Reflections in Personal Construct Theory
Reflections in Personal Construct Theory Edited by Richard J. Butler Consultant Clinical Psychologist in Child Health, Leeds Primary Care Trust and Senior Associate Lecturer, University of Leeds
A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication
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2009 2008052401
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Set in 10/12.5pt Sabon by SNP Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong Printed in Singapore by Fabulous Printers Pte Ltd 1
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Dedication Few events profoundly change the course of the path we travel. On first reading Don Bannister’s take on psychology, then watching him singlehandedly dismantle a mass of behaviourists at a conference, and finally having the privilege of his astute and penetrating observations on my clinical and research practice while I was practising at High Royds Hospital, I encountered three such events. Don died far too early. As a staunch advocate of reflexivity I’d like unequivocally to dedicate this book to his memory. Lest we ever forget.
Contents
List of contributors Preface Acknowledgements
xi xv xxv
Section I Exploring Personal Construct Theory
1
Chapter 1
Coming to terms with personal construct theory Richard Butler
3
Chapter 2
The construct Harry Procter
21
Section II The Men behind the Theory
41
Chapter 3
The George Kelly I knew Jay S. Efran
43
Chapter 4
Don Bannister through the looking glass Fay Fransella
57
Section III Construct Theory as a Meaningful Alternative
77
Chapter 5
Individuality, community and criminal behaviour James Horley
79
Chapter 6
Shaking hands with a serial killer David A. Winter
95
Chapter 7
Encounters of the puzzling kind: the organisational corollary in relation to self-construing Richard Butler
111
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Contents
Chapter 8
Sauce for the gander Sally Robbins
Chapter 9
Griddled with angst: a roller-coaster ride on the repertory grid Richard Bell
Section IV
Construct Theory as an Elaborative Choice
Chapter 10
Living aggressively Jonathan D. Raskin
Chapter 11
The guilty choice: reflections on dislodgement, extension and definition Peter Cummins
Chapter 12
Different readings of personal construct theory Trevor Butt
Chapter 13
The teacher, the singer and the personal construct theorist: an unlikely but fruitful dialogue Vivien Burr
Chapter 14
Section V
Reflexivity: what in the ‘GAK’ is that? Desley Hennessy No One Need be a Victim of Their Biography
131
145
159 161
177 195
209 221
237
Chapter 15
Differentiating the I from the ME Jerald R. Forster
239
Chapter 16
Mirror man David Green
251
Chapter 17
Landmarks on a personal odyssey Finn Tschudi
263
Chapter 18
Reconstruing after a change in health status Jörn Scheer
279
Chapter 19
Constructions of death and loss: a personal and professional evolution Robert A. Neimeyer
Chapter 20
Reflections on the creation of a dissertation Dennis Hinkle
293 319
Contents Section VI The Client as an Active Participant Chapter 21
Chapter 22
Chapter 23
Chapter 24
ix 329
Enculturing reflexivity across cultures: non-PC lessons from study abroad Naoimh O’Connor
331
The icing on the sausage: The emancipation of constructive alternativism Dina Pekkala
347
Theory, therapy and life: experiential personal construct psychology and the ‘desert places’ of a therapist Larry M. Leitner Reflexivity, research and practice: explorations in experiential personal construct psychology Alexandra L. Adame, Anthony J. Pavlo, Brendon M. Smith, Hugo J. Schielke & Larry M. Leitner
361
375
Chapter 25
The joint experiment of research supervision Beverly M. Walker
389
Section VII
And Finally . . . Reflections on Reflexivity
403
Chapter 26
Critical consciousness in action: reflections on reflection in, from and beyond personal construct psychology Bill Warren
Index
405
421
List of Contributors Alexandra L. Adame Doctoral Student Department of Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, OH45056, USA e-mail:
[email protected] Richard Bell Associate Professor Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne, Victoria, 3010, Australia e-mail:
[email protected] Vivien Burr Reader in Psychology School of Human & Health Sciences, University of Huddersfield, Queensgate, Huddersfield, HD1 3DH, UK e-mail:
[email protected] Richard Butler Consultant Clinical Psychologist Crowtrees, 40 Station Road Baildon West Yorkshire, BD176NW, UK e-mail:
[email protected] Trevor Butt Emeritus Reader in Psychology School of Human & Health Sciences, University of Huddersfield, Queensgate, Huddersfield, HD1 3DH, UK e-mail:
[email protected] Peter Cummins Consultant Clinical Psychologist Head of Adult Psychological Services (Coventry), Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership Trust, Coventry Psychological Services, Second Floor, Coventry & Warwickshire Hospital, Stoney Stanton Road, Coventry, CV1 4FH, UK e-mail:
[email protected]
xii List of Contributors Jay S. Efran Professor Emeritus of Psychology Temple University, 310 E. Gowen Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19119, USA e-mail:
[email protected] Jerald R. Forster Professor Emeritus University of Washington, 1744 NE 62nd St., Seattle, WA, 98115, USA e-mail:
[email protected] Fay Fransella Visiting Professor of Personal Construct Psychology, University of Hertfordshire; Consultant at the Centre for Personal Construct Psychology, University of Hertfordshire. c/o, Budock Cottage, 2 Lambs Lane, Falmouth, Cornwall, TR11 2JL, UK e-mail:
[email protected] David Green Honorary Senior Lecturer in Clinical Psychology & Consultant Clinical Psychologist Leeds Institute of Health Sciences, University of Leeds, Charles Thackrah Building, 101 Clarendon Road, Woodhouse, Leeds, LS2 9JL, UK e-mail:
[email protected] Desley Hennessy Research Psychologist School of Psychology, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia e-mail:
[email protected] Dennis Hinkle Psychotherapist 7610 Kona Court, Placerville, California, USA 95667 e-mail:
[email protected] James Horley Associate Professor of Psychology Augustana Faculty, University of Alberta, Camrose, Alberta, T4V 2R3, Canada e-mail:
[email protected]
List of Contributors
xiii
Larry M. Leitner Professor Department of Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056 USA e-mail:
[email protected] Robert A. Neimeyer Professor Department of Psychology, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 38152, USA e-mail:
[email protected] Naoimh O’Connor Psychology support and group facilitation, Educational Consultancy The Umbria Institute, via di priori 87, 06123, Perugia, Italy e-mail:
[email protected]
Research
Anthony J. Pavlo Doctoral Student Department of Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, OH, 45056, USA e-mail:
[email protected] Dina Pekkala Clinical Psychologist Psychological Services, Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership Trust, Coventry & Warwickshire Hospital, Stoney Stanton Road, Coventry, CV1 4FH, UK e-mail:
[email protected] Harry Procter Consultant Clinical Psychologist 70 Staplegrove Road, Taunton, Somerset, TA1 1DJ, UK e-mail:
[email protected] Jonathan D. Raskin Professor, Department of Psychology State University of New York at New Paltz, 600 Hawk Drive New Paltz, NY 12561-2440 USA e-mail:
[email protected]
xiv List of Contributors Sally Robbins Consultant Clinical Psychologist Psychological Services for Older People, 3rd Floor, River House, Gulson Hospital, Gulson Road, Coventry CV1 2HR, UK e-mail:
[email protected] Jörn Scheer Emeritus Professor of Medical Psychology University of Giessen, Germany e-mail:
[email protected] Hugo J. Schielke Doctoral Student Department of Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, OH, 45056, USA e-mail:
[email protected] Brendon M. Smith Doctoral Student Department of Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, OH, 45056, USA e-mail:
[email protected] Finn Tschudi Professor Emeritus Vallefaret 11, N – 0663, Oslo, Norway Or Institute of Psychology, University of Oslo, Box 1094, Blindern, Oslo, Norway e-mail:
[email protected] Beverly M. Walker Associate Professor School of Psychology, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia e-mail:
[email protected] Bill Warren Conjoint Associate Professor School of Education, University of Newcastle, Australia e-mail:
[email protected] David A. Winter Professor of Clinical Psychology School of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield Campus, College Lane, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, AL10 9AB, UK and Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust e-mail:
[email protected]
Preface
‘The unexamined life is not worth living.’ (Socrates at his trial for heresy) It would not be out of kilter to suppose that psychology is primarily concerned with an understanding of the human condition. To this end psychologists have proffered many theories, and variations on those many theories, to help grapple with the mystery of why folk do what they do. From his early experiences in psychology George Alexander Kelly, undoubtedly an exceptional psychologist of his time, realised that what seemed to be true of himself psychologically was probably no less true of others, an understanding he sketched in the paper ‘The autobiography of a theory’ (1963/1969). This was to be a reflection with far-reaching implications. For adopting this notion as a central tenet, Kelly set about constructing a novel psychological abstraction – personal construct theory (PCT) – which committed him to a psychology of man1 rather than of his circumstances.
What is Reflexivity? Characteristically, and arguably uniquely, we are the only species with either the ability to reflect on the self (Andrews 1998) or actively create a theory of self (Kelly 1977; Harter 1999). Reflexivity may be understood as an act of self-reference whereby a person examines the nature of their own actions, beliefs, idiosyncrasies and emotions – an exploration, as it were, of one’s psychological stance. The manner of formulating a view of ourself compellingly implies a dualism, one William James (1961), regarded as the 1
‘man’ is used here, and throughout the book, in a kellyan tradition bearing no relationship to any particular gender.
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eminent founder of modern psychology, recognised well over a century ago. In order to account for our capacity to self-reflect, James proposed two features: the self as ‘I’ and the self as ‘me’. He advanced the view that the ‘I’ self, being the fundamental organiser and interpreter of experience, reflects a core sense of self. As the subjective centre of experience he proposed that the ‘I’ self relates to conscience and evaluation of the more public sense of ‘me’. It might be deemed to be the ‘I’ in a self-description such as ‘I am honest’. Mancuso (1986) called such a construction – that aspect of self which reflects – the narrative self. In contrast, James contended the self as ‘me’ (self as object) refers to the self as a doer or actor; the self as presented to others; the self in relation to ‘mine’. Epting & Prichard (1993) suggest the notion of ‘me’ is akin to the idea of selfconstruction or self-description. In essence, the ‘me’ self is the ‘honest’, in the statement ‘I am honest’. It is as if the ‘I’ self (that which reflects) allocates the ‘me’ self (that which is reflected on) along a construct. The ‘me’ self has traditionally been a focus of inquiry within applied psychology where the eagerness to capture an individual’s sense of self has fostered a proliferation of self-concept and self-esteem measures (Blascovich & Tomaka 1991; Butler & Gasson 2005). In contrast, the self as ‘I’ has tended to be marginalised in psychological debate but has generated considerable interest in philosophical circles. Epting & Prichard (1993) lament this apparent lack of psychological interest in the ‘I’, which they describe as the largely unknown and indescribable ‘active agent being present only at the time of the production of a construct dimension’.
The Model and the Theorist … A little over 50 years ago Kelly published The Psychology of Personal Constructs (1955; reprinted in 1991a; 1991b), a meta-theory about the theories people have about themselves.2 Epting, Leitner & Raskin (2006) argue that Kelly’s premise sits comfortably with humanistic theories such as Carl Rogers’ and Abraham Maslow’s. However, while both Rogers and Maslow may be fittingly understood as emphasising self-discovery, Kelly’s theory is fundamentally concerned with self-invention (Butt, Burr & Epting 1997). Folk, he contended, have the potential for endlessly reinventing themselves. 2 The Psychology of Personal Constructs (1955) was published in two volumes with page numbers running concurrently. In 1991 it was reprinted with each volume numbered from page 1. Reference to the work(s) in this volume cite either Kelly (1955) or Kelly (1991a; 1991b). Contributors taking direct quotes may thus cite page numbers from either the original or the reprints.
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The ideas Kelly offered continue to excite and embellish the work of many psychologists and others in their endeavours to understand the vagaries of human action. In concert with reflexivity, helpful psychological accounts ought to be able to explain the construing of the theorist as well as the people he or she is theorising about. The notion of reflexivity assumes that the models, ideas, methods and thinking that variously evolve should be able to subsume the thinking which led to them. In essence, the generalisations made about other people should be equally valid for the psychologist who makes such statements. As the creation of any theory is a facet of human behaviour, reflexivity demands that the theory account for its own construction. If it fails in this respect, as Dunnett & Miyaguchi (1993) astutely observe, then it fails to ‘account for all human behaviour’. Reflexivity can thus be understood as the ‘ability of a theory to account for the theorizing of the theorist’ (Dunnett & Miyaguchi 1993). In reflecting on how he arrived at the ideas which were to form the gist of the theory of personal constructs, Kelly (1963/1969) describes two occurrences of transcending the obvious. First, he realised that the way he approached scientific supervision with his graduates’ research interests – pinpointing the issue, observing, becoming intimate with the problem, forming hypotheses, making test runs, relating data to predictions and revising thinking in the light of experience – was pretty much indistinguishable from what he was attempting as a psychotherapist in seeking solutions with people in distress. Scientific enquiry, he mused, was akin to therapeutic endeavour. Both activities, he concluded, are fundamentally concerned with the search to make sense of the events with which we are confronted. Second, Kelly recognised the paradox of how, traditionally, psychologists tend to explain their self in terms of one type of theory yet employ ‘various concoctions to explain ordinary mortals’ on the other hand. What appeared good for the goose was anathema for the gander. What would happen, Kelly wondered, if we apply the same model – man-the-scientist – that psychologists use in their self-explanations, to try to understand other people? The theory of personal constructs was born. Crucially, as Don Bannister (1982/2003) suggested, reflexivity became a ‘bedrock assumption’ of PCT. The means by which we come to model or conceptualise other people should be equally valid for the psychologist who offers such a viewpoint. At the time reflexivity marked PCT out as unique among other psychological theories. Bannister (1982/2003) argued strongly that the notion of reflexivity enabled a sharp distinction to be made between Kelly’s theory and other contemporary psychological theories and viewpoints. Thus, he contended, PCT can be regarded as psychologically authentic.
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The notion of reflexivity carries important psychotherapeutic implications. If the search for meaning appears valid as a framework for understanding both ourselves and others and behaviour represents an experimental search for answers, then the proposal that a person’s behaviour makes sense in terms of their construction of the world, however perplexing it might seems to others, is readily born. Dunnett & Miyaguchi (1993) promptly articulate this issue in relation to those (often referred to as patients or clients) who struggle with their construing. Rather than squeeze people into diagnostic categories (which are undoubtedly constructions of mental health ‘experts’), PCT takes a position whereby personal troubles (symptoms) are framed as individually fashioned experiments constructed to make sense of the world. So although behaviour may often seem problematic, as where parents and teachers complain about the manner and conduct of the youngsters in their charge, from the protagonist’s perspective the ‘problem’ may be validly understood in terms of the questions the child poses in seeking solutions (Ravenette 1977; Butler & Green 1998; 2007).
Reflexivity in the Literature … Although regarded as theoretically fundamental and, as argued by Fransella (2005), essential ‘for anyone wanting to apply personal construct psychology in a professional capacity’, reflexivity has been broadly neglected. Dunnett & Miyaguchi (1993) playfully suggest the perennial failure of psychologists to include themselves as a ‘subject’ to which psychological models also apply, is similar to ‘young children who forget to include themselves when counting the number of people in a room’. Curiously, although there is widespread acceptance of reflexivity as a core feature in any application of PCT (Fransella 2005), it rarely provokes more than a fleeting reference in the literature. Only rarely did Kelly employ the written word to explore his musings on personal experiences, but in ‘Confusion and the clock’ (1978) Kelly reflected widely on an acute coronary attack. In reporting this experience he notes: ‘I have to align my perspective along various preconceived axes, else it would be practically impossible to have any sense of ever having been there at all.’ He desperately sought to construe this new and potentially devastating experience. It was the phenomenological ‘truths’ – the ‘tick-tock-ticktock truths that repeat themselves’ – that enabled him to grapple with what was happening. Typical of Kelly, the experience was characterised by anticipation. He reflected, at a micro level, that ‘each gasping pain was a preview of the next, telling me what to expect moment by moment’. In this paper
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he also mulls over the personal significance of anticipation in retaining meaning. He suggests that anticipation helps ‘bridge the chasm between past and future over which we always find ourselves suspended’. Incidentally, Kelly (1978) also drew a distinction between anticipation and prediction. The latter he considered as something which may be understood as ‘a probability statement about events’. He predicted, for example, that he would die (‘the odds were pretty much against me’). Anticipation, however, Kelly argued, is a ‘posture one assumes towards the future’, proposing that his experience of having a heart attack was ‘in some measure, anticipated’. As Kelly had in effect already anticipated such a state of affairs, anxiety was not as devastating as he might have expected. Yet despite his anticipations, as the title of his paper suggests, Kelly was also thrown into some disarray and confusion, wondering just how ‘adequate these terms of reference are’. He was suddenly faced with a number of unfamiliar implications, including the enactment of his role as a responsible person and his dynamic and delicately balanced status as a human being. He wondered if the confusion was anguish (‘a soul-shaking term for chaos’) but settled on guilt, resulting from a failure to live up to his own expectations in relation to those closest to him. So even during such a period of torment Kelly became reflexive. He sought to understand his experience in a manner similar to that with which he endeavoured to understand others.
The Aim of this Book Over 40 years ago Don Bannister (1966) suggested that psychologists had not faced up to the issue of reflexivity. Perhaps little has changed since. PCT has stimulated a wealth of diverse ideas and applications in clinical, educational, organisational and philosophical contexts. Folk have extended and elaborated the theory in contexts perhaps even Kelly might not have anticipated. However, it is rare for the vanguard of such developments to document how the processes they find useful in their day-to-day work foster an improved understanding of their self theory. It is thought that Kelly voiced frustration with the many people who live unexamined lives (Hinkle, personal communication). Kelly was thus very much an advocate of the Socratic tradition. The thrust of this book is to furnish reflexivity, not only as a theoretical cornerstone of PCT, but also as an applied concept. Reflections in Personal Construct Theory is a collection of chapters by well-known advocates of the theory, in which they explore a favoured aspect of the philosophy in relation to its personal significance.
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Chapter Themes In naming his theory with personal as the substantive centre, Epting & Prichard (1993) suggest that Kelly heralded the importance of individuals’ search for meaning. PCT is rich in fresh insights and perspectives on the human condition. In reflecting Kelly’s unique and idiosyncratic approach to theory-making, it is also intentionally littered with a raft of lexical building blocks that many find off-putting. The book thus starts with a chapter examining many of the terms Kelly devised to lay the foundation for his theory. Harry Procter then takes one key building block – the construct – and in exploring its many facets validates the personal discrimination as key to understanding the theory. From his literature and through personal acquaintance Fay Fransella (1995) provides an astute and erudite profile of Kelly, and in chapter 3 Jay Efran, a former student of Kelly’s, adds an enlightening perspective on the man behind the theory. In the vanguard of PCT and universally regarded as the leading protagonist of its development was the British psychologist Don Bannister. In chapter 4 Fay Fransella, who closely worked and collaborated with Don, examines the personal importance of reflexivity for him. The chapters that follow are presented in four sections.
a. Construct theory as a meaningful alternative Kelly attended his undergraduate course in psychology keeping ‘one ear cocked for anything interesting that might turn up’ (Kelly 1963/1969). He was to be disappointed. In tune with Kelly’s exasperation, a similar theme of dissatisfaction with ‘taught’ psychology, the limitations of the applied psychology role and the tendency to categorise folk and their troubles into diagnostic structures are taken up by many contributors. For many, PCT has offered greater depth and breadth than other currently available psychological frameworks. Jim Horley and David Winter both discuss the limitations of current techniques in helping understand those incarcerated for criminal acts and how, in contrast, PCT, in taking the view of individuals’ having agency and choice seriously, has significantly more relevance. Richard Butler explores how PCT, particularly the organisation corollary, enabled him to make sense of both the troubles of others and the puzzlement of self. Sally Robbins describes the constraints of traditional training in clinical psychology and how the sociality corollary helps her work in understanding characters of an older age. Finally in this section, Richard Bell analyses that most ubiquitous of PCT methodology – the repertory grid
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– and describes how the psychological world of the other comes alive with such a technique.
b. Construct theory as an elaborative choice In the Kansas dust bowl where Kelly was initially to test his psychotherapeutic skills he was acutely aware that in seeking to help others figure out their troubles none of what he had studied or pursued in psychology seemed to have ‘any specific bearing on what confronted us’ (Kelly 1963/1969). In exploring the basic idea that people live in a world of meanings that they create themselves, Jonathan Raskin offers a discussion of how PCT meshes with social constructionism and radical constructivism. Peter Cummins explores the potential entrapment of an early identity and the personal and clinical ramifications, particularly guilt, in the face of elaborative choice. Trevor Butt discusses how the approach offered by PCT enabled him to make sense of resistance to change in those engaged in social skills training. Kelly described how he adopted what was later to be termed fixed-role therapy to offer alternative ‘experiments on living’ for his clients. Similarly, Viv Burr describes how she adopted fixed-role therapy to tackle a ‘crisis of confidence’ as a lecturer. Finally in this section, Desley Hennessy considers how construct theory helps explain the psychology of those with tattoos and ultimately how the process fostered a greater understanding of herself.
c. No one need be a victim of their biography In the compelling paper ‘The autobiography of a theory’, Kelly (1963/1969) unravelled some telling ‘happenings’ out of which his evolving theory helped make sense. A central theme of the paper is how, by critically examining events and considering alternatives, he was able to lay out the key premises for his theory. Peggy Dalton (1993) has explored the construct determinism vs. freedom in relation to Kelly’s view of choice. She suggests that we are determined to the extent that ‘we are governed by the nature of our own superordinate constructs; limited by the limitations of the construct system which we ourselves have created’, yet we have freedom to the extent that we are able to construe our circumstances and then reconstrue them. No one, to paraphrase Kelly, need be a victim of their biography. While many choices are made at a covert (low level of awareness) reflection and writing has for many authors raised the choices to a higher level. In this section Jerald Forster, Dave Green, Finn Tschudi, Jörn Scheer, Robert Neimeyer and Dennis Hinkle all explore how, in the course of reflection, connections
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become apparent which were not present beforehand. Reflection, as Karl Popper intimated, enables psychological growth and knowledge to emerge from problems and our attempts to solve those problems (Magee 1975).
d. The client as an active participant In working with the metaphor man-as-scientist, Kelly was keen to assist folk in looking for new solutions that emerge from disconfirming evidence. And he added, the psychological role should be very much that of a ‘fellow experimenter’. Naoimh O’Connor embraces such sentiments in exploring reflexivity across cultures. Dina Pekkala explores how the model of ‘manas-scientist’ makes such fundamental sense to her and the work she does with her patients, concluding that we essentially choose our own life-histories. The chapters by Larry Leitner and Alexandra Adame and her colleagues examine a new form of therapeutic alliance, ROLE therapy, a relationship drawn from Kelly’s sociality corollary. Beverly Walker rounds off this section by describing how PCT-influenced approaches have assisted in another relationship – that of supervisor–supervisee, where the latter takes the role of the client as active participant. In the final section Bill Warren provides a tour de force of philosophical angles on the process of reflection. An apposite conclusion for a book on reflexivity.
The Chapters are Personal Stories … Miller Mair (1988) has for some years set out a vision of an alternative psychology, one that relates to narrative or story-telling rather than the conventional limited and impoverished computational or fact-finding psychology. He presents Kelly as a story-teller extraordinaire. While Kelly certainly offered a conventional approach through his ‘man-as-scientist’ metaphor, encouraging experimentation and hypothesis testing, Mair (1988) astutely observes that he reported ‘no formal experimental results of any kind’. In suggesting that, in his many later essays, self-characterisation, fixed-role therapy (the invitation to live a different story), and so forth, Kelly (according to Mair 1988), ‘tells nothing but stories’. The contributions in this book are about how folk find PCT to be personally fruitful. A diverse range of facets and applications are explored by means of writers’ sharing their reflections on their self. The book is primarily about the stories folk tell about themselves … ‘When we tell our tales, we give away our souls.’ (William Doty (1975)
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References Andrews, B. (1998). Self esteem. The Psychologist, 10, 339–342 Bannister, D. (1966). Psychology as an exercise in paradox. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 19, 21–26 Bannister, D. (1982/2003). Kelly versus clockwork psychology. In F. Fransella (ed.) International Handbook of Personal Construct Psychology. Chichester: Wiley Blascovich, J. & Tomaka, J. (1991). Measures of self esteem. In J. Robinson, P. Shaver & L. Wrightson (eds.) Measures of Personality and Social Psychology. New York: Academic Press Butler, R. J. & Gasson, S. L. (2005). Self esteem / self concept scales for children and adolescents: a review. Child & Adolescent Mental Health, 10, 1–12 Butler, R. J. & Green, D. (1998). The Child Within: The Exploration of Personal Construct Theory with Young People. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann Butler, R. J. & Green, D. (2007). The Child Within: Taking the Young Person’s Perspective by Applying Personal Construct Theory. Chichester: Wiley Butt, T. W., Burr, V. & Epting, F. (1997). Core construing: discovery or invention? In R. A. Neimeyer & G. J. Neimeyer (eds.) Advances in Personal Construct Theory, Volume 4. New York: Springer Dalton, P. (1993) The meaning of choice and the threat of change. In L. M. Leitner & N. G. M. Dunnett (eds.) Critical Issues in Personal Construct Psychotherapy. Malabar, FL: Krieger Doty, W. (1975) Stories of our times. In J. W. Wiggins (ed.) Religion as Story. New York: Harper & Row Dunnett, N. G. M. & Miyaguchi, R. (1993). Reflexivity in theory and practice. In L. M. Leitner & N. G. M. Dunnett (eds.) Critical Issues in Personal Construct Psychotherapy. Malabar, FL: Krieger Epting, F. R., Leitner, L. M. & Raskin, J. D. (2006) George Kelly and personal construct psychology. In R. Frager & J. Fadiman (eds.) Personality and Personal Growth, 6th edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall Epting, F. R. & Prichard, S. (1993). An experiential approach to personal meanings in counselling and psychotherapy. In L. M. Leitner & N. G. M. Dunnett (eds.) Critical Issues in Personal Construct Psychotherapy. Malabar, FL: Krieger Fransella, F. (1995). George Kelly. London: Sage Fransella, F. (2005) Some skills and tools for personal construct users. In F. Fransella (ed.) The Essential Practitioner’s Handbook of Personal Construct Theory. Chichester: Wiley Harter, S. (1999). The Construction of the Self: A Developmental Perspective. New York: Guildford Press James, W. (1961). Psychology: The Briefer Course. New York: Harper & Row Kelly, G. A. (1955) The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volumes 1 and 2. New York: Norton Kelly, G. A. (1963/1969). The autobiography of a theory. In B. Maher (ed.) Clinical Psychology and Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly. New York: John Wiley & Sons
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Kelly, G. A. (1977). The psychology of the unknown. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Kelly, G. A. (1978). Confusion and the clock. In F. Fransella (ed.) Personal Construct Psychology. London: Academic Press Kelly, G. A. (1991a). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volume 1. A Theory of Personality. London: Routledge Kelly, G. A. (1991b). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volume 2. Clinical Diagnosis and Psychotherapy. London: Routledge Magee, B. (1975). Popper. Glasgow: Fontana Mair, J. M. M. (1988) Psychology as story telling. International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology, 1, 125–137 Mancuso, J. C. (1986) The acquisition and use of narrative grammar structure. In T. R. Sarbin (ed.) Narrative Psychology: The Storied Nature of Human Conduct. New York: Praeger Ravenette, A. T. (1977). Personal construct theory: an approach to the psychological investigation of children and young people. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press
Acknowledgements
I was ambling along Whitby sands one breezy morning mulling over fine memories of times shared with Don Bannister. Of his many far-reaching and insightful views and ideas – endeavour to take the person’s search for meaning seriously; think not of how to help, but of why folk might want to be lent a hand; consider not what is complained about, but the intricacies of a person’s sense of self; wonder about how folk employ even supplied constructs in their own unique way. And so forth. I knew Don in many contexts. He was deeply compassionate, original and gloriously aggressive (in a Kellyan sense) in pretty much everything he did. Whether presenting construct theory to an audience of ‘behaviourists’, reciting the ‘Ancient Mariner’ at a Christmas party or sharing a beer after work, he remained consistently optimistic, unconventional and self-assured. Samuel Butler once suggested that ‘few radicals have good digestion’ and strangely it was with great sadness that Don’s life was cut short in 1986 from cancer of the duodenum. The only time I think I ever saw Don a little tentative and unsure of himself was on the sports field. After persuading him to be goalie for our departmental football side, Psykick Rovers, and at our weekly game of tennis, which he tackled with the eagerness of fresh elaboration, a certain vulnerability was evident. It was after one particularly strenuous game of tennis that Don, wet with perspiration, declined a customary beer in favour of a lecture at the university he had agreed to give on reflexivity. That got me thinking about the subject. I was wondering about how fascinating it would be to have captured Don’s self-reflections. Fay Fransella has now kindly written her thoughts about Don in chapter 4. Then I was led to wonder what it might be like to know how others enmeshed in the theory of personal constructs employed the theory to reflect on themselves. The idea of a book was born. So although Don died over 20 years ago, I am deeply indebted to him for sowing the seeds of an idea.
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I am also keen to acknowledge my wife, Sue, and my co-writer, mate and golfing partner, Dave Green, both of whom encouraged me to take the sketchy plan forward. Every contributor has responded to the various requests, plans and deadlines without question. I’d like to thank them all for their valued contributions. I’d also like to give particular thanks to the many students who commented on the terminology section and the unstinting efforts and encouragement of Gillian Leslie, Andy Peart, Karen Shield, Annie Rose and Sarah Tilley, at John Wiley, who have proved invaluable in keeping the project on track.
Section I
Exploring Personal Construct Theory
Chapter 1
Coming to Terms with Personal Construct Theory Richard Butler Background After much soul-searching, and in his fiftieth year, George Kelly had the two volumes of his book The Psychology of Personal Constructs published in 1955 (later reprinted as 1991a and 1991b). As a stark contrast to both the psychodynamic and behavioural theories which predominated at the time, Kelly’s writings presented personal construct theory (PCT) as a complete, innovative and elaborated abstraction of how people make sense of their world and themselves. Although offering a fresh and enlightening means of understanding human psychology, the challenge it invariably presented to the order of the day resulted in PCT being marginalised in both academic and clinical arenas. As Bannister (1977) suggests, the theory has been received rather than used. PCT was written intentionally content-free, in ‘abstract terms to avoid, as far as possible, the limitations of a particular time and culture’ (Bannister & Fransella 1986; Fransella & Neimeyer 2005). However, by adopting unfamiliar terminology it seems, in hindsight, that Kelly further alienated his theory from mainstream psychology. Although his constructivist ideas remain profoundly influential and far-reaching in many threads of psychology, folk continue to find his ideas and notions somewhat troublesome to ‘engage with’ because of the phraseology he adopted. As a lead-in to this book, the fundamental threads of the theory (in reverse order: theory, construct and personal) are described, with particular emphasis on the building blocks of PCT.
Reflections in Personal Construct Theory. Edited by Richard J. Butler © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Theory 1
The philosophical foundation
Fay Fransella (1995) explored a raft of potential influences on the way Kelly developed his theory of man. From his early leanings towards physics (thus the metaphor man-as-scientist) and mathematics (thus the grid as a technique for understanding) he sought actively to oppose the then dominant psychological approaches (behaviourism and psychodynamic). He felt such theories regarded the person respectively as either a passive recipient of the environment or a passive respondent to internal, unconscious forces. Both, argued Kelly, by denying the person’s involvement in the directions that they move in, are fundamentally flawed. By considering the person as if they were a scientist, the theory, rather than being judgemental, invites an exploration of their predicament and difficulties. As Trevor Butt (2006) enlarges: ‘no longer can we maintain the idea that a person is a simple victim of circumstances, struck down by neurosis. If they are the victim of anything, it is their theory.’ Some writers (notably Bill Warren 2003; and Trevor Butt 2003; 2006) have teased out some of the specific philosophical influences on Kelly’s writing. More generally Greg Neimeyer, Jocelyn Saferstein and Wade Arnold (2005) have clarified the epistemological (theory of knowledge) context for PCT, as outlined in Table 1.1. In contrast to both empiricism (with knowledge determined by verification) and rationalism (with knowledge acquired through reason), PCT is considered clearly within the constructivist tradition, where knowledge is understood to be constructed. From such an epistemological position, Kelly’s fundamental philosophical stance of constructive alternativism is clearly apparent. Broadly this suggests: • • •
2
We contact ‘reality’ not directly, but through our interpretations and assumptions of reality. Meaning and knowledge are derived by means of the way a person perceives, or construes, events. All our present assumptions and perceptions are open to question and reconsideration.
The psychological perspective
In suggesting that people come to understand events by how they construe them, Kelly was proposing that, in essence, they are theory-makers. Indi-
Coming to Terms with Personal Construct Theory
5
Table 1.1 Personal construct theory in the context of epistemological strands Origin (ancient Greeks)
Democritus
Plato
Belief
Surest path to knowledge is through the senses
The essence of phenomena is accessible only through the mind
Contemporary expression
Empiricism (emphasises the role of experience) Through experience based on sight, sound, smell, touch, taste
Rationalism (based on justification)
Knowledge accessed
Through the rational powers of the mind and the use of reason
Modern theorists Philosophy of science
Francis Bacon, John Locke Logical positivism espousal of verificationism and falsification (Karl Popper)
René Descartes
Psychological stance
Realism objects exist independent of our experience and understanding arises through experimentation and verification
Process
Perception and validating beliefs through observation
Logical conceptualisation using rational and analytical skills; testing for logical consistency
Psychological practice
Behaviourism, cognitive behaviourism
Psychotherapy: rational emotive therapy
Foundationalism there are fundamental facts from which knowledge can be inferred Realism objects have essences (essentialism), which can be deduced through reasoning
Pyrrho
Knowledge is uncertain – hence the notion of scepticism Constructivism (knowledge is constructed) Belief in something does not necessarily justify a knowledge of it Immanuel Kant, George Kelly Postmodernism the meaning of all things is coloured by subjectivity Constructive alternativism our understanding of events is subject to a variety of alternative constructions Metaphor and symbolisation, testing validity in terms of the pragmatic ability to generalise to other realms of experience Constructivist: e.g. personal construct psychotherapy
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viduals make sense by constructing theories of themselves, other people and the events before them. In a sense if PCT is a theory about the theories people have about themselves and the world they inhabit, then construct theory can be considered a meta-theory. Sean Brophy, Fay Fransella & Nick Reed (2005) set out the characteristics of a theory. If people are in the business of constructing theories, then the characteristics held to be true of a theory might also be held to be true of the person. Thus the person in PCT might be held able to: • • • • • • • •
bind events together so they mean more than any single event by itself; formalise a set of ideas into a system; use the framework to anticipate outcomes; address issues that were not thought about at the time the theory was constructed; test their assumptions and deductions; inform action; rely on their theory when in doubt; flourish, so long as the theory proves fertile and useful.
Kelly unreservedly presented his theory in terms of a psychological structure, which consists of a fundamental postulate and 11 corollaries (see Figure 1.1). The fundamental postulate suggests that a person’s processes are psychologically channelled by the ways in which they anticipate events. This core element of the theory attempts to explain a person’s psychology not so much in terms of past history – as if through a rear-view mirror (Shotter 2007) – but in terms of anticipatory choices. The fundamental postulate implies that: • we reach out to the future; • we discriminate (construe) the events before us; • such construing enables us to anticipate future events; • consequently, we are able to predict what may happen; • and we strive to make sense of the world and our self.
Construct The following section owes much to Don Bannister and Fay Fransella (1986), who sought succinctly to define the formal aspects of the theory, and to the work of David Winter (1992; 2003), who elaborated many
Coming to Terms with Personal Construct Theory Construction
Range
a search for repeated themes (replication)
a construct is applicable for a range of events
7
Dichotomy constructs are bipolar and finite in number
Individuality individuals differ from each other in terms of how they interpret events
Sociality relating to others is at its most successful where the person seeks to understanding the other person’s construing
Organisation
Striving for personal meaning
Fragmentation sub-systems of constructs may not be logically related
Choice movement in a direction which elaborates the construct system and leads to definition or extension
Commonality similarity with others is based on similarity of construing
constructs are interrelated and subsuming
Modulation permeability of constructs allows the assimilation of new events
Experience systems change through validation and invalidation
Adapted from Butler & Green (2007) with permission.
Figure 1.1 A diagrammatic summary of Kelly’s corollaries
of the clinical issues within the framework of the theory. Further elaboration of many terms within the rubric of the theory can be found in the alphabetical index of the internet encyclopaedia of personal construct psychology, edited by Jörn Scheer and Beverly Walker (www.pcp-net.org/ encyclopaedia).
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1
The properties of constructs
Kelly (1955/1991a; 1991b) wished to distinguish between a construct and a concept. The latter he saw as existing independently of any particular person’s psychological processes. A construct, he proposed, may be viewed as: •
•
•
•
•
•
•
An abstraction arising from an awareness of a similarity and a contrast between events (elements or objects), summarised in the construction corollary, which suggests a person anticipates events by construing their replications. Devised by the protagonist with no existence independent of the person whose thinking it characterises. Hence the distinction between a construct and a concept, the latter often being treated as existing independently of any one person’s psychological processes. Bipolar. The relationship between the two poles of a construct is considered to be one of contrast (defined in terms of the dichotomy corollary: a person’s construction system is composed of a finite number of dichotomous constructs). Thus ‘lazy’ may be contrasted to ‘hardworking’. It is through such discriminations that Kelly suggested a person derives meaning. Having an emergent pole, which is the pole that arises when an individual elicits a construct. Thus if asked to characterise themselves in three ways, a person’s self-descriptions of ‘loud’, ‘unconventional’ and ‘creative’ can be seen as emergent ends of three constructs. Necessarily having a contrast or implicit pole, which describes the contrast end of a construct. Thus ‘boring’ might be differentiated from ‘unconventional’. A portable axis of reference. Constructs are discriminations imposed on events and as such are successively ‘picked up and laid down over many, many different events in order to bring them into focus and clothe them with personal meaning’ (Kelly 1958/1969). Thus Huddersfield, a geographical element, may be construed as either ‘north’ or ‘south’, depending on whether we are respectively in Bristol or Inverness. Possibly having verbal markers, though constructs are foremost the discriminations we make, not the labels we attach to them. Kelly referred to ‘unlabelled’ constructs as preverbal, possibly emerging before a child has command of speech, and which continue to be employed even though the individual has no consistent word symbol. Viv Burr (2006) has wonderfully elaborated how our artistic ‘style’, gait, handwriting, gestures, posture, dance, and so forth express our identity without recourse to symbols or language.
Coming to Terms with Personal Construct Theory
9
•
Arising out of an individual’s personal experience and therefore regarded as fundamentally their own. Kelly’s individuality corollary, which states that persons differ from each other in their constructions of events, stresses the uniqueness of each person’s construing, even where they may attach similar verbal labels to their discriminations. Two employees may both construe their boss as ‘generous’, yet their contrasts ‘tightfisted’ and ‘selfish’ suggest that each construes (understands) him in different ways. • Phenomenologically valid, in that even where a person takes another person’s verbal markers as a basis for a construct (such as with a supplied construct), they will invest it with their own personal meanings. • A means of simultaneously promoting an understanding of events (by bringing them within our grasp through one set of terms) whilst also restricting other meanings by blinding us to other aspects of the same configuration of events. Thus if we determinedly construe a pile of bricks as building material, we limit the possibility of construing them in artistic terms.
2 •
Construct elicitation
Traditionally, the Kellyan form of construct elicitation is by triadic elicitation. Here a person is asked to consider how two elements are alike (which gives an emergent pole) and therefore dissimilar to a third element (the contrast pole). Thus a brother and a friend might be construed as ‘fun to be with’ in contrast to a colleague, who might be construed as ‘boring’. • Other forms of construct elicitation have subsequently been advanced – either the similarity of two elements (e.g. two beers may both have a ‘nutty’ flavour) or the difference between two elements (e.g. free-flowing footballers vs. a set of cloggers). Further, the emergent end of constructs may be elicited through only one element (e.g. by asking a person to describe their self) • A self-characterisation directly invites a person to spell out what is important to them by writing a sketch of themselves in the third person, as if they are an observer of themselves. Their writings are awash with constructs (emergent poles at least) in relation to how they imagine others view themselves (Denicolo 2005). • Laddering (devised by Dennis Hinkle 1965) seeks to unearth superordinate constructs by asking a person why (‘how come?’) a preferred pole
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of a construct is important to them. Thus the importance of being ‘honest’ might be the need to ‘avoid criticism’ (a more superordinate construct). • Pyramiding is a contrast to laddering for it seeks to understand more subordinate constructs by asking a person to characterise, describe or detail what constitutes a preferred end of a construct. Pyramiding tends to reveal more behavioural constructs. Thus what characterises ‘honesty’ might be owning up to the mistakes we make (a more subordinate construct).
3
Constructs in relation to events (elements)
•
A construct has a range of convenience which encompasses events for which it is applicable. An element such as a guitar which fails to be interpreted within the bounds of a construct (e.g. enthusiastic–apathetic) is said to lie outside the range of convenience. The range corollary states that a construct is convenient for the anticipation of a finite range of events only. Anxiety results from awareness that events with which one is confronted lie mostly outside the range of one’s construct system. You are in effect faced with (or anticipate) a situation that feels mostly unconstruable. ‘Mostly’ is the key word here, for as Bannister (1977) illustrates, someone who is anxious about an examination or test may readily construe much about the anticipated event but remain ‘at sea’ with respects to notions of ‘what will I (or others) think if I fail this exam?’ A construct has a focus of convenience which covers events for which it is particularly apposite or usefully predictable. Thus, for example, the construct ‘out of tune–in tune’ is of particular relevance in terms of a guitar. Slot rattling describes the (usually rapid) movement of an element (self, other person or event) from one end of a construct pole to its contrast. The resulting change is regarded as fairly unstable. When elements are freely allotted to a construct it is described as being permeable. This is refined in the modulation corollary, which states that the variation in a person’s construction system is limited by the permeability of the constructs within whose range of convenience lie. A construct is described as impermeable if it rejects elements on the basis of their novelty. The pole of a construct which is less well elaborated or available for application to events is called the submerged pole.
•
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Coming to Terms with Personal Construct Theory •
•
•
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4 •
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Where a pole of a construct is relatively inaccessible and thus rarely tested (submerged), a person may sense being trapped, an experience familiar to those who suffer with problems such as agoraphobia. A construct which pre-empts its elements for membership in its own realm exclusively is known as a pre-emptive construct. It makes sense of an element in one, and only one, way. Such ‘nothing but …’ construing restricts elaborative potential. Diagnostic construing which labels people, say, as suffering from ‘schizophrenia’ may lead to perceptions of them as only schizophrenic. A constellatory construct fixes the other realm membership of its elements. As a type of stereotypical or prejudicial approach it leads to absolute linkages. For example, a person (element) construed as ‘artistic’ might also be construed as ‘self-obsessed’, ‘precious’ and ‘work-shy’. A propositional construct carries no implications regarding other realm membership of their elements. A person construed as ‘artistic’ may be construed in many other ways – ‘friendly’, ‘intense’, ‘tongue in cheek’. The repertory grid technique (grid) is an idiographic means of understanding a person’s psychological space in terms of the patterns between constructs and elements. The relationship tends to be expressed mathematically through principal components or cluster analysis. (For more information see Fransella, Bell & Bannister 2004.)
Particular types of construct
Kelly considered dependency in terms of the resources people rely on for support and validation. He contrasted undispersed dependency (reliance on a few people for most needs) with dispersed dependency (a more differentiated support network). • A dependency grid contains elements only and involves asking to whom, out of a list of people, a person would turn for help in various difficult situations. • The notion of self is constructed, and like other construing is regarded as a means by which a person makes sense of themselves. Don Bannister (1983) suggests that the self-picture and the world picture are painted on the same canvas and with the same pigments. • Folk may appear contradictory to others yet an understanding of that person’s construing may reveal different (even contrasting) construct sub-systems. Being a father and being the captain of a rugby team may consist of quite different sets of constructs. Miller Mair (1977) suggests that we may understand a person in terms of their community of selves.
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•
The Self Image Profile (Butler 2001; Butler & Gasson 2004) is an idiographic means of displaying and measuring both self-image and self-esteem by employing commonly elicited self-description constructs.
5
Constructs in relation to other constructs
•
Constructs relate to one another both ‘horizontally’ and hierarchically. In terms of horizontal relationships, constructs can be viewed as alike where they encompass similar elements and lead to similar anticipations. In grid work such constructs are highly interrelated (correlated) and cluster together. The implications grid (or Impgrid), devised by Dennis Hinkle (1965), contains no elements and explores construct relationships in terms of how each implies the other. Where constructs are closely correlated, the person might be understood as having a tight construct system. Tight construing leads to unvarying prediction and is particularly vulnerable to invalidation. Obsessionality may be perceived as the behavioural expression of excessive tightening. Loose construing, in contrast, leads to varying predictions. The relationship between two constructs might be said to be loose where mathematically there is a low correlation. Where constructs loosen to the point where predictions are vague, inconsistent and highly vulnerable to invalidation, schizophrenic thought disorder may result (Bannister 1962). Kelly describes the creativity cycle whereby a person shows inventiveness and resourcefulness by moving between construing in a loose fashion and then tightening to a point where predictions can be tested. Fixed-role therapy is one of Kelly’s original therapeutic techniques where a person is invited for a limited period to act an alternative role (set of constructs) based on an agreed sketch. This is a protected form of experimentation. The alternative sketch role is based on constructs that lie at an orthogonal angle to the person’s usual form of construing. Thus ‘good listener’ might provide the basis of a sketch where a person’s predominant construing orbits around ‘shy vs. confident’. Constructs are also organised hierarchically with constructs pertaining to physical characteristics, role and behaviour at the base, psychological
•
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•
•
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Coming to Terms with Personal Construct Theory
•
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•
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•
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constructs in the middle and core, fundamental constructs at the apex. This is outlined as the organisation corollary, which states that each person characteristically evolves, for their convenience in anticipating events, a construction system embracing ordinal relationships between constructs. By referring to evolution, Kelly was emphasising the developmental nature of construct systems whereby the ‘hierarchy’ is elaborated with experience. A superordinate construct is relatively higher in the hierarchy, lying in a ‘dominant’ relationship vis-à-vis constructs. It is generally elucidated by laddering. The resistance to change grid, devised by Dennis Hinkle (1965) and free of elements, explores the hierarchical arrangement of constructs in terms of which constructs a person would resist changing. A core construct lies at the top of the hierarchy, relates to a person’s identity, is fundamental to the way they seek to impose meaning on events and governs what Kelly called their ‘maintenance processes’. A desire for approval, avoidance of criticism, search for achievement, wish for independence and need for nonconformity are typical examples of core constructs (Butler 2006). The core role structure is the core group of constructs by which we understand ourselves. Guilt arises from an awareness that we are acting in a way that we might not have expected. You have misread yourself – in Kellyan language, an awareness of dislodgement of the self from one’s core role structure. Guilt, like all emotions, is conceptualised in PCT terms as value-free. Thus guilt might arise where a laid-back, rebellious student hands in a piece of work on time much as a conscientious scholar does who misses the deadline. Threat arises when our fundamental (core) constructs are anticipated to be endangered or are indeed invalidated, leading to a feeling that our ‘known’ world appears on the brink of becoming chaotic. Kelly defined it as an awareness of an imminent comprehensive change in core structures. Although we are often aware of an ‘alternative self ’ to our current sense of self (core role structure) we may resist taking on even what might be viewed as a preferred self because of the threat of the unknown. Thus stutterers may resist fluency (Fransella 1972); impulsive children avoid being clever (Hartley 1986); and those with anorexia may resist normal weight (Button 1993) because the implications threaten the ‘known self ’. Sometimes people may experience conflict and dilemmas, particularly when constructs are at odds with one another over a particular
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event. Kelly explained such eventualities in the fragmentation corollary, which states that a person may successively employ a variety of construction systems which are inferentially incompatible with each other. • A subordinate construct lies in a subsidiary relationship with another construct at a relatively lower point in the person’s construct system hierarchy. It is generally discovered through pyramiding. At the most subordinate lie constructs relating to physical and behavioural discriminations. • Performance profiling (Butler 1996; 1999) is an idiographic display of a person’s view of their current behaviour, functioning or ability on constructs considered important in characterising a desired performance.
6
Constructs in operation
•
Constructs often operate at a low level of awareness. Individuals do not appeal to their construct system in order to act (thus much construing is undertaken outside of consciousness), but they nevertheless are their construct system. Reflection is a means whereby constructs may be brought into awareness. Folk test out their constructs (and revise them where necessary), as if they function like scientists – hence the metaphor man-as-scientist. Behaviour is thus seen as the person’s means of asking a question. Just as all questions are anticipatory, so too is behaviour (Kelly 1970). Kelly later termed this process the experience cycle, which in optimal functioning involves anticipation, investment, encounter with the event, assessment of anticipation and revision of construing if necessary. Kelly considered the process of decision-making in terms of the C-P-C cycle, which involves, in succession, circumspection, pre-emption and control (the last of these stages Kelly later changed to ‘choice’), which forms the direction of their movement. Ruminative behaviour may be understood as the result of prolonged dwelling on the circumspection phase of the cycle. Impulsiveness is the characteristic foreshortening of the C-P-C cycle. People, according to Kelly’s choice corollary, elect that alternative in a dichotomised construct through which they anticipate the greatest possibility for the elaboration of their system. Essentially, they move in directions that to them make most sense. Thus actions are always understandable from the protagonist’s perspective, no matter how bizarre, idiosyncratic or inconsistent it may seem to onlookers.
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Coming to Terms with Personal Construct Theory •
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•
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Some people develop well-elaborated views of themselves in terms of a problem, e.g. stuttering (Fransella 1970) or nocturnal enuresis (Butler 1994) in which the problem becomes a ‘way of life’, and the contrasts (e.g. fluency, being dry at night, respectively) are poorly elaborated. Where the anticipated choice turns out as expected, the construct is described as strengthened or validated. Elaboration can take the form of extension, which is reaching out to increase the range of the construct system by exploring areas that are only partially understood, or definition, which is confirmation of experiences which are already well construed. However, where events unfold in a way the person had not expected, then the construct is described as being weakened or invalidated. Kelly described the process of validation and invalidation in the experience corollary, which states that a person’s construction system varies as they successively construe the replication of events. Hostility describes the way a person determinedly seeks to extort validational evidence to support a prediction (construction) which has already been recognised as a failure. Sometimes we cannot readily abandon a belief (Bannister 1977). A manager, sensing he has ‘lost the troops’, may resort to bullying in order to maintain his authority. Though not built on notions of psychopathology, Kelly sought to apply his theory in the clinical context and considered a disorder to be any personal construction which is used repeatedly in spite of consistent invalidation. Beverly Walker and David Winter (2005) have challenged the use of such a pejorative term, suggesting there are times when construing may fail to achieve its purpose (leading to psychological distress), but it can be regarded as the person’s best attempt to make sense of their world and themselves. Don Bannister (1963) suggested that repeated or serial invalidation may lead to schizophrenic thought disorder. Kelly described the process whereby a person broadens their ‘perceptual field’ in order to reorganise it on a more comprehensive level (though not necessarily reconstruing the elements) as dilation. Aggression is considered to be the active elaboration of one’s perceptual field. A person may broaden their perceptual field (dilate) to a point where exploration ‘outruns’ their organisation, possibly resulting in manic or paranoid behaviour. In contrast, when a person narrows their perceptual field in order to minimise apparent incompatibilities, Kelly employed the term constriction. Constriction is regarded as central to depression.
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7
Constructs in relation to other’s construing
•
Where two people construe an event in a similar way, they can be considered similar to one another. Thus similarity is based on the construing of the protagonist (not on an outsider’s view of the two people). Kelly described this in the commonality corollary, which states that to the extent that one person employs a construction of experience which is similar to that employed by another, their processes are psychologically similar to those of another person. People tend to make sense of others by employing their own construct system. Thus I might construe you as ‘erudite’ and ‘resilient’ having read through the chapter to this point. However, such construing is my construing, an observer’s perspective, and divorced from the protagonist’s (your) perspective. Construing others in our terms minimises the depth of a relationship with them. Kelly suggested we can only, as it were, truly understand another person when we seek to understand that person’s construing. He called this the sociality corollary, which states that to the extent that one person construes the construction process of another they may play a role in a social process involving the other person. In working with others, Kelly suggested we adopt a credulous approach. By attempting metaphorically to ‘stand in the other’s shoes’ and see the world through their eyes, the other person’s behaviour and stance possess an ‘intrinsic truth’. In order to fully understand another we have to subsume the construing system of the other – that is, trying to put our own construing on hold and ‘step into’ the construing world of the other. In clinical practice a desired aim is to subsume the client’s construing in terms of Kelly’s professional constructs – primarily understanding the structure of their construing in terms of tight vs. loose, constricted vs. dilated, and so forth, before focusing on content. Such a principle is crucial in psychotherapeutic work. Larry Leitner and colleagues (2005) have fully elaborated the sociality corollary and recoined the term a role relationship to distinguish it from other forms of role. Where folk have difficulty construing other people’s construction processes, their world is bereft of psychological understanding. In childhood it has been argued that those struggling with autism and Asperger’s syndrome have profound difficulty is construing the construction process of the other.
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Coming to Terms with Personal Construct Theory
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Constructs in transition
•
Revision of the construct system may leave previously construed elements omitted from the person’s way of making sense. Such elements are described as suspended. • A peripheral construct is one that can be altered without serious modification of the core structure. • Emotion, in the Kellyan sense, is understood as arising when constructs are in transition. They are value-free. Kelly defined six emotions, which have subsequently been further elaborated and extended by Mildred McCoy (1977) and Butler & Green (2007). • Resistance is understood in the context of therapy where a person, behaving perfectly reasonably from their own perspective, makes a determined stance to avoid invalidation.
Personal The final facet of the theory’s triad – Personal – is an invitation to take the person (rather than unconscious drives, faulty thinking or behavioural reactions) seriously. Kelly offered a few handy reminders as to how we might do this: •
Acknowledge that each of us lives in what is ultimately a unique world where situations/events are perceived and understood through the ‘goggles’ of our personal construct system. This is formally stated in the individuality corollary as persons differ from each other in their constructions of events. What gives a person their stamp of individuality is the particular constructs they employ as a framework to make sense of their world and themselves. • Consider the person as the unit of enquiry. This contrasts markedly with traditional, ‘numbskull’ psychology where deconstructed and dissociated fragments of the person, such as learning, memory, perception, motivation, cognition and the like, are esteemed as the focus of interest. • Recognise that we differ from each other in how we perceive and interpret events, what we consider important and what we consider are the implications. • Accept that however perplexing a person’s actions may appear to be, the protagonist is, in line with the scientist metaphor, striving to make sense of their world and their self.
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Central to pretty much all of Kelly’s thinking is the notion of reflexivity. He was convinced that observers of the human condition (psychologists, researchers, counsellors, therapists, and the like) should be understood in the same way that their ‘subjects’ or ‘patients’ are. Both are testing out their respective construct systems. Kelly mused that if a theory-maker cannot apply that theory to their own functioning, then it is a useless theory. Thus the ‘black box’ notion was seriously flawed because it couldn’t account for the ‘thinking’ that went into conceptualising the black box. Kelly argued that PCT provides a way to understand the theorising of the theorist in addition to the theories people have about themselves, their world and others. ‘People’ here includes the football supporter trying to understand why his team lost, the child grappling with why she is excluded from a social network she wishes to be part of, a mechanic working on the possibilities as to why a car shudders to a halt, a student pondering her imminent and long-term future, and Kelly himself grappling with a theory as to why folk do the things they do. Hence the focus of this book.
References Bannister, D. (1962). The nature and measurement of schizophrenic thought disorder. Journal of Mental Science, 108, 825–842 Bannister, D. (1963). The genesis of schizophrenic thought disorder: a serial invalidation hypothesis. British Journal of Psychiatry, 109, 680–686 Bannister, D. (1977). The logic of passion. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Bannister, D. (1983). Self in personal construct theory. In J. R. Adams-Webber & J. C. Mancuso (eds.) Applications of Personal Construct Theory. Toronto: Academic Press Bannister, D. & Fransella, F. (1986). Inquiring Man, 3rd edition. London: Routledge Brophy, S., Fransella, F. & Reed, N. (2005). The power of a good theory. In F. Fransella (ed.) The Essential Practitioner’s Handbook of Personal Construct Theory. Chichester: Wiley Burr, V. (2006). The art of writing: embodiment and pre-verbal construing. In P. Caputi, H. Foster & L. L. Viney (eds.) Personal Construct Psychology: New Ideas. Chichester: Wiley Butler, R. J. (1994). Nocturnal Enuresis: the Child’s Experience. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann Butler, R. J. (1996). Sports Psychology in Action. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann
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Butler, R. J. (1999). Performance Profiling. Leeds: The National Coaching Foundation Press Butler, R. (2001). The Self Image Profiles for Children & Adolescents. London: The Psychological Corporation Butler, R. J. (2006). Investigating the content of core constructs. Personal Construct Theory & Practice, 3, 27–34 Butler, R. J. & Gasson, S. L. (2004). The Self Image Profile for Adults. London: Harcourt Assessment Butler, R. J. & Green, D. (2007). The Child Within: Taking the Young Person’s Perspective by Applying Personal Construct Theory. Chichester: Wiley Butt, T. (2003). The phenomenological context of personal construct psychology. In F. Fransella (ed.) International Handbook of Personal Construct Psychology. Chichester: Wiley Butt, T. (2006). Personal construct therapy and its history in pragmatism. In P. Caputi, H. Foster & L. L. Viney (eds.) Personal Construct Psychology: New Ideas. Chichester: Wiley Button, E. J. (1993). Eating Disorders: Personal Construct Therapy and Change. Chichester: Wiley Denicolo, P. (2005). A range of elicitation methods to suit client and purpose. In F. Fransella (ed.) The Essential Practitioner’s Handbook of Personal Construct Theory. Chichester: Wiley Fransella, F. (1970). Stuttering not a symptom but a way of life. British Journal of Communication Disorders, 5, 22 Fransella, F. (1972). Personal Change and Reconstruction: Research on a Treatment of Stuttering. London: Academic Press Fransella, F. (1995). George Kelly. London: Sage Fransella, F., Bell, R. & Bannister, D. (2004). A Manual for Repertory Grid Technique 2nd edition. Chichester: Wiley Fransella, F. & Neimeyer, R. A. (2005). George Alexander Kelly: the man and his theory. In F. Fransella (ed.) The Essential Practitioner’s Handbook of Personal Construct Theory. Chichester: Wiley Hartley, R. (1986). ‘Imagine you’re clever’. Journal of Child Psychology & Psychiatry, 27, 383–398 Hinkle, D. (1965). The change of personal constructs from the viewpoint of a theory of construct implications. Unpublished PhD thesis, Ohio State University Kelly, G. A. (1955) The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volumes 1 and 2. New York: Norton (reprinted London: Routledge, 1991) Kelly, G. A. (1958/1969). Man’s construction of his alternatives. In B. Maher (ed.) Clinical Psychology and Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly. New York: John Wiley & Sons Kelly, G. A. (1970). Behaviour is an experiment. In D. Bannister (ed.) Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Kelly, G. A. (1991a). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volume 1. A Theory of Personality. London: Routledge
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Kelly, G. A. (1991b). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volume 2. Clinical Diagnosis and Psychotherapy. London: Routledge Leitner, L. M., Faidley, A. J., Dominici, D., Humphreys, C., Loeffler, V., Schlutsmeyer, M. & Thomas, J. (2005). Encountering an other: experiential personal construct psychotherapy. In D. A. Winter & L. L. Viney (eds.) Personal Construct Psychotherapy: Advances in Theory, Practice and Research. London: Whurr McCoy, M. M. (1977). A reconstruction of emotion. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Mair, J. M. M. (1977). The community of self. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Neimeyer, G. J., Saferstein, J. & Arnold, W. (2005). Personal construct psychotherapy: epistemology and practice. In D. A. Winter & L. L. Viney (eds.) Personal Construct Psychotherapy: Advances in Theory, Practice and Research. London: Whurr Shotter, J. (2007). Re-visiting George Kelly: Social constructionism, social ecology, and social justice – all unfinished projects. Personal Construct Theory & Practice, 4, 68–82 Walker, B. M. & Winter, D. (2005) Psychological disorder and reconstruction. In D. A. Winter & L. L. Viney (eds.) Personal Construct Psychotherapy: Advances in Theory, Practice and Research. London: Whurr Warren, B. (2003). Pragmatism and religion: Dewey’s twin influences? In F. Fransella (ed.) International Handbook of Personal Construct Psychology. Chichester: Wiley Winter, D. A. (1992). Personal Construct Psychology in Clinical Practice: Theory, Research and Application. London: Routledge Winter, D. (2003). Psychological disorder as imbalance. In F. Fransella (ed.) International Handbook of Personal Construct Psychology. Chichester: Wiley
Chapter 2
The Construct Harry Procter Harry Procter did his doctoral research at the Department of Mental Health, University of Bristol, on applying personal construct psychology (PCP) to family processes. He then trained as a clinical psychologist in Nottingham and worked in Adult and Child and Adolescent Mental Health in Somerset before retiring from the NHS in 2004. Currently, he is involved in teaching and supervision, and is continuing to develop PCP applications to relational and organisational contexts. He has published 25 papers and chapters on various aspects of PCP and clinical psychology, and edited two volumes of the selected papers of Milton H. Erickson for Paidos Publications, Barcelona.
Elaborated aspects of theory: construct; emotion; family construct; narrative; position ‘To make a distinction, is to open a field of enquiry.’ (Edmund Husserl)
Introduction For me, the central notion in personal construct psychology (PCP) which keeps it alive and vibrant is that of the construct itself. In this chapter I want to show how the construct is at once perceptual, emotional, concerned with action, narrative and, of course, personal. The simultaneous presence of all these attributes gives Kelly’s psychology an extraordinary depth and breadth, which various other currently available psychological frameworks Reflections in Personal Construct Theory. Edited by Richard J. Butler © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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find hard to match. I then move on to show how the writer has sought to develop this conception of the construct even further by making it also social, interpersonal and relational, allowing an enhanced PCP to remain at the vanguard of contemporary psychological theory and practice. Figure 2.1 illustrates how the construct, as the hub of a ‘wheel’ or ‘clock’, unifies a surprising range of apparently unrelated psychological concepts or
Act
Binary
Choice
Pair of alternatives
Semantic Polarity
Difference Discrimination
Meaning
Sensation Belief
CONSTRUCT
Attitude
Perception
Concept
Agreed
Situation
View
Story
Value
Opinion Emotion Judgement
Figure 2.1 Meanings of the word ‘construct’
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aspects of human experience. This could be misconstrued, as if all these aspects could be reduced to a basic idea of the construct as simply a difference or discrimination. But the vision here is precisely the reverse of reductionist. Rather than seeing human experience as consisting of a lot of unrelated aspects, as taught in traditional psychology, the construct embodies the holistic nature of experience. It is all the things on the outside of the wheel. By linking them all and drawing them into itself, it becomes something that can reflect the extraordinary nature of human functioning. So, rather than reducing anything, this conception elevates our psychology to do justice to what we are.
The Construct as Perceptual The construct is normally seen as perceptual, and so it often is. These are the items on the right-hand side of Figure 2.1. Gregory Bateson (1970) nicely discusses how perceptual organs are structured to detect differences and send these ‘news of differences’ up the neurone. A baby is already clearly able to detect ‘light’ vs. ‘dark’, ‘warm’ vs. ‘cold’, ‘loud’ vs. ‘soft’, ‘pain’ vs. ‘comfort’, ‘hungry’ vs. ‘full’ and later, ‘present’ vs. ‘absent’. These gradually become differentiated and elaborated into more and more sophisticated systems of construing, enabling the child to understand and deal with the complexities of the world. Soon constructs for dealing with the social world will be in evidence: ‘known’ vs. ‘unknown’ voice, ‘smile’ vs. ‘frown’, ‘safe’ vs. ‘scary’. These examples also underline another very common misunderstanding. Constructs are not verbal. Words, or ‘signifiers’, later become attached to the semantic poles of a construct and we clearly later learn thousands of constructs via the language in which we are immersed, but a construct itself is an experienced semantic discrimination.
The Construct as Emotional Another common misunderstanding of PCP relates to emotion. It is ironic that the way emotions are treated in Kelly’s psychology (aspects of structure and transition), intriguing and illuminating as they are, may be responsible for the critique of PCP as being ‘too cognitive’, a comment that goes back to Rogers’ (1956) original review of Kelly’s two volumes. For me, the construct has always been as emotional as it is semantic or cognitive. For example, when a baby is scared by an unfamiliar face, the reactions and feeling of fear are just as much part of the construct ‘scary’ vs. ‘safe’ as any
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descriptive or dictionary definition. The bodily reactions, the tensing, the crying and scared feeling, are all part of a single human experience/reaction that is governed by the application of the construct. The same applies to the feeling of love and relief that a child experiences when she realises that her mother is present after all. An adolescent girl says, ‘my father is a bastard’, screws her face up, clenches her teeth and feels angry and furious. All these are part of a single experience governed by the construct ‘bastard’, which holds within it the semantic, behavioural and emotional aspects simultaneously. It is very hard to express this truth because language itself, as well as our cultural and scientific tradition, is so prone to splice and segment our experience. This view of the construct puts emotional life at the centre of PCP’s vision rather than emotion being ‘added’ to the theory as a secondary aspect. Of course, some constructs, let us say in the area of mathematics, do not seem to have a strong emotional feel. However, there will always be subtle emotional aspects to any construing, and one could argue that a neutral feeling, or a subtle aesthetic appreciation or indifference, are just as much emotions as the strong ones that we tend to use in our discussions of emotion.
The Construct as Concerned with Action Kelly’s choice corollary (we choose the alternative that we anticipate will lead to greater elaboration of our construct system) makes it clear that he intended the construct to be central to action as well as to perception and understanding. As stated, the corollary seems to apply to those decisions in life in which we consider pros and cons, for example in what career path to take, like a juror weighing up the evidence in arriving at a verdict. But it must apply to all the ongoing decisions that we are continuously making in our lives all the time. The tennis player is judging the speed and direction of the ball with constructs such as ‘left’ vs. ‘right’, ‘high’ vs. ‘low’ and constructs to do with speed, spin, bounce, not to mention those involving sociality for the opponent, anticipating his or her intention and weak points, positioning oneself accordingly and bluffing by pretending to aim a shot differently from the actual delivery. There are clearly many constructs involved, at many levels, from sensorimotor alternatives through to constructs involved in planning and strategy and in construing one’s own and the other’s performance. In social interaction we are continuously using many constructs to govern the communication of meaning and emotion via posture, gestures, facial expression and voice tone that research in PCP has barely touched on so far.
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Now most of these are not choices and decisions involving conscious thought. There would not be sufficient time. They are spontaneous and pre-reflective. We can have ‘cognitive awareness’ of them, but mostly they are made in a natural, effortless way without deliberation – perhaps all of them are, and we only think that our choices involve conscious planning! Are they then reflexes, the products of a sophisticated machine? No. A person is involved, making a choice with a particular intention. If we interrupt somebody in midstream, they can give us a detailed account of their actions and judgements and how they were construing the situation. Without conscious thought or planning the person chooses a pole of a bipolar construct because it seems elaborative, the right thing to do, justified. So this simple idea of a construct is proving to be quite rich and able to capture a lot of what it means to be a human being living life. It all gets even deeper when we remember that constructs are placed in a hierarchy. As well as choosing to act in certain ways, we are able to choose to use one construct rather than another if there is a superordinate construct subsuming them. Let us continue the example of a child construing an adult as ‘scary’ vs. ‘safe’ or ‘to be trusted’. At primary school, he goes up to the teacher in a trusting way and says ‘look at this drawing’, anticipating the pleased reaction that he is accustomed to receive from his mother. The teacher, however, criticises the drawing and throws it in the waste bin. He is mortified. Later, at secondary school, he has learned to approach teachers with a number of different construct dimensions, perhaps to do with their perceived strictness, level of interest in pupils, their mood or whether the teacher is busy. The original construct ‘scary vs. to be trusted’ is still there but has elaborated and obtained a subordinate substructure which allows the person to adopt different roles or positions towards others. We return to this area later.
The Construct as Narrative This construct hierarchy can also operate in a different way in subsuming or making sense of events across time. A construct carries a story and a story communicates one or more constructs. When somebody offers a construct, asking them to say more about it will result in a story about a set of experiences which exemplifies and validates the construct. In Figure 2.2, the stem at the top represents the construct, the branches represent episodes or descriptions in the story, and the twigs at the bottom represent particular events in the story which have been ordered into a meaningful narrative sequence. A construct is like the handle of a suitcase. Inside the case resides
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TIME
Figure 2.2 Construct as a narrative tree
one (or more) stories, which can be unwrapped and expanded to a lesser or greater extent. A story may describe a brief episode exemplifying an incidental construct or a grand narrative which communicates the person’s whole life, reflecting the richness of their core construing. When Kelly says we are a form of motion, this shows how our construing is never static but always evolving and changing. In addition, we can see here that the construct itself is diachronic: it reflects and tries to capture sequences of our lives that are forever ephemeral and on the move. We can use this as a good PCP model as well for our thinking, or stream of consciousness. The construct generates or selects a narrative. This is then open to reconstrual: perhaps we select a new construct to understand the narrative. Alternatively, one of the characters or elements in the story puts us in mind of another element, which is subsumed under the same pole, or a new construct, or a contrasting element under the contrast pole. We then invent or remember a new narrative concerning these elements or events, and so it goes on. This may constitute a different type of creativity from that described in Kelly’s creativity cycle, which involves loosening and tightening. Meditation particularly shows how our flow of thinking is normally a continuous and ceaseless internal activity, as our constructs generate an extraordinary wealth of narrative scenarios. Or it may not be creative at all. Sometimes our thinking is characterised, maddeningly, by repetitive re-presentation of the same narrative, stimulating the recurrence of the same construct again and again. This happens, for example, when we are worrying about a situation or trapped in depressing thoughts about our own failures. There is a dynamic relationship between the construct and the story or stories that it subsumes. When we tell a story we hear ourselves telling it
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and realise that there is a mismatch or tension between the newly created narrative and the way we had been construing it. The construct is thereby revised and elaborated. This is the principal way in which clinical supervision, and therapy in general, works. Of course, in practice more than this occurs – there is a dialogue in which the listener responds, seeks clarification, interjects or adds counterexamples or stories of their own. Stories are a principal way of helping another person revise or even add new constructs to their repertoire. For example (see Procter 2007), I used to enjoy telling Aesop’s fable about the Hare and the Tortoise to the children I was working with, altering it, often using humour and going off at tangents to enhance the experience. It was a valuable way of giving hope and encouragement, and so much more effective than simply exhorting the child to be patient and to persevere. The examples I have given so far have been positive and hopeful ones. Of course, stories can also be used to bolster constructs associated with being stuck and Kellyan hostility. And there is a lot of interest now in narrative coherence in relation to attachment (Dallos 2006) and loss (Neimeyer 2005). Dallos provides an excellent summary of the recent work on the development of narrative coherence in childhood. Our ability to construct coherent stories helps us to cope with even very painful and abusive early experiences. We are helped to do so by the adults who care for us in the early years having good reflective ability, being able at the time to understand and make sense of our own experiences and emotions. Failure to do so is associated with incoherent narratives which have been shown to predict the way the person later relates to their own children. Neimeyer (2005; 2006) considers in detail the way loss of a loved one, especially in traumatic or stigmatising circumstances, can disrupt the coherence of lifenarratives, and how we can go about helping such a person to address this as they grow through the loss. Narrative incoherence seems to tie in well with Kelly’s fragmentation corollary and this link could lead to fruitful further research.
The Construct as Personal And so to our fifth quality in this account of the construct – the personal. This should already be clear from the story we have told so far. The construct is a perception or view, it is emotional, it involves an action or choice and it contains a narrative. Although we will soon talk about social or group constructs, at the end of the day, in practice, any construct that we encounter in our lived world is being used by a particular person at a
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particular point in time. Any construct that I use has within it unique experiences in my biography from the point at which I learned it to the current point of use. My construct of grandparent contains a wealth of memories and associations from when I became aware of my grandparents when I was a child – their garden in the Lake District, their voices and wisdom – through to my becoming a grandparent and my current experiences with my two small grandchildren in south-east London. Although my construct is utterly imbued with the social and cultural discourses of my particular western and European context, and my English and German heritage, my version of this construct is unique and personal. Of course, it is not unchanging. We see below that its expression will vary tremendously according to the particular conversational context, with whom I am speaking (or thinking) and in what role I am in. A construct always belongs to someone. I remember, years ago, in supervising a clinical psychology trainee, that he described one of his clients as depressed, quite a private person and not very confident. I asked, ‘Whose constructs are these?’ He looked at me in a puzzled way. I then said, ‘Who says that she is depressed, private, etc., is it her own view, is it your view or did the doctor say so in his referral letter?’ Her husband had described her as lacking in confidence; the doctor had diagnosed depression; the trainee himself thought that she was quite a private person. We see here the radical role of PCP. These ‘attributes’ do not belong to a person (essentialism). Rather, constructs are used by key figures in a situation. It is problematic to forget this. The husband’s and the trainee’s descriptions and the doctor’s diagnosis are all personal constructs. It is very difficult to change and deconstruct a situation without recognising this fundamental distinction. But surely some constructs are not personal but universal? Earlier, we gave as examples the very discriminations built into our sense organs. For example, if we take ‘blue’ vs. ‘red’, there are cones in the retina that fire to these wavelengths of light. However, even here we are talking about a personal construct when we are referring to the occurrence of the construct in an actual situation. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1963) expresses this well when he says, ‘there are no isolated sensations; all sensations are already drawn up into a world of particular significance for us’ (cited in Moran 2000, p. 415, my emphasis). The phrase ‘drawn up’ perfectly clarifies this point. According to Kelly (1955), each person makes their own sense of a construct and integrates it into a system of construing that has evolved within their unique biographical path and circumstances. A construct is personal, however high or low it is in the hierarchy of the personal construct system.
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So far, my aim has been to give an up-to-date account of the construct as envisaged by Kelly himself. In my understanding I have been influenced by many writers within PCP, but perhaps by Don Bannister, Fay Fransella, Miller Mair, Phil Salmon and Tom Ravenette the most. But from the beginning I was also reading sociology (particularly symbolic interactionism), Marxism and the family systemic writers (originally through the writings of R. D. Laing). The main influences here were Gregory Bateson, Paul Watzlawick, Jay Haley and the Milan Group. These sources were presenting material that severely challenged PCP and indeed the basic individualist assumptions of the discipline of psychology itself. Do we therefore abandon PCT, as so many did, or rally to the challenge in order to preserve the insights and wisdom that I hope this first section reflects? We have now examined five attributes or qualities of the construct. We next look at further aspects which result from extending and elaborating the theory to cope better with our social and relational nature. These are the situational, the social, the interactional, the positional and the relational. The integration of all ten can be summarised as the interpersonal.
The Construct as Situational Kelly (1955) critiqued personality trait theory, with his objection to ‘pigeonholing’ people and pinning them down to particular points on so-called personality dimensions. When answering the questions on personality questionnaires, such as ‘do you enjoy parties?’, I always wanted to retort, ‘It depends on what is happening to me that day, who is at the party, what mood I am in – in a nutshell, what is the situation?’ To me, when first studying psychology, the whole edifice of the trait approach was questionable because it was based on highly unsatisfactory raw data. PCP came to the rescue because it moved dimensions from the ‘objective world’ back into the mind of the psychologist. Hans Eysenck, for example, could be said to be using two constructs, ‘extroversion–introversion’ and ‘neuroticism’, with which he made sense of the whole of human life! However, we need to be careful. PCP could easily repeat these errors with the use of a type of core construct becoming like a trait and a construct system like a ‘personality structure’. On the contrary, how I construe something varies according to what my situation is and particularly who I am with and in what role. If I am with an intimidating teacher, a friend or a client, the meaning of events and my repertory of constructs varies. Miller Mair (1977) captured this well in his paper ‘The community of self ’. In my clinical practice I worked with people who were apparently totally
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‘dissociated’, becoming like entirely different people at different times and ‘switching’ rapidly from one ‘personality’ to another. But this is an extreme example of what happens with all of us in our lives.
The Construct as Social The research on early social development shows that, from the beginning, the infant is in an active role in an interactional ‘dance’ or ‘inter-subjectivity’ with the parent or other carer. John Shotter (1969) writes: Constructs are invented when a child notices a difference, draws the attention of a fellow to it, and they agree upon a way of representing it … constructs are used when a child makes or expresses a distinction using agreed ways of representing it.
Although we saw earlier how some constructs are wired into our sense organs and nervous system, the meaning or sense that these gain, the way they are used, is co-constructed within a ‘conversation’ between two or more people well before language develops. In an early paper, Glenys Parry and I (Procter & Parry 1978) took PCP to task for positioning itself in too individualist a stance and underestimating the importance of the social and sociological in its account of human development and functioning. The implications of Kelly’s work and his personal scientist metaphor seemed to be that individuals single-handedly carve out a unique construct system primarily in their own struggles and interactions with the world. We wanted to emphasise the interpersonal in the process of construct system development; that carers, from the start, mark out and select aspects of the world through pointing, naming and explaining, and the child learns through imitation and identification. Lev Vygotsky had reversed Jean Piaget’s position on the origin of thinking by saying that it derives from the internalising of interactions and conversations. Language, and more generally culture, was the source of vast amounts of the individual’s construing. In many ways, this paper anticipated critiques of PCP based on discourse analysis and social constructionism.
The Construct as Interactional Family systems theory talked about how, when we are observing a family in interaction, we can choose to view it in terms of individuals, dyads or
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triads (Haley 1963). These different ‘units of analysis’ reveal their characteristic patterns of interaction. For example, dyads (pairs of people) tended to show symmetrical or complementary interactions or ‘schismogenesis’ (Bateson 1936; Watzlawick et al. 1967), ideas that have become part of the culture in terms of ‘arms races’ and ‘escalation’. With a unit of three people certain characteristic patterns were described such as the ‘coalition’ in which two people unite in criticism of the third. These analyses were useful in working with families, but tended to play down the role of the individual and the unique meanings he or she makes of situations. Haley went as far as to say that these were irrelevant and got in the way of therapy. One way forward seemed to be to extend the notion of construct and construct system, as described by Kelly, to the level of the group or family. In Procter (1981), I ‘introduced the notion of a Family Construct System (FCS) with properties similar to individual construct systems’ (Walker & Winter 2007). Sequences of interaction may reveal, for example, that two people consistently agree on a view of events to the extent that a third person disagrees and takes on a contrasting view. We can then say that a bipolar family construct is in operation that underlies or governs the interactions of the group of three. Family interaction can then be seen as being governed by the operation of a few key family constructs which have evolved and have their origins in the traditions and culture of the families of origin of the members, and more broadly the societal discourses surrounding them. In a recent paper (Procter & Procter 2008) my wife Jane and I used Byron’s play ‘Cain: A Mystery’ to illustrate a major family construct which operates between Cain, who is questioning his family’s faith and obedience to God and valuing instead knowledge, questioning and defiance (see Figure 2.3). The family construct, ‘faith’ vs. ‘knowledge’, is depicted at the top.
FAITH
KNOWLEDGE
(Adam, Eve, Abel)
(Cain)
Sinful (Cain) Faith (Us)
Defiant (How one should be) Tame (Them)
Figure 2.3 Family and personal constructs in Cain and Abel’s family
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This pair of polarised views underlies the argument and conflict between Adam, Eve and Abel vs. Cain. Adam, Eve and Abel all see themselves as having ‘faith’, in contrast to Cain, whom they see as ‘sinful’. These are personal constructs. Cain’s personal construct governs his choice to be ‘defiant’ in contrast to the others, whom he sees as ‘tame’. The ‘faith’ group’s sense of identity and togetherness is shored up by their being able to see all the bad in the external figure of Cain, allowing internal group differences to be avoided (for example, concerning lingering issues that Eve was the first to leave the path and taste the forbidden fruit).
The Construct as Positional In Procter (1985a), I introduced the notion of position. If we think of the FCS, or any group construct system, as providing an array of slots or positions on a series of dimensions or avenues of movement, the members can move around and take up different positions in the system. Cain, for example, could take up the ‘faith’ position and imagine what it is like to see the world with the construct ‘faith’ vs. ‘sinful’. We are able to imagine ourselves in an alternative position, and its constructs can then be used to generate narratives and conversations. This explains how playwrights and actors operate. This allows us to make a link with the literature on positioning in discursive and dialogical theory. I can choose to take up different positions and when I do, it has the tendency to position the other person with whom I am in conversation (Davies & Harré 1990). Who we are, then, is the mutual creation and responsibility of partners in conversation. ‘When someone acts, their activity cannot be accounted as wholly their own activity – for a person’s actions are partly shaped by being responsive to the actions of the others around them’ (Shotter 2005) In his paper ‘The dialogical self’, Hubert Hermans (2001) writes: The I has the possibility to move from one spatial position to another in accordance with change in situation and time. The I fluctuates among different and even opposed positions, and has the capacity imaginatively to endow each position with a voice … The voices function like interacting characters in a story … each of them has a story to tell about his or her experiences from his or her own stance. As different voices, these characters exchange information … I am able to construe another person or being as a position that I can occupy and as a position that creates an alternative perspective on the world and myself.
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For example, I may normally take a different position from my father on a particular value dimension. But if I hear criticism of his beliefs, I suddenly find myself, through loyalty, arguing for him: I have internalised his position in the FCS, his voice and beliefs, and the pattern of relationship that exists between him and me is now recreated between me and the person who is criticising him. The position I take on things tends to evoke a complementary position in another person. The social construct set up often mirrors a polarity residing in the family construct system. It can be a great shock to find someone you thought you knew well suddenly taking a position, for example when she or he is with a friend from the past, that seems to run counter to the constructs one held about them. These developments imply that the construct system that a person ‘carries around’ is a broader entity than that traditionally envisaged by Kelly and that which was tapped by the self-characterisation technique or the original forms of the repertory grid involving elements and constructs. I attempted to respond to this with a family grid which involved ‘meta-elements’ – for example, ‘as my mother sees me’, ‘as she sees herself’, ‘as she sees my brother’, and so forth (Procter 1985b). Another way is to use Qualitative Grids, in which a number of different people’s views are captured on a single grid (Procter 2007; Procter & Procter 2008). This broader conception allows us to give PCP access to better accounts in the area of power and ethics. The different members of a family or group have different amounts and types of power. The constructs of the powerful group tend to prevail. In entering a group, my views and very existence may be invalidated or rendered invisible by the dominant construing. But as Foucault (1975, cited in Dzinovic et al. 2006) has described, power and subjugation are always associated with resistance and subversiveness as people are determined to oppose constructions that are imposed on them if they do not accord with their experiences and views. Kelly (1955) argues correctly that ultimately we are not the victims of our circumstances. However, our position in a power hierarchy makes an enormous difference to extent to which we can engage in an active elaboration of our constructs. It also allows a more satisfactory account of ethics. Kelly’s choice corollary as it stands could be criticised as being too individualist, in that it argues that we choose an alternative in order to elaborate a personal construct system. However, by recognising that we are part of larger family and group construct systems it allows us to do justice to human altruism. We make choices in order to elaborate these wider systems of construing. Again, this is not thought out consciously but shows itself spontaneously, for example, in most people’s wish to help when coming upon someone in
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need (Giliberto 2006). Raymond Rambert, in Albert Camus’s The Plague, having wished to escape from the disease-ridden city, when finally granted permission to leave, decides to stay after all: ‘I know now that I belong here whether I want it or not. This business is everybody’s business’ (Camus 1960).
The Construct as Relational and Inter-Personal Perhaps we can pull all this together with the hyphenated word interpersonal. I expect to treat another and expect to be treated as a person (as opposed to an object or characterisation) who has a whole world of experiences, valid understandings and the ability to make choices. This is the realm of the sociality corollary. But, with this expanded view of the person as an element in an ongoing network of relational politics, I need not only construe the other’s construction processes, but construe the construction processes of those surrounding that other and construe the relationships between them. This is the realm of the group corollary (Procter 1981), or what I now prefer to call the relationality corollary: ‘To the extent that we can construe the relationships between members of a group, we can play a role in a group process with them.’ This involves construing not just their constructs but relational processes such as situational context, schismogenesis, positioning, power and ethical aspects of their group situation. Dusan Stojnov and Trevor Butt have written: The realm of mutual relations seems to precede the realm of personhood and acts as a social fabric of personal becoming (Stojnov & Butt 2002). How we feel and what we think cannot be separated from the social currents in which we swim. The meanings we bestow on things are not individual products, but are co-constructed with others both on a micro and a macro level. (Butt 2004, my emphasis)
I have wanted, however, to preserve the contribution of Kelly and PCP in this debate. It seems to me that much is lost to psychology by deemphasising the central importance of the person in constructing meanings and values. I have attempted, over the years, to revise and elaborate PCP in order to do justice to the sociological and relational processes with which one struggles in everyday life and in clinical practice and which have been written about so extensively in the postmodernist literature. I believe our meanings are social and personal and that our constructs
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derive from social entities but that we make them our own and clothe them in our unique biographical experiences. We need here to strike the right balance. Too much towards the personal gives too individualist a position. Too much towards the social results in the loss of the lived realities of the actual people we are attempting to understand. And how are we then to understand the creativity of artists and writers, who inject new ideas into the culture? Although the work of Mozart is thoroughly based in the developments of his historical context, his innovations were carved out in the privacy of his unique mind. PCP has always had the spirit that this applies to everyone, children and adults, not just a few ‘great’ people.
A Personal Example I now exemplify these dimensions of the construct from my own construing. I think (we can never know our construing completely) that I have a construct which governs the work aspect of my life and perhaps beyond to other areas, including music-making. Its focus of convenience is a performance, especially the performance of a lecture or teaching session, or conducting a family therapy session. The construct is something like ‘effective’ vs. ‘no use’. ‘Effective’ involves being insightful, creative, perceptive and having new things to say in my teaching or therapy. The contrast pole crops up from time to time, for example, when preparing teaching. Then I judge myself to have ‘nothing further of value to say, to be out-of-date and merely repeating old ideas’. The construct affects my perception of myself and the world and even my body. When feeling effective, life seems worthwhile, there is a spring in my step and the world appears more beautiful and interesting. When feeling of no use, my body itself seems heavier, with psychosomatic reactions including anxiety, heat and a pricking behind the eyes, as opposed to a feeling of happiness and satisfaction. The construct, of course, governs my action and choices in terms of both long-term decisions (for example, to continue writing and promoting PCP) and immediate choices, such as agreeing to participate in a project. In terms of narrative, these paragraphs themselves provide an example, as well as my own thinking and fantasy, in which scenarios of success or failure run through my mind. All these combine to characterise me as a person. No doubt the themes I am describing are part of most people’s experience, but there will be aspects and modes of expression that are unique to me and relatively persistent.
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The construct is, of course, thoroughly embedded in my social and cultural heritage, my system of relationships, and is supremely sensitive to, if not (re)created by, the situational and conversational environment that I am in at the time. The concern with achievement and reputation that this construct involves, despite a concurrent wish not to be so attached to these values, is very much a reflection of my family and cultural heritage, including standards absorbed in a Quaker education, growing up in the 1960s and 1970s, and the values and beliefs held on both sides of my family. If I am with people whom I construe as sympathetic and understanding, then I am much more likely to be construing myself and my work at the ‘effective’ end of the construct. If I am feeling of ‘no use’, there is no quicker cure than to encounter a psychologist or colleague whom I come to see as not having such a good grasp or insight into an aspect of life as I do. I am then able to retrieve a view of myself as valuable, by contrast, after all!
Reflexivity and Development My theoretical position has grown and developed as a direct reflection of my own experience in life. One’s own life is like a filter which allows useful and valid notions to pass whilst extracting and disposing of dross. The core of my experience and development resides in my own family’s construct system. Having an English father and a German mother gave me, from an early age, the opportunity to compare two different ways of life and to critique one with the other. The creativity of this dialectic proved, time and again, a rich methodology for investigating many areas of interest. I think I was attracted to the idea of bipolarity in construing long before I heard of a construct. The contrast pole is often just as important in providing the meaning of something as the emergent pole. I have tended to proceed in my learning by looking for the loopholes and exceptions in things. This was perhaps an early version of the ‘deconstructionist method’. When I was about nine years old I remember my English grandfather saying, ‘Stravinsky is awful; it’s not music at all but a horrible din’. I was intrigued: it must be good to make him have such a strong opinion! I still listen to Stravinsky with great pleasure 50 years later. And at Bristol, studying psychology, I overheard our psychometrics lecturer saying, ‘I can’t make head or tail of R. D. Laing, totally incomprehensible to me!’ ‘Well’, I thought, ‘that must be an interesting area to explore!’ I did the same with PCP, as
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this chapter shows. So, I would be interested, when exploring a new and promising area, in asking, ‘Who disagrees with this position? What are the limits of its range of convenience? What examples can’t it deal with?’ Then I can challenge the framework and either enrich and develop it or conclude that we have to move on to something new. Even as I have been writing this chapter, a thought has been occurring to me about a possible lack of reflexivity at the core of PCP. I have been recommending the use and extension of Kelly’s core notion of the construct, applying it more and more widely within personal and then social psychology. The whole idea of the theory is to elaborate a holistic approach to human life, integrating the traditional dichotomies between body and mind, internal and external, personal and social. But what is the contrast pole to this construct of ‘construct’? If there is no such contrast, are we not in danger of saying ‘everything in psychology is a construct’ and therefore of saying nothing? Is Kelly’s central construct not bipolar? In a thoughtful paper, Martha Husain (1983) quotes Kelly: ‘The system is composed entirely of constructs. It consists of nothing but constructs. … We are ascribing a dichotomous quality to all human thinking’ (1955, Vol. 1, pp. 61 and 109). Husain is concerned that PCP could thereby become self-contained and all-encompassing. Kelly, of course, contrasts constructs and concepts, but only to clarify his conception. A construct is not a representation or a schema, a misunderstanding that lies at the base of Goodrich’s (1993) dismissive critique of PCP. Constructs are used to construct representations or images of the world. This does not yet answer the question: to what in human life does the functioning of constructs not apply? We could contrast constructs to events or elements, but it is clear that, once construed, these become in themselves constructs, even when an element is a construed person, which then becomes what Kelly calls a whole-figure construct, such as ‘like’ vs. ‘unlike my mother’. Perhaps pure awareness is an experience that does not involve constructs. Kelly says, ‘The personal construct we talk about bears no essential relation to grammatical structure, syntax, words, language or even communication; nor does it imply consciousness’ (Kelly 1958/1969, my emphasis). Constructs do not require awareness or consciousness, but do consciousness and awareness necessarily require constructs? This seems to take us into the region of Buddhist attempts to get beyond dualistic thinking. But the moment we begin to construe or reflect on some kind of pure state then clearly a construct is invoked. This question has set me thinking broadly and deeply, but I do not yet feel we have a satisfactory resolution of the issue.
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Conclusion I see a construct as being a microcosm of a person’s world, a little aspect of the experience which is theirs. It provides us with a gateway into their life and values. In working with children (Procter 2007), this is a useful way to proceed. One listens out for the spontaneous remarks or reactions that indicate the young person’s choice or preference on a construct that means something to them. One remembers the actual words the child used, allowing one to go back to it later and learn more from the child about what they meant, how it felt, what they did, what story they have to tell, who was there, what the others thought, and so on. Gathering this material helps to develop the child’s sense of personhood and helps other members of the family to take the child more seriously as a person. One parent sitting in the session said, ‘I didn’t know she thought all that!’ We can generalise from this to erect a standard of good communication in any context. By carefully and respectfully listening to each other’s meanings we can achieve a much higher level of interpersonal (and inter-group) understanding. This is likely to be important in promoting good communication and preventing and reducing human conflict and communication breakdown. We can develop theories in order to give us either a picture of human life or provide us with a method with which to proceed in personal and professional arenas. This enhanced PCP provides us with a rich picture or model of the human person and of social life which can be tested in research. But its strongest capacity is, heuristically, to generate a host of methods which can be used in research and professional work as well as in one’s own life. The ten attributes of the construct covered in this chapter each lead to fruitful new areas of research which can test the hypotheses being presented, for example, in investigating the emotions or narratives associated with particular constructs in particular situations. And each of the attributes can help us generate a series of questions that can be asked when we are investigating a situation, a point of view or an area of interest.
References Bateson, G. (1936). Naven: A Survey of the Problems Suggested by a Composite Picture of the Culture of a New Guinea Tribe Drawn from Three Points of View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Bateson, G. (1970). Form, Substance and Difference: Steps to an Ecology of Mind. San Francisco: Chandler Press
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Butt, T. (2004). Understanding People. New York: Palgrave Camus, A. (1960). The Plague. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Dallos, R. (2006). Attachment Narrative Therapy: Integrating Narrative, Systemic and Attachment Therapies. Milton Keynes: Open University Press Davies, B. & Harré, R. (1990). Positioning: the discursive production of selves. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 20, 1, 43–63 Dzinovic, V., Pavlovic, J. & Stojnov, D. (2006). Kelly meets Foucault: understanding school underachievement. Paper presented to the 8th Conference of the European Personal Construct Association, Kristianstat, Sweden Foucault, M. (1975). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Pantheon Books Giliberto, M. (2006). A journey between constructivism and phenomenology concerning ethics: going beyond relativism avoiding the temptation of truth. Paper presented to the 8th Conference of the European Personal Construct Association, Kristianstat, Sweden Goodrich, R. A. (1993). Deconstructing constructs: pitfalls in personal construct theory. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 25, 71–82 Haley, J. (1963). Strategies of Psychotherapy. New York: Grune & Stratton Hermans, H. J. M. (2001). The dialogical self: toward a theory of personal and cultural positioning. Culture and Psychology, 7, 243–281 Husain, M. (1983). To what can one apply a construct? In J. R. Adams-Webber & J. C. Mancuso (eds.) Applications of Personal Construct Theory. Toronto: Academic Press Kelly, G. A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs, Volumes 1 and 2. New York: Norton (reprinted London: Routledge, 1991) Kelly, G. A. (1958/1969). Man’s construction of his alternatives. In B. Maher (ed.) Clinical Psychology and Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly. New York: John Wiley & Sons Mair, J. M. M. (1977). The community of self. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963). The Structure of Behavior. Trans. A. L. Fisher. Boston, MA: Beacon Press Moran, D. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. London: Routledge Neimeyer, R. A. (2005). Growing through grief: constructing coherence in narratives of loss. In D. Winter & L. Viney (eds.) Personal Construct Psychotherapy: Advances in Theory, Practice and Research. London: Whurr Neimeyer, R. A. (2006). Lessons of Loss: A Guide to Coping. Memphis, TN: Center for the Study of Loss and Transition Procter, H. G. (1981). Family construct psychology: an approach to understanding and treating families. In S. Walrond-Skinner (ed.) Developments in Family Therapy. London: Routledge Procter, H. G. (1985a). A construct approach to family therapy and systems intervention. In E. Button (ed.) Personal Construct Theory and Mental Health, Beckenham: Croom Helm
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Procter, H. G. (1985b). Repertory grid techniques in family therapy and research. In N. Beail (ed.) Repertory Grid Technique: Application in Clinical and Educational Settings. Beckenham: Croom Helm Procter, H. G. (2007). Construing within the family. In R. Butler & D. Green, The Child Within: Taking the Young Person’s Perspective by Applying Personal Construct Theory, 2nd edition. Chichester: Wiley Procter, H. G. & Parry, G. (1978). Constraint and freedom: the social origin of personal constructs. In F. Fransella (ed.) Personal Construct Psychology 1977, London: Academic Press Procter, H. G. & Procter, M. J. (2008). The use of Qualitative Grids to explore the development of the construct of Good and Evil in Byron’s play ‘Cain: A Mystery’. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 21, 343–354 Rogers, C. (1956). Intellectualised psychotherapy. Contemporary Psychology, 1, 357–358 Shotter, J. (1969). Prolegomena to a theory of play. Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour, 3, 141–156 Shotter, J. (2005). Persons: points of condensation in a sea of living interactions. Paper for XIth Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, Rome, 7–12 April, Conceptualization of the Human Person in the Social Sciences. http://pubpages.unh.edu/∼jds/Rome.htm Stojnov, D. & Butt, T. (2002). The relational basis of personal construct psychology. In R. A. Neimeyer & G. J. Neimeyer (eds.) Advances in Personal Construct Psychology: New Directions and Perspectives, Volume 5. New York: Praeger Walker, B. & Winter, D. (2007). The elaboration of personal construct psychology. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 453–477 Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J. & Jackson, D. D. (1967). Pragmatics of Human Communication. New York: Norton
Section II
The Men behind the Theory
Chapter 3
The George Kelly I Knew Jay S. Efran Jay S. Efran received his PhD from Ohio State University in 1963. He is currently Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Temple University, Philadelphia and a Fellow of the American Psychological Association and the American Group Psychotherapy Society. He co-authored Language, Structure and Change: Frameworks of Meaning in Psychotherapy and The Tao of Sobriety: Helping You Recover from Alcohol and Drug Addiction. Jay Efran holds teaching awards from the University of Rochester, New York, and Temple University, and received the Constructivist Psychology Network’s Lifetime Achievement Award in 2006.
Introduction In 1964, I attended the American Psychological Association’s 72nd Annual Convention in Los Angeles. One of the focal events was a Division 8 Symposium on ‘Human Ecology’ featuring a panel of luminaries that included the social psychologist Muzafer Sherif and measurement guru Charles E. Osgood (the inventor of the semantic differential). However, what really caught my eye was that George Kelly was listed as a discussant. Having received my PhD at Ohio State University the year before, this seemed the ideal opportunity to say hello and bring him up to date with how things were going for me at the University of Rochester. The day of the symposium was filled with surprises – not the least of which was Kelly’s ‘performance’ at the meeting. When it was his turn to speak, Kelly stood up and promptly announced that he would, in fact, have ‘nothing to say’. Pregnant pause; stunned silence. He went on to explain that a few weeks before, when advance copies of the symposium papers Reflections in Personal Construct Theory. Edited by Richard J. Butler © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
44 Jay S. Efran arrived in the mail, he did a quick calculation; for each paper, he multiplied the average number of words per page by the number of pages. His computations convinced him that even if they were to read their papers at breakneck speed, the presenters would run well over their time limits, leaving no time for discussant comments. That being the case, he reasoned, why bother to prepare any? More audience astonishment. Kelly then went on to describe his growing panic as he realised that the presenters were not, in fact, sticking to the manuscripts they had sent. ‘Why, the first presenter skipped more than half of what he had written!’ Kelly grumbled. ‘Worse yet, the second panelist spoke entirely off the cuff, without even consulting his notes.’ Kelly proceeded to describe how he felt his heart rate increase as it dawned on him that there would, in fact, be plenty of time for his nonexistent discussant remarks. ‘Perhaps,’ he admitted with a characteristically Kellyan chuckle, ‘cutting corners wasn’t such a good idea after all!’ As Kelly described his plight, the initial hush in the audience began to be punctuated by little giggles here and there – and, finally, full laughter. Evidently, Kelly’s ‘confession’ struck a familiar chord with everyone who had ever scrambled to finish a paper en route to an important meeting or forgotten to pack their lecture notes. Of course, very few of us confess to such sins as publicly and cheerfully as Kelly seemed to be doing. As he spoke, the mood in the room shifted palpably from something stodgy and academic to more light-hearted and intimate. The audience had begun to enjoy themselves, and they were now hanging on Kelly’s every word, wondering what he might say next. Kelly then proposed that since he had nothing prepared, he might as well talk about personal construct theory (PCT) – a topic he could discuss in his sleep. However, in deference to his role as discussant, he would do his best to connect what he was saying to the issues the symposium participants had raised. Kelly then proceeded to sketch in a few PCT basics, followed by a brilliant analysis of how these principles might help resolve some of the dilemmas with which the presenters had been struggling. This part of his talk was so adroit that many in the audience – me included – began to wonder if Kelly’s initial mea culpa was merely a ploy to capture the audience’s attention. For Kelly, such a cheeky gambit would not be out of character. His talks were rarely ‘plain vanilla’, and he frequently began with a quirky anecdote or oblique premise that kept everyone guessing about where he was headed. In any event, whether genuine or contrived, his presentation at that symposium certainly made an indelible impression on me. I still have vivid memories of it more than four decades later. There were a few other surprises that day, but before discussing them, I want to mention a little-known manuscript called ‘Feelings for and feelings
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of’ which Kelly wrote in 1959. In that essay, Kelly begins by counselling his readers to steer clear of all of footnotes: ‘You have been duly warned in the Preface, if you read it as you were supposed to, against paying attention to any of these footnotes. They are bound to confuse you, just as they do me. Most certainly they will take a lot of the fun out of reading what otherwise I had hoped might be a rather congenial and amusing visit between us’ (Kelly 1959). Later, in that same footnote, he adds: ‘Confusing, isn’t it? Now you see why you were urged to leave these footnotes alone. If you must know, they are written solely for those constitutionally anxious flibbertigibbets who cannot sit down and enjoy a book without everlastingly puzzling over what the book is supposed to be about. Now you aren’t that kind of a person, are you?’ A later footnote reiterates the point: ‘Don’t look at these footnotes; they only dampen your interest in what you are about to read!’ Of course, these teasing asides guaranteed that every footnote would have the reader’s undivided attention. So, here we have two examples – one oral and one written – of Kelly’s penchant for toying with his audience’s expectations. By announcing that he was caught unprepared, he quickly humanised an otherwise stuffy symposium (and provided a perfect excuse for talking about PCT), and by belittling his own footnotes, he ensured that his readers would pay keen attention to them. Kelly seemed to delight in such whimsy. Perhaps that is why former students so regularly described him as having a ‘mischievous smile and glint in (the) eye’ (Fransella 1995). Of course, there was a method to his madness – he clearly understood that it is the unexpected twist that rivets attention.
A Tense Moment I remember sitting in one of Kelly’s classes when he startled everyone by suddenly whirling in the direction of a classmate – we’ll call him Joe. ‘What’s the matter with Joe?’ Kelly asked loudly. We all turned to Joe, who had been dreamily minding his own business but who now nearly fell out of his chair. Kelly then continued, softly and sweetly, ‘Well, the trouble with Joe is that he doesn’t realise who he could be other than Joe.’ Kelly went on to explain how each of us tends to get stuck performing the same life ‘act’ day in and day out, hardly aware that there are alternatives. As Richard Bach (1977) puts it, ‘Argue for your limitations, and sure enough, they’re yours.’ Later that day, Kelly’s comment about Joe got me thinking about the habitual roles I played in my own family. For instance, as the ‘dutiful son’,
46 Jay S. Efran I was usually the one who remembered to send a birthday or anniversary card. My brother, who was much more rebellious, rarely bothered with such family niceties. The irony is that, after a while, a card from me tended to be taken for granted whereas one from him was hailed as a minor miracle. Neither my brother nor I know exactly how or when we were ‘assigned’ these roles. We don’t remember having signed any contracts promising to behave in a certain way. In any event, Kelly’s lecture was a useful reminder that such family roles persist because we are generally oblivious to our power to change them. By the way, for Kelly, it didn’t matter whether Joe considered his usual persona good or bad, right or wrong, successful or unsuccessful. He thought we could all profit from an occasional shift in our grounding premises. Of course, this theme of playing with alternatives is basic to PCT and is also the heart of Kelly’s most innovative treatment format – fixed-role therapy (Kelly 1955; 1963/1969). In a nutshell, the fixed-role format invites clients to try out a specially designed role for a predetermined period of time. Usually, the role does not entail drastic modifications of outward behaviour. Instead, it involves a shift in the way the person defines him- or herself. For instance, an individual who is quiet and considers himself painfully shy might be asked to play the role of a ‘thoughtful’ person who doesn’t speak much unless he has something important to say. The casual observer might not notice much of a difference, but the person would be thinking differently about why and when he enters a conversation. The fixed-role exercise does not assume that the new role is necessarily superior to the old, nor does it imply that the fixed role ought to be adopted permanently. This is not an extreme makeover. When the exercise ends, the person returns to being who he or she was before, but is free to make use of any insights garnered from viewing the world through a different set of lenses. A few years ago, I again found myself thinking about what Kelly had told Joe that day. Because of a minor poison ivy rash, I switched my wristwatch from my left arm to my right. Although this may not seem like such a big deal, it took me a few days to get comfortable with the transition. During the process, I found myself noticing all sorts of other semi-automatic and habitual patterns that defined how I lived. Because this was such an eye-opening experience, I decided to ask some of my clients to try out a few minor life changes. For example, I asked one individual to get off the bus two blocks before her usual stop and walk the rest of the way home. I asked another to sit on a designated park bench for an hour, being alert to the surroundings rather than reading a newspaper, listening to a Walkman or making cell-phone calls. At the time, I had two clients who rarely read
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for pleasure. For both of them, I recommended A Kiss before Dying – Ira Levin’s (1953) classic page-turner. Both reported profiting from the experience, but in completely different ways. The first, identifying strongly with the main character, decided that his selfishness was ruining his relationships. The second, surprised at how much he enjoyed the book, concluded that he should develop more outside pursuits. Reading mystery novels became one of his new passions. As with fixed-role therapy, these mini-assignments were not designed to solve any particular problems. In fact, I avoided suggesting tasks that seemed to have a direct connection to a client’s issues. Yet, these modest exercises proved to be unexpectedly powerful catalysts for change, possibly because they seemed innocuous and sidestepped the client’s expectations.
Reinventing Assessment Psychological assessment was another arena in which Kelly had an avid interest and made substantial contributions. It was well known that he had little use for psychology’s traditional assessment instruments. He complained that these usually required participants to guess at the answers the psychologist had already decided were correct. Kelly thought it should be the other way around. His goal was to give people the opportunity to teach the psychologist how they thought about their world and to indicate which answers, from their perspective, ought to be considered correct. Kelly’s (1955) Role Construct Repertory Test (REP) is a good example of this approach. As the reader may know, the test invites people to list important individuals in their life and then show how they would make comparisons among them. The REP test uses a triadic format in which three people are compared at a time. Kelly was so enamoured of the technique that he incorporated it into his classroom exams. Answering these questions was a little bit like playing the ‘Sesame Street’ game of deciding ‘which of these things is not like the others’. Each question listed three terms, and the task was to show how any two were alike and different from the third. However, unlike on ‘Sesame Street’, there was no single correct answer, and the format permitted considerable creative latitude. For instance, a psychopathology item might consist of the following terms: (a) schizoaffective disorder, (b) bipolar disorder and (c) anorexia nervosa. A concrete student could point out that only the first two include the word ‘disorder’. A slightly more abstract response might note that only two of the items are classified as ‘psychoses’. Still more inventive responses could involve comparing (a) the dietary and nutritional implications of each
48 Jay S. Efran disorder, (b) the role each played in the history of psychiatry, (c) the differences among them in terms of recommended treatment approaches, or (d) the way a psychoanalyst might construe the aetiology of each. When Kelly was less interested in our conceptual agility and more concerned about whether we had read the assignments, he used ordinary matching questions rather than something fancier. However, even these involved a Kellyan twist. Instead of the answers just being labelled ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, Kelly used letters from anywhere in the alphabet. Therefore, the correct match might be tagged ‘i’, ‘o’, ‘r’ or ‘x’. Any letter could be used more than once and some were not needed at all. Furthermore, if you happened to get everything right, your choices would spell a word or phrase down the side of the page. On one exam, for instance, the letters for the correct choices spelled ‘icing the cake’. Of course, the fact that the answers formed a recognisable pattern made grading a snap but cheating a likelihood. After all, a student who knew a couple of the items could simply fill in the rest by guessing the relevant key phrase. In fact, we were puzzled about Kelly’s apparent lack of concern about this possibility. So one day we asked him about it. ‘Not a problem’, he said, smiling broadly, ‘you see, I often misspell the words I use as a key.’ Sure enough, on our very next test, the correct answers spelled ‘pemsonal’ rather than ‘personal’. Because Kelly so often criticised the medical model and the disease-entity approach, we were also puzzled by why he was so insistent that we study Henderson & Gillespie’s classic Textbook of Psychiatry (1950) and why he included so much DSM terminology in his tests. His reply was that he considered becoming fluent in ‘the language of psychiatry’ an essential step to becoming a competent researcher and effective critic. Although he delighted in having students challenge conventional wisdom, he also insisted that we know what we were talking about! Because he loved a touch of rebelliousness and had so many reservations about traditional testing procedures, Kelly was bound to respond positively to a project that a classmate and I did for one of his classes. Instead of handing in a paper, we tape-recorded a role-play of a teacher-psychologist conference. We had written the script, persuaded some friends to play leading roles and got Kelly’s permission to play the final product for him and the rest of our class. We knew that with his background as a dramatics coach and his interest in role-playing, Kelly was sure to like the idea. Moreover, our skit was a humorous look at the dangers of reifying test concepts, an issue to which Kelly was quite sympathetic. For instance, he used to argue that discussions about the immutability of IQ tended to be vacuous. Intelligence scales, by design, contained only items that were rela-
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tively insensitive to changes in performance conditions. Items that produced more variable results were automatically discarded. Therefore, it is mere tautology to assert that intelligence – or at least what the intelligence scales measure – is difficult to modify. This tells us something about the suppositions of the test-makers, but virtually nothing about human nature. In any event, our role-play was a tongue-in-cheek portrayal of how a teacher’s reification of the IQ concept distracted her attention from what she might do to understand her pupil and improve his classroom work. Because the skit was funny and irreverent it earned both of us a solid ‘A’.
Bon Voyage Kelly’s interest in novel assessment methods, always strong, intensified in 1958, just before he left Ohio State University for a sabbatical year abroad. He had planned to interview psychologists in foreign countries in order to learn more about how they conceptualised the field. Therefore, he was interested in inquiry methods that were basically open-ended but would still permit cross-cultural comparisons. As part of his plan, Kelly intended to conduct informal discussions with small groups of psychologists in each of the countries he visited. He wanted to avoid asking stock questions, knowing that these would inevitably reflect his own biases and make it harder for the European psychologists to reveal their own conceptual templates. As the date for his trip approached, Kelly used every opportunity to pretest the methods he was exploring. One result of this experimentation was a rather disastrous essay question that popped up in one of our class exams. He gave out blank sheets of paper, with the instruction that we draw a picture of a homunculus looking up at us. Then, we were supposed to write an essay about what that homunculus saw, particularly with regard to our purview as budding psychologists. Unfortunately, many of us had no idea what a ‘homunculus’ was. We racked our brains trying to remember whether we had come across such a term in the readings. In desperation, most of us drew a face with prominent eyes. Mine looked like one of the ‘Kilroy Was Here’ cartoons of the Second World War. The essay I wrote was basically some drivel about my future career plans. The results from our class were so dull that Kelly ultimately decided to scrap the question altogether, and the so-called homunculus exercise died a quiet death. More successful were some of the formats Kelly pre-tested with our research team. I should explain that, for me, being on Kelly’s team was a magical experience. In fact, I found this element of the Ohio State
50 Jay S. Efran curriculum so valuable that I made a point of ‘importing’ it into Temple University’s clinical programme when I became director there in 1971. At Ohio State, each faculty member’s team met weekly and was composed of students at different year levels. Initially, students were randomly assigned to the various teams and would typically rotate to a different team each quarter. (Ohio State was on the quarter rather than the semester system.) However, once a student began work on a project with a particular advisor, he or she remained on that person’s team until the project was completed. Team meetings served multiple purposes. It was the place to brainstorm ideas, seek help devising questionnaire items, pre-test experimental instructions, solicit volunteers for rating tasks, and so on. It was also a great vehicle for learning how to present in front of a group and field tough questions. Kelly’s team meetings were always held in the evening and at his home. His wife, Gladys, usually pitched in with refreshments, which were often quite creative. When the weather was cold, for example, she might serve hot chocolate or warmed cider with cinnamon-stick stirrers as well as the usual tea and coffee. As a new graduate student in an era of somewhat formal faculty–student relationships, I felt privileged to be welcomed into an esteemed faculty member’s home for these cosy fireside gatherings. On Kelly’s team, there was an admirable openness to new, even whacky, ideas. In fact, I don’t think I ever heard Kelly pooh-pooh anyone’s initial attempts at a research proposal. He seemed infinitely patient and encouraging – much more than I would have been. Although we laughed a lot at these meetings, it also felt like we were participating in something important – a grand intellectual venture. Perhaps that feeling derived from knowing that it was in just such a setting, only a few years earlier, that Kelly previewed drafts of his book chapters, reading them aloud and soliciting feedback from the group.
Duelling Tape Recorders As I indicated, Kelly used some of our meetings to pre-test materials for his European trip. One of our jobs was to help him decide what kind of tape recorder to take on the trip. In those days, the reel-to-reel Wollensak was the workhorse to be found in most clinics and psychology departments. However, Kelly needed something much lighter and more portable. Unfortunately, the technology for handheld recorders was in its infancy, and few machines had sufficient fidelity to allow group discussions to be recorded and reliably transcribed. Kelly had convinced various local vendors to let
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him try out their machines, and our weekly meetings became the testing site. While we were ‘auditioning’ tape recorders, we were also piloting Kelly’s discussion formats. The one I remember most clearly, and found the most intriguing, was called ‘the ice floe problem’. The setup was roughly as follows. Three individuals are stranded on an ice floe. Unfortunately, the rescue helicopter that arrives only has enough room to take two of them to safety. Moreover, because the ice floe is breaking up rather rapidly, there will not be time for a second trip. The group’s task is to decide who stays and who goes. In presenting this problem, Kelly explained that he was prepared to answer the group’s questions about the three people on the floe. However, the questioner would have to be specific about what he or she wanted to know. In the developing discussion, members of our team asked about the ages of the three individuals, their family background, their religious beliefs, their professions, their aspirations, their criminal records, their health, and so on. Kelly seemed to be having a marvellous time responding to our questions and gradually divulging more and more details about the individuals on the floe. Of course, he also took careful notes about the questions we were asking and the way the debate developed. Frankly, I have no recollection about whom we saved that night or which brand of tape recorder won our endorsement. However, I can report that the ice floe problem, which was a big hit with our group, made the final cut for Kelly’s European excursion, as can be verified by reading Kelly’s ‘Nebraska symposium on motivation’ paper (Kelly 1962).
A Fateful Meal I am now finally ready to return to my description of the other events that transpired on the day of that symposium in 1964. As the session was breaking up, Kelly was quickly surrounded by a throng of well-wishers. I decided to hang back a while in order to let the crowd thin. By the time I got close to where Kelly was standing, he was holding an appointment book in his hand and scheduling meetings with panel members and various other dignitaries. At that time, he was a well-known figure in APA circles, and people were clamouring to have a word with him. As we made eye contact, he seemed to assume that I too wanted to set up an appointment. Before I had a chance to clarify that I was just waving hello, he had already apologised for having no slots left open and proposed that, instead, we meet for
52 Jay S. Efran breakfast the following morning. In that awkward moment, all I could think to do was to agree. I should point out that although Kelly and I were on good terms – after all, he loved our teacher-psychologist role-play – we did not have anything like a close relationship. We were not, for example, on a first-name basis, and I would never have suggested that we dine together, especially without having some important business to transact. Yet, I had just somehow agreed to meet him for breakfast, almost undoubtedly having created the false impression that we had some valid reason for getting together. As I walked along the hotel corridor, I was struck by a terrible irony. Just as Kelly didn’t have any discussant remarks to present at the symposium, I had no agenda items for our imminent rendezvous. On the other hand, whereas he had confessed to his lack of preparation, I was not at all sure I had the courage to do the same. I spent a rather sleepless night, concocting presumably weighty matters for us to discuss. One ploy I considered was to ask lots of questions about PCT. I even invented a bogus research design that I hoped might give us something to discuss. However, as morning arrived, all such ideas began to seem increasingly feeble. At the appointed hour, I made my way towards the hotel’s coffee shop with the slow gait of a condemned man mounting the steps of the gallows. I had no idea what would happen, and I had just about given up caring. The truth is, the moment we met, all of my trepidations about our breakfast disappeared. In fact, we had an absolutely wonderful time, our conversation rolled along effortlessly, and I never felt the least impulse to trot out any of my contrived questions or to outline my fictional research plan. Eating together seemed like the most natural arrangement in the world, and I suddenly felt like a colleague and friend rather than just an advisee. One aspect of our meeting made it truly memorable – a turning point in my career. Kelly had asked about my year at the University of Rochester, and he seemed genuinely interested in hearing about the experiences I had had. After giving him a synopsis of the year’s highlights, I had to mention, in all candour, that I was both puzzled and shocked by the department’s relentless pressure to ‘publish or perish’. For instance, soon after I arrived on campus, I was advised by several members of the senior faculty that I should mount only short-term research projects and be certain that these would have sure-fire outcomes. If I were wise, I would postpone anything more adventurous until later in my career. Similarly, I was warned that I was spending altogether too much time with students and in preparing my courses. Time in the classroom was time away from the lab! Some of the other junior faculty members seemed to be operating in a state of near-
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panic, worrying that their publications wouldn’t impress the tenure committee. The work of one earnest, bright, industrious chap was constantly being disparaged as ‘second-rate’. In fact, that individual went on to become a major figure in the field, with a very exemplary publication record indeed. I admitted to Kelly that this was a far cry from how I had naively envisaged joining a ‘community of scholars’. Kelly was very sympathetic. Later, I learned that he had turned down a lucrative chairmanship at a major university because he felt that its emphasis on premature productivity was oppressive. He thought that it was of utmost importance that a junior faculty member have sufficient time to develop and to find his or her voice. In our discussion, Kelly pointed out that it wasn’t until late in his own career that he had compiled much of a publication record. I think his exact words were, ‘Until my two volumes came out, most people didn’t think that George Kelly had a single psychological thought in his brain.’ I responded with a ‘yes, but’, suggesting that in his era the field was far less regimented than it is now. Besides, I noted, he had already established himself as a resourceful mental health administrator. In addition, he had played an important role in the historic Boulder Conference on Clinical Psychology and was a ground-floor participant in APA’s clinical division. Looking back on that conversation, I marvel at my audacity in telling Kelly that his experience was no longer relevant! I was accusing him of being old-fashioned, but he either didn’t mind or I was too insensitive to notice. In any event, he responded by making me an offer I could barely believe and had no right to expect. First, he indicated that he had great faith in my abilities: ‘As far as I’m concerned,’ he said, ‘you have a good head on your shoulders and you need to feel free to use it.’ Therefore, he advised against caving in to any of the pressures for hasty publication. Instead, I should continue to pursue the work I found challenging and meaningful. He said that if, because I followed that advice, I was fired or denied tenure, I should simply pick up the phone and give him a call. He would see to it that I got another, equivalent position. I knew that his offer was sincere and that, in those days, he had the clout to back it up. As it turned out, I never had to make that call. However, just the fact that he made the offer altered the way I functioned as a faculty member, teacher, mentor and clinician. I returned to campus with a greater feeling of security and a renewed sense of purpose. In the following years, I certainly kept one eye on the department’s tenure clock. On the other hand, I tackled some risky projects that I would otherwise have put aside, and I continued to devote as much time to students as I knew they deserved.
54 Jay S. Efran Of course, even in 1964 only a few individuals could have adopted Kelly’s academic godfather stance. However, the values he was championing about the importance of unfettered inquiry are still worth endorsing. For that reason, I have often shared the story of that breakfast with graduate students and younger faculty members who were grappling with career decisions. Until that morning, I had not fully appreciated Kelly’s warmth and compassion. Also, I underestimated how much he cared about the welfare of his students. I had had a previous glimpse of his concern one day at Ohio State when he stopped me in the hallway to announce that he had submitted my name for a faculty opening at Stanford University. Apparently, he was working on my behalf even before I had given much thought to what I might do after graduation – and prior to my having discussed any career plans with him. ‘However,’ he added with a grin, ‘it’s too soon to pack your bags – Stanford often asks for names and then doesn’t do a darn thing with them’ (at least in the halls of academia, he typically said ‘darn’ and not ‘damn’).
A Final Communication For the two years after our 1964 meeting, Kelly and I had very little direct contact. Then, in 1966, a year before his death, I was surprised to find a letter from him in my mailbox. Somehow, he had got wind of the fact that I had been given an outstanding teaching award by the university. His letter was brief, but one of the nicest I have ever received. He first congratulated me heartily on the accomplishment. Then, in typical Kellyan fashion, he wondered aloud whether I might have received the award by handing out too many ‘A’s’ and pandering to students. He then concluded that, no, given his knowledge of me, I must have earned it ‘honestly’. I pictured him grinning broadly while writing that line.
Acknowledgement The author wishes to thank Elsa R. Efran for her help in preparing this chapter.
References Bach, R. (1977). Illusions: Confessions of a Reluctant Messiah. New York: Delacorte Press
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Fransella, F. (1995). George Kelly. London: Sage Henderson, D. K. & Gillespie, R. D. (1950). A Textbook of Psychiatry, 7th edition. London: Oxford University Press Kelly, G. A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volumes 1 and 2. New York: Norton (reprinted London: Routledge, 1991) Kelly, G. A. (1959). Feelings for and Feelings of. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Kelly, G. A. (1962). Europe’s matrix of decision. In M. R. Jones (ed.) Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1962. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press Kelly, G. A. (1963/1969). The autobiography of a theory. In B. Maher (ed.), Clinical Psychology and Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly. New York: John Wiley & Sons Levin, I. (1953). A Kiss before Dying. New York: Simon & Schuster
Chapter 4
Don Bannister Through the Looking Glass Fay Fransella Fay Fransella became entranced by Kelly’s ideas in the mid-1960s. She was one of a small group of people who formed the ‘Kelly Club’ set up by Don Bannister. Her early work with those who stutter was based on the idea that each person who stutters needs to elaborate a notion of themselves in relation to other people. Since then, she has written and edited several books on personal construct psychology, the most recent being the edited International Handbook of Personal Construct Psychology (2003) and A Manual for Repertory Grid Technique (second edition, with Richard Bell and Don Bannister, 2004) (the inclusion of Don’s name in that book was to acknowledge his authorship in the first edition).
Background It is not possible for me to write about Don Bannister in the context of reflexivity without acknowledging at the outset that I am also involved in that reflexivity. I have changed my views on how this chapter should be written as I looked in greater depth at his work. I want also to acknowledge the very helpful comments Max Farrar made on a draft of this chapter, particularly in relation to Don’s novels. There were some things I was absolutely sure of before starting this chapter. I am certain that without Don Bannister in the early 1960s psychology would not have got its first taste of an alternative to its existing focus on ‘non-reflexive science’, for it was Don who flamboyantly stated that ‘reflexivity is here to stay whether you [psychologists] like it or not’. Reflections in Personal Construct Theory. Edited by Richard J. Butler © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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However, Neimeyer (1985) says that ‘it would be misleading to assume that Bannister’s efforts have been solely responsible for the development of PCT in the UK’. He points out that the Zeitgeist was for alternatives to ‘psychology is a science’ offered by such people as Polanyi (1958) and Kuhn (1962), who were making waves, as were people like R. D. Laing (1960) with his book The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness followed by many others. Don came across Kelly’s ideas by sheer chance. Neimeyer (1985) interviewed him in 1979 and Don describes what happened. He was working for his PhD at the Institute of Psychiatry, London in 1957 and was reading all the textbooks he could find on personality in alphabetical order to find one that related to him personally and – lo and behold – there were Kelly’s two volumes. He sat down and read solidly for many hours and returned home exhausted. While watching the television that night he found that he was making sense of what was happening on the screen in personal construct terms. He realised it was making sense to him in personal terms: ‘And this really did sort of seize hold of me, because one of the part-articulated demands I’d been taught or read about was a sort of personal demand, that they somehow make sense of me and my personal life’ (Neimeyer 1985). He was hooked. But that story tells us more. I think it fair to say that Don was a ‘reflexive psychologist’ before he even came across Kelly! In his chapter on personal construct theory (PCT) and politics he has a whole section on reflexivity and there talks about his own thinking. In adolescence he saw himself and others ‘as essentially “individuals” whose actions were wholly determined by their individual nature’ (Bannister 1979a). His personal construct was ‘individual’ vs. ‘society’, where society was something to be rebelled against. He spent his time looking for a psychological theory that would provide a framework for his existing ideas. And along came Kelly.
Don Battles for a Reflexive Psychology thus we might set about enlarging science. Perhaps from the starting point that when the natural scientist says of a changing object ‘what does this change signify’, he is not asking the same question as when we ask of a changing person ‘what does this change signify for him’ – for this latter is truly a psychological question. (Bannister 1970)
I think it is fair to say that it was Don who forced British psychologists to become aware that something new was appearing in their discipline. In
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the mid-1960s he tackled psychologists head-on with a paper published in the Bulletin of the British Psychological Society entitled ‘Psychology as an exercise in paradox’ (Bannister 1966). I am very surprised that it was accepted for publication and cannot but admire the assessors involved. It is Don at his most quotable. Much has indeed been cited from it and I have to refrain from doing too much of it here, but some I cannot resist. His opening sentence is: ‘This paper was originally entitled “Was psychology ever a good idea?” On reflection such a title seemed both undignified and doom-laden, and was discarded’ (Bannister 1966), but he goes on to say that the subject matter still relates to that original title. He then describes the ‘model of man’ at the core of current theories. Many will remember his description of the man within psychoanalytic theories as being a battlefield: ‘He is a dark cellar in which a well-bred spinster lady and a sex-crazed monkey are forever engaged in mortal combat, the struggle being refereed by a rather nervous bank clerk’ (Bannister 1966). And then in a nutshell he describes learning theory man as ‘basically a ping-pong ball with a memory’. The point he was making, of course, is that there is a paradox in that psychologists see themselves as being quite different from the ‘organism’ or the ‘subject’. He then (still on the first page) comes to the central issue: ‘In short, we have not yet faced up to the issue of reflexivity and the need for reflexivity in psychological thinking’ (Bannister 1966). He points out that it is really only psychologists who insist on being ‘scientists’ in the traditional sense of the word, whereas people like politicians, mothers, bartenders and conmen have pondered about ‘the interesting problem of what is man’. He sums up the nature of ‘psychology as a science’ with: ‘It may be that psychology is the only science which has been able to produce concepts of its subject which are clearly more mean, more miserable, and more limited than lay concepts.’ At the time Don was writing that paper he must also have been deeply into writing the first book on repertory grids with Miller Mair, entitled The Evaluation of Personal Constructs. The first paragraph of chapter 1 makes their point clear: Psychology is often described, especially in introductory textbooks, as the science of behaviour. This phrase claims for psychologists the status and dignity of scientists, engaged in predicting and controlling the behaviours of subjects who are submitted to tasks designed by the experimenter. It simultaneously claims that the important thing to study in their subjects – other human beings – is agreed units of observable behaviour, agreed between experimenters, not between subject and experimenter. There seems to be relatively little concern with the possibility that the subject, in his own way, may
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Followed by: Psychologists in general have been rather slow to admit that their human subjects may be in the same league as themselves in this business of prediction, control and understanding, and some still refuse to regard them as being interested in the game at all.
From his ‘Psychology as an exercise in paradox’ article (Bannister 1966) and his book with Miller Mair (Bannister & Mair 1968) Don moved on to ‘Science through the looking glass’ (Bannister 1970). In this he turns to the subject of what psychologists need to do to encompass the fact that we are not using ‘subjects’ in our scientific experiments but people like ourselves, who are trying to make sense of what we are asking them to do. He spells his idea out thus: What does not seem to be commonly envisaged is that rather than traditional science moulding psychology, psychology might be the new venture which will remould science. When Gods have been thought to frown upon new undertakings, men have been known to alter their theology rather than abandon their undertakings. (Bannister 1970)
He suggests that psychology should be able to find common ground among its differing psychological approaches. In such a situation he acknowledges that Kelly made sure it was a frontrunner with its ‘man-as-scientist’ as its model of the person. But he points out: such a notion cannot explain science. It can only assure us that construct theory will see science as no Godlike, unique or freakish undertaking, but will depict it as an extension of ordinary human questing, as a formalization of sloppy human curiosity, as a Sunday best version of man in an everyday mood. (Bannister 1970)
Don thought science should become a sub-system like music or chess, having its own language and usage. He suggests that being a clearly defined sub-system gives its members a certain freedom of movement: The astronomer hovering between steady state and big bang theories does not have to feel responsible for the biologist who is polishing up evolutionary theory, any more than the composer dabbling in diatonic scales has to footnote implications for strong centre theory in chess. Thus, individual sciences
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and scientists have the kind of freedom which we grant ourselves in our personal life when we keep a degree of separation in our construing of our working life, our loving life, our political life. (Bannister 1970)
Later, he might have added ‘the novel’ to this analogy. He goes on in that chapter to spell out exactly what he thought the changes in psychology should be for it to become a ‘reflexive psychological science’. Throughout the 1960s and thereafter Don was tireless in accepting invitations to talk at university students’ Psychological Societies, for it was students who liked this alternative approach to psychology. As the load got heavier I was glad to be involved in travelling the country to ‘spread the word’. It had been my intention to package this chapter in neat parcels such as ‘Don the psychotherapist’, ‘Don the politician’, ‘Don the teacher’, ‘Don the novel writer’ and ‘Don the person’. But I decided it is not possible or even desirable to attempt to package a person. All our roles keep spilling into each other. But now I have seen so clearly that he was essentially a ‘reflexive psychologist’ long before he came across Kelly, and looked at how he tried to convince other psychologists how essential being reflexive is to developing a psychology of the living, moving person, two areas of his life stand out to me. These are ‘Don as researcher’ and ‘Don the storyteller’. However, before moving on, there is one story that Don recounts (Bannister 1979a) that exemplifies the reflexivity in Kelly’s theory that all of us are personal construers. This was to do with B. F. Skinner and his ‘token economies’, which were popular at the time for use in psychiatric hospitals. Tokens were given to ‘long-stay’ patients for doing up their flies, making their bed, using a knife and fork, and so forth. In this example, all was going well. But there was one patient who twigged what it was all about and became very adept at earning tokens. He then set up his own economy system and gave out tokens to fellow patients for not doing up flies, not making the beds, and so forth. The outcome of the two competing token economies was ‘no change’. Those running the token economy system were nonplussed. I do not think that Skinner would have been amused either. But I think that Don would be saddened by the evidence that mainstream psychology has not given up the non-reflexive ‘old science’ game. In his President’s Column in the British Psychological Society’s journal The Psychologist Ray Miller starts his May 2006 column by saying: ‘The marriage of science and practice in psychology remains the bedrock on which both the discipline and the profession are firmly founded’. Then in June 2007, the new President of the BPS, Pam Maras, says in the President’s Column: ‘Psychology is a science-based discipline; research is the foundation of and central to psychology.’
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Don as Researcher Kelly (1955) integrated notions of appropriate research design into his theory, from the very beginning. He did this by creating an essentially reflexive theory: that is a theory which accounts for its own construction. … Research is seen as simply one formalized version of ordinary human inquiry. (Bannister 1981a)
With this deep belief that psychologists must work with other construing beings, it is no surprise that Don automatically took this approach to those who were diagnosed as schizophrenic and who exhibited ‘thought disorder’. Don had worked for some years in a psychiatric hospital with so-called long-stay patients, so it was perhaps not surprising that he chose to work with these seriously handicapped people. But I think we can also find a possible reason in Don himself. There is a commonly held idea that we choose to work with certain groups of people because they have some personal meaning for us. Most would agree that Don was brilliant with words in both speech and writing. How different from him were those who use a private language which is incomprehensible to others much of the time. He says that, as personal construct psychologists: ‘We accept that they are probably saying something very meaningful and that it is we who lack the necessary construct subsystem to enable us to understand them. The shortcoming is ours not theirs’ (Bannister & Fransella 1986; 2003). There is perhaps another reason. Don was a ‘tight’ construer. I do not believe in ‘trait theory’, but I do think that we have a preference towards being a ‘tight’ or a ‘looser’ construer. Don was very clear about what he believed in, what his views were. Kelly is said to have commented something along the lines that Don was the only dogmatic personal construct theorist he knew. As an example of Don’s tendency towards tight construing, we once explored Denny Hinkle’s implications grid (1965). Don was not pleased to discover that his impgrid was filled with ‘reciprocal implications’. That is, to be ‘generous’ means you are a ‘good friend’ and someone who is a ‘good friend’ is also someone who is ‘generous’. A large number of reciprocal implications suggests a tightly-knit system of personal constructs of the sort used in that particular grid. I sensed that Don found that quite threatening. I wonder if there was, deep inside, the angry man depicted in his novels and Don found possible evidence of his tight construing unwelcome. In my view we worked well together because my favoured mode is towards ‘loose’ construing. I might be good at first and second drafts and Don was better at pulling together the final draft.
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He first published an account of his research on the construing of those who were ‘thought-disordered’ in 1960 (Bannister 1960). He was directly testing Kelly’s view that those with ‘thought disorder’ were best understood using the ‘tight’ vs. ’loose’ construct dimension. Don showed, using a repertory grid, that those diagnosed as having ‘thought disorder’ were indeed construing in a very loose way and were also inconsistent in their construing over time. Not only was he being reflexive in trying to understand the construing of those he was working with, but his work was all totally within the framework of PCT. Salmon, Bramley & Presley (1967), using the ‘Word-in-Context Test’, showed that thought-disordered schizophrenic people were no different from ‘normal people’ when construing objects. The obvious suggestion was that those with very loose construing had great difficulty with interpersonal construing, but were no different from anyone else when construing more concrete things. It was at this time that Don produced one of his great eye-catching phrases: if it is interpersonal construing that has been specifically affected in thought disorder, then any theory about its origins would have to take account of this. Theories of the ‘schizococcus’ would perhaps have to postulate an unlikely bug that bites ‘person-thinking’ rather than ‘object-thinking’ brain cells. (Bannister & Fransella 1986; 2003)
He then went on to theorise that these people had been subjected to ‘serial invalidation’, that is, their predictions about people have been proved wrong too many times: ‘What is being argued is that thought-disordered schizophrenics have been driven to loosen beyond the point at which there are enough workable lines of implication between their constructs for them to re-tighten their system.’ They have, as it were ‘sawn off the psychological branch on which they were sitting’ (Bannister & Fransella 1986; 2003). Naturally, being Don, he went on to ‘test’ this idea by working with non-thought disordered people. These ‘serial invalidation’ experiments consisted of having a number of individuals each making judgements about photographs of people. One group would consistently be told they were right and the other that they were wrong. The ‘right’ group tightened their construing as they became more and more confident. The ‘wrong’ group did not at first ‘loosen’ their construing, but first changed the pattern of relationships. However, eventually, looking at single clusters of constructs rather than a whole sub-system, loosening did take place. Then came the obvious question of whether it was possible to help a thought-disordered person to become ‘thought-ordered’. With a research
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team he sought to set up a ward of those diagnosed as being ‘thoughtdisordered’ and to have staff trained in ‘validating’ any residual construct sub-systems that an individual had been shown to have. However, there were problems with this research. For one thing, it was not possible to have a whole ward made over to the research and to have nursing staff specially trained in recognising when a person was construing in a way that repays specific validation. The conclusion from the research (Bannister et al. 1975) was that it ‘produced no startling “cure” for thought disorder but did suggest that a “journey back” is possible, long and arduous thought that journey may be’ (Bannister & Fransella 1986; 2003). Some people have wondered why he worked with me to produce the ‘Test for Schizophrenic Thought Disorder’ (Bannister & Fransella 1971). At the time I was still contaminated by the teachings at the Institute of Psychiatry, where I was doing my clinical training. That was the kingdom of Hans Eysenck and, at that time, behaviour therapy. I thought that Don’s work was so useful that we should try to put it in a form that the psychiatrists there might pay attention to. Don agreed because he said he could see that, if an early diagnosis were made, it would be easier to help that person tighten his or her construing. I was wrong. It did not work out like that of course, and became a ‘diagnostic test’ which rarely led to psychological help in those days. I have described this research in some detail to show how completely Don was true to Kelly’s theory and its reflexivity. While the main thrust of his research work was on the subject of ‘thought disorder’, he carried out much other insightful work. For instance, on the development of construing in children there was research on ‘the child’s construing of self’ with Joyce Agnew (Bannister & Agnew 1976) and then ‘growing into self ’ with Sharon Jackson (Jackson & Bannister 1985). He also looked at how newly admitted people to psychiatric hospitals see their own problems, what theory they have about those problems and how those complaints are psychiatrically construed. On this he concludes: ‘The discrepancy between the patients’ construing of their own problems and the official, medical subsuming of patients’ complaints by psychiatric hospital staff seriously limits both groups in their capacity to react imaginatively and effectively to psychological distress’ (Bannister 1985a).
Don and His Novels In the final analysis, perhaps our genius for standing in angled relationships to aspects of ourselves and others is such that the novelist is construing his
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or her own construction processes and representing this construction through the figures in the novel. The reader, it is, who provides sociality by construing the construction processes of the author. (Bannister 2006)
Before going into his novels in detail I want to say how grateful I am to Harry Procter for telling me about Camille Paglia’s work, in which she says: The English language was created by poets, a five hundred-year enterprise of emotion and metaphor, the richest internal dialogue in world literature. French rhetorical models are too narrow for the English tradition. Most pernicious of French imports is the notion that there is no person behind a text … Behind every book is a certain person with a certain history. I can never know too much about that person and that history. (Paglia 1990)
I think that she would see Don’s writings as living up to that English tradition. We are lucky to have two sources to delve into to try to see the man behind the novels. One is that of Don himself who wrote about ‘A PCP view of novel writing and reading’ (Bannister 2006) and the other from Max Farrar (2006): ‘People, poetry and politics – the novels of Don Bannister’ (Farrar is a sociologist and so views Don’s novels from a different angle). My assumption here is that Don’s novels do, in fact, reflect his own construing. Taking up Don’s metaphor of ‘Science through the looking glass’ I see four of Don’s novels as clearly reflecting Don the person. Don’s second novel, Shiloh, is so different from his other four. Shiloh is about the American Civil War, whereas, as Farrar (2006) points out, the others are about ‘what happens to a working class northern English man when his fierce, critical and political intellect pushes against the limits imposed on his situation’. Long Day at Shiloh is a product of his life-long study of the American Civil War. Richard Butler believes he even went to the battlegrounds to see them for himself before writing Shiloh. Yet even in this book there are reflections of the author, particularly in General Grant, who is said by Miller Mair to have been Don’s hero. I think Don’s apparent rush to write five novels in eight years could be seen as a need to write his autobiography. As we shall see, the novels directly or indirectly demonstrate Don’s belief in reflexivity. I have been quite lavish with reviews of his novels because I think it is important to know that however autobiographical they are, they are also seen by critics as ‘good stories’ and ‘very well written’. I start with Shiloh because the other four tell a story taken together.
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Long Day at Shiloh (Bannister 1981b) The reviews of Long Day at Shiloh were very good. The cover of the book quotes one review as saying: An extraordinary novel – the stirring recreation, in the sharpest human and historical detail, of the first twenty-four hours of one of the crucial battles of the American Civil war. Here – in the voices, in the actions, in the minds of the men who fought it – is the tumultuous first day of the Battle of Shiloh.
Max Hastings in the Evening Standard said: ‘Bannister’s earthy dialogue is superb, his feel for the confusion, dirt, exhaustion and fear of war cannot be faulted.’ John Nickolson, writing in The Times, said: ‘His command of historical detail and uncanny ability to get inside his characters make this an unforgettable if sometimes harrowing book.’ In true personal construct style Don put on the fly-leaf: ‘Shiloh is a biblical word meaning place of peace’ – a nice bit of bipolarity. Is there any other reflection of Don the person in this book? A psychotherapist once commented to me that Don must have a great deal of aggression in him. I think that was probably so, but I do not know it was ever physical. His aggression manifested itself verbally, as many people know to their cost. He does talk about his anger though, as will be mentioned later. The person behind the book can be seen from Trevor Butt’s account of what Don told him while writing Shiloh. I remember him saying that what was important was the point of view – it was entirely from the men on the ground, whereas most descriptions of battles have a commander’s point of view. In Shiloh there are no maps and no hint of strategy and what is happening is on a grand scale. It’s the common soldiers’ confusion and fear and courage he was interested in. The men all have one thing in common he said: up until that day, nothing like this (or as terrible as this) had happened to them before. And they have to make some sense of it. (Butt, personal communication)
The last page of Shiloh links to another theme in all Don’s books – sex. General Grant, Don’s ‘personal hero’, was wounded, exhausted and alone at midnight on that first day at Shiloh. As his mind wandered, he remembered a party and a woman there and how his eyes were dragged to look at her breasts. In the porch after the dinner and in the moonlight she said he could touch her breasts if he liked. The last two sentences of the book are: ‘He had stood stiffly, hesitating, then put out his hand and lightly touched her breasts. His head lolled forward and his lips loosened into a
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half smile. The cigar dropped from his mouth and hissed onto the wet earth as he fell into a doze’ (Bannister 1981b). Don himself was a cigar smoker.
Sam Chard (Bannister 1979b) Sam Chard was Don’s first novel. It got excellent reviews, many cited on the back of my edition of Shiloh. The New Yorker says: ‘A brilliant piece of storytelling, alternating between dialogue rendered in dark and bitter dialect and a cool, measured narrative, that is as vivid as Zola’s Germinal but without Zola’s hyperbole.’ The Publishers Weekly says: ‘His vignettes of people and their hopelessness are strong, terrible, ultimately moving. Bannister is a man of few words, but he makes his bits and pieces of talk, often in dialect, and his brief moments of lives count. Their sum becomes a mirror image of a particular place at a particular time.’ Don explicitly tells us that this is also a story about himself: I had already written a substantial part of the novel (Sam Chard) convinced that its sole theme concerned the nature of the pit village community before I realised that the specific events adumbrated an alternative autobiography – a super-ordinate which then I consciously articulated into yet further narrative. (Bannister 2006)
He emphasises that his was a class-ridden world and the class of his origin he never forgot. All the explicit descriptions of sex and other bodily functions, the swearing and racist and homosexual comments, are telling us that that was the way it was when he was brought up – all this, of course, written in so brilliant a way. The main impact of Sam Chard on me was that here was Don shouting ‘here I am’, ‘this is how I was brought up’, ‘this is where I belong’, ‘this is ME’. It was as if he was proclaiming that the person most people saw in real life was not the ‘real person’. He acknowledges the novel’s autobiographical nature in his chapter ‘A PCP view of novel writing and reading’ (2006).
Burning Leaves (Bannister 1982) In this novel Paul, the main protagonist, has moved away from his workingclass background and is now a university teacher, just like Don . Of that novel The Times says: ‘We still understand precious little about where and
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why madness strikes and what ought to be done when it does … there is plenty to relish in this funny and beautifully written exploration of life beyond the end of the tether’; The Times Literary Supplement says: ‘A fresh and disturbing energy, written with care. Bannister knows that renewal can be as mysterious as decline and his hero has much to endure before a frail stability sets in. To describe the shattering impact may not be all that difficult but Bannister goes on to explore the aftermath. A smoother more elegant tale would surely be less disquieting’; and John Mellors in The Listener says: ‘There is an uncomfortable, almost painful, clarity about Bannister’s prose and the way he uses it to describe a man’s decline and fall and subsequent rehabilitation.’
The Summer Boy (Bannister 1984) At the start Don quotes from Dylan Thomas’s ‘I see the boys of summer’ as follows: In spring we cross our foreheads with the holly, Heigh ho the blood and berry, And nail the merry squires to the trees, Here love’s damp muscle dries and dies, Here break a kiss in no love’s quarry. O see the poles of promise in the boys.
Gay Firth of The Times says of this book: ‘Remarkable … a good strong plot, interesting action, and vivid characterisation matched with dialogue wonderfully audible, not just readable’; and the Kirkus Reviews says: ‘A strong and loving portrait of a not-so-angry-young-man trying to make his way in a modern-day Great Britain. For once, the reader hopes for a sequel.’ The Summer Boy was a book that Don was particularly keen on. He was saddened because it was not as well received as the others, although many of us would not have been disappointed with some of the reviews. I have always thought that the last line about ‘poles of promise’ was a clear reference to Don’s view of sex, as well as a personal desire for fame and fortune. Max Farrar (personal communication) suggests that it also reflects Don’s own political yearning for society, although I doubt if he would really want to ‘nail the merry squires to the trees’. It sees Martin Morley moving away from his familiar early environment into a different world. The book ends with him having learned how powerless one can be as an individual against an existing political system – in his case, the local council.
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Hard Walls of Ego (Bannister 1987) This book was published posthumously and I have only found one review of it. That appears in the Notes on the History of Anarchism in Literature: ‘Downbeat novel of anarchist activity and interpersonal relationships, where Joe Telford, an anarcho-syndicalist veteran, returns to activism and emotional involvement.’ Hard Walls of Ego reads almost as if Don had written a ‘Fixed Role Sketch’ for himself to see how far he might be able to change. In the end he came up against those hard walls, those treasured, superordinate construings which simply refused to budge. Perhaps he found that there are limits to the changes in ourselves that we can bring about.
Some Common Themes in the Novels 1
Gender
One major point that comes across to me from these novels is that the main characters, always male, seem to think that they cannot have a relationship with a woman without having sex with her. Once that is achieved, the relationship can blossom. He is then at pains to ‘support’ the woman on whatever is her current interest. I found it interesting how there was a connection between the main female character in his novels and the colour of her hair. In Sam Chard there is Cissie standing there with a bruised face ‘and Sam brushed her heavy black hair to one side …’ (p. 28). In Burning Leaves Paul’s wife ‘sat down on the sofa across from him, pulled off her woollen bobble hat and shook out her long black hair’ (p. 7). Then, in Hard Walls of Ego ‘The woman, standing huddled in the rain, clutching a briefcase and a big torch to her chest, was short, with strings of jet black hair hanging lankly from under a soaked headscarf’ (p. 4). In real life Don had a number of relationships with women. In most he may have been the dominant partner, but I imagine also a most caring and supportive one. It sometimes seemed as if he were playing the role of PCP counsellor, wanting the woman to develop both personally and professionally. That is reflected in his novels. Farrar focuses on what he calls Don’s ‘aggressive heterosexuality’. He suggests that Don’s sexist language may have been a specific provocation to feminists. Don had no quarrel with feminism itself but may have been against feminists’ actions such as ‘braburning’. I once said that I felt I should be doing something to support the
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‘movement’. He told me that I should not think that because I was doing more than most by becoming a Reader in a large university. Farrar (2006) then raises the point about whether Don was racist and/or homophobic. I do not know about either. But Farrar adds (personal communication) that it is a genuine question, arising from the disturbance he feels as a reader of some of the more extreme statements made by some of Don’s characters. But I do know that he had several very strongly held views, for instance, on religion. One of the few times I ever saw him explode with violent anger had something to do with religion. I think it was his view that people get ‘trapped’ by religion and are swayed by that rather than by their personal, logical and, perhaps, political views.
2
Social class
Farrar points to social class being a major feature of the novels. Don makes it clear that he saw himself in Sam Chard as a fully-fledged working-class man. Sam is very conscious of social class. Down the mine as an electrician, Sam talks of the social class rankings which placed him a few steps up the social ladder. Don too was once employed as an electrician in a mine. Farrar points out that the period about which Don writes was when the ‘industrial working class was in its death-throes, and he was writing about the first generation of working class people, mainly men, who had access to free state education of a high standard, the grammar school and the university’. He suggests that this resulted in these men moving into an environment ‘when they find themselves face-to-face with representatives of the class that has an excess of both cultural and economic capital’. In Don’s novels the main characters always move up the class structure. Martin Morley in The Summer Boy works as a reporter on a local newspaper; and Paul Killick in Burning Leaves makes the move between classes and became so estranged from all around him that he spends time in a psychiatric hospital. Farrar asks the important question: ‘How heavily does this class differentiation bear down on the man?’ Don moved into a new society himself as his intelligence took him to university and then onwards and upwards. But at that time it was not unusual for miners to move away from their village and on to other things. So I think perhaps what made class such an important construct for him in his novels and, I believe, in his own life, were his politics.
3
Politics
Politics is a major issue in the novels. Don was a very political being. He was a member of The Common Wealth Party, which was founded in 1945
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and came to reject the state-dominated form of socialism adopted by the Labour Party, increasingly aligning itself instead with the co-operative, syndicalist and guild socialist traditions. I do not know much about this, but I do know that Don saw himself as very active politically and that this was extremely important to him. In Hard Walls of Ego Joe Telford becomes involved in political action and travels round the country setting up radio stations and moving on quickly to avoid detection. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of my memory, but Don told me that he and friends once carried out or thought of carrying out a very similar action themselves. I find that the anarcho-syndicalism of Joe Telford is defined as being a branch of anarchism which focuses on the labour movement. Syndicalisme is a French word meaning ‘trade unionism‘. Anarcho-syndicalists view labour unions, not the ones we see today, but genuinely democratic, autonomous, unions of working people, as a potential force for revolutionary social change, replacing capitalism and the state with a new society democratically selfmanaged by workers. Farrar sees that view cropping up in several of Don’s novels, particularly the last one, Hard Walls of Ego. It was something that Don felt very strongly about. Was he describing his own political leanings in Hard Walls? Was that his driving force?
The Man in the Books Before talking more specifically about Don himself in his books there is just one more general point that Farrar makes. He comments on the fact that Don rarely used adjectives in his novels and suggests that Don relied on dialogue to get his point across. I have noticed that he hardly ever ends a question with a question mark. Again, that is unusual. Did he not want to conform to ‘standard practice’? Interestingly, Kelly took the opposite view and suggested we should put the question mark at the beginning as well as at the end of the question, to signal that what follows is a question. Kelly was for helping the reader whereas Don seems to be saying that readers have to look after themselves. No reflexivity there it seems. Farrar (personal communication) suggests that this reflects ‘Don the Dogmatist’ or ‘Don the Old Man’, saying ‘To hell with reflexivity’! For me, the absence of question marks was disconcerting. I found myself repeatedly stopping at that point and it interrupted the flow of what I was reading. But that may say as much about me as it does about Don. How was it that he started writing novels? I think, perhaps, he might have been seeking fame and, perhaps, fortune. So, what do I read into these novels? Don was a saddened man. Starting with Sam Chard and taking Don’s
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comment that it was partly at least an autobiographical account, he is telling readers what a northern British working-class man is like. At the end Sam is not happy. He gets the sack from his job in the mine and on the last page of the book takes his rucksack and thumbs a lift in a lorry. The conversation goes like this: The driver ‘where you after’ Sam ‘Nowt special. Where you goin’. Driver ‘Brum’. Sam ‘That’ll do me fine’.
Young Martin Morley in The Summer Boy does not achieve what he set out to do. He is beaten by the politics of the local council. Paul Killick in Burning Leaves ends up alone, moving away from his loving wife. Perhaps the saddest man of all is Joe Telford in Hard Walls of Ego. After experiencing a seemingly happy relationship with Janis, he walks away from her and returns to his old home to live alone once more. Don too ‘returned home’ to Yorkshire where he was cared for by Sharon Jackson during his last months. Don dedicates this book to ‘Sharon Ruth Jackson – without walls’. I think it is worth dwelling on this return to his homeland as it relates to Hard Walls. Here is part of the quotation Don gives at the start of the novel. It comes from Bernard Russell’s Marriage and Morals: Love is something far more than desire for sexual intercourse, it is the principal means of escape from the loneliness which afflicts most men and women throughout the greater part of their lives … Passionate mutual love while it lasts puts an end to this feeling; it breaks down the hard walls of the ego …
Joe Telford gave up his seemingly deep involvement with Janis to return to where he was ‘at home’. He had moved away with Janis and become involved in much political activity, which resulted in him going to prison. Then those hard walls of ego had reappeared. I got a great feeling of despondency reading of his departure: Jan stood back from the front bay window so that she could see out but not be seen from the outside. She watched Joe walk slowly down the estate road. Twice he turned and half-raised his hand but she stood unmoving, until he had disappeared from sight.
But you could see how he warmed to being ‘at home’ once again, among so many familiar things – and people – and a very construable world:
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Joe shut the window, steered his television stand to a position opposite the armchair, pushed the plug into its socket and switched the set on. He moved behind it to put a few lumps of coal on the fire and brushed his hands on his trousers. From the kitchen, he fetched the slice of fruit cake that Nelly had given him. Lowering himself into the armchair, he picked up his glass of wine and checked that the screen showed football. Propping his feet on the stretchers of the stand, he sipped at his wine and smiled as the Liverpool back line shook itself straight and began to flow forward.
Farrer wonders if Don was pessimistic about the political future for the anarcho-syndicalism movement he was so involved with. In view of the role politics played in his life, Farrar may well be right. But I am led to wonder if there was more to it than that. Was this ‘middle-class world’ he had left Yorkshire to enter also in some way failing him? He had found fame in the small world of personal construct psychology and was ‘professionally visible’ in the larger world of psychology itself, yet he did not get as much recognition from that as he hoped for. His work on thought disorder was not taken up by other psychologists let alone psychiatrists as he would have wished – it did not make waves. His last main work was to write all these novels in just eight years. Here, I really do think he wanted to tell us about his life in a truly reflexive fashion.
Don the Psychotherapist I said at the beginning of this chapter that I would not have a section on Don the person or Don the psychotherapist because they would merge with Don the reflexive psychologist and Don the novel writer, but I was wrong. Don spent a great deal of time in a psychotherapeutic relationship with individuals. At an extreme level it is said that at one point in his career he spent one hour each day sitting with a catatonic woman. She would/ could not speak, so he would talk to her, muse out loud or read to her. After several weeks she began to talk and steadily made her way to become a fully functioning person outside the hospital. Another example of his work comes in an interview with Windy Dryden on ‘Therapists’ Dilemmas’. Don chose as his dilemma the person with delusions. He says he tried several ways to approach such a person – humouring or using rational argument – but they failed. However, he found one that seemed to be effective: The simplest way of putting it is to say that what I did was to start dealing with the theme of the delusion without dealing with its content … A distinction that is made in the theory is between superordinate and subordinate
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He gives the example of a man who thought there was a conspiracy by the hospital doctors to assassinate him. He talked of lorries being ordered by doctors to run him down. So Don did not talk about the lorries and being run down but focused on the relationship between him and the doctors. That eventually worked and they were able to agree that a particular doctor was not involved in the conspiracy. Here Don’s basic point was that it is wrong to say that psychotherapy cannot help ‘psychotic’ people. It can, but the time-scale is sometimes years rather than months. When asked what his own dilemma was in working with someone with delusions, Don said he could still get angry with delusional talk: ‘However much I convince myself that there is a way through it … I still cannot easily or readily accept delusional talk … there is something about delusional talk which I still find disturbing, anger-provoking, or at least irritating’ (p. 178). He concludes: It still feels as if the psychotic has broken part of the contract we had between us. I think there is an unwritten contract between people, an agreement to try to explain their feelings and desires to each other and to try to do that to the best of their ability. The psychotic has secretly torn up that contract. It is when that contract is not fulfilled that I am faced with my own limitations. (p. 178)
Don the Reflexive Person This quality of reflexivity, the capacity to reflect upon, is a defining characteristic of self as understood in personal construct theory, distinguishing the self that screams from the self that ponders why it screamed. (Bannister 1985c)
Farrar (personal communication) makes the following point about that quotation: I think it is significant that he postulates here a ‘screaming’ self. He could have said ‘the self that laughs’ or ‘the self that shouts’ … My impression (after reading your essay) is that it’s Don’s sense of himself as ‘screaming’, and pondering incessantly on why he is screaming. One part of his answer, I think, would be political: rage against this oppressive, class-ridden society of
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ours; the other: I have come so far, but those bastards don’t recognise my achievements and I’m screaming in painful anger. So in this sentence perhaps Don is telling us both about the quality of reflexivity AND about Don – as a truly reflexive writer always is!
A great deal of Don’s later writings were about ‘the self ’. And there is much contained in all his writings as well as in previous sections of this chapter. As a person, he believed profoundly in the importance of reflexivity both in reflecting back onto oneself and reflecting the idea that you are also a construer and in both personal and professional roles. Actually, I think that Don did not differ much in those two roles. In both he was at pains to understand what was going on inside the individual he was in contact with. In both roles he was always kind, supportive, generous with his time, concerned and all those other things that make a person feel important and understood. I would like to make a personal statement here that Don the person enriched the lives of hundreds of individuals on a personal basis and as a professional psychotherapist. Many will never forget the part he played in their lives whether as teacher, therapist or friend. I have wondered how Don would have responded to this chapter. I hear him say: ‘Go to it girlie!’
References Bannister, D. (1960). Conceptual structure in thought-disordered schizophrenics. Journal of Mental Science, 106, 1230–1249 Bannister, D. (1966). Psychology as an exercise in paradox. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 19, 21–26 Bannister, D. (1970). Science through the looking glass. In D. Bannister (ed.) Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Bannister, D. (1979a). Personal construct theory and politics. In P. Stringer and D. Bannister (eds.) Constructs of Sociality and Individuality. London: Academic Press Bannister, D. (1979b). Sam Chard. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Bannister, D. (1981a). Personal construct theory and research method. In P. Reason & J. Rowan (eds.) Human Inquiry. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Bannister, D. (1981b). Long Day at Shiloh. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Bannister, D. (1982). Burning Leaves. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Bannister, D. (1984). The Summer Boy. London: Heinemann Bannister, D. (1985a). The patient’s point of view. In D. Bannister (ed.) Issues and Approaches in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Bannister, D. (1985b). The psychotic disguise. In W. Dryden (ed.) Therapists’ Dilemmas. London: Harper & Row
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Bannister, D. (1985c). The experience of self. In F. Epting & A. W. Landfield (eds.) Anticipating Personal Construct Psychology. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press Bannister, D. (1987). Hard Walls of Ego. London; Secker & Warburg Bannister, D. (2006). A PCT view of novel writing and reading. In J. Scheer & K Sewell (eds.) Creative Construing Personal Constructions in the Arts. Giessen: Psychosozial-Verlag Bannister, D., Adams-Webber, J. R., Penn, W. I., and Radley, P. L. (1975). Reversing the process of thought disorder: A serial validation experiment. British Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology, 14, 169–180 Bannister, D. & Agnew, J. (1976). The child’s construing of self. In J. K. Cole & A. W. Landfield (eds.) Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press Bannister, D. & Fransella, F. (1971). A grid test of schizophrenic thought disorder. British Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology, 5, 95–102 Bannister, D. & Fransella, F. (1986). Inquiring Man, 3rd edition. London: Routledge Bannister, D. & Fransella, F. (2003). Inquiring Man, 3rd edition (e-book). London: Taylor & Francis Bannister, D. & Mair, J. M. M. (1968). The Evaluation of Personal Constructs. London: Academic Press Farrar, M. (2006). People, poetry and politics – the novels of Don Bannister. In J. Scheer & K Sewell (eds.) Creative Construing Personal Constructions in the Arts. Giessen: Psychosozial-Verlag Fransella, F. (2003). International Handbook of Personal Construct Psychology. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd Fransella, F., Bell, R. & Bannister, D. (2004). A manual for Repertory Grid Technique, 2nd edition. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd Hinkle, D. (1965). The change of personal constructs from the viewpoint of a theory of construct implications. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Ohio State University Jackson, S. R. & Bannister, D. (1985). Growing into self. In D. Bannister (ed.) Issues and Approaches in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Kelly, G. A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volumes 1 and 2. New York: Norton (reprinted London: Routledge, 1991) Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Laing, R. D. (1960). The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Miller, R. (2006). President’s column. The Psychologist, 19, 259 Neimeyer, R. A. (1985). The Development of Personal Construct Psychology. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press Paglia, C. (1990). Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson. New York: Vintage Books Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge. New York: Harper Salmon, P., Bramley, J. & Presly, A. S. (1967). The word-in-context test as a measure of conceptualization in schizophrenics with and without thought disorder. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 40, 235–239
Section III
Construct Theory as a Meaningful Alternative
Chapter 5
Individuality, Community and Criminal Behaviour James Horley Jim Horley is an associate professor at the University of Alberta, where he teaches in psychology and in the Crime and Community Programme. His main area of research and clinical-consulting work is forensic psychology. He is the author of more than 30 professional articles and book chapters, the author of Sexual Offenders: Personal Construct Theory and Deviant Sexual Behaviour (2008), and editor of Personal Construct Perspectives on Forensic Psychology (2003).
Elaborated aspects of theory: choice; credulous approach; individuality; sociality
If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants. (Isaac Newton 1676, letter to Robert Hooke)
Introduction One giant within psychology is George Alexander Kelly. Without question, Kelly does not receive the attention he deserves. If nothing else, his contributions to the so-called ‘cognitive revolution’ (really more of a ‘cognitive rediscovery’) that occurred in western psychology during the mid-1960s are important enough to warrant wider consideration. Kelly (1955; 1958a) taught psychologists to look beyond the traditional techniques when Reflections in Personal Construct Theory. Edited by Richard J. Butler © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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performing psychological assessments. Kelly (1955) was an innovator too with respect to clinical interventions (Landfield & Epting 1987; Winter 1992). I have no doubt that if I can see anything psychological, it is due largely to Kelly (especially 1955; 1963) and his personal construct theory (PCT). One specific point that Kelly (1955) deserves credit for is recognising the importance of reflexivity in psychology. Although reflexivity is not a straightforward or easily defined notion (Morawski 2005), it refers in its most general sense to a need to engage in any form of self-regard or selfreflection. A reflexive stance appears required in most, if not all, of the human or social sciences. Within psychology, for example, the formal incorporation of a reflexive aspect into psychotherapy has been suggested as key to effective work with many clients, especially criminal offenders (Frost & Connolly 2004). It must be acknowledged, however, that reflexivity has been ignored if not resisted actively by most experimental psychologists over the past century (Morawski 2005). In the spirit of Kelly’s concern with reflexivity, I shall consider the role that PCT has played in my professional and personal development. Since my first exposure to PCT as a second-year university undergraduate, the theory has played a foundational role in my thought and practice as a psychologist, especially my work as a forensic psychologist. I think, however, the theory has affected me in a much broader sense, even though it is more difficult to assess the full extent of the influence of a theory on a life. I will attempt to sketch a picture, however brief and incomplete, of the effect of PCT on my ideas and affairs within the profession of psychology and beyond in this chapter.
Reconciling Individual and Community After four years of work and world travel following secondary education, I decided that I had a serious interest in university and decided to pursue a bachelor’s degree. My intent was not necessarily to learn a profession, but to ‘figure things out’. What needed figuring was not just me as an individual but the broader world of human affairs, so I set out as a psychology major, to understand individuals, and a religious studies minor, to work on the relationships between people and their fellows, things and the universe. I had very lofty goals in those days! My first year of training in the field of psychology, however, was not a very satisfying one. In part, the problem was a lack of consistency, if not outright conflict, between psychology and religious studies. After hearing about rats and conditioned behav-
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iours in introductory psychology, the next class in western religious traditions would involve discussion of people and free will, followed by a consideration of Yogacaran idealism in an eastern religion class. Religious studies were far more interesting and, for me, religion was far more relevant to understanding people. I was beginning to think that I should reverse my major and minor disciplines. Fortunately, I decided to give psychology another chance during a second year as a major to see what the discipline had to offer. If Skinnerian learning principles and Freudian intrapsychic biologism were all that psychology had to offer, psychology would be history for me; indeed, social history, even general history, seemed more relevant to understanding people than psychology. The doors of psychology opened for me during a personality theory course that went well beyond learning theories and psychoanalysis. Brian Little, a new faculty member at Carleton University, presented a theory developed by someone he had spent a summer working with in the United States, a psychologist by the name of George Kelly. He introduced the theory via the work of Adams-Webber (1979), especially his research on the golden section. This was clearly neither a narrow clinical theory nor one simply concerned with principles of learning. Although enthusiastic about the sophistication and contributions of Kelly and PCT, which he remains to this day (Little & Grant 2006), Little ultimately rejected PCT for a number of reasons (see Little 2006). Yet despite his misgivings I was hooked, if only because PCT offered a view of individuals that included a sense of agency and choice, even if it were a choice limited by our previous choices of constructs and behavioural experiments (Kelly 1970a). In many ways, PCT offered me a psychological middle way between the extreme determinism of both psychoanalysis and radical behaviourism on the one hand, and the unlimited freedom of Rogerian theory on the other. PCT also seemed to be situated between the fawning scientism of B. F. Skinner and the anti-scientific position of theorists like Carl Jung. For me, PCT was like the middle path of Buddhism which I had become attracted to. A conversation with Spencer McWilliams about PCT and Buddhism, following a particularly provocative and rousing conference presentation (McWilliams 1988), proved helpful. Despite our differences concerning the nature of the relationship between the two (he saw Buddhism as subsuming PCT, whereas I saw the opposite), McWilliams assured me that the two approaches had features in common and each had something to offer the other. Both Buddhism and PCT, for example, appear to point to constant change, with Buddhism emphasising impermanence of all earthly existence and PCT positing psychological development through construct differentiation and the expansion and contraction of construct systems. Psychology,
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in the form of PCT, did seem to have some substance after all, as well as some connection to an important aspect of my undergraduate education and, indeed, my life. Much of my attraction to psychology was undoubtedly due to Brian Little, my main undergraduate mentor. Little, an extremely engaging lecturer with boundless energy and a terrific sense of humour, influenced me far beyond his splendid yet ultimately discouraging message about PCT. He persuasively presented the case for people-in-context, where the social and physical environmental contexts of all human behaviour have an influence that requires consideration (Little 1987). He developed a unit of analysis, the personal project (Little 1983), and I was attracted enough to this notion and method of analysis that I worked on an undergraduate thesis, a master’s thesis and various other research projects with him (Horley & Little 1985; Horley, Carroll & Little 1988). Although I have disagreed with Little about the best unit of analysis in personality research, always preferring the personal construct over his personality trait, the analysis of personal projects has been one aspect of my work in PCT (Horley 1988a; 1988c; 2001). Even today, personal projects analysis remains an important part of my research and clinical work (Horley 2008). Around the same time that I discovered PCT, I was exposed to community psychology. Experimental social psychology was far too artificial and too trivial for my taste, but community psychology appeared to offer more in terms of the dynamic interplay of various social groups in the real world inhabited by real people. Community psychology no doubt appealed to me because of the overtly political aspects, especially the left-leaning nature of the movement from its origins, as did early Kelly, whom I saw as an egalitarian and socialistic crusader while he travelled the back roads of western Kansas throughout the 1930s. The radical stance of community psychology appealed to me, and no doubt I was drawn to Kelly’s iconoclastic ‘whocares-what-the-majority-thinks’ approach. There seemed, however, to be little direct relevance of PCT to community or applied social psychology, notwithstanding Kelly’s work of the 1930s and the efforts of Bannister (1979) and others, who suggested otherwise. PCT really appeared to me to be an individual psychological theory. I was able to set aside this issue for some time, but it was an apparent nagging limitation of Kelly’s theory. What kept my interest in PCT at this point was its apparent ease at explaining both consistency and change. I was noticing many of my friends and family pursuing one route or the other. Personal change, even some dramatic examples like the transformation of Saul of Tarsus into Paul of Damascus, seemed to be happening to a number of those around me. I was certainly having a problem accounting for such massive and sudden shifts
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using any form of trait theory or even any variation on learning theory. PCT appeared to explain consistency and change rather easily. My own changes, admittedly relatively minor ones given my successes throughout these years, I was able to link rather readily to altered constructions and subsequent, successful behavioural experiments. I and those around me all seemed to be behaving as scientists, including a mix of good and bad scientists, just as Kelly (1955; 1958b; 1970b) had proposed. Near the end of my undergraduate years, two community psychology seminars had a major impact on my career trajectory although, needless to say, I had no idea of their impact at the time. One was taught by Don Andrews, a social learning theorist who worked with offenders and psychological aspects of criminal behaviour (Andrews & Bonta 2003). Andrews was able to demonstrate the importance of a community perspective to the development and change in anti-social behaviour. I was suitably impressed, and worked for Andrews later as a teaching assistant for his large and very popular undergraduate course in the psychology of criminal behaviour. The really influential aspect of Andrews’ arguments was his emphasis on beliefs, attitudes and values. Andrews was at a bit of a loss as to how to conceptualise and assess them properly, and this got me thinking about deficits of social learning theory and wondering anew about the possible contributions of PCT. Not long after that, following more training and exposure to criminal offenders in the real world of prison and forensic hospitals, I was prepared to argue for a PCT-based understanding of beliefs and values (Horley 1991), linked especially to the assessment and treatment work that I had been involved in with sexual offenders (Horley 1988b; Horley & Quinsey 1994; Horley, Quinsey & Jones 1997). Although we do not develop in a social vacuum, and all of us, even criminal offenders, have our constructions shaped by those around us, there is choice in our selection of constructs and our subsequent actions. PCT offered an alternative to the legal and moral conundrum of declaring law-breakers guilty and personally responsible, yet operating according to an innate disorder, such as paedophilia, in the face of which they were helpless. However important the choice corollary within PCT might be in understanding the nature and limits of freedom through the elaboration and definition of personal construct systems, there remained a problem, something lacking, in the sociality corollary. The notion of social roles and the importance of construing others’ construction processes in order to interact successfully may be central to any PCT-based social psychology, but they are far from sufficient to provide a complete foundation for a sensitive and useful social theory. I would agree with Kelly (1955), Epting et al. (1996)
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and others who have argued that a social psychological basis is provided by PCT, but we need to go far beyond what the sociality corollary has to offer. Little’s (1987) challenge that the environment is not just in our heads points to part of the problem to what is missing in PCT from a social perspective. It is not enough to consider the nature of events (Horley 1988a); we need to consider the nature of social elements, as well as the nature of relationships between elements, in order to fill this significant gap in PCT. Although Rowe (1994) may be correct, for example, in suggesting that social power involves the ability to alter others’ constructs and paint a new picture of reality, social power is much more. Power can involve very concrete skills and strengths wielded by very real social players. Indeed, people and things, our environments, are not just in our heads, although we may need to use our heads to understand aspects of our environmental contexts. A PCT-based social psychology should also address the issue of social influence on the development of constructs (Burkitt 1996), among many other issues. This social project, the elaboration of a social psychological PCT, is just beginning as far as I am concerned. Rather than view it as a fatal flaw within PCT, I choose to interpret it as an important and exciting future development. As Kelly (1955; 1963/1969) warned, if a theory is to grow and to prove relevant for an extended period of time, it must be open to modification.
Research into Offenders’ Personal Constructs My doctoral research cemented my commitment to PCT, particularly in the context of forensic psychology. My PhD supervisor, Vern Quinsey, a not too strict behaviourist, may not have encouraged my foray into the constructions of offenders, with a focus on the content of child molesters’ constructs, but at least he tolerated it. To this point, I had regarded my criminal clients as very flawed and relatively simple individuals, who required the proper assessment to reveal a rather obvious pathology, whether related to deviant constructions or some other problem area. With more experience, especially more lengthy and detailed interviews with sexual offenders, I revised my preliminary and stereotypical views of them. Sexual offenders were beginning to intrigue me, especially repeat and longterm offenders. Rather than being the possessors of some obvious pathologies, or even the unfortunate victims of a trauma or trigger that set them on the wrong course, offenders appeared to be every bit as complex, or
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even more so, than ‘regular folks’. In fact, there appeared to be fewer and fewer differences between criminals and ‘normals’. ‘There but for the grace of God’ seemed an appropriate and common mantra. About this time, I began to question the important labels, such as psychopath, that were being presented as indispensable and unassailable diagnostic terms. They appeared to be pathetic attempts, with very little thought or even research support, to shift any social responsibility for criminal deeds onto the perpetrators, although not in a way that would permit the offenders to change their ways. Offenders were, in a sense, presented with a life sentence with no real chance of parole. Many of the constructs, ‘psychopath’ in particular, struck me as devices designed to serve as straitjackets that the wearer could never escape from, thereby validating the users’ views of offenders’ incorrigibility. I swore to eschew traditional psycho-diagnostics. Certainly I would never call a client ‘psychopathic’ given that I had no idea what the term meant, except in terms of denial of subsequent mental health services and presumably more severe treatment by the police, the courts, etc. No doubt I can credit Kelly (1955) for his credulous approach and the nature of transitory diagnoses for this insight, however limited it may be. I was made aware rather quickly, however, how truly radical and rebellious such a stance remains. Surprisingly, despite incurring the disapproval of colleagues and supervisors, many of whom were likely more bemused than annoyed at my refusal to engage in traditional diagnostic labelling, I gained approval in certain circles. Many judges and parole board members regarded my psychological reports, although perhaps longer than many of my colleagues’, as much more readable and useful compared with most they received. As I was told by more than one recipient of a report, my language was clear and void of psychobabble. Between my doctoral work and return to forensic practice, I spent an interesting year at Brock University, Ontario as a one-year replacement for Jack Adams-Webber (not that anyone can replace Jack). Without AdamsWebber, the PCT environment was rather diminished, but Brock had enough of a constructivist atmosphere to make it an open and stimulating place to be. During this time, especially when Jack dropped by, it was clear that PCT presented unlimited possibilities in both experimental and applied psychology. Personally, I gained an appreciation of such things as the golden section, that pervasive and puzzling phenomenon described and investigated over the centuries by mathematicians and artists, among others. More recently, psychologists have considered the golden section, or ‘divine proportion’, of roughly 62:38 and found that it describes, among other psychological results, the use of positive vs. negative labels applied to self
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and others (see Adams-Webber 1979). My appreciation and interest in golden section research was no doubt due to discussions with Jack and with John Benjafield. While it took some time, I began to consider more of the clinical implications of the golden section in formal investigations (Badesha & Horley 2000). I left Brock to return to the familiar yet difficult confines of forensic clinical work in maximum security prisons. Boredom is seldom an issue among prison-based psychologists, at least any psychologist not falling into lockstep with the inmates and many staff who simply go about the routine business of putting in time by handing out and scoring traditional psychometric assessments. There are, however, many other problematic issues behind bars for forensic psychology, and I found that I had to deal with more than my share. One important issue for me was the balancing act of relating to incarcerated clients without becoming one. This appears to be an issue with many professionals, such as police officers (Winter 2003), who work with criminal offenders in any capacity. A common construct for inmates interpreting health professionals, at least in a Canadian context, is ‘suit’ vs. ‘not a suit’. A suit is an individual, either male or female, who is aloof and insensitive to the plight of inmates. A suit simply goes through the motions to receive a salary. To avoid being construed as a suit, I situated my office and assessment lab between two prison ranges, as opposed to the separate health wing, and against the advice of security personnel. By remaining accessible and by wearing casual yet distinctive clothing – no orange or blue denim jumpsuits were in my wardrobe – I managed to avoid the suit label. One issue that I found played an important role in forensic work was that of office furniture arrangement. My first week on the job netted me two distinct challenges from inmates whom I had never met before. Both challenges were similar in that they involved a question of whether I could push the alarm on the wall before I was assaulted, or at least words to this effect. At first I wondered what I might have done to offend these men I had just met, and in one case had said absolutely nothing to, but I realised that the furniture arrangement might have sent an unintended message to my clients. Like most prison offices, a large oak desk was positioned across the narrow office, with an alarm button, the ‘panic button’, located on the wall behind the desk. Any inmate could construe such an arrangement as a physical challenge in a setting such as a maximum secure prison. I believe that most inmates likely do view challenges where none might be intended in part to the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ messages that are available to all who pay attention, and most inmates have plenty of time to pay attention to such points. Coupled with the likely message that anyone behind such a
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desk must be intimidated by clients, thereby demonstrating weakness – a poor quality to display in any prison – a response to the challenge from the inmate client can be the result. To prevent any misunderstandings or unintended challenges, I moved my desk against the wall, again accompanied by protests from security, allowing access to the panic button to my client, but I did not receive a single further challenge over the four years that I spent there. Whether this is a triumph of environmental psychology, or PCT at its practical best, is debatable, but I would like to understand this experience as the outcome of the application of PCT principles in an atypical area, like environmental psychology, that may result in a practical design innovation. The problem remained, however, especially sitting knee-to-knee with clients: how can a truly sensitive therapist avoid viewing the social world through the eyes of antisocial clients? Since discovering PCT, I had always been intrigued by Kelly’s (1955) notion of fragmentation as a normal psychological process. Kellyan fragmentation seemed very much at odds with popular views of cognitive consistency within social psychology, and certainly contrary to notions about the pathology of dissociation within abnormal psychology. According to Kelly’s sociality corollary, it is necessary to construe another’s construction processes in order to play a role with the other individual, but there is no reason to believe that the role that one plays is a dominant or central one for the player. In order to play a role with incarcerated inmates, it is certainly necessary to view the world through their eyes. This can mean viewing experience via ‘the inmate code’, a set of rules (i.e. a set of prisonbased ethical requirements) that direct one’s behaviour behind bars (e.g. ‘don’t rat’ or refrain from cooperating with prison authorities). I found it necessary to understand the local code and to construe my clients’ worlds through the lenses of such constructs, but I was able to stand back and not see myself, unlike some of my colleagues, as bound by the code in order to survive. I was, as it were, within the code yet beyond it; within it in terms of being inside prison walls for at least seven hours in a 24-hour period and wanting to maintain a cooperative set of relations with all inmates, yet not an inmate insofar as I was a professional with a distinct set of overriding ethical concerns. I explained to all clients at our first meeting what my requirements were with respect to the law and my profession in terms of limited confidentiality (i.e. if they made a specific and viable threat, I was compelled to report it to the authorities). In this way, I was able to meet the requirements of not ‘ratting’ while at the same time, in a sense, being in the role of potential ‘rat’. Most of my clients accepted this, and because I was direct with them I never had a problem with either respect or being put in the awkward situation of having to report on a client. This
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can be seen as employing fragmentation, or accepting and living by another’s construction processes, while at the same time not allowing such a sub-system to dominate one’s own more central subsystems. A PCT-based view of fragmentation appears not only more realistic in the context of everyday human psychology, but it represents a powerful means by which everyone, psychologists and non-psychologists alike, can come to view another’s situation in a very complete manner without compromising one’s own unique perspective. It is the means by which we add significantly to our abilities to understand others and adopt a more ‘selfless’ perspective. I recognised that my time behind prison walls working with offenders needed to come to an end. If only I had listened to my wife, who sounded the warnings on the home front, I would have exited much earlier than I did. After initially entering the business for rather mercenary reasons (a secure job with good pay), I realised that I had a commitment to my clients, and a desire to change not only individuals but a brutal and ultimately unacceptable manner of treating those who are incarcerated for offensive behaviour. Unfortunately, I could see that the end of this phase of my work was ending for reasons beyond my control. Never mind that the environment of prison work was difficult enough. The bleak, century-old perimeter stone walls I could stand – wire fences I have always found more depressing – but coming to work everyday and wondering which side of the bars I preferred because of the language and behaviour of my colleagues was too much to bear. One of my confidential reports was leaked to the press, and this was the final straw for me. I accepted an academic position, which allowed me to move to a community-based programme in order to continue my research and clinical work. Although potentially fatal and clearly careerlimiting within the confines of a prison, the leaked report provided this opportunity. Unquestionably, as Bandura (1982) has noted, chance encounters and unique events can present important, life-changing opportunities. I remain ever grateful to the unknown bastard who delivered my report to the media.
Looking Back and Looking Forward There can be no doubt that the influence of PCT on my professional work has been profound. Generally, the choice corollary has allowed me to think of my offender clients as both free to enact any pro- or antisocial behaviour based on their constructions, and at the same time to see that they are bound, as are we all, by our previous constructs and behavioural experi-
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ments. The sociality corollary has allowed me to think of my clients as active construers of others’ constructions in order to engage in a social process with them by playing a role, and more often than not playing them falsely. The importance of roles that we all play in everyday interactions in itself is a significant contribution of PCT. Allied techniques such as fixed-role therapy (Kelly 1955) have proved useful to me in forensic settings, sometimes to great effect (Horley 2005) and sometimes less so (Horley 2006). Kelly’s (1955) credulous approach compels me to listen carefully to what my forensic clients are trying to tell me because their meanings and intentions are key to any assistance that I may provide. In a sense, the credulous approach requires that I regard them as active participants in the psychotherapeutic process, and it thereby forces me to avoid any haughty therapist-knows-best attitude. While its impact on me professionally is clear, the influence of PCT on my life beyond work is not so obvious. An area that has been altered without question concerns my relationships with family and friends. I am much more forgiving of transgressions now than during my younger, prePCT years. Perhaps this is due to my adopting a psychology of personal constructs versus, for example, a psychology of personality traits. I have no doubt that I am a much better listener now, and I am always keen to hear about the events of intervening months or years when getting re-acquainted. If people are not assumed to be invariant in the face of life-events, we need to listen for the impact of those events, even those that may be viewed from a normative position as ‘minor’, on their personal construct systems. Personal experience is important, and the trajectory of a life is not easy to predict in the face of any event. One theme that permeates my life to date is what might be construed as nonconformity or, perhaps, free-thinking. I have, at least since my early teens, marched to the beat of my own drummer, whether supporting the underdog wherever they may be found or embracing unpopular causes or individuals for whatever reasons. There is no way that I can attribute my initial nonconformity to PCT, but I have been encouraged by Kelly since my discovery of it. There are a couple of personal characteristics or approaches that PCT encourages. Creativity, whether in the creativity cycle or elsewhere (Kelly 1955), is one central construct. Kelly (1955; 1964/1969; 1966/1969a; 1966/1969b) not only argued for more creativity in the professional arenas of psychology – recently, a lack of creativity and imagination has been cited as one reason for the recent paucity in theorizing in social and personality psychology (Kruglanski 2001) – but personal creativity as well.
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Creativity appears to be a basic requirement, or perhaps simply a common correlate, for those prepared to stray from the fold. PCT, it appears to me, attracts its share of creative nonconformists, or practitioners and theorists who seem to deviate appreciably from the norm (Neimeyer 1985). The issue does not appear to be a simple case of self-selection either, but PCT appears to foster the nonconformity of nonconformists. Kelly seems to have led by example, and he also pointed out that good scientists of all stripes should be prepared to question existing dogma (Kelly 1955; 1958b; 1963/1969). Audacity is another characteristic that PCT promotes, if only by Kelly’s own example. Audacity is important, come what may (Gergen 1980). Kelly, via PCT, supports and promotes professional audacity in theory and psychotherapeutic work (Epting, Gemignani & Cross 2003), but he seems to support an audacious approach to life in general. Is a life lived without risk a life well lived? At this point, it might be advisable, if not obligatory, to end on a positive note. I would like to be able to write optimistically about the future of PCT and its continued growth but – due to rebelliousness or nonconformity? – I am less than sanguine about its future. There appear to be at least two dark clouds on the horizon that force me, a genuinely optimistic individual, to be less than optimistic about the long-term viability of PCT. One is the perennial tendency to regard theory as complete, as dogma. If PCT were the ‘perfect theory’, however one might imagine such a mythical creature, any of us involved with the theory to date could well rest on our laurels because we would be the purveyors of the truth within psychology. Obviously, however, this is not the case. Unfortunately, there appears to me to have been far too much complacency about the theory and a tendency to leave its fundamental postulate and corollaries alone. Perhaps this is because of Kelly’s fastidiousness, or perhaps it is due to a combination of reasons. Whatever the case, it is not healthy. The theory needs to be regarded as a work in progress in order to be a realistic option for any who might choose to embrace it. Dead theories, like dead bodies, tend to be unpleasant to be around, except by a few perverse individuals. Continued attempts to elaborate and improve PCT must be seen as essential, even if we give Kelly his just rewards for initiating the project. Kelly (1955, 1958b), in fact, would have it no other way. A second problem is more recent, although not entirely unrelated to the issue of dogma. In many ways, it is more serious. Far too many who claim to be constructivists, if not strict adherents of PCT, appear to have abandoned the basic model of constructivism for a more biomedical model. This can be reflected in the use of psycho-diagnostics. At the risk of sounding simplistic and possibly pre-emptive, I see this as a move to the dark side.
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In fact, I will take a pre-emptive stand here, and declare all psychiatric diagnostic work as clearly anti-Kellyan. However easy it may be to go with the majority position in a clinical setting, there is no way that the use of reified constructs such as ‘psychopathy’ and ‘bipolar’ can be reconciled with PCT. The present power of psycho-diagnosis, as part of the dominant medical model and undoubtedly connected to the ‘purchasing power’ of psycho-pharmaceutical companies, may be seductive. We must not, however, allow ourselves to be seduced. There is no viable way of straddling both camps. In the choice between principles and power, I hope that true constructivists, especially Kellyans, opt for the former rather than the latter.
References Adams-Webber, J. R. (1979). Personal Construct Theory: Concepts and Applications. New York: John Wiley & Sons Andrews, D. A. & Bonta, J. (2003). The Psychology of Criminal Conduct. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Badesha, J., & Horley, J. (2000). Self-construal among psychiatric outpatients: A test of the golden section. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 73, 547–551. Bandura, A. (1982). The psychology of chance encounters and life paths. American Psychologist, 37, 742–755. Bannister, D. (1979). Personal construct theory and politics. In P. Stringer and D. Bannister (eds.) Constructs of Sociality and Individuality. London: Academic Press Burkitt, I. (1996). Social and personal constructs: a division left unresolved. Theory & Psychology, 6, 71–77 Epting, F. R., Gemignani, M. & Cross, M. C. (2003). An audacious adventure: personal construct counselling and psychotherapy. In F. Fransella (ed.) International Handbook of Personal Construct Psychology. Chichester: Wiley Epting, F. R., Prichard, S., Leitner, L. M. & Dunnett, G. (1996). Personal constructions of the social. In D. Kalekin-Fishman & B. Walker (eds.) The Construction of Group Realities: Culture, Society, and Personal Construct Theory. Malabar: Krieger Frost, A. & Connolly, M. (2004). Reflexivity, reflection, and the change process in offender work. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 16, 365– 380 Gergen, K. J. (1980). Toward intellectual audacity in social psychology. In R. Gilmour & S. W. Duck (eds.) The Development of Social Psychology. London: Academic Press Horley, J. (1988a). The construal of events: personal constructs versus personal projects. In F. Fransella & L. Thomas (eds.) Experimenting with Personal Construct Psychology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
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Horley, J. (1988b). Cognitions of child sexual abusers. The Journal of Sex Research, 25, 542–545 Horley, J. (1988c). The units of analysis problem in psychology: an examination and proposed reconciliation. In W. J. Baker, L. P. Mos, H. Rappard & H. Stam (eds.) Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology. New York: Springer-Verlag Horley, J. (1991). Values and beliefs as personal constructs. International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology, 4, 1–14 Horley, J. (2001). Value assessment and everyday activities. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 13, 67–73 Horley, J. (ed.) (2003). Personal Construct Perspectives on Forensic Psychology. New York: Brunner-Routledge Horley, J. (2005). Fixed-role therapy with multiple paraphilias. Clinical Case Studies, 4, 72–80 Horley, J. (2006). Personal construct psychotherapy: fixed-role therapy with forensic clients. Journal of Sexual Aggression, 12, 53–61 Horley, J. (2008). Sexual Offenders: Personal Construct Theory and Deviant Sexual Behaviour. Hove: Brunner-Routledge Horley, J., Carroll, B. & Little, B. R. (1988). A typology of lifestyles. Social Indicators Research, 20, 383–398 Horley, J. & Little, B. R. (1985). Affective and cognitive components of global subjective well-being measures. Social Indicators Research, 17, 189–197 Horley, J. & Quinsey, V. L. (1994). Assessing the cognitions of child molesters: use of the semantic differential with incarcerated offenders. Journal of Sex Research, 31, 187–195 Horley, J., Quinsey, V. L. & Jones, S. (1997). Incarcerated child molesters’ perceptions of themselves and others. Sexual Abuse: Journal of Research and Treatment, 9, 43–55 Kelly, G. A. (1955) The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volumes 1 & 2. New York: Norton (reprinted London: Routledge, 1991) Kelly, G. A. (1958a). The theory and technique of assessment. Annual Review of Psychology, 9, 323–352 Kelly, G. A. (1958b). Man’s construction of his alternatives. In G. Lindzey (ed.) Assessment of Human Motives. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Kelly, G. A. (1963). A Theory of Personality. New York: Norton Kelly, G. A. (1963/1969). The autobiography of a theory. In B. Maher (ed.) Clinical Psychology and Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly. New York: John Wiley & Sons Kelly, G. A. (1964/1969). The strategy of psychological research. In B. Maher (ed.) Clinical Psychology and Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly. London; John Wiley & Sons Kelly, G. A. (1966/1969a). Ontological acceleration. In B. Maher (ed.) Clinical Psychology and Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly. New York: Wiley
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Kelly, G. A. (1966/1969b). Humanistic methodology in psychological research. In B. Maher (ed.) Clinical Psychology and Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly. London: John Wiley & Sons Kelly, G. A. (1970a). Behaviour is an experiment. In D. Bannister (ed.) Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Kelly, G. A. (1970b). A brief introduction to personal construct theory. In D. Bannister (ed.) Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Kruglanski, A. (2001). That ‘vision thing’: The state of theory in social and personality psychology at the edge of the new millennium. Journal of Social and Personality Psychology, 80, 871–875 Landfield, A. W. & Epting, F. R. (1987). Personal Construct Psychology: Clinical and Personality Assessment. New York: Human Sciences Press Little, B. R. (1983). Personal projects: a rationale and method for investigation. Environment & Behaviour, 15, 273–309 Little, B. R. (1987). Personality and the environment. In D. Stokols & I. Altman (eds.) Handbook of Environmental Psychology. New York: John Wiley & Sons Little, B. R. (2006). Prompt and circumstance: the generative contexts of personal projects analysis. In B. R. Little, K. Salmela-Aro & S. Phillips (eds.) Personal Project Pursuit: Goals, Actions, and Human Flourishing. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum & Associates Little, B. R. & Grant, A. M. (2006). The sustainable pursuit of core projects: retrospect and prospects. In B. R. Little, K. Salmela-Aro & S. Phillips (eds.) Personal Project Pursuit: Goals, Actions, and Human Flourishing. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum & Associates McWilliams, S. A. (1988). On becoming a personal anarchist. In F. Fransella & L. Thomas (eds.) Experimenting with Personal Construct Psychology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Morawski, J. G. (2005). Reflexivity and the psychologist. History of the Human Sciences, 18, 77–105 Neimeyer, R. A. (1985). The Development of Personal Construct Psychology. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press Rowe, D. (1994). Wanting Everything: The Art of Happiness. London: HarperCollins Winter, D. A. (1992). Personal Construct Psychology in Clinical Practice: Theory, Research and Application. London: Routledge Winter, D. A. (2003). Stress in police officers. In J. Horley (ed.) Personal Construct Perspectives on Forensic Psychology. Hove: Brunner-Routledge
Chapter 6
Shaking Hands with A Serial Killer David A. Winter David Winter is Professor of Clinical Psychology and Programme Director of the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology at the University of Hertfordshire and Head of Clinical Psychology Services for Barnet in Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust. He is a Fellow of the British Psychological Society, a Chartered Clinical Psychologist and a UKCP-registered Personal Construct Psychotherapist. He has published extensively on personal construct psychology and psychotherapy research.
Elaborated aspects of theory: the credulous approach
Introduction Having negotiated a security system more elaborate than that of the best protected airport, I was ushered into a windowless room and sat facing a sofa beneath a large ‘No Smoking’ sign. This was not the first occasion on which I was due to meet a person who had committed homicide, but I had never yet knowingly met a serial killer, and the notoriety of the particular individual for whom I was waiting heightened my anticipation of being confronted with events beyond the range of convenience of my construct system. Having had a lengthy journey, involving three trains and commencing in the early hours of the morning, I had already had ample opportunity to reflect on George Kelly’s (1955; 1991a; 1991b) definition of anxiety, but now had more time to do so as I sat and waited. Eventually, the door Reflections in Personal Construct Theory. Edited by Richard J. Butler © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
96 David A. Winter opened and my interviewee was led into the room, resplendent in ‘shades’ and a lit cigar in his mouth. I automatically stretched out my hand, but then attempted not to flinch as I recalled what the hand that was gripping mine had done. A further dilemma concerned whether it was wise to draw a serial killer’s attention to the no-smoking policy, and having decided that it was probably not, I was left barely able to focus as one cigar followed another in chainsmoking which lasted for the entire three hours of our meeting. Subsequently, I also struggled with whether, in correspondence with or references to him, to be sufficiently familiar to use his first name, with the consequent greater acknowledgement of him as a human being. This, coupled with the impact on me of occasions during our meeting when his humanity was more apparent, perhaps indicated that I was experiencing threat, in the sense that Kelly (1955) described it: People are threatened by ‘evildoers.’ … The ‘evildoer’ exemplifies what we might do if we dared, or what we might be if we behaved childishly, or what we would have been if we had not tried so hard to do better. We dare not interact with him on common ground lest we slip back into the unwanted ways. In order to take protective steps against the threat that his presence arouses within us we take symbolic measures called ‘punishment’ against him. By such measures we either destroy or symbolize the destruction of the core relationship of the ‘evildoer’ with ourselves. That may make us feel a little safer from the looming shadow of ourselves as ‘evildoers’. (pp. 505–6)
Although I am not aware of being concerned about ‘slipping into’ the ways of serial killing, I may well have been threatened by a ‘looming shadow’ of myself as a potential breaker of moral codes, like my interviewee. However, whether or not Kelly’s view of threat described my own experience, his view of punishment as primarily in the service of the punisher, rather than effecting change in the punished person, did seem to resonate with this particular serial killer’s experience. It was apparent that the enforced constriction of his world to penal or psychiatric institutions since his conviction, while satisfying the need of the public for protection from and punishment of a vilified individual, had done little to modify his own construing. Indeed, paradoxically, he considered that it allowed him freedom to express his views – something that is denied people who are constrained by the obligations of the outside world. Furthermore, he viewed imprisonment as essentially constriction to a social environment largely consisting of people showing commonality in their ‘criminal’ construing and providing considerable opportunities for education in crime.
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Personal construct psychology (PCP) has given me the good fortune to meet numerous exceptional people, but I had never anticipated that among those people would be a serial killer. This particular meeting stemmed from my attempt to explore the limits of Kelly’s (1955) ‘credulous approach’, namely that ‘From a phenomenological point of view, the client – like the proverbial customer – is always right’ (p. 322).
First Encounters with Personal Construct Psychology and its Credulous Approach Like many undergraduate psychology students of my generation, I became thoroughly disenchanted with a course that focused on rats, pigeons and stimulus–response theory. Although I had originally chosen to study psychology and zoology because of a love of animals and an interest in their behaviour, hours of sitting hunched over a dissecting board on which lay the corpse of some poor creature had already extinguished my passion for zoology, which I decided to jettison after a particularly unpleasant encounter with a dead pigeon. This decision necessitated a meeting with the Professor of Zoology, who attempted to dissuade me from converting to a single honours degree in psychology, because psychology was ‘not a science’. Having resisted his attempts to change my mind, it was with particular regret that I then found myself no more enamoured with my psychology course than I had been with zoology, largely because of the attempt of this course to mimic traditional science. I had always viewed going to university as an opportunity to indulge my intellectual curiosity rather than particularly in terms of a route to a degree and a subsequent career, but at least had I persisted with my original course I would eventually have been able to enter the job market with a qualification that indicated that, at least in part, I was a ‘real scientist’! I had been very preoccupied with such thoughts when I went to a talk given by Don Bannister at a meeting of the university’s Psychology Society. This was a period when Bannister and Fay Fransella had been touring British universities with the aim of introducing students to PCP. I was entranced by Don’s passionate and witty presentation of a non-mechanistic, non-reductionist psychology, which focused on people and took their views seriously. The philosophy of constructive alternativism, and many associated aspects of the theory, deeply resonated with my own, at that time only partially articulated, approach to life. This was a time when Don was very much engaged in his research programme on schizophrenic thought disorder, which provided an excellent
98 David A. Winter demonstration of the credulous approach in indicating that people given this diagnosis were quite comprehensible when seen as employing the same construing processes as anyone else (Bannister 1960; 1962). However, it seemed to me that a major flaw in his research was that he used a repertory grid in which the constructs and elements were supplied rather than elicited from his research participants. I therefore resolved to replicate his original study but to employ a grid using clients’ personal constructs as well as one using Bannister’s original supplied constructs. Once again I was confronted by efforts to dissuade me by a supervisor who insisted that a clinical psychology project, not to mention one involving repertory grid technique, would present too many logistical problems for an undergraduate dissertation. However, I was determined to persevere with my idea, and eventually completed the study, finding that people diagnosed as schizophrenic were differentiated from ‘normal’ people by their looser construing when using Bannister’s original grid but not when using a grid with elicited constructs (Winter 1971). Their own personal constructs, although often very idiosyncratic and in several cases neologisms, seemed to provide them with as coherent anticipations of the world as did any other individual’s personal constructs. These findings provided a further argument for a credulous approach and for taking the trouble to attempt to ‘speak the language’ of the person diagnosed as schizophrenic rather than dismissing him or her as thought disordered. Two years later, I carried out a similar study for the dissertation on my clinical psychology course, but this time including the parents of clients diagnosed as schizophrenic. Not only were these clients differentiated from those with other diagnoses on Bannister’s grid but not on a grid using elicited constructs and elements, but the same was true of the parents of these two groups (Winter 1975).
Clinical Psychology Apart from the oases provided by the work of such individuals as Bannister and Fransella, clinical psychology at the time that I trained was far from credulous. My first encounter with a member of the profession was when I worked as a nursing assistant in a psychiatric hospital during my university vacation. To gain some insight into the profession, I visited the head of the hospital’s Clinical Psychology Department, a formidable lady who appeared to spend her time routinely administering the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale to every inpatient in the hospital, who told me that I would ‘never make a clinical psychologist’. Having observed her at work, I was not too devastated by her verdict.
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Nevertheless, despite her predictions, I was duly offered a place on a clinical psychology training course, where I soon discovered that my first supervisor shared her view of me. His time also appeared to be largely spent in conducting one particular activity, but in his case this was the administration of electric shocks to ‘sexual deviants’, ranging from homosexuals to those with a predilection for self-asphyxiation. Since one of my occasional duties as a clinical psychology trainee was to collect hard-core pornography seized by the Customs & Excise Department, which was then used as stimulus material in aversion therapy, I had ample opportunity to enhance my credulity about diverse sexual tastes! I also resolved to explore whether a less mechanistic, not to say barbaric, and more credulous approach could be used to treat psychosexual difficulties, an area to which I returned several years later with the use of PCP with clients with such problems (Winter 1988; 2005a). At the time when I trained, it was often considered anathema for clinical psychologists to engage in therapy at all, as opposed to being purely psychometricians like the first clinical psychologist I had encountered. Furthermore, if a clinical psychologist were to be allowed (generally by psychiatrists) to practise therapy, this was virtually always of the most mechanistic, behavioural type, as in the work of my first supervisor. During the entire course of my training, I saw two clients for therapy, one diagnosed as agoraphobic and the other a butterfly phobic. While they provided me with considerable exercise, tramping the city streets with the former client and chasing across fields to catch butterflies for use in systematic desensitisation sessions with the latter, I cannot say that this greatly developed my therapeutic skills.
A Buddhist Interlude My introduction to and absorption in PCP coincided with an immersion in Buddhism. This was partly stimulated by meeting, and being taught meditation by, two Thai Buddhist monks at university and living in their temple in Bangkok between the completion of my undergraduate course and the commencement of clinical psychology training. This was the first of numerous visits to a country that has become a second home, and where I am now writing this chapter. Buddhism appeared entirely compatible with a constructive alternativist philosophy and a credulous approach, and such compatibilities have subsequently been explored by personal construct psychologists (McWilliams 1984; Delmonte 1987). The more recent incorporation of Buddhist ideas, as well as others more commonly associated with
100 David A. Winter humanistic approaches, into ‘third wave’ cognitive-behavioural therapy (Hayes 2004) has given this approach a more constructivist slant and raised the question of when cognitive-behavioural therapy ceases to be cognitivebehavioural therapy.
Personal Styles and Therapeutic Alternatives In my first job after qualifying as a clinical psychologist, I was fortunate enough to be able to contribute to a research programme which provided consistent evidence that the therapeutic preferences and responses of both clients and clinicians reflected these individuals’ ‘personal styles’ (essentially, their core constructs). Specifically, people who were more outerdirected and conservative were more likely to favour (and, if they were a client, to respond to) a structured, directive treatment approach, such as cognitive-behavioural therapy; and those who were more inner-directed and radical were more likely to favour (and, if a client, to respond to) a more introspective, interpersonally-oriented approach, such as group analytic therapy (Caine, Wijesinghe & Winter 1981; Caine & Winter 1993; Winter, Tschudi & Gilbert 2006). The nature of clients’ presenting symptoms and aspects of the structure of their construct systems also reflected their personal styles. Later research programmes have also demonstrated links between people’s therapeutic preferences and their philosophical beliefs (Schacht & Black 1985; Neimeyer et al. 1993; 2006; Neimeyer & Morton 1997; Arthur 2000). The ‘personal styles’ research argued for a credulous attitude towards clients’ (and clinicians’) constructions of therapy and the matching of therapeutic approaches to individuals’ personal styles, with the provision of therapeutic services that reflect a philosophy of constructive alternativism (Winter 1985). When, many years later, I took up my post of director of a clinical psychology training course, I was strongly committed to offering trainees experience of a range of therapeutic approaches, including PCP, and the opportunity to specialise in an approach of their choice, rather than the almost exclusively cognitive-behavioural approach offered by most such courses at the time. As indicated in the statement of the course’s philosophical position, combining constructivism and social constructionism, this includes: Acknowledgement that there are numerous viable alternative models of psychological problems and their treatment, and therefore intensive input on four major models (cognitive-behavioural, personal construct, psychodynamic, and systemic).
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and Acknowledgement of individual differences in preferences for these models, and therefore provision of the opportunity for trainees to select therapeutic models in which to obtain advanced input in their final year.
Such a pluralistic approach to psychological therapy is in marked contrast to several current initiatives in this area, such as the ‘Improving Access to Psychological Therapies’ programme of the British Department of Health. This programme largely derives from Lord Layard’s ‘Depression Report’ (Centre for Economic Performance 2006), which concludes that ‘The demand from each of us should be quite simple … give people with mental illness the choice of psychological therapy’ (p. 14). The ‘choice of psychological therapy’ that is promoted by the ‘Depression Report’, and by subsequent developments in the ‘Improving Access to Psychological Therapies’ initiative (e.g. Clark 2007; Clark & Richards 2007; Pilling & Burbeck, 2007), is almost exclusively a choice of cognitive-behavioural therapy, albeit with the options of therapist- and computer-administered, or individual and group, or self-study-assisted and conventional, cognitivebehavioural therapy. This is reminiscent of the Monty Python sketch where a café appears to have numerous options on the menu but in fact virtually every option is a variation on spam. When a customer asks ‘Have you got anything without spam?’ the waitress replies: ‘Well, there’s spam egg sausage and spam, that’s not got much spam in it.’
The Evidence Base for Psychological Therapies Programmes such as ‘Improving Access to the Psychological Therapies’ draw heavily on an evidence base which purports to demonstrate the superiority of cognitive-behavioural therapies. However, it is increasingly apparent (e.g. Wampold 2001) that such evidence is not as clear as it purports to be in that: a) results of comparative studies favourable to cognitivebehavioural therapy may be, at least in part, due to features of the research design, and researcher allegiance, favourable to this approach; b) there is little or no evidence for the effects of the supposed active ingredients of such approaches, as compared to those of ‘non-specific’ factors such as the therapeutic relationship and therapist characteristics; and c) meta-analyses are indicating the effectiveness of non-behavioural approaches, such as psychodynamic (Crits-Christoph 1992; Anderson & Lambert 1995), systemic (Shadish & Baldwin 2003; Sexton, Alexander & Mease 2004) and process-experiential (Elliott 2002) therapies.
102 David A. Winter There has been some resistance by constructivist as well as by humanistic therapists (Bohart, O’Hara & Leitner 1998; Botella 2000) to playing the game of providing ‘evidence’ of the effectiveness of their therapies because, for example, this is construed as inconsistent with the underlying philosophies of these therapies. However, I have argued (Winter 2000) for a credulous approach to the construing of health policy-makers, funders and, indeed, most clients, who are predominantly concerned with evidence of whether therapies work. After first presenting this argument at an international congress of PCP, I was collared by an eminent personal construct psychologist on my way out of the symposium and told that I was ‘wrong’ – perhaps an unusual remark for a constructivist to make! Being particularly concerned that PCP is in danger of extinction, for example from lack of financial support, if it is not buttressed by research evidence, I have been concerned to elaborate and evaluate this therapy with particular client groups, such as those diagnosed as agoraphobic (Winter, Gournay, Metcalfe & Rossotti 2006) or who have engaged in deliberate self-harm (Winter, Sireling et al. 2007), as well as to provide systematic reviews and meta-analyses of the ‘evidence base’ for PCP (Viney, Metcalfe & Winter 2005; Winter 2005b; Metcalfe, Winter & Viney 2007). This evidence base indicates that, although differences are smaller in purely clinical samples, PCP is more effective than standard care, no treatment or being on a waiting list at post-treatment and follow-up assessment, and somewhat more effective than other therapies post-treatment but not at follow-up. Some of this work achieved a mention as a footnote in the second edition of What Works for Whom? (Roth & Fonagy 2005), a book that was originally commissioned as a guide to purchasers of effective psychological therapies. I am currently working on a book to be subtitled What Else Works for Whom? (Winter, Metcalfe & Grenyer 2008), which aims to take a broader view of the evidence base for such therapies. More generally, I have been concerned to make the broader psychological community more aware of the extensive applicability of PCP by publishing in the mainstream psychology literature (e.g. Walker & Winter 2007).
The Limits of Credulity To return to serial killing, my explorations in this area have attempted to provide some understanding of the construing processes of individuals who engage in such behaviour or in offences of serial violence (Winter 2003; 2007). This has included the analysis of a book about serial killing written
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by one of its practitioners, Ian Brady (2001), through the conversion of this book into a repertory grid (Winter, Feixas et al. 2007). Such work, however, easily runs the risk of being construed as reflecting an ‘anything goes’ moral relativism which essentially condones the construing and actions of such individuals as serial killers. Kelly (1955) himself made it clear that adopting a credulous approach does not necessarily imply that one accepts the constructions of the individual with whom one is being credulous. In addition, it has been argued elsewhere that such features of PCP as its favouring of sociality and propositional construing (Stojnov 1996) and its essentially egalitarian outlook (Warren 1992) provide a corrective to a totally relativist approach. I would argue that an approach that attempts to understand the construing of another individual, whether that individual be a serial killer or a suicide bomber, is more likely ultimately to lead to effective intervention than is a purely condemnatory, vilifying or punitive approach. For example, the notion of evil as residing within a particular person or group of people, as in George W. Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ or Ayatollah Khomeini’s ‘the Great Satan’ (Winter 2006), has hardly been conducive to peace and harmony. A not uncommon response to attempts to adopt a credulous approach with such individuals as serial killers was evident in the following review of my first foray in this area: The ‘credulous approach’ advocated by Personal Construct theorists (PCT) is relativistic psychology at its most scientistically anaemic. The pervert (sic) as a ‘role’ indeed. This kind of cynical distancing of motive from act allows David Winter, an eminent contributor, to provide the mentally disordered and detained Ian Brady with a professional platform for his especially noxious ravings (Brady 2001). Instead of locating Peter Sutcliffe’s violence as an outcome of paranoid delusions, Brady – effectively as co-researcher – is given a PCT leg-up, and insane acts are passed off as ‘slot-rattling’. Tell that to the good people of Soham. Perhaps I just do not understand. I hope not. (Gillmer 2004, p. 53)
Later in this review, the reviewer makes his position very clear: ‘Why not just admit it? PCT is an unproven shadow of CBT.’ A more favourable ‘review’ was as follows: ‘A stimulating chapter. Less mechanistic than I expected from your self-deprecating aside.’ The reviewer in this case was Ian Brady (personal communication), who went on to say: Gratifying that the GK theory validates much of my own in ‘Janus’. Particularly in a 1950s time warp and penal museum such as ‘Ashwitz’, which has persuaded one to jettison all positive thought and inclination by its regression
104 David A. Winter and institutionalised atavism. It also consoles to have one’s thoughts and ideas pivotally confirmed by independent professional reflection – just as my current tooth abscess resonates the diseased throb and pulse of this administration. An apt example of the ‘awareness of imminent comprehensive change in one’s core structure’, and the reactive solution!
It may be, then, that Gillmer was right in that Brady has perceived my writing as validating his own views. This possibility confronts me with not a little personal construct threat and guilt – such are the hazards for the personal construct psychologist who attempts to adopt a credulous approach, and more generally for any constructivist. As stated by Mahoney: the psychological demands of constructive metatheory are unsurpassed by those of any other contemporary perspective. No other family of modern theories asks its adherents to maintain such a degree of self-examining openness, to so painstakingly tolerate and harvest (rather than eliminate) ambiguity, or to so thoroughly question both the answers and the questions by which they inquire. It is not easy to be a constructivist. (1988, p. 312, emphasis in original)
Further Hazards of Credulity As Mahoney confirms, hazards may be as evident in one’s credulity towards one’s own alternative constructions as in that towards those of others. In my case, for example, I am aware that, at least in many interpersonal situations, I probably spend far too long in the circumspection phase of Kelly’s (1955) Circumspection–Pre-emption–Control Cycle, giving serious consideration to numerous alternative constructions involved in a decision rather than pre-empting one of these and acting accordingly. I am also aware that it would often be easier for me, not to mention for others in contact with me, if I did not entertain so many different views and courses of action, rather than dismissing some of these, at least in the interest of not spreading myself too thinly. At times it feels that the only certainty, apart from that of death, is in the words of a song sung in a stadium that I regularly frequent, namely that Queen’s Park Rangers are ‘the greatest football team the world has ever seen’. A small example of credulity towards one’s own constructions was stimulated recently by Joern Scheer’s creative construing network, which led me to look back at a poetic self that had briefly emerged around the time of my initial interest in PCP, and the products of which I had later largely
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dismissed as ‘adolescent’. I am grateful to Joern for encouraging me to be credulous towards these poetic constructions, in some of which I now find early experimentation with a constructivist and credulous perspective. To give one small example: In the space between sane and mad, good and bad, man and woman, old and young, black and white, wrong and right, stands a person, pleading to be seen.
Postscript from Sierra Leone I am putting the finishing touches to this chapter in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone. Once again, I largely owe it to PCP for bringing me here, where an initial collaboration on research on the construing of former child soldiers (Goins et al. 2009) led me to join a delegation to help train mental health workers. Thus, I have found myself encouraging staff in the country’s only psychiatric hospital to take a credulous approach to their clients. This included asking each of the clients on a particular ward, the majority of whom were chained to their beds, what type of therapeutic group activity they would like to be introduced on the ward. Since the overwhelming preference was for listening to music, a cassette recorder was purchased by the delegation, together with the resources required for the activities being introduced on other wards by my colleagues. Watching the ward’s first music group, in which most of the clients were freed from their beds and danced, holding their chains, with the staff, ranks as one of the most moving experiences of my life. I have also been able to adopt a credulous approach in interviewing residents and staff in both the psychiatric hospital and a Christian faithbased counselling and rehabilitation centre concerning their constructions of psychological problems and their treatment. This has allowed exploration of contrasts between ‘demonic’ and ‘non-demonic’ problems, and correspondingly between those for which faith healing, traditional healing and western psychiatric approaches are regarded as the appropriate treatment.
106 David A. Winter It seems not inappropriate that I should be reflecting on PCP and its credulous approach in a city that was founded as the home of freed slaves, and in a country that has undergone so many horrors, not least the amputations performed by the rebel forces in the civil war that ravaged the country for some ten years. Kelly’s psychology is, for me, imbued with the hope, and the possibility, that people can move from positions of slavery to freedom. That freedom is one in which alternative constructions can be explored and respected, but within the limits that they are not enacted to the extent that they constrain the constructions of, shackle or maim another person or social group. While, from a PCP perspective, credulity for alternative constructions may not have limits, tolerance of alternative behaviours certainly does.
References Anderson, E. M. & Lambert, M. J. (1995). Short-term dynamically oriented psychotherapy: a review and meta-analysis. Clinical Psychology Review, 15, 503–514 Arthur, A. R. (2000). The personality and cognitive-epistemological traits of cognitive behavioural and psychoanalytic psychotherapists. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 73, 243–257 Bannister, D. (1960). Conceptual structure in thought-disordered schizophrenics. Journal of Mental Science, 106, 1230–1249 Bannister, D. (1962). The nature and measurement of schizophrenic thought disorder. Journal of Mental Science, 108, 825–842 Bohart, A. C., O’Hara, M. & Leitner, L. M. (1998). Empirically violated treatments: disenfranchisement of humanistic and other psychotherapies. Psychotherapy Research, 8, 1–57 Botella, L. (2000). Personal construct psychology, constructivism, and psychotherapy research. In J. W. Scheer (ed.) The Person in Society: Challenges to a Constructivist Theory. Giessen: Psychosozial-Verlag Brady, I. (2001). The Gates of Janus: Serial Killing and its Analysis. Los Angeles: Feral House Caine, T. M., Wijesinghe, O. B. A. & Winter, D. A. (1981). Personal Styles in Neurosis: Implications for Small Group Psychotherapy and Behaviour Therapy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Caine, T. M. & Winter, D. A. (1993). Personal styles and universal polarities: implications for therapeutic practice. Therapeutic Communities, 14, 91–102 Centre for Economic Performance’s Mental Health Policy Group (2006). The Depression Report: A New Deal for Depression and Anxiety Disorders. London: London School of Economics Clark, D. M. (2007). Effective psychological treatments for anxiety disorders. Paper submitted to the IAPT Expert Reference Group in support of
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the Department of Health’s submission to the Comprehensive Spending Review Clark, D. M. & Richards, D. A. (2007). Delivery options for evidence-based psychological treatments. Paper submitted to the IAPT Expert Reference Group in support of the Department of Health’s submission to the Comprehensive Spending Review Crits-Christoph, P. (1992). The efficacy of brief dynamic psychotherapy: A metaanalysis. American Journal of Psychiatry, 149, 151–158 Delmonte, M. (1987). Constructivist view of meditation. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 26, 286–298 Elliott, R. (2002). The effectiveness of humanistic therapies: a meta-analysis. In D. J. Cain & J. Seeman (eds.). Humanistic Psychotherapies: Handbook of Research and Practice. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Gillmer, B. (2004). Review of personal construct perspectives on forensic psychology. Clinical Psychology, 38, 53 Goins, S, Winter, D., Patient, S., Scrivener, L., Sundin, J. & Woolman, L. (2009). The construing of former child soldiers: an exploratory study. Paper presented at the 18tt International Congress of Personal Construct Psychology, Venice Hayes, S. C. (2004). Acceptance and commitment therapy, relational frame theory, and the third wave of behavioral and cognitive therapies. Behavior Therapy, 35, 639–665 Kelly, G. A. (1955) The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volumes 1 & 2. New York: Norton (reprinted London: Routledge, 1991) Kelly, G. A. (1991a). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volume 1. A Theory of Personality. London: Routledge Kelly, G. A. (1991b). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volume 2. Clinical Diagnosis and Psychotherapy. London: Routledge McWilliams, S. A. (1984). Construing and Buddhist psychology. Constructs, 3, 1–2 Mahoney, M. J. (1988). Constructive metatheory: II. Implications for psychotherapy. International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology, 1, 299–315 Metcalfe, C., Winter, D. A. & Viney, L. L. (2007). The effectiveness of personal construct psychotherapy in clinical practice: A systematic review and metaanalysis. Psychotherapy Research, 17, 431–442 Neimeyer, G. J., Lee, J., Aksoy, G. & Phillip, D. (2006). Epistemic styles among seasoned psychotherapists: some practical implications. In J. Raskin & S. Bridges (eds.) Studies in Meaning, vol. 3. New York: Pace University Press Neimeyer, G. J. & Morton, R. J. (1997). Personal epistemologies and preferences for rationalist versus constructivist psychotherapies. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 10, 109–123 Neimeyer, G. J., Prichard, S., Lyddon, W. J. & Sherrard, P. A. D. (1993). The role of epistemic style in counselling preference and orientation. Journal of Counselling & Development, 71, 515–523 Pilling, S. & Burbeck, R. (2007). Cognitive behavioural therapy and the effective treatment of depression. Paper submitted to the IAPT Expert Reference Group in
108 David A. Winter support of the Department of Health’s submission to the Comprehensive Spending Review Roth, A. & Fonagy, P. (2005). What Works for Whom? A Critical Review of Psychotherapy Research. New York: Guilford Schacht, T. E. & Black, D. A. (1985). Epistemological commitments of behavioural and psychoanalytic therapists. Professional Psychology: Research & Practice, 16, 316–323 Sexton, T. L., Alexander, J. F. & Mease, A. L. (2004). Levels of evidence for the models and mechanisms of therapeutic change in family and couple therapy. In M. J. Lambert (ed.) Bergin and Garfield’s Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change. New York: Wiley Shadish, W. R. & Baldwin, S. A. (2003). Meta-analysis of MFT interventions. Journal of Marital & Family Therapy, 29, 547 Stojnov, D. (1996). Kelly’s theory of ethics: hidden, mislaid, or misleading? Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 9, 185–199 Viney, L. L., Metcalfe, C. & Winter, D. A. (2005). The effectiveness of personal construct psychotherapy: a meta-analysis. In D. A. Winter & L. L. Viney (eds.) Personal Construct Psychotherapy: Advances in Theory, Practice and Research. London: Whurr Walker, B. M. & Winter, D. (2007). The elaboration of personal construct theory. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 453–477 Wampold, B. E. (2001). The Great Psychotherapy Debate: Models, Methods, and Findings. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Warren, W. G. (1992). Personal construct theory and mental health. International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology, 5, 223–238 Winter, D. A. (1971). The meaningfulness of personal and supplied constructs to chronic schizophrenics and normals. Unpublished BSc dissertation, University of Durham Winter, D. A. (1975). Some characteristics of schizophrenics and their parents. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 14, 279–290 Winter, D. A. (1985). Personal styles, constructive alternativism and the provision of a therapeutic service. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 58, 129–136 Winter, D. A. (1988). Reconstructing an erection and elaborating ejaculation: personal construct theory perspectives on sex therapy. International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology, 1, 81–99 Winter, D. (2000). Can personal construct therapy succeed in competition with other therapies? In J. W. Scheer (ed.) The Person in Society: Challenges to a Constructivist Theory. Giessen: Psychosozial-Verlag Winter, D. A. (2003). A credulous approach to violence and homicide. In J. Horley (ed.) Personal Construct Perspectives on Forensic Psychology. London: Routledge Winter, D. A. (2005a). Towards a personal construct sex therapy. In D. A. Winter & L. L. Viney (eds.) Personal Construct Psychotherapy: Advances in Theory, Practice and Research. London: Whurr
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Winter, D. A. (2005b). The evidence base for personal construct psychotherapy. In F. Fransella (ed.) The Essential Handbook of Personal Construct Psychology. London: Wiley Winter, D. A. (2006). Destruction as a constructive choice. In T. Mason (ed.) Forensic Psychiatry: Influences of Evil. Totowa, NJ: Humana Winter, D. A. (2007). Construing the construction processes of serial killers and other violent offenders: 2. The limits of credulity. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 20, 247–275 Winter, D., Gournay, K., Metcalfe, C. and Rossotti, N. (2006). Expanding agoraphobics’ horizons: an investigation of the effectiveness of a personal construct psychotherapy intervention. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 19, 1–29 Winter, D., Feixas, G., Dalton, R., Jarque-Llamazares, L., Laso, E., Mallindine, C. & Patient, S. (2007). Construing the construction processes of serial killers and other violent offenders: 1. The analysis of narratives. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 20, 1–22 Winter, D. A., Metcalfe, C. & Grenyer, B. (2008). Effective Psychotherapies: What Else Works for Whom? Chichester: Wiley Winter, D., Sireling, L., Riley, T., Metcalfe, C., Quaite, A. & Bhandari, S. (2007). A controlled trial of personal construct psychotherapy for deliberate self-harm. Psychology & Psychotherapy, 80, 23–37 Winter, D., Tschudi, F. & Gilbert, N. (2006). Psychotherapists’ theoretical orientations as elaborative choices. In P. Caputi, H. Foster & L. L. Viney (eds.) Personal Construct Psychology: New Ideas. Chichester: Wiley
Chapter 7
Encounters of the Puzzling Kind: the Organisational Corollary in Relation to Self-construing Richard Butler Richard Butler qualified at Bristol University. Throughout his clinical practice (through long-stay rehabilitation to childhood difficulties), applied sports psychology (with the British Olympic Association), research endeavours (recently with a longitudinal survey on preventative strategies in child health) and consultancy (the World Health Organisation) he has sought to draw on the principles of personal construct theory, fine-tuned by having had the fortune to work alongside Don Bannister at High Royds Psychiatric Hospital from 1978 to 1986.
Elaborated aspects of theory: core construing; hostility; organisational corollary; performance profiling; self-construing Each person has his own entanglements and it is often convenient for him to preserve them. Kelly (1978)
Background Although childhood is viewed axiomatically as a formative time in our personal history, Phil Salmon (1970) astutely questioned the notion that development unravels in a predetermined sequence. Youngsters, like others, Reflections in Personal Construct Theory. Edited by Richard J. Butler © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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encounter the vagaries of their environment and typically search for meaning through construing the events before them. It might be argued that in choosing, in a Kellyan sense, to act in ways that better serve their construction system, young children essentially construct their own development. As Van Morrison wisely tended in his song ‘Enlightenment’, ‘all around baby, you can see, you’re making your own reality’. I was brought up in a decidedly moralised family where the work ethic, typical of a northern industrial town, predominated. Family values were governed monolithically with a constricted perceptual field where an attitude that things were either right or wrong held sway. A watershed occurred when I reached the age of 11. After working reasonably hard on an odd project at school I gratifyingly finished second in the class in that final year in primary school. Yet intriguingly, although children finishing in the first 11 were awarded a place at grammar school, I was singled out by some obscure selection procedure and unceremoniously shipped off to modern school as a failure. I now see the event in terms of invalidation. The dangled evidence of a certain scholastic adeptness was abruptly cast into doubt. I’d been preemptively straitjacketed at a contrast pole, fostering a potential major realignment of self-construing. Further, I was led to question that sense of fairness and justice which Dorothy Rowe (2003) has highlighted as a core developmental construct. That elementary trust in authority could no longer be presumed. I was genuinely baffled.
Puzzlement At the time my puzzlement seemed to toy in an ungainly way with a raft of feelings, yet nowhere in Mildred McCoy’s (1977) wonderful treatise on emotion is there any reference to such a state of perplexity, nor to being confounded, stumped, flummoxed or having an acute sense of being all at sea. George Kelly (1955; 1991a; 1991b) offered two identifying threads with respect to emotion, both of which resonated easily with my experience. He suggested that emotions arise when either our current construing is found wanting or when the fate of part or all of our construct system is at stake. Both seemed in accord with my sense of bafflement. Don Bannister (1977) suggested some feeling states such as humour, worry, invention, love and wonder survive as mysteries within psychology because they make no sense viewed as either ‘cognitive’ or ‘affective’, and as such tend to remain free from the shackles of psychological experimentation. Puzzlement might well be framed in just such a vein.
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Phenomenologically, three facets seemed evident. Although McCoy (1977) described ‘surprise’ as a sudden need to construe events, the dismay I experienced appeared more crucial and more akin to the notion of shock – a sudden awareness of the need to construe the self differently – which we (Butler & Green 2007) sketched in a proposed expansion of McCoy’s model. Second, there was uncertainty and unpredictability, which Kelly classically depicted as anxiety – that startling awareness of being confronted by events which lie mostly outside the range of convenience of one’s construct system. It was not that failure was unconstruable, more that the possible implications needed to be harnessed and grappled with. Finally, I was bemused. McCoy (1977) described bewilderment as awareness of imminent comprehensive change in non-core structure, arising when faced with novel events that require alteration of construing in order to make sense. Fair enough; but this depiction again seemed to lack the sense of precariousness I felt, particularly in relation to core construing.
The Experience Reframed Tom Ravenette’s (1977) maxim that we don’t refer to our constructs in order to act rings essentially true. At the time I dealt with the reverberations of invalidation at a low level of awareness. Although invalidation can distort construing, it may provide the opportunity for adaptation and reconstruction. I now suspect I ‘channelled’ my psychological functioning in two ways. The experience of failure may have initially felt threatening in the Kellyan sense that imminent comprehensive change in core construing looked likely. However, although ‘self as failure’ had a prevailing context, the necessary revision would involve excavating the very foundation of my self-construing. I sensed the image was being foisted on me and, as I was later to understand through the liberating message of personal construct theory (PCT), I didn’t have to construe myself in ways others were resolved to see me. I steadfastly resisted reconstruing. To paraphrase Eleanor Roosevelt, folk can only make you feel inferior with your consent. I was probably, as McCoy (1977) puts it, angry – that forceful determination to ensure personal conformity in order that constructions avert being invalidated. Anger generally precedes hostility, which Kelly regarded as the continued effort to extort validational evidence in favour of a social prediction which has already been recognised as futile. Thus hostility is self-preserving. When invalidation is anticipated as potentially devastating, we may doubt the confronting evidence and maintain our current ways of construing by
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altering events to conform to our original predictions. On reflection it seemed apposite to extort confirming evidence that my ‘nameless’ judges might just have been wrong. Thus I securely held on to a working-class identity with both its work ethic and love of sport, choices that served me well in the potentially intimidating environment of a tough new school. In the spirit of hostility I also worked hard so that I might, in time, prove those in positions of power could not be implicitly counted on. Interesting how enduring hostility can be. The experience of distrust in authority had other effects, probably best appreciated in terms of the choice corollary, which states that a person chooses that alternative in a dichotomised construct through which they anticipate the greatest possibility for the elaboration of their system. Given that ‘authority as trusted’ no longer made much sense, some simple slot rattling whereby convention and authority were aligned at the contrast end – ‘not to be trusted’ – seemed worth exploring. I found experimenting with nonconformity, rebellion, obstinacy, and the like, which meshed surprisingly well with the freer times of the late 1960s, drew all kinds of benefit. Not least was that I became something of a puzzle to others, a stance Jackson & Bannister (1985) interestingly noted among some characters in their study of difficult-to-understand youngsters. As with hostility, I find the power of mystery enduringly fruitful in my adult years. After all, only dead fish swim with the stream.
And then … Considering my options with university beckoning I cast around for a course I anticipated might limit the chance of failure while endorsing antiauthoritarianism. What better choice than psychology? In terms of mystifying all those around me, including family, teachers and friends, it proved a success. However, undergraduate psychology turned out to be a barren landscape which treated people as objects to be probed and examined, but certainly not invited into any experiment. I was yet again puzzled, this time by a chasm between traditional psychological approaches to understanding people and what I intuitively thought I understood about them. After writing this I re-read ‘The autobiography of a theory’, where Kelly describes a similar nonplussed experience, being faced with the dominant S–R equation in his first course in psychology (Kelly 1963/1969). We, of course, know the eventual outcome of his puzzlement. Well, I hung on with withering expectations. I was on the brink of dropping the whole psychology thing for the charm of marine biology when,
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out of the blue during a module on personality, came a lecture (only one in three years of study) on PCT. Suddenly, out of a miasma of confusion, came fragments of clarity. What resonated particularly was Kelly’s first principle, which invited inquiry along the lines of ‘If you wish to know, then why not ask’. Quickly finding and devouring Bannister & Fransella (1986), I found Kelly’s invitation that individuals are best understood metaphorically in terms of being scientists whose aim is to predict the world and their self through noting replications called constructs exciting reading. Psychology for the first time made sense.
Influences Even before I met him, Don Bannister had been a major influence on my thinking, research and clinical practice. His writings offered a thread of wisdom and perspicacity to my hazy puzzlement. I went to work as a trainee at High Royds Psychiatric Hospital (wonderfully captured in the film Asylum) set in a valley north-west of Leeds, struggling with my research project on validation of thought disorder in those with chronic schizophrenia. Within a month of starting, Don arrived clutching a Medial Research Council grant and proudly asserting he was the longest serving senior psychologist in the UK, with 17 years under his belt. As a result of sharing some commonalities including a working-class identity, a strong sense of Yorkshire-ness and a passion for beleaguered football teams (Doncaster Rovers were as poor as my team, Huddersfield Town) we became friends, played tennis (badly) each week and I eventually persuaded him to play goalkeeper (equally badly) for our departmental football team, Psykick Rovers. Don’s influence was consuming. He taught with keenness, with a challenge to orthodoxy, with an unconventionality that saw him, on occasions, employ his jacket as a makeshift board rubber. As a supervisor and mentor he helped resolve many clinical dilemmas and predicaments, of which the following examples are typical. With crossed feet typically lolled across his cluttered desk or sitting in the hospital grounds for an impromptu tutorial, Don shed many glorious moments of clarity. Schizophrenia, though a hotbed of provocative academic theory, could alternatively be construed as a determined search for meaning from the protagonist’s perspective (Bannister 1962; 1963). Although validation of thought disorder may promote ‘unconventional’ behaviour (as viewed by staff), it may alternatively represent ‘healthy’ tightening of construing (Bannister 1965). Whilst those with agoraphobia may be helped behaviourally, unless their ill-defined view of self as non-agoraphobic is addressed in the way that Fransella
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(1972) explored the resolution to stuttering, they remain psychologically housebound. Finally, Don encouraged a view that youngsters do not alter their behaviour in response to empirically tested therapies unless the implications of that change are understood (Tschudi 1977; Butler, Redfern & Forsythe 1990; Butler 1994a).
The Puzzle of Others Through research on understanding the psycho-neurological impact of amateur boxing (Butler, Forsythe et al. 1993; Butler 1994b) I became involved in sports psychology, helping athletes work towards enhancing their performances (Butler 1996; 1997). I was soon to realise the dilemma parents often have in relation to their children – that of being puzzled (Jackson & Bannister 1985) – seemed exactly that experienced by coaches towards athletes. Despite their best cajoling, coaches invariably seemed baffled at why athletes failed to do what they expected of them. An alternative to the ‘teaching’ relationship between a coach (or parent) and performer (or youngster), and one Kelly advocated for therapeutic encounters, is that of supervisor–PhD student where a model of equal expertise forms the foundation of the relationship (Butler 1997; Butler & Green 2007). Here athlete and coach are both acknowledged as experts in their particular fields and share each other’s knowledge in constructing the best way forward. This, of course, fits seamlessly with the sociality corollary where the role of ‘coaching’ is enhanced when the coach sees fit to attempt construing the athlete’s perspective.
Performance Profiling Capturing a sense of the athlete’s expertise led to a methodology called performance profiling (PP) which facilitates both the athlete’s and coach’s awareness with regard to performance (Butler & Hardy 1992; Butler, Smith & Irwin 1993; Butler 1997; 1999). Traditional, the format consists of a visual display of aspects perceived by the athlete to be important for them to perform at their best, on to which their current ability is mapped. It takes seriously the notion that the athlete is in the business of constructing often quite elaborate theories of their performance and that interventions might best be focused on their perceived needs. PP honours the raw data, posing no predicament in terms of analysis for the athlete involved. Protagonists may digest an individualised visual sketch
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of the athlete’s perceived strengths and weaknesses on meaningful constructs. Where a discrepancy between current and idealised performance becomes noticeable, programmes to enhance such qualities can subsequently be developed. As David Winter (1992) advocates, instruction and support are at their best where constructive social interaction enables interventions to meet the athlete’s needs. Butler & Green (2007) have subsequently explored PP in relation to work with children and young people.
The Organisation Corollary Constructs rarely stand alone. Kelly suggested they are both interrelated and subsuming, structured as a hierarchical architecture of constructs (Kelly 1955; 1991a, 1991b), for which he outlined the organisation corollary. Figure 7.1 depicts a representation of this corollary, with PP envisaged at the base of this hierarchy. Given Jean-Paul Sartre’s view that a single gesture
Figure 7.1 A diagrammatic representation of the self
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implies a worldview, constructs (and thus behaviours) at the base of the hierarchy inevitably reflect more superordinate constructs. Kelly’s notion of constructs subsuming other constructs is generally described in terms of superordinacy and subordinacy. Pyramiding, which is essentially a means of understanding the behavioural constituents of psychological constructs, enables the elaboration of subordinate constructs. It seeks to elicit phenomenologically important behaviours by asking what folk ‘do’, or as in PP, inviting individuals to identify qualities they perceive as important in those who excel in their field.
The Notion of Self At a more superordinate level are psychological constructs which often relate to how people think about themselves. The self appears a fairly ubiquitous conception. Rarely do conversations unravel without reference to ‘I’. From a constructivist perspective notions of a ‘true self ’ draw little honour. In suggesting that individuals reach out to impose meaning on events with which they are confronted, and as such events invariably include the person’s own notion of self, Kelly proposed that we essentially construct the dimensions of our own identity. And we do so in the same way we construe the world around us. As Bannister (1983) hinted: ‘the self picture and the world picture are painted on the same canvas and with the same pigments’. The self might therefore be appositely considered as a sub-system within the person’s construct system. Bannister held an involved interest in the notion of self, apparent in his research on children’s self-construing (Bannister & Agnew 1976) and his later novel writing (Bannister 1987). He elaborated many of William James’s ideas regarding the self (Bannister 1983) along five dimensions. The legitimacy of individuality, he proposed, fosters a sense of separateness and distinctiveness in western societies whereas such individualism may seem egotistical, indulgent and narcissistic in eastern cultures. Second, a sense of coherence enables experiences to be related vs. a world that appears disintegrated and uninterpretable. Third, the legitimacy of history relates the extent to which an individual has a sense of continuity, employing their biography as a thread with notions that they are the ‘same person’ they were yesterday, last year or as a child, despite often significant changes in themselves vs. the sense of living in the here-and-now. Fourth, the legitimacy of agency which, in sympathy with the choice corollary, Bannister identified as the degree to which a person typically seeks to elaborate and develop their self (extension) in contrast to preserving the self through
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resisting fresh experiments (definition). Finally, the legitimacy of presentation hinges on the eagerness a person has to communicate a vision of their self (public) vs. the desire to remain mysterious to others (private).
Exploring the Self Bannister’s theoretical notions lay the foundations for an understanding of the sense of self, yet in the applied field grappling with the self as ‘I’ has proved daunting and esoteric. Within the clinical sphere Bannister enduringly advocated that the most puzzling behaviour might make sense if understood from the actor’s perspective. Thus we should move from investigating the person’s complaint to elaborating their system of self-construing. Capturing a person’s sense of self has generally been operationalised in terms of self-concept or self-esteem and has led to vast array scales for both children and adults (Blascovich & Tomaka 1991). From surveys of self-measures employed over the last 20 years, Butler & Gasson (2005) highlighted some problematic conceptual and methodological issues in relation to current measures. Confusion over definition has led to interchangeability of terminology where self-concept, self-image and self-esteem are frequently employed synonymously and indiscriminately. Susan Harter (1999) suggested terms used to describe the self are simplistic prefixes rather than legitimate constructs. However, something of a consensus is finally emerging. Self-concept is now regarded as a global, overarching presentation of self, self-esteem an evaluative aspect of self, whilst self-image alludes to how people typically describe themselves (Blascovich & Tomaka 1991; Butler & Green 1998). Most published scales of self-concept/self-esteem have been developed and psychometrically validated on small, geographically limited samples, with arguably little correspondence with a national census, thus creating significant problems in generalisation. Finally, and perhaps most damning, the composition of scales has been almost exclusively author generated, with psychologists guilty of deciding which items are valid descriptors of self.
Employing Construct Theory Principles in Assessing Self PCT has traditionally appealed to the repertory grid as a method of exploring how people make sense of themselves. Although grids can offer unique insights into a person’s phenomenological and idiopathic self-structure, they
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present construct relationships in terms of statistical associations which may not necessarily resonate with the psychological relationship between constructs. Bannister persuasively advocated employing information that individuals provide about themselves. Thus rather than converting a person’s ratings into aggregated sums or statistical correlations (as in grids) the ‘raw data’ can form a shared basis of an understanding. Bannister also suggested we should not be hesitant about supplying constructs as folk will use them in their own personal way. However, scales should be composed of items elicited and understood by the population with whom the scale is employed. Thus developing a relevant measure requires items to a have shared understanding of meaning and represent the most frequently elicited self descriptions. Bannister & Fransella (1986) suggest PCT is potentially rich as an inspiration for new ‘instruments’. In such a vein we have endeavoured to develop a means of measuring self-construing with the Self Image Profile (SIP). The original SIP (Butler 2001) was developed to display how youngsters understand their self with versions for children (aged 7–11 years) and adolescents (aged 12–16). A more recent addition has been developed for adults (aged 17–65 years) (Butler & Gasson 2004). They draw on the theoretical underpinnings of PCT and offer a means of harnessing the nomothetic values entwined in population norms and the commonality corollary with the idiopathic leanings that value people’s unique meanings in relation to their self.
Self Image Profiles: The Principles In contrast to most scales relating to self where items emerge in line with the author’s conceptualisation of self, the SIP endeavours to ensure items are relevant and meaningful to the population for whom the scale is intended. An extensive pool of constructs was generated by inviting large samples of the population to give typical self-descriptions in line with elicitation procedures described by Butler & Green (1998) and Ravenette (1977). Selected items for the SIP were the most frequently elicited selfdescriptions and people are asked to rate themselves (on a 0–6 scale) according to ‘how I am’. The SIP offers a visual profile of responses as individuals complete the scale, enabling the person to reveal to him- or herself, as well as to the clinician, something about the way they construe themselves. The avoidance of complicated scoring and ‘hidden’ agendas is accomplished through sharing such information. Such a philosophy is sympathetic to the idea of drawing on the raw data supplied by the respondent and is also in
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line with the notion of equal expertise. Although the SIP is ‘pitched’ at the psychological level of construing (Figure 7.1), with items reflecting the most frequently elicited self-descriptions, there is a theoretical acceptance of ordinal relationships in which the psychological constructs are ‘sandwiched’ between core constructs at a superordinate and behavioural constructs at a more subordinate level. For the first time in a scale of self, a differentiation between self-image and self-esteem is made in terms of definition and of scoring. Self-image is considered a descriptive notion of self (how I think about myself), whereas self-esteem reflects an evaluative judgement relating to how individuals gauge themselves (how I feel about myself), along dimensions considered important (Butler & Green 2007). Self-image is scored according to ratings on the self-descriptions, whereas self-esteem is operationalised as the perceived distance between ‘where I am’ and ‘where I would ideally wish to be’. The SIP also fosters the identification of areas of dissatisfaction (items with a discrepancy between the person’s view of self and how they would like to be), which proves invaluable as a starting point in therapeutic ventures, ensuring a focus on issues the client, rather than therapist, deems important. Figure 7.2 depicts a sample of my SIP, the five items that make up the social aspect of self. I particularly enjoy times when I can engage with others in exposing the absurd discrepancies between life and our aspirations. Thus there is little, if any, discrepancy between ‘self ’ and ‘ideal’ on items such = how I think I am
= how I would like to be
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13 Friendly 14 Sociable 15 Fun 16 Outgoing 17 Sense of humour Butler & Gasson (2004). Published with permission from The Psychological Corporation. Reproduced by permission of the author.
Figure 7.2 A section of the Self Image Profile for Adults depicting the social aspect of self
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as sense of humour and fun. The distance between two ratings has been discussed theoretically by Bannister & Fransella (1986), who suggest little discrepancy may imply relatively little force to change. That just about sums it up. Although I rate myself relatively low on ‘sociable’, I have no real desire to become more gregarious. I enjoy the company of a limited number of people rather than the buzz of many. So again, the lack of discrepancy indicates little desire for change. Where I am at odds with where I’d like to be is on the item ‘outgoing’. Although Bannister & Fransella (1986) suggest too large a discrepancy may represent in effect a fantasy, with an ‘ideal’ too distant to be converted into any kind of plan of action, the discrepancy on ‘outgoing’ is not of this kind. I may have work to do in developing a more approachable, chatty and unreserved side of my self.
Exploring Ways of Elaborating the Self In the clinical field, the SIP offers a foundation for therapeutic endeavours. Apposite items can be elaborated both horizontally and vertically through interested inquiry. Horizontal elaboration entails exploring the implications of potential change along a construct, where dissatisfaction with self is evident. An initial step may involve clarification of meaning, whereby the individual is invited to describe the contrast to the item on which ‘how I am’ has been scored, describe what it might be like to operate at some distance from this position on the construct or to elaborate the personal significance and advantages of being at the ‘ideal’. Developing propositional experiments where folk ‘act as if …’ fosters alternative facets of self to be tried for size for a limited period. Where movement along the construct proves demanding, Finn Tschudi (1977) offered a neat way of understanding the phenomenological resistance to desired change. He encouraged inquiry into predicted disadvantages of being at the ideal. For me ‘outgoing’ would represent, to some extent, buying into conformity. Vertical elaboration takes the shape of pyramiding or laddering. The former unearths behaviours that underpin the psychological construct, whereas the latter reveals superordinate constructs that fundamentally determine a person’s sense of self.
Core Construing At the pinnacle of the hierarchy of self-construing lies what Kelly described as core construing – higher-order constructs which govern the maintenance
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of a person’s identity (Figure 7.1). Such constructs lie fundamentally at the heart of the individual’s sense of self, guiding each anticipatory choice, action and stance they take. They may justifiably be viewed as the banner under which a person fights. If, as Denis Hinkle (1965) has shown, the higher a construct is in the hierarchy the greater are its implications, then core constructs assumedly have a wide range of convenience encapsulating the raft of self-descriptions and actions a person characteristically accounts for in terms of their self (Stefan 1977; Butt, Burr & Epting 1997). Compared to constructs at a lower level, core constructs appear to remain invariably stable, leading individuals to determinedly preserve a core belief about self, even in the face of mounting invalidating evidence, rather than seek an alternative construction as an ‘open-minded’ scientist might. Residing at a low level of awareness, core constructs are not readily accessible, yet we come to understand the world through the lens of such core constructs with little conscious awareness (McWilliams 2004). We rarely appeal to them, yet it might be argued that all our actions ultimately seek to validate or avoid invalidation of a core construct. Leitner & Thomas (2003) suggest core constructs exist at a low level of awareness precisely because of the possibility of profound threat if invalidated. Yet enticingly, it is with an understanding of such constructs that the fundamental essence of a person may be glimpsed.
Accessing Core Constructs Hinkle (1965) devised a hierarchical method, later termed laddering by Bannister and Mair (1968), to elicit ‘super-ordinate constructs of the preferred self’. Although there are no formal instructions for the process, laddering essentially hinges on a ‘form of recursive questioning’ to elicit higher-order implications of a construct (Neimeyer, Anderson & Stockton 2001). Fransella & Dalton (1990) suggest that laddering is ‘no more and no less than asking the question “why?” ’ a person would prefer to be described by one pole of a construct rather than the other. Alternatively, once a person has identified a preferred pole of a construct, Neimeyer et al. (2001) suggest asking: ‘what is the advantage of that?’ Revealing core constructs requires reflection. Fransella (2003; 2005) suggests successful laddering requires the listener to suspend their own construing (tempering their own assumptions) and seek to subsume the other person’s construing. It is in the process of laddering that one gets closest to the experience of being almost a part of the other person. From a host of
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laddered constructs I recently found, through factor analysis, four themes with respect to core construing (Butler 2006). Briefly these comprised: 1. Making sense – where core construing rotates around the capacity to impose meaning, establish coherence and develop a sense of self competence. Although all actions, according to Kelly, are scientific in the sense of enabling the person to check their theories, if a person’s core construing resonates with notions of competence, that person’s actions also test their sense of self as a good scientist. Many of my laddered constructs have a flavour resonant of such core construing. I ask many questions in seeking to understand the vagaries of the human condition and lean towards research endeavours to clarify the unknown. 2. Relatedness – where a person’s sense of self, as contended by Rowe (2003), seems embedded in the notion of relationship with others, particularly in terms of the search for approval and avoidance of criticism or rejection, leading to social conformity and self-respect. The person, as it were, trades in the sociality corollary, seeking to detect others’ opinion about the self and incorporates these into the sense of self. Through employing the core construct of self-respect, people make choices that depend on the imagined effect their actions may have on another’s mind. They are likely to seek the company of others, build friendships, enjoy social engagements, value trustworthiness, support, help and care for others and have a sense of humour. 3. Achievement – this resonates with Rowe’s second aspect of core construing, which relates to a sense of existence in terms of achievement, where a person seeks challenges, success and power. Sport, academic pursuit and work tasks, for example, offer an individual a context in which, through their competitiveness and consequent recognition, they can test their sense of self-determination. 4. Individuality – the fourth factor suggests that a person’s sense of self is bound up with notions of nonconformity, anti-authoritarianism, rebelliousness and independence, leading to a sense of self-reliance. In reflecting on his first heart attack, Kelly (1978) stressed the importance for him in remaining rebellious ‘against doing the things that people say would have avoided it’. He reckoned he was caught between ‘being a virtuous vegetable and an independent corpse’. Yet he maintained that conformity ‘works harder for the perpetuation of evil than for the achievement of goodness’. My laddered constructs are awash with references to this core construing. I choose, in a Kellyan sense, to act with creativity, rebellion, unconventionality, dissent, maverick intent and possibly eccentricity in anticipating the greatest possibility for elaboration of my sense of individuality.
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The Implications As core constructs form the foundations of a person’s sense of self it might be expected, as Kelly intimated, that validational experiences provoke emotion. McCoy (1977), for example, suggests love and happiness result from validation of core construing. Such feelings might, therefore, be predicted when we meet others’ approval (where self-respect is important), act in an idiosyncratic manner (if self-reliance is important) or find we are able to understand something that previously proved difficult (if self-competence is important). Given my core constructs concern both self-competence (the need to make sense) and self-reliance (the need for individuality) I’m at my most content when trying to understand the complexities of a child’s psychological struggle, undertaking clinical research, fathoming the psychological dilemmas of friends, striving to improve my skill base (such as golf) and doing all of this in a way that might not take the path of conformity. It is likely that a person’s notion of self is maintained through more than one core construct, and the variety of roles a person adopts may serve to validate different core constructs. Thus a person may primarily seek validation for a sense of self-determination whilst at work, self-respect when out with friends and self-competence when trying to figure out the intricacies of a new hobby. Miller Mair (1977) suggested the metaphor of a ‘community of selves’ to account for such experiences and to help articulate the complicated nature of our role relationships. I am increasingly conscious of how even my name – or should I say set of names? – reflects a community of selves. I resisted Richard for many years, primarily because it was a parental construction, yet now I employ it in the context of core construing relating to making sense, where I seek validation for achievement and recognition. Publications are an example. In other social contexts where my desire for individuality and nonconformity is paramount, I’m known as Rich (in the field of sports psychology), Rab (on the sports field) or, most typically with friends and colleagues, as Chuck. Of course, I have fostered each of these labels in their separate contexts; for though sometimes creating confusing for others, they maintain a sense of mystery for me. Interestingly, Kelly did suggest that ‘each of us invests his name with a particular kind of meaning’ (Kelly 1958/1969). At another level any behaviour may serve to validate more than one core construct at any one time. Thus a person might best anticipate the greatest possibility for the elaboration of both their self-respect and selfdetermination by choosing to work diligently on a project at work. I can anticipate validational experiences with respect to both self-competence (the
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need to make sense) and self-reliance (the need for individuality) through an involvement with the least alluring of human struggles (e.g. schizophrenia, nocturnal enuresis), the least endearing of sporting activities (e.g. amateur boxing) and the quirky need to support a perennially flawed football team (i.e. Huddersfield Town). Interestingly I suspect an engagement with PCT also serves to validate the need for both competence and individuality. Hinkle (1965) originally mooted that an awareness of core constructs is essential for understanding the world of another person and ourselves. As core constructs operate at a low level of awareness, the process of eliciting a person’s fundamental sense of self may awaken for the first time an understanding of the nature of their actions. Through interested inquiry and suspension of one’s own construing, the possibility of understanding a client’s core construing is enhanced. And in concert with the sociality corollary, therapists working in the Kellyan tradition consequently have the opportunity to enhance the therapeutic venture for both client and therapist and move towards resolving the puzzles that trap them. Reflexivity, on the other hand, affords a rare glimpse of core constructs that may just be implicated in our own puzzlement.
References Bannister, D. (1962). The nature and measurement of schizophrenic thought disorder. Journal of Mental Science, 108, 825–842 Bannister, D. (1963). The genesis of schizophrenic thought disorder: a serial invalidation hypothesis. British Journal of Psychiatry, 109, 680–686 Bannister, D. (1965). The genesis of schizophrenic thought disorder: retest of the serial invalidation hypothesis. British Journal of Psychiatry, 111, 377–382 Bannister, D. (1977). The logic of passion. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Bannister, D. (1983). Self in personal construct theory. In J. R. Adams-Webber & J. C. Mancuso (eds.) Applications of Personal Construct Theory. Toronto: Academic Press Bannister, D. (1987). Hard Walls of Ego. London: Secker & Warburg Bannister, D. & Agnew, J. (1976). The child’s construing of self. In J. K. Cole & A. W. Landfield (eds.) Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press Bannister, D & Fransella, F. (1986). Inquiring Man, 3rd edition. London: Routledge Bannister, D. & Mair, J. M. M. (1968). The Evaluation of Personal Constructs. London: Academic Press
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Blascovich, J. & Tomaka, J. (1991). Measures of self esteem. In J. Robinson, P. Shaver & L. Wrightson (eds.) Measures of Personality and Social Psychology. New York: Academic Press Butler, R. J. (1994a). Nocturnal Enuresis: the Child’s Experience. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann Butler, R. J. (1994b). Neuropsychological investigation of amateur boxers. British Journal of Sports Medicine, 28, 187–190 Butler, R. J. (1996). Sports Psychology in Action. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann Butler, R. J. (1997). Sports Psychology in Performance. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann Butler, R. J. (1999). Performance Profiling. Leeds: National Coaching Foundation Press Butler, R. (2001). The Self Image Profiles for Children & Adolescents. London: The Psychological Corporation Butler, R. J. (2006). Investigating the content of core constructs. Personal Construct Theory & Practice, 3, 27–34 Butler, R. J., Forsythe, W. I., Beverly, D. W. & Adams, L. M. (1993). A prospective controlled investigation of the cognitive effects of amateur boxing. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 56, 1055–1061 Butler, R. J. & Gasson, S. L. (2004). The Self Image Profile for Adults. London: Harcourt Assessment Butler, R. J. & Gasson, S. L. (2005). Self esteem/self concept scales for children and adolescents: a review. Child & Adolescent Mental Health, 10, 10–12 Butler, R. J. & Green, D. (1998). The Child Within: The Exploration of Personal Construct Theory with Young People. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann Butler, R. J. & Green, D. (2007). The Child Within: Taking the Young Person’s Perspective by Applying Personal Construct Theory. Chichester: Wiley Butler, R. J. & Hardy, L. (1992). The Performance Profile: theory and application. Sport Psychologist, 6, 253–264 Butler, R. J., Redfern, E. J. & Forsythe, W. I. (1990). The child’s construing of nocturnal enuresis: a method of inquiry and prediction of outcome. Journal of Child Psychology & Psychiatry, 31, 447–454 Butler R. J, Smith, M. & Irwin, I. (1993). The Performance Profile in practice. Journal of Applied Sports Psychology, 5, 48–63 Butt, T. W., Burr, V. & Epting, F. (1997). Core construing: discovery or invention? In R. A. Neimeyer & G. J. Neimeyer (eds.) Advances in Personal Construct Theory,Volume 4. New York: Springer Fransella, F. (1972). Personal Change and Reconstruction: Research on a Treatment of Stuttering. London: Academic Press Fransella, F. (2003). Some skills and tools for personal construct practitioners. In F. Fransella (ed.) International Handbook of Personal Construct Psychology. Chichester: Wiley
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Fransella, F. (2005) Some skills and tools for personal construct users. In F. Fransella (ed.) The Essential Practitioner’s Handbook of Personal Construct Theory. Chichester: Wiley Fransella, F. & Dalton, P. (1990). Personal Construct Counselling in Action. London: Sage Harter, S. (1999). The Construction of the Self: A Developmental Perspective. New York: Guilford Press Hinkle, D. (1965). The change of personal constructs from the viewpoint of a theory of construct implications. Unpublished PhD thesis, Ohio State University Jackson, S. R. & Bannister, D. (1985) Growing into self. In D. Bannister (ed.) Issues and Approaches in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Kelly, G. A. (1955) The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volumes 1 and 2. New York: Norton (reprinted London: Routledge, 1991) Kelly, G. A. (1958/1969). Man’s construction of his alternatives. In B. Maher (ed.) Clinical Psychology and Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly. New York: John Wiley & Sons Kelly, G. A. (1963/1969). The autobiography of a theory. In B. Maher (ed.) Clinical Psychology and Personality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly. New York: John Wiley & Sons Kelly, G. A. (1978). Confusion and the clock. In F. Fransella (ed.) Personal Construct Psychology. London: Academic Press Kelly, G. A. (1991a). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volume 1. A Theory of Personality. London: Routledge Kelly, G. A. (1991b). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volume 2. Clinical Diagnosis and Psychotherapy. London: Routledge Leitner, L. & Thomas, J. (2003). Experiential personal construct psychotherapy. In F. Fransella (ed.) International Handbook of Personal Construct Psychology. Chichester: Wiley & Sons McCoy, M. M. (1977). A reconstruction of emotion. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press McWilliams, S. A. (2004). On further reflection. Personal Construct Theory & Practice, 1, 1–7 Mair, J. M. M. (1977). The community of self. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Neimeyer, R. A., Anderson, A. & Stockton, L. (2001). Snakes versus ladders: a validation of laddering technique as a measure of hierarchical structure. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 14, 85–106 Ravenette, A. T. (1977). Personal construct theory: an approach to the psychological investigation of children and young people. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Rowe, D. (2003). Personal construct psychology and me. In F. Fransella (ed.) International Handbook of Personal Construct Psychology. Chichester: Wiley Salmon, P. (1970). A psychology of personal growth. In D. Bannister (ed.) Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press
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Stefan, C. (1977). Core role theory and implications. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Tschudi, F. (1977). Loaded and honest questions: a construct theory view of symptoms and therapy. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press Winter, D. A. (1992). Personal Construct Psychology in Clinical Practice: Theory, Research and Application. London: Routledge
Chapter 8
Sauce for the Gander Sally Robbins Sally Robbins qualified as a Clinical Psychologist in 1980 and has worked in the National Health Service with older people ever since, originally in south London and Kent, and more recently in Coventry. She has been involved in personal construct psychology since the mid-1980s, and has three book chapters and a couple of conference papers to her name.
Elaborated aspects of theory: geese; reflexivity; sauce; sociality
Introduction What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. In my culture this saying is a rare assertion of equality, at least between the sexes. If we think of it as a more general equality statement – that what is fitting for one person is also fitting for the other – it encapsulates one of my favourite aspects of personal construct psychology (PCP): the explicit application of the theory to all of us, patients and therapists alike, known as reflexivity. In the sociality corollary Kelly (1955; 1991a; 1991b) goes on to make a theoretical statement about how two of us might interact. He suggests: ‘to the extent that one person construes the construction processes of another he may play a role in a social process involving the other person’. This puts both parties together, subject to the same theory, and mutually struggling to relate to each other. It is these qualities of reflexivity and sociality in the theory that I particularly value and intend to explore in this chapter. On reflection, these aspects of the theory are important to me because I am attracted to the idea of us all being ‘in the same boat’. It is one of my touchstones in life to check my own behaviour by reversing positions and Reflections in Personal Construct Theory. Edited by Richard J. Butler © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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seeing if it still seems reasonable – that is, to check if the ‘sauce’ is suitable for both. This is probably one of the hangovers of being brought up with ‘do as you would be done by’ ringing in my ears. The beauty of the Kellyan notion of sociality is that it does not pretend that my construing and that of my client is the same; just that it is subject to the same laws. In writing this chapter I am trying to emphasise the potential usefulness of using this idea more to look at ourselves and our clients as co-participants in living the theory.
Why Sociality? Originally, I think the appeal of sociality for me was that it addresses an aspect of my work, the relationship with the patient, which was almost entirely absent from my original clinical training and yet entirely present in the actual practice. I was taught assessment, research and therapeutic techniques, but the only thing I remember in terms of how to relate to those we worked with was that we were not to answer any questions about ourselves. It may be that my memory is at fault, but having retained only this emphasis on keeping me as a person separate from the therapy process left a lot of questions unanswered and choices unexplored. Operating on this basis with everyone and in all clinical situations seemed inappropriate and was profoundly uncomfortable. Looking back I think that following this instruction would have been hostile, using the Kellyan definition of hostility as ‘the continued effort to extort validational evidence in favour of a type of social prediction which has already proved itself a failure’ (Kelly 1955; 1991a; 1991b). I was not modifying my construing in the light of experience at all. By trying to follow this instruction blindly I was ending up ignoring the outcomes of my behaviour. I was not encouraged to reflect on the feelings evoked in me by these experiences at all. By contrast, one of the main things I remember from my early supervision in PCP was being encouraged to share more of myself and to form closer relationships with the people I work with. This was probably a necessary direction of travel at the time, to redress an imbalance. The stress on reflexivity in the theory made me focus on my own construing with as much energy and attention as I applied to those I work with. I have now spent some years exploring the ‘closer’ end of my therapeutic constructs about relating to patients and I have become increasingly interested in the whole issue of how subtle changes in my approach relate to the construing of the people I am working with and affect the roles I can play.
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Examples of Sociality in Practice Issues of sociality necessarily underpin all our work with patients. The examples below illustrate some of the work situations in which I have found that an explicit consideration of what role I am playing in relation to the other’s construing system has paid dividends. When doing this I have always found it helpful to reflect on my own construing at the same time, though this is often the more uncomfortable part of the process. I have tried to represent some of this reflexivity with each example.
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The new patient
Andrew was initially referred to me as suicidal, whose suicidal wife had just been admitted to one of our inpatient wards. A retired nurse, he had cared for his wife for 10 years or more during her worsening ill health. Given his previous career he felt he was reasonably well equipped to do this, and was moreover expected by friends and family to play this role. His wife had gradually become more disabled and had been recently diagnosed as having a dementia, a diagnosis that had precipitated her wish to die. In her decline she had become more and more aggressive and belittling towards her husband, with frequent references to abuse he had experienced in the past. Her tirades were frequent, loud and often public. Sometimes she would attack him physically and Andrew found it difficult to defend himself from these assaults. He experienced this as horribly distressing. It catapulted him into a sense of vulnerability which he thought he had escaped from long ago. He could not see a way forward – hence his sense that suicide might well be the best option. In part this resulted from the contradictory messages he got from his wife and her carers about the future. He was very fearful of having her at home and the whole situation resuming as before. More importantly, as became apparent when he outlined his story, he was caught between two superordinate and conflicting constructs: ‘good husband’ vs. ‘neglectful’ and ‘vulnerable’ vs. ‘safe’. Before his wife’s illness had worsened he had been able to see himself as both a relatively good husband and as relatively safe. Now he found himself increasingly vulnerable. In order to increase his safety he needed to stop caring for her at home, but this moved him into being relatively more neglectful. Threat and guilt were the dominant features of his diagnosis. Threat, according to Kelly, is the awareness of imminent comprehensive change in one’s core structures, whereas guilt is the awareness of dislodgment of the self from one’s core role structure (Kelly 1955; 1991a; 1991b).
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As you might imagine, given the complexity of this situation, a number of other professionals were involved with Andrew and his wife in various capacities. He had felt himself compelled to explain to them all the nature of his abusive experiences, I think in part because he was so upset about them again, and in part because the information helped to explain why he felt he could no longer care for his wife. As a result, by the time I got involved, he was ready to tell me the same story, but at the same time reluctant to go over it all again. My colleagues clearly wanted me to do something about his risk of suicide, and it was equally clear, particularly from those in Social Work, that this would involve my doing some work with Andrew on what seemed to be the effect of his old traumas. I was also expected to play a practical role at times, sharing in an advocacy role for Andrew in the various meetings and discussions which revolved around the future care for his wife. For those of you who are unfamiliar with this sort of work with older people, it is quite normal for me to be involved in such practical issues. If we look at this as a construct of expectation of my role we get ‘abuse work’ vs. ‘practical advocacy’. Referring to the sociality corollary helped me to work out what was most likely to be useful to Andrew himself, rather than taking direction from my colleagues and perhaps oscillating between these two activities. Given Andrew’s position, struggling with threat and guilt, the first priority was to work on how he might begin to feel safer, and so reduce the threat at least to the level of fear, which is defined by Kelly as ‘like threat, except that, in this case, it is a new incidental construct, rather than a comprehensive construct, that seems about to take over’ (Kelly 1955; 1991a; 1991b). This we did by elaborating areas of Andrew’s construing to use old skills to help him feel more in control. He had knowledge of aromatherapy and reflexology, which he had used on patients in the past. Now he began to use it more extensively on himself. His construing of what was therapeutically useful was permeable enough to accept new ideas I supplied on how to use narrative and imagery to help him cope with his nightmares. We were able to work out an overarching strategy together and this helped him see a way out of his dilemmas. This involved first strengthening his ability to withstand doubt and emotional pressure, whilst also working through the tortuous practicalities of arranging the future care of his wife. He could see the sense of waiting until after progress had been made on these goals to decide what psychological needs he would still have then. It was by no means clear whether it would then make sense for him to try to reconstrue his old experiences of abuse then or whether he would be able to get on with his life again without having to take on this difficult and
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painful work. The idea that he might not necessarily have to do this was clearly very welcome. Finally, he was able to take on board new ways of understanding his guilt and to work on reconstruing his core roles accordingly. My main concern in working with Andrew was to get into ‘a position to encourage change’ as opposed to ‘so close I can’t see a way out either’. He was keen to be friendly with those of us who worked with him, presumably to recreate something like the working relationships he had enjoyed years ago. He described a colleague of mine as being ‘like a sister’ to him. In being different from this I was aware of seeming more distant and of his being rather disappointed that I was not ‘joining the family’.
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The failure
Perhaps I have made the previous example of using sociality to navigate towards therapeutic success sound too easy. In case that is so, I have another example to share with you, but with a very different outcome. A lady I had been working with for five or six sessions would no longer see me. There was a theme in her story about others treating her badly, from her parents who did not tell her she was adopted, to the daughters who did not take her side against her husband. She was telling me about one daughter’s recent unsatisfactory behaviour and happened to mention that one of the things that annoyed her was that the daughter used a new tea bag for each cup of tea. Looking back, I clearly failed to keep the thought ‘so do I – is it really that big a problem?’ sufficiently to myself. I completely failed to appreciate how constellatory her construing was in this area and became myself construed in the same way as her daughter, thus destroying my therapeutic role with her. The sociality corollary in this case has at least given me a way of understanding how I ‘blew it’. When I think about this lady and others where things have not gone as I would have liked the phrase that comes is ‘the ones that got away’. Given that this harks back to the fisherman’s phrase, I suppose the contrast pole should be the ‘ones I hooked’, but actually it is more like the ‘ones I’ve done something useful with’.
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The unusual situation
Sociality also guides me when the work I am doing is not therapeutic in the traditional one-to-one in the outpatient department style. Often in working with older people one or more aspects of this traditional model do not apply. Frequently, I see people in their own home or I will be involved in
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activities such as contributing to decisions on a care package which are beyond the range of traditional therapy, as I did with Andrew and his wife. The point here is that many of our therapeutic assumptions come from well-practised models of therapy. When we step outside these we need even more the guidance that the sociality corollary gives. Outside the therapy office I am open to a wide range of pushes and pulls on my behaviour. When I am in someone’s home should I accept a cup of tea? What about a sandwich? What if the kettle is boiling on the hob unnoticed? How should I react when the person wants to hug or kiss me? The answers, of course, depend on my construing their construction processes and then my playing whatever role seems useful. Mind you, if you say this in a room full of psychologists, and perhaps admit to some of your less orthodox responses, you had better be ready for a collective sharp intake of breath and some muttering. Years ago I heard about a lady being interviewed by a reporter on her hundredth birthday. She was asked what it was like being 100 and replied, ‘Oh you know … still trying to talk to the grown-ups.’ I think I know what she meant. When I was a teenager I thought that one day I would be grown up and that meant being sure of things – at last. Not too many years later it began to dawn on me that there is no state of being grown up. I must apologise here to any readers who have managed to progress beyond being 15 on the inside and to whom this does not make sense. As far as I am concerned the same is true of me as a clinician; part of me still yearns for certainty, but most of me knows that this is an illusion and that I do my best work by working hard in each new situation. This probably adds up to a construct along the lines of ‘creative uncertainty’ vs. ‘deadly certainty’.
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In supervision and training
An area of concern for me, as someone specialising in work with older people ever since I qualified, is that of the ever-present age gap between me and those I work with. When I started this work I was at least 40 years younger than my youngest patients and when I moved to my second job, which had an even older client group, the gap increased still further. I had years of ‘you look just like my granddaughter’ comments, before I graduated to looking like nieces and daughters. I look forward to looking like their sisters and cousins. I have raised the issue of the client–therapist age gap before (Robbins 2005). It seems to me that when same issue in the relationship with our patients is a constant in our work we have a particular responsibility to work out some way of addressing it.
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Now that we in England are being urged to delay our retirement age beyond 65 it is theoretically possible that one day I will be older than the people I work with, but for the last 28 years and for the next 14 this has never been and will not be the case. As you read this, the way I was originally trained suggested quite rigid rules for me to follow in order to get the relationship right – to ‘act professionally’. My guess is that anyone reading this book is likely to feel, with me, that rigid rules rarely get you very far. They are like a watch that has stopped and is therefore right twice a day but otherwise useless. A rigid rule will sometimes serve us well and is better than having no construction at all to follow, but gives us little or no help for much of the time. Sociality, by contrast, acts as an algorithm to apply to each unique situation which we can use to generate an appropriate answer and subsequently to use again and again to refine and improve our approach. I try to incorporate this way of thinking in the supervision and training that I give, which is almost always with people younger than me. At the heart of PCP is the idea of sameness and contrasting difference. In talking about the issue of age we are drawing a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them, the older people’. This leads me to encourage the people I supervise and train to look for sameness and difference in their construing of themselves and older people. When I am teaching or supervising about PCP and older people, I try to get people to elaborate their construing explicitly along these two lines, with an overlay of the corollaries to help them navigate around the territory. I emphasise the issue of explicitness, not to exclude the implicit or tacit, but because I think that much of our construing about age and our understanding of our relationships with older people tend towards the implicit and unexamined. One simple way to look at our construing in this area is to use ideas from Kastenbaum et al.’s (1972) paper ‘The ages of me’ in which the idea of people having a variety of personal and interpersonal ages is explored. Their structured interview includes items such as ‘most of the time I feel …’ and ‘I look as though I were about age …’. The original interview in the paper is quite lengthy, so in my teaching I usually use a few questions inspired by it to get trainees to loosen their idea of age from a fixed chronological property to something more varied and dynamic: a) b) c) d) e)
Chronological age How old do I look? How old would I like to be? How old do others think I am? How old do I feel inside?
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When I first used this exercise I was in my mid-twenties. I found that others sometimes seemed reluctant to admit to much of a variation between the answers of these five questions, but that if I confessed that my answer to e) had recently gone up from 12 to 13 it seemed to help. The constructions we come out with in such an exercise can help to break down any overly exclusive ‘us and them’ ideas of age. It seems self-evident that if we ourselves ‘are’ a range of ages, then older people probably are too. The range of ages might even overlap. Kastenbaum et al.’s paper reported that the discrepancy between the age people thought they looked and the age they felt themselves to be inside increased with age. This certainly holds for me: these days I am mostly about 15. This means that some 25 years ago this discrepancy was 13 years but now it has widened to 36 years. Another way of exploring the issues of same and difference is to read around and debate the construing of others in the area. When I am supervising I make reference to my ‘favourites’ in the literature, Lily Pincus’s (1981) The Challenge of a Long Life and Mary Stott’s (1981) Ageing for Beginners, to help trainees do this. These sorts of exercises can help us to elaborate our construing of ageing and to make sure it is neither too tight nor too pre-emptive to allow us to construe the construing of individual older people effectively. Another way of putting this is to say that I see this elaboration as a useful way of ‘limbering up’ for a placement working with older people. Having done such work we are more likely to be open to construing the construing systems of older people more accurately. If I reflect on what this means for me, my concern is to share what I can from my career so far, but not to do so in a way that is stultifying. Another formative experience from my training days was doing some neuropsychological tests with a very old lady and feeling under pressure to get through them and produce the answer. I felt that I was transferring the sense of pressure to her and that it was unreasonable to have expected her to do so much work in a short session. As a result, as a teacher and supervisor, I am at pains to give the people I am training and supervising the sense of being free to make decisions themselves on the spot.
5
Working with people with dementia
I have written before about some of my understanding of the changes in construing processes that tend to come with a diagnosis of dementia (Robbins & Bender 2006). In that chapter I mentioned a man I called Alf and how the love of his wife was helping to preserve his sense of his core structure despite quite drastic changes in his construing in other areas of
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his life. In writing this I was using McCoy’s (1977) understanding of love as ‘a state of awareness of the validation of one’s core structure’. I said little if anything about how I cast my own role in relation to Alf and all the people I have met with similar issues. Reflecting on this now I am aware of how thin I sometimes stretch my tenuous hold on construing the construction processes of others. Some of these people I meet before there is any question about their cognitive abilities and we are in touch because of other issues; others I meet because they are given a diagnosis of dementia and are struggling with this or because I am helping to contribute to working out what is going on with them. For all sorts of reasons I am sometimes still in touch with them when the looseness, reduction in permeability and constriction (which Mike Bender and I described in the 2006 chapter) has taken hold of much of their construing, sometimes to a point where it is no longer possible for them to speak to me. Most of my colleagues relate to these people in terms of their current mental abilities, whatever these are thought to be, so they will often talk to the carer and ignore the person. This is done with very little consideration of how what is said and how it is said may affect the person. If this is raised with them the fact that the person will not remember the incident after a few hours is cited as sufficient explanation. The question of emotional learning, or what we might describe as a relatively functioning tacit construing system, (Neimeyer 1981), does not arise, despite the fact that many of these patients will retain the sense of having felt excluded or ignored even without knowing when or by whom. When looked at from the other side we might suspect that such interactions invalidate the person’s sense of their role. In these circumstances I think the trick for us lies in developing some sort of role for ourselves that the person can appreciate as reasonable and potentially helpful whatever their current abilities, and then tying it in to a more personalised validation of their sense of self as quickly and as thoroughly as we can. If we can do this before much deterioration occurs, so much the better, because our construing of their construction processes is likely to be fuller and more accurate. Whatever our professional role, if we can do this we will at least minimise any harmful invalidation this might entail. Effectively, I am talking about showing each individual person with dementia as much love as we can, in McCoy’s definition, in order to be as useful to them as possible. I can see an example of the sort of effect I am aiming at with this strategy in the Alzheimer Café Movement, a network of informal meetings for people who have dementia or similar problems and their friends and relatives. ‘All in the same boat’ is the motto or slogan of the movement, and as I said at the beginning of this chapter, I am particularly attracted to
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the sense of equality that this expresses. Our local café meets once a month and the experience is highly valued. The people who attend know that everyone else there will either have some form of dementia or will be caring for or working with people who have dementia. The effect of this anticipation is to start the evening on a footing of shared expectations. It does not matter if the person with dementia breaks the normal social rules, as they often do in many subtle and more obvious ways. Other people are ‘in the same boat’ and will accept a wider range of behaviour than is normal. In other settings some of the people with dementia, and many of their friends and relatives, experience a sense of shame because they have somehow broken the social rules. An example might be that a husband has to order all the food and prompt his wife to eat in a café. He might then need to leave the table to escort his wife to the toilet. In a normal café such behaviour would soon get some funny looks from other customers and the husband might find himself cringing at the unwanted attention. He might feel ashamed. McCoy defines shame as: ‘an awareness of the dislodgement of the self from another’s construing of your role’ (McCoy 1977). At the Alzheimer Café this need not happen, because the other carers are likely to be able to construe the husband’s construing of the situation and play their roles accordingly. Equally, the wife who might otherwise be feeling ashamed or indeed guilty can be relatively free of such emotions because she does not experience any dislodgement from core roles. Kitwood (1997) talked about the need to focus on the person rather than the illness; the ‘person with dementia’ rather than the ‘person with dementia’. It seems that in a setting like the Alzheimer Café we manage to do this more successfully than in much of day-to-day life. So if we can construe the construing systems of people with dementia and their carers adequately, our expectations of their roles are adjusted accordingly and no sense of shame need result. Equally, if we can serve to validate their core structure to some extent, they will be less likely to feel guilty. Sometimes colleagues ask me how I can stand working with older people, many of whom are declining in their physical or mental powers. I have always known that one aspect of my attraction to the specialty is an attempt to face my own possible futures. I am working on my own ageing while I do this, letting go of my dark-haired youth and exploring my grey-haired new self, for example. I anticipate that my life in the future will still have meaning even when I lack the abilities I now rely on, and I hope people will treat me accordingly. I mentioned the motto ‘do as you would be done by’ before, so I think this is what I am trying to act on in my work with people with dementia.
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The organisation
During my 13 years working in Coventry I have been in four different organisations, while still working in the same job. Each time the organisation changes, and even sometimes when it doesn’t, we get new organisational priorities. The significance of this for those of us employed by the health service is that these priorities influence what is wanted of us as employees. Ultimately, they can determine whether we continue to be employed or not. My constructs around this are: ‘secure position’ vs. ‘at risk’; ‘usefully placed’ vs. ‘too detached’ or ‘too prominent’; and ‘responsible’ vs. ‘powerless’. I need to act to try to preserve what I value in our service because I prefer to be ‘responsible’ rather than ‘powerless’ and this requires that I be relatively ‘usefully placed’. In such circumstances it makes sense to optimise my role in relation to the organisation, using the trusted sociality corollary once again. Following the most recent changes in our organisation, we will be judged on its ability to perform in three areas: its managerial competence; its financial management; and its safety or governance procedures. If I want to survive in this setting, to be in a relatively ‘secure position’, and if I want to have any influence on the provision of psychological services for older people locally, I had better learn to play a role in relation to these organisational constructs. I therefore need to construe my activities in relation to these priorities and communicate them to the management and to my colleagues accordingly. It will help me to do this better, to make my arguments about services more effectively, if I can understand some of the more subordinate construing involved, in order to clarify how managers think these goals can be enacted. Wish me luck!
Reflecting on My Own Construing When it comes to thinking about my own construing I have found that sociality comes into its own when I find myself particularly discontented or surprised by the roles I play in relation to others. In such a situation I am left wondering what the role I play says about my own construing, or about my construing of the construct systems of others. Then I have to work it out. A few days before our first son was born I visited the antenatal clinic and was told that my blood pressure was too high and I would need to be admitted to hospital if a second check gave a similar reading. When it did I … went home. I was feeling very threatened in the clinic and the dominant
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thought was ‘you are not going to keep me in here’. I felt the staff were somehow the enemy hell-bent on trapping me there. After a difficult night wrestling with these feelings I went into hospital the next day and then spent the time there determined to get my blood pressure down and get out. I could not understand why I felt so desperate and, though ostensibly I managed to ‘behave properly’, I felt ashamed and puzzled about my feelings. It was only a couple of days later that I realised what my construing was about and why I looked on the staff as gaolers. My only other experience of inpatient hospital treatment had been when I was 2½ and admitted to hospital to have an ear abscess operated on. As was normal with hospitalised children in the UK in the 1950s, my parents were not allowed to stay with me. The only memories I have of that time are the feel and smell of my mother as I clung to her before she left, and the same feeling of being trapped and desperate that I experienced again 33 years later. On reflection I think this was a small example of what Leitner, Faidley & Celentana (2000) described as ‘structural arrest’. My dominant understanding of the staff was in relation to their keeping me in hospital, and although I was able to use more adult constructions of the situation to moderate my overt behaviour, my tacit construing was still frozen at the level of the 2½ year old. It took a few days to work this out, I think because most of the original construing was preverbal. Having hauled this into awareness I could then apply my adult verbal construing to my current experiences and develop more age- and situation-appropriate roles. Sometimes it can be helpful to undertake a more general review of my construct system and how it operates. For example, if we look through this chapter so far I think some themes in my construing system are clear: a concern to do something or be useful, and a stress on freedom, on responsibility and on uncertainty. I have laddered one of the constructs that I referred to earlier and produced: ‘what life is about’ vs. ‘might as well be dead’ ↑ ‘be in control of my own destiny’ vs. ‘rudderless’ ↑ ‘not at the mercy of others’ vs. ‘in others’ power’ ↑ ‘responsible’ vs. ‘powerless’ I often get similar results when I ladder. This exercise allows me to be more aware of what I am doing and to be able to spot when these themes might be colouring my understanding of others construing systems.
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Conclusion I spend almost all my time in relation to others, and at work I am paid to create relationships which effect change. I was taught to generate a certain way of relating to patients and to stick to it, but this rigidity seemed profoundly uncomfortable and largely unproductive. I often see others at work with ways of relating to their clients which appear unguided by theory. These work patterns often seem to be aimed either at generating friendship or at preserving a formal professional role, rather than generating therapeutic change. In this chapter I have tried to reflect on the ways I use sociality and reflexivity drawn from PCP to steer a different and more useful path. Over the years I have often referred to PCP as a structure that quite literally helps me to move around my psychological system and those of others. The analogy I have drawn is that of the framework of branches that a lemur swings on when it moves around its world. I do not claim to be able move with anything like the speed or elegance a lemur has, but I can dream. If I apply this image to this chapter, the sociality corollary is one of the most useful and well-used branches of PCP and reflexivity helps me to grip onto it.
References Kastenbaum, R., Derbin, V., Sabatini, P. & Artt, S. (1972). The ages of me: towards personal and interpersonal definitions of aging. Aging and Human Development, 3, 197–211 Kelly, G. A. (1955) The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volumes 1 and 2. New York; Norton (reprinted London: Routledge, 1991) Kelly, G. A. (1991a). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volume 1. A Theory of Personality. London: Routledge Kelly, G. A. (1991b). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Volume 2. Clinical Diagnosis and Psychotherapy. London: Routledge Kitwood, T. (1997). Dementia Reconsidered: The Person comes First. Buckingham: Open University Press Leitner, L. M., Faidley, A. J. & Celentana, M. A. (2000). Diagnosing human meaning making: an experiential constructivist approach. In R. Neimeyer & J. Raskin (eds.) Construction of Disorders: Meaning Making Frameworks for Psychotherapy Washington, DC: American Psychological Association McCoy, M. M. (1977). A reconstruction of emotion. In D. Bannister (ed.) New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. London: Academic Press
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Neimeyer, R. A. (1981). The structure and meaningfulness of tacit construing. In H. Bonarius, R. Holland & S. Rosenberg (eds.) Personal Construct Psychology: Recent Advances in Theory & Practice. London: Macmillan Pincus L. (1981). The Challenge of a Long Life. London: Faber Robbins S. E. (2005). Looking forward towards the end. In D. A. Winter & L. L. Viney (eds.) Personal Construct Psychotherapy: Advances in Theory, Practice, and Research. London: Whurr Robbins S. E. & Bender M. (2006). Making sense of dementia. In P. Caputi, H. Foster & L. L. Viney (eds.) Personal Construct Psychology: New Ideas. Chichester: Wiley Stott, M. (1981). Ageing for Beginners. Oxford: Blackwell
Chapter 9
Griddled with Angst: A Roller-Coaster Ride on the Repertory Grid Richard Bell Richard Bell is an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Melbourne, Australia and has been interested in the analysis of repertory grid data since the early 1970s. He has published more than 20 articles and book chapters on aspects of repertory grid analysis (who would have thought such a boring topic could lend itself to so many publications?) and has recently co-authored with Fay Fransella an almost totally rewritten second edition of A Manual for the Repertory Grid Technique.
Elaborated aspects of theory: constructive alternativism; duality; repertory grids
Introduction A few months ago I was making my way across Europe, towards a prestigious university where I was due to present a paper on recent developments in the repertory grid technique. Luckily or unluckily (I’m still not sure which) while en route I logged into my email to find a message from my future hosts. Apologetically, they said the presentation I had sent was too complex. Could I give a simpler talk? With a whole day and a half to spare I managed to do so. The revised talk was a simple introduction which showed how the repertory grid technique is closely linked to personal construct theory (PCT). My hosts were knocked out by this. So simple and Reflections in Personal Construct Theory. Edited by Richard J. Butler © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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so obvious. It had been a cornerstone of my first constructivist journal article ‘Theory appropriate analyses of repertory grid data’ (Bell 1988), but even then it had been a point I made and moved on to the real focus of the paper, analysing grid data, something I still seem to be doing. But the grid–theory link, so simple and so obvious, was forgotten. This is a book about reflexivity and PCT. The repertory grid ought to be a tool for getting reflexivity since it provides us with a representation of our construct system. Perhaps that is why I was invited to contribute to this book, being, in the words of Jack Adams-Webber (1989), ‘an un-reconstructed grid-head’ who is therefore sensitive to the reflexive qualities of the grid technique. Alas, it is not so. I have never found completing a grid to be helpful in understanding my world. Nor have I ever seen a self-completed grid from any of the other proponents (including Kelly himself) of the technique. Have they done them and kept them hidden because they are just too revealing? Or like me, are they too crass and insensitive or too aware of the mechanics of the grid for the grid as a technique to be a vehicle for any reflexive moments? I should add that I do not believe the grid is necessarily good at providing answers – perhaps this is why it has never been a particularly strong measure in research. Rather, I have always thought the grid, and any analysis of it, rather better at providing a starting point for asking questions. I see it more as closer to the start of the information-gathering process than closer to the end. This is not to say that the grid has not played a role in what I have taken away from PCT. To use the terminology of the grid and theory, for me the grid has not been a construct or way of viewing the world, but rather an event in my world, the successive construal of which has varied my construction system, just as George Kelly said it would (the experience corollary). Thus this chapter is a tracing out of these successive construals over the past 38 years or so in a ramble through my recollections of life on the roller-coaster of the repertory grid.
The 1970s: Getting Started My first encounter with PCT occurred in a second-hand bookshop near the Prahran Market, Melbourne in 1970. I was looking for paperback detective novels (preferably old green Penguins), but having recently graduated with a degree in psychology, I felt obliged to give the psychology shelf (in those days there was only one) a quick once-over. There they were, the famous two stubby volumes in a faded blue-grey that obscured the printing of the
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title and author. Fortunately, I opened volume 1 (had I but opened volume 2 with its clinical detail, I might well have declined the purchase and might not be writing this chapter now), which of course fell open at the fold-out sample repertory grid. I was hooked (although to be honest, the four dollar price tag on the two volumes, did play a substantial role in my decision to buy) as I had just spent a semester in psychometrics studying the famous theorem of Eckart & Young (1936) and its application in factor analysing a data matrix of columns and rows – the kind of data matrix that a repertory grid is. I’d like to say I rushed home and began writing computer programs to analyse repertory grids in this way, but of course it would not be true. I bought the volumes, took them home, put them on a bookshelf … and forgot about them. I did eventually start writing computer programs, but that was in 1979, and in another country. By the end of the 1970s I had moved to the University of Western Australia and was working in a teaching services unit. Due for study leave in 1979, I had noticed in a British Educational Technology newsletter reference to a teaching appraisal system called TARGET based on the repertory grid, which had been developed by Terry Keen and Warren Hopwood at Plymouth Polytechnic. As I was spending the first part of my leave at Exeter University (just up the road from Plymouth in Australian distance) I thought I would check it out. But even at Exeter University there were grids, analysed with an ‘illegal’ copy of Patrick Slater’s INGRID program. Slater has adapted some of the psychometrics in his PhD studies on scaling personal preferences to the analysis of repertory grid data in a technique he called ‘principal components’. Some people I met thought that the program did something funny because you couldn’t get factor loadings for both elements and constructs.1 Patiently, I would explain that this was indeed possible thanks to Eckart & Young’s theorem, but usually the audience’s eyes would glaze over after a minute and a half and we would have to adjourn for a refreshing pint in the student bar in order for me to finish my point. Eventually, I made it to Plymouth Poly and tried out the TARGET system with its innovative use of video clips of teaching as elements. But I did not meet Terry Keen, who had moved to Milton Keynes where he was running an educational resource centre. It had one of the first personal computers 1
The problem has not totally gone away. A couple of months before writing this I has an email from a distinguished British psychologist still asking how this could be so.
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and when I spent a month or so with Terry later that year I began my longdelayed foray into repertory grid analysis on this computer. Pretty soon we had memory problems and had to take the machine to Oxford to get the memory doubled – from 16k to 32k (what we would now think of as a trivial size for a file). We did a couple of innovative things in that time, one of which was to introduce the intra-class correlation as a method of measuring cognitive complexity. Traditional measures of cognitive complexity were based on matching or correlating constructs. The intra-class correlation is derived from an analysis of variance of a grid. Vannoy (1965) was the first to recognise that variance analysis is a useful thing to do with grid data as such an analysis recognises two factors – the constructs and the elements – and that we can measure the complexity among the elements as well as among the constructs. Many years later I was to return to this idea in a paper with Julian Vince and the late Jacqui Costigan (Bell, Vince & Costigan, 2002).
The 1980s: the Personal Computer Revelation The 1980s were a key time in the development of methods to analyse grids. Although the major innovations (Slater’s factor analysis and Shaw & Thomas’s clustering) preceded this they were locked into mainframe computers. This was fine for university-based usage but not much help to practitioners elsewhere. Slater’s MRC-funded service had provided such a service to practitioners, but it was long gone. The 1980s saw the advent of portable computers – portable in the Goon Show sense of having a handle, otherwise ‘luggable’ was a more apposite descriptor. Those early machines also came with an inbuilt ‘high-level’ language, BASIC, which enabled anyone to produce a computer program to analyse grid data. Initially, this could be done on both PCs and Apple Macs, which was a boon as in those days the grid world seemed roughly evenly divided between the two. At the same time there was growing concern with the dominance of grid methodology. As Bannister (1985) put it: ‘grid method is a Frankenstein’s monster which has rushed away on a statistical and experimental rampage of its own, leaving construct theory neglected, stranded high and dry, far behind’, while Neimeyer (1985a) saw it as part of ‘the crisis of methodology’ for PCT and recommended that ‘construct theorists end their faithful marriage to the grid and become more methodologically promiscuous’. This was a difficult time to be doing research with grids, particularly when one could see both sides.
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But this dichotomy was not as objective as it might seem. Slater’s (1969) caustic review of Bannister & Mair’s (1968) book may have played some part in the retreat of both Bannister & Mair from the repertory grid. There were also tensions on the other side of the Atlantic and the 1987 Congress in Memphis featured a rather sharp debate between Adams-Webber (progrid) and Yorke (anti-grid), which was much toned down for publication (Adams-Webber 1989; Yorke 1989a; 1989b). A similar debate was held at the Berlin Congress in 1999, between Tom Ravenette (anti-grid) and me (Bell 2000a; Ravenette 2000), however no altercations ensued as we were both gentlemen (Tom was always a gentleman and I adopted the role for the afternoon). We agreed with each other’s perspective in such a way as to provide an invalidating experience with the dichotomy corollary for the audience. Why was the grid so dominant? The implicit answer seemed to be ‘because it is easy’. But as well as seeing the grid as an easy thing to do, it can also be seen as a way to view ‘A person’s processes [which] are psychologically channelized by the ways in which he or she anticipates events’. The repertory grid embodies the fundamental postulate of theory. This is the simple observation referred to in my opening paragraph. Fortunately, the grid has survived because it is clear that since the grid embodies the fundamental postulate, it provides an excellent basis from which to investigate and test the theory. Investigate and test the theory? That is not a phrase you see much in the personal construct literature. By the time of the 6th International Congress on PCP at Churchill College, Cambridge in 1985 (my first) I had actually read volume 1 of Kelly’s work. Chapter 1 is headed ‘Constructive alternativism’, which establishes ‘the broader framework’ for the theory of personal constructs. Kelly defines his philosophical position as part of this as constructive alternativism: ‘there are always some alternative constructions available to choose among in dealing with the world’ (Kelly 1955). One thing I’ve taken away from Kelly’s theory is this – there is always an alternative way of construing things. To be sure I already was aware of this in the narrower world of factor analysis where indeterminacies can rule, but I’d never had such a classy name for it. But by 1985, I had the feeling that I hadn’t actually seen many alternatives propounded in PCT. In fact, I’d hardly seen any criticism from within the PCP tent. Neimeyer (1985b) talked about this (‘both method and theory embody the same flaws’), quoting criticisms from a number of leading figures in the field. These criticisms were made in interviews with him, and interviews, like PowerPoint presentations, are succinct and pithy but do not have the
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reasoned structure and testing of propositions that properly worked-up criticism requires.
The 1990s: Looking at Corollaries This was a period when I became interested in what could be tested in the theory and what might be improved (constructive alternativism). I was now seriously reading Kelly. The only major development had been Dennis Hinkle’s (1965) with his laddering, and implications grid extensions of the organisation corollary. This was never published directly but became very influential in practice due to the detailed accounts given by Bannister & Mair (1968) and Fransella & Bannister (1977), without receiving much independent testing. While staying with Terry Keen in 1979, I’d seen a couple of manuscript papers from the Utrecht PCP Congress (and subsequently published). One was by Ten Kate (1981) drawing attention to some indeterminacies in the hierarchical structuring of bipolar constructs, the other by Rathod (1981) highlighting the different representations that could be obtained from a common grid. Ten Kate’s criticism was directed at Hinkle’s extension of Kelly’s theory, but subsequently Husain (1983), and indeed much earlier Ryle (1975), directed similar theoretical criticisms at Kelly’s organisational corollary itself. These issues have been elaborated in more detail in Bell (2004a). Needless to say, these criticisms have not found their way into any subsequent general accounts of the theory. The other criticism (by Rathod), pointing out how different representations of the same grid data could be obtained, sank pretty much without a trace, although it was a valid criticism of the grid, very much in line with the concerns of Bannister (1985) and Neimeyer. One reason might be that grid users, like most social scientists, dislike statistics and quantitative data analysis. What they want is an ‘expert’ to give them the answer. By and large, the providers of grid analysis computer programs do just that. You input the grid and got the picture out. What happened in between was a private matter between the computer chip and the program. But any program written to analyse grids contains a number of choice points. Whether the programmer explicitly considered these choices and chose one or simply used the only option they knew is not often made public. In writing my computer programs (originally GPACK but later others, including GRIDSTAT) I set out to follow Kelly and embody the choice corollary into my programs. Like alcohol, too much choice is supposed to bad for you (though I’m not sure; I’m still working on the alcohol problem), so these programs generally have a recommended choice.
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Some things take time. While first constructing my GPACK program in the early 1980s, I wrote: ‘Fact and artifact in the principal component analysis of grid data’. It was quaint, typewritten with appendices of cutup mainframe computer printout, showing how different pre-analysis scalings of the grid affected the results. It was eventually presented at the 12th International Congress in 1997, and an even later version finally published (Bell 2004b). To return to my constructive alternativism position of looking at the theory via the repertory grid. The theory has a number of corollaries. In general, there are two kinds: those that simply extend the fundamental postulate, for example the construction corollary; and those where data (e.g. from a grid, though not necessarily – see Millis & Neimeyer 1990) can be tested against the corollary. Such a situation occurs with the commonality corollary: To the extent that one person employs a construction of experience which is similar to that employed by another, his or her psychological processes are similar to those of the other person. This corollary has an important practical consequence. In many practical situations with large numbers of respondents, or where the sponsoring authority wishes to test some given constructs or elements, grids with common constructs and/ or elements are used. This has some distinct advantages (Fransella, Bell & Bannister 2004) if the commonality corollary holds. In 1996 at the European Personal Construct Association Conference in Reading I proposed several ways of testing whether the corollary did hold in such data. This caused some consternation among several grid practitioners who routinely assumed the given constructs meant the same thing to everyone. A simplified version was subsequently published (Bell 2000b), although one suspects the (quite simple) test is not made. (What consultant could afford the risk of it failing?) The corollary that first attracted my attention (Bell 1988), and still does, was the organisation corollary: Each person characteristically evolves, for his convenience in anticipating events, a construction system embracing ordinal relations between constructs. Constructs are organised into a system. That seems necessary if we are going to be able to behave consistently, but what kind of system is it? Kelly says it is ordinal. As indicated (briefly) earlier in the references to the criticisms of Ryle (1975) and Husain (1983), Kelly had two somewhat contradictory views as to what constitutes this ordinal relationship, but one defining quality of an ordinal relationship is that it is asymmetric. My first thoughts, as were those of Gaines & Shaw (1980), is that we should be looking for hierarchical relationships through asymmetric measures of relationships between constructs. But when I looked at the standard
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measures relating constructs, they were all symmetric (e.g. distances and correlations). Attempts to focus on theory-appropriate relationship measures have been a failure from Gaines & Shaw through to Bell (2004b). I don’t know about the other researchers, but using this approach I have found asymmetric relationships rare in the grid data I have considered (Bell unpublished, and never likely to be published). Does this mean that the corollary is invalid or that the measurement is inappropriate? We cannot tell objectively. One feature of these considerations of the organisation corollary is the notion that in order to consider an issue such as asymmetry, we have to consider two pieces of information (i.e. the construct B–construct A relationship as well as the construct A–construct B relationship). The need to consider more than one thing at a time is a pervasive characteristic of Kelly’s theory. This duality comes to the fore in the dichotomy corollary (a person’s construct system is composed of a finite number of dichotomous constructs), which has attracted the most attention, and is a rare instance of Kelly offering a modification of his theory. He originally said: ‘We are ascribing a dichotomous quality to all human thinking’ (Kelly 1955 p. 109); but in 1966 said that a dichotomous construct ‘by its successive application to events … may create a scale with a great number of points differentiated along its length. Now a person who likes grays can have them – as many as he likes’ (Kelly 1970). But later Kelly said: ‘a construct is at heart a black and white affair, rather than a scale of grays’ (Kelly 1961/1969). So which is it, George? There are two aspects to the bipolarity issue, as I have noted elsewhere (Bell 2002): the dichotomy and the bipolarity. While the former implies the latter, the latter does not require the former and is thus perhaps the more fundamental. It is this issue that has attracted research attention since the 1960s (Mair 1967). Millis & Neimeyer (1990) provided some ingenious support for this corollary using a cognitive experiment rather than a grid, and I (Bell 2000b) subsequently found support from a psychometric perspective (naturally using grid data) but remained less than convinced (Bell 2002). It is perhaps ironic that the one explicit acknowledgement of duality in Kelly’s system is the one I am least convinced by.
Since 2000: the Dual World of Constructs and Elements In 1995 I gave a paper at the Barcelona International Congress (the 11th such congress) showing how four-way grid data (constructs, elements,
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respondents and occasions) could be modelled with a non-metric canonical variate approach termed OVERALS (Bell 1995). These were some old data from recovering psychotic patients who completed grids with common elements and common constructs on four occasions. The paper, quite properly, disappeared into outer space as even I had difficulty understanding it. But one by-product of the analysis lodged in the back of my mind. When the variance of the data was partitioned among the constructs, elements, respondents and occasions, it was the elements that accounted for most of the variance. Around that time a number of people were looking at whether the way grid ratings were collected (by element or by construct) affected the structure of the grid. A student of mine, Julian Vince, was doing a small study looking at this, and for all grids we collected a range of measures. One of these was the intra-class correlation I had developed with Terry Keen hundreds of years ago (actually, in 1979) which can be (and was) calculated for both elements and constructs. We didn’t find that the method of data collection affected this statistic, but we did find that elements were more differentiated than constructs were (Bell, Vince & Costigan 2002). Why does this happen? I went back to the famous two volumes to see what Kelly had to say about elements. The answer was – next to nothing! Elements hardly get a mention. They are the forgotten component of the theory. I began to think along the lines: ‘Behind every famous construct there stands a quiet little element. She made him what he is today.’ In a rare serious moment though, I was suspicious of the role played by element role titles. Role titles have been a part of the classic repertory grid since the beginning, and their importance was argued for by Mitsos (1958). Mitsos’s study has often been taken as evidence that role titles lead to more superordinate constructs being elicited. However, this was only a conjecture, not a finding. Together with some students I did look empirically at this (Haritos, Gindidis, Doan & Bell 2004) and we found that not using role titles led to similar differentiation among elements and constructs. Using role titles led to the same differentiation among elements as in the non-role title grids, but it led to much less differentiated constructs. There were more asymmetric (hence superordinate) relationships in the non-role title grids. So much for Mitsos’s conjecture. We also classified the content of the constructs and found the content to be the same in both conditions. Since we used fixed triads to elicit constructs, we were also able to show that particular role titles led to particular kinds of constructs being elicited. Our conjecture at the end of this paper was that if the grid administrator wanted the respondent to engage in looser construing, then not using role titles would be better, but if tighter construing was desirable, then the
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use of role titles seemed called for. We wait for someone to test our conjecture. If elements are important, then perhaps more attention should be paid to them. But of course, it would be just as incomplete to neglect constructs, and that is probably where my story will end – back worrying at constructs. It may seem strange that I have not mentioned the famous yellow book, Manual for the Repertory Grid Technique (Fransella & Bannister 1977). Of course I had a copy, much borrowed and now quite battered, as most copies are. It is still cited (even though there is a later edition) and was in print (I think) for 14 years. It was the ‘bible’ for repertory grid users, although I have always felt the earlier grid book by Bannister and Mair (1968) to be just as good. The Manual was brilliant, covering the vast range of varieties and uses of the repertory grid technique. If it did have a failing, it was in the analysis section, which was drawn from elsewhere and hinted at much but delivered little in practical detail. But then I had my chance to put my money where my mouth was in 2002 when Fay Fransella invited me to co-author a second edition. The second edition may also be a good book – I am too scared to read it in case I detect embarrassing errors – but the unexpected benefit I gained from the exercise was renewed interest in aspects of the grid occasioned by having to re-read older papers in order to write my sections. Constructive alternativism struck again. One example was when Fay insisted we include a diagram of the Slade & Sheehan (1979) ‘conflict’ contribution of inequalities of sign among trios of construct correlations. Miffed, I trudged over to the library to read (and photocopy) the original paper containing the idea (Lauterbach 1975). I was idly reading it as I walked back to my office (in a desperate attempt to persuade visiting potential international, fee-paying students that this was a place of learning) and was astounded to learn that this did not translate into conflict among three constructs, but conflict between two constructs with respect to a given element. A way of examining this was quickly devised and published (Bell 2004c) and of course it provides another instance of the need to ensure that both constructs and elements are involved in assessing grid structure. At this point I thought I was done with grids. But it seems grids were not done with me. Last year I heard a presentation by Peter Caputi on applying formal concept analysis to identify hierarchies and links between constructs and elements. Peter mentioned an old, widely unused component of the GPACK program I had written to identify diamond lattice configurations among constructs. I had another look at it, was embarrassed by its primitive structure and started to look for an alternative. Whether this alternative
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turns out to be constructive remains to be seen, but the possibility of identifying hierarchies among constructs in a repertory grid and consequently testing data against Kelly’s organisation corollary is too enticing to be ignored. At the earlier mentioned congress in Cambridge in 1985, I had been entranced by a paper by Chiari and others (subsequently published as Chiari, Mancini, Niccolo & Nuzzo 1990), which took the notion of Kelly’s organisational corollary and structured it in such a way that it corresponded to hierarchical structures among what mathematicians call ‘sets’. One issue that has bedevilled the grid (as for PCT more generally) has been its isolation (Neimeyer 1985b). With respect to grid measures there has been a tendency to use idiosyncratic names for measures devised to represent structures in grids. While this can be evocative, it does tend to work against the commonality of our ideas with those of others outside PCP, who might use different labels (e.g. ‘average correlation’ instead of ‘intensity’). One feature of the Chiari et al. team was that while most of them were clinicians, there was also a mathematician. Their team construct thus managed to have the required two poles. The analysis was set out formally in a mathematical sense (which explains why no grid users could understand it) and was unamb