PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS, MOTIVATIONS AND ACTIONS
PSYCHOLOGY OF NEUROTICISM AND SHAME
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PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS, MOTIVATIONS AND ACTIONS
PSYCHOLOGY OF NEUROTICISM AND SHAME
RAYMOND G. JACKSON EDITORS
Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York
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Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York
CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
ix Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health and Well-Being Sharon Grant
1
Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy: An Investigation through the Lens of Mencius HuaNan Gong
37
The Manifestation of Neuroticism in the Use of Information and Communication Technology Lauren L. Saling and James G. Phillips
59
College Students' Perceptions of Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals Gina Robertiello
85
Behaving Aggressively: The Role of Shame in Prisoner Confrontations Michelle Butler
109
Neuroticism and Positive Personal Characteristics: Test of a Two-Factor Model of Their Effects on Affective Health Bruce W. Smith, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz
129
Chapter 7
The Dynamics of Shame and Psychiatric Ill-Health Bengt Starrin and Åsa Wettergren
Chapter 8
Understanding Neuroticism in Emerging Adulthood: Integrating the Contributions of Erikson and Fromm Adam C. Lorincz and Steven Abell
Chapter 9
Therapy for Shame-Based Perfectionism Neil Pembroke
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169 183
viii Chapter 10
Contents Increasing the Predictive Utility of Neuroticism for Health Behaviors: The Role of Implicit Neuroticism Jennifer Boldero, Nick Haslam and Jennifer Whelan
Chapter 11
Shame: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective Sarah McLachlan, David Keatley, Chris Stiff and Martin Hagger
Chapter 12
Why Neuroticism May Be Relevant to Understanding Response to Meditation-Based Interventions: A Review of Some Forgotten Literature Brian L. Thompson
Chapter 13 Index
Neuroticism and Psychoticism as Correlates of Suicidal Behavior David Lester
197 211
225 235 239
PREFACE This book reviews the literature on the Big Five and physical and mental health, focusing on neuroticism as the personality risk factor for stress and impaired health and well-being. This book also examines biological and psychological mechanisms underlying the toxic effect of neuroticism, and possible intervention strategies are discussed. Moreover, whether individuals with neurotic traits are more prone to use information and communication technology are considered, as well as the potential to develop addictions to technology. In addition, Eriksonian identity formation in emerging adulthood is analyzed, with a special emphasis on how the unique epigenetic struggles of this developmental period may lead to experiences of neuroticism and anxiety. Moreover, numerous researchers suggest the experience of shame is linked to aggressive behavior. In this book, prisoner self-narratives are explored to determine whether the presence of shame in their identity influenced their involvement in confrontations. Whether shaming has something to do with psychiatric health is discussed as well. In addition, the utility of self-determination theory (SDT) in understanding the experience of shame and the effects of being motivated by shame avoidance is explored. Key constructs and mechanisms from SDT that explain the adaptive and maladaptive effects of shame experience and shame avoidance on behavior are also identified and discussed. Chapter 1 - This chapter reviews the literature on the Big Five and physical and mental health, focussing on neuroticism as the personality risk factor for stress and impaired health and well-being. Although neuroticism is often associated with excessive or unfounded symptom and illness reporting, studies of objective health outcomes, such as longevity or mortality, have confirmed that the trait does indeed play a genuine role in objective health status. With regard to mental health, neuroticism is associated with a range of conditions, and recent work has linked the trait with DSM-IV personality disorders. In addition, neuroticism is a strong and consistent predictor of both subjective (hedonic) and psychological (eudaimonic) dimensions of well being. This chapter presents an overarching process model, describing the effect of neuroticism on various intermediate mechanisms that tie situational stressors to negative health and well-being outcomes. Evidence is reviewed linking neuroticism with stressor exposure and emotional reactivity, negative cognitive appraisal, maladaptive and ineffective coping, and risky health behavior. The combined/interactive effect of neuroticism and other traits on vulnerability is also considered. The chapter examines biological and psychological mechanisms underlying the toxic effect of neuroticism, and concludes with a discussion of possible intervention strategies.
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Chapter 2 - In the West, shame is believed to arise from feelings toward sex, which is the origin of knowledge of goodness and evil as well as the origin of the conscience. In the Bible, sexual shame is elevated as the beginning and the source of other types of shame, so at the same time it is the prototype and standard of other types of shame. However, the generality and power of sexual shame need not be universal. In Chinese traditional thinking it is clear that shame is closely bound up with taste (eating), which occupies the primal location and plays an important role in ―taste.‖ In ancient Chinese words and expressions, the meaning of ―shame‖ is ―dedication‖ and ―delicious (food)‖ and the word ―shame‖ is used as both verb and adjective. Shame firstly involves delicious food. Beginning with the Confucian Analects, ―shame‖ in relation to the meaning of delicious food stirs feelings of morality. This reason for this association is that shame is related to the delicious food that comes from ―sheep,‖ as well as the values of goodness, beauty, and faith. Generally speaking, ―shame‖ is related to all valuable things. The shape of ―xiu‖（羞 means shame) in the Chinese ancient character shows an uncertain expression of conflict when people decide whether or not to capture the sheep. In this sense, the shame is derived from what one thinks and feels when a person faces beautiful and valuable things. Mencius regards the concept of shame as a category of morality, and the concept‘s role as an important source of human‘s nature and conscience is greatly consolidated. Furthermore, shame is the basic foundation that defines man as man. The Confucians decline the human‘s shield of morality in order to emphasize the effects of shame. Under this teaching, they merged substance (体) with function (用): existing with shame. For the Taoist who stresses the discipline of the mind, shame is taken as a defense to retain the ―nativeness‖ of the mind. Chapter 3 - The present paper considers whether individuals with neurotic traits (anxiety, depression, shyness, low self-esteem) are more prone to use information and communication technology. We have previously found that individuals with low self esteem and social anxiety are prone to use the internet. The internet offers the opportunity to edit one‘s selfpresentation through email and blogging benefitting the socially anxious. As the internet serves to document behaviour, it also provides evidence of emotional or irrational behaviours. Procrastinators prefer email, and those prone to panic are more likely to post messages on discussion groups. There is also evidence that neurotic individuals send more SMS. The present paper also considers the potential to develop addictions to technology. There is limited research addressing neuroticism as a predictor of the use of information and communication technology, nevertheless, this is an area of potential interest, particularly as the internet serves to document behaviour and self presentation in a way that was hitherto not possible. Chapter 4 - Restorative justice is a theory of justice with a rehabilitative or reintegrative approach. The emphasis is on repairing the harm caused by the behavior; benefitting the injured parties, as well as the offender. In Criminal Justice courses across the nation, this topic has been hotly debated. Is restorative justice working? Is it fair to the victim? Does it fulfill any of the goals of punishment? Although laypersons might feel differently, those taking courses on crime and justice have discussed the topic at length, and many have supported this approach. Some are working in the criminal justice system and some are working on degrees in order to obtain a position in the criminal justice system. After discussing the theory of restorative justice, especially the research of John Braithwaite, it was the researcher's intention to determine student perceptions of restorative justice efforts, and
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their views on the utility and success of this approach. This research was conducted via the administration of a survey in courses at a private catholic college in New Jersey, with social science and non-social science majors. Results demonstrated that male and female social science students had similar perceptions about the topic, and that their opinions were similar to those of the non-social science majors as well. Almost all respondents thought the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society. They thought prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders, and that reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile offenders. Most did not think that restorative justice efforts were fair to the victim (because this effort is not punitive enough), and they did not think criminals were treated too leniently today. However, most respondents did think that a victim should participate in the punishment of their victimizer (i.e. they should have a say). They did not think shaming criminals deterred the behavior of the criminal or the behavior of onlookers, or that reintegrative shaming caused less stigma. Finally, most did not think that our current punitive techniques caused offenders to think worse of themselves. Chapter 5 - Numerous researchers suggest that the experience of shame is linked to aggressive behaviour (see Scheff, 2000; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In this paper, prisoner self-narratives are explored to determine whether the presence of shame in their identity influenced their involvement in confrontations. The self-narratives of 89 adult male prisoners were examined to determine whether the prisoners expressed themes of shame in their self-narratives, the types of shame they experienced and if these experiences of shame influenced their involvement in confrontations with other prisoners. Results indicate that individuals expressing themes of shame in their self-narrative were more likely to engage in confrontations than those who did not express such themes. In particular, those who were insecure in their sense of self seemed to be more likely to react aggressively to behaviours which undermined their identity and were more likely to feel pressurised to conform to prisoner norms of masculinity and aggressiveness. This suggests that the expereince of shame may predispose individuals with an insecure self to engage in confrontations as a means of ego defence. Potential ramifications and limitations are discussed. Chapter 6 - The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effects of neuroticism and positive personal characteristics on affective health in the context of a two-factor model. The model posits that neuroticism will primarily impact negative affect while positive personality characteristics will primarily impact positive affect. The relationship between neuroticism, positive personal characteristics, and affective health was examined in three large samples of undergraduate students. The positive personal characteristics assessed included extraversion, resilience, optimism, spirituality, purpose in life, and indicators of social and emotional intelligence. Multiple regression analyses were used to simultaneously examine the effects of neuroticism and the positive characteristics on negative affect and positive affect. The results consistently showed that neuroticism was a strong predictor of negative affect while positive characteristics were generally not related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism. In addition, the positive characteristics were still related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism. Finally, neuroticism was not related to positive affect when controlling for all positive characteristics at once but was usually related to less positive affect when controlling for one at a time. The main implication is that neuroticism should be considered within the context of both the positive and negative domains of human experience. Neuroticism may
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have its strongest impact on negative affective health while positive characteristics may have their strongest impact on positive affective health. Chapter 7 - In the Icelandic sagas shame, humiliation, respect and honour are central themes. The sagas describe a culture where there are strongly regulated rituals for how a man can obtain and sustain his honour. It is only possible to be happy with oneself after gaining respect in the eyes of the other. An honourable man who has been humiliated and insulted and has been unable to get revenge, compensation or reconciliation looses his status and reputation as an honourable man. It leads to self contempt and deep depression. Contrary to what was the case in the Icelandic sagas, shame and humiliation are hidden and privatized in modern society. We feel ashamed of our shame. In this article we explore the question if, parallel to the Icelandic sagas where shame without redress could lead for instance to apthy, modern types of shame and shaming is equally associated to psychiatric illhealth. Chapter 8 - This commentary will focus on an exploration of Eriksonian identity formation in emerging adulthood with a special emphasis on how the unique epigenetic struggles of this developmental period may lead to experiences of neuroticism and anxiety. Recent lines of research (Arnett, 1998, 2000, 2001) suggest that emerging adulthood is a time of profound identity exploration for young people. Emerging adults explore issues of identity concerning work, love, purpose, and meaning amidst a period of life marked by increased freedom and significant decision-making. However, contemporary western society seems to foster a prolonged adolescence in emerging adulthood. While emerging adults begin to make choices concerning their identities and their life course, they are relatively free of adult responsibilities and commitments. Meanwhile, Erikson (1950, 1968, 1982) perceived the conflict between identity versus role confusion as an integral struggle in adolescence. With the shift in contemporary society toward a prolonged adolescence, many emerging adults face questions concerning identity in a developmental period which differs markedly from traditional conceptions of adolescence. Greater freedom afforded by college, separation from parents, and increased autonomy to make life decisions makes emerging adulthood unique. Erikson (1950, 1968) felt that lacking a coherent sense of identity causes great anxiety, as does the struggle to achieve this sense of identity. Meanwhile, Fromm (1941, 1947, 1955) suggests that freedom, while perceived of as liberating, actually, causes a great deal of anxiety and that humanity tends to escape from freedom rather than embrace and capitalize on its potential. Therefore, the understanding of a great deal of anxiety and neuroticism in emerging adulthood may lie in an integration of these theories. The increased freedom of emerging adulthood, combined with the potentially stressful issues of identity, intimacy, and facing the incoming commitments of adulthood, may contribute to increased experiences of anxiety and neuroticism. The anxiety produced by increased freedom may lead some to seek escape from this very freedom, which in turn, may cloud and disrupt identity exploration and commitment leading to role confusion and even more anxiety. For instance, automaton conformity (becoming totally immersed in one‘s culture and forsaking an individual sense of identity) could alleviate the anxiety of freedom, but it may exacerbate the anxiety of role confusion throughout emerging adulthood. Finally, potential solutions for such neuroticism and anxiety are suggested based upon the theories of Erikson (1950, 1968, 1982) and Fromm (1941, 1955).
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Chapter 9 - Psychologists have been aware for a long time of the significant psychological distress associated with ―the tyranny of the shoulds‖ (K. Horney). The tyranny that perfectionists subject themselves to often leads to self-condemnation and depression. While perfectionism has been associated with guilt dynamics, the form of perfectionism that is most frequently discussed by psychologists is connected to self-condemnation for perceived failures to reach the high standard set for personal achievement. There is therefore a strong link between perfectionism and inferiority shame. Three approaches to the treatment of shame-based perfectionism are developed. The first approach is based in cognitive therapy. It is argued that perfectionism is grounded in a faulty core belief about the self—namely, ―I am what I achieve.‖ It is further argued that release from perfectionism requires embrace of the belief that what is ultimately most important is a personal conviction that one is good, worthy, and loveable. The second method makes use of strategies developed by John Bradshaw for accepting and affirming all one‘s sub-selves. Bradshaw‘s approach is critiqued, however, for the way in which shame-based and guilt-based perfectionism are confused. This confusion leads to significant deficiencies in his therapeutic system. The third method is a modification and adaptation of Heinz Kohut‘s strategy of ―mirroring‖ developed for use in work with clients with narcissistic personality disorder. Therapeutic mirroring is a stance of affirmation, acceptance, and admiration. It is contended that shame-based perfectionism is associated with conflict between the grandiose and idealizing selves that expresses itself through criticism and condemnation. It is suggested that a strong therapeutic intervention is to help the client replace condemnation with mirroring. Chapter 10 - There is considerable evidence that neuroticism is associated with selfreported physical health, although the exact mechanisms involved are not clear. However, self-reports of neuroticism may be distorted by concerns about social desirability and/or lack of awareness, thus potentially biasing its correlations with health behaviors. In this chapter, we first review issues concerning the explicit (self-report) measurement of neuroticism. We then review recent research which indicates that explicit and implicit measures of neuroticism are at best weakly related. Discussion then focuses on how implicitly assessing neuroticism might enhance our understanding its associations with outcome variables, including health behaviors. This discussion also considers the characteristics of two related implicit measures, the Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the Go/Nogo Association Test (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2000). Preliminary evidence is presented that suggests that the GNAT may be a more appropriate measure than the IAT. We present evidence from two large undergraduate samples that GNAT-assessed neuroticism predicts self-reported health behaviors over and above self-reported neuroticism. The chapter closes with the suggestion that measuring neuroticism both implicitly and explicitly is a promising research strategy for understanding its associations with other variables. Chapter 11 - Shame has been identified as an intense unpleasant emotion (Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1973) with potentially deleterious effects on motivation and goal-striving (Fischer & Tangney, 1995). This chapter aims to explore the utility of self-determination theory (SDT) in understanding the experience of shame and the effects of being motivated by shame avoidance. Key constructs and mechanisms from SDT that explain the adaptive and maladaptive effects of shame experience and shame avoidance on behaviour will be identified and discussed. Specifically, introjected regulation, one of six regulatory styles specified by SDT, is particularly pertinent to well-documented associations between shame, maladaptive
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coping, and avoidant behavioural tendencies (e.g., Tangney, Fischer, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Introjected regulation is considered a psychological mediator characterised by avoidance of thoughts of shameful experiences or behaviours that could result in shameful emotional reactions in the future. The value of SDT in explaining and evaluating behavioural consequences of shame will be discussed using applied examples from educational, health, and resource conservation research. As the regulatory styles proposed by SDT have differing patterns of associations with psychological well-being, behavioural quality, and persistence, the theory can offer both an account of the consequences of shame and methods through which to reduce maladaptive reactions to this emotion. Ideas for further research approaching shame from an SDT perspective will be proposed, including an examination of whether inducing particular motivational orientations could serve as a buffer against the maladaptive effects of shame. Chapter 12 - Before the explosion of interest in mindfulness-based interventions (e.g. Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2004), early meditation researchers explored the impact of personality traits on response to sitting meditation practice, particularly with Transcendental Meditation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of that early research and explore how some of the findings of these often forgotten studies may be incorporated into contemporary research on meditation-based treatments. Given the incidence of depression in individuals high in neuroticism, particular emphasis is placed on understanding how neuroticism might impact and be impacted by Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy for depression (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). Chapter 13 - A review of research indicated that suicidal behavior is consistently associated with Eysenck‘s measures of neuroticism and psychoticism. It is suggested that future research should explore the value of a zonal analysis involving these two traits in identifying different rates and types of suicidal behavior.
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 1-36
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 1
NEUROTICISM: THE PERSONALITY RISK FACTOR FOR STRESS AND IMPAIRED HEALTH AND WELL-BEING Sharon Grant Faculty of Higher Education, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia
ABSTRACT This chapter reviews the literature on the Big Five and physical and mental health, focussing on neuroticism as the personality risk factor for stress and impaired health and well-being. Although neuroticism is often associated with excessive or unfounded symptom and illness reporting, studies of objective health outcomes, such as longevity or mortality, have confirmed that the trait does indeed play a genuine role in objective health status. With regard to mental health, neuroticism is associated with a range of conditions, and recent work has linked the trait with DSM-IV personality disorders. In addition, neuroticism is a strong and consistent predictor of both subjective (hedonic) and psychological (eudaimonic) dimensions of well being. This chapter presents an overarching process model, describing the effect of neuroticism on various intermediate mechanisms that tie situational stressors to negative health and well-being outcomes. Evidence is reviewed linking neuroticism with stressor exposure and emotional reactivity, negative cognitive appraisal, maladaptive and ineffective coping, and risky health behavior. The combined/interactive effect of neuroticism and other traits on vulnerability is also considered. The chapter examines biological and psychological mechanisms underlying the toxic effect of neuroticism, and concludes with a discussion of possible intervention strategies.
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INTRODUCTION Chapter Overview The first section of this chapter provides a historical overview of the personality-illness relationship, including the role of psychological stress in mediating this relationship. Discussion of stress focuses on the Transactional Model of Stress and Coping, in which cognitive appraisal and coping mediate between potentially stressful events and the subsequent experience of stress, illness, and disease. The Five-Factor Model (FFM) of trait personality (extraversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness) is then introduced as a powerful framework for understanding the role of personality in illness and disease. The next section of the chapter identifies neuroticism as the personality risk factor for stress and impaired health and well-being. The section begins with a review of studies on the relationship between FFM personality and physical and mental health outcomes. Discussion of the relationship between personality and mental health focuses on DSM-IV personality disorders, a topic area which has generated considerable interest in recent years. The relationship between personality and well being in the general population is also discussed. In the next section, explanatory mechanisms or mediating processes in the personalityillness relationship are examined. An overarching process model is presented which describes the effect of neuroticism on various intermediate mechanisms that tie situational stressors to health and well-being. The chapter concludes with a summary and discussion of possible interventions to appease the detrimental impact of neuroticism. It is noted that future research should focus on the direct evaluation of explanatory mechanisms underlying the personality-illness relationship.
The Personality-Illness Relationship: Where It Began The idea of a relationship between personality and illness began in ancient Greek philosophy, with Hippocrates‘ notion of mind-body dualism (Brantley & Garrett, 1993). Hippocrates believed that four bodily humors provided the basis for personality: black bile, blood, phlegm, and yellow bile (Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987). The four humors were theorized to correspond with specific temperaments - melancholic (depressed), sanguine (optimistic), phlegmatic (apathetic), or choleric (angry) respectively – with a person‘s predominant humor determining his or her ‗personality type‘ (Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987). Hippocrates‘ theory was later expanded by Galen, a second century physician who believed that humoral imbalance, an excess of any one humor, would give rise to illness and disease (Brantley & Garrett, 1993; Elliot & Sheldon, 1997; Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987; Michaels, Michaels, & Peterson, 1997). In contrast, a balance between the humors was thought to promote ‗good humor‘ or well-being (Winter, 1996). However, with the emergence of Cartesian dualism interest in the personality-illness relationship declined and the area did not re-emerge as a legitimate field of scientific enquiry until much later (Brantley & Garrett, 1993).
Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health…
3
Modern interest in the personality-illness relationship arose from Freudian psychology, in particular the psychodynamic treatment of hysterical paralysis (see Brantley & Garrett, 1993; Elliot & Sheldon, 1997; Friedman, 1990; Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987). Freud drew attention to the effect of unconscious conflict on physiological arousal and related symptoms (Emmons & King, 1988). The psychodynamic tradition gave birth to ‗Specificity Theory‘, the notion that a given illness could be attributed to the influence of a specific trait or underlying conflict (Brantley & Garrett, 1993). By mid-century, there was considerable interest in the topic, which came to be known as ‗psychosomatic medicine‘: the study of mental disturbance and organic disease (Friedman, 1990). Interest in Specificity Theory persevered throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Brantley & Garrett, 1993), however much of the research was methodologically questionable and the field eventually fell into disrepute (Friedman, 1990). In the 1960s and 1970s, attention shifted to the relationship between quantifiable life events and illness (e.g., Holmes & Rahe, 1967), and psychological stress was introduced as a mediator of the personality-illness relationship (Brantley & Garrett, 1993; Lazarus, 1990). Since then, stress has become a pivotal context in which to examine personality and illness (see e.g., Wiebe & Smith, 1997). While interest in the personality-illness relationship has fluctuated over time (Brantley & Garrett, 1993; Elliot & Sheldon, 1997; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1987), there is currently much interest in the topic (Korotkov & Hannah, 2004; Michaels et al., 1997; Wiebe & Smith, 1997), with considerable attention to the role of personality in the stress-illness relationship since the mid-1980s (Vollrath, 2001). Given the importance of stress and related concepts in the personality-illness literature, the stress-illness relationship will be discussed in some detail below. Renewed interest in personality and health has been driven by the progression of health and personality psychology, and behavioral medicine more generally (Korotkov & Hannah, 2004; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990). In recent years, studies linking personality to objective health outcomes, such as illness onset and longevity, have seen a resurgence of research in this area, with such studies dismissing longstanding criticism regarding the limited predictive validity of personality measures (Smith, 2006).
Stress as a mediator of the personality-illness relationship The role of personality in stress and related health outcomes is recognized in epidemiology, physiology, sociology, and psychology, with each discipline adopting its own unique theoretical and/or methodological approach (Parkes, 1994). However, a central thesis, regardless of the discipline, is that susceptibility to stress-related illness and disease is not random but systematic; that is, a person may be more or less vulnerable or resilient on the basis of personality (Friedman, 1990). Psychological models of stress vary, although most include a basic tri-level structure in which the effect of an antecedent variable or ‗stressor‘ is altered by or filtered through moderating or mediating variables (e.g., cognitive appraisal, coping) to influence the outcome variable, ‗strain‘ e.g., health (see Deary et al., 1996). Perhaps the most influential model to have emerged is Lazarus and Folkman‘s (1984) Transactional Model of Stress and Coping. Within this model, cognitive appraisal is theorized to mediate between the perception of a potentially stressful event and the subsequent experience of stress to influence the individual‘s psychological and physiological response to the event.
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Cognitive appraisal can be defined as an individual‘s evaluation of the significance of a potentially stressful event for personal well-being, given his/her goals and needs (Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007). According to Lazarus and Folkman, the appraisal process is tri-phasic: (1) Primary Appraisal – assessment of the event‘s significance for personal well-being; (2) Secondary Appraisal – (a) assessment of what can be done about the event, given one‘s available resources and (b) subsequent initiation of a coping response; and (3) Reappraisal - re-assessment of the event, including whether a further coping response is required. It should be noted that cognitive appraisal is not necessarily conscious in this model (Siegall & Cummings, 1995). Primary appraisal is subdivided into (1) ‗irrelevant‘, (2) ‗benign-positive‘ and (3) ‗stressful‘ (Monroe & Kelley, 1997; Peacock & Wong, 1990), where the latter is thought to arise from the appraisal of (a) harm (possibility of damage/loss), (b) threat (possibility of future damage/loss), or (c) challenge (possibility of gain/growth and damage/loss) (Monroe & Kelley, 1997; Peacock & Wong, 1990; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kesley, & Leitten, 1993). Harm appraisal is ‗post hoc‘ by definition, in that it does not occur until after the stressful event, while threat and challenge appraisal are ‗a priori‘, occurring before or in anticipation of the stressor (Peacock & Wong, 1990; Tomaka et al., 1993). The appraisal of a situation as harmful, threatening, or challenging is associated with an alteration in the intensity of mood or affect, triggering a cycle of change in the person‘s psychological and physiological functioning (Cox & Ferguson, 1991; Dewe, Cox, & Ferguson, 1993; Siegall & Cummings, 1995). Challenge appraisal may fluctuate between potential growth/gain and potential damage/loss, and can therefore oscillate between a state of positive and negative physiological arousal (Semmer, 1996). While primary appraisal is concerned with assessment of the event‘s significance for personal well-being (Callan, Terry, & Schweitzer, 1994; Peacock & Wong, 1990), secondary appraisal is concerned with assessment of whether one can manage the event categorized as ‗stressful‘ during primary appraisal (Cox & Ferguson, 1991; Hobfoll, 1988; Monroe & Kelley, 1997; Peacock & Wong, 1990). During secondary appraisal, the individual must assess available coping strategies or preferred coping styles in light of the situation at hand and select a coping response (Cox & Ferguson, 1991; Matheny, Aycock, Curlette, & Junker, 1993; Peacock & Wong, 1990). A coping response is not initiated unless the event is appraised as stressful in the first instance therefore coping is dependent on the outcome of primary and secondary appraisal (Dewe et al., 1993; Siegall & Cummings, 1995). It is during the coping phase that the individual is able to test the ‗workability‘ of secondary appraisal (Payne, 1991). The fact that coping is interwoven with cognitive appraisal as a key variable in the stimulus-response process is a defining characteristic of the Transactional Model of Stress and Coping (Dewe et al., 1993; Monroe & Kelley, 1997). Coping, any behavioral or cognitive attempt to control, reduce, or prevent distress in the presence of internal or external demand (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Lazarus, 1990), is thought to influence physiological arousal via its impact on (a) the intensity or duration of the stressor and/or (b) the likelihood that the stressor will recur or be appraised as stressful in the future (Wiebe & Smith, 1997). Although the central purpose of coping is to reduce tension and restore equilibrium through stressor reduction, coping may be adaptive or maladaptive (Parkes, 1994). Stress is thought to arise from (a) the appraisal of an event as harmful, threatening, or challenging, and (b) the appraisal that an adequate or appropriate coping response is
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unavailable (Cohen, Kamarck, Mermelstein, 1983; Cohen & Edwards, 1989). The stressor is manageable to the extent that the individual‘s perceived coping resources (secondary appraisal) are appraised as high in relation to the perceived threat (primary appraisal) associated with the event (Bouchard, 2003). At a general level, stress is hypothesized to contribute to illness and disease through deregulation of (a) the autonomic nervous system (e.g., cardiovascular and neuroendocrine activity) and (b) immune system functioning (Brantley & Garrett, 1993; Brown, 1993; Michaels et al., 1997; Siegrist, 1995; Wiebe & Smith, 1997). Reappraisal is concerned with the individual‘s subsequent assessment of the stressful event. Information and experience gained from the initial person-environment transaction is used to re-evaluate the situation and assess whether a further coping response is required (Tomaka et al., 1993). If the event is appraised as irrelevant or benign at this point, then no further coping response is initiated. If on the other hand, the event is still appraised as stressful, there is a continuation of the cognitive appraisal-coping-reappraisal sequence. To summarize, according to the Transactional Model of Stress and Coping, an individual‘s response to a potentially stressful event is a function of the perceptual inter-face between person and environment, as opposed to the quality or intensity of events per se (Cohen et al., 1983; Fleming, Baum, & Singer, 1984; Monroe & Kelley, 1997). With regard to strain, the causal mechanism is the individual‘s cognitively-mediated response (cognitive appraisal, coping) to the stressful event, the product of which is related to physiological arousal and subsequent vulnerability to stress-related illness and disease (Cohen et al., 1983). Several of models theorize a central role for personality in this process. For example, personality may influence the likelihood that a person will experience a stressful event (stressor exposure), his/her assessment of that event (cognitive appraisal), the selection of more or less adaptive coping strategies (coping), the extent of his/her emotional or physiological reaction (reactivity), and the etiology and progression of stress-related illness and disease e.g., due to underlying pathology (Cohen & Edwards, 1989; Friedman, 1990; Leventhal & Tomarken, 1987; Mäkikangas & Kinnunen, 2003; Siegall & Cummings, 1995; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990; Wiebe & Smith, 1997). As discussed later in this chapter, empirical work has identified a clear role for stress and related mediating processes in explaining the personality-illness relationship.
The ‘Big five’ traits and the personality-illness relationship Much of the variance in personality can be accounted for by the ‗Big Five‘ factors of extraversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1993; McCrae & John, 1992). Stone and Costa (1990) described the Five Factor Model (FFM) as a powerful framework for understanding the role of personality in illness and disease. Preliminary support for the Big Five – then labelled Surgency (extraversion), Emotional Stability (neuroticism), Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Culture (openness) – first appeared in the early 1960s (Goldberg, 1993; Winter, 1996). However, sporadic support for the Big Five throughout this decade, coupled with a demoralization of personality psychology in the 1970s, meant that the FFM did not emerge as a dominant framework until much later (McCrae & John, 1992). The 1980s saw mounting evidence for the validity of the FFM, and the subsequent development and broad application of the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI) (Costa & McCrae, 1985), and later the NEO-PI Revised and the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), as major assessment tools for the Big
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Five (Digman, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1987; McCrae, Costa & Busch, 1986; Rust, 1999). The NEO-PI-R measures 30 facets or sub-traits classified according to the Big Five domains: (1) Extraversion (activity, assertiveness, excitement seeking, gregariousness, positive emotions, warmth); (2) Neuroticism (angry hostility, anxiety, depression, impulsiveness, selfconsciousness, vulnerability); (3) Conscientiousness (achievement striving, competence, deliberation, dutifulness, order, self-discipline); (4) Agreeableness (altruism, compliance, modesty, straightforwardness, tender-mindedness, trust); and (5) Openness (actions, aesthetics, fantasy, feelings, ideas, values). The role of traits - defined and measured according to the FFM - in the personality-illness relationship is a relatively young research pursuit. Historically, the personality dimension that has received the most attention in this context is ‗Type A‘ behavior pattern (TABP) (Jex, 1998). TABP first came to prominence in the field of cardiology in the 1950s (see Friedman & Rosenman, 1959), based on the observation that people with coronary heart disease (CHD) frequently exhibited ‗hurry sickness‘ e.g., ambitiousness, competitiveness, explosive speech, impatience, irritability, rapid jerky body movement, tense facial and body musculature, time urgency (Dembroski & Costa, 1987; Järvikoski & Härkäpää, 1987; Powell, 1987). TABP was measured on a single dimension from ‗Type A‘ to ‗Type B‘, where Bs exhibited such behavior to a lesser extent. The general argument was that ambitious, hard-driving, Type As were more likely to succeed than their Type B counterparts, but simultaneously risked paying a hefty price in relation to their health (Spence, Helmreich, Pred, 1987). However, inconsistent evidence for a TABP-CHD relationship led to a reconceptualization of TABP as a multi-dimensional construct, as opposed to a global coronary-prone behavior pattern (Dembroski, 1985; Ganster, Schaubroeck, Sime & Mayes, 1991; Spence et al., 1987). A distinction was drawn between ‗toxic‘ versus ‗protective‘ Type A behaviors, and attention quickly shifted to hostility as the likely toxic component (Costa, Stone, McCrae, & Dembroski, 1987; Dembroski, 1985; Dembroski & Costa, 1987; MacDougall, Dembroski, Dimsdale, & Hackett, 1985). There is now considerable evidence to support the view that the relationship between TABP and CHD is dimension-specific (Costa et al., 1987; Dembroski, 1985; Dembroski & Costa, 1987, 1988; Ganster et al., 1991; MacDougall et al., 1985). Spence et al. (1987) identified a two-factor model of Type A behavior, ‗achievement striving‘ and ‗impatienceirritability‘, which subsequently gained popularity in the literature (see e.g., Bluen, Barlin, & Burns, 1990; Lee, 1992; Lee, Ashford, & Jamieson, 1993; Spector & O‘Connell, 1994; Spence et al., 1987; Spence, Pred, & Helmreich, 1989; Ward & Eisler, 1987a, 1987b). Achievement striving is positively related to academic and job performance, problem-focused coping, and job satisfaction, suggesting a protective function (see Bluen et al., 1990; Lee, 1992; Lee et al., 1993; Spence et al., 1987; Spence et al., 1989). However, this dimension may be associated with disordered achievement-related self-regulation (Ward & Eisler, 1987a, 1987b). In contrast to achievement striving, impatience-irritability is negatively related to problem-focused coping and job satisfaction, and positively related to depression (see Bluen et al., 1990; Lee, 1992; Lee et al., 1993; Spence et al., 1987; Spence et al., 1989). Within the FFM, achievement striving is captured by the dimension of conscientiousness. Impatience-irritability on the other hand, is captured by neuroticism and antagonism or low agreeableness. This chapter reviews the literature on the Big Five and the personality-illness relationship, focussing on neuroticism as the personality risk factor for stress and impaired
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health and well-being. Consistent with Suls and Martin (2005), the chapter focuses on neuroticism scores that fall at the high end of the normal personality continuum.
NEUROTICISM AS A RISK FACTOR FOR STRESS AND IMPAIRED HEALTH AND WELL-BEING This section focuses on studies of the relationship between personality and physical and mental health outcomes. Explanatory mechanisms underlying the personality-illness relationship are considered later in the chapter.
Neuroticism and Physical Health While neuroticism is negatively related to physical health, extraversion, conscientiousness, openness, and agreeableness are generally positively related to physical health. When discussing the relationship between personality and physical health, it is important to distinguish between two different types of studies that exist within this literature: those based on self-reported health outcomes, such as symptom and illness reports or perceived health status, and those based on objective health outcomes, such as diagnosed disorders and diseases or mortality (c.f Smith, 2006). The importance of this distinction is elaborated below.
Self-reported health outcomes Neuroticism has been consistently linked with self-reported symptoms and illness. For example, Jerram and Coleman (1999) found that neuroticism was associated with higher selfreported illness, poorer perceived health, and higher physician utilization among the elderly. In contrast, agreeableness and openness were associated with good perceived health, and conscientiousness was associated with higher physician utilization but good perceived health among men, while agreeableness was associated with lower physician utilization and lower self-reported illness among women. Goodwin and Engstrom (2002) found that low neuroticism and high extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness were associated with good perceived health among both healthy and unhealthy respondents. While self-report measures are convenient, such measures are more likely to indicate illness behavior - behavior associated with the perception of illness e.g., absenteeism, physician utilisation, over or under reporting symptoms, self-medicating - as opposed to objective health status per se (Smith & McKenzie, 2006; Wiebe & Smith, 1997). The association between neuroticism and self-reported symptom and illness reporting may reflect the trait anxiety or negative affectivity (NA) facet of the trait. NA is characterized by a generalized sense of negative emotionality or subjective distress (Watson & Clark, 1984; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). Those who score high on NA tend to be introspective, and to dwell on the negative side of themselves, others, and the world in general (Watson & Clark, 1984; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). As a result, they have a negative self-concept and feel dissatisfied on the whole (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). As such, NA may increase self-focused attention or somatic concern, leading to a preoccupation
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with sensation and illness and an increased tendency to perceive, report, or act on sensation as illness (Wiebe & Smith, 1997). Watson and Pennebaker (1989) described NA as a general trait of somatopsychic distress that is associated with a broad range of self-reported symptoms. They found that NA was unrelated to objective health status. Recent research has shown that neuroticism is associated with negative aging self-stereotypes, which in turn affect perceived health status (Moor, Zimprich, Schmitt, & Kliegel, 2006). The relationship between neuroticism and excessive or unfounded symptom and illness reporting is consistent with an Illness Behavior Model. According to this model, neuroticism is related to subjective health status via hyper-vigilance and hypochondriasis. However, other studies have refuted a general attentional or recall bias hypothesis. For example, Johnson (2003) found that neuroticism was positively related to tension symptom reporting (e.g., high blood pressure, neck pain, migraine) but was unrelated to asthma or common cold symptom reporting. Stone and Costa (1990) suggested that the disposition to report symptoms in the absence of organic disease may indicate (a) a tendency to worry about health more than usual due to anxiety, depression, or a general vulnerability factor; (b) hyper-sensitivity to pain; (c) a history of reinforcement for adopting a sick role; (d) an illness or disease-prone experience of life and subsequent tendency to perceive, recall and report symptoms in a manner consistent with this; or (e) symptoms that are due to something other than organic disease. According to this view then, the tendency to over-report symptoms can be attributed to individual differences in subjective experience rather than a report bias (Goodwin, Cox, & Clara, 2006).
Objective health outcomes In light of the ambiguities associated with self-reported health outcomes, researchers are increasingly turning their attention to prospective studies of objective health outcomes. Such studies have confirmed that neuroticism does indeed play a genuine role in objective health status. Several studies have examined the relationship between personality traits and mortality or outcomes associated with the prevalence and course of specific physical disorders or diseases. Wilson et al. (2005) found that high neuroticism (90th percentile) was associated with a 33% increase in risk of death among those aged 65 or older, compared with low neuroticism (10th percentile). High extraversion was also associated with higher risk, although the risk (21%) was substantially lower than for high neuroticism. Adjustment for baseline cognitive, social, and physical activity attenuated the effect of both traits, suggesting that these variables were possible mediators. A recent study of risk of mortality from particular causes (Shipley, Weiss, Der, Taylor, & Deary, 2008) revealed that a one standard deviation increase in neuroticism was associated with a 12% increased risk of death from cardiovascular disease. This remained significant after adjustment for age, gender, occupational social class, education, smoking, alcohol consumption, physical activity, and health. However, neuroticism was not associated with death from lung cancer and other forms of cancer, respiratory disease, or stroke. Extraversion was a protective factor for risk of death from respiratory disease in this study. Goodwin and Friedman (2006) examined the relationship between the Big Five and common mental and physical disorders among adults in the general population. They found that neuroticism was associated with increased likelihood of a wide range of mental and physical disorders, while conscientiousness was associated with reduced likelihood. A study of the relationship between neuroticism and physical disorders among adults in the general community (Goodwin et al., 2006), showed that neuroticism was associated with increased
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odds of arthritis (odds ratio [OR] = 1.5), diabetes (OR = 3.33), kidney/liver disease (OR = 2.56), stomach/gallbladder problems (OR = 2.27) and ulcer (OR = 3.23). These associations persisted after adjusting for differences in demographic characteristics and comorbid mental health disorders. A twin study (Charles, Gatz, Kato, & Pedersen, 2008), indicated that the likelihood of having a physical condition at 25-year follow up was related to higher prior neuroticism, although some associations were attenuated when familial similarity was controlled. Other studies have focused on progression or recovery in relation to specific conditions. A recent study (Ironson, O‘Cleirigh, Weiss, Schneiderman, & Costa, 2008) reported that facets within the domains of extraversion (assertiveness, positive emotionality, gregariousness), conscientiousness (achievement striving, order) and openness (ideas, aesthetics) were associated with slower HIV disease progression. In addition, profile analyses indicated that the following ‗types‘ were associated with slower disease progression: low neuroticism plus high extraversion, low neuroticism plus high conscientiousness, high extraversion plus high conscientiousness, high extraversion plus high agreeableness, and high extraversion plus high openness. In contrast, low extraversion plus low openness was associated with faster disease progression. Once again, the results suggest that high neuroticism is a risk factor, while high scores on the remaining traits confer an adaptive effect. Chung, Berger, Jones, and Rudd (2006) investigated the relationship between personality traits and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms and health problems in older patients following myocardial infarction (MI). They found that neuroticism predicted all post MI PTSD symptoms as well as general health problems, while low agreeableness (antagonism) predicted hyper-arousal symptoms only. In addition, extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness were unrelated to post-MI PTSD or general health problems. The results remained significant when controlling for angina, angioplasty, bypass surgery, heart failure, and previous mental health problems. The authors noted the consistency between their findings and the general PTSD literature, where neuroticism is the primary personality risk factor for developing PTSD.
Neuroticism and Mental Health Psychopathology Neuroticism is associated with a range of mental disorders, most notably anxiety, mood, substance, and personality disorders (see e.g., Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994; Costa & McCrae, 1990; de Graaf, Bijl, Ravelli, Smit, & Vollenbergh, 2002; Frokjaer et al., 2008; Hirschfeld, Klerman, Lavori, & Keller, 1989; King, Bernardy, & Hauner, 2003; Mangold & Wand, 2006; Weinstock & Whisman, 2006; Zonderman, Herbst, Schmidt, Costa, & McCrae, 1993). In addition, the trait has been linked with first instance of mental disorders in the general population, as well as symptom severity, treatment efficacy, and remission and recovery among psychiatric patients (Goodwin et al., 2006). A full review of the role of personality in mental health is beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, the discussion below will focus on personality disorders (PDs) only. The relationship between broad dimensions of normal personality, as measured by the Five Factor Model, and PDs has become a major focus for research, with an abundance of
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studies in the past decade (for reviews see Samuel & Widiger, 2008; Saulsman & Page, 2004). Led by Widiger and colleagues, recently there has been considerable discussion of the implications of this research for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V) (see e.g., Widiger & Samuel, 2005; Widiger, Simonsen, Krueger, Livesley, & Verheul, 2006; Widiger & Lowe, 2008; Widiger & Trull, 2007). For example, are personality disorders best diagnosed using categorical or dimensional models of classification? The basic argument is that PDs can be conceptualized as ‗extreme variants‘ of normal personality dimensions. Widiger and Lowe (2007) highlighted three advantages of a Five-Factor Model of PDs: (a) precise yet comprehensive description of both abnormal and normal personality functioning; (b) avoidance of the limitations/problems inherent in the categorical diagnostic system (e.g., heterogeneous category membership, boundary with normality is unstable, diagnostic co-occurrence); and (c) integration of research on general personality functioning into current description and understanding of PDs. Saulsman and Page (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of studies examining the relationship between the Big Five domains and the 10 PD diagnostic categories included in DSM-IV: Antisocial, Avoidant, Borderline, Dependent, Histrionic, Narcissistic, ObsessiveCompulsive, Paranoid, Schizoid, and Schizotypal. They examined maladaptive personality domains both within and across PD categories. Findings revealed that (high) neuroticism and (low) agreeableness were common across most PDs (except Dependent), while high or low extraversion and, to a lesser extent high or low conscientiousness, were common to some PDs but not others. In general, effect sizes for neuroticism and agreeableness were substantial and directionally-consistent across the PDs. Neuroticism was positively associated with PDs characterized by emotional distress (Avoidant, Borderline, Dependent, Paranoid, and Schizotypal) and agreeableness was negatively associated with PDs characterized by interpersonal problems (Antisocial, Borderline, Narcisstic, Paranoid, and Schizotypal). For extraversion, PDs characterized by gregariousness showed a positive association (Histrionic and Narcissitic), while those characterized by shyness and withdrawal showed a negative association (Avoidant, Schizoid, Schizotypal). For conscientiousness, PDs associated with orderliness showed a positive association (Obsessive-Compulsive), while those associated with recklessness showed a negative association (Antisocial and Borderline). The magnitude of the effect sizes for each PD indicated that, overall, the Five-Factor Model was better at conceptualizing some PDs (Avoidant and Borderline) than others (Obsessive-Compulsive and Schizoid). Results were generally consistent across both clinical and non-clinical samples. The authors concluded that high neuroticism-low agreeableness is likely to be an issue for a substantial number of PD patients. It may be that low agreeableness exacerbates the effect of high neuroticism on mental ill health. A limitation of the Saulsman and Page meta-analysis was that it focused on a domainlevel analysis, rather than a facet-level analysis based on the 30 sub-traits of the FFM. The authors acknowledged that for some PDs, lower order facets may show a consistent pattern (all high or all low), whereas for other PDs lower order facets may be inconsistent (some high and some low). Notably however there were few facet-level studies available for analysis at the time of this meta-analysis. Samuel and Widiger (2008) replicated and extended the Saulsman and Page metaanalysis by conducting both a domain-level analysis and a facet-level analysis, using 18 new, independent samples. While the Saulsman and Page meta-analysis indicated that five of the 10 PDs were meaningfully related to neuroticism, Samuel and Widiger found that only one of
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these PDs (Borderline) correlated above .20 with the impulsivity facet. Furthermore, the Antisocial and Dependent PDs correlated with neuroticism for different reasons: Antisocial PD correlated only with the angry hostility and impulsiveness facets, whereas Dependent PD correlated with the other four facets. Similarly, the Antisocial, Borderline, Paranoid, Narcissistic, and Schizotypal PDs all correlated with low agreeableness, but the facet-level analysis indicated that only one of the PDs (Narcissistic) was associated with the modesty facet. The authors concluded that PDs may be associated with the same FFM domain but for largely different reasons. On the basis of their findings, they suggested that the five global domains may be too broad to have diagnostic utility. The development of explanatory models of the relationship between personality traits and psychopathology is in its infancy. The question remains as to how neuroticism, agreeableness and extraversion are maladaptive among those with PDs. Saulsman and Page (2004) noted that extreme scores on personality traits are not sufficient for the development of PDs. Clark (2005) proposed that innate temperament dimensions interact with life stress to differentiate into risk factors for psychopathology through developmental pathways.
Well-being A discussion of the relationship between personality and mental health would not be complete without considering dimensions of psychological functioning in the general population. Well-being is an important index of psychological functioning and quality of life, and represents a desired mental state for most people (Schmutte & Ryff, 1997; Siegrist, 2003). Based on the current conceptulization in the literature, well-being can be defined as a multi-dimensional construct consisting of both hedonic and eudaimonic dimensions (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Hedonic or ‗subjective well-being‘ includes the dimensions of negative affect, positive affect, and life satisfaction (Diener, 1984; Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 1996). Domain-specific measures of satisfaction, such as job satisfaction, may also be used (see Grant & Langan-Fox, 2007). In contrast, eudiamonic or ‗psychological wellbeing‘ is based on a broader approach which includes autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations, purpose in life, and self-acceptance (see Deci & Ryan, 2006; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Singer, 1996). The relationship between personality and subjective well-being has been widely studied, with two major meta-analyses in the past 10 years. A meta-analysis (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998) of the relationship between 137 distinct personality constructs and subjective wellbeing found that when personality traits were grouped according to the Big Five, neuroticism was the strongest predictor of negative affect (.23) and life satisfaction (-.24), however extraversion and agreeableness were the strongest predictors of positive affect (.20 and .17 respectively). More recently, Steel, Schmidt, and Shultz (2008) performed a separate metaanalysis of the relationship between personality and subjective well-being, based only on the NEO-PI. They reported substantially larger meta-analytic correlations than those reported by DeNeve and Cooper, suggesting that combining disparate measures of the Big Five within the same analysis may attenuate the relationship between the traits and subjective well-being. Consistent with DeNeve and Cooper, neuroticism was the strongest correlate of negative affect (.54) and life satisfaction (-.38), and extraversion was the strongest correlate of positive affect (.44). VittersØ (2001) argued that it is important to identify the unique contribution of neuroticism and extraversion to subjective well-being, given that the two traits are typically
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correlated, particularly within the FFM. VittersØ found that when neuroticism was controlled in multiple regression analysis, the effect of extraversion on subjective well-being was substantially diminished or disappeared altogether. In a similar study, Hills and Argyle (2001) investigated the relationship of emotional stability (the positive analogue to neuroticism) and extraversion to happiness. They found that happiness was more strongly related to emotional stability than to extraversion, with emotional stability accounting for a greater proportion of the total variability explained in multiple regression analysis. Consistent with the subjective well-being literature, neuroticism and extraversion have also emerged as major correlates of psychological well-being. However, the other three traits, and in particular conscientiousness, are also important in this context. A study (Siegler & Brumment, 2000) of facet-psychological well-being correlations indicated that over 80% of the correlations within the domains of neuroticism, extraversion and conscientiousness were significant, compared with less than half of the correlations within the domains of agreeableness and openness. Adjusting for various spurious effects (i.e., common affective underpinnings, shared item content and source overlap), Schmutte and Ryff (1997) found that neuroticism was negatively related to autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life and self-acceptance; extraversion was positively related to all dimensions of psychological well-being except autonomy; conscientiousness was positively related to environmental mastery, purpose in life, and selfacceptance; and agreeableness and openness were positively related to positive relations and personal growth respectively. A factor analysis of the Big Five and well-being dimensions (van Dierendonck, 2005) revealed four factors: a well-being factor on which all subjective and psychological wellbeing scales loaded with neuroticism; a self-actualization factor consisting of personal growth, purpose in life and conscientiousness; an interpersonal relations factor consisting of positive relations and extraversion and agreeableness, and a fourth factor consisting of autonomy and openness. A study (Bardi & Ryff, 2007) of the combined/interactive effect of neuroticism and other traits in the prediction of psychological well-being following relocation, found that participants who scored low on neuroticism and high on openness reported higher environmental mastery and self-acceptance one month after relocation, and higher personal growth late in the post-relocation adjustment process. In addition, neuroticism had a significant main effect on all six aspects of psychological well-being, predicting lower postmove well-being scores. Together, these studies suggest that neuroticism is consistently related to all dimensions, except personal growth; extraversion is consistently related to environmental mastery, positive relations, purpose in life, and self-acceptance; conscientiousness is consistently related to environmental mastery, purpose in life and self-acceptance; and agreeableness is consistently related to positive relations. Other studies have examined the relationship between the Big Five and subjective and psychological well-being simultaneously. Keyes, Shmotkin, and Ryff (2002) found that people who scored low on both subjective and psychological well-being had the highest average for neuroticism and the lowest average for extraversion and conscientiousness. In contrast, those who scored high on both subjective and psychological well-being demonstrated the opposite trait profile. Openness distinguished between types with high
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psychological well-being but low subjective well-being, and types with low psychological well-being but high subjective well-being. Grant, Langan-Fox and Anglim (2009) examined the relationship between personality and well-being using a structured model comparison approach. Nested models were compared with the aim of answering the following research questions: (1) Does the size of the relationship between personality and well-being differ for subjective versus psychological well-being? (2) Does the size of the relationship between personality and well-being differ for particular personality traits? (3) Does the relationship between particular personality traits and well-being differ for subjective versus psychological well-being? (4) Given a particular personality trait (e.g., neuroticism), is the relationship between that trait larger for some wellbeing dimensions (e.g., negative affect) than for others? That is, is the relationship larger than the average personality-well-being relationship for that trait? They found that, overall, the relationship between personality and well-being was larger for psychological well-being than for subjective well-being. However, neuroticism showed a similar relationship to subjective and psychological well-being, and extraversion and conscientiousness showed a slightly stronger relationship with psychological well-being. Agreeableness showed a stronger relationship with subjective well-being than with psychological well-being, while openness showed a stronger relationship with psychological well-being. An examination of the overall relationship between the personality traits and well-being revealed that neuroticism showed the largest relationship with well-being, followed by extraversion, conscientiousness, openness and agreeableness in that order. Furthermore, neuroticism was the strongest correlate of both subjective and psychological well-being. Positive affect and negative affect showed larger than average correlations with extraversion and neuroticism respectively; personal growth showed a larger than average correlation with openness; positive relations showed larger than average correlations with extraversion and agreeableness; and purpose in life showed larger than average correlations with conscientiousness. Environmental mastery and self-acceptance were not examined in this study.
EXPLANATORY MECHANISMS: MEDIATING PROCESSES IN THE PERSONALITY-ILLNESS RELATIONSHIP Research on stress has made an important contribution to our current understanding of the role of personality in health and well-being, ―The association of increased stress with various illnesses is the single most important finding in convincing adherents to the medico-mechanical model of disease that psychosocial factors may play a role in the etiology of illness‖ (McClelland, 1985, p. 455).
The remainder of this chapter focuses on an overarching process model, describing the effect of neuroticism on various intermediate mechanisms that tie situational stressors to health and well-being. This model can be summarized as follows:
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Stressor exposure
Cognitive appraisal
(Stress
) Coping Reactivity Health behavior
Health / Well-being
The various subsections below outline how neuroticism is implicated in each of these phases of the stressor-illness process. Note that research on stressor exposure and reactivity is reviewed in the same section, given that studies have typically examined these two variables concurrently.
Neuroticism and Stressor Exposure and Reactivity Several studies indicate that neurotics report greater exposure to stressful life events and daily hassles (David, Green, Martin, & Suls, 1997; Fergusson and Horwood, 1987; Gunthert, Cohen, & Armelli, 1999; Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Payot, 1993; Ormel & Wohlfarth, 1991; Poulton and Andrews, 1992; Zautra, Afflect, Tennen, Reich, & Davis, 2005) and are more likely to react to these stressors with emotional distress (Brow, 2008; Bolger & Shilling, 1991; Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995; Malyszczak et al., 2007; Marco & Suls, 1993; Suls, Martin, & David, 1998; Zautra et al., 2005). For example, longitudinal research has shown that neuroticism is associated with greater exposure to stressful life events during adulthood (Fergusson & Horwood, 1987; Magnus et al., 1993), and a daily diary study (Bolger & Schilling, 1991) found that neuroticism was associated with greater exposure to stressors, greater emotional reactivity to these stressors, and greater distress in general. Malyszczak et al. (2007) reported that patients with higher neuroticism scores were more likely to develop psychological distress under stress caused by somatic illness. A recent study (Brow, 2008) of stress in the wake of 9/11 revealed that neuroticism was associated with greater emotional distress. Neuroticism is also associated with stressor exposure within particular life domains, such as the work and interpersonal domains. For example, neuroticism has been linked with higher occupational stress among managers (Ahmad, James, & Ahmad, 1991) and medical consultants (Deary et al., 1996), and higher acculturative stress among international students (Duru & Poyrazli, 2007; Mangold, Veraza, Kinker, & Kinney, 2007). One study (Andreassi, 2007) found that neuroticism predicted higher scores on four measures of work-family conflict (work-to-family, family-to-work, strain-based, and time-based), while extraversion was unrelated to the four outcome measures. Neuroticism has also been linked with higher exposure to interpersonal conflict (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995) and other negative relationship outcomes (Karney & Bradbury, 1995; Hellmuth, & McNulty, 2008). Zautra et al. (2005) found that neuroticism was associated with negative events, relationship stress, and negative affect but was unrelated to positive events or relationship enjoyment. In contrast, extraversion was associated with positive events, relationship enjoyment, and positive affect, but was unrelated to negative events, relationship stress, and negative affect. In addition, neuroticism exacerbated the effect of a day‘s negative events on negative affectivity.
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A study of the relationship between the Big Five and emotional reactivity to daily hassles (Suls, Green, & Hillis, 1998) found that those who scored high on neuroticism reported greater exposure and emotional reactivity to daily hassles, and greater distress in relation to recurrent hassles than those who scored lower on neuroticism. In addition, high neuroticism and low agreeableness were associated with a lagged-effect of prior (negative) mood on distress. In contrast, extraversion, conscientiousness and openness were unrelated to emotional reactivity or distress. Studies of personality and physiological reactivity to stress typically focus on cardiovascular reactivity or immune system functioning (Friedman, 2000). Chida and Hamer (2008) found that neuroticism was associated with decreased cardiovascular reactivity but poor cardiovascular recovery in response to stress. Findings were explained in terms of a heightened orienting response, whereby neurotics are highly attentive to external stimuli and therefore exhibit a reduction in stressor reactivity but persistence of physiological arousal after the stressor has been removed. Other studies have shown that neuroticism is associated with blunted cortisol reactivity in response to acute stress and poor antibody response (Phillips, Carroll, Burns, & Drayson, 2005). In recent years, several studies have utilized Vollrath and Torgersen‘s (2000) 8 personality types to examine the combined effect of neuroticism, extraversion and conscientiousness on stressor exposure (Grant & Langan-Fox, 2006; Lau, Hem, Berg, Ekeberg, & Torgersen, 2006; Tyssen et al., 2007). The 8 types represent unique configurations of high and low neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness. Although the dichotomization of continuous personality variables into ‗high‘ and ‗low‘ categories can compromise predictive power due to loss of information (Rovik et al., 2007), the general thesis is that examining the interplay of traits (typological approach) provides a more comprehensive and detailed picture of personality than single trait models (dimensional approach), thus enabling the more reliable identification of those at risk (Tyssen et al., 2007). Two studies have shown that types characterized by high neuroticism and low conscientiousness report higher stressor exposure (Vollrath and Torgersen, 2000; Grant & Langan-Fox, 2006). A study of stress during medical school training (Tyssen et al., 2007) found that types combining high neuroticism with low extraversion and high conscientiousness were at risk for experiencing more stress, whereas types combining low neuroticism with high extraversion and low conscientiousness were protected against stress. Similarly, Lau et al. (2006) reported that the combination of low neuroticism and high extraversion was associated with lower stress among police officers, while the combination of high neuroticism and low extraversion was associated with higher stress in this context.
Explaining the neuroticism-stressor exposure and reactivity link Bolger and Zuckerman (1995) proposed that personality traits may influence (i) stressor exposure only (Differential Exposure Model), (ii) reactivity only (Differential Reactivity Model), or (iii) both exposure and reactivity (Differential Exposure-Reactivity Model). According to the Differential Exposure Model, personality influences stressor exposure but once these stressful events occur, everyone reacts in the same way. This model is consistent with a mediated effect model in which personality predicts higher stressor exposure which in turn predicts higher strain or illness. In contrast, the Differential Reactivity Model is based on a moderated effect model in which personality predicts reactivity to stressors and therefore moderates the effect of stressor exposure on strain. The research on neuroticism cited above is
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consistent with a Differential Exposure-Reactivity Model (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995), with the trait affecting both the stressor exposure and reactivity phases of the stress-strain process, thereby increasing susceptibility to stress-related illness and disease through both mediated and moderated pathways. It may be that neurotics elicit more frequent, severe, or prolonged stressful events through their own cognitive styles and behavior (c.f. Lemos-Giráldez & Fidalgo-Aliste, 1997; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990; Wiebe & Smith, 1997). For example, dysfunctional thinking patterns associated with neuroticism may impair decision making, leading to conflict or other problems that increase stressor exposure (Suls & Martin, 2005). It is also possible that neurotics are more likely to self-select (or be selected) into high pressure jobs or dysfunctional interpersonal settings. An alternative explanation is that neuroticism predicts perceived stress (stress perception hypothesis) rather than external stressor exposure per se (differential exposure hypothesis; Conard & Matthews, 2008). Since stressor exposure is typically assessed via self-report measures, it may be that neurotics do not experience more negative events at all but simply have a lower threshold for appraising events as negative (Suls & Martin, 2005). For example, chronic negative emotionally may mean that neurotics are more likely to notice and recall negative information. Suls and Martin (2005) recommended the use of informants as a potential strategy for tackling this methodological problem. The effect of neuroticism on reactivity could arise from its influence on (i) coping strategy choice (Differential Coping Choice Model), (ii) coping strategy effectiveness (Differential Coping Effectiveness Model), or (iii) both coping strategy choice and effectiveness (Differential Choice-Effectiveness Model) (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995). In the Differential Coping Choice Model, the effect of personality on reactivity is mediated by coping choice: Personality predicts differential choice of coping strategies and these strategies in turn lead to different health outcomes. In other words, once particular coping strategies are chosen, these are equally as effective (or ineffective) for everyone. Thus, neurotics may simply choose maladaptive coping strategies in response to stressful events, which in turn lead to poor health outcomes. In the Differential Coping Effectiveness Model, personality moderates the effect of coping on reactivity. According to this model then, neurotics may experience more reactivity following a stressful event not because they routinely choose maladaptive strategies but because they choose strategies that are ineffective for them alone. Alternatively, it may be that neurotics try potentially effective coping strategies but fail to persist with these due to low self-efficacy or chronic negative affect (Suls & Martin, 2005; Tyssen et al., 2007). The relationship between neuroticism and coping is discussed in more detail later in the chapter. Another possibility is that the effect of neuroticism on reactivity reflects the presence of an underlying third variable, such as an in-born defect or deficit that is responsible for both the overt expression of neurotic traits, and the tendency to react more to stress (Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990; Wiebe & Smith, 1997). According to this Constitutional Predisposition Model, neuroticism is a marker rather than a maker of vulnerability (Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990). Recent work has supported the link between neuroticism and autonomic nervous system deregulation, and genetics appear to be least partially responsible for this effect (see Riese et al., 2007). A final possibility is that hyperreactivity increases neuroticism. However, neuroticism is likely to have causal precedence (Suls & Martin, 2005). For example, Suls and Martin suggested that the vulnerability of neurotics is likely to be rooted in biological or learned sensitivity to negative stimuli, for
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instance heredity or early socialization. They noted that the vulnerability of neurotics seems to extend to all types of stressors while other dimensions of personality, such as low agreeableness, are associated with hyper-reactivity to particular kinds of problems only.
Neuroticism and Cognitive Appraisal In addition to showing greater stressor exposure and reactivity, neurotics are also more likely to appraise events as stressful and difficult to manage. A study of primary appraisal among students (Gallagher, 1990) found that neuroticism was positively related to threat appraisal and negatively related to challenge appraisal. In contrast, extraversion showed a positive but weaker relationship with challenge appraisal. Hemenover and Dienstbier (1996) found that students who scored high on neuroticism and low on extraversion rated an exam stressor as more threatening (primary appraisal) and more difficult to cope with (secondary appraisal). Similarly, neuroticism was positively related to appraised threat and stressfulness among prospective students preparing to take a law school entry exam (Maxim, 2000). In the occupational context, Deary et al. (1996) found that (negative) cognitive appraisal and emotion-focused coping mediated the effect of neuroticism on self-reported stress. Other studies have examined the effect of all Big Five traits on cognitive appraisal simultaneously. A study of caregivers (Watson & Hubbard, 1996) found that neuroticism had a negative effect on secondary appraisal while the remaining traits generally had the opposite effect. Neuroticism was inversely related to perceived control and problem-solving confidence, as well as an overall factor of perceived problem-solving ability. In contrast, conscientiousness was positively related to perceived control, problem-solving confidence, and problem-solving ability. Extraversion and openness showed a positive relationship with perceived problem-solving confidence and problem-solving ability, and agreeableness was positively related to perceived problem-solving ability only. Penley and Tomaka (2002) examined the relationship between the Big Five and cognitive appraisal in relation to an acute stressor: preparing and presenting a speech on a controversial topic. Neuroticism was associated with negative secondary appraisal, whereas conscientiousness and openness were associated with positive primary appraisal, and extraversion, conscientiousness and openness were associated with positive secondary appraisal. In addition, neuroticism was positively correlated with perceived (post task) stress, while extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness were negatively correlated with this outcome variable.
Explaining the neuroticism-cognitive appraisal link According to reward sensitivity theory, neuroticism and extraversion capture individual differences in the functioning of two different brain systems: the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and the Behavioral Approach System (BAS) respectively (Smillie, Pickering, & Jackson, 2006). The BIS causes the person to move away from goals in anticipation of an emotional punishment and the BAS causes the person move toward goals in anticipation of an emotional reward (McAdams, 2009). This theory suggests that the relationship between neuroticism and primary appraisal could reflect a selective attention bias or underlying appraisal tendency. That is, those who score high on neuroticism may be ‗punishment sensitive‘, selectively attending to potential negative outcomes i.e., threat/damage or loss (Gallagher, 1990; Hemenover and Dienstbier, 1996). In contrast, those who score high on
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extraversion may be ‗reward sensitive‘, selectively attending to potential positive outcomes i.e., challenge. Indeed, Hemenover (2001) found that the neuroticism-cognitive appraisal relationship was mediated by a self-reported tendency to rely on negative information and that the extraversion-cognitive appraisal relationship was mediated by a self-reported tendency to rely on positive information. Kuppens and Van Mechelen (2007) suggested that neurotics are more sensitive to potential personal threats present in unpleasant evaluative events. They found that neuroticism was associated with higher appraised threats to selfesteem. With regard to neuroticism and secondary appraisal, the negative effect of neuroticism on perceived coping ability may indicate a depletion of coping resources, due to the ongoing management of chronic negative emotionality. Alternatively, it may be that neurotics have fewer coping strategies available to them to begin with (Revenson, 1990). The original formulation of the Transactional Model of Stress and Coping conceptualized coping as a discrete, situation-specific response, however it is now reocgnized that coping is more likely to be ‗dispositional‘ or trait-like in nature (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Cox & Ferguson, 1991; Dewe et al., 1993; Newton & Keenan, 1990). Indeed, Carver and Scheier (1994) found that dispositional coping was a significant predictor of situational coping. Dispositional coping is defined as ―a characteristic or typical manner of approaching or confronting a stressful situation and dealing with it‖ (Endler, 1997, p. 143). As discussed in the next section, neuroticism is typically associated with maladaptive and ineffective coping (e.g., Deary et al., 1996; Fickcova, 2001; McCrae & Costa, 1986; Shewchuck, Elliott, MacNair-Semands, & Harkins, 1999). As such, neurotics may feel less efficacious in the face of stressful events, based on past coping experience. The relationship between neuroticism and cognitive appraisal is consistent with a Stress Moderation Model of the personality-illness relationship (Wiebe & Smith, 1997). Within this model, personality is theorized to (i) attenuate, exacerbate, or prevent the appraisal of a situation as stressful, and/or (ii) guide the selection of more or less adaptive coping strategies in response to stressful events, thus influencing physiological reactivity and subsequent health outcomes (Wiebe & Smith, 1997, Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990). Statistically, this model can be represented as a mediated, moderated effect model, in that personality moderates the effect of stressor exposure on strain, an effect mediated by cognitive appraisal.
Neuroticism and Coping While there are several typologies of coping strategies, a certain level of convergence has emerged around the broad theoretical distinction between problem-focused and emotionfocused coping strategies (Dewe et al., 1993; Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Ingledew, Hardy, Cooper, & Jemal, 1996). The former aim to alter or manage stressful events; the latter aim to regulate the emotional distress associated with such events. Emotion-focused coping is often subdivided into (a) reappraisal strategies, which aim to manage interpretation of the stressful event e.g., ‗making the best of a bad situation‘, and (b) avoidance strategies, which aim to minimize tension by evading the stressful event (Bowman & Stern, 1995; Cook & Hepner, 1997; Cox & Ferguson, 1991). Avoidance coping strategies include person-oriented strategies, such as social diversion, and task-oriented strategies, such as distraction (Endler & Parker, 1994). Problem-focused coping may be more adaptive when the stressor is changeable
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or controllable, while emotion-focused coping may be more adaptive when the stressor must be accepted and endured (Forsythe & Compas, 1987; Lazarus, 1990). Avoidance forms of emotion-focused coping are generally considered to be maladaptive. While avoidance coping may be effective in the short-term, it is likely to lead to poor adjustment in the long-term (Hobfoll, 1988). For example, avoidance coping may be difficult to maintain when stressor exposure is chronic or ongoing, such as in the occupational context (Bowman & Stern, 1995). Indeed, studies have shown that avoidance coping exacerbates the effect of job-related stress on strain (Long, 1993; Parasuraman & Cleek, 1984). If coping is governed by dispositional styles rather than situation-specific strategies, then it seems reasonable to assume that stable personality traits account for some of the stability in coping (Bouchard, 2003). Indeed, past research has consistently shown that neuroticism is positively related to emotion-focused and avoidance coping and negatively related to problem-focused coping (see e.g., Bouchard, 2003; Deary et al., 1996; Hooker, Frazier, & Monhan, 1994; Matthews et al., 1996; O‘Brien & De Longis, 1996; Vollrath, Torgersen, & Alnæs, 1995; Watson & Hubbard, 1996). For example, an early study (McCrae & Costa, 1986) found that neuroticism was positively related to escapist fantasy, hostility, indecisiveness, passivity, sedation, self-blame, wishful thinking, and withdrawal, all of which were perceived as ineffective in relation to problem-solving and distress reduction. In addition, these strategies were negatively related to well-being. Subsequent studies have reported similar findings: O‘Brien and DeLongis (1996) found that neurotics reported more escape-avoidance and confrontive coping and less planful problem solving; Fickova (2001) reported an association between neuroticism and maladaptive and ineffective coping among adolescents; and Penley and Tomaka (2002) found that neuroticism was positively related to emotional regulation and defensive coping among students. More recently, Brow (2008) reported that neuroticism was positively related to use of maladaptive coping strategies, such as denial and self-blame, and inversely related to effective coping strategies, such as acceptance and active coping, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Studies using the COPE Inventory (Carver et al., 1989), a widely used measure of coping, have shown that neuroticism is positively correlated with behavioral disengagement, denial, mental disengagement, substance use, and venting, and negatively correlated with active coping, planning, positive reinterpretation, and suppression of competing activities in both clinical and non-clinical samples (Vollrath et al., 1995; Watson & Hubbard, 1996). A recent study of parents rearing children with disabilities (Glidden, Billings, & Jobe, 2006) found that neuroticism was associated with accepting responsibility (self-blame) and escape-avoidance. Escape-avoidance in turn predicted higher depression and lower current and child-related subjective well-being. Conscientiousness has also emerged as a powerful predictor of coping. In fact, conscientiousness was the strongest Big Five predictor of coping in the Fickova (2001) study. In contrast to neuroticism however, this trait is positively related to problem-focused coping and negatively related to avoidance coping (e.g., Deary et al., 1996; Hooker et al., 1994; Matthews et al., 2006; O‘Brien & De Longis, 1996; Penley & Tomaka, 2002; Watson & Hubbard, 1996). For example, Watson and Hubbard (1996) found that conscientiousness was positively related to active coping, planning, and suppression of competing activities, and negatively related to behavioral disengagement, escape-avoidance, mental disengagement, and substance use. The positive relationship between conscientiousness and problem-focused coping has been replicated in the occupational context (see e.g., Deary et al., 1996) and is
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consistent with the goal-directed and self-disciplined nature of those who score high on this trait (Penley & Tomaka, 2002). Extraversion is positively related to emotional and instrumental social support seeking (e.g., Amirkan, Risinger, & Swickert, 1995; Fickova, 2001; Hooker et al., 1994; Vollrath et al., 1995; Watson & Hubbard, 1996), however its overall relationship with coping is somewhat inconsistent. For example, when controlling for other traits, O‘Brien and De Longis (1996) found that extraversion failed to demonstrate an independent effect on coping, and Penley and Tomaka (2002) found that extraversion was unrelated to coping. In contrast, McCrae and Costa (1986) found that extraversion was positively related to positive thinking, rational action, restraint, and substitution, all of which were perceived as effective in relation to problem-solving and distress reduction. The relationship between agreeableness and coping is modest. This trait is positively and consistently related to social support seeking, and positively (though less consistently) related to problem-focused and emotion-focused coping (e.g., Hooker et al., 1994; O‘Brien & DeLongis, 1996; Penley & Tomaka, 2002). Watson and Hubbard (1996) found that agreeableness was positively related to planning, positive reinterpretation, and negatively related to substance use. In contrast, Fickova (2001) reported a weak relationship between agreeableness and coping. Penley and Tomaka (2002) found that agreeableness was positively related to passive endurance, which they interpreted as consistent with the compliant nature of those who score high on this trait. Openness is related to a range of coping strategies, though notably some research has reported a weak association. In an early study, McCrae and Costa (1986) found that openness was negatively related to turning to religion, a finding that was later replicated by Watson and Hubbard (1996). In addition, openness was positively related to humour in the McCrae and Costa (1986) study, and positively related to planning and positive reinterpretation, and negatively related to escape-avoidance in the Watson and Hubbard (1996) study. Consistent with Watson and Hubbard (1996), O‘Brien and DeLongis (1996) found that openness was positively related to positive reappraisal, while Penley and Tomaka (2002) found that openness was positively correlated with active coping and negatively correlated with passive endurance. A study of coping with marital problems (Bouchard, 2003) found that openness was positively related to planful problem solving. A recent meta-analysis of the personality and coping literature (Connor-Smith & Flachsbart, 2007) indicated that all Big Five traits predicted specific strategies. Neuroticism predicted less problem-solving and cognitive restructuring, whereas extraversion and conscientiousness showed the opposite pattern. In addition, neuroticism predicted dysfunctional coping strategies such as wishful thinking, withdrawal, and maladaptive forms of emotion-focused coping but, along with extraversion, it also predicted support seeking. In addition, personality was a stronger predictor of coping in younger samples, stressed samples, and samples that reported dispositional rather than situational coping. Given that neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness tend to show the strongest association with coping, some studies have examined the combined effect of these three traits. Such studies suggest that personality types that combine high neuroticism with low conscientiousness report less problem-focused coping and more avoidance coping than other types (Grant & Langan-Fox, 2006; Vollrath & Torgersen, 2000).
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Explaining the neuroticism-coping link The relationship between neuroticism and coping is consistent with the Differential Coping Choice and Stress Moderation models described earlier. That is, neurotics appear to choose passive and maladaptive coping strategies, such as venting and avoidance coping, in response to stress. Thus, neuroticism moderates the effect of stressor exposure on strain, an effect mediated by coping. The choice of emotion-focused coping strategies among neurotics may be driven by chronic emotionality, with neurotics preferring to use strategies that regulate emotional distress (Terry, 1994 cited in Bouchard, 2003). Connor-Smith and Flachsbart (2007) suggested that personality may influence coping strategy choice via stressor exposure. For example, given that neurotics report higher stressor exposure, they may choose avoidance coping strategies to escape from an abundance of stressors, whereas those who experience lower stressor exposure may be better placed to use other strategies. The strong and consistent relationship between neuroticism and avoidance coping could also be driven by the anxiety facet of the trait (Tyssen et al., 2007).
Neuroticism and Health Behavior Health behavior refers to any behavior that has a consequence for health, though not necessarily as a goal e.g., adherence to prescribed medical treatment, diet/eating, drinking, exercise, general self-care, preventative health care e.g., medical screening, relaxation, sexual promiscuity, sleeping, substance use, thrill seeking etc. (Friedman, 2000; Ingledew et al., 1996). There is some evidence that personality precipitates dangerous or risky health behavior (Lemos-Giráldez & Fidalgo-Aliste, 1997; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990), with neuroticism once again exerting a negative or maladaptive effect. Vingerhoets, Croon, Jeninga, and Menges (1990) found that adults who scored higher on neuroticism demonstrated poorer everyday health behavior (i.e., sleeping, breakfast, snacking, good weight, smoking, alcohol, physical activity) than those who scored lower on neuroticism. Similarly, Booth-Kewley and Vickers (1994) found that neuroticism was negatively related to wellness behavior (e.g., exercise, healthy diet, vitamin intake) and accident control, and positively related to risk taking. Conversely, conscientiousness and agreeableness were positively related to wellness behavior and accident control, and negatively related to risk taking. Openness was also associated with greater substance-related risk taking, and was the only significant predictor of this aspect of health behavior, suggesting that it also has a maladaptive effect in this context. Peltzer (2004) found that neuroticism and psychoticism were inversely related to preventative health behavior, while optimism was positively related to health behavior. There is some evidence to suggest that the link between personality and health behavior is established early, with some gender-specific differences. A study of the relationship between personality and risky behavior in children (Markey, Markey, Ericksen, & Tinsley, 2006) indicated that risky behavior among girls was related to behavior patterns associated with neuroticism, introversion and disagreeableness, while risky behavior among boys was related to behavior patterns associated with extraversion and disagreeableness. A longitudinal study of adulthood predictors of health-promoting behavior in aging (Holahan & Suzuki, 2004) found that neuroticism was negatively related to positive psychosocial behavior, while easygoingness was positively related to positive psychosocial behavior and health practices.
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There is also some evidence to suggest that health behaviors mediate between neuroticism and depressive symptoms (see Gallant & Connell, 2003). While the bulk of evidence suggests that neuroticism is associated with risky health behavior, one study (Vollrath, Knoch, & Cassano, 1999) has reported conflicting findings. Vollrath et al. (1999) investigated the relationship between personality and (a) perceived susceptibility to health risks and (b) risky health behavior (being drunk, drunk driving, risky sexual behavior, smoking) among university students. Neuroticism was positively correlated with perceived susceptibility to three of the four health risks; however path models indicated that this higher perceived susceptibility could not be explained by a higher frequency of risky health behavior. In fact, those who scored high on neuroticism engaged in less risky health behavior. In other words, they tended to worry about health risks despite being no better or worse in terms of their actual health behavior. Agreeableness was the most consistent predictor of perceived susceptibility to health risks and risky health behavior, such that those who scored high on this trait were more optimistic about future health risks and engaged in less risky health behavior. Findings for conscientiousness were similar to those for agreeableness. Openness was unrelated to perceived susceptibility to health risks and actual risky health behavior. Friedman‘s (2000) commentary on the mechanisms underlying the relationship between neuroticism and health behavior helps to reconcile these inconsistent findings. Friedman suggested that neuroticism can lead people down two alternate pathways: On the one hand, pessimism, resentment, and anxiety may lead neurotics to give up on medical regimens, turn to substance abuse, and avoid interpersonal assistance. On the other hand, vigilance about symptoms, advancement in medical practices, and adherence to treatment may lead neurotics to avoid risky health behavior. These differential outcomes are likely to be influenced by stress: Based on an analysis of data from the Terman Life Cycle Study, Friedman found that neurotics who faced parental divorce as children were at increased risk for premature mortality. With regard to the combined effect of neuroticism, extraversion and conscientiousness on health behavior, types combining high neuroticism with high extraversion or low conscientiousness engage in more alcohol and drug abuse, drunk-driving, smoking, and risky sexual behavior (Vollrath & Torgersen, 2002, 2008). High extraversion-low conscientioussness types also demonstrate more risky behavior. Other typological studies have focused on the combination of high neuroticism with low extraversion, or the so-called ‗Type D‘ personality. Denollet (1997) identified Type Ds as a coronary heart disease (CHD) subgroup characterized by problems with negative emotionality and self-expression and depressive symptoms. Williams, O‘Brien, and Colder (2004) found that the combination of high neuroticism and low extraversion predicted poorer health behavior self-efficacy. Controlling for the main effect of neuroticism, Type Ds reported significantly less health behavior and less social support than non-Type Ds. Williams et al. concluded that health behavior may play a role in explaining the link between Type D and poor clinical prognosis among cardiac patients.
Explaining the neuroticism-health behavior link The relationship between personality and health behavior may reflect individual differences in how people respond to social regulation (Tucker, Elliot, & Klein, 2006). For example, neurotics may react more negatively to overt attempts by others to influence their
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health behavior (Tucker et al., 2006). In contrast, conscientiousness people may willingly practice positive health behavior, due to a sense of obligation and responsibility to others. Indeed, people who score high on conscientiousness tend to internalize societal norms regarding sensible health-related behavior and to adhere to prescribed treatment recommendations (Goodman & Friedman, 2006). An alternative explanation is that neurotics engage in risky health behavior as a means of dealing with stress. Coping strategies may include positive health behavior, such as exercise, or negative health behavior, such substance use (Gallant & Connell, 2003), which is typically conceptualized as a form of avoidance coping (Ingledew et al., 1996). In the Health Behavior Model, a specialized version of the Stress Moderation Model discussed above, personality is thought to guide the selection of more or less adaptive health-related coping strategies in response to stress, thus influencing physiological arousal and subsequent health outcomes (Wiebe & Smith, 1997). In addition, some health behavior may be directly beneficial or detrimental to health, over and above any stress moderating effect (Ingledew et al., 1996). For example, regular planned exercise to reduce tension may have a direct, positive effect on health (Ingledew et al., 1996). Conversely, while alcohol and drug use may temporarily numb psychological distress, excessive and routine use, such as in conjunction with chronic stress, may have a direct, negative effect on health (Begley, 1998; Lepore, 1995). In support of the Health Behavior Model, Korotkov (2008) found that emotional stability, introversion, conscientiousness and openness were associated with higher engagement in health practices under high stress/distress.
CONCLUSION In summary, neuroticism is associated with a range of physical conditions as well as psychopathology and impaired well-being. In addition, neuroticism has been linked with heightened stressor exposure, negative cognitive appraisal, maladaptive coping, risky health behavior, and exaggerated emotional reactivity. These findings suggest that neuroticism may influence health and well-being indirectly, via stressor exposure or risky health behavior, or in interaction with stressful events by moderating their effect on health and well-being, via cognitive appraisal, coping, or reactivity (Bolger & Shilling, 1991; Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995; McCrae & Costa, 1991; McAdams, 2009; Magnus et al., 1993). In contrast, the remaining traits, in general, appear to confer an adaptive advantage in relation to stress, health and well-being. For example, extraversion and conscientiousness are associated with positive primary and secondary appraisal and/or adaptive forms of problem-focused coping. In addition, research suggests that the combination of high neuroticism with low extraversion and/or low conscientiousness is associated with stress vulnerability, while the combination of low neuroticism with high extraversion and/or high conscientiousness is associated with stress resistance. The aim of personality-illness research is to (a) identify the traits (or personality types) that confer risk, (b) to elucidate the mechanisms underlying vulnerability, and (c) to develop intervention strategies for preventing or managing illness and disease (Smith & MacKenzie, 2006). Research on personality and illness is particularly relevant to prevention and the early
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diagnosis of those at risk, given that traits can serve as a visible marker of underlying or emerging pathology (Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990). Suls and Martin (2005) described the relationship between neuroticism and stressor exposure, reactivity, cognitive appraisal, and coping as a ‗neurotic cascade‘ of reinforcing factors: people who score high on neuroticism report more major life events and daily hassles, show exaggerated affective reactivity to these stressors, appraise or perceive potential stressors as more threatening, and choose maladaptive coping strategies or use coping strategies ineffectively, making recovery from a negative mood more difficult. Maladaptive coping efforts reinforce the neurotic‘s negative self-concept and sense of helplessness and pessimism, making it more difficult to deal with recurring problems. Interventions to appease the detrimental impact of neuroticism should focus on these multiple processes, in particular: helping neurotics to alter dysfunctional thinking patterns and situational choices that increase stressor exposure; recognize potential positive outcomes when interpreting events rather than focusing on negative information; increase their problem-solving self-efficacy; expand their coping skills, including choosing and persisting in the use of adaptive coping strategies; and develop long-term strategies for managing anxiety and negative emotionality. With regard to PDs, generic behavioral interventions could be targeted at those with high neuroticism and low agreeableness, whereas specialized behavioral interventions may be required for extraversion- and conscientiousness-related PDs (Saulsman & Page, 2004). Prevention strategies should utilize scores on neuroticism as a screening tool for physical and mental health problems, to identify early those who are likely to benefit from treatment. The evidence reviewed above indicates that neuroticism is a consistent risk factor for a range of negative health and well-being outcomes. Although several explanatory mechanisms have been identified in the literature, few studies have evaluated these mechanisms directly, prompting a call for future studies to address this problem (Smith & McKenzie, 2006). Given that neuroticism is associated with a range of conditions, it is likely that the underlying mechanisms are heterogeneous (Goodwin et al., 2006). These mechanisms may include biochemical or psychophysiological pathways beyond the stress process (Goodwin et al., 2006; Smith, 2006). For example, consistent with a direct effect or ‗top-down‘ or dispositional model, both neuroticism and well-being measures show strong correlations over time and strong genetic components in twin studies (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001; Jang, Livesley, & Vernon, 1996; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Nes, Roysamb, Tambs, Harris, & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2006; Weiss, Bates, & Luciano, 2008), suggesting an underlying genotype. Mechanisms underlying comorbid physical and mental health disorders also need to be explored. A further issue is the direction of causality: ill health or its treatment may increase neuroticism, due to factors such as discomfort/pain or functional limitations associated with illness (Goodwin et al., 2006; Charles, et al., 2008). Equally plausible is a positive or reinforcing feedback loop between negative emotionality and physical ill health. As Smith (2006, p. 230), noted “the elucidation of mechanisms will be important not only for the advance of basic science and its translation into risk reducing intervention; the issue of mechanisms is also important for the credibility of the general perspective that personality can influence health‖.
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In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 37-58
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 2
SHAME IN CHINESE CLASSIC PHILOSOPHY: AN INVESTIGATION THROUGH THE LENS OF MENCIUS HuaNan Gong Chinese Professor of Philosophy, Department of East China Normal University, Translated from Mandarin by Chad Meyers (MA Student in the Department of Philosophy of East China Normal University)
ABSTRACT In the West, shame is believed to arise from feelings toward sex, which is the origin of knowledge of goodness and evil as well as the origin of the conscience. In the Bible, sexual shame is elevated as the beginning and the source of other types of shame, so at the same time it is the prototype and standard of other types of shame. However, the generality and power of sexual shame need not be universal. In Chinese traditional thinking it is clear that shame is closely bound up with taste (eating), which occupies the primal location and plays an important role in ―taste.‖ In ancient Chinese words and expressions, the meaning of ―shame‖ is ―dedication‖ and ―delicious (food)‖ and the word ―shame‖ is used as both verb and adjective. Shame firstly involves delicious food. Beginning with the Confucian Analects, ―shame‖ in relation to the meaning of delicious food stirs feelings of morality. This reason for this association is that shame is related to the delicious food that comes from ―sheep,‖ as well as the values of goodness, beauty, and faith. Generally speaking, ―shame‖ is related to all valuable things. The shape of ―xiu‖（羞 means shame) in the Chinese ancient character shows an uncertain expression of conflict when people decide whether or not to capture the sheep. In this sense, the shame is derived from what one thinks and feels when a person faces beautiful and valuable things. Mencius regards the concept of shame as a category of morality, and the concept‘s role as an important source of human‘s nature and conscience is greatly consolidated. Furthermore, shame is the basic foundation that defines man as man. The Confucians decline the human‘s shield of morality in order to emphasize the effects of shame. Under this teaching, they merged substance (体) with function (用): existing with shame. For the Taoist who stresses the discipline of the mind, shame is taken as a defense to retain the ―nativeness‖ of the mind.
Keywords: shame, self, having a sense of shame
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INTRODUCTION Chinese philosophers attached much importance to ―shame.‖ Mencius, in particular, took ―shame‖ as one of the four innate principles, the transcendental ground upon which all virtues and forms of virtuosity unfold, including appropriate actions and affirmative will.T Here, in the thinking of Mencius, the origin and fountainhead of man‘s appropriate actions (义) springs out from man‘s innate sense of shame and feeling of disgust in the face of everything improper. Shame unfolds in the current of life‘s vital upsurge, actively receives the other and greets the world, and thereby keeps a vigilant watch over the ascent of one‘s character as it matures into full-bodied virtuosity. This chapter reviews the direction of this path mapped out by Mencius, and aims at uncovering the dual significance of this path: On one hand, Mencius finds an indispensible value in ―shame‖ as a beneficial ingredient in the cultivation of one‘s virtue and the elevation of one‘s taste; and on the other hand, consolidates the elusive dimension of ―the other,‖ the universal norms and principles difficult to implement within the structure of the mind‘s willing disposition to ―take responsibility by oneself and for oneself‖; this chapter strengthens these three dimensions along the path towards the social level, where they can reach greater universality.
Part I. Shame of Sexuality and Shame of Taste Everyone might initially think of shame in the sense of the ―shame of sexuality‖ in association with the passions of both males and females. In fact, there is an intimate connection between ―shame‖ and ―sex.‖ For instance, in German the word scham means embarrassment, shame, shyness, and so on, but also simultaneously points to a human‘s external genital area. Shame and one‘s genitals are not only interconnected semantically, but are also intimately interrelated in thought. The German language emerged in a comparatively recent age, and the German view of shame received deep influence from the biblical tradition. The Bible‘s typical explications of sexuality and shame can be found in the third, fifth and seventh chapters of Genesis: ―For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will open, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil … then both of their eyes had opened and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons.‖ Scheler once gave an insightful account of the overall significance of this myth; he said, ―As regards the genealogy of morals, the myths of the old testament present rather trenchant wisdom through pictorial descriptions of universal truths, and show that the emotional T
The ethical concepts (仁 ren) (义 yi ) (礼 li) are certainly three of the most important concepts in the Chinese discursive tradition and have already been matched with numerous English counterparts throughout the history of translation and cultural communication between the East and West. In this chapter, I will be rendering these terms in the vein of the tradition inaugurated by philosopher David Hall and sinologist Richard Ames. The latter two thinkers have offered translations that are the most sensitive to the unmatchable expressivity of Chinese characters on one hand and the Christian character of their standard Western counterparts on the other. As a reference for the explanation of these terms, please read: The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation by Roger T. Ames. In addition, since this chapter takes the character of shame as a guide through the ancient Chinese world of concepts, the work has a genuine genealogical flavor to it, and so I chose to translate his work with the help of a variety of genealogical concepts cultivated by Gilles Deleuze in his work, Nietzsche and Philosophy. So for reference of any of the concepts concerning will in this paper, for instance, my employment of affirmative and active will can be traced by to prior definitions given by Deleuze.
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reaction of shame is the origin of knowledge concerning good and evil.‖1 A sense of shame is initially a feeling of sexual shame as the origin of knowledge concerning good and evil, the generator of conscience. In this myth, a feeling of shame for one‘s sexuality is elevated to the genesis or beginning of any sense of shame in general, and because of this it becomes the archetype and measure for all other senses of shame. The feeling of shame for one‘s sexuality, this particular realm of shame, is without any doubt a more common and rather intense sort of shame. However, the universality and intensity of sexual embarrassment really doesn‘t imply that it is the universal source of shame. We can see very clearly in the tradition of Chinese thought, for instance, that shame is primarily bound up in an intimate bond with ―taste‖ (for food), and moreover that it occupies its chief position and plays its most important role in just this sort of bond. In the pre-Qin dynastic archives, the following senses of ―shame‖ were widely employed: 1: 惟羞刑暴德之人同于厥邦。（《书·立政》） A leader merely offering (羞) to punish the morally inept as a substitute for moral aptitude will be seen as morally inept by everyone in his land. 2: 可荐于鬼神，可羞于王公。（《左传·隐公三年》） The delicious foods offered (荐) to the gods can be offered （羞） to noblemen as well. 3: 雍巫有宠于卫共姬，因寺人貂以荐羞于公。（《左传·僖公十七年》） The lady YongWu was favored by the noble GongWei, because a eunich, Diao, recommended (荐) her as a beautiful woman (羞) to the noble family. 4: 包羞（《易·否·六三》） Pack (包)the delicious foods (羞) In the excerpts archived above, the concept we have been reviewing through the Chinese ideogram for shame (xiu 羞) has the significance of ―to offer‖ as in the first example, in which shame was offered as punishment (羞刑). However, xiu (羞) has the meaning of ―delicious‖ (in the sense of food) in the fourth example of packing delicious food (包羞); in the second citation, where the delicious foods offered (荐) to the gods were tasteful enough to offer (羞) to the nobles; but also in the third passage, where xiu 羞 is employed
1
Scheller, Max: The Subversion of Values, translated from the Chinese version by TiLun Luo, Beijing. JiuZhou Press; 2004, pp. 385.
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metaphorically to ―offer or recommend (荐) a beautiful woman (羞).‖ So, shame is employed both as a verb and a noun. In the book The Explanation of Scripts and Elucidation of Characters we find the following definition: ―xiu 羞; to offer. From 羊T1—lamb, which is put forward as an offering—丑.T2‖ Taking xiu 羞 always and only in this sense of offering obviously shrinks the bulk of this character‘s signifying capaciousness; however, the above mentioned explication shows the bond of signification between xiu 羞—yang 羊—chou 丑, and without a doubt brings our minds closer to the overflowing expressivity of xiu 羞. Lamb—羊—is primarily valued for its sweet tasty flesh, and for this reason xiu 羞 is predominantly bound up with taste in food. The character for so-called ugliness—丑— considered as it is written in its radical form at the bottom of xiu 羞, does not signify the distasteful opposite of beautiful and virtuous things here, but rather expresses the idea of hands—手T3—or more precisely the idea of hands in movement, ―to raise one‘s hands.‖ In the The Explanation of Scripts and Elucidation of Characers we find the following definition: ―Chou 丑 means the handling loop of a utensil —纽.T4 It also means December, when all creatures initially spring into movement, use each other, and transform into events; —丑—is formally traced back to the image of a hand—手; in time strokes were added: from hand— 手—to—>丑—and distinguished the concept of hands raising.‖ Corresponding to this, 羞 functions as a verb to point to the action of taking the things most beautiful and beneficial to oneself and giving them up as an offering. So at what point in time did the character xiu 羞 metamorphose at the level of signification; when did its chief sense as a signfier for ―tasty‖ transform to express both ―shame (羞耻)‖ and ―humiliation (羞辱)?‖ First off it would be worthy for us to look at The Book of Changes and this character‘s expressive value in the texts of later generations.
T1
羊 pronounced Yang (y-ah-ng) with a rising tone. 羊 is written alone as the word for lamb and sheep, but is also
T2
丑 pronounced Chou with a falling-rising tone. When this character stands by itself in modern Chinese it means
written in its radical form as a conceptual addition to more complex ideograms such as in the character xiu 羞. ugly, but in the character xiu 羞 it is used as a radical and so it is used in a different sense, which will be clarified in the following paragraph. T3
手 is pronounced [Shou] with a falling-rising tone precisely as 丑 [Chou] is pronounced; it is just that a slight difference has formed between them on the phonetic level: (Ch)ou 丑 is an affricate [ts
] whereas (Sh)ou
手 is a fricative [s ]. This is evidence pointing towards a prior conceptual bond in some form existing between the two somewhere in the genealogy of their spoken and written lifeline, even though this conceptual bond seems to have been disjoined or just simply forgotten in their common use today. T4
纽 pronounced Niu with a falling-rising tone. The character contains moving hands—Chou 丑—as its chief signifying part, and it is followed by the character for interwoven threads—糸—written in its radical form. Altogether, 纽 forms the idea of hands interwoven, symbiotically woven together into webs of interaction.
Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy
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Turning to The Book of Changes section 93 we find the following passage on constancy— 恒T5—bu 不 heng 恒 qi 其 de 德, huo 或 cheng 承 zhi 之 xiu 羞 (as one fails to keep one‘s powers in sound equilibrium and constant virtuosity, outsiders advance upon his tasty foods). In this case xiu 羞 still expresses tasty foods just as it did in the earlier example we gave of xiu 羞 in The Book of Changes section 63 where ―包羞”expresses the packing of tasty, cooked flesh. In the seventh volume of Collected Commentaries on The Book of Changes, ZhiDe Lai appropriately pointed out regarding this section on Heng 恒 that ―If the wife of a man cannot uphold her post with constant virtue, but instead loses chastity through extramarital relations, then her husband will lose the potency required to tolerate her, and she will be expelled as a result. Regarding the second line of the first passage on Heng—恒 : huo 或 cheng 承 zhi 之 xiu 羞; huo 或 means outsider; cheng 承 means to advance; xiu 羞 means tasty, the image of food and drink. Since an outsider advances upon his taste for the wife, instigating extramarital affairs, the outsider simultaneously advances shame (xiu 羞) upon the husband… If we rely upon earlier commentary of this work, where xiu 羞 is interpreted here as shame/humiliation, then…‖2 The people involved in the debate here concerning this passage on Heng—恒—seem to have already noticed this kind of transformation of significance attributed to this character xiu 羞. To retrace our steps back to the origin of this transformation we cannot but open the Confucian Analects. Everyone is familiar with the habit of pre-Qin thinkers to cite authoritative texts in order to express their own thoughts. A successful citation at this time was not sought via the simple reduplication of the already said, but was sought rather as an appropriation of past writings; the aim was to raise the power of past writings, allowing them to enter into an approximation with the living situation, so the past and present of thought abut historically and contract together. In this respect, Confucius, Mencius, and Zhuangzi all had a highly distinguished mastery over this art. In the Analects, Confuc —恒—discussed above in The Book of Changes in order to express his virtue oriented thought, and at the same time incorporate this passage into his ethical system, and due to this xiu 羞 took its ethical turn being defined as ―shame‖ and ―humiliation.‖ This is without a doubt one key transformation: xiu 羞 in the sense of delicious taste transformed into xiu 羞 in the sense of ―shame.‖ Confucius gave xiu 羞 a new significance, yet in a way that tightly integrated the concept of shame into the concept of good taste. Duplicitously engaging social bonds has no integrity.
T5
恒 pronounced [Heng] with a rising tone. The character means keeping something in constancy and in some cases eternity. 2 ZhiDe Lai: Collected Commentaries on The Book of Changes; Beijing, JiuZhou Publishing House: 2004; pp. 385. Translated by Chad Meyers.
42
HuaNan Gong Feigning ritual propriety (li 禮) is shameful (xiu 羞). Exploiting the force of bravery is furtive disloyalty (GuoYu: Volume Two3). Although one‘s parents have already passed away. So how was ―xiu 羞”in the sense of ―delicious foods‖ able to transform into ―xiu 羞”in
the sense of ―shame?‖ This question begs us to once again return to the Chinese character xiu 羞 itself. We said before that xiu 羞 is composed of the two characters yang 羊 and chou 丑 written in their radical form. The explanation given in the Artificer’s Record tells us: ―yang 羊; synonym for shan 善 (good or beneficial).‖ The Explanation of Scripts and Explication of Characters4 states: ―yang 羊, synonym for xiang 祥 (auspicious).‖ ―yang 羊 (sheep)‖ is a symbol of beneficence and auspiciousness. The reason why yang 羊 was able to become a symbol for ―beneficence‖ and ―auspiciousness‖ on the one hand might be due to the meek and tamable quality associated with the lamb, and the mellifluous taste associated with its flesh. The Explication of Characters states: ―mei 美5 synonym for sweet; composed of lamb (yang 羊) on top and big (da 大6) on bottom. Lamb is domesticated for the cultivation of edible goods. The mei 美 and good (shan 善) are equivalent semantically.‖ In the same book, we find more interrelated ways of explaining mei 美 such as: ―if the sheep is big, then it is mei 美 (羊大则美)”and also ―the shepherd acts for mei 美 (羊人为美).‖ Looking at them etymologically, ―shan 善 (good)‖ and ―yang 羊 (lamb)‖ are related. The Explication of Characters states: ―shan 善 is a synonym for auspicious. From jing 誩 (to struggle), and yang 羊 (lamb); it is related to mei 美 and yi 義.‖7 We could even take notice of the character ―yi 義,‖ which is also related to yang 羊. The Explication of Characters states: yi 義 means a self distinguishing itself in society through a dignified manner. Composed of wo 我 (self, I, me) and yang 羊.‖ Xuanzhu Xu stated concerning yi 義 that, ―This character has the same significance as shan 善 (good), because they both follow from yang 羊.‖ Xiu 羞 and yang 羊 3
Translated from the Chinese by Chad Meyers. In this paper, all of the citations from Classical Chinese texts are my renderings. 4 说文解字 shuo wen jie zi. I will just use the following abbreviation hereafter: The Explication of Characters. 5
美 is pronounced mei (just like the English word: may) with a falling-rising tone. This character now commonly expresses a sense equal to the word beautiful in English, but its sense in ancient writings is complex: it not only expresses the aesthetic sense of beauty, but also refined virtuosity, as well as the refining process of cultivation and the selective power of good taste needed to consummates all things beautiful, good, and virtuous.
6
大 da means big, great, large, and even vast.
7
yi 義, simplified: (义) another Chinese Character without equal. Since it stands as one of the chief characters/concepts in ancient Chinese writings, a whole philosophical system must be chosen to unfold the layers of its sense. I will be following the philosophical tradition established by Roger Ames, and translate it as ―fitting, appropriate,‖ ―appropriate actions,‖ and similar such renderings.
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these two things of good taste are related to the Chinese characters that express proper social values such as goodness (shan 善), virtuosity/beauty (mei 美), and the appropriate integration of self into society (yi 義). In a wider sense, xiu 羞 is related to everything valuable. A fulcrum of this relation is in the significance of the radical for moving hands (chou 丑) written at the bottom of xiu 羞. These valuable things all appear at hand, and must meet the acceptance of social others; so those who have an ethical nature (or even those seeking moral excellence) need to acutely perceive and consider many questions: what relationship do I have to these valuable things? Is it mine? Should I take it or not? The character xiu 羞 shows just this kind of hand raising the lamb to be weighed, at the precipitous moment when one desires to take custody of a valuable without having yet appropriated it; xiu 羞 as ―shame‖ is precisely this vacillating disposition extended through the senses and thoughts one has when facing the lamb or any other thing of the beneficial and valuable sort. ―Having shame‖ manifests precisely this conscientious, turbulent mood, or shall we rather say the mood where conscience emerges and its power activates. We can also weigh this sentiment within the juncture of thought Confucius spoke of: ―view a gain and review its appropriateness (yi 義).‖ As it was shown above, the face value of the character yi 義 shows the self taking its own lamb (yang 羊), one takes the things that belong to oneself, and by extension: do the things that what one should do, and fashion the proper style to take care of them. The precondition of acting up to this point is being able to contemplate if one should or shouldn‘t appropriate something attainable in the face of it, what kind of style should be fashioned to go about appropriating it, what significance this kind of action has, and so on; in a word, the precondition of ―having propriety (yi 義)‖ is having shame (xiu 羞). Following the analysis above we would only want to point out that ―shame (xiu 羞),‖ food, and delicious taste all share a fully intimate kinship in the world of Chinese thought. The etymological nature of this intimate kinship shows, however, that within the world of the Chinese language, the deepest sense of shame is not ―a sense of sexual shame,‖ but is much rather a ―shame (xiu 羞)‖ tied to a sense for delicious foods. Even though the signifying radical for food (shi 食) within the original Chinese ideogram (xiu 饈) was later cut off from the ideogram we currently use (xiu 羞), this semantic differentiation just clarifies that thought is in a process of differentiation, a refining process, but differentiation really doesn‘t write off the genealogical kinship that ties them back together to their source: it is a relation of kinship both in thought and linguistic sense. Ethics of food occupies the source, and becomes the origin and springhead of other ethics (for instance sexual ethics).8
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Part II. The Role of a Sense of Shame: From Shame to Appropriate Conduct In contradistinction to the ethics of Confucius, which emphasizes the internality of an affirmative will (ren 仁) and the externality of appropriate conduct (义), Mencius reiterated the immanence of affirmative will by emphasizing the co-immanence of appropriate action. As regards the affirmative will and appropriate activity of this internal virtue, Mencius distinguished ―four principals‖ of internal nature to serve as their transcendental ground; in particular, he uncovered a ―sense of shame and disgust‖ as the origin and source of ―appropriate action,‖ posited ―shame‖ as an a priori ground, and thereby enlightened a by no means inessential region of the will (xin 心). If we say that shame (xiu 羞) was still a rather unimportant ethical category in Confucius‘ time, then it is here in the thought of Mencius when shame‘s position and role as an ethical category was relegated to noble rank; it was even treated as one of the vital wellsprings of man‘s natural tendency toward good; it was treated as the origin of conscience, nay, it was treated as the chief basis through which humans find a way to become humane. All humans have a will that cannot hold back from helping humans … a will without a compassionate sensibility is inhuman; without a sense of shame and disgust for the inappropriate, there is no human either; a will that cannot politely decline is not actively human; a will that is insensitive to the difference between true and false is inhuman. A sense of compassion is the intrinsic potential of good in the affirmed will; a sense of shame and distaste for willing the improper is the scale of values tipping in favor of appropriate action. The will to politely decline is the balance of power necessary for integrating properly into the ritual order; the will to sense true and false is the original scale of authenticity proper to wisdom and wit. Four beginnings of good taste condition the human will, just as if it has four bodies. If there are these four original sources of potential good, and the self‘s will says it is unable, it is the self‘s reactive treachery upon itself; If there are these four potentials, and one who has realized the active will to command is labeled impotent, then it is reactive treachery against affirmative command. With all of these four powers conditioning the self, one‘s wit will expand with adequate ideas, just as the fire‘s spark ignites the flammable, and the spring‘s source unfailingly reaches the unfilled. If indeed some capacity can be fulfilled, it will be reached by these four oceans; if indeed one doesn‘t fulfill some capacity, it will openly disrespect one‘s progenitor‘s commands (Mencius: Gong Sun Chou: Volume One).
Modern researchers of philosophy continuously criticize this passage purely and simply from logical terms to say, ―four senses of will (xin 心)‖ cannot serve as the necessary and sufficient conditions of a human. However, what this argument, which hosts no shortage of problems in logical terms, actually reveals to us is: a human without a sense of shame and disgust isn‘t becoming as a human, or at the very least, isn‘t becoming of an ethical person, which is to say that this human is not equipped with the resources and competence necessary to become an ethical person. Using today‘s language to say it: a sense of shame and disgust is the necessary precondition for an ―ethical human being.‖ ―Ethical humans‖ need to know ―the should,‖ ―the appropriate action (yi 義),‖ and also must put each ―should‖ into will (xin 心). ―A sense of shame and disgust for willing the improper is the principle of appropriate action,‖ emphasizes precisely this internal equivalence between the imperative command ―should‖
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and human nature. The ―appropriate action (yi 義)‖ here points at once to the appropriate action to consummate the aim of any virtue internal to a person, the consistent and stable character that each person has, and also points to the norms and standards of behavior that exist in an external form. This transcendental ―principle‖ is the precondition, starting point, and ground of virtuosity and universal moral standards. Or we could say that moralities, norms, and behavioral codes will only have authenticity and real possibility after they have been established upon ―principles (duan 端).‖ What is ―shame and distaste for the inappropriate‖ then? In Zhuxi‘s Collected Commentary on the Four Books, he explained: ―shame (xiu 羞) is the humiliation felt for the ill works of one‘s own authorship, disgust (e 恶) is the detestation felt for the ill deeds of another.‖ Zhifu Wang completely inherited this explanation from Zhuxi. According to this explanation, ―shame‖ and ―disgust‖ respectively point to different subjects: shame faces the ill work one has done and develops, whereas disgust faces other people‘s ill doings and develops. The ―ill works‖ here in ―the humiliation felt for one‘s own ill works‖ refers to something unwell in the effect of some action, yet still could point to the ―ill motives‖ that led to the action. The former points to the violation of objective norms and principles as so many actualized disobediences that have already become facts; the latter points to the rehearsal within one‘s mind where one unfolds behavior in conflict with norms, yet without any trace of this behavior formed in actuality. ―Shame‖ could dispatch for ―the unwell potential for real acts as well as real acts,‖ but will much more so arise in the case of ―still only half-willing to do well.‖ ―Willing wellness only partially and half-way‖ is not necessarily ―willing illness;‖ affairs that have ―the capacity to be shamed‖ are still not necessarily ―shameful‖ or ―despicable.‖ Therefore the territory under the custody of ―shame‘s range‖ is much wider; its ethical significance is much weaker in comparison to ―shameful‖ and ―malign.‖ The arising of shame is not exhaustively generated by infractions against moral standards that have taken place, and its cause is also not exhausted by self-accusations for the things one has done incorrectly; its arising more prominently leans toward the ―undeveloped,‖ that is, it leans toward evaluations concerning several kinds of possibilities, at any time it may take concern with what one has not done well, worrying about a potential loss of dignity or respect. Because of this, shame primarily expresses itself in the spirit of conscious selfprotection. Speaking with regard to those who have ―shame,‖ they themselves know how to do much better, the best, or rather how they could do much better in the future, but haven‘t yet for that matter willed the force necessary to go do it; because of this, even though they have not infracted against or disobeyed any norms clearly stipulated in writing, shame will continuously reappear since they either do not fully affirm the will to do it or do it negatively and thereby doom the potential for better situations to mere dreamscapes that are barren of paths to realization. Thus, ―shame‖ is related to a hierarchical order of values. To be able to realize much higher and more noble values, but in actuality fall into a lower degree of values, or, to be just satisfied in a lower degree of values exhibit two modes of being subordinate to the rank and file of ―capable of being worthy of shame.‖ Shame arises in the sinking potential of self-worth. ―Shame‖ is of course spiritual in the vital sense (inspiring, expiring, and uninspiring); however, the body will also become the origin of shame. Bodily defects, improper physical deportment, and the like all might stimulate the upsurge of shame. A child gradually beginning to sprout self-awareness will
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become embarrassed due to the exposure of his or her own body parts (for instance, sexual organs), and in the same way will become bashful, shy, and even ashamed due to selfexposure in public in the case of saying and doing inappropriate words and deeds. ―A will without a sense of shame and distaste for the inappropriate is not human.‖ ―Shame‖ will arise due to concerns over loss of self, and thus shame can prevent humans from sinking into the ―inhuman.‖ However, how can ―shame‖ prevent humans from sinking? In the end, how big of a role can ―shame‖ play? ―A sense of shame and distaste for the inappropriate‖ initially manifests itself as ―the fear of shame.‖ People who have shame ―fear shame;‖ concerned with the result of ―feeling ashamed‖ to effectively appear, however, the multiple attributes of shame that are feared stay in the order of possibly occurring without having already occurred. As soon as what is feared occurs, a person will directly ―blush,‖ that is, their ―sense of shame‖ will emerge. ―Fearing shame‖ makes people circumspect, causes them to recoil with twangs of conscience, allowing them to refrain from action and leave certain things undone. Being able to feel degrees of shame for breaking a norm, or even for not being able to meet the expectations other‘s have for oneself, on the one hand, reveals that the one who feels shame has self-worth, an acute sensitivity to perceive and register the complex fabric of norms and standards, as well as the level of attentiveness in the other‘s expecting gaze; and on the other hand, out of a care for self-worth and concern for having and losing respect comes the correction of blunders and errors. The people, who have a determinate social role, all have relatively determinate expectations from society, including self-expectations, family expectations, and community expectations concerning the capacities, identities, and virtues they must uphold. Having some identity as a property of oneself means that this identity simultaneously demands things from its owner, including demands upon the owner to adopt a kind of style to look at things, here things, gesticulate, speak, and move; this is also to say, there are not only demands upon each person to perform actions ―correctly,‖ but also for each person to perform all such acts ―appropriately.‖ Taking ―appropriate‖ (even ―the most perfect fit‖) as a measure, means ―the criteria for things capable of causing shame‖ contains negative values, and therein contained are sexual values. Thus, in the Analects ―ritual propriety‖ serves as the reference framework for ―shame‖: ―Duplicitously affirming social bonds has no integrity, defiling ritual propriety (li 禮) is shame (xiu 羞), exploiting bravery is treachery.‖ In the Analects, Second Section, the listening, looking, speaking, and acting proper to observing ritual propriety is not only ―right,‖ but also ―just right,‖ graceful; due to this, observing ritual propriety sculps a tenor on top of ―right.‖ Precisely for this reason, that which shame, in relation to observing ritual proprity, touches upon or manages is the region of neutral taste relatively distant from ―disgusting.‖ The things that fall within this jurisdiction of neutral taste may not certainly be ―just right,‖ however they are all ―right.‖ These areas of ―shameful to act‖ counteract the approach of ―disgust,‖ and the things that are left undone due to their being a ―shame to act‖ allow people to distance themselves from potential or actual ―disgust.‖ Thus, regardless of whether you feel embarrassed due to having done something that was ―a shame to do,‖ it is still due to ―a shame to do‖ that such things are left undone; a person capable of doing shame always hosts a much wealthier will to intend towards benefaction and good taste.
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As Mencius expressed it, ―affirmatively executing appropriate acts‖ (―right‖) still cannot outweigh ―virtuosity.‖ Genuine virtuosity requires ―an execution from affirmative appropriation (―just right‖). Execute upon the overflowing potential of affirmatively appropriating what is ―right‖ to do, that is, one must be sensitive of ones affirmative will to carry out appropriate acts. To be aware of oneself doing something is admittedly of the utmost importance, but doing something always has limits; ―not doing something,‖ however points to the unlimited self-sensitivity of not willing to do ―inappropriate acts,‖ which expresses much more depth of self-sensitivity in the actor‘s body. Thus, Mencius thought, people who genuinely have the virtue of acting appropriately are acting forthright from the upsurge of potential coming from what they are not willing to do: ―all humans have some potential not willing to do many inappropriate and disgusting things, and extending this potential in their active will is appropriate action‖ (Mencius: Fully Executing the Will). The reason for ―not willing to do‖ is due to clearly understanding that ―doing‖ will fall into ―inappropriate action.‖ ―Those who are good to themselves can refrain from doing‖ (Mencius, Ten Thousand Chapters: first section). The concern at every moment in the will of the self, who loves its own will for being good to itself, really doesn‘t point to any actual ―ill-doing;‖ it points rather to potential ―ill-doing.‖ This kind of worry over ―inappropriateness‖ prevents the undertaking of inappropriate acts, and for this reason, it is the power of undoing an act. Why must the way connecting us to the ―will to action‖ be paved by the ―will not to act‖? How do ―shame‖ and ―distaste‖ build the way connecting the ―will to action?‖ ―Disgusting taste‖ is a repulsive and revolting sensation felt in relation to ―inappropriate actions‖; are these repulsive and revolting feelings that rise up from within our will able to safeguard humans from doing ―inappropriate things‖? Confucius said ―[o]nly those with an affirmative will are able to love people and loath people‖ (Analects 理仁). ―Disgust‖ is an emotional sensitivity that takes the self as the center, criteria, and point of departure. The average person‘s emotional sensitivity is more often than not limited to him or herself, and only those people who have genuinely affirmed human dignity are able to actively reach the unity of emotions and reason (able to give free reign to desires without over-stepping the boundary), an individual‘s loves and hates unfold in line with universal norms and principles. Good and bad have the clear-cut distinction of personal characteristics. The Great Learning states: genuine virtuosity ―is like enjoying good color, like repulsing disgusting smells.‖ ―Disgust‖ is a scale to weigh the subject‘s level of virtue and ethical standards, and the ―ability to loath‖ marks the establishment of the subject‘s ethics and morals. But ―disgust‖ primarily points toward the illnesses of other people; that which points toward oneself and is concerned with the construction and protection of the subject‘s ethical capacities and standards, however, is ―shame.‖ Mencius said: All humans cannot bear to will something bad; if they extend this into the area that bears the action of their will, it is affirmatively willing. All humans have some potential they are not willing to enact; if they intensify this into what they are willing to enact, it is appropriate action. Humans can realize the will that has no desire to do negative to humans, and by realizing it, affirmative willing will becomes inexhaustible. Humans can realize the will that does not speculate for the sake of profiting from actions, and by realizing, appropriate action becomes inexhaustible. Humans are able to immunize their wills from the suffering effects of inappropriate speech, so there will be no place where they will react
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So how to extend this ability to sense inappropriateness through the feelings of shame and revulsion to the point where it becomes active in the willing execution of appropriateness. Confucius thought, reaching a willingness to act from the will to not act inappropriately allows one‘s sense of shame and repulsion for inappropriate actions to expand into an active willingness to do what is appropriate. Not acting primarily points toward unsuitable actions, that is, behavior that is prohibited by norms, but it also includes what cannot be done as well as the things one is unwilling to do, that is, the actions that one‘s able forces cannot reach and any behavior that one‘s will is unwilling to carry out. The consequence generated by acting out what is unsuitable to do will be the other directing blame and the gaze of disrespect at the actor. On the one hand the actor accepts the depreciation the other has for the actor, but facing the judgments his or her conscience gives the actor is much more important. ―Unwilling to act‖ is not merely being self-sensitive of acting unsuitably and the consequences resulting therein, but is also being able to self-consciously author acts of refined taste and self-willingly hold the ground of virtuosity. The unfolding of shame within a person is then ―like facing the abyss, like treading on thin ice,‖ With a fresh and bright willingness, repulse inappropriateness and safeguard the greatness of appropriate action. However, ―to protect,‖ and ―safe guard‖ is still only negative in regard to the cultivation of virtuosity, and shame still has a precious, positive value. Just as we posited earlier in this essay, ―shame xiu 羞‖ is ―offering,‖ the offering of ―beautiful taste;‖ it is taking things that have value and presenting them out into the open. With regard to human beings, it is precisely making one‘s intrinsic values, the ―taste‖ appropriate to oneself emerge into sensible life. This kind of offering from within one‘s will to the outside is without a doubt primarily based upon intrinsic values with depth. Mencius thought the four potentials were just these values with depth that every person inherits as an a priori property. ―Potential‖ is the beginning of value; it is also the origin of value. (Mencius) said: The resourceful spring undulating along, no need to rest from dusk through dawn. Fertile for a thousand fields providing forth, depositing itself without reserve into the four seas. Those with original sources are all this way, inheriting inexhaustible resources, giving forth without taking away.
This wellspring of values is just like a spring in the mountain, under conditions without small objects of desire to block it up, it will overflow with emergent potential from dusk through dawn without exhaustion. However, this wellspring of values does not appear readymade; it requires persistently unearthing its clog without slack. Mencius used the metaphor of ―digging a well‖: ―[t]he one who can will to act appropriately is ground-breaking like a digger of wells; digging a well and leaving nine stones to clog it, is the same as discarding the well‖ (Mencius: Fully Executing the Will, Volume One). With neither self-brutality nor selfabandonment, plumb the depths of one‘s self to unearth the root of good taste within the will, and realize the inherent good within the will, activate one‘s intrinsic property of good taste out in the open, and for the sake of dignity ram down the bedrock foundation. To discover the
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wellspring of values and the source of integrity one still needs to take one more step to make the well fluidly gush-forth; Mencius said: ―[w]ith all of these four powers conditioning oneself, one‘s wit will expand with adequate ideas, just as the fire‘s spark ignites the flammable, and the spring‘s source unfailingly reaches the unfilled.‖ The four sources manifest themselves like flames igniting and a springs filling. The people who have ―shame‖ will take the acute sensibility of their perceptive style and moment by moment retrieve themselves back to recoil this original spring with the weight of its essentially good taste; they will take every idea, every action, and every affair back to this inherent source of value. And supposing that at once this upsurge discontinues or stops, then this spring has no way to gush out, and thus embarrassment, a sense of shame will surge forth, flooding every nook of one‘s passions. Shame will break through the object clogging the well, the object blocking the will, and thereby allow inner virtue to unfold freely and fluently into an external form. In this sense, ―shame xiu 羞‖ and ―appropriate actions yi 義‖ embody and manifest a homogeneous value, and thus Mencius in (告子上) said: ―[a] sense of shame and distaste for willing the improper is the will of appropriate action.‖ Here Mencius puts the two in direct equivalence, and doesn‘t merely see the sense of shame and distaste for willing the inappropriate as the ―source‖ of ―appropriate actions.‖ Just as Scheller had argued, shame originates from the imbalance and disequilibrium between the spirit of a human‘s existence and a human‘s bodily demands.9 Within the philosophy of Mencius, shame arises within the conflict between the ―big body‖ (―appropriate action‖) and the ―small body‖ (―reactive bodily functions‖), an antithesis. ―reactive bodily functions is my desire; appropriate action is my desire, the two of them cannot reach a mutually acceptable contract, do not select the will to react to bodily functions and select the will to act appropriately.‖ ―The desirable‖ (good) can will multiples (diversity) and is not just one (monotony). Within a determinate social-historical assemblage, a diversity of desirables has its gradient hierarchy, its order, and with regard to an individual person, there is also a diversity of desirables and multiple hierarchies, and orders. These hierarchies and orders of values shows that there will be difference in terms of individual bodies, however speaking with regard to the integral members of an entire social body, there still remains a collectively shared measure: its bottom line is having a sense of shame and distaste for the improper, its ultimate degree then points to ―do not select reactive bodily functions, select appropriate activity.‖ The human life that has significance moves unceasingly from the bottom line in a tendency towards the approach of this aim of ultimate integrity. In actuality shame produces in the reverse process: that is, from the highest, most noble degree of value tending to fall into the decadence of the basest values. The role of a sense of shame occurs in preventing this decadence and loss of integrity, maintaining and protecting the integrity of the highest values. Only upon the condition that there is shame does appropriate activity become possible, and this is what Mencius called: ―a sense of shame and distaste for willing the improper is the inherently potent source of appropriate activity.‖ In Mencius‘s view, the small body follows the development of elementary vital life and unfolds, and a human will fall into the decadent danger of inhumanity at any random time for this reason. During the process of using ritual propriety to cultivate the desire of the small 9
See for reference: Scheller‘s The Subversion of Values: p. 167. Translated by Chad Meyers from the Chinese edition done by TiLun Luo, Beijing; 1997.
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body, the Confucian tradition enabled the big body to overflow with integrity through each sliver of time, allowing the properties of diverse forces to integrate and fortify together into a chi of unmatched refinement to drive away and disperse the chi of cults, the chi of brutality, and by protecting the big body, this chi immunized it from the invasive, reactive forces of cult illnesses. This mode of life allowed the fullness of internal values to radiate outwards to favor each individual small body, allowing the big body to express its dignity through each small body. In Fully Executing the Will, Volume One, Mencius said: ―The double affirmation of human life in the appropriate activation of ritual propriety and wisdom is rooted in the will, the four of these potentials together generate the colors of the face, and with bright cultivated eyes it can be seen in the face. It is inherited from the genealogy leading you, it is deposited in four substances, and these four substances express it clearly without a word.‖ After the body has undergone a transformation of spirit, the differences between the body‘s shame and the spirit‘s shame will gradually converge. When a human is ―ashamed to the point where there is no place to host of self-toleration,‖ not only will the face flush read and the ears roseup crimson, but the eyes will lose all clue where to fall upon and refocus, the back will poiseup stiff as if a sword-like gaze pierced it, and the hands and feet barren of any place of employment. Even though the big earth stretches vastly into the distance, the arising of shame in you will strip your feet of any place where you can stand your ground. Thus, the body can have shame, and become ashamed due to physical causes; the body in the same way also bears the shame of spirit, and infiltrates into a spirit‘s shame. Due to this, the protection given to a person‘s spirit will manifest itself in ―the shame to due something,‖ that is, it will consider the significance of doing something before it is actually done, ―a shame to‖ shows that one‘s spirit is endowed with the wealth of elevated capacity to perceive itself. What ―由仁义行”emphasizes is not doing something wrong and feeling ashamed, but much more importantly a sensitive forecast of ―shame‘s range.‖ Of course, a sense of shame, and the will to shame can emerge to the foreground at any time: prior to doing something ―a shame to do,‖ during and after the event of doing something ―the shame for being able to will it,‖ and in the same way it can protect inherent values. Thus, only after one has appropriated a sense of shame and a will to shame can ―appropriate activity (义)‖ become ―intrinsic ethicality,‖ and have significance (意义). Comparatively speaking, ―appropriate action‖ is a property of rationality, universal standards, and morality; whereas a sense of shame and distaste for the improper is a property of an individual person‘s concrete existence, a property of a person‘s passions. The significance Mencius communicated through both of them was in one aspect the universal, formal standards laid a foundation for individual existence, and in another aspect very different from the way Confucius integrated the external form (observing ritual propriety) with the internal substance (affirmative will), Mencius emphasized the integration of rational form (affirmative will, appropriate action) with emotional substance (a sense of compassion, a sense of shame and disgust for the improper).
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Part III. The Structure of a Sense of Shame: The Self without a Need for the Other In everyday life there often occurs the following kind of situation: someone did something inappropriate or unseemly, and afterwards the doer of the deed will worry about other people having seen, the gaze of the other makes him embarrassed beyond words and he carefully checks the circumference of his locality, and when realizes there is no one to be found, he will more often than not sigh a breath of relief. This is almost as if all of shame is established upon the precondition of the other‘s existence. Just like Sartre said, Shame is the comprehension of the unity of the three following dimensions: I; the presence of others; I feel shame in the presence of others. If one of these three dimensions 10 disappears, then shame will also disappear.
Shame is shame ―I feel shame for myself,‖ and the subject of this statement ―I‖ is pointing to the present self-reflective cognition and the I that has emotions, and the latter ―myself‖ is pointing towards the subject that speaks and acts. I self-reflect and cognize, judge if words and speech are either suitable or unsuitable, and will have a corresponding emotional reaction. Is the frame of reference for the self-reflective cogito ―an other person?‖ The other‘s attentive gaze and even the other‘s existence can actually provoke me to reflect upon myself, but is the other person able to adequately serve as the necessary conditions for the occurrence of shame? With no such gaze of another person around, when I realize that I didn‘t uphold even the bare minimum of moral code, when I blurt out a statement I can‘t even tolerate, or do something even I feel is less than half- decent, I will independently still produce the feeling and sense of shame. Most of the time, ―deeds that weigh on the conscience‖ are done in situations where there are no others around, that is, they are done and the other cannot see them or know about them. When the other is not around, the other will not attentively look at me, but I myself, however, will be very clear about the significance of my words and actions. To say that one‘s words and actions disobey a universal standard of conduct, we are saying that this universal standard is external (the other‘s understanding and grasp), and also internal (oneself understanding, grasping). According to the so-called ―the master advises not to will some deed of ill-conscience, so as to avoid the midnight ghost from calling at the door,‖ the arrival of the ―ghost‖ comes following self-will, that is, self-criticizing and self-evaluating due to having done something that breaks a norm. The other person doesn‘t know, the other person isn‘t around, and the self will still feel embarrassed, and even produce shame. For this reason, ―having shame‖ isn‘t necessarily like Sartre‘s argument was able to prove ―the existence of the other.‖ We should say rather, ―having shame‖ can only prove the existence of ―conscience,‖ proving the existence of ―emotions that respect norms and principles;‖ it also proves the existence of norms and principles (―appropriate conduct‖). The other‘s existence and the other‘s gaze are only the embodied manifestation of norms and principles. Because of this, we can also without any difficulty the interrelation between ―shame,‖ ―respecting elders,‖ and ―appropriate conduct.‖
10
Sartre, Jean-Paul: Being and Nothingness: p. 380. Translated from the Chinese version by XuanLiang Chen. An Wei Literature Press, 1998.
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Of course, we also will say ―feel embarrassed for someone.‖ The shame of the embarrassed person is instigated by the other person, but the subject of embarrassment is ―I,‖ it is ―I‖ feeling that the actions that some person willed did not meet what some person should will to do. ―To feel embarrassed for someone‖ is actually to say: this someone under these circumstances should ―be embarrassed‖ just the same as anyone with dignity would ―feel embarrassed,‖ the person that should feel shame is this ―someone,‖ and should not be the ―substitute.‖ The precondition of shame is that there is a self with dignity, and substituting for the other‘s sense of shame is doubtlessly a negation of this self with dignity; this is equal to saying, you are a person without dignity, and if you had dignity you ought to feel ashamed. Thus, this kind of saying ―feeling shame for someone‖ actually expresses the speaker‘s attitude about what should have been done under some kind of circumstance. For instance, in Mencius‘ Li Lou, he records such a situation of a Man of the Kingdom chi going out begging for food and his wife felt shame for him. Mencius‘ critique goes like this: ―as the master of appropriate action views it, the way a man seeks to achieve riches, recognition, and benefit does not make a man‘s wife and concubine feel shame, but that it doesn‘t make them weep together—how rare indeed!‖ The man of the kingdom of chi is actually injuring his own dignity through the warped way he goes about getting wealth and riches, and thus it is this man himself who ought to feel shame. The content and cause of the shame that is felt by the wife and the concubine lay in the unhealthy way they deal with this man, not the crooked way of searching for wealth and riches. For this reason, the shame that the wife and concubine feels regard themselves respectively, and they don‘t feel ―shame‖ for this man of chi. Genuine ―shame‖ is something the other can‘t substitute, just like one can‘t feel the happiness of others for them, or genuinely feel another‘s sadness. Although feeling shame for another person was instigated by the appearance of that person, the shameful one is still oneself and can‘t be the other. We can get a relatively clearer realization of this characteristic of ―shame‖ within a passage Mencius wrote in a criticism of BoYi and LiuXia Hui: Boyi wouldn‘t follow an order unless it came from a master of appropriate will, nor would he give a hand to someone unless they were a friend. He wouldn‘t stand in the court of an ill-willed ruler, nor exchange words with an ill-willed man. If he stood in the court of a ruler of an ill will, or exchanged words with a distasteful man, it would be for him like taking up the dynastic crown to go sit in a pit of ash, adorning the court robe just to go lay down in a puddle of mud. His will was so sensitive to things of distaste he repulsed them away out of intense disgust; if he were thinking where a fellow villager were standing, and the villager dawned his hat improperly askew, the mere sight of such a scene would stain enough of his nature for him to walk away with disdain. Accordingly, although a feudal prince would summon him with an invitation of fine words, he wouldn‘t suffer it; he couldn‘t suffer it because taking an order from a feudal prince just wouldn‘t be worth his while and that is all. On the contrary, LiuXia Hui wouldn‘t feel a spot of shame under a decadent ruler, nor would he make bureaucrat of the lowest office feel base. Holding office, he did not conceal his considerable ability, but wouldn‘t swerve an inch from the path of his principles. If overlooked, he would not complain; if he fell into poverty, he wouldn‘t ask for pity at all. Thus he said, ―[y]ou be you, I‘ll be me. If you took off your gown and stood stark naked beside me, how could you even sully my name at all.‖ Thus it was always out of his nature‘s content to be in the company of any and all without losing anything of himself. If anyone stopped him and asked him to stay he‘d stay, because there was nothing more worth of him to go and that is all.
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Mencius said: Boyi‘s wills narrowness, LiuXia Hui wills no respect: two things a master of appropriate willing chooses not to will.
As stated above, that which shame has an issue with is the self. LiuXia Hui didn‘t feel shame for a corrupt prince, and the reason lies in the self-character of shame, your shame is your shame, my shame is my own. From his view, when the other person was unclothing right next to him, the person who should feel shame is the other person, but not himself. If it is said that LiuXia Hui‘s way of doing things has problems, then his problem was in carrying the self-character of shame all the way through to its extreme, and because of this, only concentrating upon ―cultivating and repairing oneself‖ and not bringing that cultivation and repair to bear upon the ―wellness of people,‖ ―the welfare of the commoners‖; LiuXia Hui lacked the passion to realize the universality of ―appropriate action‖ in the greater public realm. Speaking in regard to ―a sense of shame and distaste for the improper,‖ when this sense falls short of the beneficence and loving concern proper to the nature of affirmatively willing, ―exhausting‖ and ―achieving‖ can both be due to ―shame‖ and ―solely be of aid to oneself,‖ but it cannot however ―affirm that aid twice for the public realm.‖ Confucius said of LiuXia Hui that, ―his will descended to insult himself,‖ but there were ―ethics within his words, and worries within his ways‖ (Analects). His body and will accepted disgrace but not shame, the reason lies in that ―shame‖ is the shame of ―I‖ regarding itself: self-protecting not to lose it, thus no feeling of shame, and disgust is also this way. Due to arising from itself, within ―shame‖ and ―the things ashamed of‖ the concern and attention paid to the other person been put into suspension. So-called ―narrow‖ and ―no respect‖ both touch upon omitting the ―other‖ due to the omission of a loving will and a ―will with a sense of compassion.‖ With regard to LiuXia Hui, the other person unclothing touches upon the other person‘s shame, not his own shame. We still ought to distinguish ―shaming others‖ and ―feeling shame for others.‖ The former refers to me awakening the other‘s sense of shame, the other ought to feel shame for himself. ―Feeling shame for others,‖ is actually the self taking a small sphere of its own sense of ―good shame‖ to come and do the shaming of ―the other person‘s self.‖ Because of this, what ―feeling shame for an other self‖ touches upon is still ―the other person‘s self‖ and not a person besides this ―other person.‖ LiuXia Hui having ―no shame under the corrupt prince‖ refers to not shaming for getting along with the corrupt prince, the corruption is with the prince but not with me. However, if shame is only blaming oneself, how then does the sense of shame and distaste for willing the inappropriate lead to ―appropriate action?‖ ―Appropriate action‖ refers to each person‘s ―should,‖ the path that each person should follow. Serving as a father, one should be ―merciful,‖ serving as a son, one should be ―filial.‖ The different identity of each self and not another person‘s identity should determine the concrete content of ―appropriate action.‖ The other omitted, ―appropriate action‖ has no concrete unfolding but is still there. Because of this, Mencius posited ―carrying out action by affirmatively willing appropriate action,‖ and opposed carrying out actions due to the other‘s face and the other‘s gaze. What this kind of sense of ―appropriate action‖ is weighted upon is its own ―should,‖ but not a balance or equity between rights and duties. The individual person of itself respects and carries the responsibility of ―laws‖ or ―duties‖; the individual internalizes ―appropriate action‖ into ―conscience,‖ through ―self-cultivating‖ work. Upon the body of a person who has morality, respecting and undertaking the responsibility for prescribed norms is embodied as a relationship of ―I‖ towards my own conscience.
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What the Confucians continuously strived after and held in high esteem was a ―study of being oneself,‖ and ―being a self‖ is constructing itself, building itself up, that is, establishing an ―I and me‖ with dignity. This ―I‖ only takes responsibility for myself, taking responsibility for absolute laws, and principles (appropriate action, nature). ―To cultivate chi, the greatest and most unbending, crammed in between the heavens and the earth ….‖ ―Loved ones not closely relating is against its affirmative will; rulers not ruling is against its wisdom; observers of ritual propriety not responsive is being against its respect; those who have not reached the object of their actions all reflectively demand their various selves, they correct themselves and the great social realm returns it‖ (Mencius: Li Lou). Behavior having not reached the intended effect primarily demands researching the self, scanning its own action. It is needed at any time to accept the conscience‘s direction and retuning. ―Shame‖ shows the self there is an attitude to deal with facts, and also at the same time declares an attitude of the future. ―shame‖ isn‘t done for another person to see; it is overflowing from inside to outside. The Confucian theory of ―being careful alone‖ has a deep explication with regard to the significance of the self-other state of affairs. ―Not seeing what is hidden, not showing what is subtle, thus the master of appropriate willing is vigilant of himself when alone‖ (Zhong Yong). Zhuxi commented on this saying: ―Speaking within inaudible allusions, acting within the imperceptibly minute; traces although unformed will converge at a time, then the self moves; although the other does not know, the self alone knows this, then the work of unity in the realm will have no one who can see it take place, but it passes into them. Thus the master of appropriate willing is eternally vigilant, and within this vigil he adds circumspection, thus he stops people‘s desires from grasping the sprouts, and doesn‘t allow them to nourish and grow within this subtle, hidden realm, to the point of keeping them far away from the principle of this path‖ (Zhong Yong). ―Concealing‖ is another kind of ―showing‖: that is, the showing to oneself under the situation where there is no attention paid by the other; ―subtle‖ is another form of ―obvious‖: obvious in the sense of the self clearly and distinctly sensing it. These two occupy the region of inaudible allusions that the other doesn‘t see and doesn‘t know, and this is also to say, whether the other person appears or not, there will be no influence upon the activity of the self‘s conscience, there will be no influence upon my perception of ―appropriate actions.‖ In this sense, ―being vigilant alone‖ manifests the selfsufficiently appropriate actions of the self. Taking the ―sense of shame and distaste for willing the inappropriate‖ to serve as one of the four sources of good taste, focuses upon the role of ―shame,‖ and stipulating internal willingness as its ultimate ground. Mencius‘ way of seeing ―shame‖ is doubtlessly heir to a few consistent places of communication with ―being vigilant alone.‖ ―That which a person has the capacity for without learning is its conscience‘s capacity. That which one doesn‘t think about but knows, is the conscience knows. The baby picked up by a child isn‘t ignorant of its love for its relatives, and the growing one‘s next to him, he not unknowingly respects his brothers. Relatives closely relating is affirmative will. Respecting elders is appropriate action. The absence of others is the arrival of the great public realm (Mencius: Fully Executing the Will (trans. Chad Meyers). ―Appropriate action‖ is ―affirmative will‘s‖ natural growth and extension, or this is to say, ―appropriate action‘s‖ ground and foundation is upon ―the affirmative willingness of relatives closely relating.‖ Even if it is like this, the two also still can be equal. ―The sense of shame and distaste‖ of ―the beginning of appropriate action‖ is in a parallel beginning with ―the sense of compassion‖ of ―the beginning of affirmative will.‖ The precondition of shame and the capacity of shame is knowing ―true and false,‖ and
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knowing ―deference with refined language,‖ and because of this, the sense of shame and distaste can cover up the will to refined deference and the sensitivity to true and false. If it is said that ―the relating‖ of ―relatives relating closely‖ is a naturally occurring emotion, then the content ―the sense of shame and distaste for willing the inappropriate,‖ ―the will of refined deference,‖ and ―the sensitivity to true and false‖ ―respect‖ could then be said to serve as the rational emotions constructed upon the foundation of the seniority system. Having seniors and inferiors, having order, having ethics and rational patterns thus it could be distinguished in the ―tranquility‖ relative to motion, and the ―purity‖ relative to filth. Those who have shame are respectful of themselves, respect themselves and thereby honor themselves (having selfhonor): People who respect people are respected in return. Taking this as a ground, Song and Ru traditions adopted ―respect‖ to replace Buddhist ―purity‖ and Daoist ―stillness‖ and served as the most important work on the cultivation of the will‘s nature.
Section IV. Having a Sense of Shame and Having a Being of Shame Moral cultivation requires a sense of shame persisting to continuously spring forth, and a moment will not emerge merely having sense of shame and then a shameless springing forth as Scheller and Sartre both understood the sense of shame: only when being seen by the other‘s gaze will shame appear. For this reason, establishing the existence of the sense of shame means establishing the sense of shame that springs forth ―without resting from dusk through dawn,‖ which requires that ―shame‖ gather the stipulation and guarantee of substance and function. Merely speaking with regard to activity, the emergence of shame might merely be a sudden spur of the moment ―event‖; it might be a discovery made by suddenly turning one‘s head back to look. Scheller said: ―In some kind of sense of the phrase ‗sense of shame,‘ the sense of shame is a kind of form of feeling ourselves, and due to this, it is attributed to the region of self-feeling; this is the substance of the sense of shame. Since there is an event occuring in all of our senses of shame, I want to call it ‗turning back to myself.‘‖ 11 ―‛Shame‘ is always shame for the sake of some thing; it is related some fact; this fact spontaneously ‗demands‘ shame, and this has absolutely no relation to our individual modes of ‗I.‘‖12 Scheller and Sartre have no way to accept that human‘s have innate goodness under the theoretical tradition of original sin. They also have no way to accept ―the sense of compassion, that all humans have it; the sense of shame and distaste for the inappropriate, that all humans have it.‖ Scheller said: ―The mind‘s sense of shame takes the existence of spiritual individuals as its precondition, therefore, the body‘s sense of shame ultimately universally exists in the human body and at any point in time in human development…On the contrary, the mind‘s sense of shame is definitely not a universal attribute of humans, and will not appear at any stage of an individual‘s and race‘s development.‖13 Without a framework of shame‘s substance and function shame will become a distinct event randomly emerging within the process of individual and racial development, and due to this, Scheller has a ―turn back to myself‖ speech about shame. On the contrary, in the Confucian tradition, shame is the unified source of substance and function, this is just as MuZong San had summarized it: 11
马克斯·舍勒：(价值的颠覆), pp. 179-180. Trans. Chad Meyers Same as above: pp. 184. 13 Same as above: pp. 197-198. 12
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―substance, that is, activity.‖ Confucians very early on determined a substance of shame‘s ―resourceful spring undulating along, no need to rest from dusk through dawn,‖ and only once there is this ―substance,‖ is it possible for ―the acting self to have shame (Confucius),‖ ―eternally bright and wise (Song Ming lixue),‖ and this is also to say, shame can and also should unfold at any time in any circumstance of a human‘s development. Upon the foundation of the sense of shame, these three: fearing shame, embarrassment and humiliation unfold as a unified process and form; people with a sense of shame have concern over the loss of self-dignity and the sinking of self-value, and therefore ―fear shame.‖ Due to fearing shame there is the capacity not to act, having respect; because of this, fearing shame is subordinate to the future. At the very moment when self-dignity is lost or falls, and at the very moment when self-value sinks, one will deeply perceive the situation about to happen; it enacts an attack upon positive self-perception, self-frustration, that is, emotive perception and emotional reaction, and thus ―shy away.‖ The loss of self-dignity and the sinking of self-value are kinds of facts that will persistently produce effects in my sense of shame: aftertastes, reflections, being ashamed for what the past had expected out of my deepest sense of value; being ashamed regards the sense of shame and distaste for willing the improper, and only due to it can I feel ashamed. Shame and Being unfold the same path, fearing shame, embarrassment, and feeling ashamed (these three) respectively correspond to dasein‘s three dimension: future, present, and past. Due to having had an experience feeling ashamed now engenders concern for the next repeat of self-dignity suffering an attack, then the fear of shame emerges out of my concern over being ashamed again, and lastly, the feeling of shame emerges from being afraid of shame … the sense of shame and distaste for willing the improper is substance (being) flowing without rest from dusk through dawn, ceaselessly persistent to emerge with functions. Mencius took ―shame‖ to serve as one of the most important sources of dignity, and values; ―shame‖ takes humans and sculpts them into moral people. A person with dignity, yet without a sense of shame and distaste for willing the inappropriate, will decay towards natural humans and even all the way towards beasts. Because of this, we can much more appropriately understand the deepest layer of sense in Mencius‘ statement: ―A shameless and tasteless will is not human.‖ Due to this kind of wellspring, people self-respect, self-form and self-dignify, and thus are able to suppress the decadence of natural humans, thereby pulling away with distance from the theory of ―life being called sex.‖ Mencius took shame to serve as the source of values, the root of existence; the social order of values that it provides is the content of a real sense of shame, and its universal significance then lies in taking shame to serve as human existence‘s real form and source of inspiration.14 Speaking from existentialism, ―shame‖ is not only one of the most important modes of self-unfolding, but it is also one of the most important modes of the self to pass along and exchange ways of relating to the world: take shame to perceive the world, to respond to the world. The ten thousand creatures and the others have all been pulled up to face my inherent will; the ten thousand creatures and the others‘ emergence primarily act as entities that have some kind of significance for me, capable of producing entities that have some kind of function in relation to me. 14
Of course, in the framework of Confucian thought, the ten thousand things and the other person are able to become existing beings that have taste, because they have the same kind of emotional connection to a sense of compassion.
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Our experience and rationality are both grounded in this kind of existential mode—in other words, this kind of existent mode correspondingly sculpted a kind of special way to experience and special way to think that is founded upon ―shame.‖ By using shame to receive entities, the self-character of shame determines not only that entities that humans are concerned about are objective self-existent substances, but rather entities that produce interrelations with humans and generate effects upon humans; they are entities becoming ―events.‖ Taking shame to connect with entities makes entities become ―events‖: ―entities are also events‖—this classic explanation precisely shows the special concern of this kind of experiential mode and rational way to think. Confucians tended towards the self-formation of human ethicality, and thereby they broke open a function for the sense of shame. Due to this breaking through of shame‘s sense into a function, they could sculpt an existence out of the unified source of substance and function: the being of having shame. Speaking with regard to Daoists who were also completely focused upon the will‘s self-formation, shame was also made to serve as a kind of important mountain pass for protecting the nature of the will. In Zhuang Zi‘s Outer Documents and Random Collections, shame had been taken several times out of Confucius‘ mouth for his own employment, but in a way that modified shame‘s significance from its basic Confucian employment. For instance: In the sheer proximity of an eloquent speaker, he even felt shame to open his ears to hear it; and for paying an eloquent speaker like that a personal interview! How would he be able to take it! (Zhuangzi: Ze Yang)
As a father, he must be able to make himself known explicitly to his son; as an elder brother, he must be able to guide his younger brother. If a father cannot make himself known explicitly to his child, or if an elder brother cannot guide his younger brother, then relationships between father–son and elder brother–younger brother are worthless. Your brother is a thief who steals very valuable things and harms the world; if you cannot guide him out of this path, and you are a genius, then you should feel shame to be one (Zhuangzi: Dao Zhi). It isn‘t difficult to see that the region of shame in Daoism and the region of shame in the mind of Confucians like Mencius cover similar ground; however, Doaists emphasized selfguarding the naturally potent ―simplicity‖ of the will; they took speech, acts, and things that injured the nature of the will‘s basic simplicity as their particular sensitivity to shame: lose the simple inherent nature and feel shame. They had shame and there were many words and actions they weren‘t willing to do, and only in this way were they able to protect themselves and not lose. In Zhuangzi we find a story of a northerner who ran into a glimpse of the emperor Shun; he saw it as an affair to mourn his principles over, he saw it as scraping the self-protecting bottom line, and was therefore ―shamed to see it,‖ willing to make a move out of the way to see an emperor and as a result through himself into the deep abyss. In Zhuangzi: Make Way for the King someone carrying a jar knew about mechanical efficiency, and also knew that mechanisms will bring along mechanical events, that mechanical events in turn will generate a mechanical heart, and thus felt a ―shame to will‖ mechanically. ―Shame‖ then became the safeguard of simple intrinsic nature, ―the range of shame‖ being the selfprotecting bottom line. Therefore, shame reached a concern of importance for the Daoist style of cultivating the nature of the will. Because of this, it could be said that in Daoism the sense
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of shame generated a being of shame, which is without a doubt one more great principle of understanding on this path of thought and existence.
REFERENCES Du, Yu. (1997). Chuqiu Jing Zhuang Jijie 春秋经传集解 (Collected Commentaries the Spring and Autumn Annals). Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Press. Guo, Qingfan (2004). Zhuangzi JIshi 庄子集释 (Collected Works of Zhuangzi). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Jiao, Xu. (1996). Mengzi Zhengyi 孟子正义 (Commentary on Mencius). Changsha: Yuelu Shushe. Jiao Xun (2003).Yi Zhangju易章句 (Commentary on the Book of Change). Kong Anguo,Kong Yinda (2000). Shangshu Zhengyi尚书正义 (Commentaries on the book of history). Beijing: Beijing University Press. Li Zhehou and Liu Gangji, eds. (1984). The History of Chinese Art. Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press. Ren Jiyu(1959). Laozi de Yanjiu 老子的研究 (A Study on Laozi). In Laozi Zhexue Taolun Ji 老子哲学讨论集 (a collection of essays on the philosophy of Laozi). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Zhenzhou: Jiuzhou Press. Sartre, Jean-Paul (1998). Being and Nothingness. Translated from the Chinese version by XuanLiang Chen. An Wei Literature Press. Scheller, Max (2004). The Subversion of Values, translated from the Chinese version by TiLun Luo, Beijing. JiuZhou Press. Wang Fuzhi (1996). Chuangshan Quanshu 船山全书 (Collected Works of Chuangshan). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Xu, Shen (1963). Shuowen Jiezhi 说文解字 (The Explanation of Characters). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Zhao, Qi. & Sun, Shi. (1999). Mengzi Zhushu 孟子注疏 (Commentaries on Mencius). Beijing: Beijing University Press. Zheng Xuan, Kong Yinda (1999). Liji Zhengyi 礼记正 (Commentaries on the Book of Rites). Beijing: Beijing University Press). ZhiDe, Lai (2004). Collected Commentaries on The Book of Changes. Beijing, JiuZhou Publishing House. Translated by Chad Meyers. Zhu, Xi. (1983). Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四书章句集注 (explanation and collected commentaries on the Four Books). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 59-83
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 3
THE MANIFESTATION OF NEUROTICISM IN THE USE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 1
2
Lauren L. Saling1 and James G. Phillips2
School of Social Sciences and Liberal Studies, Charles Sturt University School of Psychology, Psychiatry, and Psychological Medicine, Monash University
ABSTRACT The present paper considers whether individuals with neurotic traits (anxiety, depression, shyness, low self-esteem) are more prone to use information and communication technology. We have previously found that individuals with low self esteem and social anxiety are prone to use the internet. The internet offers the opportunity to edit one‘s self-presentation through email and blogging benefitting the socially anxious. As the internet serves to document behaviour, it also provides evidence of emotional or irrational behaviours. Procrastinators prefer email, and those prone to panic are more likely to post messages on discussion groups. There is also evidence that neurotic individuals send more SMS. The present paper also considers the potential to develop addictions to technology. There is limited research addressing neuroticism as a predictor of the use of information and communication technology, nevertheless, this is an area of potential interest, particularly as the internet serves to document behaviour and self presentation in a way that was hitherto not possible.
The internet was initially a directory of searchable information, but increasing access to a variety of social networking applications now means that not only can corporations decide how they present themselves to the world, but individuals can also decide how they present themselves. Given that personal information is now available on the world wide web, the lives of individuals are increasingly subject to scrutiny. Some members of the community are potentially more vulnerable to this phenomenon than others. As the ill-considered word or act cannot be undone once in cyberspace, and can leave long lasting electronic traces, it is important to understand how personal style can influence the use of information and communication technology. Within this context the present chapter considers how neurotic
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tendencies may manifest when using information and communication technologies such as the internet and mobile phones. The internet was the product of the efforts of computer scientists and it provides increasing opportunities for government and commercial sectors to get their message out to the general public. As such, the internet is of great interest to business, market researchers, and psychologists. As the user base of this technology has shifted from highly trained professionals, to the general community (and even to marginalised sections of the community), there have been efforts devoted to standardisation and improving usability (e.g. W3C) (Nielsen, 2000). Psychologists in the area of Ergonomics and Human Factors have assisted in the evaluation of the usability of technologies (i.e. human machine interaction). Nevertheless the disciplines of Ergonomics and Human Factors are somewhat lacking in understanding technologies that seek to enhance human to human interaction. This is an unfortunate historical accident that arises because most ergonomics texts (e.g. Fitts & Posner, 1967; Norman, 1988) overlooked interpersonal interaction, and until recently continued to do so (e.g. Wickens & Hollands, 2000). This is increasingly becoming an issue in the face of the emergence and widespread acceptance of the internet as a tool to support interpersonal interaction. Indeed, within the commercial sector there has been a growing realisation that usability alone does not determine internet use. Other factors such as affect and aesthetics (Lavie & Tractinsky, 2004; Norman, 2002; Tractinsky, Katz, & Ikar, 2000) also appear to drive the use of the internet and mobile phones. In particular, there is a growing need to understand people‘s use of technology to support their social interaction. Although overlooked by most, some early ergonomists made attempts to address communication and social interaction (Argyle, 1967; Welford, 1966; 1968; 1987). This is a useful starting point from which to consider people's use of information and communication technology. Argyle (1967) and Welford (1968) attempted to extend ergonomic models of human-machine interaction to human to human interaction (see Figure 1). Each person was viewed as an information processing channel, and social interaction was modelled as an interplay between two information processing channels, where one communication channel represented person A and the other communication channel represented person B. The communication channels incorporated what was known about human information processing at that time, and involved stages responsible for encoding (perception), transmission (interpretation or translation), and decoding (responding). The channels had limited capacity for processing information and were perceived as involving feedback loops. For example, in this case, person A's actions elicit responses from person B as feedback. Note that information comes from A to B from a variety of sources verbal (intended) and non-verbal (unintended), and social skill in part is reflected by the appropriate control of messaging (Argyle, 1967). Hence within the context of the internet or mobile phones, it is likely that emotional reactivity may influence the number of messages and the response to feedback, whereas a willingness to self-disclose is likely to influence the choice of communication channel (see Phillips, Saling, & Blaszczynski, 2008). Indeed, it is important to understand such tendencies as they have a direct relevance to privacy legislation (Wang, Lee, & Wang, 1998) and an individual‘s franchise in an increasingly electronic government (Toregas, 2001).
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Figure 1. Ergonomic Model of Human to Human Interaction.
Unfortunately the psychological disciplines most associated with the use of computer technology (i.e. Ergonomics and Human Factors) have tended to overlook the reasons and motivations underpinning behaviour (Skinner, 1985). Indeed a lot of current psychological research addresses behaviours that are intrinsically motivated, and where primary, and even secondary, reinforcers are not immediately apparent. Hence early attempts to address social interaction borrowed concepts from Behaviorism (Argyle, 1967; Welford, 1976). Argyle (1967) suggested that social interaction was likely to continue where interaction was reinforcing and furthered an individual's goals (Argyle, 1967). Behaviorist theory would suggest that the amount of interaction will depend upon reinforcement history, while the communication channel chosen is liable to be that channel that maximises reinforcement (Hernstein, 1961). Nevertheless the concept of reinforcement is somewhat circular in usage. Reinforcement is invoked to explain increases in behaviour, but when Behaviorists are asked to define reinforcement, it is typically defined as that which increases behaviour (Meehl, 1950). In other words that which is to be explained (explanandum) is also the explanation (explanans). This problem was addressed by discussing tendencies for reinforcements to work across situations (Hernstein, 1961; Premack, 1959), in other words to infer predispositions to respond within the organism. This explains our current interest in personality as a potential predictor of the use of information and communication technology.
Neuroticism as a Primary Personality Feature Personality theories consider the relationships between a constellation of response tendencies and predispositions as a method of predicting behaviours. Personality is typically
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construed in the psychological literature as involving a number of dimensions (Eysenck, 1994; McCrae & John, 1992). Eysenck (1991) postulated three primary dimensions of personality: Extraversion, Neuroticism and Psychoticism. According to Eysenck‘s model, neuroticism, like extraversion and psychoticism, represents a higher order personality factor that is comprised of a number of lower order traits. According to this model, neuroticism is thought to include a number of traits such as anxiety, depression, guilt feelings, low self-esteem, tension, irrationality, shyness, moodiness and emotionality (Eysenck, 1994). Collectively these traits have been understood to be markers of emotional instability. It should be noted, however, that not all neurotic individuals will display all of the traits underpinning neuroticism. Another broadly accepted model of the structure of personality, the five factor model (Costa & McCrae, 1992) specifies five dimensions of personality, Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness. As is the case with Eysenck‘s model, each of these higher order factors is comprised of a number of lower order traits. Therefore, neuroticism is considered to be a primary personality dimension in both models of personality.
The Biological Basis of Neuroticism Eysenck‘s (1967, 1994) three factor model invokes a biological basis for personality dimensions. Eysenck located the neural substrate for neuroticism in the hypothalamus and limbic system and argued that differences in levels of neuroticism between individuals is due to differing levels of instability associated with this system with respect to the stress response. As such, Eysensk‘s model postulates that individuals with high neuroticism will typically have an exaggerated response to stress and this response will manifest for a far longer period than the exposure to the stressor. Empirical studies have revealed conflicting findings with respect to stress reactivity in individuals with high neuroticism. For instance, Bono and Vey (2007) found the individuals with high neuroticism demonstrate an intense stress response, that manifests behaviourally as anxiety or depression, and has been shown to correlate with a number of physiological measures including increased heart rate. However, Chida and Harmer (2008) performed a meta-analysis of 729 studies that investigated the relationship between personality variables and stress response and recovery. The meta-analysis revealed that although individuals with high neuroticism did not display a heightened stress response they were slower to recover from stress-induced cardiovascular excitation (Chida & Harmer, 2008). Further the authors postulate that the lack of stress reactivity in those with high neuroticism could be due to continuous exposure to stress in such individuals which ultimately dulls their acute stress reaction. Certainly, this analysis reveals that individual with high neuroticism have an altered response to stress. The biological basis of neuroticism has been addressed by investigating the brain areas involved using imaging techniques. The neural correlates underpinning neuroticism and its link to anxiety and mood disorders have recently been explored using functional magnetic resonance imaging (Haas, Omura, Constable & Canli, 2007). Haas et al. (2007) investigated the brain activation associated with an emotional conflict task in individuals with high trait neuroticism. The authors noted that those individuals who obtained high scores on the
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anxious form of neuroticism (as compared to the depressive form) displayed activation of the amygdala and subgenual anterior cingulate, which are brain areas associated with anxiety and mood disorders. As such, activation of these areas appears to provide the basis for the connection between neuroticism and anxiety and mood disorders. Kumari et al. (2007) found that when a stressful situation is merely anticipated, rather than actually presented, individuals with high neuroticism experienced a greater intensity of fear than individuals who scored low on measures of neuroticism. In this experiment, participants were told that they would be experiencing an electric shock and self-report measures as well as physiological measures, such as heart rate, were recorded. Interestingly, individuals with high neuroticism reported a greater intensity of fear than that reported by those with low neuroticism. In addition, there was decreased brain activation in those with high neuroticism when compared to participants with low neuroticism. The authors explained this finding as being due to suppression by the fear response, an avoidance mechanism often employed by individuals with high ‗resting arousal‘. As such, individuals with high neuroticism may have less effective coping strategies, and rely on avoidance coping mechanisms (Robinson, Ode, Wilkowski & Amodio, 2007). This will be elaborated upon later in this chapter.
Personality, Information Processing and Problem-Solving As indicated previously, personality variables appear to be associated with the individual‘s response to stress, in particular the way in which the individual manages stress and their ability to process information when under stress as well as the problem solving strategy adopted in stressful situations. Stress appears to have a number of different effects on information processing. Where stress is acute and short-lived, it may improve task performance as it serves to focus the individual‘s attention on task demands (Andreano & Cahill, 2006). However, chronic stress, particularly where there is prolonged exposure to high cortisol levels, results in performance decrements (Jelici, Geraerts, Merckelbach & Guerrieri, 2004). Even acute stress can result in performance decrements particularly in tasks of working memory (Elzinga & Roelofs, 2005). The working memory system is involved in holding small amounts of information active for a short time period such that crucial information can be selected for further processing. As such, decrements associated with working memory will undermine information processing. It is thought that optimal functioning of the working memory system is particularly important under conditions of stress where the individual needs to efficiently process the essential features of incoming stimuli. Thus, any compromise to this system when stressed, serves to compromise the individual‘s ability to process information. Stress and arousal are known to change how information is processed. With danger or threat there tends to be a narrowing of attention (Wickens, Lee, Liu, & Becker, 2004, p. 330). The range or breadth of attention is restricted, such that stressed or aroused individuals concentrate very hard on the source of stress or how to avoid it, but there is a concomitant tendency to ignore surrounding information. The tendency to ignore surrounding information means there is a loss of "context" or situational awareness. When stress and arousal leads to a focus upon a clear and functional solution then the tendency to focus can be useful. However, when the solution is not immediately obvious, a focus induced by stress and arousal can
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compromise efforts to problem solve. Focussed attention may not be appropriate when the solution to a problem requires a broader integration of cues, an appreciation of context, or a flexible approach to circumstances. In other words, stress and arousal are thought to cause a rigidity or "cognitive tunnelling" such that people focus exclusively upon one issue to the detriment of a more flexible consideration of a wider set of options (Wickens et al., 2004, p. 330). Although, researchers have considered relationships between extraversion and information processing capacity (e.g. Brebner, 1991), less has been done in terms of furthering the understanding of how neuroticism influences information processing. Extraverts have been considered to be under aroused and hence stimulus seeking to maintain optimal arousal levels (Eysenck, 1967). However, Brebner (1980) refined this position, invoking separate mechanisms for stimulus excitation/inhibition and response excitation/inhibition. Brebner (1980) suggested that extraverts are predisposed to respond, whereas introverts are predisposed to inspect stimuli. There is some evidence to support this position (e.g. Brebner & Cooper, 1974; Brebner & Flavel, 1978). Although Brebner primarily studied extraversion, he did propose a model of emotional reactivity in the journal "Personality and Individual Differences" which has implications for other personality types. Brebner (1998) proposed an adaptive model of decision making that could be applied to emotional responses and hence can be used to draw inferences as to the nature of information processing in individuals with high neuroticism. The advantage of such a model is that it has been validated in other domains and hence can make some useful predictions. Brebner‘s model implied that neurotic individuals were less considered in their information processing, accumulating less information before reacting. On this basis, neurotic individuals would be fast and inaccurate in their emotional responses. From this, one can make predictions about their use of information and communication technology. For instance, individuals with high neuroticism scores might be more likely to use the more immediate SMS (text) rather than voice calls, and may use this technology in an ill-considered fashion. This is reinforced by findings that under conditions of high stress, individuals typically behave more impulsively as demonstrated by shorter reaction times (Duncko, Johnson, Merikangas & Grillon, 2009) and individuals with high neuroticism act as if under stress (hyper-aroused). Although, such behaviour may be adaptive in situations where there is a genuine threat, it becomes maladaptive where the individual experiences constant high level stress, such as that displayed by neurotics, and ultimately undermines functioning.
The Coping Style of Neurotic Individuals Coping typically refers to the individual‘s ability to deal with stress. A narrow focus to problem solving is typical of neurotic individuals and is associated with low emotional intelligence and emotion-focussed coping (Brebner, 2001). There appear to be a number of facets of emotional intelligence involving the ability to identify emotions, to integrate emotions and thoughts and to manage emotions (Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2000). Matthews et al. (2006) explored the relationship between emotional intelligence, personality and taskinduced stress. Emotional intelligence predicts coping such that individuals with high emotional intelligence are better able to cope with stressful situations. In particular, the authors investigated the five personality dimensions identified in the five factor model;
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Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Matthews et al. (2006) found that neuroticism was related to distress, worry and emotion-focussed coping. Such individuals therefore do not exhibit high emotional intelligence but rather demonstrate difficulties in managing task-induced stress. Indeed, on tasks requiring emotional regulation, those with high neuroticism tend to perform poorly (Bono & Vey, 2007). Neuroticism has been found to reliably predict tense arousal in performance-oriented settings (e.g. Thayer, 1989). Connor-Smith and Flachsbart (2007) examined the relationship between coping style and personality as personality features may either facilitate or sabotage coping. In particular, the authors explored coping associated with the five personality dimensions (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Extraversion and conscientiousness predicted positive coping strategies including problem solving. Neuroticism, on the other hand, predicted negative coping strategies including withdrawal and emotion-focussed coping. Emotion-focussed coping typically involves avoidance of the negative emotion associated with the stressful situation and tends to be associated with a worse outcome than problem-focussed coping that aims to address the source of stress. In general terms, individuals with high neuroticism appear to experience more negative affect and are typically less happy than those who attain low scores on measures of neuroticism (Brebner, Donaldson, Kirby & Ward, 1995) and report higher levels of stress (Costa, Somerfield & McCrae, 1996) which ultimately undermines their capacity to manage stressful situations. Research implies that neurotic individuals would be predisposed to use the internet for procrastination, and be less adaptive in their use of the internet. Perhaps making more requests for assistance. As will be outlined later, there may be some evidence to support this position.
Measuring Neuroticism Two instruments are commonly used in psychological research and clinical practice to measure levels of neuroticism. The NEO-PI-R is the instrument used to measure personality that is based on the five factor model (Costa & McCrae, 1985), while the EPQ (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) is based on Eysenck‘s three factor model. Like other personality measures, the measurement of neuroticism involves self-report such that the individual endorses or fails to endorse statements which are thought to encapsulate neuroticism. The more statements that the individual endorses that are thought to reflect neuroticism, the higher the neuroticism score the individual achieves. In considering the relationship between neuroticism and the use of technology, it is noteworthy that traits such as anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, irrationality, and shyness also contribute to the construct of neuroticism (Eysenck, 1994; McCrae, 1990) and as such the presence of these traits is taken to reflect evidence of neuroticism (Allred & Smith, 1989). Therefore research incorporating these traits also requires discussion here.
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Neuroticism as a Predictor of Psychopathology and Behavioural Problems Individuals who obtain high neuroticism scores on measures such as the NEO-PI-R or the EPQ, may display a predisposition for problematic behaviours including anti-social behaviour and mood disorders. Thus for instance, antisocial behaviour in the workplace has been found to correlate with high levels of neuroticism (Duffy, Shaw, Scott, & Tepper, 2006). This behavior tends to be characterised by undermining others such that their ability to establish positive social relationships and achieve work-related success is diminished. Other authors have noted a correlation between intimate partner-directed violence and neuroticism (Hellmuth & McNulty, 2008). Further, an individual displaying neurotic traits is more likely to have difficulty in dealing with uncertainty (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008) and is prone to the development of anxiety (Borkovec & Sharpless, 2004) and depression (Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Arntz, 2008). It is of note, however, that the impact of neuroticism on behaviour cannot be measured in isolation as other personality factors can mediate the effect of neuroticism and vice versa. However, even when controlling for other factors, high neuroticism certainly does appear to be associated with problematic behaviours, particularly behaviours which impact on social relationships. Given this, individuals with high neuroticism may find it difficult to establish social networks. This is of particular relevance where the development of social connections relies on face to face interaction. Such individuals may welcome the opportunity to foster social relationships in an environment where they can edit their self-presentation. Various internet applications, such as social networking sites, weblogs as well as mobile phone applications, such as SMS, offer this. As such it is of definite interest to investigate personality variables that predict the use of mobile phones and the internet. This is particularly pertinent with the ever-growing ubiquity of such technology. To this end a variety of personality traits have been examined such as self-esteem, perfectionism, extraversion and neuroticism. The present discussion will be limited to neuroticism and its associated traits.
Personality Predictors of Internet Use Early studies observed a tendency for shyness and loneliness to dispose people towards internet use. For instance, Scealy, Phillips and Stevenson (2002) found that shy individuals, particularly males, were more likely to use the internet for recreational activities. This finding is of interest as it suggests that although the internet affords the opportunity for shy and socially anxious individuals to pursue social relationships without the need for anxietyprovoking face to face contact, this is not necessarily the pursuit of choice for such individuals. Rather, they may pursue other internet-based activities including leisure/recreational activities. Matanda, Jenvey and Phillips (2004) found that better educated individuals were more likely to seek out entertainment on the internet, while the young and lonely used the internet for entertainment. Thus it is not clear whether heavier internet use is a cause or a consequence of neurotic tendencies such as social anxieties (Kraut et al., 1998). Through its various applications, including social networking sites and weblogs, the internet enables users to develop and maintain friendships without the need for face to face interaction. Social networking sites such as Facebook allow users to create an online profile, comprised of among other things, current relationship, vocational status, photos of the user
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and family and friends (Zhao, Grasmuck & Martin, 2008). Personal blogs are used to convey daily information, thoughts and aspiration, akin to a diary (McNeill, 2003). For both of these applications, the user controls the content of information disclosed. As such, individuals who find it difficult to establish social networks, due to social anxiety, low self-esteem, shyness and the like, may find that the internet environment offers an attractive alternative. For instance, Hertel, Shroer, Batinic and Naumann (2008) found the individuals with high neuroticism showed a preference for the use of email over face to face interactions. This was particularly obvious where there was the potential for social threats in the communication situation. Moreover, it has been noted that the self-efficacy and sociability of shy, socially-anxious individuals is enhanced by establishing online social networks (Ando et al., 2004; Sakomoto et al., 2002; Tidwell & Walther, 2002). Given that social anxiety results from a desire to present oneself in a positive manner in combination with a lack of presentational confidence (Leary & Kowalski, 1994), it naturally follows that socially anxious individuals would explore online friendships. People who have high neuroticism and its associated traits of social anxiety and low self-esteem, may feel very anxious following a face to face interaction as they have little control over their self-presentation. It has been found that online interactions cause less anxiety for such individuals than do face to face encounters (Rice & Markey, 2009). Given that such individuals may avoid face to face social encounters leading to social isolation, it would appear that online friendships have the potential to enhance psychological well-being by providing access to a social network. Some researchers argue, however, that online friendships are of dubious quality and that there may in fact be detrimental effects due to having large numbers of ‗cyber-friends‘ which distracts from ‗real‘ social relationships (Cummings, Butler & Kraut, 2002; Kraut et al., 1998). However, there is growing evidence that online friendships are often grounded in offline friendships, either because online communication solidifies already existing weak face to face social networks or because online friends may become offline friends (McKenna & Bargh, 2000). As such, online social networks have the potential to avert loneliness and may assist in the development of social skills (Ando & Sakamoto, 2008). In addition to observations that internet use can be associated with social anxiety, there are indications that internet use is also related to avoidance and poorer problem solving. For instance, there are tendencies for the internet to be used for purposes of procrastination (Lavoie & Pychyl, 2001). Procrastination is a form of task related avoidance (Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997). Indeed, Phillips and Reddie (2007) noted that procrastination was a predictor of higher amounts of email use in the work place. In particular, Baker and Phillips (2007) found that people reported that they should have been doing something else when they were responding to emails instead. Tendencies towards procrastination can ultimately detract from productivity as time and resources are not devoted appropriately (Beswick, Rothblum, & Mann, 1988). Phillips, Jory and Mogford (2007) investigated the relationship between decisional style and performance upon online assessments in university students using WebCT (an internetbased application for assignment submission, discussion boards and subject evaluations among other applications). Phillips, Jory and Mogford (2007) found that procrastinators were less likely to submit their online assignments (see Rossett, 2000). Their response to the course of study was also of interest. Phillips, Jory and Mogford (2007) found that procrastinators
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were more likely to provide negative course evaluations. Research indicates that losers tend to blame circumstance (Weiner, 1986), and in this case procrastinators potentially attributed their poorer performance to features associated with the course of study (Higgins & Snyder, 1989) when in reality they were contributing to their poor performance through late submission (or non-submission) of assignments (Beswick, Rothblum, & Mann, 1988). The consequences of avoidance within the educational sector are comparatively minor. Nevertheless, the use of the internet as a form of task avoidance can be irrational and maladaptive within the work place. For instance Lim (2002) observed that staff used the internet at work for personal purposes to redress perceived workplace injustices. As the browser history and download accounting keep records, this is potentially unwise. There were other indicators of irrationality associated with internet use. Phillips, Jory and Mogford (2007) considered whether decisional style (Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997) could predict the use of discussion groups. The authors found that students who scored high on the decisional style of hypervigilance (characterized by a feelings of time pressure and a tendency to a panic) were more likely to post messages on discussion groups. This is interesting because Radford, Mann and Kalucy (1986) have previously found high correlations between hypervigilance and scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (r=0.48) and Middlesex Hospital Questionnaire (r=0.68) in 39 patients hospitalised for depressive and psychoneurotic conditions. Individuals with high neuroticism typically find it difficult to establish and maintain social connections due to their negative affectivity (Stokes, 1985). Amichai-Hamburger and Ben-Artzi (2000) explored the relationship between neuroticism and internet use. The authors found that there was a positive correlation between high internet use, particularly of sociallyoriented internet sites, and high neuroticism particularly in females. In a follow-up study, Amichai-Hamburger and Ben-Artzi (2003) examined the impact of internet use upon users‘ well-being, with a view to investigating whether internet use promotes well-being in users who have high neuroticism scores. This study concurred with Stokes‘ (1985) model, and indicated that high neuroticism and its associated loneliness, leads to a high uptake of internet applications which ultimately promotes well-being. Although, the use of internet applications to foster social networks may be beneficial for individuals who find it difficult to develop social connections in more traditional contexts, such individuals are also prone to the development of internet overuse. For instance, Jin, Su and Cao (2007) found that neuroticism was a predictor of internet overuse.
Problematic Internet Use Internet applications, particularly those that foster the development of social networks, be they social networking sites or interactive gaming sites, provide an avenue for individuals who have difficulties in forming offline relationships to nevertheless foster social connections. Therefore, such activities have the potential to promote user well-being, particularly in individuals who have high neuroticism, introversion, social anxiety and low self-esteem. However, given that such individuals would be drawn to the internet, it is not surprising that the use of such internet applications can become excessive and potentially problematic.
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Internet addiction (Young, 1998), like other addictive behaviours is characterized by problematic overuse to the detriment of other activities. As such, other domains of the user‘s life may be undermined by heavy internet use (Kraut et al., 1998). These include social, educational, health-related and vocational dimensions. Indeed, Suler (1999) outlines eight factors that may distinguish between pathological and non-pathological internet use. Each of these factors is understood as a spectrum, ranging from normal to pathological. The number and nature of other domains that are disrupted owing to the pursuit of internet-related activities is of relevance to the classification of normal versus pathological internet use, such that the more aspects of functioning affected, the more likely the internet use is to be pathological. Another factor that Suler identifies is the number or nature of needs served by the internet use. An individual whose needs are largely addressed by their internet use such that their internet use becomes increasingly pervasive and necessary (to avert negative affect), is more likely to experience pathological internet use. There is some evidence for this position. For instance Ceyhan and Ceyhan (2008) found that loneliness and depression were significant predictors of internet overuse and that in these individuals the internet became a necessary tool to avert negative affectivity.
Personality and Self-Presentation As indicated earlier, the internet provides the opportunity for user‘s to edit their selfpresentation. Of interest, it has been noted that individuals with high neuroticism and introversion will locate their real selves on the internet rather than in more traditional social interactions (Amichai-Hamburger, Wainapel & Fox, 2002). This is because face to face interactions impose many constraints on self-presentation, while the online interface enables the user to present their ideal self, an identity that may not be possible to reveal in offline interactions due to factors such as anxiety or shyness (Bargh, McKenna & Fitzsimmons, 2002). As such, the fact that the user has control over the nature of information revealed to other users and the manner in which they market themselves to others, enables individuals who find it difficult to establish social connections in face to face contexts, to connect with like-minded individuals. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that an individual‘s online persona may differ from his/her offline persona (Suler, 2004). Using anonymous internet applications, such as chat rooms, facilitates user control over self-presentation as there are no constraints applied. More surprising is that even where the interface is not anonymous, such as social networking sites (e.g. Facebook,), users may nevertheless construct an identity (Zhao et al., 2008). Suler (2004) suggests that the change in identity demonstrated online is best understood as disinhibition. Thus users say and do things that they would not say and do in a face to face context. This disinhibition may be positively or negatively valenced such that people may behave more kindly to others online than offline or rather may become more aggressive online (Suler, 2004). Thus for instance, Whitty and Carville (2008) found that people reported being more likely to tell a self-serving lie via e-mail, followed by phone and then face to face. Interestingly, participants also preferred email when delivering harsh truths as well, suggesting that people would be less inhibited in what they had to say to both strangers and friends on-line.
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The enhanced opportunity to control messages on the internet appears to influence the choice of communication channel adopted (see Phillips, Saling, & Blaszczynski, 2008). Thus individuals who want to control their self-presentation display a preference for the use of SMS (text messaging) over phone calls (Rettie, 2007). Such individuals find the use of phone calls to be anxiety provoking and hence opt for the use of messaging instead. Similarly, weblogs are often used by those who wish to self-disclose in a non-face to face forum.
Psychological Predictors of Blogging Blogs or weblogs are a relatively new internet application which involve a personalized web page, typically belonging to a single author, where regular entries are made to update readers about the area of the blogs content (Herring, Scheidt, Wright & Bonus, 2005). Blogs take a number of forms including personal, political and interest-based blogs. The personal blog, like a personal diary, facilitates the expression of the personal narrative and has been demonstrated to provide catharsis and hence appears to promote psychological well-being. However, unlike a paper-based diary, a blog is shared with the online community. Not only is the blog read by others, but there is also an interactive feature associated with blogs such that readers can comment on the blog‘s content (Miura & Yamashita, 2007). As such, blogs enhance the development of social support and friendship with like-minded users. Baker and Moore (2008a) investigated the change in psychological well-being for bloggers and non-bloggers who used a social networking site (MySpace). The authors found that only the bloggers had improved well-being, particularly with respect to social integration and perceived social support. In contrast, there was no change in these measures for nonbloggers. This suggests that blogs provide additional avenues for developing social connections, over and above those offered by other internet applications including social networking sites. However, in another study, Baker and Moore (2008b) asked MySpace users if they intended to blog in the future. Those users who scored higher on measures of psychological distress and lower on measures of satisfaction with current social integration were more likely to express an intention to blog. This suggests that although blogging may have beneficial psychological effects, it may also be the case that those individuals who are attracted to blogging are experiencing greater psychological distress, have less social support and fewer coping resources than non-bloggers. Indeed, as is the case with other internet applications, certain personality features can predict a tendency to engage in blogging. In particular, Guadagno, Okdie and Eno (2008) found that individuals with openness to experience and high neuroticism were more likely to be bloggers than those with low neuroticism. This effect was more pronounced for females as compared to males. The authors postulate that given the difficulties which those high in neuroticism experience with respect to establishing and maintaining face to face social relationships, blogs provide a forum to foster social relationships. Thus blogs may be of particular benefit to those individuals who find it difficult to make social connections in more traditional ways.
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Psychological Predictors of Mobile Phone Use and Overuse The mobile phone is predominantly a device for social interaction (Bianchi & Phillips, 2005), but it does offer some potential for display in social settings. For instance Butt and Phillips (2008) found that extraverts with low agreeableness scores were more interested in ringtones and wallpaper. However it is likely that anxious or neurotic individuals use the mobile phone for other reasons. Indeed Phillips, Butt and Blaszczynski (2008) observed a tendency for neurotic individuals to be less interested in the new features of mobile phones. Instead Plant (2000) reported the mobile phones were carried as a form of security in case of emergencies. Although people may carry mobile phones as a form of security, this "safety net" application does not correlate with actual mobile phone usage (Walsh, White, & Young, 2007), but it does suggest that neurotic individuals may spend time checking that they are carrying their mobile phones and that the phone is charged. Mobile phones have the potential to enhance psychological well-being by offering the user an avenue for establishing and maintaining social contacts. Like the internet, mobile phones enable users to keep in touch with family and friends without the need for face to face interactions. This opportunity is heightened by applications such as SMS where only a few words are needed to stay in touch. As is the case with internet use, there appear to be personality variables that predict the use and potential overuse of mobile phones. Butt and Phillips (2008) explored the relationship between personality factors and self-reported mobile phone use in order to determine whether personality factors predict the pattern and nature of mobile phone use. Indeed, personality variables did seem to predict both the amount of mobile phone use and the nature of the communication used (i.e. SMS versus voice). In particular, individuals with higher neuroticism and extraversion scores, or lower agreeableness and conscientiousness scores spent more time messaging using SMS than making voice calls on their mobile phones (Butt & Phillips, 2008). Bianchi and Phillips (2005) investigated the relationship between personality variables (low self-esteem, neuroticism and extraversion) and problem mobile phone use. Problem mobile phone use was measured by asking participants questions about their mobile phone use which indicated features of addiction. Questions addressed aversive consequences associated with withdrawal from the mobile phone, using the mobile to escape from life problems and negative life consequences associated with mobile phone use. The authors found that low self-esteem and extraversion were predictors of problem mobile phone use. Although, neuroticism was not found to be a significant predictor of mobile phone use, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, low self-esteem is a trait of neuroticism and therefore, this aspect of neuroticism does appear to predict problematic mobile phone use. Ha, Chin, Park, Ryu and Yu (2008) investigated the variables associated with problem mobile phone use. The authors found that excessive users reported more anxiety, depression and lower self esteem than those who used their mobile phones moderately. These users tended to experience the use of the mobile phone as excessive and uncontrollable. The users demonstrated a strong attachment to their mobile phones, and the phones appeared to form a strong part of their self-identity. Similarly, Walsh and White (2007) examined problem mobile phone use from the perspective of the importance of the mobile phone to the user‘s identity. In particular, Walsh and White (2007) explored excessive mobile phone use in terms of the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1988; 1991). The theory of planned behaviour postulates that there are
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cognitions underlying behaviour such that the individual engages in a rational, systematic evaluation of crucial information prior to acting (Ajzen 1988; 1991). The authors found that mobile phone use was critically associated with self-identity such that individuals reported that the use of the mobile phone was important to their lives. It appears that mobile phone use was highly reinforced for these users and had become part of their identity. This suggests that the users would not readily stop using their mobile phones even where the use of the phone had become problematic (including financial difficulties due to excessive phone use, dangerous use such as when driving and the like, Walsh & White, 2007). Thus, although mobile phone use can have positive consequences in providing a forum for individuals to maintain their social network, there is also the potential for negative consequences to arise where mobile phone use becomes excessive. Thus rather than offering a forum for individuals to maintain contact with friends and family irrespective of distance, mobile phones can in fact interfere with social functioning. Indeed, mobile phone use can become so excessive that it can be considered to be an addiction (Munoz-Rivas & Agustin, 2005). The kinds of problems that have been identified as arising from excessive mobile phone use include dependence, prohibited or dangerous use of a mobile phone such as when driving and financial difficulties leading to significant debt particularly for young people (Billieaux, Van Der Linden & Rochat, 2008).
Neurotic Traits, Behaviours and the Use of Information and Communication Technologies As discussed above, neurotic traits such as shyness, anxiety, low self-esteem and emotional lability potentially manifest as avoidance coping (procrastination). There may be an interest in recreational applications of the technology, with a preference for text based interactions over voice or face to face interactions, and ineffective coping strategies often requiring increased assistance. This has been observed as higher use of the internet by the shy (Scealy et al., 2002), socially anxious (Matanda et al., 2004), and those with low self esteem (Armstrong et al., 2000). This can manifest as a preference for text based interactions on both the internet (Baker & Moore, 2008b; Guadagno et al., 2008) and mobile phones (Billieux et al., 2008; Reid & Reid, 2004). Poorer coping and greater levels of emotional distress can manifest as panic (Phillips, Jory, & Mogford, 2007) and intentions to Blog (Baker & Moore, 2008b). These findings are summarised in Table 1.
Behavioural Mechanisms Contributing to Addiction Addiction is defined as the compulsive engaging in a destructive behaviour which persists in the face of aversive consequences (e.g. see Lemon, 2002). The behaviour is detrimental to at least one aspect of the individual‘s functioning including social, vocational, educational or personal domains. There is an urge to engage in the behaviour and the individual will typically experience increasing tension if prevented from engaging in the behaviour. In some cases there may also be a desire to avoid withdrawal (an aversive state which may have different features depending on the particular substance or behaviour) or to
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attain the pleasurable effects of the addictive behaviour, but this feature does not apply to all addictions (Holden, 2001). There are a number of models of addiction each of which has different implications for the cause, management and prognosis of addictions. For instance, the disease model of addiction situates the aetiology and management of addiction in the medical realm. Thus addiction is viewed like any other disease requiring medical treatment and is thought to be out of the control of the sufferer. The learning model of addiction, in contrast, locates the source of addictive behaviours in the past experience of the individual such that the behaviour is learned. Depending on the particular notion of addiction endorsed, the individual who demonstrates the addictive behaviour may or may not be thought of as being in control of or responsible for their behaviour (Cohen & Saling, 2008). There are distinctions drawn between behavioural addictions (such as gambling, Shaffer, 1989 and overeating, Kelley, 2004) and chemical addictions (drugs, alcohol) although there is considerable overlap between these types of addiction both in terms of the manifestations and the underlying mechanisms (Marks, 1990). The technological addictions (Griffiths, 1995), a subset of behavioural addictions, are of particular interest here. Technological addictions, like other behavioural addictions are associated with the formation of strong habits. Some have suggested that the technologies are addictive because they are exciting (Shaffer, 1996). Others feel that as these behaviours occur in response to recently developed technologies, they must be tapping into existing mechanisms and predispositions (see Griffiths, 1996, 1998). According to Griffiths (1996) the technology may afford access to the object of interest. While some have dismissed the technological addictions as a byproduct of some other primary presenting problems (e.g. Shaffer, Hall, & Vander Bilt, 2000), the pervasiveness of the technology may still pose additional risk. There remains the possibility that we might overlook emerging areas of concern such as internet overuse (Armstrong et al., 2000; Griffiths, 1998), or overlook specific categories of possibly inappropriate use involving sex (Griffith, 2001) or gambling, that may be far more pervasive when being offered on the internet (Griffiths, 1996) mobile phones (Griffiths, 2003) or on television (Griffiths, 2007). Table 1. Neurotic traits, behaviours and use of information and communication technologies Neurotic Trait
Behavioural Manifestations
Relevant Internet Research
Anxiety
Avoidance (Procrastination)
Shyness, Social Anxiety
Preference for text based social interaction
Low self esteem Emotionally Labile
Preference for recreation
Lavoie & Pychyl (2001) Phillips & Reddie (2007) Baker & Phillips (2007) Amichai-Hamburger et al (2002) Ando et al (2004) Hertel et al, (2008) Guadagno, Okdie & Eno (2008) Armstrong, Phillips, & Saling (2000) Baker & Moore (2008b) Phillips, Jory, & Mogford. (2007)
Requests for help (Panic)
Relevant Mobile Phone Research Butt & Phillips (2008) (low conscientiousness) Reid & Reid (2004) Rettie (2007) Butt & Phillips (2008)
Ha et al. (2008) Bianchi & Phillips (2005) Billieux et al. (2008)
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Learning theory can potentially account for addiction by invoking the Matching law (Hernstein, 1961). The Matching law suggests that organisms choose behaviours that maximise their levels of reinforcement (Hernstein, 1961). Under normal conditions, the matching law operates to mediate the choice as to which behaviours to engage in, however, this mechanism can also operate abnormally resulting in addiction (Heyman, 1996). In the case of the addictions, it is argued that an inappropriately high weighting is assigned to the object of addiction (Blum, Cull, Braverman, & Comings, 1996; Jacobs, 1986). In such circumstances the addictive activity is pursued to the exclusion of more adaptive behaviours. For instance, Billieux et al (2008) considered whether mobile phone use could be predicted by features of impulsivity such as: reacting without thinking; lack of perseverance; lack of premeditation; urgency: and sensation seeking. Indeed, Billieux et al. (2008) found that features of impulsivity did predict excessive and problematic mobile phone use. The urgency component of impulsivity was found to be the strongest predictor of problem mobile phone use, while the other facets of impulsivity did predict various aspects of mobile phone use. Urgency is defined as the tendency to experience strong impulses particularly under conditions of negative affect. Thus mobile phone use appears to represent an activity upon which the user becomes dependent as the user experiences a strong impulse to use the phone, potentially to alleviate negative affect (see Jacobs, 1986). As indicated previously, concepts of reinforcement can be somewhat circular in usage (e.g. Meehl, 1950), hence we considered some factors that might predispose responding across situations (Hernstein, 1961; Premack, 1959). As such, we have explored neuroticism (and its associated traits) that may predispose the individual to technological addictions. At least some of the phenomenology associated with the ‗irresistibility‘ of addictions can be explained in terms of the automatisation of behaviour.
Addiction as Automaticity Automatic behaviour refers to behaviour that has become habitual and therefore occurs more readily than non-automatised behaviour. Traditionally, automaticity has been conceptualised as being stimulus-driven, lacking intention, attention and awareness (Bargh, 1994; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), however, newer models of automaticity have arisen suggesting that automaticity is a far more flexible process than earlier formulations implied (Saling & Phillips, 2007). Setting this debate aside, automatic processes do offer behavioural routines such that everyday behaviour can be readily performed (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Email is proportionately the most common internet application (e.g. Scealy, Phillips, & Stevenson, 2002) potentially eliciting frequent checking responses (Baker & Phillips, 2007). Thus email use often becomes habitual. As such, email use may be engaged in inappropriately, (for instance at work to the detriment of other work-related activities) and excessively. As habits strengthen (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981) and behaviours become automatic (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) people experience less conscious involvement in the task. Indeed, there can be a tendency for people to engage in automatic behaviour without intention (Reason, 1979). Behavioural addictions, therefore may be conceptualised as over-learned behaviours (hyper-automatised) such that it becomes hard to resist engaging in these behaviours (see
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Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). This would explain the phenomenology whereby some people report a difficulty associated with suppressing the urge to perform an addictive behaviour. Indeed, LaRose, Lin and Eastin (2003) postulate that addictive behaviours may become conditioned responses such that the behaviour is regularly triggered by internal or external cues and there is a reduction in self-regulation (see also Davis, 2001). This can be compounded by the fact that the individual may have limited resources in the form of poor self-esteem, negative affectivity and limited coping strategies. As we have discussed previously in the present chapter, neuroticism is associated with low self-esteem, negative affectivity and emotion-focussed coping, thus neuroticism appears to predispose people towards addictive behaviours, in this case excessive internet or mobile phone use.
Implications and Future Directions The previous section has demonstrated that Neuroticism may potentially predict the amount and nature of use of information and communication technologies. Neurotic tendencies such as procrastination and anxiety may predispose people to a greater tendency to use email, engage in blogging and the use of social networking sites. In addition, tendencies to panic may lead to posting more messages upon discussion boards. This is of note since there is typically a permanent record of these behaviours on the internet, and tendencies to use these technologies impulsively can lead to problems. Gottschalk (2005) warns that it is difficult to delete potentially incriminating emails. Not only can they be forwarded by recipients indefinitely, but they are backed up in multiple locations such as on servers or on backup tapes. This makes inappropriate messages hard to locate and delete. Thus it can be hard to take back the thoughtless message once sent. In addition, Wang, Lee and Wang (1998) have drawn attention to potential misuse of personal information. People may commit personal information to emails, or put it on social networking or blogging sites. In addition, it may be reasonable for organisations to track consumer behaviour for purposes of quality assurance. Nevertheless, personal information and behaviour patterns may be made available to other individuals or organisations, either inadvertently due to poor storage, or the information may be sold on to third parties without the individual's consent. Hence there is potential concern as to the uses to which personal information on the web may eventually be put (Wang, Lee, & Wang, 1998). There are other reasons for considering how the construct of Neuroticism influences internet usage. Neuroticism is also of interest as it may predict use of eGovernment services. Governments are seeking to deliver services electronically in the interests of efficiency (Toregas, 2001). Nevertheless democracies cannot deliver these services unless they are accessible to all (due to considerations of principles of equal opportunity and the like). The World Wide Web consortium (W3C) has developed guidelines to assist in enhancing the usability of the web, but there remain concerns that sections of the community are not making use of this technology. There is a concern that there is a digital divide between the electronically franchised, and those that do not access and avail themselves of the benefits of the technology. Heeks and Bailur (2007) indicated that far more systematic work is required in areas of eGovernment and factors influencing uptake and use of eGovernment services. Research indicates that one of the predictors of the use of eGovernment services is trust (Horst, Kuttschreuter, & Gutteling, 2007). Given that neurotic individuals are prone to
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anxiety, neuroticism is a potential predictor of an unwillingness to engage in electronic transactions or use eGovernment services. Alternatively neurotic individuals might be more likely to be respond rashly and require assistance from help desks or other forms of government intervention (Toregas, 2001), imposing greater burdens on help desks and call centres. Although western democracies are based upon one person, one vote, it is sometimes the case that people ‗vote‘ frequently. For instance, one person may attempt to overwhelm public officials on an issue by logging the same complaint multiple times (Toregas, 2001). It is possible for multiple complaints to be logged to make an issue appear more important than it actually is. As we have observed that individuals who posted on discussion groups were more prone to panic (Phillips, Jory, & Mogford, 2007), the suggestion that neurotic and irrational people should be able to effectively make use of information offered by search engines and menus may be unrealistic.
CONCLUSION Although more research has been devoted to social anxiety as a predictor of internet use, there are some indications that other neurotic traits could be associated with greater levels of internet use. The internet can be used as a tool for procrastination and as a method of controlling self-presentation. Information and communication technologies, particularly those fostering social connections can be of great benefit particularly to those shy and socially anxious individuals who find it difficult to develop and maintain face to face social connections. However, use of these technologies can become excessive and problematic, serving to undermine the individual‘s functioning. This can occur in a number of ways, for instance the individual may no longer devote sufficient time to other activities including those in the vocational and educational domains. Further, neurotic individuals may be particularly vulnerable to the creation of permanent electronic traces. If it is difficult to take back the hasty and ill-considered word, it becomes an even more difficult proposition when the illconsidered word is backed up on tapes, compact disks and servers all over the world.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Rowan Ogeil.
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In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 85-107
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 4
COLLEGE STUDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING FOR CRIMINALS Gina Robertiello Felician College New Jersey
ABSTRACT Restorative justice is a theory of justice with a rehabilitative or reintegrative approach. The emphasis is on repairing the harm caused by the behavior; benefitting the injured parties, as well as the offender. In Criminal Justice courses across the nation, this topic has been hotly debated. Is restorative justice working? Is it fair to the victim? Does it fulfill any of the goals of punishment? Although laypersons might feel differently, those taking courses on crime and justice have discussed the topic at length, and many have supported this approach. Some are working in the criminal justice system and some are working on degrees in order to obtain a position in the criminal justice system. After discussing the theory of restorative justice, especially the research of John Braithwaite, it was the researcher's intention to determine student perceptions of restorative justice efforts, and their views on the utility and success of this approach. This research was conducted via the administration of a survey in courses at a private catholic college in New Jersey, with social science and non-social science majors. Results demonstrated that male and female social science students had similar perceptions about the topic, and that their opinions were similar to those of the non-social science majors as well. Almost all respondents thought the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society. They thought prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders, and that reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile offenders. Most did not think that restorative justice efforts were fair to the victim (because this effort is not punitive enough), and they did not think criminals were treated too leniently today. However, most respondents did think that a victim should participate in the punishment of their victimizer (i.e. they should have a say). They did not think shaming criminals deterred the behavior of the criminal or the behavior of onlookers, or that reintegrative shaming caused less stigma. Finally, most did not think that our current punitive techniques caused offenders to think worse of themselves.
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INTRODUCTION The retributive theory of the 1970‘s led to a major prison population increase via the ―get-tough‖ attitude and the war on drugs. Although retribution still dominates in our correctional system today (and interestingly, among the current population of college students surveyed), there have been many efforts to repair out criminal justice system. One of those efforts has been the theory of restorative justice. It incorporates rehabilitative and retributive elements, and can assist offenders to make changes. Research has demonstrated that police and prison officials cannot convince offenders as well as their families and peers can. These efforts can therefore unite communities (Yeh, 2008). Studies on the use of alternative means of ―punishment‖ within the college environment (and elsewhere) have been experimented with over the years due to worries about the damaging effects of labeling the offender. A student conduct program at Colorado State for example, with restorative justice sanctions, has been used for students involved in less serious crimes like nuisance parties and open container violations. Colorado uses this technique more than any other college in the country. In one particular situation, a student was drinking and assaulted someone. He was assigned an alcohol management course, community service, and the opportunity to meet with the family he victimized. He also agreed to speak with students in the neighborhood about the perils of drinking, where he accepted responsibility for his behavior. In another situation, this technique was used for students who released a snake into the classroom, and in another where anti-gay slurs were used. In all of these cases, students were given the opportunity to share feelings, admit guilt, and apologize. They only qualification for this sanction is that they show remorse for their behavior. This program is seen as a blend of mediation and restitution, where together the harms caused can be identified, as well as a unique way to repair the harm. A facilitator is used to assist with this process (Lipka, 2009). By reintegrating offenders back into the community, they are shown consideration which may make them more likely to be repentant, and decrease their recidivism rates. Other colleges and universities have adopted the restorative justice model, including Clemson, Guilford College, Skidmore, and Michigan State. In Michigan, facilitators are utilized through the Office of Student Conflict Resolution. At Clemson, restorative justice techniques are used for cases of vandalism, disorderly conduct, and other minor violations of the law. At Wells College (New York), the program is customized and voluntary so there are fewer repeat offenders and more success. One common thread within all of these schools is allowing students to hear first-hand how their behavior affected others.
RESEARCH Research on labeling theory demonstrates that shaming persons may cause more crime. That ―label‖ is the social reaction, which might lead to more crime as the individual‘s reaction to the label. It stigmatizes offenders, and might make the criminal an outcast. Therefore, if we insulate offenders from counterproductive shame, reintegration instead offers an option that is both disapproving and forgiving at the same time. According to Braithwaite‘s research, this approach will control the individual from committing a crime again. If this is true, it would
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demonstrate that deterrence theory works. Deterrence theory works through fear of shame, especially if one has strong ties to the community (because they don‘t want to let people down). In fact, families and peers may be more effective agents of social control than law enforcement. Briathwaite (1989) notes that shaming itself is necessary for social control, but stigma is not. In fact, the stigmatized groups are often excluded from conventional society and prevented from participating in conventional behavior. This could lead to those groups banding together in negative ways. In fact, research on labeling shows that there is a stigma attached to the label, and that individuals who are labeled a criminal will identify with that stigma. They are then excluded from conventional roles, and their deviance may spiral. Their opportunities to engage in crime become more attractive, and those labeled individuals tend to cluster together to support each other. Of course, other situational variables need to be examined to determine whether a label really has such a dramatic affect on individuals. For example, media coverage and gossip might influence behavior. Opportunity is an important variable as well; those with blocked opportunities might be more inclined to commit crime. Shaming involves disapproval and an attempt to invoke remorse. The notion of reintegrative shaming involves efforts to welcome the offender back into the community. A key concept involved in reintegrative shaming includes interdependency or closeness/attachments, which is similar to the work of Travis Hirschi. In his Social Control Theory, people do not commit crimes because they are closely bonded to their community, church, friends, family, school, sports, and work (Hirschi, 1969). Research also shows that illegitimate opportunities increase where there is social disorganization and in societies where there is residential mobility, there is more stigmatizing shaming. Restorative justice seeks engagement with the offenders to take responsibility for the harm done and for them to appreciate the consequences of their behavior. According to Ruth-Heffelbower and Gaboury (2008), restorative justice views an offense as collective—it is against a person or group. Thus, efforts to restore the offender involves interaction between the offender and the community. Some programs that fit this model include those that teach conflict resolution skills to prison inmates. Others teach them how to reconnect with their families after incarceration. Studies show that instilling these skills can help inmates change aggressive and violent behavior (Ruth-Heffelbower and Gaboury, 2008). In the United States and Europe, victim-offender mediation has been used in a similar manner. This option has enabled the victim and offender to share their feelings in the presence of a mediator (Zehr, 2008). Parker (2008) discusses the utility of restorative justice programs by telling the story of a mother whose fifteen year old daughter was murdered. Through the Sycamore Tree Project, the mother was able to participate in a faith-based, in prison program where she could address criminals similar to the offender who murdered her daughter. This experience allowed her to let go of some of the anger, and allowed prisoners to understand the perspective of the victim. This program was developed by Prison Fellowship International, to bring together victims and offenders for meetings in the prison setting. Topics discussed included the impact of the crime, confession, repentance and making amends. In this particular case, both the offenders and the victim‘s parents benefited (Parker, 2008). However, most research shows that even with these techniques in place, reform of offenders is modest (Levrant et al, 1999; Andrews and Bunta, 2003). Further, there are some concerns about the effect on due process rights. Zhang and Zhang (2004) conducted an
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analysis of reintegrative shaming via the National Youth Survey, and they found no effect on predatory delinquency. Hay (2001) found no interaction effect of shaming and reintegration, and no positive effects of parental disapproval. Interestingly, Hay (2001) examined reintegrative shaming with parents in disciplining their kids. He found that forgiveness by peers actually increased the likelihood of participation in further criminality! Further, Botchkovar and Tittle (2005) for example, found that mediation for participating in gossip did not reduce misconduct in Russian women, and that any shaming might have negative consequences. Another concern is net widening. Lo, Maxwell and Wong (2006) for example, found that diversionary methods are more restorative, but more intrusive social control for minor offenses makes it easier for offenders to violate their conditions. Miethe, Lue and Reese (2002) concur. They tested this theory with juveniles in drug court, and found that drug court is actually more stigmatizing than reintegrative. Thus, the risk for recidivism was higher (because they were observed more and their treatment was less anonymous). Consequently, there were more opportunities to observe new violations. Due to these findings, Miethe, et al (2002) suggest the need to examine the form and contact of the type of social control. There is also a danger in using restorative justice techniques with serious offenses because it might trivialize those offenses. According to Harris (2006), interviews with participants who attended a court case or family group conference in Australia showed shame-related emotions for those who perceived social disapproval for their driving while over the legal alcohol limit. The study demonstrated that restorative justice interventions were more reintegrative in nature. However, they were not perceived as less stigmatizing by the participants, reiterating the need to examine the form and contact of the type of social control. In another study, Rodogno (2008) examined the relevance and desirability of shame and guilt in restorative justice conferences. It was found that this question is not easily answered. Instead, both emotions can be beneficial or detrimental depending on the nature of the shame and guilt, as well as cultural and situational factors. In the corporate setting, Levi (2002) tested the theory of reintegrative shaming with financial crimes. He found that large corporations are concerned about their reputations, so he thought they would commit fewer violations. Although shaming would be a common response by the media or social and occupational reference groups, he found that the threat of stopping firms from doing new business was a more effective deterrent than shaming (Levi, 2002). Some research on applying reintegrative shaming to the corporate world has been conducted in an attempt to decrease criminal activities (Barnard, 1999). In one test of Braithwaite‘s theory on tax offenders, taxpayers who thought their enforcement experience had been reintegrative were less likely to report evading their taxes two years later. (Murphy & Harris, 2007). Pynchon (2009) agrees that post-offender shame-reduction programs necessary for restorative justice efforts to meet the goal of rehabilitation. She examined the use of these efforts in Alcoholics Anonymous. According to Van Ness and Weber (2008) Victim Offender Dialogue programs in prisons provide victims and victim survivors the opportunity to meet with their offenders to discuss the crime and issues surrounding it. Face-to-face meetings between inmates and victims (or surviving family members) have been utilized in the name of restorative justice (RuthHeffelbower and Gaboury, 2008).
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Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) found support for this approach in other venues. For example, they found greater compliance with standards in nursing homes when health inspectors used the reintegrative shaming approach. Chen (2002) found support for Braithwaite‘s premise that reintegrative shaming is more effective in preventing criminal behavior (than the fear/threat of punishment) in Chinese society. This is due to the fact that shaming is particularly meaningful in a society with strong social bonds. Chen (2002) found that in Chinese society social norms are followed based on moral socialization. According to Sampson and Laub (2005), reintegrative shaming describes a family environment where informal social controls work. Sherman (1993) also found that reintegrative shaming sanctions promote deterrence. Wheeldon (2009) found that restorative justice efforts can lead to greater cooperation between individuals and the community. Interestingly, the majority of states have used restorative justice language in law or policy documents (Zehr, 2008). According to Ahmed and Braithwaite (2004), children who bully others are less likely to acknowledge shame. By that acknowledgement, individuals take responsibility for what happened and take steps to make amends. They found that the extent to which parents used non-stigmatizing shaming in response to their children‘s bullying did decrease the bullying. Robbers (2009) tested this theory with sex offenders and found that there are many barriers to successful reintegration for these offenders due to labeling and the legal requirement for registering as sex offenders. In addition, there are housing restrictions and community involvement restrictions for these offenders that make it even more difficult for them to be reintegrated back into the community. In Virginia, some sex offenders participated in a residential treatment program and said it played a major role in preventing their re-offending. Community involvement and church-related outreach has also been found effective in limiting the public stigma associated with their crime; which is critical to reintegration. McAlinden (2006) found that reintegrative shaming can be coordinated with retributive framework to better manage the label and stigma associated with sex offenders. She found that public awareness of sex offending leads to stigma. Stigma leads to social exclusion and a possible return to offending. Thus, a restorative approach brings the informal justice process closer to the community, increasing their involvement in the process of restoring and reintegrating the offender. Since there are criticisms of the reintegrative approach, combining it with current regulations rather than using it as an alternative, may be a step in the right direction. (McAlinden, 2006). A number of other researchers (Morris, 2002; Daly, 2002; Grasmick, Bursik and Arneklev, 1993) have extended restorative justice techniques to the serious crime of sex offending and domestic violence because current regulations are failing to reduce recidivism. (In fact, some of the students surveyed in the current study thought it would be appropriate to try with sex offenders). Unfortunately, Vandiver, Dial and Worley (2008) found that the stigma associated with the sex offender registry is difficult to overcome. The registry requirements have led to a loss of friends (i.e. a very small support group), which hinders resources for success. Further, the stigma in housing, employment and interpersonal relationships can be very damaging. Vandiver et al (2008) found at least one negative effect of the registry on female sex offenders, and difficulty for them to reintegrate back into their communities after this label. Yet, they found that when members of the community take a strong stance to integrate the offenders back, it does increase legitimate opportunities for employment and relationships, decreasing their loss of self-esteem and feelings of being cut off from the community.
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UNIQUE PROGRAMS Koss, et al (2004) examined the RESTORE program which is a community based, restorative justice program for sex crimes including sexual assault and rape. The response of the criminal justice system often disappoints victims since they have little control over the proceedings, and sometimes assessments of the situation are flawed. Reintegrative shaming says that those directly harmed should have a say (via the use of mediation and sentencing circles). Their study found that there were more apologies in these conferences. The use of a case manager as well as the use of impact statements by the victim, have also been found to be beneficial. Interestingly, only 47% of the students in the current study thought victims should have a say in the sentencing of their offender (see results below). Circle sentencing is an alternative method of sentencing offenders, which involves the community in the sentencing process. The offender and victim sit in a circle to discuss the impact of the offense, and to determine an individualized sentence. The process is normally used for less serious offenses (like assault and unlicensed driving). Pautz (2009) attempted to implement ―circles‖ in the classroom to develop stronger relationships between students and teachers, without turning conflicts into power struggles. Instead of using the standard response of letting students rely on teacher intervention to solve problems, students can learn to use other skills to deal with problems on their own. Problem solving-focused conflict resolution methods can be accomplished in cooperation, and lead to students holding each other accountable to develop their own solutions. With this technique, children can be reintegrated back into the group when conflict occurs. Rather than treating ―behavior‖ problems with disciplinary action, use it as an opportunity to work together, and meet the need to resolve emotions in the offender. According to Wachtel and Mirsky (2009) restorative justice practices improve the relationships between students, parents, teachers and administrators by incorporating techniques that hold students accountable. Rather than punishing students when they misbehave, efforts are taken to involve the student in repairing the harm they caused. This helps to fix relationships and fosters a sense of responsibility and respect for others. Other research on the use of restorative justice in the school setting has proven successful. Rather than using retributive techniques (like punitive detention) to handle children who misbehave, a school in South Dakota implemented an alternative called the Circle of Courage (Brendtro, Broken-leg and Van Bockern, 2002). Instead, the Restorative Justice Center responds more positively to heal and restore, and create a better school climate (Van Bockern, Ashworth, Ailts, Donnelly, Erickson, and Woltermann, 2008). In particular, it has been noted that the more punitive techniques are ineffective in changing behavior, and might instill more trauma, fear and isolation. Researchers have noted that children can develop problem solving skills and healthy self-concepts if their emotional needs are met (Brendtro, Ness, and Mitchell, 2001). Circles of Support have also been used with sex offenders for those at high risk for reoffending. They offer a network of informal support and treatment which involves moderating between the police, media and the community. In order to be successful these alternatives must be voluntary in nature. There must be public awareness and media management to understand the risks as well as the fact that most offenders will not re-offend if given appropriate treatment and support (Grubin, 1998).
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Fitzgerald (2008) did not find that the process of circle sentencing reduced the frequency or the seriousness of offending, and there were no significant differences between the treatment and control group in the percentage of offenders whose next offense was less serious. However, this does not mean that circle sentencing is not meeting other objectives. It might have a crime prevention value that is difficult to measure (if it strengthens the informal social controls that exist in Aboriginal communities). Further, Menzel (2005) found that circle sentencing helps the offender take responsibility for his or her behavior, but the results are only short-lived. Offenders are only embarrassed and regretful at the time of their apology, but not after. In New Zealand, Family Group Conferences have been experimented with. They originated in 1989, to be used for juvenile offenders. Courts served as a backup instead of the norm, and Peacemaking Circles were utilized. The conference (or circle) allows the offenders to admit their wrongdoing and acknowledge responsibility. A facilitator assists with the process, where the focus is on the harm to the offender, and on taking proactive steps to remove or transform shame. The community plays a vital role in this process, which has been found more healing than the punishment-oriented model of most courts (Zehr, 2008). Group Conferencing gives the victim a voice (which most students surveyed thought was important), and makes the offender accountable. The offenders can hear how their behavior impacted others, and the victims (or a representative for the victims) can hear the apology. Outcomes are negotiated, and the support provided tends to decrease the seriousness and the rates of re-offending because it diverts young people away from supervisory court orders and from falling deeper into the criminal justice system. Interestingly, most victims/ representatives do participate in this process (Grant, 2008). It is also important to consider the role of agents of the criminal justice system. Conti (2009) found that police recruits who were exposed to degradation, developed maladaptive coping skills and increased hostility. Thus, restorative justice training for correctional officers has also been assessed (Ruth-Heffelbower and Gaboury, 2008). Some studies show that youthful offenders that did not apologize during family conferences were three times more likely to re-offend (Morris and Maxwell, 1997). Hosser et al (2008) conducted a study of young prisoners in Germany to see if shame/guilt would be related to criminal behavior after release. They found decreased recidivism with older prisoners and decreased recidivism among prisoners with higher intelligence. They also found a positive effect of shaming and a negative effect of guilt on recidivism, meaning that those who expressed guilt were less likely to re-offend. Additionally, they found that shame and guilt together contributed to a 14% difference in the proportion of recidivists twenty-four months after release from a first prison term. It appears guilt supports pro-social behavior and motivates people to admit mistakes (Hosser, et al, 2008). According to Workman (2008), the first few months is the most challenging for released prisoners since they need assistance with housing, employment and interpersonal relationships. According to her research, if prisoners get help from mentors and the community during this time frame, their chances of re-offending drops by almost 40%. This can be accomplished through the use of a holistic approach to prisoner reintegration known as ―Restorative Reintegration‖ Operation Jericho, developed by the Prison Fellowship. Anecdotal evidence suggests moderate success via the use of trained church-based mentors who facilitate relationships with the prisoners and other community organizations in order to reduce the barriers they face (Workman, 2008).
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Although this program in itself is not sufficient to sustain long term change, it has been found that prisoners respond positively to this approach since it builds on existing strengths, and assists with accommodating employment, social, financial, health and rehabilitative needs, while including the community. Research suggests that restorative reintegration occurs when the community is involved through informal support, with less stigma and shame. In addition, by providing opportunities for praise and approval, mutual respect is promoted and the offenders can reconcile with their victims (Workman, 2008). Radosh (2008), prison programs for women that only address parenting and occupational skills are not enough to reduce recidivism. Instead, a comprehensive approach that treats offenders in a humane and supportive way is a more therapeutic response to their crimes. According to Tosouni and Ireland (2008) restorative conferencing predicted more shameguilt than traditional court processing. In addition, feelings of shame-guilt significantly lowered intentions of re-offending. Noll & Harvey (2008), found that restorative justice can be applied to clergy-perpetrated sexual abuse because it can aid the healing process for the victims as well as the church and the offenders. Grant (2008) examined two new restorative justice approaches; ROPES and The Children‘s Koori Court. ROPES is a diversionary program that involves interaction between young offenders and the police. When the program is completed, charges are struck out and the offender has no criminal record. The program has produced low rates of reoffending in pilot studies. The Koori Court is another restorative justice approach that attempt to make the court process less alienating. There is again communication between the defendant, the victim and the community. In addition, defendants must acknowledge the authority of the Elders/Respected Persons from the Aboriginal community. They must consent to participate as well. After the open exchange of information, the judicial officer (who is now better informed) will determine the appropriate sentence. The context of the offending and the prospects for rehabilitation are better addressed, and the sentence can be more individualized and appropriate than mainstream court. Because of this, cases in the Children‘s Koori Court take much longer than normal court proceedings. However, the pilot program showed that the proceedings help to understand behavior and change it (Grant, 2008, Harris, 2006). Unfortunately, evaluations of the Koori Courts pilot program (which showed that their use reduced the levels of recidivism among Koori defendants) have been criticized for the use of inadequate follow-up periods. Thus, findings cannot be taken as evidence of the effectiveness of Koori Courts in reducing recidivism.
RESULTS Summary of the Sample of 200 Students A twenty question survey was developed to be administered at a private college located in a mixed urban and suburban area of Northern New Jersey. The survey consisted of mostly closed-ended questions to assess student perceptions of the utility of restorative justice efforts, as well as some open-ended questions regarding which types of crimes and/or
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criminals this effort would work best for. Included on the survey was a legend, with the definitions of ―reintegrative‖ shaming, and some other important terms related to the contents of the questionnaire. Two hundred surveys were administered to students at this college, in fourteen different classrooms, over the course of three weeks. The survey was completely anonymous, and students were required to be age 18 or older to qualify to complete it. Both male and female students completed the survey, with a larger percentage of female students overall. Approval from the college‘s Institutional Review Board was obtained, and students were given Informed Consent forms before completion of the survey. There were 141 females and 58 males in the sample (1 person did not answer the gender question). Most respondents did not aspire to a career in Criminal Justice (163) or 81% of the sample, but 34 respondents did. Interestingly, those who did aspire to a career in Criminal Justice were not all Criminal Justice majors. Some were Business, Psychology, Sociology, Philosophy, Religion, Nursing, Physical Therapy, and Biology majors. Overall, majors were very diverse. In the sample of 200 students, sixteen different majors were represented. Most majors came from the Nursing Division (44 students). Twenty-six were Business majors and another twenty-six were Education majors. There were nineteen Criminal Justice majors, sixteen Psychology majors, and sixteen Biology majors. For a complete list of majors represented, see Table 1. It was hypothesized that Social Science students would have some prior knowledge about the topic, since they have learned about restorative justice efforts in both their lower and upper level criminal justice and sociology courses. Thus, the responses of Political Science, History, Criminal Justice and Sociology students were examined separately from the rest. First, the overall findings of the entire group will be summarized. Table 1. Majors Represented in Sample of 200 Students Majors Nursing Business Education Criminal Justice Psychology Biology No answer Art Sociology History English Arts & Sciences Communications Philosophy Political Science Pre Med Physical Therapy
Number of Students 44 26 26 19 16 16 15 9 9 8 6 3 3 3 2 2 2
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Overall, in the sample of 200 students, the majority agreed with question number 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 15 (see questionnaire in Appendix A). However, there were only three questions in which 75% or more of the sample agreed with the question, and that was on question #5, 10 and 15. On question #1, 121 respondents (or just over 60% of the total sample) agreed that restorative justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime. Seventy-eight did not, and one ―no answer‖ response was recorded. On question #2, 113 respondents (or just over 56% of the sample) agreed that restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim. Eighty-five disagreed, and there were two ―no answer‖ responses. On question #3, 127 respondents (more than 60% of the sample overall) thought criminals were treated too leniently today, and 73 did not. On question #4, 129 (60% of respondents) thought the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders, and 67 did not. Three respondents did not answer the question, and one responded with ―depends‖. On question #5, 90% (or 181 respondents) agreed that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society by locking up offenders. There were fifteen respondents who disagreed, three who did not answer, and one who answered ―depends‖. On question #6, 145 respondents (just over 70% of the sample) agreed with the statement that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive. Fifty-one disagreed, three did not respond, and one said ―depends‖ again. On question #8, 149 (just over 70%) agreed that criminals can change their behavior for the better. Forty-seven disagreed, one said ―sometimes‖ and two said ―depends‖. On question #9, 123 respondents (just over 60%) agreed that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future. Seventy-one disagreed, two responded that it ―depends‖, and one responded ―sometimes‖. On question #10, 175 respondents (or 81% of the sample) agreed that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders. Twenty-five respondents disagreed. On question #12, responses were almost evenly distributed, but a slightly larger percentage of respondents agreed that shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing crimes (i.e. general deterrence). Fifty-two percent agreed and almost 48% disagreed with the statement. There was one respondent who did not answer the question. On question #15, 157 respondents (or 75% of the sample) agreed that reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile offenders. Forty-two disagreed, and one person did not answer the question. The majority of respondents disagreed with questions 7, 11, 13 and 14. On question #7, responses were almost evenly distributed with 47% agreeing and almost 53% disagreeing with the question of the appropriateness of the victim participating in the punishment of their victimizers (one person did not respond to the question). On question #11, only 41% agreed with the statement that shaming will deter the criminal from committing a future crime. The majority (116 respondents) disagreed, and there were two respondents that left the question blank. On question #13, 80 respondents (or 40% of the sample) agreed with the statement that reintegrative shaming causes less stigma. One-hundred and seventeen disagreed, and three did not answer the question. On question #14, responses were almost evenly distributed, but the majority disagreed with the statement that using regular punishment techniques (that are not reintegrative), causes offenders to think worse of themselves. Ninety-two respondents (or 46%) disagreed, and almost 54% disagreed with the statement. One did not answer the question.
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Table 2. Crimes that Reintegrative Shaming Will Work For. Crime No Response Theft Juveniles Drugs Non-Violent Offenders Robbery Rape Sex Offenders Driving Under the Influence Breaking and Entering/Burglary Any Crime Assault Tax Evasion/Fraud Murder Crimes of Necessity Abuse Vandalism Violent Gun Peeping Toms To Prevent Future Crime
Number of Students 55 28 20 20 16 14 9 8 5 5 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
On Question #16, respondents were asked for which crimes or criminals ―reintegrative shaming‖ would work best for. Although 55 respondents did not list a crime, the most common responses were: Theft, Juveniles, Drugs, Non-Violent Offenders, and Robbery. See Table 2 for a list of responses to this question. On Question #17, respondents were asked for which crimes or criminals ―reintegrative shaming‖ would not work for. Many respondents did not list any crime, but the most common response was Murder, then Rape, and then Sex Offenders. See Table 3 for a list of responses to this question. Question #18 examined the number of majors from each discipline (which are summarized in Table 1), and Question #19 examined the number of students interested in the field of Criminal Justice. Overall, there were 34 students who expressed an interest in this field. One student did not respond and two were not sure (163 were not interested in Criminal Justice). On question #20, the gender of the respondents was revealed.
Summary of the Male Students Although males only comprised 29% of the sample, it is interesting to examine the differences in their perceptions in comparison to the female students who were surveyed.
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Number of Students 63 58 22 11 9 8 4 4 4 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Overall, in the sample of 58 male students, the majority agreed with question number 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 15. On question #5, 90% (or 51 males) agreed that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society by locking up offenders. There were seven respondents who disagreed. On question #6, 43 males (just over 74%) agreed with the statement that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive, and fifteen disagreed. On question #8, 46 males (or 80%) agreed that criminals can change their behavior for the better, and twelve disagreed. On question #9, 40 males (almost 70%) agreed that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future, and eighteen disagreed. On question #10, 48 males (or 82%) agreed that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders, and ten disagreed. On question #15, 47 male (or 80%) agreed that reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile offenders, and eleven disagreed. On question #1 and #14, only 29 male respondents (exactly 50% of the males) agreed that Restorative Justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime, and that using regular punishment techniques (not reintegrative) causes offenders to think worse of themselves. On question #2, 31 male respondents (or just over 60%) agreed that Restorative Justice efforts are fair to the victim. Twenty-three disagreed, one did not answer the question, and one male respondent ―depends‖. On question #3, 35 male respondents (just over 60% of the sample overall) thought criminals were treated too leniently today, and 22 did not. On question #4, 36 (just over 60% of male respondents) thought the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders, and 22 did not.
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On question #7, 11, and 13 less than 50% of the male respondents agreed with the statements that shaming will deter the criminal from committing a future crime, that shaming will deter the criminal from committing a future crime, and that reintegrative shaming causes less stigma. On question #12, thirty-five males (or less than 60% of them) agreed that shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing crimes (i.e. general deterrence). Twenty-five males disagreed with this statement. Overall, there were eleven male respondents who were interested in a career in criminal justice.
Males Aspiring to a Career in Criminal Justice Of the eleven male respondents who aspired to a career in criminal justice, most agreed with question number 1, 2. 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 15. Ninety percent agreed with question #5, which stated that agreed that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society by locking up offenders. Almost 82% of the males interested in a career in criminal justice (9 of them) agreed with questions #8, #9 and #10 (that criminals can change their behavior for the better, that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future, and that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders). On question #1 and #15, almost 73% thought restorative justice efforts are working to control crime, and that reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile offenders. Sixty-three percent of these males (or 7 of them interested in a career in criminal justice) agreed with question #2 and #13 (that restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim, and that shaming causes less stigma). Fifty-four percent of the males interested in a career in criminal justice agreed with question #6 and #12 (that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive, and that shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing crimes). Only 45% agreed with question #3, 4, 7 and 11 (that criminals were treated too leniently today, that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders, that it is appropriate for victims to participate in the punishment of their victimizer, and that shaming will prevent future criminality). Finally, only four of the males interested in a career in criminal justice (40%) agreed with question #14 (that using regular punishment techniques (not reintegrative) causes offenders to think worse of themselves). Interestingly, those males who expressed an interested in a career in criminal justice were not only criminal justice majors; there were Accounting, Biology and Nursing majors in this group as well.
Male Social Science Majors The researcher thought it would be interesting to compare the social science majors to the non-social science majors in this study to determine if perceptions were different depending on career choices. There were fourteen male social science majors in the sample, including History, Criminal Justice, Sociology and Political Science. Some students were double majors within the discipline. Overall, a large majority of these students agreed with question 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10, and 14. On question #6, 93% agreed that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive, and on question #8 almost 86% agreed that criminals can change their
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behavior for the better. On questions #5 and #9, 79% agreed that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society by locking up offenders, and that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future. On question #1 and #10, 70% thought restorative justice efforts are working to control crime, and that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders. Almost 65% agreed with question #3 (that criminals are treated too leniently today), and almost 65% of the male social science majors were interested in a career in criminal justice. Only 56% of male social science majors agreed with question #2 and #4 (that restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim and that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders). Exactly 50% agreed with question #7 and #12 (that the victim should have a say in the punishment of their victimizers, and that shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing crime). Only 44% agreed with question #13 (that reintegrative shaming causes less stigma), and only 35% agreed with question #11 (that shaming will deter the criminal from committing future crime). Only 21% agreed with question #14 (79% disagreed with the statement that using regular punishment techniques causes offenders to think worse of themselves).
Male Non-Social Science Majors There were 44 male respondents who were non-social science majors. Included in this group were Business, Nursing, English, Teacher Education, Psychology, Communications, Philosophy, and Graphic Design majors). Their opinions were slightly different from the male social science majors. Overall, 91% of these respondents agreed with question #5 (that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society) and 86% agreed with question #10 and #15 (that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders and that reintegrative shaming works better for juvenile offenders). Seventy-seven percent agreed with question #8 (that criminals can change their behavior for the better). On question #6, 68% agreed that the goal of punishment should be retributive, and on question #9, 66% agreed that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future. Almost 60% of respondents agreed with questions #3, 4, 12 and 14 (that criminals are treated too leniently today, that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders, that shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing a crime, and that regular punishment techniques that are not reintegrative cause offenders to think worse of themselves). Only 52% agreed with question #2 and 11 (that restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim, and that shaming criminals will deter them from committing a future crime). Only 46% agreed with question #13 (that reintegrative shaming causes less stigma) and only 44% agreed with question #1 (that restorative justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime). Thus, the male non-social science students tended to agree with questions #5, 8, 10, and 15, where the male social science majors were more likely to agree with questions #1, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10, and strongly disagree with question #14.
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Summary of the Females Students There were many more females in this sample of college students because there are more female students at the college overall. One-hundred and forty-one female students were surveyed (or 70% of the entire population examined). Overall, female students‘ perceptions were similar to the males overall. They were most inclined to agree with questions #5, 6, 8, 10 and 15 (where the males overall were most inclined to agree with the same questions (in addition to question #9). Ninety-one percent of the females overall agreed with question #5 (the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society), and 90% agreed with question #10 (prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders). Seventy-seven percent (or 109 females) agreed with question #15 (that reintegrative shaming works better for juvenile offenders), and 72 agreed with questions #6 and #8 (the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive, and that criminals can change their behavior for the better). Sixtyfive percent agreed with questions #1, 3 and 4 (that restorative justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime, criminals are treated too leniently today, and that goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders). Only 58% agreed with question #2 and #9 (that restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim, and that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future), and only 50% agreed with question #12 (that shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing a crime). Only 48% agreed with question #7 (that it is appropriate for victims to have a say in the punishment of their victimizers), and 45% agreed with question #14 (that regular punishment techniques that are not reintegrative cause offenders to think worse of themselves). The smallest percentage (38%) agreed with question #11 and 13 (that shaming criminals will deter them from committing a future crime, and that reintegrative shaming causes less stigma).
Females Aspiring to a Career in Criminal Justice Sixteen percent (or twenty-three) of the females overall aspired to a career in the field of criminal justice. Again, there were representatives from majors other than Criminal Justice, and some double majors. Those majors included: Sociology, Business, Psychology, Philosophy, Religion, Nursing, Physical Therapy, and Biology. Responses were similar to their male counterparts. The majority agreed with question #1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 15. The majority of males who aspired to a career in criminal justice agreed with some of the same questions (#1, 5, 8, 10, and 15) as well as question #9. Ninety-six percent of these females agreed with question #10 (that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders), and 91% agreed on question #5 that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society. Eighty-three percent agreed with question #15 (that reintegrative shaming works better for juvenile offenders), and 74% agreed with question #1, 2, 4 and 8 (that restorative justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime, that restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim, that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders, and that criminals can change their behavior for the better). On question #12, 70% agreed that shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing a crime, and 65% of female respondents on question #9 agreed that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future. Sixty-one percent of
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respondents on question #6 and #14 agreed that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive, and that regular punishment techniques that are not reintegrative cause offenders to think worse of themselves. On question #3 and #13, only 52% agreed that criminals are treated too leniently today, and that reintegrative shaming causes less stigma. Forty-eight percent agreed that shaming criminals will deter them from committing a future crime on question #11, and forty-three percent agreed that it is appropriate for victims to have a say in the punishment of their victimizers on question #7.
Females Social Science Majors There were twenty-one female social science majors in the sample, including those from History, Criminal Justice, Sociology and Political Science. Ninety percent of them agreed with question #10 (that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders), and over 80% of them agreed with question #5 (that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society). Almost 80% of them (16 of 21) agreed with question #1, 4, and 15 (that restorative justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime, that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders, and that reintegrative shaming works better for juvenile offenders). Seventy-one percent (15 of the 21 female social science majors) said they aspired to a career in criminal justice. Sixty-six percent of the female social science majors agreed with question #6 and # 12 (that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive, and that shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing a crime). Almost 60% of them (12 of the 21) agreed with question #2, 3, and 8 (that restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim, that criminals are treated too leniently today, and that criminals can change their behavior for the better). Fifty-percent of them agreed with question # 9, 11, 13, and 14 (that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future, that shaming criminals will deter them from committing a future crime, that reintegrative shaming causes less stigma, and that regular punishment techniques that are not reintegrative cause offenders to think worse of themselves). Finally, only 33% agreed that it is appropriate for victims to have a say in the punishment of their victimizers, on question #7.
Female Non-Social Science Majors When examining the female non social science majors, their opinions were almost exactly the same as the male non-social science majors. They were most likely to agree with questions #5, 6, 8, 10 and 15, with the same top four answers as their male counterparts. Of the 120 females in this sample, 98% agreed with question #10 (that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders) and 93% agreed with question #5 (that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society). Seventy-eight percent agreed with question #15 (that reintegrative shaming works better for juvenile offenders), and 75% agreed with question #8 (that criminals can change their behavior for the better). Seventy-three percent agreed with question #6 (that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive), and 66% agreed with question #3 (that criminals are treated too leniently today).
Table #4. Responses by Sub-Population of Sample. Sample-> Question: 1. restorative justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime 2. restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim 3. criminals are treated too leniently today 4. the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate 5. the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society 6. the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive 7. it is appropriate for victims to have a say in the punishment of their victimizers 8. criminals can change their behavior for the better 9. efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future 10. prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders 11. shaming criminals will deter them from committing a future crime 12. shaming criminals will deter the general public from committing a crime 13.re-integrative shaming causes less stigma 14. regular punishment techniques (not reintegrative) cause offenders to think worse of themselves 15.re-integrative shaming works better for juvenile offenders
Entire Pop
Males
Female
60%
50%
65%
Social Science Males 70%
Social Science Females 80%*
Males Aspiring to a CJ Career 73%
Females Non Social Aspiring to a CJ Science Career Males 74% 44%
Non Social Science Females 63%
56%
60%
58%
56%
60%
60%
74%
57%
58%
60% 60%
60% 60%
65% 65%
65% 56%
60% 80%*
60% 60%
52% 74%
60% 60%
66% 63%
90%*
90%*
91%*
79%*
80%*
90%*
91%*
91%*
93%*
70%
74%
72%
93%*
66%
74%
61%
68%
73%
47%
43%
48%
50%
33%
43%
43%
40%
50%
70%
80%*
72%
86%*
60%
80%*
74%
77%*
75%*
60%
70%
58%
79%*
50%
70%
65%
66%
59%
81%*
82%*
90%*
70%
90%*
82%*
96%*
86%*
98%*
41%
50%
38%
35%
50%
50%
48%
52%
36%
52%
60%
50%
50%
66%
60%
70%
60%
48%
40% 46%
49% 50%
38% 45%
44% 21%
50% 50%
50% 50%
52% 61%
46% 60%
33% 44%
75%*
80%*
77%*
65%
80%*
80%*
83%*
86%*
78%*
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There was less support for the remaining questions. On question #1 (restorative justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime), and question #4 (the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders), there was only 63% support, and on question #9 (efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future), there was only 59% support. Fifty-eight percent agreed with question #2 (restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim), and 50% agreed with question #7 (it is appropriate for victims to have a say in the punishment of their victimizers). Less than onehalf of the female non-social science majors agreed with questions 11-14. Only 48% agreed with question #12 (shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing a crime), and only 44% agreed with question #14 (that regular punishment techniques that are not reintegrative cause offenders to think worse of themselves). Further, only 36% agreed with question #11 (that shaming criminals will deter them from committing a future crime), and only 33% agreed with question #13 (reintegrative shaming causes less stigma).
CONCLUSION Overall, there were not many differences between the Social Science and non-Social Science majors regarding their views on restorative justice. It appears overall support from the entire sample (75% or more) existed on questions #5, 10 and 15. For the females overall, there was a 75% or higher agreement on questions #5, 10 and 15 as well. For the males overall, there was a 75% or higher agreement on questions #5, 8, 9, 10 and 15. When examining the students who aspired to a career in criminal justice, there was 75% or higher support for the males on question #5, 8, 9, 10 and 15, and for the females, there was 75% or higher support on question #5, 10 and 15 (74% of them agreed with question #1, 2, and 8 as well). When examining the social science majors, the males expressed a 75% or higher agreement with questions #5, 6, 8, and 9. Interestingly, 79% of them disagreed with question #14, and only 65% of them agreed with question #15 (where most of the overall sample was very supportive). The female social science majors expressed 75% or higher support for question #1, 4, 5, 10 and 15. Thus, they felt a bit different than their male counterparts. Finally, when examining the responses of the non-social science majors, there was 75% or higher agreement with questions #5, 8, 10, and 15 for the males and #5, 8, 10 and 15 for the females. It is apparent that the non-social science majors felt similarly, regardless of their gender. In addition, it appears the non-social science majors were less likely to agree with questions #1, 2, 4, and 9 than the social science majors and those who aspired to a career in criminal justice. Table #4 summarizes the findings for each group. To summarize, none of the sample (or sub-populations within the sample) demonstrated 75% or higher belief that restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim, or that criminals are treated too leniently today. Thus, they were more likely to believe that a victim should participate in the punishment of their victimizer, and did not think shaming criminals would deter the behavior of the criminal or the onlookers. They did not think reintegrative shaming causes less stigma, or that our current punitive techniques cause offenders to think worse of themselves. In fact, the subjects of this study were a punitive group; a large majority thought our criminals were treated appropriately (not too leniently) today. To take this a step further,
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the Social Science Males demonstrated 75% or higher belief that the goal of punishment should be retributive (although the rest of the sample did not go this far). Interestingly, the Social Science Males were the only group most supportive of the belief that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community would help them to become better people in the future. Males (including those overall, those in and not in the social sciences, and those aspiring to a career in the criminal justice system), were most likely to believe that criminals could change their behavior for the better. Non-social science females also agreed with this statement. Only Social Science Females demonstrated 75% or higher belief that restorative justice efforts were working to control or reduce crime, and that the goal of punishment should be to rehabilitate offenders. The across-the-board support for questions #5, 10 and 15 were astounding. Almost all respondents thought the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society. They thought prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders, and that reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile offenders.
REFERENCES Andrews, D. A. & Bonta. (2003). The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 3rd edition. Cincinnati: Anderson. Ahmed, E. & Braithwaite, V. (2004). ―What, Me Ashamed?‖ Shame Management and School Bullying‖. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 41, 269-94 Barnard, J. (1999). Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing. 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 959. Brendtro, L. K., Brokenleg, M. & Van Bockern, S. (2002). Reclaiming youth at risk: Our hope for the future (rev. ed). Bloomington, IN: National Educational Service. Brendtro, L. K., Ness, A. & Mitchell, M. (2001). No Disposable Kids. Longmont CO: Sopris West. Botchkovar, E. V. & Tittle, C. R. (2005). ―Crime, Shame and Reintegration in Russia‖. Theoretical Criminology, 9(4), 401-442. Braithwaite, J. (1989) Crime, Shame and Reintegration. UK: Cambridge. Cambridge University Press Chen, X. (2002). ―Social Control in China: Applications of the Labeling Theory and the Reintegrative Shaming Theory” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 46, 45-63. Cloward, R. A. & Ohlin., L. (1960). Delinquency and Opportunity. New York: Free Press. Cohen, A. K. (1955). Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang. New York: Free Press. Conti, N. (2009). ―A Visigoth System: Shame, Honor, and Police Socialization‖. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 38 (3), 409-432. Daly, K. (2001). ―Conferencing in Australia and New Zealand: Variations, research findings and Prospects‖. In A. Morris & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Restorative justice for juveniles: Conferencing mediation and circles (59-89). Oxford: UK: Hart. Fitzgerald, J. (2008). Does circle sentencing reduce Aboriginal offending? Contemporary Issues in Crime and Justice, 115 (May) 1-12. Grant, P. (2008). Interventions that work: Dealing With Young People in Conflict with the Law. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.
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Grasmick, H. G., Bursik, R. J. & Arneklev, B. J. (1993). ―Reduction in drunk driving as a response to increased threats of shame, embarrassment and legal sanctions‖. Criminology, 31(1), 41-67. Grubin, D. (1998). Sex Offending against Children: Understanding the Risk. Police Research Series Paper 99. London: Home Office. Harris, N. (2006). Reintegrative Shaming, Shame, and Criminal Justice. Journal of Social Issues. 62(2), 327-346. Hay, Carter. (2001). ―An Exploratory Test of Braithwaite‘s Reintegrative Shaming Theory.‖ Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 38, 132-35. Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hosser, D., Windzio, M. & Greve, W. (2008). ―Guilt and Shame as Predictors of Recidivism: A Longitudinal Study With Young Prisoners‖. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 35, 138152. Houts, S. S. (1995). ―Explaining Alcoholism Treatment Efficacy With the Theory of Reintegrative Shaming‖ Alcoholism Treatment Quarterly, 13, 2-38. Koss, M. P. & Bachar, K. J., Hopkins, Q. & Carlson, C. (2004). ―Expanding a Community‘s Justice Response to Sex Crimes Through Advocacy, Prosecutorial, and Public Health Collaboration: Introducing the RESTORE Program‖. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 19, 1435-1463. Levi, M. (2002). ―Suite justice or sweet charity? Some explorations of shaming and incapacitating business fraudsters‖ Punishment and Society, 4 (2), 147-163. Levrant, S., Cullen, F. T., Bulton, B. & Wozniak, J. F. (1999). ―Reconsidering Restorative Justice: The Corruption of Benevolence Revisited? Crime and Delinqueny, 45(1), 3-27. Lipka, S. (2009). With ―Restorative Justice‖, Colleges Strive to Educate Student Offenders. The Chronicle of Higher Education, April, 17, A26-A28. Lo, T. W., Maxwell, G. M. & Wong, D. S. W. (2006). ―Diversion From Youth Courts in Five Asia Pacific Jurisdictions: Welfare or Restorative Solutions‖ International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 50, 5-20. Makkai, T. & Braithwaite, J. (1994). ―Reintegrative Shaming and Compliance with Regulatory Standards.‖ Criminology, 32, 361-386. McAlinden, A. (2006). Managing risk: From regulation to the reintegration of sexual offenders. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 6, 197-218. Menzel, K. (2005). Circle Sentencing as a Shaming Sanctions. Restorative Justice Online. Washington, D.C.: PFI Center for Justice and Reconciliation. Miethe, T. D., Lu, H. & Reese, E. (2000). ―Reintegrative Shaming and Recidivism Risks in Drug Court: Explanations for Some Unexpected Findings‖ Crime and Delinquency, 46, 522-541. Morris, A. & Maxwell, G. (1997). ―Reforming Juvenile Justice: The New Zealand experiment‖ The Prison Journal, 77, 125-134. Murphy, K. & Harris, N. (2007). ―Shaming, Shame and Recidivism: A Test of Reintegrative Shaming Theory in White-Collar Crime Context‖. British Journal of Criminology, 47(6), 900-917. Noll, D. E. & Harvey, L. (2008). ―Restorative Mediation: The Application of Restorative Justice Practice and Philosophy to Clergy Sexual Abuse Cases‖. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse., 17(3/4), 377-396.
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Parker, L. (2008). Finding Release in Prison: A Victim’s Story. Washington, D.C.: Restorative Justice Online: Prison Fellowship International. Pautz, M. (2009). Empowering the Next Generation: Restorative Practices in a Preschool. Washington, D. C. Restorative Practices E-Forum: Prison Fellowship International. Pynchon, V. (2005). Shame by Any Other Name: Lessons for Restorative Justice From the Principles, Traditions and Practices of Alcoholics Anonymous. 5 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, 299. Robbers, M. R. (2009). ―Lifers on the Outside: Sex Offenders and Disintegrative Shaming‖, International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 53(1), 5-28. Rodogno, R. (2008). Shame and Guilt in Restorative Justice. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 14(2), 142-176. Radosh, P. F. (2008). Reflections on Women‘s Crime and Mothers in Prison: A Peacemaking Approach. In, F., John Wozniak, (Eds.), editors. Transformative Justice: Critical and Peacemaking Themes Influenced by Richard Quinney. Lanham, M. D. Lexington Books. 191-206. Ruth-Heffelbower, D. & Gaboury, M. T. (2008). Victim-Offender Programs in Correctional Settings--Can They Effectively Bridge Divergent Perspectives? In, Laura J. Moriarty, (Eds.), ontroversies in Victimology, Second Edition, P 133-146.Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing. Sampson, R. J. & Laub, J. H. (2005). ―A Life-Course View of the Development of Crime‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 602, 12-45. Sherman, Lawrence. (1993). ―Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction.‖ Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30, 445-73. Sutherland, E. H, & Cressey, D. R. (1960). “A Theory of Differential Association” in Principles of Criminology, 6th Edition. (Ed. Elaine S. Cressey). Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company. Tosouni, A. & Ireland. C. (2008). Shaming Youthful Offenders: An Empirical Test of Reintegrative Shaming Theory. International Journal of Restorative Justice., 4(2), 53-79. Vandiver, D. M., Dial, K. C. & Worley, R. M. (2008). ―A Qualitative Assessment of Registered Female Sex Offenders: Judicial Processing Experiences and Perceived Effects of a Public Registry” Criminal Justice Review 33, 177-198. Van Brockern, S., Ashworth, J., Ailts, J., Donnelly, J., Erickson, K. & Woltermann, J. (2008). ―The Restorative Justice Center: An Alternative to School Detention‖. Reclaiming Children and Youth, 17(3), 22-27. Van Bockern, S., Brendtro, L. & Brokenleg, M. (2000). ―Reclaiming Our Youth‖. In Villa, R.A. and Thousand, J. S., eds. Restructuring for Caring and Effective Education: Piecing the Puzzle Together. Baltimore: Paul H. Brooks Publishing Co. Inc. Vandiver, D. M. (2006). ―Female sex offenders: A comparison of solo offenders and cooffenders‖. Violence and Victims, 21(3), 339-354. Van Ness, D. W. & Weber, R. (2008). In-Prison Victim Offender Dialogue in the US. Washington, D.C.: Restorative Justice Online: Prison Fellowship International. Vogg, J. (1998). ―Delinquency and Shame: Data from Hong Kong.‖ British Journal of Criminology, 38, 247-264. Wachtel, T. & Mirsky, L. (2009). Safer Saner Schools: Restorative Practices in Schools and Education. Bethlehem, P. A. International Institute for Restorative Practices.
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Wheeldon, J. (2009). ―Finding common ground: restorative justice and its theoretical construction(s)”. Contemporary Justice Review., 12(1), 91-100. Wong, D. (1999). ―Culturally Specific Cases of Delinquency: Implications for Juvenile Justice in Hong Kong‖. Asia Pacific Journal of Social Work, 9, 98-113. Workman, K. (2008). Restorative Reintegration: A New Approach to Prisoner Aftercare in New Zealand. Auckland, NZ: Prison Fellowship New Zealand. Yeh, M. L. (2008). Restorative Justice, Affirmative Action Sentencing Legislation and the Canucks: Lessons From our Northern Neighbor. Washington University Global Studies Law Review., 7(3), 661-681. Zehr, H. (2008). Doing Justice, Healing Trauma: The Role of Restorative Justice in Peacebuilding. South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 1(1), 19-36. Zhang, L. & Zhang, S. (2004). ―Reintegrative Shaming and Predatory Delinquency‖ Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 41, 433-53. Survey on Reintegrative Shaming (Please circle the appropriate response) 1. Do you think ―restorative justice‖ efforts are working to control or reduce crime? YES NO 2. Are restorative justice efforts fair to the victim (does it fulfill the goal of punishing offenders)? YES NO 3. Do you think criminals are treated too leniently nowadays? YES NO 4. Do you think the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders? YES NO 5. Do you think the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society (by locking up offenders)? YES NO 6. Do you think the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive (punishment for the sake of punishment---the criminal did something illegal, and should pay for the crime)? YES NO 7. Do you think it is appropriate for the victim to participate (and have a say) in the punishment of their victimizer? YES NO 8. Do you think criminals can change their behavior for the better? YES NO 9. Do you think that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future? YES NO 10. Do you think prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders? YES NO 11. Do you think ―shaming‖ a criminal will deter the criminal from committing a future crime (deterrence)? YES NO 12. Do you think ―shaming‖ a criminal will deter onlookers/the general public from committing a crime at all? YES NO 13. Do you think reintegrative shaming causes less stigma? YES NO 14. Do you think using regular punishment techniques (not reintegrative) cause offenders to think worse of themselves (what is called a self-fulfilling prophecy)? YES NO 15. Do you think reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile offenders? YES NO
College Students' Perceptions of Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals 16. For which crimes do you think reintegrative shaming would work best? 17. For which crimes do you think reintegrative shaming would not work? 18. What is your major _________________ 19. Do you aspire to a career in the criminal justice system? YES 20. Are you male or female? MALE
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Key: Restorative justice is a theory of justice with a rehabilitative or reintegrative approach. The emphasis is on repairing the harm caused by the behavior, benefitting the injured parties, as well as the offender. Shaming-is a show of social disapproval Reintegrative Shaming-where the offender must own up to his/her behavior, but is then accepted back into the community
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 109-128
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 5
BEHAVING AGGRESSIVELY: THE ROLE OF SHAME IN PRISONER CONFRONTATIONS Michelle Butler* School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work, Queen‘s Univeristy Belfast, 6 College Park, Belfast, BT7 1LP, Northern Ireland
ABSTRACT Numerous researchers suggest that the experience of shame is linked to aggressive behaviour (see Scheff, 2000; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In this paper, prisoner self-narratives are explored to determine whether the presence of shame in their identity influenced their involvement in confrontations. The self-narratives of 89 adult male prisoners were examined to determine whether the prisoners expressed themes of shame in their self-narratives, the types of shame they experienced and if these experiences of shame influenced their involvement in confrontations with other prisoners. Results indicate that individuals expressing themes of shame in their self-narrative were more likely to engage in confrontations than those who did not express such themes. In particular, those who were insecure in their sense of self seemed to be more likely to react aggressively to behaviours which undermined their identity and were more likely to feel pressurised to conform to prisoner norms of masculinity and aggressiveness. This suggests that the expereince of shame may predispose individuals with an insecure self to engage in confrontations as a means of ego defence. Potential ramifications and limitations are discussed.
Keywords: Shame: Sense of Self: Insecurity; Aggression; Prison
INTRODUCTION For me […] when you are talking to someone you would like their attention, when you call someone you would like them to answer you with respect. Well for me, I found it *
Corresponding author: Telephone: 0044 798 6831727, E-mail:
[email protected]
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Michelle Butler disrespectful when he turned around and shouted ―WHAT!‖ at me. I felt like punching his fucking lights out, pardon my language, that was what I felt like and I let him know as well. […] I don‘t take disrespect. I‘m from somewhere where we don‘t take disrespect. If you disrespect me, I‘ll honour myself. But if I think it is not worthwhile, I will just walk away. 1 Know what I mean? That is the way it is. (Int. #63, age 31)
Shame is believed to be a painful emotion that is normally accompanied by a sense of ‗being small‘, shrinking, powerlessness and imagery of how one‘s defective self would appear to others (Tangney & Stuewig, 2004). It is seen as involving negative comparisons of one‘s self with others, resulting in feelings of worthlessness and inferiority (Tangney, 1990; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Shame has also been conceptualised as a social emotion arising from threatened social bonds and/or a detrimental change in social status (Cooley, 1902; Lynd, 1958; Lewis, 1971; Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, 2000). Consequently, feelings of shame may arise from an individual‘s perception of themselves, their behaviour, how they imagine they are perceived by others and how others behave towards them (Lynd, 1958; Lewis, 1971). In recent decades the concepts of shame and shaming have received considerable attention in the study of crime, conflict and violence (Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff & Retzinger 1991; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Gilligan, 1996, 2001). In particular, researchers have explored the potential links between shame and aggression with many arguing that the experience of shame and proneness to shame is linked to aggressive behaviour (Katz, 1988; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Gilligan, 1996, 2001; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher & Gramzow, 1992; Wright, Gudjonsson & Young, 2008). In this paper, the potential relationship between shame and aggression is explored to examine how and in what circumstances shame may influence an individual‘s involvement in aggressive behaviour in a prison setting.
Shame and Aggression The experience of shame is believed to be linked to aggression, feelings of anger and a reduced likelihood of dealing with anger in a constructive manner (see Gilbert & Miles, 2000; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al. 1992; Wright et al. 2008). Katz (1988) argues that the transformation of shame and humiliation into rage is the primary cause of violence. He believes that individuals experiencing shame and humiliation feel as if their sense of self is being threatened and engage in confrontations to defend their claim to moral worth. In such circumstances, Katz (1988) suggests that individuals will feel justified in hurting others in order to regain a sense of dignity and control over their identity. Indeed, research indicates that the experience of disrespect may make violence possible as it allows an individual to go against his/her general moral inhibitions by providing a justification or excuse for aggression (Butler & Maruna, 2009). Toch (1992) also examined the motivations driving an individual‘s use of aggression and concluded that the majority of violent offenders engage in confrontations out of a concern with defending, promoting, and/or compensating for their identity. Similarly, Gilligan (1996, 2001) theorises that individuals experiencing the emotion of shame tend to engage in confrontations as they attempt to deflect threats to their identity. 1
This notation is used to refer to interview with participant number 63, who was aged 31 years.
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Accordingly, feelings of shame may lead to aggression as individuals engage in confrontations2 as a means of deflecting threats to their identity arising from the experience of shame. However, as shame is thought to incorporate the view of the other, ―What brings shame is taking toward oneself what one presumes is the view that others would have, were they to look‖ (Katz, 1999: 149). Consequently, what is experienced as shameful will vary depending upon one‘s point of reference, who ‗the other‘ in question is and the esteem within which ‗the other‘ is held. As such, negative evaluations by well-respected peers may be experienced as more shaming than negative evaluations by strangers and/or out-group members (Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2001; Ellemers Doosje & Spears, 2004). In this way, shame, and what is experienced as shaming, may vary from one individual to another and from one social environment to the next. Nonetheless, it may be possible to detect commonalities in the experience of shame within a group of people from a similar social environment. Research suggests there are different types of shame which are believed to be differentially involved in facilitating aggressive behaviour (e.g. Braithwaite, 1989; Harris, 2003; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991). Scheff and Retzinger (1991) propose two different types of shame: resolved/acknowledged shame and unresolved/unacknowledged shame. According to Scheff and Retzinger (1991), everyone experiences varying levels of personal shame but some shame is acknowledged and can therefore be resolved, whilst other shame is denied and/or not fully acknowledged, becoming problematic in its impact. Scheff and Retzinger (1991) argue that while both types of shame may result in anger and aggression, it is the experience of unresolved/unacknowledged shame which can lead to prolonged displays of violent behaviour. Unresolved/ unacknowledged shame is thought to result in more aggressive confrontations through the development of shame spirals. Shame spirals are believed to occur when individuals behave aggressively to deflect feelings of shame but then become ashamed of their behaviour and feel ashamed of feeling ashamed (Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, 2000). Lewis (1971) had previously argued that it was not the experience of shame per se that leads to confrontations but rather unresolved / unacknowledged shame. Nevertheless, how the different expressions of shame may lead an individual to engage in confrontations has not been fully explained. Sullivan (1950) argues that individuals are motivated to achieve and/or maintain a sense of security in their identity. When they are confronted with events that question, threaten or challenge their identity, they will experience feelings of psychological anxiety which they attempt to reduce through the use of ‗security operations‘ (see Sullivan, 1950). Examples of security operations include rejecting one‘s rejectors or by forcing others to behave in a more in a more ‗appropriate‘ manner in the future (de Zulueta, 1994; Gilligan, 1996, 2001; Sykes, 1958). Security operations involve distracting one‘s attention away from distressing events and focusing on other thoughts and/or behaviours believed to return a sense of security and power to the ego. Engaging in confrontations is thought to be one such ‗security operation‘ through its ability to distract an individual‘s attention away from feelings of psychological anxiety and return a sense of agency and power to the self (Gaylin, 1984; Katz, 1988; de 2
Throughout this paper the term ‗confrontations‘ is used to refer to the occurrence of fights, assaults, arguments and threats of violence. When the expression ‗prisoner confrontations‘ is used, it refers specifically to the occurrence of confrontations between adult male prisoners.
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Zulueta, 1994; Gilligan, 1996, 2001). Consequently, experiences of shame may produce feelings of psychological anxiety, prompting individuals (especially men) to engage in confrontations as a means of protecting the self. de Zulueta (1994) suggests that damaged attachment bonds (i.e. damaged relationships with others, especially parents) can result in feelings of shame and humiliation as parental and cultural conditions fail to provide the individual with a sense of self-worth and self esteem. Feelings of shame are also thought to arise from wider social processes, such as exclusion, discrimination and stigmatisation, as society‘s perception of an individual can influence their conceptualisation of themselves and their relationships with others (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981; de Zulueta, 1994; Young, 1999, 2003). This implies that problematic relationships with others and/or experiences of stigmatisation, discrimination or exclusion may result in feelings of shame and contribute to the development of insecure attachments with other people. Individuals with insecure attachments are thought to be unsure of themselves and their moral worth (Crocker, Lee & Park, 2004). As a result, insecurely attached individuals are believed to experience more feelings of shame and fear negative evaluations by others than those who are securely attached (Wagner & Tangney, 1991; Mikulincer, 1998). Further, researchers argue that an individual‘s relationships with others can influence the development of their sense of self (see Fairburn, 1952; Mead, 1934). Attachment theorists, such as Bowlby (1969), place a particular emphasis on early family relationships as being important for the development of the self. Insecure attachments are believed to contribute to the development of an insecure self (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978; Crocker et al. 2004; de Zulueta, 1994; Miller, 2001). Individuals insecure in their sense of self tend to hold less positive views about themselves and seek external validation of their self-worth from others (Baumeister, Tice & Hutton, 1989; Vohs & Heatherton, 2001; Crocker, et al. 2004). This need for external validation can also lead these individuals to be more susceptible to conforming to social norms in order to achieve status amongst their peers (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper & Bouvrette, 2002; Crocker et al. 2004). This suggests that shame, particularly unresolved/unacknowledged shame, may lead those who are insecure to engage in confrontations as a means of defending and/or promoting their ego. These studies, therefore, indicate that for those who are insecure in their identity, shame may be experienced as threatening to their ego in the form of disrespect, being treated like a ‗nobody‘, a ‗loser‘, or somehow inadequate. In such circumstances, individuals may behave aggressively in an attempt to gain some semblance of control over their identity and reassert a sense of dignity and pride in their identity through being ‗hard‘ and/or a ‗badass‘ (see Miller, 2001; Young, 2003). However, these feelings may be further amplified in a prison setting as imprisonment represents a symbolic rejection of the individual by society.
Aggression in Prison Confrontations are a frequent part of prison life, with many prisoners engaging in physical fights, assaults, arguments and threats at some point during the course of their imprisonment (Boyle, 1977; Clemmer, 1940; Home Office, 2003; James, 2003; King & McDermott, 1995; McVicar, 1974; O‘Donnell & Edgar, 1996, 1998; Sykes, 1958;). Sykes (1958) argues that confrontations occur as prisoners struggle to deal with the ‗pains‘ of
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imprisonment. According to Sykes (1958), prisoners‘ involuntary segregation from the community, powerlessness within the prison regime and inability to demonstrate their masculinity through heterosexual relationships may be experienced as psychologically threatening to their sense of self (Sykes, 1958). Edgar, O‘Donnell and Martin (2002) built upon this work to argue that prisoners use aggression to make statements about their identity, place within the social hierarchy, power and reputation. These findings emphasise the importance of defending one‘s identity, masculinity and possessions as a motivating factor in prisoner confrontations. Recent research by Crewe (2005) highlights how prisoners may engage in confrontations not only out of a concern for their identity in the prison environment but also to protect their reputation outside of the prison setting. Crewe states that in English prisons there appears to be a decline in overall prisoner solidarity and a rise in solidarity amongst regional and ethnic peer groups. As prisoners may already have friends and/or associates detained in the same prison, how they behave in prison can impact upon their identity in the community. As a result, prisoners can become involved in confrontations due to their friendship networks, gangs and/or loyalties to regional or ethnic peer groups out of a desire to maintain their image in front of these peers. In particular, incidents of disrespect and insults are believed to trigger confrontations as prisoners attempt to ‗save face‘ by defending a specific image they are trying to project (Bourdieu, 1965; Goffman, 1967; Luckenbill, 1977). Prison norms of ‗toughness‘ and physical retaliation also mean that status within the prison environment tends to be based upon displays of physical strength. Consequently, many prisoners attempt to gain status in the prison environment and deflect threats to their self-image and/or social status through the use of aggression. In addition, researchers state that when an individual‘s access to social capital and/or symbolic indicators of social status is limited, being treated in a respectful manner becomes especially important for indicating their social worth (Anderson, 1999; Bourgois, 2003; Sennett, 2003). Prison is an environment where social capital is limited. As a result, threats and challenges to a prisoner‘s identity may be experienced as particularly distressing for prisoners. Anderson (1999) states that individuals with limited access to social capital may use aggression as a means of demanding that others acknowledge their social worth and treat them with dignity and respect. Within male prisons, the expression of masculinity is thought to be largely limited to displays of ‗toughness‘ (Sabo, Kupers & London 2001; Sykes, 1958; Toch, 1977). Therefore, confrontations for male prisoners can represent a particular way of deflecting threats to their identity as they attempt to replace feelings of shame with feelings of pride achieved through the aggressive display of ‗manly‘ behavior (see Gambetta, 2006; Gilligan, 1996; Sim, 1994). In particular, the nature of the prison environment appears to reinforce definitions of masculinity based on ‗toughness‘, as the prison environment is predominantly a male working class environment with a social hierarchy based on physical dominance and power (Scraton, Sim & Skidmore, 1991; Sim, 1994; Sabo et al. 2004). This is evident amongst the informal prison inmate code in which prisoners are expected to be ‗manly‘, tough and avoid displays of physical weakness (Crewe, 2005; Sykes & Messenger, 1960). Prisoners who appear tough and able to defend themselves from exploitation and/or manipulation achieve status while those who do not are perceived as weak and an easy target for future victimisation (Sykes, 1958; McCorkle, 1982; Edgar et al. 2002). This can lead prisoners who would not normally behave aggressively to ‗put on a front‘ and behave aggressively to achieve the respect of their
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masculine peers and/or avoid appearing weak to others (Sykes, 1958; McCorkle, 1982). In this way, the prison environment can place added importance on the use of aggression as a means of achieving status and respect amongst their fellow prisoners, and to communicate that they are men and should not be victimised (Gambetta, 2006; McCorkle, 1982). In this paper, prisoner self-narratives are explored to determine whether the presence of shame in their identity influenced their involvement in confrontations. A self-narrative is a story that an individual constructs to explain their behaviours, feelings, motivations and desires within a meaningful and sequential framework (McAdams, 1985, 1994, 2001). It can provide an individual with a sense of identity and self as well as reflecting how an individual views him/herself and their experiences (McAdams, 1985, 1994, 2001). Gilligan (1996) proposes that individuals who express themes of shame in their identity tend to engage in more confrontations than others. For this reason, prisoner self-narratives are investigated to discover whether these individuals reported themes of shame in their self-narratives, the types of shame they experienced and if these themes of shame influenced their involvement in confrontations with other prisoners.
Prisoners‟ Experiences of Shame Eighty-nine adult male prisoners were voluntary recruited using a random stratified sampling technique from an English Category C3 prison. These participants were male and ranged in age from 21-65 years, with a mean age of 31 years and a standard deviation of 9.39. The majority were either white British or black Caribbean and were serving sentences for burglary, robbery and drug-related offences. However, some were also serving sentences for wounding with intent, harassment, grievous bodily harm and manslaughter. Over half stated they were from a working-class background, while the remainder either reported a lowermiddle-class or middle-class background. The majority (over 80 per cent) had no school qualifications, while 60 per cent had a history of drug addiction. They were asked to complete various social and psychological questionnaires, whilst also taking part in semi-structured interviews about their life experiences both in and outside of prison. The participants were asked to think of their life as a story and to describe significant moments in their lives and why these moments were important to them. All interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed and then coded for themes of shame. These men were not asked to describe events within which they had experienced shame. Rather, themes of shame were only coded if they were already present within the men‘s self-narratives. One month later, the participants were also asked to complete a self-reported involvement in prisoner confrontations questionnaire. This was to allow a quantitative and qualitative exploration of the presence of shame in the participants‘ self-narratives and the impact of this shame on their involvement in confrontations. An inductive content analytic approach was used to identify the different themes of shame emerging within their self-narratives. The participants‘ responses to the life history interview were first coded using open coding4 to identify the different forms of shame present 3
Category C prisoners are thought to lack the skills and/or motivation to escape and are therefore deemed as a minimal threat to the public. 4 Open coding is a technique in which the data is grouped into different categories (see Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
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within their self-narratives and then axial coding5 was used to organise the different forms of shame by recurring themes. From examining the participants‘ life stories there appeared to be two different categories of shame which could both simultaneously be present within the men‘s self-narratives: unresolved/unacknowledged shame and acknowledged/resolved shame6. The participants‘ experiences of unresolved/unacknowledged shame appeared to fall into two different sub-categories: a stigma sub-category and a deflected shame sub-category. The stigma sub-category emphasised the stigmatising origins of unresolved shame and consisted of feeling automatically judged by others, perceiving others as unfairly treating the individual as inferior or feeling rejected by society and/or significant others. The following extracts illustrate some examples of shame within the stigma sub-category: Even without knowing what you have done, knowing that you have been in prison makes you a bad person, you automatically become a criminal, you‘re automatically judged, that is what it is, you can‘t avoid it, you can‘t get out of it and it makes a very big difference in my life. (Int. #72, age 35) I am making the effort but I don‘t know if anyone is going to give me a job when I get out. […] I think that companies […] just treat you like shit knowing that you‘ve got a record you‘ll suffer anything, do you know what I mean? And when they start treating you like shit and you put your foot down and stop suffering, they turn around and say ‗Hey look we told you, it is the type of person he is, good for nothing‘. (Int. #13, age 39) Some people live on the outskirts of London, like the private places and that, some people don‘t grow up to see things like some of us have seen, they don‘t care, they don‘t care, do you get me? They just want us to kill each other and put the other person away. (Int. #21, age 24)
The deflected shame sub-category focused on feeling disproved of as a person by others for transgressing a social norm but no acceptance of responsibility for that transgression and/or projecting blame on to others or refusing to accept responsibility when others feel the individual is to blame. Examples of deflected shame included: My dad used to hit me, sometimes when I was bad, sometimes, I‘m not saying for no reason at all, but for silly things that were unnecessary. Hmm, that is kinda where my life, I mean […] I wouldn‘t be here now if it weren‘t for that point in my life. […] I wouldn‘t say I‘ve achieved my full potential. I wish sometimes if things could have been different, I mean there are a lot of things surrounding what I have done and why I am here in prison that are not entirely in my control. I mean there are a lot of things that are uncontrollable out there. (Int. #1, age 22) 5 6
Axial coding builds on the categories identified through open coding and is used to organise these categories by recurring themes to form a comprehensive scheme of categories and sub-categories (see Strauss & Corbin, 1990). To assess the accuracy of the shame coding scheme an independent rater blind to the research questions and hypotheses of the study was asked to randomly code one third of the participants‘ life history interviews. This resulted in a Cohen‘s Kappa of .77 for themes of unresolved/unacknowledged shame and .82 for themes of acknowledged/resolved shame, which suggests the shame coding scheme is more than adequate. Cohen‘s Kappa is a statistical technique used to measure the degree of agreement by two different people over the coding of items beyond that which would be expected by chance. Cohen‘s Kappa of .75 or above is considered to be very good.
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Similar to the pattern found in unresolved/unacknowledged shame, the participants‘ experiences of resolved/acknowledged shame also appeared to fall into two different subcategories: an acknowledged shame sub-category and a ‗making good‘ (see Maruna, 2001) sub-category. Within the acknowledged shame sub-category the participants acknowledged their feelings of shame, disappointment, remorse, loss of status and/or accepted responsibility for their behaviour. Examples of acknowledged shame were: You start to think more and more, you know, turn my life around and be a better husband, be a better father because I feel, you know, that I have let them down, you know, I feel ashamed of myself because I think I‘m a dad, I‘m a husband and I‘ve let them all down. (Int. #38, age 41) I was just like, I was hurt, I was, I weren‘t even angry and that, I was just hurt. I felt like I let everyone down, my mum and that, my friends and I let myself down because I do so well to get my first job and get my first record out and that and then to get nicked for something like drugs was just like, totally out of the question. (Int. #4, age 22) Staying in those crack houses, I know I shouldn‘t say this now because I know it can happen to anyone, but I used to always look at other people who used to stay in those houses as scum. […] When I was working and coming into those houses to buy drugs I‘d be looking at them and thinking ‗Go wash or something‘ […] and then a couple of years down the line that was me. […] It took a lot of self-respect. I saw people who knew me as me and I couldn‘t face them, do you get me, I‘d be walking down the street and I would see them coming and it took a lot of respect from me. (Int. #76, age 34)
The ‗making good‘ sub-category involved an attempt to resolve feelings of shame by endeavouring to deal with these emotions and/or attempting to make amends for their prior behaviour: She still loves me to death but I know deep down in her mind she has had a big shock with this [watching him being arrested]. […] I‘ve apologised to her. […] I want to make her as comfortable as she can be because I know that she is still suffering, she is still hurting, she is still suffering. […] So, I just want her to be as happy as possible. (Int. #32, age 22) I was looking at my life and I didn‘t really like what I saw and I‘ll tell you why, it was because of my kids again, cause I wanted to set a good example and […] I weren‘t. […] Them getting bigger you know at school when people would ask them ‗What do your parents do? What does your mum do? What does your dad do?‘ and no answer for that. I was thinking about those things. […]Yeah, I was thinking deep. […] I was really looking at life, like family life […], responsibilities, real responsibilities, putting to rights first and foremost in my life […]. Trying to be a good role model for my kids and just to play a better part to society, you know what I mean. (Int. #63, age 31)
Over 75 per cent of the men described experiencing some form of shame within their life story without being specifically asked about their experiences of shame. Themes of either
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unresolved/unacknowledged or acknowledged/resolved shame were present in almost half of the men‘s self-narratives, while just over a quarter described experiencing both forms of shame. A tobit regression analysis7 was used to test whether these themes of shame could predict the men‘s involvement in prisoner confrontations during a one month follow-up period, whilst controlling for possible confounding demographic, sentence and psychological variables8. The regression analysis revealed that themes of shame significantly predicted the men‘s follow-up involvement in confrontations, with those expressing themes of shame, especially unresolved/unacknowledged shame, tending to engage in more confrontations than those who did not express such themes (see Butler, 2007). These findings suggest that themes of shame may predispose individuals to engage in confrontations and that a more in-depth analysis of the men‘s self-narratives may help us to understand the relationship between shame and aggression.
„Confrontational‟ Self-Narratives The self-narratives of 20 confrontational men and 20 non-confrontational men were analysed to explore how themes of shame may lead some men to engage in more confrontations than others. A grounded theory approach was used to examine whether there were consistent themes emerging within their self-narratives which could distinguish between those who engaged in confrontations and those who did not. Using the participants‘ scores on their follow-up self-reported involvement in prisoner confrontations questionnaire, the selfnarratives of 20 of the ‗most confrontational‘ participants (i.e. those who obtained the highest scores) were identified. An analysis of these self-narratives revealed that there were three emerging narrative themes which may further our understanding of how some men come to engage in more confrontations than others: a disruptive family environment; feeling stigmatised, discriminated against and excluded; and doubting their ability to succeed. Twelve of the 20 confrontational men recounted experiences of a disruptive family environment. These men appeared to be struggling with the memory of a difficult childhood in which they recalled major family disagreements, being kicked out of the family home, family break-up through divorce, feeling abandoned by being taken into care and the lack of a secure and loving home due to being constantly moved in and out of foster homes and/or penal institutions. The consequences of these experiences varied but in general the men described these events as resulting in feelings of betrayal, distrust and a lack of security and stability. In some cases, participants believed the distrust they felt for their parents resulted in a general distrust of letting others get close to them. For example: I didn‘t know who I could trust. All I knew was I could trust my brother, and me and him had to stick together. […] I still don‘t forgive them for splitting up, I still don‘t forgive them for lying to me. I don‘t forgive them for not listening to me when I needed help. Our relationship just went downhill. […] I thought if you can‘t trust your mum and dad, who can 7 8
A tobit regression analysis is a specific type of regression analysis used on non-normally distributed data. This regression model was found to be significant and accounted for 38.42 per cent of the total variance to be explained (χ2 (5)= 32.52; p<.001). Themes of unresolved/unacknowledged shame significantly predicted the men‘s follow-up involvement in prisoner confrontations (t = 2.10; p<.05) while themes of resolved/acknowledged shame were found to marginally predict the men‘s follow-up involvement in prisoner confrontations (t = 1.90; p<.10).
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Some men also reported feeling rejected by their parents and/or significant others when they were taken into care or remanded to a penal institution. These men described feeling a lack of security and stability during their childhood years as they were constantly being moved around from one foster home to another and/or from one institution to another. They experienced this lack of parental love and affection as an obstacle to their own healthy development. They were not secure in their environment and did not feel they had anyone whom they could trust or depend upon: By being put in an institution at a young age you just get placed in one institution after another, I wasn‘t sure who I could talk to, friends were few and far between, never really had anyone to talk to really. You are a person in a pack of people, you are not treated like an individual really, you are just one of a group. I felt like prison was my home, institutions were where I belonged, the next thing for me was a life sentence or dying. (Int. #88, age 47)
These early experiences are believed to be important as a lack of exposure to secure and loving relationships with others can hinder the development of a secure sense of self (Mead, 1934, Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981; de Zulueta, 1994). In addition, 11 of the 20 confrontational men recounted feeling stigmatised, discriminated against and excluded. Such recollections mainly consisted of others behaving differently towards them due to their criminal conviction and/or drug addiction. In particular, the men expressed feelings of frustration due to the stigma associated with having a criminal conviction and the problems they encountered when attempting to obtain employment: Any main obstacles I can see coming up, well there is a few. When I get out I am going to need housing, I am going to need employment without the snub nosed people who are going to look at my record and go, ‗Oh, you‘ve got a criminal record, you can‘t work for us‘. I‘ve got to find a decent employer who will accept me on the basis of how good I am as a worker and what qualifications I‘ve got and not only on the offences I‘ve committed in the past (Int. #16, age 21)
These men described feeling distrusted by the community regardless of how they behaved: They know when you are on drugs, well where I come from they do anyway, they just, they whisper behind your back and things like that, they just don‘t trust you. (Int. #54, age 34)
These men appeared to be insecure in their identity and social positioning. However, feeling stigmatised was not only a problem within the community. It could also occur within the prison. For example, the men described the majority of prison officers as taking advantage of their position, behaving unfairly and judging them to be inferior or ‗scum‘. Nevertheless, while the majority of the men verbally protested about their treatment by the prison officers, the fact they received such treatment led some to question whether they did indeed deserve to be treated like ‗scum‘:
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It‘s like the way they look at you and the way they talk to you as if you are scum like, do you know what I mean, as if you are nothing. But you are, you are something, [sigh] I don‘t know. (Int. #28, age 21)
According to Young (1999, 2003), recalling experiences such as these can be threatening to the self as individuals feel their identity and social worth are not respected by others. The last theme to emerge from the 20 confrontational men‘s self-narratives was a lack of faith in their ability to succeed. Ten of the 20 confrontational men expressed doubt in their ability to overcome obstacles. More specifically, they doubted their ability to overcome their drug addiction, to control the direction their life was taking and to cope emotionally with difficult situations: I‘ve been involved in drugs since 1987 and I think it was three years after I got into drugs that I realised I was addicted and it has been a big, big battle ever since to try and get myself out of it. I thought it would be easy but it‘s not, it‘s really hard. I‘m determined to win the war, no battle, no war because you can win the battles and lose the war. […] I mean it is very hard to try and wean yourself off drugs in the community, very, very hard. Even when I get out there is no guarantee that I will stay off drugs. (Int. #42, age 43)
This lack of faith in their ability to succeed seemed to result in feelings of shame as the men acknowledged they had let themselves and others down, and attempted to deflect responsibility for their failure to circumstances and events which were beyond their control. In addition, their doubt in their ability to overcome an addiction, to control the direction their life was taking and to cope emotionally with stressful situations may have contributed to the development of an insecure self, as the participants did not trust themselves or their capabilities. All 20 confrontational men expressed at least one of these themes within their selfnarratives while 12 men expressed two or more themes. This suggests, therefore, that the experience of shame may predispose those who are insecure in their identity to behave aggressively in order to protect their fragile sense of self.
„Non-Confrontational‟ Self-Narratives An analysis of the 20 non-confrontational men‘s self-narratives also revealed three common narrative themes: being supported by family and friends; feeling proud, successful and respected; and feeling confident in their ability to succeed. Eighteen of the 20 nonconfrontational men expressed at least one of these themes, with 16 men expressing two or more themes in their self-narrative. Sixteen of the 20 non-confrontational men described feeling supported and cared for by family and friends. They recalled being supported by significant others through their childhood, struggle with a drug addiction, imprisonment and/or trial: My family has always provided for me, looked after me, I mean they have been through a lot of rough times with me when I was younger. […] My family is very important to me. […] The family is always there for you through good and bad times. […] I don‘t want to lose any of my family. (Int. #39, age 21)
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Some described the birth of a child as providing the loving and supportive family environment they had always craved. Others recollected coming from a broken home, but nonetheless, feeling supported and cared for by friends and the community: Where I grew up, it was like 99% of everyone on my estate, they grew up like, single parent with just a mum or just a dad, like when we were out playing together and doing things together and that, we did it as family. We made our own little family, yeah, together like as friends. (Int. #4, age 22)
These men felt supported and cared for by others which appeared to provide them with a sense of security in their identity. Another narrative theme emerging in seven of the men‘s self-narratives involved feeling proud, respected and successful. While this theme was not as prevalent as the others, it was included due to the importance the participants gave to these recollections in their life stories and to the profound effect these memories appeared to have on the participants‘ sense of self. These men recalled feeling that others looked up to them and valued their opinions. They described feeling respected by others because they appeared to be successful in their lives and were taking part in activities which were deemed respectful by the community. For example: I got myself a car valeting job, was earning good money, was going out at the weekend socialising, I had good friends about me, I had money, I had good clothes, I had the, ahh, the general like […] I‘d give you […] how can I word it? I was respected in life; do you know what I mean? I felt like I was going somewhere. I was a good, respectable member of the community, you know, I was doing things that everyday members of the community were doing. That‘s my highlight of my life. (Int. #12, age 29)
These men also reported feeling proud of their achievements as well as family members and friends expressed pride at what they had accomplished: I got a job as a bus driver and I never thought that I would get the job. […] I still remember the first morning I drove the bus out of the garage I was happy, I done it for four years. It was my best job and it made my gran proud and it made my mum proud, my friends were proud, do you know what I mean? It was a good time in my life. […] Everyone was proud of me, it was like a real credit to me. (Int. #20, age 35)
A small minority of participants also described obtaining some form of public recognition which further strengthened their sense of pride in their achievements and their feelings of being respected by others: I started basketball when I was 11 or 12. […] So we had a tournament and we had to play Sudbury and Bury St. Edmonds, and […] I remember playing as well as I could. You know, making shots, scoring points, I wasn‘t greedy; I was just playing how I needed to. Anyway, we knew we had won the cup match […] and then they said ‗And we‘ve got a trophy for the most improved player in the whole tournament‘ or whatever, and you never think you are going to win anything, do you know what I mean? And they called my name out and I thought ‗Yeahhhh‘. So I was kind of real happy and I thought […] I‘d done something I had enjoyed and people recognised that. […] I‘d only been playing about four or five months and it was
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good to know that they had noticed me as part of the team […] and that just made me real happy. (Int. #16, age 21)
These participants appeared to feel appreciated and valued by others. Feeling appreciated and valued by others is thought to facilitate a sense of security and stability in one‘s social status and identity (Lind & Tyler, 1988). However, this does not mean that these men did not also recall experiences of stigmatisation, discrimination and exclusion within their life story. Rather, they described having since been exposed to situations in which they felt respected and valued by others which seemed to help counteract the potential destabilising effects of stigmatisation, discrimination and exclusion on their identity. The last common narrative theme to emerge from the non-confrontational men‘s selfnarratives was a sense of confidence in their ability to succeed. Fifteen of the 20 men expressed confidence in their ability to succeed and overcome difficult obstacles which they might encounter. In particular, these men discussed their sense of confidence in their ability to overcome their drug addiction, obtain employment and overcome obstacles more generally in life. They described looking forward to their future and appeared confident in their ability to overcome any obstacles which they may encounter. Unlike the confrontational men, they believed they had the will power and control necessary to achieve their aims. They did not believe their ability to overcome obstacles was due to chance or the right combination of circumstances. Instead, they believed their ability to overcome obstacles was due to their own ability to control themselves: Well, it is all about controlling yourself and I think I can control myself, hmm, I‘m trying to quit smoking right now, just out of the blue I said to myself I need to stop and in the last five days I‘ve only smoked 3 roll-ups and I‘ve got lots of patches so that is the type of person that I am, when I say I am going to do something I will control myself. (Int. #46, age 26)
A sense of confidence in their ability to succeed appeared to increase their faith in themselves and their capabilities. Although some of the non-confrontational men also recounted negative experiences, they tended to downplay these experiences to focus more on areas of potential strength within their self-narrative. This focus on the positive rather than the negative seemed to facilitate a sense of security in their identity as they felt confident, supported and valued by others. Based on these feelings, the non-confrontational men seemed to be less inclined to engage in confrontations as, in their own words, they felt they had ―nothing to prove‖ (Int. #4, age 22). These men already felt a sense of belonging and respect in their interactions with significant others and did not feel a need to engage in confrontations in order to ‗prove‘ their worth and/or demand respect from others. In addition, this sense of security seemed to lead the men to be less likely to engage in confrontations in order to conform to prisoner norms of ‗toughness‘ as their feelings of confidence in themselves and their abilities appeared to minimise potential threats to their ego and social status. Therefore, the experience of shame may be less likely to lead to aggression amongst individuals secure in their identity as they already feel loved and supported and do not feel a need to ‗prove‘ themselves to others. In contrast, the confrontational men‘s self-narratives tended to focus on their more negative experiences. They tended to emphasise the problematic areas of their lives more so than areas of potential strength. This pessimistic focus appeared to affect their sense of self.
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By focusing on their more challenging experiences, many of the men seemed to have developed an insecure sense of self as they did not feel respected or valued by others. In comparison to the non-confrontational men, their self-narratives did not appear to provide them with a secure foundation upon which to build their identity. As a result, these men seem to seek external validation of their status and self-worth from others. Unlike the nonconfrontational men, they appeared to place a greater importance on how they were treated by others as they seemed to seek to reaffirm their identity through their interactions with others. Accordingly, these men seemed to experience threats to their ego as particularly devastating and engage in confrontations as a means of defending their identity and/or ‗proving‘ their worth to others: Yeah, hmm, it is easy for someone to like, to like disrespect me because everyone is under pressure really and all it takes is one kind of mistake or word to perhaps upset someone really and for me when people mention things about not having much or getting anywhere then that hits on a raw nerve, or if they say anything about my family. (Int. #79, age 31)
Consequently, the experience of shame for these men seemed to lead them to be more prone to using aggression as a means to combat threats to their identity and/or social status. Further, this sense of insecurity also seemed to lead them to be more prone to succumbing to prisoner norms of ‗toughness‘ and physical retaliation in order to gain the status and respect of their fellow prisoners.
Fighting for Respect These findings indicate that, for those insecure in their identity, the experience of shame may lead to a greater involvement in confrontations as they attempt to use aggression to deflect feelings of psychological anxiety and obtain the respect or approval of others. de Zulueta (1994) argues that for those who feel insecure in their identity, feelings of shame may trigger aggressive behaviour as these feelings can threaten their fragile sense of self. For Mead (1934), identity develops from our early interactions with others. Secure and stable interactions result in a secure identity, while insecure and unstable interactions facilitate the development of an insecure self. Individuals with an insecure self are not only believed to be more inclined to actively seek external validation of their self-worth from others, but also hold less positive views about themselves and seek to enhance their selfworth by obtaining positive interpersonal feedback from others (Baumeister et al. 1989; Brown, Collins & Schmidt, 1988; de Zulueta, 1994; Crocker et al. 2004; Vohs & Heatherton, 2001). In this way, individuals with an insecure self seem to be more interdependent in their self-constructions and base their identity and self-worth more so on the approval of others. Indeed Crocker et al. conclude: People whose sense of self-worth depends on external validation, achievements, or accomplishments are more easily and frequently captured by the question of whether they are wonderful or worthless and, hence, [are] more susceptible to the pursuit of self-esteem. (2004: 283)
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Consequently, how individuals insecure in their identtiy are treated by others appears to hold a greater significance for their identity and self-worth than would normally be expected, leading them to be more prone to engaging in confrontations out of a psychological need to protect the self and/or demand respect from other. Further, this pursuit of social approval may lead individuals insecure in their identity to be more susceptible to conforming to socio-cultural norms in order to achieve status amongst their peers (Crocker et al. 2002; Crocker et al. 2004). Within a prison population, specific socio-cultural norms tend to emerge (see Crewe, 2005; Sykes, 1958; Sykes & Messenger, 1960). In particular, within male prisons, there appears to be a culture of masculinity encouraging some prisoners to base their status upon displays of ‗toughness‘ as well as promoting prisoner norms of physical retaliation (Sykes, 1958; Sabo et al. 2001; Edgar et al. 2002). In the words of one participant: If someone disrespects you, you‘ve got to put them in their place because otherwise it is a bandwagon situation isn‘t it? You know, people will think he‘s an easy touch, we‘ll all have a go so you got, you‘ve got to be on it [slaps his hand], you know, let him know okay you don‘t what any trouble but you are quite prepared to ask him if he wants some. (Int. #26, age 48)
As individuals with an insecure self may be more vulnerable to conforming to social norms in order to achieve status amongst their peers, prisoners with an insecure self may be especially prone to engaging in confrontations out of a psychological need to appear ‗tough‘. Thus, themes of shame may encourage individuals to engage in confrontations out of a psychological need to protect their fragile sense of self, gain status by conforming to sociocultural norms and/or some combination of the above. In contrast, as individuals who are secure in their sense of self tend to be less inclined to constantly seek external validation of their self-worth from others, they also seem to be less susceptible to conforming to social norms as a means of gaining status amongst their peers. This suggests that within the prison environment such individuals may be less motivated to engage in confrontations in order to demonstrate their masculinity and/or gain status by conforming to prisoner norms of ‗toughness‘ and physical retaliation. Therefore, individuals who are secure in their sense of self may be less likely to succumb to pressures to appear ‗tough‘ as they have already developed a sense of self-worth, and do not need the same level of approval from others as those who are insecure in their identity. One participant explained: 9
People have tried to diss me and I have just laughed it off because I know that no matter what they say I know what‘s what, or whatever you say is irrelevant to me. […] I think it has a lot to do with insecurity. (Int. #76, age 34)
Such individuals may occasionally engage in confrontations in an attempt to deter others from attempting to intimidate, manipulate and/or exploit them. However, they may be less likely to engage in confrontations out of a psychological need to defend their sense of self and/or gain status amongst their peers. Lastly, it is important to note that emotion of shame not only arises from how we imagine others perceive us but also how others interact with us. As a result, feelings of shame may not only arise from an individual‘s perception of themselves, their behaviour and how they 9
‗Diss‘ is a slang term used by the participants to refer to disrespect.
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imagine they are perceived by others but also how others behave towards them. For example, the men‘s belief that prison officers perceived them to be ‗scum‘ appeared to lead them to question whether they were indeed ‗scum‘. In addition, the themes of stigmatisation, discrimination, exclusion and lack of faith in their ability to succeed which emerged in the men‘s self-narratives appeared to reflect broader societal views of offenders and their behaviour. In this way, societal views, beliefs and perceptions may influence how individuals conceptualise themselves, their relationships with others and how shame is expressed in their self-narratives. Consequently: ―What is at stake in everyday violence is not a King‘s divine right but the sacred core of respectability that the assailant is defending and defining through his violence‖ (Katz, 1988: 35). Hence, intervention programmes attempting to address the presence of shame within self-narratives must tackle not only how individuals conceive of themselves but also how society perceives these individuals. Regrettably, cognitive behavioural programmes aimed at reducing aggressive behaviour tend to pathologise the individual by attributing aggressive behaviour to ‗errors‘ or biases within their cognitions (Bush, 1995; Dodge, 2003; Kendall, 2002; Merrington & Stanley, 2000). As a result, the cause of aggressive behaviour is generally attributed solely to the individual and their thinking patterns while potential social and cultural causes are ignored or downplayed. Gadd (2004) reviewed the use of cognitive behavioural programmes and concluded that these programmes failed to grasp how men‘s use of violence related to their view of themselves and their masculinity. Consequently interventions aimed at addressing psychosocial issues such as shame, masculinity and self-identity may be better placed to reduce aggression than those focused solely on cognitions and/or situational interventions. In conclusion, the findings from this research suggest that the extent to which some individuals engage in more confrontations than others depends upon the psychological need they feel to defend their sense of self and/or gain the approval of others. For those insecure in their sense of self, themes of shame appear to predispose them to engage in confrontations as they attempt to defend their identity from psychological threats and/or demonstrate their masculinity. These men seem to use aggression as a means of reducing feelings of psychological anxiety by attempting to transform feelings of shame into feelings of anger and deflect and/or displace these feelings onto others. In addition, these feelings of shame can be further amplified through their status as a prisoner and their symbolic rejection by society. This can prompt them to be more susceptible to conforming to prisoner norms of ‗toughness‘ as a way of gaining status amongst their peers and returning a sense of self-worth and respectability to their identity. Consequently, if attempts to change and/or reduce aggression are to be successful, interventions should attempt to address how individuals understand and construct their identity as well as what individuals are consciously or unconsciously attempting to achieve through their use of aggression.
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Merrington, S. & Stanley, S. (2000). ‗Doubts about the What Works Initiative‘, Probation Journal, 47(4), 272-275. Mikulincer, M. (1998). ‗Adult Attachment Style and Individual Differences in Functional versus Dysfunctional Experiences of Anger‘, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 513-524. Miller, D. T. (2001). ‗Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice‘, Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 527-553. O‘Donnell, I. & Edgar, K. (1998). Bullying in Prisons. Occasional Paper no 18, Oxford: University of Oxford Centre for Criminological Research. O‘Donnell, I. & Edgar, K. (1996). Victimisation in Prisons. Research Findings no 37. London: Home Office, Research and Statistics Directorate. Sabo, D. F., Kupers, T. A. & London, W. J. (2001). Prison Masculinities. Philadelphia : Temple University Press. Scheff, T. J. (2000). ‗Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory‘, Sociological Theory, 18(1), 84-99. Scheff, T. J. & Retzinger, S. M. (1991). Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts. Massachusetts: Lexington Books. Scraton, P., Sim, J. & Skidmore, P. (1991). Prisons Under Protest. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Sennett, R. (2003). Respect: The Formation of Character in an Age of Inequality. London: Penguin Books. Sim, J. (1994). ‗Tougher than the rest? Men in prison‘, in T. Newburn & E. Stanko (Eds.), Just Boys Doing Business? Men, Masculinities and Crime. London: Routledge. Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory, Procedures and Techniques. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. Sullivan, H. S. (1950). ‗Tensions Interpersonal and International: A Psychiatrist‘s View‘, in H. S. Sullivan The Fusion of Psychiatry and Social Science. New York: W.W. Norton. Sykes, G. M. (1958). The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison. New York: Princeton University Press. Sykes, G. & Messenger, S. (1960). ‗The inmate social system‘, in R. Clonard (Eds.), Theoretical studies in theoretical social organization of the prison. New York: Social Science Council. Tajfel, H. (1981). Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). ‗An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict‘, in W.G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. California: Brooks/Cole. Tangney, J. P. (1990). ‗Assessing Individual Differences in Proneness to Shame and Guilt: Development of the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory‘, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 102-111. Tangney, J. P. & Dearing, R. L. (2002). Shame and Guilt. New York: Guilford Press. Tangney, J. P. & Fischer, K. W. (1995).. Self-conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment and Pride. London: Guildford Press. Tangney, J. & Stuewig, J. (2004). ‗A Moral-Emotional Perspective on Evil Persons and Evil Deeds‘, in A.G. Miller (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Good and Evil. London: The Guildford Press.
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Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P., Fletcher, C. & Gramzow, R. (1992). ‗Shamed into Anger? The Relation of Shame and Guilt to Anger and Self-Reported Aggression‘, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 669-675. Toch, H. (1992). Violent Men: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Violence Revised Edition. Washington: American Psychological Association. Toch, H. (1977). Living in Prison: The Ecology of Survival. New York: Free Press. Vohs, K. D. & Heatherton, T. F. (2001). ‗Self-Esteem and Threats to Self: Implications for Self-Construals and Interpersonal Perceptions‘, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1103-1118. Wagner, P. E. & Tangney, J. (1991). Affective Styles, Aspects of the Self and Psychological Symptoms. George Mason University: Unpublished Manuscript. Whitehead, A. (2005). ‗Man to Man Violence: How Masculinity May Work as a Dynamic Risk Factor‘, The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 44, 411-422. Wright, K., Gujonsson, G. H. & Young, S. (2008). ‗An Investigation of the Relationship Between Anger and Offence-Related Shame and Guilt‘, Psychology, Crime & Law, 14(5), 415-423. Young, J. (2003). ‗Merton with Energy, Katz with Structure: The Sociology of Vindictiveness and the Criminology of Transgression‘, Theoretical Criminology, 7(3), 389-414. Young, J. (1999). The Exclusive Society: Social Exclusion, Crime and Difference in Late Modernity. London: Sage.
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 129-149
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 6
NEUROTICISM AND POSITIVE PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS: TEST OF A TWO-FACTOR MODEL OF THEIR EFFECTS ON AFFECTIVE HEALTH Bruce W. Smith*, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz University of New Mexico
ABSTRACT The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effects of neuroticism and positive personal characteristics on affective health in the context of a two-factor model. The model posits that neuroticism will primarily impact negative affect while positive personality characteristics will primarily impact positive affect. The relationship between neuroticism, positive personal characteristics, and affective health was examined in three large samples of undergraduate students. The positive personal characteristics assessed included extraversion, resilience, optimism, spirituality, purpose in life, and indicators of social and emotional intelligence. Multiple regression analyses were used to simultaneously examine the effects of neuroticism and the positive characteristics on negative affect and positive affect. The results consistently showed that neuroticism was a strong predictor of negative affect while positive characteristics were generally not related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism. In addition, the positive characteristics were still related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism. Finally, neuroticism was not related to positive affect when controlling for all positive characteristics at once but was usually related to less positive affect when controlling for one at a time. The main implication is that neuroticism should be considered within the context of both the positive and negative domains of human experience. Neuroticism may have its strongest impact on negative affective health while positive characteristics may have their strongest impact on positive affective health.
*
Corresponding author: Department of Psychology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131. Email address:
[email protected], Office: 505-277-0643, Cell: 505-366-3766, Fax: 505-277-1394.
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INTRODUCTION What are the implications of neuroticism for psychological and physical health? Our psychological health is closely tied to our emotional experience and the emotions we experience have strong implications for our physical health (Frasure-Smith, Lespérance & Talajic, 1995; Keefe, Lumley, Anderson, Lynch, Studts, & Carson, 2001; Pressman & Cohen, 2005). In order to understand the relationship between neuroticism and our emotional experience, it is important to understand both the positive and negative aspects of our emotional experience (Fredrickson, 2009; Peterson & Seligman, 2005; Zautra, 2003). These two aspects of our emotional experience have been divided into what has been called positive affect which includes emotions such as enthusiasm, interest, and pride and negative affect which includes emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1998). This division between the positive and the negative is important because positive and negative affect may operate independently and have different kinds of effects on health and well-being (Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003). High negative affect is not always associated with low positive affect and low positive affect is not always associated with high negative affect. For example, a person may experience low negative affect and low positive affect on a day when little happens and that same person may experience high negative affect and high positive affect on the first day of a challenging new job (e.g., pride and fear). In addition, while negative affect is generally related to forms of psychopathology such as anxiety and depression and predictive of physical health problems (Clark & Watson, 1991; Frasure-Smith et al., 1995; Keefe et al., 2001), positive affect may have different kinds of effects on health and well-being including enhancing creativity and problem solving and increasing resilience in times of stress (Fredrickson, 2001; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004). Why is this important for understanding the implications of neuroticism on health and well-being? There is strong evidence that neuroticism is related to adverse events and may be related to various health problems. Neuroticism is the only one of the Big Five personality factors that is consistently related to negative outcomes including negative affect, anxiety, depression, and physical symptoms (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Charles, Gatz, Kato, & Pedersen, 2008). However, knowing that neuroticism is related to more negative affect does not necessarily mean that we understand its relationship with positive affect and other aspects of psychological well-being. In order to fully understanding the implications of neuroticism for health and well-being, it is important to examine how it impacts both the positive and the negative dimensions. Unfortunately, although much is known about the relationship between neuroticism and negative outcomes, much less is known about its relationship with positive affect and well-being. In an attempt to compensate for the traditional emphasis in psychology and psychiatry on negative characteristics, the positive psychology movement was begun just before the new millennium and has continued to grow over the past decade (Ryff & Singer, 1998; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). This movement has emphasized the study of ―positive‖ personal characteristics such as optimism, spirituality, meaning and purpose, and emotional intelligence rather than negative characteristics such as neuroticism (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). The movement has even resulted in a book that some have called the ―Un-DSM‖ (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) which focuses on human strengths rather than psychopathology
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as does the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The positive psychology movement has also focused on positive outcomes such as positive affect and emotions (Fredrickson, 2009), various measures of well-being including autonomy, positive relations with others, and self-acceptance (Ryff & Keyes, 1995), and even the ability to grow and change in positive ways following stress (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006). However, just as psychology and psychiatry may have overemphasized the negative in the past, so the positive psychology movement may be in danger of focusing too much on the positive. Many studies by positive psychologists have not included an examination of neuroticism and negative outcomes and risk providing only a partial picture of how positive characteristics may play out in the lives and experience of human beings. In order to fully understand the psychology of neuroticism in relation to positive personal characteristics, it is important to consider them in the context of both the negative and the positive aspects of human experience. There is a two-factor model that does include both the positive and negative and which may provide a way to more fully understand neuroticism and its implications for health and well-being (Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003). This model is based on studies providing evidence for separate positive and negative domains of personality characteristics, affect, and possibly even social interactions (Bradburn, 1969; Davidson, 1992; Watson, Weise, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). These positive and negative domains have been associated with approach and avoidance neural systems and behaviors (Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000). Similarly, Elliot and Thrash (2002) have provided evidence that personality constructs can be divided into those associated with approach and those associated with avoidance. We define ―positive characteristics‖ as qualities associated with approach behaviors involving behavioral activation and appetitive motivational systems (Gray, 1982; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998). These characteristics include extraversion and many of the characteristics focused on by the positive psychology movement. Similarly, we define ―negative characteristics‖ as qualities associated with avoidance behaviors involving behavioral inhibition and defensive motivational systems (Gray, 1982; Lang et al. 1998). Neuroticism is a prime example of a negative characteristic that is well-represented in personality theories (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) and may be an important marker of avoidant behaviors and motivational systems. In the two-factor model, personal characteristics may uniquely influence affective domains of the same valence (Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003). Figure 1 provides an illustration of this model. The solid lines from positive characteristics to positive affect and from negative characteristics to negative affect illustrate the strongest relationships predicted by the model. The dotted lines show what are predicted to be weaker cross-valence relationships. The idea is that the positive and negative domains operate relatively independently but must be considered within the context of both domains. Since neuroticism is a prime example of a negative personal characteristic, the model would predict that neuroticism would primarily be related to negative and not positive affect when considered within the context of positive characteristics. Conversely, the model would predict that positive characteristics would primarily be related to positive and not negative affect when considered within the context of negative characteristics such as neuroticism.
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Positive Characteristics
Positive Affect
_ _ Negative Characteristics
Negative Affect
+
Figure 1. Two-factor model of the relationship between neuroticism, positive personal characteristics, and negative and positive affective health. The straight lines show the hypothesized paths and the dotted lines show alternative pathways.
The problem with many studies of both neuroticism and positive characteristics is that they are often not examined together or in relation to both positive and negative outcomes (Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003). Viewed within the framework of the two-factor model, there are several important dangers to not including both positive and negative personal characteristics and outcomes. For those studying neuroticism, they may only see the effects of neuroticism in increasing negative outcomes and miss its possible effects on positive outcomes. Although it may be easier to assume that neuroticism would decrease positive outcomes, it is possible that neuroticism may not be related to positive outcomes when positive characteristics are also assessed. For those studying positive characteristics, there are at least a couple of important dangers. First, there is the possibility of overestimating the effects of positive characteristics when not controlling for important negative characteristics such as neuroticism (Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt, and Poulton, 1989). Neuroticism may be such an important personality characteristics that it overwhelms the presence of positive characteristics such as optimism and resilience. Second, there is the possibility of missing what the two-factor model would predict as unique effects in increasing positive outcomes. For example, although positive characteristics may not be as strong in predicting less negative outcomes when neuroticism is controlled, they may still be strong predictors of positive outcomes such as positive affect.
The Current Studies In order to examine neuroticism and positive characteristics in the context of the twofactor model, we conducted three large studies with samples of undergraduate students at a major university in the southwestern United States. We included three samples to determine whether we could replicate the results with regard to neuroticism and included a variety of different positive personal characteristics. In each of the three samples, we included measures of neuroticism, negative affect, positive affect, and extraversion (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; Watson et al. 1988). We included extraversion in each sample because, like neuroticism, it is also a part of most major personality theories and may be uniquely related to positive affect (McNiel & Fleeson, 2006; Rusting & Larsen, 1997; Uziel, 2006). In addition, we included a full array of positive personal characteristics that have been the focus of the positive psychology movement and which are frequently targets for
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psychological interventions. These are all potential resources for increasing positive affect and include optimism, resilience, meaning and purpose, and spirituality as well as social and emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1997; Goleman, 2006; Flach, 1997; Frankl, 1963; Pargament, 1997; Scheier & Carver, 1985). In the first study, we included measures of spirituality (Fetzer, 1999), social skills (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), and broad measures of resilience and emotional intelligence (Connor & Davidson, 2003; Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, & Dornhein, 1998). In the second study, we included a measure of optimism (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), a measure of cognitive reappraisal (Gross & John, 2003) which is a target in cognitive therapy, and more specific measures of emotional intelligence (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). In the third study, we included more specific measures of social skills including empathy and perspective taking (Davis, 1994), a more specific measure of resilience as the ability to bounce back from stress (Smith, Dalen, Wiggins, Tooley, Christopher, & Bernard, 2008), and a measure of meaning and purpose in life (Ryff & Keyes, 1995).
Hypotheses We had four hypotheses that were based on the two-factor model (Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003). Each of the hypotheses was tested using multiple regression analyses to control for neuroticism when examining the positive characteristics and to control for neuroticism when examining the positive characteristics. The first hypothesis was that neuroticism would be related to negative affect when controlling for the positive personal characteristics. The second hypothesis was that the positive characteristics would not be related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism. The third hypothesis was that neuroticism would not be related to positive affect when controlling for the positive characteristics. The fourth hypothesis was that the positive characteristics would be related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism.
METHODS Participants and Procedures The participants were from three separate samples of undergraduate students from the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Human Research Review Committee at the University of New Mexico approved the studies and informed consent was obtained by trained research assistants.
Sample #1 The first student sample consisted of 338 undergraduate students. The mean age was 20.3 years (SD = 3.6) and 65% were female. The self-reported ethnicity was 39% white, 30% Hispanic, 17% Native American, 3% Asian American, 2% African American, and 9% mixed or other. Data was collected during the Spring of 2005. All of the participants were given course credit for participating in the research. Participation in the study involved coming to
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our research lab and completing a questionnaire with the neuroticism, positive characteristic, and affect measures listed and described below.
Sample #2 The second student sample consisted of 289 undergraduate students. The mean age was 21.1 years (SD = 4.3) and 64% were female. The self-reported ethnicity was 50% white, 34% Hispanic, 9% Native American, 4% Asian American, 2% African American, and 1% mixed or other. Data was collected during the Fall of 2007. Again, all of the participants were given course credit for participating in the research and participation involved coming to the research lab and completing a questionnaire with the measures described below. Sample #3 The third student sample consisted of 259 undergraduate students. The mean age was 21.1 years (SD = 4.3) and 64% were female. The self-reported ethnicity was 51% white, 32% Hispanic, 3% Native American, 3% Asian American, 2% African American, and 9% mixed or other. Data was collected during the Spring of 2008. Once again, all of the participants were given course credit for participating and participation involved coming to the research lab and completing a questionnaire with the measures described below.
Measures 1. Neuroticism Neuroticism was assessed in Samples 1, 2, and 3 using the Big Five Inventory (BenetMartinez & John, 1998). The eight items (e.g., ―worries a lot,‖ ―can be moody‖) were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 5 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .849 in Sample 1, .845 in Sample 2, and .808 in Sample 3.
2. Affective Health Negative Affect and Positive Affect. These were assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule in Samples 1, 2, and 3 (Watson et al., 1988). There are ten positive affect items (e.g., ―enthusiastic‖, ―interested‖, ―proud‖) and ten negative affect items (e.g., ―anger‖, ―fear‖, ―guilt‖). The participants were asked how much they had experienced each of these affects in the past two weeks. The items were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―very slightly or not at all‖ to 5 = ―extremely.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha for negative affect was .840 in Sample 1, .818 in Sample 2, and .840 in Sample 3. Cronbach‘s alpha for positive affect was .865 in Sample 1, .861 in Sample 2, and .875 in Sample 3.
3. Positive personal characteristics Brief Resilience Scale. This assessed resilience as the ability to bounce back from stressful events in Sample 3 (Smith et al., 2008). The six items (e.g., ―I tend to bounce back
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quickly after hard times‖) were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 5 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .836. Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC). This assessed the personal characteristics that compose resilience in Sample 1 (Connor & Davidson, 2003). The 25 items (e.g., ―I tend to bounce back after illness or hardship‖) were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―not true at all‖ to 5 = ―true nearly all of the time.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .937. Emotional Intelligence. This refers to the ability to appraise, express, regulate, and use emotions and was assessed by the Schutte Self Report Emotional Intelligence Test in Sample 1 (Schutte et al, 1998). The 33 items (e.g., ―I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them‖) were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 5 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .891. Empathy and Perspective Taking. These were assessed using the empathy and perspective taking subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1994). The empathy subscale consists of seven items which assess the tendency to experience feelings of sympathy and compassion for others in need (e.g., ―I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me‖). The perspective taking subscale consists of seven items which assess the degree to which an individual spontaneously takes the point of view of other people in everyday life (e.g., ―I try to look at everybody‘s side of a disagreement before I make a decision‖). The items for each subscale were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 2 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .747 for the empathy subscale and .761 for the perspective taking subscale. Extraversion. This was assessed in Samples 1, 2, and 3 using the Big Five Inventory (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). The eight items (e.g., ―is talkative,‖ ―is full of energy‖) were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 5 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .839 in Sample 1, .852 in Sample 2, and .857 in Sample 3. Optimism. This assesses positive expectancies about the outcome of future events and was assessed by the Life Orientation Test in Sample 2 (Scheier et al., 1994). The six items (e.g., ―I‘m always optimistic about my future‖) were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 5 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .781. Mood Clarity and Mood Repair. These were assessed in Sample 2 using the Trait MetaMood Scale (Salovey et al., 1995). Mood clarity is the ability to be clear about one‘s emotions and feelings and was assessed by 11 items (e.g., ―I am rarely confused about how I feel‖). Mood repair is the ability to make ones self feel better when distressed and was assessed by six items (e.g., ―When I become upset I remind myself of the pleasures in life‖). The mood clarity and mood repair items were scored on a five-point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 5 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .868 for mood clarity and .784 for mood repair. Purpose in Life. This is the belief that one‘s life has meaning and purpose and was assessed using the purpose in life scale of the Scales of Psychological Well-Being (Ryff &
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Keyes, 1995). The seven items (e.g., ―I have a sense of purpose and direction in life‖) were scored on a six point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 6 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .710. Reappraisal. This refers to the ability to changes one‘s emotional state by reappraising or thinking about a situation in a different way. Reappraisal was assessed by the reappraisal subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire in Sample 2 (Gross & John, 2003). The six items (e.g., ―when I want to feel less negative emotion, I change what I am thinking about‖) were scored on a seven point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 7 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .810. Social Skills. These were assessed using the social skills subscale of the AutismSpectrum Quotient in Sample 1 (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The ten items (e.g., ―I prefer to do things with others rather than on my own‖) were scored on a four point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 4 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .752. Spirituality. This was assessed using three items that have frequently been used to assess dispositional spirituality and religiosity in Sample 1 (Fetzer, 1999). These items are (1) ―to what extent do you consider yourself a spiritual person?,‖ (2) ―to what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?,‖ and (3) ―how often do you attend spiritual/religious services?‖ The first two items were scored on a seven point scale from 1 = ―not at all‖ to 7 = ―a great deal‖ and the third item was scored from 1 = ―never‖ to 7 = ―more than once a week.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .757. Statistical Analyses. First, correlation analyses were used to examine the zero-order relationships between the measures of negative affect, positive affect, neuroticism, and the positive personal characteristics. Second, multiple regression analyses were used to examine the relative effects of neuroticism and each positive characteristic in predicting both negative affect and positive affect. Third, multiple regression analyses were used to examine the relative effects of neuroticism and all of the positive characteristics in each sample in predicting both negative affect and positive affect. The alpha level for all statistical tests was p < .05. The size of the correlations and regression coefficients are referred to as small = .10, medium = .30, and large = .50 using Cohen‘s guidelines (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).
RESULTS The three studies are first presented separately and then the findings from all three studies are summarized and integrated. The four hypotheses are addressed for each study and in the summary and integration.
1. Study 1 The descriptive statistics and correlation analyses for Study 1 are displayed in Table 1.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations for Study 1.
1. Negative Affect 2. Positive Affect 3. Neuroticism 4. Extraversion 5. Resilience 6. Emotional Intelligence 7. Social Skills 8. Spirituality
M 2.38 3.50 2.81 3.37 3.85 3.73
SD 0.73 0.70 0.77 0.72 0.48 0.40
1 -.181** .594** -.141** -.270** -.193**
2
3
4
5
-.373** .482** -.255** .562** -.553** .445** .475** -.348** .506** .663**
6
7
8
-
3.01 0.44 -.180** .321** -.287** .670** .461** .578** 2.94 1.09 .005 .130** -.062 .172** .242** .248** .186** -
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01.
Table 2. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from Neuroticism and One Positive Characteristic in Study 1.a Negative Affect Neuroticism and Extraversion Neuroticism .597** Extraversion .011 Neuroticism and Resilience Neuroticism .629** Resilience .065 Neuroticism and Emotional Intelligence Neuroticism .600** Emotional. Intelligence .016 Neuroticism and Social Skills Neuroticism .591** Social Skills -.010 Neuroticism and Spirituality Neuroticism .596** Spirituality .041
Positive Affect -.267** .414** -.102 .508** -.233** .394** -.303** .234** -.366** .108*
Note: aStandardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Table 3. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from Neuroticism and All of the Positive Personal Characteristics for Study 1.a
Neuroticism Extraversion Resilience Emotional Intelligence Social Skills Spirituality
Negative Affect .623** .016 .079 -.019 -.044 .033
Positive Affect -.062 .359** .341** .144* .185** -.022
Note: aStandardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.
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Neuroticism had a strong positive correlation negative affect. All of the positive characteristics except spirituality had weak to medium negative correlations with negative affect. Spirituality was not related to negative affect. Neuroticism had a medium negative correlation with positive affect. Extraversion, the CD-RISC, and emotional intelligence had a strong positive correlation, social skills had a medium positive correlation, and spirituality had a weak positive correlation with positive affect. Table 2 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and one positive characteristic at a time. When negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was still a strong predictor of more negative affect when paired with each positive characteristic. In every case, the regression coefficients of the positive personal characteristics were very small and nonsignificant when predicting negative affect when neuroticism was in the equation. When positive affect was the dependent variable, the positive characteristics were significant predictors of more positive affect every time while neuroticism was a significant predictor of less positive affect four out of five times. Resilience reduced the relationship between neuroticism and positive affect the most followed by emotional intelligence and extraversion. Table 3 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and all of the positive characteristics at the same time. When negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was still a strong predictor of more negative affect when all of the positive characteristics when in the equation. At the same time, the regression coefficients for each of the positive personal characteristics were very small or non-significant when predicting negative affect with neuroticism in the equation. Conversely, when positive affect was the dependent variable, all of the positive characteristics except spirituality were still positively related to positive affect while neuroticism was no longer related to less positive affect. The first hypothesis that neuroticism would be related to negative affect when controlling for the positive characteristics was strongly supported. Neuroticism was still strongly related to more negative affect when controlling for each positive characteristic separately and when controlling for all of them together. The second hypothesis that the positive characteristics would not be related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism was also strongly supported. None of the positive characteristics were related to negative affect when entered separately or together with neuroticism. The third hypothesis that neuroticism would not be related to positive affect when controlling for the positive characteristics was partially supported. Neuroticism was still related to less positive affect when entered with each of the positive characteristics except resilience but was not related to positive affect when entered with resilience alone or all of the positive characteristics at the same time. Finally, the fourth hypothesis that the positive characteristics would be related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism was generally supported. All of the positive characteristics were still related to more positive affect when entered separately and all except for spirituality were still related to more positive affect when entered together and controlling for neuroticism.
2. Study 2 The descriptive statistics and correlation analyses for Study 2 are displayed in Table 4.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations for Study 2. 1. Negative Affect 2. Positive Affect 3. Neuroticism 4. Extraversion 5. Optimism 6. Mood Clarity 7. Mood Repair 8. Reappraisal
M 1.73 3.49 2.69 3.46 3.58 3.60 3.68 4.77
SD 0.55 0.65 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.63 0.64 1.05
1 2 3 -.089 .554** -.303** -.168** .388** -.268** -.277** .365** -.301** -.344** .283** -.487** -.255** .393** -.348** -.166** .280** -.317**
4
5
6
7
8
.299** .312** .289** .165**
.340** .660** .299**
.349** .215**
.476**
-
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01.
As in Study 1, neuroticism had a strong positive correlation with negative affect and this time all of the positive characteristics had weak to medium negative correlations with negative affect. Again, neuroticism had a medium negative correlation with positive affect. All of the positive characteristics had medium positive correlations with positive affect. Table 5 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and one positive characteristic at a time. When negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was still a strong predictor of more negative affect when paired with each positive characteristic. In almost every case, the regression coefficients of the positive personal characteristics were very small or nonsignificant when predicting negative affect while neuroticism was in the equation. The only exception was that optimism was a small but significant predictor of less negative affect. When positive affect was the dependent variable, the positive characteristics were significant predictors of more positive affect every time while neuroticism was also still a significant predictor of less positive affect every time. Table 5. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from Neuroticism and One Positive Characteristic in Study 2.a Negative Affect Neuroticism and Extraversion Neuroticism .548** Extraversion -.022 Neuroticism and Optimism Neuroticism .517** Optimism -.123* Neuroticism and Mood Clarity Neuroticism .507** Mood Clarity -.097 Neuroticism and Mood Repair Neuroticism .530** Mood Repair -.072 Neuroticism and Reappraisal Neuroticism .557** Reappraisal .009
Positive Affect -.215** .330** -.213** .299** -.216** .180** -.190** .326** -.239** .202**
Note: Standardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.
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Table 6. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from Neuroticism and All of the Positive Personal Characteristics for Study 2.a
Neuroticism Extraversion Optimism Mood Clarity Mood Repair Reappraisal
Negative Affect .499** .018 -.119 -.073 -.003 .041
Positive Affect -.097 .255** .118 .046 .148* .090
Note: aStandardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Table 6 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and all of the positive characteristics at the same time. When negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was still a strong predictor of more negative affect when paired with all of the positive characteristics. At the same time, the regression coefficients for each of the positive personal characteristics were very small or non-significant when predicting negative affect while neuroticism was in the equation. When positive affect was the dependent variable, extraversion and mood repair were still related to more positive affect while optimism, mood clarity, and reappraisal no longer predicted more positive affect and neuroticism no longer predicted less positive affect. The first hypothesis that neuroticism would be related to negative affect when controlling for the positive characteristics was again strongly supported. Neuroticism was still strongly related to more negative affect when controlling for each positive characteristic separately and when controlling for all of them together. The second hypothesis that the positive characteristics would not be related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism was generally supported. Only optimism was still a predictor of less negative affect when entered separately but not when entered with the other positive characteristics. The third hypothesis that neuroticism would not be related to positive affect when controlling for the positive characteristics was again only partially supported. Neuroticism was still related to less positive affect when entered with each of the positive characteristics but was not related to positive affect when entered with all of the positive characteristics at the same time. Finally, the fourth hypothesis that the positive characteristics would be related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism was partially supported. All of the positive characteristics were still related to more positive affect when entered separately but only extraversion and mood repair were still related to more positive affect when entered together with all of the positive characteristics.
3. Study 3 The descriptive statistics and correlation analyses for Study 3 are displayed in Table 7. Neuroticism had a strong positive correlation negative and all of the positive characteristics except for empathy had weak to medium negative correlations with negative affect. Empathy was not related to negative affect. Again, neuroticism had a medium negative correlation with positive affect. All of the positive characteristics had medium positive
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correlations with positive affect except for empathy which had a weak positive correlation with positive affect. Table 8 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and one positive characteristic at a time. As in Studies 1 and 2, when negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was still a strong predictor of more negative affect when paired with each positive characteristic. In almost every case, the regression coefficients of the positive personal characteristics were very small and non-significant when predicting negative affect while neuroticism was in the equation. The only exception was that resilience was a small but significant predictor of less negative affect. When positive affect was the dependent variable, the positive characteristics were significant predictors of more positive affect every time while neuroticism was still a significant predictor of less positive affect every time except when it was paired with resilience. Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations for Study 3. M 1. Negative Affect 1.94 2. Positive Affect 3.52 3. Neuroticism 2.83 4. Extraversion 3.46 5. Resilience 3.55 6. Purpose in Life 4.19 7. Empathy 3.90 8. Perspective Taking 3.55
SD 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.54 0.54
1 -.134* .473** -.177** -.377** -.170** -.009 -.169**
2
3
-.352** .443** .483** .503** .166** .371**
-.291** -.616** -.242** .070 -.192**
4
5
6
7
8
.296** .321** .250** .186** .069 .210** .301** .295** .279** .359** -
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01.
Table 8. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from Neuroticism and One Positive Characteristic in Study 3.a Negative Affect Neuroticism and Extraversion Neuroticism .460** Extraversion -.043 Neuroticism and Resilience Neuroticism .388** Resilience -.137* Neuroticism and Purpose in Life Neuroticism .459** Purpose in Life -.059 Neuroticism and Empathy Neuroticism .476** Empathy -.042 Neuroticism and Perspective Taking Neuroticism .456** Perspective Taking -.082
Positive Affect -.244** .372** -.088 .428** -.245** .443** -.368** .222** -.292** .315**
Note: aStandardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.
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Table 9. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from Neuroticism and All of the Positive Personal Characteristics for Study 3.a
Neuroticism Extraversion Resilience Purpose in Life Empathy Perspective Taking
Negative Affect .381** -.005 -.116 -.033 -.001 -.050
Positive Affect -.009 .208** .298** .320** .027 .119*
Note: aStandardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Table 9 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and all of the positive characteristics at the same time. When negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was a moderate-tostrong predictor of more negative affect when paired with all of the positive characteristics. At the same time, the regression coefficients for each of the positive personal characteristics were very small or non-significant when predicting negative affect while neuroticism was in the equation. When positive affect was the dependent variable, all of the positive characteristics were related to more positive affect while neuroticism no longer predicted less positive affect. As in Studies 1 and 2, the first hypothesis that neuroticism would be related to negative affect when controlling for the positive characteristics was strongly supported. Neuroticism was still strongly related to more negative affect when controlling for each positive characteristic separately and when controlling for all of them together. The second hypothesis that the positive characteristics would not be related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism was generally supported. Only resilience was still a predictor of less negative affect when entered separately but not when entered with the other positive characteristics. The third hypothesis that neuroticism would not be related to positive affect when controlling for the positive characteristics was again only partially supported. Neuroticism was still related to less positive affect when entered with each of the positive characteristics except for resilience and was not related to positive affect when entered with all of the positive characteristics at the same time. Finally, the fourth hypothesis that the positive characteristics would be related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism was generally supported. All of the positive characteristics were still related to more positive affect when entered separately and all of the positive characteristics except empathy were related to more positive affect when entered together with all of the positive characteristics.
4. Summary and Integration The three studies strongly supported the first hypothesis that neuroticism would be related to negative affect when controlling for the positive personal characteristics. In each of the studies, neuroticism was still strongly related to more negative affect when controlling for each of the positive characteristics separately and together.
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The three studies generally supported the second hypothesis that the positive characteristics would not be related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism. In the first study, none of the positive characteristics were related to negative affect when entered separately or together when controlling for neuroticism. In the second and third studies, none of the positive characteristics were related to negative affect when entered together. However, optimism in the second study and resilience in the third study were still small predictors of less negative affect when entered separately. The three studies partially supported the third hypothesis that neuroticism would not be related to positive affect when controlling for the positive characteristics. The results depended on which and how many positive characteristics were controlled for. In all three studies, neuroticism never predicted less positive affect when all of the positive characteristics were controlled. However, neuroticism was still related to less positive affect when controlling for all of the positive characteristics separately except for the two measures of resilience (e.g., the CD-RISC in Study 1 and the Brief Resilience Scale in Study 3). The three studies generally supported the fourth hypothesis that the positive characteristics would be related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism. All of the positive characteristics predicted more positive affect when entered into regression equations with neuroticism alone. When entered together, they still predicted more positive affect on 10 of 15 possible occasions. Extraversion and the measures of resilience still predicted more positive affect each time they were entered with the other positive characteristics and neuroticism. In addition, emotional intelligence, social skills, mood repair, purpose in life, and perspective taking were also still related to more positive affect when they were entered with the other positive characteristics and neuroticism.
DISCUSSION Overall, the studies supported the two-factor model of the relationship between neuroticism, positive characteristics, negative affect, and positive affect. The first hypothesis that neuroticism would be related to negative affect when controlling for the positive characteristics was strongly supported. The second hypothesis that the positive characteristics would not be related to less negative affect when controlling for neuroticism was generally supported with the exception that resilience was still a small predictor of less negative affect. The third hypothesis that neuroticism would not be related to positive affect when controlling for the positive characteristics was supported when controlling for all positive characteristics but was not generally supported when controlling for only one positive characteristic. The fourth hypothesis that the positive characteristics would be related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism was generally supported. The strong positive relationship found between neuroticism and negative affect is consistent with the relationship that has frequently been found between them (Watson et al., 1998; Clark & Watson, 1991). However, the current studies have the added advantage of controlling for extraversion and a wide variety of positive personal characteristics. In fact, the relationship between neuroticism and negative affect was still nearly as strong even when including five positive characteristics in the regression equations. While the correlations (equivalent to a regression coefficient with one predictor in the regression equation) were
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.594, .554, and .473 in the three studies, the regression coefficients when controlling for the five positive characteristics were .623, .499, and .381. Since negative affect has been related to a variety of measures of psychological and physical health (Clark & Watson, 1991; Frasure-Smith et al., 1995; Keefe et al., 2001), our findings about the consistent, strong, and unique effects of neuroticism provide added confidence that negative affect may be a vital pathway by which neuroticism affects health and well-being. Almost all of the positive characteristics (except spirituality and empathy) had small to medium and significant negative correlations with negative affect. However, only optimism and the Brief Resilience Scale still had significant relationships with negative affect when neuroticism was controlled. This is a striking demonstration of the power and scope of neuroticism and a clear example of the importance of controlling for it in studies involving negative affect. This also provides a caution to the positive psychology movement and all those who might endeavor to focus solely on the positive aspects of human personality and functioning. Studies of laudable characteristic such as empathy, spirituality, and emotional intelligence may appear to be important in isolation, but may fade in significance when considered alongside a personality construct as broad and salient as neuroticism. Alternatively, the small negative relationship that optimism and the Brief Resilience Scale had with negative affect suggests that some positive characteristics may still have a limited influence on the negative affective domain. The findings regarding neuroticism and positive affect only partially support the twofactor model (Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003). Although neuroticism was not related to positive affect when controlling for all of the positive characteristics in each study at the same time, it was generally related to less positive affect when only one of the positive characteristics was controlled. This is consistent with some other studies that have found that negative personality characteristics and events may sometimes be related to both more negative and less positive affect (Karademas, 2007; Suh, Diener, & Fujita, 1996). The fact that neuroticism was still related to less positive affect when controlling for positive characteristics like extraversion, optimism, and emotional intelligence is a testimony to the power and breadth of neuroticism. The only exceptions were the two measures of resilience which reduced the relationship between neuroticism and positive affect to a small and nonsignificant relationship. The findings regarding the positive characteristics and positive affect support the value of positive characteristics while at the same time refining our understanding of how and why they are important. All of the positive characteristics were still related to more positive affect when controlling for neuroticism alone and they were related to more positive affect two thirds of the time when five positive characteristics were entered together with neuroticism. While the findings regarding the positive characteristics and negative affect are a caution to the positive psychology movement, the findings regarding the positive characteristics and positive affect may help to refine and direct positive psychology to a more limited but realistic understanding of why positive characteristics may be valuable. In addition, they provide additional data regarding which positive characteristics may be most important. While it was surprising that optimism was not still related to more positive affect when all of the positive characteristics were considered together, it was striking that resilience, purpose in life, and extraversion were still relatively strong predictors of more positive affect.
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The results regarding resilience may be particularly important and worthy of further comment. First, both measures of resilience (the CD-RISC and the Brief Resilience Scale) were still predictors of more positive affect when controlling for neuroticism and the other four positive characteristics. Second, the Brief Resilience Scale was still related to less negative affect when controlling for neuroticism and had the strongest zero-order correlation of any positive characteristic with negative affect. The CD-RISC is a broad measure of resilience that includes many factors that may increase resilience whereas the Brief Resilience Scale is a more specific measure focusing on the ability to bounce back from stress. Although it is a positive characteristic, the ability to bounce back from stress may affect the negative domain more than other positive characteristics because it is most relevant for times of stress which tend to be perceived as more often negative than positive. Thus, the ability to bounce back from stress may be an important counterpoint to neuroticism during times of stress. While neuroticism may make a person more vulnerable to the negative effects of stress (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995), resilience may enable a person to both reduce negative affect and generate more positive affect in the context of stressful events (Zautra, Johnson, & Davis, 2005)
Implications What are the implications of these findings for the psychology of neuroticism? The most important implication is that it is important to consider neuroticism within the context of both the positive and negative domains to fully understand its power and its limitations. Although neuroticism is typically related to negative affect, the unique power of neuroticism as a personality construct became apparent when controlling for the positive characteristics. Thus, interventions that seek to improve psychological and physical health may benefit by focusing more on the potential role of neuroticism in increasing negative affect and having adverse consequences on health. Neuroticism may be an important moderator of the effects of interventions in that people who are high on neuroticism scales may be less likely to have reduced negative affect when interventions target only positive characteristics and factors. In addition, although neuroticism is a stable characteristic (Costa & McCrae, 1992), there is a large portion of the variance that may be due to environmental factors (Hettema, Neale, Myers, Prescott, & Kendler, 2006). Thus, it may be possible to target affective, cognitive, and behavioral processes that may reduce neurotic ways of responding to the world. For example, we recently completed a study showing that an eight week mindfulness meditation intervention was associated with significantly reduced neuroticism scores (Smith, Shelley, Dalen, Wiggins, Tooley & Bernard, 2008). What are the implications for the relationship between the study of neuroticism and the positive psychology movement? The most obvious implication is that psychology cannot afford to neglect either the negative or the positive side of human experience. Although positive psychology may be an attempt to balance the traditional focus on the negative, there may be just as much danger in focusing solely on the positive. On the one hand, studies of neuroticism should control for positive characteristics to avoid overestimating its effects especially in relation to positive outcomes. On the other hand, studies of positive characteristics should control for neuroticism to avoid overestimating their effects especially in relation to negative outcomes. While this may dampen the enthusiasm of some for positive
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psychology, it may also provide a more realistic focus and a truer appreciation of the value of positive characteristics in relation to the positive affective domain. It provides further impetus for whose who are working to better understand the unique effects of positive affect and emotion on a variety of aspects of human experience and health and well-being (Fredrickson, 2001; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004; Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003).
Limitations There are several limitations to these studies. The most important is that the studies were cross-sectional and make it impossible to make strong causal inferences about the relationship between the measures of personality characteristics and the measures of affect. It is possible that the affective state of the participants could have influenced their response to the personality measures. However, it is more likely the other way around because the personality items were designed to tap relatively stable characteristics while the affect items were responded to with regard to the participants‘ experience within the past two weeks. A second limitation is that the samples were university students making it difficult to generalize to other age groups and those who are less educated. At the same time, there was a relatively high representation of minority students, especially Hispanic and Native American, due to the southwestern U.S. location of the university. Third, while the outcome measures did tap both the positive and the negative domains, they were limited to positive and negative affect. They did not include other negative outcomes such as anxiety and depression and physical symptoms (Clark & Watson, 1991) or other positive outcomes such as different aspects of psychological well-being (Ryff & Keyes, 1995). However, there is strong evidence that positive and negative affect may be central mediators of the effects of personal characteristics on a variety of aspects of psychological and physical health (Frasure-Smith et al., 1995; Keefe et al., 2001; Pressman & Cohen, 2005).
CONCLUSION The studies generally supported the value of a two-factor model in understanding the psychology of neuroticism. They showed that neuroticism has a strong and consistent relationship with negative affect that remains when controlling for important positive personal characteristics. At the same time, the effects of the positive characteristics that are focused on in the positive psychology movement were reduced to non-significance in predicting negative affect when controlling for neuroticism. However, the results also showed that the power of neuroticism to predict affective outcomes may be much more limited with regard to positive affect, especially when considered within the context of positive characteristics. The power of neuroticism may be seen most strongly with regard to negative domain while the limits of neuroticism may be seen most clearly with regard to positive.
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Frasure-Smith, N., Lespérance F. & Talajic, M. (1995). The impact of negative emotions on prognosis following myocardial infarction: is it more than depression? Health Psychology, 14, 388-98. Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broadenand-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56, 218-226. Fredrickson, B. L. (2009). Positivity: Groundbreaking research reveals how to embrace the hidden strength of positive emotions, overcome negativity, and thrive. New York: Crown. Goleman, D. (1997). Emotional intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ. New York, NY: Bantam. Goleman, D. (2006). Social intelligence: The new science of human relationships. New York, NY: Bantam. Gray, J. A. (1982). The neuropsychology of anxiety. New York: Oxford University Press. Gross, J. J. & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 348-362. Hettema, J. M., Neale, M. C., Myers, J. M., Prescott, C. A. & Kendler, K. S. (2006). A population-based twin study of the relationship between neuroticism and internalizing disorders. American Journal of Psychiatry, 163, 857-864. Karademas, E. C. (2007). Positive and negative aspects of well-being: Common and specific predictors. Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 277-287. Keefe, F. J., Lumley, M., Anderson, T., Lynch, T., Studts, J. L. & Carson, K. L. (2001). Pain and emotion Journal of Clinical Psychology, 57, 587-607. Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M. & Cuthbert, B. N. (1998). Emotion, motivation, and anxiety: Brain mechanisms and psychophysiology. Biological Psychiatry, 44, 1248-1263. McNiel, J. M. & Fleeson, W. (2006). The causal effects of extraversion on positive affect and neuroticism on negative affect: Manipulating state extraversion and state neuroticism in an experimental approach. Journal of Research in Personality, 40(5), 529-550. Pargament, K. I. (1997). The psychology of religion and coping: Theory, research, and practice. New York: Guilford. Peterson, C. & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character strengths and virtues: A handbook of classification. New York, NY: Oxford Press. Pressman, S. D. & Cohen, S. (2005). Does positive affect influence health? Psychological Bulletin, 131, 925-971. Rusting, C. L. & Larsen, R. J. (1997). Extraversion, neuroticism, and susceptibility to positive and negative affect: A test of two theoretical models. Personality and Individual Differences, 22(5), 607-612. Ryff, C. D. & Keyes, C. L. M. (1995). The structure of psychological well-being revisited. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 719-727. Ryff, C. D. & Singer, B. (1998). The contours of positive human health. Psychological Inquiry, 9, 1-28. Salovey, P., Mayer, J. D., Goldman, S. L., Turvey, C. & Palfai, T. P. (1995). Emotion attention, clarity, and repair: Exploring emotional intelligence using the Trait Meta-Mood Scale. In J. W. Pennebaker (Eds.), Emotion, disclosure, & health (125-154). Scheier, M. F. & Carver, C. S. (1985). Optimism, coping, and health: Assessment and implications of generalized outcome expectancies. Health Psychology, 4, 219-247.
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Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S. & Bridges, M. W. (1994). Distinguishing optimism from neuroticism (and trait anxiety, self-mastery, and self-esteem): A reevaluation of the Life Orientation Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 1063-1078. Schutte, N. S., Malouff, J. M., Hall, L. E., Haggerty, D. J., Cooper, J. T., Golden, C. J. & Dornhein, L. (1998). Development and validation or a measure of emotional intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 25, 167-177. Seligman, M. E. P. & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. American Psychologist, 55, 5-14. Smith, B. W., Dalen, J., Wiggins, K., Tooley, E., Christopher, P. & Bernard, J. (2008). The Brief Resilience Scale: Assessing the ability to bounce back. International Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 15,194-200. Smith, B. W., Shelley, B. M., Dalen, J., Wiggins, K., Tooley, E. & Bernard, J. (2008). A pilot study comparing the effects of Mindfulness-Based and Cognitive-Behavioral Stress Reduction. Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 14, 251-258. Smith, B. W. & Zautra, A. J. (2008). Vulnerability and resilience in women with arthritis: Test of a two-factor model. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 76, 799-810. Smith, T. W., Pope, M. K., Rhodewalt, F. & Poulton, J. L. (1989). Optimism, neuroticism, coping, and symptom reports: An alternative interpretation of the Life Orientation Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 640-648. Suh, E., Diener, E. & Fujita, F. (1996). Events and subjective well-being: Only recent events matter. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 1091-1102. Tugade, M. M. & Fredrickson, B. L. (2004). Resilient individuals use positive emotions to bounce back from negative emotional experiences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 320-333. Uziel, L. (2006). The extraverted and the neurotic glasses are of different colors. Personality and Individual Differences, 41(4), 745-754. Watson, D., Clark, L. A. & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS Scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063-1070. Watson, D., Weise, D., Vaidya, J. & Tellegen, A. (1999). The two generally activation systems of affect: Structural findings, evolutionary consideration, and psychobiological evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 820-838. Zautra, A. J. (2003). Emotions, stress, and health. New York: Oxford. Zautra, A. J., Johnson, L. M. & Davis, M. C. (2005). Positive affect as a source of resilience for women in chronic pain. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 73, 212-220.
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 151-167
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 7
THE DYNAMICS OF SHAME AND PSYCHIATRIC ILL-HEALTH 1
Bengt Starrin1 and Åsa Wettergren2 Department of Social Studies, Karlstad University, Sweden and Faculty of Health and Social Studies, Lillehammer University College, Norway 2 Department of Social Studies, Karlstad University, Sweden
ABSTRACT In the Icelandic sagas shame, humiliation, respect and honour are central themes. The sagas describe a culture where there are strongly regulated rituals for how a man can obtain and sustain his honour. It is only possible to be happy with oneself after gaining respect in the eyes of the other. An honourable man who has been humiliated and insulted and has been unable to get revenge, compensation or reconciliation looses his status and reputation as an honourable man. It leads to self contempt and deep depression. Contrary to what was the case in the Icelandic sagas, shame and humiliation are hidden and privatized in modern society. We feel ashamed of our shame. In this article we explore the question if, parallel to the Icelandic sagas where shame without redress could lead for instance to apthy, modern types of shame and shaming is equally associated to psychiatric ill-health.
INTRODUCTION In most cultures there seems to exist an unwritten ethical code, which states that when we encounter another human being, we shall not deliberately act in a manner which will cause the other person to lose face. If it does happen anyway, we must make an effort to lessen or to hide the embarrassment. We should not embarrass or humiliate people, but show consideration and respect (Riezler 1943; Goffman 1955). The basic idea behind the code is that lack of respect leads to humiliation and humiliation creates shame. Shame generates a need for vindication and acknowledgement. How central is this process to our well being? Could a deeper understanding of the private and the social sides of shame and humiliation
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contribute to an increased knowledge in the area of psychiatric ill health? These are some of the questions that this essay will look at. As far as we know, there are hardly any systematic studies that deal with the extent of shaming such as humiliation and insult, and why we put people to shame. It has been suggested that shame and humiliation, and its underlying reasons are some of the best kept secrets in Western organisations and society. The reason is that we are ashamed of feeling shame and we do not want to experience the humiliation of admitting our fear of humiliation (Scheff 1990; Smith 2003). Despite the fact that emotions like shame and humiliation were important to many of the classical sociologist in understanding and explaining society, they then came to play a minor part for many years. It is only in recent years that there has been a renewed interest (Barbalet 1999; Dahlgren & Starrin 2004).
Two Kinds of Shame in the Icelandic Sagas In our discussion on the link between shame, humiliation and psychiatric ill health, we have chosen to use the Icelandic sagas as our starting point. These sagas can perhaps teach us quite a bit about the link between emotional processes and psychiatric ill health. The Icelandic sagas consist of stories about life in Iceland during the 10th and 11th century. The sagas describe a social culture where there are strongly regulated rituals for how an honourable man can achieve and maintain dignity and honour. The Russian author Aron Gurevitj states that what the Icelandic sagas really deal with, are stories about gaining respect in the eyes of others and oneself. It is only possible to be happy with oneself after gaining respect (Gurevitj 1997). The equilibrium of existence is disturbed when somebody humiliates us. In order to restore honour it is, in most cases, absolutely necessary to first get revenge and after that, reconciliation can take place. Taking revenge is not considered to be a primitive action. It is not only the person that takes revenge that gains honour, but also their family and relatives. In other words, the society illustrated in the Icelandic sagas is a strongly patriarchal one which also has a strong collective orientation. The family is the smallest building block in society. The male head of the family is portrayed as an individual to a certain extent, but not as an individual that is limited by his own body or actions. Instead, the head of the family contains the entire family. The actions and slights of individual family members are also his. It is his responsibility to get redress. Self respect and family honour are very closely linked. The respect of others is achieved through following the rules about decency, honour, revenge and reconciliation. Any man that does not follow these rules is not a man. For example, it is considered a shame not to participate in a duel or combat or to lack strength and courage. The opposite is also true, i.e. that which has a purpose and raises status is considered honourable and is sometimes talked about as great achievements. William Ian Miller writes about shame in the Icelandic sagas that it is important to differentiate between the experience of the humiliated and shamed person who sees it as part of an institutionalised system of norms, and the experience of shame as a consequence of other people's judgement, confirmed by the individual himself and which means that he cannot live up to what is expected of a fully moral and respectful individual (Miller 1993). The first type of shame, associated with anger and indignation, is the shame experienced by
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an honourable man who has been challenged and defeated. The other type of shame is associated with self contempt and self doubt and it is the shame experienced by a person who has not been able to get revenge, compensation or reconciliation. In the first type, there is also a sense of shame, but instead of self contempt, there is anger and indignation. The feeling of self contempt is dormant and could develop at full strength if the individual is proven incapable of getting revenge. The person who has been subjected to humiliation by somebody else has to take action to prove to him-self and to others that he is an honourable person. If he fails, he will end up with the second type of shame. If there is no time for retribution, and no honourable reconciliation, time will run out. The person will then be dishonoured and looses his status. The story of Havard is an example of this. He is lying in his bed devoid of strength for an entire year. The reason for this is the sorrow he feels over his son who has been killed, and his failure to get compensation. Havard now thinks that luck has deserted him and he spends another three years in his bed. Then, as he finally gets an opportunity to take revenge, his family cannot believe their eyes. The broken individual is transformed into a powerful and youthful person (Gurevitj 1997). Through this action, he has regained respect in his own eyes and in the eyes of others. It is significant that Havard's depression seems to be primarily about his lost honour, and only secondarily about his dead son. In the Icelandic sagas, an individual's view of himself is entirely dependent on how other people see him. His feeling of self is more or less a reflection of how the group and the local community see him. The reason why humiliation is a frequent occurrence in the Icelandic sagas is perhaps because it is through humiliation that a man is given the opportunity to show his dignity, his manly courage. It follows on from this that humiliation is not a secret. Shame is not a taboo. On the contrary, it is a feeling that concerns those around him. The culture of honour revolves around compensation and/or revenge.
The Concepts of Shame and Humiliation In the literature, there are different opinions as to whether shame and humiliation should be regarded as feelings that are part of different "families of emotions" or the same "emotion families". The Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit sees shame and humiliation as so called red emotions, in the sense that other people's opinions are involved (Margalit 1996). Margalit says that the person who is humiliated also experiences shame, but not the other way around. In other words, a person feeling shame does not have to be humiliated. It is possible to feel shame over a bad performance, but that is not humiliation. Humiliation is not a concept of performance. The American philosopher Martha Nussbaum writes in her book Hiding From Humanity that humiliating somebody is to subject them to shame, and that to shame somebody is in most cases the same as humiliating them, at least when the shaming is serious enough (Nussbaum 2004). Some of the authors that put shame and humiliation together are Donald Nathanson (1992), Helen Lewis (1987), Thomas Scheff (1990) and Suzanne Retzinger (1991). Nathanson states that even though it can be argued that emotional states such as shyness, embarrassment and humiliation have their own names and characteristics, the main feeling in
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these is still shame (Nathanson 1992). Turning the eyes away and lowering them and a sunken neck and shoulders are seen as typical expressions of shame/humiliation. Sociologists such as Thomas Scheff (1990) and Suzanne Retzinger (1991) regard humiliation as a shame variant. They recommend a wide definition and are opposed to the idea that shame is only about a serious crisis, dishonour or the loss of honour. The majority of shame, according to Scheff and Retzinger, does not stem from crises and is not dishonouring but more of an "embarrassment type". The broad definition of shame, suggested by Scheff and Retzinger, contains a continuation between, on the one hand, the daily, less intensive, short lived feeling of shame such as for example, awkwardness and on the other hand the type of shame that is painful and long lived. It usually gives rise to general indignation and constitutes a type that can be labelled dishonouring or humiliating shame. Scheff and Retzinger suggest that a first step towards a scientific definition of shame would be to use shame as a collective name for a large family of emotions that appear when regarding oneself negatively, even if it is only slightly negatively, through the eyes of another, or even just the expectation of such a reaction. Such a step would include less intense forms of shame, as well as more intense ones.1 In Scheff and Retzinger‘s presentation, shame has a dual aspect. On the one hand, it is a natural and normal feature of social life. It acts as a signal when there is a problem between people and it draws attention to the risk of social ties dissolving unless something is done to repair them. On the other hand, shame can be oppressive, destructive and excluding, and carry a lot of negative consequences. And it is the suppression of shame that creates harmful consequences. At the exact moment that an individual says to himself, and to people he can trust ‖I am ashamed‖, the shame is already subsiding. The paradox lies within the fact that while the individual‘s biggest fear is that his shame will become known, the solution is that the person who hears the confession is someone that he can trust. Studies also point to important biological changes taking place when an individual talks about traumatic emotional events. Talking about painful events leads to a substantial drop in blood pressure, and muscle tension decreases during, or immediately after talking about these events. These biological effects seem to be most pronounced among those who express emotions. There is also a lot to indicate that the long term effects are only visible in those who are encouraged to express emotions. Research also shows that the vast majority of people share their emotional experiences with other people. People talk about how different experiences affected their emotions, if it lead to anger, sadness or happiness etc. Some studies, however, indicate that this is not always true about shame. Shame seems to be an emotion that we would rather keep to ourselves (Pennebaker 2002). As previously touched upon, the different variations of shame have in common that they are social emotions. Through shame, other people's gaze is directed towards the self; it relates the self to other people, even if this only happens in the imagination. Experiencing shame therefore constitutes the core of being social and of the need to feel affinity to other people. As the feeling of shame is a complicated feeling as regards its consequences and as regards its
1
In daily language a number of related terms or substitute words are used to describe the feeling of shame i.e. feelings that occur when an individual looks at himself negatively through someone else's eyes. Examples would be "dismissed", "unworthy", "inadequate", "a failure", "lousy", "feeling left out".
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relationship with others, there are in the literature many attempts at conceptual distinctions, which we will not go deeper into in this chapter.2 The English term humiliation stems from humilis, which means standing low. To humiliate is to put down. The original meaning of shame is to cover oneself, to hide. Shame is considered a response to insecure and threatened social ties (Scheff 1990; Retzinger 1991). It is also a response to a loss of status or the risk of such loss (Gilbert 1998). It would also seem that shame appears more in the presence of people with a higher status than it does among people with a lower status (Keltner & Harker 1998; Collins 2004).
Shame as a Regulator Shame can be seen as the far most dominating feeling as it fills more functions than other emotions. For example, shame plays an important part in regulating the expression and consciousness of all our other emotions such as anger, fear, guilt and love. The extent to which these are allowed to be expressed, depends on the degree to which we are ashamed of them. Someone who is ashamed of showing anger will hold back that emotion. As pointed out by Thomas Scheff, a person can be so ashamed of their emotions that they become completely suppressed (Scheff 1990; Scheff 2001). The subject of shame as a regulator has been extensively dealt with by a number of writers, among them the German sociologist Norbert Elias, and the American historian Peter Stearns. The type of shame that Norbert Elias puts forward in his work about the civilisation process has both a social and a private side (Elias 1939/1991). The connection between the two is described roughly as follows; The stronger the external force is transformed through the social structure into internal self punishment and self control, and the more wide spread the pressure to conform to conventions, the more we see the fear of breaking social norms or rules manifest itself as feelings of shame. Elias' theory is that the history of the civilisation process is a history containing increasing emotional self punishment and self control. The threshold for what was considered embarrassing or shameful was gradually lowered. One distinguishing feature was that there was an increasing tendency for self restraint, self control and self punishment. One of Elias' most important contributions in his studies of the civilisation process was that he discovered the social importance of shame, and the central part played by shame in understanding changes in people's behaviour. But the civilisation process has a paradoxical consequence in Elias' presentation. On the one hand, it increases the interconnection between people, which means that people become more dependent on each other. On the other hand, it increases people's feelings of being isolated from each other. The civilisation process does not only increase the demand for constraint and control of one‘s feelings but it also finds ways of doing this that lead to among other things, more artificial, uninvolved and indifferent ways of relating to other people. American historian Peter Stearns has similar ideas in his book American Cool. The new emotional culture that emerged in modern society came to encourage a certain amount of emotional passivity as a result of the lowering of the embarrassment threshold for intense emotions. So called immature emotional expressions such as the display of anger and envy 2
Examples of such conceptual distinctions are: External shame – internal shame; functional shame – dysfunctional shame; acknowledge shame – non-acknowledge shame; healthy shame – pathological shame.
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were to be held back and corrected with the help of embarrassment. Embarrassment became the technique that was to help reason to replace emotional action without triggering defensive emotional expressions (Stearns 1994). It seems that in modern society, shame and shame variants such as humiliation have become invisible. Not because they are less frequent, but because it has become something of a taboo to display shame and humiliation in front of others. In the world of the Icelandic sagas shame was collectively regulated; shaming as well as the ways to regain respect and recognition were public and ritualised. In the modern individualised society, shame is associated with individual failure to live up to expected or desired status positions. The way that individuals deal with shame and its effects for the self-image will also be dependent on the individual‘s past history and position in the social hierarchy. It is argued that the lower the social status somebody has, the lesser the respect received from others, and the more derision and contempt (Scheff 1990). In this way, the feeling of inferiority and misery is cemented. The person who is inferior and humiliated experiences faltering self confidence and does not really dare to take any initiative. Persons and groups that are constantly reminded of their inferior position in the societal hierarchy, either through individual superiors, or by an abundance of regulations, eventually come to accept their inferior status (Ehrenreich 2002). Thus shame is seen as a concern for the individual, and a result of his/her personal shortcomings such as a lack of ability to be successful in life. It thereby becomes a feeling of the stigmatised and marginalized. Preliminary data from an ongoing study supports the statement that shame is an emotion that we prefer to keep to ourselves.3 In the study, questions were asked about which feelings would definitely be kept private, which could possibly be shown to other people, and which could definitely be shown in front of others.4 Other people was explained as meaning study colleagues and work colleagues who were not considered to be part of the closer circle of friends. The four emotions that the respondents definitely wanted to keep to themselves were jealousy, hatred, envy and shame. In relation to shame, 54 percent of women, and 53 percent of the men insisted that they would definitely keep it to themselves. The corresponding numbers for awkwardness were 35 percent and 45 percent respectively, and for embarrassment 30 percent and 43 percent. Shame seems to be a more ―shameful‖ feeling than awkwardness and embarrassment, in particular as far as women are concerned. Participants also had to say how often they had experienced different feelings in the last seven days. Happiness, pride, anger and sorrow were the most frequent emotions. Hatred, envy and shame were the least frequent ones. In relation to shame, every third woman, or 33 percent, stated that they had experienced shame at some point in the last seven days. For men, the figure was 45 percent. The corresponding figures for awkwardness were 56 percent and 64 percent respectively, and for embarrassment they were 47 percent and 57 percent. It is more common for men to feel awkwardness and embarrassment but it is also more common for these men to keep it to themselves.
3 4
The study is conducted at Karlstad University and is aimed at undergraduate students. The feelings that the participants had to comment on were jealousy, hatred, envy, shame, disgust, akwardness, embarrassment, grief and joy.
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How Common is Shaming? There is limited knowledge about the extent to which people feel that they have been patronised, been humiliated, or in any other way subjected to shaming. In order to throw some light on this, we have processed some questions from the database Life & Health. It contains epidemiological data from a population study conducted in the Swedish midlands and covering over 40,000 people aged 18-84. We have combined two questions in order to get an idea of the occurrence of humiliations. The first question is: Have you been humiliated in front of others in the last three months? The second one is: Has somebody insulted your honour? We have also included a question dealing with patronising. In Figure 1 it is apparent that the proportion of people who have been insulted/ridiculed and been treated in a patronising manner, follow roughly the same pattern. It decreases with an increase in age. The connection is very clear. The figures can be interpreted in different ways. One interpretation might be that with increasing age, we are less sensitive and less likely to consider something insulting or patronising. Another might be that people learn the codes of tact through the years, their purpose being for us to act in a way that does not deliberately humiliate people. A third interpretation could be that there is more of a taboo around admitting to such events when you are older In his study on the institutionalised social care of those with dementia, British researcher Tom Kitwood shows that subtle forms of humiliation and other types of shaming exist quietly without becoming visible. Kitwood lists the following principles, used by institutions and care workers: treachery, disempowerment, infantilisation, intimidation, labelling, stigmatization, outpacing, invalidation, banishment, objectification, ignoring, imposition, withholding, accusation, disruption, mockery, disparagement (Kitwood 1997).
Figure 1. Proportion of respondents who have been insulted/ridiculed and patronised in the last three months, in different age groups n=43.589 (Life & Health, 2004).
In many workplaces, shame and humiliation would seem to be part of the social power game and general scheming. American researcher Vincent Waldron gives detailed descriptions of how this is done (Waldron 2000). In the struggle for power, positions and authority, public humiliation is used, Waldron gives the example of Helen, who was a department manager. During a management meeting, the Director talked about his plans for
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the coming financial year and Helen thought she could see an error in the calculations. She expressed her reservation during the meeting. The Director responded with a condescending snarl and totally discarded her way of reasoning. Helen described how hurt, deflated and shocked she was at this public dressing down. Waldron considers this type of public humiliation as a form of emotional tyranny that seems to be fairly common. The emotional reactions are serious depending on the distance between the leader and the person being humiliated. He describes this type of public disqualification as being just as painful as a punch in the stomach delivered by a heavy weight champion. Organisations also use – deliberately or unintentionally – shaming and humiliation as a means to maintain the desired form of social control. Scapegoats are created and guilt is transferred onto a victim in a situation where the self image of the group/organisation would otherwise be under threat and appear in an undesirable light. People who point out wrongdoings in organisations are often seen as troublemakers. They are humiliated and run the risk of becoming isolated (Douglas 1995; Pattison 2000).
The Dynamics of Shame and Psychiatric Ill Health Within the field of stress theory, it is assumed that an external pressure such as a danger or threat can cause negative stress and lead to both physical and mental ill health. Research seems to indicate that this assumption has empirical support primarily when the danger, threat or strain contains an evaluating component directed at the social self and carries the risk of severely damaging an individual‘s sense of self. The issue here is the potential risk that other people might see the individual in a negative light. Research conducted by Sally Dickerson and her colleagues points in that direction (Dickerson et al 2004). Her research focuses on shame as a key response against threats to the social self. There are studies indicating that people, who have been subjected to shaming in the form of humiliation, ridicule and other forms of insult display more psychiatric problems than people who have not been subjected to shaming. For example, studies show that shaming covaries with mental ill health among social benefit recipients (Starrin et al 2003), the unemployed (Starrin & Jönsson 2006; Rantakeisu et al 1999) and the obese (Sjöberg et al 2005). Studies also show that shame (Gilbert 2000; Lewis 1981) and humiliation such as being rejected by someone close, publicly snubbed, personal failure, and similar things seems to be important factors for the onset of depression (Brown et al 1995; Kendler et al 2003; Scheff 2001; Åslund et al (2007) and burnout (Eriksson et al 2008).
Markers of Shame in Two Case Studies As mentioned earlier, several writers have pointed out that shame and its variants have become less and less visible. Shame has gone underground and become more difficult to discover. It seems to be the case that the more that the shame is connected to a behaviour or a state that creates suffering, the harder it becomes to empirically show the importance of
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shame. This is due to the fact that the connection between suffering and shame is made invisible to the extent that even the person suffering becomes oblivious to the chain of events. The Norwegian researcher and doctor Edvin Schei claims that patients go in and out of the health care system, being investigated and treated without getting well, and without recognition being given to underlying causal experiences of shame and self hatred (Schei 2006). The reason most shame states are not acknowledged is that they are covered over by layers of defences, often many layers (Scheff 2009). There have been some promising attempts to develop markers for shame, so that it is possible to discover shame even when it is suppressed. Thomas Scheff used markers when he conducted a new study of the interviews and observations that he carried out in a mental hospital in the 1960s (Scheff 2001). What was characteristic for all these depressed men, was that their social ties with other people were either cut off, or very weak. However, in most cases, it did not seem that they were suppressing feelings of grief or sadness. Very few of them had faces that displayed sadness, and none displayed anger. Most of them displayed empty and emotionless faces. Their faces were devoid of expression but their bodies radiated shame. According to Thomas Scheff, the behaviour of each of the older men during the interview, can be interpreted as expressing chronic shame. Distinguishing features included lack of eye contact, slow movements, nervousness and self accusations. These are all basic shame indicators. The behaviour and appearance of these men would indicate that they felt deep shame during the interview. Despite the fact that suppressed sorrow and anger can be part of the picture, the basic emotion is non-recognised unconscious shame (Scheff 2001). Scheff asks himself why the men were ashamed? Because the observations were made in a mental hospital, there is likely to be, according to Scheff, an element of shame for everybody in the role of a psychiatric patient and all that it entails. Examples would be the fact that you are no longer in charge of your own life, and that you are judged to be abnormal and incompetent. But in addition to this, the men‘s situation was characterised by a lack of a secure and safe relationship with another person. They were not part of any community. Those that were married did not get on with their wives. The rest were widowers, divorced or unmarried. Very few of the men were living with their children or other relatives. Even though some were employed, they found no satisfaction in their work. Shame was a response to damaged social bonds. The men were in a permanent state of shame primarily because their social bonds were under threat or had been severely damaged. In another study of around 30 people on long term sick-leave where all had been diagnosed either as burned out or as suffering from other stress related afflictions, shame markers developed by Suzanne Retzinger (Retzinger 1991) were used in order to trace shame in the stories told by the interviewees regarding important events leading up to the sick leave (Eriksson et al 2008). What they all had in common was that their workplaces had either been subjected to substantial changes and/or a cut in staff numbers. Secure working groups had been divided and the individuals had been incorporated into more lose groups with more superficial contact. Conflicts and personal disagreements ensued and were never solved. Relationships with co-workers, superiors and people in lower positions became increasingly conflict prone, tense and insecure. In their stories, there were expressions that directly indicate shame, such as words like humiliated, hurt and offended. We will give some examples. Kajsa, who was a pre-school teacher felt offended by her boss. She said that the boss put the blame on her and two others,
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when parents protested against the closure of their section of the childcare facility. The mere thought of her boss keept her awake at night, long after the events. In the stories there are frequent mentions of words and expressions that indirectly indicate shame such as the feeling of being on the outside, or not belonging, such as lonely, deserted, let down, dumped, bullied, rejected. The two teachers, Adam and Jan felt left out. Adam was bullied and Jan was left out in the cold. Inga-Lill, a school counsellor, was left out in the cold after a conflict with a superior. Fia, who works in a council run day care centre, was harassed. Lisbeth, a secondary school teacher, felt that she was being treated as invisible. Gerd, another teacher, felt forgotten, deserted and downtrodden. Words that express emotional hurt or threat are frequent in the stories. The pre-school teacher Kajsa talked about how depressed she felt by not being seen. She felt invisible. The same applied to Lisbeth. She felt that in the eyes of the school board she did not exist. The stories contain words and expressions indicating a feeling of falling short of ideals set by oneself and others, a failure to measure up, not being good enough. Kristina, a school assistant said that she started to lose faith in herself as nobody ever told her she did anything good. Pär, an IT worker, felt that younger workers were overtaking him. He started to feel distinctly average. District nurse Erika became more and more worried about coping with the simplest of tasks. Lotta, a medical secretary, started doubting herself. Fanny, a cleaner, was never told she did a good job. She only ever heard complaints In their stories, those on long term sick leave also described how badly affected they were by all conflict and antagonism and how this affected their emotional state. Care assistant Karin talked about people starting to ―chip away‖ at each other. Britta, a pre-school teacher, was given out to by the boss. Helena was opposed by the older teachers in her school, and in Maja‘s place of work, people started turning their backs on each other. Teacher Sigrid said that she could not cope any longer. Britta, the pre-school teacher started to experience fear. Her fear of something going wrong was so strong that she started to pray to God for help. Many also talked about how their mood changed. Anger and sadness replaced each other. David, an economist, told of how he was let down by a colleague. The workplace was full of conflicts. Everything that happened lead to him starting to ―lose his temper‖. ―I gave out to my sister-in-law‖. He does not understand himself how that could happen because he had never done anything like it before. But he does remember being very irritable before going on his sick leave. For Lotta, the anger almost became part of her everyday life for a period. ― I came here and worked and went home and was angry, and ate and slept and barked and was angry and cried and that is the way it was the whole time‖. Kristina, a school assistant, points out that her personality changed without her noticing it. Finally, her son asked her why she was so angry all the time. He wanted to know why she never laughed anymore. Even her colleagues wondered what she was angry for, as she frequently got annoyed and snapped if anyone asked her a question. Everyone in the study had experienced some sort of collapse, and it had been preceded by tensions and conflicts in the social ties. Descriptions of the collapse and its aftermath contain stories about muddled thought processes or a feeling of being absent. For many, the collapse was preceded by a conflict with a superior. Britta had an argument with the boss. She left work, took the car and ended up far from her home. She has no other memories of the drive other than that she was crying. Karin told of having experienced a confrontation where she left work in a very agitated state and never went back. She was ten weeks pregnant and
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miscarried a few days later. The doctor said that it was probably caused by her pressurised work situation. In all the presented descriptions Retzinger´s markers for shame were present.
Epidemiological Data Epidemiological data from the earlier mentioned population study conducted in the Swedish midlands confirms the link between shame and psychiatric ill health/ depression. In the study, a collective measure for shaming was created.5 As is evident in Figure 2, the proportion of people who have been troubled by depression or fatigue syndrome during the last year, increases with an increase in shaming.
I. Not subjected to shaming III. Subjected to shaming in two respects V. Subjected to shaming in four respects
II. Subjected to shaming in one respect IV. Subjected to shaming in three respects VI. Subjected to shaming in five respects
Figure 2. Exposure to shaming, troubled by depression and fatigue syndrome (Life & Health 2004, age group 18-84, n=43589).
Out of those that have not been shamed in any way, around 5 percent have been troubled by depression or fatigue syndrome in the last year. The corresponding figures for those that have been shamed in five respects are 37 and 31 percent respectively.
Depression as a Stigma Just over 40 years ago, American sociologist Erving Goffman published his book Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Goffman 1963). During a number of years, the book came to be an important source of inspiration for a number of studies dealing with vulnerable groups. Concepts like stigma and labelling were given a central role. 5
The following questions were asked: ‖Have you during the last 3 months felt …" That somebody has treated you in a patronising manner?; that someone has embarrassed you in front of others?; that someone has insulted your honour?; that somebody has made disparaging comments about you?; that anyone around you has ignored you?. The possible answers were: ‖Never‖, ‖Once or twice‖, ‖Several times‖.
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One distinguishing feature, considered to be stigmatizing, is that certain ―disadvantaged‖ groups are particularly subjected to shaming in the form of humiliations, belittling, and condescending and patronising treatment. Many people would regard them as of lesser value. Among these groups are for example, the poor (Dahlgren & Starrin 2004), the disabled (Kirschbaum 1991), and so called minority groups considered to have special features as regards for example race (Falk 2001), sexual orientation (Falk 2001) and those with mental illness (Corrigan & Kleinlein 2006). Of those mentioned mental illness is perhaps one of the most discrediting attribute. It is linked to an array of negative stereotypical traits such as that the mentally ill person is potentially violent and dangerous, weak, incompetent and unpredictable (Corrigan & Lundin 2001; Scheff 1966). People with mental illness suffer the greatest impact from stigma. Stigma robs people of rightful life opportunities such as employment and housing. Stigma also interacts with violence issues to cause people with mental illness to have a distorted experience with the criminal justice system (Corrigan & Kleinlein 2006). There has been an increase in the proportion of persons who associate mental illness with perceptions of dangerousness, violence and unpredictability. When asked what ―mental illness‖ meant to them, about 7 % of people asked in 1950 mentioned violent manifestations or symptoms, compared to 12 % in 1996. On the other hand, public understanding of mental illness such as depression has increased (Markowitz 2006). Shaming, i.e. destructive shame appears not only as one of the mechanisms behind psychiatric ill health, but for people who have been affected by psychiatric ill health and have got a psychiatric diagnosis, shame is always lurking in the background. A number of studies show that psychiatric patients lose their social status when the diagnosis becomes public and there is a great risk of being patronised (Thiesen 2001). But who is it that treats the psychiatrically ill or depressed person in a patronising manner? In the earlier referred study, Life & Health, the question was asked whether you had been treated in a patronising manner in the last three months. There was also an option to name by whom (Table 1). Fourteen different sources were named. Table 1. Sources of patronising treatment (Life & Health, 2004, 18-64 years).
Family member./relative Colleague/boss Close acquaintance Care staff
Depression during the last 12 months Women Men % % 23,0 13,1 16,6 16,6 15,5 13,0 9,1 6,6
In table 1, four of the most frequent are shown. Among women who have been affected by depression, the most common source of patronising is a family member or relative and for men affected by depression, it is a work colleague or boss. 23 percent of women have been patronised by somebody within their immediate family, or a relative. The corresponding figure for men is 13 percent. The difference between men and women in that respect is relatively large.
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Society and Shame Related Processes It is a well known fact that the occurrence of good health and disease is not evenly distributed across all sections of people. In many cases, the inequality reflects the social and financial status that the individual enjoys in society; whether he or she is employed or not, an immigrant, rich or poor, whether he or she has a rich and well developed social network or is socially isolated, if he or she has a high degree of influence over his own life or is powerless, and whether he or she has a high or a low social standing (Marmot 2004; Wilkinson 2005). A lot of research would indicate that people in subordinate and vulnerable positions are more likely to end up in emotionally stressful situations that create processes of shame. When for example the unemployed, the poor, the disabled or immigrants are treated in an arrogant or condescending manner by people in powerful positions, they are often forced to control their feelings of rage (Freund 1993). In addition to this, they also lack, to a higher extent than people in higher social positions, the social resources necessary in order to protect themselves from the negative effects of the actions of those in power. They lack what Hochschild calls ‖status-shields‖ (Hochschild 1983). It is also known that people who are further down the social and financial hierarchy are increasingly subjected to health risks. But the question is whether these risks are also related to emotional processes of a negative nature? If it is assumed that certain emotions act as the connecting link between social stresses and psychiatric ill health, it would logically follow that we would find a higher occurrence of these emotions among those groups that also display more psychiatric problems. This theory has some support in the data processed from the database Life & Health. Figure 3 shows two interesting relationships. Firstly, the prevalence of reduced psychiatric health as well as the experience of being shamed (insulted/ridiculed) are associated in a similar way with social status. The prevalence is lowest among those with secure and permanent, jobs and no financial problems, and highest among social welfare recipients. Secondly, there is a surprisingly small difference between the prevalence of reduced psychiatric health and shaming (insulted/ridiculed) for the respective groups. The figures very obviously follow each other.
A. Secure and permanent job, no financial problems
B. Unemployed
C. Welfare recipient
Figure 3. Reduced psychiatric health, insulted/ridiculed and social status (Processed data from Life & Health 2004).
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The connection between social status and reduced psychiatric health is in line with research that shows that health follows a social gradient as regards status and socioeconomical circumstances. Michael Marmot calls it the status syndrome (Marmot 2004), and Richard Wilkinson names it the inequality thesis (Wilkinson 2005), which means than those on the lower rungs of the ladder in society are in worse health that those higher up. But existing data also show that a similar gradient exists for insulted/ridiculed and that this corresponds with the gradient for reduced psychiatric health. In other words, shaming seems to constitute one possible mechanism behind the connection between social status/social position and reduced psychiatric health. Shaming means to put someone to shame and it is assumed to be able to create psychiatric ill health when it is suppressed and not recognised (Lewis 1987; Scheff 1990). Seen from an emotional-sociological perspective, external ―pressure‖ or ―stress‖ in the form of demands and expectations that society imposes on the individual is relayed to internal psychiatric processes without exception by emotions, and there are different thought models about how this happens. It would appear that shame is one of the more immediate responses when the social self is under threat (Dickerson et al 2004), for example, the risk or event of being dismissed by an important person, discriminated against, cut down to size or the subject of the spreading of unflattering information about oneself which increases the risk of being seen in a bad light (lose respect, status). Shame thereby becomes a signal that important social ties are under threat or are unsafe and/or that an individual's social status is fragile. Psychiatric ill health might then be the result of processes linked to the kind of shame during which the self is subjected to attacks that it cannot untangle or defend against. But shaming and ―the toxic shame‖ also seem to appear as a result of stigmatization of the individual as mentally ill. It seems clear that stigmatization worsens the lives of people experiencing mental illness (Corrigan & Kleinlein 2006) and that stigma is a strong barrier to recovery from mental illness (Markowitz 2006). The question that then has to be asked is how emotional processes can fit into the pattern of mental health as being unevenly distributed among the population. Our suggestion is that groups that display more psychiatric ill health (i) to a greater extent have been subjected to circumstances that create shame related psychiatrically unhealthy processes (ii) have had access to less resources in order to protect the self from being subjected to circumstances that create shame related psychiatrically unhealthy processes and iii) have access to less resources that can dissolve shame related psychiatrically unhealthy processes.
CONCLUSION The Icelandic sagas indicate that shame, humiliation respect and honour played an important role for understanding the everyday life of the people during the Middle Age. Being humiliated and unable to cope with the shame in a way that was prescribed by the cultural norms gave rise to psychiatric ill-health. Today the social mechanisms behind shame and coping with it are different but the psychological effects of unresolved shame are the same. In this chapter we have discussed and explored the contemporary link between shaming and reduced psychiatric health. Both qualitative case studies and epidemiological data indicate that shaming might be important to
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consider when understanding at least some forms of psychological problems. However further studies are needed. Since the toxic variants of shame in many cases are extremely difficult to detect as they are repressed and unacknowledged there is a need for a development of both qualitative and quantitative methods.
REFERENCES Barbalet, J. M. (1999). Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure – Macrosociological Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, G. W., Harris, T. O. & Hepworth, C. (1995). Loss, humiliation and entrapment among women developing depression: a patient and non-patient comparison. Psychological Medicine, 25, 7-21. Collins, R. (2004). Interaction Rituals Chains. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Corrigan, P. W. & Lundin, R. (2001). Don´t call me nuts: Coping with the stigma of mental illness. Tinley Park, IL: Recovery Press. Corrigan, P. W. & Kleinlein, P. (2006). The impact of mental illness of stigma. In P.W. Corrigan (Ed.), On the Stigma of Mental Illness (11-44). Washington DC: American Psychological Association. Dahlgren, L. & Starrin, B. (2004). Emotioner, vardagsliv och samhälle. Malmö: Liber. Dickerson, S. S., Gruenewald, T. J., & Kemeny, M. F. (2004). When the Social Self Is Threatened: Shame, Physiology and Health. Journal of Personality, 72(6), 1191-1216. Douglas, T. (1995). Scapegoats. London: Routledge. Ehrenreich, B. (2002). Nickel and Dimed-Undercover in low-wage America. London: Granta Books Elias, N. (1939/1991). Civilisationsteori del 2. Från svärdet till plikten: samhällets förvandlingar. Stockholm: Atlantis. Eriksson, U. B., Starrin, B., & Janson, S. (2008) Longterm sickness absence due to burnout. Qualitative Health Research, 18(5), 626-632. Falk, G. (2001). Stigma – How we treat outsiders. New York: Prometheus Books. Freund, P. E. S. (1993). The Expressive Body: a common ground for the sociology of emotions and health and illness. Sociology of Health and Illness, 12(4), 452-477. Gilbert, P. (1998). What is shame? Some Core Issues and Controversies? In P. Gilbert, & B. Andrews (Eds.), Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology and Culture (pp.3-36). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gilbert, P. (2000). The Relationship of Shame, Social Anxiety and Depression: The role of the evaluation of social rank. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 7, 174-189. Goffman, E. (1955). On Face-Work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction. Psychiatry: Journal of Interpersonal Relations, 18(3), 213-231. Goffman E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Gurevitj, A. (1997). Den svårfångade individen. Stockholm: Ordfront. Hochschild, A. R. (1983). The Managed Heart – Commerzialisation of Human Feeling. Berkely: University of California Press.
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Keltner, D., & Harker, L. A. (1998). The forms and functions of the nonverbal signal of shame. In P. Gilbert, & B. Andrews (Eds.), Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology and Culture (pp. 78-98). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kendler, K. S., Hettema, J. M., Butera, F., Gardner, C. O., & Prescott, C. A. (2003). Life Event Dimensions of Loss, Humiliation, Entrapment, and Danger in the Prediction of Onsets of Major Depression and Generalized Anxiety. Archives of General Psychiatry, 60, 789-796. Kirshbaum, H. (1991). Disability and Humiliation, Journal of Primary Prevention, 12(2), 168-181. Kitwood, T. (1997). Dementia Reconsidered. Backingham: Open University Press. Lewis, H.B. (1981). Freud and Modern Psychology, V. 1: the Emotional Basis of Mental Illness. New York: Plenum. Lewis, H.B. (1987). Shame – the ‖sleeper‖ in psychopathology. In H. B. Lewis (Ed.), The role of shame in symptom formation (pp. 1-28). New Jersey: Erlbaum. Margalit, A. (1996). The Decent Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. Markowitz, F. R. (2006). Sociological Models of Mental Illness Stigma. In P.W. Corrigan (Ed.), On the Stigma of Mental Illness (pp. 129-144). Washington DC: American Psychological Association. Marmot, M. (2004). Status Syndrome. London: Bloomsbury. Miller, W. I. (1993). Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor Social Discomfort and Violence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Nathanson, D. L. (1992). Shame and Pride. New York, London: W.W: Norton & Company, 1992. Nussbaum, M. (2004). Hiding from Humanity – Disgust, Shame and the Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pattison, S. (2000). Shame – Theory, Therapy, Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pennebaker, J.W. (2002). Emotion, disclosure and health: An overview. In J. Pennebaker (Ed.), Emotion, Disclosure & Health. Washington: American Psychological Association. Rantakeisu, U., Starrin, B., & Hagquist, C. (1999). Financial hardship and shame – A tentative model to understand the social and health effects of unemployment. The British Journal of Social Work, 29(6), 877-901. Retzinger, S. M. (1991). Violent emotions. Shame and Rage in Marital Quarrels. London: Sage Publications. Riezler, K. (1943). Comment on the social psychology of shame. American Journal of Sociology, 48, 457-465. Scheff, T. J. (1966). Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory. Chicago: Aldine. Scheff, T. J. (1990). Microsociology. Discourse, Emotion, and Social Structure. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Scheff T. J. (2001). Shame and community: Social components in depression. Psychiatry, 64(3), 212-224. Scheff, T. J. (2003). Shame in Self and Society. Symbolic Interaction, 26(2), 239-262. Scheff, T.J. (2009). A Social Theory and Treatment of Depression. Journal of Ethical and Human Psychiatry, 11(1), 37-49. Schei, E. (2006). Skam i pasientrollen. In P. Guldbrandsen, P. Fugelli, P. G. Hovinf Stang & B. Wilmar, (Eds.), Skam i det medisinske rom (pp.15-30). Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk.
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Sjoberg, R. L., Nilsson, K. W. & Leppert, J. (2005). Obesity, shame, and depression in school-aged children: A population-based study. Pediatrics, 116(3), 744-746 Smith, D. (2003). Kampen om positionerna – förnedring och skam i det sociala maktspelet. Ledmotiv – idéskrift om ledarskap, 1, 71-81. Starrin, B. & Jönsson, L.R. (2006). The Finances–Shame Model and the Relation Between Unemployment and Health. In T. Kieselbach, A. H. Winefield, C. Boyd, & A. Anderson, (Eds.), Unemployment and health (pp.75-78). Brisbane: Australian Academic Press. Starrin, B. (2006). Fattig skamsen och förödmjukad. In K. Kuusela, & S. Sand (Eds.), Integration och introduktion i arbetet med flyktingar i mindre kommuner (pp.85-104). Oplandske bokforlag. Starrin, B., KalanderBlomkvist, M., & Janson, S. (2003). Socialbidragstagande och statusbunden skamkänsla – En prövning av ekonomi-sociala bandmodellen. Socialvetenskaplig tidskrift, 10(1), 24-47. Stearns, P. N. (1994). American Cool: Constructing a twentieth-century emotional style. New York: New York University Press. Thiesen, J. (2001). Being a psychiatric patient in the community – reclassified as the stigmatized other. Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 29(4), 248-255. Waldron, V. R. (2000). Relational experiences and emotion at work. In S. Fineman, (Ed.), Emotion in organizations. London, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Wilkinson, R.G. (2005). The Impact of Inequality – How to make Sick Societies Healthier. New York: The New York Press. Åslund, C., Nilsson, K. W, Starrin, B. & Sjöberg, R. L. (2007). Shaming experiences and the assocaition between depression and psychosocial risk factors. European Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 16(5), 298-304.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Bengt Starrin PhD in Sociology, professor of Social Work at the Department of Social Studies at Karlstad University, Sweden and adjunct professor of Social Policy at Faculty of Health and Social Studies, Lillehammer University College. His major research interests concern sociology of emotions, public health, social policy and welfare. Åsa Wettergren, PhD, is a Research Fellow in Sociology at the Department of Social Studies, Karlstad University, Sweden. Her main research interests are emotions and collective identities (social movements, organizations, national identities); and emotions in and of migration and social exclusion/inclusion. She was the coordinator of the European Sociological Association‘s Research Network of the Sociology of Emotions 2005-2007.
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 169-182
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 8
UNDERSTANDING NEUROTICISM IN EMERGING ADULTHOOD: INTEGRATING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ERIKSON AND FROMM Adam C. Lorincz and Steven Abell University of Detroit Mercy
ABSTRACT This commentary will focus on an exploration of Eriksonian identity formation in emerging adulthood with a special emphasis on how the unique epigenetic struggles of this developmental period may lead to experiences of neuroticism and anxiety. Recent lines of research (Arnett, 1998, 2000, 2001) suggest that emerging adulthood is a time of profound identity exploration for young people. Emerging adults explore issues of identity concerning work, love, purpose, and meaning amidst a period of life marked by increased freedom and significant decision-making. However, contemporary western society seems to foster a prolonged adolescence in emerging adulthood. While emerging adults begin to make choices concerning their identities and their life course, they are relatively free of adult responsibilities and commitments. Meanwhile, Erikson (1950, 1968, 1982) perceived the conflict between identity versus role confusion as an integral struggle in adolescence. With the shift in contemporary society toward a prolonged adolescence, many emerging adults face questions concerning identity in a developmental period which differs markedly from traditional conceptions of adolescence. Greater freedom afforded by college, separation from parents, and increased autonomy to make life decisions makes emerging adulthood unique. Erikson (1950, 1968) felt that lacking a coherent sense of identity causes great anxiety, as does the struggle to achieve this sense of identity. Meanwhile, Fromm (1941, 1947, 1955) suggests that freedom, while perceived of as liberating, actually, causes a great deal of anxiety and that humanity tends to escape from freedom rather than embrace and capitalize on its potential. Therefore, the understanding of a great deal of anxiety and neuroticism in emerging adulthood may lie in an integration of these theories. The increased freedom of emerging adulthood, combined with the potentially stressful issues of identity, intimacy, and facing the incoming commitments of adulthood, may contribute to increased experiences of anxiety and neuroticism. The anxiety produced by increased freedom may lead some to
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Adam C. Lorincz and Steven Abell seek escape from this very freedom, which in turn, may cloud and disrupt identity exploration and commitment leading to role confusion and even more anxiety. For instance, automaton conformity (becoming totally immersed in one‘s culture and forsaking an individual sense of identity) could alleviate the anxiety of freedom, but it may exacerbate the anxiety of role confusion throughout emerging adulthood. Finally, potential solutions for such neuroticism and anxiety are suggested based upon the theories of Erikson (1950, 1968, 1982) and Fromm (1941, 1955).
INTRODUCTION Erikson and Identity According to Erikson (1950, 1968, 1982), a unique, genuine, and individual adult identity is the foundation to a healthy psychological life and ego integrity. Consequently, Erikson (1950) felt that the key conflict of adolescence in psychosocial development involved the formation of an individual identity with which to approach adulthood and relate to society, versus a sense of role confusion. Erikson believed that a key concern of adolescents is how they appear in the eyes of others in comparison to their own self-image. Furthermore, Erikson suggests adolescents connect their skills from earlier in life to their future occupational role in their social and cultural milieu. However, typically the adolescent rejects the continuity of their previous life experience in a search for a new identity. This process of rejecting previous life experiences leads to a period of exploration of various identity roles before committing to and achieving a unique individual identity. Consequently, Erikson observed that western society provides adolescents with a psychosocial moratorium, a period free of adult responsibility and commitments in order to explore the possibilities of identity. According to Erikson (1968), ego identity consists of an adolescent‘s inner sense of identity matching with his or her present and previous life experiences. This sense of identity expresses itself in a psychosocial context in relation with others and society itself. Ultimately, Erikson surmised that this sense of identity crystallizes into a career and other significant roles in adult life. Meanwhile, an adolescent actively searches for a set of beliefs and values, while also coming to terms with societal norms. The other possibility in this stage is role confusion. Role confusion according to Erikson (1968) is the failure to explore and dedicate oneself to an occupational, ideological, or personal identity. Consequently, in response to this role confusion, adolescents compensate for their lack of individual identity by forming cliques and conforming into crowds. For instance, adolescent conformity and hostility to those who are not part of their own particular in-group are examples of a defense against the frustration over role confusion. Finally, Erikson believed that adolescent love is an attempt by the adolescent to mirror their ego identity onto another to clarify role confusion. Erikson (1968) believed that the search for identity lies within the core of the individual but will find expression in a cultural and historical context. This notion emphasized Erikson‘s conception of psychosocial development. He believed humans develop within themselves and within a specific cultural and historical period. Furthermore, Erikson considered the search for identity to be a lifelong quest, coming to a head among adolescents in the identity crisis.
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Erikson (1950, 1968) saw adolescence as a period of replaying the crises of earlier psychosocial life. For instance, an adolescent must confront the issue of trust in finding faith in an ideology. However, fearing a premature commitment, many adolescents display a cynical mistrust toward adult ideology. An adolescent displays free will in deciding which activities to put energy into, even if they do not coincide with their elders‘ expectations. Meanwhile, a negative identity, formed when an adolescent indentifies with the delinquent roles discouraged by parents or society, may provide an adolescent psychological safety from the anxiety of a lack of personal identity. For instance, Erikson (1968) says that in choosing a negative identity, an adolescent takes back control over their identity crisis. Consequently, he suggests that it is easier to form a negative identity through identification than face the difficultly and anxiety of forming an individual identity or the danger of having no identity at all. The psychosocial moratorium is the battleground of an individual‘s identity crisis. Erikson (1950, 1968) conceived of the psychosocial moratorium as a second latency period consisting of a prolonged adolescence allowing an individual to explore social roles and find his or her unique niche in society. Furthermore, this moratorium period delays adult commitments, providing an adolescent the opportunity to explore potential identity commitments. Eventually, the adolescent explores roles and then makes a commitment to an identity, entering adult society. However, Erikson warned that both a premature exit or an excessive prolongation of the moratorium period could prove detrimental to the process of identity development. Essentially, an emerging whose period of moratorium goes on for too long could eventually form neurotic symptoms, such as depression or anxiety about their lack of a commitment to, and definition of, an adult identity. Erikson (1968, 1982) suggested that a great deal of human anxiety stems from an individual lacking a coherent sense of identity. Without a resolution to this stage in development, an emerging adult will rely upon the identity explorations common to the moratorium stage (such as freedom from responsibility, freedom to explore multiple identities, and a lack of commitment) to defend against the anxiety of identity development and exploration. However, this strategy may shift from an ego-syntonic and appropriate aspect of development, to an ego-alien concern and conflict as one begins to face adult responsibility and challenges. Lacking a coherent identity leaves a young adult ill equipped to deal with the anxiety and stress of adult life (Arnett, 2000). Therefore, prolonging the moratorium, delaying adult responsibility and development, and relying on the moratorium as a defense against the anxiety of identity formation could eventually lead to neurotic symptoms and personality organization. Moreover, as Erikson (1968) suggests, a premature end to the psychosocial moratorium also has similar detrimental consequences.
Marcia and Ego Identity Status Marcia (1966) reviewed Erikson‘s (1950) theory of identity development and conceptualized identity status consisting of two variables: crisis and commitment. Crisis refers to an active search for identity among possible alternatives. Commitment, on the other hand, refers to the presence of a decision related to occupational and ideological status. By interviewing college students, Marcia (1966) posited four identity statuses based upon whether individuals actively explored identity possibilities (crisis), and if they had made a
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choice concerning their identity (commitment): identity achievement, diffusion, moratorium, and foreclosure. Identity achievement refers to an individual who experienced a period of crisis and has made a commitment to an ideological orientation and occupation. Identity diffusion refers to an individual with both a lack of crisis and a lack of commitment. Identity foreclosure involves a commitment without a period of crisis. Finally, identity moratorium involves an active crisis, i.e. a search for identity, without any particular commitment. Erikson (1968) implied that achieving identity consisted of resolving previous life conflicts in order to achieve and ideological orientation and occupational relation to society. However, a reliance on the moratorium, a prolonged crisis, and lack of a commitment could potentially contribute to neurotic anxiety. That is to say, those with foreclosed or diffused identities as well as those in moratorium may rely on an imperfect and neurotic strategies to answer the question of identity development. Failure to explore or commit, and a reluctance to resolve the key conflict of the moratorium with a genuine existential choice (Sartre, 1956, 1965) in an individual adult identity may lead to neurotic anxiety through the instability of role confusion. This could especially be relevant as an individual faces adult issues and responsibilities (especially intimacy and generativity) while lacking identity and fidelity as a virtue and strategy to cope with these life stressors (Erikson, 1950, 1968). Marcia‘s (1966) ego identity statuses helped give operational definitions to Erikson‘s conceptions of identity, facilitating research on the process of identity formation. Arnett (2000), however, proposes that identity crisis and commitment often take place for many individuals in a period called emerging adulthood.
The Concept of Emerging Adulthood Arnett (2000, 2001, 2005) suggests that because of changing demographic realities, including a delay in the median age of marriage and age of first childbirth, the nature of development in late teens and early twenties is changing in industrialized societies. He suggests that the late teens and early twenties no longer involve either entering or settling into adult roles, but are marked by intense exploration of identity. Therefore, Arnett suggests that the period between the late teens and through the twenties is not adulthood or adolescence, but a developmental era called emerging adulthood. Demographically, Arnett (2000) argues that after age 18 several groups of emerging adults radically differ from each other in terms of occupation, education, and residential status. Those who go off to college experience a period of semi-autonomy, while others go straight into the work-world and move out of their parents‘ homes. Increasingly, more emerging adults attend college with a similar increase in graduate school attendance after graduation. Furthermore, emerging adults frequently change living arrangements, coming and going from home and living with roommates or romantic parents that frequently change. Overall, emerging adulthood consists of increasing demographic instability and diversity, implying a period of intense change and experimentation (Arnett, 2000). Emerging adults, according to Arnett (2000), do not conceptualize themselves as either adults or adolescents. When asked what they consider to be indicators of adult status, emerging adults indicate that accepting responsibility for one‘s self, making independent decisions, and being financially independent are more important to becoming an adult than completing education, getting married, finding a career, or having children (Arnett, 2000).
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Therefore, Erikson‘s (1950) suggestion that an occupational identity is essential to identity formation may not indicate an achievement of adult identity in the eyes of emerging adults.
Identity in Emerging Adulthood Arnett (2000, 2001) argues that much of the identity explorations Erikson (1950, 1968) conceptualized as taking place in adolescence actually take place in this period of emerging adulthood. Specifically, Arnett (2000) says that emerging adults explore and experiment with orientations toward love, work, and worldview. Agreeing with Erikson (1968), Arnett (2000, 2001) acknowledges that society provides adolescents with a psychosocial moratorium. However, Arnett asserts that this period of moratorium extends into the period of emerging adulthood. He cites that emerging adults have less role commitments, allowing them the freedom to explore and experiment with identity. However, as Erikson (1968) suggests, shortening or prolonging the moratorium or failing to resolve the crisis of identity with a genuine commitment may sometimes increase anxiety or role confusion. Deficits in adult identity can lead to a reliance on developmentally inappropriate life strategies and coping mechanisms as emerging adults enter adulthood. That is to say, identity development is a necessary conflict in emerging adulthood involving a stressful existential struggle resolved with an eventual commitment to an adult identity (Arnett, 2000). The emerging adult views identity exploration and experimenting with identity as an essential and normative aspect of this stage in life. However, eventually, as emerging adults begin to face adult questions of intimacy, commitment, and face greater responsibility, the cognitive attention devoted to identity exploration will shift toward coping with the realities of adult life in contemporary society. With adult responsibilities comes decreased time and freedom available toward forming a stable identity. A reluctance to make choices and resolve this conflict within the freedom of psychosocial moratorium can lead to existential angst and anxiety as one enters adulthood without a stable identity (Sartre, 1956, 1965). Moreover, the coping and defense mechanisms appropriate in emerging adulthood concerning identity development crumble and become imperfect and neurotic patterns of escaping from the anxiety, responsibility, and challenges of adulthood (Arnett, 2000, 2005; Erikson, 1968). Meanwhile, Erikson‘s (1950, 1968) notion that society, culture, and history affect the psychosocial development of the individual gives Arnett (2000) reason to suggest that current societal realities shift the period of identity exploration from adolescence to emerging adulthood. Indeed, Arnett admits that identity explorations in love, work, and worldview may take root in adolescence, but they achieve fruition in emerging adulthood. Arnett argues that explorations of love become more intimate in emerging adulthood compared to adolescence. Furthermore, he asserts that work experiences in emerging adulthood also allow an emerging adult to explore various occupational identities while preparing them for the adult work world. In addition, educational experiences in emerging adulthood, especially the tendency of undergraduates to change majors in their first two years, involve a period of exploration into what paths in occupation and identity an emerging adult may take. Emerging adulthood also allows for an examination of worldviews, beliefs, and values. Typically, emerging adults change their values, belief, and worldview from adolescence. Both emerging adults who
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attend college and those who do not express that developing individual values and beliefs is an integral aspect of achieving adulthood (Arnett, 2000). Emerging adulthood provides an opportunity for intense identity exploration; however, disappointments and failures are normative in the period (Arnett, 2000). Indeed, many emerging adults may experience failures in their desired occupation or are unable to find meaningful work. In addition, as Erikson (1968) suggested, a rejection and reconsideration of earlier childhood ethics, morals, and worldview may result from exploring identity, leading to a void in and emerging adult‘s sense of self, morals, and place in the world (Arnett, 2000). Furthermore, many emerging adults spend much of their time alone, indicating that identity explorations may be a lonely struggle without the traditional support of the family environment in adolescence. However, this autonomy and independence allows emerging adults the freedom to pursue identity explorations on their own, without input and criticism from parents or other authority figures (Arnett, 2000). Arnett (2000) observes and comments that emerging adulthood is not a universal concept or period of development. On a societal level, emerging adulthood is more likely in industrialized societies that allow for an extended psychosocial moratorium. Within these societies, not all young adults experience this privilege. Arnett argues that the forgotten half (those who do not go to college), minorities, and working class emerging adults lack the opportunity to explore their identities to the extent of college bound and middle class emerging adults. If Arnett‘s (2000) suggestion that much of Erikson‘s (1968) notion of identity crisis takes place in emerging adulthood, then emerging adulthood becomes the nexus of identity formation. Therefore, an examination of the literature on identity and emerging adulthood may shed light on how emerging adults achieve identity and ultimately enter adulthood.
Fromm and Escaping from Freedom Fromm (1941) in Escape from Freedom outlines his theory of the fundamental aspect of human nature, freedom, and the escape mechanisms individuals rely on in a social context to ultimately escape the very freedom that makes us human. Here, Fromm touches on aspects of emerging adulthood, especially in Western, individualistic society. Arnett (2001, 2001) argues that emerging adulthood is a period of relative freedom, of not only relative freedom, not only from adult responsibility, but the freedom to choose and develop an identity and break free from childhood values and conceptions of the world and self. Ultimately, Fromm (1941) posits that a major source of human anxiety is the conflict between the freedoms we cherish (e.g. an adolescent who wants to be free from parental control) and the anxiety and fear of freedom in face of existential dread (e.g. an emerging adult who does not know who they are and feels lost and alone). The freedom espoused by the psychosocial moratorium allows an emerging adult to explore the self and their place in society. As Arnett (1998, 2000) suggests, emerging adults spend a great deal of time alone, constantly wondering about, reworking, and exploring their identities and worldviews. However, as Fromm suggests, this freedom to explore ultimately may lead to anxiety, especially when an individual fails to embrace the freedom of human experience, and, instead, utilizes escape mechanisms to relieve the anxiety of freedom. Consequently, the mechanisms of escape outlined by Fromm (1941) may assuage the existential anxiety of prolonged freedom, but may exacerbate the
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anxiety of identity formation. This leads emerging adults to face a double jeopardy of neuroticism, bound by anxieties of freedom and identity that spring from the same source: the period of emerging adulthood. That is to say, faced with an enormous amount of important decisions in emerging adulthood, especially concerning identity, an emerging adult, according to Erikson (1950, 1968), can become anxious and uncertain while exploring the overwhelming possibilities of identity formation in emerging adulthood. Meanwhile, the immense freedom to choose and explore these aspects of identity is another source of stress (Fromm, 1941). Together, the anxiety and stress of exploring identity, combined with the unprecedented freedom for an individual to shape their life course leads to tenuous crossroad between two integral sources of potential neuroticism and anxiety in human life. Freedom as a fundamental human condition. Fromm (1941) posits that man; free from the instinctual mechanisms of lower animals, is separate from nature yet part of it. Humans, therefore, through rationalization and self-realization feels small amidst nature and the universe and is intensely aware of their own mortality. Consequently, humans are free to make decisions and control their own destiny, yet this freedom causes a dreaded sense of loneliness and anxiety, leading man to seek out ties to people and society. Fromm indicates that primary ties are akin to the biological tie between mother and child in the womb. While primary ties provide a sense of security, they ultimately limit freedom and full human potential. Nevertheless, Fromm suggests that while modern humans are free from original primary ties to nature, people ultimately seek out new ties in society. However, these new ties are akin to primary ties to nature: they also serve ultimately to limit our freedom and individuality while providing security against the loneliness of human existence. Therefore, Fromm suggests that while modern humans are free-from the primary ties of nature, they are not free-to achieve his greatest potential in productivity and love. For example, by submitting to an authority, people escape from the very freedom that makes them human. Ultimately, freedom-from nature, without a proper capacity to achieve freedom-to, motivates humans to escape from their freedom to cope with the intense loneliness and isolation freedom implies. Freedom-to choose and Existentialism. Ultimately, Fromm (1941) proposes a similar philosophy to that of Existentialism (Sartre (1956, 1965; Kierkegaard, 1843). Namely, humans are free to make their own identity, to give their individual lives meaning, independently from outside authority or influence. For Sartre (1956, 1965) especially, life is ultimately meaningless, except for the meaning an individual forms and projects into the nothingness at the core of human existence. Existentialism combines the core conflicts of both Erikson (1950, 1968, 1987) and Fromm (1941, 1947, 1955). Namely, the conflict between finding meaning in one‘s life (identity) while embracing the freedom in which one can create their own meaning, free from authority, dogma, or social forces. In emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2000) this conflict between identity, choice, and freedom becomes a key existential struggle. Meanwhile, Fromm (1941) argues that an individual will attempt to escape from the anxiety of freedom and the immense responsibility of choice in choosing one‘s life course and identity. Mechanisms of escape. Fromm (1941) suggests that mechanisms of escape are ultimately the result of insecurity in the isolated individual. A healthy person approaches their freedom
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by applying themselves to love and work, becoming one with society but still maintain a sense of self. They ultimately embrace their freedom and reach full human potential. In contrast, a person utilizing escape mechanisms cannot stand the isolation of freedom and relies on solutions to bridge the gap between themselves and the world. Consequently, these mechanisms of escape are not true solutions, they provide the isolated individual security, but they give up their sense of individuality and freedom. Fromm (1941) also suggests that ‗healthy‘ individuals enmeshed in society may not be entirely sane. The sane individual may give up part of their individuality and freedom to conform to society. Moreover, the neurotic, according to Fromm, is unwilling to conform and give away a part of themselves to societal norms. The neurotic then leans on escape mechanisms as a fantasy to the solution to the problem of their human freedom. Fromm suggested that there are three mechanisms of escape: authoritarianism, destructiveness, and automaton conformity. In the context of emerging adulthood, these escape mechanisms are possible neurotic solutions to the excess freedom afforded by the extended psychosocial moratorium (Erikson, 1968; Arnett, 2000). Authoritarianism. Authoritarianism as an escape mechanism occurs when one gives up his or her individual self to someone outside of the self to acquire the strength the individual himself lacks (Fromm, 1941). In authoritarianism, one seeks another secondary tie to make up for the lack of primary ties. Authoritarian tendencies primarily arise from two tendencies, masochism and sadism (Fromm, 1941). Fromm suggests that masochists are those who feel powerless, belittle themselves, and are dependent on sources outside of themselves for a sense of identity. Masochists are afraid of their freedom and cannot bear being alone with their sense of self. Therefore, by feeling small and helpless, they give up the power of the self and escape their individuality and freedom. To compensate for their lack of individuality, masochists seek out a power person or institution to instill in them the power they lack. They become one with the outside source, losing their freedom in the process but gaining security. In contrast, the sadist seeks a sense of identity in the domination of others (Fromm, 1941). They take complete control of others and make them dependent others dependent upon themselves. Moreover, the sadist exploits others and wishes to see and make people suffer. Fromm posits that most sadists are less conscious of their tendencies then masochists, leading to rationalization of these tendencies through reaction formations. Fromm (1941) suggests that the sadist and the masochist exist within a symbiotic relationship. That is to say, as much as the masochist needs the sadist to foster their identity, the sadist needs the masochist because his sense of identity relies upon up in the domineering power they have over their subject. For instance, Fromm cites the example of the domineering abusive husband who begs his wife to stay when she threatens to leave. Finally, Fromm (1941) suggests that the sado-masochist character is analogous to the ‗authoritarian character.‘ Authority in this sense is negative authority, where the person in power and the person subject to control have different aims and motivations and a sense of hostility is present. Consequently, the subject develops a blind admiration for the authority, giving it an almost magical quality. This authority can be either overt, through direct control seen in Fascist governments, or covert, such as advertising and conformity in democratic systems.
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Destructiveness. In the destructiveness mechanism, one escapes feelings of powerlessness and isolation by destroying the outside world in which they compare themselves to (Fromm, 1941). Consequently, destructiveness, according to Fromm, is a desperate attempt to save oneself from the world around them. Furthermore, this tendency finds expression through two tendencies, anxiety and the thwarting of life. Anxiety is a constantly feeling threatened by the outside world. Feelings of isolation and powerlessness produce this anxiety and in turn, this anxiety fuels hostility and destructive tendencies. Similarly, Fromm suggests that more the drive for life is thwarted the more destructiveness and thwarting of life is present. Therefore, the more repressive society becomes against humans reaching their full life potential, the more destructive tendencies will tend to emerge. Automaton conformity. Fromm (1941) suggests that a majority of people in modern Western society rely on automaton conformity. They cease to be themselves and become totally immersed in the culture their society provides, becoming similar to everyone else in the culture. Conformity is escaping the freedom of being unique and an individual. This conformity provides security, but at the loss of individuality of human existence. Fromm (1941) suggests that in modern society, even ‗individual‘ thoughts seen as unique, may actually be implemented from outside the self. For instance, Fromm posits a distinction between pseudo versus genuine thinking. Genuine thinking is coming to a unique conclusion based upon rational thinking and utilizing evidence to support this conclusion. In contrast, pseudo thinking is taking in outside opinions and sources of information and making them your own without any rational or unique thinking. Fromm cites an example of pseudo thinking as taking in political opinions from a newspaper and making them your own without any rational or critical analysis. Fromm (1941) also suggests that conformity breeds pseudo feelings and decisions in contrast to genuine feelings and decisions. Fromm indicates that people mask their true feelings to conform to expectations in social settings. Consequently, the suppression of these feelings produces anxiety and loneliness, leading to an even greater emphasis on pseudo feelings to defend against these real feelings. Furthermore, Fromm suggests that decisions, which we seemingly make on our own, may actually be the result of outside pressures and conformities. For instance, a choice in an occupation could be a ‗genuine decision‘ that may be influenced by conformity. Making genuine life decisions implies a sense of freedom and individual initiative that produce anxiety that pseudo decisions mask and assuage. Ultimately, pseudo feelings, decisions, and thoughts lead to a pseudo rather than genuine self (Fromm, 1941). Our genuine, thoughts, feelings, wishes, desires, and freedom are suppressed and a pseudo self becomes dominate. However, this pseudo self produces anxiety and a loss of identity. To cope with this anxiety and loss of identity, Fromm suggests that we conform to the expectations of society in order to produce a sense of security. Still, like all the escape mechanisms, security costs a heavy price, a loss of the freedom that defines are human existence.
Escape Mechanisms and Identity in Emerging Adulthood As Erikson (1950, 1968) and Arnett (2000) argue, the central crisis in emerging adulthood is forming a genuine adult identity. Furthermore, personal identity and meaning in
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life are key existential choices and struggles every emerging adult faces (Sartre 1956, 1965, Kierkegaard, 1843). However, Arnett (2000) suggests that the increased freedom of emerging adulthood, freedom that many emerging adults are experiencing for the first time in life, can be overwhelming. Similarly, Fromm (1941) posits that the overwhelming freedom of human existence leads individuals to escape from their freedom, through authoritarianism, destructiveness, or automaton conformity. Ultimately, escaping from the freedom to choose one‘s own identity forms a tenuous and potentially neurotic compromise. The individual assuages the anxiety produced by the freedom to choose at the expense of sacrificing a genuine, unique, and individual identity necessary to face the struggles and difficult choices of adulthood. Authoritarianism and identity. A potential neurotic solution to the crisis of forming an identity in emerging adulthood is to give up the freedom to choose a genuine identity to an outside authority. In other words, an individual‘s sense of identity, their beliefs, and their ethics are not the product of individual reflection and choice, but pressed upon them from an outside authority (Fromm, 1941). Potential sources influencing a sense of authoritarian beliefs can vary depending on the emerging adult‘s life course. They could come from excessive identification with parents, political groups, cults, the cumulative effects of advertising and conformity to societal values, or an abusive romantic partner. An example of this is the ego identity stage of identity foreclosure (Marcia, 1966). In this stage, an individual has made a commitment to an identity, but has not experienced an existential crisis in deciding between alternate identities and beliefs. In essence, the emerging adult represses the conflict of identity formation and stays within a safe and set pattern of beliefs and life course. Identity foreclosed individuals potentially experience choosing a genuine identity as too overwhelming. Instead, they rely upon beliefs approved by an outside authority from the individual‘s youth, such as parents or a religious group. Arnett (2000) suggests that identity exploration in emerging adulthood involves a reflection and rethinking of childhood beliefs and expectations from parental figures. However, emerging adults forming a sense of identity from authoritarianism neglect to reexamine their values and sense of self. Instead, they are individuals formed by the hands of others, unconsciously forced down a path laid out for them. There is no choice, no individual meaning, no existential crisis that the individual faces and overcomes (Sartre, 1956, 1965). Nevertheless, this compromise rejecting individual identity and freedom of choice is preferable, from Erikson‘s (1968) perspective, to having no identity at all. A potential source of depression and anxiety, and a normative aspect of emerging adulthood, is the stress of separating from one‘s parents and becoming an autonomous adult (Nelson & Barry, 2005). Consequently, emerging adults relying upon authority to form an identity for them may have issues related to separation and individuation (Nelson & Barry, 2005). That is to say, the freedom of choice to peruse an individual identity and reflect upon past beliefs about the world may evoke a sense of separation anxiety from figures whom provided comfort and stability in the past. This separation anxiety (Bowlby, 1969) may lead to depression, anxiety, and other neurotic symptoms, especially as an emerging adult grows older, becomes increasingly independent, and forced to make autonomous decisions, especially concerning intimacy and love (Erikson, 1950; Fromm, 1956). A sense of identity formed in the authoritarian escape mechanism can also lead to a rigid sense of self, thinking, and beliefs. Similar to individuals with obsessive-compulsive
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character (Shapiro, 1965), emerging adults with an authoritarian sense of identity could potentially view every decision in the context of what their authority figure would say or do. When faced with questions that the authority cannot readily provide an answer to, such as what to do in ambiguous and unique situations, these individuals may become depressed and feel a sense of emptiness. In contrast, emerging adults with an increased sense of self-agency (responsibility for one‘s life course and beliefs) make more autonomous decisions, have increased self-esteem and ego strength, and are more flexible and open to exploring identity and beliefs than those lacking a sense of self-agency (Schwartz, Cote, & Arnett, 2005). Destructiveness and identity. A grim but normative aspect of emerging adulthood is increased risk-taking behavior, binge drinking, and substance abuse (Arnett, 2000, 2005; Nelson & Barry, 2005; White & Jackson, 2005). Indeed, substance use and abuse reaches its peak in emerging adulthood for most individuals (Arnett, 2005). However, while all of these self-destructive behaviors may be normative in emerging adulthood, they have very serious consequences. Besides the risk of harming themselves or others, emerging adults may rely upon drugs, alcohol, or risk-taking behavior (especially sexual) as a coping mechanism to deal with the stress of identity formation and the overwhelming freedom afforded by the psychosocial moratorium by utilizing the escape mechanism of self-destructiveness (Arnett, 2000, 2005; Fromm, 1941). Instead of embracing their freedom to explore and choose many different possible identities (Arnett, 2000), emerging adults utilizing this escape mechanism withdrawal from the crisis of identity formation or form a negative identity, which is preferable than having no identity at all according to Erikson (1968). Arnett (2005) suggests that emerging adults abusing drugs and alcohol may well be overwhelmed by their excessive freedom, the stress of forming an identity, and their frustrations over the inconsistency of life in emerging adulthood. However, self-medicating or acting out with self-destructive behavior to cope with the anxiety and uncertainty of emerging adulthood exacerbates the crisis of identity formation. Consequently, emerging adults who are self-destructive are possibly in the ego identity stage of identity diffusion (Marcia, 1966). These individuals lack a commitment to any identity and withdrawal from the crisis of searching for an identity (Marcia, 1966). From Fromm‘s (1941) perspective, these individual‘s would rather destroy their freedom to choose an identity because of the overwhelming anxiety and stress that comes along with this responsibility. However, from Erikson‘s (1968) perspective, these emerging adults form a negative identity, one disapproved and discouraged by society, in order to cope with the existential dread of role confusion. The cost of self-destructive behavior as a solution to relieve the anxiety of forming an identity is high. Excessive drinking and drug use can lead to long-term health problems, decreased psychological well-being, anxiety, depression, criminal behavior, and even death (especially drunk-driving accidents) (Arnett, 2000, 2005; Nelson & Barry, 2005; White & Jackson 2005). Furthermore, the onset of severe psychopathology (such as depression) peaks in emerging adulthood along with substance abuse (Arnett, 2005). Consequently, this solution also contributes to increased role confusion. That is to say, when an emerging adult chooses to withdrawal from the crisis of choosing an identity, they cannot make a genuine commitment. Nevertheless, substance use and risky behavior tends to decrease as emerging adults transition into adulthood and many emerging adults consider decreased risk-taking as a criteria for becoming a true adult (Arnett, 2000, 2005; Nelson & Barry, 2005). Delaying the transition to adulthood by escaping through self-destructiveness leaves an emerging adult ill
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prepared for the challenges of adulthood because they will lack a genuine identity, a sense of self-agency, and self-worth (Erikson, 1968; Arnett, 2000, 2005; Schwartz et al., 2005). Automaton conformity and identity. At first glance, the escape mechanism of automaton conformity seems similar to authoritarianism. Both lead to a pseudo, rather than a genuine identity, however, the mechanism of escaping from the freedom of individual choice is different. In authoritarianism, an individual gives up their freedom to choose to a specific authority figure or group. In automaton conformity, the individual becomes completely enmeshed in their culture, assuaging the anxiety of individual freedom and choice by perceiving himself or herself as just like everyone else (Fromm, 1941). Much like Kierkegaard (1843), Fromm (1941) felt that confirming to the expectations of society provides a false sense of security and stability. Forming a genuine sense of individual identity implies embracing the freedom to choose one‘s life course and values. Fromm (1941) suggests that standing alone as a unique individual leads to anxiety and a sense of emptiness that one must overcome by embracing the freedom of individual human existence. However, in order to assuage this anxiety of freedom, many individuals, and conceivably emerging adults, unconsciously conform to societal expectation at the expense of forming an individual sense of identity (Fromm, 1941). Fromm (1941) emphasizes that conformity encourages pseudo thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that lead to a pseudo, rather than genuine, self. That is to say, an individual‘s sense of ethics, their thoughts, and their sense of self conforms to societal expectation rather than genuine choice, even on an unconscious level. Erikson (1950, 1968) also suggested that individuals form an identity based upon the crowd in a compromise between genuine identity and role confusion. Consequently, a risk of conformity in emerging adulthood is forming a pseudo identity based upon societal and cultural expectations rather than a genuine exploration of individual freedom (Schwartz et al., 2005). This pseudo identity, Fromm (1941) suggests, leaves a person feeling empty and anxious, especially when faced with existential choices common in emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2000). Schwartz et al. (2005) suggest that a lack of self-agency can potentially lead to increased conformity in emerging adulthood. Individuals who conform tend to utilize default individualization, that is to say, they rely upon social norms and convention in forming a personal identity that forgoes genuine exploration and assertion of individual thoughts and values. Essentially, default individualization is conforming to expectation rather than embracing the freedom to choose.. In contrast, developmental individualization relies upon free choice and genuine identity development free from expectation and norms (Schwartz et al., 2005). Emerging adults high in both self-agency and developmental individualization tend to have increased self-esteem and ego-strength, virtues necessary for embracing a genuine identity while facing pressure to conform (Schwartz et al., 2005). In contrast, individuals who conform tend to have decreased self-esteem and ego-strength, which potentially can lead to depression, anxiety, and other neurotic symptoms (Schwartz et al., 2005). One of the risks of living in capitalistic society is embracing materialism at the expense of individuality. Bambery and Abell (2006) suggest that conforming to societal expectations, especially materialistic values, can contribute to interpersonal problems and neurotic character structure. Much like Fromm‘s (1947) marketing character orientation, individuals become a commodity to be bought and sold rather than unique individuals with genuine thoughts and feelings. Conforming to materialistic values may lead emerging adults to forgo
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genuine and deliberate choice in forming an identity and, instead, form a pseudo identity based upon materialistic rather than individual, humanistic values (Fromm, 1941, 1947). Embracing freedom, choice, and identity. If the escape mechanisms are a neurotic compromise between the freedom to choose and the crisis of identity formation, than a healthy compromise is to encourage emerging adults to embrace their freedom and make genuine existential choices concerning their identity, beliefs, and ethics (Fromm, 1941; Erikson, 1968; Sartre, 1956, 1965). Both Erikson (1950, 1968) and Fromm (1941, 1947, 1955, 1956) believed that connectedness and identity can co-exist, leading one to form a stable and individual sense of identity while still maintaining a healthy connection to others. Identity exploration is a normative aspect of emerging adulthood but a profound existential crisis with many potential solutions and conflicts (Arnett, 2000). Rather than succumbing to authority, an emerging adult can reflect upon childhood values and integrate them into a genuine sense of identity. Instead of using self-destructive behavior to cope with the anxieties of freedom and identity formation, an emerging adult can embrace this freedom and explore the possibilities and privileges of the psychosocial moratorium. In spite of the immense temptation to conform blindly to societal values, an emerging adult can think critically about their place in society and examine their occupational choices and beliefs to maintain a sense of individual freedom in an increasingly materialistic society (Arnett, 2000, 2001, 2005; Bambery & Abell, 2006; Erikson, 1950, 1968; Fromm 1941, 1955; Schwartz et al., 2005).
CONCLUSION Arnett (2000, 2005) suggests that emerging adulthood is an age of possibilities and discovery in life, one full of conflict and uncertainty, but also full of optimism and opportunity. Ultimately, Erikson (1950, 1968, 1982) and Fromm (1941, 1947, 1955, 1956) agree with Freud (1949) that psychological health and well-being (as opposed to neuroticism) promotes one‘s ability to love and work. By forming a stable, genuine identity emerging adults can prepare for Erikson‘s (1950, 1968) key conflicts in adulthood, intimacy vs. isolation and generativity vs. stagnation. At the same time, embracing individuality and freedom provides a definite and healthy closure to the psychosocial moratorium (and some of the neurotic anxiety or depression that may develop during this time) and allows emerging adults move on to the possibilities and opportunities of true adulthood (Arnett, 2000, 2001, 2005; Erikson, 1968; Fromm 1941).
REFERENCES Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. American Psychologist, 55, 469-480 Arnett, J. J. (2001). Suffering, selfish slackers? Myths and reality about emerging adults. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 36, 23-39.
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Arnett, J. J. (2005). The developmental context of substance abuse in emerging adulthood. Journal of Drug Issues, Spring, 235-254. Bambery, M. & Abell, S. (2006). Relocating the nexus of psychopathology and treatment: Thoughts on the contribution of Erich Fromm to contemporary psychotherapy. Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 36, 175-182. Erikson, E. H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc. Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity, youth, and crisis. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc. Erikson, E. H. (1982). The life cycle completed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc. Freud, S. (1949). An outline of psycho-analysis. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc. Fromm, E. (1941). Escape from freedom. Chicago: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Fromm, E. (1947). Man for himself. Chicago: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Fromm, E. (1955). The sane society. Greenwich, CN: Fawcett Premier. Fromm, E. (1956). The art of loving. New York: Harper Perennial. Kierkegaard, S. (1843). Fear and trembling and sickness unto death. (W. Lowrie, Trans.) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego-identity status. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3(5), 551-558. Nelson, L. J. & Barry C. M. (2005). Distinguishing features of emerging adulthood: The role of self-classification as an adult. Journal of Adolescent Research, 20, 242-262. Sartre, J. P. (1956). Being and nothingness; an essay on phenomenological ontology. (H. E. Barnes, Trans.) New York: Philosophical Library Sartre, J. P. (1965). Essays in existentialism. Secaucus, NJ: The Citadel Press. Schwartz, S. J, Cote, J. E., & Arnett, J. J. (2005). Identity and agency in emerging adulthood; Two developmental routes in the individualization process. Youth and Society, 37, 201229. Shapiro, D. (1965). Neurotic styles. New York: Basic Books. White, H. R. & Jackson, K. (2005). Social and psychological influences on emerging adult drinking behavior. Alcohol Research and Health, 28(4), 182-190.
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 183-195
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 9
THERAPY FOR SHAME-BASED PERFECTIONISM Neil Pembroke Pastoral Studies, The School of History, Philosophy, Religion, and Classics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
ABSTRACT Psychologists have been aware for a long time of the significant psychological distress associated with ―the tyranny of the shoulds‖ (K. Horney). The tyranny that perfectionists subject themselves to often leads to self-condemnation and depression. While perfectionism has been associated with guilt dynamics, the form of perfectionism that is most frequently discussed by psychologists is connected to self-condemnation for perceived failures to reach the high standard set for personal achievement. There is therefore a strong link between perfectionism and inferiority shame. Three approaches to the treatment of shame-based perfectionism are developed. The first approach is based in cognitive therapy. It is argued that perfectionism is grounded in a faulty core belief about the self—namely, ―I am what I achieve.‖ It is further argued that release from perfectionism requires embrace of the belief that what is ultimately most important is a personal conviction that one is good, worthy, and loveable. The second method makes use of strategies developed by John Bradshaw for accepting and affirming all one‘s sub-selves. Bradshaw‘s approach is critiqued, however, for the way in which shame-based and guilt-based perfectionism are confused. This confusion leads to significant deficiencies in his therapeutic system. The third method is a modification and adaptation of Heinz Kohut‘s strategy of ―mirroring‖ developed for use in work with clients with narcissistic personality disorder. Therapeutic mirroring is a stance of affirmation, acceptance, and admiration. It is contended that shame-based perfectionism is associated with conflict between the grandiose and idealizing selves that expresses itself through criticism and condemnation. It is suggested that a strong therapeutic intervention is to help the client replace condemnation with mirroring.
Psychologists have been aware for a very long time of the significant psychological distress associated with ―the tyranny of the shoulds‖ (Horney, 1950, p. 65). The tyranny that perfectionists subject themselves to leads to self-condemnation and depression (Dunn,
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Whelton, & Sharpe, 2006; Hawley, Ho, Zuroff, & Blatt, 2006; Yoon & Lau, 2008; Wu & Wei, 2008). Recent psychological research has produced a refinement in our understanding of the meaning of perfectionism. It is now viewed as a multidimensional personality construct whose central feature is ―the disposition to impose a standard that demands flawlessly executed performance and superior achievements‖ (Dunn, Whelton, & Sharpe 2006, p. 511; Cf. Flett & Hewitt, 2002). Perfectionism has a strong link with shame (Sorotzkin, 1985, 1998; Pembroke, 2007). In order to understand the nature of this connection, it is necessary to note that shame is not a unitary entity, but rather an umbrella term for a variety of traits and tendencies associated with feeling inferior or defective. Pattison (2000) is right to suggest that the best way to approach shame is to adopt ―a kind of family resemblance theory‖ (p. 39). Two important members of the shame family are inferiority shame and moral shame.1 The latter category is associated with guilt-based perfectionism. In moral shame, both shame and guilt feelings feature. Persons afflicted by guilt-based perfectionism have unrealistic expectations concerning the quality of their moral living; as a result they are constantly assailed by guilt feelings. The superego has gone into overdrive and these persons pay for it with feelings of failure and unworthiness. Shame-based perfectionism, on the other hand, is associated with inferiority shame. Here the feelings of inadequacy flow from a sense of falling short of a desired level of achievement. As Tomkins (1987) so neatly expresses it, ―desire has outrun fulfillment‖ (p. 155). Shame-prone perfectionists never feel satisfied because they are striving for impossibly high levels of achievement. They strive for a flawless performance in a desperate attempt to establish a strong sense of self-worth. Of course, everyone experiences failure in a task or project from time to time. Perfectionism enters the picture when the sense of failure stems from a tendency to establish unrealistic expectations for personal achievement and to strain compulsively to meet those expectations. I want to suggest that shame-based perfectionism can be traced to a faulty core belief about the self—namely, ―I am what I achieve.‖ This core belief is fundamentally flawed because it can never deliver what a human person needs most. I will argue that release from the grip of perfectionism requires embrace of the belief that what is ultimately most important is a personal conviction, affirmed by significant others, that one is good, worthy, and loveable. This conviction refers to personhood and not to achievement. Others will respect and admire our achievements; they will love and value the persons that we are. The idea of a core belief comes from the school of cognitive therapy. There are, of course, various approaches within this school of therapy; I have chosen to use the methods developed by Aaron Beck and his associates. Their approach is built around three levels of thinking: automatic thoughts, intermediate beliefs, and core beliefs. I will show how shamebased perfectionism can be challenged through the use of cognitive reframing worksheets. 1
Other members of the shame family are discussed by Karen (1992) and Fowler (1996). Karen suggests four categories, namely existential shame (the individual suddenly becomes aware of his failings), class shame (the class that one is born into becomes a source of shame), narcissistic shame (one‘s personal identity is shamebased), and situational shame (those embarrassing moments—slurping one‘s soup in polite company, tripping over one‘s shoe-laces at an inopportune moment, a joke falling flat—that come to us all). Moving from ―normal‖ shame to increasingly pathological variations, James Fowler describes five types and degrees. These are: healthy shame, perfectionist shame, shame due to enforced minority shame (cf. Karen‘s class shame), toxic shame (cf. Karen‘s narcissistic shame), and shamelessness.
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Along with this focus on cognition-based treatment, attention will be given to two other useful approaches to dealing with shame-based perfectionism—namely, that of Heinz Kohut and John Bradshaw. Kohut (1977, 1984) joins Bradshaw (1988) in concentrating on acceptance and affirmation. Kohut refers to this process as mirroring. However, there is quite a bit more psychological sophistication in Kohut‘s approach. He uses psychoanalytic theory to build a bipolar theory of the Self. According to Kohut, the Self is made up of a grandiose self and an idealizing self. Shame-based perfectionism is associated with conflict between these two selves that expresses itself through criticism and condemnation. I suggest that a very powerful therapeutic intervention is to help the client replace condemnation with mirroring. This is facilitated through the mirroring stance adopted by the therapist. Bradshaw (1988) makes the claim that an important step in experiencing liberation and healing is coming to accept that all one‘s sub-selves are okay. I offer an analysis of his approach. Such an analysis is useful for two reasons. First, Bradshaw presents a helpful strategy for dealing with inferiority shame. Second, is the fact that attending to his approach points up a very common problem—namely the inability to untangle moral shame from inferiority shame. It is to a discussion of these issues that we now turn.
BRADSHAW AND ACCEPTING OUR INFERIOR SELVES In his book on the healing of shame, Bradshaw avers that an essential part of the process is ―making peace with all your villagers.‖ This is his way of saying that all one‘s sub-selves need to be recognized and accepted. The starting point in this strategy is calling to mind all the people you dislike (the person you have the strongest negative feelings about goes to the top of the list). Then you attempt to identify the reprehensible traits in each person. Now you ask yourself: What is the one trait that brings out feelings of righteousness and goodness most strongly in me? The final step is to choose the one most despicable trait for each person. Bradshaw (1988) supplies an example: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Joe Slunk – Grandiose egomaniac Gwendella Farboduster – Aggressive and rude Maximillian Quartz – Hypocrite (Pretends to help people; does it for money.) Farquahr Evenhouser – Uses Christian facade to cover-up phoniness Rothghar Pieopia – A wimp; has no mind of his own (p. 148).
Bradshaw suggests that each of these personality traits represents a disowned self. He is obviously working with Jung‘s shadow theory here. Not wanting to integrate a particular ―energy pattern‖ into your Self, says Bradshaw, you externalize it. Healing comes when these disowned sub-selves are acknowledged and fully embraced. Bradshaw (1988) goes on to enthusiastically affirm the guiding principle advocated by Stone and Winkelman (1985): [A]ll of our parts are okay. Nothing could be more affirming and less shaming. Every aspect of every person is crucial for wholeness and completeness. There is no law which says that one part is better than another part. Our consciousness with its many selves needs to operate on principles of social equality and democracy (p. 145; emphasis in the original).
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Is it really true to say that all our sub-selves are ―okay‖? If a person has a dark self that is hurting both him- or herself and those around him or her, surely this is not okay. A distinction between morally neutral and morally relevant selves is important if we are to get beyond blanket statements about the acceptability of every part of the Self. This distinction is directly related to the difference between inferiority shame and moral shame. All sub-selves associated with instances of inferiority shame are certainly okay; sub-selves linked to moral failures are not. Bradshaw seems totally unaware of this fact. At this point, some might wonder if I am guilty of the kind of moralizing that adds to the burden of shame rather than reducing it. In response to this anticipated criticism, I want to point out that there is an important difference between accepting a sub-self on the one hand, and declaring that it is acceptable on the other. Bradshaw is saying that all our sub-selves are acceptable; I think this is wrong. If I have a sub-self that expresses itself through, say, malicious gossip, that self is not acceptable. However, I do need to accept it even as I engage in the difficult task of reforming it. Self-loathing is a significant cause of emotional distress; it is important therefore to love oneself despite one‘s failings. Having offered this caveat, let‘s proceed to the task of distinguishing morally neutral from morally relevant selves.
Morally Relevant Selves To help us in this task, I propose three places in which we can locate the variety of selves that we all live with: competence, spirituality, and personality. This list is not intended to be exhaustive; however, it will suffice to indicate the process of distinguishing morally relevant selves from morally neutral ones. Competence, firstly, refers to talents, abilities and achievements. We all have our strengths, and we all struggle in certain areas. Some of us are great with language, but anything to do with mathematics—or even more frightening, computers—leaves us feeling totally incompetent. Others of us revel in figures and problem-solving, but unravel when we are anywhere near a kitchen. Still others excel on the sports field and are good with most intellectual tasks, but are all ―fingers and thumbs‖ when it comes to home maintenance. So there are mathematical selves, computer selves, linguistic selves, culinary selves, sporting selves, and ―handy‖ selves—to nominate just a few areas in which some people are particularly competent. Clearly, we are in an area that is morally neutral. If I burn the roast I have not committed a moral transgression. The fact that I can never remember my eight times table should not be counted against me as sin. We all have our areas of gifting, and we all have areas that are weak. There is no question of interpreting this fact in a moral context. The second category, spirituality, is also morally neutral. Those who embrace the spiritual life express their spirituality in different ways. There are many forms of positive spirituality on offer today. Some of these a particular individual will connect strongly with, and others less so. It may be, for example, that this individual—call her Jenny—has adopted an activist spirituality; she likes to get to work on projects aimed at promoting peace and justice in the world. Others may feel drawn to a quieter, more contemplative, approach to the spiritual life. Still others will feel more at home with a charismatic spirituality. There is no moral failure for Jenny associated with the fact that her spirituality is (mostly) of the activist variety. She is perfectly justified in embracing her activist self, just as another person is perfectly justified in embracing his contemplative self, and another her Pentecostal self.
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To be sure, it might be that this activist for peace and justice is lazy and undisciplined in her spiritual life. At that point a moral concern seems to arise. But the lack of discipline is almost certainly a factor in other areas of her life. That is, it is a personality trait and we have entered our third and final area. Under the rubric of personality I include the traits, attitudes and behaviors that are defining of one‘s personhood. There are introverts and extroverts, passive aggressives and active aggressives, optimists and pessimists, liberals and conservatives, the patient and the impatient, the hard-working and the slothful, the rash and the prudent, the intimate and the distant, the passionate and the ―cool,‖ the self-aware and the unaware, and so on. Personality traits become especially important in the context of relationships. Our style of relating is determined by our personality. Factors such as the way we deal with anger, our capacity for openness and honesty, our negotiating style, the level of our self-esteem, and our capacity for intimacy are highly significant in the context of interpersonal life. It will be evident that in discussing personality traits and relationality we have entered a morally relevant zone. Our personal failings cause harm not only to ourselves, but also to relationships and to the people involved in those relationships. To acknowledge those sub-selves that wreak havoc in our relationships and to take action on them is a moral imperative.
Right Strategy, Wrong Context I would enthusiastically endorse Bradshaw‘s approach if he concentrated on inferiority shame. If a person is to transcend her feelings of inferiority, it is very important for her to view all her non-moral inferior sub-selves as okay. She needs to be able to feel that it‘s okay that she is not amongst the elite in her chosen profession (let‘s say she‘s an accountant). If she enjoys her work, does her best, and her output is generally good (without being great), she is entitled to feel pleased and satisfied. There will likely be occasions when she makes mistakes; some of them may even be big ones. Her tendency at those moments is to rush to the conclusion that she is hopeless, a loser. She needs to resist this temptation. It‘s okay to be a good accountant who sometimes makes mistakes. She needs to come to the point, too, of accepting that it‘s okay that she is not the greatest tennis player to have ever graced the courts. She hits her fair share of good shots and she can be satisfied with that. On the other hand, she is great at gardening and pottery. What Bradshaw helpfully reminds us is that healing inferiority shame requires a capacity to wholeheartedly accept and endorse all of one‘s sub-selves. If the focus is on inferiority shame, Bradshaw is right to advocate ―making peace with our villagers.‖ The problem is that the ―villagers‖ that he lists suffer from moral flaws such as aggression and rudeness, hypocrisy, and egotism. It is therefore not a matter of simply declaring that these traits are okay; one also needs a commitment to reform them if one is to be morally responsible. In a word, it‘s the right strategy, but the wrong context.
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GUILT-BASED AND SHAME-BASED PERFECTIONISM The discussion of Bradshaw‘s approach indicates how easy it is to tangle up guilt-based and shame-based perfectionism. In order to help us separate the two, we need to attend to the differences between guilt and shame (recognizing, of course, that in relation to moral shame there is an area of overlap). Guilt is commonly distinguished from shame through a reference to the global scope of the latter (cf. Wurmser, 1987). Guilt can be localized, but shame affects the whole person. That is, whereas I do bad things that cause me to feel guilty, I am my shame. I feel guilty when I have morally transgressed, and what I need in order to feel better is forgiveness. I have experienced a temporary drop in my self-esteem due to the feeling that I have acted badly. For the person prone to shame, however, low self-esteem is an on-going and pervasive problem. This is so because I am the problem. I feel inferior, inadequate, and virtually worthless. My need is not for forgiveness but rather for love, affirmation and acceptance. Helen Block Lewis brings out these distinctions very clearly when she compares the self-reproaches in guilty thinking with those of ashamed thinking: [Guilt-laden cognitions run thus:] ―How could I have done that; what an injurious thing to have done; how I hurt so-and-so, what a moral lapse that act was; what will become of that or of him, now that I have neglected to do it, or injured him. How should I be punished or make amends? Mea culpa!‖ Simultaneously, ashamed ideation says: ―how could I have done that; what an idiot I am—how humiliating; what a fool, what an uncontrolled person—how mortifying; how unlike so-and-so, who does not do such things; how awful and worthless I am. Shame!‖ (Lewis, 1971, p. 36; emphasis in the original)
With this information before us, it is quite easy to describe guilt-based perfectionism. Those who suffer from this affliction are constantly setting their goals for good and right living at an unrealistically high level. They are acutely aware of the need to express love, integrity, and justice in order to actualize the good. If they could be content with improvement in striving after the ideal, all would be well. But their problem is that they want perfection. No matter what level of moral living they reach, it is never good enough. They show compassion to others when they fail, but sadly they hold it back from themselves. Shame-based perfectionism, on the other hand, is associated with inferiority shame. We are confronted with our limitations quite early in life. It is when we begin school that we become especially aware of the areas in which we are inferior, as Erikson (1968) has observed. Erikson (1968) points to the fact that a tendency in some men (and today, of course, we would include a growing number of women in this) to define identity in terms of work and achievements has its origin in a certain form of education. An educational philosophy with little or no appreciation for the importance of the development of the whole person will contribute to a sense of identity shaped around the thought, ―I am what I can learn to make work‖ (Erikson, 1968, p. 127). Whereas guilt-based perfectionism is associated with moral improvement, shame-based perfectionism is task-oriented and focused on achievement. In all the various tasks of life there is scope for setting impossibly high standards. Perfectionism should, however, be distinguished from striving for excellence (Cf. Au & Cannon, 1992). Working diligently on the projects that we have chosen for ourselves is appropriate and it is not incompatible with good mental health. We do need to check, however, whether or not we can still feel satisfied
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with our efforts despite some slip-ups. If this is the case, we are being realistic. Shame-prone perfectionists, on the other hand, never feel satisfied because they are striving for impossibly high levels of achievement. They strive for a flawless performance in a desperate attempt to establish a strong sense of self-worth. It is a desire to overcome feelings of inferiority and inadequacy rather than a passion for excellence that primarily drives their striving. The construction of the self developed by Heinz Kohut is helpful in understanding shame-based perfectionism. It is to a discussion of his approach that we now turn.
THE BIPOLAR SELF Kohut (1977) posits a bipolar self. This self is made up of a ―grandiose self‖ and an ―idealizing self.‖ What Kohut (1977, p. 171) calls the bipolar self accounts for two basic psychological functions: healthy self-assertiveness in relation to the mother (usually) who ―mirrors‖ it, reflects it back, and affirming and healthy admiration for the father (usually). Thus it is possible, theorizes Kohut, to identify a grandiose self that seeks admiration and approval, and an idealizing self that aims at identification with an admired other. The grandiose self wants to have its talents, abilities and achievements affirmed and valued. The idealizing self seeks to merge with the significant other whose ideals, goals and ambitions are valued. When these two basic psychological needs for admiration and merger are fulfilled in infantile development, a ―cohesive self‖ emerges. Put simply, what a child needs most is to admire and to be admired. If these needs are met through ―good enough parenting,‖ the self will achieve wholeness or cohesion. When, on the other hand, there are extreme and regular failures in nurturing the two selves, a tendency to shame results.
Mirroring as an Antidote to Shame-Based Perfectionism Kohut (1977, 1978, 1984) describes the impact of the trouble in the tiny community within the Self through references to terms such as inferiority feelings, embarrassment, and low self-esteem. Though he does not use the actual word shame very often, his work is filled with these cognate terms (cf. Morrison, 1986). Now either the grandiose or the idealizing self may experience shame, depending on the circumstances (cf. Capps, 1993). A faux pas is an example of the grandiose self experiencing shame. A speaker, for instance, has been talking himself up in the course of his address, and then suffers the embarrassment in the question time of having some glaring errors highlighted. When, on the other hand, a person‘s actual performance is judged to be below the standard established as ideal, the idealizing self is the locus of shame. A person is asked to make an important presentation at work. She prepares long and hard because she wants her work to be well received. As she is giving her presentation, though, she senses that she is missing the target. There is a gap between the ideal she has set and her actual performance. Whether it is the grandiose or the idealizing self that experiences shame, the end result is the same: an experience of painful disharmony in the relationship between the two selves. The grandiose self is rejecting of the idealizing self, and vice versa. What is required is reconciliation between the two selves. The trouble comes because each self tends to be overly
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critical and harsh in relation to the other. Interventions by the therapist need to be directed at helping the client to establish a mirroring relationship between her or his two selves. In this positive relationship, the selves value and affirm each other rather than constantly being critical and condemning. Kohut (1977, 1984) avers that positive mirroring by the therapist (i.e. affirming, approving, and admiring) will faciliatate the establishment of a mirroring relationship between the two selves. The central element in this process he calls transmuting internalization. Mirroring is expressed through empathic attunement. The therapist must be able to consistently think and feel herself into the inner world of experience of her client in order to communicate understanding and acceptance. Kohut (1984, pp. 98-99) provides the outline of the healing process: (1) Optimal frustration in the mirror transference resulting from inevitable small-scale empathic failures leads to (2) transmuting internalization, which results in (3) the laying down of the missing psychological structure. When the mental structure is built up the self becomes more cohesive, and a more cohesive self allows for selfesteem regulation in the face of one‘s own failures and the assaults of others. A stronger, more integrated self also means that there is relative harmony between its grandiose and idealizing sectors. We have been discussing approaches to helping people who suffer through constant and intense warfare between their grandiose and idealizing selves. I contend that this type of mental dysfunction has its source in the core belief that ―I am what I achieve.‖ As I indicated above, the notion of core beliefs comes from cognitive therapy. It is to the issue of using this form of therapy to help people overcome shame-based perfectionism that we now turn.
Cognitive Therapy for Shame-Based Perfectionism There are, of course, a number of different approaches to cognitive therapy. I‘ve selected the model developed by Aaron Beck and his associates. The first task is to present some of the fundamental elements in their system. This is followed by a description of how cognitive reframing worksheets can be used to help a person transcend her or his shame-based perfectionism.
Three Levels of Cognitive Dysfunction Beck‘s daughter, Judith, lists common cognitive distortions that lead to anxiety and depression (my illustrations): (1) All-or-nothing Thinking. Viewing a situation at its extremes rather than along a continuum: ―If I‘m not perfect in my parenting, I‘m a bad Mom/Dad .‖ (2) Catastrophizing. You tend to always see disaster: ―I‘ve been messing up at work lately; I‘m on a downward spiral.‖ (3) Discounting the Positive. You find ways to discredit your successes: ―Yeah okay, I‘m good at home maintenance jobs, but all that takes is a bit of common sense.‖
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(4) Emotional Reasoning. You think something must be true because you ―feel‖ it strongly: ―Others seem to rate me as competent in my job, but I still feel like I‘m not making the grade.‖ (5) Labelling. You define yourself through a negative category, discounting evidence to the contrary: ―I‘m a failure.‖ (6) Magnification/Minimization. When you evaluate yourself or a situation, you magnify the negative and/or minimize the positive: ―Okay, it might be only one low grade, but it proves that I‘m not really much good after all.‖ Or, ―I expected a good mark from her; she‘s a soft assessor.‖ (7) Mind Reading. You believe that you know what others are thinking: ―My boss wasn‘t very friendly during the coffee break this morning. That confirms my suspicions that she isn‘t happy with my work.‖ (8) Overgeneralization. You make a sweeping negative judgement based on one bad experience: ―I was tense and muffed a few of the lines in my talk; I don‘t have what it takes to be good at public speaking.‖ (9) Personalization. You attribute the negative behavior of others to a personal lack or failing: A friend is sounding a little emotionally flat on the telephone, and you assume it‘s because he‘s disappointed with you. (10) “Should” and “Must” Statements. You have a rigid understanding of how you should think and act: ―I must always be nice in my relations with others, no matter what.‖ (Beck, 1995, p. 119). Aaron Beck started with the notion of automatic thoughts that run through our heads (Beck, 1976), but later expanded his understanding of the cognitive model to include intermediate beliefs and core beliefs. The thoughts that flash through a person‘s mind in any given situation, shaping her feelings and her actions, flow from core and intermediate beliefs. Judith Beck defines the three components in the cognitive model in this way: Core beliefs are the most fundamental level of belief; they are global, rigid, and overgeneralized. Automatic thoughts, the actual words or images that go through a person‘s mind, are situation specific and may be considered the most superficial level of cognition...Core beliefs influence the development of an intermediate class of beliefs which consist of (often unarticulated) attitudes, rules, and assumptions (Beck, 1995, p. 16).
The relationship between the three dimensions in the cognitive process may be illustrated with reference to a person who has a propensity for shame. He attempts to compensate for his inferiority feelings by entertaining others. His humor is often inappropriate and not particularly funny. The core belief that he operates out of is, ―I‘m inferior.‖ At the intermediate level, there is the attitude, ―Other people tend not to like me‖; the rule, ―I must use humor to impress others‖; and the assumption: ―Humor is necessary if I‘m to keep the attention of others.‖ With these beliefs operating, when he finds himself in a situation of making a new acquaintance, the automatic thought flashes through his head, ―She probably won‘t like me but my only chance is to impress her with my wit.‖
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Cognitive Reframing Worksheets Cognitive reframing worksheets can be used to assist a client in transcending his or her shame-based perfectionism. They operate at the upper two levels of cognition. Consider the following scenario. John is an executive in an electronics company. He was appointed as chair of one the company‘s task groups six months ago. During this time, John has been attempting to deal with two strong co-workers who exercise a disproportionate influence on the group. At a meeting a held a couple of days ago, he was feeling a little tired and harried, and as a consequence he wasn‘t as sharp as he usually is. His interventions from the chair were not especially well timed. Moreover, they were wide of the mark and consequently ineffective in restraining the power brokers and the meeting moved with them in a direction that John felt was unhelpful. On the morning after he is kicking himself. He realizes that he let the meeting get away from him and he feels like a total failure. John has a tendency to shame. Though he is a competent person, he is plagued by feelings of inferiority and inadequacy. John works extremely hard and sets himself very high standards. His cover story is that he is striving for excellence in all that he does, and especially in his job. If you asked him about his tendency to depression, he would say something like this, ―Of course I get disappointed with myself sometimes. I set the bar high and when I don‘t quite make it I feel a bit down. That‘s natural isn‘t it?‖ What is really going on, though, is that John suffers from perfectionism. He needs his achievements in life to boost his self-esteem and self-confidence. But when he reaches a particular goal that he has set for himself he is disappointed with what is only a slight and temporary improvement in his selfesteem. Consequently, he needs to keep lifting the bar higher. His pattern is to push harder and harder in order to feel better about himself. Tragically, he is tying his self-worth to a disproportionate degree to his level of skill and effectiveness in the tasks he performs. John is trapped in this destructive pattern. Sadly, the only story that is available to him is the one that tells him that if only he can lift his level of achievement he will find the inner peace and positive self-esteem that have so far eluded him. The thought that he can‘t keep going the way this way has been at the forefront of John‘s mind for quite a long time. Two months ago he finally decided to take positive action; he made an appointment to see a psychotherapist. This therapist takes a cognitive reframing approach, and has been educating John in the use of belief modification. After a recent session, John decided to use his disappointing experience in the meeting as a focus for cognitive reframing. He works at the level of both intermediate and core belief. His worksheets are set out below. Through his reflections, John discovers that operating at a level higher than the belief ―I am a failure as a leader‖ is the core belief ―I am what I achieve.‖ He realizes that he is striving for perfection in a misguided attempt to boost his sense of self-worth. A deep realization dawns that what he really needs is an inner conviction that he is right, good, and full of quality. John is aware that this affirmation can only come through relationship. He knows that he can look to friends and family for confirmation of his value as a person. In reviewing the worksheets with John, his therapist affirms the fact that John is learning to the value in ―uselessness.‖ She explains that a person is useless in the sense that those who love him affirm him as full of worth and quality quite apart from anything he may achieve (Cf. Jones, 1999).
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Through using these worksheets, John is able over time to reframe his intermediate and core beliefs. As his core cognitions become healthier, more realistic, his perfectionism is mitigated. But, of course, it is an ongoing struggle and living in a more wholesome way will not come easily. Mayer (1999) uses the telling expression, ―recovering perfectionists.‖ ―[L]ike the alcoholic—who, once aware of his or her problem, can maintain sobriety only by admitting that he or she is never recovered but always working on it—the past perfectionist is one who constantly feels pulled to slip back into the demanding, overly conscientious way of thinking and behavior that makes life miserable but so well done‖ (Mayer, 1999, p. 6). The recovering perfectionist needs to stick at the task of reframing his or her core cognitions to avoid the pull back into destructive patterns. John’s Intermediate Belief Worksheet Situation I wasn‘t able to effectively manage the meeting yesterday. My interventions were ill timed and wide of the mark.
Attitudes, Rules, and Assumptions
The Intermediate Belief
Attitude: I messed I‘m a failure as a up; I really don‘t have leader. what it takes to be a leader. Rules: Each and every time I lead a meeting I must operate at maximum competency. Assumption: The fact that I didn‘t handle the meeting very well means that I‘m a failure.
Adaptive Response
Reframed Intermediate Belief Cognitive Distortions: I am an effective Over-generalization. leader who One lapse indicates total sometimes makes failure in leadership. mistakes. All-or-nothing thinking. I am either a complete success or a complete failure. Realistic Responses One lapse does not make me a failure. To have an off day now and then is to be human. Feedback from others indicates that I have good leadership skills.
John‟s Core Belief Worksheet Old core belief: I am what I achieve. How much do I believe the old core belief at the moment? 80% New belief: Before any achievement, I am worthy. How much do I believe the new belief at the moment? 40% Evidence that contradicts old core belief and supports new belief I work harder and harder; I achieve certain goals that seemed so significant; and yet I still feel unworthy. I never feel satisfied with myself. I perform my tasks well, but I know that I could have done better. ―Good‖ is not good enough for me. When I am pushing myself I tell myself that I will celebrate when the task is finished. But after all the effort, I‘m not as happy as I thought I would be. It seems like I‘m looking in the wrong place.
Evidence that supports new belief I‘m much more than my talents and skills. My sense of worth as a person does not depend on achieving at a high level. Achievements are satisfying, but it‘s deadly to build one‘s sense of self on them. I know that when it‘s all said and done, the relationships I have with my wife and kids, and with my good friends, are what really count. Achievements at work are important, but what is more important is simply to know that I am loved and accepted by those closest to me.
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CONCLUSION Shame-based perfectionism is a significant problem today. Shame-prone perfectionists never feel satisfied because they are striving for impossibly high levels of achievement. They strive for a flawless performance in a desperate attempt to establish a strong sense of selfworth. Useful approaches to working with shame-prone persons have been developed by Bradshaw and Kohut. These strategies can be adapted for work with people suffering from shame-based perfectionism. Perfectionists are not satisfied with the fact that some of their sub-selves are capable of excellence; they want all of them to be great. An adapted version of Bradshaw‘s ―making peace with your villagers‖ technique can be used to help a perfectionist accept and affirm all of her or his sub-selves. In the framework of self psychology, the shame-prone perfectionist suffers through the condemnatory stances that the idealizing and grandiose selves adopt in relation to each other. A mirroring stance in therapy as advocated by Kohut leads to an internalization process in the client, which in turn becomes the basis for positive mirroring between the two selves. In the perspective of cognitive therapy, shame-based perfectionism is linked to the core belief, ―I am what I achieve.‖ Belief modification sheets can be used to in reframing this faulty core philosophy. A more positive core belief is, ―Before any achievement, I am worthy.‖ These three approaches are complementary. Each one addresses a key area of dysfunction. Positive mirroring is vitally important in therapeutic work with shame-prone personalities; it is not optional. The decision to concentrate on cognitive reframing or on affirming activities as developed by Bradshaw and others is a matter of personal inclination and choice.
REFERENCES Au, W. & Cannon, N. (1992). The plague of perfectionism. Human Development, 13, 3, 5-12. Beck, A. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the disorders. New York: International Universities Press. Beck, J. (1995). Cognitive therapy: Basics and beyond. New York: The Guilford Press. Bradshaw, J. (1988). Healing the shame that binds you. Deerfield Beach: Health Communications. Capps, D. (1993). The depleted self. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Dunn, J. C., Whelton, W. J. & Sharpe, D. (2006). Maladaptive perfectionism, hassles, coping, and psychological distress in university professors. Journal of Counseling Psychology 53, 4, 511-523. Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York, W.W. Norton. Flett, G. L. & Hewitt, P. L. (2002). Perfectionism and maladjustment: An overview of theoretical, definitional, and treatment issues. In G.L. Flett & P.L. Hewitt (Eds.), Perfectionism: Theory, research, and treatment (5-32). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
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Fowler, J. (1996). Faithful change: The personal and public challenges of post-modern life. Nashville: Abingdon Press. Hawley, L. L., Ho, M. R., Zuroff, D. C. & Blatt, S. J. (2006). The relationship of perfectionism, depression, and therapeutic alliance during treatment for depression: Latent difference score analysis. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 74, 930942. Horney, K. (1950). Neurosis and human growth. New York: Norton. Jones, A. (1999). Exploring spiritual direction. Cambridge, Ma.: Cowley Publications. Karen, R. (1992). Shame, The Atlantic Monthly, Feb. edition, pp. 40-70. Kohut, H. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. Kohut, H. (1978). The search for the self, (P. Ornstein Ed.) New York: International Universities Press. Kohut, H. (1984). How does analysis cure? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lewis, H. B. (1971). Shame and guilt in neurosis. New York: International Universities Press. Mayer, S. (1999). High-Risk perfectionism. Human Development, 20, 1, 5-8. Morrison, A. P. (1986). Shame, ideal self, and narcissism. In A. P. Morrison (Eds.), Essential papers on narcissism (348-373). New York: New York University Press. Pattison, S. (2000). Shame: Theory, therapy, theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pembroke, N. (2007). Moving toward spiritual maturity: Psychological, contemplative, and moral challenges in Christian living. Binghamton: Haworth Pastoral Press and New York: Routledge. Sorotzkin, B. (1985). The quest for perfection: Avoiding guilt or avoiding shame? Psychotherapy, 22, 564-571. Sorotzkin, B. (1998). Understanding and treatingperfectionism in religious adolescents. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 35, 87-95. Stone, H. & Winkelman, S. (1985). Embracing our selves. Marina del Rey, Ca.: Devorss and Co. Tomkins, S. (1987). Shame. In D. Nathanson (Ed.), The many faces of shame (pp. 133-161). New York: Guilford Press. Wu, T. & Wei, M. (2008). Perfectionism and negative mood: The mediating roles of validation from others versus self. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 55, 2, 276-288. Wurmser, L. (1987). Shame: The veiled companion of narcissism. In D. Nathanson (Ed.), The many faces of shame (64-92). New York: Guilford Press. Yoon, J. & Lau, A. S. (2008). Maladaptive perfectionism and depressive symptoms among Asian American college students: Contributions of Interdependence and parental relations. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 14, 2, 92-101.
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 197-210
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 10
INCREASING THE PREDICTIVE UTILITY OF NEUROTICISM FOR HEALTH BEHAVIORS: THE ROLE OF IMPLICIT NEUROTICISM Jennifer Boldero, Nick Haslam and Jennifer Whelan University of Melbourne, Australia
ABSTRACT There is considerable evidence that neuroticism is associated with self-reported physical health, although the exact mechanisms involved are not clear. However, selfreports of neuroticism may be distorted by concerns about social desirability and/or lack of awareness, thus potentially biasing its correlations with health behaviors. In this chapter, we first review issues concerning the explicit (self-report) measurement of neuroticism. We then review recent research which indicates that explicit and implicit measures of neuroticism are at best weakly related. Discussion then focuses on how implicitly assessing neuroticism might enhance our understanding its associations with outcome variables, including health behaviors. This discussion also considers the characteristics of two related implicit measures, the Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the Go/No-go Association Test (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2000). Preliminary evidence is presented that suggests that the GNAT may be a more appropriate measure than the IAT. We present evidence from two large undergraduate samples that GNAT-assessed neuroticism predicts self-reported health behaviors over and above self-reported neuroticism. The chapter closes with the suggestion that measuring neuroticism both implicitly and explicitly is a promising research strategy for understanding its associations with other variables.
INTRODUCTION The utility of personality as a construct is premised on its ability to help us understand ―what people want, say, do, feel, and believe‖ (Ozer & Benet-Martínez, 2005, p. 402). In particular, personality variables should help us to understand important life outcomes, such as
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health and physical well-being. The role personality plays in health has been a major topic of investigation over the last several decades (Gunnarsson, Gustavsson, Tengström, Franck, & Fahlke, 2008). Research has demonstrated that not only are personality traits related to a range of illnesses, such as asthma, heart disease, and hypertension (e.g., Booth-Kewley & Friedman, 1987; Räikkönen, Matthews, Flory, Owens, & Gump, 1999), but also they are important predictors of mortality (e.g., Friedman, Tucker, Tomlinson-Keasey, Schwartz, Wingard, & Criqui, 1993; Maier & Smith, 1999). Of the Big Five personality factors, there is substantial evidence that neuroticism is associated with reduced longevity (e.g., Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007; Shipley, Weiss, Der, Taylor, & Deary, 2007), poorer mental health (e.g., Kressin, Spiro, & Skinner, 2000), more physical symptoms (e.g., Feldman, Cohen, Doyle, Skoner, & Gwaltney, 1999; Larsen, 1992), and lower ratings of subjective global health (e.g., Benyamini, Idler, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 2000; Moor, Zimprich, Schmitt, & Kliegel, 2006). However, the evidence for the role of neuroticism in ill health is mixed (Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005). For example, Smith and Spiro (2002) noted that some studies have found links between neuroticism and disease (e.g., Jones, Franks, & Ingram, 1997) whereas others have not (e.g., Zonderman, Costa, & McCrae, 1989). Any associations between neuroticism and negative health outcomes occur, in part, because those higher in this trait experience more negative affect and perceived stress (e.g., Mroczek & Almeida, 2004; Suls, Green, & Hillis, 1998; Watson & Clark, 1994), both of which are associated with physiological effects known to be related to poorer health (e.g., the production of higher levels of cortisol or inflammatory cytokines; Segerstrom, 2000; Segerstrom & Miller, 2004). However, these associations are also likely to be a result of those higher in neuroticism engaging in behaviors associated with poorer health (Mroczek, Spiro, & Turiano, 2009). For example, cigarette smoking (e.g., Goodwin & Hamilton, 2002; Saklofske, Austin, Galloway, & Davidson, 2007) and alcohol use (e.g., Grekin, Sher, & Wood, 2006; Read & O‘Connor, 2006) are associated with neuroticism and these behaviors partially moderate the factor‘s association with mortality (Mroczek et al., 2009). Finally, neuroticism is negatively associated with reporting that one engages in regular exercise (e.g., Courneya & Hellsten, 1998; Saklofske, Austin, Rohr, & Andrews, 2007). Results such as these have led some to suggest that interventions designed to change health-damaging behaviors should target those high in neuroticism (e.g., Mroczek et al., 2009). However, if interventions are to be maximally effective, it is important that these individuals are identified through the use of appropriate measures of the trait.
Self-Report Measurement of Neuroticism Most research examining the impact of neuroticism on health behavior (and other behaviors) has used self-report measures to assess this trait. A number of these measures exist. These include the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) and the NEO Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) and the International Personality Inventory Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, 1999), which both measure variants of the Five Factor Model of Personality (FFM; McCrae & John, 1992). Most research has used such FFM measures (e.g., Artistico, Baldassarri, Lauriola, & Laicardi, 2000; Trobst, Herbst, Masters, & Costa; 2002; Vollrath & Torgersen, 2002), because this model has
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provided a ―much needed organization to the study of personality and health‖ (Smith & Spiro, 2002, p. 367). The use of self-report measures of neuroticism (and other factors) is based on two assumptions. First, individuals must be aware of how neurotic they are (i.e., they have access to introspective access to information about their levels of neuroticism). Second, individuals must being willing to accurately report this information. If these assumptions are not met, self-report measures may not accurately identify those who are high on this factor and who, thus, may benefit from targeted interventions designed to change behavior.
Introspective Access to Neuroticism The issue of whether individuals have access to information about their personality has a long history in psychology. Projective techniques, such as the Rorschach Inkblot Test and the Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, 1938), are based on the assumption that individuals have limited access to information about their personality. Researchers who favor the use of these techniques, and those who do not use projective tests but employ more recently developed measurement tools (e.g., Bing, LeBreton, Davison, Migetz, & James, 2007; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), argue that individuals have different types of information about their personality which are acquired in different ways and become accessible as a result of different processes. Some information is acquired over lengthy periods of time, is relatively stable (i.e., resistant to change), and is elicited by effortless automatic processes initiated by a triggering stimulus. This type of information, known as implicit cognition (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), is presumed to exist outside conscious awareness and, thus, is inaccessible through introspection. Other information is learned relatively quickly, is relatively malleable, and is elicited by deliberative, controlled processes. Individuals are consciously aware of this information, known as explicit cognition (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). This information is accessible through introspection and forms the basis of self-reports. The nature of the relationship between implicit and explicit cognitions has been the subject of some disagreement among psychologists. Some propose that they are distinct (i.e., the full dissociation model) and argue that to fully understand how personality has an impact on behavior it is essential that both types of cognition be assessed (e.g., Bing et al., 2007: Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Moreover, as implicit cognitions are unavailable to conscious awareness, these must be measured indirectly (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). These indirect measures (hereafter referred to as implicit measures) are those that ―neither inform the subject of what is being assessed nor request self-report concerning it‖ (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p. 5).1 A related model is that which proposes that there are two independent representations of constructs; those which are ―old‖ and are activated automatically and those that are ―new‖ and require cognitive effort to retrieve them from memory (e.g., Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). However, this model argues that at times self-reports draw on ―old‖ representations, specifically when individuals lack the cognitive capacity to engage in deliberative processing or the motivation to engage in such processing. In contrast, when deliberative processing occurs, self-reports draw on the ―new‖ representations. 1
Relevant indirect methods or implicit measures are discussed below.
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Another alternative is that of Smith and DeCoster (2000). They proposed that two memory systems underpin implicit and explicit processing; one that slowly learns general regularities and one that quickly forms new associations between unique or novel events. Automatic or implicit processing involves the ―slow‖ system while conscious processing involves both. Thus, implicit personality measures assess associations learned over long periods whereas explicit measures (i.e., self-reports) assess both these older associations and more recently learned information. The final alternative is a model that assumes that individuals have access to all information about their personality and, therefore, are capable of reporting it. However, individuals may at times be reluctant to report this information. Such an approach is embodied in Fazio‘s (1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999) MODE model of attitudes. This model assumes that attitudes and, by implication, personality are available to introspection. However, as self-report measures involve verbal responses, individuals can modify these responses to present a view of the self that is consistent with a particular self-presentation goal (Olson, Fazio, & Hermann, 2007). Of these models, the last three imply that self-report (explicit) and implicit measures of neuroticism should be, at least, weakly related. Furthermore, they suggest that particular selfpresentation goals or other factors that lead individuals to either modify self-reports or engage in deliberative processing should moderate these associations. Thus, correlations between implicit and explicit assessments should be relatively weak for personality characteristics that are socially sensitive. Similarly, self-reports made under time pressure or cognitive load (i.e., those which are more spontaneous) should be more strongly associated with implicit measures than those not made under these conditions. Two published studies have examined the relationships between implicitly- and explicitly-assessed neuroticism (hereafter referred to as implicit and explicit neuroticism). Steffens and Schulze König (2006) found that these measures were weakly related (r (89) = .24, p < .05). Similarly, Boldero, Rawlings, and Haslam (2007, Study 2) found a weak positive correlation that approached significance (r (169) = .16, p < .10). Furthermore, in two recent studies using relatively large samples of undergraduate students (N = 496 & N = 322, respectively), we found that implicit and explicit neuroticism are significantly related, albeit weakly (r = .12 & .17, respectively). Recent studies have helped to clarify why implicit and explicit measures often have such modest correlations. A meta-analysis of studies using implicit and explicit measures of a range of constructs found no evidence that the extent to which the construct is more or less socially desirable moderates their relationship whereas the extent to which self-reports are made spontaneously does (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005a). However, motivation to control prejudiced reactions moderates the associations between implicitly- and explicitly-assessed attitudes to ethnic groups (Hofmann, Gschwendner, & Schmitt, 2005b). Further, Olson et al. (2007) found that discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem were a result of reporting tendencies on the explicit measure. Those who had relatively high explicit self-esteem and relatively low implicit self-esteem reported having a self-aggrandizing self-presentation style (Study 1). Moreover, explicit and implicit self-esteem corresponded for those individuals who were instructed to be honest when completing the explicit measure whereas they did not for those not given this instruction. Taken together, these results clearly indicate that implicit and explicit measures of neuroticism are related in certain circumstances, contrary to models that propose a complete
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dissociation between implicit and explicit cognition (e.g., Bing et al., 2007). However, study findings do not allow discrimination between the alternative models. It is possible that individuals have two different types of information about their personality, that which is ―old‖ and that which is ―new‖, and that ―old‖ information either influences only spontaneous selfreports (Wilson et al., 2000) or has an influence on all self-reports (Smith & DeCoster, 2002). Alternatively, individuals may have only one source of information and self-reports of this information may be subject to modification when individuals have particular self-related goals (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999).
When Might Individuals Not Be Willing to Accurately Self-Report Neuroticism? The work reviewed above implies that explicit and implicit measures of neuroticism may diverge and that one reason for this may be that self-reports are sometimes modified. As laypeople evaluate traits associated with neuroticism negatively (Haslam, Bain, & Neal, 2004), it is possible that goals such as avoiding negative evaluations and presenting a socially desirable face to the world bias self-reports of this factor (e.g., Cronbach, 1990; Orne, 1962; Rosenberg, 1969). First, evaluation apprehension effects occur for self-reports. Individuals tend to exaggerate the extent to which they possess positive qualities while downplaying the extent to which they possess negative ones (Paulhus, 2002), particularly in contexts where the outcomes associated with these self-reports are important (e.g., when completing inventories on which job selection may be based). Moreover, this occurs for self-report measures of the FFM (e.g., Furnham, 1997). Second, faking is possible. Those instructed to ―fake good‖ a Big Five measure of neuroticism score higher on emotional stability (i.e., the positive pole of the neuroticism dimension) than those not instructed to do so (Hirsh & Peterson, 2008). A recent metaanalysis conducted in the personnel selection literature demonstrated that applicants consistently report lower levels of neuroticism than non-applicants (Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006). It has been argued that indices of socially desirable responding which ―assess‖ individuals‘ tendencies to ―fake‖ their responses (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998) could be used to ―correct‖ for this tendency. Indeed, personality test users in organizational psychology favor the use of corrections for faking (e.g., Goffin & Christiansen, 2003). However, there is evidence that such corrections do not necessarily increase the validity of responses on personality inventories (e.g., Pauls & Stemmler, 2003; Reid-Seiser & Fritzsche, 2001) nor do corrected scores approximate ―honest‖ scores (Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999). Rather than attempting to correct for the impact of social desirability on responses, another strategy may be to use a neuroticism measure that is relatively resistant to faking. For example, Stark, Chernysenko, Chan, Lee, and Drasgow (2001) argued that researchers ―should begin to consider alternative models or methods of test construction that could be employed to develop personality measures that are less susceptible to faking than the currently used inventories‖ (p. 592); a suggestion that is not new (see, for example, Cattell & Warburton, 1967).
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Implicit Measures of Neuroticism as “Faking-Resistant” Measures Within the literature examining implicit cognition, it is assumed that personality is ―an associative network containing all associations of the concept of self with attribute concepts describing one‘s personality‖ (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002, p. 381). Further, by using tasks that assess the extent to which people automatically associate appropriate trait terms with themselves, these tasks are relatively resistant to distortions associated with faking (e.g., Nosek, 2005). Thus, it is possible that they provide ―faking-resistant‖ measures of neuroticism. We now consider whether the implicit measures used by Steffens and Schulze König (2006) and Boldero et al. (2007) are resistant to attempts to present the self in some particular way. Steffens and Schulze König (2006) used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) to assess neuroticism. This task, which is the most commonly used implicit measure of personality, assesses relative associations between two contrasted categories (e.g., self vs. others and neuroticism vs. emotional stability) by comparing response times in two combined discrimination tasks. Individuals are required to sort target items which represent each of the four concepts using two responses. One response is assigned to a particular pairing of the two categories (e.g., self and neuroticism) and the other to the other pairing (e.g., others and emotional stability) on one block of trials. In a subsequent block, the response assignment is reversed. As a result, in a neuroticism IAT, on one block of trials (i.e., the compatible block) words representing the self (e.g., ―me‖) are paired with words representing neuroticism (e.g., ―worried‖) and words that do not represent the self (e.g., ―them‖) are paired with words that do not represent neuroticism (e.g., ―calm‖). Response latencies for correct responses on this trial block are compared with those on a block of trials in which self words are paired with non-representative trait words and ―nonself‖ words are paired with representative trait words.2 The basic assumption of the IAT is that if two concepts (i.e., self and neuroticism) are highly associated, the sorting task will be easier when the two concepts share the same response key (i.e., the compatible block) than when they share different response keys (i.e., the incompatible block). Thus, the extent to which responses on the compatible block are faster than those on the incompatible block is taken as a measure of the extent to which an individual automatically associates the self with the personality trait, providing the implicit measure of that trait. Two recent studies (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; Steffens; 2004) have demonstrated that, inconsistent with assumptions, the IAT is not immune to faking. Fiedler and Bluemke (2005) found that individuals, both with and without prior experience on the task, were able to ―fake‖ an attitude IAT by slowing responses on the compatible block and speeding up responses on the incompatible block. Similarly, Steffens (2004) found that individuals who have prior experience on an IAT can ―fake‖ a subsequent IAT by slowing responses on the compatible block. Although faking on the IAT is not as easy or pronounced as faking on an explicit measure (Steffens, 2004), ―experts‖ are not able to identify those who fake the IAT (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005).
2
Individuals who respond incorrectly are subsequently required to make a correct response. In some scoring algorithms for the IAT (e.g., that recommended by Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), a time penalty is imposed on initially incorrect responses.
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Boldero et al. (2007) used an IAT variant, the Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001), to assess implicit neuroticism and other FFM factors. Like the IAT, the GNAT assesses the strength of association between two target categories (e.g., self and neuroticism). However, rather than requiring individuals to complete two blocks of trials in which categories are paired, only one critical block is used. In this, only words that represent neuroticism or self are used as targets and these are presented along with distractor words (i.e., words that are neither neuroticism nor self words). If the presented word is a target word, individuals are required to indicate this by responding within a relatively brief response window. If the presented word is not a target (i.e., it is a distractor), they are required to do nothing and the trial ―times out‖. The measure of association between the two target categories is the degree to which target category terms can be discriminated from distractor terms, which is assessed using error rates. The logic of the task is that stronger associations facilitate discrimination (i.e., more correct responses relative to incorrect ones). Standardized probabilities of correct and incorrect target term responses are used to compute the signal detection theory index, d΄ (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). This measure, unlike reaction time measures, is theoretically independent of participants‘ response criteria (Green & Swets, 1966), thereby eliminating a possible source of bias. The GNAT differs procedurally from the IAT in two ways: two target categories not four are used (i.e., self and neuroticism in the case of a neuroticism GNAT) and rather than making one of two responses, only a single response is required. Specifically, when a term belongs to either target category a response is required whereas no response is required if the term belongs to neither category (i.e., a distractor). A single association is assessed using one trial block. However, critical for the current discussion is the fact that responses on the GNAT must be made within a relatively short response window (both Boldero et al., 2007, and our recent studies used a response window of 700 msec). In contrast, the IAT offers individuals a relatively large response window which allows faking via the slowing of responses. Whether or not this is possible was examined with one of our recent student samples who completed, amongst other tasks, a neuroticism GNAT. We asked half our participants to ―try hard to correctly detect as many neuroticism and self items as you can‖. We chose this instruction rather than one which asked participants to appear to be not neurotic as we assumed that if they had any pre-existing biases which they employed on this task, they would try to appear as less neurotic. The remaining participants were given no explicit instructions about the task except that the target items were neuroticism and self terms. Consistent with our assumption that it is not possible to control responding on the GNAT, those given the instruction to try to correctly identify as many neuroticism and self words as they could yielded d΄s (M = 1.79; SD = .85) that were no different to those not given this instruction (M = 1.71; SD = .88), t (495) = 1.16, p = .247). Thus, it appears that because the GNAT is based on correct responses which are made within a small response window, it is difficult for individuals to modify their responses on this task. However, this conclusion must be treated with caution and await additional studies the GNAT‘s fakeability. Despite this reservation, it appears that, unlike the IAT, it is not possible to consciously modify responses on the GNAT. If this is the case, this feature makes it a promising implicit measure of neuroticism that may provide insights into the links between this personality trait and behaviors that are associated with poorer health outcomes.
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NEUROTICISM AND HEALTH BEHAVIORS When considering whether implicitly-assessed neuroticism is related to health behaviors, it is important to recognize that behavior is likely to be a function of the working of two different systems, one impulsive and one reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The impulsive system relies on easily-activated behavioral schemata but not valence or expectancy knowledge. The reflective system involves reasoning that ―leads to a noetic decision about the feasibility and desirability of a particular action‖ (Strack & Deutsch, 2004, p. 230). As a result, implicitly-assessed neuroticism is likely to be associated with behaviors that are spontaneous, automatic, and non-verbal whereas explicitly-assessed neuroticism is likely to be associated with controlled behaviors. Consistent with this proposition, Steffens and Schulze König (2006) found that implicit neuroticism correlated with indirect ratings of subjective and observer-rated stress whereas explicit neuroticism did not. As noted above, neuroticism has been found to be associated with cigarette smoking (e.g., Goodwin & Hamilton, 2002; Saklosfske et al., 2007), alcohol use (e.g., Grekin et al., 2006; Read & O‘Connor, 2006), and not exercising regularly. If implicitly-assessed constructs are associated with spontaneous behaviors, it is likely that implicit neuroticism will be associated with cigarette smoking and drinking alcohol to excess, as these behaviors are likely to be experienced as somewhat automatic or out of control. In contrast, as exercising regularly tends to involve controlled behavior, we assumed explicit neuroticism would predict it. To test these predictions, in one of our recent studies, we regressed people‘s responses to several items (―I do not smoke cigarettes‖, ―I rarely get drunk‖3, and ―I exercise regularly‖) on implicit and explicit neuroticism and their interaction in hierarchical multiple regression analyses. Consistent with our predictions, implicit neuroticism was associated with disagreeing that one rarely gets drunk and that one smokes cigarettes (β = .14, β = .11, respectively). Neither explicit neuroticism nor it‘s interaction with implicit neuroticism was a predictor of these behaviors (all βs < .09). Again consistent with our predictions, explicit neuroticism was a predictor of agreeing that one did not engage in regular exercise (β = -.28). However, although implicit neuroticism was not a predictor (β = .06), the interaction term was (β = .16). Thus, implicit neuroticism moderated the impact of explicit neuroticism. The nature of this moderation was that for those low in implicit neuroticism (i.e., -1 SD), there was a relationship between explicit neuroticism and not engaging in regular exercise whereas for those high in implicit neuroticism (i.e., +1 SD) there was not (see Figure 1). This indicates that explicit neuroticism is problematic for those who are lower in implicit neuroticism. This suggests that implicit neuroticism somehow counteracts the impact of explicit neuroticism on this type of behavior. To investigate whether we could replicate these findings, we asked another sample of student participants to complete Vickers, Conway, and Hervig‘s (1990) measure of substance risk taking, which includes items such as ―I do not drink‖ and ―I do not smoke‖ (both reverse scored). Consistent with the results, reported above, implicit neuroticism was associated with increased substance risk taking (β = .12) whereas neither overt neuroticism nor the interaction of implicit and explicit neuroticism were predictors (both βs < .06). This result is particularly interesting when considered in the light of Booth-Kewley and Vickers‘ (1994) result that selfreported neuroticism is unrelated to substance risk-taking. 3
We asked about getting drunk as moderate use of alcohol is not associated with health problems.
Engagement in Regular Exercise
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Low implicit neuroticism High implicit neuroticism
Low
High Explicit Neuroticism
Figure 1. The relationship between engagement in regular exercise and explicit neuroticism showing the moderating impact of implicit neuroticism.
Together the results of these two studies indicate that implicitly assessing neuroticism enhances our understanding of how this factor is related to health-related behaviors. In particular, they suggest that implicit neuroticism is associated with the use of substances that are associated with ill health, and may be a better predictor of this risk behavior than selfreported neuroticism, although the vast majority of previous research has employed such explicit personality measures. Further, our findings suggest that implicit neuroticism may also play a moderating role in the engagement of more deliberative and controlled healthpromoting behaviors (i.e., regular exercise).
CONCLUSION To conclude, we have proposed that implicit measurement may be useful when considering the relationship of neuroticism with health-related behaviours. Implicit measures are a useful addition to research on this topic because individuals may have limited access to information about how neurotic they are and may bias their self-reports of this factor. As a result, if only self-report measures are used, the correlations between neuroticism and behaviors may be attenuated and obscured. The results of our own and other studies which have examined the correlations of implicit and explicit neuroticism provide some evidence for the divergence of these measures and their complementary role in predicting health-related behavior. As with other constructs, implicit and explicit measures of neuroticism have some overlap but they also each have some unique predictive power. Although several techniques can be used to implicitly assess neuroticism, our studies suggest that the GNAT (Nosek & Banaji, 2000) may be particularly appropriate. Although
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this measure, which assesses the automatic associations of self-related terms with neuroticism terms, is a variant of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998), we believe it is more promising because recent evidence suggests that the IAT can be ―faked‖ by slowing responses. The GNAT does not allow this form of faking, and our preliminary results support the assumption that it is difficult to modify responses on it deliberately. Despite the widespread use of implicit methods in other areas of personality and social psychology, their utility as predictors of health behaviors has been neglected. Although some studies have examined the associations of implicitly-assessed personality with other types of behaviour (e.g., Steffens & Schulze König; 2006), to our knowledge no studies have specifically considered those behaviors that are associated with negative health outcomes (e.g., smoking cigarettes) which have been linked to neuroticism in other studies. The results of our studies indicate the implicit neuroticism is associated with smoking cigarettes, drinking alcohol to excess, and substance use-related risk taking. Further, although explicit neuroticism was associated with less engagement in regular exercise, implicit neuroticism moderated this relationship. This moderation was unexpected, but it demonstrates that it may be important to consider the role of implicit neuroticism (and implicit measures of other personality factors) in a range of health behaviors, including those which might be considered under deliberative control. The understanding of how personality is related to engagement in behaviors that are associated with health and ill health is an important research endeavor. We urge researchers to consider using implicit measures of personality in studies that examine this important topic. We believe that this will lead to a fuller understanding of the role of that personality plays as a determinant of health behavior and is an important next research ―step‖.
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ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 11
SHAME: A SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY PERSPECTIVE Sarah McLachlan, David Keatley, Chris Stiff and Martin Hagger University of Nottingham, UK
ABSTRACT Shame has been identified as an intense unpleasant emotion (Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1973) with potentially deleterious effects on motivation and goal-striving (Fischer & Tangney, 1995). This chapter aims to explore the utility of self-determination theory (SDT) in understanding the experience of shame and the effects of being motivated by shame avoidance. Key constructs and mechanisms from SDT that explain the adaptive and maladaptive effects of shame experience and shame avoidance on behaviour will be identified and discussed. Specifically, introjected regulation, one of six regulatory styles specified by SDT, is particularly pertinent to well-documented associations between shame, maladaptive coping, and avoidant behavioural tendencies (e.g., Tangney, Fischer, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Introjected regulation is considered a psychological mediator characterised by avoidance of thoughts of shameful experiences or behaviours that could result in shameful emotional reactions in the future. The value of SDT in explaining and evaluating behavioural consequences of shame will be discussed using applied examples from educational, health, and resource conservation research. As the regulatory styles proposed by SDT have differing patterns of associations with psychological well-being, behavioural quality, and persistence, the theory can offer both an account of the consequences of shame and methods through which to reduce maladaptive reactions to this emotion. Ideas for further research approaching shame from an SDT perspective will be proposed, including an examination of whether inducing particular motivational orientations could serve as a buffer against the maladaptive effects of shame.
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INTRODUCTION Shame is a ―self-conscious‖ emotion (Fischer & Tangney, 1995), evoked through processes of self-reflection and self-evaluation (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). It has been defined as the ―failure to live up to an ego ideal‖ (Lazarus, 1991, p.246). Wicker, Payne, and Morgan (1983) argued that shame is the most intense unpleasant emotion. Shame has been associated with a range of maladaptive social and health-related outcomes, including withdrawal, motivational inhibition, and avoidant patterns of behaviour (Wicker et al., 1983), in addition to feelings of worthlessness, incompetence, and anxiety (Stern, 1999). Furthermore, clinical and empirical evidence converge on the finding that those who frequently experience shame are more prone to a variety of psychological problems. However, shame has also been linked to adaptive motivational and behavioural outcomes (e.g., Turner, Husman, & Schallert, 2002), emphasising the importance of gaining an understanding of mechanisms and processes determining the outcomes of shame experience and shame avoidance. One factor likely to be pertinent to the experience and consequences of shame is motivation. Emmons (1996) alluded to inextricable ties between motivation and emotion, ―At a minimum, affect is related to goals in the following ways: It plays a role in determining one‘s commitment to goals, it energizes goal-directed behaviour; and it serves as feedback informing a person of the status of their goals‖ (p. 313). Pekrun (2006) also implies the importance of accounting for emotions in motivated behaviour, asserting that emotions can affect students‘ interest, engagement, achievement, and personality development. Many theorists in the domain of motivation suggest that shame is the most likely of the negative emotions to reduce or terminate motivated behaviour. Turner and colleagues (2002) postulated that shame can incur devastating effects on ensuing motivation and goal-directed behaviour, alluding to the need to understand mechanisms through which experiences of shame alter motivational forces driving behaviour and to determine methods for instilling shame resiliency. Although the shame literature has touched upon the relevance of selfregulation and motivation (e.g., Turner et al., 2002), studies have not yet examined shame from a global motivational perspective. It is here that self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000) may offer a useful framework for exploring the underpinnings and effects of shame-related events. SDT is an organismic-dialectical theory that provides an account of the global motivational forces underlying volitional behaviour. The theory proposes that individuals have an innate tendency towards psychological growth and the mastery of challenges through the satisfaction of three fundamental needs - autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The need for autonomy, i.e., the need to experience oneself as the initiator and regulator of one‘s behaviour, will be the main focus of this chapter with regard to motivational antecedents and consequences of shame-related events. However, the needs for competence and relatedness will also be discussed; the former referring to the necessity for individuals to feel that they are functioning effectively in their environment and the latter referring to the desire to initiate and maintain interpersonal relationships and a sense of connectedness to other people. Central to SDT is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, which is often viewed on a self-determination continuum. Intrinsic motivation refers to engaging in behaviour for motives that emanate from the self, such as for the enjoyment, satisfaction, and
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fulfilment that behavioural engagement provides, while extrinsic motivation describes behavioural engagement that is driven at least in part by contingencies external to the self, such as obtaining tangible rewards or personally-valued outcomes. The theory posits four forms of extrinsic motivation that lie on the continuum: integrated, identified, introjected, and external regulations. Integrated regulation represents the most autonomous form of extrinsic motivation whereby behaviour has been assimilated with the self such that it is consistent with one‘s values and goals. Identified regulation represents engaging in a behaviour for reasons that are highly valued yet external to the self. Introjected regulation is the least internalised form of extrinsic motivation and describes engaging in a behaviour for contingent self-worth or to avoid negative outcomes such as guilt and shame (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Introjected regulation has been described as involving internal prods and pressures (Deci & Ryan, 2000) arising from conflict between the demand of the regulation and the individual‘s lack of interest in the behaviour itself. External regulation is the prototypical form of extrinsic motivation and refers to engaging in behaviour for the acquisition of rewards or avoidance of punishment. Movement along the continuum from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation is facilitated by a process known as internalisation, in which an activity or behaviour is gradually taken in to the self, thereby becoming congruous with existing values, goals and aspirations. The continuum of behavioural regulation is shown in Figure 1. One of the key tenets of SDT is that autonomous regulation is associated with more adaptive outcomes, in terms of well-being and behavioural quality and persistence, than controlling forms of regulation. Literature has supported this across a variety of domains, including education, work, and health, showing that more autonomous forms of regulation are related to more effective learning, higher interest, expending greater effort, higher quality performance, increased satisfaction, good health, and superior psychological well-being relative to controlling forms of regulation (e.g., Black & Deci, 2000; Edmunds, Ntoumanis, & Duda, 2008; Kasser & Ryan, 1996). In this chapter, an SDT approach will be applied to the understanding of the relationships of shame experience and shame avoidance with various motivational, psychological, and behavioural outcomes. Shame experience will be discussed as an important antecedent of motivational and behavioural outcomes, including shame avoidance, while the avoidance of shame will be directly linked to introjected regulation and associated behavioural implications. An SDT perspective on the motivational and behavioural repercussions of shame experience, as well as the motivational underpinnings and behavioural consequences of shame avoidance, could be extremely valuable in applied areas, including academic, health and workplace settings.
The Experience of Shame and Its Effects on Motivation and Behaviour In order to gain a general understanding of the process by which shame can affect motivation and behaviour, there is utility in assessing the role of shame on the processes espoused by SDT. Although the majority of work examining responses to shame experiences has documented their detrimental effects on future motivation and behaviour, a small body of literature attests to the positive effects of shame experience on subsequent motivation and behaviour.
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Figure 1. The SDT continuum of behavioural regulation (Deci & Ryan, 1985)
Negative effects of shame experience on motivation and behaviour From an SDT perspective, the experience of shame will likely incur detrimental effects on behaviour through fostering controlling or non-self-determined forms of motivation. Literature documenting the effects of shame on subsequent and long-term behaviour supports this assertion. Pekrun Goetz, Titz, and Perry (2002), for example, stated that shame may be assumed to reduce intrinsic motivation due to its incompatibility with enjoyment and interest. Further, Turner and colleagues (2002) documented the experience of shame leading to diminishing pursuit of future goals, or cessation of striving completely. This is the trend in behaviour expected if an individual is extrinsically motivated (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000), especially if the incentive for goal striving is subsequently terminated (Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999). Whilst the effects of negative emotions such as shame have been reported to reduce intrinsic motivation, they may also foster states of motivated effort to avoid challenging situations and outcomes of failure (Zeidner, 2007). The role of shame in prompting avoidance behaviour has been widely documented. Performance-avoidance goals, defined as an orientation toward avoiding incompetence, have been repeatedly linked with shame (Pekrun, Elliot & Maier, 2009). This may be integrated well with the SDT literature, as competence is an important social event that facilitates an autonomous motivational orientation. Therefore, situations that engender incompetence in an individual are likely to lead to lowered intrinsic motivation and increased extrinsic motivation, possibly leading to cessation of the behaviour due to lack of intrinsic value (see Figure 1). In particular, shame is likely to elicit introjected forms of extrinsic motivation. The extensively-documented link between shame experience and performance avoidance is therefore consistent with SDT. As most individuals naturally seek out behaviours and contexts likely to support their psychological needs, particularly
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autonomy, it is probable that they will avoid situations that are incongruent with their needs such as those that foster controlling forms of motivation. Contexts that induce shame may lead to the development of introjected regulation and motivation to avoid the context or behaviour that leads to feelings of shame. Aside from the possibility that shame prompts a range of maladaptive outcomes through its damaging effects on autonomy, the experience of shame may also impact negatively on well-being by obstructing satisfaction of the need for relatedness. In impairing individuals‘ ability to establish empathic connections with others (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), shame may reduce the number of opportunities for feeling involved with and close to other people, thereby diminishing their sense of relatedness.
Adaptive effects of shame experience on motivation and behaviour In a study carried out by Turner and Shallert (2001), students enrolled in a psychopharmacology course were recruited to ascertain whether certain personality traits or motivational orientations ameliorated the negative effects of shame on behaviour. Within the group of participants who experienced high levels of shame following what they perceived to be poor results, around 40% showed no improvement in their marks for their end-of-year exams. This is consistent with the hypothesis that experiences of shame diminish motivation and performance. By contrast, the remaining 60% showed an improvement following the shame experience and significantly increased their grade. Turner and Shallert believed these participants demonstrated shame resiliency, which lead to a reinvigoration of goal commitment and goal-directed behaviour. In this case, rather than leading to reduced motivation and avoidance, shame acted as greater impetus to achieving success. Essentially, if experienced by an individual who is resilient, shame may be a positive experience leading to improved future motivation and performance.
Shame Avoidance and Its Effects on Motivation and Behaviour Introjected regulation and shame avoidance It is important to acknowledge that shame can affect behaviour through anticipatory mechanisms in which people receive feedback regarding their future behaviour in the form of anticipatory shame. It is likely that that anticipated shame and past experience will induce an introjected regulatory style, resulting in motives to avoid shame experiences. In support of this, Assor, Roth, and Deci (2004) found that introjected regulations can be primed through procedures that induce shame. It is probable that shame-prone individuals will anticipate shame and become regulated by introjection for behaviours for which they have previously encountered shame experiences. This is consistent with Schmader and Lickel‘s (2006) postulation that shame is associated with avoidance responses intended to protect the self from negative evaluation. SDT may have much to offer in illuminating mechanisms between actual and anticipated shame experiences and outcomes relating to health, well-being, and achievement, through the mediating role of introjected regulation. In the academic domain, Pekrun and colleagues (2002) highlighted the close link between students‘ emotions and their self-regulation, supporting the importance of examining shame from an SDT perspective in this field.
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Engaging in studying behaviour to attain self-worth and avoid feelings of shame is a common motivation in school pupils (Nicholls, 1989), thus shame is highly pertinent to the domain of academic achievement. Assor, Vansteenkiste, and Kaplan (2009) have differentiated between introjected avoidance and approach motivations, and it is introjected avoidance motivation in which behaviour is driven by the desire to avoid low self-worth and shame. Assor and colleagues illustrated introjected avoidance motivation in the academic domain with the example of a pupil who works hard at school in order to avoid the shame associated with poor grades. Pekrun, Elliot, and Maier (2009) suggested that the motivational effects of activating negative emotions such as shame are complex, as they serve to reduce intrinsic motivation and are therefore likely to incur negative effects on performance, but can also result in increased effort in pursuit of a goal, in order to avoid failure. This is congruous with the finding that introjected regulation is a predictor of short-term behavioural persistence (Pelletier, Fortier, Vallerand, & Briere, 2001).
Maladaptive effects of shame avoidance motivation on behaviour Despite some evidence that in particular contexts or individuals shame avoidance is associated with adaptive behavioural outcomes, a larger body of evidence attests to the negative consequences of shame avoidance motivation. SDT also offers an account of mechanisms and processes that may underlie the association of shame avoidance with undesirable outcomes. Shame avoidance is likely to be characterised by low intrinsic motivation, as focus is removed from the relevant activity or behaviour and instead placed on external factors such as avoiding peer disapproval or unfavourable comparisons with others. This focus engenders an introjected regulatory style. In the academic domain, researchers have expressed concern that shame experiences related to long-term goal striving could result in lowered standards regarding goal pursuit or even its abandonment, which is consistent with the development of introjected regulation. Pelletier and colleagues (2001) provided clear support for the association between introjected regulation and behavioural desistance in the long-term. In a study examining self-regulation in competitive swimmers, individuals displaying autonomous forms of regulation showed greater persistence at both 10- and 22-month follow-ups than those exhibiting more controlling forms of regulation. Introjected regulation was a significant positive predictor of persistence at the 10-month follow-up but became non-significant at 22 months. Similarly, Vallerand, Fortier, and Guay (1997) discovered that introjected regulation was significantly, positively associated with staying in high school over a twelve-month period but ceased to be significantly associated with persistence at 22 months. Shame-prone individuals are unlikely to show behavioural persistence (Thompson, Altmann, & Davidson, 2004), because of the development of an introjected regulatory style and the thwarting of autonomy. It therefore seems crucial to provide such individuals with an autonomysupportive environment that facilitates the internalisation process, to shift regulation from shame avoidance and other forms of introjection to engaging in behaviour for more autonomous reasons. Aside from behavioural desistance, introjected regulation has been associated with a variety of maladaptive outcomes. For example, in the sports domain, introjection has been associated with poor well-being, decreased vitality, and suboptimal performance among elite athletes (Assor, Vansteenkiste, & Kaplan, 2009). In an academic context, introjected regulation has been associated with school anxiety, ineffective coping mechanisms following
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failure (Ryan & Connell, 1989), and superficial as opposed to deep-level learning (Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens, Soenens, & Matos, 2005). Further, performance avoidance goals, which are closely linked with shame avoidance motivation by virtue of their focus on avoiding feelings of incompetence and associated shame, tend to be negative predictors of academic performance (Finney, Pieper, & Barron, 2004). These goals may undermine intrinsic motivation by evoking perceptions of threat and eliciting anxiety and evaluative pressure, which are likely to evoke introjection. Introjection may therefore mediate the relationship between performance avoidance goals and the experience of shame and associated detrimental outcomes. Pekrun and coworkers (2009) reported that performanceavoidance goals were a positive and significant predictor of shame, which is likely to interact with an introjected regulatory style and lead to maladaptive outcomes such as behavioural desistance. Alternatively, introjected regulation may be induced following a shame reaction and could serve as a mediator between shame and the development of performance avoidance goals, consistent with processes proposed by Pekrun, Elliot, and Maier (2006). As performance-avoidance goals are concerned with the outcomes of achievement-related activities and linked with a relatively controlling form of motivation, they have been associated with impaired progress, low vitality, lack of enjoyment, and suboptimal well-being (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). In contrast, Assor and colleagues‘ (2009) study of athletes found that identified regulation exhibited far stronger associations with mastery goals, well-being, and behavioural engagement than introjection, suggesting that shame avoidance motives should be discouraged and identified regulation promoted in this context, perhaps through helping athletes to perceive their sporting behaviour as consistent with personally important values and aspirations. Further undesirable ramifications of introjected regulation include instability of attitudes (Losier, Perreault, Koestner, & Vallerand, 2001) and inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviour (Koestner & Zuckerman, 1994). Koestner and colleagues (2001) emphasise the fragility of attitudes and behaviours that are grounded in introjected regulation. Introjected regulation and the undermining of intrinsic motivation could also elucidate the association between shame-proneness and the tendency to procrastinate reported by Fee and Tangney (2000). It is feasible that shame-proneness is associated with procrastination through mediation by introjected regulation, as Fee and Tangney propose that individuals procrastinate in an attempt to avoid the imminent possibility of shame experiences. Introjected regulation is likely to foster avoidance of others‘ judgement through delaying behavioural engagement. Research has documented a link between procrastination and evaluative concerns; when the possibility of negative evaluation is feared, procrastination will often ensue (Ferrari, Johnson, & McCown, 1995; Steel, 2007).
Adaptive effects of shame avoidance motivation on behaviour Shame avoidance may not necessarily be associated with behavioural desistance if the relevant behaviour comes to be assimilated with the self (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994). Burney and Irwin (2000) suggest that issues relating to body image are rooted in shame avoidance, which may have significant implications regarding exercise behaviour. In support of this, McLachlan and Hagger (in press) reported that striving primarily for appearance- and weight loss-related outcomes in leisure-time physical activity was significantly positively correlated with extrinsic forms of regulation and that individuals who rated introjected regulation highly were nearly twice as likely to specify an appearance- or
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weight loss-related physical activity outcome as their primary goal. Although behaviour regulated by introjection is less likely to be sustained than that governed by more autonomous forms of regulation, there is evidence from exercise research to suggest that introjection can be associated with adaptive outcomes. Gillison, Osborn, Standage, & Skevington (2009) proposed that introjected regulation may play a central role in the initiation of health behaviours in adolescents. These researchers showed that introjected regulation for exercise in adolescents was associated with greater than predicted levels of sport and exercise, irrespective of whether introjection was rooted in contingent self-worth or partial internalisation of adaptive reasons for exercise. Returning to McLachlan and Hagger‘s (in press) findings, it could be inferred that individuals exercising primarily for reasons associated with shame avoidance are likely to demonstrate behavioural persistence, at least in the short-term. Further support for the association of adaptive behavioural outcomes with introjected regulation comes from a study examining recycling behaviour (Koestner, Houlford, Paquet, & Knight, 2001). Koestner and colleagues reported that introjection, as a form of regulation characterised by partial internalisation of a behaviour, was significantly positively related to recycling behaviour. Although it is possible that this would only be true of short-term behaviour, as the study‘s dependent measure was current level of recycling, the study provides some indication that shame avoidance motivation can facilitate and maintain behavioural engagement.
The Moderating role of SDT variables in shame-related experiences Individual differences in self-determined motivational orientations described by SDT offer a dispositional account of the circumstances under which shame-related antecedents result in a shame experience. The General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS; Deci & Ryan, 1985) describes the relatively enduring individual differences in motivational orientations that are likely to interact with different external contingencies that support or thwart psychological needs and give rise to situational motivational regulations and behaviour. Whilst the majority of research on SDT has focused on the effects of changing these external contingencies, there is a relative dearth of research focusing on individual differences in motivational orientations affecting motivation and behaviour. In SDT, three categories of dispositional orientations have been identified: autonomy, control, and impersonal. The autonomy orientation relates to the seeking of situations that provide a sense of initiative and autonomy promotion. Autonomy-orientated individuals are likely to feel less controlled by social events and environmental contingencies that affect motivation and instead experience such contingencies as affirmation that their behaviour emanates from the self (supports autonomy) or is informational about their performance (supports competence). The controlled orientation reflects a tendency to interpret external events as controlling, leading to an external locus of causality and the feeling that one should or must behave in accordance with the desires of external agents or environmental reinforcements. Finally, the impersonal orientation refers to the tendency for individuals to experience their behaviour as being outside intentional control. Essentially, tasks are seen as being beyond the individual‘s capacity to control or master, and can lead to a decreased sense of autonomy and competence. The general causality orientations facet of SDT provides an account of factors underlying individual differences in shame resiliency and provides a useful framework for determining
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whether or not shame will have detrimental effects on motivation and behaviour. A certain level of autonomous causality orientation appears necessary in facilitating shame resiliency. Turner and colleagues (2002) argued that shame-resilient students are able to demonstrate self-regulatory processes to adapt their behaviour to meet their goals. That is, they have a number of strategies at their disposal with which they can augment their work following failure, and feel capable of using these strategies to improve subsequent performance. If students have some perception that they are the initiator and regulator of their own behaviour, are capable of altering their examination results in future, and feel they have the necessary tools available, they can increase the likelihood of shame resiliency and the elicitation of constructive academic behaviour. Further, individuals who feel their performance in exams is important to their future endeavours, and therefore exhibit an identified regulatory style, appear sufficiently motivated to overcome shame experiences, without risking the damage to the self-concept that seems to accompany a shame experience in those exhibiting an entirely autonomous causality orientation. However, Turner and colleagues (Turner & Shallert, 2001; Turner et al., 2002) found that students who report an extrinsic causality orientation regarding their academic performance and who are highly confident of their academic ability are most likely to be resilient to reduced motivation brought about by shame. Shame resiliency was represented as increased effort, motivated behaviour, and higher grades following a shame experience. It may be that those who ascribe intrinsic value to their academic success assimilate instances of success and failure too closely to their own self-worth, as academic behaviour and goals are more fully integrated with the self. Experiences of failure and its concomitant feelings of shame are then too ―close to the bone‖ for highly-intrinsically motivated individuals to recover. In contrast, individuals with an extrinsic causality orientation might be less likely to experience the selfdamaging effects of shame. Such findings suggest that shame resiliency results from interactions between regulatory constructs, involving the attainment of a balance between a degree of autonomy in one‘s endeavours and the more extrinsic causality orientation that protects the self from experiencing destructive outcomes following shame. With regard to moderating influences on the effects of shame avoidance-induced introjection on behaviour, the fit between goal content and the nature of the interpersonal environment pertinent to those goals could determine the quality of effects of introjected regulation on behaviour. This is based on a notion termed the match perspective (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). Sagiv and Schwartz posited that detrimental effects associated with extrinsic goal pursuit should only be true of contexts that emphasise autonomous over extrinsic goals. In contexts in which extrinsic goals are paramount, the negative effects of extrinsic goal pursuit, for example shame avoidance, should be reversed. In the same vein, Vansteenkiste, Timmermans, Lens, Soenens, and Broeck (2008) suggested that the match perspective could apply to individuals‘ chronic orientations towards intrinsic or extrinsic goals, such that negative outcomes related to extrinsic goal framing and striving should disappear for individuals whose goal orientation is primarily extrinsic. It could therefore be the case that shame avoidance motivation may only be associated with maladaptive motivational and behavioural outcomes in environments in which intrinsic goals are more highly valued than extrinsic goals and in individuals more strongly oriented towards the pursuit of intrinsic, relative to extrinsic, goals. In extrinsically-oriented individuals and environments, the introjected regulatory style associated with shame avoidance may not incur negative effects on behaviour.
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Future research directions Empirical research is needed to further elucidate the role of behavioural regulations from SDT in relationships between shame experience, shame avoidance, and behavioural and psychological outcomes. Such research is critical in terms of its potential to provide methods for attenuating or preventing the detrimental effects of shame experience and avoidance on motivation, behaviour, and well-being. Suggestions for future research include examining how the shame experience alters subsequent regulatory style from SDT and whether type of regulatory style affects shame resilience, for instance by determining whether behavioural regulation moderates the relationship between shame and various associated outcomes. Experimental studies could manipulate regulatory style, for example through the provision of autonomy support, and observe effects on the process of recovery from subsequent shame experiences. In the academic domain, it would be beneficial to determine whether introducing an autonomous approach to academic tasks, through emphasising enjoyment and mastery outcomes and discouraging performance-avoidance goals, could serve as a buffer against the negative impact of shame experiences on future motivation and behaviour. The positive effects of autonomy-supportive contexts, which help foster autonomous forms of motivation, have been widely discussed in the literature (Black & Deci, 2000; Deci & Flaste, 1995; Pelletier et al., 2001). Furthermore, associations between autonomy-support and increased perceived competence (Ommundsen & Kvalø, 2007) offer an interesting possibility of intrinsic motivation mediating and/or moderating the link between shame-induced introjected motivation and behaviour. Essentially, if shame fosters feelings of incompetence, leading to extrinsic motivation and avoidance behaviour, whilst autonomy-support increases one‘s sense of competence, then it is possible that increases in autonomy may ameliorate the negative effects of shame on behaviour. Turner and Husman (2008) allude to such strategies being beneficial to students‘ future success. Pekrun and colleagues (2002) showed that while positive emotions such as enjoyment and pride predicted high academic achievement, negative emotions such as shame predicted lower achievement. As Pekrun and colleagues argued that shame may impair achievement through the reduction of intrinsic motivation, it is possible that the undesirable effects that a shame experience can incur on achievement could be attenuated or eliminated through the provision of autonomy support. Thus although high levels of self-esteem, self-efficacy, and mastery-orientation appear not to offer an immediate protective effect regarding the experience of shame (Turner & Schallert, 2001; Turner & Waugh, 2007), fostering autonomous forms of motivation may help ameliorate the more maladaptive effects of this emotion. Interventions to reduce or prevent shame experiences may therefore increase their efficacy through promoting a more autonomous approach to tasks and behaviours. It is possible that individuals regulated primarily by introjection, as a result of shame experiences, would particularly benefit from autonomy support, to promote the internalisation of behaviours and prevent the perpetuation of shame anticipation. It would also be valuable to determine whether shame is more likely to be experienced by autonomously-motivated individuals, due to the personal importance of goals, or whether autonomous behavioural regulation serves as a buffer against shame and its negative repercussions.
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CONCLUSION Bringing an SDT perspective to the study of shame yields an insight into motivational processes that potentially mediate and moderate relationships between shame experience, shame avoidance, and a variety of psychological and behavioural outcomes. In summary, the experience of shame is likely to reduce autonomous forms of motivation and to encourage the adoption of an introjected regulatory style, which has been associated with behavioural quality and persistence in the short-term, but is unlikely to result in long-term behavioural maintenance. Further, principles invoked from SDT provide methods for reducing the anticipation and occurrence of shame, and also destructive outcomes following a shame experience. SDT therefore provides an invaluable framework in which to situate future empirical studies in the field of shame.
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Pelletier, L. G., Fortier, M. S., Vallerand, R. J. & Briere, N. M. (2001). Associations among autonomy support, forms of self-regulation, and persistence: A prospective study. Motivation and Emotion, 25, 279-306. Ryan, R. M. & Connell, J. P. (1989). Perceived locus of causality and internalization: Examining reasons for acting in two domains. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 749-761. Sagiv, L. & Schwartz, S. H. (2000). Value priorities and subjective well-being: Direct relations and congruity effects. European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 177-198. Schmader, T. & Lickel, B. (2006). The approach and avoidance function of guilt and shame emotions: Comparing reactions to self-caused and other-caused wrongdoing. Motivation and Emotion, 30, 43-56. Sheldon, K. M. & Elliot, A. J. (1999). Goal striving, need-satisfaction, and longitudinal wellbeing: The self-concordance model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 482-497. Steel, P. (2007). The nature of procrastination: A meta-analytic and theoretical review of quintessential self-regulatory failure. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 65-94. Stern, A. E. (1999). Cognitive and behavioural aspects of shame among pre-adolescents. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B The Sciences and Engineering, 59, 4487. Tangney, J. P., Miller, R. S., Flicker, L. & Barlow, D. H. (1996). Are shame, guilt, and embarrassment distinct emotions? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 1256-1269. Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J. & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral emotions and moral behaviour. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 345-372. Thompson, T., Altmann, R. & Davidson, J. (2004). Shame-proneness and achievement behaviour. Personality and Individual Differences, 36, 613-627. Turner, J. E. & Husman, J. (2008). Emotional and cognitive self-regulation following academic shame. Journal of Advanced Academics, 20, 138-173. Turner, J. E., Husman, J. & Schallert, D. L. (2002). The importance of students‘ goals in their emotional experience of academic failure: Investigating the precursors and consequences of shame. [Special Issue: Emotions in Education]. Educational Psychologist, 37, 79-89. Turner, J. E. & Schallert, D. L. (2001). Expectancy-value relationships of shame reactions and shame resilency. Journal of Educational Psychology, 93, 320-329. Turner, J. E. & Waugh, R. M. (2007). A dynamical systems perspective regarding students' learning processes: Shame reactions and emergent self-organizations. In P. A. Schutz & R. Pekrun (Eds.), Emotion in education (pp. 125-145). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Vallerand, R. J., Fortier, M. S. & Guay, F. (1997). Self-determination and persistence in a real-life setting: Toward a motivational model of high school dropout. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1161-1176. Vansteenkiste, J., Simons, J., Lens, W., Soenens, B. & Matos, L. (2005). Examining the motivational impact of intrinsic versus extrinsic goal framing and autonomy-supportive versus internally controlling communication style upon early adolescents‘ academic achievement. Child Development, 76, 483-501. Vansteenkiste, M., Timmermans, T., Lens, W., Soenens, B. & Van den Broeck, A. (2008). Does extrinsic goal framing enhance extrinsic goal-oriented individuals‘ learning and performance? An experimental test of the match perspective versus self-determination theory. Journal of Educational Psychology, 100, 387-397.
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In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 225-234
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 12
WHY NEUROTICISM MAY BE RELEVANT TO UNDERSTANDING RESPONSE TO MEDITATION-BASED INTERVENTIONS: A REVIEW OF SOME FORGOTTEN LITERATURE Brian L. Thompson Portland VA Medical Center
ABSTRACT Before the explosion of interest in mindfulness-based interventions (e.g. Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2004), early meditation researchers explored the impact of personality traits on response to sitting meditation practice, particularly with Transcendental Meditation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of that early research and explore how some of the findings of these often forgotten studies may be incorporated into contemporary research on meditation-based treatments. Given the incidence of depression in individuals high in neuroticism, particular emphasis is placed on understanding how neuroticism might impact and be impacted by MindfulnessBased Cognitive Therapy for depression (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002).
INTRODUCTION Beginning with Mauphin‘s (1965) study of personality changes in undergraduates who were taught Zen Buddhist meditation, a modest research literature has developed exploring the relationship between personality and meditation. Unfortunately, most of the studies are decades old, and the personality measures vary across the literature. The most consistent personality construct measured across studies is neuroticism. A full review of the construct neuroticism is unnecessary for the purposes of this chapter. In general, neuroticism refers to a tendency to make negative attributions of experiences; it appears to be related to depression and is an important factor in understanding how individuals cope with stress (Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994; Watson & Hubbard, 1996).
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With the growing influx of research on mindfulness meditation-based interventions (see Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004), particularly those developed for treating depression (see Coelho, Cantor, & Ernst, 2007), it is worth revisiting some of the older research in order to develop an understanding of ways in which understanding the interaction between neuroticism and response to meditation may inform treatment. There is evidence that personality traits may impact treatment outcome for individuals with depression (Babgy & Quilty, 2006), but none of this research has explored the use of mindfulness-based treatments. The purpose of this chapter is to briefly explore the relationship between meditation and neuroticism across a somewhat disjointed body of literature, the vast majority of which does not fit in with the current wave of interest in mindfulness-based treatments, and to make an argument for why neuroticism could be a worthwhile area of further exploration within contemporary mindfulness meditation research. A literature search was conducted in PsychINFO using the keys words ―meditation,‖ ―mindfulness,‖ and ―neuroticism.‖ The search was restricted to studies that specifically measured neuroticism.
MEDITATION AND NEUROTICISM The measures of neuroticism vary across the literature, as do the types of meditation studied. It is useful to lay some groundwork in understanding the main types of meditation. Researchers have distinguished between two types of meditation practices: concentration and mindfulness or insight (Goleman, 1978). Concentrative meditation involves focusing on a particular stimulus, such as a mantra or phrase. Mindfulness meditation differs from concentrative practices in that, although mindfulness practitioner may begin by focusing on a single object such as the breath, attention is eventually expanded to include other stimuli such as bodily sensation, sound, thoughts, and feelings. Buddhist meditation, which has influenced the current wave of mindfulness-based treatments, integrates the two (Brown & Ryan, 2004; Goleman, 1978). The key commonality across meditative techniques is an emphasis on attention (Rao, 1989).
Transcendental Meditation Within the early personality literature, the most commonly studied meditation practice is Transcendental Meditation (TM), a concentrative practice. TM practitioners mentally repeat a Sanskrit mantra given to them by a qualified teacher, constantly bringing their attention back when distracted. It is typically practiced twice daily for 20 minutes. Tjoa (1975) is the earliest study examining the effect of TM on neuroticism. Using a Dutch questionnaire, the Amsterdame Biogfische Vragenlijst, Tjoa found significant decreases in neuroticism among a group of people attending a TM lecture, testing them prior to starting TM and again one year later. Several subsequent studies using Eysenck‘s measures of neuroticism had similar findings (see Taub, 1998 for a review of Eysenck‘s theories). TM meditators exhibited decreases in neuroticism over time (Delmonte, 1980; Williams, Francis, & Durham, 1976); however, beginning TM meditators scored higher on neuroticism than the general population and continued to remain higher in neuroticism than the general
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population following TM practice, even though their scores decreased over time (Delmonte, 1980; West, 1980; Williams, Francis, & Durham, 1976). Higher scores on neuroticism among TM meditators were related to a greater likelihood of dropping out (Delmonte, 1980, 1984a; West, 1980). Exceptions to these trends were two studies using the Tennessee Self Concept Scale, which found no difference in ―neurosis‖ between TM meditators and nonmeditators in pre- and post-tests over time (Kline, Docherty, & Farley, 1982; Nystul & Garde, 1979). However, as the other TM studies used Eysenck‘s measures of neuroticism, this discrepancy may reflect differences in personality measures. In summary, it appears that individuals interested in TM tended to be higher in neuroticism than average, but those who were particularly high in neuroticism were more likely to drop out. Despite the availability of TM practitioners and receptivity to research of the TM organization, Rao (1989) cites three main barriers to conducting TM research: 1.) TM has a ―quasi-religious‖ expectation associated with practice, which may influence outcomes; 2.) TM mantras are kept secret by practitioners and consequently cannot be empirically controlled; 3.) in order to receive permission to conduct TM research, research proposals must be submitted to the TM organization, and researchers were rarely granted approval to compare TM against any other technique. As a consequence of these restrictions, some researchers developed their own ―TM-style‖ meditation in order to sidestep these difficulties. Delmonte (1984a) referred to his as a ―non-cultic technique of mantra meditation closely resembling Transcendental Meditation‖ (p. 276). The use of a ―non-cultic‖ form of TM allowed for greater experimental control over assignment of participants to the experimental condition. The findings of these TM-style studies were very similar to their TM counterparts and provide some additional detail. Participants lower in neuroticism were more likely to continue practicing meditation after three-months, but levels of neuroticism did not distinguish compliance at subsequent intervals of 6, 12, and 24 months, (Delmonte, 1984b, 1988). An alternative explanation not addressed by the author is that, as the study began with only 37 participants, and as the sample dropout rate decreased from 22-54% between 6 and 24 months, the researchers may have had insufficient statistical power to detect differences. Two reviews of the TM and TM-style research conclude that higher scores on neuroticism in practitioners are related to lower frequency of practice and greater likelihood of discontinuing practice (Delmonte, 1987; Delmonte & Kenny, 1985). Delmonte noted TM meditators exhibited decreases in neuroticism scores over time, but that prospective TM meditators reported greater neuroticism than the general population. The author further observed that, as TM has not been compared to other treatments, it is unclear whether TM meditation is superior to other interventions (Delmonte, 1987).
Mindfulness Meditation Beginning with Kabat-Zinn‘s (1990) Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR), mindfulness-based treatments have proliferated in recent years (e.g., Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2004). Mindfulness-based approaches have since been adapted for a variety of populations and have been associated with improved outcomes (e.g., Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004; Kenny & Williams, 2007; Melbourne Academic Mindfulness Interest Group, 2006). In a meta-analysis of mindfulness-based treatments, Baer (2003) found that rates of completion ranged from 60% to 97%, with a mean of 85%. Definitions of
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mindfulness emphasize the maintenance of one‘s awareness within the present moment, and applying an attitude of curiosity, acceptance, and nonjudgment towards all experiences (Bishop et al., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 1990). The attitude of acceptance of phenomenon associated with mindfulness makes the concept antithetical to neuroticism, which involves a tendency to make negative attributions of experiences. Brown & Ryan (2003) suggest that neuroticism may interfere with mindfulness, particularly worry and self-consciousness. They speculate that the practice of mindfulness may reduce neurotic attribution. In contrast to the TM literature, there are no published research studies using measures of neuroticism in exploring outcomes of interventions using mindfulness meditation. The only incorporation of neuroticism within the mindfulness literature can be found in studies using measures of neuroticism to evaluate the construct validity of recently developed measures of trait mindfulness. These studies relied on five-factor model (FFM) measures of personality. The FFM attempts to describe a common taxonomy of personality traits derived from factor analyses of personality descriptors found in language (John & Srivastava, 1999). Brown and Ryan (2003) used Costa and McCrae‘s (1992) NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI) and NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) as measures of well-being in evaluating construct validity of the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS). Using student samples, the researchers found that the MAAS was moderately correlated with lower levels of neuroticism, which was supported by Thompson and Waltz (2007). Neuroticism was also used to assess the psychometric properties of the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS), a four-facet measure of everyday mindfulness (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004). Neuroticism, was negatively correlated with the ability to describe one‘s experience, a tendency to act with awareness in everyday life, and an attitude of acceptance or nonjudgment of phenomenon. Within a few years of developing the KIMS, Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, and Toney (2006) published the Five-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ), which was derived from a factor analysis of five previously developed mindfulness measures, including the KIMS. The resulting five factor loadings from the factor analysis were similar to the four KIMS subscales with one additional factor, nonreactivity, which was not represented by items on the KIMS. Neuroticism was negatively correlated with all five mindfulness measures, and with all FFMQ subscales except—as with the KIMS—the ability to observe one‘s experience. Additionally, there are a number of studies that suggest that mindfulness meditation positively impacts affect. Following participation in an 8-week MBSR program, participants exhibited increases in left-sided anterior activation associated with decreases in negative affect and increases in positive affect (Davidson et al., 2003). Even a 15-minute focused breathing task was associated with lower negative affect and emotional volatility, and an increased tolerance of and greater tendency to view negative stimuli (Arch & Craske, 2006). Learning to label affective states during mindfulness meditation may improve the ability of the prefrontal cortex in regulating limbic responses to daily experiences (Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007), which could reduce negative response to external environmental stimuli. Perhaps the most consistent research exploring the use of mindfulness in treating negative affect is Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy for Depression (MBCT), an eight-week mindfulness-based treatment aimed at reducing depressive relapse (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). Research has found that MBCT reduces relapse rates in individuals with three or more previous episodes of depression (Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Teasdale et al., 2000),
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and there is recent evidence that MBCT is also effective for patients who are actively depressed (Kenny & Williams, 2007). Within the MBCT literature, it has been speculated that depressive relapse in individuals is associated by the reactivation of autonomous processes such as rumination and that mindfulness helps to disrupt the activation of these processes during periods of dysphoria (Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Coelho, Canter, & Ernst, 2007). There is evidence that rumination mediates the relationship between neuroticism and depression (Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2008). Stressful events may activate rumination in individuals high in neuroticism, increasing symptoms of depression (Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005). Roelofs et al. found that rumination on sadness was related to greater depression but rumination on the causes of sadness was related to lower depression. They authors suggest these results support Teasdale, Segal, and Williams‘ (1995) argument that mindful awareness of emotional processes may be adaptive in regulating mood. Individuals high in neuroticism are more likely to make negative attributions of experiences such as emotions, life events, and the actions of others (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998). In others words, individuals higher in neuroticism perceive experiences as more globally threatening. The practice of mindfulness may change core ways in which individuals prone towards negative thinking relate to internal and external experiences. Less mindful individuals tend to be more biased by their preconceptions in their perceptions of stimuli, using an encoding style associated with higher scores on neuroticism (Herndon, 2008). By contrast, more mindful people may draw from a greater range of environmental stimuli. Their perceptions are likely to be less biased towards negative interpretation of events. Mindfulness also appears to change how individuals retrieve memories. In retrieving memories, more mindful individuals are more likely to retrieve specific memories, whereas less mindful people are more likely to create a generalization than a specific memory (Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000). What this means is that when asked to retrieve a childhood memory, less mindfulness individuals are more likely to recall having a ―bad‖ childhood, based not on specific memories but on a negative composite memory. By contrast, more mindful individuals are more likely to retrieve specific memories that may include both negative and positive experiences in childhood. For individuals high in neuroticism, participation in mindfulness-based treatments may help reduce the incidence of depression, and may impact their degree of neuroticism. Depressed individuals tend to rate high on neuroticism, suggesting that neuroticism is a shared feature of negative affect (Weinstock & Whisman, 2006). Individuals high in neuroticism are more likely to view daily life events as stressful and more likely to develop depression following exposure to daily stressors (Hutchinson & Williams, 2007). Through the cultivation of mindfulness, individuals high in neuroticism may cultivate greater acceptance of experiences, reducing rumination and subsequent depression. This change in perspective may in turn lower scores of measures of neuroticism. However, this is only speculation at this time, as there is no supporting data. There is evidence that personality dispositions such as neuroticism may change over time, but that they may be also resistant to therapeutic interventions (Brody, 1994); consequently, it is unclear if mindfulness-based interventions may actually impact neuroticism.
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CONCLUSION Although a significant body of research has appeared within the last 30 years exploring the impact of meditation in individuals high in neuroticism, the study of neuroticism has not extended into the current literature of mindfulness-based treatments except as a means to assess the psychometric properties of self-report measures of mindfulness (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, et al., 2006; Brown & Ryan, 2003). These studies drew from Costa and McCrae‘s NEO questionnaires, the most validated Big Five personality measures (John & Srivastava, 1999). Although his review of the literature is outdated, many of the conclusions of Delmonte (1987) remain relevant. For one, meditators appear to exhibit higher psychological distress— particularly neuroticism—than the general population. Secondly, although meditation may lead to a reduction in psychological distress, those with particularly high levels of distress are more likely to stop meditating. Delmonte warns against prescribing meditation as a mean to improve psychological functioning, stating that: Meditation is a self-directed and active process in which a technique is used by a person (not on a person) in the context of particular subjective expectations and objectives. For this reason meditation may not be readily dispensed, like medication, to anxious or depressed patients if they show little motivation to practice. (p. 132)
Given the success of mindfulness-based interventions such as MBCT in treating depressive relapse (Segal et al., 2002), exploration of the impact of mindfulness meditation on neuroticism—and neuroticism on the impact of mindfulness meditation treatment—may be a fruitful area of continued study. To date, no research using measures of neuroticism has been conducted within the context of mindfulness meditation-based interventions designed to treat specific conditions. There is some evidence that personality traits can predict response to treatment for depression, although the research examining the relationship between neuroticism and treatment outcome for depression has not yielded consistent findings (Bagby & Quilty, 2006). A few suggestions for areas of future study will be made here. For one, as mindfulnessbased treatments have exhibited high retention rates in populations such as individuals with chronic pain and those between depressive episodes (e.g., Baer, 2003), it would be worthwhile to compare personality profiles of individuals who complete treatment against those who drop out. It is possible that high levels of neuroticism may be a possible rule-out in recommending individuals for mindfulness meditation. For example, Bagby et al. (2008) found that individuals high in neuroticism may be too emotionally dysregulated to respond to traditional CBT without first being stabilized on an SSRI. For individuals high enough in neuroticism to become easily dysregulated, perhaps Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) mindfulness skills may be more clinically valuable than mindfulness meditation, as it was developed for people who are too reactive to engage in sitting meditation (Linehan, 1993). Individuals with high levels of psychological distress may still benefit from meditation, but it may be prudent to begin orienting these individuals to mindfulness practices that are less intense than sitting meditation (e.g., DBT mindfulness skills training). Secondly, it would be interesting to track potential personality changes over time among individuals beginning meditation. Although personality is considered stable after age 30, it
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has been suggested that psychotherapy may bring about changes in personality (McCrae, 1991). The response of neuroticism to mindfulness-based interventions is difficult to predict, as research thus far has also suggested that neuroticism may be resistant to psychological intervention (Brody, 1994). Nonetheless, some of the earlier research with TM suggests regular meditation practice may reduce levels of neuroticism. As acceptance and mindfulnessbased treatments continue to proliferate (e.g., Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2004), it is important to determine who may benefit from them. The potential response of neuroticism to mindfulness meditation is largely unknown, but there is enough research to suggest that preliminary study is worthwhile.
REFERENCES Arch, J. J. & Craske, M. G. (2006). Mechanisms of mindfulness: Emotion regulation following a focused breathing induction. Behavior Research and Therapy, 44, 18491858. Baer, R. A. (2003). Mindfulness training as a clinical intervention: A conceptual and empirical review. Clinical Psychology: Science & Practice, 10(2), 125-143. Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T. & Allen, K. B. (2004). Assessment of mindfulness by self-report: The Kentucky inventory of mindfulness skills. Assessment, 11(3), 191-206. Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., Hopkins, J., Krietemeyer, J. & Toney, L. (2006). Using self-report assessment methods to explore facets of mindfulness. Assessment, 13(1), 27-45. Bagby, R. M. & Quilty, L. C. (2006). Personality traits can predict treatment for depression. Direction in Psychiatry, 26, 281-290. Bagby, R. M., Quilty, L. C., Segal, Z. S., McBride, C. C., Kennedy, S. H. & Costa, P. T. (2008). Personality and differential treatment response in major depression: A randomized controlled trial comparing cognitive-behavioral therapy and pharmacotherapy. The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 53(6), 361-370. Bishop, S. R., Lau, M., Shapiro, S., Carlson, L., Anderson, N. D., Carmody, J. et al. (2004). Mindfulness: A proposed operational definition. Clinical Psychology: Science & Practice, 11(3), 230-241. Brody, N. (1994). .5 = or -.5: Continuity and change in personal dispositions. In T. F. Heatherton & J. L. Weinberger (Eds.). Can personality change? (pp. 59-81). Washington, DC: APA. Brown, K. W. & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of bring present: Mindfulness and its role in psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(4), 822848. Brown, K. W. & Ryan, R. M. (2004). Perils and primes in defining and measuring mindfulness: Observations from experience. Clinical Psychology: Science & Practice, 11(3), 242-248. Clark, L. A., Watson, D. & Mineka, S. (1994). Temperament, personality, and the mood and anxiety disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103(1), 103-116. Coelho, H. F., Canter, P. H. & Ernst, E. (2007). Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy: Evaluating current evidence and informing future research. Journal of Clinical and Consulting Psychology, 75(6), 1000-1005.
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Costa, P. T., Jr. & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R) and NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI): Professional manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.Creswell, D. J., Way, B. M., Eisenberger, N. I. & Lieberman, M. D. (2007). Neural correlates of dispositional mindfulness during affective labeling. Psychosomatic Medicine, 69, 560-565. Davidson, R. J., Kabat-Zinn, J., Schumacher, J., Rosenkranz, M., Muller, D., Santorelli, S. F., et al. (2003). Alterations in brain and immune function produced by mindfulness meditation. Psychosomatic Medicine, 65, 564-570. Delmonte, M. M. (1980). Personality characteristics and regularity of meditation. Psychological Reports, 46, 703-712. Delmonte, M. M. (1984a). Response to meditation in terms of physiological, behavioral and self-report measures. International Journal of Psychosomatics, 31(2), 3-17. Delmonte, M. M. (1984b). Factors influencing the regularity of meditation practice in a clinical population. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 57, 275-278. Delmonte, M. M. (1987). Personality and meditation. In M. W. West (Ed.) The psychology of meditation. (118-132). Oxford: Clarenden Press. Delmonte, M. M. (1988). Personality correlates of meditation practice frequency and dropout in an outpatient population. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 11(6), 593-597. Delmonte, M. & Kenny, V. (1985). An overview of the therapeutic effects of meditation. Psychologia, 28, 189-202. DeNeve, K. M. & Cooper, H. (1998). The happy personality: A meta-analysis of 137 personality traits and subjective well-being. Psychological Bulletin, 124(2), 197-229. Goleman, D. (1978). A taxonomy of meditation-specific altered states. Journal of Altered States of Consciousness, 4(2), 203-213. Grossman, P., Niemann, L., Schmidt, S. & Walach, H. (2004). Mindfulness-based stress reduction and health benefits: A meta-analysis. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 57, 35-43. Hayes, S. C., Follette, V. M. & Linehan, M. M. (Eds.). (2004). Mindfulness and acceptance: Expanding the cognitive-behavioral tradition. New York: Guilford. Herndon, F. (2008). Testing mindfulness with perceptual and cognitive factors: External vs. internal encoding, and the cognitive failures questionnaire. Personality and Individual Differences, 44, 32-41. Hutchinson, J. G. & Williams, P. G. (2007). Neuroticism, daily hassles, and depressive symptoms: An examination of moderation and mediating effects. Personality and Individual Differences, 42, 1367-1378. John, O. P. & Srivastava, S. (1999). The big five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and theoretical perspectives. In L. A. Pervin & O. P John (Eds.) Handbook of personality: Theory and research (2nd ed, pp. 102-138). New York: Guilford. Kabat-Zinn, J. (1990). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind to face stress, pain, and illness. New York: Dell. Kenny, M. A. & Williams, J. M. G. (2007). Treatment-resistant depressed patients show a good response to mindfulness-based cognitive therapy. Behavior Research and Therapy, 45, 617-625. Kline, K. S., Docherty, E. M. & Farley, F. H. (1982). Transcendental Meditation, self/actualization, and global personality. The Journal of General Psychology, 106, 3-8.
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Linehan, M. M. (1993). Cognitive-behavioral treatment of borderline personality disorder. New York: Guilford Press. Ma, S. H. & Teasdale, J. D. (2004). Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for depression: Replication and exploration of differential relapse prevention effects. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 72(1), 31-40. Maupin, E. W. (1965). Individual differences in response to a Zen meditation exercise. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 29(2), 139-145. McCrae, R. R. (1991). The five-factor model and its assessment in clinical settings. Journal of Personality Assessment, 57(3), 399-414. Melbourne Academic Mindfulness Interest Group. (2006). Mindfulness-based psychotherapies: A review of conceptual foundations, empirical evidence and practical considerations. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 40, 285-294. Muris, P., Roelofs, J., Rassin, E., Franken, I. & Mayer, B. (2005). Meditating the effects of rumination and worry on the links between neuroticism, anxiety, and depression. Personality and Individual Differences, 39, 1105-1111. Nystul, M. S. & Garde, M. (1979). The self-concepts of regular transcendental meditators, dropout meditators, and nonmeditators. The Journal of Psychology, 103, 15-18. Rao, K. R. (1989). Meditation: Secular and sacred. A review and assessment of some recent research. Journal of the Indian Academy of Applied Psychology, 15(2), 51-74. Roelofs, J., Huibers, M., Peeters, F. & Arntz, A. (2008). Effects of neuroticism on depression and anxiety: Rumination as a possible mediator. Personality and Individual Differences, 44, 576-586. Segal, Z., Williams, J. M. G. & Teasdale, J. D. (2002). Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for depression. New York: Guilford Press. Taub, J. M. (1998). Eysenck‘s descriptive and biological theory of personality: A review of construct validity. International Journal of Neuroscience, 94, 145-197. Teasdale, J. D., Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., Ridgeway, V. A., Soulsby, J. M. & Lau, M. A. (2000). Prevention of relapse/recurrence in major depression by mindfulness-based cognitive therapy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology., 68(4), 615-623. Teasdale, J. D., Segal, Z. & Williams, J. M. G. (1995). How does cognitive therapy prevent depressive relapse and why should attentional control (mindfulness) training help? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(1), 25-39. Tjoa, A. S. H. (1975). Meditation, neuroticism, and intelligence: A follow-up. Gedrag, Tijdschrift Voor Psychologie, 3, 167-182. Thompson, B. L. & Waltz, J. (2007). Everyday mindfulness and mindfulness meditation. Overlapping constructs or not? Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 1875-1885, Weinstock, L. M. & Whisman, M. A. (2006). Neuroticism as a common feature of the depressive and anxiety disorders: A test of the revised integrative hierarchical model in a national sample. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115(1), 68-74. West, M. A. (1980). Meditation, personality and arousal. Personality and Individual Differences, 1, 135-142. Watson, D. & Hubbard, B. (1996). Adaptational style and dispositional structure: Coping in the context of the Five-Factor Model. Journal of Personality, 64(4), 737-774. Williams, P., Francis, A. & Durham, R. (1976). Personality and meditation. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 43, 787-792.
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Williams, J. M. G., Teasdale, J. D., Segal, Z. V. & Soulsby, J. (2000). Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy reduces overgeneral autobiographical memory in formerly depressed patients. Journal of Abnormal Psychology., 109(1), 150-155.
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 235-238
ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 13
NEUROTICISM AND PSYCHOTICISM AS CORRELATES OF SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR David Lester The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey
ABSTRACT A review of research indicated that suicidal behavior is consistently associated with Eysenck‘s measures of neuroticism and psychoticism. It is suggested that future research should explore the value of a zonal analysis involving these two traits in identifying different rates and types of suicidal behavior.
INTRODUCTION It is well established that suicidal behavior is more common in those who are psychiatrically disturbed (Lester, 2000). A number of studies have explored the association of suicidality with scores on Hans Eysenck‘s psychological inventories, and it is of interest to explore whether suicidality is associated with the dimensions of neuroticism, psychoticism or both. This paper reviews the research on this issue.
ATTEMPTED SUICIDES Ashton, et al. (1994) found that a sample of English attempted suicides had higher neuroticism and psychoticism scores than normal control subjects on the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ: Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). Repeaters did not differ from first-timers in neuroticism or psychoticism. Roy (2001, 2002, 2003a, 2003b), in large samples of American patients dependent on opiates or cocaine, found that those who had previously attempted suicide were more neurotic
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on the EPQ. They also had higher psychoticism scores in one of the three studies. Black and white attempted suicides did not differ in neuroticism or psychoticism scores.. Roy (1998) compared depressed American patients who had a history of attempted suicide and those who had no such history with healthy controls on the EPQ. The three groups did not differ in psychoticism scores, and the depressed patients who had attempted suicide did not differ in neuroticism scores from the patients who had not attempted suicide (but both groups had higher neuroticism scores than the healthy controls). Lolas, et al. (1991) found that both neuroticism and psychoticism scores on the EPQ were positively associated with past and current suicidal ideation in a sample of female women in Chile who had attempted suicide within the past month. Psychoticism scores, but not neuroticism scores, were associated with the number of prior suicide attempts. Nordstrom, et al. (1995) found that a sample of Swedish attempted suicides scored higher on psychoticism and neuroticism than surgical controls on the EPQ.
Self-Mutilators Roy (1978) found that nonpsychotic self-mutilators (cutters) had higher neuroticism scores than non-mutilating patients with personality disorders (and also had made more prior suicide attempts) but did not differ in psychoticism on the EPQ as compared to other psychiatric patients.
Normal Subjects Mehryar, et al. (1977) found that American college students who had thought about suicide had higher psychoticism and neuroticism scores on one of Eysenck‘s tests (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968). In a sample of American college students, Lester (1987) found that a history of threatening suicide or suicidal ideation, but not attempting suicide, was associated with higher neuroticism and psychoticism scores using the same test. Irfani (1978) found that Iranian college and high school students who had thought about suicide had higher psychoticism and neuroticism scores on the EPQ than nonsuicidal students. This result was replicated in a sample of Turkish college students. In a sample of Australian adults, Ross, et al. (1983) found that those with a history of suicidal ideation had higher neuroticism and psychoticism scores on the EPQ than those who had not.
DISCUSSION The results of these studies are summarized in Table 1 where it can be seen that both neuroticism and psychoticism are associated with suicidality in both normal subjects and in psychiatric patients. There are occasional failures to find these associations, but it is too early to speculate on the reasons for these occasional failures
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Table 1. A summary of the research
Attempted suicides Ashton, et al. (1994) Lolas, et al. (1991)
current ideation prior ideation prior attempts
Nordstrom, et al. (1995) Roy (1998) Roy (2001) Roy (2002) Roy (2003a) Self-Mutilation Roy (1978) Normal Subjects Irfani (1978) Lester (1987) Mehryar, et al. (1977) Ross, et al. (1983) ns: no significant association or differences
Suicidality & neuroticism
Suicidality & psychoticism
positive positive positive ns positive ns positive positive positive
positive positive positive positive positive ns ns ns positive
positive
ns
positive positive positive positive
positive positive positive positive
Eysenck (1967) was interested in zone analyses, that is, combining extraversion and neuroticism to form four types: stable introverts, stable extraverts, neurotic introverts and neurotic extraverts. Eysenck never explored a typology based on neuroticism and psychoticism. It would be of great interest to explore whether the rates and types of suicidal behavior differ in the four types derived from such a typology (non-N and non-P, N and nonP, P and non-N, and N and P). It is hoped that this paper will stimulate such research in the future.
REFERENCES Ashton, C. H., Marshall, E. F., Hassanyeh, F., Marsh, V. R. & Wright-Honari, S. (1994). Biological correlates of deliberate self-harm. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 90, 316323. Eysenck, H. J. & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1968). The measurement of psychoticism. British Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology, 7, 286-294. Eysenck, H. J. & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1975). Manual of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. London: Hodder & Stoughton.. Irfani, S. (1978). Personality correlates of suicidal tendencies among Iranian and Turkish students. Journal of Psychology, 99, 151-153. Lester, D. (1987). Suicidal preoccupation and dysthymia in college students. Psychological Reports, 61, 762. Lester, D. (2000). Why people kill themselves. Springfield, IL: Charles Thomas.
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Lolas, F., Gomez, A. & Suareez, L. (1991). EPQ-R and suicide attempt. Personality & Individual Differences, 12, 899-902. Mehryar, A., Hekmat, H. & Khajavi, R. (1977). Some personality correlates of contemplated suicide. Psychological Reports, 40, 1291-1294. Nordstrom, P., Schalling, D. & Asberg, M. (1995). Temperamental vulnerability in attempted suicide. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 92, 155-160. Ross, M. W., Clayer, J. & Campbell, R. (1983). Parental rearing patterns and suicidal thoughts. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 67, 429-433. Roy, A. (1978). Self-mutilation. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 51, 201-203. Roy, A. (1998). Is introversion a risk factor for suicidal behavior in depression? Psychological Medicine, 28, 1457-1461. Roy, A. (2001). Characteristics of cocaine-dependent patients who attempt suicide. American Journal of Psychiatry, 158, 1215-1219. Roy, A. (2002). Characteristics of opiate dependent patients who attempt suicide. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 63, 403-407. Roy, A. (2003a). Characteristics of drug addicts who attempt suicide. Psychiatry Research, 121, 99-103. Roy, A. (2003b). African American and Caucasian attempters compared for suicide risk factors. Suicide & Life-Threatening Behavior, 33, 443-447.
INDEX A abusive, 176, 178 academic performance, 34, 217, 219, 222 academic success, 208, 219 academic tasks, 220 accidents, 179 accounting, 12, 68, 212 accuracy, 78, 115 achievement, xiii, 6, 9, 25, 27, 34, 35, 172, 173, 183, 184, 188, 192, 193, 194, 212, 215, 217, 220, 222, 223 ACM, 78, 83 activation, 50, 62, 63, 78, 79, 131, 149, 228, 229 acute, 15, 17, 26, 32, 46, 49, 62, 63, 78 acute stress, 15, 17, 32, 62, 63 adaptation, xiii, 25, 183, 222 addiction, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 79, 80, 82, 83, 119 adjustment, 8, 12, 19, 25, 26, 208 administration, xi, 85 administrators, 90 adolescence, xii, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 222 adolescents, 19, 27, 79, 170, 171, 172, 173, 195, 208, 218, 223 adult, xi, xii, 31, 109, 111, 114, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182 adulthood, xii, 14, 21, 80, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182 adults, xii, 8, 21, 28, 169, 172, 173, 174, 178, 179, 180, 181, 236 adverse event, 130 advertising, 176, 178 aesthetics, 6, 9, 60, 80 aetiology, 73 affective disorder, 28 affective reactions, 32 affective states, 228
age, 8, 29, 38, 93, 110, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 128, 133, 134, 146, 157, 161, 166, 167, 172, 181, 208, 230 agents, 87, 91, 218 aggression, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117, 121, 122, 124, 187 aggressiveness, xi, 109 aging, 8, 21, 29, 32, 208, 210 agreeableness, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 71 aid, 53, 92 alcohol, 8, 21, 22, 23, 73, 86, 88, 179, 198, 204, 206, 209 alcohol consumption, 8 alcohol use, 198, 204 alcoholics, 30 algorithm, 208 alpha, 134, 135, 136 altered state, 232 alternative, 16, 23, 33, 67, 86, 89, 90, 132, 149, 200, 201, 227 alternatives, 90, 171 alters, 220 altruism, 6 American Psychiatric Association, 131, 147 American Psychological Association, 35, 126, 128, 165, 166, 194 amygdala, 63, 79 anger, 27, 30, 31, 87, 110, 111, 124, 130, 134, 152, 154, 155, 156, 159, 160, 187 angina, 9 angioplasty, 9 animals, 175 antagonism, 6, 9, 26, 160 antecedents, 77, 212, 218 antibody, 15, 32 antisocial behaviour, 66 antithesis, 49
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Index
anxiety, x, xii, 6, 8, 9, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 35, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 111, 122, 124, 130, 146, 147, 148, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 190, 208, 212, 216, 224, 231, 233 anxiety disorder, 26, 35, 77, 231, 233 APA, 231 appraisals, 25, 28, 29, 30 aptitude, 34, 39 archetype, 39 arcus senilis, 28 argument, 6, 10, 44, 51, 160, 226, 229 arousal, 9, 63, 64, 65, 82, 233 artery, 28 arthritis, 9, 149 ash, 52 aspiration, 67 assault, 90 assaults, 111, 112, 190 assertiveness, 6, 9, 189 assessment, 4, 5, 78, 206, 209, 231, 233 assessment tools, 5 assignment, 67, 202, 227 assimilation, 31 assumptions, 191, 199, 202, 222 asthma, 8, 198 athletes, 216 attachment, 71, 112 attacks, 25, 164 attitudes, 30, 80, 187, 191, 200, 207, 210, 217 attribution, 228 authenticity, 44, 45 authoritarianism, 176, 178, 180 authority, 92, 157, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181 autobiographical memory, 234 automatic processes, 74, 199 automaticity, 74, 77 automatization, 81 autonomic nervous system, 5, 16 autonomy, xii, 11, 12, 131, 169, 172, 174, 212, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223 availability, 227 aversion, 81 avoidance, xiii, 10, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 63, 65, 67, 68, 72, 131, 147, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223 avoidance behavior, 131 avoidant, xiv, 131, 211, 212 awareness, xiii, 45, 63, 74, 89, 90, 197, 199, 208, 228, 229
B back, 40, 41, 43, 44, 49, 50, 55, 75, 76, 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107, 118, 133, 134, 135, 145, 147, 149, 155, 156, 160, 171, 188, 189, 193, 226 barrier, 164 barriers, 89, 91, 207, 227 basketball, 120 Beck Depression Inventory, 68 behavioral effects, 34 behavioral medicine, 3 behavioral sciences, 147 behaviours, x, xi, xiv, 59, 61, 66, 69, 73, 74, 75, 80, 109, 111, 114, 205, 209, 211, 214, 215, 217, 218, 220, 222 beliefs, 124, 170, 173, 178, 181, 184, 190, 191, 193 benefits, 75, 221, 231, 232 benign, 4, 5 betrayal, 117 bias, 8, 17, 29, 201, 203, 205, 209 Big Five personality factors, 32, 130, 198 Big Five traits, 17, 20, 28 bile, 2 binding, 28 binge drinking, 179 biopsychology, 82 bipolar, 185, 189 birth, 3, 120 BIS, 17 blame, 19, 30, 48, 68, 115, 116, 159 blaming, 53 blocks, 203 blog, 70, 81 blogs, 67, 70, 79 blood, 2, 8, 28, 154, 209 blood clot, 28 blood pressure, 154, 209 body image, 217 bonds, 41, 46, 89, 110, 112, 159 borderline, 233 borderline personality disorder, 233 bottom-up, 26 boys, 21 brain, 17, 62, 63, 80, 232 breakfast, 21 breathing, 228, 231 brothers, 54 browser, 68 brutality, 48, 49 buffer, xiv, 211, 220 bullying, 89 burglary, 114
Index burn, 186 burnout, 158, 165 bypass, 9
C cancer, 8, 210 cardiology, 6 cardiovascular disease, 8 caregivers, 17, 28, 29 category a, 115, 116, 203 catharsis, 70 catholic, xi, 85 causal inference, 146 causality, 24, 218, 219, 221, 223 cellular phone, 79 channels, 60 childbirth, 172 childcare, 160 childhood, 117, 118, 119, 174, 178, 181, 207, 229 children, 19, 21, 22, 28, 89, 90, 159, 167, 172 cholesterol, 28 chronic pain, 149, 230 chronic stress, 23, 30, 63 cigarette smoking, 198, 204 cigarettes, 204, 206 classical, 152 classification, 10, 35, 69, 148, 182 classroom, 86, 90 classrooms, 93 clients, xiii, 183 closure, 160, 181 cocaine, 235, 238 codes, 45, 157 coding, 114, 115 coffee, 191 cognition, 32, 36, 51, 77, 185, 191, 192, 199, 201, 202, 208, 221 cognitive ability, 209 cognitive capacity, 199 cognitive effort, 199 cognitive load, 200 cognitive process, 191 cognitive psychology, 210 cognitive style, 16, 30 cognitive therapy, xiii, 133, 183, 184, 190, 194, 231, 232, 233, 234 cohesion, 189 cohort, 33, 210 collaboration, 104 college students, 31, 86, 99, 171, 195, 210, 236, 237 colleges, 86 colors, 50, 149
241
combined effect, 15, 20, 22 commodity, 180 communication, x, 38, 54, 59, 60, 61, 64, 67, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 79, 82, 92, 223 communication technologies, 60, 73, 75, 76 communities, 86, 89, 91 community, 8, 27, 28, 46, 59, 60, 70, 75, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107, 113, 118, 119, 120, 153, 159, 166, 167, 189 community service, 86 compassion, 44, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 135, 188 compensation, xii, 151, 153 competence, 6, 44, 186, 212, 214, 218, 220 competency, 27, 193 competitiveness, 6 compliance, 6, 89, 227 components, 24, 166, 191 comprehension, 51 computer self-efficacy, 78 computer technology, 61 concentration, 226 conception, 170 conceptualization, 6 concordance, 223 concrete, 50, 53 conditioned response, 75 conditioning, 44, 48 condom, 210 Conduct Disorder, 125 confession, 87, 154 confidence, 17, 67, 121, 144, 156 conflict resolution, 87, 90 conformity, xii, 170, 176, 177, 178, 180 confrontation, 160 confusion, xii, xiii, 169, 170, 172, 173, 179, 180, 183 conscientiousness, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 34, 65, 71, 73 conscious awareness, 199 consciousness, 81, 155, 185 consent, 75, 92, 133 conservation, xiv, 211 consolidation, 25, 77 constraints, 69 construct validity, 34, 207, 228, 233 construction, 47, 83, 106, 189, 201 consultants, 14 consumption, 8 continuity, 170 control group, 91 convergence, 18 conviction, xiii, 118, 183, 184, 192 coping strategies, 4, 5, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 63, 65, 72, 75
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Index
coping strategy, 16, 21 coronary artery disease, 28 coronary heart disease, 6, 22, 26, 27, 34 corporations, 59, 88 correlation, 13, 66, 136, 138, 139, 140, 145, 147, 208 correlations, xiii, 11, 12, 13, 24, 68, 136, 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 197, 200, 205 corruption, 53 cortex, 228 cortisol, 15, 32, 63, 198 costs, 177, 221 courts, 91, 187 covering, 157 crack, 116 creativity, 130, 208 credibility, 24 credit, 120, 133, 134 crime, x, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107, 110 crimes, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 94, 95, 97, 107 criminal behavior, 89, 91, 179 criminal justice, x, 85, 86, 90, 91, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 107, 162 criminal justice system, x, 85, 86, 90, 91, 103, 107, 162 criminality, 88, 97 criminals, xi, 85, 87, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 107 critical analysis, 177 criticism, xiii, 3, 52, 174, 183, 185, 186 cross-sectional, 30, 146 cross-sectional study, 30 crown, 52 crying, 160 cues, 64, 75 cultivation, 38, 42, 48, 53, 55, 229 cultural norms, 123, 164 culture, xii, 27, 123, 151, 152, 153, 155, 170, 173, 177, 180 curiosity, 228 cutters, 236 cyberspace, 59 cytokines, 198
D danger, 49, 63, 88, 131, 145, 158, 171 dangerousness, 162 database, 157, 163 death, 8, 116, 179, 182 debt, 72 decay, 56 decision making, 16, 64, 80
decisions, xii, 169, 172, 175, 177, 178, 179 decoding, 60 defects, 45 defence, xi, 109 defendants, 92 defense, x, 37, 170, 171, 173 defense mechanisms, 173 deficiency, 77 deficit, 16 definition, 4, 40, 154, 171, 231 degradation, 91 delinquency, 88 demand characteristic, 209 dementia, 29, 157 democracy, 185 demographic characteristics, 9 demoralization, 5 denial, 19 dependent variable, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142 depreciation, 48 depressed, 2, 159, 160, 162, 179, 229, 230, 232, 234, 236 depression, x, xii, xiii, xiv, 6, 8, 19, 25, 59, 62, 65, 66, 69, 71, 78, 82, 130, 146, 147, 148, 151, 153, 158, 161, 162, 165, 166, 167, 171, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 190, 192, 195, 208, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 238 depressive symptoms, 22, 28, 195, 232 deregulation, 5, 16 detection, 203, 207 detention, 90 deterrence, 87, 89, 94, 97, 107 diabetes, 9 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 10, 35, 131 diet, 21 differential treatment, 231 differentiation, 43 diffusion, 172, 179 digital divide, 75 dignity, 45, 48, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 110, 112, 113, 152, 153 disabilities, 19, 28 disability, 206 disabled, 162, 163 disappointment, 116 disaster, 190 discipline, x, 3, 6, 37, 95, 97, 187 disclosure, 82, 148, 166 discomfort, 24 discounting, 191 discrimination, 112, 121, 124, 201, 202, 203 discrimination tasks, 202
Index disease model, 73 disease progression, 9, 29 diseases, 7 disequilibrium, 49 disinhibition, 69, 82 disorder, 9, 26, 35, 83, 221 disposition, 8, 35, 38, 43, 184 dissociation, 199, 201, 206 distortions, 190, 202 distraction, 18 distress, 4, 7, 14, 15, 19, 20, 23, 25, 34, 35, 65, 70, 82, 230 divergence, 205 diversity, 49, 172 division, 130 divorce, 22, 117 doctors, 27 domestic violence, 89 dominance, 113 double jeopardy, 175 dream, 222 drinking, 21, 86, 179, 182, 204, 206 drug abuse, 22 drug addict, 114, 118, 119, 121, 238 drug addiction, 114, 118, 119, 121 drug use, 23, 179 drug-related, 114 drugs, 73, 86, 116, 118, 119, 179 drunk driving, 22, 104 DSM, ix, 1, 2, 10, 27, 33, 35, 130 dualism, 2 due process, 87 duration, 4 duties, 53 dynamical system, 223 dynamical systems, 223 dysphoria, 229 dysregulated, 230 dysthymia, 237
E ears, 50, 57 earth, 50, 53 eating, x, 21, 37, 221 ecological, 33 ecology, 29 education, 1, 33, 34, 93, 98, 104, 105, 221, 223, 224 educational research, 222 ego, xi, 109, 111, 112, 121, 122, 170, 171, 172, 178, 179, 180, 182, 212 ego strength, 179 elderly, 7, 206
243
elders, 51, 54, 171 emotion, xiii, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 32, 54, 64, 65, 75, 80, 83, 110, 123, 136, 146, 148, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 167, 210, 211, 212, 220 emotion regulation, 148 emotional conflict, 62 emotional distress, 10, 14, 18, 21, 27, 72, 186 emotional experience, 130, 149, 154, 223 emotional intelligence, xi, 64, 80, 129, 130, 133, 138, 143, 144, 148, 149, 209 emotional processes, 152, 163, 164, 229 emotional reactions, xiv, 158, 211 emotional responses, 32, 64 emotional stability, 12, 23, 201, 202 emotional state, 35, 136, 153, 160 emotionality, 7, 9, 18, 21, 22, 24, 62 empathy, 133, 135, 140, 142, 144 employment, 33, 38, 50, 57, 89, 91, 92, 118, 121, 162, 209 empowerment, 83 encoding, 60, 208, 229, 232 endurance, 20 energy, 135, 171, 185 engagement, 23, 29, 82, 87, 205, 206, 212, 213, 217, 218 entertainment, 66 enthusiasm, 130, 145 entrapment, 165 environment, 5, 34, 66, 67, 86, 111, 113, 118, 212, 216, 219 environmental factors, 145 environmental stimuli, 229 epidemiology, 3 epigenetic, xii, 169 equality, 185 equilibrium, 4, 41, 152 equity, 53 ergonomics, 60 ester, 236 ethical standards, 47 ethics, 43, 47, 53, 54, 174, 178, 180, 181 ethnic groups, 147, 200 ethnicity, 133, 134 etiology, 5, 13 evil, x, 37, 38 evolution, 25, 209 excitation, 62, 64 exclusion, 74, 112, 121, 124 excuse, 78, 79, 110 execution, 46, 48 exercise, 21, 23, 192, 198, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 217, 221, 222, 233 existentialism, 56, 182
244
Index
experimental condition, 227 exploitation, 113 exposure, ix, 1, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 34, 45, 62, 63, 78, 118, 229 expressivity, 38, 40 external environment, 228 external validation, 112, 122, 123 extraversion, xi, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 33, 35, 36, 62, 64, 66, 71, 81, 129, 131, 132, 138, 140, 143, 144, 148, 210, 237 extrinsic motivation, 212, 214, 220 extrinsic rewards, 221 eye contact, 159 eyes, xii, 38, 50, 151, 152, 153, 154, 160, 170, 173
foreclosure, 172 forgiveness, 88, 188 fragility, 217 framing, 219, 223 franchise, 60 free choice, 180 free will, 171 freedom, xii, 169, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182 freedom of choice, 178 freedoms, 174 friendship, 70, 113 friendship networks, 113 frustration, 30, 56, 118, 170, 190 fulfillment, 184 functional magnetic resonance imaging, 62
F fabric, 46 facilitators, 86 factor analysis, 12, 228 failure, 35, 119, 153, 154, 156, 158, 160, 170, 184, 186, 191, 192, 193, 212, 214, 216, 217, 219, 222, 223 faith, x, 37, 87, 119, 121, 124, 160, 171 familial, 9 family, 14, 25, 39, 46, 67, 71, 72, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 112, 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 152, 153, 154, 162, 174, 184, 192 family conflict, 14, 25 family environment, 89, 117, 120, 174 family life, 116 family members, 88, 120, 152 family relationships, 112 fatigue, 161 fear, 46, 55, 63, 80, 87, 89, 90, 112, 130, 134, 152, 154, 155, 160, 174 fear response, 63 feedback, 24, 60, 122, 212, 215 feet, 50 females, 38, 68, 70, 93, 99, 100, 102, 103, 147 fidelity, 172 financial problems, 163 fire, 44, 48 firms, 88 first-time, 235 five-factor model, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 81, 207, 208, 228, 233 flavor, 38 flooding, 49 flow, 184, 191 focusing, 24, 111, 122, 131, 145, 218, 226 food, x, 37, 39, 41, 43, 52
G gallbladder, 9 gambling, 73, 79, 82 games, 81 gangs, 113 gender, 8, 21, 93, 95, 102, 222 genealogy, 38, 40, 50 generalization, 193, 229 generativity, 172, 181 genetics, 16, 36 genotype, 24 genre, 79 girls, 21 glasses, 149 goal-directed, 20, 212, 215 goals, x, 4, 17, 27, 35, 61, 85, 147, 188, 189, 193, 200, 201, 212, 213, 214, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223 goodness of fit, 28 gossip, 87, 88, 186 government, 60, 76, 79, 80, 82, 176 government intervention, 76 grades, 216, 219 greed, 96, 99 grief, 156, 159 groups, x, 59, 68, 76, 77, 87, 88, 113, 146, 147, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 172, 178, 192, 200, 236 growth, 4, 11, 12, 13, 54, 147, 195, 212 guidelines, 75, 136 guilt, xiii, 62, 86, 88, 91, 92, 130, 134, 155, 158, 183, 184, 188, 195, 213, 221, 222, 223, 224 guilt feelings, 62, 184 guilty, 186, 188
Index
H handling, 40 hands, 40, 43, 50, 178 happiness, 12, 29, 33, 52, 78, 154 harassment, 114 harm, x, 4, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 107, 114, 187, 190, 237 harmony, 190 hate, 116 healing, 91, 92, 185, 187, 190 health behaviors, 29 health care system, 159 health effects, 166 health problems, 9, 24, 26, 29, 130, 179, 204 health psychology, 30, 31, 33 health status, ix, 1, 7, 8, 30 health-promoting behaviors, 205 heart, 6, 9, 22, 26, 27, 34, 57, 62, 63, 198 heart disease, 6, 22, 198 heart failure, 9 heart rate, 62, 63 hedonic, ix, 1, 11, 33 helplessness, 24 heredity, 17 heterogeneous, 10, 24 high blood pressure, 8 high pressure, 16 high risk, 90 high school, 216, 223, 236 high scores, 9, 62 higher quality, 213 HIV, 9, 29, 210 holistic, 91 holistic approach, 91 honesty, 187 Hong Kong, 105, 106 hormone, 31 hospital, 159 host, 50 hostility, 6, 11, 19, 27, 31, 91, 170, 176, 177 housing, 89, 91, 118, 162 human, x, xi, 33, 37, 38, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 55, 56, 57, 60, 80, 82, 83, 129, 130, 131, 144, 145, 148, 151, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 184, 193, 195, 209 human condition, 175 human development, 55 human dignity, 47 human experience, xi, 129, 131, 145, 174 human information processing, 60, 82 human nature, 44, 174 human will, 44, 49
245
humane, 44, 92 humanity, xii, 169 humans, 44, 46, 47, 55, 56, 170, 175, 177 humiliation, xii, 40, 41, 45, 55, 110, 112, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 164, 165 husband, 41, 116, 176 hypertension, 198, 208 hypochondriasis, 8 hypocrisy, 187 hypothalamus, 62 hypothesis, 8, 16, 28, 133, 138, 140, 142, 143, 215
I ice, 48 identification, 15, 171, 178, 189 identity, xi, xii, 46, 53, 69, 71, 82, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 188 identity achievement, 172 identity diffusion, 179 identity foreclosure, 178 identity moratorium, 172 ideology, 171 imagery, 110 images, 191 imagination, 154 imaging, 62 imaging techniques, 62 immigrants, 163 immune function, 232 immune system, 5, 15, 209 impairments, 78 implicit association test, 207, 208 imprisonment, 112, 119, 125 impulsive, 204, 210 impulsiveness, 6, 11 impulsivity, 11, 74, 77 in situ, 51, 64 incarceration, 87 incentive, 214 incidence, xiv, 27, 28, 225, 229 inclusion, 167 incompatibility, 214 indecisiveness, 19 independence, 174 indication, 218 indicators, xi, 68, 113, 129, 159, 172 indices, 201 indirect measure, 199 individual differences, 8, 17, 22, 208, 218, 222 individuality, 175, 176, 177, 180, 181
246
Index
individualization, 180, 182 induction, 231 industrialized societies, 172, 174 inequality, 163, 164 inertia, 34, 210 infancy, 11 inferences, 64 inferiority, xiii, 110, 156, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192 inflammatory, 198 information and communication technologies, 60, 73, 75 information processing, 60, 63, 64 Information Technology, 79 informed consent, 133 ingestive behavior, 80 inherited, 45, 50 inhibition, 64, 131, 212 inhuman, 44, 46 initiation, 4, 218 inmates, 87, 88 insecurity, 122, 123, 175 insight, 221, 226 inspectors, 89 inspiration, 56, 161 instability, 62, 172, 217 institutions, 117, 118, 157 instruction, 200, 203 instruments, 31, 65 insults, 113 integration, xii, 10, 43, 50, 64, 70, 136, 169, 210 integrity, 41, 46, 48, 49, 170, 188, 209 intelligence, 31, 64, 80, 91, 133, 148, 233 intentions, 72, 92 interaction, 23, 27, 40, 60, 61, 66, 67, 71, 73, 77, 87, 88, 92, 204, 226 interaction effect, 88 interactions, 25, 67, 69, 71, 72, 81, 121, 122, 131, 219 interface, 69 internal value, 50 internalised, 213 internalization, 190, 194, 221, 222, 223 internalizing, 148 international students, 14, 27 internet, x, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83 interpersonal conflict, 14, 34 interpersonal relations, 12, 89, 91, 212 interpersonal relationships, 89, 91, 212 interrelations, 56 intervention, ix, xiii, 1, 23, 24, 76, 90, 124, 145, 183, 185, 221, 231
intervention strategies, ix, 1, 23 interview, 57, 110, 114, 159 intimacy, xii, 169, 172, 173, 178, 181, 187 intimidation, 157 intrinsic, 44, 48, 50, 57, 212, 214, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223 intrinsic motivation, 213, 214, 216, 217, 220, 221 intrinsic value, 48, 214, 219 introspection, 199, 200 introversion, 21, 23, 68, 69, 238 introvert, 77 invasive, 49 inventories, 201, 235 irrationality, 62, 65, 68 irritability, 6, 25 isolation, 66, 67, 90, 144, 175, 176, 177, 181
J job performance, 6, 29 job satisfaction, 6, 11, 25, 30 jobs, 16, 163, 190 judge, 51 jurisdiction, 46 justice, x, xi, 80, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 186, 187, 188 justification, 110 juveniles, 88, 103
L labeling, 86, 87, 89, 232 land, 39 language, 27, 38, 43, 44, 47, 54, 89, 110, 154, 186, 228 latency, 171 law, 17, 74, 81, 86, 87, 89, 160, 185 law enforcement, 87 leadership, 193 learning, 54, 73, 80, 192, 213, 217, 221, 222, 223 learning process, 223 leg, 90 legislation, 60 leisure, 66, 217, 222 liberation, 185 life course, xii, 169, 175, 178, 179, 180 life cycle, 182 life experiences, 114, 170 life satisfaction, 11 life stressors, 172 lift, 192
Index likelihood, 4, 5, 8, 88, 110, 219, 227 limbic system, 62 limitations, xi, 10, 24, 30, 109, 145, 146, 188 linguistic, 43, 186 links, 110, 198, 203, 209, 210, 233 listening, 46, 117 liver disease, 9 living arrangements, 172 local community, 153 location, x, 37, 146 locus, 32, 34, 189, 218, 223 logging, 76 loneliness, 66, 67, 68, 69, 77, 80, 82, 175, 177 long period, 200 longevity, ix, 1, 3, 198, 207 longitudinal study, 21, 31 love, xii, 47, 54, 118, 155, 169, 170, 173, 175, 176, 178, 181, 184, 186, 188, 192 lung, 8 lung cancer, 8 lying, 117, 153
M magnetic resonance imaging, 62 mainstream, 92 maintenance, 186, 190, 221, 228 major depression, 29, 231, 233 maladaptive, ix, xiii, 1, 4, 10, 11, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 34, 64, 68, 91, 211, 212, 215, 216, 219, 220 males, 38, 66, 70, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 102, 147 malicious, 186 management, 18, 73, 86, 90, 157, 209 manipulation, 113 manslaughter, 114 marital quality, 29 market, 60, 69 marketing, 83, 180 marriage, 172 masculinity, xi, 109, 113, 123, 124 mask, 177 mastery, 11, 12, 13, 29, 41, 149, 212, 217, 220, 222 materialism, 180 mathematicians, 147 mathematics, 186 meanings, 33 measurement, xiii, 32, 33, 65, 81, 197, 199, 205, 206, 207, 209, 232, 237 media, 79, 83, 87, 88, 90 median, 172 mediation, 31, 32, 86, 87, 88, 90, 103, 208, 217 mediators, 8, 146, 209
247
medical school, 15, 34 medication, 230 meditation, xiv, 145, 225, 226, 227, 228, 230, 232, 233 melancholic, 2 membership, 10 memory, 63, 77, 78, 80, 117, 199, 200, 210, 229, 234 memory performance, 78 men, 7, 77, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 156, 159, 162, 188, 208 mental disorder, 9, 147 mental health, ix, 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 24, 164, 188, 198 mental illness, 162, 164, 165 mental state, 11 messages, x, 59, 60, 68, 70, 75 meta-analysis, 10, 11, 20, 26, 27, 62, 78, 200, 201, 208, 227, 232 metaphor, 48 middle class, 174 middle-aged, 27 midlife, 33 migraine, 8 migration, 167 mind-body, 2 minorities, 174 minority, 120, 146, 162, 184 minority groups, 162 minority students, 146 mirror, 170, 190 mobile phone, 60, 66, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 81, 82 mobility, 87 models, 3, 5, 10, 11, 13, 15, 21, 22, 30, 35, 60, 62, 73, 74, 82, 148, 164, 200, 201, 210 moderates, 15, 16, 18, 21, 200, 220 moderators, 26, 30, 31, 32 modern society, xii, 151, 155, 156, 177 money, 120, 185 mood, 4, 9, 15, 24, 26, 29, 30, 31, 34, 43, 62, 66, 82, 135, 140, 143, 160, 195, 209, 210, 229, 231 mood change, 160 mood disorder, 62, 66 moral code, 51 moral standards, 44, 45 morality, x, 37, 50, 53 morals, 38, 47, 174 moratorium, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 179, 181 morbidity, 210 morning, 120, 191, 192 mortality, ix, 1, 7, 8, 22, 33, 36, 175, 198, 208, 210 motion, 54, 147
248
Index
motivation, xiii, 27, 80, 83, 114, 147, 148, 199, 200, 207, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 230 motives, 45, 47, 207, 212, 215, 217 mouth, 57 movement, 6, 40, 130, 131, 132, 144, 145, 146 multidimensional, 27, 32, 184 multiple regression, 12, 133, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 147, 204 multiple regression analyses, 133, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 204 multiple regression analysis, 12 multiples, 49 muscle, 154 mutual respect, 92 myocardial infarction, 9, 26, 148
N naloxone, 31 narcissism, 195 narcissistic, xiii, 183, 184 narcissistic personality disorder, xiii, 183 narratives, xi, 109, 114, 117, 119, 120, 121, 124 nation, x, 85 National Youth Survey, 88 Native American, 133, 134, 146 natural, 44, 54, 56, 154, 192, 221 natural science, 221 neck, 8, 154 negative affectivity, 7, 14, 31, 34, 35, 68, 69, 75 negative consequences, 72, 88, 154, 216 negative coping, 65 negative emotions, 148, 212, 214, 216, 220 negative experiences, 121 negative mood, 24, 195 negative outcomes, 17, 130, 131, 132, 145, 146, 213, 219 negative relation, 14, 144 negativity, 148 neglect, 145, 178 negotiating, 187 nerve, 122 nervousness, 159 neural systems, 131 neuroendocrine, 5 neuropsychology, 148 neurotic, x, 16, 24, 34, 59, 62, 64, 65, 66, 71, 72, 75, 76, 145, 149, 171, 172, 173, 176, 178, 180, 181, 199, 203, 205, 228, 235, 237 next generation, 210 non-clinical, 10, 19 nonverbal, 166
normal, 7, 9, 69, 74, 92, 154, 184, 235, 236 normal conditions, 74 norms, xi, 23, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 53, 89, 109, 112, 113, 121, 122, 123, 124, 152, 155, 164, 170, 176, 180 nurse, 160 nursing home, 89 nuts, 165
O obese, 158 objectification, 157 obligation, 23 observations, 67, 159 obsessive-compulsive, 178 occupational, 8, 14, 17, 19, 25, 28, 30, 32, 33, 88, 92, 170, 171, 172, 173, 181 oceans, 44 odds ratio, 9 offenders, xi, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 124 old age, 29 omission, 53 openness, 2, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 23, 25, 29, 70, 187 openness to experience, 70 opiates, 235 optimism, xi, 21, 30, 31, 129, 130, 132, 133, 139, 140, 143, 144, 149, 181, 209 optimists, 187 organic disease, 3, 8 organism, 61 organizational justice, 80 orientation, 152, 172, 180, 214, 218, 219, 220, 222 outpatient, 232 overeating, 73
P pain, 8, 24, 149, 230, 232 pairing, 202 paradox, 80, 154 paradoxical, 155 paralysis, 3 parental control, 174 parenting, 92, 189, 190 parents, xii, 19, 28, 42, 87, 88, 89, 90, 112, 116, 117, 118, 160, 169, 171, 172, 174, 178, 221 passive, 20, 21, 187 path model, 22 pathology, 5, 24
Index pathways, 11, 16, 22, 24, 132, 210 patients, 9, 10, 14, 22, 26, 31, 68, 159, 162, 229, 230, 232, 234, 235, 236, 238 peer group, 113 peers, 86, 87, 88, 111, 112, 113, 114, 123, 124 penalty, 202 perceived control, 17, 25 percentile, 8 perception, 3, 7, 16, 28, 54, 56, 60, 80, 110, 112, 123, 219 perceptions, x, xi, 85, 92, 95, 97, 99, 124, 162, 217, 229 perfectionism, xiii, 66, 183, 184, 185, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195 perseverance, 74 personal goals, 27, 35 personal identity, 170, 171, 177, 180, 184 personality characteristics, xi, 129, 131, 132, 144, 146, 200 personality constructs, 11, 131 personality dimensions, 10, 29, 33, 62, 64, 65, 209 personality disorder, ix, 1, 2, 9, 10, 33, 35, 236 personality factors, 66, 71, 206 personality inventories, 201 personality measures, 3, 65, 146, 200, 201, 205, 206, 225, 227, 230 personality test, 201, 207 personality traits, xiv, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 66, 185, 187, 198, 206, 209, 215, 225, 226, 228, 230, 232 personality type, 2, 15, 20, 23, 35, 64 personhood, 184, 187 pessimism, 22, 24, 209 pessimists, 187 pharmacotherapy, 231 phenomenology, 74, 75 phenotypic, 28 philosophers, 38 philosophical, 42 philosophy, 2, 44, 49, 58, 175, 188, 194 phlegm, 2 phone, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 78, 81, 82 physical activity, 8, 21, 217, 222 physical attractiveness, 77 physical education, 222 physical health, xiii, 7, 34, 130, 144, 145, 146, 197 physical well-being, 27, 198 physiological, 3, 4, 5, 15, 18, 23, 26, 34, 62, 63, 76, 78, 198, 232 physiological arousal, 3, 4, 5, 15, 23 physiology, 3 pilot studies, 92 pilot study, 149
249
plague, 194 planning, 19, 20 play, ix, 1, 8, 13, 22, 46, 116, 120, 131, 152, 205, 218 police, 15, 30, 86, 90, 91, 92 politics, 82 poor, 15, 16, 19, 22, 68, 75, 162, 163, 215, 216 poor health, 16 poor performance, 68 population, 2, 8, 9, 11, 27, 28, 36, 86, 99, 123, 148, 157, 161, 164, 167, 226, 227, 230, 232 positive correlation, 68, 138, 139, 140, 200 positive emotions, 6, 148, 149, 220 positive relation, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 131, 143, 190 post-traumatic stress disorder, 9 poverty, 52 power, x, 15, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 90, 111, 113, 121, 144, 145, 146, 147, 157, 163, 176, 192, 205, 209, 227 powers, 41, 44, 48 pre-adolescents, 223 prediction, 12, 82, 209 predictive validity, 3 predictors, 11, 21, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 69, 71, 75, 77, 78, 79, 82, 132, 138, 139, 141, 143, 144, 145, 148, 198, 204, 206, 208, 217 pre-existing, 203 preference, 67, 70, 72 prefrontal cortex, 228 pregnant, 160 press, 217, 222 pressure, 8, 16, 68, 122, 154, 155, 158, 164, 180, 200, 209, 217 prevention, 23, 91, 233 prior knowledge, 93 prison environment, 113, 123 prisoners, xi, 87, 91, 92, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 122, 123 prisons, xi, 85, 88, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 107, 113, 123 privacy, 60, 83 probe, 35 problem drinkers, 30 problem solving, 19, 20, 63, 64, 65, 67, 90, 130 problem-focused coping, 6, 19, 20, 23 procrastination, 65, 67, 72, 75, 76, 77, 80, 217, 223 production, 198 productivity, 67, 175 prognosis, 22, 73, 148 program, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 222, 228 projective test, 199 proposition, 76, 204 propriety, 42, 43, 46, 49, 50, 53
250
Index
protection, 45, 47, 50 prototype, x, 37 proxy, 30 pseudo, 177, 180, 181 psychiatric diagnosis, 162 psychiatric disorder, 27 psychiatric patients, 9, 162, 236 psychological distress, xiii, 14, 23, 31, 32, 70, 183, 194, 230 psychological functions, 189 psychological health, 130, 181 psychological problems, 165, 212 psychological stress, 2, 3, 26 psychological variables, 117 psychological well-being, xiv, 11, 12, 13, 28, 33, 67, 70, 71, 80, 130, 146, 147, 148, 179, 211, 213, 231 psychology, 3, 5, 31, 36, 77, 81, 83, 130, 131, 132, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 194, 199, 201, 221, 222, 232 psychometric properties, 222, 228, 230 psychopathology, 11, 23, 25, 130, 166, 179, 182 psychopharmacology, 215 psychophysics, 207 psychophysiology, 148 psychosocial development, 170, 173 psychosocial factors, 13, 26, 78 psychosomatic, 3, 30 psychotherapy, 33, 182, 231 psychoticism, xiv, 21, 62, 235, 236, 237 psychotropic drug, 78 public, 45, 53, 54, 60, 76, 89, 90, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 107, 114, 120, 156, 157, 162, 167, 191, 195 public awareness, 89, 90 public health, 167 punishment, x, xi, 17, 39, 85, 86, 89, 91, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107, 155, 213 punitive, xi, 85, 90, 102 pupils, 216, 222
Q qualifications, 114, 118 quality assurance, 75 quality of life, 11, 208 quantitative research, 222 questionnaire, 80, 93, 94, 114, 117, 134, 226, 232 quizzes, 79
R race, 55, 162
random, 3, 49, 114 range, ix, 1, 8, 9, 20, 23, 24, 45, 50, 57, 63, 198, 200, 206, 212, 215, 229 rape, 90 rash, 187 ratings, 198, 204 rationality, 50, 56 reaction formation, 176 reaction time, 64, 78, 203 reactivity, ix, 1, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, 32, 34, 60, 62, 64, 210 reality, 68, 181 reasoning, 158, 204 recall, 8, 16, 121, 208, 229 recalling, 119 recidivism, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92 recidivism rate, 86 recognition, 52, 120, 156, 159 reconcile, 22, 92 reconciliation, xii, 151, 152, 153, 189 recovery, 9, 15, 24, 62, 164, 220 recreation, 73 recreational, 66, 72 recurrence, 233 recycling, 218, 222 reference frame, 46 refining, 42, 43, 144 reflection, 153, 178 regional, 113 regression, xi, 12, 117, 129, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143 regression analysis, 12, 117 regression equation, 143 regular, 23, 70, 78, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 107, 189, 198, 204, 205, 206, 231, 233 regulation, xiii, 6, 19, 22, 65, 75, 80, 82, 104, 148, 190, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 231 regulations, 89, 156, 213, 215, 218, 220 regulators, 27 rehabilitate, xi, 85, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107 rehabilitation, 88, 92 reinforcement, 8, 33, 61, 74, 79, 81 reinforcement history, 61 reinforcers, 61 rejection, 112, 124, 174 relapse, 228, 229, 230, 233 relationships, 31, 57, 61, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 78, 83, 89, 90, 91, 112, 113, 118, 124, 131, 136, 144, 148, 163, 187, 193, 200, 213, 220, 221, 223 relatives, 54, 152, 159 relaxation, 21
Index relevance, 60, 66, 69, 88, 212 religion, 20, 148 religiosity, 32, 136 remission, 9 repair, 53, 86, 135, 140, 143, 148, 154 reputation, xii, 113, 151 resentment, 22 reservation, 158, 203 residential, 87, 89, 172 resilience, xi, 34, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 149, 220 resistance, 23 resolution, 87, 90, 171 resources, 4, 5, 18, 26, 44, 48, 67, 70, 75, 89, 133, 163, 164 respiratory, 8 response time, 202 responsibilities, xii, 116, 169, 172, 173 restitution, 86 restructuring, 20 retaliation, 113, 122, 123 retention, 230 retribution, 86, 153 returns, 53 rewards, 213 righteousness, 185 rigidity, 64 risk behaviors, 31, 210 risk factors, 11, 28, 30, 167, 238 risk perception, 80 risks, 22, 35, 79, 90, 163, 180, 222 risk-taking, 179, 204 robbery, 114 role conflict, 33 routines, 74 rumination, 229, 233
S sabotage, 65 sacred, 124, 233 sadism, 176 sadness, 52, 154, 159, 160, 229 safeguard, 47, 48, 57 safety, 71, 171 sales, 25 sample, 27, 28, 31, 35, 36, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 132, 133, 134, 136, 204, 210, 227, 233, 235, 236 sampling, 114 sanctions, 86, 89, 104 satisfaction, 6, 11, 25, 30, 70, 159, 212, 213, 215, 223
251
school, 15, 17, 34, 80, 86, 87, 90, 114, 116, 159, 160, 167, 172, 184, 188, 216, 221, 223, 236 school climate, 90 scores, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 24, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 71, 117, 145, 201, 227, 229, 235, 236 search, 76, 82, 147, 170, 171, 172, 195, 226 search engine, 76 searches, 170 searching, 52, 179 secret, 153, 227 security, 71, 111, 117, 118, 120, 121, 175, 176, 177, 180 sedation, 19 segregation, 113 selective attention, 17 self esteem, x, 59, 71, 72, 73, 112 self image, 158 self-accusation, 45 self-actualization, 12 self-assessment, 206 self-awareness, 45 self-care, 21 self-concept, 7, 24, 90, 206, 219, 233 self-confidence, 192 self-consciousness, 6, 228 self-destructive behavior, 179, 181 self-determination theory, xiii, 211, 212, 221, 223 self-discipline, 6, 20 self-efficacy, 16, 22, 24, 67, 220 self-esteem, x, 18, 30, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 75, 78, 89, 122, 149, 179, 180, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192, 200, 208, 209, 220 self-expression, 22 self-identity, 71, 72, 124 self-image, 113, 156, 170 self-monitoring, 77 self-organization, 223 self-perceptions, 32, 208 self-presentation, x, 59, 66, 67, 69, 70, 76, 200 self-reflection, 212 self-regulation, 6, 75, 80, 82, 212, 215, 216, 221, 223 self-report, xiii, 7, 8, 16, 17, 18, 63, 65, 71, 81, 114, 117, 133, 134, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 204, 205, 208, 230, 231, 232 self-reports, xiii, 197, 199, 200, 201, 205 self-worth, 45, 46, 112, 122, 123, 124, 180, 184, 189, 192, 194, 213, 216, 218, 219, 221 semantic, 43 semi-structured interviews, 114 sensation, 8, 47, 74, 226 sensation seeking, 74 sensing, 54 sensitivity, 8, 16, 17, 33, 46, 47, 54, 57
252 sentences, 114 sentencing, 90, 91, 103 separation, xii, 169, 178 September 11, 25 series, 30, 32 serotonin, 28 services, 75, 80, 136 severity, 9 sex, x, 37, 38, 56, 73, 79, 89, 90, 105, 210 sex offenders, 89, 90, 105 sexual abuse, 92 sexual assault, 90 sexual behavior, 22 sexual behaviour, 210 sexual orientation, 162 sexuality, 38, 39 shape, x, 37, 175 shaping, 191 sheep, x, 37, 40, 42 shock, 63, 116 shortage, 44 short-term, 19, 216, 218, 221 shoulders, 154 shy, 45, 56, 66, 67, 72, 76, 79, 82, 206 shyness, x, 10, 38, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 72, 153 signal detection theory, 203 signals, 78 similarity, 9 sites, 66, 68, 69, 70, 75, 80 skill acquisition, 81 skills, 24, 29, 67, 79, 81, 87, 90, 91, 92, 114, 133, 136, 138, 143, 170, 193, 230, 231 skills training, 230 smoke, 204 smoking, 8, 21, 22, 121, 198, 204, 206, 207 SMS, x, 59, 64, 66, 70, 71, 81 sobriety, 193 sociability, 67 social anxiety, x, 59, 67, 68, 76, 77 social behavior, 66, 83, 91, 210 social capital, 113 social care, 157 social class, 8 social cognition, 77, 206, 208 social context, 174 social control, 87, 88, 89, 91, 158 social desirability, xiii, 197, 201, 209 social environment, 111 social events, 218 social exclusion, 89, 167 social hierarchy, 113, 156 social influence, 81 social influences, 81
Index social integration, 70 social isolation, 67 social life, 154 social movements, 167 social norms, 89, 112, 123, 155, 180 social order, 56 social organization, 127 social policy, 167 social psychology, 81, 166, 206, 207, 209 social regulation, 22 social relations, 66, 67, 70, 78 social relationships, 66, 67, 70, 78 social resources, 163 social roles, 171 social sciences, 33, 103 social skills, 67, 133, 136, 138, 143 social standing, 163 social status, 110, 113, 121, 122, 156, 162, 163, 164 social stress, 163 social structure, 155 social support, 20, 22, 36, 70 social welfare, 163 socialization, 17, 89 socioeconomic status, 209 sociological, 164 sociologist, 152, 155, 161 sociology, 3, 93, 165, 167 solidarity, 113 sorting, 202 spectrum, 69 speculation, 229 speech, 6, 17, 47, 51, 55, 57 speed, 78 spiritual, 34, 45, 55, 136, 186, 187, 195 spirituality, xi, 129, 130, 133, 136, 138, 144, 186 sporadic, 5 sports, 87, 186, 216, 221 spouse, 28 springs, 38, 49, 55 stability, 12, 19, 23, 29, 32, 35, 117, 118, 121, 178, 180, 201, 202 stages, 60 standard deviation, 8, 114 standards, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 89, 188, 192, 216 statistics, 136, 138, 140 stereotypes, 8, 208 stereotypical, 162 stigma, xi, 85, 87, 89, 92, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 107, 115, 118, 161, 162, 164, 165 stigmatization, 157, 164 stigmatized, 87, 167 stimulus, 4, 64, 74, 199, 226 stochastic, 31
Index stomach, 9, 158 storage, 75 strain, 3, 5, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 28, 32, 158, 184 strains, 34 strategies, ix, xiii, 1, 4, 5, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 63, 65, 72, 75, 172, 173, 183, 194, 219, 220 stratified sampling, 114 strength, 79, 113, 121, 148, 152, 153, 176, 179, 180, 203 stressful events, 2, 15, 16, 18, 23, 28, 134, 145 stressful life events, 14 stressors, ix, 1, 2, 13, 14, 15, 17, 21, 24, 25, 30, 31, 32, 34, 172, 229 stress-related, 3, 5, 16 stroke, 8 strokes, 40 students, xi, 14, 17, 19, 22, 27, 31, 34, 35, 67, 68, 80, 82, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 129, 132, 133, 134, 146, 156, 171, 195, 200, 210, 212, 215, 219, 220, 222, 223, 236, 237 subjective, ix, 1, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 19, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 149, 198, 204, 208, 221, 223, 230, 232 subjective experience, 8 subjective well-being, 11, 12, 13, 19, 27, 34, 35, 149, 221, 223, 232 substance abuse, 22, 179, 182 substance use, 19, 20, 21, 23, 179, 206, 208 substances, 50, 56, 205 substitution, 20 substrates, 147 suburban, 92 suffering, 47, 56, 115, 116, 158, 159, 194 suicidal, xiv, 235, 236, 237, 238 suicidal behavior, xiv, 235, 237, 238 suicidal ideation, 236 suicide, 235, 236, 238 suicide attempts, 236 superego, 184 suppression, 19, 63, 154, 177 surgery, 9 surgical, 236 survivors, 88 susceptibility, 3, 16, 22, 35, 148 swimmers, 216 sympathy, 135 symptoms, 3, 7, 8, 9, 22, 28, 29, 30, 36, 130, 146, 162, 171, 178, 180, 195, 198, 207, 208, 229, 232 syndrome, 77, 161, 164
T tangible, 213
253
targets, 132, 203 task demands, 63 task performance, 63 taste, x, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 54, 56 taxes, 88 taxonomic, 79, 147 taxonomy, 228, 232 taxpayers, 88 teachers, 90, 160 teaching, x, 37, 221 teens, 172, 181 telephone, 191 television, 73, 79 temperament, 11 tension, 4, 8, 18, 23, 62, 72, 154 territory, 45 terrorist attack, 25 testimony, 144 text messaging, 70, 81 theology, 195 therapeutic interventions, 229 therapy, 77, 184, 190, 194, 195, 231 think critically, 181 thinking, x, 16, 19, 20, 24, 37, 38, 52, 74, 116, 124, 136, 177, 178, 184, 188, 191, 193, 229 threat, 4, 5, 17, 34, 63, 64, 76, 88, 89, 114, 158, 159, 160, 164, 217 threatened, 30, 110, 155, 177 threatening, 4, 17, 24, 79, 112, 113, 119, 229, 236 threats, 18, 67, 104, 110, 111, 112, 113, 121, 122, 124, 158 threshold, 16, 155 time frame, 91 time pressure, 68, 200 tolerance, 228 top-down, 24, 26 toughness, 113, 121, 122, 123, 124 toxic, ix, 1, 6, 164, 165, 184 toxic effect, ix, 1 tradition, 3, 38, 39, 42, 49, 55, 77, 232 training, 15, 91, 230, 231, 233 trait anxiety, 7, 149, 209 traits, ix, x, xiv, 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23, 25, 34, 35, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 72, 73, 74, 76, 162, 184, 185, 187, 201, 208, 231, 235 trajectory, 31 transactions, 76 transference, 190 transformation, 41, 50, 110 transgression, 115, 186 transition, 25, 179 transition to adulthood, 179
254
Index
translation, 24, 38, 60 transmission, 60 trauma, 90 trial, 119, 202, 203, 231 trust, 6, 75, 80, 117, 118, 119, 154, 171 turbulent, 43 turnover, 25 twin studies, 24 twins, 33 typology, 237
violent, 87, 96, 110, 111, 162 violent behavior, 87 violent behaviour, 111 violent offenders, 110 visible, 24, 154, 157, 158 vocational, 66, 69, 72, 76 voice, 64, 71, 72, 91 volatility, 228 vulnerability, ix, 1, 5, 6, 8, 16, 23, 29, 238
W U ulcer, 9 uncertainty, 66, 80, 179, 181 undergraduate, xi, xiii, 129, 132, 133, 134, 156, 197, 200 undergraduates, 173, 225 underlying mechanisms, 24, 73 unemployment, 166 universality, 38, 39, 53 universe, 175 universities, 86 university students, 22, 67, 82, 146 unpredictability, 162
V vaccination, 32 valence, 131, 204 validation, 35, 112, 149, 182, 195 validity, 3, 5, 28, 30, 33, 34, 201, 207, 209, 228, 233 values, x, 6, 37, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 56, 125, 170, 173, 174, 178, 180, 181, 213, 217, 222 vandalism, 86 variability, 12, 78 variables, xiii, 3, 8, 14, 15, 27, 62, 63, 66, 71, 82, 87, 171, 197, 218 variance, 5, 117, 145 variety of domains, 213 vein, 38, 219 victimisation, 113 victims, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102 violence, 29, 66, 79, 110, 111, 124, 162
walking, 116 war, 86, 119 warfare, 190 weakness, 113 wealth, 50, 52 weight loss, 217 welfare, 53, 167 well-being outcomes, ix, 1, 24 wellness, 21, 25, 45, 53 wells, 48 wisdom, 38, 44, 50, 53, 232 withdrawal, 10, 19, 20, 65, 71, 72, 179, 212 wives, 159 women, 7, 77, 88, 92, 149, 156, 162, 165, 188, 221, 236 workability, 4 workers, 157, 159, 160, 192 working class, 113, 174 working groups, 159 working memory, 63, 78 workload, 26 workplace, 66, 68, 81, 160, 213 worldview, 173, 174 worry, 8, 22, 47, 50, 65, 228, 233 writing, 45, 81 wrongdoing, 91, 223
Y yang, 40, 42 young adults, 174
