Edi torial
f i l e : / / / E : / % E 7 % 9 4 % B 5 % E 5 % A D % 9 0 % E 5 % 9 B % B E % E 4 % B9 %A66/E ditori ...
Editorial Article Type: Editorial From: critical perspectives on international business, Volume 5, Issue 1/2 As Critical Perspectives on International Business prepared to enter its fifth year of publication, we found ourselves faced with a situation which was considered by some as the major crisis of the twenty-first century – global financial meltdown. In September 2008, the possible consequences of this crisis overshadowed concerns about climate change, AIDS and terrorism in the media – or, at least, in the Anglo-American media. In response to the problem, UK academic Stefano Harney was reported in the Times Higher Education Supplement (Corbyn, 2008) as blaming business academics for contributing to the origins of this crisis through ignoring social and political questions in their teaching – the very questions that CPoIB has sought to address. In order to contribute to the debate at an early date, CPoIB sent out a call for short, critically reflective papers which would be subject only to editorial review, so that they might appear as quickly as possible and stimulate further academic debate. In response to the call, we received a substantial number of submissions from across the world, engaging both with theoretical issues and empirical examples. We have selected the best of these papers for inclusion in this double Special Issue in order to provide the broadest range of critical and stimulating inputs to the debate. We set the scene with David Weitzner and James Darroch’s paper on “Why moral failures precede financial crises”. This leads into a series of theoretical discussions from: Giorgos Kallis, Joan Martinez-Alier and Richard B. Norgaard; Suhaib Riaz; Roy E. Allen and Donald Snyder; and Loong Wong. These papers approach the issue from a range of theoretical perspectives, including institutional theory, systems theory, and political and economic theory. Federico Caprotti’s paper ponders the future role of the state in relation to financial frameworks and leads into the group of empirical studies by: William V. Rapp; Manuel B. Aalbers; Arvind K. Jain; Jon Cloke; Robin Klimecki and Hugh Willmott; and André Filipe Zago de Azevedo and Paulo Renato Soares Terra. These papers present critical analysis of a variety of financial institutions in the USA, the UK and Brazil. We end the Special Issue with Steven Pressman’s call for a return to the economics of Keynes and Jan Toporowski’s short reflection on the implications of the financial crisis for the field of international business. We hope that this collection will stimulate further discussion in the academic literature, will be found of relevance to those engaged in determining future financial institutional frameworks and practices, and will inform the types of critical management education called for by Stefano Harney. References Corbyn, Z. (2008), “Did poor teaching lead to crash?”, Times Higher Education Supplement, 25 September, available at www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=403696 (accessed 29 September 2008) George Cairns, Joanne Roberts
第1 页 共1 页
2 009-12 -2923 :23
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1742-2043.htm
CPOIB 5,1/2
Why moral failures precede financial crises David Weitzner and James Darroch
6
Schulich School of Business, York University, Toronto, Canada Abstract Purpose – This paper aims to explore the linkages between greed and governance failures in both financial institutions and financial markets. Design/methodology/approach – The paper described how innovation changed the US financial system through an analysis of recent events, and employs the philosophic concepts of hubris and greed to explain certain developments. Findings – The development of the shadow banking system and opaque products was motivated in part by greed. These developments made governance at both the institutional and market levels extremely difficult, if not impossible. In part the findings are limited by the current opacity of the markets and the dynamics of events. Practical implications – The implication of the research is to reinforce the need for transparency if the risk of innovation in the financial system is to be both identified and managed. The creation of central clearing houses and/or exchanges for new products is clearly indicated. Originality/value – Understanding the linkages between greed, hubris and governance in the development of opaque products provides insights of value to those trying to understand the current crisis – from academics to practitioners. Keywords Governance, Ethics, Financial markets, Banking, United States of America Paper type Conceptual paper
critical perspectives on international business Vol. 5 No. 1/2, 2009 pp. 6-13 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1742-2043 DOI 10.1108/17422040910938640
Introduction Innovation and crises are endemic to the financial system and while every failure leads to significant regulatory improvement, it has never been enough to prevent the next financial crisis (see, for example, Laeven and Valencia, 2008; Rowe and Day, 2007). Yet, each crisis has unique elements and the current crisis cannot be understood without seeing how financial innovation fundamentally changed the financial system of the USA and consequently for those financial systems connected to the USA – essentially the globe. To this end, it is important to note that the drivers of the problems – structured finance products – were essentially creatures of the unregulated or lightly regulated side of the US financial system, where greed was unchecked (Johnson and Neave, 2008). While there was clearly a failure of regulation, it should be first seen as a failure in scope of regulation. But it is equally important to understand how hubris united with greed was instrumental in players working to create an unregulated market. What is stunning about the current crisis is that it is the result of governance failures of both the boards of financial institutions and markets despite significant regulatory reforms in the banking world – Basel II – and corporate governance in the USA – Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). The lesson to be learned is that regulatory reform without ethical reform will never be enough. The faith that public policymakers had resolved the major economic issues associated with business cycles and volatility combined with the private sector’s faith in hyper-rational modern finance and unregulated markets (Lynch, 2007) created an
environment conducive to the growth of greed. The arrogant faith in the new financial order led to a lack of attention to governance and ethics despite famous ethical failures and heightened regulatory concerns. While it is often said that success breeds success, long bull markets and excess liquidity breed over-confidence and an over-commitment to revenue-generating activities as opposed to control activities. In this environment of weak governance, unethical behavior flourishes. Management scholars have already faced tough questions about the ethical implications of their theoretical suppositions (Ghoshal, 2005), but the current financial woes have led to renewed calls for a more central place for ethical considerations in mainstream management theories along with new questions about the significant role greed and hubris tend to play in the practice of management. We believe that the time has come for researchers concerned with the financial system and the question of ethics to address explicitly the problem of greed. “The Great Moderation”: hubris and the limits of rationality There was a belief that policymakers had created a new and less volatile world. Ben Bernanke in a 2004 speech talked about the new world of the “Great Moderation”: The Great Moderation, the substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility over the past twenty years, is a striking economic development. Whether the dominant cause of the Great Moderation is structural change, improved monetary policy, or simply good luck is an important question about which no consensus has yet formed. I have argued today that improved monetary policy has likely made an important contribution not only to the reduced volatility of inflation (which is not particularly controversial) but to the reduced volatility of output as well. Moreover, because a change in the monetary policy regime has pervasive effects, I have suggested that some of the effects of improved monetary policies may have been misidentified as exogenous changes in economic structure or in the distribution of economic shocks. This conclusion on my part makes me optimistic for the future, because I am confident that monetary policymakers will not forget the lessons of the 1970s (Bernanke, 2004).
Unfortunately, the policymakers were not alone in their heightened self-confidence concerning their ability to manage the economy. The massive egos of many leaders, executives and aspiring executives of financial firms also played a role. The popular press abounds with stories of the arrogance of players in the financial world, both real and fictional (Bruck, 1989; Lewis, 1989; Stewart, 1992; Wolfe, 1987). Much of the arrogance is brought about by a blind faith in modern finance and perhaps the likelihood of government intervention if things went wrong. This may have been the lesson drawn by market participants from the 1998 crisis brought about by the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). Despite mounting evidence, the players at LTCM clung to the belief that their models were correct and that what was happening to them could not happen to them (see, for example, Lowenstein, 2000). But at the darkest moment, the Fed intervened, brought together the players, and found a resolution. Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s attacks on the unfounded belief in the new “pseudo science” in Fooled by Randomness (Taleb, 2005), The Black Swan (Taleb, 2007a) and the Financial Times (Taleb, 2007b) clearly demonstrate the need for humility, as well as art in risk management. There can be little doubt but that arrogance led many strictly quantitative financiers to underestimate dramatically the events that were unfolding in front of them. A blind faith in technical mastery of complex financial models left many
Moral failures
7
CPOIB 5,1/2
8
financial professionals so enamored with probability that they forgot about the uncertainty that was in the tail of their distributions. Perhaps one striking event in the current crisis will turn attention from computer screens to reality: The turmoil in financial markets has taken hold of the strategically important trade in long-term interest rate derivative, pushing rates to levels once thought to be a “mathematical impossibility.” [. . .] On Thursday [October 22], the 30-year swap spread turned negative after briefly flirting with such levels earlier in the month. This implies that investors are somehow reckoning that they are more likely to be paid back by a private counterparty than by the government, which can print money (Mackenzie, 2008).
The arrogance born out of a belief in hyper-rational “scientific” models is especially striking given the recognition that modern economics has given to the field of behavioral economics and finance. The Nobel Prize in economics surely conferred intellectual respectability upon the field when it awarded the prize in economics to George A. Akerlof, A. Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information in 2001, followed in 2002 with the award to Daniel Kahneman for his seminal work on psychology and economics and Vernon L. Smith for having legitimized laboratory experiments in the field of economics. The evidence was there for all to see that hyper-rationalistic models needed to be applied with caution. The evidence was not only there in theory but in past experience. In remarks concerning the LTCM failure and the Asian Crisis, Federal Reserve Governor Laurence H. Meyer (1999) noted that the correlations among markets behaved differently than expected by the market strategists. The correlation among the markets increased, and consequently heightened rather than lessened the impact of events. The belief in the random behavior of markets blinded market participants to the possibility of systemic issues tied to herd behavior. Yet, in 1841, Charles MacKay published Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds about earlier financial crises (MacKay, 1841). Greed has the power to transform random events into herd behavior. What is greed? We now need to explore the concept of “greed” and why it is considered by many in our society to represent a less than virtuous trait (notwithstanding the fact that the “greed is good” mantra, popularized by Oliver Stone’s “Wall Street”, has been adopted without irony by some in the business profession). “Greed” is in essence a rather difficult concept that has engaged thinkers across all religious and philosophical traditions throughout history. In Western society, it is perhaps most notably associated with the seven deadly sins of the Christian faith, but Tickle (2004) notes Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, Sikh, Muslim and Jewish sources which supports her assertion that every system has explored greed and all its “aliases” including (but not limited to) acquisitiveness, covetousness, avidity, cupidity, avarice, miserliness and simony. Tamari (1997) identifies greed as one of the two main sources of economic immorality and explains how traditional Judaism limits the harmful effects of greed through a divinely revealed code that provides a normative economic morality. In the Jewish tradition, economic activity and the acquisition of wealth can be viewed as virtuous
undertakings, depending on the source and the purpose of the activity. In this light, business is good, economic growth is good, but greed is not. Yet one does not need to refer only to classic religious traditions to find an intellectual and moral disdain for greed in all of its manifestations. Bragues (2006) has recently reminded business ethics scholars of the potential for Aristotelian virtue to inform our current debate on the place for greed in the practice of business. Generosity and magnificence are two virtues discussed by Aristotle and reinterpreted by Bragues (2006) that encourage morally minded individuals to pursue capitalist interests and even enjoy the fruits of acquired wealth without sliding into the vice of greed. Magnanimity as a business virtue in Bragues (2006) is illustrated by an individual manager who is not motivated primarily by the pursuit of wealth, but by nobler goals. In a similar Aristotelian spirit, Solomon (1993) explains that in opposition to a vice like greed, virtues represent the best in us and our communities, and the drive to excel for reasons that go beyond the simple pursuit of profit represents the most elementary of virtues appropriate to the discipline of management. For this paper, we wish to propose a working definition of greed that is rooted in economic behavior while embracing a moderate position closest in spirit to the Jewish and Aristotelian traditions that view greed as a vice only to the extent that it serves to hamper the positive possibilities of economic exchange. We propose that greed in this context needs to be viewed as occurring in situations where an individual seeks an economic return of greater value that what her input should reasonably earn and in so doing imposes costs upon others. The other is harmed in this process because the other’s ability to claim fair value is oppressed. In the context of the firm operating in society, greed is encountered when a firm attempts to avoid paying the full costs for its behavior (what economists call externalities). The pursuit of economic rents can therefore be virtuous provided that the economic actors respect the notion of mutually beneficial exchange as the ethical core of economic activity. Virtuous management involves a delicate balancing act between seeking out and developing innovative techniques and behaviors while at the same time keeping these innovations in check to ensure that they are conforming to society’s norms of ethical behavior. Financial innovations in particular can bring about significant and tangible social good in spurring economic innovation. For example, innovations in the financial markets have resulted in popular mechanisms that allow for houses to be made more affordable to the average family. However, these same financial innovations that offer opportunity for the average individual also have the capacity to tempt investors into irresponsible behavior motivated by greed and the potential of unusually high returns. Perhaps no financial innovation demonstrates this more clearly than derivatives, which allow individuals and firms to limit their exposures to undesirable outcomes or to gamble recklessly in the pursuit of high returns. In an ethical sense, financial innovation increases our opportunities to act as prudent, caring individuals, limiting harm to stakeholders such as employees, customers, and shareholders. But derivatives also create the opportunity to gamble on a massive scale. What this means is that even if the financial innovations are ethically neutral, the actions of the economic actors employing these innovations are not. If we cannot or do not wish to limit financial innovation then we must be fundamentally concerned about the moral character of those in the vanguard of poorly understood innovations. While economists and regulators may focus on the knowledge problem, it is just as important to look closely at the moral character of the players because financial innovation
Moral failures
9
CPOIB 5,1/2
creates new structural conditions with the possibility of doing both good and ill. In this context it may be useful to recall the desire expressed in the Lord’s Prayer: “Lead us not into temptation”. It is critical for management scholars concerned about ethics to understand the implications of the structural changes in the financial sector and to further understand that in many cases the only safeguard is the moral character of the financiers.
10 The new world of banking: “the shadow banking system” While greed is a constant in human behavior it is important to recognize how the financial world changed and created new opportunities for avarice that had systemic implications. William R. White (2004) at the Bank for International Settlement has written of the phenomena of “marketization”: the growing importance of financial markets compared to traditional financial institutions (e.g. banks). We need to realize the radical shift that has taken place in financial systems concerning credit facilities and risk transfer. The primary source of debt for firms has become the markets – or the “shadow banking system” as it has become known, and this has transformed the world of credit risk management (Rowe and Day, 2007). Moreover it is outside of US regulation. Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC, testifying to the Senate Banking Committee on September 23, 2008, made clear the role of lack of regulation in the current financial crisis: The failure of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to give regulatory authority over investment bank holding companies to any agency of government was, based on the experience of the last several months, a costly mistake. There is another similar regulatory hole that must be immediately addressed to avoid similar consequences. The $58 trillion notional market in credit default swaps — double the amount outstanding in 2006 — is regulated by no one. Neither the SEC nor any regulator has authority over the CDS market, even to require minimal disclosure to the market (see www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts092308cc.htm).
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, testifying before the House Committee of Government Oversight and Reform, confessed that he had counted upon the self-interest of financial institutions to protect shareholder equity. It should be noted that such a faith in market governance was not without support. The failure of the hedge fund Amaranth in September 2006 was in many ways a precursor to the current wave of financial failures, yet it caused no such systemic problems. Amaranth was trading futures on an organized exchange where the exchange was the counter-party to Amaranth’s contracts. As Amaranth started to get in trouble, the exchange forced the sale of Amaranth’s contracts in a liquid market to maintain its margin position (Cecchetti, 2007). As a result of these forced sales, while Amaranth failed and its shareholders lost, there were no systemic problems. The exchange had the information and ensured that market governance worked. In governance terms, Amaranth’s transactions were transparent to market participants. Such is not the case with many of the innovations in what has come to be called the “shadow banking system”: A plethora of opaque institutions and vehicles have sprung up in American and European markets this decade, and they have come to play an important role in providing credit across the financial system. Until the summer, structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) attracted little attention outside specialist financial circles. Though often affiliated to major banks, they were not always fully recognised on
balance sheets. These institutions, moreover, have never been part of the “official” banking system”: they are unable, for example, to participate in today’s Fed auction. But as the credit crisis enters its fifth month, it has become clear that one of the key causes of the turmoil is that parts of this hidden world are imploding. This in turn is creating huge instability for “real” banks – not least because regulators and bankers alike have been badly wrong-footed by the degree to which the two are entwined. “What we are witnessing is essentially the breakdown of our modern-day banking system, a complex of leveraged lending [that is] so hard to understand”, Bill Gross, head of Pimco asset management group recently wrote. “Colleagues call it the ‘shadow banking system’ because it has lain hidden for years, untouched by regulation yet free to magically and mystically create and then package subprime loans in [ways] that only Wall Street wizards could explain.” (Tett and Davies, 2007).
We wish to call attention to one particular aspect of this “unregulated” market: its opaqueness. The market for credit default swaps is essentially an over-the-counter (OTC) market with bilateral contracts between buyer and seller. In this market, there is no one monitoring all positions and enforcing margin requirements that act as a buffer. It must be recognized that the opaqueness of the market reflects a strategic choice by the participants. Participants could have chosen to create from the start the clearing houses and even exchanges that they are now considering (The Economist, 2008; Tett et al., 2008). This would have made this market far more transparent. Yet, ignoring the potential risks of opaque markets, the participants opted for opacity. The opacity meant that even market participants were functioning in a world where the lack of information made it impossible to assess accurately the full credit risk of counter-parties and there was no mechanism to buffer mistakes. The merger of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) hoped to challenge the OTC markets and become the clearing house for all on-exchange derivatives and move into the OTC market with its own products. Not surprisingly this has met with the opposition of major banks, which control 85 percent of global derivatives trade (Cameron, 2007). The response of the banks was to be expected – all firms seek to protect their profitability – but in this case, the greed for private profits led to extremely high public costs. Greed overrode considerations of creating the appropriate infrastructure of information disclosure necessary to ensure market governance. Interestingly, if market governance couldn’t work, neither could firm governance, since there was inadequate information on the positions taken by individual players. It should further be recognized that the many of the problems in the subprime mortgage market were also tied to improper governance related to lower levels of screening for securitized products (Keys et al., 2008). Conclusion The blind faith in markets being able to count upon self-interest to ensure self-regulation ignored major advances in the field or economics. Self-interest may well have guided actions but it was the form of self-interest which is at the heart of agency problems. It seems reasonably clear that while the shareholders were wiped out, many players at the institutions were considerably enriched during the process – even with golden parachutes. While there may be problems in implementing controls on executive compensation, it is hard not to believe that devastated shareholders are entitled to a certain level of righteous indignation. We believe that it is correct to believe that self-interest spelt greed can be counted upon – but it can be counted upon
Moral failures
11
CPOIB 5,1/2
12
in just the way that agency theorists fear. Greenspan’s comments only serve to demonstrate how isolated insiders of the financial community had become to broader concerns. The “shadow banking system” was a governance failure waiting to happen. First, how could the governance structures at firms such as Lehman have measured their exposure to credit risk given the lack of information decried by Cox? Clearly the boards of the banks were not performing the oversight role that they owed to their shareholders. The failure of many institutions has once again revealed the governance problems that both SOX and Basel II sought to correct. The decision to opt for opaque markets was a strategic decision with serious consequences. Secondly, free market advocates must recognize that in order for free markets to function, there must be open disclosure of information. Market governance is impossible in the absence of relevant information. The immediate challenge is to restore trust not only among financial institutions to restore the inter-bank markets, but also trust from the public. This is a tall order. Greed led to the governance failures at both the market and individual institutional level. Financial players who should have been committed to the good of the system in order to ensure that they could create wealth for themselves while improving the lot of others failed to recognize this obligation. Rather, greed and hubris led to the enrichment of the few to the cost of the many. It would be naive to believe that a moral renaissance is at hand and will solve all ills, so until that time we must enforce rules to promote the virtue of transparency to prevent shadow worlds in the financial system. References Bernanke, B.S. (2004), “The great moderation”, remarks at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, DC, February 20, available at: www.federalreserve.gov/ BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2004/20040220/default.htm Bragues, G. (2006), “Seek the good life, not money: the Aristotelian approach to business ethics”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 67, pp. 341-57. Bruck, C. (1989), The Predators’ Ball: The Inside Story of Drexel Burnham and the Rise of the Junk Bond Raiders, Penguin, New York, NY. Cameron, D. (2007), “CME accuses banks of inflated profits”, Financial Times, March 13. Cecchetti, S. (2007), “A better way to organise securities markets”, Financial Times, October 4. (The) Economist (2008), “Derivatives: clearing the fog”, The Economist, April 17. Ghoshal, S. (2005), “Bad management theories are destroying good management practice”, Academy of Management Learning and Education, Vol. 4, pp. 75-91. Johnson, L.D. and Neave, E.H. (2008), “The subprime mortgage market: familiar lessons in a new context”, Management Research News, Vol. 31 No. 1, pp. 12-26. Keys, B.J., Mukherjee, T., Seru, A. and Vig, V. (2008), “Securitization and screening: evidence from subprime mortgage backed securities”, EFA 2008 Meeting, Athens, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id ¼ 1093137 Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2008), “Systemic banking crises: a new database”, Working Paper No. WP/08/224, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Lewis, M.M. (1989), Liar’s Poker: Rising through the Wreckage on Wall Street, W.W. Norton, New York, NY.
Lowenstein, R. (2000), When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management, Random House, New York, NY. Lynch, J.T. (2007), “Credit derivatives: industry initiative supplants need for direct regulatory intervention: a model for the future of US regulation?”, March 8, available at: http://ssrn. com/abstract ¼ 975244 MacKay, C. (1841), Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, Wilder Editions, Harmony Books, New York, NY. Mackenzie, M. (2008), “Credit crunch upsets 30-year rate swaps”, Financial Times, October 23. Meyer, L.H. (1999), remarks before the International Finance Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, IL, October 1. Rowe, D.M. and Day, T. (2007), “Credit risk management’s 25 year transformation”, The RMA Journal, October, pp. 39-44. Solomon, R.C. (1993), Ethics and Excellence, Oxford University Press, New York, NY. Stewart, J.B. (1992), Den of Thieves, Simon & Schuster, New York, NY. Taleb, N.N. (2005), Fooled by Randomness, 2nd ed., Random House, New York, NY. Taleb, N.N. (2007a), The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Random House, New York, NY. Taleb, N.N. (2007b), “The pseudo-science hurting markets”, Financial Times, October 23. Tamari, M. (1997), “The challenge of wealth: Jewish business ethics”, Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 7, pp. 45-56. Tett, G. and Davies, P.J. (2007), “Out of the shadows: how banking’s secret system broke down”, Financial Times, December 17. Tett, G., Davies, P.G. and Van Duyn, A. (2008), “A new formula? Complex finance contemplates a more fettered future”, Financial Times, September 30. Tickle, P.A. (2004), Greed: The Seven Deadly Sins, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, NY. White, W.R. (2004), “Are changes in financial structure extending safety nets?”, BIS Working Paper No. 145, January, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract ¼ 901385 Wolfe, T. (1987), Bonfire of the Vanities, Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, New York, NY. About the authors David Weitzner is a Sessional Assistant Professor of Strategic Management at the Schulich School of Business and Associate Director of the School’s Strategy Field Study Program. His major research interest is in exploring the relationship between strategic activities and ethical virtues. James Darroch is an Associate Professor of Strategic Management at the Schulich School of Business and Director of the School’s Financial Services Program. His major research interest is the strategic management of financial institutions with a particular focus on the relationship between enterprise risk management and strategy. He has worked with several large financial institutions. James Darroch is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: jdarroch@ sympatico.ca or
[email protected]
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail:
[email protected] Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
Moral failures
13
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1742-2043.htm
CPOIB 5,1/2
Paper assets, real debts An ecological-economic exploration of the global economic crisis
14
Giorgos Kallis ICREA and Institut de Cie`ncia i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA), Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
Joan Martinez-Alier Departament d’Economia i d’Histo`ria Econo`mica and Institut de Cie`ncia i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA), Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain, and
Richard B. Norgaard Energy and Resources Group, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA Abstract Purpose – This paper sets out to investigate the potential contribution of the inter-disciplinary field of ecological economics to the explanation of the current economic crisis. The root of the crisis is the growing disjuncture between the real economy of production and the paper economy of finance. Design/methodology/approach – The authors trace the epistemological origins of this disjuncture to the myths of economism – a mix of academic, popular and political beliefs that served to explain, rationalise and perpetuate the current economic system. Findings – The authors recommend ending with economism and developing new collective and discursive processes for understanding and engaging with ecological-economic systems. Originality/value – The authors embrace the notion of sustainable de-growth: an equitable and democratic transition to a smaller economy with less production and consumption. Keywords Economic depression, Recession, Ecology, Economic theory Paper type Conceptual paper
Benjamin M. Friedman, author of The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, recalled that when he worked at Morgan Stanley in the early 1970s, the firm’s annual reports were filled with photographs of factories and other tangible businesses. More recently, Wall Street’s annual reports tend to highlight not the businesses that firms were advising so much as finance for the sake of finance, showing upward-sloping graphs and photographs of traders. “I have the sense that in many of these firms” Mr. Friedman said, “the activity has become further and further divorced from actual economic activity.” Which might serve as a summary of how the current crisis came to pass. Wall Street traders began to believe that the values they had assigned to all sorts of assets were rational because, well, they had assigned them (David Leonhardt, New York Times, 21 September 2008). critical perspectives on international business Vol. 5 No. 1/2, 2009 pp. 14-25 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1742-2043 DOI 10.1108/17422040910938659
Marx long ago observed the way in which unbridled capitalism became a kind of mythology, ascribing reality, power and agency to things that had no life in themselves. [. . .] And ascribing independent reality to what you have in fact made yourself is a perfect definition of what the Jewish and Christian Scriptures call idolatry (Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, The Spectator, 24 September 2008).
Immediate explanations pointing to proximate causes of the current financial crisis dominate public discourse: the greedy bankers, the bad loans, the unregulated financial products or the collapse of the housing market. Instead, we engage with the structural causes of the crisis. The uneven temporal and spatial pattern of capital accumulation has – deservedly – received much attention as a structural cause of the cyclical repetition of economic crises. But less attention has been paid to ecological and resource factors. This paper highlights some key ecological-economic insights concerning the current economic crisis. We argue that: . at the roots of the crisis is the growing disjuncture between the real economy of production and the paper economy of finance; . the costs of the financial crisis pale in comparison to those of current and forthcoming ecological crises; . the myths of economism – a mix of academic, popular and political beliefs that serve to explain and rationalise the economic system – allowed and justified the disjuncture between real and paper economies; and . the current crisis provides opportunities at an epistemological level, to escape from economism and at the practical level, to promote alternative socio-economic paradigms such as de-growth and environmental justice. But first let us explain the nature of ecological economics. Ecological economics: bringing natural reality back into the economy The field known as ecological economics (EE) was born out of the dissatisfaction of economists and natural scientists with the treatment of environmental issues by mainstream economics. Today EE involves a diverse field of researchers united by an ambition to reclaim the classical economic tradition of putting nature as a key factor in economic analysis. One might distinguish between a more conservative line of EE which accepts the basics of neoclassical economics but works to couple better economic with ecological models and a more critical, political-economic line of research, to which the authors of this paper belong, which seeks new paradigms for understanding ecological-economic systems as a whole and emphasises distributional, institutional and power issues (Spash, 1999). Georgescu-Roegen’s (1971) seminal critique of economics based on the laws of thermodynamics and in particular entropy and the distinction between stocks and flows is often seen as the departure point of modern EE (though there is a long lineage of related thinking before him; see Martinez-Alier, 1990). Kenneth Boulding’s (1966) thesis on the bio-physical limitations of economic activity and Karl William Kapp’s (1970) reframing of environmental externalities as the pervasive social costs of free markets are also foundational EE contributions. EE positions the economy as a subsystem of a larger local and global ecosystem (Daly, 1991). Ecological and economic systems are seen as mutually constitutive, metabolically related (Giampietro, 2003) and coevolving (Norgaard, 1994). EE rejects the rational, “homo-economicus” assumptions of mainstream economics and their liberal-utilitarian normative counterpart, which privileges market and cost-benefit mediations of human wants. Multiple, incommensurable values are recognised and deliberative-democratic mediation advocated (Martinez-Allier et al., 1998; Norgaard, 1994). Nonetheless, many ecological economists understand also the tactical use of
Paper assets, real debts
15
CPOIB 5,1/2
16
economic valuation of environmental services and negative external effects in a society where the generalised market is king. EE is particularly critical of the notion of growth-as-progress (Norgaard, 1994). Gross domestic product (GDP) is criticised both technically (van den Bergh, 2006) and fundamentally as hiding the social – environmental and distributive – costs of economic expansion (Martinez-Alier, 2002). From an EE perspective, externalities are not accounting problems, but social cost-shifting successes predicated upon institutional and power inequalities that allow some peoples’ values to count and others’ not (Martinez-Alier, 2002). But how is all this relevant to the present crisis? Real wealth versus paper wealth Rather than focusing on the immediate level of finance, from an EE perspective the economy must be analysed at three levels. At the top there is the financial level that can grow by loans made to the private sector or to the state, sometimes without any assurance of repayment as in the present crisis. The financial system borrows against the future, on the expectation that indefinite economic growth will give the means to repay the interests and the debts. Then there is what the economists describe as the real economy, the GDP at constant prices. When it grows, it indeed allows for paying back on some or all the debt, when it does not grow enough, debts are defaulted. Increasing the debts forces the economy to grow, up to some limits. Then, down below, underneath the economists’ real economy, there is the ecological economists’ real-real economy, the flows of energy and materials whose growth depends partly on economic factors (types of markets, prices) and in part from physical and biological limits. The real-real economy also includes land and the capacity of humans to do work. The EE explanation of the crisis is simple. The upper level of finance grew way too fast and too large for the real economy beneath to catch up. Frederick Soddy, a Nobel Prize winner in Chemistry, had made this point in his book Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt (Soddy, 1926) published in 1926 (Martinez-Alier, 1990). Soddy argued that it is easy for the financial system to increase the debts (private or public debts), and to mistake this expansion of credit for the creation of real wealth. However, in the industrial system, growth of production and growth of consumption imply growth in the extraction and final destruction of fossil fuels. The obligation to pay debts at compound interest could be fulfilled by squeezing the debtors for a while. Other means of paying the debt are either inflation (debasement of the value of money), or economic growth – which is falsely measured because it is based on undervalued exhaustible resources and unvalued pollution. According to ecological economist Herman Daly, the current crisis is due to the overgrowth of financial assets relative to the growth of real wealth; there is too much liquidity, not too little. “Paper exchanging for paper is now 20 times greater than exchanges of paper for real commodities” (Daly, 2008). As a consequence the value of present real wealth is no longer sufficient to serve as a lien to guarantee the exploding debt and debt is being devalued (Daly, 2008). Can the real economy catch up with debt? Ecological economists have argued with neo-classical economists whether continuous growth is possible (see Ecological Economics, Vol. 22), let alone desirable. Ecological economists have scrutinised the optimistic assumption of neo-classical economists (and most Marxists as well) that
resource substitution and technological innovation will always surpass biophysical limits (Daly, 1991). This is not to posit a simplistic notion of absolute bio-physical limits to growth, but to take seriously the possibility that the depletion of stock resources, the degradation of “sinks”, such as the global atmosphere and the increasing occupation of Earth’s space, may limit the continuous expansion of the scale of the economy and condition future human activity decisively (Norgaard, 1994). Adaptation to the changing environmental conditions may not be gradual or reversible: resources, sinks and ecosystems have thresholds which, once surpassed, lead to dramatic and very fast changes. Humans may adapt to whatever the future might bring, but the question is how many will survive and which, at what level of subsistence they will live, and what pain will be suffered along the way. Bio-physical constraints and the bottom level of the economy condition the rate at which real wealth can increase. In addition to financing and housing, high oil prices also triggered the present crisis. These were due not only to the OPEC oligopoly and oil market speculation but also due to the approaching peak-oil (Deffeyes, 2001) and market expectations of it. Also while in the 1920s the price of commodities decreased for a few years before 1929, this time the increase in commodity prices (also driven by the misguided subsidies to agri-fuels) continued for some months after the strong decline in the stock exchange started in January 2008. In late 2008 the prices of oil and commodities were declining, but this is because of declining demand, not increasing supply. Consumption of oil is going down (Financial Times, 2008). One could argue that oil at $US150 a barrel is in fact cheap from the point of view of its fair inter-generational allocation and the externalities it produces. As the crisis deepens, the price of oil goes down but it will recover in real terms if and when the economy grows again. Declining prices will cause some expensive sources to stop production (Alberta oil sands, for instance) and will also lead to lack of investment in new extraction sites. OPEC will try and reduce oil extraction during the crisis. The scheduled OPEC meeting of mid-November 2008 was brought forward to 24 October, when it decided to cut oil extraction by 1.5 mbd. Should oil prices increase again (aided by speculation in the futures market), then this will make economic recovery more difficult. Peak-oil does not mean immediate scarcity. It means that it is less easy to find oil than before, and that supply cannot increase any further above the previous level. Something like half the reserves are still there, but extraction will take place at a declining rate. We are not sure, however, whether we have already passed the peak or not, and we cannot be certain about the economics of other energy sources. This means that the current rate of fossil fuel-driven growth may be unsustainable. Even if one is not convinced that limits and peaks have been reached, the subtle fact remains that there is no way the economy can grow fast enough in real terms to redeem the massive increase in debt (Daly, 2008). As Daly (2008) argues, “spatial displacement of old stuff to make room for new stuff is increasingly costly as the world becomes more full, and increasing inequality of distribution of income prevents most people from buying much of the new stuff – except on credit”. More crucially, with projected (desired) growth rates, the change in the global atmosphere due to greenhouse gas emissions will have such catastrophic impacts that will more than offset any growth (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). Wishful thinking about de-materialised growth has proven elusive (Martinez-Alier, 2002; Polimeni et al., 2008).
Paper assets, real debts
17
CPOIB 5,1/2
18
The real toxic debts The assets that take the form of claims to debts that will remain unpaid have been given the funny name of “toxic assets”. But what about the liabilities, like the enormous “carbon debt” that is owed to future generations, and to the poor people who have produced little greenhouse gases (Srinivasan et al., 2008)? Large environmental liabilities are due by private firms. Chevron-Texaco is being asked to pay back 16 billion dollars in a court case in Ecuador. The Rio Tinto company left behind large liabilities since 1888 in Andalusia where it got its name, and also in Bougainville, in Namibia, and in West Papua together with Freeport McMoran (Martinez-Alier, 2002). These are debts to poor or indigenous peoples, also like those of Shell in the Niger Delta. These real poisonous debts are in the history books but not in the accounting books. New fossil fuels and mineral sources have a low EROI (energy return on investment) and high marginal costs. Diplomatic and military pressure on the exporting countries intensifies; although the rate of oil extraction could still increase somewhat, the coming down from the peak will be steeper and more conflictive still. We do not need to subscribe to a dollars game to argue that in all likelihood the economic costs from global ecosystem degradation and climate change (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) will be an order of magnitude higher than the accumulated debt that belies the present crisis. We should be even more concerned about forthcoming ecological crises than we – rightly – are about the present financial crisis. Ironically, economists are advocating the same recipe for ecological problems to the one that belies the present financial crisis: commodify unpriced ecological goods and let the free markets regulate their provision without state intervention. Karl Polanyi (1944), in The Great Transformation, saw the parallels between the deregulation of money supply and the commodification of nature and the double danger these posed. Money and nature (alongside labour), he argued, are fictitious commodities, that is things that circulate in the market as though they are commodities originally produced for it, when clearly they are not. Like Polanyi, many ecological economists have insisted on the impossibility and undesirability of nature’s commodification (Vatn and Bromley, 1994). But such voices are against the current: new fictitious markets, from trading carbon to pollution permits, water rights or payments for ecosystem services, are increasingly imagined and enacted (Kosoy, 2008). The risks of linking the value and level of protection of ecosystem services to the ups and down of markets and currencies go unnoticed (Harvey, 1996; Kosoy, 2008). To understand how these myths of self-regulating markets, perpetual growth and the disjuncture of the fictitious, paper economy from the real economy came to be, we need to turn to the realm of ideas and their interaction with politics and economics. The myths of economism Let us distinguish between an economy that is “out there” and the complex of myths that people, both individually and in order to act together, have developed to aid them in living within the economy. This distinction is roughly parallel to nature as a reality of its own and the complex of myths traditional peoples hold about nature and their relation to nature. In traditional societies, myths provide explanations for natural phenomena, facilitate individual and collective decisions, and give meaning and coherence to life. As people act on their myths, their societies and the natural
environment are shaped and co-evolve around them. Today, as we act on scientific understandings that were first mechanical, then chemical, and more recently biological, we see agricultural soils and rural communities transforming and co-evolving with the path of science (Norgaard, 1994). As modern people, we also act on comparable beliefs about our world (a world that is largely economic), that are rooted in the discipline of economics. We refer to this complex of myths as economism, and like traditional beliefs and scientific understanding, economism explains phenomena, facilitates individual and collective decisions, and gives meaning and coherence to our lives. Similarly, our economy is driven by and coevolves around economism. With a 25-fold increase in global market activity during the twentieth century, the economy became the cosmos of roughly half the world’s people. The rise of the market economy in everyday life, with exchange occurring over ever greater distance, can be thought of as a wedge between our contact with nature and with the moral consequences of the decisions we make. The growth of the economic cosmos is both facilitated and rationalised in public discourse by economic reasoning, albeit typically quite simplified. Simplification is also key to the dominant approach of rational thinking and the nature of disciplines. The history of scholarly economic thought can be understood as a process of boundary keeping, a process of rationalising arguments that either ignored entirely or entailed gross simplifications about the natural world and broader questions of right and wrong. Increasingly, modern people, few of whom are trained in the natural sciences, must peek through the economy to see how we relate to the natural world. Economists have pioneered and encouraged this approach. Barnett and Morse (1963) provide a clear example of trying to understand the state of nature and our relation to it through the economy. They argued that resources could not possibly be scarce because resource prices declined from the late nineteenth century through much of the twentieth. Rising prices indicate resource scarcity whether simply thinking in terms of supply and demand between two periods, using Ricardo’s argument about how the best land is used first, or exploring Hotelling’s far more sophisticated model of optimal resource use over time. These patterns of thinking can be summarised by the simple argument: If resources are scarce, If market participants know that they are scarce, Then resource prices will rise.
Barnett and Morse, and numerous economists and non-economists since (Simon, 1981; Lomborg, 2001) have simply reversed the argument, declaring that since resource prices have been falling, resources cannot be scarce. But the minor premise of their own argument, the part that connects economics to reality, has been forgotten. If market participants do not know resources are scarce in some real sense, the economic argument is invalid. If they do know, we should simply ask them. Surely it is better to learn from the differences in understanding between participants and thereby learn about the risks and conditions under which their understandings are more likely true. Prices simply blend the complexities of their understanding to a single directional indicator with no other information (Norgaard, 1990). The critically important point, however, is that for markets to work well, sufficient market participants need to understand independently the reality behind the markets. Economists, however, are arguing that we can understand reality through markets
Paper assets, real debts
19
CPOIB 5,1/2
20
apart from whether the actors in the market understand reality. This presumption explains how trouble arose in the USA through the housing market. Judging reality through the market, home buyers and banks were confident that housing prices would continue to go up because housing prices had “always” gone up. Lenders made loans to home owners whose abilities to pay were marginal and contingent upon both a healthy economy and their beliefs that home prices would always rise. Lenders knew that these new home owners might not be able to make their mortgage payments, but this was not seen as a problem because the banks thought they would simply be left holding an asset whose value was still greater than the mortgage that remained to be paid. Then Wall Street investment banks repackaged the risky mortgages as equities, portraying them as hot stocks in a rising market. The mass deception worked, indeed the increased perception of wealth helped drive up home prices by adding to the demand for homes. Everything was going up until energy prices also went up and the economy began to be less healthy. Mortgage payments were not made, banks foreclosed, but as they did so in increasing numbers, housing prices dropped, and the assets of the banks became “toxic”. The problem was that all the actors in the process had been looking at what they thought was reality through trends in market signals rather than looking at the underlying reality. For the same reasons that the financial crisis arose, managing it is difficult because economic actors are looking at crashing equities prices rather than underlying real conditions, which surely have not changed that drastically, and as they do, the market crashes ever more rapidly in a self-fulfilling prophecy. When we do try to assess the underlying ecological basis of our economy, the situation looks very bleak. By a fairly simple measure, the ecological footprint, the global population needs to reduce consumption by 25 percent to consume and process our wastes sustainably (Wackernagel et al., 2002). The assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) indicates that we need to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 80 percent globally by 2050 to avoid harmful, if not catastrophic, climate change. Hansen et al. (2008) argue that we have already passed the point of catastrophic climate change and need to reduce the existing level of GHGs in the atmosphere. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005, p. 1) argues: The changes that have been made to ecosystems have contributed to substantial net gains in human well-being and economic development, but these gains have been achieved at growing costs in the form of the degradation of many ecosystem services, increased risks of nonlinear changes, and the exacerbation of poverty for some groups of people. These problems, unless addressed, will substantially diminish the benefits that future generations obtain from ecosystems.
Making these adjustments in how we use the earth so as to not impose unjust costs on future generations while responding to the global injustices already at hand will be a major effort. Not surprisingly, however, some economists are arguing that the alignment will not be that difficult because gross domestic product will only be marginally reduced. Again, assessing whether the accommodation with reality will entail hardships cannot be determined by looking at markets. GDP went up during the Second World War while thousands died, millions lost relatives and were themselves displaced, and additional millions died early of hunger and disease.
Beyond economism We need to put much more effort into being informed of underlying conditions for markets to work well, and this is both more critical and difficult when markets entail great distances and complex transactions. How can a society taking advantage of the gains from specialisation and exchange, a process that wedges people apart from reality and the moral implications of their decisions, be both informed and moral? One answer is clearly that being informed and moral are necessary for market stability, sustainability and justice, and put some serious limits on the optimal extent of exchange (Norgaard and Liu, 2007; Norgaard and Jin, 2008). While economists are fond of noting that there are always tradeoffs and optima, one of the myths of economism has been that expanding the extent of trade is always good. There are costs to expanding markets that offset the benefits, and optimal markets may be quite constrained compared to those of today. To be better informed of reality and more moral, we probably need to deliberately set up some new institutions to facilitate these goals. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) proved to be an interesting example of a collective process for assessing reality, discussing morality, and confronting economism (Norgaard, 2008). Some 1,400 scientists from around the world participated in a review and evaluation of the existing literature on the status and importance of ecosystems and their services and the drivers forcing their degradation. Participants from developing countries repeatedly pointed out that the values of environmental services as determined through market prices or behavior were heavily weighted by who had the income to pay for them. The prices of ecosystem services reflected the tastes and concerns of the rich more than the poor. The dollars of rich ecotourists spent on international airfares are weighted the same as the dollars of the poor spent on bus fares to get to work. Thus MA participants readily saw how markets to save trees to sequester carbon, for example, are being established in poor nations where the poor are “willing” to stop using forests because the rich have the economic power to buy up the rights of the poor to stop them from using other ecosystem services of the forest. As a consequence, carbon sequestration is cheaper than it would be in a world with less income disparity. The rich can continue to drive their SUVs because the poor are willing to forego using their forests for little. Once this was made clear within the MA process, it was very difficult to use prices generated in markets as neutral values. In short, the open participatory process of the MA began to deconstruct economism (Norgaard, 2008). Another major contradiction of market-based valuation appeared in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Several scientists noticed that for there to be any rationality to relying on stated preferences or behaviour to derive the values of environmental services, one would have to assume that lay people were sufficiently informed of the very ecological complexities the MA scientists were struggling to understand. This assumption contradicted the objective of the MA to provide much needed knowledge to the public and policymakers. In short, as with the problem of measuring resource scarcity by looking at prices over time (Norgaard, 1990), the problems of using monetary values to weight ecosystem services are tightly embedded in the very socioeconomic system driving the problems of ecosystem degradation the MA sought to understand in order to design better socioeconomic policies. This circularity highlights how difficult it is to understand nature without looking through the economy with the aid of economism. Yet MA participants were able to share their
Paper assets, real debts
21
CPOIB 5,1/2
22
expertise into a very rich understanding of reality while also holding serious moral discussions. The experience that Pavan Sukhdev (with Haripriya Gundimedia and Pushpam Kumar) gained in India trying to give economic values to non-timber products from forests, and to other environmental services (such as carbon uptake, water and soil retention), has been an inspiration for the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) process sponsored by DG Environment of the European Commission. As the TEEB team states, a monetary representation of the services provided by clean water, access to wood and pastures, and medicinal plants, does not really measure the essential dependence of poor people on such resources and services. In their project “Green Accounting for India” they found that the most significant direct beneficiaries of forest biodiversity and ecosystem services are the poor, and the predominant impact of a loss or denial of these inputs is on the well-being of the poor. The poverty of the beneficiaries makes these losses more acute as a proportion of their “livelihood incomes” than is the case for the people of India at large. Hence the notion of “the GDP of the poor”: for instance, when water in the local river or aquifer is polluted because of mining, they cannot afford to buy water in plastic bottles. Therefore, when poor people see that their chances of livelihood are threatened because of mining projects, dams, tree plantations, or large industrial areas, they complain not because they are professional environmentalists but because they need the services of the environment for their immediate survival (see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/ economics/index_en.htm). Regional ecosystem assessments are now under way and there are numerous other fora that bring people together to debate underlying conditions and appropriate collective behaviour. We need to expand these and enter into them with a larger perspective on their role in offsetting the simplicities of economism. Beyond growth The economic crisis will reduce CO2 emissions and it might slow down the accelerating route to biodiversity destruction and climate change. On the other hand, it might also lead to the reduction of public and private expenditure on green technologies or pollution control. There is no doubt also that recession will hit lower-income groups and countries unevenly. But the problem with the above framing is that it is still couched in the terms of economism and growth. There is a sense of de´ja` vu with the interest rate debate (where high interest rates are supposed to make environmentally destructive projects uneconomical but also slow down environmental investments). Environment and jobs, environment and the poor are positioned at opposing ends, eco-friendly growth supposedly being the only way to reconcile them. But these are false dilemmas. What we need is an altogether different vision and framing along the lines of an Aristotelian buen vivir (as the World Social Forum proclaims) guided by oikonomia rather than chrematistics. Here we emphasise the transformative potential of an economic crisis, a crisis that many ecological economists said would come sooner or later given the unsustainable pattern of capitalist growth. Now it is the moment to generate new social visions of living well and being happy without the imperative of economic growth. Visions that render compatible living well, working satisfactory and maintaining our local and global ecosystems.
The concept of de´croissance soutenable, or socially sustainable economic de-growth, which Georgescu-Roegen started 30 years ago, is relevant (Latouche, 2004). De-growth is not about decreasing GDP because we might always change accounting conventions and include in GDP other items (unpaid domestic and voluntary work) and deduct the negative externalities of biodiversity destruction, climate change, loss of human cultures. Sustainable de-growth is about creating an alternative, smaller economy, suitable to the physical needs of humans and ecosystems. With the economic crisis, la de´croissance est arrive´e in Europe, the USA and Japan. This is an opportunity for moving with the socio-ecological transition. The challenge is how to manage the transition to a smaller economy in a socially equitable way, where those that levy the greater burden are those that already “have” and who benefited the most from the past pattern of unsustainable accumulation. At first sight, Southern countries have something to lose and little to gain from de-growth in the North: fewer opportunities for commodity and manufactured exports, less availability of credits and donations. But, the movements for environmental justice and the “environmentalism of the poor” of the South are the main allies of the sustainable de-growth movement of the North. These movements complain against disproportionate pollution (at local and global levels, claims for repayment of the “carbon debt”) and waste exports from North to South (e.g. “Clemenceau” to Alang in Gujarat, or electronic waste). They resist biopiracy and Raubwirtschaft, i.e. ecologically unequal exchange, destruction of nature and human livelihoods at the “commodity frontiers”. They claim the socio-environmental liabilities of transnational companies (Martinez-Alier, 2002). Their objectives are to have an economy that sustainably fulfils the food, health, education and housing needs for everybody. This transition to a smaller, human and ecological-scale economy is not easy. The question is how to manage it smoothly and redistribute its costs to those that most benefited by the unsustainable path that brought us here. De-growth is not apolitical. It calls for a radically new polity with a redistribution of political and economic power to allow it to be fulfilled. References Barnett, H.J. and Morse, C. (1963), Scarcity and Growth, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD. Boulding, K.E. (1966), “The economics of the coming Spaceship Earth”, in Jarrett, H. (Ed.), Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy: Essays from the Sixth RFF Forum, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, pp. 3-14. Daly, H.E. (1991), Steady-State Economics, 2nd ed., Island Press, Washington DC. Daly, H. (2008), “Credit crisis, financial assets and real wealth”, The Oil Drum, October 13, available at: www.theoildrum.com Deffeyes, K.S. (2001), Hubbert’s Peak: The Impending World of Oil Shortages, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Financial Times (2008), “Crude falls on clear signs of weak demand”, Financial Times, 23 October, p. 30. Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1971), The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Giampietro, M. (2003), Multi-scale Integrated Analysis of Agroecosystems, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
Paper assets, real debts
23
CPOIB 5,1/2
24
Hansen, J., Sato, M., Kharecha, P., Beerling, D., Berner, R., Masson-Delmotte, V., Pagani, M., Raymo, M., Royer, D.L. and Zachos, J.C. (2008), “Target atmospheric CO2: where should humanity aim?”, Open Atmospheric Science Journal, Vol. 2, pp. 217-31. Harvey, D. (1996), Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, Blackwell, Oxford. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007), Summary for Policymakers. The Physical Science Basis. Working Group 1 Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Kapp, K.W. (1970), “Environmental disruptions and social costs: a challenge to economists”, Kyklos, Vol. 23, pp. 833-47. Kosoy, N. (2008), “Branded nature and fictitious commodity fetishism”, Ecological Economics, submitted for publication. Latouche, S. (2004), “De-growth economics”, Le monde diplomatique (English edition), November. Lomborg, B. (2001), The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Martinez-Alier, J. (1990), Ecological Economics: Energy, Environment and Society, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Martinez-Alier, J. (2002), The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. Martinez-Allier, J., Munda, G. and O’Neill, J. (1998), “Weak comparability of values as a foundation for ecological economics”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 277-86. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis, Island Press, Washington, DC. Norgaard, R.B. (1990), “Economic indicators of resource scarcity: a critical essay”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 19, pp. 19-25. Norgaard, R.B. (1994), Development Betrayed: The End of Progress and a Coevolutionary Revisioning of the Future, Routledge, London. Norgaard, R.B. (2008), “Finding hope in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment”, BioScience, Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 862-9. Norgaard, R.B. and Jin, L. (2008), “Trade and the governance of ecosystem services”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 66 No. 4, pp. 638-52. Norgaard, R.B. and Liu, X. (2007), “Market governance failure”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 60 No. 3, pp. 634-41. Polanyi, K. (1944), The Great Transformation, Beacon Press, Boston, MA. Polimeni, J.M., Mayumi, K., Giampietro, M. and Alcott, B. (2008), The Jevons Paradox and the Myth of Resource Efficiency Improvements, Earthscan, London. Simon, J. (1981), The Ultimate Resource, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Soddy, F. (1926), Wealth,Virtual Wealth and Debt, E.P. Dutton, New York, NY. Spash, C.L. (1999), “The development of environmental thinking in economics”, Environmental Values, Vol. 8, pp. 413-35. Srinivasan, U.T., Carey, S.P., Hallstein, E., Higgins, P.A.T., Kerr, A.C., Koteen, L.E., Smith, A.B., Watson, R., Harte, J. and Norgaard, R.B. (2008), “The debt of nations and the distribution of ecological impacts from human activities”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 105 No. 5, pp. 1768-73. van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. (2006), “Abolishing GDP: the largest information failure in the world”, working paper, Department of Spatial Economics, Free University, Amsterdam.
Vatn, A. and Bromley, D.W. (1994), “Choices without prices without apologies”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 26, pp. 129-48. Wackernagel, M., Schulz, N.B., Deumling, D., Callejas Linares, A., Jenkins, M., Kapos, V., Loh, J., Myers, N., Norgaard, R.B., Randers, J. and Monfreda, C. (2002), “Tracking the ecological overshoot of the human economy”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 99, pp. 9266-71.
Paper assets, real debts
25 About the authors Giorgos Kallis is an ICREA fellow at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He previously held an EC Marie Curie Outgoing Fellowship at the University of California at Berkeley. He researches the co-evolution of ecological-economic systems, environmental justice and adaptation to climate change. Giorgos Kallis is the corresponding author and can be contacted at:
[email protected] Joan Martinez-Alier is Professor at the Department of Economics and Economic History, at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is among the founders and a former president of the International Society for Ecological Economics. His current research focuses on ecological economics and languages of valuation, political ecology, environmental justice and the environmentalism of the poor. Richard Norgaard is Professor of Energy and Resources at the University of California, Berkeley. He earned his PhD in Economics at the University of Chicago, has been a constructive critique of neoclassical economics, and is among the founders and a former president of the International Society for Ecological Economics. His current research stresses how scientists collectively and discursively understand complex systems and the implications of this for democracy and ecological governance.
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail:
[email protected] Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1742-2043.htm
CPOIB 5,1/2
The global financial crisis: an institutional theory analysis
26
Faculty of Business and IT, University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Oshawa, Canada
Suhaib Riaz
Abstract Purpose – This paper seeks to provide insights into the current global financial crisis from an institutional theory perspective. Design/methodology/approach – The paper presents the development of key concepts using institutional theory, grounded in a discussion of the context of the current global financial crisis. Findings – The interplay of financial industry organizations and formal and informal institutions is key to understanding the creation of the crisis. Research limitations/implications – The treatment is brief but serves to provoke further research on the global financial crisis through applying and extending new institutional theory. Practical implications – Fundamental aspects of the crisis need to be understood with respect to the organizational-institutional interplay involving the financial industry. This would help to reveal the general pattern of such crises and also point towards what needs to be taken into account for potential solutions. Originality/value – The paper has value for researchers as it opens up a discussion of the current crisis from an institutional theory perspective. Fresh concepts introduced here could be extended further and inform institutional theory in general. The paper has value for policy makers and practitioners in helping them understand the fundamentals of the organizational-institutional interplay underlying the current crisis. Keywords Recession, Financial institutions, Organizational structure Paper type Viewpoint
critical perspectives on international business Vol. 5 No. 1/2, 2009 pp. 26-35 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1742-2043 DOI 10.1108/17422040910938668
1. Introduction The current economic crisis, rapidly gaining ground across the world everyday, has been appropriately labeled as a “global financial crisis”. News stories focus on the collapse of banks and financial services organizations that until recently were deemed to be very successful and highly legitimate businesses. How could such successful businesses suddenly collapse and lose all legitimacy? How could the entire industry of investment banking lose legitimacy to the point where popular financial media report on the embarrassment of investment bankers at dinner parties? While the current crisis has several aspects that can be understood using various disciplines and theoretical lenses, new institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) can provide a unique perspective for understanding key aspects of the organizational-institutional interplay in the unfolding of the present crisis. In some ways, this situation is not new, and similar elements have been witnessed in prior crises and bubble bursts. There is an opportunity here to understand The author would like to thank participants at the McGill-Cornell Conference on Institutions and Entrepreneurship and at the Academy of Management OMT division for feedback on concepts presented here, with special thanks to Dr Richard Scott for feedback and encouragement.
these crises in a broader manner with theoretical insights that draw out the general pattern. Theoretical insights grounded in a discussion of the current global financial crisis can therefore provide a unique opportunity in understanding the fundamentals of such crises in general, rather than simply documenting the facts as they unfold. I suggest that the current crisis calls for examination as an institutional crisis, resulting from the interplay of the financial industry organizations and broader formal and informal institutions. Such an examination requires understanding the mechanisms of organizational-institutional interplay that follow from basic tenets of new institutional theory. In this position paper, I draw upon the formal theoretical apparatus of new institutional theory and extend its core ideas to help explain the unfolding of the present crisis. 2. Institutional theory and the crisis: a view of the iron cage, inside-out In this section, I present theoretical arguments to throw light on the interplay of financial industry organizations with formal and informal underlying institutions, including the international dimensions of the crisis through the build up of a “contagion of legitimacy”. For analytical purposes, I consider the investment banks and financial services organizations comprising the finance industry as organizations that exist within the wider framework of formal and informal institutions. I focus specifically on the US context, though the ideas extend to several affected regions of the world. The formal regulative institutions (Scott, 2001) include the central bank – The Federal Reserve, The Treasury and The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – while the informal normative and cultural-cognitive institutions (Scott, 2001) include the cultural acceptance of debt, high mortgages, disregard for savings, and an aggressive investment-oriented culture that involves even pension funds and 401K accounts as active investors in high-risk equity and debt securities. The new institutionalism has, as one of its core defining symbols, the “iron cage” of homogenization put forward by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), building on Weber’s idea of the iron cage of bureaucratization. In this perspective, organizations are viewed as “imprisoned” by institutions through the powerful processes of institutional isomorphism. While this visual is apt in describing the influence that the institutional environment has on organizations in general, this is only half the picture. The flip side to this is a view of the iron cage inside-out, that reveals the prominent role organizations have in influencing institutions. While the functioning of institutions and their influence on organizations has been much explored, the processes of creation, maintenance, demise and death of institutions have only recently received some attention. This theoretical problem has been described as a concern with the silences of institutional theory, rather than a rejection of its core tenets (Brint and Karabel, 1991). Half of a full sociology of institutions is thus a work in progress, and is key to understanding situations such as the current financial crisis. The need for work in this area has been highlighted by prominent proponents of institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), and recently, several attempts have been made to cover this gap (e.g. Battilana, 2006; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Garud et al., 2002; Galaskiewicz, 1991; Brint and Karabel, 1991; DiMaggio, 1991; Fligstein, 1991).
The global financial crisis
27
CPOIB 5,1/2
28
These emerging ideas on institutional formation, institutional development, deinstitutionalization and reinstitutionalization (Jepperson, 1991) have much to inform our understanding of the complexities of organizational-institutional interplay in contexts such as the present crisis. However, several of these ideas have been alluded to in empirical works but have not been brought together through theoretical development that would help us understand the issues in an integrated manner. Here I draw upon and extend these ideas to help us understand the unfolding of the current financial crisis. In the sections below, I present key concepts, such as “reverse-legitimacy”, “illegitimate structures” and “institutional crisis”, that extend and integrate some of this emerging work and are particularly useful for understanding the current crisis from a theoretical perspective. That organizations themselves can be the means, and organization-institution interactions be the processes through which power and interests are made to bear upon institutions (e.g. Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Garud et al., 2002) is a particularly useful view for understanding the creation and maintenance of the institutional framework underlying the current crisis. Organizations represent powerful interests (which could be considered their own or those of their agents) that have a bearing on the survival of the institutional framework in the domain of the organization’s operation and influence. I contend that many institutions, in fact, cannot survive today without the active support and sanction of organizations. This is particularly valid for the formal and informal institutional framework underlying the financial industry organizations. I thus argue that the “engine” of institution-organization influence identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) works both ways in its effects. Things have indeed changed since the times of Weber, but one important change is in the power and influence wielded by organizations, particularly business and financial industry organizations, all over the world today. Assuming that multinational organizations with budgets far exceeding those of several countries put together are necessarily passive players submissively seeking legitimacy in their interaction with institutions is an anachronistic thought. Business and financial organizations today are powerful beyond imagination, and have a role in influencing, shaping and manipulating anything that happens to be in the way of their survival and success. And what else could be more “in their way” than institutions? While institutions attempt to impose their constraints on organizations, organizations are busy twisting the iron cage inside-out over the institutions, i.e. determining through their actions which institutions survive and succeed in their domains. In today’s world, the power equation between organizations and institutions is such that one’s answer to “Who is caged?” with respect to the organizational-institutional interplay might well depend on the perspective one chooses, i.e. from which side of the iron mesh one views the world. 2.1 Reverse-legitimacy DiMaggio and Powell (1983) concede the active role of organizations when they state that organizations try to change constantly, yet the aggregate effect of such change is homogenization. I argue that this homogeneity could also serve to legitimate the institutions whose forces underlie the institutional isomorphic processes. This mutual
legitimation could give rise to a “contagion of legitimacy” amongst the organizations and institutions involved. Institutions have power over organizations to the extent that they can grant legitimacy to organizations, or can make an organization that does not conform to institutional pressures “illegitimate”. I contend that with the emergence of powerful business and financial organizations, this “legitimacy” flows both ways. Not only does the appearance of conformance to institutional pressures have a role in organizational success, but organizational success in turn confers a “reverse-legitimacy” upon certain institutions that are deemed to have had a role in the success of organizations associated with these institutions. If organizations within the organizational field are successful in the aggregate, the institutions from which the organizations have sought legitimacy (through conforming to the isomorphic pressures generated by these institutions) are sanctioned as having been responsible for giving rise to such successful organizations. In reality, the success of organizations could be dependent on several other factors internal or external to themselves, yet their association with certain institutions provides these institutions with the “halo” of success. One sees such situations when certain public policy decisions are made to replicate institutions that are deemed to have contributed to, or even given rise to, successful organizations (Jepperson and Meyer, 1991). This is most dramatically discernible in the clear attempt by less developed countries to imitate institutions from countries where powerful business and financial organizations have succeeded, and to then invite these powerful organizations to the host countries and hope for similar success of these and similar organizations. The proliferation of “free trade zones”, “special economic zones”, “commercial regions”, etc., in parts of the world that generally do not have institutions similar to the developed world is partly an attempt to provide powerful organizations with institutional structures of their liking, in which they have succeeded elsewhere. Thus, organizations can “reverse-legitimate” institutions in the same way that institutions “legitimate” organizations. The institutional environment has been thought of as consisting of institutions nesting with one another (Jepperson, 1991), and of interrelated networks of mutually supportive or antagonistic parts, giving rise to “contagions of legitimacy” (Zucker, 1977). The concept of “contagions of legitimacy” is a useful one, with my additional insight being that business and financial organizations are a core part of such contagions, due to the ability of powerful business and financial organizations today to “reverse-legitimate” institutions through their own success. Groups of institutions and organizations form “contagions of legitimacy” and the survival or failure of institutions or organizations in such contagions is intricately connected. The concept of “reverse-legitimacy”, related to the idea of “contagions of legitimacy” is much needed to allow for further theoretical development of ideas that have been presented in empirical works in this domain (e.g. Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Garud et al., 2002). The above concepts and arguments serve to highlight key aspects of the current crisis. The success of business organizations in the finance industry, in the aggregate, conferred a “halo” effect on the underlying formal and informal institutional structures, which were reverse-legitimated and put beyond question. For example, mortgage-backed securities proliferated since the chain of organizations involved in
The global financial crisis
29
CPOIB 5,1/2
30
their creation, securitization, insurance and rating, comprised of successful organizations in the aggregate, which helped sanction the formal regulatory institutions (particularly the Securities and Exchange Commission, but also the Federal Reserve and its credit expansion and inflationary policies) and also informal cultural-cognitive and normative institutions (for example, the cultural acceptance of high debt and excessive home mortgages). This “reverse-legitimation” of institutions underlying the financial industry success also had international ramifications as theoretically delineated above. The institutional transformations associated with the financial industry in emerging markets (e.g. China and India) and transition countries (e.g. Eastern Europe), both in terms of the formal regulatory institutions and also in terms of the cultural-cognitive and normative institutions suggest attempts at replication of features of American and Western European “successful” institutions. For example, countries where cultural-cognitive and normative institutions had historically pushed people to save saw a cultural shift and a move towards acceptance of debt, while the regulatory institutions eased up to allow financial organizations to set up businesses similar to ones they had succeeded in elsewhere. A “contagion of legitimacy” was therefore created that primarily included the financial organizations in the USA and Western Europe along with the formal and informal institutions underlying this industry’s success in this part of the world. Over time, this contagion spread across several parts of the globe where these and similar financial organizations set up businesses and features of the underlying formal and informal institutions were replicated. In summary, I propose the following: while conforming to institutional pressures, powerful organizations, through their success, can “reverse-legitimate” the institutions that underlie these pressures, and this reverse-legitimation has a positive effect on the survival and continuation of the concerned institutions. Further, “reverse-legitimation” can lead to institutional formation through attempts at replication of the “successful” institutions where such institutions do not currently exist. In the context of the current crisis, financial organizations in the USA, through their success in the aggregate, were able to reverse-legitimate formal and informal institutions in the USA, and this reverse-legitimation led to replication of these institutions in other parts of the world, particularly in emerging economies that tried to replicate elements of this success. 2.2 Illegitimate structures and institutional crisis While organizational success in the aggregate reverse-legitimates institutions, this is no guarantee of organizational conformance to all pressures from the underlying institutional framework. Though organizations derive legitimacy through the “contagion of legitimacy”, they can further manipulate the legitimacy-granting process through strategies that help avoid institutional pressures not in line with parts of their structure (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Suchman, 1995). Under certain conditions, the “contagion of legitimacy” could then head for a crisis. These theoretical arguments are delineated here and relevant to understanding how the current crisis developed and where such crises could lead. Organizations use a strategy of decoupling when faced with institutional pressures not in line with their existing structures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This involves symbolic conformance to the institutional pressures through the organization’s
institutional layer, and substantive non-conformance in technical aspects (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Oliver describes similar strategic responses as “conceal” and “buffer” mechanisms, i.e. when an organization disguises non-conformity behind a fac¸ade of acquiescence or loosens institutional attachments, respectively (Oliver, 1991; Oliver, 1996). I extend these ideas to see the major implications such organizational strategies eventually have on the fortunes of the institutions involved. I argue that a strategy of decoupling or concealment by powerful and successful organizations, prolonged over a period of time, has a negative effect on the survival of such institutions. Initially, while organizations attempt to comply in substantive terms, a few might discover ways to conceal compliance or comply only in symbolic terms while leaving their substantive aspects free from institutional pressures. The ability to carry out such a decoupling or concealment confers an advantage to these few organizations over others, since they are able to derive legitimacy from the institutions in question, and at the same time keep their technical or substantive aspects free to perform as necessary for efficiency reasons. Once such a strategy is discovered and implemented as a successful way of dealing with “undesirable” pressures from institutions, other organizations in the organizational field then mimic this strategy, particularly if it is followed by some of the more powerful and successful organizations. The situation is made worse by the ability of powerful organizations to manipulate (Oliver, 1991) the concerned institutions as well. Manipulation could be undertaken so that the organization does not have to conceal altogether, or, often more easily and conveniently, it could be undertaken to make such concealment and decoupling strategies easier to execute. The latter strategy relates to weakening the ability of institutions to detect concealment and decoupling (non-conformity of organizations in substantive terms), and is important for our analysis. As more organizations discover and implement decoupling and concealment strategies, and as implementation of such strategies becomes easier due to manipulation of the institutions by the more powerful organizations, the organizational field heads towards a legitimacy crisis. While the pursuance of symbolic conformance creates a heightened perception of organizational legitimacy to those outside the organizational field, internally, the organizations are replete with “illegitimate” substantive structures. Thus, a sustained strategy of decoupling, concealment and manipulation by organizations leads to heightened perception of legitimacy (for organizations comprising the organizational field) to those outside the organizational field, while increasing “illegitimate” structures within the field. The homogenization of the field is thus achieved, in part, through organizational strategies that make “illegitimate” structures widely prevalent. The scenario is akin to that of a bubble, or a house of cards. At some stage, if the “illegitimacy” of a few organizations, particularly the more successful ones, within the organizational field becomes well-known outside the field, a domino effect occurs whereby the legitimacy of all organizations that have until now been considered as complying in all their aspects becomes suspect. Most importantly for our purpose, this has a dramatic effect on the institutions involved as well, since their legitimacy-granting powers become suspect: they are seen as having bestowed “legitimacy” to organizations with
The global financial crisis
31
CPOIB 5,1/2
32
“illegitimate” structures within the organizational field. The case of investment banks in the USA is particularly relevant here. Investment banks needed to avoid institutional pressures that were in conflict with substantive aspects of the banks’ operations related to subprime mortgage risks, yet the nature of their businesses is such that they need to be seen as legitimate. To overcome this problem, banks resorted to a strategy of decoupling or concealment. They remained exposed to the high risk of subprime mortgages in substantive terms, while maintaining legitimacy in symbolic aspects. Pursuing a strategy of decoupling or concealment, along with manipulation where possible, helped banks carry on these substantive operations while maintaining the symbolic legitimacy, for a while. Such situations are, however, too good to last. Once the discovery of “illegitimate” structures within powerful and successful investment banks became public knowledge outside their field, the legitimacy of all investment banks along the relevant dimensions became suspect. We therefore see how the domino effect spread through the largest Wall Street investment banks and other financial industry organizations, shaking up the entire financial industry and organizations beyond that were deeply connected to this industry. Three of Wall Street’s five large banks ceased to be legitimate independent businesses within six months. Bear Sterns was bought by JPMorgan, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and Merrill Lynch faced bankruptcy and was bought by Bank of America. A key aspect here is the change in organizational form to escape the legitimacy crisis due to the deinstitutionalization of their erstwhile organizational forms (Davis et al., 1994) that were part of the earlier “contagion of legitimacy”. For example, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley changed organizational form to cease being specialized investment banks and became deposit holding banks. Bear Sterns and Merrill Lynch, earlier highly legitimate specialized investment banks, in effect changed organizational form through being acquired by universal banks JPMorgan and Bank of America, respectively. As the crisis spread across the erstwhile “contagion of legitimacy”, other organizations in the field faced a sudden loss of legitimacy: mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had to be saved through nationalization and insurance behemoth American Insurance Group asked to be saved by a government loan. Ultimately, formal institutions also bear the brunt of this collapse of the “contagion of legitimacy”, as they could lose their legitimacy granting powers and be themselves considered illegitimate. In the present scenario, skepticism is currently on the rise regarding the legitimacy granting powers of the Federal Reserve through its credit expansion and inflationary policies, the Treasury, the SEC, and governmental efforts based on these institutions to stabilize and provide legitimacy to the financial industry organizations. Similarly, informal institutions, such as the cultural-cognitive and normative acceptance of aggressive high-risk investments, high debt, excessive mortgages, disregard for savings, etc., are in question, and taken for granted assumptions about these are challenged. In other words, these informal institutions lose their legitimacy granting powers that bestowed legitimacy on financial industry organizations. This questioning and challenge of the formal and informal institutions is what manifests itself as widespread behavior that results in the flight of funds from equities, banks and other financial organizations, and even from money markets and
bonds. In other words, the legitimacy of all players that were part of the erstwhile “contagion of legitimacy” comes into question and an institutional crisis ensues. 3. Discussion In this paper, I support the use of the emerging literature in new institutional theory on the interplay of organizations and institutions to understand the current financial crisis. I provide fresh concepts and theoretical arguments on how organizations, particularly powerful and successful ones, could have an impact on the fortunes of institutions in their operating domains. My view is that a two-way influence in the institution-organization interplay has to be expected, particularly considering the existence of highly powerful and successful organizations today, that actively pursue their own interests (or those of their controlling agents). In other words, I argue for looking at the iron cage of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), inside-out, to use the same imagery, in order to understand the current global financial crisis. The ideas presented here are useful to explain the present financial crisis by focusing on the major players in the financial industry and major formal and informal institutions relevant to these players. However, the organizations and institutions considered here could also be extended to include a broader set of players in the global arena. Further, the interplay between organizations and institutions could be explored further at a finer level of granularity. For example, the recent International Monetary Fund involvement in the present crisis in countries such as Ukraine, and the European Central Bank providing credit to Hungary, could constitute cases for more detailed analysis using the concepts discussed here. In particular, cross-border organizational-institutional interplay, such as that arising from the banking industry disputes between Iceland and the UK, could comprise interesting topics of research using new institutional theory. New theoretical insights could be developed through grounding future research in such contexts and extending the conceptual ideas presented in this paper. The analysis in this paper suggests that those working for resolutions should attempt to understand the complex interplay of financial industry organizations and broader institutions, particularly with an emphasis on how this interplay provides perceptions of legitimacy to both parties. Simplistic notions of institutions pressurizing organizations in the organizational field to conform in order to seek legitimacy do not always apply, and could prove futile yet again in the future. The reality is more complex and notions of “reverse-legitimacy” and “contagions of legitimacy” are more useful. Fundamental questions about the nature of these institutions and their legitimacy-granting powers need to be raised, along with a focus on the powers that business and financial organizations, individually and collectively wield to “reverse-legitimate” these institutions. Further, wide use of decoupling strategies by business and financial organizations, such as the case of investment banks and high-risk mortgage-backed securities, could eventually trigger institutional crises that call into question legitimacy-granting powers of existing formal and informal institutions. The current crisis thus calls for examination as an institutional crisis resulting from the interplay of the involved financial industry organizations and broader formal and informal institutions. This paper provided theoretical insights to enable our
The global financial crisis
33
CPOIB 5,1/2
34
understanding of this interplay and potentially shape future policy relevant to this crisis and to similar potential crises in the future. Through grounding theoretical arguments in the context of the present crisis, this paper also introduced new concepts that would further theoretical and empirical work within emerging streams of new institutional theory. References Ashforth, B.E. and Gibbs, B.W. (1990), “The double-edge of organizational legitimation”, Organization Science, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 177-94. Battilana, J. (2006), “Agency and institutions: the enabling role of individuals’ social position”, Organization, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 653-76. Brint, S. and Karabel, J. (1991), “Institutional origins and transformations: the case of American community colleges”, in Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (Eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 337-60. Davis, G.F., Diekmann, K.A. and Tinsley, C.H. (1994), “In the 1980s: the deinstitutionalization of an organizational form”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, pp. 547-70. DiMaggio, P. (1991), “Constructing an organizational field as a professional project: US art museums, 1920-1940”, in Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (Eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 267-92. DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (1983), “The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, pp. 147-60. DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (1991), “Introduction”, in Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (Eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 1-38. Fligstein, N. (1991), “The structural transformation of American industry: an institutional account of the causes of diversification in the largest firms, 1919-1979”, in Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (Eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 311-36. Galaskiewicz, J. (1991), “Making corporate actors accountable: institution-building in Minneapolis-St Paul”, in Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (Eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 293-310. Garud, R., Jain, S. and Kumaraswamy, A. (2002), “Institutional entrepreneurship in the sponsorship of common technological standards: the case of Sun Microsystems and Java”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 45 No. 1, pp. 196-214. Greenwood, R. and Suddaby, R. (2006), “Institutional entrepreneurship by e´lite firms in mature fields: the big five accounting firms”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 49 No. 1, pp. 27-48. Jepperson, R.L. (1991), “Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalization”, in Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (Eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 143-63. Jepperson, R.L. and Meyer, J.W. (1991), “The public order and the construction of formal organizations”, in Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (Eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 204-31. Kraatz, M.S. and Zajac, E.J. (1996), “Exploring the limits of the new institutionalism: the causes and consequences of illegitimate organizational change”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, pp. 812-36.
Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B. (1977), “Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 83, pp. 340-63. Oliver, C. (1991), “Strategic responses to institutional processes”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 145-79. Oliver, C. (1996), “The institutional embeddedness of economic activity”, Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 13, pp. 163-86. Scott, W.R. (2001), Institutions and Organizations, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA. Suchman, M.C. (1995), “Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 571-610. Zucker, L.G. (1977), “The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 42, pp. 726-43. About the author Suhaib Riaz (PhD, Richard Ivey School of Business, University of Western Ontario, Canada) is an Assistant Professor of Strategy at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology at Oshawa, Canada. His research interests include institutional embeddedness of key employees and organizational capabilities, and organizational action and institutional change. Suhaib Riaz can be contacted at:
[email protected]
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail:
[email protected] Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
The global financial crisis
35
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1742-2043.htm
CPOIB 5,1/2
New thinking on the financial crisis Roy E. Allen and Donald Snyder
36
Saint Mary’s College of California, Moraga, California, USA Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to expand understanding of the current global financial crisis in light of other large-scale financial crises. Design/methodology/approach – The phenomenon of large-scale financial crisis has not been modeled well by neo-classical general equilibrium approaches; the paper explores whether evolutionary and complex systems approaches might be more useful. Previous empirical work and current data are coalesced to identify fundamental drivers of the boom and bust phases of the current crisis. Findings – Many features of financial crisis occur naturally in evolutionary and complex systems. The boom phase leading to this current crisis (early 1980s through 2006) and bust phase (2007-) are associated with structural changes in institutions, technologies, monetary processes, i.e. changing “meso structures”. Increasingly, purely financial constructs and processes are dominant infrastructures within the global economy. Research limitations/implications – Rigorous analytical predictions of financial crisis variables are at present not possible using evolutionary and complex systems approaches; however, such systems can be fruitfully studied through simulation methods and certain types of econometric modeling. Practical implications – Common patterns in large-scale financial crises might be better anticipated and guarded against. Better money-liquidity supply decisions on the part of official institutions might help prevent economy-wide money-liquidity crises from turning into systemic solvency crises. Originality/value – Scholars, policymakers, and practitioners might appreciate the more comprehensive evolutionary and complex systems framework and see that it suggests a new political economy of financial crisis. Despite a huge scholarly literature (organized recently as firstsecond- and third-generation models of financial crises) and a flurry of topical essays in recent months, systemic understanding has been lacking. Keywords Recession, Financial markets, Money, Credit Paper type Viewpoint
critical perspectives on international business Vol. 5 No. 1/2, 2009 pp. 36-55 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1742-2043 DOI 10.1108/17422040910938677
1. Introduction The current global financial crisis has many patterns in common with other recent large-scale financial crises, including in developed countries (e.g. Finland and Sweden in 1991, Japan after 1989) and less developed countries (e.g. Latin America in 1982, Asia in 1997, Russia and Brazil in 1998, Argentina in 2002). Despite a huge historical literature on boom-bust processes, and despite a flurry of topical essays in recent months, some of these more important patterns are only now being identified. Section 2 summarizes recent taxonomies with particular attention to the current situation. In order to describe the current crisis, first-, second-, and third-generation financial crisis models, which are found in the economics literature, are all helpful, but remain incomplete, especially in explaining “non-equilibrium” movements in exchange rates, interest rates, international investment flows, stock market and real estate
values, and other key financial variables. Thus, as elaborated in Section 3, there is a revival of interest in psychological and social constructs, including what Keynes, in The General Theory, called “animal spirits” and other behaviors that may occur if people have a limited cognitive and informational basis for fully rational decision-making, and therefore, they may rely on less rational social conventions, vague beliefs, and other psychological factors.
New thinking on financial crisis
37 1.1 What does this paper propose to contribute to this literature? First, in Section 4 key financial variables are, indeed, shown to be driven somewhat more by subjective, even transcendental (of observable gross domestic product – GDP – or “real” processes) psychological and social constructs than is commonly understood. Since the 1980s, structural changes in evolving financial markets, especially advances in information-processing technology and government deregulation, have allowed a greater separation of financial market processes from GDP processes. Specifically, as per the econometric research of one of the authors, the demand for money-liquidity for financial market participation has become – especially during episodes of chaotic structural change – an important source of money demand which absorbs money-liquidity away from observable GDP uses. As a related process, monetary wealth can thus be created, transferred, and destroyed across time and space more powerfully and independently of observed GDP processes than is commonly understood. Second, as elaborated in Section 5, expanding our understanding of the current crisis can be assisted by evolutionary and complex systems approaches, especially ones that privilege the role of interactive knowledge and belief systems. The relative rise and fall of interactive institutional and technological systems, or “meso” structures in the language of evolutionary economics, are seen to play a key role in driving the current boom-bust pattern. Transitions and imbalance between meso structures can account for long-run discontinuities or instabilities beyond what can be explained by normal business cycle theory. These conclusions are then summarized in Section 6 as they might direct us toward a new political economy of financial crisis. 2. Definitions and common patterns A “financial crisis” is generally defined to be “a wider range of disturbances, such as sharp declines in asset prices, failures of large financial intermediaries, or disruption in foreign exchange markets” (De Bonis et al., 1999). There is a “crisis”, generally speaking, because the real economy is seriously and adversely affected, including negative impacts on employment, production, purchasing power, as well as the possibility that large numbers of households and firms or governments are fundamentally unable to meet their obligations, i.e. “insolvency”. When an organization is fundamentally solvent but temporarily unable to meet its financial obligations, then the notion of “illiquidity” is often used, but in practice insolvency and illiquidity are difficult to distinguish. For example, a common pattern is that “vicious circles” start from a money-liquidity crisis at a few banks, which then extends to an international crisis of investor confidence in the financial sector, which extends to a balance of payments problem for the country and currency devaluation, which extends to, therefore, even further liquidity and, at some point, solvency crises at the banks.
CPOIB 5,1/2
38
Recent models of large-scale financial crises are often characterized as “first-generation” models or “second-generation” or, in the last few years, “third-generation”. First-generation models, as pioneered by Krugman (1979) and others, emphasize the importance of a country’s foreign exchange reserves, i.e. if government budget deficits are excessive, then ultimately a government loses the ability to maintain these reserves, and a speculative attack on its currency exchange rate is inevitable. Second-generation models, as summarized by Rangvid (2001), arose during the 1990s when this cause-effect linkage no longer explained various currency crises. In particular, there is now a weaker relationship between economic fundamentals such as public sector deficits and the timing and severity of speculative currency attacks and related instabilities. The timing of government decisions to abandon a currency regime in favor of other political-economic goals has also proved difficult to predict. Second-generation models thus tell stories of “multiple equilibrium” values that key variables might assume, unpredictable or irrational behavior by private investors and governments, and there has been an effort to discover new “sunspot variables” that will better explain sudden changes in markets. Third-generation models, as per Krugman (1999) and Allen et al. (2002), introduce additional variables and feedback processes, especially the role of companies’, entrepreneurs’, and governments’ balance sheets, and the impact of international financial flows and exchange rates on those balance sheets. During and after the 1997 Asian financial crises, the financial condition of firms weakened more than was anticipated by second-generation models, which drew attention to these processes. Furthermore, until new entrepreneurs come forward, or until balance sheets return to normal, it has been difficult for economies to return to normal growth and stability. In most recent cases of large-scale financial crisis, a country or region initially benefits from expanded supplies of base money, new “quasi-moneys” which are created from base moneys, and credit supplies – a financial liberalization and deregulation phase. Typically the financial sector expands as it captures profit from new efficiencies and opportunities allowed by globalization. The country or region, for a time, may be favored by international investors; thus the banking system, including government, is well-capitalized and able to expand money-liquidity. Assets increase in monetary value and interest rates are low, and this wealth effect encourages consumption, borrowing, business investment, and government spending. Productive resources are more fully utilized and economic growth is well supported. There is a “boom”, as measured by increased monetary wealth held by private and public sectors of an economy, such as the value of stocks, real estate, currency reserves, etc., and/or the current production of merchandise and services (GDP). Then, typically, the supply of base money (m) times its rate of circulation or velocity for GDP purposes (v) contracts, and therefore so does the equivalent nominal GDP. The decline in nominal GDP is usually split between its two components: (1) real GDP, which is the volume of current production measured in constant prices (q); and (2) and the GDP price level ( p). By definition, these variables are linked by the equation of exchange: (m £ v ¼ p £ q). When q declines for a sustained period (typically at least six months) we call it a recession, and when p declines we call it deflation. After this process starts, monetary
policymakers may react by rapidly expanding (m), but this action may be too little too late – individuals and institutions may have non-payable debts, banks may be failing, and international confidence in the country or region may already be damaged. In this pessimistic case, which is typical in less-developed countries with weak financial systems, the desperate increase in m may reverse the slide in p and even lead to hyper-inflation (destabilizing, rapid increases in p), but q would continue to fall. Also, a weak financial system may be unable to maintain the circulation rate of secure currencies for productive activities, especially if people are hoarding money, and thus v would decline. The initial contraction in “effective money” (m £ v) in a crisis may be caused by monetary authorities or national and international investors draining money (m) from the country or region, or there may be a decline in v for reasons having to do with the inability of the financial system to direct money toward productive activities. A contraction in effective money or withdrawal of international investment may undermine equity markets, debt markets, bank capital, or government reserves, and monetary wealth is then revalued downwards. General economic or political uncertainty worsens the situation – the resulting austerity-mentality causes a contraction of spending and credit, and an increased “risk premium” attached to business activity scares away investment and bank lending. Interest rates rise, the demand for quasi-money and credit – i.e. the desire to hold and use the insecure “monetary float” – declines and people try to convert the monetary float into more secure base money, Treasury securities, and other more secure assets. No reserve-currency banking system is able to cover all of its monetary float with secure bank reserves if customers try to redeem too much of the float at once, and thus “runs” on banks can destroy the banks themselves. A deteriorating banking sector may be unable to honor its deposits, bad loan problems surface and a “lender of last resort” such as the central bank, taxpayers, or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may need to be found. How far do these common patterns go toward explaining the current global financial crisis? The authors agree with many other commentators, such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2007), that the current crisis fits many historical patterns, as explained next with emphasis on the US situation. In particular, Reinhart and Rogoff (2007) find that: . . . the run-up in US housing and equity prices that Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find to be the best leading indicators of crisis in countries experiencing large capital inflows closely tracks the average of the previous 18 post-World War II banking crises in industrial countries (p. 339).
The initial financial liberalization and globalization boom phase of the current crisis was driven in the early 1980s by widespread deregulation of financial markets in the developed world especially the Reagan administration reforms in the USA and the Thatcher administration reforms in the UK. These policies were guided by ideologies and belief systems aimed at restoring a more capitalist tradition, and they eventually prevailed across the global system. French President Mitterrand’s attempt to advance a more socialist set of values and policies floundered by late 1982 and financial market deregulation and international integration spread not only in Europe and North America, but also Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Newly unregulated financial products, entities and markets came to play a larger role. Also, dramatic
New thinking on financial crisis
39
CPOIB 5,1/2
40
advances in information-processing technology (electronic banking systems, communication satellites, the computer revolution, etc.) facilitated international arbitrage. The commoditization and securitization of financial products by the private sector, including through virtually unregulated no-reserve-requirement “offshore banking facilities” led to dramatic increases in international money liquidity and credit, and by the end of the 1980s, global financial markets were generating a net international flow of funds of more than $3 trillion each month, i.e. the flow of funds between countries that reconciles end of the month balance of payments accounts. Of that $3 trillion, $2 trillion was so-called stateless money, which was virtually beyond the control of any government or official institution, but available for use by all countries (Barron’s Magazine, 1987, p. 45). This 1980-2006 boom phase of the current crisis was driven by fundamental changes in the basic social and technical rules of the game, or “meso” structure of the global economy (as per the evolutionary economics language of Section 5), which, among other characteristics, replaced more hierarchically organized, communitarian-disciplined, national-government-controlled rules with, instead, more free-market, technologically innovative, decentralized, and chaotically-individualistic meso structures as financial globalism prevailed. As one of the authors has elaborated elsewhere (Allen, 1999), these structural changes associated with financial globalization supported an increasing net financial inflow from the rest of the world into the USA from near-balance in 1980 to approximately $800 billion per year or 6 percent of GDP as a net financial inflow in 2006 – the peak of the long boom – which supported classic-pattern excesses in low-interest rate debt financing and spending, monetary wealth creation processes, consumerism and financial asset inflation, and now-famous lax standards in mortgage financing and securitization vehicles such as “collateralized debt obligations” and “structured investment vehicles” that passed the rights to the mortgage payments and related credit/default risk to third-party investors. The US household personal savings rate dropped from 8 percent of disposable income to 0 percent over this 1980-2006 period, while the “net wealth of the US” (net value of business assets, real estate, consumer durables, and US government property) increased from approximately $7 trillion to $50 trillion in nominal terms. The end of this long boom from the early 1980s to 2006, and the beginning of the crisis or bust phase, began with the bursting of the US housing bubble and a sharp rise in home foreclosures in the USA in late 2006, which spread to become a more broad-based global financial crisis within a year. The mortgage lenders that retained the risk of payment default, such as Countrywide Financial, were the first financial institutions to be affected as borrowers defaulted. Major banks and other financial institutions reported losses of approximately $100 billion by the end of 2007. By October 2007, 16 percent of subprime loans in the USA with variable interest rate features were 90 days delinquent or in foreclosure proceedings, roughly triple the rate of 2005, and by January of 2008, this number increased to 21 percent. Losses in the money-credit pyramid then began to spread across the system including through the collapse in June 2007 of two hedge funds owned by Bear Stearns that were invested heavily in subprime mortgages. The lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) phase of the crisis began as the Federal Reserve took unprecedented steps to avoid a Bear Stearns bankruptcy by assuming $30 billion in its liabilities and engineering the sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase. In August 2008 the US Treasury (and
therefore the US taxpayer) joined the LOLR phase by taking over and guaranteeing the funding of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the quasi-government housing market entities. In September 2008 American International Group, because of its exposure to credit default swaps, was bailed out by the Federal Reserve in an $85 billion deal, and then later that month the US taxpayer-sponsored $700 billion bailout bill was passed after Congress amended the plan to add more oversight, limits on executive pay, and the option for the government to gain equity in the companies that it bails out. As in Finland and Sweden’s crises in 1991, Europe and the USA quickly moved to acquire equity stakes in, and partly nationalize, the banks. As this essay is written in late 2008, the world thus moves quickly to regain coordinated state “social market capitalism” control of the financial system, i.e. back toward the pre-1980 “meso” rule structures that were more hierarchically organized and communitarian-disciplined (by treasuries and central banks and other official institutions) in place of the more free-market innovative, decentralized, and individualistic rule structures that dominated between 1980 and 2008. In testimony before the US Congress on 23 October 2008, former US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan famously said that “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, was such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders”. 3. The role of psychological and social factors Second- and now third-generation models of financial crisis, while simulating many common patterns, do not yet explain sudden movements in exchange rates, interest rates, international investment flows, stock market and real estate values, and other key variables to levels beyond normal fluctuations. Thus, there is a revival of interest in what Keynes, in The General Theory, called “animal spirits” such as “spontaneous optimism” among entrepreneurs and others (Marchionatti, 1999). Essentially, Keynes argued that people may have a limited cognitive and informational basis for fully rational decision-making, and therefore, they may rely on less rational social conventions, vague beliefs, and other psychological factors. One implication is that: . . . the market will be subject to waves of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment, which are unreasoning and yet in a sense legitimate where no solid basis exists for a reasonable calculation (Keynes, 1936, p. 154).
As authoritatively summarized by Kindleberger (1989) in Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, over the long history of market capitalism, the start of an unsustainable financial boom or “mania” is always linked to a sudden increase in money liquidity and lending. Unstable and exaggerated expectations, which are quite subjective, play a role: The heart of this book is that the Keynesian theory is incomplete [in explaining economic instabilities and crises], and not merely because it ignores the money supply. Monetarism is incomplete, too. A synthesis of Keynesianism and monetarism, such as the Hansen-Hicks IS-LM curves that bring together the investment-saving (IS) and liquidity-money (LM) relationships, remains incomplete, even when it brings in production and prices (as does the most up-to-date macroeconomic analysis), if it leaves out the instability of expectations, speculation, and credit and the role of leveraged speculation in various assets (Kindleberger, 1989, p. 25).
New thinking on financial crisis
41
CPOIB 5,1/2
42
Given the increased importance, across a larger and more dynamic global political economy, of subjective expectations, leveraged investment as supported by new electronic and derivative money and credit forms, unregulated no-reserve-requirement offshore financial markets, etc., some current research is consistent with the innovative notion that monetary-wealth, or what Marx called “unproductive finance capital” (as opposed to physical capital or capital goods such as machines and factories) may be a “driver” of economic instabilities. As elaborated by Philip Cerny among others, the new global financial markets may even be an “infrastructure of the infrastructure”. Cerny’s initial position, elaborated in debates that began in the early 1990s, was that “a country without efficient and profitable financial markets and institutions will suffer multiple disadvantages in a more open world [. . .] [and will] attempt to free-ride on financial globalization through increasing market liberalization” (Cerny, 1993, p. 338). Helleiner (1995) restrained this position – of a determinist, autonomous, technology-driven financial globalization – by demonstrating that states, especially the USA and the UK, have fostered and guided the entire process. Scholarly journals have been launched in recent decades to respond to these issues. For example, in the first edition of Review of International Political Economy, the editors state: The creation of a global economic order has come to represent the defining feature of our age, as a major force shaping economies and livelihoods in all areas of the world. Globalization, of course, has many aspects [. . .] The first of these is the emergence of a truly global financial market [. . .] and the resulting increase in the power of finance over production (Review of International Political Economy, 1994, p. 3).
Reversing the causality of Karl Marx’s (and many others’) philosophical materialism, it may increasingly be true that autonomous, invisible financial processes can drive changes in the physical relations of production, as well as vice versa. As part of this process, central banks and other financial market participants can (usually haphazardly) increase or reduce wealth independently of any initial changes in the production of GDP or other “real” economic prospects. The Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, began allowing for this possibility in the late 1990s: Today’s central banks have the capability of creating or destroying unlimited supplies of money and credit [. . .]. It is probably fair to say that the very efficiency of global financial markets, engendered by the rapid proliferation of financial products, also has the capability of transmitting mistakes at a far faster pace throughout the financial system in ways that were unknown a generation ago, and not even remotely imagined in the 19th century [. . .]. Clearly, not only has the productivity of global finance increased markedly, but so, obviously, has the ability to generate losses at a previously inconceivable rate (Greenspan, 1998).
The authors would emphasize from Greenspan’s quote that “the capability of creating or destroying unlimited supplies of money and credit” is equivalent to “the capability of creating or destroying monetary wealth”. Money and credit are “stores of value”, as determined by social consensus within nations and between nations. Transcendental notions of value applied to monetary assets need not reflect, or even be compatible with, the observed empirical world. For example, the purely transcendental “law of compound interest” is a social agreement, which may not correlate with the way that the physical economy grows. Growth in the physical economy is subject to thermodynamics, biological growth processes and carrying
capacity, endowments of resources, sunlight and rain, etc. Perhaps debtors as a group, who are required to pay exponentially increasing interest under this transcendental law, can generate goods and services and therefore economic revenues only in arithmetically increasing increments over time. Therefore, perhaps some debtors have to fail, and yield their economic resources to the others, so that the others can meet their obligations. Invisible belief systems, including those of money-gamblers and optimistic market capitalists, have supported a money economy based on exponential interest payments, and an easing of lending restrictions. The acceptance and growth of offshore finance in the 1980s and 1990s, without reserve requirements or other significant regulations, is an example of how belief systems – in this case market capitalist ideology — drive institutional change. Offshore market institutions, such as the Bangkok International Banking Facility, encouraged unsustainable over-lending, excessive unprofitable construction of real estate, etc., and ultimately contributed to the risk of crisis, recession and misery in the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Belief systems and their supporting institutions can thus drive empirical changes in human populations and their physical environments. Much of the economic wealth that was initially created through deposit-lending, as it exercised itself in production power, consumption power, and power to change institutions, was destroyed in the recent Asian crisis, but it nevertheless did exist as a broad social agreement. Whether or not financial crises arising from over-indebtedness and deflation – as per Irving Fisher’s classic work (Fisher, 1933) – should be systemically expected in modern capitalism has been debated. Mainstream economic thinking has until recently been generally confident that “hard-to-qualify” lending-restrictions, wherein all parties are conscious of systemic risk, can avoid over-lending and debt-failure. In contrast, Marxists (see Clarke, 1994) and others across various disciplines, such as Frederick Soddy (1926), are convinced that these crises are endemic to capitalism. Most recently, as summarized by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), a new data set covering eight centuries and 68 countries shows “a perennial problem of serial default [. . .] in this respect the 2007-08 US sub-prime financial crisis is hardly exceptional” (p. 2). Given that massive debt-repudiation crises continue to happen in the world system, we have not yet been able to avoid over-lending and periodic disjuncture-crises between, on the one hand, the belief system which includes mathematical compound interest, and on the other hand, the ability to generate money from tangible “real world” processes. Some borrowers and lenders are well informed but reckless risk-takers who know that periodic failures are required in “casino capitalism” (John Maynard Keynes’s phrase), whereas other borrowers and lenders underestimate systemic risk and allow over-lending based upon a mistaken ideology regarding the stability of the system. Thus, on both accounts, the literature generally concludes that debt crises are likely to remain with us. 4. New thinking 4.1 What do the authors propose to contribute to this literature? First, in the authors’ view, key financial variables can be driven somewhat more by subjective, even transcendental (of observable GDP or “real sector” processes) psychological and social constructs than is commonly understood. Consequently, there has been an even greater separation of financial market processes from GDP processes than is commonly understood. And, monetary wealth has thus been created,
New thinking on financial crisis
43
CPOIB 5,1/2
44
Figure 1. Structural declines in the income (GDP) velocity of money in the 1980s: identifying the start of the current financial boom (Source: IMF)
transferred, and destroyed across time and space more powerfully and more independently of observed GDP processes. Second, a better understanding of the current crisis can be assisted by evolutionary and complex systems approaches (as elaborated in Section 5), especially ones that privilege the role of interactive knowledge and belief systems and the psychological and social factors discussed above. The econometric work of one of the authors (Allen, 1989, 1999) supports this “new thinking” – essentially by showing that, under certain conditions, financial markets can “absorb” a portion of the money supply, such that the absorbed money is not contemporaneously available to support and induce the “real economy”. While economic literature has examined various demands for money for financial market participation, the author’s contribution to that literature was the first to show that the absorbed money was not simultaneously available even to induce or incentivize GDP activity. This absorption shows up as a decline in the GDP-velocity of narrow money (v), ceteris paribus, and it can also be measured by a divergence in the growth of broad money supply aggregates (such as M3) relative to narrow money supply (such as M1), ceteris paribus. This absorbed money-power might be used at a later date to reengage GDP production or consumption, or it might be destroyed in a financial crisis before its title-holders can use it. Therefore, money is not a neutral driver of the real economy over time. Furthermore, this absorption process can occur to facilitate the boom phase of a financial crisis cycle, and it can also facilitate the bust phase – by driving asset values beyond normal or sustainable levels. For example, Figure 1 shows a structural decline in the long-term trend GDP velocity of money (v) in the USA, the UK, and Canada in the early 1980s that corresponded with the beginning of the boom phase of this current financial crisis. In each of these countries, corresponding with the particular timing of the break in v, governments dramatically abandoned financial market protectionism. Policymakers removed ceilings on interest rates, reduced taxes and brokerage commissions on financial transactions, gave foreign financial firms greater access to the home financial markets, allowed increased privatization and securitization of assets, and took other steps that allowed money to move more freely and profitably between international and national markets. As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 for the USA and the UK, in these key “phase shift” years, there was a corresponding dramatic expansion in the transactions volumes of money-absorbing financial transactions (measured as the combined value of stock, bond, and government securities transactions) – shown as an inverse relationship between v and financial transactions volumes. In the USA, the major structural break in v along with other monetary-transmission relationships
occurred in 1982 as participants responded to newly profitable forms of liberalized financial market participation with the aid of new information processing technologies (Allen, 1989, p. 273). The major structural break in the UK occurred in 1985-1986 as participants anticipated the UK’s “big bang” of October 1986, which ended fixed commissions for brokers and separation of powers between brokers, and allowed a rush of foreign financial firms into the marketing of British stocks and government bonds and other securities. In addition to the direct absorption of money away from GDP activity to accommodate transactions demands for exploding volumes of financial activity, a related form of absorption occurred in the UK case due to uncertainty or information failure experienced by holders of money. That is, during a dramatic upheaval or structural change as per Big Bang, financial portfolios must be reallocated dramatically as the new opportunities are figured out and reacted to. For a time, there is not sufficient information for investors to pursue rational strategies, and the price of money-liquidity rises sharply. An increase in money demand occurs to reduce the risk of loss and in order to regain an optimal portfolio quickly once the information environment improves. In the authors’ view, this “options demand” for money can divert money-liquidity away from GDP and other markets during chaotic times (once again such that GDP activity is neither accommodated or incentivized by this portion of the money supply –
New thinking on financial crisis
45
Figure 2. Expanding volumes of money-absorbing financial transactions in the USA ($trillion/year) and the US income velocity of money (M1)
Figure 3. Expanding volumes of money-absorbing financial transactions in the UK (million of pounds/year) and the UK income velocity of money (M1)
CPOIB 5,1/2
46
the “new” claim of the authors), but it is not generally recognized by the economics profession. However, many securities market professionals swear by it. For example, Joseph Grundfest, former Commissioner of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, explained the 1987 world stock market crash as follows: Simply put, I suggest that a large component of recent market volatility is the rational result of an “information failure” in the market for liquidity rather than the consequence of rapid and irrational changes in the market’s assessment of the value of securities [. . .] The lack of information about either fundamental business prospects or about the magnitude and composition of an atypically large demand for immediate trading can be sufficient to induce substantial market volatility [. . .] [A] sharp increase in the price of liquidity is reflected in a simultaneous widening of spreads and in a general price decline in the equities and futures market alike [. . .] Once sufficient information comes to the market describing expected short-term trading flows, and once the returns to providing liquidity become high enough, the peak-load nature of the demand subsides, the risk involved in trading is reduced, the price of liquidity declines, spreads narrow, and equity prices recover a large portion of their losses (Grundfest, 1991, p. 67-8).
Japan’s financial crisis, which saw 50 percent declines in stock market prices along with similar declines in real estate and other asset prices after 1989, shows how this money absorption can occur in the bust phase of a financial crisis. Namely, absorption of base money by financial markets and therefore a decline in its rate of circulation for GDP purposes (v), in times of financial distress, can also be measured by a weakness in the growth of broad money. Expanded supplies of high-powered money may not be able to serve as a base for expanded supplies of broad money if the high-powered money supplies are instead consumed by financial institutions to resolve bankruptcies, increase reserves, and meet other capital requirements. In this case, a decline in broad money would correspond to a decline in the velocity of high-powered money as it is absorbed by distressed financial markets rather than being used to support growth in GDP. Japan’s narrow (M1) velocity began dropping significantly in the early 1990s – by approximately 30 percent from a value of 3.5 ( ¼ nominal GDP divided by M1) in 1990 to 2.5 in 1995. Just as dramatically, Figure 4 shows the big decline in the growth of Japan’s broad money supply (M2 þ CDs) in the 1990s which correlated with declines in
Figure 4. Japan’s financial crisis. The dramatic decline in Japan’s broad money supply growth rate (M2 þ CDs) in the 1990s was correlated with declines in the stock market, real estate values, and real GDP
the stock market, real estate values, and real GDP (in July 1998 a GDP recession began but was mostly avoided). Maintaining the growth of the narrow money supply (M1) did not prevent deflation and recessionary conditions, because more of the M1 was absorbed by distressed financial institutions. Elaborating this situation further, research in 1998 indicated that:
New thinking on financial crisis
A central bank in a deflationary situation with troubled banks must avoid interpreting low [nominal] interest rates as an indicator of an expansionary policy. When monetary growth is low and default risks are high as in Japan today, low interest rates reflect expectations of both low (or negative) inflation and rates of return. In such a situation, the appropriate focus of monetary policy is on money and not interest rates [broad money supplies should be expanded despite low interest rates] (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 1998, p. 1).
47
The current global financial crisis mirrors many aspects of Japan’s crisis after 1989. Developed-country stock markets are down close to 50 per cent from their peak, real estate prices, as they did in Japan, are falling more slowly but on the same trajectory (currently down 20 per cent from their peak), expanded ‘rescue’ supplies of high-powered money are not yet serving as a base for expanded supplies of broad money as the high-powered money supplies are instead consumed by financial institutions to resolve bankruptcies, increase reserves, and meet other capital goals in an environment of uncertainty and information failure. There is a decline in the income velocity of narrow money supplies and recession and the risk of deflation in the real sector are imminent. Although the US Federal Reserve took the controversial decision to stop reporting broad US money supply M3 data (supplies of cash and a wide range of bank instruments) in 2005 on the grounds that the modern financial system made this data unmanageable and not useful, estimates compiled by Lombard Street Research show a decline in the US M3 growth rate from 19 percent in early 2008 to 2.1 percent (annualized) in the period May-June 2008 – a decline very similar to Japan’s M2 þ CD decline in 1991-1992 as shown in Figure 4. A continuing decline in estimated US M3 in July 2008 by $50 billion was the biggest one-month fall of US. M3 since modern records began in 1959. The US M1 growth rate, which had fluctuated around 0 percent during 2006 and 2007 and the first half of 2008, was dramatically increased by the Federal Reserve (too little too late in the view of the authors) to approximately 5 percent in September 2008 (and thus it has not served as a base for expanded supplies of broad money as these supplies are instead consumed by financial institutions in distress). As this article is written, with nominal GDP declining from trend, the recent 5 percent increase in the growth rate of US M1 translates into a greater than 5 percent structural decline in the US income velocity of money (M1). What will prove interesting to estimate, when a few more quarters of GDP data are available, is whether the econometric equations (Allen, 1989, 1999) that measured the share of narrow money supplies contemporaneously absorbed for financial purposes in the boom phase of the 1980s is similar to the share of narrow money supplies absorbed for financial purposes in this bust phase. Also to be encouraged is research on whether typical boom and bust phase money absorption magnitudes across various large-scale country crises have been similar – thus supporting better money-liquidity supply decisions on the part of central banks and official institutions that might help prevent liquidity crises from turning into solvency crises.
CPOIB 5,1/2
48
5. Evolutionary and complex systems approaches toward understanding the current crisis 5.1 Mainstream economic theory and financial crises The neoclassical general equilibrium model has long provided the theoretical rationale underlying mainstream economic efforts to understand macroeconomic fluctuations. This model conceives of an economy as a set of fully connected interlocking markets which can be analyzed like a force field in physics. To make the model work it is virtually imperative to assume that the market participants are homogeneous or nearly so. Prices in this model are not negotiated, they are set by a central authority (the famous Walrasian auctioneer) who assesses prevailing excess demands and imposes a set of prices that will clear all markets simultaneously. The model presumes strong tendencies towards equilibrium: it would be in equilibrium most of the time unless some exogenous force was to disturb it, in which case it would normally settle back quickly. But nominal and institutional rigidities are assumed to prevent such shocks from being perfectly damped, which generates business fluctuations. Markets in a model like this satisfy the efficient markets hypothesis and, (because of the strong equilibrium tendencies), have price changes that are Gaussian (normally) distributed. An important feature of a Gaussian distribution is that very large positive and very large negative deviations from the mean (more than three standard deviations, say) are virtually impossible. Yet price changes of these magnitudes routinely occur during financial crises. This suggests that whatever is occurring during these episodes is not following the processes embodied in the general equilibrium model. The general equilibrium model also assumes that promises are always fulfilled: when goods are purchased or loans are made, the goods get paid for and the loans get repaid on schedule. This condition is routinely violated in a financial crisis. Leijonhufvud (2004) notes that, despite the obvious importance of understanding better such breakdowns in the equilibrating processes, which can threaten the social order, modern macroeconomics sheds little light on their nature. LeRoy (2004), in his survey of traditional economic analyses of price bubbles, comes to a similar conclusion. 5.2 Complexity theory Given the inability of standard general equilibrium theory to explain the occurrence of financial bubbles and crises, researchers have explored other avenues. One promising approach is to look at the economic system through the lens of complexity theory. A complex system differs in important ways from the general equilibrium system of neoclassical economics. If an economy is a complex system, all behavior emanates from the bottom, from the actions of individual agents: there is no global controller or auctioneer to set parameters or behavior. Because agent behaviors interact in nonlinear ways, the macro result which emerges can have a life of its own which is not obviously deducible from the properties of the agents: the whole is not only greater than the sum of the parts, it is different as well. Positive feedback loops often exist, which amplify the effects of small changes into large cascades with significant influence. Complex systems are path-dependent, meaning that their present state is determined by what happened to them in the past (history matters). They exhibit perpetual novelty: new behaviors and structures constantly stimulate more of the same. Dynamics dominates statics; the system evolves and adapts rather than just “running” as general equilibrium models tend to do. As a consequence, a complex system is rarely in
equilibrium. It may have long periods of stability, but stability is not the same as equilibrium: it can degenerate into chaotic behavior at short notice without exogenous disturbance. This often signals what is known as a phase shift, whereby the system changes from one way of functioning to a distinctly different way. Financial crises can often be thought of as phase shifts. Because a complex system does not have strong tendencies to equilibrium, it does not usually generate variables with Gaussian distributions. Instead, it tends to produce power law distributions, which have fatter tails than the Gaussian and thus explain the frequent occurrence of extreme positive and negative values. Benoit Mandelbrot (Mandelbrot and Hudson, 2004) has been a student of financial system prices for many decades and has produced persuasive evidence that they follow power law distributions. His work, long ignored and even suppressed by efficient market theorists, is now widely recognized as correct and has been brought to the attention of the general public by Nassim Taleb (2007). 5.3 Complex adaptive systems The mathematics of complex systems has been studied for some time now and is reasonably well understood. Although phase shifts and cascades are suggestive of financial crises and power laws are consistent with frequent large price changes, complex systems were originally developed to explain inanimate phenomena such as chemical reactions. The agents in that type of complex system have no volition of their own: they passively respond to whatever natural forces affect them. An economy on the other hand is composed of agents who both perceive their situation and are capable of changing their behavior in response to it. This suggests the notion of a complex adaptive system (CAS) in which the agents are active participants. The behavior of a CAS is much more difficult to study, yet reflection suggests that a modern economy is almost surely a CAS, so this is a task which must be undertaken if we are to make progress understanding financial crises. Foster (2005) has developed a useful taxonomy for complexity systems. He identifies four types: (1) First-order (imposed energy) – Found in inanimate settings when energy is imposed on chemical elements. Characterized by fractal patterns, butterfly effects, etc. Can be modeled with dynamical mathematics. This is the approach Mandelbrot applied to financial prices. The agents react passively, so this is a complex system. (2) Second-order (imposed knowledge, acquired energy) – Found in organic settings. Plants and animals receive imposed (genetically encoded) knowledge and also gain knowledge from experience. All of this gets translated into a knowledge structure that permits some control over energy acquisition. Agents both react and adapt to their environment, so this is a CAS. (3) Third-order (acquired knowledge) – Agents interact not only with their environment but also with images of possible worlds, i.e. mental models. When this happens, some mental models will wind up determining aspects of reality. This is a CAS where “adaptive” involves creativity. If everyone has a mental model of the market and begins associating with their fellow agents according to market rules, the market gets transformed from mental model into reality.
New thinking on financial crisis
49
CPOIB 5,1/2
50
(4) Fourth-order (interactive knowledge) – At this stage mental models began interacting with each other. Agents imagine what other agents might be imagining and alter their own models accordingly in a potentially infinite regression. Agents form aspirations and commitments into the future. This type of CAS gets extremely complicated and depends heavily on trust and understanding to achieve the cooperation necessary for the system to function. In the study of financial crises, the first-order type of complex system is of interest because it provides realistic description of how prices behave in bubbles and panics. However, it gives us a little in the way of a behavioral explanation for these price changes. The fourth-order type does provide a basis for the behavioral explanation we seek. The problem is that fourth-order complex systems cannot at present be analyzed mathematically. However, though analytical solutions are at present not possible, such systems can be fruitfully studied through simulation methods and through certain types of econometric modeling, as detailed below. The Federal Reserve has become interested in a complex adaptive systems approach to managing financial crises. In the world at large, complex systems abound – weather patterns, tectonic processes, disease contagion, power grids, etc. Their instability and potential for large, disruptive regime shifts are major social concerns. The ubiquity of such problems suggests that there may be common principles at work. A 2006 Federal Reserve conference on systemic risk (Kambhu et al., 2007) saw experts from fields such a civil engineering, disease control, ecology, national security, and finance discuss their approaches to catastrophe control. The following composite picture emerged: an initial shock (possibly a seemingly insignificant one) leads to a coordinated behavior in the system with reinforcing (positive) feedbacks. A contagion begins, which spreads the original shock. When the pressure becomes too much the system makes a regime shift “from a stable state to an inferior stable state while shedding energy so that it cannot readily recover its original state, a process known as hysteresis” (Kambhu et al., 2007, p. 7). Research is focusing on factors that increase resistance to regime shifts and hysteresis, and on factors than can help the system recover. Some of this research may prove helpful in managing financial crises. 5.4 Evolutionary economics If an economy is a complex adaptive system, then as time passes it does not just run like an electric motor; its form and structure evolves. The machine is the metaphor of the general equilibrium economy; for the complex adaptive system economy, the metaphor is the living organism. It is not easy to model an evolving economy using the neoclassical model, which can accommodate growth fairly readily but structural change only with great difficulty. In a neoclassical model of an evolving economy based on past history, the parameter values are always becoming obsolete – slowly and steadily sometimes, or very quickly when there is a structural shift. The field of evolutionary economics has emphasized these issues for some time and has made efforts to incorporate capacity for structural change into its models. Schumpeter’s idea that creative destruction is the essence of capitalism forms the basis of much modern thinking in evolutionary economics. Schumpeter emphasized the role of liberal credit as a driver of speculative booms, and sudden credit contraction as a major contributor to the severity of the ensuing crash (Leathers and Raines, 2004). The version of evolutionary economics which appears most useful for analyzing financial
crises is the “Micro-Meso-Macro” framework of Dopfer et al. (2004). This framework centers on two novel concepts: (1) rules; and (2) meso units. A rule is a pattern that agents follow in their everyday economic behavior: it may be cognitive, behavioral, technological, institutional, organizational, sociocultural, etc. Rules may be nested in other rules: we might talk about a motorcycle rule that includes engine rules, tire rules, etc. or a market rule that includes a double auction rule, a fixed-price rule, etc. Rules are carried out (actualized) by microeconomic agents (individuals, families, organizations, etc.). A meso unit is a rule plus its population of actualizations (e.g. the motorcycle meso is the motorcycle rule plus all agents who make, sell, repair, or drive motorcycles). An economic system (assumed to be complex adaptive) is a collection of meso units evolving over time. Macroeconomic behavior is the result of interactions among meso units. Economic evolution is the process by which new rules originate and diffuse through the population: very often this process takes the form of a logistic growth path in the new rule’s meso unit. Structural change occurs when a new meso rule permanently alters the coordination structure of the meso units of the economic system. Over time, creative destruction occurs: new rules are constantly being originated; the successful ones develop strong mesos which displace previously dominant mesos; the weak ones disappear. In this framework, a bubble or crisis in the financial sector would be analyzed as a structural change. Foster and Wild (1999b) have developed a promising econometric methodology for analyzing such structural shifts in terms of the logistic function, and for identifying early warning signals that the macro economy may be about to undergo a structural change. A high priority today is to analyze the international growth of money and credit over recent decades using these techniques. 6. Conclusion: toward a new political economy of financial crisis This paper has characterized the current financial crisis as having a long “boom” phase (early 1980s-2006), followed by a turning point and continuing “bust” phase (2007-) with many patterns in common relative to other financial crises. It is beyond the scope of this paper to model this financial crisis rigorously; instead the goal has been to suggest the best analytical framework – some of which is “new” as applied to financial crises – that might direct more rigorous modeling. Departing from the neoclassical general equilibrium model and other mainstream approaches, this paper proposes an evolutionary and complex systems approach toward understanding the current crisis (as well as to rethink other large-scale crises). The 1980s boom in leveraged financial transactions was thus a ‘phase shift’ in a complex adaptive system, and it was a transition to a new ‘meso structure’ in the language of evolutionary economics. As the econometric research of one of the authors has verified, structural changes in normal money supply and demand relationships occurred in the USA, the UK, and other money centers at this time that were associated with government deregulation, advances in information-processing technology, and other aspects of financial liberalization and globalization (Allen, 1999). Although beyond the scope of this paper to simulate rigorously, most of the trajectories of financial market data associated with this crisis time period – as per Figures 1-4 – fit
New thinking on financial crisis
51
CPOIB 5,1/2
52
the patterns identified by Foster and Wild (1999a, p. 754) as “logistic diffusion trajectories” with three self-organizing phases called the “emergent”, “inflexion”, and “saturation” phases. As a result of these structural changes, financial markets absorbed newly-created money-power beyond levels predicted by general equilibrium models, which in turn were used to inflate asset prices and incentivize production or consumption beyond predictions; then, during the bust phase, these variables moved in the opposite direction more than expected including a greater than expected fall in stock and real estate prices and destruction of monetary wealth. Depending on the magnitudes of these transfers and re-valuations of monetary wealth over (how much) time and space in the global system, serious real effects can be produced over time and space. These processes, generally not accepted by mainstream, Marxist, and many other economists, can nevertheless account for what the mainstream has understood as “business cycles”, “debt-deflation crises” including depressions (Fisher, 1933), etc., and what Marxists have understood as crises of “underconsumption”, “overproduction”, and ‘disproportionality’ (Clarke, 1994). The ideologies and institutions of finance, are not only “where the action is” and where differential economic power is determined across the world system, but these institutions are also increasingly key to the sustainability of the current global economic system – a necessary “infrastructure of the infrastructure”, as per Cerny’s (1993) analysis. This expansion and globalization of financial markets that accelerated in the 1980s, which seemed to take on a dramatic life of its own somewhat separate from GDP processes, can be modeled with the help of third-order and fourth-order complexity processes – acquired knowledge and interactive knowledge processes, respectively – as discussed in the previous section. Given the “animal spirits” of irrational exuberance or fear, transcendental “laws of compound interest” and no-reserve-requirement money-liquidity creation, etc., interactive mental models drove financial cycles and monetary wealth creation and destruction processes beyond the bounds of general equilibrium to levels that required a breakdown in the equilibrating processes – the boom phase and its accompanying meso structure were unsustainable (beyond 2006 or so), and now a new meso structure is in process of adaptation. In the new ordering of the global economy, it should be accepted that, increasingly, autonomous, invisible financial processes can drive changes in the physical relations of production, rather than vice versa. As part of this process, central banks and other financial market participants such as offshore banks can in some cases (haphazardly) increase or reduce wealth independently of any initial changes in the production of GDP or other “real” economic prospects. And, this wealth – literally created or destroyed out of thin air (or cyberspace) in some cases – is generally allocated through the arbitrary customs and interest rates concessions of particular social networks. Wealth itself in the global human ecology, in these cases, can thus be derived entirely from “pure social agreement”, depending on how well one can participate in the financial system. A review of the authors’ controversial position as italicized here, especially critiquing it from the Marxist and other philosophical-materialist frameworks, appeared in Review of International Political Economy (1996). To the reviewer, the authors’ approach incorrectly “privileges financial changes vis-a`-vis changes in the real economy (production of value)” (p. 532). Furthermore, to the reviewer, any perceived initial creation and distribution of wealth or “value” that happens in “the thin air” of
financial markets could not be sustained over time without correspondence to supportive GDP activity. In contrast, to the authors, “money is wealth” in the sense that it gives the holder a claim on the entire social product. The “social product” includes not only consumption power and production power, but also the power to direct and control large social processes – such as those that are dependent on (gaining access to) the institutions of government, courts, communications, and so on. The accumulation of monetary assets, or what Marxists would call the accumulation of finance capital, represents a social power claim that becomes a key driver in the evolution of the world system. Once monetary wealth is understood as power claims over the social product, then monetary wealth is “real”, and it is limited only by the degree to which power can be exerted over others. Presumably this limit would only be found in the unlikely event that an all-encompassing global monopoly has maximized its differential power. Recent research in the field of international political economy also treats monetary wealth, or finance capital (as opposed to physical capital or capital goods such as machines and factories) as an accumulation of broad social powers: Drawing on the institutional frameworks of Veblen and Mumford, our principal contribution is to integrate power into the definition of capital. Briefly, the value of capital represents discounted expected earnings. Some of these earnings could be associated with the productivity (or exploitation) of the owned industrial apparatus, but this is only part of the story. As capitalism grows in complexity, the earnings of any given business concern come to depend less on its own industrial undertakings and more on the community’s overall productivity. In this sense, the value of capital represents a distributional claim. This claim is manifested partly through ownership, but more broadly through the whole spectrum of social power. Moreover, power is not only a means of accumulation, but also its most fundamental end. For the absentee owner, the purpose is not to “maximize” profits but to “beat the average”. The ultimate goal of business is not hedonic pleasure, but differential gain. In our view, this differential aspect of accumulation offers a promising avenue for putting power into the definition of capital [. . .]. In the eyes of a modern investor, capital means a capitalized earning capacity. It consists not of the owned factories, mines, aeroplanes or retail establishments, but of the present value of profits expected to be earned by force of such ownership (Nitzan, 1998, pp. 173, 182).
Building on this quote, Nitzan argues that wealth accumulation processes allowed by monetary capital have favored pecuniary business activities and owners over tangible industrial productivity and working consumers. He argues that, increasingly, “the causal link runs not from the creation of earnings to the right of ownership, but from the right of ownership to the appropriation of earnings” (p. 180). This causality is consistent with the writings of Thorstein Veblen, who insisted that the “natural right of ownership” conferred by society to various people (initially to own slaves, then animals, land, and now capital including ever more symbolic monetary forms), can be used competitively to obtain further social powers at the expense of others (Veblen, 1923). To summarize, based upon these issues and frameworks, the authors and others gradually propose “a new political economy of financial crises” (Allen, 2004) – a project that is bound to gain further thrust both conceptually and empirically as analysis of the current crisis proceeds. In the language of evolutionary economics, hopefully this essay has usefully described some of the path-dependent trajectory of this ongoing scholarly project – itself a “meso structure”.
New thinking on financial crisis
53
CPOIB 5,1/2
54
References Allen, M., Rosenberg, C., Keller, C., Setser, B. and Roubini, N. (2002), “A balance sheet approach to financial crisis”, Working Paper No. 02/210, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Allen, R.E. (1989), “Globalization of the US financial markets: the new structure for monetary policy”, International Economics and Financial Markets: The AMEX Bank Review Prize Essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Allen, R.E. (1999), Financial Crises and Recession in the Global Economy, 2nd ed., Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton, MA. Allen, R.E. (Ed.) (2004), The Political Economy of Financial Crisis, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton, MA. Barron’s Magazine (1987), “The globalization of the industrialized economies”, Barron’s, May 4. Cerny, P.G. (1993), “The political economy of international finance”, in Cerny, P.G. (Ed.), Finance and World Politics, Edward Elgar, Aldershot/Brookfield, VT, pp. 3-19. Clarke, S. (1994), Marx’s Theory of Crisis, St Martin’s Press, New York, NY. De Bonis, R., Giustiniani, A. and Gomel, G. (1999), “Crises and bail-outs of banks and countries: linkages, analogies, and differences”, World Economy, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 55-86. Dopfer, K., Foster, J. and Potts, J. (2004), “Micro, meso, macro”, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 263-79. Fisher, I. (1933), “The debt-deflation theory of great depressions”, Econometrica, Vol. I, pp. 337-57. Foster, J. (2005), “From simplistic to complex systems in economics”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 873-92. Foster, J. and Wild, P. (1999a), “Detecting self-organizational change in economic processes exhibiting logistic growth”, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 109-33. Foster, J. and Wild, P. (1999b), “Econometric modeling in the presence of evolutionary change”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 749-70. Greenspan, A. (1998), “The globalization of finance”, Cato Journal, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 243-56. Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (1998), International Economic Trends, August. Grundfest, J.A. (1991), “When markets crash: the consequences of information failure in the market for liquidity”, in Feldstein, M. (Ed.), The Risk of Economic Crisis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Helleiner, E. (1995), “Explaining the globalization of financial markets: bringing states back in”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 2 No. 2, pp. 315-41. Kambhu, J., Weidman, S. and Krishnan, N. (2007), New Directions for Understanding Systemic Risk: A Report on a Conference Co-sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the National Academy of Sciences, National Academies Press, Washington, DC. Kaminsky, G.L. and Reinhart, C.M. (1999), “The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance of payments problems”, American Economic Review, Vol. 89 No. 3, pp. 473-500. Keynes, J.M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, Macmillan, London. Kindleberger, C.P. (1989), Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Basic Books, New York, NY. Krugman, P. (1979), “A model of balance-of-payment crises”, International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 6 No. 4, pp. 459-72.
Krugman, P. (1999), “Balance sheets, the transfer problem and financial crises”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 11, pp. 311-25. LeRoy, S.F. (2004), “Rational exuberance”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLII, September, pp. 801-3. Leathers, C.G. and Raines, J.P. (2004), “The Schumpeterian role of financial innovations in the new economy’s business cycle”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 No. 5, pp. 667-81. Leijonhufvud, A. (2004), “Celebrating Ned”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLII, pp. 820-1. Mandelbrot, B. and Hudson, R. (2004), The Misbehavior of Markets, Basic Books, New York, NY. Marchionatti, R. (1999), “On Keynes’ animal spirits”, Kyklos, Vol. 52 No. 3, pp. 415-39. Nitzan, J. (1998), “Differential accumulation: towards a new political economy of capital”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 5 No. 2, Summer. Rangvid, J. (2001), “Second generation models of currency crises”, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 15 No. 5, pp. 613-46. Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K.S. (2007), “Is the 2007 US sub-prime financial crisis so different? An international historical pattern”, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 98 No. 2, pp. 339-44. Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K.S. (2008), “This time is different: a panoramic view of eight centuries of financial crises”, NBER, working paper, No. 13761, NBER, Cambridge, MA. Review of International Political Economy (1994), Vol. 1 No. 1, Spring. Review of International Political Economy (1996), Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 528-37. Soddy, F. (1926), Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt, George Allen & Unwin, New York, NY. Taleb, N. (2007), The Black Swan, Random House, New York, NY. Veblen, T. (1923), Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times. The Case of America, introduction by Robert Leckachman, Beacon Press, Boston, MA (reproduced 1967). About the authors Roy E. Allen is Professor of Economics and Dean in the School of Economics and Business Administration, Saint Mary’s College of California. His recent books are Human Ecology Economics: A New Framework for Global Sustainability (as editor, Routledge, 2008) and Financial Crises and Recession in the Global Economy (Edward Elgar, third edition forthcoming 2009). His research interests include globalization, sustainability studies, financial systems, and use of the humanities to gain critical insights into the functioning of the economic system. Roy E. Allen is the corresponding author and can be contacted at:
[email protected]. Donald Snyder is Professor of Business Administration in the School of Economics and Business Administration, Saint Mary’s College of California. His most recent publication is “Strange priors: understanding globalization” (in Human Ecology Economics: A New Framework for Global Sustainability, Routledge, 2008). His research interests include evolutionary and complex systems among other ways to model the economic system, economic growth and development, globalization, and financial market dynamics.
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail:
[email protected] Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
New thinking on financial crisis
55
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1742-2043.htm
CPOIB 5,1/2
The crisis: a return to political economy? Loong Wong
56
School of Business and Government, University of Canberra, Canberra, Australia Abstract Purpose – This paper aims to examine the current financial crisis, suggesting that most analyses have attributed the crisis to a lack of business ethics, the rise of greed and lax regulation. Prescriptions offered to address this crisis draw accordingly on the need for greater regulation of market behaviour, business practices and boardroom pay. Whilst these reforms are necessary, they fail to recognise that such business practices have their roots in an extreme political and economic ideology – neoliberal market fundamentalism. This paper seeks to suggests that a greater appreciation of the nexus between politics, philosophy and economics is critical in order to develop a different practice. As such, the author provides a socio-historical and political context for understanding the present crisis before offering a critique and reform of the business educational agenda. The author argues that such a context would engender greater understanding of business practices and systems for both students and practitioners and would go some way in enabling them to fashion a more critical reflexive and engaged practice. Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws on a critical-historical review of the literature on the crisis. In so doing, the paper opens up the analysis to philosophical and political approaches to understanding financial crises. Findings – The paper finds that explanations for the crisis can be found through a critical appreciation of philosophical and political texts. This finding also suggests that current business and management education and practices can benefit from an incorporation of these historical strands of thought. Research limitations/implications – In drawing on various strands in philosophy, politics, economics and sociology, the paper finds that a singular account for the crisis is flawed. The paper also finds that a richer and deeper appreciation of the crisis can be found through a critical-historical positioning of the crisis. This necessitates an understanding of politics and philosophy in business practices and education. Practical implications – In explaining the crisis, the paper suggests that many of the current financial “innovations” are problematic and a more critical approach is needed to engage with these “new” innovations. Originality/value – The paper seeks to open up new vistas for business education and practices. Through a critical-historical interrogation of the crisis, the paper opens up new spaces for understanding international economics and business practices. This reflexivity is often missing in international business studies and most management practices. Keywords Political economy, Recession, Politics, Capitalist systems, Education, United States of America Paper type Viewpoint
critical perspectives on international business Vol. 5 No. 1/2, 2009 pp. 56-77 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1742-2043 DOI 10.1108/17422040910938686
Introduction “Modern history’s greatest regulatory failure”; “The end of American capitalism as we know it” – these are just two of the headlines thrown up by the credit crunch, both appearing in the Financial Times (FT). In the course of a single week, we have seen the collapse of three of America’s biggest financial institutions: on Sunday, 13 September
2008, Bank of America announced it was buying out Merrill Lynch, one of the world’s most famous investment banks; on the following Monday, Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest securities firm in the USA, filed for bankruptcy; and, on Tuesday, the US Federal Reserve invested $85 billion in a takeover of AIG, America’s largest insurance company. More recently, on Thursday, 25 September, the huge US bank Washington Mutual, in a state of collapse, was taken over by JPMorgan Chase, in a move described as “the biggest bank failure in American history” (Scholtes et al., 2008). This panic on the world’s stock markets is a reflection of the underlying crisis of world capitalism, as it plunges into the deepest slump since the 1930s. Five European banks have collapsed in as many days. Despite the $US700bn bailout, the crisis continues unabated. The German government was forced to intervene to bail out the real estate giant, Hypo, amid growing panic in the financial sector. BNP Paribas was forced under Belgian government pressure to take over Fortis’s operations in Belgium and Luxemburg. This followed the decision of The Netherlands government to nationalise Fortis in The Netherlands. Turmoil has also hit France, where Caisse d’Epargne is likely to merge with Banque Populaire, and Italy, with Unicredit going under. In Iceland, the economic crisis has forced the government to nationalise one of its biggest banks, Glitnir, while a large investment house collapsed; the authorities also drew up sweeping powers to nationalise banks and sack executives as the country faced bankruptcy. The krona fell as much as 45 per cent against the euro, as the country faced a balance of payments crisis. The crisis is producing panic everywhere. According to the FT: Yesterday’s fresh outburst of panic on global markets was final proof that as financial crises go, we are now in the big league. Comparisons with the dotcom bubble or even the Asian crisis of 1997 are inadequate. We must think of 1987 or 1929.
The article continues: With hindsight, 1987 was more contained than today. The brief, savage fall in world equities seemed the prelude to a downturn in the real economy. But the real world sailed on, and other asset classes were largely unscathed. Compared to 1929, there are two main differences today. First, world policy makers have grasped the scale of the threat more quickly and are prepared for much more drastic action. Against that, the financial system is more complex. And thanks to modern communications, the pace has accelerated. So any policy action is uncertain in its effect and generally out of date by the time it arrives (Financial Times, 7 October 2008).
In the last few months, companies that were thought to be too big to fail have all either filed for bankruptcy, been “bailed out” by the government, or been nationalised. Most economists do not know the depth and extent of the loss. As Dominique Strauss-Kahn writes in the FT: But with much of the losses yet to be realized, and with the financial crisis now acute, it has become clear that nothing short of a systemic solution – comprehensive in tackling the immediate fallout and comprehensive in addressing the root causes – will permit the broader economy, in the US and globally, to function with any semblance of normality (Financial Times, 22 September 2008).
Indeed, the US economy no longer functions with any “semblance of normality”. As David Wessel (2008) noted in the Wall Street Journal, “The past 10 days will be
A return to political economy? 57
CPOIB 5,1/2
58
remembered as the time the U.S. government discarded a half-century of rules to save American financial capitalism from collapse”. For years the USA economy appeared to be defying the laws of economic gravity, going up and up. However, its present fall is more spectacular and is far from over. The crisis has clearly spread from the financial sector to the rest of the economy. The difference with 1929 is that the world is far more interdependent and the scale of the crisis is potentially far bigger. All the factors that developed the boom over the past 20 years are now turning into their opposites. The profits bonanza has crashed. The market is contracting rapidly. Consumer spending is falling. The FT opined: “We are now, unquestionably, in the worst financial crisis since 1929. We do not know how many more banks and institutions will fail – Washington Mutual, the US counterpart of HBOS, is under severe pressure – but Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Lehman and AIG are plenty” (Financial Times, 19 September 2008). Financial turbulence originating in the USA has slowly expanded and worsened. There is now “the messy reality of global financial crisis” (Rubin, 2003, p. 297). Banks and financial institutions are weighed down by huge losses caused by “non-performing loans”. Lending channels are choked up, as lenders are being called to pay back their loans, to clean up their balance sheets, and fearful that they are “throwing good money after bad” and will not be paid back. There is real danger of a breakdown of the financial system. The new president of the International Monetary Fund has stated that the current turmoil poses the greatest financial crisis since the 1930s (Weisman, 2008). Fortune magazine, in its April 14 issue, analyses the stakes this way: The fear – a justifiable one – is that if one big financial firm fails, it will lead to cascading failures throughout the world. Big firms are so interlinked with one another and with other market players that the failure of one large counterparty, as they’re called, can drag down counterparties all over the globe. And if the counterparties fail, it could down the counterparties’ counterparties, and so on (Sloan, 2008).
In this paper, I seek to position current academic reflexive comments on the present global crisis. Some have commented on the inadequacy of management and business education, particularly its neglect of social and political questions (Corbyn, 2008). Others, including the popular press, have drawn our attention to the “continuing” relevance of Marx and even Alan Greenspan in Washington recently saw the crisis as a battle between capitalism and socialism. I therefore turn to a recent piece in the Financial Times which seeks to contextualise and position Marx within our understanding of the present crisis. I next examine critically the work of Marx and show how it enables us to frame the present crisis before examining the current phase of neoliberal capitalism and the rise of finance capital. Free market economist Martin Wolf sees the crisis as one arising from the mutation of capitalism from “mid-20th century managerial capitalism into global financial capitalism” (Wolf, 2007). Contemporary Marxist John Bellamy Foster also recognised this qualitative shift, but saw it as “a new hybrid phase of the monopoly stage of capitalism that might be termed ‘monopoly-finance capital’” (Foster, 2007, p. 1). The paper next discusses the responses to the crisis and argues that unless fundamental reforms are introduced, including an injection of politics within business education and our practices, the crisis will recur again in the future.
The MBA, the crisis and Marx Not many MBA courses include the reading of Marx’s Capital. Not many CEOs could quote from The Communist Manifesto. But there are times when it pays even the most passionate believers in capitalism (and I count myself among them) to heed the bearded Cassandra. Times like these: the worst bear market since the Great Depression – although Marx himself would have preferred to call it a “crisis of capitalism”.
So wrote Niall Ferguson, Professor of Political and Financial History at Oxford and Visiting Professor at the Stern School of Business, New York University. In his article, “Full Marx” (Ferguson, 2008), Ferguson noted that “Marx’s insights into capitalism can still illuminate [. . .] Marx got one thing right. Behind the bubbles and busts of the capitalist system there is a class struggle; and that class struggle is the key to modern politics”. He went on: “This may read like heresy, especially in the pages of the Financial Times”, said Ferguson, somewhat on the defensive. “But a little reflection on the current crisis of capitalism will show otherwise. Not that today’s class struggle bears much relation to that of Marx’s day”. In fact, says Ferguson, there is “a conflict within the bourgeoisie” where “the history of capitalism is the history of expropriation and the concentration of wealth – the means of production – in the hands of an ever-decreasing minority [. . .] widening inequality and globalisation”, making capitalism crisis-prone. Ferguson also pointed out “the real point is that many of the defects [Marx] identified in ninteenth century capitalism are again evident today. In the last 20 years, there has been a significant increase in inequality in the pre-eminent capitalist economy, the United States. In 1981, the top 1 percent of households owned a quarter of American wealth; by the late 1990s, that single percentage owned more than 38 percent, higher than at any time since the 1920s”. Commenting on the present crisis, he noted that “The global implications of a slowdown in the vast American economy are alarming. The other key element of the late-90s bubble was the willingness of foreign investors to pour money into the US, funding an enormous balance of payments deficit. These foreign investors are now staring at income statements spattered with red ink. And they have more to worry about than American investors, because a slide in the dollar exchange rate threatens to make those losses even bigger. If the experience of the 1980s is anything to go by, the dollar could fall steeply as foreign investors sell off. The resulting reduction of American imports would further hurt the rest of the world”. He went on to advise us that we should not “prepare for the death-knell of capitalism just yet” and that there was good news: the US stock market has simply retraced its steps back to mid-1997, the USA is free from the spectre of inflation, the American financial sector is in far better health than its Japanese counterpart, and above all, the Fed is not the Bank of Japan. For him, we should relax: “the recession was last year, and you barely felt it. This is the kind of crisis of capitalism Argentineans can only dream about”. For him, there are lessons to be learnt and “It is the social structure of American capitalism that is in real need of attention”. In Ferguson’s analysis, the primary culprit is the rise of the new class of CEOs and the lack of supervision of their activities[1]. Clearly there is an element of truth in his claims but so are other explanations, for example the lack of regulation and the lack of transparency was glaring as risks were undetermined (Walker, 2008). Others have castigated the US economy for its “monstrous bubble of cheap credit [. . .] with one bubble begetting another” – in the words of Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia. Elsewhere Roach has
A return to political economy? 59
CPOIB 5,1/2
60
observed that “America’s bubbles have gotten bigger, as have the segments of the real economy they have infected”. Household debt has risen to 133 percent of disposable personal income, while the debt of financial corporations has hit the stratosphere, and government and non-financial corporate debt have been steadily increasing (Roach, 2007). This huge explosion in debt – consumer, corporate, and government – relative to the underlying economy (equal to well over 300 percent of GDP by the housing bubble’s peak in 2005) has lifted the economy, created an appreciation of assets and wealth, and leads to growing instability. This was brought about as investors began to realise that a large proportion of the debt securities that they were trading were based on sub-prime mortgages that were never going to be paid back. The banks had supposedly discovered how to limit their own exposure, while raking in the charges, by repackaging poor debts as CDOs (collateralised debt obligations) and selling them on to their clients, in ways that supposedly spread and insured the risk. More fundamentally, a second, huge financial system based on banks borrowing from other banks to buy equities (the general term for assets traded on financial markets) on the basis that the value of these equities would continue to rise indefinitely, developed outside the normal banking network (Shiller, 2008). It was unregulated, not transparent and way too leveraged. If these equities begin to fall in price, the huge debts of these banks become exposed, and the contradictions in the system become apparent[2]. The spectre of Marx In their article “Production and finance”, Magdoff and Sweezy (1983) argued that that the normal path of the mature capitalist economies, such as those of the USA, the major Western European countries, and Japan, is one of stagnation rather than rapid growth. In this perspective, today’s periodic crises, rather than merely constituting temporary interruptions in a process of accelerated advance, point to serious and growing long-term constraints on capital accumulation. They saw financial explosion as a response to the stagnation of the underlying economy, helping to “offset the surplus productive capacity of modern industry”. A capitalist economy in order to continue to grow must constantly find new sources of demand for the growing surplus that it generates. That’s why, for example, money jumps into Thai real estate markets one day, and pulls out and goes into ethanol production in Brazil the next . . . and then back to mortgage securities. And there is something else: the inflows and outflows of short-term and speculative capital also act as a perverse means of imposing discipline on and restructuring capitals – a major manufacturing firm can be starved of credit or threatened with a leveraged buyout. And this kind of “financial discipline” has been imposed on whole countries in the Third World (Rude, 2004). All this is part of the reason that financial instability is a constant feature of capitalism in its more globalised and financialised forms of existence. There comes a time, however, in the historical evolution of the economy when much of the investment-seeking surplus generated by the enormous and growing productivity of the system is unable to find sufficient new profitable investment outlets[3]. In recent months, the spectre of Marx has been revived. Marxists claimed that these contradictions were anticipated by Marx. Whilst Marx was never able to complete a theory of crisis in his lifetime (volumes II and III of Capital remained unfinished when he died), Marxists traditionally link capitalist crisis to the tendency of the rate of profit
(surplus value extracted per unit capital invested) to fall over time. In order to deduce this tendency, Marx divides this “unit capital invested” into two parts: (1) constant capital, which invested in the production process (e.g. the plant, raw materials etc.); and (2) variable capital, which is invested in staff wages. Surplus value can only be extracted from workers, not machines. Surplus value is the value of the labour given by a worker above and beyond that which is paid to him or her as wages; hence it is the source of profit for the capitalist. Therefore, increasing the constant capital, for example, by investing in new machinery, whilst doubtless improving the production process, will mean that for the same surplus value extracted, a greater total capital (constant and variable) will have been invested; hence, the rate of profit will fall. This manifests itself as a fall in prices of commodities (think about how the price of electronic goods falls over time). Of course, this tendency is not a law – there are other interacting factors which can cause the rate of profit to rise. Marx identified more intense exploitation of labour, reduction of wages below their value, cheapening of the elements of constant capital, and the increase in share capital, amongst other factors. Clearly, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall represents a huge contradiction in the capitalist system: competition forces capitalists to increase constant capital (by investing in new technology, for instance), which leads to an ever-diminishing rate of return on that investment. However, this current crisis originated in the financial sector, which in this current epoch dominates world capitalism. According to Marx, capital agglomerates and seeks greater returns and a higher rate of profit. This growing concentration for Marx leads in turn, at a certain point, to a new fall in the rate of profit. Accordingly, smaller, fragmented pools of capitals are thereby forced onto new “adventurous paths” – speculation, credit swindles, share swindles, crises (Marx, 1909, Volume III, pp. 469ff). Marx is clearly identifying how concentration (i.e. the grouping of more and more capital under the control of fewer and fewer capitalists, tending to monopoly) is a driving force behind falling rate of profit, and how this falling rate of profit drives capitalists to seek profit through speculation, in effect making “free money” through trading bits of paper. This increase in share capital, claims Marxists, can counteract the tendency of falling rate of profit. In the age of huge monopoly capitalism, where 500 companies control 45 percent of the world’s economy, it is hardly surprising that it is increasingly hard to turn a large profit without engaging in “risky” financial activities (i.e. without gambling other people’s money) – credit, shares, derivatives and other assets. In this carnival of money-making, the banks lent vast sums of money and vastly over extended their loans, especially in the property market[4]. But boom turned inevitably to bust, threatening to bring down all in its wake. The present crisis is not one arising from a lack of money; on the contrary, it is the crisis that causes a lack of money. When the economy enters into crisis, credit dries up and people demand hard cash instead. This is the effect of the crisis, but in turn it becomes cause, pushing down demand and creating a downward spiral. Bankers and governments insist that the cause of the crisis is the fact that the financial system has too little capital. Clearly if we look at the last two decades, banks have been and are continuing to make huge profits. For example, in Australia both the St George Bank
A return to political economy? 61
CPOIB 5,1/2
62
and Westpac bank reported annual record profits in late October 2008. It would surely be incredulous for banks to claim they do not have enough capital. Actually, there was a huge amount of loan capital in circulation during the boom, and this superabundance of capital itself found itself flowing into speculation, especially in the housing sector. This was the basis upon which the subprime mortgage scandal arose and flourished, generating unimaginable amounts of fictitious capital. But as long as vast profits were being made and investors were happy, nobody cared. Let us take just one example: the credit default swap industry. This market allows two parties to bet on the likelihood of a company defaulting on its debt. It has grown to about $90 trillion in notional amounts insured – that is to say, probably more than double the total outstanding credit in the world. But contracts are registered nowhere but in the books of the partners. Nobody knows the real volume of trading, which therefore exposes the world economy to a huge risk. That explains the panic on Wall Street and in the White House[5]. They fear – correctly – that any severe shock can bring the whole unstable edifice of international finance crashing down, with unforeseen consequences. Unless and until all the bad assets are removed, many institutions will still lack sufficient capital to extend fresh credit to the economy. Marx described this stage in the economic cycle long ago: That means of payment are scarce during the period of crisis goes without saying. The convertibility of bills of exchange has substituted itself for the metamorphosis of commodities themselves, and so much more so at such times, as a portion of the firms operates on pure credit. An ignorant and mistaken bank legislation, such as that of 1844-45, can intensify this money crisis. But no manner of bank legislation can abolish a crisis [. . .] In a system of production, in which the entire connection of the reproduction process rests upon credit, a crisis must obviously occur through a tremendous rush for means of payment, when credit suddenly ceases and nothing but cash payment goes. At first glance, therefore, the whole crisis seems to be merely a credit and money crisis. And in fact it is but a question of the convertibility of bills of exchange into money. But the majority of these bills represent actual sales and purchases, and it is the extension of these far beyond the needs of society which is at the bottom of the whole crisis. At the same time, an enormous quantity of these bills of exchange represents mere swindles, and this becomes apparent now, when they burst. There are furthermore unlucky speculations made with the money of other people. Finally, they are commodity-capitals, which have become depreciated or unsalable or returns that can never more be realized. This entire artificial system of forced expansion of the reproduction process cannot, of course, be remedied by having some bank, like the Bank of England, give to the swindlers the needed capital in the shape of paper notes and buy up all the depreciated commodities at their old nominal values. Moreover, everything here appears turned upside down here, since no real prices and their real basis appear in this paper world, but only bullion, metal coin, notes, bills of exchange, securities’ (Marx, 1909, Volume III, Chapter 30, pp. 575-6, my emphasis).
Marx further explained that capitalist production depends, among other things, on credit, and that “the solvency of one link in the chain depends upon the solvency of another”. The chain can be broken at numerous points. And that sooner or later, credit must be paid off in cash. This fact, for Marxists, is all too frequently forgotten by those who become indebted during the process of capitalist upswing. In the first phase of capitalist expansion, credit typically acts as a spur to production: “the development of the productive process extends the credit, and credit leads to an extension of industrial and commercial operations” (Marx, 1909, vol. 3, pp. 563-5). This has a tendency to push
the market beyond its normal limits, almost limitless[6] but as soon as a crisis appears, the illusion is shattered and financial returns and prices all become problematic to enforce. Marx’s views are not so different from the recent work of Thomas Palley (2007). In his paper, “Financialization: what it is and why it matters”, Palley notes that “the era of financialization has been associated with generally tepid economic growth. [. . .] In all countries except the U.K., average annual growth fell during the era of financialization that set in after 1979. Additionally, growth also appears to show a slowing trend so that growth in the 1980s was higher than in the 1990s, which in turn was higher than in the 2000s”. He goes on to observe that “the business cycle generated by financialization may be unstable and end in prolonged stagnation”. Nevertheless, the main thrust of Palley’s argument is that this “prolonged stagnation” is an outgrowth of financialization rather than the other way around. Thus he contends that such factors as the “wage stagnation and increased income inequality” are “significantly due to changes wrought by financial sector interests”. The “new business cycle” dominated by “the cult of debt finance” is said to lead to more volatility arising from financial bubbles. Thus “financialization may render the economy prone to debt-deflation and prolonged recession”. Palley calls this argument the “financialization thesis”[7]. Neoliberalism and financialisation For the past quarter of a century, neoliberalism, sometimes called market fundamentalism, the policy of non-intervention in the economy, has been the ideology, and the set of policies that go with it. Now the economic crisis is forcing the authorities to intervene, regulate, and even nationalise firms. Is neoliberalism dead? Martin Wolf, economic guru of the Financial Times, suggests the neoliberal rulebook needs to be torn up. He dates the change from the collapse of Bear Stearns last March. “Remember Friday March 14th: it was the day the dream of global free-market capitalism died. For three decades we have moved towards market-driven financial systems. By its decision to rescue Bear Stearns the Federal Reserve, the institution responsible for monetary policy in the US, chief protagonist of free market capitalism, declared this era over. It showed in deeds its agreement with the remark by Joseph Ackerman, chief executive of Deutsche Bank that, ‘I no longer believe in the market’s self-healing power.’ Deregulation has reached its limits”. As the crisis bit into the popular consciousness, the popular press recorded the same thought. The Daily Express (DE) headline screamed, “Don’t let the spivs destroy Britain” (Daily Express, 17 September 2008). The article began, “Millions of British families are facing the destruction of their livelihoods as the nation’s economy teeters on the brink of catastrophe, brought low by the greed and stupidity of spivs in high finance”. Here, greed and Gordon Gekko is the cause but clearly not compelling or persuasive enough. Many of these policies have their roots in the 1970s and the emergence of a new neoliberal ideology. In 1973-1974 we saw the first generalised crisis of world capitalism. The preceding period from 1948 to 1973 was seen to be a golden age for world capitalism. Production went up year after year, as did living standards. In this situation of full employment, everyone was seen to be benefiting and the perception was that capitalism had changed fundamentally. Booms and slumps, it was generally believed, had been banished to the history books. Clearly the 1973-1974
A return to political economy? 63
CPOIB 5,1/2
64
recession came as an enormous political shock. The working class internationally mobilised to defend the gains of the post-war period. The ruling class, for their part, was determined to drive down living standards and restore the rate of profit. As a result of this clash, a revolutionary wave swept across the capitalist world. All the earlier certainties were thrown up in the air and called into question. In addition to rapidly rising unemployment the world economy experienced spiralling prices. The immediate trigger for inflation was the oil price crises of 1973 and 1979. Never before had we experienced inflation together with recession. This was called stagflation and in its wake neoliberalism was spawned. Associated with neoliberalism was “globalisation”. Tariff barriers were coming down all over the globe. Capital was expanding everywhere and everything was “deregulated”[8]. Its proponents argued that “globalisation” meant that resistance was futile. Because capital was endlessly mobile, nation states were becoming powerless. They had to reduce taxes on profits and obey the multinationals’ every wish or they would simply move their money elsewhere. Workers would be “blackmailed” into accepting lower and lower wages or they would lose their jobs altogether. It was a race to the bottom[9]. Neoliberal triumphalism received a further fillip as the Soviet Union collapsed and capitalism, it was claimed, had won the Cold War! So it seemed there was no alternative to capitalism (or “the market”, as apologists came to call it) and its proponents proclaimed “the end of history” (Fukuyama). Movement of money used to be analysed in terms of trade. For example, in buying a kilogram of potatoes, goods go one way and money the other. Now that’s all old hat. The movements of foreign exchange are now no longer the handmaiden of trade. By 1990, banks were creating “structured investment vehicles” and other derivative assets to bypass the reserve requirements of the Basel Bank regulations. The assumption was that geographical and sector dispersion of the loan portfolio and the “slicing and dicing” of risk would convert all but the very lowest of the tranches of these investment vehicles into safe bets. It also led to the blurring of the lines between commercial and investment banking, insurance and real estate in the FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate) sector. This led to financial innovative packages enabling high leveraging of funds accessible through low interest loans[10]. As a Financial Times report put it at the close of 2007: While investors are scrutinizing some of the industry’s best-known names, a spectre will be silently haunting events: the state of the little known, so-called “shadow” banking system. A plethora of opaque institutions and vehicles have sprung up in American and European markets this decade, and they have come to play an important role in providing credit across the system (Tett and Davies, 2007).
This “hidden” system had expanded rapidly in the 1990s and 2000s as a consequence of deregulation, which allowed many financial institutions to take on banking functions and loosened the rules that govern borrowing and lending. Effectively, there was an explosion in money supply and there was a greater competition to purchase these assets. For every dollar that crosses the exchanges for trade, sixty go for pure speculation. Speculative capital movements, swaps, forwards and options now overwhelm trade in their importance for the balance of payments (Augar, 2006)[11]. As a percentage of total US corporate profits, financial sector profits rose from 14 percent in 1981 to 39 percent in 2001 (Brenner, 2002, p. 76; see also Glyn, 2006). Financial globalisation has simply become detached from the real world of surplus value
production. For globalisers, the explosion of global financial flows shows capitalism has at last created one world. More importantly, it increased their powers and spheres of operations: from their traditional underwriting and brokerage, from mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and initial public offerings (IPOs), from proprietary trading and risk arbitrage; and from positioning themselves and their clients in relationship to the wider impact of a merger or some other major event, enabling them to gain from changes in relative prices whether or not a deal goes ahead. In lifting themselves from space (territory), corporate activities now also seek to supersede the temporal dimensions; for example, vast funds can now be shifted in nano-seconds and central banks have little control over their exchange rate, which is mainly driven by the market. Globalisers argue that “market forces” are now sweeping all before them. Now, the globalisers say, the state has to give in, privatise, deregulate and comply with the “demands” of the market. These globalisers, however, fail to understand that the state is itself an economic actor, a power affecting economic behaviour. As Bukharin points out, “The fact is that the very foundation of modern states as definite political entities was caused by economic needs and requirements. The state grew on the economic foundation; it was an expression of economic connections; state ties appeared only as an expression of economic ties” (Bukharin, 1929, p. 63). He goes on: “The stronger state secures for its industries the most advantageous trade treaties, and establishes high tariffs that are disadvantageous for the competitors. It helps its finance capital to monopolise the sales markets, the markets for raw materials and particularly the spheres for capital investment” (Bukharin, 1929, p. 137). This state of play – the interaction between economic power and state power – is still a central feature of modern economic rivalry, but in the light of the crisis, all has changed. Governments now intervene to stop the markets from collapsing and indeed, bailouts have been the order of the day. As Sutherland observes: “In the US, hundreds of billions of dollars of banking risk will be transferred to the federal government, adding to America’s huge burden of debt and increasing its reliance on foreign investors [. . .] Policymakers now face formidable challenges: fighting the fire, then repairing the financial system while keeping a lid on inflation, then putting in place effective new regulation”. For her, the worst is yet to come. She goes on, “This crisis should prompt us to reappraise our relationship with money and debt, and to think hard about how we can create a fairer and more inclusive version of capitalism. There should be no return to the market’s false gods”. Indeed, there are deeper questions that lie beyond the wrangling over the bail-out. The events that have been unfolding over the last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work. This has been echoed by European leaders, including President Sarkozy Agreeing with this sea change in consciousness. “[The] idea of an all powerful market without any rules and any political intervention is mad”. So the unchallenged economic orthodoxy of yesterday is now mad! He goes on, “Self regulation is finished. Laissez faire is finished. The all-powerful market which is always right is finished’. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s Prime Minister, sees this as an American problem exported out. He proclaimed: Everything happening now in the economic and financial sphere began in the United States. This is not the irresponsibility of specific individuals but the irresponsibility of the system that claims leadership.
A return to political economy? 65
CPOIB 5,1/2
66
Others similarly agreed: “The origin and centre of gravity of the problem is clearly in the USA”, German finance minister Peer Steinbru¨ck pronounced. And Gordon Brown, prime minister of UK, said his nation’s economic problems were imported from America, a view shared by opposition leader David Cameron (Stelzer, 2008). This is all trenchant criticism – unprecedented for a generation. Their outrage is directed at financial “geniuses” they now realise were simple charlatans, who have been helping themselves to the good things in life at our expense and landing us all in the mire in the process. Their call is for regulation. Capitalism, we are told, would be a good system if only it were adequately regulated. In ‘A shattering moment in America’s fall from power’, John Gray (2008) argues that “It is America’s political class that, by embracing the dangerously simplistic ideology of deregulation, has responsibility for the present mess”. In the same issue of The Observer, Richard Wachman writes under the headline, “This transforms the financial system. Forever”. He sums up his argument: “US power is ebbing away and free market fundamentalism is an outdated ideology”. Forever is a long time in politics. It is true that the USA is running a huge deficit with the countries it trades with. This is surely a sign of economic weakness. The country is up to its ears in debt to the rest of the world. The dollar is derided. US hegemony is weakening. Is it still the one, unassailable economic superpower? The real questions remain: (1) What is the real relation between capitalism and regulation? (2) What other country can lead the capitalist world and impose the norms and principles without which it cannot function? Capitalism will always go through cycles of boom and slump. But the 1929 Wall Street Crash led directly to the Great Depression, the worst capitalist slump so far. Economist Charles Kindleberger sought to answer the question why the Great Depression was so deep and so widespread in his book The World in Depression 1929-39. His explanation was that the slump was so severe and long-lasting because there was no international lender of last resort. We do not believe this offers a complete explanation for the disastrous decade, but it is an important aspect of the truth. Before the First World War Britain was regarded as the hegemon and acted as the lender of last resort. The gold standard was really the sterling standard. The war showed that British hegemony was under decisive challenge. After the Second World War the USA asserted its supremacy under the Bretton Woods Agreement, which determined the terms of world trade. It imposed the dollar as de facto world currency. And it had the power to act as international lender of last resort. Between the wars the USA was the most powerful capitalist nation, but it did not impose its power upon the world economy, remaining isolationist. This international anarchy led to “beggar-my-neighbour” devaluations and the virtual drying up of world trade. This impacted in turn on the economies of every nation on the globe. Now US hegemony is under challenge, but no clear alternative is in sight. If Kindleberger’s analysis of the 1930s is right, and we are entering a similar era today, then we are in for stormy times.
Reforms and the big picture It has been argued that the present crisis is the result of regulatory failure to guard against excessive risk-taking in the financial system, especially in the USA (Gray, 2008; Walker, 2008). It is further argued that “we must ensure it does not happen again”. At its core are a number of fundamental questions: the issue of business practices (which includes the practices of management, greed, business ethics and management education) and that of regulation, particularly the role of the state in effecting such regulations. The latter is particularly telling and ironic given that most economists and commentators have argued precisely the opposite: that all regulations were bad for business and should be abolished (this was particularly advocated for the financial sector). The market, its proponents claim, would deliver the right and most efficient outcome and wealth was unbounded. Similarly, present calls to ban (temporarily) the practice of “selling short” are unrealistic. In order that the markets can function, it is necessary for people to buy and sell shares, and they must do so on the basis of estimating whether the share price is going to rise or fall. The idea that it is permissible to buy shares only when they are rising is clearly an absurdity. Clearly, the present crisis presents an abertura for change. As such, some have seen in the wake of the present crisis attempts to redress the capital-society-labour relationship. Regulating the share market, curbing excessive bonuses and regulating boardroom pay, minimising risks for speculative activities and ensuring security for these transactions have all been touted as necessary reforms to make capitalism work, but such “regulation” is still driven by profits and does not necessarily make the economy more stable or provide greater equality, but rather provides conditions for greater speculation as speculators can now depend on government bailouts or their decisions. Whilst laws and regulations can be enacted, reining in greed and regulating boardroom pay is patently not feasible; how and by what mechanisms are these practices to be performed? Similarly, the (re)regulation of the finance sector and governmental interventions in the sector do not constitute a radical change[12]. In the past, states’ entities were highly involved in financial transactions and they was highly regulated. What has transpired is the reemergence of the state in managing fiscal crises engendered by finance-state actions which precipitated the crisis in the first instance, the “deregulation” of the economy and the “retreat of the state”. In effect, the state has been brought back in to enforce fiscal discipline. This requires the state to protect the interest of vested interests by giving them vast subsidies, paid for out from state revenues[13]. Speculators and bankers are rewarded for their nefarious activities by the state, which buys up all their losses, then spends further vast amounts of the taxpayers’ money to make them profitable, and when discipline has been restored, to sell them back to the bankers, who will then reap the rewards from such stabilisation (Augar, 2008). The recent events are a graphic reminder of the anarchic nature of capitalism. The idea that this can be controlled by governments and central bankers is nonsense. On the contrary, the uncontrollable nature of capitalism has never been more apparent than at the present time. Moreover, the unprecedented intensification of the concentration of capital, where vast amounts of capital (much of it fictitious) are moved about the world at the caprice of a small number of people, lends the whole process an even more convulsive and unpredictable character. The present nervousness on world stock markets is thus the first of what will be a series of tremors which, for anyone with
A return to political economy? 67
CPOIB 5,1/2
68
eyes to read, announce the beginning of the end of the present cycle. What we are witnessing now is that a particular dynamic of growth, marked by intensified financialisation, is generating new contradictions and new barriers to sustained accumulation. Here we come to a basic point of this analysis: a financial crisis has broken out because of the severe imbalances built up between the financial system – and its expectations of future profits – and the accumulation of capital; that is, the structures and actual production of profit based on exploitation of wage-labour. The state is intervening to head off further damage and to discipline and restructure the financial system. But the very complexity of the “financial packages” created during the speculative boom – with their bundled-up loans and long strings of finance – are producing new challenges for policy-makers. As one Yale economist put it, perhaps unintentionally echoing a phrase from Marx: “like the sorcerer’s apprentice, we have created things we do not understand and cannot easily control” (Dapice, 2008). This explosive uncertainty is developing against a larger international canvas. Major shifts are taking place in the world capitalist economy. The European market recently eclipsed the US market in size. China’s growing demand for raw materials to fuel its export economy is making it a new player in the scramble for resources and control over them. And China’s increasing importance as a supplier of capital to the USA is giving it new leverage. Russia is reemerging as a world imperialist player, owing in part to its vast energy reserves and rising oil and gas prices. At the same time, and at this very moment of financial crisis, the USA’s freedom of manoeuvre is severely hobbled – and this includes its ability to stimulate the economy through fiscal and monetary policy. The USA has never run such large current account deficits and no single country’s deficit has ever bulked as large relative to the global economy. The present crisis clearly foreshadows changes in geo-economic and geopolitical realities and may signal the passing of a great power and the emergence of a “new” power. It will also, in the short term, usher in a new regime of global governance and (re)regulation of financial markets. Maybe, business schools and international business practitioners can also revisit basic principles of economics and explore the relationships between economics, philosophy and politics again. Lessons learned As I have indicated, the present crisis provides us with an opportunity to reflect critically on business practices, including management education. As academics, some of us have been guilty of presenting simple, linear solutions to our students. We privilege quantifiable measures and success is determined by these measurable performance indicators. This is abundantly clear in courses in finance, strategic management and finance, particularly in MBA and executive education. Most MBA programs rely on American textbooks and case study materials, and they continue to constitute the international benchmark which typically reproduces this “American” standard and ethos (Liang and Wang, 2004). Of late, the quality of MBA programs has been and remains a subject of continual debate (Bennis and O’Toole, 2005; Cudd et al., 1995; Hettenhouse, 1998; Mitroff and Churchman, 1992; Porter and McKibbin, 1988; Roome, 2005). Henry Mintzberg (2004), for example, has been fairly critical and has condemned MBA programs as promoting formulaic, generic, “cookie-cutter” responses to business management issues and practices, rather than training people involved to
manage (Pfeffer and Fong, 2002, 2004). For Mintzberg and his colleagues, education makes the issue of management worse if it merely involves a reproduction of the insubstantial knowledge and skills offered (Gosling and Mintzberg, 2006; Mintzberg and Gosling, 2002). Ghoshal (2005) similarly opines: Business schools do not need to do a great deal more to help prevent future Enrons [. . .] They do not need to create new courses [. . .] Our theories and ideas have done much to strengthen the management practices that we are all now so loudly condemning (Ghoshal, 2005, p. 75; see also Pfeffer and Fong, 2002, 2004). In focusing on being scientific, developing models and techniques rather than the development of diagnostic capabilities, the MBA has become too instrumental and renders analysis simplistic. In the process, the MBA produces “critters with lopsided brains, icy hearts and shrunken souls” (Pfeffer and Fong, 2002, p. 80).
This concentration on models, financial indicators and performance and the lack of reflexivity within the MBA means that many managers simply do not develop or have the necessary skills to manage and/or be creative in their work and thinking (Weick, 2003). Some academics (e.g. Daniel Pink, 2004) have argued that the MFA (the Master of Fine Arts) may in fact be of more value than the MBA, because they promote creative, innovative, “out-of-the-box” thinking and conceptualisation of problems. Business leaders have similarly echoed such sentiments, noting the dearth of critical and creative thinking (Andrews and Tyson, 2004; Doria et al., 2003). Despite these criticisms, “MBA fever” has shown little signs of abating. Indeed, executive education, MBA and business education in general have all been criticized for its simplicity, positivity and linearity. Financial measures have all been overly privileged and short-term performances are lauded and celebrated through record financial profits. Business strategies and plans typically rely on a planning or design scenario but as the crisis shows, such approaches are inadequate; they do not provide us with real-time information nor are they are complete. They also certainly do not take into account the dynamism inherent in market practices, and cannot factor in for example some behavioural practices, the run on credit, confidence quantum and herd behaviour. Equally problematic is the reliance on market solutions to “regulate” the economy. Indeed, many aspects of our “efficient” capitalism combined to produce the credit meltdown that now threatens ever more aspects of the global economy. First and foremost was the private rating companies’ failure to accurately assess and honestly reveal the risks of securities based on a “bundle” of loans (securities that provide their owners with a portion of that bundle’s principal and/or interest). This was especially true for securities based on mortgage loans issued in the years of the housing boom. Investors around the world bought those securities based on those companies’ ratings. Their purchases financed the US housing bubble. We know now that those ratings were badly mistaken. Owners of those securities around the globe are taking staggering losses and reducing their lending to all borrowers. Anxiety about the risks of all sorts of borrowing has risen alongside deepening distrust of all risk assessments. Understanding why the rating companies contributed to this disaster opens a crucial window into today’s global credit crisis. It also teaches basic lessons about today’s globalised capitalism. Since the crisis, it has become abundantly clear that global financial structures and systems are arcane and inadequate. Its structures are unsophisticated and management incompetent. The presumed sophistication of bank risk-assessment models were no better than fig leaves; financial analysts use the tools of financial
A return to political economy? 69
CPOIB 5,1/2
70
engineering for valuing options and constructing derivatives. To begin with, these techniques were used mainly to reduce uncertainty and hedge currency risk, to shape a trade limiting their exposure to the level in which the trader has confidence. Derivatives, such as swaps, options and other financial instruments, are used as tools limiting such exposure (Buenza and Stark, 2004; Tett, 2007). Again, this practice points to the effects of one-dimensional reliance on economic and financial modelling techniques, that is, as useful as they are, they are limited and cannot possibly account for the range of human responses and dynamism within complex business social environments. In part, this is because the prospects of a given stock cannot be distilled in a single figure since the balance sheet of an enterprise will always comprise a complex of receipts and liabilities in which the past, present and future uneasily coexist. This is highly complex, interactive and reiterative; the deregulation of financial markets also further increased this “complexity” (Ingham, 2004). Moreover, with financial data, there is often a problem of a sample size that is not large enough to capture their variance over a significant time period. In a long-term perspective the information available to someone basing themselves on today’s financial data is very limited; by excluding the future, it is impossible to estimate and determine the future[14]. Second, we need to grasp the structure of the financial industry and the concomitant industry that sells assessments of the risks attached to securities (including those based on loans). Even the most powerful corporations need the financial world to assess their own progress, to plan for the future and to generate growth. Financialisation, as such, encourages corporations to privilege financial functions, see themselves as accidental repositories of assets which, as circumstances change, must be continually broken up and reconfigured. Their credit-worthiness is determined by banks and ratings agencies, especially if they wish to reassure investors and ensure cheap access to capital (Sinclair, 2005). Of the 150 rating enterprises around the world, three dominate – Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. Barron’s Magazine (Laing, 2007) reported on a Morgan Stanley research report which studied the 6,431 subprime residential mortgage-backed securities issued in 2006. Of these, 2,087 issues were rated AAA (the highest rating, the lowest risk); 1,266 were rated AA; and the rest were rated A or lower. Within one year of being issued, most of these securities were re-examined by the rating companies and over 50 per cent were downgraded, i.e. given a new, lower rating[15]. Clearly there was a problem with the ratings and the methodologies employed and whilst they could not be held solely for the crisis, they “were key enablers, by countenancing and legitimizing lethal capital structures”. As Brian Clarkson, the president of Moody’s, notes ruefully to Barron’s: “We misjudged the magnitude of the problem, the fact that what we expected to be a tropical disturbance ended up being a Category 5 hurricane”. As risk evaluation equations unravelled, so did financial markets’ ability to judge the worth of financial institutions’ balance sheets. Clearly, therein lies in the problem of reliance solely on indicators which were provided by firms themselves and which were, in themselves, dense, incomplete and inadequate. The complexity of the deals and the relationships between the different logics of financial instruments were not well understood and certainly had grave unintended consequences. It is apparent that “independent risk assessments” are inadequate and ineffective. Years ago, when huge losses flowed from securities whose
issuers had misrepresented their risks, the reformist demand arose that someone should “independently” assess their risk so investors would be honestly informed. It turns out now that providers of such independent assessments can misrepresent them as disastrously as their issuers did and do. More fundamentally, it reveals a blinkered ideology – market fundamentalism – at work. For example, Alan Greenspan in addressing the Futures Industry Association in March 1999 insisted that any new regulations on derivative products “would be a major mistake”: “Regulatory risk-measurement schemes”, he added, “are simpler and much less accurate than banks’ [own] risk-measurement models” (Schwartz and Creswell, 2008). Appearing recently before the US Congress, Greenspan admitted to having made mistakes, being an ideologue with a misplaced faith in the ability of markets to self-regulate. Similarly, the clauses of Basel II that allow banks to use their own valuation models need to be struck down. Financialisation, as I have indicated, privatises information that should be public, just as it commercializes everyday life. In addition, the techniques of financialisation could convert one type of income stream into another, or an asset into income or the other way round – reducing or avoiding tax. There are already calls for proper regulation and registration of these instruments. Would governments and regulation do any better? I think not. It is worth recalling that financialisation was born in a quite heavily regulated world, with some of its techniques designed to frustrate and defeat the regulators, just as others aimed at releasing “value” (Tett, 2007). As such, as a first step, the clauses of Basel II that allow banks to use their own valuation models need to be struck down before we address other pressing issues. Most prescriptions for more regulation call for a new regulatory order where the state is a more active agent. This involves a network of mechanisms designed to constrain collective outbreaks of financial imprudence before they become global. For example, it has been suggested that there needs to be a new system of globally coordinated financial regulation (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000). How and what this new regulatory framework should do, however, remains unknown for the fundamental problem remains: full and complete information, transparency and greater democratic accountability, to which the corporate sector will not readily agree[16]. Governments similarly would not be able to provide such access as privacy and commercial information enables corporations to “protect” such information. We need therefore to be more sceptical of merely pushing for regulation, financial performance indicators and seek to deconstruct them. Similarly, calls for moral restraints and greater morality in business may lead to various institutional designs and strategies to build self-restraint in organisations and whilst certainly an important aspect of “regulating” corporate capitalism, such “moralism” fails to appreciate that “conduct” cannot be divorced from the wider context of social and economic power. The actual and potential costs of the credit crunch are already huge, but they must be seen as part and parcel of the rhythm of financialised capitalism. The solution to the huge problems outlined above is not to abandon money or finance but to embed them in a properly regulated system. When properly embedded in structures of social control, finance can help to allocate capital, facilitate investment and smooth demand. But if it is unaccountable and unregulated it becomes sovereign in the reallocation process, and can grab the lion’s share of the gains it makes possible, including anticipated gains before they have been realised. The problem is aggravated as
A return to political economy? 71
CPOIB 5,1/2
72
financial intermediaries proliferate and take advantage of asymmetries in access to information and power imbalances. Such distortions multiply as “financialisation” takes hold. It is boosted as the logic of finance becomes ubiquitous, feeding on a commodification of every aspect of life and the life-course – student loans, baby bonds, mortgages, home equity release, credit-card debt, health insurance, individualised pension funds (Martin, 2002). The issues canvassed here are clearly political issues and a return to the political is necessary if reforms are to be effective. Debates about corporations, the market, the state and their attendant effects need to be revisited. This would result in more regulation like the neoliberal governance response to Enron; its efficacy cannot be assumed and needs to be questioned and challenged (Soederberg, 2008). On a more mundane level, this requires greater elements of cooperation, collaboration and contestation of ideas within and across locales and countries. The financial crisis has brought forth a coalition of the unwilling with strange bedfellows and the task for critical scholars and practitioners is to ensure the process continues to influence the “new” centres of power that now claim to represent the interests of the people. This necessitates control, transformation, democratisation and a makeover of finance capital and the restoration and creation of “new” collective public services and infrastructures. Notes 1. Despite knowing of the credit crunch in 2007 and dropping profits and share prices, senior executives were still awarded handsome pay-offs by their boards of directors. The CEOs of two Wall Street banks left their jobs in 2007 clutching lavish rewards for failure: $160 million for Stanley O’Neal at Merrill and $90 million for Charles Prince at Citigroup. At Bear Stearns the rescue left shareholders with $10 a share compared with $170 a year earlier. One-third of the bank’s shares were held by its employees, many of whom will also lose their jobs. Board members lost heavily on their holdings, but will remain very rich men since during the great CDO bonanza – in which their bank was a lead player – they had earned fees and bonuses of tens, or even hundreds, of millions. Morgan Stanley also announced a $9.4 billion loss in the last quarter of 2007 but still increased the size of its bonus pool by 18 per cent, arguing that the losses had been concentrated in structured finance and should not blight the rewards of those who continued to be profitable. Employee compensation generally runs at 50 per cent of an investment bank’s revenue. In 2007 this rose sharply and in some cases came close to 100 per cent (Rajan, 2008). 2. Thousands of mortgages would be consolidated into one instrument and the resulting pool of debt subdivided into ten tranches, each representing a claim on the income accruing to the underlying mortgages; the lowest tranche represented the first to default, the second the next poorest-paying assets and so on up to the senior levels which were least likely to default. The different tranches’ vulnerability to default was hedged by taking out insurance, at rates varying according to the perceived level of default risk. Note that a feature of the securitising and tranching process is that the holders of a tranche would not know which specific mortgages they held until the default rate within a specified period became clear. 3. The reasons for this are complex having to do with the maturation of economies, in which the basic industrial structure no longer needs to be built up from scratch but simply reproduced (and thus can be normally funded out of depreciation allowances); the absence for long periods of any new technology that generates epoch-making stimulation and transformation of the economy such as with the introduction of the automobile (even the widespread use of computers and the internet has not had the stimulating effect on the economy of earlier transformative technologies); growing inequality of income and wealth,
4.
5.
6.
7. 8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
which limits consumption demand at the bottom of the economy, and tends to reduce investment as unused productive capacity builds up and as the wealthy speculate more with their funds instead of investing in the “real” economy – the goods and services producing sectors; and a process of monopolisation (oligopolisation), leading to an attenuation of price competition – usually considered to be the main force accounting for the flexibility and dynamism of the system. Although this behaviour of the banks goes far beyond all such activities, it is not unique. In a book published in 1974, called The Bankers, the author Martin Mayer criticised the banks for over-extending themselves. In April 2008, the International Monetary Fund (2008, p. 12) was estimating that total losses were likely to come to $945 billion: “Global banks are likely to shoulder roughly half of aggregate potential losses, totalling from $440 billion to $510 billion, with insurance companies, pension funds, money-market funds, hedge funds and other institutional investors accounting for the balance”. This is most evident in financial trading particularly through trading in foreign exchange markets and in derivatives. A New York Times (NYT) report noted that in 2006, the financial sector’s share of total corporate profits in the USA rose from 8 percent in 1950 to 31 percent in 2006 (New York Times, 11 December 2007) There are a number of studies linking financialisation, neoliberalism and dollar hegemony. See for example, Harvey (2005), Glyn (2006) and Phillips (2006, 2008). David Harvey (2005) sees this process as a process of accumulation by dispossession through which working people are divested of their rights and assets, for example, the privatization of water, health care and education, goods that had been or should be entitlements. The sale of these “goods” in private markets dispossessed those who could not afford what should have been theirs by right. At the global level, this has resulted in loss of government benefits, dispossessing people through debt repayment and the liberalisation of the local economy to benefit foreign investors and domestic elites. Ironically, as Martin Wolf (2006) has shown, the economy grew twice as fast in the golden age (circa 1945-1873) as in the succeeding era of globalisation. See also the more scholarly work of Maddison (2001). Beginning in January 2001, the Federal Reserve Board lowered interest rates in 12 successive rate cuts, reducing the key federal funds rate from 6 percent down to a post-Second World War low of 1 percent by June 2003. Low interest rates tempted many homeowners to go deeper into hock by re-mortgaging. As Robert Brenner (2006) showed, the asset bubbles – first technology shares and then houses – helped to maintain the mirage of a buoyant economy and consumption growth, but only at the cost of growing personal and corporate indebtedness. This expanded the number of mortgage borrowers despite the increasing prices of houses. Many of these mortgage loans amounted to 100 percent of the appraised value of the house and could only be sustainable as long as house prices continued to rise and rates remained low. Heavy borrowing is, as such, used to buy up financial assets, not based on the income streams they will generate but merely on the assumption of increasing prices for these assets. In a recent book, Fleckenstein and Sheehan (2008) have critically appraised Alan Greenspan’s tenure at the Federal Reserve. In their view, many bad decisions were enacted, contrary to popular belief: for example, the stock market crash of 1987; the Savings And Loan crisis; the collapse of Long Term Capital Management; the tech bubble of 2000 and the credit bubble and real estate crisis of 2007. Michael Moran, for example, has pointed out that there is a long history of popular protest and discontent triggered by financial scandals and crises in the USA and that far from
A return to political economy? 73
CPOIB 5,1/2 13.
74
14.
15.
16.
undermining the institutional and regulatory basis of financial expansion, have repeatedly been “pacified” through the process of further “codification, institutionalisation and juridification” (Moran, 1991, p. 13). Furthermore, financial elites have been adept at responding to these pressures and able to use them to create regulatory frameworks beneficial to them. In October 1907, a hundred years before the onset of the current subprime crisis, the USA experienced an 11 percent decline in GDP and accelerating runs on it banks (Studenski and Krooss, 1965; Chernow, 1990). In the absence of a central bank, the US treasury and Wall Street relied on J.P. Morgan to organise the bailout. As Henry Paulson had done, Morgan let the giant Knickerbocker Trust go under in spite of its holding $50million of deposits for 17,000 depositors, fuelling further runs and panic. Finally, using $25 million provided by Treasury and a similar amount provided by Wall Street, Morgan then dispensed the liquidity to calm the markets (Chernow, 1990, pp. 123-5). This chain of events is not dissimilar to what is currently happening in the USA. Quantitative economists, however, continue to naively believe in a simple numerical discount rate which can be used to calculate the net present value of a future stream of income or payments. This flattening process – also brought on by “mark to market” and “fair value” accounting – robs the future of its most unsettling characteristics: it is at once unpredictable and carries the past within it. Morgan Stanley compared the rate of downgrades in 2006-2007 to the historical norm for 1998- 2006. The results are stunning. Among AAA-rated subprime residential mortgage-backed securities, 4 per cent were downgraded (whereas the historical norm was 0.12 per cent). Among AA rated securities, 12.2 per cent were downgraded (versus an historical norm of 0.64 per cent). Of securities rated A and below, some 97 per cent experienced downgrades (versus the historical norm of 1.24 per cent). George Soros (2008) calls for “a clearing house or exchange with a sound capital structure and strict margin requirements to which all existing and future contracts would have to be submitted”.
References Augar, P. (2006), The Greed Merchants: How the Investment Banks Played the Free Market Game, Penguin, London. Augar, P. (2008), “Do not exaggerate investment banking’s death”, Financial Times, 22 September. Bennis, W. and O’Toole, J. (2005), “How business schools lost their way”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 85 No. 5, pp. 96-104. Brenner, R. (2002), The Boom and the Bubble, Verso, London. Brenner, R. (2006), The Economics of Global Turbulence: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn, 1945-2005, Verso, London. Buenza, D. and Stark, D. (2004), “Tools of the trade: the socio-technology of arbitrage in a Wall Street trading room”, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 369-400. Bukharin, N. (1929), Imperialism and World Economy, Merlin Press, London. Chernow, R. (1990), The House of Morgan, Simon & Schuster, New York, NY. Cudd, M., King, J.O. and O’Hara, B. (Eds) (1995), “Assessment of the nature and status of the MBA restructuring trend”, Journal of Education for Business, Vol. 71 No. 4, pp. 44-8. Dapice, D. (2008), “Bad spell on Wall Street”, 24 January, available at: www. Policyinnovations.org
Doria, J., Rozanski, H. and Cohen, E. (2003), “What business needs from business schools”, Strategy and Business, Vol. 32, pp. 39-45. Eatwell, J. and Taylor, L. (2000), Global Finance at Risk: The Case for International Regulation, Polity Press, Cambridge. Ferguson, N. (2008), “Full Marx”, Financial Times, 17-18 August. Fleckenstein, W. and Sheehan, F. (2008), Greenspan’s Bubbles: The Age of Ignorance at the Federal Reserve, Wiley, New York, NY. Foster, J.B. (2007), “The financialisation of capitalism”, Monthly Review, Vol. 58 No. 11, pp. 8-10. Ghoshal, S. (2005), “Bad management theories are destroying good management practices”, Academy of Management Learning & Education, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 75-91. Glyn, A. (2006), Capitalism Unleashed, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Gosling, J. and Mintzberg, H. (2006), “Management education as if both matter”, Management Learning, Vol. 37 No. 4, pp. 419-28. Gray, J. (2008), “A shattering moment in America’s fall from power”, Sunday Observer, 29 September. Harvey, D. (2005), A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hettenhouse, G.W. (1998), “The new MBA: a journey just begun”, Business Horizons, Vol. 41 No. 4, pp. 45-8. Ingham, G. (2004), The Nature of Money, Oxford University Press, Oxford. International Monetary Fund (2008), Global Financial Stability Report: Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, available at: www.asiaing.com/global-financial-stability-report-2008.html (accessed 30 July 2008). Laing, J. (2007), “Failing grade”, Barron’s Magazine, 24 December. Liang, N. and Wang, J.Q. (2004), “Implicit mental models in teaching cases: an empirical study of popular MBA cases in the United States and China”, Academy of Management Learning & Education, Vol. 34, pp. 397-413. Maddison, A. (2001), The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, OECD, Paris. Magdoff, H. and Sweezy, P.M. (1983), “Production and finance”, Monthly Review, Vol. 35 No. 1, pp. 11-12. Martin, R. (2002), The Financialization of Daily Life, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, PA. Marx, K. (1909), Capital, Vols 1-3, Charles H. Kerr, Chicago, IL. Mintzberg, H. (2004), Managers not MBAs: A Hard Look at the Soft Practices of Managing and Management Development, Berrett-Koehler, San Francisco, CA. Mintzberg, H. and Gosling, J. (2002), “Reality programming for MBAs”, Strategy and Business, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 28-31. Mitroff, I.I. and Churchman, C.W. (1992), “Debate – MBA: is the traditional model doomed?”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 70 No. 6, pp. 128-40. Moran, M. (1991), The Politics of the Financial Services Revolution, Macmillan, New York, NY. Palley, T.I. (2007), “Financialization: what it is and why it matters”, Working Paper Series, No. 153, November, Political Economy Research Institute, available at: www.peri.umass. edu/Publication.236 þ M505d3f0bd8c.0.html Pfeffer, J. and Fong, C.T. (2002), “The end of business schools? Less success than meets the eye”, Academy of Management Learning and Education, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 78-96.
A return to political economy? 75
CPOIB 5,1/2
76
Pfeffer, J. and Fong, C. (2004), “The business school ‘business’: some lessons from the US experience”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 41 No. 8, pp. 1503-20. Phillips, K. (2006), American Theocracy, Viking, New York, NY. Phillips, K. (2008), Bad Money, Viking, New York, NY. Pink, D. (2004), “The MFA is the new MBA”, Harvard Business Review, February, pp. 21-2. Porter, L.W. and McKibbin, L.E. (1988), Management Education and Development: Drift or Thrust into the 21st Century?, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. Rajan, R. (2008), “Bankers’ pay is deeply flawed”, Financial Times, 9 January. Roach, S. (2007), “America’s inflated asset prices must fall”, New York Times, 16 December. Roome, N. (2005), “Teaching sustainability in a global MBA”, Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 14, pp. 160-71. Rubin, R. (2003), In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Washington to Wall Street, Random House, New York, NY. Rude, C. (2004), “The role of financial discipline in imperial strategy”, in Panitch, L. and Leys, C. (Eds), Socialist Register 2005: The Empire Reloaded, Merlin Press, London. Scholtes, S., Chung, C. and Brewster, D. (2008), “JPMorgan swoops in again”, Financial Times, 26 September. Schwartz, N.D. and Creswell, J. (2008), “What created this monster?”, New York Times, 23 March. Shiller, R. (2008), The Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened, and What to Do about It, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Sinclair, T. (2005), The New Masters of Capital, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. Sloan, A. (2008), “On the brink of disaster”, Fortune, 14 April, p. 82. Soederberg, S. (2008), “A critique of the diagnosis and cure for ‘Enronitis’: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and neoliberal governance of corporate America”, Critical Sociology, Vol. 34 No. 5, pp. 657-80. Soros, G. (2008), “The false belief at the heart of the financial turmoil”, Financial Times, 3 April. Stelzer, I. (2008), “Old ‘friends’ are happy to blame US for the chaos”, Sunday Times, 5 October. Studenski, P. and Krooss, H. (1965), Financial History of the United States, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. Tett, G. (2007), “Volatility wrecks financial world’s value at risk models”, Financial Times, 12 October. Tett, G. and Davies, P. (2007), “Out of the shadows: how banking’s secret system broke down”, Financial Times, 17 December. Walker, D. (2008), “Washington must heed fiscal alarm bell”, Financial Times, 22 September. Weick, K. (2003), “Positive organising and organisational tragedy”, in Cameron, K.S., Dutton, J.E. and Quinn, R.E. (Eds), Positive Organisational Leadership, Berrett-Koehler, San Francisco, CA, pp. 66-80. Weisman, S.R. (2008), “Financial regulators suggest tighter controls”, New York Times, April 12. Wessel, D. (2008), “Ten days that changed capitalism: officials improvised to rescue markets; will it be enough?”, Wall Street Journal, 27 March. Wolf, M. (2006), Why Globalization Works, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Wolf, M. (2007), “Unfettered finance is fast reshaping the global economy”, Financial Times, Vol. 18, June.
Further reading Allen, F. and Gorton, G. (1993), “Churning bubbles”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60 No. 4, pp. 813-36. Blackburn, R. (2008), “The subprime crisis”, New Left Review, March/April, available at: www. newleftreview.org/?view ¼ 2715 (accessed 30 September 2008). Bruner, R. and Carr, S.D. (2007), Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm, Wiley, New York, NY. Bryan, D. and Rafferty, M. (2006), Capitalism with Derivatives: A Political Economy of Financial Derivatives, Capital and Class, Palgrave, London. Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1996), Globalisation in Question, Polity Press, Cambridge. Holzer, B. and Millo, Y. (2005), “From risks to second-order dangers in financial markets: unintended consequences of risk-management systems”, New Political Economy, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 223-45. Jackson, T. (2007), “Crazy crisis may herald the end of new derivative folly”, Financial Times, 24 December. Kindleberger, C. and Aliber, R. (2005), Manias, Panics, and Crashes, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ. Labaton, S. (2008), “SEC concedes oversight flaws fueled collapse”, New York Times, 26 September. Maddison, A. (1991), Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development: A Long-run Comparative View, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Magdoff, H. and Sweezy, P.M. (1988), The Irreversible Crisis, Monthly Review Press, New York, NY. Orhangazi, O. (2007), “Financialization and capital accumulation in the non-financial corporate sector”, Working Paper Series, No. 149, October, Political Economy Research Institute, available at: www.peri.umass.edu/Publication.236 þ M547c453b405.0.html Shiller, R. (2006), Irrational Exuberance, Doubleday, New York, NY. Sunderland, R. (2008), “Now is our chance to change capitalism for good. Let’s take it”, Sunday Observer, 28 September. About the author Loong Wong works at the University of Canberra, Australia. He has taught and researched at universities in Australia, Denmark, New Zealand and Malaysia. His research has focused on international business practices and he has published in the Journal of Contemporary Asia, Asian Business and Management, Chinese Management Studies, Prometheus, and Information Society amongst others. He is also active in a range of public interest and social movements. Loong Wong can be contacted at:
[email protected]
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail:
[email protected] Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
A return to political economy? 77
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1742-2043.htm
CPOIB 5,1/2
Financial crisis, activist states and (missed) opportunities Federico Caprotti
78
Department of Geography, University College London, London, UK Abstract Purpose – This article seeks to discuss three key issues raised by the recent financial crisis: the rise of “activist states”; a new focus on the geopolitical effects of finance; and possible future social implications of the rapid response to crisis. Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides an analytical overview of three of the implications of the current crisis, and introduces the idea of the “activist state” in financial markets. Findings – The article focuses on three issues raised in connection with the recent crisis: the rapid rise of “activist states” as a result of impaired liquidity; the bringing to light of long-neglected geopolitical spaces of finance; and the opportunities for improved social aims communication and lobbying which result from future analyses of responses to the crisis. Originality/value – The article’s focus is on the interface between finance and politics. The article introduces the idea of a financial “activist state” as a public entity which behaves like an activist shareholder in the market. The article also suggests that the political and banking reaction to the current crisis can be seen in terms of opportunities to improve communication of social, political and policy aims in the future. Keywords Recession, Financial markets, Credit, International business, Communication Paper type Viewpoint
Introduction: activist states, new fractures, and (missed) opportunities The current financial crisis is far from over. Shocks take years to work through the financial system, and it is hard to assess their far-reaching consequences before distance from the crisis period has been achieved. The aim of this commentary is not, therefore, to provide an overview of the crisis, as it is not possible to do so effectively at this time. Rather, the aim here is to highlight some potentially new features at the interface between finance and politics, and to suggest some ways in which financial professionals, and the political reaction to the current crisis, can be seen in terms of opportunities to improve future social, political and policy aims. This short piece focuses on just three issues connected with the recent crisis: (1) the rapid rise of “activist” states as a result of impaired liquidity; (2) the bringing to light of long-neglected geopolitical spaces of finance; and (3) the multiple (missed) opportunities evidenced by the loud and increasingly high-pitched voices of the banking and political world in calling for hundreds of billions of dollars to be poured into the financial system in the form of “bail-outs”, loans, and credit. critical perspectives on international business Vol. 5 No. 1/2, 2009 pp. 78-84 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1742-2043 DOI 10.1108/17422040910938695
What is meant by “(missed) opportunities” here is the ready availability of capital and resources to rescue the “financial system”, while much smaller capital and resource allocations required to help resolve or ameliorate lasting socioeconomic problems, especially at the domestic scale, have regularly not been made available, or have been
voted down by political representatives concerned with constituency reactions (Weir et al., 1988). The sense of crisis, in other words, has legitimised demands on taxpayers. These demands dwarf previous requests, by less powerful actors and social groups, focused on a variety of social and policy issues. This commentary argues that a critical analysis of the mechanisms through which various actors (lobbyists, policy institutions, politicians, and players in the financial industry themselves) readily and powerfully coalesced around an emergent discourse of financial crisis could lead to a progressive and constructive understanding of mechanisms needed to mobilise resources and capital around other, more long-standing but equally pressing issues. The state: a new activist shareholder? The first point made by this commentary is that recent events in the financial markets should cause business leaders and scholars alike to rethink the way in which the state is conceived vis a` vis markets generally, and private firms specifically. This is due to the wider repercussions of the financial crisis in other industrial sectors, as well as in political life, and the action which governments have taken to mitigate these effects. It is precisely these reactions that signal a re-engagement of the state with the market, in a readjustment (or, as some would argue, stabilisation) of neoliberal forms of governance (Bakker, 2005). The dust raised from the current crisis has not settled. It is therefore hard to provide a comprehensive description, in this short space, of the various ways in which the state is engaging in deeper ways with financial markets. However, it has become apparent that states are, indeed, proactively and rapidly changing the ways in which they interact with financial firms. The recent crisis has seen national governments take increasingly large stakes in private companies. The motivation has been one of preserving these firms from potential failure, and stabilising the domestic financial market as a reaction to wider shocks stemming from problems with liquidity and credit markets. For example, at the time of writing, the British government was close to effectively nationalizing Bradford & Bingley, Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS, a large UK mortgage and savings provider (Vina and Stirling, 2008; Kennedy, 2008). Northern Rock, an early casualty of the crisis, was nationalised in 2007. This leads to the point that there exists an emerging landscape of state actors as activist shareholders in financial firms. The notion of “activist states” has already been applied to states heavily involved in delivering social and health policies (Ramesh and Holliday, 2001; Biehl, 2001). This article extends the concept of the “activist state” to signify those states which, through large stakes in financial firms, act increasingly like activist investors. This could be seen as a logical consequence of the fact that the financial industry is enmeshed with the rest of the economy, and, pari passu, with other industries and the diverse communities of citizens which make up the modern notion of a state. Finance – as the credit crunch has painfully brought home to millions of mortgage holders, savers and the energy poor – is deeply embedded in contemporary, everyday material life. At the same time, the economic landscape in question is not top-down: everyday material life interacts with, and influences, the financial industry. It comes as no great surprise that states are taking increasingly prominent stakes in financial firms, and that some of these firms – Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley being the leading examples – are taking steps to re-regulate, stepping down to tighter
Activist states and (missed) opportunities 79
CPOIB 5,1/2
80
regulatory controls. It may be argued that this has happened before, such as with Spain’s boosting of European regulations on Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) after a domestic banking crisis (Tett, 2008). However, the difference in 2008 is, firstly, that multiple states are taking unilateral steps to re-regulate. Secondly, they are doing so rapidly and decisively – if decisiveness is the right word in an economic climate in which a week’s delay on the proposed $700bn bail-out of US banks in early October caused the Dow Jones to lose a record amount (800 points) in a single day. As Jose´ Vin˜als, Deputy Director of the Banco de Espan˜a, stated in a recent panel given to the IESE and Harvard Business Schools: [T]he global banking system is continuously evolving within what is known as the “new global financial landscape”. This is characterised by several features: free international capital flows, global financial markets and global banks, faster transmission of risks