Recasting Anthropological Knowledge Inspiration and Social Science
This collection of original essays provides an inno...
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Recasting Anthropological Knowledge Inspiration and Social Science
This collection of original essays provides an innovative and multifaceted reflection on the impact and inspiration of the scholarship of eminent anthropologist Marilyn Strathern. A distinguished team of international contributors, all former students of Strathern, reflect on the impact of their relationship with their teacher and address the wider conceptual contribution of her work through their own writings. The essays provide an accessible entry into Strathern’s scholarship for those new to her work and a rich source of material which mobilises and deploys her concepts, including new ethnographic examples and discussion of contemporary political issues, for those more familiar with her scholarship. The result is a collection that dissects, contextualises and reroutes concepts of relationality, inspiration and knowledge in novel and unpredictable ways. Recasting Anthropological Knowledge will prove invaluable to all students of anthropology and will be of interest to scholars across the social sciences. Jeanette Edwards is Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Manchester. Maja Petrovic´-Sˇteger is a Junior Research Fellow in Social Anthropology at Peterhouse, Cambridge.
Recasting Anthropological Knowledge: Inspiration and Social Science Edited by
Jeanette Edwards and
Maja Petrovic´-Sˇteger
cambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sa˜o Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107009684 © Cambridge University Press 2011 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2011 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Recasting anthropological knowledge : inspiration and social science / edited by Jeanette Edwards, Maja Petrovic´-Sˇteger. p. cm. ISBN 978-1-107-00968-4 (hardback) 1. Ethnology – Philosophy. 2. Ethnology – Research. 3. Knowledge, Sociology of. 4. Strathern, Marilyn – Criticism and interpretation. I. Edwards, Jeanette, 1954– II. Petrovic´-Sˇteger, Maja. GN345.R429 2011 301.01–dc23 2011020071 ISBN 978-1-107-00968-4 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
For Marilyn Strathern
Contents
List of contributors Acknowledgements 1
Introduction: on recombinant knowledge and debts that inspire jeanette edward s and maja petrovic´ -sˇ t eg er
page ix xii
1
2
Writing the parallax gap: an itinerary debbora b attaglia
19
3
Too big to fail ann eli se ri les
31
4
‘Hybrid custom’ and legal description in Papua New Guinea melissa demian
49
5
Entomological extensions: model huts and fieldworks ann kelly
70
6
Kinship and the core house: contested ideas of family and place in a Ghanaian resettlement township thomas ya rrow
88
Invisible families: imagining relations in families based on same-sex partnerships aivita putnin¸ a
106
Knowledge in a critical mode: feminist expertise in design and planning ee va berglund
125
7
8
vii
viii
Contents
9 Spools, loops and traces: on etoy encapsulation and three portraits of Marilyn Strathern maja p etrovic´ -sˇ teger 10
Inspiring Strathern ad am reed
Bibliography Index
145 165
183 199
Contributors
debbora ba ttagli a is Professor of Anthropology at Mount Holyoke and Five College Anniversary Professor. She has published widely on personhood, selfhood, identities and alienness, and recently has turned to nature–culture exchanges in outer space as sites of ethnographic inquiry. eeva berglund is an independent scholar and writer on urban anthropology, environmental thought and politics. Her history of Women’s Design Service, Doing Things Differently, was published in 2007. She is on the editorial team of the Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society. meli ssa demian is Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of Kent. Drawing on her fieldwork in the Suau-speaking region of southeastern Papua New Guinea, she has published on the subjects of child adoption, the village court and land mediation systems, historical relationships with missionaries and the idea of ‘culture loss’. She also writes and publishes on wider topics in legal anthropology such as the ‘cultural defence’ and the concept of community in legal discourse. jea nette e dwards is Professor of Social Anthropology at Manchester University. She has published widely on kinship and assisted reproductive technologies and has a long-standing research interest in the anthropology of Britain and, in particular, on changing contours of class, community, indigeneity and expertise. ann kelly is a lecturer in Anthropology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, University of London. Her work ix
x
List of contributors
explores the production of scientific facts in Africa, with special attention to the built environments, material artefacts and practical labours of experimentation. She has also published on malaria control interventions, considering how rural and urban spaces are configured to manage the flow of human, parasite and mosquito populations. maja petrovic´ -sˇ teger is Research Fellow in Social Anthropology at Peterhouse College, Cambridge. She explores various contexts where bodies – whether living, dead or in the form of medically usable remains – become the sites of economic, legal, political, scientific and artistic attention. Her publications are based on her fieldwork in Serbia, Tasmania and Switzerland. aivita putnin¸ a is Director and Senior Researcher at the Centre for Bioethics and Biosafety and a Lecturer in Anthropology at the University of Latvia in Riga. Her long-standing academic interests cover topics of sexuality, homophobia, biotechnologies and reproductive health policies. ad am reed is Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of St Andrews. He conducted his original fieldwork in Papua New Guinea. That work focuses on issues around cultures of incarceration, including attention to colonial and postcolonial governmentality, the politics of vision, money and aesthetics of documents. More recently, he has conducted research in the UK, with a focus on popular theorisations of the city and urban knowledge, practices of fiction reading, memory, mind and literary subjectivities. He is the author of Papua New Guinea’s Last Place: Experiences of Constraint in a Postcolonial Prison, and the forthcoming Literature and Agency in English Fiction Reading: A Study of The Henry Williamson Society. annelise riles is the Jack G. Clarke Chair in Far East Legal Studies and Professor of Anthropology at Cornell University. Her work focuses on the transnational dimensions of legal theories, doctrines and institutions. She has conducted legal and anthropological research in China, Japan and the Pacific and has written extensively on cultural problems in the law. She is the author of The Network Inside Out,
List of contributors
xi
Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law, Documents: Artifacts of Modern Knowledge and the forthcoming Collateral Knowledge. thomas yarrow is Lecturer in Social Anthropology at Bangor University. Through research in Ghana and the UK he has developed research interests in a range of areas including NGOs and development organisations, globalisation, civil society, the anthropology of organisations, elites, the anthropology of development, and space and place.
Acknowledgements
This book is inspired by, and dedicated to, Dame Professor Marilyn Strathern. It is one of a number of ways in which her colleagues have attempted to express their gratitude and appreciation of her scholarship, intellectual generosity, kindness and integrity, as well as her unstinting support, over the years, of anthropology and anthropologists. It is, above all, a way of saying thank you. Earlier versions of four of the chapters (Petrovic´-Sˇteger, Putnin¸a, Reed and Yarrow) were first presented at a panel at the biannual conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists in Ljubljana, 2008. The panel brought together anthropologists who had been supervised by Marilyn as doctoral students and was convened as a tribute to her in the year she ‘officially’ retired. The panel also included papers from Lissant Bolton, Tony Crook and James Leach, and the editors would like to thank them and the audience, as well as Samuelle Carlson, Terence Hay-Edie, He´lena Regius and Ilana Gershon, for their different contributions to the more dispersed and broader Festschrift. Jeanette Edwards would also like to acknowledge and thank Verena Stolcke and Christina Toren for early conversations about how best to mark Marilyn’s retirement. For her work on the final manuscript, we would like to thank Patricia Scalco; for his enthusiasm and impeccable professionalism, Richard Fisher at Cambridge University Press; for her help at the beginning and the end of this book, Fay Faunch at Girton College, Cambridge; and an anonymous reader for pertinent and perceptive comments on an earlier version of the collection. The people named here are just a few amongst many who would, we know, want us to add their thanks to those of the editors and authors of this collection to Marilyn Strathern as teacher and colleague par excellence. xii
1
Introduction: on recombinant knowledge and debts that inspire Jeanette Edwards and Maja Petrovic´-Sˇteger
The chapters in this collection are connected through the inspiration they draw from the scholarship of Marilyn Strathern, one of the most compelling and innovative social anthropologists of contemporary times. From early fieldwork and a series of monographs on the Hagen people of Papua New Guinea, Strathern earned a reputation as a Melanesianist, but her theoretical interests have always also been oriented towards Euro-American (that is, her own) society. Scholars in both the social sciences and the humanities know her as a feminist and trailblazing anthropologist of, amongst other things, new reproductive technologies, gender, kinship, economics and law. Over a forty-year career, Strathern has insisted on the constructed nature of such marks of professional and other identification, often convening them into new relations or radically recasting their accepted bearing to each other. Strathern’s reconfigurations have yielded a number of particularly invigorating conceptions of knowledge that have surprised in both their representations and their effects. Her pioneering works on the social and cultural dimension and implications of a range of technological and ethical changes in our time have had a defining, or perhaps a definitively unsettling, role in articulations of what is at stake in a number of current research projects across the humanities and social sciences. How, then, to begin to unpack and introduce Strathern’s enormous contribution to scholarship generally and social anthropology specifically? Chronologically? Thematically? Through an archaeology of her key concepts? A review of her writings? Such strategies seem inadequate – inappropriate even. They go against the grain, risking the imposition of an arbitrary structure on a contribution 1
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that defies a linear account and is as immeasurable as it is uncontainable. Strathern’s writings hold up for scrutiny familiar and ‘taken for granted’ concepts and she pays sharp attention to the premises on which ‘western’ scholarship is built. Such a compulsion is as destabilising as it is exhilarating and its impact, as noted above, is felt beyond the discipline of social anthropology. Yet ‘impact’, again, does not seem quite the right word.1 Strathern’s insights are subtle. They get under the skin and niggle. They work on you as much as you (have to) work on them. The authors of the chapters presented in this collection take various strategies and we take our lead from them. Their brief was to pick up, run with and depart from key Strathernian concepts by way of their own current research. The result is something more stable than such metaphors of flight suggest. Instead of running, the authors of these chapters have decided to dwell. Debbora Battaglia (beginning this volume), for example, remarking on the generosity with which Strathern cites her students and colleagues and on how she reworks and re-worlds their ethnographic accounts, shows what it might mean to accompany rather than depart from Strathern: in her words, to go a-worlding with her. Adam Reed (ending this volume) is more cautious: for him, it is a moot point whether Strathern’s generosity in citing her students is evidence of her having been inspired by them: but, dwelling on the concept of inspiration itself, Reed reveals its unbidden, all-encompassing, dynamic and deeply social and sociable nature. Multiple flows of inspiration run through the various chapters in this volume and not only between Strathern and her students. Bearing in mind, however, that Strathern’s analytical categories have a tendency to dislocate and introduce incommensurabilities of time, place and scale between what, from another perspective, are tokens of the same current social meaning, our attempt to dwell in analytical restlessness poses a particular challenge. In After nature, Strathern outlines a working conception of merographic connection. Similar to but not the same as the relationship between part and whole, a merographic connection depicts the capacity in EuroAmerican thinking to connect up entities, tropes, images and so forth in 1
And even less so at a time when ‘impact’ is mooted in the UK as an appropriate measurement of the worthiness of research.
Introduction
3
domains of knowledge: connection in one domain entails disconnection from another. ‘Nature’ and ‘culture’, for example, are similar (connected) in the sense that they operate in comparable ways while having laws of their own. ‘Culture’ and ‘nature’ work in different fields of fact; each elicits, and is elicited by, sets of connections which differentiate the pair. Difference, then, becomes ‘connection from another angle’ (1992a: 73). Strathern’s tendency and capacity to rework and recombine knowledge originating elsewhere – in other persons and other relations – can itself be seen as an instance of the merographic. She unmoors ethnographic insight from its origins, and unhitches common idioms from familiar domains, mobilising them in a different conversation and connecting them in often unexpected but always productive ways. The authors of the chapters in this book follow suit: they make connections between their work and hers and in so doing make explicit her influence. They also, however, work their ethnography through contiguous research in their field and with the subjects and persons of their study. It is the duplex characteristic of these chapters specifically and the book generally that we want to flag here. While this volume pays tribute and is profoundly connected to Strathern it is also devolved from her and pursues its own lines of enquiry. Continuing the theme of the duplex, we introduce the authors to you twice: once through some of their specific concepts and then through their place in the structure of this book. First we should note that the thematically diverse chapters in this volume are also linked by the person of the authors. They were all supervised by Strathern as PhD students and their diversity in terms of ethnographic sites, styles of writing, and what they have chosen, or felt compelled, to do for a volume that deliberately makes reference to her ideas and influence is indicative of her eclecticism and intellectual generosity. Strathern has a canny capacity for forging and maintaining relationships across institutions and disciplines, but perhaps more noteworthy, here, is her capacity for nurturing relationships with and between individuals ‘across the board’. This latter characteristic is recognised by colleagues (see, for example, Benthall 1994) perhaps because, in itself, it is remarkable in the world of British academia where antennae are often, and still, finely tuned to all kinds of distinction. It is almost an anthropological truism to say that Strathern takes ‘the relation’ seriously at all levels.
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Recombinant knowledge The anthropological relation that Strathern unpacks is a duplex: simultaneously conceptual and interpersonal (and see both Riles and Putnin¸a, this volume). Connections between idioms of thought run in tandem with connections between persons (with specific histories). This volume is itself an example of the duplex nature of the anthropological relation. Its contributors have benefited from their relationship with the person of Strathern and owe a personal debt which they cannot, should they wish to do so, completely unhitch from the relationship between their and her ideas (and see Reed, this volume). Yet even though the duplex nature of ‘the relation’ might mean it is partisan to privilege one aspect (for example, the conceptual) above the other (for example, the interpersonal), our intention was to be partisan: to black box the interpersonal and engage the conceptual. The authors have succeeded in doing this: they have engaged Strathern conceptually and run with her ideas in novel and unpredictable ways. Moreover, in the nature of the anthropological relation, the following chapters are also, and significantly, each an instantiation of a specific interpersonal relationship. The anthropological relation that Strathern unpacks is also a tool: anthropology’s technology. Like the biotechnologist’s use of enzymes to splice and combine DNA where ‘life is put to work on life . . . the anthropologist uses relations to explore relations’ (Strathern 2005a: 7). Extending the analogy with recombinant DNA, we draw on the notion of recombinant knowledge to flag the novel entities forged through splicing and melding different ways of knowing. Recombinant knowledge serves as an organising trope for this collection on various levels. First, as a whole, the volume brings together (recombines in novel form) the writing and ideas (knowledge-making) of anthropologists whose regular stomping grounds do not usually overlap. Here, researchers who work on Melanesian law and aesthetics enter into conversation with those exploring Japanese corporate business models, insect experimentation in Africa, and same-sex parents in Latvia: how might Strathernian projects link relations among such authors? Second, the term introduces individual chapters which themselves recombine
Introduction
5
different kinds of knowledge: for example, anthropological and entomological (Kelly); categorical and relational (Putnin¸a); customary and judicial (Demian); design and feminist (Berglund). Third, each author engages (combines) Strathern. While it might be trite to note that they deploy different Strathernian concepts and draw on different writings, and that, between them, they cover publications that span three decades and more, it is nevertheless exciting to see the range of insights that have ‘grabbed’ them and how they have, in turn, put those insights to work. As Strathern herself remarked, ‘[t]o argue with an idea is to be captured by it’ (2006a: 203). The authors here have clearly been captured by Strathern but their chapters also show that they have not been held captive.
Recombinant technology Paul Berg received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his part in developing techniques for recombining DNA in vitro in 1980. The award was not given, however, without dispute over the ‘true’ origins and ‘real inventors’ of the technology. As in all ground-breaking science, perhaps in all science, a linear narrative with a focus on a single scientist hardly captures the sources, pooling and sedimentation of knowledge that makes for any ‘breakthrough’ (a theme explored also in Demian’s and Berglund’s chapters of this volume). Such narratives will not do justice to the ways in which ideas circulate, lose their moorings, get appropriated, rerouted and adapted and are put to work for different ends than those for which they were conceived. Nonetheless the technology that allowed two DNAs to be combined was granted a patent the same year that Berg received the Nobel Prize. The patent named Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer, responsible for developing the technique that allowed DNA to be cloned, as ‘sole inventors’. Reconstructing an inevitable multiplicity of origin, Doogab Yi (2008) has assembled the key actors and events that led to the Asilomar Conference of 1974 and the application for a patent on DNA cloning technology the same year. As a historian of science, Yi connects key actors, a chronology of events and the social and political climate in which they occurred. His purview and connections differ from those of the scientists; in Strathernian terms, he ‘summons other contexts’. Berg
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Jeanette Edwards and Maja Petrovic´-Sˇteger
himself writes that the exact chain of events in developing recombinant technology has escaped him: ‘Time and faulty memory have obscured some of the circumstances and events that led to the scientific breakthrough and the path to Asilomar’ (Berg 2004). For Yi, it was Berg’s paper reporting on his method for inserting genetic information into viral DNA, published in 1972, that ‘heralded a new era for gene manipulation’ (Yi 2008: 613). This paper paved the way for the creation of hybrid genes stemming from different organisms. Berg’s subsequent research, which aimed to insert viral DNA into Escherichia coli bacteria, rang alarm bells, however, and concerns were raised about the safety of the procedure. What were the risks in creating transgenic bacteria for which there were no known antibodies? Could they be controlled? Would they constitute a biohazard? The Asilomar Conference of 1974 in northern California is remembered for agreeing a voluntary moratorium on further rDNA research and being instigated by the scientists themselves. Yi writes of how, after the conference and the agreements reached there, the move by Cohen at Stanford University and Boyer at UC, San Francisco to file patent for rDNA came as a surprise. In the subsequent controversy, Cohen and Boyer claimed that universities rather than industry should benefit from the commercial potential of the technology. For their critics, not only was the timing bad but also the fact of the application itself was questionable. Should those who called for a moratorium now be seeking right of ownership on research that had been suspended? Why were there only two named ‘inventors’? Should higher education institutions benefit from research that had been funded by taxpayers? These questions and more exercised critics and supporters alike. The patent application was initially rejected on the grounds of ‘prior arts’. It was, eventually granted, however, in 1980 and two other rDNA patents followed in 1984 and 1988. According to Yi, the first patent of 1980 helped ‘transform this new techno-cultural entity – genetic engineering – into a new legal and commercial form – biotechnology’ (Yi 2008: 628). It struck the spark that ignited the explosion of the biotechnology industry on North America’s west coast. Strathern has eloquently charted the implications of a shift from discovery to invention. Invention, she points out, modifies nature;
Introduction
7
discovery does not. Patents acknowledge modification, inscribing the work and effort of the scientist. Recall here the oft-cited John Moore who the Supreme Court of the State of California decided had no property claim on cells taken from his body (Rabinow 1996). The point was that he had no claim on any financial profit gained from the stem cell line that had been developed, by a team at UCLA, from the cancerous cells of his spleen. The cells had been modified and, no longer the original raw material, they could be, and were, patented. John Moore’s body cells had been cultured-up in more ways than one. Invention, to borrow again from Strathern, cuts the network: in John Moore’s case it cut the links between the source of original material and its beneficiaries. In the case of the Cohen and Boyer patent, it cut out other persons and relations through which knowledge had been routed. Adam Reed (this volume) makes the interesting and eloquent observation that the work of drafting and redrafting a text makes the author. What may have been initially inspired by or borrowed from another is, with effort, reauthored: the inspired, in Reed’s terms, is rendered uninspired or more nearly self-sufficient. Of course, this process, as we can read for ourselves in his chapter, renders the final text no less inspirational. Here, the ‘un-’ in the uninspired merely indicates the cover-up of one source of inspiration. Reflecting on the unmooring necessary for the making of claims to autonomy (and autonomous knowledge), Yi shows how the Cohen-Boyer patent has become a gloss and shorthand for a complicated configuration not only of persons but also of politics and countercultures. By the end of the 1960s, the United States was host to a significant counterculture critical of science and technology. This current coexisted with a mainstream political will to fund biomedical rather than basic research: To some molecular biologists, it seemed that the future of their discipline increasingly depended upon its ability to find available intellectual and institutional niches in order to become a constitutive part of the expanding biomedical complex. (Yi 2008: 602)
Such a conjunction of impulses placed enormous pressure on funding agencies and scientists to produce medical applications. President Richard Nixon had declared, amongst other wars, a ‘war on disease’; this summons, combined with a biomedical interest in viruses, was
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exploited by entrepreneurial biochemists and molecular biologists. There was a mass migration of biochemists and molecular biologists from prokaryotic (bacteria) to eukaryotic (higher order) systems, with viruses being construed as the link between ‘basic’ and disease-orientated research. One further element of Yi’s account of the provenance of recombinant DNA technology is noteworthy among these relations. By the early 1980s, commercialisation had become a significant social activity for North American universities, coming to figure in their mission statements. Universities thus felt bound by the moral imperative that academics should exploit and market their research findings for the financial benefit of the institution. Yi tells a North American story, but one that resonates with research culture in the UK. Turning to British universities and to the keen ethnographic eye Strathern brings to the management of knowledge, and to the conditions in which research thrives (or not), we can follow again the contributors to this volume and attend to Strathern’s analyses of the ratcheting-up of institutional mission statements and the tyranny of institutional practices of audit and transparency (which intriguingly, as Riles addresses in this volume, did nothing to curb the excesses of banks which, amongst other things, precipitated the current financial crisis).
Mission creep Strathern has a prescience second to none for identifying key questions of the day, both political and theoretical. As well as compelling us to look at our own concepts (whether the ‘ours’ is the generic anthropologist or the generic Euro-American) with a critical eye, Strathern has commented astutely on the underlying assumptions and rhetorics of persuasion deployed by the two major political regimes of late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century Britain. While Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair do duty as proxies for these two regimes, they also stand for a broader ‘environment of fact’ which Strathern charted and articulated precisely. It may seem odd to emphasise Strathern’s political sensibility – she is not one for public emotion, soapboxes, denunciations or the like. Perhaps this is partly why her critique is so effective; why, indeed, it has been so apt. While statements from Thatcher such as
Introduction
9
‘there is no such thing as society’ were never going to go unremarked, it was Strathern’s fine-grained analysis of its connotations and her merciless unpacking of ‘enterprise’ that captured the mood of the day.2 And while some of us will remember relief bordering on euphoria at the prospect of regime change in 1997, there were already hints that Blair’s New Labour and Thatcher’s Conservatism were in some respects shades of a similar hue. Strathern had her finger on the pulse and did not miss a beat: from ‘enterprise’ to ‘prescriptive consumerism’ she moved on to the tyranny of accountability, transparency and audit. Her analysis of the political zeitgeist was all the more pertinent for not focusing directly on [P]olitics. Her remarkable rendering of the mores of the day was routed first through debates on new reproductive technologies, then through changes in higher education and the management of British universities: both cultural revolutions in their own way. To exemplify the tone and texture of Strathern’s critique of some of the innovations in the management of higher education that have occurred during her watch, we draw on just one of the many seemingly mundane materials that she productively engages – the mission statement (Strathern 2006b). In an unflinching (and witty) analysis of the format (bullet points for the first time in 129 years) and content (a mixture of exhortation and hope) of the 1996 mission statement of Cambridge University, Strathern describes how mission statements have become the University’s (not just Cambridge’s) form of ‘bullet proofing’. Laying out its mission to ‘respond to the needs of the community’ and ‘encourage and pursue research of the highest quality across the full range of subjects’, the University displays evidence of high quality within and wards off accusations of poor governance and intervention by central government. Strathern describes the mission statement as a ‘protective aversion tactic’, and to be effective it borrows the language and format of its auditors. The problem comes when the universities not only respond to external audit in the language of 2
The difference between the last Conservative government and the recently ‘elected’ Con/Dem coalition (2010) might be crudely caricatured as a shift from ‘no society’ to ‘the big society’. Strathern’s unpacking of the concepts underpinning visions of society promoted by prime ministers Thatcher and Blair will be invaluable when we come to investigate the voluntarism and ‘people power’ entailed in prime minister David Cameron’s appeal to the ‘big society’ (launched in July 2010).
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‘assessment-accountability’ but then go on to deploy the same in their internal regimes. This, of course, is not peculiar to Cambridge University. It resonates not only across most other UK universities but also across public and private sector organisations more widely (see Berglund, this volume). Again Strathern’s insight was prescient. As the language, once borrowed to deflect, became ubiquitous, it gained traction shaping not only the way in which institutions reflect on themselves and each other but also, now, on the way in which its members reflect on themselves and each other. After four research assessment exercises, it could be argued that British academia is a leaner and meaner machine. In the exercise of explicitly valuing selected items of academic achievement, which are then made the measures of worth, the phatic – the padding and polite communications required to oil the system – inevitably slides into the interstices of academic life. There, without vigilance, it will atrophy for want of affirmation. But, as we hope this volume exemplifies, not only is vigilance exercised but enthusiasm abounds and the point to underline is that vigilance has been inspired and promoted, in no small part, by treating the academy with the ethnographic seriousness it demands.3 It would be a mistake to think audit culture a bureaucratic quirk of the UK: its reach is long and tragic. As we write, a report on the current British military intervention in Afghanistan is in press. Produced by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, it identifies ‘significant mission creep since deploying to Afghanistan in 2001’. In a creeping and creepily growing list of responsibilities and targets, today’s ‘mission’ in Afghanistan encompasses ‘counter-narcotics’, ‘human rights’ and ‘state building’. While new mission statements displace former ones, they do not fully replace them: traces of earlier wishes, desires and targets remain, and new missions must both consolidate and differentiate themselves from earlier projects. As Strathern has so tellingly analysed their trajectory, there is a built-in expansive nature to mission statements: to reduce, scale back, slow down or back-pedal is to pull away from the dilation of the ‘mission’.
3
For excellent analyses of the contribution Marilyn Strathern has made to ethnographies of bureaucracy and notions of public value see the volume edited by Lebner and Deiringer (2009).
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11
Recombining persons In Euro-American kinship thinking, a theme Strathern has put firmly on the anthropological agenda, the combination of materials from unique individuals is understood to create a new and unique person. At the molecular level, genetic elements recombine; at the level of the organism, the joining of sperm and ovum creates offspring identical to neither biological parent but containing elements of both. The ensuing infant requires work and effort to socialise – to make it part of society: to cover it up. Persons, in this worldview, are ‘natural hybrids’ (Strathern 1992b: 111). In a seminal paper, first presented at the inaugural conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists in 1990 and published in Reproducing the future (1992b), Strathern unpacks the difficulty British social anthropology had in theorising English kinship in what she calls the modernist or pluralist era. Unlike unilineal descent groups, a cognatic kinship system of ‘the English kind’ does not present anthropologists with an obvious model of a social order. Cognatic kinship instead seems to mirror ‘natural’ reproduction, rendering it both unproblematic (since all kinship is cognatic) and uninteresting (as it does not programmatically form the ‘building blocks’ of society). It ‘could neither in a strong sense produce groups nor in a weak sense yield a sense of convention or society’ (1992b: 104). The anthropological and the folk models in this era were themselves intimate or closely akin. In both, a child is known to be born as a unique person from the recombination of elements from both parents. It is not, though, born complete: socialisation needs to make it into a ‘proper’ social being. Kinship (in its mid twentieth-century ‘natural’ manifestation) (pro)created the unique individual, which society had to shape and mould. Persons were part of society, life, communities, families – parts of wholes. It was the relationship between parts and wholes, in both folk and anthropological models, that generated both pluralising and unifying effects characteristic of the modernist era. Moreover, such borrowings are not confined to a classical mid twentieth-century British anthropology. Strathern notes how the language of a postmodern anthropology, deemed more fitting to contemporary post-plural conditions, also draws on procreative idioms of biological
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kinship. Her example is James Clifford’s trenchant critique of the metaand master narratives of mid twentieth-century anthropology in The predicament of culture (1988). Clifford argues that anthropology has too often sanitised and made whole what was, in fact, not only fragmentary but also hybrid. Calling for a more authentic ethnography that takes seriously the unboundedness and fragmentary nature of social life, he posits culture as collage: as bits cut up and capable of various recombinations. Instead of smoothing over the joins, anthropologists are urged to leave visible the ‘cuts and sutures of the research process’ (Clifford 1988: 146, cited in Strathern 1992b: 110). Strathern remarks on the resonances between Clifford’s model of a more fitting and, in his terms, more authentic, anthropology and the idioms of mid twentieth-century biological kinship. Here persons are individuated by the mixing of biological materials from different sources: persons in this conception are unique and ‘natural hybrids’ and the future depends on ‘perpetual hybridisation’. End-of-thecentury recombinant DNA technologies, however, while even more explicitly grounding individual variation in biology, also offer dizzying means to detach persons from ‘natural origins’ – to meld, for example, the humanly genetic with the non-human. Both cyborg and chimera, made of compatible parts, are endlessly susceptible to development. Recombinant technologies create anew and melding is a more appropriate verb than mixing: there are no sutures to either make visible or disguise. We draw on the notion of recombinant knowledge to point to the way in which different knowledges are combined rather than assembled: to the way in which concepts travel, lose their moorings and morph; and to the folly of attempting to unhitch the interpersonal from the conceptual. We ask what happens when we go a-worlding with Strathern: when we combine her insight, concepts, connections and so on with those originating in different persons and conceived for different purposes.
This volume Strathern’s own work is notable for its finely tuned focus on diverse knowledge practices and on different ways in which social worlds come to be ‘known’. In this, she has characteristically and productively drawn on ethnographic detail from one part of the world to illuminate the
Introduction
13
premises and precepts of another. We develop a similar strategy in this book. Between them, the volume’s chapters present ethnography from several parts of the world – Papua New Guinea, Ghana, Japan, Britain, Switzerland, Tanzania and Latvia. The delicately explored ethnographic examples (valuable in their own right) illuminate, extend, reroute and recombine key Strathernian concepts. The authors mean strategically to unstitch and reloop anthropological concepts, theorems and experiences to reflect upon and make explicit not only Strathernian but also general anthropological knowledge and its ethical and aesthetic dimensions and pathways. Debbora Battaglia’s piece, with which the collection opens, reflects on the notion of knowledge paths and routes by ethnographically travelling through and ‘out’ of two iconic sites and texts of Strathernian genderworlding in The self in self-decoration (1979) and ‘One-legged gender’ (1993). Battaglia wants to unpack the notion of a ‘Strathernian gift to anthropology – the fact that, through her writings, Strathern has made us, and herself, akin to birds: drawing us along paths of relations which extend the parallax view’ through an analysis of what it means to liberate an object from attachment to an essential self or identity. A parallax anthropology applied to the analysis of visual communication and stereoptic ‘worlding’ enables Battaglia to extend the invitation Strathern offered as early as 1993 – that is, to pay attention to the social effects of performative aesthetic regimes. Battaglia pushes this call even further by inviting her readers to celebrate ethnographic blind spots and occlusions. The chapter theorises the importance of the relational gaps (or sometimes unspoken contexts) which anthropologists analyse and help establish. The themes of strategic transparency, visibility, opacity and the control of knowledge in anthropology run also through Melissa Demian’s and Annelise Riles’s chapter. Using her ongoing ethnographic work on corporate debt, family law and the legal status of the household in Japan, Riles explores what anthropological notions of personhood might tell us about the nature of legal personhood (the idea of personhood as a selfreflexive effect of exchange) as exemplified by corporations and corporate debt. In other words, she studies the legal person as a question of the visibility of legal techniques. Further, relations of mutual indebtedness – a
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theme running through this collection – are here parsed and understood as transactions. By translating, switching back and forth, and making visible what does and does not get compared, by projecting juridical onto anthropological, and legal onto ethnographic theorems, Riles dissects the meaning of relationality. Moreover, she unpacks and builds upon the duplex character of the ‘relation as a tool’ (Strathern 2005a: 7), by making explicit the legal and anthropological techniques that make persons and things. The chapter shows what significant political and economic consequences of these translations have for a contemporary and novel understanding of property, financial crisis and the public personhood of the state. Demian’s chapter further unsettles classic anthropological conceptions of customary and common law by discussing documentary legalism in the cosmopolitan courts of contemporary Papua New Guinea (PNG). One of the ways that PNG describes its heterogeneity and the social complexity arising from it is through the concept of custom. Describing how legal practitioners do their own ethnography of the customs of legalism (for example, through creative sentencing practices, collectively sharing out legal responsibility, and claiming in different ways for universality and particularity), Demian describes the mechanisms through which hybrid customs and the underlying law in PNG courts are established as selfconsciously technical fields. To this, Demian adds another twist to Battaglia’s and Riles’s insight that contexts generate their own techniques. Moreover, Demian theorises relationality by contending that the underlying law, as currently understood in PNG, is a product of a series of analogies, that is, relationships between social forms that are held to be comparable because they stand as versions of one another. Interpreting repellent technologies on the outskirts of Lupiro in Tanzania, Ann Kelly’s chapter continues an exploration of the relationships revealed through techniques of differentiation (Strathern’s model of elicitation in 1988). Kelly analyses the built environment of entomological science – experimental huts – and the relational forms they set in motion as humans and mosquitoes meet and are kept apart. The classical tools of entomological research, experimental field huts, are here described as hybrid knowledge spaces that enable the entomological particularities captured beneath their roofs to be read as patterns operating on the level of an ecosystem. Kelly’s huts press us to think about the anthropologist’s practical and empirical
Introduction
15
position in an environment of (microbiological, political, ecological and infrastructural) facts. Following on these themes of architecture and African ethnography, Thomas Yarrow makes an unexpected link between an Essex village and a resettlement town in Ghana. In the 1960s, Elmdon residents made connections between a common class position (working class), a set of named families (identified as having real Elmdon names) and being a ‘real’ villager (Strathern 1981). Strathern writes of the boundary effect of kinship: Elmdon residents used kinship to distinguish between ‘real Elmdon families’ and ‘incomers’. Yarrow’s ethnographic focus is on Apeguso, a town to which resettlement quarters were added forty years ago to rehouse a small proportion of the villagers displaced in the construction of the Akosombo Dam. Kinship features again as a boundary effect working to classify resettlers and old town residents. In an appealing twist on the notion of core families in Elmdon, to which Kinship at the core refers, the preferred structure of the Volta Resettlement Project is the core house. Yarrow extends Strathern by showing how the resettlers countered old town residents’ claims to belong through kinship with their own claims to belong through rights entailed in the core house. ‘Rather than kinship’, he writes, ‘the core house was at “the core” of what it meant to belong.’ Relational perspectives and themes of kinship are further explored in Aivita Putnin¸a’s ethnography of the imagined and practical effects of the living arrangements of ‘invisible families’ in Latvia. Her research with families that are not visible to the state, such as those created by homosexual partners or heterosexual friends or kin of the same sex living together and caring for children, offers Putnin¸a a new standpoint on conceptualising notions of family, kinship, gender and sexuality in a post-socialist setting. Her point of departure is not gay/lesbian identity per se but living arrangements that entail a kinship tie that is unnamed. For Putnin¸a, the capacity to relate, create and maintain relationships of care lies at the core of contemporary versions of family in Latvia. Paying attention to the relational aspect of invisible families and to unnamed kinship ties suggests for Putnin¸a that ‘what is vanishing is not family values, but the actual relationships behind those values’.
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Eeva Berglund’s chapter celebrates the work of the Women’s Design Service (WDS) in Britain and reprises the influence of feminist expertise on the built environment. The WDS, like many other organisations in the UK, has had increasingly to account for itself in a welter of policy documents, mission statements, audit trails and attempts to standardise and justify its practice; this has detracted from the development of new forms of knowledge. While WDS used to count on ‘open-ended empirical research as a precondition for being able to offer robust expertise’, the inevitable noise this generates is hard to justify in the present goalorientated and outcome-valorised environment. But Berglund also acknowledges the enthusiasms that survive incapacitating forces. It is worth noting here that, given her profound and astute critique of political platitudes, Strathern’s writings also are neither maudlin nor pessimistic. They are rather tempered with constant reminders of what is possible and animated with a range of enthusiasms: for anthropology, ethnography, scholarship and more. As Berglund suggests, Strathern does not shy away from reminders of what open-ended research and the capacity to learn from ‘blind alleys, dead devices and strained conclusions’ can offer (Strathern 2006a: 194, cited in Berglund, this volume). WDS continues to be inspired and ‘events, publications and workshops continue to animate’. Enthusiasm also runs through Maja Petrovic´-Sˇteger’s chapter. She describes etoy, an international art collective whose project Mission Eternity sets out to interact with death and dying through digitally archiving materials selected by participants. Workshops enable participants to ‘encapsulate’ personal materials and thus ‘send’ their memories into the future. Yet, as she remarks: ‘[r]eifying, untying, sending away, dismembering . . . [does] not sever or diminish, but rather strengthen[s] the memorial process’. Besides offering a haunting ethnography, Petrovic´-Sˇteger also connects it – recombines it – with portraits of and by Strathern. Bilums, portraits and etoy capsules appear as composite bodies – co-created and co-produced – recombining materials, concepts and social relations which not only memorialise but connect pasts, presents and futures. Petrovic´-Sˇteger passes on, from Issam Kourbaj, a Syrian saying: ‘When your right palm itches, you must give something away, while
Introduction
17
when your left itches, you can count on receiving a gift.’ This adage has inspired Kourbaj’s portrait of Strathern. Etching her hands, he portrays the right in a proud relief and the left in hollow. In Papua New Guinea, meanwhile, a Bomana prison inmate tells Reed that when a prisoner sneezes, he will ask, ‘who calls out my name?’ Rotating his body while bending his forearm up and down, a prisoner will stop at the point his elbow cracks. This tells him in what quarter people are thinking of him: where those people are who outside the jail ‘call his name’. Like hiccups, headaches, dreams – involuntary bodily tics – sneezes are the ‘embodied sensation of agencies acting through’ a person. Inspiration, in its Euro-American version, comes unbidden from elsewhere – from outside oneself. To claim to be inspired by someone is to acknowledge their continued impact on your actions and manner. Yet the final text, in the case of inspired writing, is cut off (dismembered) from its source of inspiration. The text is ultimately authored, and accolade or criticism directed at the author, not his or her inspiration. The category of inspiration may be thought to run through Euro-American kinship thinking. While collateral kin may be traced theoretically ad infinitum, with material traces running down the generations, instead, in practice, ‘networks are cut’ and kin either drop or are dropped off. Reed’s analysis, though, does something bolder than describe these filiations and their cutting-off. Reed routes the category of inspiration through a Melanesian ethnography ‘zig-zagging’ between readerwriters of The Henry Williamson Society, the author inspired by Strathern, and prison inmates in PNG who are at pains to reveal or claim that ‘someone else always causes one’s actions’. Adam Reed ends the collection by beautifully exposing where we began: the point of being inspired by Strathern. He explores what it might mean, as an anthropologist, to claim an intellectual debt. How should one properly recognise the influence of the ideas of another? What exactly might it mean to embody inspiration, or actively to assert and show that we are ‘inspired by Strathern’? The answer, Reed suggests, has to hinge not on a pronounced claim, but on a practice or ongoing activity of embodied assertion. This assertion will perform the relationalities that make up concepts within a community of anthropologists and in anthropological practice. Specifically, here, Reed unpacks and runs with the familiar idiom of inspiration, imaginative flows, processes of
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composition, authorial mystification and Euro-American conventions of creativity, setting them alongside his own Melanesian material on incarceration to arrive at an altered depiction of Melanesian sociality. In Melanesian societies, as this collection reminds us, an action particularises a relation. This book particularises, acknowledges and analyses an intellectual debt. But it also bespeaks the relation we wish to foster with social anthropology. By re-worlding the interpretive capacities of Strathern’s work, and by unhitching general anthropological analysis from habitual terms and associations, the authors in this collection have attempted not only to celebrate but also to theorise the influence of Marilyn Strathern. Our task has been not to translate her concepts into images of entomological huts, bilums, ies, courts or professional societies, but to differentiate, recombine and recast various forms of sociality and diverse ways of knowing an infinitely intriguing world. Our privileged exercise in recombinant knowledge is an attempt to dwell in a few Strathernian concepts and in so doing acknowledge the unpayable debt that we (and social anthropology) have gladly incurred.
2
Writing the parallax gap: an itinerary Debbora Battaglia
The standard definition of parallax is: the apparent displacement of an object (the shift of its position against a background), caused by a change in observational position that provides a new line of sight. The philosophical twist to be added, of course, is that the observed difference is not simply ‘subjective,’ due to the fact that the same object which exists ‘out there’ is seen from two different stances, or points of view. It is rather that . . . subject and object are inherently ‘mediated,’ so that an ‘epistemological’ shift in the subject’s point of view always reflects an ‘ontological’ shift in the object itself. Or, to put it in Lacanese, the subject’s gaze is always-already inscribed into the perceived object itself, in the guise of its ‘blind spot,’ that which is ‘in the object more than object itself,’ the point from which the object itself returns the gaze. ‘Sure, the picture is in my eye, but me, I am also in the picture.’ (Zˇizˇek, The Parallax View, emphasis mine).
The exposure of epistemic ‘blind spots’ is a critical operation of the anthropological project; the ethnographic text, its apparatus of choice. This essay is an experiment in reading ethnographic texts as expressions of what Zˇizˇek terms the ‘parallax effect’1 – that is, as inscriptions of knowledge embedded in polyperspectival social acts of ‘solid seeing’ (stereopsis, in New Greek),2 inclusive of the ethnographer’s eye; inclusive, further of the ethnographer’s warm engendered body. It is this last point that intrigues me, since the entities we render often show no visible signs of our physical presence – which is to say, of our embeddedness as ‘blind spots’ amongst them. A little detective work is required for this
1 2
This is a phrase of Kojin Karatani’s (2003: 47–8). Here and throughout I am indebted to Giovanni da Col’s introduction to Zˇizˇek’s and Karatani’s relevant works, and to his boundless generosity in discussing them.
19
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presence to appear, and a willingness to follow a writer’s ethnographic itinerary of object relations, as it were ‘on the wing’.3 I can think of no more striking example than Marilyn Strathern’s writings on Melanesian art and body-themed aesthetics and sociality. Specifically, I argue that this work’s analytic stance on body-things and thing-bodies, understood as inhabiting the suspenseful space of their hyphenation, to some degree stands in for her entire project of interrogating culture ‘after nature’, and further, that this project is itself an expression of the parallax effect of polyperspectival ‘solid seeing’. An early case in point is ‘The self in self-decoration’ (1979). Drawing from her fieldwork in Mount Hagen, the author is on one level responding to critiques of Self-decoration in Mount Hagen (1971), and on another carrying Melanesian personhood into the wave of Euro-American gender discourse that was at the time seeking recognition for the performance of gendered identity against selective mechanisms of institutionalised erasure. The second exemplary piece is ‘One-legged gender’ (1993), a selfdescribed ‘experimental’ essay published in Visual Anthropology Review. The author informs us that the essay draws upon her theoretical work in The gender of the gift (1988) and Partial connections (1991; 1993: 50). At this station in her itinerary of engaging aesthetic objects, she is implicitly in dialogue with Judith Butler’s writings on gender performance (Butler 1990; 1993). Also, she is placed not as a participant observer but as a reader of others’ Melanesian ethnographies collected in Art and identity in Oceania (Hanson and Hanson 1990). As the title of her essay indicates, she gives particular attention to a ‘one-legged’ carving employed in Ramu males’ initiation rites. The fact that these two publications are separated by nearly a decade and a half and apparently free-standing is important to note when approaching writing careers as genealogies of lineal and lateral transfers and transformations of knowledge. But such temporal gaps are more than second-order observations. Rather, they map gender aesthetics to point-of-view itineraries that free up their common elements (for 3
Re-voicing Wolfgang Welsch, Schirmacher (1999) casts such a project, along Deleuzian lines, as an ‘unceasing re-valuation of the world [which does not require] a cognitive consciousness of purpose and goal of such a change’.
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example, expressions of masculinity or femininity) to recombine and attach to new object relations. In other words, it is in direct consequence of liberating the object from attachment to a singular authoritative context or fixity of perspective that ethnography ‘on itinerary’ offers a unique deliverance from myths of sure and fixed vision – of packaged, self-sufficient knowledge. The point is replayed as a commitment to making her indebtedness to subjects, including her indebtedness to other fieldworkers and their objects of inquiry, explicit. For it is by this device that she positions her writing as always already a counter-gift, and in consequence as a gift-in-suspension, on offer only, not yet for reciprocal ‘squaring’ (its reception being unknown and unknowable), incomplete, its component parts open to taking ethnographic detours to other places and even other times, and, more generally, to recontextualisation.
‘The self in self-decoration’ and . . . a detour ‘The self in self-decoration’ begins by setting up a contrast between selfadornment as persons ‘in the West’ might think of this – namely, as a technology for masking a complex inner person beneath a generic cultural ideal – and how body paint and ornaments acquired through exchange relations and standing in for them can work for Hageners to create a powerful impression of coordinated strength. Focusing on Hagen men’s performances of collective selfhood, Strathern argues that the adorned bodies’ synchronised choreography belies individual interests and shortcomings. Men perform a hierarchy of value in which the ‘skin’ or image of the collective – the stunning fierce flock of dancers exhibiting wealth to their guests – overwhelms any one body or valuable.4 In short, Hagen men’s wealth-enhanced bodies and body-enhanced things create (or perhaps invite) a connection between performers and audience, paradoxically through the fact that the two are held at a distance from one another: the apprehension of a united front, not
4
Andrew Strathern notes the logical and practical alternative to this visual rhetoric of invulnerability in reference to occasions when Hageners, sending messages to themselves about themselves, exhibit ‘shame’ and vulnerability (1975).
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individuals ‘in the round’, will set in motion a forward casting of future relations, as the dancers are scrutinised for blind spots in their own assemblage. And all this is a synaesthetic semiotic field, for which the visual is only a standing in. In reality, scents are sent wafting, sounds vibrating through the ground and through bodies. The kinetic messages of the dancers’ dress and superstructures – the up and down movement of their painted images and rhythmically coordinated aprons and feathered superstructures – are indexical of the motional coordinates of the parallax effect, commanding attention, holding the event-artefact of the Hagen dancers in mind as a placed historical moment. It is a moment in contradistinction to, say, the gisarlo dancers of classic Kaluli ethnography (Schieffelin 1976) who, when dancing before their hosts, know success only when the hosts are moved by the performance to ‘break frame’ – to leap up and burn the dancers for inciting them to painful memories. Here, a particular dancer will wear the scar not only of his skill but of the breach which defeats objectivity, honouring this. And yet another detour into psychical pain – a show of modernity’s scars: Will Rollason’s ethnography from the small Melanesian island of Panapompom (2008), where local football teams habitually devolve into brawling which halts their games as a result of critical self-scrutiny before media evidence of world-class players whose skills seem permanently (racially) to outrank them, no breach of the skill gap even imaginable. Unable to compete in a globally mediated field where they can never win the esteem that matters in others’ eyes, a gaze embedded in their own vision of themselves, the Panapompom will their own blind spot to destroy them. The imaging technologies which are an element of these scenarios focus the social issues of parallax effect. For Hageners, the presence of a camera’s spectatorial lens in an ethnographer’s hands was not a problem; indeed, if anything the camera replicated the value of distanced point-of-view that performers needed from their guests. For the Kaluli, Schieffelin tells us, a camera would have been intrusive (and not surprisingly: still and moving picture technology deal in fixed frames). For the Panapompom, team portraits were important: photographic evidence captured them as a team, their self-destruction forever outside the frame. The fact that in none of these ethnographies is the face of the
Writing the parallax gap
23
ethnographer in the picture is significant in ways I consider shortly. ‘Sure, the picture is in my eye, but me, I am also in the picture’ (Zˇizˇek’s paraphrase of Lacanian subjectivity). It is on this point that Strathern’s essay for Visual Anthropology Review turns.
On becoming birds ‘One-legged gender’ attends to the androgynous features of a carved Ramu wooden Kominimung figure. The carving consists of a head and a torso tapering to a point which is carved as two legs in one. What captivates Strathern is a description of how, at one point in a male initiation ritual, an initiator standing wide-legged ‘kicks’ the novice in the back with the pointed end of the one-legged figure. One could of course speculate on the surprise effect of subjects being blind-sided by senior males and jolted into manhood. Or perhaps the message is to expect the unexpected in life, or that invisible forces can have effects felt bodily. For Strathern’s purposes, the relevant point is perspectival – the idea that this artefact might not have been for imparting or eliciting thought of any kind but rather, positioned so that the initiate ‘is directly affected by it’ – blind-sided. No one line of sight or any number of these is sufficient to convey the experience – but neither could this experience have occurred in the absence of a blind spot, which the novice himself was party to creating as a social space. In other words, the event marks a stereo-physical moment of phenomenal and noumenal conversion upon an object relation, where each reveals the insufficiency of the other. She continues, ‘The enthusiastic Kominimung [initiator] who showed . . . what the “one-legged” figures meant was showing what they could do. These wooden figures kicked . . . [and] the novice presented his back to be kicked . . . so that the figure in effect points in either direction, from the body that projects it and from the body that invites it’ (1993: 43). The fact that the wooden figure is also painted with nipples and that the Kominimung initiator wears a string bag fashioned as female breasts on his chest engenders the insight that the two sides of society, the male and the female, deliver the man. Meanwhile, real females are invisible on this occasion, superfluous. Strathern’s interest in this ritual event was preceded in her review by a more general introductory observation about visual interpretation. For
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example, she comments on what it means to be placed so as to ‘see’ as a witness, namely, one sees only what is meant to be revealed: one side of the performer, for ‘completion’ by observers. Witnessing is the completion of an object by others with lateral forward facing vision; social stereopsis fixes object relations against a ground, particularly important when the occasion is for placing a relation ‘on the record’. Consider the distance the ethnographer has come – that I/we have come with her – from the Mount Hagen field site over decades past and human objects extending themselves in space for forming social relations, to a wooden cult figure that is ‘specifically aimed at another’ who turns his back to it (1993: 44).5 In perspectival terms we have come full circle: she has mapped us to a possible Melanesia of 360 degree vision. We have become birds, holographisers of the parallax – as Melanesians would and do appreciate, entities liberated from the limitations of (mortal) human perspective to take in and also take on the bigger (social) picture that includes them. That she regards this limitation of human perspective as an issue becomes apparent when she mentions as an aside how yet another Melanesian society contrasts human vision to that of the sun, which is thought to have ‘only one eye’. I have no idea how this notion plays out on the ground and must leave it, as Strathern does, for others to follow this particular line of thought. However, the fact of a transcending eye, in the sense of an action caught in the moment of shutting one eye at a time and so moving the world to ‘life’, is positively Copernican. Marilyn Strathern states early in the experimental essay that her interest in the one-legged object is motivated by its physical features as a ‘play on form’. However, her encounter with the ‘kick’ seems to deliver an expanded consciousness. One can conjecture that the more fully threedimensional, ‘fleshed out’ androgyny of the initiator and his wooden tool – in other words, androgyny extended beyond natural form through wood but also through the movement of a sexuality turning both away from one and towards another sexuality to social effect – is animated by lines of vision and subject positions in the fields the ethnographer has 5
Those who have viewed Dennis O’Rourke’s film Cannibal tours (1988) and have witnessed aghast the moment when the camera asks a young Sepik River man how it feels being photographed from behind by a female tourist, will appreciate this ‘kick’ as commodity fetishism does it.
Writing the parallax gap
25
differently entered, first on foot in Mount Hagen and then by way of text in Ramu. In other words, androgyny in practice requires an ontological engagement with the parallax view, and, no less, a career ethnographer’s dedication to deconstruction. Significantly, Marilyn Strathern returns to Mount Hagen at the end of ‘One-legged gender’ and ‘completes’ the dancing men who figured in ‘The self in self-decoration’ by means of an interpretation of a photograph of (female-associated) Hagen pearlshells, lined up ‘like organs’ on the ground for display, there to be witnessed by men but likewise by ‘the photographer’ (unnamed) from ‘her’ place behind the (situationally masculine) mask of the camera. And so this excursion through fields of androgynous thing-bodies and body-things arrives at its terminus. One needs to know neither the ethnographic content nor the ethnographic context fully to recognise the issue of (in)stability of figure and ground – and the (dis)connect of any singular temporality – that Strathern’s eye realises. She is mobilising theory from inside any parallax gap. She writes that ‘the invitation to “see” is an invitation to witness the appearance of a specific form, and to have in that sense elicited it. The individual witness is inevitably placed by the performer, then, into the position of seeing only what is revealed’ (Strathern 1993: 42). So, too, for her professional stance and self. In addition to iterating the Melanesian social in contradistinction to western ideologies of individualism, her work opens new lines of vision that articulate an approach to the social person as a dividual entity. If writing the parallax gap is, as I have proposed, a ‘found object’ activity of extending the self beyond itself and the spatiotemporally ‘natural’ world by way of elliptical surprises and suspenseful repositionings, then finding the ethnographer in it is a worthwhile enterprise. But in the case of this author, we will need first to find and then to learn to read her ‘skin’.
Professional work and constructs on the skin In 1979, when I made first contact with ‘The self in self-decoration’, my reading had, in addition to its explicit content, another kind of impact. For whilst on one level the ethnographer was writing mainly about visual
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culture displayed on the skin, she was to my mind also modelling a kind of serious play, one that both masked and invisibly foregrounded (as I have written of this for Trobriand political strategies of placing valuables on offer (1994)) her own distinctive, meta-canonical game of ethnographic representation – as such. In other words, I took her to be performing her own professional self and worldview. Indeed, it was and is there for anyone to see, visible as the constructs she assembled and displayed on the skin of her texts. Conceptual adornment – which not only is not skin deep but which her students to some extent cite in their own professional lives – relates directly to what Strathern calls the ‘cosmetic paradox’: That personal beautification can draw attention away from the person . . . for them, an effect consciously striven for . . . When as a group they dress themselves in feathers, paint and leaves, the first thing spectators should see is the decoration – so discovering the individual underneath becomes a pleasurable shock . . . They are pretending to be no one but themselves, yet themselves decorated to the point of disguise. This idea is incorporated specifically into aesthetics: a dancer recognized at once has decorated himself poorly. (Strathern 1979: 243, emphasis mine)
And she continues: ‘I would argue that the physical body is disguised by decorations precisely because the self is one of their messages’ (Strathern 1979: 243). Just as decorating the physical body was not claiming to hide the inner self of Hageners, intellectual expression was making no claim to be hiding the inner ethnographer. But the purposes were of course different – or rather, the one (Hagener iteration) was purposed to the local frame of the social and the other (Strathernian iteration) was not. Whereas, for Hageners, the exterior displays freed the inner (cultural) self for making a wider (social) difference in a possible world rendered iconic by public witness, the anthropologist’s worlding reveals the speculative nature of the iconic and refracts its definitional limits, which can be missed, elude witnessing. This is where the element of risk enters into self rhetoric, as regards both Hageners’ political tactics of the body, and our own disciplinary idea-plays and knowledge practices. As Strathern writes (of Hageners), ‘This self-confident display of power is hedged with anxiety; prompting omens used to divine whether there really is a value to these shining claims to an enduring value’ (Strathern 1979: 247). It matters, she argues,
Writing the parallax gap
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how good or how bad displays of decorations are, because the wrong effect – say, too clever and attention-getting or too heavy and dense – is itself a bad omen, portending a bad ending to the stories of relational shifts of power that people repeat on ceremonial occasions. In short, nothing less than the health and growth of social relational futures were at stake for Hageners then, or are now, for that matter, even as their adornment has been cosmeticised by global tourism and other expressions of cultural commodification. In some ways, the distinction between fields of ‘local knowledge’ and their ‘interlocutors’ blurs under the influence of Strathernian worlding, which refuses to recognise any point of view as privileged over any other on grounds of experiential proximity, or any connection as privileged a priori over any other. It is hardly surprising that this resolutely stereoptic worlding provokes the strongest and most self-righteous resistance from ethnographers who feel that they no longer recognise the objects, contexts and subjectivities that they themselves have laboured to describe and to analyse – which they ‘own’ in the broad sense of having taken responsibility for representing ‘what really matters’ to subjects about the relationship ‘being there’ (to give the Geertzian point a turn in the direction of a Strathernian relationality). So for example, ethnography for resisting social inequality suddenly finds itself conscripted into a programme of post-natural constructs where subjects are being posited as objects, or vice versa. But could a shift in perspective, the effect of parallax, in and of itself render these interchangeable, or power asymmetries invisible?
Coming to roost I began by inviting Slavoj Zˇizˇek (2006; also 2004) to join me on an itinerary through the Highlands of Papua New Guinea in the company of Marilyn Strathern.6 I did this in the belief that birds of a different feather can make good company, and by means of detours through different ethnographies and time frames illuminate and beyond this iterate the operation of culture-making, in the style of suspense 6
See also Kojin Karatani (2003: 47–8).
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ethnography.7 I hoped also to make apparent the ‘supplement’ to existing discourse (as Sabarl would say it) – the ‘value added’ (as Strathern would) – of a pre-doubled cross-speciated ethnography of engendered thing-bodies and body-things, which as a dioptric anamorphic device refracts Zˇizˇek’s and Lacan’s ‘reflexive twist by means of which I myself am included into the picture constituted by me’ – from ethnography’s slightly different angle of approach, perhaps constructively blind-siding the philosopher’s certain terms of reference.8 Davide Panagia makes the point from political philosophy: the political act is aesthetic at the start, an act of ‘partitioning of sensation that divides the body and its organs of sense perception and assigns to them corresponding postures of attention’ (2006: 2, emphasis mine) – culturally mediated as such, of course. Seafaring Melanesians with whom I’ve lived and worked put the point somewhat differently:
Fieldnotes June 1976: Point-of-view. Sabarl Island, PNG. Today I tacked a map of the Louisiade Archipelago to the wall of the house. A group of young men spied it when they came to talk. Excited exchanges. It seems they haven’t seen a map of their islands before. Suddenly, a shift in the interactions. Now they are reading the map, naming the islands, tracing the paths of the ocean channels with their fingers. When I ask how they’d done this [recognised their territory in the map] one replied, ‘We became birds.’
As with New Guinea Highlanders, Sabarl Islanders identify intimately with birds. Faces are painted with the markings of clan birds in rituals marking new phases of social life: the same designs appear on new babies and adults released from mourning, and on the faces of the dead – their passports to afterworld identities as ancestors. To this day, leave-takings are marked by calls and responses in alternating bird and human 7
8
The essay, ‘Blind spots: Hal Foster on the art of Joachim Koester’ (2006) opens with a quote from Alexander Kluge, author of The Devil’s Blind Spot: ‘Nothing is more instructive than a confusion of time frames.’ The notion guides Foster’s analysis of Koester’s political art and the clash of its visual imagery. Likewise referencing Strathern, Alberto Corsı´ n Jimenez explores anthropological anamorphism in ‘How knowledge grows: an anthropological anamorphosis’ (2010).
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‘languages’ – a small ritual of (dis)connection which people find deeply moving. Sabarl also speak of ‘flying’ in their dreams to gather information from the spirit world, following the airways of their totemic clan birds and, more importantly, returning home again along their historic routes. Birds figure in myth as ancestral culture heroes and marry human females who produce human girls. The fact that some species of bird are endowed with 360-degree vision does not escape Sabarl observation; neither does it that master predators like hawks share with humans laterally placed eyes and forward vision. A great hawk created the archipelago they call home from the putrefying remains of a snake it had conquered by tricking her to venture too far from her hole on land. Birds, then, are nothing if not tactical and strategic. They deploy their capacities of perspective towards social futures, and blind spots figure in these as centrally as lines of sight. Indeed, some birds are blind spots embodied; they make use of tonal feather camouflage for concealing themselves from predators, and using ‘motion camouflage’ they hover in such a way as to appear stationary while actually rapidly approaching their prey (dragonflies, classified as birds by Sabarl, do this). All told, the polyperspectival capacities of birds link them to the enterprise of scouting out solid truths and eye witnessing, and to the delusion of taking appearances as in any sense the whole or true picture of reality. One could say on the basis of bird themes alone that interpolated interspeciation is a significant aspect of an aesthetic regime for which illusion is the creative armature. Overall, I have tried to suggest that the parallax gap, taken as an undifferentiated capacity of humanness, creates space for the diversities and inclusiveness that anthropology appreciates in taking at the start our own and others’ blind spots – those occlusions that come with the package of forward-facing vision and can also blind-side – as socioculturally and historically situated acts.9 Anthropology’s work is compelled by the 9
Wagner’s idea of the figure–ground reversal for understanding object relations in the field reveals the limits of the gap but underplays the multiplicity of possible grounds – e.g. an object apparently shifting from a red field to a blue field – and thus how a figure’s apparent stability can orient people to social environments beyond the original frame of reference (cf. Wagner 1986).
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possibility that something of the social process is hidden from us, and/or from subjects at one point or another, and that there are reasons for this that are inseparable from their epistemic context which, if understood, can make all the difference to lived experience, moving forward. Conversely, what we do will inevitably offer surprises of convergence which reconstitute ‘the real’ as others regard this. Thankfully, the question of how to shape a comparative project tooled to grapple with the partiality of our vision can only be an open one.
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Too big to fail Annelise Riles
[W]hat people exchange is a totality: one perspective for another; your view of my assets for my view of yours. Thus are persons and objects created. (Strathern 1992b: 188)
In 2008, in one of the now infamous pivotal events in the financial crisis, the insurance giant AIG (American International Group) came close to defaulting on its obligations. AIG was in the business of guaranteeing others’ debts. Other parties, who had taken on the risk of guaranteeing obligations, turned to AIG to promise to fulfil those obligations should they ever have to pay on them, in exchange for regular payments to AIG. But in 2008 those parties began to doubt AIG’s ability to fulfil its own obligations in the face of the mortgage crisis. And so they began to demand collateral in the present as security for future potential debts. As AIG proved unable to meet these immediate demands these counterparties’ demands for collateral grew greater still. In a matter of days, AIG came unravelled, its inadequate assets on display for all to see. The immediate crisis was diffused when the US Department of Treasury stepped in, declaring AIG ‘too big to fail’, and promising to meet all of AIG’s obligations dollar for dollar. But this precipitated a larger political crisis of sorts, as politicians asked where the limits of the government’s obligations to ‘bail out’ private parties might lie, and as citizens’ groups on the right and the left voiced dismay as tax dollars were funnelled to AIG’s counterparties while ordinary people suffered near record debts of their own. My own work to date on capital markets and on legal knowledge in liberal states has focused on the legal knowledge practices entailed in 31
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financial transactions especially as I have observed them in Japan (Riles 2011, in press). In this respect, my interest has tracked the explicit focus of market participants: what absorbs their energies is the intricacies, financial and legal, of transactions, as transactions, and the quantity and quality of the property transacted. What is the value of the swap? What is the value of the collateral? Is it legally valid? What law will regulate the collateral and the transaction? What kinds of documents, what kinds of theories, what kinds of professionals, what kinds of laws are necessary to sustain these transactions? Yet in Strathern’s terms, this focus ‘yields a remainder’ – the question of the nature of the persons engaged in such transactions. For an anthropologist, what is particularly salient about events such as these is that state, corporation and property (assets, collateral, debts and obligations) are all being explicitly reimagined in a relational way, as potential transacting partners: the argument is anxiously made that without the state the market will fail, and vice versa. And in these moments of ‘crisis’, the potentialities and vulnerabilities of these transactors are suddenly, surprisingly – almost violently – revealed, their interdependence activated. These conditions, these aspects of persons and transactions, are the distinct province of Marilyn Strathern’s formidable contribution to the long-standing anthropological tradition of work on gifts and exchange. It took me some time to see this: the portions of Strathern’s expansive corpus that at first seemed most salient to my subject were rather her work on law and legal institutions, and on the knowledge practices of social science, bureaucracy and regulatory policy, and while she never actually asserts a divide between capitalist economies and the gift economies she has studied, Strathern herself does draw more analytical purchase from contrastive comparisons with ‘Euro-American’ persons and transactions than from analogies. So in this chapter, I want to ask a different question that is nevertheless fundamental to any anthropological account of corporate debt: what kinds of persons are the agents of financial market transactions? At the time of my fieldwork, the parties to any swap or collateral exchange traditionally were large banks, hedge funds and securities firms, although they increasingly included other corporations – manufacturers, trading companies, municipalities, universities, and more. In Japanese law, the
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salient term for corporate personality is houjin, literally, the legal person – something translated as ‘corporation’ but that includes entities US law would not count as corporations, such as schools and (as we will see, at least in some circumstances) kin groups. What kinds of legal personhood do market relations presuppose or engender? Here, I hope to demonstrate the illumination that comes from thinking through corporate persons, transactions and debts from the standpoint of Strathern’s work on exchange, kinship and personhood. The nature of debt relations is of course a long-standing theme in the anthropology of economy, personhood and kinship (Strathern 2004b: 85). There are obviously important differences between corporate debt relations and the kinds of debts that emerge from gift exchange relations. One crucial difference is that corporate debt is framed (ideologically, at least) as debt for a limited time: once the debt is paid the parties, formally speaking, will become strangers again and go their separate ways. Whether or not this in fact occurs in any practical sense does not displace the rhetorical force of the formal concept of an endpoint in the parties’ relationship (Keane 2008: 27–42). But there are also parallels. Take for example swaps like the ones that precipitated the crisis for AIG – transactions that practitioners and economic theorists sometimes analogise to barter. They are framed in the first instance as transactions, promises in the present to exchange a certain quantity for another quantity at some future date. But an obligation to pay in the future is a debt, and indeed creating debts is precisely the point, as each party sees itself as having the best of the other. In precisely the sense suggested by Strathern for the case of barter, in the epigraph above, the credit default swap is a swapping of perspectives on the totality of each side’s assets. Hence what is explicitly framed as a transaction is also implicitly understood as a relationship of ambiguous mutual indebtedness, what Strathern has termed an extraction of wealth by one side from the other (Strathern 2004b: 85–109). This fact of mutual indebtedness in turn raises questions about the capacities of each to fulfil its obligations because of the way the capacities of corporate personality are often disassembled and reassembled in the context of ‘sudden death’ or ‘government rescue’, ‘merger’, ‘acquisition’, cash flow problems, exposure to unforeseen market risks or the imposition of constraints by government regulators.
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My hope is that focusing on the constitution of legal personhood through the lens of economic exchange can help move the anthropology of law definitively beyond its lingering addiction to a view of the ‘jural’ (jural relations, jural personhood) as a matter of rules and norms governing rights and obligations, in contrast to the flexible, empirical realities of economic relations (Leach 1961). This implicitly accepted conception of law, in which, for example, the anthropology of the state is something quite distinct from the anthropology of gift exchange, assumes that the jural should be apprehended in a quite different modality, as a target of critique rather than ethnography. This straw man in my view now impedes anthropologists from grasping the potential contributions of their own knowledge to pressing ethical and political questions of the moment. Because the nature of the legal person is not accessible explicitly among my informants in the market, it has been necessary to turn to another site of legal knowledge production, the legal academy, where, in contrast, the legal person has been the subject of great debate. Here, some of the observations of the anthropology of exchange about the nature of relations and of persons turn out to have robust parallels in early twentieth-century jurisprudence. For me, this suggests that we might put the canon of anthropological theory side by side with the canon of legal theory to generative effect for each. My larger suggestion is that a Strathernian approach to ethnography and analysis points the way towards a different kind of ethnography of law as collaborative relation with (as opposed to description of) legal knowledge production.
The legal relation One of Strathern’s early contributions to the anthropology of personhood and exchange was the appreciation that relations might be analytically prior to the subjects and objects of relation (Strathern 1988: 173). It turns out that this appreciation is shared by much of modernist legal theory. For example, it is a point that the venerable Weimar era judge and legal scholar Hans Kelsen wholeheartedly embraced as an account of corporate personality in his canonical treatise, Pure theory of law ([1934] 2002). For Kelsen, law was a system of legally determined obligations of one legally recognised subject to another. What was primary and most
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significant were not the relations between individuals but rather the ‘relations between legal norms’ themselves, or between the ‘facts determined by legal norms’ (Kelsen 2002: 165). This view of the primacy of the legal relation framed Kelsen’s understanding of the legal person as a kind of assemblage of legal norms. As he wrote, in terms that predated a generation of poststructuralist theory, not to mention later subdisciplines such as science and technology studies, ‘The so-called physical person . . . is not a human being, but the personified unity of the legal norms that obligate or authorize one and the same human being’ (Kelsen 2002: 174). At the time, the dominant way of thinking about the problem of corporate personality was epistemological – in what sense does the corporation, which unlike ‘real’ persons of flesh and blood is a fiction of law, exist in the world? But for Kelsen there was nothing artificial or fictional about corporate personality. When the law states that the corporation is a person, he argued, it is simply outlining a relationship among legal orders – between the ‘national legal order’ (a total legal order) and a ‘partial legal order’, the corporation. That is, the state as a system of legal relations delegates certain capabilities, potentialities and obligations without regard to who actually activates or appropriates these. To say that the state looks at the corporation as a person is simply to say that it looks no further, with respect to certain kinds of obligations and potentialities. Those juridical relations become opaque from the state’s point of view, visible as if from the outside, so to speak. So as a first step, Kelsen’s work suggests an analogue between modern legal ways of conceptualising the state and modern anthropological ways of conceptualising the social, both of which make these entities appear and disappear in relationality. And this is where Strathern’s work reinvigorates legal debate. In the contemporary moment when more sociological accounts of law are dominant, Kelsenian jurisprudence has often been dismissed as an excessively formalistic attempt to rationalise all relations into a singular legal hierarchy with the state at the top. But from an anthropological vantage point, the fact that state and corporate personality are relational entities by no means suggests that the relations are stable, unchanging, or can be seen from only one point of view. The notion of legal personhood as an effect of relationality has taken a more discursive turn in the work of the eminent private law theorist
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Gunther Teubner. Teubner also writes against the modern version of the same standard legal view of the corporation as a fiction attacked by Kelsen. In the modern version (inflected by economic analysis), the corporation is treated as a so-called ‘nexus of contracts’ – the corporation is an entity in name only; it is nothing more than the coming together of myriad individuals, the shareholders, who through their individual contracts with one another agree to pool their wealth and act collectively – to produce, buy, sell, pay themselves dividends from the profits (Easterbrook and Fischel 1989). The corporation then is simply a useful fiction, a kind of legal shorthand. For Teubner, in contrast, the important point is the reflexive, selfobserving character of economic transactions: ‘What is unique about the corporation is that the communications, the transactions have the ability to refer to themselves, describe themselves, to call themselves by a legal name, to demand that others so call them. They are quite literally personified’ (pers. comm.). Teubner’s approach, with its focus on economic transactions rather than jural relations, comes even a step closer to Maussian understandings of personhood as a self-reflexive effect of exchange. Like Strathern, Teubner presents legal persons as reified exchanges. So what should we make of the parallel between innovations in legal and anthropological theories of exchange? Although Strathern’s work has been celebrated for its focus on relationality, and concepts of the person that follow from this (such as the ‘dividual’), parallels in legal theory suggest that these particular insights are perhaps less unique and perhaps more widespread elements of midcentury social thought, as refracted through multiple disciplines. I suspect that Strathern herself might be rather pleased to find her work already done elsewhere, for this raises the more challenging methodological question of what else the anthropologist might do when the relational analysis is already performed. Her methodological innovations on this point inspire the rest of this chapter, as they have inspired so much of my work.
Inside and outside As it turns out, the analogy of the legal constitution of corporate personhood to problems discussed in the anthropology of kinship and exchange is not a stretch at all in the Japanese context in which I work. It is not
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even an analogy. In 1947 the American occupation forces, confident that the Japanese household (ie, literally ‘house’) was a patriarchal institution that discriminated against daughters and wives, abolished the ie’s status as a perpetual property holder and mandated the individualised division of property into equal shares (Bachnik 1983; Hendry 1987: 6; Gordon 1998; Garner 2004: 215–18). During this period, the same occupation forces revised the corporate law and took numerous steps to break up large financial conglomerates and promote the growth of small businesses – a reflection of the occupation forces’ confidence that small-scale capitalism would breed democracy (Gerlach 1992: 109–10; Rider and Tajimi 1998: 153–4; Shishido 2001: 664). The response was dramatic, as companies rushed by the thousands to incorporate. The new corporations were, in many cases, the very households the occupiers had banned three years before. Today, such companies (in which the majority of the shareholders understand themselves to be kin) amount to over 99 per cent of Japanese enterprises and employ more than two thirds of the Japanese labour force (even without including non-waged labour). In Japan, then, we have a recent history of kinship relations becoming reflexive agents of capitalism through the legal techniques of incorporation. Now this was possible because of the particular character of Japanese kinship.1 The Japanese household has always been something of a puzzle for kinship studies because neither relations nor persons are prior, and persons are neither individual nor collective (Strathern 1992a: 53). Rather, what is salient is the form of the house, as a receptacle of wealth and potential of various kinds, and as directed by the office of the head and his or her spouse (positions occupied by various persons over time). Hence the much commented upon practices of adopting successors from outside, and the ease with which biological children are expelled from the household to leave only one office holder in management in each generation (Befu 1962; Brown 1966; Nakane 1967; Wimberly 1973; Yonekura 1984; Kato 1989). Anthropologists have insisted that the ie be understood first as an economic unit (Bachnik 1983) rather than a site 1
Max Weber suggests that the same sort of representation of the ‘joint household’ (an institution not limited to kin but that could expand to encompass entire guilds) as corporate organisation characterised the usage of the corporate form in premodern Europe (Weber [1889] 2003).
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of procreation and genealogy,2 and in a 1971 paper in American Anthropologist Hironobu Kitaoji argued that the corporate law, rather than anthropological kinship theory, provided the proper analytical frame for the anthropology of Japanese kinship. Like the corporation, he argued, the ie is a pool of wealth that exists in perpetuity with a unified management structure that is nevertheless advised by others. All this is rarely commented upon outright by legal elites. Household companies receive barely a paragraph or two in corporate law textbooks and Japanese law professors often express embarrassment at a foreign academic’s interest in this topic. (Why not focus on the serious and sophisticated legal solutions to the problems of global corporations, as imported directly from the United States and Europe, rather than the boring and backward realities of kinship-based companies?) The government refers to these companies euphemistically only as ‘small and medium sized enterprises’ although they are in fact often very large, and nothing in the civil code or the corporate law explicitly acknowledges their existence. Yet practising corporate lawyers take it for granted that a large share of their business involves kinship relations. ‘Japanese corporate law – that’s just family law’, one lawyer told me, of his reason for wanting to get out of corporate law practice. Government policy aimed at promoting local companies is clearly framed with an understanding of the problems of succession, tax and the burdens of legal formalities that come with framing kin relations as corporate relations for most companies. And judges routinely disregard the letter of the corporate law in legal disputes among shareholders where the law would reach a result that does not sit well with the judge’s view of proper kin relations. But if the legal machinations that transform household into corporation remain implicit in the realm of the corporation’s relationship with the outside – with other corporations, with the government – these are very much explicit in relationships on the inside. In a country in which litigation between corporations is very rare, relative to the United States and Europe, legal disputes among shareholders in household companies (disputes over ownership and control within the household/corporation) 2
Sylvia J. Yanagisako’s ‘Family and household: the analysis of domestic groups’ (1979) provides a larger critique of the focus on procreation and genealogy in the anthropology of households.
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account for more than 80 per cent of all commercial litigation in the Tokyo District Court (Japan Small Business Research Institute, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 2009). What interests me in all this are the features and potentialities of the ie form as transposed onto the legal person. First, the form itself is simple, steady, singular and unchanging (Strathern 1988: 181), albeit one that enables and encompasses an almost infinite diversity of ad hoc and contingent practices.3 Second, it is marked by a highly rigid division between inside and outside (Kondo 1990). To borrow a phrase from Strathern, the fact that the corporation is ‘one’ from the vantage point of the state does not negate the way it might be ‘many’ from another point of view (Strathern 1992a: 57). Third, it is relations between kinspersons and the form, and between one form and another, not between kinspersons, that matters. Hence internal relations between persons within the ie are notoriously conflictual and unstable, while relations between persons outside (including expelled biological kin) are notoriously attenuated. Hence also the appeal of the rules of shareholder meetings and fiduciary duties as a register for disputes. Japanese kinship is therefore a textbook case for Strathern’s emphasis on the constraints and effectiveness of form (1988; 1991). But it is important to keep in mind that what is at issue here is not just Japanese kinship but also the constitutive effects of legal form. The Japanese legal person also exemplifies corporate personality as opacity, described by Kelsen as the effect of a hard boundary between legal relations on the inside and outside. The eminent Japanese economist Katsuhito Iwai has written of the general features of the corporate form that external simplification in turn makes for internal complexity (Iwai 1999: 583–632). Iwai later makes what he views as an unrelated claim: the salient feature of the corporate form is that it ‘plays a dual role as both person and thing’ (1999: 584), subject and object – by which he means that it both owns and is owned. A shareholder who walks off with the corporation’s typewriter can be arrested for theft because the typewriter is the property of the 3
On the ad hoc and contingent as if uses of a simplified and stable kinship form as refracted through the law, see Barbara Yngvesson and Susan Coutin’s ‘Backed by papers: undoing persons, histories and return’ (2006) and Marie-Andre´e Jacob’s ‘The shared history: unknotting fictive kinship and legal process’ (2009).
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corporation, as subject of the property relation. On the other hand, in a capitalist economy, a thing is an object of property that can be sold as a commodity, and the stock market exists precisely so that the corporation can be sold in this way (1999: 592). Iwai’s point concerns the flexibility of the legal form:4 Japanese companies deploy the form in a rather personifying way, as for example in the practice of cross-shareholding in which a group of companies mutually own one another’s shares (and often these firms’ leaders make public claims about the roots of the firms’ close relations in kinship ties). This mutual relationship personifies the company because its owner, the other company, does thinks of it not as a mere basket of wealth, to be taken apart and resold, but as the subject of a relationship, Iwai argues. On the other hand, American companies deploy the same form in a way that emphasises the object quality of the corporation – valuing themselves on the basis of the sum total of their assets, from the point of view of their owners, the shareholders, he says. A Strathernian understanding of corporate personhood might entail the following elaboration on Iwai’s observation: from the outside, the Japanese corporation looks like a liberal person – it is a ‘simplification’, in Iwai’s terms, that enables the corporation to act in a relational way. But from the inside it looks like property – it is a pool of assets, the subject of contention among persons who do not see themselves as relationally bound. From this point of view, the distinction Iwai observes between corporations as persons and as things is a distinction between the view from outside and the view from inside. Drawing on Strathern’s insights about the agents and objects of exchange, then, I believe we can understand that the legal person must take a particular form (Foster 2009): from the outside it is a person, ‘simplified’, and a subject of jural relations; from the inside, it is a ‘thing’, property, a target and artefact of legal technique. The Japanese example also sharpens appreciation for the way that this opacity is also a political project. Recall that incorporation was a solution 4
Emi Matsumoto explains that although the German author of the first Japanese commercial code intended to introduce a concept of the corporation as a legal fiction, Japanese jurists from the start creatively mistranslated this notion (borrowing also from the French jurist Raymond Saleilles) to treat corporations as ‘reality’, rather than as fiction (Matsumoto 2010). This understanding of the corporation as ‘reality’ would be more difficult for Euro-Americans who perceive of personhood as naturally individualistic and of corporate forms as social artefacts or fabrications.
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to a problem of recognition: the problem of the ie was that the occupation reformers refused to recognise it, as a property owner through time, and as a citizen enjoying state privileges and owing the state a share of its wealth, as a bearer of private rights and one capable of assuming obligations by entering into contracts. But incorporation changed all that, for if the occupation regime would open up the household to recombination, it would not ‘pierce the corporate veil’ (Thompson 1991). In the liberal state, it is the availability of that veil (not in fact submission to demands for transparency) that is so often the marker of legitimacy (vis-a`-vis the state and vis-a`-vis other persons) and the basis of political recognition (Strathern 2000a). Through the example of the legal status of the ie or household in Japan, we can understand legal personification, or recognition, in the liberal capitalist state system, not simply as an effect of being seen and heard (Povinelli 2002; Gaonkar and Povinelli 2003) but also as an effect of being inaccessible to view; as the political effect of maintaining certain opacities between inside and outside. Hence, the calamity that befell AIG, in those crisis days in 2008, was that the demands of others succeeded in exposing the corporate person as just so much property (and the lesson of the ethnography of exchange is that when the ability to fulfil one’s obligations becomes reckoned in terms of crude quantities, those quantities always appear as inadequate). The near failure of AIG, as a corporate person – the radical exposure of the inside to the outside so to speak – was quite literally the effect of its transactions. The next legal step, when this occurs, is bankruptcy or corporate reorganisation – the dissolution and possible reconstitution of the corporate person through the forgiveness or renegotiation of its obligations as mediated by the state in a legal framework in which the corporation (now termed ‘the debtor’) has lost its rights of autonomy and recognition vis-a`-vis both the state and its ‘creditors’.
Legal form But how concretely did AIG’s creditors make demands on its assets and question its ability to fulfil its obligations? Or again, how do kinspersons/ shareholders challenge one another’s leadership or demand that one another’s internal contributions be recognised? In both cases it is
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through technical legal interventions – collateral calls pursuant to contractual obligations in the case of AIG, and more precisely a set of baroque lines of legal interpretation of those obligations regarding how debts and assets should be valued. Or again, in the case of the corporation, internal disputes with the corporate person take the outward form of claims that certain behaviour did not conform to the formal requirements of the corporation law, or constitute a breach of a legal duty to fiduciaries. A view of the corporation from the vantage point of Japanese kinship, in which there is nothing prior to the kinship form – no lineage, no alliances, no relationality to speak of – allows us to see that what is the inside and what is the outside of the legal person is the artefact of the selective activation of the two sides of the same form through the articulation and manipulation of legal technique. In legal anthropology, as in mainstream legal studies, legal form is treated as a largely extraneous by-product of the politics of social and economic relations, something superfluous, dull and old-fashioned – not the focus of serious and exciting scholarly inquiry. I owe its accessibility to me as an ethnographic subject not to the anthropology of law but to Strathern’s analysis of gender as ‘aesthetic’ that brings particular relations and persons into view (Strathern 1988). In an analogous way, legal technique brings the corporate person and property, externally and internally, into view and is also the medium of corporate transactions. Its effectiveness turns on ‘a contrast between the overt personification of relations and the covert techniques that determine the proper forms through which these are recognized’ (Strathern 1988: 180). In practice, the legal relation is activated differently inside and outside the legal person: on the inside, that relation emerges as legal technique. On the outside, it emerges as legal relations. As a person, the corporation is a subject of jural relations – that is to say, it is opaque, that is, the legal techniques that produce it remain implicit. As property, in contrast, the corporation is an explicit target and artefact of legal technique – viewed as if from the inside it invites opening up and recombination through legal manoeuvres. Strathern’s book Kinship, law and the unexpected (2005a) adds an additional formulation of the workings of a special kind of ‘nonepistemological’ relations – relations (like the legal person) that do not seek to describe reality. This sort of relation, what she terms ‘a tool’, has
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what she calls a ‘duplex character’. It has two possible directions to it, and hence it is possible, ‘switching back and forth’, to occupy two different positions at once ‘that anticipate each other’ (2005a: 82). In this sense, law is at once both legal technique and juridical relations ‘in the world’, in the act of ‘world-making’. On the one hand there is the world of legal relations and subjects (the world of Kelsen’s relational persons), and on the other hand there is the practice of legal technique, the manipulation of non-epistemological relations. This is obvious in practice: What does it mean to buy and sell shares? How does a corporation go into debt? One can answer these questions either with a relational description of a transaction in the world or with a description of a set of legal techniques and their human and material artefacts (Riles 2006: 1–38). Thus, the corporation can appear alternatively as a set of political relations or as a trick of doctrinal manipulation.
Legitimacy: the personhood of the state In the case of AIG, the corporate person did not actually fail. What happened rather was that the state stepped in to guarantee its debts. This in turn unleashed a fury of debate about the legitimacy of state involvement in markets, and about whether this intervention made sense from the standpoint of either market efficiency or social equity. Doubt even turned on the particular government officials ‘behind’ the actions of the state as journalists and politicians began to ask whether their decision to commit the state to standing behind AIG’s debts might have been motivated by personal interests or relations and to second guess the moves the Department of Treasury had made in its negotiations with AIG’s creditors as possible errors of legal reasoning. This incident made plain that the state was very much a transactor in these exchanges, with internal and external vulnerabilities of its own. I mentioned earlier that incorporation – the performance of legal personhood – involved a problem of recognition. But recognition takes not only the form of political representation but also the form of transaction, of mutual indebtedness and of guaranteeing one another’s debts. I want to consider what conceptions of liberal recognition the anthropological vocabulary of debts and transactions might afford.
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From this standpoint, I want to return to the politics of opacity and to the question of how the legal person and the state come to be mutually recognised. And for this I look to another legal and political theorist who sought precisely to expose the politics of legal personhood, that is, to open it to analysis as just so much legal technique. If Hans Kelsen’s Pure theory of law may be unfamiliar to some anthropologists, most already know well the text and the scholar against whom it was written. Kelsen’s nemesis was Carl Schmitt, leading jurist of the Weimar Republic, leading legal theorist of the German Nazi regime, and icon of poststructuralist theory. Schmitt’s Political theology ([1922] 2006) is read widely across the humanities today for its last chapters on sovereignty, the state of exception, and the theological foundations of the modern state. But if one reads beyond the last chapters, one finds a sociological theory of law in stark contrast with Kelsen’s relational theory. For Schmitt, Kelsen’s emphasis on the relational quality of legal norms without regard for how those norms are shaped through the technical manipulations of lawyers and judges was a perfect example of the self-justificatory ‘ideology of the lawyer-bureaucrat practicing in changing political circumstances’ (Schmitt 2006: 45). Schmitt’s ‘sociological’ approach in contrast focused on the technical knowledge practices of law and on the human actors who make and apply legal norms. The law may in some sense be a system of legal relations, in Schmitt’s view, but as such, it is inherently incomplete. The abstract norms in themselves can never tell a judge how to decide a concrete case – there is always a gap between the ‘juristic deduction’ and ‘its premises’. Hence human judgment – political judgment – is always necessary in legal technique and ‘what matters for the reality of legal life is who decides’ (Schmitt 2006: 34). In this sense, Schmitt’s text lays the groundwork for most contemporary sociolegal and critical studies of law. Schmitt takes the leftist critique of legalism to its right-wing extreme. For him, the rule of law is ultimately a farce: because legal judgment cannot be bound by law, every legal decision carried out by the state’s technocratic agents is in fact a ‘state of sovereign exception’. This illiberal politics is obfuscated, however, by the technical legal morass of the modern liberal legalist state. Dictatorship emerges as the only modern secular form of government that dares to be transparent about the state of exception.
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Now this debate between Kelsen and Schmitt was largely about the legitimacy of the public personhood of the state. But it unfolded along the same lines as the manoeuvres surrounding private legal personhood I have described. Kelsen, the progressive centrist, sought to defend the state by making it appear as a closed and coherent set of legal norms, as if viewed from the outside, while Schmitt, at both the far right and the far left at once, sought to critique it by reopening it as just so much legal technique, as if viewed from the inside of the judge’s chambers. And in the neoliberal era, Schmitt can be said to have had the best of this argument. The state is typically imagined today as nothing but an artefact of legal technique and hence a pool of collective resources. Therefore its legitimacy is always open to question, and its activities as a transactor, that is, as a subject of relations (for example, its infusion of cash into troubled banks, its regulatory demands on private parties, or its redistribution of wealth through tax and transfer schemes) are inherently suspect. In legal theory, the difference between Kelsen and Schmitt is framed as a primal and irresolvable battle over which is ultimately fundamental – law (Kelsen) or power (Schmitt). But following Strathern’s exploration of the duplex relation, I believe we can understand the opposition of law and power exemplified by the battle between Kelsen and Schmitt to turn on the double-edged quality of law in the duplex sense she describes. In my view, Kelsen and Schmitt are each merely seeing a different side of the duplex legal relation – persons and relations on the one hand and legal technique on the other. But Schmitt’s totalitarian turn highlights how for states, as much as for private legal persons, legitimacy and recognisability are a question of the implicit quality of legal technique. As Strathern has commented, when cultural practice ‘takes the form of making the implicit explicit, then what was once taken for granted becomes an object of promotion, and less the cultural certainty it was’ (Strathern 1992a: 35). Following Strathern’s comparative insights into the nature of capitalist and noncapitalist exchange, then, this suggests the following: in a liberal capitalist political system, legitimacy (the opacity vis-a`-vis the state and other persons that comes with being a person and not property) is a question of the implicitness of the effects of legal technique. The division of persons
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and things is fundamental in capitalist exchange and the liberal polity, as many have commented – but it is fundamental in a specific way, that is, as an artefact of the different potentialities of legal form. Where technique is left implicit, that is, the subject is not immediately available for opening up and recombination through legal technique, personhood is opaque, relations are explicit, and legal persons become recognised, legitimised – which is just to say that in a capitalist economy, such persons become transactors, property owners. On the other hand, where technique is explicit, that is, where the object is immediately available for opening up and recombination through legal technique, property is reckoned. Property then is also simply the state of being visible as a past or potential object of legal technique. And the corporation is a property form when it is so imagined – as the site of internal disputes among shareholders in the Japanese case, or as the target of external raids in the European and American case.
Conclusion Corporate debt, of course, is now the subject of daily news. Market transactors now complain that they are overwhelmed with bad debt – by which they mean something very familiar to debt economies, that is, debt that can never be repaid. They argue that as a result the parties find themselves excessively ‘exposed’ to one another – the transactions no longer remain on the outside so to speak. What is now being made explicit as the danger of finance in a market economy is actually the very enabling possibility of the swap transaction – that a market economy and a debt economy are not so opposed as we might think.5 Meanwhile, ordinary citizens too are implicated, as the cause of corporate debt is increasingly understood to be the ‘bad loans’ of consumers who borrowed beyond their means to buy houses and consumer goods they could not afford. The state’s debts, too, have become exposed. Sovereign debt is the new source of financial crisis. As a result of the ‘bailouts’, the US national 5
Kelsen would say that this is always the case – legal obligation is essence of legal relation; legal right is just its reflex, the obligation seen from another point of view.
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debt has risen dramatically and creditors around the world (most notably the Chinese government) have raised concerns about whether the US could ever make good on its obligations, if called to do so. In such conditions, the state appears as a fragile entity, a mere debtor, its transactions and property subject to technical inspection. The confusion about what to do about this ubiquitous debt – should the government ‘bail out’ private financial interests or not – and the fascinating alliances of the far right and the far left (the Schmittians) against the technocratic middle (the Kelsenians) concerns the way the instability of debt and transaction threatens in turn the stability of the public/private distinction. Private funds and public funds, private debts and public debts, the left and the right say, should remain separate. The debate about ‘too big to fail’ has so far been about the degree to which the state’s obligations to support corporations should be allowed to become explicit. The argument is that as transactors come to be recognised by the state and by other transactors as ‘too big to fail’, they come to have an increasingly explicit promise of support from the state. When what the state will actually do at moments of crisis is entirely known, corporations have little incentive to meet their obligations. For its part, the state’s own involvement in the market seems increasingly illicit and the state loses legitimacy. But thinking of legal persons in terms of the exchange of perspectives entailed in transactions – your view of my assets for my view of yours, in Strathern’s words above – and the demands and obligations these engender gives us a quite different conception of legitimacy and liberal law in market economy. Or more appropriately it asks whether a market economy is at all the right description of our transactions: too big to fail, after all, is the idiom and ethics of gifts and their transactors. From this point of view, what is termed a crisis is a set of relations and their effects that are absolutely germane to the nature of the persons, things and transactions, as debts are cancelled, created, transformed into further debts, and as these engender the unfolding, taking apart, exposure of internal relations, and recombination into other wholes. As Janet Roitman puts it, ‘beyond instrumentalist tactics, the productivity of debt can also be understood in terms of a primary relation that puts debtor– creditor relations at the very base of social relations more generally, and
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hence at the heart of productive associations. This means positing debates as a fundamental social fact, as already there’ in contrast to ‘an abnormal situation that needs to be rectified’ (Roitman 2005: 74). The language of exceptionalism that surrounds talk of financial crisis then shields from view the way exchange partners have their own ways – both mundane and dramatic – of keeping accounts of debts, of calling these into question, of demanding accountability for themselves and for others, and of making of vulnerability its own source of strength. The point at which anthropologists might contribute, I believe, is in bringing into view a richer conception of accountability and legitimacy, and of the wider ethics and politics it interpolates and engenders. The challenge is how to do this without making the very techniques of the activation of debts explicit. But as Hirokazu Miyazaki (2004) suggests, such things cannot and should not be analysed; they can only be replicated. In her own professional and analytical relations, Marilyn Strathern has done precisely this, to formidable effect. Ultimately it is this model that remains the greatest lasting debt, the one that animates my own professional personhood. And anthropologists certainly appreciate the promise of persons and debts that are too big to fail.
Acknowledgements An earlier version of this chapter was presented as the keynote lecture at the Conference on ‘Legal Knowledge and Anthropological Engagement’ held at the University of Cambridge, 3 October 2008 and as the Munro Lecture, University of Edinburgh, 4 December 2008. I thank Vinny Ialenti and Guillaume Ratel for their research assistance. I am also grateful to Jeanette Edwards, Marie-Andre´e Jacob, Hirokazu Miyazaki and Maja Petrovic´-Sˇteger for comments and criticisms that substantially shaped the redirection of this chapter.
4
‘Hybrid custom’ and legal description in Papua New Guinea Melissa Demian
Papua New Guinea’s Underlying Law Act 2000 was on the face of it a radical piece of legislation. It sought, among other things, to direct the courts to apply themselves more assiduously to the task of integrating custom into something called the ‘underlying law’ – that is, by privileging customary law over the common law of the Commonwealth to which Papua New Guinea is an heir. The concept of the ‘underlying law’ comes straight from the Constitution of the country, in which this resource is listed at the end of a seven-tiered hierarchy of laws which govern the country (Constitution Part II Division 1). But it is far more than a bit of documentary legalism; the underlying law was very much alive in my interviews with legal elites in Papua New Guinea that informed the research on which this chapter is based. On repeated occasions, the underlying law was mentioned by my interlocutors as difficult to develop, either because of insufficient judicial activism or initiative by lawyers, because of the reliance on district and national courts to do the job when really the responsibility rests with the village courts, and so on. I was fascinated by the constant invocation of the underlying law as something which was selfevidently desirable but always, frustratingly, just out of reach of the capacity of legal practitioners to bring it into being. Indeed my very presence in the country to conduct this research was a result of the widespread (although not necessarily universal) sentiment that neither before nor since the passage of the Act has much movement towards the development of the underlying law happened (Jessep 1998; Ottley 2002). While I had conceived of the project as an exploration of the use by district and national courts of the ‘customary law’ concept, my research was gently but persistently redirected by legal colleagues and 49
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interlocutors towards the underlying law. For example, the Deputy Chief Justice observed to me that since the common law and equity are derived from case law, a similar process of documentation of customary law could provide an analogous source, a ‘practical way to develop the principles of underlying law’. Customary law was not the issue on anyone’s mind; when I asked about it, the question was invariably reframed through discussion as one of how custom could contribute instrumentally to the development of the underlying law. Filer (2006: 67–8) identifies this notion as having arisen from the nationalist moment of independence, when ‘the legal fraternity, which had formerly dismissed the concept of “customary law” as an oxymoron, now recovered its integrity in the form of an “underlying law” which had survived the colonial encounter, but still lay buried in the ground beneath the colonial edifice of legal institutions’. Where Filer found the underlying law concept archaeological in nature, my interlocutors (in a not unrelated vein) seemed to find it ethnographic: my proper job, some suggested, was to go and learn about customary law in the rural areas of Papua New Guinea and then write it all down for the lawyers and judges to make use of. For this is precisely what the Underlying Law Act was supposed to do: require that courts move customary law up the hierarchy to take precedence over the common law, as a means of uncovering a body of law that would be the analogue of the common law, and in so doing, replace it. My initial response, shared with only a few of my interlocutors, is that the project so conceived is impossible, because custom ‘doesn’t work like that’. I was of course operating with the classic anthropological model of customary law in mind: that it is by definition unwritten and uncodified, ad hoc, contingent, negotiable, a set of ‘relationships’ rather than one of ‘rules’, and all the rest of it. More interesting than my own scepticism, however, was the parallel scepticism of my colleagues. To them, the Act was difficult if not impossible to implement because there are too many customs in Papua New Guinea, and these multitudinous customs are always either potentially in conflict with the Constitution and other laws, or potentially a cause of unmanageable complexity through their combination with each other. These combinations would in turn arise from the cosmopolitanism of contemporary Papua New Guinean society: people
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move about the country in search of employment, education or adventure, and, inevitably, they marry one another. Such ‘mixed marriages’ in turn produce children whose rights of inheritance are in question, debates over the form and quantity in which bridewealth ought to be presented, other debates about the conditions under which polygyny is permissible, and sometimes divorces, in which case all these issues become even more fraught and contested. In other words, the idea that for an anthropologist is a starting proposition (if custom is to be ‘found’ anywhere, it is in social relationships and social organisation) is for Papua New Guinean legal practitioners a can of worms. How is the underlying law to be derived from people all over the country arguing about their relationships in court? The answer, contained in the Deputy Chief Justice’s remark, is that it must operate in a manner analogous to the formation of the common law that the underlying law is meant eventually to replace. The common law is treated in the Constitution as the default to which Papua New Guinea law reverts if there are no more recently enacted statutes or Constitutional provisions to supplant it. As such it would not to be too far a stretch to call it the background against which Papua New Guinea’s ‘own’ laws are foregrounded. And as the milieu against which these locally generated laws appears, it in turn appears to be not the end result of generations of Britons arguing about their relationships in court, but a context that generates its own techniques. These techniques can then be applied to the Papua New Guinean context to produce its own analogous context: the underlying law. So to proceed, I would ask if it is necessary to set aside anthropology’s suppositions of what custom and customary law might be, that is, relations produced in a local context. The dilemma posed by the Underlying Law Act is, instead, how a putatively universal set of techniques can be applied to these local relations in order to produce a local analogue to the universalising process. As Strathern has observed: where systems appear analogous and comparison becomes possible, the possibilities bifurcate again: between the substantive comparisons that elucidate the effects of similar and dissimilar practices in different contexts, and the metaphorical illuminations that come from using concepts derived from the study of one ethnographic arena to deploy in another. (Strathern 2004a: 37–8)
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In other words, research that was originally intended as an ethnography of legalism in custom became one of legal practitioners doing their own ethnography of the customs of legalism.
Hybrid custom The relation between an anthropologist and the people she works with can often take unanticipated forms. I have in mind a moment in a land court hearing in Alotau, the capital of Milne Bay Province, in 2008. The case before the Senior Provincial Magistrate was a mundane issue of one family applying to have another restrained from building on a parcel of land until the proper ownership of the land in question had been clarified. The two contending families were in fact related by marriage, and the court had been called in response to a woman from one party having arranged to have the land surveyed, an act tantamount to aggression given Papua New Guinea’s notoriously fluid systems of land tenure. Both sides appeared to want the matter settled in court, although the magistrate attempted to steer them towards mediation instead, a preference he had also expressed to me earlier in an interview. He reminded the feuding parties that in a normal court hearing ‘there is a winner and there is a loser’, which would have serious consequences for the settlement of the dispute. The reason he gave for this was that ‘here in Milne Bay, we are matrilineal, so the land goes through the woman’s side’. He was in fact reminding them of their own system of descent and inheritance, which, although not the only form of descent found in Milne Bay, is unusually prevalent there in comparison with the rest of the country. He then proceeded to lecture the litigants on the exceptions to this rule, using his own ‘mixed’ marriage to a woman from a patrilineal group as an example. He said he could make contributions to her side to secure land rights for their children, perhaps implying that this might have been a preferable strategy for the litigants before him, rather than dragging their affines to the District Court. During his speech I was at some pains to suppress utterances of delight at hearing a magistrate from Kiriwina in the Trobriand Islands lecturing his court, including its anthropological interloper, about the niceties of matrilineal inheritance. It was not the first time I had been informed that
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matriliny was what I was ‘supposed’ to be focused on (Demian 2007: 156), but to hear it in court, from a Trobriander no less, added an appealing layer of irony to the mix. A number of relations suddenly came into view when the magistrate felt compelled to remind his litigants that they were matrilineal. Not least among these was the heterogeneity of those present in the courtroom itself. Although I was the only actual foreigner in the room, one of the features that struck me on this return visit to Alotau was how much more cosmopolitan it had become in the eight years since I had last been there. Tok Pisin, Papua New Guinea’s national creole against which Milne Bay had once been a stubborn holdout in favour of English, was now heard regularly on the streets and indeed in the courtroom. A number of the parties whose cases were heard on this and subsequent days were not from Milne Bay, but other parts of the country, with other ways of reckoning modes of inheritance, obligations to kin, and the appropriate means of settling disputes. The Senior Provincial Magistrate was, in other words, continually faced with a potential dilemma to which I was also alerted by one of his colleagues. The problem was couched in slightly different terms, but pointed to a similar set of concerns. In Port Moresby, the Deputy Chief Magistrate had also been discussing with me the problem of inheritance. He noted, for example, that people from the island of Bougainville were mostly matrilineal. What if a man from that part of the country married a woman from a patrilineal group in another part of the country? Their children would have no rights at all! In cases like this, he said, you ended up with ‘hybrid custom’: his words precisely. So what for his colleague in Alotau had been a question of procedure – why aren’t you exercising your custom? – was for this magistrate a question akin to the conflict of laws – what happens when our customs combine in unexpected ways, and which one should dominate? Like the conflict of laws, the Deputy Chief Magistrate’s hybrid custom is a ‘self-consciously technical field’ (Riles 2005: 977) that is subjected to a ‘technical aesthetics of law’ (2005: 976). That is, both were pointing to a sense of differences between parts of the country, embodied in the obligations that people bring to their relationships with one another. These differences, emblematic of Papua New Guinea’s heterogeneity, are lauded by politicians
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and the press as one of the great strengths of the country, but are also a source of no minor anxiety on the part of legal practitioners. While custom as a category may be considered so fundamental to Papua New Guinean nationhood that it is the anticipated source of the underlying law, custom as a set of practices is too diverse to keep in view at any one time. To manage them, a number of the legal practitioners I spoke to suggested a particular solution that would entail making the techniques of custom exactly analogous to those of law. The solution is that of ‘universal custom’, which I will discuss at greater length below. In this chapter, then, I propose to take seriously the concern of the two magistrates. Their observations, both to me and to the people whom they served in their professional capacity, were the product of a particular moment in Papua New Guinea’s national legal conversation. I might describe this moment somewhat as follows: one of the ways that Papua New Guinea describes its heterogeneity and the social complexity arising from it is through the concept of custom.1 That is, the country is made of different groups of people with different customs, and particularly in the legal arena, ‘conflict’ or ‘hybridity’ between customs can have unanticipated effects. But this description too has its own effect, and the effect is merographic (Strathern 1992a) in that ‘the notion of plurality – of the multiplicity of things – is derived not simply from the number of things in the world, but from the fact that any single entity can be differentiated from a similar entity by some axis other than their similarity’ (1992a: 73). Just as the customs of each social group in Papua New Guinea are seen as part of that group’s identity and internal relationships as a group, and as Papua New Guinea is seen as being made up of very many of these groups (‘ethnic societies’ was the favoured term of the Deputy Chief Justice), so the relations between these groups can be extracted in terms of the relations between their customs.2 To ‘develop the underlying law’, then, becomes a matter of relating these extracted parts to the analogous parts of the law. 1 2
In Tok Pisin it is rendered as kastom, whose meaning overlaps but does not map directly onto English custom (Keesing 1989; Foster 1992; Jolly 1994; Bolton 2003; Demian 2006). Bolton (2003) discusses a highly aestheticised version of this same process during the period of Vanuatu’s transition to independence.
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Eliciting the ‘underlying law’ Some of the commonly discussed obstacles to development of the underlying law in terms of its expression as customary law are fairly straightforward. Lawyers and judges in Papua New Guinea are trained in the ‘black-letter law’ of the state and of the Commonwealth, and are not accustomed to being asked to think in terms of customary rights or obligations except where these are presented as evidence supplementary to an affidavit – and even then, the status of custom as evidence is a contentious one to which I will return shortly. While customary law is taught as a compulsory module at the UPNG School of Law, many lawyers in the country (especially if they go into private practice) can expect, not unreasonably, never to have to confront the topic again after their graduation. So there is some concern that it is the very education and training of legal professionals in Papua New Guinea that disinclines them from taking up the problem of developing the underlying law in the proactive manner envisioned in the Constitution and the Underlying Law Act. So there is a widespread perception by legal scholars that the legal education process itself can constitute an obstacle to the development of underlying law. A second popularly observed obstacle to the development of underlying law is that lawyers think judges should be more activist in the cases they hear, and judges think lawyers are not exerting themselves sufficiently to bring customary law as evidence to bear on their arguments. This observation I can support from my own research, which did seem to indicate that the bench and the bar have each adopted a position of anticipation that the other will take the initiative. Having said this, however, it is important to ask more rigorous questions about why the two sides of the legal profession each feel that their own hands are tied vis-a`-vis bringing customary law into a case. Is it, for instance, a feature of the very relation established between custom and law that it must always originate from somewhere, or someone, else? The question is a component of my contention that the underlying law, as currently understood in Papua New Guinea, is a product of a series of analogies, that is, relationships between social forms that are held to be comparable because they are versions of one another. But they are
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versions of each other by virtue of the fact that they have first been distinguished from each other. It is that initial differentiation which allows lawyers, magistrates and litigants to compare one mode of argumentation to the other in the first place. I am of course drawing here on Strathern’s (1988) model of elicitation in Melanesia, or the revelation of a relationship through the very technique of an act of differentiation. The differentiation in turn instantiates a split between cause and agent, wherein an agent is ‘one who from his or her own vantage point acts with another’s in mind’ (1988: 272). It is this model that has been helpful in asking how it is that this thing called the underlying law is understood to be a product of the analogy between law and custom, because the technique of creating the analogy is the same technique that allows agents in the legal process to attempt to elicit the analogy from each other. In order to demonstrate that an analogic process is at work, I must start with the definition of what is meant by ‘underlying law’ in the first place. Custom in the Papua New Guinea Constitution is recognised insofar as it is part of the ‘underlying law’, a concept that is part of the bedrock of the Constitution, the last in a list of seven sources that form the law of the country. In turn, Schedule 1.2.2. of the Constitution provides the following definition of the term ‘underlying law’: ‘(a) the underlying law provided for by an Act of the Parliament under Section 20(1) (underlying law and pre-Independence statutes); and (b) until such time as there is an Act of the Parliament, the underlying law prescribed in Schedule 2 (adoption, etc., of certain laws)’. And in Schedule 2, we learn that the underlying law consists of a combination of custom, the common law, judicial precedent, laws adopted and adapted from the period before Independence, and new rules composed of, among other things, ‘analogies to be drawn from relevant statutes and custom’. So I want to ask what are the relevant analogies at work in the concept of the underlying law in Papua New Guinea, and whether it is the very nature of these analogies that is preventing the underlying law from ‘developing’, to employ the term of art as it is used in the Constitution itself and in legislation enacted since then. The Underlying Law Act, for instance, offers a much simpler analogic relationship than the Constitution does. In this piece of legislation, the
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‘underlying law’ has two sources only: the ‘customary law’ and ‘the common law in force in England immediately before the 16th September, 1975’. The relationship is analogic because the two sources are considered comparable, and combinable – if not necessarily commensurate. Because one of the more radical aspects of the Act is that it explicitly privileges customary law over the common law, and directs courts to apply customary law to the exclusion of common law wherever the customary law at issue does not conflict with any existing statutes, with the Constitution or with the National Goals and Directive Principles. But this has not happened. In the estimation of almost every legal professional I interviewed, customary law has appeared with decreasing rather than increasing frequency since the passage of the Act. Some of the reasons for this are straightforward and pragmatic. Lawyers I spoke to noted the exhaustive research that successfully pleading custom potentially involves, research for which they may have neither time nor financial or human resources. It is far easier to find the relevant case law, statute or common law principle, all of which are part of the standard legal library, than to do what is essentially anthropological research to ‘discover’ the custom of their client. Some indeed suggested, in the most diplomatic of terms, that my time might better be spent doing what anthropologists are supposed to do, and go discover some custom for them! The notion that custom is something that must be discovered, moreover, points to the distinction between discovery and invention that Strathern (2001) argues is organised by the category of nature: ‘Invention modifies nature; discovery does not’ (2001: 9). But nature is of course not the only ‘container’, in Strathern’s terminology, for this distinction. Society can serve just as well as a containing principle, particularly when society is being made explicit to itself through a process such as legal and constitutional reform. In this case, it is society that is modified by the invention of law, while society is presumably only ‘found’ – made explicit – through the discovery of custom. In practice, however, the process by which custom is introduced and assessed as evidence in a case, or offered as a remedy at the conclusion of a case, can start to look very much like invention.
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Custom, at least by most people’s definition, encompasses the whole life of a group of people – it is fiendishly difficult to extract the ‘law’ aspect of it. Often lawyers and judges must resort to references to customary ‘beliefs’, particularly in cases such as the murder of alleged sorcerers. But attempts to uncover an analogy between belief and law have run courts into trouble, because the work of drawing the analogy is itself the work of invention, of modifying the relation between a practice and the society that putatively pursues that practice. For instance in the landmark Aumane case (Acting Public Prosecutor v. Aumane, Boku, Wapulae, and Kone (1980) PNGLR 510), an attempt at judicial activism on behalf of custom was spectacularly unsuccessful because of a combination of inadequate evidence and the problematic issue of whether a custom is coterminous with a belief. In this case, three defendants from Enga Province pleaded guilty to the murder of a woman they said had killed more than twenty people by means of sorcery. The trial judge at the time, Bernard Narokobi, used the case as an opportunity to make use of the provisions of the Constitution for the application of customary law. He gave each of the defendants brief custodial sentences of a few years, and also ordered them each to pay five pigs to the family of their victim. This experiment in creative sentencing was appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, where it was rejected as grossly inadequate, not least because Narokobi was deemed to have placed unwarranted weight on what the defendants said they thought they were doing. He appeared, for example, to accept at face value their assertion that the deceased had killed twenty people with sorcery, and that to kill her was an intelligible response to her alleged misdeeds. So the then judge Narokobi, in a goodfaith effort to use the Constitution as the transformative instrument it was intended to be, was thrown back on the dilemma not of ‘discovering’ a custom to use in sentencing, but of creating one, in the sense that the defendants’ testimony elicited it from him.3 The problem was that there 3
This expedient invention of custom is not as radical as it sounds; judges in Papua New Guinea have frequently been required to resort to invention, particularly in cases involving the calculation of compensation. See Demian 2008 for another example, this time from civil law, and Filer 1997 for a further discussion of the ‘creativity’ inherent in compensation more generally.
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was no provision for compensation to be used in sentencing at the time, which was one of the grounds on which his sentence was rejected by the Supreme Court. However, this case did have the benefit of acting as a catalyst for the Criminal Law (Compensation) Act 1991, in which courts are provided with guidelines for integrating compensation into a sentence. And is compensation custom? Compensation came up in many of my interviews and informal discussions with legal practitioners, as much a problem as it is a solution. It is popularly believed in its present form to have originated in the Highlands, although it could be argued that most if not all Papua New Guinea societies include some provision for making reparations to the victims of damage in material form, if not necessarily on the spectacular scale for which Highlanders are renowned. Compensation is a technique of measurement (Strathern 1999: 220–4), of demonstrating in concrete terms the loss to yourself, your clan, your tribe or some other social unit that resulted from violence, ill-will or accident. As such, compensation appears ideally to be one of the ‘universal customs’ that a number of people I interviewed said was a requirement for any custom to become part of the underlying law. That a custom must be found throughout Papua New Guinea to be applicable to the problem of the underlying law is an interesting requirement, and was the solution proposed by several of my interlocutors to deal with the dazzling array of customs perceived to be in practice throughout the country. To cite universality as an ideal points to one of the aims of the development of the underlying law, that is, to define a set of rules and values that all Papua New Guineans can agree should apply to all Papua New Guineans. It is, in short, a tool for nationmaking, as indeed the framers of the Constitution and many jurists in the period directly following independence deemed it should be. In a related vein, the legal practitioners in my research almost all cited the cultural diversity of the country as one of the most daunting obstacles to introducing evidence of custom into a case. The desire to pin down universal custom is in part a desire to discover what all Papua New Guineans have in common. This has not only ideological but practical effects. Apart from the charter for nationhood it provides, it gives the
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provisions of the Constitution and the Underlying Law Act something to build on: if there is a custom we all ‘have’, then, subject to the test of compatibility with existing laws, it will be a good candidate for formal integration into the underlying law.
The nice thing about custom is that everyone has it However, there is then the problem of what I will call an excess of universality. Compensation suffers from this problem, and so does sorcery; I will treat each in their turn. Compensation was seen by a number of people I interviewed to be as much a hindrance as an aid to the development of any law, underlying or otherwise, in Papua New Guinea. A prime example is the bel kol payment, which certainly did originate in the Highlands but is now practised in much of the country. The principle of bel kol is that, prior to any mediation between injured and offending parties, a payment is made to the injured party to enable him or her to sit down and discuss the issue more or less dispassionately. However, as the Public Solicitor said to me, bel kol is now ‘creeping into the criminal process’ – an assertion that was supported by others I spoke to after him, when I inquired about this phenomenon in particular. In other words, it is now becoming common practice to offer the person you or your family have wronged some sort of compensation before a case goes to trial, or even before any charges are brought. To the great frustration of police and lawyers alike, this has the effect, intentional or otherwise, of causing witnesses to disappear. In some parts of the country, I was told, it is now becoming the practice for the family of the perpetrator to offer the family of the victim compensation precisely in order to prevent the conflict from going to trial. Police may not even make arrests in these instances, as the case will have no chance without witnesses. Much of the assessment of compensation appears, however, to depend on at what point in a case the compensation appears. From the perspective of police and court officials, ‘bad’ compensation is that which is paid before a trial or even an arrest. ‘Good’ compensation is that provided for by the Criminal Law (Compensation) Act 1991. This is compensation which is paid under the auspices of a court as the outcome of the case and
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within the constraints imposed by the Act, such as, that it cannot exceed the value of 5,000 kina.4 But it is precisely the wide range of relationships that compensation can affect that accounts for its appeal to Papua New Guineans, including members of the legal profession. I was given at least one impassioned defence of compensation by another member of the Public Solicitor’s Office, in which it was explained to me that compensation is a far more Papua New Guinean means of redressing wrongs than custodial sentencing. My colleague asserted that if you just punish someone by putting him in jail, you only punish that one person, when, to be really effective, you want his entire family to take responsibility for what he did. This is where compensation comes in. In the example of a rape case, she explained, you can put the rapist in jail, which does not rehabilitate him and does not place any responsibility on his family to monitor his behaviour. Or you can get him to pay compensation, which brings his entire family into the picture, and not only ‘punishes’ all of them (because they must contribute to the payment) but communicates to them the need to keep their kinsman in line. Because jail only affects the perpetrator but compensation affects his entire family, compensation can be asserted as the sort of sentence more amenable to Papua New Guinean values. Now this was just one assessment offered to me, by a lawyer to whom – at least for the sake of a good argument – the timing of the compensation payment was not of paramount concern. Her argument was based explicitly on the notion that, in Papua New Guinea, responsibilities are properly shouldered by groups rather than individuals, and that it is this ethos that underlies compensation. There is of course something to this point, although I think it is also possible to make too much of the communal value/ individual value opposition. But another serious problem lies within the provisions of the Act itself. The tiny sum of 5,000 kina – as I think it would be judged by most people in Papua New Guinea – cannot serve as the measurement of value, that is, of loss or wrong suffered, that compensation embodies. Can it be any wonder then, that people increasingly prefer to save face, materialise the ongoing relations 4
In 2008, K1.00 = £0.20.
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between their group and another, and set the value they choose on a wrong committed, rather than go to court and walk away with such a pittance? So compensation suffers from excess on two fronts: that people choose to engage in it outside the remit of the law, and that it can be used to assess value on a scale that the law does not provide for. Both of these practices are seen as interfering with the process of the law, and as such they disrupt the potential for compensation to be appropriated (in the most positive sense of the term) into Papua New Guinea’s legal repertoire. A slightly different sort of interfering excess is attributed to sorcery cases, which share with compensation the characteristic of universality in Papua New Guinean societies, but which offer an even more contentious association with custom. I was even asked by one interlocutor whether sorcery ‘counted’ as custom. The question made perfect sense to me in the light of my previous experience with Village Courts in Milne Bay Province: sorcery is the artefact of the past that no one wants to own (it is in fact regularly disavowed and repudiated), but that everyone is painfully conscious of at all times (Demian 2006). Sorcery presents a peculiar set of challenges for the contemporary Papua New Guinea court, because it can never satisfy the rules of evidence that are fundamental to the legal process. There exists the Sorcery Act 1971, which provides courts with a set of protocols for dealing with sorcery claims, which of course could not be recognised at all under the common law. But this piece of legislation creates as many problems as it solves, in the respect that it offers courts only the partial solution of recognising the belief in sorcery, without addressing how that belief is to be substantiated with evidence. This is one of the primary factors that ran Aumane into trouble, and that has dogged every case inclusive of a sorcery claim both before and since that case. Sorcery is regularly claimed as a defence in murder cases – that is, defendants will explain that they killed a sorcerer in retaliation for or anticipation of that sorcerer’s killing a member of their family. But to the best of my knowledge, the claim that a victim of a murder was a sorcerer has never been accepted as a defence, or even as much of a mitigation; indeed the Public Prosecutor was of the opinion that courts are handing
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down harsher sentences than ever before in sorcery-related cases. In spite of sorcery’s consistent failure as a defence, I was told that it is also the most consistent manner in which custom emerges in criminal law – these days custom is far more likely to be found in civil law cases, particularly land disputes and those involving adultery and other marriage problems. Again, the Public Solicitor was kind enough to tell me of a case he had recently argued in Bulolo in Morobe Province, where he was, he said, quite happy that the court did not agree with his argument. A man had been suspected of some recent sorcery-attributed deaths; he confessed to causing them and was beaten up, after which he managed to get home to be taken care of by his wife. But three men then went to his house, killed him with their bush knives and burnt down the house. At their trial the Public Solicitor pleaded that this was not just an issue of belief, because the man himself had actually confessed to practising sorcery. In fact he had previously even been imprisoned for sorcery, and admitted to practising it still after his release. The Public Solicitor told me his argument ‘should’ have had more mitigatory effect on the sentences of his attackers, but was glad that it did not. He said if the men had actually received lighter sentences, there would have been ‘no fairness or justice’ because he did not actually feel that the sorcery suspicion provided an excuse for what the men had done. This case points to the problem that an excess of universality presents to courts, and especially to defence lawyers. Sorcery is universally present in Papua New Guinea, but it is at the same time universally absent in Papua New Guinea courts, because no evidence recognised by a court can ever be offered, even in the case of an apparent confession as in the recent case in Bulolo. Underlying the problem of evidence is a historical resistance to sorcery accusations in pre-independence courts; British and later Australian colonial policy was not to recognise the existence of sorcery. And while sorcery is not universally avowed as bad in Papua New Guinea – some societies recognise both harmful and beneficial forms – it seems safe to claim that sorcery is universally a source of anxiety, deemed fundamentally incompatible with some aspect of life in contemporary Papua New Guinea, whether that aspect is Christianity, modernity, education or indeed the ‘rule of law’.
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My two examples of excessive universality, compensation and sorcery, serve as instances of some of the pitfalls of requiring universality as a condition of recognising custom as the analogy to law. Not all my interlocutors suggested this condition, of course. Others, including the Deputy Chief Justice, offered instead the suggestion – the exhortation even – that what Papua New Guinea legal practitioners really need is an exhaustive study of different customary laws throughout the country that is then written down and gathered into one comprehensive source, say a set of volumes representing each province of the country. The underlying law could then be produced through this set of elicited precedents; there might be local variations in how one deals with compensation, sorcery or other matters, but the technique for uncovering and applying these variations is the same no matter which part of the country the custom is drawn from. While the idea of a collection of customs may look like an inversion of the universality requirement, I would submit that it is actually just another expression of it. Some of my interlocutors made this explicit, in that the point of the hypothetical exercise would be to ‘discover’ what kinds of customs in Papua New Guinea really are universal. But others seemed to desire the exercise precisely because it would demonstrate just how many different customs are ‘out there’. Even this perspective, though, is a means of describing what it is that makes Papua New Guineans into Papua New Guineans: they all ‘have’ something identifiable as custom, as distinct from some other category of experience, be it law, business, the church or whatever. Although even these distinctions are not stable: one of my favourite assertions about custom, courtesy of the president of the Suau Local Government Council in Milne Bay in 1999, was ‘our custom is Christian’. This is not an effect of the ‘corruption’ or ‘inauthenticity’ of custom, but an effect of analogy. And analogy cannot be drawn between any terms one chooses, but must be drawn between terms perceived as having structurally relatable features. Christianity, like custom, is held to be a total system by most Papua New Guineans who profess it: it is a world that one inhabits, and my friends in Suau have been inhabiting that particular world for over 130 years now. So to claim that one’s custom is Christian is simply to say that what one does now is analogically comparable to what one presumably
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did in the nineteenth century before the arrival of the London Missionary Society. It was indeed this analogic relation that enabled the missionaries to imagine then, as many of my friends in Suau imagine now, that the life they were offering was an exact inversion of the life people were living at the time. The inversion would not be imaginable if Christianity were not seen as similar in form – as a way of life, not just a system of belief – to what people in Suau were already doing.5 It is precisely these sorts of analogic distinctions, along with the diversity of custom that is their corollary, that permit legal observers (and anthropological ones) to draw a coherent set of relationships between practices that makes them all identifiable as custom. For again it is differentiation that enables the analogic relation: one must distinguish one thing from another as a move preparatory to revealing that the two things are comparable, that they ‘work’ in similar ways. The idea of gathering all the customs of the country into one definitive account is an idea about demonstrating that although people from the provinces of Manus and Enga may appear to have little in common with each other, what enables both to have a relationship with Papua New Guinea law is that both have something ‘like’ law, that is, they both have custom. It is precisely the daunting diversity of custom that also exhibits the capacity for custom to be compared to law, and potentially to be made to act like law.
Describing relations If the issue of ‘developing the underlying law’ has a life beyond legislative rhetoric, it is to do with working out what the proper relationship between customary and common law is. In the Underlying Law Act, 5
Thus Cecil Abel, on the mission founded by his parents in 1890 at the eastern extremity of the Suau language area: ‘Building a new society or community begins with new homes and families and the children in those families. Life in the villages was corrupt and cruel. So Charles and Bea Abel gathered around them a new Christian family of boys and girls . . . And this family became the pattern for the new society, the new way of life in the future’ (Abel n.d.: 1). The Abels, like other successful missionaries throughout the Pacific, used the boarding school, in loco parentis model of conversion, in which the mission partly or entirely replaced the families in which children would otherwise have been raised. The children would then understand themselves to have acquired a ‘new life’ from which they were encouraged to reflect on the ‘old lives’ they had left behind.
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the relationship is a qualified hierarchy: custom is to be privileged over the common law unless it conflicts with the existing body of law or with the set of values enshrined in the National Goals and Directive Principles. But the hierarchy has not functioned in practice, for at least two reasons. The first is that the hierarchy established in the Act works directly against the commensurability that is a necessary condition for customary and common law to be comparable and combinable in the first place. To put it differently and to invoke a very old anthropological idea, a hierarchy implies encompassment: custom should, according to the provisions of the Underlying Law Act, cover or eclipse the common law, presumably because it more authentically expresses the Papua New Guinean or Melanesian experience. Indeed, the very inclusion of custom in the Constitution was an effect of the nationalistic sentiment immediately prior to, and following, Independence in 1975. If the common law was perceived not only to emanate from the United Kingdom but to constitute a particular kind of relationship between the United Kingdom and its former colony (Amet 1995), the underlying law – derived from statutes enacted since Independence and from custom – would, perhaps, alter the nature of that relationship. The second reason is the way custom is framed in popular Papua New Guinean discourse – including the discourse of those I interviewed and in court cases themselves. Custom is nearly always the implicit and specific relation between people, whereas law, common, Constitutional or otherwise, is the explicit and general relation. Custom is what putatively exists between you and your wantoks (co-ethnics); law is what putatively exists everywhere, between everybody and everybody else. This is, after all, the idea enshrined in the phrase ‘the rule of law’. And one of my interlocutors, another National Court judge, offered the intriguing observation that people may actually now prefer to turn to what he called ‘the imposed law’, that is, the law inherited from Britain and the Commonwealth more generally. The reason they might have for doing so, he suggested, is that the common law is ‘independent’ – it has both a traceable source and, significantly, one that lies outside the interests of any particular ethnic group in Papua New Guinea. It is also perceived to be less amenable to manipulation than customary law. But the common
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law, particularly the Criminal Code, can also fairly be said to reflect values that are held by most if not all contemporary Papua New Guineans. To draw too stark a distinction between the values embodied in the common law and those embodied in somebody’s customary law is to act as though there were never any exchange of ideas between Papua New Guineans and others, that that exchange of ideas is not ongoing, and that societies do not change. So to draw again on the formulation ‘our custom is Christian’, wherein another universalising system is appropriated at the scale of local relations, it is worth asking in what ways people seek out analogies that could truly permit custom to operate on the same scale as the common law. I hope to have teased two themes out of this discussion. One is that custom must be particular, and it must demonstrably emanate from a people’s past: one of my legal interlocutors, for instance, when listing persons who might be called as reliable witnesses to a claim of custom, categorically excluded members of the clergy, schoolteachers and young people in general, in preference for Village Court magistrates, Local Government councillors, senior people and ‘traditional leaders’ in general – whilst asserting in the next breath that such leaders are increasingly difficult to find, because they are all ‘dying out’. That is the version of custom as it is held to operate in the case law. Case law is after all the material from which judicial precedent is built, and successive cohorts of judges in Papua New Guinea have carefully and with reasonable success used precedent to create a model for how to approach particular customary claims, from ownership of land to appropriate (and inappropriate) remedies for adultery. It is in other words the particularity of customary claims that allows for the generalising power of the analogic relationship between cases. But custom as a potential component of the underlying law is another matter. The notion of ‘universal customs’ mooted by my interlocutors suggests that custom can also be imagined to operate at the generalised level already imagined for law. If ‘[t]he notion of relation can be applied to any order of connection’ (Strathern 2005a: 63), then, ‘in describing phenomena, the fact of relation instantiates connections in such a way as also to produce instances of itself . . . We could call the relation a selfsimilar or self-organising construct, a figure whose organisational power
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is not affected by scale’ (2005a: 63). Strathern’s observation, derived here from debates about scientific authorship, could apply equally to debates about the sources of law. In order for custom to supplant common law as the resource from which the underlying law is drawn, it must first be made to appear as though it had the same properties as the common law, most significantly the property of universal applicability. But this is an effect of the merographic relation between them, and not of the ‘automatic’ capacity of the common law to create its own context wherever it happens to be transplanted. To put it differently, the effect of describing custom as a hybrid, a combination of orders, is to bring it into relation with other hybrids – such as the common law – by extracting properties such as universality of application. Additionally, by concentrating on the universality of the common law, the origins of the latter in the ‘different and competing “indigenous” interests in eleventh-century England’ (Weiner 2006: 20) are obscured. What made the common law common was not, in other words, an ethnographic process of finding out which values, habits or practices all the peoples of medieval Britain shared. It was a legal process, ‘accrued over time by accumulated precedent and convergence of practice among jurists . . . It became the accepted “common” understanding of rights, interests, and so forth among domains that may have had significant differences in local “custom”’ (2006: 20). To summarise Weiner’s point, the common law of Britain and later the Commonwealth had never been what everyone was found to practise in common: it was what they were caused to practise in common by the instruments and institutions of the state – an effect or elicitation, Weiner suggests, of the relations between states and their subjects, or subjects within states, everywhere. And as I hope I have demonstrated, universality presents its own hazards, in that it contains a constant threat of ‘overstepping’ or ‘outrunning’ the legal framework of which it is supposed to be a part: people who pay compensation before a trial, or who kill someone accused of sorcery, are not acting lawfully. In other words, a custom can be too universal for its own good. This is why I have taken the opportunity to ask what exactly are the effects of looking for universality or even consistency between customary claims, beyond the desire to discover what it is all Papua New Guineans have in common. For it may be precisely the drive
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to discover universals that gives rise to an apparent discovery of hybridity, when what is actually being discovered is relations.
Acknowledgements The research on which this chapter is based was made possible by British Academy grant no. SG-49399. Various versions of this chapter were aired at the National Research Institute of Papua New Guinea, at the conference ‘Legal Knowledge and Anthropological Engagement’ held at the University of Cambridge, 2008, and at the annual meeting of the Association of Social Anthropologists held at the University of Auckland, 2008. I thank all who offered comments and criticisms at these venues. I also acknowledge gratefully Deputy Chief Justice Mr Salamo Injia, Mr Justice Panuel Mogish, Public Solicitor Mr Frazer Pitpit, Acting Public Prosecutor Mr Jack Pambel, Deputy Chief Magistrate Mr Stephen Oli and Senior Provincial Magistrate for Milne Bay Province Mr Steven Abisai for being so generous with their time and insights into the current state of the Papua New Guinea legal system. Profound thanks go to Ilana Gershon for heroic reading and editing of a draft of this chapter; thanks also to Maja Petrovic´-Sˇteger and Jeanette Edwards for editorial comments. Finally, none of the work discussed here would have been possible without the affiliation to the Constitutional and Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea made possible by Dr Lawrence Kalinoe. This piece is perhaps the first step on the way to repaying a very substantial debt to him and to the Commission, and to materialising a relation begun as co-researchers in the late 1990s.
5
Entomological extensions: model huts and fieldworks Ann Kelly
On the outskirts of Lupiro, a village in south-east Tanzania, four huts occupy a cleared plot of low-lying rice field. Though no different in size and shape from the homes clustered above them, their design is distinctive. The huts’ walls are made of mud-coated canvas and their roofs of corrugated iron, are lined with thatch. Erected on wooden platforms raised on galvanised piping, the huts appear to hover; their stiltfoundations are anchored in water-filled metal moats. Mesh boxes hang along the space between the roof and the wall. Empty during the day, the huts hum with activity at night. In the early hours of the morning, the only light for miles across the Kilombero River Valley is the faint glow radiating from their screened windows. The huts are an experimental extension of the Ifakara Health Institute (IHI), a well-equipped laboratory, training facility and district health centre located 24 kilometres west across the river. Though a novelty in Lupiro, experimental huts are classic tools of entomological research. Designed by British researchers in Kenya in the 1940s, they have been used primarily to study the flight patterns of malaria vectors – mosquitoes. An intermediary between the village and the laboratory, these semifield stations enable scientists to track disease transmission as a dynamic relationship between natural and social landscapes. Their architecture serves a dual purpose: to isolate ‘natural’ mosquito behaviour on the one hand and to represent ‘typical’ village conditions on the other. The huts’ location plays an important role in that compromise. Building where mosquito density is high over a long season of activity enhances experimental sensitivity; the greater the number of samples collected, the more predictive the dataset of mosquito behaviour. But stray too far from 70
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human settlements and those findings lose epidemiological traction. Hybrid knowledge spaces, the huts’ domestic camouflage enables the entomological particularities captured beneath their roofs to be read as patterns operating on the level of an ecosystem (Henke 2000; Kohler 2002; Gieryrn 2006). The significance of place to these experiments is more than ecological. Their heuristic value is both demonstrative and evaluative; huts provide a staging ground from which to forecast the effectiveness of novel environmental management strategies. The persuasive power of these investigations depends upon the social and material connections they forge between test setting and governmental intervention (Millo and Lezaun 2006). Those connections come about through the diverse practices of participation driving these experiments. In the hut, research work is not restricted to entomologists; rather it is the province of students, villagers and oftentimes children. In this way, the huts unite malaria research with both the techniques to control transmission and the local partners responsible for their implementation. The scientific credibility of facts produced in these sites is a product of collaboration; the experimental contribution of non-experts testifies to the sustainability of the method on trial.1 A model for future action, experimental huts occupy a critical space within the landscape of public health. This chapter is concerned with the built environment of entomological science and the relational forms it sets in motion. Focusing on experiments conducted in Lupiro in 2008, I describe the ways in which the human–mosquito blood-relation is developed for the ends of investigation. The evidence-gathering techniques suggest that uncovering facts is only half of the huts’ experimental enterprise: experimental labour enables community-level control. This empirical strategy provides insight into the epistemology of public health as distinct from that of regulatory science (e.g. Jasanoff 2005; Will 2007) or participatory development (e.g. Pigg 1992; Mosse 2001).2 For what is at stake in the situating of experimental work is not only the credibility or utility of its claims but also the 1 2
On the customs of participation in lab and field culture, see Kohler 2002. The former describes an experimental modality whereby evidence is brought to bear on policy decisions, and the latter a practice through which interventions are implemented by enrolling actors on the ground. The hut mixes genres of experimentation and environmental management.
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production of a community of future practitioners.3 The huts coordinate the dynamics of their many inhabitants so as to transform scientific culture. This inductive capacity to move from parasitological exchanges to public health practices presents a provocative analogue for what Marilyn Strathern describes as anthropology’s relation, a ‘duplex that does not rest on nature and culture’ (2005a: 12). However, within the hut, relationality is constituted as a form of dwelling: relations under scrutiny (man– mosquito–parasite) and relations of scrutiny (data–instruments–collectors) are held together as a dynamic process of ‘being in a landscape’ (Ingold 2000). This mode of engagement, I believe, holds lessons for anthropology. Juxtaposing entomological and anthropological methods is a privilege afforded by Strathern’s legacy. Working within a public health context, the relationship between these two knowledge-making practices is generally understood in terms of the context the former brings to the latter. As a consultant on experimental hut trials, I have been asked to collect perceptions of spatial repellent technology with the aims of developing more culturally acceptable delivery formats. However, Strathern’s use of ‘analogic reasoning’ (1991, 2005a, 2007) reveals how one might build connections between different empirical accounts of the world while preserving their distinct epistemic integrities. The task here, then, is one not of translation but of alignment; these huts offer occasions for reflection on the different ways in which conceptual relations might be constituted. This chapter consists of three sections. I begin by describing the techniques of model hut construction and the logic of their design. My discussion centres on the spatial order and material character of the evidentiary context: how the hut’s architecture shapes the data collected under its roof. My analytical focus is the special affordance of the model home as a site of knowledge production (Marres 2009): what version of malaria does this makeshift space instantiate and what species of action does that acknowledgement allow? The second section describes experiments conducted in Lupiro during the summer of 2008. Here, my interests are most straightforwardly anthropological; I explore the kinds of social relationships these domestic experiments set in motion, and consider the ways in 3
For a discussion of how the venue of the experimentation – and the domestic, in particular – creates the conditions through which scientific knowledge can be accepted as credible, see Shapin 1988.
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which they can be regarded as separate from or co-extensive with the making of knowledge. Following Janet Carsten and Stephen Hugh-Jones (1995), I am interested in what the ‘environmental conditions, resources, technology, techniques of construction and types of building . . . say about the social organization of the people who live inside’ (1995: 4) and further, how that organisation is replicated across scales – from the occupant, to Tanzania, to Africa. Finally, in the third section, I consider the epistemological conventions of these huts alongside the relational facility of anthropology’s analytic. Returning to Strathern’s insights into the ethnographic enterprise, I suggest that these huts press us to think about the anthropologist’s practical and empirical position in an environment of fact.
Baffled vectors Because their hosts tend to sleep indoors, Anopheles gambiae and funestus – the principal vectors of malaria in sub-Saharan Africa – are highly domestic.4 This habitat poses certain challenges for entomologists, generally more at home in the field.5 When A. J. Haddow built experimental huts in the 1940s, he was concerned primarily with collection: home furnishings, utensils, clothes and other personal belongings gave mosquitoes too many places to hide (Haddow 1942). Moreover, in the Kenyan villages where he was conducting his research, huts varied widely in size and shape. Inconsistent architecture confounded vector dynamics with the spatial dimensions of the study ground. To overcome this difficulty, Haddow measured the height and width of village homes and built six huts that conformed to the average size. The huts were constructed according to traditional methods. Haddow employed local builders who used mud and poles for walls, reeds for roofs, and papyrus stems for doors. Unlike typical homes, however, model interiors were kept free from clutter. Inside 4 5
For discussion of the mutuality of domestication between animals and humans and the significance to anthropology, see Cassidy and Mullin 2007. The methodological literature attendant to medical entomology suggests an ethos of scientific emplacement. Forged in the crucible of ‘fieldwork’, vector biology consists in the intense and meticulous tracking of the minute through expansive and volatile environments. The memoirs of researchers like Carrington Bonsor Williams (Williams and Wigglesworth 1982), Alex Smith (1993) or Mick Gillies (2000) emphasise the isolated, exploratory and – crucially – simplistic character of their work. Good entomological research is a matter not of refined equipment but of the reliability and thoroughness of the researcher.
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Haddow’s hut there was only a white sheet that doubled as a bed and a backdrop, making it easier to see dead mosquitoes on the floor. These first huts were designed with one purpose in mind: to articulate disease vectors – the movement of the malaria parasite, Plasmodium falciparum, between mosquito and man. Traditionally, medical entomologists pursue this relational triad at two distinct scales. Under controlled conditions of the insectary, entomologists draw conclusions about the biochemistry of Anophelene/Plasmodium interactions – how, for instance, the frequency and size of blood-feeding impacts metabolic rate and reproductive development. In the field, entomologists collect data on population dynamics, and attempt to correlate the epidemiology of malaria to the dispersal time and range of mosquitoes across landscapes. Experimental huts collapse these evidentiary contexts, bringing microbiological insights to bear on epidemiological ecology. Their standardised architecture not only facilitates collection but also allows for the experimental manipulation of human variables. Haddow’s first experiments examined the impact of odour on feeding-behaviours by noting the number of mosquitoes drawn into huts containing either ‘washed or unwashed natives’ (Haddow 1942). From collections made in huts where one, two, and up to ten volunteers had been sleeping overnight, he was able to assess the effect of body mass. By rotating sleepers between huts on different nights of the study he further ensured that a person’s – or a group’s – attractiveness could be measured independently of the huts’ geographical positions.6 Following Haddow’s example, entomologists would later draw important conclusions about the predisposition of pregnant women to malaria exposure and infection (Lindsay et al. 2000). Though elegant, these short-term assays of mosquito olfaction did not attract much attention from the public health community. The advent of DDT, a powerful (and belatedly controversial) insecticide, changed things.7 Model huts provided a cheap and simple way to evaluate the 6
7
Haddow’s rotation followed a simple random schedule. A younger generation of entomologists would use a Latin Square to allocate the nightly position of participants (or repellent). This statistical framework, initially designed for agricultural experiments, allowed experimenters control for differences in the micro-environments surrounding the huts – for instance, between a hut located closer to the swamp and one built on higher ground. Synthesised in 1864, DDT (dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane) was discovered to be a highly effective insecticide, which led to its widespread use as a general pesticide in
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efficacy and safety of DDT and other novel household repellents, such as insecticide treated nets (ITNs). The entomological data accumulated during these trials closely defined the advantages and disadvantages of the huts as tools to pilot public health policy (WHO 1982, 2006). The engineering of huts focused the attention of research, and, over the years, several design improvements were initiated. Independent of Haddow, entomologists working in West Africa developed detachable window traps to monitor habits of mosquitoes entering village homes (Simmons et al. 1945; Muirhead-Thomson 1947). Fitted to the windows of experimental huts, these traps enabled researchers to assess the number of mosquitoes repelled by the insecticide after entering. To capture those escaping through the eaves, mesh strips were fixed between the inside of the roof and the top of the walls. The placement of light apertures could also help confuse mosquitoes trying to leave, and, if attached on the leeward side of the hut, screened verandas could prevent mosquito-egress without hindering those carried into the huts by the wind. In addition to these techniques of capture there are some exquisite examples of the efforts to keep the interspecies encounter intimate. Raised on concrete pillars and surrounded by moats, huts were kept free of scavengers who might remove dead and dying mosquitoes from the ground before they could be collected. In Nepal, entomologists electrified window traps by rigging their wooden frames to an automobile ignition coil powered by a battery. This device, nicknamed the ‘monkey-buzzer’, was useful wherever wildlife posed a challenge to mosquito-capture (Figure 5.1). While their chief function was to test new products, model huts evolved in the direction of a compromise between collection and simulation. To allow mosquitoes to enter and to leave in numbers and at times most similar to those in the local dwellings, researchers would pilot huts with a variety of openings before building a complete set. Experimental architectures came to vary widely. In Belize, where houses are built with high ceilings, cube-shaped agriculture in the 1930s. During the Second World War, scientists saw the advantage of DDT for disease control and over the following decades it became the main agent in global eradication efforts. While the use of DDT dramatically reduced malaria transmission, it entailed harmful effects for wildlife, most famously documented by Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962). In recent years, DDT has made a comeback and is increasingly a preferred option for many African governments. For an excellent discussion of the history of DDT and its links to state power, see Russell 2001.
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SECTIONAL VIEWS OF SHUTTERING BOX AND CORNER BLOCK 1"
1 feet
Bolts
3"
1 feet 3" Vertical section of shuttering
Brick wall
1" Floor
9" × 4" Beam
1 feet 1 feet
Ground level
Water channel
Ground level
3"
8" 12" minimum
Concrete
3"
Stone 2 feet SECTION OF LEG
Figure 5.1 R. E. Rapley’s Experimental Hut with Shuttering, ‘Notes on the construction of experimental huts’ (1961)
exit traps (baffles) were hung from the shorn-wood roof and a walkway was built running down the centre of the hut and three metres above the floor to enable their examination. In The Gambia, where doors are left ajar as a gesture of trust, investigators fit the doorframes with small wooden blocks to leave a gap of four centimetres for mosquitoes to enter during the night. But structural adaptations were not the only way to conceal the experiment within the house. Composed of whatever material was commonly used in the area, experimental huts were easy to construct ‘with the more or less unskilled labour available’ (Rapley 1961: 659). The making of the hut was a critical aspect of its epistemic format. Across the methodological literature, semi-field trialists contextualise experimental outcomes with detailed accounts of the time and the number of labourers involved in building their huts (e.g. Sholdt et al. 1976; Lindsay et al. 1993; Grieco et al. 2000). In its 1968 bulletin on vector control, for example, WHO stressed the versatility of the experimental hut; entomological field manuals and
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textbooks continue to emphasise the use of cheap, ready-to-hand materials (e.g. Muirhead-Thomson 1947; Kuhlow 1962; Smith 1963; Moore 2008). It may not be surprising that straightforward and low-cost technologies receive praise from those working in international public health. But what does seem worthy of note is that these values are attributed to investigative tools rather than to health interventions. In other words, in engineering experimental huts a link is made between simple structures and clear outcomes.8 So what is the scientific significance of makeshift experiments? It is certainly true that rudimentary models look much more like African homes than high-tech laboratories. But that mimetic accuracy yields inductive advantages beyond those required by a demo. I suggested above that experimental hut design entails an epistemic commitment to place. Locating the experiment within the social and ecological landscape allows entomologists to build similarity between the test and the wider world. The huts’ mud surfaces, thatched roofs and wooden doorstops articulate that connection. It is important to remember, however, that for these experiments the relevant world is the ecological dynamics of malaria transmission. The model’s resemblance to domestic space is circumscribed, therefore, by the co-determining interactions of mosquito samples and human sleepers. The relationship between behaviours rendered visible in the hut and the characteristics of local vector populations is radically unstable. In Dar es Salaam, for example, mosquitoes could once be counted on to feed indoors. But after decades of spraying homes with insecticide and covering beds with insecticide-treated nets, mosquito populations are now more likely to feed in the streets. These adaptations are not merely behavioural. Anopheles gambiae undergo an ongoing and rapid process of speciation. Across the tropics, entomologists have found new sister species that are resistant to insecticides. The adaptability of the disease vector means that the success of malaria control and the credibility of malaria research must also be elastic. The failure to eradicate malaria and subsequent abandonment of those global efforts in 1969 underscores the resilience of the disease 8
A recent study on the effectiveness of seven-year-old nets explains the value of model huts this way: ‘experimental hut trials measuring personal protection or insecticide-induced mosquito mortality are simple, comparatively cheap to undertake and give clear answers about current effectiveness of older nets’ (Malima et al. 2008: 38).
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and the need for diverse and site-specific methods to control it. The experimental huts’ rough and ready form is intended to preserve that dynamism. For along with resembling the locale, the provisional character of these experiments works to situate their claims. The huts’ aesthetic – their detachable traps, open eaves, wire baffles, automotive coils, sheets and meshes – interrupts the causal linearity of proof. Instead, these rooms provide a momentary resting place to observe and record the site-specific details of man–mosquito interaction. Their experimental framework allows for evidentiary expansion from model to home, but the wiggle room between the two suggests that these extensions are subject to revision and adjustment.9 The subject of the experimental hut is the particularity of change. A built-in uncertainty is as much a feature of experiments today as it was for Haddow. The key innovation of the Lupiro huts was to render them mobile. In doing so, researchers could, with relative ease, set up shop in many different environments over a range of time with a variety of sleepers. The aim here is to widen the scope of experimentation and ultimately develop a more comprehensive picture of mosquito behaviour across the Kilombero Valley. However, I would like to suggest that in this case the mobility of the huts does not create greater distance between domesticates but rather universalises the knowledge science produces. In the following section, we see that, once made portable, the huts became increasingly sensitive both to the vicissitudes of man–mosquito behaviour and to the diverse ways of relating to it.10
The bug-men In the spring of 2008, Sarah Moore, the head of the Public Health Entomology group at the Ifakara Health Institute (IHI), began building her huts out of wood. Drawing inspiration from experimental huts 9 10
For a detailed analysis of the adjustments that take place between the experimental site and the world at large see Trevor Pinch’s analysis of testing (1993). This example of mobility provides an interesting counter-example to the argument made most famously by Latour (1993, 1999) that the authority of scientific claims depends upon its reproducible consistency across a number of settings: the ordered and standardised character of the laboratory works to distance the facts from the quotidian, to abstract universal space from variable place so that facts will not appear contingent on a particular condition.
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constructed in Belize based on the layout of a Mayan house, Sarah drew up designs for two huts, one whose dimensions corresponded to the typical Tanzanian shamba (farmhouse) and the other modelled after rural homes of a more modest size. The Mayan models were intended to be portable and consisted of four modular walls made from untreated wooden planks. The roof was composed of four strips of corrugated zinc. Initially, Sarah’s huts looked rather similar. She and her team bolted wood panels – three with a hinged window and one with a door – to a galvanized pipe framework and hinged the roof to an aluminium strut on site at the IHI. They then disassembled the huts, loaded them into two large trucks and drove them 40 kilometres across the river to the village of Lupiro. To simulate local conditions, the inner walls were fitted with removable mud panels and the corrugated roof was lined with thatch. The whole process, from breakdown to setup, took well over four hours and required a crew of eight. Understandably, Sarah found these huts difficult to handle. She returned to Ifakara and drew up a new design, this one using canvas. Not only could these huts be erected in less than thirty minutes, they could also be collapsed and shipped to sites wherever entomological research of disease vectors was being carried out. But before construction began, Sarah had to negotiate with Lupiro’s residents for access to the land. This turned out to be a rather arduous process, involving debate about the size of the plots she wanted and confusion over who actually owned them. Ultimately she had to pay rent twice over. A great deal of time was wasted in clearing land; Robert Kitende, the farmer with whom Sarah dealt most directly, insisted on waiting for the appropriate time in the rice harvest. Things ran more smoothly when she agreed to build two outhouses and a well for the village. After this point, Robert not only coordinated the transfer of land to the IHI, he mobilised a group of suitable volunteers to participate in experiments. Though the arrangement was improvised, Sarah was in fact following in the footsteps of her predecessors. In his memoir, Alec Smith recalls conditions under which he initiated his research in 1950s: ‘the local people made land available for these studies when I promised and made a deep well, for their use, close to each of two new experimental hut sites at Magugu and Taveta’ (Smith 1993: 91). Smith goes on to describe how securing land is not the only benefit to come from good community
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relations. Semi-field studies of malaria transmission require human bait, and as a mirror of the inoculation rate in the area, it must be of a local variety. This experimental set-up may sound macabre, but researchers would argue that experimental huts expose participants to no greater risks than those they incur by sleeping at home. Over the years, changes in standards of practice have made staying in a hut even safer. Volunteer sleepers are now provided with bed-nets and access to weekly screening for malaria parasites. Another advantage of the huts was that they were raised off the ground, so inhabitants are protected against other invaders such as ants and rats. And though the amount is usually nominal, in most experiments, sleepers will receive some compensation for their participation.11 Like fitting the door with a stop, sleepers enhance an experiment’s representational capacity. Encouraging volunteers to treat huts as if they were their homes provides a degree of realism, but some parameters must be maintained: getting up in the middle of the night to get water is one thing; leaving the hut to sleep at home is quite another. Accurate research demands reliable subjects – another reason why making friends within the local community is so important. Without Robert Kitende, Sarah would not know whom she might count on to follow experimental protocol. Moreover, volunteers serve as witnesses. Along with numbering mosquitoes collected in the traps, researchers record sleepers’ experiences and use their complaints of mosquito annoyance to substantiate data (e.g. Smith 1963). Sarah saw room to amplify this corroborative capacity. Rather than merely attracting mosquitoes, sleepers, she came to believe, could be trained to collect them. In this regard, she parted company with researchers like Smith. Equipped with a flashlight, participants watched for mosquitoes as they entered the hut overnight. The sleepers in Sarah’s huts got very little sleep. The feats of engineering these experiments required are matched by the physical labour needed to make them work. Mosquito collection demands patience and painstaking attention to detail. Because they feed during the night, mosquitoes must be caught before sunrise. Routine 11
As a place to spend the night, one could do much worse than an experimental hut. In The Gambia, where experimental hut trials have been conducted since the 1980s, former sleepers recall their experiences with some fondness, as a privileged time to see friends and to get away from the troubles of family life. Here, enrolling sleepers involves a politically complicated process of selection.
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capture involves aspirating mosquitoes with a rubber tube. Mosquitoes are sucked from the walls, floors, baffles, bed nets and window traps and then blown into one of two plastic cups: one for the dead, the other for the living. Because entomological observations in the huts are made principally to determine the effect of the insecticide, it is critical to note the situation and the state in which each mosquito was captured. After collection is complete, live mosquitoes are emptied into bottles of ethanol and killed. The samples are counted and classified according to species and gender, the females further subdivided into unfed, pregnant and blood-fed. The latter are taken back to the lab for further analysis. The process can take hours, and owing to the high volume and fragility of the samples, it must be done onsite. Conventionally, it is the principal investigator, sometimes aided by a field assistant, who performs these arduous tasks. Though it entailed some training, using volunteers meant that, in the long run, experiments took less time and energy. Sarah’s primary justification, however, was experimental. Her prior research in Bolivia on traditional plant repellents had piqued Sarah’s interest in developing safer and more readily available replacements for DDT. With this goal in mind, she decided to work backwards. Her project in Ifaraka was to investigate the olfactory cues governing mosquito attraction. She had set herself a challenging task: the chemical identity and physiological impact of pheromones remains one of the more poorly understood aspects of animal and human behaviour. Moreover, because DDT made mosquito extermination so easy, little research has been done on host-attraction since the 1960s. Fortunately, Sarah was not starting from scratch. Within the field, it is known that mosquitoes are drawn to human feet, so she set her PhD student, Fredros Okumu, to work analysing his socks.12 After a year of sequentially selecting and deleting compounds, Fredros managed to develop a blend that was not just as attractive, but, according to tests conducted in the insectary, more attractive than humans. These results encouraged Sarah to move swiftly to semi-field studies. Her research promised considerable benefits for public health. If her 12
More precisely, to a bacterium found on the feet, which as it happens is also used in cheese production. Anophelese gambiae are also attracted to the smell of Limburger cheese.
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compound was, indeed, effective, it could drastically reduce the cost of malaria research. Using an aspirator remains the most accurate method of collection, but it is labour-intensive and, because it entails exposure to potentially infectious mosquito bites, ethically unsound. As an alternative, the US Centre for Disease Control (CDC) has developed a light trap. Placed by a sleeper’s bed, the trap sucks mosquitoes into containers, rotated every hour. While reliable and easy to use, the CDC light trap costs over 800 dollars. It also requires six V battery power sources, which are difficult to obtain in Africa and need frequent replacement if used intensively. If Fredros’ blend attracted mosquitoes more effectively than human bait, and could be cheaply synthesised, it would open new research possibilities for poorly funded national institutions. Sarah and Fredros decided on a three-way comparison. In one experimental hut, they set a CDC light trap beside untreated bed nets used by a sleeper. In another, they placed a trap that contained the new blend beside a sleeping man. In a third, volunteers caught mosquitoes as they entered throughout the night. From six in the evening until six in the morning they aspirated in shifts of forty-five minutes, taking fifteen minutes at the end of each hour to eat and rest. Over four days each volunteer and each trap were placed sequentially in each of the huts. This rotation was replicated over four weeks. Collection was exhausting, but the work did not end there. Each morning, with a radio blaring to keep them awake, the volunteers counted and identified mosquitoes that were caught the previous night. To help those sleeping in the CDC hut record the correct moment at which mosquitoes were caught, Sarah recalibrated the light trap to Swahili time (a twelve-hour clock). By the final weeks of the experiment, the sleepers had cut the time it took to sort and identify the mosquitoes by half. Fredros confessed that the sleepers soon surpassed him in being able to detect the minute striations that differentiate one species from another. For his part, Robert Kitende insists that he can tell the difference between an anopholene and a culicine by how they bite him at night – a technique that he is now teaching his sons. The experimental huts generate, then, not only entomological data but amateur entomologists as well. This capacity to extend research practice to the public is closely tied to the epistemic significance of place and
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volatility I discussed above. The entomologists I worked with argue that the technological emphasis of current research – on vaccines, combinational therapies or genetically modified mosquitoes – simply does not suit its object. Mosquitoes change their behaviour in response to human environments, while the malaria parasite, Plasmodium falciparum, evolves in tune with the new pharmaceuticals that science develops to combat it. Vaccines are likely to be not only ineffective but, in the light of the potential for developing resistance, dangerous. But ultimately, the current focus of research and funding reflects a failure to understand the epidemiological reality of malaria as being primarily infrastructural. Indeed, the differences between the 1968, 1982 and 2008 World Health Organization bulletins on vector control are striking. While the early reports describe how to engineer drainage ditches, systems of water collection, vertical drainage systems and larval control, the 2008 bulletin discourages methods that entail logistical complexity. Instead the WHO recommends, exclusively, the distribution of insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs): In very low income countries it is not possible routinely to meet the logistical demands of ensuring that trained spray teams equipped with working spray pumps and sufficient insecticide arrive at each village in time to spray before the malaria season. It can also be argued that it is more feasible to supply ITNs in such circumstances because this does not impose similar logistics requirements. (WHO 2006: 9)
For those whose research takes place in the field, this shift in commitment from engineering projects to magic bullets represents an abandonment of local capacity. That retreat is particularly distressing because, as experience in South America, Europe and North America has repeatedly demonstrated, communities represent the greatest resource available for malaria control. But for the first time in decades, researchers like Sarah are receiving considerable financial support. As resistance to anti-malarial drugs and insecticides becomes a growing concern, controlling transmission by reducing vector or parasite populations has recaptured the attention of global health officials. Advances in bioinformatics and genomics have fuelled this interest, most specifically with the development of mosquitoes genetically modified to be malaria-resistant or sterile. Fundingstreams for basic entomological research have opened up, enabling researchers to pursue a range of translational questions, involving, for
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example, the capacity of laboratory-reared mosquitoes to compete in the wild. Answering such questions requires experiments located in malaria-infected areas (Ferguson et al. 2008), but ironically high-tech genetic solutions run counter to the pragmatic potential of semi-field research. The mosquito hut enables connections between the experiment, the world and our future effectiveness in it. Beyond generating reliable data on mosquito behaviour or developing stronger deterrents for household use, these collapsible, mutable mobiles transmit the practice of public health entomology to those for whom it is most useful. No one understands this better than Fredros. When he was ten, his rural village in northern Kenya became the site of a series of experimental hut trials. He remembers being quite taken with the ‘strange houses’, and though he was initially thought to be too young, he hung around until the researchers let him volunteer as a ‘sleeper’. His motivation and his ability to grasp the purposes and procedures of research left an impression; the team funded Fredros’ secondary and university education. In 2009, he was awarded the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene Young Investigator Award.13 For Fredros, experimental huts are democratic instruments. Hanging one of the CDC light traps beside a sleeper’s mattress, he commented: ‘Can you imagine if we didn’t have to use these traps? Studies like this could be conducted by African scientists anywhere.’
Ethnographic dwellings Anthropologists should have considerable sympathy for a science that embeds itself in the world it seeks to understand (Kelly 2008). Crosscultural traffic depends upon the undetermined significance of objects and ideas held in common. In the experimental hut, the formation of hypotheses and analysis of outcomes is inseparable from the work of manoeuvring an expansive, volatile and, quite often, inhospitable world. Demonstrating the linkages between parasite, man and mosquito requires sensitivity to the problems of context and scale, and, ultimately, 13
See Interview with Fredros Okumu: www.malariaworld.org/blog/e-interview-fredrosokumu-kenya-1981.
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to the limitations of description. Anthropology’s affinity with this entomological ethos offers a provocation to revisit our own inductive habits. Understanding how the hut manages to articulate those complex relations should motivate us to reflect on the ways in which we systematise our data and demarcate our analysis. Examining the ways in which the hut materialises public good might shed light on how we proportion ethnographic detail to make consequential statements about the world in which we live. One place to start would be the huts’ capacity to amplify the social context of science. And in that regard, Marilyn Strathern has equipped us with a wealth of theoretical resources. In her subtle analysis of contemporary Euro-American kinship and knowledge-making practices, Strathern meditates on the ubiquity of relational-thinking (Strathern 2005a). She asks us to consider science and society as artefacts of analogous modes of relating: making connections – be they causal, logical, physical or moral – is how we come to know the world and order our lives accordingly. Both conceptual and interpersonal relationality are further specified according to whether their constituent links are found or produced. Science can be understood as either the discovery of pre-existing relations or the invention of novel ones; social groupings might describe biological ties or political alignments.14 As a discipline that studies kinship to draw conclusions about cultural logics, anthropology makes for an interesting case study of this knowledge-practice. Because for anthropologists relationships function both as objects and as heuristic devices, analysis oscillates between the abstract and the concrete: ‘one not only perceives relations between things but also perceives things as relations’ (Strathern 2005a: 63). Ethnography adds a third dimension to this task of seeing double. Anthropological insights follow from long-term fieldwork. As anthropologists’ personal associations with their subjects become more deeply textured, their accounts become more secure. ‘The relation’ is therefore 14
Of interest to Strathern (2005a) are the situations where the difference between these domains is articulated and mobilised as a resource. The ethical and legal turbulence provoked by the new genetics provides her with key examples. Ova-donation, surrogacy and DNA patenting underscore the contemporary challenge of discriminating between the given and the made.
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not only anthropology’s heuristic and object but also its field. Put rather clumsily, anthropologists use relationships (made with informants) to relate social orders (interpersonal relationships) to cultural logics (categorical relationships). So how do anthropologists understand the instrumentality of the relation with respect to their intellectual work? The problem of how to manage theoretically the specific relationships formed during fieldwork may seem of a different order from the analytical operations that focus Strathern’s concern. Indeed, the extent to which ethnography can or should be considered co-authored seems an issue more of ethics than of interpretive mechanics. However, one implication of investigating relationality as a cultural phenomenon is that it allows us to understand how empirical practice drives the worlds we produce through analysis. Though generated at different moments, the connections we make in the field occupy the same conceptual space as the ones we evoke in print. The question I would raise is: what then do we do with this relational thinking? How does a commitment to the epistemic value of our research associations shape the anthropological project? It is a commonplace that defining the outcomes of an anthropological inquiry in advance of its ethnographic investigations is self-defeating. Writing field-notes entails anticipation rather than prediction; anthropologists gather as much as possible with an eye to the very things they would take for granted, knowing that, at some point, they might prove relevant. Anthropological analysis, Strathern argues, moves by bumps and jumps, gains and losses; it continually produces a remainder material that is left over, for it goes beyond the original answer to the question to encapsulate or subdivide that position (the question-and-answer set) by further questions requiring further answers. Or we might say, it opens up fresh gaps in our understanding. (Strathern 1991: xxii)
A ‘home’ of a kind, the experimental hut preserves that space through the practice of dwelling. In ‘Building dwelling thinking’, Martin Heidegger asks what is particular to the character of buildings in which we live. A thinker quite attached to his hut in Todtnauberg (Sharr 2006), Heidegger uses the notion of ‘dwelling’ to express an awareness of and commitment to the surroundings one inhabits. Relational continuity – between land, things, creatures and humans – is brought about through contiguity,
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being in a state of actual contact. Coming together in a space – nearness – precipitates modalities of response and responsibility (Heidegger 1971). Though clearly its foundations are temporary, the experimental hut creates a framework that binds man, mosquitoes and parasites over time; it creates a framework where scientists and publics can linger in a place and become aware of how it might be preserved. Tim Ingold’s anthropological extension of the poetics of dwelling reveals the dynamism of that engagement (Ingold 2000). His notion of ‘taskscape’ (as opposed to landscape) underscores not only the practical character of the conviviality of humans and nature but its movement. Preservation unfolds across space. It is this commitment to recurrently inhabiting and re-inhabiting one’s research that propels the collaborative work we see in Lupiro. Imagining fieldwork in terms of dwelling in a semi-field, rather than as an arrival and a departure, might help us cultivate modalities of practical and intellectual communion. Within the mobile and makeshift space of anthropological engagement – the homes we only partially inhabit – the dialectic between social and conceptual relations articulates the remainders of ethnography, extending the possibilities of participating in and of each other.
Acknowledgements My first thanks go to Steve Lindsay, Matthew Kirby and Sarah Moore, public health entomologists working in The Gambia and Tanzania. This chapter benefited greatly from the keen insight and generous attention of the editors, Jeanette Edwards and Maja Petrovic´-Sˇteger. For their close reading I would also like to thank Michael Guggenheim, William Kelly and Javier Lezaun. This research was conducted with the support of the Wellcome Trust (grant #2173).
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Kinship and the core house: contested ideas of family and place in a Ghanaian resettlement township Thomas Yarrow
During the 1960s, over 80,000 people were resettled following the construction of the Akosombo dam in Ghana. The project created what, at the time, was the largest man-made lake in the world, a feat that was a source of considerable national pride. Although resettlement was seen by government officials and planners to entail ‘sacrifice’, relocation was presented as a positive step from ‘tradition’ to ‘modernity’. From this perspective the extended family was equated with ‘tradition’ and although the potentially integrative social function of such kin relationships was sometimes positively acknowledged, their weakening remained an explicit goal. Though often relatively small, resettlements were explicitly conceived as ‘towns’, a terminology that itself engendered the modernising aspirations of the project (Chambers 1970). In these purportedly more urban and cosmopolitan settings, planners, politicians and state officials hoped that the political and economic functions of kinship would diminish as people engaged in more diffuse relations on the basis of common nationality and citizenship. As Diaw and SchmidtKallert observe, ‘resettlement was to produce nationalists in an urban environment rather than myopic and inward-looking tribal communities’ (1990: 19). To this end, movement from the ‘traditional’ extended family system to the nuclear family system was an explicit goal of many of the planners and government officials involved (Obusu-Mensah 1980). Focusing on one of these resettlement communities, this chapter examines how understandings of kinship, home and belonging have been reconfigured in response to forced migration and the aggregation of previously distinct groups that resettlement entailed. Whilst the persistence and continued centrality of kinship has been noted in these 88
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communities, this has tended to be regarded as a ‘hangover’ from the more ‘traditional’ forms of social life that characterised pre-settlement communities (e.g. Obusu-Mensah 1980; Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert 1990). Yet even to the extent that people in these communities themselves view kinship as a domain of ‘tradition’, the social significance and effects of these discourses cannot be reduced to any straightforward connection with the past. When kinship is taken to be explained by ‘tradition’, we fail to appreciate the different meanings, values and explanations that people attach to this term. The analytic equation of kinship with ‘tradition’ is therefore problematic insofar as it precludes ethnographic understanding of the different ways in which both planners and resettled communities understand the relationship between these domains. By contrast this chapter explores how and in what contexts different people draw on ideas of kinship and tradition, and looks at the consequences of doing so. Rather than premise analysis on a distinction between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, the chapter examines the ways in which these terms are configured in relation to competing understandings of kinship and place. The account illuminates these issues through Strathernian theorisations of kinship, but, in rerouting these through a specific set of ethnographic issues, seeks to extend their theoretical scope. In Kinship at the core (1981), Strathern demonstrates how ideas of kinship are at the heart of English conceptions of place and belonging. In Elmdon, a rural village in Essex, being a ‘real’ villager is a matter not simply of locality or geography, but of having kin relations to a group of ‘core’ families, whose genealogies stretch back beyond living memory. Whilst such claims are naturalised by the apparently immutable fact of ‘birth’, Strathern shows how this idea in fact symbolises a relationship between an individual and his or her village. Since kinship is reckoned in bilateral terms, individuals may locate their origins either maternally or paternally and hence the issue of ‘birth’ is partly a matter of choice. In this way, the distinction between ‘real’ villagers and ‘outsiders’ produces a provocative image of boundary that is in fact less absolute than it appears. In practice who is included and who is excluded changes with context. Classification does not simply delimit pre-defined sociological groups but highlights the interests by which they feel themselves to be united or divided.
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Despite significant differences in kinship ideology and practice, this understanding of kinship as a ‘boundary effect’ usefully illuminates the forms of relationship and belonging that have developed in the wake of resettlement in Ghana’s Volta Resettlement Project. The chapter focuses on the central concept of the ‘home-town’, suggesting that like the Elmdon image of ‘the village’ this arises from an equation of kinship and place. This is used to create a boundary that can then be utilised in the service of different interests, by those who were resettled as well as by those living in the towns to which resettlers were moved. As the account demonstrates, however, the centrality of kinship was challenged by resettlers, claiming to belong on the basis of their unique historical circumstances. As a symbol of this difference, the ‘core houses’, to which resettlers were moved, themselves constitute an image of boundary, delimiting resettlers from residents of the towns and defining particular rights. Extending Strathern’s analysis, it could be said that, rather than kinship, the core house is at ‘the core’ of what it means to belong.
Resettlement as modernisation The construction of the Akosombo dam and the Volta Resettlement Project that accompanied this was iconic of globally fashionable developmental ideals of Modernisation Theory and also acted to concretise the specific ‘Pan-African’ visions of the post-independence government (Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert 1990; Miescher 2007).1 As such Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first independent president, lauded the project as ‘one of the major engineering feats of the world’ (Obeng 1979: 37), presenting it as central to the realisation of rapid development of a modern economy through a process of industrialisation. The physical construction of the dam was therefore inextricably linked to the symbolic 1
Modernisation Theory proposed that all societies develop from ‘tradition’ to ‘modernity’ through a series of successive stages and that the task of development planners is to facilitate the ‘take-off’ of this process. These ideas had international currency following the Second World War, during the period in which the Volta Resettlement Project was planned and implemented. As president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah explicitly embraced Modernisation Theory, advocating development from ‘tradition’ to ‘modernity’, through economic and technological development underpinned by ‘scientific’ and ‘rational’ principles.
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construction of the post-independence nation as an independent and explicitly ‘modern’ entity (Shapiro 2003; Miescher 2007). As part of the process of resettlement, around 740 villages were relocated at fifty-two resettlement towns, built around the newly formed Volta Lake. Whilst some of these were constructed as completely new towns, others were attached to existing settlements. In all cases planners influenced by more widely fashionable theories of Central Place Theory sought to centralise services in a relatively small number of towns in order to minimise costs of infrastructural development and maximise access to services (Huszar 1970).2 Attempts were made to resettle neighbouring villages together, but in practice the project often resulted in the aggregation of people from different ethnic backgrounds and language groups with no prior relationship (Chambers 1970; Dodoo 1970). Those forced from areas inundated by the lake were frequently presented in state discourses as ‘sacrificing’ for the greater good of the nation. Nonetheless, in public discourses of the time, resettlement was itself portrayed as a form of development and a step towards modernity. As Shapiro puts it, ‘the government was not only moving people out of the way of the encroaching waters, but it was turning would-be refugees into model citizens and spearheads for development’ (Shapiro 2003: 1). In a similar vein Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert suggest that resettlement towns ‘were seen as bridgeheads of modernisation in a sea of rural backwardness and underdevelopment’ (1990: 12). While the discourses of planners and bureaucrats emphasised the need to be sensitive to the customs and traditions of these different populations, the process was ultimately conceived as a movement from ‘tradition’ to ‘modernity’. In this vein newspaper reports of the time explicitly portrayed the journey that resettler communities made as the literal movement from one state to the other. Similar ideas of the relationship between tradition and modernity underscored public discourses that contrasted the ‘backward’ forms of planning and construction of the 2
Central Place Theory originated in the work of the German geographer Walter Christaller, who developed a universal model to explain the regional distribution of services within and between settlements. This model was internationally influential during the period in which the resettlement townships were planned and was an explicit inspiration for George Nez, the regional planning advisor to the Volta Resettlement Project (see Shapiro 2003: chapter 3).
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inundated villages with the forms of ‘modern’ planning and architecture in the resettlement towns. Central to this vision of development was the ‘core house’ that resettled families were given as part of (or more often in lieu of) monetary compensation for houses, land and possessions submerged by the lake. Although ‘core houses’ took three different forms (named R-type, P-type and D-type), all were underpinned by the basic idea that a common ‘core’ or ‘nucleus’ was to be given which could then be expanded according to predetermined plans and construction techniques supposedly to incorporate infinite variability in family size and cultural preference (Danby 1970). David Butcher, a British social anthropologist in charge of the social survey, described how, ‘like an organism’, the houses were to be ‘capable of growth as the requirements of the householder increase, along with his prosperity’ (Butcher 1970: 88). In this way the core house’s potential for physical expansion was more generally seen by government planners and architects to anticipate the economic expansion they assumed would result. While these economic benefits have failed to materialise in the terms imagined (Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert 1990; Tsikata 2006), the process of resettlement has had profound and long-lasting effects both on those who were moved and on those communities to which resettlement townships were attached. During the 1950s and 1960s, large-scale technocratic development interventions and the resettlement schemes that accompanied these led to a profound shift in the relationship between the state and rural communities throughout Africa (Bernal 1997; Bonneuil 2000; Mitchell 2002). As in other schemes undertaken on the continent during the middle of the twentieth century (Escobar 1995; Bonneuil 2000) the Volta Resettlement Project entailed attempts to redesign rural life and agricultural production. These shifted the balance of power between state and agrarian communities through making the former increasingly legible to the latter. In particular this entailed the ‘domestication’ (Bonneuil 2000) of communities that formerly had little, if any, relationship to the state, and their subjection to various forms of scientific, technical and social scientific ‘expertise’. In the context of the Volta Resettlement Project, this has taken a variety of forms. Though short-lived, domestic science programmes
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sought to ease the ‘transitional’ period through the regulation of household activities in line with an ‘ordered’, ‘hygienic’ and explicitly ‘modern’ set of practices (Shapiro 2003). Similarly, both the introduction of Town Managers and the later incorporation of resettlement towns within local government (via District Assemblies) have been associated with new forms of planning regulation. Most resettlement townships have only been connected to main power lines through rural electrification projects undertaken since the late 1990s. Although many households have since been disconnected as a result of non-payment of bills, this development also engenders a new relationship to the state. Rural electrification programmes both depend on a more individualistic relationship between the state and ‘consumers’ and technically inscribe it, setting up new relationships between households and electricity suppliers that bypass representatives of wider communities. Because relationships with the state are almost invariably textually mediated, resettlement and subsequent administrative and technical changes that have accompanied this therefore tend to shift power from chiefs and elders to younger, more educated members of these communities (Obusu-Mensah 1980). In various ways the material, conceptual and political changes that accompanied resettlement have therefore extended the reach of the state, resulting in new, if sometimes precarious, forms of governmentality and citizenship.
Resettlement in Apeguso The following account focuses on Apeguso, a town of around 2,500 people located on the main road between Ghana’s capital, Accra, and the regional capital of Volta in Ho, using this as a lens to explore broader issues of kinship and belonging. The majority of residents are Akwamus, one of the clans of the Twi-speaking Akan, that predominate in southern Ghana. Although the economy is predominantly agriculturally based, people from the town are employed in a range of occupations, including as subsistence farmers, traders, and labourers at the nearby textiles factory at Akosombo. Within the Akwamu paramountcy, the chief of Apeguso occupies the position of adontehene, making him second in command to the Akwamu
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paramount chief, and giving the town a politically important position within the region. As part of the Volta Resettlement Project people came to Apeguso from a variety of places as the level of the lake rose between 1962 and 1963. Of those resettled, most were Ewe-speaking Tongu fishermen who had earlier migrated along the Volta river from places such as Bato, Mepe and Tefle in south-east Ghana. Although seasonal migration often led to increasingly permanent residence and infrequent return, connections to these home-towns remained symbolically important (Lawson 1958). Following the construction of the dam, some of these people returned to their original home-towns but most chose to move to resettlement townships, seeing this as a preferable option in terms of housing and economic opportunity. Those resettled in Apeguso all retain active connections to lineage members in what they continue to refer to as their ‘home-towns’. As for other Ewe groups (Nukunya 1969), these connections are patrilineally defined and entail a range of ongoing rights and duties, including financial obligations, the desirability of building and maintaining a ‘family’ house and the expectation of the return of the corpse at death. The Apeguso resettlement ‘quarters’ (as they continue to be called) comprised fifty-four P-type houses, along with a purpose-built primary school and central lavatory block. Initially 181 people were resettled there, making Apeguso one of the smallest of the fifty-four resettlement towns (Volta River Authority 1970). Originally the site was set apart from the main town of Apeguso, connected by a single unpaved road. Although the subsequent construction of buildings – mainly by residents of the ‘old town’ – has acted to erode this gap, a distinction remains evident in terms of both the type of building and the layout of the town. In the old town, ‘compound’ houses predominate, comprising rooms arranged around a central courtyard, built either of mud blocks or cement and roofed with thatch or iron sheeting. A number of unpaved roads cross-cut the town and a network of back routes weave between the haphazardly arranged houses. Few plots are fenced, but women and children take pride in the neatness of the patches surrounding their houses, sweeping up leaves and debris in a daily ritual that delimits the extent of the compound.
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By contrast the resettlement quarters are centrally planned, with houses ranged in linear rows around a central open space occupied by the school and the football pitch. The original resettlement houses were built of ‘landcrete’ (a mixture of lateritic soil and cement) and roofed with iron sheeting. In common with planners’ original conceptions of the houses, residents sometimes positively connect their uniform appearance to their ‘modernity’. However, in general, resettlement houses are unpopular, as evinced by occupants’ frequent complaints concerning their inadequate size and poor state of repair. Lacking the funds to purchase cement, and with the relaxation of an initially stringently applied set of planning laws, core houses have generally been extended through the addition of temporary ‘swish’ constructed bedrooms and kitchens. Though the original plans show a clear demarcation of roads and plots, subsequent developments have acted to blur these boundaries. As in the ‘old town’, most people navigate through the network of paths that weave between the houses. Resettlers and residents from the old town both commonly describe the differences between these places in terms of the quarters’ relative ‘bushiness’, ‘weediness’ and lack of order. Similarly, general consensus has it that houses in the old town are bigger, better maintained and more desirable. These differences are explicitly seen to concretise a relative difference of ‘development’ and ‘modernity’. Underlying these shared ideas, however, are competing explanations of this difference. On the one hand people from the resettlement quarters relate problems of housing to economic difficulties deriving from the historical circumstances of their resettlement and hence to broken promises on the part of government and the Volta River Authority.3 On the other hand, old town residents more commonly relate this difference to resettlers’ ‘mentality of dependency’ and to their lack of willingness to help themselves. As in Elmdon (Strathern 1981), so too in Apeguso, descriptions of differences in housing and infrastructure are used to lend sociological boundaries an immutability and permanence that is more imagined than 3
The Volta River Authority (VRA) was established in 1961, under the Volta River Development Act of the Republic of Ghana. It is a publicly owned company responsible for the generation and supply of electricity throughout Ghana. It also retains ongoing legal responsibility for the health and socio-economic welfare of resettlement communities.
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real. Ideas about the distinctive characteristics of resettlers and old town residents are in this way literalised in terms of different but overlapping understandings of the physicality of the places where they live. Distinctive forms of planning, architecture and environment themselves participate in the imagination of the differences of identity and social composition explored below.
Kinship and place Although resettlement took place over forty years ago, a distinction between ‘resettlers’ (also referred to as ‘VRA people’ or ‘government’ people) on the one hand and ‘old town residents’ on the other remains salient in a variety of different contexts. Ideas of kinship and relatedness are central to the way in which this boundary between the original residents of Apeguso and resettlers is defined and understood. In claiming Apeguso as their ‘home-town’, Akwamu residents assert connections to the place on the basis of matrilineally defined family membership. Following Middleton (1979), it is possible to construct an ideal type of the ways in which these connections are understood. Focusing on the predominantly Akan town of Akropong, Middleton describes how membership of particular ‘houses’ (efie) confers membership of larger sub-clan units. Ideally each ‘house’ literally occupies a ‘family house’ and acts as a corporate unit to allocate and distribute collectively owned property, including farming land and access to the house itself. According to Middleton: ‘Akropong is thus the nucleus of a complex network of relations between members of its population who are migrants of various kinds who, wherever they move and work, regard it as their “home-town”’ (1979: 251). People define ‘home’ on the basis of family ties which may have nothing to do with their actual place of birth. Moreover the places that people refer to as ‘home’ are frequently not the places in which they permanently reside. Similarly, in Apeguso the definition of a person’s ‘home-town’ ideally derives from membership of matrilineally defined descent groups which need not relate to the actual place where a person lives or was born. Akwamu residents of Apeguso see migration to large urban cities as part of the normal life-cycle. When young men and women move away to gain
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education and employment, they continue to see themselves as part of their abusua (family) and by extension their home-town, a phenomenon that occurs more widely in Ghana (Hill 1970; Oppong 1981; Manuh 2003) and Africa more generally (Gugler 1997; Geschiere and Gugler 1998; van Santen 1998). Indeed, far from weakening ties, such migration is often seen to strengthen them. By going away, young men – and increasingly young women – gain wealth that can be distributed amongst kin or used for the construction of family houses within the home-town. While not all return, most express the desire to do so and hope to become respected in this context as elders and heads of families. On return, migrants may occupy the room allocated to them within their ‘family house’. However if the family house is small or in poor repair, or if the person is rich, they will often choose to build a new house. As for Akans more generally, building a house is considered to be one of the most important things that a man can do (Geest 1998). People who migrate to find work in larger cities or abroad (Manuh 2003) often send money back to their home-towns for relatives to build on their behalf. In doing so, people literalise ties to ‘home’, and seek to realise the common ideal of retirement spent as a respected elder surrounded by relatives. As Geest puts it: ‘A house stands for successful life, for respect, love, happiness and security in old age. It is a thing of beauty and it provides a sense of belonging to “home” both physically and symbolically’ (Geest 1998: 336). Ideas of ‘home’ as a physical space are thus inextricably linked to the social possibilities that this realises (Corsin-Jime´nez 2003). The Twi proverb ‘Ye bias wo fie, ye mmisa wo sika’ (we ask about your house, not about your money) articulates this idea, implying that houses, by contrast to money, are of inherent social worth (Geest 1998). In this light, enduring ties to family constitute the basis upon which Akwamu residents of Apeguso claim it as their home-town. Although detailed knowledge of actual genealogical ties is often lacking, the image of connection between family and place forms the basis upon which belonging is asserted and boundaries are drawn. Aged sixty-three, Samuel Atara is a respected elder of Apeguso, where he lives in a large block-built compound house that he recently finished building. Born and raised in the town, he spent most of his adult life living and working away, including as a watchman in Accra and later in
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the steel factory at Tema. Speaking of his decision to retire to Apeguso, he described his attachment to the place in terms of his own ‘birth’ and kin ties through both his mother and father. By contrast he explained the impossibility of resettlers ever integrating into the community: ‘To me as an Apeguso man I know that this place is not their home-town, only that they stay here. If they die, they can bury them here or bury them there. But anything at all you do here, this place is not your home-town.’ In this vein Akwamu residents more generally claimed ‘real’ connections in distinction to those who were resettled in the 1960s. Since, in theory, ‘home’ is matrilineally defined, the Akan model of descent does not appear to provide the same grounds for equivocation as the bilateral model outlined by Strathern in the context of Elmdon. However, recent studies of Akan kinship show how in practice similar kinds of choices can be made. As against earlier models of lineal descent Clark suggests that: A person can concurrently invoke distinct and contradictory sets of kinship and marriage rules from Akan matriliny, fundamentalist Christianity and Western romantic secularism. Each is widely enough recognised to make an effective bargaining chip without cancelling the others out. The ability to renegotiate and reinterpret obligations of kinship, marriage, chieftaincy, neighbourhood etc., in the context of frequent and dramatic changes in life circumstances seems ironically to be one of the most firmly held and persistent values. (Clark 1999: 70)
Extending this point, it becomes apparent that if kinship idioms in fact constitute a set of plural ideological commitments from which people selectively draw, then the connections that these set up to different places are also negotiable. In Apeguso, as in Elmdon, assertions of belonging routed through kinship are in fact more flexible than they appear. In practice, ‘home’ was defined not simply through matrilineal descent but also through other familial ties. In particular people with paternal ties to Apeguso sometimes emphasised the importance of these relations and spoke of the significance of the role of the father as a spiritual guide to his children. Similarly the significance of such relations was often emphasised when allied to long-term residence. Now in his fifties, Alex Oboubi has lived and worked in Apeguso for most of his adult life. As the headmaster of the town’s largest junior
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school he is a well-respected member of the community. His mother’s family live in the nearby town of Akwamu Fie, and accordingly he conceded that some would consider this to be his real home. Yet as he explained, this was not his own way of looking upon it: You see we [Akans] believe in matrilineal inheritance. I can say that strictly speaking I don’t have my extended family here . . . But my personal belief, [and what] I normally write on forms, [is] that Apeguso is my home town because I was born and bred here.
In his view, matrilineal ties to Akwamu Fie were relatively insignificant when weighed against the various relationships that connected him to Apeguso. In particular he spoke of the fact he was born there and of family relationships on his father’s side. He also highlighted the friendships he had made and the respect that people gave him as a result of a life spent living and working in the town. ‘Home’, from this perspective, was a matter not simply of inviolable ties of kinship but also of ‘experience’ and of the connections to people and place that develop through this. In a more diffuse sense, Akwamus at times claimed Apeguso as their ‘home’ on the basis of a common ethnic identity. In the context of northwest Ghana, Lentz suggests that: The effectiveness of ethnic discourses is based on the fact that they transfer the emotional power of categories such as ‘family’, ‘village’ and ‘home’ onto larger communities. By claiming to be primordial and non-negotiable, because defined through birth, an ethnic identity creates bindedness, permanence and thus security. But it also excludes producing need and insecurity. (Lentz 2000: 137)
In a similar way, people who migrated to Apeguso from nearby towns and villages drew on ideas of the Akwamu as a single family, with a shared set of beliefs and traditions. Drawing on these ideas of ethnicity and kinship, they claimed Apeguso as ‘home’ and asserted their rights to ‘belong’ there.
Images of home Idealised images of the ‘home-town’ equate kinship and place with ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’. Yet as Manuh (2003) argues in the context of Ghanaian migrants in Toronto, people relate to common images of
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‘home’ in different ways. Manuh’s own analysis focuses on the gendered implications of this difference, suggesting that whilst male migrants imagine ‘home’ as a secure place of family and friends in the midst of their own displacements, women tend to embrace the possibilities of freedom offered by migration and correspondingly view ‘home’ as a place of repression. Similarly, in Apeguso images of ‘home’ conflate ideas of kinship, tradition and place which people understand and relate to in different ways. In the old town elder men tended to view the home-town as a place of ‘tradition’, elucidating the virtues of ‘respect’, ‘order’ and ‘tranquillity’ associated with it. By contrast, younger residents sometimes spoke of ‘tradition’ in less positive terms, highlighting the loss of freedom associated with life lived in close proximity to other family members. From this perspective kinship was regarded as a constraint and negatively contrasted with the more ‘free’ kinds of relationship that develop in the city. In a similar vein, Apeguso was sometimes described in derogatory terms as a ‘village’ (akuraa), lacking ‘civilisation’ (anibea) and ‘development’. A similar opposition between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ underscores Ewe resettlers contrasting relationship to Apeguso. Resettlers imagine Apeguso as a place of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’ by contrast to the more ‘traditional’ home-towns from which their families originated. Amongst older residents Apeguso is often negatively contrasted with ‘home’, as a place in which the youth forget about family and think only of themselves. For many the desire to return home to build a house and ultimately to be buried remains an overriding preoccupation. Peter Domey was a small child during the time of evacuation and suggested that despite having subsequently schooled and worked in Apeguso he was always made to feel a ‘second-class citizen’. By contrast he related: ‘When we go [to our home-town] it always feels like home. Because our family there want us to be there. The people there know our parents, so they feel we should come there often.’ In this way sentimental descriptions of ‘home’ articulate antipathy both towards the process of resettlement and to the way in which settlers have been treated by Apeguso residents. Apeguso is cast as a place of failed modernity, insofar as resettlement is seen to undermine their former freedom and turn them, as people sometimes claimed, into ‘permanent strangers’.
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By contrast, a number of the younger and more educated resettlers draw on a similar opposition between tradition and modernity in outlining a more positive image of Apeguso. Now aged thirty, Wisdom was born in Apeguso, where he spent much of his youth. Lacking his own house and farm in his home-town of Tefle, he talked of feeling like a ‘stranger’ there, relating this to his own exposure to ‘modern’ ideas and ways of life: When you come to modernisation and this kind of western life, sometimes we also look at them as people who . . . have lost certain facts [and] values. It is like there is something missing in their life. Looking at their dress, the way they talk . . . in that aspect we also find ourselves on top of some of them.
More generally, those born after resettlement tended to equate Apeguso with a ‘modern’ outlook and way of life, through which life in the hometown comes to be seen in terms of deficit and lack as a place that is ‘backward’ and ‘undeveloped’. Amongst resettlers and old town residents alike, an apparently simplistic dichotomy between tradition and modernity in fact articulates multiple interests and ideas, framing forms of discourse and relation that are not analytically reducible to these terms. Although kin relations are commonly elided with ‘tradition’, the ethnographic consequences of doing so are variable. As a form of tradition, kinship can be seen as ‘backward looking’ and ‘regressive’, or alternatively as integral to the maintenance of individual and social virtues such as morality and respect.
Contesting place and belonging Whilst the idealised models of Apeguso residents imagine kinship to delimit discrete sociological groups, in reality such ideas create images of boundary which are then utilised to different effect. As Strathern (1981) argues in the context of Elmdon, the key issue is not whether these ideas are objectively ‘true’ but why and in what contexts they matter. In Apeguso, many of these issues derive from the fact of resettlement. From the perspective of Akwamus, Ewe resettlers are often regarded as taking scarce resources and impinging on the rights of ‘old town’
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residents. For example, resettlers are said to put pressure on school places, as well as on public services such as water pumps and public toilets. In addition, a perceived shortage of farmland is often blamed upon resettlers, who each received three-acre plots as part of the compensation that accompanied resettlement. In the context of these issues, home-town connections are invoked as the basis upon which Akwamu residents claim differential rights. On these grounds, resettlers who have lived in Apeguso for over forty years are sometimes denied rights given to more recent Akwamu residents. For their part, Ewe resettlers voice concerns about the increasing number of people from the old town renting or buying core houses originally given to resettlers. Similarly, a perceived shortage of housing is seen to be exacerbated by the differential and partisan manner in which people from the old town implement planning regulations. In voicing these concerns, resettlers at times foregrounded their rights as citizens of the town on the basis of birth or long-term residence. Having lived and worked in Apeguso, resettlers make claims to equal treatment on the basis that the town is also their ‘home’. More commonly, however, the right to belong is asserted on the basis of resettlers’ particular history and the ‘sacrifices’ this entailed. In this way, resettlers seek to leverage a particular relationship to the state, at times defining themselves as ‘VRA people’ or ‘government people’. For resettlers, economic and political rights are therefore seen to derive from a form of belonging relating to historical circumstance rather than kinship. As a legitimating symbol of this particular history, ownership of a core house was often invoked as the basis for truly belonging as a settler. In debates between resettlers and old town residents, a common boundary is therefore differently constructed in the service of competing arguments about the respective rights of resettlers and natives of Apeguso. Whilst the nature of this boundary is contested, the manner in which it is drawn is also open to negotiation. In this way an apparently static boundary between ‘home-town’ residents and ‘strangers’ is evoked in different contexts to define different groups of people. Akwamus living in the resettlement quarters seek strategically to leverage a position of ambiguity, at times claiming Apeguso as their home-town on the basis of ethnic and kin ties, whilst at other times foregrounding the historical
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circumstances through which they were resettled. Similarly the location of this boundary becomes problematic in the context of disputes about who can legitimately claim to be a ‘real’ resettler. To the extent that this identity is seen to relate to the historical circumstances of resettlement, this is contested in terms of competing versions of history. In particular, contradictory claims are made regarding who was first to arrive and who the quarters were ‘really’ intended for. Here, again, the significance of having been given a core house is often emphasised. While a variety of people claim affiliation to the old town as the grounds for asserting a position of superiority over resettlers, it is important to note that ties to ‘home’ are not always privileged over other forms of relationship. As Edwards (1998) argues, belonging to a locality is not always regarded as positive, and different elements of identity may be brought to the fore or suspended at different times. In Apeguso those who have lived and worked ‘outside’ foreground a more cosmopolitan identity through talking of the relationships and resources that this gives them access to. The connection to people and things beyond Apeguso also at times privileges an explicitly ‘modern’ identity (cf. Ferguson 1999). By the same token, resettlers turn their own status as ‘strangers’ to their own advantage. In this way resettlers justify lack of participation in communal labour and communal events on the ground they are not ‘really’ part of the town. Similarly relationships to hometowns beyond Apeguso are used to argue for greater political autonomy in the form of an independently recognised chief. Although kinship is in this way used as the basis upon which to draw a range of distinctions, ideas of kinship are also employed in the imagination of a more inclusive future. Both Ewes and Akwamus at times assert their hope that intermarriage will lead to a situation in which all will become one. Talking of the ways in which conflict has afflicted the town, Alex Oboubi, an Akwamu, thus suggested: We are all brothers, we are all black. Forget about the dialect, forget about the ethnic background. When we begin to inter-marry, our offspring, when we are dead and gone, will become one.
Wisdom, a junior school teacher from the resettlement quarters similarly invoked kinship in his more positive assessment of the existing situation:
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You will not even identify one from the other. When you move round you will hear people speaking Twi as if they are Twis – Ewes sitting down and speaking Twi. It does happen here. And the Ewe guys are marrying the Twi ladies . . . So that cooperation is there. You will not see any difference.
Despite differences of perspective, both Ewes and Akans imagined the development of kin relations between resettlers and old town residents to provide the grounds for an undivided and prosperous community. While kinship was invoked in the assertion of social and ethnic difference, it was also invoked as a means of erasing these.
Conclusion In her discussion of a compensation dispute between two Minj tribal groups in Papua New Guinea, Strathern (2005a) suggests that the judge’s Euro-American equation of kinship with tradition concealed the capacities of Minj themselves to reflect on the fact of their relationships. Indigenous ideas of kinship and relatedness, she argues, constitute an important intellectual resource that is concealed when kinship is understood to occupy the domain of tradition. As elucidated above, a similar Euro-American understanding of kinship underpins the approach of the planners and state officials responsible for implementing resettlement. According to this logic, as resettlement brought modernity, so the importance of kinship would diminish. In the event, however, changes brought about by this process have intensified interest in kinship as a means of defining and contesting access to a variety of resources. Following Strathern, these ideas about kinship and relatedness can be seen to constitute a significant intellectual resource that cannot be comprehended in the limited analytic terms of an opposition between tradition and modernity. The contemporary importance of kinship cannot be understood as a ‘hangover’ from a more ‘traditional’ era in the sense that understandings of the importance of family relations are configured in response to interests and tensions arising out of the fact of resettlement. Yet Strathern’s (2005a) insight that kinship and tradition should not be analytically equated is partially complicated by the ways in which planners, architects and people living in resettlement townships make
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precisely this equation. When Akans talk of home-towns and of the matrilineal ties that connect them to these places, they often explicitly present these relations as ‘traditional’, by contrast to the more ‘modern’ forms of relationship imagined to develop elsewhere. By the same token, resettlers frequently speak of Apeguso as a place of ‘modernity’ and oppose this to the ‘tradition’ of their own home-towns. Whilst the presentation of kin relations as traditional may be used to legitimise claims to belong, it may also be used to denigrate them. In this way, Ewe settlers speak of the ways in which kin relations are used to exclude them from town affairs, presenting these as backward and anachronistic. In other words, choices about the kinds of relationship people participate in are inextricably bound up with understandings of tradition and modernity. A similar equation of kinship and tradition underscores much of the planning discourse, albeit to often very different effect. During the process of resettlement, kinship as a form of tradition was seen to entail both positive and negative possibilities. Whilst often seen as a negative brake on the development of more diffuse forms of relationship, and as compromising the emergence of individual, autonomous citizens, it was also at times construed as the basis for social integration. In this sense, the opposition between tradition and modernity is itself an important intellectual resource that is drawn into the imagination of different relational possibilities. Though the use planners make of this opposition may indeed conceal local understandings of kinship, the same opposition also, at times, provides the very terms in which these understandings of kinship are made evident. Borrowing from the model that Strathern developed in Kinship at the core (1981), we might say that this opposition also constitutes