Referring to Artifacts Hilary Kornblith The Philosophical Review, Vol. 89, No. 1. (Jan., 1980), pp. 109-114. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108%28198001%2989%3A1%3C109%3ARTA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V The Philosophical Review is currently published by Cornell University.
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The Philosophtcal Review, LXXXIX, No. 1 (January 1980).
REFERRING T O ARTIFACTS
Hilary Kornblith
D
ue to the work of Donnellan,' Kripke2 and P ~ t n a m , ~ it is now widely accepted that proper names and natural kind terms do not refer in virtue of associated definite descriptions; rather, these terms refer in virtue of some real connection between the user of such terms and an individual or a kind of stuff. If this account is correct, there are no nontrivial analytic sentences with proper names or natural kind terms in subject position. "Moses is Moses" and "Gold is gold" are, perhaps, analytic; "Moses led the Jews out of Egypt" and "Gold is yellow in color" are not. If this account is correct, then, the domain of philosophically interesting analytic truths is, at best, severely restricted. Putnam, however, is not content to restrict his account of reference to proper names and natural kind terms.
So far we have only used natural kind words as examples; but the points we have made apply to many other kinds of words as well. They apply to the great majority of all nouns, and to other parts of speech as well.4
The consequences of such an account for the notion of analyticity should be clear. The domain of interesting analytic truths is restricted still further, and the usefulness of the analytic/ synthetic distinction as a philosophical tool is thus called into question. Putnam is not, of course, the first to question the tenability of the analytic/synthetic distinction. What is particularly noteworthy about the attack on analyticity stemming from Putnam's work on Eeference, however, is that it has none "Reference and Definite Descriptions," Philosophical Revzew, 75 (1966), 281-304; "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions," in Davidson and Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), 356379; "Speaking of Nothing," Philosophical Reuiew, 83 (1974), 3-32. "Naming and, Necessity," in Davidson and Harman, eds., op. cit., 253-355. "'Is Semantics Possible?" "Explanation and Reference," and "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," in Mind, Language and Reality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 41bid., 242. Quoted in Stephen Schwartz, "Putnam on Artifacts," Philosophical Revzew, 87 (1978), 573. Numbers in parentheses in the text refer to the Schwartz article.
HILARY KORNBLITH
of the behaviorist trappings of, for example, Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." If Putnam is right in thinking that his account of the reference of natural kind terms can be extended, this gives mentalists as well as behaviorists good reasons for doubting the tenability of the analytic/synthetic distinction. There are those, of course, who dispute the points made by Donnellan, Kripke and Putnam about proper names and natural kind terms. I will not be concerned with this dispute here, and I will take for granted that some account along the lines of those offered by Donnellan, Kripke and Putnam is correct for proper names as well as natural kind terms. Rather, I will be concerned with Putnam's claim that his account of reference for natural kind terms can be extended to cover most other nouns. I believe that many people who are sympathetic to Putnam's account of reference for natural kind terms are skeptical about the possibility of extending this account to cover other nouns. Thus, in "Putnam on Artifacts," Stephen Schwartz allows that Putnam is correct about natural kind terms, but he denies that this account can be extended to cover artifactual kind terms. Schwartz favors an account of the reference of such terms via Lockean nominal essences. If this account is correct, the analytic/ synthetic distinction is both genuine and important. In this paper, I will take up Schwartz's arguments against a non-Lockean account of the reference of artifactual kind terms, and I will argue that there is no more reason to think that a Lockean account of the reference of such terms can be successful than there is to think that a Lockean account of the reference of natural kind terms can be successful. Defenders of the analytic/ synthetic distinction will have to look elsewhere for important analytic truths. It will be useful to begin by giving a very brief summary of Putnam's account of the reference of natural kind terms. O n Putnam's account, it is useful to introduce the following philosophical fiction. Speakers introduced natural kind terms into the language by pointing to a sample of some natural kind and saying, "Let us call whatever has the same underlying nature as this sample such and such." Of course, such baptismal cereIn From a Logical Poznt of View, (New Y o r k : Harper, 1961), 20-46.
110
REFERRING TO A RTIFA CTS
monies rarely if ever take place, but Putnam's point is merely that natural kind terms function as if they were introduced in this way. As a result, natural kind terms are not synonymous with any description of the kind in observable terms. Thus, as Schwartz rightly points out, "The use of a natural kind term carries with it the presumption of a shared common nature, even if we do not know what this nature is" (566). Schwartz's objection to extending this theory to cover artifactual kinds is straightforward. Although members of a given natural kind have a common underlying nature, members of artifactual kinds do not. I believe there is no such underlying nature of pencils, nor is there a presumption of such a nature. What makes something a pencil are superficial characteristics such as a certain form a n d function. There is nothing underlying about these features. They are analytically associated with the term 'pencil', not disclosed by scientific investigation. [571]
Now Schwartz is surely right in thinking that artifacts do not have a n underlying nature in the same way that, say, chemical compounds do. The underlying nature of a chemical compound is the stuff of which it is composed. If we take a n arbitrary molecule of water we will find that it is composed of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen. Something is water just in case it is composed of hydrogen and oxygen in the same way that they are combined in the arbitrarily selected water molecule. It would be silly, however, to think that if we arbitrarily selected a pencil and found that it is made of woad and graphite, something is a pencil just in case it is composed of wood and graphite arranged in the same way that they are in the arbitrarily selected pencil. This procedure will work even less well for such artifacts as doorstops, dimes and contact lenses. Obviously, any theory of reference which requires that artifacts be picked out by the same sort of underlying natures which are used to pick out chemical kinds is hopelessly false. Needless to say, this is not what Putnam suggests. Indeed, although composition is the underlying nature of chemical kinds, it is not even the underlying nature of other nonchemical natural kinds. Biological kinds, for example, cannot be picked out by composition. You and I are both human beings, but we surely differ in chemical composition. What serves to determine
HILARY KORNBLITH
the underlying nature of a n object depends, in part, on what kind of object it is. Schwartz asks us to imagine the following situation. Suppose we were to discover that all pencils are really some sort of biological organism. Even if we were to make this discovery, it seems we would allow that something which served the same purpose as a pencil but was not a biological organism would, nevertheless, still be a pencil. Schwartz seems to think that this counts against Putnam's attempt to extend his account of the reference of natural kind terms to cover artifactual kinds, for something which is not a biological organism would not have the same underlying nature as pencils, in the imagined case. This, however, is roughly on a par with claiming that Putnam's account of reference for chemical kinds cannot be extended to cover biological kinds, for biological kinds cannot be individuated by composition. The case of the pencil organisms does serve to highlight one further point. How one classifies objects into kinds is in part dependent on the context of i n q ~ i r y .If~ in the process of doing some chemical investigations I pick up a solid iron doorstop and say, "Let's call the kind of which this is a member 'glug'," and then I proceed to perform some chemical tests on the doorstop to determine what it is made of, then 'glug' is a new name for iron. If, however, a Martian anthropologist, in the course of investigating a wide variety of earthly artifacts, points to the very same iron doorstop and says, "Let's call the kind of which this is a member 'glug'," then 'glug' is a new name for doorstops. The context of inquiry thus helps to determine what kind of object is being named. What then is the underlying nature of a n artifactual kind? Schwartz himself seems to give us a clue when he states, in the passage already quoted, "What makes something a pencil are superficial characteristics such as a certain form and function" (571). At least for the most part, it seems that what makes two artifacts members of the same kind is that they perform the same function. Schwartz goes on to say, "There is nothing underbSee Richard Boyd, "Metaphor and Theory Change," in Ortony, ed., Metaphor and Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
REFERRING TO ARTIFACTS
lying about these features," (571) but this is a mere quibble. No genuine objection is thus presented to Putnam's attempt to extend his account of reference to cover artifactual kinds. Although Schwartz does not present any genuine objections to Putnam's non-Lockean account of the reference of artifactual terms, it will be worthwhile briefly to examine Schwartz's Lockean account to see if it is subject to the same criticisms as a Lockean account of natural kind terms. I will argue that it is. On a strict Lockean account, it is only possible to use a general term to refer if one associates with it a certain abstract idea or nominal essence; this amounts to requiring that one associate with the term a definite description true of its referent. This account was shown to be untenable for natural kind terms with a single example. Putnam pointed out that he does not know any distinguishing features of beech trees, and yet it seems that he refers to beeches when he uses the word 'beech'. An exactly analogous example can be constructed for artifactual kinds. I must confess that I do not know any of the distinguishing features of Chippendale furniture; nevertheless, when I use the word 'Chippendale', I succeed in referring to a certain kind of furniture. Putnam points out that he is able to refer to beeches in spite of his ignorance due to his ability to defer to "experts." There are members of our linguistic community who are able to distinguish beeches from other trees, and it is because these "experts" are available that those who know of no distinguishing features of beeches can succeed in referring to beeches by using the word 'beech'. A slightly revised Lockean account of reference would allow for this deference to experts, but require that the experts for any given term associate a certain definite description with it, a description which uniquely picks out the referent of the term. Putnam explicitly rejects even this weak Lockean account for natural kind terms in light of his realistic account of the reference of theoretical terms.' Perhaps Schwartz means to suggest, however, that the weak Lockean account correctly
' Op. cit., 235-238; Richard Boyd, "What Physicalism Does Not Entail," in Block, ed., Readzngs for Phzlosophy of psycho lo^, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), footnote 21.
HILARY KORNBLITH
describes the mechanism by which we refer to artifacts. Is it true, then, that for any term which names a n artifactual kind, there must be members of the linguistic community who associate some definite description with that term which is true of all and only those members of that kind? It is not. Consider the Martian anthropologist, ignorant of the nature and function of doorstops, who points to my doorstop and says, "Let's call the kind of which this is a member 'glug' ." It seems that in spite of the Martian's ignorance of the function of doorstops, he has succeeded in using the term 'glug' to refer to doorstops. Now. it might seem that the Martian's ability to use the term 'glug' is parasitic upon the existence of human doorstop experts, but this is not the case. First, it may be supposed that the term 'glug' is introduced into the Martian language only and that no human being associates any description with the term 'glug'. Second, we may even suppose that the Martians visit Earth after the human race has died out, and thus there would be no doorstop experts at all. The Martian anthropologists might then try to construct a theory about the nature and function of glugs. Thus it is clear that even if it were true (as Schwartz claims 15711) that the properties of an object which make it a member of a particular artifactual kind are not disclosed by scientific investigation, this would not show that they are analytically associated with the name of that kind. Because artifacts such as pencils and chairs are so common, it is not surprising that virtually everyone who uses the terms 'pencil' and 'chair' knows some descriptions true of their referents, but this no more provides a motivation for a Lockean account of artifactual kind terms than the fact that most people who use the name 'Jimmy Carter' know some description true of its referent provides a motivation for a descriptions-based account of the reference of proper names.'
University of Vermont
'1 am indebted to Richard Boyd and Kristin Guyot for discussions on a number of topics related to this paper.
