Principles of Social Psychiatry Second Edition
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Principles of Social Psychiatry Second Edition
Principles of Social Psychiatry Second Edition
Editors
Craig Morgan and Dinesh Bhugra NIH Biomedical Research Centre and Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK
This edition first published 2010, Ó 2010 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Wiley Blackwell is an imprint of John Wiley & Sons, formed by the merger of Wiley’s global Scientific, Technical and Medical business with Blackwell Publishing. Registered office: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK Other Editorial Offices: 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030 5774, USA For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley blackwell The right of the author to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books. Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Principles of social psychiatry / editors, Craig Morgan and Dinesh Bhugra. 2nd ed. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978 0 470 69713 9 1. Social psychiatry. 2. Community psychiatry. I. Morgan, Craig, 1971 II. Bhugra, Dinesh. [DNLM: 1. Community Psychiatry. WM 30.6 P957 2010] RC455.P72 2010 616.89 dc22 2009050970 ISBN: 978 0 470 69713 9 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Set in 10/12 Times by Thomson Digital, Noida, India Printed in Singapore by Fabulous Printers Pte Ltd First Impression
2010
Contents List of Contributors Foreword Mario Maj Preface Social Psychiatry: Alive and Kicking Dinesh Bhugra and Craig Morgan
ix xiii xv
Part One Perspectives and Methods
1
1 The Historical Development of Social Psychiatry Julian Leff
3
2 Why Psychiatry Has to be Social Paul E. Bebbington
13
3 Categories and Continuums Peter Tyrer
31
4 Social, Biological and Personal Constructions of Mental Illness Derek Bolton
39
5 Social Science Perspectives: A Failure of the Sociological Imagination Craig Morgan and Arthur Kleinman
51
6 Concepts and Challenges in Capturing Dynamics of the Wider Social Environment Stephani L. Hatch and Dana March
65
7 Qualitative Research Methods Joanna Murray
77
Part Two Components of the Social World
89
8 The Social Epidemiology of Mental Disorder Ronald C. Kessler, Philip S. Wang and Hans-Ulrich Wittchen
91
9 Families and Psychosis Juliana Onwumere, Ben Smith and Elizabeth Kuipers
103
vi
CONTENTS
10 Culture and Its Influence on Diagnosis and Management Dinesh Bhugra and Susham Gupta
117
11 Culture and Identity Julian Leff
133
12 Globalization and Psychiatry Rahul Bhattacharya, Susham Gupta and Dinesh Bhugra
141
13 Trauma and Disasters in Social and Cultural Context Laurence J. Kirmayer, Hanna Kienzler, Abdel Hamid Afana and Duncan Pedersen
155
Part Three Social Determinants
179
14 Fundamental Social Causes of Health Inequalities Jo C. Phelan and Bruce G. Link
181
15 The Sociodevelopmental Origins of Psychosis Craig Morgan and Gerard Hutchinson
193
16 Depression Tom K. J. Craig
215
17 Common Mental Disorders Christoph Lauber
227
18 Suicide Gwendolyn Portzky and Kees van Heeringen
237
19 Personality Disorder Priya Bajaj and Mike Crawford
249
20 Drug Use, Drug Problems and Drug Addiction: Social Influences and Social Responses John Strang, Michael Gossop and John Witton
259
21 Eating Disorders Mervat Nasser
277
22 Social Factors that Influence Child Mental Health Nisha Dogra
285
23 Social Determinants of Late Life Disorders Robert Stewart
295
Part Four Social Consequences and Responses
305
24 Responses to the Onset of Mental Health Problems: Issues and Findings from Research on Illness Behaviour and the Use of Health Services Bernice A. Pescosolido
307
CONTENTS
vii
25 Gender and Reproductive Health Louise Howard
321
26 Stigma and Discrimination Graham Thornicroft, Nisha Mehta, Elaine Brohan and Aliya Kassam
331
27 Taking Inequality’s Measure: Poverty, Displacement, Unemployment and Mental Health Kim Hopper
341
28 Health Economics and Psychiatry: The Pursuit of Efficiency Martin Knapp and Jennifer Beecham
371
Part Five Social Interventions
385
29 Team Structures in Community Mental Health Tom Burns
387
30 Prevention Tristan McGeorge, Sean Cross and Rachel Jenkins
397
31 Principles of Social Intervention Richard Warner
411
32 Social Interventions for Psychosis David Kingdon, Yoshihiro Kinoshita and Stefan Gleeson
425
33 Social Management of Common Mental Disorders Patricia R. Casey
439
34 Problem-Solving Therapy for People with Personality Disorders Mary McMurran, Christine Maguth Nezu and Arthur M. Nezu
449
35 Social Support Traolach S. Brugha
461
36 Modern Social Networking and Mental Health Keir Jones, James Woollard and Dinesh Bhugra
477
37 The Psychiatric–Child Protection Interface: Research to Inform Practice Colin Pritchard
483
Part Six Global Mental Health
499
38 Mental Health in Europe: Learning from Differences Mirella Ruggeri and Maria Elena Bertani
501
39 East Meets West: Current Mental Health Burdens in Greater China Roger M. K. Ng and Zhanjiang Li
517
40 Social Psychiatry in India R. Thara and R. Padmavati
531
viii
CONTENTS
41 Social Psychiatry in Africa: Evidence and Challenges Oye Gureje and Victor Makanjuola
541
42 Social Psychiatry in the Americas Pedro Ruiz
551
Epilogue
559
43 Where Next for Social Psychiatry? Dinesh Bhugra and Craig Morgan
561
Index
565
List of Contributors Abdel Hamid Afana, International Council for Torture Survivors (IRCT), Copenhagen, Denmark Priya Bijaj, Department of Psychological Medicine, Imperial College London, London, UK Paul E. Bebbington, Department of Mental Health Sciences, University College London, London, UK Jennifer Beecham, Personal Social Services Research Unit, University of Kent, Canterbury, and Personal Social Services Research Unit, London School of Economics, London, UK Maria Elena Bertani, Department of Medicine and Public Health, University of Verona, Verona, Italy Rahul Bhattacharya, East London NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK Dinesh Bhugra, NIH Biomedical Research Centre and Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Derek Bolton, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London and South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK Elaine Brohan, Health Service and Population Research Department, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Traolach S. Brugha, Department of Health Scienes, University of Leicester, Leicester and Brandon Mental Health Unit, Leicester General Hospital, Leicester, UK Tom Burns, Department of Psychiatry, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Patricia R. Casey, Department of Psychiatry, Mater Misericordiae University Hospital, University College, Dublin, Republic of Ireland Tom K. J. Craig, Health Services and Population Research Department, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Mike Crawford, Department of Psychological Medicine, Imperial College London, London, UK Sean Cross, WHO Collaborating Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Nisha Dogra, Greenwood Institute of Child Health, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK Stefan Gleeson, Hampshire Partnership Foundation NHS Trust, Southampton, UK Michael Gossop, National Addiction Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Susham Gupta, East London, NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK Oye Gureje, Department of Psychiatry, University of Ibadan and University College Hospital, Ibadan, Nigeria Stephani L. Hatch, Department of Psychological Medicine, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Kim Hopper, Nathan Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research and Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, USA Louise Howard, Section of Women’s Mental Health Service, Health Service and Population Research Department, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Gerard Hutchinson, Psychiatry Unit, Department of Clinical Medical Sciences, University of West Indies, Mount Hope, Champs Fleurs, Trinidad
x
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Rachel Jenkins, WHO Collaborating Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Keir Jones, South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK Aliya Kassam, Health Service and Population Research Department, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Ronald C. Kessler, Department of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, USA Hanna Kienzler, Department of Anthropology, McGill University, Montreal, Canada David Kingdon, School of Medicine, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK Yoshihiro Kinoshita, School of Medicine, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK Laurence J. Kirmayer, Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, McGill University and Culture and Mental Health Research Unit, Jewish General Hospital, Montreal, Canada Arthur Kleinman, Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA Martin Knapp, Personal Social Services Research Unit, London School of Economics and Centre for the Economics of Mental Health, King’s College London, London, UK Elizabeth Kuipers, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Christoph Lauber, Department of Population and Behavioural Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK Julian Leff, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Zhanjiang Li, Beijing Anding Hospital, Capital Medical University, Beijing, People’s Republic of China Bruce G. Link, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, USA Tristan McGeorge, WHO Collaborating Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Mary McMurran, Department of Psychiatry, Institute of Mental Health, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK Victor Makanjuola, Department of Psychiatry, University of Ibadan and University College Hospital, Ibadan, Nigeria Dana March, Department of Social Sciences, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, USA Nisha Mehta, School of Medicine, King’s College London, London, UK Craig Morgan, NIH Biomedical Research Centre and Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Joanna Murray, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Mervat Nasser, Health Service and Population Research Department, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Christine Maguth Nezu, Department of Psychiatry, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA Arthur M. Nezu, Department of Psychiatry, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA Roger M. K. Ng, Department of Psychiatry, Kowloon Hospital, Kowloon, Hong Kong Juliana Onwumere, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK R. Padmavati, Schizophrenia Research Foundation (SCARF), Chennai, India Duncan Pedersen, Douglas Mental Health University Institute and Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, Canada Bernice Pescosolido, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, USA Jo C. Phelan, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, USA Gwendolyn Portzky, Department of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology, University Hospital, Gent, Belgium Colin Pritchard, School of Health and Social Care, Bournemouth University, Bournemouth, UK Mirella Ruggeri, Department of Medicine and Public Health, University of Verona, Verona, Italy Pedro Ruiz, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science, University of Texas Medical School at Houston, Houston, Texas, USA Ben Smith, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
xi
Robert Stewart, Section of Epidemiology, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK John Strang, National Addiction Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK R. Thara, Schizophrenia Research Foundation (SCARF), Chennai, India Graham Thornicroft, Health Service and Population Research Department, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK Peter Tyrer, Department of Psychological Medicine, Imperial College London, London, UK Kees van Heeringen, Department of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology, University Hospital, Gent, Belgium Philip S. Wang, Division of Services and Intervention Research, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland, USA Richard Warner, University of Colorado and Colorado Recovery, Boulder, Colorado, USA Hans-Ulrich Wittchen, Max Planck Institute for Psychiatry, Mu¨nchen, Germany John Witton, National Addiction Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK James Wollard, Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust, UK
Foreword This second edition of Principles of Social Psychiatry appears more than 15 years after the first one, and even a cursory comparison between the contents of the two editions clearly documents that the scope and the impact of the social component of our discipline and profession have remarkably increased during the past few years. There is now a more widespread awareness of the role of social risk factors even in the aetiology of mental disorders that had been traditionally perceived to be mostly biological in their causation. Schizophrenia is a good example. The research evidence concerning the association between some social factors such as urbanicity and a history of migration and the likelihood of developing a psychotic condition is now quite robust, and there is also some evidence of a synergy between these factors and familial liability in the causation of the disorder. Also increasing is awareness of the impact of social factors on the identification and the diagnosis of mental disorders. The role of values in addition to evidence in the diagnostic process is now widely appreciated. One of the most debated issues in the ongoing process of revision of the ICD and the DSM is the relationship between syndromal diagnosis and impairment of social functioning. Furthermore, much greater attention than in the past is being given to the cultural relevance and acceptability of proposed diagnostic approaches, categories and criteria. The past decade has witnessed a flourishing of research on the social consequences of mental disorders, in terms both of stigma and discrimination and
burden on caregivers, as well as a new attention to the social factors involved in access to care, resilience and recovery. Moreover, some issues of clear social relevance, such as the mental health consequences of disasters and the mental health problems in refugees and victims of torture, have now a much greater visibility. Finally, the research evidence supporting the efficacy and effectiveness of psychosocial interventions for major mental disorders, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, has grown dramatically during the past 15 years, and the shift from hospital-based to community-based mental health care in several countries has generated a new interest in the link between the organization of mental health services and patients’ quality of life and satisfaction with care. A psychiatric practice and a psychiatric research that do not take the social dimension into account are now unthinkable, and it is not surprising that the scope of these ‘Principles of Social Psychiatry’ is now becoming closer to a manual of general psychiatry. One further feature of this volume is that it represents a bridge between different generations, with some of the fathers of modern social psychiatry and some young emerging researchers among the contributors, as well as a bridge between the core group of UK scientists and leaders of several regions of the world. This gives the book a special flavour, which the reader will certainly appreciate. Professor Mario Maj President, World Psychiatric Association
Preface Social psychiatry: alive and kicking Dinesh Bhugra and Craig Morgan NIH Biomedical Research Centre and Institute of Psychiatry, King' s College London, London, UK
The scope of social psychiatry is broad. Its remit ranges from the impact of social structures and experiences on the onset, course and outcome of mental disorders, to the development and evaluation of complex social interventions and systems of service delivery, to the influence of society on the construction of, and responses to, mental disorder. In this, it intersects with cultural and community psychiatry and with renewed interest in the philosophy of mental disorder, and draws from a number of disciplines, including social epidemiology, sociology and anthropology. This breadth is very much reflected in this current edition, with contributions from across the social sciences. In its focus on the social dimensions of mental disorder, social psychiatry occupies a somewhat precarious position given psychiatry’s primary orientation to the medical and biological. In many respects, social psychiatry reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s following the closure of long-stay asylums and the relocation of care into the community. Since then, however, social psychiatry (until recently at least) has been in gradual retreat, pushed back by the seemingly inexorable advance of genetics and neuroscience and their promise to uncover the basic biological underpinnings of mental distress. It is arguable that, as a consequence, the scope of social psychiatry has increasingly narrowed to health services research, leaving the business of aetiology to the ‘hard’ sciences
of genetics and neuroimaging. This has led to some inevitable hand wringing about ‘the future of social psychiatry’ [1]. It seems, however, that the obituaries are premature. In the early 2000s, Professor David Goldberg lectured widely on the topic ‘Social psychiatry: there is life after death’, and others have written in a similar vein [2]. Ironically, if the considerable advances in our understanding of the human genome and the brain have told us anything, it is the degree to which the external environment impacts on and moulds what is a flexible and adaptive biological system. As Leon Eisenberg [3] notes: ‘. . . social psychiatry . . . is alive and well precisely because of genomics’ (p. 101). With hindsight, this was always going to be the case; mental disorder in all its facets is intrinsically social it is both shaped by and in turn shapes the local social and moral worlds of individuals. We can safely put to bed any angst-ridden concerns about ‘the future of social psychiatry’. The contributions to this current edition reflect the breadth, necessity and vibrancy of social research in psychiatry, and range from consideration of conceptual and methodological issues (i.e. the nature of mental disorder, how the social world can be studied) to the social determinants of the onset, course and outcome of mental disorders, to consideration of mental health in a global context. This latter focus is relatively recent, and in part is a reflection of the
xvi
PREFACE
considerable changes that the world has undergone in the past 30 years, particularly processes of globalization, mass migration and rapidly changing social structures. The perspectives and approaches typically applied in social psychiatry may prove particularly useful in understanding how these rapidly changing contexts impact on mental well-being and their implications for mental health care. What is more, the contributions in this volume make it clear (if there was ever serious doubt) that understanding and responding to mental disorder is only possible if the social is considered in interaction with the genetic, biological and psychological; these are not competing alternatives, but constituent components of a single whole. What we hope is that the essays collected in this edition will provide both an introduction to core issues and research in social psychiatry and a platform for future research that can further unpack how our social lives contribute to the private (and social) misery of mental disorder. Perhaps then we will know even more about how we can intervene to prevent and ameliorate such suffering.
Assembling this edition has, in itself, been a social enterprise. We would like to thank all our contributors who, in spite of their busy schedules, have managed to deliver outstanding contributions. We are also grateful to Joan Marsh, Fiona Mason and their teams at WileyBlackwell for an outstanding level of support and hard work. In addition a note of thanks is hardly sufficient to convey appreciation for all the work, sweat and toil that Andrea Livingstone has put in behind the scenes.
REFERENCES 1. Lauber, C. (2008) Editorial. International Review of Psychiatry, 20, 489 491. 2. Uchtenhagen, A. A. (2008) Which future for social psychiatry? International Review of Psychiatry, 20, 535 539. 3. Eisenberg, L. (2004) Social psychiatry and the human genome: contextualising heritability. British Journal of Psychiatry, 184, 101 103.
Part One Perspectives and methods
1 The historical development of social psychiatry Julian Leff Institute of Psychiatry, King' s College London, London, UK
Defining social psychiatry is not a simple matter as its concerns and boundaries have altered over the years, as becomes evident by tracing the history of the term. The Royal Medico-Psychological Association (RMPA) had a section of Psychotherapy and Social Psychiatry that was established in 1946. The early meetings of the section focused on social psychiatry, which, although never defined formally, was tacitly assumed to concern the study of social organizations, now considered to be the territory of sociologists, such as Goffman, whose book on asylums was published in 1968 (see Chapter 5). The group, large or small, was viewed as the entity on which social organizations were founded, and the term ‘social’ was used to mean ‘appertaining to a group’. This conceptual framework originated from the experience during World War II of military psychiatrists, of whom the outstanding innovators were Maxwell Jones and Tom Main. Jones was part of the Maudsley Hospital team at Mill Hill Emergency Hospital, and was in charge of the Effort Syndrome Unit with the remit to investigate the cause of chest pains experienced by soldiers under stress. He began to lecture to large groups of soldiers in the hospital on the origin of their symptoms and soon
realized the therapeutic potential of the group itself (The Guardian, Obituary, 29 August 1990). Atthe same time Tom Main was working on a similar problem. He noted (personal communication, 1973) that the incidence of breakdown was higher in some army units than others, and these breakdowns could be legitimately viewed not only as throwing light on the problems of the sick individual but on the organization to which he belonged (battalion, regiment, etc.). Main studied these units in terms of disciplinary patterns, officer man relations, welfare, social structure, roles, role-relations and culture, capitalizing on a natural experiment. Assuming that the assignment of soldiers to units was relatively random and knowing that they were exposed to similar levels of combat stress, variations in psychiatric illness rates were very probably due to differences in the social organization of the units. From the experiences of Jones and Main with group treatment and group structure emerged the concept of the ‘therapeutic community’, which Jones utilized first with returning prisoners of war and then established at Belmont Hospital, Sutton. It was therefore natural to associate social psychiatry with psychotherapy when the section was founded in 1946. Incidentally, when
Principles of Social Psychiatry, second edition Edited by Craig Morgan and Dinesh Bhugra Ó 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
4
PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
Jones wrote about his innovatory service in 1952 his book was entitled ‘Social Psychiatry’. In addition to a concern with therapy, the section continued with studies of various organizations, especially hospitals. In addition to Belmont, other psychiatric hospitals were influenced by the experience of military psychiatrists. In Netley Hospital, which admitted soldiers suffering from psychiatric conditions, the psychiatrists witnessed rapid recovery from serious symptoms once men were removed from the stress of battle conditions. This instilled optimism about recovery, which the psychiatrists brought into the ordinary psychiatric hospitals at the end of the war. While a handful of pioneers, such as Duncan MacMillan, had established outpatient clinics outside the psychiatric hospital before the war, the new-found optimism of the military psychiatrists led to an increase in discharges and a fall in occupied beds, which began in England and Wales in 1954, the year before the introduction of chlorpromazine to clinical psychiatry. World War II also had an impact on psychiatric care in the United States (US), but for different reasons from the UK. In Britain, conscientious objectors were sent down the mines to extract coal, the so-called ‘Bevin Boys’. In the US they were given the job of orderlies in the psychiatric hospitals. These morally motivated young men brought into the hospitals their humanitarian values, which were at variance with the prevalent practice of custodial care. Their impact was less revolutionary than that of the British military psychiatrists who were put in charge of the hospitals as superintendents. That is one of the reasons why deinstitutionalization has been slower in the US than in the UK. The RMPA was superseded by the establishment of the Royal College of Psychiatrists in 1971, and two years later a Social and Community Psychiatry Group was set up within the College. Although it lost a nominal connection with psychotherapy, four members of the inaugural Executive Committee were on the staff of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations and one other was a therapist working with large groups. Furthermore, at the Annual General Meeting of the College in July 1974 the Group organized a session on ‘Prospects in Social and Community Psychiatry’, in which Tom Main was one of the three
speakers. His topic was ‘preventive psychiatry’, which requires some explanation. At the first meeting of the Executive Committee in November 1973, the concerns of the Group were subsumed under three main headings: 1. Promotion of the best possible organization and disposition of community psychiatric services, both within the National Health Service (NHS) and outside it. 2. Development of a liaison with allied groups, such as general practitioners and social workers, and also with similarly relevant groups not directly involved with medical or social work functions such as teachers. 3. Fostering of educational and scientific interests, such as postgraduate training in social psychiatry, studies of social aspects of their treatment, and epidemiological, evaluative and operational inquiries. It was anticipated that the Group would divide itself naturally into three working parties: the first area of concern would be dealt with under the heading of ‘Services’, the second under ‘Prevention’, and the third under ‘Epidemiology’. In effect these divisions amounted to the recognition of major differences in interest, ideology and practice among the members of the newly established Group and its Executive Committee. The discipline of psychiatric epidemiology was well represented on the Committee by eight members drawn largely from the three Medical Research Council (MRC) Units dealing with that field and the General Practice Research Unit at the Institute of Psychiatry headed by Michael Shepherd. The Committee also included a number of pioneers in the development of community psychiatric services. Although some of these had been involved in research studies, their reputation rested on their entrepreneurial activities in creating innovative services. Their natural affiliation was to the Services working party. The third interest group on the Committee was largely derived from the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations. Its members can be viewed as providing the strongest link with the section for Psychotherapy and Social
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY
Psychiatry in the preceding RMPA. The Executive Committee evidently considered that the Prevention working party was the most appropriate for them to join, since Colin Murray Parkes was appointed as its convenor. At the AGM of the College in 1974 each of the three speakers in the session organized by the Group was associated with one of the working parties. John Wing spoke on ‘Epidemiology and research’, Jim Birley on ‘Community services’, and Tom Main on ‘Social and preventive psychiatry’. The association of the term ‘preventive psychiatry’ with the therapeutic community movement is explicated by Hare [1] in his discussion of the relationship between social psychiatry and psychotherapy. He identified two growing points in preventive psychiatry, one of these being group methods of treatment. He viewed these as having close relations with psychotherapy, citing a publication by David Clark [2]. Clark had established a therapeutic community at Fulbourn Hospital, Cambridge, and later became a member of the Social and Community Psychiatry Group. Hare went on to argue that Maxwell Jones’ view of the functions of a therapeutic community broadened from an initial focus on the treatment of established neuroses to include prevention. Hare considered the second growth area in preventive psychiatry to lie in the domain of public health and to be represented by facilities such as hostels and workshops. These were to become the remit of the Services working party of the College Group. The claim that therapeutic communities, or indeed any other form of psychotherapy, constituted effective prevention was viewed with scepticism by the epidemiologists, since no research evidence was forthcoming. Considerable tension existed between
1.1
5
the psychotherapists and the other members of the Psychotherapy and Social Psychiatry section of the RMPA. Hare, himself an epidemiologist, argued forcefully ‘that the epidemiological aspects of social psychiatry would develop more favourably in another soil, away from the immediate discussion and study of psychotherapy’ [1]. The uneasy association between psychotherapy and social psychiatry was dissolved with the founding of the College, when Psychotherapy shared with Child Psychiatry the distinction of being the first sections to be established. Interestingly, this predated by four years the official recognition by the Department of Health of psychotherapy as a specialty. In contrast to the College south of the border, the Scottish branch retained a section of Psychotherapy and Social Psychiatry. Correspondence from its chairman indicated continuing conflict in aims between the two arms of the Section. In 1981 the Group of Social and Community Psychiatry was granted section status during my chairmanship, and the existing working parties were discontinued, to be replaced by time-limited working parties constituted to deal with specific issues. In some respects this was a recognition that the initial ideological divisions had become less salient with the passage of time, and harmonious working relationships had become established. However, there is a need to sustain a boundary between social psychiatry and psychotherapy, partly to limit the territory of the former to a manageable area and partly to avoid acrimonious disputes over real or imagined imperialistic ambitions. To this end, we will propose a definition of social psychiatry and in its exposition will explore the possibility of establishing the boundary referred to above.
A DEFINITION OF SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY
Social psychiatry is concerned with the effects of the social environment on the mental health of the in dividual, and with the effects of the mentally ill person on his/her social environment.
The phrase ‘concerned with’ is preferable to ‘the study of’ since, as we have noted, many people who regard themselves as social psychiatrists are primarily
practitioners with little or no interest in research. The term ‘mental health’ is used in place of ‘mental illness’ since there is a tradition in this field of the promotion of health, beyond the prevention of illness and the accumulation of handicaps. In conceptualizing the social environment it may be helpful to invoke the image of a pebble thrown into water, generating a set of concentric circles becoming
6
PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
ever fainter with increasing distance from the pebble. At the outer limit, culture exerts an effect, then moving progressively closer to the centre, workmates, friends and family are increasingly influential. What is the numerical lower limit of the social environment? Can two people be considered to form an environment? The answer is clearly in the affirmative. Important research in the field has been concerned with the influence of the family on the course of psychiatric disorders. Depressed patients living with a partner and patients with schizophrenia living with a single elderly parent are examples of dyads that have been included in these studies and constitute legitimate subjects for research on social influences on psychiatric illness. If dyadic relationships are fair game, then why not the relationship between a therapist and client? It is not possible to find grounds on which this should be excluded. Indeed, there are precedents for this relationship being included in social psychiatric studies in the area of ‘illness behaviour’ and ‘help-seeking behaviour’. This research has included investigation of the concepts of illness held by members of the public, their views as to the appropriate treatments, and negotiation between clients and practitioners over their respective models of illness [3 6]. It would be logical to extend these enquiries into relationships between psychotherapists and their clients. Is the word ‘relationships’ the key for which we have been searching? Would it be tenable to argue that social psychiatry is legitimately concerned with client therapist relationships but halts at the boundary to the psyche, ceding intrapsychic events to psychotherapists of all persuasions? This argument has been eroded by the development of cognitive theories incorporating the individual’s concept of him/herself and the way he/she interprets external events [7]. In the extensive field of life events research, the notion of self-esteem has been invoked as a link between the lack of an intimate relationship and the depressing effects of events that represent a significant loss [8]. Life events research is one example of the longitudinal approach in social psychiatry. Although the time-scale in this area of research is relatively short, it entails the same assumptions as longer-term research, namely that experiences in the past are represented in the subject’s memory and operate in the present to
trigger psychiatric illnesses. Past experiences include relationships as well as happenings [9]. Whatever the theoretical construction proposed to represent past experiences, be it self-concept (George Brown) or latent schemata (Chris Brewin), it is difficult to maintain a clear distinction from psychodynamic theories concerning the self and its intrapsychic processes. Some psychoanalytic theories are easier to reconcile with a socioenvironmental view than others, e.g. Freud’s seduction theory rather than his later renunciation of it. However, the conclusion of this line of argument is that the topics of central concern to psychotherapy, in its broadest sense, also fall logically within the ambit of social psychiatry. Although psychotherapy and social psychiatry share a common interest in the origins of human distress, maybe they can be differentiated by their preferred method of advancing understanding of its determinants. Social psychiatry has relied heavily on epidemiological techniques for its enquiries, involving large numbers of subjects who are usually representative of a particular population. By contrast, research into psychotherapy and psychodynamics until recent years has tended to be hermeneutic, relying on the intensive study of individuals or small numbers of highly selected patients. However, current financial stringencies in the NHS are placing increasing pressure on all practitioners to provide evidence for the effectiveness of their therapies. Partly in response to this situation, psychotherapy is beginning to develop the academic arm of its discipline [10]. It is predictable that psychotherapy will increasingly employ the research methods that are part of the stock in trade of social psychiatry, diminishing the differences in approach that we have outlined. This extended argument has not led to the erection of a solid barrier between social psychiatry and psychotherapy. The practitioners who belong to one or the other seem to have reduced the tensions that were apparent in their joint Group in the RMPA by developing a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ on territorial demarcation. We shall respect this agreement and the reader will not find any chapters specifically dedicated to psychotherapy in this volume. However, many of the contributors deal with topics that lie in the area of overlapping interests between psychotherapy and social psychiatry.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY
1.2
CROSS-FERTILIZATION
Psychotherapy is not the only discipline that interdigitates with social psychiatry. Sociology, social psychology, social anthropology and, more recently, cognitive psychology have all made valuable contributions to the development of social psychiatry (see Chapter 5). Durkheim’s [11] classical study of suicide provided central themes for two of the British MRC Units conducting research in social psychiatry (Norman Kreitman’s and Peter Sainsbury’s), while sociological critiques of institutions (e.g. see Reference [12]) stimulated Wing and Brown [13] to initiate a line of research that continued for over three decades. The proposition that social support protects against mental ill health derives from both social psychology and social anthropology, and until recently was the major focus of research in the Australian MRC Social Psychiatry Unit [14].
1.3
7
Social psychologists have conducted numerous studies of group processes, which are of direct relevance to those topics in social psychiatry that emerged from group therapy. Medical sociologists have increased our understanding of the ‘sick role’ and of the relationship between clinicians and their clients. Their work has illuminated the pathways traced by individuals as they undergo the transition into patients (see Chapter 24). The studies of migrants, which constitute a substantial corpus of research within the field of social psychiatry, would have been very ill-informed, if not fallacious, without the cooperation of social anthropologists. These related disciplines have provided a cornucopia of theories, concepts and techniques to enrich social psychiatry and stimulate its growth. Examples of this cross-fertilization will be encountered throughout this volume.
THE RISE OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY
During the second half of the twentieth century there was a steep rise in interest in and research on the biological basis of psychiatric disorders, largely stimulated by new techniques in imaging the brain and the unravelling of the human genome. Biological research was not neglected in previous decades. In fact two of the three Nobel Prizes for advances in the treatment and understanding of psychiatric illnesses were awarded in the first half of the twentieth century. Julius Wagner-Jauregg won the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1927 for showing that malarial treatment improved the prognosis of patients with cerebral syphilis (general paralysis of the insane). He was a contemporary of Sigmund Freud, who was disappointed not to get the prize for his work on the nature of unconscious mental processes. The next Laureate, Egas Moniz, had been nominated twice for the Nobel Prize for his development of the cranial angiogram with his surgical associate, Almeida Lima, but was finally awarded the prize in 1949 for his introduction of lobotomy for psychiatric disorders. In the 1940s and 1950s more than 50 000 patients had lobotomies
in the US. This form of treatment has almost entirely fallen into disuse, ousted by the introduction of psychotropic medications and the lack of evidence for the benefits of leucotomy. After a lapse of another fifty years, in 2000 the Prize was awarded to Arvid Carlsson, Paul Greengard and Eric Kandel for ‘pioneering discoveries concerning one type of signal transduction between nerve cells, referred to as slow synaptic transmission. These discoveries have been crucial for an understanding of the normal function of the brain and how disturbances in this signal transduction can give rise to neurological and psychiatric diseases. These findings have resulted in the development of new drugs’ (Press Release, Nobel Prize Committee, 2000). Of the three Laureates, all working in basic science, Kandel was unusual in having embarked on a psychoanalytic training, which he abandoned for the laboratory. The successes of biological psychiatry gave rise to an optimism that a solution to the problems of the aetiology and treatment of psychiatric disorders was within grasp. Nowhere was this as ebullient as in the
8
PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
US, where the last ten years of the century were designated ‘The Decade of the Brain’. The embracing of biological explanations for mental illnesses led to extravagant claims, such as the identification of the gene for homosexuality, and was largely responsible for the virtual extinction of psychoanalysis in the States. In the 1950s a psychoanalytic training was almost obligatory for anyone aspiring to practise as a psychiatrist, and most heads of psychiatry departments had completed this. In the UK there was also a swing towards biological psychiatry, but it was not as monolithic as in the States, although it did have a dramatic impact in one sector; the research units supported by the MRC. In the 1960s there were five such units engaged in research in the
1.4
field of social psychiatry: Norman Kreitman’s in Edinburgh, Peter Sainsbury’s in Southampton, John Wing’s in the Institute of Psychiatry in London, Michael Shepherd’s General Practice Research Unit in the same institution and George Brown’s in Bedford College, London. By the time John Wing retired in 1989 his and George Brown’s were the only two left. I took over from John Wing for a period of six years, after which the unit was closed. George Brown’s unit has not been continued after his retirement. At the time of the closure of my unit the MRC stated clearly that in future they would not support a unit that focused on social psychiatry without being integrated with biological research.
SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY IN THE UNITED STATES
The optimism generated by the experience of military psychiatrists in World War II had a stimulating effect on the emerging social psychiatry movement in the US, as it did in the UK. Formal recognition of the changing atmosphere in psychiatry came with the creation of a National Institute of Mental Health in 1949. The Institute was faced with the major task of shifting the focus of care from psychiatric hospitals to community services. The financial means to achieve this were made possible by another milestone piece of legislation, the Community Mental Health Centres Act passed by the Senate in 1963. This was a response to President Kennedy’s call for a new approach to the delivery of services to people with psychiatric illness. The sum of 2.9 billion dollars was appropriated from the federal budget for this purpose. The community mental health movement, which grew in strength from this injection of funds, was founded on the principles of social psychiatry, including the humane treatment of people with psychiatric illness, equality of access to health care, and the right of all citizens to full participation in society. There is a clear identity with the aims of the Civil Rights Movement and of Feminism, both of which were making a political impact during the same period. Many idealistic young people took posts in the community mental health centres and attempted to provide a high quality of care for the mass of long-term patients who
were being discharged from the psychiatric hospitals. There were many unanticipated obstacles to be overcome, including the fact that a substantial proportion of people with schizophrenia needed prolonged and sophisticated rehabilitation, which was not available in the centres. There was also considerable opposition from the public who held stigmatizing attitudes. Furthermore, there were entrenched financial interests, which the youthful workers lacked the political experience to combat. Widespread problems of homelessness developed among discharged patients, particularly in the cities. The resource of using private landlords to provide board and care often led to abuse of the former patients, who received a minimal standard of shelter and no care. Many of the discharged patients were living in conditions that were no better than in the psychiatric hospitals, and a considerable number ended up in prison, prompting the term ‘transinstitutionalization’ [15]. The financial provision for the centres was depleted by misappropriation of the federal funds by President Nixon in 1973. The net effect of these problems was to sap the enthusiasm of the proponents of the community mental health movement, which largely failed to fulfil its aims. Brown ([15], p. 149) considers that ‘the last era of general optimism was the community mental health period, roughly located in the decade and a half from
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 80
British Journal of Psychiatry American Journal of Psychiatry
70
Percent
9
60 50 40 30 20 1951
1956
1961
1966
1971
1976
1981
1986
1991
1996
2001
2005
Year
Figure 1.1 Proportion of psychosocial articles in American and British Journals of Psychiatry (Reproduced with permission from Cambridge University Press)
1960 1975 . . . many of the great promises of this approach were not met. In this failure we can locate the preconditions for the rise of a new biologism, a more strictly biomedical and asocial view of mental health and illness’. In the US the interest in social psychiatry has not been completely extinguished. Some enthusiasts continue to develop innovative and cost-effective community services, but the swing to a biological model of mental illness has been overwhelming. However, despite the vast sums of money that have been poured into biological research in the US, the Decade of the Brain failed to introduce any novel treatment for psychiatric illnesses, while during the same decade psychosocial treatments for schizophrenia and depression have been established by randomized controlled trials, including family intervention for schizophrenia [16], cognitive behaviour therapy for schizophrenia [17] and couple assisted therapy for depression [18]. An indication of the different historical trajectories of social psychiatry in the US and the UK is illustrated by a comparison of articles in the two principal general psychiatry journals in the US and UK, from which the great bulk of world psychiatric research emanates: the American Journal of Psychiatry (AJP) and the British Journal of Psychiatry (BJP). This study involved an analysis of the topics of articles in the two journals over the 55 years from 1950 to 2005, in which a full year of journals for the first and sixth year of each decade was scrutinized [19]. Articles were categorized broadly as biological, social and neutral (not fitting into either of the other two categories).
Inspection of the two lines in Figure 1.1 shows that in 1951 the AJP published a small majority of psychosocial articles, whereas the BJP published a great predominance of biological articles. Most of these dealt with aspects of insulin coma therapy, leucotomy, treatment of epilepsy and penicillin for neurosyphilis. During the following decade the proportion of biological articles in the BJP gradually fell, with a continuation of the same topics, but also studies on electroconvulsive therapy and the newly introduced psychotropic drugs: chlordiazepoxide, tricyclic antidepressants and antipsychotics. During this decade the proportion of psychosocial articles in the AJP declined as controlled and uncontrolled studies of the new psychotropic drugs began to be published. Then between 1961 and 1966 there was a steep rise in the proportion of psychosocial articles in both journals, the slopes being almost parallel. However, the difference in proportions between these two years’ issues was of much greater significance for the AJP (X2 ¼ 30.64, df.1, p < 0.001) than for the BJP (X2 ¼ 9.46, df.1, p < 0.001). Both journals maintained the high proportion of psychosocial articles over the next decade, the period identified by Brown ([15], p. 149) as the era of greatest optimism for community psychiatry. As noted above, it also coincides with the development of the Civil Rights Movement in the US and the rise of Feminism. In 1966 the AJP included a special section of one issue on Social Psychiatry, and articles were also published on ‘The stresses of the white female worker in the Civil Rights Movement in the South’ and ‘Psychological aspects of the Civil
10
PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
Rights Movement and the Negro professional man’. These topics constitute further evidence for the influence of the cultural and political environment on the contents of both psychiatric journals, suggested by the timing of the rise evident from the graphs. In parallel with the declining fortunes of the community mental health movement, the proportion of psychosocial articles in the AJP begins to fall. This descent continues in an almost linear fashion over the next two decades, reaching its lowest level in 50 years (34.8%) in 2001. At this point in time the AJP features almost twice as many articles of a biological nature as psychosocial articles. By contrast, the proportion of psychosocial articles in the BJP, after a moderate fall from 57.9% in 1966 to 46.3% in 1981, rises slowly but steadily to 59.0% in 2005, its highest level in the 55 years of the survey. By chance the proportions in the two journals are virtually identical in 1986, when the descending graph of the AJP crosses the ascending graph of the BJP. From this point, in terms of the publication of psychosocial articles, the two journals have been moving progressively further apart over the next two decades. The BJP shows a significant increase in the proportion of these articles, while the AJP exhibits a significant decrease of approximately the same magnitude. As a result, by 2005 the difference in the composition of the two journals is highly significant. How can we account for the opposing trends in the publication of psychosocial articles in the American and British Journals of Psychiatry? They appear to reflect a genuine divergence in both the research effort and in the practice of psychiatry. Research in social psychiatry is more strongly influenced by clinical practice than biological psychiatry, which depends heavily on technical advances in areas such as genetics and brain imaging. There are major differences in the structure of the health services in the two countries, which determine the practice of psychiatry. In the US, health care is dominated by the private insurance companies such as Blue Cross Blue Shield, which offers health insurance in every US state. Their policy is to reject applicants who have a pre-existing medical condition. People with psychiatric illnesses often have a long prodrome before seeking medical help, enabling the insurance companies to exclude them on this ground. Furthermore, private health insurance is
frequently part of a package linked to employment, so that people without a job lose out. A high proportion of people who develop schizophrenia are unemployed at first contact with the services, 82% of AfricanCaribbean patients in a recent UK study [20]. Because psychoses are often life-long conditions, they are not profitable for private insurance companies, and therefore usually fall under the state medical care system, in which standards are uneven. By contrast, the UK National Health Service excludes nobody from health care, regardless of their economic status and the chronicity of their illness. It is truly comprehensive. Another important difference in practice is the tradition of home visiting in the UK. It was standard for general practitioners to visit their patients in their own homes, although this has become less common, whereas in the US doctors work in offices, to which patients are expected to travel. In the UK, community psychiatric nurses and community occupational therapists regularly see patients at home, and psychologists and psychiatrists do so when necessary. In fact, this is the ideological basis of community mental health teams and crisis teams, the aim being to ensure that everyone who needs the service has unrestricted access to it. A damper on swings of opinion in psychiatry is provided by the inherent caution of the UK psychiatric profession. Sceptical of embracing innovative movements uncritically, British psychiatrists were not enthusiastic about psychoanalysis, and it did not achieve the widespread acceptance that characterized American psychiatry in the mid-twentieth century. There have never been more than four hundred trained psychoanalysts in Britain. That is not to say that psychodynamic ideas and concepts have failed to influence the practice of psychiatry in the UK, but they have been absorbed into an eclectic mix of approaches rather than becoming the dominant paradigm. Similarly, while biological psychiatry has its adherents in the UK, few psychiatrists rely solely on physical methods of treatment, to the exclusion of attention to the patient’s social environment, including close relationships. In conclusion, the comprehensive nature of the National Health Service in the UK, the standard of care provided to all psychiatric patients regardless of diagnosis and chronicity, and the high proportion of
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY
staff who see patients in the setting of their family through home visits, are conducive to a social approach to mental illness. In combination with the traditional eclecticism of British psychiatry, these factors will ensure the persistence of social psychiatry as an ideological and practical discipline. However, the advances in biological psychiatry cannot be set aside. The policy enunciated by the UK MRC during the Decade of the Brain is correct: collaboration is necessary between biological and social psychiatrists so that the advances in social psychiatry can be underpinned by new knowledge of brain functioning, and the discoveries of the workings of the brain can be given a meaning through understanding of the patients’ social environment.
REFERENCES 1. Hare, E. A. (1969) The relation between social psychiatry and psychotherapy, in Psychiatry in a Changing Society (eds S. H. Foulkes and G. Stewart Prince), Tavistock, London. 2. Clark, D. H. (1965) Adminstrative Therapy: The Role of the Doctor in the Therapeutic Community, Tavistock, London. 3. Mechanic, D. and Volkart, E. H. (1960) Illness behaviour and medical diagnosis. Journal of Health and Human Behaviour, 1, 86 96. 4. Young, A. (1981) When rational men fall sick: an enquiry into some assumptions made by medical anthropologists. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 5, 317 335. 5. Health Education Studies Unit (1982) Final Report on the Patient Project, Health Education Council, London. 6. Kleinman, A. (1986) Social origins of distress and disease: depression, in Neurasthenia and Pain in Modern China, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut. 7. Brewin, C. R. (1988) Cognitive Foundations of Clinical Psychology, Lawrence Erlbaum, London. 8. Brown, G. W., Andrews, B., Harris, T. et al. (1986) Social support, self esteem and depression. Psychological Medicine, 16, 813 831.
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9. Brown, G. W., Bifulco, A. and Harris, T. (1987) Life events, vulnerability, and onset of depression: some refinements. British Journal of Psychiatry, 150, 30 42. 10. Roth, A. and Fonagy, P. (2005) What works for whom? in A Critical Review of Psychotherapy Research, Guilford, New York. 11. Durkheim, E. (1951) Suicide: A Study in Sociology, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois. Originally published 1897 (translated by J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson), F. Alcan, Paris. 12. Goffman, E. (1968) Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, Penguin, Harmondsworth. 13. Wing, J. K. and Brown, G. W. (1970) Institutionalism and Schizophrenia, Cambridge University Press, London. 14. Henderson, A. S., Byrne, D. G., Duncan Jones, P. et al. (1980) Social relationships, adversity and neurosis: a study of relationships in a general population study. British Journal of Psychiatry, 136, 574 583. 15. Brown, P. (1985) The Transfer of Care: Psychiatric Deinstitutionalisation and its Aftermath, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Henley on Thames. 16. Pharoah, F., Mari, J., Rathbone, J. and Wong, W. (2006) Family intervention for schizophrenia. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, (3), Art. No.: CD000088. DOI: 10.1002/14651858. CD000088. 17. Jones, C., Cormac, I., Silveira da Mota Neto, J. I. and Campbell, C. (2004) Cognitive behaviour therapy for schizophrenia. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, (3), Art. No.: CD000524. DOI: 10.1002/ 14651858. CD000524.pub2. 18. Leff, J., Vearnals, S., Brewin, C. R. et al. (2000) The London Depression Intervention Trial: randomised controlled trial of antidepressants versus couple therapy in the treatment and maintenance of people with depression living with a partner: clinical outcome and costs. British Journal of Psychiatry, 177, 95 100. 19. Leff, J. (2007) Climate change in psychiatry: periodic fluctuations or terminal trend? in Society and Psychosis (eds C. Morgan, K. McKenzie and P. Fearon), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 20. Mallett, R., Leff, J., Bhugra, D. et al. (2002) Social environment, ethnicity and schizophrenia: a case control study. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 37, 329 335.
2 Why psychiatry has to be social Paul E. Bebbington Department of Mental Health Sciences, University College London, London, UK
Psychiatrie ist soziale Psychiatrie oder sie ist keine Psychiatrie Klaus Dorner [1] . . . when my friend, Sam Guze [. . .] entitled his Royal College Lecture: ‘Biological psychiatry: is there any other kind?’ he meant the answer to be: ‘Of course not’ and he was absolutely right. When I ask: Social psychiatry: is there any other kind? the only tenable answer is: ‘of course not’ Leon Eisenberg [2].
2.1
INTRODUCTION
Social psychiatry has no precise definition, but has been described, rather unambitiously, as a topic and a set of techniques of investigation. These techniques are primarily epidemiological, but include methods of evaluating social processes in relation to psychiatric disorders. It applies to psychiatry the purposes of epidemiology (identification of syndromes, refining the clinical picture of disorders, community health, individual risks, analytical and experimental epidemiology, operational analyses of health services, historical epidemiology [3]). There are tensions between those who, like Michael Shepherd [4], try to deal with the problem of defining social psychiatry by subsuming it under epidemiology and those, like John Wing [5,6], who take a broader view of its remit. In
my view, these positions are not radical enough: psychiatry has an essentially social component because the phenomena we seek to explain have inherently social attributes. While mental illness is by no means totally social, it is essentially social. We must therefore start further back. Psychiatry is a branch of medicine. By this we assert that it shares with medicine its matter and its method. However, in so doing, we open the door to complexity, as we shall see. The matter of medicine is the syndrome, and its method is the construction of syndromes and their use in testing hypotheses of aetiology, mechanism, pathology and treatment. Syndromes are hypothetical constructs derived speculatively from clinical knowledge and intuition: patterns of medical phenomena are
Principles of Social Psychiatry, second edition Edited by Craig Morgan and Dinesh Bhugra Ó 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
identified and grouped, with the idea that they will form useful substrates for investigation. Symptoms are medical phenomena that constitute syndromes, and syndromes are made up of patterns of symptoms (there is thus an element of bootstrapping in this intellectual process). If the various theories relating to a syndrome are well corroborated, we start to call them diseases. So far, we have been tellingly reluctant to do this in psychiatry. If the theories about particular syndromes are not corroborated, we look for better theories. Medicine, in this analysis, is thus very much a Popperian venture, and an extremely powerful means of generating knowledge. This is quite evident from its spectacular progress over the last century and a half. Syndromes have primacy over theories, in
2.2
that if the latter are refuted we will nevertheless stick by the syndrome. Only, however, up to a point: there may come a time when there has been so little gain in knowledge about the syndrome that we finally reject it on grounds of a lack of utility, and rearrange the medical phenomena into new forms [5]. This medical method is also that used in psychiatry. However, there is something unusual about the symptoms used to construct syndromes in psychiatry. Wing suggested that the term ‘symptom’ in psychiatry is analogous to its use in medicine. This might imply that the concept of symptom in psychiatry does not completely map on to the concept as used in medicine, and I would argue that such is indeed the case.
SOCIAL MEDICINE AND SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY
Social medicine is defined by its intentions: to understand how social and economic conditions influence health, disease and the practice of medicine, and to promote conditions whereby this understanding can improve the public health. In some respects social psychiatry looks like the psychiatric version of this endeavour. It is true that both rely heavily on the methods of epidemiology. Epidemiology is predicated on the concept of disease (the central medical construct) and on the derivative process of case finding. Social epidemiology involves the use of social concepts to explain patterns of health in the population. Such patterns are established by applying demographic and social constructs that themselves commonly arise from sociology. This, for example, would include the distribution of schizophrenia in relation to social class or urbanization [7 10]. In social medicine,
2.3
the social element is usually regarded as external to the concept of physical disease. While it is true that people’s social environment and their behaviour may determine a relatively strong exposure to the physical aetiological factors that lead to the disease, most social factors are not themselves generally regarded as being directly aetiological (the concept of stress is an exception, but in relation to physical disorders, it is usually formulated in terms of its physiological and physical effects). Similar sets of assumptions are held by many academics who carry out social psychiatric research. Their research may be valuable, but the assumptions carry risks in social psychiatry. This is because of the special nature of the disorders being investigated, based as they are on symptoms with very particular attributes.
THE MENTAL NATURE OF SYMPTOMS
All symptoms, whether relating to physical or psychiatric disorder, are based on self-report. Thus the details of cardiac pain are elicited by a process of crossquestioning about the nature of the experience. Such
self-reports enable the physician to focus on signs, broadly defined. These include both the appearance of the patient and the results of investigations. Thus the self-report is corroborated by external, consensually
WHY PSYCHIATRY HAS TO BE SOCIAL
verifiable, procedures, which are linked in turn to an ever-growing knowledge of underlying biological processes. This is not the case with psychiatric symptoms. There may be external signs corresponding to the internal experiences reported by psychiatric patients, but they do not command the same force of validation as in general medicine. Thus if someone behaves as if they are hallucinated by appearing to talk to imaginary voices, this has less value than clear self-reports from patients that they are indeed hearing voices. In psychiatry, the subjective content that makes up
2.4
15
the symptom has primacy over any accompanying signs. In order to consider these issues, I will relate most of the arguments that follow to schizophrenia, as it is generally regarded as having a major organic, i.e. neural, component. Schizophrenia is of particular interest because it is the condition that tests most strenuously both the psychosocial and the neural lines of explanation. It does this because of the symptoms on which the diagnosis is primarily based, viz. anomalous experiences and abnormal beliefs. These will be discussed in detail later in the chapter.
THE CARTESIAN AMBIGUITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY
Mental states are categorically different from brain states, in that we experience them, as it seems, from within. Nevertheless, mental states are generally taken to be predicated on the existence of brain states. This is of course a form of reductionism, perhaps the ultimate reductionist tenet. As such, it is what Popper [11] would call a metaphysical research programme, not testable as a totality but open to critical evaluation and capable of giving rise to testable and useful hypotheses, which then support the heuristic value of the programme. It is certainly plausible: although there are people who would believe otherwise, I am pretty certain I will no longer have mental states when my brain dies. I also feel reasonably securely that, so long as I have a morsel of brain, there will be thoughts. In other words, mental states are predicated on the existence of a brain in so far as the latter seems to be a necessary condition of the former. We must of course be very careful in our use of language in relation to brain states. To say that brains do something is at best a metaphor and at worst a category mistake. There is activity that underwrites propensity, but activity is not action, memory is not memories. Nothing based on self-report is primarily a neural construct. The link between brain states and mental states is a matter of wonder, although philosophically disturbing. However, there are circumstances in which it may also appear trivial. In my living room I see a man holding a child who is pale, bloodied and dead. The
anguish on his face and the distress I feel watching him is no doubt correlated with activity in brains that happen to be 3500 kilometres apart, but it is certainly not explicable in any satisfying way in such terms. In this instance, an adequate explanation must surely go beyond the neural to the psychological and the social. While it may be interesting, it is not enough to know how empathy might be related to mirror neurones, and the neural systems underlying mirroring and mimicry [12]. We need to know the whys and wherefores of this individual empathic act. The activity of brains is somehow segregated so that we are obliged to recognize and distinguish internal and external realities. The latter is projected, such that we perceive and recognize it as external. In other words, it is out there rather than in our minds. Although the ontological origins of the distinction between an inner and an outer world are a matter of dispute [13], it is hard for human beings to dispute the fact of the distinction at an experiential level. Our perception of an external reality is so compelling we virtually never question it. We may question what we see but we virtually never question that we see. We question our sensations, but rarely the fact of our senses. We are bolstered in this by a degree of corroboration so extensive that it is compelling in itself. Corroboration can take the form of consistency we recognize things as we remember them but also because of consensual verification. In our external world are entities that look like us, with whom we communicate
16
PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
and whom we use to confirm our experience of the world. It is relatively easy to confirm matters of physical fact the existence of given numbers on paper, the position of mercury on a thermometer. However, social facts are more difficult. We may see our Prime Minister at a podium, we may agree on the actual words he uses, but column inches are written in an attempt to arrive at a consensus about what he meant, how it was received and what its implications are for future events. Moreover, such judgements rarely achieve final consensus. (Politicians of course like to take refuge in the so-called judgement of history, but happily that, too, is never final.) Unlike mental states, we perceive brain states on the outside. Indeed, in contradistinction to some other parts of our bodies, we have absolutely no direct information about them from the inside. We infer them from the results of our procedures for realizing them, particularly, these days, from neuroimaging. Thus the contrary claim, that brains are predicated on the existence of mental states, is equally defensible; the brain is a mental construct, albeit one that is very well corroborated. Such is the compelling nature of our experience of an external world we do not regard brains as mere figments of our productive imaginings. We thus readily believe that brains exist separately from us, and that functioning brains will exist after we ourselves no longer have mental states. Let us therefore accept the idea of the brain as the underpinning of mind. However, I would also argue that neural explanations are not the same stuff as mental explanations. They do not necessarily have primacy and may indeed be unfit for purpose in some circumstances.
2.5
MAKING SENSE IN AN ERROR-STREWN WORLD
Making sense of the world is what humans (and quite a few nonhumans) do. It relies on the receipt of information about the world and the analysis of that information in terms of our existing understandings. Making sense is easy when we have full information, 1
Unlike physical disorders, mental illnesses are always about problems engaging with the social world, and this is the way in which they are identified. The symptoms by which they are recognized have inherent social aspects, even when most bizarre. For example, auditory hallucinations usually take the form of voices and of people in a relation with the hearer. This is the quality identified by the protophenomenologist Brentano ([14], pp. 88 89) as intentionality. He asserted that mental states are directed towards things different from themselves, and this distinguishes them absolutely from physical states; all, and only, mental states exhibit intentionality.1 Mental illnesses may also have a basis in physical malfunction, but this is not necessarily true, and certainly not necessarily true in every case. Indeed, attempts to find such physical features have so far been nonspecific or ambiguous. The implication is that the aetiology of mental disorders is guaranteed to contain social components, and may indeed sometimes have predominantly social components. The position is further complicated, as we shall see, by the fact that abnormalities that appear qualitative may arise because of quantitative variation in normal processes rather than in qualitatively abnormal ones. What is clear is that the syndrome of schizophrenia is built out of mental experiences that cannot be mapped on to corroborative tests tapping into biological functions. This might be an empirical deficit open to remedy, but I will argue that it is in fact a conceptual one. The distinction between internal and external worlds, the possibility of error and the availability of consensual verification are all central to the concept of mental symptoms and thus of mental disorder.
but much harder when information is incomplete. A major function of this activity is the resolution of discrepancies, and much psychiatric symptomatology reflects idiosyncratic solutions to the fact of incomplete or incompatible information. There may
Interestingly, Brentano [14] did not insist that the things that mental states are about are extended and physical. They can be internal and mental, a view with parallels in modern psychological ideas about metacognition [15].
WHY PSYCHIATRY HAS TO BE SOCIAL
be neural impairments in our ability to receive information, arising variously from failing sense organs or failures in parts of the brain and its functions. Other impairments in this ability are only neural in a trivial sense, for instance when distorted reception is the result of incoming information discrepant with prior information we may not see something because we are not expecting it and we may reject information because it is incompatible with an existing set of beliefs. There are other instances where we just do not have enough information. This is rather similar to the efforts of the voice recognition software I am using to dictate this chapter. If I stumble, mumble or cough, it gives the impression of trying desperately to make sense of something inherently nonsensical, resulting in weird combinations of words. This is not a programme fault. It may have parallels in the confabulation seen in the Korsakoff syndrome, which, interestingly, seems at least partly to have social drivers: we confabulate partly because we know it is not normal or socially acceptable to have big gaps in memory. Thus the human propensity to make sense of things may misfire when there are discrepancies to be resolved. Consider an example: psychiatrists have struggled with the concept of impaired insight, which
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is taken as a key feature of psychosis. There have been attempts to liken this to the denial and neglect syndromes often seen with injuries to the right hemisphere of the brain. However, lack of insight into the nature of anomalous experiences seems in general more likely to be a secondary process in which the compelling nature of the experience of, say, hearing voices is set against the prior knowledge that voices cannot be disembodied. It does seem unlikely that such a bet on relative likelihoods is central to the psychotic process, particularly as insight appears a composite and dimensional phenomenon in a way that neglect syndromes are not. Lack of insight then becomes the resolution of discrepancies in a manner unconvincing to others. It is really no more than a statement that the individual is having to deal with a compelling experience. This emphasizes also that making sense of experience is normally a collegial (and therefore social) process. We check out our ideas with our fellows. Thus it is known both clinically and from research that social isolation reduces levels of insight [16]. It is also often apparent in relation to phenomena like folie a deux (and a trois and a quatre) [17]. Finally, it feeds into the development of odd ideas and delusions.
ANOMALOUS EXPERIENCES
The term anomalous experience is increasingly used as shorthand for a range of odd symptoms held to typify psychotic and quasi-psychotic states. They are of particular interest because they have inherently social components, and yet they involve transgression of the distinction between inner and outer worlds. They may also seem odd, and this was the foundation of Jaspers’ un-understandability argument, to the effect that mental phenomena we are incapable of understanding must have an additional cause, explicitly neural [18]. This would include such anomalous experiences as hallucinations, passivity experiences or abnormalities of the experience of thought. Bizarre ideas would also have a neural basis. These prima facie assumptions are based on the oddity of the reported experience. There is still mileage in the psychopathological refinement of our concepts of mental symptoms. We may amplify descriptions by attempting to discern the
processes underlying the mental experiences corresponding to the symptoms. This activity should be distinguished from actual explanation it is more akin to exegesis, although it does increase the potential targets for explanation. An example is provided by Frith in his interesting account of passivity experiences as a combination of ‘forward memory’ and an exaggerated sense of agency (‘if it is not me, it must be someone else’) [19]. The descriptions of psychotic symptoms in the psychopathological literature have resulted in relatively precise differentiation, but a relatively uncritical acceptance that the individual symptoms so constructed are distinct [20]. Nevertheless, psychopathological analysis may also be used to clarify linkages between symptoms conventionally regarded as separate. For example, there are relationships between thought insertion, loud thoughts, thought broadcast
18
PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
and hallucinations. The essence of thought insertion is not the idea of external origin (a secondary explanatory delusion), but the loss of the sense of possession of the mental experience. This is shared by other passivity experiences, but also by auditory hallucinations. Loud thoughts are thoughts acknowledged as their own by the people experiencing them, but they have the quality of loudness that defines our experience of sound waves. This quality is one of the characteristic attributes of our external world and is shared of course with auditory hallucinosis. Descriptions of thought broadcast have been disappointingly vague, but close attention to the accounts of those who suffer from it reveals that the essential feature is the experience of thoughts that
2.7
are externally projected. Such thoughts share this feature with some, but not all, forms of auditory hallucinosis. Thus these four types of symptoms exhibit variously the loss of the sense of possession, loudness and external projection, and the presence or absence of each of these three features determines which symptoms may be identified. Taking Jaspers’ view, they all look like candidates for an inherently neural explanation. However, there is considerable evidence that hallucinations at any rate are causally related to particularly extreme social experiences, examination of which at least allows us to set out in more detail what is to be explained.
HALLUCINATIONS, PSYCHOSIS AND TRAUMATIC ABUSE
The abuse of children is sadly common. A recent UK survey estimated a prevalence of childhood physical abuse of around 24% and sexual abuse of about 11% [21]; higher estimates have been reported from the USA [22]. By the age of 7 years, approximately 17% of children from a nationally representative birth cohort in the UK reported being bullied [23]. This abuse has severe consequences for the mental health of the victims [24,25]. In particular, it has strong links with psychosis [26,27]. Child physical and sexual abuse is significantly associated with psychotic symptoms [28,29]. Lysaker et al. [30] found that over 40% of people with schizophrenia had experienced child sexual abuse. Using British National Psychiatric Morbidity Survey data, Bebbington et al. [24] reported relative odds of psychosis of around 12 in people who had experienced sexual abuse. Moreover, a history of childhood abuse in nonpsychotic members of the general population predicted the development of new positive psychotic symptoms at a two-year follow-up [31]. These links between trauma and psychosis form part of a triad. Thus there are also links between trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (by definition), and between PTSD and psychosis. This has implications not just for the role of stress in the aetiology of schizophrenia, but also for potential mechanisms. Psychotic symptoms in response to combat trauma were reported by Paster as long ago as 1948, and
are not uncommon [32,33]. Hamner et al. [34] compared veterans displaying long-standing PTSD and psychotic features with a sample of patients with schizophrenia without PTSD. They found very few differences in the form and intensity of the psychotic features, suggesting that schizophrenia associated with PTSD is indistinguishable clinically from the condition in general. People with psychosis have a very high prevalence of PTSD, often undiagnosed [29,35]. High rates of PTSD in people with psychosis and of psychotic phenomena in patients with chronic PTSD were confirmed in their systematic review by Seedat et al. [36]. While the prevalence of major trauma is very high indeed, rates of frank PTSD are appreciably lower [37 41]. The severity of trauma is associated with the severity both of PTSD and of psychotic symptoms [30,39,40]. Thus early trauma appears to create a nexus of interacting adverse consequences. PTSD is a condition defined essentially by an intimate relationship between the content of symptoms and the experience of strongly traumatic events, in particular the phenomenon of re-experiencing. One possibility is that some people who have been exposed to extreme trauma develop psychotic symptoms (delusions, hallucinations) whose content is also closely related to the details of the traumatic experience. If this happens, it may come about by a totally different process from the genesis of symptoms in the majority of cases of schizophrenia, or it may not.
WHY PSYCHIATRY HAS TO BE SOCIAL
Some might argue that florid symptoms in PTSD merely mimic psychotic symptoms. Thus, re-experiencing may have a compelling visual or auditory quality that could be mistaken for hallucinations. However, even in veterans exposed to extreme combat stress, the distinction between flashbacks and psychotic symptoms can be clearly made [42]. In other studies as well, the meaningful connection between the characteristics of trauma and the content of symptoms is not always apparent. Thus, Butler et al. [43] felt that, in their series, the psychotic symptoms associated with PTSD were not themselves linked to re-experiencing the trauma. Hallucinations seem to be particularly frequent in psychosis associated with trauma. Thus, all but one of the Vietnam veterans with psychosis studied by David et al. [32] experienced auditory hallucinations. Sexual abuse has been strongly linked to hallucinations in other empirical studies [40,44]. Moreover, the trauma/ hallucination link does not appear to be restricted to schizophrenia. Hammersley et al. [45] found trauma was also associated with auditory hallucinations in bipolar disorder. This relationship was particularly strong for sexual abuse that had occurred in childhood. Hardy et al. [46] examined the issue in more detail. They found that in many cases where trauma precedes hallucinations, the hallucinations are only thematically related to the trauma they did not often involve recapitulation of the traumatic event. This suggests
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19
that the mechanism is not always a direct one involving the usual effects of trauma. Another aspect of the PTSD/psychosis link concerns the potential involvement of dissociative processes. Glaslova et al. [47] suggest that traumatic stress exerts its influence on schizophrenia precisely by increasing the tendency to dissociative processes. Holowka et al. [48] certainly found childhood trauma was associated with the significant presence of dissociative symptoms in people with schizophrenia. Kilcommons and Morrison [40] also reported that dissociative processes consequent upon trauma were associated with psychotic experiences, and with hallucinations in particular. However, it should be noted that this relationship has not been found in all studies [49]. Irwin [50] suggested that the link between dissociative experiences and PTSD might arise because both were associated with childhood trauma. However, controlling for childhood trauma did not remove the association. The links between trauma and hallucinosis in psychosis may be an example of a situation where an abnormal concatenation of normal social circumstances results in an outcome that appears to represent a qualitative shift. It probably does this by activating a response propensity that is variably but widely distributed in human populations, i.e. to hallucinate [51]. There are other aspect of psychosis where similar processes might apply.
DELUSIONS
Historically, the abnormal beliefs of people with schizophrenia have defined the concept of delusion. In other words, delusions were the ideas put forward by people who were regarded as mad. Again, it has always been felt that the process of delusion formation was a qualitatively abnormal one that would be neural in basis. Delusions are beliefs that are held to be abnormal primarily in content. It is possible to describe the characteristics of delusions (false ideas that are held with very strong conviction, are not amenable to counter argument or contrary evidence, are not shared by others, and motivate behaviour). However, there is no criterion or set of criteria that is both sufficient and necessary to define the phenomenon of delusion [52].
The inevitable inference is that delusional ideas shade into normal ideas. Moreover, some people whom you would not wish to call deluded have ideas of strange content. The distribution of unusual beliefs in the populace is extensive. Many people are convinced of the truth of ideas that are not supported by available and accessible evidence. These include beliefs in astrology, alien beings, telepathy or ghosts. Political beliefs are held with strong conviction even though they may be untried, or indeed tried and found wanting. Many religious ideas if taken literally are demonstrably false (the one that particularly exercised Martin Luther was transubstantiation). Nevertheless, people may adhere to their religious belief with extremely
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PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
Percentage of population
30 25
-0.2569x
y = 24.474e 2
R = 0.9286
20 15 10 5
Figure 2.1 The distribution of Paranoia Checklist items endorsed by students [58] (Reproduced from The British Journal of Psychiatry, 186: 427 435 with per mission from the Royal College of Psychiatrists)
0
strong conviction and they may act upon the idea, sometimes to their own detriment. However, we do not generally choose to regard people of faith as having a psychiatric disorder. This is the social getout clause: we will accept that a strange and false idea is not delusional if it is widely shared. The urge to make categorical the distinction between psychosis and normality leads us to discount unusual beliefs and experiences in people we would be reluctant to see as undergoing a psychosis. This has further implications for models of psychosis that invoke continuity with normal behaviour. It had become apparent by the late 1980s that paranoid ideation and anomalous experiences were not confined to clinical groups. It is clear that the frequency of auditory hallucinosis greatly exceeds the accepted prevalence of psychosis (e.g. see Reference [53]). The distinguishing feature of those in contact with services is how upset they are by their unusual experiences [54,55]. Postulating continuities is an important component of modern cognitive models of psychosis (e.g. see References [56] and [57]), which argue that the emergence of psychotic phenomena reflects abnormal combinations of largely normal mechanisms. Thus people who hold cherished ideas typically have a confirmatory bias, being unlikely to consider alternatives impartially. These beliefs shade into what would be regarded as delusional, since the thinking that underpins them is similar in style to that in people with acknowledged psychosis.
The distribution of odd beliefs in the community has been studied empirically. Freeman et al. [58] found that 30% of an internet sample of students had ‘paranoid’ beliefs, in other words, those reflecting self-reference and threat. Moreover, the cumulative frequency of individual paranoid ideas followed an exponential curve (Figure 2.1), with the relationship between them being hierarchical, such that more extreme ideas were predictive of those that were less extreme but not vice versa. At a single point in time the continuum is defined by differences between individuals, who are thus located at individual positions on the curve. However, people are themselves likely to vary in a way that would place them at different positions on the curve at different times, dependent on changing circumstances. In a sense, they would move along the curve. These findings have considerable relevance to the aetiology of psychosis. They imply that in some people movement along a continuum (indeed probably more than one continuum) results in the emergence of psychosis. Thus the role of aetiology is to explain why particular people make this journey at particular times in their lives. In the genetic arena, this suggests a focus on quantitative analyses [59], along with the identification of quantitative trait loci [60]. In the psychological domain, it implies the convergence of different psychological attributes some cognitive, some emotional [61 63]. There are also implications for treatment, in particular such psychological treatments as cognitive behaviour therapy [64].
0
5
10
15
20
Total number of checklist items
WHY PSYCHIATRY HAS TO BE SOCIAL
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21
THE SOCIAL NATURE OF PSYCHIATRIC SYMPTOMS AND THE GENETICS OF SCHIZOPHRENIA
The social element in psychiatric symptoms and the consequence that they cannot map perfectly on to underlying brain states may have caused a particular problem for the genetics of schizophrenia. The genetic project in schizophrenia is grounded on the assumption that abnormal brain states are necessary for the development of the disorder. The idea is of a causal chain between genes, the proteins they encode for, the enzymatic reactions mediated by the proteins, the neurophysiological and neurocognitive functions served by the enzymes, and finally the symptoms we see in people with schizophrenia. It might be anticipated that at every point in this chain some causal force is lost, resulting in an attenuated relationship between the gene and the schizophrenic exophenotype. It has been clear for a long time that, if schizophrenia is a genetic condition, it is polygenic. However, the search for the genes for schizophrenia has not been very successful. A number have been identified, but problems of replication have been rife [65,66]. Moreover, it has so far been notably impossible to identify individual genes with relative odds greater than 1.3. Neither is it clear how many genes might be implicated. It is likely to be a lot. If the greatest relative odds were indeed 1.3, we would need at least a hundred to account for the accepted values for the heritability of schizophrenia. Although we may know their effects at the molecular level, we do not know how these genes work to produce schizophrenia; nor do we know if they act singly within given families or whether they interact to produce schizophrenia more generally. The recent interest in copy number variants [67] may not help much, as they are likely only to account for 1% of the cases of schizophrenia, probably at the severe end and associated with clear neurological features. Again the mechanisms of action are obscure. This unsatisfactory situation has led to the suggestion that we should really be seeking the genetic basis for the endophenotype of schizophrenia, i.e. the brain phenomena underlying the disorder itself [68 70].
The hope is that better estimates of heritability can thus be obtained. This is a tacit recognition that mental states and brain states are not equivalent and, indeed, that mental states have an additional psychosocial component tending to attenuate the influence of individual genes. Gottesman and Gould [68] suggested that this approach potentially implies a deconstruction of the concept of schizophrenia. However, such a deconstruction would entail reconstruction: schizophrenia, but not as we know it. It is a serious acknowledgement of our failure to establish a compelling aetiological narrative for schizophrenia if we can only deal with it by opting to study the aetiology of something else. This is on the way to acknowledging that the disease construct of schizophrenia has failed in its heuristic task. In any case, the concept of the endophenotype in schizophrenia has also been challenged on heuristic grounds, as the genetics of the postulated endophenotypes is no more robust than that of the exophenotype [71]. There is a troubling paradox in these molecular genetic findings. As established from twin studies, schizophrenia certainly appears to have high heritability. The diagnosis of schizophrenia relies heavily on positive symptoms, and so the heritability of schizophrenia must be the heritability of positive symptoms. However, such endophenotypes as have been postulated, e.g. abnormalities in working memory [72], would link more directly to negative symptoms and to cognitive deficits. It may in any case be questioned whether heritability, as calculated, is fit for purpose. Height is an extremely heritable attribute, but we have failed so far to establish any single gene to account for its heritability (e.g. see Reference [73]). Some of the discrepancies may derive from the fact that heritability as calculated also encompasses gene gene, gene environment and environment gene interactions, and these may be very complicated indeed. When we engage with the world, the world engages with us and may change us.
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PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
2.10
THE NATURE OF ENDOPHENOTYPES AND THE NATURE OF MENTAL SYMPTOMS
Caspi and Moffitt [74] argue that the biggest mystery of psychopathology is ‘How does an environmental factor, external to the person, get inside the nervous system and alter its elements to generate the symptoms of a disordered mind?’ This mystery has a counterpart: ‘How do the biological correlates of mental disorders so constrain the mind as to generate mental symptoms that are essentially about the external world? How does the endophenotype translate into the exophenotype?’ This question is made more difficult because neurocognitive studies are essentially a psychology of performance, and abnormalities are generally conceived as performance deficits. This lends itself easily to the important question of negative symptoms in schizophrenia even though the associations are modest [75]. However, we diagnose schizophrenia primarily from its positive symptoms. Thus we are left with the question of how deficits generate positive symptoms. This is an ancient issue in psychiatry and neurology. Hughlings Jackson, following Russell Reynolds and Herbert Spencer, differentiated negative and positive symptoms in epilepsy in the 1880s [76]. His model of positive symptoms is that they represent excitation or release from higher inhibitory control. In other words, positive symptoms are the consequences of negative symptoms. This assertion is open to empirical test: it implies that positive symptoms presuppose negative ones. However, it is well established that negative symptoms are not necessary for the emergence of positive symptoms. While the genetic basis has not as yet been substantiated, there is no doubt of an association between schizophrenia and various neurocognitive abnormalities. These involve both the cortex and subcortex, and subserve several discrete cognitive functions. However, their nature remains obscure. They may comprise dysfunctions in distinct domains, they may cluster, or they may represent a general neurocognitive deficit [77]. While up to 30% of people with schizophrenia perform within the normal range cognitively, it is possible that some high performers show
imbalances in specific functions, particularly memory and executive functions, in comparison with controls [78,79]. However, follow-up studies suggest that cognitive subtypes are not stable over time [80]. Indeed, in a ten-year follow-up of first-episode patients, IQ appears to revert to premorbid levels [81]. There is some suggestion of cognitive impairment being related to genes tentatively linked to schizophrenia, e.g. dysbindin and the val/met polymorphism in the catechol-O-methyl transferase gene [82]. It remains unclear if the impairment is general, or related to working memory or executive function [83 85]). It is also uncertain how specific the effect is to schizophrenia. Attempts using neuroimaging to link working memory deficits in schizophrenia with abnormalities in dorsolateral prefrontal cortical functioning have produced inconsistent results. The intention to search for neurocognitive correlates of schizophrenia is well founded, and may eventually produce more consistent results. It does remain possible that they may have environmental as well as genetic causes, although this is an under-researched area. Brain dysfunction is in any case likely to have very complex origins and consequences, given the way function almost certainly involves interaction at a modular level, and the capacity this allows for compensatory activity [86]. How might neurocognitive abnormalities generate the mental symptoms of psychosis? It is not difficult to see how memory deficits could contribute. Thus an unrecognized failure to remember the location of household objects might set the scene for wayward interpretations: things that are not where they were might be thought to have been moved by interlopers. However, memory is a tool that enables us to engage with the world; it is not the engagement itself. Some cognitive deficits have implications that are clearly and centrally social. These concern so-called social cognition. For instance, as a group, people with schizophrenia perform relatively poorly on tests of theory of mind abilities [87]. Such theory of mind
WHY PSYCHIATRY HAS TO BE SOCIAL
impairment is associated with both negative and positive psychotic symptoms, the latter including paranoia and passivity experiences. There is some evidence that social cognition may be relatively independent of other forms of cognition [88]. Social cognition also includes facial affect recognition and social cue perception. There is evidence of a degree of localization of these functions [87]. Facial affect recognition, particularly for negative emotions, also appears defective in some people with schizophrenia. Impairments in social perception in schizophrenia appear to have some specificity, not being so apparent in other psychiatric disorders. They are also relatively stable over time. Social cue perception involves the appreciation of more dynamic stimuli, usually in more than one modality: for instance, individuals with schizophrenia find it more difficult to identify the goals and intentions of people recorded on videotape. It is comparatively easy to see how a relative inability
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to process information about other people’s affect and intentions could lead to misinterpretations of a paranoid cast. In general, neurocognitive deficits could be seen as exerting a tonic control; as causes, they are tonic and permissive, rather than obligatory. This may be the proper model for genetic abnormalities and changes in dopamine metabolism. Dopamine may be the wind that fans the psychotic fire [89], but you can have fire without wind and it can burn without being fanned. Social causes may operate in a similar tonic way. External stress leading to affective changes may set the circumstances out of which psychotic symptoms emerge, but does not guarantee their emergence. These are examples of causes that are neither sufficient nor necessary, and it is difficult to conceive of endophenotypic influences that could be sufficient and necessary. However, some social causes may shape symptoms directly, as I will argue below.
THE CONCEPT OF THE PSYCHOSOCIAL
The word psychosocial is used with some profligacy in psychiatry, often without an adequately thoughtful consideration of its meaning. It implies the connection between the inner and outer worlds, the fact that our perception of the outer world is an aspect of our inner world, but that our subjective experience is of a reality we are effectively compelled to regard as external. Social contexts, circumstances and events are seen as outside phenomena, even though subjectively experienced. It is easier to study the psychosocial reality by trying to control either the subjective or the objective component (rather akin to the ‘bracketing’ strategy employed by the phenomenologists). Psychologists focus on subjective aspects; social scientists in contrast try to remove the subjective. This can be seen, for instance, in cognitive models of depression, which, whatever their provenance, are simultaneously cognitive and social [90]. A major area of psychosocial research that can be used to illustrate approaches to the psychosocial concerns so-called life events (see also Chapter 16). Difficulties in this sort of research arise from the fact that different people have different experiences, and also perceive them differently. As human beings with
both cognitive and empathic theory of mind, we can easily understand that some events might be particularly distressing, and thus may cause major affective and cognitive shifts in the persons exposed to them. The resulting subjective experiences, if sufficiently extreme, may be identifiable as symptoms, and there may be enough of these for the criteria for depressive disorder to be met. However, affective changes themselves may alter our perception of the events we have experienced. Thus the apparent link between event and disorder may be spurious. In the early days of life event research, there was a dispute about whether the impact of events should be assessed by the subjects themselves or be judged independently. This illustrates two principles. The first is that the impact of life events represents an interaction between the self and the world. The second is that it is possible to make a consensually verifiable assessment of the component that is external to the subject. Researchers sought techniques that would enable the subjective element of the impact of events to be stripped out. Initially, this involved panel ratings of lists of potential events preordained by the researchers. This certainly produces reliable ratings, but the
24
PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
lists limited both the range and the individual attributes of the events that could be recorded. Brown and Harris [91] responded to this by having panels of raters assess the qualities and dimensions of real events that their research participants reported in the course of a semi-structured research interview. The rating procedure involved the presentation of vignettes of the individual events prepared by the interviewer. These included demographic and situational information about the participant, and a detailed description of the event and its context. The vignettes included no information about the participants’ evaluation of the event, their emotional response or their psychiatric state. Thus the subjective elements were removed so that raters could arrive at a consensus estimate of the impact such an event would have on the average person facing equivalent circumstances. The output is an objectivized assessment of a rather particular type: it uses theory of mind as a way of identifying the likely psychological consequences of the event, in other words, its social, emotional and cognitive demand characteristics. Although it may at first sight seem so, this is not tautological, as rating the event in this way retains the possibility of refuting the event/disorder link being investigated. It does have the disadvantage that the rating reflects complex ideas about the interplay of event attributes in eliciting responses. For this reason, the overall concept of contextual threat has been refined, so that events can be rated in terms of more specific attributes, such as loss, humiliation and intrusiveness [92 96]. The
2.12
quality of intrusiveness is of particular interest in that it potentially links the demand characteristics of certain events to the psychopathological characteristics of paranoid ideation. Over the last decade, several cognitive models of psychosis have been published (e.g. see References [56] and [97] to [102]). They seek to identify the origins of psychosis by adducing interactions between social contexts, emotional tone and cognitive processing. They have generated considerable research. Where this has focused on attributes with a social cast, it is the subjective accounts (attitudes or attributional style, for example) that are given primacy. A recent example using sophisticated statistical techniques to provide an account of psychological mechanisms in paranoia is given by Bentall et al. [103]. Based on structural equation modelling using data from 173 people with serious psychiatric disorders, the most plausible model for paranoia included separate effects of a pessimistic thinking style and impaired cognitive performance. It thereby links cognitive style with processes having a clear social component (pessimism). In some cases considerable effort is put into controlling the social environment in order that characteristic subjective responses can be investigated. Thus standardized virtual reality scenarios have been used to study the nature of paranoid responses [104,105]. Such studies complement the social research represented by life event studies, but the full possibilities of relating both sorts of variable to specific symptoms of psychosis have not yet been realized.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have argued that the social element of psychiatric disorders is inalienable, because the disorders themselves incorporate the social world. Like Leon Eisenberg, I see biological and social research as inseparable necessities if we are to attain a full aetiological account in some ways this conclusion would suitably be termed a ‘no brainer’. However, the consequences for the shape of an effective research programme are profound. It is not just that we must research putative social and biological causes: we must also test models that explicitly integrate these influences. This may imply some deconstruction of
our conventional disease categories, particularly in moving to the investigation of specific symptom types. While this may be unsettling, we might thereby break out of what has signs of becoming a research impasse.
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WHY PSYCHIATRY HAS TO BE SOCIAL
2. Eisenberg, L. (1997) A very British kind of social psychiatry. British Journal of Psychiatry, 171, 309 313. 3. Morris, J. N. (1957) Uses of Epidemiology, Livingstone, Edinburgh. 4. Shepherd, M. (1983) The origins and directions of social psychiatry. Integrative Psychiatry, 1, 86 88. 5. Wing, J. (1978) Reasoning about Madness, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 6. Wing, J. K. (1991) Social Psychiatry. Social Psychiatry: Theory, Methodology and Practice (ed. P. E. Bebbington), Transaction, New Brunswick, New Jersey, pp. 265 304. 7. Hollingshead, A. B. and Redlich, F. C. (1958) Social Class and Mental Illness, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York. 8. Mortensen, P. B., Pedersen, C. B., Westergaard, T. et al. (1999) Effects of family history and place and season of birth on the risk of schizophrenia. New England Journal of Medicine, 340, 603 608. 9. Pedersen, C. B. and Mortensen, P. B. (2001) Family history, place and season of birth as risk factors for schizophrenia in Denmark: a replication and reanalysis. British Journal of Psychiatry, 179, 46 52. 10. Sundquist, K., Frank, G. and Sundquist, J. (2004) Urbanisation and incidence of psychosis and depression follow up study of 4.4 million women and men in Sweden. British Journal of Psychiatry, 184, 293 298. 11. Popper, K. R. (1974) Scientific reduction and the essential incompleteness of all science, in Studies in the Philosophy of Biology (eds F. J. Ayala and T. Dobzhansky), Macmillan, London, pp. 259 284. 12. Iacaboni, M. (2009) Imitation, empathy, and mirror neurons. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 653 670. 13. Russell, J. (1995) At two with nature: agency and the development of self world dualism, in The Body and the Self (eds J. L. Bermudez, A. Marcel and N. Eilan), MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 127 151. 14. Brentano, F. (1874) Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Duncker and Humbolt, Leipzig. 15. Flavell, J. H. (1979) Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: a new area of cognitive developmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34, 906 911. 16. White, R., Bebbington, P., Pearson, J. et al. (2000) The social context of insight in schizophrenia. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 35, 500 507.
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17. Enoch, D. and Ball, H. (2001) Folie a deux (et Folie a plusieurs), in Uncommon Psychiatric Syndromes, 4th edn (eds D. Enoch and H. Ball), Arnold, London. 18. Jaspers, K. (1959) General Psychopathology (translated in 1963 by J. Hoenig and M. W. Hamilton), Manchester University Press, Manchester, UK. 19. Frith, C. (2005) The neural basis of hallucinations and delusions. Comptes Rendus Biologies, 328, 169 175. 20. Schneider, K. (1957) Prim€are und sekund€are Symptome in der Schizophrenie, in Fortschritte der Neurologie und Psychiatrie, vol. 25 (translated by H. Marshall, as Primary and secondary symptoms of schizophrenia, in Themes and Variations in European Psychiatry, pp. 40 44, 1974, S. R. Hirsch and M. Shepherd) Wright, Bristol, pp. 487 490. 21. May Chahal, C. and Cawson, P. (2005) Measuring child maltreatment in the United Kingdom: a study of the prevalence of child abuse and neglect. Child Abuse Neglect., 29, 969 984. 22. Friedman, S., Smith, L., Fogel, D. et al. (2002) The incidence and influence of early traumatic life events in patients with panic disorder: a comparison with other psychiatric outpatients. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 16, 259 272. 23. Arseneault, L., Walsh, E., Trzesniewski, K. et al. (2006) Bullying victimization uniquely contributes to adjustment problems in young children: a nationally representative cohort study. Pediatrics, 118, 130 138. 24. Bebbington, P. E., Bhugra, D., Brugha, T. et al. (2004) Psychosis, victimisation and childhood disadvantage: evidence from the Second British National Survey of Psychiatric Epidemiology. British Journal of Psychiatry, 185, 220 226. 25. Bebbington, P. E., Cooper, C., Minot, S. et al. (2009) Suicide attempts, gender and sexual abuse: data from the British Psychiatric Morbidity Survey 2000. American Journal of Psychiatry, 166, 1135 1140. 26. Read, J., van Os, J., Morrison, A. P. and Ross, C. A. (2005) Childhood trauma, psychosis and schizophrenia: a literature review with theoretical and clinical implications. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 112, 330 350. 27. Morgan, C. and Fisher, H. (2007) Environment and schizophrenia: environmental factors in schizophrenia: childhood trauma a critical review. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33, 3 10.
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WHY PSYCHIATRY HAS TO BE SOCIAL
53. Wiles, N. J., Zammit, S., Bebbington, P. et al. (2006) Self reported psychotic symptoms in the general population. British Journal of Psychiatry, 188, 519 526. 54. Hanssen, M., Peeters, F., Krabbendam, L. et al. (2003) How psychotic are individuals with nonpsychotic disorders? Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 38, 149 154. 55. van Os, J., Verdoux, H., Maurice Tison, S. et al. (1999) Self reported psychosis like symptoms and the continuum of psychosis. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 34, 459 463. 56. Garety, P., Kuipers, E., Fowler, D. et al. (2001) Theoretical paper: a cognitive model of the positive symptoms of psychosis. Psychological Medicine, 31, 189 195. 57. Garety, P. A., Bebbington, P., Fowler, D. et al. (2007) Implications for neurobiological research of cognitive models of psychosis: a theoretical paper. Psychological Medicine, 37, 1377 1391. 58. Freeman, D., Garety, P. A., Bebbington, P. E. et al. (2005) Psychological investigation of the structure of paranoia in a non clinical population. British Journal of Psychiatry, 186, 427 435. 59. Linney, Y. M., Murray, R. M., Peters, E. R. et al. (2003) A quantitative genetic analysis of schizotypal personality traits. Psychological Medicine, 33, 803 816. 60. Plomin, R., Owen, M. J. and McGuffin, P. (1994) The genetic basis of complex human behaviors. Science, 264, 1733 1739. 61. Hanssen, M., Krabbendam, L., de Graaf, R. et al. (2005) Role of distress in delusion formation. British Journal of Psychiatry, 48 (suppl.), s55 s58. 62. Krabbendam, L. and van Os, J. (2005) Affective processes in the onset and persistence of psychosis. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 255, 185 189. 63. Krabbendam, L., Myin Germeys, I., Bak, M. and van Os, J. (2005) Explaining transitions over the hypothesized psychosis continuum. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 39, 180 186. 64. Kuipers, E., Garety, P., Fowler, D. et al. (2006) Cognitive, emotional and social processes in psychosis: refining cognitive behavioural therapy for persistent positive symptoms. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32, S24 S31. 65. Sanders, A. R., Duan, J., Levinson, D. F. et al. (2008) No significant association of 14 candidate genes with schizophrenia in a large European ancestry sample:
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101. Freeman, D., Garety, P., Kuipers, E. et al. (2002) A cognitive model of persecutory delusions. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 41, 331 347. 102. Morrison, A. P. (2001) The interpretation of intrusions in psychosis: an integrative cognitive approach to hallucinations and delusions. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 29, 257 276. 103. Bentall, R. P., Rowse, G., Shryane, N. et al. (2009) The cognitive and affective structure of paranoid
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3 Categories and continuums Peter Tyrer Centre for Mental Health, Imperial College London, London, UK
Ever since the time of Harvey it has been realized that medicine cannot progress unless it has some form of shorthand that allows the essentials of disease to be communicated unequivocally to others. In short, we cannot do without diagnoses. Classification in psychiatry has lagged behind that in medicine and related disciplines and to some extent has been scorned because of its failures in this regard. This is unfair because psychiatric disorders are extremely difficult to classify and we do not have the advantages of our medical colleagues in being able to draw on a great deal of additional independent information that enables our classifications to be validated. Nevertheless, psychiatrists have been slow to accept the principles of formal diagnosis and classification and have been all too ready to dismiss these notions as relics of some outdated ‘medical model’ of psychiatry that should have no place in a humane and understanding mental health care system. This view fails to take account of the importance of classifying all conditions for purposes of efficiency and communication; if every problem we come across in practice is unique we have to spend a very long time communicating our accounts of this person to others and spend a much longer time treating them as we go through the process of trial and error in testing all the remedies known to man. Labelling patients is not
necessarily dehumanizing; it can be a great aid to selecting treatment, predicting prognosis and maintaining proper care across a variety of settings. Although many of these comments may be selfevident they are worth repeating because in the context of social psychiatry the criticisms of classification in general are often more pronounced. Because social psychiatry tries to deal with aspects of a person’s symptoms, functioning and context almost any form of classification will be found wanting. However, it will not do justice to the tremendous variety in this subject to abandon the task of sorting them out into some reasonable order, as this leads to anarchy. Throughout this chapter the advantages of categories and continuums (it might be better expressed as continua to keep with the original Latin, but as the word ‘continuums’ is widely used I beg to be irregular) in a good classification will be addressed. The focus of the chapter is mainly on the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders, but of course categories and continuums are used across the field of social psychiatry and so some of the principles described here can be extended far beyond the field of diagnosis. I am concentrating on the question of diagnosis because here there is most controversy. There is little argument that if you are comparing the intensity of a psychiatric symptom it is reasonable to use a rating scale that has a wide
Principles of Social Psychiatry, second edition Edited by Craig Morgan and Dinesh Bhugra Ó 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
range of scores; in other words, it describes a continuum of severity. In diagnostic practice it is necessary to use categories in order to become recognized;
3.1.
it is argued here that this might led to confusion and that strict rules are needed before categories are embraced.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORIES AND CONTINUUM
An ideal diagnostic category is a discrete entity that usefully separates it from all other diagnoses or, in an apt metaphor, ‘carves nature at its joints’. It therefore stands alone and its simple description should be able to indicate its cause, its nature, its likely presentations (signs and symptoms), its course with or without treatment, and its outcome. I have been lucky with my health to date and the only serious illness I had was pneumococcal pneumonia at the age of 5. Even at this time the diagnosis was close to the top level of the diagnostic tree. It describes the cause (the pneumococcus bacterium), the nature of its presentation (consolidation of the lungs), its presentation (high fever, tachypnoea and shortness of breath, with dullness to percussion over the affected lung and impaired inflation of the lobe of the lung concerned), its course (excellent outcome in uncomplicated cases with universal response to penicillin and most other antibiotics) and its outcome (usually complete recovery in the absence of complications or associated comorbidity). A diagnostic continuum is a spectrum from ‘no diagnosis’ to ‘complete diagnosis’. It can be formulated in many ways, most commonly in the form of an equal interval range of groups that can either have anchor points to identify them or a complete range with only numerical distance being measured to indicate the point on the scale. Many diagnostic continua in psychiatry follow the Likert scale principle, named after its founder [1], which was originally described to measure opinions along
the lines of the following responses to a set of statements: 1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree. This can be easily transposed into a diagnostic format such as for the assessment of depression: 1. No depression 2. Mild depression 3. Moderate depression 4. Severe depression 5. Very severe depression. In the extreme form of the continuum the diagnosis can be represented as a line, commonly of an easily measurable length (e.g. 10 cm) and the distance of a diagnostic point measured from either end (see Figure 3.1).
Diagnostic point
___________________________________________________________________________ No depression
Figure 3.1
Very severe depression
Illustration of a diagnostic point along a continuum
CATEGORIES AND CONTINUUMS
3.2.
33
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
At first sight there appears to be no contest between these two approaches; the categorical approach wins hands down but it is wise to think again before coming to this decision. Doctors and decision makers in all parts of medicine prefer categorical classifications to dimensional ones as clinical decisions are categorical ones. You cannot decide to 30% treat a patient or admit 50% of a patient to hospital, so the decision maker abhors the dimensional system as unworkable in practice. However, this assumes that the category concerned is a valid one. The trouble is in psychiatry that so many of our diagnoses are not valid because we have no external tests that are independent and can answer the true test of validity, ‘Does this actually measure what it purports to measure?’ So the identification of the pneumococcus in my sputum was the clincher for my diagnosis of pneumococcal pneumonia, and although the sudden development of all the symptoms and signs of lobar pneumonia was almost as good, it was the identification of the bacterium that really counted. When there is no external measure of validity we fall back on gaining excellent reliability, and even though we are reminded that even 100% reliability in the detection of an alleged diagnosis adds not one jot to validity we are still reassured that without good reliability we are not going to achieve a valid diagnosis. There is now increasing evidence from research studies in all areas of medicine where there is no independent measure of disease that dimensional systems are more reliable. This is particularly true of psychiatry, and in the complex jungle of social psychiatry it is seen in its clearest form. Let me take one example, the vexed question of the classification of personality disorder [2,3]. This is a highly unpopular dichotomous diagnosis. According to current diagnostic practice people either have this nasty condition that no-one in their right mind could derive any satisfaction in having or you are squeaky clean with no personality disturbance at all. How do we decide on the dividing line between awfulness and smug virtue? This is a very arbitrary process. Thus the ICD-10 and DSM-IV definitions of personality disorder describe this condition as ‘deviations of personal characteristics and behaviour
patterns from the norm’, manifest mainly as dysfunctional behaviour that is ‘pervasive’, and which leads to distress or impairment in social, occupational and personal function. This, although more reliably rated than any of the individual personality disorders [4,5], is still extraordinarily subjective, and it is easy to see how the diagnosis can become, in the words of Lewis and Appleby, ‘the patients psychiatrists dislike’ [6]. Dimensions are less stigmatic, more reliable and avoid false or arbitrary dichotomies. The reason they are more reliable is really a statistical relationship between the numbers of options available [7], summarized in Table 3.1. The caveats in Table 3.1 are very important. In basic language they are saying to the diagnoser, ‘Are you confident that the condition you are trying to classify has no clear natural boundaries?’ If it has, then these will determine the number of groups that are chosen. Thus, for example, in dementia there is increasing evidence that there are two main categories of disorder, full Alzheimer’s disease and mild cognitive impairment [8], and that these can be identified with increasing confidence. It would therefore be inappropriate to have a seven-point scale for diagnosing Alzheimer’s disease as here we do have sufficient a priori knowledge to be confident about the diagnosis of individuals using a few categories. However, in psychiatry this extra knowledge, mainly gained from independent biological and neuropsychological evidence, is relatively rare. As David Kupfer, charged with a major role in the construction of DSM-V, puts it pessimistically ([9], p. xvii): Despite many proposed candidates, not one labora tory marker has been found to be specific in identify ing any of the DSM defined syndromes. Epidemio logic and clinical studies have shown extremely high rates of comorbidity among the disorders, undermin ing the hypothesis that the syndromes represent dis tinct etiologies. Furthermore, epidemiologic studies have shown a high degree of short term diagnostic instability for many disorders. With regard to treat ment, lack of treatment specificity is the rule rather than the exception.
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PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
Table 3.1
Improved reliability of dimensional continuums compared with categorical classification
.
A computer simulation study (Monte Carlo study) designed to investigate the extent to which the interrater reliability of a clinical scale is affected by the number of categories or scale points . All scale points between 2 (dichotomous) and 100 were examined . Results indicated that reliability (agreement between raters) gradually increased between 2 and 7 points in the scale . Beyond 7 points no substantial increase in reliability occurred no matter how many scale points were examined Caveats These findings only hold under the following conditions: (1) The research investigator has insufficient a priori knowledge to use as a reliable guideline for deciding on an appropriate number of scale points to employ (2) The dichotomous and ordinal categories being considered all have an underlying metric or continuous scale format (From Cicchetti, D. V., Showalter, D. and Tyrer, P. (1985) The effects of number of rating scale categories on levels of inter rater reliability: a Monte Carlo investigation. Applied Psychological Measurement, 9, 31 36.)
This candour is refreshing after the initial enthusiasm that greeted the introduction of DSM-III in 1980 [10]. Far too many people assumed that a reliable diagnosis derived from operational criteria was also a valid diagnosis. In truth, very few diagnoses in psychiatry can have any claim to validity; the best that can be obtained is a high level of clinical utility in the setting of its use, nicely described in the words of Kendell and Jablensky ([11], p. 8):
3.3.
CHOICE OF CATEGORY VERSUS CONTINUUM
From the guidance given above we can postulate a number of rules that can help to decide whether it is prefereable to use a category or continuum for any particular diagnostic construct in psychiatry (Table 3.2). Using the information in Table 3.2 it is easy to see how some disorders might best be moved to a Table 3.2
At present there is little evidence that most contem porary psychiatric diagnoses are valid, because they are still defined by syndromes that have not been demonstrated to have natural boundaries. This does not mean, though, that most psychiatric diagnoses are not useful concepts. In fact, many of them are invalu able. But, because utility often varies with the context, statements about utility must always be related to context, including who is using the diagnosis, in what circumstances, and for what purposes.
continuum from existing categories and how others can feel more secure in their current categorical state. Anorexia nervosa has support as a category as there are independent measures (weight loss, endocrine disturbance), there is clear clinical differentiation from other eating disorders (with a little concern about a
Questions to be asked before deciding on a categorical or continuum scale
Knowledge question
Answer
Choice of category or continuum
Is there a truly independent measure of the diagnosis?
Yes No
Use category Be inclined to use a continuum
Are there clear boundaries between the disorder and related ones?
Yes No
Use category Use continuum
Does the disorder have a different natural history and course from other (apparently related) disorders?
Yes No
Use category Use continuum
Is there a specific treatment for the disorder that makes it useful to identify separately?
Yes No
Use category Use continuum
CATEGORIES AND CONTINUUMS
fuzzy boundary with atypical anorexia nervosa) and the natural history of the condition is different from other disorders (with a very much higher mortality rate) [12]. Other conditions, such as ‘major depressive episode’ in DSM, are much more shaky as diagnostic entities. Major depressive episode does not have independent
35
measures justifying its diagnosis we are still looking for a successor to the dexamethasone suppression test [13] and its boundaries are very difficult to define. It is therefore not surprising that ICD-10 [14] moves towards the continuum option of mild, moderate and severe depression in its classification.
3.4. IMPORTANCE OF CLINICAL UTILITY Diagnosis is a useful shorthand for clinicians wishing to communicate a commonality in a few words, and a good diagnosis is only valuable if it is perceived as useful by the user. This is especially true of treatment. Any condition that leads to a specific treatment recommendation (probably the most important item in Table 3.2) is going to be very popular in clinical practice but is has to be backed by proper evidence. Thus, a suggestion several years ago that pimozide, an otherwise unremarkable antipsychotic drug, was a specific treatment for monosymptomatic hypochondriacal psychosis [15] led to a great interest in both the diagnosis and treatment of this condition. The evidence for this specificity was always very flimsy and has never been supported and so both diagnosis and its alleged special treatment have faded into oblivion. Clinical utility is also an important consideration when a condition is very common and yet only a minority of people can receive, or are available, for treatment. Earlier in this chapter I indicated the someTable 3.3
Example of a continuum scale to record the severity of personality disorder
Level of personality disturbance Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
Level 3 Level 4
what false dichotomy between normal personality and personality disorder. Using this simple categorical system it appears that between 4 and 10% of the total adult population of any country has a personality disorder [16,17]. These are staggering numbers, as it implies that 150 000 400 000 people in the UK have this medical condition. Subsumed within this group are around 300 people who have alleged ‘dangerous and severe personality disorder’ [18], but in the present classification structure they are indistinguishable from the others. It had been noticed in several past studies that the more severe personality disordered patients tend to have a much greater number of personality disorders than those with milder disorders [19 21]. In our own work we found that those with single personality disorders with apparently severe symptoms paradoxically had less associated morbidity than those with milder symptoms but with more personality disorders that crossed clusters. This led to a new continuum of classification [22] (Table 3.3) that has been shown to very useful in practice [23].
Features No personality disorder (i.e. good capacity to form relationships, reasonable personal resources to draw on at times of adversity) Personality difficulty (tendency for enduring patterns of behaviour to interfere with social functioning at times of particular stress and vulnerability but not at other times) Simple personality disorder particular and persistent personality abnormalities that create significant problems in occupational, social and/or personal relationships (present cutoff point for personality disorder in both ICD 10 and DSM IV) Complex or diffuse personality disorder widespread personality abnormalities covering more than one cluster of personality disorders Severe personality disorder widespread personality abnormalities covering more than one cluster of personality disorders and leading to gross societal disturbance
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3.5.
SOME ADVICE FOR SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY
This account indicates that both categories and continuums have a place in social psychiatry. In the past too much reliance has been placed on categorical descriptions that have often been based more on a combination of dogma and clinical consensus rather than evidence. The use of continuums is preferable in the absence of evidence, as they convey more information, generally lead to better agreement and produce data that are useful in generating hypotheses. However, there is no alternative to a categorical description when decision making has to follow on from the identification of a syndrome or disorder, so all diagnostic continuums should have anchor points that allow categorical separation, often a dichotomous one, so that they can be used to advise decision makers. With this in mind a somewhat nebulous concept such as ‘social inclusion’ can now be placed on an investigative path and explored in the same way as any other scientific concept.
REFERENCES 1. Likert, S. (1932) Technique for the measurement of attitudes. Archives of Psychology, 140, 1 55. 2. Livesley, W. J., Schroeder, M. L., Jackson, D. N. and Jang, K. L. (1994) Categorical distinctions in the study of personality disorder: implications for classification. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103, 6 17. 3. Clark, L. A., Watson, D. and Reynolds, S. (1995) Diagnosis and classification of psychopathology: challenges to the current system and future directions. Annual Review of Psychology, 46, 121 153. 4. Bronisch, T. (1992) Diagnostic procedures of personality disorders according to the criteria of present classification systems. Verhaltungstherapie, 2, 140 150. 5. Bronisch, T. and Mombour, W. (1994) Comparison of a diagnostic checklist with a structured interview for the assessment of DSM III R and ICD 10 personality disorders. Psychopathology, 27, 312 320. 6. Lewis, G. and Appleby, L. (1988) Personality disorder: the patients psychiatrists dislike. British Journal of Psychiatry, 153, 44 49.
7. Cicchetti, D. V., Showalter, D. and Tyrer, P. (1985) The effects of number of rating scale categories on levels of inter rater reliability: a Monte Carlo investigation. Applied Psychological Measurement, 9, 31 36. 8. Ritchie, K. and Touchon, J. (2000) Mild cognitive impairment: conceptual basis and current nosological status. Lancet, 355, 225 228. 9. Kupfer, D., First, M. B. and Regier, D. E. (2002) Introduction, in A Research Agenda for DSM V (eds D. Kupfer, M. B. First and D. E. Regier), American Psychiatric Association, Washington, DC, pp. xv xxiii. 10. American Psychiatric Association (1980) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd revision, American Psychiatric Association, Washington, DC. 11. Kendell, R. and Jablensky, A. (2003) Distinguishing between the validity and utility of psychiatric diagnoses. American Journal of Psychiatry, 160, 4 12. 12. Papadopoulos, F. C., Ekbom, A., Brandt, L. and Ekselius, L. (2009) Excess mortality, causes of death and prognostic factors in anorexia nervosa. British Journal of Psychiatry, 194, 10 17. 13. Carroll, B. J. (1985) Dexamethasone suppression test: a review of contemporary confusion. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 46, 13 24. 14. World Health Organization (WHO) (1992) ICD 10: Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders, World Health Organization, Geneva. 15. Munro, A. (1978) Monosymptomatic hypochondriacal psychoses: a diagnostic entity which may respond to pimozide. Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal, 23, 497 500. 16. Torgersen, S., Kringlen, E. and Cramer, V. (2001) The prevalence of personality disorders in a community sample. Archives of General Psychiatry, 58, 590 596. 17. Coid, J., Yang, M., Tyrer, P. et al. (2006) Prevalence and correlates of personality disorder in Great Britain. British Journal of Psychiatry, 188, 423 431. 18. Home Office/Department of Health (1999) Managing Dangerous People with Severe Personality Disorder. Proposals for Policy Development, Home Office, London.
CATEGORIES AND CONTINUUMS
19. Kass, F., Skodol, A. E., Charles, E. et al. (1985) Scaled ratings of DSM III personality disorders. American Journal of Psychiatry, 143, 627 630. 20. Oldham, J. M., Skodol, A. E., Kellman, H. D. et al. (1992) Diagnosis of DSM III R personality disorders by two semistructured interviews: patterns of comorbidity. American Journal of Psychiatry, 149, 213 220. 21. Dolan, B., Evans, C. and Norton, K. (1995) Multiple axis II diagnoses of personality disorder. British Journal of Psychiatry, 166, 107 112.
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22. Tyrer, P. and Johnson, T. (1996) Establishing the severity of personality disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 153, 1593 1597. 23. Pulay, A. J., Dawson, D. A., Ruan, W. J. et al. (2008) The relationship of impairment to personality disorder severity among individuals with specific axis I disorders: results from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions. Journal of Personality Disorders, 22, 405 417.
4 Social, biological and personal constructions of mental illness Derek Bolton Institute of Psychiatry, King' s College London and South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK
4.1
CAUSES, DEFINITIONS AND BOUNDARIES
There are various ways in which mental illnesses may interact with features of social organization and social processes at macro- and micro-levels. One set of issues has to do with causal pathways affecting the population prevalence of mental illness generally or of particular conditions, that is to say, involvement of social factors in aetiology. A different aspect of the same issue is the influence of social factors on maintenance of the condition, affecting duration and course. Relevant macro-features of social organization and processes mainly have to do with exclusion from access to resources of one kind or another, such as education, employment, goods, social status and access to treatment, and they are realized in social communities, families and individuals, interacting there with micro-level risk and protective factors of many kinds. These questions of aetiology are only mentioned here to set them aside as not the focus of this chapter they are addressed elsewhere in the current volume. The main questions for the present chapter are more like this: What is the role of social factors in the cons-
truction of the representation of mental illness as opposed to health and the boundaries between them? What is the role of other factors, particularly the biological and the personal? How does it come to be that this or that condition is termed an illness, as opposed to, for example, distress or disability resulting from social exclusion, or a limitation of a person’s character, or a natural human condition, or life-style choice, and so forth? Why illness with its connotations of pathological abnormality, a matter for doctors and medical treatment, to be referred to and managed by the great institutions of health care? Here features of social organization and power relations clearly play a major role, with the views and values of government policy makers, popular cultural media, health care institutions and professions and manufacturers of treatment technologies (more or less coinciding with the opinions of the well-resourced and enfranchised key treatment consumers) having dominant roles. In brief, it is plausible to suppose that the representation of mental illness as opposed to health is at least in large part created and maintained substantially by social factors.
Principles of Social Psychiatry, second edition Edited by Craig Morgan and Dinesh Bhugra Ó 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Here is Jaspers on this nearly a century ago ([1], p. 652): What health and illness mean in general are matters which concern the physician least of all. He deals scientifically with life processes and with particular illnesses. What is ‘ill’ in general depends less on the judgement of the doctor than on the judgement of the patient and on the dominant views in any given cultural circle.
On the other hand, while it may seem an easy slide from representations to social representations we can after all only think with concepts we learn in the culture science stakes a claim to identifying phenomena that are not a matter of social opinion and values, but just are natural facts. Chemistry’s periodic table of elements, for example, would illustrate this line of thought, as would the fact that the cardiovascular system regulates blood pressure. So the question is: Does illness in general and mental illness in particular refer to some natural fact that is not a matter of social opinion and values, but is rather a matter for the medical sciences? Jaspers in the quote above apparently does not look to the sciences to work out what is illness and what is not, but refers instead to the patient’s opinion and cultural views. Here is Kendell rounding on any such idea ([2], pp. 307 308): The fact is that any definition of disease which boils down to ‘what people complain of’, or ‘what doctors treat’, or some combination of the two, is almost worse than no definition at all. It is free to expand or contract with changes in social attitudes and therapeutic opti mism and is at the mercy of idiosyncratic decisions by doctors or patients. If one wished to compare the incidence of disease in two different cultures, or in a single population at two different times, whose criteria of suffering or therapeutic concern would one use? And if the incidence of disease turned out to be different in the two, would this be because one was healthier than the other, or simply because their atti tudes to illness were different?
Kendell identifies the problematic all but perfectly here. The consequences of a personal/social definition of health are very messy: boundaries are subject to
pressures from a wide variety of stakeholders, and vary across cultures and subcultures. To bring some order into this relativity, one needs something like a fact of nature, and the general approach that follows this alternative tack is accordingly called naturalism. Naturalism seeks to underpin the natural assumption often enough made by many physicians, psychiatrists, some other health care professionals, and evident in some lay discourse, that there is some clear-cut distinction between illness and health, a fixed matter of fact independent of social opinions, a matter for the biomedical or biobehavioural sciences, better recognized by trained health care experts, maybe hard to identify and clarify, but there all the same, underpinning the discourse and the institutions of health care. It is just a matter of getting clear about what this fact of the matter is. This turns out, however, to be very difficult. Naturalism in medicine has had a variety of forms including as an unselfconscious presumption in the great paradigms in nineteenth century medicine and neurology: illness as disease or lesion. More recently, over the past few decades since the 1970s, the most popular and influential kind of naturalism regarding illness and health has been based explicitly in ideas of evolutionary theory. This will be considered in the next section, but before that let us go back in time to when the whole problematic of the medical model in psychiatry first arose with gusto, in the 1960s. Two key themes in the 1960s critiques can be characterized briefly in the following way: first, that the medical model of mental illness rendered the conditions so labelled and the people who have them meaningless, disqualified and socially excluded; second, that the medical model mistook deviance that was essentially defined by social norms as being a matter of medical fact. In Foucault’s archaeology [3,4], madness was defined in Western modernity as the mere absence of reason, coinciding more or less with moral absence, concluding that madness had nothing to say, no voice, was silenced to be socially excluded, at a micro- and macro-social level. Broadly similar themes in contemporary context were explicated in Laing [5]. Mechanisms of disqualification and exclusion were explored in theory and in field studies by sociologists such as Goffman [6] and Rosenhan [7]. These historical and sociological critiques identified social processes as
SOCIAL, BIOLOGICAL AND PERSONAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS
creating the category and reality of madness, meaningless unreason, incomprehensible chaos much to be feared and avoided. In Foucault’s historical vision especially, these processes were not at all instigated by medicine or psychiatry, but on the contrary, medical psychiatry itself came into being to manage and endorse them. In any case the upshot was that psychiatry as a branch of medicine was in charge of mental illness as an object of medical science and with its legalized powers of confinement. Therefore psychiatry, from this point of view, stood accused as in Szasz’ influential in-house critique [8] of misrepresenting conditions that were essentially defined by social and moral norms as instead matters of medical illness. These were key themes in the 1960s narrative that the category of mental illness with its characteristic features of meaninglessness, silence and disqualification is socially created, and that psychiatry in practice is a form of social control, masquerading as a branch of medicine, pathologizing problems of living and social deviance. Here is Kendell again, identifying the problem ([9], p. 25): The most fundamental issue, and also the most con tentious one, is whether disease and illness are nor mative concepts based on value judgements, or whether they are value free scientific terms; in other words, whether they are biomedical terms or socio political ones.
A particular problem arose for the American Psychiatric Association in the early 1970s, one that caused the Association to set about the task of defining ‘mental disorder’: gay activists lobbied to have homosexuality removed from the classification of mental disorders, then DSM-II [10]. The Association established the Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics, including Robert Spitzer, setting it the task of reviewing the controversy and proposing a solution. It was concluded that ([10], p. 16): The consequences of a condition, and not its etiology, determined whether the condition should be considered a disorder. . . . It was proposed that the criterion for a mental disorder was either sub jective distress or generalized impairment in social effectiveness.
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It was this proposal that formed the basis of the definition of mental disorder in the DSM-III, one that was carried forward, with some amendments, to the DSM-IV. Thus the definition of mental disorder in the DSM-IV ([11], pp. xxi xxii) and also the definition in the ICD-10 ([12], p. 5) both have distress and impairment of functioning as fundamental. Both definitions state that mental disorder is not the same as social deviance, that it has to involve ‘personal dysfunction’, this latter notion apparently resting on the generalized nature of impairment, not limited to a particular social context. This approach to conceptualizing mental disorder is appropriate for medicine and health care generally: the fundamental reality is that people find themselves in much distress, or with disability, and they consult a health care professional for help with this; social deviance, violation of society’s rules and regulations, is a different matter, for other agencies and institutions. However, while this construction is correct, it soon becomes complicated under pressure. Here are three broad kinds of complications: .
Some conditions in the psychiatric manuals do seem to be a matter of social deviance, albeit pervasive social deviance. This is explicit most clearly in the diagnostic criteria for the antisocial conditions. For example, the primary criterion (A) in the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder ([11], pp. 649 50) opens with: ‘There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others’, followed by examples including ‘failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviours’. The primary problem here seems to be that other people or society at large are at risk of harm, rather than (as the primary problem) the individual himself. This of course is the kind of case that lends weight to the view that psychiatry is fundamentally in the business of defining social deviance under the guise of medical disorder and acting as an agency of social control rather than health care. These issues are not explicitly discussed or explained in the manuals. Meanwhile, however, outside of the calm of the diagnostic manuals, debates on these issues have accelerated, concerning, for example, the status of severe antisocial personality disorder
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in law and mental health services, the role of mental health services in the management of risk to the public, and so on. (Literature on these issues in the UK context include References [13] to [15].) .
Another kind of controversy refers to ‘disability’. Advocacy groups point out that disability is not an absolute category but is relative to expectations, environments and task demands typically imposed by majority social groups. This line of thought can be applied to both physical and mental disabilities. Such-and-such a condition would not give rise to disability or distress, it can be argued, if social expectations, environments and task demands were not incompatible with it, in which case inclusion in the psychiatric manuals as a mental disorder is actually an illegitimate pathologizing and negative evaluation of a difference, a cover for discrimination and social exclusion [16]. The 1970s controversy about whether homosexuality was or was not a mental disorder was one expression of this general kind of issue. Contemporary examples include, for example, controversy about ADHD: whether this is real illness, to be treated by medication, or rather temperamentally based high-activity levels in (mainly) boys causing difficulties because of socially inappropriate expectations in, for example, school settings (e.g. see Reference [17]).
.
A third kind of problem with grounding the conceptualization of mental disorder in distress and/or disability has to do with distinguishing disorder distress from normal, nonpathological distress. It is obvious enough that distress may be unconnected to mental disorder. Other kinds or causes of distress include, for example, distress due to normal life transitions, challenges and losses, in education and work, family life, relationships, ageing, and so on; and distress associated with social deprivation, exclusion or persecution. Given psychiatry’s understandable tendency to regard distress as fundamental to its domain, there is the inevitable risk of its spreading into kinds of suffering that are apparently not a matter of mental disorder. For example, there is concern that normal life suffering is being pathologized as depressive disorder [18] and that typically higher rates of diagnosable
mental disorders among the poor and in ethnic minority groups reflect social exclusion rather than disorder [19]. In fact the DSM-IV definition makes what is apparently an attempt to delineate normal distress from pathological, which would solve some but not all of the difficulties. It requires that mental disorder ‘must not be merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned response to a particular event, for example, the death of a loved one’ ([11], pp. xxi xxii, italics added). This italicized qualification appears to intend to rule out ‘normal’ or ‘normally caused’ distress and disability, but the term ‘expectable’ is vague and uncertain and cannot bear much weight. Many medical and psychiatric conditions are ‘expectable’ in any readily available sense, such as skeletal fractures following a (long) fall or stress reaction following profound psychological shock. What matters is apparently not ‘expectability’ or otherwise, but consequences in terms of distress, disability and risk thereof. All these various controversies listed above interrogatethecategoryofmentalillnessormentaldisorderand the legitimatedomainofmentalhealthservices, echoing problems identified in the 1960s. The definitions of mental disorder in the psychiatric manuals were formulated to clarify and legitimize, but, as is hardly surprising on reflection, definitions cannot possibly be expected to resolve all the complex and multifaceted issues involved. The definitions serve as position statements and are workable for most purposes, particularly in helping define perceived need to treat, allowing the manuals to get on with their main task of describing and classifying the conditions of interest as clearly as possible,optimizingreliabilityofdiagnosis for the purposes of research and communication generally. The business of resolving the problems in conceptualizing mental illness, distinguishing this category from what is normal, on the one hand, and from social deviance, on the other, has been taken up outside the diagnostic manuals, mainly by psychiatrists and philosophers. I have reviewed this literature, covering at greater length issues addressed in the present chapter, in a recent book [20]. As indicated above, the main conceptual alternative to a social definitionofillness and health invokes naturalism, and since the 1970s this has been based mainly on ideas from evolutionary theory.
SOCIAL, BIOLOGICAL AND PERSONAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS
4.2
43
THE INTERPLAY OF EVOLUTIONARY, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL NORMS
In a series of highly influential papers beginning in the early 1990s Wakefield has proposed that the proper definition of mental disorder is as harmful dysfunction. He argued that this is a plausible reading of what is intended in the DSM-IV [21] and that this being the crucial claim dysfunction is properly understood along the lines of some mental or behavioural mechanism not functioning as ‘designed’, selected for, in evolution [22]. There has been a steady flow of literature produced over the past 15 years in which Wakefield’s proposal has been (usually) criticized in many and various ways, and in which Wakefield has vigorously defended his position (e.g. see References [23] to [37]). Wakefield’s evolutionary theoretical approach to defining mental disorder accepts that there is a socially embedded evaluative component in the concept, indicated by ‘harmful’, but insists that there is another component that is independent of social evaluations, which is a matter of fact, namely the reference to mental and behavioural mechanism not functioning ‘as designed’ (as selected for) in the evolutionary process. This appeal to facts of the matter independent of social evaluations is just what makes this approach a form of naturalism, intended in this case not so much as an alternative to a social construction of health and disease but at least as a crucial, principled limitation to it, based in an actual fact of the matter concerning what is and what is not functioning as designed (selected for) in evolution. So does this work? It is correct to suppose that concepts of function and dysfunction refer to systemic design and that evolutionary natural selection is a very particular theory about design, managing as it does without a designer. There are, however, and of course, other ways in which systems are designed, namely by individuals or groups making artefacts. By all means this has not much relevance to biological systems such as the cardiovascular system, which we may suppose has been designed, selected for, in evolution, without input from culture or individuals. However, in the case of mental life and behaviour, who or what is responsible for design and function? Here are three options:
1. Evolutionary natural selection 2. Socialization processes (education, training, culturalization) 3. Individual choice (signalled by individual differences, notwithstanding 1 and 2). The first of these is of course the one emphasized by naturalism (and is presumably a matter for the ‘natural sciences’), the second is emphasized by the social sciences and the third is emphasized by psychology. Relations between these three factors in human behaviour are complicated and contentious. The point of naturalism, however, is to construe mental and behavioural mechanisms only in the first way, excluding the second, and then the third will not appear as very relevant, since the main point is to distinguish the first from the second. Here is Wakefield in one of his early papers ([22], p. 381): What, then, is a dysfunction? An obvious place to begin is the supposition that a dysfunction implies an unfulfilled function, that is, a failure of some mechan ism in the organism to perform its function. However, not all kinds of functions are relevant. For example, one’s nose functions to hold up one’s glasses, and the sound of the heart performs a useful function in medical diagnosis. But a person whose nose is shaped in such a way that it does not properly support glasses does not thereby have a nasal disorder, and a person whose heart does not make the usual sounds is not thereby suffering from a cardiac disorder. A disorder is different from a failure to function in a socially preferred manner precisely because a dysfunction exists only when an organ cannot perform as it is naturally (i.e., independently of human intentions) supposed to perform. Presumably, the functions that are relevant are natural functions (italics added).
In this example of the function of the nose we have a clear fix on the evolved function (a kind of sense perception), a clear fix on an additional cultural function that is entirely unrelated, and ‘design’ of the
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PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
nose is pulled only one way. It is all much more complex, however, when we move from glasses and noses to social behaviours that are highly evolved, such as infant and child care, and to socially interpreted evolved behaviours such as fear, whether in social or natural environments. In these examples the clarity in identification of what is the evolved function and what is the socially designed function, and the sharp demarcation between them, are lost. In these complex cases, which in the realm of the psychological are probably the great majority, the biological evolved mechanism though it does have content (e.g. anxiety is about threat perception) is realized in a concrete social environment, and if the mechanism is failing, so is the concrete social norm. Conversely, if no social norm is being broken, the mechanism is not broken either. Wakefield’s analysis rests on a line of reasoning something like the following: 1. Concepts of systemic function and dysfunction and the distinction between the two essentially refer to the design of the system: normal functioning is functioning as designed; abnormal functioning is not functioning as designed. 2. In the case of psychological functions, we are only interested in those that are naturally designed (as opposed to socially designed). 3. In the case of natural psychological functions, the best scientific account of design that we have is evolutionary selection. 4. Hence, psychological dysfunction must involve failure to function as designed by/selected for in evolution. The first premise is fine, or good enough, and so is the inference to the conclusion from the three premises. The fault lies in the second premise, which transfers to the third, and hence to the conclusion. The problem with the second premise is that it assumes an invalid demarcation between natural and social psychological functioning. This invalid assumption affects the third premise, because this now assumes what is also invalid, that evolutionary selection in
isolation from social selection accounts for the class of psychological functions of interest. These invalidities compound in the conclusion, which postulates failure in hard-to-track-down natural, evolved psychological functions, in which social factors play no role. Modification of the argument leading to Wakefield’s conclusion would replace the second premise. The origin and design of psychological functioning typically include a complex mixture of genetic, evolved factors and social factors, with individual differences running though them both. Depending on which is dominant, or which is thought to be dominant, we can attribute the origin the design of the behaviour to human nature, to society, to subculture, to family (to family genes or behaviour or both) or to the individual’s constitution, character or personal values. In brief, according to current behavioural science in an evolutionary/genetic framework, three kinds of factor are implicated in the design of human behaviour evolutionary/ genetic, environmental, including the cultural, and individual and these three kinds of factor interact in complex ways. To each kind of design there corresponds a type of norm: evolutionary/genetic, social and individual again with no clear divisions and interplay between them. It follows that a mental state or behavioural response can be said to be dysfunctional to deviate from design norms in one or more of three ways: first, in that it fails to operate in the way designed by evolution; second, in that it fails to operate in the way taught by and sanctioned by the culture; and, third, in that it fails to work in the way the person intended, according to his/her needs and values as he/she sees them. However, these three kinds of dysfunction are not clearly separated, and they interact. The first kind belongs to an evolutionary theoretic framework and is relative to conditions in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness. The second kind of dysfunction is the one accessible to social theory; it is immersed in the present, in more or less diverse social realities. There is also a third reading of dysfunctional psychic life, the one at the individual level involving deviation from personal norms and values, evident to the person involved. This meaning has been neglected, to do with the fact that ‘madness’ was silenced though it is
SOCIAL, BIOLOGICAL AND PERSONAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS
increasingly apparent in discourse led by service users. These are not, however, three meanings of psychological function and dysfunction the evolu-
4.3
45
tionary, the social and the individual but are rather three interwoven themes that run through all kinds of case.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROPER DOMAIN OF HEALTH CARE
Naturalism represents the thought that the proper domain of medicine and health care is defined by a boundary in nature, in human nature, enclosing those states of the body/mind that are pathological, which deviate from the natural way that things should be. ‘Natural’ has to be used in this characterization, because otherwise it looks as though ‘the way things should be’ is going to have to have a social meaning, variable, arbitrary, fading into indelicacy in one direction and antisocial behaviour in another. Pathology so this line of thought runs has to be something really wrong with the body/mind, regardless of social mores, that medical sciences aim to identify and doctors help treat. In the sociological view of the matter, on the other hand, this appears as a working assumption of health care, more or less justifiable, somehow or other, in any case necessarily self-serving, while in practice mental health services in particular continue misconstruing social ills as pathology and managing social deviance of one kind or another. The pieces have been stuck on the board like this for a while. There is, however, one clear reality in the middle of all this, which is the person in distress, or better, distress they find unmanageable, and disability, in their terms, who comes to the clinic for help. This reality is so obvious to the clinician that it is hardly worth mentioning, except in exasperation that it has to be. On the other hand, what comes into focus in the sociological gaze is quite different: forms of social organization, distribution of and access to resources, and so on. What does not appear in the sociological view is the individual’s inner life, this being however the primary concern of the clinician. There are also specific issues here, not just to do with the general differences between socially and individually orientated approaches, issues specifically about mental illness of the sort identified by Foucault. In Foucault’s history, madness was constructed as incomprehensible danger, excluded and in need of control, gradually coming under the care of doctors and medical science,
eventually the new profession of psychiatry. In this story madness and psychiatry were constructed together, neither being the business of society at large. In brief, no one understands madness, nor psychiatry either, and this is a particular reason why the reality of the clinical encounter, the distress and disability involved, while recognized as of high importance, has tended to remain unspoken and unheard. Of course, much water has flowed under these particular bridges in the past few decades, including the linked processes of closing of the asylums, care in the community, steady growth of service user movements, and psychiatry and mental health care services openly tackling issues of what it can and cannot do, should and should not be asked to do. The clearest position for mental health services to occupy at present seems to me to be this: they offer treatment, based on the available science of body and mind, to the person who comes to the clinic for help in distress, or better, distress they find unmanageable, and disability, in their terms. This is the core business of mental health care, and, characterized in just this way, no one else’s. Social interventions at the national political level or local community level may help communities as a whole and some individuals in them, typically over the medium to long term. They are obviously not targeted on particular individuals. Who is there for the individual? This is a particular problem when social support structures have done what they can, which is more or less, and the persons themselves have done what they can, and they are still in unmanageable distress and possibly unable to carry on with some aspect of their lives, which they regard as crucial, child care or work for example. Where then? Health care is one abiding option it always has been and no doubt always will be. Health care, dealing in constructs of illness and health, is defined by three essential features: one is distress/disability of the person coming for help, the second is provision of help based on the available
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science of body/mind and the third is ethics, such as confidentiality, duty of care and cause no (more) harm. The other profession that aims to help individuals in self-identified serious trouble is the pastoral priesthood, the contrast being that in this meeting the trouble is interpreted as in the spiritual domain, suited to the special knowledge and skills of the priest. Health care is an abiding option, so is spiritual guidance and so is community care (care by the community). The extent and boundaries and interplay between these various responses to distress vary and are always in flux, influenced by available social representations, personal narratives, distribution and provision of resources and by more or less well-evidenced beliefs about what is the best way of helping what. All of this is of course very messy, in the ways Kendell excellently identified in his 1975 paper [2], quoted above. The boundaries of illness fluctuate with the idiosyncrasies of would-be patients, medical enthusiasm and the advertising power of manufacturers of treatment technologies; and they vary across cultures and subcultures. The hope of avoiding all this typically post- or late-modern mess is of course the attraction of naturalism, which is why Kendell in his 1975 paper [2] went on to turn to it, in its evolutionary theoretic form, later consolidated by Wakefield. It certainly would all be clearer if there was some natural fact about the body/mind which meant that it was dysfunctional, disordered, quite apart from any social theories about it, the legitimate domain for medical science and doctors. Evolutionary naturalism tried to underpin this intuition, but does not work because psychological phenotypes do not cleave apart into natural/evolved functions, on the one hand, and socialized functions, on the other. The influences on functioning are muddled up together. This leaves us defining the primary feature of illness in terms of harm, but then medicine and especially psychiatry inevitably gets involved in debates with other experts about what are the causes of harm and what are the appropriate preventions or remedies, debates about the boundaries of health care with libertarians (e.g. see References [38] and [39]), with social scientists [19], about the boundaries between illness and the spiritual dimension [40,41], and in-house health care debates about the boundaries of medical approaches with critical and post-psychiatrists [42], social workers [43]
and clinical psychologists [44]. These controversies about the nature and proper domain of mental health care are inevitable and good topics for ongoing examination, just the upshot of there being no domain of (current mainstream biomedical) medicine carved out of nature’s joints, still less for psychiatry, which is thoroughly involved in the social and moral and personal world where norms and values are diverse. However, notwithstanding and in the midst of these ongoing negotiations, the domain of mental health care is a permanent fixture, as one mode of response to individuals in unmanageable trouble. Complicated though all this is, it is familiar enough and manageable within a traditional view of medicine and health care. Doctors treat patients in trouble using available medical science, and other groups advertise help too, nonmedical or alternative medical. A much more difficult problem arises when the would-be patient does not identify him/herself as having a problem, or not one that has anything to do with his/her state of body or mind, not one that has anything to do with doctors, psychologists or any such thing. This is the ‘involuntary patient’, something of an oxymoron according to the traditional and comfortable conceptualization of health care. Interestingly, the theories of medical naturalism, appealing to such as lesions, diseases or broken evolutionary mechanisms, can readily envisage that an individual is disordered or ill, quite regardless of whether they think they are so or not. However, if naturalism is given up, because unviable, and emphasis is put instead on harm as experienced by the individual patient, then so far it is not obvious how someone who says they are OK, or in any case not in need of treatment, is any business of the health care professional. The reluctant patient of course becomes the business of the health care professional typically (though not invariably) because someone else brings them or sends them to the clinic, not because the person themselves is (necessarily) experiencing suffering or disability, but because of actual harm or risk of harm to others. In these contexts mental health services become involved in protection of the public from danger, in matters of public safety, which is more obviously a function of state agencies for preserving public order. In its role in compulsory detention and possibly treatment mental health services look like an agency of social control,
SOCIAL, BIOLOGICAL AND PERSONAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS
a medicalized police force, and this is the role emphasized by the sociological and libertarian critiques that charge psychiatry with being just that. A simple idealized solution would look something like this. Health care professionals attend to willing patients in self-identified trouble who believe or who are willing to try out the belief that the professional’s expertise in matters of the body/mind can help them. The state and the police in particular deal with danger to the public. Perhaps the kind of case that best fits this simple picture is that of the antisocial conditions, which would be and mainly are directed (while they are the only problem) unambiguously to the judicial system, police and probation agencies, not to health care. However, in many kinds of case risk of harm to others and risk of harm to self are co-present, e.g. in an antisocial personality with suicidal tendencies or in some acute psychotic states, complicating the simple picture. Another kind of complication is that harm to self is judged not only by the identified patient but by others involved. There are the cases, for example, of psychotic episodes in which the person apparently presents some risk to others, and often also to him/herself, though he/she has no wish to be in hospital, is perhaps terrified of it, terrified altogether. All cases of compulsory admission involve by definition some overruling of the identified patient’s own current will, but the intention is that this is in the patient’s best interest, possibly as well for the protection of others, and is thus intended to be consistent with, an extension of, the traditional model of health care. This of course is a contentious and well-trodden area, and there is just one point to be made about it in the context of the themes pursued in this chapter. The proper domain of health care, if naturalism is given up as unviable, has to be understood in terms of distress that the person finds unmanageable, a self-identified disability, and a doctor, a mental health care professional, providing help based on the available science of body and mind. This is an entirely socially embedded understanding of illness and health care, though there is, by the way, all the room and role needed for the science, investigating causes, prevention strategies and treatments. In this socially embedded view of illness and health care which is some conceptual distance away from hypothetical lesions and diseases and broken mental
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mechanisms it is really no surprise at all, not an embarrassment, but a perspective to be welcomed, that distress and disability is not always just a matter for the individual but involves the interests of families, friends, the community and, if and when they are involved, the values of health care professionals. All this just reflects our interrelatedness. I have spent most of my professional life as a clinician working in child and adolescent services, where identification of distress, disability, risk and need to treat are sometimes matters of protracted investigation and negotiation involving mothers, fathers, grandparents, teachers, social workers, the child or adolescent brought along and the peer group in absentia. The negotiation of perspectives, stakeholding, values as to what is distress, disability, risk and need to treat is all part of the work. I assume adult mental health services involve much the same, reflecting the socially and interpersonally embedded nature of illness and health care.
REFERENCES 1. Jaspers, K. (1913) Allgemeine Pychopathologie, Springer Verlag, Berlin (3rd enlarged and revised edition, 1923). English translation of the 7th edition by J. Hoenig and Marian W. Hamilton, General Psychopathology, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1963; Chicago University Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1963. Quotation with some revised translation from and page reference to this volume. 2. Kendell, R. E. (1975) The concept of disease and its implications for psychiatry. British Journal of Psychiatry, 127, 305 315. 3. Foucault, M. (1965) Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, translated by R. Howardof an abridged version of Folie et Deraison. Histoire de la Folie a l’Aˆge Classique (Librairie Plon, Paris, 1961), Tavistock, London; reprinted Routledge, London, 1997. 4. Foucault, M. (2006) History of Madness, English translation of Histoire de la Folie a l’Aˆge Classique (Gallimard, London, 1972), Routledge, Paris. 5. Laing, R. D. (1960) The Divided Self, Penguin, Harmondsworth. 6. Goffman, E. (1961) Asylums, in Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, Penguin, Harmondsworth.
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7. Rosenhan, R. (1973) On being sane in insane places. Science, 179, 251 258. 8. Szasz, T. (1961) The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct, Harper & Row, New York. 9. Kendell, R. (1986) What are mental disorders? in Issues in Psychiatric Classification: Science, Practice, and Social Policy (eds A. M. Freedman, R. Brotman, I. Silverman and D. Hutson), Human Sciences Press, New York, pp. 23 45. 10. Spitzer, R. L. and Williams, J. B. (1982) The definition and diagnosis of mental disorder, in Deviance and Mental Illness (ed. W. R. Grove), Sage, Beverly Hills, California, pp. 15 31. 11. American Psychiatric Association (1994) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edn, American Psychiatric Association, Washington, DC. 12. World Health Organization (WHO) (1992) The ICD 10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines, World Health Organization, Division of Mental Health, Geneva. 13. Kent County Council (2006) Report of the independent inquiry into the care and treatment of Michael Stone, http://www.kent.gov.uk/publications/ council and democracy/michael stone.htm. 14. Thornicroft, G. and Szmukler, G. (2005) The draft Mental Health Bill in England: without principles. Psychiatric Bulletin, 29, 244 247. 15. Lepping, P. (2007) Ethical analysis of the changes proposed to mental health legislation in England and Wales. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine, 2, 5, http://www.peh med.com/content/2/1/5. Accessed 17 May 2007. 16. Oliver, M. (1990) The individual and social models of disability, http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability studies/ archiveuk/Oliver/in%20soc%20dis.pdf. 17. Timimi, S. (2002) Pathological Child Psychiatry and the Medicalization of Childhood, Brunner Routledge, Hove. 18. Horwitz, A. V. and Wakefield, J. C. (2007) The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry Transformed Normal Sorrow into Depressive Disorder, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 19. Kutchins, H. and Kirk, S. A. (1997) Making us crazy, in DSM The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental Disorders, Free Press, New York.
20. Bolton, D. (2008) What is mental disorder? An Essay in Philosophy, Science and Values, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 21. Wakefield, J. C. (1992) Disorder as a harmful dysfunction: a conceptual critique of DSM III R’s definition of mental disorder. Psychological Review, 99, 232 247. 22. Wakefield, J. C. (1992) The concept of mental disorder: on the boundary between biological facts and social values. American Psychologist, 47, 373 388. 23. Kirmayer, L. J. (1994) Rejoinder to Professor Wakefield, Debate on ‘Is the concept of mental disorder culturally relative?’, with J. C. Wakefield, in Controversial Issues in Mental Health (eds S. A. Kirk and S. D. Einbinder), Allyn & Bacon, Boston and London, pp. 17 20. 24. Sadler, J. Z. and Agich, G. J. (1995) Diseases, functions, values, and psychiatric classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 2, 219 231. 25. Wakefield, J. (1995) Dysfunction as a value free concept. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 2, 233 246. 26. Fulford, K. W. M. (1999) Nine variations and a coda on the theme of an evolutionary definition of dysfunction. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108, 412 420. 27. Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1999) Toward an evolu tionary taxonomy of treatable conditions. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108, 453 464. 28. Richters, J. E. and Hinshaw, S. P. (1999) The abduction of disorder in psychiatry. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108, 438 445. 29. Wakefield, J. C. (1999) Mental disorder as a black box essentialist concept. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108, 465 472. 30. Murphy, D. and Woolfolk, R. L. (2000) The harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 7, 241 252. 31. Wakefield, J. C. (2000) Spandrels, vestigial organs, and such: reply to Murphy and Woolfolk’s ‘The harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder’. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 7, 253 269. 32. Houts, A. C. (2001) The DSM’s new white coat and circularity of plausible dysfunctions: response to Wakefield, Part 1. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 315 345. 33. Wakefield, J. C. (2003) Dysfunction as a factual component of disorder: reply to Houts, Part 2. Behavior Research and Therapy, 41 (8), 969 990.
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34. Wakefield, J. (2007) The concept of mental disorder: diagnostic implications of the harmful dysfunction analysis. World Psychiatry, 6, 149 156. 35. Sartorius, N, (2007) A new way of reducing the prevalence of mental disorders? World Psychiatry, 6, 162 163. 36. Bolton, D. (2007) The usefulness of Wakefield’s definition for the diagnostic manuals. World Psychiatry, 6, 164 165. 37. Gold, I. and Kirmayer, L. J. (2007) Cultural psychiatry on Wakefield’s procrustean bed. World Psychiatry, 6, 165 166. 38. Szasz, T. (2006) Secular humanism and scientific psychiatry. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine, 1, 5, http://www.peh med.com/content/ 1/1/5. 39. Bolton, D. (2006) What’s the problem? A response to ‘secular humanism and scientific psychiatry’. Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in Medicine, 1, 6, http://www.peh med.com/content/1/1/6. Reprinted in Science and Ethics (ed. Paul Kurtz), Prometheus Books, New York, 2007, pp. 204 207.
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40. Fulford, W. and Sadler, J. (in press) Delusion and spiritual experience in the DSM: philosophical aspects of the concept of disorder, in Religious and Spiritual Issues in Psychiatric Diagnosis: Considerations for a Revised DSM (eds J. R. Peteet, F. Lu and W. Narrow), American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc. 41. Bolton, D. (in press) Commentary on Fulford and Sadler’s ‘Delusion and spiritual experience in the DSM’, in Religious and Spiritual Issues in Psychiatric Diagnosis: Considerations for a Revised DSM (eds J. R. Peteet, F. Lu and W. Narrow), American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc. 42. Bracken, P. and Thomas, P. (2005) Post Psychiatry: Mental Health in the Post Modern World, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 43. Kirk, S. A., Wakefield, J., Hseih, D. and Pottick, K. (1999) Social context and social workers’ judgement of mental disorder. Social Service Review, 73, 82 104. 44. Follette, W. C. (1996) Introduction to the special section on the development of theoretically coherent alternatives to the DSM system. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 1117 1119.
5 Social science perspectives: a failure of the sociological imagination Craig Morgan1 and Arthur Kleinman2 1 2
NIH Biomedical Research Centre and Institute of Psychiatry, King' s College London, London, UK Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
The clustering of substance abuse, street violence, domestic violence, suicide, depression, post traumatic stress disorder, . . . among people living in disintegrating communities runs against the professional medical idea that sufferers experience one . . . major problem at a time. That grouping of human problems also defeats categorisation of such issues as principally psychological or medical and, therefore, individual (Kleinman et al., [1] p. ix)
The primary purpose of this chapter is to introduce and discuss select social science approaches to the study of various aspects of mental disorder (primarily drawn from sociology and, to a lesser extent, anthropology1), in particular reflecting on what these have contributed to our understanding of mental disorder and on some key limitations. The broad areas we discuss include: the social construction of disorder (especially labelling theory), the social determinants of disorder, and the social and cultural influences on responses to disorder. More ambitiously, these approaches and their limitations are considered from
the perspective that mental disorder, in all its manifestations, is a form of social suffering [2], a form of distress that is intimately entwined with other social problems that both cause and result from experiences of emotional and mental distress. The emphasis on suffering as a collective, socially embedded experience challenges the construction of mental disorder as individual, as a set of discrete disorders requiring technical responses (be these psychological or pharmacological) of ever-increasing precision. What is more, it does this without negating or trivializing the distress that is experienced.
1 There is considerable overlap in the perspectives and methods of sociology and social anthropology. In this chapter, when we use the term ‘sociology’, we are indicating not only the discipline of sociology but also social anthropology.
Principles of Social Psychiatry, second edition Edited by Craig Morgan and Dinesh Bhugra Ó 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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5.1
SOCIAL SUFFERING
As will be discussed below, the characteristic subjective phenomena of mental disorder (e.g. sadness, anxiety, hallucinations) occur, at the very least in part, as a consequence of troubling and traumatic social experiences; they emerge in, and are shaped by, both local social worlds and wider social and economic contexts. In this sense, the experience of mental disorder is fundamentally social [3]. It occurs and is located within a particular social space, a complex nexus of social relationships and social structures that mould and transform that experience. The experience is not simply one of intrapsychic conflict or distress, of existential angst; it is frequently one of broken relationships, lost opportunities, social failures and hostility; of stigma, grinding poverty and chronic isolation. Others (especially friends and family) are almost always involved (at least to begin with), and much of the suffering occurs because the very things that come to matter most are threatened jobs, housing, social and family relationships, future possibilities. These are threatened not just by the impact of inner distress on the abilities of individuals to assume and sustain these social roles but also by the perceptions and responses of others in the wider society. In short, mental disorder is not experienced as a discrete problem, standing outside the flow of everyday life. It is part of an entangled set of circumstances. This is not to deny subjective experience; it is certainly not to deny the reality of mental distress. It is to recognize that experience is simultaneously subjective and collective. In other words, mental disorder is a form of social suffering,2 intimately entangled with the context within which it occurs, both cause and consequence of interlinked problems that may include poverty, social isolation, victimization and trauma. This clustering of problems, for example, is well illustrated in the World Mental Health Report [4,5].
Consider the following example. At the time of his first contact with mental health services, James was 33, unemployed and had lived alone for the past 14 years in a small flat.3 He first began to hear voices when he was around 16 or 17 years old, or perhaps earlier. At that time, he was living with his father and brother. He describes an extremely unhappy and abusive childhood living in a chronically unstable household. He had a poor relationship with his father and his brother, largely because of this, and he left school early with no qualifications. He never told his father or brother what he was experiencing, despite being distressed and angry, and says that he did not discuss what was happening with anyone else for fear they would think he was ‘crazy’. Only once did he attempt to talk to someone about his experiences, a friend: ‘I did discuss it with my friend I did, but he thought I was going crazy so I thought I’d leave it, you know don’t discuss it to anyone.’ Since being forced to move out of his father’s home when he was 19, and following a brief period of homelessness, he has lived alone in a one-bed local authority flat, continued to hear voices and has had minimal contact with others. Over time, James became increasingly isolated and eventually would leave his flat only to get food and collect his welfare benefits. He would spend his days watching television and smoking cannabis. The condition of his flat deteriorated and his living circumstances worsened. He had no furniture: ‘. . . there’s no carpet, no decorating or no chairs to eat your dinner on; I used to eat my dinner on the fridge and the fridge’s broken, the door on the front of the fridge was broken . . ..’ He describes at times being so hungry that he would shake, making it impossible for him to leave his flat to get money or food. He eventually contacted his local housing officer to carry out repairs in the flat: ‘. . . I phoned because there was a hole in the sitting room and he come to have a look . . . and he’d get
Kleinman et al. [1] provide the following broad definition: ‘Social suffering . . . brings into a single space an assemblage of human problems that have their origins and consequences in the devastating injuries that social force can inflict on human experience.’ (p. ix). James’ story is from a study of narratives of the experience of mental disorder collected as part of a large study of psychosis conducted in the UK. The name has been changed, and details amended, to ensure anonymity. 2 3
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES: A FAILURE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
someone to fix it, that happened . . . because I had my bed in the sitting room and when I sit on it the legs would go through the floor . . . .’ It was the housing officer who, concerned about James’s welfare, contacted social services and arranged for a home visit. Initially reluctant to go into hospital, James eventually agreed. When asked why, he replied: ‘I don’t know, I just felt like going out somewhere you know.’ What is striking about how James tells his story is that he focuses primarily on his isolation, his lack of money, his hunger and the appalling state of his accommodation. The experience of hearing voices is one facet of a series of interconnected difficulties that James endures; fear of how others will respond compounds his suffering and acts as a powerful barrier to confiding and help-seeking. To emphasize the social, collective experience of suffering and its interconnectedness with other experiences in the flow of everyday life presents a challenge to the predominant view in psychiatry of mental disorders as discrete diseases. This perspective, codified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) and International Classification of Diseases
5.2
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(ICD), incorporates a set of assumptions about underlying aetiologies and treatment approaches that privileges the individual, the biological and the technical. This is part of a broader trend to strip all forms of suffering from the social context within which it occurs, to individualize and medicalize, to provide quick-fix cures in the form of pharmacological agents and time-limited psychotherapy [6 8]. From a social science perspective, however, it is inadequate to see disease (be it mental or physical) or other forms of distress as affecting a single person. There is a need to extend outwards into the social space it is here that suffering occurs, is understood and managed. As the quotation at the head of this chapter suggests [1], suffering rarely separates into discrete boxes, and its causes and effects are rarely limited to individuals as much of the work reviewed below shows. This work, however, is theoretically disparate and just as the formulation of mental disorder as a form of social suffering provides a basis from which to critique psychiatry, so it provides for a critical reflection on some of the more prominent social science theories of, and approaches to, mental disorder.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
In considering social science perspectives on mental disorder, it is worth remembering that the original scope of sociology was broad and ambitious. The founding sociological theorists (e.g. Comte [9], Marx [10], Durkheim [11] and Weber [12]) were concerned with fundamental questions about the nature of society, its failings and necessary modifications (or in Marx’s case, root and branch revolution). The particular phenomena and problems that became the focus of study (e.g. class, income distribution, health, suicide, social integration, religion, institutions) were tools for revealing the workings of society and for understanding how social structures and social relations impacted on individuals to shape and constrain life choices and opportunities. Perhaps the most pertinent example is Durkheim’s classic study of suicide [13], in which the unequal patterning of this deeply personal act among social groups was accounted for by social structure, by the degree to which social groups were bound together by collective
norms. This, in Durkheim’s formulation, simultaneously provides an explanation for a troubling social phenomenon and resonates more widely, revealing a fundamental principle governing social life. Other examples abound, albeit often based on different ontologies and epistemologies. Parsons [14], for example, used sickness as an exemplar to reveal how societies maintain stability and order through tightly governed social roles, with rights, obligations and sanctions for breaches of these moral codes. Foucault [15,16] turned his gaze on psychiatry, critiquing it as a product of the enlightenment designed to police the boundary between normality and abnormality as a mechanism for silencing difference and unreason. In short, what drove the sociological tradition was a concern with significant questions of social order and change, and of how these became manifest in the lives of individuals. It is this coupling of the study of lived experience and broader social forces that Wright-Mills [17] famously christened ‘the
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sociological imagination’. Interest in mental disorder and related institutions stemmed in part from an understanding that these provide a lens through which elementary principles governing social life and organization may be revealed. From the outset sociologists and other social scientists were consequently
5.3
A LEGACY OF MISTRUST
The relationship between the social sciences and psychiatry has fluctuated over time, with some periods of fruitful collaboration and others of outright hostility. In the early classic studies of the social distribution and determinants of mental disorder conducted in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s [18 22], sociologists and psychiatrists collaborated with an ease that has perhaps not been seen since. At the same time, parallel perspectives developed within the social sciences and eventually converged in a series of fundamental challenges to psychiatry and the understanding of mental disorder it embodies. In the early 1930s (while Faris and Dunham [18] were conducting their seminal studies of the distribution of mental disorders across Chicago see below), Ruth Benedict [23] published her essay ‘Anthropology and the abnormal’, the primary thesis of which centred around the observation that in many cultures the behaviours and experiences classified as abnormal by Western psychiatry paranoia, seizures, trances were considered normal. In other words, the boundary between normal and abnormal was culturally relative, there were no absolute distinctions: as Benedict argued, ‘all our local conventions of moral behaviour and of immoral are without absolute validity’. This basic premise, of the cultural relativity of abnormality, was subsequently developed further and expanded, as sociologists and others began to consider how, if knowledge had no absolute basis, societies came to accept certain versions of ‘truth’.
5.4
interested both (1) in how social structure and experience impacted on individuals to cause, exacerbate and prolong mental distress and (2) in the institutions (psychiatry, asylums, diagnostic systems) that society constructed to manage the problems that came to be subsumed under the rubric of mental disorder.
This was the underlying perspective that united a series of searing critiques of psychiatry that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, notably by Foucault [15,16], Szasz [24], Laing and Esterson [25] and Scheff [26] (not all social scientists). In short, mental illness was seen as a social construction, a myth built on false analogy with physical illness; psychiatry was society’s stooge, an agent of social control, policing the socially constructed dividing line between deviance and normality, silencing difference and unreason. This simultaneously provides a critique of psychiatry and its models of mental illness and illustrates more fundamental issues relevant to how we create knowledge and seek to understand and act on the social world. Psychiatry’s response was both a reassertion of the legitimacy of its approach to the understanding and treatment of mental disorder and a counterattack accusing its critics of being unscientific and engaging in unfounded theorizing [27,28]. The charge of unfounded theorizing also partly stemmed from certain sociological theories of the origins of emotional distress, notably Bateson’s double-bind [29] and Fromm-Reichman’s ‘schizophrenogenic mother’ [30]. Towards the end of the 1970s, Eisenberg [31] commented that the gap between psychiatry and the social sciences was almost unbridgeable. The legacy of these debates is an enduring undercurrent of mistrust, in particular a mistrust (on the part of psychiatry) of sociological theory and in-depth methodologies (e.g. ethnography, qualitative interviews) and (on the part of sociology) of the power and social role of psychiatry.
SOCIAL CREATION OF MENTAL DISORDER
The most enduring sociological expression of this critique that mental disorder is not intrinsic to
individuals but a social construction is Thomas Scheff’s application of labelling theories of deviance
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES: A FAILURE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
to mental disorder [26]. The basic premise, that deviance is not intrinsic to particular behaviours and acts but is created by social groups who label acts as deviant [32], was extended by Scheff to mental illness. Symptoms were reframed as rule or norm violations. More specifically, Scheff viewed the symptoms of mental disorder as a kind of residual rule breaking, i.e. as norm-violating behaviour that cannot be readily ascribed to any other culturally recognized category. Once this ‘primary deviance’ is labelled, the argument proceeds, an individual is then treated on the basis of the label and, in the process of being treated differently, increasingly comes to take on the stereotypical characteristics of, in this case, a mentally disordered person, the result being continued and amplified norm violations, i.e. ‘secondary deviance’. It is the application of the label of mental disorder that traps individuals into the career of a ‘mental patient’. A number of classic sociological studies conducted during the 1960s and 1970s purportedly illustrated this process (from slightly differing theoretical perspectives). For example, in their study ‘On being sane in insane places’ [33], Rosenhan and his colleagues gained admission to psychiatric hospitals in the USA by claiming to hear voices saying a single word, such as ‘empty’, ‘hollow’ and ‘thud’. After admission, all ‘pseudo-patients’ then behaved normally. All but one was given a diagnosis of schizophrenia; most were treated with powerful medication and kept in hospital for a number of weeks. Once applied, aspects of the ‘pseudo-patients’, behaviour and past were viewed by staff through the prism of the label, note taking as pathological ‘writing behaviour’ for example. Goffman, in his seminal work Asylums [34], saw the process of becoming a patient as one in which a series of actors, including those in positions of authority, e.g. police, and family and friends, convince the patientto-be that his or her eccentricities and difficulties relating to others are problematic and indicative of mental disorder. Gradually, the person comes to accept this view of themselves as mentally disordered and in need of treatment, and so embarks on what Goffman termed ‘the moral career of the mental patient’. In short, it is society, through its labelling of certain behaviours as abnormal, that creates mental disorder; the chronic course of a disorder is the product of secondary deviance, of those labelled
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fulfilling the stereotypical expectations of the labellers. Mental disorder is not ‘in’ the person, it is created by society ([35], p. 136). These broad perspectives have been extensively critiqued [36]. Perhaps the most salient problem is that, in challenging the illness model of mental disorder, the very reality of the distress and suffering experienced is either downplayed and trivialized (as problems of daily living [24] for example) or romanticized (as a sane response to an insane world [25] for example). From this perspective, suffering is ironically reconstructed away. One consequence is that it becomes difficult to investigate the origins and sources of suffering, an essential task as part of any effort to intervene. In a sense, there is no problem, no suffering to explain, or, perhaps, more precisely, what suffering there is, is a function of psychiatry and its imposition of needless and damaging labels. At the risk of digressing, this logic is at play particularly in the realm of culture and mental disorder, and more specifically can be seen in the particular phenomena of reported high rates of serious mental disorder in migrant and minority ethnic populations [37]. Any response to this troubling social phenomena has been sidetracked by persistent debates about whether these high rates are real or simply a function of psychiatry misdiagnosing psychosis in groups whose cultural background and modes of expressing distress are misinterpreted [38]. Despite overwhelming evidence that this is a genuine public health problem, this debate rumbles on [39]. In short, how is it possible to make a moral case for mental health care, for the promotion of mental health in disadvantaged populations for example, or for the expansion of global mental health, if the very nature of the problem remains contested if, in the background, there is a lingering suspicion that the problems are an invention of a peculiar Western tradition? This important issue aside, the perspectives of Scheff [26], Rosenhan [33], Goffman [34] and others nonetheless contain within them important insights that have continued to influence research. In a straightforward sense, all concepts are social constructs designed to make sense of particular phenomena. These constructs, moreover, are not neutral; the ways in which phenomena are conceptualized can impact on and modify both related behaviours and experiences and the responses of others. There are a number of
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recent analyses of the seemingly endless emergence of ‘new’ mental disorders that illustrate this well (e.g. multiple-personality disorder [8,40], post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)) [7]. A further particularly telling example is provided by Barrett [41,42] in his detailed analysis of the development of the concept of dementia praecox (the forerunner of schizophrenia). He notes how Kraepelin developed the concept, a core feature of which is expectation of gradual mental and functional decline or degeneration, on the basis of observations of large numbers of patients housed in long-stay asylums. As Barrett comments, rather than being a core feature of the illness or disorder, such a trajectory may be as much a product of the impoverished environments of long-stay asylums a proposition for which there is empirical support [43]. Barrett has persuasively argued that an expectation of degeneration and chronicity nonetheless remains at the core of the concept of schizophrenia and that this continues to contribute to therapeutic pessimism and an expectation of chronicity, despite evidence that the majority of those who meet criteria for a schizophreniaspectrum disorder do not have a continuous deteriorating course [44]. This also draws our attention to the possibility that the very institutions established to help may, unwittingly, become part of the problem and exacerbate suffering. Further, there is good evidence that the application of diagnostic labels can impact on subsequent
5.5
outcomes through the negative reactions of others, and it is in attempts to understand this process that interest in labelling theory persists [45,46]. This work suggests that many of the difficulties sufferers experience in terms of finding work, accessing decent accommodation and sustaining supportive social networks are not simply due to the direct effects of the disorder, but also result from the stigmatizing and discriminatory reactions of others (see Chapter 26 for a full discussion) [47]. In recent theoretical formulations of stigma (which extend beyond Goffman’s original definition of stigma as a spoiled identity) [48], labelling (i.e. the process of signifying others as different) is conceived as one of a number of components of stigmatization. Others include stereotyping (i.e. the linking of differences to undesirable characteristics ([47], p. 180)), separating (i.e. marking the labelled group as fundamentally different) and discrimination (i.e. exclusion of the labelled group). This noted, in much recent work on stigma it is possible to discern a narrowing of the focus of enquiry, on to public attitudes towards the mentally disordered and education campaigns, and a movement away from understanding stigma within the contexts in which it arises. Recent applications of moral theory indicate just how embedded and powerful a part of the foundations of society stigma is [49,50]. A necessary component of developing strategies to reduce stigma is an understanding of what drives stigma (e.g. fear) in specific local moral worlds.
SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF MENTAL DISORDER
From the beginnings of the discipline, sociologists have been interested in the social patterning and determinants of health and disorder (both physical and mental). It is possible to identify two broad strands within this, one concerned with social structure (structural strain theory) and one concerned with individuallevel social experiences (social stress theory). Structural strain theory, simply, locates the origins of disorder in the organization and structures of society and has its foundations in the work of Durkheim. The basis for this is the observation that the incidence and prevalence of mental disorders vary by social group and context. In early work, sociological theory was
developed and applied to explain these associations. Durkheim, for example, used the concept of anomie (i.e. a state of normlessness and social disorganization) to explain the association he observed between suicide and periods of rapid economic and social change. This is further seen in Faris and Dunham’s use of theories of urban development proposed by Park and others [51] to frame their investigations, and use of the concept of social fragmentation to interpret findings that hospital admissions for schizophrenia were highest in areas characterized by poverty, crime, poor and unstable housing, and fractured social contacts [18]. The seminal work of Faris and Dunham, in which core
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES: A FAILURE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
facets of the social and geographical distribution of serious mental disorders in urban areas were first identified, laid the foundations for subsequent collaborations between sociologists and psychiatrists which further established clear links between social class and various aspects of mental disorder and mental health service use. Hollingshead (a sociologist) and Redlitch (a psychiatrist), for example, conducted ground-breaking research in New Haven documenting higher levels of mental disorder and more problematic access to care for those in lower socioeconomic groups [20]. Other studies followed, notably the Midtown Manhattan study [21,22]. What is notable about this body of research is the attention to detail and context, and the attempt to theorize the observed relationships. In other words, there was a concern with how structure becomes actualized in daily life an exercise of the sociological imagination. This said, the actual mechanisms through which social structures become actualized or embodied to cause the onset or exacerbation of mental distress have been largely unspecified, beyond some vague notion that the certain structures and contexts are a source of ‘strain’ [35]. There are more recent examples of research informed by sociological theory that seek to examine the relationship between aspects of the wider social environment and mental disorders [52,53]. The attempt to apply theories of social capital to the study of mental disorder is one such example [54]. To date, most researchers have drawn specifically from Putnam’s formulation of social capital as a collective resource that inheres in the social ties and connections of local communities [55]. There are a small number of examples where other conceptualizations of social capital have been invoked [56] (e.g. individual access to stocks of social capital, following Bourdieu [57]). However, as potentially fruitful as this may prove to be, inconsistencies in definitions and methods continue to undermine the development of a consistent body of knowledge in relation to mental disorder, and findings are equivocal some suggest a link, others do not [54,58 60]. This, moreover, hints at some of the key limitations of research that can be broadly bracketed within a structural strain framework, e.g. problems of consistent and accurate measurement of social structure and organization.
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This recent work notwithstanding, the initial attention to theory has gradually ebbed and much of the recent social epidemiology of mental disorder has been largely atheoretical, seeking simply to document the rates of occurrence of specific mental disorders and their sociodemographic correlates. This is reflected, for example, in recent years in a series of large-scale community surveys, including the US Epidemiologic Catchment Area Survey [61], the US National Comorbidity Survey [62] and the British Psychiatric Morbidity Survey [63]. The findings from many of these are summarized in Chapter 8. This approach is problematic from a sociological perspective for at least two reasons. To begin with, as Farmer argues, the social variables employed (e.g. employment, education, social class) are ‘often desocialized’, they are ‘decontextualised from larger social processes that are both historically rooted and linked to persons and processes that are not visible to the survey researcher’ (Castro and Farmer, 2005, p. 53). The sources of social inequalities, for example, that are so strongly associated with many mental disorders do not feature, as if they are somehow a part of the natural order and not a function of the ways in which society is organized. The ‘structural violence’, to use Farmer’s phrase, that exposes certain groups to the linked miseries of poverty, poor housing, isolation, poor health and health care, and so on, remains hidden the very social nature of suffering is obscured. The data cease to be a window through which to understand how social structure and contexts become manifest in the suffering of individuals, families and communities. They become simply a part of the routinized book-keeping of modern societies, documenting met and unmet need for technical and individualized interventions to reduce symptomatology. At times, researchers are left almost at a loss to explain, or even develop testable hypotheses for, observed associations (e.g. the persistent link between urbanicity and psychosis [64] a finding that is at present largely uninterpretable [65]). Linked to this, the problems and suffering faced become increasingly splintered into discrete ‘disorders’, each separable from the other (as evidenced by the explosion of disorders in DSM) and standing outside the context within which they arise and persist. This is, in fact, belied by the very evidence from these surveys that
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suggests ‘comorbidity’, the technical terminology to account for the simultaneous occurrence of more than one ‘discrete’ problem, is the norm [62]. More than this, as suffering is decontextualized in this way and measured against a checklist of symptoms, so its very meaning becomes subverted (sadness, for example, arising from job loss, relationship problems or financial difficulties is transformed into depression, a discrete disorder primarily treatable with individualized therapy be that psychological or pharmacological) (see also below) [6]. A notable exception to this trend is Link and Phelan’s theory of fundamental social causes [66], developed to explain why most disorders tend to coalesce in disadvantaged populations, even as the nature of these disorders changes (e.g. from infectious disease to chronic physical illness to mental disorder) (see Chapter 14). In short, the use of crude ‘sociodemographic’ variables in the absence of theoretically informed hypotheses about the processes underlying observed associations means that the findings of large-scale surveys can tell us little about the origins of the social disparities they document. Where more sophisticated concepts are employed (e.g. social fragmentation, social capital), additional methodological challenges are faced, and it remains that the invisible hand of ‘strain’ or ‘stress’ has to be invoked to explain how social contexts impact on individuals. What does it mean on a daily basis to live within such contexts? How do individuals and families respond? In other words, what might mediate the impact and strain of living in such conditions? It is this ‘black box’ of lived experience and meaning that social epidemiology even that theoretically informed by sociology is generally ill-equipped to penetrate [67]. What is more, the characteristic experiences of mental disorder do not occur in isolation; they tend to be interlinked with other difficulties and these linked disadvantages tend to coalesce in vulnerable groups, creating a pool of problems that cannot be splintered and addressed individually. For example, there has been a considerable amount of research investigating the high rates of psychosis in the UK black Caribbean population [38]. Almost all of this has been conducted without reference to the equally robust evidence of high levels of school exclusions, substance use, involvement with criminal justice services and unemployment in this
population. These problems are interlinked, and a full understanding of their origins and how to address them is unlikely to be achieved if each one is studied in isolation [39]. Instead, the sum of human suffering is reduced to quantifiable indices (as in, for example, the Disability Adjusted Life Year). A further major strand in the social science of mental disorder is concerned with how individuallevel processes and experiences impact on the onset, course and outcome of disorder. Most of this, implicitly or explicitly, can be grouped within the broad framework of social stress theory. Stress has become a ubiquitous explanation for a multitude of ills in modern societies. Particularly within the social sciences, it is used as the thread to link adverse social experiences and mental distress. The concept was first introduced into the sciences in the 1930s by the psychologist, Hans Selye [68,69]. Selye saw stress as the body’s physiological response to stressors, by which he meant anything that represented an insult or threat to the body, such as extreme heat or cold (i.e. anything provoking a stress response) [35]. His model of stress was developed on the basis of experiments with laboratory animals and comprises four components: (1) stressors, (2) factors that mediate the impact of stressors on the body (e.g. personality, social support networks), (3) the general adaptation syndrome (see below) and (4) responses, positive or negative ([70], p. 178). Selye conceptualized the three stages of physical response to stressors that animals pass through as the general adaptation syndrome: (1) alarm reaction, (2) resistance and (3) exhaustion. They constitute a process during which the body is physiologically aroused and prepared to resist threat (i.e. fight or flight), which, if continued for a sufficient period, leads to exhaustion and illness. Conceptually, if not in detail, this is the basic framework for current views about how social stressors impact on individuals to increase risk of mental illness. In this, social experiences and contexts (e.g. life events, ongoing difficulties, trauma, problematic interpersonal relationships) are reconfigured as stressors that threaten the integrity of individuals. A whole range of problematic contexts and occurrences i.e. social stressors (e.g. childhood abuse, bullying, trauma, unemployment, job loss, relationship problems, family conflict) have been linked
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES: A FAILURE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
with a wide variety of physical and mental disorders (including asthma, breast cancer, lupus, myocardial infarction, headaches, irritable bowel syndrome, dementia, gastrointestinal disorders, diabetes, Crohn’s disease and, of course, the full range of mental health problems, from insomnia to chronic schizophrenia) [35]. Many of these are discussed at various points in chapters throughout this book. A number of methodological approaches have also been used, ranging from predefined brief checklists of events and traumas (in childhood and adulthood) [71] to more detailed semi-structured interviews that attempt to contextualize events and difficulties as a basis for evaluating their meaning and likely degree of threat [72]. This latter approach, developed and applied by George Brown, Tirril Harris and colleagues, has underpinned a programme of research that has revealed much about the relationship between adverse events and difficulties and depression, leading to the development of a sophisticated model that posits a primary role for adverse social experiences in the aetiology of depression [73]. More specifically, this programme of research shows that: (1) the relationship is strongest for negative events, particularly those involving loss, entrapment and humiliation; (2) the association remains when only events occurring before onset of disorder is considered; (3) the sixmonth period pre-onset is important; (4) social circumstances and supportive resources mediate the risk, the risk being highest among women with three children aged under 11 who lack supportive networks and relationships; and (5) positive, fresh-start events can promote recovery [73]. Here we can see how
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context moderates the impact of stress arising from negative events (job loss, relationship break-up) and chronic difficulties (financial hardship, interpersonal conflict), and how multiple problems interconnect and interact to cause and sustain mental distress (see Chapter 16). This, moreover, can persist across generations. We know from other research, for example, that the experience of mental distress in a parent extends outwards, affecting the whole family, especially children who are themselves consequently at increased risk of subsequent disorder (see Chapter 9). However, for all this work contextualizes the exposures (to use terminology from epidemiology), it leaves uncontested the nature of the outcomes (e.g. depression, psychosis) and their conceptualization as discrete disorders that stand apart from other experiences in the flow of everyday life. It is perhaps no surprise that it is this strand of sociology that has been most readily accepted and incorporated into psychiatry. For some, this constitutes a significant limitation. In so far as the diagnosis of depression, for example, fails to take account of the context within which feelings of sadness and distress arise, Horwirtz and Wakefield [6] argue that the diagnosis is likely to embrace all those whose distress is an understandable and time-limited response to negative events (e.g. a relationship break-up, job loss) that is normal sadness, not depressive disorder. Unwittingly, this research may then contribute to the professional transformation of normal sorrow into mental disorder. This returns us full circle to fundamental questions about how such distress and suffering should be conceptualized.
SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON RESPONSES TO MENTAL DISORDER
Much social science research, in the time since the 1970s, has centred on understanding how social and cultural contexts shape the manifestation of, and responses to, mental disorder. This disparate body of research draws from a number of theoretical threads. Following on from Benedict [23], a significant interest in medical anthropology has been on how the experiences and behaviours characteristic of mental disorder and symptoms of physical illness are understood and managed in diverse settings (without
necessarily going so far as to propose the complete cultural relativity of systems of knowledge and belief) [74]. For example, a classic study by Helman [75] illustrates how culturally based illness beliefs shape help-seeking and interactions with health care services. In his study of older residents in north London, Helman sought to explore what was meant by the popular notion ‘feed a cold, starve a fever’ and how lay beliefs related to this notion influenced interactions with health care professionals. The detailed accounts
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elicited by Helman revealed a widespread folk classificatory system of what medicine terms infectious diseases, resting on the separation of illnesses into hot, cold, wet and dry. This system was based on perceived, and entirely subjective, notions of changes in body temperature associated with particular symptoms. Colds were caused by contact with the natural environment, e.g. damp or rain or wind, or by cold entering vulnerable areas of the body, such as the feet or the head. Treatment involved increasing a sufferer’s temperature with, for example, hot food, hot drinks and rest in a warm bed, and by generating personal body heat using tonics or food hence ‘feed a cold’. Fevers, in contrast, were thought to be caused by germs, bugs or viruses. Germs and the like pass from one person to another, as in the idea of ‘picking up a germ’, and as such are the result of social interaction. Remedies involve expelling the offending agent by, for example, sweating it out or ‘coughing up the muck’, or by attacking the germs with modern medicine, i.e. antibiotics. Related to this, Helman noted that doctors often couched their diagnoses and prescribed treatments in lay terms: ‘you’ve picked up a bug’, ‘it’s a tummy bug I’m afraid there’s one going around’, thereby further reinforcing popular beliefs. This example illustrates how beliefs about causation and the nature of illness can impact on how individuals respond: for colds, a hot drink and warm bed; for fevers, getting it out of the system with the help of modern medicine. The study further suggests that where cultural idioms are shared ease of communication between doctor and patient is increased. A number of the frameworks and concepts developed in ethnographic studies of healing systems in diverse cultures have subsequently been widely employed in studies of how illness is conceptualized and managed cross-culturally (e.g. the notion of health care systems as cultural systems comprising at least three overlapping sectors the professional, the folk and the popular; explanatory models of illness, as a basis for understanding the ideas about episodes of illness that each individual patient, relative and clinician brings to the clinical encounter) [76]. In sociology, similar research has been conducted within the framework of illness behaviour, initially developed by Mechanic [77] (and perhaps to a lesser extent using Parson’s formulation of the ‘sick
role’ [14]). In brief, illness behaviour refers to the ways in which individuals and significant others perceive, evaluate and respond to symptoms of illness, and was formulated in the context of growing evidence that the nature and severity of symptoms alone did not determine when and what type of help was sought. On the basis of this early work, Mechanic [78] identified a small number of factors that influenced illness behaviour, including: the nature of symptoms; culture, particularly beliefs about illness which shape the interpretation of symptoms; the impact of symptoms on family and social functioning; the responses of significant others; and the range of treatment options available (i.e. the structure of the local health care system). Much of the early research within this framework emphasized the processes of negotiation that occur within social networks in coming to an understanding of an episode of illness and deciding on appropriate responses. Zola [79], for example, demonstrated that illness behaviour and the decision to seek medical help is, at least partly, a function of the family and social context within which illness is experienced. Resolving health problems, for example, is only one of a number of competing demands on individuals and it may be that other needs, from the point of view of the sufferer, are more salient at any point. Caring for children, work, study and other such activities may take higher priority than seeking help for health problems, particularly if consultation may lead to time-consuming treatment or hospitalization. Further, the process of negotiating and weighing up the pros and cons of seeking professional help will be influenced by culturally defined roles, obligations and norms governing what is considered an appropriate response to specific symptoms and illness. For example, a study of socioeconomic variations in responses to chest pain in Scotland [80] found that respondents from deprived areas were less likely to seek help due to a tendency to normalize chest pains in the context of high general levels of ill-health and due to a constellation of related beliefs about the appropriateness of seeking help and fear of being blamed for ‘high-risk behaviours’, such as smoking, drinking and poor diet [80]. In the time since this early work there has been a vast amount of research investigating responses to illness and help-seeking, much of it conducted within
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES: A FAILURE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
the theoretical frameworks briefly sketched here. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to even attempt a synopsis of this work. One observation (in a similar vein to ones made above) is worth noting. At the risk of overstatement (and a number of exceptions notwithstanding e.g. Pescolsolido et al. [81] and see Chapter 24), there has been an increasing tendency to employ the concepts developed in early work (e.g. explanatory models) inflexibly, as fixed quantifiable variables to be correlated with specified outcomes (e.g. admission to hospital), as if these captured unchanging and readily measurable characteristics of individuals, much like taking blood pressure readings. This is particularly true of studies of explanatory models, initially intended as a window into cultural context, or of beliefs about illness more broadly. The emphasis on context and the interconnectedness of health systems and behaviours is consequently lost again, notions of
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illness are stripped from the local social worlds in which they emerge and have meaning. There is, moreover, a related tendency to reconstruct the process of managing an episode of illness as a series of rational choices, in which individuals calculate the benefits and costs of seeking help against pre-existing ideas about what is wrong and options for putting it right. This may be the case for some, but it ignores the socially negotiated process that characterizes responses to distress and suffering, a process recently well illustrated in a study by Pescosolido and colleagues [81] detailing how people come to use mental health services. In other words, this represents a further area where initial theoretically-informed research in the social sciences has been superseded by increasingly atheoretical studies designed primarily to address specific questions of perceived relevance to health services.
A FAILURE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
Within each of the areas discussed (the nature of mental disorder, the social role of psychiatry, the social distribution and determinants of mental disorder, the social and cultural influences on responses to disorder), there is a rich social science tradition (both theoretical and methodological) that has contributed greatly to our understanding of the myriad connections between society and mental disorder. However, at the same time, social science perspectives within psychiatry have been in retreat, and it is possible to discern a general tendency to reify or ignore theoretical concepts and decontextualize findings, with studies of social aspects of mental disorder becoming increasingly narrow in their focus. This reflects, perhaps uncharitably, a retreat of social science within psychiatry into health services research and social epidemiology and, with this, a decline of theory and interest in the major questions that initially drove early sociological studies of mental disorder i.e. a failure of the sociological imagination. This has been amplified by parallel developments in psychiatry, most notably an increasing dominance of biological theories of aetiology, categorical approaches to diagnosis as codified in DSM and ICD, and an increase in pharmacological treatments. This has further
contributed to a withdrawal of psychiatry from public health, at least until recently. In other words, the social aspects of mental disorder are (again with some exceptions) frequently relegated to the periphery. Social science (for now) operates at these margins. Certainly, health service research and basic social epidemiology are important as a basis for identifying need and developing appropriate interventions and treatment systems. However, our understanding of what needs to be done would be greatly enriched if social science research was once again broadened to embrace the wider social forces and contexts that impinge on and shape the lives of those who mental health services are designed to help. It is this, for instance, that will allow a fuller understanding of the interconnected problems that underpin the suffering James described in the example provided above. What we have suggested throughout this review is that social suffering, with its emphasis on the intersubjective experience of distress and its origins in the interconnected adversities and traumas that individuals, their families and communities face, offers a unifying frame through which to consider the intrinsic social nature of mental disorder and re-enrich the sociology of mental disorder.
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62. Kessler, R. C., Anthony, J. C., Blazer, D. G. et al. (1997) The US National Comorbidity Survey: overview and future directions. Epidemiologia e Psichiatria Sociale, 6 (1), 4 16. 63. Jenkins, R., Bebbington, P., Brugha, T. et al. (2003) British Psychiatric Morbidity Survey. International Review of Psychiatry, 15 (1), 14 18. 64. Krabbendam, L. and van Os, J. (2005) Schizophrenia and urbanicity: a major environmental influence conditional on genetic risk. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 31 (4), 795 799. 65. McGrath, J. and Scott, J. (2006) Urban birth and risk of schizophrenia: a worrying example of epidemiology where the data are stronger than the hypotheses. Epidemiologia e Psichiatria Sociale, 15, 243 246. 66. Link, B. and Phelan, J. (1995) Social conditions as fundamental causes of disease. Journal of Health and Social Behaviour, 35, 80 94. 67. Berkman, L. F. and Kawachi, I. (eds) (2000) Social Epidemiology, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 68. Seyle, H. (1978) The Stresses of Life, McGraw Hill, Maidenhead. 69. Pearlin, L. (1999) Stress and mental health: a conceptual overview, in A Handbook for the Study of Mental Health: Social Contexts, Theories and Systems (eds A. V. Horwitz and T. L. Schied), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 161 175. 70. Wheaton, B. (1999) The nature of stressors, in A Handbook for the Study of Mental Health: Social Contexts, Theories and Systems (eds A. V. Horwitz and T. L. Schied), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 176 197.
71. Holmes, T. H. and Rahe, R. H. (1967) The social readjustment rating scale. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 11, 213 218. 72. Brown, G. and Harris, T. (1978) The Social Origins of Depression, Tavistock, London. 73. Harris, T. (2001) Recent developments in understanding the psychosocial aspects of depression. British Medical Bulletin, 57, 17 32. 74. Helman, C. (2000) Culture, Health and Illness, 4th edn, Butterworth Heinemann, Oxford. 75. Helman, C. (1978) Feed a cold, starve a fever. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 2, 107 137. 76. Kleinman, A. (1980) Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture: An Exploration of the Borderland between Antropology, Medicine and Psychiatry, University of California Press, Los Angeles, California. 77. Mechanic, D. (1962) The concept of illness behaviour. Journal of Chronic Disease, 15, 189 194. 78. Mechanic, D. (1968) Medical Sociology: A Selective View, Free Press, London. 79. Zola, I. (1973) Pathways to the doctor. Social Science and Medicine, 7, 677 689. 80. Richards, H. M., Reid, M. E. and Watt, C. M. (2002) Socio economic variations in responses to chest pains: a qualitative study. British Medical Journal, 324, 1308 1310. 81. Pescosolido, B. A., Gardner, C. B. and Lubell, K. M. (1998) How people get into mental health services: stories of choice, coercion and ‘muddling through’ from ‘first timers’. Social Science and Medicine, 46 (2), 275 286.
6 Concepts and challenges in capturing dynamics of the wider social environment Stephani L. Hatch1 and Dana March2 1 2
Department of Psychological Medicine, Institute of Psychiatry, King' s College London, London, UK Department of Epidemiology and Center for Social Inequalities and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, USA
6.1
INTRODUCTION
As the social environment shapes individuals, individuals shape the social environment. Yet examinations of the wider social environment in social psychiatry have not fully embraced this dynamic. This chapter outlines conceptual considerations and highlights particular challenges in understanding how the dynamics and complexities of social structure and contextual factors across the life course ultimately bear on individuals’ mental health. Many assessments of the wider social environment attempt to identify important exposures that confer either risk or protection in terms of mental health outcomes, from social interactions (e.g. disorder, social capital) to physical environs (e.g. built environment, local services, access to safe places, etc.) and mobility across settings (e.g. residential stability, housing tenure, migration). We discuss many of these environmental characteristics, focusing specifically on social capital and mobility.
How an individual engages with the social environment is heavily influenced by his or her acquired level of cultural competence and accumulated experience developed over the life course. We raise some of the challenges in capturing the social environment and, most importantly, address the primary processes that link individuals to the social environment. We argue that emphasis should be placed on the relative positioning of individuals within their social environments, the salience of social context at different points across the life course and individuals’ embodiment of historically shaped social context. The issues discussed in this chapter are by no means exhaustive. Rather, the concepts and challenges to empirical examination of the wider social environment addressed below are meant to provide guidance in social psychiatric research considering social context, underscore particular points that warrant
Principles of Social Psychiatry, second edition Edited by Craig Morgan and Dinesh Bhugra Ó 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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further consideration and encourage critique of current thinking regarding the representation of the social world within social psychiatry and psychiatric epidemiology research. We begin with the conceptualization of social structure and consider how social structure is embodied over the life course by socialization, drawing on an example from the study of stress and mental health. We then proceed to a discussion of area-level factors and mental health,
6.2
with special attention granted to depression and psychosis. An elaboration on social capital, which illuminates the broader contours of a narrowly applied sociological concept in social psychiatry and psychiatric epidemiology, follows. Finally, we underscore the importance of considering the life course and consider the specific complexities in empirical research concerned with social and geographic mobility.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE
. . .[I]ndividuals contain within themselves their past and present position in the social structure ([1], p. 434).
Social structure broadly refers to enduring patterned behaviour and interactions between individuals or groups that represent hierarchical social arrangements within a social system [2,3]. The meaning and usage of the concept depends on the theoretical perspective being employed. Considerations of social structure in research are implicit in attempts to understand relations between social stratification and health, often categorized as health disparities or health inequalities research [4 6]. While the identification of differences in the distribution of disorders is key in this arena, consideration of the interrelationships among hierarchically arranged social statuses (e.g. socioeconomic status, gender, race/ethnicity, age) is imperative. Social interactions are defined, in part, by the position within a hierarchical social structure that a person inhabits. That position, in turn, becomes a constituent of the person. One concept particularly pertinent to this sociological phenomenon is habitus. In his early work, Bourdieu [7] describes habitus as ‘embodied social structures’ or schemes that reflect social status. Economic and social conditions generate shared perceptions, observations, motivations and behaviours based on occupying certain social statuses and interacting with others in the same status position [8]. Subsequent work by Bourdieu and others offering nuanced inter pretations has considered the impact of gender and racial/ethnic status positions on individuals’ interpretation and functioning within social environments [1,9 11].
Time is a critical consideration in understanding how social structure becomes embodied. First, social structure itself is influenced by history, and perspectives of social statuses shift over time. Second, social structure is embodied across the life course at critical times (e.g. childhood, adolescence and different phases in adulthood). One of the main challenges is capturing changing social structure as it pertains to individual development and mental health over the life course. This has been most obviously addressed in researchers’ attempts to highlight the influence of social structure on experience and behaviour, with an emphasis on the contribution of social processes, such as socialization, described in detail below [12].
6.2.1
Socialization: linking the individual to social structure
Social processes have been overlooked in situating the individual within his or her environment. However, in a convergence of thinking across disciplines, social processes are receiving more attention, both directly and indirectly. For example, research regarding ethnic identity development in relation to mental health and service use exemplifies the dynamics between social structure and the individual [13 15]. Implicit in the process of ethnic identity development is socialization [16]. Defined as the manner in which individuals selectively acquire skills, knowledge, values, motives,
CONCEPTS AND CHALLENGES IN CAPTURING THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
behaviours and roles [17,18], socialization is one of the common processes by which social structure is embodied and maintained and by which individuals become embedded in their social environment. However, it appears to be overlooked, particularly in research that considers interactions between individuals and the social environment in relation to mental health. In this section, we discuss the main sources of and domains in which socialization can occur across the individual life course. Socialization processes occur within contexts that shift in salience over the life course: the family, the school, among peers, the neighbourhood and in the workplace. The explicit purpose and function of interactions within these contexts is to socialize and integrate individuals at the group level [16]. Thus, embodiment of the social environment occurs partly through this process, particularly within social interactions and social participation. The complexities of how this process unfolds over the life course are best captured in longitudinal follow-up that allows researchers to examine the impact of traditional lifephase transitions (e.g. education completion, work entry, marriage or household formation). Understanding these life course transitions and thinking in terms of life course trajectories are equally important in determining how to promote social stability (e.g. social integration, maintenance of social networks and perceived social support) and to reduce social exclusion (e.g. instability in housing, debt, marital and family breakdown), particularly as each pertains to mental health. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, as noted, is particularly useful in a discussion of socialization. More fully, habitus is defined as the ‘mental or cognitive structures’ or somewhat durable dispositions that combine into a series of schemes through which the social world is perceived and evaluated [19 21]. These schemes are utilized in social interactions, and provide the guiding principles for making choices and replicating past experiences within a given social environment. The family of origin is the initial source from which meaning and purpose at the individual and group level arises, establishing patterns of power and structures of authority. Parents and primary caregivers take on a multitude of socialization goals. Many of these are central in the development of
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gender, class and racial or ethnic identities. The family provides the first instance of group membership in which individuals are endowed with similar schemes, or habitus. For example, the development of ethnic identity results from an intergenerational transmission of majority group views about race and ethnicity from parents to children. Ethnic identity represents a common heritage shared within a particular group, and a sense of unification and cohesiveness in conceptualizations of the self [22,23]. This occurs through processes, both subtle and overt, which involve the parental transmission of attitudes and behaviours and the promotion of ethnic identity development. In such processes, parents’ practices are shaped and influenced by experiences from their own families of origin and experiences in their immediate social environment [24]. Children are prepared to adapt and assimilate to specific contextual demands influenced by geographic location and historical period. Factors such as behavioural distinctions, language differences, physical features that are expressed in stereotypes and stigma add uniquely to the intricate nature of ethnic identity formation, especially during childhood and adolescence [25,26]. It is within the family context that both privilege and subordination are introduced, taught and communicated to children. In doing so, social distance is defined within specific social spaces (i.e. from the neighbourhood to larger geographical areas). In the example of race and ethnicity, parents from black and minority ethnic groups who place their children in a majority white environment will no doubt transmit ways to move about these social spaces to either assert power among the privileged or reduce the likelihood of confrontation. Similar lessons apply to social class, which are especially apparent in the absence of race and ethnicity. As discussed in greater detail below, this constitutes a critical element in understanding the intergenerational transfer of cognitive dispositions and appraisals, beliefs and behaviours, regardless of the subtlety and inadvertence with which parents communicate these social facts (in a Durkheimian sense, i.e. ways of acting, thinking, feeling that are external to the individual and made possible through power of coercion by those within privileged status groups).
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Schools have more narrowly defined socialization goals, including formal instruction and cognitive development (i.e. the acquisition of knowledge, development of analytic and verbal skills). Bourdieu identifies educational systems as among ‘the fundamental institutions in the reproduction of class inequality from generation to generation’ ([27], p. 1463). Nash [28] offers an interpretation: schools have the capability to shape and impact habitus in a manner that extends beyond the role of the family. The structural features of the classroom encourage students to formulate social comparisons and develop their responses to a system of costs and rewards. Most important in terms of status attainment, schools function as a context in which perceptions about opportunity structures and what is necessary to succeed are formed. Peer groups are an avenue for socialization that are uniquely characterized by being voluntary social interactions in which boundaries are more fluid and independence can be exercised. Friendships are, more often than other relationships, associations between status equals. They help to develop competence and validation of the self and provide an opportunity to acquire knowledge not introduced in family and school contexts. In the example of racial socialization, many studies limit their scope to a single sphere, the family. However, it is at a relatively young age