Promoting Participation: Law or Politics?
CP Cavendish Publishing Limited
London • Sydney
Promoting Participation: Law or Politics? Edited by Professor N Douglas Lewis, FRSA Director of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies Faculty of Law, University of Sheffield Professor David Campbell, BSc (Econ), LLM, PhD, FCI (Arb) Cardiff Law School
CP Cavendish Publishing Limited
London • Sydney
First published in 1999 by Cavendish Publishing Limited, The Glass House, Wharton Street, London WC1X 9PX, United Kingdom. Telephone: + 44 (0) 171 278 8000 Facsimile: + 44 (0) 171 278 8080 E-mail:
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© Lewis, N Douglas
1999
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Promoting participation: law or politics 1. Law and politics I. Campbell, David II. Lewis, N Douglas 340.1’1
ISBN 1 85941 483 4
Printed and bound in Great Britain
PREFACE Over almost 40 years of distinguished scholarship, Douglas Lewis has argued for constitutional reform which would facilitate British citizens’ effective participation in the making of the decisions that set the basic pattern of their collective life. That what now passes for the British constitution signally fails to do this is a position which he has done much to publicise through the most authoritative contributions to public law’s account of the British polity. He has argued that this failure of the British constitution is unacceptable at a compelling level of philosophic sophistication by applying transcendental moral philosophy derived from Gewirth to the central concepts of public law, such as citizenship, democracy, and rights. That the very strength of Lewis’ arguments (and other arguments to similar effect) meant that they were very far from the practices and policies of the moribund succession of British governments between 1987 and 1997 was a paradox which tells one much about those governments. The election of the New Labour Government committed to, and actually beginning to implement, radical constitutional reform is a strong endorsement of the position which Lewis has set out. One aspect of Lewis’ work – almost a hallmark of anything of real interest in contemporary legal scholarship – has been its insistence on going beyond the boundaries of the ‘black letter’ approach to public law. He has revised the methods of public law scholarship in the light of awareness of contributions from other disciplines, such as administrative studies, political science and social policy, not to mention philosophy. Following the publication of Choice and the Legal Order: Rising Above Politics, Lewis conceived of a conference on ‘The Constitutional Implications of Participation’ to explore the issues which pursuit of greater participation raises for public law and other disciplines. This conference was held at the University of Sheffield in September 1997. Four days of intensive discussion yielded papers of such a quality that the decision was taken to publish those papers as this book. The major work of organisation of the conference was carried out by Ms Di Longley of the Faculty of Law, University of Sheffield. The following colleagues were good enough to chair the various sessions of the conference: Professor Philip Jones, Faculty of Law, University of Sheffield; Professor Mike Purdue, Department of Law, City University; Ms Lorna Woods, Faculty of Law, University of Sheffield; Professor Gary Edles, American University, Washington DC, USA; Professor John Birds, Faculty of Law, University of Sheffield; Professor Alan Walker, Department of Sociological Studies, University of Sheffield; Professor Keith Ewing, Faculty of Law, Kings College London; and Professor Cosmo Graham, Law School, University of Leicester. The conference received the financial support of Cavendish Publishing, the Faculty of Law, University of Sheffield; and the School of Financial Studies and Law, Sheffield Hallam University. David Campbell’s work on the Conference and on this book was supported by ESRC grant R000236416.
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Promoting Participation Douglas Lewis and I are grateful to the contributors to this book, Ms Longley, the chairs of conference sessions, the other participants at the conference, the financial supporters of the conference, the ESRC and Cavendish Publishing for their contributions to the publication of this book. David Campbell East Morton, West Yorkshire April 1999
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CONTRIBUTORS Patrick Birkinshaw has been Director of the Institute of European Public Law at Hull University since 1992 and has been a Professor in the Law School at that university since 1990. He is the author of many books and articles including Grievances, Remedies and the State (2nd edn, 1995); Freedom of Information: The Law, the Practice and the Ideal (2nd edn, 1996); and Government and Information: The Law Relating to Access, Disclosure and Regulation (2nd edn, 2001). He became Director of the Law School at Hull University in the summer of 1997. David Campbell is Professor of Law in the Cardiff Law School. His research interests are in the law and economics of commercial transactions, the law and economics of corporate governance and in philosophical and social scientific approaches to law. His most recent publications include articles on the methodology of law and economics and applications of that methodology to the law of contract and to company law. Nicholas Deakin is currently Visiting Professor at the Local Government Centre, Warwick Business School and at the LSE. Before that, he taught social policy for 20 years at Birmingham University. His most recent project has been A study on the Treasury and social policy unit as part of the ESRC’s Whitehall programme. In 1995–96, he was chair of the Independent Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector in England. Kevin Dowd is Professor of Economics at the University of Sheffield. His main research interests are in financial regulation, risk management and political economy. Much of this work was summarised in his book Competition and Finance: A New Interpretation of Financial and Monetary Economics (1996), which attempted to provide a restatement of the case for financial laissez-faire and the abolition of central banking. Kevin Featherstone is Professor of European Politics and Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration Studies at the University of Bradford. He has published widely in European Union politics and on politics in modern Greece. His most recent book is The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union (1999). Lucy Gaster is Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham. She has been involved in ‘public participation’ for 20 years, as a community activist and service user, and more recently as a local government officer and then as an academic. Her main interests are around the relationship of government and people at the local and
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Promoting Participation neighbourhood level, looking in particular at service quality, local democracy, decentralisation and holistic working. She is the author of Quality in Public Services: Managers’ Choices (1995). Geraint Howells is Reader in Law at the Institute for Commercial Law Studies, Sheffield University. He has written widely on consumer law issues (his books include Comparative Product Liability (1991); Consumer Product Safety (1998); Consumer Protection Law (1995); and EC Consumer Law (1997)) and is editor of the Consumer Law Journal. Barry Knight is Secretary to the Foundation for Civil Society. He is a social scientist who has previously worked at the Home Office and Cambridge University. He is at present conducting research on international aspects of civil society. N Douglas Lewis (formerly writing as Norman) is Professor of Public Law and Director of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Sheffield. He has written widely in the field of public law and administration. His current research concentrates on ‘law and governance’ and social and economic rights. JE Parkinson is a Professor of Law at the University of Bristol and an Honorary Research Fellow of the Political Economy Research Centre at the University of Sheffield. His main publications are in company law and corporate theory and include Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (1993). Tony Prosser is John Millar Professor of Law at the University of Glasgow. He has written extensively about utility regulation, most recently in Law and the Regulators (1997). He has also undertaken work on media regulation and has published Regulating the Changing Media: A Comparative Study (1998). Tony Rees is Senior Lecturer in Social Policy at the University of Southampton. He is the author of the fifth edition of TH Marshall’s Social Policy (1985) and was co-editor of Citizenship Today (1996). He has also published several recent articles on citizenship and voluntarism. He is a
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Contributors member of the Council of National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux (NACAB). Mary Seneviratne is Professor of Law in the Centre for Legal Research, Nottingham Law School. Her subject areas are administrative law and criminal law. Her research interests include civil justice, ombudsmen, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and the regulation of the legal profession. She is the author of Ombudsmen in the Public Sector (1994), and her new book The Legal Profession: Regulation and the Consumer is to be published later this year. She qualified as a solicitor in 1977, and has worked in local government. Perri 6 is a Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Government at the University of Strathclyde; Senior Research Fellow (and formerly Director of Policy and Research) at the independent, cross-party think-tank, Demos; and a Visiting Research Fellow in the Centre for Environmental Strategy at the University of Surrey. He is the author, co-author or editor of over 20 books, including On the Right Lines (1998); The Future of Privacy (1998); Holistic Government (1997); Escaping Poverty (1997); The Contract Culture in Public Services (1997); and Liberty, Charity and Politics (1995). He is currently working on major studies on integration and holistic working in government, on the politics of moral character, and on the nature of the radical centre. John Wadham is a solicitor and the Director of Liberty (the National Council for Civil Liberties). He has acted for large numbers of applicants in cases before the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights. He is the editor of Your Rights: The Liberty Guide; the civil rights section of the Penguin Guide to the Law; the case law reports for the European Human Rights Review; and is the author of Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998. He has also contributed to many other publications and written many articles on human rights and civil liberties. He is a member of the Government’s Human Rights Act Task Force. He also appears as a spokesperson on human rights issues in the media and is a regular speaker at conferences and on training courses. Ian Ward is Professor of Law at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. His research interests are concentrated in the related areas of public law, European law and legal theory. He is the author of A Critical Introduction to European Law
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Promoting Participation (1996) and The Margins of European Law (1996). He is currently completing a book on the history of English constitutional thought from the 16th to 19th centuries. Stuart Weir is Director of the Democratic Audit and a joint author of The Three Pillars of Liberty (1996) and Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain (1998), its two benchmark reports on political freedom and democracy in the UK, as well as being author of its research reports on elections, quangos and task forces. He is a Senior Research fellow at the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, and Associate Consultant to the British Council. His contribution, however, draws also on community activities in Hackney and his period as a councillor there.
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CONTENTS Preface Contributors Table of Cases Table of Legislation
v vii xv xix
1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PARTICIPATION
1
N Douglas Lewis
2 PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL SOCIETY
31
Kevin Dowd
3 THE ‘HYBRID CONTRACT’ AND THE MERGING OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW OF THE ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC GOODS
45
David Campbell
4 A CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE FOR MORE PARTICIPATION: WHAT WOULD IT LOOK LIKE?
75
Perri 6
5 PARTICIPATION AND PASSIVITY: NO ROOM AT THE TOP
101
Stuart Weir
6 PARTICIPATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
113
Lucy Gaster
7 CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 137 Ian Ward
xi
Promoting Participation 8 CITIZENSHIP, PARTICIPATION AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
157
Kevin Featherstone
9 COMMUNITY POLITICS
175
Barry Knight
10 CHARITY AND PHILANTHROPY: TOWARDS A NEW PERSPECTIVE
183
Nicholas Deakin
11 PARTICIPATION AND VOLUNTEERING
193
Tony Rees
12 PARTICIPATION AND LEGAL AUTONOMY
213
N Douglas Lewis
13 THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
229
Patrick Birkinshaw
14 THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ACT DESIGNED TO INCORPORATE THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS INTO DOMESTIC LAW
251
John Wadham
15 THE CASE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS Mary Seneviratne
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267
Contents 16 CONSUMERS AND PARTICIPATION
291
Geraint Howells
17 PARTICIPATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
319
JE Parkinson
18 PARTICIPATION AND THE REGULATORY ORDER
349
Tony Prosser Bibliography
363
Index
405
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TABLE OF CASES Abdi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 1 All ER 641 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247 Attorney General v Blake [1998] 1 All ER 833 (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .232 Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v London and Suffolk Properties [1989] BCLC 100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .322 Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1991] 1 All ER 720 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .242 Bromley Borough Council v Greater London Council [1983] 1 AC 768 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219 Bushell v Secretary of State [1980] 2 All ER 608 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .248 Case C-382-3/92 [1994] ECR I-2435 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155 Chalal v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 413 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240, 252 Council of Civil Service Union v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230 Daar v Yellow Cab Co [1967] 433 P 2d 732 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .305 Davies v Eli Lilley and Co [1987] 1 WLR 1136 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .303 Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685 (CJEC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240 Hamble v MAFF [1995] 2 All ER 714 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .242 Horrocks v Ford Motor Company (1990) The Times, 15 February . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .303 Hsu v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1997] All ER 762 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Johnstone v Chief Constable of the RUC [1986] 3 All ER 135 (CJEC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240 Kremzow v Republik Osterreich (1997) The Times, 11 August . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240 M v Home Office [1993] 3 All ER 537 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230 McCann v UK (1995) The Times, 9 October . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240 Marbury v Madison (1803) 1 Cranch 103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .231 Netherlands v EU Council [1996] ECR I-2169 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241
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Promoting Participation Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 All ER 42 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .249 R v Cambridgeshire Health Authority ex parte B [1955] 2 All ER 129 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .225 R v Cambridgeshire Health Authority ex parte B [1995] 1 WLR 898 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .282 R v Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte International Trader’s Ferry Ltd [1997] 2 All ER 65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .282 R v Commissioner for Local Administration ex parte Croydon LBC [1989] 1 All ER 1033 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .244 R v HM Inspectorate on Pollution ex parte Greenpeace (No 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261 R v Independent Television Commission ex parte TSW Broadcasting Ltd [1996] EMLR 291 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .360 R v Independent Television Commission ex parte Virgin Television Ltd [1996] EMLR 318 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .360 R v IRC ex parte Unilever [1996] COD 421 (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .242 R v Legal Aid Board ex parte Donn and Co [1996] 3 All ER 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .245 R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex parte Balchin (1996) unreported, 25 October . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .244 R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards ex parte Fayed [1988] 1 All ER 93 (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230 R v Secretary of State for Employment ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1994] 2 WLR 409 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261 R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte O’Keefe (1997), The Times, 5 August . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .248 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex parte WDM Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 611 (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .248 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonweath Affairs ex parte World Development Movement [1995] 1 WLR 386 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Fayed [1997] 1 All ER 228 (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .248 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 All ER 244 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Hargreaves [1997] 1 All ER 379 (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .242 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Pierson [1977] 3 All ER 577, HL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .231 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Simms [1998] 2 All ER 491 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247
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Table of Cases R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Thompson [1997] 1 All ER 327 (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .248 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte USTII [1992] 1 All ER 212 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .248 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Venables [1997] 3 All ER 97 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .231, 248 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte WDM Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 611 (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .245 R v Secretary of State for Social Services ex parte CPAG [1990] 2 QB 540 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factorame [1991] AC 603 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Richmond LBC [1996] 4 All ER 903 (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 R v Secretary of State for Wales ex parte Emery [1996] 4 All ER 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .248 Saunders v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 313 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .242 Simmonds v Heffer [1983] BCLC 298 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .347 Stanley Johnson, (1997) unreported, 24 October . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .263 Stovin v Wise (Norfolk County Council: third party) [1996] 3 WLR 388 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .284 Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240 Svenska Journalist Forbundet v EU Council [1998] All ER (EC) 620 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240 Thompson v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1997] 2 All ER 762 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .263 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240 West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250, 322 Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] AC 1054 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219
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TABLE OF LEGISLATION Amsterdam Treaty
Control of Misleading Advertisements Regulations 1988, SI 1988/915 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
See Treaties: Amsterdam 1997, draft
Council of Europe Charter on Self-government 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Beijing Statement on Judicial Independence 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Council Regulation 2407/92, 23 July 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
Bill of Rights (Canada) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Bill of Rights (India) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Bill of Rights (United Kingdom) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222, 223,
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257, 258
224, 241, 250 Art 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Earth Summit, Rio Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280, 283, 287
See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
Case of Proclamations 1611 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights)— Art 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
Charity Act 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Charity Act 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184, 208
Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Charity Act 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184, 208
Art 5(1)(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Charter for Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 151, 153,
Art 5(1)(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 Art 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
154, 160
Art 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252, 254, 257, 262
Citizen’s Charter 1996–97 . . . . . . . . 3–4, 8, 105,
Art 8(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
119, 235,
Art 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
244, 277
Art 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Commission White Paper 1994 . . . . . . . . . . 154
Art 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Companies Act 1985— s 303 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Art 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Companies Act 1985— Pt VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Art 34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
Companies Act 1985— Pt X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Protocol 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252, 264
Art 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 Art 41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 Protocol 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252, 264
Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985— Art 78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Protocol 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Competition Bill 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Electricity Act 1989— s 2, Sched 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
Consumer Credit Act 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
ss 11–14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
Consumer Protection Act 1961 . . . . . . . . . . 291
s 46, Sched 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
Consumer Protection Act 1987— Pt I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
s 51, Sched 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
Pt II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
European Communities Act 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256, 292
s 53, Sched 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
Pt III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
European Communities Act 1973— s 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
s 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 s 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
xix
Promoting Participation European Community
Maastricht Treaty
Agreement in Social Policy . . . . . . . . 151, 154
See Treaties: European Union 1992
Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Art 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 See, also, Treaties, European Union 1992
Official Secrets Act 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256–57
European Union, Business Transfer Directive 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Paris Treaty Fair Trading Act 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
See Treaties: Paris 1951
s 124(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Fifth Company Law, draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Food Safety Act 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Railway (Fires) Act 1905 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Gas Act 1986— s 2, Sched 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Railways Act 1993— ss 12–15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
ss 23–27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
Redundancies Directive 95/56 . . . . . . . . . . 156
s 32, Sched 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992— Agenda 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 81
s 40, Sched 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 General Product Safety Regulations 1994, SI 1994/2328 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
Principle 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Rome Treaty See Treaties: Rome 1957Rules of the Supreme Court— Ord 15, r 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Housing Finance Act 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Human Rights Act 1998 . . . . . . . 230, 233, 241,
Ord 53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
242, 243, 247, 251, 255–56, 264–66
Sale of Goods Act 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Art 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 Art 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
s 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
s 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
Single European Act 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 139,
s 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
153, 159, 168
s 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
Art 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Art 118B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153, 154
ICCPR (UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)— Art 14(3)(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Social Action Programme 1974 . . . . . . 151, 153 Social Chapter See Treaties: European Union 1992: Protocol on Social Policy
Industrial Democracy White Paper 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Social Charter 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160, 220, Social Charter, European . . . . . . 221, 223, 288
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213, 284
Telecommunications Act 1984— ss 12–15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Title on Employment 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
xx
Table of Legislation Title VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160, 169
TEU (Treaty on European Union)
Paris 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 157
See Treaties, European Union 1992
Rome 1957. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139, 157,
Trade Descriptions Act 1968 . . . . . . . . 291, 312
159, 167, 168
Transfer of Undertakings Directive 77/187 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Art 117 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 24
Treaties:
Unfair Competition Act 1909 . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Amsterdam 1997, draft . . . . . . . . 140, 142, 152,
United Nations Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
154, 161, 168, 170, 238
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 . . . . . . . . . . . 268, 276,
Art 118 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
279, 284
Art F.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Arts 22–25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
European Union 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140, 151, 158, 160, 165
Vredeling Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 Art 3B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Water Industry Act 1991— ss 13–16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
Art 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141, 151, 157, 160
ss 32–35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Art A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Working Time Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Art F (Title I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Works Council Directive 94/45/EC 22 September, 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154, 155,
Protocol on Social Policy . . . . . . . . 21, 151, 154, 160, 169, 223
156, 332
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CHAPTER 1
THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PARTICIPATION
N Douglas Lewis Although it can vary in its specific forms, the whole general social and economic system of the maintenance of law and order, education and the production of goods and services is so virtually inescapable if the needs of human agency are to be fulfilled that participation in it, or its results, is also rationally inescapable.1
INTRODUCTION I want to make out the case for participation by citizens in a wide range of fundamental political, social and economic affairs; to argue that that case is embedded in the notion of citizenship (as an aspect of treating all human beings as being of the same intrinsic worth); and that, correspondingly, acceptance of this case should be reflected in the constitution itself. If the case is made out, then the constitutional implications are wide-ranging and present a challenge to almost every aspect of legal scholarship. The force of this argument is, perhaps, reflected in the contemporary political infatuation with ‘choice’. In the recent past, choice has been associated with the political right, but at a deeper level it is about according respect to each human being on account of their status as such. It will be argued that a government committed to choice would produce extensive, pluralistic institutions which encourage rational discourse rather than assume that a dominant executive knows best.2 That a strong and diverse civil society is necessary for both national stability and social cohesion follows from this thinking.3 In fact, choice and participation as linked aspects of human agency are also intimately related to autonomy (which, as I shall claim, has important implications for social and economic rights) and, of course, to an equality which is not limited to sex, religion or nationality.4 This philosophic argument will not be developed here, but is best explored by Alan Gewirth in his
1 2 3 4
Gewirth, The Community of Rights, p 84. This argument is developed in greater length by the author in Choice and the Legal Order: Rising Above Politics. Eg, Drucker, Post-capitalist Society. For the view that this reflects the core of EU law, see Judge Andrew Geddes, Protection of Individual Rights Under EC Law, p 109.
1
Promoting Participation
various writings on categorical moral philosophy, not least in the book from which the introductory quotation is taken.
THE LOGIC OF PARTICIPATION Participation is taken for granted in a number of central spheres of social organisation without its justification being analysed at deeper levels. Thus, for instance, participation in political structures is assumed in all advanced democracies, but the concept of ‘democracy’ does not receive close analytical attention. Participation is honourably mentioned in cultural exchanges, in political rhetoric and in any number of international treaties, treatises and compacts. Its origin and justification are sometimes sought in the inalienable rights of humankind, in the identification of those traits which mark out the free, unstained, human personality. This justification is more than attractive; it is compelling. But, whatever position one takes on this, it must be allowed that the standard claims made in ‘standard’ democracies, if examined immanently, always point in the same direction. If we judge most self-styled democracies by their own standards, we will arrive at roughly the same justification for the adoption of human rights. If human beings must be free to make their own choices in their own ways, then their choice of political organisation is crucial. However, for that choice to be real, it must be exercised at the lowest or most immediate level that makes organisational sense. To put it another way, participation in the political sphere is a right at all levels of government and not merely at the central level. This is a belief that is beginning to assume the status of a dominant ideology. The arrangement and delivery of public services will vary across time and place and so will, therefore, the balance between direct and representational democracy. It is improbable that we, in the advanced democracies, have struck the right balance between the two at this time, as witness the growing clamour for some version of ‘community’ politics which is examined in this book by Stuart Weir. Moreover, representative government is, to some extent, a regrettable necessity and not something to be preferred a priori. Self-expression, self-help, self-government and relative autonomy are all preferable. Representative government (in the form the context demands) is merely necessary to allow individual self-expression, though, as will be argued, that self-expression ultimately can occur only in the context of others and otherness. The point was well made by GDH Cole in 1920: ... the elector is called upon to choose one man to represent him in relation to every conceivable question that may come before Parliament, whereas, if he is a rational being, he always certainly agrees with one man about one thing and
2
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
with another about another, or at any rate would do so as soon as the economic basis of present class divisions was removed.5
Before developing the general theme, a word needs to be said about the centralised British State which is, in too many respects, the enemy of genuine political participation. The erosion of the powers of local government in the relatively recent past is well documented and is, hopefully, about to be reversed, so that a genuine commitment to subsidiarity in the best sense may be about to be made. We shall see. There are, however, dimensions of political participation, other than its strengthening of territorial politics, which merit some consideration, although the recent Labour Government’s acceptance of the Council of Europe’s charter of local self-government is to be welcomed. The Charter includes a declaration that local authorities should manage a substantial share of public affairs and have adequate financial resources of their own. It is also worth noting that the Council of Europe has endorsed directives which encourage the establishment of voluntary associations. It will be interesting to see what linkages emerge between greater autonomy for local government and encouragement for intermediary bodies representing a wide range of citizen interests. This aside, there are other aspects to citizen participation which could be pursued. Over the past 20 to 30 years, attempts have been made to increase central government’s control over capital expenditure at local level, not least through the discretionary allocation of funds via the Single Regeneration Budget and the diversion of funds to quangos such as the Housing Corporation. However, research indicates that resources tend to be spent on schemes with a low local priority simply because money was available for them. Councils have been forced to take a segmented rather than a comprehensive view of capital expenditures. Constitutional regulation has, in my view, an important and innovative part to play in encouraging genuine local partnerships between government, voluntary organisations, the private sector and an active citizenry. A number of models which might be encouraged come to mind. In recent years, we seem to have been presented with a choice between untrammelled market forces and inefficient or unresponsive public services. Yet there are experimental forms of partnership which seem genuinely capable of combining private sector efficiency with public service responsibility. Profit sharing, the community use of premises off peak, and local government’s holding of golden shares to ensure the democratic accountability of certain organisations are examples which come to mind.6 The Citizen’s Charter is capable of being reformed to offer a more genuine form of participation to service users. Note the attitude of the Labour Party when in opposition: 5 6
Cole, Guild Socialism Re-stated, p 32. Eg, Serviceteam, a Lambeth based private sector company with a public service ethos. 3
Promoting Participation
Under Labour, the design and delivery of public services will be far more user focused. Here the Citizen’s Charter has a contribution to make. Labour will remodel the Charter to have far more user involvement. Users will be consulted in the design of targets. Feedback from users will assist in continuous improvement in quality and delivery. Complaints procedures will be used as a spur to continuous improvement.7
At the time of writing, the now Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster seems determined to deliver on these promises. In any event, involvement of citizens in the socio-political project clearly is capable of being much more widely developed than traditionally is assumed. Such development does not detract in any way from the legitimacy of genuine markets.
PLAYING THE MARKET A detailed argument for markets will not be made here, but assumed as an ideal typical form of human choice.8 Of course, market choice is frequently distorted in contemporary organisation, as may be seen from, for example, Professor Mirrlees’ work on asymmetric information, but this is another matter, though one which requires remedial action when practice deviates too far from the ideal typical form. The overblown claims of the State to plan the nation’s affairs, even if morally permissible, have become increasingly threadbare. The resultant scepticism about the State is powerfully expressed in Kevin Dowd’s libertarian contribution to this book. We are only just beginning to understand the limits of the possible in terms of collective action, and there is likely to be a long, slow, learning curve before confidence in the State returns. In these circumstances, the market was bound to come back into fashion, even if there are markets and markets, with some merely serving to dignify extant, non-governmental, power configurations. However, most will agree that one basic human capacity is to choose lifestyles among alternatives, and the market, at its best, is one of the most effective ways of liberating that choosing process. This is quite apart from the fact that the competition inherent in market forces lends added spice to the drive fully to express our talents. The market is, then, a device through which, as a community, we can channel our energies in the direction of autonomy. Insofar as it offers the individual a range of meaningful and worthwhile options, then the market succeeds. If it does not offer such options, then the prevalent economic arrangements deserve further scrutiny and should be redesigned as appropriate. On one thing most are agreed – that one of the 7 8
Derek Foster, Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, speech at the IPMS Conference. The author has developed these arguments in several other works, nb, Choice and the Legal Order. 4
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
primary responsibilities of government is to ensure that markets are and remain highly competitive.9 It is widely accepted that sustained economic success depends on the establishment of a competitive market economy. What is less frequently noted is that this can normally be achieved only by social cooperation.10 Such co-operation, at the political level at least, probably requires the building of ‘defensive alliances’ which can make effective regulatory interventions. To exclude individuals from being effective market players is to devalue their citizenship. The argument for a night-watchman (or at least a nonintrusive) State is, after all, premised on the ability of individuals to choose how to manage their own lives by ‘voting’ for their preferences as consumers, as self-providers, as cultural and artistic beings, and so on. The teasing question seems, however, to be this. If as citizens we are entitled to choose our political structures, to engage in the shaping and delivery of public services, and to play the world’s markets, then it is unclear why the right to participate equally (whether through representatives or more directly) in other dominant socio-economic formations should be denied. For example, the link between being a consumer and exercising anything resembling control over large ‘private’ corporations is so tenuous as to be meaningless. There are, in other words, more or less private fiefdoms, exemplified by the large corporations, which are controlled by the few in a way which deeply touches the lives of the many, without the latter having any real powers of participation. This is true even if we take into account the role of the many as investors through institutional arrangements. Being a market player is one thing, but being a victim of the random needs of power configurations is another. Gewirth reminds us that ‘human beings are the ends for which society, including the productive process exists’. He adds: None of this is meant to deny that government should be concerned to invest in human capital for the sake of economic growth. But, such growth is valuable, in the final analysis, because of the contribution it can make to the well being of individuals and, especially ... of those individuals who cannot maintain their basic well being by their own efforts.11
Rousseau graphically made a similar point when saying that ‘no citizen shall ever be wealthy enough to buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself’.12 The reality is that each phase of industrial development has involved a modification or restriction of market relations. Although none of 9
For a highly persuasive account of the strengths and failures of traditional markets, see Stiglitz, Whither Socialism?. 10 But see, eg, Olson, ‘Big bills left on the sidewalk: why some nations are rich and others poor’. 11 Gewirth, The Community of Rights, pp 138, 141. 12 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p 50. 5
Promoting Participation
this has been root and branch, there is an implicit acceptance that, just as it is unacceptable to allow political choice to remain in the hands of a few, so production and investment decisions need to bow to the same logic. This being the case, the legal order can scarcely remain indifferent to control of the large corporation. What I have called private fiefdoms were labelled by James Madison in Federalist13 as ‘factions’, the special interests of which the Republic had to curb. The Republic’s goal was to create a system that would ‘emphasise deliberation’ rather than allowing the passion or power of a particular cause to take hold. In like vein, Cole remarked that vast inequalities of wealth and status, resulting in unacceptable inequalities of education, power and control of the environment: ‘are necessarily fatal to any real democracy, whether in politics or any other sphere.’14 The Romans had an expression for it: ‘what affects all should be approved by all.’15 Things can be done about these inequalities by the legal order. The potential, as well as the present limitations, can be seen in the judgment of a French court which in the Spring of 1997 ordered Renault to consult its European works council before making any further move to close down its Vilvoorde car plant in Brussels. Under the present legal regime, that court could not, of course, challenge the closure itself. Participative experiments have been conducted closer to home. Last year, for example, the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) recommended the creation of local economic partnerships between the private and public sectors. The TECs spoke of a ‘shared vision’ of local authorities, trades unions and the voluntary sector informing efforts to promote ‘not just competitive businesses but a competitive society – one which achieves a dynamic equilibrium between wealth creation and social cohesion’.16 At both the theoretical and empirical levels, there is a considerable amount of information to be mined and best practice to be absorbed. However, there is clearly a link between participation in the working of such structures and the familiar literature on discourse and ‘ideal speech’. Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that, even in the global marketplace, the factions or fiefdoms might need the nation state (and, therefore, the rest of us) as much as the other way around. Will Hutton, for example, has said: New technologies, markets and companies are constantly throwing up new challenges: even the mighty IBM lost its dominant position within a decade and the same forces may now be at work on McDonald’s. In this climate, even
13 14 15 16
Quoted in Howard, The Death of Common Sense, p 166. Cole, Guild Socialism Re-stated, p 14. See the history of the maxim in Gewirth, The Community of Rights, n 37. This aim was set out in a Consultation Paper sent by the TEC National Council to its 81 local bodies in England and Wales. 6
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
the biggest multinational needs allies and partners. Among the most reliable is the Nation State.17
The creation of participatory institutions at this highest level is hugely complex, but it is a challenge which will have to be met, with regional groupings and alliances almost certainly playing a central role. The issue of stakeholding arises, of course, and also the problem of the global market’s potential for obstructing political solutions. If participation is right and if the will to bring it about is there, then at least part of the answer seems to be to form ‘regional defensive alliances’ such as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Association. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) (formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) may also assume a larger, positive role. The possible contribution of the EU is extensively examined in this book by Kevin Featherstone and Ian Ward. In any event, we need to be reminded that, in terms of moral imperatives, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. The proposition which I adopt is that we need to work on the ‘ought’ first and then feed in the practical ‘cans’ as the context allows. At the moment, the most important agencies seem to be pointing in opposite directions. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has strongly, if for the moment unsuccessfully, promoted the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) which appeared to be set on outlawing: ‘all restrictions and controls that national governments might wish to impose on foreign investment.’ ‘We are,’ one of its leading negotiators boasted: ‘writing the constitution of a single global economy’.18 If its critics’ worst fears had been realised, MAI would have allowed multinationals to sue national governments for any profits lost through laws which discriminate against them. It might even have put at risk international treaties on climatic change, over-fishing and workplace and environmental legislation. On the other hand, the World Bank seems recently to have abandoned its longrunning support for minimal government in favour of a new model based on a strong and vigorous State. It lists the key tasks of government as including investment in basic social services and infrastructure, providing a welfare safety net, protecting the environment and establishing a foundation of law. Markets and government are seen to be ‘complementary’.19 A brief word on regulatory regimes as an instrument for advancing participation must be given here, though I shall return to this topic. The criticism has been levelled at the privatised utilities that their regulators operate in too secret a fashion and that they should perhaps be answerable to new, non-executive boards, including consumers. Numerous suggestions for
17 Hutton, The State We’re In, p 31. 18 Monbiot, ‘A charter to let loose the multinationals’. 19 World Bank, World Development Report 1991: The State in a Changing World. 7
Promoting Participation
reform are in the air,20 and are examined in Tony Prosser’s contribution to this book.
CLUSTERS OF EXPECTATIONS Participation has been chosen as the guiding theme of this book because of its historic political associations which are resonant with sentiments about citizenship. However, on closer examination, participation is something of an umbrella concept, and embraces a number of other cherished values. These constituent values are clearly distinguished by Perri 6 in his analysis of the cultural prerequisites of increased participation in Chapter 4. I will here focus on ‘natural justice’ and ‘equality’, both of which values have long pedigrees. Natural justice was originally limited to the courtroom, and originally to lifechallenging situations, but it has come to represent the right to be heard and to present an individual case in a wide range of administrative and political, as well as judicial, situations. Because of its close identification with the judicial arena, judicial review has not normally been expanded to bear upon private power structures, even though – in the shape of the right to be consulted – it has periodically conferred rights of a ‘participative’ sort in a range of political and administrative settings. The doctrine of fairness occasionally has been expanded into a weak doctrine of participation. All of this raises the question of the optimal role of the judiciary, not least in the context of rule making procedures. This issue is taken up by Patrick Birkinshaw in the context of the separation of powers in Chapter 13 of this book, and I turn to it in Chapter 12. The issue of participation has been raised in relation to consumer representation. It has been proposed that when decisions which concern them are about to be made, consumers should be consulted and allowed to express their views, in particular through consumer organisations.21 These proposals are all reviewed in this book by Geraint Howells. A more pointed example of consumer representation, albeit at second hand, can be seen in recent proposals for a food hygiene monitoring service which enables consumers to make their own choices and their own decisions. It also appears, at first blush, that the new Blair Government’s approach to competition policy is more consumer minded than that of its predecessors. In this respect, the focus of the new Competition Bill on regulatory issues seems to indicate an acceptance of
20 See the author’s evidence to the House of Commons Public Service Select Committee, published as The Citizen’s Charter, 3rd Report, Vol 11, Minutes of Evidence, Session 1996–97, HC78–11, pp 55–60 and the literature cited therein. 21 Geddes, Protection of Individual Rights under EC Law, p 7. 8
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
the idea that consumer participation is advanced by open regulatory structures.22 The limitations of natural justice in a UK setting are the products of history. Natural justice was developed in a context of relatively narrow State activities long before the industrial revolution had produced forms of civic, social or private power which began to impinge on individual citizens in a way which previously was practically the monopoly of the State. Over the course of centuries, there have been legislative interventions in the field of commercial and company law, social welfare and the like, which have usually been reactive responses to felt injustice rather than deductions from first principles. Constitutional first principles have, of course, never been the staple diet of the British polity. Yet it is by no means self-evident that the implications for participation of natural justice’s insistence upon a right to represent one’s own side of the story (as an instantiation of freedom of speech) should not be drawn out over a larger canvass. Analysis of natural justice’s implications might suggest that it is a constituent feature of a larger notion of participation which ought to be clearly stated as a constitutional principle guiding the recognition of an individual’s rights even against a complex swathe of social and economic counter-claims.23 The idea of equality has done important constitutional work elsewhere, for example, in the Constitution of India. To quote from Choice and the Legal Order: Rising Above Politics: Similarly with the right to equality before the law. The Indian Cellular Telephones case affords a valuable illustration of how such a basic claim can generate such unexpected results. The right not to be discriminated against in a tendering process is merely one example of the potential sweep of such a consensual commitment, but the possibilities are many and dramatic and would absorb race, gender, sexual inclination, age, disability, religious and political persuasion and so on. The right would imply equality in the face of State activity whether as an employee or mere citizen, it would embrace the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of life style (often so important in the past in areas such as social security entitlement) and comprises what is in fact ‘irrelevant considerations’ writ large but capable also of grinding exceedingly small. Irrelevant considerations is a well established ground of judicial review at common law, but it has never developed the broader sweep of which it is capable. As a clearly enunciated constitutional principle it could make a substantial contribution towards the liberation of human capacity.24
22 Wagstyl, ‘Beckett’s monopoly game’. 23 But see Gewirth, The Community of Rights, passim. 24 Lewis, Choice and the Legal Order: Rising Above Politics, pp 195–96. Incidentally, the Norwegians have a Discrimination Commissioner whose remit is not restricted by reference to race, gender, etc. Any irrelevant consideration may be regarded as discrimination. Note that the British Parliamentary Ombudsman has now extended his definition of ‘maladministration’ to include ‘showing bias whether because of colour, sex or any other grounds’. 9
Promoting Participation
The potential of equality is recognised by Bercusson who rightly sees the concept as much wider than its traditional understanding in terms of race and gender. It is capable of embracing ‘qualities’ more than equality, such as the quality of family and working life, and the quality of human resources.25 Choice, a concept which unites the political left and right, assumes the ability to act, and natural justice allows individuals to represent their own interests, their version of events, their notion of freedom, and their notion of well being to those who would have an impact on them. Even granted that citizens concede, through a procedure for moderating collective freedom and well being, decisions on the merits to the political/administrative process, they do not forfeit the right to participate, either vicariously or, depending on the nature of the impact, in personam. If given some measure of constitutional prominence, these ideas are capable of contributing extensively to the development of human rights thinking. A larger issue needs to be addressed at this point. It is that the boundary between the public and the private needs to be re-examined. This is undertaken in this book by David Campbell. The view which I tend to adopt is that the State (the constitution) has a general duty to allow the individual in society to flourish. This requires us to respect the sanctity of the private sphere, including making accessible goods such as housing, the right to family life and a basic floor of social and economic rights.26 These are matters which are extremely challenging at both the intellectual and political levels, for they pose serious questions about the autonomy of most socio-economic configurations. Such entities would have to satisfy constitutional expectations concerning participation in order to be legitimate. Although, from one point of view, the minimal State enhances individual freedom, non-State power configurations cannot expect to be uncluttered by constitutional obligations. There is no real conflict here.
PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNITY Recent years have seen a renewed interest in concepts of community, not least because of a previous generation’s excessive concentration on atomic individualism. At root, this interest turns on little more than recognition of the fact that human beings need to live in and through others. If that basic need is not satisfied, then the full development of personality becomes impossible. Correspondingly, we must give expression to this need, not only in terms of
25 Bercusson, European Labour Law, p 210. 26 Property is normally considered crucial in drawing up such a list, but it needs close confinement and definition, lest, in the hands of the powerful, it becomes an impediment to genuine participation. Gewirth, The Community of Rights, ch 5. 10
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
local political processes but by facilitating association in a variety of ways. Gewirth again: ... just as human rights, through mutuality, entail community, so community, in order to be morally justified, requires human rights. The relation of rights and community, then, is one of mutual support.27
Many of the great Victorian mutual institutions were responses to untrammelled industrialisation, which frequently tore apart human rights as they are now understood. Building societies, housing associations, cooperative enterprises, trades unions, credit unions, and such organisations as the Open Space Society and the National Trust all emerged through collective, non-governmental, effort. These developments were motivated by a notion of a common, public benefit which was to be gained from general rather than private ownership. There is, therefore, an argument to be made that the State has an obligation to assist, encourage and support voluntary organisations which seek to improve the quality of life, to encourage comradeship and the like. Even earlier, the need for collegiate activity was expressed through membership of the mediaeval guilds, which were essentially local associations of independent producers. As Cole points out, guilds were regulatory rather than managerial.28 The State’s duty to encourage society to flourish can be performed through any number of mechanisms, but the community group delivery mechanism is particularly important. The potential of voluntary groups is explored in this book by Nicholas Deakin and Tony Rees. These groups might undertake more than the mere delivery of services if they were given, in proper recognition of their role in fulfilling vital functions, a special standing in relation to the State as a new form of para-State force. In fact, the relative autonomy of voluntary and community bodies has diminished over recent times for reasons quite distinct from the fact that the rights of organised labour, although retaining a powerful universal appeal, have yet to find an acceptable form in today’s global markets. Nevertheless, voluntary associative conduct is an elemental form of civil participation, and the resurgence of the voluntary or not-forprofit sector is beginning to raise issues of their overall responsibility and accountability to the nation at large, and these issues are receiving attention right across the industrialised world.29 It is for this reason that the Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector was set up. Its report, Meeting the Challenge of Change: Voluntary Action into the 21st Century, was published by the National Council of Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) in 1996. The Commission suggested that a concordat, in the form of a Code of Good Practice, be drawn up between central
27 Gewirth, The Community of Rights, p 87. 28 Cole, Guild Socialism Re-stated, p 43 29 Eg, the Industry Commission’s Report on Charitable Organisations in Australia. 11
Promoting Participation
government and the voluntary ‘third force’ or ‘third sector’, and that a Parliamentary Select Committee be established to monitor all aspects of the relationship between government and the voluntary sector and the general impact of government policy on voluntary organisations. The Commission also recognised that fostering participation through accountability and user involvement are crucial. In particular, it said that voluntary organisations should identify all their key stakeholders and the way in which they are accountable to and communicate with those stakeholders. The Commission also suggested that funders should move towards the involvement of users not only in the delivery of services, but also in their planning. So vital is the third sector that the British government is currently supporting projects investigating how to develop a new, independent, voluntary sector in the former Iron Curtain countries. This sector is seen both as a countervailing force to the power of the centralised State and a means of establishing a free civil society,30 and the Commission’s call for a code of conduct governing the third sector’s relationship with the State is meant to ensure that that sector does not ‘become a kind of bendy toy for government to play with’. Voluntary action can marshal crucial social capital for the development of resources that are intangible but fundamental to the future of civil society. When addressing all these issues, the Commission has also pointed up certain problems and dilemmas facing the third sector31 which ought to be of considerable interest to public lawyers, although, with honourable exceptions, those lawyers have paid little attention to that sector in the past. It is clear that new organisational and, not least, legal forms of participative relationships are possible and desirable if the talents of broad swathes of the population are to be harnessed. For example, in mid-1997, the UK’s first private regeneration fund was launched with the intention of fund raising for small businesses and social organisations such as housing associations. Clearly, bodies which aim to invest in the social fabric and economy to help liberate expectations do not have to be confined to the private sector. Local employment pacts involving joint action by private companies and the voluntary sector have been called for by the EU’s Social Affairs Commissioner. As I have argued elsewhere: There has been a resurgence of original thinking about community forms of emancipation in recent times with which many will be familiar. For present purposes, the details matter less than the principle. This is where traditional concepts of subsidiarity meet community. A more autonomous local government would have both the resources and the obligation to engage in
30 Deakin, ‘Future prospects for voluntary action’, p 63. 31 Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector, Meeting the Challenge of Change: Voluntary Action into the 21st Century. 12
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
acts of self-expression. Not everyone will wish to take advantage of these opportunities, but where they do they should have the right to do so.32
Proposals also exist to develop community action in order to confront the issues of social and economic exclusion. For example, the London Voluntary Service Council has proposed the establishment of a Civic Forum to shadow the new Greater London Authority recently proposed by the Blair Government. This would be comprised of representatives from the voluntary sector, trade unions, the private sector, faith communities and local interest groups, so that those representatives could feed into the Authority’s thinking at a systemic level. There inevitably is some tension between a bottom-up view of community organisations and their top-down encouragement, especially since the latter might be selective and non-pluralistic or competitive. Most would naturally favour bottom-up emergence, albeit with resource-assistance offered by traditional politics when necessary. However, this is almost certainly to counsel perfection, and thought will need to be given to reinvigorating the system of local government community development officers and departments. Such thought can build on some successful experiments in the 1970s. Experience with tenants associations, housing management schemes, and even neighbourhood watches testifies to the utility of partnerships between central and local government and community organisations. This experience is thoroughly reviewed in this book by Lucy Gaster. Though the problem of social exclusion will not, of course, easily be solved even if local forms of participation are encouraged successfully, transparency is at least part of the solution, and it is to be hoped that freedom of information and open competitive politics will go a little way to changing the overall culture of politics and participation. One further point. It is managerially inefficient to misunderstand the needs of the community, so that prudence as well as democracy points up the need for better channels of participation. Even so, a belief in pluralism and experiment would lead to the encouragement of competitive politics at local level, something that local government might find difficult, but something with which it needs to learn to live. In other words, the encouragement of grass-roots organisations should produce a spectrum of local activity, a rainbow though not necessarily an alliance. Community bodies will serve different purposes. Some will be oriented to service, some will be ginger groups, some active campaigners, some engaged in constructive partnerships, and yet others will wish to contest conventional wisdoms. This range of groups, and their potential for enhancing participation, are described by Barry Knight in Chapter 9.
32 Lewis, ‘Participation, citizenship and the constitution’, p 117. 13
Promoting Participation
PARTICIPATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT As a coda to these thoughts on community, a word needs to be said about the environment. At the time of writing, it is estimated that some 300 measures have been adopted by the EU relating to the environment. By no means all of them create rights for individuals, but that is not really the thrust of my argument for participation. Many environmental directives are concerned simply to instruct Member States to draw up rehabilitation programmes, take measurements, designate areas for environmental protection or establish modern technologies to promote a reduction in pollution. Others designate environmentally desirable objectives, leaving it to the Member States to decide how best to achieve them.33 As a World Bank study has recently shown,34 citizen activism has been at the root of the modern environmental movements in both the industrialised and the developing countries. Some of the major actors in this process include local authorities, citizen and environmental groups, the academic and scientific communities, business and industrial sectors, etc. Particularly since the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, the promotion of widespread public involvement in environmental decision making has been looked at as a major instrument in the quest for sustainable development and reform. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), which are required by legislation to evaluate, mitigate and plan for the various environmental and social consequences of development projects, are amongst the initiatives fostering community participation in many countries. The idea of making public involvement a core element of an overall strategy for sustainable development was elucidated, inter alia, in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.35 Importantly, since the early days of the European Economic Community, there has been a strong commitment within what is now the EU to what has been termed ‘a citizen’s Europe’.36 However, commentators have not always been charitable about the UK’s commitment to environmental participation: In some cases, such as Britain, a tradition of official secrecy and ‘insider consultation’ appears to be limiting widespread citizen participation ... while in countries such as Norway (and other Scandinavian countries) political traditions of widespread participation and consensus-building among various stakeholders and interest groups have facilitated the effective incorporation of
33 Geddes, Protection of Individual Rights under EC Law, p 12. 34 Davis, Public Involvement in Environmental Decision Making. 35 Though see, also, UNECE, Guidelines on Access to Environmental Information and Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making, as endorsed in the Third Ministerial Conference, ‘Environment for Europe’. 36 Holland, European Community Integration, pp 64–65. 14
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
citizens, environmental associations and local governments into the environmental policy and decision making processes.37
There is evidence of limited access to both environmental information and decision making, not least over the industrial and water pollution control systems. This domination of decision making by insiders contrasts starkly with the Norwegian capacity ‘to integrate all sectors of the population into the policy making process without significant social upheavals, conflicts or disruptions’.38 The situation, however, is not one of unrelieved gloom. Local authorities, under the encouragement of the Local Government Management Board, has recently been active in promoting Agenda 21, the Rio Summit’s strategy for sustainable development. What is significant is that the agenda is not seen as being limited to ‘narrow’ environmental issues, but embraces the social, economic, cultural and political life of localities. The agenda covers the issues which arise when a local authority negotiates its relationship with citizens in general, so that new forms of local democracy are not an option when implementing Agenda 21, rather: ‘they are central and unavoidable.’ They will, in turn, require action by national governments and the EU.
PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LIFE Let the right to form associations and groups and to engage in social action as part of interactive nature be ceded. The State then has a duty to encourage action in and rights within voluntary organisations, but there is a need to go further and to argue for the right to participate in civil, social and industrial organisation. Choice, action and participation are generic rights and can be limited only by special justification. Isolation is not a natural condition, and there are clear existential linkages between being human and engaging in associative conduct. No unreasonable – that is, non-mutual – impediment should impair the right to choose in concert with others whose aims are shared. Not only must the State not inhibit such associative conduct, but it has a duty to create or nurture the conditions for associative possibility. The present situation with respect to industrial participation is one too greatly characterised by compulsion for dignity and ‘signal to signal’ bargaining in genuinely free markets. If the constitution were to speak of the right to participate, buttressed, in this respect, by the right to associate and accompanied by the State’s duty to encourage participation, we should be
37 Davis, Public Involvement in Environmental Decision Making, p xi. 38 Ibid, p 47. 15
Promoting Participation
moving in the right direction. Under such circumstances, an ombudsman or court could find that, in any given situation, not enough progress had been made, and might recommend the kinds of remedies used by, for example, the Indian courts. These have been shown to be much more flexible than those to which we in the West are accustomed. For example, fact-finding commissions have been established which report back to the court, government itself has been required to issue detailed progress reports, and the like.39 This is to envisage a role for the court/ombudsman as, inter alia, a social auditor. We should not be deflected by anti-court sentiments which satirise the legal order as being simply about the brutal business of imposing simple-minded sanctions. It is gratifying that there is some evidence from unexpected quarters that these unfashionable ideas about the potential of the legal order are being picked up. Rights to fair treatment in health and social care are at last being developed by radical thinkers who have begun to argue for the monitoring of such rights through the Social Services Inspectorate, Audit Commission and/or ombudsman systems.40 By all common and standard measures of human rights and choice, individual citizens must be able to demand not only dignity (the unpacking of the implications of which is assisted by examination of various International Labour Organisation standards), but also the right to have one’s personal choice feed into the collective (that is, the firm’s) decision making. It is inescapably the case that the untrammelled capitalism does not operate through true consent. Even if there is tacit consent to ‘pure’ market forces, then, since capitalism is never pure in that way, it must follow that regulating so that the rights of labour have substance must be legitimate. This is an area which is bound to be controversial, and yet the underlying human rights are easy enough to stake out and suggest no obvious limitations imposed by other than human rights needs. No consistent philosophy can presently be detected in the position over the rights of labour. There has been no attempt to work through the logic of respect for mutual choice in capitalist relations, and, of course, no deeper inquiry into the preconditions for choice to reign in the workplace or market-place. All of this makes it the more necessary for the constitution to provide the opportunity for ensuring that, as a nation, the implications of choice and human rights in all aspects of life are worked through.
39 Lewis, Choice and the Legal Order: Rising Above Politics, pp 135–36. 40 Bynoe, Rights to Fair Treatment: A Practical Study to Develop New Rights for People Seeking Health or Social Care. 16
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
STAKEHOLDING, COMPANY LAW AND EMPLOYEE PROTECTION The foregoing argument poses important questions for the now fashionable concept of ‘stakeholding’, for the reform of British company law and for a reexamination of employee protection. These are all issues which are extensively dealt with elsewhere in this book by John Parkinson. The way my overall argument embraces those issues needs briefly to be outlined. First, it is important to remind ourselves about the larger concerns which give rise to speculation about these areas of our ‘social’ life. Cole again provides the continuity. Although status meant, for very long periods of English history, marked inequalities, nevertheless, the privileged aspired to a loose, political enfranchisement reflected in distinctly ‘political’ arrangements buttressed by degrees of autonomy within a number of distinct ‘social’ spheres. But times change: There was a time, away back in the Middle Ages, when the State was only one of a number of social institutions and associations, all of which exercised, within their more or less clearly defined spheres of operation, a recognised social power and authority. During the period which followed the close of the Middle Ages, these other bodies were for the most part either swept away or reduced to impotence; but the effect of their disappearance was not, except to a limited extent for a time in the 16th and 17th centuries, the assumption of their powers by the State, but the passing of the social purposes which they had regulated outside the sphere of communal regulation altogether. Thus, the ground was cleared for the unguided operation of the Industrial Revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the vast structure of modern industrialism grew up without any attempt by Society, as an organised system, to direct it to the common advantage.41
In other words, there was a long-standing assumption of participation in the social enterprise, represented for some little time by the guilds which were not confined to the economic sphere but were ‘the common form of popular association’. 42 Industrialisation saw the relative decline of genuine participation in social organisation. There was a democratic commitment to ‘grand’ politics, whose forms and institutions, were, unfortunately, not updated to honour the sentiments underlying that commitment.43 The market came to be regarded as the economic equivalent of the democratic political process. Although, at its best, the market can make a genuine commitment to personal liberation, it is often not at its best. It can become dominated by
41 Cole, Guild Socialism Re-stated, p 29. 42 Ibid, p 42. 43 Lewis and Harden, The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and the Rule of Law. 17
Promoting Participation
private fiefdoms which have little pretension to anything other than profit maximisation. To quote Cole for the last time: ... such democracy as is recognised is conceived in a narrowly ‘political sense’, as applying to a quite peculiar sphere known as politics, and not in a broader and more comprehensive sense, as applying to all the acts which men do in association or conjunction ... They [‘democrats’] ignore the fact that vast inequalities of wealth and status ... are necessarily fatal to any real democracy, whether in politics or in any other sphere.44
Quite aside from the force of this argument in itself, it needs to be observed that socio-industrial organisations are often State-dependent, workerdependent and, indeed, dependent on a raft of institutions of civil society to which they often pay scant democratic respect, pleading instead the legitimacy of the market. Hence, the resurgence of the ‘stakeholder’ concept. For example, it is widely accepted that governments increasingly provide ‘public goods’, such as education and training, in which industry is often too short-sighted to invest. Not only are such goods increasingly important in the new technological revolution, but an insight into our proper priorities is afforded when skills and education are often described as ‘human capital’, for this makes it clear that it is human needs which must be respected, rather than man-made institutions which are the product of history and accident as well as of genuine desiderata.45 It is also by no means clear that the imperatives of private fiefdoms coincide with those of the governments which host their activities. For instance, investment is often thought by politicians to be inadequate given the longer term needs of national economies. To take one instance, the ratio of dividends to R and D spending in the UK is three and a half times higher than in the USA, 10 times higher than in Germany, and 13 times higher than in Japan.46 Furthermore, in the global free market economy, the ownership of industries once thought to be strategic is passing to those whose interests are very different from those of the previous owner. It is difficult to believe that this state of affairs can continue for long without draining the very lifeblood of democracy. It is important to restate some of these larger ideas in the face of those who believe that life is too fast-moving for governments to seek to intervene in order to reassert principle. Such people clearly are wrong, but it is important to stress that there is no simple progression between professed goals and current, shifting, power configurations. Experimentation and flexibility are crucial; but this was ever so, as witness JS Mill’s plea for ‘experiments in living’. In such shifting circumstances, it is important for the law, and
44 Cole, Guild Socialism Re-stated, p 14. 45 Thurrow, The Future of Capitalism. 46 TUC, Your Stake at Work, p 10. 18
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
constitutions in particular, to restate ancient truths and beliefs and instruct those with temporary influence over our affairs to do their utmost to put the empirical world back in touch with those truths. Reason, autonomy, and context-dependency should be in a constant state of dialectical discourse. It is important to note just how contemporary Mill sounds when placed in the middle of debates about rationality crises and New Public Management (NPM). Experiment, self-discovery and transparency (what Mill simply called ‘free speech’) are suddenly the buzz words of NPM. New Zealand is perhaps the leading example of the positive potential of NPM. In New Zealand, it is understood that not only is maximum transparency necessary for efficient and effective policy choice and performance, and that involvement of the public will increase the range of information available, but that public management techniques need to take account of the difficulties of long term, central planning. The distinguishing features of the new policy strategies are known as ‘SRAs’ and ‘KRAs’: The distinguishing features of SRAs and KRAs are their selectivity and flexibility. For all of the reasons that doom long term central planning, particularly the complexity and the uncertainty of the future, it is not possible to come up with a complete set of higher level strategic objectives, finely specified. The best we can do is pick out a few objectives, which given our understanding of the systems in which they are embedded, are most likely to exert the desired leverage on those systems.47
Attention must be paid to a number of thought provoking experiments in stakeholding. Unipart is an interesting example of a firm – the result of a management buy-out – which believes in long term partnerships with suppliers and employees. Unipart is moving forward without traditional trades unions while others, most notably the Trades Union Congress (TUC), see the latter as being an essential conduit for channelling collective concerns into the wider stakeholder debate. In opposition, the Labour Party seemed to be in touch with these ideas, arguing that trades unions should embrace change ‘and shape it for the benefit of all’.48 The Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector has argued that funders of voluntary sector projects should respect the diversity of the voluntary movement and actively seek to support experiment. Furthermore, schemes should be piloted to allow voluntary sector leaders to be placed on business boards as non-executive directors and, in their pursuit of the ‘greatest value’, companies should develop long term relationships with the voluntary sector based on commonly identified goals.
47 State Services Commission, Strategic Management in Government: Extending the Reform Model in New Zealand, p 5. 48 Derek Foster, Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, speech at the IPMS Conference. 19
Promoting Participation
At the time of writing, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has announced an inquiry into how business can introduce democracy into the workplace and give staff the chance to influence company strategy. There is some evidence, he believes, to indicate that employee stakeholding results in more jobs, productivity, pay and profits. Much more radical suggestions exist. For example, Peter Drucker, a well known supporter of ‘pension fund socialism’, has promoted the search for a simple compulsory scheme in which every adult pays into a portable pension fund which could be drawn on for house purchase as well as pensions. The huge sums of money made available would boost markets, with contributions not being counted as taxable since they would go directly into personal accounts. Other ideas for a substantial reorganisation of the regulatory regime include the American ‘R-Corps’ and ‘RFunds’ aimed at producing responsible corporate and financial behaviour, ‘personal career funds’, formal reviews of management performance by nonexecutive directors as an alternative to the hostile takeover as a means of ensuring managerial accountability, and the like. Though there is no doubt that experimentation must be encouraged, in every context we are confronted by problems of contingency, newness and seeming impotence. The only response is to hold on to primary principles, to work at the empirical level and to encourage experiment. In the UK, much of the experimentation at local level is being encouraged by the Local Government Management Board through the Local Agenda 21 planning already mentioned. This initiative is already showing promising returns, with partnerships emerging in several local authorities. Davis is clear: While not all practitioners consciously view themselves as doing EIA, there is a great deal of experimentation throughout Western Europe in this area which has implications for the development of ‘best practice’ in terms of EIA theory and practice.49
COMPANY LAW AND EMPLOYEE PROTECTION This leads us ineluctably to the twinned issues of company law and employee protection. Although stakeholding is about more than industrial and financial life, there is no need to restate the larger issues of autonomy at this point. Rather, it is useful to ask the a middle range question: ‘what are companies for?’ Leaving aside the fact that most would accept that prosperity is better than poverty, and assuming that current forms of industrial organisation are best placed to achieve prosperity, we still must recognise that prosperity is merely a means of fulfilling individual autonomy. Individual autonomy is still the
49 Davis, Public Involvement in Environmental Decision Making, pp xii, 34–35, 60. 20
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
main concern, although commitment to autonomy in itself tells us little about what constitutes a legitimate distribution of prosperity’s spoils. One determinant of distribution, linked to autonomy, is consent to the decisions about distribution which are made, and this can be established only through some form of participation in those decisions. The claim that moral principles should be regarded as intruders in the industrial sphere cannot be allowed. That established, let us mark out some of the present features of companies and, in particular, British company law, which relate to participation. Others have developed these issues with more finesse, but it is as well to fit a few of them into the general picture. The legal position of employees, for the moment at least, 50 is not compatible with personal dignity or autonomy. Their participation in the industrial enterprise, directly or indirectly, makes them entirely subordinate. For many years, redundancy has been a constant threat, against which employees have been more or less powerless. Recognising this, the EU has sought to protect employees during a take-over. Hence, the Business Transfer Directive adopted in 1977. Its existence, for all its weaknesses (and it is important to note that it does not apply where a company changes hands through a purchase of shares, although this is the way in which almost all take-overs occur in the UK), is a tribute to arguments of the sort being made here. It is useful to note the protective laws requiring the negotiation of social plans to mitigate the effects of redundancies in several European countries.51 The harshness of UK company law in failing to protect employees is legendary, while the sound without real fury about corporate governance in recent years testifies to the fact that companies are not, in any very direct sense at least, promoting the Commonweal. Too few directors face regular reelection, institutional shareholders are inert, and individual shareholders face expense and difficulty in proposing resolutions at annual meetings. It is trite to remark that company law elsewhere is, to a greater or lesser extent, aware of its wider obligations. The German Constitution’s concern for employees is well known, while the Maastricht Social Chapter, for all its manifest weaknesses thus far, has been the cause of considerable controversy. Moves on a EU company statute are currently stalled over worker rights. Whatever the eventual outcome, it seems clear that change is in the air, as witness the establishment of the Centre for Tomorrow’s Company, set up by the Royal Society of Arts to further the recommendations of the 1996 Tomorrow’s Company Report. These included company boards of directors’
50 Changing technology may ultimately mean that labour becomes a relatively unimportant commodity in industrial production. If and when that occurs, the State will have to address itself to means of providing material disbursements to assist the development of personal autonomy. The ‘ownership’ of capital, I believe, could not then continue in its present form. 51 TUC, Your Stake at Work, p 37. 21
Promoting Participation
adoption of explicit values, the monitoring of key relationships, and the duty to pay regard to the interests of the company as a whole, rather than simply to shareholders. That being said, however, the recent Hampel Committee report on corporate governance appears to swim against the tide by arguing for more concern with shareholders and less with ‘accountability’. However, a number of commentators believe that many of the corporate clashes and scandals of the last decade have seen shareholders ‘kept in the dark’. 52 Hampel has not been well received by critics of the status quo and it remains to be seen how influential it will prove to be in light of the present Government’s plans for a fundamental review of company law. It is worth mentioning too that the current system of corporate governance reflects an earlier stage of capitalism, when finance for setting up and investing in companies was raised primarily from individuals who were dependent upon other people to undertake day to day management. The present law merely encourages take-overs, which independent research has shown to have little or no beneficial impact on performance.53 In order to come to terms with reality, and to encourage the recognition of wider responsibilities, company law will have to be reformed. In my view, the centrality of the corporation requires that the basic moral framework of corporate governance should be set out in the constitution itself. Whether the EU can work significant change in this respect depends on whose hunches we back. The EU starts from the International Labour Organisation’s proposition that ‘labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce’ and Art 117 of the Treaty of Rome is clear that Member States should ‘promote improved living conditions and standards of living for workers’. It is important to say a word about the legitimacy of State intervention in the affairs of ‘private companies’ in order to head off anticipated criticism: [Companies’] actions are made possible by a combination of legal protections and other facultative devices which make it abundantly clear that the State facilitates their conduct. They are not simply players in a market place but frequently are favoured players in a constructed market place. If this is correct, then the State has the right to remake the terms and conditions of operations in the market to reflect the human rights which the State is established to protect … Both the rights of citizens and the needs of the economy require that the system of corporate governance reflects codes of duty as well as of rights. This is demanded of citizens: no less … should be expected of collectivities.54
It cannot be right to grant autonomy and more than autonomy to configurations of capital with the power to destroy careers and communities
52 Jackson, ‘FT com.guide to: corporate governance’. 53 TUC, Your Stake at Work, p 11. 54 Lewis, Choice and the Legal Order: Rising Above Politics, p 194. 22
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
and to pretend that all citizens are equally invested with a real measure of choice. A benign system of company law would respect those concerns, whether that respect be required by primary legislation or, as I have suggested would be better, entrenched. It may be thought that special status ought to be given to the rules which govern finance and industry and it made clear that they are distinctly constitutional concerns.
THE CITIZEN AS EMPLOYEE No attempt will be made here to analyse the general state of employee rights, but rather I will confine myself to fitting the position of employees into my general argument. The right to associate seems a useful place to start. Leaving aside the fact that it is recognised as fundamental in so many constitutional texts, the right to associate is one of the most self-evident propositions following from social co-existence. It is an elemental form of participation. People need to express themselves collectively as well as individually in order to make common cause and a common case, to pool their resources, and freely to associate in a common endeavour. The case was put in 1948 by Lord Beveridge: In a totalitarian State or in a field made into a State monopoly, those dissatisfied with the institutions that they find can seek a remedy only by seeking to change the Government of the country. In a free society ... they have a different remedy; discontented individuals with new ideas can make a new institution to meet their needs. The field is open to experiment or failure.55
This argument is not limited to the industrial or provident sector, but also extends to the voluntary sector. The 1996 NCVO Report is clear that the freedom of citizens to engage in voluntary action ‘is crucial to the health of democracy’.56 Any abridgement of this fundamental right needs to be cogently argued from first principles. This is patently not what has happened in recent years. Constitutional entrenchment therefore is a necessary corrective to the abridgement which nevertheless has occurred. The right to associate and to form associations is common currency in the constitutions and treaties of the world. Genuine participation also requires a degree of spiritual and material freedom. Given the continuing centrality of work, core labour standards need equally to be observed. To this extent trades unions are fully entitled to campaign for the universal acceptance of those standards by countries and
55 Beveridge, Voluntary Action, p 60. 56 Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector, Meeting the Challenge of Change: Voluntary Action into the 21st Century, para 5.5.2. 23
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global corporations, something to which even the WTO now pays lip service. The TUC is also fully entitled in the court of morals to argue at least for workers to be afforded the legal right to consultation before decisions affecting them are taken.57 Beyond these basic measures, the nature and extent of participation is bound to be experimental. For instance, the American Federation of LabourConfederation of Industrial Organisations is harnessing workers’ pension money in order to make corporations more responsible to workers, to create jobs and security; the EU is experimenting with territorial employment pacts to give maximum added value to the structural funds; and the TUC is actively promoting employee representation committees with a wide range of responsibilities, for example, for disciplinary procedures and training and production methods. Proposals also exist for ‘employment impact’ statements, analogous to EIAs, which would be required whenever plans were afoot to relocate, change employment practices, or down-size. Once more, the EU is potentially the most active player. The ‘social partners’ are a fact of Community life, with their roles potentially far reaching. Currently, of course, those partners must be consulted by the Commission when proposing labour and social policy initiatives which take their impetus from Art 118 of the Treaty of Rome as amended by the Single European Act. There are fashions in social policy, and some see the Working Time Directive as a sign of the resurgence of the radical version of worker rights set out in the Paris Treaty which established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).58 It may perhaps be the case that this sign points ultimately to a ‘social constitution’ for the EU. There are clearly prime movers who envisage an active, combined, labour/social policy, as was suggested by the Green Paper on the future of labour policy of November 1993. This Green Paper speaks the language of participation in decision making processes and, most notably, the language of ‘reconciliation’ between work and home life. This is a concept with dramatic potential,59 not just for work but for the whole spirit of community, a spirit entirely in keeping with the philosophy of this chapter. As with company law, new labour legislation promoting active rights to participate in the workplace are required, but again such legislation will need the additional protection of constitutional status. Before examining the nature of that status, I will first say a little about what, for the sake of argument, I will call the social market economy.
57 TUC, Your Stake at Work, p 41. 58 Bercusson, European Labour Law, pp 346–47. 59 Ibid, ch 15. 24
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY As I will argue more fully in Chapter 12, some of the post-Second World War constitutions, including the German, the Indian, and those of the former Iron Curtain countries, display a degree of suppleness and subtlety lacking in earlier times. Germany boasts a social market constitution, while India has its celebrated ‘directive principles’ of the Constitution which nestle just below the Bill of Rights and yet enjoy a status higher than ‘ordinary laws’. Article 38(1), for example, reads: The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of national life.
Not only do the constitutions of the former Eastern bloc countries seek to underwrite social protection through declarations about a ‘social State’, albeit committed to market principles, but references to dignity, freedom and democratic entitlements abound. Nearly all these constitutions have been drafted in close consultation with the Council of Europe, and there now is a body of distinguished opinion emerging that a modern constitution owes deeper obligations to the human condition than those considered at earlier periods in the free world’s history.60 Whilst first generation civil and political rights remain, of course, of the highest importance, and recent UK legislative proposals to enhance these are examined in this book by John Wadham, determining the potential of constitutionally providing of second generation social and political rights to foster participation is, perhaps, the most crucial issue in current debate about participation. It is examined in this book by Mary Seneviratne, and by myself in Chapter 12. Perhaps the ‘social market economy’ can be traced back to the West German Constitution after the Second World War. 61 This Constitution includes the rights of property and inheritance, freedom of choice in the exercise of a trade or profession, freedom to form or join economic or trade associations, freedom of economy and commerce flowing from the general right to personality, and the principle of the social Welfare State. The former ECSC espouses similar values by not only proclaiming a commitment to democracy as the only system of government, but also a commitment to economic liberty and free market economics. The new constitution of South Africa also refers not only to basic civil and political rights, but to socioeconomic rights such as the right to education, housing and language. One commentator has remarked that: ‘notions of democracy, transparency,
60 On the dilemmas involved in invoking ‘positive’ rights, see Sunstein, ‘Against positive rights’, pp 35–38. 61 Kommers, Politics and Commerce in the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Documents. 25
Promoting Participation
participation, accountability and intelligibility have been at the forefront of the minds of the constitution makers’.62 All this chimes well with the increasing recognition around the world that changing circumstances call for changing responses, to which witness the former US Secretary for Labour’s determination to ‘take up arms against sweatshops’, both in the US itself and in the territories of its suppliers, a response that needs greater formalisation if the global economy is not to continue to leave ‘millions of disaffected workers in its train’.63 The principle is, of course, what matters, although recent surveys indicate that, at least in the United States, access to cheap labour is a rapidly decreasing priority for manufacturing companies investing abroad.64 This coincides with signs that the UK is beginning to shift on EU social policy, with a number of blue chip companies having already begun to comply with aspects of the Social Chapter even before the election of a Labour Government. In other words, we have the arguments and the pressure is mounting. What now is needed is an institutional and preferably constitutional response. This is not to downgrade individual responsibility. On the contrary, as Gewirth argues, while the State must seek to enable persons to be productive agents on their own behalf: ‘it is a serious error to confuse the desirability of this aim with the belief that it is already fully within the powers or abilities of the persons or groups in question.’ He is in no doubt that this entails positive legal rights.65 It is worth noting that, leaving aside the former communist countries, social and economic rights are now established in the constitutions of Spain, Portugal, Greece and the Netherlands, which have all influenced the EU’s Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers in 1989.66 A commitment to broad participative rights could well be reflected in the ‘directive principles’ of constitutions, their preambles, and perhaps, to some extent in Bills of Rights, which would leave it to successive governments to work out, with judicial assistance, the most appropriate way to secure those rights.67 In any event, my argument is that participative concerns, some of which will need at any given time to be ranked, are genuinely constitutional concerns. Protecting the rights of human beings within a social setting of their own or their predecessors’ creation is pre-eminently a task for the constitution. All this suggests that, at a time when the sense of personal and national 62 63 64 65 66
Sacks, ‘Due process in making a constitution’, pp 1237–38. Wolf, ‘The dilemma of inequality’. de Jonquieres, ‘Cheap labour loses its allure’. Gewirth, The Community of Rights, pp 5, 59. For an extensive treatment of this topic, see Bercusson, ‘Fundamental social and economic rights in the European Community’. 67 There may be some mileage in considering the former US practice of ‘public interest litigation’, which would advance participation at the level of the courtroom. More seminally the argument seems to be for a constitutional principle of equality as citizens, and not just equality before the law. 26
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
identity is not as secure as it once was, a restoration of national instincts and sentiments is called for in circumstances where raw politics must learn to accept second place. In the interests of clarity, it should be said that participation does not avoid the problem of scarce resources. Human rights, including the right to participate, is one thing. The staking out of ‘wants’ is another. Whereas participation in the ‘wants’ argument must not be circumscribed, in some circumstances it may ultimately only be expressible through ‘voting procedures’. These matters require further attention and there is no advantage in being dogmatic at this juncture.
REGULATION Regulation of private fiefdoms is a worldwide phenomenon. It has, of course, been especially important in relation to the utilities since the early 1980s. In the UK, regulation has often been criticised as constituting a private bargain between the ‘expert’ regulator and the regulated industry, as Tony Prosser points out in this book. The arrangements for public participation in the regulatory process have been pragmatic and piecemeal, sometimes involving intermediary, though non-elected, bodies representing a supposed public interest, and, less frequently, by direct intervention by interested publics. It is early in the life of the new British Government, but proposals for reform already abound. The most radical moves have undoubtedly been made through the discretionary activities of the Director General of OFTEL, most recently through the development of regulatory proceedings modelled on those in the US which positively encourage participation by interested groups and the appointment of an advisory body on fair trading in telecommunications.68 I have argued elsewhere that statutory rights of intervention in decision making by the utilities ought to be introduced in order to enfranchise interested citizens and groups.69 Backed by a more general constitutional right to participate, the opportunity to fashion flexible but effective methods for public intervention would be greatly enhanced in this way.
68 OFTEL, Improving Accountability. 69 Lewis, ‘Participation, citizenship and the community’. 27
Promoting Participation
THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER In the days of the socialist thinkers such as Tawney and Cole, there was much discussion of the ‘extra-constitutionality’ of capitalist organisations. We do not have to accept their analysis of where these organisations fit into the larger commonweal (for example, they represented the same class as holds social and economic authority in the community and political authority in the State), to observe that this discussion was, in many senses, extremely acute. Starting, as I have, with a claim for autonomy, I soon moved towards the position where participation is seen as an essential expression of that autonomy. I pointed out that this meant not only participation in the political process (broadly conceived) and as (reformed) market player, but in all other salient aspects of interpersonal expression: community and social life, the relations between labour and capital, and so on. To a very real extent then, leaving salient aspects of ‘collective’ life free-standing, without direct respect for individual autonomy, is unacceptable and a matter for constitutional redress. This is why reworked fundamental human rights lie at the heart of constitutions. What is needed is a redefinition of social, industrial and financial institutions and patterns in order to identify potential methodologies for advancing participation, either directly or through representative institutions. However, at the apex of the constitution we ought to be able to work at a new level of generality, working in the belief that fundamental principles can be translated, through exhortation, experiment, research and novelty, into the whole range of publicly approved and/or facilitated activities. This obviously involves an expanded role for the legal order. To paraphrase Nonet and Selznick, the actions of political and other elites are not self-legitimating. The question whether those elites are acting in the larger public interest requires a separate assessment.70 That assessment must, ultimately, be for the courts. Personal autonomy presently requires, as it always did, a high degree of legal autonomy manifested in the separation of the guardians of the constitution from the supposed authority of those who presume to act under it. Courts should not, of course, be the bread and butter of our constitutional diet, but there is no doubt that they should be the icing on the cake: The case being made … is that a new constitutional settlement should be comprised of both a Preamble stating our beliefs about ourselves in very general terms, primary constitutional rights (albeit a more extensive list than normally envisaged, embracing, for example, equality, natural justice, participation, etc) and a layer of ‘directive principles’ to borrow the Indian phrase. The social and economic rights should probably be straddled between the primary rights and the directive principles. Over a period of time these 70 Nonet and Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Towards Responsive Law; and Lewis, ‘Participation, citizenship and the constitution’, p 117. 28
The Constitutional Implications of Participation
latter could be expected to play a crucial role, elaborating upon the primary rights under changing conditions and in the context of the needs of the times, the pace of social movements and expectations and so on. Furthermore, if we abandon our beliefs that courts or other legal institutions are only suitable for defining simple rights/duties/entitlements then we can see how our constitutional expectations could unfold gently and, hopefully, consensually.71
For a while now, such talk has been unfashionable. Minimal government and minimal State have been elided as a necessary response to global technology. The worm, however, is beginning to turn.
CONCLUSIONS There is a good deal of both theoretical and empirical work to be done to put flesh on these conceptual bones. In particular individual branches of the law need to be re-examined to see how far they can be redesigned to give force to the rights of citizens to a greater degree of participation in all forms of social organisation.72 Apart from an irreducible private sphere (which itself needs to be guaranteed by an assertion of social and economic rights), participation needs to be reasserted across the whole of the social organisation. Discrete work needs to be done, not only in the field of public law, politics and public administration, but in the field of social welfare (which has perhaps been underplayed in this chapter),73 education and health, company and competition law, the law of voluntary organisations, labour, the cooperative movements, charity and community law, labour, the environment and more besides. An assessment will also need to be made of the operation of the constitutions of the former Iron Curtain countries, perhaps through a contribution from the Council of Europe or the Venice Commission on Human Rights. Each of these areas needs to be examined to look for methods of improving participation by individuals and groups and for offering insights into just how specific constitutional principles can afford to be in this area. It is hoped that the contributions to this book will explore the implications of these issues in most of the areas in which it is most pressing that those implications assessed.
71 Lewis, ‘Participation, citizenship and the constitution’, pp 117–18. 72 The discourse would be greatly enhanced by lawyers specialising in individual disciplines taking the new constitutional claims on board. 73 Though see, now, Bynoe, Rights to Fair Treatment: A Practical Study to Develop New Rights for People Seeking Health or Social Care, who argues for fair treatment in the process by which individuals seek fair treatment. This, significantly, argues for customer views being taken into account in deciding about access or planning provision to meet their needs. The objective is ‘to promote individual autonomy and choice’. 29
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It does not seem logically possible to deny arguments in favour of autonomy and, therefore, of participation. They lie at the core of human personality and, as such, lay special claim to constitutional status. That making the world a better place is difficult is not an argument for denying that the attempt to do so should be made. Accepting the limits of the possible, the legal order is nevertheless capable, through flexible analysis, effective remedies, and reformed procedures, of making a crucial contribution. At present, in the absence of an appropriate institutional impetus, we do not even understand the limits of the possible.
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CHAPTER 2
PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL SOCIETY
Kevin Dowd
PROFESSOR DOUGLAS LEWIS ON PARTICIPATION In the previous chapter, Douglas Lewis has grappled bravely with many of the key constitutional, social and political questions of our time, and manages to bring them together in a uniquely thought provoking and provocative way. I find myself agreeing with him on a number of points, the most important of which is that we both start with the absolute primacy and inalienability of individual human rights, and following from this premise, on the corresponding need to ensure that all economic, social and political institutions are, at the very least, compatible with those rights. We also agree on the superiority of decentralised over centralised institutional arrangements, and we both share serious concerns about the tendency over the last two decades to centralise power in this country in a secretive and often unaccountable central government. Movements to break Whitehall’s grip and devolve powers back towards the people are therefore to be welcomed. So, too, is recent talk of community politics, stakeholding, and so forth – provided it does actually lead to worthwhile reforms and is not just more hot air or, worse, would lead to yet further violations of the individual human rights. Nonetheless, whilst we agree on the primacy of human rights, we disagree on what those rights actually are. Because of this, we also disagree on what they imply and, most particularly, on what they imply for the relationship between the individual and the State. However, before proceeding further, I should emphasise that my disagreements are not so much with Douglas in particular, as with the general philosophy of which he is such a prominent exponent. I should also add that I have no illusions about which philosophy would currently win out in a popularity contest. Douglas articulates, and develops, much of the leading edge thinking on constitutional issues, and most constitutional (and many other) scholars would largely agree with him. By contrast, I support a radically different philosophy and, therefore, when engaging in a discussion of constitutional issues, find myself cast somewhat in the role of the ghost at the banquet. To make matters worse, this particular ghost has no expertise in those issues, and the expertise he does have, such as it is, is in the black arts of the dismal science.
31
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The root of the difference between Douglas and myself is the old issue of positive rights. Whilst we both believe in the classic negative rights (that is the rights to life, liberty and property), he believes in a variety of additional, positive, rights (for example, the right to be provided with adequate housing), and I do not. My main objection to such ‘rights’ is that they imply that someone else must be liable for the means to satisfy them, so my right to a house implies that someone else must provide the house for me. Unfortunately, the obligation of that other person to provide me with a house does not square with their freedom to life and property (that is, their freedom not to provide a house for me). My positive freedoms would undermine other people’s negative ones. The idea that we can have both positive and negative rights is therefore an illusion. We must choose one or the other, and I choose the latter. There are also other problems with positive rights. Most obviously, how are such rights determined and how are they different from the merely desirable? Also, how do we ensure that these rights – whatever they are – are satisfiable, and what mechanisms ensure that individuals’ positive rights are actually satisfied? This difference over positive rights leads, in turn, to differences over the role and, indeed, legitimacy of the State. Given his belief in positive rights, Douglas quite naturally sees a role for the State in ensuring that people’s positive rights are satisfied. This implies a certain view of the constitution as an enabling institution, or set of institutions. In that view, the task of the constitutional scholar is to clarify these rights and spell out the mechanisms on which their satisfaction depends – to put flesh on the constitutional bones, as it were. However, I have no sympathy with this view of the constitution because it violates true (that is, negative) rights, and I believe that no constitution that violates these rights is worth having. Be this as it may, I also believe that the constitutional project that Douglas and other scholars are working on will inevitably collapse under the weight of its own internal contradictions. It is doomed to fail because there is no way of identifying rights or, more precisely, separating out rights, on the one hand, from desires, demands, or whatever, on the other. What will happen – what is happening – is that over time more and more demands become elevated into ‘rights’ and the constitution – the supposed guarantor of our rights – becomes increasingly unable to cope. Conflicts between different ‘rights’ grow and are never resolved; mechanisms to enforce ‘rights’ become more complex and contradictory and lose whatever effectiveness they might once have had; and the danger is that we effectively lose the rights we had in the first place. True – and very limited – notions of rights are replaced with an ever-growing wish list of trendy pseudo-rights, and the constitutional ship – which was never particularly seaworthy at the best of times – slowly sinks under the deadweight of its cargo. ‘Rights’ multiply like medieval religious relics and, in the process, lose all value and meaning. A constitutional Martin Luther will
32
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then appear and sweep these useless rights away, and the danger is that he will sweep away the good ones as well.
CIVIL SOCIETY: AN INDIVIDUALIST VIEW The only alternative is to abandon positive rights entirely and work on the basis of negative rights alone. So what are our negative rights? The answer is the classic libertarian one: that each individual or group of individuals is free to do as he or they wish, regardless of race, gender, religion or any other distinguishing characteristics, subject only to the constraint of not violating the equal rights of other individuals or groups of individuals.1 This right to be free is also inalienable and can, I believe, be grounded in a theory of natural rights.2 This position has some far-reaching implications. If no individual or group has any justification for violating the equal rights of others, then the State too has no such right. In the words of Murray Rothbard: ... the libertarian refuses to give the State the moral sanction to commit acts that almost everyone agrees would be immoral, illegal, and criminal if committed by any person or group in society. The libertarian … insists on applying the general moral law to everyone, and makes no special exemptions for any person or group.3
No group – the State included – therefore has any legitimacy, other than that rooted firmly in, and consistent with, the rights of individuals. Consequently, the libertarian has no time for theories of state sovereignty or state legitimacy based on gobbledegook like the divine rights of kings, nonsense about fictional social contracts, or the equally indefensible modern day belief that State legitimacy derives from some mysterious ‘mandate’ from the people (for example, via popular votes), as if the ‘people’ (or, more properly, some subset of them) are free to give away the rights of others: no group, however big, has any right to infringe the rights of others, or delegate others to do so on their behalf. The fact that some bandits 1,500 years ago murdered their way to political power gives neither them nor their successors nor their successor institutions – kings or parliaments – a right to rule the rest of us, and never did. There is no divine right of kings, there never was any social contract, and the fact that modern parliaments are democratically elected is irrelevant. Again, to quote Rothbard:
1 2 3
Boaz, Libertarianism: A Primer; Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to a Radical Capitalism; and Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. Eg, Miller and Steinbauer, ‘A new defence of natural rights’. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, p 24. 33
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The State habitually commits mass murder, which it calls ‘war’, or sometimes ‘suppression of subversion’; the State engages in enslavement into its military forces, which it calls ‘conscription’; and it lives and has its being in the practice of forcible theft, which it calls ‘taxation’. The libertarian insists that whether or not such practices are supported by the majority of the population is not germane to their nature: that, regardless of popular sanction, War is Mass Murder, Conscription is Slavery, and Taxation is Robbery.4 The libertarian, in short, is almost completely the child in the fable, pointing out insistently that the emperor has no clothes.5
Economic defence of anarchy This individualist position can be justified in a variety of ways,6 which are by no means necessarily the ways most often associated with that position.7 One of the more compelling justifications is in terms of economic theory. In economic analysis, the key criterion that determines whether any policy or institution is justified is that of ‘Pareto optimality’, or ‘efficiency’. A policy (or institution) is efficient (and so justified) if it is not possible to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off. Policies and institutions are therefore justified in economic terms if they lead to efficiency, and not justified otherwise. If I wish to establish that a particular institution is justified, I therefore need to show that an economic outcome without that particular 4
5 6
7
Some statists have attempted to defend taxation on the grounds that it is somehow ‘voluntary’. Rothbard’s response is typically to the point: ‘Anyone who truly believes in the “voluntary” nature of taxation is invited to refuse to pay taxes and to see what then happens.’ (Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, p 26.) The fact that some politicians pass a law compelling me to pay taxes does not make my payment of taxes a voluntary act on my part, and the fact that a group of other individuals might have voted them in to pass such a law still does not make it voluntary. To say that taxation is ‘voluntary’ is an abuse of the language. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, pp 24–25. Ethically, the libertarian position can be defended on the grounds that people can only behave ethically if they are free to choose: the freedom of the individual is, therefore, indispensable to any morally good society (Johnson, ‘Freedom: the moral foundation’). Machan summarises the argument very elegantly: ‘A central feature of an objective moral value judgment and conduct is that a person must be able to choose … Bona fide moral theorists have all understood that one cannot force others to behave morally – moral conduct must be the agent’s own choosing ... So a central feature of morally relevant conduct is that it is chosen and if imposed or regimented, its moral significance vanishes … If one behaved as a good citizen or a charitable person simply because one is dreadfully scared of the State placing one in jail, one would not be a good citizen or person, but barely more than a circus animal. So it is wrong to confuse conduct one should have engaged in of one’s own free will with regimented behavior imposed by some planning authority, politburo or regulatory agency. There is, in short, no such thing as coerced moral conduct.’ (Machan, ‘Two kinds of individualism: a critique of ethical subjectivism’, p 3.) The strength of the anarchist position is also apparent from the devastating critiques made by anarchists of Nozick’s attempts to justify the State in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Eg, Barnett, ‘Whither anarchy? Has Robert Nozick justified the State?’; Childs, ‘The invisible hand strikes back’; and Rothbard, ‘Robert Nozick and the immaculate conception of the State’. 34
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institution is Pareto dominated by an outcome with that particular institution. This usually comes down to an issue of whether or not one can demonstrate ‘market failure,’ with the justification for any given policy or institution that it corrects for (that is, represents a Pareto improvement over) some ‘failure’ (for example, such as the generation of inefficient externalities) that would otherwise occur in the absence of the institution being considered.8 However, whilst economists are generally agreed that this is the correct way to think about whether State institutions are justified, nonetheless most economists also regard the justification of the State as obvious (that is, they have actually given very little thought to the issue). Yet this position, like many other ‘obvious’ ones (for example, such as the flatness of the earth), fails to withstand close scrutiny. The weakness of conventional economic thinking on this issue is best highlighted by examining those instances where the case for State involvement is usually considered to be strongest – in the provision of public goods, law and order, and money and banking.9
Public goods The provision of public goods10 was long regarded as a classic area where market failure justified government intervention.11 The argument was that the non-rivalrous nature of public good consumption and/or the inability to exclude others from consuming public goods made it impossible for private producers to make a sufficient return from producing those goods to induce those producers to provide such goods (to the optimal level). However, this 8
If one is to demonstrate Pareto superiority (or the lack of it), it is very important to avoid loose thinking over the meanings of the terms ‘market failure’ or ‘externality’. A ‘market failure’ must imply some form of inefficiency (that is Pareto inferiority) and (although many writers seem to forget this) is not to be confused with an outcome (eg, large scale inequality of wealth) that a particular writer might not like. The fact that I do not like a particular outcome does not make it a market failure in the proper sense of the term. Similarly, if we are trying to justify particular institutions or policies, the only relevant ‘externalities’ are Pareto relevant ones, and these are much more specific than mere external effects (eg, the owner of a petrol station who is economically harmed by the opening up of a competitor across the street faces an external effect, but, not a Pareto relevant externality). Again, loose discussion will undermine whatever validity the exercise might have had. 9 Note, too, that the argument put forward in the text understates the case for anarchy because it does not consider the direct operating costs of the State itself, nor the deadweight, disincentive and other costs associated with raising revenue for the State via taxation, and both these costs are very large. When one takes these costs into account, the economic case for anarchy is therefore even stronger than the text suggests. 10 A public good is a good with one or more of two characteristics: non-excludability, referring to the impossibility of preventing non-paying individuals from enjoying whatever services the good provides; and non-rivalness in consumption, meaning that consumption by one person does not diminish the consumption available to others. See Cowen, ‘Public goods and externalities: old and new perspectives’. 11 Samuelson, ‘The pure theory of public expenditure’; and Bator, ‘The anatomy of market failure’. 35
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argument overlooks the large number of ingenious ways in which the private sector is able to overcome these obstacles and provide public goods.12 The argument that the private sector would not produce public goods is also refuted by abundant empirical evidence that the private sector has been able to provide them, a famous case being the private provision of lighthouses in the UK before the mid-19th century.13
Law and order The provision of law and order is often cited as another textbook case of the necessity of government involvement. However, when examined more closely, it turns out that the private sector has both the incentive and the means of evolving its own legal codes, and the means to enforce compliance with them.14 Once again, there are also many historical cases of such private systems of law and order, and they appear to have functioned well.15
Money and banking The provision of a sound currency and a safe financial system is another area where the need for State intervention has often been taken for granted. However, recent work on private monetary and financial systems has established that both of these can be provided – and provided well – in a laissez faire environment without any government involvement. 16 These claims are also confirmed by recent research on the relatively unregulated systems of the past, which, by and large, provided both sounder currency and stronger banks than we have had since the widespread adoption of central banking systems in the early 20th century.17
12 Cowen (ed), The Theory of Market Failure: A Critical Examination. 13 This particular example was brilliantly discussed in Coase, ‘The lighthouse in economics’. Some other examples are the interdependence of beekeeping and orchards (Cheung, ‘The fable of the bees: an economic investigation’) and the provision of fire protection and public leisure and recreational services (Poole, Cutting Back City Hall). 14 These claims are amply justified in, eg, Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State; Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to a Radical Capitalism; Osterfeld, ‘Anarchism and the public goods issue: law, courts and the police’; Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto; and Wooldridge, Uncle Sam, Monopoly Man. 15 These cases are further discussed below. 16 Dowd, The State and the Monetary System; Dowd, Competition and Finance: A New Interpretation of Financial and Monetary Economics; and Selgin, The Theory of Free Banking: Money Supply Under Competitive Note Issue. 17 These cases include, among others, the early banking systems of Australia, Canada, Ireland, Scotland, Switzerland, and many of the state banking systems in the antebellum US (Dowd (ed), The Experience of Free Banking). 36
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Historical examples The individualist position is also borne out by a number of cases of societies that appeared to function well in the absence of any recognisable State involvement. Some examples are the medieval law merchant,18 which governed mercantile trade for centuries; the legal systems of Anglo-Saxon England;19 saga Iceland;20 medieval Ireland;21 and even those of the frontier areas of the 19th century US, that is, the not so Wild West.22 These and other cases of stateless (or nearly stateless) social order confirm that anarchy is not chaos, and that private agencies will provide for the preservation of social order, and, in so doing, develop and/or use their own systems of legal rules. These cases also indicate that stateless social orders are relatively peaceful, because most parties to disputes have incentives to seek less costly (that is, peaceful) rather than expensive (that is violent) means of resolving disputes. This applies even to the so called ‘Wild West’, which, notwithstanding all the cowboy movies, actually turns out to have been very orderly and peaceful, and far more so than the US today. Another prominent feature of these peaceful spontaneous orders was that they evolved their own, private, institutions to provide for major social needs – most prominently, institutions to provide for the support of those unable to look after themselves (for example, such as the unemployed, the disabled, and the very young and very old), educational institutions, and institutions to look after the sick. These institutions were funded and run on a voluntary, and often charitable, basis, and did not depend on State handouts. They were often also very successful in achieving their ends.23 For example, their effectiveness in the educational field is well illustrated by the fact that widespread literacy was first achieved in both America and Britain by privately funded education systems, well before State education systems were set up.24 Society is, thus, quite capable of developing institutions to handle all major social needs, without any ‘assistance’ from the State, and the idea that only the government is capable of providing social assistance, education and other services is another 20th century myth. 18 Benson, ‘The spontaneous evolution of commercial law’; Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State; and Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law. 19 Benson, ‘The spontaneous evolution of commercial law’; Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State, pp 21–30. 20 Miller, Blood Taking and Peacemaking: Feud Laws and Society in Saga Iceland. 21 Peden, ‘Property rights under Irish celtic law’. 22 Hollon, Frontier Justice: Another Look; and Anderson and Hill, ‘An American experiment in anarcho-capitalism: the not so wild, Wild West’. 23 Watner, ‘The most generous nation on earth: voluntaryism and American philanthropy’. 24 Watner, ‘An octopus would sooner release its prey: voluntaryism versus educational statism’. 37
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THE UNDERMINING OF CIVIL SOCIETY BY STATE INSTITUTIONS Unfortunately, the growth of the State also leads to the undermining and, indeed, destruction, of many of the institutions on which civil society depends. These institutions deteriorate as the State establishes rival institutions of its own, and these new institutions undermine the mechanisms on which the older ones depend. A classic example is the undermining of charitable institutions by state supported welfare systems.25 Without State support, altruistic individuals have a strong incentive to support charities they consider worthwhile – charities to support the unemployed, unwed mothers, and so on. The delivery of this charitable support also tends to be efficient because the donors have strong incentives to vet those who ask for support and discourage bogus requests for assistance, and also to ensure that those who receive charity are weaned off it as soon as possible. However, at some point the State intervenes to establish some social assistance system – welfare, social security, unemployment insurance, or whatever. Those who were formerly recipients of charity are then told that they can now receive State support as a matter of right, and therefore have much less need of charity than they used to have. At the same time, donors no longer have the same incentive to provide. After all, they are now providing anyway through the tax system, and the earlier moral imperative – the concern that if they do not give, other people would go wanting – no longer applies. They therefore cut back on their giving, and charity gives way to taxpayer-funded support programmes. Similar stories can also be told of the displacement of private institutions that cater to education,26 health27 and other social needs,28 and of their replacement by newer public sector rivals. This displacement of private institutions has other insidious (and all too apparent) effects. The creation of State entitlements leads the recipient to think that he somehow has a right to live off other people, as if they owe him a living and he has no responsibility to look after himself.29 For his part, the taxpayer is now forced to contribute whether he wants to or not, and regardless of his views on the uses to which his funds are put (so, for example, those who oppose abortion are forced to subsidise abortions, and the like). 25 26 27 28 29
Tanner, The End of Welfare: Fighting Poverty in the Civil Society, pp 131–49. Goldberg, Why Schools Fail. Ibid, Tanner, pp 169–72. Ibid, Tanner, pp 95–125. The creation of these entitlements is also morally bankrupt: ‘under the pretense of morality, politicians and advocacy groups have made the “right to welfare” the accepted dogma of a new State religion, in which politicians are the high priests and self-proclaimed ‘benefactors’ of humanity ... Politicians put on their moral garb, but there is really nothing there. Government benevolence, in reality, is a naked taking.’ Dorn, ‘The rise of government and the decline of morality’, p 9. 38
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The earlier monitoring of charitable activities by donors has now gone, and the government bureaucrats who administer the new programmes do not have the same incentives as their private sector predecessors to return their ‘clients’ to productive life. Indeed, their incentives are often to keep recipients on their books, and so perpetuate the social problems they are supposed to ameliorate. In effect, government now pays people to be behave anti-socially – to be indigent, and so forth – and the supply of anti-social behaviour naturally rises to meet the demand for it. It is not surprising, then, that huge amounts are spent on these programmes and yet the programmes themselves seem to have little success in reducing the problems they are ostensibly meant to alleviate. The proponents of these programmes are then left wondering why the underclass grows despite the vast amounts of money spent on programmes to assist these people. The reality is simply that the underclass grows precisely because so much money is thrown at it.30
IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION Participation and the political process So what does this individualist position imply about participation issues? One obvious implication is that participation in the activities of any institutions – social, political, or whatever – should be voluntary. If each individual is free, then he is free not to participate, and the decision whether or not to participate is for him alone. Forced participation violates that freedom, and is therefore indefensible. In concrete terms, this means that there should be no forced voting, no compulsory union membership, no conscription, no compulsory savings plans, no legal tender laws, no laws against smoking pot and so on. Logically, although many writers, even libertarian ones, are reluctant to acknowledge the point, it also means no compulsory payments to the government (that is, no taxation), an implication which, if implemented, would deprive the State of the financial resources it needs to survive. Taken to its logical conclusions, the principle of voluntary participation is, thus, extremely destructive (and, I believe, rightly so) of existing State institutions. Granted that individuals have the right not to participate in the activities of State institutions, the next question is whether or not they should participate in them. Obviously, this is an issue for each person to decide as they see it. Does one participate in dealings with State institutions, even though one might regard them as illegitimate, in the hope of making the best of a bad situation? Alternatively, does one refuse point blank to participate, so as to emphasise one’s freedom and deny State institutions any excuse of 30 Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950–80; and Tanner, The End of Welfare: Fighting Poverty in the Civil Society. 39
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legitimacy? This is a difficult and highly controversial issue, and different libertarians have given different answers to it.31 Some, therefore, participate in State institutions (albeit reluctantly, and perhaps under duress) whilst others do not. The argument for participation is the pragmatic (and not in itself unreasonable) one of making the best of it (for example, by voting for the least anti-libertarian of two political candidates). Most of us also participate under duress by paying our taxes (although some heroic anarchists, such as Thoreau, have steadfastly refused to pay taxes and been persecuted for it). However, participation also has its dangers. One danger is that participation strengthens the State institutions to which one is opposed, but there is also the associated danger that participation can corrupt the person who participates: The main tragedy of political government is that few people realise it is an immoral and impractical institution … They have been conditioned to accept government as a natural part of their environment. After being raised in a culture in which ‘politics’ is the norm, and after attending years of public school and being taught that political government is a necessary component of society, most people place government in the same category as the weather – something they complain about but can’t change ... Most people are capable of high values and responsible behaviour, but once they enter the seductive garden of politics, they no longer notice that its wonders cannot be reconciled with individual responsibility and their own personal moral values of honesty and hard work ... The main tragedy of political government is not only that the voters are the ones pointing the gun, but, most importantly, that the indecency of this act is veiled from them by the political process ... The secret ballot and the use of majority vote obscure the fact that it is the struggling family next door or the bachelor down the street who are being threatened at gunpoint if they do not fill the government’s coffers or follow its mandatest ... but the structure of politics permits this to be done anonymously, and allows the supporters and perpetrators to conceal – even from themselves – the evil nature of what they are doing.32
If one accepts this point of view, it follows that fostering participation in the political process is misguided because it gives that process a legitimacy it does not deserve: Participation is an instrument of conquest because it encourages people to give their consent to being governed ... Deeply embedded in people’s sense of fair play is the principle that those who play the game must accept the outcome. 31 The issue of whether or not to vote has long been a major bone of contention in libertarian anarchist circles. There was a particularly fierce debate on the issue in the pages of Benjamin Tucker’s periodical Liberty in the 1890s. Interestingly, the dominant view – including that of Tucker himself and prominent contemporaries such as Lysander Spooner – was against voting: ‘Individualist anarchism [in this period] was overwhelmingly anti-political … If libertarianism of the late 19th century stood for any one principle it was opposition to the political solution to social problems.’ McElroy, ‘The culture of individualist anarchism in late 19th century America’, p 301. 32 Watner, ‘The tragedy of political government’, p 5. 40
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Those who participate in politics are similarly committed, even if they are consistently on the losing side. Why do politicians plead with everyone to get out and vote? Because voting is the simplest and easiest form of participation by masses of people. Even though it is minimal participation, it is sufficient to commit all voters to being governed, regardless of who wins.33
Participation a means to an end A second implication of libertarianism for participation is that there is no particular merit or demerit to participation as such, taken in the abstract. We should not reify participation or think of it as good (or bad) in itself, independently of the circumstances and interests involved. Participation is not some kind of public good that should be promoted for the sake of it. Participation (or non-participation, as the case may be) is merely a means to one or more ends, and the only valid ends are those of the individuals concerned. Participation is therefore good in so far as it furthers individuals’ (legitimate) interests, and bad in so far as it detracts from them. And, again, the judgment of whether participation in any particular instance furthers or detracts from their interests is to be made by them alone. It is not for me (or anyone else) to tell others to vote, go to church, buy in certain shops, or do anything else in particular. Nor should taxpayer funds be used to subsidise participation decisions one way or the other, especially as regards voting: if other people feel that participation in any activity is good, they should put their message across at their own expense, and not at the forced expense of others.
Re-inventing civil society A third implication relates back to the earlier discussion of the relative merits of private and State institutions. I believe that there is a strong case that private institutions are better suited to meeting social needs than the public institutions that have largely displaced them. If any politicians genuinely wish to do something useful, the best thing they can do is get out of the way and undo past measures that have undermined the social institutions on which we previously relied. The policy implications are then very obvious – abolish the Welfare State, and privatise education, social security, pensions, and so on. Naturally, these implications will be anathema to socialists and their fellow travellers, but they are actually not much different from a return to the traditions of mutualism and self-reliance that were so commonplace a century or so ago. Moreover, these traditions were actually a major part of the ideological milieu from which the Labour Party originally sprang, and for 33 Lowi, Incomplete Conquest: Governing America, pp 25–26. 41
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which the early Labour Party stood. Unfortunately, these traditions were then gradually pushed into the background as socialist influences grew and beliefs in individual responsibility were correspondingly eroded. However, now that the Labour Party has thrown socialism onto the scrapheap, the time is surely right for Labour to rediscover its own roots and start putting right the damage governments of all parties have done over the last century or so.
The erosion of the State Finally, we should not forget that the world is changing very rapidly, and one of the key trends is the erosion of the power of the individual State. One factor behind this erosion is the increasing integration of the world economy, a process which also undermines the ability of each State to control economic activities within its own borders. Governments have less and less influence over capital flows and interest rates, for example, and attempts to impose direct controls over capital flows (for example, such as foreign exchange controls) are increasingly futile and, indeed, counter-productive. Another major factor behind the erosion of State power is the astonishing progress in IT, which not only undermines State attempts to control information, but also makes business more mobile and, therefore, increasingly able to move away from hostile jurisdictions. A third factor, related to the other two, is the increasing globalisation of international business. Ian Angell summed this up nicely: Individuals and companies are setting up large transnational networks that pay absolutely no heed to national boundaries and barriers. The commercial enterprise of the future will be truly global, it will relocate (physically or electronically) to where the profit is greatest and the regulation least. The umbilical cords have been cut; the global company no longer feels the need to support the national aspirations of the country of its birth. Recently, this new business paradigm was expressed most forcibly by Akio Morita, causing uproar in Japan, when he announced that Sony was a global company and not Japanese!34
States that are particularly abusive of individuals or corporations working within their jurisdictions are therefore finding that they lose them. Thus, for instance, a State with particularly onerous taxation will find that business flees and it will gradually lose its ability to collect tax revenue. Similarly, States with more enlightened policies find that they can attract mobile business from abroad, and can thereby increase tax revenues even as they cut tax rates back. States are, therefore, forced more and more to compete with each other, with the shots being called by the ability of individuals and corporations to move their business elsewhere. Increasingly, and potentially much more so in the
34 Angell, ‘The information revolution and the death of the Nation State’, p 2. 42
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future, it will matter less and less what State individuals ‘belong’ to, but what networks, economic alliances, local communities and other voluntary associations they choose to deal with. In sum, individual choice is growing just as state power is declining. At the same time, the State is also facing an escalating legitimation crisis: Everywhere the Nation State is in retreat. All the while citizens are losing their faith in the Nation State ... For the State is failing to deliver its side of the Faustian pact, where the individual submits to the legitimate violence of the State in return for protection and security. Globalisation has shown the James Bond myth, that the State is good and global corporations (Spectre) are bad, to be blatant propaganda on behalf of the Nation State. James Bond, the patron saint of the Nation State, is now just another dirty old man.35
The withering away of the State might, just, be one prediction that Karl Marx got right.
35 Angell, ‘The information revolution and the death of the Nation State’, p 3. 43
CHAPTER 3
THE ‘HYBRID CONTRACT’ AND THE MERGING OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW OF THE ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC GOODS David Campbell1
‘HYBRIDITY’ AND THE MERGER OF THE PRIVATE AND THE PUBLIC The concept of ‘hybridity’ currently is being given sustained attention in any other than an obdurately traditional discussion of the law of contract. The private law of contract is recognised to, indeed, not be private, in the sense that the individualism of the ‘will’ theory now is accepted to be an explanatorily and ethically inadequate juristic foundation for contracting, and as such always open to criticism and modification from the communalist perspective of ‘welfarist’ or ‘relational’ theories.2 On the other hand, with the extensive reorganisation of formerly bureaucratically organised State functions along ‘contractual’ lines, public contracting has been elevated from the specialist, apparently marginal, topic of public procurement3 to the key feature of what now is properly described as ‘the contracting State’.4 The result, it appears, has been the emergence in both the private and public sectors of contracts which are hybrid in that they contain a mixture, in differing proportions, of formerly distinct private and public organisational characteristics.5 Such is the significance of the public aspects of what formerly was regarded as private and the private aspects of what formerly was regarded as public that the principal task facing the law of contract appears to be to account for the ‘disappearance’ of the division between private and public or, to put it the other way, the ‘merging’ of the private and public spheres.6
1 2 3 4 5 6
I should like to thank Peter Vincent-Jones for his comments on this chapter. My work on this chapter was supported by ESRC grant R000236416. Collins, The Law of Contract, ch 2. Turpin, Government Procurement and Contracts. A very early and remarkably prescient analysis of the shift in the nature of public contracting I wish to describe is given in Daintith, ‘Regulation by contract: the new prerogative’. Harden, The Contracting State. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance, ch 4. Oliver, ‘The underlying values of private and public law’; and Oliver, ‘Common values in public and private law and the public/private divide’. On the same process viewed, as it were, from the opposite side, cf, Dalton, ‘An essay in the deconstruction of contract doctrine’, pp 1010–11. 45
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In this chapter, I want to stress that, in identifying the ‘hybrid,’ advanced scholarship in the law of contract is, indeed, pointing to a significant development in economic policy. It is my opinion that the merger of the private and public along contractual lines is a most positive response to the failures of such policy in the past. But, I do wish to stress that the new institutions of contract have been produced as a response to the history of such failures, and cannot be understood apart from that history. Most accounts of hybridity deny this. Often of a ‘post-modern’ character that revels in a claimed break with the past, these accounts depict the hybrid not merely as novel, which of course in a sense it is, but as sui generis. Attempts to explain the emergence of the hybrid conceived in terms of this spurious radical novelty are bound to be mistaken, and have led to some very poor economic policy suggestions indeed. In order to stress the point that the significance of the new institutions of contract lies in their relationship to previous forms of economic policy, I will argue that the hybrid as such be dropped from discussion of those institutions.
THE HYBRID FORM OF CONTRACT Two things seem to be being said about the forms of contract in which the merger of private and public is given institutional shape. The first is that they are novel. If one takes economic organisation in the private sphere to be by market exchange and economic organisation in the public sphere to be by hierarchy, the new forms of contract are ‘neither market nor hierarchy’ and as such a new form of organisation. The new form of organisation has been described in a number of ways, such as a ‘clan’7 or a ‘network’, but its core feature is its novelty: … the familiar market-hierarchy continuum does not do justice to the notion of network forms of organisation … In network modes of resource allocation, transactions occur neither through discrete exchanges nor by administrative fiat.8
The second point that is made about this form of contract, however, sits rather uneasily with this first. It is that this form itself appears directly to embody the merger of private and public because it continues to display both of what formerly were regarded as private and public characteristics. The new form is ‘hybrid’ in that it stands between9 and is composed of a mixture of both of the old organisational forms:
7 8 9
Ouchi, ‘Markets, bureaucracies and clans’. Powell, ‘Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organisation’, p 306. Thorelli, ‘Networks: between markets and hierarchies’. 46
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Markets and hierarchies are polar modes … The hybrid mode displays intermediate values … the hybrid mode is located between market and hierarchy with respect to incentives, adaptability and bureaucratic costs. As compared with the market, the hybrid sacrifices incentives in favour of superior co-ordination among the parts. As compared with the hierarchy, the hybrid sacrifices co-operativeness in favour of greater incentive intensity.10
THE CONTRADICTORY STRUCTURE OF THE CONCEPT OF THE HYBRID This description of the new form of contract as a hybrid is poor. The concept of the hybrid is both contradictory and, as I will argue relatedly, turns on a mistaken belief in its own novelty. It is contradictory in that it attempts to establish the novelty of the new forms of contract, but can do so through the concept of hybridity only by retaining intact the old forms of market and hierarchy. The point has been made by Bradach and Eccles: A thread weaving its way through the discussions of these complex organisational forms is that they fall between markets and hierarchies defined as ideal types. However, the presumption that a continuum runs from market to hierarchy – with relationships between technologically separable units arraying themselves along it – is misleading, as are the three-fold typologies which simply add a category to the market and hierarchy dichotomy. These approaches rest on the premise that market and hierarchy are mutually exclusive means to govern transactions. There are … major problems with this premise … elements of the ideal types (or the poles of the continuum) are often found mixed together empirically: for instance, features of markets and hierarchies are often combined.11
The hybrid is a combination of market and hierarchy. It emerges as a third organisational form only if it can be distinguished from the other two, which therefore must be maintained as such in order that the hybrid can be distinguished from them. But, of course, by existing, the hybrid expresses an effective critique of the original conceptions of both the private market and the public hierarchy. It combines both forms, but in combining them, must change them, for they were originally understood in opposition to each other. To recognise this would, however, be to place the history of the opposition of the private and the public at the heart of the supposedly novel hybrid contract, which therefore would disappear as a sui generis form. It is as well to set out the nature of this opposition in detail, for it has changed radically in the last 25 years, with a former emphasis on the superiority of public allocation over private being reversed, and this change is the key to understanding recent developments in contract. 10 Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance, pp 104, 106. 11 Bradach and Eccles, ‘Price, authority and trust: from ideal types to plural forms’, p 99. 47
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WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC CRITIQUE OF THE PRIVATE The pure concept of the private market embodies, at its heart, as the constitution of its private character, its distinction from public regulation through hierarchical intervention. The first or basic claim of welfare economics12 is that a market which conforms to the assumptions established by neo-classical micro-economics for general competitive equilibrium13 is a perfectly efficient mechanism for the allocation of goods.14 Under general competition, goods will be exchanged up to the point where the increase in one person’s utilities achieved by further exchange would be more than offset by the diminution in the sum of another person’s. At this point of ‘Pareto optimality’,15 the market is in equilibrium because there are no further mutually beneficial exchange opportunities and, vitally importantly, it has been brought there by the uncoordinated working out of voluntary exchanges which automatically identify the point of Pareto optimality by reaching equilibrium. The beautiful symmetry of the model lies in its being driven by voluntary exchange and working only because it is so driven. Any distinction between the means and ends of the economy is redundant. Legitimate ends are secured only when they are the product of legitimate means.16 This is the source of the power of the rejection of ‘patterned principles’ of distribution17 in favour of the ‘pure procedure’ of the market18 in liberal political philosophy, for any State imposition of a ‘fair’ distribution of goods must prevent the perfectly efficient distribution which would be voluntarily reached at general competitive equilibrium.19 In contract doctrine, this stress on pure procedure is expressed in the refusal to inquire into the substantive adequacy of any contract which meets the formal requirement of sufficiency of consideration.
12 Arrow, ‘Pareto optimality with costly transfers’, p 290. 13 Arrow and Debreu, ‘Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy’. 14 Gossen, The Laws of Human Relations, ch 7; Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy, ch 4; Menger, Principles of Economics, ch 5, section 3; and Walras, Elements of Pure Economics, lesson 12. 15 Pareto, Manual of Political Economy, ch 6, section 33. 16 Nutter, ‘Moralism, morality and trade’, p 261. 17 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp 155–60. 18 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp 83–90. 19 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, ch 9. Simon Deakin has recently emphasised an aspect of Hayek’s later work of which I was aware, but the significance of which, it seems, I did not fully appreciate. Deakin, ‘Private law, economic rationality and the state’. Hayek’s appreciation in this work of the role of public law in constituting the market would appear somewhat to undermine the criticism I will make of the position I am attributing to Hayek in this paper. I will state the criticism as a criticism of the position, which indubitably has been important, and leave the question of the accuracy of attributing that position to the later Hayek. 48
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In sum, the acceptance of revealed preferences as perfectly legitimate expressions of the wills of the parties to the market (and, therefore, the ability to alienate private property on the terms one chooses) is essential to the fundamental efficiency claim for the market. The market as conceived in neoclassical economics is based as a means of allocation20 on privacy: It would … seem that wherever a Great Society has arisen, it has been made possible by a system of rules of just conduct which included what David Hume called ‘the three fundamental laws of nature, that of stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises’, or … the essential content of all contemporary systems of private law.21
The welfare claim made for the spontaneous order22 of the invisible hand23 of the market is, as we have known since at least24 Mandeville, 25 that it incomparably efficiently transforms private vices into public benefits. It is crucial for our purposes to recognise that this transformation may work in the way claimed only by eschewing the conscious public pursuit of benefit by alteration of the private vice. (To prevent confusion arising later in this chapter, let me anticipate my later argument by saying that I do not believe this claim is entirely correct.) Though the first theorem of welfare economics entails the policy recommendation that markets should, where possible, be encouraged, those economics have largely been concerned to identify circumstances where there is such a divergence between, as AC Pigou has it in Part 2 of The Economics of Welfare, the private and the social marginal net product of an investment,26 that State intervention might increase the welfare function: Certain optimistic followers of the classical economists have suggested that the ‘free play of self-interest’, if only Government refrains from interference, will automatically … yield … more economic welfare than could be attained by any arrangement other than that which comes about ‘naturally’ … if private and social net products everywhere coincide, the free play of self-interest … will tend to bring … the sum of economic welfare to a maximum … when marginal 20 I am trying to describe a claim for the necessity of private property internal to the functioning of the market as a form of allocation, as distinct from other, broadly Lockean, arguments for the, as it were, substantial necessity of such property for freedom. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Vol II, ch 5. The argument of this chapter does, however, have implications for this argument of Locke’s which I will not pursue. This argument about allocation is addressed to the voluntariness of private exchange and not directly to the claim that rational economic calculation requires private property. See von Mises, Socialism, chs 5–6; and Weber, Economy and Society, ch 11. These claims cannot, however, ultimately be distinguished. 21 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, p 65 (original emphasis omitted). Cf, Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p 526. 22 Ibid, Hayek, Vol 1. 23 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p 456. 24 Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, pp 359–62. 25 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees. 26 Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, Pt 2, ch 2, section 5. 49
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private net products and marginal social net products coincide, any obstacles that obstruct the free play of self-interest will, in general, damage the national dividend. In real life, of course, marginal private and marginal social net products frequently do not coincide … When there is a divergence between these two sets of marginal net product, self-interest will not … tend to make the national dividend a maximum; and, consequently, certain specific acts of interference with normal economic processes may be expected, not to diminish, but to increase the dividend.27
Welfare economics has tended to identify State governance as ‘intervention’ or ‘interference’ in the economy in circumstances of ‘market failure,’ that failure occurring when an assessment of the welfare function reached by a hierarchy diverges from, and is taken to be superior to, the private one produced by the market. It is not, in the first example Pigou gives in The Economics of Welfare, of a steam train emitting sparks that cause damage to property near the track,28 that the market does not assess that damage. It is that, unless the railway company owes a duty to the nearby landowners not to damage their property, the market assesses that damage as zero, which, from the private perspective under these conditions, it is. However, upon public acknowledgement that the damage has a cost, following, say, the landowners’ successful application to a commission of inquiry, that cost is identified as pertinent to the social welfare function though it is ‘external’ to the private. The natural conclusion is State intervention, such as – my examples29 – the redistributive imposition of a tax on the railway company out of which the nearby landowners can be compensated, or the provision of a ‘public good’ such as State funded research into railway engines which do not emit sparks which the railway company (for sensible reasons given private accounting horizons) is reluctant to undertake. It was this general cast of mind that characterised the broad, postwar consensus on economic policy. With the authority earned by his distinguished academic career and public service as a formulator and implementer of Keynesian economic policy, JE Meade described this consensus as the position of ‘the intelligent radical’: … the intelligent radical … recognises the need for controls and interventions in order to cope with important cases in which the market mechanism will otherwise neglect to take into account important items of social, as opposed to private, costs and benefits. Problems of environmental control … will on these grounds be recognised as raising issues which call for governmental action.30
The concept of ‘contract’ has been radically altered in the light of this recognition of market failures and acceptance of public goods. The main
27 Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, pp 127, 143, 172. 28 Ibid, Pigou, p 134. 29 Though based on Coase’s speculations about the similar problem of smoke nuisance. Coase, ‘The problem of social cost’, pp 151–53. 30 Meade, The Intelligent Radical’s Guide to Economic Policy, pp 15–16. 50
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alteration has been a massive growth in statutory intervention in contract and a concomitant shrinkage of the scope of private contract, to the point where it is only at the cost of the most violent abstraction that the advanced capitalist economies can continue to be described as market economies. Topics such as ‘consumer contracts’ and ‘sales of goods’ which, one might fairly have thought, belong at the core of the subject typically are treated as statutory ‘exceptions’ to the general common law.31 Obviously, if these exceptions were brought into the core of the subject, as they should be in order to give an account of it as positive law, contract would be changed completely. However, as even this relegation of such vital issues to the status of exceptions cannot ultimately alter the fact that exchanges actually governed by negotiations between parties unregulated by the State which easily fit within the will theory are a tiny residual category, if, indeed, they exist at all, it is clear that it is ‘contract’ that is the exception now.32 Even more tellingly, the common law itself is now shot through with welfarist reasoning33 which can be reconciled with the will theory only by the most unscrupulous and tortuous perversions of the classical doctrines of contract.34 ‘The death of contract’35 is now generally acknowledged in advanced contract scholarship, though, of course, as we still lack a clear general alternative to the will theory,36 ‘the pathetic contrast between the law of contract as it is taught in most textbooks and modern contract as it functions in society’ continues to obtain almost as much now as it did when Friedmann first identified it in 1959.37 Further development of our understanding of the concept of contract requires the removal of this contrast, but this is a task which must, after 20 years of vigorous neo-liberalism, now be undertaken not in the spirit of further diminution of the private, but in the spirit of its restoration.38 Before we enquire what restoration now can mean, let us look at the resurgence in the fortunes of the private that make any sort of restoration plausible and, indeed, necessary. 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
Collins, The Law of Contract, ch 12. I am grateful to John Gava for this striking way of putting this point. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. Campbell, ‘The undeath of contract: a study in the degeneration of a research programme’. Gilmore, The Death of Contract. Campbell, ‘Socio-legal analysis of the law of contract’. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society, p 90. The basic argument, if not this actual phrase, was present in Friedmann’s treatment of contract in Law and Social Change in Contemporary Britain, ch 4, published in 1951. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract, pp 27–34. In the UK, Atiyah has been to the forefront of stressing the changed circumstances in which the critique of the classical law of contract must now be conducted. His way of doing this, however, seems to be a simple return to the classical values he previously had so effectively criticised. He even seems now to accept many of those values. Atiyah, ‘Freedom of contract and the New Right’. This seems to me to be literally reactionary and, as such, quite contradictory, for nothing has been learned from the success of the earlier criticisms. Campbell, ‘The undeath of contract: a study in the degeneration of a research programme’, pp 41–47. 51
Promoting Participation
NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE PRIVATE CRITIQUE OF THE PUBLIC I have above used a statement of Meade’s intelligent radical to express the broad attitude to State intervention as a remedy to public perceptions of private market failure. Meade wrote The Intelligent Radical’s Guide in 1975. Of course, since then the intelligent radical has been neo-liberal.39 The poor performance of the centralised command economies of the formerly communist countries40 and the unsustainability of the ‘golden age’ of Keynesian aggregate demand management in the social democratic countries41 has meant that the last quarter of this century has been dominated by ‘conservative capitalism’.42 Central to this capitalism has been a successful attack on the extent of State intervention in the economy and a consequent attempt both to reduce that extent and to refashion the residual public sector. However, one must be careful what one means when one says this. Judging at a time when the energy of the introduction of conservative capitalism now appears to be spent, the extent to which monetarist economic policy has been able significantly to reduce the macro-economic role of the public sector (and hence produce the ‘supply side revolution’), and public choice theory to reconstruct what remain non-economic State activities along market mimicking lines, seems limited. Whatever one’s opinion of these aspects of conservative capitalism, however, the general legitimacy of the State’s direct provision of economic goods has been destroyed and the recognition of a public economic good now is accepted (in intellectual circles at least) as almost a last resort of economic policy. Goods provided in this way are to be provided along market mimicking lines when possible. It is in these two senses, of shrinking direct provision through privatisation 43 and marketisation of residual public good provision, 44 that the State is ‘contracting’. For whatever my opinion is worth, this is highly positive and must be regarded as the lasting contribution of conservative capitalism to the formulation of economic policy. The basic stated economic policy of the 39 I will argue that Coase’s criticism of welfare economic proposals for State intervention have been a part of neo-liberalism of lasting value. The principal target of this criticism has been some of Pigou’s quite erroneous identifications of market failures. But, as editor of Journal of Law and Economics, Coase published two articles which made the same point in relation to an example that Meade, it appears, wholly inaccurately gave of market failure: that of bees pollinating orchards. Coase, ‘The firm, the market and the law’, p 29. 40 Kornai, The Socialist System. 41 Armstrong et al, Capitalism Since 1945. 42 Hoover and Plant, Conservative Capitalism in Britain and the United States. 43 Moore, ‘The success of privatisation’. 44 Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government. 52
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communist countries was to reduce the number of capitalist ‘survivals’ in their economies ultimately to the zero which would mark the achievement of ‘full communism’.45 This often was expressed in messianic terms which appear ridiculous now, but which it should never be forgotten inspired an utterly despicable totalitarian belief. Far from respecting revealed preferences,46 economic policy during the dictatorship of the proletariat was ultimately directed towards the construction of a new ‘socialist psychology’.47 There is a pale but clearly discernible imitation of this policy in the pursuit of State ownership as a general good in itself which had a certain place in the ‘improving’ economic policies of the social democratic countries.48 The principal achievement of conservative capitalism has been to establish that the main problem with such a policy is not that it is unrealisable (as its proponents always feared) but that it would be dreadful to realise it,49 and in so doing has restored the fundamental plausibility of liberalism.50 I take it (as I personally always have) that any socialism other than one which sought to ‘preserve and even enlarge the atmosphere of liberalism’51 is now untenable. The intellectual success of neo-liberalism in the area where I wish to stress it is successful has been a withering attack on the Pigouvian case for public goods. In RH Coase’s ‘The problem of social cost’, Pigou’s railway sparks example is shown to be very badly argued indeed. There is a theoretical part to this argument which I regard it as unproductive to discuss other than with specialists. 52 Coase also makes the following historical argument. He plausibly assumes that Pigou can be taken to have had in mind the situation
45 Althusser, ‘Contradiction and overdetermination’, p 114. 46 Eg, Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, The ABC of Communism, p 32. Of course, The critique of the ‘subjectivism’ of neo-classical economics which is allied to this moral or moralistic position – and indeed the moralism itself – is not without merit. Cf, Bukharin, The Economic Theory of the Leisure Class. 47 Trotsky, ‘Results and prospects’, pp 229–31. 48 Cole, The British Co-operative Movement, pp 73–74. Again, there is very considerable merit in the critique of consumerism which lies behind this position. Cf, Galbraith, The Affluent Society, ch 11 49 Berger, The Capitalist Revolution. An extreme aspect of the unpleasantness of social democratic improvement, one which it is in a sense unfair now to mention, but which nevertheless certainly existed, is the room Fabianism had for eugenic social engineering, not only in a number of Shaw’s plays such as Man and Superman, but in concrete social policy proposals. 50 Brittan, A Restatement of Economic Liberalism. 51 Orwell, ‘Inside the whale’, p 48. 52 This theoretical part is the vexed and baneful ‘Coase theorem’, which I have argued is so unproductive that it should be ignored. Campbell, ‘On what is valuable in law and economics’, pp 498–505; and Campbell and Picciotto, ‘Exploring the interaction between law and economics: the limits of formalism’, p 60. I have tried to account for Coase’s somewhat equivocatory public attitude to this theorem, of which I am of the very confident opinion he himself privately disapproved, in Campbell, ‘Ronald Coase’s political views at the time of writing “The nature of the firm”’, unpublished (copy available from the author at Cardiff Law School, University of Wales College of Cardiff, PO Box 427, Cardiff CF10 3XJ). 53
Promoting Participation
obtaining in Britain after the passage of the Railway (Fires) Act 1905.53 Having claimed that the common law of nuisance would impose a liability on the railway company causing the damage,54 Coase argued that it was only because the State extended protection against the common law to the railway companies that they were able to proceed in the way they did. The 1905 Act allowed claims of up to £100 against the railways, other claims being in effect barred by previous statute. (The general point is that the building of the railways was, in essence, accomplished by expropriation on the basis of compulsory purchase under a succession of Private Acts.)55 Of course, in the light of this, Pigou’s proposed tax solution may well be supererogatory. Rather than Pigou’s example being a case where it was necessary for ‘State action to improve on natural tendencies’, it might well have been a case in which a reversion to common law property rights through what we would now call deregulation was plausible, for: ‘the situation in which sparks form a railway locomotive could start fires which burnt woods on land adjoining the railway without the railway having to pay compensation to the owners of the woods … had come about not because of a lack of governmental action but because of it.’56 If the landowner were able to sue in common law, the railway would have to decide either to obtain a permission to damage nearby property (by buying the freehold or an easement, etc) from the landowner (financed from revenues of operating the trains) or not to build (if those revenues would not cover the cost of the permission), and the market would produce a solution without necessity of State intervention.57 In the light of the subsequent development of law and economics, which has been characterised by the advocacy of ‘market solutions’ in the most ridiculous circumstances, it is as well to stress that Coase did not advocate a property rights solution to the sparks problem in ‘The problem of social cost’.58 (To the extent that that article makes any concrete policy suggestions, it is that the State is best equipped to handle the related problem of smoke
53 Most modern references to Pigou are to the 4th edn, 1932 (subsequently reprinted). However, Pigou’s treatment of the railway example had remained substantially unchanged from the 1st edn, 1920, which itself was largely based on his Wealth and Welfare, 1912. 54 Coase, ‘The problem of social cost’, pp 137, n 43. Coase’s reading of nuisance cases in ‘The problem of social cost’ has been called into serious question by the distinguished legal historian AWB Simpson in ‘Coase v Pigou re-examined’. Coase came rather badly out of an ensuing exchange with Simpson, when his usual balance and wit appear quite to have deserted him. Coase, ‘Law and economics and AW Brian Simpson’; and Simpson, ‘An addendum’. However, this does not affect the basic argument made here. 55 Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy, pp 167–75. 56 Coase, ‘The firm, the market and the law’, p 23. 57 Coase, ‘The problem of social cost’, pp 133–49. 58 Campbell, ‘On what is valuable in law and economics’, pp 498–503; and Campbell and Picciotto, ‘Exploring the interaction between law and economics: the limits of formalism’, pp 259–60. 54
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nuisance.)59 He wishes to merely draw it to our attention that the Pigouvian argument is not made out. A market driven solution may have been inferior to the one produced by the State. But, Pigou is not even aware of the possibility of a market in relationship to the sparks example, and this flatly is a mistake.60 No doubt the main reason why Pigou did not give the market solution any real thought is that he took it that intervention was such a solution, but he gives no argument that this would be the case. He advocates intervention without any inquiry whether it would work. The sparks problem is, in fairness, briefly treated by Pigou. But though not related to the sparks problem, one example he gives of a good regulatory body in all editions of Economics of Welfare (itself taken from Wealth and Welfare) is ‘the Interstate Railway Commission of the United States’.61 Of this example, Coase says: In all editions, the Interstate Commerce Commission is referred to as the Interstate Railway Commission, and this body, created in 1887, is always described as ‘recently developed’, which does not suggest any real interest in the subject.
And further: ‘Pigou never seems to have thought it necessary to enquire whether his optimistic opinion about [this commission] was justified by events’ because he was of a cast of mind that assumed ‘the existence of (almost) perfectly functioning public bodies’.62 It is this aspect of the (lack of) thinking about the proper limits of the public sphere that has led to grandiose and wasteful schemes of State intervention that we now must reject. The point it now is essential to take from Coase is that our earlier perceptions of ‘market failure’ must be complemented by perceptions of ‘government failure’ when making choices between alternative governance structures for the allocation of economic goods. 63 Furthermore, whilst reasonable improvement is, of course, analytically a goal of legitimate economic policy, we must be somewhat circumspect in our ambitions, for the inevitable existence of market and government failure makes it clear that: ‘Until we realise that we are choosing between social arrangements which are all more or less failures, we will not make much headway.’64
59 Coase, ‘The problem of social cost’, pp 115–18. 60 Coase’s even more telling criticism of this is of the use of the lighthouse in a great many economics textbooks, including The Economics of Welfare, pp 183–84, as an axiomatic example of a public good. Coase not only shows that the theoretical argument is weak, but – the Coase touch – that the actual example which the textbook authors must have had in mind, the 19th century British lighthouse system, was largely private until bought out by the State for (in current values) tens of millions of pounds. Coase, ‘The lighthouse in economics’, p 201. 61 Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, p 334. 62 Coase, ‘The problem of social cost’, p 22. 63 Coase, ‘Discussion of RE Caves, Direct Regulation and Market Performance in the American Economy and RC Cramton, The Effectiveness of Economic Regulation: A Legal View’, p 195. 64 Ibid, p 195. 55
Promoting Participation
THE SPURIOUS NOVELTY OF THE HYBRID It is the commitment to both the market based on private ownership as the natural state of the economy and the role of the State as intervention in instances of market failure that has produced the separation of private contract and public hierarchy which it appears the hybrid calls into question. The two original conceptions are, I hope it is now clear, quite antithetical as allocative structures. The former is based on a belief in complete privacy and the other is based on the public rejection of the former’s results in particular (though now, of course, with the State expending around 40% of the gross domestic product of each of the major industrialised countries, very many indeed) cases. Their purported combination in a hybrid is, as I have said, a contradiction. To be combined, they both must be changed, and indeed this is exactly what has happened. Let me look at this combination again in more detail. It is conceiving of the hybrid as a combination of two old allocative structures that gives it its novelty. The hybrid is a third form which arises, sui generis, from that combination: Two major outcomes of the search for new competitive approaches are already apparent. First, the search is producing a new organisational form – a unique combination of strategy, structure, and management processes that we refer to as the dynamic network … Second, as is always the case, the new organisational form is forcing the development of new concepts and language to explain its features and functions.65
The implication of this conception of novelty is that the hybrid must be explained in terms of its own internal logic, the logic that allows it to be distinguished from the market and hierarchy which it combines. Though this implication is followed through in the range of works on hybrids, it emerges particularly clearly from such works which are committed to systems theory after Luhmann.66 The identification of the claimed novel logic of the hybrid fits particularly well in with the cataloguing of self-referential social systems, each identified by a specific system principle, which seems to be central to works of system theory: It seems that ‘hybrids’ are fundamentally distinguished from market contract and from hierarchical organisation by different co-ordination and control mechanisms. Is it their incentive structure … risk structure … or is it something else that makes them so different that they cannot be adequately explained within the logic of exchange or corporate hierarchy? What makes them institutions that are ‘neither market nor hierarchy?’67
65 Miles and Snow, ‘Network organisations: new concepts for new forms’. 66 Luhmann, Social Systems. 67 Hutter and Teubner, ‘The parasitic role of hybrids’, p 116. 56
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The problem this conception of novelty leaves is, of course, one of explaining the genesis of the novel structure. Unless the explanation is very unusual – in the ‘neo-evolutionary’ article from which the previous quotation is taken it is based on far fetched biological analogies to mutation and parasitism – it is expressed in terms of the shortcomings of markets and hierarchies which have produced the hybrid. In the case of the franchise agreement: … the hybrid mode is located between market and hierarchy with respect to incentives, adaptability and bureaucratic costs. As compared with the market, the hybrid sacrifices incentives in favour of superior co-ordination among the parts. As compared with the hierarchy, they hybrid sacrifices co-operativeness in favour of greater incentive intensity. The distribution of branded products from retail outlets by market, hierarchy and hybrid, where franchising is an example of this last, illustrates the argument. Forward integration out of manufacturing into distribution would be implied by hierarchy. That would sacrifice incentive intensity, but would (better) assure that the parts do not operate at cross-purposes with one another. The market solution would be to sell the good or service outright. Incentive intensity is thereby harnessed, but suboptimisation (free riding on promotional efforts, dissipation of the brand name, etc) may result. Franchising awards greater autonomy than hierarchy but places franchisees under added rules and surveillance as compared with markets. Costs control and local adaptations are stronger under franchising than hierarchy, and suboptimisation is reduced under franchising as compared with the market.68
But, of course, if this sort of origin is acknowledged, it means that the hybrid is not a structure sui generis (and, of course, there are no such forms), but rather a structure the history of which is to be found in the development of the strong distinction between market and hierarchy, or, rather, in the decay of that distinction. The hybrid, I want to argue, is in fact is a stage in the development of the relationship of private and public spheres, that stage when the public critique of the private has now been complemented by the private critique of the public, and the merging of the private and the public, in which their mutually constitutive opposition disappears, is posited. As such, far from representing novelty, the hybrid represents the latest stage in the attempt to come to terms with the failure of the enlightenment project69 of the critique of civil society from the perspective of the State70 – that is to say, the failure of what so far has passed as socialism. The hybrid is, I believe, a positive response to that failure which allows us to distinguish ‘regulation’ from ‘intervention’ in future socialism.
68 Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance, p 107. 69 MacIntyre, After Virtue, ch 6. 70 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Pt 2, sub-section 3. 57
Promoting Participation
DISTINGUISHING REGULATION FROM INTERVENTION In the light of the what we have seen of Coase’s discussion of Pigou in ‘The problem of social cost’, the way in which he begins that discussion is unusual. He registers an agreement. Coase is careful to distinguish his criticisms of Pigou’s arguments for intervention, of which we have seen he is profoundly critical, from an argument of Pigou’s with which he agrees. The argument for intervention in Part 2 of Economics of Welfare is prefaced with a four page introduction in which Pigou quotes the distinguished economist Edwin Cannan to the following effect: … the working of self-interest is generally beneficent, not because of some natural coincidence between the self-interest of each and the good of all, but because human institutions are arranged so as to compel self-interest to work in directions in which it will be beneficent.71
This argument, Coase, says, ‘seems to me to be essentially correct’.72 This is a most significant argument with which to agree, for it is, of course, a rejection of the invisible hand.73 It is as well to quote the most substantial description Adam Smith gives of the invisible hand: … every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it … he intends only his own gain and he is … led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.74
I also quote Smith’s most famous illustration of the operation of the invisible hand: It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.75
However, it is not to either of these passages that Pigou directs his criticism of the invisible hand, but to the following:
71 Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, pp 128–29, quoting a 1913 paper by EA Cannan which I have so far been unable to trace. 72 Coase, ‘The problem of social cost’, p 134. 73 In ‘The problem of social cost’, n 38, Coase seems to wish to imply that Pigou thought Cannan’s argument effected only ‘followers’ of Smith and not Smith himself. On the basis of my own reading of this part of The Economics of Welfare, I cannot agree that Pigou was at all hesitant about attacking Smith, and I shall treat him as doing so. 74 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p 456. Smith’s text has to be very substantially abridged to make it easily illustrate what is now understood as the basic point of the invisible hand, and I have followed the editors of the Glasgow edition of Smith in making my abridgement. Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, p 184, n 7. 75 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, pp 26–27. 58
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… every system which endeavours, either, by extraordinary encouragements, to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater share of the capital of the society than what would naturally go to it; or, by extraordinary restraints, to force from a particular species of industry some share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it; is in reality subversive of the great purpose which it means to promote. It retards, instead of increasing, the progress of the society towards real wealth and greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real value of the annual produce of its land and labour.76
Pigou evidently thinks that Cannan’s criticism of the invisible hand disposes of this basic argument against intervention and proceeds, in the remaining 284 pages of Part 2 of The Economics of Welfare, to set out the apparatus for distinguishing between private and social net products that has since grounded intervention. But Coase’s criticism of Pigou allows us to see that Pigou has missed his mark in Smith, and that Pigou’s choice of quotation from Smith is ample evidence of this. In this quotation, Smith is setting out an argument against intervention in functioning markets which, of course, so tells against the ‘industrial policy’ which has been adopted in the UK since 194577 that it could (with stylistic alterations) easily be passed off as a general conclusion about that policy. Pigou obviously is disinclined to accept this argument and, were he to set out a case for intervention which showed awareness not merely of market failures but of the difficulties of improving on the position produced by the market, one would be compelled to consider it at length. But, to take only his most important general case, Pigou is prepared to consider ‘permanent bounties’ to shift the entire industrial system away from equilibrium based on a particular distribution of goods to an equilibrium based on another distribution (in which less of a good disliked for moral and political reasons or more of a good favoured for such reasons would be produced), even though: ‘[t]he conditions in which bounties are likely to have this effect’, he fairly says: ‘are somewhat special.’ He concludes, however, that: ‘it can be proved that, in certain states of demand and supply, some rates of bounty must have this effect,’ and, the clinching point, those states ‘can readily be depicted in a diagram.’78 There could be no clearer example of what Coase calls ‘blackboard economics’: … many propositions of modern welfare economics [are more] concerned with diagrams on a blackboard than with the real effects of such policies on the working of the economic system. I have referred to this type of economics as ‘blackboard economics’ because … the whole process takes place on a
76 Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, pp 127–28, quoting (with indicated omissions) Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p 687. 77 Crosland, ‘Government and industry’. 78 Ibid, Pigou, p 141. 59
Promoting Participation
blackboard. This is not the way one operates with a social system. All that can be done is set up a new agency, or change the rules under which an old agency operates, or take some other similar action. All that is possible is to operate on social institutions and to discuss social policy in a sensible way; it is necessary to consider the effect of changing the social institutions with which we work.79
If one now is very sceptical of intervention, it is essential to see that there is another part of Pigou’s argument against the invisible hand that is much stronger. Its strength is hidden because Pigou thought it part of the argument for intervention. It is not. Having quoted the passage from Smith we have seen, Pigou goes on: It would, of course, be unreasonable to interpret this passage in any abstract or universal sense. Adam Smith had in mind the actual world as he knew it, with an organised system of civilised government and contract law.80
Pigou certainly is here drawing attention to a major equivocation at the heart of neo-classical economics. The invisible hand typically is represented as a system of natural liberty, with economic action conforming to the assumptions of rational individual utility maximisation being traced to an essential, ahistorical human nature. One is often rather amused to see human beings as such when described by neo-classical economists look very much like the stereotype of the average citizens of the society in which those economists wrote,81 and this is particularly so in one respect. The exclusive concern with private self-interest that is analytically developed as rational individual utility maximisation has, as we have seen, very strong legitimacy in so far as it grounds a Pareto optimal allocation of resources through the market. As we also have seen, it has been the line of those arguing for a public role in economic allocations to argue that the private market does not always lead to optimal outcomes by pointing to instances of market failure and to then call for intervention by the State. But, in fact, this is an almost trivial argument quite beside the main point, which is that whilst intervention may or may not be a sensible policy in specific cases, regulation is the indispensable condition for the existence of any economic governance structure, including not only or even principally State governance, but any market, whether interventions are made in it or not.82
79 Coase, ‘The theory of public utility pricing and its application’, p 119. 80 Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, p 128. 81 These noble savages with a suspiciously contemporaneous cast to their character used to be described as Robinson Crusoes. I do not suppose a better joke about such figures will ever be made than Marx’s at Ricardo’s expense when Marx perfectly accurately described Ricardo’s own Robinsons calculating the value of their tools and labours as if ‘in accordance with the annuity tables in use on the London Stock Exchange in 1817’. Marx, Capital, Vol 1, p 169, n 31. 82 Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice, p 384. This general point has been applied powerfully to the regulation of privatised utilities in Prosser, ‘Regulation, markets and legitimacy’, p 237. 60
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Let us return to Pigou’s treatment of Smith. Quoting Vilfredo Pareto, Pigou observes that: ‘the efforts of man are utilised in two different ways: they are directed to the production or transformation of economic goods, or else to the appropriation of goods produced by others.’83 In the light of this, Pigou observes that: Activities devoted to appropriation obviously do not promote production, and production would be promoted if they were diverted into the channels of industry. We must, therefore, understand [Smith] to assume laws designed, and, in the main, competent, to prevent acts of mere appropriation, such as those perpetrated by highwaymen and card-sharpers … More generally, when one man obtains goods from another man, he is conceived to obtain them by the process, not of seizure, but of exchange in an open market, where the bargainers on both sides are reasonably competent and reasonably cognisant of the conditions. There is ground, however, for believing that even Adam Smith had not realised fully the extent to which the System of Natural Liberty needs to be qualified and guarded by special laws, before it will promote the most productive employment of a country’s resources.84
For the markets conceived to be at the heart of neo-classical economics to exist at all, economic action oriented to rational individual utility maximisation must be, as Pigou puts it by quoting from another work of Cannan’s: ‘confined to certain directions by our general social institutions, especially Family, Property and the territorial State.’85 This is to say that, at root, the private market is a publicly endorsed institution, and takes its shape from public law. Let me try to be perfectly clear about what this means. Recognising that the impulse to accumulate can lead to aggressively exploitative rather than productive action,86 it is clear that, if the neo-classical concept of economic action is to yield spontaneous economic order, the claim that economic action is solely motivated by rational individual utility maximisation should actually be understood to be a claim that it is such maximisation constrained within the bounds of ‘peacefulness’: Economic action demands stable conditions. The extensive and lengthy process of production is the more successful the greater the periods of time to which it is adapted. It demands continuity, and this continuity cannot be disturbed without the most serious disadvantages. This means that economic action requires peace, the exclusion of violence.87
83 84 85 86 87
Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, p 128, quoting Pareto, Manual of Political Economy, p 341. Ibid, Pigou, p 128. Ibid, Pigou, p 128, quoting Cannan, The History of Local Rates in England, p 176. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch 13. On the role of the law of contract specifically, see p 196. von Mises, Socialism, p 36. 61
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This solution of the ‘Hobbesian problem of order’88 theoretically precedes the argument for the order of the invisible hand, but whilst the concept of spontaneous order very valuably stresses the individual freedom inherent in competitive equilibrium, this stress appears to work against the appreciation that such order can emerge only when the antecedent problem of order is solved. This simply amounts to a denial that legitimate self-interest in the private market must be complemented by a public commitment to the municipal order underwriting the market, and, therefore, that economic action has both a private and a public dimension in any country with a basically legitimate economy and polity.89 This denial flatly runs counter not merely to the consensus positions in all social science other than neo-classical economics but to the common sense of the citizens of the social democracies,90 and accounts for the marginality of harshly ‘economic’ attitudes towards concrete policy formulation in those countries.91 Coase’s attitude to this is entirely contradictory.92 As I have repeatedly argued this elsewhere,93 I will merely assert the contradiction and then turn my attention to that side of it which I think it productive to examine. A great many of Coase’s explicit statements of a philosophy of economics are of a positivist cast which is so extreme one had not thought one would ever encounter it again in respectable social science. This involves a crude philosophic anthropology in which economic action – and specifically the inclination peacefully to exchange in regular and consistent proportions
88 Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, pp 89–94. 89 MacCormick, ‘Legal right and social democracy’. MacCormick’s argument is, of course, a specific application of the argument for an internal aspect to legitimate legal obligation derived from Hart. The ‘minimum content of natural law’ which Hart regards as indispensable in a legitimate legal system is, as he himself stresses (Hart, The Concept of Law, p 303 (note to p 193)) based on Hobbes’ (and Hume’s) solution to the problem of order. Hart, The Concept of Law, ch 9, section 2. 90 Campbell and Picciotto, ‘Exploring the interaction between law and economics: the limits of formalism’, p 276. 91 Campbell, ‘Review of OE Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance’. 92 Smith himself is, of course, the source of this contradiction. The Smith attacked by Pigou does trace the nature of the commercial societies to certain purportedly universal qualities of human nature. But, equally or, indeed, predominantly, Smith’s account of that human nature is one in which self-interest is balanced by sympathy and social selfconsciousness more generally, and incorporates a developed awareness of the then leading accounts of social development, principally Turgot’s ‘four stages’ theory. The so called ‘Adam Smith problem’ of a claimed difference between a stress on self-interest of The Wealth of Nations and a stress on sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Buckle, A History of Civilisation in England, Vol 2, p 437) is far too crude a way of registering our continuing difficulties in arriving at a philosophic anthropology which properly situates the acquisitive impulse. Coase has given a sophisticated but, to my mind, still tendentious account of ‘Adam Smith’s view of man’. 93 Campbell, ‘On what is valuable in law and economics’, pp 505–07; Campbell and Harris, ‘Flexibility in long-term contractual relationships: the role of co-operation’, pp 177–80; and Campbell and Picciotto, ‘Exploring the interaction between law and economics: the limits of formalism’, pp 252–53. 62
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denominated in money – is not itself subject to explanation but is represented as human nature as such. Given this philosophic anthropology, of course, the invisible hand may very well turn private vice into public virtue, because the vice actually contains the virtue at the outset. But, this philosophic anthropology has no place in Coase’s substantive work, which is characterised by its immense carefulness about the institutional context of rational economic action. It has been Coase’s basic insight to clarify why ‘market failure’ occurs by drawing attention to the existence of what have come to be known as ‘transaction costs’, the costs of producing an allocative outcome: In order to carry out a market transaction, it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.94
After Coase we can properly appreciate that fully contingent markets are markets at zero transaction costs, that is to say with information gathering, communication and enforcement costless. But, information gathering, communication and enforcement costs will always be positive, so that the existence of such markets is a ‘very unrealistic assumption’.95 The thrust of Coase’s work is to reject the view of ‘the economic system as it is normally treated by the economist’96 and demonstrate that ‘there is a cost of using the price mechanism’97 in order to draw attention to the existence of transaction costs in empirical markets and therefore to call for the explanation of particular markets as specific social institutions. Even an economic policy committed to the allocation of goods by markets whenever reasonably possible must pursue not the absence of regulation but the regulatory constitution of markets.98 Neo-classical economic analysis can be used as a guide to economic policy formulation only when balanced by an appreciation that action (for all practical purposes) conforming to its assumptions can take place only within facilitative institutions, markets, established for this purpose. (And as empirical markets have positive transaction costs, these must be weighed against alternatives – which boil down to the firm or the State and their hybrids – with the firm and the State themselves being (from this perspective) explained as structures which minimise transaction costs under certain conditions.)
94 95 96 97 98
Coase, ‘The problem of social cost’, p 114. Ibid, p 114. Coase, ‘The nature of the firm’, p 34. Ibid, p 38. Campbell, ‘The relational constitution of contract and the limits of “economics”: Kenneth Arrow on the social background of markets’. 63
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This is the foundation of productive law and economics because, of course, the principal such institution to which one turns to explain the form of markets, firms and regulation is the law: If we move from a regime of zero transaction costs to one of positive transaction costs, what becomes immediately clear is the importance of the legal system in the new world … what are traded on the market are not, as is often supposed by economists, physical entities, but the rights to perform certain actions, and the rights which individuals possess are established by the legal system … the legal system will have a profound effect on the working of the economic system and may in certain respects be said to control it.99
This insight should be applied to all structures for the governance of transactions, including particular markets, even that modern talisman, the securities market: … commodity exchanges and stock exchanges … are normally organised by a group of traders (the members of the exchange) which owns (or rents) the physical facility within which transactions take place. All exchanges regulate in great detail the activities of those who trade in these markets (the times at which transactions can be made, what can be traded, the responsibilities of the parties, the terms of settlement, etc), and they all provide machinery for the settlement of disputes and impose sanctions against those who infringe the rules of the exchange. It is not without significance that these exchanges, often used by economists as examples of a perfect market and perfect competition, are markets in which transactions are highly regulated (and this quite apart from any government regulation that there may be). It suggests, I think correctly, that for anything approaching perfect competition to exist, an intricate system of rules and regulations would normally be needed.100
Coase’s criticism of blackboard economics does not merely or even principally work against cases for intervention based on welfare economics, but against the passing off of pure economic reasoning as sensible economic policy: Contemplation of an optimal system may suggest ways of improving the system, it may provide techniques of analysis that would otherwise have been missed, and, in certain special cases, it may go far to providing a solution. But, in general, its influence has been pernicious. It has directed economists’ attention away from the main question, which is how alternative arrangements will actually work in practice. It has led economists to derive conclusions for economic policy from a study of an abstract model of a market situation.101
99 Coase, ‘The institutional structure of production’, p 11. 100 Coase, ‘The firm, the market and the law’, pp 9–10. Cf, Coase, ‘The institutional structure of production’, p 12. 101 Coase, ‘Discussion of RE Caves, Direct Regulation and Market Performance in the American Economy and RC Cramton, The Effectiveness of Economic Regulation: A Legal View’, p 195. 64
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As much of the theory guiding conservative capitalist policy has been precisely of this nature, its utopian goal of complete private marketisation is just as indefensible as many of the worst projections of welfare economics, and should be replaced with realistic institutional assumptions, and therefore perhaps defensibly relevant policy recommendations. Coase’s criticism of Pigou’s ideally functioning public institutions works just as well against ideally functioning private ones: … the whole discussion is largely irrelevant for questions of economic policy since, whatever we may have in mind as our ideal world, we have not yet discovered how to get to it from where we are. A better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a situation approximating that which actually exists, to examine the effects of a proposed policy change, and to attempt to decide whether the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than the original one. In this way, conclusions for policy would have some relevance to the actual situation.102
It is in pursuit of this sort of policy analysis that Coase readily could agree with Cannan that: ‘the working of self-interest is generally beneficent … because human institutions are arranged so as to compel self-interest to work in directions in which it will be beneficent.’ The ‘mechanism design’103 of a governance structure for the allocation of economic goods, even if that structure be a market, should be work of conscious, public arrangement based on law, though when the purpose of that arrangement is the allocation of economic goods, the arrangement typically should facilitate privately motivated action within itself.104 The question can never be whether to regulate a market, for without the regulation it cannot exist.
102 Coase, ‘The problem of social cost’, p 154. 103 Hurwicz, ‘The design of mechanisms for resource allocation’. 104 I stress that this applies only to the allocation of economic goods, the sole concern of this paper. It would appear that there are enormously significant spheres of social life which should not be run on market lines because the orientation of appropriate action within them should not be towards self-interest expressed as rational individual utility maximisation. Walzer, Spheres of Justice. Of course, where the boundaries of the noneconomic spheres should be drawn is essentially contestable, and neo-liberalism has usefully widened our imagination of what might usefully be regarded as economic. Duxbury, ‘Do markets degrade?’. Nevertheless, perhaps the most objectionable aspect of law and economics is the way it has, following Becker, very crudely thrust ‘economic’ reasoning into non-economic spheres, certainly creating more heat than light by so doing. Campbell, ‘On what is valuable in law and economics’, pp 492–96; and Campbell and Picciotto, ‘Exploring the interaction between law and economics: the limits of formalism’, pp 253–56. 65
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Furthermore, as the pursuit of general equilibrium is impossible, and therefore very likely indeed to be a harmful goal,105 pursuit of realistic, second-best goals106 is a matter of institutional choice which cannot be avoided. When deciding that economic goods should be allocated through markets, it is incumbent to pay a great deal of attention to the institutional structure of those markets to see that, so far as reasonably possible, action within them conforms to the assumptions of neo-classical economics which will allow the resulting distributions to be defensible as the outcomes of a voluntary market. One thinks immediately of ensuring that consumers are reasonably knowledgeable, that supply is contestable, etc.107 This is a matter of law and the cultural values guiding the interpretation and enforcement of law, but it is, of course, a matter to which, typically, very little attention has been paid at all in a law of contract which believes that contracts proper are (almost entirely) private. The result of creating markets in ignorance of the necessity of setting these institutional parameters will be, as Ian Macneil has put it, ‘a very poor joke’ at the expense of the consumer,108 as the asymmetries of information and bargaining power that characterise the advanced capitalist economies manifest themselves109 in obviously sub-optimal allocations.
105 This has been nowhere more tragically shown to be the case than in the former COMECON economies. In the absurd belief that a general market would somehow spontaneously arise, the most thoroughgoing deregulation of the former baneful command economies has been pursued for over a decade. In the absence of the legal and cultural framework which actually constitutes the invisible hand, the resulting vacuum has, especially in Russia, been filled up by the most despicable gangsterism. I have reviewed these developments in an attempt to draw from them their lesson about the necessity of providing a regulatory, institutional structure for markets in ‘What is meant by “the rule of law” in Asian company law reform?’. Coase has, to my mind to his immense credit, has made similar points in passing. Eg, Coase, ‘The institutional structure of production’, pp 6, 12. 106 Lipsey and Lancaster, ‘The general theory of second best’. 107 The most sustained general statement of the necessity of constructing an institutional structure for welfare optimising markets, including the claim that (in Sunstein’s terms) ‘there is no opposition between “markets” and “government intervention” [because] markets are … a particular form of government intervention’ (p 384), of which I am aware is Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice. I intend my basic argument to be wholly consistent with the Joerges’ argument that the creation of a proper ‘institutional framework of markets’ (p 147) in the EU is a matter of public ‘constitutionalisation’ (though I am very sceptical about many EU measures). Joerges, ‘European challenges to private law: on false dichotomies, true conflicts and the need for a constitutional perspective’. On the specific steps to create a framework for markets being taken in consumer law, see Howells, ch 16, in this volume. On such steps taken in regard of the privatised utilities, see Prosser, ch 18, in this volume. 108 Macneil, ‘Bureaucracy and contracts of adhesion’, p 6. 109 I ignore that aspect of neo-liberalism which simply denies the persisting unpleasant qualities of the capitalist economy. I have criticised one of Posner’s breathtaking sets of denials in ‘Ayres versus Coase: an attempt to recover the issue of equality in law and economics’, pp 445–49, but this is not really the stuff of productive intellectual debate. At the core of any such debate would be the way that the excellent neo-liberal and libertarian economists do not deny capitalism’s shortcomings but doubt the superiority of the proposed alternatives. Eg, Nutter, ‘Economic aspects of freedom’, p 21.
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Having set out one or two ways in which the law of contract has ‘arranged’ the play of self-interest, Pigou says: ‘This adjustment of institutions to the end of directing self-interest into beneficial channels has been carried out in considerable detail.’110 In regard of the law of contract, in one sense Pigou is even more right now than he was when he drafted this. The law of contract and its related doctrines now constitute a massive apparatus. But, as I hope we can now see, in another, less obvious but perhaps more important sense, he is wrong. The massive apparatus of contract has not at its heart tried to: ‘[direct] self-interest into beneficial channels.’ Instead, it has accepted allocations produced by oligopolistic corporations as products of ‘the market’ and, having seen that these often are markedly sub-optimal, has attempted to intervene in them on ‘welfarist’ grounds.111 These massive interventions have so undermined the will theory of contract that even the best attempts to revive112 are hopelessly implausible.113 But, as these interventions are ad hoc, they have not grounded a satisfactory alternative theory of contract.114 As opposed to the well worked out (if inadequate) claims for market efficiency, the claims for paternalism and fairness115 in welfarist contract seem indefensibly patchy. It is, however, their ex post character that makes them appear such. Once it is appreciated that there is inevitable public involvement in the construction of all markets, then the, to the extent appropriate, regulation which now is put forward in the names of fairness and paternalism can be seen to be a necessary part of securing efficiency in some contracts characterised by a lack of real bargaining.116 On the other hand, there will be contracts – very conceivably the great majority – in which competition should play a major part. But no contract will ever be reached on a wholly competitive basis and the proper bounds between co-operation and competition in specific contracts will, of course, be the principal question to be determined when establishing, or ‘arranging’, that particular governance structure. 117 We must allocate economic goods through markets, but the establishment of private markets which optimise welfare is a matter of publicly endorsed institutional arrangement.118
110 Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, p 129. 111 Brownsword, ‘The philosophy of welfarism and its emergence in the modern English law of contract’. 112 Fried, Contract as Promise and Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract. 113 Campbell, ‘The undeath of contract: a study in the degeneration of a research programme’. 114 Campbell, ‘Socio-legal analysis of the law of contract’. 115 Collins, The Law of Contract, 1986, chs 8–9. 116 Campbell, ‘The relational constitution of the discrete contract’. 117 Ibid. 118 Lewis, Choice and the Legal Order. 67
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THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE PRIVATE AFTER THE MERGER OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC In this most important sense, then, spontaneous social order is not spontaneous and the invisible hand is not invisible.119 Nozick rather concedes this, I feel, by allowing that it is necessary to have a minimal or ultraminimal State within which the market can allocate goods.120 For this concession, Nozick has been excoriated by outright libertarians, who perceived that it cuts against their fundamental anarchism.121 In this they are right. One may wish to keep the State as small as possible, and in the light of the attitude to intervention taken here, ceteris paribus one could have no disagreement with this. But once one recognises the vital public role in constituting all social institutions, including the regulatory basis even of markets in which one does not then intervene, then, on pain of contradiction if one does otherwise, one must accept the primacy of the public dimension of all social institutions. The liberal conception of the ‘nightwatchman’ State,122 the strong distinction between negative and positive rights, 123 and private property 124 are indefensible as statements of ‘natural liberties’.125 These are social institutions the form of which is (even when this is denied) and should be (though often it is not in any open way) publicly determined. The private, as a category in itself, does not exist, for the private is a public construction, the limits of which are then a matter for public debate. It is in this sense that we should understand the disappearance of the private or the merger of the private and the public. In Gewirth, the creation of publicly recognised rights 126 within a community of rights127 is placed on the single footing of argument from ‘the principle of generic consistency’.128 In Habermas, the properties of properly
119 I am not trying to drive at the attempts, through empirical studies of specific price formation processes, to give the metaphors for the operation of the market, particularly Walrasian tâtonnements (Walras, Elements of Pure Economics, p 170), some concrete sense. 120 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp 26–28. 121 Barnett, ‘Whither anarchy? Has Robert Nozick justified the State?’; Childs, ‘The invisible hand strikes back’; and Sanders, ‘The free market model versus government: a reply to Nozick’. 122 Mill, ‘On liberty’, ch 4. 123 Berlin, ‘Two concepts of liberty’. 124 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Vol II, ch 5. 125 Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy; Macpherson, ‘Berlin’s division of liberty’; and Macpherson, ‘A political theory of property’. On positive rights, see Lewis, chs 1 and 12, in this volume; and Seneviratne, ch 15, in this volume. 126 Gewirth, Human Rights. 127 Gewith, The Community of Rights. 128 Gewirth, Reason and Morality. 68
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functioning democracy129 are derived from analysis of the conditions of ideal speech.130 I do not put these examples forward to guide concrete policy formulation, for, indeed, when one does identify such concrete proposals in either author, one often finds them to be typical overstatements of the beneficent powers of state intervention.131 But the point is that they have placed the creation of social institutions on a common ground of public debate, and democracy132 can be nothing other than the actualisation of such debate.133 This brings us to the concrete issue of participation in economic policy formulation, which can be dealt with in some concluding remarks on the hybrid.
THE HYBRID AND PARTICIPATION One of the principal achievements of the use of the hybrid in the literature emerging from systems theory has been to show that regulation as intervention may be of limited effectiveness and/or have unintended and unwelcome side effects. In the former case, the intervention into ‘a social area of life’ fails to produce the hoped for results, and in the latter may have bad side effects which outweigh any useful effects. When implicated in these failures, the law itself is degraded. In the case of such intervention, Teubner argues: … either law, politics and/or the social area of life will be mutually indifferent, or juridification will have disintegrating effects on the politics and/or social sectors concerned, or, finally, law itself will be exposed to the disintegrating pressures to conform of politics and/or social sectors.134
129 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. 130 Habermas, ‘What is universal pragmatics?’. 131 Establishing the content of the social contract which allows for the generation of the pure procedure of the market is the central task of Rawls’ liberalism. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, ch 3. Appearing in 1971, A Theory of Justice summed up work published since 1958. It is very instructive to see how much less ambitious Rawls’ claims for his constitutional architecture had become when he revisited these issues in Philosophic Liberalism published in 1993. 132 Accepting something like the implications of democracy for economic policy formulation I am setting out, it has been a natural turn of that strand of libertarian thought which places private property before all else in political analysis (Rothbard, For a New Liberty, ch 2) to be extremely sceptical or dismissive of democracy. Eg, de Jouvenal, On Power, ch 14. I will not argue the basic point here, but do wish to point out that, given the manifest shortcomings of democracy, even if one rejects this social philosophy as a philosophy, it is not without its appeal as a guide to constitutional innovation. The limits it would, if ever followed, certainly place on the possible scope of state intervention is one part of that appeal. Cf, Dowd, ch 2, in this volume. 133 Campbell, ‘Rationality, democracy and freedom in Marxist critiques of Hegel’s philosophy of right’, pp 68–69. 134 Teubner, ‘Juridification: concepts, aspects, limits, solutions’, p 27. 69
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The solution is to effect proper ‘structural coupling’ between the law and the social area of life, and the key to doing this is ‘reflexivity’. A reflexive law respects the inner principles of the social area of life to be regulated and seeks to work with those principles. It does not seek to make direct substantive interventions which run counter to the inner logic of the social area of life but to make largely procedural changes which develop the positive features of that area: Instead of the comprehensive regulation of substantive legal rationality, reflexive law restricts legal performance to more indirect, more abstract forms of social control.135
The clear theme is to move away from bureaucratic imposition of outcomes through intervention to the development of reflexive dialogue with actors in an area which respects those actors’ autonomy: What makes this roundabout way of looking at [the problems of regulation] an attractive solution, by contrast with ‘command and control’ regulation – is that it opens up access – albeit indirect access – to the central mechanisms of selfregulation. Politics gains access to the central control mechanisms of firms, trade unions, and interest groups … The role of law in such processes of adjustment is rather limited … It is limited to providing forms of organisation, procedures and competences … the development of this type of ‘reflexive’ legislative policy … would be the new ‘magic formula’ of modern law: ‘Find a form of law which leaves the autonomy of social discourses undisturbed, but which simultaneously encourages them reciprocally to take heed of the basic assumptions on which each is based.’136
The hybrid contract emerges as the paradigmatic mechanism for this dialogue as its structure is given by the ‘double attribution’ of the hybrid to both market and hierarchy: Hybrids work with a new device: double attribution. It is the dual constitution of the institutional arrangement that constitutes hybrids as an emergent phenomenon … A ‘hybrid operation’ emerges from the twofold social attribution to one of the autonomous parties to the contract and, simultaneously, to the organisation as a whole … ‘Hybrid operations’ are, thus, emergent phenomena by comparison with mere ‘contractual acts’ on the one hand and mere ‘organisational decisions’ on the other. They refer to contract and organisation simultaneously. They cannot be reduced to either market transactions or to organisational decisions. When the dual attribution of action entered into the economic reconstruction of the social arrangement and was operationally used there, hybrids were constituted as autonomous actors.137
135 Teubner, ‘Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law’, p 274. 136 Teubner, Law as an Autopoetic System, pp 96–97, the last sentence quoting Blanke, ‘Verrechtlichung von Wirtschaft, Arbeit und socialer Solidarität’, p 200. 137 Hutter and Teubner, ‘The parasitic role of hybrids’, p 122. 70
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These points have been made from other theoretical standpoints clustered around the notion of ‘responsive regulation’ particularly associated with the work of John Braithwaite.138 I choose to take them up in Teubner in order to conclude by restating a point made earlier. Teubner clearly is driving at a core feature of the type of non-interventionist regulation of markets for which I am arguing, with his general concept of reflexive law respecting the autonomy of markets by assisting them to clarify the way in which they are to establish their own goals. But there are quite unacceptable features of Teubner’s account. By this I do not mean the absurd language in which that account is expressed so much as a theoretical confusion which the language obscures. The ultimately senseless description of social systems he gives, which borders on charlatanry, relieves Teubner of the necessity of giving an explanation of the development he is describing. The peculiar abstraction of the formal systems described and the incomprehensibility of the claimed independence and yet relatedness of their ‘autopoetic’ development allows Teubner to claim a novelty for the hybrid and for reflexive law as such. Instead of the novel hybrid form, I suggest we see current developments in the concept of contract as a continuation of the enlightenment project of the public critique of private interest in the light of the failure of the communist and social democratic versions of that critique. The centralised command and control economy of the former communist countries obviously are now utterly discredited139 and, though the case of social democracy is more complicated, its strain of anti-market interventionism, which opposes liberalism not as necessity but as a positive choice, is equally discredited. What is needed is, of course, is an economic governance structure which can respond to these failures in a positive way. It seems clear that contract will be the main institutional component of that structure, but, as I have said elsewhere, it will be a reformed, socialist contract.140 The institution of contract is predicated on individual choice, and so works against the unacceptable state imposition of goals through intervention. But contract has betrayed individual choice – and so sanctioned intervention until that turned out to have its own unacceptable costs – because of a lack of awareness of the necessity of public regulation of that institution which makes it true to its own goals. The hybrid has registered the necessity of changing the form of contract, but understands itself as terribly novel. This is unhelpful when the key to designing the new form of contract is to
138 Eg, Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation. 139 Except for purposes of total war, and, of course, its superiority as the economic governance structure in support of war waged in this way is another argument against it. 140 ‘The socialist contract: fairness and efficiency in markets’, Inaugural Lecture on appointment to the Chair of Law, Sheffield Hallam University, October 1997 (available from the author at Cardiff Law School, University of Wales College of Cardiff, PO Box 427, Cardiff CF10 3XJ). 71
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understand the history of the concept of contract. The claimed novelty of the hybrid has produced a number of debilitating paradoxes in current economic policy proposals of which I will mention just three particularly instructive ones. First, in the communitarian political theory 141 linked to ‘moral’ economics,142 the critique of intervention has led to an elaboration of the virtues of ‘civil society’. This civil society seems mysteriously to display a social self-consciousness, and hence a conscious acceptance of the moral bounds of selfish action, which it was the very purpose of socialism to provide by the critique of civil society by State. No attempt to address the political shortcomings which were central to the very identification of civil society as the modern form of social structure143 is made in this wholly reactionary communitarianism. This civil society works because, like Smith’s rather civilised competitive behaviour, it actually contains the public dimension which it explicitly denies. Secondly, the ‘social market’ on which much left-wing economic analysis is focused often makes more or less the opposite error. Aware both of the limits (of effectiveness) of hierarchical allocations and of the importance of setting the institutional parameters of markets, such pains are taken in many accounts of the social market to rule out certain allocations considered ethically undesirable that no real choice figures in those markets. It is merely a question of trying to use rigged markets to establish what an improving elite have already decided were the proper allocative outcomes.144 This is a failure to see that the appeal of the ‘economic efficiency’ that drives the success of neo-liberalism is not some technical efficiency in pursuit of collectively agreed goals but efficiency in allowing citizens to voluntarily determine their own goals by a collectively agreed pure procedure. The hard case arises when an elite in a hierarchical position disagrees with a voluntary choice.145 Given the position taken in this chapter, the voluntary choice must trump, so long as one can reasonably be assured it was voluntary. This assurance is, of course, typically what one lacks in the outcomes of many of the administered, oligopolistic consumer ‘markets’ of advanced capitalism. Thirdly, the New Labour government is at great pains to renounce its socialist patrimony and insist that it is attempting to steer a ‘third way’ between State socialism and free markets.146 One can see the appeal of this as propaganda, but, of course, it is wholly abstract. The power of the third way
141 142 143 144 145 146
Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda. Etzioni, The Moral Dimension: Towards a New Economics. Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, Pts 5–6. Le Grand and Estrin (eds), Market Socialism. Eg, Lewis, Choice and the Legal Order, p 35. Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. 72
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seems to lie precisely in its being third, and as such a new type of economic governance. But that this seems already to have decayed into meaninglessness as a political programme is only to be expected. If one wishes to know in concrete terms why capitalist markets and intervention have both proved inadequate and to improve on them, one must create a governance structure the very form of which is given by an awareness of the shortcomings of both. The new structure cannot be novel but must have history at its heart, 147 otherwise it is a merely abstract ‘thirdness’. It is a rather good joke that New Labour’s desperate attempt to be novel has led it to rest its economic policy on an abstract synthesis (anything rather than a development of socialism) which is, of course, an example of the dialectic reduced to an ‘empty’,148 ‘lifeless schema’149 which made dialectical materialism a laughing stock. It would appear that the denied history of socialism is rather having its revenge upon Mr Blair. The form of socialist contract we must now devise will have a dialogue with past failures at its heart. Rejecting intervention but building on our awareness of the necessity of the social regulation of the institution of the market, we may approach the problem of institutional design in a publicly endorsed way. The old privileges of private property cannot stand against this social self-consciousness, but such self-consciousness, chastened by the knowledge of the past excesses and outrages committed in the name of the public, will have a liberal respect for private choices at its heart.150
147 Any socialism developed against the beneficent background of liberalism has, of course, dealt with just the issues New Labour tries to pretend are novel. Take, for example, the following from Beveridge’s informatively entitled lecture ‘Between Cobden and Lenin’: ‘The practical issue does not lie, and is never likely to lie, between planning under completed socialism and a free pricing process under capitalism’. Beveridge, ‘Between Cobden and Lenin: the dilemmas of planning in the 1930s’, p 25. 148 Hegel, Science of Logic, p 837. 149 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p 30. 150 In ‘Conceptions of property in common law discourse’, Rotherham puts forward an acute argument about the public foundation of private property rights, but then seems immediately to move to seeing this as license for wider public expropriation, even without compensation. Whilst I do not at all rule out the measures Rotherham puts forward in specific cases, social self-consciousness of the public foundation of property rights should in general lead to an awareness of duties towards property owners. 73
CHAPTER 4
A CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE FOR MORE PARTICIPATION: WHAT WOULD IT LOOK LIKE?1
Perri 6
THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF CONSTITUTIONS One could be forgiven for thinking, the way the chatterati are talking, that constitutions live in capital cities. The British constitution, it seems, is probably going to be devolved from Westminster to Edinburgh, Cardiff and somewhere else in London. All the talk is about the distribution of seats, the comparative merits of different voting systems, and what titles the new élites in these capital cities will take for themselves. But, it is wholly misleading to talk about the constitutional geography as though it were a metropolitan gallery of old masters. Worse than that, it is actually dangerous. In fact, constitutions lead everyday humdrum lives in back streets, lowly sub-offices and schools. When those lives change, the constitutional culture of Britain can change in ways that do not get thought through clearly when everyone is obsessed with the ceremonial places in SW1 and its equivalents in Wales and Scotland. Perhaps it is easier to recognise this at first in the US than in the UK. There, the constitution is a part of what children learn about in schools, not so much when they do ‘civics’ lessons, as when they acquire certain expectations about how their lives can be lived; specifically about how they can complain; about the confidence with which they can assert certain rights; about the things that bind them together; and about what, if anything, politicians and government officials can be trusted to do, and why. The litigiousness of Americans has some of its foundations in a culture of recourse to law that the constitution affords and sanctifies. The politics of every local pressure group meeting in
1
A shorter version of this paper was given at the Public Administration Conference at Sunningdale on 2 September 1997, commissioned by Gerry Stoker. I should to thank those attending that Conference and those attending the conference on The Constitutional Implications of Participation for useful comments and questions. I am grateful to Ian Christie, Ben Jupp, Kristen Lasky, Steve Ney and Gerry Stoker for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The first section of this paper was published as 6, ‘How will we feel the morning after?’. It is a part of a longer programme of research being conducted jointly with Kristen Lasky which will examine and compare British and US cultures of constitutionalism using secondary analysis of a wide variety of quantitative data sources. 75
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every dusty church hall in small town America is shaped by the prospect that its demand could one day be entrenched, or constitutionalised. As children Americans learn the constitutional virtues and vices, learn that pressure group gridlock (in the sense of a stand-off between opposing groups leading to paralysis in decision making) is the product of irresponsibility and lack of restraint in the use of the constitution, and learn that courage, integrity and honesty are virtues on which the working of the constitution depends. And this is learned, not from Madison, but from the newspapers and the television. Constitutions live in the topics about which people gossip. In the US, gun law, abortion and prayer in schools are daily constitutional conversation. When the British start to look for their own constitutional culture, they tend, self-deprecatingly, to say that they do not have one because their constitution is scattered across dozens of basic documents rather than a single one. In fact, some very distinctive aspects of a constitutional culture can be identified in the common expectations of the British people. As befits the culture of a people whom Lady Thatcher once allegedly called ‘rough’, British constitutional culture is a rough-and-ready, coarsely hewn, unfinished affair. Moreover, that culture has changed quite a lot during the 18 years of Conservative rule, and not always in the ways the Conservative governments intended. Through the 1980s and early 1990s, as public lack of esteem for and distrust of politicians and civil servants rose, the Conservatives responded with formal and explicit codes of ethics for ministers, civil servants and MPs, and multiplied the tribe of ombudsfolk. A special Speaker’s Commission on citizenship recommended constitutional education in every school. The British public’s willingness to use the constitutional remedies of judicial review and other tribunals grew through the same period. New terms were added to the language for new constitutional vices – ‘sleaze’, ‘quangocrat’, or even Professor John Stewart’s ‘new magistracy’, and our constitutional gossip changed. All these may seem small and surreptitious changes to the constitution and the culture by comparison with moving around the furniture in the capital cities, but they are often much more important in shaping the expectations, confidence, perceptions of the relevance and irrelevance of different institutions and opportunities for participation, and even the querulousness of a people. The Labour Government is undertaking its grand rehanging of the constitutional collection of old masters in our capital cities. But, the Government, and, indeed, academic political scientists, would do well to think more about what effect its constitutional changes will have on the gossip in the bus queue, on the willingness of citizens to complain, on public understanding of what taxes are spent upon, on the demand for Legal Aid and the services of the courts, and on people’s expectations of how the risks they face in their lives might be met. These things are much harder to establish than formal systems of powers, accountability and jurisdiction. But not
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attending to the barometer of constitutional gossip brings grave risks not merely of unpopularity, but of deeper distrust of public life and ever more conflict-oriented uses of the constitution by discontented litigants and social movements. There is no point in changing the constitution unless one also changes the constitutional geography of Britain’s cultures, and perhaps unless it enables more participation and trust in the institutions of democratic participation. In this chapter, I explore what we know or hypothesise about the character of Britain’s cultures of constitutionalism. The chapter is concerned with what would sustain higher levels of participation, looked at through the lenses of a number of bodies of theory about cultures in general and political cultures in particular. The first two thirds of the chapter are theoretical and analytical. The chapter begins by sharpening up and clarifying the question to be explored: ‘what are the cultural conditions for enhanced participation?’ In particular, it explores the meaning of the assumption that participation should be sustainable, given that it is known that levels of participation describe historical cycles, and that participation should be benign, although much participation is stimulated not so much by constitutional opportunities as by disappointment. The chapter then uses one of the most powerful contemporary anthropological theories of culture to consider some of the principal cultural biases through which we each see political participation, and that we can expect to find distributed across the population of any complex society. A classification of some of the principal dimensions of different cultures of constitutionalism will be advanced. This classification will focus on cultures of trust in those individuals and organisations that have constitutional authority to make decisions, because varying the level of such trust is an important response to culturally filtered perceptions of the opportunities for and the costs and benefits of participation. In particular, some hypotheses will be formulated about presumptions about how trust will differ by cultural bias. Some conclusions about the cultural conditions for enhanced sustainable and benign participation will then be drawn, but it can be observed now that those conditions will not be easy to satisfy. In the final third of the chapter, after a brief description of changes in the British culture of constitutionalism, some of the cultural questions, risks and opportunities that the current proposals of the British Government for constitutional change will be identified. The conclusion will consider some of the implications of the argument for the future direction of democratic theory and its relationship with social capital theory.
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CULTURES, CONSTITUTIONS AND PARTICIPATION When considering increasing the level of democratic participation in political decision making it is important to identify what I have called a culture of constitutionalism, because bringing about such an increase is not just – indeed, it is not even principally – a question for the legal designers of formal constitutional rules. It is also, and arguably crucially, a question about culture.2 Constitutionalism is not just a tradition of a special kind of law making, but something with a cultural life.3 The ways in which people will make use of a set of constitutional rules are at the very least influenced by their cultures. The idea of the lobby in Britain and of the demonstration in France reflect fundamentally culturally different uses of constitutional opportunities. The cultures that enable and sustain participation are plural in number, change relatively quickly, and are susceptible to influence but not always in straightforward ways. A complex society is a mélange of sub-cultures that differ by region, by age group, by political attitude, by rituals and dress, and by levels of aspiration. 1990s Britain, for example, exhibits a wide variety of small, fragmented youth sub-cultures of relatively limited political expressivity.4 In comparison, in the Britain of the 1970s, punks, rude boys and new wave hybrids coalesced into a brief, but broadly radical, political culture.5 The contemporary political culture of 30 somethings, which are influenced by the emergence of less class-centric cultures, differ sharply from those observed during the polarisations of the 1980s. The interaction of different cultures determines not only the uses people make of the constitutional structure of opportunities for participation, but also the legitimacy of those opportunities and the acceptability of the participation practices of many interest groups. In the US, for example, cultural attitudes towards class action litigation make legitimate certain forms of participation by interest groups that some continental European countries, which have been much less willing to grant power over policy making to judges and lawyers, would have difficulty in entertaining. Cultures can either sustain or
2 3
4 5
There is a large literature on political cultures, but often not directly relevant for the present purpose (eg, Almond and Verba (eds), The Civic Culture Revisited). Constitutionalism is usually defined either as a strategy of entrenching (liberal) values, or a moral theory about why entrenchment is needed, or a justification for giving power to judges over politicians (Greenberg et al (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World; and Elster and Slagstad (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy). 6 et al, The Substance of Youth: The Place of Drugs in Young People’s Lives Today. Hebdige, Sub-culture: The Meaning of Style. 78
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undermine a constitutional order. On the other hand, changing the constitutional rules can be met with adaptation and resistance by cultures. So, too, does abstention from change. Thus, for example, the availability since the 1940s of legal aid steadily made enormous changes in the cultures of litigation and expectation about the role of law in participation in Britain, while constitutional innovations such as the early 20th century exemption of certain categories of the property of the monarch from tax so grated against changing cultures that they proved to be unsustainable by the 1990s. Moreover, understanding the cultural conditions in which constitutional rules are received is of great importance when evaluating a constitutional order. Some constitutional innovations fail because they run up against deepseated cultural limits on what is acceptable. Thus, for example, by the 1650s the Cromwellian Commonwealth ran up against a number of culturally heavily ingrained expectations and commitments in England, as did the Vichy regime led by Pétain in France in the 1940s. Under the Labour administration elected in 1997, Britain is entering a period of relatively drastic formal and explicit constitutional change (there was plenty of less formal but nevertheless significant constitutional change under the Conservatives between 1979 and 1997).6 There will be a devolved Scottish parliament with tax varying and domestic law making powers, a Welsh assembly, the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into British law, legislation to remove from hereditary peers in the House of Lords their rights to vote on primary legislation, the creation in London of a new strategic authority and a directly elected mayor, and the substitution of ‘no win, no fee’ financing options for the availability of legal aid in certain types of case.6a The Government has argued that at least some of these changes will enhance the opportunities for certain kinds of participation, thereby cutting with the grain of Britain’s political culture. For example, some of these changes have been designed to align institutions of political representation with national or city feeling and identity, and others have been justified as changing and perhaps expanding the opportunity for participation by way of redress in administrative and human rights litigation. At such a time, then, it is essential to explore the cultural conditions of the viability of constitutional change in general, and to develop ways of gauging the likelihood of current constitutional reform proposals to create, stimulate, or enhance cultures of political participation in Britain. The next section more carefully defines those valuable properties of participation for which we need to identify the cultural conditions.
6
Mount, The British Constitution Now; and Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring: Unearthing the British Constitution. 6a Hazell (ed), Constitutional Futures: A History of the Next Ten Years. 79
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CULTURES OF SUSTAINABLE PARTICIPATION The question set by the editors of this book to the authors was whether anything can be done, and if so what, to increase levels of democratic participation, and this chapter will explore the cultural conditions under which this might be possible. This question must be amended to emphasise that any such increase must be both sustainable and benign. For there are, in fact, undesirable ways to increase levels of participation, at least in the short term. For example, if social conditions are allowed to deteriorate sharply and people become frustrated, they may well participate angrily. Indeed, popular dissatisfaction and frustration with the quality and quantity of the services they receive is probably the most common reason for rising levels of participation. As Hirschman pointed out,7 an increase in the decibel levels of ‘voice’ usually occurs in response to disappointment. Furthermore, again to follow Hirschman,8 people are often prepared to participate for short periods, but burn out having become disappointed with the balance between the costs and benefits of participation, and tend to do this as part of larger social cycles of activism and civic privatism. Activists become disillusioned with their own goals, with the institutions of participation, and with their own organisations. This process can be observed, for example, in the decay of many of the leading dissident movements and early democratic parties in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary after the fall of communism. Similarly, after protracted periods of civic privatism, people become disappointed with the achievements of private exit alone, and try to find a more public voice again. It was this aspect of the rise of participation leading up to the unrest of 1968 that Hirschman originally tried to explain, after Olson’s theory of collective action seemed to leave it inexplicable. Of course, there are also wider influences on the depth, duration and distribution of the peaks and troughs of Hirschman cycles of participation. These include the condition of the economy, the labour market trends affecting the use of time, family and household structure, and also the media strategies influencing the ‘issue attention cycle’. Now while those who want to raise levels of participation can hardly advocate making matters worse in order to annoy people into exercising voice, democrats take differing views of Hirschman cycles. Some argue that they are a fact of social and cultural life, very difficult effectively to overcome, that they are perhaps no bad thing, that the right not to participate is important in a democracy, and indeed that it is offensive to liberty to want to encourage everyone or even many people to become continuously active participants in social decision making for longer than they would otherwise 7 8
Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action. 80
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prefer. Some would go further and argue that some balance between activism and passivity is essential for political stability.9 Others – let us call them activist democrats – take the view that very low levels of participation punctuated only by brief bursts of frustrated expression reflect an impoverishment of the democratic culture, in which the effective exercise of liberty has been dampened and dulled by low expectations and cynicism, and that in such situations unscrupulous politicians can readily manipulate democratic institutions for undemocratic ends. Therefore, they argue that if Hirschman cycles cannot be replaced by a continuously high level of participation based on enjoyment of being part of the decision making processes, then at least the level of activity, and the number engaging in that activity in the troughs of civic privatism, should be increased.10 While the vision offered by the activist democrats is clearly not to everyone’s taste, it has proven so attractive to many thinkers, politicians and leaders of social movements concerned with constitutional reform that it is important to identify the cultural conditions in which it would be possible to realise that vision. Yet the principal writers in the activist democracy tradition have rarely addressed this question, or when they have, their arguments have generally boiled down to the implausible claim that increasing the opportunities for participation will completely eradicate the culture of civic privatism, and, therefore, that there will be no cultural problem in sustaining radical democracy.11 Some environmental activists have imagined that the Local Agenda 21 programme created at the Rio summit would be a self-sustaining experience of local popular participation on the back of a convergence of local and global environmental concerns. However, the question of increasing participation still is not sufficiently precise. For if we are to explore the cultural conditions of greater participation, we need to ask whose participation is thought desirable, when it is thought desirable and how desirable participation can be sustained. The question of the cultural basis of active participation that is evenly or equally distributed across some key dimensions of a society is a very different and more
9
In the study of political cultures, this view is associated with Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, although it was revived in particularly virulent form in the 1970s by ‘overload’ writers suspicious of democracy (eg, Brittan, ‘The politics of excessive expectations’; Crozier et al, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to The Trilateral Commission; King, ‘The problem of overload’; and Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities. For a liberal rejection of the implications of the ‘overload’ hypothesis, see 6 and Randon, Liberty, Charity and Politics, Pt 2. 10 This view is set out in Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age and Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science. For a British collection in this tradition, see Hirst and Khilnani (eds), Reinventing Democracy. 11 Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age seems particularly close to this position as, at times, does Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics, ch 4. 81
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demanding one from a question about greater aggregate participation that may be skewed in particular ways. The first issue concerns what I will call the life course. In different societies, participation tends to be most evident during different phases of life. There are gerontocratic and there are youth dominated societies, in which the culturally defined roles, opportunities, customs and costs of participation fall differently between the generations. Soviet Russia was famously gerontocratic. Britain offers much more evenly distributed opportunities across the life course. In many African and middle Eastern countries opportunities for political participation are relatively youth dominated, reflecting the age profile of the population. Secondly, participation is lumpy because it is organised around social identities and, indeed, can play a key role in the reinforcement or reinvention of those identities. Political participation in the civil rights, women’s liberation and gay liberation movements in post-war USA has not only reinforced African-American, women’s and feminist and gay social identities, but has played a key role in their formation. Clearly, when participation becomes highly polarised around social identity and the processes of negotiation and tolerance become strained by the identification of many people with particular ‘oppressed’ identities, the result can be gridlock and, as the US expression has it, ‘culture wars’. In such culture wars, sincere participation takes place almost entirely within the enclave furnished by a particular identity and participation outside that enclave is entirely instrumental. The US presents, however, a special and extreme case of the common phenomenon that participation as a collective process is one that builds upon and itself builds identity. Thirdly, in the writings of most activist democrats, it is implicitly or explicitly asserted that the need for greater participation is most urgent among people in the lower socio-economic classes. This places rather different cultural demands than does, say, increasing the participation of the articulate, educated, middle aged, middle income groups in socio-economic classes A and B. Finally, it is necessary to specify the cultural conditions under which a high level of sustainable participation might be achieved. If high levels of participation lead to gridlock in decision making they are not likely to be sustainable for long periods of time. The next section gives a general account of political culture which will enable us to identify the conditions for sustainability.
CULTURAL BIASES ABOUT PARTICIPATION Because there are many cultures within a nation to which a pluralist liberal constitution must give space, it is well to examine what we know about the 82
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diversity and interaction of political cultures in order to assess the use of constitutional opportunities to participate. One of the most powerful theories of the range and diversity of cultures has been developed by Mary Douglas (the distinguished British anthropologist), the late Aaron Wildavsky (an American political scientist and policy analyst), and their collaborators.12 Known sometimes simply as ‘cultural theory’13 and sometimes as ‘grid-group theory’, it begins from the argument that there are two fundamental dimensions of social life, the ‘grid’ and the ‘group’, which can be depicted as the axes of a graph on which specific societies can be located. The social structural institutions of rules, roles and the classification of people and norms are the grid. The extent to which the basic unit of social life is the group or the individual, or, more accurately, the degree to which the individual is incorporated in the group, is the group. These two dimensions are fundamental because no human society can sustain itself without devising a workable settlement between the conflicting impulses that each axis represents. In the absence of some such settlement of this kind, it becomes impossible to develop coherent social systems, for example, a law of contract on which basic economic life can be based. Breaking up the space created by a cross-tabulation of these two dimensions into high and low grid and group yields a four-quadrant schema which has proven extremely useful in many empirical contexts in understanding how cultures differ.14 It is set out in Figure 1. Grid-group analysis offers more than simply a typology of the cultural biases exhibited by individuals in particular institutional settings.15 It also offers a body of explanation and prediction. I want here to draw out six key empirically testable hypotheses that emerge from grid-group cultural theory of direct relevance to the question of increasing participation.
12 Adams, Risk; Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory; Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers; and Rayner, ‘Cultural theory and risk analysis’. 13 Thompson et al, Cultural Theory. 14 For some empirical applications, see Coyle and Ellis (eds), Politics, Policy and Culture; and Dake and Wildavsky, ‘Theories of risk perception: who fears what and why?’. 15 There is an extensive debate in cultural theory about the appropriate units of analysis. Although some do, most