Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention John Cooper

Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

Also by John Cooper EAT AND BE SATISFIED: A Social History of Jewish Food PRIDE VERSUS PREJUDICE: Jewish Doctors and Lawyers in England, 1890–1990

Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention John Cooper

© John Cooper 2008 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–51691–5 hardback ISBN-10: 0–230–51691–2 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents Acknowledgements

vi

Introduction

1

1

Formative Years in Poland

6

2

Escape from Poland

26

3

Early Years in the United States

40

4

The Publication of His Master Work and the Nuremberg Tribunal

56

5

The United Nations Resolution on Genocide

76

6

1947, The First Draft of the Convention

88

7

Private Life

111

8

Yale and Geneva

119

9

Paris, Preliminary Discussion of the Convention

143

10 The First Reading of the Convention

151

11

164

The Convention is Adopted

12 The International Campaign for Ratification of the Convention

173

13 The United States Senate and the Convention

189

14

209

The Genocide Convention: Its Supporters and Enemies

15 The History of Genocide

230

16

The History of Genocide: Case Studies

243

17

Closing Years

260

Conclusion

272

Appendix

280

Notes

283

Bibliography

327

Index

331 v

Acknowledgements After his death, the correspondence and other papers of Raphael Lemkin were split up and donated to three different organizations: to the American Jewish Historical Society, where they were deposited at the Center for Jewish History in New York; to the New York Public Library; and to the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives located at the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, Ohio. Without the sustained help of the librarians and archivists at these three libraries and elsewhere, this book could not have been written. In the United States, I was guided through the State Department Papers by staff in the National Archives in Washington and assisted by librarians at the United Nations Library in New York; at Columbia University in connection with the archives of the Carnegie Corporation; at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis; and at Yivo again based at the Center for Jewish History, New York. Staff at Yale and Duke University answered my queries and also furnished me with material. I could not have made forays into the United States without the support and hospitality of my brother Rabbi Dr Martin Cooper and his wife Zephyr. They not only provided me with a loving base away from home, but my brother tracked down material from newspapers on Lemkin and arranged for one of his congregants, Jack Braun, to translate some of the family correspondence of Lemkin which was in Yiddish. He also put me in contact with Maria Kirakova and Dr William Korey, whose help I gratefully acknowledge. In London I owe much to the staff, particularly at the Wiener Library, the National Archives at Kew, the British Library and my local Swiss Cottage Library. I am also indebted to Professor Michael Alpert and Professor Kenneth Cmiel for their helpful advice, and to the late Graham Drucker for providing me with some important journal articles which I might otherwise have missed. Carole Malkin read the book in manuscript, and I would like to thank her for her invaluable suggestions for its improvement, many of which I have adopted. I would like to thank Nancy Steiner Ehrlich and the late Ruth Wetter for their memories of Lemkin and Mrs Ehrlich for sending me photocopies of pages from a book on Rainer Maria Rilke which Raphael Lemkin had annotated. To Saul Lemkin, the nephew of Raphael Lemkin and his only surviving relative, I am indebted for many fascinating conversations about his uncle and their family.

vi

Acknowledgements

vii

My wife Judy has lived with this project as long as I have and kept me going when I was encountering difficulties with the research, and I much appreciate her help and never failing optimism. Our son Zaki acted as my agent and made certain that the results of my research finally reached publication. I am truly grateful to him for his invaluable support. I would like to thank my editor at Palgrave Macmillan, Michael Strang, and his assistant Ruth Ireland for supporting this project and for their assistance throughout the development of the book and Vidhya Jayaprakash and her team in India for the editing of the manuscript. If there are any errors of fact or judgement in the book, the faults are mine. JOHN COOPER London, October 2007

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Introduction

The concept of genocide and the United Nations Genocide Convention are well-known, but the inventor of both the word and the landmark instrument of international law, Raphael Lemkin, is a figure, who has been eclipsed and over-shadowed by contemporaries. This book is an attempt to correct the record, by providing the first full biographical account of his life and his struggle to persuade the United Nations to adopt and ratify the convention. At the same time, an evaluation is also made of Lemkin’s massive unpublished history of genocide. For over two decades after Lemkin’s death, he disappeared from public memory. The legal machinery he had constructed for the trial of mass murderers was fast rusting into obsolescence and seemed beyond repair; his life-work had ended in frustrating failure. Then in December 1983 at the prompting of Dr William Korey, the research director of an international organization, the New York Public Library staged a public exhibition of the voluminous papers which had once belonged to Raphael Lemkin. The opening of the exhibition was timed to coincide with the thirty-fifth anniversary of the passing of the Genocide Convention by the UN General Assembly and staged to revive the flagging campaign in the US Senate for the ratification of the treaty. Among the papers in this archive were Lemkin’s unfinished autobiography, provisionally entitled ‘Unofficial Man’, and correspondence with diplomats about the convention.1 I resolved that when I had time from my professional career as a lawyer, I would visit the New York Public Library and examine this material on the one-man campaign against genocide. But I had to wait a number of years for this opportunity. Raphael Lemkin died penniless in June 1959, his vast horde of papers being split up among three different archives; and he had more or less disappeared from public view. An early article on his career published in the autumn of 1982 was entitled ‘Unofficial Man: the Rise and Fall of Raphael Lemkin’ which seemed to epitomize this. In some ways it was miraculous that any of his correspondence and memoranda had survived. Lemkin was perennially in debt because he spent all his limited resources on his 1

2 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

campaigning and became as ingenious as Mr Micawber in warding off pressing creditors. Towards the end of 1948, when Lemkin failed to pay storage charges for a collection of his documents, the company holding them put the correspondence up for sale as waste paper. One of the bidders after paying the sum of $12 for the papers realized that they contained valuable historical material and tried to restore them to Lemkin.2 Lemkin’s unpublished memoir, ‘Totally Unofficial’, suffers from a number of omissions which detracts from its value as a source for his life. It is a curiously impersonal account, rarely conjuring up memorable sketches of close family members; we know virtually nothing about his father, apart from the fact that he was a farmer, an unusual occupation for a Jew in Tsarist Russia; everything is curiously one-dimensional. His close collaborator in the fight for the convention, James Rosenberg, the distinguished lawyer, is left out of his account; so too, are his opponents, Roger Nash Baldwin, the civil liberties reformer and Professor Vespasian Pella. We know next to nothing about the schools he attended, his higher education in Poland and abroad, and his mentors in the Polish legal system. He is reticent about his Jewish and Zionist connections, and says hardly anything about the clash of nationalities in Poland and the Ukraine after the First World War, in which Jews were victimized, and which must have influenced his thinking. Despite the persecution of Jewish lawyers in Poland during the 1930s, Lemkin developed a thriving practice. How was he able to achieve this? The questions about the gaps and missing details in his account of his life are endless. Moreover, he was still working on his autobiography at the time of his death and the last chapters were never completed. The first and, for a long time, the only biography of Raphael Lemkin was by James J. Martin, a Holocaust denier, and was entitled The Man Who Invented Genocide. The Public Career and Consequences of Raphael Lemkin (1984). Martin claimed that Lemkin published Axis Rule in Occupied Europe in 1944 under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘staffed in part with some of the most influential and most implacable exponents for global war with Germany, well before it took place’. The volume was destined according to Martin ‘to become one of the most fateful works in the history of political thought in the 20th century’, although ‘it was authored by an almost total obscurity, one Raphael Lemkin ... there were grounds for suspecting that his name was a cover for the work of a highpowered committee’. Martin further provocatively maintained that Lemkin’s reprinting of a large number of German wartime occupation decrees turned his book into ‘a compendium of second-hand and third-hand claims, allegations and insinuations. Lemkin had actually witnessed nothing he reported, especially that part of his work which pretended to be a reliable testimony to the extermination of part of Europe’s Jews’. Again, ‘so, a global press campaign established the reputation for the new word and crime, genocide, which its author in a book of over 700 pages failed to support with a single

Introduction

3

witness or verifiable piece of direct evidence insofar as it involved ... the deliberate, planned mass murder of Jews and other minorities, in Axisoccupied Europe, 1943–4’.3 As Martin failed to consult any of Lemkin’s surviving papers, including his unpublished autobiography, he had to rely on secondary sources; and he created mysteries, where none existed, such as Lemkin’s roundabout journey of 10,000 miles from Poland to the United States crossing hostile frontiers during the War. He also repeated embroidered stories emanating from Lemkin himself about his past, such as the claim that he had fought as a partisan in the Polish forests for six months, living on potatoes and leaves. Lemkin built up his analysis of German policy from occupation decrees dating from 1939 until the autumn of 1942, ending just when the mass killing was starting to accelerate; and it is unfair to criticize him for not providing eyewitness accounts during wartime conditions. In any case Martin discounted later post-War evidence of the German killing-machine, so that his distorted view of history cannot be taken seriously. He was right about one matter: whereas the issue of human rights ‘had taken over almost the entire world stage’ by the early 1980s, the Genocide Convention ‘had slipped back into the obscure regions of indistinct terminology’.4 Serious scholarship with regard to Raphael Lemkin commenced in 2001, when William Korey published a short monograph on Lemkin’s ‘role in the development of a major instrument of international law: the Genocide Convention’; but it was not a biography, it suffered from various lacunae and did not set him in the full context of his pre-War background. Samantha Power devoted four chapters to Lemkin in her Pulitzer prize winning study, ‘A Problem from Hell’. America and the Age of Genocide (2002), although they hardly advance the groundwork laid out by Korey. Her principal thesis quoting Churchill was to describe mass murder as ‘a crime without a name’ and then to state that after the coining of the word genocide by Lemkin it became ‘a crime with a name’. James Fussell posted important material about Lemkin on the Prevent Genocide website; and Professor Steven Jacobs commenced his research on Lemkin, by editing the latter’s book on the Nazi genocide in 1992. After the First World War, the Austrian, Ottoman and to some extent the Tsarist empires disintegrated and a number of new states were carved out of their territories, including Poland.5 During the First World War and its aftermath, the region in which Lemkin grew up and the surrounding area became the scene of vicious conflict between the competing nationalities, and its Jewish inhabitants were exposed to pogroms. In the restored Polish state, where Lemkin received his university education and practised as a lawyer, national minorities eventually comprised 33 per cent of the total population. After pogroms inflicted on the Jews by the Polish armies, as they established the borders of their new state, the victorious Allied powers forced a Minorities Treaty on the Poles in 1919, which they only reluctantly

4 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

ratified. The treaty quickly proved to be a failure. While Polish socialists and liberals accepted that Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Germans had rightful claims to some measure of autonomy, they were unwilling to grant the same privileges to Jews, who constituted a sizeable portion of the pre-War Polish population.6 The chapters at the beginning of this book show how Lemkin was exposed to the destructiveness of the conflict of nationalities from an early age, how from his involvement in the international law circuit connected with the League of Nations he developed new ideas for dealing with the perpetrators of ethnic violence and how from his Zionist background he borrowed the concept of cultural autonomy from Dubnov. This was the genesis of his later concept of cultural genocide (ban on languages, schools, destruction of cultural monuments etc.) which suffused much of his thinking and action. I suggest that Lemkin’s 1933 proposals for punishing the instigators of ethnic violence and the destroyers of the cultural monuments of minority groups had a limited significance. They were meant to rectify conditions in pre-War Poland, to replace the defective Minorities Treaty with an international law enforceable by the League of Nations. In Chapters 2 and 3, I try to indicate that Lemkin continued to antedate the evolution of his ideas on genocide to his early years of the war in Sweden and the United States. In fact, I believe that he did not make this intellectual quantum leap until the summer of 1942. During the Second World War, the Nazis embarked on a completely new nationalities policy, by creating a gigantic, more homogeneous empire for themselves in Eastern Europe which involved the extermination of Jews and gypsies, and the enslavement and re-settlement of other national groups. Lemkin was one of the first persons to grasp the significance of what was happening in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944), outlining the restructuring of the population initiated by the Nazis, coining the word genocide to denote the murder of millions and setting out his proposals for redress (Chapter 4). This was a novel situation and Lemkin’s answers were equally novel. Rebuffed at Nuremberg, where he thought that his suggestions for dealing with criminal conspiracy and genocide were undervalued, Lemkin decided to mount a campaign at the United Nations to make the slaughter of national, ethnic, racial and religious groups a crime in international law. The core of the book is a group of Chapters, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, which are a detailed analysis of the campaign for the Genocide Convention and its ratification, driven forward by the superhuman efforts of Lemkin; but he was tied to important constituencies, Christian and Jewish, the World Federation of United Nations Associations, women’s organizations and later Eastern European refugee groups. In this section of the book, I carefully analyse which groups of supporters Lemkin was relying on for specific phases of his campaign, for he was using the assistance of different groups as his campaign unfolded, and why it suddenly gathered momentum after

Introduction

5

so many setbacks. My account of Lemkin’s campaign for a convention is based on a wide array of diplomatic and other sources, which have not hitherto been utilized. With the onset of the Cold War and the exploitation of the genocide agenda by a left-wing and Communist civil rights organization, the ratification of the treaty foundered in the Senate and Lemkin’s base of support shrank (Chapter 13). His hopes that the convention could form part of a new world order received a mortifying blow. This caused him to turn increasingly to his writing of ‘The History of Genocide’ and his autobiography. Nevertheless, Lemkin fought tenaciously for his concept of genocide as a legal instrument and preserved it from the assaults of the Nuremberg judges and human rights enthusiasts (Chapter 14). Since the publication of Korey’s book, the focus of research has shifted to Lemkin’s writings on ‘The History of Genocide’, particularly colonial genocide and its links with total war and mass murder. Important contributions on these themes have been made by Dirk Moses, Dan Stone, Mark Levene and Jurgen Zimmerer; and special issues of Patterns of Prejudice and the Journal of Genocide Research were devoted to Lemkin in 2005.7 I concur with the suggestion of Mark Levene and Dirk Moses that the power struggle of empires and states within the international system must be treated as a process and that there was radicalization and an escalating scale of ethnic violence and class warfare in the first half of the twentieth century, resulting in the ‘European civil war’. Far from being isolated episodes, the different genocides were inextricably linked, as I try to show in my survey.8 Historians are now seeking to demonstrate, in my view successfully, how the methods used by the European colonial powers to intimidate and exterminate the indigenous inhabitants of America and Australia were replicated by the Nazis in their empire building quest in Eastern Europe. In the concluding sections of the book, I discuss Lemkin’s attempt to write a history of genocide and cover his private life, an earlier portion of which is dealt with in Chapter 7. In Chapter 15, I try to reconstruct Lemkin’s unfinished ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ and later survey a sample of studies taken from ‘The History of Genocide’ in order to assess the value of the whole project (Chapter 16). There is a focus on certain episodes from Lemkin’s unpublished ‘History of Genocide’; colonial genocide in the Americas, Australia, and Africa, culminating in the carnage of the Armenians and Jews in 1915–1920; a man-made famine in the Ukraine and the Holocaust. All these seemingly stray episodes can be woven together, for Hitler sought to set up a new German empire in Eastern Europe to compete with rival imperial powers.

1 Formative Years in Poland

Rafel Lemkin, a name later anglicized to Raphael Lemkin, was born on a farm called ‘Ozerisko’ near the village of Bezwodene in eastern Poland on 24 June 1900. At the time of Lemkin’s birth, the region into which he had been born was absorbed into Imperial Russia during the partitions of Poland but it is now part of Belarus. The whole area was a contested borderland which was to be controlled by successive states during Lemkin’s lifetime. From his earliest years his whole outlook on the preservation of nationalities and the means of preventing their destruction was influenced by what was happening around him. His parents’ farm was situated 14 miles from the city of Wolkowysk or some 50 miles from Bialystok. For reasons which are not altogether clear, certain sources appear to record Lemkin’s year of birth as 1901, but this appears to be an error, as the year given on his tombstone which contains an inscription from his brother is 1900 and data in his entry for Who Was Who in America and in a tax return support the supposition that this is correct. His father Joseph was a farmer, a somewhat unusual occupation for a Jew in Tsarist Russia, while his mother Bella neé Pomeranz was an intellectual, teacher and amateur artist. Raphael had two siblings, an elder brother called Elias and a younger brother called Samuel.1 Under the Tsarist regime, the Jews were forbidden to own or cultivate land, but were compelled to live in cities or villages of a certain size. Nonetheless, some Jews despite these restrictions became successful farmers and others lived in specially designated agricultural colonies, so that by 1900 it was estimated that some 100,000 Jews in Tsarist Russia, which, of course, included eastern Poland, had settled on the land. To circumvent the oppressive restrictions affecting Jews, Lemkin’s parents not only paid rent for their farm but had to bribe a local police official on a regular basis. As a child Lemkin watched as this policeman, smartly dressed in a uniform and with highly polished boots, with his long moustache and arrogant mien, would dismount from his horse at his parents’ farm and wait to collect the next instalment of his bribe. Later Lemkin remembered how this man stood 6

Formative Years in Poland

7

out in his childhood as a symbol of oppression, whenever he called to extract cash from his hard-pressed parents.2 Lemkin described the farm as consisting of approximately a hundred acres which lay in a large clearing between forests of birch and pine. The farm was jointly owned by Lemkin’s father and an uncle. ‘The children [of the two families], who were mostly of the same age, spent their days together in one happy gang. While our parents were busy on the farm, especially in the summer months’, he recalled, ‘the children escaped ... the control of eight parental eyes’, and had the freedom to play and roam over every corner of the farm.3 Elsewhere I have argued that a false antithesis was drawn in Jewish memoirs from the nineteenth century and later ‘between the prison like atmosphere of the heder [the religious elementary school] and the liberating influence of nature, from which Jewish children were said to be excluded. If the evidence is re-examined, it appears that the Jewish child was only partially banned from the garden of Eden’.4 In his unpublished autobiography, Raphael Lemkin described his childhood on the farm in idyllic terms. He recalled how he loved listening ‘to the metallic whisper of the swinging scythes and sickles, and to the sighs of the clover and rye which were falling like wounded heroes.’ At sunset the animals returned to their stables, when they were watered with help from Raphael and his playmates, who participated in many farming activities. Then the chickens which were about to lay eggs were carried by the children to a separate barn for the night, so that the eggs could be easily collected the next morning. So too, when the potatoes were planted, Lemkin would follow behind the plough with a basket in his hand scattering seed. At the termination of the harvest, the local population celebrated, women wore blue garlands of flowers in their hair and once as a child Raphael was chosen as the harvest king, while the assembled farm hands were served refreshments consisting of sausages and vodka.5 During his childhood Raphael enjoyed climbing trees, hiding from his parents under the cover of their leaves. When the hay and clover were carted to barns, he rode triumphantly on top of the harvested crop. On an adjoining lake, Raphael and his brothers and their playmates built small rafts which they navigated with long branches, while pretending to be pirates. On one occasion, he fell into the lake in a new pair of trousers, for which he received his first thrashing from his mother, although as a progressive she was opposed in principle to corporal punishment. At the age of three, Lemkin rode his first horse and every day afterwards he would have a ride on the same white horse with deepening delight.6 Gradually the carefree antics of Raphael and his companions, who included a pet dog called Riabtchik, came to an end. In a story which has echoes of the tale of the garden of Eden, Lemkin related that to win acceptance among his friends, he joined them in stealing fruit from trees in two private gardens on the farm, the ownership of which had been retained by

8 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

the original owner. When as a result of this incident, his father informed him and his elder brother that stealing was forbidden by God, Lemkin thought that his father was inventing this prohibition until he read the Biblical edict against stealing. Yet Raphael was an introspective child, who also enjoyed being alone in the nearby forest, where he could ‘think and feel without outer disturbance’, a propensity to solitary living which deepened over the years.7 Raphael and his circle of friends sometimes played with the children of the farm labourers, but were always aware of the differences between them. These children, the offspring of the local peasantry, were Ukrainian, spoke a distinctive language, Ruthenian, and belonged to the Orthodox Church, but as a result of many hours passed in their company, Lemkin could speak the language of his playmates fluently and mimic their pronunciation, in addition to which he unconsciously acquired a detailed knowledge of their Christian culture. But there were other differences between the two sets of play fellows. Whereas Lemkin had to wash his head daily with soap, the children of the farm hands had their hair infected with lice which their mothers removed in front of everyone on Sunday afternoon. During the week, when the Jewish children and the offspring of the farm labourers played together, the peasant children were left all day long without food. Raphael and his playmates shared their sandwiches with them. Looking back, Lemkin felt that he was unduly boastful to the children of the labourers about his new clothes and shoes, when they were always bare shod in summer and in winter ‘wrapped their feet in rags and wore sandals made of bark’.8 Lemkin belonged to a Jewish family which, if not ultra-pious, was traditional in every respect. Saul Lemkin recalled that his grandfather, Joseph, the father of Raphael, went to synagogue on every Sabbath, put on tefillin (phylacteries) every day, and celebrated all the festivals. He was a gentle and hard-working man.9 As was customary for children between the ages of three and five years, one winter he was enrolled in a heder, the Jewish elementary school. His teacher lived in a nearby village in the house of Bella, a playmate of Lemkin’s, to whom he was immensely attracted. Because in previous years itinerant teachers had taught Lemkin to read Hebrew in a competent fashion, he and his brother joined a higher class to study the Bible. Incidentally, the fact that these teachers had eaten chicken in Lemkin’s home seems to suggest that the family kept a kosher kitchen. A number of boys from the village came to Bella’s house to join the teacher’s classes. Lessons started at six o’clock in the winter mornings, the only warmth in the room coming from a kerosene lamp, and the teacher taught the Bible with such reverence and love that some of this feeling was imparted to his pupils and Lemkin made rapid progress.10 The following winter the teacher taught Lemkin about the Prophets. Phrases such as the following melted into the boy’s memory: ‘Cease to do evil; learn to do well; relieve the oppressed; judge the fatherless; plead for

Formative Years in Poland

9

the widow’. These words stirred the imagination of the young Lemkin, and he was equally moved by Isaiah’s message for nations to beat their swords into ploughshares. At the same time, in 1905 and 1906, in the wake of the Russian Revolution violent pogroms broke out in the nearby city of Bialystok, and in 1906, 70 Jews were killed and 70 were severely injured by soldiers, who went on a rampage and looted for three days. Rumours that the mob had ripped open the stomachs of Jewish victims in order to stuff them with feathers reached Lemkin’s family. Chaim Nachman Bialik’s (1873–1934) poems denouncing the perpetrators of pogroms in southern Russia and the passivity of some of the victims also gradually made an impression on Lemkin, who was on the threshold of adolescence.11 It is against this specifically Jewish background, the passion for justice imbibed in the heder, the plight of the local Jews as a result of pogroms and Bialik’s poetic outburst in response that Lemkin’s receptivity to the suffering of other victims must be understood. These altruistic feelings were reinforced by Lemkin’s mother, who thought ‘that young children should first of all be indoctrinated in feelings and sensitivities because she believed in the great impact of early emotions on the formation of character’.12 In the winter evenings, Lemkin’s mother would gather Raphael and his brothers around the stove, when they were not receiving Hebrew reading lessons from a tutor, teaching them songs and sometimes poems which they would sing to improvised tunes. Lemkin remarked that having words sung, was recognized from ancient times as a powerful stimulus to memory, particularly when the songs were taught by one’s mother. Lemkin was convinced that such teaching ‘invades all the senses and stays forever because the consciousness of the child is being formed while it listens’. Sometimes Raphael’s mother would read her children tales by the Russian author Krylov, which he had adapted from Lafontaine or Aesop’s fables. A favourite song was the following by the Russian poet Semyon Yakovlevich Nadson (1862–1887), who had some Jewish ancestry and was one of the rare Russian intellectuals sympathetic to the plight of the Jews. This song became his family’s ‘second Bible. It was, however, stronger than the Bible to us’, Lemkin declared, ‘because in the Bible we found some murders which our teachers had difficulty in explaining. There was pure repudiation of violence in Nadson’.13 My dear brother, beloved and suffering, Whoever you are, don’t lose heart, Although falsehood and evil are ruling the world, And the earth is soaked with distress. Though the sacred ideals are reviled, And the blood of the innocent flows, Trust the Baal [false god] will be destroyed, And love will return on earth.

10 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

In his autobiography, Lemkin liked to portray himself as a universal man. His whole interest in the subject of the destruction of racial and religious groups had been triggered by his reading of the novel Quo Vadis as a young boy, in which a Roman Emperor had attempted to exterminate the Christians. ‘A line red from blood, led from the Roman arena through the gallows of France to the pogroms of Bialystok’, he argued, but this is a misleading trail.14 The reverse was the case. In fact, the pogroms in Bialystok and the heightened tension in Lemkin’s neighbourhood during the lengthy trial of Mendel Beilis shaped Lemkin’s outlook and led to his insightful reading of the novel. When he was ten, Lemkin’s parents took up residence in the nearby city of Wolkowysk, as they decided that their sons needed a sound secular education. Wolkowysk was located in a valley being surrounded on three sides by mountains and was 56 miles distant from Bialystok. More than half the town’s population of 20,000 was Jewish. ‘It was a sufficiently sophisticated city to possess a well-developed, modern social hierarchy. At the very top were balebatim, independent entrepreneurs and homeowners, some of whom were fabulously wealthy people and cherished philanthropists. The middlestrata were composed of small-scale retail shopkeepers, tradesmen and artisans. The lower strata were composed of a complete spectrum of labourers, who either worked independently, or for a salary in a factory or office. A noteworthy exception to modern life was that rabbis, scholars and teachers were treated as a special class. Even though they were not materially wealthy, their intellectual and spiritual capabilities earned them special regard’. If we were to place Raphael’s family in this social structure, it would be in the upper ranks of the middle strata.15 Raphael and his brothers were enrolled in the local school, whose curriculum covered the equivalent of the first four years of an American high school. After Lemkin had been attending this school for a year, the Mendel Beilis case erupted into a cause célèbre in Russia.16 On 25 March 1911, the body of a child with multiple stab wounds was found near Kiev. Despite the fact that the victim’s clothing and inner organs were saturated with blood and that a local criminal gang were suspected of murder, a St Petersburg reactionary newspaper accused the Jews of staging a ritual murder, and on the strength of the tainted testimony of two drunkards, who claimed they had seen him abducting the boy, Mendel Beilis was arrested. The first trial which took place in 1912 was inconclusive. For the second trial which was heard in September and October 1913, when Beilis was formally charged with ritual murder, the Russian government relied on the evidence of witnesses, who fared badly under cross-examination. Hence the jury found Beilis not guilty of committing any crime, but in an atmosphere charged with hatred and with credence given to spurious notions the jury decided nonetheless that a ritual murder had occurred.17 All the Jewish pupils at Lemkin’s school were collectively called by the name of Beilis by the other pupils. Tension increased in the city of Wolkowysk,

Formative Years in Poland

11

where a pogrom was expected to occur, and many sections of the Russian Jewish population numbering 5,600,000 felt at risk from mob violence. Raphael Lemkin recalled how his family discussed the progress of the trial on a daily basis. With the pronouncement of the not guilty verdict as far as Beilis was concerned, some of the tension evaporated. But Lemkin remembered that ‘The axes, the hammers and the guns were already prepared, while the jury deliberated. I did not see how a situation of this kind could be bearable for a long time’.18 Bella Lemkin was a formidable personality, a teacher and an adherent of the Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi [1746–1827] system of education, whose aim was ‘to teach him [the child] from the nature of things themselves ... not by words. Leave him to himself to see, hear, find, stumble, rise again, and be mistaken ... What he can do for himself let him do ... nature teaches better than men’.19 When he was 12 and his whole family were immersed in the day to day progress of the Beilis case, Lemkin ‘read the famous novel of Henryk Sienkiewicz, Quo Vadis, about the persecution of the early Christians’. Appalled by the story, he asked his Mother why the Christians did not call the police when they were thrown to the lions. Instead of answering that question his Mother asked him whether he thought the police could have helped the Christians since the Emperor Nero was sitting in the arena.20 Possibly Lemkin’s memory was at fault because he already knew from his childhood experiences that a persecuted group could not rely on the local police for assistance. In an early draft of his autobiography, Lemkin himself made this point. ‘I realized vividly that if a Christian would have called a policeman for help, he would not have received any protection’.21 Five years earlier in 1951 a somewhat different recollection of the discussion about the book appeared in an interview Lemkin gave to the journalist, Herbert Yahraes. ‘When the Roman emperor made the animals kill the early Christians’, he challenged his mother, ‘it was a bad thing wasn’t it?’ ‘Yes’, she agreed, ‘very bad’. ‘And all those other people–they just sat around in the amphitheater and clapped!’ ‘That was very bad, too’. ‘Today we don’t do things like that. When people kill people today, they get put in jail, don’t they?’ ‘Yes, today they get put in jail’, she reluctantly agreed.22 What is clear is that the young Lemkin had many conversations with his mother about the novel, Quo Vadis, which he read and re-read, and we can appreciate how the theme of the novel resonated with the young Lemkin at

12 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

a time when his family were following with apprehension the fate of Beilis in a trial for ritual murder and when the young boy was suffering from constant anti-Semitic spite at school. He developed a growing interest in the question of ethnic and religious hatred and devoured other books about massacres, books on the destruction of Carthage, the Mongol invasions of Europe, the torture of the Huguenots, and the deportation of the Moors from Spain. But Lemkin deliberately played down the fact in his unpublished memoirs and in interviews with journalists that his own Jewish background had first sparked his interest in the problem.23 Raphael Lemkin developed into an imaginative, somewhat solitary youth, and an omnivorous reader under the guidance of his mother Bella, whom he adored. She encouraged him to read the great writers of the world, passing on volumes to him from her well-stocked library, and by the time he was fourteen he had already read Nietzsche and was well on his way to mastering four modern languages.24 Increasingly Bella moulded the personality of her precocious son, Raphael, and shaped his outlook far more than his gentle father. In 1914 the German army surged into Russia, occupying the area surrounding the Lemkin family farm in eastern Poland and in 1915 shell fire destroyed their home. His mother’s library was saved because the family had taken the precaution of packing the books into crates and burying them in the forest. Worse than the fate of the books was their own wartime predicament, as the German army seized their crops and for long periods the family starved as did the rest of the civilian population.25 Despite various interruptions, Lemkin continued with his studies, and at some point during the First World War, enrolled in a Gymnasium, a grammar school, in the town of Bialystok; he also appears to have attended briefly a similar school in the Lithuanian town of Vilnius. At these schools he appears to have received a thorough grounding in Latin and Greek and some of the nuances of French and German. Apart from mathematics, Raphael was an excellent student.26 Wolkowysk, ‘along with its Hebraists and idealistic Zionists, had a reputation in Poland’. Thanks to the leadership of Rabbi Abba Yaakov Borukhov (1840–1936) and his predecessor Rabbi Jonathan Eliasberg, Wolkowysk ‘stood out among the cities around it, in its commitment to the [Jewish] nationalist ideal’. Raphael Lemkin attended a modern reformist heder, where he was taught Hebrew as a living language by Herschel Linevsky. When Lemkin had become an established figure in Poland, ‘he was in the habit of sending his [former] teacher a greeting card before every Jewish holiday in a clear, precise Hebrew’. Rabbi Borukhov had an affable personality with a ‘natural tendency ... to show affection for people without regard to their’ status, and he had good standing among the Christians in the town, who ‘would come to him to adjudicate disputes between them and Jews over money matters’. But he also encouraged the collection of funds for Zionist

Formative Years in Poland

13

projects and inspired enthusiasts of the Hebrew language to set up a library to provide spiritual sustenance for the town’s youth. ‘A circle of “Lovers of the Hebrew Language” grew up around the library, to which the Gymnasium student Raphael Lemkin belonged’, and the Yiddish schoolteacher Shimon Krinsky singled out Lemkin as being among the band of ‘zealot[s]’ for the Hebrew language. Nonetheless, despite these divisions, the Bundists held Rabbi Borukhov in high regard, sometimes coming to hear his sermons; ‘and when he made aliyah to the Holy Land, they too, sent him a letter of good wishes in Hebrew’.27 As the German army retreated in 1918, the Lemkin family farm was destroyed once again. ‘At that time, Lemkin a boy of seventeen, organised partisan groups of schoolboys to disarm the Germans. These groups delivered hundreds of Germans to the authorities of the newly created Polish state’,28 and when two years later Marshal Pilsudski drove a fresh invasion of Russian Bolshevik forces out of eastern Poland, Lemkin claimed that he was wounded by some fragments of a shell.29 His blossoming Polish nationalism and his injuries helped to convert Lemkin into a fervent opponent of the Soviet Union and the Bolsheviks. Around this time, Samuel, who was physically the strongest of the three boys, died in the influenza pandemic, and his mother Bella was so distraught that she was only able to sleep fitfully during the next two to three years.30 William Hagen has pointed out that Sporadic anti-Jewish outbursts accompanied the emergence in 1918–1919 of the new Polish state, but the worst violence and pogroms occurred in connection with military operations, as in the struggle in November 1918 over control of Lemberg [Lvov] and then in 1919–1920 during the Polish– Soviet War ... The anti-Bolshevik Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian military organizations and bands, sometimes opportunistically allied with the Poles against the Red Army, staged exceedingly brutal pogroms in the Polish–Russian borderlands that claimed very numerous Jewish victims. In Lvov, in a pogrom in November 1918 which lasted for 3 days, 72 Jews were murdered and 443 were injured. On 5 April 1919, the local Polish military commander in Pinsk ordered the shooting of 34 Jews, maliciously accusing the participants at a meeting to distribute food for Passover of being a secret Communist cell. In the spring of 1919 in the Lithuanian town of Lida 35 Jews were killed, while in Vilna 50 perished. During the Russian Civil War, Piotr Wrobel estimated that another 50,000 to 60,000 Jews perished in pogroms and attacks in the Ukraine chiefly perpetrated by the anti-Bolshevik armies between December 1918 and December 1919. Lemkin is completely reticent in his memoirs about the pogrom in Lvov, where he became a student shortly afterwards, and about the further series of assaults on Jews in eastern Poland

14 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

and Lithuania which were close to his hometown of Wolkowysk. To the south of the town was the Ukraine, where the mass murder of Jews in 1918–1919 took place on a greater scale than at any time before the Second World War. Yet it was these pogroms rather than news of the wartime Armenian massacres, of which the public only became slowly aware in eastern Europe after the assassination of Talaat Pasha on 14 March 1921, that may have been the formative influences of Lemkin’s early student years.31 Piotr Wrobel asserted that the cruelties of World War II had their roots in World War 1 and the Russian Civil War, but ... also ... that a sudden encounter of modernity with isolated traditional societies [in the eastern European borderlands] had sometimes an explosive character, and that a new kind of violence ... was introduced during 1914–1921 ... This ‘modern violence’ of the 20th century differed in many ways from the previous forms of war violence. It was of a mass character and affected not only the combatants but also the entire population of a given big geographical region. Frequently, civilian casualties were bigger than military ones and the fighting armies deliberately exterminated and terrorized civilians.32 Seeing these chaotic events unfold around him puzzled Raphael Lemkin and set him thinking on how to prevent such violence and to preserve embattled nationalities and cultures. To forestall future outrages, against their ethnic minorities, such as the pogrom at Pinsk, the Allied powers forced a Minorities Treaty on the Poles in 1919 which they reluctantly ratified. All inhabitants were guaranteed ‘full and complete protection of life and liberty’ together with religious freedom. All Polish citizens were ‘to be equal before the law and were to enjoy equal rights’, and there was to be no restriction on any citizen in the free use ‘of any language in private, in commerce, in religious matters’ and so on. Where a minority resided in any area, who spoke a language other than Polish, the Polish government was to facilitate their instruction ‘in their mother tongue’ at the primary school level. Funds were to be made available to these schools by the state and local authorities. School committees appointed by the local Jewish communities were to supervise the schools under the control of the state. A government bill on language and education dealt only with territorially concentrated minorities, not Jews. They were promised that their case would be considered in a further measure which never materialized. Only a single state grant was made to Jewish schools in 1927, and while schools for Sabbath observers were opened, their number was gradually reduced. Nor would the Polish government recognize a central body to represent Jewish interests, though Jews comprised ten per cent of the Polish population. The provisions of the Minorities Treaty for the most part were not implemented.33

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15

After the War, Lemkin entered the University of Lvov in 1920 to study philology, and he was an outstanding student being able to speak nine languages and to read twelve. His father Joseph had wanted Raphael to start working in a humdrum job, but his mother Bella clashed with her husband and insisted that her brilliant son Raphael had the benefit of a university education.34 At university he added Arabic and Sanskrit to his knowledge of the main European languages. William Korey has pointed out that Lemkin chose to study philology, as language was the key to understanding cultures and nations. Lemkin was deeply influenced by Herder, who argued that the cultural development of each nation produced a folk spirit, Volkgeist, which was reflected in its own unique culture and art.35 At Lvov, Raphael had a heated exchange with his professor, when they were discussing the killing of Talaat Pasha, the Turkish Minister of the Interior, one of the principal perpetrators behind the murder of between 800,000 and 1.2 million Armenians in 1915. His Armenian assassin, Soghomon Tehlirian, was acquitted by a court in Berlin in June 1921, on grounds that he was insane. Lemkin thought that it was the Turkish minister, who should have been arraigned before the courts for mass murder, not the Armenian seeking revenge.36 Lemkin asked why a man, who had participated in so much killing had not been arrested, to which the professor responded that there was no law under which he could be charged. ‘Let us take the case of a man who owns some chickens’, the professor declared. ‘He kills them. Why not? It is not your business. If you interfere, it is trespass’.37 When Lemkin brushed aside this analogy and persisted with his argument, he was met with the objection that this would interfere unduly with national sovereignty. Lemkin responded that ‘sovereignty of states ... implies conducting an independent foreign and internal policy, building of schools, construction of roads, in brief, all types of activity directed towards the welfare of people. Sovereignty ... cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent people’.38 Unknown to Lemkin, Lord Robert Cecil tried unsuccessfully to introduce an amendment in February 1919 authorizing the council of the League of Nations to react to ‘religious persecution and intolerance’ that ‘endangered the peace of the world’ and to ‘take such other steps’ to put an end to the persecution.39 According to Lemkin this exchange with his professor caused him to drop some of his philology courses and decide to study law, but it is more probable that it was the killing of Jews in Poland and the Ukraine which was happening around him that sensitized Lemkin to this issue and made him so agitated about the trial and acquittal of Tehlirian, resulting in him opting for law as a career. In 1919–1920 a fellow Jewish law student at Lvov, Mundyk Steiger, was convicted of trying to assassinate the President of Poland in the city and was only saved from execution by the confession of a Ukrainian nationalist.40 If the contents of the conversation are examined, it seems more likely to have

16 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

been between Lemkin and a law professor at a later date, when he had already switched courses. Lemkin then went for postgraduate work to the Universities of Heidelberg, Berlin and Paris. By 1926, Lemkin had obtained his doctorate of law from Lvov and was ready to start his career.41 It is also likely that during his student years Raphael Lemkin deepened his Zionist sympathies. Ezra Mendelsohn has observed that ‘Polish nationalism exerted a tremendous influence on Polish Jewish youth and pointed large numbers of Jews towards Zionism’, and it is not improbable that the young Lemkin moved through the same phases of an attraction to Polish nationalism before renewing his allegiance to Zionism. While he was in Lvov, Lemkin mixed in Jewish intellectual circles, translating a short story of Chaim Nachman Bialik called Noach i Marynka (Noah and Marinka) in 1926 from Hebrew into Polish, a copy of which is in the Jewish National Library. In his introduction to the tale, Lemkin quoted from Mickierwicz’s epic Pan Tadeusz which was beloved by Poles but praised Bialik as ‘our national poet’, who endeavoured to wake the nation from its slumber and showed it the brightly lit path to a free, happy future on its own liberated soil. With a lash of satire, he whipped those, who did not want to see God’s revelation, and who did not want to hear the call to resurrection42 Clearly Lemkin was indicating his own adherence to the Zionist cause. The story was about an unresolved love affair between neighbours, a Jewish youth and a Gentile girl and prefigured some of Lemkin’s own later predicaments. Shortly after graduation, Lemkin had his views on the need for the radical reform of international law strengthened by the trial in Paris of Samuel Schwartzbard, who in 1926 assassinated Symon Petliura, the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, who bore some of the responsibility for the pogroms. Again, the Paris jury in October 1927 faced a dilemma, being unable to acquit a man for murder but equally being unwilling to condemn a man, who had avenged the killing of tens of thousands of innocent victims, among them his own parents. So they decided that Schwartzbard like Tehlirian was insane and should be freed. Jewish attitudes to the assassination were confused. While the Jewish masses supported it, the American Jewish Committee told Schwartzbard’s lawyer to plead that he was mentally unstable and not argue that the murder was justified. Raphael Abramovitch sent an anti-Schwartzbard article to the Forward which the editor would not publish, but he ensured that his paper also refused to open a public subscription for Schwartzbard’s defence.43 However, Lemkin wrote an article after the trial, calling Schwartzbard’s act ‘a beautiful crime’ and deploring ‘that there was no law for the unification of the moral standards of mankind in relation to the destruction of national, racial and religious groups’.44 Later in a letter to the Manchester

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17

Guardian signed by Pearl Buck but clearly drafted by him, Lemkin cited the example of both the assassination of the Armenian and Ukrainian leaders responsible for mass killing, as there was no court of law prepared to try them, but when he was reiterating the point to a State Department official, he only quoted the Ukrainian example because this weighed more heavily on his mind.45 Lemkin decided to specialize in criminal law and criminal fiscal law, writing a series of monographs and establishing close relations with the country’s leading academic specialists in this field, including Professors Makarewicz, Makowski, Jamontt and Rappaport. With Tadeusz Kochanowski, he wrote the Criminal Code of the Soviet Republics (1926), dealing with the evolution of Russian and Soviet penal law, followed in 1929 by a book, analysing the Italian Fascist criminal code. In 1931, he collaborated with Jan Koryory in a project on Polish law, the publication of a wide-ranging commentary on The Fiscal Penal Statute of 1926, which was twice updated. In 1931, he wrote a Commentary on the Polish Penal Law Project and a year later with two of his mentors, both of whom were judges in the Polish Supreme Court, he published the two volume standard Commentary on the Polish Penal Law of 1932. With Professor Rappaport, Lemkin drafted the code for minor criminal offences which became law in 1932. The following year Lemkin published a major study entitled The Criminal Judge Faced by Modern Criminal Law and Criminology, pointing out that judges should be trained in criminology and psychology to make them more skilful when sentencing criminals involved in serious crimes and habitual offenders, and went on to contribute numerous articles to the Polish Encyclopedia of Criminal Law published between 1931 and 1939.46 Despite the difficulties being encountered by Jewish lawyers in the advancement of their careers in Poland, Raphael Lemkin on the strength of his first book was appointed as secretary of the Court of Appeals in Warsaw in 1927 and two years later as deputy public prosecutor in the District Court of Warsaw. ‘Other appointments followed soon’, Lemkin declared, including the appointment as Secretary of the Penal Section of the Polish Committee on codification of laws, where I worked on the Polish penal code; representative at the International Bureau for Unification of Penal Law which met every year in another capital of Europe; Secretary General of the Polish Group for the Association of Penal Law. I was soon on friendly terms with the highest judicial authorities and leading intellectuals of Western Europe. I submitted papers to all these conferences. There were solemn opening speeches, dinners and receptions with decorations covering half of the chests of the delegates.47 Lemkin was introduced to the international law circuit, and in particular to the Association Internationale de Droit Penal, by his mentor and colleague

18 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

at the Free University of Warsaw Professor Emil Stanislaw Rappaport. At these conferences which were held under the auspices of the League of Nations, Lemkin made many useful contacts, including the Belgian statesman Count Henri Carton de Wiart, the President of the League, and Karl Schlyter, the Swedish Minister of Justice; in addition, he met the leading international lawyers, such as Professor Vespasian Pella and Professor Donnedieu de Vabres, and voluntary workers. Lemkin was proud to have ‘collaborated with and ... [become] a close friend ... [of] Professor Donnedieu de Vabres’.48 To understand the development of Lemkin’s thought, we must briefly discuss the issues which were vexing lawyers at the international conferences during the 1920s and early 1930s. Following a report of a committee of the League of Nations, Hugh H. Bellot, the Secretary-General of the International Law Association suggested in 1922 that an international criminal court should be set up to try war criminals. In 1927 the Association Internationale de Droit Penal under the leadership of Professor Rappaport declared that both aggressive war and the propaganda for such a war should be classified as international crimes and that a commission should be set up to see how this proposal could be implemented. At the same time, Professor Vespasian Pella revived the idea of the establishment of an international criminal court. At subsequent conferences in 1930 and 1931 of the association, the issue of ‘the intentional use of instruments capable of producing a public danger’ was considered. Although some delegates wished to include terrorism under this heading, this was opposed by Rappaport and Lemkin. A commission was set up with Lemkin included in its membership to recommend a policy for the association to adopt. Jean-Andre Roux, the Secretary-General of the association, focussed solely on terrorism, fixing minimal national penalties for the offence and ignoring wider international law concerns.49 Lemkin’s ideas on how to combat the persecution of racial and religious groups had been maturing, as he was sharpening his skills as a legal draftsman and perspicacious commentator. Meanwhile Hitler had become the Reich Chancellor on 30 January 1933 and waves of refugees began to leave Germany, particularly doctors and lawyers, as the position of Jews and their sympathisers worsened. In August 1933, 3,000 Assyrian Christians in the village of Simel in Iraq were massacred in an ethnic cleansing episode. At last there appeared to be an opportunity for Lemkin to broach his proposals, as he was one of those invited to present a report on terrorism on behalf of the steering committee of the Association Internationale de Droit Penal which was due to meet in Madrid between 14 and 20 October 1933. Against a deteriorating international scene, Lemkin was motivated to act and in a paper submitted to Pedone, the official publisher of the League of Nations, Lemkin designated two new crimes in international law: the crime of barbarity which outlawed the extermination of ethnic, social and religious groups by means of massacres, pogroms or economic discrimination, while

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the crime of vandalism forbade the destruction of cultural or artistic works which embodied the genius of a specific people. He borrowed the concept of the crime of barbarie from the Romanian international lawyer Vespasian Pella.50 Acts of barbarism often resulted in the flight of persecuted groups – here Lemkin must have been thinking of the flood of refugees from Nazi Germany – and individuals from such a group were sometimes prone to terrorism and to carrying out political assassinations. He argued that the world community had already banned slavery, the trade in women and children, the drug trade, the counterfeiting of money, the circulation of obscene publications, piracy and terrorism. These crimes were deemed a threat to the international order, and even if committed elsewhere, could be tried in the country, where the culprit was apprehended. Underlying Lemkin’s argument was the proposition that the annihilation of an ethnic or religious collectivity, however, was much worse than the destruction of cables or the hijacking of a merchant ship, and should be treated in a similar serious manner by the international community. Other crimes which concerned Lemkin were the acts of terror against the transport links between nations and the disruption of the telephone or telegraphic service and the deliberate dissemination of disease. Therefore, he stated that an international convention against such crimes was necessary.51 Part of this emphasis on crimes of vandalism or cultural destruction must be seen in the context of Jewish politics in Poland between the two World Wars. While ethnic Poles wanted their state to be homogeneous and monolithic, Zionists such as Lemkin and his friend Yitzhak Gruenbaum had a vision of Poland as a ‘nationalities state’.52 During the 1920s moderate Zionists such as these men were ‘committed to the struggle for Jewish national rights both “here” in Poland and “there” in Palestine’, and the former included extensive Jewish national autonomy schemes in Poland; in other words, there was considerable overlapping between this programme of the Zionists and that of the moderate Jewish cultural autonomists in Poland. But the Polish government despite signing the 1919 Minorities Treaty undermined the movement for Yiddish or Hebrew language schools, a key component of Jewish cultural autonomy. By invoking the protection of a new international treaty, Lemkin hoped to some extent to circumvent Polish opposition to Jewish national and cultural autonomy.53 However, if the text of his paper is scrutinized, it is not certain that Lemkin had as yet conceptualized the idea of genocide, for he still appears to have been thinking in terms of legislating against pogroms and massacres and the economic discrimination which was widely practised in Poland. I would suggest that during the 1930s Lemkin still saw the problem of mass killing within the conceptual framework of Jewish history and more specifically within the confines of Polish Jewish history. As far as massacres are concerned, one of the formative events in Polish Jewish history was the slaughter of the Jews by the Cossacks led by Chelmienicki in 1648. Many

20 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

attempts have since been made to distinguish a massacre from genocide with Mark Levene defining it as ‘one-sided killings’, and Jacques Semelin remarking that ‘A massacre is in no way a genocide, whereas a genocide always implies one or more massacres’.54 After the First World War, we have seen that there were pogroms against the Jews in the Polish borderlands and even more brutal massacres in the Ukraine which were well known to Lemkin, and the unrest in Poland continued after the war. In 1922 there was a riot in Minsk in which four Jews were killed and six were wounded, arising out of a blood libel accusation, and rioting also occurred in the towns of Radom, Vilna, Olsham and Mlava, while blood libel accusations were made against the Jews in Warsaw, Lodz and Vilna. Again, in 1923 there were anti-Jewish disturbances in Kaltowicz, Posen, Lvov and Cracow. From the mid-1930s onwards such pogroms were once again to become a common feature of Jewish life in Poland, though violence against the Jews never subsided during the whole interwar period.55 After the First World War, the commercial boycott of the Jews was enforced by agitators sponsored by the nationalist parties, particularly the Endeks, in conjunction with associations of merchants and artisans. Typical was the situation in the shtetl of Kolo. Returning to his hometown of Kolo in 1923, J. Cohen Lask noted that The Jews in the streets and markets are like skeletons. They have lost both their courage and vitality. There is a government monopoly of certain goods, such as sugar and tobacco, and these are supplied exclusively to the Christian traders. Then, again, there are a number of agitators who, either by argument or by force, prevent customers from entering shops owned by Jews. The British Board of Deputies was informed in 1926 that They had to deal with pogroms and burning and robberies [in Poland in the past], but they had never had to encounter a problem of this kind, which was a sort of creeping paralysis which was coming over the whole of Polish Jewry and which was caused by the economic condition of the country.56 As he was preparing for the conference in Madrid, Lemkin’s phone rang one evening. It was a Judge of the Supreme Court, the chief Polish delegate to the conference, almost certainly Justice Rappaport, who was his mentor and warned him in somewhat embarrassed tones that the Minister of Justice was opposed to him, Lemkin, attending the meeting in Madrid. He also referred to an article that had appeared in the influential anti-Semitic newspaper Gazata Warszawska which attacked Lemkin’s invention of the new international crimes of barbarity and vandalism, denouncing him for

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being solely concerned to protect his own race. Under Josef Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, there had been a reorientation of Polish foreign policy in an attempt to secure a rapprochement with Germany, and as a first step, the Polish government undertook ‘to stop anti-German propaganda’ and Lemkin’s scheme was regarded as falling under this category. In September 1934 Poland renounced the Minorities Rights Treaty.57 Lemkin immediately wrote letters to his friends in Western Europe, urging them to support his scheme which was to be published in time for the forthcoming conference. His proposals were tabled at the conference in Madrid, without the delegates being given the opportunity to accept or reject them. Subsequently, William Korey has pointed out that Lemkin exaggerated his role, by suggesting that when he spoke at the Madrid conference, the German delegation walked out. In fact, Korey showed that Lemkin had been prevented from going to Madrid. The Gazeta Warszawska implied that Lemkin as a public prosecutor was giving the wrong impression to other governments about Polish foreign policy. Shortly afterwards, on 26 January 1934 the Poles and Germans signed the Declaration of Non-aggression, and Lemkin finding that his position in public service was untenable resigned his post as public prosecutor.58 Lemkin was at the same time deeply involved with the Jewish community in Warsaw. In addition to publishing two manuals in Yiddish in 1928 and 1929 explaining various facets of Jewish and Polish law, he wrote a column in a Yiddish newspaper, Haynt [Today] answering readers’ legal queries. He held the position of Professor of Law at Tahkemoni College from 1927 until 1939 and gave occasional courses in law at the Free University of Warsaw.59 Raphael Mahler explained that Jews who held full professorships [in inter-War Poland] could be counted on the fingers of one hand, while most of the remainder never advanced beyond the rank of assistants. In some cases, young Jewish scholars were advised frankly by their sponsors to embrace Christianity if they ever hoped to become even docents [lecturers]. Despite his prolific output, Lemkin as a Jew was not fully welcomed in Polish academic institutions. Takhemoni College was a rabbinical seminary, where students were instructed both in the Talmud and Modern Hebrew literature and given a thorough grounding in secular subjects. During the 1920s, when it was headed by the distinguished Polish Jewish historian Mayer Balaban, it was a prestigious institution. The College was financed by the Mizrachi organization, a Zionist body with a Modern Orthodox ideology.60 It is likely that Lemkin chose to work there, as he was broadly in sympathy with Zionist aspirations since his student days. Raphael Lemkin was on friendly terms with many members of the Jewish intelligentsia in Warsaw, among whom was Yizhak Gruenbaum (1879–1970). Gruenbaum was a leader of the General Zionists and head of the Aliyah (immigration) Department of

22

Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

the Jewish Agency 1933–1935. In fact, Raphael’s brother Elias went on two trips to Palestine in 1933–1934, returning to Poland for the birth of his youngest son Samuel in April 1934 and managing to obtain an immigration certificate through Raphael’s influential contacts, to see if he and his wife and children could settle there, but he found economic conditions too difficult; it is possible that because of the obstacles encountered by his brother, Raphael may have adopted a somewhat cooler attitude towards the Zionist movement.61 Almost barred from public service in Poland during the 1930s, Jewish intellectuals turned to the liberal professions, particularly medicine and law, which they dominated at the lower levels. In 1931 just under half of the legal practitioners and barristers in Poland were Jewish. A new law was passed in 1938 empowering the Minister of Justice from time to time to close the list of barristers’ candidates and to determine the number to be admitted but at the same time it was made compulsory for candidates to serve a court apprenticeship, with the aim of excluding Jews. A boycott was organized against Jewish lawyers in Poland, so both industry and the trade unions were reluctant to have them represent their interests.62 Unperturbed by these obstacles, Lemkin plunged into private law practice in 1934 and as an acknowledged expert on tax law including its international ramifications, saw his practice thrive. He opened offices in central Warsaw, first at 6 Jenaborska and then at 6 Kredytowa, an exclusive district.63 According to William Korey, ‘With some of Europe’s biggest corporations becoming the firm’s clients, Lemkin was quickly beginning to amass a fortune’. There are various indications of Lemkin’s affluence in this period. He acted as ‘counsel for the heavy industries in Polish Upper Silesia. Because of the financial and economic inter-connection of these Polish industries with German industries ... [he] could get an insight in[to] the workings of the German economy and finance’.64 In the 1950s, Lemkin assessed his Polish property as being worth $150,000. He also had a fine collection of paintings from medieval times onwards depicting the administration of justice which were looted and carried off to Berlin.65 When he later met up with a former colleague from Warsaw and they reminisced about the past, Lemkin bluntly declared that ‘The big lawyer’s fees, the idle talk about our own endless professional wisdom, the expensive furniture, the country houses, will never return’.66 Lemkin had a hectic working week, advising clients on their tax, foreign exchange control and other problems, and then would spend a relaxed weekend in his country cottage, where perhaps he found some of the time to write an endless succession of books and academic legal articles. During the mid-1930s or perhaps a little later, Raphael Lemkin, who had a tendency to take on too many commitments, contracted a fever in Vienna; he neglected his illness and fell ill with double-pneumonia. Although the medical specialists pronounced his chances of recovery as minimal, his

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23

mother and sister-in-law Lisa journeyed to Warsaw to nurse him and helped him through his convalescence, but he was left with a weakened heart.67 In 1936 or perhaps a year or two later Lemkin met Professor Malcolm McDermott of the Duke University Law School, North Carolina, when he assisted him in translating the Polish Penal Code of 1932 into English. At that time Lemkin had received a tentative offer of an academic position in the United States, but after his mother’s pleas to him to stay in Poland he had shelved the plan.68 As the international situation grew more gloomy and as the prospects of Poland’s Jews worsened in 1937 and 1938, the idea of migrating from Poland to a country, where his talents would be better appreciated simmered in Lemkin’s mind. In 1936 he was approached by Count Carton de Wiart, the former Prime Minister of Belgium, to make a study of ‘payment restrictions in international relations’.69 His new career as a corporation lawyer daily advising clients on tax law and the regulations governing the movement of currency from one country to another encouraged Lemkin to embark on a magnum opus in French on exchange control. This treatise would, if necessary, give him the éntree to academic circles overseas. Raphael Lemkin kept in close contact with his parents, particularly with his mother to whom he was deeply attached, and his brother. Every New Year (Rosh Hashanah) in September and every Passover in the spring, Raphael travelled to Wolkowysk to spend these holidays with his parents. On the New Year festival, he sometimes left early before its completion and picked up the transport for the return journey outside the town so as not to embarrass his religious father.70 Away from his family in Warsaw, Lemkin stopped attending a synagogue and he abandoned most forms of religious observance. Every year Lemkin would join the international legal conference circuit, going abroad to Budapest, Copenhagen, Paris, Amsterdam and Cairo, meeting colleagues and delivering papers. Although Lemkin liked to give the impression that he availed himself of every opportunity before the Second World War to denounce the crime of barbarity at these gatherings, this was not the case.71 Apart from the 1933 paper on crimes of barbarity and vandalism presented to the Madrid conference, Lemkin only touched on these issues in similar articles published in Austrian and Polish law journals at the end of the same year. Rebuffed by the shelving of his report, Lemkin shifted his focus of interest from crimes against ethnic groups to the need to support the system of collective security sponsored by the League of Nations to prevent war. Despite the new urgency given to the issue of terrorism with the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Louis Barthou, the French Foreign Minister, in October 1934, Lemkin hardly participated in the deliberations of the Association Internationale de Droit Penal in the following year to draft a convention against terrorism and to set up an international criminal court.72 In the summer of 1937 Lemkin travelled to Paris where he gave an important paper on ‘The protection of peace by domestic penal law’ to the

24 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

Fourth International Congress of the Association for Criminal Law. While saying that he personally still favoured the system of collective security as the ideal to which all should aspire, he noted that there was also a place for bilateral treaties between nations. He suggested that international peace was not only the task of international law which governed relations between states, but it was also necessary for individual societies to educate their citizens for peace. He believed that law has always performed through its prohibitive norms the function of collective education on moral issues ... peace ... [was] not only a political issue, but also a moral problem of deep significance. If societies were given a direct share in preserving peace, governments would lose all incentive to break peace because they would realize that they would be violating not only international laws but also the criminal laws of their own countries if they did so, and that they would be acting against the feelings and sanctioned interests of their own peoples. Among the offences against good international relations Lemkin listed in his proposed law code were hostile acts against the independence or territorial integrity of another state by an individual or armed group, the diffusion of false news, and the spreading of hostile propaganda full of hatred against another state. Second, he wished to ensure that individuals who spread propaganda to incite one state to attack another in violation of international agreements and to undermine an ongoing arbitration process between states were to be punished. Growing up in a contested borderland over which different armies clashed during the First World War and its aftermath made Lemkin acutely sensitive to the concerns of the diverse nationalities living there and their anxieties about self-preservation. Hence when he enrolled in the University of Lvov, he switched to the study of the law to have a better understanding of these problems; later by joining the international law circuit, he teamed up with a group of older scholars, Emil Rappaport, Donnedieu de Vabres, and Vespasian Pella, who acted as his mentors. Ambitious, exceedingly industrious, and disillusioned by the Minorities Treaties ratified by Poland in 1919, he devised his own scheme in 1933, based on ensuring that acts of barbarity and vandalism committed against peaceful groups were declared to be crimes in international law. Repudiated by his government and attracting little support elsewhere, Lemkin put his plan aside and concentrated on his law practice, other less contentious suggestions, and his writing. Despite the increasing severity of the economic boycott against Jews in Poland, Lemkin’s private legal practice throve, after he was forced to resign his official appointment. Comparing the plight of the Jews in pre-War Poland with that of the black population in the Southern states before the civil rights era and railing against the discrimination directed

Formative Years in Poland

25

against them in his historical studies, Lemkin deftly under-played his concerns in his memoirs. In the remaining years before the Second World War, he concentrated on the drafting of a formidable treatise on exchange control regulations. This would be his passport for acceptance in the academic world overseas.73

2 Escape from Poland

On 1 September 1939, the German air force attacked Poland destroying most of the Polish aeroplanes on the ground and bombing road and railway communications. Dive-bombers hunted for columns of marching men, while at the same time fleeing civilians were strafed with machine-gun fire. On land there was a Blitzkrieg, a lightening war, as German mechanized units with light tanks and motorized artillery advanced rapidly; they were quickly followed by heavy tanks and artillery which completed the military occupation of the area, and then the same pattern of advance was repeated. Cities such as Warsaw were relentlessly pounded by artillery without regard to the number of civilian casualties inflicted. Around Poznan in western Poland 19 divisions of the Polish army were trapped and in the ensuing battle 170, 000 Polish soldiers were taken prisoner.1 On 6 September 1939, Raphael Lemkin walked down Marszalkowaka Street in Warsaw towards the railway station, passing houses which were burning ‘like candles’. That morning Colonel Umiastowski, the official spokesman, broadcast on Warsaw radio, telling listeners that western Poland had almost fallen and that a new line of defence was being set up in the east and south along the frontiers with Russia and Romania on the Bug and Narew rivers, where all able-bodied men were expected to fight. People anticipated that Russia would stay out of the conflict because she had signed a non-aggression pact with Poland.2 Eventually Lemkin boarded a train as dawn was approaching and secured a corner seat in a compartment. While serving in the Polish army, Lemkin had been wounded in his ‘right leg close to the hip’ which detracted from his mobility.3 Suddenly a powerful detonation shook the train followed by a bomb explosion which was even closer. A cry rang out that passengers should evacuate the train, as it had been hit. People began jumping through the doors and windows, screaming ‘Oh God’, ‘Oh Jesus’.4 Fleeing from the train, Lemkin joined four other men and headed towards the city of Siedlce which was well to the east of Warsaw and close to the Bug and Narew rivers. Along the way Lemkin linked up with another group in a 26

Escape from Poland

27

forest, but they were careless and allowed too much smoke to escape when they prepared breakfast. Then the group rested shaded by the trees, but they were jolted from their slumber by the sound of falling bombs. After the raid was over, the group discovered that three of their members lay dead. Lemkin continued his flight, hitching a lift aboard a horse-drawn military vehicle and sat next to a sleeping and exhausted Polish soldier. With his heart pounding and fearful of drowning, Lemkin was forced to walk the length of a shaky beam, the remnants of a bridge which once spanned a river.5 Usually the rain started to fall early in September in Poland turning the roads into a quagmire which would have impeded the passage of Nazi tanks. But this year the cloudless blue skies during the day and the clear nights full of stars favoured the rapid advance of the Germans. ‘In the daytime’ Lemkin observed, ‘the planes controlled the sky with a terrifying furor, and continued to rain their relentless fire and destruction. We were exhausted from hunger, thirst, and animal-like fears’.6 Other eye-witness testimony confirms the veracity of Lemkin’s account.7 Because of the instructions on the radio for able-bodied men to leave the cities and join the army in eastern Poland, most of the escapees on the road were male. As soap and hot water were not available, people washed irregularly. There were no facilities for shaving, so long beards became de rigeur. Whenever the sun rose, socks and underwear were washed rapidly and dried by its warmth. Soon the men began to take on the appearance of a bunch of robbers. The only vestiges of their previous status were the eyeglasses worn by them. In contrast most of the women, who left Warsaw, went east to seek refuge with relatives. During the first days on the march, their major preoccupation was keeping their stockings intact. When they were no longer able to wear lipstick, some of them confessed to feeling ‘undressed’, yet they still looked condescendingly on the barefooted peasant women, who served them food. Sometimes strangers paired off and made love in the dark, despite the lack of privacy.8 As they progressed further south, Lemkin noticed that there were fewer bombing attacks. At last the overhead flights of hostile aircraft ceased, and Lemkin’s group decided that it was safe to walk during the day. ‘One day we heard that the Russians had entered Poland. This explained to us the ominous silence in the sky during the recent days’, he remarked. Later it became known that there was a secret clause in the Nazi–Soviet non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939, which allocated much of eastern Poland to the Russians, and the Soviet army invaded Poland on 17 September 1939 to secure the territory which they had been allocated.9 With effective resistance by the Polish army to the German onslaught now doomed by the Russian intervention, it must have been about this time that Lemkin’s vague thought of escaping to Lithuania and Sweden, if the need arose, must have hardened into a firm intention. As we have seen, Lemkin had formed a friendship with Karl Schlyter, a former Minister of

28

Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

Justice in Sweden, and he was relying on him to facilitate his entry, provided he could reach him by cable. He also wanted to visit his parents, who lived in the town of Wolkowysk in eastern Poland, to reassure them that he was still alive.10 Near a bridge which led to a small town near Kovel was a police post manned by several Russian soldiers, who selected and arrested people as they tried to cross the bridge. Lemkin stayed with a Jewish family in a nearby town, who advised him to buy peasant clothes and discard his suit which someone could collect for him at a later date. Nevertheless, the next day when Lemkin attempted to cross the bridge, a Russian soldier questioned him. Lemkin answered him in Ruthenian, a local language which he had acquired in childhood when he played with the Ukrainian peasant children. He claimed to have been taken from his village of Ozerisko, which was near to Wolkowysk, by the Polish army, but was now returning home. Dissatisfied with his answer, the soldier continued to question him: ‘You are not going in the direction of your home, you are going toward Kowel [Kovel]. Your home is northeast’.11 Lemkin replied, ‘I know it, but I have been dragged by the army south and would like to take the train home from Kowel’. Not satisfied with these responses to his questions, the soldier asked Lemkin to show him his hands. He did not find them sufficiently calloused for Lemkin to pass as a peasant. ‘But I work as a secretary in my village office’, [Lemkin continued], ‘I went to school and I know how to read and write. You can telephone my village office and find out’. Lemkin was told to go into a little room and lie down on the floor which was covered with straw. If he was not released soon, Lemkin sensed that he would be in danger and could be detained indefinitely. Pretending to be hungry, Lemkin banged on the door demanding food, and the soldier brought him bread. Continuing with his pretence, Lemkin greedily devoured the bread, although he had been given a meal of chicken by his Jewish hosts only two hours earlier.12 In the middle of the night, a man masquerading as a peasant joined Lemkin on the straw and started to question him as to where he came from and whether or not he had a family. Lemkin claimed to have a wife and four children. Turning the tables on his interrogator, Lemkin volunteered the information that in his village it cost ten zlotys to christen a child and casually asked the other man how much it cost in his village, a question which failed to elicit an answer and deepened Lemkin’s suspicion that he was trying to ensnare him. Soon Lemkin fell asleep and started to snore; he was woken from his slumber by the other man, who asked him the time. Looking at the sky, where a silver line was visible, Lemkin predicted that it would soon be daybreak. The other man responded by claiming that the Bolsheviks wanted to make soldiers of the peasants. But Lemkin replied that thanks to the Russians more food would be available. He studied the man, whose head was square, with a haircut which was never worn by the peasants around

Escape from Poland

29

Wolkowysk. Admitting defeat, the man interrogating Lemkin added that many Polish officers were trying to evade capture disguised as peasants.13 In all, the Russians massacred 20,000 individuals belonging to the Polish elite, mainly officers but also landowners, industrialists and civil servants. More than 4,000 of these victims were buried in a mass grave in the forest of Katyn near to Smolensk.14 When Lemkin awoke, the man had left the room and he was released soon afterwards. Lemkin shambled to the door slowly trying his best to imitate the gait of peasants. He could not forget this incident and his brush with death. Playing with the peasant children as a young boy had saved his life. Lemkin soon found refuge in one of the many hundreds of predominantly Jewish shtetlekh. towns in the province of Volhynia. His host, a Jewish baker, remembering what had happened during the First World War took a complacent view of Germany’s future intentions: ‘How can Hitler destroy the Jews, if he must trade with them?’. Similar sentiments about the good relations existing between Jews and the German army of occupation in Poland during the First World War were expressed by Jakob Wassermann in one of his novels and were widely shared. Lemkin paraphrased Hitler’s ideology and explained that this War was different; the Nazis had the aim of changing the population structure of the territories they seized by replacing them with Germans and regaled him with biblical comparisons of the deportation of the Jews by the Assyrians to no avail. Here what Lemkin implied was the kernel of the theory that underpinned his classic work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944), yet his recollections seem to be confused at this point.15 Perhaps what was happening in Poland in the autumn and early winter of 1939 had radicalized Lemkin’s thought. During this period, the Germans had conducted their military campaign in Poland with a viciousness reminiscent of the upheavals in eastern Europe after the First World War, and the SS and police with the cooperation of the German army primarily targeted the leadership of the Polish nation in the conquered territories, murdering about 50,000 persons, of whom about 7,000 were Jews, by December 1939.16 Nor do the remarks of his host’s son about the murderous intentions of the Germans towards Poland’s Jews ring true either, for the family was living in the Russian eastern zone of Poland, and both the baker and his son would have been much more concerned with the evolution of current Soviet policy towards the Jews than musing about what Germany might intend. Until now German venom had been directed towards the Polish elite as a whole and was not particularly directed against Jews. Lemkin’s exposition at this point of German plans for the wholesale destruction of the Jewish population in eastern and central Europe was heavily tinged with hindsight. True there were those prophetic voices which warned of an impending catastrophe in eastern Europe. Chaim Weizmann, when giving evidence to the Peel Commission on 25 November 1936, warned that east of the Rhine, the Jews had become ‘ “the flotsam and jetsam of the world”. Almost six million

30 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

Jews ... in that part of the world are doomed to be pent up in places where they are not wanted, and for whom the world is divided into places where they cannot live, and places where they cannot enter ... They are doomed ... they are in despair’. Daniel Goldhagen drew attention to ‘The pre-existing genocidal potential that inhered in Germans’ eliminationist anti-Semitism ... and the evaluation of people like Lessing, Lewisohn, Thompson, and the mid1939 congressional testimony of the American journalist Quentin Reynolds, who predicted the “annihilation of the Jews” in “a complete pogrom” ’. Dr Franz Borkenau wrote in April 1939 that ‘no less than seven million Jews are bottled up in an area where most of them are no longer wanted’ and predicted that ‘There is little doubt that within a few years the fate of the Jews in eastern Europe will resemble that of the Armenians in Turkey’.17 But it is doubtful, despite his later protestations, that Lemkin at this point shared the views of these visionaries. Lemkin’s 1933 proposals against barbarity and vandalism looked back to the Armenian massacres and the plight of the Ukrainian Jews after the Russian revolution, but he later failed to draw attention to Herschel Grynszpan, who shot the German envoy, Ernest Von Rath, in Paris on 7 November 1938 because the Germans had deported 17,000 Polish Jews, including Grynszpan’s family, into a no-man’s land between the two states. At the time Lemkin was busy with his own plans for reinvigorating the collective security system of the League of Nations and writing his book on exchange control. He was primarily an international lawyer and had neither the time nor the inclination to read the burgeoning literature of the German population experts and economic planners, who had schemes for the dispossession of the Jews and the resettlement of large population groups in eastern Europe. Nevertheless, once Germany had conquered western Poland and other territories these plans had to be recast as laws, and it is possible that Lemkin may have stumbled on them in Sweden in 1940–1941, when he started collecting Nazi occupation decrees.18 After a week or more’s stay in Volhynia, his host told him that trains were due to start running again the next day. Although the trains still had Polish ticket collectors on board, travel was free as yet and Lemkin thought that in this state of confusion while Russian control had not been fully implemented in the occupied zone of Poland this would be a good time to visit his parents in Wolkowysk.19 As the night-time curfew was coming to an end in the morning, Lemkin crept stealthily from the railway station at Wolkowysk to the home of his parents . After breakfast, he slept and joined his parents and brother for a family discussion. Both his parents were in poor physical shape and too infirm to flee with him. As the Soviet regime had taken over eastern Poland, his brother deemed it to be the wisest course to divest himself of the ownership of his dry goods store selling clothes, underwear and smart ladies shoes and register himself as an employee. Elias was tall, easy going and something

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31

of a ladies man.20 Raphael spoke about his plans to go to Lithuania and then make his way onwards to America. His father said that his brother Isadore who had migrated earlier to the United States would be able to assist him. Of all the members of his immediate family, in which she included his brother and sister-in-law Lisa and their two children, his mother remarked that he was the loneliest and the only ‘loveless one’. She exclaimed that ‘We know you will continue your work, for the protection of peoples. Unfortunately, it is needed now more than ever before’. Despite Lemkin’s attempt to give the impression that here she was talking about his efforts to resuscitate his 1933 campaign against barbarism and vandalism, it is questionable whether any such plans had as yet crystallized in his mind.21 Raphael and his mother had been through this conversation about the direction of his life without the solace of a wife and companion many times. As usual he tried to parry the thrust of her argument with a line from Goethe’s Herman and Dorothea: ‘Take a wife so that the night might become the more beautiful part of your life’. But this time she brushed aside his joke and continued Mothers want their children to marry, because as the givers of life they know the significance of married life. They also want to convey the protection of their children, to another woman, a spiritual sister in the mission of love. We are not eternal any of us ... Please Raphael, in the past you did not have time. You wrote a book almost every year. But are you sure that every book is more important than a friend, a spiritual companion, who could help you develop the life of the heart? Your goal is to bring the world closer to the life of the heart – there must be a place in it for a congenial, intelligent women. He kissed his tearful mother, conceding that she might be right and that ‘Recent events have been so drastic that perhaps ... [he] must make a decision on this too’.22 Although this sounds plausible, perhaps Raphael and his mother were too enmeshed. Despite living at a distance from his parents in Warsaw, he was unable to separate sufficiently from his mother. True, he led a very busy life, advising high-powered clients and appearing in court on their behalf, attending an interminable number of international law conferences and writing books and articles. But at weekends he relaxed in his country cottage, and at the international conferences he had the opportunity of meeting many male companions and perhaps some eligible women too. At the same time, his choice of translating Bialik’s story about a love affair between a Jewish boy and Polish girl showed that he did not know whether or not to cross the divide and choose a gentile girl or marry a young Jewish bride, who would be more acceptable to his parents. When he moved to America, Lemkin formed relationships with both Jewish and gentile women, and as

32 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

has been noted, many women found him attractive. If the relationship grew too intense, Raphael would grow uncomfortable and try to break free from it and seems to have had a problem with intimacy. It seems unlikely that this pattern of relationship with women suddenly emerged for the first time when Raphael moved to the United States, and more likely that he already had a series of short-term relationships with various women in Poland. It is interesting that the one lady friend we know about from pre-War Poland with whom Raphael had a relationship was a married woman, someone safe, to whom his commitment could be limited.23 After slipping through the Russian lines, Raphael Lemkin arrived in Vilnius some time between 10 October 1939, when the Russians announced that they would transfer the city to the Lithuanians, and 27 October 1939, when they actually withdrew. He did not seek refuge in the forests in the neighbourhood of Warsaw for six months as is implied in some accounts.24 Lemkin depicted the Russian occupation of Vilnius, which began on 19 September, as being on the whole an economic conquest rather than a political one, but this is not accurate. True that the Russian troops stripped factories of their machinery and printing works of their presses. They also had an insatiable hunger for consumer goods of all kinds, watches, trousers, shirts, hats, shoes and nails, which were in short supply in Russia because of the heavy investment in the production of capital goods during the 1930s, and this is confirmed by other witnesses, such as the novelist Chaim Grade. He reported that ‘It seemed as though the whole Russian army had lined up at these Jewish shops to buy gifts for their wives and children, from bolts of fabric and suits to hairpins and spools of thread’.25 The Russian women accompanying the soldiers purchased beautifully embroidered night-gowns in the mistaken belief that they were evening-dresses. They wore them when they were dining in a fashionable restaurant, causing mirth at their naivety. True that Lemkin witnessed a Russian political commissar haranguing people on a street corner and boasting that the Soviet Union would remain neutral until the Germans and the Western powers fought each other to a standstill, thus preparing the way for a peaceful Russian takeover of Europe. But Lucy Davidowicz noted that ‘After the Red Army entered Vilna on September 19, 1939, Soviet commissars arrested hundreds of people, among them Zalmen Reisen and his son Saul [prominent Yiddish journalists]’.26 It has been estimated that about twenty thousand Jewish refugees made their way from German or Russian occupied Poland to Vilnius. They have been described as ‘the spiritual elite of Polish Jewry. To Lithuania fled ... the Jewish intelligentsia of Zionist or socialist persuasion, Zionist and Bundist leaders, authors, journalists, teachers, scientists, Hassidic and non-Hassidic Rabbis, whole Yeshivot and a large section of the Jewish plutocracy’.27 Lemkin, a part-time law teacher in a rabbinical seminary and a columnist on a leading Zionist Yiddish newspaper in Warsaw, was very much a member of this elite. Many of the refugees eventually sought refuge in the United States,

Escape from Poland

33

Palestine, China and elsewhere.28 Yet Raphael Lemkin was also a member of the wider Polish elite. Since 1935, Lemkin had served as a member of the Supreme Council of representatives of the combined Polish judiciary, bar and law faculties.29 Professional smugglers established escape routes from Warsaw to Vilnius as the Polish Jews were not as yet enclosed in a ghetto. The first escapees from Warsaw were closely questioned by the refugees anxious for news of their families and the conditions in the capital. The refugees kept their Polish currency in little pouches suspended from their necks, but it was dwindling in value by the hour. They also brought with them all sorts of consumer goods which they tried to sell. The black market on Rudnicka Street throve. Professional smugglers hid Polish banknotes in cheese and butter and crossed from the Russian zone, returning with dollars hidden in the soles of their shoes. Many of the dollars were purchased from poor Jews, which were sent to them by relatives in America.30 The Joint Distribution Committee and Society for the Protection of Health of the Jews (OZE), established shelters for the most prominent writers from Warsaw and elsewhere, the intelligentsia and social activists, and a home for mothers and children. It is quite possible that Lemkin as a member of this privileged group was allocated such accommodation. Jews allowed homeless strangers into their attics, while the Jewish Community Council opened refugee homes and soup kitchens. ‘People with fever lie [on the ground]’, Herman Kruk noted, ‘with nothing to cover them. No shirt, no clothing. A piece of soap is a problem, a towel a rare sight’.31 The principal concern of the refugees was to emigrate, and they approached relatives and friends abroad in order to obtain a visa or they purchased the necessary papers on the black market. Several days after his arrival in Vilnius, Lemkin sent cables to Karl Schlyter, the former Minister of Justice in Sweden, and Count Carton de Wiart of Belgium, a former president of the League of Nations, requesting their help for temporary entry into their own countries as he intended to use them as staging posts for his journey to the United States. Both Karl Schlyter and Count Carton de Wiart were friends Lemkin had made while attending international law conferences during the 1930s and at this critical time in his life they were very useful contacts.32 He also despatched another cable to his close friends the Pedones, a mother and daughter, who owned a great French publishing house and were the official publishers of the League of Nations. Unusually the Pedones took a great personal interest in their authors. They acted as an unofficial clearing-house for members of the legal profession and academic lawyers being as much concerned with their career moves as the latest family gossip. Lemkin confirmed that he had survived the downfall of Poland and asked what had happened to the manuscript of a book on the law of international payments which he had posted to them before the outbreak of the War. A warm reply was received from the Pedones and many letters followed.

34

Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

They understood that if the book was published it would assist him in securing an academic appointment. The Pedones published the book, La Reglementation des Paiements Internationaux in 1939 and sent copies to universities in the United States and to Karl Schlyter and Professor Malcolm McDermott. At the same time, Lemkin wrote to his American friend Professor McDermott of Duke University, North Carolina, informing him about his present position and sounding him out about job prospects in the United States. Schlyter arranged for Lemkin to travel to Sweden, while McDermott busied himself with securing an invitation from Duke University to the United States.33 La Reglementation des Paiements Internationaux, a treatise of 422 pages, was an analysis of the exchange control legislation of 54 countries. Lemkin not only examined the conflict of laws between states but discussed the means to limit their effect. A separate chapter was devoted to describing the clearing arrangements between nations, and the book had a preface by Marcel van Zeeland, the director of the Bank of International Settlements in Basle.34 Thorsten V. Kalijarvi reviewing the book in the American Journal of International Law noted that Dr Lemkin has succeeded in drawing together the complicated threads of international payments, exchange clearing, and credit into a logical and intelligible system ... either one or both of these excellent works [a later Swedish version] deserve to be translated into English, since, nowhere, to the review’s knowledge, can similar treatments be found either in legal or financial literature.35 A professional colleague and friend from Warsaw, Benjamin Tomkiewicz, called with the latest news of Lemkin’s parents, with whom he had been staying for a brief visit. Tomkiewicz had left an old mother behind in Warsaw, ‘with whom and for whom he lived’. As so often in Lemkin’s memoirs, he appears to be talking as much about himself and his own intimate feelings as those of the other person. His friend, who was also a high calibre lawyer, noted that they would never enjoy such a wonderful life again with frequent weekend leisurely visits to their country cottage. Tomkewicz survived the War, picking up his career as a lawyer in Israel.36 At the end of October 1939, Lithuanian troops entered Vilnius and a week later Lemkin travelled to Kaunas, the capital of the neutral Lithuanian state, where it would be easier to contact the Swedish embassy to obtain his entry visa. He stayed for a while as a guest of a lawyer, Dr Laser Lowenstein, in Kaunas, whose wife and daughter were in Switzerland, to whom he had been introduced by friends in Vilnius.37 Raphael Lemkin pondered his fate as a refugee – the enforced idleness, the loss of self-esteem, and the constant swallowing of the bread of affliction, meals always eaten at someone else’s table. There were three things that Lemkin had always dreaded, wearing

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35

spectacles, losing his hair and becoming a refugee. Now all three had come to pass and at the age of 39 he was beginning to feel middle-aged. At last a telephone call came from the Swedish embassy, informing him that his entry visa had arrived. Shortly afterwards, he travelled by train to Riga, the capital of Latvia, a neutral Baltic state.38 As Lemkin had some time to spare before a flight became available to Sweden, he also went to see Professor Simon Dubnov (1860–1951), the famous Jewish historian and ideologist of Jewish cultural autonomy in Poland, who was living in Riga. Lemkin probably made this visit in the winter of 1939. Earlier in August 1938, the great historian had given an interview observing that ‘The present is very sad indeed, in all the four thousand years of Jewish history there never were such horrifying moments as now’. Still he continued in his usual mood of optimism, ‘But Jewish history will go on and continue’.39 That Lemkin deliberately sought out Dubnov indicates something of a disillusion with the Zionist standpoint in the crisis facing eastern European Jewry and an increasing readiness to engage with others with differing views. It is clear, however, that despite their dissension on various issues, Lemkin was deeply influenced by Dubnov in his thinking on the importance of the cultural autonomy of national groups. He claims that he discussed his 1933 plan to prevent the mass extermination of ethnic groups and that the historian agreed with him. If so, the onset of the War had revitalized Lemkin’s thinking, for he does not seem to have given his own scheme all that much thought since the mid-1930s, but it is more likely that they concentrated on discussing such practical issues of where refugees fleeing from the Nazi onslaught could be granted safe haven. ‘The most appalling part about this type of killing’, Lemkin told Dubnov, ‘is that in the past it has ceased to be a crime when large numbers are involved and when all happen to belong to the same, nationality, or race, or religion. These things must be discussed openly. Let the nations take their choice whether they want to belong to the civilized world community’. Both Dubnov and Lemkin, however, concurred that history would have to sit in judgment on the vicious war unleashed by the Nazis. When marching towards his death in 1941, Dubnov held the same views and kept on repeating: ‘Good people, do not forget, good people, relate it, good people, write it down’.40 Shortly after this memorable visit, Lemkin flew to Sweden, a state proud of its neutral stance during international conflicts. This feeling of confidence was shattered by the Nazi invasion of Denmark and Norway on 9 and 10 April 1940 followed by the rapid capitulation of their governments. A letter arrived from Lemkin’s friend in Belgium, Count Carton de Wiart, during the same month advising him that a visa was awaiting him at the Belgian legation in Stockholm. Lemkin had originally intended to use Belgium as a transit point for his journey to the United States, but the job offer from Professor McDermott of Duke University had not yet arrived. Then the

36 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

Germans invaded Belgium and Holland on 10 May 1940, overrunning Belgium in a matter of days. After having received the sympathy of the Belgian minister for Poland’s defeat, it was now Lemkin’s turn to commiserate with him on Belgium’s dire fate. When a few days later Lemkin visited the Polish consulate in Stockholm, he found former Polish officers in a defiant mood, proud that they had held out against the German army for three weeks instead of collapsing rapidly like the British and French, who had mounted the Narvik expedition in an ill-judged attempt to save Norway.41 Lemkin decided to learn Swedish in the same way that he had acquired Lithuanian by reading the newspapers with the help of a dictionary. His book on the regulation of international payments had been well-received in the Swedish legal journals. His friend Karl Schlyter, the former Justice Minister, suggested that he might give a course of lectures on the subject of his book at the University of Stockholm. When Lemkin went along to discuss this idea with the vice-president of the University, the latter demurred because he was not altogether happy with Lemkin’s pronunciation of Swedish. Matters were rectified when, at the suggestion of friends, Lemkin was coached by a former actress, who worked with him for several hours a week in perfecting his pronunciation. To devise a course of lectures, Lemkin with help translated extensive excerpts from his book on international payments into Swedish and then concentrated on delivering each lecture clearly in Swedish with the assistance of his teacher. The first lecture was to an audience of three hundred persons including many faculty members; it was well received and Lemkin was elated that he was lecturing in Swedish after a stay of only five months in the country.42 Yet the news coming from abroad was disquieting. British troops evacuated their positions in France in May 1940 which was followed by the humiliating peace terms dictated by Hitler to the French government one month later. At the same time on the 20 June 1940 the Russians invaded the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and soon afterwards incorporated them into the Soviet Union. Above all, Lemkin was worried by what was happening to his parents and brother in occupied Poland as he had not received any communication from them. According to Lemkin’s memoirs he had already read Hitler’s political testament, Mein Kampf, and was certain that he intended to destroy the Jews like vermin. In two notorious passages Hitler proclaimed that ‘If at the beginning of the War twelve or fifteen thousand of these Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas, as happened to hundreds of thousands of our best German workers in the field, the sacrifice of millions at the front would not have been in vain’ and ‘The nationalization of our masses will succeed only when, aside from all the positive struggle for the soul of our people, their international poisoners are exterminated’. The first passage in particular can be linked to Hitler’s tirades against alleged Jewish war profiteers and was not a plea for the extermination of all Jews.

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37

It is doubtful whether there was a straight route from Mein Kampf to the genocidal regime at Auschwitz.43 Although Hitler informed the Czech Foreign Minister on 21 January 1939 that ‘We are going to destroy the Jews’, this would not have been known to Lemkin. Nor would a passage in Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on 30 January 1939 make all that much impact until he repeated its message on more than a dozen occasions between 1941 and 1945, as at first it could be interpreted as political hyperbole. In it Hitler declared that Today I will be a prophet again: If international finance Jewry within Europe and abroad should succeed once more in plunging the peoples into a world war, then the consequence will not be the Bolshevization of the world and therewith a victory of Jewry, but on the contrary, the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe.44 It is much more likely that at this stage Lemkin was disturbed by what was occurring in eastern Europe. He then conceived the brilliant idea of finding out what was happening in those parts of Europe seized by the Germans by analysing their occupation decrees. Before the War, Lemkin and other international lawyers had been concerned by an innovation in the German Criminal Code of 28 June 1935, which made punishable any act which was analogous to an act already prohibited by law; this removed a basic right – no punishment unless the offence was prohibited in law, and he and other speakers at the International Congress of Comparative Law at the Hague in 1937 had voiced criticism of this measure.45 Lemkin had contacts in a Swedish business corporation for which he had previously acted in Warsaw, and he asked them to instruct their agents to obtain copies of the official gazettes in the countries which had been overrun by the Germans, when they were available. He started to study these documents and then found that additional copies of these gazettes were stocked by Stockholm libraries.46 Lemkin stayed in Sweden until the end of the winter of 1941, but by then the ultimate intentions of Nazi policy towards the Jews had not been clarified. True that Hitler had formulated his policy of Germany acquiring a living space, Lebensraum, at the expense of Russia in Mein Kampf: For centuries Russia drew nourishment from [the] Germanic nucleus of its upper leading strata. Today it can be regarded as almost totally exterminated and extinguished. It has been replaced by the Jew ... He himself is no element of organization, but a ferment of decomposition. The giant empire in the east is ripe for collapse. And the end of Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state.47 By the time Germany invaded Russia on 22 June 194l, Lemkin was safely installed in the United States.

38

Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

A decree of 12 October 1939 set up the General Government in a rump portion of Poland after the western and northern parts of Poland were incorporated into the Reich. While the Polish elite was to be exterminated, the rest of the Polish population were to be turned into willing drones of the Germans. The Jewish population was to be concentrated into ghettos perhaps to be shunted further afield to Madagascar, but meanwhile they had to register for forced labour. As Michael Burleigh explained, ‘The wider backdrop to productive ghettos was a process of attrition which killed about half a million people through disease and deliberate starvation’. Nothing was known to Lemkin of the inadequate rations allotted to Jews by the Germans until he left Sweden, and the Swedish press was ‘reticent’ about the persecution of the Jews until late 1942.48 What alerted Lemkin to the evil intentions of the Nazi regime, when he started analysing the decrees, were the laws confiscating the property of Jews in Poland and rendering them destitute, the forced labour introduced for Jews from the age of 14 to 60, and the death penalty for those leaving the Warsaw ghetto without permission (October 1940). This latter penalty seemed to be a draconian measure, unless there was a more sinister underlying purpose. By putting these facts together, Lemkin claimed in his memoirs that he had already deduced the genocidal thrust of Nazi policies from their occupation decrees.49 It is far from certain, however, that Lemkin had collected all this information from the decrees before his departure from Sweden, and as Walter Laqueur pointed out until ‘the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 there had been some arbitrary killings (of Jews) but no major massacres’.50 So why should Lemkin at this stage suspect that Germany was planning the mass murder of Jews? At the beginning of 1941, Lemkin received news of his appointment to a position at Duke University in North Carolina. In one of their last letters to him, his parents urged him to take up the lectureship in the United States. For a time he was gripped by indecision as he worried about ‘leaving his parents on a powder keg’. After obtaining the necessary visas to Russia, Japan and the United States, Lemkin started a round of farewells to friends. He flew to Moscow and with several hundred other refugees travelled by train from Moscow to Vladivostock, a journey which took ten days. In late 1940 and early 1941 the Joint Distribution Committee and other Jewish organizations had secured a few thousand American visas for Jewish activists and Yeshiva students stranded in Vilnius, some of these persons were no doubt Lemkin’s travelling companions.51 From Vladivostock, Lemkin went by boat to Japan, where he boarded a Japanese ship to the United States. The ship arrived at Vancouver in Canada and then proceeded the next day to Seattle in the United States. On a bright, sunny morning in April 1941 Raphael Lemkin disembarked. He was greeted by a friendly customs officer, who asked with a real note of concern in his voice about the situation in Europe. He gave Lemkin’s suitcases a cursory

Escape from Poland

39

inspection and told him that his own parents still lived in Shannon in Ireland and gave him a friendly squeeze, exclaiming ‘Okay, boy – You’re in’.52 While Lemkin was part of the flood of Jewish refugees from Poland, who crowded into Lithuania and Sweden, and it is probable that his journey to the United States was paid for by the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, he also belonged to a network of international lawyers. This facilitated his passage from Lithuania via Sweden to the United States, and at the same time, his friendship with Professor McDermott led to an academic position being created for him in the United States. In any case Lemkin’s academic credentials were strengthened by the publication of an important treatise on the law of exchange control in French, a work which would be accessible to lawyers in the English-speaking world. Lemkin’s memoirs which are the only extant source for these years must be used with caution as some of the conversations cited, such as that with the Jewish baker and his son, appear to be invented while other characters are convenient mouthpieces for the airing of Lemkin’ s own robust views. Throughout his memoirs, Lemkin antedated the evolution of his prescient perception of murderous Nazi plans either to October 1939, when he was fleeing from Poland, or his stay in Sweden, when he started collecting their occupation decrees. At the time of his departure from Sweden, Lemkin was probably aware of the German policy of herding Polish Jews into ghettos, but doubtful that he knew much about their policy of deliberately starving them and unlikely that he knew anything about the genocidal intentions of the Nazis or their plans for a general upheaval of all the peoples of eastern Europe.

3 Early Years in the United States

Raphael Lemkin arrived in the United States on 18 April 1941. From the first the auguries were good, the harbinger of countless kindlinesses he was to receive from individuals. To reach Duke University in North Carolina, Lemkin embarked on a three day journey, changing trains at Chicago. The train stopped at Lynchburg, Virginia, where he noticed in the rest rooms of the station signs, stating “ ‘For Whites” and “For Colored” ’. When he innocently asked a black porter if there were special facilities for blacks, his question was ignored, and it was only years later that Lemkin appreciated how rude he must have appeared and that the porter no doubt believed that he was trying to poke fun of him.1 This incident set Lemkin musing. He remembered that in Warsaw there was a single black person in the entire city. He was employed as a dancer in a popular night club, where he pounded the floor with both feet as if to destroy it. Everyone enjoyed his dancing and tried to invite him for drinks. A feeling of curiosity and friendliness prevailed towards this lonely black man in Poland. But towards the Jews, I could not help thinking, there was not the same friendliness; there were three millions of them in the trades, in the professions, in other work, and their competition was felt.2 In the afternoon, a day and a half after leaving Chicago, Lemkin’s train reached the station at Durham, North Carolina, where Professor Malcolm McDermott was waiting to welcome him. They had not met for five years since they had cooperated in the translation of The Polish Penal Code of 1932 and the Law of Minor Offenses into English. Incidentally the drafting of the law relating to minor offences had been left by the Polish government to Lemkin and his mentor Professor Rappaport. Still Lemkin felt that his relationship with Professor McDermott had not changed: it was as if we could resume our conversation just where we had left off, our feelings about world events were of such a similar quality ... In the car 40

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my friend kept inquiring about my travels, but when he saw after a few questions that I had tears in my eyes he stopped.3 ‘Durham was a lively, bustling city smelling of tobacco and human perspiration. There were gasoline stations on the corners, cars crowding bumper to bumper ... People greeted one another in a casual friendly manner’.4 ‘ “This is our university”, ... [McDermott] said after a little while, as we drove along a beautiful winding avenue. We crossed a little bridge over an artificial lake. At the end of the avenue I saw a huge quadrangle of high buildings, clean-cut and dressed in stony dignity,’ Lemkin declared, The smell of fresh-cut grass on the lawns and the coolness of the shade from the old trees was soothing. Young men and women moved about the campus with a remarkable ease. The boys wore white shirts open at the collar; the girls wore no stockings – they had on light summer dresses and carried many books and even more smiles, which they distributed generously. There was nothing of the European university atmosphere of worry ... in these faces. One could read them like open books.5 Professor McDermott showed Lemkin to a room on the first floor of a dormitory, where a bed had already been made up. After a conversation about the War and Lemkin’s travels, the Professor declared that he would leave him until six o’clock, when there was a university alumni dinner, at which Lemkin was invited to speak about the situation in Europe.6 Lemkin showered and rested, merely jotting down a few opening remarks for his speech and for the rest relying on momentary inspiration or the ‘linguistic lend-lease that’ his ‘friend had offered ... But he listened attentively and every time I stopped,’ Lemkin recalled, ‘he gave me a word which he thought would fit in. Usually he guessed correctly’ To Lemkin’s surprise his remarks were received with thunderous applause.7 Since Lemkin had arrived at the university towards the end of term, no teaching schedule had been arranged for him. He was introduced to Dean Claude Horack and his colleagues in the law faculty and was ‘installed in a pleasant office overlooking the park’, where students called to have a chat. Lemkin found that the American students were refreshing and harder working than their European counterparts, as they were examined almost on a daily basis on the decisions in law cases. He ‘was accustomed to the type of student in Europe who was class conscious, highly nationalistic, and who basically considered physical work as a personal degradation. With few exceptions European students had somewhere in their minds a feeling that they were born to do something exceptionally important if not for the world at least for their own country. Every one of them was a human being plus something supra-natural, vague and, of course, vain. The American student is more natural. He has a little sense of mission, neither personal nor collective. He

42 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

would be ashamed to admit any class consciousness or excessive nationalism’. European students tended to be more passive and only started to become anxious before examinations which were oral.8 When Lemkin joined the law faculty of Duke University, he found that his colleagues were also ‘friendly and curious’. The university appointed him as lecturer in comparative law in the Law School, and Lemkin and his colleagues often discussed the differences between the Anglo-American Common Law tradition with an emphasis on case law and the Continental legal system based on abstract codification, as exemplified, for instance, in the Code Napoleon or the German Civil Code of 1900. Lemkin frequently had discussions about European problems with Dean Horack, who assisted him in the clarification of his ideas on occasions when he was called upon to address an audience.9 While at Duke University Lemkin began work on two articles, both continuing his pre-War criminological and family law studies. One on ‘The Treatment of Young Offenders in Continental Europe’ was published in 1942, the other on children from families disrupted by divorce appeared two years later. Surveying the measures adopted to combat juvenile delinquency on a comparative basis, Lemkin advocated the adoption of special juvenile courts which would sentence offenders after hearing reports on their personalities and social background, and there would be an emphasis on educational measures depending on the response of the delinquent.10 The second article dealing with children from divorced families emphasized that the increasing number of working mothers should contribute towards the maintenance of their children, the need for the enforcement of maintenance payments by negligent parents and the necessity for the setting up of an elaborate conciliation service which would operate in special family courts.11 The articles show that Lemkin was in the vanguard of progressive legal reformers as far as juveniles were concerned. From time to time, Lemkin would drop in ... at the office of Judge Thaddeus Bryson, who taught North Carolina statutes. He was an old man with a handsome, dreamer’s face, somewhat of a mystic. He had a Polish first name, which was given to him by his parents to honor the Polish hero Thaddeus Kosciuszko who came to ... fight for American independence. Once Judge Bryson looked at me significantly as we were talking together, Lemkin remembered, then lowered his voice as if to give his words more weight: ‘I have no doubt that you were saved from the European ... [conflagration] for a special purpose,’ he told me. ‘It is bigger than you are, or than any of us – wait

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and you will see.’ He repeated this several times but did not explain precisely what he meant, causing Lemkin some embarrassment, but later imbuing him with a sense of mission which helped carry him over difficulties which he later encountered.12 Lemkin, who was invited by Professor McDermott to join him in a trip to Washington, was struck by the simplicity in design of the White House. ‘There is’, he noted, ‘great power and spirit in this kind of architectural under-statement ... the Capitol and government buildings [in Washington] had an unpretentious working atmosphere that was also impressive’. Washington, he believed, had ‘little trace of the tortuous sumptuosity of the imperial’ capitals, such as London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Moscow. Lemkin visited the Polish Embassy and then Library of Congress, where he renewed his friendship with John Vance, the law librarian. Vance was described as being Slender, with a moustache and sideburns, he had vivacious brown eyes and a voice which conveyed a peculiarly deep concern for men and the world. He played the guitar and sang songs from his native Kentucky. There was a touch of the poet and artist in him, and he was a good lawyer and very competent librarian as well.13 Following the German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, Lemkin turned on his radio to hear in the news that the German army had invaded eastern Poland. This ‘meant smoking villages, columns of bluish-brown dust rising quickly after artillery shells had fallen on the ground.’ For the fourth time that century Lemkin’s hometown of Wolkowsyk was attacked by invading armies, as it had been previously been besieged by the German army in 1915 and again in 1920, when the Russian army moved through it. Lemkin was filled with a sense of foreboding.14 During the Russian occupation of eastern Poland from 17 September 1939 to 21 June 1941, the Jews of Wolkowysk had some respite. After the Polish army and police withdrew from Wolkowysk following the Russian invasion, local anti-Semites staged a minor pogrom, killing Alexander Makov, Joseph Galiatsky and Itcheh the dancer as well as a shoemaker and some other victims, while two Jewish soldiers stationed in the city were murdered. As a last detachment of Polish cavalry withdrew, they broke into Jewish homes with the help of local anti-Semites and robbed their occupants. When the Russian troops entered Wolkowysk shortly thereafter, they were welcomed by the Jewish inhabitants, order was quickly restored, and the leader of the anti-Semitic faction was detained by Russian troops and executed. For a period of 21 months, the Jews felt more tranquil.15

44 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

The Russian authorities drew a distinction between wealthy property owners, whose assets were seized, and small shopkeepers and artisans. At the lower levels of the Soviet administration and institutions in eastern Poland, large numbers of Jews for the first time entered government employment. BenCion Pinchuk pointed out that ‘The new supply networks of stores, warehouses and consumer cooperatives provided many jobs for Jews who had lost their stores or were formerly connected with commercial establishments. Many thousands of Jews were absorbed into the Soviet marketing and supply system which was ... inefficient and labour intensive’. Moreover, ‘New schools needed teachers, principals, inspectors. Public works required officials and personnel in offices, warehouses,[and] food facilities’. The Soviet regime in Poland eagerly recruited Jewish doctors, engineers, agronomists and pharmacists. On the debit side, there was a general reduction in the low existing standard of living in eastern Poland, but Jews quickly learned how to adapt to the new system and supplement their earnings.16 Once he was settled in the United States, Lemkin wrote to his parents and in the summer of 1941, a rather bedraggled envelope from his parents arrived for Lemkin at the Duke University office. Although they were dated 25 May 1941, he recalled that his parents’ letters had been en route to him for more than two months, and if this was the case, the letters would have arrived after the German invasion of eastern Poland. ‘We read your long awaited letter with great pleasure’, his father began, and ask you to continue to give us pleasure with your letters. I feel well, thank God. May it never be worse in future. I am at home now as the potato [season?] is finished. For the time being, we are lacking nothing. Eliyahu [Elias] and Lisa [your sister-in-law] and the dear children greet you lovingly. They are all well ... I send you a [number of] addresses [in America]. If you have time, it won’t do any harm to meet them. His mother’s letter was just as short, but contained more information. We are all perfectly well, and are lacking nothing that is required in order to live. Be calm about us. If possible, write more frequently. Eliyahu has work and earns enough to cover basic provisions. Father is at home today, as he has no work to do in the summer. Be healthy and happy. When his parents wrote their letters, they were still living under Russian occupation and they tried to reassure him that though conditions were harsh they were tolerable, and his mother’s letter seemed to contain a reprimand for not communicating with them frequently enough.17 According to Lemkin it was written on a scrap of paper, perhaps a quarter of the size of a normal piece of writing paper. The quality of the paper spoke eloquently of the

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extreme poverty in which they were living. Something within myself told me that in this letter they were saying goodbye. I chased the thought away, as I would a mosquito, but it came back to me in the evening, as I walked through the campus. The letter itself had a tone of subdued despair, in spite of my parents’ efforts not to alarm me. It was the last letter I ever received from them.18 These thoughts seem to be very much the product of hindsight and not how Lemkin was feeling at the time because news of what the German army was doing following their invasion of Russia and eastern Poland had not filtered through as yet to the United States, and his parents’ letters were written while eastern Poland was still under Russian occupation. In fact, Raphael Lemkin’s nephew Saul, who lived under the Russian occupation with his grandparents, has glowing memories of the period, and having examined the letters, I would dispute Lemkin’s contention that they were written on undersized notepaper. Apart from these considerations, a German intelligence officer reported on 12 July 1941 that ‘To an amazing extent, the Jews [in Belarus] are remarkably ill-informed about our attitude to them’.19 It is thus doubtful that at this juncture Raphael Lemkin was as alarmed about his parents well-being as he suggests in his memoirs. Meanwhile Lemkin was busy lecturing to local audiences on the situation in Europe. When a request for a speaker came to the university, Mr Dwyer, the Vice-President, highly recommended him. Lemkin visited many towns in the state and told the same story to Chamber of Commerce meetings, to women’s groups, to gatherings of young people. At the end of most of ... [his] speeches people would come and say to ... [him], ‘I am ashamed that we are standing idle and watching innocent people being slaughtered,’ or, ‘When Hitler finishes with Europe, he will turn against us anyway – so shouldn’t we intervene now?’ Many of these speeches were made after 22 June 1941, when following the German invasion of Russia the Einsatzgruppen killed 2,000 Jews in Bialystok on 27 June and another 7,000 in Lvov a few days later, while by the end of the year they and their Romanian allies had killed 600,000 Jews. 20 But it was not until October 1941 and May 1942 that accounts of these atrocities began to appear in the American press in such papers as the New York Times, and it is, therefore, unlikely that Lemkin was including items about the massacre of Jews in his talks before the autumn of 1941. A study by Adam Tooze has shown that this American speculation about Hitler’s intentions was accurate and that had he won the War millions of Slavs would have perished and that Hitler believed that conflict with the United States was inevitable. 21

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Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

One night as he was gradually becoming aware of what was happening in Poland Lemkin awoke covered in sweat. He had an anxiety dream in which his ‘mother’s face came close’ to him. He didn’t see her body, just her face, with her hair combed low on her forehead. Her eyes smiled through a thick mist of sorrow, as if she knew a secret ... [he] did not know ... [He] stretched ... [his] hand toward her face, to caress it, but she moved back from ... [his] touch, fading gradually and ... [he] awoke. Much later ... [he] learned that during the Nazi blitz ... the largest area of the city, including the place where ... [his] parents’ home ... stood, [had] burned down. The population, some 20,000 people, was crowded into a few small houses near the railroad station. When Lemkin spent an evening with Professor McDermott and told him how he was feeling, the Professor advised him to be strong and courageous and to show a smiling face, if he hoped to persuade others to share his views about Nazi Germany.22 Lemkin became depressed and found it difficult to contain his anxiety. A student recalling her time at Duke University, confessed that ‘I was very sorry for you because of the misfortunes to you during the war, especially regarding your parents’.23 Lemkin forced himself to be pleasant to colleagues and students, but for many months he struggled to regain his customary zest for living. Lemkin was no doubt helped to navigate this crisis by the support of Professor Malcolm McDermott and his family. A letter sent by McDermott to Lemkin on 25 February 1948 shows what a warm and caring individual he was and how sympathetic he was to Lemkin’s idealism. ‘My dear good friend’, he wrote, For weeks I have been meaning to write you to thank you for your card of remembrance at Christmas time ... Mrs McDermott and I drove to Houston, Texas, to spend the Holidays with Raymond and his little family ... You will be interested, I know, to learn that he graduated at the top of his class [in law school] ... Last fall Mrs McDermott and I decided to give up the big house on the East Campus which we occupied for sixteen years. The children are grown up and gone. Servants are practically unobtainable ... What a pitiable plight humanity is in! I hope and pray you men at work on the situation may find some sane solution ... With my warmest regards and best wishes, I am Sincerely your friend, Malcolm McDermott.24 Thus, encouraged Lemkin plunged back into work at Duke University. While he was living in Sweden, he had as early as 1940 started collecting documents smuggled out of Nazi occupied Europe, the majority of which were occupation decrees, and he had brought much of this material with

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him to the United States. He had continued collecting this material at Duke University in 1941 and 1942, persuading the librarian to open a special documentation centre on the laws of occupation. 25 He now set about translating these decrees into English and writing an analysis of them. He wrote to John Vance at the Library of Congress, urging him to obtain a regular flow of Nazi edicts, by contacting book dealers in neutral countries, such as Portugal, Switzerland and Sweden. At the instigation of Vance, Lemkin was invited to address the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association in Indianapolis in October 1941 on the subject of ‘Totalitarian Control Over Foreign Economies’. Although this paper has been lost, it is possible to reconstruct its argument; its principal point was that Germany used the bank clearing system with a trading partner to extort trading advantages, wringing increasing concessions until it was able to import goods without paying for them, and that in some instances the local currency was destroyed to compel a recaltricant population to trade with the Germans. Vance and Judge Keaton sponsored a resolution at the same meeting condemning the Germans for the introduction of lex talionis, the law of an eye for an eye, and for despoiling or undermining the legal profession in occupied Europe.26 Vance introduced him to Colonel Archibald King of the Military Government section of the War Department, who was experienced in drafting American legislation to regulate the behaviour of American Army personnel serving on foreign soil. King was trained in the Anglo-American Common Law tradition, believing that lawyers in other countries ‘were also basically decent and dedicated’. Lemkin tried to disabuse him of these notions as far as the Germans were concerned, warning him that Hitler had made German law into an instrument of oppression for the population in the countries which the German army had occupied. When Colonel King asked him whether or not he thought that the Germans were abiding by the Hague Convention, Lemkin answered that though they appeared to be heeding its regulations because of their own troops who had been taken prisoner, they were secretly breaking them. Colonel King expressed an interest in the subject; this led to Lemkin asking the Colonel if he would like to attend a course lectures he was giving on the topic, and a subsequent invitation to Lemkin by the War Department to deliver a series of lectures at the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia. The decrees which Lemkin translated were bound in a mimeographed volume running to 170 pages in 1942 for the use of the students at the school without any introductory analysis of their meaning, but Lemkin must have developed his ideas while giving this lecture course.27 Lemkin now had a growing reputation in the United States, and in June 1942, he received a telegram offering him the position as chief consultant to the Board of Economic Warfare in Washington which he was quick to accept. Six months earlier on 7 December 1941 Japan had attacked American warships at Pearl Harbour without warning, and four days later Hitler

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declared war on the United States, forcing the Americans to enter a global conflict. The Wall Street executives and lawyers who came to Washington to oversee the build-up of their nation’s military machine found themselves in a large city with poor transport facilities and a dearth of theatres and restaurants; in short, it had in many ways the atmosphere of a small town.28 Lemkin, however, was exhilarated finding a different city to the one visited by him a year earlier; it was teeming with people and pulsating with energy. People walked in the streets and crammed into the offices, talking a new language that ‘was born almost overnight’. Words such as ‘commission’, ‘report’, ‘production’, ‘appointment’, ‘boat’, ‘plane’, ‘Germany’, ‘Japan’ and ‘London’ were heard incessantly and were repeated ‘in all possible combinations’. Daily trains and aeroplanes from all parts of the country were pouring thousands of newcomers into Washington: ‘businessmen, professors, lawyers, men and women, old and young’, all anxious to offer their services to defeat the Germans and their allies. Lemkin discovered a radio storyteller for children working as a personnel officer, while his secretary was an atrocious typist. Nevertheless, he was the envy of his colleagues, who had to wait a long time for their memoranda to be typed. There was an apocryphal story that candidates for the typing pool were selected from the arrivals on early trains, so long as they knew the difference between a machine gun and a typewriter.29 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr stated in his memoirs that he ‘was much attracted by the activism of BEW [Board of Economic Warfare which he thought of joining]. People were rushing around doing things – imposing blockades, buying up scarce metals, blacklisting Axis-controlled firms, plotting to deny the enemy strategic materials’. He contrasted this with what he termed a return to academic life in the Research and Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA.30 Lemkin’s colleague Eleanor Lansing Dulles, the sister of Allen and John Foster Dulles, had a more sceptical opinion about the merits of the Board of Economic Warfare. Although some of the work there was effective, methodical, and concrete, particularly that on export and import controls, most was strange and unstructured, shot through with bureaucratic feuds and confused by comings and goings of experts and administrators. President Roosevelt and some of his associates were fighting his former close associate, Vice President Henry A. Wallace, who was head of BEW. Lemkin made an ally and friend of Eleanor Dulles and he appears to have socialized with Eleanor, who had been married to David Blondheim, a Professor at Johns Hopkins University, where he specialized in Jewish Romance languages.31 This was a useful contact, as it later gave Lemkin access to her brothers John Foster Dulles in the State Department and Allen Dulles at the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Lemkin agreed with Eleanor Dulles about the amount of infighting between the different departments with the heads of agencies trying to obtain assignments for their own personnel and bigger budgets to increase their activities. People took long lunch hours and there were several cocktail parties to attend every day, where politics were discussed incessantly and wives complained of boredom.32 Meanwhile reports about the massacre of Jews were reaching Allied capitals. From July 1941 onwards the Yiddish press of New York carried stories of the killing of hundreds of Jews in towns in eastern Poland and later in the autumn of 1941 the accounts of these murders grew more harrowing speaking of thousands of Jewish victims in both Poland and the Ukraine.33 Dr Gerhart Riegner, the representative of the World Jewish Congress in Switzerland, sent telegrams to Washington and London in July 1942, saying that he had learned from a reliable source that the Germans planned to deport and concentrate some four million European Jews in the East, where they were to be exterminated. Roosevelt received other reports, particularly from his ambassador to the exiled governments of Europe in London, confirming the news about the extermination of European Jewry, but as he was resolved to concentrate on the successful prosecution of the War he played down these reports at a meeting with American Jewish leaders on 8 December 1942 and considered a bold intervention on behalf of the Jews inopportune; it would be a certain vote loser.34 Rumours about the massacre of European Jewry abounded in Washington from late 1942 to December 1944, Lemkin remembered, but no one could see the actual reports as they were suppressed.35 The Central European section of the Research and Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was under the intellectual dominance of Franz Neumann. Its staff included scholars of the calibre of Felix Gilbert, Hojo Holborn, Herbert Marcuse, Carl Schorske and Stuart Hughes. Because of Neumann’s wrongheaded analysis of the Nazi regime as a product of monopoly capitalism, the section’s analysts failed to comprehend how the persecution of the Jews was mutating into genocide. In an appendix to an updated edition of his book dated December 1944, Neumann claimed that Not only Jews fall under the executioner’s ax but so do countless others of many races, nationalities, beliefs, and religions ... It follows that in this Anti-Semitic ideology and practice the extermination of the Jews is only the means to the attainment of the ultimate objective, namely the destruction of free institutions, beliefs, and groups. This may be called the spearhead theory of Anti-Semitism.36 Barry Katz suggested that although these analysts ‘had reported regularly on the incidence ... of official violence and terrorism, on mass deportation, and on the network of Nazi concentration camps, their papers prior to [1945] ... yield

50 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention

no unambiguous evidence that they had grasped these as elements of a systematic policy of genocide’.37 Despite Telford Taylor’s assertion, which has been repeated by many other authorities, Lemkin was never a member of the OSS, thereby escaping daily exposure to Neumann’s misleading and muddled concept of the spearhead theory of anti-Semitism; and he was free to develop his own ideas in 1942–1943 about the absence of the rule of law in German occupied territory, the economic exploitation of conquered territories and peoples, and his new concept of genocide to explain the structure of the Nazi regime.38 In his own agency Lemkin found that his colleagues were unaware that the Nazis ‘planned the destruction of peoples under their control’. His first attempts at trying to interest them in the problem during lunch were discouraging, as his colleagues ‘attention was rather absorbed by their own assignments on which they worked ... They were masters in switching the discussion in the ... direction concerning their own subject.’ Attempts to raise the issue were rebuffed with a rejoinder that the discussion seemed to be verging on the realm of fantasy. When they asked Lemkin whether or not the Nazis had begun to implement their plans, he replied they had been doing so for two years, but he was unable to specify what had happened recently. Some colleagues claimed that this was not credible, as people in Washington remembered the false atrocity stories spread about the Germans during the First World War. But there is an irony in this in that recent research reveals that brutal atrocities committed by the Germans in Belgium in 1914 were successfully covered up. Lemkin felt bitter about the attitude of his colleagues, thinking that certain ‘peoples would have to perish first, so as to prove that their destruction was deliberately prepared as part of Hitler’s plan’.39 Through his work, Lemkin met Henry Wallace (1888–1965), the VicePresident of the United States and Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare. He was an agrarian scientist and visionary, and editor of a respected farm journal, who sprang to fame by developing strains of high-yielding hybrid corn and had served as Secretary of Agriculture under Roosevelt. Lemkin described Wallace’s ‘movements as angular, as if he ... had not emerge[d] yet completely from the half-dreaming contemplation in which a real farmer is continually held by nature’. Lemkin’s friends suggested that he should broach his ideas to Wallace, but he decided to do so indirectly, by talking about the Tennessee Valley Authority which had built a huge dam to supply hydroelectric power to nearby farming communities. Lemkin noticed how Wallace warmed to him, when he interjected the word ‘agriculture’ and mankind’s debt to the farmer into their discussion. He also mentioned that he had himself been brought up on a farm in Poland and had witnessed the poverty of the Polish farmers.40 Lemkin dined later with Wallace in the house of a friend, but was ‘unable to penetrate through the friendly fog of his lonely dreams that evening’. On several other occasions, Lemkin spoke to Wallace. He explained his

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forebodings, and waited in vain for his reaction, but none was forthcoming. In the end, Lemkin realized just as others had done that trying to gain the interest and support of Wallace was futile.41 Wallace for as long as possible tried to distance himself from a politically contentious issue. He failed to react in a positive manner, when shown the Riegner telegram which first outlined the Nazi plans for the mass murder of Jews. When confronted by a march of 400 Orthodox rabbis on Washington on 6 October 1943, pleading with the government to establish a rescue agency and to admit Jewish refugees, Wallace, Time reported, ‘squirmed through a diplomatically minimum answer’.42 Rebuffed by the Vice-President, Lemkin through the good offices of a friend decided to approach President Roosevelt and according to his memoirs was asked to submit his plan in a one page memorandum. Lemkin felt that his first draft, though good, seemed to lack fire. What was needed was an international treaty ‘branding genocide a crime’.43 ‘In 1943 or 1944, when I served as Chief Consultant to the Board of Economic Warfare ... a colleague of mine, miss Betty Hight’, he wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt on 1 February 1950, took to you a memorandum on the concept of genocide and on the necessity to prepare a Genocide Treaty after the war. Miss Hight reported to me later that you had discussed this matter with the President who expressed his great interest and asked you to tell me that he believed in this cause; that such a treaty would not apply to past genocide cases but would be very beneficial for the future.44 Yet, in a letter written four years earlier he gave a somewhat different account which cannot altogether be reconciled with the extract which we have just quoted. ‘It was an honor and pleasure to have your recent note’, Lemkin declared, confirming receipt of my article on genocide, as well as your letter in 1945 expressing favorable remarks with regard to my book ‘Axis Rule in Occupied Europe’ which was conveyed to you by Mrs Betty Hight. At that time, as you may recall, I was interested in drawing your attention, as well as the attention of our great world leader, President Roosevelt, to the problem of punishing the German War Criminals for the crime of genocide, a term I coined for the concept of killing nations and obliterating their cultures. I am very grateful to you that you discussed this problem with the President at the time.45 Weighing up the evidence, it is more likely that Lemkin tried intervening with Roosevelt on one occasion rather than two and that the earlier 1946 letter contains the more accurate recollection of what transpired which was in any case unsatisfactory from Lemkin’s perspective; once again we have

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reason to note Lemkin’s antedating in his memoirs of his campaign to draw the attention of world leaders to the genocide perpetrated by the Germans against the Jews. Not until a visit of Jan Karski, a courier from Poland, on 28 July 1943, who impressed on the President that the Jews were being singled out for slaughter on an unprecedented scale, was Roosevelt stirred into taking action for Jewish refugees in France and Romania, and later under pressure from Peter Bergson, who founded the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, into setting up the War Refugee Board in January 1944. In contrast, Rabbi Stephen Wise, one of American Jewry’s foremost leaders and a friend of the President, counselled against forceful intervention with the government.46 But in the latter part of 1942 and the first half of 1943, the prospects for Jews in occupied Europe were gloomy. Lemkin was worried about his parents and the inactivity of Roosevelt on behalf of European Jewry, and as a result his sleep was frequently punctured by nightmares. Worst of all were the visions which came in a half-sleepy stage. During one of them ... [he] saw the interior of a train. A drab light was falling on people sitting on valises. Among them was ... [his] mother with a stony face. Next to her was a small boy. Who was he? ... [His mother’s] mouth was silent ... [frozen]. Where was she going? Was it her last journey? All this while Lemkin was working feverishly on a new project. Since his health was visibly deteriorating, his friends arranged an appointment for him to consult a doctor. ‘Nervous exhaustion, high blood pressure, slow down, rest, seek relaxation, don’t worry’, was the advice a somewhat jaded Lemkin received with indifference.47 While still an employee of the Board of Economic Warfare, Lemkin discussed with colleagues about bringing out a mimeographed edition of his private collection of Axis laws and decrees; the Board agreed that he could continue to use the same material ‘in research work and in lecturing, as well as for purposes of publication’.48 But well before the end of 1942 Lemkin had now come to realize that his whole approach was flawed. ‘Statesmen’ were ‘messing up the world’. In a democracy the people made the final decisions and it was necessary for him to help formulate public opinion and ‘appeal directly to the American people’. He felt confident that the Americans would understand what he had to say about the fate of the different populations in occupied Europe, particularly the Jews. Working rapidly, he prepared an outline of his proposed book which was an extended analysis of the German occupation decrees already translated by him. After that ... [Lemkin in the summer of 1942] had a conversation with George Finch, director of the International Law Division of the Carnegie Endowment Fund. As ... [Finch] was reading the material while lounging

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in a soft chair in the sleepy Cosmos Club ... [Lemkin] watched his face and read in it an approval of ... [his] book, even before he said yes. Finch was already familiar with Lemkin’s collection of occupation decrees, some of which Lemkin had utilized as reading material for the course he had given to the School of Military Government in Charlottesville, Virginia. Finch encouraged Lemkin to complete the manuscript, promising to print the sections which had already been completed.49 There was also talk in the summer of 1942 of the Carnegie Foundation publishing a translation of Lemkin’s French or Swedish books on foreign exchange restrictions and the international system of clearing. Lemkin sent George Finch a copy of the review of the Swedish volume which had appeared in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, where the reviewer had praised the author and suggested that it be translated into English.50 Lemkin at Finch’s suggestion tried approaching several expert translators, but did not succeed in finding one, who could meet the Foundation’s requirements. He claimed that the publication of such a volume was useful because ‘The liquidation of the actual clearing agreements in occupied Europe will be a problem not only for Peace Conferences but also for the occupying armies, which must undertake a freezing of the clearing assets’. Lemkin had favoured the translation of the Swedish volume as it included ‘the war experiences’, but failing in his initial approach he offered to update his French book. Here too he ran into difficulties.51 Meanwhile Lemkin pushed forward his new project. Originally he had proposed to George Finch in the middle of July 1942 the publication of a book not exceeding 200 pages based on the German occupation laws and decrees accompanied by an analytical study.52 From a talk given by Lemkin on 16 May 1942 to the North Carolina Bar Association, we can conjecture how he was developing his ideas for his seminal volume on genocide. He had already demonstrated that Germany was ignoring the rules and customs of international law, which had evolved since the second half of the eighteenth century, and constructed their legal principles on the basis that what was ‘useful and necessary for the German nation’ was the law. German law was used as an instrument of oppression to subjugate the population in occupied lands. Lemkin also addressed audiences on the economic plans of Germany, showing how Germany was filching vast territories in eastern Europe in order to restructure the population and shift parts of it elsewhere, and how it utilized the international credit exchange system to dominate the trade of the countries which it had occupied and to squeeze the population. ‘Life and property are not respected’, Lemkin asserted. ‘People disappear from their homes at night, and nobody knows where they have gone. The occupant has created many large trust corporations which take over properties from the population and vest the titles in themselves, in order to convey them to German settlers’. Thus, many of the essential

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themes in Axis Control in Occupied Europe had already been formulated by Lemkin by May 1942.53 Only the shock of the mass killing perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen in the Soviet Union stimulated Lemkin’s thinking still further, leading him to construct the concept of genocide. From time to time Lemkin had requested an extension of the delivery date for the manuscript which had at first been three months and each time there had been an extension of the delivery date the manuscript had continued to grow in size until it had become a bulky volume. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington had also provided Lemkin with office facilities for a year, the services of a shorthand typist and research and editorial assistance. They had reimbursed Lemkin $ 454 for expenses incurred by him in obtaining documents and translations and had paid him an honorarium of $ 500. This financial and secretarial and research assistance was necessary, as Lemkin was only being paid the sum of $ 25 a day for his work at the Board of Economic Warfare.54 Unfortunately Lemkin, who was a very able lawyer, was inclined to be querulous at times, had a litigious streak in his personality and was very concerned about protecting his rights to his forthcoming book, and there was a protracted dispute with George Finch and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace which delayed publication of the book from December 1943 to August 1944. The proofs of the book had been forwarded to Lemkin at the end of 1943 with the intention of publishing the book by 15 February 1944.55 The dispute centred on Lemkin reserving the magazine, radio and dramatic rights to his book and various other concerns. A Washington lawyer friend of Lemkin, Fulton Brylawski, sent a revised agreement to George Finch with suggestions which the latter tried to accept as far as he was able to do so.56 On 12 May 1944 Lemkin sent an irate letter to George Finch, stating you have submitted to me three drafts of contracts. It is difficult for me to get an orientation as to your position in this matter since you have withdrawn your own proposals and substituted for them proposals less advantageous for me than those you proposed previously. The negotiations you had with my lawyer, Mr Brylawski, which seemed at a certain moment to lead to an agreement between us were interrupted by you without any reason understandable to me.57 In the end the dispute was resolved through the mediation efforts of the Author’s Guild and Lemkin’s good sense, when he conceded that the book had to be copyrighted in the name of the Carnegie Endowment, and a contract was signed on 18 August 1944 and publication of the book was later scheduled for 15 November 1944.58 On arrival in the United States, Lemkin’s first impression was that the discrimination practised against the black population in the South bore certain resemblances to the unfair treatment meted out to Jews in pre-War

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Poland. Although he had surmounted the obstacles to an affluent lifestyle, Lemkin felt very keenly about pre-War Polish anti-Semitism, even if his criticism was expressed in a low key fashion in his memoirs. Lemkin quickly adapted himself to academic life in the United States, publishing papers on criminology and family law, but his principal preoccupation was on drawing conclusions regarding German policy in Continental Europe from the occupation decrees he was busily collecting. To popular audiences and through his Washington contacts to American military officers, Lemkin gave talks on German law which he perceived as breaking free from all civilized restraints in its arbitrariness. To other audiences and colleagues in the Board of Economic Warfare, he voiced his concerns about German economic planning, including the confiscation of vast territories in eastern Europe, the forced movement of large ethnic groups and the subordination of trade in satellite states to Germany’s needs. Under the impact of War as viewed through the American press and his own intimate knowledge of conditions in eastern Europe, Lemkin leapt to the conclusion that Nazi policy was grounded not only on the movement of peoples, but their starvation and destruction, particularly if they were Jews, summed up in the word genocide. By July 1942 Lemkin was ready to incorporate all these themes into a book, Axis Control in Occupied Europe, the publication of which was held up for six months or more because of his own intransigence.

4 The Publication of His Master Work and the Nuremberg Tribunal

Raphael Lemkin’s seminal work, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation. Analysis of Government. Proposals for Redress, was published in Washington towards the end of 1944, although his preface was dated a year earlier, 15 November 1943. It was a volume almost 700 pages in length, part of which analysed the occupation laws in terms of the techniques devised by the Germans for subjugating conquered peoples, part of which dealt with the impact of the occupation regulations on a country by country basis, while half the book contained an English translation of the German decrees. Lemkin’s main insight was to understand through studying these occupation regulations that the Germans intended to reorganize Europe on racial lines and that this would involve mass-murder and the suppression of other cultures. In violation of international law, Lemkin argued, large areas of occupied Europe were incorporated into the Reich, including western Poland, Luxembourg and certain Yugoslav provinces, and other enormous tracts of land in the East were earmarked for colonization and the Lebensraum (living space) theory was invoked by the Nazis in support of this. Himmler proclaimed that ‘Our task is to Germanize the East, not in the old sense of bringing the German language and laws to the people dwelling in that area, but to ensure that in the East only people of genuinely German, Teutonic blood shall live’. This policy was implemented ‘by mass deportations of native populations by the police (in such countries as Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, and Slovenia), by providing assistance in the settlement of German colonists coming into new areas in the occupied countries, and by liquidating owners of business enterprises and putting Germans in their place’. The Government General of Poland, the Ukraine and parts of Russia were to be utilized as a source for ‘raw materials, food, and labor’.1 The core of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe was a chapter dealing with genocide, a new concept invented by Lemkin to denote ‘the destruction of a nation or ... an ethnic group’. He derived the word from ‘the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing), thus corresponding in its 56

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formation to such words as tyrannicide, homocide (homicide), infanticide, etc’.2 Lemkin, a philologist by training, deliberately coined the short and chilling word of genocide to shock listeners as one which would have much greater impact than the earlier term ‘crimes of barbarity and vandalism’. It seems from the preface to the book that the word had been minted by Lemkin in 1943 and first occurred in print in Polish in the same year as ludobojstwo (loaded = people) and (zabojstwo = murder) in a bill of the Polish government-in-exile.3 In a civilized society, Lemkin argued, ‘war is conducted against states and armed forces and not against populations’. Further, he stated that ‘It required a long period of evolution in civilized society to mark the way from wars of extermination, which occurred in ancient times and in the Middle Ages, to the conception of wars as being essentially limited to activities against armies and states’. Although this historical sequence was to be revised later in his unpublished ‘History of Genocide’, the examples cited in a footnote to the previous statement included the siege of Magdeburg which occurred in the seventeenth century during the Thirty Years War.4 But Lemkin also traced the evolution of modern genocides in Europe to a time before the First World War, long before the advent of the Nazi regime. He declared that Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization of the area by the oppressor’s own nationals. Denationalization was the word used in the past to describe the destruction of a national pattern ... Thus, the terms ‘germanization’, ‘Magyarization’, ‘Italianization’, for example, are used to connote the imposition by one stronger nation (Germany, Hungary, Italy) of its national pattern upon a national group controlled by it.5 Under National Socialism, ‘the nation, not the state’ was the predominant factor. He pointed out that Alfred Rosenberg claimed that ‘History and the mission of the future no longer mean the struggle of class against class, the struggle of Church dogma against dogma, but the clash between blood and blood, race and race, people and people’. Hitler even before the Second World War, Lemkin contended, had prepared a plan to destroy nations which had to be adapted to political considerations in different countries. It could not be implemented in full force in all the conquered states, and hence the plan varied as to subject, modalities, and degree of intensity in each occupied country. Some groups – such as the Jews – are to be destroyed completely.

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The inhuman treatment of the Jews was a ‘device for promotion of the anti-Christian idea of the inequality of human beings and German racial superiority’. The Germans had devised a scheme for destroying the subjugated populations, so that if the Germans lost the War, they would still retain their ‘numerical, physical and economic superiority’. The physical debility and even the annihilation of the subject peoples was to be achieved by starving them. Whereas the Poles were given rations equivalent to 66 per cent of the food which they had received before the Second World War, the Jews were allotted 20 per cent of their pre-War rations. Lemkin devoted a short chapter to the legal status of the Jews immediately before his survey of genocide and according to his knowledge at the end of 1943, Jews were liquidated ‘within the ghettos, or in special trains in which they were deported to a so-called “unknown” destination’. At that point Lemkin quoted an estimate of 1,702,500 for the number of Jews who had been murdered in all the occupied countries.6 Michael Ignatieff has noted that Lemkin was just as concerned about the fate of the Polish people as he was about the fate of his fellow Jews. In the decrees penalizing the use of the Polish language and promoting the destruction of Polish cultural monuments and treasures, the use of Poles for slave labour, the merciless repression of all resistance, and the settlement of Germans on Polish land, Ignatieff suggested, ‘– in all those awful edicts Lemkin could make out a concerned desire to subjugate, and if necessary to exterminate, the Polish people’.7 While he was working as a civil servant in Washington, Lemkin was also a habitué of Polish émigré circles and Polish concerns weighed heavily upon him. As he later told Judge Harry Fisher on 19 April 1949, ‘There must be a hierarchy of values in human society and the preservation of life must be on the top of this hierarchy. The indescribable tragedy which resulted in the extermination of six million Jews, three million Poles must not be forgotten’.8 Lemkin used the term physical genocide too freely, referring to the ‘mass killings, mainly of Jews, Poles, Slovenes, and Russians’; equally his concept of the techniques of genocide – political, social, economic, biological, physical, moral and religious – was too diffuse to be useful and had to be defined more sharply later. Moreover, Lemkin exaggerated the physical dangers facing the Poles, by stating that ‘Hitler expressed the view that it is their [the Poles] soil alone which can and should be profitably Germanized’, because an experiment in the Zamosc region to achieve this end encountered too much resistance.9 Although he was right when he stated that the aim of the Nazis was the annihilation of the Jews, he did not appreciate the scale on which they had succeeded by the time his book was published at the end of 1944, and for this reason he tended to underplay the uniqueness of the Jewish situation. As far

Publication of His Master Work & Nuremberg Trial 59

as his other major thesis was concerned, he was wrong in claiming that the Nazis by colonizing the East would win the war, even if the German armies were defeated because the German occupation of these territories was too short for them to have a lasting impact. Nor was he to know that the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 would stipulate ‘that the German population or parts of it who have remained in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary must be transported to Germany’, thus reversing Hitler’s plans. By 1982 13.10 million Germans were expelled or fled from eastern Europe or came by agreement from the Soviet Union and were resettled in Germany.10 Even so, Lemkin’s account was the most intellectually coherent and compelling examination of the violent population restructuring in eastern Europe. He was also correct to stress the ambitious genocidal plans of the SS against the Russian population and the starvation scheme, both of which were never fully implemented.11 Lemkin asserted that the S.S. and the police [particularly the secret police or Gestapo] in the occupied countries are engaged in a program of subjugation, of exploitation, and of the destruction of other nations, in which they were trained long before the war, and in which they fanatically believe. The War crimes committed by them are not sporadic incidents of ill-will but are an instrumentality for the carrying out of the program. At the same time, the law in the occupied countries was ‘bereft of moral content and respect for human rights’. He further declared that an analysis of the specific functions of the Gestapo and S.S. and of their program and world outlook leads to the conclusion that in the light of their close connection and combined activities they constitute an association having as its purpose the commission of crimes in genere. Such crimes are directed not only against municipal law of the occupied countries, but also against international law and the laws of humanity. Such an association amounts to what is called in Anglo-Saxon law conspiracy, or in continental European law unlawful association. Therefore, mere membership in such groups should be treated as an offense, and all the members of the Gestapo and S.S. should be punished for the sole reason that they are carrying out such functions in the occupied countries. Moreover, if a member of the Gestapo or S.S. has also committed a concrete crime, he should of course be punished for the specific crime. The code followed by the police was based on the programme of the National Socialist party, the ideas expressed in Mein Kampf and Hitler’s speeches, ordinances of the government, and the decisions of the courts after Hitler’s assumption of power. Lemkin dismissed the defence plea that members of such police units were only obeying superior orders, when the

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police were ‘habitually involved in committing similar crimes, and had voluntarily joined these units’.12 As the publication date of 15 November 1944 approached, Lemkin busied himself with making the necessary contacts in the media to ensure that Axis Rule in Occupied Europe was reviewed and that his ideas reached the wider public. Only if he achieved this preliminary goal would Lemkin be able to influence governments. While living in Washington at the end of 1944, Lemkin approached Eugene Meyer, the proprietor of the Washington Post, and had a fruitful encounter with him which ‘struck sparks’ and this was followed by an important editorial in the paper on the subject on 3 December 1944, echoing his concerns and linking his ideas about genocide with the systematic destruction of European Jewry.13 It opened with a report of the War Refugee Board which remarked that in Birkenau between April, 1942, and April, 1944, approximately 1,765,000 Jews were put to death by poison gas in ingeniously constructed chambers; their bodies were then burned in specially designed furnaces; their ashes were distributed as fertilizer. This process of extermination by gassing was carried on in other camps besides Birkenau; in the main it was applied only to Jews ... There were unspeakable atrocities at Auschwitz and Birkenau. But the point about these killings is that they were systematic and purposeful. The gas chambers and furnaces were not improvisations, they were scientifically designed instruments for the extermination of an entire ethnic group.14 It then referred to the fact that ‘a noted Polish scholar and attorney, Prof. Raphael Lemkin, now on the faculty of Duke University’ had coined the word genocide to describe wanton ethnic killing. ‘Thus Jews were gassed at Birkenau and Aryan Poles and Russians and Slovenes were otherwise butchered, not for any crime or any resistance to Axis authority but because the Nazis wished to exterminate the ethnic groups to which they belonged’. By defining genocide in such a broad way, despite the revelations about the concentration camps, Lemkin continued to blur the sharpness of his analytical insight and to discount the uniqueness of the destruction of the Jews.15 The editorial ended by stating that Lemkin believed that genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. If genocide was regarded in the sense of undermining the foundations of national life, then the Nazis had committed genocide in all the occupied

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countries of Europe so as to make them subservient to German rule. It was necessary to secure an international agreement to outlaw genocide: ‘If such an agreement is reached, neutrals will feel no violation of their sovereignty in the demand that perpetrators of this crime be handed over to justice’.16 Not to be outdone the New York Times on 21st January 1945 devoted a front page review of Lemkin’s volume in their book section by Otto D. Tolischus which as William Korey pointed out was somewhat unusual for so scholarly a treatise.17 Again, Raphael Lemkin took the initiative for securing such a favourable treatment of his book through his contacts in the Authors’ Guild and he also provided the illustration to accompany the review.18 ‘A monster more terrifying than the Great Beast of the Apocalypse’, Tolischus noted, more destructive than anything spawned by nature, has been let loose upon the earth. Conceived in the ecstasy of man’s soaring ambition, but born in the hell of war and revolution, it has turned upon its creator and is now devouring him by the million, growing more monstrous, more cruel and more voracious upon what it feeds. The reviewer praised Lemkin for depicting ‘what Axis rule in occupied Europe means and what it would have meant to us had it ever spread to our shores’ and the volume as ‘an indispensable handbook for scholars and historians and for those authorities of the United Nations charged with undoing, as far as possible, the effects of Axis Domination’. However, he found fault with Lemkin for dwelling on ‘German militarism born of the innate viciousness of the German racial character ... Surely just because he is a Pole Dr Lemkin would not want to be held personally responsible for all the acts of the Pilsudski regime’.19 A friend of Raphael Lemkin’s Leopold Kohr likewise castigated him for making ‘populaces responsible’ and for singling ‘out one people against the others, as the Nazis of all countries do with the Jews, or you do with the Germans’. In a draft review of the volume which out of friendship, he told Lemkin, he had decided not to publish, Kohr spelled out what he meant. ‘Once moving towards biological nationalism – which Dr Lemkin does in indicting the Germans instead of the Nazis and complimenting otherwise the greatness of biological entities ... – the road is taken which, even if it does not always end in Hitler, leads to him’.20 As Samantha Power has observed, Lemkin followed a similar line of argument to that of Daniel Goldhagen, who ‘ascribed guilt not only to the perpetrators of the crimes but to their fellow citizens who failed to stop them and often appeared actively supportive’. Yisrael Gutman pointed out in a favourable discussion of Goldhagen’s book that he had reopened the whole debate about the dimensions of German anti-Semitism since 1918, something that was necessary.21

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So too, Lemkin continued to receive excellent reviews in the academic journals for Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. In the American Journal of International Law Arthur Kuhn asserted that The collection and presentation of the most important laws, decrees, and proclamations of the occupying forces, country by country, in excellent English translation, constitute a veritable tour de force ... His unique contribution consists, firstly, in his presentation of the basic facts by marshalling the actual laws and decrees themselves, country by country, and labelling them for what they are, legislation for genocide; and secondly, in his analysis of the various attacks upon all the elements of nationhood in the respective fields, political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical and religious.22 Merle Fainsod in the Harvard Law Review was equally ecstatic in his praise, calling the book ‘a monumental task in gathering together and distilling the essence of this witches’ brew’.23 Although Lemkin never claimed to have influenced the form of the indictment prepared by the prosecutors at Nuremberg, apart from the insertion of the charge of genocide, there are interesting parallels between the ideas expressed in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe and the proposals of Colonel Murray C. Bernays. So much so that Robert Conot argued that there was a direct connection. According to him Colonel Mickey Marcus of the Army Civil Affairs Division handed Bernays an advance copy of Lemkin’s book, but from the records of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace we now know that the book was not despatched to Major General John Hilldring, the Director of the Army Civil Affairs Division, until 28 October 1944 and would have trickled down to Bernays a little later.24 Nevertheless, gossip about the contents of the book could have reached Bernays earlier at one of the endless Washington cocktail parties or the proofs of the book could have been shown to him. Bernays, who was then working in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Personnel Division, was responsible for collecting evidence on crimes committed against American servicemen by the Germans, particularly by the Waffen SS Bernays was persuaded by Lemkin’s formulation that members of the SS and the Gestapo had participated in a criminal conspiracy and wrote a memorandum on 15 September 1944 entitled the ‘Trial of European War Criminals’ incorporating these ideas.25 This memorandum according to Bradley F. Smith ‘shaped the subsequent prosecutions at Nuremberg’ and ‘may, indeed, be one of the most significant documents in international law’. Bernays reiterated Lemkin’s argument that the Nazi party and the SS and the Gestapo were criminal organizations, whose members should be tried before an international court with having conspired to commit murder. If a representative defendant from one such criminal organization was convicted, then all the other members would be

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guilty once their own membership had been proved, and since the criminal conspiracy existed from the earliest days of the Nazi regime, pre-War crimes committed by members of these organizations would also be punished, as the American Jewish Conference and the Refugee Board had been urging. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau’s plan to demilitarize Germany and to strip it of its industrial potential, by turning it into an agrarian state and for the summary execution of the German leadership, was opposed by the War Department in favour of a trial. At a meeting Bernays’ contentions won over his departmental chief and later on 27 November 1944 Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, and Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, submitted a joint memorandum entitled ‘The Trial and Punishment of European War Criminals’ to President Roosevelt which seems to have convinced him as well.26 Meanwhile as a result of his growing reputation Lemkin in May 1945 secured a temporary appointment in the War Crimes Office of the Judge Advocate General’s Office. Here on the ground floor of the Pentagon building in Washington he worked with other research analysts, such as Mosenthal, Lychenheim, Israelite and Reich gathering evidence against Nazi war criminals, but from time to time he was sent on assignments overseas. Walter Gerson, a former colleague in the office, remarked that Anyone who worked with you at the time could never forget with what zeal and interest you observed each bit of evidence that was found against some of the Nazi war lords et al. Many, many times we have spoken of our stirring conversations with you and your tireless zeal in your work. I cannot remember ever having taken part in such a conversation that your characteristic modesty was not always apparent.27 Lemkin’s first assignment was on familiar territory, that is, ‘reviewing all the gazettes, proclamations, edicts, etc. issued by the Germans in occupied countries in Europe, selecting those considered to be violations of the laws of war, and classifying and translating these documents’ with the help of some assistants, but he was also influencing policy.28 Reporting to General John Weir in June 1945, Lemkin privately took credit for the new formulation of the law contained in the landmark Bernays memorandum. ‘I was very glad to hear when Colonel Bernays told me in your office on Friday, 15 June 1945’, he declared, ‘that Justice Jackson has accepted the recommendations of my book (pages 23, 24) to the effect that the Gestapo and SS should be tried and made responsible collectively as a group and that mere participation in the Gestapo and SS should be treated as a crime’.29 At a meeting of the Allied powers in London on 2nd August 1945, an agreement was signed by all the parties to set up an International Military Tribunal. Lemkin’s temporary appointment was extended and in the summer and autumn of 1945 he was sent to London, where he assisted Robert Jackson in

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drafting the indictment of the major war criminals. Although there was a desk at the Office of Strategic Services manned by Dr Charles Dwork which collected valuable documentation on the Nazi persecution of the Jews, Justice Jackson ‘preferred legal experts who could work with historical documents and testimonies’ bypassing the intelligence experts from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and not utilizing the material which they had collected. Lemkin was one of these legal experts, whose services were called upon by Jackson.30 A document known as ‘the Charter’ defined the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal and under Article VI listed the crimes with which the leading war criminals would be charged. The Lemkin–Bernays conspiracy thesis appeared under Count One which stated that the Tribunal could try defendants as individuals and for their membership of certain organizations which were classified as criminal for the formulation of ‘a common plan or conspiracy to commit ... Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity’. Count one delineated ‘The Common Plan or Conspiracy’ and included the defendants’ plan to commit Crimes against Humanity, both within Germany and within the occupied territories, including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against civilian populations before and during the war, and persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, in execution of the plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal wars, many of such acts ... being violations of the domestic laws of the countries where perpetrated. Further, The programme of action against the Jews included disenfranchisement, stigmatisation, denial of civil rights, subjecting their persons and property to violence, deportation, enslavement, enforced labour, starvation, murder and mass extermination ... Of the 9,600,000 Jews who lived in the parts of Europe under Nazi domination, it is conservatively estimated that 5,700,000 have disappeared, most of them deliberately put to death by the Nazi conspirators.31 Count Three, War Crimes, charged the defendants with formulating a ‘Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit War Crimes’. This part of the indictment concerned Lemkin deeply and he had, in fact, assisted in its drafting. On 28 September 1945, Lemkin in his capacity as adviser to Jackson sent Colonel Telford Taylor a memorandum, stating that The defendants have entered a conspiracy for the destruction or crippling the development of entire nations and religious groups by undermining the foundations of their economic existence ... and by exterminating millions of

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them in specially created institutions and camps or exposing millions of them to death by under-feeding, forced labor and compulsion to live in specially created unhealthy conditions.32 Lemkin was also in touch with the legal expert of the World Jewish Congress, Dr Jacob Robinson, and its President, Rabbi Stephen Wise. Both Robinson and Wise were helpful in obtaining some softening in the British opposition to the inclusion of the new concept of genocide in the indictment. He also met Chaim Weizmann and Moshe Shertok (Sharrett) to discuss the possibility of Weizmann giving evidence on behalf of the Jewish people at the Nuremberg Trial. Weizmann advised Justice Jackson on 18 October 1945 that although ‘considerable progress’ had been made in the preparation of the Jewish case, he would not testify unless this was with the support of the British and American prosecution teams. Jackson refused his offer to testify, remarking that We were eventually able to get such complete and damning documentation on the persecution of the Jews that it would have been an anti-climax to have had any Jew to testify to it. The Nazi documents are so coldly cruel and so complete as to the purpose to exterminate the Jews and so detailed as to their accomplishment of this object that nothing could be added.33 Against the objections of G.D. Roberts, one of the British representatives concerned with the preparations for the trial, the United States forced through the inclusion of the concept of genocide into the indictment. The defendants were charged under Count Three with conducting ‘deliberate and systematic genocide, viz. the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian population of certain occupied territories to destroy particular races and classes of people, and national, racial or religious groups, particularly, Jews, Poles and Gypsies, and others’, and with deportation for slave labour, the murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and the plunder of private and public property.34 Count Four specifically defined Crimes against Humanity, though it also relied on the facts pleaded in the previous charge and among other matters added the following: These persecutions were directed against Jews. They were also directed against persons whose political belief or spiritual aspirations were deemed to be in conflict with the aims of the Nazis. Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933; they were deprived of liberty, thrown into concentration camps where they were murdered and ill-treated. Their property was confiscated. Hundreds of thousands of Jews were so treated before 1st September, 1939. Since the 1st September, 1939, the persecution of the Jews was redoubled; millions of Jews from Germany and from

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the occupied Western countries were sent to the Eastern Countries for extermination. Counts Three and Four embodied the two different concepts for the protection of national minorities, the group approach favoured by Lemkin, under which genocide would become a crime, and the protection of the human rights of individuals, under which any violation would become a crime, an approach espoused by Lauterpacht. In fact, when John Humphrey drafted Article 46 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he took his draft dealing with the protection of ‘ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities’ entirely from a text Lauterpacht published in 1945.35 The phrase, Crimes against Humanity, had been suggested by Professor Hersch (later Sir Hersch Lauterpacht 1897–1960), a Polish-Jewish international lawyer of distinction and a member of the British War Crimes Executive, to Robert Jackson, the head of the American prosecution team; it had been something that Jewish groups had been campaigning for since 1942, and achieved their first success when on 17 December 1942 Anthony Eden read a statement to the Commons declaring that the Allied governments condemned the Nazi policy of exterminating European Jewry and reaffirming that those responsible for these crimes would ‘not escape retribution’.36 Besides assisting in the drafting of the indictment, Lemkin busied himself investigating war criminals and sent a 200-page memorandum he had prepared on General Weir’s instructions on Professor Karl Haushofer, a leading expert on geopolitics, to Sidney Alderman in September 1945. The latter was so impressed with the report that he recommended the prosecution of Haushofer and his inclusion in the list of major war criminals, though this was not possible at this late stage. ‘In many ways it seems to me’, Alderman summarizing the report asserted, that Haushofer, who is now in our custody, fills in the void created by the death or absence of Hitler as the main moving spirit in the common plan. Haushofer was Hitler’s intellectual godfather. It was Haushofer, rather than Hess, who wrote Mein Kampf and who furnished the backbone of the Nazi bible and for what we call the common criminal plan. Geo-politics was not merely academic theory. It was a driving dynamic plan for the conquest of the heartland of Eurasia and for domination of the world by the conquest of that heartland. The whole scheme for domination of Europe and of Eurasia and, hence, of the world, and for the linking up of the power of the expanded Pan-Germans with the power of the expanded Japanese Empire was contained in Haushofer’s teachings. 37 On 12 September 1945 Lemkin wrote to General John Weir, the Director of the War Crimes Office in Washington, that ‘our first report on charges

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and legal evidence against leading war criminals (the 400-page report) is being extensively used in the preparation of the Indictment’, and in a nostalgic mood he added that he missed ‘very much the wonderful atmosphere of your office and the stimulating conversations with you’.38 Meanwhile Lemkin had been promoted to become adviser on foreign affairs to the War Department at a salary of $ 7,500 per annum, a position that he retained until 1947.39 During his stay in England, Lemkin took it upon himself to make contact with the British press; as a result the Sunday Times and the Tribune, a leftwing socialist magazine, explained the meaning of the new concept of genocide.40 A good review of his book also appeared in the Times Literary Supplement which suggested that If only she [Germany] had been able to defeat England in that year [1940], and to refrain from the immediate exploitation of conquered peoples, she might have brought a united Europe into existence. But in the intoxication of her triumph she proved to be so tyrannical and clumsy in her treatment of the occupied countries that her historic opportunity was thrown away. Mr Lemkin has produced a comprehensive and scholarly documentation of that failure, and of Axis misrule in general. As a Pole, he writes with the deep feeling and understanding which arise out of the sufferings of his own country; and as an experienced lawyer, he is obviously master of the legal issues involved ... His book should be in all reference libraries; for decades to come it will be of special use to lawyers, both national and international. It will also provide historians and others with easily accessible ... material.41 In London Lemkin met former friends from Poland and was shocked by their stories of Nazi atrocities. He was slowly beginning to comprehend the dimensions of the Nazi onslaught against the Jews. Towards the end of 1945, he returned to Washington to assist in the preparation of the war crimes trials in Tokyo.42 On his return to Washington, Lemkin planned at first to write a two volume treatise on Japanese war crimes very much on the lines of his book on the Nazi regime in occupied Europe. He would cover such topics as the legal definition of aggressive war, the defence of obedience to superior orders and crimes against humanity; the second volume would discuss Japanese techniques of occupation, economic crimes, the spiritual mobilization for aggressive war, and analyse Japanese rule in South-East Asia country by country. He also handed his superiors in the War Crimes Office a copy of his report on Karl Haushofer, pointing out the relevance of his links with Japanese militarists. He intimated that Haushofer, who was held under mild supervision by the Americans, should be prosecuted in the next batch of war crime trials.43

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A few days later, Lemkin in his new role as adviser on foreign affairs followed this up with a memorandum on the importance of the Haushofer case for the Tokyo trials. ‘Haushofer’s activities cannot be limited to one country or continent’, Lemkin began, since he was the only German who saw for a long time, even before Hitler, the full implications of global war and felt that Germany deprived of an adequate Navy and of access to the ocean, could achieve world domination only through global war in which Japan’s Army and especially Navy, would play its role in fighting the United States and Great Britain ... Haushofer has been pressing the point that the combined forces of Germany, Japan, and Italy, including a highly organized manpower of about 200,000,000 persons placed on a block of space consisting of more than 3,000,000 square kilometers and controlling the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Pacific can permanently control the world ... Haushofer was the main authority and promoter of the strategic plan that the Japanese armed forces and the German armed forces should meet somewhere in India and thus cut the British Empire in two parts ... Haushofer and his disciples saw long before the war the battles at Pearl Harbor and at Hong Kong. As a former member of the German general staff, for whom he acted as an emissary in Japan from 1908 to 1910 and as a former instructor of the Japanese army, he knew the country better than any other German. Haushofer’s writings which were translated into Japanese and his advice to Japanese leaders, helped the Japanese government to shape its policies and propaganda for the creation of the Asiatic co-prosperity sphere. Haushofer’s idea was that Japan should encourage local nationalistic movements in Asia by proclaiming the principle of self-determination of the peoples of Asia. By leading these nationalistic movements against the western powers, Japan would be able to enlist the services of all these peoples for war against Britain and the U.S.A.44 Lemkin ended his memorandum by suggesting an ingenious legal ruse for trying Haushofer in Japan: ‘If Haushofer should be tried for participation in a conspiracy to wage war against U.S.A., Britain, China, and other powers, the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal would be justified by the fact that the overt act of this conspiracy was committed in the Far East’. Arrangements were put in place for the interrogation of Nobuyuki Iimoto, the driving force behind the Japanese Geopolitical Institute which had disseminated Haushofer’s ideas.45 Colonel Damon Gunn, the acting Director of the War Crimes Office, enthusiastically endorsed Lemkin’s plan for the prosecution of Haushofer in

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Tokyo. He was especially struck by the incisiveness of Lemkin’s analysis which teased out the details of a global conspiracy, linking the ambitions of Germany and Japan.46 However, Haushofer had always advocated a German– Russian alliance and fell out of favour with Hitler. When the intended prosecution of Haushofer was referred to Justice Jackson for his approval, he opposed putting him on trial, saying that We rejected him as a defendant in this case because of his very advanced years and because his only activity was teaching and writing and we felt prosecution would encounter questions about academic freedom, freedom of speech, etc, which made it inadvisable to complicate our case by including him. Haushofer recently had [a] paralytic stroke and probably could not be moved to Japan. I have given his case personal consideration and would not recommend him as a defendant and think him useless as a witness. Ill, and perhaps feeling harassed by the campaign for his prosecution unleashed by Lemkin, Karl Haushofer and his wife committed suicide a week later.47 After an interval in Washington, Lemkin in May 1946 set out on an inspection tour of the military tribunals in Germany, staying in Europe through the summer months until a verdict was reached at the Nuremberg Trial. He took the opportunity of visiting displaced persons camps, searching in vain for remnants of his family, and realizing more and more the scale of the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jews. He was also deeply offended by the discovery that some of the personnel of the Nuremberg Tribunal had been engaging in illegal trading practices.48 While serving on temporary duty in the American zone of Germany, he was handed a memorandum compiled by United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) officials on the crime of stealing children from occupied countries. He passed on the report to Walter Rapp, the Chief of the Interrogation Section, and understood from him that this report was to be acted on in the office of Subsequent Proceedings. As Lemkin saw it, this crime was part of the more complex crime of genocide, consisting not only of annihilation of members of racial and national groups but also of weakening them through demographic devices such as obstructing procreation through abortions and imposing contraceptive measures, sterilizations, castration, and even stealing children of tiny age, as well as compelling women of related blood (in Norway and Holland) to bear children with members of the German armed forces ... The experimentation on human beings can be fully understood and qualified as criminal from the point of view of international law in connection with the crime of genocide since the German medical profession and German scientists in general

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have been mobilized for the commission of the crime of genocide, in the same way as the criminal organizations, SS and Gestapo, have been mobilized for this particular purpose.49 According to Paul Rassinier, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, ‘was the mosttalked-about work in the corridors of the Nuremberg Court in late 1945 – early 1946 time’.50 Moreover, the concept of ‘genocide’ gained a new prominence, when Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, the British deputy prosecutor, cross-examined Constantin Von Neurath, who had served as Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, on 25 June 1946. It is probable that Lemkin, who was visiting Nuremberg, encountered Maxwell-Fyfe in the vicinity of the court, and lobbied him to include the concept of genocide in his questioning. Lemkin mentioned that at this time he was in contact with the judges and prosecutors of the Tribunal.51 As far back as August 1945, Lemkin had sent Donnedieu de Vabres, an old friend, who was to become the French representative on the judicial panel, a copy of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, eliciting compliments from him about the cogency of his newly coined word, genocide; it is likely that Lemkin approached him.52 Fyfe pointed out Now, defendant, you know in this indictment in this trial we are charging you and your fellow-defendants with, among other things, genocide which we say is the extermination of racial and national groups ... as has been ... [stated] in the well-known book of Professor Lemkin ... What you wanted to do was to get rid of the teachers and writers and singers of Czechoslovakia, whom you call the intelligentsia, the people who would hand down the history and tradition of the Czech people to other generations. When Lemkin wrote to Fyfe a couple of months later, he remarked, ‘I would like to reiterate my very warm appreciation of your great and so effective support which you lent to the concept of Genocide. I think that the inclusion of Genocide in the judgment would contribute to the creation of a preventive atmosphere against repetition of similar sorts of barbarity’.53 ‘Perhaps nothing has left a deeper impression upon the trial’, The Times correspondent noted on 29 July 1946 – certainly upon the accused – than the merciless logic with which Sir Hartley Shawcross completed his closing speech in a tense, crowded courtroom [at the Nuremberg Tribunal] on Saturday. He had not the rhetoric, the eye for the vivid phrase of Mr Justice Jackson, but he had a sure grasp of this black record that was hailed on all side as, even, it is said in the dock, as a tour de force ... The Attorney-General also devoted much of his speech to ‘genocide’, the new crime of the Nuremberg indictment, which in the conception of Professor Raphael Lemkin, an eminent lawyer

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of the War Department in Washington, contains all the means, including aggressive war, aimed at the extermination of nations and racial groups.54 Nevertheless, though Shawcross paid lip service to Lemkin’s concept of genocide in his address as an analytical tool to describe these horrendous crimes, he had a different approach to international law and found no role for the concept in the ongoing proceedings. Instead he placed great emphasis on crimes against humanity in Count four of the indictment, asserting that war crimes were in their very enormity crimes against humanity. The crimes against humanity were war crimes, writ larger still. Moreover, the crimes against humanity which this Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal are limited to this extent – they must be crimes the commission of which was in some way connected with, in anticipation of or in furtherance of, the CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE or the WAR CRIMES stricto sensu with which the defendants are indicted ... we have thought it right to deal with matters which the criminal law of all countries would normally stigmatize as crimes. Murder, extermination, enslavement, persecution on political, racial or economic grounds. These things done against belligerent nationals or, for that matter, done against German nationals in belligerent occupied territory would be ordinary war crimes the prosecution of which would form no novelty. Done against others they would be crimes against national law except in so far as German law, departing from all canons of civilized procedure, may have authorized them to be done by the State or by persons acting on behalf of the State ... the nations adhering to the Charter of this Tribunal have felt it proper and necessary in the interest of civilization to say that these things even if done in accordance with the laws of the German State, as created and ruled by these men and their ringleader, were ... against the Law of Nations. I do not minimize the significance for the future of the political and jurisprudential doctrine which is here implied.55 True Shawcross highlighted the destruction of European Jewry in his closing speech. ‘Two-thirds of the Jews in Europe exterminated, more than six million of them on the killers’ own figures. Murder conducted like some mass-production industry in the gas chambers and the ovens of Auschwitz, Dachau, Treblinka, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Maidanek and Oranienburg’. He also described the operations of the Einsatzgruppen after the invasion of Russia. But like Lemkin he saw the assault on Jewry in the context of a total of twelve million murders and of another seven million persons uprooted from their homes and enslaved. Shawcross also gave the same confusing analysis of genocide as Lemkin, by referring to the fact that ‘Genocide was not restricted to the extermination of the Jewish people or of the gypsies. It

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was applied in different forms to Yugoslavia, to the non-German inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, to the people of the Low Countries and of Norway’, but unlike Lemkin he failed to invoke the concept of genocide as a new form of crime which could be used to secure convictions in legal proceedings.56 Lemkin had written to Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the United Nations on 20 May 1946 and in similar terms to Eleanor Roosevelt that Justice Jackson accepted my idea of formulating genocide as a crime and has included the charge of genocide in Count 3 of the Nuremberg indictment. Thus a solid foundation in recognizing genocide as an international evil has been laid in Nuremberg. By formulating genocide as a crime, the principle has been proclaimed that a national, racial or religious group as an entity has the right to exist, analogously as the recognition of homicide as a crime proclaims the principles that an individual has a right to live. A precedent will be set for the intervention in internal affairs of other countries on behalf of persecuted minorities.57 Distraught at being unable to trace any members of his family from Poland and suffering from high blood pressure, Lemkin was confined to a military hospital between 20 and 26 July 1946.58 After his release, he discovered that his brother Elias and his sister-in-law Lisa together with their two sons were alive and living in Berlin; they were almost the only survivors of his 49 member family. His uncles, aunts, and cousins, all had perished, apart from Daniel Lemkin and David Lemkin. As he explained to Herbert Yahraes, ‘If you mean do I know which went into the gas chambers, and which the Germans starved in the ghettos, and which the Germans shot or beat or worked to death someplace else, no, I don’t know that’. Overjoyed to find Elias but numbed by the death of his parents, particularly his mother, Raphael advised his brother to leave Berlin, as it was an isolated and dangerous place, and Elias travelled with his family to Frankfurt before settling in a refugee camp in Munich.59 He learned from Elias that in June 1941, he had gone with his wife and sons on what was expected to be a short visit to Moscow to see Lisa’s mother and the rest of her family, leaving Joseph and Bella Lemkin behind in Wolkowysk. On 22 June 1941, the Germans invaded Russia and Elias and his family were trapped in the Soviet Union. Through Lisa’s brother Elias obtained work on a construction site and then an easier job in a stockroom in the Urals; at first the family were so short of money that Elias had to sell the summer suits he had brought with him for food. In 1944, Elias and Lisa by using influential connections in her family obtained permission to live in Moscow. According to The Volkovsyk Memorial Book both his parents, Joseph and Bella, perished in the Treblinka concentration camp. Raphael remained upset with his brother for not ensuring the safety of their parents.

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After the War, Elias had returned to Poland with his wife and children, but following a pogrom in the town of Kielce in July 1946, when 42 Jewish survivors were murdered, the family fled to Germany.60 As William Korey has suggested the death of his parents, particularly his mother, who was his emotional anchor, was a shattering experience which transformed Lemkin from ‘a crusader’ into ‘a zealot’ for inscribing the crime of genocide into the international law code.61 From Nuremberg Lemkin flew to England, where in Cambridge he attended a conference of the International Law Association which met from 19 to 24 August 1946. Later he claimed to have received a cool reception for his ideas, when he delivered a paper on the prevention of genocide, but this was not his impression at the time.62 Thus, he wrote to the Honourable John J. Parker, a Judge at the Nuremberg Tribunal, on 27 August 1946 that ‘In the course of the discussions I have been asked many questions about the crime of Genocide. I think I succeeded in convincing the audience as to the usefulness of such a concept of law which would follow the path of organized criminality’. At the same time Lord Porter, who presided over the conference, advised Lemkin that it ‘has shown a keen and active interest in the problem of Genocode [sic]’. A committee has been appointed ‘to consider the best method of setting up an International Criminal Court to deal with international crimes, which ... naturally would include the crime of Genocide’.63 This indicated that Lemkin’s ideas had reached the realm of practical politics, emboldening him to take further action. In September 1946, Lemkin flew to Paris to introduce the concept of genocide into the peace treaties between the Allies and the Axis satellites. He submitted carefully formulated proposals that anyone who participated in a conspiracy to destroy a national or religious group in these countries should be liable under their criminal codes for the crime of genocide with a penalty of imprisonment or death. There was also an additional safeguard for members of aggrieved groups to petition the United Nations which would be able to invoke sanctions against the offending state.64 His efforts were rebuffed. ‘Good heavens, man’, an American representative remarked, ‘don’t you read the papers? Don’t you know we’re having a devil of a time with the Russians as it is, without dragging in another issue?’ A French delegate was equally blunt, saying that ‘I’m all for your idea. But as a diplomat, how can I bring it up? It’s not on the agenda’. Lemkin became so despondent that on the third day of his stay in Paris, he once again fell ill and was taken to an American military hospital in the French capital.65 When a few days later the judges began to deliver their verdict at the Nuremberg Tribunal on 30 September 1946, they attached paramount importance to crimes against peace. ‘To initiate a war of aggression is ... not only an international crime, it is the supreme crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains the accumulated evil of the whole’.66 While the Tribunal condemned the conspiracy to commit aggression, it found that the

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conspiracy charge was only ‘applicable to crimes against peace and not to war crimes or crimes against humanity’, thus promoting a very restricted definition of crimes against humanity. The Continental jurists, and in particular Donnedieu de Vabres, had from the beginning been opposed to the conspiracy charge. Moreover, the Tribunal did not accept the prosecution’s contention that Nazi atrocities in Germany, particularly those perpetrated against Jews prior to the war in Poland could be held to be punishable as crimes against humanity. For this to be the case it was necessary to prove that the crime against humanity was linked to a war crime or a crime against the peace, but the Tribunal was unable to establish any such linkage. On 1 October 1946, the judges read out the verdicts and sentences on the major figures of the Nazi regime, of whom 11 were sentenced to death.67 ‘By excluding Crimes against Humanity from the conspiracy [charge]’, Robert Conot asserted, ‘the judges unwittingly cut the ground from the case against the [Nazi] organizations; for no matter how pernicious the SD [the Security Service] and Gestapo had been, they had not been part of a conspiracy to wage an aggressive war’.68 Thus, the central core of the Lemkin– Bernays thesis that the Nazi era represented a conspiracy perpetrated by criminal organizations was eliminated and the atrocities committed by the Nazis in Germany before the war were ignored. Moreover, Donald Bloxham observed that As the fundamental aim [at the Nuremberg trials] was to show how war crimes and crimes against humanity derived from a conspiracy to aggression, establishing the link became in practice more important than charting the multitude of crimes. The story of the murders and privations was reduced ... to the presentation of ‘representative examples’ of atrocities, while the suffering of Jews as a group was down-played.69 Lemkin believed that the persecution of the Jews should have been treated within the framework of genocide. ‘This allows making a crime out of the massacres of the Jews before the war in Germany proper and after the war in all occupied countries’, he asserted.70 Even so, his approach was also flawed because his theory propounded the equivalence of the many genocides perpetrated by the Nazis, of which the atrocities committed against the Jews were just one, and despite Lemkin’s vigorous lobbying of the prosecutors and judges at Nuremberg, they rejected his pleas to convict members of the Nazi hierarchy of the crime of genocide. Disillusioned and heart-broken by news of the death of his parents, the lack of response from the delegates at the Paris conference and the judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal, all following rapidly on each other, Lemkin remained ill. One day while still confined to his bed in the military hospital in Paris Lemkin happened to hear on the radio about the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. Lemkin

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was electrified by the news, believing that here at last was a forum which would listen to him. He spent several days devising his plans and persuaded his doctors to discharge him from the hospital, which they were willing to do provided he travelled back to the United States on a ship and not by aeroplane. Lemkin already possessed a medical report from a Dr Savage which stated that he was ‘hypertensive, mildly exhausted, and apprehensive of flight’.71 Through his contacts, Lemkin wangled a passage on a troop transport. Lemkin’s achievements were, nevertheless, remarkable. From being an unknown, refugee professor, within five years he had become an influential policy adviser in Washington. His book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe influenced the deliberations at the Nuremberg Tribunal to a greater degree than has hitherto been assumed and his new concept of the crime genocide was slowly establishing itself in international law. In the 12 trials of the United States Military Tribunal of SS commanders, military officers, German doctors and legal figures which followed the proceedings at Nuremberg, the concept of genocide won gradual acceptance. So too, the Polish Supreme National Tribunal convicted the commandant of Auschwitz of genocide, while another accused was charged with ‘genocidal attacks on Polish culture and learning’.72

5 The United Nations Resolution on Genocide

Since his failure in 1933 to convince a conference associated with the League of Nations to recognise the new international crimes of ‘barbarity’ conceived of as the destruction of ‘ethnic, religious, or social’ groups and their culture which he designated as ‘vandalism’, Raphael Lemkin had not given his original proposals too much attention. During the Second World War, his analysis of the Nazi decrees in the subjugated countries of Europe compelled Lemkin to re-evaluate his ideas. But he merely touched on his original themes of the crimes of ‘barbarity’ and ‘vandalism’ when he addressed the North Carolina Bar Association on 16 May 1942.1 When he described his original proposals again in 1944, he wrongly claimed to have used the phrase ‘national, religious, or racial’ groups, a distinctive change of emphasis which showed a new awareness of the scale of mass killing and perverse racism. In his Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944), however, he looked forward to the amendment of the Hague Regulations ‘to prohibit genocide in any war which may occur in the future’. Every action impairing ‘the life, liberty, health, corporal integrity, economic existence, and the honor of the inhabitants when committed because they belong to a national, religious, or racial group’ was to be forbidden. Likewise ‘every policy aiming at the destruction or aggrandizement of one of such groups to the prejudice or detriment of another’ was to be prevented. Lemkin asserted that the system implemented in the past to protect minorities ‘was based mainly on international treaties and the constitutions of the respective countries’, but the enforcement machinery for these constitutional provisions was wholly inadequate. What was required was an international multilateral treaty, with provisions not only in the constitutions of each country but also in their criminal codes for the protection of minority groups: ‘Each criminal code should have provisions inflicting penalties for genocide practices’. Under the principle of universal repression, culprits suspected of such practices could be apprehended by the courts of the country in which the crime had been committed or to which they fled. Whereas prisoners of war were protected by the Hague Convention, the plight of women and children and groups of the population 76

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in occupied countries went unmonitored; and it was necessary for the regulations of the Hague Convention to be revised, by setting up an agency to inspect occupied countries and to make ‘inquiries as to the manner in which the occupant treats nations in prison’.2 True that Lemkin was deeply disappointed by the form of the judgment delivered against the accused at Nuremberg on 1 October 1946, particularly its failure to include the concept of genocide; later he was to call it ‘the blackest day’ of my life;3 yet as early as April 1946 in the American Scholar Lemkin proposed ‘that the United Nations as they are now organized, together with other invited nations, enter into an international treaty which would formulate genocide as an international crime, providing for its prevention and punishment in time of peace and war’. Thus, it is apparent that Lemkin at the beginning of 1946 had already outlined plans for a treaty under the aegis of the newly constituted United Nations to combat genocide. Moreover, Lemkin argued that ‘the crime of genocide should be recognized therein as a conspiracy to exterminate national, religious or racial groups ... The crime so formulated should be incorporated in every national criminal code of the signatories’. These last points had already been made in his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. He went on to assert that ‘The liability for genocide should rest on those who gave and executed the orders, as well as on those who incited to the commission of the crime by whatever means, including formulation and teaching of the criminal philosophy of genocide’. Lemkin also devised a new scheme, whereby states pursuing a policy of genocide should be held accountable before the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. The Council may request the International Court of Justice to deliver an advisory opinion to determine whether a state of genocide exists within a given country before invoking, among other things, sanctions to be leveled against the offending country. The Security Council may act either on its own initiative or on the basis of petitions submitted by members of interested national, religious or racial groups residing either within or without the accused country. Here Lemkin had the lessons of the Holocaust in mind when he suggested that persecuted religious or racial groups could petition the Security Council to take action on their behalf.4 Similarly, Lemkin suggested that ‘an international body (such as the International Red Cross) should have the right to supervise the treatment of civilian populations by occupants in time of war in order to ascertain whether genocide is being practiced by such occupant.’5 Fortunately Count Bernadotte, the President of the Swedish Red Cross, stated that he would take up Lemkin’s proposal, and it was eventually implemented as Article 143 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 dealing with the treatment of civilian populations by occupation forces.6

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By the spring of 1946 Lemkin had modified the proposals which he first formulated in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe and which he had reiterated in an article in the Free World in April 1945, by advocating that the newly formed United Nations should sponsor a treaty to prevent genocide and that it should use its machinery to enforce it. Articles on similar lines to these proposals which were first outlined in the American Scholar appeared in France in the influential Revue Internationale de Droit Penal, a journal controlled by Professor Vespasian Pella, one of Lemkin’s pre-War sponsors, and also in the Bulletin de la Commission internationale penale et penitentiaire and in Belgian and Norwegian law journals.7 So too, when Lemkin addressed the Cambridge conference of the International Law Association in August 1946, he put forward the same plan.8 Temporarily stunned by the failure of the Nuremberg Tribunal to supply a useful precedent for advancing the cause of genocide at the United Nations, Lemkin as we have seen was confined to a hospital bed in Paris at the beginning of October 1946. But from the time of his intervention at the peace conference with the Axis powers a month earlier, Lemkin’s conviction had hardened that it would fall on him to take the necessary action to ensure that his scheme to prevent genocide was implemented. He was galvanized into action on hearing about the new opportunities that had arisen at the United Nations, arriving by mid-October in New York, where the General Assembly was due to meet at Lake Success in a disused factory on Long Island. On returning to the United States, he hurried to Lake Success, where the agenda for the first meeting of the General Assembly was being drawn up. Lemkin conferred with Henri Laugier, the Assistant Secretary-General of the UN, about his proposed resolution on genocide and he expressed interest, but Lemkin had only five days left to find delegates to sponsor the resolution before the agenda was closed.9 The institutions of the United Nations were gradually taking on a coherent form, but as yet the procedure had not become fixed and formalised, allowing Lemkin considerable leeway as a private individual campaigner and lobbyist. A few years later it is doubtful whether the same opportunities would have been available to a private individual. As John Humphrey the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations observed about Lemkin ‘Never in the history of the United Nations had one private individual conducted such a lobby. He could be seen everywhere in the committee-rooms and, by common consent, was accorded privileges denied to other private individuals’.10 To begin with Lemkin ‘hung around the press room at Lake Success, prowled the corridors, and within a few weeks was on speaking terms with almost every delegate’.11 Describing the atmosphere in the Delegates’ Lounge of the United Nations, Lemkin sensed that ‘Statesmen felt as if they owed an apology for the holocaust,[and for] past follies ... There was an accumulation of constructive energies, which always follow in international life a destructive period [sic].

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If there was not open enthusiasm, one could notice a latent open mindedness about humanitarian issues.’12 Taking the view that it would be futile to approach one of the great powers for help because their bureaucracies had made policy decisions well in advance of the first General Assembly meeting, Lemkin decided to ask a small nation to place a resolution against genocide on the agenda. Lemkin met Professor Frede Castberg, the Norwegian delegate and an international lawyer, who advised him that it would be necessary for him to approach another delegation to sponsor his resolution because he could not obtain instructions from his government in time. Norway, however, would support his proposal for the resolution against genocide being added to the agenda.13 Later Lemkin sat down on a comfortable sofa in the Delegates’ Lounge in the UN to draft a resolution, asking the world body to study genocide with the aim of making it into an international crime. Although a private individual without any government backing, he availed himself of the UN’s secretarial facilities to have the document mimeographed to augment the supply of copies. A young man from Ecuador, who worked in the Secretariat of the United Nations, informed him about the solidarity of the Latin American delegations, who formed a significant group of states. Lemkin’s shrewd tactic was to win the approval of delegates from the smaller South American states, thereby drawing the support of the larger entities in their wake. First he approached Dr Ricardo Alfaro, a former President of Panama and international lawyer, who was head of his country’s delegation with copies of his book on Axis Rule in Occupied Europe and his recent article in the American Scholar to supply him with background material about the resolution which he was asking him to sponsor. Having asked for 24 hours to study the material, Alfaro came back the next day and signed the resolution, wishing Lemkin good luck. Then Lemkin went to speak to the delegate from Cuba, another of the smaller South American states, who was amenable and likewise signed the resolution.14 This was important, as the decision of these two South American delegations to support the resolution would draw a powerful block of South American states behind it, some twenty out of fifty-one states comprising the United Nations, although another four states joined the world body in the course of 1946. Raphael Lemkin’s plan was next to win over the Indian delegation, thereby gaining the adherence of the surrounding Asian powers. With both the South American and Asian states arrayed solidly behind him, Lemkin thought that the European states would have to support his resolution ‘after the recent holocaust’.15 These words were in a passage deleted by Lemkin from his memoirs, but it seems clear from this section and a passage quoted above that Lemkin kept on returning to the murder of six million Jews, and perhaps to the wider Polish tragedy in his thoughts and that this was the factor motivating him to place the resolution against genocide on the UN General Assembly agenda rather than a general feeling of disquiet at past

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massacres in history. During the late 1940s, Lemkin thought about the fate of the Jews in the Second World War in terms of numbers slaughtered and was not using any shorthand concepts such as holocaust, which he was to do a few years later. Lemkin renewed his friendship with Mrs Corbett Ashby (Dame Margery Irene Corbett Ashby 1882–1981), an influential voice in the women’s international peace movement since her involvement with the League of Nations, whom he caught sight of in the Delegates’ Lounge at the United Nations. She introduced him to Mrs Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister and head of the Indian delegation. Lemkin explained his formula for protecting the ‘unity of mankind in diversity’ to her and Mr Supon, a former judge and MP, carefully tailoring his message to suit his audience and adding that every nation had a role in enriching the culture of mankind. ‘We in India live by this principle,’ Mr Supon agreed, ‘We are many races and creeds. Still we have the concept of oneness. Our philosophers preached it, Gandhi worked for it. I will be glad to propose that our delegation act as one of the sponsors.’ As soon as Mrs Pandit signed the resolution against genocide, Lemkin raced to the Secretary-General’s office on 5 November with two hours left to deposit it, having secured the necessary three sponsors.16 After this successful foray, Lemkin hurried to Washington, where he asked for two months unpaid leave from the War Department to push his campaign for a genocide resolution at the United Nations. Deprived of his salary, Lemkin vacated his comfortable quarters of the Wardman Park Hotel in Washington and moved to a shabby room at 102nd Street in Manhattan, New York at a rent of $25 a month to facilitate his lobbying activities.17 Having cultivated the friendship of Eugene Meyer and Alan Barth of the Washington Post, Lemkin turned his attention to the New York newspapers. He visited the offices of the New York Times, where Otto Tolischus promised his support for the campaign to secure a genocide resolution at the United Nations, and he also lobbied the editorial staff of the New York Herald Tribune.18 But most of Lemkin’s efforts were concentrated on the daily lobbying of the United Nations correspondents of the American press, who were based at the United Nations headquarters at Lake Success. John Hohenberg of the New York Post working in his room at Lake Success was interrupted by a stranger. He was preparing an assignment for a deadline in next day’s paper. This was his first encounter with Lemkin, who stood some 5 feet 9 and a half inches in height with greying hair and blue eyes which were slightly myopic behind his glasses. ‘The stranger, after all, seemed harmless enough ... in a well-worn double-breasted suit, scuffed black shoes, and a dark necktie askew against a none-too-clean white shirt collar ... He had a thick accent, but he spoke English with emphasis and deliberation ... “You and I, we must change the world” ’, he declared, ‘To change the world’, Hohenberg retorted, ‘you must see The New York Times’.19

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Eventually through persistence Hohenberg was won over by Lemkin and he prepared the first of many stories on the issue of genocide for the New York Post, and after several weeks Raphael Lemkin was able to exhibit a small bundle of clippings that he kept with his daily sandwich in his battered black briefcase. Although most of the professional diplomats long since had given up on him as an unmitigated nuisance, our ‘unofficial man’ became a rather special person in the press section.20 So too, Kathleen Telsch remembered how ‘Correspondents on deadline used to run from him [Lemkin] like mad’, and another New York Times reporter A.M. Rosenthal recalled that whenever he met him, Lemkin would ruefully announce himself, saying ‘Here is that pest Lemkin ... I have a genocide story for you’.21 The draft resolution on the crime of genocide was couched by Lemkin in general terms and deliberately severed from any connection with the catastrophe that had befallen the Jews in order to win wider acceptance among delegates at the United Nations. Its rarefied language and abstract phraseology imbued it with a timeless element and won it diverse supporters. All Lemkin’s familiar themes were rehearsed in the preamble – the comparison of genocide with homicide, the loss to world culture when a human group was extinguished, and the many instances of genocide ‘when national, racial, ethnical or religious groups’ were destroyed ‘entirely or in part’. In his original draft Lemkin referred to both ‘national’ and ‘ethnical’ groups, but when the resolution came before the United Nations’ Legal Committee political groups were substituted for them.22 The draft resolution went on to state that the General Assembly invites the Social and Economic Council to study this problem [of the crime of genocide] and to prepare a report on the possibilities of declaring genocide an International Crime and assuring international cooperation for its prevention and punishment and also recommending ... that genocide and related offenses should be dealt with by National Legislations in the same way as other international crimes such as piracy, trade in women, children and slaves, and others.23 Lemkin was convinced that the United States because of its past stand against the persecution of minorities should be the power that proposed to the Steering Committee of the General Assembly that genocide should be added to the current agenda. To achieve this goal, Lemkin conferred with Dr Alfaro, the representative of Panama, who set up a meeting between him and Ambassador Austin, the head of the United States delegation. By good fortune, Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas happened to be a member of the United States delegation.24 She was an outstandingly beautiful woman,

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always surrounded by a coterie of male admirers and a riveting speaker on civil rights, and the genocide resolution was an attractive cause for her.25 Douglas introduced him to Adlai Stevenson, who was adviser to the American delegation, and Lemkin broached to him the subject of American assistance for launching his proposed resolution at the United Nations as well as plying him with background literature. When Lemkin discussed the matter the next day with Stevenson, the latter said that he ‘hoped that the United States would propose the inclusion of the Genocide proposal in the agenda’.26 Again, the intervention of Mrs Corbett Ashby proved crucial to the success of Lemkin’s campaign. Throughout 1946, the struggle between Russia and the Western powers intensified. The Communists set up the International Democratic Women’s Federation with many millions of members in an attempt to dominate the discussion of issues concerning women at the United Nations. As a countermeasure, Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt and the leaders of 19 national women’s associations in the United States organized an International Assembly of Women outside New York from 12 to 22 October 1946. In a convivial atmosphere, women leaders were asked to discuss ways of assisting the programme planned for the forthcoming United Nations meeting.27 Among the British delegates to the International Assembly of Women was Mrs Corbett Ashby, an influential voice in the moderate International Alliance of Women Voters. She seems to have been working closely with Lemkin and interested the leaders of women’s international organizations in the issue of genocide. Lemkin was introduced to Francis Perkins, the head of the Civil Service Commission in the Roosevelt Administration, and Dr Hannah Rydh, a Swedish archaeologist and President of the World Women’s Alliance. After Lemkin addressed a group of women delegates whose countries had been occupied by the Nazis during the War, two Czechoslovakian women, the Deputy Mayor of Prague, Mrs Pelantova, and a young resistance fighter, spoke, vividly describing how they had been tortured during the German occupation of their country. The meeting decided to send one woman from each country to lobby the United Nations delegation from their own country to win support for the resolution against genocide. A few days later Lemkin, who was monitoring the mood of the delegates at the United Nations, noticed an appreciable upsurge of support among them for his proposals.28 At last the Steering Committee of the General Assembly met. It consisted of the President and Vice-President of the Assembly together with the six chairman of the individual committees of the United Nations. A South American delegate from Panama was acting as Chairman of the Sixth Committee (otherwise known as the Legal Committee), which would consider the draft resolution; after sounding out friendly chairmen of the other committees he told Lemkin that he was hopeful about the outcome of their deliberations. When the subject of genocide was considered, Adlai Stevenson for the United States proposed the inclusion of genocide in the agenda. The

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USSR unexpectedly opposed this, but this was symptomatic of the growing tension between Russia and the Western powers. As the majority of delegates supported the inclusion of the item on the agenda, it was adopted.29 To mollify the Soviet Union and to persuade it to drop its opposition to the genocide resolution, Lemkin approached Jan Masaryk, the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, pleading with him to intercede with the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, Andrei Vishinsky. What was the reason for Russian intransigence? Partly it was a personal vendetta. During the 1930s, Vishinsky had written the preface to a pamphlet called ‘Counter-revolutionary Intervention Through Criminal Law’, in which he denounced Lemkin’s concept of barbarity as a subterfuge to allow the capitalist world to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.30 But partly Soviet opposition was influenced by wider international issues. Between 1941 and 1944 Russian troops deported 1,500,000 people belonging to smaller nationalities from the Crimea and the Northern Caucasus, including the Chechens, on grounds of their alleged collaboration with the Germans, causing the death of a third of the deportees during the first harsh year.31 Rumours abounded in the corridors of the Nuremberg Tribunal about these Russian deportations, possibly making the Soviet Union wary of taking up the issue of genocide.32 As Lemkin noted in his memoirs, which constantly returned to the theme of the mass killing of Jews and by implication to the fate of his own parents, ‘It was still 1946, a little more than one year after Hitler’s ovens, and a little more than one month after the Nuremberg judgement.’33 Until the 1950s, there was no convenient shorthand phrase, such as ‘Holocaust’, which had passed into common parlance to describe the attempt to exterminate the Jews; partly because of this and partly because it was not a central concern of the Nuremberg Tribunal, consciousness of this event was rapidly fading from the public scene. Thus Lemkin had to move quickly and deftly to counter potential opposition from the Russians, as there was no certain groundswell of support for his ideas. He was conversant with the writings of Thomas Masaryk, the founder of the modern Czechoslovakian state and Jan’s father, who had tried to delineate the cultural personality of nations, and when he spoke to Jan Masaryk, he put forward one of his stock arguments of a nation through its culture surviving the death of its individual members.34 Jan Masaryk was not only sympathetic to schemes designed to protect minorities but was like his father a supporter of Zionism, concluding a lecture in 1943 to the Jewish Historical Society of England with these words: You Jews, we Czechoslovaks need and deserve security – economic security, political security, religious security. The future of Europe, nay, of the world, depends on that. May it please God that this gift, kept from the Czechoslovaks for a long time and from the Jews for a still infinitely longer time, will become our common denominator.35

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Lemkin asked Masaryk to convey a message to the Russians: ‘Both you and Vishinsky have a sense of humour. Why not tell him that penicillin is not an intrigue against the Soviet Union?’ and nor is the genocide resolution. Fortunately this approach worked, so much so that Vishinsky made speeches in support of the genocide resolution and voted in favour of it in contrast with Russian obduracy over the Declaration of Human Rights.36 After this success, Lemkin turned his attention to the delegates on the Legal Committee, supplying them with copies of his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, his article in the American Scholar and a pamphlet in French. Having given copies to Alexandre Parodi of the French Foreign Ministry and Professor Henri Chaumont, the French delegate, Lemkin was told the next day by Parodi that the French delegation viewed his proposal favourably. Lemkin also saw Philip Noel-Baker, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, who had read his book when it first appeared and shared his viewpoint. More importantly, Lemkin had lunch with Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney-General and the British delegate, whom as we have seen introduced the concept of genocide in his closing address to the Nuremberg Tribunal, and took this opportunity of plying him with his ideas, as is apparent from Sir Hartley’s subsequent address to the Legal Committee.37 Shawcross asserted that The United Nations had clearly to state at once that aggressive war and genocide constituted punishable crimes ... during the fifth International Conference for the Unification of Criminal Law, held in 1933, a proposal to punish crimes now included under the heading of genocide had been defeated. Since then, six million human beings had been coldly and deliberately exterminated with a view to destroying the Jewish race. It had not been possible to punish that crime, since such proceedings would have involved the application of ex post facto legislation. The situation must be prevented from recurring [Here he relied on the authority of Grotius and Westlake] ... it was necessary ... that international law should limit the omnipotence of certain States over their citizens and in certain cases protect them against their own government ... International conventions should be concluded; but the public denunciation of this crime would have to take place immediately.38 The whole address closely reflected Lemkin’s own thoughts at this time and is a rare instance where a public figure dwelt on the mass extermination of Jews. Professor Ernesto Dihigo, the Cuban delegate on the Committee, introduced the resolution on genocide with flair, and was well supported by Justice Chagla of India, the other state co-sponsoring the resolution. Reporting back to the Foreign Office in London, Eric Beckett mentioned that on 22 November 1946 Shawcross ‘moved amendment to replace operative clause which declares “that genocide level of international crime for commission of which principals and accessories as well as States are individually responsible” ’.

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Beckett continued that France on ground that States could not have criminal responsibility moved to read ‘principals and accessories be they private persons or statesmen’. Beckett ended by stating that U.S.S.R. favoured reference to ... [Economic and Social Committee]. United States which had earlier put in a resolution for ‘formulation of principles of charter of Nuremberg’ and Poland did not speak before the meeting was adjourned but favoured referring subject to codification sub-committee and latter will probably move in this sense at the next meeting39 Later the British delegate, McKinnon Wood, tried to delay matters, by arguing that the genocide resolution should be referred to the United Nations committee which was considering proposals from the United States for the codification of the principles of the Nuremberg Judgment.40 For the American Judge Biddle, who had served on the judicial panel at the Nuremberg Tribunal, had approached President Truman and asked him to ensure that the United Nations adopted the principles of the Nuremberg judgment and defined what constituted planning or waging an aggressive war. As a result, on 11 December 1946 the General Assembly confirmed resolution 95(1) which called for the ‘formulation, in the context of a general codification of offences against peace and security of mankind or of an international criminal code, of the principles recognised in the Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal.’41 Within the State Department and the Foreign Office in Britain, there was strong opposition to Judge Biddle’s plans. Patrick Dean of the British Embassy in Washington, who had been deeply involved in the arrangements for setting up the Nuremberg Tribunal, had lunch with Robert Jackson, the Chief American Prosecutor at the trial, and agreed with him that Biddle’s scheme was unfeasible. First, the judgment concerning the Major War Criminals at Nuremberg was not unanimous and to have it adopted by the United Nations ‘might well mean that the Russians or some of their stooges would start to cast doubt on those portions of the judgment with which they disagreed.’ Second, even if the United Nations adopted the Nuremberg judgment, this would not necessarily be advantageous: The findings of the Nuremberg Tribunal are an example of Case Law, founded on an international agreement framed in wide language, and it would be better in present circumstances to leave the findings as to aggressive war and crimes against humanity on that basis. Any attempt to define the exact limits of the Nuremberg judgment by further international agreement would tend to sterilise the doctrines laid down at Nuremberg, and this would lead to other intending aggressors finding a way round the judgment as crystallized in some U.N.O. resolution or other international agreement.

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In a later letter on 6 December 1946 to Shawcross, enclosing his report on his lunch with Jackson, Dean added that the American proposal ‘was that the charter of the Nuremberg Court, rather than the judgment, should be adopted by the U.N.O.’ and that this was an improvement because the Charter was more consistent and framed in wider terms than the judgment.42 In the end it was agreed that a sub-committee of the Legal Committee should be set up to prepare the draft of the resolution against genocide. A South American, Ambassador Gajardo of Chile was chosen as chairman, while Charles Fahy (1892–1979), a former Solicitor-General and the United States delegate, acted as rapporteur and assumed leadership of the subcommittee. Judge Riad Bey, the delegate for Saudi Arabia, had sought out Lemkin in the delegates’ lounge to enthuse about his book and to congratulate him on his concept of genocide. Within the sub-committee according to Lemkin an attempt was made to delete the term genocide and substitute the word extermination for it. As a member of the sub-committee, Judge Riad pleaded for the retention of the term genocide, declaring that ‘A term is progress. This term describes action “cide”, to destroy – and describes the subject which is destroyed “the genos”. Extermination can refer also to insects or to animals. Extermination ... would limit the concept in scope and modality of action.’43 If the report of the sub-committee is examined, there is nothing in it about this episode. Possibly it was air-brushed out of the report, possibly it was an attempt by Lemkin to add drama to an otherwise humdrum story. As redrafted, the resolution stated that genocide was contrary to the moral law and was a crime in international law for the commission of which principals and accomplices were punishable; it also called on member states to adopt the necessary legislation against the crime. Genocide was specified as a crime whether ‘committed religious, racial, political or any other grounds’. Unlike Lemkin’s earlier draft, the resolution adopted by the subcommittee included political groups because of an intervention ‘by the British delegation at a very late hour of a tiresome genocide meeting in Lake Success’; at the same time, the categories of national and ethnical groups were omitted from the resolution, probably at the insistence of the British delegation.44 After some discussion, it was agreed that there ‘should be early action’ and that the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations should be invited to prepare a draft convention on genocide for the next session of the General Assembly, without the assistance of other committees, as this would have caused delay.45 Having passed the resolution which affirmed the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the General Assembly on the same day, 11 December 1946, went on to adopt resolution 96(1) which declared that genocide was a crime under international law. On the surface, Lemkin’s success seemed complete but in reality the resolution was in part a careful manoeuvre

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conducted by Sir Harley Shawcross to take the heat out of the issue. So long as a genocide resolution couched in vague language was confirmed, its supporters would be satisfied and pressure to pass a convention would abate and the measure could be kicked out of sight. To Lemkin, the groundwork for his scheme had been prepared by ‘a mixture of blood and tears of millions of innocent people throughout the ages and of the last few years. Among them were also the tears of my parents and friends.’46 Even so, Lemkin had made significant progress in his campaign, by enlisting the enthusiastic support of many outstanding leaders in international women’s organizations as well as that of the American press at so early a stage. Without their help, his attempt to secure a genocide resolution would have faltered at the first hurdle. He had cultivated the interest of Charles Fahy, an important voice in the State Department, in his cause and, as we shall see, was soon receiving American diplomatic backing for his campaign.

6 1947, The First Draft of the Convention

After his success with the genocide resolution, Lemkin had returned to his office in the War Department in Washington, but by the middle of 1947 he decided that if his efforts were going to produce an international treaty banning genocide, he would have to relocate to New York to be at the centre of the struggle at Lake Success. He, therefore, resigned his position, moved back into accommodation in New York and lived off the largesse of his friends and his own inadequate savings. During 1947 and the early months of 1948 there were three interwoven strands to Lemkin’s life: his pivotal role in the preliminary drafting of the genocide convention and the ever widening campaign for an international treaty assisted as it was by the support from international Jewish organizations, the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations, and American Church groups; a brief tortured relationship with Gertrude Sladek; and his endless correspondence to ensure that his brother Elias and his family could leave Germany for a new life in Canada. I shall focus on Raphael Lemkin’s public career in this chapter, leaving details of his private life to the following one. Lemkin now took his first hesitant and tentative steps to organize a worldwide campaign for a genocide convention. As yet there was no institutional movement for such a campaign and he did everything on a short-term basis, taking such action as he deemed to be appropriate. Lemkin played a critical role in the commission of three experts appointed by the United Nations to draft a genocide convention, persuading the other experts to accept the concept of physical genocide and to allow the General Assembly to decide the question of cultural genocide. His most clever move in the campaign for a convention was to enlist the active assistance of Charles Fahy, an influential State Department adviser, whom he had met when Fahy was taking the lead in the sub-committee considering the draft genocide resolution. With Fahy’s help the State Department and in turn the United States government was swung behind the campaign, thereby overwhelming the efforts of the British and the Russians to stifle the convention at birth. Throughout 1947, Lemkin relied heavily on the intervention of the World Jewish Congress on his behalf 88

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and at other times on the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the Alliance Israelite. They helped to rout the remaining pockets of resistance to the convention in France and to build ties to Eastern bloc countries, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, thereby weakening Soviet opposition. He also grew closer to James Rosenberg of the American Conference of Christians and Jews in the autumn of 1947, using that organization to try and overcome British obstruction and as a way of reigniting his floundering campaign. International women’s organizations also assisted. By garnering fresh sources of support at the United Nations, after intensive lobbying of delegates, Lemkin almost single-handedly was able to counter the opposition of Arab delegates to the convention. Even so, only by a Herculean effort and audaciousness was Lemkin able to force a new vote on the General Assembly, when it passed a resolution to bury the convention at the behest of the British and Russian delegations. On 25 February 1947, Raphael Lemkin telephoned the State Department to ascertain the position of the United States on the genocide resolution which was an item on the agenda of the Economic and Social Council. Lemkin said he understood that the State Department ‘wanted to refer the genocide resolution to the Human Rights Commission’. Carl Marcy answered that such a reference seemed to me to be logical since genocide seemed intimately related to the subjects considered by the Human Rights Commission. Mr Lemkin said he was afraid that genocide will get involved in the political maneuverings in connection with human rights and would be lost ... Mr Lemkin then said he understood that Mr Fahy wanted to have a special committee to handle the subject of genocide.1 This was the first of a number of occasions in 1947, when Charles Fahy’s intervention within the State Department was crucial. Charles Fahy (1892–1979) had served as Solicitor General during 1941–1945. After a stint as director of the legal division of the United States Group Control Council in Germany after the Second World War, he returned to Washington as a legal adviser in the State Department and was a political heavyweight. As a radically inclined labour lawyer, he was receptive to Lemkin’s arguments. On 28 March 1947, the Economic and Social Council, a principal organ of the United Nations, directed the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, to draw up a draft convention with the assistance of experts in international law in accordance with the resolution passed by the General Assembly in December. In May 1947 Lie invited Lemkin together with with two other international lawyers, Professor Donnedieu de Vabres from France and Professor Vespasian Pella from Romania, to prepare a draft of the convention.2 Both de Vabres, a professor at the Sorbonne and a judge, who had served on the Nuremberg Tribunal and Pella, the President of the International Penal Law Association, were distinguished in their field. Described as ‘aging ... with sparse hair, dark horn-rimmed

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glasses, and a heavy walrus mustache’, Judge de Vabres was inclined to be reticent but when he occasionally intervened in the Nuremberg proceedings his comments were incisive. Having invented the concept of genocide and having thought about its history and its implications in international law more deeply, Lemkin it was said aroused the envy and antagonism of his older colleagues and their relationship was not a harmonious one.3 As far as Vespasion Pella was concerned, this was not an altogether accurate assessment, as in a letter to Lemkin dated 15 December 1947, he still referred to him as ‘my dear friend’, and in a later letter he drew his attention to the fact that he had launched Lemkin in the international arena during the 1930s and that he had favoured Lemkin’s proposals for the repression of genocide on the national and international plane when they worked together as experts for the UN. Furthermore, despite strong opposition from certain members at the conference of the Association de Droit Pénal in July 1947, he had pushed Lemkin’s ideas to the fore.4 On the other hand, despite the support of the French government for the genocide cause Lemkin told an acquaintance in August 1947 that Professor Donnedieu de Vabres ‘does not share this opinion for reasons that are personal to him’, and by the summer the antagonism between the two men seems to have hardened.5 All three men, however, considered the preliminary draft of their report with some other experts, including Professor John Humphrey of the United Nations Human Rights Division. Although the Secretary-General was meant to obtain the comments of the Committee on the Codification of International Law and the Human Rights Commission on the draft convention (document E/447), it was not possible to do so within a short time frame; nor was it possible to submit copies of the draft convention to member states for their comments until 26 June 1947, so that their replies would not become available until the latter part of the session of the Economic and Social Council. In turn the Council would not have enough time to submit the convention to the General Assembly for their approval towards the end of the year.6 In fact, these delays were jeopardizing the whole timetable for the rapid implementation of the convention. On what points in the first draft of the convention did Lemkin clash with his colleagues? Following the provisions of the December 1946 resolution, the purpose of the draft genocide convention was defined as preventing the destruction of racial, national, linguistic, religious or political groups. Lemkin distinguished between ‘ “physical” genocide (destruction of individuals), “biological” genocide (prevention of births) and “cultural” (brutal destruction of the specific characteristics of a group)’. While Professors de Vabres and Pella accepted that there was physical and biological genocide, they were more sceptical about the concept of cultural genocide, stating that the General Assembly should decide this point.7 While Lemkin’s colleagues wanted political groups to be protected by the convention, he reiterated his doubts about whether their inclusion was justified in his letter to Sir Hartley

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Shawcross of 8 July 1947. To his colleagues, ‘He pointed out ... that political groups have not the permanency and the specific characteristics of the other groups referred to and ... that the Convention on Genocide being of general interest, it should not run the risk of failure by introducing ideas on which the world is deeply divided’. Moreover, ‘the human groups most likely to suffer from genocide as history has shown, are racial, national and religious groups’. Professor de Vabres opposed this, stating that ‘genocide was an odious crime, regardless of the group which fell victim to it and that the exclusion of political groups might be regarded as justifying genocide in the case of such groups’. Professor Pella thought that the Assembly should decide this question, but even if political groups were protected this cover should not be extended to Nazi or fascist organizations. This was a more difficult matter than Pella admitted because the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet bloc could easily denounce liberal political parties as having fascist tendencies and then persecute their adherents.8 There was a sharp disagreement between Lemkin and the two other experts on the necessity for including cultural genocide in the convention. ‘Professor Donnedieu de Vabres and Professor Pella held that cultural genocide represented an undue extension of the notion of genocide and amounted to reconstituting the former protection of minorities (which was based on other conceptions) under cover of the term genocide’. Lemkin held a contrary opinion, arguing that ‘a racial, national, or religious’ group’s right to existence was justified not only from the moral point of view, but also from the point of view of the value of the contribution made by such a group to civilization generally. If the diversity of cultures were destroyed, it would be as disastrous for civilization as the physical destruction of nations. He added that means of cultural genocide were criminal acts under municipal law and hence there was no reason why they should not be included in the international crime of genocide. Lemkin stated that ‘cultural genocide was much more than just a policy of forced assimilation by moderate coercion’; it was achieved by the involuntary transfer of children from one group to another, by the destruction of a nation’s intelligentsia, by the prohibition of the use of a national language in private conversation, and by the burning of books and the destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses.9 Lemkin’s views on the crucial role of culture were deeply influenced by his familiarity with the theories of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), something that he acquired in his student days, when he was training as a philologist, and were reinforced by his immersion in books written by Simon Dubnov and the Austrian Social Democratic politician and legal thinker Karl Renner (1870–1950). Herder claimed that ‘cultures are comparable but not

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commensurable; each is what it is, of literally inestimable value in its own society, and consequently to humanity as a whole’. Moreover, Herder stressed ‘the value of belonging to a group or culture, which for Herder at least is not political, and is indeed, to some degree, anti-political, different from, and even opposed to, nationalism’.10 Lemkin was to continue repeating these two themes, by emphasizing the uniqueness of cultures, their need for protection, and by downgrading the importance of the political realm. Hence his lastditch fight to protect his concept of cultural genocide, and his flexibility as regards omitting political groups from the convention. But probably Lemkin owed the greatest intellectual debt to Simon Dubnov, whose ideas underpinned Lemkin’s own beliefs, particularly as regards cultural genocide. Dubnov asserted that the source of vitality for the Jewish people consists in this – that this people, after it passed through the stages of tribal nationalism, ancient culture and political territory, was able to establish itself and fortify itself in the highest stage – the spiritual and historical-cultural, and it succeeded in crystallizing itself as a spiritual people that draws the sap of its existence from the natural or intellectual ‘will to live’. All this only because in the play of forces that sustained Jewish nationalism those elements not dependent on territory counted more then those dependent on territory. In the measure that the positive political factors declined, the spiritual factors increased in importance. Dubnov’s basic concept was that the extra-territorial Jewish people must build its life within the given framework, i.e. in the Diaspora. According to his fundamental theoretical premiss, there is no need to provide a territorial basis for national existence; and the problem of the Diaspora is one of finding a way to safeguard the people’s spiritual-creative powers, or, even less, to preserve its cultural independence as a spiritual-historical entity.11 Further, Dubnov contended that The difference between Palestine and the Diaspora will be quantitative and qualitative. In Palestine there will be a none too numerous minority of the Jewish people that will be distinguished by a richer and more complete national culture, while the Diaspora will be weaker but will make up in quantity for quality. A Jew has the right to participate in the civic life of his country in which he dwells, but he could also say ‘I have the right to speak my language, to make it the language of instruction in my schools, to order my internal life in my communities and to create institutions serving a variety of national purposes; to join in the common activities

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with my brethren not only in this country, but in all the countries of the world’. Dubnov awarded primacy to Hebrew over Yiddish as the language of the Jewish people, while recognizing the importance of the latter.12 As a vehicle for implementing his ideas on Jewish cultural autonomy in the Diaspora, Dubnov and a group of friends formed the Folkspartay which had a liberal political orientation. Of lesser significance as an influence on Lemkin’s thinking, despite his effusive comments, was Karl Renner. ‘Your books on the importance of national groups as being apart from States has inspired my work for many years, and finally led me to initiate the action to outlaw genocide’, Lemkin informed Karl Renner, who was now President of the Austrian Republic. He continued, In my efforts to convince the members of the United Nations to adopt the Genocide Treaty, I used your arguments about the universal cultural value of national groups, and about their significance as contributing factors to world civilization. I argued that if the Greeks were exterminated before they gave to the world Socrates and Plato, if the Jews before they gave to the world the Bible, and the French were obliterated before they produced their great literature and political philosophy, the world would have been deprived of these treasures.13 Within the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian empire, Renner had ‘envisaged the concept of nationality as “a union of similar thinking and similarly speaking persons”, irrespective of where they live’, a view which the Jewish Bundists in pre-War Poland found attractive. Schooling, art and literature belong to the nations. However, as general education itself is an essential precondition of material culture, the state determines at all levels of schooling the minimum of education that the nations have to guarantee. At the same time, the state guarantees the poorer, undeveloped nations the means to provide this minimum.14 Thus Lemkin’s thinking and that of the Jewish national cultural autonomists, particularly that of their leading ideologist Dubnov, converged, with Lemkin adapting this creed so as to make it universally applicable to all ethnic groups. Vespasian Pella had been campaigning for an international criminal court since 1928, publishing his Plan for a World Criminal Code in 1933. Whereas Professor Pella and his colleague de Vabres were thus in favour of a permanent international criminal court, Lemkin thought that the establishment of such a court should be omitted from the convention, as there was a danger that

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persons of lesser importance would escape punishment because of the use of complicated procedural rules by such a court. His colleague, Professor de Vabres, contended that rulers should be tried by the permanent international criminal court, while lesser officials should be tried by local criminal courts. Lemkin declared that in the absence of a sufficiently developed international criminal law, the setting up of such a court was premature.15 During the summer of 1947, Lemkin moved in with Laser and Mary Lowenstein, friends he had made in Kaunas, who were living in an apartment at 290 Riverside Drive, New York.16 Desperately short of funds, Lemkin needed to stay with these friends to relax and recuperate, as he was suffering from high blood pressure brought on by his recent exertions at the United Nations. His plans were crystallizing, and he had definitely decided to stay in New York, where he could effectively carry on his lobbying activities at Lake Success, and had informed his landlady in Washington, Mrs Alpar, through a friend that he was vacating his room there on 1 July.17 Within Britain opinion hardened against the implementation of a genocide convention. On 26 February 1947 Eric Beckett (1896–1966), the principal legal adviser to the Foreign Office, observed that This Assembly resolution on genocide is a useless resolution, and I think our attitude to it generally must be that we should not mind if it got lost somewhere and died a natural death, and at the most we do not want much time and expense being wasted in drawing up a perfectly useless convention. It is all a complete waste of time, seeing that, if genocide takes place anywhere, it will take place under conditions where no international convention will be observed18 When instructions were dispatched by the Foreign Office to the British delegation at the United Nations in New York a few weeks later, they were told that ‘We should be glad to see the item lost sight of and therefore see some advantage in suggestion of China that the Secretariat should prepare a first draft, and that this draft should be referred to Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination.’19 Conferring as he did on a regular basis with the representatives of many nations in the Delegates’ Lounge of the United Nations, Lemkin’s antennae soon picked up the negative noises emanating from the United Kingdom delegation. Still grateful for Sir Hartley Shawcross’s address supporting the genocide resolution at the United Nations on 22 November 1946, Lemkin was unaware that his support was heavily qualified and on 8 July 1947 appealed in vain to Shawcross, whom he thought would persuade his government to act more sympathetically. ‘I hear that some lawyers in England’, Lemkin wrote, would like to wait with the genocide convention until all possible crimes of any international significance are codified in an international criminal

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code or otherwise. But such work will take decades ... Throughout history the main attacks were directed against religious, racial and national groups. They have no protection now. There are no more minority treaties. The framers of the International Bill of Rights do not foresee any practical possibility of enforcement of such rights on an international scale ... We can now do constructive work on genocide, because it is essentially an ethnico-cultural concept. The political groups do not belong here organically and if some governments will prefer to omit them, then we still have very much to protect. I feel that if we will not have the Convention on genocide this year we might not have it for many years because the political situation is deteriorating ... Sir Hartley, now like in autumn 1946 so much depends on you. The enemies of the Convention will never dare to attack frontally. The way to kill a real thing is to send it to committees for study.20 Unfortunately Lemkin had completely misconstrued Shawcross’s position on the genocide convention which was one of outright opposition. He had not realized what was left unsaid by Shawcross in his speech to the United Nations on 22 November 1946 that the British politician’s support was strictly limited. This becomes clear from Shawcross’s letter to Eric Beckett of 21 July 1947, asking him for assistance in replying to Lemkin. He [the latter] is rather a bore and has got a bee in his bonnet about genocide, which, as you know, he raised at the General Assembly. I thought myself that it would be quite impracticable and valueless to have an international convention on genocide, and that the simplest course would be to have a resolution at the Assembly declaring that genocide is an international crime. This ... would have been at least as useful as any convention would be likely to be ... I do not myself altogether share the view which Professor Brierly has rather indicated, that the question of the Nuremberg decision and genocide are matters that cannot be dealt with in a hurry. My own feeling is that they must either be dealt with in a hurry by adopting merely declaratory resolutions to the effect that the Nuremberg decision represents the existing law and that genocide is an international crime, or they will not be dealt with at all.21 On 13 June 1947, the Secretariat draft was sent to the Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification for its comments. Professor Brierly, reiterating Britain’s negative attitude drafted a resolution that the committee should decline to reply to the request. As a compromise, the Secretary-General was told that they had no comments to make because member governments had not answered them.22 At the same time, Dr Everitt R. Clinchy, President of the National Conference of Christians and Jews in the United States, visited Britain in July 1947 and

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had a meeting with Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, in an attempt to bypass Shawcross’s obstructionism on the genocide issue, but his meeting with Bevin was fruitless because the Foreign Office legal advisers all shared Shawcross’s views.23 Throughout the summer of 1947 the conflict between the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine was escalating and the British while referring the matter to the United Nations hoped that the issue would be passed back to them in order to allow them to impose their own solution. A committee, UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), was despatched by the General Assembly to investigate the problem. In July 1947 the British navy apprehended the Exodus, a ship packed with 4,500 Jewish refugees, outside Palestinian territorial waters with the intention of repatriating them to Europe. When the refugees were sent to internment camps in Germany by the British, the move backfired. But the protracted three months struggle between the Zionists and the British over the fate of the refugees on the Exodus and the deepening clash between Jews and Arabs in Palestine only served to complicate matters as far as the genocide convention was concerned.24 Certain Arab states began to obstruct the passing of the genocide convention because it was seen as an instrument assisting the Zionist cause, while Jewish lobby groups felt constrained by the crisis. Thus, Maurice Perlzweig of the World Jewish Congress advised Lemkin that he had been unable to do anything of importance in England. The unhappy Exodus incident formed the substance of all my conversations, which included the visit made by Easterman and myself to the Under Secretary of State, and it would have weakened the importance of the Convention to have dragged in a reference to it after rather tense discussions of the Palestine situation.25 During 1947, the World Jewish Congress was one of Lemkin’s main sources of support; it was a federal body which comprised Jewish communities and Jewish organizations in 57 countries. There was considerable turf warfare between it and the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations, of which the AJC and the Alliance Israelite were members, to represent world Jewry before the United Nations.26 A meeting was arranged between a sub-committee of the World Jewish Congress and Raphael Lemkin on 24 June 1947 to discuss the tactics to be adopted for the forthcoming meeting of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on the genocide convention.27 The WJC later claimed after speaking to Lemkin that After careful consideration and inquiry we have come to the conclusion that one of the major reasons for delay has been the inclusion of ‘political groups’ in Article 1, Paragraph 1 [of the draft convention]. This was a later addition to the original draft, and its inclusion has given rise to

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controversy which may wreck the whole project ... We therefore urge you, in your discussion with officials of your Government, to draw attention to the desirability of omitting ‘political groups’ in order to eliminate controversy and ensure speedier action.28 Likewise the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations in a memorandum to the UN also proposed that political groups should be omitted from the convention.29 In particular, the Soviet Union was opposed to the inclusion of political groups in the draft convention. During a visit to Geneva, Maurice Perlzweig saw Jan Masaryk, the Czech Foreign Minister and a friend of long standing, and urged him to use his influence with the East European Governments to prevent them from wrecking the prospects of the Convention because of the unfortunate inclusion of a reference to political groups. I told him that we were trying to do what we could to induce the Western Nations to agree to the excision of this reference, and we were counting on Czechoslovakia to act as a bridge between the two groups. He assured me in the warmest terms that he was in full sympathy with the purposes of the Convention and would give instructions along the lines I suggested as soon as he returned to Prague.30 Behind the scenes Lemkin continued to work with the Norwegian and South American delegations in sponsoring a resolution on the genocide convention for a meeting of the ECOSOC during the summer of 1947, and having resigned from the War Department, was staying with friends, the Lowensteins, at 290 Riverside Drive, New York, to be close at hand to the deliberations of the United Nations. Mr Seyersted of Norway proposed a special session of the ECOSOC and the appointment of a committee to examine the comments from governments on the report of the SecretaryGeneral on the draft convention which would have to be made by the 1 September, so that matters could proceed expeditiously. In this he was supported by the delegates from Venezuela and Chile. Mr Stinebower, the delegate for the United States, ‘wondered whether the Economic and Social Council was the competent body to consider this legal problem and felt that the advice of the International Law Commission, if established, might be needed’. Gore Booth, the United Kingdom representative, added his support for this proposal, but the underlying purpose of the British move was revealed by a colleague’s comment.31 ‘Our course of conduct at the [General] Assembly [regarding genocide]’, advised Con O’Neill in a Foreign Office memorandum on 29 July 1947, ‘should be governed by the desirability of getting the whole idea of having a convention on genocide dropped. If we cannot succeed on this ... then all we can do, I think, is to aim at spinning matters out in such a way that nothing ever happens’.32 Norway with some

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support from China continued to press for a draft convention to be approved by a special session of the ECOSOC during the General Assembly, but this was rejected by seven votes to five with five abstentions. Instead a compromise proposal of the United States was adopted on 6 August 1947 by the countries which wished to proceed more slowly. The Secretary-General was requested to submit the draft convention with any comments by governments which were received in time by the General Assembly at its forthcoming session.33 During the summer of 1947, Lemkin persuaded the AJC to support his campaign for a genocide convention. On 29 July 1947, there was an important meeting between representatives of the AJC and the American Association for the United Nations. Lemkin was to prepare a pamphlet with secretarial assistance furnished by the AJC for distribution by the American UN Association to influential opinion makers and UN delegates. The AJC was to try and insert material on the issue in small-town newspapers and more generally in the press. At a further meeting between Dr Slawson of the AJC and Lemkin, it was agreed that the AJC would defray the cost of cables in the amount of $1,500 as its contribution to the campaign to promote the early adoption by the General Assembly of the Convention on Genocide ... These cables are intended for about 500 persons throughout the world who are expected to prevail upon their respective governments to issue instructions to their Delegations to act in favor of the Genocide Convention. The campaign has no organized directing body, but is supported by individuals within and outside of the United Nations offices. Professor Lemkin is most active in the campaign. Others are important members of the Secretariat. The CCJO [Consultative Council of Jewish organizations] is on the ‘inside’.34 Throughout the summer and autumn of 1947, there was also close liaison between Lemkin and representatives of the WJC, and under the direction of Lemkin they coordinated their moves in the international arena as regards the rapid passage of the genocide convention through the United Nations. Moreover, steps were taken by Lemkin’s allies in the WJC to ensure that France adopted a friendly attitude to the draft genocide convention, as it had expressed reservations. Its president Stephen Wise, the world famous Jewish leader, who was already an old friend of Lemkin, wrote to Dr Cahn-Debré of the Congress Juif Mondiale requesting that it submit its comments on the draft convention to the Secretariat of the United Nations, and that it lend its influence to the support of prompt and favorable action in this matter by the General Assembly. I believe that Blumal, Grumbach and Prof. Cassin should be approached to assist in obtaining the support of the French government.35

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Cassin on June 14–15 1947 had recently thoroughly revised the original draft of the declaration of human rights and was the French sponsor of a rival project to the proposed genocide convention.36 Following a meeting with René Cassin, Cahn-Debré advised Rabbi Stephen Wise that Cassin had spoken to Charles Chaumont, a principal legal adviser to the French Delegation to the UN, finding him favourable to the idea of a genocide convention and promising to be helpful in New York.37 The State Department treated the draft convention prepared by Lemkin and his colleagues seriously and made constructive comments. Its principal objections were to states being given jurisdiction to try nationals of any other state for crimes of genocide, the inclusion of cultural genocide in the convention and the proposal to establish a permanent international tribunal to try such crimes. However, it was decided to include political groups in the convention on ‘the understanding that the offense is to be restricted to physical destruction’. Once the United States approved the convention, it was envisaged that some offences would fall under federal jurisdiction which usually came within the purview of states, but this was not expected to cause any difficulties. The possibility exists that sporadic outbreaks against the Negro population of the United States may be brought to the attention of the United Nations ... However, since the offense will not exist unless part of an overall plan to destroy a human group, and since the Federal Government would under the treaty acquire jurisdiction over such offenses, no possibility can be foreseen of the United States being held in violation of the treaty.38 Shortly before the opening of the new session of the General Assembly on 16 September 1947, Raphael Lemkin spent four days in Washington conferring with Charles Fahy, a friendly and helpful adviser in the State Department, on the draft convention. He reported that the State Department has modified its position to the extent that it will now actively support the Draft Convention and will favor its being fully treated in the Legal Committee of the General Assembly.(Since Faris el Khouri [a Syrian] has been elected Chairman of this Committee during Monday’s session, this may cause a special problem, for Middle Eastern countries have demonstrated their opposition to Genocide. However, with the probability of a change in the Indian Government’s position and of the United States, Khouri may have a difficult time pigeon-holing or delaying the proper consideration of the Convention). Nevertheless, the United States desired the retention of political groups in the convention, despite the opposition of the Soviet bloc.39 The more positive

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attitude being shown by the Americans was due to the pressure put on them by religious and labour organizations.40 At this point Raphael Lemkin’s chief concern was to prevent the reference of the convention to a not yet created committee or to the next assembly. As he explained to Cardinal Spellman’s secretary, ‘Important Latin American delegates should be approached in order to obtain a resolution for sending the convention to a sub-committee of the Legal Committee for working out a final draft. Such a final draft might be easily prepared on a basis of the existing draft within a few weeks’.41 On 1 October 1947, perhaps deliberately, Raphael Lemkin gave a rather downbeat assessment of the position of the draft genocide convention at the United Nations, stating that it was endangered due to British intransigence on the issue.42 When the Legal Committee of the United Nations convened again two days later, during a discussion on genocide there was an unexpected outburst from the delegate from Pakistan, who stated that hundreds of thousands of people were being murdered in India with the connivance of the authorities because of their religious beliefs.43 The representative from India replied that the charges were ‘baseless, untrue and reckless’, but when the representative for Pakistan tried to counter these denials he was ruled out of order by the committee chairman to the relief of the British government.44 Britain was embarrassed by the risk of a public wrangle in the General Assembly between two Commonwealth countries, India and Pakistan, with accusations of genocide being bandied about; it also served to bring the issue of genocide to the forefront of international attention, something which Britain had been determined to avoid.45 The draft genocide convention was considered again by the Legal Committee on 6 October 1947. Mr H. Dubinsky of the World Jewish Congress summarized what happened at this meeting. But for the exception of the known attitude of ... Mr el Khouri and for the already revealed position of the Arab delegations and the British delegation, there appeared to be a decided and in fact determining change of attitude on the part of the overwhelming majority of all delegations in favor of the adoption of a Draft Convention. This is in strict opposition to the noted reluctance and hesitancy of many governments as exhibited in the last session of the Economic and Social Council to permit a substantive consideration of the Convention. The United States altered its position to the extent that it favored an accelerated and genuine treatment of a Convention. India undoubtedly due to recent events happening there, no longer remained under the influence of Mr Malik of Lebanon. Latin American countries, primarily through the intervention of high Catholic authorities, were even prepared to propose final adoption of the Convention in the present Assembly. France came out clearly in its comments for a speedy adoption. Although the USSR continued to demonstrate reluctance to have

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the Convention treated substantively, due to the inclusion of ‘political groups’ as a constant term, Czechoslovakia, Poland and even Yugoslavia by their comments showed a willingness to advance the discussion of the Convention from a purely procedural consideration to one of substance. In fact, the only real opposition to the adoption of the Genocide Convention as such, was expressed by U.K., Australia and Egypt with the latter particularly singling out cultural Genocide as a non-desirable inclusion in a Convention ... The present status, however, of the Draft Convention, is that it has been almost unilaterally ciphered [siphoned] off into SubCommittee 2 of the Legal Committee [which was already burdened with a heavy agenda] solely for procedural consideration. This slight-of-hand was accomplished primarily and almost solely by the parliamentary partisanship and deceit of el Khouri, who insisted on referring to this issue as ‘this Genocide business’.46 Abba Eban singled out Faris al-Khoury, whom he described as a ‘veteran Syrian statesman’, as leading the Arab assault to set aside the partition plan for Palestine in the Security Council in December 1947, so that Lemkin had a formidable opponent to contend with.47 It was on this occasion that Sir Hartley Shawcross made a violent attack on the draft convention. He declared that ‘unless such a convention were adopted by a majority it would do more harm than good. He cited instances where certain States would be reluctant to relinquish domestic jurisdiction by ratification of the convention, for example ... in matters relevant to the repression of subversive activities by political groups’.48 Lemkin remembered that ‘This statement made a very great impression on the Delegates’.49 Reporting to the AJC about the drift of opinion in the Legal Committee at the end of November 1947, Max Gottchalk remarked that ‘There is no doubt that Professor Lemkin’s untiring activity has influenced some of the small countries, but it seems that he wonders himself if he has not overdone it. I noticed that during yesterday’s session a messenger was giving out Western Union cables to delegates. After about half of them received it, and were openly making jokes about it, Professor Lemkin went over to the messenger and stopped further distribution’. The cable referred to expressions of agreement with the genocide convention by different prominent South American personalities, which have been received by the World Federation of United Nations Associations.50 A draft resolution was placed before the Legal Committee in November 1947, requesting the ECOSOC to continue its work concerning the suppression of the crime of genocide, including studying the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat and proceeding to its completion. This move was no doubt once again inspired by Lemkin, who was devoting all his energy to lobbying and pushing the genocide convention through the United Nations, and beginning to orchestrate a worldwide campaign among Jews, Christian

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groups, and the International Council of Women to bring recalcitrant nations into line. The leading opponents did not waver under this assault and an alternative resolution was placed before the committee by Russia, supported by the United Kingdom, which asked the ECOSOC instead to decide whether a convention was desirable or necessary, and if so, whether there should be a separate convention or whether the draft convention should go before the International Law Commission. This amended resolution which would have meant indefinite delay in the implementation of the convention was adopted by the committee by 22 votes to 18 on 20 November 1947.51 Lemkin, who was talking to delegates on a daily basis at the United Nations, was asked by friends in the press section at this time, ‘How is it going today, Dr Lemkin?’, John Hohenberg recalled. He would wave his hands. ‘Plots, plots against genocide’, he would say, and grit his teeth and shake his head. ‘But I will win in spite of all their plots’. ‘Who’s plotting against you, Dr Lemkin?’ one of us would ask in pretended innocence, knowing full well what the answer would be. ‘The British, the Russians ... Plots ... Plots52 There is evidence that Raphael Lemkin influenced the deliberations of members of the Legal Committee in some remarks in the draft brief to the United Kingdom delegation at the United Nations. The genocide discussions in the Sixth [Legal] Committee provoked spates of useless oratory, many delegates being influenced by a [an artificial; words crossed out] campaign which had begun in the United States largely at the instigation of one or more of the three experts [that is, Lemkin] employed by the Secretariat to prepare the draft convention, and which has been taken up strongly by Jewish organisations in the U.S.A. and other countries including the United Kingdom.53 Why were the Russians and the British so opposed to a genocide convention? Beth Van Schaack pointed out that if political groups were included in the convention, it would call into question ‘Stalin’s politically motivated purges of the kulaks (the petty bourgeois) during the forced collectivizations of agriculture in the late 1920s and early 1930s’.54 According to Terry Martin, Soviet ideological xenophobia fanned Russian nationalism which regarded Diaspora nationalities (Koreans, Germans, Poles and Finns) living on the borders of the Soviet union as disloyal because of conflicts over land and their resistance to the collectivization of farms. During the Second World War, the reliability of several nationalities (Chechens, Ingush, Balkars and Karachai) in the North Caucasus was also suspect because of previous decades of severe ethnic conflict. As a result, there had been huge deportations of the population of the Soviet Union during the Second World War, involving

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mass dispersals, particularly in the Caucasus, which might infringe some of the new provisions of international law.55 So too, when the legal experts at the Foreign Office surveyed the draft convention, they found many reasons for disliking it. Gerald Fitzmaurice (1901–1982) asserted that ‘As the convention stands, it might quite plausibly be argued that, were it in operation, His Majesty’s Government could be guilty of genocide in a number of cases, as for example against Germans in the British Zone [of Germany], against Jews in Palestine or against a number of colonial peoples’.56 In addition, the British delegation had changed their tack on the inclusion of political groups in the convention, their delegate arguing ‘that it was dangerous for States to sign a convention which precludes them from fighting subversive activities of’ these groups.57 Taking a gamble and challenging the obstruction of these two great powers, Lemkin, a private individual with no official position, approached Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil, then president of the General Assembly, and pleaded with him to be allowed more time to line up supporters for a substitute resolution, so that a convention could be put before the Assembly for approval in 1948. ‘ “Mr President”, said Lemkin, “who is making international law for the world –Vishinsky or the General Assembly? I ask this now because in 12 minutes you will begin presiding over a meeting which may decide to destroy the genocide convention by postponing it indefinitely. I appeal to you to hold off the vote” ’.58 Fortunately Lemkin’s bravado succeeded, and Aranha agreed to postpone the vote. This allowed Lemkin time to rally his supporters and two South American states, Panama and Cuba with Egypt, successfully put forward a resolution in the plenary session in November 1947 which ‘restored the subcommittee’s text of the operative part of the resolution’. Norway, France, the United States, Mexico, the Dominican Republic and China spoke in favour of the new resolution, while the United Kingdom and the USSR. spoke against it. The Chinese added an amendment to the resolution, requesting the ECOSOC to take into account the instruction to the International Law Commission to prepare a draft convention incorporating the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. The joint resolution of Panama, Cuba and Egypt was adopted on 21 November 1947 by 34 to 15 votes, while the Chinese amendment was passed by 29 votes to 15 with 8 abstentions.59 In addition, Lemkin’s spirits had been raised by a letter from a former colleague John Fried based in Germany. He told Lemkin that There is now a genocide case pending in Nuernberg [sic] – the case against the Einsatzgruppen, the leaders of which are indicted for genocide – the murder of more than one million persons ... Another case involving genocide will start soon, the case against leaders of several Nazi race organizations, such as the Lebensborn Organization of the S.S., the Reichssiedlunges-hauptamt,

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the organization ‘zur Festigung deutschen Volkstume’, etc. The subject will be murder, forced germanization, forced transfer of civilian population from belligerently occupied territories, kidnapping, etc. – as you see involving various aspects of genocide which so far have not been so widely discussed. I shall also send you material on this case.60 The machinations of the British against the convention remained a source of worry for Lemkin, so that he was always looking for new allies. ‘In the fall of 1947 Dr Lemkin came to me for help’, James Rosenberg recalled. I was Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and could see his need ... Despite Dr Lemkin’s marvelous achievement in winning General Assembly condemnation of genocide only a year before the convention already appeared to be a dead cock in the pit. It looked as if it was being gaffed to death by semantics. Sir Hartl[e]y Shawcross brilliant Attorney General of the United Kingdom, then delegate to the UN, was a leader of those who wanted to send the business of drafting the convention to a not-yet created committee of lawyers. This ... would mean committee-cide of the convention. Hence Lemkin and Rosenberg planned some new initiatives to counter the British diplomatic offensive.61 Reflecting on what had happened some six weeks later, Lemkin wrote to Gertrude Samuels, a leading writer on the New York Times, that The opposition was small but skillful ... It consisted of two types, political and legalistic. Some delegations, especially the Russian but also the British were not enthusiastic about the fact that there would be a legal basis for looking into the destruction of populations within their sphere of influence ... A great deal of deliberate confusion has been created by an ill-advised tendency from a small group of influential lawyers to mix the genocide issue with the larger projects of the codification of international law. They wanted jobs, honors and Mandarin ceremonies to go on for decades in international law committees. In your last editorial you called such committees ‘perfumed coffins’ ... You will be surprised to hear that the Legal Committee was won over by these intrigues ... But the next day we won an overwhelming victory in the [General] Assembly62 What the Foreign Office did not realize was that Lemkin’s lobbying of delegates at the United Nations was not just supported by a narrow alliance of Jewish organizations but was part of a wider campaign involving the international women’s movement, Christian religious leaders and later the American labour organizations, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and

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Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO).63 On 6 November 1947, Leonard Stein, the President of the Anglo-Jewish Association, had written to the Foreign Office: The Association does not suggest that the draft Convention prepared by the United Nations Secretariat should be accepted as it stands. The Consultative Council of Jewish Organisations has submitted a number of proposals for the improvement of the draft, and it is understood that extensive changes have been advocated by the United States Delegation in a reasoned memorandum. The draft may well be considered to need revision or even re-casting, but it is feared that the course recommended by the United Kingdom Delegation may, if adopted result in the whole matter being shelved. The Foreign Office responded to Stein with an evasive reply.64 Both the British Federation of Business and Professional Women and the International Council of Women vainly pressed the British government to support the genocide convention at the General Assembly.65 At the same time, Lemkin and Pearl Buck, a novelist and Nobel Prize winner, organized an appeal by many distinguished political leaders and intellectuals to the General Assembly, calling for the adoption of the convention. Among the recipients of this appeal was the Archbishop of Canterbury, who prevaricated by asking Pearl Buck to contact the World Council of Churches, which was dealing with the issue.66 The resolution passed by the General Assembly on 21 November 1947 reaffirmed the resolution of 11 December 1946 and declared that genocide was an international crime. It pointed out that many states had not yet submitted their observations on the draft convention, while noting that the ECOSOC had stated in its resolution of 6 August 1947 that it proposed ‘to proceed as rapidly as possible with the consideration of the question of genocide’. It requested the ECOSOC to continue its work on the suppression of the crime of genocide, including the study of the draft convention by the Secretariat, and to proceed with the completion of a convention taking into account that the International Law Commission, which will be set up in due course in accordance with the Assembly Resolution ... has been charged with the formulation of the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal, as well as the preparation of a draft code of offences against peace and security. It instructed the ECOSOC not to wait for all member states to submit their observations on the draft before commencing its work, and ‘to submit a report and the convention on this question to the third regular session of the General Assembly’. This resolution was a major set-back for Britain and Russia in their fight against the implementation of the genocide convention.

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Eric Beckett admitted as much, saying that ‘We have done quite satisfactorily except on the Genocide issue, where the amendments passed in plenary thwarted our efforts to quash the d[ra]ft convention’ Despite the British and Russian plans to ask the ECOSOC merely to ‘study’ the proposed convention, the drafting of a specific convention was requested.67 The American Conference of Christians and Jews started to put renewed pressure on their sister organization in Britain for the latter to contact the British government in order to elicit a change in attitude to the genocide convention. The Revd. Bill Simpson, the Secretary of the Council of Christians and Jews, then wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 7 January 1948, explaining that Our American Colleagues are anxious that the British Council of Christians and Jews should help ensure a favourable consideration of the matter when it comes before the Economic and Social Council at its meeting in February [1948] ... The members of the Executive, however, are reluctant to urge support for the Convention to be considered by the Economic and Social Council without a clearer understanding of the reasons which led to the change of attitude by the British representatives to the United Nations. The letter ended by requesting information which could assist the executive in forming their own judgment in the matter.68 The repeated interventions of the American Conference of Christians and Jews were not coincidental but bear the hallmarks of a carefully crafted policy by Lemkin and the leading officers of the organization, Dr Everitt R. Clinchy and John Rosenberg, to exert maximum pressure on the British government to encourage them to rethink their policy on the genocide convention rather than relying on abortive personal appeals to Shawcross. Out of this alliance eventually grew the beginnings of a new organization, the Committee for an International Genocide Convention. Within the Foreign Office, there was increasing scepticism as to whether the Council of Christians and Jews intervention could cause a change in their American colleagues’ point of view. ‘There is not, however, very much hope of the English Council of Christians and Jews being able to persuade their American colleagues to see the light’, wrote one official in a minute on 12 January 1948.69 A letter under the signature of Hector McNeil, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, was sent in reply to the Revd. Bill Simpson on 19 January 1948, but in reality it had been drafted by Sir Hartley Shawcross.70 He declared that ‘when the three experts nominated by the Secretariat of the United Nations had produced their draft convention, it became apparent that the production of a convention was a difficult and highly controversial matter,

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involving both legal and political issues’. If you take a look at the draft convention, ‘you will agree that there was room to doubt whether in fact many governments would be able to adhere to a convention of this type’. He reiterated that the British government wished to rely on the existing international law formulated at Nuremberg, but that if they abstained on the vote at the United Nations, this could only undermine what had already been established in law. The International Law Commission should conduct its work on genocide in connexion with the codification of the relevant decisions deriving from the judgment of the Nuremberg tribunal, another task which it has to do. But much of the substance of the original draft convention can in our view more profitably be dealt with in other ways. For instance, many problems of racial and other animosities manifested against individuals and groups in the form of persecution and discrimination are more properly the concern of the appropriate organ of the Human Rights Commission. With this in mind, the government sent the British Council of Christians and Jews a copy of the draft convention prepared by the United Nations.71 A few days later Revd. Bill Simpson answered Hector McNeil, thanking him for his ‘assurance that His Majesty’s Government take a very serious view of the problem of genocide’, and later telephoned the Foreign Office to say that the substance of the letter had been passed on to their American colleagues.72 The Americans were not entirely reassured by the reply and demanded to know whether or not the British had voted along with the Russians against the convention, which the Foreign Office was able to state had not been the case. The picture which emerges from the official papers is of a cosy relationship developing between Bill Simpson and various legal advisers at the Foreign Office, after frequent telephone calls on his part and his willingness to follow the Foreign Office point of view without too many questions and his reluctance to persuade his executive to adopt a tougher line with the British government.73 On 12 February 1948, the ECOSOC began a new discussion in New York on the subject of genocide in order to take it a stage further. The Venezuelan delegate opened the debate, by pointing out that The Council was not now concerned with the question whether or not there should be a convention on genocide. The Council must now produce a draft for the Assembly, and must presently refer the Secretariat’s draft convention to an ad hoc Committee to that end ... The French accepted the Venezuelan and the United States suggestions and said that the political and administrative questions involved must be settled before the convention was sent to the General Assembly.

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The British delegation reported that on the following day, Davidson (Canada) supported the United States proposal that an ad hoc Committee of the Council should be set up to prepare a draft convention on the basis of the Secretariat draft and the comments on it by Governments. He felt that this Committee should include those members of the Council who had already made comments with the addition of two or three members of the Council and aided wherever possible by legal and social experts ... China pressed for a speedy conclusion of the draft convention on the United States lines ...74 Once again Lemkin appeared to be working closely with the Venezuelan government, which had taken the initiative to ensure that there was a draft convention to present to the General Assembly. They had probably taken this step after his persistent urging. The British reported that the Venezuelans ‘Considered that the draft Convention went beyond the Assembly resolution, and involved an unjustified surrender of sovereignty ... Circumstances were not yet ripe for international criminal jurisdiction: Venezuela would therefore prefer a Convention by which member States undertook to adopt national criminal legislation ensuring the punishment of genocide’.75 This last proposal which was so closely modelled on Lemkin’s ideas must have been inspired by him. Britain and Russia continued with their opposition to the draft convention, but were overruled by almost all the other members, who wanted to see the setting up of an Ad Hoc Committee to draft the convention. The U.S.S.R. agreed with the United Kingdom that the concept of genocide needed to be much more clearly defined and that the Council was not in a position to discuss the substance of the matter at this stage as only very few members of the United Nations had yet submitted comments. He spoke at length on the need for a definition of genocide to cover the stirring up of racial and religious hatred by fascist and semifascist organizations. Britain introduced an amendment, requesting the Ad Hoc Committee to consider the desirably of referring genocide in its strict sense to the International Law Commission and in its other aspects to the Sub-commission on Discrimination of the Human Rights Commission. Poland accused the United Kingdom of indulging in delaying tactics and sabotage, and the British delegation withdrew their amendment after they thought they had made their point and when it looked as if they alone would be voting for the amendment.76 The British delegation claimed that they were told by an American representative in February 1948 that the United Kingdom proposals

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would be approximately their view if they ‘had the courage of their convictions’. But the Americans are now committed to a convention and are proposing that the Council set up a Committee of the Council composed of the four members who have submitted comments (Denmark, France, United States and Venezuela) with instructions to prepare a new draft for submission to the 7th session of the Council after reference to the next Session of the Human Rights Commisssion.77 The Venezuelans pressed for a committee of nine members including the five great powers to draft the genocide convention, using the present draft as their starting point and stipulating that the Secretary-General would merely advise this committee, whereas in the United States draft resolution the primary responsibility for the preparation of the draft would rest on the Secretary-General, who was to work with a smaller committee of four members. The British reported that ‘The resolution adopted is a truncated form of the Venezuelan draft with minor points from the American one’.78 The resolution was adopted unanimously at the plenary session of the ECOSOC on 3 March 1948 with the United Kingdom delegation being the only one to abstain from voting. Katz-Suchy, the Polish representative, had asked for unanimous approval of the resolution as an urgent necessity ... He reinforced his demand by citing a recent American judgment in a war crimes trial at Nuremberg in which the shooting by Germans of partisans was held no crime under the laws of war because partisans were not members of a regular and recognizable military force entitled to treatment as ordinary prisoners of war. In the names of millions of Poles slaughtered in the war he protested against this ‘monstrous judgment’.79 The resolution called on all states that had not transmitted their comments on the draft convention (document E/447) to do so at the earliest possible date. It established a committee composed of representatives from China, France, Lebanon, Poland, Venezuela, the United States and the Soviet Union. It was to meet at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York to draft the convention and to submit this draft with the recommendations of the Human Rights Commission to the next session of the ECOSOC.80 During 1946 and 1947, Raphael Lemkin had become an accomplished lobbyist in the corridors of the United Nations at Lake Success. He had been the chief source of inspiration for the first rough draft of the genocide convention, but he was still a long way from seeing this document translated into a legally binding code of international law. He had deftly sidestepped the obstructive tactics of the Arab states, which regarded his scheme as tactical weapon of the Zionists, and he had outsmarted the British and the Russians in the General Assembly, when they had wanted to consign the

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convention into oblivion – no mean feat for a solo player with only a few allies. He had gained the active support of the United States government and the interest of Jewish and Church organizations for the convention. He now had to ensure that the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the United Nations produced a workable document.

7 Private Life

Since his mother’s death, Raphael Lemkin had grown increasingly suspicious of other human beings, so much so that he was unable to trust another person sufficiently to enter into an intimate relationship with them, if they were female. His relationships with women tended to be brief, fracturing easily. In this chapter, I cover a series of short encounters between Lemkin and members of the opposite sex. But 1947 was a significant year for Lemkin in another respect; it was when he started his first serious research into the history of genocide, sometimes with the help of these women, who filled the roles of both girl friend and researcher at the same time. I shall also discuss Lemkin’s efforts to assist his brother Elias to move from West Germany to Canada, efforts that were clouded by Lemkin’s smouldering resentment about the supposed abandonment of his parents in wartime Poland by his brother. After the War, Lemkin again met the married woman he had been mesmerized by in Warsaw, who had migrated to the United States, but too much had happened in the intervening years. She had lost both her children during the Holocaust and the two of them found it difficult to resume their previous relationship. She moved to Chicago and dropped out of his life. He was also captivated by a young American woman he met in Nuremberg, when he was working there in 1946. She was possibly, Maryanne Shelley, ‘one of the few Americans who know Russian well’, whom Lemkin was trying to help obtain a position in Vienna.1 During 1947 while he was living in New York, Raphael Lemkin met two young women, Trudy (Gertrude) Sladek and Miriam Milliren, who assisted him with his researches for a new project on the history of genocide. With Trudy Sladek, a rather intense relationship developed. Trudy was a Czech Jewess, who had settled in the United States and went to work as a senior librarian for UNESCO in Paris. When they met, she was an attractive woman in her early thirties and Lemkin was in his late forties. At the time she was also becoming more attentive to her family’s Jewish roots. She explained to Lemkin that ‘I adored my father, who was not only the best, but also the 111

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most intelligent man whom I knew (may be it is the Electra complex which attracts me to older men!) and if I compare you to him, it is about the greatest compliment I can pay someone. I never felt close to my husband ...’2 She despised her mother, who had been incarcerated in the Theresienstadt concentration, where she had cooperated with the kapos, the Jewish guards, and had denounced large numbers of Dutch and Czech Jews for hoarding food, resulting in their being sent to an extermination camp, but had recently become reconciled to her at a time when she was terminally ill.3 In the course of a meal at a French restaurant in New York in June 1947 Trudy had said more than she intended to Raphael Lemkin, spilling out the details of her unhappy ten-year marriage to a man who had joined an anti-Semitic party as a youth in Czechoslovakia, though he loved eating Jewish food.4 She became involved with Lemkin through carrying out research for him on the Lusatians as part of his new genocide project. They were a Slav people living in eastern Germany, who were eventually subjected to intensive germanization campaigns in the nineteenth century. ‘I will bring you some more materials on the Lusatians ...’, Trudy Sladek told Lemkin, ‘You realize that this is just the first rough draft, not organized. I can write it up as soon as I get the entire material ...’. She already had ‘all the legislative references for the middle ages ... By the way Lessing was of Lusatian origin (Lesniak). Too bad – I always hoped ... “Nathan” [the Wise] was written by a Jew’.5 Trudy Sladek was drawn to Lemkin not only by their shared idealism but also by his wide-ranging and fascinating conversation about philosophy, literature and art whether it touched on the paintings of Bruegel or on the thought of the religious existentialist philosopher Soren Kierkegaard (1813–1851). On 27 June 1947 she wrote Lemkin a letter that shows the intensity of their relationship, stating that I am leaving anyhow [for Paris to take up her job with UNESCO] – so I really do not care –but this will all have to last me for the rest of my life. Please suit yourself – your health comes first – and anyhow I do not want to have any claims whatsoever – I am not jealous any more –as long as you are happy.6 A day later she told him that she wanted to go out with him once or twice more, that he would look nice in an evening suit, and that if he held himself straight he would look 20 years younger.7 Later she confessed that a mutual friend had remarked that Lemkin was ‘the smartest man she knows and also very good looking’, and that she, Trudy, was also very attractive.8 However, the relationship between them was emotionally turbulent; sometimes she was abject and apologetic, at other times she was nasty, and he could be wounding too. On 20 July 1947, she wrote to Lemkin that ‘I feel that I really have betrayed my father through my behaviour during last

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week – may be your mother too – but now I feel that everything is again settled’. Perhaps she was feeling guilty about her passionate attachment to Lemkin, which might have become physical, leaving her with feelings of disquiet, as she was still in the throes of her divorce suit. She admitted that there was a reconciliation with her mother because she was afraid of losing him.9 Her ‘life was dull’, but she was ‘not [as he had depicted her] exactly the Bovary type’, a provincial hankering for a more romantic and sexually exciting life, ‘You still do not trust me – I wish you would’.10 Lemkin always brought out the mothering instinct in his lady friends. Trudy told him that ‘My dear I am very concerned about your health and living conditions when I will be gone’.11 Sentiments which she repeated later. She also became very involved with Lemkin’s family concerns about the welfare of his brother Elias and his dependents, who were still living in Munich. Lemkin was making frantic efforts to arrange a passage for his brother to emigrate to Canada. On 30 June 1947, Miriam Milliren informed Lemkin that her friend Trudy Sladek had sent Elias a food parcel containing ‘chicken and turkey and ham, goose fat, fruit and milk! She has another box ready to be wrapped and taken to the post office also’. At the same time, Miriam had despatched her own food parcel for Lemkin’s family in Germany and had taken his belongings from his room in Washington to her own apartment for safe keeping. When Lemkin decided to relocate to New York on a permanent basis in the summer of 1948 so as to have easy access to the United Nations, he asked Miriam Milliren to inform his landlady, Mrs Alpar, that he was vacating his room in Washington on 1 July 1947. While working, Miriam still found time to carry out research for Lemkin on the Japanese oppression of the Koreans during their occupation of the country.12 In the first week of August 1947 Lemkin accompanied Trudy, when she boarded the Queen Mary in New York for her voyage to Europe, giving her a gift of flowers. She thanked him for the suggestion, which she was following, to leave her collection of books to the Hebrew University. Lemkin’s Zionist leanings though dormant were still there, but were concealed out of his concern not to antagonize the Arab states on the genocide issue. She felt uneasy about travelling on a British ship with Palestine closed to Jewish immigrants and millions of Jews still residing in Displaced Persons Camps. She also wondered if he could pick up an old Hebrew grammar, as she planned to visit relatives in Tel Aviv.13 Having settled in Paris to commence her new job at UNESCO, she suddenly had a premonition on 25 September 1947 that something was wrong with him, and begged him to write to her to reassure her, ‘However, apparently with the exception of your mother, nobody ever cared about you, so you cannot understand [my concern]’.14 A couple of weeks later she wrote again to thank him for his letter which arrived when she was feeling low and cold because of the fuel shortage in France, and worried by the tension between

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the West and the Soviet Union which she felt could erupt into a new Pearl Harbour. But Please do write me all about you personally. How you are. How do you manage to live and on what? I do not want to pry into your affairs, but I am thoroughly concerned and sincerely interested. You know that ... Don’t be such a damned coward! I am sorry we both have messed up things so much – but I have changed. She added ‘Who feeds you chicken livers and beigels?’ Moreover, in a burst of altruism and maternal concern so commonly evoked by Lemkin from girl friends, she remarked ‘Darling. Why don’t you marry Miriam [?] She would take excellent care of you. You need someone.’15 A few more letters followed from Trudy. But the more Trudy pursued him with offers to resign her position at UNESCO and return to the United States, the more Raphael Lemkin withdrew into himself and became uneasy about having to come close to a woman other than his mother. Trudy was disturbed by the anti-American attitudes and anti-Semitism so prevalent among the UNESCO staff.16 As a Christmas present she had sent him a map of pre-1775 Poland and she had also ordered books from Pedone for him; her expenses for the books and other material totalled $28–50, money which she badly needed.17 Infuriated by Lemkin’s silence and lack of communication, Trudy’s love transmuted itself into a cold, venomous fury. On 13 June 1948, Miriam wrote to Lemkin warning him that ‘Trudy’s venum [sic] toward you had so increased that she is a danger to you’. For a long time she had been writing to her in a similar vein and Lemkin had asked Miriam to fob off Trudy, by explaining that he had been ill and this was his reason for not writing to her. According to Miriam, Trudy informed everyone, who knew him ‘ “of the unscrupulous character of Dr Lemkin”, saying that ‘you owed her thirty dollars which you would not repay.’ She triumphantly recorded that they all replied that it sounded just like you’.18 Trudy had returned to Washington in June 1948, exclaiming that she made ‘a better friend than an enemy’. Miriam’s advice was that he had to take action to prevent Trudy from damaging his work further, as they had mutual friends in the United Nations and the State Department. On 5 September 1948, Miriam wrote to Lemkin that she had resigned her job in Washington to return to college and finish her studies and she too ceased to have regular contact with him.19 However, Miriam regarded their relationship as one of father and daughter and kept in touch with him from time to time over the years, as Lemkin himself was a hopeless correspondent. ‘I would love to see you – remember, I am your “grown-up daughter in Washington” ’, she told Raphael Lemkin in 1953, ‘and I love you ’20 Lemkin could be very charming and many women found this together with his unworldliness and little boy lost manner most attractive. One of

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his former secretaries, Rosemary McKay, wrote to him, Gee whiz, I sure enough was surprised but quite pleased with your heaven sent gift [of stockings], and the card was doubly sweet. You know, I was so tickled hearing from you that the card in itself would have been sufficient ... At least, I definitely was sure you were bringing sunshine to someone’s life! ... Please take care and may God bless and keep you well in all your activity. You have my love, may I hear from you soon?21 Another woman with whom Lemkin formed a romantic attachment probably in the years 1949–1950 was Hazel Metcalfe. She remonstrated with him for not writing, telling him that the strain of not hearing from him was intolerable. She was tied to looking after her elderly father, whose second wife had recently died. She had written to him a week ago without mailing the letter, not knowing whether or not his ‘silence was from illness or indifference’. In the earlier letter, she informed him that ‘My concern is a deep painful thing. So I don’t think you can possibly realize what you’ve given me in the past year, and I wish so much that I could repay you in some way, but feel so helpless to do so’. When writing to Lemkin she invariably called him darling and signed one letter ‘with much love’.22 In a later letter written in 1951 congratulating Lemkin on being nominated for the Nobel Prize after she lost contact with him, she advised him to ‘concentrate on rest, diversion and your vitamins’. She ended the letter somewhat playfully with ‘Best wishes always to my favorite son’.23 Their relationship seems to have followed the usual pattern of momentary closeness, followed by swift retreat on Raphael Lemkin’s part. Yet the woman who enjoyed the closest and longest relationship with Lemkin in these years was Elizabeth Nowinski. She described herself as his ‘Research assistant on Genocide [1946–1950] and on behalf of the Genocide Convention. Typed most of the material, at times was secretary, helped with publicity and interviewed various people’. Many of her letters were signed Bish or Bish Bosh-Bush. She had a coarse sense of humour, was nosy, extravert, and hectoring, keeping a careful watch over Lemkin’s activities and state of health, ‘I learned on the telephone last night that you are alive and enjoying your usual bad healt[h.] Everyman to his taste as the old maid said as she kissed the cow’.24 She also told him in no uncertain terms to consult a friend, who would be able to recommend a good Jewish dentist, an eye doctor and an able general practitioner.25 On another occasion she remonstrated, ‘You broke our pact – not to cause needless suffering to one another. How can one be so casual. I was under a cloud all summer ... Sleepless nights, nightmares – maybe you met with foul play’.26 Apart from these ladies, there were a number of other women Lemkin met through his scholarly work and activities at the United Nations: one was Anna May Barbour, who was employed in the editorial department at Lake Success, the other was Mrs Margot Doehler. Anna May Barbour undertook

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research for Lemkin on the Inquisition in Spain and France and the Quakers. Her earliest letters in 1948 contain expressions of her affection for him, while she was also solicitous about his health. She explained to him that she realized ‘that passive goodness is not enough. Your fight has been an inspiration to me, and your success no less hard-earned than well deserved’.27 Within a few years, however, she was writing to Lemkin about repaying a loan she had made to him ‘if and when it is convenient for you to settle it’, but gradually because of Lemkin’s failure to reply the correspondence petered out.28 Margot Doehler reprimanded Lemkin on 2 June 1948 for giving her the trouble of sending him a registered letter. You could save yourself and other people so much trouble by showing a little more consideration but you seem to think that ... in the end you will always find somebody to help you, that’s what you think. Yes, I am sensitive, and I know exactly when things are not as they should be and it hurts me very much. As I told you, I am planning to go to Cedar Lodge the last week in June, it would be nice if you could come there too. But I know that you will not do it, because when I ask ... you must always be alone and have rest from everybody. She added a postscript, saying ‘I hope you will be better soon. You just need a romance, that’s all, but of course not with me. Academic degree essential’. The pattern of her relationship followed that of his earlier romance with Trudy Sladek – pursuit by a woman, who was interested and caring and flight by Lemkin from the enchantress.29 Soon afterwards she insisted on the repayment of $843 which she had lent Lemkin, though nothing happened until she instructed lawyers to sue him for the debt.30 All these intense relationships with women were clustered in the post-War years. Apart from Milly Milliren, they had faded by the early 1950s, even if there were a number of female friends, whom he corresponded with and visited intermittently in connection with his campaign for the genocide convention. Lemkin liked to make the excuse that ‘he could not afford to fall in love’, that a relationship with a woman would have distracted him from his life work, the crusade against genocide. But had Lemkin married, it would have given him a wider perspective on life and might have lessened his paranoia and suspicion of others. He antagonized ‘many people with his insistence and impatience’.31 During the summer of 1947, Lemkin had been relying on the hospitality of his friends, the Lowensteins, and had been staying with them at 290 Riverside New York to be close at hand to the United Nations. By the autumn of 1947, he had to make alternative arrangements and was residing at 240 West 102nd Street New York, and had been borrowing money from such friends as Margot Doehler and Walter Glocer to pay for his rent and other

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living expenses, causing him to plunge deeply into debt.32 At the same time, Lemkin had requested Dr Kurt Grossman to prepare a paper on the ‘Economic Consequences of Genocide’ with special reference to international trade as part of a larger project on the history of genocide, agreeing to pay him $150 for the completed work. Somewhat typically, Lemkin became involved in an acrimonious legal dispute with Grossman regarding payment.33 To rectify his parlous financial situation, Lemkin started applying for academic positions, and in October 1947 he wrote to Professor Robert Oppenheimer at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton asking him about his chances of obtaining a fellowship. Oppenheimer sent a polite reply, but stated that because there was no one with the right background in international law or history it would be better for him to apply to one of the well endowed law schools. During the current year, they were desperately pressed for space and money. He could, however, apply again for membership of the Institute for the academic year 1948–1949.34 Raphael Lemkin was in poor health in the summer of 1947, when he went to stay with his friends, the Lowensteins, in New York to recuperate, and he was still complaining about his health in October.35 He was also beset by worries about his brother. Raphael Lemkin’s uncle Isadore Lemkin, who had a prosperous grocery business in Hartford Connecticut, had promised to sponsor the admission of Elias and his family into the United States, but reneged on the agreement. Thus Elias together with his wife Lisa and their two sons were still living in Munich. The eldest boy Saul was suffering from a kidney complaint which had been misdiagnosed by the doctors in Germany and had his appendix removed without improving his health. His parents continued to be anxious about his health and Lisa sunk into depression. She appealed to her brother-in-law to help them move from Germany, if not to America, at least to Palestine, so that they could start their life again. Far from being extinguished in the 1930s, the Zionist sentiments of Elias were still smouldering.36 While Lemkin was constantly racked by guilt about the plight of his brother’s family, his first priority was to the campaign for a genocide convention. As he told Dr Kalman Stein of the World Jewish Congress, ‘Unfortunately I have no money to pay for the [travelling] expenses of my brother since all my savings I put into the action I am leading now of which you are fully aware’.37 Raphael Lemkin’s family in Canada, including his cousin Israel Agulnik and his daughter Ruth, went to immense trouble to obtain the necessary visas for Elias and his family to be given permission to settle in Canada, where it had been arranged that Elias would work on a poultry and dairy farm. The Jewish immigrant aid society Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society of America (HIAS), however, would not advance the necessary travelling expenses.38 In the end, Raphael Lemkin used his contacts in the World Jewish Congress to ensure that the money for the voyage to Canada

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was provided by the Munich office of the Joint Distribution Committee. His bother Elias and his family sailed for Canada on the Cunard White Star liner, the ‘Scythia’, reaching Quebec on 14 November 1948.39 The Agulniks arranged temporary lodgings in Ottowa for Elias Lemkin and his family. However, Elias decided not to take up the position on the farm, as the farmer had a Pole working for him; Elias felt uncomfortable because of the anti-Semitism which he had previously to endure in Poland, including a pogrom in Wolkowysk in which a number of Jews were killed in 1939 before the Russians occupied the town. As he was unable to obtain alternative employment in Ottowa, Elias moved with his family to Montreal. Having borrowed 2,000 dollars from the Agulniks, Elias opened a grocery store in a Jewish area of Montreal, but after two years competition from a rival store forced him to close.40 Elias and Lisa endured great hardship in their early years in Canada having to peddle goods which they took to customers. To increase the family income, they removed their younger boy, Samuel, from school and found him employment. Saul went to a teacher training college, receiving a stipend while he studied which helped to support the family.41 There was some relief when his brother and his family immigrated to Canada, but there were still problems, like Elias refusing to take the farm job and ending up unemployed. Lemkin could not help much because his priority was the genocide work, and he threw himself into it with all his heart. But before he could advance the genocide issue, he had to find regular employment with loose constraints on his time, if he was to achieve anything.

8 Yale and Geneva

1948 opened auspiciously for Raphael Lemkin, who received an invitation to join the law faculty at Yale to lecture on the law of foreign exchange and the development of international law at the United Nations with the rank of visiting Professor from 1 March 1948. His contract was renewed on an annual basis and Lemkin stayed there until the end of the academic year 1950–1951. When Lemkin accepted the offer, he made it a condition of his acceptance that he would be allowed to give his campaign for a genocide convention priority over his teaching duties. Dean Wesley A. Sturges agreed, saying that ‘Making international law is as important as teaching it’.1 Lemkin had been living in conditions of privation since the autumn of 1947 and needed to return to work. As the manoeuvres of the British government to have the preparation of the genocide convention indefinitely delayed had been successfully thwarted by Lemkin’s adroit daily lobbying of delegates at the United Nations and his newly forged alliance with James Rosenberg; he no longer had to be based in Manhattan and was happy to take up the Yale appointment. In this chapter, I shall cover both Lemkin’s career at Yale and the intensification of his campaign for a genocide convention at the United Nations which resulted in the appointment of the Ad Hoc Committee to prepare a fresh draft of the convention. Realizing the limitations of being a lone campaigner, Lemkin began to work more closely with James Rosenberg and suggested the formation of a pressure group to support his actions in the United States and overseas. Dean Wesley A. Sturges gave Lemkin ‘a light lecture schedule’ as well as ‘supplying him with research assistance and secretarial facilities for his crusade’ against genocide.2 Although conservative in manner, Wesley Sturges recognized the significance of the genocide convention and gave Lemkin generous leave from his academic duties to attend the sessions of the United Nations at Geneva and Paris to bring his campaign to fruition. A Genocide Research Fund was established at Yale, Lemkin being paid by regular grants out of the fund. His colleague and friend Eugene Rostow 119

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informed Lemkin that the Dean was making approaches to the Viking Fund and that he had written to several other persons, who had made promises of money.3 While teaching at Yale, Lemkin gave a seminar on the law and practice of the United Nations, including legal disputes handled by the International Court of Justice and a course on international business transactions. Lemkin earned considerable credit with the Dean, by inviting John Matkos of the State Department to address the Yale Law School on the subject of the genocide convention.4 During his time at Yale, Lemkin continued with his research for a book provisionally entitled ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’. He also engaged a series of paid helpers to work on different aspects of the history of genocide. Hitherto his forays into this field had been perfunctory and I would date his first serious concern with the subject from 1947 onwards and particularly from his time at Yale, not as Mark Levene contends from the mid-1930s.5 One of his most promising research assistants was a female called Biffy, who went to Paris to comb through difficult sixteenth-century French material on the 1572 Massacre of the Huguenots on St. Bartholomew’s Day, and also did some preliminary research for him on the Nuremberg Tribunal. ‘I am making it [the chapter] fairly long as the Nazi case is so important, but I’ll explain that later when I send it’, she told Lemkin.6 In an earlier letter, she informed Lemkin that she was sending him two articles of Poliakov’s on the rescue, or attempts to rescue the Jews through different intermediaries, namely the Joint Distribution Committee etc. The one is on Hungary, and the other more general one ... [will] come out in the Monde Juive in a month or so ... As to your 2nd request on the Final Solution, he [Leon Poliakov of the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine] has just this morning given me the necessary documents and I shall start ... on them right away, and send you the material, then you can tell me if you need more, and he will give further references.7 Biffy’s relationship with her mentor Lemkin was both loving and a trifle cheeky, a factor which irritated him; he loathed being addressed as ‘dear genokid’. Lemkin introduced some of his findings from his historical research into his classes at Yale, giving his students time to absorb the knowledge which he was imparting. He stressed the moral blindness of many perpetrators of genocide. For example, when the Herero, a tribe in South West Africa, were driven with their cattle into a forest in 1896 which was set ablaze, the German consular official in his report only mentioned the destructions of cattle, not the human victims. On balmy spring nights, Lemkin would have long discussions with his students and their friends in the Yale Quadrangle, often captivating his listeners. His success could be measured by the fact that when

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he took his students to the United Nations and introduced them to some of the delegates, the students could talk with confidence on the subject of genocide and its ramifications.8 One of the ‘faithful and devoted’ students he inspired was Etienne Bloch, the eldest son of the great historian Marc Bloch, who switched from a career as a historian and became a judge and writer on human rights.9 While Lemkin charmed some of his students, who found him to be ‘sweet’ and appealing, there were other individuals who clashed with Lemkin and considered him to be a difficult and dogmatic character. Despite these tensions at Yale, Lemkin continued to focus on securing a genocide convention at the United Nations, a resolution was not enough. A convention would become part of international law, while a resolution would lack substance and could easily be ignored. A month before he joined the law faculty at Yale, he had already pleaded with his new ally James Rosenberg for more assistance in his campaign. James Rosenberg (1874–1970) was a remarkable New York insolvency lawyer and a talented painter, whose work was exhibited in the National Gallery in Washington. As a lawyer he participated in the reorganization of the Maxwell Motor Company which became the Crysler Corporation, and between 1932 and 1939 he handled the bankruptcy administration of Ivar Kreuger, the Swedish match King, recovering over $37 million, which was an outstanding achievement. He was a member of several New York clubs and on first name terms with prominent Wasp lawyers, such as John Foster Dulles. He was a cousin and friend of another lawyer Joseph Proskauer, the head of the American Jewish Committee, but less conservative and an early supporter of Israel and Zionism. Blessed with a painter’s eye to recognize artists of genius, Rosenberg amassed a collection of paintings by Matisse, Modigliani, Cezanne, Gaugin and Van Gogh.10 After Lemkin’s entreaties for help, James Rosenberg, the chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the National Conference of Christians and Jews turned to Willard Johnson, its programme director, who sent letters asking for the assistance of American religious leaders of all denominations. On 10 February 1948 at the behest of the National Conference of Christians and Jews a small group representing 128 religious leaders, Protestants, Catholics and Jews met Charles Malik, president of the Economic and Social Council, and presented a petition to him for a genocide convention.11 Educated in a Protestant mission school in Lebanon, Malik grew up as a lover of the bible and was a philosophy teacher.12 With a deep spiritual affinity to these leaders, Malik pledged his support for a convention. According to Lemkin Dr Walter Kotschnig [the American representative] had quoted this petition in his statement before the Economic and Social Council, and had stressed the necessity for the Council to comply with the request of the religious leaders and organizations; the above action of the group had been of great

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importance ... Up to that time, the draft convention on genocide had been shunted from committee to committee without result. However, after the February meeting with Dr Malik, and the attendant publicity, the Economic and Social Council created a seven nation Ad Hoc genocide drafting committee and appropriated a special budget for its work.13 At the same time, as we have seen Lemkin with the active support of Pearl Buck organized a manifesto signed by international celebrities calling for a genocide convention. Among those who signed this declaration were Edouard Herriot (1872–1957), the president of the French National Assembly; Count Folke Bernadotte, president of the Red Cross; Aldous Huxley; Francois Mauriac; and two more female prize winning writers, the poetess Gabriela Mistral (1889–1957) and the novelist Sigrid Undset (1882–1949).14 Nevertheless, the United Nations correspondent of the New York Post reported that this didn’t discourage a knot of busy internationalists who, for undisclosed reasons, have been conducting a vigorous corridor lobbying campaign against the enactment of a genocide convention at this time. These diplomats, some of whom aren’t even attached to delegations of U. N. members, still hope to stall the genocide campaign despite the wishes of an overwhelming majority of the Economic and Social Council.15 The Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide met at the United Nations at New York between 5 April and 10 May 1948 under the chairmanship of John Matkos, the United States representative, to thresh out the terms of a new draft convention, producing a report dated 24 May 1948. Lemkin stated in his memoirs that the report of the committee was prepared with his ‘participation behind the scenes’.16 After a week of deliberations, D.V. Sandifer reported to the State Department that The caliber of the personnel of the Committee seems to be unusually high. There is a rather even and delicately balanced division in the Committee with the French and Chinese representatives at present working in accord with the United States; the Polish delegate of course follows the Russian lead, which leaves the balance in the hands of the Lebanese and the Venezuelan delegates. One or more of these has tended recently on some important points to vote with the United States, France, and China, although during the first week their tendency seemed to be in the other direction.17 The first point of contention was a proposal by France which noted that genocide, while possessing specific characteristics, should be classified in

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the preamble to the convention as ‘a crime against humanity’. The other members of the committee disagreed, partly because these crimes had been clearly defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and partly because the 1946 resolution separated genocide from the other crimes which the International Law Commission would be asked to codify. Second, the Soviet Union requested that the words ‘the aim of genocide is the destruction of separate human groups on racial, nationalistic or religious grounds’ should be added to the preamble. This proposal, too, was rejected by other members of the committee. Third, the Soviet Union stated that the parties to the convention should ‘declare that the crime of genocide is organically bound up with fascism–Nazism and other similar race “theories” which preach racial and national hatred, the domination of the so-called higher races and the extermination of the lower races’. Other members of the committee objected that history ‘revealed many previous cases of genocide’, and once again the amendment to the preamble was rejected.18 Then the committee proceeded to discuss the various clauses of the treaty section by section. While the committee were unanimously in favour of protecting national, racial and religious groups, there was dissension as to whether or not political groups should be included. The Soviet Union and Poland suggested that political groups lacked the stability of the other groups and that their inclusion would undermine the purpose of the convention which was to shield national, racial and religious groups from destruction. After a vote, the inclusion of political groups was narrowly accepted by four votes to three.19 Article 3 of the proposed convention defined ‘cultural’ genocide as destroying the language, religion or culture of groups by prohibiting the use of a language in daily intercourse or in schools or publications and demolishing or preventing the use of schools, libraries, historical monuments or places of worship belonging to a particular group. It was argued that the concept overlapped with the violation of human rights and the rights of minorities, and that if these rights were properly protected, ‘cultural’ genocide could be prevented. Many states, it was contended, would object to the inclusion of ‘cultural’ genocide, and that if it was included in the provisions of the convention this might prevent many countries from ratifying the treaty, thereby undermining its efficacy. Despite the vehement opposition of the United States to the inclusion of ‘cultural’ genocide in the convention, this article was adopted by six votes to one. The Soviet Union wanted to include a section in the convention making punishable the following acts: ‘All forms of public propaganda (press, radio, cinema, etc.) aimed at inciting racial, national or religious enmities or hatreds or at provoking the commission of acts of genocide’. This proposal was rejected by five votes to two.20 Article 5 stipulated that heads of state and private individuals were to be punished for acts of genocide. An attempt by the Soviet Union and Poland to add the words, the ‘command of the law or superior orders shall not

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justify genocide’ was, however, defeated. The representative of Venezuela pointed out that ‘The Charter of the Military Tribunal of Nurnberg admitted that principle having in mind the crimes of war, but to attempt it in time of peace is to invite the armed forces to disobedience, when they are in themselves a non-political body, bound to obedience and non-deliberative’.21 Article 7 stated that persons charged with genocide shall be tried by national courts of the territory in which the offence was committed or by a competent international tribunal. While everyone agreed to repression by national courts, the establishment of international jurisdiction led to disagreement in the committee. Those supporting such an international jurisdiction claimed that if it was lacking, the most serious cases of genocide would go unpunished because the courts in the territory of the states where the most serious offences had occurred would be reluctant to punish the perpetrators. Those opposing the intervention of an international court declared that it would infringe the principle of the sovereignty of states. Further they stated that at present there was no international court with criminal jurisdiction. Either a new court would have to be created or a new criminal chamber would have to be added to the International Court of Justice. When a vote was taken four states (China, France, Lebanon, the United States) supported the principle of international criminal jurisdiction and the two Slav states unsuccessfully opposed it. The committee also voted for the inclusion of the words ‘or by a competent international tribunal’. But when the United States tried to have the international tribunal decide in the first instance whether or not a state had failed to take action against the perpetrators of genocide before it tried the case, this proposal was rejected. Other states felt that this might call into question the court’s jurisdiction.22 ‘The principle of universal repression by a national court of individuals who had committed genocide abroad’ was also ventilated in the committee. Since genocide was mostly committed by those in power in a state, they would be unwilling to try offenders in their own courts. Hence when the authorities of another state arrested offenders, they should be entitled to try them in their own courts. The supporters of this principle ‘added that, since genocide was a crime in international law, it was natural to apply the principle of universal repression. They quoted conventions on the repression of international offences such as traffic in women and children, counterfeiting currency, etc’. As this last point was a long standing argument of Lemkin, it is possible to detect his influence behind this debate. The opponents of universal repression held that the concept conflicted with ‘the traditional principles of international law and that permitting the courts of one State to punish crimes committed abroad by foreigners’ infringed ‘the sovereignty of the State. They added, that, as genocide generally implied the responsibility of the State on the territory of which it was committed, the principle of universal repression would lead national courts to judge the acts of foreign governments. Dangerous international tension might result’. Hence the

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committee rejected the incorporation of this principle in the convention by four votes to two.23 On 30 April 1948, the committee voted as to whether or not to accept the convention as a whole and the overwhelming majority of its members voted in the affirmative, including China, France, Lebanon, the United States and Venezuela, while the Soviet Union voted against the convention and Poland abstained. Although Britain had been invited as a great power to join the committee, it had cleverly refused the invitation, as it did not want to put in any constructive work in shaping the convention which it hoped would fail. Russia submitted a document explaining its vote. On the one hand, it praised the committee for adopting many of the principles in the convention which it supported – the concept of cultural genocide, such punishable acts as the instigation of genocide and conspiracy to commit it, not allowing the perpetrators of genocide the defence that their act was a political one and making the creation of conditions aimed at the extinction of human groups an offence. On the other hand, it criticized the committee for including political groups in the objects of genocide, thereby neglecting the destruction of national, racial and religious groups and ignoring the Nazi race theories, and it condemned the fact that public propaganda aimed at instigating genocide was not banned by the convention nor was the manufacture of materials or products intended for the perpetration of genocide. Another matter which rankled was that the committee refused to countenance the banning of parties which stirred up, racial, national and religious hatred. Poland issued a statement explaining its abstention, despite wishing to be one of the first signatories to such a convention by the fact that many of its earlier suggestions had been ignored, but it was still hoping to achieve a more acceptable text.24 On 23 April 1948 the inaugural meeting of the Committee for an International Genocide Convention took place at the New York home of James Rosenberg with the attendance of prominent Church leaders and Raphael Lemkin. Revd. Bill Simpson admitted to a Foreign Office official that they were ‘a fairly strong group’.25 As we have noted James Rosenberg was chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ), reconstituting his group as a national support organization for Lemkin. Willard Johnson, the programme director of the NCCJ, was given a pivotal role as the general secretary of the new pressure group. Among the important churchmen on the committee were Dr Samuel McCrea Cavert, general secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, and Dr Henry Noble MacCracken, co-chairman of the International Council of Christians and Jews. The committee’s aim in the first instance was to attract a mass public following and secure a favourable outcome to the deliberations of the next session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which was due to meet at Geneva in the summer by sending representatives to lobby delegates in the conference hall, and efforts

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were, also, made to ensure that Dr Everett Clinchy, president of the NCCJ, participated in the lobbying. In May the new organization was strengthened by Major John A.F. Ennals, the secretary-general of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, who was based in Geneva, becoming an ex-officio member of the committee, and it was decided to invite the adherence of prominent individuals such as Pearl Buck and Allen Dulles and the support of labour representatives and women’s organizations.26 Lemkin was only reluctantly persuaded to become a committee member of the new organization which seems to indicate that the initiative for the foundation of the genocide support group came from the Human Rights group of the NCCJ, not from Lemkin. However, Lemkin confided to John Matkos that ‘he was instrumental in bringing it [the new committee] into existence, a thing which ... [Matkos] never doubted’.27 Because of the difficulty in obtaining instructions from foreign associations, it was decided to change the name of the organization to the United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention. There was also a generation gap between Lemkin and Rosenberg. Although the relations between the two men were cordial, despite occasions when they quarrelled over policy, they remained somewhat stiff. On 11 June 1948, Rosenberg scrawled a couple of lines to a typed letter which gives some indication of their relationship. ‘It has been a privilege to work with you. Keep calm. Don’t overwork’.28 In contrast to the old boys network which allowed Rosenberg to address John Foster Dulles by his first name in correspondence, this was never the case when he wrote to Lemkin. Among the points emphasized by Rosenberg in a letter to the British Council of Christians and Jews (CCJ) in April 1948 was that the committee had resolved to include the prohibition of the destruction of places of religious worship in the genocide convention. He suggested that when the draft convention was considered by the Human Rights Commission, the Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal Griffin, the Catholic leader, should write to Eleanor Roosevelt its chairman to press for the inclusion of this provision in the convention, as he feared that it would be omitted at this stage.29 The Revd. Bill Simpson of the CCJ regarded Rosenberg as ‘emotional and impractical’, and he told the Foreign Office official with whom he was liaising that he intended to inform Rosenberg that the British government like the American had always been opposed to the concept of cultural genocide and that, therefore, it was pointless writing to the Archbishop, who agreed that their attitude was a sensible one.30 During the winter and spring of 1948, Lemkin, who had now joined the law faculty at Yale, lectured and busied himself researching material for a new book on ‘The History of Genocide’. To save money he rented a cheap $5-aweek room in New Haven, and worked on the expulsion of the Moors from Spain.31 At a meeting of the new pressure group to combat genocide on 13 May 1948 Rosenberg remarked that ‘he hopes Dr Lemkin will be able to attend

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the July UN meetings on funds provided by the committee, if Dr Lemkin is physically able to do so. (He has been ordered by his doctor to take a 3 weeks rest because of high blood pressure)’.32 Then towards the end of July 1948 Lemkin received a cable from a close ally Ambassador Perez Perozo of Venezuela which warned him that a meeting of the ECOSOC was due to take place in Geneva. The Council’s approval of the genocide convention was of the utmost importance, if the General Assembly which was due to meet in Paris in September 1948 was to vote in its favour. Hence Lemkin was keen to go to Geneva to sound out the support for the convention among the delegates on the ECOSOC. Lemkin felt sufficiently recovered from his bout of ill health to make immediate plans to fly to Geneva.33 At Lemkin’s behest Sir Zafrulla Khan, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, requested Dr Malik to bring to the attention of the ECOSOC his country’s charge of genocide against India in the Security Council, urging the rapid implementation of the convention.34 Pakistan’s charge of genocide against India in its treatment of Moslems was aired in the Security Council on 28 January, 7 May and 3 and 8 June 1948. The Pakistani delegate to the Security Council reiterated that he was ‘unable to accept the suggestion of the representative of China that the question of genocide and non-implementation of certain agreements be dropped by my Government’.35 These Security Council discussions, of course, kept the genocide issue in the public eye. British attempts to block the adoption of a convention against genocide or have it shunted to the International Law Commission met with the approval of a group of French lawyers who had participated in the Nuremberg Trial. Rosenberg told Victor Gollancz that if the convention was sent to the International Commission, ‘the whole effort would be lost in the fogs and bogs of grammarians’ funerals’. He warned John Slawson of the American Jewish Committee (AJC) that There are some French lawyers who are connected in one way or another with the United Nations, whether officially or not I do not know ... They have, according to reliable information in my possession, been persuaded that the whole subject of genocide should be referred to an International Law Commission, which is the most perfect way I know of to kill the whole effort. Moses Moskowitz of the AJC advised on the necessity of René Cassin intervening with Professor de Vabres, who was ‘the man behind the French Lawyers Club’.36 Meanwhile in the early June 1948, James Rosenberg travelled to Washington to confer with State Department officials on the attitude of the United States government to the genocide convention prior to his trip to England. On 9 June 1948, accompanied by Lemkin, he met Ernest Gross in accordance with a suggestion of the Under-Secretary of State, Robert Lovett,

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who wished to hear the views of their group on the convention. Gross made it clear that the American government wished to retain the protection of political parties in the convention, while Gross was open to their suggestion as to an international tribunal.37 Later Rosenberg informed Lovett that ‘there is a real chance for the adoption of a Genocide Convention if you and your colleagues, and all the private organizations which are deeply interested, keep working at the matter. I hope that I may be able to accomplish something in England’. He found the officials most helpful, but hoped that some kind of an Article VII, dealing with implementation [the setting up of a court system to try offenders], will remain in the Convention. I do not mean a detailed plan of immediate implementation but I do mean something along the lines which Mr Gross so constructively suggested, namely the provision for the creation of a court of competent jurisdiction ‘to be constituted by or under the United Nations’.38 Lovett wrote to the American Ambassador to Britain Lewis Douglas with reference to Rosenberg’s forthcoming visit, so that he should have the necessary advice and help when speaking to British representatives. He also informed him that Rosenberg, as chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the NCCJ, was ‘favorably known’ to the State Department.39 At the same time, Rosenberg contacted Foster Dulles, saying that Thinking back to your magnificent work in bringing together Catholics, Protestants, and Jews in support of human rights, I feel confident that, despite the many duties which are on your shoulders, your interest in this profoundly important human subject has not decreased ... The main danger of defeat of a convention on genocide, so far as I see, is the apparent opposition of the British.40 In reply Foster Dulles told Rosenberg that ‘I had dinner last night with Mrs Roosevelt and I talked over with her and some of the State Department people the status of the Genocide Convention. You may be sure that it has my sympathy and support, and that I am trying to push it ahead’.41 Before leaving for Britain by ship on 14 June 1948, Rosenberg conferred with Charles Malik, the newly elected president of the ECOSOC, telling Julie Stuart of the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA) that ‘Dr Malik ... has been extremely helpful’ and that associated organizations should be mobilized to inundate him with letters.42 Rosenberg also looked forward to Malik’s leadership role as regards the implementation of the genocide convention in the ECOSOC and the General Assembly.43 On 16 June 1948 the Human Rights Commission, of which Malik was also a member, meeting in New York considered the new draft of the genocide convention. ‘Due to lack of time’, it noted,

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the Commission was not able during its third session to cover the draft Convention thoroughly and therefore is not in a position to make any observations concerning its substance. However, the Commission is of the opinion that the draft Convention represents an appropriate basis for urgent consideration and decisive action by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly during their coming sessions. A tricky hurdle had been cleared and it was an important moment for Lemkin, whose cause had been swept along to success by the post-War euphoric mood which was shared by many of the delegates on the Commission, who wanted to create a new world order.44 Because of family commitments Rosenberg was unable to travel to Geneva, but before he left England he arranged a meeting in London in the last week of June with Dr MacCracken and John Ennals to coordinate policy prior to the Geneva meeting. They agreed that political groups should be omitted from the convention, that cultural genocide should be limited to acts of collective violence against the language, religion or culture of a national, racial or religious group aimed at their destruction, and that persons charged with genocide should not be tried by an International Court.45 Earlier James Rosenberg had noted in a memorandum to his colleagues in the Committee for a Genocide Convention that the inclusion of political groups in the treaty has aroused serious objection from Great Britain, Latin America, and the Soviet Union, and from various thoughtful men, including American citizens. To leave this word ‘political’ in the definition therefore means that when the matter comes up in Geneva in July before the Economic and Social Council and again before the General Assembly in Paris in September, it is more than likely that there will be such opposition to the definition as to kill our efforts altogether.46 After his briefing at the State Department before his trip to Europe, Rosenberg seems to have wavered for a time in his opposition to the inclusion of political groups in the convention because of the State Department’s hard line on the issue. This is indicated by his subsequent conversation with British Foreign Office Officials. During his visit to England James Rosenberg accompanied by Dr Henry Noble MacCracken, an influential American churchman, and in the company of Revd. Bill Simpson went on 29 June 1948 to the Foreign Office to confer with officials on the progress of the draft genocide convention and to ascertain whether a direct approach could influence the thinking of British policy makers before the meeting at Geneva. With regard to including political groups in the convention, Rosenberg thought that they should continue to do so and ‘not sacrifice a point of principle for this problematic

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support’ of the Slav bloc of countries. He realized that Article 3 dealing with the definition of ‘cultural’ genocide as at present drafted would not be approved and suggested that it should be deleted and the following words substituted: ‘Any deliberate act of collective violence committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national, religious or racial group’. Moreover, he believed that Article 7 which referred to a competent international tribunal ‘was too vague and should be strengthened by the addition of the words “to be created under the authority of the United Nations” or that the Article should be omitted altogether’. Two General Assembly resolutions, he declared, had supported the idea of a genocide convention and it would cause ‘great disillusion’, if it was not forthcoming. Dr MacCracken added ‘that Churches and minority groups in the USA such as the Jews and the Poles much wanted a Convention and would be disappointed if it failed to the extent that they might seriously affect the election’. The British Foreign Office could now have been under no illusions that support for the genocide convention in the United States was merely confined to a small Jewish lobby.47 While on his trip to London, James Rosenberg also met Hector McNeil (1907–1955), the under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office, through the intervention of the American Ambassador Douglas. Reporting to his colleagues on the United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention, Rosenberg mentioned that he told Mr McNeil that there was a great danger in the British position that the Genocide Convention should be referred to an International Legal Commission, not yet even created. This is not a job for lawyers and I speak as one. It is a task for statesmen. Not lawyers but statesmen wrote Magna Carta and the United States Constitution. He claimed that McNeil ‘was friendly’ and Ambassador Douglas was ‘strong’ for the convention.48 By now the campaign of the United States Committee for a Genocide Convention was making headway in international opinion and was becoming a formidable force. A British government report noted on 12 July 1948 that a large body of public opinion in many countries had shown itself in favour of a Convention. Support has been forthcoming from the World Federation of United Nations Associations, and in this country from the Council of Christians and Jews and various other religious bodies, particularly those with connexions with America where several religious organisations have formed a society to support a Genocide Convention.49 Following the example of Rosenberg, Lemkin met John Matkos at the State Department on 16 July 1948 before his European trip. It was decided

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that in the event of the adoption of the convention being endangered the State Department would give further consideration as to whether or not to include political groups. As the United States was opposed to the inclusion of cultural genocide, it was not appropriate for their representative to suggest modifications to this article. Matkos reported that ‘Lemkin resorted to his pet theory of universal jurisdiction. Article VII provides that crimes should be punished in the territory of the state in which they are committed. He thought that other states should have jurisdiction to punish this crime’, citing the example of Schwartzbard, who in Paris assassinated a Ukrainian leader responsible for pogroms. Matkos ‘informed him that for obvious reasons the department was not in favor of universal jurisdiction. He [Lemkin] thought that by adding ... [a] provision to the extradition article, it will be sufficiently disguised to prevent detection’.50 Moreover, Lemkin remarked that James Rosenberg was about 75 years old and that he might have been influenced indirectly by ‘sinister forces’ in the person of Vespasian Pella to omit articles from the convention dealing with the court system to try such cases and the reference of disputes as to the interpretation of the convention to the International Court of Justice. He had persuaded Rosenberg to delete this request from his letter of 12 July 1948 to Jack Tate, a legal adviser at the State Department.51 This shows a slightly warped and paranoid streak in Lemkin’s way of thinking, when he encountered what he imagined was opposition to his ideas, but this was not the first clash between Lemkin and Professor Pella, who had been his sponsor in international law circles. A few months earlier on 20 April 1948 an item had appeared in the Washington Post by the well-known columnist Drew Pearson accusing Pella, when he was the Romanian Minister to Switzerland during the War, of being associated with the Fascist Antonescu government which was implicated in the slaughter of 300,000 Jews. Pella was also said to be close to Anna Pauker, the post-War Communist leader of Romania. Despite this, he was consulted by State Department officials, and was believed to have engineered the sudden U.S. shift of policy regarding genocide ... Instead of backing a genocide convention with teeth, U.S. Delegate John Matkos was ordered to confine the crime of genocide to governments. This would nullify the treaty, as a government could claim rioters, uncontrolled by government, committed wholesale murders.52 The day after the press report appeared, Vespasian Pella went to see John Matkos to complain about Lemkin, whom he blamed as the instigator of the Drew Pearson story. He produced documentary evidence showing that he had in fact aided and saved thousands of Jewish lives during the War.53 He also showed Matkos a publication, in which he had stated that the complicity of governments should not be required to constitute the crime of genocide.

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During the preliminary discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee, Matkos had at first taken the position that the complicity of governments was required in the case of genocide, but because of the opposition of the other members of the committee, whom Lemkin had probably approached, the United States had dropped this proposal.54 Lemkin felt very strongly on this matter, drafting a memorandum dealing with it for the State Department. He noted that The responsibility of individuals is essential, because genocide in most of the cases was committed through groups of individuals blinded by hatred and intolerance. The Nuremberg case is not the only one of genocide. Governments might instigate such crimes, but they are always masters in hiding evidence ... Factually, if genocide will be treated as a crime only when it is committed with the complicity of governments, a genocide case will never be tried.55 On 23 July 1948 Raphael Lemkin funded by the Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention flew to Geneva to lobby delegates to a meeting of the ECOSOC, arriving there the next day. Assistance for him was at hand, John Ennals of the World Federation of UN Associations was based there, and Dr MacCracken was on a visit due to address both the International Council of Christians and Jews and the ECOSOC.56 It was Lemkin’s first visit to the city since 1938 and was an emotional occasion as he once again paced through the corridors of the Palais des Nations formerly used by the League of Nations. As far as New York was concerned, the venue in Geneva was a mere sideshow of the United Nations, but feelings of melancholy overwhelmed Lemkin, as he paced through the ornate rooms and contemplated the irretrievable errors of history. He entered the room reserved for the meeting of the ECOSOC and conferred with his friend Ambassador Perez Perozo of Venezuela and other delegates. True that the genocide convention was on the agenda, but the majority of the delegates were not particularly interested. There were still two or three weeks left before the topic of genocide was reached on the agenda. It was up to him to stir up public opinion and to prod the delegates into action.57 Feeling a fresh surge of energy, Lemkin called on Ambassador Gilberto Amado of Brazil, an acquaintance of several years standing, in his room at the Hotel de Paix the next day. Amado was a Professor of Criminal Law as well as being an outstanding novelist, a bon vivant and connoisseur of high-class food and French wine and a lively conversationalist. When Pearl Buck had written to him in 1947 concerning the genocide convention, he had sent a helpful reply. ‘Lemkin is a generous fanatic, but we like his ideas and are supporting them’, and now he was smiling as Lemkin entered the room. Not wishing to seem a bore, Lemkin tried an indirect approach before broaching the subject of genocide. He asked Amado about the novel he was currently writing and was informed that it concerned a woman who beguilingly kissed

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her lover by endlessly ‘extending ... her lower lip’. After they exchanged views on a colleague’s new book, it was Amado, who in fact asked Lemkin what was going to happen to the genocide convention at the current meeting of the ECOSOC? ‘Well, Mr Ambassador’, Lemkin replied, ‘that is for you to decide. Latin America is the reservoir of active humanitarianism. This is an issue which is very congenial to the Latin American delegates and I hope that they will put up another fight’. ‘We will see’, Amado answered, ‘we will have to sound out our friends’. Lemkin then steered the conversation back to the safe subject of food and wine before they parted.58 Lemkin followed this up the next day by a visit to the WFUNA headquarters, where he spoke to its secretary-general, Major John Ennals, an old friend and doughty fighter. The office of the association was situated at 1 Avenue de la Paix, Geneva in the Villa Rigot, a rather dilapidated building and everything was run on a shoe-string budget, but many of the staff were dedicated and were prepared to work for a pittance so long as they could be involved with such work and meet interesting visitors. On 19 July 1948, Julia Stuart had written to Ennals from the New York office of the WFUNA with a batch of letters from major organizations in support of the genocide convention.59 For many months Julia Stuart and Ennals had been coordinating an international campaign for a genocide treaty at the behest of Rosenberg and Lemkin. At the latter’s instigation she advised Ennals to have the letters printed as a ‘blue document’ for distribution to members of the ECOSOC. Among the ECOSOC documents which are extant are the letter from Sir Mohamed Zafrulla Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, to Charles Malik urging him to proceed with the completion of the genocide convention on behalf of ‘thirty million Muslims now facing extermination’,60 and a cable from Stuart to Trygve Lie on 15 July 1948 stating that the International League of Catholic Women with 36 million members and the International Transport Federation representing four million members in 45 countries wanted a ‘speedy adoption of the convention ... 46 Organizations met [on] 17 June 1948 in New York for strengthening UN through religion and adopted strong resolution condemning genocide’.61 After they discussed some of their next moves in the campaign to secure a genocide convention, John Ennals led Lemkin into the garden of the villa. Here they chatted with Dr Azmi and Mr Alaoui, journalists from Egypt and Morocco, both were useful contacts. Azmi was credited with coining an Arabic word for culture and this naturally led on to talk of the origins of the term, genocide. Lemkin agreed with Dr Azmi that words helped to ‘crystallize our thinking. They become symbols for action, they are rallying points for past human experiences and a program for the future’. Alaoui listened carefully, asking if he could write up the conversation for his newspaper in Morocco, to which Lemkin agreed.62 By way of illustration of the danger of ‘cultural’ genocide Raphael Lemkin touched on the history of Iceland, a nation of ‘some hundred and eighty eight

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thousand persons. This small nation’, Lemkin remarked, ‘has an original culture and defends it stubbornly and consistently; it has its own language, its own theater, four political parties, and a newspaper for every one of them. It has a very old bible in its University Library, which I saw during my visits in Reykjavik. It has also one of the world’s oldest parliamentary bodies, the Althing. Suppose somebody decides to commit genocide on the Icelanders. Together with the 188,000 persons an original culture would disappear from the world forever. A culture cannot be recreated artificially like synthetic rubber ... genocide of a nation means the destruction also of its culture; it means, also, the impoverishing of world civilization’.63 Lemkin’s deep rooted interest in the subject of the prevention of cultural genocide, to which he kept returning, was heavily influenced by his pre-War experiences in Poland and Bundist ideology. During the first three weeks of August 1948, Lemkin toiled feverishly to activate the campaign for a convention, sometimes calling at hotels to lobby delegates or taking other practical steps to mobilize public opinion.64 With the assistance of Ennals and Claire Brossard of the WFUNA, attempts were made to arrange radio and press conferences for Lemkin and a genocide fact sheet was prepared for distribution to delegates and organizations for them to cable their support.65 By 21 August 1948, Lemkin declared that he had incurred expenses of $550–600 in connection with the campaign for a genocide convention; this included ‘postage, cables, telephones and salaries’.66 As there were still two weeks or more to go before the key meeting of the ECOSOC on genocide, John Ennals arranged two public lectures: one in a United Nations building to which delegates were invited; the other at the summer school sponsored by his association which had attracted 76 students from 19 countries.67 Lemkin then drew on his current research, reading passages from his files on the history of genocide to his audiences to show that such incidents were not carried out at the whim of rulers, but regularly occurred when certain historical situations arose. He was asked whether or not genocide had happened in the Far East, to which he replied by quoting the example of the widespread massacre of Catholic converts in seventeenthcentury Japan. ‘They were compelled to drink water until their bodies were completely bloated’, he asserted. ‘Then all the openings of their bodies were closed with cement; they were put in a lying position, covered with planks and then carts with heavy loads, led by horses’ walked ‘over the planks. The bodies of the victims exploded with a strange liquid of water and blood. So perished the 50,000 Catholics’. Other accounts place the number of victims of this massacre at well over 30,000. When Lemkin was asked how genocide could be combated, he suggested that the problem had to be tackled at both the national and international level: nationally it should be made an offence in the criminal code and punished in the same way as other crimes; internationally cases of genocide should be tried by the World Court at the Hague or dealt with by organs of the United Nations. The main point was to make

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mankind appreciate the cultural contribution of minorities and small nations to world civilization and the loss that would ensue if they were slaughtered like chickens.68 In the middle of August 1948, Lemkin was alarmed to discover that the United States delegation had made a secret deal with the British placing discussion of the issue of genocide to the bottom of the ECOSOC agenda. This meant that there would be no time to consider and approve the draft convention during the current meeting of the ECOSOC, when they had been close to adopting it. Lemkin told Dr MacCracken, the vice-chairman of the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, that A member of the American delegation told me that the British delegation will not oppose the genocide convention under the condition that the draft will not be discussed at the present meeting of the ECOSOC. Apparently under the influence of the promise, the American delegation proposed [made a proposal] which would prevent the discussion of the draft convention by the ECOSOC, namely, the United States delegate proposed to change the place of genocide on the agenda from Number 2 to the bottom of the list.69 Lemkin was appalled, fearing that this was another British subterfuge to block the convention and sent a cable on 16 August 1948 to Julia Stuart in New York instructing her to ‘inform committee urgently organize despatch cables Washington and Delegation Geneva from American N.G.O.s emphasising importance consideration this session [of the convention]’.70 Every day Lemkin tried to do something to gain support for the genocide convention, but now felt increasingly despondent because he lacked a substantial ally at the United Nations in Geneva with the influence and determination to bring this event nearer. He was feeling utterly drained, his spirits lowered by a gloomy and windy afternoon. Worrying that he had not achieved much with the deadline for the vote in the ECOSOC drawing near, he went to bed early, but found himself unable to sleep. So he dressed at 1 a.m., and went for a walk, crossing the bridge on Lake Leman and standing somewhat aimlessly deep in thought. On hearing footsteps behind him, he turned and saw the delegate from Canada, Ambassador Dana Wilgress. They decided to walk together and soon the ambassador mentioned that his main interest at university had been history and that he read it endlessly. He also asked Lemkin why he thought the genocide convention was so important. Lemkin took this as a cue to go into a lengthy explanation, citing the example of the ancient Assyrians. The Assyrian Kings practised genocide on a large scale; they obliterated entire nations, sometimes for no other reason than their victims refused to pay tribute after having been subdued ... they boasted of having killed

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off the entire population of great cities and how they drove into captivity scores of people; how they blinded, mutilated, skinned and hanged [them] – and all with the feeling of having fulfilled the command of their gods who ordered them to do so in their dreams. No excuse before history ever occurred to them to be necessary.71 That night the conversation between Lemkin and the ambassador ranged across many topics, including the Athenians who urged the suppression of the revolt at Mitylene with moderation, and then Lemkin spoke about the massacres unleashed by the Mongols and religious violence, leading him on to the subject of the decimation of the Armenians. Here the ambassador took up the story and recounted what the churches in Canada had done to assist the Armenian children, who had been orphaned by the genocide, and the ambassador was empathizing so completely with Lemkin’s concerns over the genocide convention that Lemkin felt that his companion was himself turning into a stout advocate of the cause. When Lemkin walked back to the hotel with the ambassador, Dana Wilgress promised to do something which would advance the campaign ‘for us’. This phrase etched itself into his memory. Wilgress soon afterwards introduced Lemkin to Dr Herbert V. Evatt, the Australian Foreign Minister, a personal friend of his and the future president of the General Assembly which was due to meet in Paris in September 1948. The ambassador told Lemkin to wait for his call at the hotel, where he was staying, assuring him that it was ‘too big a cause to be lost; it is simply a matter of getting the right people to do the right thing at the right time’.72 Buoyed up by these remarks, Lemkin could not sleep, but took a long, slow bath and then watched the dawn break over the city, dreaming all the while of the impending triumph of his crusade. He sat anxiously by the telephone until Ambassador Wilgress telephoned him to say that he had arranged a meeting for him with Dr Evatt at eleven o’clock.73 Dr Evatt had already caused a stir at the General Assembly, where in 1946 he had led a revolt of the smaller powers in an unsuccessful attempt to curb the rights of veto of the five permanent members of the Security Council, but he had also insisted on the importance of economic and social issues for the maintenance of peace, resulting in the additional powers being conferred on the ECOSOC to bring it on par with the Security Council.74 When they met, Dr Evatt assured him that he knew how hard the past years had been and that he promised ‘to conspire’ with him to bring the campaign for a genocide convention to a fitting conclusion in Paris. He summoned his personal secretary and instructed him to be ready to receive Lemkin’s proposals and to liaise between the two of them. Meanwhile was there anything he could do to assist him at the current session of the ECOSOC in Geneva, where he was in charge of the Australian delegation? Lemkin admitted that it would be helpful to receive the endorsement of the ECOSOC for the draft

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convention. Evatt confirmed that Col. Johnson, the Australian delegate on the ECOSOC would support the convention, but first needed to be briefed.75 The first indication of Herbert Evatt’s new-found collaboration with Lemkin was a statement he addressed to the ECOSOC on 25 August 1948, the day before the discussion of the genocide proposals. He told them that The Council this session has found itself unable, because of lack of time, to consider the convention in any detail. I would strongly urge that the United Nations cannot allow the situation to drift on in this way any longer. It is two years since the Assembly first asked for a convention and I feel that the Assembly, at its meeting in Paris next month, should take the draft prepared by the subcommittee [the Ad Hoc Committee], examine it in detail, and adopt a final convention which can be recommended to member nations for ratification ... The adoption of a convention on genocide should not necessarily be dependent upon the other work which the United Nations is doing in the field of human rights. The convention is far more specific than the draft Declaration on Human Rights ... While it may not be possible at this stage to obtain agreement on all points [some of which may be controversial], this should not prevent the United Nations from adopting a convention.76 A new momentum was given to the campaign for a genocide convention, and with the additional support of the United States’ delegation, the logjam at the United Nations was broken. Mingling with the delegates to the meeting of the ECOSOC, Lemkin negotiated secretly with members of each diplomatic mission, not telling a delegate from one country what he had said to another. He tried to obtain the agreement of delegates to a package consisting of three points: ‘omission of political groups’; ‘limitation of cultural genocide to acts of violence’; and an American compromise plan for a future international court. Unfortunately John Ennals without sufficiently coordinating the plan of action with its originator encouraged delegates from different countries to discuss Lemkin’s scheme, details of which leaked out. To undermine Lemkin’s compromise plan, the British promised a number of delegates that they would not oppose the genocide convention at the forthcoming Paris Assembly, so long as they agreed that the ECOSOC would ‘not pass any resolution approving the convention’, and that they would limit themselves ‘to transmitting the convention to the Assembly with individual declarations of the delegations’. Above all, the British were concerned to avoid a ‘discussion on the merits [which] might lead to agreement as to the text of the convention’.77 Hence the United States at the insistence of the British had agreed to drop the item of genocide to the bottom of the ECOSOC’s agenda, when there would only be enough time for a brief discussion.

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So unremitting was the Foreign Office in its opposition to the genocide convention that it persuaded the British United Nations Association to follow its lead in resisting the convention, compelling John Ennals at the WFUNA to stop rendering so much assistance to Lemkin and forcing Lemkin during the last week of August to move and operate from the office of the International Council of Christians and Jews in Geneva.78 Whereas the State Department was happy to listen to the suggestions of Lemkin and James Rosenberg and used its diplomatic muscle to ensure that the convention was implemented, the attitude of the Foreign Office was wholly negative; not only did the United Kingdom delegates spearhead the opposition to the convention at the United Nations, but officials coerced pressure groups to follow the government line. Lemkin explained to Dr MacCracken, ‘the genocide convention, because of its inherent high moral values, cannot be fought against openly and only procedural tactics will be used in future’.79 As was disclosed by the British delegate’s speech to the ECOSOC, their main line of contention was that genocide was already recognized as a crime in international law by the Nuremberg Judgment which they maintained covered very much the same ground. ‘But Gentlemen’, Lemkin would answer in their informal talks, ‘the Nuremberg Judgment applies only to aggressive war and not to every kind of war, not to a defensive war. Aggression was not at all defined in Nuremberg’, and war crimes were often quickly pardoned at the conclusion of a war.80 As for ‘cultural’ genocide, the British maintained that this could be dealt with by a subcommittee of the Human Rights Commission: ‘In deference to [the] feelings of colleagues,[the]UK delegation [stated that it] would not oppose the Convention – though [the] Attorney-General had declared it as unnecessary – but would simply abstain on the resolution’. Among the topics covered at his briefing session with the Australians, Lemkin touched on his inconclusive talks with the British and how to counter their arguments.81 Col. Johnson used a clever ruse to undermine the British position, when the genocide convention was discussed by the ECOSOC on 26 August 1948. He waited until the British delegate reached the weakest portion of his speech before requesting him to repeat the point for the benefit of his listeners. He then asked if the Nuremberg Judgment applied in peace as well as war, to which the delegate replied, ‘Yes’. When it was Col. Johnson’s turn to speak, he kept on emphasizing the British delegation’s erroneous conclusions about the Nuremberg Judgment which he then refuted by reading the relevant sections of the Nuremberg Charter and passages of the Judgment. By the time he had finished speaking the whole atmosphere at the ECOSOC meeting was dramatically different; the British had been outgunned and outmanoeuvred by Lemkin’s careful briefing of the Australian delegate.82 Support for a genocide convention was forthcoming both from the French United Nations Association and the Alliance Israelite. Marcel Franco, the New York representative of the Alliance, assured James Rosenberg that both

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Professor René Cassin and Professor de Vabres were in favour of such a treaty.83 The French delegate to the ECOSOC was unhappy with the coinage of the new word ‘genocide’ which he dismissed as an unworthy hybrid, though it was too late to change it. Privately Lemkin defended the term, by pointing out that the Greek word genos had a wider connotation than its Latin equivalent genus; for instance, Plato also used the word to describe spiritual or religious groups. Moreover, other hybrid terms such as bicycle had passed unnoticed into the English language without causing offence.84 The French while opposed to ‘cultural’ genocide being included in the convention thought that it could not function properly without an international court, for genocide was a crime perpetrated by states or government officials. France considered that the ‘convention must definitely go to [the] Assembly, which must consider getting it adopted as quickly as possible.’85 The Russians criticized the draft convention for failing to include inflammatory propaganda as one of the categories of the crime: ‘Racialism is [the] spiritual father of G[enocide]. [There is an] Organic relationship between Fascism and Genocide’. The USSR did not believe that the draft convention in its present form was satisfactory. What the Russians were concerned about was that the genocide convention would interfere with national sovereignty. They reserved the ‘right to submit complete proposals and amendments when [the] Draft Convention is discussed at [the] General Assembly’. Despite these reservations, the Russians supported the idea of a treaty.86 Additional backing for the genocide convention came from the Polish delegate, who attacked certain states that ‘wished to prevent the early adoption of a convention from ‘narrow nationalist and imperialist motives’. He urged, in support of the retention of the clause on cultural genocide, the beneficial effect it would have on the peoples of colonial independent territories’.87 Boosted by the campaign of the United States Committee for a Genocide Convention, Willard Thorp, the American representative on the ECOSOC made a strong statement in favour of the draft convention. He remarked that his ‘Government is eager to see a Draft Convention on the subject adopted by the General Assembly at its next session, and is fully prepared to join with the other nations in the development of the necessary definitive draft’. A group of Latin American countries represented on the ECOSOC, Venezuela, Peru, Peru, Brazil and Chile, joined the United States in their solid support for the convention. The criticism of the United States was limited to three points. As genocide was a new word, it should be very carefully defined, having ‘a single-minded and unmistakable focus on those barbarous acts of physical destruction against groups of individuals whose most recent occurrence stirred the world to demand action’. He feared that the extension of the meaning of the word to include ‘cultural’ genocide would confuse the public and diffuse the urgent demand for a basis for action ... If we try to cover all these fields of protecting the rights of human groups ... in

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one convention, we shall detract from the major issue before us, which is the prevention and punishment of physical acts of violence against national, racial, religious, or political groups. Thorp also thought that the phrase ‘direct incitement in public or in private to commit genocide’ in Article 4 of the draft convention should be omitted. Finally, he claimed that the United States government was in favour of a vague phrase that perpetrators of genocide could be tried ‘by a competent international tribunal’. This would allow the establishment of an Ad Hoc tribunal or it ‘might take the form of a criminal chamber of the International Court of Justice’.88 On the evening of 26 August 1948, Charles Malik, the president of the ECOSOC, ruled that since they had already taken a decision, to ‘transmit the draft convention and records of the Council proceedings to the General Assembly’, there could be no vote on the matter. It was a friendly gesture from a stalwart exponent of the necessity for a declaration of human rights. Nonetheless, the United Kingdom and Netherlands delegations placed on record the fact that they would have abstained had a formal vote been taken.89 After their success in thwarting agreement on the terms of the genocide convention, the British delegation tried to soften up the representatives of other powers in advance of the meeting of the General Assembly in Paris in the autumn, by spreading two ideas, which Lemkin explained to James Rosenberg: First: [that] the Genocide Convention should be sent to the International Law Commission [after the General Assembly in Paris decided on its creation] ... The other device is the following: The Assembly would only define Genocide and not discuss the implementation at all. This would assimilate Genocide with the International Bill of Human Rights and would allow Genocide to be swallowed by the Declaration of Human Rights. If there is no implementation for Genocide this means that it is not treated as a crime and only as a pious desire to see to it that it should not happen again in the future. This is a device to kill the Convention on Genocide. I was told on good authority that the British delegation will fight Genocide to the bitter end.90 Meanwhile Lemkin travelled to Berne for a couple of days to renew his friendship with Dr Hans Opprecht, a publisher and influential Swiss MP. Their meeting went well and Dr Opprecht secured an appointment for Lemkin with the Swiss Foreign Minister, who was non-committal when asked to support the genocide convention, but intimated that he was sympathetic. The Foreign Minister did, however, arrange a large press conference under government auspices for Lemkin to talk about the genocide

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convention, and there was generous coverage of conference in the Swiss press. It was now the end of August and Lemkin decided to take a ten day holiday at Glion which was a village soaring to a great height above Montreux with a spectacular view of the lake and the Rhone. Here he relaxed after his stressful exertions on behalf of the genocide convention but not for long. Discovering that there was a conference of the Moral Rearmament movement taking place at their nearby headquarters at Caux, Lemkin secured an invitation to lunch. At an afternoon symposium, he was impressed by a French journalist, M. Scotto-Lavina, and decided to make his acquaintance as he would be a useful contact in Paris, for the General Assembly was due to meet there on 15 September.91 At the Casino in Montreux, Lemkin momentarily threw off his intellectual preoccupations and invited a young lady to dance. She turned out to be a professional dancer and performed an exquisite tango, and later when they were chatting, she informed him that she came from Chile and was of Indian descent. When he started to talk about his work on the genocide convention, she gave Lemkin a strange stare assuring him that he would become famous after his death.92 Briefly Lemkin returned to Geneva, where Charles Malik, the president of the ECOSOC, greeted him in a friendly fashion. ‘Good that I see you now’, Malik observed, ‘this very afternoon I signed a paper passing on the Genocide Convention to the General Assembly in Paris’.93 Although their aims were divergent because of Malik’s interest in human rights, this episode makes it unlikely that Malik and Lemkin had as yet clashed significantly. Nevertheless, Lemkin remained suspicious of Malik, telling Rosenberg that the president of the ECOSOC had suggested the omission of the articles making genocide an international crime Malik ‘professed initially to be a friend of the convention and here in Geneva proved to be a strong but hidden opponent’.94 So far Lemkin’s manner which could be somewhat hectoring at times had not alienated Malik nor made him into a permanent enemy. The movement for a genocide convention created by Lemkin had gained great momentum. He had successfully ensured that the essential features of the genocide convention, including cultural genocide and the plan for a court, were incorporated by the Ad Hoc Committee into their revised draft of the convention. He had instigated the formation of a pressure group, the United States Committee for a Genocide Convention, which tried to neutralize British opposition to the convention. He had enlisted the help of Jewish and Church groups in the United States, who had brought in fresh sources of support, particularly the World Federation of United Nations Associations(WFUNA). Lemkin had also begun to write sections of a wideranging historical survey of genocide which he drew on when trying to brief delegates at the United Nations on the finer points of the convention. Without the financial assistance of the United States Committee for a Genocide Convention, Lemkin would not have been able to travel to Geneva

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and Paris and stay there for more than four months and then be able to mount a campaign among members of delegations for a convention with the support of John Ennals of the WFUNA. The British far more than the Russians were Lemkin’s toughest opponents at the United Nations, and despite the cooperation of the United States delegation with Lemkin, the British had persuaded the Americans to drop the item about the convention to the bottom of the agenda at Geneva. Gaining the support of Herbert Evatt, the Australian Foreign Minister, Lemkin by careful briefing outfoxed the British delegation. But his hopes of securing a quick package deal on the main terms of the convention were dashed by the British. He had all to fight for when the draft of the Ad Hoc Committee was considered by the United Nations in Paris.

9 Paris, Preliminary Discussion of the Convention

It was drizzling in Paris when Raphael Lemkin arrived from Geneva on 14 September 1948, but his elation was not dampened because the beauty of the city sent his spirits soaring and he also felt nearer to achieving his goal. Paris was recovering from the War with restaurants reopening and a busy nightlife resuming.1 Usually Lemkin chose to stay in a small hotel, but this time he selected the Hotel Claridge on the Champs-Elyseés, where many other delegates were staying and it was in walking distance of the Palais de Chaillot, the meeting place for the UN General Assembly.2 For the time being his constant financial worries were over, as James Rosenberg had arranged a cheque for $500 to be sent to him and had intimated that more funds would be available should he need them.3 James Rosenberg had agreed that Lemkin would be able to spend up to a hundred dollars a week plus business expenses.4 Here at the Hotel Claridge, Lemkin had the opportunity to meet other delegates informally and could try to influence the outcome of the proceedings at the United Nations. In Chapters 10, 11 and 12, I will chart the progress of the convention through the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris. In this chapter, I show how after an initial setback in submitting a mass petition to the General Assembly, Lemkin successfully proposed the adoption of a new, quicker procedure for the Legal Committee to examine the convention article by article, so that the Assembly would be able to approve the convention in 1948. In Chapter 10 the debates on the core provisions of the convention, such as what constituted genocide and the means of enforcement, are considered. In Chapter 11, I deal with the remaining provisions of the convention and an adroit campaign led by Lemkin to ensure that the section making political genocide a crime was jettisoned in order to ensure that the rest of the convention was passed by the Assembly. Before he left New York for Switzerland Lemkin had arranged that the United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention would deluge the General Assembly in Paris with a massive petition showing 143

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worldwide support for a convention. On 18 July 1948, Lemkin wrote to James Rosenberg, While considering certain plans of action at the next Assembly in Paris concerning genocide, I thought that an appeal to the General Assembly by numerous organizations covering many countries and indicating the membership might exercise a considerable influence upon the Delegates. My experience with the appeal by intellectuals and Presidents of Parliaments at the last Assembly of the United Nations justify the usefulness of such action now. You will realize that the preparation of such an appeal and the collection of signatures requires considerable time. Two months are, however, sufficient. Since our Committee is meeting Tuesday, it might well decide to adopt such an action, if it will deem it advisable. I have drafted a proposed statement ... We must prove to the Assembly that millions of people throughout the world are behind this convention. I would suggest ... [an] approach first of all [to] the U. N. Nongovernmental organizations ... The most important organizations in every country, such as civic groups, women’s organizations, organizations of labor, Chambers of Commerce, religious groups, Universities and Colleges should be approached as well.5 When the United States Committee met on 20 July 1948, they approved Lemkin’s plan for a mass petition. A couple of days later Lemkin wrote to the secretary of the committee, asking for the minutes to be corrected, as he considered the initiative to be ‘very important and would like to take personal responsibility for having proposed it’.6 By the time the General Assembly met in Paris in September 1948, the United States Committee claimed to have gathered and filed petitions with the Assembly signed by the leaders of 166 organizations from 28 countries representing over 200 million people, a remarkable effort at mobilizing opinion which should have impressed delegates and made them more receptive to Lemkin’s proposals.7 In reality through the miscalculation of Rosenberg, the petition never reached the Assembly. ‘At the beginning of the [Paris] Assembly I needed badly the petition’, Lemkin explained, because there were difficulties in getting the Assembly on her way to start the drafting of the Convention. I sent a cable to Rosenberg but he refused to send the original petition and proposed a list of organizations without their signatures. I discussed with Dr Evatt this matter and he told me that a petition should be submitted in the original. I then cabled again to Rosenberg and received the same answer. I started a storm of cables (maybe ten of them) without result. Then I sent a strong cable to Johnson [the secretary of the United States Committee] who finally sent

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me the petition. In the meantime I organized in Paris a committee which would present the petition to the Assembly ... When the petition arrived Dr Evatt told me that since the work of the Assembly on the Genocide Convention is very much advanced it would be unnecessary or even detrimental to present such a petition at such a late date. Then the petition was never presented to the Assembly. Lemkin’s initial euphoria in Paris soon dissipated; this was a dismal start to his campaign.8 However, Lemkin ascertained from Dr Evatt’s assistant that the Legal Committee of the United Nations would begin considering the genocide convention in detail in October. He advised Rosenberg that their committee should not encourage the United States delegation to delete the item of cultural genocide from the convention. If cultural genocide was conceded at this point, this would play into the hands of the British delegation: They fight cultural genocide not in order to have a convention, but in order to be able to bury it (in the form of ... physical genocide) in the International Law Commission. In their opinion, physical genocide should be treated together with the Nuremberg law and as you well know according to the resolution of the Assembly of 21 November 1947 the codification of the Nuremberg law belongs to the International Law Commission. The British position in the Legal Committee will be: kill one by one. First separate cultural genocide and than start a filibuster discussion on physical genocide, which will end up as you rightly call it in ‘committeecide’. The United States government remained stubborn as regards the inclusion of political groups in the convention and for the necessity of an international tribunal. The United States Committee ‘might have to give up one or two of the above mentioned points, but let us do it in time, coldly, through bargaining and certainly not through giving arguments to our skillful opponents’.9 A few days before the General Assembly was due to meet in the latter part of September, Lemkin visited the Australian delegation and conferred with Dr Herbert Evatt, the new President of the Assembly, on the tactics to be adopted at the current session: ‘Evatt was a brilliant but insecure man, almost paranoid in his desire to dominate and in his suspicion of those around him’. Lemkin handled him superbly with the right mixture of flattery and deference to his superior political judgment. In the end, they became close friends.10 Evatt asked Lemkin which delegate was sympathetic to the convention, so that he could be chosen as chairman of the United Nations Legal Committee (otherwise known as the Sixth Committee), in which there would be a detailed discussion of the convention. Lemkin

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remarked that Dr Ricardo Alfaro, the former President of Panama, with whom he had worked closely in the past would be suitable; a few days later Dr Alfaro’s appointment as chairman was announced.11 If the Legal Committee followed the customary procedure, they would devolve the task of examining the genocide convention clause by clause to a subcommittee, which would not be able to report back to the full committee until the end of the session. The Legal Committee would not then have enough time for their own consideration of the convention and would be unable to transmit it to the General Assembly for adoption until the 1949 session. To short-circuit this cumbersome procedure, Lemkin proposed a procedural innovation under which the draft convention would go straight to the full Legal Committee for examination and hopefully approval. When Lemkin raised this suggestion with Dr Alfaro and other representatives, they saw difficulties ahead, but nevertheless Lemkin persisted and successfully persuaded a number of friendly delegates to sponsor a resolution. He also wrote different speeches for the delegates emphasizing that there should be no delay in adopting a genocide convention that year.12 When the Legal Committee met on 21 September 1948 to discuss procedural and other matters, Ernest Gross, the United States delegate, submitted that in view of the special urgency of the question ... [he] was not in favour of referring it to the International Law Commission. Having regard to the troubled state of the world, it was essential that the convention should be adopted as soon as possible, before the memory of the barbarous crimes which had been committed faded.13 Begum Ikramullah, the delegate of Pakistan, an attractive young woman dressed in a sari, delivered a powerful speech in favour of action stating that her ‘country took a special interest in the question’ and that it had been ‘aroused by acts of genocide directed against a particular group of the Indian population, the Muslims’. Her speech deeply affected other delegates, whose facial expression seemed to change.14 The Australian representative supported the American view and that of the committee chairman, Dr Alfaro, that the draft convention should be examined article by article.15 When the session ended, Lemkin rushed across the floor to where Begum Ikramullah was seated to thank her. In the corridor, he met Shawcross, who exclaimed that ‘The Committee is becoming emotional, this is a bad sign, it might go in the wrong direction’. Lemkin shot back the riposte, ‘Why is it wrong to prevent slaughter?’.16 Sir Hartley Shawcross for the United Kingdom led the assault on the convention within the Legal Committee, declaring that the representative of the USSR had referred to the expectations of the peoples of the world on the question of genocide. It was important not to build up

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hopes and expectations unless they could be fulfilled ... [He] did not feel particularly enthusiastic about the draft convention before the Committee. It was a complete delusion to suppose that the adoption of a convention of the type proposed, even if generally adhered to, would give people generally a greater sense of security or would diminish the dangers that at present existed of persecution on racial, religious or national grounds. The atrocities committed by the Nazis and fascists ‘were largely the crimes of totalitarian states, which would not change their methods because of the existence of a convention to which a number of nations had adhered’.17 The Soviet bloc countries having suffered from the depredations of the Nazi regime were strong opponents of the delaying tactics of Sir Hartley Shawcross. Manfred Lachs for Poland stated that his country attached great importance to the question of genocide and his government wished to see the convention adopted, ‘so that genocide should be embodied in an international instrument’.18 Vadim Kovalenko for the Ukraine objected to the doubts cast by Shawcross on the efficacy of a genocide convention. He averred that such a convention ‘like all international conventions, would have great legal and moral force ... it would lay down the concrete measures which the signatory States would have to take and ... the States would be in duty bound to observe rigorously the obligations they had undertaken’.19 Vladimir Prochazka for Czechoslovakia castigated the United Kingdom for the doubts expressed with regard to the convention which ‘were a kind of defeatism which were not in keeping with the spirit of the Charter and would destroy the value of international agreements and conventions’.20 Israel still remained a contentious issue. Although the declaration of independence of the new state was pronounced on 14 May 1948, its security remained fragile until the beginning of 1949 because of warfare with its Arab neighbours. Despite this, Lemkin carefully avoided upsetting the Arab supporters of the genocide convention by playing down his Zionist sympathies and by not singling out the fate of the Jews during the Second World War. Thus Arab nations such as Egypt and Lebanon and Islamic states such as Iran and Pakistan gave Lemkin useful support in the Legal Committee quite apart from the regular assistance that he received from many Latin American states. In fact, he later thanked the Iranian foreign minister for the contribution of their representative at the United Nations, Dr Abdoh, in the matter of the international penal tribunal and for the extension of the convention to dependent territories.21 So too, the historian Evyatar Friesel, who investigated the United Nations proceedings concerning the birth of Israel, found that there was ‘little indication in the opinions expressed by the different nations to show that the Holocaust had influenced their positions ... The Zionist representative who appeared before [the UN Special Committee on Palestine] barely alluded to the subject’.22

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Dr Azkoul emphasized that Lebanon was deeply interested in the issue of genocide because his country consisted of a mixture of people of different races and religions. He did not share the skepticism expressed by the United Kingdom representative with regard to the convention. Even if the convention served only to establish officially that genocide was a crime under international law, thus keeping the conscience of humanity constantly on the alert against it, that was already sufficient reason for adopting it. The convention did more; it condemned the fanaticism from which sprang all the horrors of genocide. Above all, for the first time in an international document the convention stressed the need for ‘the protection of the human group’.23 Dr Azkoul was a very effective speaker, who was only reassigned to the Legal Committee through Lemkin’s personal intervention with the Lebanese Prime Minister.24 Equally as hostile as the United Kingdom in its opposition to the genocide convention was Belgium. Lemkin wrote to Leon Kubowitzki of the World Jewish Congress on 11 August 1948 that The legal adviser of the Belgian Foreign Office, Dr Kaeckenbeeck, was not well disposed to the Convention during the last Assembly. It was, however, under [Paul Henri] Spaak [the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister] as President of the Assembly that the basic resolution on Genocide was passed. I know that Spaak has a warm spot in his heart for this Convention.25 Despite earlier efforts to win the support of the Belgian government by approaching A. Verbist, the Minister of Health, to influence his colleagues in the Foreign Office and Ministry of Justice, these interventions did not bear fruit.26 When he addressed the Legal Committee, Dr Kaeckenbeeck argued that a detailed declaration based on Articles 2 and 4 of the draft convention was all that was necessary; governments could then bring their domestic legislation in line with the 1946 genocide resolution and the declaration should call on states to make genocide an extraditable offence: ‘There was no likelihood that the draft convention, in its present form, would be approved by the Belgian Parliament’.27 South Africa and the United Kingdom both stressed that it might become necessary at a later stage to refer the text of the genocide convention to the International Law Commission which would not be functioning until 1949 and tabled an amendment to give effect to this, but the amendment was heavily defeated. The United States delegation worked closely with Lemkin and the Rosenberg Committee, intervening in a helpful fashion. They

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pushed through a resolution stating that the preparation of the text of the convention should not be referred to the International Law Commission because such a step would have been tantamount to renouncing hope of the quick adoption of a convention.28 Voting on a proposal of the delegation from the Philippines, the Legal Committee resolved to examine the draft convention prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee article by article, leaving the preamble until last.29 Lemkin felt that in the meantime he had to stir and retain the interest of delegates in the problem of genocide in all its aspects. True that he had made available to them copies of articles and his book entitled Axis Rule in Occupied Europe; yet he believed that a preoccupation with the Nazi experience was insufficient, as there had been many episodes of genocide throughout history. So he decided to produce short, snappy memoranda culled from the book he was compiling on ‘The History of Genocide’ with the help of a bilingual typist recruited from French Radio. From Geneva Lemkin had warned James Rosenberg that ‘I will need a bilingual secretary and office space, since my work in the redrafting stage of the convention will be considerable’,30 and the National Conference of Christians and Jews forwarded him $500, while the philanthropist Benjamin Abrams made some additional funds available.31 The secretary agreed to type these memoranda early in the morning on several days a week before the sessions of the Legal Committee started. Lemkin carried the typed memoranda in his pocket, distributing them to delegates at opportune moments during the debate, but when he tried handing them to delegates during the frequent social receptions his overtures were rejected. He, therefore, tried a new tactic . He telephoned some delegates, asking them to meet him half an hour before the session opened for a chat. Others he met for lunch. Gradually as the delegates became more immersed in the issue, their attitude changed and they became more receptive to his approaches and more eager to read his memoranda. All this sustained effort and sleepless nights worrying about his campaign for a convention left Lemkin feeling flat and exhausted.32 The widow and daughter of his French publisher, M. Pedone, having survived the War, sponsored Lemkin’s activities in France by arranging for him to give a lecture on the genocide convention at a prestigious Foreign Affairs centre and by persuading the influential left-wing newspaper Le Monde to publish an article by him summarizing the genocide convention and defending three of its contentious features. But Lemkin’s opponents among the French lawyers published a rejoinder about the convention in the same newspaper by Eugene Aroneau though space was not found for a second article by Lemkin refuting their assertions. Aroneau claimed that the Nuremberg Charter and Tribunal which embraced the concept of crimes against humanity sufficed and that there was in place a legal system which limited national sovereignty under whose protection many of these crimes took place.33 Upset by this public relations setback, Lemkin contacted M Scotto-Lavina, the

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journalist who seemed sympathetic to him in Switzerland, who arranged for Lemkin to be interviewed by Combat. As this interview reached a similar progressive audience, he was somewhat mollified. Again Lemkin had to explain why a genocide convention was necessary because the Nuremberg Tribunal failed to provide adequate legal protection.34 Within the delegations at the United Nations, opposition to the genocide convention was gathering momentum. Sensitive to every shift of opinion among delegates, Lemkin began to notice how groups of delegates would gather before and after meetings speaking in hushed tones in his presence and averting their eyes in embarrassment when he tried to speak to them. To counter this hostility, Lemkin contacted officials in various foreign ministries, requesting them to send fresh instructions to their delegates and received an encouraging answer from Sweden. He alerted Clarence Pickett, a Quaker leader in Philadelphia, who despatched a cable to the United States delegation. He made an appointment to see Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Premier, and was advised by Mr Sutch that this was an astute move, as there were difficulties over the question in his delegation. One of the New Zealand delegates, Mrs Newland, became a convert to the cause and promised to educate her countrymen about the importance of this issue.35 As usual Lemkin fretted about the lack of support for the convention among delegates to the General Assembly and pleaded with James Rosenberg in a letter on 29 September 1948 and a cable to organize a fresh wave of petitions to delegates in support of a genocide convention. Rosenberg protested that ‘It is simply impossible to go through the effort of asking people to repeat themselves and they resent it. We have made our effort and we have done an enormous amount of work to collect these petitions and the support from all over the world, and nothing is gained by repetition’.36 Lemkin remained very much on edge, but there was little reason for him to be so for the preliminary discussion in the Legal Committee had revealed widespread support from all the regional blocs, including the Soviet Union and its allies; the United Kingdom and Belgium were isolated in their intransigent opposition.

10 The First Reading of the Convention

On Tuesday 5 October 1948, the Legal Committee started to examine the draft convention prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee article by article, starting with the first one. Seated in ‘the long drab’ room behind the delegates, Lemkin followed the proceedings attentively, from time to time passing notes to friendly representatives.1 Russia and Belgium were obstructive. For the United States John Maktos supported the view of the United Kingdom that genocide was a crime under international law to dispel any doubts. As for the French proposal that it should be defined as a ‘crime against humanity’, Maktos noted the Nuremberg Charter by using this term in article 6, sub-paragraph (c) stated that the Tribunal ‘had jurisdiction only over crimes committed during the war or in connexion with the preparations for war’.2 An amendment suggested by the United Kingdom ‘whether committed in time of peace or war’ secured a comfortable majority, when a vote was taken. The Syrian delegate Mr Tarazi claimed the phrase ‘or at any moment’ should be added to cover what was currently happening. He was of the opinion that the Arab League had not entered Palestine for the purpose of making war but of restoring law and order. The Government of the State of Israel did not constitute a State as it was based on a resolution of the General Assembly, which under the terms of the Charter had only the right to recommend and not to decide ... the campaign in Palestine was not a war; nor ... could it be said it had taken place in time of peace. Nevertheless, the Jews had committed atrocities against the Arabs during the campaign, and those crimes deserved to be punished. However, the Syrian amendment was defeated. Article 1 also stipulated that states should prevent and punish genocide.3 Two days later the delegates began discussing Article 2 with many representatives, particularly those from South America, opposing the inclusion 151

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of political groups in the convention. Ambassador Gilbert Amado of Brazil argued that the crime was unknown in the countries of Latin America, since in those countries there did not exist that deep-rooted hatred which in due course led to genocide. Political struggle in Latin America was sometimes violent, sometimes emotional, but it was above all ephemeral. It was impossible in that part of the world to envisage such an intensification of political animosity as would lead to movements of a pogrom-like character.4 For Venezuela Perez Perozo asserted that there were countries where the population was still developing and where political struggle was very violent. Those countries would obviously not favour the inclusion of political groups in the convention. If the Committee sincerely desired that the convention should be drawn up in the near future it should decide against the inclusion of political groups which would so patently endanger the future of that international agreement. Political groups were already protected by national legislation and that protection would be further extended by the Declaration of Human Rights.5 Sir Hartley Shawcross while claiming that his delegation had not made up its mind as to which specific groups should be covered by the convention presented strong arguments for the inclusion of political groups. ‘He asked whether a fascist State, for instance, should be entitled to destroy the lives of persons because they happened to be members of a Communist group, or vice versa. There was as much persecution on political grounds as there was on racial grounds, and the question of political persecution was a practical problem in Europe. Concentration camps, sometimes known as labour camps, might still be in existence or make their appearance in the future. It was true that political groups did not have the same stable characteristics as racial or national groups, but in certain States the ruling political parties would insist that they possessed an existence as stable as some religious or racial groups ... Genocide it must be remembered could only be committed with the connivance of States, and, therefore, to declare that political groups should be protected by domestic laws was wholly illusory’.6 Lemkin recalled how ‘an ominous silence’ descended on the delegates, ‘who were always respectful of the rank and hierarchy of the speaker’.7 But while Shawcross had already made clear that the British government was not inclined to be enthusiastic about the convention, he had declared that it was ‘prepared to adhere to a Draft on the provisions of which there could be the largest common agreement’. In the last weeks of October 1948, conversations had taken place between Revd. Simpson, ‘David Kessler of the

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Anglo-Jewish Association, William Frankel of the American Jewish Committee (London Office) and D.H.T. Hildyard of the Foreign Office’. Typically Simpson as a result of these conversations urged caution suggesting that as it now seemed that Britain was ‘broadly favourable towards the adoption of the Convention and that no useful purpose would be served by holding a meeting at this stage or seeking to bring pressure upon our representatives in Paris’.8 Because of Simpson’s passivity, even informal interventions by representatives of Anglo-Jewry were ruled out and narrowed the ranks of Lemkin’s supporters in the final weeks of his campaign for a convention. The Legal Committee now resumed their discussion as to whether or not political groups should be included in the convention. Ernest Gross, the US representative, pointed out that the Nazis had been able to identify the Social Democratic Party and the Communists and to ban their adherents; the allies as the occupying powers in Germany had proscribed the Nazis, so that the argument that it was difficult to identify political groups was untenable. He understood the anxieties of certain delegations that by including political groups in the convention difficulties might be caused to legitimate governments by subversive elements. To overcome these fears, the US delegation intended ‘to show the need for the establishment of an international tribunal’.9 In reply Mr Platon Morozov for the USSR contended that the Nuremberg indictment defined genocide as the extermination of racial and religious groups in the occupied territories ... the Nazis had exterminated members of political groups because they formed the intellectual elements of populations which they sought to subjugate in order to establish German domination over the world. The prisoners of Maidenek, Osweicim [Auschwitz] and other extermination camps were sent there as members of nations which Hitler’s Germany had decided to wipe out ... The fact that there were some members of political organizations among them did not mean that the primary objective was anything other than the wholesale destruction of the civilian populations of the territories which were to be conquered and colonized, and, concurrently the destruction of their respective national cultures.10 This analysis was similar to that voiced by Lemkin in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944) and may have been taken directly from him or borrowed at second hand, but in 1948 when the full extent of Jewish suffering was apparent, these observations were seriously flawed. Again, Manfred Lachs stated that the Nazis ‘had taken advantage of an incomplete enumeration [of acts constituting genocide] and had therefore been enabled to use, among other things, asphyxiating gases’. Eastern bloc delegates

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throughout the debates in the Legal Committee continued to dwell on the crimes of the Nazis, without mentioning that the Jews had been selected as a special target.11 In his briefing of delegates, Lemkin was careful to avoid controversial areas such as the special attention paid by Nazis to the destruction of Jews during the Second World War. Sardar Bahadur Khan of Pakistan spoke of the supporters of Hitler persecuting the Jews under the Weimar Republic, while the Yugoslav delegate mentioned certain events which had happened after the end of the Second World War: ‘in 1945, armed bands had been brought into Czechoslovakia and, in spite of the opposition of the Government, had committed crimes of genocide against the Jew; in 1946, the same had occurred in Poland’.12 The Arab delegations repeatedly harked back to the situation in Palestine. The Egyptian delegate referred to crimes not covered by Common Law such as those ‘committed by Para-military organizations which acted on orders ... in Palestine before 14 May 1948, when Zionist groups had wiped out whole villages, at a time when the Mandatory Power was leaving the country and when no established authority could assume responsibility for those acts’.13 When the vote was taken in the Legal Committee on 15 October as to whether or not to include political groups in the convention, it was decided to do so by 29 votes to 13 with 9 abstentions. The core of the opposition came from Eastern bloc countries led by the Soviet Union, who were joined by a number of Latin American states as well as Belgium and Iran, but the interesting point to note was that more Latin American nations voted for the inclusion of political groups than opposed the measure. The votes of Panama, Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador and Salvador were cast in favour of the inclusion of these groups.14 Accordingly, I would dispute the view of William Schabas, who sought to minimize the importance of Soviet insistence on the exclusion of political groups from the protection of the convention. In fact, the request of the World Jewish Congress for the removal of political groups from the convention was at the behest of Lemkin, who sought to appease the Russians and their affiliates.15 Under Swedish guidance it was agreed to add ethnical groups to the category of persons to be protected by the convention, as this would cover linguistic groups not connected to a state.16 Moreover, a Norwegian amendment defining genocide as the destruction of a group as a ‘whole or in part’ was accepted, for a group could be obliterated by executing its intellectual leaders, a key point in Lemkin’s analysis of the factors behind genocide and an amendment probably suggested by him.17 Then a protracted and acrimonious debate began when the chairman asked the committee to decide on the wording of the next phrase of Article 2 which delineated the motives for committing genocide. The phrase read as follows: ‘on grounds of the national or racial origin, religious belief, or political opinion of its members’.18 For the United Kingdom Mr Gerald

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Fitzmaurice moved an amendment suggesting that the phrase should be deleted, for mention of motive might allow guilty parties to exonerate themselves.19 Venezuela proposed an amendment substituting the words ‘as such’ for the offending phrase delineating motives. Speaking on behalf of Venezuela, Perez Perozo stated that motives were implicitly included in his amendment ‘as such’, without enumerating motives which could only be restrictive in character. 20 Not satisfied with the wording of the Venezuelan amendment, the French introduced an alternative form of words ‘by reason of its nature’ which their spokesmen claimed was less ambiguous. 21 Perozo assured delegates that the ‘purpose of both amendments was to specify that, for genocide to be committed, a group – for instance, a racial group – must be destroyed qua group’. The aim of the amendment was to give discretionary power to future judges trying cases of genocide to enable them to take into account a wide range of motives. In view of this assurance the French withdrew their amendment, allowing the Venezuelan proposal to be adopted by the committee by 27 votes to 22 with 2 abstentions. 22 Raphael Lemkin had been attending the committee meetings and speaking to delegates on a daily basis. He was growing increasingly frustrated and impatient at the obstructive tactics of the Russian delegation which set the tone for the committee proceedings and which encouraged other delegations to respond in a similar fashion. Lemkin approached the Secretary-General and Dr Herbert Evatt, both the President of the Assembly and the Australian Foreign Minister. Sometimes the arguments of the delegates show signs of a briefing session with him. On 19 October 1948 Mr Dignam, the Australian representative, regretted that the committee was proceeding so slowly and was becoming bogged down ‘listening to useless personal interpretations’. The answer was for the committee to meet more often and for a time limit to be imposed on speakers. If the committee failed to report to the General Assembly on its work to date, the Australian delegation would raise the matter.23 Mr Ivan Kerno, the assistant SecretaryGeneral in charge of the legal department, drew the committee’s attention to the fact that both the Secretary-General and Dr Evatt were concerned about the slowness of the committee’s work if the convention was to be approved during the current session. He reiterated the Australian delegates remarks, appealing to delegates not to prolong the debates unduly and stating that he would ascertain whether there could be two meetings of the committee daily. In turn Dr Alfaro promised to accelerate the work of the committee and John Maktos for the United States also pleaded for two meetings daily.24 The chairman of the Legal Committee acted not only on this suggestion but on a British proposal by imposing a five-minute time limit on speeches which could be extended to ten minutes for important concerns. A right of reply would also be allowed.25

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It was around this time in the third week of October 1948 that Lemkin wrote to James Rosenberg, complaining that the committee has spent 16 days and has voted till now only one article and [a] half in the first reading. The reason is ... [that] the U.K. delegation is obstructing skillfully the discussion by amendments which it makes in appropriate time; stimulates a large discussion and then withdraws its amendments. In addition to that cocktail propaganda is flourishing. It was necessary to counteract this with the help of the US delegation, but even here their support was becoming slightly wobbly. Lemkin continued, ‘Therefore I suggest with most courteous insistence that a constant flow of letters and telegrams in the next four weeks should continue, so that the U.S. delegation knows that the American people wants the convention’. The US delegation had ‘created a great disturbance in the minds of delegates especially of Latin America by insisting upon the inclusion of political groups. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela objected strongly’.26 The French introduced an amendment originally submitted by Professor de Vabres suggesting that governments were implicated in all cases of genocide. The amendment noted that genocide ‘is committed, encouraged or tolerated by rulers of a State’. For France Charles Chaumont added that ‘The theoreticians of Nazism and fascism, who taught the doctrine of certain races, could not have committed their crimes if they had not had the support of their rulers; similarly, pogroms had occurred frequently only in countries where no severe legal measures were taken against the perpetrators’. If governments failed to act where there was mass murder, it was for the international community to intervene by arming international law with the necessary means. But most of the other delegates baulked at the French proposal, insisting instead that there were many cases where genocide was committed by armed groups without any connection to the government in power.27 According to the Venezuelan delegate there were secret societies which succeeded in committing crimes against groups while escaping the notice of the State, or again in the case of countries where the vast extent of territory and difficulties in communication made it impossible for the Government to intervene in time to prevent the perpetration of crimes or ensure their prevention.28 The French amendment went to a crushing defeat by 40 votes to 2 with a single abstention.29 Mr Ti-sun Li for China wanted a provision to cover acts of genocide perpetrated by the extensive supply of narcotics. Japan had built an opium processing plant at Mukden during the War which could process 400 tons of opium annually, creating a large number of addicts and thereby undermining

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the mental health of significant sections of the Chinese population. The delegate for India successfully suggested a compromise formula, whereby the phrase ‘or mental harm’ would be added after a reference to acts which caused the ‘serious physical’ destruction of members of a group.30 Apart from this, the committee had to find a flexible formula to cover the grim conditions associated with concentration camps – enforced labour in factories and mines, deportation of civilian populations and death marches. This was done by inserting a subclause – ‘Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’ – in the article. This was an improvement on the flexible formula which had first been suggested by members of the Ad Hoc Committee.31 Syria pressed for a fifth sub-paragraph to be added to those acts constituting genocide to cover what would now be called ‘ethnic cleansing’. This was ‘Imposing measures intended to oblige members of a group to abandon their homes in order to escape the threat of subsequent ill-treatment’.32 The Syrian delegation viewed ‘any measures directed towards forcing members of a group to leave their homes ... as constituting genocide’, and obviously covered the case of 700,000 Palestinian refugees, who had recently abandoned their homes. Many delegates opposed the Syrian amendment because they claimed that it went too far and was outside the scope of genocide, and it was defeated by 29 votes to 5 with 8 abstentions. Even the Egyptian delegate abstained despite the fact that his country’s forces were losing control of much of the Negev to the army of the new state of Israel. At the same time, the crisis over the Arab refugees led to action elsewhere: the UN committee which was drafting the Declaration of Human Rights modified it in important respects. Article 13 was amended to give a ‘right of return’ to refugees, but they only had the right to seek and enjoy asylum in a host country.33 The continuity of the group was also the concern of the Legal Committee, as children were sometimes forcibly transferred from one group to another. The Nazis had selected children to be brought up as Germans. This was a subject which had long preoccupied Lemkin. During 1946 he had passed on an UNRRA report dealing with the abduction of these children for further action to be taken; he had pressed for the inclusion of a clause against the kidnapping of children in 1947 in the first draft of the genocide convention (document E/447), and had raised the matter again in his article for Le Monde. More recently he had been exploring historical examples of this malpractice at Yale: the forcible abduction of Christian children by officials of the Ottoman empire to be brought up as Janissaries and the seizure of under age Jewish children in Tsarist Russia for service in the army and conversion to Christianity, but it was of considerable contemporary relevance because some 30,000 children had been kidnapped during the Greek civil war in 1947 and forcibly taken to Communist states in the Balkans, and at the instigation of the Greek delegate and the support of the US delegate, John Maktos,

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who was born in Greece, a provision was added to the convention classifying this as a genocidal act.34 At the same time, Lemkin had mobilized international women’s organizations in a campaign for the restoration of abducted Greek children to their families, but a cable of support from Queen Frederica of Greece arrived too late to influence the vote at the United Nations.35 With a similar purpose in mind, Lemkin also ensured that another provision was added to the same article banning the imposition of ‘measures intended to prevent births within a group’ and classifying this as genocide. Article 3 of the draft convention which dealt with cultural genocide was considered by the Legal Committee on 25 October 1948. This was an issue on which Lemkin felt so strongly that he remarked in his memoirs that he had successfully steered it through two drafts of the convention; we have seen how he tried to persuade the US delegation in the summer of 1948 to keep provisions for the protection of the language, schools, places of worship and historical monuments of a group in the convention.36 For Pakistan Sardar Bahadur Khan argued that the crimes of physical and cultural genocide were complementary since they both had as their aim the elimination of a group by exterminating its members or destroying its culture. In Asia the protection of sacred books and shrines was of more value than life itself for large sections of the population.37 Giberto Amado of Brazil did not agree, remarking that the cultural inviolability of a group could be protected through the framework of international human rights or minority treaties: Given the historical evolution of civilizations’, a state might be justified in endeavouring ‘to achieve by legal means a certain degree of homogeneity and culture.’ Another delegate pointed out that there were no minority rights treaties currently in force. The Egyptian delegate complained about ‘the crime of cultural genocide’ being committed in the Holy Land at the same time criticizing the colonial powers for trying ‘to substitute their own culture for the ancient one respected by the local population’. When a vote was taken, it was decided to omit cultural genocide from the convention by 25 votes to 16 with 4 abstentions.38 Whereas the Western democracies, some of whom were colonial powers, were anxious to exclude cultural genocide from the convention and the intervention of the United Nations, China, the USSR and its satellites plus a number of Islamic states voted for its retention. The Czech delegate spoke of ‘a gigantic plan for the complete germanification of the Czechoslovak nation’ as well as the similar treatment meted out to the Lusatian Serbs much earlier – indications of a briefing session with Lemkin. It was also noticeable that many members of the Commonwealth with indigenous populations, such as Canada, South Africa and New Zealand voted for the deletion of the clause.39 Bereft of the assistance of Dr Alfaro, the chairman of the Legal Committee and of the pivotal support of Dr Evatt and the US delegation on this issue, Lemkin claimed that he decided with some reluctance to concede defeat

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quickly in this matter. This was despite the fact that he still attached the utmost importance to the issue, so much so that he quoted Heine’s immortal words ‘wherever they burn books they will also, in the end, burn human beings’ to a journalist from the New Yorker when she interviewed him in Paris. In his memoirs Lemkin stated that after a night’s sleep he decided to give up the fight for the inclusion of cultural genocide in the convention once the Legal Committee had delivered a negative verdict, but in reality his shift in attitude was a much slower process, for on 30 October 1948, some five days after his defeat on this issue, he wrote to the Papal Nuncio in Paris Joseph Roncalli, the future Pope John XXIII: Unhappily, article 3 which represents the soul of all the convention, has been discarded at the first reading. We hope that thanks to your initiative, it will be restored in a revised form, in order that the United Nations could declare that man does not only live by bread, but has also need of spiritual nourishment. It is unlikely then that Lemkin had as yet admitted defeat on this issue, and there is some evidence that at a later stage he tried to have provisions for the protection of national cultures incorporated in the genocide convention. In the end, he declared in his memoirs that he calculated that by jettisoning cultural genocide, he would be saving valuable debating time in the Legal Committee and thus enhancing the chances of the passing of a genocide convention in the current session. This passage looks like special pleading and it is doubtful whether he made any such calculation at the time.40 On 26 October 1948 the Legal Committee began considering Article 4 in the draft convention which because of the shelving of cultural genocide became the new Article 3. It included a phrase making incitement to commit genocide a punishable act. As the Yugoslav delegate asserted, the crimes of genocide committed during the Second World war had been initiated by inciting the masses through false propaganda.41 Nevertheless, the United States tried to have the incitement clause struck out of the convention because it feared that other governments on the pretext of suppressing propaganda to commit genocide would seize control of the press and radio, and they might then use the same pretext to criticize other governments which could lead to increased international tension; the delegations of the United Kingdom, Brazil, Chile and New Zealand supported the deletion of incitement from the convention.42 Rebutting the Anglo-American position, the Russian delegate pointed out that ‘The Peoples of the world would indeed be puzzled if the ... instigators of genocide, those who incited others to commit the concrete acts of genocide, were to remain unpunished’ and carried sufficient support from a wide range of nations, apart from those in the Soviet bloc, to defeat the US amendment.43 Attempts by the Soviet Union to have acts preparatory to genocide and propaganda aimed ‘at provoking the commission of acts of

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genocide’ included in the convention were rebuffed.44 The adoption by the Legal Committee of the offences of attempting to commit genocide and complicity in the perpetration of genocide completed Article 3. Next, Raphael Lemkin decided to approach members of ex-servicemen’s organizations, forced labour associations and resistance groups in France and French religious leaders to obtain greater support from the public for a genocide convention.45 He visited pastor Marc Boegner, the head of the Protestant Church in France, who spoke to him about the tribulations of the Huguenots and Jews, promising to assist the campaign. Among the Protestants, Lemkin’s most helpful supporter was Jean Nussbaum, the director of the Association de Liberté Religieuse. He met Monsignor Joseph Roncalli, the Papal Nuncio to France, a progressive and humble man with an overpowering personality, who assisted both Lemkin and Professor René Cassin, the human rights campaigner.46 In particular, Roncalli promised to use his powers of persuasion on the South American delegations to the United Nations. Another useful contact was Jacques Herissay, the president of the Association of Catholic writers, who invited Lemkin to dinner to talk to opinion makers within the Church about his ideas. In return Lemkin arranged a meeting at his hotel over drinks for a group of distinguished Catholic intellectuals with the result that various religious newspapers started publishing articles about the genocide convention.47 While the religious leaders gave Lemkin an enthusiastic response, the help provided by the other groups was more sporadic. At the same time, Lemkin tried to secure broadcasting time on the French radio to create a groundswell of local opinion in favour of the convention which would influence the deliberations of the Legal Committee which was meeting in Paris, where there were so many distractions. He told the manager of a branch of the French broadcasting system which was based in the United States that he had ‘tried since the beginning of the campaign to be constantly in touch with the representatives of public opinion: Press, Radio, Civic Clubs, and so on. While in Paris, I made several talks on the Radio. The last one was on 27th October 1948 through Radio-France here in Paris’.48 He also contacted the French section of the UN radio station in Paris to arrange a programme on the genocide convention featuring sympathetic members of different delegations.49 The US delegation remained suspicious of the constant interventions and amendments tabled by the Russians, believing that they wanted to kill the draft convention by endless debate. John Maktos, the US delegate, intervened in the discussion on ‘preparatory acts’, noting that it was easy to propose measures, regardless of the possibility of applying them, when there was no intention of adopting the convention. He recalled that the representative of the Soviet Union on the Ad Hoc Committee had said that he could not approve the convention because he was not satisfied with article 2. The United States representative felt he

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could predict that the USSR delegation would vote against the text of the convention. He considered that delegations which had no intention of ratifying the convention should not create difficulties for those which sincerely desired to do so. Matkos conceded that he was merely predicting that the Soviet Union would not sign the convention without saying that this was its fixed intention.50 Four meetings were spent between 30 October and 4 November 1948 discussing completely different matters, thus slowing the progress of the convention through the Legal Committee. Once again John Maktos intervened, almost certainly at Lemkin’s behest, demanding that the discussion of the convention should not be interrupted in future except in emergencies. Kerno, the assistant General-Secretary, added that the General Assembly was finishing its current session on 8 December 1948 which meant that the Legal Committee would have to complete its work on 1 December 1948.51 The committee then considered Article 5 of the draft convention, which covered the responsibility of heads of state, public officials and private individuals for acts of genocide, leaving its main provisions unchanged, but agreed at the prompting of Sweden that kings needed to be differentiated from presidents of republics by using a formula suggested by the Netherlands and Thailand ‘constitutionally responsible rulers’, which would exclude constitutional monarchs. This provision was strongly supported by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands which like Sweden had monarchs with limited powers.52 But when the United Kingdom tried to insert an amendment in Article 5 providing explicitly for the responsibility of states and governments for genocide, it was defeated.53 Article 6 of the draft convention encouraged states to pass ‘the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention’; this was amended at the urging of the USSR, by states having to include in such legislation effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide.54 Article 7 of the draft convention stressed that there should be a trial of persons accused of genocide in the state having territorial jurisdiction, if this was possible, but this was not meant to exclude the jurisdiction of the country of the accused’s nationality. Some delegations, particularly the French, wanted the convention to establish an international criminal court to stage such trials, if no country was willing to try the accused. In 1934 the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou had been assassinated in Marseilles, as a result of which the League of Nations had drafted a convention in 1937 for the punishment of terrorism, but as yet it had only been signed by three states. John Maktos for the United States objected strongly to the amendment tabled by the United Kingdom for recourse to the International Court of Justice, where a state or government was alleged to have committed genocide. The Soviet Union, regretted that the United Kingdom and Belgium ‘were

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protracting the work of the Committee by submitting amendments which aimed at the reconsideration of decisions already taken’. 55 As a number of delegations were adamantly opposed to an international court, the Netherlands proposed that this matter be relegated to a separate article, and a wrecking amendment supported by Belgium and the Soviet Union was carried, deleting the phrase offering the alternative of trial ‘by a competent international tribunal’.56 When the article, however, came back before the Legal Committee on the second reading, an anodyne reference to an international court was restored to the text though it was agreed that if any such court was created it would only be binding on nations willing to accept its jurisdiction.57 Meanwhile Lemkin busied himself lobbying delegates to the Legal Committee, suggesting proposals they could make and asking them to second amendments.58 Article 9 of the draft convention which eventually followed the previous article in the final form of the convention dealt with the contentious issue of extradition for such offences. Although the UK delegation was not happy with the article, it could only be amended in minor respects. Gerald Fitzmaurice wrote to London that he had spoken to the Attorney-General [Shawcross] about omitting the passage which provides that genocide should not be considered as a political crime but he feels, and I must say, I agree with him, that we should never get away with this, and that it would indeed be destructive of the whole obligation to extradite, because, in fact, genocide in its more serious form nearly always is a political crime.59 Article 8 of the draft convention covered action by the United Nations in cases of genocide. Many delegations considered that this article was redundant and the committee deleted it on a vote on 11 November 1948 at the behest of Belgium and the United Kingdom.60 The article expressly stated that complaints about genocide could be brought before all the organs of the United Nations in an attempt to circumvent the Security Council with its veto power. Even if an international tribunal eventually tried persons accused of genocide, a long interval could elapse before they came to trial. Complaints, however, could be rapidly ventilated at the United Nations.61 The next day a joint Russian–Belgian–French amendment which allowed complaints about cases of genocide to be brought to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly was tabled, but the amendment was rejected with many members of the Western powers including the United States voting against it.62 The delegates now moved to consider article 10 of the draft convention which dealt with referring disputes between states relating to the interpretation of the treaty to the International Court of Justice. An Anglo-Belgian amendment was allowed which permitted such referrals to the Court to cover the

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responsibility of states for genocide.63 Australia now introduced a further amendment which encouraged parties to call upon any competent organ of the United Nations to take action under the UN Charter for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.64 This amendment itself became the new article 8 in the final form of the convention. In his memoirs Lemkin claimed that when he tried to have the article restored, he discovered that the delegates on the committee were at receptions that evening (it was a Friday night), as the social life of the Assembly intensified before it drew to a close. At midnight, he finally reached John Maktos, the US delegate, on the telephone, urging him to call other delegates. Lemkin himself now telephoned a number of delegates, who promised to consider the proposal sympathetically. Dr Alfaro, the chairman of the Legal Committee, was most helpful, stating that it was necessary to have two international monitoring bodies, both the International Court of Justice and the United Nations.65 If the debates in the Legal Committee are examined, it is apparent that it was the Australian delegation that took the initiative, probably at Lemkin’s prompting, and that although John Maktos of the United States changed tack in his attitude to this amendment, his role in the reversal of the previous vote was less significant than Lemkin contended.66 Considerable resistance from the United States had to be overcome for this vote to be reversed, as the Americans were ‘afraid of accusations which may be made against them as a government in respect of the treatment of the negro and Red Indian populations of the United States’.67 At the session on Saturday afternoon a fresh vote was taken, restoring the article.68 By dint of hard work and the assistance of John Matkos, the American delegate, and Dr Evatt, Lemkin overcame the delaying tactics of the UK delegation, who submitted time wasting amendments in the hope of aborting the convention. The Russians denied American charges that they had no intention of ratifying the convention, when they indulged in similar tactics. But many of the East European states which had suffered from Nazi persecution and destruction were strong supporters of the measure. Lemkin also had to allay the concerns of the Arab states, who were suspicious that the convention aided the Zionist cause. He had seen his favourite concept of cultural genocide brusquely discarded, and although political parties had been included in the convention, he faced a dilemma as to what further action he should take, for the Russians and their satellites as well as a group of South American states were strongly opposed to it. The measure could yet fail to command the necessary majority, when it was voted on in the General Assembly. In addition, there were still a number of further articles in the convention for the Legal Committee to consider.

11 The Convention is Adopted

It was at this juncture that Dr Alfaro, the chairman of the Legal Committee, appointed a subcommittee on 13 November 1948 to draft the final articles of the convention. Physically drained by his efforts, Lemkin relaxed momentarily and was not too careful about vetting the remaining clauses; he was so tired by all these weeks of hyperactivity that he could hardly stand on his feet.1 After this wearying struggle, Raphael Lemkin decided that he would follow a new routine in order to conserve his energy by focussing on the big issues and ignoring other matters. This also gave him ample time to participate in the social life of the Assembly. He was becoming embarrassed by a tendency among delegates to treat him as a secular saint by only talking to him about great moral and philosophical issues. In this way he was foregoing any intimate relationship with them. So he attended cocktail receptions, where he talked and danced and joked. Whenever anyone asked him anything about genocide, he would invariably reply, ‘Genocide, what’s that? They laughed, and...[he] laughed too’. Despite all this bantering and socialising, Lemkin mentioned in his autobiography that he felt condemned to loneliness, but that condition was really self-imposed because he rejected closer friendship with a number of female admirers.2 Once Lemkin had relaxed his close scrutiny of the proceedings of the Legal Committee, when the final articles were considered on 15 and 16 November 1948, the opponents of the convention inserted clauses in it which caused him much concern. Article 14 contained a provision which limited the duration of the convention in the first instance to ten years, and Article 15 stipulated that if as a result of denunciations the number of parties, who had signed up to the convention fell below 16, it would come to an end. Article 16 permitted a contracting party to suggest revision of the convention at any time with the consent of the General Assembly.3 Most of the remaining articles in the convention dealt with its implementation, apart from Article 12. This was the colonial article which the United Kingdom was able to have inserted in the convention, despite opposition from the Soviet bloc, and it 164

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allowed states with colonies by notification to the Secretary-General to extend the application of the convention to the territories over which they held sovereignty.4 During the concluding deliberations of the Legal Committee news reached Lemkin of a letter signed by representatives of human rights groups sent to various organizations in Paris claiming that it was impossible to draft a genocide convention. The opponents of the convention were concerned that if it was implemented their own area of activity would inevitably shrink. Immediately Lemkin set to work to prepare a quick response to this letter which he circulated widely. Lemkin approached Dr Evatt’s press officer, who after consulting with his boss prepared a statement drawing attention to the importance of the convention. When Dr Evatt’s statement supporting the genocide convention appeared on 26 November 1948, it was very effective and Lemkin’s opponents in the human rights organizations hurried to offer him their congratulations. Yet he never trusted them, fearing that with their large staffs, ample funds and prestige they would not give up their efforts to undermine the convention. As almost none of this correspondence survives, it is difficult to date this episode accurately, but we do know that Dr Evatt issued a press statement which appeared on 26 November 1948 and in all probability the incident occurred around this time.5 Something which may throw light on this hidden warfare between Lemkin and his opponents was a cable sent from Lemkin to the American Jewish Committee (AJC) on 29 November 1948. It stated that ‘Nolde opposed Genocide Convention Stop Will be grateful for your cabling him. Only you can help’. Dr Fred Nolde was an influential figure, who belonged to the Federal Council of Churches and was chairman of a temporary NGO set-up in Paris. One of his actions was to refuse to circulate a resolution which Lemkin had urgently requested.6 A couple of more days was spent by the Legal Committee drafting the preamble to the convention. A Venezuelan proposal was adopted which stated that genocide was a crime against international law and that it had existed in all periods of history. In this way, genocide was differentiated from the judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal which recognized the concept of crimes against humanity, though with a restricted meaning, by stipulating that they had to be committed in connection with international armed conflict. Genocide was also recognized as a wide-ranging concept, thereby differentiating it from fascism and the Nazi era. The Soviets tried several times without success to give it this historically restricted meaning.7 Once again, Lemkin seems to have been working in tandem with the Venezuelan delegation to persuade the Legal Committee to accept his own more flexible formulations. From 19 to 29 November 1948 the Legal Committee dealt with other business allowing the drafting subcommittee to put the final touches to the

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convention and Lemkin a useful period for respite and reflection. For a long time, he had been thinking that unless a fresh vote was taken by the Legal Committee on the issue of excluding political parties from the convention it would founder when it reached the General Assembly. James Rosenberg and Dr Clinchy of the Human Rights Committee of the National Council of Christians and Jews had sent a cable to John Foster Dulles, who was an influential figure in the US delegation in Paris and whose brother Allen was associated with the United States Committee for a Genocide Convention. They believed that as a prominent Presbyterian layman he could be swayed by pressure from religious groups. Dulles stated that Mr Gross of the State Department, who was handling the issue of the genocide convention was under the impression that the Soviet bloc is absolutely unwilling to accept any convention that might give rise to any international rights of enforcement, and they are trying through various processes of amendment to make the convention sufficiently unacceptable to some Delegations as to make it impossible to get a two-thirds vote in the Assembly As yet it was impossible to predict whether or not this manoeuvre would be successful.8 Rosenberg replied that according to his latest information ‘Gross is urging the inclusion of the word [political]. I think Gross is wrong’. He pleaded with Dulles not to upset the Latin American group of countries over what was a comparatively minor issue, and suggested that if he had a spare 15 minutes, it might be useful to have a chat with Raphael Lemkin. Copies of this correspondence were sent by Rosenberg to Lemkin.9 Lemkin decided to orchestrate unremitting pressure primarily on the US delegation in Paris, but also on Belgium and the United Kingdom. On 28 October 1948, he wrote to Jane Evans of the American Jewish Conference: I think the American delegation (Hotel d’Iena, Paris) should receive a number of telegrams demanding [it] to drop issues which endanger the adoption of the convention such as political groups. Moreover the U.S.A. delegation should be kept under the warm influence of a constant flow of letters and telegrams urging [the] adoption of the genocide convention. Our friends here cannot be left without the influence of American public opinion, because the British are still opposed to the convention and they try to influence the U.S.A. delegation by direct and indirect means.10 He informed Jeanne Eder of the International Council of Women that the British and Belgian governments had been underplaying the criminal dimensions of genocide and presenting it as a political dispute between states, so pressure from the branches of her organization were needed to

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keep these states in line.11Growing increasingly alarmed at his failure to persuade the American delegation to change their course and fearing for the fate of the convention, Lemkin sent a cable to James Rosenberg on 12 November 1948. Your letter Dulles helped ... More help necessary from you to Dulles and from many organizations and individuals to American delegation urging factual not only verbal leadership adoption convention ... England using Belgium for killing convention ... Because inclusion political groups Latin Americans losing interest convention while England Belgium intriguing among them ... Kindly ask Sporborg and USA labor organization to cable their friends Brussels.12 Following this, Rosenberg contacted the Herald Tribune, the New York Times, Dr Henry MacCracken of the International Council of Christians and Jews, and Dulles, stirring them into action. He warned Dulles that the US delegation by ‘insisting on the inclusion of the word “political” in the definition of genocide, is running [into] grave danger of losing the whole battle for a genocide convention’. He pleaded with him to have a chat with Ernest Gross and John Maktos, who were in charge of the matter for the State Department.13 Cables were sent from the Federal Council of Churches to Eleanor Roosevelt, who was in Paris as leader of the American delegation on the Human Rights Declaration, and to Ernest Gross, while the Quakers sent a message to Warren Austin.14 At the same time, James Rosenberg advised Lemkin that he should have a heart to heart conversation with Senator Warren Austin, the head of the American delegation to the UN, ‘and explain the difficulties’.15 On 23 November 1948, Lemkin wrote to the editor of the New York Post alerting him to the small but skilful opposition to the convention from Britain. In particular, he focussed on the changing attitude of Britain to the inclusion of political groups in the convention. In 1946 the British delegation at a late hour ensured that the genocide resolution covered these groups. On 5 November 1947, the British delegation violently attacked the inclusion of these groups, pointing out the danger of a convention which precluded states from fighting the subversive activities of these bodies. But in the autumn of 1948 Shawcross brazenly declared that he would like to see a delegation who would dare to oppose the inclusion of political groups and they were included in the convention. If political groups continued to be incorporated in the convention, Lemkin warned, it would not secure the two-thirds majority of votes necessary to secure its passing in the General Assembly because of the opposition of the Latin American countries and the Soviet bloc. To avert this, he was in touch with Dr Evatt, the president of the General Assembly, who had suggested a procedure for obviating this impasse: Controversial matters should be omitted until a later date and agreement

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reached on the rest of the convention. ‘However already now a whispering campaign among Delegates is spreading that the Genocide convention will not be approved by the Assembly because it contains “explosive matters” such as political groups ... you must realise that Delegates are changing often and some do not remember or wish to forget’.16 On 24 November 1948, James Rosenberg and Willard Johnson of the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention sent a cable to Lemkin. In it they advised against his ‘futile approach. Our groups repeatedly [stress] same issue... urge you talk Dulles and [Benjamin] Cohen. Our best hope asking CIO and AFL [the American trade union organizations] help.’17 Disquieted by all that was happening, Lemkin went to see Dr Evatt, who quickly analysed the situation. After hearing what Sir Hartley Shawcross had been arguing, Dr Evatt stated that the British were the obstacle and Lemkin was convinced that they were deliberately trying to destroy the convention by the inclusion of political groups. Dr Evatt remarked that he was late for lunch with Foster Dulles, but asked Lemkin to join him for the journey in the car so that they could have a talk. Evatt stated that he would ‘ask Dulles for new instructions to the American delegation. The vote must be reconsidered, otherwise the Convention is lost’. By effective lobbying, the United States obtained a two-thirds majority in the Legal Committee on the next day for the previous vote to be reconsidered and later the decision for inclusion of political groups in the convention was overturned. Before falling into an exhausted sleep, Lemkin remembered to leave a message at Dr Evatt’s hotel, thanking him for his help.18 Lemkin presented the story in a dramatic fashion in his memoirs, stating that Dr Evatt’s intercession with Foster Dulles converted the American delegation to the idea of dropping political groups from the convention. But Dr Evatt at Lemkin’s suggestion had already delivered a broadcast on 26 November 1948 and issued a statement to the press highlighting the significance of a convention, so they must have had their discussion on tactics at an earlier date.19 Again, when Lemkin wrote to Clarence Pickett of the American Friends Service Committee on 21 November 1948, he referred to ‘a movement under way to adopt the EVATT plan and to omit the political groups in the second reading in order to save the convention’, and a similar letter was despatched to Miss Romme of the Union Internationale De Ligues Féminines Catholiques in the Hague.20 Evatt because of his vanity did not take it amiss, when Lemkin suggested an adroit political move and then permitted the senior statesman to endorse it and regurgitate the plan as his own idea. In reality, the US delegation as well as other sympathetic ones were gradually softened up by a massive barrage of cables and letters from pressure groups prodded by Lemkin and James Rosenberg of the United States Committee. Rosenberg because of his upper middle-class lifestyle and connections could reach parts of the State Department which were inaccessible

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to Lemkin. Around 25 November 1948, Lemkin despatched a furious cable to the AJC asserting that their lobbyist in Paris Joel Wolfsohn ‘refuses demand exclusion political groups ignoring your previous position and memoranda favored exclusion’. In response, the AJC sent fresh instructions to Wolfsohn: ‘Leave to your judgment whether change of position advisable considering present conditions in Paris. Assumed you have cleared with AJA [Anglo-Jewish Association] and Alliance [Israelite]’.21 On 27 November 1948, Joel Wolfsohn of the AJC’s Paris office, after a briefing session with Lemkin, reported that he and some other NGO representatives had recently met with American members of the UN mission to make them understand ‘that political genocide, if retained in the convention, might mean first that the convention might not pass the assembly, and second, that even if adopted by the assembly, might not secure enough adherents to make it meaningful’. Separately, he wrote to Clark Eichelberger that Lemkin was taking a tougher line than his supporters. He was ‘willing to throw anything and everything overboard to save the ship’.22 In desperation Lemkin wrote to Ernest Gross, the American delegate to the Paris Assembly on 28 November 1948, stating that a letter which Rosenberg had sent to Gross, of which he had sight, contained a chronological error about the attitude of the British to the inclusion of political parties in the convention. He set out the facts to correct this. Baring his innermost thoughts in a draft of the letter, Lemkin decided to cut them out of the final version of the letter which he despatched to Gross in the hope of influencing him, ‘Genocide has taken the lives of my dear ones; the fight against genocide takes my health. I am ready to give my life for this cause’.23 On 29 November 1948 Ernest Gross adducing the same arguments for a volte-face as the AJC had put to him addressed the Legal Committee: ‘the Committee must prepare a complete draft convention founded on just principles; on the other hand, the convention must be ratified by the greatest possible number of Governments’. While the US delegation still thought its policy was correct, he would agree to the deletion of political groups from the convention so as not to deter ‘certain countries from acceding to it’. A two-thirds majority was rapidly obtained for re-examining the relevant Article 2, and following this the US amendment for the exclusion of political groups from the convention was passed by 22 votes to 6 with the Soviet bloc abstaining and the British casting their vote for the amendment.24 On 30 November 1948, Lemkin came across Joel Wolfsohn in the Palais de Chaillot and stopped him ‘to express his gratitude for all the work that ... [he], personally, and that the AJC had done. Moreover, he apologized for having been sharp at different times’.25 At Lemkin’s prompting the AJC felt that the insistence on the inclusion of the term ‘political’ might jeopardize the adoption of any Convention on Genocide and we therefore made every effort to influence the U.S. delegation to agree to the

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elimination of this term. Mr Wolfsohn kept in constant touch with the American delegation and finally succeeded in helping to bring about its agreement to this change.26 Sustained daily pressure by Lemkin and the United States Committee for a Genocide Convention rather than a dramatic intervention of Dr Evatt with Dulles converted Ernest Gross and the American delegation. The next day the US delegation tabled an amendment to Article 6 which was modified by France, asking for the alternative of trial ‘by a international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to such Contracting Parties as shall have accepted the jurisdiction of such tribunal’, and this was adopted by the Legal Committee as a supplement to trials by national tribunals.27 The final text was prepared and submitted to the plenary meeting of the General assembly with a report and amendments from the Soviet Union and Venezuela. The Soviet Union sought to reinstate provisions in the convention dealing with cultural genocide, the prohibition of fascist organizations, the obligatory application of the convention to colonies and the exclusion of international jurisdiction, all without success. The Venezuelan delegation put forward an amendment stating that the systematic destruction of religious buildings, schools and libraries of a group was genocide, but withdrew it because of lack of support. This last ditch attempt at the partial rehabilitation of cultural genocide made by Dr Perez Perozo, a close ally of Lemkin, may well have been at the latter’s instigation.28 Lemkin was never reconciled to the replacement of cultural genocide by the rival project of a human rights declaration. On 9 December 1948 the General Assembly started to discuss the Genocide Convention and a vote was taken. Lemkin heard rumours ‘that a joint attack against [the] genocide convention by Russia and England might take place’, but it failed to materialize. He felt that all the delegates were smiling at him. India’s was the first vote to be taken which was a resounding ‘yes’, followed by all the other delegates. Only South Africa might have opposed this, but wisely absented itself from the Assembly. When the United Kingdom abstained from voting, Lemkin sent out telegrams to the 28 organizations in England which had previously signed the petition for a convention and their pressure led to the British delegation reversing their stand and voting for the convention.29 A thunderclap of applause burst from the public gallery after a unanimous vote in favour of the convention. John Foster Dulles congratulated Lemkin in his rather stiff, formal way, saying that he had made a great contribution to international law. Delegates from South America, many of them close friends, rushed over to him to give him an ‘abrazo’, a hug. Dr Evatt strolled from the podium, linked his arm with that of Lemkin and posed for a photograph from the world’s press. Unknown well-wishers sallied forth from the public gallery to offer their congratulations.30

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Ernest Gross told the General Assembly that ‘The unanimous vote ... on this matter in itself reflected the determination of the peoples of the United Nations, whatever their race, creed or nationality, to assure that the barbarism which has so recently shocked the conscience of mankind would never again take place’.31 At the same time, two related resolutions were adopted. One invited the International Law Commission to study the feasibility of setting up a criminal chamber of the International Court of Justice to try persons charged with genocide. The other resolution requested states administering dependent territories to take measures to extend the provisions of the convention to these territories as soon as possible.32 Then in his finest hour Lemkin suddenly vanished, hiding himself from the public acclaim. A.M. Rosenthal of the New York Times guessed where he was, leading the other correspondents back to the darkened hall. There sitting on the same seat which he had occupied earlier was Lemkin. When they begged him for an interview, John Hohenberg recalled, he refused, muttering ‘ “Let me stay here alone” ... And this was the man we had thought to be a clown, a publicity hound, a self-seeking fanatic’.33 Two days later representatives of a number of states signed the convention, giving the first indication of which nations were likely to ratify the treaty. The UN radio correspondent, Mike Hayworth, requested Lemkin to give him an interview. ‘The UN acting as Santa Claus is now giving to the world a beautiful Christmas gift’, Lemkin remarked. ‘The Genocide Convention is being signed by the first twenty-two nations. Congratulations’.34 Lemkin confided to Miss Romme that before returning to the United States, I would like to organize an International Committee to assure ratifications of the convention by all Member States of [the] United Nations. You realize that a considerable amount of public sentiment and pressure will be necessary. Could you think of a very important personality as President of such a committee? Do you think that Queen Wilhemina would accept it? I am intending to visit several [European] countries to organize local committees for ratification of the convention.35 Suddenly all the months of hectic toil working on the convention and the emotional turmoil bubbling under the surface when he had to force himself to assume a calm exterior hit Lemkin. His had been a virtuoso performance, cajoling and rallying his supporters in an intricate web of pressure groups, writing an incredible number of letters, propagandizing for his cause and constantly outwitting his opponents in the General Assembly, and convincing his doughtiest supporter, the State Department, to follow his lead on so many occasions. All this could not have been achieved without the assistance of James Rosenberg and the United States Committee for a UN Genocide

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Convention which drew its strength from its religious affiliates and the aid offered by the prestigious AJC. Also vital was the input from the World Federation of United Nations Associations. While the continuous flow of publicity which Lemkin obtained from the major American newspapers was of critical importance, the trade unions and the women’s organizations at this stage were mostly on the periphery of the campaign. When the French radio requested an interview, Lemkin could not refuse; although the recording equipment was brought to his room in the hotel, he was too ill to assemble his thoughts and he could not utter anything coherent. The next day he was taken to a hospital in Paris, where Lemkin claimed he stayed for the next three weeks, without any physical ailment being found. However, in a letter to a friend he confessed that he ‘had to spend almost all the time after the end of the Assembly in fighting a bad case of flu in the American Hospital in Paris’.36 He seems also to have been suffering from exhaustion and a nervous breakdown of some kind. On 10 January 1949, Rosenberg acknowledged receiving a cable from Lemkin, stating that he was returning to the United States after a bout of ill health. Gradually walking on the deck of the Queen Mary bound for New York and breathing in the fresh sea air, he recovered his mental equilibrium, but he could only talk to fellow passengers about innocuous subjects and studiously avoided serious topics which could only lead to mental agitation and nervous exhaustion.37 Despite, defeats on a number of issues about which he cared deeply, particularly cultural genocide, Lemkin had seen many of his ideas triumph. Genocide, the murder of national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, became a crime under international law. Nor did it did matter whether these vicious deeds occurred in the time of peace or war. Moreover, the perpetrators of genocide could be punished in national courts, while the groundwork had been laid for future trials in some form of international criminal court. But first Lemkin had to ensure that a sufficient number of states ratified the convention in order to make it an enforceable instrument. A new international campaign for ratification was opening.

12 The International Campaign for Ratification of the Convention

Lemkin now had to switch his energy into an international campaign to cajole representatives from at least 20 states to ratify the Genocide Convention, so that the treaty became part of international law. Not only had the legislatures of many states to approve of ratifying the convention, but their Foreign Ministers had to deposit a document confirming ratification at the United Nations. All this was a wearying process and it was imperative that everything was done quickly before all the euphoria surrounding the General Assembly’s approval of the convention evaporated. As was becoming routine, Lemkin hurried to see Dr Evatt, selling him the plan of the campaign which was run under the latter’s imprimatur, though most of the legwork was done by Lemkin. While it was true that Lemkin used all his charm and flattery to beg delegates at the United Nations and ministers for their support, he also relied on allies in the World Federation of United Nations Associations, South American university rectors and women’s international organizations to exert pressure on different governments. Because of his fears that the United States Committee for a Genocide Convention had been infiltrated by human rights activists, Lemkin was adamant that it would play no role in the campaign. Sometimes Lemkin had to devote much energy and extensive correspondence to ensure the successful outcome of a campaign in an individual country, as in the case of France; sometimes a few deft moves sufficed. On his return from Paris, Lemkin’s health deteriorated once again, and he was not fit to return to work as a professor at Yale University Law School until May 1949. As he told the Cuban ambassador, the ‘prolonged fever’ from which he suffered ‘developed later in[to] a number of local infections and my hand was operated twice in the last two months’.1 Spring on the campus soothed Lemkin’s frayed nerves, and he enjoyed teaching small classes of students. He gave a stimulating course on genocide to his law students, ranging widely over its cultural, psychological and economic implications, and provoking his students into asking many questions and engaging them frequently in ‘searching conversations’. He explained how the Latin term genus, the Greek genos and the Sanskrit genos were ‘basically the same 173

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social unit which was originally conceived of as an enlarged family’, claiming descent from a common ancestor. He continued that the broad ‘O’ in genocide was always used to convey a large object and here gave the word the meaning of destroying masses of people, the nation. The latter became the reservoir ‘of racial memories and the transmitter of idiosyncrasies and prejudices’. Nationalism engendered both pride in one's own group and feelings of superiority over other groups which could sometimes be very destructive. He warned his students with remarkable foresight that it will take a long time until results will be noticeable. The Genocide Convention is only a framework for this task, a rallying point for thinking and acting. As starting point for a new conscience! ... It was made an international crime. This means that the condemnation by world society must also follow.2 Lemkin could also rely on the support of one remarkable colleague on the Yale law faculty, Eugene Rostow (1913–2002). During the Second World War, he had served as a State Department adviser and was raised to a full professorship at Yale at 34. President Johnson later appointed him as UnderSecretary for Political Affairs at the State Department during 1966–1969.3 He smoothed difficulties with the Treasurer’s office to ensure that Lemkin was paid during his absence in Paris in the winter of 1948, besides approaching several donors to fund Lemkin’s academic work. ‘You know to what depths I would sink in order to cope with bastards’, Rostow assured him: What shocks me often is as you say the weakness of our intellectuals in not wanting to fight ... They make the worst possible allies anyway, because they tend to run out when they should be most stubborn. However, you quite evidently organized a very effective team. My hat goes off to you. Now come home and write a book about it, to make sure that the victory is not lost.4 While Lemkin was at Yale, Rostow continued to intervene on his behalf with State Department officials and high calibre journalists. All this boosted Lemkin’s morale. The United Nations was meeting again at Lake Success in New York in the spring of 1949, and Lemkin decided to go there to begin a campaign to persuade member nations and others to ratify the Genocide Convention, for which a minimum of 20 state signatories were required. When he entered the hall of the General Assembly, Dr Herbert Evatt beckoned Lemkin to join him on the podium. Evatt, as a British Foreign Office official noted, had ‘always seen the Genocide Convention through rather rose coloured spectacles’, and was keen to be of further assistance to Lemkin in his campaign.5 Lemkin told Dr Evatt of his plan initially to obtain one signatory for the ratification from

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all the continents and then to use the momentum generated by this to pressure other governments into signing the Convention. Dr Evatt thought this was such an excellent idea that he, as Foreign Minister, arranged for the ratification bill to be introduced into the Australian Parliament on 20 May 1949.6 In addition, he wrote to other governments as President of the General Assembly asking them to ratify the Convention. Among these letters was one sent to Hector McNeil, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, praising the United Kingdom for being one of the chief supporters of the Genocide Convention. This was not strictly accurate, but he stated that he was sure that ‘we are of the same opinion that this Convention marks a milestone in the development of international law ... I wish also to express the hope that your Government will proceed at the earliest possible date with the signing and ratification of this Convention.’7 Lemkin gained some quick early successes in his plan to obtain ratification of the treaty from a country in all the world’s continents. He contacted Stuart Spencer, the American adviser to the Ethiopian government, an African state, and on 1 July 1949 Ethiopia became the first nation to ratify the Convention. There was a rapid adherence to the Convention from two European governments: Iceland and Norway. Iceland was a country often cited by Lemkin as a state with a tiny population but with a unique culture which had to be preserved. Norway had always been in the forefront of Lemkin’s supporters for international legislation on genocide. Its Foreign Minister Erik Dons passed on the contents of Lemkin’s letter urging prompt action on ratification to Terje Wold, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who expedited the passage of the treaty through Norway’s Parliament.8 Australia’s early ratification of the Convention on 8 July 1949 was yet another fruit of Dr Evatt’s friendship and support.9 Throughout 1949 Raphael Lemkin became increasingly unhappy with the deliberations of the United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention. At a meeting on 2 March 1949, it was decided that the Committee should concentrate its efforts on seeking ratification of the Convention by the US Senate and ‘to write to non-Governmental organizations [NGOs] with consultative status asking them to express their opinions in favor of the genocide convention through their regular channels’. Copies of this correspondence were to be forwarded to John Ennals, the Secretary-General of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, a key Lemkin ally in the fight for the universal ratification of the treaty. At another meeting of the United States Committee on 18 October 1949, it was agreed ‘That no effort be made to secure ratification in other nations except as Dr Lemkin calls on individual members for aid in special situations’ and this point was reiterated at a session of the committee on 28 March 1950. The minutes of the organization noted that ‘in light of Dr Lemkin’s work with other nations which requires individual treatment and knowledge of delicate political situations, this committee refrain from work in other countries and concentrate on the USA,

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except where Dr Lemkin asks special action’.10 Lemkin’s wanted to keep the worldwide campaign for a treaty tightly under his own personal control because at some point in 1949 he became concerned that the United States Committee had been taken over by a group of human rights activists, who were prepared to use it for their own purposes.11 At the end of March 1949, Lemkin advised his friend Gertrude Samuels, a journalist on the New York Times, that he had disturbing news from Washington. The State Department preferred not to submit the convention to the present session of the Senate on grounds that its agenda was overcrowded. He praised her recent editorial for quoting the American delegate, Ernest Gross, who asserted that it was necessary to ‘act quickly before the memory of the genocidal acts of the last war have faded’. It was urgent that he went to Washington to sort matters out because without the example of the United States ratifying the convention other nations would withhold or delay ratification. The consequences of this would be disastrous, particularly in relation to the 21 Latin American states.12 A campaign of letter writing was initiated, and Telegrams to the Secretary of State were sent by Dr Stephen Wise, Judge Proskauer [of the AJC], the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, by Judge Steinbrink in the name of the Anti-Defamation League, and many others. Senator Humphrey [the influential Democrat] wrote a letter to the Secretary of State expressing his interest in the Convention.13 Lemkin also conferred with Senators Robert Taft, Douglas and McMahon, all of whom requested submission of the convention to the Senate. Taft informed Lemkin that his letter had ‘made a strong impression in the State Department’. In June Ernest Gross told Lemkin that he would consult Senator Vandenberg shortly on the convention’s submission to the Senate.14 When the United States failed to take the lead, no ratification of the Convention was forthcoming from any country in South America or Asia. The objective of securing 20 signatories to the treaty in time for the 1950 General Assembly’s approval was in peril. Although his correspondence, as we shall see, suggests that there was some input from Dr Evatt, in his memoirs Lemkin noted that he was the sole originator of the plan to persuade the numerous smaller Latin American states to ratify the Convention. Panama, Honduras and Coast Rica had populations near to one million, while a larger number of states, El Salvador, Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Uraguay, had a population of two to three million.15 Lemkin engaged the services of a Spanish secretary from Cuba and was advised on tactics by Jaime Angel, a graduate law student from Colombia, who was studying at Yale. He suggested sending short, incisive letters to key individuals. Letters were despatched to the presidents, the ministers of Foreign Affairs and the archbishops and bishops of all 20 republics and

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many examples of these letters are still extant in Lemkin’s correspondence. Because of the political clout of the Catholic Church in South America the clergy were targeted. To Lemkin’s delight the Latin American press corps had fully reported the United Nations’ discussions of genocide which resulted in a positive response from many of the recipients of the letters. At the same time, Lemkin contacted women’s organizations and humanitarian groups in South America, who sent delegations to their Foreign Ministers pleading with them to ratify the Convention.16 While relaxing one weekend at the Castlebrook Inn at Westbrook, Connecticut, near to where he was teaching at New Haven, Lemkin noticed an item in a Sunday newspaper that a Congress of Latin American Universities was meeting in Guatemala City. Among the organizers were Dr Carlos Martinez Duran, the rector of the University of San Carlos in Guatemala, and Mendez Pereira, the President of Panama University, who had represented his country at the United Nations in 1946 and had supported the passing of the resolution on genocide. Lemkin cabled the Congress, asking them to endorse the Genocide Convention and they adopted a resolution on 22 September 1949 to this effect which was sent by the delegates to their Foreign Ministers. Many university presidents became adherents of the cause and started to campaign for the ratification of the treaty in their own countries. Pressure was building up in a number of South American countries for the ratification of the Convention.17 Cementing a friendship between the two men, he invited Jorge Villagomez Yepes, a law professor and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Chamber of Deputies in Ecuador, to spend the day with him at Yale in June 1949. Ecuador later became the first South American country to ratify the Convention on 21 December 1949.18 All the while Lemkin kept up his written bombardment of influential South American ministers to gain more adherents. On 28 July 1949, he wrote to Dr Temistocles Messina Pimental, the Minister of National Economy of the Dominican Republic, that There is a plan, started by Dr Evatt to proclaim the ratification of the convention by twenty nations during the next Assembly ... I have the feeling that Dr Evatt is right with his plan. Humanitarian treaties must be ratified within the first year after their adoption, while the enthusiasm is still alive. As similar letters were sent to other figures of influence, it is likely that Lemkin coordinated this public relations initiative with Dr Evatt.19 In fact, Lemkin wrote to Dr Evatt on 29 July 1949 that I think we should go on now vigorously carrying out your plan of ratification within this year. It was very good of you to write to the heads

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of legations that you hope that the Genocide Convention will be ratified this year so that before the end of the next assembly it could be proclaimed as a binding law. We will call your plan the ‘Evatt Plan’ ... I have written about it to several friends in influential positions in some countries who are very grateful for your constructive proposals.20 Turning his attention away from South America, in August 1949 Lemkin wrote a long letter to President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines proclaiming that the latter had undertaken ‘a ... historical mission to preserve the peoples of Southeast Asia from destruction. The onslaught of Communism in Asia is directed first of all against the concept of Nations as independent units living a full life of sovereignty, culture and religious expression’. Lemkin looked upon the Philippines for leadership in Southeast Asia to make their governments aware of the advantages of ratifying the Genocide Convention.21 Lemkin sent a similar letter to Ambassador Padilla Nervo of Mexico, reminding him of his own assertion that if Mexico ratifies the convention first, many Latin American countries will follow. Certainly, the great humanitarian tradition of your country, and the great prestige of its leaders throughout Latin America, in the United Nations, and in the world at large, qualifies Mexico as a natural champion and leader for the genocide convention22 At the end of September 1949, Lemkin wrote to Dr Evatt again, ‘I wish to thank you whole heartedly for your message to the Assembly concerning Genocide. It made a very strong impression on the delegates and prompted some of them to action’.23 Their close relationship deepened the friendship between Lemkin and Dr Evatt. In countries where labour or civic groups were operating, such as Western Europe or Scandinavia, Lemkin made direct approaches to these groups to stir them into action. Valuable support was given by Mr Oldenbroek of the International Federation of Trade Unions with its headquarters in the Netherlands. Additional assistance was rendered by women’s groups, particularly by the International Alliance of Women, the International Council of Women headed by Dr Jeanne Eder which was based in Zurich and the Inter-american Commission on Women in Buenos Aires presided over by Senora Amalia de Castillo Ledon of Mexico. The latter’s group passed a resolution urging prompt action.24 Lemkin met Castillo Ledon in 1949, when she was part of the Mexican delegation to the United Nations. She advised him that she was going on a trip to Central America promising to take up the issue of ratification, which he had already raised with their Foreign Ministers. From this time, she cooperated with Lemkin, and she also prodded the local women’s organizations into exerting additional pressure on the Foreign Ministers. She and Lemkin discussed serious matters in a somewhat

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frivolous way with an undercurrent of sexual innuendo. On one occasion, he said to her secretary: ‘Tell Senora Ledon that if she does not do that, I will marry her mother (who was a widow) and thus will become her stepfather and then I will spank her legitimately’.25 Hearing news of a conference of ministers from Latin America in Washington in April 1950, Lemkin hurried there to lobby them to ratify the Genocide Convention. Mingling with the delegates, Lemkin was noticed by Senora Ledon, who introduced him to the Foreign Minister of El Salvador, Dr Rafael Urquia. A friendly conversation ensued as the minister was wellbriefed on the issue because of Lemkin’s previous letters and Senora Ledon’s own spadework. He assured Lemkin that ‘El Salvador had been working on the ratification – it will be ready for the 1950 Assembly’.26 While in Washington, Lemkin called at the Haitian Embassy to meet the Foreign Minister Dr Vilfort Beauvoer. Lemkin pleaded with the minister by reminding him that ‘Your ancestors, Excellency, were brought as slaves to this hemisphere. They were tortured and beaten; now you are a free people. Please translate your experiences into an act for the good of all humanity. Your government should be in the forefront of this action’. When the minister asked Lemkin for more information about the Convention, Lemkin thought that he was encountering resistance. Soon through reflection he realized that this was not the case. The minister had, in fact, been deeply moved. As Lemkin left, the minister gripped him warmly by the hand and stated, ‘Nous allon le faire’ (We will do it).27 Lemkin was also in touch with Antonio Vieux, who had been a member of the Haitian delegation to the United Nations in 1947; both Vieux and June Rosenberg, an American diplomat, successfully interceded with members of the National Assembly, impressing on them the importance of ratification.28 During his stay in Washington, Lemkin also met Dr Angela de Chacon, a women’s rights activist and lawyer from Costa Rica. She wrote up the Convention in a law journal and for the Colombian magazine El Lumbre. She agreed that his approach of concentrating first on the smaller countries in the campaign for ratification was the right one. Through Chacon, Lemkin was introduced to the ambassador for Costa Rica, Mario Echandi, a young, idealistic lawyer, open to ‘new concepts’. Ambassador Echandi pressed Lemkin to write to him when he returned to Yale, and on 9 June 1950, the ambassador sent Lemkin a copy of a letter he had received from his own undersecretary for External Affairs. It thanked him for enclosing a copy of a letter from Lemkin explaining the terms of the Genocide Convention: The contents of Professor Lemkin’s note is [are] highly interesting and I am taking the liberty of preparing several copies of it in order to present them to members of the Cabinet as well as to the ... Legislative Assembly in view of considering the possibility of ratifying the convention by our country.29

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Ambassador Echandi, Senora Chacon and the Foreign Minister all followed this up by assisting the ratification process.30 Lemkin had lunch with Dr Garcia Bauer, the delegate of Guatemala, at the United Nations and confided his plan of securing 20 ratifications of the Convention before the meeting of the General Assembly in 1950. Lemkin declared that he had confidence that Guatemala would sign up to the Convention. Once 20 nations had ratified the Convention, he declared, they would act as ‘spokesmen before the world for this cause. They will be the founding nations of a new humanity’. Dr Bauer assured Lemkin that he could achieve this, but if speed was of the essence then it was essential that he write a letter to the President of Guatemala. His brother, who was on a visit to New York, would personally deliver it.31 At the same time, Lemkin approached several organizations in Guatemala, with which he had been in touch previously, asking them to renew their request for ratification. On a further trip to Washington, Lemkin met the Guatemalan Foreign Minister and begged him to ensure that the requisite action was taken by his country.32 Above all he received sustained support from Senor Duran, the rector of the University of Guatemala, with whom he was in regular correspondence; the latter was able to confirm to Lemkin the fact that the Guatemalan Congress had approved the ratification of the convention.33 In the meantime the ratification by Ecuador was being presented to the United Nations despite the fact that it was concerned with ‘rehabilitation problems following . . . [an] earthquake’.34 Lemkin not only asked Trygve Lie to attend the ratification ceremony in person but also requested the New York Times to ensure that their photographer be present in order to capture the event, thus generating more publicity for the ratification campaign. Lemkin knew that he could also rely on Cuba and Panama for assistance, as Panama's Ambassador Alfaro had from the first been an enthusiastic advocate of the genocide resolution, but matters did not proceed in Cuba as quickly as Lemkin had anticipated and the treaty was not ratified there until after the assembly of 1950.35 In 1949 the United Nations comprised about 60 member states. A considerable group of countries had been refused admission because of lack of agreement between the great powers. Nevertheless, the Genocide Convention empowered these non-member nations, if they so wished, to ratify the treaty; Lemkin correctly surmised that they would only be too happy to take advantage of these provisions, if they were provided with an opportunity. He persuaded the delegates of Australia, Cuba and the Philippines to sponsor a resolution in the General Assembly on 3 December 1949, inviting non-member states to adhere to the Genocide Convention and called upon other states to ratify it with all possible speed.36 In January 1950, the Secretary-General of the United Nations sent out invitations in accordance with the resolution to Korea, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Ceylon, Jordan, Monaco, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to ratify the Convention.37

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At the same time, Lemkin had been working hard for many months to convince France to ratify the Genocide Convention. During the course of a conversation with Joel Wolfsohn, Lemkin revealed that ‘René Cassin was evidently the stumbling block in France in getting the Convention submitted to the Chamber of Deputies’ and called for assistance from the American Jewish Committee (AJC). Wolfsohn remarked that ‘in view of the fact that Judge Proskauer has so actively supported the Convention and since he is a lawyer, word from him to Prof. Cassin might be helpful’.38 The necessary support was forthcoming from elsewhere. Lemkin was aided by his friend Dr Jean Nussbaum of the International Association for the Defence of Religious Liberty, who lobbied on his behalf in France with great effect and intervened with the Cabinet to send the convention to the National Assembly.39 As Lemkin explained to Leroy Beaulieu of the Quai D’Orsay, ‘Quick ratification by France would start a strong ratification movement in the entire world because every country looks to France for guidance in matters of international law and new ideals’.40 At the 1949 meeting of the General Assembly in New York, when Lemkin was lobbying he made two useful contacts, Marcel Plaisant and Pierre Montel, who were members of the French delegation and helped to mobilize public opinion in favour of ratification. Marcel Plaisant, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, who was a leading intellectual, imbued with the ideals of the French Revolution and enlightenment, a believer in the perfectibility of man. Pierre Montel was a man of a different stamp. Chairman of the Defence Committee of the National Assembly, he was a businessman from Lyons, whose three sons had died fighting for the resistance, leaving him with few illusions about human progress. He told Lemkin that the Convention ‘should be ratified without one word of discussion. This was a matter of national honor. Please keep me informed and write to me as often as you wish’. Lemkin also alerted Edouard Herriot, the President of the French National Assembly; Leon Blum, the former Prime Minister of France; and Jean Minjoz, who was the rapporteur on genocide of the Judicial Committee of the National Assembly, to the importance of the issue. Lemkin with indefatigable energy plunged into correspondence with them to ensure the success of the campaign.41 On 18 February 1950, Lemkin wrote to Leon Blum, advising him to put vigour into the movement for a treaty, as he needed 20 states to ratify the Convention. So far seven nations had ratified it, but thirteen more were required. If France ratified the Convention, he thought that all the other states would follow her example, in particular states which were not members of the United Nations, such as Switzerland and Italy. He appealed to Blum to use his influence to obtain a rapid parliamentary vote for the measure. Blum replied that the subject would have his keen attention. Yet it is doubtful, despite this display of goodwill, whether Blum contributed much to the campaign.42

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More French help was forthcoming from other individuals, such as Jean Minjoz, Eduard Herriot, Marcel Plaisant and Jean Nussbaum. In addition, Zahir Hosrovian, an old Armenian friend, contributed to the effort. He warned Lemkin that the Council of State, an important French legal body, was against the convention ‘because they say there is the “rights of man” and the Genocide [Convention] is “superfluous” ’ and advised him on whom to approach to overcome this hurdle.43 Minjoz, too, was very supportive, steering the convention through the Judicial Committee of the National Assembly.44 He also arranged for a colleague, Senator George Pernot, to guide the convention through the appropriate committee in the Senate expeditiously.45 By 2 August 1950 France had ratified the convention, although the instruments of ratification were not deposited at the United Nations until 14 October 1950.46 French adherence to the treaty greatly aided Lemkin’s campaign in the French protectorates of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. France quickly arranged for these three Southeast Asian countries, which were not member states of the United Nations, to ratify the Convention. Moreover, Lemkin had always enjoyed easy relations with representatives of another Southeast Asian state, the Filipino delegation to the United Nations, and as a result of the brutal Japanese occupation of their islands during the Second World War, the population of the Philippines was committed to the ratification of the Convention and their legislators attended to this promptly.47 If Lemkin succeeded, it was because he was ably assisted by Judge Ingeles, Senator Paredes and General Romulo, the influential Filipino delegate at the United Nations, who wrote to the President requesting a special session of their parliament to consider the convention.48 Other non-member states of the United Nations which Lemkin contacted were Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Korea. On a trip to Washington early in September 1950, Lemkin called at the Sinhalese Embassy and conferred with the charge d’affaires. He explained to Lemkin how Buddhism through its teachings had tried to curb human ‘greed, anger and illusion’, thus removing many of the incentives to commit acts of mass murder. When Lemkin left, he extracted a promise from him to urge his government to ratify the Convention before the convening of the 1950 General Assembly.49 On 29 September the charge d’affaires, W.D. Gunaratna, informed Lemkin that ‘I have had a communication from Ceylon in reply to my cable, to the effect that the Ceylon Government has decided to accede to the Genocide Convention and that the instrument of accession is being forwarded to the United Nations within the next few days’.50 On 6 April 1950, Lemkin wrote to John Chang, the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States, thanking him for his interest in the Genocide Convention, and stating that he hoped that ‘you can persuade your Government to accede to the Convention through ratification by the present session of your assembly before it adjourns’. Lemkin also wrote to

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the Foreign Minister, Ben C. Limb, and the President of Korea, asking them to accelerate their country’s ratification of the Convention. Two months later he again wrote to Ambassador Chang informing him that his Foreign Minister, Ben C. Limb, had written with the news that ‘the convention on Genocide will be submitted soon to the assembly for ratification’, and that Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General, has ‘suggested today ratification of the Genocide Convention in point 10 of his message to the member governments’.51 But a formal document acknowledging Korea’s adherence to the Convention had failed to arrive at the United Nations’ headquarters, without which the ratification was valueless. Part of the problem was that the Communist-dominated North had invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, throwing the country into chaos. Luckily at this juncture Lemkin met the Korean Foreign Minister, then on a visit to the United States, who informed him that the document of ratification was circulating between the Prime Minister’s and the President’s office in Korea for the completion of formalities. To speed matters up, the Foreign Minister agreed to write a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations confirming that Korea had ratified the Convention.52 On 31 July 1950 John Chang sent a note to Ambassador Warren Austin of the United States, warning him that many Christians belonging to the Korean elite were threatened with extirpation at the hands of the invaders and urging America to accelerate ‘the ratification of the Genocide Convention so that it might become a law very soon, possibly before the opening or during the first month of the next General Assembly of the United Nations’.53 Copies of a note couched in similar terms were sent to 49 friendly governments, both those which were members of the United Nations and those non-members which had been invited to adhere to the Convention, entreating them to accelerate the signing of the Convention. As a result of the note, President Truman pleaded with the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally, to speed up the ratification of the treaty by the United States. The whole movement for ratification gathered momentum because of the Korean War.54 Israel because of the annihilation of European Jewry during the War was one of the first states not only to ratify the Genocide Convention but to go a step further. Dr Leon Kubowitzki of the World Jewish Congress, with whom Lemkin had worked closely on the adoption of the convention, advised him that he had received his cable of 5 November 1949 ‘and took up the matter with Messrs. Sh[abtai] Rosenne, legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry, and Yakob [Jacob] Shapiro, the Attorney General. As a result of these conferences, the matter will be expedited and ratification is expected within the next two months’.55 On 19 December 1949 Dr Kubowitzki advised Lemkin that ‘the transfer of the Knesset [Parliament] to Jerusalem has brought about a delay in the work and the proceedings of the House, but I shall follow the matter up and I have hopes that the ratification will be decided upon very soon’.56 Two

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months later Dr Jacob Robinson, now Counsel to the Israeli delegation to the United Nations, stated that he had written ‘today to Shabtai Rosenne expressing my surprise at the slow motion of the filing of our ratification’. All this pressure brought results because by 9 March 1950 Israel had deposited the document of ratification at the United Nations.57 Moreover, on 5 June 1950, Jacob Robinson sent Lemkin the Hebrew and English texts of the Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law which was passed by the Knesset on 16 May 1950 and wondered ‘whether some other countries which have ratified the Convention have already taken the necessary measures for their implementation by national legislation’.58 Among the Lemkin Papers is a draft of a cable to Ben-Gurion dated 5 November 1949 with an important passage which has been excised. It reads, ‘the concept of genocide is created with the blood of six mill[ion of] the Jewish people not only recently but throughout history’. It reveals Lemkin’s innermost thoughts which he was so reluctant to let others glimpse.59 Similar sentiments were voiced in a letter of thanks for Israel’s ratification of the convention which Lemkin sent to Moshe Sharett, the Foreign Minister. ‘Although the Jewish Genocide case is not the first in history’, Lemkin declared, ‘it was this case which brought the necessity of an international law so close to human conscience, that the peoples of the world could no more refuse to accept it’.60 Lemkin wished to include Turkey in the first 20 countries to ratify the Convention to give that country an opportunity to make symbolic reparation for the massacre of the Armenians. Lemkin carefully avoided mentioning the subject of the Armenians in his conversation with Adnan Kural, a counsellor at the Turkish Embassy, with whom he enjoyed good relations. Rather he steered their talk in another direction, into a paean of praise for the progressive reforms of the Turkish government. Among them the reformed ‘alphabet, liberation of your women, introducing modern methods of education. The world has been watching you’, Lemkin pointed out. The Genocide Convention is the best logical step. But this progress must be dramatized during the next General Assembly. ‘Otherwise’, he warned, ‘your ratification ... would be lost in later ratifications which would follow automatically’.61 Although in his memoirs Lemkin made much of his friendly reception by a junior official at the Turkish embassy in November 1949, the really significant meeting happened the next day. Lemkin called on the Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations, Selim Sarper, and repeated the gist of his previous conversation and secured a promise from him to send a cable to his government urging ratification of the convention. On 4 May 1950, Lemkin wrote to Sarper that ‘I received the good news from your office that the Parliament of Turkey ratified the Genocide Convention on March 29 before its dissolution ... I wish to thank you whole-heartedly for your leadership and also for your great personal kindness to me’.62

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Unable to convince India and Pakistan that they needed to ratify the Convention, Lemkin was rewarded by his long-standing friendship with Sir Zafrullah Khan, the representative of Pakistan. The latter persuaded Asad Al-Faqqih, the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Washington, to pass on a message to his government suggesting that they ratify the treaty.63 The Ambassador informed Lemkin ‘that His Majesty King Ibn Saud has consented to the ratification of the Genocide Convention, and ... I am expecting the document of ratification to arrive here at any time. Needless to add that it will be deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations without any delay’. In his letter of thanks dated 2 April 1950, Lemkin praised the Saudi Ambassador ‘for the very important role you have played in this worthy matter’. But on 5 May 1950, Lemkin again wrote to the ambassador, pointing out that within the last three months Saudi Arabia and four other countries, namely Turkey, France, Liberia and the Philippines had ratified the Genocide Convention and impressing on him the necessity for his country to deposit the formal documents of ratification with the United Nations.64 Jordan, the neighbour of Saudi Arabia, shortly afterwards ratified the Convention, reducing the target figure to six countries needed to sign up to the Convention.65 On one of his trips to Washington, Lemkin met Richard Bright, the charge d’affaires of the Liberian Embassy, suggesting that ethnic groups which had been persecuted should be especially interested in the Genocide Convention. Liberia (Free Land) was settled by freed slaves from the United States in the nineteenth century, who formed a state with the indigenous peoples of the interior. Bright agreed with Lemkin and noted that this new law had to be implemented quickly. Unflagging in his efforts, Lemkin persisted with his lobbying activity in the lounge of the United Nations at Lake Success, targeting those delegates, who were expected to deposit instruments of ratification of the Convention on behalf of their governments shortly. In this way Lemkin claimed in his memoirs that he gained the friendship and support of the Ambassador of Liberia.66 On 5 May 1950, he informed Bright, the charge d’affaires, that he was contacting ‘the delegates of those countries who ratified but did not deposit yet the instrument of ratification asking them to suggest to their governments to accelerate the deposition of the document of ratification’. Bright it appears was the key figure in the campaign on the Liberian side, for Lemkin wrote on 6 June 1950 to him thanking him ‘whole-heartedly for your help in obtaining ratification of the Genocide Convention. You were very patient and generous to me and this I will never forget’.67 The Cuban Ambassador, Luis Machado, advised Lemkin that in recognition of his work for the Genocide Convention he had been honoured with the award of the decoration of the Order of Carlos Manuel de Cespedes. Lemkin hurriedly invited his friends to the award ceremony that was to take place at the Cuban Embassy in Washington on 21 September 1950.68 He smartened his appearance for the occasion by having a quick hair cut and

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buying a pair of black shoes more in keeping with his blue suit. He enjoyed being the centre of attention, answering the questions put to him by reporters and basked in the flashing lights of the press photographers. Lemkin made a speech about the convention at the ceremony which was fully reported in the press, thus further bolstering the campaign for ratification of the convention.69 Throughout his campaign to secure sufficient ratifications of the convention to ensure its implementation, Lemkin continued to collaborate with Dr Evatt. Major J. Plimsoll, the Australian delegate, was in frequent contact with Lemkin in 1949 and the early part of 1950 on Dr Evatt’s instructions. But after this the correspondence seems to tail off, indicating that Lemkin was being left more to his own resources. On 18 January 1950, Major Plimsoll wrote to Lemkin that I had a telephone call from Dr Evatt last night ... I understand that he has been in touch with you during the past few days, and raised certain matters which you and I have discussed together in the past. Dr Evatt asked me to take the next opportunity I had of helping you in any way in furthering this question. I would be glad to know ... whether there is anything I can do. The ratifications of the Genocide Convention have made good progress in the last few weeks, and you have now received more than a third of the minimum required ... I understand from Dr Evatt that you have been in Washington lately, and there no doubt you have helped to mobilize further support ... But I feel more confident now than ever before that the requisite twenty ratifications will be received.70 Gertrude Baer of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom informed Lemkin on 29 August 1950, need I tell you that I have been working on the Genocide Convention whenever there was a chance of doing so? Of course, I wrote to all our Sections to urge their National Governments to sign and/or ratify. I repeated my appeal in my Report on UN work just a few weeks ago in England. I also suggested again that General Romulo be asked to make an appeal when he opens the UN General Assembly ... At a private meeting of our organization the enclosed letter was read. You will see that there are all sorts of points brought before Parliaments and Gov[ernment]s & N.G.O.s [non-governmental organizations] to show why the Convention can’t be ratified. Of course, I continue to tackle this question; but it is necessary that other N.G.O.s do so, too.71 The necessary help was forthcoming from other international organizations which rallied to Lemkin’s cause and the obstacles to ratification were overcome.

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Returning to New York for the opening of the General Assembly of the United Nations in the autumn of 1950, Lemkin sent a letter to his ally in Paris, Dr Jean Nussbaum, who lobbied furiously on his behalf and spoke to Ambassador Garrand of France.72 He expressed his concern that although the French legislature had approved the Convention, the instruments of ratification had not been deposited in New York. If they were despatched quickly, France would gain prestige as being the twentieth state to ratify the Convention which would bring it into effect 90 days later. The ambassador said that he would speak to Robert Schuman, the Foreign Minister, who was due to appear at Lake Success in a few day’s time. Later Lemkin met Schuman at Lake Success, who greeted him in a friendly manner and said that he agreed with what Garrand had told him. Several days later the formal instruments of ratification were deposited on behalf of France. By the middle of October 1950, four more states had ratified the Convention than were required to bring it into force. But despite this, it was necessary after the minimum number of ratifications had been obtained to sign in addition a protocol, and a formal signing ceremony was arranged on 16 October 1950 at the UN headquarters in the presence of the Assistant General-Secretary, Lemkin and the Ambassadors of France, Korea, Haiti and Costa Rica.73 Lemkin’s principal allies in the final stages of the ratification campaign were the World Federation of United Nations Associations and its secretary John Ennals, international women’s organizations, South American university rectors and a number of Jewish organizations: ‘When the Genocide Convention reached the necessary number of ratifications on Oct[ober] 16, 1950, I intended to write to you to thank you for your splendid help on the Genocide Convention since 1947’, Lemkin remarked to Ennals: ‘We were together through thick and thin in this battle, and you never let down this cause which was bound to meet with difficulties’.74 Among the international women’s organizations which offered support were the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the International Council of Women and Inter-American Commission of Women. Jeanne Eder, the President of the International Council of Women and an old friend, congratulated Lemkin: ‘we read in the newspapers of the ratification of the Convention on GENOCIDE. A long struggle has come to an end, but this end would hardly have been reached if you had not devoted so much time and energy to it’.75 Maria de Levi of the Inter-American Commission wrote to Lemkin that In the absence of the Chairman ... it is my pleasure as Acting Chairman of the Commission, to acknowledge receipt of your kind letter of appreciation for the help and support given by Mrs de Castillo Ledon, Mrs de Calvo, Mrs Acuna de Chacon, and myself in obtaining the ratification of the Genocide Convention by Nicaragua, Panama, Costa Rica and Ecuador, respectively.76

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After expending selfless and almost super-human effort, reaching out to individuals all over the globe, Lemkin had reached his objective of ratification. Now, he needed a superpower, the United States to come on board, if the convention was to be implemented and to have the ultimate threat of military force to coerce non-compliant nations. For this reason, he now turned his attention increasingly to the US Senate.

13 The United States Senate and the Convention

American opposition to the Genocide Convention stemmed primarily from four sources: a group of Judges who had participated in the Nuremberg Trials, some of the activists in the movement for human rights, a section of the American Bar Association (ABA) and, above all, the Southern wing of the Democratic party. Basically this is the story of how a group of Southern senators exploited fears about a movement for civil rights for the black population of the United States to frustrate Lemkin’s campaign for the ratification of the treaty in the Senate. In April 1949, Lemkin was voicing his concern to contacts in the American Jewish Committee (AJC) that the Genocide Convention would not be acted on in Congress during the current session. In May, James Rosenberg complained that ‘for almost two years, we had no cooperation whatever from the AJC or any other Jewish organization, though other organizations, such as the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, National Conference of Christians and Jews, etc, etc, worked effectively and diligently with this Committee’.1 These misgivings were exaggerated. The AJC later claimed that they undertook, through discussions with appropriate officials in Washington and formal representations to the State Department, to speed submission of the treaty to the Senate. To activate public opinion, a staff member was again assigned to Dr Lemkin in March, 1949, mounting an extensive publicity program and enlisting the support of numerous organizations – Jewish, Christian and non-sectarian ... Immediately after President Truman transmitted the Convention to the Senate ... we launched a three-stage drive: first, to persuade influential organizations to testify before the Senate Subcommittee; second, to generate popular interest in the hearings; and third, to elicit grassroots pressure for a favorable decision. This led us into another large-scale undertaking, conducted through the channels of cooperative organizations, through all the mass media, and vigorously backed by AJC national leaders and chapter members in many cities who were called upon to utilize personal 189

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contacts with strategic members of Congress and aid in marshalling support among lawyers.2 If the State Department file is examined, it is apparent that Lemkin mounted a very effective campaign in collaboration with the AJC and the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention for the prompt submission of the convention to the Senate. Among the senators, who wrote to Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, were Hubert Humphrey, Paul Douglas, Wayne Morse and Robert Taft, all prominent in Democratic and Republican ranks.3 Other letters were despatched to Acheson by Lemkin’s friends Professor Eugene Rostow and Dr Evatt.4 During April and May 1949, the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention staged a series of meetings at which religious organizations, women’s associations and trade union bodies were represented, all pressing the administration to send the treaty to the Senate.5 About 33,000 copies of a fact sheet stressing the need for prompt American action were distributed through friendly organizations, while a revised sheet was forwarded to 1,600 newspaper editors, resulting in editorials appearing in the New York Times, Christian Science Monitor and the Washington Post.6 In June 1949 at Rosenberg’s prompting the American Civil Liberties Union, of which Roger Baldwin was the director, augmented this chorus demanding urgent action; on 28 June 1949 came the reply that ‘the Convention was submitted by the President to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on Thursday, June 16’.7 Professor Eugene Rostow, a colleague of Lemkin’s in the Yale Law faculty, wrote to Senator Brien McMahon begging him to give Raphael Lemkin a half hour of his time from his busy schedule to discuss the ratification of the Genocide Convention by the Senate. He added ‘as a loyal rooter of yours, I should like to see you head a Sub-Committee in charge of preparing this Treaty for the Full Foreign Relations Committee’.8 There seems to have been some contact between Lemkin and McMahon, for on 14 June 1949, Senator McMahon advised Lemkin that ‘For your confidential information, I have learned that the State Department has forwarded the Covention to the White House, for transmission to the Senate in the near future’.9 Shortly afterwards Senator McMahon became chairman of the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which was going to examine the Genocide Convention with a view to ratifying it. At the same time, President Truman endorsed the convention, requesting senators to ratify it on the grounds that the United States had ‘long been a symbol of freedom and democratic progress to peoples less favored’ and that it was necessary to eradicate the ‘world-shocking crime of genocide’.10 Towards the end of 1949 Lemkin contacted Senator McMahon to explain the line-up of the enthusiasts for and opponents of the convention. ‘The

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support for the convention is considerable throughout the country’, Lemkin assured McMahon, and is forthcoming mostly from religious groups (Federal Council of Churches, National Catholic Welfare Conference, Jews), from womens’ organizations, and Labor (C.I.O. and A.F.L.) Also the minority groups are supporting strongly the convention, especially the Lithuanians, the Poles ... Some members of the American Bar seem to be the only opposition to the convention. I am sure you are aware of the fact that the Bar Association is split on the subject and that the St. Louis meeting of the Bar decided to submit to the Senate the opinions of both sides. I lectured the other day in Harvard Law School and my colleagues there shared my view that the constitutionality of the convention is beyond doubt. Given his leadership Lemkin felt certain that public opinion would develop in favour of the convention,11 and a comfortable majority for ratification was expected in the Senate. Lemkin tried to galvanize support in the Catholic Church for the convention by writing to Cardinal Spellman and by focussing on the religious and ethnic dimensions of genocide: I have examined the recent records in the Lithuanian Information Center in New York and in the Latvian Legation in Washington. I found appalling evidence of genocide carried out systematically on the Lithuanian nation. The priests and intellectuals are being killed or mutilated in order to deprive the nation of religious ins[p]iration and national guidance. Some seven hundred persons have been deported to Siberia. I saw Soviet instructions to deport husbands and wives in different trains and in different directions, allegedly for sanitary reasons. The real purpose of this separation is to stop procreation within this Catholic nation so that it will finally die out ... When the convention becomes binding law upon nations, we shall be able to bring up this case before the International Court of Justice and elsewhere as provided by the convention ... It is the first international law in human history which makes the destruction of religious groups and nations an international crime.12 When a new international labour movement without Communist participation was set-up, Lemkin tried to interest the American trade union leaders in an anti-genocide clause for insertion in its constitution, highlighting that the Soviet government was the only one practising genocide on a large scale.13 Within the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, there was increasing tension between Raphael Lemkin and the leadership. Accusations hurled at James Rosenberg were that the Committee was deliberately asking

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the State Department to delay submission of the convention for ratification by the Senate. Rosenberg responded that he needed more time ‘to do an educational job before it reaches Congress’.14 After a chat with Rosenberg, Joel Wolfsohn reported that The delay [in the submission of the convention] is regrettable but, in view of the fact that this will probably be – considering the opposition of the American Bar Association – a controversial item, it may be just as well to wait until a more effective public opinion has been developed. Mr Rosenberg’s interest, of course, is in the creation of this effective and informed public opinion. Lemkin inspired a letter from Dean Wesley Sturges and Eugene Rostow of the Yale Law School to Rosenberg questioning these tactics and demanding prompt action.15 Lemkin also took exception to the brief James Rosenberg had initially prepared for the Senate subcommittee on behalf of the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention. He was told by Willard Johnson, its secretary, that since he objected, he should write his own independent brief.16 A distinguished legal luminary, Judge Robert Patterson, at Rosenberg’s behest, agreed to write a new brief for the Senate committee and it was decided that he should confer with officials of the Department of Justice and the State Department concerning the role he would play at the hearings.17 The tension between Raphael Lemkin and James Rosenberg continued to escalate at the council meetings of the United States Committee. On 18 October 1949, James Rosenberg sent a telegram to one meeting resigning from the chairmanship of the organization. His resignation was unanimously rejected. Notable among Rosenberg’s supporters were Allen Dulles, Roger Baldwin, Clark Eichelberger of the American United Nations Association and the influential clergymen Henry Atkinson and Samuel Cavert.18 By November 1949 Rosenberg was in almost daily contact with State Department officials to coordinate their policy as regards the presentation to the Senate.19 At a contentious meeting of the United States Committee on 15 December 1949, Raphael Lemkin led a minority revolt. He was in disagreement with James Rosenberg over the legal basis of the opposition of the ABA to the ratification of the convention. When he tried to explain his own position, he was interrupted by the chairman of the meeting, Roger Balwin. The discussion on the issue was brought to a halt. Mr Rubinow, supported by Lemkin, suggested that Judge Patterson should testify before the Senate not in the name of the United States Committee but for the American Bar Association. This would indicate that a split had occurred in this organization and emphasize the apolitical nature of his evidence. Lemkin remarked that the brief Rosenberg had prepared on behalf of the United States Committee was detrimental to the cause of ratification because it confused

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‘genocide with human and minority rights’; nor had Rosenberg the right to submit a brief which had not been approved by the Committee.20 Lemkin explained the source of his dissension from James Rosenberg in a letter to Thomas Mahoney, the co-chairman of the United States Committee. The brief that Rosenberg had prepared for the Senate hearings was not to his taste. He took it to the State Department to show it to officials for their comments. They too deemed it to be inappropriate. Nevertheless, Rosenberg persisted and drew up an equally unsatisfactory brief for Judge Patterson. When Lemkin took objection to this at a meeting of the United States Committee, Roger Baldwin had ruled him out of order saying he had intruded into matters ventilated in private correspondence and had interrupted discussion of the question at a subsequent meeting of the Committee. Lemkin was concerned that there was a definite plan to present genocide as a part of human rights and to mix it with Truman’s civil rights program. Baldwin’s interest in working with our committee ... consists of getting something for the civil rights program with which he is permanently connected. Obviously the genocide convention would be defeated if presented in this contest [context] because of the filibuster ... In the last issue of the Reporter of the American Jewish Committee, an article on genocide presents the genocide convention as part of human rights. The President of the American Jewish Committee, Joseph Proskauer, is a cousin of James Rosenberg. Proskauer, Eichelberger, Rosenberg, and Baldwin work closely together. I was told that Patterson is the president of the Civil Rights Congress (I don’t recall the exact name).21 Here Lemkin was referring to the black radical activist William Patterson, who should not be confused with Judge Robert Patterson. Eugene Rostow, no doubt prompted by Lemkin, wrote a letter to Drew Pearson, the famous columnist of the Washington Post, which claimed that there was a concerted Russian campaign to undermine the convention: Those who are trying to keep it bottled up in the State Department constitute as strange a collection of bedfellows as have ever been brought together. The fellow travellers of course are fighting it with every means at their disposal, for they know that a genocide treaty accepted as part of international law would be a powerful weapon for enquiring into the police methods of the Soviet Union and its satellites. While they dare not oppose it openly, their technique now is to link genocide with the far more controversial human rights program, hoping thus to assure its defeat in the Senate ... [Vespasian] Pella, Anna Pauker’s highly paid representative in the United States, is still active among legal groups organizing this tactic of smothering genocide with human rights ... However, the Soviet

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idea to kill the convention is recently gaining ground. By way of their usual channels, the Russians have spread a confusion between the Genocide Convention and the Human Rights issue, and a few American organizations have fallen inadvertently into the Russian trap, by sponsoring the inclusion of genocide in the controversial Human Rights program.22 While there may well have been a substantial element of truth in Lemkin’s description of the machinations occurring within the United States Committee, further assertions by him that there was a conspiracy led by Professor Vespasion V. Pella against the convention shows his increasingly paranoia. The more his alter ego, the Genocide Convention, was attacked, the more Lemkin reacted outrageously. His dwindling trust of old friends and supporters ignited into a cold hostility towards them. Professor Pella had been a former mentor, a supporter of the Genocide Convention, and had assisted in his campaign for the convention, but Lemkin chose to believe that this was no longer the case, seeing Pella as an official representative of a Communist government. With little supporting evidence, he claimed that that Pella was directing a movement against the convention with links to Roger Baldwin of the United States Committee and George Finch of the American Bar Association.23 If Pella was alienated and antipathetic to Lemkin, it was partly his own fault for upsetting him with wild tendentious accusations. An old friend and ally, Elizabeth Warriner, reprimanded Lemkin for his suspicious attitude. She informed him that at a panel discussion James Rosenberg ended up paying you a very fine Tribute – although he said you had the feeling he was ‘sabotaging’ you in some way. Of course I don’t know what your distrust is based on ... You can’t turn all your old friends into enemies (as with [Gertrude] Sladek & Rosenberg.) Please don’t. Best wishes for 1950. It was a timely warning.24 From the information that he had received, Lemkin expected that the Senate hearings on the convention would start in the second half of January 1950 and last until March. ‘In the United States we face, I am afraid, an uphill fight because some Southern Senators are confusing genocide with discrimination and lynchings’, Lemkin noted. He was less certain of quick success in his campaign to have the Senate approve the treaty.25 Complaining to Thomas Mahoney, he said that he had the other day a conversation with Judge Patterson which impliedly confirms my fears that Rosenberg is determined to deprive the hearings of their broad, independent character by scuttling the right of every

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organization to speak for itself. He is determined to present to the Senate endorsements and statements from certain organizations in such a way that this cumulative presentation would make hearings and independent statements unnecessary. Patterson mentioned to me that ... Rosenberg thinks that the testimony of five or six organizations would be sufficient ... You will be interested to know that the State Department is completely opposed to the policy of hearings as pursued by Rosenberg. The State Department apparently knows that the opposition might use the interlocking endorsements as a method of representing the committee as a pressure group in order to demonstrate that there is no genuine support in this country for the Genocide Convention.26 Lemkin was highly critical of the conduct of the campaign to persuade the Senate to ratify the convention. Writing to Mr Dilliard of the St. Louis Post Dispatch, he confided that he had information that a certain group is trying to convince [Senator] McMahon that the hearings should be brief and organizations should be heard for only five minutes. I hear that another organization [the United States Committee] has sent out letters to two hundred and seventy organizations asking them to send statements of support for the convention not to Senator McMahon but to this organization. This might be sabotage. It might also mean organizational vanity and seeking of glory to the detriment of the cause.27 Lemkin remarked to Father Conway that ‘The concept of genocide is very rich. Every angle – religion, economy, humanity, womanhood as victims, dictatorship, communism, Russia’s victims – all these should be brought to the attention of America and the world through these hearings’.28 At the end of March 1950 Lemkin told his colleagues in the United States Committee ‘that the Senate received a volume of mail on Genocide second only to the Atlantic pact’.29 He remarked to his friend Gertrude Samuels, who penned editorials for the New York Times, that while he was writing to her, ‘thousands of letters are being carried by mail from every corner of the U.S. to Capitol Hill’.30 Much of it he had helped to stir up by writing to the leaders of American ethnic associations, such as ones for the Italians and Lithuanians.31 Lemkin wrote to Charles Rozamarek, the president of the Polish American Congress, based in Chicago. After thanking him for his past help for letters sent to President Truman and the State Department on the convention, he observed that A splendid occasion presents itself during the hearings of the genocide treaty scheduled in the Senate for the middle of January. The Lithuanians

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already wrote to Senator Brien McMahon, Chairman of the special subcommittee for ratification ... They asked for a hearing in support of ratification of the ... convention. At this occasion they will bring up as an example of usefulness of the convention the case of genocide, perpetrated now on the Lithuanian people by Soviet Russia. If you would kindly agree to write to Senator MacMahon ... you might be able to include in your written statement for the Senate the necessary material on the Katyn case [the mass murder of members of the Polish elite by the Soviets].32 Contrary to William Korey’s assertion of Lemkin’s sudden lurch ‘toward expounding anticommunist and anti-Soviet themes, the classic leitmotifs of the unfolding cold war’, when the Senate failed to ratify the convention, we can see that Lemkin tried to involve Eastern European refugee groups from the onset of the campaign. There was no abrupt shift to an anti- Communist stance; his attitudes flowed from his own first-hand experience of Soviet regimes in two World Wars.33 The preliminary hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on the Genocide Convention in the early part of 1950 seemed to elicit a favourable response. Dean Rusk, the Deputy Undersecretary of State, testified that his country would ‘demonstrate to the rest of the world that the United States is determined to maintain its moral leadership in international affairs’. He added that the ratification of the treaty would demonstrate the American commitment to the ‘development of international law on the basis of human justice’. Against a background of growing rivalry with the Soviet Union, Rusk emphasized that the United States ‘was engaged in a very fundamental struggle in our foreign relations between the forces that are trying to build up a free world and the forces that are trying to tear it down’. Samantha Power has suggested that Rusk’s testimony lacked force because he had to draw on examples outside the field of human rights law to find instances where the United States had supported international treaties suppressing criminal conduct. The Solicitor-General Philip B. Pearlman submitted that ‘The Convention on Genocide is notice to the world that the commission of that crime will result in punishment of the criminals and that the civilized nations will take action to make that punishment certain and severe’.34 William Korey has pointed out that the antagonism of a large section of the ABA carried great weight with the Senate, a body filled with lawyers.35 In September 1949, the ABA’s House of Delegates had voted to oppose the convention. This was despite a flurry of telegrams from the United States Committee and the National Conference of Christians and Jews which had earlier descended on the association and the State Department in an attempt to wrest a favourable endorsement of the ratification of the convention.36 The phrase in Article 2 of the convention, dealing with intent to destroy a group ‘in whole or in part’ was pounced on by critics to allege that this definition of genocide could be applied to anyone accused of lynching

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blacks. Senator McMahon stated, however, that the subcommittee understood the phrase ‘in part’ to be a substantial part of the group. In addition, the clause in the convention referring to the causing of ‘mental harm’ to a racial group was said by opponents to be aimed at the segregation laws of the Southern States. Such arguments by an ultra-conservative organization of lawyers were very persuasive with senators from the Southern states.37 Second, critics of the convention held that the treaty-making powers of the executive must only be used ‘with regard to matters of international concern’. Offences committed under the genocide convention were incorrectly regarded as falling within the purview of domestic legislation and outside the ambit of the government.38 Finally, opponents of the convention contended that offences such as murder which were prohibited by the convention fell under the category of state crimes and that the ratification of the convention would shift the balance for trying such crimes from the states to the federal government. Moreover, many within the ABA feared that if any Americans were ever arraigned before an International Court, they would be denied their constitutional rights.39 To counter the resistance of the ABA, The United States Committee agreed to invite ‘members from the legal profession and deans of law colleges’ to join their organization and asked Judge Robert P. Patterson to become chairman of their their legal advisory body and prepare the brief for the Senate subcommittee with a team of legal heavyweights. Judge Patterson was ‘a former judge of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, former Sec.[retary] of War [in the Truman administration] and now President of the Bar of the City of New York’.40 Among those serving on the legal advisory committee were Wesley A. Sturges, dean of the Yale Law School; A.A. Berle, a veteran New Dealer; Oscar Cox, and Charles Fahy. Groups supporting the convention included the American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations, National Conference of Christians and Jews, Federal Council of Churches of Christ, National Council of Women, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and many more.41 The brief ridiculed the constitutional objections to the United States ratifying the convention. The opponents of the convention ‘would tear down the moral leadership of the United States in the post-war world. They fail to realize that the Soviet bloc would invariably make world-wide capital of American repudiation of even the limited code of morality set up by the Convention’.42 The brief quoted Secretary of State George Marshall’s statement that ‘Governments which systematically disregard the rights of their own people are not likely to respect the rights of other nations’ and are inclined to use force in the international field. Genocide was an international crime, the consequences of which impinged on other nations, particularly the dislocation of populations, ‘What the opposition overlooks is that genocide is not a domestic matter and that the foreign policy of the United States must of necessity be broad enough to carry out our international obligations’ The

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treaty-making powers of the United States were not limited by any constitutional provisions. They ‘were not within the competence of the individual states but is in the executive subject to approval by the Senate’. If the United States can under these treaty-making powers protect migratory birds, they can ‘constitutionally protect groups of human beings’.43 The brief quoted Lemkin only once, touching on the distinction between genocide and a race riot. He observed that It is not enough to kill persons belonging to a different race or religion, but these murders must be committed as part of a plan to destroy the given groups. For example, those Turks who participated in annihilation of 1,200,000 Armenians are guilty of Genocide because they acted with the intent to destroy the Armenian Nation. There were echoes of Lemkin’s thought in other passages, such as the following: ‘We have learned the tragic lesson from recent history that wholesale destruction of groups as a domestic crime may escape punishment when committed by the head of a state or its officials under the guise of legality’. Again, the brief reiterated Lemkin’s contention that ‘The Convention is not to be classed as one for protection of human rights but for the preservation of international peace’.44 Lemkin’s testimony before the Senate subcommittee grated on members of the Senate. They disliked the earnestness and zeal of a Jewish college professor, speaking with a foreign accent. Much of the criticism was bigoted and due to anti-Semitic prejudice. Senator Alexander Smith of New Jersey complained that the ‘biggest propagandist’ for the convention was ‘a man who comes from a foreign country and who speaks broken English’, an unwarranted slur. Smith claimed that he was ‘sympathetic with the Jewish people’, but ‘they ought not to be the ones who are propagandizing [for the convention], and they are’. Even Senator Cabot Lodge, who supported ratification, declared that by giving testimony before the subcommittee, Lemkin had ‘done his own cause a great deal of harm’, and McMahon noted that Lemkin was ‘the least plus quantity’ for ratification.45 Despite all this, after listening to the relevant testimony, Senator McMahon stated on behalf of the subcommittee that he was ‘impressed by the unanimity of the opinion of our people [in favour of ratification] ... I have not found an editorial or expression of opinion against ratification all over the country. Great organizations have passed resolutions and sent them in, urging ratification’.46 Americans were becoming alarmed at the Soviet incorporation of more of Eastern Europe, the fall of China to the Communists, the conviction of Alger Hiss from the State Department for perjury and the staging of a successful Russian atomic bomb test. Then on 9 February 1950 an obscure senator from Wisconsin Joseph McCarthy made the extravagant claim that

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‘I have in my hand a list of 205 Communists that were made known to the Secretary of State and who nevertheless are still working and shaping the policy of the State Department’.47 After April 12, 1950, when the Senate Subcommittee recommended ratification with certain ‘understandings’ appended to the treaty, the legal issues – at best difficult to interpret for mass consumption – became even more complicated ... This task [of informing public opinion] was further impeded by the continued aggressive and obscurationist tactics of the American Bar Association and also by distracting national and international tensions, notably the McCarthy hearings in Washington and the outbreak of war in Korea [in June 1950], which monopolized the attention of both legislators and the public. This meant that the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee postponed its vote.48 As Korey has suggested, ‘The Korean conflict unleashed powerful xenophobic forces, significantly bolstering McCarthyism and the widespread anticommunist witch-hunt in numerous political and cultural quarters. Resurgent nativism buttressed the traditional isolationist view that the Genocide Convention and other international human rights treaties would undermine American sovereignty’.49 This growing mood of xenophobia and anti-Communism sweeping the United States was adroitly exploited by two Southern members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, its chairman Tom Connally, and Senator George to block moves for the Committee to consider the Genocide Convention prior to sending it to the Senate for a full hearing. They feared that the convention would help to undermine segregation in the South. Even earlier than the Korean War, the national campaign for the ratification of the convention by the Senate appeared to be faltering. At a meeting of the United States Committee on 23 March 1950, the secretary pointed out that it had accumulated a deficit of $682.36 which James Rosenberg said he would endeavour to sort out. But the Committee still remained short of funds. There was talk of dissolving the Committee, though it was unanimously agreed that it should continue until the Senate took action.50 At the next meeting on 12 June 1950, it was felt that ‘little could be done until 1951 because of the present world crisis’. It was reported that Senators Tom Connally and George were obstructing action by the Foreign Relations Committee, and it was decided to put pressure on Senator Connally after 2 January 1951 to present the convention to the Foreign Relations Committee for action.51 However, the malaise which had overtaken the United States Committee did not matter as much as it once did because the centre of the campaign for the Senate to ratify the convention had shifted to the National Civil Liberties

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Clearing House, the Women’s International League and National Community Relations Council, an umbrella organization of Jewish groups, including the AJC. At an informal lunch on 26 April 1950 called by Lemkin, the participants agreed on personal approaches and letters to Senator McMahon to urge him to speed up the submission of the convention to the full Foreign Relations Committee, to stir up a letter writing campaign in the home states of the 12 senators, and to despatch a joint letter to these senators signed by as many organizations as possible.52 On 11 May 1950, a joint letter from all the relevant organizations was sent to Senator Tom Connally and the other 11 senators, followed by a telegram the next day from Bishop Bromley Oxnam.53 Lemkin asked his friend Edith Hansen of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom to persuade city mayors to write to Senator Connally and other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She herself had written to three such mayors. She informed him that Lillian Cohen, the assistant secretary of the United States Committee, had written to many national organizations requesting their local chapters to send letters to their senators and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Letters were also despatched to a long list of lawyers, asking them to participate in a letter writing campaign to the Senate. 54 In May 1950 Pearl Buck wired key chairmen in legislatures in all states with a senator on the full committee. Lemkin prodded the General Federation of Women’s Clubs into action, by having them send telegrams to the governors of states with a senator on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asking for a positive response to ratification, but action did not appear to be imminent. Lemkin also utilized his contacts in the Armenian community to invite readers of their newspaper to write to the relevant senators.55 Reporting on a talk with Lemkin on 2 June 1950, Marcus Cohn stated that I suggested that we try to get A.A. Berle to come down to Washington and spend a week or ten days buttonholing senators ... the American Bar Association has had its representatives in Washington during the past several weeks doing just that. If Berle saw 40 or 50 senators, it would counteract, in part, the damage which the A.B.A. has done.56 On 5 June 1950, Lemkin wrote to Adolph Berle that ‘I have just returned from Washington where ... I found out that the ABA did quite a devastating job on the senators. The ABA has issued many memoranda which repeat incorrect statements and disregard completely the McMahon report with the understandings’. Although he did not lobby the senators, Berle wrote an excellent letter to the New York Times.57 On 16 June 1950, a meeting of organizations interested in the ratification of the Genocide Convention was held at the State Department with Assistant

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Secretary John Hickerson. Seymour Rubin, who was present at the meeting, declared that Hickerson reiterated that the Department was pushing the Convention as much as it could and that he hoped that action would be taken by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee during the current week ... he rather neatly sidestepped the issue of whether the Department would ask that the President issue an immediate public statement by suggesting that the interested organizations should bring all their forces to bear on Congress sometime after the present week. He stressed the importance of the role of the organizations and said that their help would be essential either in getting the Convention out of the Committee or, if that is done during the present week, through the Senate. Plans were implemented for messages and wires to senators, who were members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from a wide range of Jewish and non-Jewish organizations and individuals.58 On 10 July 1950, Seymour Rubin had a lengthy discussion with Lemkin regarding progress achieved towards the Senate ratification of the convention. He reported that Lemkin ‘was considerably disturbed and had the feeling that neither the State Department nor Senator McMahon was exercising any considerable effort with respect to the Genocide Convention’. A day later, Seymour Rubin in the company of Philip Schiff of National Community Relations Council (NCRAC) and Sanford Bolz of the American Jewish Congress met with David Niles, an aide to President Truman. We pointed out that, although for sometime the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate had been unable to muster a quorum, Senators Lodge and Green were now back from their European trips and it would seem possible for them to get a quorum. As a matter of fact, a number of miscellaneous treaties and conventions of no particular importance had, in fact, recently been reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He promised to take up the matter of the delay in the Senate’s ratification of the convention with the president. The upshot was that in October 1950 Truman sent a letter to Senator Connally appealing to him for the appropriate action to enable the United States to become a party to the convention. He cited the danger to Christians posed by the recent Communist invasion of South Korea.59 When Lemkin’s plans for bringing the convention into force in the United Nations crystallized in August 1950, he felt he would not have enough time for delivering his lecture course at Yale, as he had to intensify his lobbying efforts at Lake Success. He telephoned Dean Wesley Sturges, so that alternative

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arrangements could be made. Once again he stayed with his friends the Lowensteins in New York. Lemkin’s relations with his host Dr Laser Lowenstein were close. He had arranged for Lowenstein’s daughter Ruth to be accepted as a student at Duke University, where he had previously taught. They shared family secrets and had acquaintances in common, some of whom were consultants working on rival projects at the United Nations. A few were against the Genocide Convention. Lemkin’s greatest frustration was the hostility of the Senate to the ratification of the convention. The lobbying effort required to secure the ratification of the convention by sufficient states in the United Nations drained Lemkin. He fell into a paranoid mood, imagining that his friend, Lowenstein, had suddenly turned against him. Lemkin thought that Lowenstein was ordering him out of the room he was using. Lowenstein required it for his daughter, when she returned from a trip. Vacating the room hurriedly, Lemkin had to find alternative accommodation elsewhere. As a result, Lemkin whose savings had been depleted, found himself in straitened circumstances.60 At this critical juncture Lemkin became sick. ‘Unfortunately, in the second half of October [1950]’, he informed his old friend John Ennals, ‘I became desperately ill and had to undergo a very serious [gallbladder] operation. I am better now, but have to take special care of my health’.61 For several days in October 1950, he was wracked by such severe abdominal pains that he was put in an oxygen tent, because he could hardly catch his breath. The doctor advised an immediate operation, to which Lemkin nodded his assent and signed the necessary papers for the operation. Lemkin willed his body not to die before his mission to implement the convention had been accomplished. He felt that if he died at this juncture all his efforts would be squandered – the Senate would fail to ratify the convention, while the United Nations Legal Committee had referred the question of reservations to the convention to the International Court of Justice which undermined its efficacy. After the operation, Lemkin slowly regained consciousness and awoke as a smiling nurse put a spoon of tea in his mouth. He knew that he would have to recover his vitality to battle against his opponents and used laughter to aid his own recovery. Lemkin was a brilliant mimic, especially of South American delegates to the United Nations. His room became a centre, where other patients, who wanted an optimistic atmosphere and a good laugh congregated.62 From his hospital bed, with the help of a secretary, Lemkin directed operations against an amended resolution being considered by the Legal Committee of the United Nations. The resolution asked the International Court for a ruling on the question of ratification of the convention by a state with reservations. Thus at this critical juncture in the campaign for Senate ratification of the convention Lemkin’s attention was diverted to other issues concerning the treaty. Illness removed him from the scene, when his attention and coordinating skills were most required.

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From the hospital Lemkin then went to a convalescent home in Lakewood. There he sat wrapped in blankets under the winter sun, breathing in the bracing air, gazing at pine trees, and musing about renewing his campaign for the convention and punching the noses of his more obstreperous opponents.63 His recovery was slow. On 13 February 1951, Lemkin was still apologizing for non-attendance at a critical meeting of the strategy committee of the United States Committee on grounds of ill-health.64 Towards the end of March 1951 Ralph Bass wrote to Lemkin, commiserating with him about his poor health.65 Because of his illness, Lemkin did not know what was happening in the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention. His friend Miriam Ritterband informed him that the U.S. Committee for the Genocide Convention has been reorganized and is planning to get into action. They have a secretary and plan a nationwide program of education as well as political action in the U.S. Senate. I really believe that it would be safer and more efficient to coordinate the work in Connecticut with that of the central group. It could do more harm than good if each of us went off on his own tangent.66 At a session in January 1951 of the Committee, a double-barrelled drive was suggested to influence senators with letters and pressure from the grass roots on members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, combined with a careful scrutiny of the voting intentions of senators on this issue. The AJC offered the services of Ralph Bass, a staff member, to assist the Committee in their campaign on a full-time basis.67 At a subsequent meeting of the strategy committee in February, under Roger Baldwin’s chairmanship, it was agreed that Senator McMahon and Adrian Fisher of the State Department be approached to decide whether or not the time was ripe for pro-ratification sentiment to be stirred up in Senator Connally’s state of Texas.68 Although Ralph Bass had met Raymond Rubinow, an influential member of the United States Committee, in March 1951 and had ‘discussed ... holding a meeting soon in order to take effective action to continue the genocide campaign’, the crisis caused by the Korean War overshadowed everything else and for the time being delayed any steps being taken.69 However, on 10 April 1951, Bass was assured by Senator McMahon’s secretary that he was ‘determined to take up the Genocide Convention for a vote and believes that the [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee will vote it out within the next thirty days’. McMahon advised that it was ‘very important to have persons or organizations with Texas backgrounds or contacts impress upon Senator Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that there is widespread demand for the Convention’. The United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention together with a host of Jewish organizations ensured that Connally was deluged with letters and telegrams.

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At a joint meeting of the strategy and publicity committees of the United States Committee, on which the National Community Relations Council was represented, Bass reported that it was decided we should not approach the large body of Senators until the Convention is reported to the Floor. We have detailed plans to act on a wide front the moment this happens. Our legislative experts, Roger Baldwin and Dorothy Detzer, say we can safely wait until the Convention appears on the Senate calendar. Professor Lemkin was incidentally in Washington on Monday ‘working hard for the Convention’.70 Connally remained obdurate, refusing to bend to pressure. The brief moment when Senate victory seemed within his grasp disappeared, leaving Lemkin suspicious that Roger Baldwin as a leading human rights campaigner was happy to leave the convention in limbo. In the summer of 1951 James Rosenberg conferred with Lemkin and devised a letter which was sent to Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State. It emphasized how the Soviet Union wanted genocide to be dealt with as part of a comprehensive codification of the Nuremberg principles or alternatively as part of a Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, but with one important change, that is, the establishment of an international criminal court. This they knew was anathema to the United States and would imperil the code from ever becoming law. ‘President Truman ... referred to the fact that the Soviets are taking German children from their homes into Soviet Russia’, just as the Communists had abducted 28,000 Greek children. Rosenberg appealed to Acheson to raise the issue of Russia practising genocide against German children and for the United States to exercise moral leadership by ratifying the convention. At the end of July 1951 James Rosenberg read about Russia eliminating seven minority groups. He contacted Lemkin again and suggested sending a petition to the Senate asking that the government demand that the United Nations investigate charges of genocide against the Soviet Union.71 Again in October 1951, Rosenberg suggested a new approach through the Catholic Church, as a Czech prelate had raised his concerns about the genocide being perpetrated in Soviet labour camps. None of these initiatives bore fruit.72 By the summer of 1951 almost the only organizations still ardently pressing for the ratification of the convention were Jewish and Central and Eastern European refugee groups.73 Professor Anson Rabinbach has suggested that in an attempt to appease some influential Southern senators in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Lemkin sought in vain to differentiate the Genocide Convention from human rights, as he thought that this might overcome their obstructive opposition to the convention.74 The other tactic of Lemkin was to voice shrill denunciations of the Russians with claims of genocide on behalf of Central and Eastern European refugee groups in an attempt to

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win over right-wing and isolationist senators. But the senators remained unconvinced, believing that both the convention and human rights could assist the struggle of black Americans in the burgeoning civil rights movement which had both national and international ramifications. We shall shortly touch on the international aspects of the civil rights struggle (see Chapter 14). In December 1951 the radical black civil rights champion William Patterson presented a well-publicized petition to the United Nations claiming that genocide had been committed against the black population of the United States; in his memoirs he denounced Tom Connally, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the principal opponent of the ratification of the convention by the Senate, as ‘a spokesman for virulent racism in the US Senate’. This move was widely regarded as unpatriotic and played into the hands of Tom Connally and the other senators from the South.75 As Irving Sarnoff rightly pointed out to Lemkin on 31 January 1952, By accusing the United States of pursuing a policy of genocide against Negroes, William Patterson has apparently publicized the very issue which Tom Connally et al. have raised in their resistance to the treaty. I would guess that the possibility of Senate passage of the measure is even more remote now than it was when you spoke to me in the Fall.76 Thus the convention remained in a state of limbo, permanently aground in the Senate subcommittee, from where all the enthusiasm generated by Lemkin’s campaigning could not dislodge it. On 17 January 1952, Senator McMahon made another attempt to persuade his colleague Senator Connally to change his mind. He drew attention to a recent letter addressed to Acheson by a 100 Republican members of the House of Representatives, stating that as long as the United States was not a party to the convention it could not bring an effective legal case against the Soviet Union on grounds of genocide. ‘As you know’, McMahon wrote, I made several legal efforts subsequent to January 1, 1951, to have the Convention and the subcommittee report considered by the full Committee, but without success. In the face of this record, I hope that you can find a place for the Genocide Convention on the agenda of the Foreign Relations Committee at an early date.77 Connally with the support of the ABA and other Southern senators refused to budge from his implacable opposition to the convention. Still in poor health, Lemkin was not as sharply focussed as usual and was unable to exhaust and outflank his enemies. Soon he was complaining about ‘sabotage’ from the AJC undermining the campaign for the Senate ratification of the convention.78

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In February 1952 James Rosenberg gave a pessimistic assessment to Lemkin noting that while he would like to ‘make another really strenuous effort’ to bring about the ratification of the convention, it would ‘be very difficult’ to do so in an election year. He stated that he would be happy to have a chat with him about the situation.79 This was followed by a letter from Dr Samuel Cavert, the secretary of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, to Lemkin because he had not replied to the earlier Rosenberg letter. They had been wondering whether there are any useful steps that our Committee on the Genocide Convention might take at this juncture. One idea which occurred to Mr Rosenberg, and it strikes me as good, is an approach to the two political conventions which will be held in July [1952], in the interest of getting planks in both the Democratic and Republican platforms.80 This was the policy which was, in fact, adopted. What turned out to be the last full council meeting of the United States Committee was called on 19 May 1952 by Dr Samuel Cavert, the co-chairman, to appoint separate delegations to ensure that ratification of the convention appeared in both party platforms. Although its activities disappeared from public view, the council did not disband and continued to function. The co-chairmen, were also to approach Senator McMahon for a realistic appraisal of whether or not pressure should be exerted on the Senate or whether such efforts should be postponed until 1953.81 Ralph Bass told a colleague, ‘in confidence, that James Rosenberg has asked Roger Strauss to approach Gov[ernor] Dewey and John Foster Dulles with a view to getting a genocide plank into the Republican platform’.82 Foster Dulles advised Rosenberg that while he was not forgetful of his communication, ‘it turned out to be quite impractical to get into the Republican platform anything effective with reference to the Genocide Convention’.83 Similar approaches to the Democrats foundered because of the resistance of the Southern wing of the party. At the end of 1952, James Rosenberg sent Lemkin a solicitous letter, stating ‘I worry about your health’ and requesting a meeting. He pointed out that ‘The appointment of Mr Dulles as Secretary of State [by President elect Eisenhower] gives me new hope for ratification of the Genocide Convention’.84 After a rough period of differences over policy, when they frequently clashed, the relationship between Rosenberg and Lemkin seemed to be on the mend. On 9 March 1953, Rosenberg wrote to Jack Tate, who was dealing with matters associated with the convention at the State Department, to ask whether he felt ‘there is any chance of pushing for ratification of the Genocide Convention. Perhaps the recent terrible events in Russia may create a better atmosphere for obtaining ratification’.85 Nevertheless, the optimism about the elevation of Dulles, who had been a longstanding

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supporter of the convention, soon evaporated. To overcome the isolationists in the Senate, Dulles reversed his policy and pledged that he would never ‘become a party to any covenant [on human rights] for consideration by the Senate’, and agreed with the critics of the convention that it went too far by encroaching on the sovereignty of other states.86 The new administration contended that ‘the human rights goals of the United States can most effectively be advanced at this time by specific action programs rather than by the treaty-making process’.87 At the same time as Lemkin’s campaign for ratification by the Senate ran adrift, his teaching contract at Yale was not renewed. The Dean and faculty, apart from Eugene Rostow, were disappointed in Lemkin and tired of his long absences from his academic duties, and his services were not retained after the summer of 1951, when the cold war intensified and genocide gradually disappeared as an issue from public consciousness. Lemkin irked his colleagues and some of his students. He had made himself unpopular with the Dean by incurring excessive charges for telephone calls and telegrams connected with his genocide campaign, and Wesley Sturges had to curtail their use. The Dean had discussed Lemkin’s extravagant expenditure with him to no avail.88 Lemkin, it was rumoured, had given a star student, who consistently achieved grade ‘A’s’, a poor mark for a term paper dealing with genocide because it contradicted his own viewpoint. The student went to see Dean Wesley Sturges, who sympathized with the student’s complaint. Lemkin did not fit sufficiently well into the Yale faculty, where his uncoordinated movements and noticeable paunch made him appear slightly odd. He struck one sympathetic observer as a ‘loner’, a man obsessed with a single idea.89 Lemkin assembled a formidable coalition consisting of Church and Jewish bodies, women’s associations, trade unions and minority groups (Poles and Lithuanians) in favour of ratification of the convention by the Senate. Against them were arrayed the more conservative lawyers in the ABA and the Southern wing of the Democratic party, though the more liberal elements among the lawyers which included the New York Bar strongly supported ratification. But ratification of the convention by the Senate faded from practical politics in Lemkin’s lifetime, partly because of the veto exerted by the Southern wing of the Democratic party, partly because of the world crisis stirred by the cold war,90 and the connection between the fight against the radical wing of the civil rights movement, many of whose prominent supporters were Communists or their sympathizers, and the international struggle against the Soviet Union. John Foster Dulles, the new Republican Secretary of State, who was deeply involved in the contest with the Soviet Union adopted a hard line against the convention and human rights, though he had formerly been an important supporter. As the campaign foundered, Lemkin started quarrelling with his most loyal supporters, James Rosenberg and the United States Committee for a

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Genocide Convention. He also fell sick at a critical time between October 1951 and March 1952, when the campaign needed careful monitoring. Without the backing of a superpower, the United States, in the 1950s, the Genocide Convention could not be enforced against offending parties. It was a hammer blow to Lemkin’s hopes. He was forced to adopt a defensive posture to protect the convention from the encroachment of rival human rights projects.

14 The Genocide Convention: Its Supporters and Enemies

As his relationship with the United States Committee for a Genocide Convention and the American Jewish Committee deteriorated in 1951 and 1952, Lemkin gained the support of new allies among the Central and East European ethnic groups, the Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Hungarians. He utilized their friendship to ensure that the provisions relating to genocide in the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the draft Covenant on Human Rights were not watered down. He further exposed fundamental flaws in the draft code which would have restricted the activities of the European émigré organizations in the United States. Every move Lemkin made was overshadowed by the strife between the United States and the Soviet Union. When these ethnic groups begged Eleanor Roosevelt to bring up charges of genocide against the Soviet Union in the United Nations at the end of 1951, she was reluctant to do so. She thus incurred Lemkin’s wrath. He also opposed an attempt by William Patterson of the Civil Rights Congress, a radical and with Communist affiliated body, to petition the United Nations, charging genocide by the United States government against their black population. In 1953 Lemkin made a rare public intervention on behalf of Soviet Jewry, an impending tragedy only averted by Stalin’s death. In the summer of 1951, despite a period in a convalescent home, Raphael Lemkin’s poor health persisted and some friends installed him in the luxurious Edgewater Beach Hotel in Chicago on the lake’s edge. He recuperated and made a good recovery, assisted by the warmth of the sun and the solicitude of these friends. Numerous conventions were held at the hotel, and Lemkin, always searching for new allies, dropped into some of the sessions and became aware of huge untapped sources of support among ethnic and religious groups. In New York Lemkin worked closely with the Armenians, but his centre of interest now shifted to Chicago and the Midwest, where he campaigned among Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Polish, German and Hungarian groups.1 His sympathy for these East and Central European refugee organizations grew naturally out of his own experiences in Poland. It was not merely a sudden ideological 209

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move to the right; it was more in harmony with growing cold war sentiment and rhetoric in America. In the aftermath of the First World War, when Marshal Pilsudski pushed back a renewed Bolshevik onslaught, Lemkin claimed to have suffered some injuries to his leg, and again in the Second World War during the Russian invasion of Poland Lemkin fled through the Soviet lines, narrowly avoiding permanent incarceration and possible death. Moreover, when he sought to persuade the United States Senate to ratify the convention, Lemkin had already become involved with these East European immigrant groups. In 1947 a new intake of Republican senators to Congress, including John Bricker of Ohio and Joseph McCarthy in Wisconsin, reinforced the ranks of other isolationist Republicans from Midwestern and mountain states; all were against foreign entanglements and reluctant to spend money on foreign aid or troop commitments overseas. The Russian advance in Eastern Europe and the fall of China to the Communists led to charges that the Democrats were being ‘soft on Communism’ and cries of treachery against the American political establishment.2 Senator Joseph McCarthy exploited this political malaise by claiming wildly on 9 February 1950 that the State Department were harbouring 205 Communists, thereby losing the cold war. An era of political paranoia followed. Raphael Lemkin began increasingly to ally himself with Central and Eastern European organizations with power bases in the Midwest because the wider the political sympathy for his aims in this area the more pressure could be exerted against their senators to secure ratification of the convention. In his statements Lemkin accused the Soviets of genocide, claiming that they were trying to destroy these nations by imprisoning their elites in labour camps, by starving them to death, by deporting them and forcibly transferring their children rather than crushing them through cultural genocide. Lemkin turned first to the Lithuanians for support. On 17 June 1951, he opened an exhibition on ‘Genocide in Lithuania’ arranged by the Cleveland, Ohio, branch of the Lithuanian National Council. The exhibition displayed ‘special instructions on deportations and the techniques of separating families. According to recent information, in some cases the Soviet authorities import Kalmuks or Russians to replace a deportee’, he advised Governor Frank Lausche of Ohio. Lemkin emphasized that ‘The material on extermination of the captive nations is appalling’. He, therefore, urged the Governor to press President Truman to obtain ratification of the convention and to use ‘genocide as a concept carrying the highest moral condemnation in our cold war against the Soviet Union’.3 Lemkin was requested by Dr Pius Grigaitis, the executive secretary of the Lithuanian American Council, to draft a pamphlet on ‘Genocide in Lithuania’ in May 1952, for which he was remunerated. As Lemkin was unemployed, since Yale had not renewed his contract, the financial crutch provided by the immigrant organizations was most welcome and sustained him through some lean years. Among the subheadings included

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in this brochure were ‘destruction of selected parts of the Lithuanian nation such as, intellectuals, clergy, peasants, middle class ... Mass Killings and tortures ... Deportations and problems of short life expectancy in Siberia ... Destructions of the family as a method of breaking up the continuity of the Lithuanian Nation’.4 In Chicago, Lemkin also established a good working relationship with the Polish and Greek Americans. Charles Rozmarek, the president of the Polish American Congress, wrote to Senator James Duff, pressing him to support ratification of the convention in the Senate as well as objecting to the draft code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. The letter stated that the Polish Americans were interested in the immediate ratification of the convention ‘because the Soviet authorities are practicing genocide on the Polish people, especially by destroying, intellectuals, professionals, and clergymen. By striking at the brains of the Polish people they hope to destroy the body’.5 Lemkin wrote to Adele Lagodzinska, the president of the Polish Women’s Alliance, enclosing a draft of a statement on ratification of the convention for her to sign which they had previously discussed, saying that her interest in the matter gave him new hope.6 When Congress set up an investigative committee to look into the mass murder of captured Polish officers and professional men at Katyn by the Russian army, Lemkin attended the hearings and helped to formulate the Polish American Congress’ demand in 1953 to President Eisenhower that he raise the question of the massacre at the United Nations.7 So too, Lemkin started working with Greek Orthodox Youth Groups in Chicago. During the Greek Civil War, 28,000 children were abducted and transported to neighbouring Communist countries, where they were indoctrinated, and the fear was that their services would later be utilised to subvert Greece. Lemkin had successfully lobbied for a new crime to be included in the Genocide Convention dealing with ‘the forcible transfer of children from one group to another’. Queen Frederica of Greece supported the demand for the return of the children. Archbishop Michael’s compassion was so aroused that he arranged for organizations of Greek Americans to testify before the Senate in favour of the ratification of the convention.8 On 23 July 1951 the conventions of the Order of AHEPA in Chicago, of Greek Orthodox Youth as well as that of the Daughters of Penelope all adopted similar resolutions to expedite the repatriation of the Greek children and for the ratification of the convention by the Senate.9 Drawing on his friendship with the leaders of the Polish Women’s Alliance in Chicago, Lemkin asked them to write to Ambassador Warren Austin, urging him to broach the issue of the missing Greek children at the United Nations.10 When Lemkin approached Anna Lord Strauss, a member of the American UN delegation, she stated that ‘Because of my deep personal interest in this subject ... I am planning to discuss this situation at length with Mr Cohen and with other members of the Delegation when the item comes up for debate’.11

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In 1951, while Lemkin still held his academic position at Yale, his total income reached the modest sum of $5,675.00, the bulk of which came from Jewish organizations, the Littauer Foundation contributing $2,925 and the American Jewish Congress $1,000. The Lithuanian American Congress only paid him $750, while the remaining funds came from the Pandick Press.12 Once Lemkin lost his university teaching appointment, he became much more dependent on funding from the East European immigrant organizations. In 1952, the Lithuanian National Council paid him $1150, the Ukrainian Congress $400 and Radio Free Europe $200, while $200 was provided by Jewish sources. His overall income dropped to $2,025. So short of cash did Lemkin become in 1952 that in September he was compelled to make an application for Social Security.13 In the summer of 1951, Lemkin was still employing a female research assistant and factotum, whose name was Ulric Cole. She explained in a letter to Lemkin that she was feeling uneasy about his absence, all ‘to do with the age-old female habit of worrying about physical welfare ... Again, its Cole egotism, for its quite evident that you no longer need a nurse maid at all times. (The important part of the sentence is the last three words)’. She told him while he stayed in Chicago that he had received the usual telephone calls from his faithful followers, Mrs Kay Johnson, Dr Tow, Knauth and the ‘nosy’ Mrs Nowinkski.14 In another letter, she advised Lemkin that you may, if the doctor suggests a vacation (which this doctor certainly would), want to go to the Spectors or to Lakewood, or you might want to go somewhere and be completely by yourself. Or, since my time is free, I should be very glad to take care of you myself, out of town, preferably, in a pretty place, so please feel perfectly free to accept my offer, or to reject it, as you like ... I know you hate to make decisions.15 While he was teaching at Yale, Lemkin sometimes stayed with Isaiah Spector and his wife. These friends who owned a house deep in the countryside in Woodbridge, Connecticut. Ulric Cole’s relationship with Lemkin fell into the usual pattern of such female admirers, inspiring in them both affection and the mothering instinct. Throughout the time she was helping Lemkin in 1951, it appears that Ulric Cole also made loans to him, totalling $516.84, as she asked him to repay them at the beginning of the next year.16 During the latter half of 1951 and 1952, Lemkin’s financial situation drastically deteriorated. He was unemployed. He borrowed money from friends in Washington to advance the train fare to New York, and he could not afford to pay his bill for accommodation at the Henry Hudson Hotel when he returned. For some weeks, he endured the calculated insults of the lift boy. Finally his clothes were confiscated, and he was locked out of his room. Lemkin agreed to pay off the arrears in small instalments. Thus Lemkin declared, he found

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himself ‘pleading a holy cause at the UN while wearing holely clothes’. This remark shows Lemkin’s humour and sense of the absurd. His enlisting his cause as a holy one suggests the fact that despite his sophisticated and secular education, Lemkin still had a Jewish way of looking at the world. His friends at the United Nations noticed his plight and conspired together to provide him with regular meals. Ashamed of having to live off the charity of friends, Lemkin tried to limit himself to a bowl of soup when he was their guest. Eventually he moved into a furnished room at 79 West 89th Street, New York. At first he borrowed money from friends to pay his rent. Soon, he fell behind and his landlord regularly visited his room at midnight to vent his anger. The landlord disconnected the electric light and removed his blankets. Lemkin shoved a large dressing table against the door, enabling him to sleep undisturbed.17 Towards the end of 1951, Lemkin forged new ties with other immigrant organizations from Eastern and Central Europe, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the Hungarian National Council and the Americans of German origin. He became acquainted with Bela Varga, the former president of the Hungarian Parliament, and a leading Hungarian exile. Lemkin tried to persuade his old friend Gertrude Samuels to write an editorial on the Hungarian situation for the New York Times. He drew her attention to the fact that the Hungarians needed to be saved from genocide: ‘A deportation is not a resettlement or a train ride. It is a one-way trip without return, and slave labourers have a life expectancy of two years’.18 On 8 November 1951, Lemkin sent George Eberle the draft of a cable which he suggested he should send to Ambassador Warren Austin at the United Nations: ‘We urge immediate investigation of Soviet Genocide committed on German people. First, by withholding prisoners of war from their families. Second, by kidnapping German children from the Eastern Zone as reported by Bishop Dibelius to President Truman. Third, by having carried out Sudeten expulsion in conditions involving physical destruction’.19 Lemkin was a master political tactician, orchestrating many different anti-Soviet campaigns on behalf of the captive nations of Europe around the theme of genocide, thereby allowing this concept to pass into everyday parlance and into debates in the United Nations and saving it from being emasculated by human rights campaigners. As Otis Swift admitted in a letter to Lemkin, ‘Until I saw the attached copy of the Ukrainian Bulletin, I had very stupidly not realized that you would be so closely involved with phases of this problem’. Lemkin was also associated with the umbrella organization of these vanquished peoples, the Assembly of Captive European Nations.20 In these years Lemkin worked closely with Church groups of all kinds and with multifarious Jewish organizations. In a memorandum prepared by Lemkin in June 1950 for the American Zionist Council, he argued that Next to Arms for Israel, this Convention ranges as very important for the legal and political defense of Israel in the United Nations and in the

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diplomatic world at large. Many Jewish minorities are still living in unfriendly surroundings in Europe, in the Near East and in many other countries without mentioning specifically Germany. The Genocide Convention is the only international treaty available for the protection of the Jews in the world today. He asked all the Zionist organizations to bombard senators with appeals in support of the ratification of the convention.21 The telegrams which were dispatched to the senators were couched in anodyne terms without any specifically Jewish content. The telegram from the Labor Zionist Organization of America stated that ‘We join in repudiating the crime of genocide, together with the CIO, AFL and other neighbour [labour] organizations throughout the world who went on record against the crime of genocide as the greatest barbarity ever conceived by the human mind’.22 Other Jewish organizations with which Lemkin continued to cooperate were the World Jewish Congress and its American affiliate, the American Jewish Congress and the Philadelphia Council. Lemkin spoke at a dinner in New York on 12 April 1951 at which he received the Stephen Wise Award for ‘the outstanding contribution to the defense of the rights and status of Jews throughout the world’.23 The following year he addressed the conference of the Zionist Organization of America and the Philadelphia Council.24 Yet Lemkin rarely linked the Genocide Convention to Jewish issues at least publicly, preferring to operate behind the scenes, as he believed that too close an association with Israel and the Jewish community would be detrimental to his cause. When the Czech government put 14 defendants on trial, 11 of whom were Jews (the Slansky trial), Lemkin made one of his rare public interventions in January 1953 in the organ of the Anti-Defamation League, the ADL Bulletin. He was also concerned about a growing and vicious anti-Semitic campaign behind the iron curtain, when a group of doctors, most of whom were Jewish, were charged in Moscow with conspiring to kill Stalin. These rigged show trials jeopardized the well-being of the Jewish population in Eastern Europe, he noted. What was happening to the Jews in Czechoslovakia and Russia was genocide. The convention defined genocide as ‘“acts committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, racial or religious group as such” through killing, causing disintegration of their minds, physical destruction in slave and labor camps, breaking up of families and stealing of children’. He demanded that the United Nations should ‘investigate the situation in the Soviet [Union] and its satellites with a view to establishing whether genocide against the Jewish communities is being committed. If it is, the United Nations should be called upon to apply sanctions against those countries violating ... the Genocide Convention’.25 Lemkin continued to be concerned with Russia’s policy towards its Jews and pleaded with Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, the most influential Jewish leader in America, to intervene with the president, pointing out that ‘Israel is still in

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danger and so are the lives of millions of Jews threatened by communist genocide’.26 He wrote to Dr Samuel Nargoshes of the Jewish National Fund suggesting that an editorial in the Christian Science Monitor on ‘Moscow and Jewry’, which called for the invoking of the convention, should be reprinted by him in his column.27 It is quite possible that Lemkin may have had a hand in the formulation of this editorial. However, the sudden death of Stalin on 5 March 1953 resulted in the anti-Semitic campaign abating and the release of the doctors from prison. Writing to his friend Mrs Laura Dreyfus Barney in Paris on 6 November 1951, Lemkin observed that there is a real danger to the Genocide Convention because it is being sabotaged both in the United States and in the United Nations by a peculiar combination of representatives of vested interests in the United Nations projects. The lawyers of the International Law Commission have included Genocide in Article 1, Point 8, of the ... Draft Code of Offenses ... which they have succeeded in placing on the agenda without observing the usual procedure of submitting such a document to governments for comments. The human rights lobbyists ... would like to cover the ground of the Genocide Convention by Articles 3 and 4 of their draft. Of course you know of the opposition of the American Bar Association, – but you will be amazed ... [at the] cooperation between all three opposition groups! He went on to warn her that ‘persons in Paris who do not look at the Genocide Convention in the same way as you and I are the following: [René] CASSIN – [Frederick] NOLDE – [Moses] MOSKOWITZ [of the AJC] – and [Clark] EICHELBERGER’.28 She wrote a reassuring reply, telling him that the International Council of Women had not put the draft Code of Offences on their agenda and that a small committee had been set up to aid the liberation of the abducted Greek children.29 To the above opponents of the convention, Lemkin added Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, after she gave an interview at Idlewild airport at the end of 1951. Peter Kihss’ observation on the interview is as follows: Asked if the United States thought charges against the Soviet bloc were likely to be or ought to be brought up in the Assembly, as urged by exiles and Americans of Eastern European ancestry:[she replied] ‘How could you prove it? I’m not sure you can prove that. Unless you can prove it, there’s no use bringing it up.’30 For this answer which challenged the legal basis of the campaigning of the East European organizations, Eleanor Roosevelt earned Lemkin’s contempt and enmity and his private references to her were unflattering.

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Although during the drafting of the convention it had been decided not to include an article concerning reservations, a number of states including the Soviet bloc only accepted the convention subject to reservations. The United Kingdom objected to the reservations, pointing out that an international convention ‘must be accepted or not accepted as a whole’. To Lemkin, this meant that the British were resorting to delaying tactics at the United Nations and trying to hold up the implementation of the convention.31 Senator Humphrey explained to the American United Nations mission that until the International Court decided there would be a delay of a year and it would ‘immobilize the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has before it the report of its McMahon Subcommittee recommending four reservations’ to the convention.32 Lemkin initiated a campaign with the support of Ukrainian and Lithuanian émigré organizations plus some women’s groups to persuade the State Department to change its position on the question of reservations without result.33 The United Nations Legal Committee asked the International Court of Justice whether a reserving state could be regarded as being a party to the Genocide Convention if some of the parties to the treaty objected to the reservations but others did not. On 28 May 1951, the Court decided that a reserving state was to be regarded as being a party to the convention if the reservation was compatible with the purpose of the treaty. A party which rejected reservations as being incompatible with the purposes of the convention was entitled to regard the reserving state as not being a party to the convention. If the signatory state objecting to the reservation had not ratified the convention, its objection would not have validity until it ratified the treaty, but an objection to a reservation by a state which had not signed the treaty would not be legally binding.34 As we have seen, opposition to the Genocide Convention, if not the actual concept of genocide, stemmed primarily from two sources, a group of judges who had participated in the Nuremberg Trials and some of the activists in the movement for human rights. Professor Vespasian V. Pella, who was the Minister Observer for the Romanian government at the United Nations until 5 November 1948, had attended the proceedings at Nuremberg in May 1946. Here he discussed with Francis Biddle, the American Judge, and his Soviet counterpart the question of codifying parts of the international penal law, and his arguments were sufficiently persuasive for Biddle to suggest to the American government that the United Nations prepare a Code of Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind incorporating the principles of the Nuremberg Judgment.35 Lemkin told the editor of the New York Herald Tribune that the Russians favoured a draft code and the concept of crimes against humanity because it permitted them to appear innocent in the following crimes which they have committed, while they could claim to be attacked by

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Germany; the destruction of the Volga Germans, of the Crimean Tartars, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmucks, Karachais and the Balkarians. By that they had also destroyed considerable numbers of inhabitants of the Baltic states which came under their control in June of 1940.36 On 18 November 1947, Andrei Vishinsky, the Russian representative, delivered a blistering attack on the West in the General Assembly and demanded that a draft code against war-mongering and outlawing the use of atomic energy be devised. A resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 21 November 1947 entrusting the work of preparing such a code to the International Law Commission of the United Nations which commenced its deliberations in May 1949.37 Although Professor Pella had been a mentor of Lemkin and a supporter of his genocide project, the relationship between the two men had deteriorated since December 1947 following their participation in a committee to draft the convention. Lemkin was very sensitive to criticism, even if it was constructive as was the case with Pella, and inclined to be suspicious of another party’s motives; he lacked the ability to trust. Soon Lemkin was feeding friendly journalists and colleagues in the human rights movement with stories undermining Pella’s credibility. He was supposed to be active among legal groups in the United States ‘organizing this tactic of smothering genocide with human rights.’38 Drew Pearson, a famous columnist on the Washington Post, wrongly claimed that Pella represented the fascist Romanian regime of Antonescu in Switzerland during the war, whereas as a diplomat he had been instrumental in saving Jewish lives. In April 1949 Pella had taken the initiative at a conference of non-governmental organizations having consultative status at the UN to secure the passing of a resolution encouraging states to ratify the convention. In January 1950, Pella had a long conversation with Lemkin in which he clarified his opposition to the Communist regime in Romania. In fact, he had resigned his diplomatic position in 1948 and refused to return home. During the summer of 1950, Lemkin had telephoned Pella begging him to intervene in certain European countries to persuade them to ratify the convention, and he had done so and had correspondence available to prove this. Again, in October 1950 he had asked the International Bar Association to publish their resolution in favour of the ratification of the convention. Despite this, tales had been spread by Lemkin claiming that Pella was hostile to the ratification of the convention, and if the retailing of such inventions did not stop, Pella said he would seek legal redress.39 Pella was active in preparing a number of draft texts of the Code of Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind which he submitted to the International Law Commission of the United Nations. At the time, Pella was staying in the home of Professor Manley Hudson of Harvard University, the chairman of the International Law Commission. Despite his later denials, it

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was clear that Pella worked closely with Professor Jean Spiropoulos, the rapporteur of the draft code for the International Law Commission. In June 1950 the International Law Commission met in Geneva and by August a subcommittee of three had prepared a draft Code of Offences. Later the Commission requested Professor Pella to write a detailed memorandum on the draft code which was circulated to member states of the United Nations. Meeting again in Geneva in June 1951, the International Law Commission adopted a draft Code of Offences which was virtually the same as the text already formulated by the subcommittee of three.40 When the New York Times subsequently criticized the draft code, particularly those sections dealing with civil strife and terrorism, Pella disassociated himself from the draft, claiming that this was all the work of Professor Spiropoulos. America, the national Catholic weekly, with whose editor Lemkin was friendly, pointed out that this was not the case and that the contentious sections had been drafted by Pella. To this Pella responded by declaring that the provisions in the draft code which make it ‘an international offense for authorities of a state to organize and encourage or even tolerate activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts or stir up civil war in another country’ ... are directed against the fifth columns which menaced the free world. But according to Lemkin the formulation of the code permitted the indictment of the United States, France and Western Germany from where national liberation movements were sending messages of support to their fellows in Poland and the Baltic states, who were challenging Russian authority. However, in the memorandum drafted by Pella for the United Nations Secretariat, he wrote that ‘under the Code, it should be a punishable act to incite, encourage or tolerate activities designed to spread terror among the population of another state’. In his letter of 2 November 1950 Pella denied that he shared the point of view of members preparing the draft code, who incorporated genocide into its provisions, but Lemkin claimed that in an article published in the Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal he did precisely this.41 Two organizations, the Polish American Congress and the Lithuanian American National Council, prodded by Lemkin, added their voice to the criticisms, noting that the draft code ‘would outlaw help to nations enslaved by the Soviet Union; would legalize Soviet territorial acquisitions; would destroy the Genocide Convention; was placed on the Assembly agenda prematurely, without previous study by member governments’. In addition, Lemkin induced the American Jewish War Veterans to associate themselves with these appeals.42 Congressman Charles Kersten, also influenced in some measure by Lemkin, wrote to Ambassador Warren Austin asking him whether he would

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be criminally liable under the provisions of the draft code for assisting covert organizations in the satellite states. Kersten was the initiator of the $100 million appropriation amendment to the Mutual Security Act. On 11 November 1951, 26 Republican Congressmen led by Walter Judd urged the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to instruct the American delegation to oppose the draft code in the General Assembly. If the draft code was adopted, it would prevent the United States government and the American people from being everlastingly on the side of human freedom and in support of all who struggled for it and resist tyranny and police state methods ... it might mean a death blow to most Voice of America programs and to Radio Free Europe. Further the Congressmen warned that ‘The blatant endorsement of this code by the communist press of the world, including the Daily Worker in this country, together with its reported communist authorship, is sufficient grounds for our delegation to exercise the utmost caution’.43 At the same time, the campaign by the East European groups broadened in scope, when on 24 November 1951 representatives of some 12 million American citizens of Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Ukrainian, Hungarian, Czech and Slovak origin urged the State Department to press the United Nations to investigate examples of genocide perpetrated by the Soviet Union. Behind this initiative we would detect in large part the hand of Lemkin. It was seized on by the Republicans and was followed up by a letter of 11 January 1952 signed by over a hundred Republican members of Congress requesting that the Secretary of State lodge charges of genocide against the Soviet Union in the General Assembly. In a State Department memorandum it was admitted that ‘Organizations speaking for refugees from behind the Iron Curtain and for Americans of Eastern European descent have in recent months been urging that we raise in the United Nations various Soviet violations of Soviet fundamental human rights, including mass deportations and genocide’. The memorandum noted that without additional research it would be difficult to substantiate the charges. After conferring with other pro-Western delegations, the Americans found that there was in some cases outright reluctance to have a separate item on Soviet and satellite violations of human rights placed on the agenda ... An additional factor militating against the introduction of charges of Soviet genocide in the General Assembly is the failure of the United States Senate to act upon the Genocide Convention.44 Eleanor Roosevelt as acting chairman of the American delegation at the Sixth General Assembly answered a cable sent by the Czech National

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Council, requesting her to introduce a new item on the agenda dealing with ‘deportations, persecutions and other violations of human rights in the countries behind the Iron Curtain’. She told them that our Delegation is taking the leadership in the positive work of setting standards for the safeguarding of human rights through the Universal Declaration of Human rights and the drafting of a Covenant on Human Rights ... it is virtually impossible for our Delegation to place a charge of genocide on the Agenda or even to press it hard in debate, in view of the fact that the United States is not a party to the Genocide Convention.45 Article 2 section 5 of the draft code forbade ‘the undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a state of activities [or of organized activities] calculated to foment civil strife in another state’ This section was widely criticized in the American press. Professor Charles Fenwick wrote in the American Journal of International Law that Protests were promptly forthcoming from organizations in the United States, such as the Polish American Congress and the Lithuanian Council, against the assumption by the United States of any obligations to restrain their activities on behalf of the liberation of their respective countries from the regime imposed upon them by minorities supported by the Soviet Union. Under the Mutual Security Act passed in 1951 funds were allocated to selected persons residing in or refugees from the Soviet Union and her satellites to form them into a military force in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for any similar purposes determined by the president. There was here a clear intention on the part of Congress not only of tolerating organized activities calculated to foment civil strife in another state, but of encouraging them by the open and avowed use of special funds. This made the consideration of the draft Code wholly impracticable and it was taken off the agenda of the General Assembly and postponed until its seventh session. Although resolutions of the United Nations of a political nature are not legally binding, it is a different matter when accusations of individual criminal responsibility are made, as they would be if the draft code was adopted, and every American policeman would have to cooperate in the code’s enforcement, Lemkin averred.46 Article 2 section 6 of the draft code defined terrorist acts as ‘the undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a state of terrorist activities in

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another state, or the toleration by the authorities of a state of organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another state’. Lemkin believed that terrorist acts could be said to involve the stealing of property for political purposes, and this would include the theft of a government document by a civil servant who fled abroad. Persons who removed deportees from a train to prevent genocidal acts could also be held responsible as international criminals.47 It was intended that the draft code was to be enforced both through domestic courts of states and through an International Criminal Tribunal. A draft statute setting up such a tribunal had been prepared and included on the agenda for the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly in the autumn of 1952. Already it was clear that the Soviet Union proposed using the tribunal for propaganda purposes against the United States. The International Association of Democratic Lawyers, a Communist front organization, of which Professor Pella was an active member, sent a team of eight investigators to Korea to collect material on the Soviet charges of bacteriological warfare. On their return, the group called a press conference in Vienna in which they claimed that the American army personnel in Korea ‘are guilty of germ warfare and that the United States be arraigned in a Nurnberg style war crime[s] trial on the charge that American troops have committed hundreds of atrocities in Korea’.48 The National Committee for a Free Europe sought to ‘pierce the iron curtain with messages of moral and practical value through the facilities of Radio Free Europe, thus taking the fight to the enemy’s camp’. These messages endeavoured to sustain the cultural and ‘spiritual life of the captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe’ and give them the hope that they would be able to regain their freedom. By bringing into force the draft code, the Soviet Union aimed at undermining these efforts by restricting the activities of such organizations as the National Committee for a Free Europe and ensuring that the State Department would be obliged in law to monitor their work very strictly.49 It was for these reasons that the State Department was reluctant to go ahead with the draft code arguing that although it had ‘not been made public ... certain of its provisions may limit us in supporting refugee groups from Eastern Europe’.50 A resolution of the General Assembly of 4 December 1954 noted that the draft code raised problems connected with the definition of aggression and decided to postpone further consideration of the matter until the Special Committee that had been appointed to define aggression submitted its report. So far these difficulties had been too perplexing to surmount. It remained a moot point as to whether the Special Committee appointed to define aggression would have finished their deliberations in time for the opening of the new session of the General Assembly in the autumn of 1959.51 In fact, the International Law Commission only adopted the draft code in 1996, when it incorporated the exact text of Article 2 of the

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convention and Article 3 in a revised form; the latter enumerated punishable acts.52 As a result of Lemkin exposing the flaws in the draft code, particularly its provisions which prohibited American help to nations behind the Iron Curtain, he boasted that it became a ‘dead issue for ten years’. When a friend suggested that Lemkin’s manoeuvres were deadly, he modestly brushed aside this compliment, saying ‘I am an old, sick man. How can I be deadly?’ Nevertheless, the friend doubted very much that Lemkin was as yet a ‘dead duck’.53 Lemkin planted a story in the Cleveland Plain Dealer on 24 June 1951 that Vespasian Pella had conceived a plan to break up the Genocide Convention by including its clauses in the draft code and a new Human Rights Covenant. As we have seen, the leader of the human rights movement in the United States was Roger Baldwin, who was President of the International League for the Rights of Man and was a close colleague of Pella on its committee. Once sympathetic to the Soviet experiment, Baldwin had become disenchanted by having to deal at close quarters with Communist sympathisers.54 Nevertheless, there was rivalry between the human rights movement and the supporters of the Genocide Convention, and when Baldwin became chairman of the executive of the United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention in 1949, Lemkin accused him of using his position to undermine the support of American organizations for the ratification of the genocide convention. Lemkin further claimed that Baldwin took the view that if the Senate ratified the convention, it would not approve the Human Rights Covenant, having considered that it fulfilled its obligations.55 On 29 January 1952, Raphael Lemkin and Daniel Flood, a Republican Congressman, had a meeting with State Department representatives to voice similar complaints. Dr Lemkin stated that his efforts, and those of other supporters of the Genocide Convention, to obtain favorable action in the Senate were being blocked by the activities of individuals and organizations who were pushing for the inclusion of provisions covering genocide in the Human Rights Covenant now under study in the United Nations ... these activities had created new difficulties with regard to the Genocide Convention, by sowing misinformation in the public mind regarding the extent to which the Genocide Convention actually dealt with human rights matters and impinged upon the sovereignty of the ratifying states. Mr Lemkin said that the efforts in particular of Roger Baldwin and the League for the Rights of Man, Ex-Minister Pella of Rumania, and Alvarez Del Vayo were directed toward blocking the Genocide Convention in order to keep the way clear for a human rights covenant including genocide in its broad provisions. He intimated that Pella was subject to Communist influence, and remarked that the Communists were also seeking to sabotage the

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Genocide Convention by supporting the draft code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind.56 Despite Lemkin’s complaints about Roger Baldwin’s undue influence over the deliberations of the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, James Rosenberg sent a telegram on 6 June 1952 to the State Department on behalf of the Committee expressing concern that the issue of Genocide is thus being confused and involved with many other controversial issues in [the] draft code such as the definition of aggression, violation of treaties, disarmament etc. Article III of draft Covenant of Human Rights deals with right to life. There is considerable likelihood this general notion of deprivation of life may be regarded as a substitute for Genocide Convention. This was exactly Lemkin’s line of argument. The Department assured Rosenberg that his comments on the draft code would be borne in mind, while Mrs Roosevelt had already introduced amendments to the Covenant on Human Rights dealing with the matter raised by him.57 Article 1 of the proposed draft Covenant on Human Rights declared that Each state hereto undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in this Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. As drafted, it appeared to Lemkin to be a somewhat utopian project to enshrine the rights of citizens all over the world in a common law code. Article 3 stated that it was a crime to take anyone’s life, but Lemkin insisted that it was absurd to make this an item of international law, as a drunken brawl which ended in death would fall under such a category. Already in 1947 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People had petitioned the Human Rights Division of the United Nations for the redress of the grievances of black Americans. Their appeal was without result. Alexei Pavlov, the Russian delegate to the United Nations, exploited this discontent and argued in 1949 that since President Truman had denounced lynchings in the United States, it was necessary for the draft Covenant to include such an article. The civil rights movement in the United States felt rebuffed by Congress and certain sections in it resolved to impose a civil rights programme on their own country by supporting a United Nations Human Rights Covenant.58 Hence they were sympathetic to Russian moves at the United Nations. On 19 May 1952, the Russian delegate Morozov at a session of the Human Rights Commission proposed a text which stated that ‘No one may be

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deprived of life. Everyone shall be protected by law’. This was accepted with an amendment submitted by Mrs Roosevelt on behalf of the United States, so that the first sentence now read ‘arbitrarily deprived of his life’.59 Article 4 also placed segregation and racial discrimination under the control of the United Nations. It read in part that ‘No one shall be subjected to degrading treatment’. Lemkin warned that there was a grave danger of the Human Rights Commission adopting the draft Covenant of Human Rights and that it could be confirmed by the General Assembly and later adopted and ratified by the Soviet satellites and a group of Arab countries: Should this happen, the Draft Covenant of Human Rights will become international law and will be used by unfriendly powers to discredit U. S. A. in world opinion. Soviet propaganda will obtain a legal stranglehold. Moreover under such circumstances it will be impossible to charge the Soviet Union with her crimes against millions of people, because she will retaliate with discrimination and lynchings charges.60 Lemkin regarded the Genocide Convention as a wonderful instrument ‘because it exposes world Communism as a criminal organization’ which ‘had falsely imprisoned a hundred million people in Central and Eastern Europe’.61 William Patterson, the executive secretary of the Civil Rights Congress, a Communist front organization which was on the radical wing of the civil rights movement, went to Paris at the end of 1951 to present a petition to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations charging the United States with genocide against its black population. The petition which was in the form of a book entitled ‘We Charge Genocide, The Crime of Government Against the Negro People’ was a careful and detailed study of the discrimination suffered by the American black population and was distributed to the Secretary-General and sympathetic delegations. Among the signatories to the petition were a galaxy of black activists, including the veteran campaigner Dr W.E.B. Du Bois. Simultaneously on 17 December 1951, the renowned actor and singer Paul Robeson left the same document at the United Nations headquarters in New York amid a fanfare of publicity. The Southern wing of the Democratic party in the Senate exploited this opportunity during the cold war to smother the Genocide Convention because of the Communist affiliation of many of the circle around William Patterson. A State Department memorandum reported that ‘No action is expected in the UN by any of its members [on the petition] although it has been rumored that two non-Soviet governments had been found willing to propose UN action’.62 Egypt and India, however, thought it wisest not to become too involved, and a meeting with the Haitian, Dominican, Ethiopian and Liberian delegates also foundered because they were all soliciting aid under the Marshall Plan. Patterson admitted that ‘Every effort to get the Human Rights Commission

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to discuss the genocide charges has been blocked by the influence of American imperialism. The Latin American delegates were wholly in the U. S. grab bag’.63 Lemkin like so many of the white law professors criticized by Patterson for their cool response to the petition believed in the gradualist approach to ameliorate the condition of the blacks, and in correspondence with him disputed Patterson’s contention that their maltreatment amounted to genocide. In an interview with the New York Times on 18 December 1951, Lemkin stated that ‘ “The accusations were a maneuver to divert attention away from the crimes of genocide committed against Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles and other Soviet subjugated peoples”. Lemkin branded Paul Robeson and ... Patterson as “un-American” elements serving a foreign Power’.64 Lemkin’s opponents found this argument unacceptable. One of the signatories to the petition, Dr Oakley Johnson, asked Lemkin Have you ever lived in the South in a Negro section ... or on a Southern Negro College campus? ... The white police, white newspapers, white officials, white judges and white juries do not just ‘frighten a Negro’. They terrorize all Negroes, regularly, systematically, all the time. ... When the discrimination is against all the ‘individuals’ in a well-defined racial group, when resistance to such discrimination is put down by laws, police, and courts, and when discrimination is consciously calculated to enforce ‘white supremacy’, reaching the point ... of causing anguish to adolescent children or of refusing admittance of critically injured persons to a hospital, isn’t there a potential element of genocide in it?65 ‘The Soviet double standard and the hostility of the southern bloc in the Senate to any international undertaking that might bolster the ... [black] drive made the State Department warier than ever of the Convention’, wrote Joseph Lash. Mrs Roosevelt countered Russian criticism of American discrimination very cleverly by stating the readiness of her government to have Soviet experts examine their practices if American observers could do likewise in the Soviet Union.66 Lemkin was still writing letters to the press in 1957 pointing out that the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights drew no distinction between one man killing another and a situation where a nation or race was destroyed. Nor did the draft Covenant state that deprivation of life was a crime.67 The International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights was not adopted by the United Nations until 1966, but the United States did not ratify the Covenant until 1992 and then only did so with numerous reservations.68 Apart from this, the Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 1964 and 1968 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 slowly ameliorated the position of black Americans and made Russian interventions irrelevant.69 As Tanya Elder pointed out, Lemkin remained

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‘perplexed’ that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights ‘with no legal enforcement could actually trump the legal precedents of the Genocide Convention’.70 When the Nationalist Chinese government of Formosa (Taiwan), then the official representative of their country at the United Nations, deposited China’s ratification of the Genocide Convention on 19 July 1951, they also filed a letter asking the Secretary-General to take steps to revise the Chinese text of the convention. The permanent representative of China at the United Nations transmitted a new Chinese text incorporating the amendments to the Secretary-General, but he stated that he was not empowered to accept the revised text and referred the matter to the General Assembly with a memorandum asking them to make the decision. However, he observed that ‘the revised Chinese text submitted by the Permanent Representative of China introduces only revisions which are in the main of a linguistic nature, and does not in any sense alter the substance or meaning of the Convention as expressed in the other four official texts’. On 5 December 1952, the General Assembly having considered the Chinese request decided to pass this item on to the Legal Committee. Here it was decided that the Chinese text was to be called the corrected text and that it was to be sent with a covering letter by the Secretary-General to all signatories of the Genocide Convention for them to notify their acceptance or rejection of the new text. Afterwards the revised resolution was sent to the General Assembly for its approval.71 Lemkin was worried about the proposed Chinese revision to the text of the Genocide Convention which he felt went to its core and watered it down to a version acceptable to the human rights activists. On 15 December 1952 he sent a telegram to Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, which was ignored.72 Peng-chun Chang, the permanent representative of China, was a philosopher with a pragmatic approach, but he was also one of the principal architects of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and inclined to be suspicious of the rival project, the Genocide Convention.73 The next response of Lemkin was to launch a fusillade in the guise of a letter to the New York Times on 17 December 1952 signed by his allies in the Central and Eastern European liberation movements but almost certainly drafted by him. ‘We fear however’, they declared, that the convention will ultimately be put on ice and superseded by the proposed United Nations Draft Code of Offenses Against Peace and Security of Mankind, which, being a declaration will not be enforceable as binding international law. Tragically and ironically enough, the Chinese proposal for the revision of the Genocide Convention is in line with the Soviet proposal made in the Assembly of the UN on November 20, 1947, where it was defeated.74

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This was followed up by a letter from Dr Herbert Evatt, the former President of the General Assembly, who as we have seen was a close ally of Lemkin. He noted that the Nationalist Chinese government was seeking to revise the text of the existing Genocide Convention in such a way that the concept of genocide is likely to be equated to and confused with certain war crimes as defined in the Nuremberg Judgment ... I can state that the departure from the Nuremberg foundation was regarded as necessary in order to secure universal acceptance of rules to punish genocide whether in time of war or in time of peace. But the Chinese proposal, despite the good intentions of that Government, will tend to confuse genocide with war crimes punishable only as an incident to an aggressive war ... all UN members should be on their guard against a proposal which weakens the moral force and questions the legal force of the existing Genocide Convention.75 Lemkin attacked the proposed Chinese revision of the Genocide Convention in a memorandum, asserting that it introduced substantive changes in the convention. An attempt has been made, Lemkin remarked, ‘to assimilate the genocide convention with those parts of the Draft Code of Offenses which deal with the crimes established by the Nuremberg judgments and Charter of the Military Tribunal’. Throughout the Chinese text the term ‘crime of genocide’ has been replaced by the phrase ‘act of genocide’, which is a substantial change because a crime is a legal concept while an act is only a physical one and could arise from an act such as negligence which does not have criminal connotations. This shows that there was an intention to substitute the Code of Offences for the Genocide Convention. Moreover, the meaning of the term genocide was also changed by applying it to all human groups, ‘so that the destruction of one family or of two or three persons would be called genocide; and a limitation was introduced into the concept of genocide, stating that it had to be committed with ruthlessness or cruelty’. But Lemkin observed that genocide could be committed by devious means, particularly under colonial rule. In Article 2 the words ‘imposing measures to prevent birth within the group’ which could mean the compulsory separation of the sexes was altered to ‘impeding birth within the group’. This could narrow the definition to merely impeding the actual birth process.76 As a result of Lemkin’s campaign against the Chinese government’s attempt to revise the authentic Chinese text of the convention culminating in Dr Evatt’s widely publicized appeal in July 1953, many nations refused to approve the Chinese proposal which seriously weakened the convention.77 An earlier letter of Lemkin’s urging Canada to ratify the convention contained some acerbic comments about the Communist regime in China.

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Lemkin warned about the areas of the world threatened by genocide which were ripe for intervention by the United Nations. These areas were the Baltic states and China where action had been started against the intellectuals, clergymen, tradesmen and all the other enlightened Chinese who represent the forces of the cohesion of the Chinese people. This is being done in the hope that the remainder of the Chinese, after they have lost their leaders, will be more amenable to foreign rule. Did Lemkin equate the victory of Mao in the Chinese civil war with the triumph of alien Marxist forces? Probably he did, and this also indicates the strength of his anti-Communist sentiments.78 In 1953, when a new Republican administration took over, Lemkin again induced the Hungarian National Council, Polish organizations, the National Council of Jewish Women and Norman Thomas to write to John Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State, to voice his concerns about articles in the draft code and the Covenant on Human Rights diluting the concept of genocide. Bela Varga of the Hungarian Council claimed that Certain members of the UN Secretariat who are dealing with legal matters ... have succeeded in confusing UN delegations and even in winning the support of certain influential American organizations, especially those which are interested in having a UN Human Rights Covenant in order to strengthen their fight for the Civil Rights Program on the domestic scene. A section of the Polish American Congress added that they were ‘gravely concerned over arrangement between Mrs Roosevelt and former Administration to make Genocide part of anti-discrimination and human rights projects of United Nations’.79 These clumsily phrased missives bore the hallmarks of Lemkin’s work and did not deceive State Department officials. Dr W.M. Kotschnig minuted that both the American delegation to the United Nations and ‘ourselves are presently inundated with the type of communications hereby attached, is due to the hysterical agitation of Mr Lemkin who is afraid that somebody in the General Assembly might tie Genocide again to discrimination’.80 Anton Weiss-Wendt has criticized Lemkin’s denunciations of Stalin’s policy towards non-Russian ethnic groups as genocide as in many cases an extravagant claim.81 I would regard Lemkin’s remarks in the early 1950s as cogent, only later when hopes of the Senate passing the convention had faded from practical politics did his censure become more unrestrained; if the contraventions sometimes did not fall under the ambit of the Genocide Convention, Anne Applebaum has observed that cultural genocide would

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be a more appropriate term. She further asserted that Without a doubt, the Chechens, the Tartars, the Volga Germans, the smaller Caucasian nations – and, over a longer period, the Balts and the Poles – were meant to vanish, to be absorbed into the Russian-speaking Soviet world. In the end, these nations did ‘reappear’ after the death of Stalin, albeit slowly ... My guess is that the destruction of cultures, but not of peoples, suited his [Stalin’s] purposes better. Even so, considerable numbers of people perished in the prison camps, the Gulags, and in exile villages in the far north and Kazakhstan; so there was also some physical genocide. In addition, it appears that Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953 thwarted his plan to incarcerate all the USSR’s Jews in concentration camps after the Doctors’ Plot was revealed.82 Nonetheless, Lemkin had successfully launched a new concept in international law and had prevented it from being diluted or obliterated by the machinations of his detractors at the United Nations. It was a staggering achievement. During the middle of the 1950s Lemkin became increasingly isolated. His interventions were no longer welcome at the State Department; he had by this time quarrelled with all the leading human rights activists and theorists, with Eleanor Roosevelt and Roger Baldwin, with René Cassin and Hersch Lauterpacht. Speaking in Jerusalem in May 1968, when receiving an honorary doctorate, Cassin remarked that the Genocide Convention was sterile and that genocides had occurred which went unpunished because there was no International Criminal Court.83 Lauterpacht regarded Lemkin as a crank. Later he dismissed the convention in his treatise on international law in a convoluted footnote. He pointed out that Sir Hartley Shawcross had declared that ‘the only real sanction against genocide was war’ ... Yet it may be difficult, in the long run, to withhold support from an express condemnation of a crime of tremendous magnitude and from a treaty embodying some additional safeguards against a renewed eruption of criminal malevolence perpetrated under the aegis of the State and threatening large masses of human beings.84 Lemkin was also at loggerheads with key supporters, the United States Committee for a Genocide Convention and the AJC which funded his campaigning . His avid enthusiasm for the cause of the East European émigré organizations was backfiring, his comments were often too loud and shrill. Rejected on so many sides, Lemkin turned more and more to his intellectual activity, to writing his ‘History of Genocide’ and his memoirs.

15 The History of Genocide

In Chapters 16 and 17, I will explore Lemkin’s attempt to write ‘The History of Genocide’. This chapter will first of all cover Lemkin’s efforts to raise funds for his ambitious research project, including plans for the establishment of an institute devoted exclusively to the study of genocide, and then I will outline Lemkin’ general theory as to the causes of genocide. In the following chapter, I will present a series of case studies of genocide culled from Lemkin’s own writings. At the end of each chapter, I will try to evaluate his approach. As early as November 1947, Raphael Lemkin applied to the Rockefeller Foundation for a grant for the preparation of a ‘book on genocide’.1 But his ambitious project to describe the historical dimensions of genocide did not commence in earnest until he took up his appointment at Yale in March 1948, when funds were secured from other sources. Student research assistants were instructed by Lemkin to transcribe details of each case of genocide on to a card. ‘The data are collected under headings covering physical, biological and cultural genocide’, Lemkin observed, ‘Emphasis is laid upon the role played by governments, groups and individuals in the commission of the crime. The psychological and sociological factors are also examined’. In a subsequent report to the Viking Foundation in July 1948 Lemkin remarked that he was no longer relying on tabulating the research on to cards, but was examining examples of genocide perpetrated by the Mongols and committed against the Bohemian Protestants in the sixteenth century in chapter length treatments.2 Three years later Lemkin secured a grant of $5,000 from the Lucius Littauer Foundation to complete this work on genocide that would be published in two volumes. The project would be a scientific and scholarly study of genocide from ancient times to the present with an examination of every genocide case of importance during that period, in its historical, legal, psychological, political, sociological, economic, religious and cultural aspects, which will survey the background and conditions leading up to, and the methods and techniques 230

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used in the commission of the crime of genocide and its effect upon society through loss of life and destruction of economic resources and cultural values.3 By the autumn of 1952, Raphael Lemkin had been unemployed for a year and had depleted the funds which had been made available to him by the Lucius Littauer Foundation and was desperately seeking alternative sources of finance to enable him to carry on his general work on genocide. Dr Samson Weiss of the Regional Council of Young Israel approached Edward Silver on Lemkin’s behalf to win the support of the Orthodox Jewish Community for the project. He explained that the Genocide Convention had been initiated by Professor Lemkin and ratified so far by 40 nations, remarking by way of parenthesis that ‘Incidentally, the Arab States accepted it’. Nevertheless, Britain and Russia have concluded, according to Professor Lemkin, an unholy alliance to stop it, and the United States Senate and the State Department are deeply influenced by the British attitude ... The Committee for the Genocide Convention, formed by the American Jewish Committee people, does not work in keeping with Professor Lemkin’s intention. In fact, he feels that this Committee is now a major hindrance ... Professor Lemkin has spent all his savings and, what is much more important, his good health quite single-handedly in this matter ... But he cannot continue, due to the strictest orders of his physician, to work 18 hours a day, without [a] secretary, typing all letters by himself, making phone calls without secretarial help, etc. etc. There was, however, a dilemma as far as Professor Lemkin was concerned in obtaining help from this source and identifying himself too closely with the Jewish community. Our organization’s ‘President, authorized me to offer Professor Lemkin office quarters and phone service in our Young Israel building’, Dr Weiss remarked, But we are financially unable to put a secretary at his disposal. Furthermore, since Dr Lemkin must continue to receive the support of all religious denominations which have been very helpful so far, it is much better for him if the address is not identified with any religion or religious organization. An amount of not more than $10,000 per annum is involved for office, secretary, press releases, telephone, telegraph and occasional ads. This figure ... was arrived at in discussion with Professor Lemkin and is not just a wild guess. The UN session, just now started, is of crucial importance because attempts are being made to side-track the Genocide Convention and to have it ‘covered’ by the Human Rights Declarations and other instruments of totally insufficient guarantee.

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Though Professor Lemkin to the best of my knowledge is not himself an observant Jew, he is certainly far removed from and opposed to all assimilationist tendencies and, to quote his own words, has dedicated this work to the memory of 49 members of his family killed by the Nazis ... It is my belief that everyone who meets Professor Lemkin will leave the meeting greatly uplifted and will deem it a privilege to have made his acquaintance. Professor Lemkin is already today a historic figure. He might well be the next Nobel Peace Prize winner. Then, of course, everybody will jump on the bandwagon. As orthodox Jews, we should lead and not follow.4 The letter throws a fascinating light on Raphael Lemkin’s strong ties to the Jewish community, counterbalanced by a desire to keep his distance from it because of political necessity and the need to appeal to all quarters. At the same time, Lemkin communicated with Dean Jacob Hartstein of Yeshiva University, a Modern Orthodox Jewish Institution in New York, proposing the creation of a Genocide Educational Fund. It was to be run on the same lines as the fund at Yale with students preparing papers and studies on genocide under Lemkin’s direction. He had already secured the first major contribution to the proposed fund of between one and two thousand dollars from the Kaufman Foundation. He was confident that more contributions would be forthcoming. A circular letter was sent by a group of supporters soliciting contributions for the Yeshiva University Genocide Fund, and though there is a record of at least one payment to Lemkin from the fund in 1953, in all probability an insufficient sum was collected forcing him to look elsewhere for support.5 For a short while, Lemkin was granted office space and secretarial assistance at the headquarters of the American Jewish Reform movement. One day he walked into the building and questioned a member of the staff, Al Vorspan, as to what they were doing. ‘We told him we were working on immigration reform, setting up coalitions, civil rights, McCarthyism. He said, “Are you people crazy? Did you ever hear of the holocaust?” ’ He begged for help which he was given. As was usual with Lemkin, ‘His brief tenure ... was marked by acrimonious internal debates. Even those who forgave him his purported monomania tired of his obsession’.6 So precarious was Raphael Lemkin’s financial situation that some of his friends, notably James Rosenberg and Dr Louis Finkelstein, the President of the Jewish Theological Seminary, urged that contributions should be made to a Temple Emanu-El charitable fund for Lemkin’s benefit. Lemkin, however, complained that ‘This was done without my knowledge or consent and I have repeatedly expressed my unwillingness to accept the funds so raised or any part thereof’. Lemkin was immensely proud and while willing to receive contributions for a genocide fund, refused to accept any money

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which was collected for his personal use. He would not live off the proceeds of charity. After a discussion between Lemkin and Revd. Dr Julius Mark in the summer of 1953, it was agreed that the money collected would be returned to the donors.7 The Jewish Labor Committee, however, was willing to assist Lemkin in funding his research and at the end of 1953 was making him a monthly payment of a $100.8 At the beginning of 1954 Lemkin applied to the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany and specifically to Professor Salo Baron, the distinguished Jewish historian and chairman of its cultural committee, for a substantial grant of $50,000 for genocide work for the year. He had not relinquished the implementation of his somewhat grandiose schemes despite a recent series of rebuffs. The grant was to be used in part to open an office with adequate staff to secure another six to eight new ratifications of the Genocide Convention which had hitherto been ratified by 43 nations and securing the passing of ‘domestic legislation in at least ten countries to the effect that the criminal codes should include the crime of Genocide and the highest penalties should be provided’. In part the grant was to be utilized for the ‘Publication of ... [his] basic volume on Genocide and ... [his] studies on historic cases starting from antiquity and ending with the recent Nazi case’. Twenty million people had so far been the victims of genocide in this century and it could only be characterized by the Yiddish word, hefker, meaning lawless. Apologizing for the fact that his application was out of time, he reminded Salo Baron that ‘The Genocide Convention in itself is a moral and legal deadline for those who would like to repeat Auschwitz or the pogroms of Bialystok, Nemirov and Kishinev’.9 Lemkin also sent an urgent letter of appeal to Dr Nahum Goldman, the President of the organization, demanding that the use of funds for the making and explaining of a law against Genocide and the work of saving peoples and cultures from destruction is a matter in which the petitioner is neither Lemkin nor any organization ... It is a matter which your Conference must deal with and must handle exofficio. Hence no problem of deadline applies here. Lemkin’s inclination to regard himself as a cause rather than a person sometimes led him to behave in a grandiose way. Dr Carlebach of Maariv, the leading Israeli evening newspaper, agreed with Lemkin that ‘The allocation of these funds is certainly the least they owe to you and your idea’.10 Nahum Goldman, having served as chairman of the Comité des Délégations Juives, whose responsibility was the supervision of the minorities treaties, was not unsympathetic to Lemkin’s ideas. ‘I am convinced that the principle of minority rights’, he wrote in his memoirs, ‘perhaps expressed in a somewhat different form, must be a part of every truly libertarian legal order and that the world will have to return to this principle’.11

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After conferring with Dr Judah Shapiro of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims in the spring of 1954, it was agreed that Lemkin would apply for a research grant for ‘a person to do the necessary research and editorial work’ to prepare for the publication of the genocide book. Lemkin was allocated a grant of $5,000 for the academic year 1954–1955 payable in instalments. Lemkin arranged with Harry Starr of the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation in December 1954 for advance payments being remitted to him against the money from the grant.12 On 11 August 1955, Dr Judah Shapiro informed Lemkin that ‘the Conference have approved the grant of $3,000 to you within the fellowship program of the Conference’. The sum was for the academic year 1955–1956 and was to be paid in three instalments.13 In the academic year 1955–1956, Lemkin was considerably more financially solvent than he had been for a number of years, as he was offered an appointment as a Professor of Law at Rutgers University for one year at a salary of $12,000. He was to introduce ‘problems and solutions from law systems other than the American in a few selected areas’ and present ‘a two-hour seminar in International Law [in] the second semester’.14 He gave a series of public lectures on comparative legal systems, touching on Russian, Chinese, Hindu, Islamic and Jewish law, the Code Napoleon and international crimes.15 During his appointment at Rutgers, Lemkin continued to suffer from periodic bouts of ill health which necessitated his absence, but he appears to have made a good impression on the faculty and long afterwards he remained on good terms with Dean Lehan Tunks. On 4 June 1958, he wrote to the Dean that ‘Mrs Tunks told me some time ago that she would like to visit the UN together with your children. Why don’t you come over all to have lunch with me at the UN and to see the most interesting things?’16 Temporarily reprieved from financial hardship, Lemkin was once again able to employ student research assistants in 1955–1956 on his projected ‘History of Genocide’. One of the students, who investigated the Incas, could discover no evidence of genocide. But having remonstrated with Lemkin and finding his ‘attitude towards fulfilling’ his ‘financial obligations ... quite distressing’, he threatened to report him to the authorities at Yale unless there was prompt payment.17 Acrimonious correspondence with creditors was not unusual with Lemkin, perhaps because he believed that people should be happy to work for a pittance for a noble cause such as the genocide project. Although the research grant for the work on the genocide book was not renewed by the Conference on Jewish Material Claims in June 1956, Lemkin was given a study room in the Princeton University Library for the summer.18 The failure to secure the renewal of his grant probably reflected doubts about his ability to complete his ‘History of Genocide’ and have a manuscript ready for publication. On the other hand, Lemkin’s use of the facilities at Princeton appears to have been extended, as he wrote on 9 April 1957 for a

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messenger to return his typewriter to his New York address. Because of ‘sickness’, he explained, he had been absent from ‘Princeton the last several months’.19 Nonetheless, he was able to subsist from January 1957 onwards on a small pension which was paid to him. Lemkin’s efforts to establish a research institute for the study of genocide continued to be frustrated. On 16 December 1955, Dr Judah Shapiro of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims informed Lemkin that owing to a shortage of funds ‘The Executive Committee recommended that action on the application for a Genocide Institute be deferred for the coming year’. A direct appeal by Lemkin to Dr Nahum Goldman to appear before the Board of Directors of the Conference was rebuffed.20 In the following year Lemkin wrote to Mrs Korn that I am also working on a plan to establish an International Research Institute to study genocide from the point of view of psychiatry, history, sociology, culture and international law. I would like very much to establish a working base for such an Institute in the New School for Social Research and had preliminary talks with Dean [Saul] Padover [the expert on Joseph 11] and Dr Standinger of that school, but nothing likewise came of these discussions.21 Despite the failure on this front, Lemkin continued to make applications for support for the publication of his history of genocide to the Carnegie Endowment and later in 1958 and 1959 to the Social Science Council and the Rockefeller Foundation, again without success.22 He told his friend Mrs Laura Dreyfus Barney in 1958 that he had kept an office, meaning his study room in the library at Princeton, for the past few years and that he had been commuting these last years between Princeton and New York, for the purpose of negotiating further ratifications. I am very eager to accelerate completion of the manuscript and publication [of my volumes on the history of genocide], because of the darkening clouds on the political horizon, and last but not least, I feel more and more like a man who is spending himself physically in an accelerated pace. My efforts are very often frustrated because I have no financial backing, neither for my activities of an international nature, nor for my writings.23 Unrestrained by any contractual obligations, such as a time limit for submission of the manuscript and by any form of editorial control, Lemkin allowed the project to grow in scale until it became unmanageable. By 1958 the book on genocide had expanded into a first volume entitled ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’, which was to be followed by three historical volumes covering antiquity, the middle ages and modern times.24 All this

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historical material was at different stages of completion, Lemkin preferring his researchers to look at primary sources because of the tendency of perpetrators to hide the truth and victims to exaggerate the extent of the casualties.25 Although Lemkin had only partially completed the first volume which he entitled ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’, he left us with more than one synopsis of the entire project, so that we have a good idea of its overall shape. In part one of the first volume Lemkin began by describing how new words were coined and by pointing out that Gabriela Mistral suggested ‘that certain words (she refers particularly to Genocide) carry in themselves a moral judgement’. Lemkin surveyed national, racial, religious and ethnic groups and declared that groups were the creators of cultures as well as words.26 He asserted that he was introducing a new element into the study of history, the genos (group), and that ‘genocentric elements’ were ‘sometimes even more important than the elements of the state and empire’.27 As ‘modern nationalism’ developed, it became ‘more and more clear’ according to Lemkin ‘that the voluntaristic element in making the decision of living as a nation is paramount’.28 He quoted John Stuart Mill, who characterized the new feelings of exclusive nationalism and of appeals to historical rights as barbaric, and remarked bitterly that ‘in the backward parts of Europe and even (where better things might be expected) in Germany, the sentiment of nationalism so far outweighs the love of liberty that the people are willing to abet the rulers in crushing the liberty and independence of any people not of their own race and language’.29 Lemkin contended that The new ideal consists of establishing an international collective responsibility for the survival of four basic groups of humankind: national, racial, religious, and ethnical. The very existence of these groups in terms of survival is put under international control and supervision. It is felt that these groups cannot and should not be left at the mercy and unilateral decisions of their governments or the majority groups of their countries. If these groups should be destroyed or attempts should be made or conspiracies conceived to destroy them, then the community of nations must be put on the alert and request either suppression or prevention of the destructive acts. This responsibility is both international and collective ... National, ethnical and religious groups are the bearers of specific cultures. These cultures find expression in specific creations in the fields of music and art, literature, scientific achievements, linguistic, religious concepts, and so forth ... National culture develops and grows through natural processes. It cannot be planned, blue-printed, pre-ordained ... Since it is the creation of the free spirit and of a crossing of invisible elements, it is a unique achievement.

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Hence, it is irreplaceable ... In a larger sense the diversity of cultures is the basic condition of the existence of world cultures.30 This was a powerful restatement of Herder’s viewpoint. Lemkin observed that The ambitions and conflicts of group and group have tended to eliminate the weaker and hence reduce the number of the surviving groups [or states], but the political unity of the human race has not yet been achieved ... The peoples of these states [numbering about a hundred], the survivors of a ceaseless struggle ages long, are still engaged in intense competition for national growth and survival. In the course of this long rivalry ... the states best fitted to survive under existing conditions, have found a certain degree of cooperation between them to be absolutely indispensable, in order that each state might preserve its own strength and foster national growth.31 At this point in Lemkin’s analysis there was some conceptual confusion as he slid imperceptibly from describing the Darwinian struggle between ethnic and cultural groups, resulting in the survival of the fittest, into attributing it to a contest between states. Lemkin traced ‘The awakening of the world conscience ... to the times when the world community took an affirmative stand to protect human groups from extinction. Bartolome de las Casas, Vittoria, and humanitarian interventions, are all links in one chain leading to the proclamation of genocide as an international crime by the United Nations’. He stated that ‘Grotius, Woolsey, Bluntschli, Hubery, Wheaton, Westlake, Heffter, and K. von Rotteck’ were ‘authorities who recognize the legality of humanitarian intervention’.32 Lemkin also prepared a list of instances where humanitarian intervention was necessary, including Turkish abuses against the Greeks (1827), persecution of Protestants in Tuscany 1855, French intervention in Syria on behalf of the Maronites, who were Christians (1860), Prussian persecution of Jews in Frankfurt (1866) and the Russian pogroms.33 Lemkin noted that John Hay, the Secretary of State, in 1902 instructed the United States envoy in Romania to protest against massacres by exclaiming that ‘This country ... cannot be a silent party to an international wrong’. The international lawyer Stowell defending the right to humanitarian intervention asked, ‘Why ... should the independence of a state be more sacred than the law which gives it that independence?’34 In part two of his ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’, Lemkin intended to describe the history and function of the Genocide Convention in great detail.35 In part three of the first volume, Lemkin examined the social sciences to unravel the factors leading to genocide.36 He cited the French social psychologist,

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Gustave Le Bon, who distinguished between unruly behaviour by a few men and participants in an ‘Audience Fanatique (e.g. political rally, revival meeting) which is focussed on a leader who attempts to guide the crowd’s emotional tensions into particular channels of release ...’ and ‘observed that the active participant in an Audience Fanatique and particularly in a coordinated riot discards most or all of his rational and moral control and becomes a bundle of emotions easily guided by others’. Lemkin asserted that Genocide does not originate with the riot mob ... there must exist certain myths and superstitions regarding the victimized group in order that genocide may be properly rationalized. Such myths are built up through a period of time by non-scientific scholars who try to prove, often quite sincerely and by what seem to be scientific means, that there exists certain inferior races and religions, or that certain nations have particular destinies. These myths are strengthened in public opinion through systematic propaganda ... Such interested groups may even create incidents to foster violent group responses against victim groups ... Scientists and pseudo-scientists have been used to devise quicker and cheaper methods of extermination and to carry out mass-sterilization programs. Militias and shock-troops have been used to do the killing and pillaging. Some of these individuals may be psychotics but we are led to suspect that soldiers and henchmen who have been conditioned to such action as part of their duties, regard their odious task as they would fighting a plague. Lemkin attempted to chart both the psychology of the perpetrators and the victims, who displayed such emotions as fear, loss of self-respect and defiance, often drawing on examples from the Shoah.37 Next Lemkin considered the sociology of genocide. He pointed out that racial, religious, national, linguistic and political groups are exposed to genocide only when they constitute a minority or subjected majority within the community or sphere ... in which they are destroyed. If this is not the case, we are dealing with manifestations of war or revolution ... a subjected group may be a majority controlled by a powerful minority as is the case in colonial societies. If the majority cannot be absorbed by the ruling minority and is considered a threat to the minority’s power, genocide is sometimes the result (i.e. the American Indian). Ethnic groups may have separate economic institutions like the Gypsies or be united by common socio-economic status like the American Negro whose racial identity is in many cases approaching a fiction ... Genocide is a gradual process and may begin with political disfranchisement, economic displacement,

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cultural undermining and control, the destruction of leadership, the break-up of families and the prevention of propagation. Each of these methods is a more or less effective means of destroying a group. Actual physical destruction is the last and most effective means of genocide. To escape from destruction, the victims may convert or assimilate or emigrate or panic into disorganized flight or they may respond by seeking martyrdom.38 Lemkin drew attention to ‘The selection of a human group as a scapegoat for [the] political failure of other groups and governments ... (scapegoatism)’.39 Elsewhere he observed that ‘There are three main types of groups which commit genocide: 1) Vested interest groups including governments 2) Soldiers and others especially trained in mass-sterilization, violence or extermination methods who stand in the service of the vested interest groups 3) Mobs;40 Economic conditions have most frequently played a dominant role in ethnic persecutions and genocide ... With regard to Jews, that classical victim of genocide, economic considerations entered into every case. During the middle ages the money-lending monopoly of the Jews, which in itself was the result of severe economic restrictions, fanned hostility against them in times of economic difficulties. In modern times, the Jews have been economically displaced and robbed for the enrichment of vested interests and governments ... racism evolved during the era of colonial expansion. As the natives in the colonies of European powers became Christianized, a new justification for their economic exploitation had to be found. This was racism. Racist dogma made it possible for Christian empires to exploit, exterminate and Christianize without any manifest embarrassment.41 Finally, Lemkin explored the subject of genocide and demography. He argued that ‘The decimation of populations from the time of the Assyrian kings until the present was sometimes so great that special authorities had to be established to repopulate the area concerned’. He also cited the example of the ‘Population Commissions in Transylvania in [the] post Mongolian period’. Repeating a major theme of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe which touched on German colonization plans in Eastern Europe, Lemkin claimed that Genocide was often used in war when defeat was inevitable as a population device, so that consequently power inherent in larger populations could be won even though the war was lost. A population policy which so many times in history expressed itself in [the] deliberate creation of conditions of life which lead to the gradual disintegration of health and mass death explains some demographic changes in large areas of the world.

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Here Lemkin was in part covering the worst aspects of the colonial experience. He noted that genocide often caused mass migrations of the surviving population.42 Historical ‘examples are necessary not only to prove that genocide has always existed in history’, Lemkin claimed, but also to explain the practicability of the Genocide Convention which up to now has been ratified by the parliaments of 58 nations ... One of the basic reasons for genocide is a conflict of cultures as it appeared for example in the encounter between migrating nomadic tribes and sedentary ones. Also this conflict was particularly violent when the ideas of the absolute appeared in the course of the encounter of various religions. The economic and political expectations which were attached to the annihilation of a group worked always as a generating force of genocide. Also colonialism cannot be left without blame. Then Lemkin turned to one of his favourite themes. ‘The destruction of those parts of nations which provide the forces of cohesion and cultural inspiration to the entire nation can best be understood in terms of examples of the period of the “White Mountain” ... [in] Bohemia and of the destruction of the national elites in the present’ Soviet satellite states.43 Lemkin remarked on the evolution of nationalism from the 18th century Hederian Romantic approach through the cultural self-determination concept of the Revolution of 1848 up to the power complexes of 20th century nationalism. If nationalism was only contemplative in the 18th century, it becomes culturally activistic in the 19th century and politically aggressive in the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. The idea of self-determination becomes more and more dynamic in Asia and Africa ... It is already strong in Latin America. Nationalism in itself, as long as it is limited to cultural expression and both economic and political independence, has nothing to do with genocide. However, when coupled with a strive for power, aggrandisement, internal anxieties, and disrespect for minorities, it can well, create a climate, which, with certain conditions, might be used for the perpetration of genocide. Further, In Pareto, one finds a description of the 20th century as the most impatient and violent of centuries. It is the century which engendered Fascism, Nazism, and Militant Communism. It is also a century of upheaval in the fields of government, economics, social planning, and the like matters of Common living of societies. The future creates in some people fear and

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anxiety ... Fear and impatience in dealing with the vexing problems represented by a group of human beings might easily lead to the temptation of attempting a final solution of the problem by liquidating the group. This is exactly the climate which originates genocide.44 While considering the nature of prejudice, Lemkin claimed that It was during the modern era of colonial expansion that racism first appeared. However, it did not become well formulated until much later when it became a factor in national strife. It reached its peak in those modern totalitarian nations which evolved ideas of racial unity and destiny. Perhaps its deepest roots have been cast in the non-totalitarian culture of North America, because of its unique social composition and history, and there dig into the same soil as the equally powerful roots of liberalism and democracy. Religious prejudices do still exist and assume medieval intensity in many parts of the world. But in the West race prejudice is foremost today.45 Lemkin utilized anthropological theory to defend his view of the dangers inherent in cultural genocide and its crucial importance, though against his wishes the concept was not incorporated in the Genocide Convention. According to Lemkin, Malinowski, the founder of the functional school in anthropology, regards culture as having three independent dimensions: a material base, social ties, and symbolic acts. He believes that no definite line of demarcation can be drawn between form and function ... the destruction of cultural symbols is genocide, because it implies the destruction of their function and thus menaces the existence of the social group which exists by virtue of its common culture.46 Enough survives of Lemkin’s introductory volume to extrapolate his theory of the reasons for genocide and to reconstruct his historical view of the modern period. Like Walter Benjamin’s unfinished masterpiece The Arcades Project, it may be possible to piece together substantial portions of this volume and then to assess its true value and stature. If anything, the volume is skewed by its emphasis on explaining the Shoah and its failure to assimilate sufficient examples of genocides from other historical periods. As far as the three historical volumes are concerned, large sections are still extant, and Professor Steven Jacobs intends to edit and publish both the introductory volume and all the historical material; although the worth of the historical volumes are being increasingly recognized by scholars, particularly those interested in colonial genocide, they are flawed because the topics covered have been arranged alphabetically and not according to

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their historical sequence or grouped thematically according to their significance. However, Lemkin analysed the historical material by using an important new conceptual approach and aspects of the different genocides can thus easily be compared. It is to these historical examples that we must now pay some attention.

16 The History of Genocide: Case Studies

In this chapter I propose to examine examples of colonial genocides and a number of pivotal genocides from the modern era: the killing of the Armenians, the post First World War pogroms against the Jews in Poland and the Ukraine, the Stalinist inspired famine in the Ukraine during the 1930s and the Holocaust, all taken from Lemkin’s own writings. Lemkin intended to tackle a long list of other gruesome genocides, among them the murder of the Assyrian Christians, the extermination of the Sinti and Roma (gypsies) and the murder of the Russian and Romanian Jews, but not every topic in his overall project was completed at the time of his death. In conclusion, I will summarize the critiques of Lemkin’s work and suggest how some of the genocides which I have discussed were historically connected. In the ‘Revised Outline of Genocide Cases’ Lemkin first analysed the factors leading to genocide, citing religious and racial fanaticism, economic exploitation such as slavery, colonial expansion or military conquest and contempt for the alien. Second, he drew attention to the methods and techniques of genocide, attributing equal significance to the physical extinction in all its forms, biological genocide such as separation of families and sterilization, and cultural genocide. The latter included not only the destruction of books and objects of art, but the annihilation of the cultural leadership of a group and the demolishing of cultural monuments and historic cities. Then Lemkin dealt with the motivation of the perpetrators and the attitudes of the genocidists. He also examined the propaganda techniques to keep populations subjugated, which included sowing discord among them, intimidating them, and using misrepresentation and deceit to undermine them. He considered the responses of the victims, including suicide and planned emigration, acceptance of political subordination and assimilation. After this, he dealt with the responses of outside groups, varying from opposition to genocide or indifference to it. Finally, he summed up the aftermath of genocide, seeing it as resulting in cultural losses, population changes and economic decline.1 243

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From the evidence of their essays, these or similar guidelines were given to his student researchers as a tool to assist them in sifting the historical material which they were examining on their teacher’s behalf. Some of the earliest historical essays were written by Lemkin’s students, while the later more extended treatments of genocide were the work of Lemkin himself. Mark Mazower has argued that Drawing on Hannah Arendt and others, we can discern continuities in the practice of organized violence between European policing of the colonies in the late nineteenth century and the later shift to total war on the continent itself. Military and policing doctrines, more or less imbued with a racist contempt for the enemy, emerged in a colonial context that would help shape the new brutality displayed by the European armies toward non-combatants on the Old Continent after 1914: thus precursors for the Wehrmacht’s brutality toward civilians in World War 11 have been found in the expeditionary force sent to crush the Boxer Rebellion, as well as in the 1904 war against the Herero in South West Africa. Mazower observed settler violence may well be connected with mainstream ethnic cleansing more closely than is commonly admitted, since it often established attitudes and practices ... which came in the early twentieth century to influence police and military behaviour by European states vis-a-vis their own populations and those of adjacent conquered territories, too.2 In his unpublished writings, in which we would include essays prepared by his students under his direction, Lemkin wrote extensively on the brutality of colonial genocide which has been seen as a stepping stone to the Shoah. Lemkin, however, traced this violence against the indigenous population of the Americas and Australia by European colonial regimes back to the first phases of their imperial expansion after 1492. Subsequently there was renewed violence against the native inhabitants in the European scramble for Africa, particularly in its late nineteenth century phases. When as part of the wider project research was undertaken on genocide in the Spanish colonial empire, Lemkin organized the material around his original guidelines. First, there was the physical genocide perpetrated by the Spanish conquerors of South America. The governor of Yucatan, Francico Montejo, seized children whom he fed to the dogs for his amusement. The governor of Rio de la Plata executed 5,000 Indians in one day ... Often the soldiers neglected to kill the slaves before letting their dogs attack them. They drove the Indians along in chains, as Las Casas puts it: ‘like droves of pigs’ ... After fleeing from their

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tormentors, captured Indians were known to be wrapped in straw and burned over a slow fire ... Often the natives would first be plundered, then have their hands, noses or ears cut off and finally shut up in their houses of thatch which were burned. As to biological genocide, the early Spanish expeditions were made for the purpose of ensnaring the native population as slaves, who were ‘then sold in Europe and the Indies. As the ... [male] slaves were used as porters and miners, and the female ones as cooks and mistresses, the separation of families was concomitant with slavehunting’. The population of San Juan and Jamaica fell precipitously from 600,000 to 200 in 40 years, while Nicaragua was almost depopulated. According to Las Casas more than twenty million Indians were slaughtered in Spanish America, besides others who died from overwork, in combat or were taken prisoner and executed.3 It has been pointed out that until the 1950s, a population estimate of 7.5 millions was widely accepted for the indigenous inhabitants of Latin America, but that this figure was revised upwards by Henry Dobyns in the 1960s to an unrealistic figure of 80–100 million, so that Las Casas’s estimate of Indian casualties horrendous as they were was somewhat exaggerated, and that in any case more Indians were killed by virulent diseases brought by the European settlers than deliberately slaughtered.4 Lemkin argued that ‘A subtle kind of cultural genocide was committed by the Spanish missions in Mexico, California, Louisiana and elsewhere’. Take the example of the mission in California: The savage comes unthinking into the mission, receives the food which is willingly offered to him, and listens to their (the missionaries’) instructions. He is still free. But as soon as he is baptized, he belongs to the church and hence he looks with pain and longing to his native mountains. The church has an inalienable right to her children, a right which she exercises with rigour. Once the Indians had embraced Christianity, their fate is sealed and they can no longer escape from the reach of the church – or the mission. They become virtual prisoners and their adherence to mission-life is henceforth enforced with violence, if necessary. Corporal punishment is inflicted on Indians of both sexes who fail in their religious duties. Even though the Indians did not understand the language, they were not permitted to absent themselves from mass. Everywhere the Spanish armies destroyed the former cultural centres and extirpated the ruling elite. Having profited from the ownership of slaves, the Spanish colonists with a few

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exceptions became genocidists. Spanish troops ‘took brutal reprisals against rebellious Indians, who[m they] tortured, maltreated, raped and looted’ and were ‘the enforcers of genocide’.5 One of Lemkin’s researchers, a young woman called Birgit, wrote a paper on the North American Indians. She described what she had done as follows: Wrote up into a memorandum material on the sale of liquor and on Indian slavery ... Obtained material (on cards) about genocide against the Plains Indians and the Californian Indians. Wrote it up in memorandum. Plains Indians: Sandy Creek Massacre (worst type of atrocities à la Europe). Washita Massacre. Wounded Knee Massacre (cult[ural] & phys[ical] genocide – a religious sect destroyed). Destruction of buffalo to starve Indians. Prohibition of tribal culture in early reservations – withholding of food supply. Individual land allotment to destroy tribal life. California Indians: Forceful eviction from fertile valleys into barren mountains where I[ndians] starved ... land policy of U.S ... Failure to provide for uprooted Indians, to protect reservations against white intrusion. Thematically the material was arranged along the lines of physical and cultural genocide, while by a series of apt quotations the attitude of General Amherst and other genocidists towards the Indians was clarified, including an attempt to introduce smallpox deliberately among them, and there was a section on the Indian responses to this onslaught.6 Michael McDonnell and Dirk Moses observed that genocide and disease were interdependent factors, operating in a subtle fashion, which resulted in the depopulation of the Americas. Male slavery and the local women utilized as cooks and mistresses interfered with procreation. Slave labour camps and missions incubated lethal infections. Cultural genocide, the destruction of indigenous cults coupled with the decimation of local elites and their replacement by Christianity and the Catholic hierarchy, demoralised the local population, increasing their susceptibility to infection. Alcoholism was widespread. It has been suggested that without European intervention, such as land confiscation and massacres, the precipitous decline in population would have been much less severe. David Stannard asserted that Although at times acting independently, for most of the long centuries of devastation that followed 1492, disease and genocide were interdependent forces acting dynamically – whipsawing their victims between plague and violence, each one feeding upon the other, and together driving countless numbers of entire ancient societies to the brink ... of total extermination. Elazar Barkan thought that ‘colonists in the New World would’ not ‘have hesitated to destroy indigenous peoples had they not died of disease’, but

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suggested that Stannard went too far by confusing such intention to annihilate with collateral responsibility.7 Lemkin wrote a paper on what he deemed to be genocide in Tasmania. The Colonial Times on 1st December 1826 stated that ‘We make no pompous display of philanthropy; we say unequivocally “self-defense is the first law of nature”. The Government must remove the Natives, they will be hunted down like wild beasts and destroyed’. After a failed attempt initiated by the governor to drive the natives into ‘the cul de sac of Tasmania’s peninsula’ in 1830, the government scoured the bush for Aborigines, capturing 236 of them and killing many within the next two years. Because of the preponderance of men among the immigrants, both the settlers and convicts who had escaped into the bush preyed on the native women, enslaving some and forcing others into prostitution. The Aborigines were encouraged to move to Flinders Island ‘which for 15 years was the home of the miserable remnant of the native tribes of Tasmania, and for the majority of them it became their grave’. The last male Aborigine from Tasmania died in 1869, the last female in 1877. According to Lemkin under the benevolent regime of George Angus Robinson, the natives ‘became cleaner in their personal habits, attended church and sang psalms, but their spirit was gone’. With their will to live undermined, the Aborigines succumbed to disease and alcohol. Lemkin considered that The blame for this destruction of a race lies on the cruelty and lack of understanding of human beings ... [in] the cruelty of the selfish, grasping settlers and convicts who aroused the spirit of revenge of the originally, peaceable natives, and ... [in] the lack of understanding of the men who in the end strove to protect them and make them conform to the standard of an alien civilization, and killed them with misguided kindness.8 Dirk Moses has argued that in cases of colonial genocide, the bulk of the deaths cannot be attributable to an intentional exterminatory policy. Most deaths were caused by disease, malnutrition, alcohol, a declining birth rate and intertribal warfare. The ‘British occupation of the Australian continent necessarily entailed the destruction of Aboriginal society as a culture (ethnocide) and vast number of Aborigines, even if mass death was not its aim. But this is not genocide’. Driven by international market forces for an expansion in the production of wool, British settlers from the 1820s seized hunting territory from the Aborigines without compensation for use as pasture for their sheep and excluded these hunting bands from their sources of food. The pastoralism of the settlers and the production of wool on a large-scale was incompatible, with the hunter-gatherer economy of the Aborigines. The Tasmanian case is often cited as an example of genocidal policy, but it was in reality an example of segregationist policy with the indigenous population being persuaded to move to Flinders Island. In

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Queensland, in contrast, the struggle between settlers and Aborigines for pastoral land for their sheep was at its most acute and use of government terror transformed local massacres by settlers into a state sanctioned genocidal policy.9 Jesse Shipway disputed the analysis of Dirk Moses by suggesting that the Tasmanian genocide was a by-product of modernisation [the Bauman thesis]. The indigenes died of disease and interruptions in fertility functioning that resulted from incidental encounters with the European interlopers, but the keenness of the administrators to move the Aborigines out of the areas suitable for pastoral expansion cannot be separated out from this larger diorama of mortality. Her contention is very much in line with the previous remarks of Dirk Moses about the contribution of European colonial rule to the depopulation of South America, in which cultural genocide was also a factor.10 We shall now consider whether the Belgian regime perpetrated genocide in the Congo when it first colonized this region of Africa in the late nineteenth century. Lemkin’s hundred page treatment can bear comparison with Adam Hochschild’s book King Leopold’s Ghost. A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (1999). Lemkin carefully delineated how Leopold issued a decree in 1887 confiscating all unoccupied land, while over 450 independent African chiefs signed treaties handing over control of tribal land in the belief that they were merely granting a plot for establishing a trading post. Next decrees were issued in 1889 forbidding the hunting of elephants by the indigenous population, so that the collection of ivory became a government monopoly, and a further decree stipulated that the procuring of rubber and gum copal from the state domain was forbidden.11 Tribal chiefs and villages were forced to pay taxes by collecting excessive amounts of rubber and other products and supplying the government gendarmerie with food. If a village fell behind with the collection of its rubber quota, punishment expeditions were mounted by some 2,000 white agents and the militia, the force publique, consisting of Africans forcibly conscripted. To enforce discipline, punishment was inflicted on men, women and children with the chicotte, ‘a lash of hippopotamus hide’, and often the scars from the injuries inflicted during a beating could last a lifetime. By these means, King Leopold and the Belgian regime terrorized the indigenous population and enslaved it, but Lemkin’s views have also recently been criticized for attributing ‘an inborn savagery’ to ‘the indigenous population’, that is ‘racist’.12 Lemkin estimated that three-quarters of the population were wiped out in a few years by brutality and starvation, more recent estimates cautiously suggest that half the indigenous population perished. Adam Hochschild puts this population loss at 10 million. William Rubinstein disputed this

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figure as far too high on the basis of later population censuses, calculating that 1 or 1.5 million persons died. Most of them, weakened by undernourishment and appalling working conditions, fell victim to various epidemics that were raging.13 The system of forced labour in the German colonies in East and South West Africa was equally pernicious and bore many similarities to conditions in the Congo.14 In 1904 the first genocide of the twentieth century took place in German South West Africa, when the Hereros rose in revolt because of the confiscation of tribal land and harsh working conditions. Since the rinderpest outbreak in Southern Africa in 1897 which destroyed many cattle, the Herero had become much more vulnerable to pressure on their resources. They killed just over a hundred Germans, but spared the missionaries, women and children. While Lemkin suggested that only 15,000 Hereros survived a genocidal campaign of extermination by the German army out of a population of 90,000, recent estimates would reduce the original number of Hereros to 80,000. In 1905 the Nama joined the revolt, losing half their population which totalled 9,781 in 1911.15 The Hereros were a pastoral people living in scattered small settlements in an area of what is now Namibia and dependent on their herds of cattle for a diet of meat and milk. Before proceeding with his campaign against the Hereros to put down the revolt, General von Trotha issued a proclamation on 2 October 1904: The Herero people will have to leave the country. If the people refuse, I will force them with cannons to do so. Within the German boundaries, every Herero, with or without firearms, with or without cattle, will be shot. I won’t accommodate women and children anymore. I shall drive them back to their people or I shall give the order to shoot at them.16 The Herero warriors were driven in their thousands into the desert, where Trotha expected to give battle and had built stockades for 8,000 prisoners. Instead the Hereros escaped into the desert, dying of hunger and thirst. The surviving males were compelled to undertake forced labour on railway construction and placed in copper and diamond mines; families were separated, causing the birth rate to fall, and wives and daughters were sent to white farms, where they consorted with a rabble and sometimes became infected with gonorrhoea, which caused them to become sterile.17 Dr H.F.B. Walker, who travelled to German South West Africa during the First World War, noted that ‘What are left of them [the Hereros] the Germans have reduced to a state of slavery by a very simple and efficient means. They do not allow the Hereros to own cattle or land except under conditions which makes it next to impossible’. According to Lemkin ‘The colonial policy was upheld by General von Liebert, an ex-Governor of German East Africa, a member of the Reichstag

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and president of the Anti-Socialist League. He declared that cruelty was necessary “to open up a black continent to civilization” ’. The General Staff of the German army noted without pity that ‘The waterless Omaheke was to complete the work of German arms: the annihilation of the Herero people’. Tilman Dedering concluded that ‘the German–Herero war more closely resembles the actions of German soldiery on its eastern front during the Second World War, rather than the specificity of the Nazi death camps’. Other historians such as Jurgen Zimmerer believe that the annihilation of the Hereros was Germany’s first genocide.18 Nor was Lemkin’s empathic attitude towards tribal peoples merely theoretical. During the First World War British forces conquered German South West Africa, and after the War Britain accepted the mandate of the territory on behalf of South Africa.19 The South African government confiscated further tribal land which they distributed to white settlers from their own country and Portuguese Angola. The Revd. Michael Scott made representations on behalf of the Hereros and other tribal peoples to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations in 1947–1948. In a letter to Lemkin on 9 June 1948, Michael Scott stated that ‘I informed the chiefs how very good you had been in helping me to get their opinions made known [among United Nations delegates] and they were very grateful indeed’ and begged him to obtain a copy of a UN report which the government of South Africa was trying to suppress and forward it to him. 20 All the endless days of lobbying at Lake Success by Lemkin were rewarded, as he not only established a rapport with a wide range of delegates but it enabled him to master the intricate procedure of the new international body. Thus he could actively support the decolonisation process in Africa whether it was in Namibia or, as we shall see, in Algeria. So grateful were the Algerian nationalists to Lemkin for his help that representatives of the F.L.N. attended his tombstone consecration.21 In a lengthy manuscript treatment of the massacre of a million or more Armenians Lemkin described these crimes in graphic detail. Lemkin devoted half his extended essay to the earlier persecution of the Armenians in the 1890s and at Adana in 1909, the other half to the massacres and deportations of 1915–1916. There are many parallels in his text with the horrors of the Holocaust: the herding of peaceful citizens into churches or other buildings which were then set alight; the deliberate killing of women and children; the Kurds arriving with sieves and sifting through the ashes of victims, searching for gold which they might have swallowed; the deportation of the victims in packed trains for hundreds of miles without food or water; and the incidents of cannibalism.22 Much of the later slaughter of the Armenians was carried out by police battalions, though earlier disgruntled minorities, such as the Kurds, were manipulated by the sultan to seize farm land from the Armenians for use as pasture.23 Lemkin himself remarked that

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A strong parallel may be drawn between the extermination of the Armenians by the Turks and the extermination of the Jews by the Germans. The position of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire closely approximated that of the Jews in Germany. The Armenians were the industrious citizens of the Empire, with a talent for handicrafts and intellectual pursuits. They had the same gift for commerce as the Jews, and in Asiatic Turkey it was the Armenian who was the skilled workman and the man of business.24 For Lemkin it was ‘undeniable that the Ottoman Government is a politico-religious system’ and that there was ‘no place in the Ottoman Empire for persons of Christian faith’. While Lemkin singled out the teaching of the Koran as being inimical to the Armenians, who were Christian, as being a key factor in their persecution, later historians have shifted the emphasis. 25 As in the historiography of the Holocaust, there is a dispute between intentionalists and functionalists with Vahakn Dadrian emphasizing how the Balkans War of 1912 catapulted the extremists into the top positions of the Ittihadist party and later the government enabling them to implement their long held plan to exterminate the Christian minorities and with Donald Bloxham suggesting that the Turks became more extreme as the war situation deteriorated, so that by June 1915 they regarded the Armenians as traitors and mass deportations turned into murder. Bloxham puts it thus: ‘The Armenian Genocide was a – perhaps the – archetypal example of a nationalist genocide. It was not a genocide of biological racism, nor of religious fanaticism, though both of these motives certainly influenced various perpetrators’. However, the American ambassador to the Ottoman court suggested that the call to a jihad (Islamic holy war) ‘started passions aflame that afterwards spent themselves in the massacres of the Armenians and other subject peoples’. 26 It was also significant that the majority of the massacres of the Armenians occurred after Friday prayers. Lemkin was of the view that ‘The [Turkish] Government with Germany as its ally need have no fear of future retaliations for its plan of complete extermination [of the Armenians], as it was convinced that Germany would win the war and would shield Turkey from the vengeance of the Western Powers and of Russia’. At the same time, Lemkin condemned German complicity in the slaughter of the Armenians. There is every evidence that the persecution of the Armenians met with full favor in Germany ... Had Germany wished she could have stopped the atrocities merely by withdrawing her support ... It is unlikely that the German authorities initiated the crime, but it is clear that the Germans made no move to stop it.27

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Lemkin also quoted without comment a remark that ‘These (Armenians) were not savages, like the Red Indians who retired before the White man across the American continent’.28 Bloxham has asserted that while some German military representatives in Turkey supported the massacre of Armenians, they did not share this opinion as a group.29 As with the case of Holocaust denial, there have been repeated attempts by the Turkish authorities to dispute the Armenian genocide, and a recent attempt by Guenter Lewy to defend these disclaimers drew an angry response from readers of the Commentary magazine.30 ‘Early in the [First World] war’, Lemkin observed, ‘the commander of the Russian Army ordered public warnings posted against the Jewish “menace” ’, Lemkin remembered, ‘accusing the Jews of practising espionage on the entire front. He ordered the taking of hostages, evacuation and repressions ... Pogroms, massacres, expulsions, forced labor became the order of the day. Hundreds of thousands of Jews fled or were ... [evicted] from their homes’. In 1915 the German army occupied all of Russian Poland. ‘But the German masters bent on “divide and rule”, sought first the favor of one, then of the other section of the population. Hunger, want and privation sharpened the conflict’. 31 During the war, Lemkin pointed out that the Germans put in place a vast system of economic controls in Poland, handed German companies monopolies over trading in wheat and potatoes, and shut down the textile industry of Lodz, by confiscating the machinery, all in the hope of forcing starving workers to emigrate to Germany. 32 Following the First World War, there was a fresh wave of pogroms in Poland on a smaller scale than the Chmielnicki massacres of 1648–1667 and in the Ukraine on as large a scale, in which Lemkin suggested 120,000 Jews were killed. Of these losses Lemkin attributed under half, 50,000 victims, to the Deniken pogroms. As we have seen earlier, Piotr Wrobel reduced this estimate of Jewish losses in the Ukraine in 1918–1919 to 50–60,000 in all. Moreover, Lemkin noted that ‘Pogroms and persecutions became routine [in Poland] in 1919 and 1920. The excesses were distributed over a vast area, including the whole of Galician territory from Cracow to Lemberg [Lvov] and various districts in Congress Poland’.33 Lemkin believed that The First World War was a grim prelude to the harsh drama of postwar Polish–Jewish relations ... The pogroms [of 1918–19] were followed by the so called ‘cold pogrom’. Administrative measures were designed to destroy the three million Jews economically so that they would either emigrate or starve. Encouraged by the German example the beating and boycotting of Jews was intensified after 1934. In September 1939 the fourth partition of Poland took place ... Hitler solved the Polish Jewish problem by extermination.34

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All these events resonated deeply with Lemkin, many of them he had witnessed at first hand, and though omitted from his memoirs, supply the missing link of his perception of a new propensity to violence unleashed by the clash of nationalities in the borderlands during the First World War and the destruction of the Jews in the Shoah. The outline of Lemkin’s ‘History of Genocide’ contains no mention of the self-imposed famine in the Ukraine in the 1930s, but Lemkin gave a lecture on the subject, possibly at a later stage he meant to incorporate it into the project. Lemkin regarded ‘The mass murder of peoples and of nations that has characterized the advance of the Soviet Union into Europe’ as ‘not a new feature of their policy of expansionism ... Instead, it has been a long term characteristic even of the internal policy of the Kremlin, one which the present masters have had ample precedent for in the operations of Czarist Russia’. According to Lemkin, Stalin attacked the Ukrainian farmers, a large mass of independent peasants who are the repository of the tradition, folklore and music, the national language and literature, the national spirit, of the Ukraine. The weapon used against this body is perhaps the most terrible of all – starvation. Between 1932 and 1933, 5,000,000 Ukrainians starved to death ... There has been an attempt to dismiss this highpoint of Soviet cruelty as an economic policy connected with the collectivization of the wheatlands and the elimination of the Kulaks, the independent farmers that was therefore necessary.35 Robert Conquest estimated that five million died in the Ukrainian famine of 1932–1933. Stephen Wheatcroft, who was able to look at fresh material in the Russian archives, put the number of victims as three to four million but conceded that it ‘might be as high as 4 to 5 million’, a figure in line with Conquest. William Rubinstein suggested that the Ukrainian famine was a man-made catastrophe, the result of grandiose social engineering schemes gone madly awry rather than a deliberate genocidal act. Conquest, however, showed that Communist officials discussed a possible death toll of five million people before the dekulakization programme of 1930–1932 was implemented and that Stalin’s excessive requisition of grain from the Ukraine and his blockade of the area to prevent fresh food supplies from reaching it was criminal and an attempt to undermine the nationalist cause.36 Certain revisionist German historians saw a link between the earlier twentieth century episodes of mass violence and the ‘Final Solution’. Andreas Hillgruber traced everything back to the nationality struggles on the European periphery during the First World War. This was followed by the first genocide – that of the Armenians in Turkey – and by the mass expulsion of Greeks from Asia Minor. The extermination and resettlement practices of Hitler and Stalin in their

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respective ‘spheres of influence’ in the period of the partnership in 1939–40 had continued such ‘exchanges of populations’, and mass murder then reached an extreme degree in Hitler’s ‘Eastern War’ from June 1941 onward; first the Jews in Poland and in the entire East were to be exterminated, then those in the whole of German-occupied Continental Europe. Richard Evans sharply criticized Hillgruber and Ernst Nolte for trying to relativize Auschwitz and implying that Hitler’s policies were not qualitatively different from the extermination of the Armenians or the resettlement of European populations.37 Central to his whole project was a survey of the genocide perpetrated by the Nazi regime which Lemkin called the ‘Hitler Case’. We fortunately possess a rough sketch of this section of the book on genocide which Lemkin was dissatisfied with, but which he reshaped in an even briefer outline.38 To open his account, Lemkin focussed on the German geopolitical aims in the War, making the familiar point that by the colonization of Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic Ocean and by restructuring the population the Germans hoped to ‘Win [the] peace even if [the] war is lost’. Thus Nazi Germany embarked upon a gigantic plan to colonize Europe, and since there are no free spaces local populations had to be removed in order to make room for Germans ... Moreover Germany had never good experiences in the past with overseas colonisation. It was thus much simpler to colonize the European continent. Hitler’s plan covered the Poles, the Serbs, the Russians, the Frenchmen. The case against the Jews and the Gypsies were based not upon colonisatery [sic] but upon racial considerations. In the entire G[enocide] problem there should be made a differentiation between the case of purely racial G[enocide] and the case of national G[enocide]. The main purpose of the Nazis was a commission of Genocide against nations in order to get hold of their territory for colonisation ... This was the case of the Poles, and the Russians and Ukrainians. The case against the Jews and Gypsies was of a purely racial and rather emotional political nature. Here Lemkin’s thinking seems to have developed because in the years immediately after the War he tended to equate the genocide committed against the Poles with that inflicted on the Jews. He argued that the Nazis favourable racial classification of the Poles was in stark contrast with their view of the Jews and gypsies, who were regarded as ‘the vermin of the earth’.39 In section two of the outline Lemkin described the science and philosophy of genocide. He stated that For the first time in history the case of G[enocide] was organized in a scientific way. Research laboratories were set up and the combined force

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of medicine, biology, physics, were set at the goal of mass murder. Large scale experimentations on human bodies were carried out for the purposes of establishing a system of quick murder and sterilization. Murder had the immediate purpose of wiping out large segments of population, however this was not enough since it was physically impossible to destroy millions in a short time and since this would create difficulties for the ... [economy] and shortage ... [of] labor a long range plan was devised to interrupt the biological continuity of nations. This could be achieved through sterilizations. From the point of view of the ultimate goal what difference does it make whether a nation is wiped out today or whether it dies out within one generation from sterilization which would act like a time bomb?40 Lemkin quoted evidence from the Nuremberg trials to show that the Nazis tried to discover a ‘rapid method of sterilization which could be used to wipe out Russians, Poles, Jews and other people’, but that they intended because of labour shortages to sterilize and preserve two to three million fit Jewish men and women.41 Lemkin in part 3 also explored the techniques of mass murder by medical experiments, ‘outright killings’, and wastage of life.42 Next Lemkin considered how the Nazis internationalized their genocide: ‘The Nazis did not want to remain alone in their G[enocide] policy. Pressure was put on France, Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia to carry out G[enocide] on their Jews. Moreover the Nazis have managed to instigate the Croations to kill off 700 thous[and] Serbs’.43 Finally, in part 5 of his study, Lemkin surveyed the aftermath of the Nazi crimes, dealing with such topics as the numbers killed, cultural dislocations, ‘influence upon the German mind, cheapening of human life as a world problem, destruction of social and moral pattern of German people (doctors, lawyers, church)’.44 Lemkin expanded these ideas on the Shoah in a thick manuscript, given the title of Raphael Lemkin’s Thoughts on the Nazi Genocide. Not Guilty? by its editor Professor Steven Jacobs, thus obscuring its rightful place in Lemkin’s whole body of work. When Lemkin became deeply immersed in a topic, he tended to treat it at some length, and his account of the doleful consequences of the Mongol incursions during the middle ages runs to 160 pages. Thus what Steven Jacobs has published is not some separate, unknown volume by Lemkin, but an important segment of his ‘History of Genocide’. Additional proof for this contention is that in structure it is similar to Lemkin’s other historical material on genocide and that the primary source for the essay edited by Jacobs are the 38 volumes of The Proceedings and Documents of the Nuremberg Trials, and that the outline of Lemkin’s ‘History of Genocide’ has a section entitled the Nuremberg Trials.45 The manuscript edited by Steven Jacobs commenced with a short resumé of the history of the Nazi regime, emphasizing that ‘the Third Reich

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embarked upon a systematic program of genocide, aimed at the destruction of nations and ethnic groups within the sphere of German influence’.46 Section two dealt with the techniques employed by the Nazis to kill Jews and others such as starvation, overcrowding, extermination through work, concentration camps, torture, shooting, gassing, and sterilization of the insane and weak. Other portions of the work covered the legal basis for Nazi crimes, the world view of the aggressor, the psychological reactions of their victims, and asked which members of the Nazi hierarchy and which institutions were guilty of these crimes. The concluding portion of the volume dealt with losses, with estimates of the number of Jews, Gypsies and Slavs, who were killed, and the cultural losses which ensued. Side by side with the extermination of ‘undesirables’ went a systematic looting of artworks, books, the closing of universities and other places of learning, the destruction of cultural monuments ... In the small village of Polotnyanny Savod the occupants looted and burnt Pushkin’s house, which had been turned into a museum. The Germans destroyed manuscripts, books and pictures which belonged to Leo Tolstoy at Yasnaya Polyana. The German barbarians desecrated the grave of the great author ... The systematic destruction of intellectuals, of libraries, of works of art, the closing of schools and universities, the control of books, radio and theater were all parts of the masterplan to reduce most of Europe to the status of dumb slaves and to reserve the chances of higher education to the Germans. The results show that it is easier to stamp out human lives than to crush people’s spirit. In sheer numbers Germany won her goal, but where intangible values are concerned, she lost.47 In his assessment of Lemkin’s work on the Shoah, Dan Stone noted that he anticipated many themes in current Holocaust research –the plans to restructure the population in Eastern Europe, Nazism as a political religion, the mass murder committed by ordinary persons in the police battalions and the role of the German army in the extermination of the Jews. If Lemkin’s research was deficient, it was that he exaggerated the role of the Nazi lawyer Hans Frank as General Governor in Poland in influencing policy. Lemkin made an advance on previous studies by viewing the Holocaust as ‘on a continuum ... with earlier, especially colonial genocides’ and not as something unique, but as part of a gigantic colonial enterprise in Eastern Europe.48 Nevertheless, it is still necessary to differentiate conceptually between the Nazi policies aimed at the extermination of the Jews and gypsies and their plans to enslave Poles and Ukrainians and perhaps to destroy their elites. Lemkin’s ‘History of Genocide’ was written without the intellectual verve and brio of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Much of his orientation relating to the preservation of peoples and cultures was derived from Herder and this

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would include his anti-imperialist stance, though he developed this approach further by supplying an intellectually incisive framework for the comparative analysis of genocides. Because he strongly maintained that examples of gruesome genocides were to be found in all historical periods, he drew up an outline of the project and arranged the three historical volumes on antiquity, the middle ages and modern times alphabetically and not in the order of their historical sequence. Yet he does seem to have wavered on this point, as a 1954 letter to Professor Salo Baron spoke of ending with the Nazi case. Nevertheless, Lemkin was trapped by his approach: there was thus no need to shape the various examples of genocide in a linear sequence to explain the Shoah, and he failed to explore the historical links, if any, between colonial genocide, the Armenian massacres and the post 1918 upheavals in Eastern Europe, the Ukrainian genocide and the Shoah. Mark Levene has refined Lemkin’s exposition of the colonial genocide by claiming that Spanish and Portuguese colonial regimes in Latin America wanted to exploit and enslave the indigenous population but ultimately intended to assimilate them and create a racially mixed society. In contrast, the Anglo-Americans and the settlers in some parts of Australia sought ‘to disgorge’ themselves of their natives, to seize their land and to farm for global markets. Even if the Anglos had a civilizing mission, the result of their policies was genocidal. Levene added that it was the shift from Spanish colonial empire to a cluster of competing, settler-elite led and boundary obsessed nation-states, which provided the emotional and material stimulus for this renewed surge forward and with it the slaughter of more ‘Latin American Indians in the nineteenth century ... than in the previous three centuries of Spanish rule’. Michael Mann made a similar analysis of the genocidal impact of settler democracy in the United States, referring to ‘the murderous roles of Washington, Jefferson and Jackson and the moral equivocations of Lincoln’ – ‘the first truly dark side of democracy’.49 Recent scholarship has also revealed that Lemkin failed to realize how well the indigenous population in South America and Africa sometimes adapted and recovered from colonial incursions. Nevertheless, I do not agree with Levene’s attempt to create a benign portrait of the first phases of the Spanish colonial empire in South America. Rather I would characterize it as a regime instituting a pernicious policy of cultural genocide, resulting in the extermination of the native elite and the decimation of the masses by robbing them of their culture and demoralizing them. Dirk Moses has pointed out the difficulties in elucidating ‘an account of European modernity that links nation-building, imperial competition and international and intra-national racial struggle to the ideologically driven catastrophes of the twentieth century’. He depicted the century running from

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1850 to 1950 as the ‘racial century’, when the European nations competed in rival-nation building projects. This approach ‘links the genocides that occurred in the European colonies with the intra-European population politics of the inter-war and war years’. The Habsburg monarchy, the Tsarist regime and the Ottoman empire were in a state of decomposition, which they tried to arrest by assertion abroad and ethnic ‘purification’ at home. Hence, I would add, the violence unleashed in the successor states, the mass murder of the Armenians by the Turkish state in 1915–1916 and the pogroms committed against the Jews in Poland during the War and its aftermath and on an even larger scale in Ukraine after the First World War. As Germany was a latecomer to this international and imperial struggle, Dirk Moses asserted, its colonial methods were more ruthless, and it sought to utilize ideas and techniques tried in German South West Africa, when it attempted to carve out an empire in Eastern Europe in 1941.50 The economic volatility in the Weimer Republic enabled the radical right to seize power in Germany in 1933 and to implement a racist programme, culminating in the Holocaust. Wilhelmine rule in their colony in South West Africa conditioned the population of Imperial Germany to accept the new norms of mass murder and the war of annihilation. Terms such as Lebensraum, living space, and Konzentrationslager, concentration camp, passed into everyday parlance and were adopted by the Nazis. Hitler borrowed Friedrich Ratzel’s living space theory and expanded it to embrace the whole of Eastern Europe. The land area of Poland and Russia was ripe for colonization and the civilian population, who were regarded as subhumans, could be treated with brutality. Jurgen Zimmerer has asserted that ‘forced-labor’ was a ‘central aspect’ of the connection between ‘German colonial rule in South West Africa’ and ‘National Socialism’. Some 15,000 Hereros and 2200 Namas or 45 per cent of the inmates perished in the colonial concentration camps, being worked to death. So too, the Nazi race law banning sex and interracial marriage between Jews and Aryans was based on similar legislation which had been implemented earlier in German South West Africa. Hermann Goring, Franz Ritter von Epp and Eugen Fischer were influential figures in the Third Reich, who had a strong personal ties to the German colony in South West Africa, and helped to develop the Nazis genocidal plans.51 Isabel Hull has partially modified this approach by admitting that I taught that Hannah Arendt was intuitively right in her surmise that imperialism was the main factor conveying Europe toward final solutions, but I could not locate the link between the two, except in ideology [racism]. I now believe that the link is the [German] military, whose practices in the imperial situation followed an internal dynamic that favored final solutions. Because of its peculiar constitution, there was no proper parliamentary control over the German military.52

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Yet, the scale of violence in Eastern Europe during the Holocaust was not merely due to the import of methods of colonial warfare, but was a more brutal repetition of the ethnic conflicts occurring between empires and their successor states in this European fault zone during the War and into the 1920s and beyond. We have already discussed the pogroms unleashed against the Jews in Poland and their forcible removal from the war zone by the Russians, resulting in mayhem and murder. In a shtetl near Lemkin’s home town of Wolkowysk, the Russian commander ordered Jews to strip naked, dance and ride pigs, after which every tenth man was shot.53 Such tales were heard by Lemkin as a young man, leaving indelible scars. While it is not true that the Soviet Union and the Nazis learned from each other, Eric Weitz noted that both were born in the culture of violence spawned by the First World War. Michael Mann observed that ‘The Ukraine during the Russian Civil War saw murderous cleansing of Jews [by the nationalists and Tsarist generals] in ways that prefigured the far worse slaughter during World War II. Somewhere between 50,000 and 150,000 Jews were killed, between 3 and 10 per cent of all Ukrainian Jews’.54 Even larger was the famine induced deaths of five million Ukrainian peasants during the 1930s under Stalin in an attempt to collectivize agriculture and to obliterate Ukrainian nationalism which only served to exacerbate ethnic tension still further. Manus Midlarsky stressed the continuity of the atrocities committed in Eastern Europe during the aftermath of the First World War and the Holocaust. People were so inured to violence that they were ready to inflict it on others, while it was noticed that perpetrators went unpunished. In addition, Midlarsky spoke of the close later collaboration between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Nazis and their active participation in the massacre of Jews, the latter being perceived as supporters of the Soviet regime. Take the following example of this cooperation: During the first three days of July 1941, the ‘Nightingale Battalion’, composed almost entirely of Ukrainians under the direction of the Gestapo, slaughtered seven thousand Jews in the vicinity of Lwow (Lemberg). Before their executions, Jewish professors, lawyers, and doctors were made to lick all the steps of four-story buildings and to carry garbage in their mouths from house to house.55 All the disgruntled nationalities wreaked their vengeance on the Jews prompted by the Germans, but this did not deter the Poles and Ukrainians from killing each other.

17 Closing Years

In this chapter, I cover Lemkin’s increasing frustration, as his campaign to induce the US Senate to ratify the convention ground to a halt, resulting in his falling out with his most loyal supporters James Rosenberg and the American Jewish Committee (AJC). Hence his flurry of activity, mostly concentrated in the early 1950s, to persuade additional states to ratify the convention. The depletion of his campaigning activities allowed Lemkin more time for intellectual reflection and writing, but by the mid-1950s he was suffering from poor health and flagging energy. Even his writing grew more personal, more introspective, and with more leisure time available, he allowed himself the luxury of cultivating some new friendships. Lemkin’s drive to persuade more countries to ratify the Genocide Convention gradually became more intermittent after it came into force as an instrument of international law on 12 January 1951. So too, his attempts to convert the Senate to the merits of the treaty fizzled out because his relations with his sponsors, the United States Committee and theAJC, reached a low ebb. When Sidney Liskofsky of the AJC bumped into Lemkin in the street in 1954, Lemkin had demanded we turn over to him ‘all the files of the U.S. Committee for a U.N. Genocide Convention’. If we do not do so, Lemkin said, he would come to our annual meeting and create a scandal. Of course, even if we wanted to turn over the files, we do not have the authority to do so. If the U.S. Committee should terminate its activities, which it is not planning to do, the co-chairmen, James N. Rosenberg, Dr McCrea Cavert and James Carey, would decide as to the disposition of the files. We have on several occasions suggested to Prof. Lemkin that he take whatever documents belong to him, or which he feels would be useful to him in his work.1 Ralph Bass explained to David Danzig that he was still on part-time loan [from the AJC] to the U.S. Committee for a U.N. Genocide Convention as a sort of secretary or coordinator ... Len Margolin 260

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tells me that Gallob [of the National Jewish Post] has indicated he has an unfavorable view of the U.S. Committee. From Moses Moskowitz I learn that Prof. Lemkin has been fulminating against the U.S. Committee and the A.J.C. in the U.N. corridors, and that this was probably the genesis of the contemplated articles. Lemkin has been accusing the AJC of ‘sabotaging’ the Convention and of all kinds of skullduggery. Bass tried to direct Gallob to James Rosenberg, but he was out of town, ‘We are handicapped by the fact that certain matters that ... Rosenberg has discussed with Senator Lehman and with State Department people are confidential. They would clearly show why at certain times we did not press for the Convention’.2 Ralph Bass advised his superiors that The NCRA told the [National Jewish] Post that the U.S. Committee had not done certain things it should have done in ’52 and ’53 – namely, call meetings of the constituent organizations and exert pressure on Senators. I gave Gallob [the journalist concerned] the facts, which were that James Rosenberg and the two other chairmen of the U.S. Committee have felt that since the Bricker amendment was proposed we should not push the Convention until that had cleared. I also showed him how we had continued our educational work with various organizations and individuals.3 Senator Bricker attempted to introduce an amendment to the constitution restricting ‘the president’s authority to approve foreign treaties’, which the Eisenhower administration blocked; but a weaker Democratic version of the same amendment sponsored by Senator George was defeated by one vote in February 1954.4 At the end of February 1954, James Rosenberg as co-chairman of the US Committee decided to arrange a lunch, as he was planning a renewed campaign for the convention. At the lunch Roseberg spoke to Irving Engel and Ralph Bass of the AJC, also present at this meeting was Lillian Cohen of the NCCJ. A notable absentee from the meeting arranged by Rosenberg was Lemkin, who was not invited because their relationship had soured. Admittedly Lemkin was difficult to work with, but the failure of Rosenberg and his colleagues to take Lemkin fully into their confidence fuelled Lemkin’s paranoia. Speaking as an individual, Engel was totally opposed to calling a meeting of interested organizations scheduled for the 29 March 1954. Engel pointed out the large number of Senators who had voted for the George Amendment and said that an active campaign by Genocide Convention adherents would give ammunition to isolationist candidates in the forthcoming primaries and subsequent Congressational elections. Mr Engel said that these figures would immediately seize upon renewal of Genocide

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Convention activities and would say ‘You see, no sooner had they licked the Bricker and George amendments then they showed what they were really after – Genocide and UN involvements’. Mr Engel felt it was so important that no such ammunition be supplied that it would be extremely unwise to hold a Genocide Convention meeting at this time. Rosenberg concurred and agreed to call off the forthcoming meeting saying that even if this led to unfavorable publicity in the National Jewish Post they must take the risk.5 Despite their recent differences, James Rosenberg sent a warm letter to Lemkin on 29 September 1954 remarking on the forthcoming election and saying that he would like to have a talk with him about the possibility of action. He scribbled a postscript adding ‘In Nov[ember] I’ll be 80 years of age. But if there’s a chance for ratification of the Gen[ocide] Con[vention], I’ll do my best’.6 Nathaniel Goodrich advised Ralph Bass at the beginning of 1955 that the Administration will not only not seek but will actively oppose consideration of the Genocide Convention ... Senator George is the new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee ... it is well-known that the entire Southern wing of the Democratic party is definitely opposed to it. Senator George’s views generally coincide with those of the Southern Democrats.7 The ratification by the Senate passed out of practical politics as a result of the Southern Democrats regarding the convention as a lever for civil rights for the black population of the United States and the growing conviction that ratification by the Senate would boost the Soviet side in the cold war. With the fight for ratification by the Senate stalled, Raphael Lemkin turned his attention and energy elsewhere by persuading more nations to ratify the treaty and by urging those countries that had already ratified the convention to pass their own national codes outlawing genocide. He exploited his old contacts with Count Carten de Wiart and Pierre Hermel, the Minister of Education, to use their influence, and the convention was ratified by Belgium at the end of 1951.8 His campaign for the universal ratification of the convention reached its apogee in 1952, when nine other nations adopted the treaty. Of these states, Lemkin directed most of his attention to Canada and Mexico but relied on local initiatives elsewhere. In the same year he wrote to Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, now the Home Secretary and an old friend, pleading with him without success, to have the United Kingdom ratify the convention.9 Although a few more states ratified the convention every year until the end of the 1950s, Lemkin mostly had little to do with this. Exceptionally, he expended great effort in 1953–1954 to secure the adhesion of the German Federal Republic to the convention.

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During 1951 the Egyptian Senate Foreign Relations Committee had indefinitely postponed consideration of the genocide treaty, but somehow the impasse had been overcome and Egypt ratified the convention: Six members of the Committee strongly objected to the agreement on grounds that it had been made exclusively in the interest of the Jews. They followed the lead of ... [the] Chairman, who asserted that Article 11 clearly indicates that the Convention was suggested by the Jews in their own interests during the trial of German political leaders and military commanders at the end of the Second World War. He went on to say that if Egypt signed this agreement she would be bound by its provisions at a time when the Palestine Arabs have been rendered homeless by the ‘savage aggression’ of the Jews.10 Although by the late 1950s his political interventions were growing rarer, Lemkin did write to his friend Habib Bourgiba Jr at the Tunisian embassy in Washington reminding him that an important conference of independent African States, including Tunisia will take place in Rabat in May. I hope that this conference will find it possible to endorse the Genocide Convention as a basic international instrument in the struggle against colonialism. I have drafted such a resolution, and am sending it to you with the hope, that you will find it possible to suggest to your government its submission to the Conference. Your government might be interested to see this statement on Genocide, issued in February 1957 by the Algerian Front of National Liberation.11 Lemkin was an opponent of French colonialism in Algeria and circulated a memorandum critical of French moves at the United Nations to undermine the Genocide Convention which had been invoked against France in the Algerian case. The French delegate amended Article 2 of the Draft Code of Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind dealing with crimes against humanity, adding the words ‘by the authorities of a State or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities’. The effect of this amendment would free the French colons in Algeria from any responsibility for crimes committed against the Algerians ... The French hope to retain from all crimes against humanity only extermination, which is so much a restricted concept, that one must kill millions of people in order to incur responsibility ... The French have been working simultaneously on an additional plan, which consists in making ‘Genocide’ a form of discrimination in order to bring it within the limitations of article 2 point 7 of the U.N. Charter.12

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Habib Bourgiba thanked Lemkin for noting his interest in the Algerian cause, which was a noble one.13 Since his intervention at the United Nations on behalf of the inhabitants of South West Africa a decade earlier, Lemkin had been a consistent and vocal critic of imperial rule. On 23 February 1959, Lemkin informed President Betancourt of Venezuala that the Genocide Convention had obtained 59 ratifications, ‘a number exceptionally great, and second only to that of the U.N. Charter itself’.14 Many of these ratifications had been obtained by the hard grind of Raphael Lemkin himself through copious letter writing and the incessant lobbying of delegates at the United Nations, and even where he had not been so active in securing ratifications of the treaty, he had acted as a point of focus during his lifetime for the whole campaign. After his death, the rate at which countries ratified the treaty dropped so precipitously that among human rights treaties William Korey pointed out ‘as of September 14, 2000, it is among the lowest in the number of ratifications with only 132’. Large states such as Japan and Indonesia and the Congo, despite Lemkin’s earlier efforts to engage the interest of the first two nations, have still not ratified the convention.15 As well as encouraging more nations to ratify the convention, Lemkin corresponded with those countries that had ratified, urging them to introduce their own domestic law on genocide. He wrote to Professor Angelo Macchia of the Italian Mission to the United Nations thanking him ‘for the texts of the Italian draft law on genocide’ and informing him that ‘Yugoslavia adopted a genocide law in 1949; Israel in 1950; Germany in 1954; and Denmark in 1955’.16 At the end of 1953, Lemkin mooted the formation of an International Committee for the Protection of Peoples from Genocide. It was to maintain headquarters near the location of the United Nations in New York and be under the control of a secretary general, a position for which Lemkin nominated himself, and an international committee. In an explanatory memorandum, Ruth Colby asserted that Non-govermental organizations of course may raise their voice in protest against violations of the Conventions when Governments do not. But the fact is they rarely do. The paradox of non-governmentals is that ... they are rarely disposed to take bold action on a perilous issue without sounding out at least informally their Governments ... It should be noted that it will not be the power of such a Committee to indict, or accuse or pass judgment, but merely to express concern over a certain situation which has all the grim aspects of developing into an act of Genocide. Such an expression, coming from a body of the most responsible men in the world community, is certain to set off a chain reaction of public opinion on lower levels, thus bringing into the world a new type of implementation which the Genocide Convention so badly needs.17

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Like so many of Lemkin’s ambitious and far-sighted schemes this organization never attracted the necessary funding to take off. Yet this did not deter Lemkin from sometimes designating himself as the founder of the World Movement against Genocide when signing letters. By the early 1950s, Lemkin’s campaigning activities were waning, and he had more time for his writing and to interest foundations in sponsoring his ‘History of Genocide’. However, he grew increasingly introspective and in 1955 he approached Richard Walsh of the John Day Company, commercial publishers, with various proposals. Walsh was incidentally the husband of Pearl Buck, the Nobel Prize winning novelist, who was a close ally and supporter of Lemkin in his campaign for a genocide treaty. Richard Walsh told him bluntly that ‘we could [not] successfully sell a book about the history of genocide, whether condensed or at length’. He was only slightly more enthusiastic about publishing Lemkin’s autobiography, but stated that Lemkin’s idea of having his biography written by John Hersey, author of best-selling book ‘The Wall’ on the Warsaw ghetto uprising, was an excellent one. ‘I am certain’, he continued, ‘that it will be much better to have you approach him directly, using your well known ability to impress your point of view upon various persons. No doubt Mr Hersey has close relations with his publisher and could make his own arrangements’.18 Walsh clearly did not want anything more to do with the project. Raphael Lemkin appears to have shelved this plan of having John Hersey write his biography and by August 1958 had himself prepared a draft of the major portion of his memoirs with the provisional title of ‘Totally Unofficial’. Through the good offices of his lawyer friend Maxwell Cohen, Lemkin submitted two sample chapters from the middle of his autobiography on his work at the United Nations in securing the adoption of the genocide convention to different publishers. While agreeing that the book recorded important events, Charles Pearce of Duell, Sloan and Pearce advised Lemkin that it would not be a commercially viable proposition for his company to publish the book.19 Next Lemkin tried literary agents, Curtis Brown Limited. Here he encountered an enthusiastic and encouraging response from Naomi Burton, who was also most solicitous about his health. Lemkin sent her the manuscript of his unfinished memoirs together with an outline of the whole project. Naomi Burton responded that she had ‘looked at the more detailed outline and am very pleased with it’. She offered the manuscript to Simon and Schuster, whose readers gave it a guarded welcome. One reader claimed that ‘There is good narrative suspense in Lemkin’s account of his flight from Warsaw, but it is dissipated by a too long reminiscent flashback into his childhood’. The other reader’s reaction was that I met Lemkin once, very briefly, about six years ago. He impressed me as a quiet, unassuming man with great humanity ... the childhood memories

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are too long. Yet the reader wants very much to know where Lemkin got that great reservoir of pity for the persecuted and hatred for the persecutor ... If Lemkin does not win the Nobel Prize, I think the audience for such a book would be very small.20 A third reader stated that she would like to read more of this, but I also agree that it seems a very dubious commercial risk. My reservations about the manuscript ... are two: it never really tells the reader the mechanics of getting a passionate conviction transformed into international law except in terms of personal magnetism, midnight walks around Lake Leman, etc; I’m afraid that after the English was cleaned up some of the charnm of the story might be lost. Without seeing more material, the publishers could not decide whether or not to take up the book.21 Naomi Burton remained hopeful, telling Lemkin ‘if Simon and Schuster don’t come through I think we should try Houghton Mifflin next. You are not looking very strong and I do hope that you are really over the ‘flu, but this is a beastly time of the year to throw off such things. Take care of yourself’.22 By January 1959 no postive responses had come through from publishers. Lemkin’s health was deteriorating; he was weary and could only work fitfully on his memoirs. Naomi Burton continued to have faith in the project and to prod Lemkin throughout the year to send her more material and to complete his autobiography. On 20 July 1959, she wrote, ‘I’m just wondering how you are and how your work on the manuscript is coming along. Do let me hear from you.’ A month later she anxiously inquired ‘It’s such a long time since we heard from you that I’m really worried and would like to have a line telling me how you are’.23 Lemkin was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950, 1951, 1952, 1955, 1956 and 1958.24 To enable his campaign for the nomination to go forward, Lemkin wrote to friends and acquaintances with draft letters to the Nobel committee which they could amend as they saw fit. In 1951 he informed Professor Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School that The Nomination must be in the hands of the Committee before the first of February. Therefore, I would suggest that you kindly send a Night Letter immediately, and follow this up with an Air-Mail letter. I hope you will forgive me, if I enclose a check to cover the expense of the Night Letter.25 In 1951, Lemkin also secured letters of support from Dr Philip Friedman, the Dean of the Jewish Teachers Seminary of New York, the Mayor of

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Jerusalem, the president of the Italian Jewish community, and the Central Conference of American Rabbis. In his endorsement, Dr Philip Friedman, the pioneer Holocaust historian, followed Lemkin’s guidance and stressed that the Genocide Convention is extremely valuable from the point of view of preserving nations not only as a conglomeration of human beings, but as bearers of original cultures. This century has proved again the accuracy of Paul Valery’s statement that civilizations and cultures are mortal. The cultures of Jews in several European countries, with their achievements for scholarship, art, school system, literature, libraries – all that has been destroyed.26 Once the cold war intensified in the 1950s and the ratification of the Genocide Convention stalled in the Senate in 1950, Lemkin gradually ceased to be a public figure and it became much more difficult for him to enlist support for securing the Nobel Peace Prize, and without active promotion of his cause by the US government and canvassing on his behalf to obtain his nomination for the Peace Prize his repeated applications were doomed to failure. Lemkin enjoyed close friendships with a number of men from the same East European Jewish background as himself. There was his cousin Dr Robert Lemkin and his wife, who lived on Long Island, who offered Raphael frequent hospitality, when he was lobbying nearby at the United Nations at Lake Success. Another family member with whom Raphael Lemkin was acquainted was Robert’s brother Professor William Lemkin of Brooklyn College, an author of chemistry textbooks.27 There was Dr Lasar Lowenstein and his wife, Mary, with whom Lemkin lodged in New York City when he lacked accomodation. Raphael Lemkin had many animated conversations about politics with his friend.28 There was Isaiah Spector, a furrier and radical intellectual, and his wife, who had a home in the countryside in Woodbridge, Connecticut. It was not far from Yale, where Lemkin worked from 1948-1951. During his years at Yale, Lemkin used to stay with them from time to time. Both Isaiah Spector and Robert Lemkin ended up by storing large deposits of Raphael Lemkin’s correspondence and memoranda. Maxwell Cohen, a lawyer, friend and adviser of Lemkin, assisted him in drafting documents for his campaign for a genocide convention, and with whom Lemkin often stayed in his country home in the Pocono Mountains. Finally, there was Mrs Bolgatz, who provided a tranquil atmosphere and a healthy diet in her home in Spring Valley for Lemkin to rest and recuperate. Lemkin’s brother Elias and his wife came to New York in August 1956 to meet Raphael and Lemkin wrote to Sarah Greenberg, who was married to a cousin, thanking her ‘for your great kindness in extending such wonderful hospitality to my Brother and my sister-in-law and you were the most gracious hostess’.29 Lemkin also wrote to Hanoch Roskies, a friend in

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Montreal, who had become a wealthy textile manufacturer, saying that ‘My brother visited me last week and I was very upset to realize that he was not doing so well, and that the work he is doing now is too taxing for him. May I ask you the favor of trying to find something for him in your business’. But Elias was too proud to accept a menial position and nothing came of this approach. Whenever his brother invited Raphael to stay with him in Canada, Lemkin made the excuse that he had antagonized some senators in his campaign for the ratification of the convention by the United States, and that if he left the United States on a visit, he would never be allowed to return there.30 By 1954 Raphael Lemkin had severed his ties with the AJC and the State Department under the stewardship of Foster Dulles was hostile to the ratification of the Genocide Convention and human rights issues. Without a strong lead being taken by the United States, there was little hope of the United Nations enforcing the Genocide Convention. Lemkin could have obtained an appointment as a Judge on the International Court of Justice if he would have toned down his vociferous campaigning for the Genocide Convention. But he was unwilling to do this.31 Cut off from many former friends, Lemkin grew increasingly isolated, despondent and paranoid. There was only intermittent correspondence with his chief supporter James Rosenberg of the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention. The organization was put in mothballs ready to be reactivated at a more propitious time. In addition, Lemkin had alienated many of the leading American and international figures in the human rights movement. Only at rare intervals did the relentless personal anguish driving Lemkin break through his cogent legal arguments for a convention. We have already encountered them at critical junctures in his campaign for the convention and its ratification – the draft letter to Ernest Gross in November 1948, which he never sent, and the excised passage in a cable to Ben Gurion in November 1949. Another such occasion was a letter despatched in the summer of 1950 to Thelma Stevens of the Methodist Women’s Council, when the campaign in the Senate for ratification of the convention was stalling: This Convention is a matter of our conscience and is a test of our personal relationship to evil. I know it is very hot in July and August for work and planning, but without trying to become sentimental or trying to use colorful speech, let us not forget that the heat this month is less unbearable to us than the heat in the ovens of Auschwitz and Dachau and more lenient than the murderous heat in the desert of Aleppo which burned to death the bodies of hundreds of thousands of Christian Armenian victims of genocide in 1915.32 In his summary of his autobiography, Lemkin indicated a certain withdrawal from life in his late 50s. Troubled by ill-health and dimiminished

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energy, he started looking inwards and found ‘expression in poetry as the circle of my friends decreases. I become conscious of aging and try to adjust myself’.33 He carried on a lively correspondence with Helen Steiger of the World Council of Churches in Salzburg Austria, sometimes touching on philosophical subjects.34 He also formed a deep friendship with an older woman, Clara Hoover, in the last two years of his life, and towards the end of his life he befriended a young woman, Nancy Ehrlich. Lemkin’s more introspective mood is reflected in a poem which he scribbled on the back of a letter in March 1957. Oh heart don’t stop beating in a fleeing to end it all I wish to see my roses bloom in my garden again stop this cutting pain Delay eternity’s call.35 Most vacations at Christmas and in the summer Lemkin now spent with friends in Spring Valley. For some reason, when it came to the Christmas break for 1958, Raphael Lemkin did not call or say goodbye to Clara. From her name and Park Avenue address, it is likely that Clara Hoover was a Wasp, the antithesis of his usual lady friends, and it appears that she was a distant cousin of President Herbert Hoover.36 Clara complained that he had not been listening to her attentively the day before, so that she had decided to put down on paper what she had been meaning to say to him for many months: I can think of you in no other way, as one whom I love and cherish ... For a very long time I have suffered the same heartache I have experienced twice before in my life. Being a man, you may not understand my reactions, but I feel a deep need to know in a general way, how you are, where you are, and what problems you are faced with. I knew your blood pressure was dangerously high, but you always reassured me by saying the doctor said it would go back to normal when the sessions of the Assembly were over, and I looked forward to that ... You seemed to feel your illness didn’t matter to me – that I was callous about it ... [I did] not know the full seriousness of your trouble until the last night, you were here, and later on the telephone ... I have the deepest affection for you ... I admire and respect you greatly for the things you have accomplished in life. I have a loyalty to you that nothing and no one can shake ... This is the reason I have kept calling in spite of all the rebuffs. You say that you are an unhappy man. I am, also. The best way to overcome unhappiness is to make someone else happy. You can do this very easily ... Don’t add me to your list of hates and enemies. Is there no room in your heart for foregiveness! I have always

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given you understanding friendship, truth and sincerity. I have been so grateful for your friendship and companionship.37 Raphael Lemkin had a wonderful capacity for evoking feelings of love and affection from women which he was unable to reciprocate. He radiated charm, his conversation could sparkle and ranged over a vast number of topics sometimes with encyclopaedic comments, and he was not without humour. But the more intense his relationship with a woman grew, the more keen Lemkin was to rupture it by provoking a quarrel over some trifling matter. In the case of Clara Hoover, he did not succeed because of her maturity and ability to handle him. He sent Clara a card for her birthday in July 1959; there was other correspondence, and they remained good friends. She told him to ask his doctor about a new drug to relieve hypertension manufactured by Merck which could be taken orally, thus eliminating the need for so many visits to the doctor’s office. As she wrote on 23 July 1959, ‘Your health and welfare are always a primary concern of mine though you don’t inform me and I think of you often with much affection’.38 During the last year and a half of his life, Raphael Lemkin formed a friendship with a young woman, Nancy Ackerly (later Ehrlich). He was then living at 504 W.112th Street, New York, near the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. Nancy was assistant to the resident student advisor at International House nearby. One afternoon she was having lunch in Riverside Park with a student from India when an elderly gentleman walked by and opened a conversation by saying, ‘I know the words for I love you in fifteen languages’. Out of this encounter a friendship developed. Lemkin loved listening to classical music. He would take Nancy with him as a companion when he visited art galleries, museums and on strolls in the park. Lemkin struck Nancy as a man with a mission, a widely cultured, educated and humane person, and later as she got to know him, as a visionary and mystic with a deep spiritual life. He gave Nancy as a keepsake a book about the poet, Rainer Maria Rilke, entitled ‘His Last Friendship’. He had underlined many passages in this book which reveal his inner life. Lemkin had many friends, most of whom did not know each other. However, Nancy and Lemkin used to visit Phyllis Kotite, a Lebanese American Woman who worked at UNESCO, who also aided and supported Dr Lemkin’s work. As Lemkin’s health was failing, he valued his friendship with Nancy which could be described as filial, which perhaps provided some continuity and hope for the future. Lemkin asked Nancy to help him look over and, as he said, ‘smooth out the English lanaguage’ in his autobiography with which he was concerned in the last months of his life. She was working with him until the last week of his life.39 Many of the thoughts expressed in the introduction to ‘His Last Friendship’ about Rilke’s personality which Lemkin underlined were those with which he could identify and sympathize. Rilke was visionary, who ‘perceived hidden aspects of things’. Had not Rilke before the First World War foreseen in

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his writing ‘an era so oppressive to man that many would be forced to seek refuge in a new spiritual world’. Rilke had created ‘a new cosmos of the soul’. He wanted to attain to something which resembled ‘mysticism or holiness’. He believed that ‘Vice hinders the just and true ... it is an offence against harmony, a dissonance’. Rilke lived a life of ‘loneliness ... [he] lived all his life as if he had neither country nor family, nor issue, nor even a religion’. For Rilke ‘life and death were the reverse and obverse of the same phenomenon; past, present, and future were one for him, and all the proofs that our appearance as living creatures is inseparable from the presence of the departed were precious to him’. He encountered ‘in all things’ an ‘experience of the divine’, and here Lemkin added a few words, ‘which is bigger than the normal man’.40 Finally, Lemkin underlined some lines from a Rilke poem: What wilt thou do, God when I die?... I am thy garment – thy life work In losing me, thy meaning fails’.41 While making business arrangements on 28 August 1959 for the publication of his autobiography ‘Unofficial Man’, Raphael Lemkin collapsed and died of heart failure. The AJC paid the costs of his funeral, which only a small band of mourners attended. At the funeral only one ambassador from Korea and one diplomat, Michael Elizur, the Israeli Press attaché joined the other mourners for the funeral. He was buried in the Mount Hermon Cemetery in Queens, New York with a simple memorial over his grave. The inscription reads ‘Dr Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959) the Father of the Genocide Convention’. At his landlord’s insistence his books and papers had to be removed from the one room which he rented on the Westside of New York. They were dispersed among three libraries, complicating the task of any future biographer, and ensuring that his life and career remained in the shadows.42

Conclusion

Raphael Lemkin liked to present himself as a universal man, an interpretation which has been followed by most historians. His roots, however, were in the quagmire of ethnic conflict in pre-War Eastern Europe and were authentically Jewish. After the First World War, the Habsburg, Ottoman and to some extent the Tsarist empires disintegrated and in their place nations were established in new states with freshly defined borders. So, far from being dominated by one nationality these new states tended to be multi-ethnic communities. Jews, for instance, comprised ten per cent of the population in Poland before the Second World War. To protect the rights of Jews and other ethnic groups, such as the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, the victorious allies forced the new Polish state to ratify the 1919 Minorities Treaty. But it was quickly seen to offer little protection to Jews and other threatened groups. Lemkin grew up in a borderland in eastern Poland, a zone of increasingly vicious conflict in two World Wars. Because of his early experiences, Lemkin had a deep understanding of the nationality problems of pre-War Poland and in 1933 proposed the introduction of two new infractions of international law: the crime of barbarity which outlawed the extermination of ethnic, social and religious groups by means of massacres, pogroms or economic discrimination; and the crime of vandalism which penalized the destruction of cultural or artistic works which embodied the genius of a people. His proposals were meant to rectify the deficiencies of the Minorities Treaty. They had the aims of saving Polish Jewry from pogroms and economic boycotts and boosting their efforts in the struggle to preserve their culture by making acts of violence against such groups crimes under international law. The 1933 proposals did not envisage having to save a whole people from extermination, its aims were much more restricted. Lemkin was much influenced by Simon Dubnov’s ideas on preserving cultural autonomy for Jews, which he as a Polish Zionist shared, and later never wavered in his belief in the importance of preventing cultural genocide. The intellectual inspiration he drew from the work of the Austrian political theorist Karl Renner was much less significant. At the same time, 272

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Lemkin was also the product of the international law circuit of the 1930s and the new ideas on the enhanced scope of international law emanating from the League of Nations, borrowing the concept of barbarity from his mentor Professor Vespasian Pella. But the Polish government was moving towards a rapprochement with Germany, forcing Lemkin to resign from his official position and to shelve his proposals. During the Second World War, the borderland in which Lemkin grew up became a killing zone. The Nazis tried to create a more homogeneous empire in Eastern Europe by restructuring the population and carrying out genocidal policies against the Jews and gypsies and earmarking other ethnic groups for extermination and enslavement. Having moved to the United States in April 1941, Lemkin soon grasped what Germany was planning and his response was to start writing Axis Rule in Occupied Europe by the summer of 1942, when his own ideas coalesced. The book was published two years later. In it he set out his new concept of genocide – the mass murder of national, racial and religious groups – and his proposals for prosecuting the Nazis after the War and for making genocide a crime in international law. The ideas expressed in his book, particularly the charge of conspiracy against members of the Gestapo and SS, influenced the deliberations of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and the new concept of genocide, even if it was given short shrift by the court, rapidly established itself in international law in subsequent trials. In April 1946, Lemkin suggested that the United Nations should pass a treaty making genocide a crime in international law whether committed in time of peace or war. When no government would take up his proposals, almost single-handedly Lemkin persuaded the newly formed United Nations to pass a resolution on 11 December 1946 embodying these ideas. He was assisted by the press corps and women attending an international conference, who lobbied United Nations delegates on his behalf. He also gained the friendship of Charles Fahy, an influential State Department adviser, who played a key role in the drafting of the resolution, and through this friendship the State Department and in turn the United States government became firm supporters of Lemkin. With two senior international lawyers, Professor Donnedieu de Vabres and Vespasian Pella, Lemkin was designated to prepare a first draft of the genocide convention in May 1947. Lemkin preserved the bulk of his scheme in this draft. He won the support of the State Department and the World Jewish Congress and some other Jewish and Church groups for his proposals. With these few allies, he foiled the attempts of the Russians and the British government to consign the convention into oblivion, broached possible compromises with the Soviet bloc by suggesting the exclusion of political groups from the convention, and circumvented the obstructive tactics of the Arab states, who denounced the convention as a Zionist plot. When the Ad Hoc Committee threshed out a new scheme for the convention, Lemkin

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with the assistance of the State Department again ensured that the most important points in his original proposals were left intact. Apart from a ban on the physical annihilation of a group, these included the concept of cultural genocide and the plan for a court. Despite the progress that had been made, Lemkin was still far from seeing his proposals translated into law. Appreciating the difficulties of being a lone campaigner, Lemkin started to work more closely with James Rosenberg, the chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the National Conference of Christians and Jews in the autumn of 1947. But this was not enough and to break the impasse at the United Nations, where the British were intriguing against him by delaying tactics, Lemkin encouraged Rosenberg to set up the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention in April 1948. This was a pivotal moment in his campaign for Lemkin, as he now had the support of a pressure group comprised of Jewish leaders and prominent American Churchmen and human rights activists; he could no longer be accused of acting for parochial interests and be tagged with an exclusive Jewish label. In certain respects the British were more obstructive than the Russians and were trying to have the draft convention shunted from committee to committee, so that nothing happened; it was imperative for Lemkin to stop this. Without the funds liberally dispensed by the United States Committee, Lemkin would not have been able to stay in Geneva and Paris for more than four months from 23 July until December 1948 to mount a cheap but effective campaign to push the convention through to a successful conclusion. Added support came from the World Federation of United Nations Associations, voluntary associations based in Paris, and John Matkos of the State Department. Abigail Green has argued that the nineteenth century “transdenominational humanitarian campaigns of men such as [Sir Moses] Montefiore, [Sir Culling] Eardley,and [Adolphe] Crémieux should cause us to rethink the origins of human rights activity ... support for international humnitarian activity was not motivated primarily by abstract concerns with a secular theory of human rights ... Instead,international humanitarian activity tended to be motivated at some level by religious concerns".So too,the mid-twenteith century campaign for a genocide convention sprang primarily from Jewish and Christian sources which drew their strength from an interdenominational organization,the National Conference of Christians and Jews. Lemkin also gained the invaluable assistance of Dr Herbert Evatt, the president of the General Assembly, who gave the convention an early place on the agenda and streamlined procedure at the United Nations meeting in Paris to enable it to be scrutinized by the Legal Committee more quickly; he cooperated with Lemkin’s manoeuvring and lobbying in the struggle for the convention, and he later facilitated the campaign to have the convention ratified rapidly. Genocide, the physical destruction of national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, was for the first time made into a crime in international law. It did

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not matter whether or not these malevolent deeds were committed in time of peace or war; and such action against the whole group or a significant portion of the group were both classed as genocide. The perpetrators of genocide were to be tried in courts of the state, where the crimes took place, and the groundwork was laid for a future international criminal court. However, at the insistence of the Russians and the East European bloc political genocide was omitted from the convention, while the Western powers demanded that cultural genocide was dropped from the treaty. But first the convention had to be ratified by 20 states before it could become an instrument of international law. Lemkin acted energetically to enlist the support of the necessary number of states before the euphoric post-War mood evaporated. While he charmed delegates at the United Nations, he could also rely on allies from the World Federation of United Nations Associations, women’s international organizations and South American educators to put pressure on individual governments. Lemkin excluded the United States Committee from this phase of his lobbying because he feared that it had been infiltrated by human rights activists antagonistic to his viewpoint. A prime target of Lemkin’s campaign were the South American states and he engaged the services of a Spanish speaking secretary to open a vast correspondence with key public figures. His campaign was crowned with success, and the convention came into force on 12 January 1951. Unfortunately, Lemkin’s attempt to convert the United States Senate to the merits of the convention ended in abject failure in his lifetime. To Lemkin’s discomfort, an early civil rights movement accusing the United States government of genocide against its own black population incited a caucus of Southern senators to block the ratification of the convention in the Senate. As the campaign for Senate ratification fell apart and hampered by ill health at a critical juncture, Lemkin blamed his erstwhile supporters, James Rosenberg and the United States Committee and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) for his lack of success. The issue of genocide was deliberately confused with civil rights and the ties of the civil rights protagonists to the Communist party were highlighted by right wing and isolationist senators during the McCarthy era and the cold war. The ratification of the convention became entangled in a number of other cold war issues and any positive response was regarded as unpatriotic by a widening circle of Americans. Lemkin now looked to the assistance of Central and Eastern European émigré groups, who charged the Soviet Union with genocide, to block attempts to weaken the convention as an instrument of international law. If his claims of genocide against Russia were somewhat exaggerated in the post-War era, it was nevertheless true that it continued to commit cultural genocide against the captive nations under its control and that the physical annihilation of the Jews was only fortuitously prevented by Stalin’s sudden death.

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As Lemkin’s friend the historian Philip Friedman acknowledged, ‘there can be no doubt that the fundamental stimulus that induced its originator to develop this theory [of genocide] and to fight for its adoption on the international stage for many years in a heroic struggle of one against the many, was the great Jewish tragedy during Nazi rule in Europe’;1 and the truth of this view is confirmed on a number of occasions in Lemkin’s correspondence and in his unpublished memoirs. For a time, his campaign in the late 1940s and early 1950s for a United Nations convention and for its universal ratification broke free from its ethnic origin and with wide-ranging support took on a more universal hue. Like Sigmund Freud, Lemkin was concerned that his cause was not identified solely with a Jewish coterie. But the cold-war conflict and the failure of the Senate to ratify the convention meant that interest in and support for his ideas ebbed from 1952 onwards and willy-nilly Lemkin ended up living off a pension from a Jewish organisation. Yet Lemkin’s ideas on cultural genocide which were dropped from the convention at the insistence of the Western powers are still imbued with some relevance in the case of ethnic conflict today, such as Kosovo and Darfur in the Sudan, and perhaps should be re-examined; for the abuse of the cultural rights of a group often precedes their mass murder; there is often a slippage from the extirpation of a group’s culture and the destruction of its historic monuments to ethnic cleansing and genocide. Michael Mann has explained how Murderous ethnic cleansing typically emerges as a kind of plan C, developed only after the first two responses to a perceived ethnic threat fail. Plan A typically envisages a carefully planned solution in terms of either compromise or straightforward repression. Plan B is a more radically repressive adaptation to the failure of Plan A, more hastily conceived amid rising violence and some political destabilization. When both these fail, some of the planners radicalize further.2 Thus the attack on a group’s cultural rights is important because it is so often an early warning of a potential genocidal situation. By limiting the terms of the convention to physical genocide, the Western powers altered the scope of the treaty and disguised its historical antecedents in the politics of inter-War Europe. Equally the Western powers blocked the attempt to insert the protection of minority rights into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.3 However, Lemkin’s concept of cultural genocide has sometimes been misinterpreted as being solely an ideological construct, but it was far wider than this and embraced the annihilation of a nation’s elite, the carriers of its traditions, and the stealing of children to bring them up in an alien milieu. At the centre of Lemkin’s political campaigning for the convention and his comparative studies of past genocides was a belief in the uniqueness of

Conclusion 277

human cultures and the need for their preservation derived from Herder; he was also indebted to Herder for his downgrading of the state and political structures and his critical attitude to the negative consequences of Western colonialism; his political and intellectual thought were a seamless whole. Lemkin embarked on a functional analysis of European colonial regimes borrowed from a fellow Pole, the cultural anthropologist Bronislav Malinowski, showing how these societies imploded under the impact of foreign rule. Lemkin stressed that nations were in perpetual conflict in the international system and pointed out the racism of Western society in his introductory volume to the study of genocide. In an inchoate form he grasped that there was a potential genocidal process present in modern society, but he never married this dynamic theory to his individual case studies of genocide. Still his view of the Nazi empire as a colonial regime in embryo was a tremendous intellectual achievement which was developed further by Hannah Arendt. She linked it to European imperialism. Mark Levene and Dirk Moses showed that massive ethnic fault lines developed at the intersection of empires in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, resulting in conflict and mass killing in times of World War. Manus Midlarsky emphasized the continuity of ethnic violence in these killing zones which often became more toxic over time.4 After Raphael Lemkin’s death in 1959, his reputation plummeted and the Genocide Convention remained a neglected legal instrument for the duration of the cold war. Why was this? It was partly personal, his boorishness and paranoia alienated many past associates, but more important was the unpropitious international situation. ‘Ratification by the United States is of particular importance’, Lemkin wrote to an old friend on 12 February 1951, ‘Without it, the Genocide Convention might well share the fate of the old League of Nations’.5 His prediction proved to be accurate. When the United States failed to ratify the convention for almost three decades, there was no superpower to act as an enforcement agency and before the foundation of Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s and the International Criminal Court in 2002, the convention also lacked teeth for its implementation. Because of the failure of the United Nations to protect groups under siege, human rights activists decided to proceed on an individual basis. Amnesty International was founded in 1961 and grew into a worldwide organization with over a million members campaigning for the rights of individuals imprisoned for their politics or beliefs and against torture and the death penalty. Helsinki Watch founded in 1978 which developed into Human Rights Watch lobbied the United States government at the highest levels with regard to human rights abuses in specific countries. Once again there was a renewed emphasis on intervention by governments.6

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When the United States government finally ratified the convention, there was a dramatic improvement in the international situation in relation to the prevention of genocide. Ratification almost happened by accident. President Reagan gave it his strong support, after a disastrous visit to the Bidburg Cemetery in Germany, where 49 Waffen SS men were buried. The visit attracted much adverse publicity, thus helping to undermine Republican opposition to the ratification of the convention. The Senate approved the ratification of the Genocide Convention in 1986, but it was another two years before it passed the Genocide Implementation Act which made it a punishable offence in the United States.7 At the same time, the term Holocaust began to be employed during the 1960s to describe the Nazi programme to exterminate the Jews, it was commemorated increasingly and special museums were built in the United States culminating in the establishment of the United States Holocaust Museum in 1993;8 its offshoot was the Committee on Conscience designed ‘to confront and work to halt acts of genocide and related crimes against humanity’, but it was only one among a number of such organizations devoted to the prevention of genocide, such as the Aegis Trust in Britain. There was now a mass movement in existence to combat both human rights abuses and genocide with a renewed will for government action, particularly in the United States. Everything for which Lemkin had fought and dreamt was now in existence – organizations to alert governments and to mobilize opinion, research institutes to enquire into genocides past and present and to ascertain the best means for their prevention. Yet despite all these new positive factors, states have been slow to act against the perpetrators of genocide. When acts of mass murder were committed in Cambodia (1977), in Halabja against the Kurds (1988), in Rwanda (1994) and Srebenica (1995), no action was taken until too late. Critics doubted whether the convention had any effect in preventing genocide and stated that it created a false sense of security. Why was this? Part of the problem lies in the contradiction at the heart of the founding principles of the United Nations. Sovereign states were not only to be secure from the interference of other states, but from the United Nations itself, except in exceptional circumstances. Under article 2 part 7 of the UN Charter, ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. However, the abuse of the human rights within its borders and the maltreatment of minorities could trigger action, resulting ultimately in military intervention. In 2005 the United States helped to emasculate a new United Nations declaration stating that countries had an obligation to halt genocide, instead substituting a weaker statement, which was still an advance on the previous position. It noted that ‘We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner ... should peaceful means be inadequate

Conclusion 279

and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. What happens to the peace deal agreed for the region of Darfur in the Sudan in May 2006 will decide whether or not this improvement to the Genocide Convention goes far enough. There has been a call for ‘rebadging the (7,000) African Union troops under the UN and giving them more firepower and training’, and possibly additional manpower. Nevertheless, ‘How such a small peacekeeping force can assert any control over an area the size of France’ is questionable. Nicholas Kristof noted that ‘the UN has regularly failed abysmally in situations like the one in Darfur, when military intervention is needed but a major power (in this case China) uses the threat of a veto to block action’.9 Despite this impediment to action, the upgrading of the peacekeeping troops will perhaps happen in a piecemeal manner, step by step, with Western governments driven along by popular pressure to force this concession out of the Sudanese authorities. Alternatively Western governments could offer a measure of protection to the besieged population of Darfur, by instituting a no fly zone over the area for the Sudanese air force. Sanctions against key figures in the Sudanese regime or their indictment by the International Criminal Court will in the end create such irresistible pressure on their government that they will be forced to comply more fully with the international consensus. In 1951 Catherine Bradshaw Boyd, one of his former students at Duke University, wrote Lemkin a letter with a prescient tribute: It is true that you cannot see the results of your work. But your work is great, far greater than this generation. The results can only be known with the passage of time. You yourself will in all likelihood never see the concrete result you wish to see. But generations to come will enjoy and know the ideals you strive to realize. I know it is cold comfort, but that seems to be the way with this business of living.10 Because of the perpetuation of mass killing and ethnic cleansing in the twenty-first century, the concept of genocide has gained a fresh relevance and urgency in international law and with it Lemkin’s reputation has soared and gained a new buoyancy. Thus even if the stalemate in Darfur continues, Western governments under popular pressure will be compelled to intervene elsewhere to put an end to a potential genocide and this will ultimately benefit the authority of the United Nations and enhance Lemkin’s status. Like the act of 1807 to abolish the slave trade, inspired by William Wilberforce, Raphael Lemkin’s crusade against genocide was an attempt to enshrine a new principle in international law which may take many decades to be enforced and for his true worth to be appreciated.

Appendix

The United Nations Convention on The Prevention and Punishment of The Crime of Genocide The Contracting Parties. Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (1) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world; Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international cooperation is required: Hereby agree as hereinafter provided: Article I. The Contracting parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish. Article II. In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: a. Killing members of the group; b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Article III. The following acts shall be punishable: a. Genocide; b. Conspiracy to commit genocide; c. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; d. Attempt to commit genocide; e. Complicity in genocide. Article IV. persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. Article V. The Contracting parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.

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281

Article VI. persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. Article VII. Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force. Article VIII. Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III. Article IX. Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. Article X. The present Convention, of which the Chines, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948. Article XI. The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations. After 1 January 1950 the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Article XII. Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible. Article XIII. On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary–General shall draw up a process-verbal and transmit a copy thereof to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in Article XI. The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession. Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession. Article XIV. The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming into force. It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period. Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.

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Article XV. If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective. Article XVI. A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General. The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request. Article XVII. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in Article XI of the following: a. Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Article XI; b. Notifications received in accordance with Article XII; c. The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with Article XIII; d. Denunciations received in accordance with Article XIV; e. The abrogation of the Convention comes into force in accordance with Article XV; f. Notification received in accordance with Article XVI. g. Notification received in accordance with Article XVI. Article XVIII. The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations. A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to each member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in Article XI. Article XIX. The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.

Notes Introduction 1. Jewish Chronicle 30 December 1983. 2. Steven Schnur, ‘Unofficial Man: The Rise and Fall of Raphael Lemkin’, Reform Judaism (Fall 1982): 9–11 and 44. Tanya Elder, ‘What You See before Your Eyes: Documenting Raphael Lemkin’s Life by Exploring His Archival Papers, 1900– 1959’, Journal of Genocide Research 7:4 (2005): 469–99. 3. James J. Martin, The Man Who Invented Genocide. The Public Career and Consequences of Raphael Lemkin (Torrance, California: Institute for Historical Review, 1984), pp. 1, 4, and 171. 4. James J. Martin, Raphael Lemkin, pp. 24–6 and 179. 5. Theodor Hanf, ‘Reducing Ethnic Conflict through Cultural Autonomy: Karl Renner’s Contribution’, in Uri Ra’anan et al. eds, State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies in the Breakup of Multi-National States (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 33. 6. Shimon Frost, Schooling as a Socio-Political Expression (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1998), pp. 18–33. 7. Patterns of Prejudice 39:2 (2005) ed., A. Dirk Moses and Dan Stone and Journal of Genocide Research 7:4 (2005) ed. Dominik J. Schaller and Jurgen Zimmerer. 8. Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Vol. 2: The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 215–23 and 277–84, and A. Dirk Moses, ‘Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the “Racial Century”: Genocides of Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust’, Patters of Prejudice 36:4 (2002): 7–36.

1

Formative Years in Poland

1. Steven Schnur, ‘Unofficial Man: The Rise and Fall of Raphael Lemkin’, Reform Judaism (Fall 1982): 11. Who was Who In America Vol. 3 (Chicago: A.N. Marquis, 1966), p. 511. 2. Gershon David Hundert and Gershon C. Bacon, The Jews in Poland and Russia. Bibliographical Essays (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 157. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, section entitled ‘Buying the Right to Live’, Lemkin Papers, reel 2, New York Public Library. 3. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, section entitled ‘Introduction’. 4. John Cooper, The Child in Jewish History (Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson, 1996), pp. 270–74. 5. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, sections entitled ‘Introduction’ and ‘The Harvest’. 6. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, sections entitled ‘Image of Entirety’ and ‘The Lake’. 7. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, sections entitled ‘Introduction’, ‘Stealing’ and ‘The Forest’. 283

284

Notes

8. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, section entitled ‘Children of Farm Hands’. 9. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 12 August 2004. 10. John Cooper, The Child in Jewish History, pp. 264 and 279. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, section entitled ‘First Love & Early Education’, p. 12. 11. Encyclopaedia Judaica (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1996), Vol. 4 column 806 article on Bialystok. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, p. 14. 12. Biographical sketch of Raphael Lemkin, p. 1, reel 2, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 13. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, pp. 12–15. 14. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, p. 14. 15. The Volkovysk Memorial Book translated by Jacob Solomon Berger (Mahwah N.J., 2002), Foreword and Part 1, pp. 7 and 13. 16. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, p. 11. 17. ‘Beilis Case’, The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia Vol. 2 (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1969), pp. 139–41. 18. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, p. 11. 19. James Bowen, A History of Western Education: The Modern West Europe and the New World Vol. 3 (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 220 and 228. 20. Biographical sketch of Raphael Lemkin, p. 1, Lemkin Papers, reel 2, New York Public Library. 21. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, unpaginated, reel 2, New York Public Library. 22. Herbert Yahraes, ‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, Collier’s, 3 March 1951, p. 28. 23. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Early Childhood’, p. 14, and biographical sketch of Raphael Lemkin p. 1, reel 2, New York Public Library. 24. Henry La Cossit, ‘The Man Who Outlawed Genocide’, New York Herald Tribune magazine, This Week, 7 Jan. 1951 p. 7. Herbert Maza, Neuf Meneurs Internationaux de l’initiative individuelle dans l’institution des organisations internationales (Paris: Sirey, 1965), p. 347. 25. Henry La Cossit, ‘The Man Who Outlawed Genocide’, p. 14. 26. Who Was Who in America Vol. 3, p. 511, and Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, p. 53. La Cossit, ‘The Man Who Outlawed Genocide’, pp. 7 and 14. 27. The Volkovysk Memorial Book Part 1, pp. 25–28 and 41 and Part 3, p. 112. 28. Biographical sketch of Raphael Lemkin, Raphael Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/1, American Jewish Historical Society. 29. Who Was Who in America Vol. 3, p. 511. Herbert Maza, Neuf Meneurs Internationaux de l’initiative individuelle dans l’institution des organisations internationales, p. 347. 30. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 9 December 2004. 31. William H. Hagen, ‘Murder in the East: German-Jewish Liberal Reactions to the Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland and Other East European Lands, 1918–1920’, Central European History 34:1 (2001): 1–30. Jerzy Tomaszewski, ‘Pinsk, Saturday 5 April 1919’, Polin 1 (1986): 227–251. Peter Kenez, ‘Pogroms and White ideology in the Russian Civil War’, in John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambrozo ed., Pogroms: AntiJewish Violence in Modern Russian History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 293–313. Piotr Wrobel, ‘The Seeds of Violence. The Brutalization

Notes 285

32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41.

42.

43. 44. 45.

46.

47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52.

of an East European Region, 1917–1921’, Journal of Modern European History 1:1 (2003): 125–48. Piotr Wrobel, The Seeds of Violence, p. 126. Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others. The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 208 and 257–64. Shimon Frost, Schooling as a Socio-Political Instrument (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1998), pp. 19–33. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 12 August 2004. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2001), p. 6. Herbert Yahraes, p. 28 and Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 1–4 and 14–19. Yahraes, ‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, p. 28. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, pp. 18–19. Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others. The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection 1878–1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 153. Helen Hilsenrad, Brown was the Danube (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1966), pp. 114–16. Maza, Neuf Meneurs Internationaux de l’initiative individuelle dans l’institution des organisations internationales, pp. 347 and 348; Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin, pp. 7 and 8. Chaim Nachman Bialik, Noach i Marynka translated and with an introduction by Rafal Lemkin (Lvov: N. Siegel, 1926). Leon I. Yudkin, ‘Bialik’s Prose, and His Poetry Too’, Hebrew Studies XLIII (2001): 299–313. Zosa Szajkowski, ‘ “A reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917–1921”: A Rebuttal’, Jewish Social Studies XXXI:3 (1969): 203–5. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, p. 19. Pearl Buck to the editor of the Manchester Guardian, 22 January 1948; Lemkin Collection P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society; note of an interview with Raphael Lemkin by John Matkos 16 July 1948, RG 59 File 501-BD Genocide. Summary of activities of Raphael Lemkin pp. 21–3, reel 2 New York Public Library. Raphael Lemkin and Malcolm McDermott, The Polish Penal Code of 1932 and the Law of Minor Offenses (Durham N. Carolina: Duke University Press, 1939), pp. 7–9. James Fussell, Comprehensive Bibliography: Writings of Raphael Lemkin, Prevent Genocide website. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, p. 20. Memorandum by Raphael Lemkin to General John M. Weir 20 June 1945, RG 153 Box 77 File 107–9. Daniel Marc Segesser and Myriam Gessler, ‘Raphael Lemkin and the international debate on the punishment of war crimes (1919– 1948)’, Journal of Genocide Research 7 (December 2005): 456. Segesser and Gessler, ‘Punishment of War Crimes’, pp. 453–57. William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 26. Raphael Lemkin, ‘Les actes constituant un danger general (interetatique) consideres comme delits de droit des gens (Paris: A. Pedone, 1933), pp. 1–8. Ezra Mendelsohn, ‘Jewish Politics in Interwar Poland: An Overview’ in Yisrael Gutman, Ezra Mendelsohn, Jehuda Reinharz and Chone Shmeruk ed., The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars (Hanover New England: University Press of New England, 1989), p. 13.

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Notes

53. Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe between the World Wars (Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 11–83 and particularly p. 58. 54. Mark Levene and Penny Roberts eds, The Massacre in History (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1999), and Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan eds, The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 354. 55. Jewish Chronicle 4 August and 22 September 1922, and 7 September 1923. Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 73–4. 56. Jewish Chronicle, 24 August 1923 and 23 April 1926. Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe, p. 73. 57. Jan Karski, The Great Powers and Poland 1919–1945: From Versailles to Yalta (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), pp. 168–73. 58. Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin, pp. 11 and 12 and Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter on ‘the Flight’, p. 22. Karski, The Great Powers and Poland 1919–1945, pp. 167–75. 59. Copies of the books, The Organization of Jewish Communities (1928) and Industrial Law (1929), are in the Yivo Library, New York. Jewish Chronicle, 26 January 2001, p. 30. 60. Raphael Mahler, ‘Jews in Public Service and the Liberal Professions in Poland, 1918–39’, Jewish Social Studies VI:4 (October 1944): 291–350 and particularly pp. 337–38. Israel M. Biderman, Mayer Balaban: Historian of Polish Jewry (New York: Dr I. Biderman Book Committee, 1976), pp. 75–6. 61. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 12 August 2004. 62. Mahler, ‘Jews in Public Service and the Liberal Professions in Poland’, pp. 308–9, 313, and 318–23. 63. International Law Association Reports of Conferences 1934 and 1938 with list of members. 64. Memorandum by Raphael Lemkin to General John M. Weir, 20 June 1945, RG 153 Box 77 File 107–9. 65. William Korey, ‘Raphael Lemkin: “The Unofficial Man’’ ’, Midstream (June–July 1989), p. 46. Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Session of the North Carolina Bar Association (Durham N.C.: Christian Printing Co, 1942), pp. 106–7. 66. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, p. 54. 67. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 11 August 2004. 68. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, pp. 44–5. 69. Memorandum by Raphael Lemkin, 20 June 1945. 70. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 11 August 2004. 71. Yahraes, ‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, pp. 28–9. 72. Memorandum by Lemkin, 20 June 1945. Segesser and Gessler, ‘Punishment of War Crimes’, p. 458. 73. Raphael Lemkin, ‘La protection de la paix par le droit penal interne ’, Revue Internationale De Droit Penal no. 1 (1938): 95–126. Summary of Activities of Raphael Lemkin pp. 14–15, reel 2.

2

Escape from Poland

1. Martin Gilbert, Second World War (London: Fontana, 1990), pp. 1–7. Alexander B. Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology and Atrocity (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003), p. 1. 2. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, p. l. Stefan Waydenfeld, The Ice Road (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1999), p. 6.

Notes 287 3. William Korey, ‘Raphael Lemkin, “The Unofficial Man” ’, Midstream (June– July 1989), p. 346 and Maza, Herbert Maza, Neuf Meneurs Internationaux de l’initiative individuelle dans l’institution des organisations internationales (Paris: Sirey, 1965), p. 349. 4. Lemkin, Autobiography, Chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, pp. 2–3. 5. Lemkin, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, pp. 3–8, 23–6 and 30–3. 6. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’ p. 27. 7. Waydenfeld, The Ice Road, pp. 37–43 and Jerzy Lando, Saved By My Face (Edinbugh: Mainstream, 2002), p. 29. 8. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, pp. 27–9. 9. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, pp. 29–30. Gilbert, Second World War, p. 9. 10. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, p. 30. 11. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, p. 31. 12. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, pp. 31–2. 13. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, pp. 32 –4. 14. Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: History’s Age of Hatred (London: Allen Lane, 2006), p. 419. 15. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, pp. 38–9. 16. Alexander B. Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland, pp 1–2 and 233–34. 17. Norman Rose, Chaim Weizmann: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1986), p. 317. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (London: Abacus, 1997), pp. 125–26. Franz Borkenau, The New German Empire (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1939), pp. 130–32. 18. Gotz Aly and Susanne Heim, Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2002), pp. 39–72 and 176–7. 19. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, p. 42. 20. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 11 and 12 August 2004. 21. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, pp. 44–5. 22. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘The Flight’, pp. 45–6. 23. Ruth Wetter to the author, 7 August 2003. 24. Israel Cohen, Vilna (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1943), p. 469 and Maza, Neuf Meneurs Internationaux de l’initiative individuelle dans l’institution des organisations internationals, p. 349. 25. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, p. 48. Chaim Grade, My Mother’s Sabbath Days. A Memoir (New York: Schocken Books, 1987), p. 224. 26. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, p. 48. Lucy Davidowicz, From That Place and Time. A Memoir 1938–1947 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1989), p. 208. 27. Herman Kruk, The Last days of the Jerusalem of Lithuania: Chronicles from the Vilna Ghetto and Camps. 1939–1944 ed. Benjamin Harshav (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. XXVI and 28. 28. Ben-Cion Pinchuk, Shtetl Jews Under Soviet Rule: Eastern Poland on the Eve of the Holocaust (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 37–8. 29. Memorandum by Raphael Lemkin to General John M. Weir, 20 June 1945, RG 153 Box 77 File 107–9. 30. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, pp. 49–50. 31. Herman Kruk, Chronicles from the Vilna Ghetto, pp. 29–31. 32. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, p. 50. 33. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, pp. 50–1.

288

Notes

34. Raphael Lemkin, La Reglementation des Paiements Internationaux (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1939) passim and Curriculum Vitae, p. 12, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 35. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, p. 527. Review of Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, reel 3, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 36. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, p. 54. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 11 August 2004. 37. Ruth Wetter to author, 7 August 2003 and 21 March 2004. 38. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, pp. 53 and 55–9. 39. Koppel Pinson introduction to Simon Dubnow, Nationalism and History (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1958), p. 48. Nathan Rotenstreich, ‘History, Sociology and Ideology’ in Aaron Steinberg ed., Simon Dubnov. L’Homme et Son Qeuvre (Paris: World Jewish Congress, 1963), p. 54. 40. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter 3, pp. 60–1. Sophie Erlich-Dubnov, ‘La Vie de Simon Dubnov’ in Nationalism and History (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1958), p. 25. Dubnow, Nationalism and History, p. 355. 41. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, pp. 63–4. Martin Gilbert, Second World War, pp. 53–8. 42. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, pp. 64–5. 43. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, p. 67. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans by Ralph Manheim (PIimlico: London, 1955), p. 620 and Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889–1936: Hubris (London: Penguin Books, 1999), pp. 152 and 244. 44. Lucy Davidowicz, The War Against the Jews 1933–45 (Harmondsworth Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 142–43. 45. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), p. 28. 46. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, p. 67. 47. Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889–1936: Hubris, pp. 248–49. 48. Lucy Davidowicz, The War against the Jews 1933–45, pp. 149–50. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. 76–7 and 544–45. Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (London: Pan Books, 2001), p. 594. Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy 1939–42 (London: Arrow Books, 2005), pp. 81–9 and 111–68. Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1980), p. 51. 49. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Flight from the Russians’, pp. 66–9. 50. Laqueur, The Terrible Secret, p. 11. 51. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Interlude in Lithuania’, pp. 70–8. Kruk, Chronicles from the Vilna Ghetto, p. 49, n. 13. 52. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Interlude in Lithuania’, pp. 88–90.

3

Early Years in the United States

1. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, pp. 91–3. 2. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, p. 93. 3. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, pp. 93–4. The Polish Penal Code of 1932 and the Law of Minor Offenses trans. by Raphael Lemkin and Malcolm McDermott (Durham, n. Carolina: Duke University Press, 1939), pp. 7–9.

Notes 289 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33.

Lemkin, Autobiography, pp. 93–4. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, p. 94. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, p. 94. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, pp. 95–6. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, pp. 96–8. Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction (London: Butterworths, 1984), p. 190. Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Session of the North Carolina Bar Association (Durham N.C.: Christian Printing Co, 1942), pp. 107–8. Raphael Lemkin, ‘The Treatment of Young Offenders in Continental Europe’, Law and Contemporary Problems IX: 4 (Autumn 1942): 748–59. Raphael Lemkin, ‘Orphans of Living Parents: A Comparative Legal and Sociological View’, Law and Contemporary Problems X: 5 (Summer 1944): 834–54. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, pp. 98–9. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, pp. 100–1. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, p. 104. The Volkovsyk Memorial Book, Part 1, p. 329. Ben-Cion Pinchuk, Shtetl Jews Under Soviet Rule, pp. 49–55, and The Volkovsyk Memorial Book, Part 1, p. 330. Joseph and Bella Lemkin to Raphael Lemkin, 25 May 1941, Lemkin Collection, p-154, box 1/4 American Jewish Historical Society. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, p. 104. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 12 August 2004. Ben-Cion Pinchuk, Shtetl Jews under Soviet Rule, p. 118. Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret, p. 12. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter 5 pp. 99 and 105. David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews. America and the Holocaust 1941– 1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), pp. 20 and 21. Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Allen Lane, 2006, pp. XXIII-XXVI, 9–11, 465–7, and 476–85. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’ p. 105. Catherine Bradshaw Boyd to Raphael Lemkin 12 April 1951, box 1/2 American Jewish Archives. Malcolm McDermott to Lemkin 25 February 1948, Lemkin Collection, p-154, box 1/6 American Jewish Historical Society. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. XIV–XV. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, p. 103, and Lemkin, Axis Control in Occupied Europe pp. 31, 59, and 229. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘A Pole Discovers America’, pp. 100–3. Raphael Lemkin, Readings on Military Government in Europe. Part 1-Translations of Statutory Material (Charlottesville, virginia: School of Military Government, 1942). Herbert Yahraes, ‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, Collier’s, 3 March 1951, p. 56. David Fromkin, In the Time of Americans (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 422–23. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘My Work in Washington…’, p. 1. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Life in the Twentieth Century. Innocent Beginnings, 1917–1950 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), p. 295. Eleanor Lansing Dulles, Chances of a Lifetime (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1980), p. 167. Raphael Lemkin to Eleanor Dulles, 28 August 1946, Lemkin Papers 1/13, American Jewish Archives. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘My Work in Washington…’, p. 1. David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, p. 20.

290 Notes 34. Laqueur, The Terrible Secret, pp. 94 and 95. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, pp. 45–7 and 71–3 and 311–13. Richard Breitman, Official Secrets. What the Nazis Planned, what the British and Americans Knew (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), pp. 150–52. 35. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘My Work in Washington…’, p. 7. 36. Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (London: Frank Cass, 1967), pp. 550–51. 37. Schlesinger, A Life in the Twentieth Century, pp. 305–7. 38. Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (London: Bloomsbury, 1993), p. 49. 39. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘My Work in Washington…’, p. 2. 40. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘My Work in Washington…’, pp. 2–3. 41. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘My Work in Washington…’, p. 3. 42. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, pp. 55 and 152. 43. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘My Work in Washington…’, pp. 3–4. 44. Raphael Lemkin to Eleanor Roosevelt, 1 February 1950, Lemkin Collection, p-154, box 2/3 American Jewish Historical Society. 45. Raphael Lemkin to Eleanor Roosevelt, 18 May 1946, Lemkin Papers 1/13, American Jewish Archives. 46. Breitman, Official Secrets, pp. 195–201. Rafael Medoff, ‘Conflict between American Jewish Leaders and Dissidents over Responding to News of the Holocaust: 1942 to 1943’, Journal of Genocide Research 5:3 (September 2003): 439–50. 47. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘My Work in Washington…’, pp. 7–8. 48. Raphael Lemkin to Rifat Tirana, 10 November 1942 and Philip Dunaway to Raphael Lemkin, 7 December 1942, Lemkin Papers, box 1/13 and box 1/4 American Jewish Archives. 49. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘My Work in Washington…’, pp. 5–6. Agreement between Raphael Lemkin and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1944, Lemkin Papers, box 2/20 American Jewish Archives. 50. Raphael Lemkin to George Finch, 21 July 1942 with a copy of the review and George Finch to Raphael Lemkin, 24 July 1942, Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY) Archives Series I.L. (Publications) Box 83/8, Columbia University. 51. Raphael Lemkin to George Finch, 22 April 1943 and 5 June 1943, CCNY Archives Series I.L. (Publications) Box 83/8, Columbia University. 52. George Finch to Raphael Lemkin, 24 July 1942 and draft agreement, CCNY Archives Series I.L. (Publications) Box 83/8, Columbia University. 53. Proceedings of the Forty-fourth Annual Session of the North Carolina Bar Association, pp. 107–16. 54. Agreement between Raphael Lemkin and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1944, Lemkin Papers, box 2/20 American Jewish Archives. 55. George Finch to Raphael Lemkin, 20 December 1943, CCNY Archives Series I.L. (Publications) Box 83/8. 56. Memorandum on motion picture production of Raphael Lemkin’s volume, 27 January 1944. Fulton Brylawski to George Finch, 28 March 1944 with draft agreement, CCNY Archives Series I.L. (Publications) Box 83/8, Columbia University. 57. Raphael Lemkin to George Finch, 12 May 1944, CCNY Archives Series I.L. (Publications) Box 83/8, Columbia University. 58. Luise M. Sillcox to Raphael Lemkin, 6 July 1944, Lemkin Collection, p-154, box 1/4 American Jewish Historical Society. George Finch to Louise Schatz, 21 August 1944 and Louise Schatz to George Finch, 6 November 1944, CCNY Archives Series I.L. (Publications) Box 83/8, Columbia University.

Notes 291

4 The Publication of His Master Work and the Nuremberg Tribunal 1. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. X, 8 9, and 21. Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Allen Lane Penguin Books, 1998), pp. 161 and 162. 2. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. XI and 79. 3. Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 40–3. Beate Ziegs, Raphael Lemkin und die Volkermordkonvention, p. 1. www.hist.net/ag-genozid/lemkin.htm 4. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 80. 5. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. 79 and 80. 6. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. 75–89. 7. The Ottowa Citizen, 8 April 2001. 8. Raphael Lemkin to Judge Harry Fisher, 19 April 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/1 American Jewish Historical Society. 9. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. XI, XII, XIX and 82. Adam Tooze, Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Allen Lane Penguin Books, 2006), pp. 467–68. 10. Christian Zenter and Friedemann Bedurftig, The Encyclopedia of the Third Reich (New York: De Capo Press, 1997), p. 248. 11. Tooze, Nazi Economy, pp. 463–85. 12. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp.X, 17 and 21–4. 13. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2001), p. 18. 14. Washington Post, 3 December 1944, B4. 15. Washington Post, 3 December 1944, B4. 16. Washington Post, 3 December 1944, B4. 17. Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin, p. 19. 18. Memorandum of Miss Stanton to George Finch, 24 October 1944 and George Finch to Raphael Lemkin, 24 October 1944, CCNY Archives Series I.L. (Publications) Box 83/8, Columbia University. 19. Otto D. Tolischus, ‘Twentieth-Century Moloch: The Nazi-Inspired Totalitarian State, Devourer of Progress – and of itself’, New York Times Book Review, 21 January 1945, pp. 1 and 24. 20. Leopold Kohr to Raphael Lemkin, 2 January 1944 [1945] and draft review, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/11 American Jewish Archives. 21. Power, A Problem from Hell pp. 39–40. Yisrael Gutman, ‘Goldhagen – His Critics and His Contribution’, Yad Vashem Studies XXVI (1998): 329–364. 22. Arthur K. Kuhn, review in American Journal of International Law 39:2 (April 1945): 360–62. 23. Merle Fainsod, review in Harvard Law Review 58 (1945): 744. 24. George Finch to Major General H. Hilldring, director Civil Affairs Division, War Department, 28 October 1944, CCNY Archives Series I.L. (Publications) Box 83/8, Columbia University. 25. Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1983), pp. 9–14. 26. Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (London: Andre Deutsch, 1977), pp. 27–9. Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (London: Bloomsbury, 1993), pp. 34–7.

292

Notes

27. Walter Gerson to Lemkin, 8 January 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/7, American Jewish Archives. 28. Memoranda of Norman A. Stoll to General Weir, 22 May 1945 and of C.L. Yancey to Chief Clerk JAGO, 26 July 1946, RG153 Box 77 File 107–9. 29. Memorandum of Raphael Lemkin to General John M. Weir, 20 June 1945, RG 153 Box 77 File 107–9. 30. Shlomo Aronson, ‘Preparations for the Nuremberg Trial: The O.S.S., Charles Dwork, and the Holocaust’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 12:2 (1998): 257–81. 31. The Trial of the Major German War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany Vol. 1 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1946), pp. 1–11. 32. Raphael Lemkin to Colonel Telford Taylor, 28 September 1945, Lemkin Papers, reel 4, New York Public Library. 33. Summary of Raphael Lemkin’s Autobiography, pp. 3 and 4, Lemkin Papers, reel 2, New York Public Library. Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann Vol. XXII Series A, ed. Joseph Heller (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1979), pp. 36 and 42. Chaim Weizmann to Robert Jackson, 18 October 1945. Weizmann Archives, File 2608; and Robert Jackson to Chaim Weizmann, 7 January 1946, ibid., File 2623. Michael R. Marrus, ‘The Holocaust at Nuremberg’, Yad Vashem Studies XXVI (1998), pp. 13–14. 34. Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, p. 103. Nuremberg Trials Vol. 1 pp. 11–28. 35. Nuremberg Trials Vol. 1 pp. 28–30. Johannes Morsinck, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 6. 36. Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg, p. 59. John P. Fox, ‘The Jewish Factor in British War Crimes Policy in 1942’, English Historical Review XCII: 362 (January 1977): 82–106. 37. Memorandum of Sidney S. Alderman to Mr Shea and Colonel Taylor on ‘Dr Lemkin’s Study on Karl Haushofer’, 7 September 1945, RG153 Box 61 File 100-737. 38. Lemkin to General John M. Weir, 12 September 1945, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/13, American Jewish Archives. 39. Lemkin Papers, Description of the Project, (E) Offices Held, reel 3, New York Public Library. 40. Tribune, 23 November 1945. 41. Times Literary Supplement, 22 September 1945. 42. Summary of Raphael Lemkin’s Autobiography, p. 3, Lemkin Papers, reel 2, New York Public Library. 43. Memorandum of Raphael Lemkin to Sidney Rubinstein, 24 January 1946, RG153 Box 61 File 100-737. 44. Memorandum of Raphael Lemkin to Damon M. Gunn, 30 January 1946, RG 153 Box 61 File 100-737. 45. Memorandum of Raphael Lemkin to Damon M. Gunn, 30 January 1946, and Tokyo Office to War Department Washington, 11 February 1946, RG153 Box 61 File 100-737. 46. Memorandum of Damon M. Gunn to Joseph Keenan on the ‘Connection of Dr Haushofer in the Tokyo Conspiracy’, 1 February 1946, RG153 Box 61 File 100-737. 47. Robert Jackson to Joseph Keenan, 5 March 1946, RG153 Box 61 File 100-737. Washington Evening Star, 14 March 1946.

Notes 293 48. Summary of Raphael Lemkin’s Autobiography, p. 3, Lemkin Papers, reel 2, New York Public Library. 49. Memorandum of Raphael Lemkin to James M. McHaney, 8 August 1946, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/13, American Jewish Archives. 50. James J. Martin, The Man Who Invented Genocide. The Public Career and Consequences of Raphael Lemkin (Torrance, California: Institute of Historical Review, 1984), p. 7. 51. Summary of Raphael Lemkin’s Autobiography, p. 3, Lemkin Papers, reel 2, New York Public Library. 52. Donnedieu de Vabres to Raphael Lemkin, 28 December 1945, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/18 American Jewish Historical Society. 53. Nuremberg Trials Vol. 17 p. 188. Raphael Lemkin to David Maxwell Fyfe, 26 August 1946, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/18 American Jewish Historical Society. 54. The Times, 29 July 1946. 55. Nuremberg Trials Vol. 19, pp. 431–32. 56. Nuremberg Trials Vol. 19, pp. 407 and 448–57. 57. Raphael Lemkin to Trygve Lie, 20 May 1946, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/13 American Jewish Archives. 58. U.S. Army Medical Report on Lemkin, 19 July 1946, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/13 American Jewish Historical Society; and Office of the Registrar 385 Station Hospital record of hospitalization, 26 July 1946, Lemkin Papers, Box 5/7, American Jewish Archives. 59. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 11 August 2004, and Herbert Yahraes, ‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, Collier’s, 3 March 1951, p. 56. 60. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 11 August 2004, and The Volkovsyk Memorial Book, translated by Jacob Solomon Berger (Mahwah N.J., 2002) Part 1, p. 413. 61. Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin, p. 26. 62. Summary of Raphael Lemkin’s Autobiography, p. 3, Lemkin Papers, reel 2, New York Public Library. International Law Association Report of the 41st Conference 1946, ‘Report of the Forty-First Law Conference Cambridge 1946’ (London: International Law Association, 1948), pp. 25–7. 63. Raphael Lemkin to the Hon. John J. Parker, 27 August 1946 enclosing a copy of a letter of Lord Porter of 24 August 1946, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/13 and Box 2/11 American Jewish Archives. 64. Raphael Lemkin, ‘The Protection of Basic Human Rights of Minorities in the Forthcoming Peace Treaties’, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 7/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 65. Yahraes, p. 56. 66. Bernard D. Meltzer, ‘The Nuremberg Trial: A Prosecutor’s Perspective’, Journal of Genocide Research 4:4 (2002), pp. 562 and 563. 67. Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, pp. 582–88. Meltzer, Nuremberg Trial, p. 563. 68. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, p. 484. 69. Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial. War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 62 and 89. 70. Memorandum of Rafael Lemkin, ‘Observations on War Crimes and Genocide’, p. 7, Wiener Library. 71. Biographical summary of Lemkin’s career and note of Dr C. Savage, 28 June 1946, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Boxes 1/1 and 1/13 American Jewish Historical Society. 72. William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 47–50.

294

5

Notes

The United Nations Resolution on Genocide

1. Raphael Lemkin, Les actes constituant un danger general (interetatique) consideres comme delits de droit des gens (Paris: A. Pedone, 1933), p. 4. Proceedings of the Fortyfourth Annual Session of the North Carolina Bar Association (Durham N.C.: Christian Printing Co., 1942), p. 112. 2. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. 90–5. 3. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2001), p. 25. 4. Raphael Lemkin, ‘Genocide’, American Scholar 15:2 (1946): 1–4. 5. Lemkin, Genocide, p. 4. 6. Summary of Activities of Raphael Lemkin, p. 7, Lemkin Papers, reel 2, New York Public Library. 7. Raphael Lemkin, ‘Genocide a New International Crime, Punishment and Prevention’, Revue Internationale de Droit Penal 3 and 4 (1946): 360–70. Raphael Lemkin, ‘The Crime of Genocide’, Bulletin de la Commission internationale penale et penitentiaire XII (1946): 34–43. Summary of Activities of Raphael Lemkin, p. 6, Lemkin Papers, reel 2, New York Public Library. 8. International Law Association Report of the 41st Conference 1946, pp. 25–7. 9. Yahraes, ‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, Collier’s, 3 March 1951, p. 56. Biographical summary of Raphael Lemkin’s career, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/1 American Jewish Historical Society. 10. John P. Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations, A Great Adventure (Epping, Essex: Bowker Publishing Co, 1983), p. 54. 11. Yahraes, He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime, p. 56. 12. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, p. 5. 13. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, p. 4. 14. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, pp. 5–7. 15. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, p. 6. 16. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, pp. 7–8, and Korey, Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin, p. 27. 17. Yahraes, He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime, p. 56. 18. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, pp. 3–4. 19. John Hohenberg, ‘The Crusade That Changed the U.N.’, Saturday Review 9 November 1968, p. 86. 20. John Hohenberg, ‘The Crusade That Changed the U.N.’, p. 86. 21. Samathana Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 51–2. 22. Korey, Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin, p. 30, draft resolution on genocide 2 November 1946, United Nations A/BUR/50 and letter of Raphael Lemkin to New York Times, 8th November 1946. 23. Draft resolution on the Crime of Genocide, A/BUR/50, 2 November 1946, UN Library. 24. Lemkin, Autobiography, chaper entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, pp. 8–9, and Hohenberg, ‘The Crusade That Changed the U.N.’, p. 87. 25. Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson. Master of the Senate (London: Jonathan Cape, 2002), p. 141. 26. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, p. 9. 27. Tass Agency, 16 July 1946, PRO FO371/59808, and correspondence between the International Assembly of Women and Miss L. Hartford and Lady Reading, 8 April 1946, and Heathcote-Smith Memorandum, 14 August 1946, PRO

Notes 295

46.

FO371/59827. New York Times 14, 17 and 20 October 1946 and New York Herald Tribune, 14, 17 and 20 October 1946. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, pp. 9–11, and New York Herald Tribune, 17 October 1946. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, p. 11. Yahraes, He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime, p. 29. Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers (London: Sphere Books, 1972). Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, p. 12. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, p. 12. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, pp. 12–13. Jan Masaryk, Minorities and the Democratic State (London: Jewish Historical Society of England, 1943), p. 20. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, pp. 13–14. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, pp. 14–16. Journal of the United Nations, 25 November 1946. Eric Beckett to McKinnon Wood, 23 November 1946 PRO FO371/59795. Journal of the United Nations, 2 December 1946. United Kingdom UN Delegation to Foreign Office, 12 December 1946 PRO FO371/59800. Patrick Dean to Eric Beckett, 19 November 1946 and Patrick Dean to Hartley Shawcross, 6 December 1946 PRO FO371/59837. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’, pp. 17–20. Raphael Lemkin to T. Thackerey, 23 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. Saudi delegation ‘Draft Protocol for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide’, 26 November 1946 A/C. 6/86, UN Library. William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 42–5. Sixth Committee, Draft Report on the Crime of Genocide, 6 December 1946 A/C. 6/120 pp. 1–4, UN Library. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Birth of the Convention’ p. 21.

6

1947, the First Draft of the Convention

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45.

1. Memorandum of conversation between Raphael Lemkin and Carl Marcy, 25 February 1947, RG 59 Box 2186 File 501. BD/Genocide 1947–48. 2. Raphael Lemkin to Hartley Shawcross, 8 July 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67519. 3. William Korey, Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2001), p. 30. Joe J. Heydecker and Johannes Leeb, The Nuremberg Trial (Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 95. 4. Pella to Lemkin, 15 December 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/18 American Jewish Historical Society; Pella to Lemkin, 2 November 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/11 American Jewish Archives. 5. Raphael Lemkin to unknown correspondent, 19 August 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/18 American Jewish Historical Society. 6. Draft convention on genocide. Note by Secretary-General, 18 July 1947. P.R.O. FO 371/67519. 7. P.R.O. FO 371/67520 draft of the Genocide Convention (UN document E/477), pp. 17, 18 and 27. 8. P.R.O. FO 371/67520 draft of Genocide Convention E/477, p. 22. 9. P.R.O. FO 371/67520 draft of the Genocide Convention E/447, pp. 27–8.

296 Notes 10. Isaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder. Two Studies in the History of Ideas (London: Hogarth Press, 1976), pp. 153 and 182. 11. Koppel Pinson introduction to Simon Dubnow, Nationalism and History (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1958), p. 48. Nathan Rotenstreich, ‘History, Sociology and Ideology’ in Aaron Steinberg ed., Simon Dubnov, L’Homme et Son Oeuvre (Paris: World Jewish Congress, 1963), p. 54. 12. Pinson, Nationalism and History, pp. 51 and 57. 13. Raphael Lemkin to Karl Renner, 29 March 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/15 American Jewish Archives. 14. Robert S. Wistrich, Socialism and the Jews. The Dilemmas of Assimilation in Germany and Austria-Hungary (London: Associated University Presses, 1982), pp. 303–4; A.L. Patkin, The Origins of the Russian-Jewish Labour Movement (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1947), pp. 175–82. Theodor Hanf, ‘Reducing Conflict through Cultural Autonomy: Karl Renner’s Contribution’, in Uri Ra’anan et al. eds, State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies, the Breakup of Multinational States (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 33–52. 15. P.R.O. FO 371/67520 draft of the Genocide Convention E/447, pp. 35 and 41–3. 16. Mrs Ruth Wetter to the author, 7 August 2003. 17. Miriam Milliren to Raphael Lemkin, 28 June 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 18. P.R.O. FO371/67573 Minute of Eric Beckett, 26 February 1947. Knighted in 1948, William Eric Beckett was a Q.C. and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. 19. P.R.O. FO 371/67573 17 March 1947. 20. Raphael Lemkin to Hartley Shawcross, 8 July 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67519. 21. J.L. Brierly to Eric Beckett, 7 July 1947, and Hartley Shawcross to Eric Beckett, 21 July 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67519. 22. William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 55. 23. W.W. Simpson to Ernest Bevin, 7 January 1948, P.R.O. FO371/72692. 24. Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel. from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1977), pp. 279–83. 25. Maurice Perlzweig to Raphael Lemkin, 29 August 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/18 American Jewish Historical Society. 26. Henri Monneray to Raphael Lemkin, 26 September 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/18 American Jewish Historical Society. 27. Leon Kubowitzki to Raphael Lemkin, 23 June 1947, World Jewish Congress Papers, B84/6 American Jewish Archives. 28. Circular of Maurice Perlzweig of 10 July 1947, World Jewish Congress Papers, B84/6 American Jewish Archives. 29. Memorandum of the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations with a letter to Trygve Lie, 24 July 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67519. 30. Maurice Perlzweig to Raphael Lemkin, 29 August 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/18 American Jewish Historical Society. 31. Economic and Social Council transcript of the fifth session, P.R.O. FO 371/67520. 32. Minute by C.D.W. O’Neill, 29 July 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67519. 33. Resolution of ECOSOC dated 6 August 1947, and United Kingdom delegation to UN to Foreign Office 8 August 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67519. 34. Notes of conference between the AJC and the American UN Association, 29 July 1947 and memorandum of Moses Moskowitz, 21 August 1947, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Boxes 91 and 92 Yivo.

Notes 297 35. Stephen Wise to Dr S. Cahn-Debré, 28 August 1947, World Jewish Congress Papers, B84/6 American Jewish Archives. 36. Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 63. 37. Dr S. Cahn-Debré to Stephen Wise, 11 and 18 September 1947, World Jewish Congress Papers, B84/6 American Jewish Archives. 38. Memorandum from Ernest Gross and Dean Rusk to Robert Lovett, 10 September 1947, RG 59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/Genocide 1945–949. 39. Memorandum of H. Dubinsky, 17 September 1947, World Jewish Congress Papers, B84/6 American Jewish Archives. 40. Stephen Wise to William Green, 26 August 1947, World Jewish Congress Papers, B84/6 American Jewish Archives. 41. Raphael Lemkin to Cardinal Spellman’s secretary, 30 September 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/18 American Jewish Historical Society. 42. Memorandum of Dr Jacoby, 2 October 1947, World Jewish Congress Papers, B84/6 American Jewish Archives. 43. UK delegation to UN to Foreign Office 3 October 1947, P.R.O. FO371/67521. 44. UK delegation to UN to Foreign Office, 6 October 1947, P.R.O. 371/67521. 45. Rumbold of Commonwealth Relations Office to Mason of the Foreign Office, 7 October 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67521. 46. Memorandum of H. Dubinsky, 13 October 1947, World Jewish Congress Papers, B84/6 American Jewish Archives. 47. Abba Eban, An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 101–2. 48. James Rosenberg to Jack Tate, 12 July 1948, RG59 Box 2186 File 501. BD/Genocide 1947–948. 49. Raphael Lemkin to T. Thackerey, 23 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 50. Memorandum of Max Gottchalk, 7 November 1947, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 51. UK delegation to UN to Foreign Office 25 November 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67521; and Raphael Lemkin to T. Thackerey, 23 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 52. John Hohenberg, ‘The Crusade That Changed the U.N.’ Saturday Review, 9 November 1968, pp. 86–7. 53. Draft brief for the UK delegation to the Sixth Session of the Economic and Social Council on Genocide, P.R.O. FO 371/67519. 54. Beth Van Schaak, ‘The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot’, Yale Law Journal 106:7 (May 1997): 2264–268. 55. Terry Martin, ‘The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing’, Journal of Modern History 70 (December 1998): 813–61. Minute of J.H. Brimmell, 13 July 1948, P.R.O. FO371/71676. 56. G.G. Fitzmaurice to Hartley Shawcross, 16 August 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67519. 57. Raphael Lemkin to T. Thackerey, 23 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 58. Herbert Yahraes,‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, Collier’s, 3 March 1951, p. 56. 59. UK delegation to UN to Foreign Office, 25 November 1947, FO 371/67521. 60. John Fried to Raphael Lemkin, 3 October 1947, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 61. Maxwell Geismar ed., Unfinished Business. James N. Rosenberg Papers (Mamaroneck, New York: Vincent Marasia Press, 1967), 169–70.

298

Notes

62. Lemkin to Gertrude Samuels, 12 January 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 63. Yahraes, ‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, p. 56; Memorandum for Dr Marcus, 8 December 1947, World Jewish Congress Papers, B84/6 American Jewish Archives. 64. Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations to Trygve Lie, 24 July 1947, P.R.O. FO371/67519, and Leonard Stein to R. Arculus, 6 November 1947 and R. Arculus to Leonard Stein, 24 November 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67521. 65. Dame Pauline Haslett to Clement Attlee, 26 September 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67520, and Katherine M. Cowan to Ernest Bevin, 9 December 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67521. 66. Cable of Francois Mauriac, Pearl Buck and Lemkin to Refling Hagen, 3 September 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/18 American Jewish Historical Society. S. Eley to Pearl Buck, 6 October 1947, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 67. United Nations resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and minute of R. Arculus, 28 November 1947, P.R.O. FO 371/67521. New York Times, 22 November 1947. 68. W.W. Simpson to Ernest Bevin, 7 January 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 69. Foreign Office minute, 12 January 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 70. James Rosenberg to Jack Tate, 12 July 1948, RG59 Box 2186 File 501. BD/Genocide 1945–949. 71. Hector McNeil to W.W. Simpson, 19 January 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 72. W.W. Simpson to Hector McNeil, 24 January 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 73. Minutes of R. Arculus, 30 January 1948, and D. Hildyard, 5 February 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/6772692. 74. UK delegation to UN to Foreign Office, 14 February 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 75. Minute of D. Hildyard, 16 February 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 76. UK delegation to the UN to the Foreign Office 14 February 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 77. UK delegation to UN to Foreign Office from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, 14 February 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 78. UK delegation to the UN to the Foreign Office, 24 February 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 79. UK delegation to the UN to the Foreign Office 8 March 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 80. Secretary-General to the Foreign Secretary, 18 March 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692.

7

Private Life

1. Ruth Wetter to the author, 7 August 2003, and telephone interview with Ruth Wetter, 6 January 2004; Raphael Lemkin to Eleanor Dulles, 28 August 1946, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/13 American Jewish Archives. 2. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 27 June 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 3. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 9 August 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 4. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 27 June 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 5. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 6 July 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. New Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 2002), Vol. 7, p. 569.

Notes 299 6. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 27 June 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 7. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 28 June 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 8. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 9 August 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 9. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 20 July 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 10. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 9 August 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 Amercan Jewish Historical Society. 11. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 23 June 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 12. Miriam Milliren to Raphael Lemkin, 28 and 30 June 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 13. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 9 August 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 14. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 11 October 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 15. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 26 October 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 16. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 18 September 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/18 American Jewish Historical Society. 17. Trudy Sladek to Raphael Lemkin, 4 February 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/6 American Jewish Historical Society. 18. Miriam Milliren to Raphael Lemkin, 13 June 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/6 American Jewish Historical Society. 19. Miriam Milliren to Raphael Lemkin, 5 September 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/6 Amercan Jewish Historical Society. 20. Miriam Milliren to Raphael Lemkin, 19 July 1953, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/8 American Jewish Archives. 21. Rosemary McKay to Raphael Lemkin, undated, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/8 American Jewish Archives. 22. Two undated letters from Hazel Metcalfe to Raphael Lemkin, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/19 American Jewish Archives. 23. Hazel Metcalfe to Raphael Lemkin, 23 February 1951, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/4 American Jewish Historical Society. 24. Elizabeth Nowinski to Raphael Lemkin, 16 November 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/9 American Jewish Archives. 25. Elizabeth Nowinski to Raphael Lemkin, undated, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/19 American Jewish Archives. 26. Elizabeth Nowinski to Raphael Lemkin, undated, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/19 American Jewish Archives. 27. Anna May Barbour to Raphael Lemkin, 29 August 1948 and 18 December 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/6 American Jewish Historical Society. 28. Anna May Barbour to Raphael Lemkin, 21 August 1951 and 24 June 1952, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/19 American Jewish Archives. 29. Margot Doehler to Raphael Lemkin, 11 August 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/6 American Jewish Historical Society. 30. Herbert J. Strong to Raphael Lemkin, 6 October 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/6 American Jewish Historical Society.

300 Notes 31. Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 77. 32. Walter Glocer to Raphael Lemkin, 17 May 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/6 American Jewish Historical Society; Blum and Jolles to Raphael Lemkin, 13 November 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/20 American Jewish Archives. 33. Agreement of 12 September 1947 between Raphael Lemkin and Kurt Grossman; Kurt Grossman to Raphael Lemkin, 21 October 1947, Raphael Lemkin to Kurt Grossman, 21 October 1947, and Kurt Grossman to Raphael Lemkin ,10 November 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 34. Robert Oppenheimer to Raphael Lemkin, 24 October 1947 and 17 November 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 35. Raphael Lemkin to Kalman Stein, 25 October 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 36. Elias and Lisa Lemkin to Raphael Lemkin, 5 July 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 11 August 2004. 37. Raphael Lemkin to Kalman Stein, 25 October 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 38. Ruth Agulnik to Raphael Lemkin, 30 October 1947, 5 November and 8 November 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 39. Kalman Stein to Raphael Lemkin, 6 November 1947, and Ruth Agulnik to Raphael Lemkin, 8 November 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/5, American Jewish Historical Society; Ruth Agulnik to Raphael Lemkin, 17 May 1948, and Elias Lemkin to Raphael Lemkin, 1 October 1948 and 6 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/6 American Jewish Historical Society. 40. E-mail from Ruth Agulnik to author, 22 August 2004; interview with Saul Lemkin, 12 August 2004. 41. Interviews with Saul Lemkin, 11 and 12 August 2004.

8 Yale and Geneva 1. Herbert Yahraes, ‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, Collier’s, 3 March 1951, p. 56. Secretary of Yale University to Raphael Lemkin, 17 April 1948, 18 June 1949, 10 June 1950, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/13 American Jewish Historical Society. 2. Yahraes, ‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, p. 56. 3. Eugene Rostow to Raphael Lemkin, 31 December 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/6 American Jewish Historical Society. 4. Reports of the Dean of the Yale Law School 1947–48, pp. 15–16; 1947–49, p. 16; 1949–50, p. 24 and 1950–51, p. 16, Yale University Library. Raphael Lemkin to Dean Wesley Sturges, 2 March 1950 and Dean Wesley Sturges to Jack Bernard Tate, 28 April 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Boxes 2/3 and 2/1 American Jewish Historical Society. 5. Raphael Lemkin to Dean Wesley Sturges, 2 March 1950, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/3 American Jewish Historical Society. Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State.Vol. 1 The Meaning of Genocide (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 43. 6. Biffy to Raphael Lemkin, 18 March 1949, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library;and Biffy to Raphael Lemkin, 28 March 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 6/3 American Jewish Archives.

Notes 301 7. Biffy to Raphael Lemkin, 16 February 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/8 American Jewish Archives. 8. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 6A–6D. 9. Carole Fink, Marc Bloch: A Life in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 331. Etienne Bloch to Raphael Lemkin, 19 June 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/2 American Jewish Archives. 10. Maxwell Geismar ed., Unfinished Business. James N. Rosenberg Papers (Mamaroneck, New York: Vincent Marasia Press, 1967), Preface, pp. 1–111; Jerold S. Auerbach, ‘Joseph M. Proskauer: American Court Jew’, American Jewish History 69 (Sept. 1979): 103–16. 11. New York Times, 11 February 1948; Geismar, Unfinished Business, pp. 169–70. 12. Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), pp. 125–26. 13. Minutes of the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, 23 April 1948, p. 2, Social Welfare History Archives (SWHA), University of Minnesota. 14. Pearl Buck to the editor of the Manchester Guardian, 22 January 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 15. New York Post, 14 February 1948. 16. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 26–7. 17. D.V. Sandifer to Ernest Gross, 14 April 1948, RG59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/Genocide 1945–949. 18. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide (UN document E/794), 24 May 1948, pp. 7 and 8, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 19. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 24 May 1948, pp. 13 and 14. 20. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 24 May 1948, pp. 17, 18, and 23. 21. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 24 May 1948, pp. 24–6. 22. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 24 May 1948, pp. 29–31. 23. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 24 May 1948, p. 32. 24. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 24 May 1948, pp. 50–3. 25. Revd. Bill Simpson to D.H.T. Hildyard, 7 May 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 26. Minutes of the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, 23 April and 13 May 1948, SWHA University of Minnesota. 27. Minutes of the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, 26 April 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. John Matkos interview with Raphael Lemkin, 16 July 1948, RG59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/Genocide 1945–949. 28. James Rosenberg to Lemkin, 11 June 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 29. Rev. Bill Simpson to D.H.T. Hildyard with enclosure, 7 May 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 30. Rev. Bill Simpson to D.H.T. Hildyard with enclosure of a copy of a letter to Rosenberg, 7 May 1948 and Foreign Office minute of D.H.T. Hildyard, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 31. Yahraes, ‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, p. 56. 32. Minutes of the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, 13 May 1948, p. 1, SWHA University of Minnesota. 33. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, p. 1, reel 2, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. Lemkin to Perez Perozo, 24 July 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society.

302

Notes

34. Zafrulla Khan to Charles Malik, 4 February 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 35. Etienne Bloch, ‘The Genocide Issue in the India-Pakistan Case’, pp. 1–29. Yale term paper, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 7/8 American Jewish Historical Society. 36. James Rosenberg to Victor Gollancz and John Slawson, 20 May 1948 and memorandum of Moses Moskowitz, 2 June 1948, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 37. Memorandum of conversation between James Rosenberg and Ernest Gross, 9 June 1948, RG59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/Genocide 1945–49. 38. James Rosenberg to Robert Lovett, 11 June 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 39. Robert Lovett to Lewis Douglas, 9 June 1948, and George Marshall to Lewis Douglas, 16 June, RG59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/Genocide 1945–49. 40. James Rosenberg to John Foster Dulles, 11 June 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 41. John Foster Dulles to James Rosenberg, 17 June 1948, RG59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/ Genocide 1945–49. 42. James Rosenberg to Julie Stuart, 11 June 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 43. James Rosenberg to Charles Malik, 11 June 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 44. United Kingdom UN delegation to Foreign Office, 18 June 1948, P.R.O FO 371/72692. 45. John Ennals to Raphael Lemkin, 2 July 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 46. Memorandum of James Rosenberg, 25 May 1948, p. 1, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 47. Meeting with James Rosenberg, Dr H.N. McCracken and Rev. W. Simpson on genocide at the Foreign Office, 29 June 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72692. 48. Minutes of the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, 20 July 1948, p. 1., SWHA University of Minnesota. 49. Steering Committee on International Organizations, item 18 of agenda of 7th session of the ECOSOC note of the Foreign Office, 12 July 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72693. 50. Memorandum of conversation between John Matkos and Raphael Lemkin, 16 July 1948, RG59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/Genocide 1945–49. 51. Memorandum of a conversation between John Matkos and Raphael Lemkin, 16 July 1948, RG59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/Genocide 1947–48. 52. Washington Post, 20 April 1948, RG59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/Genocide 1945–49. 53. Vespasian Pella to Lyman White, 5 April 1948 and Rapport sur l’activite de l’oeuvre en faveur des Israelites de nationalite Roumaine durant l’exercice 1944 (Geneva: 1945), RG59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/Genocide 1945–49. 54. Memorandum of a conversation between Vespasian Pella and John Matkos, 21 April 1948, RG59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/Genocide 1945–49. 55. Memorandum of Raphael Lemkin, undated, but probably June 1948, RG59 Box 2186 File 501.BD/Genocide 1945–49. 56. James Rosenberg to Charles Malik, 15 July 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society.

Notes 303 57. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 2–4. 58. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 4–5. 59. Julia Stuart to John Ennals, 19 July 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 60. Zafrulla Khan to Charles Malik, 4 February 1948, ECOSOC document E/634, Lemkin Papers, Box 4/7 American Jewish Archives. 61. Cable Julia Stuart to Trygve Lie, 23 July 1948, ECSOC document E/C. 2/105, Lemkin Papers, Box 3/1 American Jewish Archives. 62. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, p. 6. 63. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 6–7. 64. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 4 and 9. 65. Interoffice memoranda, 5 August and 17 August 1948, and draft genocide factsheet, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 66. John Ennals to James Rosenberg, 21 August 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 67. Charles Judd to Raphael Lemkin, 25 August 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 68. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 7–9. Richard Storry, A History of Modern Japan (Penguin Books: Harmondsworth Middlesex, 1965), p. 63. 69. Lemkin to Dr Henry Noble MacCracken, 30 August 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 70. Cable John Ennals to Julia Stuart, 16 August 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 71. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 9–11. 72. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 12–3. 73. Lemkin, Autobiograpy, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, p. 13. 74. Glendon, A World Made New, pp. 13–4. 75. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 14–5. 76. Statement of H.V. Evatt to ECOSOC entitled 25 August 1948, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/13 American Jewish Archives. 77. Raphael Lemkin to James Rosenberg, 13 September 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 78. Raphael Lemkin to Rosenberg, 30 August 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 79. Raphael Lemkin to Dr Henry Noble MacCracken, 30 August 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, American Jewish Historical Society. 80. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 15–6. 81. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 15–6, and interoffice memorandum of Claire Bossard to Raphael Lemkin of summary records of the ECOSOC meeting, 26 August 1948, p. 5. 82. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 16–7. 83. J. Paul-Boncour to James Rosenberg, 4 June 1948, and James Rosenberg to Raphael Lemkin, 11 June 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 84. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, p. 15. 85. Interoffice memorandum of Claire Brossard to Raphael Lemkin of summary records of the ECOSOC meeting, 26 August 1948, pp. 3 and 4. 86. Interoffice memorandum of Claire Brossard to Raphael Lemkin of summary records of the ECOSOC meeing, 26 August 1948, pp. 2–3.

304 Notes 87. United Kingdom delegation to UN at Geneva to British Foreign Office, 31 August 1948, P.R.O. FO371/72693. 88. Advance text of the statement of Willard Thorp to the ECOSOC, 26 August 1948, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/12 American Jewish Archives. 89. United Kingdom delegation to UN at Geneva to British Foreign Office, 31 August 1948, P.R.O. FO 371/72693. 90. Raphael Lemkin to James Rosenberg, 30th August 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 91. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, pp. 17–21. 92. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, p. 22. 93. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Geneva’, p. 23. 94. Raphael Lemkin to James Rosenberg, 13 September 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society.

9

Paris, Preliminary Discussion of the Convention

1. Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 131. 2. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 24. 3. James Rosenberg to Raphael Lemkin, 1 October 1948, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 4. Raphael Lemkin to James Rosenberg, 13 September 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 5. Raphael Lemkin to James Rosenberg, 18 July 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 6. Minutes of the United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, 20 July 1948, pp. 1 and 2, SWHA University of Minnesota. Raphael Lemkin to Willard Johnson, 22 July 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 7. Statement to a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, 4 January 1950, SWHA University of Minnesota. 8. Raphael Lemkin to Thomas Mahoney, 28 December 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 9. Raphael Lemkin to James Rosenberg, 13 September 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 10. Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1987), p. 117; and William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2001), p. 34. 11. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 24. 12. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 25–6. 13. UN General Assembly, Sixth Committee Summary Records of Meetings 21 September to 10 December 1948, 63rd Meeting, pp. 4–5. 14. 63rd Meeting, pp. 10–11, and Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 36. 15. 63rd Meeting, p. 7. 16. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 36–7. 17. 64th Meeting, pp. 17–18. 18. 64th Meeting, pp. 18–20. 19. 65th Meeting, pp. 18–20. 20. 66th Meeting, pp. 29–30.

Notes 305 21. Raphael Lemkin to Iranian foreign minister, 18 December 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 22. Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), p. 71. 23. 66th Meeting, pp. 32–3. 24. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 33–4. 25. Raphael Lemkin to Leon Kubowitzki, 11 August 1948, World Jewish Congress Papers, B84/7 American Jewish Archives. 26. A. Verbist to John Ennals, 23 June 1948 and John Ennals to A. Verbist, 1 July 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 27. 65th Meeting, pp. 22–3. 28. 66th Meeting, pp. 33–4. 29. Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention:Its Origin and Interpretation (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1949), p. 7. 30. Raphael Lemkin to James Rosenberg, 13 September 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 31. Willard Johnson to Raphael Lemkin, 21 October 1948, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/10 American Jewish Archives. Benjamin Abrams to Raphael Lemkin, 26 October 1948, Lemkin Collection, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 32. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 27–8. 33. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 32 and Le Monde, 2 and 12 October 1948. 34. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 32 and Combat, 2 November 1948. 35. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 32–3 and 34–5. 36. James Rosenberg to Raphael Lemkin, 1 October 1948, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library.

10

The First Reading of the Convention

1. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 43 and 45. 2. UN General Assembly, Sixth Committee Summary Records of Meetings 21 September to 10 December 1948, 67th Meeting, pp. 38–40. 3. 68th Meeting, pp. 52 and 53. William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 72. 4. 69th Meeting, p. 56. 5. 69th Meeting, p. 58. 6. 69th Meeting, pp. 60–1. 7. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 33. 8. Memoranda of William Frankel and Bill Simpson, 1 November 1948, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 9. 74th Meeting, pp. 102–3. 10. 74th Meeting, pp. 104–5. 11. 72nd Meeting, p. 83. 12. 79th Meeting, p. 153 and 80th Meeting, p. 167. 13. 79th Meeting, p. 155. 14. 75th Meeting, p. 115. 15. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, pp. 139–140. 16. 75th Meeting, pp. 115–6. 17. 73rd Meeting, p. 97.

306 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47.

48.

Notes 75th Meeting, p. 117. 75th Meeting, p. 120. 76th Meeting, pp. 124–25. 76th Meeting, p. 127. 77th Meeting, pp. 131, 132 and 133. 78th Meeting, p. 141; Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter on ‘Paris’, pp. 43 and 55–6. 78th Meeting, p. 142. 81st Meeting, p. 172. Raphael Lemkin to James Rosenberg circa, 21 October 1948, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 78th Meeting, pp. 145–47. 79th Meeting, pp. 155–6. 80th Meeting, p. 170. 81st Meeting, pp. 177 and 179, and Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide (document E/794), p. 6. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 45–6. 81st Meeting, p. 176. 82nd Meeting, pp. 184–86. Mary Ann Gledon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), pp. 152–53. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’ pp. 47–8, and 82nd Meeting, pp. 186–91. Queen Frederica of Greece to Ruth Gage Colby, 11 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 53. 83rd Meeting, pp. 193–95. 83rd Meeting, pp. 197–200 and 206. 83rd Meeting, pp. 205–6 and William Schabas, Genocide in International Law, pp. 184–85. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 53–4. Raphael Lemkin to Joseph Roncalli, 30 October 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 84th Meeting, p. 218. 84th Meeting, pp. 213–14 and 218, and 85th Meeting, p. 225. 84th Meeting, p. 219, and 85th Meeting, p. 229. 86th Meeting, pp. 224, and 87th Meeting, p. 253. Raphael Lemkin to M. Perrin of Féderation Nationale des Combattants Anciens Prisonniers de Guerre, 27 October 1948; Raphael Lemkin to M. Beauchamp of Féderation Nationale des Deportés du Travail, 27 October 1948, and Raphael Lemkin to M. Barral of Union Française des Associations des Combattants de la Libération et Victimes des Deux Guerres, 27 October 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. Glendon, A World Made New, p. 132. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 37–8. Raphael Lemkin to Marc Boegner, 30 October 1948, and Raphael Lemkin to Jacques Herissay, 28 October 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. Raphael Lemkin to manager of French broadcasting system New York, 3 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society.

Notes 307 49. Raphael Lemkin to M. Donot, 3 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 50. 86th Meeting, pp. 237 and 240. 51. 91st Meeting, p. 299. 52. 93rd Meeting, p. 318 and 95th Meeting, pp. 342 and 343. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter on ‘Paris’, pp. 48–9. 53. 96th Meeting, pp. 353 and 355. 54. 93rd Meeting, pp. 324 and 326. 55. 98th Meeting, pp. 373 and 379. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter on ‘Paris’, pp. 54–5. 56. 97th Meeting, pp. 363–5 and 98th Meeting, p. 381. 57. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 55. United Kingdom delegation of Paris to Foreign Office, 25 November 1948, P.R.O. FO371/72693. 58. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 55–6. 59. Gerald Fitzmaurice to Vincent Evans, 18 October 1948, P.R.O. FO371/72693. 60. 101st Meeting, p. 417. 61. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 56. 62. 102nd Meeting, pp. 421 and 423. 63. 104th Meeting, p. 447. 64. 105th Meeting, p. 454. 65. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 56–7. 66. 105th Meeting, p. 455. 67. United Kingdom delegation of Paris to Foreign Office, 25 November 1948, P.R.O. FO371/72693. 68. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 57 and 105th Meeting

11 The Convention is Adopted 1. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 57, and UN General Assembly, Sixth Committee Summary Records of Meetings 21 September to 10 December 1948, 104th Meeting, p. 440. 2. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 40–1. 3. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, p. 58. 4. United Kingdom delegation of Paris to Foreign Office, 25 November 1948, P.R.O. FO371/72693. 5. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 50–2; and Raphael Lemkin to Bishop Garber, 26 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 6. Cable of Raphael Lemkin to Simon Segal, 29 November 1948, and Joel Wolfsohn to Simon Segal, 30 November 1948, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 7. William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 76–9. 8. John Foster Dulles to James Rosenberg, 28 October 1948, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Library. 9. James Rosenberg to John Foster Dulles, 3 November 1948, and Rosenberg to Raphael Lemkin, 3 November 1948, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 10. Raphael Lemkin to Jane Evans, 28 October 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society.

308 Notes 11. Raphael Lemkin to Jeanne Eder, 11 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 12. James Rosenberg to Charles Merz, 15 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 Amwerican Jewish Historical Society. 13. James Rosenberg to Geoffrey Parsons, Dr Henry Noble MacCracken and John Foster Dulles, 15 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 14. Copies of cables of Dr Samuel McCrea Cavert to Eleanor Roosevelt and Charles Taft to Ernest Gross, 17 November 1948, and Ruth Rotstein to James Rosenberg, 17 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 15. James Rosenberg to Raphael Lemkin, 15 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 16. Raphael Lemkin to T. Thackerey, 23 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 17. James Rosenberg and Willard Johnson to Raphael Lemkin, 24 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 18. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 39–40. 19. Draft letter on the notepaper of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom circa, 26 November 1948,and Raphael Lemkin to Bishop Garber, 26 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 20. Raphael Lemkin to Clarence Pickett, 21 November 1948 and to Miss M. Romme circa, 21 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Boxes 1/19 and 2/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 21. Cable of Simon Segal to Joel Wolfsohn, 26 November 1948, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 22. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2001), pp. 38–9. Raphael Lemkin to Joel Wolfsohn, 24 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 23. Raphael Lemkin to Ernest Gross, 28 November 1948, and Raphael Lemkin to Ernest Gross, draft letter circa 28 November 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Boxes 1/19 and 2/5 American Jewish Historical Society. 24. 128th Meeting, pp. 661–62 and 663–64. 25. Joel Wolfsohn to Simon Segal, 30 November 1948, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 26. Memorandum from Zachariah Shuster to John Slawson, December 1948, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 27. 129th Meeting, pp. 665 and 671 and 130th Meeting, pp. 674 and 684. 28. Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: Its Origin and Interpretation (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1949), pp. 8–9. 29. Raphael Lemkin to M. Romme, 14 December 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154 American Jewish Historical Society. 30. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 59–60. 31. Foster Dulles to George Marshall, 8 December 1948, RG59 File 501. BD Genocide 1945–9. 32. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, p. 80. 33. Hohenberg, ‘Crusade That Changed the UN’, p. 87. 34. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’ pp. 60–1.

Notes 309 35. Raphael Lemkin to M. Romme, 14 December 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/19 American Jewish Historical Society. 36. Raphael Lemkin to Guillermo Belt, 27 January 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/14 American Jewish Archives. 37. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Paris’, pp. 61–2. James Rosenberg to Raphael Lemkin, 10 January 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/7 American Jewish Historical Society.

12 The International Campaign for Ratification of the Convention 1. Raphael Lemkin to Guillermo Belt, 5 May 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/1 American Jewish Historical Society. 2. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 4–6. 3. Dan A. Oren, Joining the Club. A History of Jews at Yale (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 282–83, and obituary The Times, 28 November 2002. 4. Eugene Rostow to Raphael Lemkin, 31 December 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/6 American Jewish Historical Society. 5. Minute of D. Hildyard, 8 June 1949, P.R.O. FO372/78848. 6. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, p. 6. J. Plimsoll to Lemkin, 24 May 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/11 American Jewish Archives. 7. Herbert Evatt to Hector McNeil, 13 May 1949, P.R.O. FO371/78848, and Raul Fernandes, Minister of External Relations of Brazil, to Herbert Evatt, 31 May 1949, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 8. Raphael Lemkin to Erik Dons, 5 May 1949 and Erik Dons to Raphael Lemkin, 19 May 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/1 American Jewish Historical Society. Terje Wold to Raphael Lemkin, 5 July 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/17 American Jewish Archives. 9. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, p. 6. 10. United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention committee minutes, 2 March 1949, 18 October 1949 and 28 March 1950, SWHA University of Minnesota. 11. Genocide-Chronology, June 1949, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 12. Raphael Lemkin to Gertrude Samuels, 30 March 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/1 American Jewish Historical Society. 13. Raphael Lemkin to Judge Harry Fisher, 19 April 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/1 American Jewish Historical Society. 14. Raphael Lemkin to Robert Taft, 4 June 1949, and to Judge Joseph Sherbow, 13 June 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/1 American Jewish Historical Society. 15. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 7 and 8. 16. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 8, 9 and 11. 17. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 11–13. Cables of Mendez Pereira and Martinez Duran to Raphael Lemkin, 19 and 22 September 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/3 American Jewish Archives.

310

Notes

18. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 7–10. Raphael Lemkin to Jorge Villagomez Yepez, 13 June 1949, and to Charles Merz, 14 June 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/1 American Jewish Historical Society. 19. Raphael Lemkin to Temistocles Messina Pimental, 28 July 1949, and to Jorge Villagomez Yepes, 29 July 1949, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 20. Raphael Lemkin to Herbert Evatt, 29 July 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/14 American Jewish Archives. 21. Raphael Lemkin to Elpidio Quirino, 9 August 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/13 American Jewish Archives. 22. Raphael Lemkin to Padilla Nervo, 2 August 1949, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 23. Raphael Lemkin to Herbert Evatt, 24 September 1949, Box 1/14 American Jewish Archives. 24. Memorandum entitled ‘Summary of Activities of Raphael Lemkin’, p. 16, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. Amalia de Castillo Ledon to Raphael Lemkin, 26 December 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 25. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 10–11. 26. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 21–2. Rafael Urquia to Raphael Lemkin, 14 September 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/15 American Jewish Archives. 27. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 22–4. Vilfort Beauvoer to Raphael Lemkin, 5 May 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/15 American Jewish Archives. 28. Raphael Lemkin to Antonio Vieux, 2 April 1950, and Antonio Vieux to Raphael Lemkin, 29 May 1950, Lemkin Papers, Boxes 1/15 and 1/16 American Jewish Archives, and Lemkin to June Rosenberg, 13 April 1950, and her undated reply, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/12 American Jewish Archives. 29. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 28–31. Mario Echandi to Raphael Lemkin, 31 May and 9 June 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/5 American Jewish Archives. 30. Under-Secretary at the Foreign Ministry to Angela de Chacon, 30 August 1950 and to Raphael Lemkin, 18 October 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/15 American Jewish Archives. 31. Raphael Lemkin to President Juan Jose Arevalo, 22 June 1949 and Carlos Garcia Bauer to Raphael Lemkin, 16 August 1949, Lemkin Papers Boxes 1/13 and 1/2 American Jewish Archives. 32. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 28–31. 33. Martinez Duran to Raphael Lemkin, 29 and 30 March 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/4 American Jewish Archives. 34. Press release by Raphael Lemkin concerning Ratification of the Genocide Convention by Ecuador, 21 December 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 4/3 American Jewish Archives. 35. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, p. 31. 36. Raphael Lemkin to Andrew Cordier and to Quintin Paredes, 17 December 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 37. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 14 and 20. 38. Memorandum from Joel Wolfsohn to Simon Segal, 20 July 1949, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo.

Notes 311 39. Jean Nussbaum to Raphael Lemkin, 20 October 1949, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. Raphael Lemkin to Jean Nussbaum, 29 December 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/14 American Jewish Archives. 40. Raphael Lemkin to Leroy Beaulieu 29 December 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/14 American Jewish Archives. 41. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 14–16. Raphael Lemkin to Jean Nussbaum, 29 December 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/14 American Jewish Archives. 42. Raphael Lemkin to Leon Blum, 18 February 1950, and Leon Blum to Raphael Lemkin, 1 March 1950, Boxes 1/15 and 1/2 American Jewish Archives. 43. Zahir Hosrovian to Raphael Lemkin, 22 February 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/8 American Jewish Archives. 44. Jean Minjoz to Raphael Lemkin, 26 February 1950, 5 April 1950 and 2 May 1950, Box 2/8; Raphael Lemkin to Jean Minjoz and Pierre Montel, 22 April 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/15 all in American Jewish Archives. 45. Jean Minjoz to Raphael Lemkin, 2 July 1950, Box 2/8;,Raphael Lemkin to George Pernot, 3 August 1950, Box 1/15; George Pernot to Raphael Lemkin, 11 August 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/11 all in American Jewish Archives. 46. Telegram of Zahir Hosrovian to Raphael Lemkin, 2 August 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/8 American Jewish Archives. 47. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, p. 16. 48. Lemkin to Judge Ingeles and Quintin Paredes, 17 December 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. Lemkin to Judge Ingles, 22 December 1949, with draft letter of General Romulo to President Quirino, Boxes 1/14 and 2/12; Lemkin to Quintin Paredes, 12 February 1950, Box 1/15; Lemkin to Judge Ingles, 25 April 1950, Box 1/15 all in American Jewish Archives. 49. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 24–5. 50. W.D. Gunaratna to Raphael Lemkin, 29 September 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/7 American Jewish Archives. 51. Raphael Lemkin to John Chang, 6 April 1950 and 6 June 1950, and to Sigmund Rhee and Ben C. Limb, 6 April 1950, Box I/15, and Ben C. Limb to Raphael Lemkin, 1 May 1950, Box 1/12 all in American Jewish Archives. 52. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 19–20. 53. John Chang to Warren Austin, 31 July 1950, Box 1/3 American Jewish Archives. 54. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 33–4 and note on the Special importance of the Genocide Convention for Korea, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 55. Leon Kubowitzki to Raphael Lemkin, 10 November 1949, Box 1/11 American Jewish Archives. 56. Leon Kubowitski to Raphael Lemkin, 19 December 1949, Box 1/11 American Jewish Archives. 57. Jacob Robinson to Raphael Lemkin, 23 February 1950, Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 2/12 American Jewish Archives. Raphael Lemkin to Moshe Sharett, 10 March 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/15 American Jewish Archives. 58. Jacob Robinson to Raphael Lemkin, 5 June 1950, with a copy of the Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law 1950, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 59. Draft cable of Raphael Lemkin to Ben Gurion, 5 November 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/7 American Jewish Archives.

312

Notes

60. Raphael Lemkin to Moshe Sharett, 10 March 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/15 American Jewish Archives. 61. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 31–2. 62. Raphael Lemkin to Selim Sarper, 4 May 1949, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/15 American Jewish Archives. 63. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, p. 33. 64. Asad Al-Faqih to Raphael Lemkin, 30 March 1950, and Raphael Lemkin to Asad Al-Faqih, 2 April 1950 and 5 May 1950, Box 1/15 American Jewish Archives. 65. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, p. 33. 66. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing the Mountain Again’, pp. 27–8 and 43–4. 67. Lemkin to Richard Bright, 5 May 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/15 American Jewish Archives. Raphael Lemkin to Richard Bright, 6 June 1950, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 68. Luis Machado to Lemkin, 15 September 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/8 American Jewish Archives. 69. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, p. 35. 70. J. Plimsoll to Raphael Lemkin, 18 January 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/11 American Jewish Archives. 71. Gertrude Baer to Raphael Lemkin, 29 August 1950, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 72. Jean Nussbaum to Raphael Lemkin, 16 October 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/9 American Jewish Archives. 73. Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 47–9. 74. Raphael Lemkin to John Ennals, 12 February 1951, Box 2/1 American Jewish Archives. 75. Jeanne Eder to Raphael Lemkin, 26 October 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/5 American Jewish Archives. 76. Maria Piedad Castillo de Levi to Raphael Lemkin, 28 February 1952, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/3 American Jewish Archives.

13 The United States Senate and the Convention 1. Memorandum of Joel Wolfsohn to Ethel Phillips, 4 April 1949, and James Rosenberg to Jacob Blaustein, 25 May 1949, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 2. American Jewish Committee Papers, Memorandum on ‘Support of the Genocide Convention by the AJC 1947–51’, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 3. Hubert Humphrey to Dean Acheson, 1 April 1949, Wayne Morse to Dean Acheson, 6 May 1949, Robert Taft to Dean Acheson, 9 May 1949, and Paul Douglas to Dean Acheson, 13 May 1949, RG 59 File 501 BD/Genocide 1945–9. 4. Eugene Rostow to Dean Acheson, 23 March 1949, and Warren Austin to Dean Acheson, 20 May 1949, RG59 File 501. BD/Genocide 1945–9. 5. James Rosenberg to Dean Acheson, 20 May 1949, RG59 File 501. BD/Genocide 1945–9. 6. Activity of the AJC regarding the Convention against Genocide, 24 February 1950, American Jewish Committe Papers, GEN-10 Box 91 Yivo. 7. Robert MacIver and Roger Baldwin to James Webb, 1 June 1949, Roger Baldwin to James Webb, 8 June 1949, and Margaret Carter to Roger Baldwin, 13 and 28 June 1949, RG59 File 501. BD/Genocide 1945–9.

Notes 313 8. Eugene Rostow to Brien McMahon, 4 May 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/10 American Jewish Historical Society. 9. Brien McMahon to Raphael Lemkin, 14 June 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/1 American Jewish Historical Society. 10. Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 64. 11. Raphael Lemkin to Brien McMahon, 17 December 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 12. Raphael Lemkin to Cardinal Francis Spellman, 13 September 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 13. Raphael Lemkin to David Dubinsky, 16 November 1947, with a draft ‘Memorandum On Action against Genocide to Be Taken in London’, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 14. Willard Thorp to Leo M. Cherne, 6 May 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/10 American Jewish Historical Society. 15. Wesley A. Sturges and Eugene Rostow to James Rosenberg, 12 May 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/10 American Jewish Historical Society. 16. Willard Johnson to Raphael Lemkin, 28 July 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/1 American Jewish Historical Society. 17. United States Committee for a United Nations Genocide Convention minutes, 30 September 1949, SWHA University of Minnesota. 18. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention minutes, 18 October 1949, SWHA University of Minnesota. 19. Memorandum of W.M. Kotschnig to Mr Sandifer, 21 November 1949, RG59 File 501. BD/Genocide 1945–9. 20. United Committee for a UN Genocide Convention minutes, 15 December 1949, and Raphael Lemkin to Willard Johnson, 26th December 1949, SWHA University of Minnesota. 21. Raphael Lemkin to Thomas Mahoney, 19 December 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 22. Eugene Rostow to Drew Pearson, 16 June 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/10 American Jewish Historical Society. 23. Raphael Lemkin to Edward A. Conway, 19 December 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 24. Elizabeth Warriner to Raphael Lemkin, undated, but late December 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 25. Raphael Lemkin to Professor Sellin, 31 December 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 26. Raphael Lemkin to Thomas Mahoney, 2 January 1950, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/3 American Jewish Historical Society. 27. Raphael Lemkin to Mr Dilliard, 2 January 1950, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/3 American Jewish Historical Society. 28. Raphael Lemkin to Edward Conway, 2 January 1950, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/3 American Jewish Historical Society. 29. Special report from Willard Johnson, 28 March 1950, SWHA University of Minnesota. 30. Raphael Lemkin to Gertrude Samuels, 30 March 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 31. Mary Kizis to Raphael Lemkin, 17 February 1950, and Raphael Lemkin to George J. Spatuzza, 17 February 1950, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/3 American Jewish Historical Society.

314

Notes

32. Raphael Lemkin to Charles Rozamarek, 17 December 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 33. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2001), p. 73. 34. Peter Ronayne, Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust (Lanham, Maryland:Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp. 17–18. Power, A Problem from Hell, pp. 64–5. 35. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin, p. 65. 36. Telegrams from James Rosenberg and Everret R. Clinchy to the American Bar Association, 28 January 1949, and from James Rosenberg to Ernest Gross, 28 January 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/10 American Jewish Historical Society. 37. Ronayne, Never Again?, pp. 20–1, and Power, A Problem from Hell, p. 66. 38. Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin, p. 66. 39. Ronayne, Never Again?, p. 22. 40. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention minutes 2 March 1949, SWHA University of Minnesota;and circular letter of Samuel McCrea Cavert, Thomas H. Mahoney, and James Rosenberg 22 December 1949, Lemkin Collection, Box 2/2 American Jewish Historical Society. 41. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention statement to Senate subcommittee 4 January 1950, SWHA University of Minnesota. 42. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention brief, p. 7, SWHA University of Minnesota. 43. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention brief, pp. 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, and 19. 44. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention brief pp. 21 and 28. 45. Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin pp. 67–8, and Power, A Problem from Hell, p. 68. 46. Peter Ronayne, Never Again?, p. 23. 47. Paul S. Boyer ed., The Oxford Companion to United States History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 480 48. American Jewish Committee Papers, Memorandum on ‘Support of the Genocide Convention by the AJC 1947–51’, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. Power, A Problem from Hell, p. 69. 49. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin, p. 66. 50. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, 23 March 1950, SWHA University of Minnesota. 51. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention minutes, 12 June 1950, SWHA University of Minnesota. 52. Mary Alice Baldinger to all organizations operating through National Civil Liberties Clearing House, 27 April 1950, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/3 American Jewish Historical Society. 53. Friends Committee on National Legislation to Tom Connally, 11 May 1950, and Telegram of Bromley Oxnam to Tom Connally, 12 May 1950, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/3 American Jewish Historical Society. 54. Edith Hansen to Raphael Lemkin, 19 May 1950 and 7 June 1950, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/3 American Jewish Historical Society. 55. Thalia S. Woods to Lemkin, 23 June 1950, and James Mandalian to Raphael Lemkin, 21 June 1950, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/3 American Jewish Historical Society.

Notes 315 56. Marcus Cohn to David Danzig, 2 June 1950, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 57. Raphael Lemkin to Adolph Berle, 5 June 1950, and Getrude Samuels to Raphael Lemkin, 6 July 1950, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/3 American Jewish Historical Society. 58. Seymour Rubin to John Slawson, 19 June 1950, and Jules Cohen circular to NCRAC members, 23 June 1950, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 59. Dean Acheson to President Truman, 25 August 1950, with draft letter to Senator Connally, RG59 File 340.1-AJ/Genocide 1950–4. 60. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 52–3. Interview with Ruth Wetter, 16 March 2004. 61. Raphael Lemkin to John Ennals, 12 February 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/1 American Jewish Archives. 62. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, p. 54, and for Raphael Lemkin’s sense of humour see Ruth Wetter’s interview, 16 March 2004. 63. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, p. 54. 64. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention minutes of the strategy committee, 13 February 1951, SWHA University of Minnesota. 65. Ralph Bass to Raphael Lemkin, 23 March 1951, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 66. Miriam Ritterband to Raphael Lemkin, 13 February 1951, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/4 American Jewish Historical Society. 67. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention minutes, 10 January 1951, SWHA University of Minnesota. 68. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention minutes of strategy committee, 13 February 1951, SWHA University of Minnesoata. 69. Ralph Bass to Raphael Lemkin, 23 March 1951, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 70. Memorandum of Ralph Bass to Jules Cohen, 11 April 1951, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 71. James Rosenberg to Dean Acheson, 20 June 1951, and James Rosenberg to Raphael Lemkin, 30 July 1951, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 72. James Rosenberg to Raphael Lemkin, 26 October 1951, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 73. Mrs Moses L. Isaacs to Dean Acheson, 29 June 1951, and Rabbi Roland Gittelsohn to Dean Acheson, 22 August 1951, RG59 File 340.1-AJ/Genocide 1950–4. 74. Professor Anson Rabinbach, ‘Raphael Lemkin and the Notion of Genocide’ lecture at the Wiener Library, 28 January 2005. 75. William L. Patterson, The Man Who Cried Genocide (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 172. 76. Irving Sarnoff to Raphael Lemkin, 31 January 1952, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/12 American Jewish Archives. 77. Brien McMahon to Tom Connally, 17 January 1952, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 78. Memorandum of Ralph Bass to Simon Segal, 29 April 1952, and Ralph Bass to Charles Hogan, 2 May 1952, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 79. James Rosenberg to Raphael Lemkin, 27 February 1952, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library.

316

Notes

80. Samuel McCrea Cavert to Raphael Lemkin, 8 April 1952, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/3 American Jewish Archives. 81. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention minutes, 19 May 1952, Lemkin Papers, Box 4/7 American Jewish Archives. 82. Memorandum of Ralph Bass to Edwin J. Lukas, 5 July 1952, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 83. John Foster Dulles to James Rosenberg, 14 July 1952, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 84. James Rosenberg to Raphael Lemkin, 26 November 1952, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 85. James Rosenberg to Jack Tate, 9 March 1953, RG59 File 340.1-AJ/Genocide 1950–4. 86. Power, A Problem from Hell, p. 70. 87. Howard A. Cook to Mrs Herman B. Levine, 10 June 1953, RG59 File 340.1-AJ/ Genocide 1950–4. 88. Wesley Sturges to Russell Grele, 22 December 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 1/13 American Jewish Historical Society. 89. Private information. 90. Professor Anson Rabinbach, ‘Raphael Lemkin and the Notion of Genocide’ lecture at the Wiener Library, 28 January 2005.

14 The Genocide Convention: Its Supporters and Enemies 1. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, draft of chapter entitled ‘Working in Isolation’ p. 1, reel 2, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 2. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 312–3 and 342–3. 3. Raphael Lemkin to Frank J. Lausche, undated, but probably 1 June 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/7 American Jewish Archives. 4. Pius Grigaitis to Raphael Lemkin, 16 May and June 2 1952 with copy of the outline of the brochure, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/7 American Jewish Archives. 5. Charles Rozmarek to James Duff, 11 July 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/12 American Jewish Archives. 6. Raphael Lemkin to Adele Lagodzinska, 17 July 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/1 American Jewish Archives. 7. June Rorty to Raphael Lemkin, 13 February 1953, and press release, 31 March 1953, Lemkin Papers, Boxes 2/12 and 4/3 American Jewish Archives. 8. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, draft of chapter entitled ‘Working in Isolation’, p. 1, and Raphael Lemkin to Henry Grady, 22 March 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/15 American Jewish Archives. 9. Raphael Lemkin to Arthur Peoponis, 24 July 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/1 American Jewish Archives. 10. Felicia Kulakowski and Bibianna Wilseck to Warren Austin, 27 July 1951, and General Secretary of Ditrict of Illinois to Warren Austin, undated, Lemkin Papers, Boxes 1/11 and 2/19 American Jewish Archives. 11. Anna Lord Strauss to Raphael Lemkin, 15 November 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/14 American Jewish Archives. 12. Tax return 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/20 American Jewish Archives. 13. Tax return 1952 and Social Security application, September 1952, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/20 American Jewish Archives.

Notes 317 14. Ulric Cole to Raphael Lemkin, 29 June 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/3 American Jewish Archives. 15. Ulric Cole to Raphael Lemkin, 26 July 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/3 American Jewish Archives. 16. Ulric Cole to Raphael Lemkin, 4 January 1952, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/3 American Jewish Archives. 17. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, draft of chapter entitled ‘Working in Isolation’, pp. 2–3. 18. Raphael Lemkin to Gertrude Samuels, 7 December 1951, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library. 19. Raphael Lemkin to George Eberle, 8 November 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/1 American Jewish Archives. 20. Otis Swift to Raphael Lemkin, 27 November 1953, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/14 American Jewish Archives. 21. Memorandum of Raphael Lemkin to the American Zionist Council, 14 June 1950, Lemkin Papers, reel 1 New York Public Library. 22. Berl Frymer to Raphael Lemkin, 21 June 1950, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library. 23. David Petegorsky to Raphael Lemkin, Lemkin Papers, 22 March 1951 American Jewish Archives. 24. Albert J. Makler to Raphael Lemkin, 10 March 1952, and Joseph Tenenbaum to Raphael Lemkin, 19 May 1952, Lemkin Papers, Boxes 2/8 and 2/15 American Jewish Archives. 25. ADL Bulletin, January 1953, pp. 3 and 8. 26. Raphael Lemkin to Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, 29 January 1953, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/3 American Jewish Archives. 27. Raphael Lemkin to Samuel Nargoshes, 16 February 1953, with a copy of the editorial, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/19 American Jewish Archives. 28. Raphael Lemkin to Laura Dreyfus Barney, 6 November 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/1 American Jewish Archives. 29. Laura Dreyfus Barney to Raphael Lemkin, 11 December 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/2 American Jewish Archives. 30. Peter Kihss to Raphael Lemkin, 30 December 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/11 American Jewish Archives. 31. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, chapter entitled ‘Climbing a Mountain Again’, pp. 37–8. 32. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey to Jack Tate, 24 October 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/8 American Jewish Archives. 33. Correspondence in November and December 1950 in State Department file, RG59 File 340. I/AJ/Genocide 1950–51. 34. Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (London:Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 294–95. 35. Raphael Lemkin memorandum on the draft Code of Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind, p. 2, Lemkin Papers, reel 4, New York Public Library. 36. Raphael Lemkin to August Heckscher, draft letter probably late 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/7 American Jewish Archives. 37. Raphael Lemkin memorandum on the Draft Code, pp. 2–3. 38. Copy of Drew Pearson’s ‘Washington Merry-Go-Round’ Washington Post, 20 April 1948, Lemkin Papers, Box 4/3 American Jewish Archives;Eugene Rostow to Drew Pearson 15 June 1949, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 2/1.

318 Notes 39. Vespasian Pella to Raphael Lemkin, 2 November 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/11 American Jewish Archives. Herald Tribune, 28 October 1951, American Jewish Committee, GEN-10 Box 91 Yivo. 40. Raphael Lemkin memorandum on the Draft code, pp. 2–3. 41. Second Raphael Lemkin memorandum on the draft Code of Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind, Lemkin Papers, reel 4, New York Public Library; Vespasian Pella to Raphael Lemkin 2 November 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/11 American Jewish Archives. 42. Draft code memorandum, p. 4. New York Times, 23 September 1951. Memorandum of conversation between Pavilas Zadeikas, Mr Martin and Mr Allan, 8 November 1951,and Paul Ginsberg to James Webb, 18 November 1951, RG59 File340. I/AJ Genocide 1950–51. 43. Draft code memorandum, pp. 4–5, and New York Herald Tribune, 12 November 1951. 44. Charles Kersten and others to Dean Acheson, 11 January 1952; memorandum of Sanders to Dean Acheson, 14 January 1952, and Jack McFall to Charles Kersten, 19 February 1952, RG59 File 340. I/AJ Genocide 1952–4. 45. Eleanor Roosevelt to Andrew Valucheck, 5 December 1951, RG59 File 340. I/AJ Genocide 1952–4. 46. Draft code memorandum, pp. 10–12. 47. Draft code memorandum, p. 13. 48. Draft code memorandum, p. 14, and New York Times 19 April 1952. 49. Draft code memorandum, p. 15. 50. Memorandum, 28 January 1952, RG59 File340. I/AJ Genocide 1952–4. 51. Memorandum on the Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind by Earl F. Cruickshank, 5 February 1959, pp. 1–5, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 52. William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 87–8. 53. Raphael Lemkin, Autobiography, draft of chapter entitled ‘Working in Isolation’, pp. 1–2. 54. Robert C. Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin and the American Civil Liberties Union (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 231–34 and 330. 55. Raphael Lemkin, memorandum on the Truth about the Genocide Convention, p. 12, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 56. Memorandum of conversation between Daniel Flood and Raphael Lemkin and Dean Acheson and David Popper, 29 January 1952, RG59 File 340. I/AJ Genocide 1952–4. 57. Telegram of James Rosenberg to John Hickerson, 6 June 1952, and John Hickerson to James Rosenberg, 25 June 1952, RG59 File 340. I/AJ Genocide 1952–4. 58. Raphael Lemkin, memorandum on the Truth, pp. 12–14. Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor:The Years Alone (London: Andre Deutsch, 1973), pp. 66–7. 59. Raphael Lemkin, memorandum on The Soviets and the Genocide Convention, pp. 3–4, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. Mary Ann Gledon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 152. 60. Raphael Lemkin memorandum on the Draft Covenant of Human Rights, 12 June 1952, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 61. Raphael Lemkin, memorandum on the Truth, p. 15. 62. State Department circular airgram, 31 January 1952, RG59 File 340. I/AJ Genocide 1952–4. William Patterson, The Man Who Cried Genocide (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 201.

Notes 319 63. Patterson, The Man Who Cried Genocide, pp. 196–8 and 212. 64. Patterson, The Man Who Cried Genocide, pp. 179 and 191. 65. Oakley Johnson to Raphael Lemkin, 24 June 1953, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/9 American Jewish Archives. 66. Lash, Eleanor, pp. 67 and 69. 67. Raphael Lemkin, letter to the press, 10 November 1957, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 68. Gledon, A World Made New, pp. 84 and 213. 69. W. Augustus Low and Virgil A. Clift ed., Encyclopedia of Black America (New York: Da Capo, 1984), pp. 246–48. 70. Tanya Elder, ‘What You See before Your Eyes: Documenting Raphael Lemkin’s Life by Exploring His Archival Papers, 1900–1959’, Journal of Genocide Research 7 (December 2005): 486. 71. Request of the government of China for revision of the Chinese text of the Genocide Convention Report of the Sixth Committee of the UN A/2351, 20 December 1952, pp. 1–8, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 72. Raphael Lemkin to Dean Acheson, telegram, 15 December 1952, with State Department comment, RG59 File340. I/AJ Genocide 1952–4. 73. Glendon, A World Made New, pp. 133–34. 74. Raphael Lemkin memorandum on the Revision of the Genocide Convention, p. 1, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 75. Dr Herbert V. Evatt to New York Times, 13 July 1953, and Le Populaire de Paris, 1 July 1953, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 76. Raphael Lemkin, memorandum on the Revision of the Genocide Convention, pp. 3–4, and a further memorandum on the New Chinese Text of the Genocide Convention, pp. 1–2, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 77. Raphael Lemkin, memorandum on the new Chinese Text of the Genocide Convention, p. 1, reel 4, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 78. Raphael Lemkin to Lester Pearson, 4 April 1950, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/15 American Jewish Archives. 79. Bela Varga to John Foster Dulles, 27 February 1953; Norman Thomas to John Foster Dulles, 29 October 1953; Joseph Tysowski and Stanley Maziarz to James Hagerty, 6 November 1953 and Howard Cook to Mrs Engel, 7 December 1953, RG59 File340. I/AJGenocide 1952–4. 80. Memorandum of W.M. Kotschnig to Mr Murphy, 3 November 1953, RG59 File340. I/Aj Genocide 1952–4. 81. Anton Weiss-Wendt, ‘Hostage of Politics: Raphael Lemkin on “Soviet genocide” ’, Journal of Genocide Research 7 (December 2005): 551–59. 82. Anne Applebaum, Gulag. A History of the Soviet Camps (London: Allen Lane, 2003), pp. 278, 382–89 and 426–27,and Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov, Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot against the Jewish Doctors, 1948–1953 (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), pp. 295–311. 83. René Cassin, La Pensee et L’Action (Boulogne-Sur-Seine: Editions F. Lalou, 1972), p. 160. 84. H. Lauterpacht, A Treatise on International Law by L. Oppenheim Vol. 1 (London: Longman, 1974), p. 744.

15

The History of Genocide

1. Roger F. Evans to Raphael Lemkin, 6 November 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8/11 American Jewish Historical Society.

320 Notes 2. Report by Raphael Lemkin on the Genocide volume, March–May 1948, and Raphael Lemkin to Paul Fajos, 22 July 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8/11 American Jewish Historical Society. 3. Harry Starr to Raphael Lemkin, 13 February 1951, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8/11 American Jewish Historical Society. 4. Samson R. Weiss to Edward S. Silver, 15 October 1952, Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 2/17 American Jewish Archives. 5. Raphael Lemkin to Jacob Hartstein, 2 October 1952, circular letter 15 December 1952, Pearl Karden to Raphael Lemkin, 15 May 1953, Lemkin Papers, Boxes 2/2, 1/8 and 2/18 American Jewish Archives. 6. Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, 1 March 2007, http: //blogs. rj. org/ rac/2007/01/ memories-of-lemkin.html Reminiscences of Al vorspan; and Steven Schnur, Unofficial Man p. 45. 7. Raphael Lemkin to directors of Temple Emanu-El charitable fund, undated, and Revd. Dr Julius Mark to Raphael Lemkin, 27 August 1953, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/8 American Jewish Archives. 8. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2001), p. 85. 9. Raphael Lemkin to Salo Baron, 22 February 1954, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/2 American Jewish Archives. 10. Raphael Lemkin to Nahum Goldman, 19 March 1954, and A. Carlebach to Raphael Lemkin, 5 April 1954, Lemkin Papers, Boxes, 2/4 and 1/3 American Jewish Archives. 11. Nahum Goldman, Memories (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969), p. 140. 12. Judah J. Shapiro to Raphael Lemkin, 26 April 1954, 1 July 1954 and 15 October 1954, and Harry Starr to Raphael Lemkin, 20 December 1954, Lemkin Papers, Boxes 1/3, 2/13 and 2/14 American Jewish Archives. 13. Judah J. Shapiro to Raphael Lemkin, 11 August 1955, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library. 14. Dean Lehan K. Tunks to Raphael Lemkin, 27 May 1955, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/15 American Jewish Archives. 15. Leaflet on Comparative Law lectures by Raphael Lemkin at Rutgers University in September 1955, Lemkin Papers, reel 4, New York Public Library. 16. Raphael Lemkin to Dean Lehan K. Tunks, 4 June 1958, Lemkin Papers, reel 4, New York Public Library. 17. Heath MacBain to Raphael Lemkin, 13 August 1955, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library. 18. Saul Kagan to Raphael Lemkin, 20 January 1956, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/20 American Jewish Archives. Raphael Lemkin to William S. Dix, 6 June 1956, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library. 19. Raphael Lemkin to Mr F.J. Worthington, 9 April 1957, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/5 American Jewish Archives. 20. Judah J. Shapiro to Raphael Lemkin, 16 December 1955, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library; and Nahum Goldman to Raphael Lemkin, 4 January 1956, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/13 New York Public Library. 21. Raphael Lemkin to Mrs William Korn circa 1957, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/7 American Jewish Archives. 22. Raphael Lemkin to Dr Abraham Flexner, 6 August 1956, and Kenneth W. Thompson to Raphael Lemkin, 20 March 1959, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library.

Notes 321

23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

Robert R. Wilson to Raphael Lemkin, 19 March 1958, and Raphael Lemkin to Robert R. Wilson, 22 March 1958, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/17 American Jewish Archives. Raphael Lemkin to Laura Dreyfus Barney, 9 January 1958, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/6 American Jewish Archives. Raphael Lemkin to Malcolm Davis, 20 July 1956, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library; Raphael Lemkin to Salo Baron, 22 February 1954, Lemkin Papers, Box 1/2 American Jewish Archives. Raphael Lemkin to Harry Starr, 26 February 1951, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8/11 American Jewish Historical Society. Raphael Lemkin, ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ Part 1, chapter 1, pp. 1–7, and outline of the chapter, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Lemkin, ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ synopsis circa 1958, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Lemkin, ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’, Part 1, chapter 2, section 2, Lemkin Papers, Box 7/2 American Jewish Archives. Lemkin, ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ Part 1, chapter 2, section 5, p. 9, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Lemkin, ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ Part 1, chapter 2, sections 1 and 2, Lemkin Papers, Box 7/2 American Jewish Archives. Raphael Lemkin, ‘Enforcement of International Law’, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Lemkin, ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ synopsis, and ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Raphael Lemkin, ‘List of Persecutions as Grounds for Humanitarian Intervention’, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Lemkin, ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ synopsis, and ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Outline of part 2, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Outline of part 3, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Raphael Lemkin, ‘The Concept of Genocide in Social and Individual Psychology’, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Lemkin, ‘The Concept of Genocide in Sociology’, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Lemkin, ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ synopsis, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Lemkin, ‘The Concept of Genocide in Sociology’, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Raphael Lemkin, ‘Genocide in Economics’, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Lemkin, ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ synopsis and outline of the book, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Lemkin, ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ synopsis, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Raphael Lemkin, section on the ‘Community of Nations’, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Lemkin, ‘The Concept of Genocide in Sociology’, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. Raphael Lemkin, ‘The Concept of Genocide in Anthropology’, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library.

322 Notes

16 The History of Genocide: Case Studies 1. Revised Outline of Genocide Cases circa 1947, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8/11 American Jewish Historical Society. 2. Mark Mazower, ‘Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century’, American Historical Review 107 (October 2002): 1158–1178 and particularly, pp. 1165 and 1176. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), pp. 158–302. 3. Spanish Colonial Genocide, pp. 1–3, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8/12 American Jewish Historical Society. 4. William Rubinstein, Genocide (London: Pearson Longman, 2004), pp. 55–61. 5. Spanish Colonial Genocide, pp. 4–7, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8/12 American Jewish Historical Society. Michael A. McDonnell and A. Dirk Moses, ‘Raphael Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas’, Journal of Genocide Research 7:4 (2005): 510. 6. Birgit to Raphael Lemkin, 25 May 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8/11 American Jewish Historical Society. 7. McDonnell and Moses, ‘Genocide in the Americas’, pp. 507, 510 and 518–19. Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan eds, The Specter of Genocide. Mass Murder in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 122 and 136. 8. Raphael Lemkin, Tasmania, pp. 10–18, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. 9. A. Dirk Moses, ‘An Antipodean Genocide? the Origins of the Genocidal Moment in the Colonization of Australia’, Journal of Genocide Research 2:1 (2000): 89–106. 10. Jesse Shipway, ‘Modern by Analogy: Modernity, Shoah and the Tasmanian Genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research 7:2 (2005): 218–19. 11. Raphael Lemkin, Belgian Congo, pp. 3–4 and 7, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. 12. Lemkin, Belgian Congo, pp. 11, 12, 79–81 and 87. Dominik J. Schaller, ‘Raphael Lemkin’s View of European Colonial Rule in Africa: Between Condemnation and Admiration’, Journal of Genocide Research 7:2 (2005): 531–38. 13. Raphael Lemkin, Belgian Congo, p. 88 and Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost. A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 233. Rubinstein, Genocide, pp. 97–9. 14. Raphael Lemkin, The Germans in Africa, pp. 1–50, Lemkin Papers, Box 6/9 American Jewish Archives. 15. Raphael Lemkin, Hereros, p. 12, Lemkin Papers, Box 6/12 American Jewish Archives. Tilman Dedering, ‘ “A Certain Rigorous Treatment of All Parts of the Nation”: The Annihilation of the Herero in German South West Africa, 1904’ in Mark Levene and Penny Roberts eds, The Massacre in History (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1999), pp. 206, 212–13 and 220 n. 52. 16. Lemkin, Hereros, pp. 3, 10–11 and 15; Dedering, The Annhilation of the Herero, p. 211. 17. Lemkin, Hereros, pp. 10, 14, and 16. Isabel V. Hull, ‘Military Culture and the Production of “Final Solutions” in the Colonies: The Example of Wilhelminian Germany’ in Gellately and Kiernan eds, The Specter of Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 148–9. 18. Lemkin, Hereros, p. 18 and Dedering, The Annihilation of the Herero, pp. 213 and 217.

Notes 323 19. Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson ed., The Oxford History of South Africa Vol. 2 1870–1966 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 504–6. 20. Michael Scott to UN Trusteeship Council, 6 December 1947, report of Scott 17 April 1947, and Scott to Raphael Lemkin, 9 June 1948, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 7/6 American Jewish Historical Society. 21. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 12 August 2004. 22. Raphael Lemkin, Turkish Massacre of Armenians, pp. 61, 65, 70, 77, 79, 80 and 82. Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8/15 American Jewish Historical Society. 23. Raphael Lemkin, Turkish Massacre of Armenians, pp. 78, 80 and 90. 24. Raphael Lemkin, Turkish Massacre of Armenians, p. 93. 25. Steven L. Jacobs, ‘Raphael Lemkin and the Armenian Genocide’, in Looking Backward, Moving Forward: Confronting the Armenian Genocide ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, 2003), pp. 129–131. 26. Vahakn Dadrian, ‘The Secret Young Turk-Ittihadist Conference and the Decision for the World War One Genocide of the Armenians’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 7 (Fall 1993), pp. 173–201. Donald Bloxham, ‘Determinants of the Armenian Genocide’, in Richard G. Hovannisian ed., Looking Backward, Moving Forward (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, 2003), pp. 38 and 44. Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris. The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), p. 170. 27. Steven L. Jacobs, ‘Raphael Lemkin and the Armenian Genocide’, pp. 131–32. Raphael Lemkin, Turkish Massacre of Armenians, pp. 95–8. 28. Raphael Lemkin, Turkish Massacre of Armenians, p. 64. 29. Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide. Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 115–123 and 130–133. 30. Guenter Lewy, ‘The First Genocide of the 20th Century?’, Commentary (December 2005): 47–51 and (February 2006): 3–10. 31. Raphael Lemkin, Jews in Poland in Modern Times, p. 8, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. 32. Raphael Lemkin, Poles and Germans, pp. 1–4, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. 33. Lemkin, Jews in Poland in Modern Times, pp. 23, 25–7 and 54–5, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. William Hagen, ‘Murder in the East’ p. 8. 34. Lemkin, Jews in Poland in Modern Times, p. 10. 35. Raphael Lemkin, Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine, pp. 4–6, Lemkin Papers, reel 3, New York Public Library. 36. Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow (London: Arrow Books, 1988), pp. 299– 307 and 322–330. William Rubinstein, Genocide, pp. 202–4. 37. Richard Evans, Hitler’s Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), pp. 52–5. 38. Raphael Lemkin, Hitler Case: Outline, Lemkin Papers, Box 7/13 American Jewish Archives. 39. Raphael Lemkin, 1 Draft: Hitler Case, pp. 1–2, Lemkin Papers, Box 7/13 American Jewish Archives. 40. Lemkin, 1 Draft: Hitler Case, p. 2. 41. Steven L. Jacobs ed., Raphael Lemkin’s Thoughts on Nazi Genocide. Not Guilty? (Edwin Mellen Press: New York, 1992), pp. 114–126. 42. Lemkin, Hitler Case: Outline. 43. Lemkin, 1 Draft: Hitler Case, p. 3. 44. Raphael Lemkin, Hitler Case: Outline.

324

Notes

45. Jacobs, Raphael Lemkin’s Thoughts on Nazi Genocide, p. xviii; and History of Genocide outline part 3 Modern Times, p. 2, Lemkin Papers, reel 3 New York Public Library. 46. Jacobs, Raphael Lemkin’s Thoughts on the Nazi Genocide, p. 23. 47. Jacobs, Raphael Lemkin’s Thoughts on the Nazi Genocide, pp. 299, 306 and 314. 48. Dan Stone, ‘Raphael Lemkin on the Holocaust’, Journal of Genocide Research 7:4 (2005): 539–50. 49. Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Vol. 2: The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide (Lodon: I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 19–22 and 96–7. Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 109 and 110. 50. A. Dirk Moses, ‘Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the “Racial Century”: Genocides of Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust’, Patterns of Prejudice 36:4 (2002): 7–36. 51. Jugen Zimmerer, ‘The Birth of the Ostland Out of the Spirit of Colonialism: A Postcolonial Perspective on the Nazi Policy of Conquest and Extermination’, Patterns of Prejudice 39:2 (2005): 197–219. Benjamin Madley, ‘From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe’, European History Quarterly 35:3 (2005): 429–64. 52. Isabel V. Hull, ‘Military Culture and Final solutions’, pp. 143 and 160–2. 53. Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: History’s Age of Hatred (London: Allen Lane, 2006), p. 137. 54. Eric Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 10. Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 66. 55. Manus I. Midlarsky, The Killing Trap (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 43–54.

17

Closing Years

1. Memorandum of Ralph Bass to John Slawson and others, 27 January 1954, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 2. Memorandum of Ralph Bass to David Danzig, January 1954, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN 10 Box 92 Yivo. 3. Memorandum of Ralph Bass to A.L. Bernheim and others, 7 January 1954, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN 10 Box 92 Yivo. 4. Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 70 and 530. 5. Memorandum from Ralph Bass to John Slawson, 1 March 1954, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10 Box 92 Yivo. 6. Jemes Rosenberg to Raphael Lemkin, 29 September 1954, reel 1, Lemkin Papers, New York Public Library. 7. Memorandum of Nathaniel Goodrich to Ralph Bass, 10 January 1955, American Jewish Committee Papers, GEN-10, Box 92 Yivo. 8. Pierre Harmel to Raphael Lemkin, 18 February 1950, 27 February 1950, 23 May 1950, 12 September 1950 and 20 March 1951, Lemkin Papers; F. Van Cauwelaert to Raphael Lemkin, 29 May 1951, Lemkin Papers, Boxes 1/8 and 2/16 American Jewish Archives.

Notes 325 9. Raphael Lemkin to David Maxwell Fyfe, 17 January 1952, and David Maxwell Fyfe to Raphael Lemkin, 18 February 1952, P.R.O. FO 371/101409. 10. Jefferson Caffery to State Department, 31 May 1951 RG59. 340.I-AJ.Box 134, National Archives. 11. Raphael Lemkin to Habib Bourgiba, 28 March 1957, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/5 American Jewish Archives. 12. Memorandum of Raphael Lemkin ‘To Avoid Responsibility for Genocide in Algeria the French are Destroying the Genocide Convention’ circa 1957, Lemkin Papers, Box 4/3 American Jewish Archives. 13. Habib Bourgiba to Raphael Lemkin, 4 April 1957, Box 1/2 American Jewish Archives. 14. Raphael Lemkin to President Romulo Betncourt, 23 February 1959, Lemkin Papers, Box 2/7 American Jewish Archives. 15. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2001), p. 83. 16. Raphael Lemkin to Angelo Macchia, 1 June 1957, Box 1/2 American Jewish Archives. 17. Memorandum of the International Committee for the Protection of Peoples from Genocide, 11 January 1954, together with an explanatory memorandum by Ruth Cage Colby, Lemkin Papers, Box 4/3 American Jewish Archives. 18. Richard Walsh to Raphael Lemkin, 16 February 1955, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library. 19. Charles A. Pearce to Raphael Lemkin, 19 August 1958, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library. 20. Charlotte Seitlin to Naomi Burton, 7 October 1958, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library. 21. Charlotte Seitlin to Naomi Burton, 7 October 1958, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library. 22. Naomi Burton to Raphael Lemkin, 7 November 1958, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library. 23. Naomi Burton to Lemkin, 20 July 1959 and 14 August 1959, Lemkin Papers, reel 1, New York Public Library. 24. Power, A Problem from Hell, p. 77. 25. Raphael Lemkin to Paul Freund, 23 January 1951, and Paul Freund to the Nobel Prize Committee, 24 January 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 5/3 American Jewish Archives. 26. Dr Philip Friedman to the Nobel Prize Committee, 23 April 1951, Raffaele Cantoni to the Nobel Prize Committee, 6 July 1951, Mayor of Jerusalem to the Nobel Prize Committee, 6 August 1951 and Joseph L. Fink to Dr Philip Friedman, 14 August 1951, Lemkin Papers, Box 5/3 American Jewish Archives. 27. Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin, pp. VII and VIII. 28. Ruth Wetter to author, 21 March 2004. 29. Raphael Lemkin to Sarah Greenberg, 30 August 1956, Lemkin Papers, reel 1 New York Public Library. 30. Lemkin to Mr Roskies, 31 August 1956, Lemkin Papers, reel 1 New York Public Library. 31. Israel W. Charny ed., Encyclopedia of Genocide vol. 2 (Santa Barbara California: ABC-Clio, 1994), p. 403. 32. Raphael Lemkin to Thelma Stevens, 26 July 1950, Lemkin Papers, reel 1 New York Public Library.

326 Notes 33. Outline of Autobiography chapter 13 amended to 14, Lemkin Papers, reel 1 New York Public Library. 34. Helen Steiger to Raphael Lemkin, 10 December 1957, 28 July 1958 and 5 April 1959, Lemkin Papers, Boxes 2/14 and 2/19 American Jewish Archives. 35. Tanya Elder, ‘What You See before Your Eyes: Documenting Raphael Lemin’s Life by Exploring His Archival Papers, 1900–1959’, Journal of Genocide Research 7 (December 2005): 491. 36. Interview with Saul Lemkin, 11 August 2004. 37. Clara Hoover to Raphael Lemkin circa June 1959, Lemkin Papers, reel 1 New York Public Library. 38. Clara Hoover to Raphael Lemkin undated 1959, and 7 June and 23 July 1959, Lemkin Papers, reel 1 New York Public Library. 39. Nancy S. Ehrlich to the author, 18 and 19 September 2007. 40. Marcel Raval ed., Rainer Maria Rilke: His Last Friendship. Unpublished Letters to Mrs Eloui Bey with a study by Edmond Jaloux (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952), pp. 16, 24, 25, 30, 34, 51 and 87. Copies made available to me by Nancy S. Ehrlich. 41. Ibid., p. 88. 42. Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin, pp. 3, and 86–7. Obituary of Raphael Lemkin from a Montreal newspaper, August 1959.

Conclusion 1. Philip Friedman, Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1980), p. 563. 2. Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 7. 3. Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), pp. 160–61. 4. Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Vol. 2: The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide (Lodon: I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 215–23 and 277–84. Dirk Moses, ‘Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the “Racial Century”: Genocides of Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust’, Patterns of Prejudice 36:4 (2002): 31–6. Manus Midlarsky, Killing Trap (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 45–54. 5. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2001), p. 72. 6. Hans Peter Schmitz, ‘From Lobbying to Shaming: The Evolution of Global Human Rights Activism since the 1940s’. http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/schmitz.html 7. Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 159–69. 8. Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York: Houghton Mifflin,1999), pp. 128, 132–33 and 207–38. 9. David Schorr, ‘United Nations Reform in Context’, The Stanley Foundation (February 2006), p. 7. Nicholas Kristof, ‘A Wimp on Genocide’, New York Times, 18 September 2005 and ‘Dithering Through Death’, International Herald Tribune, 17 May 2006. Sunday Times, 14 May 2006. 10. Catherine Bradshaw Boyd to Raphael Lemkin, 12 April 1951, Lemkin Papers,Box 2/1 American Jewish Archives.

Bibliography Archives Raphael Lemkin papers Raphael Lemkin Papers-MC-60 Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio. Raphael Lemkin Collection-P154 American Jewish Historical Society at the Center for Jewish History, New York. Raphael Lemkin Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library, New York.

Other collections American Jewish Committee Archives-GEN Yivo at the Center for Jewish History, New York. Carnegie Corporation of New York Archives-I.L. (Publications) 83/8 Columbia University, New York. FO 371 Genocide Convention. National Archives of the United States, Washington D.C. Record Group 59 Genocide Convention. Public Record Office, National Archives Kew, Surrey. Record Group 153. Judge Advocate General’s Office. United Nations Archives, United Nations Library, New York. United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, Social Welfare History Archives University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. Weizmann Archives, Rehovot, Israel. World Jewish Congress Papers Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio. Yale University Archives Yale, Connecticut.

United Nations documents and journals Draft Convention on Genocide (UN document E/477).

Journal of the United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide. UN General Assembly, Sixth Committee Summary Records of Meetings.

Selected books and articles Anne Applebaum, Gulag. A History of the Soviet Camps (London: Allen Lane, 2003). Shlomo Aronson, ‘Preparations for the Nuremberg Trial: The O.S.S., Charles Dwork, and the Holocaust’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 12: 2 (1998): 257–81.

327

328

Bibliography

Isaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder. Two Studies in the History of Ideas (London: Hogarth Press, 1976). Chaim Nachman Bialik, Noach i Marynka (Lvov: N. Siegel, 1926) translated and with an introduction by Rafal Lemkin. Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial. War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Richard Breitman, Official Secrets. What the Nazis Planned. What the British and Americans Knew (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998). Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1983). Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow (London: Arrow Books, 1988). Henry La Cossit, ‘The Man Who Outlawed Genocide’, New York Herald Tribune magazine This Week 7 January 1951: 14 and 26. Eleanor Lansing Dulles, Chances of a Lifetime (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980). M. Einhorn ed., The Volkovsysk Memorial Book (Manwah, NJ, 2002) translated by Jacob Solomon Berger. Tanya Elder, ‘What You See before Your Eyes: Documenting Raphael Lemkin’s Life by Exploring His Archival Papers, 1900–1959’, Journal of Genocide Research 7: 4 (2005): 469–99. Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others. The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Maxwell Geismar ed., Unfinished Business. James N. Rosenberg Papers (Mamaroneck New York: Vincent Marasia Press, 1967). Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan eds, The Specter of Genocide. Mass Murder in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New. Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001). Abigail Green, ‘Rethinking Sir Moses Montefiore: Religion, Nationhood, and International Philanthropy in the Nineteenth Century’, American Historical Review 110:3 (2005): 657. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (London: Abacus, 1997). Theodor Hanf, ‘Reducing Ethnic Conflict through Cultural Autonomy: Karl Renner’s Contribution’, in State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies in the Breakup of Multi-National States eds Uri Ra’anan et al. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991). Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost. A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa (London: Macmillan, 1999). John Hohenberg, ‘The Crusade that Changed the UN’, Saturaday Review 9 November 1968. John P. Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations. A Great Adventure (Epping, Essex: Bowker Publishing Co, 1983). Steven L. Jacobs ed., Raphael Lemkin’s Thoughts on Nazi Genocide. Not Guilty? (Edwin Mellen Press: New York, 1992). Steven L. Jacobs, ‘Raphael Lemkin and the Armenian Genocide’, in Looking Backward. Moving Forward. Confronting the Armenian Genocide ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2003). Peter Kenez, ‘Pogroms and White Russian Ideology in the Russian Civil War’, in Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History eds John Klier and Shlomo Lambrozo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889–1936: Hubris (London: Penguin Books, 1999): 45–48.

Bibliography

329

William Korey, ‘Raphael Lemkin: “The Unofficial Man” ’, Midstream (June–July 1989): 45–48. William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2001). Herman Kruk, The Last Days of the Jerusalem of Lithuania. Chronicles from the Vilna Ghetto and Camps, 1939–1944 ed. Benjamin Harshav (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). Walter Lacquer, The Terrible Secret (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1980). Raphael Lemkin, Les actes constituant un danger general (interetatique) consideres comme delits de droit des gens (Paris: A. Pedone, 1933). Raphael Lemkin, ‘La protection de la paix par le droit pénal interne’, Revue Internationale De Droit Pénal 1 (1938): 95–126. Raphael Lemkin, La Reglementation Des Paiements Internationaux (Paris: A. Pedone, 1939). Raphael Lemkin, Readings in Military Government in Europe. Part 1 Translation of Statutory Material (Charlottesville, Virginia: School of Military Government, 1942). Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government. Proposals for Redress (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944). Raphael Lemkin, ‘Genocide a New International Crime, Punishment and Prevention’, Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal 3 and 4 (1946): 360–70. Raphael Lemkin and Malcolm McDermott, The Polish Penal Code of 1932 and the Law of Minor Offenses (Durham North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1939). Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State Vol.2 The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005). Benjamin Madley, ‘From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe’, European History Quarterly 15: 3 (2005): 429–64. Raphael Mahler, ‘Jews in Public Service and the Liberal Professions in Poland, 1918–39’, Jewish Social Studies VI: 4 (October 1944): 291–350. Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). James J. Martin, The Man Who Invented Genocide. The Public Career and Consequences of Raphael Lemkin (Torrance, California: Institute for Historical Review, 1984). Terry Martin, ‘The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing’, Journal of Modern History 70 (December 1998): 813–61. Michael A. McDonnell and A. Dirk Moses, ‘Raphael Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas’, Journal of Genocide Research 7: 4 (2005): 501–29. Ezra Mendelsohn, Zionism in Poland (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe between Two World Wars (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1983). Ezra Mendelsohn, ‘Jewish Politics in InterWar Poland: An Overview’ in The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars eds Yisrael Gutman and Others (Hanover, New England: University Press of New England, 1989). Manus I. Midlarsky, The Killing Trap. Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). A. Dirk Moses, ‘An Antipodean Genocide? the Origins of the Genocidal Moment in the Colonization of Australia’, Journal of Genocide Research 2: 1 (2000): 89–106. A. Dirk Moses, ‘Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the “Racial Century”: Genocides of Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust’, Patterns of Prejudice 36: 4 (2002): 7–36. Franz Neumann, Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (London: Frank Cass, 1967).

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Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000). William L. Patterson, The Man Who Cried Genocide (New York: International Publishers, 1971). Ben-Cion Pinchuk, Shtetl Jews Under Soviet Rule. Eastern Poland on the Eve of the Holocaust (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). Koppel Pinson ed., Simon Dubnow, Nationalism and History (Philadelphia: JPSA, 1958). Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell. America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002). Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention. Its Origins and Interpretation (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1949). Peter Ronayne, Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). Alexander B. Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland. Blitzkrieg, Ideology and Atrocity (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003). William D. Rubinstein, Genocide (London: Pearson Longman, 2004). Beth Van Schaak, ‘The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot’, Yale Law Journal 106: 7 (1997): 2264–2268. William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Dominik J. Schaller, ‘Raphael Lemkin’s View of European Colonial Rule in Africa: between Condemnation and Admiration’, Journal of Genocide Research 7: 4 (2005): 531–38. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, A Life in the Twentieth Century. Innocent Beginnings, 1917– 1950 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co, 2000). Steven Schnur, ‘Unofficial Man: The Rise and Fall of Raphael Lemkin’, Reform Judaism (Fall 1982): 9–11 and 45. Daniel Marc Segesser and Myriam Gessler, ‘Raphael Lemkin and the International Debate on the Punishment of War Crimes (1919–1948)’, Journal of Genocide Research 7: 4 (2005): 453–68. Aaron Steinberg ed., Dubnov L’Homme et Son Oeuvre (Paris: World Jewish Congress, 1963). Dan Stone, ‘Raphael Lemkin on the Holocaust’, Journal of Genocide Research 7: 4 (2005): 539–50. Zosa Szajkowski, ‘ “A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917–1921”: A Rebuttal’, Jewish Social Studies XXXI: 3 (1969): 184–213. Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (London: Bloomsbury, 1993). Trial of Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1946). Anton Weiss-Wendt, ‘Hostage of Politics: Raphael Lemkin on “Soviet Genocide”’, Journal of Genocide Research 7: 4 (2005): 551–59. Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide. Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). Peter Wrobel, ‘The Seeds of Violence. The Brutalization of an East European Region 1917–1921’, Journal of Modern European History 1: 1 (2003): 125–48. David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews. America and the Holocaust 1941–1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985). Herbert Yahraes, ‘He Gave a Name to the World’s Most Horrible Crime’, Collier’s 3 March 1951. Jurgen Zimmerer, ‘The Birth of the Ostland Out of the Spirit of Colonialism: A Postcolonial Perspective on the Nazi Policy of Conquest and Extermination’, Patterns of Prejudice 39: 2 (2005): 197–219.

Index Abrams, Benjamin, 149 Acheson, Dean, 205 Ad Hoc Committee, 109, 122–5 Agulnik, Israel and Ruth, 117, 118 Alderman, Sidney, 66 Alfaro, Ricardo, 70, 145, 163, 164 Algeria, 263 Alliance Israelite, 138, 169 Amado Giberto, 132–3, 152, 158 American Armenians, 209 American Bar Association, 47, 189, 192, 196, 197, 200, 205, 207 American Church groups, 191, 204, 213 American Jewish Committee, 98, 169–70, 172, 189–90, 209, 261, 268 American Jewish Congress, 214 American labour organizations, 104, 168, 191, 197 American Reform movement, 232 American students, 41 American UN Association, 98, 135 American UN delegation, 97, 99, 107–8, 108, 110, 135, 139–40, 148–49, 156, 160–1 American Zionists, 213–14 Angel, Jaime, 176 Anglo-Jewish Association, 169 Arab states, 96, 99, 100, 101, 109 Aranha Oswaldo, 103 Arendt, Hannah, 244, 258 Archbishop of Canterbury, 105, 126 Armenian genocide, 5, 14, 15, 136, 250–2 Ashby, Dame Corbett, 80, 82 Association de Droit Penal, 17, 18, 23–4 Assyrian Christians, 18 Assyrians, ancient, 135–6 Atkinson, Henry, 192 Austin, Warren, 167, 218 Australia, 247–8 Australian delegation to UN, 138, 155, 175 Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 2, 4, 29, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 67, 70, 75, 76, 78, 153

Baer, Gertrude, 186 Balaban, Mayer, 21 Baldwin, Roger, 2, 192, 193, 194, 203, 222, 223 Barbour, Anna May, 115–16 Baron, Salo, 233, 257 Barney, Laura Dreyfus, 215, 235 Barthou, Louis, 161 Bass, Ralph, 203, 204, 206, 260, 261, 262 Beck, Josef, 21 Beckett, Eric, 84–5, 94, 106 Beilis, Mendel, 10, 11, 12 Belarus, 6 Belgium, 148, 151, 262 Belgium Congo, 248–9 Ben-Gurion, David, 184 Bergson, Peter, 52 Berle A.A., 197, 200 Bernadotte, Count Folke, 77 Bernays, Murray C., 61, 63 Bevin, Ernest, 96 Bezwodene, 6 Bialik, Chaim Nachman, 9, 16 Bialystok, 9, 10, 11, 45 Biddle, Francis, 85 Births, prevention of, 158 Biffy, 120 Black American population, 99, 189, 205, 209, 223 Black dancer, 40 Blum, Leon, 181 Bloch, Etienne, 121 Board of Economic Warfare, 47, 48, 50, 52 Borderland, 24, 273 Borkenau, Franz, 9 Borukhov, Rabbi Abba Yaakov, 12–13 Bricker, John, 210, 261 British attitude to convention, 94, 97–8, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106–7, 108, 135, 137, 138, 140, 142, 156, 163, 167, 170 British United Nations Association, 138 Brylawski, Fulton, 54 331

332

Index

Bryson, Thaddeus, 42 Buck, Pearl, 105, 122, 126 Burton, Naomi, 265, 266 Byelorussians, 4 Cambodia, 182 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2, 52–5 Carthage, 12 Cassin, René, 98–9, 127, 139, 181, 215, 229 Castberg, Frede, 79 Cavert, Dr Samuel McCrea, 125, 192, 206, 263 Cecil, Robert, 15 Ceylon, 182 Chaumont, Henri, 84 Chelmienicki, Bohdan, 29 Chicago, 209 Children, abduction of, 69–70, 157–58, 204, 211, 213 China, 226–28 Christians, ancient, 11–12 Civil Rights, 189, 193, 194, 196–97, 205, 224, 225 Clinchy, Dr Everitt R., 95–6, 106, 122–3, 125–6, 151, 166 Cohen, Benjamin, 168 Cohen, Maxwell, 265, 267 Colby, Ruth, 264 Cold War, 5, 132, 191, 210, 221 Cole, Ulric, 212 Colonial Genocide, 5, 244–50, 256, 257 Colonialism, 241 Colonization, 57 Commercial boycott of Jews, 20, 22 Committee for an International Genocide Convention, 125–6 Communists, 5, 199, 209, 224 Complicity, 132 Concentration camps, 60, 71, 72 Conference on Jewish Material Claims, 234, 235 Connally, Tom, 199, 200, 203, 204, 205 Conquest, Robert, 253 Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations, 97 Conway, Edward, 195 Costa Rica, 179–80 Council of Christians and Jews, 106–7, 126

Crime of barbarity, 18–19, 24, 76 Crime of conspiracy, 59, 64, 74 Crime of vandalism, 18–19, 24, 76 Crime of war, 64, 71 Crimes against humanity, 64, 65, 66, 71, 74 Cuba, 180, 185–86 Cultural autonomy, 19 Cultural genocide, 4, 90, 91, 123, 129, 130, 131, 158–59, 170, 228–9, 257 Czech National Council, 219–20 Czechosovakia, 83, 84, 97, 258 Dean, Patrick, 85, 86 Declaration of Non-Aggression, 21 Deportations of population, 239–40 Doehler, Margot, 116 Domestic law of genocide, 264 Douglas, Helen Gahagan, 81 Douglas, Lewis, 128, 130 Draft Code of Offences, 216–22 Duke University, 34, 40, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47 Dulles, Allen, 48, 126, 192 Dulles, Eleanor Lansing, 48, 49 Dulles, John Foster, 48, 121, 128, 166, 168, 170, 206–7 East European organizations, 204, 207, 209, 210, 219, 220, 228 Eastern bloc countries, 89, 99, 101, 109, 130, 147, 153–4 Ecuador, 180 Economic and Social Council of UN, 89, 105, 107, 135, 136, 137 Eder, Jeanne, 166 Egypt, 263 Ehrlich, Nancy, 270 Eichelberger, Clark, 192, 193, 215 Einsatzgruppen, 45, 54 El Salvador, 179 Ennals, John, 126, 129, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 175, 187 Endeks, 20 Ethiopia, 175 European civil war, 5 European students, 41 Evatt, Herbert V., 136, 137, 145, 155, 163, 168, 170, 173, 174–5, 176, 177–8, 186, 190, 227

Index Exchange control, 23, 33–4, 53 Fahy, Charles, 86, 87, 88, 89, 99 Finch, George, 52, 53, 54 Finkelstein, Dr Louis, 232 Flood, Daniel, 222 France, fall of, 36, 89, 98 French attitude to convention, 139, 156, 263 French lawyers, 127, 149 French religious leaders, 160 French United Nations Association, 138 Friedman, Dr Philip, 266, 267 Geneva, 132–40, 141–2 Genocide, definition of, 20, 60, 90, 122–3, 155, 198 Genocide, first draft of the convention, 88–94 Genocide Convention, second reading, 151–170 abduction of children, 157–8 colonial article, 164–5 complaints to UN, 162, 163 cultural genocide, 158–9 disputes between states, 162–3 ethnic cleansing, 157 extradition, 162 incitement, 159–60 international court, 161–2 limited duration, 164 mental harm, 157 narcotics, 156–7 political groups, 153–4 and preamble, 165 responsibility of heads of state, 161 Genocide word, meaning of, 1, 56–7, 60–1, 73, 86, 173–4 German army, 12, 13, 26–7, 29, 36, 50 German delegation to conference, 21 German Federal Republic, 262 German invasion of Russia, 37, 43, 59 Gestapo and S.S., 59, 62–3 Goldman, Dr Nahum, 233, 235 Goldhagen, Daniel, 30, 61 Gollancz, Victor, 127 Grigaitis, Dr Pius, 210 Gross, Ernest, 127, 128, 153, 166, 167, 169, 171 Grossman, Dr Kurt, 117

333

Grynbaum, Yitzhak, 19, 21 Grynszpan, Herschel, 30 Gunn, Damon, 68 Haiti, 179 Haushofer, Karl, 66, 67, 68, 69 Hebrew language, 12, 13 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 91, 92 Hereros, 249–50 Herriot, Eduard, 181, 182 Hight, Betty, 51 Hilldring, John, 62 History of Genocide, 5, 57, 111, 112, 116, 120–1, 126, 230–259, 234, 235–42 Hitler, Adolf, 5, 26, 22, 23, 45, 47, 57, 59, 66 Hohenberg, John, 80 Holocaust, 5, 79, 83, 169, 184, 254–9 Hoover, Clara, 269–70 Huguenots, 12, 120 Hull, Isabel, 258 Human rights, 3, 237 Human rights supporters, 165, 208, 215, 223, 224, 226, 229 Humphrey, John, 78, 90 Hungarians, 213 Iceland, 133–4, 175 Ikamullah, Begum, 146 India, 79, 80, 100 Inter-American Commission of Women, 178, 187 International Alliance of Women, 178 International Assembly of Women, 82 International Committee for the Protection of Peoples from Genocide, 264 International Council of Christians and Jews, 167 International Council of Women, 166, 178, 187 International criminal court, 18, 124, 128, 140 International Democratic Women’s Federation, 82 International Law Association, conference, 73 International Military Tribunal, 63, 64 Israel, 147

334

Index

Jackson, Robert, 63–4, 65, 69, 70, 85 Jacobs, Steven, 3, 255 Japan, 28, 47, 134 Japanese war crimes, 67 Jewish farmers, 6–7 Jewish history, 19 Jewish lawyers in Poland, 22 Jewish organizations, 4, 204, 207 Jewish refugees, 18, 14–15, 26 Jewish schools, lack of funding, 14 Jews, discrimination against in Poland, 3, 20, 21, 40 Jews, mass murder of, 36, 45, 49, 54, 58, 60, 64, 153, 154 Johnson, Colonel, 137, 138 Johnson, Kay, 212 Johnson, Dr Oakley, 225 Johnson, Willard, 125, 168 Joint Distribution Committee, 33, 38, 117–18 Karski, Jan, 52 Katyn massacre, 196 Kaunas, 34 Kersten, Charles, 218–19 Khan, Sir Zafrullah, 185 Khouri, Faris el, 99, 100 King, Archibald, 47 Korea, 182–3, 199 Korey, William, 3, 5, 21, 61, 196, 264 Kovel, 28 Kubowitzki, Dr Leon, 183 Laos, 182 Laugier, Henri, 78 Latvia, 34, 36 Lauterpacht, Sir Hersch, 66, 229 League of Nations, 6, 7, 37 Lebanon, 148 Le Bon, Gustave, 238 Lemkin, Bella, 6, 8, 11–12, 15, 22–3, 30–1, 44, 46, 52, 72 Lemkin, Daniel and David, 72 Lemkin, Elias, 8, 22, 30, 31, 72, 73, 111, 113–17, 118, 267, 268 Lemkin, Isadore, 31, 117 Lemkin, Joseph, 2, 6, 8, 23, 30–1, 44, 72 Lemkin, Lisa, 23, 31, 72, 117, 118, 267

Lemkin, Raphael, Background in Eastern Europe childhood, 6–12 education, Jewish, 8–9, 12, 13 education, secular, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16 family farm, 6–7 flees from Poland, 26–32 flees to Sweden, 35–8 flees to Vilnius, 32–4 international lawyer, 17, 18–19, 23–4 lecturer at Takhemoni College and Free University of Warsaw, 17, and 21 as partisan, 3, 32 public prosecutor, 17, 21 private practice as lawyer, 22, 23 questioned by Russians, 28–9 specializes in criminal and tax law, 17, 22 writes law manuals, 17, 23, 33–4 Career in the United States, Academic appointments, at Duke University, 42–7 at Yale, 119–21, 207, at Rutgers, 234 Board of Economic Warfare, 47–53 publishes and promotes Axis Rule, 53–62 War Crimes Office, 63–7 War Department promotion, 67 Family and Personal Life, death, 271 evaluation of career, 272–9 health, 22–3, 52, 72, 73, 94, 117, 172, 173, 160, 202–3, 209, 268, 269–70 income, 212–13, 230–4, 235 relations with brother Elias, 22, 72–3, 117–18, 267–8 relations with friends, 194, 212, 267 with Dr Lasar Lowenstein, 34, 94, 116, 117, 202, 267 relations with with Jewish community, 214–15, 231–2 relations with parents, 8, 11–12, 30–2 relations with women, 31–2, 111, 115–16, 212 spiritual life, 270–1

Index Lemkin, Raphael, Family and Personal Life – continued with Clara Hoover, 269–70 with Gertrude Sladek, 111–14 with Miriam Milliren, 114–15 with Nancy Ehrlich, 270 withdraws from life, 268–9 works on “History of Genocide”, 230–59 Zionist, 16, 19, 21–2, 113, 213–14 Genocide Convention, abortive campaign for Senate ratification, 189–208 campaigns for a UN resolution, 76–87 campaigns for ratification of the convention, 173–88 campaigns for further ratification of the convention, 261–4 helps to draw up the convention with other experts, 89–94 persuades UN to reverse a negative vote, 103 sets up of the United States Committee for a Genocide Convention, 125–6 saves convention from its enemies, 215–28 travels to Geneva, 132–142 travels to Paris for the convention and its drafting, 143–72 works behind the scenes with the Ad Hoc Committee, 122 works with East European and other ethnic groups, 209–12, 213–14, 218, 219, 221 writes autobiography, 265–6, 270 Lemkin, Samuel, 13 Lemkin, Saul, 45, 72, 111, 118 Lemkin, Dr Robert, 267 Lemkin, Professor William, 267 Levene, Mark, 5, 120, 257 Liberia, 185 Lie, Trygvie, 72, 89, 180 Linevsky, Herschel, 12–13 Lithuania, 32–4, 36 Lithuanians, 191, 210–11, 218 London, 63, 67 Lovett, Robert, 127, 128

335

Lowenstein, Dr Lasar, 34, 94, 116, 117, 202, 267 Lusatians, 112 Lvov, 13, 15, 16, 45 Lynchburg, 40 Madagascar, 38 Mahoney, Thomas, 193, 194 Malik, Charles, 100, 121–2, 127, 128–9, 140, 141 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 241 Mann, Micheal, 257, 258 Marcus, Mickey, 62 Martin, James, 2 Masaryk, Jan, 83, 84, 97 Masaryk, Thomas, 83 Massacre, 20 Matkos, John, 120, 126, 130–1, 132, 160, 161, 163 Maxwell-Fyfe, Sir David, 70, 262 McCarthy, Joseph, 198, 199, 210 McCracken, Dr Henry Noble, 125, 129, 132, 135, 138, 167 McDermott, Professor Malcolm, 17, 23, 27, 34, 40, 41, 43, 46 McKay, Rosemary, 115 McMahon, Brien, 190, 191, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 203 McNeil, Hector, 106–7, 130, 175 Mein Kampf, 36–7, 59, 66 Mexico, 178 Meyer, Eugene, 60 Mickiewicz, Adam, 16 Midlarsky, Manus, 258 Milliren, Miriam, 114–15 Minorities Treaty, 14, 21, 24, 76, 158 Mintos, Jean, 181, 182 Mongol invasions, 12 Montel, Pierre, 181 Moors, 12 Moses, Dirk, 5, 246, 247, 257, 258 Moskowitz, Moses, 215 National and ethnical groups, omitted, 86 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 223 National Committee for a Free Europe, 221 National Community Relations Council, 199, 201

336 Index National Conference of Christians and Jews, 89, 106, 121, 125–6, 149, 166, 189, 197 Nationalism, 240 Nazis, 4, 62–3 Neumann, Franz, 49 New York, 88, 94 New York Public Library, 1 New York Post, 80, 122, 167 New York Times, 45, 61 Newland, Mrs, 150 Niles, David, 201 Noah and Marinka, 16 Nobel Peace Prize, 266–7 Nolde, Dr Fred, 165, 215 Norway, 97, 154, 175 Nowinski, Elizabeth, 115, 212 Nuremberg Charter, 64–6 Nuremberg Judges, 149, 216 Nuremberg Tribunal, 70–2, 73–4, 85 Nussbaum, Dr Jean, 181, 182, 187

Philippines, 178, 182 Physical destruction of a group, 157 Plain Dealer, 222 Plaisant, Marcel, 181, 182 Plimsoll, Major J., 186 Pogroms, 8, 10, 10–12, 13–14, 20, 73, 252–3 Poland, 2, 26–32, 101, 108, 109 Poles, 58 Poliakov, Leon, 120 Polish elite murdered by Germans, 29 Polish elite murdered by Russians, 29 Polish foreign policy, 21 Polish lady, 32, 111 Polish penal code, 40 Political groups, 81, 86, 91, 99, 123, 129, 130, 131, 152, 154, 163 Power, Samantha, 3, 61 Princeton University, 234–5 Proskauer, Joseph, 121, 181, 193 “Quo Vadis”, 11–12

Occupation decrees, 37, 38, 39 Office of Strategic Services, 49, 50, 52, 64 Oppenheimer, Professor Robert, 117 Pakistan, 109 Palestine, 96, 101, 151, 154, 157, 159 Panama, 180 Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi, 80 Paris, 143 Paris Peace Conference, 73 Parodi, Alexandre, 84 Partisans, 109 Pasha, Talaat, 19 Patterson, Judge Robert B., 192, 194, 195, 197, 211, 218 Patterson, William, 205, 209, 224–5 Pearlman, Philip B., 196 Pearson, Drew, 193 Pedone, 18, 33, 34, 149–50 Pella, Vespasian, 18, 19, 24, 78, 89, 90, 91, 93, 131–2, 193, 216, 217–18, 222, 273 Perlzweig, Maurice, 96, 97 Perozo, Perez, 127, 132, 152, 170 Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich, 11 Petition against genocide, 143–5 Petliura, Symon, 16

Rappaport, Professor Stanislaw, 20, 24 Rath, Ernest von, 30 Ratification of the convention, 173–88, 260–4 Red Cross, 79 Religious organizations, 4, 104, 172 Renner, Karl, 93 Reservations to convention, 215 Resolution on genocide, 81–7 Revised Outline of Genocide Cases, 243 Riegner, Dr Gerhart, 49 Riga, 35 Ritterband, Miriam, 203 Robeson, Paul, 224 Robinson, Jacob, 65, 184 Romans, 11 Romme, Miss, 168, 171 Roncalli, Joseph, 159, 160, 223, 224 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 51, 72, 82, 209, 215–16, 219–20, 228 Roosevelt, President Franklin, 51, 63 Rosenberg, Alfred, 57 Rosenberg, James, 2, 89, 104, 106, 119, 121, 125, 126, 127, 129, 131, 140, 143, 144, 145, 150, 156, 166, 168, 171, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 204, 206, 207, 223, 232, 260, 261, 262

Index Rosenthal, A.M., 81, 171 Roskies, Hanoch, 267–8 Rostow, Eugene, 119–20, 174, 190, 192, 207 Rubin, Seymour, 201 Rubinow, Raymond, 192, 203 Rubinstein, William, 248–9, 253 Rusk, Dean, 196 Russian occupation of Poland, 27–30, 44, 45 Russian population, German plans for, 59 Rutgers University, 234 Saint Louis Dispatch Post, 195 Samuels, Gertrude, 104, 176, 195, 213 Sarnoff, Irving, 205 Saudi Arabia, 185 Schlyter, Karl, 18, 34, 36 Schuman, Robert, 187 Schwartzbard, Samuel, 16, 131 Scoto-Lavina, 141, 149–50 Security Council, 77 Sharrett, Moshe, 65, 184 Shawcross, Sir Hartley, 70, 71–2, 84, 86, 87, 90–1, 94–5, 96, 101, 104, 106, 146–7, 152 Shapiro, Dr Judah, 234, 235 Shelley, Maryanne, 111 Simpson, Revd. Bill, 106, 107, 125, 126, 129, 152–3 Sladek, Gertrude, 88, 111–14, 194 Slansky trial, 214 Slawson, John, 127 Smith, Bradley, 62 South American academics, 177 South American delegates at UN, 79, 151, 154, 156 South American politicians, 177 South American religious leaders, 176–7 South American women’s organizations, 178–9 Southern senators, 189, 194, 198, 205, 207 Soviet antisemitism, 214–15 Soviet army, 13, 27, 28–9, 32 Soviet deportations, 102–3, 216–17, 229

337

Soviet Union, 83, 102, 105, 108, 139, 153, 155, 223–4 Spanish colonial empire, 244–7 Spector, Isaiah, 212, 267 Spellman, Cardinal, 191 Starvation diet, 58 State Department, 201, 221, 268 Steiger, Helen, 269 Steiger, Mundyk, 15 Stein, Leonard, 105 Stevenson, Adlai, 82 Stinebower, 97 Stone, Dan, 256 Sturges, Wesley A., 119, 192, 197, 201, 207 Sweden, 27, 35–7, 46 Swedish press, 38 Switzerland, 140–1 Syria, 99, 100, 151, 157 Tasmania, 247 Tate, Jack, 206 Tehlirian, Soghomon, 15 Telsch, Catherine, 81 Terrorism, 18, 23 The Times, 70–1 Times Literary Supplement, 67 Tokyo Trials, 68 Toliscus, Otto D., 61, 80 Tomkiewicz, Benjamin, 34 Truman, President Harry, 190, 201 Tunisia, 263 Ukrainian genocide, 253 Ukrainians, 4, 13, 213 UN Legal Committee, 82, 86, 101–2, 105–6, 145–6, 155 United States, 34, 38–8, 148 United States Committee for a UN Genocide Convention, 126, 144, 145, 168, 170, 171–2, 173, 175–6, 190, 199, 200, 203, 206, 207, 208, 260, 261, 268 Universal jurisdiction, 124–5, 131 University posts in Poland, 21 “Unofficial Man”, 1 Vabres, Professor Donnedieu de, 18, 70, 74, 89–90, 93, 127, 139, 273 Vaga, Bela, 213

338

Index

Vance, John, 43, 47 Venezuela, 97, 107–9, 122, 125, 127, 132, 146, 155 Vietnam, 182 Vilnius, 12, 32–4 Vishinsky, Andre, 83, 84 Volhynia, 30 Wallace, Henry, 50–1 Walsh, Richard, 265 War Crimes Office, 63 Warriner, Elizabeth, 194 Warsaw, 22, 26 Washington, 43, 48, 67, 69, 80 Washington Post, 60 Wassermann, Jakob, 29 Weir, General John, 63, 66–7 Weizmann, Chaim, 29, 65 Wiart, Henri Carton de, 18, 23, 35, 262

Wilgress, Dana, 135–6 Wise, Stephen, 52, 65, 98, 99 Wolfsohn, Joel, 169, 181 Wolkowysk, 6, 10, 12, 13, 23, 30, 43, 118 World Jewish Congress, 88, 96, 98, 117 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 187, 200 Women’s organizations, 4, 104, 105, 172, 173, 187, 200 World Federation of UN Associations, 4, 128, 134 Yale, 119–121, 207 Yiddish press, 149 Zimmerer, Jurgen, 258 Zionist, 12–13, 16, 21–2, 113, 117, 121