QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy Volume 86
Managing Editors KAI VON FINTEL, M.I.T., Cambridge LISA MATTHEWSON, University of British Columbia Editorial Board JOHAN VAN BENTHEM, University of Amsterdam GREGORY N. CARLSON, University of Rochester DAVID DOWTY, Ohio State University, Columbus GERALD GAZDAR, University of Sussex, Brighton IRENE HEIM, M.I.T., Cambridge EWAN KLEIN, University of Edinburgh BILL LADUSAW, University of California at Santa Cruz TERRENCE PARSONS, University of California, Irvine
For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/6556
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS A Scopal Treatment of Exceptional Wide Scope Phenomena
CORNELIA ENDRISS University of Osnabrück, Germany
ABC
Cornelia Endriss Albrechtstrasse 28 49076 Osnabr¨uck University of Osnabr¨uck Germany
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ISBN 978-90-481-2302-5
e-ISBN 978-90-481-2303-2
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2303-2 Library of Congress Control Number: Applied for c Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 springer.com
F¨ur Volker
Contents 1 Introduction 1.1 Information Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Truth-Conditional Effects of Information Structure 1.3 Topical Quantifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Topicality and Exceptional Wide Scope . . . . . . 1.5 An Outline of the Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 The Structure of this Book . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2 Topicality 2.1 Defining Topicality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Aboutness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Familiarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Topics as Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.4 Indefinite Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.5 Reinhart (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Topic Tests and Topical Quantifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Simple Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Syntactic Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Intonational Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4 Morphological Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.5 A Discourse Configurational Language: Hungarian 2.2.6 Alleged Topic Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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19 19 20 21 23 23 26 29 30 32 44 47 50 51 55
3 Genuine and Apparent Scope Readings 3.1 Specificity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Ioup (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Hintikka (1986) . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3 Enc¸ (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.4 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Wide Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Apparent Wide Scope . . . . . . 3.2.2 Apparent vs. Genuine Wide Scope
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CONTENTS 3.3
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4 Exceptional Wide Scope 4.1 Scope Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Class of Wide Scope Quantifiers . . . . . . 4.3 Genuine vs. Apparent Exceptional Wide Scope 4.4 Approaches Relying on Speaker’s Reference . . 4.4.1 Fodor and Sag (1982) . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2 Other Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Approaches Relying on Domain Restriction . . 4.5.1 Schwarzschild (2002) . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.2 Other Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.3 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Presuppositional Approaches . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.1 Yeom (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.2 Cresti (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.3 Other Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.4 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Choice Function Approaches . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.1 Reinhart (1997); Winter (1997) . . . . 4.7.2 Kratzer (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.3 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.4 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 Approaches Relying on Wide Extraction . . . . 4.9 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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107 107 112 115 118 118 123 123 133 134 136 136 138 138 144 150 151 152 152 156 165 174 182 182 184
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187 187 191 197 197
3.4
Functional Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Natural Functions . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Properties of Natural Functions . . . 3.3.4 Apparent vs. Genuine Narrow Scope . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 Semantic Effects of Topicality 5.1 Types of Aboutness Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Intonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Topicality Induces Wide Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Genuine Wide Scope vs. Apparent Wide Scope . . . 5.3.2 Apparent Non-Wide Scope Interpretations of Direct Aboutness Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Does a Strong Interpretation Imply Topicality? . . . . . . . 5.5 Approaches Relating Exceptional Wide Scope to Topicality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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6 Exceptional Wide Scope as a Topic Phenomenon 213 6.1 Deriving the Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
CONTENTS 6.2
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6.4 6.5
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Technical Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Quantifier Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Structured Meanings . . . . . . . . . . . . . Components of the Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Creating a Topic Discourse Referent . . . . . 6.3.2 The Topic Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Quantifier Classification . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.4 Topic Assert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Deriving Wide Scope via Topicality . . . . . . . . . Intermediate Scope Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.2 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.3 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Functional Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.1 The Interpretation of Functional DPs . . . . 6.6.2 Topic Interpretation and the Topic Condition with Functional DPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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7 Conclusion A Technicalities and Experiments A.1 Generalized Quantifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.1.1 Monotonicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.1.2 Witness Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.1.3 Lexical Quantifier Semantics . . . . . . . . . A.2 Pilot Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.2.1 The Accent Pattern of Wide Scope Indefinites A.2.2 Wide Scope vs. ‘Anti-Distributivity’ . . . . .
222 222 233 235 236 238 239 245 246 249 249 254 258 260 263
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281 281 281 281 281 283 283 285
Bibliography
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Index
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Acknowledgements This book grew out of my PhD thesis at the University of Potsdam and, naturally, I owe a lot to many people who have helped me since the first day I thought about quantification and topicality. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of my thesis committee: Peter Staudacher, who got me interested in linguistics in the first place and who taught me virtually everything about academic research I know by now; Manfred Krifka, who was always a source for new ideas, exotic data and pointers to other approaches; and Ede Zimmermann, whose suggestions and comments were always extremely helpful for the solution of persistent problems. I owe a lot to Christian Ebert, Hans-Martin G¨artner (who introduced me to exceptional wide scope phenomena during a seminar), Andreas Haida, Stefan Hinterwimmer, and Gerhard J¨ager. They have helped me with detailed discussions on various aspects of the approach. The fruits of these collaborations resulted in co-authored publications that relate to the issues of this book. Furthermore, I would like to thank Sigrid Beck, Suna Bensch-Aydin, Peter Bosch, Daniel B¨uring, Philippa Cook, Regine Eckardt, Alex Grosu, Be´ata Gyuris, Irene Heim, Klaus von Heusinger, Robin H¨ornig, Shinichiro Ishihara, Bryan Jurish, Elsi Kaiser, Dalina Kallulli, Hans Kamp, Katalin Kiss, Frank K¨ugler, Knud Lambrecht, Edmund Pohl, Robert van Rooij, Roger Schwarzschild, Yael Sharvit, Arnim von Stechow, Craig Thiersch, Carla Umbach, Thomas Weskott, and Malte Zimmermann for helpful comments, inspiring discussions and support. Many thanks go also to my non-linguistic collaborators Verena Diehl, Inge Endriss, Erin Gordon, Barbara Herold, Clarissa K¨ohnken, Wolf Lindstrot, Katja Uhlisch, and Silke Quast for their patience while enduring questions about native speaker judgments. I thankfully acknowledge the support of the collaborative research center SFB 632 Information Structure, funded by the German Science Foundation DFG, and its speaker, Caroline F´ery, in particular. I would also like to thank the people at Springer, in particular Helen van der Stelt and Jolanda Voogd, and the editors of the Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy Series, Kai von Fintel and Lisa Matthewson, for their willingness to publish this work, many helpful comments and suggestions and their overall support while preparing the manuscript. Finally, I would like to thank my family – my parents, Volker, Axel, Dorothee, Finja, and Christian – for their constant support and help.
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Chapter 1
Introduction This book is dedicated to two major issues: topicality and exceptional wide scope, which are not as unrelated as one might assume. In this introduction, I will acquaint the reader with the notions that will be needed for the discussions in subsequent chapters and briefly lay out the proposal I wish to make with this work. I will start with a short introduction to information structure, which is necessary to get a picture of the different notions of topicality, and then set the stage for a new approach to exceptional wide scope phenomena.
1.1
Information Structure
Information structure is originally understood as the linguistic field that is concerned with the question of how a piece of information is presented by a speaker most efficiently so that it can be best understood by a listener. At first, this seems to be the counterpart to truth-conditional semantics, which deals with the question of what kind of information can truthfully be conveyed. Given the situation in which a speaker wants to convey the information in (1.1), (1.1) Some time in the past, a person called Dena bought a horse. truth-conditional semantics only cares about the fact that exactly this information is conveyed. This could be done by an utterance of the following sentence: (1.2) Dena bought a horse. There are certainly many other ways to convey the information in (1.1) apart from (1.2), but even if we commit ourselves to the structure in (1.2), there are several ways C. Endriss, Quantificational Topics, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 86, c Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2303-2 1,
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QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
to present it. The most natural way would be to focus the whole VP bought a horse and hence to stress horse (by the rules of focus projection1 ). (1.3) Dena [bought a HORSE]F . Sentence (1.3) naturally splits into two parts. As has been pointed out by Moln´ar (1993), we can look at these two parts in several ways. Her view is based on the Organonmodell of B¨uhler (1934) and she proposes to distinguish three different aspects of the information structure of an utterance2 : 1. the factual level, which distinguishes what is said (the comment) from what this comment is about (the topic of the utterance); 2. the hearer-related level, which differentiates between things that are new to the hearer (the rheme) and things that are already known (the theme); 3. the speaker-related level, where the utterance is divided into what is important or relevant from the speaker’s viewpoint, i.e. the focus, and what is not as important and thus constitutes the background. All three levels can coincide, overlap, or be disjoint. In the case of (1.3), they all coincide.3 Let us look at the theme-rheme distinction first. It is plausible to assume that the hearer already knows Dena as a person, but that he learns from the sentence that she has bought a horse. Hence Dena constitutes the theme and the rest of the sentence the rheme. The focus or most relevant information that is to be conveyed by the speaker, corresponds to the predicate, i.e. to bought a horse, whereas Dena builds the background. As can be seen, in this case, background coincides with theme and focus with rheme. Thirdly, we can look at the information to be conveyed by (1.3) in the following way: we distinguish between the entity under discussion, the part the sentence is about, and its counterpart, i.e. the information that is given about the topic, the predicative part. In (1.3), Dena would clearly be the topic, whereas bought a horse would be the comment. Hence, topic, background, and theme as well as comment, focus, and rheme coincide. But as mentioned above, this is not always the case. In fact, these information structuring units lie orthogonal to each other. For example, the domains can overlap as in example (1.4) from (Dahl, 1974, p. 2, ex. 3)4 or embed each other, i.e. focal constituents can be embedded in topics as in (1.5) or topics can be embedded in focal constituents (see von Fintel, 1994) as shown in (1.6).5 1 See
for instance Selkirk (1995) for the relationship between focus accents and possible focus domains. I use capital letters to indicate the main accent and brackets with subscript F ([. . . ]F ) to mark the focus domain. 2 I would like to thank Rainer Ludwig, who called my attention to Moln´ ar’s work (cf. also Ludwig, 2006). 3 As focus and rheme coincide most of the time, I will, following linguistic tradition, often refer to the part of the sentence with new information as its focus, although, strictly speaking, I should refer to it as its rhematic part. 4 In his examples, Dahl (1974) only distinguishes between topic-comment on the one side and focusbackground on the other. 5 See (Moln´ ar, 1993, pp. 166–67) for further related examples.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION (1.4)
3
a. What about John? What does he drink? b. John drinks beer. c. [John]T [drinks beer]C [John drinks]Th [beer]Rh [John drinks]B [beer]F
The two questions in (1.4a) render John the topic and beer the focus and rheme of the sentence in (1.4b). drink is neither topic nor focus/rheme, which means that topic and focus/rheme are not complementary. This is indicated in (1.4c), where T(opic) overlaps with B(ackground) and F(ocus) with C(omment). As has been argued by several authors (see e.g. von Fintel, 1994; Krifka, 1998), partial or contrastive topics can be understood as topics with an embedded focal constituent. (1.5)
a. Yesterday, I saw many horses. b. [[↑THREE ]F (of the) horses]T were very cute.
The sentence in (1.5b) contains the partial topic three (of the) horses. A certain set of horses has been introduced by (1.5a) and (1.5b) makes a statement about a part of this set. The determiner three of the DP needs to be accented in this context. It carries a strong accent, which is usually assumed to be a rising one, indicated by an arrow ↑.6 The sentence is clearly about (a subset of) the horses introduced in (1.5a), so the subject three horses can be argued to be the topic. But three clearly represents central and new information and it contrasts with all other possible functions from the set of horses to possible subsets, which can be explained if three is interpreted as rhematic and focal.7 According to von Fintel (1994), one can also find examples of topics in focus (for further examples see also Lambrecht, 1994, p. 130). His example (see von Fintel, 1994, p. 56 originally Selkirk, 1995, p. 554 (based on Selkirk,1984)) is given in (1.6). (1.6)
a. We sat around the campfire last night, telling all sorts of stories about bats. Then, today guess what happened? b. [MARy bought a BOOK about [bats]T ]F .
Though the whole sentence is in focus, which means that under ‘normal’ circumstances, the main accent would be on bats, bats can be deaccented. Von Fintel argues that this is so because the bats or the stories about them are topical.8 6 In the course of this book we will see that it is not entirely clear whether this accent really has to be a rising one. However, it is usually assumed to be realized this way. 7 (von Fintel, 1994) does not argue for the topical status of DPs such as three horses in (1.5) by reference to their aboutness status, but rather by reference to a notion of discourse topicality. Yet, I take it that the basic line of argument remains the same. 8 This deaccenting effect is different from deaccenting in second occurrence focus constructions, which von Fintel (1994) also discusses. In example (1.7) from (Rooth, 1992, p. 109), only associates with rice rather than with eat, resulting in a meaning: the only thing that people eat who grow rice is rice.
(1.7) People who GROW rice generally only EAT rice. According to the interpretation of (1.7), the accent should be on rice. Obviously, the reason for the fact that eat receives the main accent is that it is contrasted with grow. People have argued that in these cases rice also receives an accent – but a much less strong one than grow – and that rice is still focal and therefore can associate with only (see Partee, 1991; Rooth, 1992). This so-called second occurrence effect is confirmed
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QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
Going back to example (1.2), if one sets aside the exact characterization of the information-structural units of (1.2), it is certainly true that, out of context, (1.3) is the best way to pronounce (1.2). But things are different if (1.3) (repeated as (1.10b) below) is uttered as an answer to (1.10a). (1.10)
a. Who bought a horse? b. # Dena [bought a HORSE]F . c. [DEna]F bought a horse.
(1.10b) is not well suited as an answer to the question in (1.10a).9 The best way to answer this question and convey the information in (1.1) would be by uttering (1.10c). The question in (1.11a), on the other hand, would allow for (1.10b) as an answer, but not for (1.10c) (repeated below as (1.11b) and (1.11c), respectively). (1.11)
a. What did Dena do? b. Dena [bought a HORSE]F . c. # [DEna]F bought a horse.
What this shows is that information structure defines the appropriateness of an utterance. Although (1.11b) and (1.10c) are truth-conditionally equivalent, they are, nevertheless, appropriate only in specific contexts.
by an observation that von Fintel ascribes to Susanne Tunstall, namely that the sentence sounds odd when rice is replaced by a pronoun. (1.8)
?? People
who GROW rice generally only EAT it.
Von Fintel claims that the reason for the oddity of (1.8) might be the fact that the anaphoric pronoun it cannot carry a focus accent, which would be necessary for the VP to count as associate of only. Now, this is different in example (1.6). Here, we can replace bats by a pronoun without causing ungrammaticality. (1.9)
a. We sat around the campfire last night, telling all sorts of stories about bats. Then, today guess what happened? b. [MARy bought a BOOK about [them]T ]F .
This suggests that there is a difference between the two types of deaccenting, which would mean in turn that topical deaccenting really is different in nature. As a side remark, it seems that the focus theory of Schwarzschild (1999), which is entirely based on the notion of givenness, would predict the correct pitch accents in (1.6) as well as in (1.7). Still, it is not clear to me how one could derive the correct meaning for (1.7) (as no F-marking for the NP rice would be predicted, which eventually has to associate with only). But more to the point, there would clearly be no difference between the ‘deaccentuation’ of bats in (1.6) and rice in (1.7) as both constituents are simply not predicted to receive an F-marking in the first place. What this shows is that it remains necessary to differentiate between topical deaccenting on the one hand and non-topical/purely givenness triggered deaccenting on the other. 9 I mark pragmatic oddity, e.g. due to contextual inadequacy, with the hashmark (#). Ungrammaticality is marked with the star (∗), and graded (un)acceptability (with respect to grammaticality as well as contextual adequacy) by question marks (?? – essentially unacceptable, but marginally possible; ? – possible, but not fully natural).
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.2
5
Truth-Conditional Effects of Information Structure
It is well known – especially due to the work of Rooth (1985) – that information structure and semantics are not as separate from each other as it might seem at first sight. In fact, information structure has been shown to heavily influence the truth conditions of a sentence. The best known examples of information structure-sensitive interpretations are sentences with focus-sensitive particles such as only or sentences with quantificational adverbials (Q-adverbs in the following) such as always, which usually also involve indefinites. I use the term ‘indefinite’ for DPs that denote weak quantifiers in the sense of e.g. (Milsark, 1977) or (Barwise and Cooper, 1981). As opposed to some authors (e.g. Heim, 1982; Kamp and Reyle, 1993), I assume that indefinites have quantificational force and do not just denote free variables, sets, plural individuals, or other semantic objects. In other words, I use the term indefinite as equivalent to weak quantifier. Note that neither the extensional characterization of the class of indefinites nor the intensional characterization of how this class can best be defined is undisputed (for an overview of the different notions see de Swart, 1999). Example (1.12) from Rooth (1992) shows that focus is decisive for the interpretation of the sentence.10 (1.12)
a. In English orthography, a ‘U’ always follows a ‘Q’. (true) b. In English orthography, a ‘U’ always follows a ‘Q’. (false)
Given our knowledge about English orthography, only (1.12a) is correct, which says that whenever there is a ‘Q’, it is followed by a ‘U’. (1.12b), on the other hand, states that ‘U’s only appear after ‘Q’s in English, which is certainly not correct. These readings are usually referred to as quantificational variability readings (Berman, 1991), as the quantificational force of the indefinite a ‘U’ /a ‘Q’ depends on the quantificational adverb (and varies with it). Under the assumption that quantificational adverbials exclusively quantify over eventualities/situations s and not over individuals (see e.g.von Fintel, 1994; Hinterwimmer, 2008; Endriss and Hinterwimmer, 2008 and for a different view Lewis, 1975; Heim, 1982; Kratzer, 1995), the sentences in (1.12a,b) receive the interpretations in (1.13a,b), respectively.11 (1.13)
a. ∀s[in(s, Q) → follow (s, U, Q)] b. ∀s[in(s, U ) → follow (s, U, Q)]
Representation (1.13a) can be understood to say that all (relevant) situations which contain a ‘Q’ are situations in which this ‘Q’ is followed by a ‘U’; and representation (1.13b) can be understood to say: all situations containing a ‘U’ are situations where this ‘U’ follows a ‘Q’. The different readings of (1.12a,b) can only exist due to the 10 The accented word is set in boldface and underlined here as it consists of one capital letter only, that, obviously, cannot be marked as accented as above. 11 The representations in (1.13) are problematic in many ways. Without further assumptions, especially without assuming minimal situations, they would not reflect the intuitive truth conditions of (1.12) because of the so called requantification problem (see von Fintel, 1994), which leads to an instance of the proportion problem (see Kadmon, 1987). Unfortunately, a discussion of these matters would lead us too far afield.
6
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
different accent placement in the two sentences, i.e. due to information-structural differences. It has been argued that the different interpretations come about because focal material is exclusively interpreted in the second argument – i.e. in the nuclear scope – of quantificational adverbials, whereas the remaining information of the sentence (i.e. the denotation of the whole sentence minus the adverbial itself and minus the focal part) is mapped onto the first argument, i.e. the restrictor (see e.g. Rooth, 1985; Herburger, 2000 for concrete proposals for the formulation of such mapping algorithms). Alternatively, it has been suggested that it is not focus, but topicality, the other important information-structural entity, that plays the decisive role (see e.g. Chierchia, 1995). Under this view, it is assumed that topical material is interpreted in the restrictor. Partee (1991) argues that focus as well as topicality has to be considered: topical material is interpreted in the restrictor, whereas focal material is mapped onto the nuclear scope. In contrast to Q-adverbs, the arguments of quantificational determiners such as every are not determined by information structure.12 They are determined by syntax instead: the syntactic complement forms the restrictor and the rest of the sentence constitutes the nucleus. In the following, I will often refer to the denotation of a DP that consists of a quantificational determiner and an NP – e.g. every man – as a generalized quantifier or just a quantifier. (1.14)
a. In English, every ‘Q’ is followed by a ‘U’. (true) b. In English, every ‘Q’ is followed by a ‘U’. (true)
Though out of context (1.14a) is clearly more natural than (1.14b) both sentences convey true information. The two versions differ only in their appropriateness conditions and not in (truth-conditional) meaning. Both receive the same interpretation given in (1.15). All relevant x (i.e. all letters) that are ‘Q’s are followed by a ‘U’, which means nothing other than: all ‘Q’s are followed by a ‘U’. (1.15) ∀x[is(x, Q) → ∃y[is(y, U ) ∧ follow (y, x)]
1.3
Topical Quantifiers
As we have seen, syntax dictates the arguments for quantificational determiners and information structure does not influence this process directly. Yet, information structure still has some semantic effect in the context of sentences with determiner quantifiers, too: topical indefinites have been argued to receive a partitive or a specific/referential/wide scope interpretation (see among others Cresti, 1995; J¨ager, 1996; de Swart, 2001; Portner and Yabushita, 2001).13 Consider the following contrast in German, where – as opposed to the indefinite in (1.16a) – the indefinite in (1.16b) 12 There are however exceptions to this general scheme, namely certain quantificational determiners that seem to be sensitive to information structure, i.e. many and few (cf. Herburger, 2000 but see Cohen, 2000 for a conservative explanation of the different readings of many and few based on an inherent vagueness of these quantificational determiners and not on an information-structural dependence). I will ignore this complication. 13 I will elaborate on the terms specificity, referentiality, and wide scope in Section 3.1. Up to this point, the reader is asked to understand specific, referential, and wide scope indefinite as expressing the same thing in a pre-theoretical manner.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
7
is assumed to be topical,14 indicated by its particular intonation pattern (namely by a strong accent on the determiner). (1.16)
a. Jedes Pferd hat ein HINdernis passiert. every horse has a
obstacle
passed
‘Every horse has jumped (over) some obstacle.’ ∀x[horse(x) → ∃y[obstacle(y) ∧ jump over (x, y)]] b. Jedes Pferd hat ↑EIN Hindernis passiert. every horse has one obstacle
passed
‘Every horse has jumped (over) some obstacle.’ ∃y[obstacle(y) ∧ ∀x[horse(x) → jump over (x, y)]] In (1.16a), the indefinite ein HINdernis (one obstacle) receives a focal accent. (1.16b) realizes what is usually considered to be a topical accent on the (determiner of the) indefinite. Native speakers’ judgments vary with respect to the question of whether (1.16a) has only a narrow scope reading for the indefinite or whether it is ambiguous between a narrow and a wide scope reading. However, uncontroversially, (1.16b) does not allow for a simple narrow scope reading. It supports only a wide scope reading for the indefinite ↑EIN Hindernis (some obstacle) or a contrastive (narrow scope) reading, where ein is read as one and contrasted to two or three. In the contrastive reading, the sentence would have to be followed by something like (1.17) Aber alle f¨unf haben nur wenige Pferde geschafft. but
all five have
only few
horses managed
‘But only few horses managed all five.’ That (1.16b), if interpreted non-contrastively, forces a wide scope reading of the indefinite calls for an explanation.15 A solution that connects the wide scope reading of the indefinite with its topical status suggests itself. It has often been noted that only certain types of quantifiers can function as topics, among them singular indefinites such as some man and bare numeral indefinites such as three men.16 To illustrate this, in the following example German left dislocation serves as a topic-testing device, which, according to (Frey, 2000; Jacobs, 2001; Frey, 2004b), marks the left-dislocated element unambiguously as topical. Note that leftdislocated indefinites in German often have to carry a strong accent on the determiner (although an accent on the NP-complement would be the usual ‘neutral’ accent pattern for a DP in German) to make the sentences sound felicitous, which is indicated by capital letters in (1.18) and (1.19). The reason for this unusual accent pattern will become clear in subsequent chapters. When the quantifiers are marked as infelicitous in left-dislocated position and no specific accent is indicated, this is to be understood to mean that the quantifiers are infelicitous in this position under any intonation. (RP stands for resumptive pronoun in the following.) 14 Possibly,
it is a partial topic as in the case of (1.5). will come back to the contrastive reading of examples such as (1.16b) in the course of this book. Let us set this reading aside for the moment. 16 Many authors do not consider these indefinites which can be topical to be quantifiers as I do, however. 15 I
8
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS (1.18)
a. EInen Politiker, den kennt jeder. some politician RP knows everybody
‘One politician everybody knows.’ ¨ b. Ein kleines MADchen, das wollte einst nach Frankreich reisen. a
little
girl
RP wanted once to
France
travel
‘Once, a little girl wanted to travel to France.’ c. ∗ Fast alle Politiker, die kennt keiner. almost all politicians RP knows nobody ∗
Mehr als f¨unf kleine M¨adchen, die wollten einst nach Frankreich more than five little
girls
RP wanted once to
France
reisen. travel
To see the general picture, consider the following example. (1.19)
a. ∗ Kein / EIN Pferd, das hat die Bananen gefressen. no
/ some horse RP has the bananas eaten
‘No horse / Some horse has eaten the bananas.’ b. ∗ (Nur) Wenige / ?? Mehr als drei / ∗ Fast alle / DREI Pferde, die (only) few
/
more than three / almost all / three horses RP
haben die Bananen gefressen. have
the bananas eaten
‘Few / more than three / almost all / three horses have eaten the bananas.’ (1.19) shows that only elements of a small subclass of quantifiers (and of the weak quantifiers) are permissible in topical position, among them singular indefinites and bare numeral indefinites in particular. This peculiar fact calls for a semantic explanation. Why is it that only some quantifiers can function as topics, whereas others cannot? We will see that this fact follows directly from the lexical semantics of the quantifiers involved (provided a certain view and formal representation of topicality).
1.4
Topicality and Exceptional Wide Scope
Interestingly, the class of topicable quantifiers, i.e. the class of quantifiers that are observed in topic positions or can be marked as topics otherwise, coincides with the class of quantifiers that can scope out of scope islands, i.e. constructions that usually do not allow quantifiers to take scope out of them. I will give a reason for this correlation and formulate an approach that treats exceptional wide scope readings of certain quantifiers as a by-product of their interpretation as sentence topics (for a similar idea see Cresti, 1995). Syntactic islands, i.e. those constructions that prohibit (overt) extraction from them (cf. Ross, 1967), are always also scope islands.17 As if -clauses are known to be such syntactic islands, they are also scope islands. 17 The reverse does not necessarily hold, however. E.g. finite clause complements of verbs such as believe do not constitute syntactic islands, but are usually considered to be scope islands (cf. Farkas, 1981).
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION (1.20) Peter will be happy if few movies are shown.
9 [if > few ] ∗ [few > if ]
(1.20) illustrates that an if -clause constitutes a scope island. The sentence only receives a narrow scope reading for the quantifier: Peter will be happy if overall few movies (under discussion) are shown. It is impossible to interpret the sentence as saying that for certain few movies, it holds that Peter will be happy if these movies are shown. This would be the wide scope reading. However, it is known that indefinites such as some N are not bound to this island constraint. In fact, they can take scope out of a scope island. I will refer to this ability as the exceptional wide scope behavior of indefinites. Details aside, the class of quantifiers that show this exceptional behavior – wide scope quantifiers in the following – coincides with the class of topicable quantifiers: bare singular indefinites and bare numeral quantifiers are among the wide scope quantifiers, whereas most other quantifiers respect scope islands. (1.21)
a. Peter will be happy if no movies are shown.
[if > ¬∃] ∗ [¬∃ > if ]
b. Peter will be happy if almost all movies are shown. [if > alm∀] ∗ [alm∀ > if ] c. Peter will be happy if few movies are shown. [if > few ] ∗ [few > if ] d. Peter will be happy if more than three movies are shown. [if > > 3] ?? [> 3 > if ] e. Peter will be happy if a/some movie is shown.
[if > ∃] [∃ > if ]
f. Peter will be happy if three movies are shown.
[if > 3] [3 > if ]
(1.21e,f) allow for a wide scope reading of the involved quantifiers; all other sentences do not. (1.21f), for example, can mean that there are three particular movies, say: Fried Green Tomatoes, Memento, and Fight Club, such that if these movies are shown, Peter will be happy. Such a wide scope reading is impossible in the case of e.g. (1.21d), which cannot mean that for more than three movies, say for a certain five movies, it holds that if they are shown, Peter will be happy. (1.21d) can only mean that overall more than three movies have to be shown in order to make Peter happy. This is the narrow scope reading. It will become clear in the subsequent chapters why there is a close correspondence between topicable quantifiers and those that allow for exceptional wide scope. As a side remark, I will not address the question of local scope – which quantifiers can take local scope over others and which cannot and why. I will focus on exceptional wide scope only.18 I will also only briefly discuss quantificational variability readings and focus on the readings of indefinites in interaction with other determiner quantifiers instead. I propose, in line with Cresti (1995) and Portner and Yabushita (1998), to correlate topicality and wide scope. In my approach, the same reason that explains why not all quantifiers can serve as topics also explains why these quantifiers cannot take exceptional wide scope. The ability to be a topic and to receive a wide scope interpretation is reduced to the application of one and the same operation to the respective 18 For
an in-depth discussion of local scope phenomena see the contributions in (Szabolcsi, 1997a).
10
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
constituent. Quantifiers receive wide scope due to their interpretation as topics. This in turn means that the topic-relation is not a pure pragmatic, non-semantic relation as explicitly claimed by Reinhart (1981, p. 3),19 but that it has a direct influence on the truth conditions of an utterance. It will be shown that exceptional wide scope has to be analyzed as a genuine scope phenomenon, i.e. that a topical indefinite has to literally take wide scope. It will also be shown that other attempts to imitate wide scope behavior eventually fail, because they cannot account for the full range of data (cf. also Schwarz, 2001a,b, 2004) or overgenerate badly. Among those are approaches that leave the indefinite in situ and introduce some existential closure mechanism (be it existential closure of an individual, a choice function or a Skolem function) (e.g. Reinhart, 1997; Winter, 1997; Kratzer, 1998), ones that interpret the respective indefinite as referential (e.g. Fodor and Sag, 1982), or that assume some kind of extreme domain restriction for the restriction of the indefinite (Schwarzschild, 2002). The only existing approaches to exceptional wide scope that are equipped to capture the truth conditions of all different sorts of readings correctly are those that treat specific indefinites as presuppositional (e.g. Yeom, 1998). However, these approaches suffer from conceptual problems, that will be discussed below. My proposal will also make a contribution to the conceptual question of whether exceptional wide scope phenomena in general are a matter of pragmatics or of semantics. This question underlies all approaches that attempt to explain specificity and exceptional wide scope. It has most explicitly been raised in (Bende-Farkas and Kamp, 2001). In their paper (and in many other works), exceptional wide scope readings are treated on a par with de re-readings of indefinites, also referred to as specific readings by many authors. An indefinite receives a wide scope interpretation when the respective indefinite is used (and understood) specifically, i.e. as the object the speaker has in mind and wants to talk about. As syntax should not influence the question of whether a speaker wants to talk about a specific object he has in mind or just make an existential utterance, according to this view, it is expected that indefinites embedded in syntactic islands behave exactly like ones that are not embedded in such islands. Bende-Farkas and Kamp (2001) raise the question of whether such specific readings, which involve notions about the speaker’s thoughts and intentions, should actually be reflected in semantic representations or whether those readings just come about by pragmatic inferences that go beyond semantics. In the second case, the narrow and the specific readings would have the same semantic representation (involving an existential statement) and the specific reading would simply come about because the hearer assumes that the speaker must be in the position to utter what he said on grounds of some specific knowledge that he has, namely that a particular object fulfills the existential statement he just made. The authors argue for the first view (i.e. for seeing specificity as a semantic matter), although they acknowledge that there are arguments for both sides. Occam’s razor makes the pragmatic solution more likely, because such pragmatic reasoning has to be assumed elsewhere anyway, but e.g. the existence of 19 But
note that Reinhart (1981, p. 14, Section 4) relativizes this claim later on in her article.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
11
overt specificity markers in numerous languages (e.g. bestimmt in German20 ) shows that specificity seems to be a phenomenon of the syntax-semantics interface. The authors argue that more – especially crosslinguistic – work is needed and close their chapter on specificity (Chapter 3, p. 87) with the following words: [...] we expect from such research further insights into the ways in which human languages draw the line between what is incorporated into their “grammar” [...] and what is left to extralinguistic inferences on the part of the interpreter. This last motivation brings us to what we see as the other major issue on which the study of specific indefinites forces us. This is the distinction which it seems to us must be acknowledged between semantic content as it emerges from application of the syntax-semantics interface principles to the syntactic structure of an uttered sentence and the (more or less conventionalised) further inferences which the recipient is likely to draw (and which he may, as a competent speaker of the language, be expected to draw). The way we formulated this question makes it into a clear case of the demarcation between semantics and pragmatics, as that issue is usually understood. And it is possible that some semanticist will feel that this is therefore an issue with which they will have no commerce. But the matter is a matter of language interpretation, so no overarching theory of interpretation in verbal communication can afford to ignore it. And if it is to be addressed properly, then, we contend, we will need the quite rich modes of description and representation which we haven’t hesitated to use [...]. This quotation of Bende-Farkas and Kamp (2001) makes it very clear that the authors understand specificity to be a very complex matter, namely one that involves speakers’ intentions and a hearer’s interpretation of them. Nevertheless they say that it is a matter of language interpretation and therefore cannot simply be excluded from semantics. I will only indirectly address their question about where to locate specificity, but nevertheless contribute to the question under discussion. I will argue that certain phenomena, which so far have often been discussed under the label specificity, should be kept out of this discussion. These are those phenomena that can (and, as we will see, must) be analyzed as genuine scope phenomena (including exceptional wide scope). Such readings can and should be represented without recourse to the speaker’s reference (for this view see also Ludlow and Neale, 1991). In other words, I will not address the question raised by Bende-Farkas and Kamp (2001) about where to locate specificity directly, but I will narrow down the range of such specific readings and show that a certain group of phenomena should be analyzed as genuine scope phenomena. I will argue that wide scope and specificity have to be kept strictly apart and neither can be reduced to the other. I will show that there are cases where an indefinite has to be assumed to take genuine wide scope – even out of a syntactic island – via a scopeshifting mechanism and that no other mechanism can account for the full range of data. I hope to convince the reader that exceptional wide scope phenomena are a matter of semantics and, more precisely, of scope alone. In other words, genuine wide scope readings can actually be told apart from specific, i.e. apparent wide scope, readings. Exceptional wide scope readings actually do exist and cannot be correctly grasped by other interpretation mechanisms. 20 Note that bestimmt behaves quite differently from gewiss, although both, gewiss and bestimmt, are often treated alike and often both are taken to be the German correspondents to certain.
12
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
There is a second question that is raised in (Bende-Farkas and Kamp, 2001, p. 86) and pointed out as being an important issue for future research, which will also be addressed in this book: How does the form of an indefinite NP influence its possible interpretations? When drawing the line between genuine wide scope and specific readings, one has to differentiate between different shapes of indefinites. I take bestimmt to be a specificity marker in German. Topical indefinites are often realized with a heavy (typically rising) accent on the determiner (↑EIN Pferd (some horse)) in German. As topical indefinites receive exceptional wide scope due to the topic interpretation mechanism, I predict a different scope-taking behavior of indefinites with accented and unaccented ein as well as differences between specific bestimmt-indefinites and simple ones. Furthermore, it is important to carefully differentiate between simple narrow scope and genuine intermediate scope readings on the one side and functional (wide scope) readings on the other. Such readings are easily confused and often misinterpreted in the literature. A differentiation can (and must) be drawn by similar means as is done in the literature on functional and pair-list readings in the context of questions. Functional readings are independent of exceptional wide scope readings and hence there is no independent reason for a functional approach to exceptional wide scope phenomena, though this seems to be implicitly assumed by all proponents of the choice/Skolem function approaches and has been explicitly claimed by (Winter, 2004). In other words: functional readings and exceptional wide scope are two unrelated phenomena. But, of course, it is possible that indefinites that take exceptional wide scope can receive a functional interpretation if those indefinites or quantifiers can receive such an interpretation in other contexts. These indefinites receive functional wide scope readings, which can be empirically distinguished from simple narrow scope readings. I account for them with a mechanism for the interpretation of functional topics that is a monotonic extension of my mechanism for the interpretation of ordinary topics.
1.5
An Outline of the Proposal
My aim is to explain how exceptional wide scope readings can be derived and why they are restricted to a certain class of quantifiers. In brief, I explain these exceptional wide scope readings via the topical status of the involved quantifier. Hence, only topical quantifiers are able to take wide scope out of islands. I make crucial use of two basic formalisms to account for this correlation: first, the concepts of Dynamic Semantics (in particular Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991), and second Krifka’s (1992) system of structured meanings. Crucially, in the structured meaning approach, an utterance is separated into two information-structurally different parts. In the cases at hand these are the topic αT and the comment αC . Rules guarantee the compositional derivation of the meaning of such structured utterances. At every step, the conventional meaning can be derived by applying the comment to the topic. Furthermore, my analysis is based on Kadmon’s (1985) proposal to reflect the anaphoric potential of a quantifier in the lexical semantics of the quantifier itself. Kadmon (1985) treats bare numeral and modified numeral indefinites alike and represents both kinds as directly introducing
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
13
plural discourse referents. But only so called exhaustive quantifiers such as at least three linguists introduce a set that exhausts the entire intersection of the restrictor set linguists and the set corresponding to the VP-predicate, whereas non-exhaustive quantifiers such as three linguists introduce a subset of this intersection. The distinction is empirically motivated by the different anaphoric possibilities of sentences following these quantifiers. The lexical semantics of the two quantifiers then looks as follows: (1.22)
n
λP λQ.∃X[ |X| = n ∧ X ⊆ P ∩ Q ]
at least n
λP λQ.∃X[ |X| ≥ n ∧ X = P ∩ Q ]
Now, what needs to be explained is that three linguists is a topicable and hence a wide scope quantifier, whereas at least three linguists is not. If an item serves as the topic of a sentence, it is – following Reinhart (1981) – understood to be the address/the link for the context update, which (sloppily speaking) points to a place where the information conveyed by the sentence will be stored during the context update. Individuals and sets make perfect addresses in this sence, but many items, quantifiers in particular, do not provide sensible addresses. And this is why they cannot serve as sentence topics in general. But one can still observe some quantifiers overtly marked as topics, as was pointed out above. Hence these quantifiers apparently are possible sentence topics. Although quantifiers per se do not provide sensible addresses, some of them can still function as topics. What happens in this case is the following: a sensible representative of the entire quantifier is selected that can stand proxy for the quantifier itself. Then an address is created for this representative, which serves as the anchor for the information update. Address creation of a representative eventually comes down formally to the creation of a discourse referent for this representative. If a (topicable) quantifier serves as the topic of an utterance, e.g. an assertion, the common ground update looks schematically as follows: (1.23) Frame ∃P [P is a representative for αT ] & Assert αC (F(P )) First, a discourse referent for the representative P of the topical quantifier αT is created in a separate Frame-Setting (= topic-establishing) speech act (cf. Jacobs, 1984), and then the comment part αC is applied to (a function F of) this representative P instead of application to the quantifier αT itself. Speech act conjunction is understood as dynamic conjunction that allows for dynamic binding in the sense of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991). The question is what would be a good candidate to represent the entire quantifier αT . The answer is: a minimal witness set21 MW (αT ) in the sense of Barwise and Cooper (1981) (cf. also Szabolcsi’s (1997b) approach). Finally we end up with the following interpretation schema for utterances containing a topical quantifier αT : (1.24) Frame ∃P [MW (P, αT )] & Assert αC (F(P )) This formula describes exactly what happens when a quantifier serves as the aboutness topic of a sentence. A minimal witness set P , which is a sensible representative of the topical quantifier αT is selected, and a discourse referent for this set is introduced. In a next step, this set P is treated as the object of the predication αC , which is applied to 21 See
the appendix, Section A.1, for the definition of a minimal witness set.
14
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
(a function of) it. Note that the topical quantifier αT necessarily takes wide scope over all operators that might occur in the comment part αC , because the Frame-Setting act happens first. Hence, updating the common ground with a quantificational topic αT will necessarily result in a wide scope reading of the quantifier. What exactly F does in (1.24) depends on the (verbal) environment of P and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Note that there is a possibility that the topic-introducing speech act fails, namely when the speaker wants to use a non-existent entity as topic. These are exactly those cases that are conceived of as ‘catastrophic presupposition failure’ elsewhere, illustrated in (1.25). (1.25) The king of France is bald. A formal test that operates on the lexical semantics of quantifiers, dubbed the Topic Condition, decides whether a quantifier can serve as sentence topic or not. To test the ability of a quantifier to serve as an aboutness topic, one compares the aboutness case (i.e. the case where a discourse referent is created) to the standard semantics αC (αT ) the sentence would have disregarding information structure. This comparison is conducted only with respect to certain simple comments. It is checked whether the aboutness topic operation, when applied, would yield a sensible result. The intuition behind the test is that the aboutness function of a topic should not change the semantics of the topic-embedding sentence. A quantifier G fulfills the Topic Condition if for certain general simple cases 1. the creation of the discourse referent has no truth-conditional effect w.r.t. a standard context update, and 2. dynamically speaking, the introduction of a new discourse referent does not destroy already existing anaphoric possibilities, but only adds a new possible topic that can be referred to in subsequent discourse. It will be shown that the Topic Condition is capable of deriving the correct classification of quantifiers into topical/wide scope quantifiers and their complement class. As a main result, all monotone increasing non-exhaustive quantifiers22 are predicted to be topicable. So there is a direct interrelation of non-exhaustivity and topicability. If a monotone increasing quantifier is interpreted non-exhaustively, it should also be interpretable as sentence topic. This explains why three N – being non-exhaustive, cf. (1.22) – is classified as topicable and hence as a wide scope quantifier and why at least three N, as an exhaustive quantifier, is not. As shown above, the common ground will always be updated with the existential statement for a topical quantifier first. This will necessarily result in a widest scope reading. It is, however, well known that one can find examples not only of readings where quantifiers scope out of syntactic islands and take widest scope, but also of intermediate scope readings, as e.g. in the following example in German. (1.26) Jeder Student hat angek¨undigt, die Party zu verlassen, wenn ↑EIN Dozent every student has announced,
the party to leave,
if
some lecturer
auftaucht. shows-up.
‘Every student announced that he will leave the party if some lecturer shows up.’ 22 See
the appendix, Section A.1.1 for definitions of monotonicity properties.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
15
The sentence has an intermediate scope reading in which ein Dozent (some lecturer) takes exceptional scope out of the if -clause, but narrower scope than jeder Student (every student). The reading says that for every student there exists some specific lecturer such that the student would leave the party immediately if the lecturer he picked turns up. This intermediate scope reading comes about as a result of the interpretation of embedded topic-comment structures. In the case of example (1.26), it is the verb ank¨undigen (to announce) that can be applied to a topic-comment structure. Accordingly, an intermediate scope reading is not available for a variant of sentence (1.26) where the topic-comment structure verb ank¨undigen (to announce) is missing, as exemplified in the following German example, which only features a widest scope reading. (1.27) Jeder Student verl¨asst die Party sofort, Every student leaves
wenn ↑EIN Dozent auftaucht.
the party immediately, if
some lecturer shows-up.
‘Every student will leave the party immediately if some lecturer shows up.’ To account for intermediate scope readings as exemplified in (1.26) I develop an interpretation strategy for embedded topic-comment structures. If there is a nonillocutionary topic-comment structure embedding operator Op (such as the verb ank¨undigen (to announce)), the existential statement corresponding to the topical part takes scope over the embedding operator – in parallel to the case where a topical indefinite takes scope over an illocutionary operator such as Assert (by way of a separate act of topic establishment), as was discussed above. However, as in this case of embedded topicality the involved operator is not an illocutionary operator, this establishment of a discourse referent does not manifest itself in a separate speech act of topic establishment, but is simply part of the semantics proper and will thus interact with other scopal elements in the same expression. The interpretation schema is as follows: (1.28) ∃P [MW (P, αT )] ∧ Op(αC (F(P ))) Again, the involved conjunction operator has to be interpreted as dynamic conjunction. Finally, I lift the entire system to deal with functional topics. Functional indefinites such as ein Bild von sich (a picture of himself ) can be topical, which is evidenced by the fact that they can appear in left-dislocated position in German, which is a topicmarking position. A functional topic also receives a wide scope reading, namely a functional wide scope reading. A dependent DP such as ein Bild von sich (a picture of himself) is translated as a function from individuals to generalized quantifiers (GQs), assigning every individual x the GQ ‘a picture of x’. Analogously to the non-functional cases, a quantificational topic of this functional type necessitates the creation of a discourse referent that stands proxy for the involved quantifier, if the quantifier passes the Topic Condition. The storage address creation process is hence extended to involve minimal witness functions (MWF ) f , which find a minimal witness set for every quantifier G(y) of the functional generalized quantifier G. Context update rules and Topic Condition involving functional aboutness topics are adapted accordingly.
16
1.6
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
The Structure of this Book
The next chapter, Chapter 2, serves to lay out different views and finally my own view of topicality. I will only deal with sentence topics and not with topics of larger units of discourse. I follow Reinhart (1981) in the assumption that sentence topics do not have to be familiar to the hearer, which is why indefinites can be topical when they constitute the entity that the sentence is about. There are several ways of overt topic marking involving syntactic, morphological, and intonational means. I will use these devices to illustrate, against common assumptions, that some, but not all quantifiers can be topical. It will be shown that singular indefinites – recall that I count indefinites among the class of quantifiers –, unmodified numeral indefinites, and (plural) universal quantifiers can be overtly marked as topics. I will mostly look at German and English data and consider data from other languages only sporadically. My conclusions will therefore only hold for German and possibly English, but I hope that it can be shown in the future that the consequences for topicality and wide scope are actually languageindependent. We will see that only those quantifiers that have been observed as overtly topic-marked can also be conceptually conceived of as possible sentence topics. All remaining quantifiers cannot serve as sentence topics. One important part of this book is dedicated to the question of why this is so. Chapter 3 will set the stage for subsequent discussion about exceptional wide scope phenomena. Therefore, I thoroughly differentiate between apparent and genuine scope phenomena. It is widely acknowledged that indefinites can appear to take wide scope, although in fact they are interpreted with narrow scope. The most common mechanisms to derive such pseudoscope readings (borrowing a term from Kratzer, 1998) is via engaging some kind of speaker’s reference or ‘extreme’ domain restriction towards a singleton set. I also count specific readings among the class of pseudoscope readings. My view of specificity is built on the ones advocated by Ioup (1977) and Hintikka (1986): I take it that specific readings only come about in the context of opaque operators and they can be understood as wide scope readings with respect to the involved operator. I will not deal with the question how such specific readings exactly come about and hence, any mechanism that can deal with the opaque/transparent contrast can be adopted. What is important for my needs is to set apart these specific readings in the context of opaque operators from genuine wide scope readings in truly transparent contexts. I will illustrate that genuine wide scope readings actually exist and that they can be accounted for only by a scope-shifting mechanism. Furthermore, Chapter 3 will deal with the differentiation between apparent and genuine narrow scope readings. I will provide means to distinguish between functional readings, which are co-variation readings that depend on the value of some other operator and are therefore easily mixed up with narrow scope readings, and genuine narrow scope readings. Only after having carefully differentiated between these different sorts of apparent and genuine wide and narrow scope readings are we prepared to investigate the exceptional wide scope phenomena, which this book aims to explain. Before presenting my own approach to exceptional wide scope, Chapter 4 discusses the phenomena at hand, including a discussion of the class of quantifiers that exhibit exceptional wide scope, and the different approaches that have been proposed
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
17
to handle these phenomena. First, we will observe that the class of quantifiers that allow for exceptional wide scope is the same as the class of quantifiers that have been observed with overt topic markings (as documented in Chapter 2). I will also discuss exceptional wide intermediate scope phenomena, i.e. readings where indefinites take exceptional wide scope out of scope islands, but yet narrower scope than some other c-commanding operator. In the course of the discussion of the approaches that have been proposed in the literature so far to account for such – exceptional – widest and intermediate scope readings, it will turn out that none of the approaches makes correct predictions about the class of wide scope quantifiers, if they make any predictions at all and do not simply stipulate the class of quantifiers/indefinites subject to the proposed mechanisms. There are four different main branches of approaches towards exceptional wide scope: approaches relying on speaker’s reference, approaches that are built on the idea of (extreme) domain restriction, choice/Skolem function approaches, and presuppositional approaches, which assume that ‘specific’ indefinites presuppose their lexical content. Only the last class of these approaches makes use of an actual scopeshifting mechanism, whereas all the others entertain pseudoscope mechanisms of all different sorts. I will point out the weaknesses of these existing approaches, which mostly stem from the fact that they can only account for apparent wide scope and not for genuine wide scope. The presuppositional approaches, which can account for genuine wide scope readings, because they make use of a scope-shifting mechanism, will be shown to suffer from serious conceptual problems. In Chapter 5, I discuss the different interpretative effects of topicality. I show that topical indefinites always constitute aboutness topics of the sentences under investigation. The aboutness relation can exist in a direct or a more indirect way. I understand the topical subjects of generic and quantificational variability sentences as indirect aboutness topics, where the indefinites define the situations that the sentences are about. Topical indefinites that take wide scope constitute direct aboutness topics. Indirect aboutness topics are only discussed very briefly and the remainder of the book is dedicated to the explanation of the semantic effects of direct aboutness topics. I will provide data showing that aboutness topicality actually invokes wide scope of the involved topical quantifier as opposed to specificity or referentiality. Chapter 5 closes with a brief discussion of two preceding approaches from the literature that correlate topicality and wide scope. Chapter 6 outlines my interpretation mechanism of topical quantifiers. As argued in Chapter 5, topical quantifiers receive wide scope. As my mechanism is an informationstructural mechanism that is not sensitive to syntactic constraints, it also derives exceptional wide scope out of scope islands for topical quantifiers. The prediction is that only topical quantifiers can receive exceptional wide scope, which is indeed confirmed by the facts. I develop a monotonic extension of my approach interpreting topical quantifiers that can correctly deal with functional entities also, so that I can handle the functional wide scope readings that I have discussed in Chapter 3. Exceptional wide intermediate scope readings that have been pointed out to exist and discussed in Chapter 4 are derived by means of nested topic-comment structures. A topic always takes wide scope only with respect to the topic-comment structure it is a component of. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the main results.
Chapter 2
Topicality The concept of topicality has been around for many years, partly under different notions (cf. e.g. ‘das psychologische Subjekt’ (the psychological subject) in Paul, 1880). Topicality is furthermore understood in extremely different ways. In 1981, Reinhart (1981, p. 4) writes: Although the linguistic role of the relation TOPIC OF is widely acknowledged, there is no accepted definition for it and not even full agreement on the intuitions of what counts as topic. As far as I can surmise, the situation is no different 25 years later. It lies beyond the scope of this book to give a detailed overview of and discuss all the different notions of topicality that have been proposed during the last around 100 years of research on information structure. I will hence only present my own view of topicality and discuss the necessary preconditions for it.1 It will turn out that topic can be seen as an entirely conceptual notion, independent of any syntactic, morphological or intonational markings. A topic can be simply conceived of as being what a sentence is about. However, certain syntactic structures, morphologic markers and intonational means have been argued to indicate the topical status of a constituent. Hence topicality is testable via such means. I will present some of the methods that have been proposed in the literature. Here, also, I cannot give an exhaustive list. I will then proceed to show that many quantifiers cannot be marked as topical, which I take to indicate that these quantifiers cannot be interpreted as topics. The question why this is so will be answered in the remainder of this book.
2.1
Defining Topicality
From Chapter 1 you may recall that according to Moln´ar (1993) the topic-comment dichotomy is just one of three important information-structural dichotomies, the other two being focus-background and theme-rheme. The topic-comment dichotomy relates 1 For a broader overview of the different notions of topicality, the reader is referred to (Moln´ ar, 1993) and (McNally, 1998).
C. Endriss, Quantificational Topics, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 86, c Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2303-2 2,
19
20
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
to the factual aspect of an utterance, whereas the other two relate to concerns of the speaker and hearer, respectively. Discourse givenness, which is crucial from the hearer’s point of view, is the most important feature for defining the theme-rheme distinction. Relevance from the speaker’s viewpoint is the important notion for a definition of focus vs. background. Both properties are of less importance for the notion of topicality. In particular, following this distinction, there is no problem with nondiscourse given topics, as will be shown in this section. First of all, one has to differentiate between discourse and sentence topics. The first item refers to topics of an information unit consisting of several sentences and the second to those of just one single sentence. I will only investigate sentence topics and disregard topicality in the context of larger bits of discourse. The reader is referred to (McNally, 1998) for a presentation and discussion of the relationship of discourse and sentence topicality. Two concepts play an important role for the investigation of sentence topics: aboutness and familiarity. Let us start with the concept aboutness.
2.1.1
Aboutness
Definition 2.1 Under the aboutness concept, a sentence topic is what the sentence is about. To illustrate, consider the following sentences. (2.1)
a. Yesterday, Clarissa visited Dena. b. Yesterday, Dena was visited by Clarissa. c. The telephone rang.
While (2.1a) is most naturally understood as conveying some information about Clarissa, (2.1b) tells us something about Dena. The topic-comment structure of the two sentences differ in that (2.1a) establishes Clarissa as topic, whereas in (2.1b) Dena is the natural choice for the topic. Truth-conditionally though, both sentences have exactly the same meaning. Sentence (2.1c) is an example of an antitopic sentence2 (see Jacobs, 2001, p. 646). Antitopic sentences are often referred to as event-reporting, all-new or thetic sentences (cf. also Lambrecht, 1994, pp. 137ff.). In a thetic sentence, all information is conveyed in one step, without separation into an entity on the one side and saying something about it on the other. Sentences that contain topics such as (2.1a,b) can be referred to as categorical sentences. The thetic/categoricaldistinction was originally introduced as a distinction between types of judgments by the philosopher Franz Brentano and further investigated by his student Anton Marty. In their works it is argued that there are two different judgment forms: the categorical and the thetic judgment (see Kuroda, 1972 or Ladusaw, 1994 for an overview of the thetic/categorical-distinction). A categorical judgment is made in two steps, i.e. by the act of recognition of that which is to be made the subject [the topic in our terminology, 2 Antitopic sentences in Jacobs’ (2001) sense must not be confused with what Lambrecht (1994) calls antitopics. These are topical elements in the right periphery of a sentence.
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
21
CE], and the other, the act of affirming or denying what is expressed by the predicate about the subject (Kuroda, 1972, p. 154). Such a judgment corresponds straightforwardly to what a sentence with a topic expresses. A thetic judgment, on the other hand, is made in one single step; it is used to report the perception of a situation. Such a judgment corresponds most naturally with antitopic/topicless sentences. Following linguistic tradition, I will use the thetic/categorical-distinction to directly describe sentence forms that correspond to the judgment types indicated above. A thetic sentence then is to be understood as a sentence that represents a thetic judgment.
2.1.2
Familiarity
There has been a long lasting debate about whether only already known and preestablished entities are possible sentence topics, i.e. items under discussion, or whether it is possible to establish and talk about a topic at the same time. In other words, the question is whether discourse givenness or familiarity is an obligatory feature of topics. Some scholars (e.g. Hockett, 1958; Kuno, 1972; Gundel, 1985, 1988; Portner and Yabushita, 1998; Hedberg, 1990) indeed subscribe to this view.3 In anticipation of my results, I will take the opposite view. I follow Reinhart (1981) and adopt the view that familiarity is not an obligatory property of topics. But let me lay out the familiarity view of topicality first. Intuitively, familiarity can be grasped as existence in a discourse model. Definition 2.2 Under the familiarity concept, a sentence topic is an established object that has already been introduced into the discourse model (or is existent in the discourse model due to world knowledge). Under the familiarity view, discourse-givenness is seen as a requirement for the topical entity. The topical entity must not be discourse-new, but has to already be existent in the common ground or otherwise familiar to the speaker, e.g. via general (world) knowledge. It is obvious that even if familiarity were a necessary property of topics, it cannot be a sufficient one. There are often many discourse old expressions in one sentence, which cannot all be sentence topics, of course. The following quote from (Hockett, 1958, p. 201) suggests that topics are always familiar, but that the aboutness property still is the defining property: The most general characteristic of predicative constructions is suggested by the terms ‘topic’ and ‘comment’ [. . .]: the speaker announces a topic and then says something about it. 3 The importance of the concept of givenness to topics is emphasized also in the work of the representatives of the so-called Prague School, represented e.g. by Petr Sgall, Jan Firbas, or Eva Hajiˇcov´a, who build on insights of the members of the Cercle linguistique de Prague, especially represented by Vil´em Mathesius. For discussion of the role of discourse givenness for the definition of theme, see e.g. (Firbas, 1964). Note that what is referred to as theme in their terminology corresponds to what others call topic. Often the different aspects of information structuring pointed out in the introduction (theme-rheme, topic-comment, focus-background) are not kept apart.
22
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
First, something is introduced and second, when it is already known, it is used, i.e. something is said about it. Note that Hockett (1958) argues that typically the grammatical subject is the topic of a sentence, but he is well aware of exceptions to this general tendency. His defining property is the aboutness relation of the topic with respect to the rest of the sentence. An important question that arises immediately and that is answered quite differently in different approaches is the question of what counts as discourse-given. Kuno (1972), who uses the term theme for what we call topic and anaphoric for given, argues that topics have to be items either explicitly introduced in previous discourse or ones that are permanently in the hearer’s background (as e.g. the sun). However, anaphoric items do not necessarily have to represent old information in the sense that what is conveyed in the semantic relation in which they appear is already known. A certain item can be given, but still represent the new information part of a sentence in which it appears. Consider the following example from (Kuno, 1972, p. 272). (2.2)
a. Among John, Mary, and Tom, who is the oldest? b. TOM is the oldest.
Tom in (2.2b) is given, but still represents new information. In the terminology I introduced above, we would say that Tom constitutes the focus and the rheme of the sentence, although it is discourse-given. Hence, not all anaphoric items represent old information parts. What does hold, so Kuno claims, is the following: themes (topics) are necessarily anaphoric. Furthermore, Kuno distinguishes between predictable and unpredictable themes. Predictable themes correspond to continuing topics and unpredictable ones can be seen as topic changes. The former type is exemplified by John in (2.3b), the latter by John in (2.4) (both from Kuno, 1972, p. 308). (2.3)
a. Will John do it? b. If he can, John will do it.
(2.4)
a. Mary is a singer, and John is a composer.
A similar point is made by Gundel (1988), who also holds the view that topics must be familiar and emphasizes that there are different senses of familiarity. First, she defines relational familiarity as to mean that a topical expression is given in relation to its comment (and the comment is new in relation to the topic). Second, she defines referential familiarity, where givenness is to be understood as givenness of the referent of the topical expression, i.e. where the referent is known to the speaker and the hearer. She furthermore differentiates between two different kinds of referential familiarity: assumed familiarity, which demands that the hearer have previous knowledge of the entity under discussion4 and activated referentiality, which holds for an entity that the speaker’s and hearer’s attention is already focused on. Gundel points out that topics always have to fulfill relational familiarity and assumed familiarity, but they can, of course, be inactivated, which is the case when a topic-shift occurs. As is easy to see, Gundel draws the same distinctions as Kuno. Her relational familiarity corresponds 4 She
attributes the term and her notion of assumed familiarity to (Prince, 1981).
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
23
to Kuno’s oldness criterion. Her assumed familiarity corresponds to his anaphoricity constraint and her activated familiarity is what Kuno dubs predictability.
2.1.3
Topics as Entities
There is some disagreement with respect to the question of whether it is the linguistic constituent contained in the sentence that is the topic of the sentence or whether it is the denotation of the linguistic entity. Most linguists (to mention just a few: Dahl, 1974; Gundel, 1985, 1988; Hedberg, 1990; Portner and Yabushita, 1998) hold the second view, i.e. that sentences are about the referents of linguistic entities, which, of course, makes perfect sense, because it is intuitively felt that sentences are about ‘real world’ entities (or their representations in the speaker’s/hearer’s mental models) and not about linguistic expressions (for further discussion see also Lambrecht, 1994, pp. 127–28). It has been argued (e.g. by Dahl, 1974) that, under this view, where topics constitute real world entities, only referential expressions can be topical. In other words, definites and names, but not quantifiers, which are not referential, would be possible sentence topics.5 Definite would also include generic readings of bare plurals as in Men are mortal, which, as has been pointed out by (Kuno, 1972) and (Kuroda, 1972), can also be understood as topics. The ‘referent’ in this case would be the entire kind or class that the generic utterance is made about (men in this case).
2.1.4
Indefinite Topics
The view that topical items have to be familiar cannot be upheld, however. Reinhart (1981, 2004) has argued extensively and convincingly that not only definites and names are possible topics, but also indefinites. She concluded that familiarity cannot be an obligatory property of topics. This view has also been defended by Moln´ar (1993) and Frey (2000, 2004a). Recall examples (1.18a,b) from the last chapter, repeated below as (2.5a,b), which are ‘about’ the individual introduced by the indefinite, intuitively speaking. Furthermore, the indefinites occur left dislocated, in a position that has been argued by Frey (2000, 2004b) to host topical constituents only. (2.5)
a. EInen Politiker, den kennt jeder. some politician RP knows everybody
‘One politician everybody knows.’ ¨ b. Ein kleines MADchen, das wollte einst nach Frankreich reisen. a
little
girl
RP wanted once to
France
travel
‘Once, a little girl wanted to travel to France.’ Other suggestive examples can be found when looking at sentences with stative verbs, which are usually assumed to exclude a thetic interpretation of the sentence in question 5 I will show later on in this chapter that there are cases of quantifiers that can be understood as topics – this is possible only under certain circumstances, namely when a sensible representative for the quantifier, which is a set (i.e. referring to a set in the world), can be found. Under this view, the cases of topical quantifiers also do not constitute counterexamples to the assumption that topics are referential (in some broader sense).
24
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
(see Krifka et al., 1995). Here, the subject needs to be interpreted as topical. Consider the beginning of the fairy tail K¨onig Drosselbart (King Thrushbeard). ¨ (2.6) Ein KOnig hatte eine Tochter, die war so u¨ beraus sch¨on, dass . . . a
king
had a
daughter who/she was so overwhelmingly pretty that
‘A king had a daughter who was beautiful beyond all measure, . . .’ The subject of the main clause is indefinite (ein K¨onig (a king)) and the predicate is a stative verb. Hence, the indefinite needs to be interpreted as topical.6 Yet, indefinites behave somewhat inconsistently. Sometimes they seem to be perfect sentence topics (as in the previous examples), whereas on other occasions, sentences with an indefinite marked for topicality are unacceptable. (2.7)
??
Ein FENster, das hat Peter ge¨offnet.
a
window
RP has Peter opened
In light of the fact that topics are regarded as entities (as discussed above) and the work of Fodor and Sag (1982), who argue that indefinites are ambiguous between a referential and a quantificational interpretation, Reinhart (1981) proposes that only referential indefinites can be interpreted as topics. What Reinhart calls a referential indefinite is called a specific indefinite or a wide scope indefinite in other approaches. (Cresti, 1995; Portner and Yabushita, 2001; Portner, 2002) explicitly correlate topicality with specificity. My own approach (Ebert and Endriss, 2004 and Chapters 5, 6) correlates topicality and wide scope. These approaches all predict that purely unspecific/narrow scope indefinites cannot be topical. We will see examples in the next section which show that, indeed, such indefinites cannot be marked as topical by syntactic or morphological means. Let me point out here that the proposal I will present in subsequent chapters makes the prediction that all topical indefinites necessarily take wide scope, which does not imply that they are necessarily specific. We will see in the next chapter that wide scope and specificity are indeed different concepts that have to be kept apart. In fact, Ward and Prince (1991) have challenged the claim that topical indefinites have to be specific or referential and give examples for what they take to be unspecific topical indefinites such as e.g. a great body in the following example (see Ward and Prince, 1991, ex. (7a)). Note that the authors suppose that syntactically topicalized DPs are topical. (2.8) (Brains you are born with.) A great body you have to work on. [Brook Shields, in health club commercial] Ward and Prince (1991) argue for a certain variant of a familiarity restriction to hold for topics (including topical indefinites), namely that topics have to be either familiar or relate to one or more familiar entities via a salient (partially ordered) set-relation. Although topical indefinites can indeed be unspecific, their line of argument is still open for discussion. First, the authors do not clarify their view of specificity, which 6 I thank Manfred Krifka for pointing me to the importance of such examples. Notice though that Lambrecht (1994, p. 352, Chapter 4, endnote 33) regards such beginnings of fairy tales as rhetorically motivated abbreviations of the conventional formula [= there-sentences with subsequent elaborations on the introduced entity, CE] and argues that they could hardly occur in spontaneous conversation.
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
25
makes it hard to follow their examples. I presume that they hold an epistemic view of specificity, which is the view that for a specific indefinite to be used the speaker has to have a referent in mind. And second, in most of their examples, the indefinite under discussion does not necessarily have to be interpreted as topical, because it is not unquestionably marked as topical. The involved indefinite might only appear to be topic-marked, although, in fact, it is not, as is the case for example (2.8). I will show in Section 5.3.2 of Chapter 5 that the fronted indefinite in the second sentence of (2.8) is actually not topical. The fronting operation is licensed by a contrastive interpretation (a great body vs. brains). In any case, the examples of Ward and Prince (1991) do not challenge my approach, which forces topical indefinites to take wide scope. I can show that the unspecific topical indefinites they present have to take wide scope when other scope-inducing elements are inserted. Unfortunately, a discussion of their examples has to be deferred to a point when all theoretical assumptions and the notions that are needed have been introduced. We will come back to them in Chapter 5. Besides the examples in (Ward and Prince, 1991), which suggest that indefinite topics are less restricted than usually assumed (i.e. that they can be unspecific), Gundel (1985) (and Hedberg, 1990 building on her system) also raises doubt that specificity is an obligatory feature of topical indefinites. However, the conclusion Gundel draws is quite different from the one drawn in (Ward and Prince, 1991), namely that – besides some exceptions to the rule – indefinites cannot be topical at all, no matter if they are specific or unspecific. Gundel (1988) argues that the familiarity criterion of topics, which is a pragmatic principle, generally bars indefinites from topic positions. She concludes that the very few exceptions one finds have to be seen as exceptions to the rule, where the familiarity criterion, being a pragmatic principle, is suspended or weakened for certain rhetorical effects. She notes in support of her claim that indefinite topics are restricted to certain constructions, cannot appear in combination with types of sentences other than assertions, and always need an anchor to a familiar entity. The indefinite a daughter of a friend of mine in (2.9) (from Gundel, 1985, ex. 13, p. 88) would be anchored to the familiar expression me and is thus allowed to serve as topic according to Gundel. (Note that she takes extraposed elements to be necessarily topical.) (2.9) A daughter of a friend of mine, she got her BA in two years. However, the restriction that indefinite topics always have to be anchored to a familiar entity can be shown not to hold, as evidenced by the examples in (2.5). Portner and Yabushita (1998), who also hold the view that topics are necessarily familiar and referential, discuss indefinite topics, which are instances of – in their view: seemingly – non-familiar topics. They claim that in these cases it is not the indefinite itself which is topical, but only the NP-complement. Their example is given in (2.10) (see Portner and Yabushita, 1998, p. 120, footnote 2). (2.10) Three boys arrived. One, I like – but the others... Here, one is fronted and could therefore be conceived of as topical. However, in (2.10), one should be most naturally interpreted as focus and the implicit restrictor boy can be taken to be topical, as argued by Portner and Yabushita (1998). Another option to interpret the sentence would be that the entire quantifier one plus the implicit/elided
26
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
restrictor is topical, where one is additionally marked for focus. Be this as it may, these are clearly not the only cases of quantificational topics. We have already seen examples where it is not plausible to assume that only the NP-complement of the dislocated indefinite is topical (namely examples (2.5a,b), see also e.g. (2.11b), below). Hence I conclude that (unfamiliar and unspecific) indefinites can indeed be topical.
2.1.5
Reinhart (1981)
I follow Reinhart’s conception of aboutness topicality (which is based on Strawson, 1964). According to Reinhart (1981), the fact that most sentence topics are familiar is not an inherent property of the topics themselves, but rather due to general requirements on discourse structure. In a coherent discourse, two contiguous sentences have to be linked to each other – either because they give information about the same referent or because there is an obvious relation between the two propositions expressed in the two sentences. Most discourses are linked by a referential link. This is the reason why most topics are discourse old. As mentioned above, Reinhart holds the view that discourse-new items can represent topical information, which she proves using several tests that had previously been proclaimed to be tests for topicality in the literature. In particular, she points out that there is nothing wrong with indefinite topics, which necessarily represent new information (for this novelty condition with respect to indefinites see Heim, 1982). (2.11)
a. Anne has eaten all the bananas. b. Some horse has eaten all the bananas.
Intuitively, (2.11a) appears to be about Anne in the same way as (2.11b) is about some (particular) horse. Reinhart takes this intuition seriously and then argues in detail that indefinites can be sentence topics just as well as other (in her terminology:) referential DPs can. The question that suggests itself and which Reinhart wants to answer is what it could mean for an expression to be about something. Reinhart restricts herself to DP-topics to keep things as simple as possible, though she is aware of the fact that there might well be topics of other categories such as frame setting adverbs etc. Reinhart uses the concept of a context set, as introduced by Stalnaker (1978). The context set represents the shared knowledge of a speaker and a hearer at a given point of discourse. This context can be updated by adding new propositions to the context set according to the utterances made. Reinhart notes that the context set as proposed in (Stalnaker, 1978) is not organized in any way and suggests to extend it with respect to the organization of information. Her metaphor is the organization of a library catalogue, which is comparable to Heim’s (1982) file change semantics (as Reinhart acknowledges herself). In this metaphor, each book entry corresponds to a proposition. The idea is that all the information of the library is organized in such a way that it is stored under a certain subject or keyword. This keyword now corresponds to a topic. The topic of a sentence is the address where the remaining information of the proposition made is stored. The topic hence represents the sorting key where the information that is known about it is
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
27
stored. This information can then be accessed via the topic entry. The same idea is pursued by Vallduv´ı (1992) and implemented by Portner and Yabushita (1998), though the latter do not account for the case of non-familiar topics. In Reinhart’s view, [s]entence topics [...] are one of the means available in the language to organize, or classify the information exchanged in linguistic communication (Reinhart, 1981, p. 24). Topics thus have an information structuring function in the very literal sense of the word. Portner and Yabushita (1998) give examples from Japanese, which show that this information organization actually has some testable effects. They claim that information stored under a certain entity is easily recoverable via this entity, whereas information that is not associated with this entity, but has been attached to it otherwise, is not as easily processed. Their argument builds on the following examples (see Portner and Yabushita, 1998, pp. 120–21). (2.12)
a. [Chiisana kodomo o small
child
tsureta onna-no-hito]2 ga
ACC taking woman2
-kimashita. Kanojo wa chikin fraido steeki o -came
she
T OP chicken fried
mazu haitte
N OM first
entering
chuumon
steak ACC order
shimashita did
‘A woman with a small child came in first, and she ordered chicken fried steak.’ b. Tsugini, [tenisuraketto o motta waki otoko-no-hito]3 ga next
tennis racket
ACC holding young man3
yatte-kimashita. Kare3 wa konojo ni came
ni
he3
biiru o
T OP she
raketto o
N OM
tewatashite, baa
DAT racket ACC handed
bar
tori ni ikimashita.
DAT beer ACC get to went
‘Next, a young man holding a tennis racket came in. He handed the racket to her, and went to the bar to get a beer.’ c. Betsu no otoko-no-hito to omna-no-hito ga okurete kimashita. other of man
Eiga o
mini itte-ita
and woman
N OM being late came
yoo-deshita.
movie ACC watch going-were seemed
‘Another man and woman, who were late, came in. They seemed to have been to a movie.’ In the second sentence of (2.12a), the woman is the topic (which is indicated by the topical marker wa attached to kanojo (she)). The information that she ordered a chicken fried steak is hence stored under her entry. Accordingly, the information conveyed by the second sentence of (2.12b) (that a man (who had just entered) handed a racket to the woman) is stored under the man’s and not under the woman’s entry, because the man is the sentence’s topic (indicated by the wa). The exact contents of (2.12c) is irrelevant for our concerns. It just serves to lead the hearer’s attention to something else. Consider now the possible continuation in (2.13a) vs. the continuation in (2.13b), which is degraded.
28
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS (2.13)
a. Chikin fraido steeki o chicken fried
chuumon shita omna-no-hito2 ga
steak ACC order
did
woman2
ichiban
N OM first
sakini kaerimashita. early returned
b.
‘The woman who ordered a chicken fried steak left first.’ ?? Otoko-no-hite3 ga reketto o tewatashita onna-no-hito2 ga man3
N OM racket ACC handed
woman3
N OM
ichiban sakini kaerimashita. first
early returned
‘The woman who the man handed a racket to left first.’ Portner and Yabushita say that the continuation in (2.13b) is not as good as the one in (2.13a). They say this is because the information that the woman was given the tennis racket is not stored under the entry for the woman, but rather under the one for the man.7 The authors conclude that the organization of information actually has an influence on linguistic phenomena. Reinhart formally represents this information structuring with a set of possible pragmatic assertions (PPA) for a given sentence s, where φ is the proposition expressed by s. (2.14)
PPA(s) := {φ} ∪ {hα, φi : α is the interpretation of an NP in s}
If an utterance s is made in a context c, a specific element hαi , φi of the PPA is chosen by a selection function, where αi is the aboutness topic of φ. If the sentence has no topic, the selection function yields the element φ. The chosen element then is used to update c. Reinhart assumes that this updating mechanism proceeds in a very specific manner.8 1. The familiarity case: Given an element hαi , φi of the PPA, the proposition φ corresponding to sentence s will be checked against all other information already stored under entry αi . If it does not contradict it, the context will be updated, and the new information φ will be stored under αi . This procedure can only be undergone if the topic αi is familiar. 2. The new topic case: If no entry αi already exists in the context, as in the case of non-familiar topics such as indefinites, an entry has to be created, and the information φ is stored under this newly created entry. The selection function works on pragmatic grounds, i.e. it chooses an element from the PPA that is pragmatically adequate. Apart from the constraint that point (1) (discourse 7 Portner and Yabushita (1998) note that the clumsiness of the relative clause construction in (2.13b) can be softened if the original construction is replaced by raketto o uketotta onna-no-hito (woman who received a racket). Still, this modification of (2.13b) would remain a less suitable continuation than (2.13a). 8 As pointed out to me by Ede Zimmermann, this formalization of the topic-comment structure is certainly too simplistic. In particular, assertions of the sort R(a, a) would allow for only one structuring into topic and comment, namely ha, R(a, a)i, where it is not clear which a would constitute the topical part. Furthermore, it would be difficult to give a coherent definition of comment, which is usually understood as the complement of topic.
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
29
old entities as topics) is given priority over point (2) (discourse new entities as topics), Reinhart formulates further conditions on the selection function, but she concedes that more work needs to be done here (see Reinhart, 1981, pp. 29ff. for further details). In the case of certain topic constructions (e.g. left dislocation in German or topicalization in English), Reinhart suggests not restricting the selection function, but rather narrowing down the PPA. Under the assumption that left dislocation syntactically marks the dislocated element as topic, the PPA should only contain pairs hαi , φi with αi representing the dislocated element, as only αi can possibly be the topic of φ. Likewise, phrases that may not function as topics, to which Reinhart counts (genuine, i.e. non-indefinite) quantifiers, should also never be the first component of an element of any PPA. Reinhart’s claim that there is still a lot of work needed to specify the exact conditions on the selection function is still true today. However, this book will not explore the nature of the selection function, but rather the second component that Reinhart mentions: the correct restriction of the PPA. Reinhart would exclude all (strong) quantifiers as possible topics and only allow for referential entities, which in her view include indefinites. Recall that I count indefinites among the class of quantifiers. I want to show exactly which quantifiers are excluded as topics, i.e. I will show which ones can never turn up as the first component of an element in a PPA, and which quantificational expressions can be conceived of as possible sentence topics. As already pointed out by Reinhart, indefinites are, of course, among the ones that can be topical. However, I will show that it is only a proper subclass of the indefinites, and most importantly, I want to show why this is so.
2.2
Topic Tests and Topical Quantifiers
Generally, quantifiers have been claimed to be poor candidates for sentence topics, which is probably why there has not been a thorough investigation of different quantifiers that serve as topics. For example, Frey (2004a) agues that the fact that quantifiers cannot be sentence topics follows from the overall concept of topicality – from the aboutness concept as well as from the familiarity concept. In fact, quantifiers do not refer back to already introduced referents. They introduce new discourse referents themselves and therefore will never meet the familiarity criterion. This is unproblematic as we have seen above, because topicality can be defined without reference to any familiarity concept. However, intuitively, they also serve poorly as an ‘address’ in the sense of (Reinhart, 1981), where the remaining sentence information can be stored. Nevertheless, we have seen that there are several exceptions. Certain indefinites have been shown to appear as topics quite frequently. The exceptional behavior of indefinites in this respect is usually explained by their ‘referential’ status. It is claimed that indefinites can receive a referential interpretation and that only such referential indefinites can be sentence topics, because these can easily serve as a ‘storage address’. In this section, I will investigate which quantifiers can be topical and which ones cannot. I will conduct this investigation by looking at overt topic-marking devices in different languages, but concentrate on topic-marking strategies in German and English.
30
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
Although topics certainly do not have to be overtly marked as topical (e.g. a sentence’s grammatical subject is often understood as its topic without any morphological or syntactic marking in English or German), there are means to overtly mark a sentence topic. I will present and discuss some of these means and investigate which quantifiers can be used as topics by using these devices. The list of topic-marking devices will certainly not be exhaustive. It will, however, cover the most common and reliable ones among the topic tests.9
2.2.1
Simple Tests
As argued above, topicality is best understood in the aboutness sense. Usually, one has quite good intuitions concerning what a specific sentence is about. Let us reconsider example (2.1a), repeated here as (2.15). (2.15) Yesterday, Clarissa visited Dena. Intuitively, this sentence tells us something about Clarissa, i.e. that she visited Dena. This intuition can be made even stronger if we let (2.16) precede our example in (2.15). (2.16) I will tell you something about Clarissa. In continuation of (2.16), sentence (2.15) sounds perfectly natural and seems to give us information about Clarissa. If, on the other hand, (2.15) is preceded by (2.17), the sentence sounds less natural under the ‘neutral’ intonation and certainly does not seem to tell us anything about Clarissa. (2.17) I will tell you something about Dena. We rather feel that we are learning something about Dena here.10 Probably the best way to continue (2.17) and convey the information in (2.15) would be by uttering (2.1b), repeated here as (2.19). (2.19) Yesterday, Dena was visited by Clarissa. With respect to the examples discussed, it seems that one intuitively knows what the involved sentences are about. We also have a test at hand that helps to back up our intuitions. Supposing that in a sentence s there is an item x which is believed to be the aboutness topic of s, we can test our intuitions by checking whether s still sounds fine if it is preceded by I will tell you something about x. If s sounds unnatural, x cannot 9 See e.g. also (Kallulli, 1999), where it is argued that direct object doubling clitics in Albanian and Greek indicate the topical status of the involved phrases. This might also be an appropriate means to overtly test for topicality. However, throughout her thesis, Kallulli (1999) uses non-focal and topical as synonymous. As she argues that in fact focus is the decisive feature that determines the derivations and topic is just considered to be the complement, her notion of topicality is certainly very different from what I would regard as topic in line with (Frey, 2001; Reinhart, 1981, and others). 10 If the example sentences are not marked for any special intonation, I assume that they are pronounced ‘neutrally’, i.e. with the same accent pattern as if they were uttered out of context. It is not uncontroversial that a ‘neutral stress pattern’ actually exists. For a short discussion of this see (Reinhart, 1995, Chapter 3). Sentence (2.15) as a follow-up sentence to (2.17) would sound much better with a ‘non-neutral’ stress pattern as in (2.18).
(2.18) Yesterday, ClaRIssa visited Dena.
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
31
be the aboutness topic of s. If s still sounds natural, x is at least a likely candidate to function as the topic for s. Such tests have been proposed and are used quite frequently in the literature. For example Reinhart (1981) proposes the following method to test the aboutness status of some item: if a sentence s with the assumed topic x can be safely paraphrased by It was reported of x that s, the aboutness topic of s is x. The problem with these tests is that they heavily rely on rather vague intuitions that are not independently verifiable. Furthermore, these tests are not a means by which to determine whether or not a certain quantifier can be regarded as the aboutness topic of a sentence. This is so because they are not applicable to items that introduce new discourse referents to the discourse model, as do indefinites or quantifiers in general (cf. the ‘novelty condition’ from (Heim, 1982)). Consider example (2.11b), repeated below as (2.20), which contains the indefinite some horse. (2.20) Some horse has eaten all the bananas. Suppose it is to be tested whether some horse is the aboutness topic of (2.20). The aboutness test would tell us to replace x with some horse in I will tell you something about x resulting in (2.21) I will tell you something about some horse. We would then have to check whether (2.20) still sounds natural if it follows (2.21). As has just been pointed out, indefinites (and quantifiers in general) can never refer back to already introduced entities. The indefinite some horse in (2.20) and (2.21) therefore can only refer to different entities (if they refer at all). Hence, we cannot use this test to elucidate the aboutness status of indefinites and quantifiers. However, the test could be modified slightly in the following way. In the target sentence the assumed topic could be replaced by a corresponding pronoun. (2.22)
a. I will tell you something about some horse. b. It has eaten all the bananas.
As (2.22) sounds perfectly natural, we conclude that some horse is the aboutness topic of (2.20). However, this test would only work for dynamic quantifiers because it makes use of intersentential reference. In order to circumvent this complication, one could use the test proposed in (Reinhart, 1981), which involves only intrasentential anaphora. (2.23) It has been reported about some horse that it has eaten all the bananas. However, it is not guaranteed that replacing the quantifier in the target sentence by a pronoun is harmless in all aspects.11 In order to obtain more reliable results, we have to base the investigation of quantificational topics on other tests. 11 See e.g. (Reinhart, 1981, footnote 6), who reports that the aboutness test fails for generic indefinites in the singular, although Reinhart (1981) assumes that generic indefinites are topical.
32
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
2.2.2
Syntactic Marking
The German middle field position Topics are usually presumed to appear in the prefield of German clauses (cf. e.g. Moln´ar, 1993; Jacobs, 2001). But the German prefield can host more than topics. It can host any phrase, the only constraint being that it has to be one constituent. In particular, there is no information-structural restriction on what can be located in the German prefield. Topics (cf. example 2.24a), (narrowly) focused parts (2.24b) as well as phrases that are neither focus nor topic (2.24c) can be found in this position (cf. Frey, 2005). (2.24)
a. Tell me something about Clarissa. Clarissa hat heute einen TEST geschrieben. Clarissa has today a
test
written
‘Clarissa took a test today.’ b. Who did you see yesterday? Clarissa or Dena? ClaRIssa habe ich gesehen. Clarissa
have I
seen.
‘It was Clarissa whom I saw.’ c. Das TElephon klingelt. The telephone rings.
‘The phone is ringing.’ The initial sentence in (2.24a) requires Clarissa to be the topic of the subsequent target sentence. The sentence sounds natural with Clarissa occupying the prefield. In (2.24b), Clarissa is narrowly focused due to the preceding question. Still, the item can occur in the prefield. Finally, (2.24c) shows that items that are neither topic nor narrow focus can also be hosted by the prefield. In the preceding Section 2.1, it was shown that sentences like (2.24c) contain no topic. Being a thetic sentence, the most natural assumption for (2.24c) would be that the whole sentence is in focus and not only the DP das Telephon (the telephone). Hence, this phrase can neither be topic nor narrow focus. However, as has been pointed out by Frey (2004a), there is a position in the German middle field that can only and must be targeted by constituents that are interpreted as aboutness topics: the one directly above the base position of a sentence adverbial. In this respect, German can be regarded as a discourse configurational language. Frey (2004a, p. 157) formulates the following principle: Frey’s Topic Principle In the middle field of the German clause, directly above the base position of sentential adverbials (SADVs), there is a designated position for topics: all topical phrases occurring in the middle field, and only these, occur in this position. Note that only sentence adverbials mark the right edge of the topic position as these adverbials have the highest base position in the middle field. Temporal or locative
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
33
adverbials do not have this property. Sentence adverbials express the speaker’s estimation of an eventuality (Frey, 2004a, p. 157), such as gl¨ucklicherweise (fortunately), anscheinend (apparently), sicherlich (certainly), and wahrscheinlich (probably).12 Frey (2004a) justifies his claim that aboutness topics of the German middle field can be found only in a certain position by discussing several topic tests. He shows that whenever a constituent is classified as topic according to these tests, it has to turn up in the designated middle field position. Consider the following example from (Frey, 2004a, p. 158). (2.25) Ich erz¨ahle dir etwas u¨ ber Maria. (Let me tell you something about Maria.)
a. N¨achstes Jahr wird Maria wahrscheinlich nach London gehen. next
year will Mary probably
to
London go
‘Next year Mary will probably go to London.’ b. # N¨achstes Jahr wird wahrscheinlich Maria nach London gehen. year will probably
next
Maria to
London go
As discussed above, the context in (2.25) forces Maria to be the topic of the subsequent sentence. (2.25a), where Maria appears in the position directly above the SADV wahrscheinlich (probably), sounds perfect. (2.25b), in which Maria is not in topicposition, is not felicitous, though (2.25b) is a grammatical sentence and would be fully acceptable in a different context. Licit quantifiers in the middle field topic position Under the assumption that Frey’s topic principle is correct, it can be used as a test to determine which quantifiers can be interpreted as topics. In example (2.26), the sentence adverbial interessanterweise (interestingly) marks the position to its left as a topic position.13 (2.26) W¨ahrend des Vortrags ... during
the talk
...
a. hat ein / ? jeder Student interessanterweise geschlafen. has a
/ every student interestingly
slept
‘some / every student was asleep, interestingly.’ b. hat ∗ kein / ∗ fast jeder Student interessanterweise geschlafen. has no
/ almost every student interestingly
slept
‘no / almost every student was asleep, interestingly.’ c. haben drei / einige / ? die meisten / ? alle Studenten interessanterweise have
three / several / the most
/ all students
interestingly
geschlafen. slept
‘three / several / most / all students were asleep, interestingly.’ 12 SADVs also have focus-inducing uses (see Jacobs, 1986). The SADV is then associated with one narrowly focused constituent. This reading sometimes interferes and should be disregarded. 13 To understand the judgments made below, recall that we have to abstract away from a reading of interessanterweise (interestingly) where it is understood as focus-inducing adverb.
34
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS d. haben ∗ wenige / ∗ h¨ochstens drei / ?? mehr als drei / ?? genau drei / have
few
∗
alle Studenten interessanterweise geschlafen.
fast
/ at-most
almost all students
three /
more than three /
interestingly
exactly three /
slept
‘few / at most three / more than three / exactly three / almost all students were asleep, interestingly.’ e. hat interessanterweise ein / kein / jeder / fast jeder Student has interestingly
a
/ no
/ every / almost every student
geschlafen. slept
‘some / no / every / almost every student was asleep, interestingly.’ f. haben interessanterweise drei / einige / ? wenige / h¨ochstens drei / have
interestingly
three / several / few
/ at-most
mehr als drei / genau drei / die meisten / alle / fast more than three / exactly three / the most
three /
alle Studenten
/ all / almost all students
geschlafen. slept
‘three / several / few / at most three / more than three / exactly three / most / all / almost all students were asleep, interestingly.’ The sentences in (2.26a–d) show that only singular indefinites (ein Student (some student)), bare numeral indefinites (drei Studenten (three students)), and the quantifier einige N are well suited in Frey’s topic position.14 Frey (2004b) claims that they receive a ‘specific’ interpretation when they occupy the designated topic position, which explains why they sound natural when they are followed by an explanatory sentence such as (2.27a,b), respectively. (2.27)
a. N¨amlich Peter. namely
Peter
b. N¨amlich die drei in der letzten Reihe. namely
the three in the last
row
‘Namely the three in the last row.’ Universal quantifiers such as jeder Student (every student) and alle Studenten (all students) seem a little degraded in the topic middle field position, but not completely ungrammatical. (Reinhart, 1981, p. 12) also points out that universal quantifiers can felicitously appear in topic positions. Her justification for this fact is that universals can be reinterpreted as sets containing all elements of the quantifier’s restrictor and that these sets can in turn be understood referentially. In the following, I will refer to the quantifiers that can turn up in topic positions – i.e. singular indefinites, bare numeral indefinites, einige N, and universal quantifiers – as topicable quantifiers. I exclude the GQ die meisten N (most N) from my investigations at this point and I will come back to this quantifier later in Section 6.3.3, when I will discuss the semantics of the different GQs in detail. For the moment, it suffices to note that sentence (2.26c) with die meisten 14 The determiners of these expressions have to carry a strong accent in this position, which can be interpreted as an additional topic-marking device (see Section 2.2.3 below). The question of why this accent is often obligatory will be discussed in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
35
Studenten (most students) occupying Frey’s middle field position sounds quite ok. For German, it could be argued that die meisten Studenten (most students) sounds grammatical in topic position only because the definite article die (the) causes the DP to be syntactically treated like a definite description15 and that it can thus occupy a topic position only due to its definite-like appearance, although, semantically, it is not interpreted as topical. However, we will see below that in Japanese and Korean mostquantifiers allow for topic marking, too. Yet, in these languages, there is no definite article that could license this use in a way comparable to what I suggested here. For the moment, we have to leave this issue unsettled. All other quantifiers are more or less deviant. But whereas monotone increasing quantifiers such as mehr als drei Studenten (more than three students) and non-monotonic quantifiers such as genau drei Studenten (exactly three students) sound just extremely odd in the position above the sentence adverbial, monotone decreasing quantifiers such as wenige Studenten (few students), weniger als drei Studenten (less than three students) or kein Student (no student) in this position result in entirely ungrammatical sentences. The ungrammaticality or oddity of the sentences in (2.26a–d) with the respective subject quantifiers can only be due to the fact that these quantifiers occupy a topic position. As (2.26e,f) show, the corresponding sentences with the same quantifiers in a non-topic position are fully grammatical.16 Apparent counterexamples There are examples that seem to pose problems for the claim that only topical elements can occupy the designated middle field position. If the element that appears before the sentence adverbial receives a contrastive interpretation, all kinds of elements, i.e. also quantifiers that usually cannot be interpreted as sentence topics such as fast alle Katzen (almost all cats), seem to be allowed. (2.29)
a. ...weil
fast
alle KATzen erstaunlicherweise intelligent sind.
because almost all cats
surprisingly
intelligent are
‘...because, surprisingly, almost all cats are intelligent.’ b. Aber PFERde sind in der Regel ziemlich dumm. but
horses
are in the rule
relatively stupid
‘But horses are usually quite stupid.’ Following (Frey, 2005), I assume that the quantificational DP in (2.29a) does not occupy the designated middle field position, but rather one that Frey calls KontrP . To reconstruct his line of argument, let us first go through the assumptions he makes concerning the German prefield. The basic question he raises and convincingly answers is 15 Cf. (Pafel, 2005, pp. 44–45), where meisten of die meisten is analyzed syntactically as an adjective (and semantically as a quantity predicate). 16 Note that wenige Studenten (few students) in subject position of (2.26f) seems somewhat degraded. The grammatical status improves if nur (only) is inserted:
(2.28) W¨ahrend des Vortrags haben interessanterweise nur wenige Studenten geschlafen. during the talk have interestingly only few students slept ‘During the talk, only few students were asleep, interestingly.’ The reason for this is not clear to me, but I assume that it is independent of the pursued issues.
36
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
why the German prefield can be filled by all different kinds of constituents. He argues that, generally speaking, it can be filled for two different reasons: 1. To satisfy the EPP (Extended Projection Principle)... • either by Spec-CP base-generated items such as es (it) • or via Formal Movement (FM), which goes back to (Fanselow, 2002) and says that the highest XP in the middle field can be moved to Spec-CP (Minimal link condition). ¯ 2. Due to genuine A-movement, which has the pragmatic effect of contrastive interpretation. It follows that if a (non base-generated) constituent in the prefield does not necessarily receive a contrastive interpretation, it must have been moved there by FM. Frey (2005) assumes that the left periphery in German is structured as in (2.30). (2.30) CP (((hhh C0 (((hhh KontrP (((hhh Kontr 0 (((hhh FinP (((hhh Fin 0 (((hhh TopikP ``` Topik 0 XX X ... P P In this structure the left boundary of the middle field is marked by Fin. Importantly, this position does not host complementizers, which are generated in C (see Frey, 2004c for arguments). In other words, the middle field is not conceived of as beginning right below the position of the complementizer, as is usually assumed. ¯ SpecCP , SpecKontrP , and SpecFinP are A-positions and constitute the C-domain; SpecTopikP constitutes the highest position in the middle field and hosts topics only. There are several conditions that have to hold for this structure. Most importantly for our concerns, complementizers are generated in C. There is only one EPP-feature in the C-domain, and KontrP only hosts phrases with a [+contrastive]-feature. Significantly, Frey (2005) now shows that sometimes elements only seem to occupy the highest middle field position and in fact have to be interpreted as occupying the SpecKontrP -position (for further details see Frey, 2005, pp. 156ff.). These elements then necessarily receive a contrastive interpretation, which distinguishes them from
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
37
those constituents that actually occupy the highest position in the middle field. (Frey, 2005, p. 156) gives the following example: (2.31)
a. ...weil
ROT Max die Haust¨ur
because red
streichen will.
Max the entrance-door paint
wants
‘because Max wants to paint the door red.’ b. ∗ Max will ROT die Haust¨ur Max wants red
streichen.
the entrance-door paint
In (2.31a), ROT (red) seems to occupy the highest middle field position, because it appears below the complementizer weil (because). However (2.31b) shows that the target item ROT (red) cannot appear in the alleged middle field position, if the prefield is occupied. Frey concludes that in (2.31a) it does not, in fact, occupy a middle field position, though it may appear to, but rather SpecKontrP . (2.31b) then is ungrammatical due to the fact that the target item cannot occupy SpecKontrP here, because there is already one constituent in the prefield (and there is only one EPP-feature to be realized in the C-domain). This now gives us an explanation for the initial example (2.29a). Here too, the quantifier occupies SpecKontrP and not the middle field position, which is reserved for sentence topics. Although fast alle Katzen (almost all cats) is located in a position above the sentence adverbial erstaunlicherweise (surprisingly), it has to be assumed to occupy SpecKontrP and not the topic position in the middle field. This assumption is justified by the fact that (2.29a) has a contrastive flavor and necessarily has to occur in a contrastive context, where fast alle Katzen (almost all the cats) are distinguished from another element such as Pferde (horses) in (2.29b). This means that non-topicable elements that appear in a position above the sentence adverbial are not counterexamples to Frey’s claim that there exists a topic position in the German middle field, as long as these elements necessarily receive a contrastive interpretation. German Left dislocation Syntactic dislocation is usually assumed to be a topic-marking device that labels the disclocated element unambiguously as topical (see among others Reinhart, 1981; Gundel, 1985, 1988; Jacobs, 2001). It has been shown by Frey (2000, 2004b), however, that, at least in German, not all dislocation constructions pattern alike and that not all mark the dislocated element as topic. Frey shows that German left dislocation, as opposed to hanging topic constructions or topicalization (despite the unfortunate names of these constructions), is a topic-marking construction.17 Left dislocation vs. hanging topic It is important to distinguish German left dislocation from hanging topic constructions (see also Altmann, 1981). A left-dislocated phrase is prosodically integrated into the subsequent sentence (see example 2.32a), which distinguishes left dislocation from hanging topic constructions (see example 17 Vallduv´ı (1992)
argues that Catalan left dislocation is also a topic-marking device.
38
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
2.32b). Frey (2004b, 2005) indicates this by using different arrows, as shown in the following example. (2.32)
a. Die Clarissa → die ist in Bolivien. (Left Dislocation) the Clarissa
RP is in Bolivia
‘Clarissa is in Bolivia.’ b. Die Clarissa ↑ sie/die ist in Bolivien. (Hanging Topic) the Clarissa
she/RP is in Bolivia
‘Clarissa is in Bolivia.’ A second requirement of German left dislocation constructions is that the resumptive pronoun (RP) must be a weak d-pronoun (die in (2.32)), whereas in hanging topic constructions the resumptive pronoun can be a d-pronoun or an ordinary pronoun (sie in (2.32b)). Weak d-pronouns are form-identical with the different appearances of the definite article. Furthermore, in left dislocation constructions, the d-pronoun and the left-dislocated phrase must agree with respect to case. It is usually assumed that the RP must occur in the prefield (see e.g. Vat, 1981), but see (Frey, 2004b) for a different view. In German hanging topic constructions the RP can appear in any position. As pointed out by Vat (1981), left dislocation allows for binding of an element in the left-dislocated phrase by some element of the following sentence (as long as this element c-commands the base position of the resumptive pronoun). Hanging topic constructions, on the other hand, do not allow for binding (see Frey, 2004b, ex. (3), p. 205 for the following example). (2.33)
a. Seineni Doktorvater → den verehrt jeder Linguisti . his
supervisor
RP admires every linguist
‘His supervisor, every linguist admires (him).’ b. ∗ Seineni Doktorvater ↑ jeder Linguisti verehrt ihn/den. his
supervisor
every linguist
admires him/RP
The binding facts now help to differentiate between hanging topic constructions and left dislocation, even if the resumptive pronoun is a weak d-pronoun in the prefield as in (2.34). (2.34)
a. Alexandras Schwester, die hat jeder Alexandra’s sister
zuerst angerufen.
RP has everyone first
rung-up
‘Alexandra’s sister, everyone rang (her) up first.’ b. Seinei Schwester, die hat jederi zuerst angerufen. his
sister
RP has everyone first
rung-up
‘His sister, everyone rang (her) up first.’ While (2.34a) could be a hanging topic or a left dislocation construction, (2.34b) has to be an instance of left dislocation, because seine (his) can be bound by jeder (everyone). It has also been pointed out by Vat (1981) that left dislocation is island sensitive, whereas the hanging topic construction is not. (2.35)
a. ∗ Seinen Doktorvater → ich kenne jeden Linguisten, der den liebt. his
supervisor
I
know every linguist
who RP loves
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
39
b. Diesen Philosophen ↑ ich kenne jeden Linguisten, der ihn liebt. this
philosopher
I
know every linguist
who him loves
‘This philosopher, I know every linguist who loves him.’ Frey (2005) argues that the left-dislocated element is located in SpecCP and that the resumptive pronoun can occupy another Spec-position in the prefield (SpecFinP or SpecKontrP , see the preceding discussion). According to (Frey, 2004b), the RP first has to be moved to the topic position in the middle field, then it can be moved further to the prefield. The RP may also remain in the middle field, but then it necessarily occupies the designated topic position. (2.36)
a. Seinen Doktorvater → jeder Linguist mag den anscheinend. his
supervisor
every linguist likes RP apparently
‘His supervisor, every linguist likes (him), apparently.’ b. ∗ Seinen Doktorvater → jeder Linguist mag anscheinend den. his
supervisor
every linguist likes apparently
RP
Frey (2004b) concludes that the resumptive pronoun in German left dislocation constructions has to be a topic. Due to the relationship between the RP and the dislocated phrase, the dislocated phrase must also be topical. Hence, German left dislocation unambiguously marks the left-dislocated phrase as topic. This does not hold for German hanging topic constructions, where the RP might also appear in a non-topic marking position (see Frey, 2004b, ex. (21), p. 212). Licit quantifiers in left dislocation constructions Using left dislocation to test the topical status of quantifiers, we get results very similar to the ones observed for the middle field cases.18 (2.37)
a. Ein Pferd, das hat die Bananen gefressen. some horse RP has the bananas eaten
‘Some horse has eaten the bananas.’ b. ∗ Kein / ∗ Jedes / ∗ Fast jedes Pferd, das hat die Bananen gefressen. no
/
every / almost every horse RP has the bananas eaten
‘Some / No / Every /Almost every horse has eaten the bananas.’ c. Drei / Einige / ? Alle / ? Die meisten Pferde, die haben die Bananen three / several / all
/ the most
horses RP have
the bananas
gefressen. eaten
‘Three / Several / Few / All / Most horses have eaten the bananas.’ d. ∗ Wenige / ∗ H¨ochstens drei / ?? Mehr als drei / ?? Genau drei / few ∗
/ at-most
three /
more than three /
exactly three /
Fast alle Pferde, die haben die Bananen gefressen. almost all horses RP have
the bananas eaten
‘Few / At most three / More than three / Exactly three / Almost all horses have eaten the bananas.’ 18 The fronted DPs in the examples of this section have to be read as prosodically integrated into the subsequent sentence to assure that we are actually dealing with left-dislocation as opposed to a hanging topic construction (cf. the discussion of the last subsection).
40
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS e. Ein / Kein / Jedes / Fast jedes Pferd hat die Bananen gefressen. some / no
/ every / almost every horse has the bananas eaten
‘Some / No / Every / Almost every horse has eaten the bananas.’ f. Drei / Einige / Wenige / H¨ochstens drei / Mehr als drei / Genau drei three / several / few
/ at-most
three / more than three / exactly three
/ Die meisten / Alle / Fast alle Pferde haben die Bananen gefressen. / the most
/ all
/ almost all horses have
the bananas eaten
‘Three / Several / Few / At most three / More than three / Exactly three / Most / All / Almost all horses have eaten the bananas.’ Although all quantifiers are allowed as subjects of the sentences in (2.37e,f), certain quantifiers are not allowed in left dislocated position. The class of quantifiers that is allowed here is the same as the class of quantifiers that is allowed in the middle field topic position: singular indefinites, bare numeral indefinites, einige N,19 and marginally universal quantifiers (only plurals). The GQ jedes Pferd (every horse) is deviant in left dislocated position (cf. example (2.37b)). This can be explained as follows: the topic mechanism that I will propose in Chapter 6 – put in simplified terms – evokes that in the case a quantifier is marked as topical a representative subset of this quantifier is picked out that serves as the address for the context update. In the case of jedes Pferd (every horse), the mechanism yields a set that contains all horses and nothing else, which is a plural object. This object would therefore require a plural resumptive pronoun. Syntactically, however, the (singular) quantifier has to agree with the resumptive pronoun and hence should be resumed by a singular pronoun. Consequently, a plural resumptive pronoun renders the sentence entirely ungrammatical. (2.38) ∗ Jedes Pferd, die haben die Bananen gefressen every horse RP have
the bananas eaten
Although the RP would correctly pick up a plural set introduced by the topic mechanism, this clashes with the syntactic requirements of jedes (every), which requires a singular resumption. As these two constraints are incompatible, singular universal DPs cannot turn up in left dislocation constructions on syntactic grounds. The GQ die meisten Pferde (most horses) is also (marginally) allowed in leftdislocated position. As already mentioned during the discussion of the middle field topics, I have to postpone a discussion of most-GQs until Chapter 6.
Apparent counterexamples We observe the same class of quantifiers both in left dislocation constructions and in Frey’s middle field topic position. But now consider the following examples. (2.39)
a. Verr¨uckt! Gestern hat jeder Linguist seine KATze mit zur crazy
yesterday has every linguist his
cat
gebracht. brought
‘Crazy! Yesterday, every linguist took his cat to the party.’ 19 See
also (Altmann, 1981, p. 21) for an example of a left-dislocated einige-DP.
Party
with to-the party
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
41
b. Falsch. Seinen HUND → DEN hat jeder wrong his
dog
RP
mitgebracht.
has everyone brought-along
‘Wrong. Everyone took his dog.’ Frey discusses related examples (Frey, 2004a, ex. (24), (25), p. 165) and argues that the left-dislocated element can be focal and topical at the same time. The focal part is responsible for the contrastive flavor. However, it can be observed that such contrastive left-dislocated DPs can also be found with quantifiers that one would not want to regard as topical and that fail the middle field topic test. (2.40)
a. A: Gestern hat jeder Linguist mehr als drei Flaschen BIER zur yesterday has every linguist more than three bottles
beer
to-the
Party mitgebracht. party brought-along
‘Yesterday, every linguist brought more than three bottles of beer to the party.’ b. B: Bier? Mehr als drei (seiner besten) Flaschen WEIN → DIE hat beer
jeder
more than three of-his best
bottles
wine
RP has
mitgebracht.
everyone brought-along
‘Beer? Everyone brought more than three bottles of (his best) wine.’ (2.41)
a. A: Das Aufr¨aumen nach der Party ging doch sicher schnell, weil the cleaning-up after the party went PART surely quickly because
so viele geholfen haben, nicht? so many helped
have
not
‘I guess the cleaning-up after the party went quickly because many people helped you, right?’ b. B: Naja. Fast alle KINder → DIE haben mir tats¨achlich geholfen. well
almost all children
RP have
me indeed
helped
(Aber die Erwachsenen die haben nur rumgesessen.) but
the grown-ups
RP have
only sat-around
‘Well, almost all children helped me to clean up indeed. (But the grown-ups only sat around.)’ Intuitively, the modified numeral indefinite mehr als drei (seiner besten) Flaschen Wein (more than three (of his best) bottles of wine) and the strong quantifier fast alle Kinder (almost all children) do not constitute plausible sentence topics, i.e. they are not objects that a sentence can possibly be about. Binding into the DP is possible, which shows that we are dealing with left dislocation and not with a hanging topic construction. The reader might be sceptical about example (2.40b) because the involved DP is a partitive one and partitive constructions are known to behave ‘abnormally’ in many respects. However, when the material in parentheses is omitted – resulting in a version that does not contain a partitive element – the sentence is still grammatical. Note that the prosodical integration (indicated by the arrow →) also indicates that the sentences are left dislocation constructions and not hanging topic constructions.
42
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
Despite initial appearance, these examples do not constitute an argument for the claim that modified numeral indefinites or strong quantifiers such as fast alle Kinder (almost all children) can serve as aboutness topics. They rather show that not all cases of left dislocation have a topic-marking function. Without the contrastive context, sentences (2.40b) and (2.41b) are just as bad as the relevant sentences in (2.37d), as shown in (2.42). (2.42)
a.
??
Mehr als drei (seiner besten) Flaschen Wein → die hat jeder
more than three of-his best
bottles
wine
RP has everyone
mitgebracht. brought-along
‘Everyone brought more than three bottles of his best wine.’ b. ?? Fast alle Kinder → die haben mir (tats¨achlich) geholfen. almost all children
RP have
me (indeed)
helped
‘Almost all children helped me (indeed).’ It is striking that in (2.40) and (2.41) not only the contrastive element, but also the resumptive pronoun receives a heavy accent. This can be explained if it is assumed that, in these cases, the resumptive pronoun has directly moved to SpecKontrP , without having landed in the topic position of the middle field on its way. This is motivated by the contrastive interpretation the sentences obtain. Empirically, this case is distinguishable from the topic case, because the relevant sentences can only be interpreted with a contrastive flavor. In other words, German left dislocation has two different functions: to mark topicality and to mark contrastivity. I conclude – contrary to (Frey, 2004b) – that not all left dislocation constructions necessarily mark the left-dislocated element as topical. Exceptions to this rule are those where the RP is interpreted in SpecKontrP . The resulting sentences can only be interpreted contrastively. But all left dislocation constructions that do not have a contrastive flavor are necessarily topic-marking. That two seemingly very different functions – marking contrastivity and marking topicality – are encoded by one and the same means might seem surprising at first sight. However, without having a deeper insight why this correlation exists, let me point out that it can be found in other places as well. First, it is well known that the Japanese marker wa marks constituents as either topical or contrastive (see Kuroda, 2005 and his earlier work for some speculations about possible sources of the correlation of contrastivity and topicality).20 And second, it will be shown below that also a certain accent pattern in German can indicate either topicality of the accented constituent or a contrastive interpretation. Now we can examine the contrastive quantifiers in the alleged middle field topic position (cf. examples (2.29) from the previous section) from another perspective. There, 20 Note also that according to (Gundel, 1988), who cites (Lambrecht, 1980), French left dislocation receives a contrastive interpretation in standard French, but a ‘neutral’ one in non-standard French. If ‘neutral’ is understood to mean ‘non-contrastive, but topical’, this seems to suggest that the two different functions that left dislocation can have – to mark topicality and to mark contrastivity – have been disassociated such that only one of the functions is now expressed by left dislocation in standard French and the other one by left dislocation in non-standard French.
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
43
I followed Frey (2005) in the assumption that these quantifiers do not occupy the designated topic position, contrary to how it might appear. An alternative way to look at the data now would be to assume that the designated middle field position can mark aboutness topicality or contrastivity, just as left dislocation serves these two different functions. The topic-marking function of left dislocation Concerning the relationship between a current topic and the preceding text in German, Frey (2004b) observes that a left-dislocated element has to stand in some relation to the previous discourse (see also Frey, 2005, p. 164), i.e. the left-dislocated element denotes a referent already introduced in the discourse or refers to some already established discourse referent. This judgment is in line with (Ward and Prince, 1991), who argue that elements that are dislocated to the left in English have to stand in some (salient partially ordered set) relation to an element of the preceding context. So English and German seem to pattern alike in this respect. (2.43)
a. Meine besten Freundinnen sind alle weggezogen. my
best
friends
are all moved-away
‘My best friends have all moved away.’ b. Die Clarissa, die ist nach Bolivien gegangen. the Clarissa RP is to
Bolivia
gone
‘Clarissa went to Bolivia.’ c. Die Clarissa, sie ist nach Bolivien gegangen. the Clarissa she is to
Bolivia
gone
‘Clarissa went to Bolivia.’ (2.43b,c) are meant to follow (2.43a). While (2.43b), which is a left-dislocation construction, can only be interpreted to mean that Clarissa is one of the speaker’s best friends, in the hanging topic construction (2.43c) it could be the case that a completely new topic is initiated, which would mean that Clarissa is not necessarily interpreted as being one of the speaker’s best friends. (Frey, 2004b) furthermore points out (attributing this observation to Keenan-Ochs and Schieffelin, 1976 and Duranti and Ochs, 1979) that left dislocation is a device that serves to change the current topic of a conversation. He calls this the topic-promoting function of German left dislocation: left dislocation is only an appropriate means if a non-topic acquires the status of a topic.21 This is the reason why some left dislocation constructions sound odd even if the dislocated element is a topic, namely when the left-dislocated element had already been the topic in previous discourse. Hence, not all topics are acceptable in left dislocation constructions. The reverse is a reliable test, though: if a certain constituent is felicitous in a left-dislocated position, it is necessarily the topic of the sentence (except in those cases that necessitate a contrastive interpretation). Hanging topic constructions behave differently again. The dislocated phrase might pick up a phrase that has been the topic of a preceding sentence. 21 Frey (2004b) refers to sentence topics here. He shows that left dislocation constructions are a good means to establish a new sentence topic. On the other hand, they cannot change the discourse topic (see Frey, 2004b, ex. (31), (35) pp. 216–17).
44
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
English topic-marking constructions According to Gundel (1985), extraposition to the beginning or to the end of a sentence always involves topical DPs (at least if the involved DP does not receive a heavy accent). We have seen that, at least for German, this claim is too strong. Reinhart (1981) agrees that, in English, fronted DPs are topical. In (Gundel, 1988), the author picks out topicalization (also called the double-subject construction) as – in her view – one of the clearest cases of a topic-marking construction. This is in line with (Frey, 2004b), who shows that English topicalization rather than English left dislocation patterns with German left dislocation as far as e.g. binding properties are concerned. In view of this, it would thus be expected that English topicalization serves as a topic-marking device in the same way as German left dislocation does. However, such a conclusion cannot be drawn for English left dislocation without further research. I have to leave the issue unsettled and close this section with the remark that in order to reconstruct the judgments about topical quantifiers in English that were given for German in the preceding section, one has to find a construction that unambiguously marks one of the involved constituents as topical. It would then be predicted that the class of quantifiers allowed in this construction comprises only singular indefinites, bare numeral indefinites and potentially universal quantifiers.
2.2.3
Intonational Marking
Topicality can be indicated via intonation, at least in English and German. Given topics are usually deaccented, unless they are read as contrastive topics. Contrastive topics, on the other hand, receive a secondary pitch accent (see e.g. Gundel, 1985, 1988; Hedberg, 1990; Moln´ar, 1993; B¨uring, 1997). This accent is usually argued to be a rising one, which I will mark with the arrow ↑.22 (2.44) Was ist denn mit Maria und Oliver los? Warum sind die so schlecht gelaunt? (What’s up with Maria and Oliver? Why are they in such a bad mood?) ↑OLIver ist durch die Pr¨ufung gefallen und ↑MaRIa hat zu wenig Oliver
is through the exam
fallen
and
Maria
has too little
geschlafen. slept
‘Oliver failed the exam and Maria hasn’t had enough sleep.’ In (2.44), Oliver and Maria are clearly topical and given. They receive an accent nevertheless, because the two topics are contrasted with each other. There is furthermore a special brand of sentences that are said to involve contrastive topics too, so called hat contour sentences or bridge accent sentences e.g. discussed 22 As mentioned above, it is unclear whether partial topics really have to be indicated by a rising accent on the determiner of the DPs involved. The same holds for contrastive topics. Furthermore, it is not clear in those cases where the topic is marked by a rising tone, whether this accent has to be just a simple rising tone or a fall-rise tone, as claimed in (Jacobs, 1997) for the first DP of so called ‘hat contour’ structures (see below). Jacobs concedes that intuitions might be additionally blurred, because an (underlying) fall-rise tone can be simplified to yield only a rising tone in the end.
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
45
by (B¨uring, 1997; Jacobs, 1997; Krifka, 1998; B¨uring, 2003). Consider the following well-known example from (B¨uring, 1997, ex. 2a, p. 175). Again, I mark a rising tone by the arrow; a falling tone is indicated by the backslash.23 (2.45) ↑ALle Politiker sind \NICHT korrupt. all
politicians are
not
corrupt
‘Not all politicians are corrupt.’ Intonation is crucial here. The sentence consists of two primary accents, a rising one on the determiner of the subject DP and a falling one on nicht. It only has one reading, namely a scope inversion reading, where the negation takes scope over the universal quantifier. This is, of course, a very peculiar feature and this fact has hence received a great deal of attention in the literature. However, I will not discuss the scope facts here, because they are irrelevant for my concerns.24 What is important, though, is the fact that these examples are usually regarded as involving a topical constituent. B¨uring (1997) argues that the determiner of the subject DP (i.e. alle (all)) is topical. In (Jacobs, 1997), the construction is referred to as I-topicalization and contrastive topicalization. I depart from (B¨uring, 1997) and (Jacobs, 1997) and do not consider the subject determiner nor the entire subject DP in (2.45) to be topical – at least not in the aboutness sense. B¨uring (1997) has a much broader conception of topicality than the aboutness concept which is usually adopted (as critically noted in Jacobs, 1997, p. 107). For this reason, B¨uring identifies far more objects as topical than one would usually regard as aboutness topics. Jacobs (1997) however, whose conception of topicality is much closer to the aboutness view, argues that I-topicalization is a topicalization construction precisely because one has the intuition that the underlying utterance made is actually made about the subject quantifier. Yet, he points out that this notion of aboutness topicality is a different one than the one advocated in (Reinhart, 1981), because with I-topicalization, the subject quantifier does not need to represent an address or a link for information storage. In other words, Jacobs argues that the subject quantifier does not need to be ‘referential’. This is evidenced by the fact that (almost) all quantifiers can be involved in ‘contrastive topicalizations’, although we have seen that most of them cannot be marked as aboutness topics in the general case. Hence, there is a clear difference between I-topicalization and other topicalization constructions such as left dislocation (see Jacobs, 1997, pp. 96-99, footnote 28). Most quantifiers are not licensed in ordinary topicalization constructions, while they are perfectly acceptable with I-topicalization. Let me illustrate this last point by way of the following example. (2.46) ↑WEnige / Mehr als ↑DREI / Genau ↑DREI Politiker sind \NICHT few
/ more than three / exactly three politicians are
not
korrupt. corrupt
‘It is not the case that few / more than three / exactly three politicians are corrupt.’ 23 I diverge from the traditional notation here, where usually a rising tone is represented by the slash, and follow the notation in (Pafel, 2005), instead. 24 See (Ludwig, 2006) for a discussion of the different scope-taking possibilities of hat contour sentences with varying subject quantifiers.
46
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
All subject quantifiers in (2.46) are felicitous with the indicated intonation pattern, i.e. a rising tone on the determiner and a falling one on nicht. Yet, based on our assumptions thus far, all the subject DPs are very unlikely candidates to serve as sentence topics. I conclude that in I-topicalization constructions, the involved quantifiers are not topical in the aboutness sense outlined above (i.e. they do not point to an address for information storage). However, they are undoubtedly contrastive with respect to some other quantifier – the existence of a contrastive element in the context (whether given overtly or covertly) is even considered as a conditio sine qua non for hat contour structures by Jacobs (1997). In other words, what is called a ‘contrastive topic’ in the literature, is just (part of) a contrastive – non-(aboutness) topical – constituent. The specific accent pattern is simply licensed by the contrastive readings the sentences have.25 So far, we have seen an example where the (usually rising) accent indicates a contrastive topic (cf. (2.44)) and one where it simply indicates contrastivity, but not aboutness topicality (cf. (2.46)). There are other examples where the accent actually only marks aboutness topicality and not contrastivity. It simply marks a new topic. This function of the intonation pattern has been pointed out in various places (see Gundel, 1985, 1988; Hedberg, 1990; Moln´ar, 1993; McNally, 1998). If the DP consists of a determiner and a simple (non-modified) NP-complement, the accent usually falls on the determiner, as in the case of the hat contour structures in (2.46). Consider the following example from German. (2.47) ↑DREI Filme von Hitchcock(, die) kennt jeder. three films of
Hitchcock
(RP) knows everybody
‘Three of Hitchcock’s films everybody knows.’ Drei Filme (three films) is arguably the topic of (2.47). Being an indefinite, it cannot be given and it is hence marked by a (rising) tone on the determiner. Note that this intonational marking can mark topicality on its own or add to the syntactic marking via left dislocation, as indicated in (2.47). Jacobs (1997) distinguishes this kind of construction, which he refers to as I-specification, from the I-topicalization cases in (2.45) and (2.46) by way of several characteristics. First, the accent on the determiner in I-specification constructions can be a rising or a fall-rise tone, but it does not need to be. This is different for I-topicalization constructions, where the accent must be a rising one or a fall-rise. Yet, typically both constructions use a rising tone. In the following German example from (Jacobs, 1997, ex. 31, p. 101), which the author takes to be an example of I-specification, the determiner can bear a falling tone.
25 The accent on the determiner of the subject DP is probably not a simple focus accent, as has been pointed out by (B¨uring, 1997) and (Jacobs, 1997). This is one of the reasons why these authors treat these constructions as topicalization constructions. Yet these constructions do not involve topical items in the conception of topicality that is adopted in this book.
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
47
(2.48) Ich glaube, dass man /JUgendlichen vor I
believe that one
teenagers
allem \EInen Roman von Grass
before all
some novel
of
Grass
empfehlen kann(, n¨amlich “HUNdejahre”). recommend can
namely ‘Hundejahre’
‘I believe, one novel of Grass can be especially recommended to teenagers(, namely ‘Hundejahre’).’ And second, according to Jacobs, I-specification does not evoke alternatives to the quantificational determiner, but rather to the entire DP. Furthermore the I-specified DP can be additionally characterized by a continuing namely-phrase. It is questionable whether any contrast is evoked at all in what Jacobs calls I-specification constructions. Rather the DP under discussion seems to be marked as topical and further specification about this topic is expected – hence the felicity of the namely-continuation. This differentiates the I-specification construction from the I-topicalization cases, which are acceptable only in contrastive contexts. In sum, intonation can serve as a topic-marking device. Just like German left dislocation, a specific intonation pattern, i.e. a strong – usually rising – tone on the determiner of a quantificational DP, can either indicate topicality or contrastivity in German or English.
2.2.4
Morphological Marking
Japanese, Korean, and Hmong Kuno (1972) argues that in Japanese main clauses, the morphological marker wa has two unrelated functions: it either marks the topic (Kuno calls it the theme) of a sentence or it signals that the wa-marked constituent is contrasted with another element.26 (Note that Kuno assumes that in subordinate clauses, thematic wa is replaced by ga, whereas wa in the contrastive sense is retained, but see Kuroda (2005) for a more sophisticated analysis of embedded wa.) We are only interested here in the thematic use of wa. Kuno claims that in this case, the wa-marked expression has to be familiar (in his terms: anaphoric) or generic.27 Accordingly, topicless sentences such as It is raining cannot contain a wa-marked constituent (unless there is some contrastive flair to them). (Kuno, 1972, p. 270) gives the following example. (2.49)
a. ∗ Ame wa hutte imasu. rain T OP falling is
‘(Lit.) Rain is falling.’ 26 In fact, as hinted at above, it is doubtful that these two functions are actually unrelated. In many languages, among them English and German as we have just seen, topical and contrastive elements are marked by the same intonation pattern (a strong accent on the determiner). Furthermore, German left dislocation and Frey’s topic position in the German middle field seem to have an ambiguous role as marking topicality and marking contrastivity. So it seems that there should be a reason for this close connection between contrastiveness and topicality. 27 I will set aside generic readings for the moment and come back to them – yet only very briefly – in Chapter 5.
48
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS b. Ame ga
hutte imasu.
rain N OM falling is
‘It is raining.’ Kuroda (1972, 2005) argues that the function of wa is actually not to mark the involved DP as topical, but to indicate that the underlying sentence involves a categorical judgment, whereas sentences without wa represent thetic judgments. However, Kuroda is referring to topic as a discourse notion and hence argues mostly against the claim that wa-marked items have to be familiar. Whether wa actually marks topics in an aboutness sense or indicates categorical judgments is a subtle question that cannot be investigated here. For the purpose of this book, I will treat the two views alike and take it that Kuroda’s view that wa marks categorical judgments is essentially the same as saying that it marks the (aboutness) topic of a sentence. Note that Korean has a thematic marker similar to the wa-marker in Japanese, namely nun (and its variant un) (see among others Lee, 1987; Hedberg, 1990; Kuroda, 2005; Tomioka, 2007). The same holds for Hmong28 and the marker mas (see Fuller, 1988). Licit quantifiers with thematic topic-markings To my knowledge, there is little discussion in the literature about the possibility of (thematic) wa-marking of quantifiers. Kuno shows that quantificational phrases such as oozei no hito (many people) are ungrammatical when they are wa-marked, unless they can be interpreted contrastively. This is shown in example (2.50) (Kuno, 1972, p. 270). (2.50)
a. ∗ Oozei no hito
wa party ni kimasita.
many of people T OP party to came
b. Oozei no hito
wa party ni kimasita ga, omosiroi hoto wa
many of people T OP party to came
hitori
but interesting people T OP
mo kimasen desita.
one-person even come-not did
‘Many people came to the party, but not a single interesting person.’ Furthermore, one can find a few comments on the possible wa-markings of quantifiers in (Tomioka, 2007). It is shown that thematic wa-marking in Japanese and nun/unmarking in Korean is possible with subete-no gakusee-wa/motun haksayng-un (all students) and hotondo-no gakusee-wa/taypwupwun-uy haksayng-un (most students), respectively.29 We have seen that in English and German, universal quantifiers and DPs with the determiner most can also appear in topic positions. Hence, these findings are compatible with what we have observed so far. The Japanese correspondents of more than three N, less than three N and exactly three N cannot be marked by a thematic wa in Japanese.30 Consider the following data. (2.51)
a.
??
3 -biki -yori ooku -no neko -wa nemutteiru.
3 -C LF -than many -G EN cat
-T OP be.sleeping
‘More than three cats (T OP) are sleeping.’ 28 Hmong
is a language spoken by Hmong people e.g. in northern Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. dareka-wa/nwukwunka-nun (someone) can be used contrastively. See also (Lee, 1987, ex. (2c), p. 4) for an example of a nun-marked most-DP in Korean. 30 I am grateful to Shinichiro Ishihara (p.c.) for providing me with the Japanese data and judgments. 29 Furthermore,
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY b.
??
49
3 -biki -izyoo -no neko -wa nemutteiru.
3 -C LF -or.more -G EN cat
-T OP be.sleeping
‘Three or more cats (T OP) are sleeping.’ c. ?? 2 -hiki -yori sukunai neko -wa nemutteiru. 2 -C LF -than few
d.
cat
-T OP be.sleeping
‘Less than two cats (T OP) are sleeping.’ ?? 2 -hiki -ika -no neko -wa nemutteiru. 2 -C LF -or.fewer -G EN cat
-T OP be.sleeping
‘Two or less cats (T OP) are sleeping.’ e. ?? Tyoodo 3 -biki -no neko -wa nemutteiru. exactly 3 -C LF -G EN cat
-T OP be.sleeping
‘Exactly three cats (T OP) are sleeping.’ The two question marks indicate that the sentences are odd, unless they are interpreted contrastively. In a thematic reading they are infelicitous. The following quantifiers, however, can be felicitously marked by a thematic wa. (2.52)
a. Neko -wa nemutteiru. cat
-T OP be.sleeping
‘A cat (T OP) is sleeping.’ b. 3 -biki -no neko -wa nemutteiru. 3 -CLF -G EN cat
-T OP be.sleeping
‘Three cats (T OP) are sleeping.’ c. Subete -no neko -wa nemutteiru. all
-G EN cat
-T OP be.sleeping
‘All cats (T OP) are sleeping.’ Again, singular indefinites, bare numeral indefinites, and universals are among the topicable quantifiers, which is what we find for English and German, too.31 Finally, (Hedberg, 1990, Chapter 2), citing (Lee, 1987, pp. 18–19) for the Korean example32 given in (2.54a) and (Fuller, 1988, p. 57) for the Hmong example in (2.54b), pointed out that also in Korean and Hmong ‘specific’ indefinites may be morphologically marked as topics.
31 Note
however that I was also told that the Japanese translation of almost all N can be wa-marked without problems, whereas in German and English this quantifier cannot appear in topic positions. I have to leave an investigation of these contradictory findings for future research. (2.53) hotondo subete -no neko -wa nemutteiru almost all -G EN cats -T OP be.sleeping ‘Almost all cats (T OP) are sleeping.’ 32 There are further examples of nun-marked indefinites in (Lee, 1987), e.g. ex. (7) on p. 8. But note that although Lee takes nun to be a topic marker in Korean, the author holds a different view of topicality than I have put forth. In particular, he does not follow Reinhart’s (1981) aboutness view of topicality.
50
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS (2.54)
a. ∂ ce
ne-ka manna-n salam-un mikuk-e
o-n
ci
yesterday I-N OM met-ATTR person-T OP America-L OC come-ATTR since
sam ny∂ ntφ-s’-nınte
acitkto unc∂ n-il
three year became-PAST-C IRCUM yet
mos ha-n
-te.
driving-ACC not do-N PST QUOT
‘A man I met yesterday (T OP) has been in America for three years, but (he said) he cannot drive yet.’ b. Ib co neeg tuaj tshiab (mas) kuvxav tau ib co pab kuv. one G RP person come new
T OP
I-want get one G RP help me
‘(From) a group of people (who) just arrived (T OP), I want to get some people to help me.’
2.2.5
A Discourse Configurational Language: Hungarian
Szabolcsi (1997b) dubs Hungarian a language that wears its LF on its sleeve. In Hungarian, most sentences containing more than one quantifier are unambiguous, and these quantifiers only receive surface scope. Szabolcsi shows that there are several positions in Hungarian that can host only certain kinds of quantifiers. She argues that the Hungarian pre-verbal field has the following structure (the asterisk indicating the possibility of multiple filling).33
(2.55)
TopP ∗ ( ((hhh QP ∗ ( ((hhh PredOp/Focus P P
For our purposes, there is only one position that is particularly important, namely the Top-position, which can host only topics. It is reported in (Szabolcsi, 1997b, p. 121) that this position can host the following GQs: a legt¨obb fi´u (most of the boys), valamely fi´u/bizonyos fi´uk (some boys), bare numeral quantifiers such as hat fi´u (six boys), and sok fi´u (many boys). However, this position excludes universals (in the singular), monotone decreasing quantifiers such as kev´es fi´u (few boys) and modified numeral quantifiers such as t¨obb mint hat fi´u (more than six boys). Note that Beghelli and Stowell (1997) argue that in English also all N (as opposed to every N and each N ) belongs to the class of group denoting quantifiers, which are the ones that can be hosted by the Top-position. Szabolcsi (1997b) does not discuss a plural universal quantifier in Hungarian. However, according to Be´ata Gyuris (p.c.), the quantifier az o¨ sszes N (the whole N), which is to a certain extent similar to all N, can appear in Top-position at least marginally. It is obvious that the topic position in Hungarian can basically be targeted by the same quantifiers that we found in topic positions in German and English and that can be wamarked in Japanese. The only difference to what we have seen before is that sok fi´u 33 Szabolcsi has different names for what I – following (Wedgwood, 2004) among others – dub Top(ic)P and Q(uantifier )P , namely HRefP and HDistP , respectively.
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
51
(many boys) can target the topic position, although we have seen that many N cannot be thematically wa-marked in Japanese, but only contrastively. I exclude the quantifier many N from my examination here, because it is known to behave problematically in many respects and an in-depth analysis of it would go beyond the scope of this book.
2.2.6
Alleged Topic Tests
In this section, I will show that some topic tests that have been proposed in the literature do not actually test topicality. Hence, in the following I will outline what I will not treat as a test for topicality as opposed to what has often been claimed. Subjects and sentence initial position It has been proposed every now and then that (grammatical) subjects are topics. Though this is certainly a clear tendency (cf. e.g. Kuno, 1972) and the unmarked case, it is not necessarily so. There are clear cases where a non-subject is the topic of a given sentence. Reinhart (1981, p. 9) cites the following example: (2.56) Kracauer’s book is presumably the most famous ever written on the subject of the cinema. Of course, many more people are familiar with the book’s catchy title than are acquainted with its turgid text. (The Village Voice, Oct. 1, 1979:49) Intuitively, it is quite obvious that the topic of the second sentence is the book (or its title), which is not the grammatical subject of the sentence. The sentence is felt to be about the book, which is also a discourse old entity. Passive constructions, on the other hand, Reinhart (1981) claims, mark their subjects unambiguously as topics under ‘neutral’ intonation. The subject can only be nontopical if it is uttered with a focal accent. In (Reinhart, 2004) this assumption is relativized. There the claim is a negative one. She assumes that in a passive construction, a non-subject can never be the topic. The subject can be the topic, but it is also possible that the bare proposition is topical (which for others would mean that the sentence is topicless). Summing up, grammatical subjects do not have to be topical, not even in passive constructions. Hence, I will not use subjecthood as a topic test. The same holds for the sentence initial position. Many linguists (see e.g. Halliday, 1967; Firbas, 1964; Moln´ar, 1993) have claimed that topical DPs can only appear in sentence initial position. However, this claim has turned out not to hold in general (see e.g. Gundel, 1985; Hedberg, 1990; Frey, 2004a). Cataphoric pronouns Cataphoric or backward anaphoric pronouns are assumed to relate to topics only (see Reinhart, 2004) or, as Kuno (1972) states it, to discourse old, predictable entities. Though Kuno (1972) formulates his hypothesis in the indicated way, he would presumably subscribe to the view that cataphors only relate to topics. In his work,
52
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
Kuno himself mentions several exceptions and complications to this hypothesis. Yet, cataphoric constructions are often used as a test for topichood. In this section, I will give reasons why I want to exclude them from my topic testing devices. It is argued that cataphoric pronouns such as the underlined pronouns in (2.57) have to relate to a topic. In the following, I will call this the topical antecedents only assumption. (2.57)
a. Aus Angst um ihren Job hat Anne geschwiegen. out fear
about her
job has Anne remained silent
‘Because she feared to lose her job, Anne remained silent.’ b. Weil sie Angst um ihren Job hatte, hat Anne geschwiegen. because she fear
about her
job had
has Anne remained silent
‘Because she feared to lose her job, Anne remained silent.’ Recall that while Kuno (1972) understands all topics to be familiar entities, Reinhart (1981, 2004) defends the aboutness (only) concept of topicality and argues that also non-familiar items such as indefinites are good representatives of topics. Therefore she also expects (topical) indefinites to be suitable in backward anaphoric constructions and argues that this prediction is actually borne out.34 She bases her claim on corpus studies of (Carden, 1982), which show that in fact most of the cataphoric pronouns in his corpora relate to items that do not meet the familiarity criterion. Frey (2004a) follows Reinhart (1981, 2004) and uses backward anaphoricity to support his claim that middle field topics always occupy the designated topic position. Under the assumption that backward anaphoric pronouns have to relate to a topic it is predicted in Frey’s theory that the ‘antecedent’ (here, it should better be called ‘postcedent’) of the pronoun has to be located in the topic-promoting German middle field position, because – as shown above – all topics in the German middle field have to occupy this position. The prediction is confirmed by the data in (2.58) (cf. related examples in Frey, 2004a, pp. 159–60). (2.58)
a. Aus Angst um ihren Job hat Anne leider out fear
about her
geschwiegen.
job has Anne unfortunately remained silent
‘Because she feared to lose her job, Anne remained silent, unfortunately.’ b. ∗ Aus Angst um ihren Job hat leider Anne geschwiegen. out fear
c. Weil
about her
job has unfortunately Anne remained silent
sie Angst um ihren Job hatte, hat Anne leider
because she fear
about her
job had
has Anne unfortunately
geschwiegen. remained silent
‘Because she feared to lose her job, Anne remained silent, unfortunately.’ 34 (Kuno, 1972, p. 304, footnote 28) also cites one example from (Postal, 1972), where – what he calls – a ‘specific’ indefinite is the antecedent of a backwards anaphor. He claims that this is possible because the indefinite in Postal’s example is ‘specific’ and therefore half anaphoric as he considers it to be ‘speakerreferential’.
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY d. ∗ Weil
53
sie Angst um ihren Job hatte, hat leider
because she fear
about her
job had
Anne
has unfortunately Anne
geschwiegen. remained silent
Unfortunately, there are cases of (plural) backward anaphora, where it seems that the antecedent does not have to be located in Frey’s topic position. But this does not question Frey’s assumption of a designated topic position in the German middle field in general, as he gives plenty of other convincing arguments for his claim. It only shows that backwards anaphoricity is not necessarily tied to topicality. The ungrammaticality of (2.58b,d) would thus have to be explained on different grounds (see below). (2.59) Aus Angst um ihre Jobs haben leider out fear
about their jobs have
fast
alle / mehr als 500
unfortunately almost all / more than 500
Angestellte geschwiegen. employees
remained silent
‘Because they feared to lose their jobs, almost everybody / more than 500 employees remained silent, unfortunately.’ Apart from the fact that the antecedents of the cataphoric pronouns are not situated in Frey’s topic position, the quantifiers in (2.59) are very unlikely topics anyway. (Recall that we have observed above that these DPs usually cannot be marked as topical.) One can also find very unlikely candidates for sentence topics in the singular such as keiner (no one) or fast jeder (almost everyone) as cataphoric antecedents. (2.60) Aus Angst um seinen Job hat keiner / fast out fear
about his
jeder
geschwiegen.
job has no one / almost everyone remained silent
‘Because they feared to lose their jobs, no one / almost everyone remained silent.’ Both keiner (no one) and fast jeder (almost everyone), are allowed in the backward anaphoric construction in (2.60).35 To complicate matters even further, these 35 Sentence (2.60) with keiner (no one) in subject position only receives a contrastive interpretation (with a specific contrastive intonation pattern). One would expect the sentence to be followed by an utterance like (2.61).
(2.61) Sondern eigentlich nur aus Bequemlichkeit. but actually only from convenience ‘But actually just out of convenience.’ It seems that this contrastive interpretation suggests itself because it is the only plausible one the sentence can possibly have. This is evidenced by the fact that the contrastive interpretation is not specific to the cataphoric version in (2.60). Also (2.62) only receives the contrastive interpretation indicated above. (2.62) Keiner hat aus Angst um seinen Job geschwiegen. no one has of fear about his job remained silent ‘No one remained silent because he feared to lose his job.’ However, a slight variant of (2.60) also yields a ‘neutral’, non-contrastive interpretation for the sentence: (2.63) Aus Angst um seinen Job hat keiner sich zu reden getraut. out fear about his job has no one himself to talk dared ‘Because they feared to lose their jobs, no one dared to talk.’
54
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
quantifiers are not licensed in all backwards anaphoric constructions (cf. (2.64) vs. (2.60)). (2.64)
??
Weil
er Angst um seinen Job hatte, hat keiner / fast
because he fear
about his
job had
jeder
has no one / almost everyone
geschwiegen. remained silent
Interestingly, plural quantifiers – also ones that we have observed not to function as topics usually – seem to be ok here. (2.65) Weil
sie Angst um ihre Jobs hatten, haben fast
because they fear
about their jobs had
have
alle Angestellten /
almost all employees
/
mehr als 500 Angestellte geschwiegen. more than 500 employees
remained silent
‘Because they feared to lose their jobs, almost all employees / more than 500 employees remained silent.’ Examples (2.59), (2.60), and (2.65) provide substantial counterevidence to the ‘topical antecedents only’ assumption. And there is yet another argument: cataphoric pronouns appear in answers to wh-questions, which are arguably focal and non-topical. This proves Kuno (1972, pp. 302ff.) wrong, who claims that backwards pronominalization is not possible if the antecedent is new information or the focus. Consider first a counterexample that Kuno (1972, p. 306) gives himself, where a cataphoric pronoun is related to a focused constituent. (2.66)
a. Who killed Mary? b. ? With an accomplice that hei hired, Johni killed Mary. c. ∗ With an accomplice that Johni hired, hei killed Mary.
Kuno judges the cataphoric variant in (b) to be not as bad as the non-cataphoric one in (c) and hypothesizes that exhaustive answers to questions cannot be pronominalized intrasententially, which might be the reason why (2.66c) is ungrammatical. As then there would be no other way to express the circumstances in (2.66), Kuno argues, the (b)-variant is (marginally) licit even though this variant violates the constraint that cataphoric pronouns must relate to topical/non-focal material. However, consider now another example, where Kuno’s line of argument cannot be maintained. First note that the cataphoric pronoun is licensed even though the antecedent is in focus. (2.67)
a. Wen wird Maria zum Mannschaftskapit¨an ernennen? who will Maria to-the team captain
nominate
‘Who will Maria nominate to be team captain?’ b. Obwohl eri in letzter Zeit so schlecht in Form war, glaube ich, (wird although he in last
time so bad
in form was believe I
(will
es) Peteri (sein). it) Peter (be)
‘Though he has performed so poorly recently, I believe it will be Peter.’
CHAPTER 2. TOPICALITY
55
The following example shows that, here, the anaphoric variant of (2.67b), given in (2.68), is fully acceptable, which means that Kuno’s argument is not applicable to this example. (2.68) Ich glaube, (es wird) Peteri (sein), obwohl eri in letzter Zeit so schlecht in I
believe (it will) Peter (be)
although he in last
time so bad
in
Form war. form was
‘I believe it will be Peter though he performed so poorly, recently.’ I conclude from all this – contrary to (Kuno, 1972; Frey, 2004a; Reinhart, 2004) – that cataphoric pronouns do not have to relate to topics. This is in line with (Carden, 1982), who doubts that backwards anaphora [...] has any discourse function per se or if at all, it would be a subtle one (see Carden, 1982, p. 386, footnote 2). Whatever this discourse function might be, it could be the reason for the ungrammaticality of examples (2.58b,d). For this reason, I will not make use of backwards anaphoricity as a topic test.
2.3
Conclusion
In the first section of this chapter I have outlined my view of topicality, which is similar to Reinhart’s (1981): sentence topics constitute what the sentence under discussion is about. These topics can be familiar items, but need not be. In the second section I have presented different strategies of topic-marking. These strategies I used as a device to investigate which quantifiers can be sentence topics and which ones cannot – the crucial underlying assumption being that only those quantifiers that can be overtly marked as topical can generally serve as topics. One has to be careful when applying these devices as topic tests, because often the same construction marks topicality and contrastivity. Hence, to be sure that topicality is involved, one has to control for contrastivity. After careful consideration, it turned out that only singular indefinites, unmodified numeral indefinites, the quantifier einige N in German, (plural) universals, and sometimes most-DPs can be marked as topical. All other quantifiers, among them modified numeral quantifiers and all monotone decreasing and non-monotonic quantifiers, cannot serve as sentence topics. As mentioned above, I will exclude the GQ many N from further investigations, because the semantics and properties of this quantifier are highly controversial. Consequently, it also behaves inconsistently with respect to topicality. We have seen in Section 2.2.4 that it cannot be marked by the thematic wa marker in Japanese. (If marked by wa, there is only a contrastive interpretation to the sentence.) Yet, according to Szabolcsi (1997b), sok fi´u (many boys) can appear in topic position in Hungarian. In German, on the other hand, speakers vary in their judgments about topic-marked many-DPs. The following sentence with the left-dislocated many-DP was accepted by most of my informants (although we cannot entirely exclude that there is some contrastive flavor to the sentence).36 36 But see (Altmann, 1981, p. 21) for an example of a left-dislocated many-DP which he judges as deviant.
56
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS (2.69) Viele Freunde von Peter, die mag ich. many friends
of
Peter RP like I
‘Many friends of Peter, I like.’ What I will concentrate on in the following chapters are the clear cases of topicable quantifiers, i.e. singular indefinites, bare numeral indefinites and (plural) universals. I will explain why only these quantifiers are possible sentence topics and show that my treatment of topical quantifiers also naturally accounts for the exceptional wide scope behavior of certain indefinites, which are the topical indefinites.
Chapter 3
Genuine and Apparent Scope Readings Having pointed out my view of topicality, I will now set the stage for the second main topic of this book, which are the exceptional wide scope phenomena. In this chapter, I will discuss the highly controversial term specificity, which will in the end be argued to be a notion that only makes sense in the context of opaque operators. Specific readings hence have to be set apart from wide scope readings in truly transparent contexts. I will furthermore discuss methods which can serve to differentiate between apparent wide scope readings and genuine wide scope readings of indefinites in a systematic way. Furthermore, I will discuss functional readings, which can also be indicative of wide scope readings, as I will show. Due to their co-variation with other quantifiers, they are often misjudged as narrow scope readings. I understand them as constituting apparent narrow scope readings. I will also present methods to differentiate between functional wide scope readings and genuine narrow scope ones.
3.1
Specificity
In this section I will discuss different notions of specificity and finally outline my concept of specificity – only for the purpose of showing that the unspecific/specificambiguity, whose treatment is entirely dependent on the correct handling of opacity, is a complex and disputed matter that should be kept apart from discussions about scope in truly transparent contexts. There are many different conceptions of specificity. Some authors take a specific entity to be the entity ‘the speaker has in mind’ or ‘the speaker wants to refer to’ – i.e. the speaker’s referent in the sense of Kripke (1979). Others simply refer to scope interactions and understand a specific entity to be an entity that takes wide scope over some other operator or even widest scope with respect to all involved operators. Farkas C. Endriss, Quantificational Topics, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 86, c Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2303-2 3,
57
58
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
(1994) calls the former type of specificity epistemic specificity and the latter scopal specificity. She notes that the first is a pragmatic notion, whereas the second is a semantic one.
3.1.1
Ioup (1977)
I adopt the general notion of specificity of Ioup (1977), who argues that specificity is completely independent from Donnellan’s referential/atrributive distinction on the one hand and from relative scope interactions with other quantifiers on the other. Ioup argues that specificity has to be understood as dealing solely with Quine’s opaque vs. transparent contexts. It is known that certain verbs evoke opaque contexts, i.e. contexts where two coreferential term phrases cannot be used interchangeably without possibly changing the truth conditions. Attitude verbs such as to believe or the verb to want are examples of these kinds of verbs. Consider the following sentences (cf. examples (1)–(3) from Ioup, 1977, p. 233): (3.1)
a. Clarissa wants to own a horse. b. She will ride it tomorrow. c. She will ride one tomorrow.
(3.1a) can be followed by (3.1b) or (3.1c). The continuation in (3.1b) forces the specific reading of (3.1a), because Clarissa knows one particular horse that she wants to own. The continuation in (3.1c) forces the unspecific reading. In this reading, Clarissa is interested in owning a certain type of object, namely one of the kind horse. In the example above, wants creates an opaque context for the indefinite and is therefore responsible for the ambiguity of (3.1a). It can be seen that only in the specific reading, which is enforced by the continuation in (3.1b), is an accessible discourse referent for the horse established, because only in this case can one refer back to the specific horse via the pronoun it. The ambiguity of (3.1a) could be captured as a scope ambiguity with respect to the verb to want, i.e. the specific reading triggered by the continuation in (3.1b) could be represented as (3.2a) and the unspecific reading triggered by (3.1c) as (3.2b) as was originally proposed by Quine (1956) and Montague (1973).1 (3.2)
a. ∃x[horse(x) ∧ want(clarissa, own(clarissa, x))] b. want(clarissa, ∃x[horse(x) ∧ own(clarissa, x)])
(3.2a) allows for the inference that the object under discussion, namely the specific horse, exists, whereas the unspecific reading does not allow for this inference. However, Ioup (1977) argues that the specific/unspecific distinction cannot always be made on these grounds. She gives the example in (3.3) (her example (6), p. 235), which is ambiguous between a specific and a non-specific reading for the dragon, but in neither reading we can infer that dragons actually exist. (3.3) Alberta believes that a dragon ate her petunias. 1I
only give a very schematic representation in formula (3.2), ignoring e.g. intensionality.
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
59
In the specific reading, Alberta believes that there is a particular dragon that ate her petunias, whereas in the unspecific reading she believes that one member of the dragon type ate her flowers. According to Ioup (1977), the decisive difference between the specific and the unspecific reading for (3.3) lies in the fact that in the specific reading, Alberta has a thought about (at least) one specific object, whereas in the unspecific reading she holds a belief with respect to the set of dragons or the generalized quantifier a dragon. But note that in the specific reading, the dragon is specific with respect to Alberta’s belief-world, but need not actually exist. Alberta believes that there is one specific individual that she conceives to be a dragon that ate her petunias. In the unspecific reading, she is ignorant with respect to the question which individual ate her petunias. In fact, there might be no instance of the set of dragons (in Alberta’s world) for which the reported property (= that Alberta believes that it ate the petunias) holds. For every item which Alberta believes to be a dragon, she might not believe that this very dragon ate her petunias, but she might still believe that it was a dragon that did it. In the specific reading, the truth of the sentence depends on a relation holding between Alberta and one particular (but for the speaker possibly unidentifiable) object. We can draw the same distinction in the case of (3.1a). In the specific reading, there is one particular horse, and Clarissa wants to own it. The specific reading therefore describes a relation between an individual and one particular object and the unspecific reading describes a relation between this individual and a set/property (for this view of specificity see also Partee, 1974; Zimmermann, 2006, the former referring to the specific and unspecific readings as referential and non-referential readings, respectively). Zimmermann (1993) goes one step further and analyzes simple transitive non-composed opaque verbs such as to seek as operating directly on properties, which again reflects the view that unspecific readings embody relations to properties.2 The unspecific reading of (3.5a) can thus simply be represented as (3.5b). (3.5)
a. Clarissa is seeking a horse. b. seek (clarissa, horse)
Enc¸ (1991) argues that examples such as (3.3) show that specificity cannot be equated with a wide scope reading of the indefinite with respect to an epistemic/opaque operator, as was suggested for (3.1) and the representation in (3.2) (for a related example and argumentation see Elbourne 2005, Chapter 3.3.1). At first sight it seems as if (3.6) is not the correct representation of the specific reading of (3.3), because it would require 2 Zimmermann’s account is motivated and supported by the fact that de dicto readings for certain quantifiers are missing with a certain class of opaque verbs. This is illustrated in (3.4) (examples (a,b) taken from Zimmermann, 1993, p. 161).
(3.4)
a. b. c. d.
Alain is seeking each comic-book. Alain is trying to find each comic-book. Alain is seeking a comic-book. Alain is trying to find a comic-book.
While (3.4a) lacks a de dicto reading and only supports a de re reading, (3.4b) is ambiguous between the two readings. However, (3.4c,d), where the universal has been replaced by an indefinite, both are ambiguous between a de re and a de dicto reading. This difference can easily be explained in his account, where seek can directly operate on properties. Indefinites do not need to be analyzed as quantifiers, but can be identified with their defining property (cf. Heim, 1982; Kamp and Reyle, 1993), which is not an option for universals. Hence, seek can be applied to a property in (3.4c), but not in (3.4a).
60
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
that there is a dragon that actually exists. (This is not to say that (3.6) is not a possible reading of (3.3), it simply does not seem to represent the specific reading we are after.) (3.6) ∃x[dragon(x) ∧ believe(alberta, eat petunias(x))] As discussed above, (3.3) has a specific reading that does not force the speaker to believe in the existence of dragons. Enc¸ (1991) concludes that specific readings hence cannot be analyzed as scope phenomena. This objection, however, is not a solid argument against all theories that aim at explaining such specific readings as wide scope readings over opaque operators. It might e.g. be the case that the believe-operator introduces more than one opaque operator and the specific indefinite takes wide scope only over one of them. One can assume the following axiom3 : Axiom 3.1 (Axiom of Belief) believe(x, p) → believe(x, know (x, p)) One could now analyze the specific reading of (3.3) in the following way: (3.7) believe(alberta, ∃x[dragon(x) ∧ know (alberta, eat petunias(x))] This would be a specific reading where the indefinite takes wide scope over an epistemic operator (know). Yet, the indefinite is interpreted in Alberta’s belief -world. Another option to analyze (3.3) in its specific reading would be to give it the representation in (3.6), but to assume that quantification over ‘nonexistent’ objects is possible, as has been argued by various authors (for discussion and references see Parsons, 1980; Moltmann, 1997). In the end, (3.6) might be the correct analysis of the specific reading of (3.3) (possibly under the assumption that non-existent objects can be quantified and predicated over). This might then explain why (3.3) can be followed by (3.8). (3.8) But it is a figment of her imagination. Here, the pronoun it refers back to the (non-existent) dragon. If we allow for existential quantification over non-existent objects, the use of the pronoun is easily explained, because it can simply be (dynamically) bound by the existential quantifier in (3.6) preceding it. Zimmermann (1993) also points out that non-specificity and failure of existence entailments must not be confused. Although the sentence John worships a Greek Goddess does not entail the existence of Greek Goddesses, this does not mean that the sentence has an unspecific reading. There is no ambiguity between a specific and an unspecific reading involved. The sentence only has one reading: the specific one, i.e. that there is one Greek Goddess (which might not exist after all) such that John worships her. For the sake of being concrete, I will assume – and by doing so slightly depart from (Ioup, 1977) – that specific readings can in fact be conceived of as wide scope readings over some involved opaque operator. However, the reader is asked to bear in mind that the derivation of such specific readings will not be a subject that will be discussed further. Any mechanism that understands the involved ambiguity in the presence of opaque operators as one where the indefinite takes wide scope over the opaque operator 3I
thank Peter Staudacher for pointing this out to me.
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
61
in one of its readings can be adopted. In other words, the concrete treatment of de re, i.e. specific, readings will not be of my concern. I will rather be concerned with the derivation of (exceptional) wide scope in non-opaque contexts, which will be discussed in great detail below. What is important, however, is my basic concept of specificity, which is exactly the one of Ioup (1977) detailed above: an indefinite can be specific or unspecific with respect to an opaque operator; the unspecific reading describes a relation between an individual – e.g. Clarissa in (3.1) – and a property (in this case the property of being a horse). The specific interpretation describes a relation between an individual and an object (a particular horse). Her conception of specificity brings Ioup into disagreement with all approaches in which the specificity ambiguity is related to speakers’ intentions. In such approaches, sentence (3.9) would be argued to be ambiguous between a specific and an unspecific reading for the indefinite a logician – depending on whether the speaker wants to refer to a particular logician he has in mind or whether he wants to refer to the property of being a logician, which is ascribed to some person that might not be known to the speaker in any other way. Farkas (1994) refers to this ambiguity as epistemic (non)specificity. (3.9) Paul talked to a logician. This alleged specificity distinction refers to speaker’s intentions for it is the speaker’s intent in using the phrase and not her knowledge, that distinguishes the two readings (see Ioup, 1977, p. 238). Ioup points out (and attributes this point to Barbara Partee) that this distinction is reminiscent of Donnellan’s attributive/referential distinction for definites. However, (3.9) clearly establishes an accessible discourse referent in both readings, independent of whether the speaker mainly intends to refer to a person he knows as a logician or whether he wants to ascribe a property to some person by using the indefinite. Both ways, the speaker could continue (3.9) by (3.10), where he refers to the logician. (3.10) He was very intelligent. This would mean that unspecific as well as specific indefinites can introduce externally accessible discourse referents and this would be not a criterion to distinguish between specific and unspecific readings. As Ioup considers this an unwanted result, she concludes that the specific/unspecific distinction should be kept strictly apart from the attributive/referential distinction. She argues that the first distinction is a semantic matter, whereas the second one is a pragmatic issue. That this second distinction can only be drawn on pragmatic grounds is also noted in (Farkas, 1994) when discussing epistemic specificity. Whether or not the speaker wants to refer to a certain individual or to an individual’s property plays no role for the truth conditions and has no linguistic consequences, e.g. concerning the introduction of discourse referents. (3.9) is true if there is one logician that has the property λx[talked to(paul , x)] – independently of whether the speaker knows the logician or not or if he intends to refer to a specific object or just to a property of some object. In (3.1a) on the other hand, there is a difference in truth conditions depending on whether the indefinite is interpreted specifically or not. In the specific reading, there must be one particular horse that is such that Clarissa wants to own it, but there might be others that she does not want to own.
62
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
The truth conditions for the non-specific reading are different. The sentence is true if Clarissa wants to own just an arbitrary member of the horse kind. That de dicto (≈ unspecific) and de re (≈ specific) readings are independent of the referential/attributive distinction has also been pointed out by Kripke (1979), who has shown that there is no one-to-one correspondence between attributive uses of definite descriptions and de dicto interpretations on the one hand and referential uses and de re interpretations on the other (see Kripke, 1979, pp. 9–10). In Ioup’s system, we then expect referentially and attributively intended specific indefinites. (3.9) would be an example of an indefinite that can be uttered with an attributive or with a referential intention. The sentence is not ambiguous concerning (non-)specificity. However, Ioup argues that non-specific noun phrases only exist in an attributive reading. Furthermore, Ioup (1977) advises the reader not to confuse specificity with wide scope over other non-opaque operators. In her view, a narrow scope indefinite such as a girl in (3.11) (from Ioup 1977, p. 242, originally Karttunen 1968, p. 6) can well be specific. (3.11) Harvey courts a girl at every convention. Due to the lack of any operator that causes opacity, we would not speak of specificity in the context of sentence (3.11) in our terminology. However, what Ioup points out is that even in the narrow scope reading of the indefinite the speaker can have the girls identified, which would then correspond to a narrow scope (epistemically) specific reading.
3.1.2
Hintikka (1986)
That specific indefinites seem to behave inconsistently concerning their scope behavior has also been observed by Hintikka (1986), who makes a proposal for the semantics of a certain. In the literature, a certain-indefinites had usually been argued to be entities that simply take widest scope over all operators. Hintikka showed that this generalization does not hold (as had also been noted by Fodor and Sag, 1982), as the following example (from Hintikka, 1986, p. 332) illustrates. (3.12) Each husband had forgotten a certain date – his wife’s birthday. The indefinite a certain date clearly has to be interpreted as dependent on the respective value given to each husband. Hence, it does not take plain wide scope, but it does not take ordinary narrow scope either. Hintikka argues that a certain-indefinites are actually interpreted outside of epistemic operators such as believe or know. But this in turn does not mean that they have to take wide scope over all other operators (e.g. quantifiers) that are c-commanded by the epistemic operator under discussion. He furthermore proposes that the involved epistemic operators can be tacit. For (3.12), it can be assumed that the sentence is embedded under I know (that) – represented by4 KI . 4 The fact that an agent A knows ϕ is represented as K (ϕ). This is to mean that ϕ is true in all worlds A that A holds to be possible and that ϕ is true in the actual world. The agent I stands for the speaker.
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
63
According to Hintikka’s assumptions, the indefinite a certain date is interpreted outside of the epistemic operator KI , but does not take scope over other scope-inducing elements such as the quantifier each husband. The following higher-order formula represents this state of affairs (3.13) (see Hintikka, 1986, p. 334). (3.13) ∃f [KI (∀y[husband (y) → forget(y, f (y))])] There is a function f such that the speaker knows for each husband y that y forgot f (y). We will see at a later stage that this formula, which Hintikka takes to correctly represent the truth conditions of (3.12), can be derived without making the non-standard assumption that an operator can be evaluated outside of an (epistemic) operator O without taking scope over other operators which are in the scope of O. An important ingredient for this alternative derivation of the formula in (3.13) will be the assumption of functional elements in natural language, which will be introduced in Section 3.2. Note that Hintikka assumes that the tacit epistemic operator need not be the speaker’s, i.e. the sentence in (3.12) does not have to be assumed to be embedded under I know (that), but could also be assumed to be embedded under e.g. Peter knows (that) (if Peter is salient somehow). Then the implication is that somebody else, but not the speaker, knows who ‘a certain’ person [in our case: what the date, CE] referred to is (Hintikka, 1986, p. 335 based on a different example). A similar idea can already be found in (Fodor and Sag, 1982), where it is argued that a certain-indefinites can be used to indicate that an identification of the relevant individual could be given by the speaker or someone else whose propositional attitudes are being reported. This idea of specificity is related to the concept of relative specificity in (von Heusinger, 2002), where it is argued that specific indefinites have to be specific with respect to someone. According to von Heusinger (2002), the selection of the instance that makes the sentence true depends on the person that specificity is relativized to.5 Summing up, Hintikka’s main ideas are to analyze certain as a specificity marker for indefinites and to interpret a specific indefinite as being evaluated outside the scope of epistemic operators. However, if an indefinite is interpreted outside of an epistemic operator O it does not necessarily take scope over all other operators that appear in the scope of O. The correct readings can be realized by employing functions.
3.1.3
Enc¸ (1991)
The notion of specificity in (Enc¸, 1991) is rather different from what has been discussed so far. Enc¸ (1991) emphasizes that specificity is to be interpreted independently of relative scope – with respect to other quantifiers as well as opaque or epistemic operators. Her core argument against the claim that specificity has to do with wide scope over epistemic operators as proposed by Hintikka (1986) is made on grounds of an example that is very similar to the example of the dragon in (3.3) above, where 5 Von Heusinger (2002) argues that wide scope indefinites are special instantiations of relative specific indefinites, namely ones which are bound to the speaker. As Ioup (1977) argues for the independence of scope dependencies and specificity, this view is different from Ioup’s view. This position is also different from the one taken in (Hintikka, 1986). Hintikka argues for the existence of functional (= non wide scope) readings which are dependent on the speaker’s and not anybody else’s knowledge (= speaker-specific).
64
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
a wide scope construal does not straightforwardly represent the specific reading. But we have seen above that a wide scope representation might be correct under certain additional assumptions (e.g. that existential quantification over non-existent objects is allowed for). However, Enc¸ (1991) understands this to be a counterargument to Hintikka’s analysis and argues that specific indefinites are better thought of as entities that presuppose the existence of some other entity that they relate to, i.e. that want to be linked to an individual or a set that has already been established in the context. Enc¸ (1991) mainly discusses Turkish data, where it can be argued that a DP that is marked for accusative has to be interpreted as specific and one that is not marked for accusative has to be interpreted as unspecific as shown in the following example (from Enc¸, 1991, ex. (12)/(13), pp. 3f). (3.14)
a. Ali bir piyano -yu kirialamak istiyor. Ali one piano
-ACC to-rent
wants
‘Ali wants to rent a certain piano.’ b. Ali bir piyano kirialamak istiyor. Ali one piano
to-rent
wants
‘Ali wants to rent a (nonspecific) piano.’ Enc¸ (1991) also observes that the accusative case marker is furthermore responsible for the partitive interpretation of a DP, as is illustrated in the following example in Turkish (from Enc¸, 1991, ex. (16)–(18), p. 6). (3.15)
a. Odam
-a
birkac¸ c¸ocuk girdi.
my-room -DAT several child entered
‘Several children entered my room.’ b. Iki kız -ı tanıyordum. two girl -ACC I-knew
‘I knew two (of the) girls.’ c. Iki kız tanıyordum. two girl I-knew
‘I knew two girls.’ The two girls in (3.15b) (where the DP is marked with accusative) relate back to the group of children that has been introduced in (3.15a). The two girls in (3.15c), on the other hand, cannot be interpreted as a subgroup of the children who entered the room. Hence, (3.15c) following (3.15a) would seem rather incoherent, because there is no intuitive link between the two sentences. These data suggest that specificity is somehow linked to partitivity. A specific indefinite is interpreted as a partitive DP – partitive with respect to a set introduced beforehand. Enc¸ now argues that all specific DPs have the property that they are linked to another DP that has already been established in the context. A definite DP DP 2 (which counts as specific in her approach) picks up an entity that is already known to the hearer (= that of another DP DP 1 ), i.e. the link is established via identifying DP 1 as DP 2 . All strong determiners (which are also specific in Enc¸’s terminology) pick up an already established set in their restrictor. The DP every man would refer to a set of men already introduced in the context. And finally, partitive indefinites, which denote a subset or an
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
65
element of some other set that has been talked about beforehand, constitute examples of specific indefinites. In the case of a certain-indefinites, which Enc¸ also counts as specific indefinites, matters are slightly more complicated. It is quite clear that these kinds of indefinites do not always refer to objects that are subsets or elements of some other set that is known to the hearer. Consider example (3.16) (from Enc¸, 1991, ex. (64), p. 20). (3.16) Every man wanted to dance to a certain song that he loved as a teenager. Quite clearly, a song that he loved as a teenager does not necessarily denote an element or a subset of some previously mentioned set. There is a dependent reading here that for every man there is a specific song that he had loved when he was a teenager, and it is this song that he wanted to dance to. Enc¸ takes it that in this case the link to previous discourse is established via a function, which assigns novel objects (the songs) to familiar objects (the men). This means that also in this case there is some linking relation to objects already introduced in the context. Enc¸’s view of specificity differs strongly from other conceptions of specificity. While it is usually argued that specificity is closely connected to the notion of opacity, in Enc¸’s view it is simply familiarity that plays the key role for defining specificity, i.e. a specific entity must be known to the hearer in certain respects. Possibly, the subjects of Enc¸’s investigations (i.e. partitive indefinites) have more in common with topical indefinites than with specific indefinites in the general understanding of the term. This will be discussed in Section 5.3, where the scope behavior of partial topics will be investigated.
3.1.4
Consequences
My concept of specificity is that of (Ioup, 1977) as discussed above. Simple indefinites such as a logician can be understood specifically or non-specifically. Specificity is understood with respect to an opaque (not necessarily epistemic) operator. It addresses the question of whether the sentence predicate holds true of a particular individual or whether it describes a relation to some property. For the sake of concreteness, I assume that a specific indefinite takes wide scope over at least one opaque operator. (If the existence of functional items is taken into account, this conception does not contradict the view that there can be dependent readings of specific indefinites as exemplified by example (3.12).) For the purpose of this book, the exact mechanism that derives these specific readings is however irrelevant. I assume that indefinites marked by German bestimmt are necessarily specific under this view of specificity (i.e. they have to be interpreted with wide scope over an opaque operator). I also tentatively want to assume that the same holds for English certain. This notion of specificity is essentially the one of Hintikka (1986) – the only difference being that Hintikka argues that a certain-indefinites take wide scope only over a (possibly tacit) epistemic operator, whereas I assume that bestimmt-indefinites in German have to take scope over any opaque operator whatsoever.
66
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
Let me point to some important data at this stage. Although specificity in the sense explicated above is a strictly semantic notion and independent of discussions about what the speaker – or someone else – has in mind, the latter notion could be conceived of as a special case of the former, namely when the embedding operator is an epistemic one. Whenever there is no overt opacity-inducing operator, it can be assumed, following Hintikka, that the sentence is embedded under an epistemic operator such as I know that, I believe that, I have heard (from xyz) that. This might be the reason why specificity is often understood in a pragmatic way as the entity the speaker (or someone) has in mind – especially in the case of sentences lacking an overt opacity-inducing operator. Let me illustrate this point by referring back to (3.9). It could be assumed that this sentence is in fact interpreted in one of the ways given in (3.17). (3.17)
a. I know that Paul talked to a logician. b. I believe that Paul talked to a logician. c. I heard from Maria that Paul talked to a logician.
Under this assumption, the original example (3.9) is ambiguous between a specific and a non-specific reading due to the epistemic operators know, believe, and I heard from Maria ≈ Maria believes and told me. In the case of (3.17a,b), the specific reading would be similar to one where a logician denotes an individual the speaker has in mind. In (3.17c) it would denote an individual that Maria has in mind. Epistemic/pragmatic specificity would then be just an instance of semantic specificity under certain circumstances, namely when specificity holds with respect to some overt or covert epistemic operator. There is more to be said on the nature of epistemic specificity, its relation to the semantic view and the consequences that follow from these two diverging notions. I will elaborate on these matters when discussing different approaches that rely on speaker’s reference in Section 4.4. The assumption that bestimmt-indefinites have to be read specifically with respect to opaque operators also accounts for the fact that only sometimes do they seem to necessitate a widest scope interpretation, whereas at other times they do not. (3.18)
a. Komischerweise ist jeder franz¨osische Diplomat in eine bestimmte oddly
is every French
diplomat in a
certain
Stadt in Malaysia gezogen. city
in Malaysia moved
Oddly enough, every French diplomat moved to a certain city in Malaysia. b. Komischerweise wollte jeder fanz¨osische Diplomat in eine bestimmte oddly
wanted every French
diplomat in a
certain
Stadt in Malaysia ziehen. city
in Malaysia move
Oddly enough, every French diplomat wanted to move to a certain city in Malaysia. While (3.18a) can only mean that there is one city in Malaysia (whose name the speaker might have forgotten, which is why she does not present the city’s name) to which all the French diplomats moved, (3.18b) – additionally to a non-variation reading where all diplomats wanted to move to one and the same city in Malaysia – has a reading where the cities can vary with the values for the diplomats. In other words,
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
67
(3.18b) is ambiguous, whereas (3.18a) only has one reading, namely a non-variation reading. This is easily explained. The specific indefinite eine bestimmte Stadt (a certain city) needs to take wide scope over an opaque operator. In (3.18b), there is an overt one (wanted ). If the indefinite takes scope over it, it may still take narrow scope with respect to the universal. In the case of (3.18a), there is no overt opaque operator, and the presence of a covert epistemic operator such as I heard /I believe has to be assumed. If the indefinite takes scope over this operator, it inevitably also takes scope over the subject quantifier. Although (3.18b) contains an overt opaque operator, the possibility of interpreting the sentence as containing a tacit epistemic operator is not ruled out either. This is how the wide scope interpretation for the indefinite comes about. Examples along these lines will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. However, it has been pointed out by Hintikka (1986) that there are indeed sentences where no overt epistemic (or opaque) operator is present and yet the sentences seem to support a non-wide scope reading for the specific indefinite involved. This also holds for the German translations of these sentences. We have already encountered one such example, namely example (3.12). Consider its German translation. (3.19) Jeder Ehemann hat schonmal ein bestimmtes Datum vergessen – den every husband
has once
a
certain
date
forgotten
the
Geburtstag seiner Frau. birthday
of his wife
Each husband had forgotten a certain date – his wife’s birthday. Another relevant example is given below (see Hintikka, 1986, ex. (23), p. 334). (3.20)
a. b. c. d.
Every true Englishman adores a certain woman. The Queen. His mother. Jeder echte Engl¨ander bewundert eine bestimmte Frau. every true
Englishman adores
a
certain
woman
e. Die Queen. the Queen
f. Seine Mutter. his
mother
(3.12), (3.19) and (3.20a,d) not only support a widest scope reading for the indefinite, but also seem to support a narrow scope reading, as the felicitous continuations in (3.20c,f) indicate. At first sight, this seems to contradict the predictions made by the account of specificity outlined above. The certain/bestimmt-indefinites in (3.12), (3.19), (3.20a,d) need to take scope over an opaque operator. As there is no overt one, it has to be assumed that the indefinite takes scope over a tacit epistemic one. But then, it would have to take scope over the universal subject quantifier, also. However, the values for the women can obviously vary with the men. It will be shown at length in section 3.3.2 that the readings indicated in (3.12)/(3.19) and exemplified by the continuations in (3.20c,f) are, in fact, not narrow scope readings, but functional wide scope readings, which can be differentiated from the narrow scope readings on empirical and theoretical grounds. (3.19) and (3.20d) hence do not constitute counterexamples to the treatment of bestimmt-indefinites that has been advocated in this section.
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QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
Consider furthermore the following examples, which have been brought up by Farkas (2002). Farkas argues that a certain-indefinites may be interpreted within the scope of intensional predicates such as dream, believe, and think due to an identifiabilityconstraint (for details see Farkas, 2002), but not within the scope of conditionals or want. (3.21)
a. If Ben solves a certain problem from this list Mr. Koens will praise him. b. I dreamt I had to catch a certain unicorn. c. Poor delusional Mary! She wants to catch a certain unicorn (she thinks has been ravaging her garden).
Arguably, (3.21a) only allows for a wide scope reading of the indefinite, whereas (3.21b) and (3.21c) allow for readings where the indefinite is interpreted in the scope of an opaque operator (dream and think, respectively). (3.21b) can mean that the speaker believes that unicorns exist and that she dreamt that she had to catch one particular one of these unicorns, or it can mean that she dreamt that she had to catch some particular unicorn (but only in her dream-worlds does she believe in the existence of unicorns). (3.21c) also has a reading where there is one particular unicorn of whom Mary believes that it exists and she wants to catch it. Hence, (3.21b,c) allow for readings where the indefinite can be interpreted inside the scope of the involved opaque operators, and (3.21a) only has a reading with the indefinite interpreted outside of the scope of the if -clause. Exactly the same readings seem to be present for the German translations of (3.21a-c). (3.22)
a. Wenn Ben ein bestimmtes Problem von dieser Liste l¨ost, wird Herr if
Ben a
certain
problem from this
list
solves will Mr.
Koens ihn loben. Koens him praise
If Ben solves a certain problem from this list Mr. Koens will praise him. b. Ich tr¨aumte, ich m¨usste ein bestimmtes Einhorn fangen. I
dreamt
I
would have to a
certain
unicorn catch
I dreamt I had to catch a certain unicorn. c. Arme verwirrte Maria! Sie will ein bestimmtes Einhorn fangen poor delusional Mary
she wants a
(, von dem sie glaubt, es habe of
certain
unicorn catch
ihren Garten verw¨ustet).
whom she thinks it would have her
garden ravaged
Poor delusional Mary! She wants to catch a certain unicorn (she thinks has been ravaging her garden). At least for the German examples it can be shown that the observed differences can also be explained if one takes into account whether one or more than one opaque operator is involved. In the case of (3.22c), the indefinite can take scope over want and below a tacit epistemic operator such as Mary believes that, which would yield the desired reading where only Mary believes in unicorns. In (3.22b), there are two overt operators, namely m¨usste (would have to) and tr¨aumte (dreamt), which evoke two different readings. And finally, in the case of (3.22a), there is only one overt
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
69
operator (the if -clause). The specific indefinite has to take scope over it and thus takes wide scope. Even if we assume that this sentence also introduces an epistemic operator, this operator would take scope over the entire sentence. Hence, if the specific indefinite takes wide scope over it, it would also take wide scope over the if -clause. The sentence thus only supports one reading. The following example gives further evidence that the very simple empirical generalization that bestimmt-indefinites have to take scope over at least one opaque operator is on the right track. In the following German example, the bestimmt-indefinite takes narrow scope with respect to the if -clause, because there is another opaque operator over which the indefinite takes scope. (3.23)
a. Wenn Maria ein bestimmtes Pferd reiten will, redet sie solange auf if
Maria a
certain
horse ride
want talks she so long on
den Besitzer ein, bis er es ihr erlaubt. the owner
in
until he it her allows
If Maria wants to ride a certain horse, she will endeavor to persuade the owner to allow it. b. Wenn Maria sich eine bestimmte Telephonnummer merken muss, if
Maria herself a
certain
telephone number memorize must
versucht sie, die Zahlen irgendwie mit Bildern zu verbinden. tries
she the numbers somehow with pictures to link
If Maria has to memorize a certain telephone number, she tries to link the digits to pictures in her mind. In (3.23), the indefinites can clearly be interpreted within the scope of the if -clauses. This stands in sharp contrast to (3.22a), where the indefinite can only take wide scope over the if -clause. The difference lies in the fact that in (3.23), the indefinite can be interpreted as specific with respect to will (want) or muss (has to), whereas no other opaque operator is involved in (3.22a). In subsequent chapters, we will encounter more data that support this treatment of bestimmt-indefinites as taking scope over at least one opaque operator. Furthermore, it can be verified that they behave rather differently from other kinds of indefinites, which is due to the fact that only bestimmt-indefinites are necessarily marked as specific.
3.2
Wide Scope
In the preceding section, we have seen that specific readings are induced by particular operators that evoke opacity. We have seen that – except for some complicating cases, i.e. specific indefinites in the context of a believe-operator – specific readings can be conceived of as cases where the involved indefinite takes wide scope over the involved opaque operator. In the literature, there are various proposals about how to properly deal with opacity. Hence, the exact formulation of what it means for a specific indefinite to take ‘wide scope’ depends on the approach taken. In the following, I will keep agnostic about the exact mechanism that derives specific readings. In this
70
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
section, I will discuss scope interactions of indefinites (and quantifiers in general) with operators other than opaque ones. I want to keep these two cases – specificity and wide scope in truly transparent contexts – apart, because wide scope in transparent contexts and wide scope in opaque contexts are presumably not derived through the same kind of mechanism. I will refer to wide scope readings only in the context of quantifiers or other non-opaque operators and refer to the notion of specificity only in the context of opaque operators. Consider the following example. (3.24a) is ambiguous between a reading that corresponds to the c-command relations of the quantifiers at the surface and one where the embedded quantifier takes scope over the quantifier that c-commands it. (3.24)
a. Every student has read some book that Anne recommended. b. 1. ∀x[student(x) → ∃y[recom book (anne, y) ∧ read(x, y)]] 2. ∃y[recom book (anne, y) ∧ ∀x[student(x) → read(x, y)]]
This means that the indefinite can undergo so-called scope inversion and take wide scope over an operator that c-commands it at the surface. The two readings are given in (3.24b). I will refer to reading (3.24b.1) as the narrow scope reading and to (3.24b.2) as the wide scope reading of the indefinite, whenever I presume that a scope mechanism brings about the two readings under discussion. We will see that there are other ways to derive readings very similar to the ones given in (3.24b). When I want to stay neutral with respect to the involved interpretation mechanism or when it is debatable whether the readings under discussion are a matter of scope, I will use the unbiased terms covariation reading for (3.24b.1) (because the value of the indefinite co-varies with the values for the students) and non-variation reading for (3.24b.2). One way to derive the scope inversion reading is by assuming that a syntactic scope mechanism such as Quantifier Raising (QR) (cf. May, 1977) is involved. A quantifier Q2 that is c-commanded by a quantifier Q1 at the surface can be moved to a higher position, such that Q2 c-commands Q1 after the movement operation has applied. It is generally assumed that such a movement operation takes place at the level of logical form (LF) and that this logical form is interpreted by the semantics component. C-command relations at LF correspond to scope relations in semantics. As this movement operation is a syntactic mechanism, it is expected to obey syntactic rules, i.e. in particular it would not be expected that a quantifier can be moved out of a syntactic island, just like it is impossible for a phrase embedded in a syntactic island to overtly move to a position outside of this island (cf. Ross, 1967).
3.2.1
Apparent Wide Scope
Some sentences seem to support a wide scope reading of an indefinite, although this wide ‘scope’ reading is actually only apparent. We already encountered one source of apparent wide scope, namely specificity. Specific readings are often analyzed as involving wide scope over an opaque operator in the semantic structure. But this is not the only option to analyze them, as has been shown in the preceding section.
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
71
Furthermore, specific indefinites are usually realized differently from indefinites taking genuine wide scope concerning e.g. intonation, as we will see below. In any case, specific readings are substantially different from wide scope readings in truly transparent contexts and therefore I take specificity to be a case of apparent wide scope as opposed to genuine wide scope derived by a scope-shifting mechanism in transparent contexts. Apart from specificity, there are three major sources for apparent wide scope: the alleged wide scope reading is just a special case of the narrow scope reading and thus not a genuine reading in itself; the alleged wide scope reading is in fact a referential reading; or the domain of the indefinite is implicitly restricted by context to a singleton set such that the wide scope reading is in fact indistinguishable from the narrow scope one.
No genuine reading It has been known for many years that certain apparent scope ambiguities are, in fact, not ambiguities. Rather they express some kind of underspecification (for a historic overview of the development in the literature, see Ruys, 1992; Reinhart, 1997). Consider the following example. (3.25) At the party, everybody danced with a woman. Sentence (3.25) seems ambiguous between a narrow scope reading for the indefinite a woman, where the women co-vary with the people, and a wide scope reading, where only one woman is involved. In the former reading, the sentence is true in a situation where everybody danced with a (possibly) different woman. The wide scope reading is stronger and forces that everybody danced with the same woman. However, in this case, the wide scope reading is just a special case of the co-variation one. Whenever one can find a model that makes the wide scope reading true, the same model also verifies the co-variation reading. This, one could argue, shows that the sentence is not ambiguous, because the alleged wide scope reading is in fact not a genuine reading, but implies the narrow scope one. However, it is commonly known that not all wide scope readings can be explained away as special cases of narrow scope ones (see e.g. Ruys, 1992). Consider (3.26), a variant of (3.25), where the universal quantifier is replaced by a non-monotonic one. (3.26) At the party, exactly ten people danced with a woman. (3.26) also seems ambiguous between a wide scope and a narrow scope reading. This time, neither reading implies the other one. The narrow scope reading does not imply the wide scope one: if exactly ten people danced with a (possibly) different woman, it certainly does not necessarily hold that there is one woman such that exactly ten people danced with her. Also, if the wide scope reading is true, it does not follow that also the narrow scope reading holds: if there is one woman for whom it holds that exactly ten people danced with her, there might well be other women such that other men danced with them. Examples such as (3.26) show that scope ambiguity is a real phenomenon and not just an illusion, because non-variation readings cannot always be argued to be a subspecies of co-variation ones.
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QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
Speaker’s reference There is another source for apparent wide scope readings that in fact are not scope readings: the indefinite might be read referentially. Fodor and Sag (1982) argue that indefinites are (lexically) ambiguous between a referential and a quantificational reading. In the referential reading, an indefinite denotes one specific entity. Its interpretation is the same as for a referential term such as Peter. This approach will be discussed in greater detail in Section 4.4.1. Let me just point out here that under its referential reading, an indefinite can appear to take wide scope as it is scopeless like any other referential item. Kratzer (1998) dubbed this phenomenon pseudoscope. If in example (3.26), the indefinite a woman denoted a particular woman, say Maria, the sentence would receive the interpretation that there is one particular woman, i.e. Maria, such that exactly ten people danced with her. The wide scope reading is true whenever this referential reading is true. However, no scope inversion would be involved. This conception is closely connected to the epistemic view of specific indefinites introduced in Section 3.1. Pseudo-wide scope has to do with the speaker’s intention to point to an individual he has in mind. The indefinite then points to the speaker’s referent in the sense of Kripke (1979). In his work, Kripke argues that it is a general feature of language that certain items – he mainly discusses names and definite descriptions – can be used as a semantic referent or as a speaker’s referent. The semantic referent of a designator d is understood as the referent that is assigned to d in the speaker’s idiolect in the general case. The speaker’s referent is the object the speaker wants to talk about in a concrete situation. In certain – what he calls – complex cases, semantic and speaker’s reference diverge. Let us assume that Franz and Ferdinand are two different persons. By the name ‘Franz’, the speaker usually refers to Franz, i.e. the object franz and by the name ‘Ferdinand’, he refers to Ferdinand, i.e. ferdinand . Now, take the situation in which Franz is waving to the speaker from some distance, and the speaker sees that someone is waving, but mistakes Franz for Ferdinand.6 He might then utter (3.27). (3.27) Ferdinand is waving. The semantic referent of Ferdinand in this utterance would be ferdinand , because the speaker usually refers to ferdinand via the name ‘Ferdinand’, but the speaker’s referent now is franz , because the speaker means to refer to the person who is waving, which is franz in this concrete situation. Whether or not sentence (3.27) has to be regarded as true when uttered in the speaker’s reference sense is not under discussion at this stage, but will become relevant later. In anticipation of the discussion in Section 4.4, the sentence appears false in a situation in which Franz, the person the speaker actually sees, is waving, but the semantic referent ferdinand of the utterance is not (even if the speaker means to refer to franz by his utterance). Kripke subscribes to this view, although he writes that he is unsure about the importance of his own intuitions. Examples similar to (3.27) can be found for diverging uses of definite descriptions. In these cases, the speaker’s reference reading would correspond to Donnellan’s referential uses of definites and the semantic reference reading would correspond to the 6 This
example is a modified version of an example by Kripke (1979).
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
73
attributive uses. However, Kripke emphasizes that the possibility of differentiating between speaker’s referent and semantic referent is not a property that is peculiar to definites. Quite to the contrary, Kripke argues that speaker’s and semantic reference are pragmatic notions (of language use) and that an ambiguity between the two uses is therefore a phenomenon that is expected to arise generally, i.e. in the case of all possibly referring expressions and in all languages. The notion of speaker’s reference then is applicable at least to names (as could be seen in the above example), definites, and also indefinites (see Kripke, 1979, footnote 40). An indefinite such as a woman in (3.26) could then be used to refer to the speaker’s referent (i.e. the individual the speaker has in mind) or it could be used as a non-referring expression. In the second case, a woman receives its ordinary quantifier interpretation. In the first case however, it can be argued that sentence (3.26) receives an apparent wide scope ‘reading’, because a woman refers to one specific woman and hence the value of a woman does not vary with the people. According to Kripke (see also Ludlow and Neale, 1991), this would however be no genuine semantic reading of the sentence, but only a different usage of the indefinite a woman. I will come back to this point in Section 4.4, where I will also discuss the intuitive truth conditions of sentences containing indefinites used to refer to speakers’ referents.
Implicit domain restriction A further possible source for apparent, but not genuine wide scope could be implicit domain restriction. It is known that natural language makes extensive use of covert implicit domain restriction that is triggered by context (see e.g. von Fintel, 1994; Stanley, 2000; Mart´ı, 2003). For individual quantifiers, this restriction can be imposed by intersecting the restrictor set with the denotation of a covert predicate that is determined by the context. In a context as given in (3.28a), (3.28b) would not be about all apples in the universe, but about all the apples that have been introduced in (3.28a), i.e. all apples that Peter had bought the day before. (3.28)
a. Yesterday, Peter bought apples. b. Every apple tasted awful.
Portner and Yabushita (2001), Schwarzschild (2002) and Breheny (2003) propose that it is in fact this domain restriction that is responsible for apparent wide scope. Consider again examples (3.25) and (3.26). In both cases, the indefinite’s restrictor woman could be assumed to be covertly restricted to contain only one woman, namely the woman that the speaker has in mind and which satisfies the sentence predicate (= that everybody/exactly ten people danced with her). I will refer to this case, where the restrictor set is restricted in such an extensive way, as extreme domain restriction. The indefinite could then be interpreted as a narrow-scope indefinite. But due to the domain restriction to a singleton set, there is always one and the same woman picked out of the set. This reading would be a reading where the respective woman does not vary with the people, which makes it appear like a wide scope reading. It would be hard to tell between the singleton set-hypothesis and genuine wide scope in this case. Both assumptions could account for the data under discussion.
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QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
This implicit domain restriction can be conceived of as an instance of epistemic/pragmatic specificity, because the speaker has restricted the NP-domain such that it comprises only one individual. Hence the speaker has a specific individual in mind (or a specific property that can be assigned to one individual) that fulfills the sentence predicate. I will discuss the approaches that rely on this assumption and their empirical and theoretical consequences in Section 4.5.
3.2.2
Apparent vs. Genuine Wide Scope
Now that we have seen three options that could account for seemingly wide scope readings without invoking a scope mechanism, I will illustrate that there are examples that show that wide scope readings actually do exist and have to be accounted for by a scope-shifting mechanism. Genuine wide scope exists: the general line of argument My argument will proceed as follows: I will start with examples that only allow for covariation readings, i.e. sentences where a wide scope reading and also all readings that give rise to apparent wide scope readings are excluded. I will then show that a minimal variant, which only differs from the original version in the accent pattern of the indefinite involved, allows for a non-variation reading. It is implausible to assume that variation of the accent pattern influences the availability of specific/referential/extremely domain-restricted readings. The only option that explains that the second variant, as opposed to the first, allows for a non-variation reading is to assume that in the second version the indefinite takes genuine wide scope. Before getting to the heart of this argument, let me illustrate the general point by way of a short example. It has been noted every now and then (see e.g. Fodor and Sag, 1982; Geurts, 2002; Pafel, 2005) that simple indefinites in German and English usually do not allow for ‘specific’ readings, i.e. non-variation readings in my unbiased terminology. But the heavier the DP, the more easily can it be interpreted as ‘specific’. The following example illustrates this fact.7 (3.29)
a. Keiner meiner Freunde hat einen MatheMAtiker zu seiner Party none
of-my friends
has a
mathematician
to his
party
eingeladen. invited
‘None of my friends invited a mathematician to his party.’ b. Keiner meiner Freunde hat einen rothaarigen MatheMAtiker zu seiner none
of-my friends
has a
redheaded
mathematician
to his
Party eingeladen. party invited 7 In the following German examples, I mark the main accent inside the relevant indefinites by capitals in the German variants. Main accent on the NP-complement is the ‘neutral’ stress pattern for a German DP. I will concentrate only on the relevant DPs and omit all other nuclear and pre-nuclear accents. As before, the arrow (↑) indicates that the involved accent is most naturally realized as a rising tone. Accents that have no preference for a realization as a rising tone are indicated by simple capitals (without the arrow).
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75
‘None of my friends invited a redheaded mathematician to his party.’ c. Keiner meiner Freunde hat einen rothaarigen MatheMAtiker, den ich none
of-my friends
has a
redheaded
mathematician
who I
aus HEIdelberg kenne, zu seiner Party eingeladen. from Heidelberg
know
to his
party invited
‘None of my friends invited a redheaded mathematician whom I know from Heidelberg to his party.’ (3.29a) only receives a co-variation reading.8 (3.29b) marginally allows for a nonvariation reading, but certainly more readily than (3.29a). (3.29c) finally, where the indefinite is extremely heavy, almost only allows for a non-variation reading. In this case, it is extremely plausible to assume that the non-variation readings do not come about as genuine scope effects, but by way of a non-scope mechanism such as extreme domain restriction or speaker’s reference that evokes the illusion of a wide scope reading. That the heaviness of the NP-complement matters for specificity/referentiality is not surprising, because here the speaker uses an indefinite to refer to a specific object he has in mind. The more information he gives about this object, the easier it is for the hearer to conclude that the speaker is talking about some particular object. The data in (3.29) are thus entirely expected. What is rather unexpected, however, is the fact that a minimal variant of (3.29a) (which we had observed to only allow for a co-variation reading) supports the non-variation reading. (3.30) Keiner meiner Freunde hat ↑EInen Mathematiker zu seiner Party none
of-my friends
has some mathematician to his
party
eingeladen. invited
‘None of my friends invited some mathematician to his party.’ The only difference between (3.29a) and (3.30) lies in the accent pattern of the indefinite. It is the NP-complement that receives the main accent in (3.29a) (which corresponds to the ‘neutral’ stress pattern in German), whereas in (3.30) it is the determiner. I will refer to this kind of indefinite, which exhibits a strong (usually rising) accent on its determiner, as emphatic indefinites in the following. Indefinites with the ‘neutral’ intonation pattern, where the main accent falls on the NP-complement, will be referred to as slim indefinites. German emphatic indefinites pattern with English indefinites that are realized with the determiner some instead of a (see the translation in (3.30) vs. (3.29)): some-indefinites obtain genuine wide scope much easier than a-indefinites. I will thus speak of some-indefinites as being emphatic and a-indefinites as representing slim indefinites in English.9 Consider the following contrast. 8 This effect can be further strengthened when the indefinite article is phonetically reduced to ‘n, i.e. if einen Mathematiker (a mathematician) in (3.29a) is replaced by ‘n Mathematiker. However, note that Pafel (2005) argues that such indefinites with phonetically reduced determiners are non-quantificational. He treats them as kind-denoting entities. I take a different view and treat them as ordinary quantificational indefinites. 9 There is a direct relationship to the weak-strong distinction of unstressed and stressed some in English discussed e.g. in (Milsark, 1977). The slim variant is sometimes set apart from the emphatic version by noting sm and SOME, respectively. However, we will see that the facts about the correct accent placement are not as straightforward in English as they are in German. It is usually assumed that SOME-indefinites represent strong quantifiers, which are existence-presupposing, whereas sm-indefinites denote weak quantifiers, which are not. As I do not follow the theoretical claim that the emphatic version denotes a different quantifier
76
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS (3.31)
a. None of my friends invited a mathematician to the party. b. None of my friends invited some mathematician to the party.
While (3.31a) only supports a narrow scope reading for the indefinite, (3.31b) supports a wide scope reading and could be followed by Namely this friend of Peter’s from Cologne. However, unlike in German, the determiner does not have to be accented in order to make this wide scope reading available.10 We will encounter examples where stressing the determiner even makes the wide scope reading vanish, but then again others where stressing the determiner brings out the wide scope reading. The interrelation of accenting and wide scope readings in English is as yet unclear and I will set this issue aside, but German seems to be more systematic here. A heavy accent on the determiner evokes a wide scope reading. In English, a similar difference manifests itself in the choice of the determiner: sometimes a-indefinites only support narrow scope readings and in the very same contexts some-indefinites can obtain wide scope readings. Going back to the German cases, the generalization now could be the following: a heavy accent on the determiner indicates a specific/referential use of the indefinite on the speaker’s side (cf. example (3.30)), while a destressed determiner indicates a nonspecific/non-referential reading (cf. example (3.29a)). However, such a generalization would be entirely ad hoc and there does not seem to be a deeper reason for such a generalization. It seems more reasonable to assume that (3.30) embodies a genuine wide scope reading for einen Mathematiker (some mathematician). The deeper reason for this wide scope reading still needs to be explained and will become clear in the course of this chapter. This contrasts with examples (3.29b,c), which, when read in a non-variation reading, most plausibly embody a specific/referential/extremely domainrestricted reading. Pafel (2005, pp. 193–197) also observes that a heavy accent on the determiner of an indefinite in German influences the possible readings for this indefinite.11 He shows that sentences with quantificational subjects and indefinite objects with non-heavy NPcomplements do not bear inverse scope readings, unless the indefinite is realized with an accent on the determiner. He gives the examples in (3.32) (Pafel, 2005, p. 11, 196) and argues – on the basis of investigations of judgments of more than a dozen native speakers of German – that (3.32a) does not exhibit an inverse scope reading, whereas (3.32b) clearly does. (In the examples I adopted Pafel’s notations of accent markings.)
than the slim version, I refrain from utilizing the notions weak and strong and stick to my theory-neutral terminology. 10 Note that examples along the lines of (3.31b) and their possible continuation by namely-sentences contradict a claim of Farkas (2002) that if a speaker chooses the determiner some (instead of a) this indicates that the speaker is unable or unwilling to identify the verifying value in subsequent discourse. She calls this the ‘no imminent identification requirement’ (attributing this observation to M. Israel). Farkas deals with destressed some and my English informants tell me that the determiner in this example at least can be destressed. 11 It is also remarked in (van Geenhoven, 1998, p. 208) that [f]ocusing the indefinite determiner einen (a) can give rise to a wide scope reading [...]. Although the involved accent is presumably not a simple focal one – at least not only a focal one (the accent might be the result of a focal accent that is embedded in a topical constituent) –, the basic observation made is the same.
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS (3.32)
77
a. Jeder Pianist hat eine Beethovensonate in seinem ReperTOIRE. every pianist has a
Beethoven sonata in his
repertoire
‘Every pianist has some Beethoven sonata in his repertoire.’ b. Jeder Pianist hat EI↑ne # BEET&hoven-Sonate in seinem every pianist has some
Beethoven sonata
in his
ReperTOIRE. repertoire
‘Some Beethoven sonata every pianist has in his repertoire.’ Pafel (2005) concludes that emphatic indefinites are not quantificational and treats indefinites in cases like (3.32b) as ‘specific’, i.e. referential-like (although he assumes that a specific indefinite triggers an existential quantifier on semantic structure eventually). Note that Pafel judges the involved accent on the determiner to be a static high tone, whereas I have assumed the emphatic stress pattern to involve a rising tone in the usual case. He describes the involved accent pattern in the following way: The prosody in mind is the one with a heavy accent on eine (presumably a static high tone ↑), an intonation break (#) after eine, and a falling accent on Beethoven (Pafel, 2005, p. 11, 196). However, as pointed out above, such emphatic indefinites can probably also be realized with a falling tone as claimed by Jacobs (1997) for indefinites in I-specification constructions, which are very similar (or even identical) to the cases at hand. Summing up, in line with Pafel, I take the view that emphatic indefinites are instances of indefinites that seem to take wide scope. However, as will be argued in the upcoming section, they embody genuine wide scope readings and not specific or referential readings, as Pafel assumes.
Genuine wide scope exists: the argument in detail Let us go through the line of argument in detail. I start with the observation that there are sentences that are unambiguous in that they only support a co-variation reading. This means that in these cases, the indefinite can only take narrow scope. In other words, we observe that a (genuine) wide scope interpretation as well as extreme implicit domain restriction and a referential/specific interpretation are excluded. (3.33)
a. Ich war gestern auf einer Party mit vielen internationalen G¨asten und habe mich mit sehr vielen Studenten unterhalten. (I went to a party with many international guests yesterday and talked to many students there.) b. # Verr¨uckterweise kam jeder Student, mit dem ich mich came every student
crazily
with whom I
myself
unterhalten hatte, von einer UNi. talked
had
from a
university
‘Oddly enough, every student with whom I had talked was from a university.’
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QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
(3.33b) with the German simple indefinite einer UNi (a university) is infelicitous in continuation of (3.33a), because it somehow seems to convey trivial information, which particularly cannot be regarded as odd. The same holds for English and a-indefinites. (3.34)
a. I went to a party with many international guests yesterday and talked to many students there. b. # Oddly enough, every student with whom I had talked was from a university.
The fact that every student the speaker spoke to was from/studied at some university or other is something the hearer knows anyway if he is acquainted with the meaning of the word student.12 In other words, the sentences seem to support a co-variation reading only. The wide scope or referential/specific/extremely domain-restricted reading seems to be missing. But such a non-variation reading would be a perfectly sensible and informative one, namely stating that every student the speaker talked to was from one and the same university. Yet, this reading is absent, which is why the sentences appear so odd. So what does this tell us? It makes us become aware of the fact that the involved indefinites cannot take (genuine) wide scope over the subject, nor do they allow for a specific/referential/extremely domain-restricted reading in these sentences. Such sentences make up the perfect starting point for further investigations of minimal variants and the readings they exhibit. The fact that (3.33b) and (3.34b) do not have a specific/referential/singleton set reading makes us realize that the sentences actually also lack a wide scope reading. We would not become aware of this when evaluating other sentences that allow for some apparent wide scope reading such as the minimally modified examples (3.35) and (3.36), where the involved indefinites are slightly heavier than in the original examples: von einer Uni (from a university) has been replaced by von einer deutschen Uni (from a German university) in the German example, likewise in English. (3.35)
a. Gestern war ich auf einer Party. (Yesterday, I went to a party.) b. Verr¨uckterweise kam jeder Student, mit dem ich mich unterhalten crazily
came every student
with whom I
myself talked
hatte, von einer deutschen UNi. had
from a
German
university
‘Oddly enough, every student with whom I had talked was from a German university.’ c. N¨amlich von der Humboldt-Universit¨at. Namely from Humboldt University. (3.36)
a. Yesterday, I went to a party. b. Oddly enough, every student with whom I had talked was from a German university. c. Namely from Humboldt University.
12 There is one way to make sense of the sentence, namely when one is comparing universities with other institutions that have students (e.g. so called Fachhochschulen (universities of applied sciences) in German). The reader is asked to ignore such readings and assume for the sake of the argument that the only institutions that host students are universities.
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
79
(3.35b) and its English variant in (3.36b) seem to be ambiguous between a co-variation and a non-variation reading of eine deutsche Uni /a German university, which is evidenced by the fact that they can be continued with the remark in (c). Unlike in (3.33) and (3.34), a non-variation reading is not entirely excluded here. This is due to the fact that (3.35b)/(3.36b) can be read specifically/referentially/as extremely domainrestricted. As I have noted above it has often been observed (see e.g. Fodor and Sag, 1982; Geurts, 2002) that a specific/referential reading is more easily available in German and English if the DP is heavier. Hence (3.35) allows more readily for a specific/referential reading than (3.33) just as well as (3.36) allows more readily for a specific/referential reading than (3.34). The adjective deutschen/German makes the DP heavier. In other words, neither (3.35b)/(3.36b) nor (3.33b)/(3.34b) have genuine wide scope readings. But in (3.35)/(3.36) the specific/referential/domain-restricted reading, i.e. an apparent wide scope reading, is possible. Hence, it is much easier to see that there is no genuine wide scope reading for (3.33b)/(3.34b) than for (3.35b)/(3.36b), because no such apparent readings interfere. All of this is important for the following reason: take the German example (3.33b). Here, we can be sure that the indefinite cannot be read specifically/referentially/as extremely domain-restricted due to the lack of a non-variation reading. If we can find a minimal variant of this sentence, embedded in exactly the same environment, that supports a non-variation reading, it is very likely that this reading is a genuine wide scope reading – precisely because there would be no reason that this minimal variant supports a specific/referential/domain-restricted interpretation for the indefinite (in exactly the same environment) as opposed to the version in (3.33b). In the following, I will give an example of such a minimal variant of the original example that actually allows for a non-variation reading. I claim that this reading comes about by means of a scope-shifting mechanism, because a referential/specific/domain-restricted reading can be excluded. Now consider the following example from German, which is entirely parallel to (3.33), except that the determiner of the indefinite receives a heavy accent. In other words, the following example involves an emphatic indefinite instead of the slim indefinite in the original example. (3.37)
a. Ich war gestern auf einer Party mit vielen internationalen G¨asten und habe mich mit sehr vielen Studenten unterhalten. (I went to a party with many international guests yesterday and talked to many students there.) b. Verr¨uckterweise kam jeder Student, mit dem ich mich unterhalten crazily
came every student
hatte, von ↑EIner Uni. had
from some
with whom I
myself talked
(N¨amlich vom MIT.)
university namely
from MIT
‘Oddly enough, every student with whom I had talked was from the same university. (Namely from MIT.)’ In German, the emphatic variant of (3.33b) in (3.37b) with a heavy accent on the determiner is perfectly sensible. It receives the non-variation reading that was missing in the slim variant.
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QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
Unfortunately, things are not as clear in English, if we substitute the slim indefinite a university in (3.34b) by the emphatic variant some university. (3.38)
a. I went to a party with many international guests yesterday and talked to many students there. b. Oddly enough, every student with whom I had talked was from some university. (Namely from MIT.)
For some of my English informants the non-variation reading is now available. To them the sentence is ambiguous between a co-variation and a non-variation reading, if some is not accented. However, surprisingly, with strongly accented some, the sentence still seems to only obtain the infelicitous co-variation reading. For others, the sentence only has the infelicitous co-variation reading, no matter if the indefinite is realized with some as in (3.38) or with a as in (3.34b). Setting English aside for the moment and concentrating on German, I conclude that (3.37) is an instance of genuine wide scope for the following reasons: 1. it is not a specific reading, 2. it is not a reading that emerges via extreme domain restriction, and 3. it is not a referential reading. As for 1., no overt opaque operator is involved, which makes it very unlikely that specificity is involved. Furthermore, if a tacit epistemic operator could be assumed to be introduced in the case of (3.37), this should also be possible in the case of (3.33). But as (3.33) lacks a specific reading, this assumption is not plausible. In other words, if it can be assumed that a tacit opaque operator is involved, then this assumption can equally be made for the sentences that involve the emphatic variants of the indefinites as well as for those that involve the slim ones. An assumption that the insertion of a covert operator is only possible in the case of the emphatic variants would be highly implausible. To disprove 2., one would have to assume that it is possible to interpret the restrictor set of the emphatic indefinite in (3.37) as a singleton set. But then it would be unclear why the restrictor set of the slim indefinite in (3.33) should not be interpretable as a singleton set in the very same environment. Covert restriction is triggered by context. As the sentences appear in exactly identical contexts, such an assumption is implausible. Note furthermore that the accent on the determiner of emphatic indefinites in German seems to be the same one as the one for partitives, which is shown in the following example. (3.39)
a. Gestern hat Sarah sich
einige Unis
angeschaut.
yesterday has Sarah herself several universities looked-at
‘Yesterday, Sarah visited a few universities.’ b. ↑EIne der Unis / ↑EIne Uni hat ihr sogar gefallen. one of the universities / one university has her even liked ‘One of the universities / One university she actually liked.’ The preceding example makes it appear quite implausible that the restrictor set of emphatic indefinites in German is narrowed down to denote a singleton set by implicit
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
81
domain restriction in the general case. The context sentence (3.39a) introduces a set of universities. The indefinite eine Universit¨at (some university) in (3.39b) picks out one of those universities. But at the utterance point of this indefinite, there is no reason why the restrictor set should comprise fewer elements than the ones recently introduced, i.e. fewer than all the universities that have just been explicitly introduced in the preceding sentence. Also in the context of co-variation vs. non-variation readings, we can find examples where it is not possible to try to explain wide scope via implicit domain restriction. Here is again an example from German. (3.40)
a. Gestern haben sich die Sch¨uler viele verschiedene Unis angeschaut. (Yesterday, the pupils visited many different universities.) b. Alle Sch¨uler w¨urden sich bei ↑EIner Uni sofort all
pupils
would
themselves at
one
university immediately
immatrikulieren. enroll
‘All pupils would enroll for one university, immediately.’ c. N¨amlich bei der Humboldt-Universit¨at. (Namely for Humboldt University.) Sentence (3.40b) allows for a non-variation reading of the indefinite, which is verified by the fact that (3.40c) is a felicitous continuation. However, the specified context in (3.40a) gives us no clue that the set of universities is implicitly restricted to a singleton set – to a set that contains only one university, i.e. the university that fulfills the sentence predicate, i.e. the university that is such that all pupils would like to enroll for it. Quite to the contrary, the context introduces many different universities, which are therefore all salient. Why should the set of universities be restricted to comprise only one (and the intended) university in (3.40b)? There is at least no obvious reasonable answer to this question. Additionally, as mentioned above (and shown in (3.39)), the accent on the determiner of emphatic indefinites is identical to the one on the determiner in partitives such as eine der Unis (one of the universities). It is well-known that partitives carry a nonuniqueness presupposition/implicature, i.e. it is usually assumed that for partitives to be licensed it is imperative that there are more relevant, contextually salient elements in the restrictor set than just the ones talked about in the target sentence. The same seems to hold for emphatic indefinites. As opposed to slim indefinites with lexically rich restrictors (such as eine deutsche UNi, die ich sehr sch¨atze (a German university I really value)), which seem to carry no such non-uniqueness presupposition, emphatic indefinites seem to be licensed only if it is well-known that the restrictor set contains more elements than the one that is currently under discussion.13 This non-uniqueness 13 Nevertheless ordinary (slim and possibly also heavy) indefinites such as a (German) university (I really value) are also banned from uses where both the speaker and the hearer know that the restrictor set consists of only one element. Slim indefinites usually carry a uniqueness ‘antipresupposition’ along the lines: use this indefinite only if it is not taken for granted that there is only one (contextually salient) element in the restrictor set (see Percus, 2006). These antipresuppositions of indefinites can be explained if one considers the lexical items that they compete with. An obvious competitor of the indefinite determiner would be the definite determiner. What is important for our concerns is that while slim indefinites may carry antipresuppositions of the above-mentioned style, emphatic indefinites seem to carry genuine presuppositions/implications of the kind: there are more relevant and salient elements in the restrictor set.
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QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
presupposition/implication of emphatic indefinites and partitives has probably the same source: both carry a heavy accent on the determiner. If this accent is interpreted as a focal accent that is embedded in a topical constituent (cf. e.g. von Fintel, 1994; Krifka, 1998), the non-uniqueness presupposition/implication follows straightforwardly. The focal accent invokes alternatives to the stressed determiner. In partitive constructions, the determiner is a numeral. (Note that in German the numeral ein (one) is form-identical to the indefinite determiner ein (a).) Stressing the numeral in EIne Uni (one university) in a sentence such as EIne Uni war gut gelegen (ONE university was situated suitably) only makes sense in a context where there are alternatives such as two, three, four (other) universities etc., which are not situated suitably or where the speaker is at least unsure whether they are. This explains the non-uniqueness presupposition/implication of indefinites with stressed determiners, i.e. emphatic and partitive ones. This line of argument can also account for the fact that emphatic indefinites usually induce ‘exactly’ interpretations. If the accent on the determiner one makes reference to alternatives such as two, three etc., it naturally follows that with EIne Uni war gut gelegen (ONE university was situated suitably) it is implicated that only one university is situated suitably. The alternatives (two, three, etc. universities) are implicitly excluded, as these form alternatives to the utterance that is made and the obvious reason for the speaker for not having chosen one of these alternatives is that the speaker knows that they are not true or at least that she does not know whether they are true (cf. Section 5.2 for more discussion of the role of intonation and the effect on possible interpretations). To conclude, (3.37) cannot be explained as an instance of extreme domain restriction to the effect that the restrictor set consists of only one element. Quite to the contrary, emphatic indefinites, as well as partitives, seem to presuppose/imply that the restrictor set contains more than one salient element. Extreme domain restriction is not a conclusive explanation for the data at hand. I have shown so far that the wide scope readings of the emphatic indefinites in the examples discussed above can neither be explained as specific readings (with respect to opaque operators) nor as readings that emerge via extreme domain restriction. Now it remains to exclude point 3., referentiality, from the enumeration above. The remaining question is: can the non-variation readings of the emphatic indefinites in the examples discussed so far be due to a referential/non-referential distinction with respect to the speaker’s mind? I will show that the answer is ‘no’. And hence there is only one way left to account for the non-variation reading of the emphatic indefinites: they take genuine wide scope. To make my point, let us first assume that these readings were indeed due to a referential interpretation. To account for the difference between emphatic and slim indefinites shown in (3.33) vs. (3.37), one would have to argue that only emphatic indefinites can denote speakers’ referents and that precisely this is not possible for slim indefinites. Under this assumption, it would in turn be problematic to account for the non-variation readings of heavy, yet slim indefinites as in (3.35). Assuming that only emphatic indefinites allow for a referential interpretation then is no viable option. The last remaining option would be to assume that simple slim indefinites cannot be interpreted referentially/specifically, but that emphatic ones as well as heavy slim indefinites such as the indefinite einer deutschen UNi in (3.35b)
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
83
can. This does not seem to be a sensible move and hence I conclude that emphatic indefinites give rise to genuine wide scope readings. Anti-distributivity vs. wide scope There are types of sentences that, at first sight, seem to involve genuine wide scopetaking indefinites, but closer inspection reveals that they instantiate another type of apparent wide scope readings.14 Consider the following example. (3.41) Wir sitzen doch alle in EInem Boot. we sit
PART all in one
boat
‘We are all in the same boat.’ At first sight, it seems as if the indefinite, which is realized with a heavy accent on the determiner, can be assumed to take genuine wide scope. However, already the English translation makes clear that the accent on the determiner is not to indicate wide scope, but rather to indicate some kind of ‘non-distributivity’ reading. The accent might be licensed because it expresses the contrast of one and the same as opposed to possibly different ones. One can actually construct examples which are ambiguous between this ‘anti-distributivity’ reading and the usual wide scope one. (3.42)
a. Wenn Bine und Oli in EInem Hotel schlafen m¨ussen, gibt es auf jeden if
Bine and Oli in one
hotel sleep
must
give it on every
¨ Fall Arger. case trouble
‘If Bine and Oli have to sleep in one (and the same) hotel, there will be trouble.’ b. Wenn Fritz und Frank durch EIne T¨ur gehen, gewinnen sie den if
Fritz and Frank through one door go
win
they the
Hauptgewinn. first prize
‘If Fritz and Frank go through one (and the same) door, they will win the first prize.’ c. Immer wenn Peter und Maria in EInem Auto sitzen, dr¨uckt Peter always when Peter and Maria in one
car
sit
pushes Peter
besonders aufs Gas. particularly on-the gas
‘When Peter and Maria sit in one (and the same) car, Peter speeds particularly fast.’ All sentences are ambiguous when uttered with an accent on the determiner of the indefinite, as indicated in the examples. Let us assume that (3.42a) is uttered in a context where several hotels are under discussion. The wide scope reading of (3.42a) can be described as saying that there is one particular hotel (e.g. the most uncomfortable one among the hotels) where Bine and Oli do not want to sleep. If they have to, there will be trouble. The ‘anti-distributivity’ reading, on the other hand, would 14 I
thank Manfred Krifka for bringing these phenomena to my attention.
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QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
be true in a scenario where there is trouble whenever Bine and Oli have to spend the night in one and the same hotel, e.g. because they cannot stand each other. In other words, there will be trouble independent of the choice of the hotel. (3.42b) has to be imagined in a game show context. Fritz and Frank each have to go through one door separately and they cannot see which door the other one has gone through. The quiz master utters (3.42b) in the wide scope reading if there is one specific winning door and if Fritz and Frank coincidentally both step through that same door, they win. The ‘anti-distributivity’ reading is true if they win after stepping through one and the same door, no matter which one. Finally, (3.42c) is true in the wide scope reading if there is one particular car, say Paul’s Porsche, which is a very fast car. Furthermore, Peter wants to show off in front of Maria. Hence, whenever he drives Paul’s Porsche and Maria sits next to him he tries to impress her by driving really fast. But he does not try to drive fast when he drives other cars, because he knows that this would not impress Maria. On the other hand, the sentence is true in the ‘anti-distributivity’ reading if Peter drives fast whenever Maria sits next to him – whatever car he is driving. All three sentences have the two indicated readings.15 Unfortunately – contrary to what we had hoped for – there seems to be no correlation between the kind of accent on the determiner and the sentence’s interpretation. Both the wide scope and the ‘antidistributivity’ reading can be realized with a rising or a falling tone on the determiner (cf. Jacobs, 1997, who claims that indefinites in what he calls I-specification constructions can be realized with a rising or a falling tone on the determiner, although a rising accent is usually preferred, cf. Section 2.2.3). See the appendix, Section A.2 for the description and results of two informal pilot studies that investigated the correlation of the kind of accent on the determiner of an indefinite and its interpretation. I could not find any correlation – neither between a rising tone and a wide scope interpretation nor between a falling one and an ‘anti-distributivity’ reading (cf. experiment 2, Section A.2.2 of the appendix). Generally speaking, I found no distinctive accent pattern for (exceptional) wide scope readings (cf. experiment 1, Section A.2.1). Concerning a tentative analysis of these anti-distributivity readings, it seems that they come about due to a focal accent on the determiner that evokes alternatives to other determiners or number words. Furthermore, it is known that focal elements tend to take narrow scope (see Pafel 2005, pp. 82–84 and references cited therein). In the case of example (3.41), the indefinite einem Boot (one boat) has to take narrow scope. As the sentence is preferably interpreted in a cumulative reading, the sentence comes to mean the following: we all sit in one and the same boat and not in two three, four, etc. In principle, there is another reading to the sentence, namely a distributive one, which is, however, not very salient, namely that everyone sits in one (possibly different) boat, but not in two, three, four, etc. To contrast sitting in one boat with sitting in two or three would be a rather odd move, of course, and hence the reading is not very salient. This reading is, however, the only available one for (3.43), because jeder (everyone) forces a distributive reading. 15 The alert reader might have noticed that the sentences are not ambiguous in the strict sense, because in all three cases the wide scope reading implies the ‘anti-distributivity’ reading. I assume that the ambiguity is nevertheless genuine.
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS (3.43)
#
Jeder
85
sitzt in EInem Boot.
everyone sitzt in one
boat
‘Everyone sits in one boat.’
Summary
What I have shown in this section is the following: some sentences support a nonvariation reading with slim indefinites, but these readings can be argued to be only apparent wide scope readings – either because they are special cases of the narrow scope readings and therefore not genuine readings, because they are instances of specific or referential readings, or because they are evoked by extreme domain restriction. There are however sentences that only allow for a co-variation interpretation of the involved slim indefinite, i.e. genuine wide scope as well as specific/referential/extreme domain-restricted readings are missing – for whatever reason that may be the case. Yet, emphatic variants of these indefinites allow for a non-variation reading in the same environment. I have shown that the only way to account for these readings is via the assumption that the emphatic indefinites take genuine wide scope. Hence, not all non-variation readings can be reduced to apparent wide scope readings. Some wide scope readings are genuine. Note that my claim affects only one direction of the imaginable implication concerning emphatic form and wide scope interpretation. Emphatic indefinites receive a genuine wide scope interpretation.16 The other direction does not necessarily hold. There may very well be indefinites that receive a (scope-shifted) genuine wide scope interpretation without being realized emphatically. This explanation of the facts discussed above also clarifies the observation (cf. e.g. Farkas, 1981; Abusch, 1994; Kratzer, 1998; Bende-Farkas and Kamp, 2001) that some-indefinites lend themselves to non-local interpretations and in particular exceptional wide scope interpretations more readily than indefinites with the determiner a. According to the view presented here, this is so because some-indefinites, being instances of emphatic indefinites, often allow for genuine (exceptional) wide scope interpretations when a-indefinites, the slim variants, do not. This fact is especially clear when the NP-complement of the indefinite is not heavy enough to allow for a referential/specific/extremely domain-restricted interpretation of the indefinite, i.e. to allow for a seemingly wide scope interpretation. As a referential/specific/extremely domainrestricted interpretation is not always possible (only in certain contexts and/or when the descriptive content is ‘heavy’ enough), but scope-shifting always is, some-indefinites allow for a wide scope interpretation more easily.
16 I will discuss the underlying reason behind this implication and putative counterexamples to it in Chapter 5. For the moment, my aim was a very moderate one, namely to show that not all non-variation readings can be accounted for by non-scope shifting mechanisms.
86
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
3.3
Functional readings
In the preceding section, we have discussed cases of apparent wide scope, i.e. cases where an indefinite seems to receive wide scope over another operator, although in fact it takes narrow scope, and the illusion of a wide scope interpretation is evoked by other factors. We concluded that genuine wide scope readings do nevertheless exist. In this section, we will investigate the reverse phenomenon. There are readings of indefinites, in which the value of an indefinite co-varies with the values of some other operator because the indefinite contains a functional element. I claim that such a co-variation reading can nevertheless be an instance of a wide scope reading, namely a functional wide scope reading. I will show that this functional wide scope reading is – empirically and formally – distinguishable from a narrow scope reading. I want to make two major claims here: 1. functional wide scope readings or apparent narrow scope readings, exist, and 2. these readings are semantically different from genuine narrow scope readings, which means that not all narrow scope readings can be reduced to functional readings; hence genuine narrow scope readings also exist. Combining the claim from the last section that wide scope readings actually exist with the second claim of this section, we can conclude that scope readings are genuine. Neither can narrow scope be reduced to functional wide scope nor can wide scope be reduced to referentiality or some other phenomenon.
3.3.1
Data
Let us start with the following example in English. (3.44) Everyone hates some relative (of his). Example (3.44) has two readings: one which represents the ordinary narrow scope reading, in which everyone is paired with some relative whom he hates; and one, which I call the functional wide scope reading, in which there is some specific kind of relative, say his mother in law, whom everyone hates. The first reading instantiates a pair-list reading, whereas the second reading is a genuine functional reading. The function could be the mother-in-law function, which is a function that maps every x to x’s mother in law. The functional reading is triggered by the NP relative of his, which is obviously a functional element that maps people to their relatives, where the pronoun his is bound by everyone. It can already be seen that indefinites in English can have the decisive functional reading even if there is no overt pronoun involved. Example (3.44) also supports a functional reading if the material in parentheses is omitted. This is because the NP relative is functional by itself, as a relative has to be interpreted with respect to someone whose relative he is. Quite generally, most NPs in English allow for a functional interpretation, even if they do not seem functional at first sight. The NPs book or picture for example can be reinterpreted as functional items to mean a book belonging to/written by someone or a picture of someone, respectively. The more likely such a reinterpretation is according to the context, the more readily available is a functional reading.
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87
I will differentiate between the functional wide scope reading and a simple narrow scope one by means of methods that are known from discussions about functional vs. pair-list readings of questions (as well as from discussions about functional DPs with relative clauses containing a quantifier). The function/pair-list distinction is usually not discussed in the context of quantifier scope, although it has important consequences for the interpretation of wide (and intermediate) scope indefinites by means of – parameterized or non-parameterized – choice functions (see Section 4.7). The only exceptions I am aware of are (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984, Section 3.4) and (building on this) (G¨artner, 2001, p. 132), where a distinction between functional readings and pair-list readings is drawn in a very brief discussion of quantifier scope phenomena. I hope to convince the reader that a further investigation of the questions raised in this section might be worthwhile in order to learn more about the correct treatment of indefinites. Consider example (3.45), given the following context: In einer Schule wollte die Kunstlehrerin mit ihren Sch¨ulern eine Collage basteln und bat daher alle Sch¨uler, zur n¨achsten Kunststunde ein Bild mitzubringen. Am Tag davor erinnerte sie die Kinder noch einmal daran, an alles zu denken, weil normalerweise immer jemand irgendetwas vergisst. Als sie dann zum Kunstunterricht kam, war sie total erstaunt, ... (At school, the arts teacher wanted to make a collage with her pupils and asked each pupil to bring a picture to the next lecture. The day before the arts class she reminded her pupils again not to forget, because usually at least some children forget what they were asked to bring. When the teacher came to the arts lecture, she was surprised, ...) (3.45) denn
↑EIN Bild
von sich,
because some picture of
das hatte u¨ berraschenderweise jeder
himself RP had surprisingly
every
Sch¨uler mitgebracht. pupil
brought-along
‘because, surprisingly, every pupil had brought a certain picture of himself.’ (3.45) has a co-variation reading, where the pictures vary with the pupils.17 But interestingly, the reading is not a simple narrow scope reading. The sentence cannot mean that every pupil brought along just some picture whatsoever, although this reading is made highly salient by the context and should therefore be expected by the hearer. The sentence exhibits only a functional wide scope reading. This reading can be paraphrased as follows: there is a method f of assigning pictures to pupils x, such that every x brought f (x).18 17 Note that the indefinite is realized emphatically, which is the usual way of realizing a left-dislocated indefinite in non-contrastive sentences, non-generic sentences, and sentences that do not contain a quantificational adverb, i.e. in non-marked true episodic sentences. We will discuss the reasons for this in Chapter 5. For the moment, it suffices to say that there is no other non-marked way of realizing the indefinite. In particular, a slim realization (with an accent on the NP-complement) would lead to a contrastive interpretation, where the NP Bild (picture) would have to be contrasted with other things. (3.45) would then have to be followed by a sentence such as Aber die BAStelpappe hatten wieder alle vergessen (But everyone forgot the paperboard). 18 I assume that properties such as picture fn are predicates that range over functions, i.e. picturefn denotes a set of picture-functions, functions that yield pictures when applied to some individual. This is only for expository purposes. A detailed compositional formalization of the derivation of functional wide scope readings will be given in Section 6.6. Note that Cresti (1995) also discusses the derivation
88
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS (3.46) ∃f [picturefn (f ) ∧ ∀x[pupil (x) → bring(x, f (x))]]
Interestingly, a simple narrow scope reading is available in (3.47a) (uttered in the same context as (3.45)), which is indicated in (3.47b) (and which is equivalent to (3.47c)). Note that here, in contrast to (3.45), the functional indefinite ein Bild von sich (a picture of himself ) is not in left-dislocated position. (3.47)
a. denn
jeder Sch¨uler hatte tats¨achlich ein BILD von sich
because every pupil
had indeed
a
picture of
himself
mitgebracht. brought-along
‘because every pupil had brought a picture of himself, indeed.’ b. ∀x[pupil (x) → ∃f [picturefn (f ) ∧ bring(x, f (x))]] c. ∀x[pupil (x) → ∃y[picture(y) ∧ of (y, x) ∧ bring(x, y)]] Anticipating the results from the treatment of functional indefinites that will be outlined in Chapter 6, the crucial difference between (3.45) and (3.47) lies in the fact that in (3.45) the decisive indefinite is topical and in (3.47) it is not. The interpretation of such topical functional indefinites will be discussed in Section 6.6. As it stands, the difference between (3.45) and (3.47a) would not be correctly represented, because, without further assumptions, formulas (3.46) and (3.47b,c) are obviously equivalent (for this conclusion cf. also Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984).19 In other words, if simply the existence of a function f in (3.46) that maps pupils to pictures of themselves made sentence (3.45) true, the functional wide scope reading would be indistinguishable from the narrow scope reading. A model for the narrow scope scenario, i.e. where every pupil brought a picture of himself, certainly also satisfies (3.46), because there exists a function f such that every pupil brought f (x). This function maps every pupil to the picture he brought. To distinguish the functional wide scope reading from the narrow scope reading, it is important that f cannot denote just any function whatsoever. A function in the linguistic world is not just any function. f can only be instantiated by a function with well-defined properties. In the literature, it has been proposed in other contexts (in particular in connection with answers to wh questions) that such linguistically relevant functions have to be natural functions as opposed to just arbitrary functions (cf. among others Chierchia, 1993; Jacobson, 1999; Sharvit, 1997). I will discuss the properties of such ‘natural functions’ below. First I will lay out the reasons that this distinction is indeed empirically motivated. of such functional wide scope readings. However, in her framework indefinites do not denote GQs, but free variables. Consequently, her analysis, which relies on existential closure of a function variable and presupposition accommodation, is substantially different from mine and will not be discussed any further. 19 A functional construal of narrow scope as in (3.46) goes back to Thoralf Albert Skolem, who has shown that a first-order formula of the form ∀x[∃y[R(x, y)]] is (satisfiably) equivalent to ∀x[R(x, f (x))], where R is a relation and f is a function – both being non-logical constants and thus to be interpreted by the model. To prove this equivalence, one has to assume the Axiom of Choice (at least in the case of infinite functions). Definition 3.2 (The Axiom of Choice) Let C be a collection of nonempty sets. Then one can choose a member from each set in that collection. Hence, there exists a function f defined on C with the property that, for each set S in the collection, f (S) is a member of S.
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89
On the empirical side, one can differentiate between the different readings of functional and genuine narrow scope readings (here of (3.45) on the one side and (3.47) on the other) by means of the possible continuations of the respective sentences (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984). In other words, empirically, the difference between the functional wide scope reading and a true narrow scope reading can be brought to light by the possible subsequent contexts. (3.45) can be followed by (3.48) N¨amlich das (jeweilige) Einschulungsbild. namely
the (respective) picture of the first day at school
‘Namely the picture of the pupil’s first day at school.’ But an enumeration of person-picture pairs such as given in (3.49) would not be an appropriate continuation of (3.45). (3.49) ? N¨amlich/Und zwar Peter ein Bild namely
Peter a
seiner Einschulung,
Bild, auf dem er auf einem Pferd reitet, Maria ein Bild picture on which he on a
Fritz ein
picture of-his first-day-at-school Fritz a horse rides Maria a
von ihr und
picture of
her and
ihrer Mutter, ... her
mother
‘Namely Peter brought a picture of his first day at school, Fritz, a picture where he is riding a horse, Maria, a picture of her and her mother, ...’ In fact, (3.49) would be a perfect continuation of (3.47a), where ein Bild von sich (a picture of himself ) takes narrow scope with respect to the pupils. If the formula in (3.46) is the correct representation of (3.45), i.e. of a functional wide scope reading, the data in (3.48) and (3.49) suggest that f can be equated with the function x’s picture of his first day at school, which maps every x (pupils in this case) to the picture of x on his first day at school, but not with the enumeration of personpicture pairs as in (3.49). In line with Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), I take this as an indication that pair-listings do not count as functions per se. The difference between functional readings and pair-list readings is better known from constituent questions with quantifiers exemplified in (3.50) and (3.51) from (Krifka, 2001b, pp. 1–2.). (3.50)
a. b. c. d.
Which dish did every guest make? Pasta. His favorite dish. Al, the pasta; Bill, the salad; and Carl, the pudding.
All answers (3.50b–d) are legitimate answers to (3.50a). At first sight, it might appear that (3.50b) is different in nature from answers (3.50c,d), which can be grouped together as exemplifying some kind of functional answer. (3.50c) might just be a short form for (3.50d). However, the following example shows that it is in fact answers (3.50b,c) that should be grouped together, and (3.50d) that should be regarded as a special case that has to be accounted for by entirely different means. (3.51)
a. Which dish did most guests make? b. Pasta.
90
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS c. Their favorite dish. d. # Al, the pasta; Bill, the salad; and Carl, the pudding.
While (3.50a), which contains the quantifier every guest, allows for the pair-list elaboration in (3.50d), (3.51a) with the quantifier most guests in subject position does not allow for such an answer, a property shared by most other quantifiers. This in turn shows that there is a crucial difference between the functional reading on the one hand and the pair-list reading on the other, because most quantifiers in questions trigger the former, but not the latter (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984, Chapter 3).20 There are basically two ways to deal with the observed phenomena: Either pair-list readings of questions are considered to be functional readings, but functional readings of a different kind, namely non-natural ones (cf. among others Engdahl, 1985; Chierchia, 1993). Or pair-list readings are not treated as functional readings right from the start (see e.g. Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984; Krifka, 2001b).21
3.3.2
Natural Functions
In the previous section, we have seen that genuine functional readings (i.e non-pair-list readings) involve functions of a special kind, which are often referred to as natural functions. In the following I will discuss what has been proposed in the literature to distinguish between ‘natural’ and other functions.
Hintikka’s view Hintikka (1986) argues that certain functions have to be understood as natural functions and that naturalness can come about in two ways: either the function is a simple and familiar function such as the mother- or father-function, or the sentence under discussion is constructed in such a way that the hearer’s attention is drawn to a functional interpretation. Hintikka (1986, p. 334) expresses this second possibility for naturalness in the following way: What makes the functional reading natural [...] is not that the crucial value of the function variable in question is already familiar to us, but that the writer is unmistakably calling his reader’s attention to it, in order to discuss it and perchance even to find out what it is. He gives the example in (3.52) (see Hintikka, 1986, p. 332) to illustrate this. (3.52) A certain sum of money will be payed for each quantity of this commodity. In this example, the reader’s attention is drawn to the respective amounts of money for each quantity. Now reconsider example (3.12), repeated below as (3.53). (3.53) Each husband had forgotten a certain date – his wife’s birthday. 20 For
more arguments that pair-list and functional answers have to be kept separately, see (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984; Sharvit, 1997). 21 It would lead too far astray to discuss all the advantages and problems of the two divergent views. For an overview of the arguments for and against a functional treatment of pair-lists and discussion of an alternative method by quantifying into questions, see (Chierchia, 1993).
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91
As discussed in Section 3.1.2, Hintikka proposes that indefinites modified by certain take scope outside of epistemic operators. He assumes a tacit operator I know (KI ) applied to the entire sentence in (3.53). The indefinite a certain date now must be interpreted outside of the scope of the epistemic operator I know, which, under standard assumptions, would mean that it would have to take scope over the entire sentence. However, Hintikka argues that the indefinite does not necessarily have to take scope over the quantifier each husband, which is, of course, a very exceptional and non-standard assumption.22 This reading, he argues, is representable as the functional reading in (3.54). (3.54) ∃f [KI (∀y[husband (y) → forget(y, f (y))])] However, in light of our discussion in connection with examples (3.44) and (3.45) above, there is now another possibility of deriving the reading in (3.54), which does not rely on the undesired assumption that quantifiers can take scope over some operator O1 that c-commands operator O2 without taking scope over this operator O2 at the same time. The indefinite can be interpreted as inherently functional. In this case, the specific DP would be interpreted as a certain date depending on the respective husband. The indefinite can then be assumed to take ordinary wide scope over KI and all other operators in its scope, i.e. also over each husband. The result would be similar to the one predicted in Hintikka’s approach (the representation given in (3.54)). As the existential quantification over the function f takes wider scope than all other operators, this reading would be a functional wide scope reading. Let us now assume that the naturalness restriction proposed by Hintikka is imposed on f in (3.54), i.e. that the domain of quantification over f comprises only natural functions, where naturalness is understood in Hintikka’s sense. Unfortunately, these restrictions would still not suffice to single out the correct functional wide scope reading that we are after, because the proposed naturalness definition does not allow us to discriminate between natural function readings and simple pair-list assignments. Nothing would prevent f in (3.54) from referring to a simple pair-list, if this pair-list could correspond to the function that the writer is unmistakably calling his reader’s attention to. Hence, Hintikka’s notion of naturalness does not help to distinguish ‘natural’ functions from arbitrary ones and pair-lists and is therefore an inappropriate means to restrict the available functions in (3.54) such that the intuitive truth conditions of (3.53) could be correctly accounted for.
Sharvit’s view Sharvit (1997) also takes it that both pair-lists and more natural concepts, such as the mother-function, denote functions. However, she argues that natural functions and pair-lists are of different semantic types. She regards the mother-function as a ‘function-in-intension’ of type hhe, ti, he, eii and a pair-list enumeration as a ‘functionin-extension’ of type he, ei (see Sharvit, 1997, pp. 56–57). A function-in-intension is 22 Note that Hintikka assumes that quantifiers quite generally show this exceptional behavior of exhibiting non-linear scope relations, also in the absence of epistemic operators. Hintikka (1974) dubs these readings branching readings.
92
QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
defined by a function-definition schema and has to be applied to a set to yield a function-in-extension. Sharvit (1997, p. 57) gives the following definition for a natural function: Definition 3.3 (Sharvit, 1997) A function h is natural, if there is a contextually salient function-definition schema S, such that h maps every relevant set to the unique function which satisfies S, and of which that set is the domain. The natural mother-function would be represented as follows (see Sharvit, 1997, p. 59): (3.55) λP σg[Dom(g) = P ∧ ∀x[x ∈ Dom(g) → g(x) = mother of (x)]], where σ is the uniqueness/maximality operator Hence, the natural mother-function is a function from possible domains to the functions which satisfy the salient function definition schema ‘mother’ [= ‘mother of ’ in the above formula, CE] (Sharvit, 1997, p. 58). It is emphasized that the function definition schema has to be contextually salient (in some unspecified sense). This contextual salience is understood in the same way as it is in (Hintikka, 1986) (in his first sense), i.e. the function schema must have been previously mentioned or familiar to the hearer, because it describes a widely known concept.
3.3.3
Properties of Natural Functions
I will show that natural functions do not have to be contextually salient in any sense. The function in the pupil-picture example (3.46), for example, can definitely refer to a function that is not salient before it is addressed. This is evidenced by the fact that (3.45) can be followed by (3.56). (3.56) N¨amlich das Bild, das auf der letzten Klassenfahrt gemacht wurde und namely
the picture that on the last
school-trip
den jeweiligen Sch¨uler mit einem dreik¨opfigen the respective pupil
with a
made
was
and
Dinosaurier zeigt.
with-three-heads dinosaur
shows
‘Namely the picture that had been taken during the last school trip, which shows the respective pupil with a dinosaur with three heads.’ It is quite clear that the function in (3.56) is neither natural in the sense that it is a simple function nor salient in the usual meaning before it has been mentioned. Kratzer (1998, 2003) argues that functions can be salient in the sense that they are in the speaker’s mind; so from the speaker’s point of view, the function under discussion can be regarded as salient. Kratzer admits that there are readings in which the speaker does not know the relevant function himself, but maybe heard from someone else about this function. Yet, so Kratzer argues, he would have some method in mind to determine the value of the function. It is, however, not appealing to subsume speaker’s knowledge under the heading salience. Furthermore, I will show in Section 4.4 that even this assumption cannot account for the full range of data. There are wide scope readings
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93
in which the speaker does not know any more about the individual or function that is taking wide scope than the fact that it does take wide scope. I suggest taking a different route to account for the functional wide scope readings. In line with (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984; Krifka, 2001b), I take it that pair-list enumerations do not count as functions in the first place. They are not of functional type. To single out those functions that are usually referred to as ‘natural’ functions, the domain of the functions that can be quantified over has to be restricted, as has been proposed by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984). Natural functions in this sense must have the following properties23 : 1. they must be nameable, which relates to the concept of the function-definition schema of natural functions in (Sharvit, 1997) and is also an idea hinted at in (Chierchia, 1993, p. 212: functions that we can readily access or define (my emphasis, CE)); and 2. they must be informative. We will see that it seems as if there was a third restriction on functions, namely that they must not be over-informative, i.e. they must be expected to some extent. But this alleged restriction will in the end turn out not to be a restriction on the functions themselves, but a result of other restrictions triggered by the context in which the functions appear. All these requirements do not have to be stipulated, but can be derived from more general constraints that have to hold for natural language exchanges anyway. Let us reconsider the pupil-picture example (3.45) from the beginning of this section (repeated below, slightly simplified) and discuss in detail how the proposed restrictions on functions can correctly account for the functional wide scope reading of (3.57a), represented in (3.57b). (3.57c) shows the version that supports a narrow scope reading, which is represented in (3.57d,e). (3.57)
a. ↑EIN Bild
von sich,
some picture of
das hatte jeder Sch¨uler mitgebracht.
himself RP had every pupil
brought-along
‘Every pupil had brought a certain picture of himself.’ b. ∃f [picturefn (f ) ∧ ∀x[pupil (x) → bring(x, f (x))]] c. Jeder Sch¨uler hatte ein BILD von sich mitgebracht. every pupil
had a
picture of
himself brought-along
‘Every pupil had brought a picture of himself.’ d. ∀x[pupil (x) → ∃f [picturefn (f ) ∧ bring(x, f (x))]] e. ∀x[pupil (x) → ∃y[picture(y) ∧ of (y, x) ∧ bring(x, y)]] To ensure that (3.57b) is not simply equivalent to the narrow scope reading in (3.57d) (which is equivalent to (3.57e)), f must be a natural function. A natural function must meet the properties I specify below.
Nameability First, function f in (3.57b) has to be nameable, which means that it must be possible to refer to the function by a linguistic object. Concepts such as every pupil’s picture of 23 (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984, p. 198) only have a short comment on the properties of these functions that one can quantify over. They have to be either conventional in some sense (such as the mother-function, the wife-function, etc.) and thus in some sense computable, or they must be made computable by the context.
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QUANTIFICATIONAL TOPICS
his first day at school then have a name and hence denote functions. Pair-lists on the other hand do not count as ‘naming a function’ and therefore do not denote functions in this sense. However, there certainly needs to be said more about what can count as naming a function and why pair lists cannot possibly make good names of functions. The nameability concept does not exclude naming a function by way of saying something like: the y such that x = x1 and y = y1 or . . . or x = xn and y = yn .24 An additional simplicity criterion would have to exclude such descriptions, which would make the nameability criterion superfluous to a certain extent. A first attempt to exclude such function descriptions would be by postulating that the functions have to be open for different kinds of function domains (cf. the concept of a function definition schema in Sharvit 1997). The pair-list function described above has a fixed domain, however. Yet, one could construct a related case where the y-value of a function of the following kind is given: the y such that x = x1 and y = y1 or . . . x = xn and y = yn and c for all other x, where c is some constant. This function is open for all kinds of domains. Yet, intuitively, it should not count as a nameable function. The relevant feature here seems to be the fact that there is a case differentiation in the domain of the function, which makes it an unsuitable candidate for a function name. An in-depth investigation of these issues would be needed to say more about the underlying factors of nameability (or simplicity or naturalness), which is beyond the scope of this book. The nameability criterion might actually follow from a more general constraint on language use. The existence of objects that have names can be taken for granted in any language model. Hence, the existence of nameable functions can be taken for granted. If a speaker refers to an object, he must make sure that this object actually exists in the hearer’s model. If the speaker refers to a function, the hearer assumes that the speaker is referring to a nameable function, because the speaker can only be sure of the existence of nameable functions in the hearer’s model. Certainly, other functions are construable and might exist, but while the existence of these functions cannot be excluded, their existence cannot be taken for granted either – at least not in the case of infinite functions and when the Axiom of Choice is not assumed.25 There is a loose connection to what Moltmann (1997) calls the Acceptance Condition on Domains of Underived Contexts, which says that for a context c, D(c) [= the domain of c, CE] contains only entities that the speaker and the addressee accept. Moltmann uses this condition to restrict the domain of a context to accepted entities (and hence exclude merely possible entities). The same seems to hold for functions. Only nameable functions can be assumed to be accepted by the speaker and the hearer; other ‘merely possible’ functions are not elements of the domain. Informativity If we want to make sure that functional wide scope readings cannot be trivialized and made equivalent to simple narrow scope readings, it remains to be explained why the 24 Thanks
to Ede Zimmermann for pointing this out. thank Manfred Krifka and Peter Staudacher for pointing me to the Axiom of Choice and its relevance to my concerns. See also footnote 19. 25 I
CHAPTER 3. GENUINE AND APPARENT SCOPE READINGS
95
function the picture that every pupil brought is not a possible value for f in (3.57b). If f could refer to this function, the functional wide scope reading would be indistinguishable from the narrow scope reading. The possibility of resolving f to this function would lead to uninformativity, however. This issue is independent of the nameability criterion. The function the picture that every pupil brought meets the nameability criterion, of course. The function has a name and is thus of the right (function) type. However, the mere existence of this function already follows from the narrow scope reading of the indefinite. If every pupil brought along some picture of himself, there also exists a function that assigns to each pupil the picture that he brought. In other words, if the speaker simply intended to communicate the narrow scope reading in (3.57d), there would be no reason for him to choose sentence (3.57a) instead of the simpler form (3.57c) to convey this meaning. Therefore, (3.57c) instantiates the unmarked way to convey the narrow scope reading, whereas (3.57a) would clearly be a marked form. The ‘complicated’ way of communicating the narrow scope reading would be blocked by the possibility of conveying the same information by simpler means. Hence, f cannot be resolved to the function that describes the narrow scope reading of the sentence. There is a related phenomenon, namely that (3.57a) cannot be continued by (3.58a). (3.58)
a.
#
Namely the picture that every pupil brought.
b.
#
Namely, every pupil brought the picture that he brought.
c. ∃f [bring picturefn (f ) ∧ ∀x[pupil (x) → bring(x, f (x))]] (3.58a) would be entirely uninformative when uttered in continuation of (3.57a). It is understood to mean that f is to be resolved to the function the picture that everybody brought. But the fact that this function exists is already known after the utterance of (3.57a) and – more importantly – before (3.58a) is uttered. The very same constraint prohibits (3.59a) from being continued by (3.59b) or (3.60a) from being answered by (3.60b). (3.59)
a. If some relative of mine dies, Paul will inherit a fortune. b. # Namely the relative that is such that if he dies Paul will inherit a fortune.
(3.60)
a. Who killed Paul? b. # Paul’s murderer. / # Someone.
The reason why (3.60b) does not count as an appropriate answer to (3.60a) and why (3.59b) is not an appropriate continuation of (3.59a) lies in the information content of the respective utterances. (3.60b) does not increase the questioner’s knowledge. The same holds for (3.59b) and the uninformative continuation of (3.57a) by (3.58a). All those continuations would be uninformative, because they do not rule out any worlds that support the information before the very utterance is made.
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Expectance The nameability and the informativity criterion seem at first to be insufficient to account correctly for the restrictions on functional wide scope readings.26 It seems as if there was another restriction on the possible domain of functions, namely that the involved functions can only be resolved to functions that can be expected. This requirement is easier to see in the following example in German than in our original pupil-picture example. (3.61)
a. ↑EInen Verwandten von sich, some relative
b.
of
den hat jeder Sch¨uler mitgebracht.
himself RP has every pupil
brought-along
‘Every pupil has brought along a certain relative.’ # N¨amlich (jeweils) seinen besten Freund. namely
respectively his
be