limited to preserving the interests of propertied groups. This deeply internalized bias is embedded, for instance, in the failure of legal systems in some countries to criminalize or prosecute violations of the rights of the poor or of women. Another form of bias is more superficial, but just as effective at excluding certain groups. These are biases built into the terms of access or claim-making in accountability institutions. Fluency in official languages, high degrees of literacy or financial solvency may be required to trigger an official investigation by a human rights commission or audit office, ruling out engagement by a large number of social groups. One of the novel features of what we call the new accountability agenda is the extent to which it is not merely seeking to plug jurisdictional gaps: it also attempts to address systematic biases by formulating new standards of accountability and by applying these standards to informal social institutions normally deemed beyond the remit of accountability systems – a topic addressed in Chapter 6. Attention to the relationship between accountability and voice warns against naïve expectations that more voice for the poor will compel powerholders to answer to the poor more directly. Institutionalized anti-poor bias can constrain and contain voice. We have also highlighted the constructive role that accountability processes can play in enabling the kinds of public deliberation that can challenge biased standards of probity and fairness in
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public life. Chapters 4 to 7 detail a range of contemporary initiatives to hold power-holders to account, to make the voice of excluded groups more effective and to revise standards. In Chapter 3, however, we develop in greater depth the problem of accountability failure in order to highlight the consequences of elite capture and bias for human development. We examine how different varieties of accountability failure compound one another, contributing to the political marginalization of the poor, the weakening of their voice and, hence, their continued invisibility to, or exclusion from, accountability institutions.
3 Accountability Failures and Human Development
As we argued in Chapter 2, corruption is not the only reason why accountability institutions fail to protect the poor. The very nature of democratic representation means that elections cannot possibly deliver fully on the popular expectation that bad governance will be punished at the ballot box. Moreover, accountability failures that particularly afflict the poor stem from elite ‘biases’ as well as from elite ‘capture’. In this chapter we detail the range of ways in which accountability failures – of both the capture and bias variety – adversely affect poor people. We focus on the impact that these institutional failures have on four aspects of human development: (1) on people’s ability to achieve market gains and livelihood security; (2) on their chances of improving their human capital endowments in education and health; (3) on whether they will live and work in a clean and safe environment; and (4) on their rights to physical safety. Corruption in anti-poverty programmes (‘targeted’ agricultural subsidies diverted to better-off farmers), in service delivery (vaccines for poor rural communities stolen by health providers) and in public goods (clean air and water regulations violated by firms with the connivance of officials) – these and other abuses undermine poor people’s ability to capitalize on the one asset they have in abundance, their labour. Beyond sheer corruption, the existence of both intended and unintended elite biases means that accountability institutions may fail to detect or punish abuses of power that particularly afflict the poor. Biases embedded in the formal remits, operating procedures and informal practices of accountability institutions can be racist and sexist as well as anti-poor. To the extent they deny certain groups (the poor, women, ethnic and racial minorities) the right or opportunity to demand answers of public authorities, they erode the value of the citizenship rights such groups can enjoy. Worse, problems of capture and bias can cripple the capacities of disadvantaged people to organize and articulate a collective ‘voice’. This is because, in addition to the way the capture of public property can deprive the poor of the resources needed for collective action, the biased functioning 45
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of accountability institutions can deny legitimacy and validity to their claims and complaints. This chapter illustrates these points with examples of accountability failures that disproportionately afflict the poor, and that work to perpetuate their material poverty and social marginality. Attention to the fact that some forms of accountability failure have a particularly concentrated impact on poor or socially excluded people, undercutting their market capacities and even their civil and political rights, enables us to identify some of the institutional and political causes of poverty. Recent studies of poverty reinforce an important point: that poor people experience deprivation across a variety of fronts; poverty is not simply a matter of low incomes. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2000–01, for instance, sees poverty as characterized by a lack of assets, security and power. Because the multiple forms of deprivation interact with and sometimes reinforce one another in unexpected ways, neither the World Bank nor the many other organizations that produced global poverty reports to coincide with the new millennium1 can be faulted for failing to distinguish between causes and manifestations of poverty. They are often one and the same. This holds true for accountability as well. Being unable effectively to demand accountability is both a symptom of poverty and one of the reasons why poor people remain poor. Many of the critical human development deprivations that afflict the poor – the lack of assets, security and power – can be traced back to an absence of genuine accountability. Doing so enables us to assess whether proposals for institutional reform are likely to address capture and bias in ways that will make powerful actors more answerable for the impact of their actions (and inactions) on human development. If accountability failures that reinforce poverty turn out to be constitutive, rather than merely contingent, features of conventional accountability systems, then reforms must address not only the capture of public resources, but also entrenched elite biases in the formal remits and informal practices of existing institutions.
Forms of bias and capture in conventional accountability institutions But before discussing the four areas of human development deprivation outlined above – which are illustrated with a range of case studies from around the world – we must briefly review how the problems of capture and bias afflict, in general terms, six key accountability institutions: (1) the electoral system; (2) legislatures; (3) reporting structures within bureaucracies; (4) oversight and regulatory agencies; (5) public expenditure management systems; and (6) the judiciary. Electoral systems, even in mature democracies – such as India’s or France’s – often fail to create incentives for representatives to promote the interests of
Accountability Failures and Human Development 47
the poor. Many have legally permissible avenues for influence-peddling that are beyond the reach of the poor – for instance, lax campaign-finance regulations or professionalized lobbying industries. Why the poor should have such difficulty using electoral processes as a tool for answerability and enforceability, even where they are a majority of voters, is a subject that has animated a great deal of research in political science, some of which was discussed in Chapter 2. History, culture and social structure play important roles. For instance, if voters are polarized around issues of identity (ethnicity, caste, race, religion, sect), politicians can more easily evade accountability for their failure to deliver services and justice to the poor. (A more charitable view would be that such forms of politics can build a sense of group solidarity and cultural pride, which may be more highly valued for some people than fleeting material gains.) Long-established relationships between elite patrons and lower-status people in clientelist systems may prevent voters from punishing errant politicians at election time, for fear of losing whatever benefits they receive as loyal clients.2 In young democracies, because few parties have a credible record of achievement on broad poverty-reduction programmes, political contenders often seek electoral advantage by developing and rewarding client loyalty through targeted spending.3 In most electoral systems voters lack information about the role of elected representatives in affecting service quality, and they tend to make decisions based on events close to election time.4 It is difficult for voters to coordinate in assigning rewards or penalties to politicians for their performance on public services, particularly primary health and education, because these are complex services and outcomes are hard to attribute to any one representative’s (or government’s) term in office. Information deficiencies lead voters to give more credit to politicians for initiating public works projects (like construction), providing direct subsidies for essential commodities (food, fertilizer) and increasing employment in the public sector. These sorts of public resources are most easily and directly targeted to supporters. Most of the defects mentioned here represent problems of bias in electoral systems, but there are problems of capture too: voters can be intimidated into electing politicians who will not advance their interests; corporate lobbying groups can ‘capture’ politicians by bankrolling their campaigns or various forms of electoral fraud can distort the collective voice and choice of voters. Legislatures should, in theory, be the forum in which government policy is reviewed, where the performance of the executive is monitored and where the detailed operations of key government functions – in particular, public expenditure management – come under intensive scrutiny. Legislatures, however, are notoriously open to capture – both corporately, where ‘party discipline’ often involves subtle forms of unwarranted inducement (such as undue rewards for compliant Members of Parliament in Westminster-style systems) and through the buying of individual legislators by sectoral interest
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groups or even wealthy individuals. Legislators in places as diverse as the American state of Texas and the Indian state of Gujarat have been almost literally captured, sequestered by party leaders who have relocated them en masse to neighbouring jurisdictions in order to, in effect, prevent them from performing their duties, whether this is voting on redistricting proposals (as in Texas in May 2003) or selecting a provincial chief executive (as in Gujarat in October 1996). Forms of bias are also evident. Parliamentary procedure – such as committee rules and filibuster provisions – often militates against deliberation on certain types of issues of concern to disadvantaged people. The UK House of Lords, until recently dominated by large landholders, long thwarted reform of property laws that would have given tenants greater rights in relation to property ‘freeholders’. The institutional design of the US Senate – in which each state, regardless of its population, elects two Senators – gives disproportionate voice to agribusiness and ranching interests based in sparsely populated western states. Reporting and management systems in the civil service make subordinates accountable to their superiors. The result is often capture. Under pressure to please their bosses, lower-level officials – regardless of their inclinations – are often obliged to collude in the abuse of public office in order to retain their jobs, or to avoid punishment transfers or even to ensure that they are not themselves charged with corruption. Classic abuses include buying and selling positions in bureaucratic hierarchies,5 obtaining underserved promotions and subverting competitive procurement procedures. All of these enable officials to derive illicit income. Many other varieties of theft allow senior civil servants and front-line service providers to abuse their positions of public trust. Anti-poor biases pervade various aspects of accountability systems within public bureaucracies. For instance, performance targets and measures may simply not reward pro-poor service delivery. Without a direct or explicit mandate to serve the poor, even well-intentioned officials who seek to do so may find it impossible to work against the grain of official incentives (as opposed to political pressures, which would constitute capture) that compel them to focus on other, better-connected constituencies. Procedures for filing complaints about poor quality services may be insensitive to the special conditions facing the poor, or access points to officialdom too remote from the sites of injustice that require remedy, allowing abusive treatment of clients or theft of public resources to continue unchecked. Public-service providers or officials in charge of distributing licences, permits or essential documentation, such as birth or land certificates, may use their ability to ration these goods to intimidate and control poor people – for instance, buying their acquiescence in other forms of abuse which perpetuate cycles of non-accountability. The consequence of these forms of bias and capture is that putatively public goods, even those as basic as the maintenance of law and order, can be dispensed as favours rather than as entitlements, making
Accountability Failures and Human Development 49
citizens not rights-holders but supplicants. This transforms public goods into private (rivalrous, excludable) goods in the process. Oversight or regulatory agencies often fail to take action to investigate abuses of power in the public or private bodies over which they exercise jurisdiction – for reasons of both capture and bias. Audit offices, environmental protection agencies, electoral commissions, equal opportunities bodies, labour standards offices and even anti-corruption commissions can underperform in response to undue influence exerted by political leaders or interest groups. The independence of these specialized accountability institutions is undermined when governments staff them with people who will turn a blind eye to official malpractice. Non-government oversight bodies charged with upholding professional standards, such as medical or teaching associations, may fail to demand answers of public authorities (including members of these professions acting in a public capacity) because of internalized and largely unremarked biases that prevent detection of certain types of abuses – such as abuses of the rights of subordinated groups. Oversight bodies can suffer from an unintended form of bias caused by data aggregation and work overload. Often these agencies are small and underfunded, yet are mandated to monitor and review a vast quantity of official decisions and actions. It is impossible for them to obtain the finegrained detail needed to detect specific, actionable cases of misappropriation or abusive behaviour. National audits suffer from this problem, missing bookkeeping gimmicks that disguise stolen funds at local levels. The results of national audits are often published years after the fact, by which time a new party may have come to power and any investigation of its predecessor would appear politically motivated. Public expenditure management systems often make only notional connections between the spending proposals of line ministries and actual spending patterns, fail to prevent extra-budgetary spending on the military or perks for top politicians, or lack adequate auditing mechanisms to expose these deviations. These are examples of the capture of public resources. Sometimes resource scarcity is the excuse used by politicians for the failure of public services to reach the poor. While outright capture can itself cause ex ante resource scarcities, elite biases in decisions about how to allocate limited resources can also be the cause of anti-poor distortions in public spending. Decisions about taxation and the mobilization of resources may favour the wealthy but result in inadequate revenue for the polity in general. These kinds of biases in the management of public finances may go entirely unchecked in formal audits because they represent sanctioned expenditure, not theft. Judiciaries suffer from capture when court officials subvert official operating procedures to benefit bribe-payers, or when judges lack autonomy from the political executive and respond to political agendas. Biases are built into
50 Reinventing Accountability
judicial proceedings. Their formal impartiality offers little protection for the poor when access is limited by their inability to purchase legal representation or to travel to court locations, or by barriers imposed through the use of non-vernacular languages in judicial proceedings. More insidious and less obvious biases are also found: courts routinely discount the testimony of certain categories of plaintiff, such as women or the poor, especially when pressing charges against powerful social actors. These biases are sometimes specifically mentioned in laws themselves. The investigative and enforcement machinery of the judicial system, most notably the police, is often not only captured by elites through bribery and networks of influence, but also prone to elite biases when crimes committed largely by the poor, like petty theft, are investigated with more alacrity than are elite crimes, like tax evasion, which primarily harm the poor, whose chances for a better life depend disproportionately on the availability of public resources. Given the judiciary’s essential role as an arena for assessing complaints against other horizontal and vertical accountability systems – ensuring, for instance, that when irregularities are identified by government auditors they are investigated, and (where warranted) charges are pressed and a trial conducted – the existence of capture and bias in the judiciary can doom reform efforts. We now turn to the four human development deprivations exacerbated by failures in accountability institutions – lack of access to: sustainable livelihoods, particularly land and fair wages; capability-enhancing services, particularly education and health-care; a decent environment, particularly clean air and unpolluted water; and physical security, particularly freedom from abuse (or neglect) by police. Naturally, real-world examples of the sort provided below have a way of spilling beyond conceptual boundaries. Though they are invoked to clarify rather specific issues, it should be understood that many of the examples cited relate to more than one type of deprivation; that any type of deprivation will, inevitably, have been produced by failures in more than one sort of accountability institution; and that most of these failures will have been caused by a combination of both bias and capture.
Sustainable livelihoods The opportunities for disadvantaged people to engage in sustainable livelihoods is compromised by failures of accountability institutions. Much of the fault lies with anti-poor ‘bias’. Economic policies routinely discriminate against people working in the informal sector, and in ways that can be remedied only by thoroughly overhauled accountability institutions, such as new performance criteria for programme administrators linked directly to pro-poor outcomes. But corruption and other forms of ‘capture’ also impede the ability of accountability institutions to defend the livelihood prospects of the poor.
Accountability Failures and Human Development 51
Access and secure title to land are among the most important assets that can help poor people to improve their chances of a better life. However, many public actions ostensibly designed to promote access to productive resources fall prey to accountability failures. The Colombian government’s National Land Reform Institute (Instituto Nacional Colombiano de Reforma Agraria, or INCORA) was founded in 1961 to reduce the gross inequality in rural land ownership. Though INCORA’s average annual budget in the late 1980s was roughly US$140 million, its work ‘produced little visible effect’. Land reform legislation passed in 1994 failed to produce better results for the poor. Parliamentary questions raised from time to time sought to obtain at least a degree of answerability. But this form of oversight is a blunt instrument for securing accountability. The lack of more specific mechanisms of accountability within the programme itself was the more serious problem. The legislation provided for a ‘land purchase grant’, but the way this was structured ‘created incentives for collusion between sellers and buyers to overstate land prices, divide the surplus between them, and let the government foot the bill’.6 The poor were not in on this cozy arrangement. Conventional financial monitoring of such transactions was never going to be able to stamp out such abuses. On paper, the transactions appeared legitimate, even though this was in reality a case of the rich capturing resources meant for the poor. Accountability institutions have also fared poorly at ensuring that poor and vulnerable people are not denied credit for productive purposes. This happens both directly and indirectly. The indirect form arises when failures related to other livelihood concerns take their toll on people’s ability to access credit. A study of Kenya found that a lack of formal educational attainments and insecure title over land were the main reasons why rural women in particular who try to diversify livelihoods through enterprise activities are denied credit.7 Fieldworkers on the Bangladesh government’s anti-poverty rural micro-finance programmes are known to favour better-off villagers for credit, even though they are above the poverty line. This happens in NGO programmes as well.8 The terms of reference of internal accountability systems and external regulatory structures would need to be substantially redesigned for them to hold formal credit agencies and micro-finance institutions accountable for biases of this sort. Staff in these agencies are assessed on the basis of their performance in recovering loans and interest payments, not for their capacity to compensate for accountability failures in other public institutions that lower their borrowers’ creditabsorption capacity. The more direct route by which oversight mechanisms fail to ensure that poor people gain access to credit involves their inability to detect (or failure to prosecute) cases of corruption in government credit programmes. This is particularly important as corruption in formal credit markets can affect the rates offered through informal sources.9 A study by Transparency International
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Bangladesh found that people accessing credit from the formal banking sector paid a direct bribe of between two and 20 per cent of the loan value. This wide range reflected the diverse socio-economic profile of respondents, but the ‘[l]arger percentages are extorted from uneducated rural applicants’. Moreover, these farmers faced higher demands for bribes than the more affluent borrowers seeking commercial loans ‘because the bribe is usually shared with government officials that may be involved in the loan review process’, including the many functionaries at the local level. The bribes received by local officials ‘percolate up to District and higher levels and neutralize the monitoring function of the administrative hierarchy’.10 But these fees are just for obtaining the loan. In order to obtain an assurance from rural branch managers of state-owned banks that they will not actually have to repay the loan, borrowers pay up to 50 per cent of the loan’s value in bribes. These promises are often not honoured, but an audit by Bangladesh Bank revealed that branch managers had forgiven at least 1.6 billion taka in interest payments without authorization. These practices have other unfortunate knock-on effects – making it more difficult to improve accountability systems. The very fact that poorer Bangladeshis are forced to collude in such illicit transactions – and to pay a fee to access credit under such conditions – undermines their willingness to play a role in demanding accountability or protesting against corruption. The Transparency International study also notes a range of means by which unsuspecting farmers are cheated, including one confidence-trick in which illiterate people are persuaded to sign papers that they are told entitle them to a grant. In fact, they have unwittingly agreed to pay back a loan for up to five times the amount of the ‘grant’ funds they are given. The remaining 80 per cent goes to the con-men, who form a ‘corruption syndicate’ (including local government representatives and police officers) ‘to perpetrate the scam’. The Transparency International study makes clear that the negative impacts on the poor are the result of multiple accountability failures that reinforce one another. Members of Parliament, the Bureau of Anti-Corruption, the Judiciary, and the Police, that might have served as monitoring devices for the people are also agents of the political party that controls MOF [Ministry of Finance] … The Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance is the people’s oversight agent that is supposed to discipline the MOF but it too is subject to stronger agency relationships to political parties.11 Obtaining employment and safe working conditions, and getting paid a fair wage (or at least what was due), is another aspect of livelihood security that has continued to elude many of the world’s poor. Accountability actors such as labour inspectors have in many cases failed to make any impact, and often make things worse by taking bribes in exchange for non-enforcement of
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regulations. This form of corruption also drives up ‘employment-related’ costs, reducing what employers are willing to spend on wages, benefits and occupational-safety measures that would assist workers trying to eke out a living. As for the self-employed, the obstacles faced by the poor in obtaining formal business licenses push them into both economically and legally marginal activities such as sex work, scavenging or street hawking. Yet these same marginal practices make the poor vulnerable to blackmail and bribery by officials, thus trapping them in self-reinforcing circuits of corruption and poverty. Accountability institutions may even be used by officials to prey upon people in these circumstances, sometimes to the point of criminalizing poverty. For instance the ‘beggars’ courts’ in Delhi12 use a very loose definition of ‘beggar’ as someone ‘wandering about’ (based on the 1959 Prevention of Begging Act) to give the police free rein to round up all manner of informal sector entrepreneurs, such as street vendors, palm readers or boot-black boys. The beggars’ court provides magistrates, lawyers and police the opportunity to collect petty bribes from the unfortunate individuals who are thus collected off the streets, and who, because ‘begging’ is technically a crime, would otherwise face a hearing. Bail is a major means of squeezing the accused, for although the court claims it takes no money for bail, lawyers routinely collect about half of the monthly earnings of a street hawker from each defendant and distribute it to other court officials. In effect, a combination of direct capture (bribes) and bias in the legal system (a definition of ‘begging’ that criminalizes many of the livelihoods of the urban poor) is used to persecute people in informal sector work, undercutting their already pitiful earnings. In such contexts a formal business licence may offer little protection to the self-employed. Rather, it can give officials further opportunities for predation. To take another example from Delhi, the licensing system for cyclerickshaw drivers not only fails in its purpose – limiting the numbers of rickshaws on the road and ensuring they are in good repair – it does precisely the opposite, enabling the police to profit from overcrowding and removing incentives for rickshaw-pullers to upgrade their vehicles and make their work less dehumanizing.13 Rickshaw-peddling is a dangerous and poorly paid job, and the use of desperately out-of-date cycle technology makes it even more physically depleting than it needs to be. Most rickshaw drivers lease outdated and often unsafe vehicles from large contractors, paying over double the value of a new rickshaw every year in rent. It is police corruption in the implementation of the official licensing system that keeps drivers from buying their own rickshaws and thus earning bigger profits, and from using some of the savings for the simple and accessible technologies available to make their work easier. The rickshaw license is officially available for Rs. 27 a year, but to obtain one costs at least Rs. 500–600 of ‘speed money’. But this license does not guarantee immunity from police harassment, so there is little point in paying
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for one. The Delhi Municipal Corporation frequently rounds up rickshaws, ostensibly to check their legal status, yet even owners of licensed vehicles must pay a bribe of between Rs. 30 and Rs. 300 to have them released, over and above the daily storage fees charged while they are impounded. The Corporation can fine even license-holding rickshaws – Rs. 100 each – for violations such as missing reflectors or mud-guards. The raids are a pretext for bribery, not a means of improving road safety. Unsurprisingly, this system of capture erodes the incentive to invest in safe and efficient cycle rickshaws, let alone to pay for a license. Large contractors operating fleets of extremely poor-quality rickshaws arrange to by-pass some of this police predation by purchasing licenses in bulk, and paying hefty monthly haftas (bribes) to the police. They recover these costs from the daily rent paid by the drivers. The opportunity even to have or keep a job is eroded when malfunctioning accountability institutions allow firms to become unviable. Many of China’s former state-owned factories went out of business due to asset-stripping and outright looting by managers, making the chances of reviving them under private ownership almost unthinkable. This has become an increasingly regular feature of the country’s capitalist transformation, reducing employment prospects for disadvantaged people.14 And the obvious inability of the anti-corruption agencies to take action in anything other than a symbolic (and highly politicized) fashion has increased the incentive for managers to embezzle resources, since they can do so with impunity. The nascent efforts of China’s independent union movement to counteract such tendencies have run up against these problems as well as the familiar constraints on the exercise of voice in the context of limited political pluralism. Even in other, more liberal, political systems, the power of unions to act as an effective force to demand accountability has been on the wane as a result of duplicitous government action.15 In Sri Lanka the government’s Board of Investment establishes officially mandated ‘worker councils’ in free-trade zones. These impede the emergence of active unions capable of either defending workers’ rights directly or insisting that enforcement agencies perform their functions impartially. In Mexico, too, President Vincente Fox has failed to address the problem of these ‘protection unions’. And rather than applaud the efforts of the employees’ union of Philippine Airlines to engage in voluntary wage restraint in order to assist the rebuilding of the company and protect their jobs in 1999, the Philippines President’s response was to override institutions for ensuring worker protection (including the courts) by proposing a strike ban and curtailing employees’ right to associate freely.16 Another example of an institution that fails to provide accountability in the interest of workers is India’s now defunct Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). The BIFR was designed to ensure that ailing industries that received government bailout packages adhered to the associated terms and conditions. These usually stipulated that government funds be earmarked for investments to upgrade plant and machinery in the hope
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of reviving the firm’s competitive position, and thereby saving jobs. But not only did the BIFR not keep effective watch on the uses to which the company managements put the funds – or compel other government agencies to monitor or report on these activities – the BIFR refused even to make public the terms of the revival agreements so that other actors in civil society could make inquiries to see if the bailout conditions were being honoured. In many cases, union officials that were allowed access to the relevant documents were themselves bought off by company managements, with law enforcement agencies taking a cut to continue protecting these collusive relationships.17 There has been much discussion in recent years of the plight of child workers, and the need for international agreements to outlaw the most egregious forms of child labour. Legislation to protect children exists in many countries, but is not enforced – another failure of accountability institutions. Human Rights Watch reports that Egyptian children employed by cotton-farming cooperatives work long hours, routinely face beatings at the hands of foremen and are poorly protected against pesticides and heat. Most of the children are also well below Egypt’s legal minimum age of 12 for seasonal agricultural work. The Egyptian government has a responsibility to ensure compliance with the country’s 1996 Child Law, but it fails in this duty by permitting cooperatives to employ children well below the minimum age for seasonal agricultural employment without regard for the law’s provisions governing the maximum number of days and hours that children may work. The cooperatives have further subjected children in their employ to routine ill-reatment and failed to provide them adequate protection from occupational hazards, in violation of both the Child Law and relevant international conventions.18 The examples in this section have dealt mainly with the failure of accountability institutions to enable the poor to thrive as producers in the market, where they encounter the exploitative practices of private-sector actors. Accountability failures are also rife where the state steps in to compensate for market failures, for instance with anti-poverty employment programmes. A chronic problem in public-works programmes that provide the poor with employment during drought periods is that corrupt income can be obtained by officials, at all levels, by bid-rigging, over-invoicing for materials and labour, manipulating labour-productivity norms and wage rates and onselling of subsidized grain meant for wage payments.19 In the case of antipoverty public-works programmes in developing countries, the result is that 40–50 per cent of budgeted resources are shared among cooperating contractors, government engineers, local bureaucrats, ministry supervisors and auditors.20 With so many agencies involved, lines of accountability get confused. There are no viable points at which adversely affected workers may lodge complaints or see an investigation launched, and no obvious part of the system that is free from the taint of graft. One observer of the elaborate system of pay-offs at different levels of a public works department in Nepal suggests that payments by lower-level
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officers to their senior colleagues represent the pay-off from disabling the accountability mechanisms at each point in the administrative hierarchy at which their actions are subjected to oversight reviews or audits.21 In Nepal, as elsewhere, corruption is said to be ‘systemic’ in that it pervades most of the public administration, and ‘systematized’ in that there is a ‘ladder’ of payments out of illicit earnings from lower to higher officers in the hierarchy. These payments follow fairly standardized percentages or ‘cuts’ of the illicit earning. This puts great pressure on lower-level civil servants to charge bribes or simply to misappropriate funds meant for public goods, because they must earn enough from bribes to cover the cost incurred in obtaining the post in the first place. In Nepal’s Department of Roads and Irrigation, a typical system for the distribution of ‘black money’ would be: 5 per cent for costs relating to the entertainment of visiting officials; 10 per cent to the district audit office; 10 per cent to local politicians, engineers and overseers; 25 per cent to the direct overseer; 15 per cent to the district engineer; and 35 per cent divided equally among the overseeing accountant, senior department officials and high-ranking bureaucrats in the ministry. Graft of this kind has a direct impact on the poor. Unskilled workers are supposed to be the ‘beneficiaries’ of employment-creation programmes linked to large infrastructure projects. Such schemes are intended to provide the poor with a minimum wage during periods of (usually seasonal) livelihood stress. But the collusion of actors within and across the many public institutions that deliver these programmes makes it nearly impossible for workers to pursue grievances against those who have appropriated a share of their wages.
Capability-enhancing services Appropriate and affordable basic services are essential for the poor to enhance their human capital base and to make the most of their physical assets such as credit or land. The key services for building human capital are education and health care. These are more effective when supported with other services such as sanitation, drainage, waste collection, piped water, housing, rural electricity, roads and public transportation, without which health problems and time constraints on productivity can increase. These capability-enhancing services can be complemented by ‘safety-net’ programmes for periods of great livelihood stress such as seasonal unemployment, disability or old age. Safety-net services include public-employment programmes, pensions, insurance and other forms of social welfare. Throughout the world, poor people experience serious obstacles to accessing and fully benefiting from basic capability-enhancing services, whether provided by the state or by the private sector.22
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It is important to distinguish between obstacles stemming from fiscal constraints and obstacles that are a combination of capture and bias in service delivery and design. Many developing countries simply lack the resources necessary to provide either universal or targeted social services; accountability may not be as big a problem as is the emaciated budget. Of course, very often these resource constraints are themselves partly the consequence of high-level corruption, which siphons public funds away from basic social services and amenities and into investments that produce bigger commissions for corrupt officials, such as defence contracts and large-scale infrastructure construction projects.23 The hugely expensive power plant built in the Indian state of Maharashtra by the now-disgraced US energy giant Enron is an example the kind of highlevel ‘capture’ that can set in place a perpetual drain on public resources needed for social and economic services. Constructed in the 1990s by Enron’s local joint venture, the Dabhol Power Corporation, the project included an energy purchase agreement that charged the Maharashtra government such high rates that it ultimately became cheaper for the government simply to pay the plant’s mandatory fixed maintenance and administration charges than to buy and use its electricity. The electricity produced by this wasteful plant is twice as expensive as its nearest competitor, and seven times as expensive as the cheapest electricity available in Maharashtra. Even accounting for the fact that the prices charged by Enron/Dabhol’s competitors do not fully reflect the true cost of electricitygeneration and transmission, the differential is too great to be explained away as a reflection of underlying economic realities. The Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) estimated that even if it were to purchase 90 per cent of Enron’s output from January 2002 onwards, its losses would be $1.2 billion a year. Strapped for cash, the MSEB would have to force local industrialists, who have been generating their own cheap electricity, to purchase the more expensive Enron power, thereby raising costs and cutting jobs. And meanwhile electricity for rural areas, for schools and clinics, would remain unattainably expensive. Enron made no secret of the fact that it had paid out millions of dollars to ‘educate’ politicians and bureaucrats in Delhi and Mumbai in order to obtain various government clearances.24 Capture in service delivery takes a wide variety of forms. One of the most common is staff absenteeism, where doctors, nurses and teachers collect their public-sector salaries and then moonlight during clinic and school hours. Random visits by researchers to schools and clinics in some developing countries have discovered absentee rates of up to 40 per cent, with higher rates for remote rural areas.25 Medicines are commonly lacking in clinics in poor countries,26 as are textbooks and desks in schools. Sometimes there was simply no money for them, but when these same materials appear on the open market, it usually means that health and education providers have
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been auctioning them off rather than supplying them for free or for an approved fee to clients. Alternatively, the kickbacks from procurement reaped by higher-level officials, or other practices such as over-invoicing for substandard materials, can shrink the quantity and diminish the quality of materials that reach lower-level service providers and their clients. The capture of resources meant for buildings and maintenance can make conditions so appalling or unsafe in public clinics and schools that patients and students must find alternative providers. The 1999 ‘Public Report on Basic Education in India’ details ghastly squalor in rural schools, which produces serious physical danger for children – the threat of collapsing buildings, and the vermin and disease encouraged in the unsanitary conditions.27 Finally, public service providers may exact payments for services that they should provide free of charge. Teachers may teach poorly in order to encourage parents to pay for after-hours tuition, or they may exact payments for the award of higher grades. Health-service providers routinely demand bribes for treatment, in effect transforming government clinics into private practices.28 Corruption in the day-to-day delivery of public services has a disproportionately negative impact on the poor. First, because the poor simply have fewer options than wealthier service users for ‘exit’ – for substituting private provision for poor-quality public services – they suffer most directly from the declining quality of services. If the poor do choose the ‘exit’ option, the costs of private provision may be even higher than the combined formal and illicit ‘top-up’ charges for public-sector services, because private providers may impose surcharges for servicing the physically remote, unsafe or unpleasant living areas of the poor. In Angola, one NGO found that poor people on the rural fringes of the capital city of Luanda paid a great deal more than those in built-up areas for their water supply as a consequence of having to purchase water in tiny quantities from private suppliers.29 Second, when it comes to everyday corruption, poor service users, because of their low social status and relatively low capacity to press complaints or expose corruption, may be under much more pressure from providers to pay bribes than higher-status public-service users, who might object or report corrupt officials. Where the poor are engaged in survival activities on the margins of legality, such as sex work or scavenging forest produce, their sense of possessing a legitimate voice may be weak, thus increasing their vulnerability to predation by government officials. Many economic marginals must pay off petty officials to avoid being reported to higher authorities. Refusal to pay would mean risking their livelihoods. Protest actions, unless extremely well coordinated, would be easily dismissed or crushed because of the social marginality of such people. For instance, Nepali sex workers in India stave off the risk of arrest, confinement to remand homes and potential deportation by paying regular bribes to the police. Police officers in Delhi and Mumbai are known to pay exceptionally high ‘commissions’ to their bosses for transfers to red-light areas,
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where earnings from bribes are high precisely because of the vulnerability of sex workers to ‘clean-up’ raids.30 The third reason why the poor suffer more than wealthier groups from accountability failures in public services is that the illicit payments made by the poor for services that should be available free of charge represent a much greater proportion of their meagre incomes than do payments made by wealthier service users. Beyond the problem of sheer capture, problems of anti-poor bias set in right from the design of public services. It is well known that elite biases among both designers of basic services and those who staff them produce a marked preference for urban and high-cost tertiary-level social services, such as hospitals and universities, as well as for high-technology investments in infrastructure, rather than in maintenance of existing facilities or their extension to poorer areas.31 This skewed distribution of basic services reflects poor people’s lack of influence in determining the types of public services that should be available, their physical location and the nature of interactions between service providers and clients. This lack of influence stems from a failure in representative politics that carries over to a lack of vigilance in national budgeting exercises that could, in theory, ensure that budgeted funds are devoted to primary-level services. Elite biases are also found in the terms of access to public services, in the types of services deemed most appropriate for the poor and in provider behaviours and attitudes deemed appropriate and even professional. Accountability instruments such as administrative reporting procedures, professional and service-level performance standards and oversight bodies often fail to correct for the social biases embedded in application procedures for basic services that end up disqualifying the most needy applicants. In Thailand, a string of exclusions are triggered by the requirement that, to apply for water or electricity connections, households supply a formal registration number furnished by municipal authorities. Informal housing erected in low-income or slum neighbourhoods generally does not qualify for formal registration. Yet, without this registration number, parents cannot register the birth of a child. Without birth certificates these children will not be able to enrol in school.32 Access barriers can limit and discipline the claims the poor make on public services, or can discriminate between and exclude particular categories of the poor, such as ethnic or religious minorities, or, as we will see in Chapter 7, women. Access barriers can be unintended, or can be intentionally built into the qualification requirements for applicants, or else can be left to the discretion of front-line state workers to apply. The case of India’s Public Distribution System (PDS), which makes subsidized basic commodities available for purchase by the poor, helps to illustrate this point. In the late 1990s, the state government in Maharashtra (of which Mumbai is the capital) abused the process by which applicants for means-tested benefits
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through the PDS were screened to deny members of the Muslim minority access to a range of public services. The Hindu-nationalist governing coalition in Maharashtra at the time, composed of the Shiv Sena and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), introduced a policy of issuing colour-coded ration cards to different income groups, providing varying levels of rights to purchase cheap commodities. Yellow cards provided the greatest range of subsidies, but were also the hardest to obtain, as they required applicants to provide documentary proof that they were below the officially determined poverty line. The discretion exercised by local rationing officials in issuing these cards is, of course, an important source of personal rent for them, and can also be manipulated by party activists to create patterns of exclusion. People are willing to pay a substantial amount for their ration card (the going rate in 2000 was $10033 – an enormous amount for people living below the poverty line) because beyond the (limited) entitlements to subsidized food that the card provides, it also serves as proof of identity, a passport to a wider range of pubic services. Activists from organizations affiliated with the ruling parties used the new screening procedures to attempt to halt what they saw as an influx of illegal Muslim aliens (purportedly from Pakistan and Bangladesh) by unfairly harassing Muslims and denying their claims for official registration as BPL (or Below Poverty Line) families. Where poor people overcome access barriers to public services, they may encounter a fresh set of problems: contemptuous treatment by service providers, or discrimination in service provision that endows poor clients with less of a public resource than is their due. Poor people in need of health care may be obliged to pay bribes to be seen by a health professional, may not receive appropriate treatment or may be mistreated or humiliated. Poor children may not be able to attend school because their parents cannot afford the ‘informal payments’ that must be made to ensure that the teacher attends class. The school may be too far away, the quality of teaching too substandard or the risks of abusive treatment by teachers too high to make attendance worthwhile.34 Examples abound of high-handed, patronizing, rude or outright abusive nurses, teachers, police and local government officers. Service providers may single out clients for abuse on grounds other than class. For instance, girls in many schools in Africa and elsewhere are the targets of sexual harassment and even rape by male teachers.35 Health care workers in rural Maharashtra routinely provide less information on contraceptive choices and side-effects to their poorer women patients.36 In Benin, elite and peasant patients received radically different types of care from the same overworked nurses and midwives in the same service.37 Abusive treatment of maternity patients by midwives and nurses has been documented in obstetric services in black and coloured areas of South Africa’s Western Cape Province.38 Jewkes et al. (1998) found that abuse of women in ante-natal clinics included expressions of contempt, moral hectoring of unmarried mothers and violation of patient confidentiality.
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Women in labour and post-natal women patients endured verbal assaults, were required to clean floors and were neglected when in pain.39 Abuse varied in intensity according to the class, race and marital status of patients, with young black single mothers coming in for particularly punitive treatment. To limit their work burdens and to socialize pregnant women into deferential attitudes towards medical staff, nurses and midwives also imposed demanding entry-point rituals on expectant mothers. For instance, in one obstetric clinic in an African township (Kwazola) nurses told expectant mothers that in order to be sure of a booking for their delivery, they would have to begin queuing by 3:00 or 3:30 a.m. for the 7:00 a.m. opening. Many pregnant women could not travel at that hour, given the lack of public transport in the middle of the night and the dangers of physical attack in the townships. This draconian requirement kept bookings low, far below the clinic’s quota. Formal systems of administrative control, performance assessment and grievance redressal often fail to register or punish maltreatment of patients. Although procedures exist to sanction staff who abuse patients, senior managers in the medical system say they can only act if specific complaints are made by patients. But patients rarely register formal complaints for fear of victimization and further abuse, or because their contact with a particular branch of the health service is so irregular that there seems little point in spending time to make improvements. Incentive and promotion systems likewise fail to note or punish abuse of patients, partly because the local nursing culture condones controlling behaviour.40 The study of Western Cape ante-natal clinics also highlights shortcomings in informal accountability systems. Professional nursing ethics, imparted through training and socialization in health facilities or through nurses’ associations, appear actually to exacerbate problems of bias. Ideologies of patients’ inferiority and nurses’ intellectual and moral superiority, not an ethic of care and respect for patients, are often transmitted in these arenas.41 These failures in informal accountability mechanisms, combined with the relatively weak voice of a dispersed female clientele that is not in sustained contact with the health system, produce a poor-quality service and a longer-term negative impact on maternal health care. Accountability institutions often do not punish this behaviour, and sometimes even reward it. For instance, school teachers in some African contexts are not punished for sexually abusing students, whereas pregnant girls are forced to leave school. This outcome is the product of institutionalized elitist (or in this case, masculine) biases. Accountability and responsiveness problems at the level of service delivery also result from difficult work conditions and an inadequate or non-existent professional ethos centred on client needs. Demoralized, under-paid and poorly resourced workers will seek to control the variety of demands that clients place upon them by limiting the information about the services they offer, curtailing their
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contact with socially marginal clients and exaggerating rituals of deference in order to augment their own status and power in relation to clients.42 Beyond the failure of audit institutions and oversight agencies to control for corruption in the delivery of services, informal accountability institutions that cultivate quality controls among service providers, like the peer reviews and self-regulation that are provided by medical associations or teacher-training systems, may not only fail to encourage professionals to address the particular problems and needs of the poor, but instead usually uphold the interests and status of professionals. Poor people may be deprived of the information they need to make an objective assessment about whether the type and quality of treatment they receive from publicservice providers is adequate, or the best that can be provided under prevailing fiscal constraints. Indeed, authorities may deliberately suppress or distort information that would enable poor clients of public services to demand better treatment. A shocking example of this occurred at the turn of the twenty-first century in South Africa, where millions of HIV-positive people were denied treatment with anti-retroviral drugs. President Thabo Mbeki, Minister of Health Manto Tshabalala-Msimang and other senior members of the ANC cited fiscal constraints that prevented public purchase of expensive drugs from multinational pharmaceutical companies. More controversially, they justified their refusal to invest in anti-retrovirals with scepticism about the link between HIV and AIDS. Mbeki and other ANC leaders frequently argued between 1998 and 2002 that the viral explanation for AIDS was a western conspiracy designed to detract from the connections between poverty and AIDS, and to advance racist portrayals of African sexual practices. This position may seem less bizarre when it is acknowledged that biomedical and cultural representations about AIDS contagion do indeed tend to pathologize African sexual practices and family structures.43 Nevertheless, it has allowed all manner of myths and conspiracy theories about the causes and potential cures for AIDS to flourish in South Africa, while at the same time suppressing information about research findings on AIDS treatments, and enabling the government to continue to resist the testing and distribution of AIDS drugs. By 2002 the South African government took its idiosyncratic interpretation of the AIDS crisis beyond the arena of cultural debate and attempted to institutionalize it in the national oversight bodies responsible for regulating medical research and approving drugs.44 In September 2002 the Health Minister introduced a Bill to give her the power directly to appoint members of the Medicines Control Council (MCC). The MCC had taken an activist role in the HIV/AIDS debate, siding with conventional science and approving anti-retrovirals for prescription, particularly after a civil society campaign succeeded in pressuring the drugs company Pfizer to supply its anti-AIDS drugs for free to state clinics in March 2001. The new legislation enabled the
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minister to appoint to the MCC members who did not have the appropriate qualifications, and to appoint all members of the committee that would hear appeals on MCC decisions. This was interpreted as an effort to place supporters of the Mbeki line onto the MCC. Also in 2002 the Medical Research Council was subjected to high-level government interference and direct intimidation when the Department of Health suppressed a report on the impact of HIV/AIDS on adult mortality in South Africa. Through these and other45 actions the government continues to resist the dissemination of anti-AIDS drugs in state clinics, even though a civil society group, the Treatment Action Campaign, obtained a ruling in South Africa’s High Court in which the state’s constitutional obligation to promote anti-AIDS treatments was affirmed. By 2002 only 20,000 of the estimated six million HIV-positive South Africans were receiving treatment; these were the better-off, who could afford private treatment. This case demonstrates failure in both vertical accountability institutions (such as the electoral system) and horizontal accountability institutions (such as the legislature). The examples outlined above highlight the ill effects that accountability failures in public services can have on the human capital endowments – the health and education – of poor people. These failures will have a negative impact on the economic relationships into which the poor enter as producers. Other essential public services are designed to support the poor as consumers. However, redistributive programmes designed to strengthen the hand of the poor as consumers can instead, because of problems of capture and bias, twist their arms to accept much less than their fair share of public goods. An example is corruption in subsidized food schemes, such as India’s PDS, mentioned earlier. Through the PDS, state-procured food grains, sugar and other commodities such as kerosene are supposed to be available at below-market prices to poor consumers in rationed amounts. But a common practice is for shop owners illegally to divert a large proportion of those commodities to the open market. The remaining commodities are adulterated in order to disguise the ‘leaked’ portion.46 Frequently, in order to disguise the theft of commodities by officials and shop-owners, poor consumers are asked to sign the ration register in the ‘fair price shop’ to show that they have purchased more food than they actually have. This implicates them, knowingly or not, in the fraud, and they can be reminded of this if they attempt to protest to the authorities later. India’s Central Vigilance Commissioner has asserted that this kind of ‘[c]orruption is anti poor’, and calculates that ‘31% of the food grains and 36% of the sugar meant for the [PDS], which is designed to provide food security to the people below the poverty line, gets diverted to the black market’.47 Poor people attempting to improve accountability in the PDS instantly find that the perpetrators of fraud are the very people to whom complaints must be addressed. Formal vigilance committees are meant to monitor the fair price shops and check for impropriety. Yet these are chaired by local politicians, many of whom
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own or control these shops and obtain personal rents from the profits made from the unsanctioned sale of commodities on the open market.
Decent environmental quality Stories of poor people suffering ill health or losing their livelihoods as a result of environmental degradation emerge with depressing regularity in newspaper articles, NGO briefings and the reports of government agencies and international organizations: rivers polluted by industrial effluents, oncefertile soil become too salty to farm. The causes of policy failure are often complex, involving local contingencies and forces operating from much farther afield. But the disastrous impacts on the well-being of the poor can almost always be traced back to failures in accountability institutions. This may seem simply a different way of expressing a familiar grim fact – that those who suffer have little voice in the decisions that affect their lives. But this is not always, strictly speaking, the case. There is often ample scope for free expression: the chance to march in protest demonstrations, speak at local public hearings, comment on the findings of environmental impact assessments. But the offending projects – whether government dams or private-sector factories – so often go ahead anyway. Why? Because officials responsible for assessing risks and enforcing regulations have few incentives to perform either task with the diligence which they are duty-bound to employ. The chances of an official being penalized for faulty decisions after the fact – even when they were made in the face of clearly articulated, fully documented and logically incontrovertible opposition – are negligible. Which means that at the time environmentally disastrous projects are being approved, the formal obligation of public officeholders to answer for their provisional decisions, to justify them on the basis of firm and independently verified evidence, are met with shoddy reasoning and cavalier indifference – a mockery of public deliberation. In other words, when the institutions of ex post enforcement are lacking, ex ante answerability has almost no chance of serving its ostensible purpose. Large dam projects around the world have attracted attention for accountability failures that produce adverse social and environmental consequences for disadvantaged people, in spite of the fact that considerable voice has been raised ex ante to warn of likely negative effects. The depletion of fish stocks, the water-logging of land and the loss of forest cover have directly affected the livelihoods of poor people reliant on these vital resources. The social costs include involuntary relocation of thousands of people; a high proportion come from marginalized groups such as indigenous communities. This in turn leads to many further deprivations including a decline in the standard of living, an increase in health problems (including infant mortality and morbidity) and livelihood insecurity due to the loss of common property resources.48
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States and international funding agencies have rarely been accountable when planning and building large dams. The failures of conventional channels of accountability stem both from outright corruption and more subtle forms of policy bias. Both sources of failure are found in the muchcriticized World Bank-funded Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Allegations of large-scale bribery have been widespread. This, for some critics, explains why the project was undertaken without the critical environmental studies on erosion and downstream impacts having first been undertaken. Moreover, pervasive corruption in the project is thought to have made the social fund that accompanied this project of virtually no use to the affected communities. Anti-poor biases in the operating procedures of the relevant accountability agencies were also in evidence: none of the regulatory bodies, nor even the courts, were prepared to challenge the fact that the poor in South Africa’s townships, who suffer from water inequity dating to apartheid, would not be able to afford the project’s expensive water. Problems of capture and bias have been so blatant in this case that an effective prosecution was mounted by the Lesotho government, resulting in an 18-year sentence for the CEO of the Highlands Development Authority in June 2002. It is unusual enough for such a high-level official to be brought to book so quickly and to be given such a stiff sentence. But the Lesotho government went further, slapping a massive fine on the bribe-giver, the Canadian company Acres, and challenging the World Bank to debar the company from further contracts as specified in its procurement guidelines.49 A more general bias-related accountability failure is the routine practice of overlooking differential impacts of large dams on women and men. These include the widening of gender disparities, either by imposing a disproportionately large share of costs on women or through unequal allocation of benefits. In Sri Lanka, the Mahaveli Dam project introduced tenure arrangements that undermined women’s rights to own and control land. The Sardar Sarovar Project in India neither allocates land in the name of married women nor compensates them for the loss of income previously generated through the collection of forest products.50 Oversight mechanisms designed to increase the accountability of project implementation agencies for the impact of their actions on women have been a huge disappointment. For example, even though the Asian Development Bank approved a gender policy in 1998, a review of its dam projects indicates that the projects were largely oblivious to the gender dimensions of forced displacement. The World Bank’s Operation Evaluations Department acknowledged that commitments to respect the specific needs of women were ignored. The World Commission on Dams has issued detailed guidelines that include the need for informed and prior consent of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, public acceptance before projects are implemented and a thorough investigation of alternative projects. But they risk being ignored by countries
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and by agencies such as the World Bank, which has in fact been accused of watering down its own resettlement guidelines.51 These norms continue to be flouted with impunity by national dambuilding agencies. A good case in point is the proposed Ilisu dam in Turkey. The project is expected to create a large reservoir of 300 sq. kms, violating the rights of thousands of Kurdish people. Internationally accepted practice dictates that an Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIAR) for projects involving involuntary resettlement should include a full resettlement action plan. The Ilisu EIAR has produced only a partial plan – failing, for instance, to incorporate an ‘indigenous peoples plan’ or to assess the legal rights of the Kurdish minority – and even this has not been disclosed to those affected by resettlement.52 Such practices undermine the capacity of opponents of the dam to demand further justification for the proposed actions. It is clear that the mere existence of international guidelines cannot produce accountability if oversight agencies lack the will to enforce them, or if there is no one that can be held accountable when agencies pass the buck among themselves. The intersection of capture and bias exacerbates the environmental problems and livelihood deprivations experienced by poor people displaced by large dam projects, but sheer corruption is the prime reason why accountability institutions in South-East Asia have failed to stem the region’s air pollution problems. In 1995 Indonesia banned the practice of burning forest to clear land, but plantation owners continued to do so. The executive director of the Rubber Association of Indonesia explained that burning was much cheaper than manual clearing, and that paying off local officials to turn a blind eye to persistent violations was relatively straightforward.53 Bribes in fact flowed into many levels of the bureaucracy, and were shared up and down the administrative hierarchy, ensuring a conspiracy of silence in which supervisors were almost guaranteed not to penalize junior officers for their obvious failure to enforce regulations, and juniors (if they knew what was good for them) returned the favour by not whistle-blowing on their senior colleagues. It was only when the annual ‘haze’ began to spread over Malaysia and Singapore in 1997, forcing Indonesia to declare a national emergency, that international embarrassment catalysed a crackdown. This did little more than show up the lack of domestic accountability: the 1997 burning was not the worst to have affected Indonesia, and poor farmers had long suffered ill health and damaged crops. But not only had they not been protected; the government had pinned the blame on farmers’ slash-and-burn agricultural practices. Though Indonesia’s government has stepped up indirect forms of accountability in more recent years – for instance, naming and shaming corporate culprits – Malaysia has not taken the idea of information-led accountability to heart. Even when Indonesian forest fires were affecting Malaysia in the
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summer of 2001, the Malaysian government still refused to release data on the extent of air pollution or its likely health effects, fearing bad publicity would harm the tourist industry. This is consistent with the record of Malaysia’s regulatory bodies, which have been shown to short-circuit accountability systems by siding with powerful interests rather than with disadvantaged citizens. The country’s Clean Air Action Plan was reportedly torpedoed by a group of influential ministers in 1994 on the grounds that it would be ‘too costly’.54 Sheer corruption, but also the complicating effect of contracting-out responsibility for environmental damage control to private actors, undermined efforts by Thai villagers living in the basin of the Mae Klong river to pinpoint responsibility for the contamination of their drinking water. After a local dumpsite used by a large pulp and paper company was flooded in 1996, people in two villages were exposed to contaminated water from their wells. People who were already poor were forced to pay for water from clean sources. In theory, the firm’s activities were subject to a range of regulatory controls. Regulations issued by Thailand’s Ministry of Industry, and administered by its Factory Control and Inspection Bureau, obliged firms to line the base of waste disposal sites with plastic sheeting to protect the soil from contamination. In addition, rules issued by the Science and Technology Ministry’s Pollution Control Department required sites to have their foundations compressed by a mechanized roller, so that the soil would be compact enough to minimize the risk of leakage. The inability of these agencies to enforce these rules is a classic form of accountability failure. While no credible proof of corruption was produced to explain this failure, officials in Thailand’s regulatory agencies (like those in many countries) are notoriously prone to bribery by those who should be the subject of their scrutiny. In the village of Wang Sala, two other, more subtle, causes were at work besides corruption. First, the failure of accountability agencies to perform their allotted functions was hampered by the existence of intermediaries. The pulp and paper company did not directly perform the site preparation, nor was it directly involved in the haulage, waste disposal or site management activities. Its much smaller subcontractor could more easily conceal its activities from regulators. Second, the ability of direct pressure by local residents to compel government agencies to take action was limited by their already insecure livelihood prospects. For many, employment with the company was their only hope of a better wage. Fear of losing their jobs made them refrain from open criticism or protest action. One local youth told a visiting researcher: ‘My parents warned me not to speak out against the factory, because that is where I can get a job in the future’. Intimidation – linked to, but distinct from, corruption per se – is a major reason why there is insufficient pressure on regulators to enforce rules that should protect the poor.55 Accountability agencies not only fail to prevent environmental degradation in areas inhabited by the poor, they often collude in covering up serious
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abuses. In November 1998, nearly 3000 tons of toxic waste was dumped in an open field in the town of Sihanoukville in southern Cambodia. Scavengers combing through the waste soon fell sick. One person reportedly died. Instead of conducting the thorough investigation they had promised, Cambodian politicians arrested protestors who had blamed corruption for the failure of the authorities to uphold environmental standards. A few low-level officials were arrested, but these were widely seen as scapegoats. Back-up mechanisms of accountability also failed. As a Human Rights Watch Report put it, ‘the judicial process against those responsible for the public health menace falls short of providing the thorough investigation and accountability promised by the Cambodian government and ensuring that the necessary checks and balances are put in place to prevent new cases of dumping’.56 Another case of an environmental cover-up – undermining the official transparency on which accountability must rest – comes from Bangladesh. Arsenic contamination of water from tube wells built by NGOs for poor communities came to the attention of doctors at Dhaka Community Hospital (DCH) in 1996.57 The government had been warned of contamination in 1984, and found at least one arsenic-contaminated well, though it refused to make the information public, and none of the oversight agencies was able to force it to do so. Wells continued to be built. In 1993 both the government and the WHO were informed through a letter sent by an Indian doctor, an international expert on arsenic. But still no action was taken. Internal accountability procedures were unable to force the authorities to do so. When the DCH attempted to expose the problem, its doctors were accused by the government of being ‘scaremongers’ and officials attempted to intimidate the media into not reporting news of the allegations. Finally, in January 1997, survey results from 14 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts were published showing high levels of arsenic toxicity in tubewell water. It was another three months before the problem was publicly acknowledged in a World Health Organization (WHO) statement saying that arsenic in drinking water was a ‘Major Public Health Issue’ which should be dealt with on an ‘Emergency Basis’. It was a further two years before UNICEF admitted publicly on US television that it had been ‘a part of the problem’. Internal mechanisms within each of these agencies not only failed to fix the problem in a timely manner, but no disciplinary action was taken against officials responsible for the cover-up. An indication of the government’s lack of commitment to seeking accountability was a warning from the Health Ministry to DCH staff who were organizing a conference at which international experts were to discuss the problem. The Health Ministry cautioned them against allowing anything ‘subversive’ into conference documents, and insisted that these be submitted for official approval before the conference.58 The courts have in some instances filled the accountability gap created by failed regulatory systems, oversight mechanisms and political processes. One
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study that documents the almost Kafka-esque bureaucratic breakdowns that have destroyed large parts of the urban environments inhabited by Calcutta’s poor also highlights some of the ways in which the judiciary has stepped in to take up the slack. But even then bias creeps in to complement capture: the initiative came mainly from middle-class groups which possess the financial and social capital necessary to sustain public interest litigation on these issues. Investigative agencies and court officials tend to be dismissive of the evidence provided by poorer citizens, even when they form associations to press their claims.59 A study of the Nigerian oil industry highlighted the role of accountability failures within the legal system that produced detrimental environmental and social impacts. Adverse effects faced by the poor included soil, water and air pollution, and the loss of arable land. In this case, the incapacity of the courts to handle highly technical detail – and their refusal to award damages or uphold convictions of perpetrators – in the face of claims by judges that they were ‘unqualified’ to rule upon these matters, had the effect of allowing industrial groups to operate with impunity.60 A particularly egregious failure of a state’s accountability institutions to uphold the rights of the poor against a corporate polluter is the case of the 1984 Union Carbide chemical gas leak in Bhopal, India. More than 3000 people were instantly killed when a cloud of methyl isocyanate escaped from the facility. Between 10,000 and 19,00061 people from the low-income settlements surrounding the plant are believed to have died subsequently as a result of long-term illnesses stemming from the poisoning. Union Carbide’s evasion of legal responsibility in the US courts has been one of the catalysts for the new strategy of establishing a subsidiary’s ‘foreign direct liability’ in the legal jurisdiction of its parent company (an accountability innovation discussed in Chapter 5). Although the Indian government initiated litigation against the company in the United States, Union Carbide’s lawyers successfully argued that American courts were not competent to judge the value of lives in the developing world. The case was transferred to India in 1986. The Indian government’s subsequent acceptance of what many saw as an inadequate settlement – allegedly ‘imposed’ by India’s Supreme Court – fed the perception that, like many other governments, India’s put commercial interests above both environmental concerns and the lives of its poorest citizens. Though the $470 million settlement was far less than the original claim of $3.2 billion, had the funds been properly administered, they might have brought a meaningful difference to the lives of survivors. The failure of the Indian authorities to provide adequate compensation to survivors, or to invest in municipal infrastructure and accessible medical services in the affected area, illustrates ongoing accountability failures in judicial and administrative systems. Another, earlier, accountability failure – the unwillingness of the authorities to enforce zoning regulations – arguably increased
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the death toll itself, by allowing informal settlements to be located in the shadow of the plant in the first place. Efforts to establish criminal responsibility have been haphazard. Union Carbide Chairman Warren Anderson was arrested when he travelled to Bhopal just after the catastrophe. Released on bail, with an undertaking to return to India when directed by the Indian courts, he never did. In 2002 India’s Central Bureau of Investigation proposed that the charge of ‘culpable homicide’ against Anderson be reduced to a non-extraditable offence – ‘hurt by negligence’. The chief judicial magistrate of the Bhopal High Court was widely applauded within India for rejecting this proposal. But the Indian authorities have made no significant efforts to extradite Anderson, and with a maximum 20-year sentence for culpable homicide (compared to two years for negligence) there is little chance that he will give himself up, or that the US government will seriously cooperate with India to pursue the aging Anderson. The $470 million paid by Union Carbide is less than one-tenth of the compensation paid following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989. The US government and the State of Alaska won over a billion dollars in compensation for Exxon’s damage to Alaska’s wildlife and coastline, and class action suits on behalf of commercial and subsistence fishermen and others whose livelihoods were affected by the oil spill won plaintiffs five billion dollars in punitive damages.62 In this case, private litigants were much more effective than was a sovereign state in the Union Carbide case where the government could not obtain justice for the killing of thousands of citizens. The Indian government was disadvantaged in not being able to hold Union Carbide to account in the company’s home-country courts – and, possibly, by fears among high-ranking Indian officials that their alleged regulatory failures might receive further publicity were they to pursue the matter with greater vigour.
Physical security The poor are often the primary victims of violent crime and human rights abuses, whether committed by fellow citizens or by state agents. Certain types of violations affect vulnerable groups almost exclusively. Crimes such as rape and domestic battery, for instance, are mostly suffered by women and children, while racial and ethnic minorities are often targets of systematic, organized assaults on their persons and property. While physical insecurity is itself a form of diminished human development, it also undermines health and well-being, and causes poor people to shy away from investing in their futures or broadening their income-generating efforts. Girls may not be educated for fear of sexual assault on the way to school or in the classroom. Where violence is perpetrated by the police, and left unpunished by the courts, the poor will perceive the justice system as a
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form of organized theft and will not expect to receive fair treatment from other state officials. They may avoid engaging with the state and accessing the public services that could help them out of poverty. One reaction to a lack of safety and security is for communities to form self-help policing initiatives that can evolve into vigilantism, compounding the security problems of rival social groups and undermining general respect for the law. Investment by the poor in do-it-yourself security systems (or in ‘protection’ payments to the police or to organized thugs) erodes their scarce disposable income, detracting from investment in their longer-term livelihood security and human development. In some countries, the police, far from acting as defenders of public order and security for all citizens, can be the agents dispensing violence and terror. Or they can reinforce social privilege by under-policing or ignoring lawlessness and violence in poor communities, while protecting the property and rights of the wealthy. A World Bank report, based on participatory research conducted in 1999–2000 with poor people in 23 countries,63 found that the police force in many developing countries was the public institution perceived by poor people as the most corrupt and predatory – extracting bribes and ‘protection money’, while dispensing harassment and abuse.64 Latin American countries suffer from very high levels of police abuse of suspects and prisoners, as well as the abuse of lethal force for the suppression of social movements and the control of crime in poor neighbourhoods. Police impunity in many Latin American countries is a legacy of military rule. Not only are the police, in some instances, accustomed to controlling, rather than protecting; the state’s apparatus of coercion is sometimes deliberately shielded or exempted from the institutions of democratic constitutionalism and civilian control as part of the deal struck by military authorities during the transition to democratic rule. In Colombia (and until recently, Brazil) the police were subject to their own system of justice through military courts, where conviction rates for torture and the abuse of deadly force are very low. Outside periods of political repression under dictatorships, the main victims of physical abuse in police custody and arbitrary use of lethal force are poor people and racial minorities. In Brazil, killings by the military police, who do much of the patrol work in urban areas, amount to a substantial proportion of all intentional homicides, particularly targeting young men and people of African descent in low-income areas.65 Though the military police have justified these killings as a means of controlling violent crime, studies of the thousands of police killings over the years show that more than half of those killed had never had any contact with the criminaljustice system, and few were even suspected of a violent crime when they were killed.66 Those who are arrested are likely to experience physical abuse in custody, or even torture, which reformers in the civil police system have acknowledged is a common practice.67
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This kind of police violence, which involves street shootings of suspects of non-serious crimes and routine physical abuse or even torture of suspects, bypasses the criminal justice system. It specifically targets the poor. The police rarely kill middle-class people. In contemporary Latin America, the individuals targeted for killing, arrest and abuse in custody are those who commit the crimes of the poor, such as petty theft or illegal squatting. In some countries, the police are supported in this crusade against the poor by laws that give them extensive powers to detain categories of people deemed a threat to the status quo. In Venezuela, the 1939 Vagrancy Law allows police to detain persons deemed a social threat for up to five years. In Argentina, police edicts allow the federal police to detain people for up to 30 days for vagrancy, drunkenness or even cross-dressing. These are examples of institutionalized anti-poor bias. That impunity in the exercise of police powers constitutes a form of ‘social cleansing’ is supported by evidence indicating that the victims of police excesses are not just those accused of specific crimes, but also social outcastes, such as homosexuals or street children.68 Other social groups whose associational power might threaten the political dominance of urban elites are also targeted. In Brazil and Mexico, the police have been associated for generations with killings of peasant squatters and union leaders in rural areas, to a degree that amounts to suppression of social movements.69 Multiple accountability failures produce the impunity in police behaviour that fundamentally erodes the physical security of the poor. Administrative systems to discipline the police are weak. According to human rights monitors, police disciplinary systems are untransparent and in some countries, such as Ecuador and Paraguay, unresponsive to complaints of torture.70 A report on pervasive police abuse in the United States reinforces this point: Perhaps most important, and consistently lacking, is a system of oversight in which supervisors hold their charges accountable for mistreatment and are themselves reviewed and evaluated, in part, by how they deal with subordinate officers who commit human rights violations. Those who claim that each high-profile case of abuse by a ‘rogue’ officer is an aberration are missing the point: problem officers frequently persist because the accountability systems are so seriously flawed.71 The organizational culture of the police, which should act as an accountability institution by supporting professionalism and respect for the law, reinforces the difficulties of checking police lawlessness. Tolerance for police brutality sometimes transforms it into a rite of passage, inducting newer recruits into violent behaviour. By implicating them in misconduct, such forms of initiation discourage officers from whistle-blowing or pursuing reforms from within. This culture of corruption and brutality is exacerbated by problems common to public services in developing countries: police are
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often under-trained, under-paid and under-respected, and therefore lack incentives to eschew the incomes and privileges obtained through extortion and cultivating a climate of fear. Financial auditing to expose illegally acquired income is also a missing accountability ingredient here. But the biggest culprit in the failure to establish democratic control over the police is the judiciary. The judiciary fails to prosecute crimes from which the poor disproportionately suffer, particularly violent crimes in low-income neighbourhoods or in rural areas. Brazil’s Pastoral Land Commission notes that of the 1730 killings of peasants, rural workers, trade union leaders, religious workers and lawyers committed between 1964 and 1992, only 30 cases had been brought to trial by 1992, and just 18 of these resulted in convictions.72 Not only does the judiciary show much less zeal in prosecuting crimes committed by the middle class than those committed by the poor against the property of the middle class, the judiciary has not been diligent in investigating or punishing police abuses. One reason for this is police interference with investigations and trials. Forensic evidence is tampered with or destroyed, and both witnesses and prosecutors are intimidated with threats of violence.73 Many countries lack effective agencies of oversight to regulate and reform police and justice systems, such as police complaints authorities or ombudsmen, independent judicial commissions or national human rights commissions. Where such agencies exist, they can be directly undermined by the police if they appear likely to threaten police impunity. For instance, in the Mexican state of Sinaloa, the president of the Human Rights Commission was murdered in 1990, and a police commander was accused of the killing. During the trial six prosecution witnesses were murdered.74 Alternatively, human rights oversight bodies can be undermined by political interests or captured by individuals or groups lacking commitment to human rights. In El Salvador, for instance, political capture destroyed the autonomy and effectiveness of the Procurator for the Defence of Human Rights (the Spanish acronym for which is PDDH). This office was created in 1992 to combat democratic misuses of state authority, based on the classic model of the Swedish Ombudsmen. Eduardo Peñate Polonco was elected to head the PDDH in 1998 while under investigation by the same body for his previous conduct as a trial judge, including charges of corruption. At the time of his appointment he was already facing nine complaints on such grounds as obstruction of justice and violation of legal principles. The leftist FMLN withdrew support for Peñate’s nomination, but the rightist parties remained firmly behind him. The appointment was confirmed. In the following year, the PDDH ‘suffered a sustained loss of credibility due to high staff turnover, apparent mismanagement of funds, and a visibly reduced emphasis on the investigation of human rights complaints’, according to one study. A strong Procurator is perceived as contrary to the interests of the ruling coalition.
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Civic organizations and parties with a stronger stake in the PDDH’s vitality have been too fragmented and ineffective to resist the politicization of this vital office.75 Corruption and intimidation of the judiciary account, in part, for the failure to prosecute police impunity. But a bias in favour of police impunity and against a fair hearing for the poor is built into several important procedural aspects of the legal system. For instance, most Latin American justice systems rely heavily on the written dossier, placing great value on confessions and other declarations by suspects and witnesses – a characteristic of Continental-style systems. The Anglo-American legal tradition, in contrast, relies much more on concentrated oral hearings. Human rights activists argue that judicial systems that consider confessions a key form of evidence create incentives for torture.76 The emphasis on written procedures also creates access barriers – alienating illiterates and speakers of indigenous languages – and encourages a delegation of judicial powers to poorly trained and inadequately supervised para-legals who prepare the written dossiers that judges rely upon when deciding cases. These procedural obstacles are good examples of the bias form of accountability failure – in this case, biases that prevent poor people from accessing and using oversight mechanisms. Perhaps the most disturbing bias is public tolerance for police brutality directed against the poor. Although Latin American publics are as scandalized as others by gross abuses of lethal force, particularly when there are police massacres of prisoners and suspects, many observers comment that there is a high level of approval for policing aimed at containing ‘dangerous classes’ and protecting the property of elites, even if this impinges on the right to physical security. A Brazilian human rights advocate argues that ‘throughout the continent, impunity is virtually assured for those who commit offences against victims considered “undesirable” or “subhuman” ’, the law constituting a ‘border guard’ that protects elite privilege.77 The social relations underlying these mechanisms of exclusion contribute to accountability failures in public-security systems in that they implicitly justify the absence of police protection for the poor. * * * We have argued in this chapter that many aspects of poverty result from failures in the institutions designed to assure public probity and regulate economic activity. To demonstrate the relationship between accountability failures and the deprivations endured by the poor and other socially marginalized groups, we have examined failures of oversight institutions to ensure equity in access to livelihood opportunities, to capability-enhancing services, to a decent environment and to physical security. These are four key arenas that determine the levels and quality of poor people’s physical, human and social capital.
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We have also suggested that there is much more to accountability failure than simple corruption, or the abuse of public office for private (financial) gain. Accountability failures also inhere in the reproduction of elite biases by institutions of public oversight. This often occurs because these institutions lack a remit to respond to the needs of the poor, or because institutions erect obstacles to those who might try to demand answers of public authorities or ask that punishments be imposed on people and institutions that violate their rights. Were conventional accountability institutions to work with greater efficiency, a number of biases in the conduct of public servants and the terms of access to public resources would nevertheless persist unchecked, and continue to reproduce social exclusions. This reflects, among other things, the problem of the weak political voice of the poor and other socially marginalized groups, who have difficulty in making accountability institutions answer for the injustices they experience. The failure of accountability institutions to answer to the poor, and to answer for their performance in terms of poverty reduction, produces a suboptimal distribution of public goods and services, one that produces neither human development nor efficiency gains. Worse, these failures reduce the capacity of poor people to work collectively as civil and political actors. By denying the legitimacy and validity of the complaints and claims of the poor, some biased accountability institutions may even contribute to an internalization by the poor of a sense of inferiority, thus preventing them from identifying shared interests. Faced with the multiplicity of accountability failures discussed in this chapter it is difficult to know what kind of accountability reforms would be most meaningful to the poor, and where to start when capture and bias are so deeply institutionalized and mutually supportive. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 we analyse a range of accountability reforms that attack forms of capture and bias that existing accountability institutions and mainstream governance reforms have failed to address, or in some cases refused to identify as problems at all. We are not guided by a comprehensive theory of accountability reform. Instead, we document real-life innovations in tackling accountability failures around the world. Few of these initiatives spring from the top levels of governments trying to stem large-scale fraud, or from international donors keen to promote good governance, or from multinational corporate actors trying to reduce the costs of foreign direct investment. They stem primarily from citizens desperate to put an end to the daily acts of intimidation and extortion that impoverish them, and the disdain and abuse they encounter in their interactions with public agents. Some of the accountability experiments discussed include the actions of crusading and courageous public actors fighting sclerotic and resistant administrations. The initiatives we examine operate not just at the national level, but also involve individuals and groups using international legal
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instruments to pursue human rights abusers or polluting corporations across national boundaries. They also involve the creation of new international accountability instruments to address problems long neglected by states content to protect deposed dictators or criminally negligent firms. As we shall see, the cases involve the use of unconventional methods for monitoring and assessing the actions of public and private power-holders. And they insist upon new standards of probity, in which equity and social justice are explicit criteria against which power-holders must justify their decisions and actions.
4 New Roles for Accountability Actors
The institutional and accountability failures described in Chapter 3, and the stunning range of human development deprivations they have permitted to persist, have catalysed demands for the creation of more effective ways of making both official state agencies and powerful private actors accountable for the full range of actions in which they engage. Civil society organizations and crusading individuals, operating within and across national borders, are demanding that public authorities answer more directly to the people affected by their actions. Concerns about the accountability of large corporations, for instance, intensified with the bankruptcies of US-based firms Enron and WorldCom in 2001–02, and the financial crisis that struck the Italian company Parmalat in late 2003. These corporations not only exercised enormous employment power, and influence over large economic institutions, such as California’s deregulated electricity market (Enron) or dairy cooperatives in a number of countries (Parmalat); they are trustees of ordinary people’s savings through both their internal pension funds and the financial institutions that purchase company stock on behalf of small investors. Multinational firms exercise vast power over citizens in the countries where they operate. Through industrial pollution and the ill effects of their products – cigarettes, drugs – corporations affect more than just the people who consume them directly. These activities, of both powerful actors and the organizations and individuals that seek to hold them to account, create the impression of a vast expansion in the type of actors involved in accountability processes – that is, in the range of both seekers and targets of accountability. But this is largely illusory. In reviewing practical attempts to reinvent accountability, we find that there is not all that much change in the type of actors involved. It is the roles into which these familiar actors have been cast that is undergoing a transformation. Consider, for instance, public discussions about the accountability of multinational pharmaceutical companies. For many activists, north and south, the critical question is the same one posed in the title of an article 77
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published in 2000 in the New England Journal of Medicine: ‘The Pharmaceutical Industry – To Whom is It Accountable?’1 Pointing out that the industry – at least in the United States – ‘benefits enormously from publicly funded research, government-granted patents, and large tax breaks’, its author argues that ‘[f]or these reasons, and because it makes products of vital importance to the public health, it should be accountable not only to its shareholders, but also to society at large’.2 But pharmaceutical firms are, theoretically, already accountable to the public – through the regulations imposed under laws enacted by politicians elected through a system of universal adult franchise. The actors are thus not new. What activist pressures and public deliberation have accomplished, however, is to revise the criteria by which the firms’ performance is assessed, making their impact on ordinary people’s human development prospects, rather than compliance with financial and technical rules, the relevant standard of accountability. To the extent that governments fail to keep pace with these changes in norms, people and their associations feel vindicated in participating more actively and directly in the monitoring of pharmaceutical firms’ actions, and in participating in government-industry negotiations about regulatory matters. Individuals acting alone and civic groups waging campaigns also subvert the firms’ power when they exit to cheap, sometimes illegal, generic drugs, or take part in public protests against government policy or company behaviour. Familiar actors thus find themselves playing new roles. The idea of civic groups acting as seekers of accountability is nothing new; indeed, it is a cornerstone of liberal political theory. Civic organizations – operating in a relatively free political space somewhere between the family and the state – are a key catalyst in vertical accountability systems that seek to check abuses of public power. There is also remarkable constancy among the type of targets being held to account. As we have seen, even the global corporation, that most high-profile of the ‘new’ targets of accountability, is not only not new, but has long been subjected to accountability demands: multinational firms have had to answer to regulators in home and host governments, to shareholders, to trade unions, to the courts. None of this is to deny that there has been an increase in the number and visibility of both seekers and targets of accountability. National chapters of the Berlin-based Transparency International continue to be born, as do national human rights commissions, ombudsperson offices, anti-corruption commissions and equal opportunities bodies. At the international level, new institutions – such as the International Criminal Court and environmental and weapons-control treaties – are being established. Targets from whom accountability is sought are also proliferating. The World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995, is perhaps the most visible example. And the number of multinational corporations is also on the rise as firms from several developing countries begin to establish themselves outside their home
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jurisdictions. Within states, too, the devolution of political decision-making and public-service management to subnational authorities has generated a large number of new accountability targets, their close proximity to people making them loom larger at local levels. Though neither the targets of accountability, nor the actors seeking it, are fundamentally of a new type (though they may have multiplied and become more visible), the methods used by accountability-seekers to achieve their objectives, and the jurisdictions over which they seek to impose accountability, have indeed undergone important changes. Both of these issues – and indeed the interrelation between the geographic scope of operation and the choice of technique – are addressed in Chapter 5 (on ‘New Methods and Shifting Accountability Jurisdictions’). Targets of accountability are struggling to adapt to (or resist) these new methods, as well as to rapidly changing norms of performance, the subject of the subsequent chapter (on ‘New Standards of Accountability’). It is the complex and often unpredictable interplay between these factors (concerning technique, scope and norms) that largely explains why both seekers and targets of accountability find themselves playing new roles, performing alongside actors with whom they have rarely shared the stage. No actor has been liberated from type-casting more than civil society. Their dramatic range expanded, citizens and their associations are playing three new roles. First, they have assumed positions as quasi-official agents, either attempting to substitute for failing state accountability institutions, or participating directly in formal accountability processes as fully vested players. Second, civic groups are playing a more central role in creating new formal accountability mechanisms. Third, civil society organizations have themselves increasingly become targets of accountability. In the discussion that follows, we address these three trends in turn, focussing the analysis on the extent to which each new role may have opened spaces for disadvantaged people to benefit from changing relationships of accountability.
Substituting for (and participating in) official accountability processes To understand the significance of citizens and their associations participating directly in official accountability mechanisms, or mimicking these processes in ways that attract significant public attention when states refuse to open up their internal mechanisms, it is helpful to return to the distinction between horizontal and vertical forms of accountability. While citizens and civil society have traditionally been relegated to participation in vertical channels of accountability – voting, advocacy – they have now begun to take part in those horizontal channels that, because they involve state agencies checking
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the power of other state agencies, have excluded non-state entities by definition. In other words, the search by citizens and their associations for new roles has caused the vertical–horizontal distinction to blur. This blurring represents a shift towards augmenting the limited effectiveness of civil society’s watchdog function by breaking the state’s monopoly over responsibility for official oversight. This new ‘hybrid’ form of accountability3 is now reasonably widespread, but a number of recent examples suggest insights as to how citizens might prompt more satisfactory performance from authorities, or even see sanctions enforced for manifestly poor decision-making or outright corrupt behaviour. The indicative cases reviewed here are grouped according to the accountability institutions involved: parties and electoral competition, public expenditure management and audits, judicial and law enforcement institutions and accountability systems in public service bureaucracies. Citizen engagement in political accountability systems Voters in many countries are right to feel cynical about reforms to electoral and campaign-finance systems that seem to have no effect on the rate at which politicians accumulate illicit earnings. India’s various reforms, for instance, have not had much substantive impact: though visible campaigning expenses have been reduced, there is little indication that politicians have had their illicit sources of wealth choked off. Measures requiring parliamentarians to declare their personal assets may come with confidentiality provisions keeping that information away from the ordinary citizen. Efforts by electoral commissions to proscribe parties that engage in criminal activity or violence, or to prevent politicians with criminal records from taking up their parliamentary seats, may be desultory, delayed by years of legal proceedings, or else directly subverted by judges who have been intimidated by criminal politicians. Once elected, representatives are deft at evading citizen demands for greater transparency. Representatives often seem so little concerned about voters’ sanctions (ex post accountability) that much stronger ex ante controls on the quality of parties and politicians are needed to enable voters to identify scoundrels before they get into office. The case of the Poder Ciudadano (PC), an Argentine civil society association dedicated to fostering cleaner political competition, is an example of citizens taking on some of the roles of a horizontal state accountability agency such as an electoral commission. The PC monitors campaign finance norms, broadcasts information about the assets of politicians and accumulates evidence that can be used to expose political corruption. As one analysis put it, the PC has ‘filled the vacuum left by government institutions that were supposed to bring transparency to the electoral process, but failed’.4 The PC’s approach to ‘developing mechanisms of citizen control’ in elections began with the creation of a database of Argentine politicians, including their professional profiles and political platforms. The next step
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was ‘a project aimed at full-fledged financial disclosure’ of campaign finance for elections to the capital’s city council (in 1997 and 2000) and for presidential elections (in 2000).5 This kind of transparency, which included candidates declaring their personal assets, did not in itself provide all of the elements of accountability. But it did add an increased element of answerability to complement the process by which an enforcement mechanism – in the form of voter choice – could be exercised by ordinary people over their elected representatives. In this sense, it was a substantial step towards making ‘politicians more accountable to public opinion by requiring them to comply with norms of democratic governance … turning what has traditionally been either a passive or partisan voter into an informed citizen’.6 Moreover, the data on personal assets could then serve as baseline information against which successful candidates’ financial rectitude could subsequently be assessed by comparing their assets prior to election with those held after a term in office. The PC also created a methodology whereby the spending of parties during election campaigns could be monitored. This is ordinarily a job for an electoral commission, but where such institutions do not fulfil this important function, a space is created for non-state actors to assume these duties – sometimes in partnership with the state, sometimes in a bid to shame the relevant state institutions into performing their appointed functions more effectively.7 ‘Voter education’ efforts elsewhere, such as the high-profile Project Votesmart in Oregon, USA, do not always go as far as the PC in publicizing details of campaign financing or exposing excessive rates of asset accumulation by politicians. Project Votesmart has created a database on over 13,000 elected officials and candidates for office in the United States. This information covers the backgrounds, issue positions, voting records, campaign finances and performance evaluations of legislators and candidates by over 100 advocacy groups from across the political spectrum. But unlike the PC, Project Votesmart does not engage politicians directly in declaring assets and making commitments to probity. Project Votesmart seeks to improve political accountability by giving citizens and the media the information they need to sanction politicians for poor decision-making or criminal behaviour. Evaluations of Project Votesmart show that access to better information on the behaviour of politicians had little to no short-term effect on voter mobilization amongst socially excluded groups.8 This is because information alone is insufficient to alter the social conditions that produce either political alienation or clientelist relationships, where poor people vote on the basis of material inducements or social pressures exerted by powerful patrons. Indeed, research on developed country democratic processes shows that voters react to evidence about corruption in politics by becoming more fatalistic and apathetic about the value of political participation, and (increasingly) refusing to vote.9 It seems that, as some of the theoretical
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literature discussed in Chapter 2 indicated, ex post controls on politicians (voting them out of office) do not necessarily operate more effectively when good information about their conduct in office is available to voters. Voter education is at best only a weak answerability tool because it neither engages citizens more directly in public decision-making or reviews of spending, nor links information disclosures to investigative processes. Mainstream efforts to improve the accountability functions of political institutions such as legislatures aim to enhance the capacity of legislators to hold the executive to account. Conventional reforms in these areas include finance and audit acts that focus on ‘strengthening parliament’s hand’ through access to detailed monthly reports on actual expenditure, capacity building to aid the deciphering of budgets and financial-control mechanisms to restrain off-budget expenditure. Citizen efforts to participate in processes that cast light on departmental operations or off-budget spending can provide assistance to particularly energetic parliamentarians by demonstrating popular demand for probity. The sleuthing and publicizing work of the Mexican civil society group Fundar, within a broad-based network called the Civic Alliance, helped bring an end to the use of a Presidential secret account that operated independently of congressional approval.10 After a sustained campaign, the pressure led to the abolition of the secret fund, and set in place other measures to improve budget transparency.In Zambia, civil society groups provoked unprecedented moves by parliament in 2000 to lift the president’s immunity from prosecution, freeze the presidential discretionary fund and publicize MPs’ assets.11 In other contexts parliamentary oversight committees have been opened up for more direct citizen participation. South Africa’s parliamentary committees are noted for their transparency and accessibility to the public, to the point of holding hearings in remote locations in order to overcome the mobility and time constraints of poor people. But, again, making submissions to parliamentary committees limits civil society to an ‘information-provision’ role; no submission is guaranteed a full hearing or investigation, and civil society groups are not guaranteed full access to the information upon which parliamentarians are making their decisions. In general, the controls that voters exercise over politicians once in office are so weak, and the collusion of opposition legislators with corrupt executives so cheaply purchased, that there are great limits to how far citizen engagement can improve political accountability. A substantial alteration of legal and constitutional frameworks is needed to produce more direct answerability of politicians to citizens, an alteration that might create formal institutional space for civil society groups in government, as is the case with corporatist constitutional arrangements. Nevertheless, short of such radical measures, citizens have found it possible to engage in other institutions of public oversight to considerable effect.
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Citizen engagement in financial planning and auditing No ‘horizontal’ arenas of public oversight are more closed to civil society engagement than the planning of public expenditure or the auditing of public accounts, yet it is here that the most striking forms of direct civil society engagement are to be found. Citizens’ organizations are seeking improvements in both the allocation of public resources and the probity exercised in their expenditure. Budgeting and auditing tend to be secretive affairs because of the political sensitivities involved in collecting government revenues, establishing priorities for national spending and then assessing whether the money was spent as it should have been. Citizens have an enormous stake in how national and local funds are spent, but are not normally admitted to the key decision-making bodies that establish spending priorities, and certainly not to auditing processes, since citizen auditing would strike at the heart of practices that preserve the powers of bureaucrats and politicians. Secrecy in public accounts can mask the use of public funds for personal gain and the patronage arrangements through which these illicit rents are distributed. The last decade of the twentieth century saw a proliferation of citizen efforts to participate in national and local budgeting, and more recently these have been complemented by citizen audits of actual spending. Participation in formulating the budget and analysing it after the fact correspond to the categories of ex ante and ex post accountability outlined in Chapter 1. The idea is to make officials answerable for their proposed spending plans as well as, more conventionally, for whether money was actually spent as planned. Budget analysis by civil society organizations – either after budgets have been initially presented for legislative endorsement or, indeed, after they have been executed – has also flourished in recent years.12 (Budget analysis from a gender perspective is one of the accountability tools discussed in Chapter 7.) But while these efforts are important in helping to provide a framework through which a more precise form of answerability might be engendered, they tend not to involve the enforcement that is implied by direct involvement of citizens in detailed auditing functions. This is because civil society budget analysis generally excludes direct auditing of accounts, depriving citizen investigators of the documentary proof of malfeasance that is provided in detailed financial accounts. The limitations of excluding audit functions from citizen participation in budget management emerge from an analysis of the most well-developed system of participatory budget formulation: in the municipalities of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte in Brazil.13 Participatory Municipal Budgeting has been promoted in Brazilian municipalities since 1988 by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), or Workers’ Party. It gives groups of citizens a direct say in how local funds are spent, and institutionalizes their role in monitoring the execution of public works, and
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in reviewing actual spending. Though by the late 1990s it was being practised, to varying degrees, in a large number of Brazil’s 500 municipalities, it has tended to be most effective where the PT has been in charge of city government, particularly in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte.14 It is a multi-stage annual exercise involving city residents both directly and through neighbourhood representatives in a cascading system of public assemblies and sectoral committees. These bodies establish spending priorities for basic capital investments (paved roads, drainage and sewage, school construction) in their own neighbourhoods. Two huge annual open assemblies are held. The first reviews spending on the previous year’s budget; the second is the forum for electing representatives from each of the city’s main zones to sit for the rest of the year on the Participatory Budget Council. Members of this Council, which include senior municipal officials, are responsible for assembly of the municipal budget. They follow a strict set of criteria that assigns a certain level of resources to every city region according to: (a) its population and proportion of poor residents; (b) the quality of existing services; and (c) whether the region has received substantial city resources in the past (in which case it earns a lower priority for current spending). Delegates can also compete for specific works needed by different communities within their regions, and indeed sub-regional groups meet to lobby delegates for this purpose. Once the Participatory Budget Council draws up the municipal budget proposal, it submits it to city hall and reviews the final proposal, which city hall then submits to the city council. The Participatory Budget Council is then responsible for monitoring the implementation of the budget, particularly the execution of approved public works, and for investigating problems that delay these works. Although the PT has taken credit for the participatory budgeting idea, at least one observer has suggested that it was a civil society group that first initiated citizen engagement in budgeting. Avritzer argues that the Union of Residents’ Associations of Porto Alegre came up with the idea of a public budgeting process in the mid-1980s.15 A statement from the organization in 1986 outlines why engagement in budgeting is so critical for citizens’ capacity to promote accountable local government: The most important aspect of the City Hall is the collection of taxes and the definition of where the public money will go. It is based on this that we will have or not the funds with which to attend to the demands of the popular estates and neighbourhoods. This is the reason why we want to intervene directly in the definition of the municipal budget and control its application.16 From this time, popular participation in budgeting became a political demand of left-wing parties in the area. However, once the PT was in power, the precise structure of the participatory process was established by neither
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civil society nor the PT, but by planning officials from city hall. To avoid politicization of citizen engagement (at least along party lines) the officials insisted that local-level residents’ associations – not the large apex residents associations or other formal civil society groups – be the foundation of the participatory process, the location from which delegates should be elected. They were obliged to concede to the PT’s demand that sector-specific advisory bodies be established in parallel to the technocratic and insulated bureaucracies usually responsible for identifying new public works or services and monitoring their implementation. These sectoral committees are not alternative sources of planning instructions; rather, they serve to bring greater transparency and public review to the hitherto closed decision-making of the technical bureaucracies. The result, apparently, has been a shift in the language and attitude of city bureaucrats from a ‘technobureaucratic’ to a ‘technodemocratic’ culture, in which technical staff attempt to convey recommendations in accessible language and move from a relationship of command over citizens to one characterized by negotiation and persuasion.17 Advocates argue that during the 1990s participatory budgeting in the two cities produced much greater equity in the distribution of public funds.18 Between 1989 and 1996 the proportion of households in Porto Alegre with access to water rose from 80 per cent to 98 per cent, the percentage of households served by the municipal sewage system rose from 46 per cent to 85 per cent and the number of children enrolled in public schools doubled.19 Perhaps more importantly from an accountability perspective, the greater transparency involved in the budgeting processes improved confidence in the management of public funds. Tax revenues increased by 50 per cent between 1989 and 2000.20 Levels of popular participation have grown over time, with historically disempowered groups (women, poor and working class people on the urban periphery) making up at least half, if not more, of the regional assemblies.21 Citizen engagement in monitoring public works has also led to much higher levels of efficiency in executing physical projects, as suggested by a study of the extension of the public sewage network in Porto Alegre.22 While only 15 per cent to 20 per cent of budgetary demands are met, over time almost 90 per cent of participating communities have perceived material gains. In about 30 per cent of projects across the two cities, residents have had to intervene to make sure that works were properly executed. People have infrequently sought assistance from politicians. Instead residents have turned to their regional assemblies or directly to delegates on the Participatory Budget Council. This by-passing of traditional political mediators, who use such appeals for help as a means of establishing patronage relationships, suggests a profound shift towards citizens seeing service-delivery as theirs by right, rather than as a favour to be obtained through political contacts. It is a shift from ‘loyalty’ to ‘voice’, to use Hirschman’s terms (introduced in Chapter 2).
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What is not at all clear from the published accounts is whether this system endows participants with the legal and technical capacity to audit past expenditures in detail. While ‘reviews’ of previous budgets are conducted at the beginning of each planning year, this process is undertaken at the huge assembly meetings, and therefore does not permit the degree of disaggregation necessary to audit the many spending decisions involved in capital projects. Also unclear are how far spending information is broken down, whether participants have a right to demand intimate spending details for every project or the extent to which the monitoring of public works involves close inspection by members of the Participatory Budget Council of the quality of the inputs, their technical appropriateness and so forth. These very intimate details of spending in public works schemes have been the centrepiece of a striking experiment in direct citizen auditing of government spending in the north Indian state of Rajasthan. A grassroots organization called the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), or Workers and Farmers Power Association, has turned ordinary people into financial auditors, in effect substituting for inefficient and corrupt official auditing agencies.23 The result of years of work to expose local corruption has been legislative reform to the system of local government such that throughout Rajasthan, village-level accounts now must be subjected to scrutiny by a village meeting to which all residents are invited. Citizen auditing of the kind the MKSS promotes is almost unheard of for several reasons. First, few countries offer citizens a statutory right to the disaggregated financial records (and supporting documentation) required to scrutinize local public spending. Second, because citizen auditing can expose corruption and networks of privilege between bureaucrats and local elites, it is strongly resisted by administrators and politicians. It can be a highly risky activity for ordinary citizens, and can jeopardize other, patronage-based relationships they may have with politicians, bureaucrats and local elites. Third, there is an inescapable level of expertise necessary for budget analysis in order to make sense of government accounts, and a capacity for generating independent testimony on financial transactions is needed if official accounts are to be verified. The MKSS tackled these three constraints through three interlinked initiatives. First, it led a state-wide and national campaign for citizens’ legal right to information. Second, the MKSS built a cohesive and highly motivated local organization with connections to journalists, lawyers and other social action groups to enhance its lobbying potential (and to reduce the likelihood that its members would be attacked by local elites). Third, the MKSS developed innovative methods for aggregating and analysing budgetary information. The MKSS’s work began in the early 1990s in a campaign to secure minimum wages for seasonal employees – mostly impoverished rural women – on government drought-relief works. The campaign revealed the
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role of corruption in the underpayment of wages. It became clear that local authorities were billing the central and state governments for amounts that far exceeded what workers were paid. To expose specific instances of these and other forms of fraud that deprived the poor of development resources – inflated estimates for public-works projects, the use of poor-quality materials, over-billing by suppliers – access was required to financial records. These have long been kept secret by local officials. The MKSS needed not just aggregate balance sheets, but also supporting documentation, like