Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, 50)

John saw Mary run. Therefore, John saw Mary move her legs in way W.

But this inference is invalid; John might see Mary run without seeing her legs (suppose a waist-high wall separates them over which John cannot see). But if the

26

CHAPTER ONE

object of see in this case is just an event, then such an inference should be valid. The fact that (34) is invalid, as well as a number of other facts, prove difficult to explain for a view that claims NI complements denote events.l 8 Of course, NI perception verbs can take events as objects--as in John saw an arriving of Mary ; they can also take facts--e.g., John observed the fact that Mary arrived. It is thus tempting to conclude that perception verbs count among their objects not only events and facts, but also objects different from either. We might use Barwise and Perry's term for this sort of entity and call it a situation. But the term situation in ordinary language appears to denote a state or some similar such entity.1 9 Since states are not generally recognized objects of NI perception, I will call the latter BPsituations.

1.4 Divisions Among Proposition-like Entities

Various sorts of contexts for improper nominals not contemplated by Kaiser and Vendler lead to further ontological distinctions among abstract entities. Propositional Contexts. A verb phrase like is true, attitude verbs like believe, be certain, doubt, say, and know, and other verbs taking that clauses like imply, and entail. Such contexts take felicitously that clauses in the indicative mood or certain derived nominals as complements; they do not take of-ing gerunds or POSS-ing gerunds. These contexts generate a wide variety of logics. 20 Projective Propositional Contexts: e.g., ask, allow, be necessary. These contexts, in contrast to the group above, take as complements only infinitivals or that clauses in the subjunctive mood from the class of sentential nominalizations. These contexts also generate a wide variety of logics. 21 Factual Contexts. These are contexts generated by verbs like indicate and show. They take all nominals as syntactic subjects; they also take negated nominals. Syntactic objects are restricted to that clauses and POSS-ing and perhaps also ACCing gerunds or certain derived nominals (for states). The rough semantics of the show or indicate context is that a fact, eventuality, or object indicates that a certain fact obtains. Causatives also appear to offer such contexts. Factual contexts appear to support a logic different from that of NI perception contexts or of propositional contexts, the contexts closest in syntactic and semantic analysis. 22 They too permit negated nominals, derived nominals, of-ing geru~ds, and POSS-ing gerunds as subjects and objects. . Pure propositional contexts and projective propositional contexts have complementary distributions among imperf\,:ct nominals. Factive contexts take a wider variety of nominals as arguments than pure propositional contexts. Again using Vendler's strategy, I conclude that within the typology of abstract objects, there are two distinct types--those of propositions and projective propositions. Included within the projective proposition contexts are rogatives like wonder and ask, buletics like want and desire, command verbs like command, plead, entreat, and permission verbs like allow and permit. Propositional verbs include "positive

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

27

factive" and "nonfactive epistemic" verbs like believe and know, and "negative" verbs like doubt and deny.23 These contexts have significantly different logics that, as far as I know, have only been accounted for by positing a difference in the type of arguments these predicates take. For rogatives, the link between the semantics of questions and the semantics of such contexts and the fact that successful, wellestablished analyses of questions treat these quite differently from normal propositions makes it plausible that rogatives take different types of objects from those that are arguments to the pure propositional contexts or those objects denoted by that clauses in the indicative mood. 24 The other projective contexts have a similar analysis to the rogatives. 25 While projective contexts isolate a distinct class of types of projective propositions, the ontological distinction suggested by the division between factive and propositional contexts is more delicate. The distribution of nominals between them is very similar to that given by Vendler's observations about eventuality containers and abstract object containers; the factive contexts handle a superset of the nominals accepted by propositional contexts. If there is a plausible semantic difference between these contexts that is most easily explained by a difference in denotation, then Vendler's strategy will distinguish three types among abstract entities. I tum now to a closer look at factive and propositional contexts. A Vendlerian argument distinguishes between the denotations of ACC-ing and POSS-ing gerund phrases. The examples in (27) repeated below do show that paradigm proposition containers do not readily accept ACC-ing and POSS-ing gerund phrases: (35.a) *Mary hitting Sue is true. (35.b) *Mary's hitting Sam is true. (35.c) That Mary hit Sue is true. Yet the gerund phrases as well as that clauses occur as arguments to supposedly factive contexts like indicate, show, causative verbs, and predicates like is a fact. So by Vendler's argument, there appears to be a semantic distinction between the type of objects denoted by POSS-ing and ACC-ing gerund phrases and the denotation of that clauses in certain contexts. Moreover, if we take factive contexts and propositional contexts to take different types of entities, it would seem that that clauses may denote either facts or propositions. But is there a real difference between facts and propositions in natural language metaphysics? We must examine the different contexts. Factive contexts take as objects that clauses in the indicative tense and POSS-ing and ACC-ing gerund phrases. By looking at the logic of these conteXts, we can again construct arguments to distinguish their arguments ontologically. The arguments assume that indicate and show denote, like propositional attitude verbs, two place relations with a subject and an object argument place. For both types of verbs, the object argument place may be filled by a that clause. As with NI perception contexts, it appears that the objects denoted by that clauses within

CHAPTER ONE

28

indicate and show contexts obey identity principle (1). Consider the valid argument in (28), in which we have two sets of documents A and B.

(36)

Documents A indicate that Cicero was the most highly regarded philosopher of his time. Cicero = Tully. Documents B indicate that Tully was the most highly regarded philosopher of his time. Therefore, documents A and B indicate the same thing.

Factual contexts also validate arguments in which we have substitution of expressions denoting the same property, whereas propositional contexts do not. Consider the argument in (29) (from Cresswell 1985): (37)

The map indicates that it is 7 + 5 kilometers to Upper Moutere. Therefore, the map indicates that it is 12 kilometers to Upper Moutere.

Again (37) is valid, while the corresponding argument with a propositional attitude context substituted for the factual context is not. 26 Similar distinctions in the logic of factive and propositional contexts show up with complex noun phrases of the form the fact that p, the claim that p and the indication that p. These nominals, I will assume, have an analysis on which the objects they denote are arguments of a context introduced by the noun that heads the noun phrase. (38.a) The fact that Cicero was the most highly regarded philosopher of his time is identical to the fact that Tully was the most highly regarded philosopher of his time. (38.b) The belief that Cicero was the most highly regarded philosopher of his time is identical to the belief that Tully was the most highly regarded philosopher of his time. (39.a) The fact that it is 12 kilometers to Upper Moutere is identical to the fact that it is 7+5 kilometers to Upper Moutere. (39.b) The belief that it is 12 kilometers to Upper Moutere is identical to the belief that it is 7+5 kilometers to Upper Moutere. (38.a) and (39.a) strike many speakers as true, while it is in keeping with the pattern of (32) to suppose that (38.b) and (39.b) are false. The discrepancy in truth value indicates that there is an ontological difference between the arguments of factual contexts and the arguments of attitude contexts. Or to put it ontologically: there is a difference between propositions and facts. 27 Differences between contexts as to substitutivity do not point per se to a difference in ontological categories. One could maintain that factual contexts take propositions as arguments but do not distinguish between logically equivalent

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

29

propOsItIonS, just as it is plausible to maintain that truth is a predicate of propositions but does not distinguish between materially equivalent propositions, in the sense that a materially equivalent proposition may be substituted for another within the context is truer ... ) salva veritate. But this would leave distributional data concerning gerunds and that clauses unexplained. There is in any case yet another difference between facts and propositions. As Moore argued, facts and propositions have different existence criteria. Propositions exist "eternally" or at least to exist independently of whether they are true or not. The proposition that

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

CHAPTER ONE

30

easily be explained away. Facts differ not only from propositions but also from events in natural language metaphysics. Suppose that a sentential nominal 0 denotes an event and suppose it contains an occurrence of a singular term a. Now suppose a = p. Let us again assume with Davidson and Lemmon that o[pla] denotes the same event as The death of Caesar is the same event as the passing away of the Roman conqueror of Gaul. Facts differ from events with respect to such identity of reference principles. Suppose that 0 denotes a fact and that it contains a definite description a. Suppose further that a = p. There appear to be readings of o[Pla] such that it does not denote the same fact as O. To see this, let's examine the indicates construction once again:

o.

(42)

The 33 rings indicate that this tree was thirty-three years old when it was cutdown. This tree = the first tree that Jack Webber, woodsman extraordinaire, felled on December 7, 1987. Therefore, the 33 rings indicate that the first tree that Jack Webber, woodsman extraordinaire, felled on December 7, 1987 was thirty-three years old when it was cut down.

There is a reading on which the argument in (42) is not valid, while there is no similar ambiguity for the similar inference on which coreferential proper names are substituted for each other. Indicates has been established to be a factual context, and the that clause picks out a fact. Event descriptions, I am assuming, continue to refer to the same event when one substitutes one coreferring term for another. But the invalidity of (42) then shows that fact descriptions do not have this property. The plausible explanation for this linguistic behavior is that facts have different identity conditions from events.31 Common noun phrases also furnish contexts for distinguishing propositions, facts, and events. Many types of natural language metaphysical entity are also explicitly named in natural language. Facts are one example; they are picked out by the common noun fact (though curiously propositions are not--the term proposition in ordinary language means something quite different from the philosopher's use!). That clauses and other nominals may combine with common noun phrases in a construction called the noun complement construction, and such noun complement constructions may often replace nominals in various contexts. The common noun phrases that are predicable of that clauses and other nominals allow us to extend the Vendlerian argument in the following way: if a statement of the form
31

noun phrase the fact must denote facts, then the infelicity of the sentences in (41) indicate that facts fail to have many of the properties of events--like spatial or temporal location. (43.a) #The fact that Mary fell down occurred in the park at noon. (43.b) #The fact of Mary's falling down occurred (obtained) in the park at noon. (43.c) #Mary falling down occurred at noon. Once again facts appear to differ from events. The arguments distinguishing eventualities from facts leave us with a puzzle. Given that facts do not have spatiotemporal locations, how do facts have causal efficacy? I'll retum to this problem in chapter five, when I analyze fact denoting constructions. Having introduced the common noun fact as a sort of context or container in our discussion of facts, we must countenance a whole host of such common noun contexts. Many sentential nominalizations combine with noun phrases as NP complements. The common noun phrase components in such constructions may also act as containers. Here is a sample of the sort of common nouns that may combine with that clauses, for instance: (44)

That Mary is happily married is a fact (proposition, truth, falsehood, supposition that her husband erroneously makes, hope of her mother's, fear of her suitor's, a possibility, a necessity, etc.)

The extended Vendlerian argument, introduced in conjunction with example (44) distinguishes further types by examining how head noun containers and predicate containers "fit together." For instance, (45.a) but not (45.b) is felicitous. (45.a) John announced the fact that he was married. (45.b) #John announced the thought (claim) that he was married. So one infers that announce may be satisfied by facts but not by thoughts or propositions. Similar examples force us to acknowledge a distinction between possibilities and facts, as well as between propositions and possibilities. (46.a) (46.b) (46.c) (46.d)

John feared the possibility that Mary had left without him. ?John feared the claim that Mary had left without him. John believed the claim that Mary had left without him. ?J ohn believed the possibility that Mary had left without him.

The sentences in (46) suggest a difference in type between propositions and possibilities. (47) reveals a similar pattern among possibilities and facts. (47) ?John feared the fact that Mary had left without him.

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS While (46.a) sounds fine, (47) is not very felicitous. These observations suggest a further division among abstract entities--among possibilities, facts, propositions, and projective propositions. The Vendlerian observations concerning eventuality and abstract entity denoting nominals are as much a study of the contexts to which these nominals supply arguments as they are a study of the nominals themselves. Many of these predicates seem to pick out distinct ontological types which lie on a scale of world immanence. For instance we have distinguished a variety of eventualities; these lie toward the concrete end of the spectrum as they all have spatiotemporal properties and causal efficacy. On the other hand projective propositions and propositions arguably have none of these properties. Propositions also exist in all possible worlds, whereas our intuitions concerning eventualities is that they are, for the most part, contingent entities. Facts fall somewhere in between in the spectrum of world-immanence. They are contingent entities in the same sense as eventualities; but their identity conditions are still to some extent dependent upon our descriptions of them, as is evident from the inference pattern in (42). There are further, finer distinctions between various types of abstract entities--e.g., between possibilities and facts. As we shall see, this complex typology receives support from other data, such as that involving quantification and anaphora.

2. QUANTIFICATION, ABSTRACT OBJECT ANAPHORA AND THE TYPOLOGY OF ABSTRACT OBJECTS

2.1 Quantification One way of testing whether the types of predicates isolated in the previous section are satisfied by different types of objects is to quantify over the relevant argument places in complex open sentences. To state the test formally, suppose
33

have a rather different feel. (48.c) lacks a truth value altogether; it is unacceptable, as is any variant with another quantifier substituted for nothing. According to my intuitions, (48.c) indicates a category mistake. Such sentences are unacceptable, though it is impossible to attribute the unacceptability to a syntactic source; both belief and temporal contexts allow such quantification when they occur in isolation. And also the unacceptability cannot be attributed to a simple incompatibility of predicates as in (48.a-b). The unacceptability of (48.c) indicates a semantic incompatibility between the types of objects that such contexts take as arguments; the same type of object does not satisfy both contexts, in this case a belief context and a temporal location context. Let us now apply our quantificational test to the division between eventualities and propositions. A sentence like (48.c) above indicates a distinction between the two types of objects. Objects of belief are not the sort of things that can (at least in any straightforward sense) take time. So the quantficational test does distinguish between objects that have a temporal location or extension and those that do not. The quantificational test also distinguishes projective propositions from pure propositions. Projective propositions and propositions are both at the abstract end of the spectrum of world immanence, but the quantificational test distinguishes between them. One cannot quantify over projective and ordinary propositions at the same time. Contrast for instance (49.a-b) with (49.c-d): (49.a) (49.b) (49.c) (49.d)

#John desires everything that Mary believes. #Everything Mary asks for is true. John asks for something that Mary wants. Everything that John believes is true.

On the other hand, (49.c) shows that the quantification test does not distinguish between different types of projective propositions; although questions and desires would seem to be very different sorts of objects, quantification binding an argument in both contexts simultaneously seems fine. The quantificational test also reveals that the syntactic tests for projective proposition contexts are not absolute. Expect is a verb that can take either a normal that clause in the indicative mood or an infinitival phrase. So it and similar verbs would appear to straddle the categories of propositional and projective propositional contexts. In the case of expect, however, the quantificational test appears to indicate that its objects are projective propositions: (50.a) ? John expects something that Mary knows. (50.b) You can expect whatever you ask for (desire, permit). The moral we should draw from these anomalies is a familiar one. The distinction between projective propositional contexts and propositional contexts is a semantic one, and syntactic tests for context classification are not in general absolute. There are limits to the quantificational test. It does not distinguish between the

---------------

34

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

CHAPTER ONE

various eventualities when the usual contexts are used. The contexts used to distinguish among eventualities are temporal modifiers. The temporal modifiers for states like lasted for an hour and those for punctual events like happened in an hour are incompatible. So are modifiers for extended events--e.g., beginning at five, ending at five--and predicates for punctual events--e.g., occurred at seven. But these incompatibilities appear to be merely predicate incompatibilities. (51.a) Nothing that lasts for an hour happens in an hour. (51.b) Nothing that begins at five had occurs at seven.

(51.c) John saw something that lasted an hour and took place in the park. Finally, the quantificational test does not reliably distinguish between the objects satisfying factive and NI perception contexts. (51.d) (51.d) Everything John saw is a fact. Finally, let us consider factive and proposition contexts relative to the quantification test. Consider (52) in comparison to (5l.d). Clearly (52.b) is better than (52.a), which seems decidedly odd. But even attitude verbs with factive presuppositions like know do not seem to yield perfectly felicitous sentences--witness (52.b-c) (52.a) ?Everything John believes is a fact. (52.b) ?These photographs indicate what John knew. (52.c) ? These tapes indicate nothing of what John knew. The intended readings of (52.b-c), where what is indicated are the facts toward which John has some attitude, is not available. Thus, the quantificational test also supports the distinction between facts and propositions. Similar quantification tests to those I have already discussed will distinguish between facts and projective propositions and facts and eventualities.

35

not just sentential nominals but other constructions like verb phrases or even whole sentences introduce abstract objects and eventualities into a discourse and may serve as referents for anaphoric pronouns. The study of anaphora considerably broadens the scope of natural language metaphysics, and it also refines and verifies our provisional typology of abstract objects with another sort of data. Before discussing anaphoric examples, I need to sketch how I conceive of abstract entity anaphora. I illustrate with eventualities. Anaphoric reference to events may involve sentential nominal antecedents as in (53). (53)

The quantificational test also does not distinguish between the denotations of Nl complements and events. Consider the riddle-like but acceptable sentence.3 2

--~------

[The destruction ofthe citY]i amazed Fred. Iti had been bloody.

But events may be introduced into a discourse by other than nominal elements. Verbs, or more precisely the tense and aspectual components usually associated with an inflection or I node in the syntax, introduce events as objects in a discourse. These events may be referred to anaphoricaily in subsequent discourse. Ramsey (1927) first proposed that verbs might be predicates of events as well as the arguments contributed by their subjects, objects and indirect objects. Davidson (1967) argued that action verbs had a hidden argument place for events. According to Davidson a sentence like (54.a) has the logical form of (54. b): (54.a) John kicked Sam on Monday. (54. b) 3e (kick(e,j, s) & past(e) & on(Monday, e)) Now (54.a) can be extended to a sentence in which anaphoric reference is made back to the event introduced by the first clause. (55)

John kicked i Sam on Monday, and iti hurt.

The coindexing on the verb represents an anaphoric link between the event entity characterized by the verb hurt and the denotation of the pronoun. The coindexing here and throughout the book is to be interpreted semantically; the denotation of the pronoun and its antecedent are semantically related in some way. Davidson's logical form for (55), given in (56), illustrates the general semantic effect of anaphora in traditional terms; the anaphoric pronoun introduces a variable which is either bound by or somehow related to the semantic value of the antecedent NP or in this case bound by the existential quantification introduced by the verbal complex.

2.2 Anaphora (56) Another linguistic construction with which we make reference to abstract entities is anaphora. In anaphora, intuitively we refer with a pronoun to an object that has already been introduced into the discourse by some other linguistic construction. If we take anaphora to be a relation between the denotations or the semantic values of the linguistic antecedent and the pronoun, it can be very profitable to study abstract entity anaphora. Abstract entity anaphora reveals that

3e 3e'(kick(e,j, s) & past(e) & on (Monday, e) & past(e') & hurt(e', e))

The semantic approach to anaphora is right, but the Davidsonian analysis is inadequate and incomplete for a number of reasons. A full analysis of intersentential anaphora will have to await the development of DRT, coming in chapters 2 and 3. I will defend the semantic analysis of anaphora in chapter 6 using the DRT framework.

36

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

CHAPTER ONE

One can anaphorically refer not only to eventualities but also to purely abstract objects like propositions and facts. Consider, for instance, the examples at the beginning of the introduction. The acceptable patterns of abstract entity anaphora thus may offer another source of information concerning the diverse sorts of abstract objects. There are two ways to use the anaphoric data to uncover distinctions of natural language metaphysics. Suppose that the linguistic antecedent of an anaphoric pronoun occurring within a context C is a nominal A occurring in context C. If the anaphoric link is felicitous, then C and C may be satisfied by the same sort of entity. Further, the denotation of A may satisfy both context C and C'. If the anaphoric link is infelicitous, then this is an indication again that C and C are not satisfied by the same type of entity. Because of the general analysis of anaphora, the anaphoric test is a semantic one. The anaphoric connection made between C and C' is at the level of denotations, not syntactic expressions. The anaphoric data concerning perfect and imperfect nominals supports the hypothesis that semiconcrete objects like events and abstract objects like propositions should be distinguished. Nominals that denote events cannot be anaphorically linked to pronouns that occur in contexts that don't admit such nominals. (57.a) ?[The destruction of the citY]j took several hours. Fred hadn't believed it;, when he had first heard about itj. (57.b) [The destruction of the citY]j took several hours. Fred hadn't believed that itj could happen. Even though it makes sense to link anaphorically the first occurrence of the pronoun in (57.a) with the derived nominal phrase, it sounds bad to many speakers. I explain this by appealing to a clash of type requirements. The relation of believing takes a proposition as an object; it forces the pronoun to refer to a proposition. If of-ing gerundives always refer to events, then to identify the semantic value of the pronoun with that of the gerundive would yield a clash of types. On the other hand, (57.b) is a context whose preferred arguments are events, and that sounds fine. If we distinguish between propositions and events, then we can explain why (57.a) is bad and (57.b) good. These examples show that eventualities and propositions are to be distinguished, even when neither is introduced by an NP or a noininal. Consider for instance the pair, (58.a) Susan's boyfriend has graduated. But Sally does not believe it. (58.b) The worst student in the graduating class has graduated. But Sally does not believe it. In principle, there are two choices for the anaphoric antecedent of it in (58.a), since as we have already seen sentences may introduce both eventualities and propositions into a discourse. The first is that it refers to the proposition expressed by the first sentence in (58.a). A second possibility would be that it refers to the

37

event introduced by the first sentence. In many contexts, it may in fact be difficult to tell whether a pronoun picks out a proposition or an event. But from what I have said the second possibility is not a real one. For suppose that Susan's boyfriend = the worst student in the graduating class. Then the first sentences in (58.a) and (58.b) introduce the same event (on many if not most views of events), but it appears that (58.a) may be true while (58. b.) is false. If it picks up the proposition expressed by the first sentence in (58.a-b), then the argument sketched above with regard to events does not go through. The proposition determined by the first clause in (58.a) will not on most plausible theories of propositions be identified with the proposition determined by the first clause in (58.b). Anaphora also distinguishes between various sorts of eventualities. For instance, we cannot felicitously refer anaphorically to states with paradigm event contexts like it took place. Compare (59.a), for instance, with (59.b): (59.a) ?John lovedj Mary. Itj took place in the park. (59.b) John loved Mary. It lasted many years. Also if an anaphoric pronoun occurs in a context that attributes an extended temporal interval, it cannot refer to an achievement. (60)

?Alexis reachedj the summit. Itj took several minutes.

The other types of eventualities impose similar constraints on anaphora. Among the abstract entities, the anaphoric data only partially reflects the distinctions developed with other tests. The anaphora test distinguishes between facts and propositions, or facts and projective propositions, though the data is perhaps not as firm here as one would like. The predicate is a fact, I have assumed, is a factual context and ACC-ing gerunds supposedly denote facts, while verbs like doubt and believe take propositions as objects. Although what the sentences in (61) attempt to express is perfectly sensible, these sentences still sound quite odd to me. (61.a) ?John doubts [that Susan got an A on the test]j. But itj is a fact. (61.b) ?Mary wonders whether [she got an A on the test]j. But it j (that j) is a fact. (61.c) ?[Fred kissing MaryL was too much for Sam to bear. But John didn't believe itj. Propositional verbs, on the other hand, happily share anaphoric connections between their complements: 33 (62)

John believed [that Mary would leave himJi. Fred was certain of iti, was certain of itj, knew itj, expected itj).

The anaphora test does not distinguish projective propositions and propositions

38

CHAPTER ONE

when the normal containers are used. In general, projective propositional and simple propositional verbs do not share anaphoric connections between their complements very well--witness (63.a-b). (63.a) ? John asked (wanted) [to go to the parkJi. His mother believed itj. (63.b) ?? His mother will allow [John to go to the park]j. But he doubts that j. Yet other examples with anaphoric links between projective propositional and propositional contexts are fine. (63.c) John believes that he will go to the park. His mother will allow itj. (63.d) The Danes believe [that the Germans will reunite]j. The French fear it j. The Germans themselves desire itj. (63.d) shows that sometimes the anaphora test does not distinguish between possibilities (the objects of fear), propositions, and objects of buletic verbs. Nevertheless, the similar (63.b) is unintelligible, though the scenario is perfectly straightforward: John's mother will allow him to go to the park, but he doubts that he will go to the park. Of course, the anaphoric link between that in (63.c) and the proposition expressed by the entire first sentence is a possible anaphoric antecedent; but that is simply an instance of anaphoric linking between two propositional contexts. Once we look at complex nominal antecedents where an NP dominates an S' or Complement Phrase (CP), however, we see a better reflection of the typology of abstract entities. With such antecedents the anaphora test distinguishes between facts, possibilities, propositions, and projective propositions. The following examples show that that clauses in a complex NP cannot act as antecedents to pronouns when the pronouns occur in a context that takes as argument a distinct type of abstract object from the type taken as an argument to the predicate introduced by the head noun of the complex NP. The first clauses on their own, however, seem to me to be fine. (64.a) ?John believed [the claim that Mary would leavehim]j, and he feared itj. (64.b) ?John feared [the possibility that Mary would leave him]j. Fred believed itj. (64.c) ?John feared the possibility [that Mary would leave himJi.The signs indicate thisj. (64.d) ?John believed the claim [that he would go to the park]j, but his mom wouldn't permit itj. (64.e) ?John doubts the claim [that Mary got an A on the test]j, but itj's a fact. (64.t) ?Mary wonders about the question whether [she got an A on the testl. But it j (thatJ is a fact Especially telling is the contrast between (64.g) and (63.b). Though the first

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

39

sentence of (64.g) is fine, the discourse as a whole is decidedly odd. (64. g) ?The Danes believe the claim that the Germans will reunite. The French fear it, while the Germans themselves desire it. The anaphoric test does not strongly confirm a difference between propositions and the objects of NI perception (BP situations). Statements like (65) are natural in which the anaphor is linked to the antecedent verb phrase: (65.a) John believes that Mary [hit a home runl. After all he saw her do SOj (it j ). (65 .. a) John saw [Mary cross the finish line first in the marathon]j. Two days later, he still didn't believe itj. In contrast with (65.a-b), however, (66) is not felicitous. (66)

??John saw [Mary cross the finish line first in the marathon]j. Two days later, he still didn't believe this claimj.

As with the distinction between projective propositions and propositions, the anaphora test distinguishes propositions and objects of NI perception only when complex NP constructions of the form the N that p are used. In general, the anaphora test upholds the divisions in the typology already introduced in earlier sections. But the anaphoric data also indicate that the boundaries of the kinds in the typology are more fluid than we might perhaps suppose. We can sometimes make reference in a context whose arguments are typically of type X to an entity which we would judge to be of type Y given its context, for X '# Y. It seems that only with complex noun phrases in which the NP dominates a CP do we get the relevant type distinctions. Also we get puzzling asymmetries--as in the contrast between (65.a-b) and (66) or between various projective attitude contexts as in (67) below. Projective attitudes include desires, questions and commands. Desires differ from commands and both differ from questions, in that pronouns within buletic contexts cannot easily pick up antecedents within rogative and permission contexts.34 At least (67.a-c) sound worse than an anaphoric link between two buletic contexts as given in (67.d), and much worse than the VP ellipses in (67.e-t) (67.a) ?Eva asked [whether she could go to the park]j. She had wanted thatj all day. (67.b) ? Eva's mom allowed her [to go to the park]j. But she didn't want that j. (67.c) ?Eva asked [to go to the park]j. She had wanted thatj all day. (67.d) Johanna wanted [Eva to go to the park]j. Eva wanted thatj too. (67.e) Eva asked whether she could [go to the park]j. She had wanted to ¢j all day.

40

CHAPTER ONE (67.f) Eva's mom allowed her [to go to the park]j. But she didn't want to ¢j.

There is a curious asymmetry here between buletic contexts and the others. One can pick up antecedents within buletic contexts for pronouns in permission or rogative contexts, but not vice-versa. Rogative and permission contexts happily allow anaphoric links in either direction. (68.a) (68.b) (68.c) (68.d)

Eva asked [whether she could go to the park]j. Her mom permitted itj. Her mom allowed Eva [to go to the park]j. She had asked about thatj. Eva wanted [to go the park]j. But her mom wouldn't permit itj. Eva wanted [to go the park]j. But she didn't dare ask her mom about itj.

Why are some anaphoric links between two contexts C and C' good while links between C' and C are for the most part uniformly bad? This is a puzzle of natural language metaphysics that we cannot yet resolve. The anaphora test yields other intriguing puzzles. It shows that there is an unexpected fluidity to the typing in the typology of abstract objects and suggests that at a more fundamental level, many distinct types of natural language metaphysics may be very similar, if not identical. The analysis of these phenomena will come in chapters 5 and 8, but I will touch again on this theme once we have examined the typology from a third perspective--the perspective of closure principles.

3. PRINCIPLES OF SUMMATION AND STRUCTURED DOMAINS FOR ABSTRACT ENTITIES The last way of examining types of abstract objects in natural language metaphysics concentrates on their logical closure principles. The investigation of closure principles answers questions like this: If 8 denotes an object of type T, does -,8 also denote an object of type T? If so, then objects of type T are closed under some sort of operation of complementation, corresponding to the meaning of negation. The closure principles for an entity of type T define an algebraic structure for the domain of objects of type T. Different closure principles will differentiate between various sorts of abstract objects and provide us with a more systematic treatment of natural language metaphysics to conclude this investigation. An answer to the question of what is the structure of the domain of propositions or events, however, depends on what we are postulating a structured domain for. I can think of two possible reasons. The first concerns the possibilities for propositionhood, eventhood, facthood; etc. That is, what sort of abstract entities does natural language allow us to talk about? This is, I believe, the sort of question that has motivated those interested in the "algebra of events." Such theories of the structure of an ontological domain should ensure that the entities to which one can refer anaphorically exist. Second, they should provide denotations for combinations

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

41

of expressions that each denote an entity of a particular kind. I shall refer to such domains with bold letters in italics--e.g., P, E ,etc. A second concern is to characterize the domain of propositions put forward by a bit of natural language discourse. That is, the task is to discover just what propositions, events, or other types of objects are introduced by a particular bit of natural language discourse. This is a concern of theories like Discourse Representation Theory. A text has a complex logical and rhetorical structure that complicates our understanding of the domain of entities made available by a text. A text may simply assert the existence of some object. It may also contain the supposition that such an object exists and then contain a number of assertions based on this hypothesis. And there are many other rhetorical devices or modes that a text contains besides simple assertion and supposition. Thus, we might think of a text as generating a set of domains--or better yet a set of domains and assertions about objects in those domains, i.e., a set of partial models--which is structured in a particular way to make clear the logical and rhetorical structure of the text. I shall call such structures spaces, if T is a text, then JP(T) and E(T) are the spaces of propositions and events constructed from T. I shall be able to make this much more precise using DRT, but for now spaces will be defined as a structure <'M, ~ >, where 'M is a set of partial models and ~ is a partial ordering such that if M ~ M' and x E 1:(M), where 1:(M) is the domain of M, then x E t£(M'). The ordering encodes the relevant structure of the logical and rhetorical relations of a text but it abstracts away from the content of those relations, as this is not needed to express closure principles for spaces. I will assume that a satisfaction relation for formulae may be appropriately defined for models M in 'M. I will also suppose that these partial models form a context for the processing of elements of the text. So we may speak of a particular phrase introducing an object into a particular partial model in the structure--the one that serves as its most local context. Most local is defined with the help of~: M is the most local context for a phrase

3.1 Events I will begin again with events, for they are more familiar ground. Linguists like Bach (1981, 1986), Link (1983), Ter Meulen (1984) and Krifka (1987, 1989) have studied the structure of the domain of events. One interesting aspect of the domain of events is that events can be summed together to yield new events. Of course the same is true of the domain of individuals.

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

CHAPTER ONE

42

(69.a) Fred, Mary, and Jane met Sam at the store. They went to the movies together. (69.b) Every man on this block owns an expensive sports car. They are all Ferraris. Kamp and Reyle (199+) discuss such examples at length. I shall look at their DRT analysis in chapter 2. For now I simply point out that examples suggest that individuals may sum together to form plural entities or groups. The summation principle undergoes a substantial change for event and proposition anaphora. Events do not pluralize easily in the following sense. One cannot use a plural anaphoric pronoun alone to pick up a group of events, in the way that one can use a plural pronoun to pick up a group of individuals--e.g., people, rocks, trees, etc. Consider the following example (due to Link):36

accomplishments, which behave similarly, as Krifka (1987) has argued, to co~nt noun denotations. If this is right, then it appears that we have two ways of forrmng collections for events--a principle that takes individual events and fuses them into a larger individual event (the mass-like summation principle), and a principle that takes individual events and forms a plural group from them (the "count" summation

(71)

Many runners drank wateri from the stream flowing by the finish line. It i made them quite sick.

(69.b), (70.b), and (71) have a similar logical form. The singular pronoun in (71) picks up all those quantities of water drunk by the runners--i.e., those quantities satisfying the conjunction of the two properties related by the denotation of the determiner many. The pronoun in (70.b) appears to pick up a collection produced by the same principles as the collection in (71). This principle of "summation" appears to work generally with all kinds of events--even achievements and

.

~~~.

It appears that the domain of eventualities allows the mass type of sumn;atIon

over diverse types of eventualities. Example (72) shows that one can anaphoTIcally refer to a sum of events and states introduced over several clauses. The definite description the outing in the last sentence refers to the sum of all the events that are introduced in the previous sentences. (72)

(70.a). Three men raised i the flag of the republic. TheYi took the ruling junta by surprise. (70.b) Three men raised i the flag of the republic. Iti took the ruling junta by surprise. (70.a) cannot be used to mean that there were three events of raising the flag, the group of which took the junta by surprise. One can use the plural definite description these events to pick up the group, a fact familiar from plural anaphora generally. On the other hand, in using the singular pronoun to refer to this group of events as in (70.b), an acceptable sentence with the same intended anaphoric interpretation results. This anaphoric data provides some support for the notion developed recently by Bach (1981), Ter Meulen (1984), Link (1983) and Krifka (1987,1989) that events in natural language metaphysics are a structured domain, closed under a summation operation. On such a conception, events sum together to form a new event. More precisely, the space of events is closed under a "join" or sum operation. The linguist's algebraic view of events refines an older philosophical theme that events are subject to mereological principles. 36 This feature makes event expressions akin to mass nouns, where many "lumps" of the same stuff may sum together to form a larger, singular "lump" of the same stuff:

43

John went to pick Mary up for the dance. But he had forgotten the corsage. That made him late. The food at the dance was terrible, the music mediocre. Then John spilled some punch on Mary's dress. She said she never wanted to see him again. The outing was in short a disaster.

In contrast to closure under summation, the domain of events is not closed under complementation. The reason for this is the following. Assuming a c~mpositio~al semantics for event expressions, this means that the negation of a nOmInal denotIng an event does not necessarily also denote an event. To use Cresswell's (1985) example, the train's arrival may be an event, but whatever the train's non-arrival denotes, it does not denote an event. The non-arrival of the train does not accept the standard perfect nominal containers--as witnessed by (73): (73)

*The non-arrival of the train occurred at 10 am (lasted many hours, took place at the station in Victoria).

So in virtue of Vendler's criteria, the denotation of the non-arrival of the train should not be classified as an event. Further, the non-arrival of the train can be paraphrased by a that clause; the positive derived nominal phrase the arrival of the train cannot be--that the train arrived is not synonymous with the arrival of the train. At best, events obey the following law of relative complementation. This law says that for any subevent e of an event e', written e c e', there exists a third event that summed together with e yields e' and is disjoint with e. In symbols where 0 represents overlap and E9 sum and leaving off the outside universal quantifiers: (EO)

e c e' .... 3e" (e" E9 e = e' & --,e" 0 e).

The principle of relative complementation does not predict that the non-~val of the train is an event, if one assumes that there isn't any larger event of WhICh the train's arrival and the train's non-arrival are components. This assumption appears reasonable. Suppose we think of some description of an extended event e'--e.g., the

44

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

CHAPTER ONE

1988 campaign for the U.S. presidency by the Democratic candidate. We may also single out a particular event e, the acceptance speech at the Democratic convention. The phrase the rest of the campaign certainly appears to have a denotation that is the relative complement of e' in e. It is also very unclear whether the disjunction of two event descriptions yields another event. A sentence like (74)

John's kissing Mary or his pinching her led her to knock him unconscious with her handbag.

appears to indicate not that some sort of disjunctive event led her to knock him unconscious, but that one or the other event (perhaps the speaker doesn't know which) did. What could a disjunctive event even be? We seem to have no such conceptual category. If such observations hold in general for events, we should tentatively with Link (1983) and Krifka (1987) assign events a domain structure whose two closure principles are (EO) and (El)--the former concerning relative complementation, the latter concerning summation. (E1)

::le" e"= effie'.

Krifka and Link go on to develop a lattice structure for events characterized by the universal closure of the following axioms besides (EO) and (E1): (E2) (E3) (E4)

effie = e. effie' = e' ffi e, (e ffi e') ffi e" = e ffi (e' ffi e").

Without further discussion, some of these axioms--for instance (E3)--seem suspect. The event of John's taking his shoes off and going to bed, as van Benthem (1991) has argued, is not the same event as John's going to bed and then taking his shoes off; the latter might have quite different causal consequences for instance--like John's getting his bedsheets dirty. Moreover, these axioms yield more events than are warranted for anaphoric purposes. To see what is anaphorically warranted, let us investigate the space ]B(T). Immediately suspect in the algebraic characterization of events is the axiom (E1). Not every sum of events yields another event. The mereological summation principles for events in domains of elements of ]B(T) appear to be much more limited--at least if we are looking at mereological principles for events and not groups of events. Outside of a determinate context, it appears that a pronoun cannot refer to the sum of two disparate, unconnected events. Consider for instance (75): (75)

Fred went shopping for a new pair of sneakers. Mary went to her office to prepare some reports. It took a long time.

45

Of course matters are here difficult to judge, since interpreters will put (75) in a context so that the sum of the two events may be a possible antecedent.37 Example (75) suggests at least that it is not the case that in every context any group of events may be summed together. That is, given a text T that mentions two events, their sum may not be an object of ]B(T). This is not so surprising if we look at the facts about plural anpahora; there too not every sum of individuals is available to be the referent of a plural pronoun. Consider for example (77): (76)

John first picked up Jaime, then Mary, and finally Susan for the double date to the movies. They had a nice time.

Frey and Kamp (1991) contend correctly that it is impossible to get Jaime and Mary to be the referent of they, unless they are already given as a group by the context. Similarly, mereological principles for mass terms are, upon closer examination, more limited than some discussion in the literature suggests.3 8 One must be careful about the implications of such examples as (75) and (76). No one, for example, would deny that some events are more salient in a given context than others, and so more likely to be chosen as referents for pronouns, than others; and there is no doubt that one could interpret the data in (75) and (76) as a matter of salience in context. On a salience oriented theory, the explanation of the data would claim that while such events were in principle available as referents for pronouns, they are assigned such a low salience that they are never chosen as referents. But there is evidence against the view that the domain of events is closed under summation which the salience theory does not explain. Conjunctions of event denoting nominals do not always denote one event. Sometimes they denote a group of events. Contrast for instance (77.a) with (77.b): (77.a) John's hitting of Fred and Mary's getting married were the main events of the week. (77.b) John's hitting of Fred and Fred's subsequent returning of the punches was the main event of the week. It is impossible to talk about the sum of the two events denoted by the nominals in the conjoined subject NP in (77 .a). It seems, however, just possible to s~eak of (77.b) as an event in the singular. The possibility of doing so depends on bemg able to fit the events into a coherent whole event--in this case a fight. The salience theory does not explain this failure of summation. So (E1) does not hold for event spaces, ]B(T), created by texts T. The advocate of (El) may still be unconvinced by the example in (77 .a). He can always force the two events in (77 .a) to merge together by using the expression, the event of Thus,

(78)

the event of John's hitting Fred and Mary's getting married

47

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS would, according to him, denote the sum event. The use of such event descriptions however, can be explained by a much weaker principle: if e, e' E 1:(M) for some M in B(T), then e €a e' E 1:(M), if it is explicitly introduced by an event description that is a conjunction of a description for e and a description for e'. These conjoined event descriptions are not terribly felicitous in any case, unless the context supplies some reason for connecting the events. Thus, it may be that (E1) is an artifact--a natural generalization from texts, but not one that is fully supported by our linguistic practice. If one is persuaded by these judgments, one might reject (E1) as a principle of E as well as rejecting it as a principle of B.39 One can also cast doubt on (EO) from the perspective of B. While (EO) might be appropriate for a certain philosophical approach to events, it is certainly too liberal from the perspective of B. The set of events introduced by a natural language text does not satisfy (EO). To see this consider (79): (79)

#Dukakis made a great acceptance speech at the Democratic Convention. It was the highlight of his campaign. It suffered from complacency.

(79) is bad, if we assume the only available event antecedents for occurrence of it in the last sentence are the events of Dukakis's speech and of his campaign. Since (79) is bad, it seems impossible to assign as an antecedent to the pronoun the event that is the complement of Dukakis's speech relative to his campaign for the Presidency, which intuitively is what is desired. Of course, this event is easy to pick up with the phrase, the rest of his campaign; if we insert that phrase in place of the occurrence of it in the last sentence, the discourse becomes perfectly felicitous again. The rest of his campaign gives the listener the license to construct the event and introduce it into the universe of discourse, but otherwise the event is not taken to exist in B(79), the space of events generated by (79). A superior description of the domain of events of a text B(T) is one on which B(T) is closed under several principles of comprehension of the form if
(EO)

Suppose the phrase the rest of the fP, where

is an event space. Suppose also that 3M E :M such that M ~ Mo, and 3e', e E 1:(M) such that M ~
As Krifka (1987) and Bauerle (1987) have noted, there is a problem with events and negation if events are not closed under complementation. It affects both a

theory of events that has only (EO) or only (EO). Suppose that we adopt the general account of a large class of adverbial modifiers in the way proposed b~ Davi~son, and suppose we analyze for two hours as a predicate of events. But If that IS the case and events are not closed under negation, how can we make sense of (80) .on the reading where the adverb is understood to have wide scope over the negatIve quantifier no one? (80)

No one talked for over two hours.

If we try to carry out the standard event-based approach40 to such adverbial modifiers, we cannot write down a coherent logical form for (80) that captures the intended reading. For the logical form for No one talked would ~e --,3x3e t.alk(x, e), and if we make for two hours a predicate of e, we must end up WIth the lOgICal form --,3x3e(talk(x, e) & for two hours(e», which assigns (80: incorrect truth co~ditions. I shall expand on this difficulty in the next sectIOn when I examme the complementation principle for states. I turn now to the counterpart of (E1) for the space B(T). I will assume that the domain B(T) contains events explicitly introduced by event descriptions. But this is not enough to characterize those sums of events that are elements in B(T). Example (77.b) indicates that sums of events that are of the same type, or whose types are "naturally connected together" in some sort of script-like world knowledge, are elements of B(T). These connections might be thought of as a path of events types; intuitively, such a path is supposed to connect events of a particular type in a natural or stereotypical sequence. Such paths are part of the common sense knowledge of the competent speaker and are exploited in text understanding. 41 Such rela~ons on event types define derivative relations on events. I will use a two place predicate epath(e, e') whose interpretation is that e and e' are instantiations of two event-types belonging to the same path. Paths are typically temporal sequences of events (these include causal sequences of events too), but they may sometimes be temporally simultaneous and spatially contiguous or related. I hypothesize a collection principle that sums ~ven~ in the ~ame e-path and also any events in the same e-path temporally or spatIally mtervemng between the two events. Let €a again stand for 'sum', 0 'overlap', c 'is a part of. Let u, v range over individuals, e, e', etc., range over events. Let M E :M for any structure <:M, ~ > built up from a text. Then

(B 1)

(E-Path Collection): \fM 3M I(M I extends M & 3e" E 1:(M) (E-path(e, e') -+ (e, e' c e"

».

E

1:(M I) \fe, e'

The notion of an E-path is very vague; it is also provisional. In chapter 8, I will use notions from discourse structure to make event summation more precise. In view of examples like (70), one might also suggest that B(T) is closed under another limited principle of comprehension, on which all the events satisfying one

~-----zrii:~~~=~~~-~--riTTA~-~-~-~---:;-----~-----P--------~------------------------------------

CHAPTER ONE

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

of a certain conventionally determined class of event descriptions sum together into one event. One way of doing this would be to sum events according to their participants; if their participants form a group entity in the text, then so do the events they participate in. I will assume that such actors can play certain roles in events--RJ, R 2 , etc. In what follows let R range over such roles.42 (lB2)

(Thematic Event Collection): \fM 3M 1 (M 1 extends M & \fy -+ e C e')).

E

'L(M) 3e'

49

that events do. The pronoun appears to pick up the proposition that combines everything Mary says.43 One could also refer to everything that Mary says with the plural description these claims. Thus, propositions seem to have very similar summation principles to those for events. There is also the less constrained summation familiar from events. The following example shows how several, separate sentences in a text may combine to form a proposition that is the anaphoric referent of a pronoun or definite description.

E 'L(Ml) \fe E 'L(M) \fx(x E Y& R(x, e))

(82) The. principle of .thematic event collection relies on separate axioms for groups (~hI~h would anse from the study of plural anaphora). But given these, the pnnciple accounts for the examples in (77), as well as (70.b). In (77.a), the two events ~en'~ of the same type nor do their types fall into a natural path. Further, they fall to mvolve elements of an antecedently given group. So it is difficult to connect them together to form a spatiotemporal path and a single event. Once the group ~s antec~dently given as in (77.b), however, the principle of thematic event collectIOn predicts correctly the sum to be available. As for (70.b), we can plausibly s~ppose from the facts of plural anaphora that three men introduces a group into the discourse. . These principles of restricted comprehension and collection define a very dIfferent structure for the domain of events in comparison with the Krifk:a-Link treatment. The event building operations described by (lBO)-(lB2) create for a given set of atomic or "urelement" events a cumulative hierarchy that includes ever more complicat~d events.. This view reflects a different metaphysical persuasion from that of Krifk:a and Lmk. Of course for events of a certain type--for instance, events of some?ne's drinki!1g wi~e--on~ can easily derive with some plausible, additional assumptIOns, the Krifk:a-Lmk lattIce structure. The textual perspective encoded in ]B takes sums and composite events to be essentially the product of human thought. Events .are construct.ions--particular regions of space-time singled out by a conventIOnal!y deterrnmed ~lass of event descriptions and event building operations. The appropnate mathematical structure for the space ]B(T) is not an algebra but rather a weak set theory, with axioms (lBO)-(lB2). If E is identified with the set of all events introduced in ]B(T) for some T, then in general none of the Link-Krifk:a axioms hold.

3.2 Propositions

Proposition anaphora reveals that the domain of propositions too has a structure. Consider for instance (81): (81)

John believes everything Mary says. Further, it is all true.

(81) suggests that groups of propositions "sum" to form a singular entity in the way

The "liberation" of the village had been bloody. [Some of the Marines had gone crazy and killed some innocent villagers. To cover up the "mistake," the rest of the squad had torched the village, and the lieutenant called in an air strike.]j At first the battalion commander hadn't believed itj.

Though similar with respect to summation properties, the domain of propositions and the domain of events also differ from each other. Most philosophical or linguistic theories of propositions (including something like the possible worlds theory or a Russellian theory) take he domain of propositions to be closed under these operations of a Boolean algebra: complement, join and meet. 44 We have already seen that the domain of propositions appears to be closed under a summation corresponding to conjunction. The disjunction of two propositions also forms a proposition; and further the negation of a proposition is a proposition, to which we may refer anaphorically. (83.a) Sam suspects that [either Fred is at a party or he is at a bar]j. Jenny thinks thatj too. (83.b) [It's not true that Mary will lose the racel; Fred believes this j too. Already these closure principles suggest that events and propositions are quite different sorts of objects. It is far from clear, however, that tidy structures like Boolean algebras are precisely what is wanted to characterize the domain of propositions in natural language metaphysics. Although the closure principles for a Boolean algebra might be plausibly applied to the domain of propositions, it is quite unrealistic to assume that the identities of a Boolean algebra hold as well. To assume that the identities held would imply that all logically equivalent propositions express the same proposition. But this view is not compatible with the demands of natural language metaphysics, or, for that matter, with a viable natural language semantics for propositional attitudes. 45 We have established that the Boolean closure principles are plausible for the domain P. But what, for instance, are the generators of the algebra? What identities if any might such an algebra satisfy? From the perspective of natural language metaphysics and the needs of semantics for attitude constructions, the generators might be the propositions expressed by simple, assertoric sentences. Of course we

50

CHAPTER ONE

must allow that in some cases an assertoric sentence will not express a proposition __ for example, if it contains an anaphoric pronoun and that pronoun has no antecedent. As some have argued,46 that the relevant antecedents exist is a presupposition of the sentence. In that case, we may take the following single axiom schema for our theory of propositions. 47 As notation, I will use' A , as an operator on sentences; if cp is a sentence, then Acp is the proposition cp expresses. (PI)

(Simple Propositional Comprehension) If S is an assertoric sentence, then given a context where all of S's presuppositions are fulfilled, AS E P.

Even though many of the propositions within this space are logically equivalent, natural language metaphysics still distinguishes them because of their different roles in attitude contexts. Their behavior in attitude contexts makes clear that logically equivalent propositions may still be distinct propositions. If we are committed to a principle of diversity in natural language metaphysics, we may as well be liberal: (P2)

(Diversity) There are infinitely many distinct but logically equivalent propositions.

With Fine (1981), we might say that on such a theory there will be infinitely many distinct propositions all true in the same possible worlds. 48 Fine shows that a theory which includes (a limited form) of propositional comprehension (for a formal language), diversity, an axiom specifying the necessary existence of propositions, and one relating propositions to possible worlds is logically very simple; it is sound and complete with respect to a simple semantics and it is decidable. One might take these two axioms to define the domain of propositions. But this really tells us very little about propositional identity. One might add to our pitiful stock of axioms idempotence of conjunction: (P3)

(Idempotence) p & p = p.

But it is not clear that one could add the same operation for other operators under which the space of propositions is defined. In DRT, for instance, it will tum out that while the operation corresponding to conjunction is idempotent, the operation corresponding to disjunction is not. From a characterization of P, I tum now to the space ]peT). Many of the observations about JB(T) apply also to the domain ]P(T) of propositions generated by a text T. If we take the anaphoric data seriously to indicate what are the available abstract entities that natural language discourse posits, then we have very strong reasons to doubt that ]peT) is closed under arbitrary intersection of constituent propositions. Consider (82) again: (82)

The "liberation" of the village had been bloody. Some of the Marines

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

51

had gone crazy and killed some innocent villagers. To cover up the "mistake," the rest of the squad had torched the village, and the lieutenant called in an air strike. At first the battalion commander hadn't believed it i . While some conjunctive propositions are available as referents for the pronoun, some are not. In particular, the conjunction of the first and second sentences alone does not appear to furnish an antecedent, nor, perhaps, the conjunction of the second and the third sentences. Also it would be difficult to argue that ]P(T) is closed under relative complement; the relative complement of the proposition expressed by all of (82) except the last sentence, for instance, is not an acceptable antecedent to the pronoun. So the domain of propositions ]peT) cannot have the closure properties of a Boolean algebra. If it were, we should be able to make anaphoric reference to these propositions, but we cannot. The structure of ]peT) is intimately connected with interpreters' intuitions about discourse structure. The conjunctive propositions that are posited by a text are those carved out by these mysterious principles of discourse structure. One of these principles is the propositional analogue of (E3). But there are others too that depend on the topical organization of the discourse. The space ]peT) is not cumulative in the following sense. Once the sums of propositions are formed, the propositions from which they were formed are often no longer available. To get smaller constituents, the space of propositions]P also is closed under certain "separation" or "segmentation" principles that carve up the content of a discourse in distinct ways-the inverse in effect of collection principles. Support for these principles about ]P(T) and a fuller study of them, however, must await a more thorough characterization of propositions and proposition anaphora in chapters 7 and 8. . If we identify P with the propositions of UT ]peT), again a set theoretIcal conception of the domain of propositions emerges, one governed by various comprehension principles ranging from the simple (PI) to the segmentation axioms mentioned in the previous paragraph. These principles leave a great deal of work to be done on the logic framework of propositions. For instance, they entail that even sentences like This proposition is false. express propositions in natural language metaphysics. More on this in chapter 10.

3.3 States Some have argued that states are identical to propositions. 49 But given our discussion of the previous two sections, states surely have a different logical structure from purely abstract entities. First, the domain of statesSO is not closed

52

CHAPTER ONE

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

under an operation of complementation, while the domain of propositions is. A state is always a state of some object.51 If the object ~ exists, it is not in the state

Suppose

(C) is a principle of conversion for eventuality types. The "property negation" of an event predicate is a state predicate. We can think of types here either as real properties or simply as extensional sets. (C) places an interesting constraint on the domain of states and events. It is a principle that relates the two domains together. (C) says that if't is a type that is a subset of E, then the complement of 't in the universe of eventualities is a subset of S, the space of all possible states. This interpretation of (C) assumes a complement operation on types corresponding to the negation sign. One can exploit (C) to define a principle of closure under complementation for states. Let s range over states, and suppose

53

are too strong. They must be restricted to certain eventuality types. At least negations of state descriptions seem to produce new state descriptions. Suppose it is false that John knows where the ball is. So it is the case that there is no state of John's knowing where the ball is. But then it seems very natural to say: John is in the state of not knowing where the ball is. That's just what John does not know where the ball is means. We can also assign typical stative adverbial modifiers to the eventualities introduced by the verbs, and we can refer to them anaphorically as states: (85.a) John didn't know where the ball was for over an hour. (85.b) John didn't knowj the answer to the problem. This j lasted until the teacher did the solution on the board. The negations of states behave like states with respect to adverbial modifiers--unlike accomplishments or achievements. 53 (85.a) (85.b) (85.c) (85.d) (85.e) (85.f) (85.g) (85.h)

After Mary was in the hospital, John went to visit her. After Mary wasn't at the hospital, she was at home. ?After Mary didn't eat the cake, John left. After Mary didn't swim, she went home. While Mary was at home, John washed the dishes. While Mary wasn't at home, John cleaned up the house. ?While Mary didn't eat the cake, John washed the dishes. While Mary didn't swim, John talked to her non-stop.

In contrast to the negations of statives and stative predicates themselves, the negations of accomplishment predicates in (85.c) and (85.f) sound odd. Negations of achievement predicates are also bad with these adverbial modifiers, whereas states go fine with them. Negations of activity predicates seem much like statives with respect to these test adverbials. So we might extend (Sl) to: (Sl')

Suppose x is a state or activity variable. Vu

E

0 (-.3x
--->

3s -.
u)).

(Sl)

(Argument Relative Complement): Vu

E

0 (-.3e
--->

3s -.
u)).

(S 1) says that whenever an actor, 0, of a possible event

?The non-arrival of the train lasted for hours.

If the non-arrival of the train denoted a state as it would under an unrestricted (Sl), then (84) would be predicted to be perfectly acceptable. Consequently, (Sl) and (C)

Because of (84) it is not possible to extend (S 1') to allow

No one got on base for over an hour.

Such a sentence would be typically uttered in a context in which the subject NP makes reference to a contextually salient background group of individuals whose existence is not in dispute. 54 Getting on base in baseball is an achievement, and achievements don't normally take durative adverbial modifiers like for two hours.

54

CHAPTER ONE

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

States normally take such durative modifiers (as well as activities). This seems to indicate that there is a state described by (86). We can pick up this state anaphorically too, by continuing (86) as in (87.a), and we can exploit the state's temporal location to situate the next event in the discourse as in (87.b). (87.a) No one got on base for over an hour. This occurred during the first game. (87.b) No one got on base for over an hour. Then Reggie hit a home run. The word then in second sentence in (87.b) exploits the temporal extension of the state mentioned in the first sentence and helps us locate the event of Reggie's hit. Krifka (1987) does offer a solution to account for the evidence in (86)-(87). He supposes that the logical form of a sentence like (80) involves reference to a maximal event as follows: (88)

3e (maximal(e) & for-two-hours(e) & -,3x 3e' C e laugh(x, e'))

55

reference to a maximal event. If that is the case, then the logical form in (87.b) cannot be correct, and that casts doubt on (88) as the logical form for (80). In the final analysis, I believe that one must handle adverbial modification--like that in (86) and (87)--in a quite different way. A defense of (S 1') as the right characterization of the complementation characteristics of the domain of states and a solution to the problem of event negation and adverbial modification is given in chapter 5. Relativizing (S 1') to the models in a given state space yields an appropriate axiom for S. Suppose 'AxAU. (511)

VM E '.M ifM ~ -,3x
Ur SeT), then (SI') is simply a consequence of (511). With respect to the other closure axioms, states behave similarly to events. States do not have an operation corresponding to the Boolean operation U. There aren't disjunctive states, just as there are no disjunctive events in ordinary English. The argument against the closure of the space of all possible events under join should carry over to the space SeT). But it also appears that OBI) - OB2) hold for the space SeT). If S is identified with

Krifka's solution is wrong, because it postulates the existence of a maximal event. No such maximal event is available for anaphoric reference with either a pronoun or a definite description. At least not if we think of an event in the ordinary sense of natural language metaphysics. One would expect that maximal events should have spatial parts like other large events; for instance a large battle may have one part waged in a valley, another on a hill top. If the event is really maximal, then it should include all (perhaps all accessible) spatial regions at that time. So if we can say things like,

3.4 Facts (89)

The battle raged across several counties. It included small skirmishes in the hills and a cavalry charge on the plains.

Then one ought to be able to say, (90)

?No one laughed for two hours, but it (this event) included Mary's washing of the dishes next door as well as a sunset on Neptune.

If Krifka's proposal really gave the logical form of (80), then there should be no difficulty with the anaphoric link in (90); the pronoun could refer back to the maximal event introduced by the logical form of the first sentence. Following the analysis of anaphora of events in the previous section and the hypothesis about logical form, one should naturally come up with the following logical form for (90):

(91)

3e (maximal(e) & for-two-hours(e) & -,3x 3e' C e laugh(x, e) & 3e" Mary wash dishes(e") & 3e'" C e sunset on Neptune(e"'))

C

Facts are one of the abstract entities occupying an intermediate position on the spectrum of world immanence. The logical structure of the domain of facts indicates that facts differ from events. "Conditional events" appear not to be a possible category of natural language metaphysics; the noun phrase the event of jf Mary comes to town, then Jack will be happy or a gerundive phrase construction like Jack's kissing of Mary jf she comes to town. do not denote events. Event descriptions or event denoting nominals simply cannot have the form of a conditional. Some of the anaphoric evidence surveyed earlier also suggests that there are no negative or disjunctive events, for it appears impossible to anaphorically refer to them. The syntax of that clauses allows us to speak happily of "conditional", "negative", or "disjunctive" facts, just as we speak of conditional propositions and negative propositions.

e (92.a) The fact that if Mary came home late, John would be in a bad mood forced her to leave work earlier than the others.

But (91) is completely anomalous; it does not appear as though one can make any The presence of conditional facts in natural language metaphysics also potentially

CHAPTER ONE

56

distinguishes facts from BP situations; conditionals are not acceptable complements of NI perception verbs. 55 Similarly, our language allows us to construct expressions that denote facts that are the complements (or the contradictories) of other facts, just as it does for propositions. (92.b) That no one bothers any more about doing a good job is not a legitimate excuse for distributing goods of poor quality. Natural language metaphysics also countenances some facts as "generalizations" of other facts. Reference to disjunctive facts in natural language also seems fine-witness for instance (93). (93)

The fact that the children were either asleep or playing quietly in their room allowed Mary to get some work done.

Unlike a disjunction of event descriptions (cf. example 75) the fact described in (93) involves as constituents facts described by either disjunct. So true disjunctive facts appear to exist. The structure of the domain of all possible facts, F, appears subject to the same comprehension axiom scheme as the one given for propositions (PI). In view of our discussion of substitution inferences in section I of this chapter, however, the principle of diversity would not apply to F. The space IF of facts generated from a text is, as in the case of propositions or of events, much more limited than F. In a discourse, the definite descriptions this fact and these facts may pick up only a limited number of possibilities. These available facts appear to be closely correlated with individual or atomic events or with complex but not compound sentences. They do not follow the discourse structure principles that govern the structure of spaces of type lP(T). Consider a slight variant of (82): (94)

The "liberation" of the village had been bloody. [First on a sweep through the town some of the Marines had gone crazy and killed some innocent villagers. To cover up the "mistake," the rest of the squad had torched the village. To cap it off, the lieutenant called in an air strike.L #This facti (these factsj, the factsJ made the senior officer call for an investigation.

The intended anaphoric link in (94) is not possible, if the singular NP this fact is used. The singular NP may only refer to the fact associated with the topic event \3r perhaps with the fact determined by the penultimate sentence. On the other hand, the intended anaphoric connection is fine with the plural NP these facts. It appears that atomic facts may not sum together to form singular facts, at least not in all cases. Fact locutions act more like count nouns than mass nouns in terms of their summation properties. As (94) indicates, events are more mass-like than facts. By

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

57

the event comprehension principles, the events denoted by the text within the square brackets should constitute an entire event--the event of the liberation. Nevertheless, even compound sentences denote single facts; insofar as facts obey a comprehension principle like (PI). Surely we can say the fact that Mary came home and that Sam stayed home and notbe forced to say the facts that Mary came home and that Sam stayed home. Thus, it appears that only a principle of comprehension governs the domain of facts; there is no separate summation principl~. ~hus, f~cts have different closure principles from propositions and events, a fmding whIch reinforces the conclusions of the previous two sections. There are two remaining types of abstract objects the structure of whose domains has not been discussed: projective propositions and BP situations. The domain of BP situations, however, seems much like that of events, and the domain of projective propositions is quite heterogeneous. Rather than characterize generally a space of projective propositions, it appears as. though we oug~t to consider separately a domain of intentions, a domain of questIOns, and a domam of desires. I won't pursue those analyses here, however.56

4. PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS The study of diverse linguistic contexts, anaphora and logical structure have led to a rich metaphysical picture.The divisions suggest the following phylum tree with the basic types at the leaves of the tree arranged from left to right in increasing order of abstraction along the spectrum of world immanence:

Saturated Abstract Objects

-----------~

Eventualities

~States

Purely Abstract

Events

Proposition-like Objects achievements accomplishment processes

PureProA Projective Propositions

Fact-like Objects ~

possibilities I facts situations states of affairs?

~ questions conunands desires

Spectrum of Abstractness

>The diagram reveals a basic distinction between event-like and proposition-like

58

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

CHAPTER ONE

entities. But a closer investigation of the spectrum of world immanence reveals a much more complicated typology. At the next level of detail, we may distinguish between events and states under event-like entities--and then further between states, activities, processes, accomplishments, and achievements. Among the propositionlike entities we have distinguished a group of fact-like entities with causal efficacy and a group of pure proposition entities. Both of these groups have further subdivisions. Here is a summary of the characteristics of the major divisions in natural language metaphysics. Eventualities: Spatiotemporal modification (states and events sharply distinguished by a variety of classifications of spatiotemporal modifiers), causal efficacy, no closure under complementation (states support modified complementation, events support relative complementation). Logical behavior: substitutability of coreferential expressions preserving reference to the same event or state. Limited comprehension principles dictate limited mereological summation properties. Simple Propositions: No spatiotemporal modification, no causal efficacy, highly intensional entities (no substitution of logical equivalents or of coreferential terms to preserve denotation to same proposition). Summation dependent on discourse structure. Projective Propositions: No spatiotemporal modification, no causal efficacy, highly intensional entities (no substitution of logical equivalents or of coreferential terms to preserve denotation to same proposition). Complex anaphoric properties occur among different types of projective propositions. Limited comprehension principles dictate limited summation properties. Facts, Possibilities, States of Affairs: No spatiotemporal modification. Probable causal efficacy. Logical behavior: substitutability of coreferential names, definite descriptions may get an opaque reading, questionable substitution of logical equivalents salva veritate, Sentential Comprehension Principle. My examination of abstract entities in natural language metaphysics has revealed a complex typology but also some puzzles. First, there is the problem of the structure of the domains of these abstract objects. The domains of events, propositions, and facts each seem to possess a rich structure with much as yet unsolved, at least as far as their interaction is concerned. That structure appears to bear some relation to the space of such entities created by a text, but much more needs to be said, especially in the case of propositions. Also, many of these domains are fraught with paradox in natural language metaphysics. This poses a traditional problem that natural language metaphysics cannot solve on its 6wn. How can we have a theory of propositions which admits paradoxical propositions? And how do other abstract domains avoid paradox, if they do? A second raft of difficulties concerns the typology itself. The typology of abstract entities is fluid. We have already seen that anaphoric links can exist between contexts that admit incompatible types of abstract objects--e.g. between

59

objects of NI perception and objects of propositional attitude. The selectional restrictions determined by various contexts do not appear to always apply. Further one can "relabel" as a possibility or a conjecture what someone believes: (95.a) John is certain that the universe was created in a big explosion, but as far as I know that is only a possibility, a conjecture, not proven fact. (95.b) Fred fears the possibility that Mary may leave John. But as far as John is concerned it is already a fact to be lived with. Of course, one can also disagree about the status of ordinary objects, as (96) attests: (96)

John believes he saw a cat run into the sewer, but I swear it was a rat.

There is, however, a different feel to (96) in comparison with (95.a-b). In (96), the nature of the object is in doubt. In (95.a-b), the content and even the structure of the abstract object at hand is completely determined; the characterization of the abstract entity by the that clause is not in doubt. What is being contested is the type. of abstract entity. A more apt comparison is to recast the discussion in (96) as bemg about the question of whether the cat John believes he saw was real or a figmen~ of his imagination. But unlike imagination and reality; identifying the abstract object type is often a matter of fiat or decision. Another consideration related to the fluidity of this typology is that different sorts of abstract entities like facts and propositions may "agglomerate" together to form uniform wholes that may be picked up by anaphoric pronouns. For instance, consider the following example: (97)

The fact that Sam ran off with his secretary surprised no one. Mary's expectation that he would be unfaithful is also a pretty grim commentary on his character. All of it makes plain the typical, sad state of modem marriages.

This, as well as the data in section 2.2.2 suggests that abstract entities like facts and propositions may not be so different that they cannot merge together to form another proposition. . The fluidity of the typology is revealed in the linguistic forms of sententlal nominalization as well. An unusual feature of my classification is that some sentential nominals, viz., that clauses, and to some extent POSS-ing gerunds, have a polymorphic or chameleon-like quality; like the color of chameleon~, their true nature depends on their surroundings. They may serve to charactenze abstract entities of different and even incompatible types. For instance that clauses may denote several different types of abstract entities: facts, propositions, and possibilities. This suggests that that clauses introduce structures that are ~ot themselves of any particular type in the typology of natural language metaphYSICS but which may serve to characterize many different types of abstract entities. '

------------------------.-~--~-."~.-~~"~--

60

CHAPTER ONE

The typology for abstract entities differs markedly from a typology for concrete entItles. But the fluidity of the abstract object typology makes sense to a conceptualist. For while the realm of concrete entities appears to have fixed and determinate boundaries, there are no such boundaries that need be respected when categorizing the products of thought. For the conceptualist, the distinctions between abstract entities need not answer to fixed and determinate distinctions in nature or external reality. Abstract objects are our own creations and our categorizations of them answer to our own pragmatic needs; as our needs change, so may our categorizations. Furthermore, our needs for categorization may be local, so the typology may not be complete or altogether worked out. Finally, we may suspend our categorization for certain purposes or when giving another perspective on some abstract object. Natural language metaphysics reflects these conceptualist tenets faithfully. The next chapters will tum to a more careful linguistic analysis of these matters. 1Mental states, however, which relate together propositions and agents, may very well have causal efficacy. More on this later. 2Philosophers like Davidson have claimed that events are concrete individuals. According to Davidson (1967), however, events are to be individuated by their causes and effects (so they are not individuals like rocks, trees, animals, or space shuttles, altJiough they may share some properties with ordinary individuals). 3For unsaturated entities too there is a similar distinction between world-immanent and abstract objects. Natural kinds and event types are examples of world-immanent properties; such properties have causal efficacy, and kinds even have a kind of spatiotemporal extensIOn as in: (1) platypi are found in Australia but nowhere else. (2) dinosaurs lived for about 400 million years. Many predicate nominals, on the other hand, denote abstract properties with no causal efficacy or spatiotemporal extension. So it is odd to say something like: (3) Goodness caused the world to be saved. except in a highly metaphorical sense. But I will not examine predicate nominals or natural kinds here. 41 use the term gerund phrase to refer to the complex construction employing a verbal for like loving or having loved or even the form being about to Jove. This seems to oe standard usage in at least some of the syntactic literature, but there are many variations of terminology in this area. I also made up the term of ing gerund to denote those gerunds in which one argument IS or would be expressed with a prepositional phrase beginning with of. 51 use these somewhat barbaric terms, ACC-ing gerunds and POSS-ing gerunds, because they have become standard in the linguistic literature on sentential nominals. ACC-ing and POSS-ing stand for the different cases of the subject of the gerundized verb. 6See "Unfair to Facts" in Austin (1961). 7Temporal adverbial PPs also hold of perfect nominals, as in Fred's kissing of Mary on Monday. 8For a discussion, see Smith (1991). 9This suggestion is picked up by Bennett (1988). 1°1 differ here from Vendler in my judgments about the acceptability of the container true with yerunds and derived nominals. 1Vendler's arguments for distinguishing these types of eventualities rests on an examination of verb classes, although as Verkuyl (1972) pointed out, verb classes themselves do not uniquely determine the type of eventuality that the sentence will eventually introduce. 12For a detailed discussion of these categories and problems involving them see Dowty (1979), Krifka (1987), Smith (1991). 13See Barwise (1981), Barwise and Perry (1983), Asher and Bonevac (1985a-b), Higginbo'~lam p985a). 4Kaiser introduces two other contexts that I will not here. They consist of verbs of hapJJening and duration-- e.g. begin, stop, and last, and emotive and cognitive verbs-- e.g., infuriate, bOther, anticipate and regret. It seems to me that these classes of verbs do not distinguish between other types of abstract entities; the first group of verbs does playa peculiar role in that they take imperfect nominals like POSS-ing gerund constructions and apply temporal properties to them. More on this in chapter 5.

FROM EVENTS TO PROPOSITIONS

61

15Barwise (1975) and Barwise and Perry (l?78, 1983) argue.persuasively on these grounds that the objects ofN! perception are not sets ofP9ssIble worlds ..TheIr arguments, ~owever, do not distinguish the naive notion of a proposluon from the objects of N1 percepuon. 16 This argument is given in Asher and Bonevac (1985.a). . 170 [!3/a] is the result of uniformly substituting the term !3 for every occurre~ce. of the term am 0: ·18 For a discussion see for example Asher and Bonevac (1985a, 1985b). Higgmbotham (1985a) IS a defense of the view that NI complements denote events. . 19Consider for instance His desperate situation forced him to gamble all he had on a vel)' nsky plan. 20S ee Asher (1987). 21See Asher (1987) again for a discussion. 22See Bonevac (1984). 23 In Asher (1987) I give a relatively detailed account of these categories. 24The semantics of questions that I have in mind is ~e s~mantics of questions using their direct or correct answers. ThIS view is held by a number of lIngUISts and phIlosophers. See Karttunen (1977), and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982). 25 Again see Asher (1987) for a discussion and bib~ography. . 26S ee also Gupta and Savion (1987) for confirmauon on the faIlure of the property argument form .. .. . for projective propositional contexts. . 27These differences are too simple when we examme contexts m whIch propOSItIOnal and facUve contexts share arguments. There are highly intensional ~ontexts that appear to take ~acts ?S arguments and they would seem to sugzest that facts mIght also have those sorts of Idenuty conditions'that we have suggested are llie mark ofpropositi~ns. C~nsequently, (I) ~annot ~ used to distinguish between facts and propositions. There IS a readmg, for mstance, on whIch (l.a) IS true while (1.b) is false: (1 a) The fact that Superman was vulnerable interested Lex Luthor. (1:b) The fact that Clark Kent was yuhIerab~e interes~d Lex Lutl!or. . This objection however is not conclUSIve. Denved nommal, POSS-mg and of-1f1g gerund phrases, however, also behave non-extensionally in such contexts. The sa'!le contrast as, m (l.a) an.d. (l.b) obtains if we substitute instead of the pair of complt?x NPs, the parrs Superman s vulnerabilItya.nd. Clark Kent's vulnerability. On their own these nommals apJJear to denote ~e same state, b!lt wIthm the context of a verb like interest, these ~ominals aJJl~ar 19 denot~ somethII)g mu.ch '!lore lIke a proposition. Superman's spurning of LOIS and ClaiK Kent s spurmng .of LOI~, ~hICh m normal contexts would denote events also behave as if they denoted projJoSItIons wIthm the con~xts . described in (27). Names of individuals such as Superrp.!Ifl and Clark Kent al~o behave m the subject position of interest as if they were within s~me propOSIuonal ~ontext. Thus, mterest generates a propositional context, and tJierefore, one mIght argue.. always mvolves some appeal to .mental states, propositions or some other intentional object related m some way to the actual deno~u9n 9f the noun phrase or nominal in subject place. Propositional contexts can even be generated WIth mdIcate. Consider the pair: (2.a) This proof indicates to me that xn + yn = zn has n~ solution in the whole numbers. (2.b) This proof indicates to me that Fermat's theo~em IS true. . . It seems as though the frrst of this pair could be true WIthOUt the second bemg true, If I.am not aware of the contents of Fermat's theorem. Attitude contexts m?y ~orce such an ?ccommoda~on as the data concerning the various types of nominals would seem to mdIcate. The unif~rm beh~vI~r of all . nominals m such contexts makes it plausible that the more complex semantIc analYSIS IS .appropnate and so these sorts of observations do not vitiate the distinction oetween facts and propOSItIOns. 28This reconstruction of Moore's argument is .giv~n in Fine (1981). Note that sho~ and il}dic:ate do not require their object arguments to be facts m thIS sense; maps may show somethmg or mdIcate sometJiing but then they may also be wrong. Thus, such contexts seem to take not on1y facts but possible facts or possibilities as arguments. 29Many philosophers who adopt a corres~ndence theory of truth take this argument to support the view that facts ground the truth of propoSItions. For a discussion, see Hochberg (1978). 30This example is due to Peter Lasersohn in conversation. . 31 There is an interesting question as to whether one can use the argumel!t P!ltterns. m (2~) to make distinctions between BP SItuations and facts. It does seem t~at the substItuuon of mtensIOnally equivalent property descriptions wit~in a fact den~ting nqmm?l preserves the reference of that nominal whereas we have seen that It does not WIth BP SItuatIons. 32 The ~cceptability of events as well as NI complements as objects of NI perception verbs would .. explain why the quantificational test fails.. 33The data in (62) is sensitive to the presence dlscours.e partIcles lIke bur or tOf!. ~ese add considerable complexity to the analysis of abstract enuty anaphora. TheIr role IS dIscussed at length in chapter 8. . . 34Contrast (70) however with the perfectly acceptable VP ellipSIS: John asked [whether he could go

62

CHAPTER ONE CHAPTER TWO

to the park);. He wants to. Of course here there is no clash in types; the anaphoric construction picks up a concept expressed by the VP in the previous clause. I shall analyze such constructions in chapter 5. 35It was given in a talk by Link at a conference on Discourse Representation Theory, Stuttgart, Gennany, 1987. 36Davidson (1967) states that events are subject to mereological principles. 37For instance, when we create a context in which these two events become thematically connected, then the anaphoric link becomes quite good: Fred and Mary drove into town together. Fred went shopping for a new pair of sneakers. Mary went to her office to prepare some reports. It took a long time. 38 Earth and water when mixed together make mud, but what of hydrogen and nitrogen? The mereological principles for mass tenns work only on quantities of a particular kind of stuff. 390f course one might here distinguish between singUlar events, which is what I have been talking about, and plural groups of events. Events can be summed to fonn a plural group along the usual principles of gn;mp fonnation. Such groups would be referred to witli the complex demonstrative these events as m: John hit Mary. Sam got married. These events would prove momentous in the history of Smallsville. 40rhis approach too is due to Davidson (1967). 41Such appeals to common sense knowledge in text understanding have a long history within the AI commumty-- see for instance Schank & Abelson (1977) or in computational lInguistic analysis Dahlgren (1988). ~2I .w.ill al..yays suppos~ that among the groups of individuals are singleton groups for every mdividual m the domam. 43The detenniner all then forces a distributive reading over this conjunction. I'll return to this curious anaphoric phenomenon later. 44A possible worlds theory of propositions identifies propositions with sets of possible worlds. Proponents of such a view are Stalnaker (1976, 1984), Lewis (1970), Montague (1970). A Russellian view of propositions, defended recently by philosophers like Salmon (1986), Soames (1987) and Barwise ana Perry (1983), claim that propositions are structured com,l'lexes that include individuals, relations that have those individuals as arguments and some sort of' polarity" indicating whether the relation holds or does not hold of the individuals. 45The view that prop()sitions are sets of possible worlds completely describes the al~ebra and gives it a Boolean structure. It also verifies all the Boolean identities. I here do not include Stalnaker's (1976, 1984) suggestions for a semantics in which linguistic facts about what word referred to what object as well as non-linguistic situations would be encoded into the possible worlds structure. For a discussion see Stalnaker (1984). 46See R. van Sandt (forthcoming) for a discussion of this issue. 47With sentential quantifiers, propositional comprehension, which could be written as 3p p =
A CRASH COURSE IN DRT

The last chapter introduced a typology of abstract entities in natural language metaphysics. To investigate and analyze the typology further, I need to give a detailed semantics of sentential and verbal nominals. In order to do this, I will introduce the semantic framework, Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), within which the analysis will take place. That is the task of the present chapter. Much of this chapter rehearses material and motivation in DRT that has already surfaced elsewhere. All of this fragment, for instance, is covered in Kamp and Reyle (199+).1 But unlike the top-down analysis of Kamp and Reyle, the analysis and construction procedure of the DR-theoretic structures presented here is bottom up. It describes a program that has been implemented in LISP and PROLOG.2 The principal novel contribution of this chapter is to give a semantics for the bottom up construction procedure that shows the construction process is semantically coherent and gives the right results. This semantics yields insights into the possibility of a compositional treatment of DRT, and it also lays the foundations for the semantic analysis of sentential nominals. DRT contains two components: the DRS construction procedure, a procedure for constructing semantic representations, and the correctness definition, the method by which these representations are interpreted. I will first give a brief review of these components within the basic DRT fragment of Kamp (1981). DRS construction will proceed from the bottom up perspective. In the following sections, I will sketch two extensions to the basic fragment that will be very important for the analysis of nominals denoting abstract entities and abstract entity anaphora: the analysis of verbs as event predicates and tense and aspect, and plurals and plural anaphora.

1. A PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW OF THE AIMS OF DISCOURSE

REPRESENTATION THEORY DRT was the first of a group of theories to develop a dynamic notion of meaning. The proposal for a dynamic semantics is, however, already present in Stalnaker (1976). The group of dynamic theories includes the situation semantics of Barwise (1985) and the Dynamic Predicate Logic of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990).3 These theories all view the meaning of a sentence as a function from contexts to contexts. DRT analyzes meaning in two steps. The first, the DRS construction procedure or so called DRS construction algorithm, is a set of rules for constructing a semantic representation for a discourse. This representation is called a discourse representation structure or DRS, and it is built up sentence by sentence. If j sentences have been

63

64

CHAPTER TWO

processed to yield the DRS Kj , then the processing of Sj+l will yield a DRS that The second part of DRT mterpretatlon, the correctness definition, provides instructions for homomorphically embedding a DRS in a model so as to yield correct truth conditions for a discourse. The interpretation of a discourse in DRT then takes two steps: first the construction of a DRS, then the proper embedding of the DRS in a model. Combining the correctness definition with the construction procedure yields a dynamic, truth co~ditional interpretation of discourse. The dynamic meaning of Sj+l is that function WhICh takes us from the truth conditions of Kj to the truth conditions of K·+ 1. .Several pr.oponents of dynamic semantics have eschewed this two st~p approach to mterpretatIOn. 4 They have voiced various objections to the use of DRSs the intermediate level of representation in DRT. One objection is that the exploitati~n of an intermediate level of representations threatens a certain view of compositional semantics familiar from Montague Grammar. This is the doctrine of direct interpretation, on which the rules for semantic interpretation must exactly follow the s~ntactic rules of phrasal construction (thus allowing the syntactic rules .to be dispensed with in principle). Another difficulty for the two stage view concerns the seman.ti.c interpretation of the DRS construction procedure itself. In previous expOSItIOns, the DRS construction procedure seems to have no semantic interpretation; it is simply a formal procedure for getting the right truth conditions for a discourse without appealing to any intuitive notion of meaning of the lexical items in the disco~rse. In the last section I address this criticism and show how the meaning of a DRS IS a function of the meanings of its parts. Perhaps the principal challenge, however, is to say precisely what is the role of ~he inte~mediate level. What does it buy us? Various interpretations of the ~ntermedlate level have been suggested during the development of DRT: (1) the DRS IS a level of "logical form," (2) the DRS is a "partial model" of what is said in the discourse, or (3) the DRS is a "mental representation" of the content of a discourse formed by a recipient of it. Which of these views is correct? The "narrow" view of DRT (usually espoused by those who do not like DRSs or representations), construes a DRS only as a representation of logical form for dynamic semantics. I believe that a broader view of DRT is warranted on which all three characterizations of ?RSs a:e correct. ~ut in order to defend this claim, some remarks concerning the phIlosophIcal foundatwns of truth conditional semantics are in order. Much of the subsequent linguistic investigation in this book does not hinge on these philosophical points. But I mention them to make clear what I take to be the aims of DRT. Formal semantics has proceeded for the most part independently of philosophical concerns ~at attempt to link meaning with use. 5 The version of DRT that I present here begms to address these concerns by situating semantics within a more compr~hensive theory of verbal communication. Such a theory might take the followmg shape. Contents are at bottom properties of cognitive states. In co~~unication, speakers attempt to convey these contents (among other things) to :eclplents who attempt to reconstruct these contents from the verbal message. A DRS IS an abstract, partial, and non-linguistic specification of the information a recipient ~ombines .with Kj to form an extended DRS Kj+l.

A CRASH COURSE IN DRT

65

recovers from the processing of a discourse. Or more precisely, the information the recipient recovers must have a structure homomorphic to that of a DRS. Thus, DRSs are to be distinguished from inscriptions in the DRS language, which is, as the reader will soon find out if he or she does not already know, full of "boxes." The sort of information of which a DRS is a partial specification also serves as a component of cognitive states; the belief that
...

",,--------------------------------------11'~~~----~~.

~~-~---

CHAPTER TWO

A CRASH COURSE IN DRT

full analysis of pronominal and temporal anaphora. Such an analysis may prevent the full compositionality required for the direct interpretation of natural language. But I reject the claim that a semantics must necessarily directly interpret natural language. It

elements of the domain ofM such that f(x) is a boy in M, fey) is Fred in M, and f(x) kicks f(y) in M. If we define (1) to be true in M just in case (K1) has a proper embedding in M, we get the right tmth conditions. We have now seen a DRS and the truth conditions it detennines for a simple

66

seems completely unilluminating to do so when one is interested in the meaning of pronouns. The intennediate level of representation allows us to defme processes like pronominal and temporal anaphora resolution in a simple and clear way that is not

open to those who espouse direct interpretation. This does not show that the use of representations is inescapable, but it constitutes prima facie strong evidence in their favor. One can almost always save the strong view of semantic compositionality and eschew an essential appeal to representations at the expense of baroque and unlike! y semantic values. But I shall not pursue it here.

2. TIlE BASIC FRAGMENT

67

sentence. The next step is to extend the treatment to multisentence discourse. Let us add to (1) another sentence to get the discourse: (2)

A boy kicked Fred. Fred cried.

We know what stmcture the first sentence yields; it is (K1). To get a DRS for all of

(2), the DRS created from the first sentence serves as a context for processing the second sentence. In processing the second sentence, the conditions and discourse referents introduced by the second sentence are entered into the condition list and universe a1ready created in processing the first sentence. This is the result x,y,z

The original fragment of DRT discussed in Kamp (1981) contained Common nouns, verbs, the determiners a and every, and the English conditional expressed by if

(K2)

.. . then. In this section, I introduce a construction procedure and correctness definition for this fragment, extended with rules for processing definite noun phrases and negation.

boy(x) Fred(y) kick(x,y) cry(z) Fred(z)

The advantage of using the DRS built up from previous discourse as a context for the

2.1 DRSs and Truth Conditions The best way to get acquainted with DRSs is to look at an example. The DRS for (1) below, ignoring the semantic contributions of tense, appears as (K1): (1)

A boy kicked Fred. (Kl) ffX,-u,Y'o-;---j

boy(x) Fred(y) kick(x,y)

(K1) describes graphically an abstract, information stmcture, a DRS, with two parts. One part is called the universe of the DRS, the other its condition set.. A DRS is an

ordered pair consisting of its universe and condition set, written as .

interpretation of the next sentence arises in the process of anaphora resolution. Anaphoric pronouns introduce a peculiar sort of condition. Many conditions come with a determinate, context free-content, but others do not In particular those that are introduced by anaphoric pronouns introduce a discourse referent that must be linked with some other discourse referent in order to give the condition a complete meaning. I write such conditions as being of the fonn z =? Such conditions are incomplete conditions. All other conditions are complete conditions. The distinction between incomplete conditions and complete conditions carries over to DRSs. Complete DRSs are those containing only complete conditions; incomplete DRSs contain at least one incomplete condition. The condition contributed by the pronoun he in (3), z =?, is responsible for the DRS (K3) being incomplete. (3)

A boy kicked Fred. He cried.

The DRS depicted in (K1) has as its universe two "discourse individuals," x and y,

and as its condition set a collection of property ascriptions to x and y. The conditions in ConK l are formed from n-place DRS predicates and n discourse referents as arguments. In this fragment, DRS predicates are generated from nouns or verbs. The condition set says that x is a boy, y is Fred and x kicks y. To give the tmth conditions for (1), we need to define a proper embedding for (K1). Informally, a proper embedding for (K1) in an (extensional) model M = , consisting of a domain D and an interpretation function [I, is a function f that maps x and y onto

x,y,z (K3)

boy(x) Fred(y) kick(x,y) cry(z)

z=? The question mark in this condition needs to be replaced by a discourse referent, in

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order to complete the DRS. The task of anaphora resolution is to find an appropriate discourse referent other than z and to tum z = ? into an identity assertion. In the example at hand, y is an appropriate discourse referent introduced by the processing of the first sentence; i.e., the discourse referent is an element of the DRS that serves as a context for the processing of the second sentence of (3). After identifying y with z, we have the following completed DRS for (3):

(K'3)

x, v. z boy(x) Fred(y) kick(x,y) cry(z) z~v

(K5) ~

69

x,y John(x) Fred(y) like(x, y)

(K5) has a proper embedding just in case there are no obj~cts x and y such that x is John, y, Fred, and x likes y. We could also add disJunc!lon as an operator to this fragment, but since disjunction will not figure prominently in what follows, I wIll make do with the original DRS operators'? We have seen some examples of DRSs for very simple natural language texts. In the next section, we will see how to build DRSs from DR-theoretic meanings of basic expressions.

(K '3) has a proper embedding in a model M just in case M contains Fred and a boy

such that the boy kicked Fred and Fred cried. There are more complex DRSs that themselves contain DRSs. Any condition containing one or mOTe DRSs as a constituent is called a complex condition. (4) gives rise to one: (4)

Every girl kicked Fred. (K4)

Igir~X) I

"* Fred(y)

kick(x, y)

The DRS for (4) has two DRSs that are constituents of a complex condition. Such constituents are called subDRSs. I will caIl the one on the left (K4.1) and the one on the right (K4.2). The notion of a proper embedding for such a DRS must take these subDRSs into account. It does so in the following way: fis a proper embedding for (K4) in a model M iff every extension (superset) off that properly embeds (K4.1) in M can be extended to a proper embedding of (K4.2) in M. Not only do many determiners like every introduce such complex DR-theoretic structures, but conditionals and other operators do as well. In particular, besides the "* operator on DRSs, I will use one corresponding to negation, -,. Thus. a sentence like (5) yields the DRS below it: (5)

John does not like Fred

2.2 The Basic Construction Procedure The DRS construction procedure builds up a DRS for a discourse in a stepwise fashion,- sentence by sentence. The actual inputs to the construction procedure are parses of sentences. reflecting their syntactic structure. Th~ syntac~c theory ass~ed in this section is a simple fragment of X' theory and a leXICon WhICh subcategonzes argument positions of the verb. The negation particle not and conjunctions like or ~d and not are assumed to combined with sentences, verbs, and verb phrases. ThIS fragment does not have boolean combinations of noun phrases or detenniners. The syntactic assumptions will be expanded in section 3. 8 . Let us begin with a simple natural language discourse, a simple sentence like (I) repeated below: (I)

A boy kicked Fred.

To construct (KI) we need look only at one sentence. Sentence (I) has the following syntactic structure if we ignore tense.

NP

/~

Det

I

a

N

I

boy

kick

Fred

The DRS construction procedure that I shall describe works bottom up, translating the terminal nodes of the syntactic tree into DR-theoretic structures that are then

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combined together according to a process called DRS conversion to produce a DRS. This process has been implemented in both PROLOG and LISP and is described in a variety of papers.9 The translation of a common noun or a verb yields a DRS predicate. So the translation of person, which I shall sometimes write as person ~ is AX person(x), while kick' = AX AY kick(x, y). These predicates can be represented as DRS structures known as predicative DRSs. The italic letters represent variables over discourse referents or dr variables, and the A operator is a variable binding operator.,_

Accordingly I shall introduce predicative DRS variables and bind them with a A.operator. A partial DRS also may have a declared discourse referent. A declared discourse referent is a discourse referent that is to serve as an argument of a premcative DRS that will be assigned to one of the predicative DRS variables during the operation of DRS conversion. When a predicative DRS variable P is assigned a discourse referent as an argument, P is a variable over n-place predicative DRSs for n ~ 1, whereas when P is not assigned a discourse referent as an argument, then it may vary over n-place predicative DRSs for n ;, O. Partial DRSs are converses to predicative DRSs. Predicative DRSs are formed from DRSs by taking out discourse referents, while partial DRSs introduce discourse referents. In order to make sure that a partial DRS does not introduce a discourse referent that has already been introduced into the DRS K for a discourse, we require that the discourse referent x it introduces be not already an element of UK or the universe of any DRS that occurs within K. To state this precisely. we must suppose that the translation of a determiner like. is always relative to a DRS context. The translation of the determiner. then relative to a context DRS K is the partial DRS:

Definition: For a sequence of dr variables x" ... , x. and DRS K such that x" ... , x. E UK, Ax" ... , AX.«UK-{X" ... , x.J), ConK(x.!x" ... , x./x.» is a premc.tive DRS. Here are predicative DRSs corresponding to person' and kick' expressed in the graphical DRS langnage:

AxF====11 .

person(x)

AX AX jl--ki-'c-k-(x-,-y-)--1

The interpretation of predicative DRSs is quite familiar from algebraic treatments of properties and propositional functions. The A. indicates an operation of "discourse referent abstraction," in which a discourse referent is removed from a DRS. Thus a predicative DRS is a DR-theoretic object which is a function from discourse referents into DRSs. Predicative DRSs combine with one or more discourse referents to yield a DRS. Nevertheless, discourse referent abstraction works much like A-abstraction; and like A-abstraction (which operates on formulas), object abstraction has a converse--DRS conversion, in which a n+ l-ary predicative DRS combines with a discourse referent to produce an n-ary, predicative DRS. DRS conversion is analogous in part to the wayan ordinary A abstract applies to a constant. But DRS conversion differs from A-conversion; the form of its partial and predicative DRS arguments do not detennine the output of DRS conversion, as is the case with 1..conversion. DRS conversion is able to fill in any of the A-abstracted discourse referent places in a predicative DRS. DRS conversion exploits syntax and other information sources encoded in the form of linking rules to tell it which discourse referent fills in which argument place. This gives DRT great flexibility in accounting for different possible scopings of operators and quantifiers, something that is usually taken care of in the ordinary type theory of Montague Grammar with type raising. The flexibility of DRS conversion makes the predicative DRS expressions in the DRT language equivalent to A-expressions of the lambda calculus with a polymorphic interpretation. The translation of the NP and the determiner of sentence (I) is more complicated but familiar from the work on quantifiers of Montague (1968, 1970) and van Benthem (1984). A determiner introduces a partial DRS. A partial DRS is what remains from a DRS when one or more predicative DRSs is abstracted away from it.

71

APAQ t-u"-c-:--! P(u) Q(u) where u is a new discourse referent relative to K. This means that the translation of a detenniner is context sensitive; the discourse referent it introduces may only be determined within the context of constructing a particular DRS. In this notation, P and Q combine with predicative DRSs, while u is a declared discourse referent. Thus, determiners are to be understood semantically as functions from predicative DRSs to DRSs. But the function introduced by the determiner in a given context also performs the function of introducing a new discourse referent, a new discourse object, into the infonnation structure. The round brackets denote the application of . the predicative DRS to a discourse referent. Typically, the translation of the common noun phrase in an NP is assigned to P; u is assigned as an argument to that predicative DRS during DRS conversion. I will sometimes write partial and predicative DRSs in linear notation to save space. For example the partial DRS above would be written as, A.PAQ <{uj, {P(u), Q(u)}>. I will further abbreviate partial and predicative DRSs by using variables for DRSs--e.g., AQAP K A proper name like Fred introduces a partial DRS too, but it is one that is partially filled in. If determiners introduce relations between properties or rather concepts, proper names introduce one place properties of concepts. Thus the translation of Fred is

A.P t-v~_ _1 Fred(v) P(v)

72

Partial DRSs can be easily understood in operational tenns as supplying the discourse referent arguments to turn predicative DRSs into DRSs.1 o But in offering a semantics for the construction procedure, we must assign some extensions to partial DRSs and predicative DRSs and show how DRS conversion comes up with the right extensions for DRSs. The semantic extension of the output of the DRS construction algorithm relative to a model M should be a set of embedding functions--those embedding functions that properly embed the output DRS in M. The partial DRSs and predicative DRSs that go into building the output DRS constrain the set of ~roper embedding functions for the result of DRS conversion. If we are to do this correctly, the contribution of each condition will have to be understood dynamically. Given a set of embedding functions or some embedding function, the semantic extension of a condition will be to return a more constrained set of embedding functions. There are a variety of ways one could proceed here, I I Most natural from this bottom up perspective is to treat predicative DRSs similatiy to propositional functions and thus

assign to them extensions that are functions from discourse referents and a given embedding function to sets of embedding functions. Partial DRSs will then be functions that may combine with predicative DRS denotations and a given embedding function to yield sets of embedding functions. For the interested reader, I make this more precise in section 5.3 of this chapter. As our semantics for the construction algorithm implies, DRS conversion is similar to 13 conversion of the lambda calculus. It merges partial DRSs and predicative DRSs together, assigning the appropriate arguments to the appropriate places and returning a DRS. Aoperators in effect always have widest scope in the conversion routine, for the combination of a one place partial DRS and an n+ 1 place predicative DRS yields an n-place predicative DRS. Though ugly to state (see the last section of this chapter), DRS-conversion is easy enough to understand once one has seen an example. Having translated all the terminal nodes of the tree for (1), we now combine these translations together in DRS conversion. Let us first combine the predicative DRS that is kick' with the translation of Fred. According to the rule of conversion together with the infonnation that the discourse referent introduced by Fred fills the object argument place of kick " we get the predicative DRS:

AX

f-cv'-cc-.,-~

kick(x,v) Fred(v)

We now combine a' with boy'to get the following partial DRS:

AQ

u

boy(u) Q(u)

This partial DRS may now combine with the predicative DRS constructed for the VP in DRS conversion to give us the final result.

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CHAPTER TWO

u v

boy(u) F~~v) ..\ kicklU, v

2.3 DRS Consl111ction, Multiple Sentence Discourse, and Intersententia! Anaphora Let us now turu to the more complex example (3), repeated here. (3) A boy kicked Fred. He cried.

The translations of the expressions in the second sentence are familiar except for he. The translation of he is a partial DRS of the fonn

The condition z = ? is an incomplete condition. Anaphora resolution will make the condition complete. But first we have to construct the DRS for the second sentence. It is this:

We now must update this DRS with the DRS for the previous sentence. This amounts just to taking the union of the universes and the condition sets of the two DRSs. I also call this operation DR-theoretic union, symbolized by !,d. DEFINITION: DRS-update(Kj, K 2 )

= «UK,

U UK'), (ConK, U ConK.»

= Kr

!,d K2 x. v.z boy(x) Fred(y) kick(x, y) cry(z) z=? The task of anaphora resolution is to find an appropriate discourse referent other than z with which to replace the ? in z = ? After using the process of anaphora resolution to identify y with z, we have the following, completed DRS for (2):

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x,v,z boy(x) Fred(y) kick(x, y) cry(z)

A CRASH COURSE IN DRT

The partial DRS introduced by every combines with the predicative DRS that is the translation of girl to yield tltis partial DRS:

1..Q

z=y Anaphora resolution is a distinct process from DRS construction proper. The reason for distinguishing them is that the structure of a DRS imposes a constraint on anaphora koown as accessibility. But to define accessibility, we need to de,'c\op the DRS construction procednre a little forther.

2.4 Every and if. .. then

D-D The sentential operator and the deterntiner introduce slightly different structures when we look more closely. The sentential operator yields a partial DRS with a complex condition and no declared discourse referent.

The determiner yields a partial DRS with a complex condition and a declared

discourse referent

r============

This combines with the farniliar translation of the VP to yield the DRS: (K4)

The deterntiner every and the sentential operator if . .. then complicate the picture of DRSs by introducing conditions with subDRSs, DRSs within DRSs. These conditions are known as complex conditions. Sentences with occurrences of every and if. . .then yield DRSs with complex conditions of the following shape, containing a pair of DRSs and an operator.

75

Ig~(X) I-

v Fred(y) kick(x, y)

It is worth remarking that while detenniners have uniform translations as partial DRSs, partial DRSs are a quite diverse group. The partial DRS that is the translation of. , as well as the partial DRS that corresponds to a proper name, have the functIOn of introducing a discourse referent into the DRS--an object that we can taik about and refer to in subsequent disconrse by means of anaphoric pronouns. A definite NP also yields under translation a partial DRS that introduces a discourse referent into the discourse. This discourse object. however, is presupposed to be familiar to the

interpreter, at least in the sense that the takes the noun phrase to refer to a specific individual that the speaker takes him to koow something about.!2 Such partial DRSs differ considerably from the partial DRS introduced by every. This partial DRS looks much more like an ordinary quantifier. A disconrse referent

is also introduced in this case, but since it occurs in an embedded DRS, we shall see that in general it cannot be referred to in subsequent discourse. The discourse referent introduced by every functions like a variable, and in the complex condition of the partial DRS there is a tripartite structure familiar from the theory of general!zed quantifiers. The box on the left of the complex condition corresponds to the restnctor property; the one on the right is the nuclear scope; the arrow is the quantificati?nal relation.13 A detenniner is quantiiicational just in case it yields a p~~~.U?"~§};ylth a tripartite structure and intrOduces a 'newruscoilisefeferefiriirffie~re'strictor: _~·"."'_W~""'"_~-·'·'.""_

..". _"'._.

~,_

2.5 SubDRSs, Accessibility, and An.phora

In building the DRS for (4), we use a partial DRS like the one above. (4)

Every girl kicked Fred.

The treatment of quantificational deterntiners and logical operators introduces a complex logical structure into DRSs. This structure affects anaphora and helps us to understand the constraint of accessibility, which exploits tltis logical structnre. Again let us proceed by way of an example which contains anaphoric pronouns and yields a DRS with complex conditions.!4

A CRASH COURSE IN DRT (6)

If a high school student owns a Mustang, he works on it every day.

77

Accessibility is a relation on discourse referents in the universes of DRSs. Roughly. the constraint says to find all the accessible discourse referents accessible to some

The clause in the antecedent yields the DRS,

discourse referent x, one must look in those universes of DRSs to the left or superordinate to the universe in which x is declared.

x,V

The accessibility constraint allows us to complete the DRS for (6) by identifying

high-school student(x) Mustang(y) own(x, y)

Zl

with x and Z2 with y. According to the definition for accessibility, x is accessible

to z, and y to z,. This yields the following finished DRS for (6):

while the clause in the consequent yields the DRS: x High-school student(x) Mustang(y) own(x, y)

Zl ? '0. =?

...

Zl, Z2 Zl=X

z,,=y

Work-on-every-day(zj,

Z2)

work-on-everv-daY(ZI,Z2) The two DRSs above furnish the arguments to the structure introduced by if then. So pnor to anaphora resolution the DRS for (6) looks like this:

(K6)

X

high-school student(x) Mustang(y) own(x, y)

...

Zl. :q

zl

?

Z2=

?

work-on-every-day(zj,

Z2)

The DRS for (6) above cont';;ns incomplete conditions within a subDRS. The completion of the conditions in DRSs with subDRSs is subject to a semantic constraint, accessibility. To define accessibility, I need fitst to define the notion of subordination. recursively. Definition: (Subordination): If K is a constituent of a complex condition of K', then K is subordinate to K'. If K. is a constituent of a complex condition of Kn-l and Kn-l is subordinate to K, then K. is subordinate to K.

(6) is a so called "donkey" sentence, and the DRS above is equivalent to the one for evel}' high school student who owns a Mustang works on it evel}' day. One of the successes of DRT was to yield this predicted equivalence, using unifonn rules to process the indefinite article, the detenniner evel}', and the conditional operator. The accessibility constraint together with the DRS construction rules, however, forbid the anaphoric links that are suggested by the coindexings in the following

sentences (Le., when an NP is coindexed with a pronoun, that indicates that the discourse referent introduced by the NP and the discourse referent introduced by the pronoun are to be identified in the anaphora resolution process).15 (7.a) (7.b) (7.c)

*Every man who owns every Mustang i likes i~. *Every man who owns a Mustang j praises it. It, runs very well. If a professor were to own a Mustangi. he would not be able to maintain it. It, would cost him too much to fix.

Let us look at (7.a) to see how the accessibility constraint rules out the suggested

anaphoric connection. One new element in (7.a) is a relative clause; the construction procedure translates a relative clause as a predicative DRS and combines it with the predicative DRS derived from the head of the common noun phrase, identifying the

I now define the accessibility of a discourse referent x to a discourse referent y in a DRS Ko by an enumeration of cases: Definition: (Accessibility): Let K = Ko or K be subordinate to Ko. Then: (i) If x, y E UK, then y is accessible to x in Ko: (ii) if K' is subordinate to K and x E UK' and y E UK, then y is accessible to

x in Ko; E UK', x E UK" and K' ... K" is a complex condition of K. then y is accessible to x in Ko; (iv) otherwise, y is not accessible to x in Ko.

(iii) if y

two A-operator bound discourse referents. This new predicative DRS now becomes an argument to the partial DRS introduced by the detenniner of the NP.1 6 The DRS for (7.a)

x man(x)

Z

Z=?

like(x, z)

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has a structure in which y, the discourse referent representing the intended antecedent for Z, is inaccessible to z according to the definition of accessibility; y occurs in a subDRS of a DRS that is to the left of the one in which z occurs. Thus, the anaphora resolution module will not be able to identify y with z. Note that accessibility is not merely a configurational principle. It reflects a constraint imposed by the trnth ~onditional interpretation of DR-theoretic structures. Any attempt to identify z with y In th~ DRS above makes its embedding conditions incoherent. An embedding funcMn f that embeds the subDRS on the left side of the arrow does not itself assign an object to y; so there IS no embedding function of the right hand subDRS extending f .that maps z to an individual that is identified with fey). The accessibility of a disco~se referent entails that.it gets a value assigned by an appropriate embedding function. AccessIbilIty thus differs from syntactic constraints like those of "precede and command," which syntacticians have proposed. 17 First, it is defined on semantic structures and has a semantic justification, whereas the syntactic constraints do not. Further it has different empirical consequences; syntactic precedence and command constraints in conjunction with principles of a binding theory rule out sentences like JOhni likes himi. whereas accessibility does not. Precede and command constraints do not distinguish between the semantic content of detenniners or operators and so cannot by themselves account for the phenomena in (6) and (7.a) and (7.a-b). Note, however, that while (7.a-b) are unacceptable, (7.c) is fine. Craige Roberts's (1987) notion of modal subordination offers a DR-theoretic account of such examples. The modal, she argues, indicates that the second sentence is to be interpreted relative to the context created by DRS-update of the left subDRS with the right subDRS derived from the fIrst sentence of (7.c). This seems right in (7.c). The would of the second sentence indicates a causal link between the inability to maintain ~ Mustang and its costliness; a professor who owns a Mustang is not able to maintain It because. it costs h~m too much to fix. However. one can also get acceptable sentences like (7.c) WIthout overt modals. Consider (8): (8)

Every professor who owns a Mustang j is unable to maintain it. It. costs him too much to fIx. I

I believe that a DR-theoretic explanation of (8) must follow similar lines to that suggested by Roberts for the modal sentences. Causal links implied by a text, as we shall see In chapter 8, do not require an overt modal or other lexical indication. Since modals are not a part of thi~ fragment, I give the DRS for (7.c) with the anaphoric equations filled m. All the links made are consistent with the accessibility constraint I have represented the causal link by a conditional. This is inadequate, but this is aiJ that can be done within the bounds of this fragment.

x

Zl, Z2 Zl x

=

professor(x) Mustang(y) own(x, y)

=y is-not-able-to-maintain (z 1, Z2) Z2

x. . Zl. Z2 Professor (x) Mustang(y) own(x, y)

...

Zl =X z2 =y

is-not-able-to-maintain (

79

"3=x z'=y

cost-too-much-to fix(z3' z') )

2.6 Scopes for Quantifiers in DRT and Other Constraints on Anaphora The principal innovation in the DRT analysis of anaphora is the constraint of accessibility. Accessibility, however, is dependent upon the scopes assigned to the translations of noun phrases. The scopes determine the exact logical strncture of the DRS constrncted. The interaction of scope assignment and DRS constrnction has implications not only for anaphora resolution but also for more general issues like compositionaiJty. As an example of a sentence with several possible scopes for the noun phrases. consider a case in which noun phrases within the VP take wide scope over noun phrases in subject position. For example, (9) has a reading in which this holds. Imagine that the cOntext is one where people are discussing the success of a county fair. (9)

Many people visited almost every booth.

Within this context, the wide scope reading of (9) is preferred and implies that for almost every booth many people visited it. Determining the scope of quantifier expressions and operator expressions in ~aturallanguage is complex. Various factors affect scope: among them are syntactic configuration, lexical semantics, grammatical position, and, in speech, phonological stress. Because scope affects the logical strncture of a DRS and because accessibility is determined by the logical strncture of a DRS, DRS constrnction and scope assignment must fIx the strncture of the DRS prior to exploiting that structure as a constraint on anaphora resolution. In the present description of the DRS constrnction procedure (and in most implementations), different scope assignments are made possible by the fact that the argument position of a discourse referent in a predicate is specified independently of the linear order of applications of DRS conversion. Thus, regardless of when the partial DRS introduced by an NP is used in DRS conversion, the discourse referent it contributes as an argnment to the matrix predicate of the sentence will end up in the right place.

80

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,

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The linear order of applications in DRS conversion. on the other hand, determines the scope of a particular NP translation. While this allows the construction procedure to handle different scopes for quantifiers, it also opens the question of rule to rule compositionality. If the syntax incorporates a rule like "quantifier raisingl1 that places an NP higher up on the syntactic tree than its customary position,18 then one can use the position of the NP in the syntactic tree to detennine its scope and thus also its place in the linear order of application of partial DRSs to predicative DRSs. With such a syntactic rule and its semantic correlate, one would get a determinate, seoped reading for each syntactic structure; the DRS construction procedure for this fragment would be an "algorithm," a function from syntactic structures to DRSs. The DRS construction procedure would be compositional in accordance with the Montagovian rule to rule hypothesis concerning compositionality. On the other hand, the syntax might not have such a rule. Even so, our definition of conversion allows us to apply the translation of the NP in a different order than the one the syntactic configuration might suggest. This allows us to give different scopes to the translation of the NP, relative to various quantificational elements or operators. 19 But this gives the DRS construction procedure the potential to yield potentially several DRSs for each syntactic structure, and this violates the requirements of the rule to rule hypothesis. One could perhaps recover functionality and the strong form of compositionality by specifying other factors besides the syntactic structure that detennine scope. Besides scope, which affects accessibility, anaphora is dependent on a number of other syntactic and discourse factors. The anaphora resolution process employs syntactic information of various kinds. For instance, the discourse referent x introduced by an anaphoric pronoun may only be identified with a discourse referent y in the anaphora resolution process if the antecedent noun phrase and the pronoun agree in gender and number. Further, if x is introduced by a full noun phrase. x may only be identified with y in the anaphora resolution process, if the antecedent noun phrase and the pronoun obey syntactic constraints like disjoint reference. 2o But these will be largely of peripheral interest to the present study and are much discussed in the current syntactic literature. Of more interest in the study of anaphoric reference to abstract entities are the constraints on anaphora based on discourse principles. I discuss the discourse constraints briefly here and then at length in later chapters. There have been several studies arguing persuasively for constraints on anaphoric reference to ordinary individuals based on discourse structure. 21 These appear to be of two general kinds. One sort of discourse constraint exploits a variety of cues in order to determine a salience ranking on accessible discourse referents relative to some other discourse referent z that occurs in an anaphoric equation; the greater the degree of salience of a discourse referent x relative to z, the more likely is the process of anaphora resolution to identify x with z.22 The other, central to this book, exploits principles about the structure of the discourse to yield certain configurational constraints on the anaphora resolution process, similar in nature to accessibility or syntactic configurational constraints. We have seen already one such example of discourse effects in the DRS

for (7.c). The discourse structure of (7.c) is such that discourse referents that would not ordinarily be accessible are so. It seems hopeless to make sense of such discourse structure effects within the framework of a strongly compositional mapping from syntax to semantics, especially when there are no clear lexical triggers like a modality. In (7.c) it is clearly not the syntax that determines when subordination is possible. The factors that make modal subordination a possibility are complex and ill understood; they depend on world knowledge as well as on grammatical details like the interaction of tenses. I shall argue in chapters 7 and 8 that discourse structure is very important to a correct analysis of anaphoric reference to abstract entities; and there, once we have some idea of discourse structure, I shall review the constraints on individual anaphora imposed by discourse structure.

2.7 Other Determiners and Operators in the Basic Fragment We have treated one quantificational determiner, every, and one logical operator, if. .. then. The basic fragment contains one other truly quantificational determiner and two other operators. no is the other quantificational determiner. It introduces a discourse referent which is in effect "bound" by occurring within a subDRS. A negation on this subDRS reveals the determiner relation, and the DRS itself is the union of the restrictor clause and nuclear scope. So no introduces the following partial DRS:

According to the definition of accessibility, the discourse referent introduced by no within the subordinate DRS will not be accessible to a discourse referent introduced within a superordinate DRS. DRT predicts (10) to be bad, for instance. (10)

'No girl; slept. She; was then very cross.

Just as in this fragment the lexical element ifintroduces the operator ~ on its own (without, that is, the introduction of a discourse referent), the lexical element not introduces the negation operator on its own and has the translation:

Negation may have multiple scopes in this DRT fragment--in particular scopes over V, VP, or S.23 Semantically, then, negation will take either a predicative DRS or

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DRS as an argument. But since DRSs are in effect O-place predicative DRSs, we need only the translation for the negation operator given above.24

X.V

boy(x) Fred(y) kick(~: y) «x, a>, }

2.8 External Anchors and Definites

One unsatisfactory feature of the original fragment as I have described it thus far is the treatment of definite singular tenns. Philosophers like Kripke (1972) and Kaplan (1977) have persuasively argued that proper names, indexicals and demonstratives contribute the same denotation in every possible world, no matter in what non-quotational context the expression occurs. Their views fann the "direct

theory of reference." DRT adopts their insights, reflecting the directly referential character of such expressions at the level of DRS interpretation. A special device fixes the assignment to the discourse referent; it is a partial function, which is called an external anchor, from discourse referents in the universe of a DRS to objects and times in the domain of the model. A DRS with an external anchor is said to be externally anchored. I also call a real individual that is the value of tltis function with the input of a discourse referent x in a DRS K the external anchor for x. Proper names are directly referential expressions. So since (1) above contains a proper name, (KI) should have an external anchor; the pair consisting of the discourse referent introduced by Fred and the object Fred is the external anchor for (KI), as indicated below: x,V boy(x) Fred(y) kick(~: y)

«y,Fred>}

83

The device of external anchoring forces us to rethink the status of conditions that a directly referential singular tenn introduces in a DRS. Since such a tenn gives rise to an externally anchored discourse referent. the condition it contributes is otiose for detennining the real individual that is the value of the discourse referent un~~r a proper embedding of the DRS. But then what infonnation might such ~ condillOn convey? Clearly the use of the tenn conveys certain ~nfo~~ti.on to th: mterpreter. For example, the use of a name seems to convey metahngUlstIc informatlOo--e.g., the infonnation that the discourse referent introduced by the name a stands proxy for an individual with the name (1.. But attempting to incorporate this sort of infonnation directly into the truth conditional content that a name contributes to a discow;se le~ds to trouble. Suppose we try to process the sentence Kripke IS necessan!y Identlcal with Kripke. If the condition 'named(x, 'Ktipke')' is assumed to contnbute to ~e content of the DRS and noun phrases are processed in the nonnal way, the followmg DRS (where D, not part of our current fragment, stands for the modal operator) results:

x named('Kripke', x) y D x y named('Ktipke', y) «x, kripke>, }

External anchors constrain the intetpretation of the DRS in the following way: if K is a DRS containing a discourse referent x and <x, b> is in the external anchor for K, then f is a proper embedding of K only if f(x) = b. Proper names are not the only directly referential expressions. The pronouns this and that are often read as deictica11y referring to some salient individual in the environment of the speaker and audience, as are complex demonstrative phrases like this man and that airplane. So consider for example the sentence, (11)

This boy hit Fred.

Since this boy is also a directly referential expression, (11) generates two external anchors, ODe for the discourse referent introduced by this boy and one for the discourse referent introduced by Fred. The complex demonstrative this boy also introduces a condition--just as an indefinite would.

DRT then appears to predict that this obviously true statement expresses ~he falsehood that the individual named Kripke necessarily has the property of bemg named 'Kripke'.25 . . One might eliminate the conditions introduced by directly referenual expressIOns entirely to avoid this problem. But conditions introduced by proper names an~ other directly referential expressions do serve a purpose. They supply the agent WIth the means for connecting up the content of a message in which such expressions occur with his antecedent beliefs in the right way; the infonnation conveyed by a proper name a for instance, allows the agent to integrate the infonnation about the bearer of ex with ~ther information he has about the bearer. The construction of such "internal connections" is an essential part of interpretation and of belief fonnation, since only by integrating the content of the message with his antecedent beliefs can an agent evaluate the new material. Similarly, the semantic contribution (for the agent) of a definite NP, like a defmite description or a complex demonstrative. is often simply to single out some mdivldual

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for which a discourse referent has already been introduced in the processing of the discourse or which is otherwise available from context, not to contribute to the set of

property ascriptions attributed to the individual picked out. Nevertheless, the descriptive conditions of the definite in this case still make a contribution--the

furnishing of internal connections between elements of the agent's cognitive state. The internal connections introduced by all defmites end up playing a crucial role in gauging the behavior of singular terms within belief contexts, as we shall see in

chapter 3. This way of characterizing the conditions introduced by names (but also other definites) pertains to DR theory's fonnalization of the fantiliarity theory of definites. According to the familiarity theory of definites, it is a presupposition of a definite NP a that the recipient of a discourse containing a be familiar with a's

denotation. The familiarity with definites also is a presupposition of bearers of propositional attitudes, if the definites occur within the report of the attitude,z6 It is thus essential to the DRT account of names, indexicals, demonstratives, and other directly referential expressions that they do introduce some conditions on discourse referents--inc1uding perhaps such metalinguistic information as is

suggested by the use of the condition 'named( , )'. But these conditions are to be understood in a different way from other conditions. An acceptable account of the contribution of proper names and other definites to DRS construction must

distinguish between two sorts of conditions: those that directly contribute to the truth

85

3. EXPANDING THE FRAGMENT: EVENTS IN DRT There are three expansions of the original fragment that are important to later developments: work on events and tense, plurals, and belief contexts. Belief contexts have a special importance in that their treatment already lays down some of the

fundamental precepts of the semantics of abstract entity denoting constructions. They merit a separate chapter. Events and plurals I will cover in the next two sectlons.

Some of the earliest papers on DRT (e.g., Kamp 1979, Kamp and Rohrer 1981) set out to develop a DR-theoretic account of temporal reference and ~emporal anaphora using event discourse referents. 3o Since we will be analyzin? n?~nals that denote events and event anaphora in the next two chapters, this matenalis Important to review.

A paradigm example of an event or state introducing construction in DRT is the tense or aspectual component of a sentence often syntactically realized as an ending on a finite verb. Following recent syntactic theory, I will associate this component with the syntactic constituent I, the inflection node. The translation of this constituent introduces in DRS construction a discourse referent of a different type than we have seen before; it is an event discourse referent, a discourse referent that an embedding function must map onto an event in the model. Event discourse referents and conditions on them carry the temporal and aspectual infonnation of a discourse.

Following the suggestions of Davidson (1967) on which adverbs are predicates. of

conditions of a report, and those conditions that are relevant to the interpretation of the report by the agent. I'll call the two sorts of conditions attributive and referential respectively, in honor of Donellan's similar distinction for definite descriptions?? Conditions produced by names are almost always referential, while conditions derived from other definites may be referential or attributive. By treating the conditions of definite descriptions as either attributive or referential, one in effect

events, conditions on event discourse referents may also convey the mfonnanon contained in adverbs and adverbial clauses in a discourse. Detailed DRS construction procedures for the temporal systems of French,

reproduces the familiar scope distinctions for definite descriptions and operators like those introduced by modalities. This discussion leads to the following processing rules for the definite determiner the. The definite determiner introduces the same basic DRS structure as the indefmite. But it brings with it uniqueness and familiarity presuppositions, which have various effects on the DRS construction process. Typically, fantiliarity and

DRS construction with events. First we must make some additional syntactic assumptions. In current X' syntactic theories, the site for temporal and aspectual infonnation ~s the inflectio? node (I) of a syntactic structure. 31 X' theory says that given any baSIC category X, It

including temporal adverbs, exist in Bras (1990) and Kamp and Rohrer (forthconting). A relatively comprehensive construction procedure for Enghsh also exists in Kamp and Reyle (199+). I only sketch here some of the leading ideas of

accessible discourse referent satisfying all the conditions attributed to x. 28 Definite descriptions, however, may also have a functional reading, when the head noun of the

has a maximal projection XP and an intennediate node X' such that XP c,,? be rewritten as YP X' and X' may be rewritten as X ZP, where YP and ZP are maxunal projections of basic categories Y and Z.32 IP is the maximal projection of I and is the syntactic fonn of a simple sentence. I have five basic categories: V (verb), M (modifier), N (noun), C (complement), D (detennmer), and I (mflectlOn). I also assume for all categories a pair of features concerning nouns and verbs .. I wIll say

noun phrase denotes a functional property--i.e. a property AxAYCP(X,y) such that for every x if x is a possible argument for cP, then there is a unique y such that cp(x, y).

that a category is +n just in case it is nounlike, +v just in case it is verb-like. Some basic categories may come with either feature. Modifiers may be of the +~ o~ the +v

This reading is often present with e;vent or state nominals, as we shall see in chapter 4. In this case, the meaning of the~head noun fulfills the uniqueness and familiarity

variety depending on whether they attach to N' (in which case ~ey are adJecnves) or to V' (in which case they are adverbs). Here are the rules the X theory Imphes for I

uniqueness presuppositions are satisfied by requiring that the discourse referent x

introduced be identified by the anaphora resolution module with some most salient,

presuppositions. 29

and its projections.

VP - MP(+v) V'

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A CRASH COURSE IN DRT

V' - V (NPobjecu, (NPobject2), (CP) I'-IVP IP-NPI' (NPobjecu, (NPobject2), and (CP) all stand for possible arguments of V, where CP is a maximal projection of a complement--e.g., a that clause. The subcategorization frame for the verb will detennine what syntactic category of arguments the verb must take. With I are associated several features: Tense, Aspect, Modal, and Agreement, which encode properties of the verb such as whether it is in the past or pluperlect tense, has perfective or imperfective aspect, or is accompanied by a modal auxiliary like can or must These syntactic rules yield the following structure for a simple sentence: IP

NP~r

I~VP

~

Tense, AGR, / Aspect, Modal

V' /

~ ADJ

V~NP I yields one or more event discourse referents and a variety of conditions expressing temporal and aspectual information. 33 Thus, I plays a semantic role much like the detenniner in a noun phrase, reflecting the syntactic similarity. A simple tense like the simple past or present functions very much like an indefinite or definite detenniner. More complex tenses function more like quantificational detenniners introducing complex conditions and discourse referents within subDRSs.34 DRT thereby predicts that event anaphora should follow the patterns of individual anaphora. I shall look at event anaphora in chapter 5, when I discuss abstract entity anaphora I introduces a discourse referent of a different sort from individual discourse referents introduced in chapter 2. DRT distinguishes between sorts of discourse referents--in particular between individual discourse referents and state and event discourse referents. I introduces state or event discourse referents. State discourse referents are denoted by S, s" etc. while event discourse referents are denoted. bye, e" etc. To save the orthography at the price of some ambiguity, I will use e, e, etc. as eventuality discourse referents when I do not need to distinguish between the different types of eventualities. Here is a natural translation of I:

AP

IP(e) I
87

In the partial DRS above, 'I' represents the condition(s) derived from the temporal and aspectual information contained in I. This translation of I does not reflect the function argument structure implicit in the syntax. I is the head of the whole sentence, but my translation reflects a syntax in which the subject NP is the head. One could reflect the function argument structure of the syntax in the semantic translation of 1. But nothing is gained semantically by this move, and some aspects of DRS construction become more awkward with the more complex translations. 35 Thus, I shall stay with the simpler translation above. The conditions derived from temporal and aspectual information are often quite complex. They involve temporal anaphoric relations between the events introduced in the inflection node and events and times already introduced into the discourse by previous material. DRT here follows in broad outlines the Reichenbachian treatment of tenses. One special discourse referent introduced is the temporal discourse referent that stands for the moment of uttering or writing down of the discourse--the "now of the discourse context." Past tenses introduce an equation that says that the action occurred previously to the time of the discourse (e < n). Present tenses introduce an equation that says that the event overlaps the now (e ~ n), while future tenses introduce an equation that says that the event is later than the now (0 < e). But there are other temporal relations that obtain as well. For instance, the simple past tense introduces a temporal relation between the event discourse referent e it introduces and the event discourse referent introduced in the previous main clause e'; the relation is that ~(e < e').36 A pluperfect tense typically introduces the equation e < e'. The rules governing the use of these equations in DRSs are quite complex; they depend on lexical, semantic, and syntactic information as well as on the structure of the discourse built up to that point. 37 In DRT, the task of introducing these equations has traditionally been left to an augmented anaphora resolution module. Since the analysis of tense lies outside the scope of this book, I will not go into details here.3 8 Besides rules concerning the temporal properties of events, a DRT must also provide rules for calculating aspect. In DRT, aspect is determined at the level of the DRS (Smith 1991, Bras 1990). This requires distinguishing not only between states and events at the level of discourse referents, but also between accomplishments, achievements, activities and processes. As Verkuyl (1972), ter Meulen (1984), Krifka (1987, 1989) and others have noted, whether a sentence introduces an accomplishment or an activity may depend on the entire VP or even the entire sentence. Not just features of the verb but also features of its arguments must sometimes be used to detennine the type of event or state that eventually fIlls in the event argument place in the predicate introduced by the verb. We will look at details in chapter 4. The parallel between I and D forces us to revise our translation of VPs. The semantic translation of an N' is a property; its DRS translation is a predicative DRS applying to the discourse referent introduced by the translation of the D. The translation of a VP is also a property. But it must be a two-place predicative DRS-one argument place to be filled by the subject of the whole sentence and the other to be filled by the event discourse referent introduced by 1. How does this work? We

1I1!r~------------------------------------',""""_--'-----

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must change the entries for verbs given in the previous section. Following Davidson and others like Parsons (1989), we add to the translation of each verb an eventuality

A CRASH COURSE IN DRT to yield, according to the definition of DRS conversion:

argument place and introduce eventuality discourse referent variables e, e l .. etc ..

Thus intransitive verbs cp become two place predicates of the form lee lex cp', where cp' is the DRS predicate corresponding to the verb; transitive verbs", become three place predicates of the form lee lex ley cp', and similarly for ditransitive verbs. The translations of transitive and ditransitive verbs convert with the translations of their indirect and direct objects in the way discussed in previous sections. But once the translation of the VP is built up, we see that it is a two place relation rather than a one place property. Its translation is of the form lee lex cp; so it may combine with the translation of the I. Thus the semantic translation of a YP is a property of eventualities; it is an event- or state-type. Our choices so far also dictate the form of the translation of adverbial phrases. Following Davidson, many of these form predicates on events. In the DRS construction procedure, then, adverbial phrases should form predicate ascriptions to

lee! Ax

~u'":,~ y",,=:o::<1

named ('Sam', y) erkick (x, y) school(u) at(u,e, )

«y, Sam>}

The I component contributes an event discourse referent and conditions reflecting the

assertion that the event has already happened. 4! 1 will summarize all these conditions with just one, e < n, where n is a discourse referent representing the "now" of the discourse:42

the event discourse referents introduced by the inflection node. To do this and to

AX e,u,Y,n

combine with the translation of V' to yield an event type, the translation of an adjunct cp must be of the form

e
named ('Sam', y) e-kick(x, y) school(u) at(u, e)

APlee P(e)

cp' (e) This is the right sort of structure to combine with the property of events given from the trartslation of the Y' to yield another property of events.39 Let us now look at an example of how we might introduce and treat event

«y, Sam>} This predicative DRS may now combine with the translation of the subject NP in the familiar way to yield the DRS (K12): (KI2)

discourse referents.

89

e,u,Y,v,n

named('John', v) e
(12) John kicked Sam at school.

Let us look at the processing of (12) in detail. kick Sam yields the predicative DRS: y

leelex~n~am~e'd~('~S~am~",y')~ e -kick(x , y)

«y, Sam>} This now combines with the translation of the adjunct adverbial,40 which is

lePlee 1 p-ue:--:----i P(e l ) school(u) at(u, e l )

named('Sam', y) e'-kick(v, y) school(u) at(u, e) (,} This DRS is not quite complete. When amalgamated with already accepted information, the conditions of the form named(a, x) will disappear; their role is to guide the updating correctly. But we must await the next chapter to see how this is done. But (KI2) serves to derme truth conditions for (12); (KI2) has a proper embedding just in case there are objects correlated with u, v, y, e--call them l!, Y, y, !e-such that: y is John,!! is a school, y is Sam, ~ (the event-type discourse referent introduced by the finite verb) is an event of Y kicking y, and !e occurs at l!. Thus, (K12) confers the right truth conditions on (12). When a VP contains a quantificational determiner, it may turn out that an event discourse referent is declared in a DRS superordinate to the one in which the

condition derived from the verb is introduced. But this causes no particular difficulty.

11

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A CRASH COURSE IN DRT

Consider (13.a) and the DRS for it derived according to our construction procedure.43

we must appeal to some other principle to explain (13.c) besides the usual method of reflecting wide scope readings in the DRS construction procedure.

90

(13.a) Mary hit every boy. 4. PLURALS IN DRT

x e n named('Mary', x) e
§--~ {<x, Mary>}

Because of the way DRS conversion nonnally proceeds, the event discourse referent is declared in the universe of the principal (topmost) DRS, along with its temporal conditions. Nevertheless, the event discourse referent is an argument of the predicate derived from the verb. 44 An event description e-, y for x, y respectively. In (13.a) the event described is an event in which Mary hits x, for every boy x. This event is the sum of all these events in which Mary hits a particular boy. This treatment implies quite permissive substitution principles within event descriptions. In (13.a), for example, were the quantifier phrase every boy to be coextensive in a model M with the students who were bad in class, then the event introduced by (13.a) in which Mary hits every boy and the event introduced by Mary hit the students who were bad in class would be the same. This analysis predicts that event descriptions must always be transparent to substitution of coreferential singular terms, unless these descriptions occur within the scope of an intentional operator. This is welcome in view of the discussion in chapter 1. But notice that the approach to (13.a) won't do in every case. (13.b) Mary hit no boy.

The preferred reading for this sentence is to have negation take wide scope. To get this reading, we need to postulate that the negation in the VP always percolates to I and takes wide scope over the eventuality introducing components of 1.45 A further question is whether eventualities introduced by the inflection node may take wide scope over the subject noun phrase. Can we say that there is one event described in the following sentences, for instance?

The next extension to the DRS construction procedure I consider concerns plurals. The DRT view incorporates many of the observations and analyses of Link (1983, 1987), Krifka (1987), and Landman (1988) on plurality. A comprehensive treatment of plurality with DRT is given in Kamp and Reyle (199+).47 I will sketch here only their general approach and the DRT treatment of plural anaphora. The observations about plural anaphora are important for my analysis of abstract entity anaphora 4.1 DRS Construction for Plurals and Basic Plural Anaphora

Plural NPs sometimes act as terms referring to sets, groups or kinds, and these plural NPs may act as linguistic antecedents for plural pronouns. (14)

The students went camping. They enjoyed it.

During DRS construction, plural NPs, like singular NPs, introduce conditions and discourse referents. 48 Various difficulties concerning dependent plurals and NP conjunction have led some to suggest that there should be a uniform type of discourse referent for plural entities and individuals.49 If we follow the suggestions of Link and Krifka, a uniform type for individuals and groups would reflect the uniformity of individual and plural entities as elements of a lattice in the model theory. While I shall adopt at least provisionally the lattice-theoretic models for plurality common in this research, I shall ignore the complexities of dependent plurality and adopt a conceptually simpler theory in which plural discourse referents form a distinct type denoted by capital letters 'X', 'Y', 'XI " etc.; embedding functions always map plural discourse referents onto non-atomic parts of the lattice of groups and individuals in the model, while mapping individual discourse referents to atoms in the lattice.50 With our decision made, we can now represent a discourse like (14) with the following DRS:5!

Ye Z z e' (13.c) Every boy kissed his mother. (13.d) No one kissed their partner. The consensus about (13.d) is that the event discourse referent introduced by the processing of I is not entered into a DRS universe outside the scope of the negation implicit in the quantifier no one .46 With (13.c) matters are not so clear. Most likely,

students(Y) e-go-camping(Y) e'-enjoy(Z, z) Z=Y

z=e The new elements in the DRS above are the plural discourse referents Y and Z, and

1lII----------------------~-~,~---~--

CHAPTER TWO

A CRASH COURSE IN DRT

the identification between them. The plural discourse referents are introduced by plural NPs. The plural pronoun also introduces a condition that the anaphora resolution process must fill in. A new constraint on anaphora is that the process of anaphora resolution may not identify a plural discourse referent ~ith an individual discourse referent. Not all plural quantifiers introduce plural discourse referents. Many incorporate instead instances of quantificational determiners introducing individual discourse referents. For example, determiners like few, mos~ and many are almost always read distributively; that is, when such a detenniner occurs as part of an NP, it is interpreted as quantifying over elements satisfying the common noun phrase which is its head. Thus sentences like (15.a-b), in contrast with (15.c),

is the sum of Susan and Bill. These examples indicate that the antecedents for plural anaphors may be constructed from other discourse referents or DR-theoretic structures in the text This is also a fundamental feature of abstract entity anaphora, to which I return in chapter 5. The operation needed to construct new discourse referents from old discourse referents in (16.a) and (16.b) sums over previously introduced discourse referents. I define it as follows:

92

(15.a) Many men lifted a piano. (15.b) Most men lifted a piano. (15.c) The men lifted a piano.

!

I

do oot have collective readings. When the head common noun phrase is interpreted as a property of individual discourse referents. it types the discourse referent introduced by the determiner as being an individual discourse referent. Kamp and Reyle (199+) extend the DRS language to incorporate many different quantificational relations; these are enclosed diamond-like shape, occurring between the DRSs representing the restrictor and nuclear scope. A sentence like (15.b), for instance, will yield thus the following DRS: n

~~ man(x)

most x

e,V e
This is a straightforward rewriting in the DRT formalism of a generalized quantifier representation for (4) like that to be found in van Benthem (1984). Quantificational determiners other than every will introduce quantificational relational predicates into the DRS language.

4.2 Plural Anaphora

DRT has some new and interesting insights about plural anaphora. Plural NPs are not the only kind oflinguistic antecedents plural anaphora exploits. Consider, (16)

Susan went camping with Bill. They enjoyed it

On the most salient reading of the plural pronoun in (16), they refers to the group that

93

(PSUM) Given any fmite number of discourse referents ~" .. " ~n' where each 13i may be a plural or singular discourse referent, we may form the sum 131 + ~2 + ... + ~n and use it to replace a ? in an incomplete condition of a DRS K, if the ~i are all accessible from K. Suppose Z = ? is a condition in an incomplete DRS K. Then if ~" ... , ~n are all accessible to Z (in K), then one may identify Z with ~1 + ~2 + ... + ~n to complete K. The import of the operation of sum for the examples (16.a-b) is clear. The last clause of the definition is needed to handle the contrast between examples (17) and (18), which are due to Hans Kamp. (17)

Bob is mean. Each student he takes out for a beer ends up paying for every pitcher they order.

The pronoun they in (17) can refer to the sum of Bob and a particular student he takes out The definition (PSUM) permits this since the discourse referent introduced by 'Bob' and the discourse referent introduced by 'every student' are accessible to Z, since it is introduced in the subordinate DRS. In (18), however, (18)

Bob is mean. Each student he takes out for a beer ends up paying for every pitcher they order. They don't get on now.

the second occurrence of they introduces a discourse referent Z in the main DRS to which the discourse referent introduced by every student is not accessible. So (PSUM) rules out the anaphoric link between Z and any group consisting of Bob and some student he takes out for a pitcher. This accords with speakers' intuitions; the reading of the second occurrence of they as bound by the quantifier in the second sentence is not generally accepted. Sometimes sums are explicitly marked by means of conjoined noun phrases, but sometimes they are not An interesting and important aspect of plural anaphora is that not all of the sums that can be formed are acceptable as anaphoric referents. Consider, for instance, the possible readings of a sentence like (19): (19)

Suzie kissed John. Sam was wedded to Mary. They are both very happy.

(PSUM) predicts that there are six possible interpretations of (19), one for each

1I"'r-----------------~_,~------.

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possible group with two members that can serve as antecedent to the anaphor. But (19) has fewer than six readings. Consider, for instance, the following variants of (19): (20.a) #Suzie kissed John. Sam was wedded to Mary. They are both very happy, although Suzie and Mary are not. (20.b) #Suzie kissed John. Sam was wedded to Mary. They are both very happy, although Sam and John are not. Given the adverbial clauses, they should have as antecedent in (20.a) the sum John + Sam and in (20.b) the sum Suzie + Mary. But these groups are not acceptable antecedents for the pronoun. What do seem to be acceptable antecedents for the they in (19) are the sums Suzie + Sam and John + Mary. The elements of these groups do not share the same thematic role or even the same syntactic position. It is a delicate matter what to make of examples. Perhaps the unacceptability of Suzie + John as an antecedent is just a matter of salience, this group being so much less salient than other groups. But were it simply a matter of salience or world knowledge, we should be able to play with the context to alter salience. Certainly this works with individual anaphora: (21)

Sue invited the physicist over for dinner to John's house. He kepttalking incomprehensibly about gravitrons, while the rest of us tried to get away to watch the football game.

But now when we tty to do something similar with plural anaphora to pick up a group like Mary and Suzie as in (20.a) or (20.b), we fail. It should be perfectly possible to refer to the group Suzie + Mary by means of a definite descriprion. (20.c), for instance, is completely felicitous. (20.c) #Suzie kissed John. Sam was wedded to Mary. The girls are both very happy, although Sam and John are not.

95

The plural pronoun in (22) refers to the group of all those students in the class who went on the camping trip. But since the individual students are not explicitly introduced into the discourse as discourse referents, (PSUM) cannot be used to form the appropriate sum. I assume that the quantificational structure of (22) does not introduce a plural discourse referent, since many always has distributive readings. 52 What we need is a particular operation to yield groups; it is called abstraction. Abstraction exploits a condition introduced by a quantificational determiner like most, every, and many. If the condition is of the fortn ct <> ~, then abstraction allows us to form a group of all those objects satisfying an alphabetic variant of ct I,l ~, the DRS update of ct with ~.53 The group is denoted by the term LX ct U ~, where L takes the DRS ct I,l ~ and a discourse referent declared x in ct I,l ~ and returns the group of all those objects y that satisfy the property Ax ct I,l~. Such a group is the intended antecedent of the pronoun in (22). We will see more of abstraction when we develop the account of anaphora of abstract objects in chapter 6. The appendix defines truth conditions for conditions of the form X = Lx ct I,l ~. In conclusion, it is noteworthy that the DR-theoretic treatment of plural anaphora assimilates plural pronouns much more closely to definite descriptions. The operations of (PSUM) and abstraction can be viewed as ways of determining pertnissible descriptions for which the plural pronoun stands proxy. Evans (1980) developed the view that pronouns stand in for contextually supplied definite descriptions. DRT's view of singular pronouns is quite different; it takes them to function essentially as bound variables, but DRT gives a different notion of binding and scope than traditional linguistic theories. On the other hand, DRT seems more inclined to agree with the Evans view of pronouns insofar as plural pronouns are concerned. This area of DRT is, however, still quite unsettled.

5. APPENDIX: FORMALIZATION OF DRS CONSTRUCTION AND DRS INTERPRETATION

5.1 Definition of DRSs These observations indicate first that pronominal anaphora and definite description anaphora differ. Second, they indicate that collections must fall under a certain description, or they must be constructed by reference to infOrtnation like role, or topic and focus, since the elements in the group share the property of being topicalized. One should modify (PSUM) so as to reflect these constraints. But at present we lack a framework in which we can develop precise constraints to predict these observations. We shall see in chapter 8 that principles of discourse structure will give us such a framework There is one other sort of plural discourse referent introducing operation that should be briefly mentioned. The operation (PSUM) is unable to account for the anaphoric phenomena in a discourse that is quite similar to (18.a-b): (22) Many students in my class went on the camping !tip. They enjoyed it.

I adopt the following conventions for variables over different types of discourse referents. x. y, etc., range over discourse referents of any type; c. Ct. etc. over discourse referents of event type; t 1• t2 for temporal discourse referents; and X. Y, etc., for plural discourse referents. Temporal discourse referents include the "now" discourse referent, n. I define DRSs and their conditions by means of the following double recursion: DEFINITION:

(i) (ii)

If,!, is an n-ary DRS predicate and x" "', x. are discourse referents, then V(x b ...• xn) is an atomic condition. If x" X 2 are discourse referents of any kind, e I, e 2 are eventuality

96

(iii)

discourse referents, t a temporal discourse referent, then Xl = X2. Cl < e2, e 1 < t are conditions. If K" K, are DRSs, x is a discourse referent, e is an event discourse referent, and '" is a quantifier relation symbol, then the following are conditions: -,K, Kl =* K 2 • e-K, and

K1 (iv)

(v) (vi)


el EB e2 = mine {e': el C e' & e2 C e'}, if there is such an e' = 0, otherwise Note that without additional axioms on the domain of eventualities EB is neither commutative nor associative. 54 There are several ways we can set up the definition of a proper embedding. The simplest defines the concept of a proper embedding of a DRS K in a model M with respect to a function from discourse referents into objects in DM <w, I> I will call any such function from discourse referents into OM an embedding function. Define an embedding function g to extend an embedding function f relative to K in M at <w, t> ( written g 21< f) just in case Dom(g) = Dom(f) U UK, g 2 f. I will also say that g extends f relative to a set of discourse referents X. Define an external anchor for Kin M to be a partial function from UK into (U<w,1> E W X T (Dom«w,t») U T, such that if n E UK then A(n) = the utterance time of the discourse, and if i E UK A(i) = the speaker of the discourse. Now we define a proper embeddingf ofK in M at <w, t> (written If, K]Mw U with respect to a possibly empty external anchor A for K in M and satisfaction of a condition in M relative to an embedding function f for the DRS in which the conditions occur at <w,t> (written (M, w, t) ~f).

K1

If x is a discourse referent in UK, and K E DRS, then X = LX K is a condition. If Xl •.. "X n are discourse referents, then X = Xl+ ...+ Xn is a condition. A DRS is a pair , where U is a set of discourse referents, and Con a set of conditions.

Conditions that contain subDRSs are complex conditions; those without constituent conditions are simple or atomic conditions. An atomic DRS contains only atomic conditions; otherwise it is complex.

5.2 Model Theory

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The original model theory of this fragment was extensional. In order to talk about meanings in DRT, however, I introduce intensions with respect to worlds and times. They will become crucial in the section in which I add attitude descriptions to the DRT language, but they are also useful to talk about the semantic concepts for the extensional fragment of the language. Further, the easiest tack for the model theory would be to follow Krifka and Link and assign the domain of eventualities and sums a lattice structure. In view of the discussion in chapter 1, however, it appears that the domain of eventualities does not have a tidy algebraic structure. This is reflected in the models below. Define an intensional DRS model M to be a quintuple <W, T, D, E, II>. (i) W and T are non-empty sets (the set of worlds and times respectively). (ii) D is a function from W X T into a non-empty, atomic lattice (D<w,t> is the "domain of individuals and sums of individuals in w at t"). (iii) E is a function from W X T into a set of objects (eventualities) partially well ordered by inclusion such that: (a) if 'I' is an E-path description (see chapter 1) VetE E<w,t 1> Ve2 E E<w,t z>' .. Ven E E<w,tn> ("" eo) - 3e' E E<w.t.> (el C e' & ... & eo C e') and (b) if '" is an eventuality description, then 3e' E E<w, t> Ve E E<w, t>Vxt. ... xn'l'(e, Xl. ... , xn) - e C e'). E<w,t > is the "domain of eventualities in watt". Dom«w,t» = D<w, I> U E<w, 1>. (iv) II is an interpretation function that assigns to DRS predicates functions 0 such that for <w. t> EW X T o«w, t» E go (Un E ",(Dom«w,t»)n). To quantifier relation symbols, II assigns functions 'Y such that for <w, t> E W X T into y( <w, t» E go go (Un E ",(Dom«w,t»n», where: Dom«w,t» = D<w I>U E<w 1>. Since C on eventualities is a partial well ordering, we may 'extend the summation operation Ell defmed by the lattice for pluralities to eventualities:

DEFINITION (Proper embedding and Satisfaction): (i) If '" is an atomic condition of the form : 3g 21<, f (g(x) = b & [g, Kd~.t.f) I. (iv) If", is of theform e-KI , then(M, w, t) ~f'" iff3g 21<, f[g, KdMw,t,f). (v) If",is a condition of the form KI "'" K" then (M, w, t) Fr ",iff'lfg21<, f ([g, Kd~,t.f - 3h 21<, g [h, K,]~,t,g).

K1

ffi

K1

If", is a condition of the form then (M, w, t) ~f '" iff <{b: 3g 21<, f [g, KI]Mw,t,f& g(x) = b}, {b: 3g 21<,f [g, KdMw,t,f & 3h 21<, g [h, K,]Mw,t,g h(x) = bl> E 1
I.

W

,

rr------:-:-fe-r-en-c-e-t-o-w-o-r-ld-S-i-n-th-e-defi-m--i-ti-o:-H-o-:-~-p-ro-:-e-~-e-mO-be-ddin-.-g-a-b-ov-e-.5-5-----------..·r"'·. ~~-, .. "'iill!.A""""

The notion of proper embedding yields a definition oflogical consequence (in fact several notions of consequence, but I only give the most familiar here). Let us write M low, t K iff 3f [f, K]Mw,t, and M I' K iffVw E WM 'It E TM (M, w, t) I' K. We may now define a DRS K to be a logical consequence of K' iff for every DRS model M (M, w, t) I' K'"* (M, w, t) I'f K, for all w, t of M. We write K is a logical consequence ofK' as K' I' K. Validity is defined by taking K' to be the empty DRS.

5.3 The Construction Procedure and its Semantics I restrict myself here to extensional models for simplicity. It will be obvious how to extend the discussion here to intensional models. I will show in this section how to supply denotations to partial DRSs and predicative DRSs so that one can verify that the construction procedure yields the correct output set of embedding functions for given inputs. The extension of a DRS is a set of embedding functions relative to an embedding function g (g may be the empty function!). Our denotations for partial DRSs and predicative DRSs will reflect this fact First I define the language of DRS conversion precisely and then specify the operation DRS conversion, updating and anaphora resolution. Here are the expressions of the language: Vocabularv of the DRS Language. Object Language Symbols: X,y,Xh ...

e, el •...

P, Q, P" Q" ... li, X, y. Z, Xl> .. loves( , ), boy( ),etc.

"'*. I , V Metalinguistic Symbols. x, y, Z, Xl •... e,eh" , x, y, .. ' e, el •...

K,K',K .... . P, Q, Q" .. .

individual, eventuality or plural discourse referent variables. eventuality discourse referent variables predicative DRS variables discourse referents (individual type) DRT predicates DRS operators

variables over individual, eventuality or plural discourse referents variables over eventuality discourse referents variables over discourse referent variables variables over eventuality'discourse referent variables variables over FDRSs variables over predicative DRS variables

'l'-'-'-

<11, '¥, <11" •••

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99

variables over DRT predicates variables over DRT conditions and sets ofDRT conditions

I will use ConK to denote the conditions of a DRS K and UK to denote the universe ofK. I now extend the basic DR-theoretic structures with some new kinds. These are various types of l1incomplete" DR-theoretic structures, or structures containing variables. Out of these will emerge DR-theoretic structures representing quantifiers and propositional functions. I use a simple recursive definition. Let a(i3/Y) denote the result of substituting an occurrence of f3 for every occurrence of y, where a is any DR-theoretic structure. Also defme a discourse referent argument for a condition to be any discourse referent occurring in the condition. DEFINITION: (FDRS): Any DRS is an FDRS. If'l' is a DRS condition in an FDRS K, then K(P/Iif) is an FDRS, and if'l' has a discourse referent argument x E UK, then K(P(x)/Iif) is also an FDRS. Ifx EUK and K is an FDRS, then K' = . (iii) If 6 occurs in K but not in an atomic condition: K[x/Ii] = < UK, {'l'[xI6]: 'l' E ConK}>, where: (a) 'l'[xlli] = 'l'(xI6) if'l' is atomic; (b) 'l'[xlli] = Q(K,[xI6], K 2 [xI6]) if'l' is a condition of the form Q(K" K 2 ) and Q is DRS operator or quantifier

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relation. DEFINITION: TO is a partial DRS (PADRS) iff K is an FDRS or a PRDRS and either: (i) K has one predicative DRS variable, Q, u is a designated discourse referent EUK U (UK' < K(UK')), Il a discourse referent or dr variable argument for Q, and TO = A.Q K[u/Ill; or (ii) K has two predicative DRS variables, P and Q, u is a designated discourse referent, and 8 a discourse referent or dr variable argument for P and Q and TO = A.PA.Q K[u/Ill ; or (iii) K has two predicative DRS variables, P and Q without any discourse referent arguments and TO = A.PA.Q K; or (iv) K has one predicative DRS variable P without any discourse referent arguments and TO = A.P K. Further, if TO is a partial DRS then so is A.x7t. In order to derme conversion, I define the substitution of a predicative DRS for a predicative DRS variable. Recall the definition of DRS update or DR-theoretic union K U K'. This obviously extends to FDRSs. Now for the substitution operation. In the following definition suppose that K is an FDRS, u e UK is a discourse referent, K I is an FDRS and P a predicative DRS variable occurring in a condition '¥ E ConKDEFINITION: Suppose'¥ is an atomic condition. Then, if'¥ = P(u), Subst('¥, K', P) = UK', Subst('¥, K', P) = K, otherwise. Suppose'¥ is a condition of the form Kl ~ K 2 . Subst('¥, K', P) = K(Subst(K" K', P) ... Subst(K" K', P)/ '1'). Suppose'¥ is a condition of the form ---.K,. Then Subst('¥, K', P) = KhSubst(K" K', P)/ '¥). Subst(K, K', P) = I,l [Subst('¥, K', P): '¥ E ConK}.

With the substitution operation defined. we are now ready to define DRS-

conversion precisely_ There are two cases: DEFINITION: (DRS-Conversion) (I) Suppose that A.P K, E PADRS with a desiguated discourse referent u, A.P K,A.a, ... A.a.K, E PRDRS U PADRS, a, is a discourse referent variable, and for i j aj is either a discourse referent or predicative DRS variable. Then: Conv(A.PK" A.a, ... A.a.(K" a,) = A.a, ... A.ai_lA.ai+I ... A.a.K, [PI! K,[u/a,ll, where: K[P II K, '} is an FDRS just like K except that: (a) Con K(P II K} = ConSubst(K, K', Pl·

*'

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101

(b) UK{P II K'} = USubst(K, K, Pl· (II) Suppose that A.P K, E PADRS, with no designated discourse referent and A.a, ... A.a.K, E PRDRS U PADRS. Then: Conv(A.PK" A.X, ... A.x.(K,) = A.a, ... A. a.K, [P II K,} The DRS conversion of an n+ I place predicative DRS with a partial DRS with just one predicative DRS parameter yields an n-place .predicative DRS. The DRS conversion of an n+ I place predicative DRS with a parnol DRS WIth two predicatlve DRS variables yields an I1+ I-place partial DRS. DRS conversion generalizes a form of the law of (3 conversion for the higher order A.-calculus, translating predicative DRS variables as second order variables and predicative DRSs as A-terms in an obvious way. Part of the DRS construction procedure is to specify the linking rules, which specify which syntactic structures under the DRS translation will introduce discourse referents for which argument positions in predicative DRSs derived from other constituents. The linkiog rules determine, in the definition above for a given partial DRS and predicative DRS, which argument place (occupied by the variable -",,)is to be fIlled by the discourse referent introduced by the partial DRS, if there is any. For the simple fragment defined so far, configurationally dermed notions of subject and object will suffice to detennine which noun phrase translation contributes w~iCh discourse referent to which argument place in a given predicative DRS. Thus, 10 a sentence like Every boy loves a horse. the linking rules would say that the "subject argument place" of the translation of love is to be filled in with the desiguated discourse referent introduced by the translation of every boy, while the "object argument place" of the translation of love is to be fIlled in with the discourse referent introduced by the translation of a horse. More complicated syntactic structures will require a more elaborate conception of linking rules, as we will see in chapter 4. With these linking rules, the definition of conversion allows us to put predicative and partial DRSs together in an order-free way; we are able to specify any logically consistent possible scoping of noun phrases from a given syntactic structure. Similarly, the conversion routine specifies which predicative DRS variable is to be replaced by the predicative DRS. But in practice we will not need this flexibility; the partial DRS derived from D or I always combmes first with the translation of the structure that is adjoined to D or I. To effect this I will simply exploit the linear order of predicative DRS variable abstracts, converting the outennost fIrst. Because the DRS conversion procedure allows us in effect to get several different DRSs from the same syntactic structure, it cannot produce a strongly compositional semantics in the rule to rule sense. Conversion is more than just function application. 56 If we wish to recover a strong form of compositionality for the mapping from syntax (and perhaps other sources) to meanings, then we must place

F<}"& .

,-~----

----------

)r

i·:

i

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constraints on the conversion process. For instance, the position of an NP or operator introducing expression in the syntactic tree might determine its order of application. Using a theory of syntax with quantifier raising and the configurational constraint on the order of application, we could then have a strong form of compositionality in which every syntactic structure produced a unique DRS up to anaphora resolution. The DRS conversion procedure enables us to put together partial and predicative DRSs in a bottom up, order free fashion to artive at a DRS for a sentence Sj. This DRS must now be integrated into the result of DRS construction for the discourse up to Sj. 11ris uses the DRS update or DR-theoretic union operation. It is very simple and has already been introduced. The final stage in constructing a DRS completes the incomplete conditions--resolving the anaphoric equations. Formally. anaphora resolution is a complex function from incomplete DRSs to DRSs that fills in the anaphoric equations. This function exploits syntax, the DR-theoretic semantic structures, world knowledge, and the discourse structure of the text to yield an answer; thus the full meaning of a DRS does not compositionally depend just on the meaning of its parts (unless one wants to think of pronouns as having a very complex meaning) but also on a number of contextual factors. I now tum to the semantics of the construction algorithm and the process of DRS conversion. Let M be a standard DRS model. An extended DRS model 'M = <M, E>. E is a type structure built up in the following way. Let DR be the collection of all discourse referents and 1"the set of all partial functions f: DR - DM--DM being the domain of M. DR and 'f are primitive types of E. E contains four complex types: to, t" t2, and t3. to is defined recursively as follows: 'fS to, and if (~ - '/) S to, then «DR X~) - '/) S to. to is the type of a predicative DRS.57 t, the type of a unary partial DRS and it is very simple: t, = (to - to). Two place partial DRSs have the type t2 = (to - (to - to)). The general semantic interpretation of Conversion, !Convl, is a functional of the type t3 = Un E [0, l}{ (tn+! X DR- (to 't n)}. Because of the way conversion is defined and semantically interpreted, the conversion. for instance, of a unary partial DRS with a designated discourse referent and an n+ I-ary predicative DRS will yield an n-ary predicative DRS; conversion of a one place partial DRS without designated discourse referent and n+ I-ary predicative DRS will yield an n+ I-ary predicative DRS. Now I give the semantics of partial and predicative DRSs for this frajLment in a fixed, extended DRS model. The denotation of a predicative DRS Ax, ... A",K relative to an embedding function g, lAx, ... Ax. Klg, is a function of type to:

conversion. Then for a partial DRS = APAQ «x), {P(x), Q(x)}> the appropriate denotation would be:

102

!Ax, ... AX. Klg = f: (DR)n - /O('/) such that: (VR E DRn) f(R) = {h 1 [h, K[R/x" ... , x,]gM & h '2 K[R/~]) g}. Suppose G is an n+ I-ary predicative DRS denotation. When a discourse referent x replaces one of the A-abstracted discourse referent variables of G, a family of n-ary predicative DRS denotations results--one for- each argument in G which x may fill. I will denote the result G{x} Which argument x will fill is specified by DRS

1Ig is a function E : to - (to - to), such that if G" G 2 are m+ I and n+ I-ary predicative DRS denotations, then E(G" G 2): DRn+m - /O('/) s. tho VR E DRn+m E(G" G 2)(R) = {f E 'f13h E U(G, {x))(R) & 3h' E U(G 2{x))(R) & (h Uh') U g =f}. The denotation of the partially filled in partial DRS that is the translation of a proper name a--i.e., where = A.P <{x}, {named(a, x), P(x) }>--is a function from a discourse referent and a predicative DRS denotation to a set of embedding functions. 1Ig is a function P: to ~ to, such that if G,is a n+l-ary predicative DRS denotation, then p(G,): DRn - /O('/) S. tho VR E DRn p(G,)(R) = (fE 'fl fE U(Gtlx))(R)(g~f&E InamedIM)· We must assign a denotation to a partial DRS like that introduced by eve!}' that takes its complex logical structure into account. We do not want this denotation to pick out a set of embedding functions relative to a choice of predicative DRS denotations Q,and Q2 and a background embedding function embedding functions that are so large that they assign values to discourse referents that are not in the domain ofK or introduced in Q, or Q2. This could mess up the content of our DRtheoretic structures. So I shall use rnin(f) such that !p(£) to mean that f is a minimal function that has the property!p. Formally, min(f) & = APAQ <{), {«x), {P(x» "*<{], {Q(x)} >} > relative to a function k: 1IIc is a function A : to - (to - to), such that if G" G2 are m+ I and n+ I-ary predicative DRS denotations, then A(G" G,): DRn+m - /O('/) S. tho VR E DRn+m A(G" G 2)(R) = {f E 'f 1 min(f) such that k S f & (Vg 2 f) (31 E U(Gtlx))(R) & I U f = g)- (3h '2 g) (3j E U(G(x})(R)) such that jUg = h)}. The other operators of the first order fragment are straightforward. For negation-where = AP <{), {~P}>, we have: 1Ik is a function N: to - to, such that if G' is an n-ary predicative DRS denotation, then N(G'): DRn - /O('/) S. tho \fR E DRn N(G')(R) = {f E 'f: min(f) such that g I: f & -.3k '2 f k E G'(R)}.

The semantics for the negative determiner no is quite straightforward given what I have said about negation and other determiners. I leave the detalls to the reader. The interpretation of the DRS conditional is very similar to that for the universal

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105

quantifier. If cl> = APAQ<¢, {p ... Q}>,

1cI>l g is a function D: 'to -+ 'to. such that if G 1• O2 are m and n-ary predicative DRS denotations, then D(Glo G,): DRn+m - p('f) s. tho Vi! E DRn G(Glo G,)(i!) = {f E 1'1 min(f) such that k S f & (\fg 2 f) (31 E G,(i!) & I U f = g)- (3h 2 g) (3j EG(i!) such thatj U g = h)}.

The other cases of conversion are similar and left as an exercise to spell out. Let's look at a particular example of how we generate the right sort of embedding functions. Consider Every boy kisses a girl. Let us first get the denotation of the noun phrase a girl. Converting lal with Igirll, we get a partial DRS denotation which is a function from n-ary predicative DRSs D and n-tuples of discourse referents i! such that

?ur translation for the inflection node does not force us to countenance new types partIal DRSs or interpretations. For the general quantifier relations, we have a more complex but general clause. Let cl> be a partial DRS of the following form where

la girll(D, i!) = {g E 1'1 3h E IAPAQ<{U}, {P(u), Q(u)}>I(IAx <{}, {girl(x)} >1[ulil(D{ u} )(i!))}. = {g E rl3h E k{u}, {girl(u)}>1 & 3h' E UD{u}(i!) & hUh'

<{ I, {P (x)



= g}. Q(x)}>

icl>i;, is a function Q : ~o - (~o - ~o), such that if Glo G, are m+ I ary and n+ l-ary predicative DRS denotations, then Q(Glo G,): DRn+m - p('f) S. tho Vi! E DRn+m Q(G lo G,)(i!) = {f E 1'1 min(f) such that k S f & 3g 2 f 3h 2 f <{g(x): (31 E U(Gdx})(i!) & I U f = g)}, {h(x): (3m E U(Gdx})(i!)) (3j E U(G,{x})(i!)) such thatj U fU m = hI> E [
A~K, is to weed out from l'all those embedding functions except those that pro~erly

embed K WIth tbe property variables instantiated to AuK, and A~K,. More formally, DRS converSIOn amounts to the operation of applying a partial DRS denotation to a pr.ed~cat~ve DRS denotation in the right arguments. Thus, my semantics is ehmmallve, unlike that of Groenendijk and Stokhofs (1990) semantics for their dynamic logic. While this semantics is not that of ftrst order logic since the semantic values of sentences are sets of embedding functions, it is no more complex than theirs. Let us examine conversion in more detail. The general semantic interpretation of Conversion, IConvl, is a function of type ~2' If f is a n+ l-ary function from discourse referents to a set of embedding functions, then f[ulil is the n-ary function that results from assigning u to the i-th argument place of f. Now let A be an n+ 1ary predicative DRS denotation and B a 1- place partial DRS with designated discourse referent u. Then ~Conv(B, A, x;lg = the predicative DRS denotation G: DR" - rsuch that for all i! E DR", G(i!)={fE rifE

B(A[uli])(~)&gSfI.

Suppose that C is the denotation of a two place partial DRS designated discourse referent u. Then IConv(C, A, x;lg = the partial DRS denotation G: such that for any m+l-ary predicative DRS denotation D and for all i! E DRn+m G(D, i!) = {f E 1'1 f E U(C(A[uli]))(D{u}) & g Sf}. '

Now iAxAY <{}, {kiss(x, y) }>I = f: DR2 - P('f) such that Vx,y f(x, y) = {g I [g, <{x, y}, {kiss(x, y)} >1 & dom(g) = {x, Y} }. Combining the two we get, IAxkiss a girl (x)1 = the function f: DR - P (1J such that Vx f(x) = {g E 1': g E la girll(1 Awkiss(x, w)I, w)} = {g E rl3h E k{ u}, {girl(u)}>1 & 3h' E IAxAw kiss(x, w)l[u/wll (x) & hUh' = g} = {g E 1'1 g E k{u}, {girl(u), kiss(x, u)}> I} = {g E 1'1 [g, <{u}, {girl(u), kiss(x, u)}>]}. Now we calculate levery boyi(lmiss a girl(x)I). The result is the following, correct set of embedding functions M: M = {f E 1'1 min(f) & (\fg 2 f) (31 E IAzboy(z)l(v)& I U f = g)(3h 2 g) (3j E IAxkiss a girl(x)1 (v) & jUg = h)} = {f E 1'1 min(f) & (\fg 2 f) (31 E k{v}, {boy(v)}>i& I U f = g)- (3h 2 g) (3j E k{u}, {girl(u), kiss(v, u)i}>&j U g = h)} = {f E 1'1 min(f) & (Vg 2 f) ([g, <{v}, {boy(v)}>l- (3h 2 g) ([h, <{u}, {girl(u), kiss(v, u) }>l. This gives us the right set embedding functions as the content of the DRS K for every boy kisses a girl. Each function in M is a proper embedding of K, but these are just the minimal such functions, and in this case there is only one--the null function. Thus, K is true iff (Vg) ([g, <{v}, {boy(v)}>l- (3h 2g) ([h, <{u}, {girl(u), kiss(v, u)}>l, which is what is desired. A final component of DRS conversion is when one adds one DRS to another, using the DRS update function. The idea of piecing together embedding functions for K and K' and requiring that the result be an embedding function ensures that an embedding function for the whole does not inadvertently piece together with a function in IK'lgM a "large" function from IKlgM, which assigns to a discourse

106

CHAPTER TWO

A CRASH COURSE IN DRT

107

referent v ~ UK but v E UK' the wrong sort of value. IDRS-update(K, K')I g = {f E 1'13h E IKlgM &3k E 1K'lgM &f =h Uk}.

One can check to see that the construction procedure gives us the right results: given denotations for the basic predicative DRSs and the partial DRS, the semantics of DRS conversion yields the appropriate set of embedding functions for the resulting DRS. We now can write down and straightforwardly prove a compositionality theorem. Let lail"", I~jl"" be the semantic denotations of a i and ~j as specified above in an extended model 'M = <M, E>. THEOREM: Suppose ~ is an n+ 1 place predicative DRS. Then if a IS a partial DRS, then IConvl""(IexI"", I~I"", Ui) = IConv(a, ~, ui)I"". COROLLARY: Suppose a DRS K has been fonned by converting together n partial DRSs a" ... ,a. and m predicative DRSs~" ... , ~m. Then: IConvl""(la,I"", (. " , IConvl""(Icx.I"", I~,I"", z",),1~21), ".),I~mi"", Z,) = {f E 1'",,: [f, K]M}. The proof of this theorem is a long-winded but straightforward induction on the

complexity of the conversion process. We still have to consider the semantics of anaphora resolution. Anaphora resolution falls outside the scope of the compositional theory of meaning. The discourse context, together with world knowledge, is needed to find the appropriate

antecedents for anaphoric pronouns. Thus, the meaning of a sentence containing a pronoun is not simply a function of the content of the pronoun, which simply introduces a denotation for the pronoun, and of the content of the other constituents. Accordingly, it seems best to treat the unresolved conditions of the fonn z = ? as empty; that is, they do not put any constraints on the proper embeddings for the DRSs containing them. Then, the semantic effect of the process of anaphora resolution is straightforward: it is a function from sets of embedding functions to a subset of those embedding functions. If IKlg is the set of functions properly embedding Kin M relative to some embedding function g and z = ? is a condition of K and z = y is a condition of K' (K. after anaphora resolution), then IKl g = {f E 1'1 f E IKlg & fez) = f(y)}. Every function in IKig is assured of aSSigning a value to y, given the way the process of anaphora resolution was defined (on K).

ISee Kamp all:d Rohrer (forthcomi~), for a detailed treatment of tense in French. Precursors to that

may be found m Kamp (1979, 19816) and Kamp and Rohrer (1983). Kamp 0981a) contains an early

4Heim (1982) was the ftrst of these. See also Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990). SOne reason for this perhaps is that fannal semanticists working in the tradition of linguistics have tried to elaborate a 1tcom~tence model" of knowledge of £!1ean~ng, which tends ~o ignore the li":k between meaning and use. Dummett ~d phtlosopher~ Iollowmg. hun have bee!1 particularly forcefu~ 1P addressing the latter i~sue. D~mmett.s concern~ 3f.1Se from rus attempt to mterpret Wlttgenstems comments on meaning m the PhilosophIcal InvestIgations. 6See also Zeevat (1989). Zeevat gives a reformulation of DRT with som~ different notations. In essence it follows the bottom up C~)fistruction pr<;K=ed!Jfe already developed Slnce Frey (1985) .. Zeevat does not. however, give a sem~tics for the .ieXlcalltems and then denv:e the sf!lndard meanmg of a DRS (a set of embedding funcnons, as we wIll see below) from the meanmgs of its parts. 7To see what a DRS with a disjunctive structure would look like, consider: (1) Mary likes John or M;iry likes Fred. This Yields the following DRS:

(Kl )

x,V Mary(x) John(y) like(x, y)

x', y'

v

Mary(x') Fred(y') like(x', y')

(Kl) confers the truth conditions one would e~peft it has a pro~r embedding just in case eith~r there are obiects conelated with x and y such that all of the conditiOns m the DRS on the left hand Side of v are satiSfied or there are objects correlated with x' and y' such that all of the conditions in the DRS on the right hand side are satisfied. 8For details on X' theory, see for example Radford (1979). The DRS cO!1str.uction pr9Cedure is q1)ite robust. Parsing implementations based on LFG and GPSG currently furnish mputs to unplementanons of the DRS construction procedure. 9nte original idea of a bottom UP: construction W"QCedure for DRSs beginning with LPG f-structure.s as inputs was described in Frey (1985). Reyle (1985), and Klein (1989). For a report of some extensions and an implementation thereof see Wad3. and Asher (1986) and Asher and Wad~ (1989). Many other implementations in the US and in Europe now employ this procedure, e.g., Klem and fohnson (1986) and various systems at IBM Germany, University of Stuttgart, MCC and the University of Texas and the University of Georgia. IGro supply the right arguments in the right argument places we need to appeal to the argument structure of the predicates that is taken from the lexicon. This is especially true in the treatment of scope ambiguities. 111 will think of the semantic content of predicative DRSs extensionally for this simple fragment here and identify them with sets of embedding functions. 12por a discussion of this see Heim (1982). 13There is a well-known difficulty with this division between i!1defmites and other quantificap~nal detenniners. This comes from the way indefi!1ites work witllln t)1e scope of complex conditIons introduced by ev~. The DRT construction predicts that a sentence like Every man who owns a donkey beats it. . . .. implies that ~very man beats every. donkey h~ own~. But many have won:'-e4 abouF thi~ predicnon, and similar predictions that surface wnh detennmers like most. These predictIOns give nse to what ~as been kriown as the "proportion problem." Another difficulty comes in accounting for conditionals like If I have a dime m my pocket, fU put it in the meter. Len Schubert and Jeff Pelletier argue that this sentence does not have the straightforward universal reading. But it is not clear that these examples constitute decisive counterexamples to DRT. In particular we have yet to understand the way lexical constraints and world knowledge as well as various cOmmunicative principles may constrain or eliminate buth conditional readings. 14rhis is an example of a "donkey sentence," a proper treatment of which was a principal motivation

for the development ofDRT. See Kamp (1981), Helffi (1982).

fonnulation of th.e rules for a fragment wi~ the conditional, universal quantifier, and indefinites. The present fonnulanon of the DRS constructlOn procedure reflects the bOttom up translation procedure suggested by Frey (1985) and implemented and extended in Wada and Asher (1986) and Asher and

15r assume that relative clauses like those in (S.b) are quantificational islands, in the sense accepted by syntactitians. Thus, a noun phrase inside a relative clause cannot have scope outside the clause.

2See Wada and Asher (1986) for example. 3sy this tenn I will mean to cover Heim (1982) and the various works of Kamp.

18See May's (1985) QR rule, for instance. 19For details see Wad. and Asher (1986) and Gadbois (1987).

Waaa (1989).

'

IlSpor details see Wada and Asher (1986). 17See Reinhart (1983) for a discussion. 2D-rhe syntactic literature, especially in Chomskian frameworks, is replete with studies of such

CHAP'IERTWO

108

A CRASH COURSE IN DRT

conilgurationaI constraints. An especially classic essay and very good introduction to the subject is Reinhardt (1983). For an indication of how to integrate syntactic constraints in the DRS anaphora

resolution modufe. see Asher and Wada (1989). 21pox (1984. (1987) contains a detailed treatment of the effects of Mann & Thompson's (987) theory of discourse sbUcture on the processing of individual anaphoric pronouns. Dahlgren (1989) contains a swnmary and review of the approaches including an early version of my own. 22These cues include the gt1U11matical po§ition within the sentence of the NP antecedent introducing the discourse referent, the number of times the discourse referent has been identified with other discourse referents anaphorically. and when the discourse referent was introduced into the discourse. See Asher and Wada (1989). Also see the discussion of local discourse structure by Joshi. Grosz. and Weinstein (1986). 23When we expand the syntactic fragment in the next section. it may also have scope over 1'. where IP is the maximal projection of inflection and corresponds to the S category here 24 Some DRT fragments include a disjunction operator. The one in this book does not Disjunction also may take as arguments any pa:ll: of predicative DRSs or partial DRSs1 as in complex determiners like two or three or In noun phrase disjunctions. These nonsentential disjunctions require the use of typeshifting operators. but these cause no more than a mechanical difficulty. See tfie Appendix to cb-apter 10. 25The problem concerning conditions introduced by proper names is familiar from discussions concerrung the scope of descriptions and modal operators in the philosophical literature concerned with Kripke's work on modality and names. For a review see Salmon (1986). 26 Irene Heim (1982) develope,d the familiarity theory of definite within the DR theoretic framework. For further details on how familiarity affects belief contexts, see Asher (1986). 27Barwise and Perry (1978) distinguish between a "value-free" interpretation of a defmite description and a "value-loaded" mterpretation of a definite description. Someth~g like this distinction (tfiough there are important differences) was noted earlier by Donnellan (19bO). The redundancy in (4} is avoided by supposing that the agent processes the definite according to a "referential" strategy that employs at the revel of discourse referents something like the value-loading strategy of interpretation in Barwise and Perry (1983). The princiuaI contribution that the DR-theoretic approach makes to singular terms is to combine in a fruitful way the distinction between nove1/familiar long employed by discourse theorists with more familiar distinctions of scope. The analySis of proper names Within DR-theory offers an illustration of this. 28The idea behind this implementation is due to I. Heim (1982) and her treatment of the familiarity theory of definiteness. 29There are uses of definite descriptions that don't meet either one of the cases I have just sketched. These could be treated as introducing a quantificationaI relation with a Russellian reading. 30A good introduction to some of these issues can be found in Partee (1984). 31 In English there seem to be three largely independent parameters used to encode temporal and ~tual infonnation--tense, as]Je:Ct and modality. See O~ (1989) for an elaboration of ibis claim. Tense is usually encoded morpfiologically on the verb With the past afftx -ed or with the present tense conjugation of verbs. Aspectual information is conveyed by tlie perfective use of the auxiliary have (e.g.• John has eaten) or by the progressive fonn of the vern (Jdhn is crossing the street). "Purely ~~r.?~" modals in English are will. Some English auxiliaries combine these parameters; (or instance. ~: (1989) argues that would is a combinatJ.on of a past tense marker and a modal. 3 Some have argued that "basic" categories like I themselves have a structure. See Pollock (1988) for some intriguing arguments about possible repercussions of a particular structure for the inflection node. 33I will only treat I as introducing one event discourse referent; I will not here go into a detailed examination of the way tense and as~t might work in DRT. For details on tense inrrench see Kamp and Rohrer (1981, forthcoming). Smith (1991) contains a study of aspect 34See for instance the analysis of the present perfect or the pluperfect in Ogihara (1988). which Kamp and Reyle (199+) take over. 35We would have two choices for the translation ofl, Option B or C given graphically below:

0C. .

A.PA. (

~ P(e) )
e

(~) ~

On options B or C, the inflection node would introduce a unctor mat when gIven the appropriate arguments returns the semantic value of the whole sentence. This would be a Tunction from partial DRSs and predicative DRSs and returning a DRS. The trans1ation of I would thus have a different semantic type from either that of a partial DRS or a uredicative DRS. Option B. however, nets us no new semantic flexibility over and aoove option A, the simple translation for I in the text; so given a

109

choice between A and B, we might as well stic.k wi!h the simpler transl~tion in option A.. Option C allows us to have an event discourse referent With WIde scope over the discourse referents mtroduced by the subject NP. but at the cost o~ an additional and useless subDRS that cannot be mterpreted. But see below for some reasons why A IS preferable to C. 36Bras (1990) and Kamp and Reyle (199+) give an overview of the rule~ of ten~ for Frepch and English res~tively. For a discussion of the iiependence of these anaphonc equations on dISCOurse relations, see Eberle (1990. 1991). 37See Lascarides and Asher (1991) for a discussion. . 38For details see Partee (1984), Kamp and Rohrer (forthcoming). For a more recent and computational . . treatment of a large French fragment. see Bras (1990). . 39 A Davidonian treatment of adverbial 'Qhrases as predicates of ~vents fllJ.1S mto some severe ob?tacles, there are adverbs that just don't in any plausible sense tran~late mto predicate~ of events. ConSider for instance the sentence Mary colored It purple. The adverbIal purple IS vefY, difficult to analyze as an event modifier. In the face of such examples•. we !Dust revise our analysIs. Let us call a Cresswell ad'unct any adverbial phrase whose translation IS a VP-operatqr of .the form A.P n(p(e. u]) (see Cresswell 1985). Cresswell and Davidsonian adjuncts are comp~t1ble, m that w~ can countenance a DRS construction procedure th.at use? both f!ansl~tions. W~ might translate adjuncts as C.resswel} ad" uncts by default. Davidsoman adjuncts. 10 which adVerbIal phrases are. treated as ~~3;tes 0 ev~nts appear upon further analysis. This ap'proach wquld aJlows ~s to avol(~ a standar cralnocdlSm gf adverbs as VP operators. The cnticism arises in connec~lO!l WIth the mterpretation of tempo a v~r s and tense Temporal adverbs like yesterday, in two day s tIme as VP ~to~ mu.st take.a scope v~s a vis the scope of the tempor.al operator PAST. This generate~ difficultIe~ !n getting ~e nght interpretation for sentences like John went home yesterdt!y.•.or m two days time, John WIll have fmished the examination (see Dowty (1979»). The poSSibilIty tha~ so~e adverbs are C~essw~U adjuncts avoids this difficulty. Temporal adverbs wquld pe paradigm Instance.s. of Davldsoruan ad uncts and so would not have to take scope positions VIS a VIS other temporal condi~o~s. .. 4~hrases like the leg in the adverbial PP appear tq be ellip~cal fun~tional descnptlOI?~--hldm&. a hidden argument place that is detennined by the lexlc.al m~mg of kick and the preposition. I will . forego here. however. any systematic attempt to deal With this J?OOblem. 41 In reference to the poo,sibilities discussed in footnote 35, optIons A, B or C here makes no difference to DRS construction m this case. . ' 42This is actually way too simple. See for instance Kamp and Rohrer (forthcommg). 'J!le mechanism of temporal reference though can be ignored here since it IS not really gennane to my tOPlC. 43 Again options A. B, C (see footnote 35) for the translation of I seem to make no ~fference here. 44Unless restricted the construction procedure also allows every boy to have w14e scope over the event discourse referent. Under the approach to scope disc,-!ssed .in the prevIo.us c~a~ter, !he contribution of the NP every boy woul4 combine in DRS conversIon With the translation ate entire f. This would result in an unproblematic DRS. . . 450n option C (see footnote 35) for translating I, this reading appears to be Ifl1posslble. So such sentences are an argument in favor of option A. 46 Again this militates against option C for translating 1. . . , 47Van Eyck (1985) gives one treatment of plurals in DRT along generalized quan~er lines. Root (1986) and Roberts (1987) also exploit DRT lor dealing with certain problems of plurality. . 481 will ignore here plural NPs that are. fonn~ from conjuncti9ns of singular NPs. Thes&>m)troduce complicatIOns that are not germane to tillS project For a diSCUSSIOn see Kamp and Reyle (I +. 49For a discussion of these prob~ems see Frey 3;nd Kamp (to appear) and Kamp and Reyle (199+). , . The problem arises very clearly With NP conJunctIon.. 50The one exception to this statement will concern sentences like fewer t?J.an two of Johns 1f;Fdf enjoyed themselves. But at least they had a good time. Some people find tins statement accepta e. f so. it appears that plural discourse referents may refer to atoms. .. . 51 In the DRS below. I don't give a full reconstruction ~f th~ definite NP. JWill assume a thea}:. of definite descriptions in which the uniqueness presupPOsition IS somehow satisfied by the context or . details on this see"Kamp and Reyle (199+). 52collective predicates like dispersed go very badly with NPs with many: *Many students dispersed. See Kamp and Reyle (199+) for a discussion. . ' . 53We need to ~ppeal to .~p'habetic variaI!ts here to aVOid problems With the DRT analogue of vanable clashes. Here IS the deflOltIOn of abstraction: Let Ko be a DRS containing a condition of the fann Z =? .and a conditio!, of the fon:n Kl .Q K 2, where n is a two place operator introduced by a plural or smgular determmer. Then If I; E UK 2 • and it is a presuppqsition or an implicature of ~l n K2 that ~ere '!Ie some I;s such that all tiie conditions in K2 ~ KJ are satisfiea. then if K3 IS an alphabetIc ~anant of K20 L I; K3 denotes a .. . d ced group ~at milY repla~ ? in th~ q:mdi~on Z = ? in anaphqra re~lubqn.. Abstraction IS qll1te a restncted pnnclple; It can only be used m conJuncbon Wlth conditions 101£0 u

110

CHAPTER TWO CRAI'fER THREE

by 4e~rminers: .As ~tated it also rules out ,!b;straction on a condition introduced by a downward ~ntai.ling quantifier lIke no, for suc~ ~ quantifier carries ne!ther the appropriate presup}J9sition or Imrhcature. ~ote also Om! the condition Kl n K2 must be m CooK as weD as the condition Z =?

IriS also predl~ts that certain sums are O?t pos~ible. For a discussion see Kamp and Reyle (199+). It would suffice to adopt a comprehensIOn mom that generalizes the e-path axiom above' 55 \jelE <.E<w,t1> Ve2 E ~W,t2>'" \len E E<w,tn» 3e' E E<w,t n> tel C e' & ... & en'c e' , Asher

(19~6,

ATTITUDES AND ATTITUDE DESCRIPTIONS

1987) defines. an embedding for a DRS directly. But these efforts contain some

errors. Here IS a co~ted ve!"Slon. One must as~ume that DRSs occur always in a particular context. No PRS ever oc:curs ill two different DR-theoretIc contexts, although infinitely many of its alphabetic vanants .occur m all sorts of DR-theoretic contexts. This is actually a byproduct of the DRS construChOn. De~e .(alternativelY):an ~~bedding f ofK in M at <w,t> as follows: (1) k~ a map from mdivldual diScourse referents in UK into D<w,t> if there is no K' such that K:S; (ti) Dom(f).2 UK & f is a function from individual discourse referents in D<w I> if there is a K' such that K:s; K'.

The rest of

the definition proceeds as in the text

UK- > K (UK- ) into •-

•

~6~ne c~ design a pure function application version of conversion, bu.t the conversion routine as e me~ WIll tum out to have advantages. The cost, I conjecture. of replacmg conversion with such an

~~~b~n 'wl:'ould be to make already c
This IS differen~ from the usual cumed de~lhOn of types. because Conversion may take any element of an n-tuple of discourse referents as one of Its arguments.

In the analysis of abstract entities, propositions requires careful consideration. This chapter presents the results of previous research in DRT on attitudes and attitude reports that bears on the analysis of propositions in natural language metaphysics. 1 My analysis of abstract objects in subsequent chapters starts from the view of \ propositions as I have portrayed them in my work on the attitude. This view differs from the usual approaches to propositions in the philosophical literature in several ways. First, it implies that the id~!ltity~9itions of propositions are radically context dependent. Because of this, traditional puzzles about belief like those proposed by Frege ana by Kripke (1979) receive a novel solution. Further, this context sensitivity suggests that the traditional search for one criterion of identity for propositions in terms of 'sets of possible worlds as in Montague (1968) or in terms of alphabetic variants of particular logical forms as in Fodor (1975), or in terms of structured states of affairs as in Barwise and Perry (1983), Soames (1987), and Salmon (1986) is deeply misguided. Second, while the analysis of attitudes and propositions requires postulating that mental states are structured and have contents, we need not postulate propositions as independent, abstract entities themselves. Attitude talk does not commit us to Platonism, contrary to what Bealer (1982) and many others have suggested. Third, DRT integrates and makes precise within a truth conditional framework some of the ideas of conceptual role theories of meaning (Field 1972). DRT thus combines advantages of what are often seen as incompatible approaches. Fourth. the extension of the DRS construction procedure to attitudes introduces concepts and concept discourse referents into the semantics. The discussion of concepts will also figure in my discussion of abstract entities and anaphora. Finally, the work on attitudes introduces machinery to develop a more sophisticated notion of update meaning in the dynamic interpretation of attitude reports than what was presented in chapter two, or in Kamp (1981), Heim (1982), and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1987). It is just this sort of machinery that will be needed in the development of an account of discourse structure. The dynamic theory of attitude interpretation follows a dynamic theory of attitude fOImation.

1. ATTITUDES AND ATTITUDE FORMATION DRT offers a highly contextual theory of attitudes and attitude ascriptions. 2 The context in which attitudes and attitude ascriptions are to be evaluated includes other attitudes of the agent. For a person's attitudes are typically connected in a variety of 111

-.-._._-_.

1If!IT----------------------~--r-··

112

CHAPTER THREE

ATTITUDES AND ATTITUDE DESCRIPTIONS

"

113

%

ways to other mental states, and it is this that accounts fundamentally for the contextual nature of attitudes, attitude ascriptions, and ultimately propositions. DRT's account of attitudes arises out of a certain view of how attitudes are fonned in response to verbal information. Consider (I) and its DRS (KI): (I)

Judge Gisell sentenced Colonel North to jail. (KI) D,V,n,e,x

named(v, 'Gisell') named(u, 'Colonel North') e
Objects, but may also involve relations of evidence and deduction. DDRSs may have external anchors. (Kl) is an example. (KI)

e', VI, UI, Xl named(v I, 'Gisell') KZ: named(u I, 'Colonel North') KI:judge(vI) marine(u I) e'-presides-over(v j, XI) of(ul, XI) trial(x I)

beliefCKI) beliefCKz)

e- sentence(v, u)

tore, x) jail(x) . {, J A simple thesis concerning belief formation is that in accepting (I), the agent forms a belief characterized by the DRS for (I). According to DRT, the same structures that represent the infonnation that a recipient recovers from a discourse also serve to characterize the subject matter of an agent's attitudes, or attitude Objects. A crucial aspect of acceptance is how the new belief is interpreted relative to, and coordinated with, antecedently acquired beliefs about the same subject matter. If our beliefs are false, the characters and objects they are about may not exist. And since false beliefs have the same phenomenological character as true beliefs,3 the individuals and objects constitutive of attitude Objects must be conceptual, not real. 4 A belief about familiar subject matter and familiar conceptual individuals, when incorporated into the agent's antecedent beliefs, shares with them one or more common conceptual individuals as constituents. From the perspective of DRT, this way of thinking about attitudes invites us to identify discourse referents with conceptual individuals. This suggestion implies that DRSs that characterize beliefs about the same conceptual individual must share at least one discourse referent. For example. assume that the agent who accepts (1) has various beliefs about Colonel North and the Iran-Contra investigation (e.g., North shredded documents, North lied to Congress about the arms for hostages deal with Iran), but that not among them is the belief that North is sentenced to jail. Suppose also that the agent knows that Judge Gisell presided over North's trial. Then in interpreting this new infonnation, the new belief must have the same conceptual individual constituents as the old beliefs about North and Gisell. We need some way of talking about collections of attitudes or portions of an agent's total cognitive state. I will do this by means of a delineated DRS (DDRS)--a structure composed of three parts. These are: (i) a set of DRSs or delineated DRSs (each one characterizing some Object of the agent's attitudes), (ii) a set of discourse referents ~ommon to these DRSs (the delineated DRS's universe), and (iii) a set of conditions on those DRSs.s These conditions deterurine the type of attitude of attitude

(KI) represents some of our hypothetical agent's beliefs about North. (KI) depicts graphically the three components of a delineated DRS. The top portion is the universe of the delineated DRS. The two portions of the delineated DRS in (KI), labeled K, and K" comprise the second part consisting of component DRSs. The third part, lowest in the diagram, states that K, and K, are both beliefs. (KI) also has external anchors for Gisell and North. Suppose that an agent with a portion of a delineated DRS such as that in (KI) accepts (I). This should lead first to an incorporation of the DRS for (1) with the material in (KI) to form a new delineated DRS (K1.a). The discourse referents declared in the universe of the DRS for (1) will now be declared in the universe of (Kl.a). In accepting (I), for example, the agent comes to believe that there is an event of the sentencing; the discourse referent for the event will be declared in the universe of (K1.a) and will represent the existential commitment. A complication arises in treating the conditions introduced by definite noun phrases (see section 2.5). The conditions introduced by definites should typically be deleted from a DRS as it is transformed into an attitude Object because they do not contribute to the list of conditions in DRS describing the subject matter of a belief but rather serve to make the right internal connections between the new belief and the background beliefs. An acceptance of (I), then, should lead to a delineated DRS In which the new belief shares discourse referents with the two portions in (KI). (K I a) vt. e', Ut. Xt. e, X2, v, U

named(v" 'Gisell') K . named(u" 'Ollie North') K,: e - sentence(v, u) ,. marine(u,) K , : judge(vI) tore, x,) e'-presides-over(v 1. Xl) jail(x,) of(u" x,) U=Ul trial(X,) v =Vl beliefCK,) {
beliefCK,)

>, J

beliefCK,) {, J

ATlTIUDES AND ATTITUDE DESCRIPTIONS

The DDRS (K1.a) represents the relevant portion of the agent's mental state that is affected by the acceptance of the new information in (I). The disconrse referents representing North and Gisell in the DRS for (1) have been identified with the ones that represent North and Gisell in the agent's delineated DRS in (KI). Note that not all the conditions introduced by the definite NPs are deleted. These conditions correlate a discourse referent with the linguistic item and are needed when we look for the right discourse referent to identify in establishing internal connections for a new belief. But these conditions remain in the delineated DRS directly attached only to the disconrse referent introduced by the agent's first encounter with the defmite NP. Belief formation is thus a function, according to DRT, from delineated DRSs to delineated DRSs. I will call this fUl:!on updatjpg. A precise statement of rules for updating of delineated DRSs is tricky. We disconrse referent identification 10 cannot a1 ways correctly maintain that two discourse referents introduced by occurrences of the same name or definite description, for instance, stand proxy for the same individual; different people may have the same name. Thus, the rule for identifying discourse referents so introduced must be a default rule, with a proviso that such an identification should be made only where the agent has no compelling reason to doubt that the same person is being referred to. The same goes for the assumption that discourse referents introduced by different Dames stand proxy for different individuals. Updating is the key to the story about content on the DR-theoretic contextual theory of belief. The content of a person's belief should be understood in terms of how the belief changes the antecedently given cognitive state of the agent. The updating of the delineated DRS depicting the relevant portion of the agent's cognitive state shows how accepting new infonnation generates a new belief, and how the new belief changes the agent's cognitive state. By using delineated DRSs and the mechanisms of DRT, we can represent and analyze the connections between the new belief, represented by K 3 , and other portions of the cognitive state. These connections are built up in a systematic way. There are two sorts of connections that a delineated DRS like (Kl.a) exhibits. The fIrst sort consists of "external" connections between attitudes in the cognitive state and objects in the agent's environment. These are represented by the external anchor of the delineated DRS, which pairs discourse referents that are constituents of attitude Objects with objects that exist in the domain of the full model. The second sort consists of "internal" connections between attitudes in the cognitive state. These occur when different attitude Objects are about the same conceptual individual" Disconrse referents in delineated DRSs serve to link to beliefs, or even attifudes ofUifferent types, together; such linked attitudes are be about the-same conceptual individual. I call such links for a given attitude Object intf'l'JJ!l anchors. These two types of connections are independent and potentially incompatibleJ The incompatibilities are of interest, for they are central to many puzzles about belief-for instance, Kripke's (1979) famous puzzle concerning Pierre. 8 Kripke's puzzle is about a Frenchman, Pierre, who as a child grows up looking at picture books of

taken

liS

London and forms the belief that London is pretty. Suddenly, he is whisked away to London and ends up in a seedy part of the city where he is confined for the rest of his days. He forms the belief that London is ugly. The process of belief formation in both cases proceeds nonnally. But because Pierre fails to make the connection between the city named 'Londres' of his childhood pictnrebooks and his current place of residence, he ends up associating two different discourse referents with London-one for the city he knew as a French child from pictnre books and one for the London slum that he currently lives in. While both disconrse referents are externally anchored to London, the sets of the property ascriptions Pierre ends up associating with the two discourse referents are incompatible with each other. Each set of associated conditions, however, is by itself perfectly consistent. Thus, although Pierre does have a set of beliefs about London that cannot possibly ever be all jointly true, no amount of introspection will enable him to discover his difficulty. A DRT theory of belief has no trouble describing Pierre's predicament. Neither would a number of representational theories of belief. But DRT diverges from other theories in that what an agent believes must be interpreted relative to background mental states. This leads to a sophisticated analysis and explanation of Kripke's puzzle. Other representational theories merely postulate a difference in belief without explaining how Pierre could have come to such a predicament.9 In answer to Kripke's question, "What does Pierre believe?" DRT answers that what Pierre believes can be made plain only when one looks at the whole of the delineated DRS depicting the relevant portion of his total cognitive state. An agent's beliefs and other attitudes are thus not a set of discrete and independent propositional atoms but rather a complex of interrelated structures built up through a complicated process of belief fonnation and revision. This is an extension of the DRT approach to sentence interpretation as a function from contexts to contexts. The view also has important consequences for attitude ascription interpretation. One could also interpret Kripke's question about Pierre to be "Which attitude reports in English are true of Pierre?" We will see how DRT answers this question in the next section.

2. ATTITUDES, OPERATORS, AND PREDICATES

An interpreter of a belief report must perform a complex task. First, he must process the belief report--say it is of the form K believes that p. Second, he must integrate the result with what he antecedently believes. Third, he must integrate the DRS constructed from the clause p into his representation of what he believes the agent already believes. So in dealing with a recipient's processing of an attitude report, we must countenance at least two delineated DRSs--the delineated DRS depicting the total cognitive state of the recipient, and the delineated DRS the recipient has for the agent. These delineated DRSs are constructed and updated with material from the belief report by means of three stages of processing (stages I, II, III below). I will build up this complex structure step by step. First, let us look at the structure of a basic attitude report. Suppose a speaker S tells a recipient R:

r-----------------~.-~-~

116 (2)

CHAPTER THREE Nicholas believes that the meltdown at Chemobyl has ended.

The syntax of such a belief report involves a verb whose complement is an S'. This S' introduces a subDRS characterizing the Object of a belief of the agent, a component of the agent's total cognitive state, for which I will introduce a discourse referent of a special type. The S' introduces a partial DRS that resembles the partial DRS introduced by a proper name. That is not so surprising; that clauses function similarly to names, because they are names for propositions! A straightforward approach to the translation of a that clause is to build it compositionally from the translations of the complementizer and the embedded clause. That yields a partial DRS with an argument both for the semantic contribution of the embedded clause and for the predicative DRS that results from the translation of the attitude verb--viz.,

Notice that the partial DRS above has two different types of variables--the ordinary predicative DRS variable for the translation of the verb and a different type of variable for the contribution of the embedded clause, which will serve as an argument to the predicative DRS. The embedded clause should in extensional contexts give rise to a DRS, which is a trivial instance of a predicative DRS. On the other hand, it is customary in many theories of attitudes to distinguish between the ordinary contribution of a clause in extensional contexts and its contribution in intensional contexts. I follow this custom here. This leads to a distinction between predicates of DRSs and DRS operators. DRS operators are familiar from the previous chapter. =* is a DRS operator and its semantics are defined relative to the proper embeddings of the DRSs that are its ~guments. Another such operator is --, or the modal operator D. The important difference between DRS operators and predicates of DRSs is with respect to their semanti:s. The semantics for an operator like negation is given in terms of the proper embeddings of the DRS that is its argument. A condition of the form -,K is satisfied relative to an embedding function f and indices w, t just in case there is no extension g of f such that g properly embeds K at <w, 1>. A condition of the form OK is satisfied relative to f, w, t just in case for all possible worlds w' there is an extension g of f such that g properly embeds K at w', t. Predicates of DRSs, on the other hand, take DRSs as arguments referentially. The descriptive conditions introduced by attitude verbs are predicates of DRSs.1 o Their satisfaction conditions will exploit the sttnctural properties of DR-theoretic objects, as well as the functions these objects specIfy under the correctness definition in the model theory. Thus, over and above the usual predicative DRS variables, whose interpretation ranges over predicative DRS denotations, we need variables whose interpretation will range over predicative DRSs themselves. TEe DR-.!!>eor~li£'y~g.!J.!];UheJll1'.elves are ..E3;!heoretic count~!l?..'I!!'UQJ're.gean"nollons..of.rere.ence-and.~~nse. DR'Ss;-ffiUs, can serve as oOfeCts of attitude verbs and hence help to chara~t~rize at least one notion of

ATTITUDES AND ATTITUDE DESCRIPTIONS

117

proposition. The distinction between predicates of DRSs and DRS operators is reflected in the translation of the complementizer above with the introduction of a new variable K of a type that ranges over DR-theoretic structures. The notion of a predicate of DRSs complicates the basic and the extended model theory of chapter two. First, DR-theoretic structures themselves must now be counted as elements of the models. There is also a question about the logical type of these structures; are they first order or second order objects? I will take variables ranging over DRSs as entities to be a kind of individual, and so the definition of partial DRSs and predicative DRSs of the previous chapter will remain intact But the decisions here are delicate; one could have done things differently. Further, as Thomason (l980b) observed, the decision to have attitude predicates take sttnctured objects like DRSs leads to paradoxes similar to the Liar when attitudes are taken to be closed under nontrivial modal principles. Similar assumptions will become unavoidable after expanding the DRT fragment in the next few chapters. I will discuss these issues in chapter 10. Finally, the semantic contributions of DR-theoretic structures in general must not only be phrased in terms of constraints on embedding functions but must also refer to some aspect of the structure of K itself. A noteworthy feature of the partial DRS introduced by the complementizer is that no discourse referents for the propositional argument are introduced. It will tum out that proposition type discourse referents may occupy the same argument position in the translation of an attitude verb as the subDRS contributed by an embedded clause. But there is no need to introduce discourse referents when translating the that clause. A subDRS as an argument to a predicate of DRSs is rather like a constant or a complex term if it involves discourse referents that are not declared in its universe; the model theoretic interpretation of predicates of DRSs implies that a subDRS as .an ~ument denotes a designated object jn the model. Since a subDRS is not a diS ..c..0.. u..rse ref.erent, .it.c..QU.stants-for--abstract is not assigned a value under.an. y denote e.m.b.ed.di.n.g.fu.n . c•. tl.·.O . n. 1;lJJU,J~ r ((n') <: c~~s~~~~t~gJh.~TI-:LaS. .objects, they.. the same object in the ~J(' ~ mo~el_.r.e.garill"s.,-pL.theDRSjnwhichthe)'.were."eclared and what embeddin function was being considered We don't need to introduc~'discourse;-referents for thatclaUStfrtofsemlffiucreasoiis~ Further, such discourse referents are not needed to account for scope ambiguities or quantificational dependencies; subDRSs do not have any. Finally, subDRSs are already recognizable constituents of DRSs, should we wish to identify discourse referents with them anaphorically. Thus, discourse referents introduced by that clauses appear otiose. Because I will allow quantification over the DRS arguments of attitudinal relations, we must also countenance discourse referents which will range over DRSs. I will call these discourse referents proposition discourse referents. The letters 'p', 'q', 'r', etc., stand for proposition discourse referents. These discourse referents are of a different type from either event or individual discourse referents. Where p is a proposition discourse referent, K a DRS, and a an attitude verb, then, a(x, p), a(x, K), are conditions. With these preliminaries out of the way, we can write down a first attempt at the processing of (2). By combining the DRS from the embedded S together with the '- -

ATTIWDES AND ATTIWDE DESCRIPTIONS

CHAPTER THREE

118

partial DRS for the complementizer and proceeding as in chapter 2, (K2.a) results.

(K2.a)

x,s named(x,'Nicholas') s-believe(x, e3. v, e4 meltdown(e3) named(v, 'Chernobyl')

e3 atv e4-end(e3) e4<now {<x, NIcholas>, }

119

cognitive state, however. To this end, I will adopt a representation of internal anchors sitnilar to the quasi-external anchors of Asher (1987). These function like external anchors with respect to the interpretation of the discourse referents declared in the nested delineated DRS, but their values are determined by the assignments to the discourse referents in the superordinate delineated DRS. Internal anchors are part of the cognitive state of the recipient and are represented in the diagram below by pairs of the fonn «(t" I3».13 Now since we must represent between both the agent's and the recipient's cognitive states and we must distinguish between beliefs of the agent and beliefs of the interpreter; we will label beliefs within DDRSs with conditions of the form believe(x, K), which tell us who the believer is. The interpreter refers to himself with the discourse referent i. (K2 b)

The first stage of processing of (2) yields the DRS above. The condition, believe(x, K), where K is a DRS, should say something like this: K describes a portion of the tolal cognitive state of x and this portion is a belief. But then this first stage of processing (stage I) is not by itself an adequate representation of what Nicholas believes. It fails to capture any of the connections that this belief has with other components of the agent's cognitive state which S was trying to convey,I1

S1> S2, s'o. s'" S'2' s, ell Vl> x" Ul> X,K

e2. V2, U2

K:=

3. INTERPRETING ATTIWDE ASCRIPTIONS Let us now fill in the interpretation of (2). Suppose that the agent Nicholas has certain background beliefs about Chernobyl--namely, that it is in Ukraine and it was a

dangerous accident--which the recipient R knows about and represents in his depiction of the agent's cognitive state. Let's suppose the speaker S believes that R has this information and is trying to convey Nicholas's belief that the meltdown has ended. Note that on this background story, R and the agent Nicholas are both familiar with the denotations of the dermite noun phrases that occur in the complement of belief report in (2). Moreover, the conceptual object that stands proxy for Chernobyl for R is an object that R believes Nicholas is familiar with. At least R has every reason to suppose that this is so, and so R's delineated DRS for Nicholas's cognitive state should make this evident. A commonality of reference between R and Nicholas should be indicated. 12 Establishing and indicating a commonality of reference is the main task of the second stage of interpretation of an attitude report; here the recipient integrates the new information with what he already believes about the subject matter. In the second stage of processing of (2), R integrates the new information with what he knows about Chernobyl and the surrounding events. Key to Stage II is the processing of definite NPs. The processing of the dermite NPs in the report forces R first to coordinate the interpretation of the discourse referents they introduce with the appropriate discourse referents standing proxy for the same entities in his total cognitive state. What does this coordination mean over and above a constraint on the embedding functions? Presumably we don't want to impute a necessary awareness of such internal anchors to the agent. We want these links to be part of the recipient's

v, inu, Ukraine(u,) named(vJ, 'Chemobyl) (other conditions about Chemobyl)

named(x" 'Nicholas') fother conditions about Nicholas) cognitive state (x I.K )

K,

K2

V2 in U2 e2 atv2 meltdown(e2) Ukraine(u2), named(v2, Chemobyl) accident(e2) dangerous(e2) K,

K\' s,-believe(x" K,')

I

I s-believe (x , K:

s2-believe(x" K 2')

{«elt e2»' «VI, V2»} s'o-believe(i, K 1)

e, atv, meltdown(e, ) accident(e,) dangerous(e ,)

s' ,-believe(i, K 2)

K\

e3. v, e' ) meltdown(e3) named(v, 'Chemobyl') e3 at v e' end(e,) e'<now

{«e3,e,», «v, v,»} s'2-believe(i, K 3 )

s' 2 -believe(i, K')

{<Xlo NIcholas>, , , } For reasons of space, I have been forced to put the labels for the various components of the main delineated DRS wherever I could. One can delete some of the information appropriate to constructing internal anchors at Stage II once it has served its purpose--viz. the condition named (x, 'Nicholas'). I cannot yet delete all such information, however. For although the connections between the new infonnation and R's background beliefs have been made, the belief being reported must, to receive a proper evaluation, be integrated with the agent's background beliefs of which the recipient is aware. This happens at stage III of the processing. Stage III, depicted in (K2.c) below, integrates the information contained within the

120

CHAPTER lliREE

A ITITUDES AND AITITUDE DESCRIPTIONS

complement of the belief report with the recipient's representation of the agent's total

total cognitive state. The belief report (2) is true in the context in which it is utterred if and only if the interpreter in the context is able to construct by means of the rules a faithful representation of the agent's cognitive state. The truth conditions of a belief report thus depend upon the interpreter's beliefs about the agent's total cognitive state. The truth conditions for a belief report must be stated relative to a contextually specified delineated DRS K representing the recipient's information. This is DRT's distinctive, context-sensitive approach to attitude reports. Stating the truth conditions for belief reports with some precision requires the following notions. Let us suppose for the minute that content is defined, as is traditional, via the set of indices or world-time pairs; thus, the content of a DRS K is the set of world-time pairs at which K has a proper embedding. A DRS K is at least as detenninate as a DRS K' just in case the content of K is a subset of the content of K'. I will say that a beliefreport of the form a believes that q> is true at w relative to a given context that includes K just in case the processing of the report yields an augmented delineated DRS K' which we may write as K+ K and the component of K + Kip that is derived from the complement of the report (Kip) approximates the content and structure of some component K* of a's total cognitive state K at w.

cognitive state. When definite NPs occur in then- belief contexts, a presupposition of familiarity extends to the agent in the following sense. In using a defInite NP within a belief context, the speaker is implying that the agent has some familiarity with what R and S take to be the NP's denotation. Names and definites of all kinds presuppose a definite element built into the belief context. Of course the agent may be taken to be.

wrong about the familiarity conditions for the object of the conversation. So the recipient of a report containing a definite NP

a should, according to the principle of

definite reference identification, identify the discourse referent introduced by ex with some discourse referent already declared in the universe of the delineated DRS representing what the recipient already knows about the agent's beliefs. These already declared discourse referents serve to connect the new belief to antecedent beliefs.I4 The same goes for discourse referents introduced by noun phrases with wide scope over the belief context but which playa role in the conditions of the subDRS describing the belief. SJ, SZ. S3. s'o, s'"

s'z.

elo

VI>

Xl, Ul> X,K

narned(x" 'Nicholas') other conditions aoout Nicholas) cognitive state (Xl> K)

f

ez,

K:=

v, inUI Ukraine(u\) named(v" Chemobyl') (other conditions about Chemobyl)

vz, uz, e', e3

ez at Vz Vz in Uz meltdown(e,) Ukraine(u,l named(v" Chemobyl') aCcident(ee dangerous ez)

Ki

e3 =e, e' end(e,) e'<now e3 atv 2 v 2 = v,

K,

K, K' srbelieve(xl, K,') sz-believe(xl> K z') s3-be1ieve(x" K') {«v" vz». «el, ez». <
K\

el atvl meltdown(e\) aCCident(e~

dangerous el)

K,

s'l-believe(i, K z)

s'z-believe(i, K3) (<Xi> NIcholas>, Chernobyl>, ,
(i) (ti)

121

the content of K* is at least as deterntinate as that of K,p, there is a function f from K+ Kip into the universe of K such that for any discourse referent x (of any type) in Kip' (a) the content of the DRS containing just those conditions of K* involving f(x) as an argument is at least as detenninate as the content of the DRS containing just those conditions of Kip involving x as an argument; (b) if x occurs as an argument of some other portion K'I' of K + Kip' f(x) occurs as an argument to conditions in some other portion K** of K such that the content of K** is at least as detenninate as that of K",.

To go back to our example (2), let us suppose that the relevant portion of the agent's cognitive state is as depicted in the delineated DRS K included within the component K\ of (K2.c), and suppose that we are interpreting (2). Then the role of K* in the definition of the satisfaction conditions is played by the rightmost component of K. On this assumption for the internally anchored discourse referent e3, K z ' would play the role of K** and for V2 K\' would play the role ofK**. The adequacy of the last part of the satisfaction definition for belief reports depends upon what portions exist or may be assumed to exist in delineated DRSs. One way of carving out portions is by looking at the discourse referent involved. Distinguishable conceptual individuals are those whose sets of property ascriptions are distinct. I will assume that for two discourse referents representing distinguishable conceptual individuals in a given delineated DRS K, there will be some portion of K in which one discourse referent occurs without the other, IS In view of parts (ii.a-b) of the satisfaction definition for belief reports, any two distinguishable conceptual individuals x, y occurring within a constructed belief state

122

CHAPTER TIlREE

ATIITUDES AND ATTITUDE DESCRIPTIONS

K must be mapped onto distinct discourse referents in the agent's real DDRS, unless K contains the equation x = y. This still leaves open the question of what happens to the mapping n between the constmcted cognitive state representation K and the real cognitive state K in cases where the two conceptual individuals, though distinct, are qualitatively indistinguishable. Suppose that this holds for some agent f(u) in a world w in a model 'M. We can show that n still will be I-Ion those equivalence classes. [x] of discourse referents in K, where [x] = {y E UK: 'M FK, w, f Kbelieve(u, x =

defended,l7 For in this example, the putative belief that you do not have enough money to pay for your meal plays no role whatever in your behavior at the restaurant You only become aware of your unfortunate situation when you get the check! Such problems arise because of the traditional notion of content underlying the satisfaction definition above, which identifies content with a set of possible worlds. This notion of content is unsatisfactory. A satisfactory notion of content for cognitive states and their descriptions takes these contents to have a logical structure. This logical stmcture should reflect the intuitive, logical stmcture of our beliefs. Sets of possible worlds do not reflect the logical stmcture of our beliefs and as such they fail to give us the appropriate notion of content On the other hand, contents are not simply bits of syntax--sentences in the langnage of thought either. As the possible worlds notion of content suggests, contents are possibly partial views of the way the world might be. We must combine both this notion of logical structure and the extralinguistic view of content. One notion of structured content and one solution to the problem of logical equivalence extends the structure of cognitive states already discussed to the conceptual level. This is the approach I have pursued here and elsewhere.1 8 I introduce discourse referents for concepts. I then exploit their internal and external connections as I did those of individual discourse referents in the satisfaction definition for attitude conditions. To motivate the introduction of concept discourse referents, consider a conceptual analogne to Pierre's predicament. Imagine that Peter, a New York City kid, has read several books about the English countryside prior to going there for a bicycle tour. In descriptions of the moors, he has read i about a certain kind of bush, gorse, with pretty yellow flowers. He forms a belief that gorse is pretty. Now suppose that Peter does not get to England until October (when I suppose that gorse is not in bloom). While bicycling along a slippery road, he falls into a thorny, undistinguished looking bush and gets scratched rather badly. He forms the belief that the sort of bush he has just fallen into has about as much merit as poison ivy. Explaining his misfortune to a doctor, he describes the green spiky bush and asks what it is. The doctor replies by saying, Db that's furze that you fell into. Furze and gorse are identical types of bushes, but nothing in Peter's cognitive state would lead him to suspect this. The parallels between Peter and Pierre suggest an analysis of Peter's doxastic situation along the lines of that of Pierre's. Peter does not identify the two concepts of furze and gorse, just as Pierre fails to identify the place he lives in with the city he read about as a child. In fact Peter believes,

y)J.'6

A special case of the internal connections between attitude Objects arises with

quantifications into attitude contexts. Quantifying in occurs when a quantifier outside the scope of a belief context binds a valiable within the belief context. The fact that an attitude predicate takes a DRS itself as an argnment leads naturally to questions about quantifying into an attitude context. In DRT, quantifying in is reflected in a DRS Kin which an attitude ascription taking a DRS K' as an argument occurs and a discourse referent x is declared in UK that also occurs within a condition of K'. The contribution to the interpretation of K' of the noun phrase that introduces x is purely structural; it contributes a discourse referent and some familiarity presuppositions to the content of the belief Object being described. These familiarity conditions will force x to have an internal connection to some antecedently given y in the representation of the agent's cognitive state.

4. CONCEPTS AND ATTITUDES Despite the machinery so far, the theory of attitudes and attitude reports is still seriously incomplete. For while the theory has a representational flavor, it fails to block the dubious inferences based on substitution of logical equivalents within belief contexts. This substitution of logical equivalents within attitude contexts is known as the puzzle of logical equivalence. But it is precisely this ability to block such inferences that makes representational theories of belief attractive in the first place! To see just how dubious such inferences are, suppose that you are at a restaurant in Austin, Texas, and about to order some Mexican food. Suppose also that you believe that you have $5.00 in your pocket and so you order the fajitas and an iced tea. You order because you have the belief that you have enough money to pay for the meal. You also believe, having just looked at the menu, that the fajitas cost $4.00, an iced tea $.60, and that there's a 10% sales tax on the total. But your joint belief in all these things together with your belief that the total price of your meal is the sum of the prices of the individual items ordered plus 10% of the total is logically equivalent to the belief that you do not have enough money to pay for the meal. It seems to me disastrous for a theory of belief to predict that if you have the one joint belief, you have the other. This prediction is obviously bad if the model of belief is one which counts as beliefs those attitude Objects of which the agent is consciously aware. But the prediction, at least in this particular case, is equally bad, I believe, if beliefs are constmed functionally as dispositions to behavior, a view that Stalnaker has forcefully

(3)

123

gorse is not furze.

But this failure to identify the two concepts is not the fault of Peter's logical powers; he lacks certain empirical and linguistic information. Let's now take a closer look at properties and concept discourse referents. I will identify a property with an intension, a function from worlds to sets of individuals. Natural kind terms, common nouns, and perhaps also verbs and at least some adjectives function similarly to proper names; they introduce concept discourse

CHAPTER THREE

ATTITUDES AND ATTITUDE DESCRIPTIONS

referents when processed and they generate similar familiarity presuppositions, 19 The discourse referents they introduce are concept discourse referents, discourse referents that stand proxy for properties. Like individual discourse referents, concept discourse referents may be constituents in more than one attitude Object. Concept discourse referents also typically enter into relations with linguistic items; where a is a general term and c the concept it evokes in an agent, 'named (c, a)' might be one sort of condition (presumably there would be others) applying to the concept discourse referent in the agent's total cognitive state. Finally, some concept discourse referents, viz., those introduced by natural kind terms, may have their content detennined by relations external to the agent's cognitive states; that is, concept discourse referents may be elements of an external anchor.2o On the other hand, concept discourse referents apply to individual discourse referents. just as predicates are applied in ordinary DRT to individual discourse referents, With concept discourse referents, it is easy to describe Peter's predicament. For Peter as for Pierre, internal and external connections are in conflict, as is witnessed by the delineated DRS (K3), Notice that the logical functors and relations like named are not replaced by concept discourse referents; the innate conceptual apparatus of the cognitive agent includes the logical operators and the relation that ties linguistic expressions to concepts.

processing of the report yields an augmented delineated DRS K', Call the component of K' that is derived from q> K
124

K3

Clo Cz. C3, X,

nm(ch 'gorse') CI(X) c,(x) KI believe (K 1)

Y

nm(c" 'furze,) c,(y) ~ c,(y) K, belief (K 2 )

K,

nm(c" 'pretty')

K'

Cl '¢:. Cz

belief (K3)

belief (i, K')

{, }21 Given the information available to him, Peter rightly distinguishes between CI and c, or the concepts of gorse and furze; one concept applies to an object that is pretty, while the other applies to an object that is not pretty, To get an adequate account of Peter's predicament, the theory of belief reports must be sensitive to the internal connections and, more generally. the internal role of the concepts constitutive of the agent's belief Object. Crucial to understanding Peter's predicament in (K3) are the arguments x and y of the concept discourse referents, as well as the indirect connections x and y provide to other concept discourse referents of which they are arguments. The internal role of a concept discourse referent includes a specification of which conceptual objects fall under the concept--i.e., which discourse referents the concept discourse referent is applied to. To capture these requirements, I extend the definition of the function I defined on individual discourse referents that I used earlier to determine the truth conditions of belief reports to concept discourse referents, Suppose that the report a believes that

i

I'

(I)

(ll)

125

(as before) the content ofKI is at least as determinate as that ofK,p, there is a function f from the universe of K' into the universe of K.22 such that for any discourse referent x (of any type) in K,p, (a) the content of the DRS containing justthose conditions of Kl involving f(x) as an argument is at least as detenninate as the content of the DRS containing just those conditions of K

.. " u, as arguments in K~ then I(x) has JUl> .. " JU, as arguments in K 1 and (iii) lis a restricted isomorphic embedding (see appendix chapter 10) ofK~ in Kl> defined recursively on the logical structure ofK~,

The final characterization of an attitude Object is thus the structural description of a DRS as a set of discourse referents and a set of conditions paired together with its traditional content. At least some of the conditions are structured and built up out of concept discourse referents, conditions on those discourse referents, and logical operators (or other predicates that are taken to be part of the logical structure of the DRS),23 The structure of the DRS is essential in characterizing beliefs; for it is the connections that discourse referents of the DRS have to the environment and to other DRSs characterizing portions of the agent's cognitive state that determine the belief Object's content. 24 The definition above takes account of this structure with the notion of a restricted isomorphic embedding defined in the Appendix to chapter 10, This more complex truth definition takes into account the structure of conditions needed to address Peter's predicament as well as the puzzle of logical equivalence, Suppose now that Peter believes the inanity that the kind furze is self-identical or that furze is furze but that otherwise his mental state is as depicted in (K3), Why does Peter not believe that gorse is furze on my view? To make the report true, we would have to use the inane belief that furze is furze as our designated portion of his total cognitive state, We would then have to suppose a function Ii from the DDRS constructed from the report to the one characterizing the agent's cognitive state in the model such that the concept discourse referents c 1 and c 2 generated by the concept words furze and gorse in the report were mapped onto a single concept discourse referent, the one associated with the predicate furze in the real representation (call this c'), But if li(cI) = Ii(c,) = c', then given what we know about his encounters with

CHAPlER THREE

ATITIUDES AND ATTITUDE DESCRIPTIONS

gorse and furze, Ii cannot satisfy clauses ILb and ILc.ii; he does not associate the same properties with Cl and C2 and he does not attribute them to the same objects in the belief report. Substitution of logical equivalents will fail in general because of

clause II.c.in.

Truth predicates and attitudinal predicates also have similar logical complexities, to be discussed in chapter 10. So it seems that they should both be analyzed as predicates. Following Kratzer's (1981) analysis, one might view modals in DRT as somewhat intermediate between DDRS independent predicates like truth and the attitudinal

This truth definition provides the general framework for the analysis of all attitude verbs in DRT. The differences between verbs consist in how the structure and content of the target attitude Object relates to the structure and content of the DRS representing the attitude Object that is constructed from the report. Clause lI.c.iii, for

force and cause--might be DDRS independent but intensional. It would be a relatively easy exercise to adapt modal analyses of causatives within the DRT framework, but in these areas DRT seems to offer few new insights.

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127

predicates. Still other clausally complemented verbs --in particular causatives like

instance, may be quite complicated when attitudes other than belief are countenanced.

What is distinctive about DRT's view of attitudes and attitude reports and how this

Briefly, attitudes are grouped into a number of types. Certain attitudes, which I'll call projective attitudes, introduce operators on the DRSs that describe a portion of the mental state. These operators affect both the content of the attitude Object described and the homomorphic embedding conditions for the function f in clause lLc.iii.

affects the general analysis of propositions is that the semantics of attitude reports, and the attitudes themselves, are dependent upon the way the attitude being reported

Examples of projective attitudes are wanting or desiring, questioning, and free-choice permission; all of these "project" some reaction or intention on the part of the agent. The principal difference in the rules of DRS construction for projective attitude

reports occurs at stage I of interpretation. A report like

interacts with other elements of the interpreter's representation of the agent's cognitive s,tate. Thus, attitude reports must always be evaluated relative to a delineated DRS. In

situations where the interpreter has a hopelessly inaccurate representation of the agent's total cognitive state, many reports that might otherwise be adequate will turn out to give the wrong picture. So, belief reports may lead to the right picture in some circumstances (for some audiences) but not in others. In some cases, the delineated DRS supplied is radically defective to the extent that no report about a certain mental

(4)

John wonders whether Mary got the contract

state of the agent's would lead the recipient to construct a correct approximation of the "targeted" mental state. In such cases there is nothing the speaker can do except to try

would yield the following DRS for a stage I analysis:

to rebuild the relevant portions of the recipient'S delineated DRS so as to ensure a correct interpretation. 26 Thus, it is difficult (though perhaps not impossible) to

classify belief reports as true or false simpliciter, belief reports are true or false relative to a context that specifies what the recipient knows about the agent's cognitive state. The DR-theoretic approach is quite different from several competitors. There are

x, p, e named(x, 'John')

e-wonders(x, Q

e, v, w named(v, 'Mary') the contract(w) e-get(v,w)

e<now

{<x, John>, }

two sorts. One is Cresswell's (1985) structured meanings view, also proposed by Lewis (1972), on which a proposition (and an attitude Object) is to be modeled as or

identified with a sequence of intensions--one corresponding roughly to the meaning of each constituent of the sentence. Cresswell thus shares the DRT view that the

characterization of an attitude Object must both take account of its structure as well as its content traditionally construed. Cresswell's approach distinguishes between logically equivalent propositions like those expressed by the sentences in (6):

The operator Q is introduced by the WH element. A full interpretation of (15) requires as before the two additional levels of processing. I omit the details. 25 At the other end of the spectrum of complexity lie non-attitudinal propositional predicates like the modals and true. While the proper interpretation of attitude

predicates depends on a representation of the agent's total cognitive state, clearly a predicate like true does not depend on any such representations; ideally it depends only on what happens at the world of evaluation. Truth is DDRS independent and extensional. Nevertheless, treating true as a predicate of DRSs makes it easy to analyze sentences like (5)

Everything Jom believes is true.

(6.a) (6.b)

The distance between the two lakes is 12 miles. The distance between the two lakes is 7 + 5 miles.

This is so because the structured intension for 12 miles differs from that for 7+5 miles. There are alternatives to Cresswell's that also differ from DRT--theories of first order propositions like Bealer (1982) or Chierchia and Turner (1988), or higher order theories of propositions like that in Thomason (1980a). All of these views offer solutions to the problem of the substitutability of logical equivalents within attitude contexts by taking propositions to be highly structured objects.

Missing in all of these competitor treatments is the context sensitive interpretation

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ATfITUDES AND ATfITUDE DESCRWTIONS

of attitudes. In order to accommodate the Pierre and Peter puzzles. it seems that all of these theories must treat primitive concept terms and names as definite descriptions. This means that they must reject well-entrenched theories of direct reference. Further. which definite descriptions these names and concept terms are abbreviations of must

delineated DRSs, given that we start from a context in which nothing is assumed about either Joni's or Chachi's mental states, or a context in which we make the same assumptions for both.28 This looks suspiciously like substitutional quantification to many, and indeed it is very closely related. DR-theoretic structures are, as characterizations of attitudes, predicates of mental states. They are not linguistic objects. But since DRSs are isomorphic to DRS inscriptions, it would appear that quantification over DRSs is simply quantification over DRS inscriptions. But then haven't we just elaborated a variant of the sentential view of belief--the view that sentences of some language of thought are the objects of the attitudes? If so, doesn't an argument like that developed by Church impugn this view? I believe not. In fact I will use this argument to highlight how the DR-theoretic treatment of belief and of propositions as objects of belief differs from the usual sentential approach. Church devised a particular argument to criticize Carnap's semantics for belief sentences on which sentences were the objects of belief. A certain refinement of Church's argument can be used as a general attack on representational theories of mind and semantics like the one proposed in this chapter. Church plausibly assumes that when a monolingual Gennan speaker sincerely and knowingly asserts to himself Schnee ist weiss, a monolingual French speaker sincerely and knowingly asserts to himself La neige est blanche.and a monolingual English speaker sincerely and knowingly asserts Snow is white, this is good evidence that they all have the same belief. Suppose sentences are taken as objects of beliefs. A Carnapian might assume that each of the sentences above forms the object of a belief of the agent who asserted it. As Church remarked, this entails that these individuals do not have the same belief, which is counterintuitive. What all the sentences have in common, Church would have said, is that they express the same proposition. If beliefs are relations between agents and Churchean propositions, then this predicts that the three monolingual speakers above all have the same belief. Church's argument is a powerful argument against sentential theories of attitudes and offers at least a potential difficulty for the DR-theoretic view of the attitudes. DRSs are closely linked to sentences of natural languages, and indeed the DRS inscriptions that issue from the English to DRS translation program do not share all the same elements of the DRS inscriptions that issue from the Gennan to DRS translation or French to DRS translation. But to see whether the difficulty is real, we have to examine more closely the meanings of predicates of DRSs. I have analyzed predicates of DRSs into conditions similar to those introduced by proper names; a word like 'snow' introduces a concept discourse referent c and the condition named(c, 'snow'). DRS concepts are thus connected in a special way to their linguistic expressions. But the predicate constant 'named' denotes a basic primitive concept of humans; it is not a piece of language. It relates a linguistic tenn and a non-linguistic concept or conceptual individual. Both proper names and concept words contribute a truth conditional content to a discourse by supplying external anchors for the individual or concept discourse referents they introduce. External anchors for concepts are intensions, and these

depend on other facts about the agent's cognitive state, which these other theories

cannot account for since they don't have the right sort of context sensitivity. For some agents the belief that furze is a pretty bush is the belief that gorse is a pretty bush. The DRT account of attitude contexts is precisely designed to accommodate a theory of direct reference while also making sense of the context sensitive interpretation of attitudes. For the DR-theoretic account. the meaning of an expression should be the contribution that the expression makes under an interpretation to the semantic content and structure of the whole. In a dynamic setting the structure of a condition with an altemation is important for the way the rest of the text is to be processed. It may make a difference to the processing of an anaphoric pronoun. If that is the case then it seems reasonable to think of or as contributing not just the truth conditional content of a famlllar operator, but a particular structure as well. That structure plays an important role in the cognitive life of the agent--especially in his reasoning; the content of that structure also plays an important role: it detennines whether that reasoning is correct. Both are needed for an account of agents.

5. ATTITUDES, PROPOSITIONS, AND REPRESENTATIONS DRT's analysis of attitudes has important implications for a general theory of propositions although DRT itself does not actually say what a proposition is. But DRT does imply that if propositions were to be identified with Objects of attitudes, capturing unifonnities of structure as well as content, then they would have to be thought of as having a complex structure, articulated within DRT in terms of concept discourse referents, individual discourse referents and logical predicates. But in fact my account of attitudes and attitude reports does not commit us to the existence of propositions as distinct objects at all. Rather it conunits us to the idea that mental states have both a content and a complex structure described in tenns of DDRSs. Consider, for instance, the propositional quantification in (7): (7)

Joni believes everything that Chachi believes.

Suppose that K, is the delineated DRS for Chachi and K2 the delineated DRS for Joni. (7) implies that there is a 1-1 function f from UK, into UK, such that for every constituent K < K, there is an alphabetic variant constituent t(K) < K 2 • This would guarantee that Joni believes every proposition that Chachi believes. We can get this interpretation of the quantification in (7), simply by quantifying over the proposition discourse referents in the first stage of interpretation of (7) and by assuming that such discourse referents map onto DRSs in the model under embedding functions. 27 The rules of DRS construction and delineated DRS updating will then build the same

ATITfUDES AND ATITIUDE DESCRIPTIONS intensions are part of the sphere of socially detennined meanings, in which individual speakers participate by using the language. How to spell out this socially detennined meaning is an open question. I shall assume that an answer compatible with a conceptualist outlook on abstract entities is possible. As we saw in connection with belief reports, however, the internal connections among discourse referents also are important in describing a person's cognitive state. These internal connections. or internal anchors, must be taken into account in detennining what an agent believes. 29 They help detennine the structure of the mental state whose content and structure we are trying to capture by making attitude attributions. Sometimes the fit between the agent's state and what the recipient constructs is not altogether exact, but adequate attitude interpretation aims for as close a fit as possible. The upshot of this discussion is that while DRSs aren't linguistic objects, they do have linguistic elements in them according to the DRS construction procedure as outlined. The question that Church's argument raises is, How can we say that two monolingual speakers of different languages have the same beliefs? The external and internal anchors that help to analyze puzzles ahout belief yield an appropriate response to Church's argument. Let us fIrst look at the case of a monolingual speaker of a foreign language, Pierre, whose beliefs are reported by a monolingual English speaker, Peter. In this simple case, matters become already quite complicated. Let us suppose that Pierre sincerely and reflectively asserts (8)

La neige est blanche,

and that Peter reports to a recipient Sam, who is a French and English speaker and who is aware that Pierre is a nonnal, competent, monolingual French speaker. (9)

Pierre believes that snow is white.

(9) should come out true on our theory. Sam will interpret Peter's report against what he knows of Pierre's background cognitive state. Knowing that Pierre is a competent, monolingual French speaker, Sam might use the appropriate translation of snow in French, neige, as a constituent of a condition, named(ct', 'neige), in a portion of the delineated DRS K that for Sam represents Pierre's cognitive state. The condition, named(cI', 'neige'), says that Pierre has a concept CI", which is named by the tenn neige. Similarly, for Pierre's concept of whiteness. In interpreting the attitude report, Sam must find for Cl ", the discourse referent introduced by the occurrence of snow in (9), an appropriate internal anchor. Assuming that Pierre is a competent speaker, Sam will link C1" with C1' in K. When updating K with the subDRS derived from the complement clause of (9), Sam will delete conditions like named(ci ", 'snow') and named (C2 ", 'white') and insert the appropriate internal anchors, as the principles of attitude report interpretation require. But in following the procedures for attitude interpretation, Sam has already anchored Cl ", the concept discourse referent introduced by snow in (9), to the concept discourse referent C1 that for him represents snow--similarly again for the concept of whiteness. Presumably

131

too, Sam will internally anchor Pierre's concepts of snow and whiteness to his own concepts of snow and whiteness. In so doing, Sam will come up with a faithful representation of Pierre's cognitive state, which the pri~ciples of attitude re~ort interpretation of this chapter will assign, given the assumptIOns, a proper embedding. Thus, (9) comes out true as desired: c10 C2, x named(c [, 'snow') named(c" 'white') Pierre(x) x's cognitive state!l()

CJ',C2',Ct",C2" named(ct', 'neige') named(c" 'blanche')

K

u K9:

C1 "(u)

Cl"=Ct'

...

c,"(u) C2" =C2' I

believe(x, K) believe(x, K9) «Ch CI"», «C2, C2"» «Cit cl '», «C2, C2 '» In interpreting (9), Sam has done something that my earlier account of delineated DRS construction did not mention. Sam uses a translation manual to detennine the appropriate internal anchors. Good translation manuals correlate words whose predicates of DRSs have the closest intension or the closest functional role across the speakers of a given language community,30 The translation manual helps Sam correlate Ct with c 1 ' --his concept of snow with Pierre's concept. In determining appropriate internal anchors for concept discourse referents, the interpreter chooses the concept discourse referent already declared in the delineated DRS that plays the closest functional role to the concept discourse referent representing the concept for the interpreter. By doing this he ensures that the internal roles of Cl and c 1 ' are, if not identical, as close or closer than any other two roles.31 This is what is required to give a faithful representation of an agent's cognitive state. An interpreter of a belief report should exploit all of the tools available to situate the report within the appropriate context of interpretation for the particular agent (or group of agents). By using a translation manual in interpreting the belief report about an agent who is a monolingual speaker of a foreign language, the interpreter is merely exploiting a tool essential to getting the interpretive context right. Suppose now that Sam does not know what Pierre's linguistic capacities are. He may assume a cautious interpretation. and so internally link the concept discourse referent CI" with whatever discourse referent CI' occurs in his representation of Pierre's cognitive state K that represents the concept of snow. We should note that C1' will only represent snow if in this delineated DRS K for Pierre, c l' has an internal anchor c I, the discourse referent the concept of snow for Sam --which represents the concept of snow in the delineated DRS K of Sam's cognitive state. Sam may not specify what the linguistic tenn associated with c I' is in K; that is, K may not contain

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CHAPTER TIIREE

a portion in which the condition named(cl', a) occurs. Or it may contain a generalization of this condition--with an existential quantification over the name position; that is,., Sam may just say that Pierre links whatever the appropriate translation of 'snow' in Pierre's home language with c 1. In either case, however, he will get the faithful representation and (9) will come out true. What is crucial to the correct interpretation of the report in this case is: (i) that the concept of snow for Pierre play the appropriate functional role in the total cognitive state to that of snow for Sam, and (li) that any external connections between the concept of snow for Pierre and the environment also approximate as closely as possible those connections between Sam's concept of snow and his environment. Matters become really interesting when Sam knows that Pierre has certain idiosyncratic features about his language use--Le., when he knows that Pierre is not a normal monolingual French speaker--at least not normal in ways relevant to the interpretation of (8). (Here is where the interplay between socially detennined and individual content becomes very important.) Let's suppose that Sam knows (though Peter does not) that Pierre has a rather idiosyncratic use of the word neige. By neige, Pierre means heroin. Sam will exploit this knowledge to get a rather different interpretation of Peter's statement. Though Peter may not have a faithful representation of what Pierre believe, Sam may, in virtue of his "insider information" about Pierre's linguistic idiosyncrasies. Once again, Sam is exploiting the relevant tools to build a faithful representation. Before he used a translation manual for the two languages; now he uses his knowledge about Pierre's idiolect. Once again it is important to notice that the "proposition" to which Pierre is related in his belief that he would express as (8) is one whose content and structure are defined at least in part by its many connections with other components of Pierre's cognitive state. This affects how we should understand reports involving quantification over objects of attitudes or agents. When we have quantification over DRSs as in the translation of (10),

(10)

Peter believes something that Pierre believes,

we must understand (10) as a quantification over some DRS that can be added both to a DDRS faithfully representing a portion of Peter's cognitive state and to a DDRS faithfully representing a portion of Pierre's cognitive state so as to produce two DDRSs faithfully representing possibly more inclusive portions of the respective agents' cognitive states.3 2 Suppose now that we find a witness for the existentially quantified variable in (10). The replacement of the propositional variable by a DRS is only the beginning of the interpretive task, as outlined in the procedure of delineated DRS construction. We must now reinterpret that DRS, using the conditions with the predicate named to give the DRS its appropriate internal connections. This implies that a sentence like (10) may be true without its being the case that both Pierre and Peter share all the same internal connections or, indeed, have cognitive states that are mirror images of each other. So, in particular, Pierre and Peter may share a belief in the sense that (10) is true, even if Pierre and Peter are both monolingual speakers.

-~t-~,c",j"

"

ATIITUDES AND ATIITUDE DESCRIPTIONS

'lj

133

DRT thus does not succumb to Church's argument. The distinction between the DRT view and the sentential view of attitude objects is that the relation between a DRS and the attimde it describes is very much more complicated than that supposed by the sentential view. Church's argument fails against DRT because of the complexity of this interpretive task. Since DRT does not claim to offer a reduction of truth conditional content to some DR-theoretic notion, an appeal to translation manuals, which involves a tacit appeal to the concept of meaning, may be accommodated without circularity. Translation manuals, which pair words with the same or similar truth conditional intensions, are a legitimate device that can be used in attitude ascription interpretation, in particular in detennining the appropriate internal anchors for concepts. If we wanted to reconstruct Churchean propositions, we could have appealed to the appropriate sort of equivalence classes of DR-theoretic structures under predicate of DRSs translations and alphabetic variance. Simply defining propositions using the equivalence classes defined by alphabetic variance would not suffice, as our example shows. The discussion of (8) and (9), however, also reveals that such reconstructions of propositions are otiose. Further, the reconstruction misses the point about contextual interpretation. We can get the desired prediction that Pierre and Peter can have the same belief even though they are both monolingual speakers, without supposing there are such common, mind independent entities as fine-grained propositions toward which they both bear the attitude of belief. We can quantify over DRSs alone and get the correct truth conditions for (10) and for more customary sentences like (11), (11)

Everyone believes that snow is white,

without implying that the same DRS (or the same object) with the same internal connections is a constituent in all those mental states. Indeed if that were what was meant by (11), such statements would never be true. Indeed quantification over DRSs alone, which are not at all good candidates for the post of DR -theoretic counterpart to propositions, is the most sensible approach in this framework to the problem of representing quantification over attitude Objects and over propositions generally. The moral is that natural language attitude ascriptions don't really require propositional quantification. The philosopher's propositions are an abstraction, a construction unnecessary for the purpose of doing natorallanguage semantics, and in particular the semantics of the attitudes. Apparent reference to such entities in natural language stems from an uncritical look at natural language syntax and evaporates upon closer analysis. Thus, the construction procedure and analysis of propositional quantification and reference to propositions reveals that we do not have to countenance propositions after all. What philosophers have called propositions are various ways of classifying the contents of mental states. In some cases a very fine-grained notion of proposition emerges from our descriptions of cognitive states, as in our discussion of puzzles like

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those besetting Pierre and Peter. In other cases, and especially in the case of animals like dogs, a much cruder notion is called for. The beliefs of a dog or even a small child ought to be reported according to different criteria than those I have been proposing for adult humans. The concepts of a dog or a small child may not be connected to any linguistic tokens. The interpretive task is now even more complex. In such cases there is no question of using a translation manual to get the right internal connections; the agents don't speak any language at all. Our guide to getting the right internal connections for the concept discourse referents introduced in the processing of a report about a belief of such an agent must look at rough, functional equivalences. Again let's consider an example. Let's suppose that my dog, Demi, sees me pick up my leash and put on my running shorts and shoes. She gets very excited and acts as though she believes that she and I are going for a run together. On the basis of this behavior, I say to my wife, Sheila,

interpretation for dogs, we avoid attributing to them beliefs in tautologies or logically equivalent beliefs that may be logically very complex. If that structural constraint does not hold, for instance, then it would follow that if Demi believes that we are going for a run, she also believes that we are going for a run and that the axiom of choice is equivalent to the Hahn-Banach theorem. A semantic theory ought to avoid such conclusions. Having looked at how one might interpret a belief report about a dog, what lessons have we learned about propositions? The "propositions" that a dog entertains might be much more roughly or coarsely individuated, in the sense that a great deal many more reports might generate DRSs faithfully describing the dog's belief state. This is because the semantic constraints generated by internal anchoring are so much weaker in this case. A dog's belief state in general has much less structure than an adult human's. Further, the basic concepts are not tied to linguistic expressions. so a whole level of complexity is eliminated. The choice of internal anchors for the representation of a doggy belief is guided only by rough functional role equivalents. The proposition that a dog is related to when it believes something is again an abstraction over and above the DRSs used to describe the contents and structure of mental states. For dogs, however, the relevant propositional objects of belief may be modeled by different equivalence classes than those used to isolate the propositions appropriate to adult human agents. The individuation of propositions at the level of natural language metaphysics is thus highly context-sensitive and interest-relative. Against this perspective the debate between possible worlds theorists, Neo-Russellians and Fregeans concerning the "true nature" of objects of belief or propositions seems misguided. Many direct reference theorists have argued that their theory of structured proposition is the appropriate one. Possible worlds theorists champion an even cruder notion of proposition, while Neo-Fregeans concentrate on fine-grained theories of propositions. Their debate misses the point; propositions are abstractions of bits of contents and structures of cognitive states (which DR-theoretic structures attempt to model); these abstractions don't have set identity criteria outside of a particular context of interpretation. Sometimes, crude propositions would have sufficed; at other times. only extremely fine-grained context sensitive ones may do. In light of these investigations into the nature of attitudes and attitude reports, it is tempting to conclude that propositions are really abstractions and ways of classifying agents' mental states. In chapter 10, I shall argue that at the level of real metaphysics, the propositions of natural language metaphysics may be reduced to the DR-theoretic constructs and as such are byproducts of human infonnation processing.

(12)

i I

Demi believes that she and I are going for a run.

Sheila interprets this relative to what she knows about Demi's cognitive state and relative to her own state. In so doing, for instance, she finds an internal anchor for the concept of running in her representation of Demi's cognitive state K.. Let's call this doggy concept of running Cd. As part of her interpretation of (12), however, Sheila also links Cd with the concept of running Cs of her own cognitive state. There is a question about how to specify that internal connection. So far we have treated this connection as a matter of identity. But perhaps the relation should be. one simply of correlation; Demi's discrimination of concepts in view of her cognitive capacities are perforce much cruder than Sheila's--so the two concepts should be distinguished. But what would the truth conditional import of this correlation between discourse referents be? It might be something like this: the intension of Cs determined by its role in Sheila's cognitive state is closer to the intension of Cd as detennined by its role in Demi's cognitive state than the intension of any other concept discourse referent in Demi's cognitive state. This semantic interpretation of the link imposed by the demands of internal anchoring will not support any deterininate way of constructing internal anchors for such elaborate conceptual discriminations as those of Pierre and Peter in chapter two, in which there are two distinct concepts with the same intension. But note that such examples are very difficult to construct for dogs or small children; only the connections between language and concepts or individuals appears to generate such puzzles. We still want to distinguish logical structures of beliefs for dogs, and thus keep the general outline of our semantics for attitudes. Doggy beliefs, however, may only have a very simple logical structure; they are most likely described by atomic DRSs only. Dogs probably don't reason much if at all--they don't exhibit behavioral signs that would indicate that they have disjunctive or negated beliefs (what could those signs be other than verbal behavior?), though they may have existential beliefs--viz. wanting attention from someone. If we keep the structural constraints on belief

l35

6. CONCLUSIONS This chapter finishes the presentation begun in chapter 2 of research in DRT that is the necessary ground work for the semantics of abstract entities. We have now introduced a semantics within the DR-theoretic framework for abstract objects

136

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CHAP1ER THREE

including quantification over propositions. The task of the next two chapters is to expand the foundations for the semantics of abstract entities described in this chapter and to examine a wider range of abstract entity denoting constructions. 1 Kamp (1985,1990), Asher (1986.1987.1989), Zeevat (1986). A related view is that of Stalnaker

&1987). For developments of this view see Kamp (1985, 1990), Asher (l986. 1987, 1989). 30therwise, we could tell they were false and it would be irrational to continue to have these beliefs. 4Por a discussion of conceptual individuals, their philosOphical heritage and AI applications, see

I: II! I: .

Rappaport (1988). SHow the objects of attitudes are to be individuated is a complicated matter--the question may have no elegant solution. For a discussion see Asher (1986). 6As we shall see later, the use of the same concepts will also generate such internal connections. 7 Par a discussion of various types of incompatibility, see Asher (1989). 8 The topic has been discussed at some length within this framework in Asher (1986) and Kamp 11985). 9S ta lnaker (1987) has also advocated a contextual theory of belief. His notion of context, however, is much less structured than that postulated by DRT. lOMy approach here differs from one I have pursued elsewhere (Asher (1986, 1987, 1989). While the model theory of the fOffiler approach was more elegant, a problem arises with respect to the anaphoric data. In those earlier works, PI, pz, etc. were menial state discourse referents and· were mapoed onto total cognitive states of agents, represented in the theory as delineated DRSs. But then shoula be able to refer to an agent's total cognitive state with an anaphoric pronoun. But this is not the case. To remove this proDIem, it seems to me now best not to have discourse referents for total cognitive states. Otherwise, however, much carries over from the earlier papers. 11 I have also brushed over certain issues here that are crucial in the recipient's inte:g>retation of the belief report. The condition named(v, 'Chemobyl') within the conditions of the DRS characterizing the discourse referent p in Stage I indicates that the recipient assumes that the agent associates the name 'Chernobyl' with some conceptual individual, but thlS assumption may be questioned in some cases. For discussion see Asher (l9!:16). 12These observations introduce a default rule of discourse referent identification: if the universe of a delineated DRS K' contains a discourse referent x introduced by a defmite NP and K' is nested within another delineated DRS K and UK contains a discourse referent y introduced by the same NP, then x and y ought to be mapped to the same object by an embeddin,&: function. This is similar to another default rule--namely, if the universe of a delineated DRS K for an agent A contains a discourse referent x introduced by a definite NP and another attitude!epQlt about A contains an occurrence of the same defmite NP, then the discourse referent introduced by the new occurrence should be identified with x. There are well-known exceptions to this rule. These examples merit discussion, but they seem rarasitic upon the customary uses of NPs. I shall ignore these examples here. 3Rainer Btuerle suggested this notation to me. 14Certain rules are needed to handle those cases where the context specifies no or an empty delineated DRS for the agent whose beliefs are being interpreted. For details see Asher (1986). 15por more details on this problem, though with different tenninology, see Asher (1986). 16More precisely, suppose that (i) 'M ~K w f Kbelieve(u, g>(x y»), (li) x =F y and (iii) 'M w f Kbelieve(u x =J'), where Kcp is the DRS formed from cpo SupPose (iv) agent u believes the irivial identity x ='x. By (i) there is a function n: UK+ Kc:p ->- UK, where K is the cognitive state off(u) that meets all the constraints defined above. Assume n(x) = n(y). By (iv), there is a condition in K+ K

"K

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ATTITUDES AND ATIITUDE DESCRIPTIONS

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I

__________________________________________________

I

fix) "f(y)· 23The details of such an account would have to address in detail what concept-type discourse referents are to be introduced in the \,rocessing of a discourse. Does each word introduce a concept discourse referent? Cresswell (1985 has indicated that such assumptions may be too simple. Whlch concepts are introduced in a sentence depends not only on the words involved but on its topic-comment and focus structure as well. 24Por a detailed defense of this view see Asher (1986, 1989). 25por some details see the next chapter. But for a fun discussion of the truth conditions of reports like (15) see Asher (1987). 26This is known colloquially as supplying a "background story," and it is a favorite pastime of philosophers who discuss difficult examples about belief. 27 Notice that (7) does not contribute any new material with which to update the recipient's representation of elther Joni's or Chachi's cognitive state. The statement will thus be evaluated in effect relative to what the recipient already believes about Joni's and Chachi's mental states. 28To be sure statements like (7) are not usually meant literally; there is a certain amount of "slop" in what counts as having the same belief. In the DRT account, however, there are many places in which we could relax the account of truth conditions to account for the sloppy use of sentences like (7). We could alter the relation between the DRS derived from the complement of a report and its relation to the portion of the cognitive state the reporter wishes to report on. Alternatively, we could alter our aefinition of what counts as the same delineated DRS or the same DRS. 29The internal connections between discourse referents, in combination with inference represent the use to which the agent puts the conditions and the structures in which they figure. Par an account of these internal connections in teffilS of a probabilistic notion of functional role, see Asher (1988). 30Note that the functional role of an expression may be at variance with its intension, if the intension is taken to be fixed by something like a "paradigm sample" as in Putnam's or Kripke's work. 31We need to make precise some measure of closeness of content. But there are many metrics that one might define on indices to get an appropriate notion. I will not pursue that topic here. 3~That. is, they will be more inclusive if the original DDRSs do not already contain a witness verifying this claim.

I

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

139

CHAPTER FOUR nominals and semantically correlated sentences. The theory §hgJJJd predict the synonymy of the a-b pairs in (1) - (4) while avoiding that prediction for the pair in (5) and (2.c-d).

THE SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION FOR SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

In chapter 1, I introduced several tasks for any linguistically sensitive, semantic theory abstract entities. One was to provide a semantics of the variety of construcnons that make up the class of sentential nominals, by which I mean all those

0:

~:~~~[~~~7~~~~~:~j~!!y~~;:~;~~~e~~;~~_t:j~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~n~ ~~runds

and POSS-ing gerunds), that clauses, for infinitival phrases, naked mfIm~ve p~ases and noun phrases involving a variety of common nouns that may combme WIth that clauses or gerund phrases. The class of common nouns itself divides into three: nouns that are nominalizations of some propositional attitude verb, nouns that are nominalizations of other complemented verbs, and nouns that are not nominalizations of any verb. This chapter and the next develop a semantics for sentential nominals using the DRT framework. My semantics for nominals follows the characteristic two level analysis of DRT--one relevant to DRS construction and the other relevant to DRS interpretation. The next two chapters elaborate the construction procedures and DRtheoretic structures for sentential nominals and their constituents. Because of the complexity of the construction procedure for nominals, I will concentrate on sentence interpretation. Questions of discourse interpretation will come in chapter 7, where an account that integrates DRT semantics and discourse structure, and which is much ~ore sophisticated than the multi sentential interpretation of chapter two, will be mtro~~ced. In chapter 10, I describe the truth conditional interpretation of these condillons and structures and discuss some of the logical difficulties that they introduce. Th~ construction procedure for sentential nominals is complicated, because the syntactIc structure of some of the nominals, in particular the gerunds, is unclear. I will spend the first part of this chapter laying out my syntactic assumptions and their semantic consequences. I will then turn to a DRS construction procedure for event l denoting nominals--derived nominals and the so called of-ing gerunds and some 1abstract nominals-- that clauses and infmitivals. Chapter five will investigate the more problematic POSS-ing and ACC-ing nominals and return to look at the problems , described in this chapter. Before getting started with the analysis, let us first investigate three problems that a semantics for sentential nominals should solve. First Problem: The Semantic Correlation between Nominals and Sentences. A first criterion of adequacy for a semantics is to get right the relations between

I

138

(1.a) (1.b)

The army's destruction of the city was bloody. The army destroyed the city. It was bloody.

(2.a) (2.b)

Fred's shooting of Bill led to his imprisonment. Fred shot Bill, and that led to his imprisonment.

(2.c) (2.d)

Bill's hitting of that policeman will land him in prison. Bill hit that policeman. It will land him in prison.

(3.a) (3.b)

John's hitting Bill caused Bill to yell. John hit Bill. That caused Bill to yell.

(4.a) (4.b)

John sprinting past Bill was a welcome sight. John sprinted past Bill. It was a welcome sight.

(5.a) (5.b)

Mary doubted that John was unhappy. John was unhappy. Mary doubted that.

",,"1l.'"):

In de~igning the appropriate DRS construction procedure to account for these data, we Will also perforce make other predictions concerning other anaphoric data, such as anaphoric reference to indefinite NPs occurring within the context of sentential nominals. This will test the adequacy of our constructions. Capturing this anaphoric data is a principal reason to use the framework of DRT. Second Problem: Spectra of Nouniness and World Immanence. Derived nominal and gerund constructions exhibit a varied range of syntactic forms and a correlated range among their semantic denotations. Ross, Quirk, and others have spoken of a spectrum of "nouniness." Derived nominal constructions are true nominals like noun \ phrase~; they m~~ CO?tain detei1tiInerS:"l)e plUraTIZe'(f.'ai1cfmaytike'ii"djectival, but not ) adverbIal, modIfIcatIOn. At the other end of the spectrum of nouniness are that clauses; they do not take determiners, cannot be pluralized and may take adverbial, but not adjectival, modification. In the middle are various gerund constructions. Some gerund constructions may come with deteIDiiii:ers;-oiliers-prohibri"iiiem~'Some gerund constructions take adjectival modification only, while others take adverbial modification only in English. In languages like German and Italian, both adjectival and adverbial modifications together are allowed on some infinitival constructions which makes them fall in the middle of the scale of nouniness. The nouniness of ~ nominal also affects the argument structure it inherits from the verb from which it derives.. The argument structure of very "nouny" result nominals may drift 1 ~
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CHAPTER FOUR

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

that of the verb from which they are derived. The syntactic spectrum of nouniness correlates with t~e spec~rum of wOrl.d immanence among the semantic denotations of sentential nonunals. I mtroduced thIS spectrum in chapter 1. Here I dwell on it at greater length. In chapter 1, we employed three different tests to find ontological distinctions--Vendler's container argument, quantification and anaphora, and the logical structure of the .~om~ins of typ.e~ of entities. All the tests distinguished between purely abstract entItles like pr'2Positions at one end of the spectrum and eventualities at the other. Most of the tests upheld finer distinctions between various-types of pure abstract entities--for instance, bet~~J,-!_~jec.!!-y~~p!9.n9j.i.tiQ!!§'J!D.\;l_PJll:e..PL~p.o.sitions--as :-v~l: as between various types of eventualities--accom'plishmen.ts,~~.?;~v:"?:7Ets,'_.~~!l.":!!~,~~~,,~2_~~~~s: They also for the most part distinguisheaoerween purely aostract objects, eventualItIes, and entities intermediately placed on the spectrum of world immanence--e.g., facts, possibilities, and situations. There emerg~ n~ simple correspondence be~ween t~pe of sentential nominal and type of semantic object. But there were some mterestIng generalizations. Infinitivals appear to denote only projectiv~ pro~ositi~ns. Si~arly, some gerund phrases and derived nominals are quite restncted m therr denotatIOns. ( POSS-ing and ACC-ing gerund p~~ses deno~e facts or possibilities, and in certain \ circumstances perhaps eventualitIes. Of-mg gerunq.L~p"~_l!!:...!(L.~en~nly e~alities. Derived result nominals may only denote a concrete physical obje~t.as in the product of his labor, or a physically visible or verifiable res~lt of some act~vlty or process as in the city's destruction. As Vendler (1967) pomted out, den.v.ed I process nominal constructions may denote eventualities but also more abstra~t entities \ like facts or possibilities. That clauses typically denote purely abstract objects, but they appear indifferent as to which type of abstract object--they may denote facts, propositions, possibilities, etc. These observations raise questions that an analysis of nominals must answer. How do w~~~em~9"§']'.Qtations? What is the relation betwee~ syntactic form, DRS structures and the typology of natural la~guage metaphysics? Should and if so how can we integrate an account of the different semantic denotations with an account of the syntactic spectrum of nouniness? Yl,hy do the POSS-ing constructions and that clauses have the flexibility to denote ( different types of abstract entities, whereas others like derived nominal phrases, and \ ACC-ing gerund phrases do not? Further, an analysis of nominals should assign the appropriate logical structure to the domain of events, st~tes, facts, etc., that ~hey denote, and it should make evident the observed connectIOns between the vanous ( distinct types--for instance the connections ~tween facts and ev~n:~~lities, facts and situations, situations and events, and propOsItionS, facts, and possIbilities. Third Problem: Nominals and Event Negation. Some derived nominals and all ( the gerund forms can incorporate some form of negation.

These nominals introduce the problem of event neS!!!.i2.n. Given the DRT approach to verb interpretation of chapter 2, the sentence corresponding to (6.a)--the train did not amve--generates the following DRS.

140

If'-b(pj.s

(6.a) (6.b) (6.c)

I

The non arrival of the train John's not kissing Mary Fred not seeing Mary

-,

x,e train(x) e-arrive(x)

It will be true just in case there is no event of the train's arriving. But then what does the gerund construction in (6.a) denote? The role of negation with nominals is peculiar. I will examine the details in chapter 5 and argue for a combined syntactic and semantic solution to the problem of event negation: the place of negation in the syntactic structure and the general translation from syntax to DRT forces the negated nominal to denote a fact, not an eventuality.

1. SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC ASSUMPTIONS AND BASIC PRINCIPLES With the goals of the analysis sketched, I now layout its basic assumptions. The DRS construction procedure, introduced in chapters 2 and 3, translates the lexical items and follows the structure imposed by the syntax "from the bottom up" to put these translations together into a DRS for a sentence. The complex syntax of nominals requires more syntactic assumptions. Although chapters 2 and 3 used only a "plain vanilla syntax," I will assume in what follows the framework of Chomsky's Government and Binding theory; it is the syntactic framework in which the most f sophisticated work on the syntax of nominals and nominalization has been done.

1.1 Assumptions about Syntax and the Syntax -Semantics Interface Already in chapter 2, I adopted X' theory as the basic grammatical framework. X' theory stipulates the following. Let X, Y, and Z be any categories. Then

XP -> ZPX' X' -> X YP I assume seven basic categories: D (determiner), N (noun), P (preposition), M (Modifier--either adjective or adverb), V (verb), I (inflection) and C (complement). In chapter 2, however, D was not assumed to have the structure of an X' category. In this chapter, each basic category has the structure of an X' category. This assumption leads to the so called DP analysis. Abney (1986, 1987) has put forward some interesting syntactic arguments for a parallel treatment of inflection and

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CHAPTER FOUR

detenniners. Abney's work, as well as that of others on the DP analysis,2 is essential

r for the study of gerunds, whose syn~ Abney discusses in de~il. Like the inflection position I, the detenniner is the locatIOn of agreement features In the noun phrase, and like I it is a head of a maximal projection. The maximal projection of I is IP (standing for S); the maximal projection of D is DP. The inflectional elements in I .tak~ a projection of V as complement, while the inflectional elements in D take a proJectlon of N as complement. The agreement features in I detennine the tense and number markings on the verb, while the agreement features in D detennine the genitive case marking on the subject of the noun phrase that is in specifier position in the DP.. In following Abney's analysis, I will also argue that the agreement features aSSIgn accusative case to the subject of ACC- ing accusatives. Now for several assumptions conceming nominals and nominalization. Lexicalist Hypothesis: Following Chomsky's (1970) general "lexicalist" hypothesis, I assume that in the lexicon are nominalization affixes -ing and -ion and rules for attaching such affixes to verbal stems like destroy, kill, and the like. Affixes like -ion or -ing are deverbalizing elements that take a verbal lexical item into. a nominal one. That is, they carry a +n, -v pair of features into a -n, +v feature parr. This is a lexical transformation. To deal with ACC-ing and POSS-ing gerunds, however, I will use a form of affix hopping, on which the -ing affix takes a wider scope at surface structure than their phonological form implies} But it is only of the sort that is required in any case to deal with the movement of the tense features from I onto the verb, and so is not something out of the ordinary. Argument Structure. Linguists use the terms argument structure ~d ~guments in different ways.4 Syntacticians use the notion of argument often to IndIcate what semanticists would call an argument place--for instance, the subject or agent argument place. Every noun or verb yields a DRS predicate u~der the semantic o:anslation (encoded in a lexicon); an argument place of the predicate, and by extensIOn of the noun or verb is indicated by a lambda abstracted discourse referent variable. Semanticists ~ould understand that such an argument place could be filled by a wide variety of arguments--semantic arguments are simply discourse referents supplied during the construction process. Syntactic arguments, typically of lexical elements like instances of verbs or nouns, are those syntactic constituents, typically noun phrases or nominals, that introduce such discourse referents to fill the sem~tic argument places. A further complication is that argument places may be la?eled ~ a variety of ways. One way syntacticians have labeled argument places (e.g., In LeXICal Functional Grammar) is by using the traditional grammatical functions subject, object, indirect object, etc. Another way is to use the semi-syntactic, semi-semantic notion of "thematic roles" or a-roles that come from work in Government and Binding Theory-Agent, Patient, Theme, Goal, etc. Argument structures have typically been defined . to be sets of labeled argument places.s The notion of argument structure is indeed relevant at several levels of analYSIS-lexical, syntactic, and semantic. So one should have a variety of labels for argument places--hence possibly a number of argument structures. 6 ~er, there.§hQJJldjle linking rules that detennine th~,~p!.~P.rt~r~,f9J}JJ..\':.GtiQJ1s...b.e,tweeu.a,rgument places and ..,"""'....",,,.•.,,.,...,..,,.,.,.,•....-,,.... ,,-->",..-..,..,,'''''"' "

.....'"

-' ~

~

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

143

potential syntactic argumen~~~~!ll~_t~~u:ee;. these maY.be defined by correlating variOus labelings of argument places. These linking rule§-WIll correlate conceptual or "lexical-semantic" labels (on which selectionai restrictions are defined) with the semisyntactic labels given by theta roles and in tum correlate these with the fully syntactic notions of subject, object, indirect object, etc. While I could make do with argument structures defined using either grammatical functions or a roles, I will assume the existence of an appropriate set of linking"Ftlles that will allow me to use grammatical function terminology or theta role terminology to specify the right semantic arguments for the semantic translation of a verb or verbal nominal. It is convenient to be able to use both a roles and grammatical functions. Locality. Given this notion of argument structure, we need principles concerning how these argument positions may be filled. The linking rules between syntax, lexicon. and semantics tell us the details. But the linking rules themselves obey a more general constraint, which I call the locality principle. Inspired by Fukui (1986), we might require that an argument place of the semantic translation of a V or N /3 may be filled by a discourse referent x only if x is introduced by a D or I within the minimal CFC of /3, where:

/3 for a is the minimal DP or IP that

DEFINITION: The minimal complete functional complex (minimal CFC)

common noun or verb 'Y in a syntactic tree dominates /3.

't

Thus, if a PP occurs as part of a DP in which a verbal nominal occurs, the PP may furnish an argument in the structure, not otherwise. As Grimshaw (1990) and others have observed, however, a verbal nominal may contain syntactic argument positions that are not realized at phonological form. In this case syntacticians have spoken of "optional arguments." In the tenninology I have just tried to make precise, this means that argument places may optionally have syntactical arguments. This is quite different from saying that argument place~ do not need to be filled semantically; not filling an argument place at the semantlc level drastically changes the semantic type of the object. A predicate with an unfilled argument position denotes a property, while a predicate with all argument positions filled denotes a "saturated" object--like an eventuality, a fact or a proposition. An argument of a nominal may be syntactically optional and nevertheless semantically required, if the context requires that the nominal denote a saturated entity. To deal with this possibility, I propose the following revised locality principle, or (RLP). Suppose that the argument positions of some predicate a are syntactically unfilled within the complete functional complex /3 of a, but that the selectional restrictions of a predicate on /3 dictate that /3 introduce a discourse referent of saturated type. The revised locality principle allows us to fill these positions. I assume with Grimshaw (1991) that argument positions of verbs and nouns are labeled optional or not optional in the lexicon and that a nominalizing affix may change the status of an argument position from required to optional. Typically, lexical nominalizing affixes have this function .

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CHAPTER FOUR

DEFINITION: The DRS-component of a partial or predicative DRS of the form

Aa.1> .. , Aa. n K is K.

13 of the semantic translation v of a V or N a in a syntactic tree 't may be filled by a discourse referent x only if either: (i) x is introduced by a D or I within the minimal CFC y for a; or (ii) 13 is optional and selectional restrictions on y require that 13 be filled. x must then be declared in the universe of the DRS K in which v is a condition. (B) If 13 remains unfilled, then the minimal DRS-component K' in the translation of y containing v is converted to a predicative DRS AuK' and u fills 13.

DEFINITION: Revised Locality Principle (RLP). (A) An argument place

(RLP) is a complex semantic principle. 7 It exploits selectional restrictions for property or saturated abstract entity readings. By part (A), (RLP) will supply discourse referents so as to saturate a nominal when the predicate to which it contributes a semantic argument allows that the argument is a saturated entity. But when the predicate licenses a property reading of the argument, (RLP) will contribute a property by part (B), or more properly speaking a predicative DRS, to the process of DRS construction. In the case of a nominal with a verbal root, the predicative DRS will contain the conditions derived from the verb and all the verb's arguments realized within the minimal CFC. I shall give some examples of this when I analyze of-ing gerunds. A [mal assumption concerning argument structure arises from the observation that some nominals have the same argument structure as their associated verbs, while others do not. Roeper (1988, 1989) distinguishes between argument structure preserving affixes and non-preserving affixes. I will follow the spirit of this view, modifying the letter: the appropriate difference seems to be between argument transforming affixes (-A affixes) and argument preserving affixes (+A affixes). The linking rules will determine how the argument structure for a given constituent a is to be filled with syntactic and semantic arguments. The one constraint in view of the revised locality principle on these linking rules is that the syntactic arguments must all lie within the minimal CFC containing a.

1.2. Additional Semantic Principles and the Effects of the DP Analysis on DRS Construction

The DP analysis and principles like (RLP) that relate to the argument structure of nominals and how these arguments are to be filled form the principal new assumptions of this chapter about syntax and the syntax-semantics interface. These assumptions will affect the DRS construction procedure. But most of the basic apparatus that we need for constructing DRSs for nominals is already in place. The

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

145

DRS construction procedure already distinguishes between various types of objects by assigning distinct types of discourse referents for various sorts of eventualities, concepts, propositions, concrete individuals and groups. I will broaden this list of distinct types here by supposing that there are in addition abstract discourse referents, k 1 , k 2 • There are also more specific types of abstract entity discourse referents: fact discourse referents, fl> f 2, ... , possibility discourse referents pOI> P02, ... , pure proposition discourse referents, p, Ph P2 ... , as well as projective proposition discourse referents of various kinds. Type information will be defined by means of conditions on discourse referents; So a condition of the form cp(k) is equivalent to cp(x) & abstract(x). The distinct letters serve only as abbreviations for these extra conditions. Sometimes, more than one condition is needed to encode the type information. For instance, a condition of the form cp(f) is equivalent to cp(k) & fact(k) & charf(k); cp(po) is equivalent to cp(k) & possibility(k) & charf(k). The condition fact(k) introduces factive presuppositions that must be processed in DRS construction, while possibility(k) tells us that k must map onto a DRS and signals a distinct type at the level of natural language metaphysics. Charf(k) is a special predicate to be discussed below. The different letters T, 'pI for these defined types will serve as abbreviations for such extra conditions. Another trait of the construction procedure is that while a true noun phrase must introduce a discourse referent as an argument of the matrix verb of its clause, some non -"DP-like" abstract object denoting expressions like that clauses do not introduce discourse referents but DR-theoretic structures as arguments. Already a feature of the construction procedure and its interpretation in the previous chapter, we will see much more of this here. The roster of DRT predicates must also expand to accommodate the semantics of sentential nominals. Some of the logical operations introduced in chapter 2 in the formalization of the DRS construction procedure and its interpretation now will be adopted as part of the language of DRS conditions. Included are the symbols for the logical operations of discourse referent abstraction A and functional application O. The fragment also includes the predicate: '",,'. It denotes the characterization relation, which takes as arguments a discourse referent of some abstract type and a subDRS or a predicative DRS; I write x "" K when the DRS K characterizes x. I will make key use of the "characterization" predicate in this chapter and following ones. There are in fact several "characterization" relations--one for each type of abstract object. I will distinguish them by introducing a condition charrO or charpO to indicate that the characterization relation denoted is the one appropriate for facts or for propositions respectively. CharfO further constrains the conditions for a proper embedding of a DRS Ko in which it occurs; charf(k) is satisfied in M relative to w, t, f iff for any DRS Kh if E [""DM, then f(k) is a DRS intensionally equivalent to K 1 • CharpO, the characterization relation for propositions, is interpreted more strictly: charp(k) is satisfied in a DRS model M relative to w, t, f iff for any DRS Kh if E [""DM, then f(k) is a DRS identical with K up to the discourse referents introduced in UK--i.e., f(k) is an alphabetic variant of K where the variance differs only in what is declared in UK and Uf(k).8 This definition of course

146

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

implies that DR-theoretic structures like DRSs, and now also predicative DRSs, are elements of the domain of the model, but this assumption already underlies the discussion of attitudes in chapter 3. Details of the model theory come in chapter 10. One new syntactic assumption, the DP analysis, significantly affects DRS construction. The DP analysis supports the similar way in which the construction procedure interprets I and D. Both inflectional elements and determiners will introduce discourse referents whose type will be determined by the predicates assigned to this discourse referent. This parallelism plays an important role in my interpretation of sentential nominals. In order to understand the semantics of sentential nominals--particularly derived and gerund nominals, we must give a semantics for the DP in specifier position that makes general sense in the grammar. Its translation should at least resemble if not be identical to the normal translation of the DP. But it also supplies an argument to the head common noun of the dominating DP, and my semantics will reflect this. This argument may have a quite different function depending on the type of the head noun. Consider for instance a derived nominal like

Following the treatment of defmites in chapter 2, I assume that the context or meaning of the nominal and the process of anaphora resolution supply the definiteness or maximality effect and so the partial DRS it yields will be identical to the one for a. The conclusion that there are such null determiners follows from the assumptions of the syntactic analysis. Null determiners are needed to assign case to the nominal subject in constructions with DPs in specifier positions, in which no other determiners occur. But another interesting fact is that other, lexically realized determiners realized in the D slot are incompatible with a DP in specifier position:

(7.a)

John's honesty.

The DP in specifier position in (7) denotes the bearer of the property of being honest. This is a quite different relation from that borne by the DP in specifier position to the head noun in a noun phrase like (7.b)

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CHAPTER FOUR

*The army's the destruction of the city. *John's most moves. *The friend's no claim. *A man's all dreams. *The army's a destruction of the city.

One might think that this does not apply to all determiners. At least some lexically overt determiners, including all the cardinality determiners, appear to go with DPs in specifier position: (9.a)

(9.b) (9.c) (9.d)

John's every move. A man's many dreams. Cantor's uncountably many sets. Everyone's three wishes.

John's mother.

The DP in specifier position will have a uniform translation in the DRS construction procedure; the difference in meaning will depend upon the N' which is the head of the DP, its argument structure, and the linking rules. The head determiner of a DP assigns the possessive case to the DP in possessive case, should the latter exist. Often, however, as in (1.a) - (S.a) or the examples in (7), there is no lexically expressed determiner unless it is the's. But this ending, as well as the his in his kissing her, more plausibly mark the possessive case. 9 If it is a case marking, then according to the DP analysis there must be a head determiner of the whole DP which assigns case to the DP in specifier position. Since there is no lexically expressed determiner in the DP, I infer the existence of a null determiner in the D slot. What sort of determiner should this be, however? One thing to notice is that the noun phrase (7.c)

(S.a) (S.b) (S.c) (S.d) (S.e)

John's friends

denotes the group of all of John's friends. A DP containing a DP in specifier position thus appears to have an existential force and a maximality effect as part of its meaning. The appropriate sort of null determiner in the D slot then should be a definite determiner similar in translation to the. I'll call it sthe for silent the.

But note that each one of the determiners in (9) may be read as a measure expression --hence, as a modifier of the set introduced by the N'. There is no measure reading for the or a; it must always introduce a partial DRS structure and be treated like a full determiner. My hypothesis, which accounts for this data, is that only null determiners assign case to the specifier slot of the DP. Since the determiners in (9) are used as measure expressions, we may consistently assume that in these examples, it is the presence of the null determiner that assigns case.1O The assumption of a null determiner is also essential, however, to interpretation. By assuming a null determiner, we can give a DP with possessive case its normal semantic analysis. The semantics of the entire noun phrase is built up in a compositional way. The presence of such a determiner in constructions with DPs in specifier position is essential to DRS interpretation. If possessives are present and contribute one argument to the head common noun, typically the head has an obligatorily labeled argument position, which must be filled by a discourse referent introduced by a determiner. I will assume that the lexically unrealized determiner sthe occupies the D position whenever there is no overt determiner. The assumption of a null determiner is not completely novel. ll But so far as I know, mine is the first semantics of nominals that makes use of it. Another complexity concerning the interpretation of possessive modifiers of DPs is the relation between the quantificational force of the null determiner and the

CHAPTER FOUR

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

possessive modifier DP. By having the order of application follow the syntactic analysis, the quantifier that results from translating the DP in specifier position has wide scope over the quantifier formed from combining the null determiner with the head of the main DP. An example of Hans Kamp's, however, shows that there are examples in which it appears that the generalized quantifier formed from the null determiner and the head noun may take wide scope:

thus provide the desired syntactic correlate. 13 There is, however, in the case of quantifier scopes within a DP an additional, empirical constraint.

(ll.a) Martin Luther King voiced every good man's dream. This dream has liberty and justice for all people, not just those with money or a light skin.

This constraint seems supported by the contrast between (ll.b) and (ll.a), where the wide scope reading of the generalized quantifier formed from sthe and the head noun is not possible:

148

In (ll.a) the context forces a wide scope for the embedded quantifier. The bottom up DRS construction procedure accommodates such an example, because it yields different scope readings for noun phrases, when one varies the order in which the partial DRSs introduced are applied to a predicative DRS with multiple argument places.l 2 Nothing prevents converting the partial DRSs with the predicative DRSs in a DP translation in a different order from that suggested by the syntactic structure. In particular, by first applying the partial DRS derived from every good man to the predicative DRS derived from dream, we get the following interpretable structure:

AX

x

CCJAI ~

w

I

Idream(y, x)1

Applying the partial DRS below derived from sthe to the structure above yields the partial DRS for the whole nominal (the second figure below):

APAQ l--_x_ _ _

1

P(x) Q(x)

AQ I

x

I

CCJA' I ~Wldream(y,x)1 Q[x]

One would like, in the interests of a stronger form of compositionality, a syntactic correlate to the DRS construction procedure's flexibility for handling (l1.a). The closeness of the syntactic analysis of DP with that of IP suggests that a syntactically plausible theory of scope assignment that allows the elements of I (such as negation) to have wider scope over the DP in specifier position of an IP will also allow the embedded D to have wide scope over the DP in the specifier position of a DP and

149

CONS1RAINT ON QUANTIFIER MOVEMENT IN DPS: The head D of a complex DP a cannot have wide scope over the DP ~ in the specifier position of a when ~ introduces a negation.

(ll.b) No good person's dream envisions torture of the innocent. In conclusion, the DP analysis, together with the assumption that there are null determiners filling in the D position when no overt determiner is present, accounts for possessive constructions in general and in particular for their use in conjunction with derived nominals and gerund phrases. The principles of syntactic construction and semantic interpretation of DPs are perfectly general, but a key feature of my analysis of gerund phrases and derived nominal phrases is to exploit the analysis of DPs proposed here. The assumption of null determiners together with (RLP) and the semantic effects of the DP analysis allow us to distinguish grammatically between abstract entity and eventuality denoting nominals. Roughly, the presence of an inflection node within the nominal, together with its proposed semantic interpretation, will determine whether a nominal must introduce an abstract object into the discourse. Given the presence of an inflection node within a construction, (RLP) and the semantic translation of the DP analysis will ensure that the construction denotes an abstract object. Although as we shall see there is little hope for establishing a general correspondence between particular syntactic constructions and particular types of abstract entities and eventualities in natural language metaphysics, a grammatical distinction corresponding to the general division between abstract entities and eventualities nevertheless exists. This reflects the strong differences in the syntactic distribution of abstract and eventuality referring expressions, practices of anaphoric reference, and semantic intuitions about the nature of these entities. Armed with an expanded DRS language, the DP analysis, the constraint on quantifier movement in DPs and (RLP), I now tum to the details of the DRS construction procedure for the nominals. I will begin with the syntactically straightforward and proceed to the problematic constructions.

2. DERIVED NOMINALS Derived nominals can form sentential nominals, in the sense that their content is the same as that of a sentence. The army's destruction of the city, for instance,

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS introduces an event in which the anny destroyed the city; thus, the sentence, the anny

I destroyed the city, makes same semantic contribution to a discourse as the nominal in (l.a) and (l.b): (l.a) (l.b)

The anny's destruction of the city was bloody. The anny destroyed the city. It was bloody.

2.1 The Distinction between Process and Result Nominals Derived nominals need not only refer to processes. They can also refer to particular objects: (12.a) Franklin's favorite invention was the printing press. Lebeaux (1986), Abney (1987) and Grimshaw (1990), as well as others, distinguish between "process" and "result" nominals. (1.a) contains a process nominal denoting the process or event of ;cIty'S destruction, while (12.a) and even (I.c) are so called result nominals. (I.c)

151

between (La) and (I.c) is between argument preserving and argumen.!Jransf9.!!1!!nK nominals; thus, the term result nominal should be replaced by argument transforming (I.c) and (12.a-b) introduce another semantic argument place in the translation of the nominal--an argument place such that anything filling it must be related causally to the event satisfying the event argument of the corresponding \ process nominal. The noun phrases filling the semantic argument places of the translations of the nominals in (12.a) and (12.b) appear to obey the same linking rules as they do in the process reading of (1.a).14 The only difference is that in the case of result nominals, (RLP) fills in the event argument place, while in the case of process nominals, it is the head determiner. The basic distinction between process and result nominals is thus a semantic one. It is reflected in the features relevant to argument structure. Both process and result nominals are V nominalizations. Process nominals~.§~~_~!h~_¥_gyX!)~!l~!DI..£t.!JI,e,..Qf the verb; they have the feature (+A), which alloWS the argument structure of the verb topercolate up the tree. Result nominals do not preserve the argument structure of the verb; they have the feature (-A), which indicates that the argument structure of the root has been in some way transformed. 15 There is thus very little difference between the two syntactic structures for (1.a) and (1.c).

'nominal.

Tree for (1.a)

Tree for (1.c)

IP

IP

The destruction remained for all to see.

There is clearly a difference between the denotation of the nominals in (1.a), and (1.c) and (12.a). The first thing to observe is that result nominals do not denote resulting states of a process. If result states, like other states, exist only if their actors exist, then one might think that the destruction of the city fails to denote anything at all if it must denote a state. After all, the city exists no longer. MUC~?~~plll:~~}>l?I~__l!.nd intuitiv.e is the thesis that (l.c) refers to theeffec.t§,Qtllix_Qs:sJruc.tion. What are effects?->Theyare-typ{caily not's'tates-6utifiings"iiiat result from an event that is a change of state. In the case of a city's destruction, they might consist of piles of rubble, burned out buildings, and the like. Importantly, effects do not fill an argument t place of the verb destroy; they are the causal byproduct of the events that satisfy the event argument place of the verb. (12.a) refers also to an effect of some inventing process. But effects are only one sort of denotation for result nominals. Consider for instance the use of translation in (12.b). (12.b) Fitzgerald's translation of the Iliad is a masterpiece (over 300 pages long, weighs more than 3 pounds, took ten years to complete). The nominal may refer to either the abstract object--the translation, a collection of English sentences or its physical realization in a particular edition, as well as the process of translation. A certain flexibility is needed in determining what a derived nominal construction contributes to the meaning of the clause in which it occurs. The real distinction

/~

A

/~A) the anny's

D' (+A) was bloody

~ D

~+A)

MP

~l'

N' (+A)

A L

N'(+A)

~(+A) of the city I destruction (+A)

DP (-A)

/ D

I

the

~'(-A) ""

~

remained for all to see NP (-A)

A

MP

N' (-A)

I N(-A)

I

destruction (-A)

The syntactic anl!!Y.~_tL@:~i!,dYJ!l~~the !iKQ!;~q!£!!2ns. Since there is no VP in the nominaIization, no adverbial modification of the nominal is possible. Since an NP is part of the nominal, adjectival modification for derived nominals is predicted [ to be possible.

152

CHAPTER FOUR

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

2.2 Process Nominals

We must combine (K.l) with the head of the DP and the translation of the possessive. Now the DP analysis does some work. The DP in specifier position, the army, is assigned case (the possessive). So according to the DP analysis, there must then be a head determiner of the whole DP which assigns case. There is no lexically expressed determiner in the DP. My analysis postulates the existence of a null determiner in the D slot, sthe; and I claim that only the null determiner can assign possessive case to DPs in specifier position. The semantic translation for sthe is just the partial DRS for the determiner a; the use of the defInite determiner implies that there is a unique or at least most salient event of the destruction of x by y in the context. The discourse referent that this partial DRS introduces fills the event argument place of the nominal, when the translation of sthe in D combines with the head N' translation.

Let us now tum to the semantics of process nominals. The hypothesis that (1.a) is a nominalization in which the argument structure of the verb is preserved implies that subject and objects are required if the verb is transitive. The translation of the derived nominal in (1.a) will be the predicative DRS,

AV Ae AU e -destroy (u, v) We must now combine this translation of the nominal with the rest of the nominal phrase. But how are the various argument places filled? This is th~U~~K.2f the r l~J~.riik~. Forrurargument preserving eventuiillty-no!ii.illaIs;oar;ooimportant liriling rule is that the discourse referent introduced by the head determiner must go into the event argument place. PPs typically realize object and indirect object arguments of derived nominals as in the gift of a math problem to Alexis. According to (RLP), these PPs must fall within the minimal CFC containing gift. The semantic contribution of the prepositions here is simply to help guide the conversion process to insert the right argument in the right argument position. If a nominalization subcategorizes for an object and indirect object, then a prepositional phrase headed by of typically contains the direct object, while a prepositional phrase headed by to typically contains the indirect object. The rules for the fIlling of the subject argument place are more complex. But at least it seems to be the case that if an of PP is present in the nominal, then if the nominal contains also a possessive modifIer, the translation of the latter fIlls the subject argument place. 16 Now let us apply these rules to (1.a). First note that the syntactic structure of the nominal tells us that the city may go in for one of the arguments of the verb, since the affix to the nominal passes the verb's argument structure up the tree to the minimal CFC containing the prepositional phrase. In this case the translation of the city furnishes the direct object or Theme argument for AXAeAY e-destroy(y, x).17 The translation of the city is the following partial DRS--assuming the DRT analysis of definites, on which the uniqueness presuppositions of a definite are somehow satisfIed in the context.

AU AQ

e, x city(x) e-destroy( u, x) Q(e)

One of the argument places of the translation of the N' is still unfIlled. It will be filled by the discourse referent introduced by the translation of the embedded DP with possessive case. According to our linking rules, this DP is a DP in DP nominal subject position; it should contribute a semantic argument to the subject argument place of the property or relation that is the translation of the head noun, not to the matrix verb. The translation of the army's is:

AQ

y army(y) Q(y)

The partial DRS just constructed from sthe destruction of the city is a property for the partial DRS from the annyto combine with, yielding the partial DRS:

AQ

Combining the predicative DRS and partial DRS with the process of DRS conversion defined in chapter 2, we get the following predicative DRS (K.l): Ae AU

153

x,e, y army(y) city(x) e-destroy(y, x) Q(e)

This structure now combines in the usual way with the translation of the verb phrase to get the following DRS for all of (1.a).

x city(x) e -destroy(u, x)

L

~------~~~~~~--~-~~-~~~----~-----,----.--.~--------------------

154

CHAPTER FOUR

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

x,e,y,n

Such argument positions are labeled optional, if it is possible for them not to be realized at phonological form. {BLP) in~~.l!~~~.~.2i~~o.!!rS_~r~[~~m..illt.~t~!1.Ql?jJQ!LI!l argu!!l~I,lt.Q9.~j!iQn, if this does not conflict with the type restrictions of the predicates mwhich the semantic contribution of the nominal figures as an argument. Finally, derived nominals may have their direct object realized by the DP in specifier position. Consider, for instance,

army(y) city(x) e-destroy(y, x) bloody(e) e
(15)

This example shows how the linking rules, the DP analysis and the assumption of a null determiner are essential in the construction of a DRS translation for a nominal. The assumption .of a null determiner is also essential in giving the DP with possessive case marking its normal semantic analysis and the semantics of the entire noun phrase in a compositional way. The DRS for (1.a) is essentially an alphabetic variant of the DRS that would be derived for (1.b), and so I predict (1.a) and (1.b) to be semantically equivalent. Below is the DRS for (1.b) after the process of anaphora resolution has filled in the equation derived from it and after the temporal anaphora rules have added their conditions as described in chapter 2. Note that the predicates type the discourse referent introduced by the pronoun as an event predicate.

army(x) city(z) e-destroy(x, z) e
'Au 'AQ l--~e,,:-x~_--1 city(x) e-destroy( u , x) Q(e)

The subject Agent argument place of destroy is an optional argument place. (RLP) fills in the Agent argument place with a discourse referent x and so transforms the partial DRS derived so far into the following partial DRS.

Some process nominals do not come with a possessive modifier. In such cases the construction procedure will exploit the (RLP) assumption. The destruction of the city was bloody.

'AQ

In (13) destruction has the process reading in virtue of the predicate bloody, qut there ~ no l~icalJy',~5Qr.~§§~~.nQI11il1ill.~yJ)ject. Indeed we cannot on my analysi"s have a lexically expressed subject as a DP in possessive case together with the determiner the in a derived nominal or gerund phrase. The prediction that this must be so follows from our assumption that overt determiners in D do not assign case; only null , determiners do. But although there is no lexically expressed subject, there is evidence that sentences like (13) have a lexically unrealized SUbject, since it can be anaphorically bound as in (14). It is presumably the army that did the destroying.

x,e,y city(x) e-destroy(Y, x) Q(e)

The discourse referents introduced by (RLP) are similar to other discourse referents in that they inherit the quantificational force of the DRS structure in which they are introduced. In (13) the discourse referent x introduced into the Agent position just inherits the existential quantificational force of the DRS for the whole sentence:

I

(14)

Scipio's destruction

It appears that (15) only has the reading where Scipio is in fact the object argument of the nominalized verb. is Examples like (15) complicate our linking rules for derived ., nominals by adding an extra clause: if a nominal contains an activity verb nominalization, a Theme must be lexically realized if an Agent argument is already present. Thus, the DP in specifier position may sometimes furnish an object or Theme argument, depending on what other arguments are realized in the nominal phrase. Again the null determiner contributes the eventuality argument while (RLP) fills in the rest of the arguments. Let us see now how (RLP) interacts in these cases with the DRS construction procedure. Let us, for instance, construct the partial DRS for the nominal in (13) and (14) in two stages. We first get the following partial DRS in a manner similar to the construction procedure for (1.a) using the DP analysis, the linking rules, and the null determiner assumption:

x, z, n,e, e'

(13)

155

x,e, Y city(y) e-destroy(y, x) bloody(e)

The destruction of the city made the army very unpopUlar.

L

~--~~~~~~-~~=-=~~------P""--~-----~---------------------

156

CHAPTER FOUR

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

Given our discussion of the correctness definition for such a DRS developed in chapter 2, my construction procedure furnishes the right results for (13). Here are some other examples showing how discourse referents introduced by (RLP) may inherit the quantificational force of the context determined by the DRS construction procedure. In (16.a), the discourse referent introduced by (RLP) assumes a universal force due to the quantificational force of never, which has scope over the subject noun phrase as well as the VP, and in (16.b) the discourse referent is bound by a generic operator.

e, x, z, u,e', n city(z) e-destroy(x , z) x =u army(ur--)_ _ _---, e'- make(

(16.a) The destruction of cities is never justified. (16.b) The destruction of wildlife typically occurs with uncontrolled development. The mechanisms of DRS construction appear to give the right predictions in both (16.a) and (16.b). Here is the DRS for (16.b), in which gen is a quantificational relation representing Krifka's (1988) generic quantifier. 19 I omit the temporal information here for simplicity. Again we use (RLP) to fill in optionally labeled argument places.

t

x,y,e wildIife(x) e-destroy(y, x)

e,

~

U,

v,e

I

unpopular(u~

-----157

I)

Curiously, discourse referents introduced by anaphoric pronouns cannot be linked in the process of anaphora resolution with discourse referents introduced by (RLP). Compare for instance,20 (17.a) Every failure of a man hurts him. (17.b) ??Every failure hurts him. where him in (17.b) is identified with the implicit subject of failure. I propose a general lexical realization constraint for propositional anaphora: discourse referents introduced by anaphoric pronouns must be anaphorically identified with discourse referents introduced by overt lexical elements. So no discourse referents introduced by (RLP) can be used in anaphora resolution.

lf

e'-occur(e) withee', e") e"-develop(u, v) uncontrolled(e") u=y

I have identified u and y above, since the agents of the destruction of the wildlife are understood to be also the agents of development. These examples show how (RLP) interacts with the principles of DRS construction. (RLP) also interacts with the process of anaphora resolution in an interesting way. The discourse referents introduced by (RLP) are similar to other discourse referents in that they may be linked anaphorically to discourse referents introduced by noun phrases other than anaphoric pronouns, like definite descriptions. (14) above is an example of this. This discourse would be uttered felicitously only in a context in which the discourse referent introduced by the defmite description the army would be anaphorically identified with some antecedently specified discourse referent. I will assume that unpopular yields a subDRS argument of make, in which the discourse referent introduced by the army figures as an argument of a condition. This will allow us to solve the anaphoric equation optionally introduced by (RLP) in the following way:

2.3

~esult~oIninals

On my analysis, result nominals are distinguished by the transformation of the argument structure of the verbal complex. This acknowledges the observation, made by Lebeaux and Abney, that !.~§l!I~.~'2..~~.~,!~,~!1~~!JfC:>__ ~~_~I!:!I~i9__drift. As for an explanation of this drift, the transformation depends on at least two semantic factors. The first is the ev~~ual!!l.!Y.£~J~1~~~5:~::~:LQy"t,!}~y_
The army's destruction of the city remained for all to see.

mr:I!'I1~1fi~T------15-8~~'='='-==~='--~--~~--~C~H-A-P-TE~R~F_O-U~R=~-~_'-----_ _ _ _~l·~·T_"-~---~--~~"~----

r ,

,

-

. :/:

i i

z,x,y,e e-destroy(y, x) effect(e, z) [remained for all to see(z)] From the lexical realization constraint for pronominal anaphora, I predict that only the effect of the destruction is available for anaphoric reference. Thus,

should strike the reader as rather ........odd. --~-",,-.~--

There is a particularly interesting argument transformation for derived norninals that chang~~.!?e type of their denotation from an eventuality,()En~i!!QiyJ
e -destroy (y, x ) effect ( e, z) Q(z) I assume that in the lexical transformation from destroy to destruction all the argument positions of the translation are labeled optional; that is, they need not be filled at the level of the syntax. Thus, we exploit (RLP) to fill these argument places in order to derive the following partial DRS for the nominal in (I.c). AQ

z, x, y,e e-destroy(y, x) effect(e, z) Q(z)

i Applying this partial DRS to the translation of the verb phrase yields the DRS. The

....

'

..

~.,~,~ ~"""

(19.a) The collapse of the Germans is a fact. (19.b) John informed Sue of Mary's departure. (19.c) A collapse of the stock market is a real possibility.

This combines with the translation of the determiner and yields the following partial DRS:

; :

'''';

2.4 Propositional and Fact Readings of Derived Nominals

I

AY AX Ae AQ f---_--=-z _ _----;

?IThe destruction remained for all to see. It had lasted for hours.

(I.c)

AYAZAXAe ~I_________~I

I

S-E-NT-ENT-I-A-L-N-O-M-IN-A-L-S---------15;---

square brackets indicate an incompletely processed condition.

Using the DRS construction procedure, I define argument transformations more precisely. Now suppose that the nominal is lexically derived from a verb
e -destroy(y ,x) effect( e, Z )

___

c~

•

The nominals in (19) !l~~~Jl.I£!X~~.9!!!-$s. To account for these, my analysis proposes a particular form of argument transformation and a particular argument transform. 22 The transform~es the derived nominal and adds .!!.!Ulf.$JU!!IW!..PJJl£!tXllL!!D abstract object that the-denvoonOri'llnannmnlpC113racterizing. I shall call it the abstract argument transforma'fioIi-:-Tfie affirtilltnnay function as an abstract argument transform. Graphically, we have Normal Translation AX!> ... , AX n , Ae r~----~

Abstract Argument Translation Ak, AXI'"'' AX n , Ae

i---::=====:::;-

1
The characterization predicate'" has already been introduced as part of the expanded DRT vocabulary of this chapter. k is a discourse referent variable of abstrasLQQiect type. The type information on discourse reIerelltsor-irrgument plaCeSTs7'arried by Coiiditions. Thus, when a discourse referent fills in the argument place indicated by k, it will be typed as an abstract entity discourse referent. In the linking rules for derived nominals, the head determiner will fill in the abstract entity argument place in the

_fh

~

.~",»

.~

CHAPTER FOUR

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

argument transfonned translation. With this argument transfonnation and our other assumptions, we have ready-made a propositional reading of derived nominals. Let us work out the translation of (19.b). Assume t.lliU.Jllf.Q1Jn~_ill.K~.L~wq indivi~~~d a!~t as.~m~~. Thus its translation is:

following construction. The simple condition 'Mary(u)' is shorthand for the metalinguistic infonnation and external anchors, discussed in chapter 2, that names introduce.

160

'Af 'Ax 'Ay 'Ae

'Ae 'AQ [------'u::.!..,-"'k'--_ _--"1 Mary(u)

Ie - infonn (y, x, f )I

I

I

k"" \e-depart(u~

In order to convey the typing infonnation that one of its arguments is a fact, this predicative DRS must actually contain some extra conditions about that argument place. The condition charfO constrains the characterization relation, as noted in section 1. 'Az 'Ax 'Ay 'Ae

161

f---:-::----:----:---i

Q(k) An application of (RLP) now fills in the event argument-place not syntactically realized within the DP structure of the nominal. According to the definition, (RLP) must introduce a discourse referent e within the universe of the subDRS that characterizes the fact. This gives us the following partial DRS for the nominal:

e - infonn(y,x, z) char feZ ) fact(z)

'AQ

u, k Mary(u) I

We now need to specify how the nominal contributes a fact to the fact argument place of inform. Departure has the following nonnal translation on the left and abstract argument translation on the right (the predicate"" requires that the discourse being characterized is of abstract type, and I have used my abbreviation in choosing the variable k).

l

e

I

k"" e-depart(u)\ Q(k) This combines with the translation of the matrix verb to yield the DRS on the left, which we abbreviate as the one on the right using the conventions about fact discourse referents discussed in section 1:

'Ak 'Ae 'Ax

'Ae 'Ax e - depart(x )

e -depart(x )

I

Since Mary has possessive case, my syntactic assumptions imply that the nominal contains a null determiner as head, the familiar sthe. The linking rules for the abstract argument transfonnation of the nominal tell us that the discourse referent introduced by the detenniner must go into the abstract entity argument place, where the DRS constructed from the nominal will end up characterizing it. The predicative DRS above then combines with the partial DRS derived from sthe to yield this partial DRS: 'Ae 'Ax 'AQ

k

1--;1====~11 k "" Ie - depart(x )1 Q(k)

The declared discourse referent k is a generic abstract entity discourse referent. Continuing the conversion process, we combine the partial DRS for Mary to get the

v, w, u, e', f John(v) Sue(w) e'-infonn(v, w, t) Mary(u)

v, w, u, e',k John(v) Sue(w) e'-infonn(v, w, k) Mary(u)

I

k ""

l

e-depart(u)

char f (k)

e

I

e

I

f ""

e-depart(u)

fact(k)

Note that the discourse referent introduced by the determiner automatically inherits the type infonnation from the abstracted argument place in the predicative DRS. The truth conditions of the finished DRS are that John infonned Sue of the fact that Mary departed, and this is just what we want for the fact reading of (19.b). For it may be the case that Mary departed in a hurry, y~t(12,l?J.g2~.§.~not !!!!I1!Y..that Joh!l in~2.wed Su~.M...ruy!..h.uEie!L~el?arture.23 Conversely, if John infonned Sue of Mary's hurried departure, he must have infonned Sue that she departed hurriedly, not simply that she departed. Since the approach to abstract entity readings for derived nominals does not depend on the type of determiner but rather on the presence of an argument

J

~

__________

~~=-~c~

____

~

__

~=-~~~

______- - - -________

..

"~

~~----~----·----------------------------

CHAPTER FOUR

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

transform, the nominals in (19.a) and (19.c) are predicted to have abstract entity readings.

matrix predicate is well knownrequires a pro~osition as an.argument. By the same general translation procedure'as that given for (l9.b), we come up with the following DRS for (20.a), except that the nominal refers to propositions rather than facts:

162

163

."L,-, .

v, S',p

2. 5 Remarks on Property Derived Nominals

John(v) We have so far considered derived nominals that come from or contain verbs and even verbal complexes. But t~~_.~~.!!!~.Q.!!'Q.mi,nals thatcomeJroIDJlQ.i!<£tLyes. From honest we get honesty; from good, goodness; and so on. One might also consider in the class of derived nominals, expressions like John's honesty, Sheila's goodness, etc. '~'""'~'''-'''='''''~''''''..-.,,~....- .•~.-.''''""'''''''''''''',.,"",'.-.- .... ~., •• ,,'.-.~"'''.~''''.~. I It would be rather astonishing if such nominals acted in a completely different manner \ from the sort of nominals we are considering. The analysis of derived nominals carries over to the nominalizations involving abstract nouns like honesty, goodness, and the like. Such nouns traditionally have been thought to pick out universals or properties. To the noun honesty should correspond something like the property AX honest(x). But honesty does not just denote this property, since sometimes the argument of the property may be filled in-e.g., by the denotation of a DP in possessive case as in (20.a-b). (20.a) John's honesty is well-known. (20.b) John's honesty l~ he realized he would never be caught cheating the customers. In (20.b2..!E~::s."g.Qll~§tx,£tYltQ!:~~~~,§.t~te ~le in (20.a) it denotes a proposition or some abstract object. The analysis of derived nominals, and in particular the use of the null determiner hypothesis and~~~!!!:.ac~,~~I!EJ~!!!~~!?~~!!?n, predict that I both an eventuality and a fact reading are possible for such nominals as in (20). The tra~~!"~?!!.'?~!l, __i!.!!,,p.E~9.!~a!!:y~ .P..R§,_~iJh,J.W.\Lar,g!JJ!l5;n1.,pla.c~s~.:a,_.s.@te argument place aI),d ~ipdividual arg!!~~tP!1!~e.

AS Au I

I

I s -honest(u ) I

Once again my syntactic assumptions imply that there must be a lexically null determiner to assign case to the DP in specifier position, John. The translation of sthe, together with the standard argument structure for honest, give this DRS for (20.b). u,s John(u) s-honest(u) [s lasted only until ...] The DRS for (20.a) indicates that the nominal has a propositional interpretation. The

l~ !

I

p""

s

I

l s-honest(v)J

s'-well-known(p)

3. OF-ING GERUND PHRASES AND BARE NOMINALS Of-ing gerund constructions or phrases are phrases like Fred's shooting of Bill and his loving of Mary. They contain gerunds like shooting as well as possessive and prepositIonal phrase modifiers. This form of gerund phrase is distinguished syntactically from two others--in particular the POSS-ing and ACC-ing gerund phrases to be discussed in the next chapter. The of-ing gerund combines well with determiners, accepts adjectival modifiers, and submits to pluralization (a shooting of Bill, many shootings of Bill, the violent shooting of Bill) but POSS-ing and ACCing gerund phrases do not (*a shooting Bill, *many shootings Bill, *Fred's violent shooting Bill). Of-ing gerunds also fail to have tense markers. These features distinguish of-ing gerund nominal constructions not only from other gerund nominals but also from the other abstract nominals like infinitivals and that clauses. Of-ing ) gerund phrases closel.Y.!~~~
3.1 Analysis of of-ing Gerund Phrases

The syntax of of-ing gerunds closely resembles that of derived process nominals. The affix -ing, like the affix -ion, has the lexical function of turning a verbal form into a nominal form. Some have argued that of-ing gerunds are deverbalizations of V', assuming again that PPs headed by of furnish internal arguments. 24 However, insertion of material between the PP and the gerund is fine and so casts doubt on the idea that the of phrase and the gerund form a constituent: (21.a) The unveiling by the President of his new budget was greeted with

164

CHAPTER FOUR

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

guffaws by Congressmen from both sides of the aisle. (2l.b) The flogging by the guards of the prisoners was overlooked by the committee. I will assign the gerund phrase the same general syntactic structure as that for derived norninals.

I

165

rules for argument places in of-ing gerunds are quite sensitive to the 1 structure of the whole gerund phrase. Let us translate our earlier example (2.a) of an of-ing gerund phrase: Fred's deliberate shooting of Bill led to his imprisonment. We begin with almost the same syntactic structure for (2.a) as (l.a): (2.a)

DP

~

DP

DP

D'

~

A

Fred's

DA MP

N'

/~

A+ +A affix

I

n)

PP

V

The translation of the gerund will be a predicative DRS that is identical to the translation of the verb stem, and it will have the same argument structure. This argument structure is either preserved by the affix or altered according to one systematic pattern to yield a manner or event property reading for the nominal (see 22.b below).25 The argument structure percolates up the tree determining in conjunction with linking rules the semantic effects of various PPs that it Ccommands. The linking rules for of-ing gerund phrases are largely familiar with the following exception: when of-ing gerund phrases are argument preserving, the discourse referent contributed by the head determiner either fills in the eventuality argument place of the gerund or an argument place that is typed for a property. Ofing gerunds do not have saturated abstract entity readings. When an of-ing gerund has both a DP in specifier position and an of PP, then the possessive modifier furnishes the subject argument of the gerundized verb, while the of PP will yield an object or theme arguments. When no of PP is present, a DP in specifier position may contribute either a subject or an object argument: (22.a) John's shooting led to his death. (22.b) John's shooting was rather poor on the hunt last week.

I Without the presence of DPs in specifier positions, of PPs also may contribute either , a subject or an object argument: (23.a) John witnessed the spanking of Frank (contributes an object) (23.b) John applauded the elegant playing of the visiting team.

D'

~\

led to his imprisonment

N'

~ N(+A)

6

I

of Bill

destroying (+A) This postulated syntactic structure predicts the adjectival modification of of -ing gerunds. The DP in specifier position Fred yields on translation a partial DRS of a familiar sort. The discourse referent introduced by Fred fills in the subject argument place of the gerund's translation. The syntactic structure for (2.a) requires that the translation of the gerund have the same argument structure as the verb has--to wit:

A.y I.e A.xl---_ _ _-l e -shoot(x, y Once again the DP analysis and my syntactic assumptions entail that a lexically null determiner in head position assigns case to the DP Fred's. After combining the DP Bill's translation with the predicative DRS, we combine the result with the translation of the null determiner. This yields a partial DRS of the following form:

Ax A.Q

u, e e-shoot~ ,u)

Bill(u) Q(e)

This structure combines with the translation of the possessive noun phrase to yield the expected partial DRS.

------------------------,---

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

A.Q

v,u,e Fred(v) e-shoot(v, u) Bill(u)

my syntactic analysis.

3.2 The Aspectual Force of -ing in Of-ing Gerunds

Q(e)

~ll t?is is farni!iar from the previous section on derived nominals. Once again the predic~tIve DRS dictates that the type of the discourse referent introduced by the null determmer must be an event. It is now a routine matter to combine this structure with

the VP to get a DRS for (2.a): v, U, e, Z, x, e', n

Fred(v) e-shoot(v, u) Bill(u) z's imprisonment(x) z=u e'-lead to(e, x) e'
A surprising feature of of-ing gerund constructions is that on an event reading of a gerund construction, the nominalizing affix makes an aspectual and semantic contribution to the information content of the nominal. This calls for a new assumption about the interpretation of -ing. -ing', the interpretation of[-ingD, is a partial function on eventuality types into event types: if cp is an event type E, then [ingD(cp) is an activity type, if an activity type naturally correlated with E (like the activity involved in crossing a street) exists; otherwise, [-ingD(cp) is undefined. 27 Also [-ingD determines a linking rule: the head of the nominal construction (this is a D in of-ing gerunds and an I, as we shall see, in POSS-ing and ACC-ing gerunds) must fill in the activity argument place. There are two consequences of this interpretation of [-ingD. First, it implies that of-ing gerunds must denote eventualities. Second, it predicts that s~6 coiTIpTeXes1liYnot1laVeoT-mg ~ruiial'orms, sil-ice states have'weli~defmed, correiiiie!d~~ti~iti~s:' i~' th;"p~~wes~r;e"il{ood,ringD. "",,,,,,,',",,, seems to have a similar effect. 2 State types do not combine with the progressive form; nor does [-ingD combine with a state type in the of-ing gerund construction.

ao-ii"ot

--.-"-'.,~'"'""""""""'""",','"".""-

L

The. construction procedure yields essentially the same DRS for (2.a) as for our earlIer (2.b) repeated here: Fred shot Bill, and that led to his imprisonment. The theory thus predicts an equivalence in meaning of (2.a) and (2.b). The DRS construction procedure for of-ing gerunds is almost identical to that for derived, event nominals. The DRS for (2.b) differs from that for (2.a) only because of the anaphoric equation introduced by the pronoun and because of the tense coordination equation that will insist that the event of shooting is not after the event of lea~ing to. imprisonment. But tense coordination is important. The predicted eqUIvalence between (2.a) and (2.b) follows only because we have some lexical information about one event leading to another. Such events must have a definite temporal sequence; the one leading must precede the one which is brought about. (2.c),and (2.d), on the other hand, (2.c) (2.d)

Bill's hitting of that policeman will land him in prison. Bill hit that policeman. It will land him in prison.

are not synonymous, though (2.d) entails (2.c). The reason for this is clear, once we look at the .teI?poral info.nnation conveyed by each discourse. (2.d) is true only if the event of hIttmg the polIceman takes place earlier than the speech time on a DR~heoretic analysis of tense. 26 The analysis of the nominal (2.c), however, carries with It no temporal information. The nominal itself does not yield any information about when the event it introduces must take place. There is no temporal information about the.connecti?n between events that is grammatically expressed in of-ing gerunds or

denve~ normn~s. ~njs..contai.nedin..te.infl\f.£liQIl'"nQ"d~H~L!lJieme[lce. ~ut !!.~~~r.()f~~~_~9.~~~g1:iQnsnot(lerived.nominals"containinflectional,"elementIi~QP

167

"8"""'''''"·""~·'''"'"=·ww.'"'',

(24.a) ??John's knowing of calculus (24.b) ??John's loving of Mary '- b" L ~ (24.c) ??John's lacking of a car

e..~~( J/~ ~':.J \y.~'): "J

It is difficult to interpret these nominals; no process or activity is associated with the

state of knowledge or the state of love. This is not to saYJh~L~.9.!illQt reieuo.the states ~~~~_lan..1!!~g~!",».!!Ji!ls..~l!:(L()i",~jpg,ph!!l~,e~,,_"W!;.JJ~~.deriyeO.,Qominals. There is another interesting interaction between the aspectual force of [-ingD and the type of eventuality. When one applies [-ingD to telic eventuality types like achievements and accomplishments, one does not denote the completed event but rather a preparatory phase of it; the preparatory phase is the naturally correlated activity. The completion's existence is a default inference, which one can assume to exist unless this is inconsistent with information in the text. This lies at the heart of the so called imperfective paradox,29 but it also manifests itself wiih"noITiliia:rs:-'Une defallitimplication of an of-ing gerund that has an achievement or accomplishment denoting verbal complex and refer to the completion. But it is also important to notice that the reference to the completed event can also fail when the context warrants.(25.a) The launching of the space shuttle occurred at 10:40 a.m.

may"exploit'the

(25.b) The launching of the space shuttle was aborted because of a computer malfunction. ~ (25.c) John's crossing the street caused him to run into Jones. (25.d) John's crossing the street was cut short by his being run over by a truck. _ _ _ , __ ,.,'"'' .• .,_,r .~

~~._~

I

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS (25.e) Sheila's drinking of wine took place in the Weinstube Trauble. As we might also guess from studying the behavior of progressives--PROG(
I

3.3 Bare Gerunds and Nominals

,! Gerunds without modifiers or PPs, also known as bare gerund phrases, and the . similar bare derived nominals are difficult to analyze. But using (RLP) they tum out to be quite similar to "clothed" nominals. (26.a) Unsafe flying caused the aircraft to crash. (26.b) Unsafe flying is dangerous. (27) Des~?.!i~I!,"~~_~i~!S~. (26.a-b) have no lexically expressed arguments or determiners at all--hence the name \ of "bare gerund." Q.Q,_a:..b.)_artLexarnpl~s--.of-ot.Jng.,g.elluN,__.£2!1§!!:':l£t!,?tI~_"~nd not ~OS~:JEg Ot.b.1:C:iag,,~D.ID.d'&'.~.~y"&.!:<"'9t~th~ta9i«'£!i¥aLJ:no.difiC,i!timLpresent. The nominals in (26) have the same syntactic structure as normal of-ing constructions, while (27) has the same syntactic structure as a normal derived nominal. Bare gt{m!l.~~!.ill!§..hl!~~~~qmgs. (26.a) for instance may have an existential reading--i.e., someone's unsafe flying aircraft x caused x to crash.31 It max. ~2. ha~C#lm~.r~!!di»....g;__UllSafe,.ilying"typicAUy,_w..a::Ub.t<~gl:m~~Qf th~~ r aft9JasAS<1· (:?2.,g~2.1~7thav_~~~~,.2.'E!~~~}".~~~~~~.!!:~~~~:_ ,t!:P.!,~~,,~~ts of ( £ryin~~~.£~9~g,~!2?~,~~~"!~~~~!!stJ_~f,Q~!tt9.£,tiQR,,~e_,,wj5(~_~. But they may also have uJlly~[s.al.xeadings--e.g., all acts of destruction are wicked. A sentence like (28) has a~_r.~~ding. :

an:c

(28)

Extermination was the general's favorite method of quelling a discontented populace.

I Method identifies a way of acting or an event type, and presumably this forces

~

"

extennination to denote some sort of unsaturated abstract entity.

(26.a) has a straightforward translation with the help of (RLP). The Agent and Theme arguments ~rt]x-i!?g~l!!:~_QPtional. Accordingly, (RLP) fills in these"argiiffient places·o:filieo·semantlc translation of the gerund during the translation process, if the context permits the nominal to denote a saturated entity. I also assume that the lexically null determiner sthe exists in of-ing gerund constructions. This determiner introduces a discourse referent that fills in the event argument place of the translation , Ii

!i

j ,""',ill,l

'i l ! ill !I::,I

till!:

169

of flying. Without any specifier in nominal subject position and without any mOdal) operator, we predict the quantificational force of the DRS context to be existential in the DRS derived from (26.a), which gives us the right truth conditions for (26.a). This analysis also predicts that we can anaphorically refer to the unsafe flying event in ) '---,-..-- .. --, ----",'" subs~calI1IiS,course:-'-'-------'-'-----""'-

(29)

---"--.-.,"-~,-,,,--,-.~-------.---,-~-

Unsafe flying caused the aircraft to crash. It was a typical fighter jock ) stunt.

When specifiers occur in argument positions with gerunds or in the determiner position, the analysis predicts that the quantificational force of the DRS context will affect the interpretation of the sentential nominal. (30)

Every killing is an offense against God.

In (30) the truth conditional effect of the DRS construction procedure is a universal quantification over the discourse referents introduced by (RLP) in subject (Agent) and object (Patient) argument places as well as a universal quantification over the event introduced by killing. A proper treatment of (30) simply falls out of the 1 construction procedure together with a use of (RLP). Applying the partial DRS for every to killing gives us the following predicative DRS.

"Ax 'Ay 'AQ

--

~ -@ill

(RLP) fills in the rest of the argument places to give us the following partial DRS which yields intuitively the right truth conditions for (42.a).

u, e, v e-kill(u, v)

I

r====1

I - ~

..J

The generic reading of (26.b) is also easily represented if we assume with Krifka ( that a lexically unrealized, generic quantifier occupies the D position. Applying the partial DRS for the generic quantifier and using (RLP) on the translation of unsafe flying, we get:

AQ

x, y,e e-fly(x, y) , unsafe(e)


---------;1;-:;7-;:;:-O~==~~~~---':C::::H::-A:-::PTE:::::::::::-R-:F::-:::O::-U=R~~-----~---~-,t-r-'';''_''~--~"-~-----SE-NT-E-NT-IA-L-N-O-M-IN-A-L-S----------~~~-------

When combined with the predicative DRS for the VP of (26.b), the resulting DRS indicates that (26.b) is true just in case events of anyone's flying unsafely are typically dangerous. I As (28) indicates there are also property readings for bare nominals at least. How _' do we derive those? We must exploit an as yet unused condition in (RLP), Part (B). I The VP of (28) selects a concept as an argument; this concept is according to the VP identified with the general's favorite method. Concepts are abstract objects, and so the contribution of the subject DP in (28) must be a concept discourse referent characterized in some way by extennination. The nominal extennination like other nominals has an abstract argument translation whose abstract entity argument place is filled in by the discourse referent introduced by the lexically unrealized determiner, sthe, in the head position of the nominal. Since the predicate of the nominal takes a concept or property as an argument, there is a translation of the nominal on which (RLP) does not fill all the argument places of the nominal's translation. Let us look at the completely unsaturated reading. By part (B) of (RLP), if the argument places of the nominal are unfIlled, the A-operators and their arguments must be attached to the minimal DRS-component containing the translation of extennination. Part (B) of (RLP) in fact type shifts the denotation of the nominal, since the result of exploiting (RLP) characterizes the abstract argument place of the nominal's translation by an unsaturated structure and hence types that argument place as a property argument place. Consequently, we have the following partial DRS for the nominal in (28), in which the normal translation for extennination characterizes the discourse referent introduced by sthe. AP

J

This concludes my treatment of the nominals that can straightforwardly denote eventualities. The translation begins with a uniform syntax for all of-ing gerund constructions and treats bare gerunds, gerunds ~~~~~ifie~p~~.!ions, and gerunds with lexically expressed determiners in the head D position in a uniform way. Derived nomrriiifsnave-tworumosn:aen:ncrusyntacncstrUciiifes::a:rrfenn'in:,iiTy in the type of affixes used. Using (RLP), the linking rules, uniform interpretations of affixes, four types of argument transforms--the effect transform, the product transform, the manner transform, and the abstract argument transform--and the assumption of a null determiner sthe, the translation procedure makes sense of the diverse truth conditional readings and anaphoric properties of gerund and derived nominals in a compositional way. Of-ing g~~!l~_ap_~9:~EY~_~2.!!!i-.!1_~:Lp!!ra~~~_~~~~a.! ) }I:" ,€,~", a characteris.!ic ~blgYl!Y,QLQl~!1Y.:_~~!l~I!g~B2~!1,l!lS. They have a "chameleonic" character, in that they may denote different sorts of saturated abstract objects, eventuality types or eventualities.32

4. THAT CLAUSES The most straightforward type of pure abstract nominal construction is the that clause, syntactically an example of the CP category. Pure abstract nominals denote only abstract entities, not eventualities. That clauses may occur on their own, as subjects of predications, as complements to attitude verbs, and as elements in N CP constructions like the thought that Mary is wise. One desideratum for an analysis is) that that clauses be treated uniformly throughout these constructions, even though they have widely varying semantic interpretations.

c

c'"

AY Ae AX

--------1

[-I

Ie -extermination (x, y)

4.1 That Clauses Differ from DPs

P[c] Converting this partial DRS with the VP's translation, a DRS results that determines (28) to be true just in case the event type of exterminating is the general's favorite method. (RLP) thus yields an unsaturated, property reading when selectional restrictions require it. If an event nominal supplies an argument to an event predicate, however, then the property reading will be predicted to be unavailable, because one cannot apply an eventuality predicate to an abstract object. The typing restrictions on the discourse referent introduced by the nominal will not be satisfiable. My analysis of -ingpredicts that bare of-ing gerunds also have property readings. Speaker's judgments vary in this area, however. Some but not all find the examples in (31) fine, both of which would require a property reading of the nominal: (31.a) Vigorous walking is what Amanda likes to do. (31.b) Slow skiing in the bumps is what Paul likes to do.

That clauses that occur within propositional attitude contexts are already discussed in chapter 3. There they introduce subDRSs as arguments to attitude predicates. I argued that that clauses had a particular interpretation that distinguished them from ordinary DPs. In this section, I will continue with that approach. The decision to differentiate that clauses and DPs requires more discussion in this more general context; it also receives additional plausibility. That clauses do not have the same distribution or enter into the same constructions as DPs. In particular, the noun that clause construction is not an N DP construction or a DP DP construction. Suppose that that clauses were in fact just DPs. If that clauses were noun phrases, then the most plausible analysis of the the N that S construction would be that of Delacruz (1976), who treats the that clause like an appositive. But the appositive construction is symmetric, while clearly the noun that clause construction is not: (32.a) John, a friend, took me home last night. (32.b) A friend, John, took me home last night.

172

CHAPTER FOUR

(32.c) The thought that Fred is insane has crossed my mind. (32.d) *That Fred is insane, the thought, has crossed my mind. Further, the mark of a DP in DRT is that it introduces a discourse referent and a condition on that discourse referent. But that clauses may combine in the noun complement construction with NPs which themselves generate discourse referents of different and incompatible types. One may speak of the fact that Mary is wise, the possibility that Mary is wise, the thought that Mary is wise. The very same that ( clause may characterize a wide variety of abstract entities--thoughts, propositions, , facts, possibilities, and the like. If the typology of chapter 1 is right, then these different NPs give rise to different and incompatible types of discourse referents. That clauses put conditions on these discourse referents; they do not introduce yet another type of discourse referent to be identified with different incompatible types. This furnishes yet another argument for distinguishing that clauses from DPs. On my approach, a that clause introduces a DRS, not a discourse referent. , Nevertheless, this DRS has an ontological status. It may be anaphorically referred to, as we will see in chapter 6. It can also be quantified over or play the role of a constant in the following pattern of valid quantificational patterns of reasoning: John believes everything that Mary believes. Mary believes that Susan is smart. So John believes that Susan is smart.

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

construction. These head nouns may be either nominals derived from various clausally complemented verbs--in particular attitude verbs, or abstract nouns like fact, truth, falsity, possibility, etc. I consider the attitudinal, derived nominals first. Derived nominals like belief, knowledge, doubt, claim, etc., as we have seen, have an argument structure. Consider for instance, (33.a) The belief that Mary had gotten an A on the test made John behave rudely toward her. (33.b) The knowledge that Sam was an idiot did not alter Mary's feelings toward him. (33.c) The proof that Fermat's last theorem was false made Susan famous. In (33.a-b), the attitude verbs have subjects. The subject of believe, the believer, is John in (33.a); the knower in (33.b) is Mary; the theorem prover in (33.c) is Susan-even the nominal proof appears to have a subject argument. None of the examples in (33) strike one intuitively as result nominals; they intuitively denote states, but not result states. So the argument structure of the verb should percolate up the tree. The syntactic analysis of such sentences follows that for derived nominals--the only difference being that the NP dominates a CPo Here is, for example, the syntactic structure for (33.a). IP

1~6

r

This argument has the form of a syllogism whose first premise quantifies over the structures introduced by that clauses. The second premise indicates that the structure introduced by the that clause serves as an instance of the antecedent of the first premise. I shall interpret such quantification referentially and assume that DRSs are objects in the domain of a DRT model and that quantifiers like everything may range over them. So it makes sense to think of DRSs as denoting entities in the model-themselves.

D'

~ NP

I the

Let us now look at some that clause constructions in more detail. The translation of that clauses is already familiar from chapter 3. They introduce partial DRSs of the following form: AKAP~

~ A more complex construction involving that clauses is the N CP construction. The way in which the subDRS introduced by the that clause is incorporated into a common noun phrase denotation depends on the type of head noun in the N CP

made John behave rudely toward her

I N' (+n, -v)

N~CP I

4.2 N'-CP Constructions

173

believe(+n, -v)

I

C'

~IP

I /~ that Mary had gotten an A on the test Given this syntactic structure for (33.a), the noun complement structure readily translates into a DRS structure. The CP will yield a partial DRS, where again the square brackets indicate that the conditions they enclose are not fully processed.

(S34)

AP

u,el

P(

)

Mary(u) [el- got an A. .. (u)] This now combines with the familiar translation of believe, filling the complement argument place of the condition to yield the following predicative DRS:

AS AX S - believe( X

) u,el Mary(u) [el- got an A. .. (u)]

The result is a familiar looking predicative DRS for the NP inside the DP. The translation of determiner the will supply one argument, (RLP) the other. The derived nominal is argument structure preserving, so the fills in the eventuality argument slot It is possible to anaphorically identify the discourse referent introduced under (RLP) with one introduced by a definite, and I do so here. With the translation of the VP and the choice of appropriate antecedent for the discourse referent introduced by (RLP), the following DRS for (33.a) results: s, x, v

x=v s-believe(x, f----=u,-,e:..!I_ _ _---j Mary(u) el- [got an A... (u)] John(v) [s made v behave rudely toward her] This translation gives the intuitively right truth conditions for (33.a); it implies that John has the belief and that it is his state of belief that has the causal efficacy. That the state rather than the proposition has causal efficacy is what is also wanted in view of the discussion of such sentences in chapter 1. An N' CP construction with an abstract noun as head is exemplified in (34):. (34)

175

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

CHAPTER FOUR

174

The fact that Mary is wise reflects well on her teachers.

The most obvious syntactic construction rules would attach the CP to the N' in the following way:

~

D'

~

~e

A

reflects well on her teachers

I

lP

fact

~IP

~at

6

Mary is wise

Abstract nouns like fact, truth, etc., must have an optionally label~d characterization argument place, since they may take that clauses or other sentenu~ nominals that characterize abstract entities like facts or propositions. On thIS assumption, the translation of fact would introduce a characterization co~dition with one argument place for the discourse referent introduced by the detern~mer. and the other for the contribution of the complement if it exists. The contrlbutIOn of a complement of an abstract noun will be either a subDRS that characteri~es the discourse referent introduced by the determiner in noun complement construcuons or a discourse referent characterized itself by a DRS. Here is the general type of predicative DRS for abstract nouns:

e

Here k is an abstract entity discourse referent, while ranges over DR-theoretic structures or abstract discourse referents. 33 The head noun of N' CP constructions often dictates what type of abstract object is involved. Some nouns may ch~acteri~e the discourse referent as propositional; other nouns like fact subcategonze theIr discourse referent arguments to be of fact type. . Now we are ready to interpret (34). The N CP construction yields the followmg predicative DRS. The head noun fact has typed its discourse referent argument as factive. Once again, fis a fact discourse referent variable that is shorthand for type information encoded as conditions in the predicative DRS.34

----------------------------------

176

CHAPTER FOUR

AI

fact(f) u,

f""

SI

Mru:y(u) SI- wlse(u) This predicative DRS now combines with the translation of the determiner the to yield the following partial DRS, in which the discourse referent introduced by the determiner inherits the type restrictions in the predicative DRS.

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

Since true and false take propositions as arguments, the nominals in (35) must denote propositions. The examples in (35) are instances of argument transforming nominals. The head determiner sthe in (35.b) simply fills in the proposition argument place of the nominal, and (RLP) fills in the state argument place. (35.a) is an example in which the argument structure of the nominal is transformed by means of a version of the abstract argument transform applied to abstract nouns and attitude verb nominals. This adds an optional characterization argument to the translation of belief:

AX AP Ax AS

r-------j

s - believe( x, p) p""K

f

c1aim(f)

f""

I

u, SI Mary(u) wise(u)

SI-

177

The complement fills in the characterization argument, and the head determiner sthe fills in the proposition argument place. On the other hand, the theory predicts that since of-ing gerund phrases are argument preserving unless they have property readings, they do not license such propositional readings.

Q(f) Conversion of the partial DRS above with the predicative DRS formed from the VP of (34) now produces a DRS that says that it is the fact itself, not some associated state as in (33.a), that reflects well on Mary's teachers.

i

!

f fact(f)

f""

U, SI

Mary(u) wise(u)

SI-

[reflects well on her teachers(f)] These seem to be the right truth conditions for (34). Using ideas about argument transformations from result nominals, (RLP) and a well-supported syntactic analysis of noun complement constructions, the construction procedure shows how a noun complement construction may in some cases, e.g. (33.a), contribute a state as an argument to the matrix verb and in other cases, e.g. (34), a fact or a proposition. The linking rules and argument transformations for derived nominals and of-ing gerunds prove themselves useful in connection with that clauses too. Derived nominals can have altered argument structures; attitudinal derived nominals may have a particular propositional reading on which the argument denoted by the nominal is the subDRS introduced by the that clause or simply by its propositional argument. Thus, it is felicitous to say: (35.a) John's belief that Mary will leave him is true. (35.b) All of John's beliefs are false.

J

(36.a) *John's uttering that Mary loves him is true. (36.b) ??Samantha believes every one of Mary's mutterings. How does my analysis of thatc1ause constructions fare on the desiderata? It does not predict the synonymy of (5.a) and (5.b), repeated below: (5.a) (5.b)

Mary doubted that John was unhappy. John was unhappy. Mary doubted that.

The analysis also predicts that noun complement constructions whose heads are abstract nouns like fact, proposition, or truth only take the as a determiner.3 5 (37.a) # A fact that Mary is wise (37.b) # Many truths that Mary is wise (37 .c) # Every fact that Mary is wise The reason why this behavior is predicted is that the that clause in the noun complement construction uniquely characterizes the abstract entity discourse referent that is the other argument of the abstract noun. Where the head noun of the noun complement construction has no other arguments except these, determiners other than the will be misleading at best--as in the case of (37.a) or (37.c), in which the use of the indefinite or every has the implicature that there are more than one proposition or fact. Plural determiners, on the other hand, presuppose that their NPs are plural and plural NPs must denote groups of more than one member; thus (37.b) is completely incoherent.

_,.---------~~~~=~--~-~~-~~~----------"~P~--~'--'-~-~---------------------

178

CHAPTER FOUR

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

4.3 That Clause Constructions, Factive Presuppositions, and Individual Anaphora

referents introduced by the processing of the complement clause or nominal into a subordinate DRS be entered into the main DRS, or in as superordinate a DRS as is possible within the bounds of consistency in a further stage of processing. 36 The same copying rule should be used on the subDRSs that are derived from the processing of these nominals as is used on those derived from factive verb constructions. Similarly a subDRS that characterizes the argument of the predicate fact should also be treated with the copying rule. As an example of the treatment of factive presuppositions on nominals, consider (38.c). Here first is the DRS for (38.c) without the additional processing of the factive presupposition of know:

The DRT analysis of noun complement constructions also has certain implications for individual anaphora. This confirms the adequacy of our construction rules with some different data. Consider the following examples. (38.a) ?The mistaken belief that someonej had tried to climb the mountain in a blinding snowstorm stopped the mountaineers from trying to rescue himj. (38.b) The fact that a manj had tried to climb the mountain in a blinding snowstorm did not stop the mountaineers from trying to rescue himj. (38.c) The knowledge that some bOyj kissed her at the party didn't help Mary recognize himj in chemistry class the next day. (38.a) is predicted to be bad by DRT when the quantifier someone has narrow scope with respect to the belief context. Let us see why. I abbreviate the embedded DRS as kl and for simplicity I will not process the VP except for the pronoun; I will assume that the discourse referent for the pronoun is declared in the principal DRS. U,X,z,s false(kl) s-believe(U,1' - - - = x - - - - - - - - - , I ) person(x) [x try to climb the mountain ... ]

I

I

mountaineers(X) [s did not stop X from trying to rescue z] z=? U=X The intended discourse referent antecedent for z, x, is inaccessible to z and so the discourse is predicted to be bad. Syntactically and structurally, (38.b-c) appear to be similar to (38.a); but they are acceptable, while (38.a) is not. The crucial difference is that (38.b-c) involve factive predicates. An explanation of the anaphoric behavior in such examples depends on a treatment of factive presuppositions. Factive verbs like know and regret presuppose the truth of their complements. Nominalizations of factive verbs yield the same predicate of DRSs as the verbs and so should inherit the factive characteristics of the verbal forms with which they are associated. So the knowledge that cp, John's regret that cp and Mary's knowledge of the proposition that cp all presuppose cpo The abstract noun fact also presupposes the truth of its complement or argument; the semantics of fact dictate that the noun introduces a typing predicate, 'U:possibility(k) and a factive presupposition that the DRS characterizing the possibility is true. DRT builds these presuppositions into the construction rules for treating factive expressions by requiring that alphabetic variants of the conditions and discourse

179

u, x, s, Zl u=x s-know (u, I--_-'-v'-'z""--"e"-"w'-------J boy(v) e-kiss(v, z) z=u party(w) eatw [s did not help x recognize Zl ...] Mary(x) Zl =? This DRS does not provide a suitable antecedent discourse referent for z" the discourse referent introduced by the pronoun him. With the processing of the factive presupposition, however, an antecedent becomes available for the pronoun.

u=x s-know(u,

I--_v-,-,_z,,-e--,-,_w_-l

) boy(v) e-kiss(v, z) z=u party(w) eatw [s did not help x recocgnize Zl ... ] Mary(x) Zl =VI bOY(VI) el-kiss(v" Z2) Z2 = u Party(WI)

el atwI This treatment of factive presuppositions thus predicts that (38.b) and (38.c) are acceptable.

--------------------~""~--~-----""

180

CHAPTER FOUR

5. MORE ABSTRACf NOMINALS: INFINITIV ALS AND PROJECTIVE PROPOSITIONS Infinitival phrases are another instance of the category CP.37 Like that clauses, for infinitivals combine with NPs in the noun complement construction, or they may stand on their own as complements to various attitude verbs or in other contexts. But they do not combine with paradigmatically propositional contexts.

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS DP

DP~D'

Fr~

~NP

~N'

N~CP I desire

(39.a) Fred's desire for Frank to please Sam is encouraging. (39.b) For Frank to please Sam will be difficult. (39.c) *For Fred to shoot Bill is true (a fact, a claim I would not have made). When combined with particular verb nominalizations, for infinitivals appear to have the same semantic function as that clauses do; they characterize saturated, propositionlike entities. But infinitivals also differ in several important ways from that clauses. First, there are some well-known distributional differences between for infinitivals and that clauses as complements to attitude verbs; that clauses with indicative mood don't combine with equi verbs like want and desire, but for infinitival phrases do. On the other hand, forinfinitivals don't combine with propositional verbs like believe or predicates like is true, while that clauses of course do. An infinitival is felicitous as a complement in many contexts in which that clauses in subjunctive mood are felicitous. This limits infinitivals to complements of those attitude verbs which I have called projective attitude verbs (these include buletic, permission, intentional, and rogative verbs), complements of modal adjectives or adjectives morphologically derived from projective attitude verbs, and complements of NPs whose heads nominalize a projective attitude verb or modal adjective.

5.1 Analysis of Infinitivals

I follow the standard GB syntax for infinitivals. For infinitivals are an instance of the category CPo I will take to as part of the inflection node I; for is a complementizer, needed in English to be sure that the subject of the infinitival receives case. The infmitival in (39.a) thus has the following syntactic structure:

181

'-... C'

~

.........-c for

- IP

DP~I'

I

Frank

I-----------VP I

~

to please Sam

The semantic translation of this construction proceeds along the same lines as the one for that clauses; since the tree for (39.a) is structurally similar to the syntactic analysis of (33.a), the construction procedure should proceed similarly. The principal difference concerns the translation of the for infinitival itself. It is this:

A.P I~======;-I

I x,e, y I P (* Frank(x) ) Sam(y) e- please(x, y)

* is introduced by the forcomplementizer, and it carries the information that such a structure characterizes a projective proposition of some kind. As there are many sorts of projective propositions, the surrounding context, in particular the predicate introduced by the attitude verb, must determine exactly what sort of projective proposition is being characterized, just as the head noun an N'-CP construction with a that clause determines what sort of entity the that clause characterizes. In (39.a), for instance, the for infinitival characterizes a desire, as is made evident from the head noun of the noun complement construction. Thus, the head of the construction determines * to be a function from DRSs to objects of desire; I will denote this function with the symbol W. The semantic translation for the whole DP then is:

A.Q

u,s Fred(u) I) s-desire(u, W I x, e, y Frank(x) Sam(y) e- please(x, y) Q(s)

This translation predicts that (39.a) will be true just in case the state of Fred's desiring

182

183

CHAPTER FOUR

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

Frank to please Sam is encouraging. These are intuitively the right truth conditions. It is not the abstract proposition that is encouraging, nor is it merely the fact that Fred and the projective proposition are related in some way. Rather it is the fact that Fred is in the state of desiring that projective proposition that is encouraging. In another context, the translation of the infinitival might differ. Consider, for instance,

analyses of infinitivals, but there is considerable evidence for the syntactic assumption. 40 Further, there are several arguments that indicate that forinfinitivals must be treated as a semantic as well as syntactic unit. First, for infinitivals can be quantified over as in (42.a) or anaphorically referred to as in (42.b). The semantic object quantified over in (42.a) is a complete proposition--it is the proposition identified by the that clause that Fred shoot Bill. The noun phrase that possibility has as antecedent the entire for infinitival, which also expresses a complete proposition.

(40)

Fred's permission for Frank to use his airplane did not extend to using it for drug running.

The syntactic structure of (40) is almost identical to that of (39.a), and the contribution of the CP to the interpretation of the subject noun phrase is identical to that given in the DRS above. But because the head of the subject DP is a nominalization of permit, a different projective proposition is determined. In (40) we have a projective proposition that is the object of attitudes of permission and prohibition. I denote such objects of permission and prohibition with a DRS and an operator P--P is also a function from DRSs to projective propositions. The contents of objects of attitudes of prohibition and permission differ from the contents of desires. A set of propositions WK is determined relative to a set of beliefs; each member of the set contains doxastically possible worlds and represents a most desirable realization of K. PK is a set of propositions determined relative to a set of prohibitions; each member of PK represents a permissible outcome in which K is realized. The projective semantics is useful in getting certain inference patterns validated here that are not valid for non-projective contexts. 38 The contribution of the infinitival nominal is to characterize outcomes, but such nominals do not fully specify the sort of outcomes being characterized. The examples discussed so far all have heads that are deverbalizations of projective attitude verbs. But there are also abstract nouns that are heads of the noun complement construction--for instance: (41)

The necessity for Fred to jump made him scared.

The analysis of (41) resembles that of (33). The CP in (41) has an almost identical syntactic structure to that of (34). The subject or theme argument place of make is filled by a projective proposition, which is characterized by a DRS K and an operator N. Like all projective propositions, N(K) determines a set of propositions. The content of N(K) is defined relative to the set of contextually admissible worlds, those that verify everything in the context. Then every proposition in N(K) represents a possible extension of the context in which K has a proper embedding. This makes (41) true at a world w and a context C just in case every possible extension of C verifies Fred's having to jump. If these extended contexts are identified with worlds, then we have a definition of alethic necessity,39 This semantic analysis of infmitivals follows closely the syntactic assumption that such constructions are instances of CPo There are alternative syntactic and semantic

(42.a) For Fred to shoot Bill is not something I desire. (42.b) John wanted for Mary to be chair, but that possibility scared Frank. This is evidence that a for infmitival gives us a complete semantic unit and a saturated object. The DRS construction procedure together with the CP syntactic analysis of infmitivals predicts this. As further evidence for this semantic unity, infinitivals take on the propositional character that this logical form would imply in some constructions like those involving attitude verbs. A sentence like it was necessary for Fred to jump is synonymous with it was necessary that Fred jump.41 Another example of such a construction occurs in John wants for Mary to be chair. This report is synonymous with John wants that Mary be chair, or John wants Mary to be chair. (42.a) also has a that clause paraphrase. It would appear that a for infinitival in such a context should introduce a proposition-like entity. A final argument for treating infinitivals as introducing saturated entities is this. My semantics for infinitivals implies that the noun phrase right after the occurrence of the complementizer for is within the scope of an intensional operator. This predicts that an indefinite like a or someone may very well have narrow scope and a de dicta reading in a sentence like (43.a) Fred wants to marry someone. Indefinites occurring in the infinitival appear to have the predicted scope ambiguities with respect to intensional operators. Fred may be happy with anyone who wants to marry him (the de dicta reading of 43.a), or Fred may want someone in particular to marry him (the de re reading of 43.a); the mechanisms for scope variation discussed in chapter two and earlier here account for these readings. Anaphoric examples, however, confirm that if the noun phrase follows the complementizer, only the de dicta interpretation is possible: (43.b) ?For someone to marry him is something Fred desperately wants. She is very pretty. (43.c) ?For a neighbori to own a pit bull is something we do not want. Nobody likes himi' The second sentence (43.c) has a strongly preferred de dicta reading, on which it

...."",...------~=~=~~-~-~~~~~-------.~--~. -~-----.------------

CHAPTER FOUR

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

expresses a about our desires. On such a reading the discourse referent introduced by a neighbor is declared in the subDRS constructed from the infinitival. This discourse referent is inaccessible to the discourse referent introduced by the pronoun in the second sentence, and so (43.c) is predicted to be bad. I assume a syntactic constraint prevents the wide scope reading of the DP.42

include this information under the I node, where it would most naturally go, unless we adopt a non-standard view of I and VP ( on which the VP dominates elements of I). Further, the CP analysis makes our semantic translation easier by letting the I fill in the event argument place of the predicative DRS derived from the VP (or its nominalization), although we could also fill in the event abstract if we assumed the non-standard view of I and VP. Chierchia (1985) suggests that the DP that for takes as argument is the possessor of the property denoted by the infinitival. There are two ways that this could work. One might take the for to introduce the conversion operation, applying the partial DRS introduced by the DP to the predicative DRS introduced by the infinitival. But then, on our general assumptions about abstract entity anaphora, partial DRSs would be structures that, like predictive DRSs and DRSs, we can quantify over or anaphorically refer to. But that does not seem to be the case, so given our assumptions, we must reject this analysis of for. The second interpretation is to assume that the for PP introduces a function that takes an individual and a property as arguments and returns a proposition; in DRT terms, for(x, K), where x is an individual discourse referent and K a predicative DRS, is a function that relative to an embedding function f denotes a projective proposition in which f(x) is the agent realizing the event-type denoted by the predicative DRS K. This approach will only yield a de re interpretation of the NP in the PP. Let's now work out a simple example like,

)'~

5.2 Chierchia's Analysis of Infinitivals

Having described my analysis and some arguments for it, let us examine a prominent alternative, Chierchia's (1984) (1985) theory. One might analyze for infinitivals in terms of a nominalized verb phrase denotation and some sort of interpretation of the prepositional phrase. 43 A principal argument for this view is semantic in nature. Chierchia claims that the following argument is valid. (44)

Paul tried whatever Mary tried. Mary tried to climb the Eiger. So Paul tried to climb the Eiger.

Chierchia claims that if one takes a standard syntactic analysis of this construction on which the complement of try is at least a full IP and the PRO in subject or Agent position is understood as necessarily coreferential with the subject of try, then one cannot explain the validity of the argument. On the other hand, if one analyzes the object of try as a nominalized verb phrase and for as a preposition, then the validity of (44) has a straightforward explanation. This is Chierchia's principal argument for his view. But one can also account for this argument on a view in which infinitivals denote projective propositions. But first let us see how the view fares on other grounds. On Chierchia's view, infinitivals would be taken to be VP nominalizations, just as that clauses are sentential nominalizations. They would function as terms in the characterization relation "", but they might also occur as arguments to certain verbs-typically the modals and auxiliaries, have and do. They would also be arguments of certain nouns or adjectives. The construction algorithm would treat the nominalization of a VP node analogously to a that clause. Such nominals would introduce predicative DRSs. Assuming that nominalizations of VPs and VPs are to be treated in parallel, the predicative DRSs formed from VP nominalizations would always have a A-abstracted event discourse referent and a A-abstracted discourse referent over the subject place argument of the verb in the VP. Such structures could serve to characterize concepts or properties of a particular kind--event or action types. On closer examination, several difficulties beset this view. First, there are some syntactic difficulties. Infmitivals often carry tense or aspectual information; infinitives like to have loved and to be crossing the street appear to convey both temporal and aspectual information. The CP analysis provides a natural place for inclusion of this information in its syntactic representation, but with the VP nominalization we cannot

(45)

185

For Fred to shoot Bill was wicked.

The translation of for is AX AQ AP[ {k}, {for(x, Q) This applies to the translation of Fred, to yield: AQAP

x, k Fred(x) for(x, Q) P(a)

= k & P[k]}] in the list notation.

=k

Note that Q is an abstract over a predicative DRS. Applying this now to the translation of the infinitival would yield, on this alternative proposal: AP

x, k Fred(x) for(x, AZ f-=-~u:L::.e_ _--I Bill(u) e-shoot(z, u) P(a)

)

=k

There is a problem with this interpretation of for too, however. The subject place argument in this analysis always has wide scope outside the property expression. It

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS is thus completely unclear how to get the de dicto reading on this alternative semantics. This seems to be a serious objection, since de dicto readings like those for (43.b-c) are the only acceptable readings. Chierchia does not address this difficulty. The only way I can see around it is to appeal to some curious procedure for inserting semantic material inside the subDRS using for. But then we have just reinstated a view equivalent to the one that infmitivals are CPs and denote saturated entities. Let us now return to Chierchia's main argument for his view, the argument pattern in (44), assuming now that infinitivals denote projective propositions. Chierchia is right about the objects over which the first premise of (44) quantifies; the reader evaluates the argument as an instance of quantifying over VP denotations, extracting the relevant VP denotations from the CP denotation. As some evidence for this view one might consider the synonymy of Whatever Mary tries, Sam tries with Whatever Mary tries to do, Sam tries to do. Thus, it seems we understand the first premise of (44) as containing a suppressed to do. Syntactically, the second argument place of this auxiliary use of do is a VP, which means that we get the following DRSs for the premises of (44). I'll assume that in trying one tries to realize a desire. The translation of this suppressed to do applies a VP denotation to the PRO subject of the to do infmitival. First Premise of (44): x,e,c John(xl) el-try(xJ, wi

Mary(x) ,..-_----, e-try(x,W f-----,z=-----1 Pro(z) x=z c(z)

Zl PrO(ZI) XI =Zl C(ZI)

I)

Second premise: Mary(X2) e2-try(x2, WI

Z2

I)

PrO(Z2) X2 = Z2 [X2 climb the Eiger]

The argument will be valid, if one postulates a principle of abstraction on which VP denotations can be recovered from propositions. As we shall see in chapter 6, we need such a principle, the principle of C(oncept) abstraction, to treat VP-ellipsis and concept anaphora in any case. This principle allows us to abstract the predicative DRS derived from the VP of the first premise, while the presence of auxiliary do

,

187

restricts the quantification in the first premise to VP-denotations. This analysis makes (44) a valid argument. The universal quantification above is over VP denotations, as Chierchia suggests, but this does not show that VP denotations must be the objects of try. The analysis uses a CP analysis for infinitivals and employs the uniform semantic translation procedure outlined here. It seems to me plausible, and it shows that Chierchia's argument for his approach to infinitivals is not compelling. Given the other difficulties with Chierchia's analysis of infinitivals, my CP based analysis seems preferable. So far we have seen examples of nominals that denote eventualities and nominals that denote abstract entities. The construction procedure for these nominals has been relatively straightforward and the syntactic structures for them relatively certain. We have exploited several principles over and over again to analyze these nominals: the DP analysis, (RLP), the notions of argument preserving and argument transforming nominals, the assumption of the existence of a null determiner, linking rules for various constructions, and the constraint that anaphoric pronouns must be anaphorically bound to lexically realized elements. In the next chapter, I turn to the problematic gerunds and return to some other headaches for the semantics of sentential nominals. IThe distinction between process and result nominals is due to Bach (1981). The observation about drift is reported in Lebeaux (1986). 2See for instance Higginbotham (1985a). 3 Many authors have argued for or assumed a theory of affix hopping for all gerunds (Jackendoff 1977, Baker 1985, Lebeaux 1986, and Abney 1987). Affixes liKe -ion or -ing are deverbalizing elements that take any verbal projection into a nommal one. A drawback is that a general theory of affix hopping for all gerunds dictates a division of labor between the syntax and lexicon that might seem unnatural. o!1e th~s of -ion and -ing as lexical affix~s, then a natlll1l! position would be that the syntax treats killmg, for mstance, as an atom. The unrestricted affi- hoppmg hypothesis puts certam transformations that are intuitively understood as lexical within the proVInce of syntax. I shall accordingly avoid such affix-hopping theories. 4See for instance Roeper (1985, 1989), Grimshaw (1990), Bierwisch (1989), 5Some authors like Grimshaw and Williams have argued that it is necessary to impose an ordering on the argument places. But this is not necessary on my approach, 6nIese labels may convey other information and be the basis of theories about what is an admissible Agent, for instance. See Dowty (1987), 71'01 Asher (1990b) I proposed a different ~d simple! hypothesis that exploited the simpler locality pnnclple. I fql!owed Roeper q988, 1989) m ,assummg that at some level of analysis the unfilled argumen,t poSItions, are filled With a,phonologlcally empty element, PRO. Semantically, PRO would behave like a definite noun phrase, m that it mtroduces a discourse referent that may be identified with some other accessiple discourse,referent already introduced in the ~~ourse or simply existentially bound when there IS, no approJlnate antecedent: Such aprocedure mdlcates that when all the semantic arguments of a predicate In a CFC a. are supplied by such empty elements, then a. may only introduce a saturated DR-theoretic structure or discourse referent into the context. I now believe, however, that the claim that PRO occurs in an empty argument position is false. The approach with PRO does not appear to be acceptable for languages like German, for example. In German syntax the PRO would have to occur in a position where it would receive case from the noun and so be governed as Bhatt (1989) has observed, But PRO must by definition be ungoverned. Hence the more complex principle (RLP), 8We need of course to allow for different discourse referents in Uf(a) from those declared in UK. Otherwise our defmition of characterization will be far too strict. 9In fact's is not a real determiner at all. Consider the phrase a friend ofJohn's, There would be no way to put the phrase together compositionally if 's were a determiner. Notice also that a friend of JoJ;n's IS not synonymous with Jolin's friend, I am indebted to Katsuhiko Yabushita for raising this QOmt. Another problem with taking's as a determiner is this. While this assumption might work (barring the difficulty just mentioned) for roSS-ing gerunds, of-ing gerunds, and derived nominals, one would lose,the uniform analysis of nominals that IS a feature of my account; one would need another semantics for nominals where this marking does not occur, as is the case with ACC-ing'

u:

~----------~=-~~--~~~~~~------~-----,~-----~~-------------------------

188

CHAPTER FOUR

gerunds, and subjectless gerunds. See my discussion of ACC-ing gerunds in chapter 5. TOOne might think that (1) below offers difficulties for this analysis, since there is no room for a null determiner. (1) The destruction of the city by the army. . But here the lexically realized nominal subject i.s assigned the appropriate case by ~e pre)J9sition, so this too fails to generate a counterargument agamst the hypothesIs tllat null determmers eXist and are essential case assigners. llPor instance Schubert and Pelletier (1988) make use of a null determiner 11 in connection with the semantics of mass nouns. 120ne can also easily get the appropriate translation for (22) if one co.untenances type shif~ meanings for quantifiers including null quantifiers. If we allow the null determmer to have a type shifted translation of APAAQ [{x}, {(P(x», Q(x)l], . . then we can get the wide scope reading qf the null detef1!1iner: is a yariable rangmg. over partial DRSs. Thus, the meaning of the qetermme~ has t)'pe S~lfted Its meru.ung from a function. of two predicative DRSs to a function taking a partIcular fUnction from predlcative DRSs to part!al DRSs as one argument and a predicative DRS as another. But I will not pursue this here. See lor mstance Asher (1990b). 13See for instance Prey's (1989) analysis of scope within German. He proposes just such a scoping procedure for IPs. His procedure and predictions carry over to the DP realm. 14It is also thus unclear to me how to take Grimshaw's (1990) claim that result nominals never have syntactically realized arguments. But perhaps I misunderstand her claim. l3Lebeaux (1986) suggests that this semantic distinction might have a syntactic correlate. He supposes that process derived nominals nominaliz~ a V'. If tha~ is r.igh~, then it woulq appear th~t w~ateyer. supplies the object argume!lt for a ~sitIve ,,:erb nommallza~on together WI~ the nomll~al1Zation Itself forms a constituent. On thiS syntactIc analysIs, then, we predict that destructIOn of the CIty forms a constituent. One test for constituenthood depends on wliether one could introduce an adjunct between the nominalization and the PP. But many poople find (a) the destruction by the army of the city (b) the destruction in 1458 of the city . . . ... grammatical, so by this test the constitl!enth~ of the nommalizatI9n together With Its object argument IS in some doubt. Some have called thiS the mtemal argument. (Grunshaw 1986, 1990). l6It is not always the case that a DP in possessive case fills the subject argument--e.g., The city's destruction by the army. . . . Exactly which part of the CPC fills which argument place of the head N m a nommal wIll depend on the particular prepositions used. 17Grimshaw speaks of this argument as the "internal argument." As does Lebeaux (see note 15), Grimshaw thinks that there is a syntactic difference between this argument position and the others. I do not see this distinction and it plays no part in my theory. l8As observed by Chomsky (1982), Lebeaux (1986), and Safir (1986). 119The semantics for the generic operator would follow that proposed in Asher and Morreau (1991). 201 am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for K1uwer for these examples. 21 A similar idea is proposed in Bierwisch (1989). 22In Asher (1990b) I offer a different account using two different phonologically unrealized determiners, abs and sthe. The account here seems slightly more elegant. 23 1 am indebted to A. Zucci for pointing this out to me. 24Lebeaux (1986) takes -ingto nomi!lalize a ~omplete ~entence. ~ut this. appears to ~o",,: for aqverbial modification of the embedded VP. Smce of-mg gerundives doesn t permit such modification, thiS analysis seems flawed. This analysis also m!Jkes the semantic inte~retation more difficult: Our rules would not yield an event as the designated discourse referent con!I:ibuted by the nommal given such a syntactic analy~is. In fact ~ don't know h9w to get ~ event den9tIng nOf!lmal from Lebeaux's construction Without resortIng to ad hockism. So I will take a different view below. 25The manner or property readings of of-ing gerunds alters the arguf!lent structure of the gerund. In (22.b) for instance, !tie denotation of the gerund is the manner in which John shoots. An~e Rossdeutscher of the University of Stuttgart pointed this reading out to me. In section 3.3. and in chapter 5, we will see other event type readings for such nominals. 26See Kamp and Reyle (199+). 27See Bartsch (1986) for some related observations for German and Dutch. See Milsark (1988) for a detailed diSCUSSion of a unified syntactic and lexical theory of -ing. 28 Events introduced by sentences in the progressive accept activity or process pre~icates--not ju~t stative predicates. So for instance, locatives are perfectly acceptable With progreSSives, but not With statives. 29See for instance Dowty (1979).

SENTENTIAL NOMINALS

189

300ddly enough, some event nominals share this dependence on defaults. Again the type of eventuality the nominal is taken to refer to is important. The launch of the space shuttle was aborted sounds 1l!l good to me as (26.b). !?~rt¥!!d· .. I lie th e !;Iill~~ accomplisllments ml!Y.[l';k.Lto.~t s. tative nominals onlY denote srares, 1I0wever.1here IS some w at a enve nominal can'represem-'-giVeli""tJiat it col'lUtiT!Sl'ltJaspecrtI!lfbr tense forms and given that any nonstative verbal complex can refer to a preparatory phase through the use of the progressive. Derived nominals exploit this leeway, as do ofmggerunds.

31This observation is due to Weir (1986), 32This is of a piece, I believe, with the more widespread ambiguity in natural language concerning events and event~l¥pes, on which verbs like happen and frequency adverbials may take either event~s or eventualitIes as arguments. One might also use this construction for the constructions denoting concepts--e.g. the concept of a

horse.

34See section 2.4 of this chapter for details. 350ne can of course say it is a fact that Mary is wise or it is a truth that Mary is wise, but these are not examples of a noun complement construction; these are cleft constructions. It is also of course perfectly acceptable to speak of a proposition that I have been entertaining, but in this NP that I have been entertaining is a relative claus~ an~ again not an example of the construction. Another apparent counterexample to my contention IS: (1) A claim that Mary is unhappy may spur the insurance company to action But (1) is a process or event nominal. So (1) is predicted to be OK. ~6Whe!l the DRS construction procedure is strictly followed in the processing of definites and mdefImtes, only those discourse referents introduced by indefinites will remam inside the subordinate D,RS; an .alphapetic variant of the conditions in the subI?RS is hence desired to avoid converting a de dicto attItude mto a de re one. See Asher (1987)for a discussion and Van der Sandt (1992) for a much more sophisticated analysis of presupposition. 37prom the perspective of a framework like Government and Binding. But there are other analyses, see for instance Chierchia (1985). 38Por details see Asher (1987). 39Thest: extensiqns of the context might be restricted in certain ways, so we would get a notion of eSlstemlc necessity such as advocated by Kratzer (1981). 4 See Chomsky (1971), als.o Abney (1987). 41There are two senses of be necessmy--one which takes an S' complement in the subjunctive the other .which takes an S' complement in the indicative mood. They appear to be slightly different in meanmg; the second is unalterably factive while the first is not. The first is used withm the more complicated in order to construction. 42Again a constraint like that proposed by W. Prey (1989) would do the job. But there may be others as well. 43Chierchia (1985) proposes a nominal analysis of infinitivals; the alternative analysis of for infinitivals I am ~uggesting would be Chierchian in spint. Chierchia notes that the nominal analysis of infinitives explams the mystery as to why most languages do not allow the formation of sentences with umnflected VPs. That is, if VPs and infinitIval phrases denote the same sort of entities, why do we have the following sorts of mismatches in so many languages? (a) *John to love Mary. (b) *John tries loves Mary. The syntactic analysis rules out both of these as malformed. But of course the CP analysis of infinitivals also predicts these examples to be ungrammatical.

PROBLEMS FOR THE SEMANTICS OF NOMINALS CHAPTER FIVE

PROBLEMS FOR THE SEMANTICS OF NOMINALS

This chapter continues the development of the DRS construction procedure for various types of nominals. I look at some problematic nominals--the ACC-ing ~nd POSS-ing nominals as well as the naked infinitive complements of perceptIon reports. I will argue that all are instances of an IP syntactic construction; this syntactic assumption, together with the assumptions already made in chapter 4 about the syntax-semantics interface and the DRS construction procedure, will account for much of the semantic behavior of these peculiar nominals. In the last two sections, I return to the difficulties for an account of nominals raised at the beginning of chapter 4.

1. IP GERUNDS AND SOME DATA ABOUT THEM The sentential nominals most challenging to analyze are ACC-ing and POSS-ing gerund phrases. Examples of ACC-ing ge~.E~,,~'()E§mW~g!1§ar~fred.§'flQQtiIJg)3ill, Mary being about to kiss John, C8.esar7iiiVing set up camp; ~Jl!~§_()fP9~S~illg constructions are F[.ecJ_'§.§l]QQtingJ3iJJr ,Mmy!s-being,about_tQ,kiss.John, Caesar's havingse't'upcamp:' Particularly intriguing are the (pOSS-ing) gerund phrases with null subjects like promptly firing Fred. I call all of these IP gerunds since I will claim that they are IP constructions. IP gerund phrases differ from of-ing gerund phrases in a number of ways. They never pluralize and do not take determiners. Further, some IP gerunds can have existential event readings without determiners or overt subjects. (La) (1.b) (1.c) (1.d)

*The building the Panama Canal took longer than expected. *Building of the Panama Canal took longer than expected. *John's hitting the ball were a welcome sight. John's kissings of Mary were a familiar part of homeroom.

In this, IP gerund phrases resemble that clauses and for infinitivals. Again like that clauses and infinitivals, IP gerunds may contain elements of tense and aspect: (2)

John's having kissed Mary.

IP gerund phra~~~ to_£ll~_!l:£~~,".~~~, NPs like idea or fa.ct in such constructions=as the idea of. These are very similar to the N' CP constructIon. Just as 190

191

with CP constructions involving that clauses or forinfinitivals, the head noun cannot be pluralized and only takes the determiner the. Of-ing gerund phrases may also enter ) into ofconstructions, but not so felicitously. (3.a) (3.b) (3.c) (3.d)

The idea of firing Fred The idea of Mary firing Fred nThe ideas of Mary's firing Fred ?The idea of Mary's firing of Fred

IP gerunds also resemble CP constructions in that they take felicitously some of the same predicates as that clauses (4.a-c) and infinitivals (4.h). Notably IP gerunds do not take felicitously predicates of pure propositions like true, attitude predicates or predicates of saying like say, assert, and so on except in certain adverbial constructions (4.i-j): (4.a) (4.b) (4.c) (4.d) (4.e) (4.f) (4.g) (4.h) (4.i) (4.j)

Mary's having hit Swanee is a fact (a possibility I hadn't thought of). Sam's being about to crown his brother is what his mother fears. Fred's kissing Susan surprised Bill, caused Mary to cry, and amazed Tina. *?Fred's kissing Mary is true. *?Fred kissing Mary is true. * Susan asserted Fred's hitting Bob. *Fred believed Sam's hitting Bob. Sam's crowning his brother was not a nice thing. Fred going out with Mary is something that Susan found hard to believe. It's hard to believe Aslan('s) running offlike that.

--

As the data in (3) already indicates, IP gerund phrases overlap in distribution with infinitivals. In fact, unmodified gerund phrases and infinitivals can often be used interchangeably; both IP gerund phrases and forinfinitivals can occur as arguments to permission verbs, though not with all projective attitude verbs or predicates: (5.a) (5.b) (5.c) (5.d)

Fred allowed Mary's sleeping in on Saturdays. Fred allowed Mary to sleep in on Saturdays. John's hitting Mary was a bad thing to do. *Mary wanted John's hitting Fred.

(5.a) and (5.b) do differ: (5.a) has a factive presupposition or at least implicature, \ which (5.b) lacks. The presupposition is that Mary did sleep in on Saturdays. (5.c) carries a similar presupposition. The data surveyed indicates that IP gerund phrases denote something in common ) with that clauses and infinitivals. The common ground of these constructions is the domain of facts and possibilities. So a plausible hypothesis is that IP gerunds denote h facts.1 IP gerunds do go well with ~!!!i'ye contexts--a pru:.@i~ f~c.l.C..9_Il~xt: John hitting Mary made her mad. We have/also seen that IP gerunds generate factive

s

{r"

f

CHAPTER FIVE

PROBLEMS FOR TIlE SEMANTICS OF NOMINALS

presuppositions. But notice that such presuppositions can be canceled in certain contexts:

subcategorized for possibilities or uncompleted events--at least events possible or incomplete with respect to the knowledge of the speaker--while those with past participles referring to completed events go well with predicates subcategorized for completed events or facts. Compare for instance:

192

(6)

Mary prevented John's kicking the cat.

(9.a) (9.b) (9.c) (9.d) (9.e) (9.f)

Given our analysis of the predicate fact, on which it generates a factive presupposition and a predicate typing the argument as a possibility, these examples should not oF .. /f,""'r' surprise. Thus, IP_g~ru!ld~m.~,YJ!lS!Hi~!!..()J~12Q§§i.l?Uiti~lwr.facts. There is some guestion as to wheth~!. IP ~~!!~_P.!t1:.~~!_s!~!l9~§.x<mLuaJities. Most IP gerund phrases combine with eventuality predicates very infelicitously. (7.a) (7.b) (7.c) (7.d) (7.e) (7.f) (7.g) (7.h) (7.i)

Ij I, II

i

??Fred's hitting Bill started after their argument. ?? Fred's shooting Bill was bloody. ?Fred's shooting Bill took place behind the bar. ?Fred's shooting Bill happened yesterday. *?She cried after his singing the Marseillaise. (Vendler) *Fred hitting Bill happened yesterday (started after their argument). *Fred shooting Bill was bloody. *Fred shooting Bill took place behind the bar. *She cried after him singing the Marseillaise.

?Mary's hitting John is a fact. Mary's hitting John occurred last Tuesday. Mary's having hit John is a fact. ?Mary's having hit John is a possibility I haven't thought of. *Mary's having hit John occurred last Tuesday. Mary's hitting John is a possibility I have thought of.

The predicate fact is also sensitive to aspect; it goes better with achievement or accomplishment verbs than stative or activity verbs. For instance, John's loving Mary ) is a fact is questionable, while John's winning the race is a fact is more acceptable.

2. TIlE SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF IP GERUNDS The syntactic analysis of IP gerunds is of a piece with the syntactic analyses of other norninals in chapter 4. The differences between the various gerunds begin with the scope of -ing in the syntactic analysis. In of-ing gerunds, the -ing has a V in its scope. My syntactic hypothesis concerning ACC-ing and POSS-ing gerunds is that they are nominalizations of a projection of V which contains at least some elements of the I structure (the aspectual and perhaps the tense, though not the modal features of English); that means that if we adhere to X' theory then an IP is a constituent of such gerund phrases. This syntactic assumption has important semantic consequences. The syntactic analyses of these constructions is much less secure than those examined in chapter 4. Both ACC- ing and POSS-ing gerund constructions contain at least a VP within the norninalization to account for the possibility of VP adverbial modification in these constructions. But arguments that such constructions contain I are controversial. Many analyses of these constructions have been proposed. 4 None is completely satisfactory. I have mostly followed the syntactic analyses suggested J by Reuland (1983) and Abney (1987). In some places I have diverged from their, accounts in order to solve problems that confront them.

These examples indicate that there is a big difference between IP gerunds and of-ing gerunds. Speakers find the same sentences with of-ing gerund phrases substituted in ( for the IP gerund phrases m..!!£!!.jJetter than (7.a-i). It is interesting to note that predicates like take place and happen are much more felicitous at least with these POSS-ingconstructions than other event-like predicates, but these two predicates are prime examples of predicates that take event-type arguments. All the other predicates in (7) are plainly event predicates, which leads one to suspect that IP gerund phrases don't introduce events. In particular, ACC-ing gerund phrases sound very bad with event predicates. In languages like French which have a form corresponding to the ACC-ing gerund (though not one corresponding to the POSS-ing gerund), gerund phrases cannot combine grammatically with such event predicates. 2 On the other hand, some data suggests that POSS-ing gerund phrases, especially tho~_~Hh9l!tl~1Q9_a)!Y1:~l!Ji~l:;fL~JL,*c.ts, go well with predicates that we would think ( , of as event predicates. Contrast, for instance, the examples in (7) with those of (8).3 (8.a) (8.b)

193

Building the Panama Canal took longer than expected. Gathering pecans in Central Texas starts in September.

2.1 ACC-ing Constructions as IPs

To complicate the pi~er, it appears that the tense and aspect of the verbal participle makes quite a difference in terms of the denotation of the IP gerund phrase as a whole. Propositional predicates sound worse with present and future tensed participles than with perfect or past participles. POSS-ing gerund phrases with present or future participles are perhaps slightly more felicitous with predicates

I tum now to the details of the ACC-ing gerund phrase. The subjects of ACC-ing constructions have accusative case, not possessive case. This signals an important difference for the syntactic structure of these constructions in contrast to the other gerund constructions and derived norninals. Another important difference between derived norninals and of-ing gerunds is that ACC-ing and POSS-ing gerunds do not

\

i

r

FIVE

admit adjectival modification of the nominal. So the syntactic structure for such nominals cannot contain an NP node, since the presence of such a node would entail the possibility of adjectival modification, as with of-ing gerund phrases and derived nominals. 5 But X' theory only requires for the DP analysis that D' have as daughters D and some maximal projection. That maximal projection could be lP itself. The -ing affix has an aspectual force, as we have already seen. So it naturally goes in I, with the result of making I and its projections (-v, +n). This commits us to a form of affixhopping; the -ing must hop from I to the verb. But this is no different from the usual affix-hopping required to explain the movement of tense and agreement features from I to the verb in English. I suppose that only lPs with the feature <-v, +n> may stay in a complement position of a DP. This leads to the following structure. DP, 'D'

D~~IP(+N,-V)

DP/~ I' (+N, - V)

I

I~VP

John +A-ing ~ kiss Mary In this structure, adjectival modification of the nominal is not possible. Adverbial modification is possible, since the structure contains a VP. One difficulty with the ACC-ing constructions is how to account for the case of the subject. Speakers prefer (lO.a) to (lO.b). (lO.a) Him hitting her so hard frightened Mary. (lO.b) ?He hitting her so hard frightened Mary. The subjects of the lP in an ACC-ing gerund construction get accusative case. My analysis offers one way to explain the accusative case that is assigned to the subject. 6 Since I is (-v, +n), there is no agreement marking in I. Consequently, I does not assign John nominative case. Since D and lP are sister nodes, however, it is possible in the above structure for the null determiner in D to assign case to John. I will assume that a lexically null determiner in D position optionally assigns exceptional case to the subject of the IP in the complement position. The null determiner assignsJohn accusative case in this configuration, according to a principle of exceptional case marking. 7 This case assigning configuration is not completely anomalous. For assigns case from the C position to the subject of an IP in the infinitival construction, and that configuration is analogous to this one. The structure I have proposed is not without problems, but I believe it can be defended. The first potential problem is that this analysis predicts that sentential adverbs are admissible in ACC-ing gerund constructions. They are inadmissable in

PROBLEMS FOR THE SEMANTICS OF NOMINALS

195

argument position--e.g., (ll.a). But they can occur in second position--e.g.,(11.b-c). 8 (l1.a) *Probably John going to the store was the result of their discussion. (11.b) John probably being a spy was hard news for the director of the Agency to take. (ll.c) The teacher's comment about Fred possibly having to repeat second grade came as no surprise to his parents. There is a possible explanation of this behavior. If we allow sentential adverbs in sentence initial position, then presumably they must attach to IP. This, however, would break the appropriate case assigning relation between the null determiner in the main D slot and John, at least if we assume that accusative case is assigned to John by the D. This case assigning relation appears similar to that in infinitival CP or exceptional case marking constructions, since sentential adverbs in front position are not allowed there either: (12.a) *For probably Fred to be a spy was unthinkable. (12.b) *John thought probably Fred to be a spy. (12.c) *John believed probably Fred to be a spy. In these constructions, the placement of the adverb breaks the case assignment relation. This seems to be good evidence that the explanation of case assignment in ACC-ing constructions also explains the distributional data about sentential adverbs. The requirement of case assignment would rule out the occurrence of sentential adverbs in front of the subject DP both for infinitivals and for ACC-ing constructions. With a syntactic analysis in place, the semantic interpretation of the ACC-ing construction is relatively straightforward. My hypothesis about case assignment entails that there must be a null determiner in the head position--sthe. But the nominal contains an entire lP. This yields under translation an entire subDRS, and so there are no argument places for the translation of the determiner to fill within the translation of the complement of the DP, which has given us the subDRS. If we suppose in natural language that vacuous quantification is prohibited, an assumption that has robust support, then we must assume that the nominal has an argument structure like that of a that clause and analogous to that given by the abstract argument transformation of derived nominals. The following transformation of the translation of the IP, where K is the DRS that usually results from IP, is forced by the presence of the sister D, if we are to avoid vacuous quantification. The silent determiner in the head D of the construction fills in the possibility argument place.

Both the syntax and the semantics of IP gerunds contribute to determining the appropriate type of discourse referent. An IP gerund construction introduces a

PROBLEMS FOR THE SEMANTICS OF NOMINALS possibility or a fact into the discourse. But according to my analysis of the predicate fact, this simply means that ACC-ing constructions introduce a possibility discourse referent and a factive presupposition. Some predicates of ACC-ing constructions may block this factive presupposition, in which case the ACC-ing construction will denote a possibility. If nothing blocks the factive presupposition, the ACC-ing construction will denote a fact. Possibilities are in effect possible facts, with the same identity conditions as facts. Facts, however, must always be actual. In the case of John kissing Mary, we introduce and characterize a possibility discourse referent, po, in the following partial DRS structure:

construction introduces in effect a fact discourse referent. Given the processing rule for presuppositions discussed in chapter 4 (section 4.3), alphabetic variants of the conditions and discourse referents declared in the characterizing DRS are entered into the main DRS. With the processing of the factive presupposition, the sentences (l3.a-b) are truth conditionally equivalent. Here is the DRS for (l3.a): f, x', e', y' f'"

AQ po '" I x, e, y John(x) Mary(y) e- kiss(x,y) Q(po)

(4.e)

x,e,y John(x) Bill(y) e- sprint past(x,y)

po

The null determiner introduces a discourse referent which the syntactic and semantic structure and content of the nominalized IP determine to be of possibility or fact type. This makes ACC-ing gerunds semantically very different from other nominals. The mandatory typing of the discourse referent as possibilities or facts accounts for the unacceptability of sentences like (4.e), repeated here:

197

welcome-sight(f) John(x') Bill(y') e'- sprint past(x',y')

2.2 POSS-ing Constructions as IPs The syntactic structure and semantic interpretation of POSS-ing gerunds is very close to that for ACC-ing constructions. Here is my analysis for John's kissing Mary.

*?Fred kissing Mary is true. DP

On the other hand, many attitude verbs and other complemented constructions accept facts as arguments. So my analysis allows that ACC-ing gerund constructions and CP constructions may occur in many of the same linguistic contexts. Also, ACC-ing gerunds yield completely standard subDRSs that include the content of the DP in accusative case. Abney (1987) reports that a sentence like some boy kissing Mary was too much for Fred to bear has both a wide and narrow scope reading for some boy; it may be some particular boy whose kissing of Mary breaks Fred, or it might be just any boy's kissing Mary that is too much for him. One can account for these scope ambiguities in the same way that one accounts for scope ambiguities involving that clauses. Finally, we must account for the synonymy of the pair (4.a-b) from chapter 4 repeated here: (l3.a) John sprinting past Bill was a welcome sight. (l3.b) John sprinted past Bill. It was a welcome sight. The difference between the two DRSs is only that the conditions introduced by the gerund phrase are not declared in the principal DRS (and so are not declared as "true"). The content of the gerund phrase is, however, presupposed in (l3.a). Here nothing blocks the factive presuppositions of the ACC-ing construction and so the

DP/~D' / Johni

D~IP(+N,-V) ~ DP/ ""-I' (+N, - V) li

I/~VP

+A-ing

~

kiss Mary I assume that John has moved before S-structure from its position within the IP to the specifying position of the whole DP, where it gets the usual possessive case that all DPs have in that position. Now I have assumed that D optionally assigns exceptional accusative case to the specifier position of the embedded IP. So in cases where D does not assign accusative case to the DP in situ, then John must move to the specifier position of the DP to receive case. Since the head of the DP dominates an I projection, the lexically null, abstract determiner must occur in the D position. The DP John in the specifier position of ,the main DP is the subject or Agent argument of the verb in the IP of POSS-ing gerunds, with case being assigned by the lexically null determiner. POSS-ing gerunds, like ACC-ing constructions, are

CHAPTER FIVE

PROBLEMS FOR TIlE SEMANTICS OF NOMINALS

predicted not to take lexically overt determiners, because the determiner position is already filled with the lexically null detenniner, which is needed to assign the appropriate case to the nominal subject. ACC-ing and POSS-ing gerunds are also both predicted to accept VP adverbial modification but not adjectival modification. In spite of these similarities, many syntacticians, however, have argued that there is a considerable difference between POSS-ing and ACC-ing gerund constructions. Horn (1975) produced many putative tests to show the difference between these constructions. Given that I am claiming that the syntactic structures between these two constructions are very close, I must examine these arguments carefully. Luckily for me, however, Portner (1990) has already pointed out that many of these tests do not work. For the few that do, a unifonn IP analysis of such constructions makes the appropriate predictions. (A discussion of the spurious differences between ACC-ing and POSS-ingconstructions occurs in the footnote to this sentence. 9) One distinction that Horn observes does indicate a syntactic difference between POSS-ing and ACCing constructions. He notes that pied piping for WH possessives is allowed in POSS-ingconstructions, but not for WH accusatives in ACC-ingconstructions:

a maximal projection, then it must dominate an IP. If the analysis is wrong, we must either reject the syntactic treatment of tense and aspect or X' theory, both of which are well established. I turn now to the semantic analysis. The syntactic structure of POSS-ing gerunds resembles that of ACC-ing gerunds. Let us again consider the POSS-ing construction John's kissing Mary. By my syntactic analysis, this construction includes an embedded IP, and so in particular the event argument place of kissing will be filled by the translation of the I, as is familiar from chapter 2. Again in order to avoid vacuous quantification, we are forced to the following translation of the IP. I assume that the movement of the DP John yields a lambda bound discourse referent variable and a linking rule connecting the argument place to the discourse referent introduced by John.

(14.a) The man whose flirting with your wife you took such exception to. (14.b) *The man who(m) flirting with your wife you took such exception to. But the syntactic analysis I am using accounts for this one observed difference between ACC-ing and POSS-ing constructions; it permits pied piping with POSSing gerunds, while the analysis for the ACC-ing construction does not. 10 My syntactic analysis does run into a familiar difficulty, however. The syntactic analysis of POSS-ing gerunds predicts that they should accept sentential (IP) modifiers. But several authors have claimed that POSS-ing gerunds do not combine with sentential adverbs or sentential adverbial PPs, when those adverbials occur in the second position (15.a-b).1 1 This contrasts with the behavior of ACC-ing gerunds. But it seems that such constructions are OK for some speakers if we change the tense or move the sentential adverbial as in (15.c-d): (I5.a) ? John's probably being a spy made the committee reject his application for a security clearance. (I5.b) ?? John's, to our delight, leaving so early distressed Susan. (15.c) John's probably having been a spy made the committee reject his application for a security clearance. (I5.d) John's leaving, to our delight, so early distressed Susan.

'Apo 'Ax po ""

199

e,y Mary(y) e- kiss(x, y)

My assumptions about case, familiar from chapter 4, imply a null determiner in head D position. The predicative DRS now combines with the partial DRS derived from sthe to get the following partial DRS:

'Ax 'AQ

po e,y po ""

Mary(y) e- kiss(x , y)

Q(po) This combines with the translation of John in the usual way, giving us:

'AQ

po, u John(u) po"" e,y Mary(y) e- kiss(u, y) Q(po)

(15.a-b), I conclude, fail to show that POSS-ing gerunds do not have an analysis on which the DP dominates an IP.12 The DP over IP analysis is, in any case, implied by some well-entrenched assumptions: since POSS-ing gerund phrases take temporal and aspectual modifications (an auxiliary verb is sometimes included within a gerund), the construction must contain some component of I. If the D' is to dominate a maximal projection,. then it must dominate an IP. If the analysis is wrong, we must

As with ACC-ing constructions, the presence of the DP over IP introduces a type restriction on the discourse referent introduced by the nominal. Given that a possibility discourse referent is introduced which may turn into a fact discourse referent if nothing blocks the factive presuppositions of the construction, we cannot combine such a construction with a true propositional predicate. We thus predict the

CHAPTER FIVE

200

r I

If the factive presuppositions of an IP gerund are not blocked, it will end up denoting a fact. But sometimes these presuppositions are blocked. This occurs for example in (6), repeated below, where the factive presupposition is blocked by the main verb.

(6)

Mary prevented John's kicking the cat.

In contrast to the DRS for (l3.a), there is no copying of the conditions of the subDRS into the principal DRS. The semantics of prevent prevents this. Since the factive presuppositions are blocked in this case, the construction procedure will yield the following DRS for (6): po, u, x, e Mary(u) e'- prevent(u, po) John(x) e,y po'" cat(y) e- kick(x,y) Let us take stock of my analysis of IP gerunds. First it explains why IP gerunds in general do not go well with event predicates. IP gerunds, which incorporate an I, cannot introduce event discourse referents that could fill the event argument places in those event predicates. Incorporating inflectional elements within the ACC-ing and POSS-ing gerund nominal, however, yields appropriate translations for the past and present forms of the gerund, which are present in many languages. While the inflection node in a present gerund introduces a discourse referent that overlaps the temporal perspective point set by the reference point of the matrix verb, the I in a past gerund introduces an event discourse referent that is prior to the reference point set by the matrix clause verb, as is evident from this sentence: (16)

His having lost his driver's license once made John an especially careful driver when the cops were around.

If we treat having lost as a past tense or perfective gerund, we would have to interpret its syntactic structure as containing an I node. My syntactic analysis seems to be required for those gerunds in which inflection is lexically realized, if we wish to keep within the bounds of X' syntax. My general principles for semantic interpretation then predict that IP gerunds with past tense or perfective gerunds, which must have an IP analysis, are always infelicitous with event predicates. Such IP gerunds must denote saturated abstract entities like possibilities or facts. Second, my analysis explains semantically why gerund phrases don't combine with standard overt determiners. Such determiners contribute a discourse referent to a

PROBLEMS FOR THE SEMANTICS OF NOMINALS

201

predicative DRS and may introduce a complex logical structure. But if one of these lexically realized determiners were to combine with the translation of an 1', e, the discourse referent introduced by the determiner would have to go in for the subject argument of e to prevent vacuous quantification. But then we would not be able to find a suitable interpretation for the DP in specifier position of these abstract nominals. Only the abstract determiner introduces the condition to avoid this difficulty. Third, my analysis gives a semantic account of why gerund nominals do not pluralize. 13 Pluralization of NPs is an operation that converts A-abstracts (the translations of N') of one type into A-abstracts of another type. For instance, pluralization converts of-ing gerunds from a A-abstract over individual events to a Aabstract over groups of events. But in the case of I gerunds, the relation", takes a DRS structure and a discourse referent as semantic arguments. The denotation of a DRS s~cture is just itself, never a group of objects. Further, the DRS uniquely charactenzes the other argument of "'. Pluralization of an IP gerund would make no sense semantically. Fourth, in the semantic interpretation, fact and possibility discourse referents typically map under an embedding function to abstract objects that obey the law of intensional identity. This accords with the data on facts of chapter 1. Since we have distinguished between facts and propositions, my analysis also explains why IP gerund constructions do not go well with predicates like true that take only proposition like entities as arguments. Fifth, my analysis predicts, given the flexibility of the DRS construction procedure, scope ambiguities for the quantifier in subject position.1 4 One can interpret the DP in subject position as being contained within the semantic content of either form of the IP gerund: (17.a) John's puerile behavior precluded anyone's having a good time at the party. (17.b) John's puerile behavior precluded anyone having a good time at the party. In (17 .a-b) anyone is a negative polarity item, and so it must be included within the complement of the verb, preclude, which creates a negative polarity context. The DRS construction procedure permits the noun phrase to be interpreted as having wide scope over the null determiner as well, if we appeal to the usual scoping mechanisms used within DRS construction. By combining the partial DRS produced from the moved DP with the predicative DRS constructed from the I' , we can get the desired narrow scope reading. The construction procedure, with its flexible routines for combining partial and predicative DRSs, allows both interpretations of John's loving Mary. 15 Difficulties for the DP over IP analysis arise with the POSS-ing gerunds examples (8.a-b) (8.a)

Building the Panama Canal took longer than expected.

PROBLEMS FOR THE SEMANTICS OF NOMINALS (8.b)

Gathering pecans in Central Texas starts in September.

The gerund in (8.a-b) must denote an event and not a specific fact, because of the selectional restrictions of the main verb. The general interpretive rules do not permit the nominal to contribute an event discourse referent as an argument to the main verb. To explain the apparent event readings of POSS-ing gerunds, one might claim that at least some POSS-ing constructions have a different syntactic analysis, which I'll call the DP over VP analysis. On the DP over VP analysis, the nominalizing affix has as a VP the maximal verbal projection in its scope rather than an IP. I do not know how to give such an analysis within the confines of X' theory without at the same time introducing an NP node, which would then wrongly predict that adjectival modification for POSS-ing gerunds is possible.1 6 The best I can do is the unorthodox tree: DP, 'D'

/"'- VP

D -ing

The DP over VP analysis commits us to a stronger form of the affix hopping hypothesis than the IP analyses commit us to. Further, the DP over VP analysis does not seem to be possible for either ACC-ing gerunds or POSS-ing gerunds with lexically realized inflectional elements; the inflectional elements belong to I and so such constructions naturally subscribe to the DP over IP analysis. Finally, the DP over VP analysis predicts that POSS-ing gerunds do not take sentential adverbs, but they do in at least some positions. So the DP over VP analysis has flaws. A crucial difference between the DP over VP analysis and the DP over IP analysis for POSS-ing gerunds appears in the semantic interpretation. For the semantic interpretation of a VP in my theory is a two place property. One of the argument places of the VP property is of event type. For instance, the translation of the VP in (8.a) is:

MAe

y

r---~--------~

x -build(e, y) Panama Canal(y)

One should compare this predicative DRS with one that is the translation of an IP like that on page 199. A predicative DRS like that above may combine according to the principles of DRS construction with the translation of the determiner sthe. Such a translation will contribute an event argument to the VP translation. The result of this combination will be a familiar partial DRS:

AX AQ

203

e, Y e-build(x, y) Panama Canal(y) Q(e)

The locality principle (RLP) fills in the missing subject argument with a discourse referent declared within the DRS component of the partial DRS constructed for the DP.

AQ

I

e,x, y e-build(x, y) Panama Canal(y) Q(e)

The DP over VP analysis also predicts fact readings of POSS-ing gerunds, if the abstract argument transformation of the gerund is used. (RLP) then fills in both the event and subject argument place of the nominal. But it does not tell us why both readings are not always possible--and hence it fails to predict the judgments in (7). The DP over VP analysis is also not ideal, because it fails to explain why no standard determiners combine with any of the gerund constructions. Why cannot standard determiners bind event arguments in gerunds when they can do so in derived nominal and of-ing constructions? But subjectless gerunds with clear event readings refuse to take ordinary determiners: (18)

*Some (a) building the Panama Canal took longer than expected.

The DP over IP analysis supplies a neat explanation for this phenomenon. Further, the examples motivating the DP over VP analysis are quite fragile. An obvious eventuality predicate in (19.a) does not combine with the POSS-ing construction; much better is the event denoting of-ing gerund. (19.a) *?Gathering pecans in Central Texas lasted two months. (19.b) The gathering of pecans in Central Texas lasted two months. (19.a) indicates that the POSS-ing gerund does not denote an event. So perhaps some curious interaction between the generic interpretation of the present tense and the fact denoted by gathering pecans in Central Texas accounts for the iterative event reading of (8.b). There is perhaps something peculiar about the predicates take and start. Infmitivals also take these predicates, although their syntactic analysis as CPs is quite secure and with the usual DRS construction procedure they do not introduce eventuality discourse referents. So do some noun phrases with abstract nouns. (20.a) To build the Panama Canal took longer than expected (20.b) For America to build the Panama Canal took longer than expected. _

PROBLEMS FOR TIlE SEMANTICS OF NOMINALS (20.c) This possibility starts in September. (20.d) This possibility has taken longer to materialize than we had hoped. A possible hypothesis is that the event readings of sentences such as (20.a-b) or (8.ab) rely on a particular semantic function of these predicates. The predicate take longer than expected might in some cases also take abstract objects like projective propositions or possibilities and return events; such predicates are about the realization of their abstract object arguments. If that is right, we do not need a special syntactic analysis, then, to account for the eventuality-denoting behavior of POSS-ing gerunds. The DP over VP analysis is not compelling, at the very least. The DP over IP analysis seems best both for ACC-ing and POSS-ing gerunds.

3. NAKED INFINITIVES The last sentential nominal I will discuss is the naked infinitive construction. In chapter 1, I assigned a special sort of denotation to NI complements. This tight correlation between syntactic type and type of abstract object is suspicious; it does not exist anywhere else in natural language metaphysics. It turns out that this fit may indeed be an illusion. Like the gerunds, NI complements have a mysterious and controversial syntactic structure. Many claim NI complements to be sentential nominalizations of some sort. On this view, the syntax of NI perception contexts yields the following labeled bracketing: [NP [see [NP VP]IP]Yp]S. Others have denied that NI complements are real syntactic constituents. They have taken the structure of a naked infinitive perception report to be [NP [see NP VP]yp]S. As I argued in chapter 1, however, at the semantic level, NI perception verbs have an object argument that can be referred to and quantified over.

of seeing, and the event-type given by the embedded verb, and assume that the construction presupposes that the event-type argument is realized. This suggests the following gloss on NI perception. First, NI perception involves a particular psychological state, the state of perceiving an event of a certain type. The predicative subDRS that is an argument to the perception predicate see context serves to characterize the psychological state in a way similar to the way subDRSs structurally characterize belief states. If the semantics of perception reports exploits the structure and content of the DRS in the way that the semantics for propositional attitudes in chapter 3 exploits the content and structure of the propositional object of those attitudes, the mental state component of the seeing will be highly intensional. But if the noun phrases in the embedded IP are taken to have wide scope over the seeing context, the construction procedure dictates that only the condition given by the verb falls inside the DRS. This condition is the intensional component of NI perception contexts argued for in Asher and Bonevac (1985b). An NI perception context also generates a particular sort of factive presupposition or condition. The factive presupposition copies the material inside the subDRS into the main DRS, but always within the scope of the quantifiers from the NI clause. Thus if a negative quantifier occurs within the NI clause and has wide scope over the NI context as our construction requires, the factive presupposition will be automatically blocked. This captures the factivity inferences described in Asher and Bonevac (I985b). As an example of this approach to NI perception contexts, let us consider the processing of the first clause of (2I.a). The IP argument to see contributes a predicative DRS. Assuming that the DPs involved in the IP obligatorily take wide scope over see and so quantify into the seeing context,18 we end up with the DRS on the left for the first clause of (21.a) without the processing of the factive presupposition and the DRS on the right with the factive presupposition displayed. 19 x y, e

(2l.a) John sees Mary run, and Sam sees it too. (2I.b) John saw whatever Mary saw. There are a number of constraints upon any satisfactory analysis of NI perception contexts. Perception verbs are semi-transparent attitudes in that they license a considerable number of substitution inferences, but they are not wholly transparent. 17 Accordingly, noun phrases in an NI complement are to be interpreted as if they had wide scope over the seeing context, as in Asher and Bonevac (1985a). Since NI complements are taken to have null inflection, they yield, according to the DRS construction procedure I have developed, a predicative DRS with an abstracted eventuality argument place or event type. In order to verify the inferences required of NI perception reports in Asher and Bonevac (I985b), one must identify the arguments of a perception verb as involving the property ascribed to that event determined by the verb in the NI complement report. One might be tempted then to take the semantic arguments of the NI perception predicate to be the agent, the event

205

John(x) Mary(y) e-see(x, Ae'

x, y, e e'

~)

John(x) Mary(y) e-see(x, Ae' ~)

~

e'-run(y)

~

My approach to NI perception contexts does away with situations, but it preserves the inference patterns that motivated the introduction of situations. Further, it predicts some of the observations that have motivated the view of Higginbotham (1985) and Parsons (1990) that NI perception complements denote events--in particular the synonymy between (22.a) John saw Mary arrive. (22.b) John saw an arrival of Mary. (22.c) John saw an arriving of Mary.

CHAPTERFNE

PROBLEMS FOR THE SEMANTICS OF NOMINALS

While the nominals in (22.b-c) denote eventualities among the saturated entities, both of-ing gerunds and derived nominals may also denote event types in the appropriate contexts using (RLP) and the abstract argument translation. Moreover, there is a serious flaw with the event analysis of NI complements when we look at the anaphoric examples. Consider:

DRSs relative to Ef, where Ef is the relation determined by sameness of intensional content. To state the principle in more ordinary, philosophical language: for any possible facts fl and f2' 0 (Obtain(f l ) <-> Obtain(f2» ~ fl = f2' where Obtain(f l ) is true at a world and time iff f is actual at w and t. The construction procedure also yields a very liberal principle of comprehension. This supports our constraints on the domain of facts elaborated in chapter 1. Propositions, on the other hand, are characterized by alphabetic variant DRSs, DRSs varying possibly only on the discourse referents declared in them. For propositions PI and P2, PI = P2 just in case they are characterized by the same equivalence class of DRSs relative to Ep, where Ep is the equivalence relation determined by alphabetic variance. Further, the DRS construction procedure and the definition of a DRS automatically yield together the idempotence axiom and a liberal principle of comprehension. Thus we have remained faithful to the view of propositions sketched in chapter 1. The DRS construction procedure, on the other hand, requires that eventualities be rather coarse grained and extensional entities. Again this accords with the picture of chapter 1. But other individuation principles for events, like Kim's (1966), are also possible.

206

(23)

John did not see Sam take the money, and Mary didn't see it either.

The difficulty for the event theorist in getting the truth conditions of (23) right is that the event discourse referent putatively introduced by the complement of see in the first clause lies within the scope of the negation sign. Thus, it is not accessible to the discourse referent introduced by it in the second clause, unless the negation has scope over the second clause too. But this scope for negation would give incorrect truth conditions. The acceptability of the anaphoric link has to do with the way the discourse structure affects anaphora. The parallel structure between the two clauses allows us to get an appropriate anaphoric link, though not to an event. Details will come in chapters 6-8 .

207

.1

4. CORRESPONDENCES AND CONNECTIONS BETWEEN ABSTRACT OBJECTS My analysis of nominals began with three problems that any such analysis should solve. I return to them now. The first was to give a systematic account of the semantics of sentential nominals. I have done that, and I have exhibited the relations between the semantics for sentences and their nominalizations. The second problem concerned the spectra of nouniness and world immanence. I have shown how to account for that correlation too, though some open questions remain--e.g., about the relation of facts to events and about the plastic character of the typology. I address these problems now. Section 5 will concern itself with the last problem, the problem of event negation.

4.2 The Spectra of Nouniness and World Immanence do not Correlate Completely Philosophers have traditionally associated many of these sentential nominals with different denotations. That clauses were claimed to denote propositions or facts, gerund phrases facts or possibilities, and derived nominals events or pro