Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention John Cooper
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Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention John Cooper
Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
Also by John Cooper EAT AND BE SATISFIED: A Social History of Jewish Food PRIDE VERSUS PREJUDICE: Jewish Doctors and Lawyers in England, 1890–1990
Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention John Cooper
© John Cooper 2008 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–51691–5 hardback ISBN-10: 0–230–51691–2 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
Contents Acknowledgements
vi
Introduction
1
1
Formative Years in Poland
6
2
Escape from Poland
26
3
Early Years in the United States
40
4
The Publication of His Master Work and the Nuremberg Tribunal
56
5
The United Nations Resolution on Genocide
76
6
1947, The First Draft of the Convention
88
7
Private Life
111
8
Yale and Geneva
119
9
Paris, Preliminary Discussion of the Convention
143
10 The First Reading of the Convention
151
11
164
The Convention is Adopted
12 The International Campaign for Ratification of the Convention
173
13 The United States Senate and the Convention
189
14
209
The Genocide Convention: Its Supporters and Enemies
15 The History of Genocide
230
16
The History of Genocide: Case Studies
243
17
Closing Years
260
Conclusion
272
Appendix
280
Notes
283
Bibliography
327
Index
331 v
Acknowledgements After his death, the correspondence and other papers of Raphael Lemkin were split up and donated to three different organizations: to the American Jewish Historical Society, where they were deposited at the Center for Jewish History in New York; to the New York Public Library; and to the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives located at the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, Ohio. Without the sustained help of the librarians and archivists at these three libraries and elsewhere, this book could not have been written. In the United States, I was guided through the State Department Papers by staff in the National Archives in Washington and assisted by librarians at the United Nations Library in New York; at Columbia University in connection with the archives of the Carnegie Corporation; at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis; and at Yivo again based at the Center for Jewish History, New York. Staff at Yale and Duke University answered my queries and also furnished me with material. I could not have made forays into the United States without the support and hospitality of my brother Rabbi Dr Martin Cooper and his wife Zephyr. They not only provided me with a loving base away from home, but my brother tracked down material from newspapers on Lemkin and arranged for one of his congregants, Jack Braun, to translate some of the family correspondence of Lemkin which was in Yiddish. He also put me in contact with Maria Kirakova and Dr William Korey, whose help I gratefully acknowledge. In London I owe much to the staff, particularly at the Wiener Library, the National Archives at Kew, the British Library and my local Swiss Cottage Library. I am also indebted to Professor Michael Alpert and Professor Kenneth Cmiel for their helpful advice, and to the late Graham Drucker for providing me with some important journal articles which I might otherwise have missed. Carole Malkin read the book in manuscript, and I would like to thank her for her invaluable suggestions for its improvement, many of which I have adopted. I would like to thank Nancy Steiner Ehrlich and the late Ruth Wetter for their memories of Lemkin and Mrs Ehrlich for sending me photocopies of pages from a book on Rainer Maria Rilke which Raphael Lemkin had annotated. To Saul Lemkin, the nephew of Raphael Lemkin and his only surviving relative, I am indebted for many fascinating conversations about his uncle and their family.
vi
Acknowledgements
vii
My wife Judy has lived with this project as long as I have and kept me going when I was encountering difficulties with the research, and I much appreciate her help and never failing optimism. Our son Zaki acted as my agent and made certain that the results of my research finally reached publication. I am truly grateful to him for his invaluable support. I would like to thank my editor at Palgrave Macmillan, Michael Strang, and his assistant Ruth Ireland for supporting this project and for their assistance throughout the development of the book and Vidhya Jayaprakash and her team in India for the editing of the manuscript. If there are any errors of fact or judgement in the book, the faults are mine. JOHN COOPER London, October 2007
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Introduction
The concept of genocide and the United Nations Genocide Convention are well-known, but the inventor of both the word and the landmark instrument of international law, Raphael Lemkin, is a figure, who has been eclipsed and over-shadowed by contemporaries. This book is an attempt to correct the record, by providing the first full biographical account of his life and his struggle to persuade the United Nations to adopt and ratify the convention. At the same time, an evaluation is also made of Lemkin’s massive unpublished history of genocide. For over two decades after Lemkin’s death, he disappeared from public memory. The legal machinery he had constructed for the trial of mass murderers was fast rusting into obsolescence and seemed beyond repair; his life-work had ended in frustrating failure. Then in December 1983 at the prompting of Dr William Korey, the research director of an international organization, the New York Public Library staged a public exhibition of the voluminous papers which had once belonged to Raphael Lemkin. The opening of the exhibition was timed to coincide with the thirty-fifth anniversary of the passing of the Genocide Convention by the UN General Assembly and staged to revive the flagging campaign in the US Senate for the ratification of the treaty. Among the papers in this archive were Lemkin’s unfinished autobiography, provisionally entitled ‘Unofficial Man’, and correspondence with diplomats about the convention.1 I resolved that when I had time from my professional career as a lawyer, I would visit the New York Public Library and examine this material on the one-man campaign against genocide. But I had to wait a number of years for this opportunity. Raphael Lemkin died penniless in June 1959, his vast horde of papers being split up among three different archives; and he had more or less disappeared from public view. An early article on his career published in the autumn of 1982 was entitled ‘Unofficial Man: the Rise and Fall of Raphael Lemkin’ which seemed to epitomize this. In some ways it was miraculous that any of his correspondence and memoranda had survived. Lemkin was perennially in debt because he spent all his limited resources on his 1
2 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
campaigning and became as ingenious as Mr Micawber in warding off pressing creditors. Towards the end of 1948, when Lemkin failed to pay storage charges for a collection of his documents, the company holding them put the correspondence up for sale as waste paper. One of the bidders after paying the sum of $12 for the papers realized that they contained valuable historical material and tried to restore them to Lemkin.2 Lemkin’s unpublished memoir, ‘Totally Unofficial’, suffers from a number of omissions which detracts from its value as a source for his life. It is a curiously impersonal account, rarely conjuring up memorable sketches of close family members; we know virtually nothing about his father, apart from the fact that he was a farmer, an unusual occupation for a Jew in Tsarist Russia; everything is curiously one-dimensional. His close collaborator in the fight for the convention, James Rosenberg, the distinguished lawyer, is left out of his account; so too, are his opponents, Roger Nash Baldwin, the civil liberties reformer and Professor Vespasian Pella. We know next to nothing about the schools he attended, his higher education in Poland and abroad, and his mentors in the Polish legal system. He is reticent about his Jewish and Zionist connections, and says hardly anything about the clash of nationalities in Poland and the Ukraine after the First World War, in which Jews were victimized, and which must have influenced his thinking. Despite the persecution of Jewish lawyers in Poland during the 1930s, Lemkin developed a thriving practice. How was he able to achieve this? The questions about the gaps and missing details in his account of his life are endless. Moreover, he was still working on his autobiography at the time of his death and the last chapters were never completed. The first and, for a long time, the only biography of Raphael Lemkin was by James J. Martin, a Holocaust denier, and was entitled The Man Who Invented Genocide. The Public Career and Consequences of Raphael Lemkin (1984). Martin claimed that Lemkin published Axis Rule in Occupied Europe in 1944 under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘staffed in part with some of the most influential and most implacable exponents for global war with Germany, well before it took place’. The volume was destined according to Martin ‘to become one of the most fateful works in the history of political thought in the 20th century’, although ‘it was authored by an almost total obscurity, one Raphael Lemkin ... there were grounds for suspecting that his name was a cover for the work of a highpowered committee’. Martin further provocatively maintained that Lemkin’s reprinting of a large number of German wartime occupation decrees turned his book into ‘a compendium of second-hand and third-hand claims, allegations and insinuations. Lemkin had actually witnessed nothing he reported, especially that part of his work which pretended to be a reliable testimony to the extermination of part of Europe’s Jews’. Again, ‘so, a global press campaign established the reputation for the new word and crime, genocide, which its author in a book of over 700 pages failed to support with a single
Introduction
3
witness or verifiable piece of direct evidence insofar as it involved ... the deliberate, planned mass murder of Jews and other minorities, in Axisoccupied Europe, 1943–4’.3 As Martin failed to consult any of Lemkin’s surviving papers, including his unpublished autobiography, he had to rely on secondary sources; and he created mysteries, where none existed, such as Lemkin’s roundabout journey of 10,000 miles from Poland to the United States crossing hostile frontiers during the War. He also repeated embroidered stories emanating from Lemkin himself about his past, such as the claim that he had fought as a partisan in the Polish forests for six months, living on potatoes and leaves. Lemkin built up his analysis of German policy from occupation decrees dating from 1939 until the autumn of 1942, ending just when the mass killing was starting to accelerate; and it is unfair to criticize him for not providing eyewitness accounts during wartime conditions. In any case Martin discounted later post-War evidence of the German killing-machine, so that his distorted view of history cannot be taken seriously. He was right about one matter: whereas the issue of human rights ‘had taken over almost the entire world stage’ by the early 1980s, the Genocide Convention ‘had slipped back into the obscure regions of indistinct terminology’.4 Serious scholarship with regard to Raphael Lemkin commenced in 2001, when William Korey published a short monograph on Lemkin’s ‘role in the development of a major instrument of international law: the Genocide Convention’; but it was not a biography, it suffered from various lacunae and did not set him in the full context of his pre-War background. Samantha Power devoted four chapters to Lemkin in her Pulitzer prize winning study, ‘A Problem from Hell’. America and the Age of Genocide (2002), although they hardly advance the groundwork laid out by Korey. Her principal thesis quoting Churchill was to describe mass murder as ‘a crime without a name’ and then to state that after the coining of the word genocide by Lemkin it became ‘a crime with a name’. James Fussell posted important material about Lemkin on the Prevent Genocide website; and Professor Steven Jacobs commenced his research on Lemkin, by editing the latter’s book on the Nazi genocide in 1992. After the First World War, the Austrian, Ottoman and to some extent the Tsarist empires disintegrated and a number of new states were carved out of their territories, including Poland.5 During the First World War and its aftermath, the region in which Lemkin grew up and the surrounding area became the scene of vicious conflict between the competing nationalities, and its Jewish inhabitants were exposed to pogroms. In the restored Polish state, where Lemkin received his university education and practised as a lawyer, national minorities eventually comprised 33 per cent of the total population. After pogroms inflicted on the Jews by the Polish armies, as they established the borders of their new state, the victorious Allied powers forced a Minorities Treaty on the Poles in 1919, which they only reluctantly
4 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
ratified. The treaty quickly proved to be a failure. While Polish socialists and liberals accepted that Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Germans had rightful claims to some measure of autonomy, they were unwilling to grant the same privileges to Jews, who constituted a sizeable portion of the pre-War Polish population.6 The chapters at the beginning of this book show how Lemkin was exposed to the destructiveness of the conflict of nationalities from an early age, how from his involvement in the international law circuit connected with the League of Nations he developed new ideas for dealing with the perpetrators of ethnic violence and how from his Zionist background he borrowed the concept of cultural autonomy from Dubnov. This was the genesis of his later concept of cultural genocide (ban on languages, schools, destruction of cultural monuments etc.) which suffused much of his thinking and action. I suggest that Lemkin’s 1933 proposals for punishing the instigators of ethnic violence and the destroyers of the cultural monuments of minority groups had a limited significance. They were meant to rectify conditions in pre-War Poland, to replace the defective Minorities Treaty with an international law enforceable by the League of Nations. In Chapters 2 and 3, I try to indicate that Lemkin continued to antedate the evolution of his ideas on genocide to his early years of the war in Sweden and the United States. In fact, I believe that he did not make this intellectual quantum leap until the summer of 1942. During the Second World War, the Nazis embarked on a completely new nationalities policy, by creating a gigantic, more homogeneous empire for themselves in Eastern Europe which involved the extermination of Jews and gypsies, and the enslavement and re-settlement of other national groups. Lemkin was one of the first persons to grasp the significance of what was happening in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944), outlining the restructuring of the population initiated by the Nazis, coining the word genocide to denote the murder of millions and setting out his proposals for redress (Chapter 4). This was a novel situation and Lemkin’s answers were equally novel. Rebuffed at Nuremberg, where he thought that his suggestions for dealing with criminal conspiracy and genocide were undervalued, Lemkin decided to mount a campaign at the United Nations to make the slaughter of national, ethnic, racial and religious groups a crime in international law. The core of the book is a group of Chapters, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, which are a detailed analysis of the campaign for the Genocide Convention and its ratification, driven forward by the superhuman efforts of Lemkin; but he was tied to important constituencies, Christian and Jewish, the World Federation of United Nations Associations, women’s organizations and later Eastern European refugee groups. In this section of the book, I carefully analyse which groups of supporters Lemkin was relying on for specific phases of his campaign, for he was using the assistance of different groups as his campaign unfolded, and why it suddenly gathered momentum after
Introduction
5
so many setbacks. My account of Lemkin’s campaign for a convention is based on a wide array of diplomatic and other sources, which have not hitherto been utilized. With the onset of the Cold War and the exploitation of the genocide agenda by a left-wing and Communist civil rights organization, the ratification of the treaty foundered in the Senate and Lemkin’s base of support shrank (Chapter 13). His hopes that the convention could form part of a new world order received a mortifying blow. This caused him to turn increasingly to his writing of ‘The History of Genocide’ and his autobiography. Nevertheless, Lemkin fought tenaciously for his concept of genocide as a legal instrument and preserved it from the assaults of the Nuremberg judges and human rights enthusiasts (Chapter 14). Since the publication of Korey’s book, the focus of research has shifted to Lemkin’s writings on ‘The History of Genocide’, particularly colonial genocide and its links with total war and mass murder. Important contributions on these themes have been made by Dirk Moses, Dan Stone, Mark Levene and Jurgen Zimmerer; and special issues of Patterns of Prejudice and the Journal of Genocide Research were devoted to Lemkin in 2005.7 I concur with the suggestion of Mark Levene and Dirk Moses that the power struggle of empires and states within the international system must be treated as a process and that there was radicalization and an escalating scale of ethnic violence and class warfare in the first half of the twentieth century, resulting in the ‘European civil war’. Far from being isolated episodes, the different genocides were inextricably linked, as I try to show in my survey.8 Historians are now seeking to demonstrate, in my view successfully, how the methods used by the European colonial powers to intimidate and exterminate the indigenous inhabitants of America and Australia were replicated by the Nazis in their empire building quest in Eastern Europe. In the concluding sections of the book, I discuss Lemkin’s attempt to write a history of genocide and cover his private life, an earlier portion of which is dealt with in Chapter 7. In Chapter 15, I try to reconstruct Lemkin’s unfinished ‘Introduction to the Study of Genocide’ and later survey a sample of studies taken from ‘The History of Genocide’ in order to assess the value of the whole project (Chapter 16). There is a focus on certain episodes from Lemkin’s unpublished ‘History of Genocide’; colonial genocide in the Americas, Australia, and Africa, culminating in the carnage of the Armenians and Jews in 1915–1920; a man-made famine in the Ukraine and the Holocaust. All these seemingly stray episodes can be woven together, for Hitler sought to set up a new German empire in Eastern Europe to compete with rival imperial powers.
1 Formative Years in Poland
Rafel Lemkin, a name later anglicized to Raphael Lemkin, was born on a farm called ‘Ozerisko’ near the village of Bezwodene in eastern Poland on 24 June 1900. At the time of Lemkin’s birth, the region into which he had been born was absorbed into Imperial Russia during the partitions of Poland but it is now part of Belarus. The whole area was a contested borderland which was to be controlled by successive states during Lemkin’s lifetime. From his earliest years his whole outlook on the preservation of nationalities and the means of preventing their destruction was influenced by what was happening around him. His parents’ farm was situated 14 miles from the city of Wolkowysk or some 50 miles from Bialystok. For reasons which are not altogether clear, certain sources appear to record Lemkin’s year of birth as 1901, but this appears to be an error, as the year given on his tombstone which contains an inscription from his brother is 1900 and data in his entry for Who Was Who in America and in a tax return support the supposition that this is correct. His father Joseph was a farmer, a somewhat unusual occupation for a Jew in Tsarist Russia, while his mother Bella neé Pomeranz was an intellectual, teacher and amateur artist. Raphael had two siblings, an elder brother called Elias and a younger brother called Samuel.1 Under the Tsarist regime, the Jews were forbidden to own or cultivate land, but were compelled to live in cities or villages of a certain size. Nonetheless, some Jews despite these restrictions became successful farmers and others lived in specially designated agricultural colonies, so that by 1900 it was estimated that some 100,000 Jews in Tsarist Russia, which, of course, included eastern Poland, had settled on the land. To circumvent the oppressive restrictions affecting Jews, Lemkin’s parents not only paid rent for their farm but had to bribe a local police official on a regular basis. As a child Lemkin watched as this policeman, smartly dressed in a uniform and with highly polished boots, with his long moustache and arrogant mien, would dismount from his horse at his parents’ farm and wait to collect the next instalment of his bribe. Later Lemkin remembered how this man stood 6
Formative Years in Poland
7
out in his childhood as a symbol of oppression, whenever he called to extract cash from his hard-pressed parents.2 Lemkin described the farm as consisting of approximately a hundred acres which lay in a large clearing between forests of birch and pine. The farm was jointly owned by Lemkin’s father and an uncle. ‘The children [of the two families], who were mostly of the same age, spent their days together in one happy gang. While our parents were busy on the farm, especially in the summer months’, he recalled, ‘the children escaped ... the control of eight parental eyes’, and had the freedom to play and roam over every corner of the farm.3 Elsewhere I have argued that a false antithesis was drawn in Jewish memoirs from the nineteenth century and later ‘between the prison like atmosphere of the heder [the religious elementary school] and the liberating influence of nature, from which Jewish children were said to be excluded. If the evidence is re-examined, it appears that the Jewish child was only partially banned from the garden of Eden’.4 In his unpublished autobiography, Raphael Lemkin described his childhood on the farm in idyllic terms. He recalled how he loved listening ‘to the metallic whisper of the swinging scythes and sickles, and to the sighs of the clover and rye which were falling like wounded heroes.’ At sunset the animals returned to their stables, when they were watered with help from Raphael and his playmates, who participated in many farming activities. Then the chickens which were about to lay eggs were carried by the children to a separate barn for the night, so that the eggs could be easily collected the next morning. So too, when the potatoes were planted, Lemkin would follow behind the plough with a basket in his hand scattering seed. At the termination of the harvest, the local population celebrated, women wore blue garlands of flowers in their hair and once as a child Raphael was chosen as the harvest king, while the assembled farm hands were served refreshments consisting of sausages and vodka.5 During his childhood Raphael enjoyed climbing trees, hiding from his parents under the cover of their leaves. When the hay and clover were carted to barns, he rode triumphantly on top of the harvested crop. On an adjoining lake, Raphael and his brothers and their playmates built small rafts which they navigated with long branches, while pretending to be pirates. On one occasion, he fell into the lake in a new pair of trousers, for which he received his first thrashing from his mother, although as a progressive she was opposed in principle to corporal punishment. At the age of three, Lemkin rode his first horse and every day afterwards he would have a ride on the same white horse with deepening delight.6 Gradually the carefree antics of Raphael and his companions, who included a pet dog called Riabtchik, came to an end. In a story which has echoes of the tale of the garden of Eden, Lemkin related that to win acceptance among his friends, he joined them in stealing fruit from trees in two private gardens on the farm, the ownership of which had been retained by
8 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
the original owner. When as a result of this incident, his father informed him and his elder brother that stealing was forbidden by God, Lemkin thought that his father was inventing this prohibition until he read the Biblical edict against stealing. Yet Raphael was an introspective child, who also enjoyed being alone in the nearby forest, where he could ‘think and feel without outer disturbance’, a propensity to solitary living which deepened over the years.7 Raphael and his circle of friends sometimes played with the children of the farm labourers, but were always aware of the differences between them. These children, the offspring of the local peasantry, were Ukrainian, spoke a distinctive language, Ruthenian, and belonged to the Orthodox Church, but as a result of many hours passed in their company, Lemkin could speak the language of his playmates fluently and mimic their pronunciation, in addition to which he unconsciously acquired a detailed knowledge of their Christian culture. But there were other differences between the two sets of play fellows. Whereas Lemkin had to wash his head daily with soap, the children of the farm hands had their hair infected with lice which their mothers removed in front of everyone on Sunday afternoon. During the week, when the Jewish children and the offspring of the farm labourers played together, the peasant children were left all day long without food. Raphael and his playmates shared their sandwiches with them. Looking back, Lemkin felt that he was unduly boastful to the children of the labourers about his new clothes and shoes, when they were always bare shod in summer and in winter ‘wrapped their feet in rags and wore sandals made of bark’.8 Lemkin belonged to a Jewish family which, if not ultra-pious, was traditional in every respect. Saul Lemkin recalled that his grandfather, Joseph, the father of Raphael, went to synagogue on every Sabbath, put on tefillin (phylacteries) every day, and celebrated all the festivals. He was a gentle and hard-working man.9 As was customary for children between the ages of three and five years, one winter he was enrolled in a heder, the Jewish elementary school. His teacher lived in a nearby village in the house of Bella, a playmate of Lemkin’s, to whom he was immensely attracted. Because in previous years itinerant teachers had taught Lemkin to read Hebrew in a competent fashion, he and his brother joined a higher class to study the Bible. Incidentally, the fact that these teachers had eaten chicken in Lemkin’s home seems to suggest that the family kept a kosher kitchen. A number of boys from the village came to Bella’s house to join the teacher’s classes. Lessons started at six o’clock in the winter mornings, the only warmth in the room coming from a kerosene lamp, and the teacher taught the Bible with such reverence and love that some of this feeling was imparted to his pupils and Lemkin made rapid progress.10 The following winter the teacher taught Lemkin about the Prophets. Phrases such as the following melted into the boy’s memory: ‘Cease to do evil; learn to do well; relieve the oppressed; judge the fatherless; plead for
Formative Years in Poland
9
the widow’. These words stirred the imagination of the young Lemkin, and he was equally moved by Isaiah’s message for nations to beat their swords into ploughshares. At the same time, in 1905 and 1906, in the wake of the Russian Revolution violent pogroms broke out in the nearby city of Bialystok, and in 1906, 70 Jews were killed and 70 were severely injured by soldiers, who went on a rampage and looted for three days. Rumours that the mob had ripped open the stomachs of Jewish victims in order to stuff them with feathers reached Lemkin’s family. Chaim Nachman Bialik’s (1873–1934) poems denouncing the perpetrators of pogroms in southern Russia and the passivity of some of the victims also gradually made an impression on Lemkin, who was on the threshold of adolescence.11 It is against this specifically Jewish background, the passion for justice imbibed in the heder, the plight of the local Jews as a result of pogroms and Bialik’s poetic outburst in response that Lemkin’s receptivity to the suffering of other victims must be understood. These altruistic feelings were reinforced by Lemkin’s mother, who thought ‘that young children should first of all be indoctrinated in feelings and sensitivities because she believed in the great impact of early emotions on the formation of character’.12 In the winter evenings, Lemkin’s mother would gather Raphael and his brothers around the stove, when they were not receiving Hebrew reading lessons from a tutor, teaching them songs and sometimes poems which they would sing to improvised tunes. Lemkin remarked that having words sung, was recognized from ancient times as a powerful stimulus to memory, particularly when the songs were taught by one’s mother. Lemkin was convinced that such teaching ‘invades all the senses and stays forever because the consciousness of the child is being formed while it listens’. Sometimes Raphael’s mother would read her children tales by the Russian author Krylov, which he had adapted from Lafontaine or Aesop’s fables. A favourite song was the following by the Russian poet Semyon Yakovlevich Nadson (1862–1887), who had some Jewish ancestry and was one of the rare Russian intellectuals sympathetic to the plight of the Jews. This song became his family’s ‘second Bible. It was, however, stronger than the Bible to us’, Lemkin declared, ‘because in the Bible we found some murders which our teachers had difficulty in explaining. There was pure repudiation of violence in Nadson’.13 My dear brother, beloved and suffering, Whoever you are, don’t lose heart, Although falsehood and evil are ruling the world, And the earth is soaked with distress. Though the sacred ideals are reviled, And the blood of the innocent flows, Trust the Baal [false god] will be destroyed, And love will return on earth.
10 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
In his autobiography, Lemkin liked to portray himself as a universal man. His whole interest in the subject of the destruction of racial and religious groups had been triggered by his reading of the novel Quo Vadis as a young boy, in which a Roman Emperor had attempted to exterminate the Christians. ‘A line red from blood, led from the Roman arena through the gallows of France to the pogroms of Bialystok’, he argued, but this is a misleading trail.14 The reverse was the case. In fact, the pogroms in Bialystok and the heightened tension in Lemkin’s neighbourhood during the lengthy trial of Mendel Beilis shaped Lemkin’s outlook and led to his insightful reading of the novel. When he was ten, Lemkin’s parents took up residence in the nearby city of Wolkowysk, as they decided that their sons needed a sound secular education. Wolkowysk was located in a valley being surrounded on three sides by mountains and was 56 miles distant from Bialystok. More than half the town’s population of 20,000 was Jewish. ‘It was a sufficiently sophisticated city to possess a well-developed, modern social hierarchy. At the very top were balebatim, independent entrepreneurs and homeowners, some of whom were fabulously wealthy people and cherished philanthropists. The middlestrata were composed of small-scale retail shopkeepers, tradesmen and artisans. The lower strata were composed of a complete spectrum of labourers, who either worked independently, or for a salary in a factory or office. A noteworthy exception to modern life was that rabbis, scholars and teachers were treated as a special class. Even though they were not materially wealthy, their intellectual and spiritual capabilities earned them special regard’. If we were to place Raphael’s family in this social structure, it would be in the upper ranks of the middle strata.15 Raphael and his brothers were enrolled in the local school, whose curriculum covered the equivalent of the first four years of an American high school. After Lemkin had been attending this school for a year, the Mendel Beilis case erupted into a cause célèbre in Russia.16 On 25 March 1911, the body of a child with multiple stab wounds was found near Kiev. Despite the fact that the victim’s clothing and inner organs were saturated with blood and that a local criminal gang were suspected of murder, a St Petersburg reactionary newspaper accused the Jews of staging a ritual murder, and on the strength of the tainted testimony of two drunkards, who claimed they had seen him abducting the boy, Mendel Beilis was arrested. The first trial which took place in 1912 was inconclusive. For the second trial which was heard in September and October 1913, when Beilis was formally charged with ritual murder, the Russian government relied on the evidence of witnesses, who fared badly under cross-examination. Hence the jury found Beilis not guilty of committing any crime, but in an atmosphere charged with hatred and with credence given to spurious notions the jury decided nonetheless that a ritual murder had occurred.17 All the Jewish pupils at Lemkin’s school were collectively called by the name of Beilis by the other pupils. Tension increased in the city of Wolkowysk,
Formative Years in Poland
11
where a pogrom was expected to occur, and many sections of the Russian Jewish population numbering 5,600,000 felt at risk from mob violence. Raphael Lemkin recalled how his family discussed the progress of the trial on a daily basis. With the pronouncement of the not guilty verdict as far as Beilis was concerned, some of the tension evaporated. But Lemkin remembered that ‘The axes, the hammers and the guns were already prepared, while the jury deliberated. I did not see how a situation of this kind could be bearable for a long time’.18 Bella Lemkin was a formidable personality, a teacher and an adherent of the Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi [1746–1827] system of education, whose aim was ‘to teach him [the child] from the nature of things themselves ... not by words. Leave him to himself to see, hear, find, stumble, rise again, and be mistaken ... What he can do for himself let him do ... nature teaches better than men’.19 When he was 12 and his whole family were immersed in the day to day progress of the Beilis case, Lemkin ‘read the famous novel of Henryk Sienkiewicz, Quo Vadis, about the persecution of the early Christians’. Appalled by the story, he asked his Mother why the Christians did not call the police when they were thrown to the lions. Instead of answering that question his Mother asked him whether he thought the police could have helped the Christians since the Emperor Nero was sitting in the arena.20 Possibly Lemkin’s memory was at fault because he already knew from his childhood experiences that a persecuted group could not rely on the local police for assistance. In an early draft of his autobiography, Lemkin himself made this point. ‘I realized vividly that if a Christian would have called a policeman for help, he would not have received any protection’.21 Five years earlier in 1951 a somewhat different recollection of the discussion about the book appeared in an interview Lemkin gave to the journalist, Herbert Yahraes. ‘When the Roman emperor made the animals kill the early Christians’, he challenged his mother, ‘it was a bad thing wasn’t it?’ ‘Yes’, she agreed, ‘very bad’. ‘And all those other people–they just sat around in the amphitheater and clapped!’ ‘That was very bad, too’. ‘Today we don’t do things like that. When people kill people today, they get put in jail, don’t they?’ ‘Yes, today they get put in jail’, she reluctantly agreed.22 What is clear is that the young Lemkin had many conversations with his mother about the novel, Quo Vadis, which he read and re-read, and we can appreciate how the theme of the novel resonated with the young Lemkin at
12 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
a time when his family were following with apprehension the fate of Beilis in a trial for ritual murder and when the young boy was suffering from constant anti-Semitic spite at school. He developed a growing interest in the question of ethnic and religious hatred and devoured other books about massacres, books on the destruction of Carthage, the Mongol invasions of Europe, the torture of the Huguenots, and the deportation of the Moors from Spain. But Lemkin deliberately played down the fact in his unpublished memoirs and in interviews with journalists that his own Jewish background had first sparked his interest in the problem.23 Raphael Lemkin developed into an imaginative, somewhat solitary youth, and an omnivorous reader under the guidance of his mother Bella, whom he adored. She encouraged him to read the great writers of the world, passing on volumes to him from her well-stocked library, and by the time he was fourteen he had already read Nietzsche and was well on his way to mastering four modern languages.24 Increasingly Bella moulded the personality of her precocious son, Raphael, and shaped his outlook far more than his gentle father. In 1914 the German army surged into Russia, occupying the area surrounding the Lemkin family farm in eastern Poland and in 1915 shell fire destroyed their home. His mother’s library was saved because the family had taken the precaution of packing the books into crates and burying them in the forest. Worse than the fate of the books was their own wartime predicament, as the German army seized their crops and for long periods the family starved as did the rest of the civilian population.25 Despite various interruptions, Lemkin continued with his studies, and at some point during the First World War, enrolled in a Gymnasium, a grammar school, in the town of Bialystok; he also appears to have attended briefly a similar school in the Lithuanian town of Vilnius. At these schools he appears to have received a thorough grounding in Latin and Greek and some of the nuances of French and German. Apart from mathematics, Raphael was an excellent student.26 Wolkowysk, ‘along with its Hebraists and idealistic Zionists, had a reputation in Poland’. Thanks to the leadership of Rabbi Abba Yaakov Borukhov (1840–1936) and his predecessor Rabbi Jonathan Eliasberg, Wolkowysk ‘stood out among the cities around it, in its commitment to the [Jewish] nationalist ideal’. Raphael Lemkin attended a modern reformist heder, where he was taught Hebrew as a living language by Herschel Linevsky. When Lemkin had become an established figure in Poland, ‘he was in the habit of sending his [former] teacher a greeting card before every Jewish holiday in a clear, precise Hebrew’. Rabbi Borukhov had an affable personality with a ‘natural tendency ... to show affection for people without regard to their’ status, and he had good standing among the Christians in the town, who ‘would come to him to adjudicate disputes between them and Jews over money matters’. But he also encouraged the collection of funds for Zionist
Formative Years in Poland
13
projects and inspired enthusiasts of the Hebrew language to set up a library to provide spiritual sustenance for the town’s youth. ‘A circle of “Lovers of the Hebrew Language” grew up around the library, to which the Gymnasium student Raphael Lemkin belonged’, and the Yiddish schoolteacher Shimon Krinsky singled out Lemkin as being among the band of ‘zealot[s]’ for the Hebrew language. Nonetheless, despite these divisions, the Bundists held Rabbi Borukhov in high regard, sometimes coming to hear his sermons; ‘and when he made aliyah to the Holy Land, they too, sent him a letter of good wishes in Hebrew’.27 As the German army retreated in 1918, the Lemkin family farm was destroyed once again. ‘At that time, Lemkin a boy of seventeen, organised partisan groups of schoolboys to disarm the Germans. These groups delivered hundreds of Germans to the authorities of the newly created Polish state’,28 and when two years later Marshal Pilsudski drove a fresh invasion of Russian Bolshevik forces out of eastern Poland, Lemkin claimed that he was wounded by some fragments of a shell.29 His blossoming Polish nationalism and his injuries helped to convert Lemkin into a fervent opponent of the Soviet Union and the Bolsheviks. Around this time, Samuel, who was physically the strongest of the three boys, died in the influenza pandemic, and his mother Bella was so distraught that she was only able to sleep fitfully during the next two to three years.30 William Hagen has pointed out that Sporadic anti-Jewish outbursts accompanied the emergence in 1918–1919 of the new Polish state, but the worst violence and pogroms occurred in connection with military operations, as in the struggle in November 1918 over control of Lemberg [Lvov] and then in 1919–1920 during the Polish– Soviet War ... The anti-Bolshevik Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian military organizations and bands, sometimes opportunistically allied with the Poles against the Red Army, staged exceedingly brutal pogroms in the Polish–Russian borderlands that claimed very numerous Jewish victims. In Lvov, in a pogrom in November 1918 which lasted for 3 days, 72 Jews were murdered and 443 were injured. On 5 April 1919, the local Polish military commander in Pinsk ordered the shooting of 34 Jews, maliciously accusing the participants at a meeting to distribute food for Passover of being a secret Communist cell. In the spring of 1919 in the Lithuanian town of Lida 35 Jews were killed, while in Vilna 50 perished. During the Russian Civil War, Piotr Wrobel estimated that another 50,000 to 60,000 Jews perished in pogroms and attacks in the Ukraine chiefly perpetrated by the anti-Bolshevik armies between December 1918 and December 1919. Lemkin is completely reticent in his memoirs about the pogrom in Lvov, where he became a student shortly afterwards, and about the further series of assaults on Jews in eastern Poland
14 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
and Lithuania which were close to his hometown of Wolkowysk. To the south of the town was the Ukraine, where the mass murder of Jews in 1918–1919 took place on a greater scale than at any time before the Second World War. Yet it was these pogroms rather than news of the wartime Armenian massacres, of which the public only became slowly aware in eastern Europe after the assassination of Talaat Pasha on 14 March 1921, that may have been the formative influences of Lemkin’s early student years.31 Piotr Wrobel asserted that the cruelties of World War II had their roots in World War 1 and the Russian Civil War, but ... also ... that a sudden encounter of modernity with isolated traditional societies [in the eastern European borderlands] had sometimes an explosive character, and that a new kind of violence ... was introduced during 1914–1921 ... This ‘modern violence’ of the 20th century differed in many ways from the previous forms of war violence. It was of a mass character and affected not only the combatants but also the entire population of a given big geographical region. Frequently, civilian casualties were bigger than military ones and the fighting armies deliberately exterminated and terrorized civilians.32 Seeing these chaotic events unfold around him puzzled Raphael Lemkin and set him thinking on how to prevent such violence and to preserve embattled nationalities and cultures. To forestall future outrages, against their ethnic minorities, such as the pogrom at Pinsk, the Allied powers forced a Minorities Treaty on the Poles in 1919 which they reluctantly ratified. All inhabitants were guaranteed ‘full and complete protection of life and liberty’ together with religious freedom. All Polish citizens were ‘to be equal before the law and were to enjoy equal rights’, and there was to be no restriction on any citizen in the free use ‘of any language in private, in commerce, in religious matters’ and so on. Where a minority resided in any area, who spoke a language other than Polish, the Polish government was to facilitate their instruction ‘in their mother tongue’ at the primary school level. Funds were to be made available to these schools by the state and local authorities. School committees appointed by the local Jewish communities were to supervise the schools under the control of the state. A government bill on language and education dealt only with territorially concentrated minorities, not Jews. They were promised that their case would be considered in a further measure which never materialized. Only a single state grant was made to Jewish schools in 1927, and while schools for Sabbath observers were opened, their number was gradually reduced. Nor would the Polish government recognize a central body to represent Jewish interests, though Jews comprised ten per cent of the Polish population. The provisions of the Minorities Treaty for the most part were not implemented.33
Formative Years in Poland
15
After the War, Lemkin entered the University of Lvov in 1920 to study philology, and he was an outstanding student being able to speak nine languages and to read twelve. His father Joseph had wanted Raphael to start working in a humdrum job, but his mother Bella clashed with her husband and insisted that her brilliant son Raphael had the benefit of a university education.34 At university he added Arabic and Sanskrit to his knowledge of the main European languages. William Korey has pointed out that Lemkin chose to study philology, as language was the key to understanding cultures and nations. Lemkin was deeply influenced by Herder, who argued that the cultural development of each nation produced a folk spirit, Volkgeist, which was reflected in its own unique culture and art.35 At Lvov, Raphael had a heated exchange with his professor, when they were discussing the killing of Talaat Pasha, the Turkish Minister of the Interior, one of the principal perpetrators behind the murder of between 800,000 and 1.2 million Armenians in 1915. His Armenian assassin, Soghomon Tehlirian, was acquitted by a court in Berlin in June 1921, on grounds that he was insane. Lemkin thought that it was the Turkish minister, who should have been arraigned before the courts for mass murder, not the Armenian seeking revenge.36 Lemkin asked why a man, who had participated in so much killing had not been arrested, to which the professor responded that there was no law under which he could be charged. ‘Let us take the case of a man who owns some chickens’, the professor declared. ‘He kills them. Why not? It is not your business. If you interfere, it is trespass’.37 When Lemkin brushed aside this analogy and persisted with his argument, he was met with the objection that this would interfere unduly with national sovereignty. Lemkin responded that ‘sovereignty of states ... implies conducting an independent foreign and internal policy, building of schools, construction of roads, in brief, all types of activity directed towards the welfare of people. Sovereignty ... cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent people’.38 Unknown to Lemkin, Lord Robert Cecil tried unsuccessfully to introduce an amendment in February 1919 authorizing the council of the League of Nations to react to ‘religious persecution and intolerance’ that ‘endangered the peace of the world’ and to ‘take such other steps’ to put an end to the persecution.39 According to Lemkin this exchange with his professor caused him to drop some of his philology courses and decide to study law, but it is more probable that it was the killing of Jews in Poland and the Ukraine which was happening around him that sensitized Lemkin to this issue and made him so agitated about the trial and acquittal of Tehlirian, resulting in him opting for law as a career. In 1919–1920 a fellow Jewish law student at Lvov, Mundyk Steiger, was convicted of trying to assassinate the President of Poland in the city and was only saved from execution by the confession of a Ukrainian nationalist.40 If the contents of the conversation are examined, it seems more likely to have
16 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
been between Lemkin and a law professor at a later date, when he had already switched courses. Lemkin then went for postgraduate work to the Universities of Heidelberg, Berlin and Paris. By 1926, Lemkin had obtained his doctorate of law from Lvov and was ready to start his career.41 It is also likely that during his student years Raphael Lemkin deepened his Zionist sympathies. Ezra Mendelsohn has observed that ‘Polish nationalism exerted a tremendous influence on Polish Jewish youth and pointed large numbers of Jews towards Zionism’, and it is not improbable that the young Lemkin moved through the same phases of an attraction to Polish nationalism before renewing his allegiance to Zionism. While he was in Lvov, Lemkin mixed in Jewish intellectual circles, translating a short story of Chaim Nachman Bialik called Noach i Marynka (Noah and Marinka) in 1926 from Hebrew into Polish, a copy of which is in the Jewish National Library. In his introduction to the tale, Lemkin quoted from Mickierwicz’s epic Pan Tadeusz which was beloved by Poles but praised Bialik as ‘our national poet’, who endeavoured to wake the nation from its slumber and showed it the brightly lit path to a free, happy future on its own liberated soil. With a lash of satire, he whipped those, who did not want to see God’s revelation, and who did not want to hear the call to resurrection42 Clearly Lemkin was indicating his own adherence to the Zionist cause. The story was about an unresolved love affair between neighbours, a Jewish youth and a Gentile girl and prefigured some of Lemkin’s own later predicaments. Shortly after graduation, Lemkin had his views on the need for the radical reform of international law strengthened by the trial in Paris of Samuel Schwartzbard, who in 1926 assassinated Symon Petliura, the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, who bore some of the responsibility for the pogroms. Again, the Paris jury in October 1927 faced a dilemma, being unable to acquit a man for murder but equally being unwilling to condemn a man, who had avenged the killing of tens of thousands of innocent victims, among them his own parents. So they decided that Schwartzbard like Tehlirian was insane and should be freed. Jewish attitudes to the assassination were confused. While the Jewish masses supported it, the American Jewish Committee told Schwartzbard’s lawyer to plead that he was mentally unstable and not argue that the murder was justified. Raphael Abramovitch sent an anti-Schwartzbard article to the Forward which the editor would not publish, but he ensured that his paper also refused to open a public subscription for Schwartzbard’s defence.43 However, Lemkin wrote an article after the trial, calling Schwartzbard’s act ‘a beautiful crime’ and deploring ‘that there was no law for the unification of the moral standards of mankind in relation to the destruction of national, racial and religious groups’.44 Later in a letter to the Manchester
Formative Years in Poland
17
Guardian signed by Pearl Buck but clearly drafted by him, Lemkin cited the example of both the assassination of the Armenian and Ukrainian leaders responsible for mass killing, as there was no court of law prepared to try them, but when he was reiterating the point to a State Department official, he only quoted the Ukrainian example because this weighed more heavily on his mind.45 Lemkin decided to specialize in criminal law and criminal fiscal law, writing a series of monographs and establishing close relations with the country’s leading academic specialists in this field, including Professors Makarewicz, Makowski, Jamontt and Rappaport. With Tadeusz Kochanowski, he wrote the Criminal Code of the Soviet Republics (1926), dealing with the evolution of Russian and Soviet penal law, followed in 1929 by a book, analysing the Italian Fascist criminal code. In 1931, he collaborated with Jan Koryory in a project on Polish law, the publication of a wide-ranging commentary on The Fiscal Penal Statute of 1926, which was twice updated. In 1931, he wrote a Commentary on the Polish Penal Law Project and a year later with two of his mentors, both of whom were judges in the Polish Supreme Court, he published the two volume standard Commentary on the Polish Penal Law of 1932. With Professor Rappaport, Lemkin drafted the code for minor criminal offences which became law in 1932. The following year Lemkin published a major study entitled The Criminal Judge Faced by Modern Criminal Law and Criminology, pointing out that judges should be trained in criminology and psychology to make them more skilful when sentencing criminals involved in serious crimes and habitual offenders, and went on to contribute numerous articles to the Polish Encyclopedia of Criminal Law published between 1931 and 1939.46 Despite the difficulties being encountered by Jewish lawyers in the advancement of their careers in Poland, Raphael Lemkin on the strength of his first book was appointed as secretary of the Court of Appeals in Warsaw in 1927 and two years later as deputy public prosecutor in the District Court of Warsaw. ‘Other appointments followed soon’, Lemkin declared, including the appointment as Secretary of the Penal Section of the Polish Committee on codification of laws, where I worked on the Polish penal code; representative at the International Bureau for Unification of Penal Law which met every year in another capital of Europe; Secretary General of the Polish Group for the Association of Penal Law. I was soon on friendly terms with the highest judicial authorities and leading intellectuals of Western Europe. I submitted papers to all these conferences. There were solemn opening speeches, dinners and receptions with decorations covering half of the chests of the delegates.47 Lemkin was introduced to the international law circuit, and in particular to the Association Internationale de Droit Penal, by his mentor and colleague
18 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
at the Free University of Warsaw Professor Emil Stanislaw Rappaport. At these conferences which were held under the auspices of the League of Nations, Lemkin made many useful contacts, including the Belgian statesman Count Henri Carton de Wiart, the President of the League, and Karl Schlyter, the Swedish Minister of Justice; in addition, he met the leading international lawyers, such as Professor Vespasian Pella and Professor Donnedieu de Vabres, and voluntary workers. Lemkin was proud to have ‘collaborated with and ... [become] a close friend ... [of] Professor Donnedieu de Vabres’.48 To understand the development of Lemkin’s thought, we must briefly discuss the issues which were vexing lawyers at the international conferences during the 1920s and early 1930s. Following a report of a committee of the League of Nations, Hugh H. Bellot, the Secretary-General of the International Law Association suggested in 1922 that an international criminal court should be set up to try war criminals. In 1927 the Association Internationale de Droit Penal under the leadership of Professor Rappaport declared that both aggressive war and the propaganda for such a war should be classified as international crimes and that a commission should be set up to see how this proposal could be implemented. At the same time, Professor Vespasian Pella revived the idea of the establishment of an international criminal court. At subsequent conferences in 1930 and 1931 of the association, the issue of ‘the intentional use of instruments capable of producing a public danger’ was considered. Although some delegates wished to include terrorism under this heading, this was opposed by Rappaport and Lemkin. A commission was set up with Lemkin included in its membership to recommend a policy for the association to adopt. Jean-Andre Roux, the Secretary-General of the association, focussed solely on terrorism, fixing minimal national penalties for the offence and ignoring wider international law concerns.49 Lemkin’s ideas on how to combat the persecution of racial and religious groups had been maturing, as he was sharpening his skills as a legal draftsman and perspicacious commentator. Meanwhile Hitler had become the Reich Chancellor on 30 January 1933 and waves of refugees began to leave Germany, particularly doctors and lawyers, as the position of Jews and their sympathisers worsened. In August 1933, 3,000 Assyrian Christians in the village of Simel in Iraq were massacred in an ethnic cleansing episode. At last there appeared to be an opportunity for Lemkin to broach his proposals, as he was one of those invited to present a report on terrorism on behalf of the steering committee of the Association Internationale de Droit Penal which was due to meet in Madrid between 14 and 20 October 1933. Against a deteriorating international scene, Lemkin was motivated to act and in a paper submitted to Pedone, the official publisher of the League of Nations, Lemkin designated two new crimes in international law: the crime of barbarity which outlawed the extermination of ethnic, social and religious groups by means of massacres, pogroms or economic discrimination, while
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19
the crime of vandalism forbade the destruction of cultural or artistic works which embodied the genius of a specific people. He borrowed the concept of the crime of barbarie from the Romanian international lawyer Vespasian Pella.50 Acts of barbarism often resulted in the flight of persecuted groups – here Lemkin must have been thinking of the flood of refugees from Nazi Germany – and individuals from such a group were sometimes prone to terrorism and to carrying out political assassinations. He argued that the world community had already banned slavery, the trade in women and children, the drug trade, the counterfeiting of money, the circulation of obscene publications, piracy and terrorism. These crimes were deemed a threat to the international order, and even if committed elsewhere, could be tried in the country, where the culprit was apprehended. Underlying Lemkin’s argument was the proposition that the annihilation of an ethnic or religious collectivity, however, was much worse than the destruction of cables or the hijacking of a merchant ship, and should be treated in a similar serious manner by the international community. Other crimes which concerned Lemkin were the acts of terror against the transport links between nations and the disruption of the telephone or telegraphic service and the deliberate dissemination of disease. Therefore, he stated that an international convention against such crimes was necessary.51 Part of this emphasis on crimes of vandalism or cultural destruction must be seen in the context of Jewish politics in Poland between the two World Wars. While ethnic Poles wanted their state to be homogeneous and monolithic, Zionists such as Lemkin and his friend Yitzhak Gruenbaum had a vision of Poland as a ‘nationalities state’.52 During the 1920s moderate Zionists such as these men were ‘committed to the struggle for Jewish national rights both “here” in Poland and “there” in Palestine’, and the former included extensive Jewish national autonomy schemes in Poland; in other words, there was considerable overlapping between this programme of the Zionists and that of the moderate Jewish cultural autonomists in Poland. But the Polish government despite signing the 1919 Minorities Treaty undermined the movement for Yiddish or Hebrew language schools, a key component of Jewish cultural autonomy. By invoking the protection of a new international treaty, Lemkin hoped to some extent to circumvent Polish opposition to Jewish national and cultural autonomy.53 However, if the text of his paper is scrutinized, it is not certain that Lemkin had as yet conceptualized the idea of genocide, for he still appears to have been thinking in terms of legislating against pogroms and massacres and the economic discrimination which was widely practised in Poland. I would suggest that during the 1930s Lemkin still saw the problem of mass killing within the conceptual framework of Jewish history and more specifically within the confines of Polish Jewish history. As far as massacres are concerned, one of the formative events in Polish Jewish history was the slaughter of the Jews by the Cossacks led by Chelmienicki in 1648. Many
20 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
attempts have since been made to distinguish a massacre from genocide with Mark Levene defining it as ‘one-sided killings’, and Jacques Semelin remarking that ‘A massacre is in no way a genocide, whereas a genocide always implies one or more massacres’.54 After the First World War, we have seen that there were pogroms against the Jews in the Polish borderlands and even more brutal massacres in the Ukraine which were well known to Lemkin, and the unrest in Poland continued after the war. In 1922 there was a riot in Minsk in which four Jews were killed and six were wounded, arising out of a blood libel accusation, and rioting also occurred in the towns of Radom, Vilna, Olsham and Mlava, while blood libel accusations were made against the Jews in Warsaw, Lodz and Vilna. Again, in 1923 there were anti-Jewish disturbances in Kaltowicz, Posen, Lvov and Cracow. From the mid-1930s onwards such pogroms were once again to become a common feature of Jewish life in Poland, though violence against the Jews never subsided during the whole interwar period.55 After the First World War, the commercial boycott of the Jews was enforced by agitators sponsored by the nationalist parties, particularly the Endeks, in conjunction with associations of merchants and artisans. Typical was the situation in the shtetl of Kolo. Returning to his hometown of Kolo in 1923, J. Cohen Lask noted that The Jews in the streets and markets are like skeletons. They have lost both their courage and vitality. There is a government monopoly of certain goods, such as sugar and tobacco, and these are supplied exclusively to the Christian traders. Then, again, there are a number of agitators who, either by argument or by force, prevent customers from entering shops owned by Jews. The British Board of Deputies was informed in 1926 that They had to deal with pogroms and burning and robberies [in Poland in the past], but they had never had to encounter a problem of this kind, which was a sort of creeping paralysis which was coming over the whole of Polish Jewry and which was caused by the economic condition of the country.56 As he was preparing for the conference in Madrid, Lemkin’s phone rang one evening. It was a Judge of the Supreme Court, the chief Polish delegate to the conference, almost certainly Justice Rappaport, who was his mentor and warned him in somewhat embarrassed tones that the Minister of Justice was opposed to him, Lemkin, attending the meeting in Madrid. He also referred to an article that had appeared in the influential anti-Semitic newspaper Gazata Warszawska which attacked Lemkin’s invention of the new international crimes of barbarity and vandalism, denouncing him for
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21
being solely concerned to protect his own race. Under Josef Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, there had been a reorientation of Polish foreign policy in an attempt to secure a rapprochement with Germany, and as a first step, the Polish government undertook ‘to stop anti-German propaganda’ and Lemkin’s scheme was regarded as falling under this category. In September 1934 Poland renounced the Minorities Rights Treaty.57 Lemkin immediately wrote letters to his friends in Western Europe, urging them to support his scheme which was to be published in time for the forthcoming conference. His proposals were tabled at the conference in Madrid, without the delegates being given the opportunity to accept or reject them. Subsequently, William Korey has pointed out that Lemkin exaggerated his role, by suggesting that when he spoke at the Madrid conference, the German delegation walked out. In fact, Korey showed that Lemkin had been prevented from going to Madrid. The Gazeta Warszawska implied that Lemkin as a public prosecutor was giving the wrong impression to other governments about Polish foreign policy. Shortly afterwards, on 26 January 1934 the Poles and Germans signed the Declaration of Non-aggression, and Lemkin finding that his position in public service was untenable resigned his post as public prosecutor.58 Lemkin was at the same time deeply involved with the Jewish community in Warsaw. In addition to publishing two manuals in Yiddish in 1928 and 1929 explaining various facets of Jewish and Polish law, he wrote a column in a Yiddish newspaper, Haynt [Today] answering readers’ legal queries. He held the position of Professor of Law at Tahkemoni College from 1927 until 1939 and gave occasional courses in law at the Free University of Warsaw.59 Raphael Mahler explained that Jews who held full professorships [in inter-War Poland] could be counted on the fingers of one hand, while most of the remainder never advanced beyond the rank of assistants. In some cases, young Jewish scholars were advised frankly by their sponsors to embrace Christianity if they ever hoped to become even docents [lecturers]. Despite his prolific output, Lemkin as a Jew was not fully welcomed in Polish academic institutions. Takhemoni College was a rabbinical seminary, where students were instructed both in the Talmud and Modern Hebrew literature and given a thorough grounding in secular subjects. During the 1920s, when it was headed by the distinguished Polish Jewish historian Mayer Balaban, it was a prestigious institution. The College was financed by the Mizrachi organization, a Zionist body with a Modern Orthodox ideology.60 It is likely that Lemkin chose to work there, as he was broadly in sympathy with Zionist aspirations since his student days. Raphael Lemkin was on friendly terms with many members of the Jewish intelligentsia in Warsaw, among whom was Yizhak Gruenbaum (1879–1970). Gruenbaum was a leader of the General Zionists and head of the Aliyah (immigration) Department of
22
Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
the Jewish Agency 1933–1935. In fact, Raphael’s brother Elias went on two trips to Palestine in 1933–1934, returning to Poland for the birth of his youngest son Samuel in April 1934 and managing to obtain an immigration certificate through Raphael’s influential contacts, to see if he and his wife and children could settle there, but he found economic conditions too difficult; it is possible that because of the obstacles encountered by his brother, Raphael may have adopted a somewhat cooler attitude towards the Zionist movement.61 Almost barred from public service in Poland during the 1930s, Jewish intellectuals turned to the liberal professions, particularly medicine and law, which they dominated at the lower levels. In 1931 just under half of the legal practitioners and barristers in Poland were Jewish. A new law was passed in 1938 empowering the Minister of Justice from time to time to close the list of barristers’ candidates and to determine the number to be admitted but at the same time it was made compulsory for candidates to serve a court apprenticeship, with the aim of excluding Jews. A boycott was organized against Jewish lawyers in Poland, so both industry and the trade unions were reluctant to have them represent their interests.62 Unperturbed by these obstacles, Lemkin plunged into private law practice in 1934 and as an acknowledged expert on tax law including its international ramifications, saw his practice thrive. He opened offices in central Warsaw, first at 6 Jenaborska and then at 6 Kredytowa, an exclusive district.63 According to William Korey, ‘With some of Europe’s biggest corporations becoming the firm’s clients, Lemkin was quickly beginning to amass a fortune’. There are various indications of Lemkin’s affluence in this period. He acted as ‘counsel for the heavy industries in Polish Upper Silesia. Because of the financial and economic inter-connection of these Polish industries with German industries ... [he] could get an insight in[to] the workings of the German economy and finance’.64 In the 1950s, Lemkin assessed his Polish property as being worth $150,000. He also had a fine collection of paintings from medieval times onwards depicting the administration of justice which were looted and carried off to Berlin.65 When he later met up with a former colleague from Warsaw and they reminisced about the past, Lemkin bluntly declared that ‘The big lawyer’s fees, the idle talk about our own endless professional wisdom, the expensive furniture, the country houses, will never return’.66 Lemkin had a hectic working week, advising clients on their tax, foreign exchange control and other problems, and then would spend a relaxed weekend in his country cottage, where perhaps he found some of the time to write an endless succession of books and academic legal articles. During the mid-1930s or perhaps a little later, Raphael Lemkin, who had a tendency to take on too many commitments, contracted a fever in Vienna; he neglected his illness and fell ill with double-pneumonia. Although the medical specialists pronounced his chances of recovery as minimal, his
Formative Years in Poland
23
mother and sister-in-law Lisa journeyed to Warsaw to nurse him and helped him through his convalescence, but he was left with a weakened heart.67 In 1936 or perhaps a year or two later Lemkin met Professor Malcolm McDermott of the Duke University Law School, North Carolina, when he assisted him in translating the Polish Penal Code of 1932 into English. At that time Lemkin had received a tentative offer of an academic position in the United States, but after his mother’s pleas to him to stay in Poland he had shelved the plan.68 As the international situation grew more gloomy and as the prospects of Poland’s Jews worsened in 1937 and 1938, the idea of migrating from Poland to a country, where his talents would be better appreciated simmered in Lemkin’s mind. In 1936 he was approached by Count Carton de Wiart, the former Prime Minister of Belgium, to make a study of ‘payment restrictions in international relations’.69 His new career as a corporation lawyer daily advising clients on tax law and the regulations governing the movement of currency from one country to another encouraged Lemkin to embark on a magnum opus in French on exchange control. This treatise would, if necessary, give him the éntree to academic circles overseas. Raphael Lemkin kept in close contact with his parents, particularly with his mother to whom he was deeply attached, and his brother. Every New Year (Rosh Hashanah) in September and every Passover in the spring, Raphael travelled to Wolkowysk to spend these holidays with his parents. On the New Year festival, he sometimes left early before its completion and picked up the transport for the return journey outside the town so as not to embarrass his religious father.70 Away from his family in Warsaw, Lemkin stopped attending a synagogue and he abandoned most forms of religious observance. Every year Lemkin would join the international legal conference circuit, going abroad to Budapest, Copenhagen, Paris, Amsterdam and Cairo, meeting colleagues and delivering papers. Although Lemkin liked to give the impression that he availed himself of every opportunity before the Second World War to denounce the crime of barbarity at these gatherings, this was not the case.71 Apart from the 1933 paper on crimes of barbarity and vandalism presented to the Madrid conference, Lemkin only touched on these issues in similar articles published in Austrian and Polish law journals at the end of the same year. Rebuffed by the shelving of his report, Lemkin shifted his focus of interest from crimes against ethnic groups to the need to support the system of collective security sponsored by the League of Nations to prevent war. Despite the new urgency given to the issue of terrorism with the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Louis Barthou, the French Foreign Minister, in October 1934, Lemkin hardly participated in the deliberations of the Association Internationale de Droit Penal in the following year to draft a convention against terrorism and to set up an international criminal court.72 In the summer of 1937 Lemkin travelled to Paris where he gave an important paper on ‘The protection of peace by domestic penal law’ to the
24 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
Fourth International Congress of the Association for Criminal Law. While saying that he personally still favoured the system of collective security as the ideal to which all should aspire, he noted that there was also a place for bilateral treaties between nations. He suggested that international peace was not only the task of international law which governed relations between states, but it was also necessary for individual societies to educate their citizens for peace. He believed that law has always performed through its prohibitive norms the function of collective education on moral issues ... peace ... [was] not only a political issue, but also a moral problem of deep significance. If societies were given a direct share in preserving peace, governments would lose all incentive to break peace because they would realize that they would be violating not only international laws but also the criminal laws of their own countries if they did so, and that they would be acting against the feelings and sanctioned interests of their own peoples. Among the offences against good international relations Lemkin listed in his proposed law code were hostile acts against the independence or territorial integrity of another state by an individual or armed group, the diffusion of false news, and the spreading of hostile propaganda full of hatred against another state. Second, he wished to ensure that individuals who spread propaganda to incite one state to attack another in violation of international agreements and to undermine an ongoing arbitration process between states were to be punished. Growing up in a contested borderland over which different armies clashed during the First World War and its aftermath made Lemkin acutely sensitive to the concerns of the diverse nationalities living there and their anxieties about self-preservation. Hence when he enrolled in the University of Lvov, he switched to the study of the law to have a better understanding of these problems; later by joining the international law circuit, he teamed up with a group of older scholars, Emil Rappaport, Donnedieu de Vabres, and Vespasian Pella, who acted as his mentors. Ambitious, exceedingly industrious, and disillusioned by the Minorities Treaties ratified by Poland in 1919, he devised his own scheme in 1933, based on ensuring that acts of barbarity and vandalism committed against peaceful groups were declared to be crimes in international law. Repudiated by his government and attracting little support elsewhere, Lemkin put his plan aside and concentrated on his law practice, other less contentious suggestions, and his writing. Despite the increasing severity of the economic boycott against Jews in Poland, Lemkin’s private legal practice throve, after he was forced to resign his official appointment. Comparing the plight of the Jews in pre-War Poland with that of the black population in the Southern states before the civil rights era and railing against the discrimination directed
Formative Years in Poland
25
against them in his historical studies, Lemkin deftly under-played his concerns in his memoirs. In the remaining years before the Second World War, he concentrated on the drafting of a formidable treatise on exchange control regulations. This would be his passport for acceptance in the academic world overseas.73
2 Escape from Poland
On 1 September 1939, the German air force attacked Poland destroying most of the Polish aeroplanes on the ground and bombing road and railway communications. Dive-bombers hunted for columns of marching men, while at the same time fleeing civilians were strafed with machine-gun fire. On land there was a Blitzkrieg, a lightening war, as German mechanized units with light tanks and motorized artillery advanced rapidly; they were quickly followed by heavy tanks and artillery which completed the military occupation of the area, and then the same pattern of advance was repeated. Cities such as Warsaw were relentlessly pounded by artillery without regard to the number of civilian casualties inflicted. Around Poznan in western Poland 19 divisions of the Polish army were trapped and in the ensuing battle 170, 000 Polish soldiers were taken prisoner.1 On 6 September 1939, Raphael Lemkin walked down Marszalkowaka Street in Warsaw towards the railway station, passing houses which were burning ‘like candles’. That morning Colonel Umiastowski, the official spokesman, broadcast on Warsaw radio, telling listeners that western Poland had almost fallen and that a new line of defence was being set up in the east and south along the frontiers with Russia and Romania on the Bug and Narew rivers, where all able-bodied men were expected to fight. People anticipated that Russia would stay out of the conflict because she had signed a non-aggression pact with Poland.2 Eventually Lemkin boarded a train as dawn was approaching and secured a corner seat in a compartment. While serving in the Polish army, Lemkin had been wounded in his ‘right leg close to the hip’ which detracted from his mobility.3 Suddenly a powerful detonation shook the train followed by a bomb explosion which was even closer. A cry rang out that passengers should evacuate the train, as it had been hit. People began jumping through the doors and windows, screaming ‘Oh God’, ‘Oh Jesus’.4 Fleeing from the train, Lemkin joined four other men and headed towards the city of Siedlce which was well to the east of Warsaw and close to the Bug and Narew rivers. Along the way Lemkin linked up with another group in a 26
Escape from Poland
27
forest, but they were careless and allowed too much smoke to escape when they prepared breakfast. Then the group rested shaded by the trees, but they were jolted from their slumber by the sound of falling bombs. After the raid was over, the group discovered that three of their members lay dead. Lemkin continued his flight, hitching a lift aboard a horse-drawn military vehicle and sat next to a sleeping and exhausted Polish soldier. With his heart pounding and fearful of drowning, Lemkin was forced to walk the length of a shaky beam, the remnants of a bridge which once spanned a river.5 Usually the rain started to fall early in September in Poland turning the roads into a quagmire which would have impeded the passage of Nazi tanks. But this year the cloudless blue skies during the day and the clear nights full of stars favoured the rapid advance of the Germans. ‘In the daytime’ Lemkin observed, ‘the planes controlled the sky with a terrifying furor, and continued to rain their relentless fire and destruction. We were exhausted from hunger, thirst, and animal-like fears’.6 Other eye-witness testimony confirms the veracity of Lemkin’s account.7 Because of the instructions on the radio for able-bodied men to leave the cities and join the army in eastern Poland, most of the escapees on the road were male. As soap and hot water were not available, people washed irregularly. There were no facilities for shaving, so long beards became de rigeur. Whenever the sun rose, socks and underwear were washed rapidly and dried by its warmth. Soon the men began to take on the appearance of a bunch of robbers. The only vestiges of their previous status were the eyeglasses worn by them. In contrast most of the women, who left Warsaw, went east to seek refuge with relatives. During the first days on the march, their major preoccupation was keeping their stockings intact. When they were no longer able to wear lipstick, some of them confessed to feeling ‘undressed’, yet they still looked condescendingly on the barefooted peasant women, who served them food. Sometimes strangers paired off and made love in the dark, despite the lack of privacy.8 As they progressed further south, Lemkin noticed that there were fewer bombing attacks. At last the overhead flights of hostile aircraft ceased, and Lemkin’s group decided that it was safe to walk during the day. ‘One day we heard that the Russians had entered Poland. This explained to us the ominous silence in the sky during the recent days’, he remarked. Later it became known that there was a secret clause in the Nazi–Soviet non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939, which allocated much of eastern Poland to the Russians, and the Soviet army invaded Poland on 17 September 1939 to secure the territory which they had been allocated.9 With effective resistance by the Polish army to the German onslaught now doomed by the Russian intervention, it must have been about this time that Lemkin’s vague thought of escaping to Lithuania and Sweden, if the need arose, must have hardened into a firm intention. As we have seen, Lemkin had formed a friendship with Karl Schlyter, a former Minister of
28
Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
Justice in Sweden, and he was relying on him to facilitate his entry, provided he could reach him by cable. He also wanted to visit his parents, who lived in the town of Wolkowysk in eastern Poland, to reassure them that he was still alive.10 Near a bridge which led to a small town near Kovel was a police post manned by several Russian soldiers, who selected and arrested people as they tried to cross the bridge. Lemkin stayed with a Jewish family in a nearby town, who advised him to buy peasant clothes and discard his suit which someone could collect for him at a later date. Nevertheless, the next day when Lemkin attempted to cross the bridge, a Russian soldier questioned him. Lemkin answered him in Ruthenian, a local language which he had acquired in childhood when he played with the Ukrainian peasant children. He claimed to have been taken from his village of Ozerisko, which was near to Wolkowysk, by the Polish army, but was now returning home. Dissatisfied with his answer, the soldier continued to question him: ‘You are not going in the direction of your home, you are going toward Kowel [Kovel]. Your home is northeast’.11 Lemkin replied, ‘I know it, but I have been dragged by the army south and would like to take the train home from Kowel’. Not satisfied with these responses to his questions, the soldier asked Lemkin to show him his hands. He did not find them sufficiently calloused for Lemkin to pass as a peasant. ‘But I work as a secretary in my village office’, [Lemkin continued], ‘I went to school and I know how to read and write. You can telephone my village office and find out’. Lemkin was told to go into a little room and lie down on the floor which was covered with straw. If he was not released soon, Lemkin sensed that he would be in danger and could be detained indefinitely. Pretending to be hungry, Lemkin banged on the door demanding food, and the soldier brought him bread. Continuing with his pretence, Lemkin greedily devoured the bread, although he had been given a meal of chicken by his Jewish hosts only two hours earlier.12 In the middle of the night, a man masquerading as a peasant joined Lemkin on the straw and started to question him as to where he came from and whether or not he had a family. Lemkin claimed to have a wife and four children. Turning the tables on his interrogator, Lemkin volunteered the information that in his village it cost ten zlotys to christen a child and casually asked the other man how much it cost in his village, a question which failed to elicit an answer and deepened Lemkin’s suspicion that he was trying to ensnare him. Soon Lemkin fell asleep and started to snore; he was woken from his slumber by the other man, who asked him the time. Looking at the sky, where a silver line was visible, Lemkin predicted that it would soon be daybreak. The other man responded by claiming that the Bolsheviks wanted to make soldiers of the peasants. But Lemkin replied that thanks to the Russians more food would be available. He studied the man, whose head was square, with a haircut which was never worn by the peasants around
Escape from Poland
29
Wolkowysk. Admitting defeat, the man interrogating Lemkin added that many Polish officers were trying to evade capture disguised as peasants.13 In all, the Russians massacred 20,000 individuals belonging to the Polish elite, mainly officers but also landowners, industrialists and civil servants. More than 4,000 of these victims were buried in a mass grave in the forest of Katyn near to Smolensk.14 When Lemkin awoke, the man had left the room and he was released soon afterwards. Lemkin shambled to the door slowly trying his best to imitate the gait of peasants. He could not forget this incident and his brush with death. Playing with the peasant children as a young boy had saved his life. Lemkin soon found refuge in one of the many hundreds of predominantly Jewish shtetlekh. towns in the province of Volhynia. His host, a Jewish baker, remembering what had happened during the First World War took a complacent view of Germany’s future intentions: ‘How can Hitler destroy the Jews, if he must trade with them?’. Similar sentiments about the good relations existing between Jews and the German army of occupation in Poland during the First World War were expressed by Jakob Wassermann in one of his novels and were widely shared. Lemkin paraphrased Hitler’s ideology and explained that this War was different; the Nazis had the aim of changing the population structure of the territories they seized by replacing them with Germans and regaled him with biblical comparisons of the deportation of the Jews by the Assyrians to no avail. Here what Lemkin implied was the kernel of the theory that underpinned his classic work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944), yet his recollections seem to be confused at this point.15 Perhaps what was happening in Poland in the autumn and early winter of 1939 had radicalized Lemkin’s thought. During this period, the Germans had conducted their military campaign in Poland with a viciousness reminiscent of the upheavals in eastern Europe after the First World War, and the SS and police with the cooperation of the German army primarily targeted the leadership of the Polish nation in the conquered territories, murdering about 50,000 persons, of whom about 7,000 were Jews, by December 1939.16 Nor do the remarks of his host’s son about the murderous intentions of the Germans towards Poland’s Jews ring true either, for the family was living in the Russian eastern zone of Poland, and both the baker and his son would have been much more concerned with the evolution of current Soviet policy towards the Jews than musing about what Germany might intend. Until now German venom had been directed towards the Polish elite as a whole and was not particularly directed against Jews. Lemkin’s exposition at this point of German plans for the wholesale destruction of the Jewish population in eastern and central Europe was heavily tinged with hindsight. True there were those prophetic voices which warned of an impending catastrophe in eastern Europe. Chaim Weizmann, when giving evidence to the Peel Commission on 25 November 1936, warned that east of the Rhine, the Jews had become ‘ “the flotsam and jetsam of the world”. Almost six million
30 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
Jews ... in that part of the world are doomed to be pent up in places where they are not wanted, and for whom the world is divided into places where they cannot live, and places where they cannot enter ... They are doomed ... they are in despair’. Daniel Goldhagen drew attention to ‘The pre-existing genocidal potential that inhered in Germans’ eliminationist anti-Semitism ... and the evaluation of people like Lessing, Lewisohn, Thompson, and the mid1939 congressional testimony of the American journalist Quentin Reynolds, who predicted the “annihilation of the Jews” in “a complete pogrom” ’. Dr Franz Borkenau wrote in April 1939 that ‘no less than seven million Jews are bottled up in an area where most of them are no longer wanted’ and predicted that ‘There is little doubt that within a few years the fate of the Jews in eastern Europe will resemble that of the Armenians in Turkey’.17 But it is doubtful, despite his later protestations, that Lemkin at this point shared the views of these visionaries. Lemkin’s 1933 proposals against barbarity and vandalism looked back to the Armenian massacres and the plight of the Ukrainian Jews after the Russian revolution, but he later failed to draw attention to Herschel Grynszpan, who shot the German envoy, Ernest Von Rath, in Paris on 7 November 1938 because the Germans had deported 17,000 Polish Jews, including Grynszpan’s family, into a no-man’s land between the two states. At the time Lemkin was busy with his own plans for reinvigorating the collective security system of the League of Nations and writing his book on exchange control. He was primarily an international lawyer and had neither the time nor the inclination to read the burgeoning literature of the German population experts and economic planners, who had schemes for the dispossession of the Jews and the resettlement of large population groups in eastern Europe. Nevertheless, once Germany had conquered western Poland and other territories these plans had to be recast as laws, and it is possible that Lemkin may have stumbled on them in Sweden in 1940–1941, when he started collecting Nazi occupation decrees.18 After a week or more’s stay in Volhynia, his host told him that trains were due to start running again the next day. Although the trains still had Polish ticket collectors on board, travel was free as yet and Lemkin thought that in this state of confusion while Russian control had not been fully implemented in the occupied zone of Poland this would be a good time to visit his parents in Wolkowysk.19 As the night-time curfew was coming to an end in the morning, Lemkin crept stealthily from the railway station at Wolkowysk to the home of his parents . After breakfast, he slept and joined his parents and brother for a family discussion. Both his parents were in poor physical shape and too infirm to flee with him. As the Soviet regime had taken over eastern Poland, his brother deemed it to be the wisest course to divest himself of the ownership of his dry goods store selling clothes, underwear and smart ladies shoes and register himself as an employee. Elias was tall, easy going and something
Escape from Poland
31
of a ladies man.20 Raphael spoke about his plans to go to Lithuania and then make his way onwards to America. His father said that his brother Isadore who had migrated earlier to the United States would be able to assist him. Of all the members of his immediate family, in which she included his brother and sister-in-law Lisa and their two children, his mother remarked that he was the loneliest and the only ‘loveless one’. She exclaimed that ‘We know you will continue your work, for the protection of peoples. Unfortunately, it is needed now more than ever before’. Despite Lemkin’s attempt to give the impression that here she was talking about his efforts to resuscitate his 1933 campaign against barbarism and vandalism, it is questionable whether any such plans had as yet crystallized in his mind.21 Raphael and his mother had been through this conversation about the direction of his life without the solace of a wife and companion many times. As usual he tried to parry the thrust of her argument with a line from Goethe’s Herman and Dorothea: ‘Take a wife so that the night might become the more beautiful part of your life’. But this time she brushed aside his joke and continued Mothers want their children to marry, because as the givers of life they know the significance of married life. They also want to convey the protection of their children, to another woman, a spiritual sister in the mission of love. We are not eternal any of us ... Please Raphael, in the past you did not have time. You wrote a book almost every year. But are you sure that every book is more important than a friend, a spiritual companion, who could help you develop the life of the heart? Your goal is to bring the world closer to the life of the heart – there must be a place in it for a congenial, intelligent women. He kissed his tearful mother, conceding that she might be right and that ‘Recent events have been so drastic that perhaps ... [he] must make a decision on this too’.22 Although this sounds plausible, perhaps Raphael and his mother were too enmeshed. Despite living at a distance from his parents in Warsaw, he was unable to separate sufficiently from his mother. True, he led a very busy life, advising high-powered clients and appearing in court on their behalf, attending an interminable number of international law conferences and writing books and articles. But at weekends he relaxed in his country cottage, and at the international conferences he had the opportunity of meeting many male companions and perhaps some eligible women too. At the same time, his choice of translating Bialik’s story about a love affair between a Jewish boy and Polish girl showed that he did not know whether or not to cross the divide and choose a gentile girl or marry a young Jewish bride, who would be more acceptable to his parents. When he moved to America, Lemkin formed relationships with both Jewish and gentile women, and as
32 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
has been noted, many women found him attractive. If the relationship grew too intense, Raphael would grow uncomfortable and try to break free from it and seems to have had a problem with intimacy. It seems unlikely that this pattern of relationship with women suddenly emerged for the first time when Raphael moved to the United States, and more likely that he already had a series of short-term relationships with various women in Poland. It is interesting that the one lady friend we know about from pre-War Poland with whom Raphael had a relationship was a married woman, someone safe, to whom his commitment could be limited.23 After slipping through the Russian lines, Raphael Lemkin arrived in Vilnius some time between 10 October 1939, when the Russians announced that they would transfer the city to the Lithuanians, and 27 October 1939, when they actually withdrew. He did not seek refuge in the forests in the neighbourhood of Warsaw for six months as is implied in some accounts.24 Lemkin depicted the Russian occupation of Vilnius, which began on 19 September, as being on the whole an economic conquest rather than a political one, but this is not accurate. True that the Russian troops stripped factories of their machinery and printing works of their presses. They also had an insatiable hunger for consumer goods of all kinds, watches, trousers, shirts, hats, shoes and nails, which were in short supply in Russia because of the heavy investment in the production of capital goods during the 1930s, and this is confirmed by other witnesses, such as the novelist Chaim Grade. He reported that ‘It seemed as though the whole Russian army had lined up at these Jewish shops to buy gifts for their wives and children, from bolts of fabric and suits to hairpins and spools of thread’.25 The Russian women accompanying the soldiers purchased beautifully embroidered night-gowns in the mistaken belief that they were evening-dresses. They wore them when they were dining in a fashionable restaurant, causing mirth at their naivety. True that Lemkin witnessed a Russian political commissar haranguing people on a street corner and boasting that the Soviet Union would remain neutral until the Germans and the Western powers fought each other to a standstill, thus preparing the way for a peaceful Russian takeover of Europe. But Lucy Davidowicz noted that ‘After the Red Army entered Vilna on September 19, 1939, Soviet commissars arrested hundreds of people, among them Zalmen Reisen and his son Saul [prominent Yiddish journalists]’.26 It has been estimated that about twenty thousand Jewish refugees made their way from German or Russian occupied Poland to Vilnius. They have been described as ‘the spiritual elite of Polish Jewry. To Lithuania fled ... the Jewish intelligentsia of Zionist or socialist persuasion, Zionist and Bundist leaders, authors, journalists, teachers, scientists, Hassidic and non-Hassidic Rabbis, whole Yeshivot and a large section of the Jewish plutocracy’.27 Lemkin, a part-time law teacher in a rabbinical seminary and a columnist on a leading Zionist Yiddish newspaper in Warsaw, was very much a member of this elite. Many of the refugees eventually sought refuge in the United States,
Escape from Poland
33
Palestine, China and elsewhere.28 Yet Raphael Lemkin was also a member of the wider Polish elite. Since 1935, Lemkin had served as a member of the Supreme Council of representatives of the combined Polish judiciary, bar and law faculties.29 Professional smugglers established escape routes from Warsaw to Vilnius as the Polish Jews were not as yet enclosed in a ghetto. The first escapees from Warsaw were closely questioned by the refugees anxious for news of their families and the conditions in the capital. The refugees kept their Polish currency in little pouches suspended from their necks, but it was dwindling in value by the hour. They also brought with them all sorts of consumer goods which they tried to sell. The black market on Rudnicka Street throve. Professional smugglers hid Polish banknotes in cheese and butter and crossed from the Russian zone, returning with dollars hidden in the soles of their shoes. Many of the dollars were purchased from poor Jews, which were sent to them by relatives in America.30 The Joint Distribution Committee and Society for the Protection of Health of the Jews (OZE), established shelters for the most prominent writers from Warsaw and elsewhere, the intelligentsia and social activists, and a home for mothers and children. It is quite possible that Lemkin as a member of this privileged group was allocated such accommodation. Jews allowed homeless strangers into their attics, while the Jewish Community Council opened refugee homes and soup kitchens. ‘People with fever lie [on the ground]’, Herman Kruk noted, ‘with nothing to cover them. No shirt, no clothing. A piece of soap is a problem, a towel a rare sight’.31 The principal concern of the refugees was to emigrate, and they approached relatives and friends abroad in order to obtain a visa or they purchased the necessary papers on the black market. Several days after his arrival in Vilnius, Lemkin sent cables to Karl Schlyter, the former Minister of Justice in Sweden, and Count Carton de Wiart of Belgium, a former president of the League of Nations, requesting their help for temporary entry into their own countries as he intended to use them as staging posts for his journey to the United States. Both Karl Schlyter and Count Carton de Wiart were friends Lemkin had made while attending international law conferences during the 1930s and at this critical time in his life they were very useful contacts.32 He also despatched another cable to his close friends the Pedones, a mother and daughter, who owned a great French publishing house and were the official publishers of the League of Nations. Unusually the Pedones took a great personal interest in their authors. They acted as an unofficial clearing-house for members of the legal profession and academic lawyers being as much concerned with their career moves as the latest family gossip. Lemkin confirmed that he had survived the downfall of Poland and asked what had happened to the manuscript of a book on the law of international payments which he had posted to them before the outbreak of the War. A warm reply was received from the Pedones and many letters followed.
34
Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
They understood that if the book was published it would assist him in securing an academic appointment. The Pedones published the book, La Reglementation des Paiements Internationaux in 1939 and sent copies to universities in the United States and to Karl Schlyter and Professor Malcolm McDermott. At the same time, Lemkin wrote to his American friend Professor McDermott of Duke University, North Carolina, informing him about his present position and sounding him out about job prospects in the United States. Schlyter arranged for Lemkin to travel to Sweden, while McDermott busied himself with securing an invitation from Duke University to the United States.33 La Reglementation des Paiements Internationaux, a treatise of 422 pages, was an analysis of the exchange control legislation of 54 countries. Lemkin not only examined the conflict of laws between states but discussed the means to limit their effect. A separate chapter was devoted to describing the clearing arrangements between nations, and the book had a preface by Marcel van Zeeland, the director of the Bank of International Settlements in Basle.34 Thorsten V. Kalijarvi reviewing the book in the American Journal of International Law noted that Dr Lemkin has succeeded in drawing together the complicated threads of international payments, exchange clearing, and credit into a logical and intelligible system ... either one or both of these excellent works [a later Swedish version] deserve to be translated into English, since, nowhere, to the review’s knowledge, can similar treatments be found either in legal or financial literature.35 A professional colleague and friend from Warsaw, Benjamin Tomkiewicz, called with the latest news of Lemkin’s parents, with whom he had been staying for a brief visit. Tomkiewicz had left an old mother behind in Warsaw, ‘with whom and for whom he lived’. As so often in Lemkin’s memoirs, he appears to be talking as much about himself and his own intimate feelings as those of the other person. His friend, who was also a high calibre lawyer, noted that they would never enjoy such a wonderful life again with frequent weekend leisurely visits to their country cottage. Tomkewicz survived the War, picking up his career as a lawyer in Israel.36 At the end of October 1939, Lithuanian troops entered Vilnius and a week later Lemkin travelled to Kaunas, the capital of the neutral Lithuanian state, where it would be easier to contact the Swedish embassy to obtain his entry visa. He stayed for a while as a guest of a lawyer, Dr Laser Lowenstein, in Kaunas, whose wife and daughter were in Switzerland, to whom he had been introduced by friends in Vilnius.37 Raphael Lemkin pondered his fate as a refugee – the enforced idleness, the loss of self-esteem, and the constant swallowing of the bread of affliction, meals always eaten at someone else’s table. There were three things that Lemkin had always dreaded, wearing
Escape from Poland
35
spectacles, losing his hair and becoming a refugee. Now all three had come to pass and at the age of 39 he was beginning to feel middle-aged. At last a telephone call came from the Swedish embassy, informing him that his entry visa had arrived. Shortly afterwards, he travelled by train to Riga, the capital of Latvia, a neutral Baltic state.38 As Lemkin had some time to spare before a flight became available to Sweden, he also went to see Professor Simon Dubnov (1860–1951), the famous Jewish historian and ideologist of Jewish cultural autonomy in Poland, who was living in Riga. Lemkin probably made this visit in the winter of 1939. Earlier in August 1938, the great historian had given an interview observing that ‘The present is very sad indeed, in all the four thousand years of Jewish history there never were such horrifying moments as now’. Still he continued in his usual mood of optimism, ‘But Jewish history will go on and continue’.39 That Lemkin deliberately sought out Dubnov indicates something of a disillusion with the Zionist standpoint in the crisis facing eastern European Jewry and an increasing readiness to engage with others with differing views. It is clear, however, that despite their dissension on various issues, Lemkin was deeply influenced by Dubnov in his thinking on the importance of the cultural autonomy of national groups. He claims that he discussed his 1933 plan to prevent the mass extermination of ethnic groups and that the historian agreed with him. If so, the onset of the War had revitalized Lemkin’s thinking, for he does not seem to have given his own scheme all that much thought since the mid-1930s, but it is more likely that they concentrated on discussing such practical issues of where refugees fleeing from the Nazi onslaught could be granted safe haven. ‘The most appalling part about this type of killing’, Lemkin told Dubnov, ‘is that in the past it has ceased to be a crime when large numbers are involved and when all happen to belong to the same, nationality, or race, or religion. These things must be discussed openly. Let the nations take their choice whether they want to belong to the civilized world community’. Both Dubnov and Lemkin, however, concurred that history would have to sit in judgment on the vicious war unleashed by the Nazis. When marching towards his death in 1941, Dubnov held the same views and kept on repeating: ‘Good people, do not forget, good people, relate it, good people, write it down’.40 Shortly after this memorable visit, Lemkin flew to Sweden, a state proud of its neutral stance during international conflicts. This feeling of confidence was shattered by the Nazi invasion of Denmark and Norway on 9 and 10 April 1940 followed by the rapid capitulation of their governments. A letter arrived from Lemkin’s friend in Belgium, Count Carton de Wiart, during the same month advising him that a visa was awaiting him at the Belgian legation in Stockholm. Lemkin had originally intended to use Belgium as a transit point for his journey to the United States, but the job offer from Professor McDermott of Duke University had not yet arrived. Then the
36 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
Germans invaded Belgium and Holland on 10 May 1940, overrunning Belgium in a matter of days. After having received the sympathy of the Belgian minister for Poland’s defeat, it was now Lemkin’s turn to commiserate with him on Belgium’s dire fate. When a few days later Lemkin visited the Polish consulate in Stockholm, he found former Polish officers in a defiant mood, proud that they had held out against the German army for three weeks instead of collapsing rapidly like the British and French, who had mounted the Narvik expedition in an ill-judged attempt to save Norway.41 Lemkin decided to learn Swedish in the same way that he had acquired Lithuanian by reading the newspapers with the help of a dictionary. His book on the regulation of international payments had been well-received in the Swedish legal journals. His friend Karl Schlyter, the former Justice Minister, suggested that he might give a course of lectures on the subject of his book at the University of Stockholm. When Lemkin went along to discuss this idea with the vice-president of the University, the latter demurred because he was not altogether happy with Lemkin’s pronunciation of Swedish. Matters were rectified when, at the suggestion of friends, Lemkin was coached by a former actress, who worked with him for several hours a week in perfecting his pronunciation. To devise a course of lectures, Lemkin with help translated extensive excerpts from his book on international payments into Swedish and then concentrated on delivering each lecture clearly in Swedish with the assistance of his teacher. The first lecture was to an audience of three hundred persons including many faculty members; it was well received and Lemkin was elated that he was lecturing in Swedish after a stay of only five months in the country.42 Yet the news coming from abroad was disquieting. British troops evacuated their positions in France in May 1940 which was followed by the humiliating peace terms dictated by Hitler to the French government one month later. At the same time on the 20 June 1940 the Russians invaded the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and soon afterwards incorporated them into the Soviet Union. Above all, Lemkin was worried by what was happening to his parents and brother in occupied Poland as he had not received any communication from them. According to Lemkin’s memoirs he had already read Hitler’s political testament, Mein Kampf, and was certain that he intended to destroy the Jews like vermin. In two notorious passages Hitler proclaimed that ‘If at the beginning of the War twelve or fifteen thousand of these Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas, as happened to hundreds of thousands of our best German workers in the field, the sacrifice of millions at the front would not have been in vain’ and ‘The nationalization of our masses will succeed only when, aside from all the positive struggle for the soul of our people, their international poisoners are exterminated’. The first passage in particular can be linked to Hitler’s tirades against alleged Jewish war profiteers and was not a plea for the extermination of all Jews.
Escape from Poland
37
It is doubtful whether there was a straight route from Mein Kampf to the genocidal regime at Auschwitz.43 Although Hitler informed the Czech Foreign Minister on 21 January 1939 that ‘We are going to destroy the Jews’, this would not have been known to Lemkin. Nor would a passage in Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on 30 January 1939 make all that much impact until he repeated its message on more than a dozen occasions between 1941 and 1945, as at first it could be interpreted as political hyperbole. In it Hitler declared that Today I will be a prophet again: If international finance Jewry within Europe and abroad should succeed once more in plunging the peoples into a world war, then the consequence will not be the Bolshevization of the world and therewith a victory of Jewry, but on the contrary, the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe.44 It is much more likely that at this stage Lemkin was disturbed by what was occurring in eastern Europe. He then conceived the brilliant idea of finding out what was happening in those parts of Europe seized by the Germans by analysing their occupation decrees. Before the War, Lemkin and other international lawyers had been concerned by an innovation in the German Criminal Code of 28 June 1935, which made punishable any act which was analogous to an act already prohibited by law; this removed a basic right – no punishment unless the offence was prohibited in law, and he and other speakers at the International Congress of Comparative Law at the Hague in 1937 had voiced criticism of this measure.45 Lemkin had contacts in a Swedish business corporation for which he had previously acted in Warsaw, and he asked them to instruct their agents to obtain copies of the official gazettes in the countries which had been overrun by the Germans, when they were available. He started to study these documents and then found that additional copies of these gazettes were stocked by Stockholm libraries.46 Lemkin stayed in Sweden until the end of the winter of 1941, but by then the ultimate intentions of Nazi policy towards the Jews had not been clarified. True that Hitler had formulated his policy of Germany acquiring a living space, Lebensraum, at the expense of Russia in Mein Kampf: For centuries Russia drew nourishment from [the] Germanic nucleus of its upper leading strata. Today it can be regarded as almost totally exterminated and extinguished. It has been replaced by the Jew ... He himself is no element of organization, but a ferment of decomposition. The giant empire in the east is ripe for collapse. And the end of Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state.47 By the time Germany invaded Russia on 22 June 194l, Lemkin was safely installed in the United States.
38
Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
A decree of 12 October 1939 set up the General Government in a rump portion of Poland after the western and northern parts of Poland were incorporated into the Reich. While the Polish elite was to be exterminated, the rest of the Polish population were to be turned into willing drones of the Germans. The Jewish population was to be concentrated into ghettos perhaps to be shunted further afield to Madagascar, but meanwhile they had to register for forced labour. As Michael Burleigh explained, ‘The wider backdrop to productive ghettos was a process of attrition which killed about half a million people through disease and deliberate starvation’. Nothing was known to Lemkin of the inadequate rations allotted to Jews by the Germans until he left Sweden, and the Swedish press was ‘reticent’ about the persecution of the Jews until late 1942.48 What alerted Lemkin to the evil intentions of the Nazi regime, when he started analysing the decrees, were the laws confiscating the property of Jews in Poland and rendering them destitute, the forced labour introduced for Jews from the age of 14 to 60, and the death penalty for those leaving the Warsaw ghetto without permission (October 1940). This latter penalty seemed to be a draconian measure, unless there was a more sinister underlying purpose. By putting these facts together, Lemkin claimed in his memoirs that he had already deduced the genocidal thrust of Nazi policies from their occupation decrees.49 It is far from certain, however, that Lemkin had collected all this information from the decrees before his departure from Sweden, and as Walter Laqueur pointed out until ‘the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 there had been some arbitrary killings (of Jews) but no major massacres’.50 So why should Lemkin at this stage suspect that Germany was planning the mass murder of Jews? At the beginning of 1941, Lemkin received news of his appointment to a position at Duke University in North Carolina. In one of their last letters to him, his parents urged him to take up the lectureship in the United States. For a time he was gripped by indecision as he worried about ‘leaving his parents on a powder keg’. After obtaining the necessary visas to Russia, Japan and the United States, Lemkin started a round of farewells to friends. He flew to Moscow and with several hundred other refugees travelled by train from Moscow to Vladivostock, a journey which took ten days. In late 1940 and early 1941 the Joint Distribution Committee and other Jewish organizations had secured a few thousand American visas for Jewish activists and Yeshiva students stranded in Vilnius, some of these persons were no doubt Lemkin’s travelling companions.51 From Vladivostock, Lemkin went by boat to Japan, where he boarded a Japanese ship to the United States. The ship arrived at Vancouver in Canada and then proceeded the next day to Seattle in the United States. On a bright, sunny morning in April 1941 Raphael Lemkin disembarked. He was greeted by a friendly customs officer, who asked with a real note of concern in his voice about the situation in Europe. He gave Lemkin’s suitcases a cursory
Escape from Poland
39
inspection and told him that his own parents still lived in Shannon in Ireland and gave him a friendly squeeze, exclaiming ‘Okay, boy – You’re in’.52 While Lemkin was part of the flood of Jewish refugees from Poland, who crowded into Lithuania and Sweden, and it is probable that his journey to the United States was paid for by the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, he also belonged to a network of international lawyers. This facilitated his passage from Lithuania via Sweden to the United States, and at the same time, his friendship with Professor McDermott led to an academic position being created for him in the United States. In any case Lemkin’s academic credentials were strengthened by the publication of an important treatise on the law of exchange control in French, a work which would be accessible to lawyers in the English-speaking world. Lemkin’s memoirs which are the only extant source for these years must be used with caution as some of the conversations cited, such as that with the Jewish baker and his son, appear to be invented while other characters are convenient mouthpieces for the airing of Lemkin’ s own robust views. Throughout his memoirs, Lemkin antedated the evolution of his prescient perception of murderous Nazi plans either to October 1939, when he was fleeing from Poland, or his stay in Sweden, when he started collecting their occupation decrees. At the time of his departure from Sweden, Lemkin was probably aware of the German policy of herding Polish Jews into ghettos, but doubtful that he knew much about their policy of deliberately starving them and unlikely that he knew anything about the genocidal intentions of the Nazis or their plans for a general upheaval of all the peoples of eastern Europe.
3 Early Years in the United States
Raphael Lemkin arrived in the United States on 18 April 1941. From the first the auguries were good, the harbinger of countless kindlinesses he was to receive from individuals. To reach Duke University in North Carolina, Lemkin embarked on a three day journey, changing trains at Chicago. The train stopped at Lynchburg, Virginia, where he noticed in the rest rooms of the station signs, stating “ ‘For Whites” and “For Colored” ’. When he innocently asked a black porter if there were special facilities for blacks, his question was ignored, and it was only years later that Lemkin appreciated how rude he must have appeared and that the porter no doubt believed that he was trying to poke fun of him.1 This incident set Lemkin musing. He remembered that in Warsaw there was a single black person in the entire city. He was employed as a dancer in a popular night club, where he pounded the floor with both feet as if to destroy it. Everyone enjoyed his dancing and tried to invite him for drinks. A feeling of curiosity and friendliness prevailed towards this lonely black man in Poland. But towards the Jews, I could not help thinking, there was not the same friendliness; there were three millions of them in the trades, in the professions, in other work, and their competition was felt.2 In the afternoon, a day and a half after leaving Chicago, Lemkin’s train reached the station at Durham, North Carolina, where Professor Malcolm McDermott was waiting to welcome him. They had not met for five years since they had cooperated in the translation of The Polish Penal Code of 1932 and the Law of Minor Offenses into English. Incidentally the drafting of the law relating to minor offences had been left by the Polish government to Lemkin and his mentor Professor Rappaport. Still Lemkin felt that his relationship with Professor McDermott had not changed: it was as if we could resume our conversation just where we had left off, our feelings about world events were of such a similar quality ... In the car 40
Early Years in the United States
41
my friend kept inquiring about my travels, but when he saw after a few questions that I had tears in my eyes he stopped.3 ‘Durham was a lively, bustling city smelling of tobacco and human perspiration. There were gasoline stations on the corners, cars crowding bumper to bumper ... People greeted one another in a casual friendly manner’.4 ‘ “This is our university”, ... [McDermott] said after a little while, as we drove along a beautiful winding avenue. We crossed a little bridge over an artificial lake. At the end of the avenue I saw a huge quadrangle of high buildings, clean-cut and dressed in stony dignity,’ Lemkin declared, The smell of fresh-cut grass on the lawns and the coolness of the shade from the old trees was soothing. Young men and women moved about the campus with a remarkable ease. The boys wore white shirts open at the collar; the girls wore no stockings – they had on light summer dresses and carried many books and even more smiles, which they distributed generously. There was nothing of the European university atmosphere of worry ... in these faces. One could read them like open books.5 Professor McDermott showed Lemkin to a room on the first floor of a dormitory, where a bed had already been made up. After a conversation about the War and Lemkin’s travels, the Professor declared that he would leave him until six o’clock, when there was a university alumni dinner, at which Lemkin was invited to speak about the situation in Europe.6 Lemkin showered and rested, merely jotting down a few opening remarks for his speech and for the rest relying on momentary inspiration or the ‘linguistic lend-lease that’ his ‘friend had offered ... But he listened attentively and every time I stopped,’ Lemkin recalled, ‘he gave me a word which he thought would fit in. Usually he guessed correctly’ To Lemkin’s surprise his remarks were received with thunderous applause.7 Since Lemkin had arrived at the university towards the end of term, no teaching schedule had been arranged for him. He was introduced to Dean Claude Horack and his colleagues in the law faculty and was ‘installed in a pleasant office overlooking the park’, where students called to have a chat. Lemkin found that the American students were refreshing and harder working than their European counterparts, as they were examined almost on a daily basis on the decisions in law cases. He ‘was accustomed to the type of student in Europe who was class conscious, highly nationalistic, and who basically considered physical work as a personal degradation. With few exceptions European students had somewhere in their minds a feeling that they were born to do something exceptionally important if not for the world at least for their own country. Every one of them was a human being plus something supra-natural, vague and, of course, vain. The American student is more natural. He has a little sense of mission, neither personal nor collective. He
42 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
would be ashamed to admit any class consciousness or excessive nationalism’. European students tended to be more passive and only started to become anxious before examinations which were oral.8 When Lemkin joined the law faculty of Duke University, he found that his colleagues were also ‘friendly and curious’. The university appointed him as lecturer in comparative law in the Law School, and Lemkin and his colleagues often discussed the differences between the Anglo-American Common Law tradition with an emphasis on case law and the Continental legal system based on abstract codification, as exemplified, for instance, in the Code Napoleon or the German Civil Code of 1900. Lemkin frequently had discussions about European problems with Dean Horack, who assisted him in the clarification of his ideas on occasions when he was called upon to address an audience.9 While at Duke University Lemkin began work on two articles, both continuing his pre-War criminological and family law studies. One on ‘The Treatment of Young Offenders in Continental Europe’ was published in 1942, the other on children from families disrupted by divorce appeared two years later. Surveying the measures adopted to combat juvenile delinquency on a comparative basis, Lemkin advocated the adoption of special juvenile courts which would sentence offenders after hearing reports on their personalities and social background, and there would be an emphasis on educational measures depending on the response of the delinquent.10 The second article dealing with children from divorced families emphasized that the increasing number of working mothers should contribute towards the maintenance of their children, the need for the enforcement of maintenance payments by negligent parents and the necessity for the setting up of an elaborate conciliation service which would operate in special family courts.11 The articles show that Lemkin was in the vanguard of progressive legal reformers as far as juveniles were concerned. From time to time, Lemkin would drop in ... at the office of Judge Thaddeus Bryson, who taught North Carolina statutes. He was an old man with a handsome, dreamer’s face, somewhat of a mystic. He had a Polish first name, which was given to him by his parents to honor the Polish hero Thaddeus Kosciuszko who came to ... fight for American independence. Once Judge Bryson looked at me significantly as we were talking together, Lemkin remembered, then lowered his voice as if to give his words more weight: ‘I have no doubt that you were saved from the European ... [conflagration] for a special purpose,’ he told me. ‘It is bigger than you are, or than any of us – wait
Early Years in the United States
43
and you will see.’ He repeated this several times but did not explain precisely what he meant, causing Lemkin some embarrassment, but later imbuing him with a sense of mission which helped carry him over difficulties which he later encountered.12 Lemkin, who was invited by Professor McDermott to join him in a trip to Washington, was struck by the simplicity in design of the White House. ‘There is’, he noted, ‘great power and spirit in this kind of architectural under-statement ... the Capitol and government buildings [in Washington] had an unpretentious working atmosphere that was also impressive’. Washington, he believed, had ‘little trace of the tortuous sumptuosity of the imperial’ capitals, such as London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Moscow. Lemkin visited the Polish Embassy and then Library of Congress, where he renewed his friendship with John Vance, the law librarian. Vance was described as being Slender, with a moustache and sideburns, he had vivacious brown eyes and a voice which conveyed a peculiarly deep concern for men and the world. He played the guitar and sang songs from his native Kentucky. There was a touch of the poet and artist in him, and he was a good lawyer and very competent librarian as well.13 Following the German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, Lemkin turned on his radio to hear in the news that the German army had invaded eastern Poland. This ‘meant smoking villages, columns of bluish-brown dust rising quickly after artillery shells had fallen on the ground.’ For the fourth time that century Lemkin’s hometown of Wolkowsyk was attacked by invading armies, as it had been previously been besieged by the German army in 1915 and again in 1920, when the Russian army moved through it. Lemkin was filled with a sense of foreboding.14 During the Russian occupation of eastern Poland from 17 September 1939 to 21 June 1941, the Jews of Wolkowysk had some respite. After the Polish army and police withdrew from Wolkowysk following the Russian invasion, local anti-Semites staged a minor pogrom, killing Alexander Makov, Joseph Galiatsky and Itcheh the dancer as well as a shoemaker and some other victims, while two Jewish soldiers stationed in the city were murdered. As a last detachment of Polish cavalry withdrew, they broke into Jewish homes with the help of local anti-Semites and robbed their occupants. When the Russian troops entered Wolkowysk shortly thereafter, they were welcomed by the Jewish inhabitants, order was quickly restored, and the leader of the anti-Semitic faction was detained by Russian troops and executed. For a period of 21 months, the Jews felt more tranquil.15
44 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
The Russian authorities drew a distinction between wealthy property owners, whose assets were seized, and small shopkeepers and artisans. At the lower levels of the Soviet administration and institutions in eastern Poland, large numbers of Jews for the first time entered government employment. BenCion Pinchuk pointed out that ‘The new supply networks of stores, warehouses and consumer cooperatives provided many jobs for Jews who had lost their stores or were formerly connected with commercial establishments. Many thousands of Jews were absorbed into the Soviet marketing and supply system which was ... inefficient and labour intensive’. Moreover, ‘New schools needed teachers, principals, inspectors. Public works required officials and personnel in offices, warehouses,[and] food facilities’. The Soviet regime in Poland eagerly recruited Jewish doctors, engineers, agronomists and pharmacists. On the debit side, there was a general reduction in the low existing standard of living in eastern Poland, but Jews quickly learned how to adapt to the new system and supplement their earnings.16 Once he was settled in the United States, Lemkin wrote to his parents and in the summer of 1941, a rather bedraggled envelope from his parents arrived for Lemkin at the Duke University office. Although they were dated 25 May 1941, he recalled that his parents’ letters had been en route to him for more than two months, and if this was the case, the letters would have arrived after the German invasion of eastern Poland. ‘We read your long awaited letter with great pleasure’, his father began, and ask you to continue to give us pleasure with your letters. I feel well, thank God. May it never be worse in future. I am at home now as the potato [season?] is finished. For the time being, we are lacking nothing. Eliyahu [Elias] and Lisa [your sister-in-law] and the dear children greet you lovingly. They are all well ... I send you a [number of] addresses [in America]. If you have time, it won’t do any harm to meet them. His mother’s letter was just as short, but contained more information. We are all perfectly well, and are lacking nothing that is required in order to live. Be calm about us. If possible, write more frequently. Eliyahu has work and earns enough to cover basic provisions. Father is at home today, as he has no work to do in the summer. Be healthy and happy. When his parents wrote their letters, they were still living under Russian occupation and they tried to reassure him that though conditions were harsh they were tolerable, and his mother’s letter seemed to contain a reprimand for not communicating with them frequently enough.17 According to Lemkin it was written on a scrap of paper, perhaps a quarter of the size of a normal piece of writing paper. The quality of the paper spoke eloquently of the
Early Years in the United States
45
extreme poverty in which they were living. Something within myself told me that in this letter they were saying goodbye. I chased the thought away, as I would a mosquito, but it came back to me in the evening, as I walked through the campus. The letter itself had a tone of subdued despair, in spite of my parents’ efforts not to alarm me. It was the last letter I ever received from them.18 These thoughts seem to be very much the product of hindsight and not how Lemkin was feeling at the time because news of what the German army was doing following their invasion of Russia and eastern Poland had not filtered through as yet to the United States, and his parents’ letters were written while eastern Poland was still under Russian occupation. In fact, Raphael Lemkin’s nephew Saul, who lived under the Russian occupation with his grandparents, has glowing memories of the period, and having examined the letters, I would dispute Lemkin’s contention that they were written on undersized notepaper. Apart from these considerations, a German intelligence officer reported on 12 July 1941 that ‘To an amazing extent, the Jews [in Belarus] are remarkably ill-informed about our attitude to them’.19 It is thus doubtful that at this juncture Raphael Lemkin was as alarmed about his parents well-being as he suggests in his memoirs. Meanwhile Lemkin was busy lecturing to local audiences on the situation in Europe. When a request for a speaker came to the university, Mr Dwyer, the Vice-President, highly recommended him. Lemkin visited many towns in the state and told the same story to Chamber of Commerce meetings, to women’s groups, to gatherings of young people. At the end of most of ... [his] speeches people would come and say to ... [him], ‘I am ashamed that we are standing idle and watching innocent people being slaughtered,’ or, ‘When Hitler finishes with Europe, he will turn against us anyway – so shouldn’t we intervene now?’ Many of these speeches were made after 22 June 1941, when following the German invasion of Russia the Einsatzgruppen killed 2,000 Jews in Bialystok on 27 June and another 7,000 in Lvov a few days later, while by the end of the year they and their Romanian allies had killed 600,000 Jews. 20 But it was not until October 1941 and May 1942 that accounts of these atrocities began to appear in the American press in such papers as the New York Times, and it is, therefore, unlikely that Lemkin was including items about the massacre of Jews in his talks before the autumn of 1941. A study by Adam Tooze has shown that this American speculation about Hitler’s intentions was accurate and that had he won the War millions of Slavs would have perished and that Hitler believed that conflict with the United States was inevitable. 21
46
Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
One night as he was gradually becoming aware of what was happening in Poland Lemkin awoke covered in sweat. He had an anxiety dream in which his ‘mother’s face came close’ to him. He didn’t see her body, just her face, with her hair combed low on her forehead. Her eyes smiled through a thick mist of sorrow, as if she knew a secret ... [he] did not know ... [He] stretched ... [his] hand toward her face, to caress it, but she moved back from ... [his] touch, fading gradually and ... [he] awoke. Much later ... [he] learned that during the Nazi blitz ... the largest area of the city, including the place where ... [his] parents’ home ... stood, [had] burned down. The population, some 20,000 people, was crowded into a few small houses near the railroad station. When Lemkin spent an evening with Professor McDermott and told him how he was feeling, the Professor advised him to be strong and courageous and to show a smiling face, if he hoped to persuade others to share his views about Nazi Germany.22 Lemkin became depressed and found it difficult to contain his anxiety. A student recalling her time at Duke University, confessed that ‘I was very sorry for you because of the misfortunes to you during the war, especially regarding your parents’.23 Lemkin forced himself to be pleasant to colleagues and students, but for many months he struggled to regain his customary zest for living. Lemkin was no doubt helped to navigate this crisis by the support of Professor Malcolm McDermott and his family. A letter sent by McDermott to Lemkin on 25 February 1948 shows what a warm and caring individual he was and how sympathetic he was to Lemkin’s idealism. ‘My dear good friend’, he wrote, For weeks I have been meaning to write you to thank you for your card of remembrance at Christmas time ... Mrs McDermott and I drove to Houston, Texas, to spend the Holidays with Raymond and his little family ... You will be interested, I know, to learn that he graduated at the top of his class [in law school] ... Last fall Mrs McDermott and I decided to give up the big house on the East Campus which we occupied for sixteen years. The children are grown up and gone. Servants are practically unobtainable ... What a pitiable plight humanity is in! I hope and pray you men at work on the situation may find some sane solution ... With my warmest regards and best wishes, I am Sincerely your friend, Malcolm McDermott.24 Thus, encouraged Lemkin plunged back into work at Duke University. While he was living in Sweden, he had as early as 1940 started collecting documents smuggled out of Nazi occupied Europe, the majority of which were occupation decrees, and he had brought much of this material with
Early Years in the United States
47
him to the United States. He had continued collecting this material at Duke University in 1941 and 1942, persuading the librarian to open a special documentation centre on the laws of occupation. 25 He now set about translating these decrees into English and writing an analysis of them. He wrote to John Vance at the Library of Congress, urging him to obtain a regular flow of Nazi edicts, by contacting book dealers in neutral countries, such as Portugal, Switzerland and Sweden. At the instigation of Vance, Lemkin was invited to address the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association in Indianapolis in October 1941 on the subject of ‘Totalitarian Control Over Foreign Economies’. Although this paper has been lost, it is possible to reconstruct its argument; its principal point was that Germany used the bank clearing system with a trading partner to extort trading advantages, wringing increasing concessions until it was able to import goods without paying for them, and that in some instances the local currency was destroyed to compel a recaltricant population to trade with the Germans. Vance and Judge Keaton sponsored a resolution at the same meeting condemning the Germans for the introduction of lex talionis, the law of an eye for an eye, and for despoiling or undermining the legal profession in occupied Europe.26 Vance introduced him to Colonel Archibald King of the Military Government section of the War Department, who was experienced in drafting American legislation to regulate the behaviour of American Army personnel serving on foreign soil. King was trained in the Anglo-American Common Law tradition, believing that lawyers in other countries ‘were also basically decent and dedicated’. Lemkin tried to disabuse him of these notions as far as the Germans were concerned, warning him that Hitler had made German law into an instrument of oppression for the population in the countries which the German army had occupied. When Colonel King asked him whether or not he thought that the Germans were abiding by the Hague Convention, Lemkin answered that though they appeared to be heeding its regulations because of their own troops who had been taken prisoner, they were secretly breaking them. Colonel King expressed an interest in the subject; this led to Lemkin asking the Colonel if he would like to attend a course lectures he was giving on the topic, and a subsequent invitation to Lemkin by the War Department to deliver a series of lectures at the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia. The decrees which Lemkin translated were bound in a mimeographed volume running to 170 pages in 1942 for the use of the students at the school without any introductory analysis of their meaning, but Lemkin must have developed his ideas while giving this lecture course.27 Lemkin now had a growing reputation in the United States, and in June 1942, he received a telegram offering him the position as chief consultant to the Board of Economic Warfare in Washington which he was quick to accept. Six months earlier on 7 December 1941 Japan had attacked American warships at Pearl Harbour without warning, and four days later Hitler
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Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
declared war on the United States, forcing the Americans to enter a global conflict. The Wall Street executives and lawyers who came to Washington to oversee the build-up of their nation’s military machine found themselves in a large city with poor transport facilities and a dearth of theatres and restaurants; in short, it had in many ways the atmosphere of a small town.28 Lemkin, however, was exhilarated finding a different city to the one visited by him a year earlier; it was teeming with people and pulsating with energy. People walked in the streets and crammed into the offices, talking a new language that ‘was born almost overnight’. Words such as ‘commission’, ‘report’, ‘production’, ‘appointment’, ‘boat’, ‘plane’, ‘Germany’, ‘Japan’ and ‘London’ were heard incessantly and were repeated ‘in all possible combinations’. Daily trains and aeroplanes from all parts of the country were pouring thousands of newcomers into Washington: ‘businessmen, professors, lawyers, men and women, old and young’, all anxious to offer their services to defeat the Germans and their allies. Lemkin discovered a radio storyteller for children working as a personnel officer, while his secretary was an atrocious typist. Nevertheless, he was the envy of his colleagues, who had to wait a long time for their memoranda to be typed. There was an apocryphal story that candidates for the typing pool were selected from the arrivals on early trains, so long as they knew the difference between a machine gun and a typewriter.29 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr stated in his memoirs that he ‘was much attracted by the activism of BEW [Board of Economic Warfare which he thought of joining]. People were rushing around doing things – imposing blockades, buying up scarce metals, blacklisting Axis-controlled firms, plotting to deny the enemy strategic materials’. He contrasted this with what he termed a return to academic life in the Research and Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA.30 Lemkin’s colleague Eleanor Lansing Dulles, the sister of Allen and John Foster Dulles, had a more sceptical opinion about the merits of the Board of Economic Warfare. Although some of the work there was effective, methodical, and concrete, particularly that on export and import controls, most was strange and unstructured, shot through with bureaucratic feuds and confused by comings and goings of experts and administrators. President Roosevelt and some of his associates were fighting his former close associate, Vice President Henry A. Wallace, who was head of BEW. Lemkin made an ally and friend of Eleanor Dulles and he appears to have socialized with Eleanor, who had been married to David Blondheim, a Professor at Johns Hopkins University, where he specialized in Jewish Romance languages.31 This was a useful contact, as it later gave Lemkin access to her brothers John Foster Dulles in the State Department and Allen Dulles at the Central Intelligence Agency.
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Lemkin agreed with Eleanor Dulles about the amount of infighting between the different departments with the heads of agencies trying to obtain assignments for their own personnel and bigger budgets to increase their activities. People took long lunch hours and there were several cocktail parties to attend every day, where politics were discussed incessantly and wives complained of boredom.32 Meanwhile reports about the massacre of Jews were reaching Allied capitals. From July 1941 onwards the Yiddish press of New York carried stories of the killing of hundreds of Jews in towns in eastern Poland and later in the autumn of 1941 the accounts of these murders grew more harrowing speaking of thousands of Jewish victims in both Poland and the Ukraine.33 Dr Gerhart Riegner, the representative of the World Jewish Congress in Switzerland, sent telegrams to Washington and London in July 1942, saying that he had learned from a reliable source that the Germans planned to deport and concentrate some four million European Jews in the East, where they were to be exterminated. Roosevelt received other reports, particularly from his ambassador to the exiled governments of Europe in London, confirming the news about the extermination of European Jewry, but as he was resolved to concentrate on the successful prosecution of the War he played down these reports at a meeting with American Jewish leaders on 8 December 1942 and considered a bold intervention on behalf of the Jews inopportune; it would be a certain vote loser.34 Rumours about the massacre of European Jewry abounded in Washington from late 1942 to December 1944, Lemkin remembered, but no one could see the actual reports as they were suppressed.35 The Central European section of the Research and Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was under the intellectual dominance of Franz Neumann. Its staff included scholars of the calibre of Felix Gilbert, Hojo Holborn, Herbert Marcuse, Carl Schorske and Stuart Hughes. Because of Neumann’s wrongheaded analysis of the Nazi regime as a product of monopoly capitalism, the section’s analysts failed to comprehend how the persecution of the Jews was mutating into genocide. In an appendix to an updated edition of his book dated December 1944, Neumann claimed that Not only Jews fall under the executioner’s ax but so do countless others of many races, nationalities, beliefs, and religions ... It follows that in this Anti-Semitic ideology and practice the extermination of the Jews is only the means to the attainment of the ultimate objective, namely the destruction of free institutions, beliefs, and groups. This may be called the spearhead theory of Anti-Semitism.36 Barry Katz suggested that although these analysts ‘had reported regularly on the incidence ... of official violence and terrorism, on mass deportation, and on the network of Nazi concentration camps, their papers prior to [1945] ... yield
50 Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention
no unambiguous evidence that they had grasped these as elements of a systematic policy of genocide’.37 Despite Telford Taylor’s assertion, which has been repeated by many other authorities, Lemkin was never a member of the OSS, thereby escaping daily exposure to Neumann’s misleading and muddled concept of the spearhead theory of anti-Semitism; and he was free to develop his own ideas in 1942–1943 about the absence of the rule of law in German occupied territory, the economic exploitation of conquered territories and peoples, and his new concept of genocide to explain the structure of the Nazi regime.38 In his own agency Lemkin found that his colleagues were unaware that the Nazis ‘planned the destruction of peoples under their control’. His first attempts at trying to interest them in the problem during lunch were discouraging, as his colleagues ‘attention was rather absorbed by their own assignments on which they worked ... They were masters in switching the discussion in the ... direction concerning their own subject.’ Attempts to raise the issue were rebuffed with a rejoinder that the discussion seemed to be verging on the realm of fantasy. When they asked Lemkin whether or not the Nazis had begun to implement their plans, he replied they had been doing so for two years, but he was unable to specify what had happened recently. Some colleagues claimed that this was not credible, as people in Washington remembered the false atrocity stories spread about the Germans during the First World War. But there is an irony in this in that recent research reveals that brutal atrocities committed by the Germans in Belgium in 1914 were successfully covered up. Lemkin felt bitter about the attitude of his colleagues, thinking that certain ‘peoples would have to perish first, so as to prove that their destruction was deliberately prepared as part of Hitler’s plan’.39 Through his work, Lemkin met Henry Wallace (1888–1965), the VicePresident of the United States and Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare. He was an agrarian scientist and visionary, and editor of a respected farm journal, who sprang to fame by developing strains of high-yielding hybrid corn and had served as Secretary of Agriculture under Roosevelt. Lemkin described Wallace’s ‘movements as angular, as if he ... had not emerge[d] yet completely from the half-dreaming contemplation in which a real farmer is continually held by nature’. Lemkin’s friends suggested that he should broach his ideas to Wallace, but he decided to do so indirectly, by talking about the Tennessee Valley Authority which had built a huge dam to supply hydroelectric power to nearby farming communities. Lemkin noticed how Wallace warmed to him, when he interjected the word ‘agriculture’ and mankind’s debt to the farmer into their discussion. He also mentioned that he had himself been brought up on a farm in Poland and had witnessed the poverty of the Polish farmers.40 Lemkin dined later with Wallace in the house of a friend, but was ‘unable to penetrate through the friendly fog of his lonely dreams that evening’. On several other occasions, Lemkin spoke to Wallace. He explained his
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forebodings, and waited in vain for his reaction, but none was forthcoming. In the end, Lemkin realized just as others had done that trying to gain the interest and support of Wallace was futile.41 Wallace for as long as possible tried to distance himself from a politically contentious issue. He failed to react in a positive manner, when shown the Riegner telegram which first outlined the Nazi plans for the mass murder of Jews. When confronted by a march of 400 Orthodox rabbis on Washington on 6 October 1943, pleading with the government to establish a rescue agency and to admit Jewish refugees, Wallace, Time reported, ‘squirmed through a diplomatically minimum answer’.42 Rebuffed by the Vice-President, Lemkin through the good offices of a friend decided to approach President Roosevelt and according to his memoirs was asked to submit his plan in a one page memorandum. Lemkin felt that his first draft, though good, seemed to lack fire. What was needed was an international treaty ‘branding genocide a crime’.43 ‘In 1943 or 1944, when I served as Chief Consultant to the Board of Economic Warfare ... a colleague of mine, miss Betty Hight’, he wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt on 1 February 1950, took to you a memorandum on the concept of genocide and on the necessity to prepare a Genocide Treaty after the war. Miss Hight reported to me later that you had discussed this matter with the President who expressed his great interest and asked you to tell me that he believed in this cause; that such a treaty would not apply to past genocide cases but would be very beneficial for the future.44 Yet, in a letter written four years earlier he gave a somewhat different account which cannot altogether be reconciled with the extract which we have just quoted. ‘It was an honor and pleasure to have your recent note’, Lemkin declared, confirming receipt of my article on genocide, as well as your letter in 1945 expressing favorable remarks with regard to my book ‘Axis Rule in Occupied Europe’ which was conveyed to you by Mrs Betty Hight. At that time, as you may recall, I was interested in drawing your attention, as well as the attention of our great world leader, President Roosevelt, to the problem of punishing the German War Criminals for the crime of genocide, a term I coined for the concept of killing nations and obliterating their cultures. I am very grateful to you that you discussed this problem with the President at the time.45 Weighing up the evidence, it is more likely that Lemkin tried intervening with Roosevelt on one occasion rather than two and that the earlier 1946 letter contains the more accurate recollection of what transpired which was in any case unsatisfactory from Lemkin’s perspective; once again we have
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reason to note Lemkin’s antedating in his memoirs of his campaign to draw the attention of world leaders to the genocide perpetrated by the Germans against the Jews. Not until a visit of Jan Karski, a courier from Poland, on 28 July 1943, who impressed on the President that the Jews were being singled out for slaughter on an unprecedented scale, was Roosevelt stirred into taking action for Jewish refugees in France and Romania, and later under pressure from Peter Bergson, who founded the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, into setting up the War Refugee Board in January 1944. In contrast, Rabbi Stephen Wise, one of American Jewry’s foremost leaders and a friend of the President, counselled against forceful intervention with the government.46 But in the latter part of 1942 and the first half of 1943, the prospects for Jews in occupied Europe were gloomy. Lemkin was worried about his parents and the inactivity of Roosevelt on behalf of European Jewry, and as a result his sleep was frequently punctured by nightmares. Worst of all were the visions which came in a half-sleepy stage. During one of them ... [he] saw the interior of a train. A drab light was falling on people sitting on valises. Among them was ... [his] mother with a stony face. Next to her was a small boy. Who was he? ... [His mother’s] mouth was silent ... [frozen]. Where was she going? Was it her last journey? All this while Lemkin was working feverishly on a new project. Since his health was visibly deteriorating, his friends arranged an appointment for him to consult a doctor. ‘Nervous exhaustion, high blood pressure, slow down, rest, seek relaxation, don’t worry’, was the advice a somewhat jaded Lemkin received with indifference.47 While still an employee of the Board of Economic Warfare, Lemkin discussed with colleagues about bringing out a mimeographed edition of his private collection of Axis laws and decrees; the Board agreed that he could continue to use the same material ‘in research work and in lecturing, as well as for purposes of publication’.48 But well before the end of 1942 Lemkin had now come to realize that his whole approach was flawed. ‘Statesmen’ were ‘messing up the world’. In a democracy the people made the final decisions and it was necessary for him to help formulate public opinion and ‘appeal directly to the American people’. He felt confident that the Americans would understand what he had to say about the fate of the different populations in occupied Europe, particularly the Jews. Working rapidly, he prepared an outline of his proposed book which was an extended analysis of the German occupation decrees already translated by him. After that ... [Lemkin in the summer of 1942] had a conversation with George Finch, director of the International Law Division of the Carnegie Endowment Fund. As ... [Finch] was reading the material while lounging
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in a soft chair in the sleepy Cosmos Club ... [Lemkin] watched his face and read in it an approval of ... [his] book, even before he said yes. Finch was already familiar with Lemkin’s collection of occupation decrees, some of which Lemkin had utilized as reading material for the course he had given to the School of Military Government in Charlottesville, Virginia. Finch encouraged Lemkin to complete the manuscript, promising to print the sections which had already been completed.49 There was also talk in the summer of 1942 of the Carnegie Foundation publishing a translation of Lemkin’s French or Swedish books on foreign exchange restrictions and the international system of clearing. Lemkin sent George Finch a copy of the review of the Swedish volume which had appeared in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, where the reviewer had praised the author and suggested that it be translated into English.50 Lemkin at Finch’s suggestion tried approaching several expert translators, but did not succeed in finding one, who could meet the Foundation’s requirements. He claimed that the publication of such a volume was useful because ‘The liquidation of the actual clearing agreements in occupied Europe will be a problem not only for Peace Conferences but also for the occupying armies, which must undertake a freezing of the clearing assets’. Lemkin had favoured the translation of the Swedish volume as it included ‘the war experiences’, but failing in his initial approach he offered to update his French book. Here too he ran into difficulties.51 Meanwhile Lemkin pushed forward his new project. Originally he had proposed to George Finch in the middle of July 1942 the publication of a book not exceeding 200 pages based on the German occupation laws and decrees accompanied by an analytical study.52 From a talk given by Lemkin on 16 May 1942 to the North Carolina Bar Association, we can conjecture how he was developing his ideas for his seminal volume on genocide. He had already demonstrated that Germany was ignoring the rules and customs of international law, which had evolved since the second half of the eighteenth century, and constructed their legal principles on the basis that what was ‘useful and necessary for the German nation’ was the law. German law was used as an instrument of oppression to subjugate the population in occupied lands. Lemkin also addressed audiences on the economic plans of Germany, showing how Germany was filching vast territories in eastern Europe in order to restructure the population and shift parts of it elsewhere, and how it utilized the international credit exchange system to dominate the trade of the countries which it had occupied and to squeeze the population. ‘Life and property are not respected’, Lemkin asserted. ‘People disappear from their homes at night, and nobody knows where they have gone. The occupant has created many large trust corporations which take over properties from the population and vest the titles in themselves, in order to convey them to German settlers’. Thus, many of the essential
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themes in Axis Control in Occupied Europe had already been formulated by Lemkin by May 1942.53 Only the shock of the mass killing perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen in the Soviet Union stimulated Lemkin’s thinking still further, leading him to construct the concept of genocide. From time to time Lemkin had requested an extension of the delivery date for the manuscript which had at first been three months and each time there had been an extension of the delivery date the manuscript had continued to grow in size until it had become a bulky volume. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington had also provided Lemkin with office facilities for a year, the services of a shorthand typist and research and editorial assistance. They had reimbursed Lemkin $ 454 for expenses incurred by him in obtaining documents and translations and had paid him an honorarium of $ 500. This financial and secretarial and research assistance was necessary, as Lemkin was only being paid the sum of $ 25 a day for his work at the Board of Economic Warfare.54 Unfortunately Lemkin, who was a very able lawyer, was inclined to be querulous at times, had a litigious streak in his personality and was very concerned about protecting his rights to his forthcoming book, and there was a protracted dispute with George Finch and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace which delayed publication of the book from December 1943 to August 1944. The proofs of the book had been forwarded to Lemkin at the end of 1943 with the intention of publishing the book by 15 February 1944.55 The dispute centred on Lemkin reserving the magazine, radio and dramatic rights to his book and various other concerns. A Washington lawyer friend of Lemkin, Fulton Brylawski, sent a revised agreement to George Finch with suggestions which the latter tried to accept as far as he was able to do so.56 On 12 May 1944 Lemkin sent an irate letter to George Finch, stating you have submitted to me three drafts of contracts. It is difficult for me to get an orientation as to your position in this matter since you have withdrawn your own proposals and substituted for them proposals less advantageous for me than those you proposed previously. The negotiations you had with my lawyer, Mr Brylawski, which seemed at a certain moment to lead to an agreement between us were interrupted by you without any reason understandable to me.57 In the end the dispute was resolved through the mediation efforts of the Author’s Guild and Lemkin’s good sense, when he conceded that the book had to be copyrighted in the name of the Carnegie Endowment, and a contract was signed on 18 August 1944 and publication of the book was later scheduled for 15 November 1944.58 On arrival in the United States, Lemkin’s first impression was that the discrimination practised against the black population in the South bore certain resemblances to the unfair treatment meted out to Jews in pre-War
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Poland. Although he had surmounted the obstacles to an affluent lifestyle, Lemkin felt very keenly about pre-War Polish anti-Semitism, even if his criticism was expressed in a low key fashion in his memoirs. Lemkin quickly adapted himself to academic life in the United States, publishing papers on criminology and family law, but his principal preoccupation was on drawing conclusions regarding German policy in Continental Europe from the occupation decrees he was busily collecting. To popular audiences and through his Washington contacts to American military officers, Lemkin gave talks on German law which he perceived as breaking free from all civilized restraints in its arbitrariness. To other audiences and colleagues in the Board of Economic Warfare, he voiced his concerns about German economic planning, including the confiscation of vast territories in eastern Europe, the forced movement of large ethnic groups and the subordination of trade in satellite states to Germany’s needs. Under the impact of War as viewed through the American press and his own intimate knowledge of conditions in eastern Europe, Lemkin leapt to the conclusion that Nazi policy was grounded not only on the movement of peoples, but their starvation and destruction, particularly if they were Jews, summed up in the word genocide. By July 1942 Lemkin was ready to incorporate all these themes into a book, Axis Control in Occupied Europe, the publication of which was held up for six months or more because of his own intransigence.
4 The Publication of His Master Work and the Nuremberg Tribunal
Raphael Lemkin’s seminal work, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation. Analysis of Government. Proposals for Redress, was published in Washington towards the end of 1944, although his preface was dated a year earlier, 15 November 1943. It was a volume almost 700 pages in length, part of which analysed the occupation laws in terms of the techniques devised by the Germans for subjugating conquered peoples, part of which dealt with the impact of the occupation regulations on a country by country basis, while half the book contained an English translation of the German decrees. Lemkin’s main insight was to understand through studying these occupation regulations that the Germans intended to reorganize Europe on racial lines and that this would involve mass-murder and the suppression of other cultures. In violation of international law, Lemkin argued, large areas of occupied Europe were incorporated into the Reich, including western Poland, Luxembourg and certain Yugoslav provinces, and other enormous tracts of land in the East were earmarked for colonization and the Lebensraum (living space) theory was invoked by the Nazis in support of this. Himmler proclaimed that ‘Our task is to Germanize the East, not in the old sense of bringing the German language and laws to the people dwelling in that area, but to ensure that in the East only people of genuinely German, Teutonic blood shall live’. This policy was implemented ‘by mass deportations of native populations by the police (in such countries as Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, and Slovenia), by providing assistance in the settlement of German colonists coming into new areas in the occupied countries, and by liquidating owners of business enterprises and putting Germans in their place’. The Government General of Poland, the Ukraine and parts of Russia were to be utilized as a source for ‘raw materials, food, and labor’.1 The core of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe was a chapter dealing with genocide, a new concept invented by Lemkin to denote ‘the destruction of a nation or ... an ethnic group’. He derived the word from ‘the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing), thus corresponding in its 56
Publication of His Master Work & Nuremberg Trial
57
formation to such words as tyrannicide, homocide (homicide), infanticide, etc’.2 Lemkin, a philologist by training, deliberately coined the short and chilling word of genocide to shock listeners as one which would have much greater impact than the earlier term ‘crimes of barbarity and vandalism’. It seems from the preface to the book that the word had been minted by Lemkin in 1943 and first occurred in print in Polish in the same year as ludobojstwo (loaded = people) and (zabojstwo = murder) in a bill of the Polish government-in-exile.3 In a civilized society, Lemkin argued, ‘war is conducted against states and armed forces and not against populations’. Further, he stated that ‘It required a long period of evolution in civilized society to mark the way from wars of extermination, which occurred in ancient times and in the Middle Ages, to the conception of wars as being essentially limited to activities against armies and states’. Although this historical sequence was to be revised later in his unpublished ‘History of Genocide’, the examples cited in a footnote to the previous statement included the siege of Magdeburg which occurred in the seventeenth century during the Thirty Years War.4 But Lemkin also traced the evolution of modern genocides in Europe to a time before the First World War, long before the advent of the Nazi regime. He declared that Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization of the area by the oppressor’s own nationals. Denationalization was the word used in the past to describe the destruction of a national pattern ... Thus, the terms ‘germanization’, ‘Magyarization’, ‘Italianization’, for example, are used to connote the imposition by one stronger nation (Germany, Hungary, Italy) of its national pattern upon a national group controlled by it.5 Under National Socialism, ‘the nation, not the state’ was the predominant factor. He pointed out that Alfred Rosenberg claimed that ‘History and the mission of the future no longer mean the struggle of class against class, the struggle of Church dogma against dogma, but the clash between blood and blood, race and race, people and people’. Hitler even before the Second World War, Lemkin contended, had prepared a plan to destroy nations which had to be adapted to political considerations in different countries. It could not be implemented in full force in all the conquered states, and hence the plan varied as to subject, modalities, and degree of intensity in each occupied country. Some groups – such as the Jews – are to be destroyed completely.
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The inhuman treatment of the Jews was a ‘device for promotion of the anti-Christian idea of the inequality of human beings and German racial superiority’. The Germans had devised a scheme for destroying the subjugated populations, so that if the Germans lost the War, they would still retain their ‘numerical, physical and economic superiority’. The physical debility and even the annihilation of the subject peoples was to be achieved by starving them. Whereas the Poles were given rations equivalent to 66 per cent of the food which they had received before the Second World War, the Jews were allotted 20 per cent of their pre-War rations. Lemkin devoted a short chapter to the legal status of the Jews immediately before his survey of genocide and according to his knowledge at the end of 1943, Jews were liquidated ‘within the ghettos, or in special trains in which they were deported to a so-called “unknown” destination’. At that point Lemkin quoted an estimate of 1,702,500 for the number of Jews who had been murdered in all the occupied countries.6 Michael Ignatieff has noted that Lemkin was just as concerned about the fate of the Polish people as he was about the fate of his fellow Jews. In the decrees penalizing the use of the Polish language and promoting the destruction of Polish cultural monuments and treasures, the use of Poles for slave labour, the merciless repression of all resistance, and the settlement of Germans on Polish land, Ignatieff suggested, ‘– in all those awful edicts Lemkin could make out a concerned desire to subjugate, and if necessary to exterminate, the Polish people’.7 While he was working as a civil servant in Washington, Lemkin was also a habitué of Polish émigré circles and Polish concerns weighed heavily upon him. As he later told Judge Harry Fisher on 19 April 1949, ‘There must be a hierarchy of values in human society and the preservation of life must be on the top of this hierarchy. The indescribable tragedy which resulted in the extermination of six million Jews, three million Poles must not be forgotten’.8 Lemkin used the term physical genocide too freely, referring to the ‘mass killings, mainly of Jews, Poles, Slovenes, and Russians’; equally his concept of the techniques of genocide – political, social, economic, biological, physical, moral and religious – was too diffuse to be useful and had to be defined more sharply later. Moreover, Lemkin exaggerated the physical dangers facing the Poles, by stating that ‘Hitler expressed the view that it is their [the Poles] soil alone which can and should be profitably Germanized’, because an experiment in the Zamosc region to achieve this end encountered too much resistance.9 Although he was right when he stated that the aim of the Nazis was the annihilation of the Jews, he did not appreciate the scale on which they had succeeded by the time his book was published at the end of 1944, and for this reason he tended to underplay the uniqueness of the Jewish situation. As far
Publication of His Master Work & Nuremberg Trial 59
as his other major thesis was concerned, he was wrong in claiming that the Nazis by colonizing the East would win the war, even if the German armies were defeated because the German occupation of these territories was too short for them to have a lasting impact. Nor was he to know that the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 would stipulate ‘that the German population or parts of it who have remained in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary must be transported to Germany’, thus reversing Hitler’s plans. By 1982 13.10 million Germans were expelled or fled from eastern Europe or came by agreement from the Soviet Union and were resettled in Germany.10 Even so, Lemkin’s account was the most intellectually coherent and compelling examination of the violent population restructuring in eastern Europe. He was also correct to stress the ambitious genocidal plans of the SS against the Russian population and the starvation scheme, both of which were never fully implemented.11 Lemkin asserted that the S.S. and the police [particularly the secret police or Gestapo] in the occupied countries are engaged in a program of subjugation, of exploitation, and of the destruction of other nations, in which they were trained long before the war, and in which they fanatically believe. The War crimes committed by them are not sporadic incidents of ill-will but are an instrumentality for the carrying out of the program. At the same time, the law in the occupied countries was ‘bereft of moral content and respect for human rights’. He further declared that an analysis of the specific functions of the Gestapo and S.S. and of their program and world outlook leads to the conclusion that in the light of their close connection and combined activities they constitute an association having as its purpose the commission of crimes in genere. Such crimes are directed not only against municipal law of the occupied countries, but also against international law and the laws of humanity. Such an association amounts to what is called in Anglo-Saxon law conspiracy, or in continental European law unlawful association. Therefore, mere membership in such groups should be treated as an offense, and all the members of the Gestapo and S.S. should be punished for the sole reason that they are carrying out such functions in the occupied countries. Moreover, if a member of the Gestapo or S.S. has also committed a concrete crime, he should of course be punished for the specific crime. The code followed by the police was based on the programme of the National Socialist party, the ideas expressed in Mein Kampf and Hitler’s speeches, ordinances of the government, and the decisions of the courts after Hitler’s assumption of power. Lemkin dismissed the defence plea that members of such police units were only obeying superior orders, when the
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police were ‘habitually involved in committing similar crimes, and had voluntarily joined these units’.12 As the publication date of 15 November 1944 approached, Lemkin busied himself with making the necessary contacts in the media to ensure that Axis Rule in Occupied Europe was reviewed and that his ideas reached the wider public. Only if he achieved this preliminary goal would Lemkin be able to influence governments. While living in Washington at the end of 1944, Lemkin approached Eugene Meyer, the proprietor of the Washington Post, and had a fruitful encounter with him which ‘struck sparks’ and this was followed by an important editorial in the paper on the subject on 3 December 1944, echoing his concerns and linking his ideas about genocide with the systematic destruction of European Jewry.13 It opened with a report of the War Refugee Board which remarked that in Birkenau between April, 1942, and April, 1944, approximately 1,765,000 Jews were put to death by poison gas in ingeniously constructed chambers; their bodies were then burned in specially designed furnaces; their ashes were distributed as fertilizer. This process of extermination by gassing was carried on in other camps besides Birkenau; in the main it was applied only to Jews ... There were unspeakable atrocities at Auschwitz and Birkenau. But the point about these killings is that they were systematic and purposeful. The gas chambers and furnaces were not improvisations, they were scientifically designed instruments for the extermination of an entire ethnic group.14 It then referred to the fact that ‘a noted Polish scholar and attorney, Prof. Raphael Lemkin, now on the faculty of Duke University’ had coined the word genocide to describe wanton ethnic killing. ‘Thus Jews were gassed at Birkenau and Aryan Poles and Russians and Slovenes were otherwise butchered, not for any crime or any resistance to Axis authority but because the Nazis wished to exterminate the ethnic groups to which they belonged’. By defining genocide in such a broad way, despite the revelations about the concentration camps, Lemkin continued to blur the sharpness of his analytical insight and to discount the uniqueness of the destruction of the Jews.15 The editorial ended by stating that Lemkin believed that genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. If genocide was regarded in the sense of undermining the foundations of national life, then the Nazis had committed genocide in all the occupied
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61
countries of Europe so as to make them subservient to German rule. It was necessary to secure an international agreement to outlaw genocide: ‘If such an agreement is reached, neutrals will feel no violation of their sovereignty in the demand that perpetrators of this crime be handed over to justice’.16 Not to be outdone the New York Times on 21st January 1945 devoted a front page review of Lemkin’s volume in their book section by Otto D. Tolischus which as William Korey pointed out was somewhat unusual for so scholarly a treatise.17 Again, Raphael Lemkin took the initiative for securing such a favourable treatment of his book through his contacts in the Authors’ Guild and he also provided the illustration to accompany the review.18 ‘A monster more terrifying than the Great Beast of the Apocalypse’, Tolischus noted, more destructive than anything spawned by nature, has been let loose upon the earth. Conceived in the ecstasy of man’s soaring ambition, but born in the hell of war and revolution, it has turned upon its creator and is now devouring him by the million, growing more monstrous, more cruel and more voracious upon what it feeds. The reviewer praised Lemkin for depicting ‘what Axis rule in occupied Europe means and what it would have meant to us had it ever spread to our shores’ and the volume as ‘an indispensable handbook for scholars and historians and for those authorities of the United Nations charged with undoing, as far as possible, the effects of Axis Domination’. However, he found fault with Lemkin for dwelling on ‘German militarism born of the innate viciousness of the German racial character ... Surely just because he is a Pole Dr Lemkin would not want to be held personally responsible for all the acts of the Pilsudski regime’.19 A friend of Raphael Lemkin’s Leopold Kohr likewise castigated him for making ‘populaces responsible’ and for singling ‘out one people against the others, as the Nazis of all countries do with the Jews, or you do with the Germans’. In a draft review of the volume which out of friendship, he told Lemkin, he had decided not to publish, Kohr spelled out what he meant. ‘Once moving towards biological nationalism – which Dr Lemkin does in indicting the Germans instead of the Nazis and complimenting otherwise the greatness of biological entities ... – the road is taken which, even if it does not always end in Hitler, leads to him’.20 As Samantha Power has observed, Lemkin followed a similar line of argument to that of Daniel Goldhagen, who ‘ascribed guilt not only to the perpetrators of the crimes but to their fellow citizens who failed to stop them and often appeared actively supportive’. Yisrael Gutman pointed out in a favourable discussion of Goldhagen’s book that he had reopened the whole debate about the dimensions of German anti-Semitism since 1918, something that was necessary.21
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So too, Lemkin continued to receive excellent reviews in the academic journals for Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. In the American Journal of International Law Arthur Kuhn asserted that The collection and presentation of the most important laws, decrees, and proclamations of the occupying forces, country by country, in excellent English translation, constitute a veritable tour de force ... His unique contribution consists, firstly, in his presentation of the basic facts by marshalling the actual laws and decrees themselves, country by country, and labelling them for what they are, legislation for genocide; and secondly, in his analysis of the various attacks upon all the elements of nationhood in the respective fields, political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical and religious.22 Merle Fainsod in the Harvard Law Review was equally ecstatic in his praise, calling the book ‘a monumental task in gathering together and distilling the essence of this witches’ brew’.23 Although Lemkin never claimed to have influenced the form of the indictment prepared by the prosecutors at Nuremberg, apart from the insertion of the charge of genocide, there are interesting parallels between the ideas expressed in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe and the proposals of Colonel Murray C. Bernays. So much so that Robert Conot argued that there was a direct connection. According to him Colonel Mickey Marcus of the Army Civil Affairs Division handed Bernays an advance copy of Lemkin’s book, but from the records of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace we now know that the book was not despatched to Major General John Hilldring, the Director of the Army Civil Affairs Division, until 28 October 1944 and would have trickled down to Bernays a little later.24 Nevertheless, gossip about the contents of the book could have reached Bernays earlier at one of the endless Washington cocktail parties or the proofs of the book could have been shown to him. Bernays, who was then working in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Personnel Division, was responsible for collecting evidence on crimes committed against American servicemen by the Germans, particularly by the Waffen SS Bernays was persuaded by Lemkin’s formulation that members of the SS and the Gestapo had participated in a criminal conspiracy and wrote a memorandum on 15 September 1944 entitled the ‘Trial of European War Criminals’ incorporating these ideas.25 This memorandum according to Bradley F. Smith ‘shaped the subsequent prosecutions at Nuremberg’ and ‘may, indeed, be one of the most significant documents in international law’. Bernays reiterated Lemkin’s argument that the Nazi party and the SS and the Gestapo were criminal organizations, whose members should be tried before an international court with having conspired to commit murder. If a representative defendant from one such criminal organization was convicted, then all the other members would be
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guilty once their own membership had been proved, and since the criminal conspiracy existed from the earliest days of the Nazi regime, pre-War crimes committed by members of these organizations would also be punished, as the American Jewish Conference and the Refugee Board had been urging. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau’s plan to demilitarize Germany and to strip it of its industrial potential, by turning it into an agrarian state and for the summary execution of the German leadership, was opposed by the War Department in favour of a trial. At a meeting Bernays’ contentions won over his departmental chief and later on 27 November 1944 Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, and Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, submitted a joint memorandum entitled ‘The Trial and Punishment of European War Criminals’ to President Roosevelt which seems to have convinced him as well.26 Meanwhile as a result of his growing reputation Lemkin in May 1945 secured a temporary appointment in the War Crimes Office of the Judge Advocate General’s Office. Here on the ground floor of the Pentagon building in Washington he worked with other research analysts, such as Mosenthal, Lychenheim, Israelite and Reich gathering evidence against Nazi war criminals, but from time to time he was sent on assignments overseas. Walter Gerson, a former colleague in the office, remarked that Anyone who worked with you at the time could never forget with what zeal and interest you observed each bit of evidence that was found against some of the Nazi war lords et al. Many, many times we have spoken of our stirring conversations with you and your tireless zeal in your work. I cannot remember ever having taken part in such a conversation that your characteristic modesty was not always apparent.27 Lemkin’s first assignment was on familiar territory, that is, ‘reviewing all the gazettes, proclamations, edicts, etc. issued by the Germans in occupied countries in Europe, selecting those considered to be violations of the laws of war, and classifying and translating these documents’ with the help of some assistants, but he was also influencing policy.28 Reporting to General John Weir in June 1945, Lemkin privately took credit for the new formulation of the law contained in the landmark Bernays memorandum. ‘I was very glad to hear when Colonel Bernays told me in your office on Friday, 15 June 1945’, he declared, ‘that Justice Jackson has accepted the recommendations of my book (pages 23, 24) to the effect that the Gestapo and SS should be tried and made responsible collectively as a group and that mere participation in the Gestapo and SS should be treated as a crime’.29 At a meeting of the Allied powers in London on 2nd August 1945, an agreement was signed by all the parties to set up an International Military Tribunal. Lemkin’s temporary appointment was extended and in the summer and autumn of 1945 he was sent to London, where he assisted Robert Jackson in
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drafting the indictment of the major war criminals. Although there was a desk at the Office of Strategic Services manned by Dr Charles Dwork which collected valuable documentation on the Nazi persecution of the Jews, Justice Jackson ‘preferred legal experts who could work with historical documents and testimonies’ bypassing the intelligence experts from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and not utilizing the material which they had collected. Lemkin was one of these legal experts, whose services were called upon by Jackson.30 A document known as ‘the Charter’ defined the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal and under Article VI listed the crimes with which the leading war criminals would be charged. The Lemkin–Bernays conspiracy thesis appeared under Count One which stated that the Tribunal could try defendants as individuals and for their membership of certain organizations which were classified as criminal for the formulation of ‘a common plan or conspiracy to commit ... Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity’. Count one delineated ‘The Common Plan or Conspiracy’ and included the defendants’ plan to commit Crimes against Humanity, both within Germany and within the occupied territories, including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against civilian populations before and during the war, and persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, in execution of the plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal wars, many of such acts ... being violations of the domestic laws of the countries where perpetrated. Further, The programme of action against the Jews included disenfranchisement, stigmatisation, denial of civil rights, subjecting their persons and property to violence, deportation, enslavement, enforced labour, starvation, murder and mass extermination ... Of the 9,600,000 Jews who lived in the parts of Europe under Nazi domination, it is conservatively estimated that 5,700,000 have disappeared, most of them deliberately put to death by the Nazi conspirators.31 Count Three, War Crimes, charged the defendants with formulating a ‘Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit War Crimes’. This part of the indictment concerned Lemkin deeply and he had, in fact, assisted in its drafting. On 28 September 1945, Lemkin in his capacity as adviser to Jackson sent Colonel Telford Taylor a memorandum, stating that The defendants have entered a conspiracy for the destruction or crippling the development of entire nations and religious groups by undermining the foundations of their economic existence ... and by exterminating millions of
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them in specially created institutions and camps or exposing millions of them to death by under-feeding, forced labor and compulsion to live in specially created unhealthy conditions.32 Lemkin was also in touch with the legal expert of the World Jewish Congress, Dr Jacob Robinson, and its President, Rabbi Stephen Wise. Both Robinson and Wise were helpful in obtaining some softening in the British opposition to the inclusion of the new concept of genocide in the indictment. He also met Chaim Weizmann and Moshe Shertok (Sharrett) to discuss the possibility of Weizmann giving evidence on behalf of the Jewish people at the Nuremberg Trial. Weizmann advised Justice Jackson on 18 October 1945 that although ‘considerable progress’ had been made in the preparation of the Jewish case, he would not testify unless this was with the support of the British and American prosecution teams. Jackson refused his offer to testify, remarking that We were eventually able to get such complete and damning documentation on the persecution of the Jews that it would have been an anti-climax to have had any Jew to testify to it. The Nazi documents are so coldly cruel and so complete as to the purpose to exterminate the Jews and so detailed as to their accomplishment of this object that nothing could be added.33 Against the objections of G.D. Roberts, one of the British representatives concerned with the preparations for the trial, the United States forced through the inclusion of the concept of genocide into the indictment. The defendants were charged under Count Three with conducting ‘deliberate and systematic genocide, viz. the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian population of certain occupied territories to destroy particular races and classes of people, and national, racial or religious groups, particularly, Jews, Poles and Gypsies, and others’, and with deportation for slave labour, the murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and the plunder of private and public property.34 Count Four specifically defined Crimes against Humanity, though it also relied on the facts pleaded in the previous charge and among other matters added the following: These persecutions were directed against Jews. They were also directed against persons whose political belief or spiritual aspirations were deemed to be in conflict with the aims of the Nazis. Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933; they were deprived of liberty, thrown into concentration camps where they were murdered and ill-treated. Their property was confiscated. Hundreds of thousands of Jews were so treated before 1st September, 1939. Since the 1st September, 1939, the persecution of the Jews was redoubled; millions of Jews from Germany and from
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the occupied Western countries were sent to the Eastern Countries for extermination. Counts Three and Four embodied the two different concepts for the protection of national minorities, the group approach favoured by Lemkin, under which genocide would become a crime, and the protection of the human rights of individuals, under which any violation would become a crime, an approach espoused by Lauterpacht. In fact, when John Humphrey drafted Article 46 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he took his draft dealing with the protection of ‘ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities’ entirely from a text Lauterpacht published in 1945.35 The phrase, Crimes against Humanity, had been suggested by Professor Hersch (later Sir Hersch Lauterpacht 1897–1960), a Polish-Jewish international lawyer of distinction and a member of the British War Crimes Executive, to Robert Jackson, the head of the American prosecution team; it had been something that Jewish groups had been campaigning for since 1942, and achieved their first success when on 17 December 1942 Anthony Eden read a statement to the Commons declaring that the Allied governments condemned the Nazi policy of exterminating European Jewry and reaffirming that those responsible for these crimes would ‘not escape retribution’.36 Besides assisting in the drafting of the indictment, Lemkin busied himself investigating war criminals and sent a 200-page memorandum he had prepared on General Weir’s instructions on Professor Karl Haushofer, a leading expert on geopolitics, to Sidney Alderman in September 1945. The latter was so impressed with the report that he recommended the prosecution of Haushofer and his inclusion in the list of major war criminals, though this was not possible at this late stage. ‘In many ways it seems to me’, Alderman summarizing the report asserted, that Haushofer, who is now in our custody, fills in the void created by the death or absence of Hitler as the main moving spirit in the common plan. Haushofer was Hitler’s intellectual godfather. It was Haushofer, rather than Hess, who wrote Mein Kampf and who furnished the backbone of the Nazi bible and for what we call the common criminal plan. Geo-politics was not merely academic theory. It was a driving dynamic plan for the conquest of the heartland of Eurasia and for domination of the world by the conquest of that heartland. The whole scheme for domination of Europe and of Eurasia and, hence, of the world, and for the linking up of the power of the expanded Pan-Germans with the power of the expanded Japanese Empire was contained in Haushofer’s teachings. 37 On 12 September 1945 Lemkin wrote to General John Weir, the Director of the War Crimes Office in Washington, that ‘our first report on charges
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and legal evidence against leading war criminals (the 400-page report) is being extensively used in the preparation of the Indictment’, and in a nostalgic mood he added that he missed ‘very much the wonderful atmosphere of your office and the stimulating conversations with you’.38 Meanwhile Lemkin had been promoted to become adviser on foreign affairs to the War Department at a salary of $ 7,500 per annum, a position that he retained until 1947.39 During his stay in England, Lemkin took it upon himself to make contact with the British press; as a result the Sunday Times and the Tribune, a leftwing socialist magazine, explained the meaning of the new concept of genocide.40 A good review of his book also appeared in the Times Literary Supplement which suggested that If only she [Germany] had been able to defeat England in that year [1940], and to refrain from the immediate exploitation of conquered peoples, she might have brought a united Europe into existence. But in the intoxication of her triumph she proved to be so tyrannical and clumsy in her treatment of the occupied countries that her historic opportunity was thrown away. Mr Lemkin has produced a comprehensive and scholarly documentation of that failure, and of Axis misrule in general. As a Pole, he writes with the deep feeling and understanding which arise out of the sufferings of his own country; and as an experienced lawyer, he is obviously master of the legal issues involved ... His book should be in all reference libraries; for decades to come it will be of special use to lawyers, both national and international. It will also provide historians and others with easily accessible ... material.41 In London Lemkin met former friends from Poland and was shocked by their stories of Nazi atrocities. He was slowly beginning to comprehend the dimensions of the Nazi onslaught against the Jews. Towards the end of 1945, he returned to Washington to assist in the preparation of the war crimes trials in Tokyo.42 On his return to Washington, Lemkin planned at first to write a two volume treatise on Japanese war crimes very much on the lines of his book on the Nazi regime in occupied Europe. He would cover such topics as the legal definition of aggressive war, the defence of obedience to superior orders and crimes against humanity; the second volume would discuss Japanese techniques of occupation, economic crimes, the spiritual mobilization for aggressive war, and analyse Japanese rule in South-East Asia country by country. He also handed his superiors in the War Crimes Office a copy of his report on Karl Haushofer, pointing out the relevance of his links with Japanese militarists. He intimated that Haushofer, who was held under mild supervision by the Americans, should be prosecuted in the next batch of war crime trials.43
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A few days later, Lemkin in his new role as adviser on foreign affairs followed this up with a memorandum on the importance of the Haushofer case for the Tokyo trials. ‘Haushofer’s activities cannot be limited to one country or continent’, Lemkin began, since he was the only German who saw for a long time, even before Hitler, the full implications of global war and felt that Germany deprived of an adequate Navy and of access to the ocean, could achieve world domination only through global war in which Japan’s Army and especially Navy, would play its role in fighting the United States and Great Britain ... Haushofer has been pressing the point that the combined forces of Germany, Japan, and Italy, including a highly organized manpower of about 200,000,000 persons placed on a block of space consisting of more than 3,000,000 square kilometers and controlling the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Pacific can permanently control the world ... Haushofer was the main authority and promoter of the strategic plan that the Japanese armed forces and the German armed forces should meet somewhere in India and thus cut the British Empire in two parts ... Haushofer and his disciples saw long before the war the battles at Pearl Harbor and at Hong Kong. As a former member of the German general staff, for whom he acted as an emissary in Japan from 1908 to 1910 and as a former instructor of the Japanese army, he knew the country better than any other German. Haushofer’s writings which were translated into Japanese and his advice to Japanese leaders, helped the Japanese government to shape its policies and propaganda for the creation of the Asiatic co-prosperity sphere. Haushofer’s idea was that Japan should encourage local nationalistic movements in Asia by proclaiming the principle of self-determination of the peoples of Asia. By leading these nationalistic movements against the western powers, Japan would be able to enlist the services of all these peoples for war against Britain and the U.S.A.44 Lemkin ended his memorandum by suggesting an ingenious legal ruse for trying Haushofer in Japan: ‘If Haushofer should be tried for participation in a conspiracy to wage war against U.S.A., Britain, China, and other powers, the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal would be justified by the fact that the overt act of this conspiracy was committed in the Far East’. Arrangements were put in place for the interrogation of Nobuyuki Iimoto, the driving force behind the Japanese Geopolitical Institute which had disseminated Haushofer’s ideas.45 Colonel Damon Gunn, the acting Director of the War Crimes Office, enthusiastically endorsed Lemkin’s plan for the prosecution of Haushofer in
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Tokyo. He was especially struck by the incisiveness of Lemkin’s analysis which teased out the details of a global conspiracy, linking the ambitions of Germany and Japan.46 However, Haushofer had always advocated a German– Russian alliance and fell out of favour with Hitler. When the intended prosecution of Haushofer was referred to Justice Jackson for his approval, he opposed putting him on trial, saying that We rejected him as a defendant in this case because of his very advanced years and because his only activity was teaching and writing and we felt prosecution would encounter questions about academic freedom, freedom of speech, etc, which made it inadvisable to complicate our case by including him. Haushofer recently had [a] paralytic stroke and probably could not be moved to Japan. I have given his case personal consideration and would not recommend him as a defendant and think him useless as a witness. Ill, and perhaps feeling harassed by the campaign for his prosecution unleashed by Lemkin, Karl Haushofer and his wife committed suicide a week later.47 After an interval in Washington, Lemkin in May 1946 set out on an inspection tour of the military tribunals in Germany, staying in Europe through the summer months until a verdict was reached at the Nuremberg Trial. He took the opportunity of visiting displaced persons camps, searching in vain for remnants of his family, and realizing more and more the scale of the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jews. He was also deeply offended by the discovery that some of the personnel of the Nuremberg Tribunal had been engaging in illegal trading practices.48 While serving on temporary duty in the American zone of Germany, he was handed a memorandum compiled by United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) officials on the crime of stealing children from occupied countries. He passed on the report to Walter Rapp, the Chief of the Interrogation Section, and understood from him that this report was to be acted on in the office of Subsequent Proceedings. As Lemkin saw it, this crime was part of the more complex crime of genocide, consisting not only of annihilation of members of racial and national groups but also of weakening them through demographic devices such as obstructing procreation through abortions and imposing contraceptive measures, sterilizations, castration, and even stealing children of tiny age, as well as compelling women of related blood (in Norway and Holland) to bear children with members of the German armed forces ... The experimentation on human beings can be fully understood and qualified as criminal from the point of view of international law in connection with the crime of genocide since the German medical profession and German scientists in general
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have been mobilized for the commission of the crime of genocide, in the same way as the criminal organizations, SS and Gestapo, have been mobilized for this particular purpose.49 According to Paul Rassinier, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, ‘was the mosttalked-about work in the corridors of the Nuremberg Court in late 1945 – early 1946 time’.50 Moreover, the concept of ‘genocide’ gained a new prominence, when Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, the British deputy prosecutor, cross-examined Constantin Von Neurath, who had served as Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, on 25 June 1946. It is probable that Lemkin, who was visiting Nuremberg, encountered Maxwell-Fyfe in the vicinity of the court, and lobbied him to include the concept of genocide in his questioning. Lemkin mentioned that at this time he was in contact with the judges and prosecutors of the Tribunal.51 As far back as August 1945, Lemkin had sent Donnedieu de Vabres, an old friend, who was to become the French representative on the judicial panel, a copy of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, eliciting compliments from him about the cogency of his newly coined word, genocide; it is likely that Lemkin approached him.52 Fyfe pointed out Now, defendant, you know in this indictment in this trial we are charging you and your fellow-defendants with, among other things, genocide which we say is the extermination of racial and national groups ... as has been ... [stated] in the well-known book of Professor Lemkin ... What you wanted to do was to get rid of the teachers and writers and singers of Czechoslovakia, whom you call the intelligentsia, the people who would hand down the history and tradition of the Czech people to other generations. When Lemkin wrote to Fyfe a couple of months later, he remarked, ‘I would like to reiterate my very warm appreciation of your great and so effective support which you lent to the concept of Genocide. I think that the inclusion of Genocide in the judgment would contribute to the creation of a preventive atmosphere against repetition of similar sorts of barbarity’.53 ‘Perhaps nothing has left a deeper impression upon the trial’, The Times correspondent noted on 29 July 1946 – certainly upon the accused – than the merciless logic with which Sir Hartley Shawcross completed his closing speech in a tense, crowded courtroom [at the Nuremberg Tribunal] on Saturday. He had not the rhetoric, the eye for the vivid phrase of Mr Justice Jackson, but he had a sure grasp of this black record that was hailed on all side as, even, it is said in the dock, as a tour de force ... The Attorney-General also devoted much of his speech to ‘genocide’, the new crime of the Nuremberg indictment, which in the conception of Professor Raphael Lemkin, an eminent lawyer
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of the War Department in Washington, contains all the means, including aggressive war, aimed at the extermination of nations and racial groups.54 Nevertheless, though Shawcross paid lip service to Lemkin’s concept of genocide in his address as an analytical tool to describe these horrendous crimes, he had a different approach to international law and found no role for the concept in the ongoing proceedings. Instead he placed great emphasis on crimes against humanity in Count four of the indictment, asserting that war crimes were in their very enormity crimes against humanity. The crimes against humanity were war crimes, writ larger still. Moreover, the crimes against humanity which this Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal are limited to this extent – they must be crimes the commission of which was in some way connected with, in anticipation of or in furtherance of, the CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE or the WAR CRIMES stricto sensu with which the defendants are indicted ... we have thought it right to deal with matters which the criminal law of all countries would normally stigmatize as crimes. Murder, extermination, enslavement, persecution on political, racial or economic grounds. These things done against belligerent nationals or, for that matter, done against German nationals in belligerent occupied territory would be ordinary war crimes the prosecution of which would form no novelty. Done against others they would be crimes against national law except in so far as German law, departing from all canons of civilized procedure, may have authorized them to be done by the State or by persons acting on behalf of the State ... the nations adhering to the Charter of this Tribunal have felt it proper and necessary in the interest of civilization to say that these things even if done in accordance with the laws of the German State, as created and ruled by these men and their ringleader, were ... against the Law of Nations. I do not minimize the significance for the future of the political and jurisprudential doctrine which is here implied.55 True Shawcross highlighted the destruction of European Jewry in his closing speech. ‘Two-thirds of the Jews in Europe exterminated, more than six million of them on the killers’ own figures. Murder conducted like some mass-production industry in the gas chambers and the ovens of Auschwitz, Dachau, Treblinka, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Maidanek and Oranienburg’. He also described the operations of the Einsatzgruppen after the invasion of Russia. But like Lemkin he saw the assault on Jewry in the context of a total of twelve million murders and of another seven million persons uprooted from their homes and enslaved. Shawcross also gave the same confusing analysis of genocide as Lemkin, by referring to the fact that ‘Genocide was not restricted to the extermination of the Jewish people or of the gypsies. It
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was applied in different forms to Yugoslavia, to the non-German inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, to the people of the Low Countries and of Norway’, but unlike Lemkin he failed to invoke the concept of genocide as a new form of crime which could be used to secure convictions in legal proceedings.56 Lemkin had written to Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the United Nations on 20 May 1946 and in similar terms to Eleanor Roosevelt that Justice Jackson accepted my idea of formulating genocide as a crime and has included the charge of genocide in Count 3 of the Nuremberg indictment. Thus a solid foundation in recognizing genocide as an international evil has been laid in Nuremberg. By formulating genocide as a crime, the principle has been proclaimed that a national, racial or religious group as an entity has the right to exist, analogously as the recognition of homicide as a crime proclaims the principles that an individual has a right to live. A precedent will be set for the intervention in internal affairs of other countries on behalf of persecuted minorities.57 Distraught at being unable to trace any members of his family from Poland and suffering from high blood pressure, Lemkin was confined to a military hospital between 20 and 26 July 1946.58 After his release, he discovered that his brother Elias and his sister-in-law Lisa together with their two sons were alive and living in Berlin; they were almost the only survivors of his 49 member family. His uncles, aunts, and cousins, all had perished, apart from Daniel Lemkin and David Lemkin. As he explained to Herbert Yahraes, ‘If you mean do I know which went into the gas chambers, and which the Germans starved in the ghettos, and which the Germans shot or beat or worked to death someplace else, no, I don’t know that’. Overjoyed to find Elias but numbed by the death of his parents, particularly his mother, Raphael advised his brother to leave Berlin, as it was an isolated and dangerous place, and Elias travelled with his family to Frankfurt before settling in a refugee camp in Munich.59 He learned from Elias that in June 1941, he had gone with his wife and sons on what was expected to be a short visit to Moscow to see Lisa’s mother and the rest of her family, leaving Joseph and Bella Lemkin behind in Wolkowysk. On 22 June 1941, the Germans invaded Russia and Elias and his family were trapped in the Soviet Union. Through Lisa’s brother Elias obtained work on a construction site and then an easier job in a stockroom in the Urals; at first the family were so short of money that Elias had to sell the summer suits he had brought with him for food. In 1944, Elias and Lisa by using influential connections in her family obtained permission to live in Moscow. According to The Volkovsyk Memorial Book both his parents, Joseph and Bella, perished in the Treblinka concentration camp. Raphael remained upset with his brother for not ensuring the safety of their parents.
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After the War, Elias had returned to Poland with his wife and children, but following a pogrom in the town of Kielce in July 1946, when 42 Jewish survivors were murdered, the family fled to Germany.60 As William Korey has suggested the death of his parents, particularly his mother, who was his emotional anchor, was a shattering experience which transformed Lemkin from ‘a crusader’ into ‘a zealot’ for inscribing the crime of genocide into the international law code.61 From Nuremberg Lemkin flew to England, where in Cambridge he attended a conference of the International Law Association which met from 19 to 24 August 1946. Later he claimed to have received a cool reception for his ideas, when he delivered a paper on the prevention of genocide, but this was not his impression at the time.62 Thus, he wrote to the Honourable John J. Parker, a Judge at the Nuremberg Tribunal, on 27 August 1946 that ‘In the course of the discussions I have been asked many questions about the crime of Genocide. I think I succeeded in convincing the audience as to the usefulness of such a concept of law which would follow the path of organized criminality’. At the same time Lord Porter, who presided over the conference, advised Lemkin that it ‘has shown a keen and active interest in the problem of Genocode [sic]’. A committee has been appointed ‘to consider the best method of setting up an International Criminal Court to deal with international crimes, which ... naturally would include the crime of Genocide’.63 This indicated that Lemkin’s ideas had reached the realm of practical politics, emboldening him to take further action. In September 1946, Lemkin flew to Paris to introduce the concept of genocide into the peace treaties between the Allies and the Axis satellites. He submitted carefully formulated proposals that anyone who participated in a conspiracy to destroy a national or religious group in these countries should be liable under their criminal codes for the crime of genocide with a penalty of imprisonment or death. There was also an additional safeguard for members of aggrieved groups to petition the United Nations which would be able to invoke sanctions against the offending state.64 His efforts were rebuffed. ‘Good heavens, man’, an American representative remarked, ‘don’t you read the papers? Don’t you know we’re having a devil of a time with the Russians as it is, without dragging in another issue?’ A French delegate was equally blunt, saying that ‘I’m all for your idea. But as a diplomat, how can I bring it up? It’s not on the agenda’. Lemkin became so despondent that on the third day of his stay in Paris, he once again fell ill and was taken to an American military hospital in the French capital.65 When a few days later the judges began to deliver their verdict at the Nuremberg Tribunal on 30 September 1946, they attached paramount importance to crimes against peace. ‘To initiate a war of aggression is ... not only an international crime, it is the supreme crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains the accumulated evil of the whole’.66 While the Tribunal condemned the conspiracy to commit aggression, it found that the
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conspiracy charge was only ‘applicable to crimes against peace and not to war crimes or crimes against humanity’, thus promoting a very restricted definition of crimes against humanity. The Continental jurists, and in particular Donnedieu de Vabres, had from the beginning been opposed to the conspiracy charge. Moreover, the Tribunal did not accept the prosecution’s contention that Nazi atrocities in Germany, particularly those perpetrated against Jews prior to the war in Poland could be held to be punishable as crimes against humanity. For this to be the case it was necessary to prove that the crime against humanity was linked to a war crime or a crime against the peace, but the Tribunal was unable to establish any such linkage. On 1 October 1946, the judges read out the verdicts and sentences on the major figures of the Nazi regime, of whom 11 were sentenced to death.67 ‘By excluding Crimes against Humanity from the conspiracy [charge]’, Robert Conot asserted, ‘the judges unwittingly cut the ground from the case against the [Nazi] organizations; for no matter how pernicious the SD [the Security Service] and Gestapo had been, they had not been part of a conspiracy to wage an aggressive war’.68 Thus, the central core of the Lemkin– Bernays thesis that the Nazi era represented a conspiracy perpetrated by criminal organizations was eliminated and the atrocities committed by the Nazis in Germany before the war were ignored. Moreover, Donald Bloxham observed that As the fundamental aim [at the Nuremberg trials] was to show how war crimes and crimes against humanity derived from a conspiracy to aggression, establishing the link became in practice more important than charting the multitude of crimes. The story of the murders and privations was reduced ... to the presentation of ‘representative examples’ of atrocities, while the suffering of Jews as a group was down-played.69 Lemkin believed that the persecution of the Jews should have been treated within the framework of genocide. ‘This allows making a crime out of the massacres of the Jews before the war in Germany proper and after the war in all occupied countries’, he asserted.70 Even so, his approach was also flawed because his theory propounded the equivalence of the many genocides perpetrated by the Nazis, of which the atrocities committed against the Jews were just one, and despite Lemkin’s vigorous lobbying of the prosecutors and judges at Nuremberg, they rejected his pleas to convict members of the Nazi hierarchy of the crime of genocide. Disillusioned and heart-broken by news of the death of his parents, the lack of response from the delegates at the Paris conference and the judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal, all following rapidly on each other, Lemkin remained ill. One day while still confined to his bed in the military hospital in Paris Lemkin happened to hear on the radio about the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. Lemkin
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was electrified by the news, believing that here at last was a forum which would listen to him. He spent several days devising his plans and persuaded his doctors to discharge him from the hospital, which they were willing to do provided he travelled back to the United States on a ship and not by aeroplane. Lemkin already possessed a medical report from a Dr Savage which stated that he was ‘hypertensive, mildly exhausted, and apprehensive of flight’.71 Through his contacts, Lemkin wangled a passage on a troop transport. Lemkin’s achievements were, nevertheless, remarkable. From being an unknown, refugee professor, within five years he had become an influential policy adviser in Washington. His book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe influenced the deliberations at the Nuremberg Tribunal to a greater degree than has hitherto been assumed and his new concept of the crime genocide was slowly establishing itself in international law. In the 12 trials of the United States Military Tribunal of SS commanders, military officers, German doctors and legal figures which followed the proceedings at Nuremberg, the concept of genocide won gradual acceptance. So too, the Polish Supreme National Tribunal convicted the commandant of Auschwitz of genocide, while another accused was charged with ‘genocidal attacks on Polish culture and learning’.72
5 The United Nations Resolution on Genocide
Since his failure in 1933 to convince a conference associated with the League of Nations to recognise the new international crimes of ‘barbarity’ conceived of as the destruction of ‘ethnic, religious, or social’ groups and their culture which he designated as ‘vandalism’, Raphael Lemkin had not given his original proposals too much attention. During the Second World War, his analysis of the Nazi decrees in the subjugated countries of Europe compelled Lemkin to re-evaluate his ideas. But he merely touched on his original themes of the crimes of ‘barbarity’ and ‘vandalism’ when he addressed the North Carolina Bar Association on 16 May 1942.1 When he described his original proposals again in 1944, he wrongly claimed to have used the phrase ‘national, religious, or racial’ groups, a distinctive change of emphasis which showed a new awareness of the scale of mass killing and perverse racism. In his Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944), however, he looked forward to the amendment of the Hague Regulations ‘to prohibit genocide in any war which may occur in the future’. Every action impairing ‘the life, liberty, health, corporal integrity, economic existence, and the honor of the inhabitants when committed because they belong to a national, religious, or racial group’ was to be forbidden. Likewise ‘every policy aiming at the destruction or aggrandizement of one of such groups to the prejudice or detriment of another’ was to be prevented. Lemkin asserted that the system implemented in the past to protect minorities ‘was based mainly on international treaties and the constitutions of the respective countries’, but the enforcement machinery for these constitutional provisions was wholly inadequate. What was required was an international multilateral treaty, with provisions not only in the constitutions of each country but also in their criminal codes for the protection of minority groups: ‘Each criminal code should have provisions inflicting penalties for genocide practices’. Under the principle of universal repression, culprits suspected of such practices could be apprehended by the courts of the country in which the crime had been committed or to which they fled. Whereas prisoners of war were protected by the Hague Convention, the plight of women and children and groups of the population 76
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in occupied countries went unmonitored; and it was necessary for the regulations of the Hague Convention to be revised, by setting up an agency to inspect occupied countries and to make ‘inquiries as to the manner in which the occupant treats nations in prison’.2 True that Lemkin was deeply disappointed by the form of the judgment delivered against the accused at Nuremberg on 1 October 1946, particularly its failure to include the concept of genocide; later he was to call it ‘the blackest day’ of my life;3 yet as early as April 1946 in the American Scholar Lemkin proposed ‘that the United Nations as they are now organized, together with other invited nations, enter into an international treaty which would formulate genocide as an international crime, providing for its prevention and punishment in time of peace and war’. Thus, it is apparent that Lemkin at the beginning of 1946 had already outlined plans for a treaty under the aegis of the newly constituted United Nations to combat genocide. Moreover, Lemkin argued that ‘the crime of genocide should be recognized therein as a conspiracy to exterminate national, religious or racial groups ... The crime so formulated should be incorporated in every national criminal code of the signatories’. These last points had already been made in his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. He went on to assert that ‘The liability for genocide should rest on those who gave and executed the orders, as well as on those who incited to the commission of the crime by whatever means, including formulation and teaching of the criminal philosophy of genocide’. Lemkin also devised a new scheme, whereby states pursuing a policy of genocide should be held accountable before the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. The Council may request the International Court of Justice to deliver an advisory opinion to determine whether a state of genocide exists within a given country before invoking, among other things, sanctions to be leveled against the offending country. The Security Council may act either on its own initiative or on the basis of petitions submitted by members of interested national, religious or racial groups residing either within or without the accused country. Here Lemkin had the lessons of the Holocaust in mind when he suggested that persecuted religious or racial groups could petition the Security Council to take action on their behalf.4 Similarly, Lemkin suggested that ‘an international body (such as the International Red Cross) should have the right to supervise the treatment of civilian populations by occupants in time of war in order to ascertain whether genocide is being practiced by such occupant.’5 Fortunately Count Bernadotte, the President of the Swedish Red Cross, stated that he would take up Lemkin’s proposal, and it was eventually implemented as Article 143 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 dealing with the treatment of civilian populations by occupation forces.6
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By the spring of 1946 Lemkin had modified the proposals which he first formulated in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe and which he had reiterated in an article in the Free World in April 1945, by advocating that the newly formed United Nations should sponsor a treaty to prevent genocide and that it should use its machinery to enforce it. Articles on similar lines to these proposals which were first outlined in the American Scholar appeared in France in the influential Revue Internationale de Droit Penal, a journal controlled by Professor Vespasian Pella, one of Lemkin’s pre-War sponsors, and also in the Bulletin de la Commission internationale penale et penitentiaire and in Belgian and Norwegian law journals.7 So too, when Lemkin addressed the Cambridge conference of the International Law Association in August 1946, he put forward the same plan.8 Temporarily stunned by the failure of the Nuremberg Tribunal to supply a useful precedent for advancing the cause of genocide at the United Nations, Lemkin as we have seen was confined to a hospital bed in Paris at the beginning of October 1946. But from the time of his intervention at the peace conference with the Axis powers a month earlier, Lemkin’s conviction had hardened that it would fall on him to take the necessary action to ensure that his scheme to prevent genocide was implemented. He was galvanized into action on hearing about the new opportunities that had arisen at the United Nations, arriving by mid-October in New York, where the General Assembly was due to meet at Lake Success in a disused factory on Long Island. On returning to the United States, he hurried to Lake Success, where the agenda for the first meeting of the General Assembly was being drawn up. Lemkin conferred with Henri Laugier, the Assistant Secretary-General of the UN, about his proposed resolution on genocide and he expressed interest, but Lemkin had only five days left to find delegates to sponsor the resolution before the agenda was closed.9 The institutions of the United Nations were gradually taking on a coherent form, but as yet the procedure had not become fixed and formalised, allowing Lemkin considerable leeway as a private individual campaigner and lobbyist. A few years later it is doubtful whether the same opportunities would have been available to a private individual. As John Humphrey the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations observed about Lemkin ‘Never in the history of the United Nations had one private individual conducted such a lobby. He could be seen everywhere in the committee-rooms and, by common consent, was accorded privileges denied to other private individuals’.10 To begin with Lemkin ‘hung around the press room at Lake Success, prowled the corridors, and within a few weeks was on speaking terms with almost every delegate’.11 Describing the atmosphere in the Delegates’ Lounge of the United Nations, Lemkin sensed that ‘Statesmen felt as if they owed an apology for the holocaust,[and for] past follies ... There was an accumulation of constructive energies, which always follow in international life a destructive period [sic].
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If there was not open enthusiasm, one could notice a latent open mindedness about humanitarian issues.’12 Taking the view that it would be futile to approach one of the great powers for help because their bureaucracies had made policy decisions well in advance of the first General Assembly meeting, Lemkin decided to ask a small nation to place a resolution against genocide on the agenda. Lemkin met Professor Frede Castberg, the Norwegian delegate and an international lawyer, who advised him that it would be necessary for him to approach another delegation to sponsor his resolution because he could not obtain instructions from his government in time. Norway, however, would support his proposal for the resolution against genocide being added to the agenda.13 Later Lemkin sat down on a comfortable sofa in the Delegates’ Lounge in the UN to draft a resolution, asking the world body to study genocide with the aim of making it into an international crime. Although a private individual without any government backing, he availed himself of the UN’s secretarial facilities to have the document mimeographed to augment the supply of copies. A young man from Ecuador, who worked in the Secretariat of the United Nations, informed him about the solidarity of the Latin American delegations, who formed a significant group of states. Lemkin’s shrewd tactic was to win the approval of delegates from the smaller South American states, thereby drawing the support of the larger entities in their wake. First he approached Dr Ricardo Alfaro, a former President of Panama and international lawyer, who was head of his country’s delegation with copies of his book on Axis Rule in Occupied Europe and his recent article in the American Scholar to supply him with background material about the resolution which he was asking him to sponsor. Having asked for 24 hours to study the material, Alfaro came back the next day and signed the resolution, wishing Lemkin good luck. Then Lemkin went to speak to the delegate from Cuba, another of the smaller South American states, who was amenable and likewise signed the resolution.14 This was important, as the decision of these two South American delegations to support the resolution would draw a powerful block of South American states behind it, some twenty out of fifty-one states comprising the United Nations, although another four states joined the world body in the course of 1946. Raphael Lemkin’s plan was next to win over the Indian delegation, thereby gaining the adherence of the surrounding Asian powers. With both the South American and Asian states arrayed solidly behind him, Lemkin thought that the European states would have to support his resolution ‘after the recent holocaust’.15 These words were in a passage deleted by Lemkin from his memoirs, but it seems clear from this section and a passage quoted above that Lemkin kept on returning to the murder of six million Jews, and perhaps to the wider Polish tragedy in his thoughts and that this was the factor motivating him to place the resolution against genocide on the UN General Assembly agenda rather than a general feeling of disquiet at past
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massacres in history. During the late 1940s, Lemkin thought about the fate of the Jews in the Second World War in terms of numbers slaughtered and was not using any shorthand concepts such as holocaust, which he was to do a few years later. Lemkin renewed his friendship with Mrs Corbett Ashby (Dame Margery Irene Corbett Ashby 1882–1981), an influential voice in the women’s international peace movement since her involvement with the League of Nations, whom he caught sight of in the Delegates’ Lounge at the United Nations. She introduced him to Mrs Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister and head of the Indian delegation. Lemkin explained his formula for protecting the ‘unity of mankind in diversity’ to her and Mr Supon, a former judge and MP, carefully tailoring his message to suit his audience and adding that every nation had a role in enriching the culture of mankind. ‘We in India live by this principle,’ Mr Supon agreed, ‘We are many races and creeds. Still we have the concept of oneness. Our philosophers preached it, Gandhi worked for it. I will be glad to propose that our delegation act as one of the sponsors.’ As soon as Mrs Pandit signed the resolution against genocide, Lemkin raced to the Secretary-General’s office on 5 November with two hours left to deposit it, having secured the necessary three sponsors.16 After this successful foray, Lemkin hurried to Washington, where he asked for two months unpaid leave from the War Department to push his campaign for a genocide resolution at the United Nations. Deprived of his salary, Lemkin vacated his comfortable quarters of the Wardman Park Hotel in Washington and moved to a shabby room at 102nd Street in Manhattan, New York at a rent of $25 a month to facilitate his lobbying activities.17 Having cultivated the friendship of Eugene Meyer and Alan Barth of the Washington Post, Lemkin turned his attention to the New York newspapers. He visited the offices of the New York Times, where Otto Tolischus promised his support for the campaign to secure a genocide resolution at the United Nations, and he also lobbied the editorial staff of the New York Herald Tribune.18 But most of Lemkin’s efforts were concentrated on the daily lobbying of the United Nations correspondents of the American press, who were based at the United Nations headquarters at Lake Success. John Hohenberg of the New York Post working in his room at Lake Success was interrupted by a stranger. He was preparing an assignment for a deadline in next day’s paper. This was his first encounter with Lemkin, who stood some 5 feet 9 and a half inches in height with greying hair and blue eyes which were slightly myopic behind his glasses. ‘The stranger, after all, seemed harmless enough ... in a well-worn double-breasted suit, scuffed black shoes, and a dark necktie askew against a none-too-clean white shirt collar ... He had a thick accent, but he spoke English with emphasis and deliberation ... “You and I, we must change the world” ’, he declared, ‘To change the world’, Hohenberg retorted, ‘you must see The New York Times’.19
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Eventually through persistence Hohenberg was won over by Lemkin and he prepared the first of many stories on the issue of genocide for the New York Post, and after several weeks Raphael Lemkin was able to exhibit a small bundle of clippings that he kept with his daily sandwich in his battered black briefcase. Although most of the professional diplomats long since had given up on him as an unmitigated nuisance, our ‘unofficial man’ became a rather special person in the press section.20 So too, Kathleen Telsch remembered how ‘Correspondents on deadline used to run from him [Lemkin] like mad’, and another New York Times reporter A.M. Rosenthal recalled that whenever he met him, Lemkin would ruefully announce himself, saying ‘Here is that pest Lemkin ... I have a genocide story for you’.21 The draft resolution on the crime of genocide was couched by Lemkin in general terms and deliberately severed from any connection with the catastrophe that had befallen the Jews in order to win wider acceptance among delegates at the United Nations. Its rarefied language and abstract phraseology imbued it with a timeless element and won it diverse supporters. All Lemkin’s familiar themes were rehearsed in the preamble – the comparison of genocide with homicide, the loss to world culture when a human group was extinguished, and the many instances of genocide ‘when national, racial, ethnical or religious groups’ were destroyed ‘entirely or in part’. In his original draft Lemkin referred to both ‘national’ and ‘ethnical’ groups, but when the resolution came before the United Nations’ Legal Committee political groups were substituted for them.22 The draft resolution went on to state that the General Assembly invites the Social and Economic Council to study this problem [of the crime of genocide] and to prepare a report on the possibilities of declaring genocide an International Crime and assuring international cooperation for its prevention and punishment and also recommending ... that genocide and related offenses should be dealt with by National Legislations in the same way as other international crimes such as piracy, trade in women, children and slaves, and others.23 Lemkin was convinced that the United States because of its past stand against the persecution of minorities should be the power that proposed to the Steering Committee of the General Assembly that genocide should be added to the current agenda. To achieve this goal, Lemkin conferred with Dr Alfaro, the representative of Panama, who set up a meeting between him and Ambassador Austin, the head of the United States delegation. By good fortune, Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas happened to be a member of the United States delegation.24 She was an outstandingly beautiful woman,
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always surrounded by a coterie of male admirers and a riveting speaker on civil rights, and the genocide resolution was an attractive cause for her.25 Douglas introduced him to Adlai Stevenson, who was adviser to the American delegation, and Lemkin broached to him the subject of American assistance for launching his proposed resolution at the United Nations as well as plying him with background literature. When Lemkin discussed the matter the next day with Stevenson, the latter said that he ‘hoped that the United States would propose the inclusion of the Genocide proposal in the agenda’.26 Again, the intervention of Mrs Corbett Ashby proved crucial to the success of Lemkin’s campaign. Throughout 1946, the struggle between Russia and the Western powers intensified. The Communists set up the International Democratic Women’s Federation with many millions of members in an attempt to dominate the discussion of issues concerning women at the United Nations. As a countermeasure, Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt and the leaders of 19 national women’s associations in the United States organized an International Assembly of Women outside New York from 12 to 22 October 1946. In a convivial atmosphere, women leaders were asked to discuss ways of assisting the programme planned for the forthcoming United Nations meeting.27 Among the British delegates to the International Assembly of Women was Mrs Corbett Ashby, an influential voice in the moderate International Alliance of Women Voters. She seems to have been working closely with Lemkin and interested the leaders of women’s international organizations in the issue of genocide. Lemkin was introduced to Francis Perkins, the head of the Civil Service Commission in the Roosevelt Administration, and Dr Hannah Rydh, a Swedish archaeologist and President of the World Women’s Alliance. After Lemkin addressed a group of women delegates whose countries had been occupied by the Nazis during the War, two Czechoslovakian women, the Deputy Mayor of Prague, Mrs Pelantova, and a young resistance fighter, spoke, vividly describing how they had been tortured during the German occupation of their country. The meeting decided to send one woman from each country to lobby the United Nations delegation from their own country to win support for the resolution against genocide. A few days later Lemkin, who was monitoring the mood of the delegates at the United Nations, noticed an appreciable upsurge of support among them for his proposals.28 At last the Steering Committee of the General Assembly met. It consisted of the President and Vice-President of the Assembly together with the six chairman of the individual committees of the United Nations. A South American delegate from Panama was acting as Chairman of the Sixth Committee (otherwise known as the Legal Committee), which would consider the draft resolution; after sounding out friendly chairmen of the other committees he told Lemkin that he was hopeful about the outcome of their deliberations. When the subject of genocide was considered, Adlai Stevenson for the United States proposed the inclusion of genocide in the agenda. The
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USSR unexpectedly opposed this, but this was symptomatic of the growing tension between Russia and the Western powers. As the majority of delegates supported the inclusion of the item on the agenda, it was adopted.29 To mollify the Soviet Union and to persuade it to drop its opposition to the genocide resolution, Lemkin approached Jan Masaryk, the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, pleading with him to intercede with the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, Andrei Vishinsky. What was the reason for Russian intransigence? Partly it was a personal vendetta. During the 1930s, Vishinsky had written the preface to a pamphlet called ‘Counter-revolutionary Intervention Through Criminal Law’, in which he denounced Lemkin’s concept of barbarity as a subterfuge to allow the capitalist world to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.30 But partly Soviet opposition was influenced by wider international issues. Between 1941 and 1944 Russian troops deported 1,500,000 people belonging to smaller nationalities from the Crimea and the Northern Caucasus, including the Chechens, on grounds of their alleged collaboration with the Germans, causing the death of a third of the deportees during the first harsh year.31 Rumours abounded in the corridors of the Nuremberg Tribunal about these Russian deportations, possibly making the Soviet Union wary of taking up the issue of genocide.32 As Lemkin noted in his memoirs, which constantly returned to the theme of the mass killing of Jews and by implication to the fate of his own parents, ‘It was still 1946, a little more than one year after Hitler’s ovens, and a little more than one month after the Nuremberg judgement.’33 Until the 1950s, there was no convenient shorthand phrase, such as ‘Holocaust’, which had passed into common parlance to describe the attempt to exterminate the Jews; partly because of this and partly because it was not a central concern of the Nuremberg Tribunal, consciousness of this event was rapidly fading from the public scene. Thus Lemkin had to move quickly and deftly to counter potential opposition from the Russians, as there was no certain groundswell of support for his ideas. He was conversant with the writings of Thomas Masaryk, the founder of the modern Czechoslovakian state and Jan’s father, who had tried to delineate the cultural personality of nations, and when he spoke to Jan Masaryk, he put forward one of his stock arguments of a nation through its culture surviving the death of its individual members.34 Jan Masaryk was not only sympathetic to schemes designed to protect minorities but was like his father a supporter of Zionism, concluding a lecture in 1943 to the Jewish Historical Society of England with these words: You Jews, we Czechoslovaks need and deserve security – economic security, political security, religious security. The future of Europe, nay, of the world, depends on that. May it please God that this gift, kept from the Czechoslovaks for a long time and from the Jews for a still infinitely longer time, will become our common denominator.35
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Lemkin asked Masaryk to convey a message to the Russians: ‘Both you and Vishinsky have a sense of humour. Why not tell him that penicillin is not an intrigue against the Soviet Union?’ and nor is the genocide resolution. Fortunately this approach worked, so much so that Vishinsky made speeches in support of the genocide resolution and voted in favour of it in contrast with Russian obduracy over the Declaration of Human Rights.36 After this success, Lemkin turned his attention to the delegates on the Legal Committee, supplying them with copies of his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, his article in the American Scholar and a pamphlet in French. Having given copies to Alexandre Parodi of the French Foreign Ministry and Professor Henri Chaumont, the French delegate, Lemkin was told the next day by Parodi that the French delegation viewed his proposal favourably. Lemkin also saw Philip Noel-Baker, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, who had read his book when it first appeared and shared his viewpoint. More importantly, Lemkin had lunch with Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney-General and the British delegate, whom as we have seen introduced the concept of genocide in his closing address to the Nuremberg Tribunal, and took this opportunity of plying him with his ideas, as is apparent from Sir Hartley’s subsequent address to the Legal Committee.37 Shawcross asserted that The United Nations had clearly to state at once that aggressive war and genocide constituted punishable crimes ... during the fifth International Conference for the Unification of Criminal Law, held in 1933, a proposal to punish crimes now included under the heading of genocide had been defeated. Since then, six million human beings had been coldly and deliberately exterminated with a view to destroying the Jewish race. It had not been possible to punish that crime, since such proceedings would have involved the application of ex post facto legislation. The situation must be prevented from recurring [Here he relied on the authority of Grotius and Westlake] ... it was necessary ... that international law should limit the omnipotence of certain States over their citizens and in certain cases protect them against their own government ... International conventions should be concluded; but the public denunciation of this crime would have to take place immediately.38 The whole address closely reflected Lemkin’s own thoughts at this time and is a rare instance where a public figure dwelt on the mass extermination of Jews. Professor Ernesto Dihigo, the Cuban delegate on the Committee, introduced the resolution on genocide with flair, and was well supported by Justice Chagla of India, the other state co-sponsoring the resolution. Reporting back to the Foreign Office in London, Eric Beckett mentioned that on 22 November 1946 Shawcross ‘moved amendment to replace operative clause which declares “that genocide level of international crime for commission of which principals and accessories as well as States are individually responsible” ’.
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Beckett continued that France on ground that States could not have criminal responsibility moved to read ‘principals and accessories be they private persons or statesmen’. Beckett ended by stating that U.S.S.R. favoured reference to ... [Economic and Social Committee]. United States which had earlier put in a resolution for ‘formulation of principles of charter of Nuremberg’ and Poland did not speak before the meeting was adjourned but favoured referring subject to codification sub-committee and latter will probably move in this sense at the next meeting39 Later the British delegate, McKinnon Wood, tried to delay matters, by arguing that the genocide resolution should be referred to the United Nations committee which was considering proposals from the United States for the codification of the principles of the Nuremberg Judgment.40 For the American Judge Biddle, who had served on the judicial panel at the Nuremberg Tribunal, had approached President Truman and asked him to ensure that the United Nations adopted the principles of the Nuremberg judgment and defined what constituted planning or waging an aggressive war. As a result, on 11 December 1946 the General Assembly confirmed resolution 95(1) which called for the ‘formulation, in the context of a general codification of offences against peace and security of mankind or of an international criminal code, of the principles recognised in the Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal.’41 Within the State Department and the Foreign Office in Britain, there was strong opposition to Judge Biddle’s plans. Patrick Dean of the British Embassy in Washington, who had been deeply involved in the arrangements for setting up the Nuremberg Tribunal, had lunch with Robert Jackson, the Chief American Prosecutor at the trial, and agreed with him that Biddle’s scheme was unfeasible. First, the judgment concerning the Major War Criminals at Nuremberg was not unanimous and to have it adopted by the United Nations ‘might well mean that the Russians or some of their stooges would start to cast doubt on those portions of the judgment with which they disagreed.’ Second, even if the United Nations adopted the Nuremberg judgment, this would not necessarily be advantageous: The findings of the Nuremberg Tribunal are an example of Case Law, founded on an international agreement framed in wide language, and it would be better in present circumstances to leave the findings as to aggressive war and crimes against humanity on that basis. Any attempt to define the exact limits of the Nuremberg judgment by further international agreement would tend to sterilise the doctrines laid down at Nuremberg, and this would lead to other intending aggressors finding a way round the judgment as crystallized in some U.N.O. resolution or other international agreement.
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In a later letter on 6 December 1946 to Shawcross, enclosing his report on his lunch with Jackson, Dean added that the American proposal ‘was that the charter of the Nuremberg Court, rather than the judgment, should be adopted by the U.N.O.’ and that this was an improvement because the Charter was more consistent and framed in wider terms than the judgment.42 In the end it was agreed that a sub-committee of the Legal Committee should be set up to prepare the draft of the resolution against genocide. A South American, Ambassador Gajardo of Chile was chosen as chairman, while Charles Fahy (1892–1979), a former Solicitor-General and the United States delegate, acted as rapporteur and assumed leadership of the subcommittee. Judge Riad Bey, the delegate for Saudi Arabia, had sought out Lemkin in the delegates’ lounge to enthuse about his book and to congratulate him on his concept of genocide. Within the sub-committee according to Lemkin an attempt was made to delete the term genocide and substitute the word extermination for it. As a member of the sub-committee, Judge Riad pleaded for the retention of the term genocide, declaring that ‘A term is progress. This term describes action “cide”, to destroy – and describes the subject which is destroyed “the genos”. Extermination can refer also to insects or to animals. Extermination ... would limit the concept in scope and modality of action.’43 If the report of the sub-committee is examined, there is nothing in it about this episode. Possibly it was air-brushed out of the report, possibly it was an attempt by Lemkin to add drama to an otherwise humdrum story. As redrafted, the resolution stated that genocide was contrary to the moral law and was a crime in international law for the commission of which principals and accomplices were punishable; it also called on member states to adopt the necessary legislation against the crime. Genocide was specified as a crime whether ‘committed religious, racial, political or any other grounds’. Unlike Lemkin’s earlier draft, the resolution adopted by the subcommittee included political groups because of an intervention ‘by the British delegation at a very late hour of a tiresome genocide meeting in Lake Success’; at the same time, the categories of national and ethnical groups were omitted from the resolution, probably at the insistence of the British delegation.44 After some discussion, it was agreed that there ‘should be early action’ and that the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations should be invited to prepare a draft convention on genocide for the next session of the General Assembly, without the assistance of other committees, as this would have caused delay.45 Having passed the resolution which affirmed the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the General Assembly on the same day, 11 December 1946, went on to adopt resolution 96(1) which declared that genocide was a crime under international law. On the surface, Lemkin’s success seemed complete but in reality the resolution was in part a careful manoeuvre
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conducted by Sir Harley Shawcross to take the heat out of the issue. So long as a genocide resolution couched in vague language was confirmed, its supporters would be satisfied and pressure to pass a convention would abate and the measure could be kicked out of sight. To Lemkin, the groundwork for his scheme had been prepared by ‘a mixture of blood and tears of millions of innocent people throughout the ages and of the last few years. Among them were also the tears of my parents and friends.’46 Even so, Lemkin had made significant progress in his campaign, by enlisting the enthusiastic support of many outstanding leaders in international women’s organizations as well as that of the American press at so early a stage. Without their help, his attempt to secure a genocide resolution would have faltered at the first hurdle. He had cultivated the interest of Charles Fahy, an important voice in the State Department, in his cause and, as we shall see, was soon receiving American diplomatic backing for his campaign.
6 1947, The First Draft of the Convention
After his success with the genocide resolution, Lemkin had returned to his office in the War Department in Washington, but by the middle of 1947 he decided that if his efforts were going to produce an international treaty banning genocide, he would have to relocate to New York to be at the centre of the struggle at Lake Success. He, therefore, resigned his position, moved back into accommodation in New York and lived off the largesse of his friends and his own inadequate savings. During 1947 and the early months of 1948 there were three interwoven strands to Lemkin’s life: his pivotal role in the preliminary drafting of the genocide convention and the ever widening campaign for an international treaty assisted as it was by the support from international Jewish organizations, the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations, and American Church groups; a brief tortured relationship with Gertrude Sladek; and his endless correspondence to ensure that his brother Elias and his family could leave Germany for a new life in Canada. I shall focus on Raphael Lemkin’s public career in this chapter, leaving details of his private life to the following one. Lemkin now took his first hesitant and tentative steps to organize a worldwide campaign for a genocide convention. As yet there was no institutional movement for such a campaign and he did everything on a short-term basis, taking such action as he deemed to be appropriate. Lemkin played a critical role in the commission of three experts appointed by the United Nations to draft a genocide convention, persuading the other experts to accept the concept of physical genocide and to allow the General Assembly to decide the question of cultural genocide. His most clever move in the campaign for a convention was to enlist the active assistance of Charles Fahy, an influential State Department adviser, whom he had met when Fahy was taking the lead in the sub-committee considering the draft genocide resolution. With Fahy’s help the State Department and in turn the United States government was swung behind the campaign, thereby overwhelming the efforts of the British and the Russians to stifle the convention at birth. Throughout 1947, Lemkin relied heavily on the intervention of the World Jewish Congress on his behalf 88
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and at other times on the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the Alliance Israelite. They helped to rout the remaining pockets of resistance to the convention in France and to build ties to Eastern bloc countries, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, thereby weakening Soviet opposition. He also grew closer to James Rosenberg of the American Conference of Christians and Jews in the autumn of 1947, using that organization to try and overcome British obstruction and as a way of reigniting his floundering campaign. International women’s organizations also assisted. By garnering fresh sources of support at the United Nations, after intensive lobbying of delegates, Lemkin almost single-handedly was able to counter the opposition of Arab delegates to the convention. Even so, only by a Herculean effort and audaciousness was Lemkin able to force a new vote on the General Assembly, when it passed a resolution to bury the convention at the behest of the British and Russian delegations. On 25 February 1947, Raphael Lemkin telephoned the State Department to ascertain the position of the United States on the genocide resolution which was an item on the agenda of the Economic and Social Council. Lemkin said he understood that the State Department ‘wanted to refer the genocide resolution to the Human Rights Commission’. Carl Marcy answered that such a reference seemed to me to be logical since genocide seemed intimately related to the subjects considered by the Human Rights Commission. Mr Lemkin said he was afraid that genocide will get involved in the political maneuverings in connection with human rights and would be lost ... Mr Lemkin then said he understood that Mr Fahy wanted to have a special committee to handle the subject of genocide.1 This was the first of a number of occasions in 1947, when Charles Fahy’s intervention within the State Department was crucial. Charles Fahy (1892–1979) had served as Solicitor General during 1941–1945. After a stint as director of the legal division of the United States Group Control Council in Germany after the Second World War, he returned to Washington as a legal adviser in the State Department and was a political heavyweight. As a radically inclined labour lawyer, he was receptive to Lemkin’s arguments. On 28 March 1947, the Economic and Social Council, a principal organ of the United Nations, directed the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, to draw up a draft convention with the assistance of experts in international law in accordance with the resolution passed by the General Assembly in December. In May 1947 Lie invited Lemkin together with with two other international lawyers, Professor Donnedieu de Vabres from France and Professor Vespasian Pella from Romania, to prepare a draft of the convention.2 Both de Vabres, a professor at the Sorbonne and a judge, who had served on the Nuremberg Tribunal and Pella, the President of the International Penal Law Association, were distinguished in their field. Described as ‘aging ... with sparse hair, dark horn-rimmed
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glasses, and a heavy walrus mustache’, Judge de Vabres was inclined to be reticent but when he occasionally intervened in the Nuremberg proceedings his comments were incisive. Having invented the concept of genocide and having thought about its history and its implications in international law more deeply, Lemkin it was said aroused the envy and antagonism of his older colleagues and their relationship was not a harmonious one.3 As far as Vespasion Pella was concerned, this was not an altogether accurate assessment, as in a letter to Lemkin dated 15 December 1947, he still referred to him as ‘my dear friend’, and in a later letter he drew his attention to the fact that he had launched Lemkin in the international arena during the 1930s and that he had favoured Lemkin’s proposals for the repression of genocide on the national and international plane when they worked together as experts for the UN. Furthermore, despite strong opposition from certain members at the conference of the Association de Droit Pénal in July 1947, he had pushed Lemkin’s ideas to the fore.4 On the other hand, despite the support of the French government for the genocide cause Lemkin told an acquaintance in August 1947 that Professor Donnedieu de Vabres ‘does not share this opinion for reasons that are personal to him’, and by the summer the antagonism between the two men seems to have hardened.5 All three men, however, considered the preliminary draft of their report with some other experts, including Professor John Humphrey of the United Nations Human Rights Division. Although the Secretary-General was meant to obtain the comments of the Committee on the Codification of International Law and the Human Rights Commission on the draft convention (document E/447), it was not possible to do so within a short time frame; nor was it possible to submit copies of the draft convention to member states for their comments until 26 June 1947, so that their replies would not become available until the latter part of the session of the Economic and Social Council. In turn the Council would not have enough time to submit the convention to the General Assembly for their approval towards the end of the year.6 In fact, these delays were jeopardizing the whole timetable for the rapid implementation of the convention. On what points in the first draft of the convention did Lemkin clash with his colleagues? Following the provisions of the December 1946 resolution, the purpose of the draft genocide convention was defined as preventing the destruction of racial, national, linguistic, religious or political groups. Lemkin distinguished between ‘ “physical” genocide (destruction of individuals), “biological” genocide (prevention of births) and “cultural” (brutal destruction of the specific characteristics of a group)’. While Professors de Vabres and Pella accepted that there was physical and biological genocide, they were more sceptical about the concept of cultural genocide, stating that the General Assembly should decide this point.7 While Lemkin’s colleagues wanted political groups to be protected by the convention, he reiterated his doubts about whether their inclusion was justified in his letter to Sir Hartley
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Shawcross of 8 July 1947. To his colleagues, ‘He pointed out ... that political groups have not the permanency and the specific characteristics of the other groups referred to and ... that the Convention on Genocide being of general interest, it should not run the risk of failure by introducing ideas on which the world is deeply divided’. Moreover, ‘the human groups most likely to suffer from genocide as history has shown, are racial, national and religious groups’. Professor de Vabres opposed this, stating that ‘genocide was an odious crime, regardless of the group which fell victim to it and that the exclusion of political groups might be regarded as justifying genocide in the case of such groups’. Professor Pella thought that the Assembly should decide this question, but even if political groups were protected this cover should not be extended to Nazi or fascist organizations. This was a more difficult matter than Pella admitted because the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet bloc could easily denounce liberal political parties as having fascist tendencies and then persecute their adherents.8 There was a sharp disagreement between Lemkin and the two other experts on the necessity for including cultural genocide in the convention. ‘Professor Donnedieu de Vabres and Professor Pella held that cultural genocide represented an undue extension of the notion of genocide and amounted to reconstituting the former protection of minorities (which was based on other conceptions) under cover of the term genocide’. Lemkin held a contrary opinion, arguing that ‘a racial, national, or religious’ group’s right to existence was justified not only from the moral point of view, but also from the point of view of the value of the contribution made by such a group to civilization generally. If the diversity of cultures were destroyed, it would be as disastrous for civilization as the physical destruction of nations. He added that means of cultural genocide were criminal acts under municipal law and hence there was no reason why they should not be included in the international crime of genocide. Lemkin stated that ‘cultural genocide was much more than just a policy of forced assimilation by moderate coercion’; it was achieved by the involuntary transfer of children from one group to another, by the destruction of a nation’s intelligentsia, by the prohibition of the use of a national language in private conversation, and by the burning of books and the destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses.9 Lemkin’s views on the crucial role of culture were deeply influenced by his familiarity with the theories of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), something that he acquired in his student days, when he was training as a philologist, and were reinforced by his immersion in books written by Simon Dubnov and the Austrian Social Democratic politician and legal thinker Karl Renner (1870–1950). Herder claimed that ‘cultures are comparable but not
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commensurable; each is what it is, of literally inestimable value in its own society, and consequently to humanity as a whole’. Moreover, Herder stressed ‘the value of belonging to a group or culture, which for Herder at least is not political, and is indeed, to some degree, anti-political, different from, and even opposed to, nationalism’.10 Lemkin was to continue repeating these two themes, by emphasizing the uniqueness of cultures, their need for protection, and by downgrading the importance of the political realm. Hence his lastditch fight to protect his concept of cultural genocide, and his flexibility as regards omitting political groups from the convention. But probably Lemkin owed the greatest intellectual debt to Simon Dubnov, whose ideas underpinned Lemkin’s own beliefs, particularly as regards cultural genocide. Dubnov asserted that the source of vitality for the Jewish people consists in this – that this people, after it passed through the stages of tribal nationalism, ancient culture and political territory, was able to establish itself and fortify itself in the highest stage – the spiritual and historical-cultural, and it succeeded in crystallizing itself as a spiritual people that draws the sap of its existence from the natural or intellectual ‘will to live’. All this only because in the play of forces that sustained Jewish nationalism those elements not dependent on territory counted more then those dependent on territory. In the measure that the positive political factors declined, the spiritual factors increased in importance. Dubnov’s basic concept was that the extra-territorial Jewish people must build its life within the given framework, i.e. in the Diaspora. According to his fundamental theoretical premiss, there is no need to provide a territorial basis for national existence; and the problem of the Diaspora is one of finding a way to safeguard the people’s spiritual-creative powers, or, even less, to preserve its cultural independence as a spiritual-historical entity.11 Further, Dubnov contended that The difference between Palestine and the Diaspora will be quantitative and qualitative. In Palestine there will be a none too numerous minority of the Jewish people that will be distinguished by a richer and more complete national culture, while the Diaspora will be weaker but will make up in quantity for quality. A Jew has the right to participate in the civic life of his country in which he dwells, but he could also say ‘I have the right to speak my language, to make it the language of instruction in my schools, to order my internal life in my communities and to create institutions serving a variety of national purposes; to join in the common activities
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with my brethren not only in this country, but in all the countries of the world’. Dubnov awarded primacy to Hebrew over Yiddish as the language of the Jewish people, while recognizing the importance of the latter.12 As a vehicle for implementing his ideas on Jewish cultural autonomy in the Diaspora, Dubnov and a group of friends formed the Folkspartay which had a liberal political orientation. Of lesser significance as an influence on Lemkin’s thinking, despite his effusive comments, was Karl Renner. ‘Your books on the importance of national groups as being apart from States has inspired my work for many years, and finally led me to initiate the action to outlaw genocide’, Lemkin informed Karl Renner, who was now President of the Austrian Republic. He continued, In my efforts to convince the members of the United Nations to adopt the Genocide Treaty, I used your arguments about the universal cultural value of national groups, and about their significance as contributing factors to world civilization. I argued that if the Greeks were exterminated before they gave to the world Socrates and Plato, if the Jews before they gave to the world the Bible, and the French were obliterated before they produced their great literature and political philosophy, the world would have been deprived of these treasures.13 Within the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian empire, Renner had ‘envisaged the concept of nationality as “a union of similar thinking and similarly speaking persons”, irrespective of where they live’, a view which the Jewish Bundists in pre-War Poland found attractive. Schooling, art and literature belong to the nations. However, as general education itself is an essential precondition of material culture, the state determines at all levels of schooling the minimum of education that the nations have to guarantee. At the same time, the state guarantees the poorer, undeveloped nations the means to provide this minimum.14 Thus Lemkin’s thinking and that of the Jewish national cultural autonomists, particularly that of their leading ideologist Dubnov, converged, with Lemkin adapting this creed so as to make it universally applicable to all ethnic groups. Vespasian Pella had been campaigning for an international criminal court since 1928, publishing his Plan for a World Criminal Code in 1933. Whereas Professor Pella and his colleague de Vabres were thus in favour of a permanent international criminal court, Lemkin thought that the establishment of such a court should be omitted from the convention, as there was a danger that
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persons of lesser importance would escape punishment because of the use of complicated procedural rules by such a court. His colleague, Professor de Vabres, contended that rulers should be tried by the permanent international criminal court, while lesser officials should be tried by local criminal courts. Lemkin declared that in the absence of a sufficiently developed international criminal law, the setting up of such a court was premature.15 During the summer of 1947, Lemkin moved in with Laser and Mary Lowenstein, friends he had made in Kaunas, who were living in an apartment at 290 Riverside Drive, New York.16 Desperately short of funds, Lemkin needed to stay with these friends to relax and recuperate, as he was suffering from high blood pressure brought on by his recent exertions at the United Nations. His plans were crystallizing, and he had definitely decided to stay in New York, where he could effectively carry on his lobbying activities at Lake Success, and had informed his landlady in Washington, Mrs Alpar, through a friend that he was vacating his room there on 1 July.17 Within Britain opinion hardened against the implementation of a genocide convention. On 26 February 1947 Eric Beckett (1896–1966), the principal legal adviser to the Foreign Office, observed that This Assembly resolution on genocide is a useless resolution, and I think our attitude to it generally must be that we should not mind if it got lost somewhere and died a natural death, and at the most we do not want much time and expense being wasted in drawing up a perfectly useless convention. It is all a complete waste of time, seeing that, if genocide takes place anywhere, it will take place under conditions where no international convention will be observed18 When instructions were dispatched by the Foreign Office to the British delegation at the United Nations in New York a few weeks later, they were told that ‘We should be glad to see the item lost sight of and therefore see some advantage in suggestion of China that the Secretariat should prepare a first draft, and that this draft should be referred to Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination.’19 Conferring as he did on a regular basis with the representatives of many nations in the Delegates’ Lounge of the United Nations, Lemkin’s antennae soon picked up the negative noises emanating from the United Kingdom delegation. Still grateful for Sir Hartley Shawcross’s address supporting the genocide resolution at the United Nations on 22 November 1946, Lemkin was unaware that his support was heavily qualified and on 8 July 1947 appealed in vain to Shawcross, whom he thought would persuade his government to act more sympathetically. ‘I hear that some lawyers in England’, Lemkin wrote, would like to wait with the genocide convention until all possible crimes of any international significance are codified in an international criminal
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code or otherwise. But such work will take decades ... Throughout history the main attacks were directed against religious, racial and national groups. They have no protection now. There are no more minority treaties. The framers of the International Bill of Rights do not foresee any practical possibility of enforcement of such rights on an international scale ... We can now do constructive work on genocide, because it is essentially an ethnico-cultural concept. The political groups do not belong here organically and if some governments will prefer to omit them, then we still have very much to protect. I feel that if we will not have the Convention on genocide this year we might not have it for many years because the political situation is deteriorating ... Sir Hartley, now like in autumn 1946 so much depends on you. The enemies of the Convention will never dare to attack frontally. The way to kill a real thing is to send it to committees for study.20 Unfortunately Lemkin had completely misconstrued Shawcross’s position on the genocide convention which was one of outright opposition. He had not realized what was left unsaid by Shawcross in his speech to the United Nations on 22 November 1946 that the British politician’s support was strictly limited. This becomes clear from Shawcross’s letter to Eric Beckett of 21 July 1947, asking him for assistance in replying to Lemkin. He [the latter] is rather a bore and has got a bee in his bonnet about genocide, which, as you know, he raised at the General Assembly. I thought myself that it would be quite impracticable and valueless to have an international convention on genocide, and that the simplest course would be to have a resolution at the Assembly declaring that genocide is an international crime. This ... would have been at least as useful as any convention would be likely to be ... I do not myself altogether share the view which Professor Brierly has rather indicated, that the question of the Nuremberg decision and genocide are matters that cannot be dealt with in a hurry. My own feeling is that they must either be dealt with in a hurry by adopting merely declaratory resolutions to the effect that the Nuremberg decision represents the existing law and that genocide is an international crime, or they will not be dealt with at all.21 On 13 June 1947, the Secretariat draft was sent to the Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification for its comments. Professor Brierly, reiterating Britain’s negative attitude drafted a resolution that the committee should decline to reply to the request. As a compromise, the Secretary-General was told that they had no comments to make because member governments had not answered them.22 At the same time, Dr Everitt R. Clinchy, President of the National Conference of Christians and Jews in the United States, visited Britain in July 1947 and
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had a meeting with Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, in an attempt to bypass Shawcross’s obstructionism on the genocide issue, but his meeting with Bevin was fruitless because the Foreign Office legal advisers all shared Shawcross’s views.23 Throughout the summer of 1947 the conflict between the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine was escalating and the British while referring the matter to the United Nations hoped that the issue would be passed back to them in order to allow them to impose their own solution. A committee, UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), was despatched by the General Assembly to investigate the problem. In July 1947 the British navy apprehended the Exodus, a ship packed with 4,500 Jewish refugees, outside Palestinian territorial waters with the intention of repatriating them to Europe. When the refugees were sent to internment camps in Germany by the British, the move backfired. But the protracted three months struggle between the Zionists and the British over the fate of the refugees on the Exodus and the deepening clash between Jews and Arabs in Palestine only served to complicate matters as far as the genocide convention was concerned.24 Certain Arab states began to obstruct the passing of the genocide convention because it was seen as an instrument assisting the Zionist cause, while Jewish lobby groups felt constrained by the crisis. Thus, Maurice Perlzweig of the World Jewish Congress advised Lemkin that he had been unable to do anything of importance in England. The unhappy Exodus incident formed the substance of all my conversations, which included the visit made by Easterman and myself to the Under Secretary of State, and it would have weakened the importance of the Convention to have dragged in a reference to it after rather tense discussions of the Palestine situation.25 During 1947, the World Jewish Congress was one of Lemkin’s main sources of support; it was a federal body which comprised Jewish communities and Jewish organizations in 57 countries. There was considerable turf warfare between it and the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations, of which the AJC and the Alliance Israelite were members, to represent world Jewry before the United Nations.26 A meeting was arranged between a sub-committee of the World Jewish Congress and Raphael Lemkin on 24 June 1947 to discuss the tactics to be adopted for the forthcoming meeting of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on the genocide convention.27 The WJC later claimed after speaking to Lemkin that After careful consideration and inquiry we have come to the conclusion that one of the major reasons for delay has been the inclusion of ‘political groups’ in Article 1, Paragraph 1 [of the draft convention]. This was a later addition to the original draft, and its inclusion has given rise to
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controversy which may wreck the whole project ... We therefore urge you, in your discussion with officials of your Government, to draw attention to the desirability of omitting ‘political groups’ in order to eliminate controversy and ensure speedier action.28 Likewise the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations in a memorandum to the UN also proposed that political groups should be omitted from the convention.29 In particular, the Soviet Union was opposed to the inclusion of political groups in the draft convention. During a visit to Geneva, Maurice Perlzweig saw Jan Masaryk, the Czech Foreign Minister and a friend of long standing, and urged him to use his influence with the East European Governments to prevent them from wrecking the prospects of the Convention because of the unfortunate inclusion of a reference to political groups. I told him that we were trying to do what we could to induce the Western Nations to agree to the excision of this reference, and we were counting on Czechoslovakia to act as a bridge between the two groups. He assured me in the warmest terms that he was in full sympathy with the purposes of the Convention and would give instructions along the lines I suggested as soon as he returned to Prague.30 Behind the scenes Lemkin continued to work with the Norwegian and South American delegations in sponsoring a resolution on the genocide convention for a meeting of the ECOSOC during the summer of 1947, and having resigned from the War Department, was staying with friends, the Lowensteins, at 290 Riverside Drive, New York, to be close at hand to the deliberations of the United Nations. Mr Seyersted of Norway proposed a special session of the ECOSOC and the appointment of a committee to examine the comments from governments on the report of the SecretaryGeneral on the draft convention which would have to be made by the 1 September, so that matters could proceed expeditiously. In this he was supported by the delegates from Venezuela and Chile. Mr Stinebower, the delegate for the United States, ‘wondered whether the Economic and Social Council was the competent body to consider this legal problem and felt that the advice of the International Law Commission, if established, might be needed’. Gore Booth, the United Kingdom representative, added his support for this proposal, but the underlying purpose of the British move was revealed by a colleague’s comment.31 ‘Our course of conduct at the [General] Assembly [regarding genocide]’, advised Con O’Neill in a Foreign Office memorandum on 29 July 1947, ‘should be governed by the desirability of getting the whole idea of having a convention on genocide dropped. If we cannot succeed on this ... then all we can do, I think, is to aim at spinning matters out in such a way that nothing ever happens’.32 Norway with some
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support from China continued to press for a draft convention to be approved by a special session of the ECOSOC during the General Assembly, but this was rejected by seven votes to five with five abstentions. Instead a compromise proposal of the United States was adopted on 6 August 1947 by the countries which wished to proceed more slowly. The Secretary-General was requested to submit the draft convention with any comments by governments which were received in time by the General Assembly at its forthcoming session.33 During the summer of 1947, Lemkin persuaded the AJC to support his campaign for a genocide convention. On 29 July 1947, there was an important meeting between representatives of the AJC and the American Association for the United Nations. Lemkin was to prepare a pamphlet with secretarial assistance furnished by the AJC for distribution by the American UN Association to influential opinion makers and UN delegates. The AJC was to try and insert material on the issue in small-town newspapers and more generally in the press. At a further meeting between Dr Slawson of the AJC and Lemkin, it was agreed that the AJC would defray the cost of cables in the amount of $1,500 as its contribution to the campaign to promote the early adoption by the General Assembly of the Convention on Genocide ... These cables are intended for about 500 persons throughout the world who are expected to prevail upon their respective governments to issue instructions to their Delegations to act in favor of the Genocide Convention. The campaign has no organized directing body, but is supported by individuals within and outside of the United Nations offices. Professor Lemkin is most active in the campaign. Others are important members of the Secretariat. The CCJO [Consultative Council of Jewish organizations] is on the ‘inside’.34 Throughout the summer and autumn of 1947, there was also close liaison between Lemkin and representatives of the WJC, and under the direction of Lemkin they coordinated their moves in the international arena as regards the rapid passage of the genocide convention through the United Nations. Moreover, steps were taken by Lemkin’s allies in the WJC to ensure that France adopted a friendly attitude to the draft genocide convention, as it had expressed reservations. Its president Stephen Wise, the world famous Jewish leader, who was already an old friend of Lemkin, wrote to Dr Cahn-Debré of the Congress Juif Mondiale requesting that it submit its comments on the draft convention to the Secretariat of the United Nations, and that it lend its influence to the support of prompt and favorable action in this matter by the General Assembly. I believe that Blumal, Grumbach and Prof. Cassin should be approached to assist in obtaining the support of the French government.35
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Cassin on June 14–15 1947 had recently thoroughly revised the original draft of the declaration of human rights and was the French sponsor of a rival project to the proposed genocide convention.36 Following a meeting with René Cassin, Cahn-Debré advised Rabbi Stephen Wise that Cassin had spoken to Charles Chaumont, a principal legal adviser to the French Delegation to the UN, finding him favourable to the idea of a genocide convention and promising to be helpful in New York.37 The State Department treated the draft convention prepared by Lemkin and his colleagues seriously and made constructive comments. Its principal objections were to states being given jurisdiction to try nationals of any other state for crimes of genocide, the inclusion of cultural genocide in the convention and the proposal to establish a permanent international tribunal to try such crimes. However, it was decided to include political groups in the convention on ‘the understanding that the offense is to be restricted to physical destruction’. Once the United States approved the convention, it was envisaged that some offences would fall under federal jurisdiction which usually came within the purview of states, but this was not expected to cause any difficulties. The possibility exists that sporadic outbreaks against the Negro population of the United States may be brought to the attention of the United Nations ... However, since the offense will not exist unless part of an overall plan to destroy a human group, and since the Federal Government would under the treaty acquire jurisdiction over such offenses, no possibility can be foreseen of the United States being held in violation of the treaty.38 Shortly before the opening of the new session of the General Assembly on 16 September 1947, Raphael Lemkin spent four days in Washington conferring with Charles Fahy, a friendly and helpful adviser in the State Department, on the draft convention. He reported that the State Department has modified its position to the extent that it will now actively support the Draft Convention and will favor its being fully treated in the Legal Committee of the General Assembly.(Since Faris el Khouri [a Syrian] has been elected Chairman of this Committee during Monday’s session, this may cause a special problem, for Middle Eastern countries have demonstrated their opposition to Genocide. However, with the probability of a change in the Indian Government’s position and of the United States, Khouri may have a difficult time pigeon-holing or delaying the proper consideration of the Convention). Nevertheless, the United States desired the retention of political groups in the convention, despite the opposition of the Soviet bloc.39 The more positive
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attitude being shown by the Americans was due to the pressure put on them by religious and labour organizations.40 At this point Raphael Lemkin’s chief concern was to prevent the reference of the convention to a not yet created committee or to the next assembly. As he explained to Cardinal Spellman’s secretary, ‘Important Latin American delegates should be approached in order to obtain a resolution for sending the convention to a sub-committee of the Legal Committee for working out a final draft. Such a final draft might be easily prepared on a basis of the existing draft within a few weeks’.41 On 1 October 1947, perhaps deliberately, Raphael Lemkin gave a rather downbeat assessment of the position of the draft genocide convention at the United Nations, stating that it was endangered due to British intransigence on the issue.42 When the Legal Committee of the United Nations convened again two days later, during a discussion on genocide there was an unexpected outburst from the delegate from Pakistan, who stated that hundreds of thousands of people were being murdered in India with the connivance of the authorities because of their religious beliefs.43 The representative from India replied that the charges were ‘baseless, untrue and reckless’, but when the representative for Pakistan tried to counter these denials he was ruled out of order by the committee chairman to the relief of the British government.44 Britain was embarrassed by the risk of a public wrangle in the General Assembly between two Commonwealth countries, India and Pakistan, with accusations of genocide being bandied about; it also served to bring the issue of genocide to the forefront of international attention, something which Britain had been determined to avoid.45 The draft genocide convention was considered again by the Legal Committee on 6 October 1947. Mr H. Dubinsky of the World Jewish Congress summarized what happened at this meeting. But for the exception of the known attitude of ... Mr el Khouri and for the already revealed position of the Arab delegations and the British delegation, there appeared to be a decided and in fact determining change of attitude on the part of the overwhelming majority of all delegations in favor of the adoption of a Draft Convention. This is in strict opposition to the noted reluctance and hesitancy of many governments as exhibited in the last session of the Economic and Social Council to permit a substantive consideration of the Convention. The United States altered its position to the extent that it favored an accelerated and genuine treatment of a Convention. India undoubtedly due to recent events happening there, no longer remained under the influence of Mr Malik of Lebanon. Latin American countries, primarily through the intervention of high Catholic authorities, were even prepared to propose final adoption of the Convention in the present Assembly. France came out clearly in its comments for a speedy adoption. Although the USSR continued to demonstrate reluctance to have
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the Convention treated substantively, due to the inclusion of ‘political groups’ as a constant term, Czechoslovakia, Poland and even Yugoslavia by their comments showed a willingness to advance the discussion of the Convention from a purely procedural consideration to one of substance. In fact, the only real opposition to the adoption of the Genocide Convention as such, was expressed by U.K., Australia and Egypt with the latter particularly singling out cultural Genocide as a non-desirable inclusion in a Convention ... The present status, however, of the Draft Convention, is that it has been almost unilaterally ciphered [siphoned] off into SubCommittee 2 of the Legal Committee [which was already burdened with a heavy agenda] solely for procedural consideration. This slight-of-hand was accomplished primarily and almost solely by the parliamentary partisanship and deceit of el Khouri, who insisted on referring to this issue as ‘this Genocide business’.46 Abba Eban singled out Faris al-Khoury, whom he described as a ‘veteran Syrian statesman’, as leading the Arab assault to set aside the partition plan for Palestine in the Security Council in December 1947, so that Lemkin had a formidable opponent to contend with.47 It was on this occasion that Sir Hartley Shawcross made a violent attack on the draft convention. He declared that ‘unless such a convention were adopted by a majority it would do more harm than good. He cited instances where certain States would be reluctant to relinquish domestic jurisdiction by ratification of the convention, for example ... in matters relevant to the repression of subversive activities by political groups’.48 Lemkin remembered that ‘This statement made a very great impression on the Delegates’.49 Reporting to the AJC about the drift of opinion in the Legal Committee at the end of November 1947, Max Gottchalk remarked that ‘There is no doubt that Professor Lemkin’s untiring activity has influenced some of the small countries, but it seems that he wonders himself if he has not overdone it. I noticed that during yesterday’s session a messenger was giving out Western Union cables to delegates. After about half of them received it, and were openly making jokes about it, Professor Lemkin went over to the messenger and stopped further distribution’. The cable referred to expressions of agreement with the genocide convention by different prominent South American personalities, which have been received by the World Federation of United Nations Associations.50 A draft resolution was placed before the Legal Committee in November 1947, requesting the ECOSOC to continue its work concerning the suppression of the crime of genocide, including studying the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat and proceeding to its completion. This move was no doubt once again inspired by Lemkin, who was devoting all his energy to lobbying and pushing the genocide convention through the United Nations, and beginning to orchestrate a worldwide campaign among Jews, Christian
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groups, and the International Council of Women to bring recalcitrant nations into line. The leading opponents did not waver under this assault and an alternative resolution was placed before the committee by Russia, supported by the United Kingdom, which asked the ECOSOC instead to decide whether a convention was desirable or necessary, and if so, whether there should be a separate convention or whether the draft convention should go before the International Law Commission. This amended resolution which would have meant indefinite delay in the implementation of the convention was adopted by the committee by 22 votes to 18 on 20 November 1947.51 Lemkin, who was talking to delegates on a daily basis at the United Nations, was asked by friends in the press section at this time, ‘How is it going today, Dr Lemkin?’, John Hohenberg recalled. He would wave his hands. ‘Plots, plots against genocide’, he would say, and grit his teeth and shake his head. ‘But I will win in spite of all their plots’. ‘Who’s plotting against you, Dr Lemkin?’ one of us would ask in pretended innocence, knowing full well what the answer would be. ‘The British, the Russians ... Plots ... Plots52 There is evidence that Raphael Lemkin influenced the deliberations of members of the Legal Committee in some remarks in the draft brief to the United Kingdom delegation at the United Nations. The genocide discussions in the Sixth [Legal] Committee provoked spates of useless oratory, many delegates being influenced by a [an artificial; words crossed out] campaign which had begun in the United States largely at the instigation of one or more of the three experts [that is, Lemkin] employed by the Secretariat to prepare the draft convention, and which has been taken up strongly by Jewish organisations in the U.S.A. and other countries including the United Kingdom.53 Why were the Russians and the British so opposed to a genocide convention? Beth Van Schaack pointed out that if political groups were included in the convention, it would call into question ‘Stalin’s politically motivated purges of the kulaks (the petty bourgeois) during the forced collectivizations of agriculture in the late 1920s and early 1930s’.54 According to Terry Martin, Soviet ideological xenophobia fanned Russian nationalism which regarded Diaspora nationalities (Koreans, Germans, Poles and Finns) living on the borders of the Soviet union as disloyal because of conflicts over land and their resistance to the collectivization of farms. During the Second World War, the reliability of several nationalities (Chechens, Ingush, Balkars and Karachai) in the North Caucasus was also suspect because of previous decades of severe ethnic conflict. As a result, there had been huge deportations of the population of the Soviet Union during the Second World War, involving
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mass dispersals, particularly in the Caucasus, which might infringe some of the new provisions of international law.55 So too, when the legal experts at the Foreign Office surveyed the draft convention, they found many reasons for disliking it. Gerald Fitzmaurice (1901–1982) asserted that ‘As the convention stands, it might quite plausibly be argued that, were it in operation, His Majesty’s Government could be guilty of genocide in a number of cases, as for example against Germans in the British Zone [of Germany], against Jews in Palestine or against a number of colonial peoples’.56 In addition, the British delegation had changed their tack on the inclusion of political groups in the convention, their delegate arguing ‘that it was dangerous for States to sign a convention which precludes them from fighting subversive activities of’ these groups.57 Taking a gamble and challenging the obstruction of these two great powers, Lemkin, a private individual with no official position, approached Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil, then president of the General Assembly, and pleaded with him to be allowed more time to line up supporters for a substitute resolution, so that a convention could be put before the Assembly for approval in 1948. ‘ “Mr President”, said Lemkin, “who is making international law for the world –Vishinsky or the General Assembly? I ask this now because in 12 minutes you will begin presiding over a meeting which may decide to destroy the genocide convention by postponing it indefinitely. I appeal to you to hold off the vote” ’.58 Fortunately Lemkin’s bravado succeeded, and Aranha agreed to postpone the vote. This allowed Lemkin time to rally his supporters and two South American states, Panama and Cuba with Egypt, successfully put forward a resolution in the plenary session in November 1947 which ‘restored the subcommittee’s text of the operative part of the resolution’. Norway, France, the United States, Mexico, the Dominican Republic and China spoke in favour of the new resolution, while the United Kingdom and the USSR. spoke against it. The Chinese added an amendment to the resolution, requesting the ECOSOC to take into account the instruction to the International Law Commission to prepare a draft convention incorporating the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. The joint resolution of Panama, Cuba and Egypt was adopted on 21 November 1947 by 34 to 15 votes, while the Chinese amendment was passed by 29 votes to 15 with 8 abstentions.59 In addition, Lemkin’s spirits had been raised by a letter from a former colleague John Fried based in Germany. He told Lemkin that There is now a genocide case pending in Nuernberg [sic] – the case against the Einsatzgruppen, the leaders of which are indicted for genocide – the murder of more than one million persons ... Another case involving genocide will sta