Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-1589 (Studies Presented to the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentar)

PRINCES, POLITICS AND RELIGION 1547- 1589

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PRINCES, POLITICS AND RELIGION 1547- 1589

N.M. SUTHERLAND

THEHAMBLEDON PRESS

The Hambledon Press 1984 35 Gloucester Avenue, London NW1 7AX

History Series 30 ISBN 0 907628 44 3 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Sutherland, N.M. Princes, politics and religion, 1547-1589. - (History series; 30) 1. Europe - History - 1517-1648 I. Title II. Series 940. 2'32 D220

©N. M. Sutherland 1984

Printed in Great Britain by Robert Hartnoll Ltd., Bodmin, Cornwall

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Preface

vii ix

1

Introduction

2

Was there an Inquisition in Reformation France?

13

3

Catherine de Medici and the Ancien Regime

31

4

Antoine de Bourbon, King of Navarre and the French Crisis of Authority, 1559-1562

55

5

The Origins of Queen Elizabeth's Relations with the Huguenots, 1559-1562

73

6

Queen Elizabeth and the Conspiracy of Amboise, March 1560

97

7

The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Colloque of Poissy, 1561: A Reassessment

113

8

The Assassination of François Due de Guise, February 1563

139

9

The Role of Coligny in the French Civil Wars

157

10

The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the Problem of Spain

173

The Foreign Policy of Queen Elizabeth, the Sea Beggars and the Capture of Brill, 1572

183

12

William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands: A Missing Dimension

207

13

Catherine de Medici: The Legend of the Wicked Italian Queen

237

1

1

Index

1

251

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The articles collected here, with the exceptions of Chapters 1, 2 and 11 which are new, originally appeared in the following places and are reprinted by kind permission of the original publishers. 3

Historical Association Pamphlet, General Series 62 (1966; Revised Edition 1978).

4

French Government and Society, 1500-1850. Essays in Memory of Alfred Cobban, ed. J.F. Bosher (Athlone Press, London, 1973), 1-18.

5

Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London, xx, no. 6 (1966 for 1964), 626-48.

6

The English Historical Review, Ixxxi (1966), 474-89.

7

The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 28 (1977), 265-89.

8

The Historical Journal, 24, 2 (1981), 279-95.

9

Actes du Colloque I'Amiral de Coligny et son Temps, (Societe de THistoire du Protestantisme Franqais, Paris, 1974), 323-38.

12

Archiv fur Reformationsgeschichte, 74 (1983), 201-30.

13

The Sixteenth Century Journal, ix (1978), 45-56.

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PREFACE

Articles in learned periodicals, some of which have only a restricted circulation, are bound to become increasingly obscure and obscured as time passes. In view of the paucity of material on early modern Europe, available in English, it is hoped that this collection may help to meet a need which has often been expressed to me by schoolteachers and by university colleagues. It is also hoped that it may bring to the attention of a wider public a number of interpretations which depart from long received opinion. This applies most particularly to the foreign policy of queen Elizabeth which is seriously distorted by too insular an approach. For reasons of economy, and hence of price, these articles have been reproduced as they were originally printed. In certain cases this has resulted in a degree of overlap which, it was editorially decided, should remain, thereby preserving the separate integrity of each article. For the same reasons, there are editorial differences between them and, in one instance, American spelling.

For PETER HASLER with gratitude for much help over the years

1 INTRODUCTION Each of the articles in this collection explores some facet of the post-Reformation struggles of sixteenth-century Europe, mainly in terms of princes, politics and religion, though naturally there were also other factors at work and other issues at stake. It therefore seems desirable to provide some analysis of the structure of European politics behind these more detailed studies. On the international level, conflict between developing, 'nation' states primarily derived from the fear of foreign control, or domination, which produced a general and supreme pre-occupation with defence. It is therefore necessary to consider the nature of these fears in France, Spain and England, whose triangular struggles dominated the later sixteenth century, the kind of exploitable, domestic problem to which they were all potentially vulnerable, and the impact of protestantism upon existing, traditional power conflicts. The new dimension of heresy came to involve the post-Tridentine Papacy in an active, and even aggressive role in northern European affairs. The main objective of the Papacy in this respect became the overthrow of England, the principal protestant country. However, the pre-occupation of Spain and France, with external defence and internal fragmentation, precluded the formation of an effective catholic league, such as the Papacy earnestly desired. The failure to achieve a united catholic front, threw responsibility for the fortunes of regenerated Catholicism back upon Spain and France independently and, more widely, upon the shoulders of prominent catholics everywhere. This diffusion proved to be a fatal weakness. Protestants fears were not, however, baseless since Philip II, who was already opposing heresy in France and his own rebellious Netherlands, might at any moment yield to catholic pressure to undertake an enterprise of England. The power struggle and the religious conflict became, to a great extent, focused in the Netherlands, the reasons for which are developed in chapter twelve. For the Papacy the Netherlands themselves were only a secondary consideration; they were, however, a primary obstacle to the destruction of protestant England, not least because they engrossed Philip II. Catholic hostility to England appeared to fuse English interests with those of Philip's rebels and heretics, much as it had already forged a link between England and the huguenots — which is shown in chapter five. Elizabeth, however, never wanted war

2

Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-1589

with Spain; in spite of the great anti-Spanish war with which the century ended, Philip and Elizabeth, it will finally be shown, were the most reluctant enemies. Neither France, Spain nor England was basically aggressive in the last four decades of the sixteenth century; yet it proved impossible to avoid hostilities. In most instances, their fears of each other were exaggerated; but such is the nature of fear, and it is only with hindsight that this can safely be said. France was afraid of Spanish domination, both externally and internally, arguably from 1559 to 1659. In the sixteenth century Calvinism and the civil wars rendered her extremely vulnerable to intervention, penetration, subversion and, in the 1590s, actual conquest, which was only narrowly averted. Philip II of Spain, widely presumed to have dominated Europe was, in turn, extremely afraid of France. He feared the implications of her traditional hold on England's enemy Scotland, the French dynastic connection with Mary queen of Scots and hence, potentially, French power over England. Conversely he also feared that France might succeed in sinking her enmity with England in a dynastic alliance - such as Spain herself had recently achieved in the reign of Mary Tudor — and, most immediately, he feared French influence upon, and activities in, the Netherlands. So did queen Elizabeth, but not for the same reasons. Indeed England's principal fear, at least until her invasion of the Netherlands in 1585, was of her traditional enemy, France. Like Spain, England also feared the French connection with Scotland and with Mary queen of Scots, which posed a considerable threat to England's domestic peace. Apart from the fear of domination, domestic, factional and foreign conflicts tended to focus on a variety of problems which mainly derived from several closely related weaknesses — to which all principalities were potentially vulnerable. The first and most obvious weakness was the ubiquitous diversity of religion, varying from place to place, but always posing a crisis of authority. This diversity not only gave rise to disobedience and violence, but also to international cross currents. Especially in France, the Netherlands and Scotland it facilitated the disruption, or even anarchy, caused by aggrieved nobility in arms or opposition. France and Scotland were, furthermore, a prey to the danger and dislocations of a regency, whether de jure or de facto, while both England and France encountered the nightmare perils of an uncertain or a disputed succession. If, by contrast, Spain appeared impressively secure and inaccessible, this was more than offset by her extreme vulnerability, domestic and foreign, in the Netherlands - the beloved homeland of Charles V - which poisoned the whole reign of Philip II, and seriously affected the destiny of Spain.

Introduction

3

To what extent the post-Reformation struggles were genuinely ideological, will always remain controversial. But, since no historian can escape from the problem of religion - the most exploitable of all domestic struggles — it seems reasonable to accept that, as well as dynastic accidents, religion did affect the power conflicts which already existed before the Reformation. What then were these conflicts, and what was the impact of religion upon them? One could disperse the smoke of ideology and argue that the remaining conflict was normal and inevitable. By the mid-sixteenth century, the central struggle was that between France and the Hapsburgs. In the division of his empire in 1555-6, Charles V gave to Philip and to Spain both the Netherlands and Milan. Thus the Hapsburg encirclement of France became the Spanish encirclement, thereby crystallizing the issue of the Spanish road, or roads. These were the vital lines of communication between Spain, North Italy and the Burgundian territories, as well as the Tyrol and the Germanic empire. Thus, so long as the Netherlands and Milan were Spanish (in the event, until 1713), there was certain to be recurrent Franco-Spanish conflict, although the focus might shift from time to time, mainly between Italy and the Rhine. England was not secure from the repercussions of this conflict, because Charles V was perfectly aware that his territorial settlement, in favour of Spain, was effectively dependent upon an English alliance; unfortunately he was powerless to guarantee its future. Thus Charles sought to achieve the safety of the Netherlands through the marriage of prince Philip — as he then was — to Mary Tudor in 1554. At the time, Philip might eventually have inherited the entire Hapsburg empire. Consequently his marriage represented the greatest potential threat to France since the election of Charles, already king of Spain, to the imperial throne in 1519. Philip's English marriage may, in addition, be seen as a powerful retort to the recently renewed dynastic link between France and Scotland. Mary queen of Scots had been sent to France in 1548 at the age of six and betrothed to the dauphin, Francis. Her French mother, Mary of Lorraine, remained as the regent of Scotland. The marriage was necessarily delayed until 1558, when Francis became fourteen. Thus, in France and Scotland, respectively, the two Marys posed a nutcracker threat to England. It might, therefore, be argued that Mary Tudor's Hapsburg marriage was advantageous. It could, however, more cogently be argued that, caught up between France and Spain, England had become both the pawn and the prize. Neither great power could safely allow the other to absorb or to dominate England. The early death of Mary Tudor in 1558 modified this pattern in

4

Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-1589

favour of France, on account of Mary Stuart's catholic claim to the throne of England. Mary's death, and the accession of protestant Elizabeth, terminated the Anglo-Spanish dynastic alliance and distorted, if it did not destroy, the affiliation between the Netherlands and England which Charles V had perceived to be necessary. This alteration also rendered Philip vulnerable in the Low Countries, and exposed England to serious economic and commercial dangers and difficulties. Furthermore, in 1558 the French claim through Mary - the queen dolphin as they called her — to the crown matrimonial of England, surely guaranteed a resumption of Franco-Spanish conflict, in spite of the impending treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, which ended the current series of wars. The structure of politics, and the political probabilities were again substantially changed by the premature death of Henry II in July 1559, immediately after the treaty. Spain became incontestably the strongest power in Europe. The marriage at that time of Henry's daughter, Elisabeth de Valois, to Philip II at least temporarily increased the ascendancy of Spain over France (Elisabeth died in 1568), and rendered them both alarming to England. Fears were graphically expressed that England might then become a northern Piedmont or Milan. In these circumstances, the new independence of Elizabethan England became inseparable from her renewed protestantism; religion distanced her from both great catholic monarchies. Thus it was from this plight of pawn in the European power struggle that queen Elizabeth had to rescue England. It follows that Elizabeth's essential mission was the defence of England while, throughout her reign, she was beset by great dangers. It was therefore the accession of queen Elizabeth, together with the protestantism of England, which brought about that perplexing, triangular tension, which characterised European politics in the later sixteenth century. Up to the accession of Elizabeth, at least, all this had little or nothing to do with religion. There would have been conflict, as there always had been. But, without the new dimension of religion, it could not have taken its historic form. Religion, in the first place, greatly modified the dynastic and territorial Franco-Hapsburg rivalry. As the two great catholic powers, the interests of France and Spain agreed, in that respect, while their mutual enmity and fears remained. Following the death of Henry II, religion promoted the polarisation of internationally powerful factions within France. Thus it was primarily religion which gave the struggles of the later sixteenth century their characteristic factional, and hence fragmented quality, which needs to be examined in a little more detail.

Introduction

5

Civil war, with a marked religious content, had already come to the Germanic empire, and was shortly to occur in France and the Spanish Netherlands. There was also revolution, followed by spasmodic hostilities, in Scotland. All these domestic tumults were of crucial concern to foreign neighbours, including England, which alone escaped with a rebellion (the rising of the northern earls in 1569) and a series of conspiracies. Might not the nobility in France, the Netherlands and Scotland have achieved a similar fragmentation, unassisted by religious issues? Possibly they could have; and certainly the religious element gradually diminished. Nevertheless, the nobles did generally become involved behind religious banners in at least quasi-religious conflicts, whose outcome depended upon a confessional following. Religion, furthermore, affected everyone, from the altruist martyr to the cynic, or realist, who adopted the religion appropriate to his side or to his aspirations. The political fragmentation of Germany was both augmented and crystallized by diversity of religion. However, most Lutheran princes were mainly concerned to preserve the religious peace of Augsburg of 1555, which afforded an uneasy truce. Thus, German participation in the European conflicts of the later sixteenth century was largely confined to the Calvinist Palatinate and a few minor supporters. To protestant Germany, a catholic threat was more theoretical than immediate — at least while the emperor held aloof, reserving his combative strength for the Turk. France is perhaps the prime example of fragmentation not, in the event, territorially, but in the sense of factions which were nominally confessional. Chapters one to nine all, in their different ways, relate to this fragmentation of France, together with its wider effects on European affairs. Faction is the reason why French sixteenth-century history is so confused, and why her foreign relations have been so poorly understood. After 1559, one cannot rightly speak of the policy of France: one must distinguish carefully between royal policy — which was not always identical to that of the queen mother, Catherine de Medici (until her death in 1589) — and the separate catholic and huguenot interests. The interests of the catholic crown never corresponded to those of the catholic faction led by the Guise family. Indeed, in many respects, the crown had more in common with the huguenots who, after January 1562, were repeatedly beholden to the crown for varying degrees of religious toleration. This complexity in France goes far towards explaining why the foreign policy of queen Elizabeth has generally been regarded as utterly bewildering. In terms of the movement of French factions, as she perceived them, her policy

6

Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-1589

was perfectly consistent; nor did she make any secret of it. Whoever opposed the catholic Guises would, in some wise, receive her support. Ultimately, this led to a short-term deviation in the underlying Anglo-French hostility when, after 1589, Henry IV reimposed on France a royal and national policy and destroyed the Guisard Catholic League. In his reign, England and France, together with the newly-formed United Provinces of the Netherlands, finally and effectively allied against Spain; that was the materialisation of Philip II's lifelong nightmare. This was the nearest that Europe ever came to the protestant league which certain protestants had wanted all along. The Netherlands were fragmented in every respect, not only territorially but also by factions at different levels from the high nobility to the municipalities. In the 1560s the grievances of the nobility came to focus on religious issues, and religion went far towards accounting for the civil war which complicated the Dutch revolt against Spain. Religion as well as authority also became the sticking point upon which mediation and peace negotiations repeatedly foundered. The revolt was to end, not with the establishment of a fatherland, but in the secession of seven Calvinist-controlled provinces from the catholics of the south. Thus, over a long period of forty years or more, religion was steadily injected into existing conflicts, and its role was both to polarise and to fragment. It was about 1566, with the pontificate of Pius V and the outbreak of iconoclasm in the Netherlands, that religion also brought the Papacy into an aggressive role in northern European affairs. This placed new pressures on princes, who were primarily concerned, as they had to be, with their own, vital, national interests. Neither England nor Scotland had been represented at the council of Trent, and it was clear by the end of the council in 1563 (the date of the thirty-nine articles) that England was definitively protestant - though her unique, Anglican brand was never comprehensible on the continent. The idea of catholic action and reaction is inherent in that of an ideological struggle. Nevertheless, historians are still prone to reject the proposition that there was in the sixteenth century a positive, catholic movement or crusade, with dismissive expressions like bias, court gossip or exaggeration. Yet it is doubtful if anyone would seriously challenge the reality, however varied and amorphous, of the Counter Reformation. There certainly was a generalised catholic movement, in the sense of a widespread hope and intention that Catholicism should be restored, and should prevail. These aspirations were backed by the Holy Office with various types of Inquisition in different countries - and they generated a variety of anti-protestant activities and enterprises. When,

Introduction

7

shortly after the conclusion of the council of Trent, it was the inquisitor general who became the pope, there surely could be no dispute or misunderstanding about his attitude to heresy; nor was the policy of his successor, Gregory XIII, perceptibly different. It is in no way surprising that the principal thrust behind the catholic movement should have come from Rome, which provided the only element of catholic unity and continuity. The Papal attitude to the problem of heresy was from the start wholly destructive. In the original case of Germany, successive popes (with the exception of Adrian VI), had not been unwilling to see Charles V ruined by a problem whose resolution might greatly have augmented his power. If taken in time, certain humanistic measures of reform could, possibly, have stemmed the tide, or altered the course of events. The Papacy, like Charles himself, was also forcibly preoccupied by the Turks, posing an immediate threat to the Papal states, whereas the problem of heresy was diffused. The Papacy did not however, for that reason, neglect the existence of heresy in the north and west. Paul IV, albeit a bellicose Neapolitan who wanted the Spanish out of Naples, had actually laboured considerably to end the Franco-Hapsburg wars. He did so in the hope of uniting the catholic powers of France and Spain against the heretics everywhere. This, if improbable, was certainly spoken of, and succeeded at least in creating alarm. Such a sentiment was indeed formally incorporated into the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559, though we may reasonably assume that bankruptcy on both sides was a more compelling argument. That France and Spain should unite against heretics everywhere, made some degree of sense under Paul IV, who died in 1559. But under his successors it became political naivety of the first order. Evidence relating to the Papal efforts, and failure, to bring about a catholic league in the 1560s and the acceptance of the decrees of Trent, is discussed in chapter eleven. Gradually, however, the civil wars in France, and the development of trouble in the Netherlands rendered Franco-Spanish co-operation impossible, at least on the national level. Thus, while these ubiquitous catholic forces appeared extremely alarming, they too were fragmented, and undeniably weakened by their lack of cohesion and leadership. Henry II had been, perhaps, the most promising executor of catholic policy, for whom sentiment and self-interest had coincided remarkably well. He had begun a war of extermination in France, and notoriously quartered the arms of protestant England with those of France and Scotland. But for his early death Henry II might have done more for the catholic cause than Spain's 'most catholic majesty' was

8

Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-1589

ever to achieve. Philip II obviously supported the catholic aspiration to suppress all heretics. But it is not usually recognised that, as the principal bulwark of militant Catholicism, he was a considerable disappointment. Philip had inherited his father's catholic mantle without the mystique of the imperial crown, and his own political burdens rendered this pre-eminent catholic role a serious embarrassment. It was all very well for Rome to supply policy and plots, with far too little money. But, for Philip, there could be no religious enterprise which was not also profoundly political, affecting the affairs of his entire empire. Naturally there were many reasons for Philip's aversion from executing Papal policy. One of the less obvious reasons was that he was far more afraid of France than he had any genuine need to be. Philip's servants were less constrained than the king, and often more militantly catholic than he could afford to be. The same was true of queen Elizabeth, in the protestant sense. Probably the most influential and effective of the Spanish catholic militants was the duke of Alva. Alva had fought the Lutherans in Germany for Charles V, and subsequently pursued a militant catholic policy more doggedly than Philip ever did. By the testimony of his own correspondence, Alva was active in France in this respect in 1559, and at the Bayonne meeting in 1565 between the courts of France and Spain. How he proceeded in the Netherlands, from the summer of 1567, is notorious. Don John of Austria, Philip's half-brother, is perhaps a special case; but, as captain-general of the Holy League of 1571, and therefore also a servant of the Papacy, he must rank as a leading catholic. Whether he was really a militant catholic, or merely militant, is not completely clear. Certainly he was glad to serve the Papacy, and the catholic cause, because he dreamed of kingdoms to be conquered, whether in infidel Africa or in protestant England. As a cardinal, and primate of the Netherlands, responsible for at least the episcopal inquisition, Granvelle should also be included. While it is not apparent that he was actually as militant as his enemies supposed, he did belong to the same court faction as Alva, and was therefore seen by the Netherlands nobility as the duke's devotee. Alva's counterpart in France was Lorraine, cardinal legate and inquisitor general, who worked with his brother, the due de Guise, a successful military commander. Thus, the murder of Guise in 1563 somewhat diminished their scope. It was, nevertheless, the Guise family who sustained the catholic movement in France and, to a large extent, against England until, in the 1590s, Henry IV destroyed their League and alliance with Spain.

Introduction

9

There were, furthermore, those who moved in the orbit of Mary queen of Scots, the northern hope of catholics everywhere. On a lowerlevel, there were numerous other militants who created an atmosphere of conflict, albeit in less prominent ways. One could cite the Alva faction in the Spanish court; extremists in the Netherlands' administration, and hostile ambassadors like Chantonnay - Granvelle's brother - in France, or de Quadra who was arrested in England, and De Spes and Mendoza who were both expelled by Elizabeth. There were also agents and agitators, and the fulminating English exiles in the Netherlands, as well as the genuinely devout, and the accomplished Jesuits - officially but not effectively debarred from politics. Such people successfully orchestrated a war of nerves and propaganda, and sustained the impression that Philip was much more menacing as a catholic prince than really was the case. On the other hand, protestant fears were not wholly imaginary since Philip might, at any given moment, yield to such catholic pressure, and especially when his own fears became acute. This was the case in 1569, and in June 1571 Roberto Ridolfi, a secret Papal envoy, succeeded in foisting his Marian plot upon Philip. This was assuredly not because Philip pined to see Mary crowned in England, but because he was wrongly persuaded of Elizabeth's implication in plans devised in France for an enterprise of the Netherlands. Philip was also much alarmed by her marriage negotiations with Henry of Anjou, heir apparent to the throne of France. It was from about 1567, when Alva and his Spanish army arrived in the Netherlands, that the great triangular power struggle and the religious conflict became centred there. Direct evidence of co-operation between Alva in the Netherlands and Lorraine in France, against heretics and the nobility in opposition, is only slight. On the other hand, it is very clear that the huguenots and the Netherlands rebels saw their quarrel as one, directed against common enemies. The degree of confederacy between the huguenots and the Netherlands is one of the very important, but less obvious factors in these struggles, because it cut clean across national politics, and complicated older issues. Under Henry IV the former confederacy matured into French support for the United Provinces, which lasted until, in the seventeenth century, those Provinces became more afraid of France than of Spain. As a hotbed of Calvinist resistance, the Netherlands naturally attracted Papal attention. Nevertheless Gregory XIII was even more concerned to obtain the co-operation of Philip II in a flagging enterprise of England, presumably because Elizabeth had survived the Ridolfi plot. The catholic attitude to the major problem of English

10

Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-1589

protestantism in the 1570s was coloured by three main factors: the imprisonment in England of Mary queen of Scots; the excommunication of queen Elizabeth in 1570, and the belief that it was she who sustained the rebels and heretics in the Netherlands. The imprisonment in England of Mary queen of Scots in 1568 provoked her relatives, the Guises, to intrigue in Scotland and to conspire against England. If one hopes to understand Elizabeth's foreign policy, one should not underestimate her fears, both of the Guises and the French, and of the instability of Scotland, however exaggerated such fears may now appear to have been. In these circumstances, the Papal and wider catholic cause became fused with Mary's personal cause, and her claim to the throne of England. The Papacy had first become involved in 1569, in the rising of the northern earls, which was partly a Marian plot. After the subsequent Ridolfi fiasco, intended to murder Elizabeth, crown Mary, and restore England to Rome, a third attempt was projected through Don John of Austria, governor of the Netherlands from November 1576 until his death in October 1578. Chronologically the second, but probably the most important, factor which coloured catholic attitudes to England was the excommunication of queen Elizabeth. This was promulgated in February 1570, at the express request of the northern earls, albeit months too late to help them. Since the excommunication comprised Elizabeth's deposition, it was naturally to that end that the Papacy laboured in the 1570s and 1580s. That also explains why catholics everywhere expected Philip to undertake the enterprise of England — whether it suited him or not, he was the only prince who could. The third factor was the widespread belief that it was Elizabeth who sustained her co-religionists, the rebels in the Netherlands; another reason for expecting Philip to act. But the rebels in the Netherlands were not Elizabeth's co-religionists — or, at any rate, she did not think so — and the assumption that she sustained them, if comprehensible, was mistaken. Many of the English did indeed wish her to do so, but very little help was ever sanctioned by the queen. Nevertheless, Elizabeth's excommunication necessarily rendered her highly vulnerable, and sensitive to developments in the Netherlands. If Philip were ever to rule them as an absolute king of a conquered territory (he was not, of course, king of the Netherlands), England could not expect to survive — or not unless her relations with France appeared close enough to inhibit Spain. Thus it was that from 1575-8, the Papacy worked incessantly to launch an enterprise of England with the necessary co-operation of Spain, while Elizabeth, as the only protestant

Introduction

11

prince of any stature, was desired by protestants everywhere to champion their cause; they were disappointed. The foreign policy of queen Elizabeth did not embrace the cause of religion; nor did she wish to support foreign rebels. However, the treaty of Hampton Court with the huguenots in 1562 (they were not rebels) had doubtless created a wrong impression, and raised unfounded hopes. Elizabeth did not support the huguenots because they were Calvinists. She did so in the hope of recovering Calais (lost to France by Mary in 1558) and because they alone opposed the Guises. The Guises intrigued in Scotland, threatened England, and supported Mary Stuart, an eligible princess, for whom they had in mind Don Carlos, prince of Spain. To the Netherlands, Elizabeth's attitude was negative and pacifist. If only hostilities could be ended, she would neither be involved in war, nor threatened by its outcome. Thus for several years she strove to mediate a peace for which, if necessary, she was quite prepared to sacrifice religion. The traditional conception of Philip and Elizabeth as the great protagonists of rival religions, and hence as the great antagonists, has not yet been seriously dented. This may be partly because contemporaries of both persuasions cast them in those roles. They might, in fact, have understood each other rather well, had they only enjoyed normal diplomatic services, and proper channels of communication. It would probably not be an exaggeration to say that politically they were both more concerned with France than with each other. They were however concerned with each other in the sense that they were both afraid. Philip was not responsible for the excommunication of Elizabeth but, after 1570, catholic pressures built up against her; ultimately they were forced into war by events beyond their control in the Netherlands and France. Possibly the tensions of naval and commercial conflicts would soon have led to open war in any case. Philip was rigidly pinioned by his inherited style of 'most catholic majesty'. Nevertheless a war with England in the fifteen sixties would have been desperate in terms of his debilitating and preoccupying struggle with the Turks. In the seventies it could only have increased his already overwhelming political, financial and military problems in the Netherlands. Elizabeth, for her part, was necessarily bound to reject the role of protestant champion and figurehead. But not all her servants wanted her to do so, and historians can still be scathing about what she easily could or should have done - usually without regard to the current disposition of the Spanish fleet. Of the two things that Elizabeth most wanted to avoid (leaving aside civil war in England), the

12

Introduction

first was the extension of French influence in the Netherlands — she said so repeatedly — and the second was a war with Spain. Elizabeth could not afford to go to war. That France and Spain could not afford it either is irrelevant; their systems were not comparable, and their revenues were raised in different ways. Elizabeth already had sufficient trouble with her Parliaments — over religion, the succession and her marriage. When, in 1585, she could avoid the war no longer, she was much less insecure at home. Neither could Elizabeth afford to risk her own regime, resting upon her royal supremacy 'in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal'. If she were seen to be the champion and figurehead of protestants in Europe, she could hardly have controlled the radicals who threatened her supremacy at home. Above all, Elizabeth did not wish to provoke Philip into supporting Mary — whom Elizabeth never succeeded in rendering politically harmless. Whether Mary was more dangerous in France, in Scotland or in England, in prison or at liberty, alive or dead, remained debatable. It has already been seen that Elizabeth's unavoidable support of the huguenots — which was in no wise religious — became an embarrassment, and an entanglement from which she was unable to escape. While the huguenots supported Philip's rebels in the Netherlands, Philip supported their enemies, the Guises, in France. The Guises, in turn, kept irons in the Scottish fire, and threatened Elizabeth, to whom Mary's presence was a constant danger. On the ideological level-, Philip was bound to subscribe to the enterprise of England and the deposition of Elizabeth. Nevertheless, events surely establish his reluctance to oppose her openly: he did not, as it happened, move against her until she herself had invaded the Netherlands in 1585. After the despatch of Elizabeth's favourite, the earl of Leicester, open war was bound to follow — in the Netherlands, in France and at sea.

2 WAS THERE AN INQUISITION IN REFORMATION FRANCE? To an early modernist, concerned with the persecution of protestantism in the sixteenth century, it is far from clear whether there was, or was not, and Inquisition in France before the civil wars. Frequent references to the matter lead one to suppose the existence of some residual Inquisition, but no substantial or coherent material lies to hand. This paper lays no claim to being an exhaustive enquiry — which would almost certainly yield a collection of fragments. It is rather an essay in correlation.1 To the basic question, was there or was there not an Inquisition in sixteenth-century France, the short answer must be yes; it would not, however, be unassailable. The existence of the Inquisition has been illustrated for Languedoc by Raymond A. Mentzer in his doctoral thesis: 'Heresy Proceedings in Languedoc, 1500-1560'.2 In other parts of France, the subject remains fragmented and obscure. What, then, was the nature of this sixteenth-century Inquisition, and to what extent was it traditional? Why, furthermore, if the medieval Inquisition did still exist, do we find that, from about 1555, Henry II strove to reintroduce an Inquisition into France? Was the same terminology being used in different senses? The unavoidably confused nature of this subject is quickly apparent. Should we say the Inquisition, or an Inquisition, and how can it be defined? Are we dealing with a function, an institution or a procedure? It was, above all, a function: the seeking out, enquiring into, and extirpation of Christian heresy. In some instances, it also crystallized into an institution. As such, it was an extraordinary tribunal, or series of tribunals, which disposed of heresy cases and no other matters. But, in theory at least, the Inquisition was never an institution which functioned in isolation, either from the ordinary, episcopal jurisdiction, or from the strong arm of the secular authorities. 1 In my book, The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition (New Haven, London, 1980), 12, I wrote: 'the development of the persecution in France ought, properly, to be studied against the background of the residual Inquisition,' which would then have led me too far from my subject. In some respects, this paper modifies chapters one and two. 2 The University of Wisconsin, 1973.

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Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-1589

The Inquisition also came to be a procedure, which derived from Roman and canon law, and was later adopted as the criminal procedure of the parlements of France, and of other countries in which the medieval Inquisition operated.3 Obviously one key to the confused nature of the subject lies in the time span. Nothing could have survived unchanged through three centuries, which witnessed the evolution of the French monarchy and royal government, and consequent changes in the balance of relationships between the crown and the Papacy. Whereas the Inquisition of the thirteenth century was initiated by the Papacy, with willing secular support, that of the sixteenth century was dominated by secular authorities, with a confused response from a now 'Gallican' church, seriously degraded by the crown for reasons of patronage. It has often been stated that the Inquisition was founded in Languedoc in 1233. That is understandable, but misleading. The Inquisition was a Roman inheritance with no precise beginning. It is, however, reasonable to proceed from the late twelfth century, and to describe the Inquisition, which developed gradually, as having been papal and imperial in origin.4 It could hardly have been otherwise since Toulouse, where the Inquisition was most urgent and active, was not yet governed by the King of France.5 This factor of political geography influenced the development of the Inquisition both in Toulouse and in what was then loosely called the north, or France, generally meaning the Dominican Province of France.6 Certain fundamental principles of the Inquisition — episcopal responsibility, detection and informing, and the co-operation of the secular authority — were proclaimed at the Council of Verona in 1184, 3 C. V. Langlois, L'Inquisition d'apres des travaux recents (Paris, 1902), 48-53, 85-6. 4 D. A. Mortier (Rev. pere), Histoire abrege de I'Ordre de Saint-Dominique en France (Tours, 1920), 68. 5 The names Languedoc and Toulouse are confusingly used interchangeably. Philip Augustus held lower Languedoc. In 1226 he acquired the comital powers in the adjacent county of Toulouse, Raymond VII having been excommunicated. The exact timing of these events is variously rendered. Toulouse then consisted of north Albigeois, Rouergue, Venaissin, part of Quercy and the Agenais. In 1249 these territories were inherited by Alphonse of Poitier, brother of Louis IX, in the right of his wife, and passed to the King of France in 1271. Elizabeth M. Hallam, Capetian France 987-1328 (London, 1980), 54-62, 188-9, 254-8; Leon Albert Mirot, Manuel de geographic historique de la France, 2 vols (Paris, ed. 1948,1950), i, 138-9; L. Lalanne, Dictionnaire historique de la France (Paris, 1872), p. 1530. 6 By 1221 the Dominicans had some sixty houses, divided into eight Provinces, each under a Prior Provincial. Toulouse and the southern part of the kingdom of France came under Provence. The Province of France, centred on Paris, comprised the rest of the kingdom, roughly north of an arc from Bayonne through Perigueux and le Puy to Nice, and other areas beyond the frontiers. In 1330 a separate Dominican Province of Toulouse was created.

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when pope Lucius IV commanded the establishment of an episcopal Inquisition. At the same time, the emperor Frederick I decreed that 'obstinate' — meaning unrepentant — heretics and recidivists were to be passed to the secular authorities for punishment. The fourth Lateran council of 1215 subsequently placed upon secular powers the duty to exterminate heresy, a requirement which was incorporated into canon law. While the point of this requirement is obvious, it was, nevertheless, the source of that legislative and juridical confusion which makes the subject so hard to clarify. After Lucius IV, Innocent III (1198-1216) and Honorius III (1216-1227) struggled with the serious problem of heresy in Toulouse by means of special legates and monastic inquisitors, seeking also the more powerful help of the neighbouring kings of France.7 Successive kings were, from the start, supporters of the Inquisition. Philip Augustus (Philip II, 1180-1223) accepted the decrees of the Lateran council. Louis VIII, having temporarily acquired the comital rights of the excommunicated count Raymond VII of Toulouse, issued letters patent in 1226 on the punishment of the 'crime' of heresy, and of those who harboured heretics; and he took up arms in Toulouse. Louis IX, while at war with the count, issued the first comprehensive edict on the subject, against the heretics of Languedoc.8 The ordinance incorporated the principles of the Lateran council and the provisions of 1226. Offenders against this ordinance were barred from giving evidence, holding offices, making wills, or receiving inheritances - a considerable loss of civil rights — and their property was confiscated in perpetuity. The ordinance contained rigorous guarantee clauses. In 1229, when the wars were over and Raymond VII was obliged to co-operate, diocesan councils at Narbonne and Toulouse sought to implement the laws.9 The council of Toulouse forbade the reading of the Bible, and devotional works in the vernacular — an early version of censorship. With the co-operation of the emperor, pope Gregory IX (1227-1241) sought to define and unify the ecclesiastical and secular laws against heresy; he issued statutes in 1231 which were circulated to various prelates. The following year, the emperor Frederick II produced 7 L. Tanon, Histoire des Tribunaux de I'Inquisition en France (Paris, 1893), 22-3; H.C. Lea, A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages, 3 vols (London, 1906), i, 129, 139; D. A. Mortier, Histoire des Maftres Generaux de I'Ordre des Freres Precheurs, 8 vols (Paris, 1920), i, 192-4. 8 F. A. Isambert, Recueil general des anciennes lois franqaises, 29 vols (Paris, 1829-33), i, 218, fourth Lateran council; 227-8, April 1226; 230, April 1228. 9 Isambert, i, 234; Walter L. Wakefield, Heresy, Crusade and Inquisition in Southern France (London, 1974), 136; Mortier, Histoire des Maftres, 194 & n. 7.

16

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a savage and comprehensive ordinance against heretics which was incorporated into the five books of decretals promulgated between 1230-4. Thus, at least in theory, these regulations - papal and imperial - obtained everywhere throughout Christendom.10 Since the imperial decree formed the basis of the Inquisition, it is necessary to survey its main provisions. Those who were condemned by the church, and recidivists, were to die at the stake; those who recanted were imprisoned for life; all property was to be confiscated and heirs disinherited; children to the second generation were ineligible for office; all defenders of heretics were to be banished and their property confiscated, and the houses of heretics and their protectors were to be razed. All rulers and magistrates, present and future, were required to swear to exterminate everyone designated by the church as a heretic, upon pain of forfeiture of office. Secular authorities, anywhere, who neglected these duties might be excommunicated by papal inquisitors.11 The successors of Louis IX equally accepted responsibility for the extermination of heresy. Louis X in 1315 explicitly confirmed the constitutions of the emperor Frederick II, and Philip VI, in 1329, confirmed all past heresy laws.12 There were three basic conditions necessary for the successful prosecution of heresy, as Walter L. Wake field has succinctly put it: a body of laws, the assurance of state support, and officials specially commissioned for the purpose.13 In the early thirteenth century no officials were more suitable for the task than the mendicant friars — the friars preachers — (Franciscans as well as Dominicans). Able, educated and mobile, they were free of material ties and local graft, and depended directly on the Papacy.14 In April 1233, Gregory IX issued two bulls, in respect of Languedoc and France, appointing the friars preachers to assist the bishops in the prosecution of heresy. All Dominicans, anywhere, were commissioned to act as inquisitors. Later, the Priors Provincial were instructed to select qualified persons for the task.15 The appointment of the Dominicans as inquisitors has often been described as the institution of a papal, or monastic Inquisition. This Inquisition was, however, neither projected nor founded;16 it evolved. & n. 7. Medieval Culture. Robert le Bougie and the Beginning of the Inquisition in Northern France (ed. New York, 1958), 208. 11 Lea, i,321-2. 12 Isambert, iii, 123-9,15 December 1315; iv, 364, November 1329, mandement. 13 Wakefield, 136. 14 Tanon, 45; Lea, i, 299; Raskins, 207-8. 15 Wakefield, 140; Lea, i, 328-9; Langlois, 38-9; Haskins, 210. 16 This is a much quoted statement of Lea, i, 328; Haskins, 207.

Was There an Inquisition in Reformation France?

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By 1233, therefore, canon and civil laws specified duties and penalties, without machinery or procedures; thus all endeavours were experimental and ad hoc, leading to a variety of practice. In Languedoc, where the need was greatest, the Inquisition took root and gradually became institutionalised at Toulouse and Carcassonne. Extensive records were preserved and, out of experience, a body of practice and customs emerged. Successive popes through Innocent IV — who authorised the use of torture in 1252 - to Alexander IV, Urban IV, and Clement IV, continued to add to the corpus juris canonici on the subject of heresy.17 Besides Toulouse and Carcassonne, Paris also became a centre of the Dominican Inquisition.18 In 1235, Gregory IX appointed Robert le Petit, called le Bougre, inquisitor general for all France, and in 1255 Alexander IV placed the Inquisition for the whole kingdom under the Provincial Prior of Paris. While this did not — in practice — mean that no one else would ever make appointments, it did mean that, thenceforth, a senior Dominican always served as inquisitor general. He would have up to six inquisitors under him, operating wherever need arose. Mortier, historian of the Dominicans, has said that the early history of the Inquisition in France (that is to say outside Languedoc) is difficult to establish. It has never been more than fragmentary, presumably because its activity was only spasmodic and ad hoc.19 Charged with the extirpation of heresy, it was natural that the crown should have taken part in the Inquisition from the earliest times. Robert le Bougre is known to have received futl royal support and protection and, soon after the crown was possessed of Toulouse, the king began to intervene in the troubled affairs of the Inquisition. Its theory was simple but, in practice, the respective role of the bishops, friars inquisitors, and the secular authority could never be precisely or definitively settled. Parallel activities, with or without friction, were frequently to occur, both in the middle ages and still more in the sixteenth century. It was, therefore, equally natural for subjects to turn to the king, and for him, or his immediate servants, to be the arbiters. Thus Philip IV sent a team of enqueteurs, one of whom was Richard 17 Raskins, 208. Hallam, 229-30. 18 The first Dominican houses were established at Toulouse and Paris. Mortier, Histoire abrege, 28-9. 19 Raskins, 219-30, 231, 2434; Mortier, Histoire abrege, 68-70; Mortier, Histoire des Maitres, 358-9, 499; Lea, ii, 119; M. J. C. Douais, Documents pour servir d I'histoire de I'inquisition dans le Languedoc, 2 vols (Paris, 1900), i, pp' xxii-xxv; Hallam, 230, 234' The inquisitor general was, traditionally, the prior himself. However, in the sixteenth century, it may have been the vicaire of the Gallican Congregation; the matter is unclear.

18

Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-1589

Leneveu, aparlementaire?® The parlement of Paris, principal arm of the crown, evolved out of the curia regis into a sovereign court while the Inquisition was developing into a southern institution. Space precludes an account of the gradual process by which the parlement came to be 'juge souverain des choses de Peglise ... interprete officiel et gardien de la double puissance des rois dans Tordre spirituel et temporelle'. Given the responsibility of the king to extirpate heresy, it was only to be expected that, as his sovereign court grew in authority, it would come to dominate the Inquisition. It was quite simply the most suitable secular authority to exercise that responsibility, and not least because the parlement was, itself, a quasi ecclesiastical body. It comprised not only the six spiritual peers but, more important, a varying number of conseillers-clercs, as well as laymen learned in canon law. The development of royal justice opened the way for a system of appeals, in ecclesiastical cases the 'appel comme d'abus', which eventually clinched the supremacy of lay over spiritual courts. The parlement did not judge of doctrine but, by intervening in sentencing, punishing and appointments, it both recognised and claimed responsibility in heresy matters. By providing for appeals, it alleviated — at least in theory — one of the harshest features of the Inquisition. By the sixteenth century, appeals from the Inquisition to the parlement were common in Toulouse.21 The monastic Inquisition of the Dominicans gradually became dormant as heresy died out and other problems dominated the later middle ages; but the provisions of 1233 were never rescinded. Thus, in the north, the residual Inquisition of the sixteenth century was only skeletal but, in Languedoc, it survived as a recognisable institution, with its own premises. In both cases it was, however, something of an anachronism in the very different world of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Obviously, then, the authority of the crown and the jurisdiction of the parlements were more extensive and effective than the influence and activity of the Dominicans could possibly be. Nor were the Dominicans any longer the principal arbiters in France of 20 Joseph R. Strayer, The Reign of Philip the Fair (Princeton, 1980), 14, 17, 76, 87, 261 seq. 21 Originally the parlement of Paris covered the whole kingdom. The parlement of Toulouse was founded in 1443 and, by 1553 there were seven provincialparlementSiE. Maugis, Histoire du Parlement de Paris, 2 vols (Paris, 1914), ii, 1; Ferdinand Lot & Robert Fawtier, Histoire des institutions franqaises au moyen age, 2 vols (Paris, 1958), ii, 458; J. H. Shennan, The Parlement of Paris (London, 1968), 58, 82; Felix Aubert, Histoire du Parlement de Paris de Vorigine a Franqois Ier, 1250-1515, 2 vols (Paris, 1894), i, 5; Strayer, 240 seq. Tanon, 550 n. 1; Mentzer, 73.

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19

matters of faith and doctrine, having been superseded by the Sorbonne, founded in 1231, which asserted an influential role in public affairs.22 In the sixteenth century, the control of heresy presented complex new problems. In the first place, the combination of heresy with the invention of printing was revolutionary. Printing provided a far-reaching and incendiary means of propaganda and dissemination. Consequently much of the struggle against heresy related to the multiple problems of censorship, which the friars could never have undertaken. Persecution also centred much less on the genuine 'inquisitio', the precise exposure of private opinions, and more on the control of overt acts and the handling of heretical works. This change reflected the fact that heresy was then a political as well as a religious issue. Its prosecution in France may be closely correlated with both foreign policy and domestic conflicts — in particular the tension between the king and the parlement ?^ The tension between the king and the parlement was never greater than in the sphere of religion, since the parlement had created and steadily defended the principles of Gallican liberties. They had strongly favoured the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (1438) and, conversely, unremittingly opposed the largely political Concordat of 1516. In particular, they opposed the restoration of appeals to Rome — which affected them directly — and of annates. They also deprecated the abolition of the principle of elections to benefices. The Concordat was seen by the parlement, albeit largely mistakenly, as the source of those manifest ecclesiastical evils which, they believed, were opening the way for heresy.24 This conflict between the king and the parlement was clearly reflected in their respective attitudes to the prosecution of heresy and the operation of an Inquisition. Altliough the residual Inquisition could no longer function in its medieval form, its familiar presence was 22 In the mid-fourteenth century, the Dominicans had been gravely affected by plague; they were devastated by the hundred years' war, and divided by the papal Schism. In the fifteenth century they became split between the reformed or Observant communities, and the unreformed Conventual houses. Thus, by the sixteenth century there were not only Provinces, but also Congregations of Observants. Until 1514, there were three Provinces in France: Provence, Toulouse and France, plus the Congregation of France, which comprised the Observant houses of Provence and Toulouse. In that year the twenty-five Observant houses of the Province of France, including the Jacobins in Paris, were detached from the Congregation of Holland and formed into the purely French Gallican Congregation, which escaped the authority of the Provincial of France. Mortier, Histoire abrege, 34-9,179-97. 23 See Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, chaps, i, ii. 24 R. J. Knecht, 'The Concordat of 1516', University of Birmingham HistoricalJournal ix, No. 1 (1963). This article shows that the evils in question did not arise from the Concordat but mostly preceded it.

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evidently taken for granted, and its attitudes and terminology were by no means extinct. One of the most explicit references we have to the residual Inquisition in Francis's reign is the appointment by the Provincial of the Dominicans of Mathieu Ory as one of the Inquisiteurs de la foy. He is said to have been served by six others, operating throughout France. It is interesting to note that Ory's appointment was approved by the king and registered by the parlement.25 Francis I and Henry II actually disposed of a far more powerful Inquisition - in terms of function - than was possible in the thirteenth century. At first it was directed by the parlement upon its own initiative and, after 1530, by the crown through a new series of edicts. Thus, when contemporaries referred, confusingly, to the need to institute the or an Inquisition, they evidently intended the restoration of some form of ecclesiastical direction and control, outside the royal judicial system. To the parlement, such a proposition was obviously inadmissibly retrograde and anti-Gallican. Indeed, as Henry was to discover, it was no longer even possible. When it came to a showdown, the supposedly 'absolute' monarch could not coerce the parlement to implement his will. The first moves against incipient protestantism in France, exemplify the changes discussed, and were inquisitorial in approach and purpose. On 15 April 1521 the Sorbonne denounced the works of Luther, and in June the parlement forbade the publication of religious works without the Faculty's consent.26 Together these measures resurrected the ancient problem of suspects — persons suspected of 'heretical pravity'. It was not, however, until 1525 that the parlement appointed a special commission of two of its own members, and two doctors of theology. These nominees of the parlement were to be designated by the bishop of Paris as his deputies, to prosecute heretics and suspects. This arrangement reflected existing practice in Languedoc, where such commissions of the parlement usually included the inquisitor.27 Part of the new problem, however, was that the parlement of Paris suspected the prelates. Consequently it was concerned about the immunity of the clergy, and the possibility — since the Concordat — of their filing 25 Catalogue des Actes de Franqois I&, 10 vols (Paris, 1887-1908), iii, 208-9, no. 8472, 30 May 1536, letters patent. The details relating to Ory's appointment are disputed, but are not important in this connection. He definitely was a Dominican inquisitor, and attached to the cardinal de Tournon, Ordonnances des rois de France. Regne de Franqois ler, 8 vols. (Paris, 1902-72), viii, 90-1, & n. 1, 15 May 1536; Mortier, Histoire des Maitres, 415-16; Mortier, Histoireabrege, 208; Nathanael Weiss, La Chambre ardente (ed. Geneva, 1970), p. xvii. 26 13 June 1521. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle ,11. 27 C.-A. Mayer, La Religion de Marot (Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance, xxxix) (Geneva, 1960), 141-2;Mentzer, 69-70.

Was There an Inquisition in Reformation France? 21 appeals to Rome. These fears explain their request to the regent, Louise de Savoie,28 to obtain the papal appointment of commissioners to proceed and inform against immune clergy. They also requested letters patent authorising the parlements to force the bishops to empower their nominees to prosecute heretics. The result was a papal bull of 17 May, confirmed by letters patent of 10 June 1525, authorising the new commission of the parlement (with one substitution) to assist the inquisitor of France, according to the usual procedure specified in heresy cases. This commission was to despatch such cases without respect of persons (immune clergy) within the jurisdiction of the parlement of Paris. The secular authorities were required to give the usual support and assistance. The commissioners had wide discretionary powers, and there were no appeals.29 Thus, if the pope had initiated a monastic Inquisition in the thirteenth century, his successor could reasonably be said to have authorised an inquisition parlementaire in the sixteenth century - at least in the jurisdiction of Paris. In January 1527 Francis I replaced the commission of the parlement — albeit juges delegues of the Papacy — by an episcopal commission, plus three theologians appointed by the University as a body. While there were multiple reasons for this, one of them was to loosen the grip of the parlement over the growing problem of heresy.30 If Francis were not in control of the matter, bis foreign policy could be gravely prejudiced. On the other hand, he was shortly to need the support of the parlement in order to modify the treaty of Madrid. This enabled the president, Guillart, to speak out about the danger of religion, and to put pressure on the king to assemble diocesan councils to tackle the problem of heresy.31 Francis needed money, and he consented. The most important of these councils was held in Paris under the chancellor Antoine Duprat, cardinal legate and archbishop of Sens. Duprat condemned the doctrines of Luther and Zwingli, and published a general decree renewing all the medieval canon law upon which the Inquisition had been founded. He also issued sixteen articles of faith, and forty articles of conduct - probably the first serious attempt, before the council of Trent, to define heresy.32 28 Louise de Savoie, mother of Francis I, was regent during his imprisonment in Madrid, following his capture at the battle of Pavia, 1525. 29 Mayer, 142-9. 30 Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 18. 31 24 July 1527, Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 19-20. 32 Philip A. Limborch, The Holy Inquisition, (London, 1825), 140-1; G. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum, nova et amplissima collectio (Paris, 1902), xxxii, 1157-61,1181-3.

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Royal intervention was only necessary if there was to be a uniform, national system. It was not, however, until 1530, after the peace of Cambrai, that Francis I took action. The edict of 29 December 1530 required the parlements, baillis, senechaux, and other officials of royal justice to assist the juges delegues with armed force, and with prison facilities. These 'juges' in question were, in effect, additional inquisitors appointed by the legate, and we know that four were named for the jurisdiction of the parlement of Paris.33 Thenceforth, all these authorities were to proceed against heretics, in conjunction with the inquisitors - presumably ordinary inquisitors - everywhere. Thus, through a cardinal legate and the crown, the full powers of the church and state were marshalled to undertake a form of Inquisition, not identical to that of the middle ages, but performing the same function. In spite of these provisions, in August 1533 Clement VII issued a bull inviting Francis to extirpate heresy and institute the tribunal of the Inquisition in France. Francis's need of a papal alliance, and the marriage of Henri due d'Orleans to Clement's niece, Catherine de Medici, afforded the Papacy some leverage in France. All the same, it is difficult to see either what the pope envisaged, or what Francis intended when, in December, he forwarded the bull to the parlement for registration. Nothing was altered in consequence, in spite of the king's menacing reference to 'main forte et armee'.34 The spread of Zwinglian influence did, however, disturb the king, and he reacted angrily to the notorious affair of the placards — seditious and ubiquitous bill sticking.35 His consequent edict of January 1535 revived two ancient inquisitorial practices: the imposition of the penalties of heresy itself against those who harboured heretics, and rewards for informing — measures which recalled the edicts of Louis VIII, 1226, and Louis IX, 1228.36 The edict of Coucy, July 1535, not only recalled, but also extended early inquisitorial practice. This edict was the first in the series to refer to the death penalty which, since time immemorial, had been imposed upon obstinate heretics. Now, however, it was extended to the new offence of trafficking in heretical works, and for the propagation of heresy by any means.37 The edict of Coucy throws a flicker of light upon the current inquisitorial practice. It permitted the release and restoration of certain culprits, if they abjured before the bishop or his vicar general and the 33 34 35 36 37

Catalogue, vi, supplement, 240, no. 20120, 29 December 1530, letters patent. Mayer, 150-1,10 December 1533, Francis I to the parlement of Paris. 17 October 1534. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 28-9. Catalogue, iii, 8, no. 7486, 29 January 1535, edict of Paris. Catalogue, iii, 23-4, no. 7559, 23 February 1535; 109, no. 7990,16 July 1535.

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23

inquisiteur de lafoy. Further to the death penalty, another inquisitorial element was revived in 1539, when the parlement was authorised to use torture in certain circumstances. It was, however, already an aspect of criminal procedure.38 The execution for heresy of an inquisitor in Toulouse influenced the king to grant the parlement of Toulouse cognisance of heresy cases in the first instance.39 In June 1539, this authorisation was extended not only to the other parlements, but also to the baillis and senechaux, who might all dispose of such cases, without appeal. This diminished the relative importance of the parlements. Since the parlements would brook no interference with their established right to hear appeals, and the church could not accept the jurisdiction of secular authorities in matters of doctrine, this was an ill-considered edict, and it was not registered. Thenceforth disputed jurisdictions and genuine confusion distracted attention from the main objective. The objections of the parlement were quickly rectified in 1540, when heresy cases from all other courts were to be sent to the chambre criminelle of the parlements for judgement. The edict described heresy as 'lese-majeste, sedition et perturbation de nostre estat et repos public\ a clause which doubtless reflected a growing preoccupation with problems of law and order. This, however, was hardly a new conception: heresy had been described as a crime - if not as treason - in the letters patent of 1226. Nothing was done to placate the prelates until 1543, when the judgement of heresy was attributed to the church, and sedition to the state. But, since heresy itself was sedition, this fumbling distinction proved to be unworkable, and the edict was not published.40 One way out of this impasse might be to employ special tribunals — which is what the Inquisition had originally been. Thus, in 1545, Francis instituted a special chambre in the parlement of Rouen. The parlement, inquisitors and bishops had already co-operated in Normandy for many years.41 When Henry II ascended the throne in 1547, he inherited both the problem of heresy - just when the influence of Calvin was beginning to be felt — and also procedures which were weakened by confusion and conflict. Henry, furthermore, quickly began to suspect the royal judiciary, including the parlement of Paris, while the parlement itself suspected the prelates. In these circumstances, Henry's tendency was to try to increase the relative role of the church in a more active 38 39 40 41

Catalogue, iv, 14, no. 11072, 24 June 1539. Catalogue, iii, 660, no. 10534,16 December 1538. Catalogue, iv, 474, no. 13225, 23 July 1543. A. Floquet, Histoire du Parlement de Normandie, 1 vols (Rouen, 1840), ii, 223 seq.

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persecution. Thus his mounting desire for what he envisaged as an Inquisition5, was evidently connected with an effort to break the control of the parlement over heresy matters. Conversely, it was the parlement itself which resisted and thwarted his will — probably more for Gallican liberties than for doctrinal reasons. The matter ended in a serious breach between king and parlement. From his accession, Henry was under the influence of Charles de Guise, for whom he immediately obtained a cardinal's hat. At the coronation, this cardinal of Lorraine received from Henry an oath which conformed to the imperial decree of 1232, to exterminate 'tous ceux que 1'eglise lui designera comme imbus d'erreurs'.42 It was not, however, very obvious what further action Henry could take, and his first pre-occupations were, in any case, with foreign policy and a rebellion. It would appear that he hoped for more expeditious results by means of a special tribunal on the Rouen model. According to the preamble of the edict of November 1549, the so-called chambre ardente in Paris had been established 'des nostre nouvel avenement5.43 It is doubtful, however, if one should take that too literally, since the registers date only from 2 May 1548. The Paris chambre consisted of ten members, chosen from several parlements, presided over by Pierre Lizet, premier president of Paris. This chambre ardente was to dispose of heresy cases without appeal. Nevertheless, the parlement opposed the chambre, perhaps because they were implacably opposed to all special tribunals. In January 1550, they requested the closure of the chambre ardente, its cases to go to the chambre criminelle, as in 1540. The registers ceased forthwith, although the request is said to have been refused. There is, however, some indication that the chambre de la reine, said to be the same thing, still existed in 1558.44 However this may be, the chambre ardente did nothing to dispel the hostility and confusion which arose from the later edicts of Francis 1. Except that it restored the sovereignty of the parlements in respect of appeals, Henry's edict of November 1549 only increased the practical difficulties by requiring a complex, joint civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction in cases involving both heresy and derivative offences. It is interesting to note that although the appointment of the Inquisitor, Ory, had been confirmed by the parlement in 1536, in 1550 he was not 42 Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 41. 43 E. Haag, La France Protestante, 10 vols (ed. Geneva, 1966), x, 16, 19 November 1549. 44 Maugis, ii, 7, n. 1; 8, & n. 1 & 2; Weiss, p. Ixxi seq. There is some suggestion that the edict of 1549 abolished the chambre ardente, but there is nothing to this effect in the text. Haag, x, 14-17; Mentzer, 71-2; Gaston Zeller, Les Institutions de la France au XVIe siecle (Paris, 1948), 179.

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25

required to report to anyone but the bishops.45 Henry would appear to be excluding the parlement in every way he could. Conflicts of jurisdiction were not, however, the only problem. Henry made no secret of the fact that he regarded the judiciary as suspect.46 This may partly explain his expansion, in January 1551, of the new, royal presidial courts, which were established throughout the country. In the edict of Chateaubriant, 27 June 1551 - described as 'un vrai code de persecution' - the presidiaux received the same powers as the parlements to proceed against disorders arising from heresy cases, and to pass judgement without appeal. The cognisance of simple heresy had been restored to the church (1543, 1549). But as (1540, 1543, 1549) heresy was itself sedition, the confusion remained insurmountable. The edict of Chateaubriant revived three further elements of the medieval inquisition, the pattern that Henry appears to have had in mind: the ineligibility of heretics for certain offices; compulsory informing and rewards, and the active tracking down of heretics — also, in this case, of heretical works. A later Guisard edict of September 1559 added the razing of houses where heretical activities occurred, a stipulation of the imperial decree of 1232.47 It was reported by the nuncio, Santa-Croce, in February 1553, that Henry had decided to establish a special heresy council.4 8 This might have been a conciliar version of the chambre ardente — the council being the only body superior to the parlements. Alternatively, Henry may have been thinking in terms of the Spanish 'suprema', the principal organ of the Inquisition in Spain. Then, in 1555 - or possibly in 1554 - Henry submitted for registration an edict of the Inquisition, which was rejected by two successive semestres of the parlement.49 Some knowledge of the contents of this important edict can be gleaned from a remonstrance of the president Seguier, and the conseiller du Drac, presented to the king at Villers-Cotterets on 22 October 1555. The parlement was still worried about the juridical confusion; they denied that they were dilatory, as the king had alleged, and they resented his suspicions of their orthodoxy. Henry is reported to have complained that, Yil en falloit choisir douze en chaque semestre pour punir les Lutheriens [a chambre ardente] il estime qu'ils 45 A. Fontanon, Les Gdits et ordonnances des rots de France, 4 vols (Paris, 1611), iv, 226-7. 46 Haag, x, 23-24, 27 June 1551, edict of Chateaubriant, arts, xxiii, xxv. 47 Fontanon, iv, 259-60,4 September 1559. 48 J. Lestocquoy, Ed., Acta Nuntiaturae Gallicae, ix, Correspondance du nonce en France, Prospero Santa-Croce, 1552-1554 (Rome, Paris, 1972), 143. 49 From 1554, different personnel sat turn and turn about. Zeller, 151.

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ne se pourraient trouver'. The king, Seguier went on, had been told that the parlement was afraid of inquisitors. On the contrary, he declared, Tinquisition mise en 1'ordinaire par personnes dignes peut etre bonne'. If, however, the king wished to make use of 'Inquisitors', they requested him to employ only 'gens approuves', limited to conducting enquiries and making reports. This would appear to mean that any new inquisitors; were only to prepare heresy cases for other authorities, and not themselves to act as a special tribunal; clearly the word 'inquisitor' was being used in different senses, which contemporaries evidently understood. The reasons advanced by Seguier for the parlement's refusal to register the edict of the Inquisition are revealing. For laymen and clergy in minor orders, he said, there already existed the edict — presumably of Chateaubriant, 27 June 1551 - and, for the clergy, the ecclesiastical courts. What the king now proposed would, they averred, ruin his royal justice and augment that of the church. This was because the edict ascribed to the church the judgement of laymen in heresy cases, without appeal. Secular courts would be left with only the punishment of the condemned. That was, indeed, how the medieval Inquisition had worked. Thus the core of the objection appears to have been the abolition of the well-established right of appeal to the parlement. That, Seguier said, would deprive laymen of legal protection and, in effect, the clergy also. An edict of confiscation, which had followed that of the Inquisition, also raised anxieties about the protection of property. Under an independent inquisitorial system, they said, it would be easy to forge the evidence of two witnesses, burn the accused, and seize his property; this measure would therefore affect every nobleman in France. There can be no doubt that sequestrations and confiscations, which ruined the innocent and guilty alike, had been one of the harshest and most arbitrary aspects of the early Inquisition. There was, the president claimed, with some justification, no need for 'an Inquisition'. Adequate provision already existed for the punishment of heresy by referring laymen to the presidial courts, with appeal to the parlements, and clergy to the ecclesiastical courts, with the same right of appeal. This was not, it should be noted, a statement of the current regulations, but evidently of what the parlement was prepared to accept. For the purpose of receiving clerical appeals, they proposed that their number of conseillers-clercs should be increased.5 ° The parlement may therefore be seen to have upheld the function of the Inquisition, but purged of some of its undesirable aspects. These, after all, had originally stemmed more from inadequate machinery than 50

Maugis, ii, 3-5.

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27

from malevolent principles. But they would not accept an Inquisition which could function wholly outside the royal judical system, and they had consistently resisted any interference with appeals. Such retrograde steps as Henry's Inquisition edict evidently proposed, would necessarily have appeared both nonsensical and oppressive. The king, however, no longer trusted the parlement. The Inquisition seems, therefore, to have been quite narrowly conceived, not as the function of prosecuting heresy, but as the judgement of laymen by special ecclesiastical courts, outside the royal judicial system, with no security of property, and no right of appeal. The controversy revealed by the remonstrance of October 1555 accounts for the contents of Henry's letter of 13 February 1557 to his ambassador in Rome, Odet de Selve.51 In it, Henry admitted to having agreed to establish an Inquisition in France 'suivant la forme de droit, pour estre le vray moyen d'extirper la racine de telles erreurs'.52 The proposal, however, had raised certain difficulties. Henry now wished the pope to instruct a cardinal and other prominent churchmen, authorising them to appoint suitable persons to organise an Inquisition 'en la forme et maniere accoustumee de droit, sous 1'autorite du Saint Si&ge Apostolique, avec 1'invocation du bras seculier et juridiction temporelle' — a fair description of the medieval Inquisition. That would have relegated the royal courts to the auxiliary role originally attributed to the secular power. The king undertook to support this Inquisition with all his might.5 3 On 26 April 1557 the pope accordingly appointed the cardinals Lorraine, Bourbon and Chatillon as inquisitors general for all France. While a commission of cardinal pluralists was unlikely to commend itself to the parlement, the terms of the commission allowed, potentially at least, for some degree of compromise. The cardinals might delegate both the cognisance of heresy cases in the first instance, as well as authority to hear appeals. The Inquisition, as originally, was to be imposed with the co-operation of the bishop, in each diocese. The papal brief was formulated into letters patent of 24 July 1557 for registration by the parlement. Henry added the stipulation that the

51 G. Ribier, Lettres et memoires d'estat, 2 vols (Blois, 1666), ii, 677-8, 13 February 1556/7, Henry II to de Selve. The time lag is accounted for by the preoccupation of foreign policy. 52 Rene Ancel, Nonciatures de France, i, parts i and ii (1909,1911) Nonciatures de Paul IV, vol. i (2), 458-9, 11 August 1556, instructions from Carafa to Rucellai. Henry had agreed to what the pope desired in respect of heresy. 53 The pope agreed to address his brief to Lorraine. Ribier, ii, 678-84, 28 March 1556/7, de Selve to Henry II.

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cardinals might only delegate their powers to persons of proven quality. Whereas it was normal for the parlement to receive the oath of inquisitors, they were now to be sworn to fidelity before the privy council. Henry, however, yielded a little in the matter of appeals. The cardinals were to establish appeals tribunals in the parlement towns. At least six out of ten members were to be conseillers of the parlement.54 On the same day as the letters patent, the king also issued the edict of Compiegne, which vastly extended the death penalty in heresy cases. Following his undertaking to the pope, Henry also declared that such disorders should be punished and suppressed by force as well as by justice. This could be interpreted as proclaiming a latter-day crusade. The letters patent and the edict were not registered until six months later, in the presence of the king, which indicates compulsion. Furthermore, the parlement evidently obstructed their execution, since the papal commission to the cardinals was apparently rescinded the following June 1558; certainly the proposed new Inquisition was never established.5 5 There is no sign that the cardinals did more than appoint four inquisitors general, whose oaths were received by the parlement. In accordance with the remonstance of 1555, they were only empowered to attend to doctrinal matters.56 This attitude of the parlement to the edicts of religion and the form of Inquisition attempted by Henry II was entirely consistent with their Gallican opposition to the Concordat, and their perfectly proper aversion from extraordinary tribunals. Such tribunals not only detracted from the authority of the parlement, but also threatened civil liberties and juridical standards. Henry, however, could not be expected to appreciate their intransigent opposition in the face of a rapidly worsening problem. At the end of April 1559, the wars being over, Henry rounded on them, demanding to know from each and every member what he believed should be done. As a result, Anne du Bourg and seven others were arrested — which was only a very small minority. If the parlement could frustrate the Inquisition, they were powerless to divert the king from his martial intentions, proclaimed in letters patent on 2 June; it was not the parlement but his fatal accident which supervened.5 7 The conduct of the Guises, who assumed power under Francis II, suggests that they may have been prompting Henry. Lorraine resumed 54 Fontanon, iv, 228-9, 24 July 1557, letters patent. 55 Ludwig von Pastor, Histoire des papes, 16 vols (Paris, 1888-1934), xiv, 261. The correspondence of the nuncio, Lorenzo Lenzi, affords no enlightenment. 56 Maugis, ii, 7. 57 Lucien Romier, Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion, 2 vols (Paris, H3-14), ii, 362-4, letters patent, 2 June 1559.

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the struggle for the registration of the edict of the Inquisition, possibly hoping that the recent arrests had altered the disposition of the parlement. The following August, he called a meeting with senior officials to discuss the matter and, allowing certain — unspecified — amendments, the king again ordered the parlement to register the edict.58 The Guises, however, could hardly hope to succeed where Henry II had failed. Besides, from March 1560, the policy of the crown moved away from various forms of Inquisition towards the equally unacceptable policy of licenced co-existence. The heresy of the sixteenth century had posed a juridically insoluble problem, and the parlement had reached an impasse. 58 Ribier, ii, 817, 10 August 1559, Francis II to the avocat and procureurs generaux du parlement de Paris.

Princes, Politics and Religion, 1547-1589

PREFATORY NOTE Catherine de Medici is one of the most controversial figures of the early modem period. Her name has come to symbolise her age and both have long retained an exceptionally powerful emotive force. Consequently they have attracted many writers primarily seeking to apportion blame for the sombre events of the sixteenth century. This has resulted in a bewildering multiplicity of judgements upon Catherine, ranging from the scurrilous to the fulsome. Much of what has been written about her appeared, in any case, before the publication in nine volumes between 1880 and 1905 of her vast correspondence, which has still been very little used. Since this essay was first published in 1966, I have myself partially superseded it. This is, therefore, a new and fully revised edition. No authoritative work has yet appeared on Catherine de Medici and we remain, as I originally stated in the preface, largely ignorant of many factors with a bearing upon her life and work. Meanwhile, the purpose of this essay is necessarily limited. I have tried to escape from mechanical cliches and the polemics of the pamphleteers, seeking to place Catherine's efforts and achievements in a more accurate historical perspective.

3

CATHERINE DE MEDICI AND THE ANCIEN REGIME The career of Catherine de Medici is generally seen, with literal precision, as divided from the seventeenth century — and hence in popular parlance from the ancien regime - by the exceptional reign of Henry IV which joins the two centuries in more than a purely temporal sense. Similarly, the civil wars, habitually designated 'wars of religion', are tidily stowed behind the edict of Nantes, 1598. In this way the complexities of the sixteenth century may be conveniently disposed of, and France can be seen to have shared in the internal crises and external wars which were the common experience of many countries in the first half of the seventeenth century. But such a simplification renders both Catherine's career and the seventeenth century incomprehensible by ignoring the distinct, internal unity of what one might call the century of civil wars. This lay between the two great peace treaties of CateauCambresis in 1559 and the Pyrenees in 1659. The problems and crises of the seventeenth century did not spring from the healing reign of Henry IV; they must be traced back at least to the sudden death of Henry II in 1559, and the subsequent outbreak of civil war. Indeed, there is a sense in which this whole period might be regarded as the great crisis or watershed of pre-Revolutionary France. From this crisis a stronger monarchy slowly emerged, permitting the achievements of the grand siecle, before its decline and fall in the eighteenth century. The career of Catherine de Medici, like the crisis itself, proceeded from the accidental death of her husband. Thus, during the first thirty years of this century of troubles, her endeavours to guide the destinies of France rendered her the first custodian of the monarchy which she successfully struggled to preserve. Catherine de Medici - or the little duchess as they called her - was married in 1533 by her uncle, pope Clement VII, to Henry of Orleans, second son of Francis I. Apart from the exigencies of Franco-papal relations, there was every reason why Catherine should have married well in France. Her mother, Madeleine de la Tour d'Auvergne, comtesse de Boulogne, had married Lorenzo dei Medici, duke of Urbino, when he came to Blois in 1518 as papal representative at the christening of the dauphin Francis. Madeleine was descended, on her father's side, from the ancient dukes of Aquitaine and the counts of Auvergne. Her mother, Jeanne de Bourbon- Vendome, was a direct descendant of Saint-Louis, and a princess of the blood. Through this connection, Catherine was a second cousin of Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, first prince of the blood. She was also a cousin by marriage of her own husband Henry, and related to many members of the French nobility, in particular the dukes of Montpensier and Guise. Orphaned almost at birth, she was the heiress of extensive properties in France as well as an Italian inheritance. At the time of her marriage - celebrated by no less

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than thirty-four successive days of feasting - she was considered an advantageous match. She did not lack distinguished suitors - including the King of Scotland — and the customary disparagement of her descent was a later invention of her enemies. Virtually nothing is known of Catherine's childhood in Rome and Florence. She is said to have been charming and vivacious, and blessed with the courageous gaiety she displayed all her life. She grew up with an unswerving sense of duty and was sufficiently well trained and instructed to be received as an adornment into the almost legendary court of France. There she avoided embroilments, behaved with notable discretion and endeared herself to the king. Not only was she cultured and creative, but also energetic and fearless in such taxing pursuits as archery and hunting. Francis therefore admitted her into his circle of intimates. Deeply influenced by the Fontainebleau and Saint-Germain of Francis I, Catherine herself was to become a lavish builder, patron and collector. Her own court was later described by Brantome as a veritable heaven upon earth. If Catherine had more in common with Francis I than with her husband, her marriage was by no means unsuccessful. In spite of Henry's abiding attachment to Diane de Poitiers, and the curious menage a trois which he maintained to the end of his life, the depth and durability of Catherine's love for him is very well attested. It enabled her to suffer this mortification with dignity and civility. Her principal study was always to please him, and her letters suggest that singleminded devotion to Henry was the light of her early life and the inspiration of her widowhood, albeit combined with a certain element of morbidity. This prompted her to dress in black when he took the field and, many years later, to set aside in her Paris house a darkened mourning room. Throughout Henry's reign Catherine lived quietly, withdrawn from the strife of public affairs. Nevertheless, her ability was noted by the Venetian, Contarini, who thought that she deserved to be consulted. It is doubtful, however, if anyone seriously suspected her of being incomparably more able than her husband, for whose sudden death in a tournament she was neither politically nor personally prepared. Over a year later her health was still thought to be endangered by her grief. Catherine had already reached the then advanced age of forty when she was tragically hurled into the political arena and confronted with an unprecedented situation. The year 1559 was already climacteric in the affairs of Europe. But the French Renaissance monarchy was also involved in a domestic crisis when the king's sudden death posed new and even graver problems. The overwhelming importance of the person of the king was a mystical fact in the state of France. Henry had been a legitimate, adult, crowned king, the visible head of the social hierarchy, the theoretical source of patronage and justice, and an effective soldier who defended his frontiers and suppressed revolt. As such, he had provided a principle of unity. But once this principle was destroyed, the

Catherine de Medici and the Ancien Regime

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deficiencies of his government, the youthfulness of his children and the existence of deeply divided factions instantly threatened anarchy. Henry's death also coincided with plague, famine and the aftermath of war, the emergence of the problem of religion in its most acute form, a financial crisis and a breakdown of justice. These conflated problems heralded a long revolutionary period. The dauphin Francis, though not legally a minor, was only fifteen and far from strong. This lent Catherine immediate importance, although her position as queen mother was perilously ill-defined. It was certainly not upon her invitation that the cardinal of Lorraine and his brother Francois due de Guise assumed control of the government. They were already powerful and, in the absence of effective royal support, there was no one at court who could successfully oppose them. Consequently it was the Guises who dominated Francis's brief reign. It was marked by the violence of their religious persecution and by their mounting unpopularity, at least with those who were not their clients. Their determination to control the king, to direct his affairs to their own advantage and to resist any moderate religious settlement, produced a deep cleavage in the state. Such, at least, was the widespread opinion, and emphatically that of Catherine herself. She saw the whole period, from 1559 to the outbreak of civil war in 1562, as a struggle against the Guises and all they stood for. In the absence of a regency for Francis II, there was initially little that Catherine could do to resist the Guises. She opposed their demands for a form of inquisition, and strove to control and limit.the causes of conflict. She was assisted in this by the appointment, in May 1560, of the distinguished chancellor, Michel de L'Hospital, who added liis support and wisdom to her own restraining counsels. On his advice - and that of the admiral, Gaspard de Coligny, seigneur de Chatillon, who was soon to become a huguenot leader — Catherine called an assembly of notables, which met at Fontainebleau in August 1560. L'Hospital hoped, in this way, to draw the crown closer to the princes of the blood, Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre and his brother Louis, prince de Conde. Both these princes, were it not for the Guises, would normally have been prominent in the council. The Bourbons declined to attend this assembly, though they dared not boycott the estates general, summoned to Orleans in December. The Guises therefore seized upon this opportunity to try to destroy them. Conde was arrested on arrival, charged with heresy and lese-majeste and summarily condemned. His life, however, was dramatically saved by the premature death of Francis II on 5 December 1560. The failure of such an audacious coup raised a mortal enmity between the Guises and Conde. This was a most inauspicious beginning to the minority of Charles IX. The death of Francis II, though another personal calamity, partially released Catherine from the control of the Guises. It enabled her to secure the regency necessary for Charles IX, who was only ten. The

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regency was ultimately confirmed by the estates general, and Navarre, as first prince of the blood, was correctly associated with Catherine as lieutenant general. The achievement was an indication of Catherine's political dexterity, but there is no sign that she considered it a triumph. On the contrary, she viewed the future with apprehension. In a letter to her daughter Elisabeth, queen of Spain, Catherine declared that her principal purpose was to serve God and maintain her authority. This was not for herself, but in order to preserve the kingdom and for the benefit of her sons whom, she said, she loved as Henry's children. Years later she reminded Henry HI that ever since his father's death she had had no wish to live except in the service of God and the crown. It was probably true that there was nothing more of life that she desired for herself; certainly she possessed no rosy illusions about her dawning political career. In the same, celebrated letter, she described not only her personal desolation, but also the danger of her public position in a deeply divided kingdom in which there was no one — she meant of the nobility - in whom she could trust. This, among other private letters, is particularly valuable because it disposes of the still prevalent opinion that Catherine was ambitious and avid for power. Ambition, however, was scarcely a moral force capable of sustaining her, as something did, through years of unremitting struggle. Besides, she was so obviously dwelling on the past, not grasping at the future, and her intentions were always conservative. She strove to restore the state and order which had previously existed under Francis I and Henry II, before her world collapsed. Catherine's acquisition of the regency was a corresponding setback for the Guises, who lost direct control of the royal authority; but they were not disgraced and remained powerful at court. The struggle was therefore intensified, since Catherine had acquired some initiative, while the Guises had lost ground. The regency was no sooner established than they began conspiring to oust Catherine from power, and quarrelled violently with Navarre. This crisis centred on a struggle for control of the council, and swiftly conjured the spectre of civil war. Thwarted in their endeavours, they turned to Spain, seeking the leadership of Philip II for a political association known as the Triumvirate. This was formed in April 1561 and consisted originally of Guise himself, the constable Montmorency and Saint-Andre, a marshal of France. Together these three largely controlled the army. They were later to obtain the adherence of Navarre by feigning sympathy for his primary interest, the recovery of Spanish Navarre or at least the exaction of proper compensation. It is evident that the Guises had been in touch with Spain since the negotiations for the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. But their more positive connection in 1561 introduced a new factor into French politics and licensed the subversive intervention of Spain with which France was cursed throughout the century of civil wars. At court the Triumvirate began to adopt an insolent, hectoring attitude; so did

Catherine de Medici and the Ancien Regime

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Chantonnay, the Spanish ambassador. When censured for his absence from the court sermon at Easter, Guise accused Catherine of 'drinking at two wells' in her religious policy; he also announced his contempt for her moderate religious edicts and flaunted his wish to fight the protestants. Chantonnay, for his part, threatened her with exile to her chateau of Chenonceaux. Evidence suggests that Catherine knew of the existence of the Triumvirate as an organised faction; certainly she was vehement in her condemnation of the Guises. While they were generally referred to collectively, it was primarily Lorraine who incurred distrust and antipathy, the duke having been a popular and colourful military hero. Catherine complained to her daughter Elisabeth that it was they — 'who were used to playing the king' — who prevented her from restoring order in France. She resented their humiliating treatment of her during Francis's reign, and their constant misconstruction of her conduct. She believed that she was hated on their account, and would never be obeyed while they were associated with the government. Nor was she moved by their pious pretexts, but thought them obsessed by grandeur and greed. In the words of L'Hospital, they deemed it a profitless waste to serve a child. In spite of this insubordinate hostility, Catherine and L'Hospital strove for some practical settlement of the problem of religion and for the reform of abuses in the state. Consequently they sought the advice and consent of several traditional forms of council. They had begun by trying, with the edict of Romorantin in May 1560, to detach religion from politics, and to distinguish effectively between heresy and treason. But this, and several other moderate edicts, were all delayed and obstructed by the parlement of Paris. So was the great reforming ordinance of Orleans - potentially capable of having altered the history of France - which L'Hospital formulated in 1561 from the cahiers of the estates general. Neither Catherine nor L'Hospital was responsible for the colloque of Poissy, a national council which opened on 9 September 1561 and lasted for over a month. This had been determined by the assembly of Fontainebleau, should the pope fail to call what the French really wanted, a new, general council, franc et libre. Such a council, whether general or national, was formally promised to the estates general in January 1561, so great was the pressure of public demand. Catherine, however, was among those who still believed in the possibility of doctrinal reconciliation because, as she said, the protestants held no 'monstrous opinions'. In a sense, she was right, since a mixed commission of moderates produced several formulae of masterly ambiguity. But the concurrent assembly of prelates was implacably opposed to the whole enterprise. The colloque of Poissy was probably foredoomed to failure, if only because the alignment of parties was too far advanced. Catherine may

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have placed some hope in the formal reconciliation, which she had staged in August, between Conde and Guise. This seeming charade was actually a vital expedient to enable both factions to meet at court. But, as one contemporary observed, their stomachs were averse. Both sides were arming and the Guises left court, without licence to depart, before the colloque was over. The Triumvirate had lately been threatening Catherine with the power of Spain, and treating her with personal discourtesy. They even roused her in the night with alarming reports. Chantonnay supported them with a policy of intimidation. Nor were the catholics any longer the only offenders. Years later, Catherine recorded how admiral Coligny, seeking to impel her into the protestant camp, was also a frequent harbinger of disturbing news. This might partly account for her lifelong distrust of him. The frustration of Poissy publicly confirmed a state of deadlock between the parties which, if most generally expressed in terms of religion, was by no means confined to a single issue. In view of the danger of civil war, Catherine and L'Hospital were advised to summon to Saint-Germain two representatives from each of the eight parlements. Together with the council — from which the Triumvirate had withdrawn -this assembly produced the celebrated edict of January 1562. This edict formally recognised the existence of organised protestant churches, and brought them under a degree of royal supervision. It conditioned all future protestant thinking because it permitted the cult outside the towns, without otherwise restricting its celebration. Thus it was also a recognition of the need for licenced coexistence as the only practicable solution to the problem of religion. The idea of toleration barely existed, and the first edict (of January), no less than the last edict (of Nantes), was primarily a political measure. Their purpose was the preservation of peace until, by the grace of God, the churches should be reunited. It is impossible to determine Catherine's part in the initiative which led to the edict of January. Certainly it showed considerable statemanship. The procedure was irreproachable and it shifted the onus of decision onto the assembly, whose authority was unassailable. It also forced the nobility to show their hand. In spite of its failure, the edict was a triumph for Catherine. Moved to great eloquence by the momentous occasion, her concluding oration evoked both a favourable decision and the unexpected admiration of the papal nuncio. Furthermore, time and subsequent disasters confirmed her judgement that coexistence must be permitted, if France and the monarchy were to survive. This, perhaps, was the real issue. The departure of the Guises from court and council in October 1561 was a flagrant act of insubordination which had already placed them in the wrong. Their subsequent refusal to honour the edict of January was tantamount to declaring the war for which they had openly been preparing. Perhaps most serious of all was the decline of huguenot confi-

Catherine de Medici and the Ancien Regime

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dence in the power of the crown and the good faith of catholics. Many of them treated the protestants as outlaws. Their deprivation of present security and future hope released a universal quarrel which could be pursued in countless ways and at any point on the social scale. Catherine's position was enigmatic in the spring of 1562, before the outbreak of civil war in June. It is still uncertain to what extent she was a prisoner and tool of the Guises, or covertly inclined to seek protestant support from the prince de Conde. If she could not publicly range the crown on the side of the protestants, neither was her cause confounded with that of the triumvirs. Consequently she was isolated, while suffering the importunity of both factions. This alone would account for the remarkable fervour and perseverance of her efforts to make peace, 'in spite of the very heavens and all the elements'. But, as she was publicly bound to deny that she and the king were detained or coerced by the Triumvirate, she quickly came to be identified with the catholics, who legally controlled the royal forces and a number of high offices obtained in Henry's reign. Her real situation, however, was much more complex, and very unstable. The war itself was brief and settled nothing. But it did break the deadlock which had led to violence, and altered both Catherine's position and that of the factions. In the first place, the Triumvirate no longer existed: Navarre and Saint-Andre had died in battle and the constable, Montmorency, had been taken prisoner; so, on the protestant side, had the prince de Conde. These two contenders could therefore be induced to negotiate. But the principal factor, both in dissolving the Triumvirate and in enabling Catherine to conclude the treaty and edict of Amboise in March 1563, was the murder of Francois due de Guise. The assault was perpetrated before Orleans on 18 February. Thus the catholics, though ostensibly victorious, had suffered major losses. Since it was their leaders who had done most to constrain the crown, the collapse of the Triumvirate and the return of peace afforded Catherine a modicum of independence. After the conclusion of peace at Amboise, Catherine moved to her lovely chateau of Chenonceaux. There she sought to soothe and reconcile the now depleted court with a spell of dazzling entertainment, before resuming her struggle to impose authority and enforce a minimum of religious toleration. This summer of 1563 was a first turning point in Catherine's career. She and the king had endured a powerful challenge and survived a major crisis, which might well have annihilated the royal authority or subjected the crown to that of Spain. If, as regent and a woman, Catherine had lacked the power to prevent a clash or to coerce the parties, once the contenders had been weakened she strove to sustain the crown above the factions. This would at least preserve the traditional conception of the monarchy until, as she then hoped, Charles himself might command obedience. The nobility would normally submit to their sovereign in person, but not to any substitute

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authority. Determined not to hazard her new advantage, she refused to grant the prince de Conde Navarre's former status of lieutenant general. He had, after all, signed the treaty of Hampton Court with queen Elizabeth in September 1562. He was therefore responsible for the English occupation of Le Havre. This, if considerably less dangerous, was not less reprehensible than the Spanish affiliations of the Triumvirate. Instead of promoting the prince — of whose amorous activities she also disapproved — Catherine simply enlisted his services to expel the English from Le Havre in the summer of 1563. Then, upon the return journey, during which she was dangerously ill, she declared the king of age in the parlement of Rouen. This was a precaution, intended to augment the royal authority. It was also a decisive act of political courage, since Charles was an ailing child of only thirteen. Furthermore, it was a pointed reproof for the obstructive parlement of Paris. Upon this occasion Catherine drafted a set of instructions for the king's future guidance. This testament reveals her conception of his duty and of the tasks confronting the crown. The four points which Catherine emphasised were authority, obedience, religion and justice. The king was to offer leadership, and to establish his regime by restoring the proper function of the court. As the centre of attraction, it should hold the state of France in order. She gave priority to public affairs, within a regular routine, and to the satisfaction of the nobles, whose expectations must be fulfilled. This serious political maxim was impressed upon Catherine by Francis I, who already thought the nobles dangerous if insufficiently amused in time of peace. It therefore indicates their uncertain loyalty and suggests her awareness of social tensions. For these reasons Francis had maintained a resplendent court and garrisons in the provinces. These had provided for defence, but also served as chivalric centres for local magnates, dissipating what Catherine called their esprit de pis faire. After specifying the need for order and discipline at court, of whose laxity she disapproved, Catherine turned to the necessity of demonstrating the king's concern for his people. She maintained that those who profited from his unpopularity had neglected his business, excluded envoys and ignored the dispatches for weeks on end. Charles should follow the example of Francis and Henry in welcoming everyone with some personal courtesy, in order to dispel what she called the menteuses inventions of those who had tried to destroy the king's image. He should also follow the examples of Louis XII and Francis I in relation to patronage and the control of the provinces. Louis, she said, had carried about a complete list of office holders and was informed of every vacancy. By the strict control of patronage he had excluded the importunate and reserved for the crown the obedience and service of those he promoted. Francis was also said to have kept lists of provincial notables. He purchased the services of a dozen or so in every province to keep himself minutely informed of public and private affairs in town

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and country. By similar means, Charles should be able to obviate the formation of leagues and conspiracies — from which his reign had already suffered. Finally, Catherine commended to him the care of merchants and the urban bourgeoisie. This curious document, entrusted to the young king's tutor, ignored a number of important matters, including finance and military strength. It reveals Catherine's inevitably traditional view of the monarchy, and would appear to imply that she had been powerless, as regent, to act as she advised. It also betrays the administrative frailty of the crown, and its tenuous hold on provincial loyalty within a supposedly centralised state. Catherine's description sounds archaically simple, but the fact remains that royal control was easily shattered. In the spring of 1564, Catherine embarked upon one of the most courageous and imaginative endeavours of her life, a vast, elaborate progress of court and government round the provinces of France, lasting for over two years. She hoped to restore the public image of the crown, to diffuse a sense of authority and leadership, and to supervise the execution of the edict of Amboise. This marathon journey included the celebrated 'interview' at Bayonne, in the summer of 1565. At this curious, frontier meeting between the courts of France and Spain, a series of political exchanges were offset by a group of the most costly and spectacular festivals ever devised by Catherine or witnessed by the Valois court. They were intended to please her adored Elisabeth, queen of Spain, and also to demonstrate the vitality of France. Catherine had proposed a meeting with Philip II as early as August 1559. But, in the interval, relations had deteriorated. If she could only see Elisabeth, and effect some improvement at a personal level, she might be able to neutralise the influence of Spain. This was essential in order to safeguard the independence of France and to minimise catholic disapproval of the recent peace and edict of Amboise. Certainly the current trend towards hostile relations could not safely be allowed to continue. Catherine's intentions had been perfectly sound. Nevertheless, the interview had such disastrous results as to constitute a second turning point in her career. It was Philip himself — as well as Elisabeth — whom Catherine had been hoping to meet. But arrangements and the journey were both far advanced before she knew for certain that the duke of Alva was coming instead of Philip. He was no diplomat, skilled in the art of insubstantial discussion, but a military extremist of blood and iron with whom she had nothing whatever in common. It is now accepted that nothing was concluded at Bayonne; but this was neither known nor believed at the time. The episode not only gave rise to sinister rumours, it also had a profound psychological effect upon the huguenots, undermining their confidence in Catherine and the edict. The effects of Bayonne became even more serious when, in 1566, Alva was appointed to suppress the revolt in the Netherlands. The huguenots, who saw that conflict in its religious and social aspects, were seized

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with something akin to panic. Not only was Catherine gravely compromised, but popular identification of these two movements ensured the maximum impact on France of the affairs of the Netherlands. Thus the French civil wars were extended right into the pattern of international politics. If Catherine had succeeded at Baypnne in reviving the entente established by the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, before Henry's death in 1559, the later civil wars might have been of more purely domestic concern. As it was, the resurgence of Franco-Spanish hostility became definitive (if not necessarily or consistently apparent), in the mid 1560s, just when Catherine was about to need catholic support on account of the second and third civil wars. The French crown therefore came to be threatened by the dual danger of civil war on the one hand and, on the other, the hostility of Spain. These were circumstances in which the exploitation and perpetuation of trouble in France — preferably trouble of protestant origin - was bound to become a principle of Spanish foreign policy. Such exploitation provided Spain with a highly effective means of neutralising the power of France and curtailing the independent action of the crown. Of the two dangers, war with Spain was undoubtedly the greater, and several factors contributed to a steady deterioration of Franco-Spanish relations. The death of Elisabeth de Valois in 1568 severed an intimately personal link between Catherine and Philip; various French incursions into the Netherlands were a recurrent source of friction, and the gradual decline of Turkish pressure on Spanish resources in the Mediterranean resulted in a more northerly orientation of Spanish policy. Catherine therefore become more afraid of a clash with Spain than of any other calamity — a political assessment which was amply vindicated by the subsequent experience of Henry IV. At no time is Catherine's real position more difficult to assess than during the years 1566—70, following Bayonne and the signal failure of her whole arduous journey. This had not perceptibly enhanced the king's authority or done much to enforce the religious edict. It is normally assumed that Catherine was all-powerful at this time, and consequently responsible for everything that happened. It is also assumed that she chose to alter her policy, and to turn against the protestants whom she had previously appeared to favour. It is therefore necessary to consider the circumstances in which she found herself, the extent to which she wielded authority, and the nature of her political connections. After the interview at Bayonne, the protestants came to re-associate Catherine with their extreme opponents. Once again, her image was obscured by the shadow of Lorraine, from whom she had escaped in 1563 when the death of his brother and the collapse of the Triumvirate deprived him of an effective following. When he returned from'the council of Trent, in January 1564, it was therefore natural that he

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should have sought to recover a powerful position at court. But he lacked opportunity until 1566, since he did not take part in the great itinerary. Lorraine, who still represented the brains and ambitions of the former Triumvirate, remained deeply suspect to the protestants. He is the key, both to an understanding of Catherine's position during these years, and to events preceding the second and third civil wars. These began in 1567 and 1568 respectively, largely as a result of Lorraine's instigation. The explosive tensions which menaced France in the mid-15 60s were, to a great extent, related to the murder of the due de Guise. Paradoxically, it was this which had enabled Catherine to make peace in 1563. But, far from rejoicing, she was justly angry and appalled by this fearful precedent which guaranteed the recurrence of trouble by the exploitation of religious strife in a private cause. It is impossible to ascertain who prompted the murder. But the house of Guise accused the admiral, and forthwith prosecuted a violent quarrel against him and his whole house of Chatillon. This new element of vendetta produced a sinister atmosphere of impending disaster and goes a long way towards accounting for the second and third civil wars. The quarrel had reached such feverish, menacing proportions, even before the journey round France, that neither faction would tolerate the other's presence at court, where Lorraine was held to be in danger. The dispute was reserved by the king for later judgement in the council and, in January 1566, Coligny was declared innocent of the murder of Guise. This, if anything, only intensified the quarrel. France resounded with recriminations and informed observers expected a violent outcome. The quarrel was at least a major contributory cause of the crisis known as the incident de Meaux in September 1567 — a matter of weeks after the arrival of Alva in the Netherlands. This was a protestant initiative, apparently to ambush the king and court, though the leaders declared Lorraine to have been their mark. In spite of this unpardonable outrage against the king's person, Catherine's immediate and continuing reaction was still to negotiate for the restoration of peace and the edict of Amboise. This was achieved at Longjumeau in March 1568. But this 'little peace', as it was called, lasted only a few months, and the third civil war began in August 1568. Since Catherine was able, albeit with difficulty, to obtain the peace of Longjumeau and the edict of Amboise in March 1568 and since, early in June, Lorraine was reported to be 'doing all' at court, it is clear that he must have consolidated his influence during April and May. Catherine was gravely ill at the time, and nearly died. Lorraine, a client of Spain and an inveterate enemy of the protestant nobles, was blamed by most protestants and many catholics for machinations which led to the renewal of war in August 1568. Certainly it was due to him that Catherine's edict of Amboise was revoked in September. This followed an acrimonious clash with her trusted councillor, L'Hospital, who re-

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tired from court. These elements of conflict show how Lorraine's return to power had been via a gradual insinuation. Little by little, he proved too strong for Catherine. He succeeded in exploiting the favour of the young due d'Anjou - heir apparent to the throne - whose jealousy of his brother the king aggravated dangerous factions at court. Anjou was appointed lieutenant general following the death, in November 1567, of the old constable Montmorency - the last of the triumvirs. This was an attempt by the crown to regain at least nominal command of the army from the inimical catholics. In these circumstances, given Lorraine's rank and ability, the weakness of Catherine's position and the strained relations with Spain, she was unable to resist his influence or to exclude him from court and council. The resurgence of Lorraine and his affiliation with Anjou, coupled with the temporary effacement of the catholics as a faction, following the loss of their military leaders, fundamentally affected the position of the protestants. This forced them into opposition, whether real or apparent (but the distinction could not long survive) to the crown itself. In view of the non-enforcement of the religious edict, the presence of 6,000 Swiss mercenaries in France, and of Alva's veteran forces in the Netherlands, their only alternative to opposition was a policy of potentially suicidal inactivity. Thus their apprehension and their provocation made them increasingly assertive. Whereas, during the first civil war, attention had focussed on the catholics, in the second and third it lay with the protestants, who were skilfully made to appear the aggressors. If they could not detach him from the court, or capture him without laying an ambush for the king, then it was in vain that they declared Lorraine to be their enemy. But, if the huguenots could see no practical alternative to opposing, or appearing to oppose the crown, Catherine was equally bound to defend it, and the recurrence of war was precisely what Lorraine required to compel her into his extreme catholic camp. In 1568, however, there was another, related and powerful reason for Catherine's catholic affiliations. Conde had, for some time, been in league with the prince of Orange. If, as then seemed imminent, France was to be invaded by pro-protestant forces from the Netherlands, Catherine could only choose the side of Spain, at the same time seeking to avoid any involvement in the affairs of the Netherlands which might lead to a disastrous general war. These are probably the main factors which explain what has often been interpreted as Catherine's fickle adoption of a pro-catholic, Guise, and Spanish policy. In reality, dangerous circumstances had forced her hand, and war had once again blurred the subtler distinctions of peace. This misapprehension may be partly explained by the erroneous assumption that Catherine was all-powerful. However, the sad failures of these years show that far from having enjoyed sovereign authority she was, on the contrary, virtually powerless. Had it been otherwise, Guises and Chatillons would have respected the king's judicial decision

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of 1566, and Catherine's edict of pacification would have been honoured and retained. But in fact she was neither revered nor supported. She had failed to secure the peace, to impose authority, or to subdue the nobles. Because of her rank she was everyone's target, and exposed to a clamour of divergent pretensions. Yet, being politically isolated, she was obliged to employ those about her, in spite of their dubious loyalty and uncertain commitment. Charles, furthermore, did nothing to enhance his royal authority by continued reliance upon his mother though, to judge from repeated allusions to his alarming debility, it is doubtful if he were really to blame. He evidently lacked the strength for more than fitful activity, which meant that others could safely ignore him. When, in August 1570, the treaty of Saint-Germain released Catherine from the political servitude engendered by the war, she immediately disgraced Lorraine and resumed her own, former, moderate policy. Thus the years 1570—72 witnessed her third distinct attempt to reconcile opposing factions, and to secure a stable peace on the basis of limited toleration. This was to be achieved in two principal ways: by reintegrating protestants into public life through the return of Coligny to court and council, and by reviving an old proposal to marry Henry of Navarre to her daughter Marguerite. Neither was to be easily accomplished and neither proved to be successful. It was only after lengthy hesitation that, in September 1571, Coligny was persuaded to return to court which, for two years after the peace, was more often than not dispersed. But his absence did not prevent him from becoming embroiled, as huguenot leader, in the enterprise of the Netherlands, although this was largely devised, with some of his younger lieutenants, by Louis of Nassau. Opinions upon the enterprise were sharply divided; but Catherine was not alone in strongly opposing a war with Spain. Such was the discordant background to the wedding of Henry and Marguerite which was finally solemnised in Paris on 18 August 1572. Catherine, as was to be expected, personally designed several elaborate entertainments for it. But some were never to be applauded, as the celebrations were disrupted by violent events. The attempted murder of Coligny in August 1572 and the consequent massacre of St. Bartholomew in which he died, finally destroyed the policy of peace and conciliation which the wedding festivities had represented. These events are among the most controversial of modern history. They have bedevilled the interpretation of Catherine's career, because of their emotive force and because the hardy legend of the wicked Italian queen largely rests upon the assumption that they were her deliberate and cold-blooded crimes. While this belief is still widespread, or even prevalent, some historians now maintain that it was Catherine - exercising the regalian right of summary jurisdiction - who planned the murder, but not the massacre which followed its failure. Catherine's position was not less complex than in 1562, 1567 and

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1568 when, in spite of her most strenuous efforts, she had repeatedly been manoeuvred into civil war. In August 1572 it was the events of St. Bartholomew's eve which opened the fourth civil war. It is impossible to distinguish Catherine's role from that of the rest of the court and council which — it now seems reasonably clear — collectively authorised what I have called elsewhere a 'pre-emptive act of war' against the infuriated huguenots who threatened to devastate the court and capital. One thing, however, is quite certain: for the rest of her life Catherine had to contend with the consequences of the massacre. Its immediate effects were the frustration of Catherine's work of conciliation since 1570, the resumption of civil war and the political failure of the Bourbon marriage, which became an embarrassment. There were also more far-reaching effects, which resulted from the hardening attitude of the protestants. They began to exploit the disruptive ambitions of the king's brother Alen£on and were to produce, as Charles IX lay dying, one of the most dangerous situations that Catherine ever had to face. The massacre, for which the protestants blamed the crown, caused them to evolve a more elaborate organisation, the nascent protestant 'state within the state', which matured about 1575. Such an organisation, defensive in origin, was open to the exploitation of noble extremists who commanded the initiative in war and politics. This led to a gradual divergence between them and the consistoriaux, the honest zealots, who were fairly easily satisfied with reasonable terms, provided these were honoured. This partial divergence of interest between the leadership and the rank and file (which became more marked towards the end of the century), resulted in a decrease in emphasis on the cause of religion, the only effective bond of unity. This led to fragmentation and permitted the emergence of different and even disparate forms of opposition, if only for limited periods and largely negative purposes, since the members of any successful malcontent movement were bound to dispute the division of spoils. New situations and quarrels became superimposed upon existing ones, producing fluid combinations and unstable alliances for ill-defined purposes. Civil war, previously conducted for at least some distinguishable reasons, began to yield to anarchy, unrestrained and unpredictable. Thus, during 1573, an obscure and evidently revolutionary movement arose in the south of France, its principals, for a time at least, including both catholics and protestants. They looked for support to the turbulent young Alenfon, whose rank and ambition seemed promising assets while his folly and incompetence were not yet apparent. Whatever purposes the others entertained, Alenfon coveted his brother's crown. He had allegedly sought to murder Anjou - heir presumptive at the siege of La Rochelle which followed the massacre. But when Anjou became king of Poland, in 1573, Alen9on transferred his attentions to Charles. Some attempt upon Charles' life was thwarted when

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sickness unexpectedly altered his itinerary. Alenfon and the young Navarre then planned a palace coup, at Saint-Germain, to be supported by some more general rising. Thus, with Henry far away in Poland and Charles already on his deathbed, Catherine was not only faced with the continuation of civil war, but also with revolution, and a powerful, if ill-considered assault upon the succession by her own youngest son. The coup and the rising both miscarried. This enabled Catherine to arrest the rebel princes, and to move the king to the fortress of Vincennes. There he died a few weeks later, on 30 May 1574. These measures did not, however, end the attempted revolution; Catherine was further obliged to arrest the marshals Cosse and Montmorency both catholics - who received time for repentance in the Bastille. These arrests, if essential for security, had the disadvantage of precluding a negotiated settlement with other opposition leaders, chief of whom was Montmorency's brother, Damvil\e,gouverneur of Languedoc. Catherine therefore sought to isolate the malcontents, by detaching them from the huguenots, and this is what she was trying to do at the time of Charles's death. Catherine had already taken steps to ensure the continuity of government. In the presence of Alenpon, Charles declared Henry of Anjou his rightful heir and, pending his return from Poland, Catherine's regency was registered in the parlement. It was by her presence of mind in providing for the transmission of authority and in arresting the princes and marshals - an expedient she had never attempted before - that Catherine preserved the crown for Henry and, with it, the principle of legitimacy. There is no doubt that the state, as she conceived of it, had come very close to subversion. This reprieve is one of Catherine's positive achievements amidst the catalogue of her abortive efforts. But, if the court crisis was over, the provinces were still in arms. Catherine therefore spent the summer struggling to restore peace and order before Henry had returned. It is clear from her letters what Charles's early death had cost her, and also how intensely she adored the wayward, gifted prince in whom she now placed all her hopes for the recovery of France. Otherwise the future held only some barely conceivable ruin. Whereas Charles had grown to manhood but not to strength, Henry was already twenty-two and apparently not yet subject to those afflictions of body and mind which later frustrated his good intentions. Charles had not governed for himself, or not in any regular sense, but it is clear, indeed it was inevitable, that Catherine expected Henry to do so. Far from resenting any consequent change in her own position, she had always wanted France to possess an effective king. No other authority could ever restore the realms of Francis I and Henry II. It was therefore natural that Catherine should have longed, as she said, for Henry's glory and success. Even so, her nascent hopes were tempered by a growing fear of his unsuitability for government, while he loitered on his way amidst the splendours of Venice. Her attitude is

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clearly illustrated in a long letter of advice to the king; it also disposes of the traditional allegation that her judgement was impaired by her maternal affections. This long and remarkable memoir, dated 8 August 1574, began with an expression of her love for Henry and her hopes for his future greatness. Recognising his potential advantage in appearing from abroad, and the importance of his royal dtbut in France, she exaggerated his reputation and experience. She exhorted him to take magisterial possession of his kingdom, and to restore order with firmness and benevolence as though he were unaware of the irresponsible ways of the French. Then her dream of majesty dissolved in her fear of Henry's feeble dependence upon others and his propensity for junketing with frivolous companions. The memoir urged him to stand alone, as master in his realm, and to avoid provoking opposition by the entertainment of favourites. To obtain the support and obedience of the provinces — now more difficult and essential than ever - Henry necessarily received the same advice as Charles. Similarly, Henry was to maintain a well-ordered court, himself providing the example, rising at a given hour and dispatching his affairs with punctilious attention. Henry must personally assume all control and direction, whether of the dispatches, diplomacy, petitions, finances or councils. Thus all policy and advancement would proceed from him, and all allegiance and gratitude return to him. The restoration of the country through regular government could win Henry support and esteem. Catherine never theorised; she was urgently concerned with practical issues and the emulation of a good example. Before the development of an abstract allegiance to the state, France could be healed in no other way. The conclusion of Catherine's letter is interesting: it says that during her regency she had begun to put the state in order, thereby implying that she had previously been powerless to do so. But Henry, she declared, cy peult tout, mais qu'yl veulle'. Thus she affirmed her belief in his opportunity and her fear of his insufficiency, mingling with the first expression of her hopes the apprehension of their disappointment. Catherine's fears were, indeed, well founded, and nothing reveals more clearly the extent of her moral courage than her acceptance of the agonising discrepancy between her love for Henry and her considered opinion of the king. It is difficult to penetrate Henry's relations with his mother. Her exposition of his duty indicates, by implication, her conception of her own. With his accession she retreated into the background, though never into obscurity. Henry seems mostly to have taken her for granted, alternately exploiting and neglecting her. While she cheerfully endured much for the sake of his service, she was evidently wounded by his personal indifference. It may be that he found her a little hard to bear, that she frightened him, or that her steady devotion and resolute character induced in him a painful sense of guilt since, in spite of his weakness, he was neither unscrupulous nor oblivious of his

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own deficiency. Catherine's influence on Henry was always considerable and, when others entreated him in vain, it was she who recalled him to his duty. This tends to show that she did not seek to dominate him. That would have been the exercise of another substitute authority and it was a king, not a cipher, that Catherine wanted to restore the former state of France. Though Catherine's position was considerably altered, Henry often left her to supply his absence, and sent her on strenuous, hopeless missions to avert the effects of his own incompetence. Not the least taxing of her efforts for Henry was the struggle to control the menacing activities of Alenpon - now heir presumptive - until his death in 1584. But, if his death removed one danger, it created another, since the protestant Navarre became heir to the throne. This — combined with the wider movement of European affairs - spurred the Guises to form an organised Catholic League. In December 1584 they entered into treaty relations with Spain and, for Catherine, the wheel had come full circle. From the beginning of 1585 - when Catherine was seriously ill — Henry began to be gravely menaced, whether with deposition, imprisonment, military disaster or assassination. But the Guise audacity was weakened by a certain hesitation, which enabled Catherine to play for time. She could not, however, save the king from a more subtle kind of incapacitation and a more terrible form of depredation through the effective, if not calculated manipulation of his personality. This was to drive him to desperation, and to the murder of Henri due de Guise. If Henry's accession had been Catherine's achievement, it was also largely due to her that he was not deposed. Thus one could say that her ultimate service was her contribution to the preservation of the crown for Henry of Navarre, though she did not, of course, ever know this herself. Neither can she have realised the magnitude of his distinction, since he did not yet display those qualities of wisdom, fortitude and imagination which matured with years and responsibility. At this time, uncertainly backed by the protestant party, he repudiated all overtures from the court, declining to assist the king and redeem his tottering heritage. It was Catherine, now old and frequently very sick, who travelled the provinces striving to resist, avert or neutralise this latest and most dangerous threat to the kingdom and to Henry, a total, tragic failure, for whom the painful intensity of her affection remained undiminished. But the situation was beyond control or correction; it was only a few days before her death in January 1589 that Catherine learnt of the murder of Henri due de Guise, committed at the instigation of Henry himself. Thus the folly of Orleans was repeated at Blois, this time begetting a revolution, followed by the Spanish invasion and disputed succession which were Catherine's conception of the ruin of France.

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Mercifully Catherine did not live to see the complete collapse of the Valois monarchy with the murder of Henry in August 1589. Nevertheless, a survey of her career, however brief, shows her to have been the one significant link between the relatively settled reigns of her husband, Henry II, and her cousin and son-in-law, Henry IV. As regent and queen mother she represented, not Jndeed the focus of unity which, it was amply demonstrated, only the king himself could provide, but at least a degree of continuity, permitting a regeneration of the monarchy which, in the following century, was to scale the heights of its power and achievement. If Catherine had begun by working through traditional institutions, she ended by propounding to Henry III what, in effect, were principles of royal absolutism. In other words, in spite of her constant image of the late medieval and Renaissance monarchy, as a result of her experience between 1559 and 1574 it was Catherine who first began to move towards the later conception of absolutism. This was not the exercise of new or greater powers, but a different attitude, and a different use of existing powers. Seventeenth-century absolutism was dependent upon the maintenance of adequate royal forces, whereas Catherine had disposed of no certain force at all. Thus, in considering the position of Henry III, she had unwittingly posed one of the central problems of the ancien regime, the absolute necessity for effective, personal domination by the king. It is therefore worth examining rather more closely the significance of Catherine's role in relation to the ancien regime, and the nature of the problems which confronted her. Some of the problems were naturally rooted in the past, while others sprang from the Reformation. All of them were closely interrelated, and each contributed to the complex of crises which followed the death of Henry II. This event revealed with tragic force the total dependence on the king of the society and state of France. The loss of his person not only presented grave new problems, but also released hitherto controllable tensions, permitting the stream of public life to surge towards a reach of chaos. So, from a position of utter weakness. Catherine became the first to face the collapse of authority in the state. Authority was possibly the fundamental problem of the next hundred years, which successively taxed the abilities of Henry IV, Richelieu, Mazarin and Louis XIV. The collapse of authority which followed the death of Henry II, may be studied in terms of certain ancillary problems, of which the first and most obvious was the notorious weakness of a regency. During the century of civil wars three ineffective kings, whether youthful, sick or inadequate, were succeeded - after the reign of Henry IV - by two minorities. If, technically, Catherine's actual regency was brief, what one might describe as her 'regency situation' was her insuperable disadvantage. For varying reasons, she could not prevent the reigns of her sons, Francis, Charles and Henry, like the minority of Louis XIII and, to a lesser extent, that of Louis XIV after them, from leaving a central

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vacuum. Consequently, each of these reigns witnessed a comparable pattern of disorders, mostly instigated or supported from abroad. It was this power vacuum, with or without a regency, that made way for the activities of the nobility in arms. By the sixteenth century their powers and profits had grown uncertain and their disaffection was the most intransigent problem of the century of troubles. This disaffection heralded the crisis in 1559 with a clash of ambitions and two mutually exclusive ideologies. Gradually it developed, on both sides, into a shameless and greedy feudal-type opposition, based in the provinces. After the end of the civil wars it took the form of revolutionary conspiracies. Finally it developed into a predominantly court opposition, although this too, as in the Fronde, might combine with other elements and give rise to civil war. The initial form of this disaffection of the nobles, which confronted Catherine, was far the most complex, the most difficult to subdue and, in many ways, the most dangerous. In the first place, it was precipitated, though not uniquely caused, by the fusion of a political with a religious crisis. This resulted in the use of ideology as an,instrument of policy. Not only was that a new and obscurely complicating factor, it was also highly dangerous in that religion was, in all senses, a popular issue, comparable in effect to famine or economic distress; it was capable of embroiling others in the quarrels of noblemen. Secondly, by dividing the country along religious lines, the two contending parties precluded the formation of a moderate, centre and royalist party — there being only two religions. Thus, by opposing each other and not, ostensibly, the crown — far more dangerous than straightforward rebellion — they created a triple interest in the state.. This resulted in a crippling severance of the political from the religious interests of the crown, which was simultaneously paralysed by its isolation and bound by its religion to the otherwise inimical catholic faction. To this predicament — finally resolved by Henry IV — there was no better solution available to Catherine than the possible effects of time, chance and negotiation; hence her essential helplessness. This predicament was not, of course, always equally precise or pressing, but it remained a feature of that kaleidoscopic background which makes Catherine's career so difficult to understand. The tripartite problem, though sometimes obscured, was not resolved, even when genuine ideological motivation began to decline, at least on the leadership level. At this stage the civil wars tended to become endemic, a way of life and even a means of livelihood, particularly for the impoverished young huguenot seigneurs of the south and west, who manifestly enjoyed the alternate satisfactions of laying siege to some neighbouring citadel and to the ladies of the court of Navarre. It was this cavalier and parochial attitude to grave national issues which led Catherine, some fifty years before cardinal Richelieu, to deplore the ungovernable frivolity of the nobility of France.

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The activities of the nobility in arms not only beat against the throne itself but also threatened, at times, to subvert the legitimate succession. This was rendered uncertain throughout this period by the collapse of authority, the 'regency situation' and by dynastic accidents. The defence of the succession was of paramount importance to Catherine's struggle for the monarchy and, under her sons Charles and Henry, it was menaced in three different ways. Indeed, there was even a sense in which the first civil war was partially a succession crisis, since the three surviving sons of Henry and Catherine were all expected to die young, leaving a conceivably protestant Bourbon succession. If this was only a minor element in the first civil war, the murderous enmity of Alen^on towards his elder brothers represented a direct assault upon the succession, if not the dynasty. His continuous, menacing insubordination was an important factor in the civil strife of the 1570s. Alenpon's treachery was also the first instance of a new form of opposition, arising from within the royal family itself, and backed by a medley of greedy aspirants. It showed that the ideology of the civil wars was already overtaxed, if still potentially useful. It had to be in the name of religion that the Guises openly tried to subvert the Bourbon succession to their own advantage; an endeavour which they pursued against Henry IV until his abjuration in 1593 and the disintegration of the Catholic League. After the restoration of peace in France the succession was still menaced, albeit in different ways: by the existence of royal bastards including Auvergne, son of Charles IX - by the infancy of Henry's heir, born in 1601, and by the machinations of nobles who planned to exterminate the royal family. The reign of Henry IV saw the end of direct assaults upon the succession. But its continuing uncertainty nourished a long series of shockingly cynical malcontent movements, of the kind initiated by Alen
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Mazarin: how to ensure the position and safety of catholic France in a Europe dominated - or, at least in her case, increasingly dominated — by the catholic power of Spain. Indeed, France was never more effectively surrounded by the Hapsburgs - whose system virtually embraced all catholic powers - than at the height of the ideological conflict of the sixteenth century. If Catherine could not safely turn to Spain, which sustained her domestic enemies, neither could she appeal to any protestant power. Thus the isolation of the crown, resulting from the religious alignment of the parties, also extended into the foreign sphere as an integral part of the same predicament. This was the beginning of that embarrassing need for a policy of catholic at home and protestant abroad which necessity and shifting values in international affairs ultimately rendered acceptable. But, in the 1560s, it was practically impossible. Its inception might just be discerned in the forbearance which developed between Catherine and Elizabeth, whose common fear of Spanish domination exceeded their mutual hostility. Apart from these problems, which stemmed from the collapse of authority combined with the effects of the Reformation, Catherine was also faced with the emergence of certain long-term difficulties of an administrative nature. In the first place, the death of Henry II had coincided with a national bankruptcy. If Catherine possessed no financial sense, neither did any king of France between Louis XII and Henry IV. Lack of money continually frustrated her efforts, and the financial crisis of 1559 marked the appearance of another fundamental problem of the ancien regime. The Fronde in the seventeenth century and the great Revolution in the eighteenth were both precipitated by financial crises, and grave fiscal difficulties resulted from every major war undertaken by the monarchy. Financial embarrassment was not, of course, peculiar to France. In the sixteenth century it represented a complicating new factor in European affairs, and one whose successful manipulation might prove a condition of survival. It was a long-term problem which, in France, happened to reach an acute stage at a time of general crisis. The explanations probably fall into three main categories: social, administrative and technical, and there are two related social factors which must be considered here. Civil war, following a bankruptcy, may be assumed to have worsened a bad situation, and the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Correro expressed the view in 1569 that while other sections of society were ruined, considerable wealth was concentrated in the hands of townsmen, merchants and 'gens de robe longue'. He believed that this accumulation of wealth in the possession of one cliss made it harder for the crown to obtain revenue. As a generalisation, this was probably true. Furthermore, these were the men who purchased offices and had thereby begun to possess the administration just when the government had most need of middle-class support. Through their offices and their social solidarity they were able to form a kind of fiercely protective caste. Thus France

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had already begun to suffer from that vested interest in corrupt stagnation which arrested her development and ultimately did so much to destroy the old regime. Catherine's advice to Charles and Henry shows her awareness of what one might call the general administrative predicament of the monarchy. If never entirely solved, this was gradually and painfully mitigated during the first half of the seventeenth century. It had its roots in the past, and must have arisen in any case. But it was rendered more acute by the effects of the extensive sale of offices under Francis I and Henry II, and became really serious upon the collapse of royal authority and the growth of religious and political controversy. It was recognised and aptly described by Michel de L'Hospital, when he declared the crown to be absolute in theory, but in practice devoid of hands or feet. Throughout this period there were repeated government protests about the non-enforcement of the law, a failure which resulted in a withdrawal of confidence. Royal commissioners, precursors of the intendants, were constantly travelling the provinces in executive capacities, and much of Catherine's own time and energy were expended upon the losing battle for law and obedience. Royal edicts had frequently to be reissued and, late in the century, their slovenly drafting sometimes reflected the apparent expectation that they would .be ignored. Many royal protests and angry rebukes were addressed, in particular, to the parlement of Paris. Having purged its ranks of all protestant elements, it assumed an attitude, not of legitimate surveillance, but of obdurate, negative obstruction. The years 1560-2 were a period of intense constructive effort on the part of Catherine and L'Hospital. By correctly consulting a succession of constitutional bodies, they sought to arrest the impending anarchy, to elicit a sense of responsibility, to defend the force of law, and to obtain a measure of formal consent. .But the parlement of Paris caused inestimable harm by cavilling at interminable length over the qualified registration of three successive edicts. These had been devised by three authoritative bodies between May 1560 and January 1562 in urgent and realistic attempts to contain the problem of religion and achieve some modus vivendl Faced with Catherine's final, despairing demand for a better solution, the parlement disclosed its sterility by returning a list of futile prohibitions. The abortive and largely neglected efforts of these years are chiefly commemorated in the magnificent ordinance of Orleans. This included a large section on the reform of justice, regarded by L'Hospital as an essential precondition for the restitution of authority. This was complemented by the ordinance of Moulins, 1566, but both these extensive measures were frustrated by the parlement, which asserted superiority over the estates by presuming to review and register their work. This was then destroyed by its non-application. The ordinance of Orleans, based on the cahiers of the estates, appears to show that at least a sig-

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nificant part of society desired major reforms. Yet, when these became law, their enforcement proved impossible. A full explanation of this phenomenon, which is almost certainly connected with the financial needs of the crown and the ownership of offices, might do much to elucidate the flaws and conflicts of the ancien regime. If the parlements were not solely to blame for the non-application of reforms, they bear a grave and primary responsibility. Not only did they thwart the outstanding constructive work of the 1560s, they were also the first to obstruct the enforcement of each successive edict of pacification, thereby precluding religious peace and bringing law and authority into disrepute. This accounts for the protestants' mounting obsession with security — notoriously reflected in the guarantee clauses of the edict of Nantes — since they maintained that if the king could not protect them under the law, they might and must protect themselves. It would be untrue to say that the parlements caused the civil wars, but it is incontestable that they prolonged them. The problem of the administration and the enforcement of the law — neglected by the parlements — appears to account for the failure of reform in the sixteenth century and obscures the fact that these were distinct, if related questions. The purely administrative problem was later greatly diminished by means of more adequate machinery of government, the growth of a central bureaucracy — which Catherine indirectly fostered — and by the creation of a larger standing army. But the problem of reform remained. Looking back, therefore, it is evident that Catherine and L'Hospital experienced both the impossibility of reforming France, and that negative obstruction of the parlements which is so familiar to students of the eighteenth century. L'Hospital, who strove by precept and example to illumine a path of salvation, is said to have declared that as they had been the architects of their own authority, so they would inflict their own retribution. Even though the fault was not entirely unilateral, this was still a prophetic commentary on that failure of crown and parlement to cooperate, which proved to be a fatal weakness of pre-Revolutionary France. Catherine's career might, therefore, be interpreted in terms of her struggle against the breakdown of royal authority in the face of mounting forces of opposition which both embraced and exploited the conflicts released by the Reformation. But the complexities of her career, and the confusion of the civil wars, have tended to obscure the fact that she was also confronted — in circumstances of peculiar difficulty — by some of the underlying problems of the ancien regime. Without her conservative achievements the later monarchy would have had no foundations upon which to build. In particular, Catherine foreshadowed the attitude of Richelieu in her efforts to promote a specifically national policy, perhaps because each of them wielded the royal authority without wearing the crown. The royal authority and a

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national policy should, ideally, have been fused, as in the person of Henry IV, whose brief and brilliant years of peace were among the most creative of the ancien regime. Yet, like Catherine, he too experienced the impossibility of obtaining either collaboration or willing administrative support. This political deficiency left the crown no alternative to the progressive sterility of absolutism. But even absolutism was paradoxically weakened both by its dependence upon the uninterrupted exercise of exceptional qualities, and by its own intrinsic rigidity. Having been raised almost to the status of a cult, it ended by defeating its own purpose.

4

ANTOINE DE BOURBON, KING OF NAVARRE AND THE FRENCH CRISIS OF AUTHORITY, 1559-1562 The accidental death of Henry II on 10 July 1559 both precipitated the French crisis of authority and provided what was probably the greatest political opportunity in the life of Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, because his rank as first prince of the blood—after the young royal brothers—rendered him preeminent in France. But Navarre was absent and quite unprepared for this opportunity. He was also at the disadvantage of having been in near disgrace at court, where his principal adversaries, Francois, due de Guise, and his brother Charles, cardinal of Lorraine, then predominated. The death of the king removed a relatively strong monarchy, leaving a power vacuum which, in the absence of Navarre, the Guises were prompt to fill. Their neglect of the proper procedure in these circumstances, and their virtual coup d'etat not only provoked violent opposition but, more serious still, it aggravated old and vicious rivalries among the nobility. This was the basic cause of the crisis of authority, which is complex because it was essentially two-fold, religious and political. The religious crisis was already held to be threatening the established order before the death of the king when the rivalries of the nobility immediately intermingled with a political crisis. This combination soon had the disastrous effect of rendering the older, religious problem insoluble, whichitmightnot otherwise have been, for it was not, at that time, religious solutions which were lacking, but the political power to enforce them. Not the least of these dangerous rivalries was that between the Guises and Navarre. Indeed Navarre had always been involved in conflict and adversities at court. As Bourbon princes, he and his younger brother Louis, prince de Conde, inherited the disesteem which had afflicted their house since the defection to the emperor I would like to thank Mr P. W. Hasler for reading and criticising the typescript of this essay.

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in 1525 of their uncle the constable of Bourbon. They were tolerated by Henry II, whom they served without reward or even the deference due to their rank, while their prescriptive place in court and council was easily assumed by their abler and more favoured Guise cousins. There were also more personal antagonisms between them: Frangois, then due d'Aumale, had been blamed—whether justly or not—for the murder of a Bourbon brother, Enghein, in 1546. He had also been rejected by Jeanne d'Albret, who chose in Antoine, then due de Vendome, the socially superior match. Antoine, therefore, had little to lose when, in 1555, he inherited Navarre in the right of his wife, exchanged his gouvernement of Picardy for that of Guyenne and withdrew to Beam. The inheritance was opportune since both then and again in 1559 he was incensed against the king and his older favourite, the constable Anne, due de Montmorency, for their slighting neglect of his particular interests in the peace negotiations of 1555 and the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis between France and Spain. Together with the little kingdom of Navarre, Antoine inherited sufficient treasure to command attention, and also his father-in-law's determination either to recover Spanish Navarre, conquered by Ferdinand of Aragon in 1512, or else to extract some acceptable compensation. This miniature dynastic ambition became the primary passion of his life, the only fixed star in his firmament and the sole criterion of his political conduct, to which the claims of religion, the preservation of the monarchy and the tranquillity of France were all subordinated. For this reason it also became the means by which Philip II sought to manipulate Navarre, both as a minatory neighbour and, later, as the first prince of France. In 1555 Antoine still hoped for Spanish Navarre as opposed to compensation. He therefore resumed the negotiations of his father-in-law with the retired emperor, Charles V, to admit the Spanish into Guyenne—now his own gouvernement—by way of exchange. This treacherous and self-defeating project— a good illustration of Navarre's political imbecility—was revealed in 1556 by the indiscretion of a president of the parlement of Bordeaux, and consequently suspended. Other propositions followed for valuable compensation such as Franche Comte or parts of the Netherlands, so long as Philip was apprehensive

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of Navarre. In 1557 there were prolonged negotiations for the cession of Milan against Guyenne. This further intrigue was also discovered, from an intercepted letter, by the French secretary of state Claude de Laubespine. It is therefore hardly surprising that France ignored Navarre's interests at the peace conference which opened in September 1558.1 At the same time he was also dropped by Spain, who no longer needed him, and thereafter Philip never again treated the matter of compensation seriously.2 When it was later resumed, the two territories primarily considered were the 'kingdom' of Tunisia and the island of Sardinia. Tunisia was little more than the arid retreat of dusky pirates, neither Spanish nor a kingdom, while Sardinia was a primitive island, largely worthless even to the maritime power of Spain, let alone to the inland kingdom of Navarre. Navarre's treacherous relations with the king of Spain, and in time of war, were quite enough to destroy any claim to royal consideration in France. But he was also persona non grata on grounds of religion since, by 1558, he generally passed as a protestant. While this doubtless reflected both the hopes of the Calvinists and the hostility of his enemies, he nevertheless had only himself to blame because he permitted the foundation of Calvinist churches in Beam, whether from sympathy, indolence, or defiant independence. He must, however, have become at least interested, since he openly engaged the Genevan pastor Boisnormand from the end of 1557, an act of indiscretion whose likely repercussions probably escaped him.3 Calvin, however, 1

A remonstrance stating Navarre's case was formally presented at Cercamp by Jean Jacques de Mesmes, but subsequently ignored. B.N. Fonds frangais, 23049, fos. i6i-76v., 12 Nov. 1558; E. Alberi, Relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti al Senato, ser. i (1856-62), iv, 77; A. Desjardins, Negotiations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane (5 vols. 1859-75), iii, 120, 3 Nov. 1547; 228, 23 Feb. 1547/8; C. Weiss (ed.), Papiers d'Etat du Cardinal de Granvelle (9 vols. 1841-52), v, 261, 17 Oct. 1558, Spanish plenipotentiaries to Philip II. In spite of detailed agreements on the property rights of individuals, the treaty contains no mention of Navarre's claims. F. Leonard, Recueil des traitez de paix . . . (6 vols. 1693), ii, 535-572 Granvelle, v, 332-8, 29 Oct. 1558, the bishop of Arras (Granvelle) to Philip II. 3 Francois Le Gay de Boisnormand. Robert M. Kingdon, Geneva and the Coming of the French Wars of Religion, 1555-1563 (Geneva, 1956), pp. 10, 67, 138, 140; A. de Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d^Albret (4 vols. 1881-6), i, 222, 217-18; ii, 29; Jules Bonnet, Lettres de Jean Calvin (2 vols. 1854), ii, 163 n.

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quickly realised this potential advantage and, in December 1557, appealed to Navarre to support the protestants at the forthcoming meeting of the estates general in France, and also, with the authority of his rank, to seek the diplomatic intercession of certain German princes.4 Navarre's religion was therefore already problematic at the end of 1557. When he went to court in March 1558, he took with him the regrettably indiscreet pastor David;5 he attended the singing of psalms in the Pre-aux-Clercs, and was instrumental in obtaining the release from prison of the Paris pastor, La RocheChandieu. But he also attended mass at court and frequently declared his orthodoxy. Furthermore, during the course of seeking diplomatic intercession from Germany, Navarre's agent, a protestant and former echevin of Metz called Gaspard de Heu, seigneur Du Buy, was reported by another Paris pastor, Macar, to have discussed some plan for a military alliance between Navarre and the count Palatine, 'so that if it came to an armed clash, all would have their forces ready in order to crush the enemies of the Gospel'.6 While this was not at all what Navarre had in mind, he was none the less gravely compromised when Du Buy was arrested and his papers seized.7 Indeed, this affair was evidently one factor in the religious crisis, and the king, according to Macar, angrily demanded whether the protestants would not wrest the crown from off his head.8 The incident naturally tended to confirm, his opinion that they were seditious, and is presumably one reason why he and his extreme ministers, the Guises, prepared to exterminate heresy in France, as soon as peace could be made with Spain. 4

Bonnet, ii, 163-9, 14 Dec. 1557, Calvin to Navarre. The estates general opened on 6 Jan. 1558. 5 David was a former monk and not trained as a pastor. Kingdon, pp. i o, 61, 63. 6 This statement almost certainly related to Metz, a German bishopric taken for France by Guise in 1552, and about which a number of German princes were much concerned at that moment. G. Zeller, La Reunion de Metz a la France (Strasbourg, 1926), ii, 43; N. M. Sutherland, 'Calvinism and the Conspiracy of Amboise', History-, June 1962, pp. 115-16. 7 It may be significant that Du Buy was related by marriage to La Renaudie, leader of the conspiracy of Amboise. Granvelle, v, 337 and n.i. Du Buy was secretly executed at Vincennes, without trial. B.N. Mss. fr. 22562, fos. 110—13, 4 September 1558, proces verbal of his execution. 8 A. Coquerel, Precis de Vhistoire de VEglise Reformee de Paris, 1512-1 $94 (1862), p. Ixxv, 9 May 1558, Macar to Calvin.

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Having been enlisted by Calvin, who clearly represented the churches, and also induced to sponsor political action in Germany, Navarre, first prince of the blood royal, had almost inadvertently become a figurehead, the leader-elect of the French protestant movement, whose several strands were still only half identified. If, however, there were any truth in the Du Buy affair, then one must suppose that some sort of independent militant element was gradually emerging, even before the death of Henry II, fostered perhaps from the confines of the empire, and presumably supported by provincial gentry, but separate from the membership of the churches, whose leaders were then evangelical and pacifist.9 Navarre's headship of this nascent movement was tentative and far from established, albeit clearly designated by his independent sovereignty, his French rank, his signs of tolerance—not to say conversion—and his deepseated quarrel with the inquisitorial cardinal and his brother, who had long swayed the counsels of Henry II. The Guises had never been more powerful than during these months in 1558 when Navarre was at court. Indeed he had come to congratulate the king upon the siege of Calais, and to attend the marriage of the dauphin to Mary queen of Scots, a niece of the Guises, events which crowned the military reputation of the duke, and the political ascendancy of the cardinal. As early as March 1558, Macar clearly expressed to Calvin the fear that Lorraine—in pursuit of riches—might overturn the kingdom.10 Thus it was as the natural opponent of the Guises that many began to place their hopes in Navarre, and this is why the protestants of Paris continually implored him to intercede for them at court. But although he frequently inferred that he might, he dashed their hopes and incurred their contempt by repeatedly failing to do so. His nature was always to seek refuge in procrastination. But he was evidently awaiting the German ambassadors, who arrived about 8 May 1558, since he naively informed Macar that his interest in the German princes was first to win their friendship, and then to obtain their support for 9

See for example, Coquerel, p. xxvi, 7 Feb. 1557/8, Macar to Calvin. Coquerel, p. Ixxiii, 21 March 1558, Macar to Calvin. Lorraine's intense ambition was a commonplace. The Venetian ambassador, Soranzo, in his report for 1558, also mentioned his mendacity and avarice. Alberi, Relazioni, ser. i, vol. ii, 443-5. 10

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the recovery of Spanish Navarre. In other words, he might assume the role of protestant champion if it were likely to further his dynastic ambition, but unless or until he were sure of this, he would not commit himself.11 Consequently he drifted with the tide of events. He served in the summer campaign of 1558, but less from duty to the king of France than in the fantastical hope of capturing the king of Spain; apparently another means, in his own estimation, of recovering Spanish Navarre.12 There were therefore multiple reasons—personal, religious and political—why the Guises and Navarre should stand opposed the moment Henry died, and when he did so these circumstances ensured that the dual religious and political crisis was fused from the start. Conducted by the Guises, persecution came to be regarded not as the policy of the crown but as that of a faction. This in turn reduced opposition to something less than sedition. Inevitably the Guises were opposed by all who envied their power or denied their faith. The protestants, in spite of their early disillusionment, were bound to experience a wave of hope that Navarre, their natural ally, would now defend them against the persecution of his own enemies; and this could only be achieved through political action. What ensued, therefore, was a struggle for power in the name of religion.13 But the situation was complicated, and the pretext exploded from the start, because Navarre oscillated embarrassingly between the two confessions, and so long as his religion remained uncertain, no one could safely rely on his politics. It was generally supposed, in this moment of crisis, that Navarre would alter his frivolous, pragmatic attitudes and rise in some way to the occasion. This was, after all, his great opportunity, as the Guise monopoly of the government provoked an immediate politico-religious opposition, vast, uncertain and turbulent, whose disparate elements simultaneously turned to 11

Coquerel, p. Ixxv, 9 May 1558, Macar to Calvin. De Ruble, i, 274; Rochambeau, Lettres d^Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d'Albret (1878), p. 158, 20 Aug. [1558] Navarre to his wife. Philip II did, contrary to his usual practice, take the field on 21 August, but peace negotiations were in hand by the first week of Sept. Granvelle, v, 169-70, 9 Sept. 1558, Spanish plenipotentiaries to Philip II. 13 Even in the 15605 there were some who admitted this. D. Thickett (ed.), Estienne Pasquier, Ecrits politiques : VExhortation, p. 62 ff.; Desjardins, iii, 563, 25 Sept. 1561. 12

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Navarre for leadership. Three weeks after Henry's death,potential supporters flocked to meet him at Vendome, on his way to court.14 Navarre was then in a stronger position than he appears to have realised: abroad both England and Spain were anxious to know what he would do, while at home his brother Conde had staunchly upheld the Bourbon cause at court, until he was hastily despatched to Brussels to ratify the peace treaty. The powerful constable, Montmorency, who carried the allegiance of his three Chatillon nephews, had urgently summoned Navarre, and the Guises betrayed alarm by transferring the king to the stronghold of Saint-Germain and placing his guard on a war footing.15 On the other hand, the Guise position was far from weak. They could reasonably claim to be continuing the dead king's policy upon the new king's authority, and their control over Francis II, though resented was not illegal. It could only be challenged on the grounds that the government of a sick boy of fifteen constituted a de facto regency, which the first prince of the blood would have a better claim than the Guises to direct. In August 1559 this political conflict was not irremediable, because the religious split was not yet definitive. Few of the protestant churches had then been formed, the movement was still largely under strict pastoral discipline, and the nobles had mostly not yet adopted intransigent religious attitudes. There were of course both religious and political extremists but, given a measure of statesmanship, Navarre might well have arrested the dual crisis. Many would have thought him worth serving if, together with Catherine the queen mother, he had sought a political union of all anti-Guisard elements, primarily comprising the Bourbon, Montmorency and Chatillon groups, and adopted a firm but moderate religious policy.16 This is basically what the admiral, Coligny, is said to have counselled at Vendome, and the Guises, who had not yet appointed their followers to a multitude of key 14

N. M. Sutherland, 'Calvinism', History, June, 1962, p. 120. According to the English ambassador, Throckmorton, the Guises had meant to meet Navarre and do him honour, but were alarmed by the gathering at Vend6me. Calendar of State Papers Foreign, i$$8-i$$9, p. 457, 8 August 1559, Throckmorton to the queen. 16 The Spanish ambassador, Ghantonnay, reported, albeit somewhat later, that hatred of the Guises was by no means confined to the protestants. Archivo documental Espanol, Negodaciones con Francia, i (Madrid, 1950), 323, 27 June 1560, Chantonnay and La Vega to Philip II. 15

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positions, could not have opposed such a combination. Besides, they were too astute either to challenge excessive odds, or to place themselves demonstrably in the wrong. But Navarre had left Vendome without a policy, and his wouldbe supporters were quickly alarmed and alienated by his supine inactivity. Perhaps he had expected all to fall before him. Instead, he was paralysed in the face of his opponents who publicly disdained him, allegedly suborned his closest councillors, and threatened him with the power of his old enemy Spain, who could occupy his property in the Netherlands and deny him compensation for Navarre. According to Blaise de Monluc, who served him in Guyenne, his principal concern in coming to court had been to impress Chantonnay, the Spanish ambassador, which, if true, is a prime example of Navarre's capacity for grasping the inessentials of a situation.17 One is forced to conclude that he lacked the vision, ability and constancy of purpose to seize the initiative and claim his rightful position. A congenital subordinate with no sense of proportion, he even failed to attract advisers able to supply his deficiencies, perhaps because his service was insecure and his principal objective of no interest to anyone but himself. It is not entirely clear at what point this was generally realised, but his unshakeable obsession with the question of compensation is demonstrated by his conduct at this time. For Navarre to leave court at the end of 1559 was political suicide, sealing and publicising his abdication of leadership. Whether or not he understood this, he willingly escorted Elisabeth de Valois on her long journey to the frontier, a ceremonial service which was sure to provide fresh Spanish contacts, and ought to merit the gratitude of her husband Philip II. Thus Navarre had dissipated the immediate opportunity provided by Henry's death, and never again recovered the support and initiative lost in the four months (July-November 1559) before his ignominious departure on a face-saving embassy. This had fundamental and disastrous repercussions since, under Francis II, no one of lesser rank could assume an impartial viceregal role and combine the centre with the protestants against the 17

B.N. Mss. fr. 15542, fo. 28-v., 22 July 1559, Instructions from Monluc to La Tour going to the due de Guise; De Ruble (ed.), Blaise de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres (edn. 1864), iv, 108.

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Guises. Without leadership,this inchoate mass possessed no unity or strength of purpose. Members of the several noble groups became fluid and divisible elements exposed to varying pressures and conflicting loyalties, while already in August 1559 some protestants had begun to seek in Conde a substitute for Navarre.18 Conde if not appreciably abler, was at least better served, more energetic and nursed more reliably French and comprehensible ambitions. But he was emphatically only second best, his authority being distinctly inferior in law and sentiment to that of Navarre; nor did he ever seriously aspire to more than a partisan leadership. Betrayed and disappointed, the protestants were obliged to look beyond the consistorial circle for physical protection, while a swiftly developing military opposition to the Guise administration was equally bound to champion the protestant cause and to solicit their enviable resources. So there arose a predominantly political protestant party, which never fully merged with the consistorial element, but destroyed the original nature of the evangelical movement by linking it with political and social objectives. Once there existed two identifiable parties publicly professing opposed religions, floating elements could be aligned, and the preconditions of civil war were established. This was demonstrated by extensive uprisings in 1560, during which Navarre pursued his territorial interests, intrigued with the sheriff of Fez, and allowed protestantism to expand in Bearn and Guyenne. Having skilfully prevailed over the Bourbon princes in 1559, and virtually driven Navarre from court, the next step for the Guises was to destroy them altogether by planting on them responsibility for the widespread disorders of 1560. When, after much deliberation, the princes ventured to Orleans in October 1560, in response to a royal command, Conde was arrested and condemned to death for rebellion and heresy.19 Navarre was detained, and his lands were troubled by French and Spanish forces.20 But, just when the initial crisis of authority looked like 18

N. M. Sutherland, 'Calvinism', History, June, 1962, p. 127. Memoires du prince de Conde (4 vols. 1743), "> 373~95- The precise charges against him seem not to have survived. 20 Conde, iii, 409, 19 May 1562, Reponse . . . a la Requeste presentee par le Triumvirat. 19

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ending in total triumph for the Guises, it was renewed and intensified on 5 December 1560 by the premature death of Francis II, since his brother Charles IX was a minor for whom a formal regency was necessary. In such circumstances Navarre, as first prince, could not safely or justifiably be excluded. So, from having been virtually a prisoner of state at the mercy of the Guises, he became, with Francis's final breath, the central figure in French affairs. This was indeed a second opportunity, except that Navarre was now outmatched by the queen mother, Catherine de Medici, to whom he and Conde were beholden for their deliverance from the Guises. In these new circumstances, Navarre was rather more inclined to play his proper role, but Catherine had observed his inability to do so. She, also, had been grossly ill-used by the Guises, and realised that their only political salvation lay in partnership, more especially in view of the impending estates general which was likely to attribute the regency to Navarre. He undoubtedly held the formal advantages, but circumstances favoured her. It was not difficult to reconcile Navarre, while he was still under detention and Conde under sentence of death, before Francis died. Thus, the day after, on 6 December, they presented the court with a fait accompli which, for the moment, saved and suited them both. Catherine, though explicitly supreme, had shrewdly avoided the title of regent, and it was not until the end of March that Navarre obtained that of lieutenant-general.21 Their division of power was approved by the parlement, disputed by the estates general and sanctioned by a reglement in council on 21 December—the day after Conde's liberation.22 Since Navarre's participation was essential to any regency government, this was the beginning of a complex struggle for his political and religious adherence and support, which increased in intensity during 1561 and reached its climax in the crisis of January to March 1562, immediately before the first civil war. 21

Conde, ii, 280, March 1561; M. E. Brambilla, Ludovico Gonzaga, duca di Nevers (Udine, 1905), pp. 116-18, 12 Dec. 1560, Gonzaga to the duke of Mantua. 22 Dupuy, Traite de la majorite des rois (1655), pp. 351-2; F. A. Isambert, Recueil general des anciennes lois frangaises (29 vols. 1821-33), xiv, 58-60; De Ruble, iii, 23; La Ferriere, Lettres de Catherine de Medicis (vols. i-iv, 1880-95), i, 162, 15 Jan. 1560/1, Catherine to Limoges.

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It is difficult to separate and clarify the religious aspects—which were twofold—from the political—which were threefold—in the triangular struggle which developed between the catholic crown, the protestant leaders Conde and Coligny, and the extreme catholic Guises. The struggle held several possible eventualities: Catherine's real hope, as regent in all but name, was to assume the unifying, vice-regal role that Navarre had disregarded, and to realise the moderate, loyal, centre party which should have been formed in i55g?before the crown was pressed by rival confessional factions, whose attitude to a minor king was anything but compliant. Alternatively, Catherine with Navarre might retain the loyalty of the protestants. Failing this, so long as they stood firmly together, the bizarre but joint embodiment of sovereignty, they might still have prevailed in holding the factions apart. The struggle for Navarre's allegiance itself suggests this. The final and most dangerous possibilities were that either side might isolate and incapacitate the crown by the seduction of Navarre. Clearly the survival of the regency partnership depended upon the closest co-operation. But the somewhat nebulous agreement of December 1560 had contained no religious undertaking. Lately delivered from the Guises, and highly susceptible to the strong pressure of Calvinist relatives at court—including his forceful wife, whose conversion was announced on Christmas day —-Navarre became more fully and publicly protestant than ever before; but not definitively so.23 This public protestantism was a capital error, now that he was an adjunct of the crown, for whatever Catherine felt about the protestants or against the Guises, it was axiomatic that she, the crown and France must be catholic. Not only Catherine, therefore, but France, the royal authority and Navarre's own power and dignity required that he also should be catholic, moderate, and distinct from the Guises. But to support Catherine in the political sphere while weakening her in the religious, was to enable the Guises to drive a wedge between them and—politically—to ruin them both. Navarre's religion, however, still depended on his prospects, and he never shared Catherine's national objectives. Thus the 23

J. Delaborde, Les Protestants a la cour de Saint-Germain lors du colloque de Poissy (1847), P- 55 Nancy L. Roelker, Queen of Navarre, Jeanne d'Albret 1528i$j2 (1968), p. 134.

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only sure way of securing his full support was to satisfy his peculiar ambitions, which were not superseded even by his lieutenancy of France. In other words, his priority was still compensation for Spanish Navarre and, instead of imperiously demanding this from a position of power in France—as Spain temporarily feared he might—he rather saw in the politicoreligious struggle one more means of extracting it. For this reason Catherine tried to bargain for him with the king of Spain. But the protestant tenor of the court, and the milder religious policy since the death of Francis II, did not commend the request to Philip who, furthermore, had no interest in assisting Catherine, with Navarre's support, to preserve the crown from the factions. If Navarre were going to bargain for his compensation this way, Philip would exact a stiffer price, and it was the extreme catholic Guises who were better placed than Catherine to obtain the desired concession. Upon the outcome hung the issue of civil war or peace, since the authority of the first prince and lieutenantgeneral could legitimise an assumption of arms which would otherwise be rebellion and lese-mafestJ. Catherine's initial success in winning Navarre's political support was therefore considerable, but relations between the nobles at court were still very precarious. The Guises were dethroned, but they were not defeated and could not be disgraced. This is what Navarre demanded, apparently on the instigation of Conde who was fuming vengeance for his arrest and condemnation, and said to be organising a huguenot party.24 At the end of February 1561 these various tensions nearly exploded into civil war. On 27 February Navarre, and all but the Guisards prepared to leave court, which would have destroyed the regency partnership and placed Catherine and the crown once more under Guise control. Catherine only just averted this calamity by persuading the constable to remain, the others deciding not to leave without him.25 After this crisis, and unable any longer to dominate the council, 24 B. N. Fonds Italien, 1721, fo. 267, 16 March 1561; Conde, ii, 588-91, Conde to Navarre and to Catherine, undated but of the end of Dec. 1560 or early 1561; Archivo documental Espanol, Fronda, i, 510, 24 Dec. 1560, Chantonnay to Philip II; ii, introduction, p. xiii; 127-30, 26 March 1561, Chantonnay to Philip II. 25 La Ferriere, Lettres, i, 584—7, 3 March 1561, Catherine to Limoges.

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the Guises went into opposition Booking to Spain for support and, reputedly on 6 April, formed a rather obscure, militant catholic association, known as the 'Triumvirate', which they induced Montmorency to join.26 As a loyalist, he had been a powerful, moderating influence, restraining his protestant Chatillon nephews. But as a Guisard, they were bound to oppose him outright, both in religion and in politics, and Coligny later bitterly reproached him for having forced their hand. 27 At one blow, therefore, the Guises had virtually terminated any hope of a centre party, simultaneously winning, in the constable, the principal military commander. Catherine's inevitable course was, if possible, to draw closer to Navarre, and she was doing her assiduous best to obtain for him the cession of Sardinia, Siena or the Balearic islands.28 At the end of March she had already strengthened her original agreement with Navarre, which is why he then became lieutenant-general, representing the king's person throughout the country. On 8 April Charles signed letters patent confirming the lieutenancy and specifying in minite detail the precise nature of Navarre's supreme military powers.29 This, presumably, was intended to ensure that the military authority of the crown—vested in Navarre—was superior to that of the constable, Guise and all the marshals of France combined, and so prevent any legitimate military action on their part. It therefore became correspondingly urgent for the Triumvirate to win Navarre's allegiance. The cardinal de Tournon later 26

The Triumvirate is too big a subject to develop or to document within the scope of this essay. I hope to do so elsewhere. 27 B.N. Cinq Cents Colbert, 24, fos. 248-9, 6 May 1562, Coligny to Montmorency. 28 Archivo documental Espanol, Francia, ii, 208-9, i May 1561, Chantonnay to Philip II; La Ferriere, Lettres, i, 590-1, 22 March 1561, Catherine to the queen of Spain; 184, 7 April 1561, Catherine to Limoges; 189, 21 April 1561, Catherine to Limoges; De Ruble, iii, 272-3. There was, however, very little hope of Catherine succeeding so long as there were protestants active at court. Besides, it so happened that Spain was then actually using Sardinia and the Balearic islands as bases for reinforcements for Oran, and Philip's attention was chiefly concentrated on Turkey. B.N. Mss. fr. 6614, fo. 81 [March 1560/1], Limoges to Catherine, unsigned autograph with the date cancelled; Mss. fr. 15874, fos. 1-6, 3 April 1560/1, Limoges to Catherine; Mss. fr. 6604, fo. 22, 16 April 1561, Charles to Limoges. 29 De Ruble, iii, 75, 334-50, Letters Patent, from the original in the Archives des Basses Pyrenees, E. 584.

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alleged that after the death of Francis II the Guises had tried to bribe Catherine with large sums of money, but that being unsuccessful they were obliged to look to Navarre, their only alternative.30 In this they received the support and encouragement of the Spanish ambassador Chantonnay who urged them to come to terms with Navarre precisely in order to participate in his authority.31 They could not have done so had the court protestants prevailed, but Navarre's religious conduct was becoming increasingly erratic. He withdrew into retreat before Easter and then attended solemn mass and communion, making sure that the nuncio informed the pope.32 Apart from demonstrating his eligibility for compensation, this might have been partly to dissociate himself from the relatively pro-protestant edict of 19 April, or perhaps to enable him to attend the coronation on 15 May, which was clearly essential, and from which his protestant relatives were absent. But Philip II paid little attention to French entreaties on behalf of Navarre, whether from Catherine or the Guises, and throughout the summer Chantonnay was cold, not to say hostile on this point because Navarre's religious conduct was not such as to merit the condescension of Spain.33 Besides, it suited Spain to blame him for the restrained religious policy of the crown. In August, however, Navarre was described as ostentatiously catholic, doubtless because he was sending an envoy to Rome to seek papal intervention with Philip.34 It had also been intended to send the seigneur d'Ausances to Spain but he was ill 30 c

. . . tentare 1'altra strada che sola restava, di muovere con li suoi parti colari interessi 1'animo del re di Navarra'. De Tournon referred, of course, to Navarre's desire for compensation. For this purpose theyv employed his own servants d'Escars and Lenoncourt, bishop of Auxerre. J. Susta, Die Romische Curie und das Conzil von Trient unter Pius IV (4 vols. 1904-19), ii, 374-5, 4 Feb. 1561/2, de Tournon to Borromeo. 31 c y tomar con el auctoridad y credito'. Archivo documental Espanol, Francia, ii, 221-2, 12 May 1561. Chantonnay to Philip II. According to a pamphlet of about April or May 1561, Navarre is said to have been warned that the Guises would seek to win his allegiance in order to use his title and authority, but in the end to make a fool of him. Conde, iii, 378. 32 Archivo documental Espanol, Francia, ii, 141-8, 7 April 1561, Chantonnay to Philip II. 33 C.5.P.F., 1/61-2, p. 155, 25 June 1561, Throckmorton to the queen; Archivo documental Espanol, Francia, ii, 281, 7 July, 1561, Chantonnay to Philip II; 437-9, 29 Sept. 1561, Philip II to Catherine and Charles IX; 458, 2 Oct. 1561, Philip II to Chantonnay. 34 D'Escars; he arrived on 24 Sept. 1561, Granvelle, vi, 342.

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and his departure was delayed.35 From mid-September Navarre was subjected to the subtle persuasions of the papal legate, the cardinal of Ferrara, an uncle of the Guises, especially sent to traverse the proceedings of the collogue de Poissy—September to October 1561—which was, in effect, a national council. The admission of certain leading protestants to this assembly inevitably alienated Philip even further, and it required the intercession of his queen, Elisabeth de Valois, to persuade him so much as to listen to the message of Ausances.36 The disastrous failure of Poissy publicly confirmed a state of religious deadlock, and therefore accelerated both the alignment of parties and the battle for Navarre's allegiance.37 About this time it becomes increasingly hard to differentiate between Catherine's efforts to retain Navarre by obtaining his compensation, and those of the Guises to win him by the same means, until finally the distinction ceased to exist. By mid-November, at a time of critical diplomatic activity between France and Spain, the nuncio thought Navarre spoke as if the Guises had won, against both Catherine and the protestants.38 More significantly, however, he also reported Navarre to have declared with candid, impious cynicism that he would abandon the protestants in return for 'his due', but not otherwise, a policy which played into Philip's hands. De Vargas, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, reported d'Escars to have made a similar statement to the pope, while Chantonnay, for his part, declared Navarre to be so tepid about both religions that it was impossible to tell which he really favoured. But, as civil war appeared ever more imminent, the pleadings of the nuncio and legate were pressingly supported by the French catholics who employed the argument that Navarre, as lieutenant-general, might turn the power of France against Philip. While de Vargas ridiculed Tespoir bien gratuit qu'il [Navarre] a con§u de lui-m£me', he still took seriously the 35

B.N. Mss. fr. 15875, fo. 41, 14 July 1561, Charles to Limoges. B.N. Mss. fr. 15875, fo. 194, 24 Sept. 1561, Limoges and Ausances to Catherine; Mss. fr. 3951, fos. 26-42, 10 Oct. 1561, memoire by Limoges and Ausances. 37 B.N. Mss. fr. 6618, fos. 82-37., 29 Aug. 1561, de Laubespine to Limoges, refers to the alignment of parties before the colloque. 38 The legate, Ferrare, described Navarre at this time as cla virtu vitale di questo regno'. Susta, i, 304-5. 36

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remarkable suggestion that Navarre was capable of resorting to war against Spain. This illogical attitude reflected Philip's extreme anxiety about the possible effects of French affairs upon those of the Netherlands, where any hostilities might be expected to occur.39 Chantonnay, who must surely have known better, contented himself with reporting the matter in remorseless detail and, at the end of November, Ausances once again left for Spain.40 Thus, instead of dominating France by holding the confessional factions apart, Navarre, engrossed in his private fantasy, drifted irresponsibly between them, cheerfully pursuing his usual profligate life at court and attending both mass and the protestant cult with offensive impartiality. The denouement came with the return of Ausances at the beginning of January 1562, when France was already on the brink of civil war.41 This was just before the opening of the extraordinary assembly at Saint-Germain, the final effort to reach a workable compromise on the problem of religion. Navarre hailed the Spanish mission as a signal success, though it is difficult to see why.42 The catholic agents therefore besieged Navarre, alluding to superior and unrealistic prizes like parts of Italy or the Netherlands; even the catholic hand of Mary Stuart.43 In this way, 39

Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses . . ., ser. i, vol. vi (1835), Lettres de Prosper de Sainte-Croix au cardinal Eorromee^ pp. 10-12, 15 Nov. 1561; Granvelle, vi, 342-9, 30 Sept. 1561, de Vargas to Philip II. The Venetian ambassador, Michele Suriano, later reported having heard that if Spain were to move, the protestants 'faranno revoltar tutta la fiandra in un giorno, e che hanno modo di farlo facilmente'. Tommaseo, Relations des ambassadeurs venitiens sur les affaires de France au xvi? siecle (1836), i, 562. 40 Archivo documental Espanol, Francia, iii, 90-104, 21 Nov. 1561, Chantonnay to Philip II; 105-6, 26 Nov. 1561, Chantonnay to Philip II; 159, 10 Dec. 1561, Chantonnay to Philip II; De Ruble, iii, 299 ff. 41 De Ruble, iii, 308; Ausances returned on 2 Jan. 1562, though it appears that the deliberation of this and other matters was considerably delayed in Spain. Susta, ii, 369, 17 Jan. 1561/2, Crivello to Borromeo. 42 Archivo documental Espanol, Francia, iii, 279 ff., 18 Jan. 1562, Alva to Chantonnay. Alva said that Philip had, out of cpura liberalidad' offered Navarre Tunis, with help towards its conquest. This 'liberal' offer was made upon the most exacting political and religious conditions, which Navarre was powerless to fulfil. 43 Sainte-Croix, Lettres, pp. 15-16, 5 Jan. 1561/2; Hyppolite d'Este, Negotiations on lettres d'affaires ecclesiastiques et politiques ecrites au pape Pie IF (1658) pp. 4-11, 10 Jan. 1561/2, Ferrara to Borromeo. The pope also sent an envoy to Spain, Susta, i, 330, 4 Jan. 1561/2, Pius IV to Ferrara; 334, 3 Jan. 1561/2, Borromeo to Ferrara; ii, 371-2, 18 Janj 1561/2, de Tournon to Borromeo.

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he was nevertheless impelled to support the catholic extremists in the assembly, and openly opposed its moderately tolerant edict— the celebrated edict of January—eloquently promoted by Catherine and the chancellor de L'Hospital. In this moment of supreme crisis, sovereignty, one and indivisible, had been induced to speak with two voices. The regency partnership was not united behind the new edict and, if the young king's lieutenant-general opposed it, were not others licenced to do so? After this triumph, Ferrara redoubled his efforts to hold Navarre who, if not entirely deceived as to Philip's intentions was, for the moment, at least optimistic.44 So, without having reached any certain decision, he supported the Guises just sufficiently to serve their purposes in the crisis which followed the edict of January.45 It was he who summoned Guise to Paris on 28 February to oppose the execution of the edict, while Catherine was striving to overcome the resistance ofiheparlement.*Q Soon after he expressed his resolution to live in the closest friendship with Guise.47 The Triumvirate, shielded by Navarre's supreme command, could therefore safely appear in arms, which they did, entering Paris by the royal Porte Saint-Denis on 15 March, while Catherine, who had delivered Navarre from the Guises, was thereby betrayed into their hands.48Bereft of Navarre's authority, her proper policy of royal independence collapsed. Alone, she was faced with the now complete religious alignment and thus, for the crown, a purely religious choice. To this the answer was inevitably catholic, since she could never accept specifically protestant support against the 44

Sainte-Croix, Lettres, p. 40, 25 Feb. 1561/2. He believed Navarre's compensation to be virtually certain. He was mistaken. 45 De Tournon reported Navarre to have 'fait a haute"voix profession de sa foi catholique'. M. Francois, Correspondance du Cardinal Frangois de Tournon (Paris, 1946), p. 433, 28 Feb. 1561/2, de Tournon to Borromeo. 46 J. Delaborde, Gaspard de Coligny, amiral de France (1879), ^? 22 ~3J D. Thickett (ed.), Estienne Pasquier, Lettres historiques, 1556-94 (Geneva, 1966), PP-4792~5Sainte-Croix, Lettres, p. 47, 13 March 1561/2. 48 B.N. Mss. fr. 6611, fos. 20-1, 16 March 1561/2, Guise and others to Catherine, original. Sainte-Croix, Lettres, p. 55, 19 March 1561/2, says that Guise entered Paris the day before. The letter, however, is wrongly dated and should be attributed to 16 March. This text contains many similar inaccuracies. Throckmorton gives the date as 16 March, C.S.P.F., 1561-2, p. 558, 20 March 1561/2, Throckmorton to the queen; so does Delaborde, Coligny, ii, 35; De Ruble, iv, 117, follows Throckmorton.

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Guises and yet sustain the reservation that she and the crown remained catholic.49 Instead, she ostensibly succumbed to the catholics and strove to sustain the reservation that the crown was still independent. Catherine was a great believer in the natural solutions of time and, after all, Navarre's defections were not usually final.50 But it so happened that this one procured the first civil war in which he perished, without ever having obtained his compensatory crown. 49

According to Soubise, Catherine resisted his persuasions for precisely this reason. De Ruble, iv, 117. 60 In May Navarre could still write to the French ambassador in Spain about his compensation because of his 'singulier desir de scavoir par ou j'en doiz passer'. B.N. Mss. fr. 6606, fo. 5, 9 May 1562, Navarre to Limoges, and, as late as 26 June, he was said to be confirmed in his catholic alliance by the impending arrival of his Portuguese messenger Almeida. Francois, Correspondance, p. 443, 8 March 1561/2, de Tournon to Borromeo; Susta, ii, 491—2, 26 June 1562, Santa-Croce to Borromeo. The correspondence on this subject ended only with his death.

5 THE ORIGINS OF QUEEN ELIZABETH'S RELATIONS WITH THE HUGUENOTS, 1559-62 QUEEN ELIZABETH'S formal relations with the Huguenots in France began with the treaty of Hampton Court, which she signed on 19 September 1562, with the prince de Conde and his protestant associates.1 In 1559, however, there was no such thing as a Huguenot faction in France ; the international situation was confused and unstable, and the role of Queen Elizabeth was a matter for conjecture. The three and a half years which elapsed between the European treaty of Cateau-Cambresis in April 1559 and the treaty of Hampton Court, witnessed the emergence of the Huguenots in France, the gradual clarification of international issues, and the development of a predominantly protestant foreign policy on the part of Queen Elizabeth. If we consider the deceptively simple question, why did Queen Elizabeth enter into relations with the Huguenots, the answers all lead back to the European situation after the treaty of CateauCambresis. From this time of uncertainty, hatred and fear, dates the great ideological struggle of the sixteenth century. Indeed, the growth of heresy had been one important reason for concluding the first long phase of the Franco-Hapsburg rivalry, better known as the Italian wars. At the time of the treaty— and for years to come—it was generally believed in protestant circles, and with much supporting evidence, that the kings of France and Spain were mutually resolved to turn their power and authority against the heretics, first at home and thereafter in the rest of Europe.2 As the return of England to the Reform1 The date is sometimes given as 19th and sometimes as 20th. Printed in J. Dumont, Corps diplomatique, v, 94-95 (Latin); P.R.O., S.P. 70/41/486, rough copy corrected by Cecil and endorsed 27 September 1562. 2 This is a large subject, which cannot be fully discussed here. 23-24 May 1559, Throckmorton to Cecil, Forbes, A Full View of the Public Transactions in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth (London, 1740), i, pp. 99-102 ; 13 June 1559, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 126-30; 21 June 1559, Throckmorton

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ation was one of the first great acts of Queen Elizabeth, it was natural that frightened Protestants on the continent should have envisaged the Queen as the pillar of their faith and the guarantor of their survival, for the treaty also threatened her, leaving her country in dangerous isolation. The death of Elizabeth's predecessor Mary, wife of Philip II, had severed the crown of Spain from that of England, thereby rendering questionable, under the protestant Elizabeth, the timehonoured Anglo-Spanish alliance. When Elizabeth rejected Philip's prompt offer of marriage, he turned to France, and sealed his treaty by marrying Elisabeth de Valois, daughter of Henry II. As a result, Queen Elizabeth lost the old alliance with Spain, at a time when her relations with France, the traditional enemy, could hardly have been worse. Apart from the recent loss of Calais, recaptured by the due de Guise, the principal source of conflict was a dynastic connection with Scotland, enabling France to challenge Elizabeth's very title to her throne. The claim to Scotland and the threat to England were vested in the person of Mary, Queen of Scots who, by virtue of a catholic upbringing and her descent from King Henry VII, was now championed by her catholic relatives as claimant to the throne of England. As the daughter of Mary of Lorraine, widow of James V, she was a niece of Fran§ois, due de Guise and his brother Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine. The Guise brothers, who had been for years among the ablest and most powerful ministers of Henry II, in 1558 triumphantly accomplished the marriage of their niece to Henry's son, the Dauphin, Francis, who thereby received the crown matrimonial of Scotland. When, therefore, in May 1559, the protestant nobility of Scotland rose in revolt against the French and catholic government of Mary of Lorraine, war in Scotland became inevitable, and the situation for Elizabeth was perilous indeed.1 It became, if anything, even more threatening when, on 10 July, Henry II died and Francis and Mary ascended the throne. Mary's uncles, the Guises, promptly seized control of the royal to the Privy Council, Ibid., pp. 138-46; 4 July 1559, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 152-3 ; 29 April 1559, Count Feria to Philip II, Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, 1558-67, p. 62 ; 8 March 1594, statement by Sir Henry Killigrew, Cecil Papers, 25, f. 70, seen by courtesy of Lord Salisbury. 1 12 July 1559, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, pp. 84-5.

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authority1 and wasted little time in assuming for France the title and the arms of England.2 This powerful and ambitious family was extremely important. At least until the murder of the due de Guise in February 1563, they held much of the initiative in European affairs, and it was through them that relations between England, Scotland, France and, later, Spain were so closely interwoven. They were also the decisive factor in the relations which developed between Elizabeth and the Huguenots, since it was in opposition to their usurped authority under Francis II, and in resistance to their persecution, that the Huguenots began to form a faction in the state. The Guise intention was to exterminate the Protestants in France, and to crush the rebellion in Scotland as a prelude to the prosecution of Mary's claim to England. In these critical circumstances, much depended on the policy of Elizabeth. To some of her more protestant servants, in particular Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, Ambassador in Paris, William Cecil, Principal Secretary of State, and certain members of the Council, it was obvious that Elizabeth must forthwith defend both herself and the Protestants in France by sending help to Scotland and preparing a fleet. Elizabeth was equally haunted by the question of defence : the three major issues of her accession—religion, her marriage and the succession—could all be resolved into different aspects of this one overriding problem, the preservation of an independent and, presumably, protestant England. It is impossible to say what Elizabeth thought or really wanted, but she declined to be forced into the role of protestant champion. To her, apparently, the situation was more complex. In the first place, France and Spain might be formally united, but a royal marriage neither constitutes a true alliance, nor dissolves deep-seated rivalry,3 though catholic fer1 This consisted principally in possessing the person of the King and the cachet, his personal seal; in controlling the finances and the royal forces and in dominating the Council. On this crisis and the gradual formation of a protestant faction, see my article,c Calvinism and the Conspiracy of Amboise ', History, xlvii, June 1962. 2 4 August 1559, Throckmorton to Cecil, Forbes, i, pp. 190-2 ; 8 August 1559, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 192-5. Throckmorton was entertained at court on plate which quartered the royal arms of England with those of France and Scotland. 3 This was strongly the opinion of Margaret of Parma, Regent of the Netherlands, 7 October 1560, Margaret to Philip II, Gachard, Correspondance de Margaret d'Autriche avec Philippe II (Brussels, 1867), i, pp. 296-312.

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vour, it is true, was likely to be far more binding. The attitude of Spain, therefore, remained of critical significance.1 Uncertain factors existed and Elizabeth chose to wait, uncommitted. She herself appeared as yet uncertain of the destiny of England, or possibly only certain that apparent uncertainty represented the surest means of defence. But, in order to do nothing, ceaseless activity was necessary, to create confusion and maintain suspense. The Queen, in fact, was not averse from seeming to take action, and it may have served her waiting purpose very well to let her servants form vague protestant connections in the Empire, France and Scotland, while she herself sought to avoid any further alienation of catholic opinion and, above all, to hold the Spanish door ajar. Thus, protestant though she was, her intentions were unknown. Colossal pressures on the Queen from multiple dangers, rapid events and divided counsels may simply have cancelled each other out. But while she laboured to remain at peace and to escape involvement, rival forces battled ceaselessly about her, Catholics for her subversion, by luring her back to Eome, and Protestants for her alliance and support. Only very gradually, as events began to force her hand, did the scales slowly descend on the protestant side. Even then Elizabeth had reservations. Elizabeth's years of suspense—during which all initiative came from without—fall into three periods : the first from May 1559-December 1560, one might call the French phase. It featured the growth, in France, of political and religious opposition to the Guises, and abroad their threat to England through the inheritance of their niece, the Queen of Scots. The intermediate period, December 1560-April 1562, one might call the Spanish phase. It witnessed a partial fall from power of the Guises, and a consequent shift in the political centre of gravity from France to Spain. Meanwhile, opposition to the Guises was welding the Huguenots into an organised faction under the leadership of Louis de Bourbon, prince de Conde, and Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France. The last period, April-September 1562, witnessed the outbreak of civil war in France, and the 1 On the rivalry of France and Spain and the hostility of both for England see, for example, September 1559, Robert Hogan or Hoggins to Cecil, Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations politiques des Pays-Bas et de I Angleterre sous le regne de Philippe II (Brussels, 1882-1900), ii, pp. 24-8.

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direct appeal of the Huguenots to Queen Elizabeth, culminating in the treaty of Hampton Court. The treaty forms a landmark in European affairs, but it should not be inferred that a happy partnership ensued. Elizabeth still disliked expensive commitments, and the policy of intervention was obstructed by a section of her Council. When Throckmorton went to France as Elizabeth's Ambassador in May 1559,1 he and Cecil were at one in their belief that an active protestant foreign policy represented England's only hope of salvation. They constantly upheld each other in a courageous, if semi-despairing opposition to the Queen's chronic inactivity, and her disinclination to spend money, even when to abstain seemed an extravagant false economy. Attention was already fixed on Scotland, where the protestant revolt had just begun, and all their efforts and entreaties for over a year must be seen in the context of these Franco-Scottish affairs, which bore so heavily on England. Throckmorton even urged on Elizabeth the wisdom of being gracious to John Knox, whose opinion of female rulers was only too notorious and, before reaching Paris, he wrote to Cecil that numerous Protestants in the south and west had issued a confession of faith and were showing signs of resistance to Henry II, which provided the Queen with an opportunity for the ' setting forth ' of religion.2 Cecil, he suggested, might make use of ' the matter in Scotland ', to commend this policy to the Queen.3 In reporting the political crisis which followed the death of Henry II, Throckmorton seized the opportunity of pressing his views on the Queen. He had already sent warnings of what he held to be her impending fate at the hands of France and Spain.4 Close to the source of the danger, he now urged that it was ' in no wise safe ' for Elizabeth to remain over long ' in doubtful and unknown terms ' with the King of Spain. It was high time to seek some definite alliance and make essential naval preparations because it was not ' to be suffered ? that the French shall 1

May 1559, Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1547-80, p. 128 ; 15 May 1559, Throckmorton to Cecil, Forbes, i, pp. 90-1. 2 13 June 1559, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., p. 130; 15 May 1559, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., p. 92. 3 23 May 1559, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., p. 101. 4 4 July 1559, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 152-3.

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vanquish the Scots ' that now favour your religion' or be permitted to land such forces as might later assail England, which was what they fully intended.1 The crisis in France did nothing to lessen the need for such precautions. When the young and ailing Francis II ascended the throne, authority belonged by right to the first Prince of the Blood, Antoine de Bourbon, King of Navarre—then reputed to be a Protestant—and his brother Louis, prince de Conde. But, by seizing control of the government, in the absence of Navarre, the Guises precipitated a struggle for power in which they received catholic support, and the Bourbons and others were quickly identified with the persecuted Protestants. Intense hatred of the Guises, on personal and political as well as religious grounds, swept over much of France with great rapidity. It was therefore inevitable that Throckmorton should have begun to think of French protestantism as a means of abating the power of the Guises and of diverting their energies from Scotland and England. Fear of the Guises was, in fact, the unaltruistic basis and origin of Elizabeth's relations with the Huguenots, but because in 1559 they were mostly anonymous, isolated and without leadership, they were not collectively approachable. Thus Throckmorton's immediate reaction to the crisis in France was not related to the Protestants. Three days after Henry's death, while the Guises were immersed in their coup d'etat, he swiftly advised Elizabeth to avail herself of this splendid chance to descend upon the lost port of Calais.2 The idea was a good one. By the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, Elizabeth had been forced to acquiesce in the loss of Calais, with a face-saving clause—which no one believed3—providing for its restitution in eight years' time. The redemption of this military disaster of Marian England would have been of great domestic value to Elizabeth, and her possession of a Channel port would 1

18 July 1559, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., p. 165. 13 July 1559, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 157-60. See for example : 27 July 1559, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., p. 175 ; 14 December 1559, Killigrew and Jones to the Privy Council, Ibid., p. 278 ; 30 November 1560, Robert Jones to Throckmorton, Hardwicke, Miscellaneous State Papers (London, 1718), i, p. 167 ; Jones gave the novel reason that the Secretary of State, Jacques Bourdin, had bought 700 acres of land in the vicinity and was building there ; 7 October 1561, Mundt to Elizabeth, Calendar of State Papers, Foreign, 1561-2, p. 350. 2 3

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have increased the difficulty for France of campaigning in Scotland. Elizabeth, in fact, became ever more tenaciously anxious to recover Calais and—apart from her need to resist the Jhouse of Guise—it was principally Calais that she hoped to obtain from the treaty of Hampton Court. More important even than reasons of prestige, she wanted an alternative staple to Antwerp for English merchants in the Netherlands, both because the future revolt might already be predicted, and because the outbreak of any quarrel with Spain would render Antwerp inhospitable to English shipping. Calais was also strategically situated in relation to the Netherlands and probably featured in the secret clauses of the treaty. In 1559, however, Elizabeth wanted peace. She did nothing all the summer, while the Guises quietly increased their forces in Scotland. By September, when the French gave orders for the fortification of Calais, Throckmorton became really desperate, and exploded to Cecil that he could not hold his peace.1 He reported that the French were ' practising '—as he said—to take Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight, and warned the Queen that he learnt from all the sources that he ever used or knew of, that the French ' mind verily to have to do with us as soon as time and opportunity shall serve them and to convert all their forces that way.' 2 There were things he must convey but could not write, and he actually persuaded the Queen to allow him to return. The public pretext was the illness of his wife, but no one was deceived.3 Throckmorton arrived on 11 November4 and stayed, not for the four or five days originally conceded, but until the end of January 1560. Such was the gravity of the crisis. It has been alleged that Throckmorton went home to inform the Queen of preparations for the rising, known as the Conspiracy of Amboise, which took place in France the following March. This is apparently a misconception, resulting from a failure to see the matter in its context. For an ambassador to leave his post was exceptional, conspicuous and extremely ill-received. 1

23 September 1559, Throckmorton to Cecil, Forbes, i, pp. 238-9. 1 9 September 1559, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 228-35. 24 September 1559, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 239-40; 11 October 1559, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, Ibid., pp. 251-2. 4 13 November 1559, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, p. 114. 2

3

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Throckmorton may, or may not, have learnt of the approaching ' garboils', as they said, but he would never have left France on that account. The reason was far more serious. If the evidence is not absolutely conclusive, it very strongly suggests that the primary reason for Throckmorton's extraordinary journey was to persuade the Queen of the existence of a catholic conspiracy to depose her, centred in the preparations of the Guises to invade England through Scotland, the Isle of Wight and Portsmouth.1 According to Don Alvaro de Quadra, Bishop of Aquila, the Spanish Ambassador in England, it was as a result of Throckmorton's visit that the Queen and the Council decided to send overt help to the Protestants in Scotland, though only after much altercation, and a threat of resignation from Cecil, who declared that he would work in the kitchen or in the garden, but that he could offer the Queen no other advice.2 The treaty of Berwick for the mutual defence of England and Scotland was signed on 27 February 1560.3 Throckmorton's long absence in England, contrary to diplomatic usage, rendered him sinister and suspect to the Guises, who rightly supposed him to have departed for reasons ' smally' to their advantage.4 Upon his return, at the end of January 1560,5 he was persona non grata, and even threatened with arrest.6 His peril was not lessened by Elizabeth's candid declaration of 24 March, in which she publicly complained that the Guises had 1

Idem ; 9 April 1560, De Glajon to Philip II, Ibid., p. 145; 7 October 1559, Throckmorton to Cecil, Forbes, i, p. 249; 6 January 1560, Killigrew and Jones to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 292-6; 4 February 1560, Throckmorton to the Privy Council, Ibid., p. 317 ; 3 January 1560, Mundt to Elizabeth, C.S.P.F., 1559-60, pp. 261-2 ; 24 March 1560, Proclamation concerning peace, Ibid., pp. 472-3. The continued presence of Spanish troops in the Netherlands, coupled with arrangements for their embarkation, necessarily added to this sense of crisis. 10 January 1560/1, Margaret to Philip II, Gachard, i, pp. 372-4; C. Paillard, Considerations sur les causes generales des troubles des Pays-Bos au XVIe siecle (Brussels, 1874), pp. 12 seq. 2 18 November 1559, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, pp. 115-16. A little money had been sent as early as September 1559, and Cecil had been giving what encouragement he could. M. Lee, James Stewart, Earl of Moray (Columbia, 1953), pp. 48, 54 ; J. E. Neale, Queen Elizabeth I (ed. 1952), pp. 99100; undated draft, Cecil to Elizabeth, Thomas Wright, Queen Elizabeth and her 3Times (London, 1838), i, pp. 24-5. Lee, p. 56. 4 8 November 1559, Killigrew and Jones to Elizabeth, Forbes, i, p. 265. 5 21 January 1560, de Quadra to the Duchess of Parma, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, p. 120; 25 January 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, C.S.P.F., 1559-60, p. 329. 6 8 February 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Forbes, i, p. 324 ; 27 February 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 334-44.

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exalted the Queen of Scots for their private advancement, and prepared an invasion of England. She was, therefore, she said, arming in self-defence, although she wished for peace and the departure of the French from Scotland.1 In these circumstances, it was only to be expected, after the Tumult of Amboise had broken upon the Guises in March 1560, that they should have declared, and possibly also believed, that Elizabeth and her ministers had assisted the sedition.2 There is, in fact, no evidence that Throckmorton or his colleague, Henry Killigrew, who accompanied him to France, were in any way connected with the conspiracy,3 but the allegation is of interest because it is assumed to imply the existence of close relations between Throckmorton and the Protestants at this date. On this point the evidence is vague and inconclusive, for it was not until after the Conspiracy of Amboise that the Protestants really began to emerge as a faction. A certain amount of supposition appears to be involved, on the part of contemporaries and historians alike. This is probably because both Throckmorton and Killigrew were so thoroughly tarred with the protestant brush that they had never been trusted in catholic circles. Throckmorton declared as much himself.4 Both had previously spent some time in France as exiles, and Killigrew had entered the service of the vidame de Chartres, a kinsman of the prince de Conde, a connection which, it is thought, must have provided useful contacts in leading protestant circles.5 This could be true, but it is speculation and the vidame died in December 1 24 March 1560, C.S.P.F., 1559-60, pp. 472-3. Throckmorton deplored this outspokenness for fear of Guise resentment, and he was evidently right. The following month he reported a Guise plot to murder Elizabeth, and also that Lorraine had sworn to be revenged on her. Subsequent events bore this out. 25 April 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 581-3; 28 April 1560, same to same, Ibid., p. 596. 2 27 March 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, C.S.P.F., 1559-60, p. 479 ; 28 March 1560, de Quarda to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, p. 140 ; A. Teulet, Relations politiques de la France et de VEspagne, avec VlZcosse au XVle siecle (Paris, 1862), ii, p. 44. 3 This is fully discussed in chapter 6 below. 4 21 June 1559, Throckmorton to Cecil, Forbes, i, p. 136. 5 Throckmorton fled from England on 20 June 1556, and was pardoned on 1 May 1557. J. E. Neale, ' Throckmorton's Advice to Queen Elizabeth', English Historical Review, Ixv, 1950, p. 92. Killigrew, who was involved in the Wyatt rebellion, was away between 1554-6 ; A. C. Miller, Sir Henry Killigrew (Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 20. Few, if any, noblemen had been converted at this time.

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1560.1 Conde and Throckmorton must, presumably, have met at court, but the acquaintance was not significant before Conde emerged as a protestant leader, during the summer of 1560. Certainly Throckmorton was in touch with the King of Navarre, in whom the Protestants sought a champion and protector. But they were very quickly disillusioned, for his religion varied with his prospects and his heart was fixed in Navarre. When Navarre came to court, after the death of Henry II, first Killigrew, and then Throckmorton had several meetings with him. Significance has been attached to this because—in the circumstances—they had to be clandestine. They easily might have proved important in the relations between Elizabeth and the Huguenots, but in fact, as Killigrew later declared, they were merely complimentary.2 On a lower social level, de Quadra alleged the existence of close relations between Throckmorton and the Protestants by the time of the Conspiracy of Amboise, partly no doubt because he thought Throckmorton ' ready to do any wickedness '. He was impressed by Throckmorton's role in the escape from France of the protestant Earl of Arran—a key figure in the Scottish political scene—and by the movement of government agents between England and Brittany.3 English intelligence in Brittany could have been more extensive than we now know, but this was never a strongly protestant province, and the principal purpose was certainly to discover the extent of French preparations for Scotland. The escape of the Earl of Arran had been accomplished by Throckmorton and others, not with the help of French Protestants, but with that of secret agents in the service of 1 Fran$ois de Vendome, vidame de Chartres, died 22 December 1560. He should not be confused with his better-known cousin and successor, Jean de Ferrieres, seigneur de Maligny, who later negotiated the treaty of Hampton Court. It was not Fran9ois, but Edme, brother of Jean and known as le jeune Maligny, who took part in the Conspiracy of Amboise. 2 8 March 1594, statement by Sir Henry Killigrew, Cecil Papers, 25, f. 70 verso ; 15 August 1559, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Forbes, i, pp. 197-205 ; 25 August 1559, same to same, Ibid., pp. 212-16; 19 July 1559, Elizabeth to Navarre, C.S.P.F., 1558-9, p. 390 ; 25 August 1559, Navarre to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 500-1. 3 21 January 1560, de Quadra to the Duchess of Parma, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, p. 121 ; 3 February 1560, de Quadra to Philip II, Ibid., p. 125. Arran was the son of James Hamilton, Duke of Chatellerault, heir apparent to the throne of Scotland.

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Elizabeth.1 During their time as exiles, Throckmorton and Killigrew had certainly become acquainted with other wandering Protestants and impecunious persons in want of a patron, mostly English, Scots, Irish and Italians, many of whom were subsequently drafted into Elizabeth's expanding intelligence service. Nothing more definite can be established, and the precise existence or extent of Throckmorton's connections with the Protestants by the time of the Conspiracy of Amboise, remains as obscure as the identity and activities of the Protestants themselves. For six months after his return to France in January 1560, Throckmorton was still preoccupied by the Guises and their designs on England, for the treaty of Berwick between England and Scotland was no sooner made in February 1560 than the French began to send a succession of undistinguished envoys to talk of peace, and so play for time. Throckmorton therefore resumed his warnings against the ambition of the Guises, their honied words, and fawnings which were nothing but procurements.2 Cecil supported him sturdily, impressing on the Queen, through the agency of the Privy Council, the ' old-rooted hatred of the House of Guise ', and their intent to * bereave the Queen's Majesty of her crown '.3 The point, in fact, was incontrovertibly established by the interception of two letters from the Guise brothers to their sister, the Kegent of Scotland, disclosing their aggressive and unneighbourly intentions, as soon as they were free to act.4 But, as Cecil wearily observed a little later, the 1

Lee, 45-9 ; A Memorial committed to Killigrew, undated, Forbes, i, pp. 171-2 ; 17 July 1559, Memorial to Throckmorton, Ibid., p. 163 ; 18 July 1559, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 163-6. 2 4 February 1560, Throckmorton to the Privy Council, Forbes, i, pp. 31620; 27 February 1560, same to same, Ibid., pp. 344-7 ; 7 March 1560, Privy Council to Throckmorton, Ibid., pp. 349-51 ; 7 March 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 352-5 ; 8 March 1560, same to same, Ibid., pp. 355-6. 3 A Brief consideration on the weighty matter of Scotland, undated, Ibid., pp. 387-90 ; 23 March 1560, petition of the Privy Council to the Queen, drafted by Cecil, Ibid., pp. 390-6; May 1560, Throckmorton to the Queen, Ibid., pp. 437-9 ; 20 February 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, C.S.P.F., 1559-60, pp. 387-90. 4 19 February 1560, Guise and Lorraine to the Queen Regent, C.S.P.F., 1559-60, pp. 384-7, intercepted by Cecil; 9 April 1560, same to same, Forbes, i, pp. 398-400, apparently intercepted by Throckmorton. 9 April was evidently the date on which Throckmorton had the letter copied into his own cipher and not the date of the original since he himself had analysed its contents in a letter of 6 April to Cecil; Ibid., pp. 507-9. See also, 3 May 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 427-30, in which he explains how he obtained the letters.

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Queen had never liked ' this matter of Scotland', and instead of expelling the French while they were troubled at home, she tormented her servants by receiving their envoys and treating of peace, which was signed at Edinburgh in July.1 This put an end to the immediate Scottish crisis, but merely deferred the danger from France because, as Throckmorton had always said, the French were only playing for time, and the treaty was never ratified. The months which followed the treaty of Edinburgh were a time of great uncertainty, both in England and in France. English affairs were troubled by the rise to favour of Lord Robert Dudley whom the Queen, for some years, wanted to marry. Speculation ran high, and when Lord Robert's wife died on 8 September 1560 in unfortunate, not to say ambiguous circumstances, the affair created something of an international scandal, damaging to the Queen's reputation. Both Cecil and Throckmorton strongly and bravely opposed Lord Robert—as contemporaries generally styled him—consequently falling into relative disfavour and, with them, the pro-Scottish, protestant policy which they had fostered.2 For the rest of the period covered by this paper, the conduct of Elizabeth's foreign policy was strongly affected by the fortunes and influence of Lord Robert and the opposition of his enemies.3 In France, following the Tumult of Amboise in March, there was a great simmering unrest throughout the summer of 1560. The facts are mostly obscure, but the air was thick with rumours of rebellion, and fragments of conspiracy were reported, troubles which seem to have given rise to a series of disconnected and indirect appeals to Queen Elizabeth, probably from individuals or isolated groups, but not, so far as we know, to Throckmorton. The Queen's Ambassador was not, after all, a proper channel for improper proposals. There were plenty of secret agents to 1 13 May 1560, Cecil to Throckmorton, Forbes, i, pp. 454-5 ; 27 May 1560, same to same, Ibid., p. 500; 28 May 1560, Killigrew to Throckmorton, Ibid., p. 501. 2 11 September 1560, de Quadra to the Duchess of Parma, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, pp. 174-6 ; 30 November 1560, Jones to Throckmorton, Hardwicke, i, pp. 163-9. For Cecil's objections to the Dudley match, see S. Haynes, State3 Papers (London, 1740), p. 444. 11 September 1560, de Quadra to the Duchess of Parma, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, pp. 174-6; 10 October 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, C.S.P.F., 1560-1, pp. 347-8; 28 October 1560, same to same, Ibid., pp. 376-7.

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perform such offices. Thus, for example, late in May 1560 Christopher Mundt, the Queen's agent in Strasbourg, reported that he had been ' divers times required to ask the Queen to join and assist certain princes in France who are grieved with the present administration'. In return it was offered, ' if all things shall come to a prosperous end', that they would c aid her again to her desire', presumably the recovery of Calais. These were unofficial overtures for which no commission was produced, but more recently Mundt had also received an envoy from Conde desiring him to write privately to the Queen.1 Also in May, Throckmorton learnt of a revolt in Brittany, and was informed that in case of war the Protestants there would deliver to the Queen Nantes, Angers, St. Michael's Mount and other ports that they might master.2 Early in June an agent called Harrie Wilson drafted a mysterious document in which he alleged that several German princes, together with representatives of England, Scotland and ' a certain house of France ', had agreed upon a league entitled ' the revenge of Christian blood '. Their followers were to assemble in France, and the Queen of England was to land forces at convenient places in Normandy, Brittany or Guyenne.3 This was probably the pious hope of a busy ' practiser ' but it is interesting to note that after the conclusion of the treaty of Edinburgh, Elizabeth commanded Throckmorton to send ' some discreet persons ' to just these provinces, to know how they liked the accord; but it is not clear to whom she referred.4 Later in the summer Lorraine complained to Throckmorton of rumours that the Queen had been c a comfort to the rebels and makers of stirs ', quite possibly to observe Throckmorton's reaction.5 To this Elizabeth retorted with speed and acidity that she wished all other princes were as clear in this matter as she.6 The Guises moved swiftly to avert rebellion in France during this summer of 1560, mastered the situation and recovered their former initiative. At the end of October they even dared to 1

23 May 1560, Mundt to Cecil, C.S.P.F., 1560-1, p. 75. 22 May 1560, Throckmorton to the Queen, Forbes, i, pp. 461-73. 3 [1 June] 1560, Intelligence from the court, C.S.P.F., 1560-1, pp. 93-4. 4 19 July 1560, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, Ibid., p. 194. 5 22 August 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., p. 248. 6 26 August 1560, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, Ibid., p. 261.

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arrest Conde himself, when he and Navarre reached Orleans to attend a meeting of the Estates General. Consequently Throckmorton and others had begun to send home a fresh series of warnings, concerning the renewal of a catholic league which was 6 very pernicious' to the Queen.1 He and Cecil now became correspondingly anxious about the Queen's disfavour and dislike of their Scottish policy, since they considered it essential for survival to support a protestant faction there and to arm at sea. It was widely believed abroad that the country would be ruined, and therefore become an easy prey, if the Queen were to marry Lord Robert, and her preoccupation had resulted in neglect of business. Cecil went so far as to ask Throckmorton to solicit the Queen for the ' better despatch of her affairs', a ticklish commission indeed.2 Throckmorton, who never lacked the courage of his convictions, did even more. He despatched a trusted agent to observe developments in Scotland3 and sent Robert Jones to England to speak ' very roundly ' to the Queen about the rumours of her marriage. Jones reported having done so on 30 November. He also warned the Queen of the existence of a * straight league' between France and Spain, to share the realms of England and Scotland, and that Calais would never be restored according to the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. To Throckmorton he reported that, while the majority of the Council supported the Scottish cause, he perceived the Queen to be ' very cold '.* Everything now turned upon the problem of the Queen's marriage, which gave—or at least appeared to give—a new and alarming twist to her foreign policy. Although it was claimed as early as October 1560 that she had decided not to marry 1

13 August 1560, Mundt to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 228-9; 10 October 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 340-6 ; 12 October 1560, Shers to Cecil, from Venice, Ibid., pp. 353-4 ; [22 October] 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 367-8 ; 17 November 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 391-6 ; 17 November 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., p. 397 ; 26 November 1560, Mundt to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 406-7 ; 28 November 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 407-10; 29 November 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 412-13 ; 7 December 1560, Chamberlain to Elizabeth, from Toledo, Ibid., pp. 424-6. 2 28 October 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 376-7. 3 Alexander Clarke. 28 November 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 410-11; 1 December 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Hardwicke, i, pp. 161-2. 4 30 November 1560, Jones to Throckmorton, Ibid., pp. 163-9.

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Lord Kobert,1 this was not believed, and it appears tliat neither Lord Kobert, nor even, apparently, the Queen herself, had as yet abandoned hope.2 A few months later, and reputedly for this reason, Lord Robert turned to de Quadra, Philip's Ambassador, in search of substantial support, initially through the agency of his brother-in-law, Sir Henry Sidney, one of de Quadra's informants.3 For well over a year to come the Queen's foreign policy contained a strong pro-Spanish element although, at the same time, she discreetly strengthened her protestant connections. Throckmorton's advertisements on points of policy—particularly the mission of Robert Jones—had not been without effect on the Queen, although she objected to his censorious and disobliging comments on her personal conduct.4 Philip II was not averse from the Dudley marriage—-faute de mieux—indeed he offered his support, but only in return for religious concessions of a kind that Lord Robert had no power to grant, but which Elizabeth herself for many anxious months appeared liable to make.5 We may well doubt whether the Queen ever seriously intended such a momentous change,6 but it is important to understand how thoroughly and for how long she concealed her purposes and kept the world—including Cecil and Throckmorton—guessing.7 Her motives are obscure and were probably complex. There is too much evidence to ignore the marriage aspect, but 1

15 October 1560, minute, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, p. 177. 2 If Elizabeth's personal wishes are a matter for conjecture, the suggestion is hazarded on the grounds that in mid-January 1561, the Council regarded Throckmorton's protests as an ill-advised striving against the stream. 13 January 1561, Killigrew to Throckmorton, C.S.P.F., 1560-1, p. 497. Cecil also commented that only God knew what the Queen would do. 15 January 1561, Cecil to Throckmorton, Ibid., p. 498 ; 25 March 1561, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, pp. 186-91. 3 22 January 1561, de Quadra to Philip II, Ibid., pp. 178-80. A niece of Henry Sidney had married Count Feria, Philip's former Ambassador in England. 4 31 December 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, C.S.P.F., 1560-1, p. 475; 13 January 1561, Killigrew to Throckmorton, Ibid., p. 497. 5 23 February 1561, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, pp. 180-4 ; 17 March 1561, Philip II to de Quadra, Ibid., pp. 184-6; 26 March 1561, de Quadra to Philip II, Ibid., pp. 186-91 ; 27 April 1561, de Quadra to Lord Robert, Ibid., pp. 195-9. 6 This is as far as Conyers Read was prepared to go : Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth (London, 1955), p. 203. 7 Cecil, in fact, was reduced to seeking information from de Quadra himself, who declared him confused and confounded as to the Queen's intentions, 25 March 1561, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, pp. 186-91.

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there are also other possible and adequate explanations for this long Spanish flirtation. De Quadra himself had his own ideas on the subject. These may be more easily understood after following events in France, which were radically altering both the European situation and the nature of the threat to England. The second, or Spanish, phase, December 1560-April 1562, began with the death of Francis II on 6 December 1560. The King's death destroyed the French claim to the crown matrimonial of Scotland, and set in motion a number of changes. Owing to the exertions of the Queen Mother, Catherine de Medici, Mary's uncles ceased to exercise the royal authority, and Conde was saved from the scaffold which the Guises had prepared for him, thus affording the Protestants some kind of hope for the future. This partial fall of the Guises had extensive repercussions. France became split by two major factions, both distinct from the interest of the Crown, which was left in a dangerous and ill-defined position. Deprived of their usurped authority and its backing for their Scottish policy, the Guises now turned directly to the King of Spain. This Throckmorton reported as early as 31 December 1560.1 As a result, the Franco-Scottish threat to England ceased, and the political centre of gravity began to shift from France to Spain. The Guises, however, still held a trump card in the person of the Queen of Scots, who was once again a marriageable princess. The prosecution of her claim to England now required Philip's blessing on a powerful catholic marriage, preferably to the Archduke Charles of Austria or, politically more dazzling still, to Philip's own son, Don Carlos, Prince of Spain. Mary had always been the focus of the catholic danger to Elizabeth, first with the backing of France, but now, increasingly, as an instrument of Spain. Although this change was neither inevitable nor complete until after the outbreak of civil war in France, which neutralised the power of the French crown, and above all the murder of the due de Guise in February 1563, which deprived the family of their principal executive, Throckmorton reported to Cecil on 26 February 1561, ' the danger that may grow, will 1 31 December 1560, Throckmorton to the Privy Council, C.S.P.F., 1560-1, pp. 471-4; 31 December 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 474-6.

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arise from the Queen of Scotland's second marriage ', He added that Spain and the House of Austria were more to be feared than the French.1 The point about Mary's marriage was plain enough to the Queen, but with this proviso: she evidently thought that the cultivation of Spanish friendship still had much to commend it. Indeed de Quadra himself later came to believe that the obstruction of Mary's marriage was actually the ' foundation ' of these relations with him, though at other times he did not rule out the importance of the Queen's own marriage problem.2 Up to this time Throckmorton had always been prepared at least to consider the merits of a Spanish alliance, if this appeared to offer the maximum security for England, but now he began both to urge and to pursue a more actively protestant policy in France, because Philip, he said, would ' earnestly travail' to repress the religion and so Elizabeth must seek its advancement.3 By January 1561, if not before, Cecil had been restored to favour, and Throckmorton received reasonable support from home. He had reported to Cecil the desire of the Admiral, Coligny, for Elizabeth's support in a French National Council,4 and Cecil replied that time served well in France for the advancement of religion and bade Throckmorton set moving ' all the wheels that may make motion '.5 He also encouraged the activities of the protestant German princes, who had been alarmed by the arrest and condemnation of Conde, and were testing the current temperature of English enthusiasm for the cause of religion.6 Cecil and Throckmorton seized upon the opportunity provided by a new reign to have the protestant Earl of Bedford sent to France to condole and congratulate, and at the same time to further their policy.7 Bedford was instructed to obtain 1 26 February 1561, Throckmorton to Cecil, C.S.P.F., 1560-1, pp. 579-80. 2 3 June 1561, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, p. 206. 3 31 December 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, C.S.P.F., 1560-1, pp. 474-6. 4

Idem ; some of the French were still in hope of a compromise. See for example, 31 May 1561, Throckmorton to Cecil, C.S.P.F., 1561-2, p. 127. 5 15 January 1561, Cecil to Throckmorton, C.S.P.F., 1560-1, p. 498. 6 1 December 1560, Hotman to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 417-18 ; 7 December 1560, Frederic, Count Palatine to Elizabeth, Ibid., p. 429; 8 December 1560, Count Mansfeld to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 436-7; [30 December] 1560, Memorial for Mundt, Ibid., pp. 465-6. 7 Bead, Cecil, p. 241, describes Bedford as Throckmorton's nominee.

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the ratification of the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis or, in other words, confirmation of the Queen's rights to Calais ; to promote the cause of religion in France ; to impede arrangements for a General Council (namely the Council of Trent); to hinder a catholic marriage for Mary, and to extend an olive branch to the fallen Guises, for the sake of amity with their niece, instructions which hardly display a pro-Spanish bias, but rather an acute awareness of the Franco-Spanish catholic threat.1 Furthermore, Elizabeth requested Throckmorton to contact the protestant Queen of Navarre, whose influence was paramount in the south-west of France, and licensed an English agent, Nicholas Tremayne, to enter the service of the King of Navarre, whose religion was still a matter for speculation, but whose rank made him supremely important.2 For several weeks, Throckmorton and Bedford busily set the wheels in motion, with the result that by March 1561, in the Queen's name, they had quietly established contact with leading Huguenots, in spite of the continuing ambiguity of her relations with de Quadra which perpetuated the anguish of Protestants while raising the hopes of Catholics. For this reason, the battle for Elizabeth's allegiance intensified. It was the Admiral, Coligny, who now drew attention to this struggle and requested a meeting with Throckmorton on 24 April 1561, somewhere near Fontainebleau.3 He was anxious to obtain the Queen's support in religious matters because Elizabeth was generally regarded as the keystone of the protestant arch and, like the Catholics, Coligny realised that if she were lured back to Rome, the protestant cause in Europe would collapse. The timing of the interview is explained by the mission to England of a Papal Nuncio, the Abbe Martinengo, even then in Brussels, to request the Queen's participation in a General Council, and induce her to acknowledge the Pope. The burning question of the moment—consuming the energies of both de Quadra and Cecil—was whether or not the Nuncio would be admitted into England. Coligny declared the demarche to have been instigated 1 19 January 1561, Cecil to Throckmorton, C.S.P.F., 1560-1, pp. 504-5 ; 20 January 1561, Instructions for the Earl of Bedford, Ibid., pp. 505-9. 2 20 January 1561. Throckmorton to the Queen of Navarre, Ibid., p. 509 ; 23 January 1561, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, Ibid., p. 514. 3 29 April 1561, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, C.S.P.F., 1561-2, p. 82.

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by Spain and the Emperor to discredit Elizabeth in the eyes of Protestants. Throckmorton needed no convincing, and quickly composed for the Queen one of his major pronouncements on foreign policy. He insisted on the unflattering truth that her prestige depended on her religion, yet the Pope, the Emperor and Spain were assured from England that there would be no great difficulty in inducing her to change it and that this was the moment to try. At the same time Throckmorton learnt from Coligny and other sources, that negotiations were far advanced for the marriage of Mary to Don Carlos, and that Philip, like France before him, was looking not only to Scotland, but thence to England, where he had hopes of a good following. Throckmorton therefore urged the Queen that she must now support the Protestants abroad, in the same way as Spain was supporting the Catholics. To begin with, it was essential to safeguard herself in Scotland by supporting the ' mightiest, wisest and most honest', even at an annual cost of £20,000, and quickly too, before Mary returned home. Furthermore, it was only sensible to profit from the troubles in France by also maintaining a protestant faction there and so ' prepare better her advantage than can be done by any other device'. Thus the cynical Throckmorton preceded Philip II in designating France as the battlefield of Europe. To Cecil he wrote of his extreme fear of the Spanish c incantations ' and of a change of religion in England because, he said, Spain had become too great, intolerable, and ' a monstrous member of Europe '.1 Elizabeth's reply to so stern a lecture was perhaps unexpectedly gracious, allowing both Throckmorton's ' wisdom and his earnest goodwill'. She did not, of course, commit herself, but she soothed him with a plain statement that she ' did not mean nor ever meant to make a change in religion', and he might c boldly announce her good determination in this '. She also said that she had considered well the implications of the Nuncio's visit, and had decided to reject it.2 About this, how1 20 April 1561, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., p. 69 ; 23 April 1561, same to same, Ibid., pp. 75-6; 23 April 1561, Coligny to Throckmorton, Ibid., p. 77 ; 29 April 1561, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 82-8 ; 1 May 1561, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 92-3; 4 May 1561, same to same, Ibid., pp. 97-8. 2 6 May 1561, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, Ibid., pp. 100-1.

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ever, there had been ' no small ado '. Indeed, a battle royal had raged at court, for admission of the Nuncio appeared to others, if not to the Queen herself, tantamount to recognition of the Pope. From this to the dreaded change of religion, seemed a very little step. To these ends de Quadra had ' entered into such a practice . . . that he had taken faster hold to plant his purpose than was Cecil's ease shortly to root up '. The Council, Cecil said, was contrary, but had been afraid ' to adventure the advising of such as were of other minds 9.1 Cecil's relief was impressive ; but two months later he did not feel sure that the danger was over.2 He took care to see that the Queen's answer to de Quadra, concerning the non-admission of the Nuncio, was widely distributed, ' lest our former inclination had been too hastily spread by the adversaries '.3 Throckmorton did the same in France, where Spain had begun a comparable policy of intimidation € to fear such as are not well assured'—pressure which steadily increased.4 De Quadra's comments on this Nuncio crisis are revealing. The Council, which had held many meetings, had sought to embroil him with the Queen, while he himself tried to avoid the Council, finding Lord Kobert more easily managed. The Queen appeared to him embarrassed and upset, and he suspected that something had changed her mind. He believed that' they ' —he referred presumably to protestant sympathisers—had been encouraged by recent negotiations in France, and observed that they had been pushing their affairs ' hotly' in Germany and intriguing in Scotland to keep Mary from marrying a foreigner. In de Quadra's opinion the Nuncio's mission had forced the Queen's hand. He traded on her discomfiture to propose that she and Lord Kobert could, with his help, escape from Cecil and the tyranny of the Council—that ' gang of heretics '—and so be 1 2

[10] May 1561, Cecil to Throckmorton, Hardwicke, i, pp. 170-2. 14 July 1561, Cecil to Throckmorton, Ibid., pp. 172-4; 15 July 1561, same to same C.S.P.F., 1561-2, p. 189. 3 8 May 1561, same to same, Ibid., pp. 103-5. 4 9 May 1561, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., p. 107 ; 16 May 1561, same to same, Ibid., pp. 112-13; 21 May 1561, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 119-22 ; 12 August 1561, Mundt to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 247-8 ; 10 April 1561, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 598-9 ; The Martinengo affair had, in fact, shaken confidence in the Empire, just as the Catholics intended : 13 May 1561, Mundt to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 109-10. The Queen's reputation in France also suffered: 23 June 1561, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 156-7.

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married.1 Seen through de Quadra's eyes the scales had begun to turn on the protestant side, although Cecil was still far from confident. De Quadra was constantly trying to discredit and dislodge him, while he continually strove to preserve the estimation of Protestants in the eyes of the Queen. By mid-September de Quadra was sure that Cecil was winning, since he possessed the Queen and the Council absolutely but, as late as December, Cecil told Throckmorton that he only appeared to be powerful because he had access to the Queen. In reality he was without credit, and therefore could not c fashion' and c put forth' the proposals which Throckmorton made. In their anxiety both, parhaps, exaggerated a little.2 After the Nuncio's abortive mission to England, it was events in France which were next to force the Queen's hand. During the summer of 1561, while the Colloque of Poissy, the French National Council, occupied attention, the alignment of parties steadily proceeded. The Guises, in particular, seeking to repair their lost advantage, had closely allied themselves with Spain, and news of this agreement and its subsequent developments were reported to Elizabeth in some detail in September—if not before.3 There were also other signs of danger, which belong to the complex story of the origins of the civil wars, but which, as Throckmorton kept insisting, closely concerned the Queen of England for, he said, the ' complot', which began in France, was * laid and intended to be executed and practised as well i [her] realm, Scotland and elsewhere '.4 It was the declaration in France of limited toleration by the terms of the edict of January 1562 which precipitated the conflict 1

3 June 1561, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, pp. 205-7 ; 30 June 1561, same to same, Ibid., pp. 208-9. 2 14 July 1561, Cecil to Throckmorton, Hardwicke, i, pp. 172-4 ; 22 December 1561, same to same, Ibid., pp. 177-9 ; 15 July 1561, same to same, C.8.P.F., 1561-2, p. 189 ; 13 September 1561, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 155867, pp. 212-15. 3 Michaud et Poujoulat, Nouvelle collection des memoires pour servir a Vhistoire de France, ser. i, vol. vi, Memoires-journaux du due de Guise, pp. 464 5 ; 24 September 1561, de Gruz to Elizabeth, C.S.P.F., 1561-2, pp. 320-7. 4 17 April 1562, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 603-8 ; 26 September 1561, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 328-30; 9 October 1561, same to same, Ibid., pp. 360-2; 15 October 1561, same to same, Ibid., p. 369; 14 November 1561, same to same, Ibid., pp. 396-403; 23 November 1561, Somers to Throckmorton, Ibid., pp. 411-12 ; 10 December 1561, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 432-5; 20 December 1561, Throckmorton to Challoner, Ibid., pp. 449-51 ; 30 December 1561, Mundt to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 463-4.

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there and, from the month of March, the French were in arms, if not precisely at war. Thus it became increasingly necessary to define the Queen's position, since she still maintained with de Quadra what he called relations of ' pretended friendship '.* Throckmorton therefore pleaded that the time had come when the Queen must' countenance ' the Protestants and, in particular, ensure that Conde was not seduced by the Catholics like his brother Navarre. This urgency was not at all for the cause of religion in France but because, as he said, ' our safety is for neither part to overthrow the other '.2 If the Guises and Spain together exterminated the Protestants and mastered France, they might safely proceed to Scotland and thence to England in support of Mary's claim, as they intended. Cecil, for his part, appealed to Christopher Mundt in Strasbourg to arrange for a courtly and persuasive German envoy to arouse the Queen, and convince her—since he could not—that ' the papist princes that seek to draw her to their parts, mean her subversion '.3 At the end of March 1562 Elizabeth sent Throckmorton a little cautious encouragement, permitting him to assure the protestant leaders of her ' amity and assistance by all possible means '. If this was a poor substitute for the effective material help which they required, it was a clear declaration of moral support, such as Elizabeth hesitated to make.4 It was during the last of our three periods, April-September 1562, that the scales finally sank on the protestant side. At least since November 1561 Lord Robert had been probing in France for the support that he wanted5 and, late in the spring 1 2

31 January 1562, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, p. 226. 24 January 1562, Throckmorton to Cecil, C.S.P.F., 1561-2, pp. 503-4; 6 March 1562, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Ibid., pp. 545-9 ; 9 March 1562, Throckmorton to Cecil, Ibid., pp. 552-3 ; 14 March 1562, same to same, Ibid., pp. 3553-4. 22 March 1562, Cecil to Mundt, Ibid., pp. 561-2. 4 [31] March 1562, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, Ibid., p. 570. According to de Quadra, however, Elizabeth began sending money to France from the Netherlands in April. 30 April 1562, de Quadra to Granvelle, Lettenhove, iii, pp. 512-13. In November 1561, Lord Robert sent his secretary, Mowbray, on a secret mission to Navarre and Coligny. 27 November 1561, de Quadra to Philip II, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, pp. 218-21 ; 31 January 1562, same to same, Ibid., pp. 224-8. Thenceforth, Lord Eobert supported the policy of intervention in France. As a result, it was opposed by his personal enemies and those who did not share his views on the succession. 16, 17, 25 October 1561, all from de Quadra to the Duchess of Parma, Ibid., p. 262.

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of 1562, de Quadra was politically annihilated by a dramatic success on the part of Cecil. He contrived to bribe de Quadra's secretary, Borghese Venturini, whose revelations finally convinced all non-believers of the basic hostility of Spain.1 For the rest of the century, and beyond, it was Spain and all her catholic partisans who were to be the enemies of England.2 In 1562, however, the House of Guise seemed more directly threatening than the King of Spain himself, and the obvious battlefield was France. Furthermore, with the recognition of the enmity of Spain, the need for Calais had become imperative. This, to judge from her dealings with the Protestants, was Elizabeth's immediate concern.3 Thus, from the Huguenot's point of view, Elizabeth's capitulation, the long-coveted support from England and the treaty of Hampton Court proved to be purely negative, paralysed from the outset by disagreement over Calais. Genuine military help had been expected, but it never came, for dynastic quarrels and the cause of religion in France meant nothing more to Elizabeth than an element in the safety of England. She was not, after all, a Calvinist, and her relations with the Huguenots were simply one aspect of the terrific struggle of the sixteenth century, conceived in terms of Catholic versus Protestant, but also and essentially as much a struggle for power, and in some cases for survival, as it was for the maintenance and propagation of any particular confession of faith. Since Elizabeth's accession England had weathered several crucial years of mortal danger; the great western European issue was no longer between France and the Hapsburgs, or France and England, but between England and Spain, and the politico-religious struggles which broke out in France and, later, also in the Netherlands, became a vital factor in the undeclared war between Philip and Elizabeth. 1

Lettenhove, iii, Introduction, pp. i, seq.; 28 April 1562, Statements by Borghese Venturini, C.S.P.F., 1561-2, pp. 641-3 ; 3 April 1562, de Quadra to Granvelle, C.S.P.Sp., 1558-67, pp. 234-5; 6 June 1562, de Quadra to the Duchess of Parma, Ibid., pp. 238-9; 6 June 1562, de Quadra to Philip II, Ibid., pp. 241-3 ; 6 June 1562, de Quadra to the Duke of Alva, Ibid., p. 244. 2 This is naturally not to suggest that there were not also other causes of Anglo-Spanish hostility, in particular commercial and maritime disputes. 3 Over thirty years later Elizabeth was still bargaining for the recovery of Calais. 21 January 1597/8, Thomas Edmondes to Cecil, T. Birch, An Historical View of the Negotiations Between the Courts of England, France and Brussels (London, 1749), p. 57.

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Note to Chapter 5 After an interval of some twenty years, I realise that I rather exaggerated the degree of tension between England and Spain in 1562; it was less definitive and more fluctuating.

6 QUEEN ELIZABETH AND THE CONSPIRACY OF AMBOISE, MARCH 15601 IT is widely believed among historians of the sixteenth century that England was implicated - not to use a more precise expression - in the disturbance in France of March 15 60 known as the conspiracy or tumult of Amboise. The origins of the conspiracy are still obscure. It evidently developed through various stages and materialized as a protestant insurrection of the lesser nobility against the political tyranny and religious persecution of the cardinal of Lorraine and his brother the due de Guise. The catholic Guises controlled the government of Francis II, who was too young and too ill to rule, and were justifiably held to have usurped the proper functions of the princes of the blood, the king of Navarre and the prince de Conde, both of whom were presumed to be protestant. The movement therefore combined and confused French political and religious issues. The belief in the complicity of England in the conspiracy sometimes incriminates the queen herself and sometimes only her representatives in France, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton and his companion, Henry Killigrew, which is not necessarily the same thing. The former and more serious proposition appears to have stemmed from an article, 'La Complicite de 1'Angleterre dajcis le complot d'Amboise',2 by J. Dureng, who claimed to see in the conspiracy the origins of Elizabeth's relations with the huguenots. Being the only full and documented discussion, it has been taken as authoritative by those whose work touched on the subject without demanding a detailed investigation of their own.3 Attention was later drawn to this theme and to Dureng's work by Lucien Romier4 who has probably had a greater influence than any other author on historians of this period. Whereas Dureng was primarily interested in the origins and nature of Elizabeth's foreign policy, Romier sought to account for the finances of the conspiracy and categorically asserted the complicity of Elizabeth. Some English and American historians, in particular Professor Sir John Neale,5 Dr. A. L. Rowse6 and Amos C. Miller, have eschewed the more complicated question of the queen's complicity and settled for a rather vague and general involvement of 1.1 would like to thank Professor R. B. Wernham for the time and thought which he devoted to constructive criticism of this article. 2. Revue d'histoire modeme et contemporaine, vi (1904-5), 249-56. 3. This was evidently the cajse with Amos C. Miller in his recent work Sir Henry Killigrew (Leicester, 1963), who Apparently followed Duteng in assuming the complicity of England in general and of Ktilligrew in particular. 4. La Conjuration d9Amboise (Paris, 1923). 5. Queen Elizabeth I (London, ed. 1952). 6. Ra/egft and the Tbrockmortons (London, 1962).

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England through the activities - official or unofficial, for this is not clear - of Throckmorton and Killigrew. Before discussing the arguments of the historians, it is necessary to understand something of the circumstances in which Throckmorton, assisted by Killigrew, went to France in May 1559 where, as strong protestajits at a catholic court, they were neither liked nor trusted. This was a few weeks after the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis had restored an uneasy peace in which the catholic world seemed poised for an onslaught against heresy, though the form of the struggle was still uncertain. The situation, however, was radically altered by the sudden death, on 10 July, of Henry II. It was this which enabled the Guises to seize control of the government of Francis II, who had recently married their niece, Mary queen of Scots. The dual policy of the Guises was to combine the repression of protestants with the promotion of Mary's claim to the throne of England by making war on Elizabeth from Scotland. Elizabeth's position became acutely dangerous when, in 1559, the protestant nobility of Scotland rebelled against the government of Mary's mother, Mary of Lorraine, widow of James V, and sister of the Guises, which provided a convenient pretext for the transportation to Scotland of considerable French forces. All the summer of 1559 Throckmorton was preoccupied by the danger to England from France via Scotland. He finally became desperate with anxiety and, on 24 September, requested permission to go home to speak to the queen because what he had to say could not be committed to writing.1 Permission was granted, for a brief visit of four or five days. Nevertheless, Throckmorton arrived in England on 11 November and only returned to France at the end of January 1560. Naturally, after this long absence, he was more than ever suspect and unacceptable to the Guises, who threatened him with arrest.2 His position was rendered even more dangerous by the sequence of events. The treaty of Berwick for the mutual defence of England and Scotland was signed on 27 February and, on 6 March, Elizabeth clearly stated her requirements of France in a document described as 'a sum of the things desired on the part of England'.3 About the middle of the month the conspirators gathered in small bands in the neighbourhood of the court at Amboise, where the tumult broke upon the Guises. Finally, on 24 March, Elizabeth issued a 'proclamation concerning peace,' in which she publicly complained of the exploitation by the Guises of the queen of Scots, and of their intended invasion of England.4 This annoyed Lorraine who reacted 1. 24 Sept. 1.559, Throckmorton to the queen, Forbes, A Full View of the Public Transactions in ttie Reign of Queen Elizabeth (London, 1740), i. 239. 2. 8 Feb. 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Forbes, i. 324. 3. Calendar of] S[tate] P[apers] F[oreign]t ijjy-ijto, pp. 428-9. 4. Ibid. pp. 472-3.

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1

strongly and it is not surprising, in the circumstances, that he should have sought to discredit Elizabeth and Throckmorton by implicating them in the current turmoil in France. This was an obvious charge to make against a hostile monarch and a detested ambassador. Apart from any other consideration, if it could be made to stick, whether through evidence or emphasis, it would constitute a breach of the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis and therefore cancel Elizabeth's treaty rights to Calais in eight years' time. Much of the diplomatic manoeuvring on both sides of the.Channel was related to this point, each side being anxious to establish that the other had broken the treaty first. The accusations, however, were made in correspondence and in speech about the court, not to the queen or Throckmorton direct, since the turmoil in France had made the government anxious at least to postpone the impending war with England. A considerable part of the case supporting the complicity of England in the conspiracy rests upon such declarations issuing from official catholic sources during and after the tumult, and Dureng regarded this as the most positive and telling part of his evidence. He did not, however, attempt to produce a connected argument, but rather sought to gather up all the miscellaneous bits of evidence which he believed to be relevant. These may be roughly arranged into four groups: evidence derived from the catholic sources, evidence relating to the king of Navarre, evidence relating to Germany and, finally, what he called 'preuves historiques et morales'. As these points do not form part of a coherent case, it is necessary, for the sake of clarity, to discuss them each in turn. Dureng began by referring to a letter from the Spanish ambassador Chantonnay, to Philip II, in which he reported that the cardinal of Lorraine was greatly incensed against the queen and her ministers.2 Further to Chantonnay's report, and as coming from a different and more reliable source, Dureng quoted a letter from the duke of Alva to Granvelle in which he said that England had spread 'seditions populaires en France'.3 In fact it was not Alva who made this assertion. He was merely reporting what the French ambassador had told the Spanish court. The source, therefore, was the same as Chantonnay's. As a third source, Dureng quoted a draft of a reply to be made by the French ambassador in London, probably to Elizabeth's declaration of 24 March concerning peace, which stated that there were 'beaucoup d'arguemens et de grandes apparences 1. 28 Apr. 1560, Throckmorton to the queen, ibid. p. 597. 2. Dureng, p. 249, gives an imprecise reference and citation. 3 Mar. 1560, Chantonnay to the bishop of Arras (Granvdlle); 19 Mar. 1560, Chantonnay to Philip II, C. Paillard, 'Additions critiques a Phistoire de la conjuration d'Amboise', Revue historique, xiv (1880), 62, 80, 90, 103-4. 3. 20 Mar. 1560, Alva to the bishop of Arras, A. Teulet, Relations politiques de la France et de I'Espagne avec r£cosse au XVIe siecle (Paris, 1862), ii. 76. Dureng's reference is imprecise arid the citation incorrect.

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pour croire que ceste derniere conjuration ... n'a este faicte sans une secrette intelligence de la dicte Royne, qui, concurrant avecques eulx et en religion et en mauvaise volunte, a peult-estre este bien ayse de veoir advenir une subversion a ceste couronne . . /.1 It looks suspiciously as though Elizabeth's alleged complicity was based on the fact that trouble in France was clearly to her advantage. However this may be, the document is obviously not evidence for the nature and origins of what took place within France, but a draft - which may or may not have been used - drawn up for the purpose of demonstrating the injustice and falsehood of Elizabeth's complaints against France, and is part of the diplomatic manoeuvring relating to the vital question as to which side had first been guilty of violating the treaty. For further evidence, Dureng observed that Throckmorton also reported an accusation made by Lorraine against the queen and himself, without denying it.2 The subject of this letter, however, addressed to Cecil on 12 April, was not the conspiracy, which was no longer of current interest, but Lorraine's reaction to Elizabeth's declaration of 24 March concerning peace. This had made him angry and therefore provoked an accusation against the queen, and Throckmorton as her instrument. Throckmorton had, in fact, already reported on 21 March that the Guises suspected him of complicity in the conspiracy, and without denying it.3 This, at best, would be negative evidence and, since Cecil would have known the truth in any case, cannot be taken to imply that the suspicions or accusations were therefore correct. Neither is there anything in Throckmorton's earlier letters, written from Amboise before and during the conspiracy itself, which can be used to implicate him. He first mentioned the matter on 7 March in order to urge that this was the time for the queen to take action in relation to Scotland4 and this was the burden of several other letters in which, far from revealing any inside knowledge, he appears to have been quite unfamiliar with 'these that rise'. When, on 21 March, he reported that Lorraine suspected him of complicity, he did so to emphasize his personal danger, thereby adding to the already strong case in favour of his revocation, which he had previously urged on the queen for political reasons.5 Dureng then turned from the catholic allegations to his three other types of evidence: that concerning Elizabeth's relations with the king of Navarre, evidence originating in Germany, and evidence drawn i. Undated draft, c. Apr. 1560, Teulet, ii. 50; also in A.L. Paris, Negotiations... relatives au rlgne de Franfois II (Paris, 1841), p. 326. 2.12 Apr. 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil—not the queen as stated by Dureng—CSPF, ijW-i;totp. 535. 3. 21 Mar. 1560, Throckmorton to the queen, and also to Cecil, Forbes, i. 379, 386. 4. 7 Mar. 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Forbes, i. 352-5. 5. 9, 15, 21 Mar. 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, ibid. pp. 358, 374-5, 385; 15, 21 Mar. 1560, Throckmorton to the queen, ibid. pp. 563, 368, 376-81.

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from the co-incidence of events. He attached considerable importance to the alleged fact that Elizabeth offered support to the 'parti d'opposition, des que ce parti d'opposition s'organise'. He also said that one thing was certain, namely that there had been English advances to Navarre, 'chef momentane de 1'opposition nobiliaire et protestante, proposition d'alliance formelle'.1 The protestants had certainly looked to Navarre for leadership and protection, at least since 1557, though he was never to fulfil their expectations. When, therefore, as first prince of the blood, he became the rightful governor of France upon the accession of Francis II, their hopes were naturally raised. It was not immediately clear what Navarre would do; indeed it was not even clear that he was really a protestant. When he came to court from Guyenne in the summer of 1559, Killigrew went to meet him at Vendome, where he broke his journey. This was on the personal initiative of Throckmorton, to seek an appointment for him to deliver letters from the queen.2 Killigrew and Navarre exchanged courtesies, he and Elizabeth each being anxious to know where the other stood and, as a result of Killigrew's request, Navarre sent for Throckmorton to meet him, late at night, at SaintDenis on 22 August. The meeting was clandestine by Navarre's arrangement because of his humiliating position at the court which was controlled by the Guises, who were hostile to England. Throckmorton presented the queen's letters and, using the discretionary power expressly granted him, he told Navarre that the queen would be 'bien contente de se joindre en telle alliance et amitye avec vous, que tout le meilleur moyen de la vraye religion soit deuement advance, au bon plaisir de Dieu ...'. Navarre replied that 'he wolde not fayle to do the beste he coulde in that good enterprise'.3 This was Dureng's 'proposition d'alliance formelle' between Queen Elizabeth and the leader of the French opposition party. But there was no such party in August 1559; Navarre was never a party leader, and this was not the way in which alliances were made. Throckmorton's was a purely complimentary speech devised, as he said, by himself - he had, after all, to say something - upon the presentation of the formal letters which custom required Elizabeth to address to Navarre (among others) upon the occasion of a new reign. The letters were dated 19 July, nine days after the death of Henry II. But, as he naturally did not know what was going to happen, his eminently diplomatic words left the door ajar, whether for entry or withdrawal. Killigrew himself later recalled that the queen had had no intelligence with Navarre 'other than ordinary compliments in respect of 1. Dureng, pp. 250, 251, 256. 2. 15 Aug. 1559, Throckmorton to the queen, Forbes, i. 201-2. 3. 19 July 1559, Elizabeth to Navarre, CSPF, if}8-ijf99 p. 390; 22 Aug. 1559, Throckmorton's address to Navarre, ibid. pp. 491-2; 25 Aug. 1559, Throckmorton to the queen, ibid. pp. 498-9; 25 Aug. 1559, Throckmorton to the queen, Forbes, i. 213. Dureng gives the wrong volume of the CSPF.y and no other specification.

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his place and dignity.. .n Elizabeth's relations with Navarre are not, in any case, relevant to Dureng's Amboise thesis, since Navarre is not held to have been involved in the conspiracy. Turning to the evidence from Germany, Dureng said that the failure of the projected alliance with Navarre reduced Elizabeth to intriguing with the conspirators2 and, in this connection, wrote of the activities of Francois Hotman, professor of law at Strasbourg. According to Dureng, Hotman is said to have gone to France in September 15 59 at Elizabeth's expense in order to galvanize Navarre into action, and this he connected with the furtherance of the conspiracy. Hotman was the arch-plotter of Germany and a frequent embarrassment to protestant authorities. On 19 September 1559 he wrote a letter to Calvin (who invited him to shroud his activities in greater mystery), and referred to a journey to be made by two French gentlemen to see Navarre which he hoped* would be paid for by Elizabeth, adding 'Cesar est pour nous'. 'Cesar' was taken by Dureng to mean the queen. Two points clearly emerge from the letter: firstly that someone from Strasbourg was about to visit the queen, which may have been to request this money for the journey and, secondly, that Hotman was concerned, at that time, with a plan of his own for the recapture of Metz from France, which he regarded as a blow in favour of protestantism. Dureng gave no reference for this letter, which is printed in an article by R. Dareste, who made it clear that it was not until much later that Hotman heard of the conspiracy. His activities in September certainly related to other matters; it was he, and not the queen, who was intriguing, and he did not go to France either in her service or at her expense.4 The supposed journey of Hotman to France is also related by Dureng to Throckmorton's request of 24 September to return to England, and to certain evidence concerning Killigrew during Throckmorton's absence. In order to avoid repetition, these points which refer to the queen's servants as opposed to the queen herselfwill be discussed later. Dureng made one other point in connection with Germany by which he claimed to show that negotiations were opened between the conspirators and the queen.5 He referred to a letter of 27 February 1560 from Christopher Mundt, the English agent in Strasbourg, to Cecil, in which he reported that some weeks before he had been asked, under promise of secrecy, 'whether the French might successfully ask for assistance from the Queen for the purpose of abating these persecutions' [of the protestants by the Guises]. Mundt replied 1. Cecil Papers, 25, fo, yov, seen by courtesy of the marquess of Salisbury. 2. Dureng, p. 252. 3. My italics. 4. 19 Sept. 1559, Hotman to Calvin, R. Dareste, 'Fra^ois Hotman, sa vie et sa correspondance', Revue historique, ii (1876), 21-23. 5. Dureng, p. 253.

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'that if it could be proved that the French Princes were engaged in this movement... he thought that the Queen would not be wanting in kind offices'.1 This report clearly does not show that Elizabeth was negotiating with the conspirators, but that persons unknown, who were anxious to enlist her support, made tentative enquiries of her agent in Strasbourg. Mundt's reply was diplomatic, sounding friendly and meaning nothing, since he professed to believe that the queen would not be wanting in 'kind offices' - whatever this might mean in certain given circumstances which he knew could never be fulfilled. Dureng described his final type of evidence as 'preuves historiques et morales' and in this section discussed the co-incidence of various events. One of his points related to the timing of the conspiracy. This was extremely opportune for Elizabeth and, believing her to have been implicated, Dureng considered that this was no accident. He thought it significant that what he called Elizabeth's 'ultimatum' to the French ambassador should have been issued on 6 March, the date originally chosen for action by the conspirators. This would have been a nice co-incidence. But it appears less dramatic when Elizabeth's demands to the French ambassador are related, as they should be, firstly to the conclusion, on 27 February, of the treaty of Berwick for the mutual defence of England and Scotland and, secondly, to a communication from the French ambassador and the English reply to this dated 2 and 5 March respectively. The demands of 6 March followed up the reply of the previous day.2 Furthermore, it is far from certain that 6 March was the original date for the outcome of the conspiracy. The majority of sources give io,March, but the matter remains unresolved.3 Dureng's conclusion was that there had been no treaty between England and the protestants and that no subsidies were paid. On the other hand an alliance had been proposed to Navarre, 'des intelligences constantes' existed with the protestants and there had been a startling co-incidence between the timing of events in Scotland and France. After some doubt and deliberation, he decided that this was sufficient to establish the complicity of England in the conspiracy. Dureng's manner of placing reported speech between quotation marks, while referring his readers to the sources, his imprecise references, wrong references and lack of references make one wonder whether he ever read the documents he supposed he was quoting and which he completely misconstrued. While the belief in England's complicity in the conspiracy of Amboise was first elaborated by Dureng, it was probably Lucien 1. 27 Feb. 1560, Mundt to Cecil, CSPF., 1119-1560, p. 412. Dureng gave the date as 17 Feb. and referred only to 'the Calendars\ 2. CSPF, ijJ9-ij6o, pp. 423-4, 425-6, 428-9. 3. Romier, pp. 83, 87; Paillard, p. 85.

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Romier - whose works are so well known - who did most to confirm and fix this belief in the minds of historians. Unlike Dureng, he produced a carefully constructed case which will therefore be presented as a whole and analysed afterwards. Romier was primarily interested in accounting for the finances of the conspiracy, since the men employed in the rising are known to have been paid. Navarre's biographer, Alphonse de Ruble, decided by a process of elimination that only Navarre was in a position to have provided the money, a theory which has never been adopted by later historians.1 Romier rejected it out of hand, as being improbable and without evidence, declaring that we should rather think of England.2 Assuming, thenceforth, that it was England who financed the conspiracy, Romier went on to state that the French government received evidence relating to Elizabeth's role 'dont il [the government] ne pouvait faire etat publiquement que pour une declaration de guerre'. Lorraine, however, Romier continued, not wishing to conceal everything, let it be known in court circles that the conspiracy had been fomented by the queen of England. A further accusation, by the king himself, is also indicated. Thirdly, Romier contended that in December 1559 certain turbulent* barely concealed their relations with Elizabeth's agents, and that the Admiral, Coligny, was in a state of indignation about what he had learnt in Normandy, when he joined the court at Amboise in February 1560. Finally, Romier declared that the conspirators had formally solicited Elizabeth's support. The queen's game is said to be clear enough: to finance a rebellion which would prevent the French from assisting catholic Scotland, but without [openly] compromising herself in order to avoid the hostility of Spain. This is a striking, clever and sophisticated argument. Firstly, two dramatic affirmations neatly disposing of the problem in hand are used to support each other - that England financed the conspiracy, and that the French government possessed evidence of this which could only be disclosed in a declaration of war - although the second must, for compelling reasons, remain a mystery. The curtain, however, is raised just a little, to reveal accusations by Lorraine and by the king himself. Having, in this way, seduced his readers into placing confidence in the utterances of Lorraine, and those who repeated his pronouncements, Romier was then able to use, with effect, the evidence of catholic accusations against the queen and Throckmorton which, in Dureng's unskilled hands, made no impact whatsoever. Romier quoted only two accusations, but appears to clinch his argument by an impressive volume of references to these and, supposedly, other examples, thus apparently building up a cumulative effect. Investigation, however, reveals that there 1. Alphonse de Ruble, Antoine de Rourbon et Jeanne d'Albret (Paris, 1881-6), ii. 227-8. 2. Romier, pp. 73-74.

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was no accusation made by the king against Elizabeth or Throckmorton in the letter in question, addressed to the bishop of Limoges, ambassador in Spain. Dated 31 August 15 60, it specifically referred, not to the conspiracy in March, but to subsequent protestant activities during the summer, after the treaty of Edinburgh between France and England signed on 7 July I560.1 At least two others in this group of references are also inapplicable: firstly a letter of 26 February 1560 from Lorraine to the constable, Montmorency. The letter said that the king had written to Montmorency himself to inform him about the conspiracy, which was then suspected. The letter contained a postscript added by the secretary de Laubespine on behalf of the due de Guise, which referred to Throckmorton and the queen only in relation to Scottish affairs without mentioning the conspiracy.2 Another letter of 2 5 February 15 60, from de Laubespine to Montmorency, referred to the queen's preparations for Scotland which had alarmed the French court. He believed that they were only defensive and that war was unlikely. This would enable them the better to deal with ctant de petites follies dont on sent le vent parmi ce Royaume. Desquelles le roi vous escrire'. There is no accusation here of complicity on the part of Elizabeth.3 Indeed it is interesting to note that in letters to each other about the conspiracy of Amboise, members of the court made no mention of England, which suggests that the accusations may have been invented for propaganda purposes.4 There is not one of Romier's many references which accounts for the vital, initial statement that the evidence possessed by the government of the complicity of Elizabeth was such that it could only be disclosed in a declaration of war. The only clue to this, which the sources provide, is in the similar letters of 3 and 19 March from Chantonnay to the bishop of Arras (his brother) and Philip II. Quoting from the former, written in French, Chantonnay said: 'Sans point de faute led. cardinal [Lorraine] se ressent merveillieusement de la reine d'Angleterre et de ses ministres, memement de Frangmaton [Throckmorton] et toutesfois il est conclu de dissimuler ceci, pour n'entrer en guerre, s'il est possible . . .'5 The meaning of this is simply that Lorraine refrained from addressing his accusations to Elizabeth or Throckmorton directly, in order to avoid the outbreak of war at that critical and dangerous moment, not that the government possessed particular evidence of Elizabeth's complicity which could only be disclosed as a declaration of war. There was, therefore, no 1.31 Aug. 15 60, Francis II to the bishop of Limoges, A.L. Paris, pp. 494-5. 2. B[ibliotheque] N[ationale], Paris, MSS. Fonds frangais, 3157, fo. 3, 26 Feb. 1559/60, Lorraine to Montmorency. 3. B.N., MSS. fr. 3158, fo. 51, 25 Feb. 1559/60, de Laubespine to Montmorency. 4. B.N., MSS. fr. 3157, fos. 12, 25 Feb., 19 Mar. 1559/60, two letters of Francis II to Montmorency. MSS. fr. 3158^0. 54, 19 Mar. 1559/60, de Laubespine to Montmorency. 5. Paillard, p. 90.

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mysterious reason why we ought to believe the statements of Lorraine. It cannot, of course, be proven that Romier's assertion was a corruption of these letters of Chantonnay, but his omission of any reference to them certainly calls for explanation. He knew much more than Dureng about the official, catholic propaganda relating to the conspiracy. He used Dureng's article; he used Paillard, who analysed the two letters; and his work reveals a thorough knowledge of the correspondence of Chantonnay. To describe the government's accusations against England as propaganda, and therefore not evidence of her complicity, is not to dismiss a legitimate argument. The accusations could have represented fact, fiction or fear but, whether or not the Guises believed their own story, it was vital to them that other people should. These accusations formed part of the government's official, catholic version of what happened, designed both to incriminate all protestants and to deflect attention from the unpopularity of the Guises. The official story was countered, on the protestant side, by repeated efforts to show the untruthfulness of the catholic assertions and the righteousness of their own intentions.1 Lorraine and his supporters were in a critically dangerous position, both at home and abroad, and it was natural and necessary that they should defend themselves in this way and do everything they could to discredit Elizabeth, more especially in the eyes of Spain, whose attitude was equivocal and therefore menacing. The matter can be seen in its proper perspective if we consider that Lorraine's accusations were not confined to England. On 15 March he summoned Chantonnay to dinner and, speaking of the Emotions' in the kingdom, 'en accusoit fort la reine d'Angleterre, aucunes villes et princes de 1'empire sans les nommer mettant en chef la cite de Gen&ve'. This, obviously, was what Chantonnay was required to tell the king of Spain.2 Romier's last two points, which dealt with conditions in Normandy and the appeal of the protestants to Queen Elizabeth were intended to support the denunciation of England by Lorraine. The allegation of incriminating relations between the queen and troublemakers in Normandy was apparently based on a report of two magistrates in the region of Saint-L6 who had heard that certain protestants, said to be in arms, were in touch with the English and favoured by the queen.3 The report, as it stands, is hearsay only, and impossible to evaluate. But English activity in the maritime province of Normandy - and there were certainly a number of English agents there - was most likely, at that time, to have been connected with 1. See, for example, Regnier de La Planche, Histoire del'Estatde France sous le rlgm de Pranfois II (ed. 1836), pp. 258 ff. 2. Paillard, pp. 103-4. It is not clear whether he was quoting a letter of 18 Mar. 1560 from Chantonnay to the governess of the Netherlands, or that of 19 Mar. to Philip II. Geneva was not involved in the conspiracy, nor were the French churches. 3. A. Floquet, Histoire du Parlement de Normandie (Rouen, 1840), ii. 282.

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French preparations for the invasion of Scotland. This is borne out by the letter of Coligny to the constable Montmorency, dated i March 15 60, to which Romier referred. Coligny's indignation about what he had learnt in Normandy related to edes maulvais offices que la royne d'Angleterre faisoit pour nous a 1'endroit des Escossois'.1 The letter did not so much as make a passing reference to the impending conspiracy, whose existence had already been betrayed, and is therefore not evidence of the complicity of Elizabeth in this event. Romier's final assertion, that the conspirators formally solicited Elizabeth's support, was based on the enquiry reported by Christopher Mundt from Strasbourg on 27 February 1560, which has already been discussed. Upon analysis, therefore, Romier's entire case - intended to dispose of a long-standing historical problem by accounting for the financing of the conspiracy - is reduced to a single point, namely that Lorraine accused Elizabeth of having fomented it.2 This completes the arguments of Dureng and Romier in support of the complicity of Elizabeth, and brings us to the case against Throckmorton and Killigrew. Romier could find no grounds for supposing that Throckmorton had taken part in the 'agissements secrets de son gouvernement',3 but Dureng, and certain English and American historians, among others, have believed that both Throckmorton and Killigrew were somehow involved. In the case of Throckmorton, this would at least have been in character, and both he and Killigrew were wholehearted advocates of an active protestant foreign policy, whereas the queen, at that date, was not. But, in so far as the case against Throckmorton is reasoned, rather than assumed, it appears to be based on the belief that he sought permission to return to England at the end of September 1559^ order to inform the queen of the organization of the conspiracy. Dureng linked the departure of Throckmorton to the letter of Hotman addressed to Calvin on 19 September 1559 in which he said 'Cesar est pour nous', and commented, Vest done probablement de la conjuration qu'il s'agit,'4 meaning, apparently, both the letter and Throckmorton's journey. This opinion, so far as Throckmorton was concerned, was echoed by J. E. Neale, who said, 'he had come ... in all probability . . . to tell Elizabeth of a conspiracy against the Guise party in France, in which he himself had had a hand'. Neale also said that Throckmorton had talked about the conspiracy when he was home in December.5 The mere acquisition of information - this was Throckmorton's business - would not, in itself, imply complicity. Throckmorton, 1. i Mar. 1559/60, Coligny to Montmorency, A.L. Paris, pp. 319-20. 2. Romier, p. 73. The accusation was reported by the Venetian ambassador: B.N., Fonds Italien, 1721, fo. 33, 28 Mar. 1560. 3. Romier, p. 74 note. 4. Dureng, p. 252. 5. Neale, pp. 99, 103; no reference.

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however, could only have been either informed or involved in September 15 59 if the conspiracy had already been initiated by that date. Both Romier and Dureng subscribed to this opinion, though on completely different grounds. Romier's argument need not be discussed because he did not believe in the complicity of Throckmorton or draw any conclusions from the timing of his return to England.1 Dureng's belief that the conspiracy originated in September 15 59 was deduced from a celebrated letter from Calvin to Coligny, dated 16 April 1561. The letter says that 'sept ou huit mois auparavant [before March 1560], quelqu'un ayant charge de quelque nombre de gens, me demanda conseil s'il ne seroit pas licite de resister a la tyrannic dont les enfans de Dieu estoyent. . . opprimez, et quels moyens il y auroit'.2 The meaning of this is perfectly clear. It indicates the distress of a group of Calvinists with tender consciences in the circumstances following the death of Henry II. It proves the existence of an idea one which Calvin categorically rejected - but not the inception, at that date, of the actual conspiracy of Amboise. It is true that Throckmorton's departure for England roughly coincided with certain preliminary discussions, which were a failure, but which are presumed to have led, in some unknown way, to the development of the conspiracy in the form in which it materialized. One could, perhaps, postulate that he knew of this, but rumours of plots were commonplace and this would not explain his departure from France, 'contrary to the custom of all ambassadors'. Throckmorton had infinitely more serious reasons for his extraordinary journey to England, namely to induce the queen to believe in the extent and severity of the danger which threatened her from the Guises via Scotland. A study of his correspondence can leave no doubt as to the nature of his preoccupations at this time, and for months before and after. He himself specifically stated that he had been urging the queen to invade Scotland since i September I559- 3 If Throckmorton had wind of impending trouble in France it would have strengthened his case for action in Scotland, but the timing of his journey to England cannot even be taken to establish knowledge of, let alone complicity in, the conspiracy. A more plausible hypothesis is that Throckmorton learnt of the conspiracy - in the form in which it materialized, as opposed to any preliminary manoeuvres - while he was in England. It would be 1. Romier (pp. 31-34) alleged that the conspiracy originated after the king's coronation on 18 Sept. 1559. I have already sought elsewhere to show that this opinion was not well founded. See my discussion of 'Calvinism and the Conspiracy of Amboise' in The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition (New Haven, London, 1980), pp. 84-6. 2. J. Bonnet, Lettres dejean Calvin (Paris, 1854), ii. 383. The quotation fairly obviously refers to a pastor, and the French churches were not involved in the conspiracy. 3. This point has been fully developed, with references, in chapter 5 above;'21 Mar. 1560, Throckmorton to Cecil, Forbes, i. 385.

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possible at least to deduce this from a letter from Killigrew and Jones to Cecil, dated 29 December I559 1 in which they reported rumours of a plot to kill Guise and Lorraine, though it is true that they gave no details. One cannot be sure of the correct interpretation of this letter, especially as only two days earlier Killigrew and Jones had referred to some current 'garboil and stir' in Paris.2 But it is interesting that the report roughly corresponds with the time at which La Renaudie, leader of the conspiracy, was probably seeking to enlist support in Geneva.3 The matter remains problematical, but its implications are significant. If the letter from Killigrew and Jones were, in fact, a reference to the conspiracy of Amboise, this would greatly lessen, if not actually eliminate, the possibility of complicity, and would put a date on the acquisition of knowledge. Two other historians, A. L. Rowse and Amos C. Miller, have been more emphatic than Dureng and Neale in their accusations against Thfockmorton, Miller also including Killigrew, the subject of his book. Rowse did not attach significance, in this respect, to Throckmorton's journey to England. But he quoted Throckmorton's own observation, 'they do greatly suspect me to have been a doer in these troubles' - an argument, as Rowse correctly says, adduced in favour of his revocation - and added that che had certainly been doing his bit; he was in touch with the Huguenot leaders against the Guises, Admiral Chatillon and the Prince of Conde. When Conde's brother, Antoine King of Navarre, came to Paris Throckmorton intercepted him for a secret interview; he was not able to persuade this poltroon to assume the leadership of his own cause and party'.4 We are not told what Throckmorton's 'bit' may have been. His relations with Navarre and their clandestine meeting have already been discussed, and it has also been stated that it is a common error to speak of Navarre as a party leader. It is similarly mistaken to refer to a huguenot party in 15 5 9, before any such thing existed, and not even Conde, let alone Coligny, can reasonably be described as a leader of the huguenots by March 15 60. Nothing more can usefully be said about Throckmorton in this connection. Although his protestant policy and his flair for intelligence have aroused widespread suspicion, we know nothing about his relations with the huguenots at this time5 and, as he was out of France during the crucial months of preparation for the rising, it is difficult to see what, in any case, he could have done to help. Furthermore, his letters displayed neither knowledge of nor interest in the event. To the outside world it was, after all, quite a minor disturbance in a sea of troubles. 1. 29 Dec. 1559, Killigrew and Jones to Cecil, ibid. p. 292. 2. 27 Dec. 1559, Killigrew and Jones to the queen, Forbes, i. 287. 3. N. M. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, p. 92. 4. Rowse, p. 30. 5. See ctiap. 5 above.

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According to Amos C. Miller, not only Throckmorton but also Killigrew set about 'kindling' rebellion in France.1 Under the direction of the government and of Throckmorton, Killigrew is said to have become 'one of the most active agents of intrigue in France'.2 Miller then mentioned their part in the escape from the continent of the earl of Arran, heir presumptive to the throne of Scotland. This was certainly a brilliant coup, but it did not relate to intrigues with the huguenots. The following month Killigrew went to Vendome cto open communication' between Elizabeth and Navarre. Then, when Throckmorton returned to England - the journey is here related to Scotland and not to the conspiracy - Killigrew acted in his place as charge d'affaires. Both Dureng and Miller associated Killigrew with the conspiracy during Throckmorton's absence in England, Dureng on account of a despatch to Cecil from Killigrew and Robert Jones of 6 January 15 60, in which he said they requested 'des hommes surs pour entretenir des intelligences du cote des religionnaires'.3 The document, in fact, does not mention the 'religionnaires', and there is no problem about the nature of the request. Killigrew and Jones had neither the privileges of ambassadorial status, nor the advantages of secret agents. Furthermore, as Englishmen, protestants, and associates of Throckmorton, they were disliked, distrusted and isolated. Throckmorton himself had already been absent for some two months and, as they said, they Void... be sory, that any thing of moment, and importaunce for her Majestie's service, shuld, for want of judgement of things of this world, escape the Queen's Majestie's knowledge,' although they would do their 'uttermost' to learn all they could. In these unenviable circumstances they requested 'somme man of good experience' to be sent over for the queen's service, in other words a suitable ambassador, cor ells that somme order may be furthwith taken, for the intertaining of such as may be thought mete to be used on this side for intelligence'.4 Two previous letters show that they were asking for money with which to secure the services for the queen of certain Italian, Scottish and Irish secret agents, all wellknown to Throckmorton and the English government. They had, in fact, already engaged one of them, Florence Diaceto. The request, quoted by Dureng, therefore argues the inadequacy of their contacts in general - they complained of their increasing isolation and fear of arrest - and not the intimacy of their relations with the protestants in particular.5 Miller, completing Killigrew's career in France from the time of Throckmorton's departure, said that both they and other English i. Miller, pp. 2, 53. 2. Ibid. p. 53. 3. Dureng, p. 253; no reference. 4. 6 Jan. 1559/60, Killigrew and Jones to Cecil, Forbes, i. 297. 5. 27 Dec. 1559, Killigrew and Jones to the queen, ibid. pp. 286-91; 29 Dec. 1559, Killigrew and Jones to Cecil, ibid. pp. 291-2.

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agents were 'deeply involved in the intrigues with the French Protestant faction which led to the Tumult of Amboise in March I5605.1 The extent of Killigrew's personal connection with the huguenots is said to have been shown by the fact that when he returned to London at the end of February 15 60, 'he was able to give his government the first2 news of the intended revolt - information which had been transmitted to him by one of the French conspirators'.3 Far from establishing Killigrew's personal connection with the huguenots, this would dispose of the whole case against him and Throckmorton, for how deep was their involvement in a conspiracy, which had been under preparation for some time past, if Killigrew only learnt of its existence fortuitously, after it had been betrayed and was widely expected? This evidence which, if accurate, would exclude both knowledge and complicity on the part of the English envoys, appears to conflict with the suggestion that Killigrew and Jones may have been referring to the conspiracy of Amboise in their letter of 29 December 15 5 9 to Cecil.4 However, the word 'first', relating to the first news of the conspiracy, has been interpolated by Miller and does not appear in the printed Remembrance of Killigrew. He said: c. . . I came over with the Advertisements of the Conspiracye intended to be executed at Amboise; which was discovered to me by the Way homewardes, by one of the Conspirators'.5 This could be taken to mean, not that Killigrew first heard of the matter in this way, but that this was when he learnt how the project was actually to be executed. This interpretation would rule out complicity, but not necessarily knowledge. The only possible conclusion is that none of the evidence so far produced for the complicity of Queen Elizabeth and her ministers in the conspiracy of Amboise will stand examination, and it is worth adding that, on the English side, Conyers Read found none. He simply mentioned that Throckmorton had even been charged with complicity, and that Cecil denied the current rumour that the queen 'had had a hand in it'.6 This, however, was in conversation with the Spanish ambassador and so carries no more weight than Lorraine's accusations to Chantonnay. We should, therefore, frankly admit - as Conyers Read tacitly implied - that the matter remains unresolved and, if Elizabeth were in fact involved, then it was covertly and, true to character, she keeps us guessing still. Her most likely means of encouraging such an exploit would have been indirectly, by the guarantee of a loan, probably in Strasbourg or Antwerp. Such a transaction, expressed in terms of some other business, could i. Miller, pp. 54-55. 2. My italics. 3. Miller, p. 55. 4. See above, p. 109. 5. No date; 'A Remembrance of Henry Killigrew's', L. Howard, A Collection of Letters (London, 1753), p. 186. 6. Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen 'Elizabeth (London, 1955), pp. 165, 240.

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easily have been kept secret and would be impossible to trace. But the probability of her having done so is slight. The effort to persuade her to arm against the danger from Scotland, which threatened not only the country but also her personal position as queen, reduced Cecil to thoughts of resignation1 and Throckmorton to near despair and the desertion of his embassy, and he frequently deplored the queen's insistence on economies which, he believed, would cost her dear. In September 1559 Elizabeth sent £2,000 to Scotland2 - little more than a tip - and all the encouragement was provided by Cecil. Why then should she have squandered money on a foolhardy demonstration in France, which might never have materialized? Elizabeth did not embark on foreign ventures until the eleventh hour after she was convinced of the necessity, and there was no necessity for her intervention in France in 1559-60. The situation was quite troubled enough to serve her purpose without her assistance. But, when all the arguments are exhausted, there persists a kind of emotional belief that - however unsatisfactory the evidence Elizabeth must, all the same, have been involved in the conspiracy. This, at least on the continent, where Elizabeth was hopefully regarded as the protestant counterpart of Philip II, appears to have arisen from the mistaken assumption that she cared about the cause of religion and the fate of the huguenots in France. But the awful truth was that she did not. She was never a Calvinist, and there was nothing altruistic about her foreign policy. In 15 60, she cared about peace, the preservation of her throne and the defence of England. Later on, when the situation had altered ajid Elizabeth was obliged to adopt a predominantly protestant foreign policy, her ostensible 'help' to the huguenots was geared, not to their military or economic needs, but to her own determination to recover Calais. Even Throckmorton, who was hardly disinterested, protested that her motives were embarrassingly obvious.3

1. Undated draft, Cecil to the queen, Thomas Wright, Queen Elizabeth and her Times (London, 1838), i. 24-25. 2. M. Lee, James Stewart, Earl of Moray (New York, 1953), P- 483. 24 Sept. 1562, Throckmorton to the queen, Forbes, ii. 64-65.

7

THE CARDINAL OF LORRAINE AND THE COLLOQUE OF POISSY, 1561: A REASSESSMENT1

T

he colloque of Poissy, September-October 1561, was an important incident in the history of the Reformation, and a dramatic incident in the career of the cardinal of Lorraine. This subject was first studied in detail by H. O. Evennett in his book The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent, published in 1930. More recently, Evennett provided the inspiration for Donald Nugent in his study Ecumenism in the Age of the Reformation: The Colloque of Poissy.* It is upon these two important works that any reassessment must necessarily be based. In a concluding chapter on 'the case of the cardinal of Lorraine', Nugent wrote: 'while the sources would seem to argue for a better view of Lorraine and his conduct at Poissy, an element of ambiguity remains'.3 This cautious comment refers to the introduction by Lorraine of the confession of Augsburg and a Lutheran formula on the eucharist. For Nugent, the 'critical role of the enigmatic cardinal of Lorraine has never been resolved'.4 In order to concentrate on his subject, the colloque itself, Nugent skipped briefly over its historical background. This he believed to have been fully treated by others5—doubtless Evennett in particular. It is, however, still necessary to study this historical background more precisely in order to clarify how and why the colloque arose. Only then does it become possible to interpret the all-important role of Lorraine. Both authors—Nugent following Evennett—attributed the colloque to 1 The interpretation to follow supersedes my former judgement of Lorraine's role at the colloque of Poissy: The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the European Crisis 7559-7572, London 1973, 11. 2 Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1974. 3 Nugent, 219. 4 Nugent, 12. 5 Nugent, 14.

114 Princes, Politics and Religion, 154 7-1589 Lorraine as its principal protagonist and, secondarily, to Catherine de Medici, who is said to have appropriated his idea.1 Because a colloque eventually materialised, with Lorraine playing a leading part, the two books are permeated by the assumption that this represented his longterm policy. In Nugent, this assumption is wholly vague, and necessarily so, because there is absolutely no supporting evidence. It appears to have derived from what he described as Lorraine's 'sudden call for a national council' (March i56o),2 and probably also from a statement made by Evennett. Referring, but unspecifically, to the summer of 1561, Evennett said that Lorraine supported the colloque, 'an idea of his own original mooting'.3 He made no effort to reconcile this statement with Lorraine's opposition earlier in the year—roughly when Catherine is alleged to have adopted his idea. This raises a major problem, intrinsic to the subject. Neither Evennett nor Nugent made any attempt to define what was meant by a national council. This failure, together with jumbled chronology, has greatly confused their interpretation of the evidence. There is a genuine problem in this matter of definitions. Various terms were then, and still are, used indifferently. But they conceal fundamentally different meanings. Without going into the finer shades of meaning, a gallican, or national council meant three principal things: an assembly of prelates who would attend to church reform, and might or might not discuss doctrine; an assembly of prelates, theologians and, possibly, other learned men, to which protestants might be admitted and heard. Thirdly, it could mean a similar assembly to which protestants were admitted upon a basis of equality, to engage in a theological disputation prior to seeking doctrinal agreement. This is usually—but not invariably—what was meant by a colloque. With reservations, this is what occurred at Poissy. So far as possible, the expressions gallican council, national council, and colloque will be used to describe those three meanings respectively. Nevertheless, one is forced to the conclusion that it was more the contents of the agenda than the composition of the assembly which—at least to its opponents—constituted a national council. We are now in a better position to consider Evennett's statement which unfortunately appears to have misled Nugent. The idea which Lorraine had 'mooted' was not a colloque, but a gallican council. Almost simultaneously, however, there arose a parallel, protestant demand for a national council, by which they did mean a colloque. Thus, the story of this council flowed, from the beginning, in a dual stream. Evennett, however, mostly ignored evidence from protestant sources. If the story ran in a dual stream, it also developed in two distinct phases: first during the reign of Francis n, from March to December 1560, when plans 1 2 3

Evennett, 94-6, 235, 240-1; Nugent, 66, 209. Nugent, 17. Evennett, 241.

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for a national council lapsed on account of the impending general council.1 Secondly, the idea was revived in 1561, when the pressure came largely from the protestants who were, by then, relatively powerful at court. This disposes of the notion that Catherine adopted Lorraine's idea, since it was not uniquely, or even predominantly, his. It would be a separate study to clarify Catherine's conception of 'the idea'. This was governed by her overwhelming desire for peace and order, and fashioned by the pressure of men and events. Clearly, therefore, Lorraine cannot have opposed 'the idea' (of a council) because, as Evennett alleged, Catherine had adopted it.2 But he did oppose it; and this was precisely because the idea in question no longer represented the gallican council he had 'originally mooted'. For the same reason, Lorraine's opposition persisted into the summer of 1561, and it will be seen that Evennett was wrong in thinking otherwise. When, finally, Lorraine dropped this opposition, and favoured a kind of national council, it was for a new and compelling reason. Neither Evennett nor Nugent produced any evidence—in spite of their assumptions—that Lorraine contemplated anything like a collogue before June or July 1561. Having failed to specify what 'idea' he was writing about, Evennett blurred the issues. By using imprecise terminology, he would have us believe that Lorraine continuously pursued a policy which resulted in the colloque of Poissy.3 If the cardinal inquisitor desired a colloque, to Evennett this was because of his sudden conversion to irenicism in March 1560, at the time of the conspiracy of Amboise.4 Such a transmutation is inherently improbable, and has to be explained by qualities of character, in particular Lorraine's outstanding adaptability.5 It follows that, for Evennett, the eventual staging of the colloque was purely ecumenical and required no further explanation. Consequently, he was vague about Lorraine's period of opposition, early in 1561, and overlooked his dramatic change of policy in June 1561, which led to his supporting the colloque. Evennett himself supplied the vital explanation, while failing to grasp its significance. These misconceptions result in a seriously garbled account of events which preceded the colloque, from May to September 1561. It is true that Lorraine's performance at Poissy was ecumenical and, narrowly defined, his irenicism is incontrovertible. But Evennett does not define it; consequently he gets lost along the way. Thus, the questions to be examined are these: what was the historical background to the colloque of Poissy? What was the policy of Lorraine from 1560-1, and for what reasons did he introduce Lutheranism into the deliberations at Poissy? Evennett and Nugent are certainly right in asserting that this was not an act of villainy. Neither is it at all mysterious. 1

This, however, was quickly in doubt again. Evennett, 235. s Elsewhere Evennett asserts that Lorraine lacked a single, directing motive (74). 4 Evennett, 235. 5 Evennett, 12. 2

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It will be seen that the colloque of Poissy was not the fulfilment of Lorraine's long-term purpose, but a pis alter. It was also an occasion upon which he made a remarkable virtue of necessity. The history of the French national council, as it materialised at Poissy in 1561, is closely linked with the reconvening of the council of Trent, suspended since 1552. Political rivalries and war had frustrated its ecumenical purpose, and it had proved unacceptable to the Lutherans. But the conviction survived, that only a general council could solve the problems of religion. After the religious peace of Augsburg, 1555, these problems were concentrated in France. It was, therefore, France which needed and desired a general Council, considerably more than her neighbours. By Article in of the treaty of Gateau-Cambresis, 1559, France and Spain were equally committed to procuring a council.1 The cardinal de Tournon wasted no time in urging Henry n to honour this commitment, as soon as he had recovered from celebrating the peace.2 Tournon was unaware that Henry lay dying; and his death was to alter the face of public affairs. After Henry's death, Lorraine faithfully pursued his established policy of violent persecution and laboured 'avec rigoureuses executions' to bring order into these affairs.3 But he was thwarted by the opposition of the parlement of Paris, which reftised to register the edict of the inquisition.4 The persecutory edicts of 4 September and 13 November 1559 further testify to Lorraine's religious policy.5 But all his efforts failed and, in January 1560, he resumed Tournon's theme. He wrote to the bishop of Limoges, ambassador in Spain, intimating that France badly needed a general council, for which Philip n's agreement would be necessary.6 The intention of France to strive for a general council, and to constrain the protestants was public knowledge.7 The general council was what Lorraine really wanted, all along, and it is important to be clear about this. But he was adamant that it had to be a new council, in a different place, and free of access.8 It was essential to France that the Germans and Lutherans should attend. Lorraine realised that this would be neither quick nor easy to achieve; in the event, it was to prove 1

Frederic Leonard, Recueil des traitez de paix, Paris 1693, ii, 536. G. Ribier, Lettres et memoires d'Estat, 1666, ii. 806—11: 9 July 1559, Tournon to Henry n. 3 Ribier, ii. 819: 20 December 1559, Lorraine to the bishop of Angouleme, ambassador in Rome. 4 This was probably more from gallican than pro-protestant sentiment. Ribier, ii. 817-18: 10 August 1559, Francis to the avocat and procureurs generaux of ft\e parlement of Paris. 5 A. Fontanon, Les Edits et ordonnances des rois de France, Paris 1911, iv. 259-60. 6 Louis Paris, Negotiations lettres et pieces diverses relatives au regne de Francois II, Paris 1841, 205—7: January 1559/60, Lorraine to the bishop of Limoges, ambassador in Spain. This letter is signed 'Charles' in royal fashion. 7 Calendar of State Papers Foreign, 1559-60, 267: 6 January 1560, Killigrew and Jones to Elizabeth. 8 Evennett, 93-4. 2

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impossible. This problem of obtaining a free, new, general council was greatly exacerbated by the conspiracy of Amboise which exploded into a serious crisis in March 1560. It was in these circumstances that Lorraine made his 'sudden call' for a national council.1 It was simply intended as an interim measure in the face of a desperate emergency; but the gravity of the crisis was not understood elsewhere. To contemporaries, the idea of an interim was highly emotive, and it aroused obdurate opposition in Rome and Madrid. This call for a national council in March 1560, is the basis of Evennett's argument that Lorraine was then converted to irenicism. Certainly Lorraine did perceive that the French problem of religion was beyond any ordinary national control; this was apparent to everyone. Consequently, in the face of revolution, the extreme persecution would have to be abandoned. This was a matter of tactics. The only remaining remedy was the re-unification of Christendom, and the only means to that end was a general council.2 This did not, however, imply Lorraine's conversion to a spirit of clemency, but rather the urgent preparation of a way by which the erring protestants might quickly be restored to the catholic fold. In the meanwhile, they were to be given no encouragement. It was the crisis and the urgency which were new, not Lorraine's attitude to councils or protestants. From this assumed change of spirit, however, Evennett goes on to argue that Lorraine was responsible for the changes in royal policy. Catherine de Medici, the admiral Coligny, and the chancellor, he says, could not have forced upon Lorraine a policy to which he was entirely opposed.3 But it was precisely the failure of the old policy of persecution, principally associated with Lorraine, which enabled Catherine to exert some influence in favour of moderation. In that moment of utmost peril, in March 1560, Lorraine was helpless. His inability to prevent a change in royal policy does not mean that he was responsible for it, or that it sprang from his initiative. Evennett can only advance this argument by ignoring evidence of successful catholic efforts to subvert the new royal policy. Otherwise he would have had to postulate a breach between Lorraine and his brother the due de Guise, which has never been suggested by anyone. With this controversy in mind, it is necessary to examine the evidence relating to the changes in royal policy, and to Lorraine's 'sudden call' for a national council. Lorraine's first reaction to rumours of the impending conspiracy was in character with the cardinal inquisitor. The edict of February 1560 was the last of the edicts of persecution.4 Its purpose was the derogation of anyone who failed in his duty to persecute protestants. It was primarily aimed at seigneurial jurisdiction, and proclaimed the Guises's well1

Nugent, 17. Evennett, 93. 3 Evennett, 99. 4 Fontanon, iv. 261. The edicts of persecution had begun with that of Chateaubriant, 27 June 1551: ibid., 252-7. 2

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founded fear of the country gentry. This was followed on 11 March, before the full extent of the conspiracy was known, by the famous and controversial edict of Amboise.1 It was this edict which initiated the changes in royal policy. Evennett called this a remarkable document, showing a 'profound modification of sentiment'. It did, indeed, calmly explore the nature of the religious problem and reject, as no longer applicable, the rigours of the edicts of Chateaubriant and Compiegne. The Huguenots, it declared, had become so numerous that this could only lead to a blood bath. In the hope that clemency might prove more profitable, it offered a complete amnesty for all past 'crimes'2 of religion, provided the guilty abjured. This corresponded very closely to the advice said to have been offered by Coligny. He is also said to have called for a suspension of the persecution, and a plain edict under which to live in peace, pending a free council.3 By this, he meant one in which everybody would be heard. The present edict, however, excluded pastors, conspirators against the royal family, the king's ministers and the State. Evennett is emphatic in his opinion that the credit and responsibility for the edict of Amboise belong to Lorraine.4 But this is to place his alleged change of heart and policy before the event which is supposed to have caused it. More significantly, this opinion appears to derive from a statement of Lorraine, in response to papal criticism, that it was he who had advocated this policy.5 But the claim was not made until June, when the policy was irreversible, and he could hardly be expected to have publicised his eclipse in the council. Evennett overlooked the fact that the preamble to the edict expressly—and for the first time—attributes it to Catherine; also that it was neither printed nor published.6 He might have argued much more plausibly that Lorraine reluctantly consented to the edict of Amboise in a forlorn attempt to undermine support for the incipient rising. There is, however, evidence that the edict of Amboise marked the beginning of a prolonged struggle for power in the council. The conspiracy shortly presented a military situation which called for the services of Lorraine's brother, the due de Guise. He was appointed lieutenant general with emergency powers. But, according to one account, the chancellor refused to seal the commission unless the Guises consented to the publication of a general pardon.7 Such an amnesty was 1

Fontanon, iv. 261-3. The edict of Fontainebleau, i June 1540, had proclaimed heresy to be a crime: Fontanon, iv. 246-8. 3 Regnier de la Planche, Histoire de I'Estat de France sous le regne de Francois //, ed. B hon, Paris 1836, 247-8. Evennett rejected La Planche as being hostile to Lorraine. He is, in fact, a remarkably reliable source. 4 Evennett, 100. 5 Evennett, 99. 6 La Planche, 300. 7 Louis ler prince de Conde, Memoires, ed. London 1743, i. 342, n. i. 2

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issued on 16 March for all who came in arms, provided they withdrew in twos and threes within forty-eight hours.1 The duke's commission was sealed the next day.2 The amnesty was accompanied by permission for one or two Huguenots to present their remonstrances and petitions. These could hardly be agreeable to Lorraine, their most detested persecutor, and the target of the movement. Evennett evades this problem, by blaming the whole affair on the prince de Conde for whom, he says, such permission would be useless.3 A petition and a confession were, for all that, shortly presented to Catherine at Chenonceaux, and the petitioners were rebuffed by the Guises.4 Furthermore, holding Lorraine responsible for the new policy of conciliation, Evennett fails to record that the amnesty was cancelled about a week later.5 Similarly he omits that a second pardon, this time for all past religious offences, was granted in May, by the edict of Loches.6 Such swift reversals of policy can only reflect conflict in the council. This more temperate royal policy was embodied in the edict of Romorantin in May i56o.7 The tension at court guaranteed that it was neither inquisitorial nor tolerant. Its moderation consisted in restoring the distinction between heresy and sedition, returning heresy to the sole jurisdiction of the prelates. In commenting that this would appeal to Lorraine, Evennett overlooked the fact that it tacitly repealed the death penalty imposed by the edicts of Compiegne, 155?, and Ecouen, 1559. Furthermore, civil offences arising from heresy were removed from the parlements—allegedly Guisard—and confided to the royal cours presidiaux. It is doubtful if this was as satisfactory to Lorraine as Evennett supposed.8 The conspiracy of Amboise was no flash in the pan. On 22 May, Throckmorton reported that 30,000 men would be in the field against the Guises before the end of June.9 It was also followed by voluminous and, at times, vitriolic pamphlet warfare. The full case against the Guises is very extensive. Thus it was that a long document, known as the 1 Fontanon, iv. 262—3. The date of this pardon is variously given as 16, 17, 18 March. The king himself had announced it by 16 March. G. Herelle, La Reforme et la Ligue en Champagne, Paris 1888, i. 30-2: 16 March 1560, Francis to the bailly ofVermandois. 2 Conde, 342-6, 17 March 1560. This commission is printed in a number of places. 3 Evennett is exaggeratedly anti-Bourbon. His rendering of their role in 1560 is demonstrably false. 4 This was probably late in April, or the first week in May, when Catherine was at Chenonceaux. This could be the undated remonstrance printed in Conde, i. 405-10; La Planche, 300—3. 5 La Planche, 262, gives 22 March 1560; see also, 270. Throckmorton had reported this by 6 April. CSPF., 1559-60, 505: Throckmorton to Elizabeth; ibid., 534: 12 April 1560, same to same. 6 Conde, i. 539, May 1560. 7 Fontanon, iv. 229—30. 8 It was not registered until 16 July. 9 Patrick Forbes, A Full View of the Public Transactions in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, London 1760-1, i. 465: 22 May 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth.

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Remonstrance of Theophile, was presented to the government in May 1560.l It gave warning of further trouble if the Guise regime continued. This, therefore, clearly indicates that the protestants distinguished between the Guises and the newly moderate policy of the government. The remonstrance demanded a council 'saint et libre', general or national, in which everything should be determined by the Word of God. Meanwhile, they requested freedom of conscience to live according to their confession of faith. This early protestant demand for a council is ignored by Evennett. It is, again, inherently improbable that Lorraine reacted with a new spirit of compliance towards his adversaries, especially as, in March 1560, he was very frightened. Subsequently, the campaign against him increased; his property at Dampierre and Cluny was sacked and his very life was allegedly endangered.2 But he did seek to placate his specifically religious opponents by promoting the council that was generally desired. On 21 March 1560 Lorraine wrote to the pope, Pius iv, and explained the gravity of the danger revealed by the hitherto unsuspected numbers and strength of the heretics.3 As the necessary preliminaries for a general council would inevitably be slow, he asked the pope to send cardinal Tournon as legate a latere, with powers to investigate and reform the corrupt life of the French Church, and to convene 'should it be considered desirable, an assembly of bishops to decide questions of faith and morals'. This was Lorraine's 'sudden call' for a national council. It was to be a gallican council under legatine direction, and in no way resembled the colloque of Poissy. It was, however, his reference to faith and morals which caused the furore. Consequently the matter was swiftly reported by the Spanish ambassador, Chantonnay, to the duchess of Parma with a note of alarm.4 When Lorraine made this request, things were moving quickly in France. In the last ten days of the month two decisions were taken, before the court left Amboise, now filled with the stench of decaying bodies. The first decision concerned an assembly of notables, and the second an assembly of bishops. From this point, confusion has arisen as to what sort of national council was intended. Tornabuoni, the Tuscan ambassador, reported on 25 March that the court had decided to hold an assembly of bishops and other seigneurs and 'gens de robe longue' to consider what remedies and expedients were necessary, on account of the great disorders in France. Meanwhile, he said, they were sending an 1

La Planche, 299—302. Calendar of State Papers Venetian, 1558-80, 189: 20 April 1560, Michiel to the doge; Evennett, 113—14. A month later Throckmorton reported an attempt to murder the due de Guise, out hunting, Forbes, i. 464: 22 May 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth. 8 Evennett, 96-7, gives 21 March 1560, but prints the document as appendix i, and there gives 22 March. 4 C. Paillard, 'Additions critiques a 1'histoire de la conjuration d'Amboise', Revue histonque, xiv (1880), 344: 28 March 1560, Chantonnay to Margaret of Parma. 2

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envoy to urge the pope that necessity forced them to demand a free council.1 He added, however, that they would stipulate so many conditions that they could not easily be met. Consequently there would be a gallican council, which would include many tainted persons (imbratti).2 This does not necessarily mean that Tornabuoni feared or expected a colloque\ he could easily have had some of the prelates in mind. On the other hand, rumours of pressure for a collogue were reported not long after.3 About this time Lorraine naturally discussed with the nuncio 4 the reforms which were necessary in France. He explained (lie need for speed, and told him that the king intended to summon an assembly, such as Tornabuoni had described to his prince. This, Lorraine said, was to concert measures for the pacification of the realm and the retention of the catholic faith. He added that he hoped Tournon would be there to preside. This rather loose phraseology led Evennett to maintain that Lorraine was Vague about the nature of the proposed council'.5 Lorraine, however, like Tornabuoni, was not referring to a national council, but to the decision to summon an assembly of notables. If he added that he hoped Tournon would preside, this was for reassurance. It has already been stated that the definition of a national council, to those who opposed one, tended to depend upon the agenda. Lorraine's proposed gallican council was a separate matter, as described in his letter to the pope. But Evennett's unfortunate misconception introduced an initial confusion into what Lorraine meant by a national council. On 31 March the court issued letters patent addressed to the parlement of Paris, containing an official account of what had occurred at Amboise. This curious document cannot possibly have originated with Lorraine; its contents differed dramatically from the Guise story, which castigated the protestants and the Bourbons. It stated that the purpose of the movement had been to present a petition. Furthermore, it expressly disculpated Conde, whom the Guises were frantically trying to destroy. The letter ended by announcing that the clergy were to be summoned, within six months, to reform the Church; then everyone who had been alienated could be reconciled.6 This was an announcement, not a summons, since neither date nor place was given. It was a preliminary gesture, to soothe the protestants, on the one hand, and to galvanise the pope, on the other. It did indeed startle and anger the pope, though 1 Philibert Babou de la Bourdaisiere, bishop of Angouleme reached Rome on 12 April with the requests for a general council and a legate to preside over a national one: Evennett, 102. 2 Abel Desjardins, Negotiations diplomatique* de la France avec la Toscane, Paris 1859-86, iii. 411: 25 March 1560, Tornabuoni to Cosme i. 3 Evennett, 116. 4 Lorenzo Lenzi, bishop of Fermo. 5 Evennett, 97. 6 Conde, i. 347-52: 31 March 1560, Francis to the parlement of Paris.

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Pius was to show himself more anxious to obstruct a national council than to obtain a general one. Pius was especially horrified by news of the amnesty, and appears to have assumed that a gallican council might lead to a gallican Church (perhaps with England in mind). 1 He quickly decided to resume the council of Trent. This was not what France required, and the decision was to cause prolonged difficulties and delays. Pius appointed the bishop of Viterbo as an additional legate to France (making three in all) and agreed to send Tournon.2 In order to curb Lorraine, who was deeply suspect in Rome, he was to be closely associated with Tournon. They were both appointed inquisitors, and legates a latere, and empowered to summon a small advisory body of bishops and other men.3 This circumscribed concession was not to authorise, but to preclude, a national council. During the early summer of 1560 negotiations relating to the general council only served to convince Lorraine that a French council was urgent and necessary. The new legate, Viterbo, arrived in mid-June and quickly registered his protest.4 Lorraine replied that when the king 'sees the congregation of the Council-General at hand, and without impediment, he will at any rate desist from proclaiming the National Council'. Lorraine is then reported to have said that all the king had intended was to 'assemble the Prelates of the Kingdom with the other estates, as his Councillors . . . with the presence and intervention of a Legate'. This, Lorraine said, should not correctly be called a national council.5 Evennett is almost certainly mistaken in interpreting this to mean that a mixed ^councill was intended; it is an extension of his original confusion, already explained. Dates however, had not been fixed, and there would have been advantages in calling the prelates at the same time as the assembly of notables. Ultimately the assembly of prelates coincided with an estates general. Lorraine was nettled, at this time, by being so unjustly censured. On 20 June he addressed a long apology to cardinals Tournon and Ferrara, and tried to calm the hysteria engendered by the suggestion of a council in France. He outlined his proposed agenda. This made no mention of doctrine. 'Wider issues' and 'the restoration of Christian unity' were to be left to the general council.6 It is, therefore, abundantly clear that Lorraine was not proposing a colloque\ that was a protestant notion. Lorraine's belief in the need for a gallican council was to receive strong support from the assembly of notables which met at Fontaine bleau from 21-26 August. Admiral Coligny seized the floor in order to present two protestant petitions. They were loyal and moderate in tone, 1

Evennett, 102-3. Sebastian Gualtieri, bishop of Viterbo. Evennett, 106-7. 3 Evennett, 110-112. 4 Evennett, 119. 5 CSPVen. 1558-80, 226-7: 21 June 1560, Michiel to the doge. 6 Evennett, 127, and appendix iii. 2

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but demanded the right to acquire churches (temples).1 This would, of course, entail recognition. Clearly, from then on, this matter would be pressed. Coligny was followed by Jean de Monluc, bishop of Valence, who called for a national council pending the general one. He added that the national council was more likely to be profitable if the most learned protestants were summoned, under safe conduct, 'pour disputer et conferer ensemble, s'il y avoit moyen de nous accorder'. Finally, Monluc maintained that exile was the worst punishment which should be inflicted for simple heresy.2 Monluc was followed byCharlesde Marillac,|archbishopof Vienne,who also called for a general council. But, he declared, there was no obligation to go to perdition for the sake of the pope. France needed a national council also, for which there were precedents. It might, perhaps, simply be described as a consultation. He did not enlarge upon what form this should take.3 Lorraine's speech came last, on the fourth day.4 Evennet paid little attention to this vital evidence of the cardinal's policy and intentions. It has already been stated that what Lorraine really wanted was a new, free, general council and, failing that, a gallican council. This, however, is not what he said; nothing like it. Lorraine began by denouncing the protestants. They were neither loyal nor obedient, whatever they protested. To grant them churches, he continued, would be to sanction their idolatry, which the king could not do without being eternally damned. These are two unequivocal statements which hardly indicate a fundamental change of heart towards the Calvinists. Lorraine then went on to deprecate the idea of a council of any kind: *il n'y voyoit pas grande raison * . . ' . He explained, rather vaguely, that a council s purpose was to reform the morals of the clergy. This was something every individual could do for himself, upon general or particular admonitions. For the rest, it was only necessary to observe what had already been concluded and decreed in respect of religion; all the councils in the world could order nothing but the observation of previous ones. After this remarkable obfuscation, Lorraine denounced the sedition of the protestants and their libels and placards, many of which were directed against himself. They ought, he said, to be severely punished. Peaceful heretics should not, however, be prosecuted, but left to the bishops. This was simply to re-iterate the terms of the edict of Romorantin. Royal officials had been sent to their posts to deal with sedition, and bishops to their dioceses to deal with heresy.5 They were also required, within two months, to 1 Lalource et Duval, Recueil des pieces originates et authentiques concernant la tenue des e'tats generaux, 1789, i. 68-9; Conde, iii, supplement, 645-8. 2 Lalource et Duval, i. 111-12. 8 Lalource et Duval, i. 76—99. 4 Lalource et Duval, i. 73—5. 5 Conde, i. 551, July 1560; P. Dupuy, Instructions et lettres des rois tres Chretiens et de leurs ambassadeurs et autres actes concernant le concile de Trente, ed. Paris 1654, 445:25 July 1560.

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gather information for the king about the state of the Church, 'afin de regarder a la necessite d'assembler un concile generate ou national'. Finally, Lorraine referred to the proposal, made by others, to hold an estates general. As reported, his statement does not make sense, but it appears that he was favourable. There were good political reasons for this, which do not concern us here. Against the background of his recent utterances to Rome and to papal agents, Lorraine's ostensibly curious speech can be interpreted in only one way. According to the report, 'le cardinal fonda son opinion sur le contenu esdites deux requetes presentees par 1'amiral'. This provides the clue. Such legitimate petitions could not be swept aside. The assembly was in favour of a national council, and Valence had proposed that learned protestants should not only be admitted, but admitted upon equal terms, 'pour disputer et conferer ensemble'. That meant a colloque. It must be remembered that Lorraine was a cardinal legate inquisitor. His innocent proposal for a gallican council, under legatine direction, was already anathema to the pope. Clearly he was not going to support a proposal for a national council that threatened to become a colloque. Besides, he was awaiting the arrival of Tournon from Rome. Thus, in seeking to defer any decision until the bishops had reported from the provinces, he was frantically playing for time. Having largely ignored this telling speech, at Fontainebleau, Evennett does not allow that Lorraine had any reservations about the national council before February 1561, if then.1 The decisions of the assembly of Fontainebleau were embodied in an edict of 31 August 1560.2 The assembly, it stated, had proposed church reform, if possible by means of a general council; otherwise, and in the meanwhile, by an assembly of bishops, prelates, and other members of the Church. The assembly had also proposed a meeting of the estates general. This was to be held first, in order to allow some time in which to procure the celebration of the general council, according to the hope afforded by the pope, emperor and king of Spain, in favour of which everything possible was to be done by France. The estates were summoned for 10 December, and the prelates were to be ready to assemble on 20 January 1561. The place, however, was still to be decided. The prelates were to consider their submission to the general council, if this seemed imminent, and to reform whatever was in need of it. Furthermore, they were to hear anyone who had anything to say on the subject of religion. Such persons were to be allowed to come and go freely and in safety. While this did not constitute a summons, letters patent of 10 September did. They called the clergy to Paris on 20 January 1561. This, again would seem to point to disagreement in the council. The clause 1 Evennett, 208-10, is quite vague about this. Lorraine's opposition must, however, be inferred. 2 Paris, Negotiations, 486-90, 31 August 1560.

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was repeated that anyone might address the assembly in freedom and safety.1 This was, indeed, to declare a national council, but not a colloque. This decision is sufficiently explained by the circumstances. A principle problem delaying the general council was the French insistence upon a new one, in order that the protestants should attend; it was, after all, upon their account that it was needed at all. If, therefore, the French were going to be forced to hold a national council as a substitute for a general one, then the same factors must obtain. Those who wanted to attend, however, were merely to be heard.2 It was likely that Lorraine agreed, if reluctantly, to these measures. There was still time in hand, and they had the desired effect of stimulating the pope. But, unfortunately, he obstinately adhered to his decision to reconvene the council of Trent.3 Via Tournon, who finally reached court on 24 October 1560, the pope sent offers of military help against the protestants. This was the local solution that he and Spain much preferred to a council. According to Evennett, this was welcomed by the Guises, but not by Catherine.4 The elaborate details relating to this deadlock over the general council cannot be entered into here. It was, however, temporarily lifted when, on 10 October, cardinal Ferrara wrote to the king and Lorraine to say that the pope had agreed to open a council at Vercelli or Casale. Whether Ferrara was deceived or deceiving, he contrived to convey the impression that the pope had thereby consented to a new council, in place of Trent. On 31 October Lorraine responded enthusiastically. He welcomed and accepted the proposal, intimating that the national council could consequently be cancelled.5 Not long after, however, news arrived that the emperor had agreed to the council being held at Trent. Anxious not to forfeit the council altogether, France then yielded so far as to authorise Angouleme to accept, provided the pope published his bull of convocation before the meeting of the estates general in France; otherwise the national council could not be cancelled. This was because the government was already committed; a council had been promised to the people.6 The bull was issued on 29 November, and summoned the council to Trent on Easter day, 6 April isGi. 7 It arrived in France on 17 December, four days after the opening of the estates general. The wording of 1

Conde, i. 578-80, 10 September 1560. ' . . . oya so lent tous ceulx qui auront a remonstrer': Paris, Negotiations, 489. 3 Henry et Loriquet, Correspondence de Philibert Babou de la Bourdaisiere, eveque d'Angouleme (Travaux de 1'Academic de Reims, xxvii. 1857-8), 31-5: 30 September 1560, La Bourdaisiere to the king. 4 Evennett, 170-1. 5 Evennett, 178-9; appendix v, 31 October 1560: Lorraine to cardinal Ferrara, italian; also in S. Ehses, Concilium Tridentinum: Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatuum, nova collectio, Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1901-19, viii. 91-2. 6 Evennett, 180-1; Ehses, viii. 91-2: 31 October 1560, Francis to Ferrara. 7 Evennett, 194-5. 2

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the bull, however, was unacceptably vague. Lorraine rightly detected that what it implied was a resumption of the council of Trent. This was useless. France had been duped and Lorraine was angry. He swung opinion against the bull, while steps were taken to discover the emperor's attitude.1 The certainty of a general council would have been of inestimable help to Catherine de Medici, who had bec%ome regent for Charles ix on 6 December 1560. The end of 1560 was a time of perilous religious, political and financial crisis. The premature death of Francis n on 5 December had called many things into question. In these circumstances, the estates were not to be trifled with. Both recognition of the regency government and financial assistance were urgently required of them. They expected far-reaching reforms, and they expected the promised council—general or national—from which, it was vaguely supposed, reunion would blossom. A preparatory session of the third estate, meeting in Paris on 8 November, had clearly drafted such a request.2 Access was to be free and safe, and everyone to be freely heard. The assembly should be presided over by the king and court, and attended by learned divines of saintly life. All differences must be determined by the Word of God. If these conditions were not observed, the council would be neither legitimate nor fruitful. Meanwhile, devout and peaceful protestants were to be unmolested. As the decisions of this council were to be binding upon everyone, clearly its composition and procedure were vitally important. Monluc, at Fontainebleau, had audaciously called for a disputation. But this was even more radical, reflecting the growing conviction that only the State could act effectively. This was a proposal for a colloque, under the auspices of the crown, whereas Lorraine had requested a gallican council under a senior legate. This growing protestant demand is entirely overlooked by Evennett. With the general council once more in doubt, religion weighed heavily upon the estates general, and concerned them more than finance, for which they had chiefly been summoned. Evennett paid too little attention to their deliberations, which constitute an important factor in the history of the national council. The dimensions of the religious conflict had been publicly formulated at Fontainebleau. Members of the estates were aware that the protestant petitions were still pending. The assembly of bishops, called for 20 January was to have been cancelled. Instead, the government cautiously postponed it to 25 February, by which time the estates, at least, would be over.3 But, as no place was specified, this reduced a positive summons to a mere announcement. Requests for a general or national council were prominent in the 1

Evennett, 201—2. Conde, ii. 649—55. 3 Ehses, viii. 122—3: 4 January 1561, Charles to his bishops. 2

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cahiers of the estates. Most religious bitterness was expressed by the nobles, who petitioned in favour of the protestants. Nobles and tiers demanded reforms, and a council. Protestants were to be allowed to participate, together with the doctors of the catholic Church. Both estates wanted an interim and an amnesty, and both were strongly anticlerical.1 Repeated demands for things which had already been enacted testify to the non-enforcement of the law in the provinces. The clergy, for their part, loudly condemned the protestants, against whom they called for severe treatment. They were prepared for reforms, but wanted the lay help of the crown against heresy. This meant a return to the edicts of persecution in force before the conspiracy of Amboise. Furthermore, the clergy favoured the creation of itinerant judicial commissions—the inquisition in all but name—and the administration of an oath of religion to all office holders. This would exclude the protestants. It was with peace and order in mind that Catherine issued a regulation designed to appease the nobility. The lettres de cachet of 28 January 1561 rested upon her sole authority.2 They were described as an act of clemency to grace the new reign. All religious prisoners were to be released, and all heresy cases suspended. Contrary to the wishes of the clergy, the mild edict of Romorantin was specifically confirmed. The reglement was declared to have the authority of letters patent. Consequently it was resisted by the catholic parlement, which was not invited to register it. While Evennett would have us believe in Lorraine, the unsWerving irenicist, it is hardly surprising that he made no recorded effort to exert a moderating influence in the first estate, for which he was speaker. Before the estates dispersed, on 31 January, the government formally guaranteed a council 'franc et libre', which anyone might attend under safe conduct.3 This was a promise re-affirmed; there could be no more positive commitment. Nor could there be any further question of excluding the protestants from any national assembly, unless a general council were to meet upon the instant. That their summons was later to become a matter of uncertainty, sprang entirely from the strength of catholic opposition. The moment the estates dispersed, on 31 January, the council discussed the petitions presented by Coligny at Fontainebleau, in which the protestants demanded temples. Supported by Coligny, Chatillon, Navarre, La Roche-sur-yon and Monluc, the petitions were, nevertheless, rejected by a majority decision. They were referred to a commission of the estates, which had remained behind to prepare the

1 Evennett, 203-4; Georges Picot, Histoire des etats generaux, Paris 1872, ii. 28 f.; G. Baum et E. Cunitz (eds.), Histoire ecclesiastique des eglises reformees au royaume de France, Paris 1883—9, i- 456 f2 Michaud et Poujoulat, Nouvelle collection des memoires pour servir a I'histoire de France, serie i, vol. vi. Memoires du prince de Conde, 570-1. 3 Picot, ii. 87.

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work of a further assembly. It was scheduled to meet on i May, to discuss finance.1 It was therefore perfectly clear to Lorraine which way the wind was blowing. Protestant pressure for their petitions, and for a collogue was steadily increasing. This is a vital factor, which Evennett overlooked, blaming all protestant progress on Catherine. It was consequently at this stage that Lorraine closed ranks with the other legates, Viterbo and Tournon, dropped his opposition to the bull, and was restored to favour at Rome.2 As the wording of the bull had not yet been clarified, the pope was not finally committed to raising the suspension on Trent. Since Lorraine grasped at that slender straw, it follows that he was desperately anxious for the general council to materialise. This alone could avert a national council. This, in turn, means that he opposed the sort of national council that was now likely to take place, namely a colloque instead of a gallican council under legatine direction. Lorraine's position and influence at court, had, in any case, changed since the death of Francis n. On i February 1561 he withdrew to his diocese of Rheims.3 In this way, he could wait upon events, without adopting any irreversible position. It will be seen that this passive opposition lasted from February to some time in June, when a change of policy was forced upon him. According to Evennett, Lorraine was recruited by the other legates, Viterbo and Tournon, about February 1561 to restrain Catherine, whose alleged policy of compliance with the estates general threatened to lead to toleration—an allegation which entirely ignored her intense fear of Spain.4 By neglecting political factors, Evennett missed the evidence that it was not Catherine who required restraint; nor could Lorraine have applied it by withdrawing. Later on—and no timing is specified—Lorraine is said to have 'intervened' to 'modify Catherine's plans'.5 Consequently, he assisted her 'to propel a vessel' he had originally launched, but whose course he had deflected.6 'Even the Colloquy', Evennett writes, 'was an idea of his own original mooting'.7 We have seen that this is not true. Nor is it true that Lorraine 'intervened', to modify plans to introduce toleration. These two assertions are important, insofar as they underlie Evennett's very confused version of what happened in the summer of 1561. It is, however, first necessary to consider that pressure of men and events to which, as regent, Catherine de Medici was subjected in the spring of 1561. Conflict over the papal bull prevented the general council from open1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Jules Delaborde, Gaspard de Coligny, amird de France, Paris 1879-82, i. 499-500. Evennett, 208-9. Evennett, 212. Evennett, 210. Evennett, 240. Evennett does not make it clear how he thinks Lorraine 'deflected' this vessel. Evennett, 236, 240—1.

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ing on 6 April. Nor had a French assembly of prelates met on 25 February. The turbulent estates general had failed to ratify Catherine's regency, hoping to find in the king of Navarre a firmly protestant champion. As first prince of the blood, Navarre was associated with the regent, and his advancement was fiercely resisted by the due de Guise. Late in February, this rivalry flared into a violent and dangerous court quarrel.1 The insecure regent was further challenged by the estates of the He de France, which met on 20 March 1561.2 It is possible that they may have been influenced by the second Calvinist national synod which met at Poitiers on 10 March.3 The synod drew up a memorandum for presentation to the estates general, scheduled for i May. They particularly wanted a suitably composed royal council, in order to guarantee the execution of royal commitments—further evidence that the religious edicts were not being enforced. They also determined that each province should send a protestant representative to reside at court, to protect the affairs of their respective churches. These deputies were, naturally, to work as a body, and to present a confession of faith, together with a petition. They were also to co-operate closely with those seigneurs at court who were well-disposed towards them. They shortly constituted a well-informed pressure group, backed by an efficient provincial organisation. One result of these events, central and provincial, was an arrangement by which Navarre became lieutenant general of the kingdom, renouncing his claim, as first prince, to the regency.4 This resolution of the court crisis was announced by letters patent of 25 March i56i.5 As the estates of the He de France had been swiftly dissolved for their temerity, the resumption of the estates general was postponed to i August. Their function was to vote money. Consequently the letters forbade them to discuss the government—which was settled—or religion, which was not. For this purpose, it had been decided to summon 'des plus grandz, dignes et vertueux personnaiges . . . gens de saincte vie, doctrine et savoir, pour prendre d'eux advis sur ce qui se devra faire . . . attendant le fruict d'un bon et saincte concile'. Once again, this was a declaration of intent rather than a summons, since no date or place had

1

N. M. Sutherland, The French Secretaries of State in the Age of Catherine de Medici, London 1962, 114-16. See above chap. 4. 2 Alphonse de Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne D'Albret, Paris 1881-6, iii. 62-4. 3 Jean Aymon, Tous les Synodes nationaux des eglises reformees de France, The Hague 1710, i. 13-23. 4 This was confirmed by letters patent of 8 April 1561: De Ruble, iii. 75, 344-50. Navarre's more protestant brother was restored to the council on 13 March, for the first time since his arrest by the Guises on 31 October 1560: Conde, ii. 383; Aumale, Histoire des princes de Conde pendant le XVIe et XVIIe siecles, Paris 1863-96, i. 100, gives 15 March. It makes no difference. 5 Conde, ii. 281-4, 25 March 1561.

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been indicated. This significant document is ignored by Evennett who placed at the end of April the final decision to hold a council.1 Nothing relevant happened in April, however; there was no new decision, and the time and place of any council were still unknown. Evennett condemned Catherine for what he believed to be her determination to summon the protestants to a national council, itself to be held under the pretext of preparing for Trent. In fact, Catherine's secretary, de Laubespine, provides evidence of how nervous she was about making concessions to conciliate Navarre and his supporters.2 Following the withdrawal of Lorraine in February 1561, the history of the colloque of Poissy entered into its second phase, during which the impulse was primarily protestant. This was the time of maximum Calvinist expansion.3 The protestants were over-encouraged by the more favourable climate at court. The celebration of Easter (6 April) gave rise to excesses and deplorable incidents which could only damage their cause and belie their claims. The edict of 19 April 1561 was issued in these circumstances, and should be related to the increase in public disturbances.4 Its whole emphasis was on public order. But it also confirmed existing regulations. These were being resisted and ignored because they suspended the persecution. Now, in the interests of those who behaved discreetly, it was further specified that people were not to be molested in their houses.5 This edict was distributed directly to the provinces, by-passing the parlements.6 It was interpreted as tantamount to authorising the cult in private. Consequently it caused an uproar, and, according to Chantonnay, threw the catholics into desperation.7 At home and abroad, catholic opposition to the trend of events in France was becoming menacing. An even more perilous position now obtained than that which had followed the conspiracy of Amboise the previous year. In spite of unremitting efforts, the protestants had become steadily stronger. The general council had still not materialised, and the need for emergency measures was paramount. The climax to this dangerous religious debate was reached in what Estienne Pasquier called the 'pourparlers de Paris' in June-July 1561. Evennett's treatment of this significant episode is both inadequate and erroneous. This appears to derive from his mis1

This opinion is unexplained. It appears to have derived from a letter of 22 April 1561. It is, however, clearly not what the letter means. H. de la Ferriere, Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, Paris 1880-95, i. 191-2: Catherine to the bishop of Rennes, ambassador in the empire. 2 Bibliotheque nationale, Paris, fonds frangais, 6614, fol. 230 [March 1561], draft by de Laubespine for Catherine to Limoges. This letter was private and confidential. 3 Bulletin de la Societe de I'histoire du protestantisme fran^ais, xiv (1865), 319: 24 May 1561, Calvin to Bullinger. 4 Conde, ii. 334-5* 19 April 15615 This repealed a clause of the edict of Chateaubriant, June 1551. 6 Baum et Cunitz, i. 507; Conde, ii. 352-7. 7 Conde, ii. 7: 22 April 1561, Chantonnay to Catherine.

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taken conviction that Catherine was working for toleration, that a colloque was already determined, and that Lorraine supported it. Evennett maintains that, ever since April, 'Catherine had been quietly laying her plans for a National Council in the summer, to be composed of a mixed assortment of laymen and ecclesiastics and to be accompanied by a religious colloquy'.1 This is pure invention, for which he could offer no evidence. Catherine, as we have seen, had studiously avoided defining the assembly announced on 25 March. In a letter of 21 April, to Limoges, she indicated that she would be free to travel south (she hoped to meet Philip n) as soon as the estates general was over, about mid-August. The letter referred to no other engagement, doubtless because the matter of the general council was still undetermined.2 According to Evennett, however, Lorraine persuaded Catherine to separate die civil from the ecclesiastical elements of the mixed assembly which he postulated, and to hold two separate gatherings.3 This assertion is advanced as evidence that Lorraine supported the colloque, and that he and Catherine were in alliance. Consequently, Evennett says, the council and parlement were to meet in June, to prepare the ground for a fresh edict regulating 'le fait politique'.4 The edict of July 1561, which resulted from this consultation—it corresponds to our 'pourparlers de Paris'—is said to have embodied Lorraine's proposals.5 This account does not make sense, and it does not correspond to what happened. It is therefore necessary to consider the evidence relating to the 'pourparlers de Paris'. The court went to Rheims for the coronation of Charles ix, which was performed by Lorraine on 15 May. The following day a letter to the parlement of Paris, in the name of the king, announced his intention to hold an assembly of notables.6 Its members were to be elected by the king from lists of persons nominated in the provinces and by the parlement of Paris. This would have been a lengthy procedure, and it might have yielded a protestant result. Whatever the reason, however, we hear no more about it. At the time of the coronation, Lorraine is reported by La Place to have complained to Catherine on behalf of the clergy. He protested against the spread of protestantism, and the nonobservance of the edicts. The judges he said, in an oblique criticism of the edict of April, thought they were expected to tolerate religious assemblies. During the expected colloque, La Place continued, Lorraine declared that the king must on no account permit any innovation in religion! This expectation of a colloque did not derive from any arrangements, but from the deadlock in the negotiations for the general coun1

Evennett, 236. La Ferriere, Lettres, i. 189: 21 April 1561, Catherine to Limoges. 3 Evennett, 240. 4 Evennett, 253. 5 Evennett, 241-2, 261-4. 6 Conde, ii. 364—5, 16 May 1561.

2

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cil. In order to prevent innovations in religion, it was necessary to 'faire une loy inviolable'. Consequently, the king should assemble the princes, seigneurs and council in the parlement of Paris 'pour le tout y solennellement traicter, [et] garder puis apres inviolablement ce qui seroit arreste'.1 This evidence from La Place, and elsewhere, is borne out by the fact that such an assembly did take place—the 'pourparlers'—and such an edict was attempted by it; both, however, were unsuccessful. Thus it is clear that Lorraine must have feared the outcome of a collogue, which was likely to take place. He, therefore, sought to pre-empt it by his proposed *ioy inviolable'. This, according to La Place, was to have been final. It was, he said, the only certain way Lorraine could see of obtaining any settlement. Not having yet been appointed, the collogue could still be averted. From this one might deduce that Lorraine was still supporting the sort of limited gallican council he had advocated from the beginning. The letters patent of 25 March could easily be thus interpreted. They had made no reference to freedom of access—unlike the declaration of 31 January to the estates general. An inoffensive assembly of prelates, under Tournon's legatine direction, had already been authorised by the pope and Lorraine had never proposed anything else. The belief that Lorraine intended to pre-empt their collogue, is supported by the contents of a protestant petition of 11 June. It was presented by Esternay, a protestant of Picardy and a follower of Conde, on behalf of the Calvinist deputies at court.2 The principal purpose of the petition was to request the king to consider their cause, and 'commander que nqstre Doctrine et nostre vie soyent examinees selon la parole de Dieu', which, it said, they had in no wise contravened. Presenting their confession of faith, they requested permission to expound and defend it. For this purpose they wished to recall various exiles, under safe conduct. This was a petition for a free, national colloque. It further demanded an end to persecution, protection against outrages, and the release of prisoners—all things for which existing law already provided. Finally, they requested permission to hold their services in public, and for temples, or other premises. To obviate the problem of sedition, which the churches had always condemned, they proposed that their meetings should be supervised by royal officials. This was a protestant gauntlet which could hardly be ignored. Evennett missed the significance and effect of this petition because he confused its timing. He placed it after the decision of the following day, 12 June, to summon the national council, announced in March.3 This 1

Pierre de la Place, Commentaires de I'estat de la religion et republique sous les roys Henry et Francois seconds et Charles neufuiesme, ed. Paris 1836, 127-8. A similar version appears in Baum et Cunitz, i. 509, 516. 2 Conde, ii. 370-2, 11 June 1561. S J. Le Plat, Monumentorum ad Historiam Concilii Tridentini, Louvain 1781-7, iv. 704-5, 12 June 1561.

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summons was naturally a delicate matter, and had to be carefully presented. The letters patent therefore explained that no place had been designated for the proposed assembly of prelates on 25 February because the matter of the general council was in doubt. As the prelates were now to be summoned to Paris for 20 July, under the same banner of preparing for Trent, it was necessary to assert that most princes held their prelates ready to depart—which appears to be largely rhetorical. This was simply diplomatic commonsense and not, as Evennett maintains, the hypocrisy of calling a colloque under pretext of preparing for Trent.1 For it was not the desired colloque which had so far been announced. The protestants were perfectly clear about this. The nuncio, Viterbo, was not disturbed by this summons; nor was he hoodwinked, as Evennett claims.2 The summons, once again, was necessarily vague. The petition of 11 June had still to be dealt with, and obviously the nature of the council could not be determined before the 'pourparlers de Paris', which might yet promulgate Lorraine's 'loy inviolable'. In the meanwhile, however, it could not be alleged that no council had been vouchsafed. The matters to be considered in Paris were initially propounded to the parlement by the chancellor, de L'Hospital, on 18 June.3 He said that the conseil prive was undecided how to act, pending the general council. His speech, as it is recorded, does not refer to the protestant petition, which had been referred to the royal council. The question to consider was whether the edicts should be retained or altered, and whether penalties should be increased or diminished. Discussions on the problem of heresy and the nature of the law appear to have lasted from 23 June to 11 July, possibly longer. Surviving accounts of the 'pourparlers' are regrettably scrappy. It is clear, however, that the debates were heated; also, that opinions were almost equally divided. According to Le Laboureur, the petition was debated at length. But Estienne Pasquier does not mention it. He says that Catherine imposed a secret, written vote on the motion, 'qu'il falloit ou suivre 1'eglise Romaine . . . ou vuider le Royaume avec permission de vendre ses biens'. The motion, he says, was carried by a majority of only three, and that uproar ensued. This hardly points to a desire for toleration, but rather to a pre-occupation with law and order. Finally, on 11 July, opinions are said to have been drafted into articles. These articles were subsequently drawn up in the form of an edict.4 1

Evennett, 224, 254. Evennett, 281; J. Susta, Die Romische Kurie und das Konzil von Trient unter Pius IV, Vienna 1904-14, i. 200-1, 14 June 1561: Viterbo to Borromeo; ibid., 207-9: 20 June 1561, same to same; Joannis Calvini Opera, Corpus Reformatorum, xxix-lxxxvii, eds. G. Baum, E. Cunitz, E. Reuss, Brunswick & Berlin 1863-97, xviii. 547-9: 11 July 1561, Marlorat to Calvin. 3 Conde, ii. 396-400, 18 June 1561. 4 Jean Le Laboureur, Additions au memoires de Castelnau, Paris 1731, 1.^67-9; Conde, ii. 401-3; Estienne Pasquier, Lettres historiques, ed. D. Thickett, Geneva 1966, 646. 2

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This edict of July, which was not published until the end of the month, was the perverted product of fundamental disagreement.1 It re-affirmed the conciliatory edicts of Romorantin, and April 1561; but it specified that no assemblies were to be held in public or private. It declared a general amnesty for all religious offences since the reign of Henry n, and imposed banishment as the maximum penalty for simple heresy. It was further curiously stipulated that authorities were forbidden to pursue anyone indiscreetly. While this was probably in the interests of peace, it sounded like an invitation to ignore the prohibition of private assemblies. The edict was only provisional, pending a council; it was voiced abroad that it would never be executed, which de L'Hospital later confirmed.2 Such a negative result was bound to be greeted by a violent tempest of indignation—possibly even war. This abortive act was a scandalous exhibition of deadlock, and similarly disastrous to catholics and protestants alike. Before its publication, however, letters patent of 25 July wisely announced the intensely-desired safe conducts. The letters declared that the bishops had already assembled. Anyone else, who wished to speak, might come and attend in safety, 'pour 1'esperance que Nous avons de prendre par ce moyen une bonne et saincte resolution'.3 As early as i July, Chantonnay had reported that the councillors could see no other solution but to hold a national council.4 Coming from the Spanish ambassador, this, it will be seen, was distinctly ironic. According to Evennett, this was the colloque which Catherine had intended since April, under pretext of preparing for Trent. But it was precisely on account of Trent that a council had repeatedly been postponed. There was no villainy in this; there was simply no longer any alternative. It is evident that no decision had been taken before the 'pourparlers' in June; even now, it was a council, not a colloque, which had been announced. The protestants were only to be heard. It is clear that Lorraine cannot, as Evennett alleged, have dominated the assembly in Paris; nor did the provisional edict of July embody his proposals. It did not remotely resemble his projected 'loy inviolable'. But the deliberations of the assembly had been vitiated from the outset. They opened on 23 June: that same day Chantonnay had informed the queen that Philip n had reversed his former policy, and accepted the bull convening the council of Trent.5 This meant that France had finally lost the long struggle for a new and free general council, and that the protestants would not attend. The one, universally recognised 1

Fontanon, iv. 264-5. De Ruble, iii. 103-4; Michel de L'Hospital, Oeuvres completes, ed. P. J. S. Dufey, Paris 1824-5, 449~5°- This is a corrupt text. 3 'Tous ceux qui auront ... aucunes Remonstrances, ou qui voudront estre ouis ...': Conde, i. 41-2, 25 July 1561. 4 Conde, ii. 12, i July 1561. 5 Evennett, 256; Nugent, 63-4; Susta, i. 210-11; 23 June 1561, Viterbo to Borromeo. 2

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remedy was not even to be attempted. This was a devastating blow to Lorraine, who always maintained that a resumption of Trent would only confirm the disunity of Christendom, and render it definitive. France had already tried every expedient apart from a national council. Lorraine had only wanted a provisional, gallican assembly to reform the Church. Now a national council would have to replace the general council, since this was not going to tackle the right problems. In these circumstances, the protestants' demand for admittance could no longer be opposed. Philip's decision clinched the form of the council of Trent; conversely, it accounts for the nature and timing of the colloque of Poissy. The significance of this vital factor was completely missed by Evennett, to whom Lorraine's support of the colloque required no explanation. It is Evennett's triumph to have found and published a memorandum dated June-July 1561, in which Lorraine elaborated his plans for the forthcoming national council.1 The contents of the memorandum, as explained by Evennett, bear out the foregoing analysis of Lorraine's conduct and policy. In his memorandum, Lorraine explained that he wanted to turn the assembly of bishops into an exploratory conference, in order to investigate the grounds of the present schism. This was not to be a disputation; thus he still did not favour a colloque, in any true sense. It only remained, at the time of writing, to summon suitable persons. Lorraine's purpose was to re-establish Christian unity—the reason for which he had been calling for a new, free, general council. The memorandum was intended for the German princes. Protestantism had originated in Germany, and Lorraine had always maintained that there could be no satisfactory religious settlement which excluded the Lutherans. Thus, if his exploratory conference in France were to succeed in reaching any consensus of agreement, it must be such as to embrace the Lutherans also. For this reason they, and the German princes, had a potentially important role to play; France could not restore Christian unity on her own. Lorraine, however, did still believe that by patient study and earnest search it was possible to educe the one, true religion, which could tolerate no other. While he may have been prepared to accept modifications in matters indifferent, this did not mean that he was open to Lutheran or Calvinist persuasion. That would not be necessary: the determination of differences by reference to the Word of God would vindicate catholic doctrine. There was, furthermore, a prevalent if rather vague belief, that once the Church had been reformed, other religious problems would disappear. Lorraine also accepted that a great many issues badly needed clarification. He pointed out, in his memorandum, that there was already agreement on the Apostles' Creed. Fundamentally, everything turned upon the disputed nature of the Real Presence. If only an agreed formula could be reached upon''the eucharist, then the 1 Evennett, 264 f.; appendix viii.

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way would be open for progress in other respects. Between Rome and Geneva there existed a well-publicised eucharistic gulf. It is, therefore, not difficult to understand why Lorraine should have introduced a moderate Lutheran formula. It offered the only possible hope of bridging that gulf. By this means the Calvinists were to be imperceptibly eased towards a more acceptable doctrine of the Real Presence. Lorraine was to face monumental difficulties in his self-appointed mission as saviour of Christendom, not least from the implacable obstruction of his fellow prelates. They were totally opposed to anything more than a gallican assembly. On i August they denied taking part in a national council and determined not to discuss doctrine.1 This should be left to Trent. On 14 August Tournon proposed to send to the king 'pour mettre ordre aux huguenots et devoyes'—hardly an ecumenical attitude.2 This was why the protestants presented a petition on 17 August, asking to be heard.3 If they were to be heard at all, which was still doubtful, they feared subjection to procedural disadvantages. It was Catherine who forced the prelates to consider this petition. On 8 September a dozen theologians arrived from the Sorbonne seeking to avert a confrontation.4 Consequently, the protestants petitioned a second time.5 Their requests had neither been conceded nor answered, when the colloque opened, inauspiciously, the following day. Ten days later the cardinal legate of Ferrara arrived with Diego Lainez, general of the Jesuits, to assist in traversing proceedings.6 Constructive deliberation was naturally very difficult in this atmosphere of mutual hostility, spiced with fear. In spite of tenacious efforts on the part of a few individuals, failure to reach agreement on a eucharistic formula is, in essence, the story of the colloque of Poissy. It would have been feasible to agree upon a form of words, had their meaning remained undefined. But members, on each side, really only believed in the possibility of agreement provided the other could be made to see the truth. Thus precise definitions were all-important, and Lorraine's Lutheran intervention was received with profound dismay.7 He inevitably provoked suspicion by loftily requiring the Calvinists to sign his formula, while declining to do so himself. It must, however, be remembered that, with the pope, legates, Jesuits and prelates all furiously opposed to what he was doing, Lorraine was playing with fire. 1

Evennet, 286. De Ruble, Le Colloque de Poissy (Memoires de la societe de I'histoire de Paris, xvi. 1889), Paris 1890, 19. 3 Baum et Cunitz, i. 543-4. 4 Baum et Cunitz, i. 555; de Ruble, Le Colloque de Poissy, 26. 5 Baum et Cunitz, i. 553-4. 6 Ferrara was appointed legate a latere on 2 June and left Rome with Diego Lainez on 2 July 1561. They arrived at Poissy on 19 July. Evennett, 259-60; de Ruble, Le Colloque de Poissy, 33; Nugent, 118. 7 Evennett, 351 f.; Nugent 142—3. Nugent prints various formulae which were discussed, 233-40. 2

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Had he signed a Lutheran formula without first extracting the Calvinists' assent, he could have been ruined for a heretic. It was essential for him to secure his retreat, back into the body of prelates. Consequently, he could not advance towards the protestants. They must be induced to come to him, and signing his formula was to be the first, and major step. Had he succeeded in this, he would have been unassailable, and widely acclaimed. Only he could have led any subsequent ecumenical movement. In the event, Lorraine was defeated as much by the Catholic Church as by its adversaries. Dispirited by the evaporation of his dream, he withdrew completely and pronounced anathema upon those who rejected the uncompromisingly catholic formula devised by the prelates.1 Lorraine had seized, or fashioned, a chance to attempt in France what the pope and the hierarchy had failed or refused to attempt universally—the re-unification of Christendom. It was in this respect that he made a supreme virtue of necessity, and international attention was briefly focused on Poissy. Although doctrinal agreement at Poissy would not have solved the problem of its enforcement, this was, nevertheless, a splendid failure; for contemporaries still believed in the selfauthenticating properties of true religion. Lorraine, alone among his peers, had brought exceptional courage and vision to a great ecumenical endeavour. Thereafter, there were no alternatives. He distinguished himself at the council of Trent, and reverted to his former role of cardinal inquisitor. This is described by Evennett as *a spectacular change of policy', of a questionable nature. But really it was not.2 1 2

Evennett, 382, Nugent, 172. Evennett, 2.

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8 THE ASSASSINATION OF FRANCOIS DUG DE GUISE, FEBRUARY 1563 Francois due de Guise, commander of the French catholic forces, was assaulted by Poltrot de Merey (or Mere) before Orleans on 18 February I563.1 He succumbed six days later, on 24 February, to the attentions of his surgeons, whose lethal ministrations are horribly retailed by the Spanish ambassador, Chantonnay.2 On that fatal day, Guise had gone to inspect his camp in the suburb called Portereau from which his forces were sapping and mining the stronghold of Orleans, occupied for the past year by the protestant confederates of the prince de Conde. The capture of this city, then considered imminent, would have been the fourth military episode of the first French civil war.3 But, instead of the expected collapse of Orleans and the continuation of war, France was rocked by the unexpected death of Guise which effectively interrupted hostilities.4 The causes and consequences of the murder of the due de Guise have received very little attention.5 While this seminal event remains a partial mystery, it still throws a great deal of light upon the French civil wars which were, from the start, of European significance. Indeed, this murder is of fundamental importance if we are to understand both the origins and the nature of the civil wars, as well as their duration. The episode is also a supreme illustration of the manner in which the ideological conflict poisoned the relations of the nobility, who were already sufficiently inclined to aggressive rivalries. During this period, the ictga of assassination as an instrument of policy deeply permeated the political ethos. While it is difficult to ascertain who actually began the dreadful ding-dong of murder plots and assaults in France, it would be reasonably safe to assume that this occurred around the time of the tumult of Amboise, which broke in March i56o.6 The conspiracy itself, 1

Cimber et Danjou, Archives curieuses de fhistoire de France depuis Louis Xljusqu'a Louis XVIII (27 vols., Paris, 1834-48), serie i, v, Relation de la blessure et de la mort du due de Guise, 1676°. 2 Louis Icr prince de Conde, Mtmoires (6 vols., London, 1743 edn), n, 135, 23 Feb. 1563. 8 The others were the siege of Bourges, Sept. 1562; the siege of Rouen, Oct. 1562 and the battle ofDreux, 19 Dec. 1562. 4 Calendar of state papers foreign, 1563, pp. 163-5, 2^ Feb. 1563, occurrences in France. 5 Alphonse de Ruble, Vassassinat de Francois due de Guise (Paris, 1897) is the only work on this subject. 6 On the tumult of Amboise see N. M. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition (New Haven, London, 1980), chap. HI.

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directed against the persecuting government of the Guises, was not a murder plot. But, having failed, it was very brutally and bloodily suppressed. Thus, in the absence of any appropriate procedures, there were obviously those who entertained the only apparent means of overthrowing that detested regime. Certainly the earliest murderous reports date from the end of 1559 when the tumult was in preparation. On 16 May 1560, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton informed Queen Elizabeth that there were six men who planned to kill the due de Guise out hunting. Hunting accidents were not too difficult to engineer and were therefore a favoured device for the removal of enemies. One of the six, however, revealed the plot, and the others fled.7 It was also about this time that the admiral Coligny - who was not implicated at Amboise - is said by Brantome to have warned madame de Guise of a plot against her husband's life.8 On the other hand, the Guises had lost no time at all in publicly blaming the prince de Conde for what they called that 'abominable treason', and Throckmorton had also reported on 29 March that the prince was 'greatly suspected and watched'. The Histoire ecclesiastique went further and alleged that the Guises had advised the king to kill the prince.9 Government therefore had been dangerously challenged; law and order had but a tenuous hold, and who had been first in the attempt to murder their adversary was already uncertain. Similar reports rapidly multiplied. While some were presumably false, and others true, they are all evidence of fear and hatred, and of an attitude of mind which could certainly carry such thoughts to fruition. This was manifestly apparent by the end of 1560, long before the civil wars began. Fran£ois due de Guise had been one of the principal persons in France since the beginning of the reign of Henry II, his cousin and youthful companion, although the enemies of his house of Lorraine purported to despise them as foreigners. It is true that the duchepairie of Guise dated only from 1527, erected to reward the duke's father, Claude, for his military services to the crown. But Francois' mother, Antoinette, was a Bourbon princess and, in 1548, he was superbly married to Anne d'Este, daughter of the duke of Ferrara by Renee de France, herself a daughter of Louis XII. The Guises had mostly dominated the council of Henry II, but they had done so as a fraternity and it is impossible to distinguish the duke's political role from that of the cardinal of Lorraine; his military services, however, were paramount. The contemporary author, Brantome, remarked that Guise was a blessed commander whose campaigns were ever attended by good fortune, unlike those of his foremost adversary, Gaspard de Coligny, admiral of France. As the captor of the Imperial bishopric 7

P. Forbes, Afull viei^ of the public transactions in the reign of Queen Elizabeth (2 vols., London, 1740-1), i, 464, 22 May 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth; Jules Delaborde, Gaspard de Coligny amiral de France (3 vols., Paris, 1870^82), i, 450. 8 Pierre de Brantome, Oeuvres completes, ed. Ludovic Lalanne (i i vols., Paris, 1864-82), iv, 253, 290. 9 Conde, Mlmoires, i, 347-52, 31 Mar. 1559/60, lettre du roi sur la conjuration d'Amboise; CSPF, 1559-60, p. 488, 29 Mar. 1560, Throckmorton to Elizabeth; G. Baum and E. Cunitz, eds., Histoire eccUsiastique des Eglises rtformtes du royaume de France (3 vols., Paris, 1883-9), !» 3°9-

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of Metz in 1552, the general of the last Italian wars, the redeemer of the traumatic Spanish victory of Saint-Quentin in 1557 and, crowning glory, the conqueror of Calais, held by England since 1347, Guise was widely exalted as a military hero. Together with his virtues of character, these achievements largely account for his almost universal popularity. He was held to be courteous, affable and frank, and merciful and chivalrous in war; in short the very prototype of military valour. Brantome goes so far as to claim that he had no equal, being 'tres universel en tout'. This, no doubt, is hyperbolical, since it was not the high nobility in France who represented the supreme renaissance ideal of Thomme universel'. Guise was a plainer man than that, and the Venetian, Michiel, is doubtless nearer the truth in describing him more simply as predominantly a soldier, and most highly esteemed (' grandemente laudato'). Few, however, would have quarrelled with Brantome's description, 'le grand ducde Guise'.10 This apparently unblemished personal reputation seems puzzlingly contradictory in view of the notorious unpopularity of'the Guises', and the virulent hatred which they incurred at least from the death of Henry II in 1559, when the crown lost control of the affairs of France. But it should be noted that 'the Guises' are invariably described collectively, and it is interesting to speculate upon the possible role of the duke, had he not been overshadowed by Lorraine, with his papal orientation and his ecclesiastical wealth and patronage. While it would be difficult to locate contemporary documents specifically disparaging the duke, alone and individually, one could quickly collect a substantial dossier against 'the Guises', revealing the mingled admiration and loathing inspired by the incontestably brilliant cardinal, whom even the Spanish disliked and distrusted. In fact all the hatred of the house of Guise, and all the condemnation of their inordinate, avaricious ambition - allegedly detected and prophetically proclaimed on his deathbed by the discerning Francis I11 - appears to have been concentrated on Lorraine, the family's political genius. There was nothing whatever in the duke's devoutly magnanimous deathbed conduct though the surviving account is not necessarily true - to associate him either with the harsh and sinister Guisard image, or with 'Guisard' policy as it materialized with significantly unbroken continuity until the death of Lorraine in 1574. In particular, far from having enjoined his relatives to avenge his death and their own grievance, Guise is said to have requested the pardon of his assassin, as he himself forgave him.12 Yet the fatal vendetta against the house of Chatillon, maliciously erected upon his murder, did far more to ruin the kingdom than the simple antipathy of catholics and Calvinists could ever have effected. Brantome avowed that Lorraine had sought to press the duke further than he really wished to go, meaning, presumably, in the prosecution of extreme 10 Brantome, Oeuvres, iv, 187, 244, 319; N. Tommaseo, Relations des ambassadeurs Venetiens sur les affaires de France au XVle siecle (2 vols., Paris, 1836), I, 440. 11 H. Forneron, Les dues de Guise et leur epoque (2 vols., Paris, 1877), i, 78. 12 Cimber et Danjou, serie i, v, Relation, 177-8, 190-7.

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political Catholicism.13 It was Lorraine and not Guise who had tried to arrest the Bourbon prince de Conde after the conspiracy of Amboise in March 1560, and the Venetian, Suriano, informed the doge and senate that in the brief reign of Francis II it was Lorraine alone who had governed, and that Catherine de Medici greatly esteemed the duke.14 Even the Spaniard, Chantonnay, reported in December 1560 that Guise appeared to concede Catherine's right to the regency for Charles IX, but that Lorraine lamented the family loss of power and influence.15 It is possible, therefore, that Catherine, who steadily refused to disgrace the Guises,16 may have distinguished between them, and one must at least consider whether the services of the duke, without the 'practices' of the cardinal, might not have been more acceptable and manageable. However this may be, at the time of his death Catherine gratuitously expressed her admiration for Guise in a private letter to her sister-in-law, the duchess of Savoy. This may, however, simply have reflected her intense fear of a protestant victory in the first civil war because she believed it would precipitate a Spanish invasion.17 One might, in fact, have expected Lorraine to be the assassin's first target. Certainly the Venetian, Michiel, while extolling the cardinal's remarkable qualities and accomplishments, sombrely recorded that nothing in the kingdom was more greatly desired than his death.18 But it happend that Lorraine was absent at the council of Trent, and it was the duke who would capture Orleans and obviate the renewed religious toleration which any peace treaty must necessarily contain.19 In 1563 Guise still enjoyed, to a great extent, his personal and military reputation. Both had, if anything, recently been enhanced by his spectacular victory at the battle of Dreux in December 1562 and his irreproachable treatment of the captured prince de Conde. Nevertheless, impelled as he was by Lorraine and the irresistible force of events, the duke's public image was subtly changing. The national hero of the Franco-Hapsburg ('Italian') wars had become, in April 1561, titular leader of the 'Triumvirate', and he could not serve for long as the military executive of this extreme political, ultramontane, pro-Spanish junta, without attracting his share of the odium. Thus the combination of the duke's public position and personal worth may help to explain on the one hand why he was assassinated and, on the other, why this was received with such widespread grief and horror.20 13

Brantome, Oeuvres, iv, 228. Eugenic Alberi, Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti (15 vols., Florence, 1839-63), sine i, iv, 143. 15 Archive documental Espanol, Negociaciones con Francia, 1559-1566 (9 vols., Madrid, Real Academia de la Historia, 1950-4), i, 493-6, 3 Feb. 1560, Chantonnay to Philip II. 18 H. de La Ferriere, ed., Catherine de Medicis, Lettres, vols. i-iv (Paris, 1880-95), *> 5^6, 3 Mar. 1561, Catherine to Limoges; 177, 27 Mar. 1561, Catherine to Limoges, 'j'aysurce.. .point insiste infiniment'; N. M. Sutherland, The French secretaries of state in the age of Catherine de Medici (London, 1962), pp. 113-18. 17 La Ferriere, Lettres, i, 517, 25 Feb. 1563, Catherine to the duchess of Savoy. 18 Tommaseo, Relations, i, 436-9. 19 The Calvinists had obtained a measure of supervised toleration by the edict of January 1562. 20 Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale, MSS Italien, 1722, fo. 689, 27 Feb. 1563; 1724, fo. 105, 2 Mar. 1563; Conde, Memoires, n, 137, 2 Feb. 1563; CSPF, 1563, p. 164, 26 Feb. 1563, occurrences in France; Sutherland, The French secretaries, pp. 134-5. 14

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The circumstances of the duke's death at the hands of Poltrot, a native of Aubeterre in Angouleme, are fairly well attested: accounts vary only in minor details.21 The deed done, Poltrot panicked. He lost his way in the night, failing to escape from the district. He laid low all the next day but ended by confessing his guilt to soldiers who arrested him upon suspicion.22 Poltrot appears to have been brought before the queen mother and members of the council at the camp Saint-Hilaire near Saint-Mesmin on 21 February. There he made a long deposition which fairly obviously intermingled truth with falsehood.23 He alleged in this evidence that he had gone to Orleans in the service of Jean de Parthenay-Larcheveque, sieur de Soubise, about June or July 1562 when the civil war began. There he claims to have been approached by the seigneur de Feuquieres, gouverneur of Roye in Picardy, and by one, captain Brion, who had since been killed. According to Poltrot, Feuquieres and Brion sought to lure him into a ' bonne entreprise' in the service of God and the king, and to the relief of the people. Without revealing what they had in mind, Poltrot said that they referred him to the admiral Coligny. Here follows the climax of the deposition: Poltrot maintained that a few days later he had a private interview with Coligny. After sounding him out, the admiral requested him to go to the enemy camp and kill the due de Guise, as a great service to God, the king and the 'republique'. Poltrot declined so grave an undertaking, and Coligny simply enjoined him to silence, without pressing the matter further. Poltrot maintained that he then departed with Soubise to Lyons. There he remained, until about Christmas 1562, when Soubise is said to have sent him to Orleans at the request of Coligny, to whom he delivered a packet of letters at the village of 'Selles in Berry. Poltrot then claimed to have waited in Orleans upon Coligny's orders, and to have had a second interview in which Coligny reverted to his proposition of the previous summer. While he was again excusing himself, Poltrot asserted, less plausibly, that Theordore de Beze and another Calvinist minister arrived. They urged upon him, with pious exhortations, the merit of such a service. So, the deposition states, he allowed himself to be persuaded. After having committed himself, Poltrot alleged that he began to learn of a wider plot. 'Chatillon', as the admiral Coligny is styled throughout the deposition, is said to have told Poltrot that he was not alone in 'de telles entreprises', and that there were more than fifty gentlemen who had promised to execute ' other similar undertakings'. Coligny, he said, then gave him twenty ecus - a paltry sum - to go to the duke's camp and conspire to kill him. Accordingly, the deposition continues, Poltrot went to the camp, where he succeeded in entering the service of the duke, whom he followed to Blois. But 21

Cimber et Danjou, strie i, v, Relation, 167-97. A reward was immediately offered for the assassin's arrest. Cimber et Danjou, strie I, v, Relation, 168-70, gives 1,000 crowns for the 'author' of the crime; CSPF, 1563, p. 163, 26 Feb. 1563, occurrences in France, gives 2,000 for his identification, 10,000 for his life and 30,000 for his arrest; MSS Italien, 1722, fo. 687, 24 Feb. 1563. 23 CSPF, 1563, p. 163, 26 Feb. 1563, occurrences in France; Cimber et Danjou, striei, v, Relation, 168; Delaborde, Coligny, n, 225; de Ruble, L'assassinat, pp. 56ff. 22

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a few days later he returned to Coligny at Orleans, and again offered his excuses on the grounds that Guise was habitually well accompanied. Coligny and de Beze are then said to have pressed him, and Coligny to have given him a further payment of 100 ecus. This was in order to purchase a better horse, upon which to secure his escape. So, once again, Poltrot returned to the catholic camp to lay his plans. After having acquired a 'cheval d'Espagne', he went and lodged for a few days at the 'chateau de Cornell',24 two or three leagues from the camp Saint-Hilaire, apparently in some uncertainty of mind. But, when he saw that Guise was pressing the city really hard, Poltrot became concerned for the safety of some of those within, and so resolved to execute his promise. It was that same day, therefore, 18 February, that he followed Guise to Portereau and lay in wait for him. Poltrot was questioned by Catherine de Medici as to who else was involved. He replied that no one else had approached him, but he believed La Rochefoucault to have been informed, since it was he who had welcomed him when he arrived at Villefranche near the village of Selles. Asked if Conde were implicated, Poltrot replied that he believed not. He also exculpated Coligny's brother Francois d'Andelot, and Soubise who had told him that this was no way to proceed (qu'il nefalloit allerpar tel moyen). Poltrot then warned Catherine of the hostility of Coligny and his followers since the protestant defeat at Dreux in December 1562 because, he said, they claimed that she had betrayed her promises made to them before Paris. The meaning of this passage is not clear: it is impossible to tell what was meant by 'promises'. 'Before Paris',25 can only refer to the dangerous crisis of March 1562, when Conde and Guise were simultaneously in arms in Paris. On 15 March, Catherine de Medici had left her chateau of Montceaux for Fontainebleau, whence she wrote Conde four short letters between 16 and 31 March I562.26 These letters, which are derived from copies and may not be complete or accurate, were later published in the Empire in support of a claim that the protestants had taken up arms upon Catherine's orders. In the form in which they survive, none of these letters will bear that interpretation. Conde, in any case, was already in arms by that time. The letters are, however, somewhat ambiguous. This is neither surprising nor abnormal, since Catherine's French was nothing if not idiosyncratically obscure. Her own explanation 27 was that she had begged the prince de Conde to evacuate Paris - which he did, on 22 March. She knew full well that it was useless to hope for such compliance from the due de Guise, who had already contumaciously ignored her recent summons to Montceaux. The origin of the rumour that Conde had taken up arms and seized towns upon the queen's orders - when 24

This was possibly Cormeilles in the Eure. It is interesting to note that Coligny also used this expression 'before Paris' in his reply to Poltrot's deposition. Du Bouchet, Preuves de rhistoire de nilustre maison de Coligny (Paris, 166-2), p. 25

527

28'

La Ferriere, Lettres, I, 281-5, dates them between 16 and 26 Mar. This is an error, since two of them were clearly written between 27 and 31 Mar; ibid. 290-3, 10 Apr. 1562, Catherine to Chatillon. This is not the admiral but his brother, Cardinal Chatillon. 27 La Ferriere, Lettres, i, 282, n. i.

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all their correspondence and papers discuss only the renunciation of arms and the evacuation of Paris - is unclear, but its dissemination made Catherine furiously angry.28 Completing the whole supposed 'complot', Poltrot further declared in his deposition that there were persons, both at court and in the camp, planted by Coligny to perform 'other similar deeds',29 but he did not know who else, besides the duke, it was intended to dispose of. He had only heard, in a general sense, that when Guise was dead, other commanders who succeeded him could expect a similar fate, as well as six or seven unnamed chevaliers of the Order of Saint Michel. This Order was known to have been packed by the Guises. Finally, Poltrot volunteered that the Guisard Louis de Bourbon, due de Montpensier, and the seigneur de Sansac were particularly hated. On the following day, 22 February, the deposition was read out to Poltrot, who signed every page of it. According to one of the various rumours reported by Sir Thomas Smith, Poltrot had wished to deliver his country from misery, ' whereof Guise is the chief cause', and there were forty30 more conspirators who sought to 'despatch the cardinal of Ferrara [papal legate and a kinsman of the Guises], and one or two others who are the occasion of there being no accord '.31 Thus, although there were deeper causes, intermingled with the origins of the civil war, possibly a more immediate explanation of the murder of the duke was the protestant desire for peace, which the catholic leaders would certainly not have signed after the fall - which was confidently expected - of Orleans. Indeed, Guise was blamed for the breakdown of peace negotiations back in December 1562, before the battle of Dreux. His intransigence was believed to substantiate Conde's claim to have 'certain proof that the duke intended his destruction, and that of his party.32 Conversely, it was believed that the death of Guise would open the way to some accord. This did, indeed, prove to be true, at least ephemerally.33 28 La Ferriere, Lettres, I, 290-3, 10 Apr. 1562, Catherine to Chatillon; 293-6, u Apr. 1562, Catherine to Limoges. According to Santa Croce, this damaging claim was made in a packet containing Conde's first declaration of 8 Apr. 1562, received by the parlement of Paris on 17 Apr. The declaration itself made no such claim. Conde, Memoires, m, 222-32, 8 Apr. 1562, Declaration faicte par Monsieur le Prince de Conde; Cimber et Danjou, sine I, vi, Lettres de Prosper de Sainte-Croix a cardinal Borromte, 89, 17 Apr. 1562. This remains a controversial matter, and the documentation relating to the outbreak of the first civil war has never been analysed. 29 The Venetian ambassador reported that the huguenots expected other, similar events (altri effeti simili). This may have been either camp gossip or his version of Poltrot's own statement. A. H. Layard, Despatches of Michele Suriano and Marc'Antonio Barbara, Venetian ambassadors at the Court of France, 1560-1563 (Lymington, The Huguenot Society of London, 1891), p. cv. 30 The deposition says fifty conspirators. 31 CSPF, 1563, p. 163, 21 Feb. 1563, occurrences in France. The duke's brother, the cardinal of Guise, and the nuncio, Santa Croce, would have qualified in this category, as well as the Spanish ambassador, Chantonnay. 32 This was a reference to the terms of the so-called 'treaty' of the Triumvirate. N. M. Sutherland, The massacre ofSt Bartholomew and the European conflict 1559-1572 (London, 1973), pp. 347-50; CSPF, 1562, p. 534, 2 Dec. 1562, articles [of peace] sent by the prince; ibid. 1563, p. 142, 17 Feb. 1562, Smith to the privy council; 163-4, 26 Feb. ^63, occurrences in France; Forbes, n, 263, 5 Jan. 1563, d'Andelot to Elizabeth; Delaborde, Coligny, n, 1996°. 33 MSS Italien, 1725, fos. io6v-io7, 2 Mar. 1563; 1724, fo. 4, 8 Mar. 1563.

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A copy of Pol trot's deposition was sent to the admiral at Caen where he was fighting in Normandy, according to his biographer, Jules Delaborde.34 But, another account which, to judge from the timing of its receipt, may be more accurate, stated that the deposition was circulated amongst Coligny's forces by La Valette.35 He was seeking to disrupt the protestant army and to bribe the German cavalry to reverse their allegiance.36 One or other report must be true since Coligny hastily prepared a reply, dated 12 March.37 In this reply he categorically denied any complicity in the murder of the duke, and anxiously entreated that Poltrot should be physically guarded, and spared intimidation until a full investigation could be made. Coligny inevitably saw in the deposition the villainy of his mortal enemies, pointing out that he was described throughout as the seigneur de Chatillon, whereas he was never thus styled except by those who claimed to demote him from his rank and office (de Festal et degre qui lui appartient). The inference was that Poltrot had been suborned into making a false confession. It seems more likely, however, that he was induced to co-operate from fear of torture and death. Coligny, in his reply, denied ever having met Poltrot before he delivered the letters from Soubise at jSelles in December 1562, an incident he confirmed. Thus he had never requested Poltrot's services at Orleans the previous summer. Although, Coligny said, Soubise had asked him to send Poltrot straight back to Lyons, he gave him leave to go to Orleans where he claimed to have business. Coligny went on to deny the allegation that he had instigated the crime. He admitted, however, to having had information before the war, as well as more recently, of plans to kill the duke. Far from having initiated or approved them, however, he had actively thwarted them, and had sent a warning to madame de Guise. But, after the massacre of Vassy (in which the due de Guise was held to have been responsible for the death of a number of protestants at worship on i March 1562) and the subsequent (not consequent) assumption of arms, Coligny had regarded the Guises as enemies of the king and the kingdom. He had then heard that Guise and the marshal Saint-Andre (both members of the Triumvirate) had hired assassins to kill the prince de Conde, as well as his own brother d'Andelot - information which he communicated to the queen ' before Paris'. As a result, Coligny had desisted from active dissuasion of anyone who spoke of killing the duke.38 But he solemnly swore that he had neither positively 34

Delaborde, Coligny, n, 227ff. La Valette was the father of the better-known due d'Epernon, favourite of Henry III. 38 Conde, Mtmoires, iv, 285-303; Du Bouchet, Preuves, p. 522. It was feared that Coligny might march on Paris. 37 Du Bouchet, Preuves, pp. 523-35, gives the date in error as 22 Mar. 1562/3. It should be 12 Mar., the date of Coligny's covering letter to Catherine de Medici. Conde, Memoires, iv, 303. Coligny's reply was also signed by La Rochefoucault and Theodore de Beze. 38 Du Bouchet, Preuves, pp. 521-2, 527, 590; Delaborde, Coligny, n, 229, 232-3; Brantome, Oeuvres, iv, 253, 290. In a letter of 29 Dec. 1559, Killigrew and Jones reported to Cecil rather vague rumours of a plot to murder Guise and Lorraine (Forbes, i, 292). In his letter to Catherine of 27 Mar. 1562, Coligny claimed to have heard that Guise threatened him: 'me menace fort', but there may have been other letters. Bibliotheque Nationale, MSS fran^ais, 20461, fos. 217-217v, original. 36

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sought nor prompted such a thing, whether directly or indirectly, by word, promises or money. Coligny did, however, confirm the statement that he had, about the end of January 1563, employed Poltrot upon the advice of Feuquieres, and given him twenty ecus to spy upon the duke's camp. Coligny added that had he himself harboured nefarious intentions against the duke's person, he would not have placed himself in the hands of Poltrot. This is a trenchant argument since Poltrot, so far as we can tell, possessed neither ability nor resolution. Doubtless the only reason why Coligny employed him at all was because he had previous experience as a spy in Picardy. Furthermore, he was small and dark and had been in Spain as a youth. He might, it was said, pass as a Spaniard. In fact Coligny claims to have thought him suspect because, ever a braggart, Poltrot protested that it was easy to gain admittance to the duke's camp. In the same document, Theodore de Beze, who was also inculpated in the deposition, declared that after the massacre of Vassy there had been many who desired to kill the duke. He, however, had never advocated anything against him except through the normal course of justice, which he had demanded of the queen mother at Montceaux.39 Since that time war had intervened, in which ordinary right and justice no longer applied. De Beze therefore admitted to having prayed that God would either induce in the duke a change of heart, or otherwise deliver the kingdom. But he had neither spoken of Guise in public, nor ever met Poltrot.40 Coligny further claimed that he had already departed for Normandy when Poltrot first returned from spying on the catholic camp. He thereby denied the last of the three alleged interviews at Orleans, and the second supposedly involving de Beze. It was d'Andelot who received Poltrot's report and sent him on to his brother, Coligny, at Neufville. There, at Neufville, Poltrot told Coligny that he had entered the 'duke's service, which Coligny believed. D'Andelot, like Coligny, also suspected Poltrot and for this reason had ordered the seigneur de Traves to accompany him. But, presumably because he had access to Guise, Coligny still thought Poltrot could be useful. So he gave him 100 ecus with which to procure a better mount and support himself while obtaining further information. Coligny then conceded that, upon this occasion at Neufville, Poltrot had ventured to assert that it would be easy to kill the duke. This, in Coligny's answer, is the first mention of assassination being raised between them. Coligny's comment was that he had neither taken the matter seriously, nor ever incited Poltrot thereto. Finally, in his long answer to the deposition, Coligny denied any general hostility towards the queen, from whose service he would never be deflected, and begged that Poltrot be safely protected in order to ensure the indispensable confrontation without which he could never be acquitted. At the same time, he impugned the parlement of Paris, and other inimical judges. In his covering 39 40

Catherine was at Montceaux from 7 to 15 Mar. 1562. Du Bouchet, Preuves, p. 527 [12] Mar. 1562/3.

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letter to Catherine of the same date, 12 March 1563, Coligny declared with injudicious candour that, although he was entirely innocent, he nevertheless regarded the duke's death as the greatest benefit which could have befallen the kingdom, God's church and, in particular, his whole house.41 The day after signing his deposition, on 23 February 1563, Poltrot was taken to Paris and imprisoned in the Conciergerie. There he underwent several further interrogations before his torture and death on 18 March. This would appear to be significantly soon after his retraction, on 15 March, of his first deposition which incriminated Coligny. De Ruble maintained that Poltrot expected Francois de Montmorency, son of the constable and gouverneur of Paris, to extricate him in return for exculpating his cousin, the admiral - an unconvincing argument. According to the circumstances, and the treatment he received, Poltrot altered his statements several times and, although they may contain the truth, as evidence they are vitiated and contradictory.42 There is no other, external evidence from which the truth of this tangled matter can be scholastically verified. But the primary accounts, Poltrot's first deposition and Coligny's reply and his letter to Catherine of 12 March agree in certain important respects. It therefore seems reasonable to accept that Poltrot did see Feuquieres at Orleans - whether in the summer of 1562, or the following winter - and that, upon Feuquieres' advice, Coligny did employ Poltrot as a spy in January 1563. But Poltrot's first, private interview with Coligny at Orleans in the summer of 1562 and the second interview with Coligny, de Beze and another unnamed pastor in December 1562 do not ring true. Nor can one reasonably reject Coligny's statement that if he had, indeed, plotted the duke's death as alleged in the deposition, he would not have employed Poltrot for the purpose. Furthermore - though he did not make the point - for such a perilous service he would have expected to offer a commensurate reward. Coligny's statement is also plausible that Poltrot himself subsequently spoke of the matter at Neufville. Poltrot, since he incontestably performed the deed, obviously had it in mind, and Coligny had no interest in fabricating that point. On the contrary, since he admitted having then given Poltrot enough money for a horse - if not for a bribe43 - this information was, to say the least, gratuitous. Indeed, Coligny's supporters reproved him for the indiscretion, to which he replied that it might be embarrassing if it later appeared that he had been less than frank. 44 If, therefore, one postulates that it was unlikely to have been Coligny who instigated the murder of the due de Guise, one must necessarily consider why else Poltrot should have performed the deed; and what, furthermore, was the significance of his other 'general plot' allegations. An answer to the first of these questions - why did Poltrot perform the 41

Du Bouchet, Preuves, pp. 521-2; Conde, Mtmoires, iv, 303. De Ruble, L'assassinat, pp. 69-72, 76-7, 89; Delaborde, Coligny, 11, 234-5. 43 CSPF, 1563, p. 163, 21 Feb. 1563, occurrences in France. One of the current allegations was that Coligny had hired Poltrot for 300 crowns to murder the duke. 44 Delaborde, Coligny, n, 231-2. 42

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deed? - may be found in the memoirs of Soubise. It is of the disconcertingly simple variety all too often disregarded by historians in search of sophisticated arguments; but there is no reason to reject it. Soubise recorded that he had been a close friend of La Renaudie, leader of the conspiracy of Amboise, and that Pol trot was one of La Renaudie's kinsmen. The precise relationship is not stated. Poltrot is also said to have been a kinsman of someone else, unnamed, who was captured at Amboise and killed in prison. Furthermore, he had served as a page to Francois Bouchard, seigneur de Saint-Martin de la Coudre. Bouchard's son, David, was the senechal of Angouleme and his brother Gui was the - protestant - bishop of Perigueux; Bouchard was also a brother-in-law of Soubise.45 As a rich friend of La Renaudie, Bouchard had led a contingent of Perigourdins to the tumult of Amboise, in which he and Poltrot were both captured. It is not clear how Poltrot escaped. Bouchard, however, was pardoned, although his property was sequestered by the Guises in favour of their adherent, the marshal Saint-Andre. Bouchard is alleged to have returned to Geneva where he had already spent a year before 1560. According to Brantome, he resorted to making buttons. He came back to France after the edict of January 1562, and is said to have incited Poltrot to murder the due de Guise who refused to recognize that edict. Whether or not the incitement is true, it is clear that Poltrot was closely connected with the Perigourdin leadership of the conspiracy of Amboise. It was comprised of protestants, at least some of whom had Genevan connexions, who also had personal quarrels with the Guises. La Renaudie himself had only recently returned to France from a long exile in Switzerland as the result of an unsuccessful law case46 when his brother-in-law, Gaspard de Heu, seigneur du Buy, an echevin of Metz and an agent of the king of Navarre, was judicially murdered in September I558.47 For this La Renaudie had apparently sworn to be revenged and had subsequently perished in the tumult of Amboise. The testimony of Soubise is therefore perfectly acceptable - that Poltrot had maintained ever since that he would be revenged (il avail toujours este en resolution (Ten venger lui et sa patrie), and frequently boasted that he would kill the due de Guise. But as Poltrot was young and voluble, his declarations were ignored as bravado.48 In his final confession, made between bouts of torture, immediately before his death on 18 March, Poltrot incriminated Soubise. Soubise was then said to have proposed to Coligny, about a year before, that Poltrot - one of his own 45

Bouchard's sister, Antoinette, married Soubise on 3 May 1553. Bulletin de la Societe historique et archeologique du Perigord, xiv (1887), 420-5; E. Haag, La France Protestante (i o vols., Paris, 1846-59), second edn, incomplete (6 vols., Paris, 1877-88), Francois Bouchard, 2nd edn, and Poltrot, ist edn. 46 Henri Naef, La conjuration d'Amboise (Memoires et documents de la Societe d'histoire et archeologie de Geneve, xxxii, Geneva, 1922), pp. 3546°. 47 N. M. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, p. 69 n. 14. 48 Jules Bonnet, ed., Memoires de la vie de Jean de Parthenay-Larcheveque, sieur de Soubise (Paris, 1879), pp. 36ff., 71-3. See also Henri Naef, 'Justice pour La Renaudie', Bulletin de la Societe de rHistoire du Protestantisme Franc,ais, avril-juin (1971), p. 302.

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company of light horse - should murder Guise, but Coligny would not hear of this until after the battle of Dreux in December 1562. This conflicts with Pol trot's earlier statement that Soubise had told him 'qu'il ne falloit aller par tel moyen'. It may be noted, however, that Soubise had motives strictly comparable to those of Poltrot himself. It is much more likely that the instigation came from this largely ruined Perigourdin milieu, than from Coligny who lost far more than he gained by the death of the due de Guise. The evidence against Soubise was, however, taken under torture, and is therefore tainted. Nevertheless, the timing of'about a year before' is interesting. It corresponds to the point, in March 1562, when Coligny claimed to have heard of Guisard plans to murder both Conde and d'Andelot, as well as himself.49 If the memoirs of Soubise are correct, Poltrot had entertained the idea of the murder for three whole years. During this time he was rather unlikely to have had any suitable opportunity, until the duke was on the verge of capturing Orleans. Those were circumstances in which he could easily reassure himself as to the virtue of the deed, since his kinsmen, colleagues, and co-religionists were in imminent and mortal danger. Such a murder could, after all, be represented as an act of war like any other. That Guise was murdered in time of war explains why, in partisan denial of Coligny's urgent request for a confrontation, the parlement of Paris had Poltrot hastily - and horribly executed on 18 March I563.50 Coligny had already impugned the parlement and other inimical judges, and this was just one day before the peace of Amboise, on 19 March, would automatically have amnestied all the crimes of war. The fact that the same principle should equally have protected Coligny was steadfastly ignored by the Guises, while Coligny, for his part, was concerned to establish his innocence. Any claim to the benefit of amnesty would have been publicly interpreted as an admission of guilt. The further' general plot' allegations, attributed to Coligny in the deposition, could have been inserted by Poltrot as a means of playing for time. Time was certainly of the essence, since the peace negotiations were well advanced. Such allegations might also be held to lessen the enormity of his personal offence. On the other hand, Poltrot's evidence cannot really be regarded as carefully calculated. He may well have been unaware of the state of negotiations, and he was probably too frightened to be clever. Such plots and plottings were, however, just the sort of bombastic talk he might have overheard in protestant circles, or even from Feuquieres. His acquaintance with Poltrot was explicitly confirmed by Coligny, who admitted to having employed Poltrot upon Feuquieres' advice. It is also plausible that Poltrot was truthful in alleging that Feuquieres approached him on the subject of murder - whether in the summer of 1562 or early in 1563. Indeed, by way of encouragement, Feuquieres could easily have gone so far as to insinuate that Coligny would not be unfavourable; for in a certain sense that was true. 49 50

De Ruble, Uassassinat, pp. 77-8; Layard, Despatches, pp. cxi-xcii, 23 Mar. 1563. Conde, Mtmoires, iv, 309-10, 18 Mar. 1563, arret du parlement.

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Nothing can be firmly concluded from these general allegations. There was, nevertheless, rather a lot of smoke, and the more specific evidence of the ambassadors would seem to confirm the existence of some greater fire than Poltrot's smouldering grievance. Sir Thomas Smith, the English ambassador, who was at Blois, returned a journal of'occurrences' written over several days, in which he recorded that 'not four days before' the assassination of the duke, the cardinal of Bourbon, Conde's eldest brother, had sent to warn the due de Guise that his life was in danger. The next day - which can only have been either 15, 16 or 17 February - there was a rumour in the court that Conde, a prisoner of war, would have escaped from prison ' that night' had it not been for Damville's vigilance, ' whereof divers of his keepers are hung' (sic).51 In Smith's account, these two factors, namely an assault upon Guise and the escape of Conde, are not specifically related to each other; but in others they are. Writing on 23 February, the nuncio Santa Croce, who was also at Blois, said that Conde planned to flee the night that Guise was assaulted (18 February), but that he was betrayed to Damville by the soldiers he had bribed. The day before, Santa Croce went on, Conde had enquired of his brother the cardinal de Bourbon, whether the due de Guise were not injured. Bourbon replied that he was not, whereupon Conde observed that he soon would be.52 The Spanish ambassador, Chantonnay, wrote from Vendome on 2 7 February. He reported that for two weeks past - thus from about 14 or 15 February, dates which fit well enough with Smith's evidence - Conde had been enquiring whether Guise were not dead or wounded. Santa Croce had only said wounded. Consequently the cardinal de Bourbon, Chantonnay continued, had sent the duke a warning. The Venetian, Barbaro, also said that on the day of the assault a warning letter had arrived from Monluc in Guyenne, but all of no avail.53 The timing of these reports is arresting. After Poltrot had received the 100 ecus, and bought his Spanish horse, he claimed in the first deposition to have lodged 'for a few days' at the chateau of'Cornell', two or three leagues from the catholic camp. There he procrastinated until he saw that the duke was closing in on Orleans, which was expected to fall within twenty-four hours. Since the combined evidence of the ambassadors cannot lightly be dismissed, it poses an interesting problem. If they are to be believed, then we are either faced with the startling coincidence of Poltrot's movements and Conde's enquiries, or else with the presumption that Conde was aware of Poltrot's intentions. When questioned about his vaguer allegations, Poltrot had said that he did not believe Conde to be involved. Conde, however, was a prisoner, and Coligny and d'Andelot both thought Poltrot unreliable. If, in fact, he was acting as an instrument of the nobility, it need not necessarily follow that he was well informed of their affairs. The tenor of the deposition would support the interpretation that Poltrot was under Guisard pressure, not only to 51 CSPF, 1563, p. 163, 26 Feb. 1563, occurrences in France. Damville was a son of the constable Montmorency. 52 Sainte-Croix, Lettres, p. 124, 23 Feb. 1563; Layard, Despatches, pp. civ-cv, 2 Mar. 1563. 53 Conde, Memoires, n, 137, 27 Feb. 1563; Layard, Despatches, pp. civ-cv, 2 Mar. 1563.

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incriminate Coligny, but also to exculpate Conde. He did, however, implicate La Rochfoucault, albeit for the slender reason that he had come to meet him at Villefranche near feelles. Apart from religion and politics, there was a simple link between La Rochefoucault and Conde: they were brothers-in-law. There was also a link between La Rochefoucault and Feuquieres: the former was comte de Roye in Picardy, and the latter was gouverneur of Roye. Conde himself was gouverneur of Picardy, married to Eleanore de Roye and the owner of extensive property in the province. Feuquieres (a man whose advice was valued by Coligny) cannot have been a stranger to Conde. It is undisputed that Poltrot was the duke's assassin, for which he had his own personal and provincial reasons. If Feuquieres did indeed meet Poltrot and believed that he would perform the deed for his own satisfaction, without any mention of pecuniary reward, this could have been a godsend since the 'service' was perilous indeed, and could have been dearly sold. Since Guise was imminently about to capture Orleans, Poltrot's admitted procrastination, and over a neriod of several days, could sufficiently account for Conde's impatient enquiries, from about 14 or 15 February, as to whether the duke were not killed or wounded. One is therefore bound to consider whether the prince de Conde, La Rochefoucault and their associates had not been planning what Poltrot finally performed; for we must either accept that Conde was, at the least, informed of the duke's impending murder, or else reject the evidence of three ambassadors. The key to the remaining mystery may well lie in the role of Feuquieres, about whom insufficient is known.54 He would have prompted Poltrot in the service of Conde, rather than of Coligny. The several possibilities are certainly not well defined. Poltrot may have murdered the duke of his own volition, with Conde, like Coligny, a well-contented onlooker. Alternatively, Poltrot could have been used, through the agency of Feuquieres, to execute what Conde and La Rochefoucault had themselves been planning. Having his own, well-established, motivation clearly made him a convenient instrument for cynical exploitation. Thirdly, Poltrot could have performed, coincidentally, what Conde and La Rochefoucault were 'otherwise' expecting.55 If Poltrot was a man who harboured grievances against the Guises, so also was Conde - and on a truly princely scale. Posterity has never known for certain whether he had played any part in the conspiracy of Amboise; nothing has been proved against him. But his papers were ransacked in the chdteau and, in order to evade arrest, he was obliged to make good an ignominious escape. Thereafter he had joined his brother at the court of Navarre in Nerac, remaining in the south during the troubled summer of 1560, suspected by the Guises of planning a general rebellion. The events of that summer are still obscure. Both Conde and Navarre cautiously absented themselves from the assembly of notables at Fontainebleau in August 1560, but they could not so 54

I am grateful to Dr Joan M. Davies for having investigated Feuquieres in Paris. De Ruble concluded that Conde intended in some way to profit from the murder to escape that night, but the mechanics of this are not apparent. De Ruble, L'assassinat, p. 88. 55

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easily refuse to attend the estates general later in the year.66 Upon their arrival at Orleans, in October 1560, Conde was immediately arrested. He was condemned to death for llst-majeste and heresy after the mere travesty of a trial. This was a preposterous outrage against a prince of the blood. His reprieve was as dramatic as it was unexpected due to no less an event than the sudden death of Francis II. The change of regime not only resulted in a partial eclipse of the Guises, but naturally also left them alarmingly compromised, in spite of their dastardly efforts to blame the deceased king. Here, then, was an offence which no prince could possibly digest, and no one doubted Conde's inability to do so. But this was not all. By the terms of the so-called 'treaty' of the Triumvirate, formed in April 1561 about two or three weeks after Conde's return to the council - and perhaps even partly for that reason - the Guises and their associates had sworn, among other things, to exterminate the house of Bourbon.57 The king of Navarre had been their initial target, but he had since perished at the siege of Rouen in October 1562. There is ample evidence that the existence of the Triumvirate was known to Conde who, considering the magnitude of his previous wrongs, was unlikely to discount its declared purpose as theatrically improbable.58 Now, in 1563, albeit in different circumstances, he was once again a prisoner and must necessarily have feared for his life. Furthermore, Guise seemed about to capture Orleans, and it was generally accepted that he would sabotage either the conclusion or, failing that, the implementation of peace. Indeed, according to Francois de La Noue, an excellent source, they believed that he intended to carry the sword throughout protestant France. Extermination of the protestants is what the^ had been preparing for at the end of 1560, when they were thwarted by the death of Francis II and the rehabilitation of Conde and Navarre, Certainly, in 1563, Guise had no interest in making peace, although for a while he had allowed it to be hoped that he might agree, because his army was in need of a rest.59 The Guises had evidently prepared their tactics in case a peace were to be concluded, since Catherine's determination was notoriously formidable. Smith reported on 17 February 1563 that there was a council in Paris, kept by the cardinal of Guise (the duke's brother), the nuncio Santa Croce, the cardinal legate of Ferrara and the Spanish ambassador. They are said to have resolved that in case of peace, they, the Parisians and the catholics would reject it, unless the pope allowed it. This was inconceivable. In this case, they would 'declare the Duke of Guise to be the protector of the Roman and Catholic Church. So by that means he will remain Lieutenant, and continue in arms, and be aided in money by the Pope and such as profess the Popish religion.'60 All this, also, was strictly in accord with previous 58

Space precludes a full account of the reasons. '.. .d'effacer entierement le nom de la famille et race des Bourbons', printed in Sutherland, The massacre of St Bartholomew, p. 349. 58 The 'treaty' appears among Conde's papers, and he is alleged to have published it in Apr. 1562. Conde, Mtmoires, in, 209-13. 59 F. E. Sutcliffe, ed., La Noue, discours politiques et militaries (Geneva, 1967), p. 607. 80 CSPF, 1563, p. 142, 17 Feb. 1563, Smith to the privy council. 57

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Triumvirate policy, and corroborates the opinion of La Noue. But, whether in war or in peace, Lorraine was said to have been constructing a catholic league at Trent, for which, after the battle of Dreux, Guise was the designated leader. This also is supported by the 'treaty' of the Triumvirate in which, the preamble says, the' choses premierement accordees' were' mises en deliberation a 1'entree du.. .concile de Trente'.61 It is therefore abundantly clear that there existed a dual stream of revenge and pre-emptive hatred which converged upon the due de Guise: that of the protestant gentry who survived the conspiracy of Amboise, and that of the huguenot nobility who became, with the Bourbons, targets of the Triumvirate. Thus, although it has never been alleged that Conde might have been implicated in the death of the due de Guise - whether directly or indirectly, in effect or potentially - it can hardly be said that he lacked sufficient motives for desiring it. As it transpired, the deed was performed by Poltrot, who could not have had personal access to Conde while he was a prisoner. So, according to the content of Poltrot's deposition, it was possible for the Guises to fix the guilt on Coligny. It is doubtful if anyone believed this: the juridical (if not the moral) case against him was derisory; nor has posterity been inclined to believe it. But nobody really had to believe it for the accusation to be politically damaging. The Guises must have known as much about Conde as their associates Santa Croce and Chantonnay reported, and their reports, together with that of the strongly protestant Sir Thomas Smith, tend to suggest at least a prima facie case against Conde. Further clarification does not seem to be possible. Conde's implication or innocence is of rather more than antiquarian curiosity. If he either were, or were believed to be, guilty of the muder of the duke, then it is as much to this as to Lorraine's pursuit of Triumvirate policy after the first civil war that we must look for an explanation of Conde's own defensive conduct on the one hand, and on the other, of the catholics' treacherous treatment of him from 1563 until he was murdered in 1569. Whatever the Guises really believed to be the truth of the matter, in March 1563 it was most politic to seek to ruin Coligny who, if innocent of positive participation, was undeniably compromised. Coligny was an abler enemy than Conde. Besides, as a prince of the blood, Conde was a personage apart and, like his late brother, Navarre, might yet prove useful as a princely figurehead. As a prisoner of war - albeit not wholly incommunicado since he was employed in the peace negotiations - he was already vulnerable, whereas Coligny was still at liberty, in command of an army in Normandy. So it was that, after the peace of Amboise, in March 1563, the Guises made repeated attempts to seduce and detach Conde from the huguenots - a transmutation for which he must be publicly blameless - while launching against Coligny a murderous vendetta, trumpeting aloud his responsibility for this first, infamous political assassination of the French civil wars. Poltrot's early execution ensured that the case could never be satisfactorily resolved, thereby 81 Louis de Maimbourg, Histoire de la Ligue (Paris, 1684), P- *4> Sutherland, The massacre of St Bartholomew, p. 347.

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permitting the Guises their spurious grievance of a denial of justice. In this they undoubtedly displayed their political acumen. As a prince, Conde's place was at least on the steps of the catholic throne, if not in the catholic Guisard camp, whereas Coligny, though arguably more loyal than any of them, was partially unfitted for royal service by reason of his unswerving Calvinism. The catholics, however, failed to seduce Conde; consequently his days, like those of Coligny, were numbered.62 The murder of the due de Guise in February 1563 therefore represented a paradoxical catastrophe, simultaneously facilitating the immediate conclusion of peace - which necessarily involved a degree of religious toleration - while ensuring the subsequent renewal of war; hence, perhaps, the disconsolate fury of Catherine de Medici at this irretrievably botched solution.63 Assassination had, unhappily, become implicit in public moturs, whose degeneration was gravely deplored by the more dispassionate of contemporaries. In so sinister an atmosphere of fear and rumour, there were bound to be those with itching resentments and nothing to lose, who confidently anticipated for audacious deeds both mundane and celestial rewards. The death of Guise proved to be the first of a grisly succession of comparable crimes which terminated the lives of Conde, Coligny, Henri due de Guise, his uncle the cardinal of Guise, Henry III and Henry IV of France. Coligny's brothers d'Andelot and the cardinal Chatillon may also have been murdered. The wonder was less that Guise should have perished at Orleans, than that Coligny should have survived for so long.

62 Conde was murdered as a prisoner of war after the battle of Jarnac in Mar. 1569. Coligny perished in the massacre of St Bartholomew in Aug. 1572. 63 MSS Italien, 1724, fo. 4, 8 Mar. 1563.

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9 THE ROLE OF COLIGNY IN THE FRENCH CIVIL WARS Gaspard de Coligny, admiral of France, was the principal victim of the massacre of St. Bartholomew in August 1572. It is therefore pertinent to ask, why did he have to die ? This question may be answered in two ways. The massacre was an event of European importance, and one could answer by saying that Coligny had to die because he was an enemy of Spain and of international Catholicism. But, as the opening salvo of the fourth civil war, it was also a domestic episode, and one could equally well answer by saying that Coligny had to die because he was an enemy of the house of Guise. This must not, of course, be taken to mean that the Guises were responsible for the massacre, which was far more complex than that. There is no contradiction in this apparent dichotomy since, apart from ambassadors, nuncios and other envoys, the Guises — in particular Lorraine — were the principal agents of Spain and international Catholicism in France. But there were also other, more personal and domestic, reasons for the enmity between the Guises and Coligny and, by answering the question in this way one may stress the internal, domestic aspects, both of the massacre and of Coligny'-s role in the three civil wars which preceded it. The enmity between the Guises and Coligny, which dated from the reign of Henry II, became centred in what I have called the Guise-Chatillon vendetta from the time of the murder of Francois due de Guise at Orleans on 18 February 1563, for which his family publicly blamed the admiral. It is therefore necessary to examine how this vendetta arose, and how it affected Coligny's role in the civil wars. It should, however, be emphasised that this is to isolate one aspect of a complex story. In doing so two important points emerge : firstly the extreme weakness of the crown, and secondly the predominantly defensive role of Coligny, who has frequently been depicted as a rebel commander. As the vendetta was fabricated by the Guises in order to

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blame the admiral for the murder of the duke, during the first civil war, the explanation must be sought among the origins of the war itself. Not the least important of these was the rivalry of the nobility. A personal and military rivalry between Guise and Coligny is clearly apparent at least from the Spanish victory at Saint-Quentin in Picardy in 1557. Coligny was captured (as well as his uncle, the constable, Anne due de Montmorency) and became a protestant in prison, while Guise was recalled from campaign in Italy and proceeded, among other victories, to recover Calais from the English. But the first serious and open confrontation between Guise and Coligny was at the assemblee des notables at Fontainebleau in August 1560, at which Coligny publicly presented two petitions on behalf of the Calvinists (1). This nascent cleavage deepened during 1561 when Catherine de Medici, as regent in all but name for the young Charles IX, restored Coligny to the council, previously dominated by the Guises (2). After the failure of the colloqae of Poissy, September-October 1561, Coligny was among those who wrere instrumental in obtaining the edict of January 1562, by which the Calvinists were formally recognised and granted limited toleration (3). Finding themselves reduced in power from the inception of the regency in December 1560, and assuming a stance of opposition, in April 1561 the Guises formed an extreme catholic cabal, known as the Triumvirate, which looked to Spain for support (4). The three triumvirs were Guise himself, the constable Montmorency, and the marshal SaintAndre, but they were always supported by others, in particular Lorraine, the inspiration of the catholic extremists. The Triumvirate was initially directed against the supposedly protestant King of Navarre, the rest of the house of Bourbon Ole nom de la famille et race des Bourbons'), and (1) LALOURCE et DUVAL, Recueil de pieces originates et authentiques, concernant la tenue des Etats Generaux, 9 vol. (1789), I, 66-76, recit de ce qui s'est passe a 1'assemblee de Fontainebleau au mois d'aout 1560 ; Memoires de Conde, 6 vol. (ed. 1743), II, 645-8 ; J. DELABORDE, Gaspard de Coligny amiral de France, 3 vol. (1879-82), I, 463. (2) N.M. SUTHERLAND, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, and the European Conflict 1559-1572 (1973), 14 n. 4. (3) A. FONTANON, Les Edits et ordonnances des rois de France, 4 vol. (1611), IV, 267-9, 17 January 1562. (4) MICHAUD et POUJOULAT, Nouvelle collection des memoires pour servir a I'histoire de France, serie I, vol. VI, Memoires-journaux de Frangois due de Guise, 464-5 ; SUTHERLAND, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 11, n° 1, 347-50.

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all French Calvinists, whose extirpation it decreed (5). It was as a result of their efforts, combined with the emissaries of Spain and the pope, that Coligny and his brothers, Francois d'Andelot and Odet cardinal de Chatillon were forced to quit the council in February 1562, immediately before the crisis in March which led to the first civil wrar (6). This eviction of Coligny from the council — which Catherine sought to camouilage by dispersing the court and ordering everyone to their charges — proved to be an important precedent. In the ensuing crisis Coligny therefore joined the prince de Conde in arms (7) — to both of whom the purposes of the Triumvirate appear to have been known (8) — and Coligny and the due de Guise entered the first civil as opposing leaders. Thus, on the national level the struggle was, to a great extent, personalised by the faction leaders and centred in this enmity between Guises and Bourbons which, after the first civil war and the murder of the due de Guise, was extended to Coligny in the form of the vendetta. Guise was assaulted on 18 February 1563 by an obscure Angoumois, Poltrot de Merey. Poltrot was arrested and, on 21 February, made a long deposition — later retracted — in which he incriminated Coligny and hinted at the implication of La Rochefoucauld, Conde's brother-in-law. A copy of this deposition reached Coligny in the field in Normandy and, on 12 March, he hastily prepared a reply. In this he categorically denied any complicity in the murder of the duke, requested that Poltrot should be carefully guarded pending a full confrontation, and impugned the parlement of Paris, held to be Guisard, and other inimical judges. At the same time he injudiciously declared to Catherine his satisfaction at the duke's death, as the grea(5) Navarre was seduced by the Triumvirate. E. PASQUIER, Litres historiques (Ed. D. Thickett, 1966), 95 ; Prosper de SAINTE-GROIX, Lettres adressees au cardinal Borromee, in GIMBER et DANJOU, Archives curieuses, serie I, (1885), VI, 46-9, 13 March 1562 ; DELABORDE, Coligny, II, 23-4. (6) SAINTE-CROIX, Lettres, 39, 22 February 1562 ; Archive documental Espagnol, Negociaciones con Francia, 1559-1566, 9 vol. (1950-4), III, 382, 28 February 1562, Chantonnay to Philip II ; Hyppolite d'EsxE, Negociations ou lettres d'affaires ecclesiastiqu.es et politiques ecrites au pape Pie IV (ed. 1658), 101-2, 3 March 1562, Ferrara to Borromeo. (7) 27 March 1562, Coligny to Catherine. DELABORDE, Coligny, II, 48-50. (8) This is a complex matter but it is notable that the "treaty" appears among Conde's papers. Conde, Memoires, III, 209-13. He is alleged to (have published it in April 1562.

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test benefit which couM have befallen the kingdom, God's church, and his whole house. This was partly because he had received warnings of plots against his own life and those of his brother d'Andelot and the prince de Conde (9). Disregarding the admiral's demand, and thereby precluding his disculpation, the parlement hastily executed Poltrot on 18 March, one day before the peace of Amboise, by which the crimes of war were amnestied. That the same principle should have applied to Coligny was ignored by the Guises, and Coligny himself was more anxious to establish his innocence. Any claim to the benefit of amnesty would have been interpreted as an admission of guilt. The case was therefore ready made, or some would say tailor-made by the parlement for the Guises to blame Coligny for the murder of the duke. If no one ever seriously believed him guilty, no one had to for the accusation to be damaging, and from it stemmed the GuiseChatillon vendetta which thenceforth crippled and largely dominated the internal affairs of France for some nine years, until the death of Coligny in the massacre. Much had been altered by the war, the death of the duke de Guise in February and the return of peace in March 1563. The catholics had implacably opposed the strenuous efforts of Catherine to make peace, in which she was assisted by the captivity of Montmorency on the one side, and Conde on the other. In the event of her succeeding, Guise was allegedly to have remained in arms as the lieutenant of the pope (10). But, since Guise was dead, the catholic problem — largely shouldered by Lorraine — was how to proceed with triumvirate policy ? Initially, therefore, the vendetta was the means by which, in lieu of war, they sought to sabotage the peace. To disrupt the 'peace' — any peace — was much easier and much cheaper than to wage a war — which involved the reluctant crown — and so this became a standard catholic procedure. In order to disrupt the peace it was essential to ruin 1,9) DELABORDE, Coligny, II, 220-35; CIMBER et DANJOU, Archives ciirieuses, serie I, vol. V, 167-93. Relation de la blessure et de la inort du due de Guise ; CONDE, Memoires, IV, 285 seq. ; 303, 12 March 1563, Coligny to Catherine. (10) Calendar of State Papers Foreign, 1563, p. 142, 17 February 1562/63, Smith to the privy council ; Edmond CABIE, Ambassade en Espagne de Jean Ebrard de Saint-Sulpice, 1562-1565 (1903), 112-13, 31 January 1563, Saint-Sulpice to Catherine ; 114, 5 February 1563, secret letter of Saint-Sulpice to Charles IX and Catherine ; 115-16, 25 February 1563, Saint-Sulpice to Catherine.

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Coligny with whom Catherine and the king might otherwise have succeeded in imposing it. Not only was Coligny a far more redoubtable enemy than the prince de Conde but, as first prince of the blood, Conde was a personage apart. The catholics intended to seduce him, if they could, just as they had seduced his dead brother, Navarre, both in order to dispose of the authority of his rank and, correspondingly, to deprive the huguenots of this advantage. Thus, while Conde must remain blameless, it was essential to have something more than his now legalised Calvinism to level against Coligny, some fresh pretext — however specious — for remaining in arms, for threatening his life, and for continuing to exclude him from court and council, which it was indispensable for Lorraine and the catholics to dominate. Indeed, according to the parlementaire Pasquier, this exclusion of Coligny from the council was the principal purpose of the vendetta (11). If Coligny's life had, in a general sense, been in danger since his emergence as a protestant leader and the formation of triumvirate policy in 1561, it was far more specifically and continually threatened after the inception of the vendetta, and in spite of successive edicts of pacification in 1563, 1568 and 1570. Indeed, he was never to be safe again, and his danger was notorious. Already on 12 March 1563, the English ambassador Sir Thomas Smith recorded his anxiety for Coligny 'with Aumale [the late duke's brother] and the Ciiiisians so great about the queen mother making such a brute to ron upon the admiral!' (12). Furthermore, they threatened him in arms when he sought for the first time to return to the court in May 1563, and repeatedly demanded justice against him in the parlement, which Coligny had already impugned (13). On 16 May 1563 the king evoked the matter to himself and forbade either party to offend the other (14). (11) Bref discours de tout ce qui a este negotie pour la querelle entre les maisons de Guyse et de Chatillon (1564), attributed to E. Pasquier by D. Thickett. (12) Dr. FORBES, A Full View of the Public Transactions in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, 2 vol. (1740-1), II, 358, 12 March 1503, Smith to Elizabeth. (13) C.S.P.F., 1563, p. 344, 17 May 1563, Middlemore to Cecil; Bibliotheque Rationale, mss. italien, 1724, ff. 56-8, 15 May 1563 ; Bref discours ; DELABORDE, Coligny, II, 263-5. (14) B. N., mss. frangais, 3193, ff. 51-2, 16 May 1563, arret du conseil, printed in Du BOUCHET, Preuves de I'histoire de I'illustre maison de Coligny (1662), 537.

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Coligny remained at home at Chatillon during the summer of 1563, in which Le Havre was recaptured from the English who had occupied it during the war. Thereafter, seeing the queen in extremity as the result of a heavy fall from her horse, the Guises went in force to Meulan planning, if she died, to seize the young king and, contemptuously ignoring his evocation, although he was now declared of age, they again demanded justice in the parlement (15). The king repeated his evocation, referring the matter to the council. Only then, according to his own evidence, did Coligny permit his followers to assemble. This was evidently necessary since, in October, he complained of a warning that Aumale had despatched two gentlemen to kill him (16). The following month the Guises sent a substantial force to prevent Coligny from returning to court near Fontainebleau. Upon this occasion he called their bluff and, well accompanied, went to Paris about 90 November and resumed his place in the council where, according to Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, he was in great danger (17). The Guises withdrew, but impugned the jurisdiction of the council in criminal cases, whereupon Coligny counter-petitioned for the evocation to stand. Faced with this deadlock, on 5 January 1564, the king suspended the matter for three years, or during pleasure, and licensed both parties to depart (18). The situation was therefore hardly reassuring, more especially as the resourceful Lorraine was about to return from the council of Trent. Coligny withdrew some ten days before his arrival on 29 January (19). The possible implications of this brief return to court of Coligny had vexed and alarmed all catholic extremists, who were determined to ensure his future exclusion (20). Thus the struggle, which focused upon the Guise-Chatillon ven(15) B. N., mss. italien, 1724, ff. 143 verso, 30 September 1563 ; f. 145, 30 September 1563 ; Bref discours, 13-14. (16) B. N., mss. fr. 20461, f. 61, 8 October 1563, Coligny to Charles IX ; DELABORDE, Coligny, II, 295 seq. (17) C.S. P.F., 1563, p. 600, 26 November 1563, Throckmorton toElizabeth. (18) Archive documental Espagnol, Francia, VI, 27-9, 5 January 1564, extraits des registres du conseil prive ; 32, 8 et 10 January 1564* Chantonnay says the decision was taken on 4 January ; B. N., mss. italien, 1724, f. 189, 29 December 1563 ; ff. 192-3, 12 January 1564. (19) Archivo documental Espagnol, Francia, VI, 73, 23 January 1564, Chantonnay to Philip II. Coligny had gone to Chatillon four days before. (20) One might call this two months, the longest Coligny ever spent at court after ihis expulsion in February 1562.

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delta, became greatly intensified in France, where Lorraine immediately strove to reassert his control of the council, an endeavour in which he was both skilful and favoured by circumstances. It was also marked by an increasing internationalism, the catholics sustained by the Papacy and Spain, and the huguenots looking first to the Netherlands and, albeit in rather different ways, beyond them to England and Germany. Whether or not there were formal hostilities, from this time on there was to be no real peace and still less, for the huguenots, security. On the contrary, there were plentiful rumours of Spanish and catholic 'practices', that the court was bent upon subjecting the huguenots to the papists, and that Philip II and the house of Guise would serve this turn. Before she embarked on the great itinerary of the court round France, during 1564-6, Catherine was warned that Chantonnay, the Spanish ambassador, and his brother Granvelle, Philip's minister in the Netherlands, w7ould seek to re-ignite the civil wars. Certainly the vendetta in no wise abated while she was away, and hostilities were indeed narrowly averted. 'De jour a aultre,' the catholic Simon Renard wrote on 6 October 1564 to the duchess of Parma in the Netherlands, Vaccroist 1'inimitie et partiality par les practiques que meynent ceulx de la maison de Guise pour venger la mort du feu seg de Guise, pour reinpetrer le credit qu'ilz ont eu par le passe... [et] procurer leur ruyne par vengeance publique et criminelle' (21). The following January, 1565, Lorraine openly clashed with Francois due de Montmorency, goiwerneur of Paris, who challenged the cardinal's alleged right to enter the city in arms, and resisted his progress. The situation became so dangerous that Coligny. actually went to his cousin's support, and France came very close to the renewed civil war that all extreme catholics then desired (22). This went not only for the French, but also for the Spanish, of which Catherine received ample evidence at Bayonne where the courts of France and Spain held a spectacular meeting in June 1565. Even before the meeting, the duke of Alva who, to Catherine's regret represented Philip II, had rudely informed the French ambassador, Saint-Sulpice, of the folly of imagining that France could 'parvenir' and remedy the 'maux et (21) Bulletin de la Societe de rHistoire du Protestantisme Francais, XXXVI (1887), 640. (22) CABIE, Ambassade en Espagne, 344-5, 4 February 1565, SaintEtienne to Saint-Sulpice.

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perils qui nous environnaient de tons cotes,' without Spain (23). At the meeting itself,Alva found Catherine as unreceptive as usual to the argument that she should employ force to eliminate protestantism. Alva therefore turned to the catholic leaders who surrounded Catherine, no prominent protestants being there, and prepared to act in concert with them. According to Alva himself the idea was formulated of concentrating upon the removal or, in other words, the 'elimination' of five or six of the huguenot leaders (24). This proved to be a turning point in the story of the primarily personal and domestic vendetta, which thereafter gradually merged into a wider, international catholic policy to eliminate the principal huguenot leaders, of whom Conde, as a Bourbon, had already been endangered by the Triumvirate. This 'elimination' idea itself was not new, but it now assumed a new impetus. A month later, in July, Lorraine revealed to Granvelle an association of the Guises, the due de Montpensier and others to support Catholicism, seeking Philip's participation (25). While the connection between these intrigues is not established, it is difficult to believe that none existed, since all the extreme French catholics followed Lorraine. In view of all that had happened since the peace of Amboise in March 1563, including, during the summer of 1564, a strenuous effort to detach Conde from the protestants (26) it is not surprising that they should have sought to strengthen their links with the Netherlands, both personally with the nobility, some of whom were kinsmen, and between the Calvinist churches.These, it must be remembered, were well-organised communities, capable of contingency planning. Only a matter of days after the conclusion of the conference at Bayonne, Granvelle wrote to warn Philip both of the progress of Calvinism in the Netherlands, and of the close and regular correspondence between Montigny, brother of count Home, and his Chatillon cousins in France (27). (23) CABIE, Ambassade en Espagne, 7-9. (24) Charles WEISS, Papiers d'Etat du cardinal de Granvelle, 9 vol. (1841-52), IX, 298, 21 June 1565, Alva to Philip II. (25) GRANVELLE, Papiers d'Etat, IX, 399-403, 15 July 1565, Granvelle to Philip II. (26) GRANVELLE, Papiers d'Etat, VIII. 126-7, 6 July 1564, occurrents in France ; SUTHERLAND, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 50, and n° 5. ( 2 7 ) GRANVELLE, Papiers d'Etat, IX, 404, 18 July 1565, Granvelle to Philip II.

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The settlement of the vendetta was therefore critically urgent for the peace and security of the kingdom since, more than ever before, Coligny was regarded as a dangerous enemy of Spain, and the mounting power of Lorraine endangered the crown of France. The returning court reached Moulins in January 1566, where the king was particularly vulnerable because he was seriously ill. The events of Moulins clearly indicate Lorraine's grip on the destiny of France, and the importance to him of the vendetta. On 29 January Charles IX sought to terminate the vendetta by a simple arret in council declaring Coligny's innocence of the murder of Guise (28). But Lorraine had already contumaciously declared that he would honour no adverse verdict, and that his brother, Aumale, would seek the admiral's life, a statement which came very close to a declaration of war against the huguenots, and in total disregard for the authority of the crown (29). Nor were these idle threats. In March during a resounding row in the council with the chancellor, de L'Hospital, over the interpretation of the edict of Amboise, Lorraine explicitly admitted that he sought to ruin the protestants (30). In May and June there followed reports of a 'secret practice' to kill, the admiral, his brother d'Andelot — who had narrowly escaped an ambush in January — and La Rochefoucauld, by a 'great concourse of people'. 'Conde also complained of persons lying in wait for his life (31). Not only therefore was the vendetta rather invigorated than terminated, but Lorraine and the French catholics had clearly adopted the 'elimination' policy outlined by Alva to Philij^JI at the time of the Bayonne conference. This had the advantage that it could be indifferently pursued in either peace or war. In these circumstances it is not surprising that disturbances in the Netherlands later in 1566, followed by the appointment of Alva as military governor, should have had

(28) Archives de Chantilly, papiers de Conde, serie K, IV, fol. 134, s. d., contemporary copy of the arret; B. X., mss. fr. 3193, fol. 31, 31 January 1566, Coligny to the duchess of Ferrara. (29) B. X., mss. fr. 3193, ff. 52 verso-57 verso, ce qui se passa a Moulins. (30) B.X., mss. fr. 3951, ff. 100 verso-107 verso, 15 March 1565. (31) C.S.P.F., 1566-8, p. 9, 23 January 1566, Smith to Leicester; 70, 21 May 1566, Sir Thomas Hoby to Cecil ; 82-3, 24 May-8 June 1566, Hoby to Leicester and Cecif; B. X., mss. italien, 1726, ff. 19 verso-21 verso, 23 May 1566 ; DESJARDINS, Negotiations, III 525 2 June 1566.

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grave and alarming repercussions in France (32). With his approach along the eastern frontier of France, in the summer of 1567, general consternation rose to crisis point. Thereupon Lorraine augmented his policy of intimidation in France while Alva began to persecute the nobility in the Netherlands. In August 1567 Coligny complained from Chatillon of having 'by secret means deciphered some practice that wholly tended to his confusion' (33). Catholics were said to be 'bragging' that, with the arrival of Spanish forces in the Netherlands, the king would revoke the edict - which Catherine denied (34). Early in September when Alva arrested Egmont, and Coligny's cousin count Home — and exiles were flocking over the frontier — the French court was at Lorraine's house at La Marche, whence he intensified the vendetta. When asked by the queen mother 'whether he would not stand to the arrest (sic. arret) of the Privy Council given for the Admiral's innocency' at Moulins, he haughtily refused, answering 'that if there had been 500 arrests he would never let that pass so unrevenged'. Coligny, 'being advertised,' replied that he 'therefore needed a better guard for his safety and that he doubted not by the help of his friends to make the duke of Guise recoil' (35). These were the circumstances which precipitated, on 26 September 1567, what is known as the entreprise de Meaux, which led to the second civil war. This was a protestant prise d'armes of which, apart from self-defence, the principal purpose was to capture Lorraine and detach him from the court. But because he escaped — by the grace of God and his good Turkish horse — the protestants were saddled with the awful responsibility of having, in effect if not in intention, laid an ambush for the king. This placed them grievously in the wrong and, if possible, enhanced Lorraine's determination to catch and 'eliminate' their leaders, more especially when, in February 1568, he again 'escaped very hard at Rheims' from an assault upon his coach (36). Unable to avert the peace of Longjumeau in March 1568, which reconfirmed that of Amboise, Lorraine once again (32) M. F. NAVARRETE, Coleccion de documentas ineditos para la historia de Espana, IV, 388-96, 31 January 1567, instructions for Alva. (33) C.S.P.F., 1566-8, p. 305, 31 July 1567, Xorris to Leicester. (34) C.S.P.F., 1566-8, p. 327, 23 August 1567, Norris to Elizabeth ; 330, 2 August 1567, Norris to Elizabeth. (35) C.S.P.F., 1566-8, p. 335, 6 September 1567, Charles IX to Elizabeth ; 341, 16 September 1567, advertisements out of France. (36) C.S.P.F., 1566-8, p. 413, 9 February 1568, Norris to Cecil.

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planned to obstruct its implementation and to pursue the vendetta in 'peace' through the policy of 'elimination'. Thus neither war nor peace brought Coligny any respite. Two days after the conclusion of peace, Lorraine held a nocturnal meeting of the most catholic members of the council at which he launched a campaign of harassment. He intended that 'the king' should remain in arms, that the important protestant cities of Orleans, Soissons, La Rochelle and Auxerre should be surprised, and that all fords, bridges and passes were to be controlled. Conde's gouvernement of Picardy was to be taken over by marshal Cosse, and protestants everywhere were to be burdened with 'toutes sortes de charges', and generally 'mal traitez'. All this was in order that 'it would be more easy to work their wills of the principals of the religion'. This conspiracy, however, 'was not so secretly kept as wickedly devised, for by 10 o'clock next day the Cardinal Chatillon had knowledge thereof (37). Lorraine soon returned to this plan in May 1568 when Catherine was grievously ill. In the event of her death, he meant to swoop upon the young king, as well as purging the country of protestants. Meanwhile he held another council at which it was again determined to 'exterminer les chefs de ladite religion de sorte que pour ledict effect certaines personnaiges furent deputez pour chacun d'eulx particulierement, qui furent depeschez de la court, et desquels on a sceu les noms, qui avoyent charge de surprendre et assassiner les chefs de ladicte religion' (38). This projected coup roughly coincided with the outbreak of hostilities in the Netherlands, following the publication in April of the Justification of William of Orange. But the surprise of these leaders, as Lorraine repeatedly discovered, was more easily determined than accomplished. Thus, 'parce quils ne furent trouvez a descouvert, et quilz en eurent advertissement 1'entreprise fut differee'. Besides, Lorraine's attention was diverted to England, on account of the arrival there in May of his niece Mary queen of Scots. Nethertheless, he continued his preparations to try again, and the huguenots remained, as the English said, well fenced. In July and early August 1568 Conde, Coligny, d'Andelot (37) C.S.P.F., 1566-8, p. 346-7, 30 March 1568, Xorris to Cecil; Public Record Office, London, SP/70/105. (38) PRO/SP/70/105.

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and Esternay all complained of assassination attempts against them (39). By then they were already angry and alarmed by the execution in Brussels on 5 June, of Egmont and Home, among many others and, not surprisingly, they began to arm to protect the nobility of both countries. They also went further and concluded a formal treaty of mutual defence and assistance, already mooted in 1567, with William of Orange (40). Lorraine was therefore obliged to act quickly if he were to 'eliminate' the huguenot leaders before the inevitable outbreak of war, whether in the Netherlands when William invaded, or in France. For this intervention he therefore fixed upon 25 August, when everything was allegedly 'bien disposees en Bourgoigne pour faire ladicte execution' (41). But yet again Conde and his colleagues received many warnings and they fled on 23 August, not in arms but writh their families, towards La Rochelle. Jeanne d'Albret also fled from the attentions of Blaise de Monluc in Beam, while Chatillon rapidly crossed to England. Here was another coup manque, and just as William of Orange was about to cross the Netherlands frontier. But, according to the English ambassador Norris, writing a month later, Lorraine did not give up, but continued daily preparations 'for the surprise of the Prince and the Admiral, and others of the nobility' (42). The only alternative to their apprehension was war which, if intrinsically desirable for the extreme catholics, nevertheless presented many and grave difficulties while Catherine de Medici opposed it in France, and Spain was concerned with the revolt in the Netherlands. Its negative outcome, after two years' campaigning, proves the point. Having escaped Lorraine's multiple coup, Conde, Coligny and other huguenot leaders were clearly not intended to survive the third civil war, which their 'elimination' in August or September 1568 should have averted. Conde was the first to fall, murdered as a prisoner after the battle of Jarnac on 13 March 1569 ; d'Andelot also died, at Saintes on 7 May 1569, and may have been murdered. Coligny, however, survived not only (39) C.S.P.F., 1566-8, p. 511, 31 July 1568, affairs in France; 515-16, 7 August 1568, Norris to Elizabeth. (40) Groen VAN PRINSTERER, Archives ou correspondance inedites de la maison d'Orange-Nassau, serie I, 8 vol. ((1835-96), III, 282-6, August 1568, projet d'alliance. (41) PRO/SP/70/105. (42) C.S.P.F., 1566-8, p. 558, 30 September 1568, Norris to Cecil.

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the war itself, but also several attempts upon his Hfe, and a judicial condemnation with a heavy price upon his head (43). It is not surprising that this implacable vendetta against Coligny, merged with the more general catholic policy of 'elimination', should have resulted in a protestant obsession with security, clearly reflected in the treaty of Saint-Germain in August 1570 (44). In the first place there is some evidence for supposing that the disgrace and departure of their mortal enemies, Lorraine and the Guises, may have been a protestant pre-condition of peace, which was only achieved after long, hard bargaining. However this may be, the Guises were disgraced (45) in August 1570 at the time of the treaty of Saint-Germain, the first of the edicts of pacification to grant the protestants strategic places de surete, Montauban, Cognac, La Charite and La Rochelle. Thereafter Coligny remained in La Rochelle for over a year, during which the policy of elimination was fostered from Rome, while the continued bribing of assassins in France confirmed the need for such precautions (46). This need is further illustrated by the circumstances of Coligny's eventual return to court on 12 September 1571. Since the king had failed in his efforts to settle the vendetta before Coligny's arrival, the admiral first extracted a capitulation of eleven articles including separate, individual promises of his safety from Charles, Catherine, Anjou, Alencon and all the nobles and marshals (47). Immediate reactions to Coligny's — reluctant — reappearance at court were as unfavourable as they had been in 1563. Philip II commented menacingly to his ambassador Alava, that the only good reason for summoning Coligny could be to ensure his arrest and execution. 'Ce serait,' he wrote, 'un acte de grand merite et d'honneur'. He doubted, however, if Charles had *le coeur de la faire' (48). Lorraine, for his part, organised a disquieting gathering at Joinville, a Guise town, (43) SUTHERLAND, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, chapter V, passim. (44) FONTANON, Edits et ordonnances, IV, 300-4, 11 August 1570. f45) C.S.P.F., 1569-71, p. 314, 11 August 1570, Norris to Elizabeth. (46) Charles HIRSCHAUER, La Politique de St. Pie V en France, 1566-1572 (1922), 53, n° 2, 119, 24 September 1570, Frangipani to Husticucci ; 132-3 and n° 1, 14 November and 136, 28 November 1570, both from Bramante to Rusticucci. (47) DESJARDINS, Negociations, III, 698-701. (48) P. CHAMPION, Charles IX, la France et le controle de VEspagne, 2 vol. (1939), I, 405, Philip II to Alva.

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:and there were grave religious disturbances in Paris where their influence had always been strong (49). When the court dispersed on 18 October, and Coligny went home to Ghatillon, (50) Charles attempted yet again to .settle the vendetta, summoning the Guises, but without Lorraine. The reassembly of the court, together with Coligny, was then expected in November for the furtherance of the marriage of Navarre and Marguerite de Valois. But, true to their policy of exclusion, the Guises and the catholics were determined that Coligny should not return. Precisely what they did is not clear but, in mid-November, a mysterious crisis erupted which the Englishman Sir Henry Killigrew described as 'some practice' of the catholics who favoured Spain. Among other, more far-reaching things, it was certainly a move against Coligny, to keep him from court at the risk or the 'cost of civil war, and possibly also to murder him if he did venture to return (51). At the same time the Guises occupied the city of Troyes in Champagne with a large gathering, and disorders occurred in Paris on such a scale that the gouverneur Montmorency, entered the city with 4-500 horse. There he reported a great increase in Guise followers, and learnt of a plan to besiege Coligny at Chatillon, where he was unprepared for war. The king himself had heard of some 'brags' of the house of Guise that they would be revenged upon Coligny and evidently extended to him a surely unprecedented offer of royal protection. Coligny's summons was therefore countermanded (52). Thus, after some five weeks at court in September to October 1571, on account of the still highly effective vendetta, he did not again return until 6 June 1572 (53). By February 1572, however, reconciliation of the vendetta had become virtually essential to the crown for the comple(49) DESJARDINS, Negotiations, III, 701, 22 August 1571. (50) C. DOUAIS, Lettres de Charles IX a M. de Fourquevaulx ambassadeur en Espagne, 1565-1572 (1897), 367, 18 October 1571, Charles to Fourquevaulx ; HIRSCHAUER, La Politique de St. Pie V, 173-4, 17 October and 174-5, 26-8 October 1571, both from Frangipani to Rusticucci. (51) C.S.P.F., 1569-71, p. 569, 3 December 1571, Killigrew, advertisements from France. (52) B.N., mss. fr. 3193, f. 25, 13 December 1571, Goligny to Charles IX ; DESJARDINS, Negotiations, III, 737-8, 4 December 1571 ; 740-4, 24 December 1571 ; C. S. P. F., 1569-71, p. 569, 3 December 1571, Killigrew, advertisements from France; 576, 17 December 1571, Killigrew to Burghley ; 582-3, 30 December 1571, advertisements from Walsingham. (53) A. THEINER, Annales Ectiesiastici, 3 vol. (1856), I, 338-9, 9 June 1572, Frangipani to cardinal di Como.

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tion of the Bourbon marriage, between Marguerite and Henry of Navarre, and for the pursuit of a proposed enterprise in the Netherlands, in which the king was involved and for which Coligny's participation was necessary. This was not possible unless he could and would return to court. Yet another effort was therefore made in mid-February, when Guise and Coligny were to be ordered to embrace one another (abbracciare insieme) (54). A certain captain Gryllye was sent to Coligny to negotiate this improbable event and, on 27 March, Charles confirmed the arret of Moulins declaring Coligny's innocence of the murder of Guise. As might be expected these hopes were disappointed. But one, Nancay, tried again in May when the young due de Guise — then aged twenty-one — consented (55). It is not clear how this ostensible reconciliation was achieved, after so many failures, and it presents an interesting problem. Guise was a child of twelve at the time of his father's death, and the vendetta so far as we know had been pursued by his uncles Lorraine and Aumale, and by his mother, since 1565 the duchess of Nemours. Others of the house of Guise — presumably Aumale and the duchess — are said to have rejected this settlement, allegedly because Lorraine was still excluded from court. But in May 1572 Lorraine had gone to Rome upon the death of the pope, Pius V ; here, perhaps, lies the explanation. The young duke can scarcely have known Coligny, who anyway belonged to his father's generation, and he may very well have wanted to go to court which he had had little or no opportunity to attend since he was grown up. The absence of Lorraine in Rome — which conveniently glossed over his continued disgrace — could have facilitated the duke's condescension. This placed him creditably in the right, while his mother and Aumale obtained the best of both worlds having been readmitted to court while reserving the principle of the unresolved vendetta. Thus the great vendetta which, for nine years since March 1563, had bedevilled Coligny and the affairs of France, was arrested rather llhan terminated. But this, coinciding with the absence of Lorraine, served a temporary purpose by permitting Coligny to return to court without any imme(54) DESJARDINS, Negotiations, III, 749, 14 February 1572. (55) C.S.P.F., 1572-4, J). 49, February H572, occurents from France ; DELABORDE, Coligny, III, 380 ; B. N., mss. fr. 3188, f. 27, 5 May 1572, Xangay to Boucihage ; BESJARDINS, Negotiations, III, 771, 28 April 1572.

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diate threat of armed intervention. It did not, however, permit him to return in even moderate safety, as was generally recognised, since the vendetta had been absorbed into the wider, catholic policy of 'elimination', to which one must look for an explanation of his ultimate death in the massacre of 24 August 1572, and consequently the end of his role in the civil wars.

10 THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW AND THE PROBLEM OF SPAIN The meaning of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew has long exercised historians and bedevilled the history of sixteenth-century France. Why should it have been more significant than any other massacre, and what was it all about? It is important to understand, in the first place, that the 'Massacre' comprised not one event, but three. The first of these was the abortive attack, in the streets of Paris, upon the admiral of France, Gaspard de Coligny, seigneur de Chatillon, on Friday morning 22 August 1572. The second was the further assault during the night of Saturday 23-4 August upon Coligny and his principal adherents which was followed or accompanied by the massacre in the popular sense. This last was the only respect in which it might be called a religious outrage of catholics against protestants. It was not, therefore, primarily a religious incident, although Paris had long been fiercely catholic and can hardly have forgotten the protestants' siege of 1567. In my book, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559-1572 (London, 1973), I have reached a conclusion which is well-based, if not definitive: the decision, apparently taken on the Saturday night, 23 August, to 'eliminate' Coligny and the protestant leaders, was a collective, pre-emptive act of war — civil war — on the part of the royal family and some members of the council. This desperate expedient reflected their very great danger, on account of the furious huguenot reaction to the assault upon the admiral the day before. We are therefore back with the initial assault upon Coligny and the central problem of the Massacre: why did the admiral have to die, and why did he have to die then? There is no scholastically acceptable evidence to solve the mystery of the assault in its conspiratorial details. Apart from the satisfaction of curiosity, this is not very important, because the general answer emerges clearly enough: Coligny was an enemy of Spain, also of international Catholicism as a politico-religious movement which, in 1571-2 at least, was more actively promoted from Rome than from Madrid. The reason why Coligny had to die just then, having contrived to evade or otherwise survive all previous attempts to dispatch him — and there had been many since 1562 — was because he had command of an impending invasion of the Netherlands. Indeed he

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actually had royal permission to depart in the week beginning 25 August. That was the day before the duke of Alva, Spanish governor of the Netherlands, left Brussels to march towards the French frontier against a mixed force of French and Flemish exiles already occupying Mons. Coligny's permission clearly involved the king — who granted it - although his only support, in this respect, was that of the huguenots themselves. One way, therefore, of describing the second and fortuitous stage of the Massacre episode would be as the 'elimination' of those who were about to invade Hainault in support of the revolt of the Netherlands, and therefore about to make war upon Spain. But although everyone involved — or who may have been involved, since the list varies slightly in different accounts — was opposed to foreign war, their opinions were too different, not to say disparate, to have acted together for this reason. The reason, as already stated, was a belief in their common danger at the hands of the enraged huguenots. The more extreme were supporters of Spain, and of political Catholicism in its aggressive, international sense. The failure of the initial assault upon Coligny accommodated them by extending his liability to his principal followers. While hostility to all the huguenot leaders was nothing new, upon that occasion the admiral alone had been singled out, perhaps precisely because of the perilous circumstances in crowded Paris. The more moderate opposed foreign war because they held the political circumstances to be inauspicious. Some also went further, raising financial, military, and even patriotic objections. This disparity and confusion, exemplified in the circumstances of the Massacre, illustrates the predicament of the crown and the fragmentation of policy which arose from the sectional divisions of the civil wars and lasted until 1598. Consequently, in relation to foreign affairs, one can never accurately refer to 'France', but only to particular French interests, which were conflicting and mutually exclusive. Thus, whether one considers the Massacre as a domestic episode and turning point in the French civil wars, or as an international, European incident — and it was both — the common element and central theme was Spain, and the admiral Coligny was the key figure. The Spanish and catholic (both Papal and French) pressures upon the internal affairs of France, and the individuals concerned in them, in turn affected foreign relations and the fundamental, long-term Franco-Spanish rivalry - itself one aspect of the wider European struggle against the domination of Spain. Both internal and external affairs were immensely complicated after 1559 by the struggle for the survival of protestantism — in different forms — hence the politico-religious conflict of the sixteenth

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century, of which the Massacre was symptomatic. It is therefore necessary to examine more closely this 'problem of Spain' and the several attitudes of those who desired or feared the war with Spain which, before 24 August, appeared inevitable, but which whatever else it may also have done — the Massacre averted. The consequences were tragic for all but the extremists involved in the 'elimination' episode, for whom the renewal of civil war was not unwelcome. After the division of the empire of Charles V, 1555-6, the Franco-Hapsburg rivalry, which had long found expression in the Italian wars, became a predominantly Franco-Spanish rivalry. Latterly, these wars had also been pursued on the borders of the Netherlands, and in northern France, where Coligny, then gouverneur of Picardy, Was captured at Saint-Quentin in 1557. It was during his imprisonment in Ghent that he became a Calvinist. After the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559, the focus of political attention shifted from Italy to the Netherlands, whose troubled affairs rapidly began to affect Franco-Spanish relations — theoretically restored to amity by the treaty — on account of the growth of Calvinism. In Philip's explicit estimation, it posed an alarming political threat to the stability of the Netherlands. Thus it was largely Calvinism in France that frustrated the Franco-Spanish detente, primarily caused or permitted the interference of Spain in the internal affairs of France, and increasingly rendered those of the Netherlands the touchstone of Franco-Spanish relations. Coligny had distinguished relatives in the brothers count Home and Montigny, and it was mainly to deflect the huguenots' attention from the Netherlands that Philip II persistently contested their inclusion in the council — in particular the Chatillon brothers. He was also diversely instrumental both in provoking civil war in France and in thwarting the objectives of peace. For this purpose, he adamantly opposed the edicts of pacification which terminated the first three civil wars. However, civil disturbance in France became less clearly advantageous to Philip II once the Netherlands were in combustion, and after the beginning of the assault by Alva (who arrived in August 1567) upon the nobility as a class. Of this, the execution of Egmont and Home in June 1568 has long been regarded as symbolic. Alva's assault upon the nobility necessarily connected the Netherlands' cause - no matter how different in domestic origin and ultimate aspiration - to that of the huguenots. They, too, were threatened in their persons and property and, down through the ranks of society, suffered continual persecution from the agents of Rome and Madrid and other catholics in France. This was in spite of the toleration clauses of the successive

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edicts of pacification, which the crown was disastrously incapable of enforcing. The nature and extent of the links between the cause of the huguenots — whether that of the noblesse as a class, or the establishment of religious liberties — and the cause, or mingled causes of 'rebels and heretics' in the Netherlands, is a very large subject. But their fusion, at least on the leadership level, is sufficiently demonstrated by the formal treaty of mutual assistance concluded between William of Orange and the huguenot leaders, Coligny and the prince de Conde, in August 1568. That was shortly after the execution in the Netherlands of Egmont and Home, among hundreds of others, and immediately before the outbreak of the third civil war in France.1 The timing of these events is significant. The third civil war began with an attempt by the cardinal of Lorraine — dubbed by the hostile Sir Thomas Smith 'the minister of mischief — to 'eliminate' certain protestant leaders. Upon this occasion, they all escaped, though Conde and d'Andelot (Coligny's brother) did not survive the war. It was this same catholic policy — Papal, Spanish, and extreme political French catholic — of 'elimination' that was adopted and executed in Paris on 23 August 1572. Upon that dreadful occasion, however, others were forced to accede to the notorious long-term policy of the extremists, owing to the immediate danger of the court at the hands of the enraged hugueonts, following the assault upon the admiral. In August 1568, Lorraine's abortive 'elimination' coup averted an imminent huguenot invasion of the Spanish Netherlands in support of the first attempt of William of Orange to raise rebellion. Lorraine's coup, together with the subsequent abrogation of the edict of pacification, resulted in the third civil war. The probability that further civil war — one way or another — was unavoidable, is a separate matter. When, four years later, in August 1572, the policy of 'elimination' was at last successfully executed, it again averted an imminent invasion of the Netherlands. This invasion was intended to synchronize with William's second attempt to raise a general rebellion, and it precipitated the fourth civil war. These two attempts to send help to the Netherlands may be related to the treaty of August 1568 between William of Orange and the huguenots, which — though by no means the whole explanation — is sufficient to account for the idea that I have called 'transference'. This meant slightly different things to different people, but in all cases involved some 'French' — whether national or sectional — war in the 1 Groen van Prinsterer, Archives ou correspondance d'Orange-Nassau, se'rie i (8 vols. Leiden, 1835-1896), iii, 282-6.

inedites de la maison

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Netherlands, preferably to avert or divert war in France. There was a fairly common conviction, based on past experience, that war, whether foreign or civil, could not long be avoided. We have seen that war against Spain in the Netherlands had been one traditional expression of Franco-Hapsburg rivalry. But, after the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, and with the Calvinist reformation in France, such war had ceased to be either the policy of the king, or that of the French catholic faction. This political cleavage quickly followed the death of Henry II, since the catholic faction leaders, so recently prominent in the Italian wars, forged stronger links with Spain than the dynastic alliance of the crown. But, to their adversaries, the huguenots, war in the Netherlands still remained a traditional concept, and was revived in the form of 'transference' between the first and second civil wars. Indeed, the notion was explicitly embodied in the treaty between William of Orange and the huguenots, which stipulated that if hostilities ceased in either country, they should be resumed in, or 'tranferred' to, the other. Here is at least one reason why William and his brother, Louis of Nassau, both served in France in the third civil war. This in turn explains why the idea of 'transference,5 this time back to the Netherlands, was an important element in French attitudes to Spain during the two years between the treaty of Saint-Germain in August 1570 and the Massacre in August 1572. After 1570, however, the difference was that Charles IX, who developed an exploitable yearning for martial glory, was skilfully embroiled by those responsible for the Netherlands enterprise in this essentially sectional pursuit of 'transference'. Charles himself did not, of course, see it that way, since he could neither conceive of fighting for Calvinism at home, nor for 'rebels and heretics' abroad. This involvement of the king had at least two important results. By vastly increasing the attendant risk of open, general war with Spain, it implicated everyone who held some public position or stake in the kingdom. It also magnified the issue of 'transference' into a national controversy, centred on proposals for an 'enterprise of the Netherlands', as it was called. The enterprise was simultaneously strongly canvassed, deeply feared, and violently opposed by divers interests, as it matured during 1571 and miscarried in 1572. /Transference,' or the enterprise of the Netherlands, was strongly canvassed by Louis of Nassau, who remained in France after the third civil war, and by the Flemish exiles, who clearly had the most to gain and little, if anything, to lose. If 'transference' was also essentially a huguenot policy, it is vitally important to understand that the party was deeply, albeit unequally, divided on the issue. It was some of the

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younger, more impetuous members, in particular Charles de Teligny (later Coligny's son-in-law), Francois de la Noue, and Jean de Hangest, seigneur de Genlis, who combined with the Flemish to influence and enmesh the wayward king. Charles IX was then exceptionally exposed, since the court had been vacated by the leaders of both factions which, if no longer engaged in fighting, could hardly be described as at peace. Coligny and others, including Nassau in the suite of Jeanne d'Albret, had opted for the relative security of La Rochelle; and Lorraine and the Guises were in disgrace. The Netherlands enterprise was most deeply feared by Catherine de Medici and her moderate supporters, because the dread of war with Spain and the concomitant effort to maintain the amity of Cateau-Cambresis was the lodestar of her political career. No other interpretation makes continuous sense — not necessarily of all she said — but of all that she did. To Catherine, war with Spain was the ultimate, because the most dangerous catastrophe, to be avoided at almost any cost. That conviction was certainly justified by future events and the near defeat of Henry IV in the 1590s. The violent opposition to the Netherlands enterprise did not, however, come from Catherine, who could not afford to antagonize its supporters. It came from all the ultramontane, pro-Spanish, extreme political catholics, led by the heir apparent and lieutenant-general, Henri due d'Anjou, as their princely figurehead, and his mentor, the cardinal of Lorraine. Although Catherine had excluded Lorraine from the council, he was not ineffective from a distance. Besides, during these two years, the court was mostly dispersed. Here, therefore, are three distinct attitudes to the problem of Spain and the Netherlands, to which can be added no less than four others. Firstly there was the clear, personal attitude of Coligny. This was shared by a proportion of his followers, albeit not by those who had been at court, since it took virtually no account of the king. There was also an apparently more conditional attitude on the part of Catherine, developed pragmatically in response to events and to the dilatory and ambivalent attitude of the king, which cannot be clarified. Neither for Charles, who had so recently received Spanish 'help', nor for Catherine, who needed the huguenots' support in other matters, was the Netherlands issue a straightforward one; nor were Charles and Catherine, in this respect, in agreement with each other. Finally, there was the more dispassionate view of a few serious councillors. They propounded the absolute need of France for general peace, and emphasised her poverty and defencelessness. The position of Coligny was different from that of either Charles or

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Catherine, and also from that of his own more extreme huguenot followers who adhered to Nassau. It is true that Coligny was Spain's worst enemy among the French, and that he was bound by ties of treaty and kinship to the cause of the Netherlands, as the nobility conceived of it. Furthermore, he had always favoured war in the Netherlands, and supported the idea of 'transference'; but not unconditionally. In a petition of July 1569, during the third civil war, he had himself requested peace in France and proposed 'transference'. But he made it perfectly clear that it was a national war that he had in mind, categorically stating that the king should rather employ the two opposing forces together 'pour... le bien de vos affaires,' which was in the Netherlands. But the national concept was grotesquely unrealistic, since a principal consequence of civil strife was the disintegration of national policy. After 1570, however, Coligny's personal conception of 'transference' was as a sectional, protestant war with Spain, separately and apart from the French crown from which, in spite of the treaty of Saint-Germain, he was still detached. This war was intended to be in and for the Netherlands, with the full support and co-operation of England. It has to be admitted that Coligny held a simplistic conception of the affairs of France, and still more of the disposition of queen Elizabeth. In support of this policy, he favoured the marriage of Henry of Navarre to queen Elizabeth — propounded in 1570 and in 1571 — rather than Henry's marriage to the king's sister, Marguerite de Valois. To be fair, however, it was not Coligny who pressed the idea of 'transferance' at all in 1571. There were then no hostilities in the Netherlands, and he himself was pre-occupied with the implementation of the edict of Saint-Germain and personal and public problems of security. 'Transference', with the 'support' of the king, would entail Coligny's own return to court, to which both he, and those who shared his opinions and feared for his person, were strongly opposed, since he could hardly be expected to trust either the motives or the efficacy of the king. Besides, Charles was not merely unstable: he was not a free agent. Even if his intentions were honourable, he could neither protect Coligny nor command any substantial - let alone national - support. We have already seen that he was in disagreement with Catherine de Medici; in some respects he was also as strongly opposed as the huguenots themselves by the catholic extremists; and he had no money. In the event, by September 1571, Coligny found himself and the party irretrievably committed by Nassau, together with his own belligerent extremists, to their policy of 'transference'. This was done during Coligny's absence at La Rochelle, and without his consent or

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approval. This policy, albeit ill-defined, definitely involved invasion of the Netherlands in 1572 in what, to Coligny, was the worst possible combination of circumstances: it was to be without even the nominally assured support of England - upon which their preferred project of partition depended — and with only a personal and indeterminate commitment on the part of the king. Furthermore, there were grounds for believing that everything had been leaked to Spain. The ill-conceived, ill-planned and incompetently executed enterprise of the Netherlands, in its historic form, was not therefore, despite the repetitions of historians, the policy of the admiral. It was only then, after Coligny had been obliged, in his own estimation and that of his adherents, to brave the dire peril of the court, that he urged the king to declare war upon Spain. This advice was first reported in September 1571. But, as Coligny was only at court for five weeks, and did not return again until the following June, his war policy primarily applies to the summer of 1572. Advocacy of war did not represent Coligny's conversion to Nassau's policy. It was rather a matter of tactics, a pis aller, designed to bring the unhappy affair closer to his former conception of 'transference' as a national undertaking. The obvious importance of doing so, was to protect the huguenots from the vacillations of the king. Charles might still be induced, either to abandon or to turn against them, so long as he was publicly declaring his peaceful intentions. Thus deserted - following the entry of Nassau into the Netherlands in April 1572 — the huguenots would have been exposed to the awful vengeance of Alva. But Charles did not declare war upon Spain and, although the dramatic denouement was unforeseeable, it would be difficult to argue that Coligny was wrong. So much for the traditional belief in the controlling influence of the admiral over the king. Charles' attitude was much more elusive. He appears to have wanted war — some war somewhere — in a romanticised way; perhaps as an alternative to hunting. By June 1572, when Coligny returned to court for the second time, Charles was deeply involved in the Netherlands enterprise, if not necessarily heavily committed. Nassau (whose assistance he had needed for the Bourbon marriage) had departed for the Netherlands in April, followed in May by Genlis - from both of whom Charles' vociferous disavowals failed to dissociate him. But the problem and paradox was that, unlike Coligny, Charles continued to recoil from a war with Spain. This was not pure perversity. Only in theory could Charles prosecute war upon his own authority, despite the weighty opposition of Catherine, as well as that of the catholic extremists — who might be expected to support Spain — and the entire

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council, in which the huguenots had no influence. Some of the council, in particular the due de Nevers, the marechal de Tavannes, and the garde des sceaux de Morvillier, were opposed to war for patriotic reasons. France required peace, reconciliation and reform, and was in no position to sustain a war, which they envisaged as likely to be long. This indeed was the positive, constructive aspect of Catherine's policy. Coligny is said to have argued, in June and July, that Charles was already irreversibly committed, and that the choice was not between war or peace, but between Spanish or civil war. Apart from his crippling impotence in France, Charles was also prevaricating because he had not yet renounced the hope of an English declaration against Spain, and her overt and sufficient support, for which he was striving with uncharacteristic application. Catherine, too, had long been and still was striving for English support, if not to facilitate the Netherlands enterprise, at least to protect France from Spain. English support would certainly have diminished the danger, and hence the opposition of all but pro-Spanish extremists. It was also the only thing which conceivably might, in this dreadful impasse, have brought Charles, Catherine and Coligny into a working agreement. Such an agreement, if perceived, must have enjoined caution upon Philip II and Alva. But queen Elizabeth also was exercised by the problem of Spain, whose attention and forces she wished to deflect from the shores of England. So her crucial reply to French entreaties was long and — since she intended to act but not to affirm — somewhat villainously delayed. Elizabeth's reply was still anxiously awaited during the frenetic week of festivities which followed the marriage of Henry of Navarre and Marguerite de Valois on 18 August - the immediate reason for that unique, and uniquely dangerous gathering in turbulent Paris. But, as Alva prepared to march south from Brussels, it was already the eleventh hour for the departure of Coligny to the support of his confederates in Mons and the invasion of William of Orange. Coligny and his forces must go in a day or two, if they were ever to go at all. It was then, in that awful week of suspense, when only his removal could still effect a dramatic alteration, that the assault upon Coligny occurred, followed by the 'elimination' and the Massacre. Together, these events frustrated the enterprise of the Netherlands, defeated the revolt as conceived in 1572, and averted war with Spain. The storm was deflected back into France, where the fourth civil war ensued.

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11 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF QUEEN ELIZABETH, THE SEA BEGGARS AND THE CAPTURE OF BRILLE, 1572 'Queen Elizabeth, the Sea Beggars, and the Capture of Brille, 1572', was the title of a now celebrated article by J. B. Black, published in the English Historical Review in January 1931. This article was devoted to the proposition of earlier historians (mainly J. A. Froude, A. F. Pollard and J. A. Williamson) that queen Elizabeth was 'responsible' for the Sea Beggars' attack on Brille on 1 April 1572, after having expelled them from England on 1 March. Great significance has been attached to the Brille episode because it was later seen to have precipitated the Revolt of the Netherlands — an eventuality which no one could possibly have predicted. Black himself refuted the arguments of the historians, and denied the responsibility of the queen. But he did so purely on the grounds that their scholarship was bad, and their evidence tainted.1 Thus, while he asserted that there is no evidence to prove that the queen was responsible for the assault — what would constitute responsibility is nowhere defined — Black nevertheless accepted that she perfectly well could have been responsible. He raised no objections to any of the historians' unexamined suppositions — in particular, Elizabeth's supposedly well-known anti-Spanish bias; only their supporting evidence was disposed of. In accepting Black's conclusions that Elizabeth was not, in the event, responsible, later historians have apparently also received his opinion that she perfectly well could have been behind the assault. If so, they presumably also accepted the false assumptions about the nature and objectives of her foreign policy upon which both opinions rested; or perhaps they merely failed to challenge them, since a study of appropriate later works does not actually produce so precise an agreement. Either way, there is an area of confusion to be examined. Black's article is generally still regarded as definitive. Charles Wilson, in particular, has said: 'as far as I can judge, Professor Black settled this issue for good and all nearly forty years ago'.2 R.B. 27.

1 2

This has not since been disputed. Charles Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands (London, 1970),

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Wernham, also working from Black, sticks to his original opinion that 'the evidence hardly suffices for a conclusive answer'. It is just possible, he has written in this connection, that Elizabeth's expulsion of the Sea Beggars 'from her southeastern ports' in March 1572 and their seizure of Brille on 1 April may have been a first step towards the control of French influence east of Calais and in the straits of Dover. That tentative suggestion would appear to ignore Elizabeth's relations with the French - fragmented France - for at least four years past. In support of his suggestion, Wernham quotes J. A. Williamson as having said that 'no similar expulsion was decreed against the western privateers operating from Plymouth and west country ports'.3 That, however, was not so. The commission for marine causes of 1 March 1572 required them to write to 'the mayors and all other herr heyghnes officers of her townes and portes westwardes... strayghtly charginge and commandinge them... to put the said orders [expulsion of sea rovers and 'frebutters'] in dewe execution in those parts as they will answer to the contrary'.4 Wernham went on to comment how odd it was that the Sea Beggars 'went when ordered, so quietly and with so little protest'. He further remarked that the Revolt of the Netherlands began as a movement which owed its initial impulse to Elizabeth. 'Whether Elizabeth had provided that impulse deliberately or accidentally, its immediate results were very much to her liking'.5 It will be seen, however, that the Sea Beggars did not meekly depart when required to go; also that the results of their exploit were far from being to the queen's liking. Even Conyers Read, who usually dug deeper, referred his readers to Black, and Brian Dietz, in his thesis on 'Privateering in North West European Waters, 1568-1572', declared that there was no need to repeat Black's acceptable evidence.6 Since historians have, at the least, slurred over Black's assumptions, while mostly accepting his conclusions, it is necessary to look more closely at what he said. Historians, he wrote, have pointed out that 'the departure of La Marck [Guillaume de la Marck baron de Lumay, the Sea Beggar leader in 1572] from English waters, which fired the train of events, was not merely the prelude to the attack on Brille but its true causa causans; and they imply, suggest, or even assert that more was known in English government circles concerning the intentions of the 3 R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada (London, 1966), 318, and The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1558-1603 (Berkeley, London, 1981), 42. 4 British Library, Lansdowne Mss. 13, ff. 129-30, Instructions, 1 March 1571 [12]. 5 Wernham, Before the Armada ,319. 6 University of London, 1959. I am grateful to the author for full permission to use and quote from his thesis.

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pirates than the facts would appear to disclose. On this showing, the expulsion and the capture stand together as the first and last acts in a connected piece of policy... and the birth of the impulse that carried La Marck and his company to Brille is traced to the English... queen and her minister Burghley'.7 That is Black's version of what other historians had said, and he too accepted that there was a prima facie case for adopting this opinion. There is, he said, some circumstantial evidence, besides 'the well-known anti-Spanish bias of Elizabeth's foreign policy, together with her alleged friendly feeling for the pirates'. 'Elizabeth's record in the field of foreign affairs,' Black continued a few lines further on, 'has become a byword for what is cynical and unprincipled, a weaving and unweaving of webs in an atmosphere of profound dissimulation and obscurity'. He therefore found it 'inherently probable' and 'thoroughly in keeping with the general trend of her diplomacy that, in the spring of 1572, she should be the agent provocateur of the onslaught on Brille, masking the adroitness of her move by an action ostensibly friendly to Spain'. The 'ostensibly friendly action' is a reference to the document of 1 March 1572 by which, it has been supposed, the Sea Beggars were expelled from England. 'Is Brille,' Black asks, 'to be added to the list of the queen's subtle strokes against the Spanish monarchy?' He went on to consider the matter in the overtly moral terms of guilt or innocence. 'Even if the direct evidence for the queen's complicity breaks down, it may be said [that] there is still plenty of presumptive evidence on which to secure a conviction'.8 What do these vague, subjective and emotional statements really mean? What actually was that 'general trend' of Elizabeth's diplomacy, which Black made no attempt to illustrate? To what 'subtle strokes' against the Spanish monarchy was he referring? Such phrases are pure atmospherics, apparently emanating from the 'well-known anti-Spanish bias' of Elizabeth's foreign policy. The tell tale 'well-known', indicates a basic and unsubstantiated assumption. Yet historians should recall that Elizabeth had been reigning for twenty-seven years before she could see no alternative but to invade the Spanish Netherlands in 1585. The underlying bias in this period was, in fact, the exact opposite of anti-Spanish: it was that of the old Burgundian alliance which, at least since 1496, had safeguarded vital commercial relations and, not infrequently, the security of England. It is impossible to make sense of the history of the 1560s and 1570s by proceeding from an assumption of Elizabeth's anti-Spanish bias. 7 8

Black, 30. Black, 31,37.

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Anyone who can be bothered, can test that proposition for himself. Black, it will be recalled, was reduced to declaring that 'Elizabeth's record in the field of foreign affairs has become a byword for what is cynical and unprincipled, a weaving and unweaving of webs in an atmosphere of profound dissimulation and obscurity'. Such mumbo jumbo can only be regarded as an admission of defeat. The same may be said of Charles Wilson's more recent complaint, that 'Elizabeth's policy towards France is even less easy to elucidate than her policy towards Philip [II]'. 9 While neither Wernham nor Wilson explicitly affirmed Black's belief in Elizabeth's 'well-known anti-Spanish bias', they evidently share his bewilderment in the interpretation of her foreign policy. Meanwhile that important and widespread conviction — arising, perhaps, from the abiding emotional impact of the Armada story - remains afloat, never having been analysed. The gradual, uneven deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations was a trend that Elizabeth continuously struggled to arrest. This struggle and Elizabeth's underlying bias in favour of the old Burgundian alliance — as well, indeed, as the bases of her foreign policy — happen to be spectacularly well illustrated by the vexed saga of her relations with the Sea Beggars. The war in the Spanish Netherlands, which they precipitated, was a catastrophe which Elizabeth had striven to avert since the autumn of 1570. In refuting the arguments of the earlier historians, Black outlined the evidence leading up to the alleged expulsion of the Sea Beggars on 1 March 1572. He established, at some length, that expulsion was not a sudden, or a new idea, thereby tending to show that it was not connected with the Brille incident. But he failed to notice, in the process, that the Sea Beggars were not, in fact, expelled on 1 March 1572 and, as it will be shown, that there was no proclamation of that date, in any normally accepted sense of the term. Black himself actually illustrated the falsity of the supposed 'anti-Spanish bias' in his own, quite accurate, assessment of the evidence relating to Elizabeth's attitude after the assault upon Brille. This assessment led him to conclude his article with the following statement, which refers to Elizabeth and William Cecil, lord Burghley: the 'correctness of their attitude towards Spain in 1572 is worthy of emphasis'.10 In fact, the 'correctness' of the queen's attitude towards Spain is equally worthy of emphasis throughout the years from 1568, when a Sea Beggar fleet was first assembled. This critical analysis indicates the purpose of this paper, as well as 9 10

Wilson, 126. Black, 47.

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the need to reconstruct Elizabeth's relations with the Sea Beggars, and to re-examine their alleged expulsion from England within the wider framework of her foreign policy. The traumas and fluctuations of these relations with the Sea Beggars can only be understood if they are closely correlated with the movement of Anglo-Spanish relations, which were exceptionally critical during the troubled years 1568-72.n These years witnessed the arrival in England of Mary queen of Scots (May 1568), the disgrace of Elizabeth's ambassador in Spain, the affair of the Spanish treasure ships, the rising of the northern earls followed by the Ridolfi plot, and the excommunication of queen Elizabeth. Elizabeth's relations with the Sea Beggars, which necessarily compromised her in the eyes of Spain, were essentially circumstantial: they were neither desired, nor formed by the queen of her own volition. The Sea Beggars' embarrassing insistence upon using the Channel and English south coast ports — which contained large numbers of Flemish refugees — was both an accident of geography and an unfortunate corollary of Elizabeth's necessary affiliations with the Huguenots, established before the Sea Beggar fleets were formed. By the autumn of 1568, both the hopes of William of Orange for the Netherlands, and the safety of England, rested upon the success of the Huguenots in the third French civil war. Consequently, by supporting the Huguenots, Elizabeth became — in an awkward sense and by extension — somewhat involved with the Netherlands to which, nevertheless, she steadily refused to recognise any commitment. Elizabeth's essential need to support the Huguenots arose from the cardinal of Lorraine's intended enterprise of England, following the imprisonment there of his niece, Mary queen of Scots. The launching of his enterprise, however, depended upon the removal or overthrow of the Huguenot leaders.12 Thus Elizabeth had no alternative but to run whatever other risks were necessary in order to sustain the Huguenots in the field. The Huguenots and the Netherlands shared the same enemies, if not the same objectives, and the open confederacy between them carried the danger for Elizabeth of drawing her into their conflict with Spain. In that case, Philip II could be expected to support Mary. In 1571 that is, in fact, what began to happen. It was, possibly, the most dangerous thing that could happen, because it entailed the risk of 11 This should, of course, be done in much more detail than is possible within the space of an article. 12 Lorraine made no secret of the fact that he sought to ruin the Huguenots, and he is said to have declared at Moulins in 1566 that his brother the due d'Aumale would seek the admiral [Coligny's] life. Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, Fonds Franqais, 3951, ff. 100 verso107 verso, 15 March 1565; 3193, ff. 52 verso-57 verso [1566] ce qui se passa a Moulins.

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civil war in England. That, in September 1568, was Lorraine's own avowed objective, as the most auspicious preliminary to the overthrow of Elizabeth.13 In the great struggle which then began, sea power and naval warfare were obviously to be of paramount importance. Thus it was in a maritime sense that the Huguenots were most dependent on England, when they fitted out their fleet of privateers, late in 1568. Privateering was an effective and profitable form of naval warfare and, for the Huguenots and the Netherlands alike, this was to be a major source of supply. In February 1569, William of Orange therefore commissioned a Sea Beggar fleet, which necessarily had to operate in the North Sea and the Channel, both to maintain communications with their Huguenot allies at La Rochelle, and to defend the Netherlands by holding the Narrow Seas. So it came about that the Sea Beggars joined in the existing war at sea, in the same relationship to England as the Huguenots who, from 1568-70, alone stood between England and Lorraine. Thus Elizabeth had no alternative but to bear with the Sea Beggars who supported her protectors. By August 1570, when the French war ended and Lorraine was disgraced, English relations with Spain had become so tenuous that Elizabeth still desperately needed some sort of French amity — as they said — to counterbalance the growing danger from Spain. We shall see why. So far as the privateers were concerned — whether Huguenot or Flemish — their relationship with England was always extremely ambiguous: neither formalised, defined, nor at all secure. This was because the sudden growth of privateering in 1569 — with a fair smattering of English participation — placed Elizabeth in a very dangerous position. Not only did all the privateers — and pirates — prey upon Spanish ships, but also upon all other ships of catholic origin. Elizabeth however, was not at war with anyone, let alone engaged in 'religious' war against all catholics everywhere. Privateering, however profitable, was barely susceptible to political control and, when pursued in English ports and waters, it necessarily gave rise to frequent, embarrassing, and dangerous incidents. The most notorious of these incidents was the affair of the Spanish treasure ships in December 1568, which led to a total and disastrous

13 Calendar of State Papers Foreign, 1566-8 p. 545 [10 September] 1568, message delivered by sir Henry Norris to the French king; 548, 15 September 1568, Norris to Elizabeth. Calendar of State Papers Spanish, 1568-79, pp. 109-10,18 February 1569, Philip II to Alva.

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14

trade embargo with Spain and the Netherlands. Consequently, Elizabeth was struggling throughout the years in question, to prevent the ensuing clashes and reprisals from leading to open war. This breach was not healed uhtil the Anglo-Spanish agreement of April 1573.15 The delay occurred at least partly because the activities of so many privateers — who had caused the incident in the first place — rendered the restoration of normal commercial relations virtually impossible. The affair of the Spanish treasure ships, and other less resounding incidents, demonstrated that Elizabeth's attitude to these dangerous friends depended upon matters of degree rather than of principle; upon time, place and circumstance. In other words, the privateers ran the risk of being penalised for even their legal and most dramatic successes if, by occurring in English ports or waters, they compromised the queen. She made it plain that they were not to exceed a certain discreet moderation of which - perforce ex post facto - Elizabeth herself remained the sole arbiter.16 Otherwise she would strike and, //she could catch them, arrest and punish the authors, regardless of their rank, in order to establish that she was not to be held responsible for such acts of hostility against catholic powers. Elizabeth's problems with the privateers were intensified late in 1570 when, after the end of the war in France, it was determined by the Flemish and some of the Huguenot leaders (not the admiral, Coligny, who had not returned to court), to transfer hostilities to the Netherlands. In 1571 and 1572 there were, accordingly, successive plans for an enterprise of the Netherlands, in which both the Huguenots and Louis of Nassau counted upon Elizabeth to play a leading part.17 This policy of 'transference' became a nightmare to queen Elizabeth — 14 Conyers Read, 'Queen Elizabeth's seizures of the duke of Alva's pay ships', Journal of Modern History, i (1933), is the only study of an incident which merits more detailed investigation. It was a complex matter: the ships were good prize, which was embarrassing. Elizabeth assumed the Genoese loan on account of her desperate need to borrow money to keep the Huguenots in the field. Wilson's stricture that this was 'an escapade as costly as it was senseless*, is very wide of the mark. Wilson, 26. 15 CSPF., 1572-4, pp. 296-7, March 1573, Renewal of the Intercourse; 327, 30 April 1573, Proclamation: Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations politiques des Pays-Bas et de I'Angleterre sous le regne de Philippe //, 11 vols (Brussels, 1882-1900), vi, 700-2, 6 April 1573, Guaras to Alva; 710, 15 April 1573, Alva to Elizabeth. The agreement was effective from 1 May for two years initially. It reaffirmed 'ancient amities and confederacies'. 16 This emerges from the affair of the Venetian carracks, captured by the Huguenot Jacques de Sores, in the Channel in December 1569. Dietz, 123-6; James A. Williamson, Sir John Hawkins, the Time and the Man (Oxford, 1927), 221; Charles de la Ronciere, Histoire de la marine franqaise, 6 vols (Paris, 1889-1932), iv, 110-11. 17 On the enterprise and the role assigned to England, see N. M. Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the European Crisis 1559-1572 (London, 1973), passim.

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and no ephemeral dream — because it affected the two fixed stars in her political firmament: the avoidance of war with Spain, and the obstruction of French expansion or influence in the Netherlands. Elizabeth was neither all powerful, nor a free agent. She could not afford, nor was she literally, physically, able to dissociate herself from her unilateral allies, who threatened to suck her into their war in the Netherlands. It is vital to remember that her path was strewn with paradoxes. The policy of transference required the equipment of Sea Beggar fleets, not simply for privateering but for use as an operational force. There is some evidence to suggest that Elizabeth's hope and intention was to assist — a little — in providing William with such a strategic force, but without provoking a succession of incendiary incidents. It was evidently never intended, on either side, that these augmented Sea Beggar fleets should settle in English ports and waters but, being entirely unsupplied and unpaid, they could not possibly remain inactive while the Netherlands enterprise was repeatedly delayed — from the autumn of 1570 until their own initiative of April 1572.18 Thus, throughout 1571, there were at least two roving Beggar fleets whose commanders firmly regarded England as an ally. Elizabeth strove to bar her subjects from participation in their exploits,19 and to maintain her private distinctions which, however, were either incomprehensible to others, unacceptable, or merely ignored. If the Channel was England's protective moat, it was also her neighbours' highway and battlefield; and the operations of the Sea Beggars did not conform to Elizabeth's requirements of discipline and discretion. By the end of 1570, it will be remembered, Elizabeth's relations with Spain were so tenuous that she had further need of French amity. These bad relations derived from the imprisonment of Mary, the disgrace of Elizabeth's ambassador, the rising of the northern earls and the presence of English catholic exiles in the Netherlands, the Sea Beggars, the treasure ships and trade embargo, and Elizabeth's excommunication in February 1570. Furthermore, parliament had impertinently proclaimed in 1566, by inserting a clause into the 18 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 154 n. 1-155, 24 July 1571, Thomas Cobham to his brother lord Cobham; Historical Manuscripts Commission, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the marquis of Salisbury, Hatfield House, 23 vols (London, 1883-1973), ii, 12-13, 21 February 1571/2, queen Elizabeth to the mayor of Dover. 19 Calendar of State Papers Domestic, Addenda, 1566-79, p. 332, Proclamation. The date appears to be uncertain, but the text suggests that it fell within the period of the third French civil war, September 1568 - August 1570. Acts of the Privy Council, vol. 8, 1571-5, pp. 27-8, 12-14 May 1571, the privy council to sir Henry Radcliffe, captain of Portsmouth.

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preamble to the subsidy bill, that Elizabeth had promised to marry. She was obliged to call parliament again - for April 1571 - and it was only in France that the indispensable marriage negotiation could then be undertaken. Elizabeth, however, could not draw closer to France without, by the same token, also drawing closer to the Flemish rebels whose activities, in turn, were embroiling her with Spain. Yet she was obliged, at the least, to prevaricate with Louis of Nassau, newly influential at the court of France, because he might influence the outcome of the marriage negotiation. Towards the middle of April 1571, the Channel was said to have become crowded with Sea Beggar vessels. They were supplied and supported by their compatriots and the English, given shelter, and enabled to discharge their goods.20 This was done in clear contravention of the prize laws and the edicts against piracy. Such activities were not an indication of royal sympathy for the Sea Beggars, but rather to be explained by what Burghley called lucri causa, which almost certainly had ramifications in high places. Some coherent knowledge of the privateering involvement of leading Englishmen might explain a great deal, especially as many of them were far more 'Puritan' than the queen. The gathering of the Sea Beggars in and around England occurred just a few weeks before the arrival in Madrid of the Papal agent, Roberto Ridolfi. His proposals, as described by Philip II in a letter to Alva, were the murder of queen Elizabeth, the marriage of Mary to the duke of Norfolk, and the recatholicising of England. Ridolfi was successful in winning Spanish support for his plot because Philip II believed - quite wrongly - that Elizabeth was supporting the Netherlands' enterprise that Louis of Nassau was devising in France. By about July 1571, the proposals, at least in general, had been leaked to Spain.21 Whether or not Elizabeth was aware of it, Philip issued orders and money, and appointed a commander, Chiappino Vitelli, for a Spanish enterprise of England.22 If, in theory, the Sea Beggars might be expected to protect Elizabeth from the power of Spain, it was even 20 J. B. A. T. Teulet, Ed., Bertrand de Salignac de la Mothe-Fenelon, Correspondance diplomatique, 1 vols (Paris, London, 1838-40), iv, 103, 1571, La Mothe to Charles IX. 21 Ridolfi arrived in Madrid on 28 June 1571. L. P. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas, 5 vols (Brussels, 1848-79), ii, 185-7, 14 July 1571, Philip II to Alva; 198-202, 14 September 1571, Philip II to Alva; Dudley Digges, The Compleat Ambassador (ed. London, 1655), 123-6, 12 August 1571, Walsingham to Burghley; Alphonse de Ruble, Memoires inedites de Michel de la Huguerye, 3 vols (Paris, 1877-80), i, 27-31. 22 Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, ii, 185-7, 14 July 1571, Philip II to Alva; 195-7, 30 August 1571, Philip II to Alva.

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more desirable that they should not, in the first place, expose her to it. Thus the first English effort to control the problems of privateering and to expel the Sea Beggars coincided with the unravelling in England of the Ridolfi plot, which was generally known to have been discovered by sometime in June 1571. The English efforts also coincided with the development in France of the enterprise of the Netherlands, for which both the Flemish and the Huguenots were unwisely banking on English support.23 Thus it was that, late in July, about the time that Nassau's plans for the Netherlands enterprise matured in France, the Sea Beggars moved out of Dover into the Downs, only to be assailed by fourteen of Alva's ships. In these circumstances the queen evidently consented to the guns of Dover castle being fired to protect them. 24 If Elizabeth did not want to harbour the Sea Beggars in England, it was certainly not her intention that they should be sunk by Alva in the Narrow Seas - more especially before she had obtained the defensive alliance she so urgently wanted with France.25 It was in August 1571 that William's commander, Guislain de Fiennes, sieur de Lumbres, was joined, and in some unclear way superseded, by La Marck. To judge from a later comment, Elizabeth did not trust him.26 She could not, however, do less for him than she had been prepared to do for de Lumbres - whatever that may have been. La Marck apparently obtained some sort of licence, relating to the acquisition of armour, and a passport, which was for his departure.27 It must from the start, have been clear to La Marck that he was unwelcome, since this 'assistance' was accompanied by strenuous measures against the Sea Beggars as privateers and, above all, as pirates. They had begun to prey upon shipping of all origins, including England herself, and that of her vital commercial allies, Hamburg and Emden. The queen had taken these matters 'so muche at harte' and was 'so muche offendid as upon full resolution will no longer suffer those kinde of dealinges to be unreformed'. Accordingly, in October 1571, the 23 La Mothe, iv, 141, 14 June 1571, La Mothe to Charles IX; Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 154 n.1-155, 24 July 1571, Thomas Cobham to lord Cobham. Philip II was informed by De Spes on 23 June 1571 that the Ridolfi plot had been discovered. Gachard, Correspondance de Phillipe 77, ii, 191, 4 August 1571, Philip II to Alva. 24 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 162,18 August 1571, De Spes to Alva. 25 Paul de Foix was in England at the time upon the business of the marriage alliance. 26 Dietz, 317; HMC Hatfield, ii, 12-13, 21 February 1571/2, Elizabeth to the mayor of Dover; Roger Avermaete, Les Gueux de mer et la naissance d'une nation (Brussels, 1944), 54-5. 27 CSPSp. 1568-79, pp. 337-8, 20 September 1571, De Spes to Philip II; 339-42, 13 October 1571, :De Spes to Philip II; HMC Hatfield, ii, 12-13, 21 February 1571/2, Elizabeth to the mayor of Dover.

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queen, council and lord admiral launched a vigorous campaign against the Sea Beggars, and other offenders, which exceeded all routine reiterations, reproofs and warnings. Consequently, she appointed Mr. Gonston and Mr. Holstock, two officers of the navy, not only to arrest those concerned in such offences, their ships and goods, but also all others who had had any dealings with them.28 It is not clear whether this commission could have been used to arrest La Marck himself, but it is interesting to note that the demarche coincided with a major hitch in her negotiations with France. In these circumstances it was doubly important to try to conciliate Spain although, in the autumn of 1571, that proved to be impossible.29 It was unfortunate that, in the midst of these activities for marine causes, lord Cobham, the lord warden of the Cinque Ports, and his brother Thomas, should have been arrested upon suspicion of complicity in the Ridolfi plot. This serves as a reminder that these maritime events roughly coincided with the arrest of the duke of Norfolk (7 September 1571) and the discovery of the role of Spain, or at least of the Spanish ambassador, De Spes. He was expelled in mid-December 1571 for practising to alienate the queen's good subjects and irritating 'such as be mutable to commit horrible offences against their native country'.30 In the absence of Cobham, the lord wardenship was placed in commission, under sir Henry Crispe, William Crispe, lieutenant of Dover, sir Thomas Scott and Edward Boys, or any two of them.3 l Two weeks later the lord high admiral commissioned Ralph Lane to arrest all pirates, being her Majesty's subjects or living under her 'obeysance' who, partly by themselves and partly being associated with foreigners robbed and spoiled both their countrymen and also the subjects of friendly powers. There is a draft indication that similar commissions were to be conferred upon William Wynter and Thomas Prideaux. Whether these were intended to be general instructions to harass La Marck and his fleet is not clear from the document, in which they are not mentioned.32 If so, this would be moving dangerously close to military action, since Lane was authorised to fit out such ships 28 APC., 1571-5, pp. 44-5, 20 September 1571, the privy council to lord Cobham; 45, 29 September 1571, the privy council to lord Cobham; 46-7, 3 October 1571, the privy council to lord Cobham. 29 Paul de Foix left England about 20 September 1571. Elizabeth was anxious about the French attitude to Mary and to Scotland whose regent, Lennox, was murdered on 4 September. She also feared that the alliance might be self defeating by drawing her into war in the Netherlands. 30 CSPF., 1569-71, p. 573, 14 December 1571, speech declared to the Spanish ambassador. 31 APC, 1571-5, p. 49, 21 & 23 October 1571, commissioners for the Cinque Ports. 32 Dietz, 340-1; Public Record Office, HCA/14/11/ no. 105 and attached documents.

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as he needed. How to get rid of La Marck — and quickly too — without hostilities was clearly of the essence of the problem, and something must have affected him since, late in November 1571, he referred to 'la nouvelle restraincte9. He clearly understood that the queen wished him to leave, and he offered various reasons — including the weather — why he could not do so. Like the unsuccessful Huguenots before him, he sought to regularise his position by submitting various articles for consideration, referring at the same time to 'la cause commune'. He behaved as if he regarded Elizabeth as the ally he certainly wished her to be. Since De Spes had been dismissed and finally departed from Dover — of all dangerous places, about 25 January 1572 — it is perhaps not surprising that La Marck should have persisted in thinking in these terms. Elizabeth, however, would never concede that she shared a common cause with those who were at war with Spain; nor would she enter into any formal agreement with La Marck. To his annoyance, his articles were totally ignored.33 From these communications, and one further, querellous and disrespectful letter, it was clear that he either could not, or did not intend to leave; and he had denied responsibility for his company on the grounds that he had not yet received command of the fleet. This was outstandingly injudicious: a man who was neither in command nor even in control was obviously both unacceptable and undesirable.34 The expulsion of De Spes might well have been regarded as a final breach with Spain, had Elizabeth not carefully made it plain that she was willing to receive a more suitable ambassador. Two months later no one had yet been appointed, but she averted a final breach by the device of describing Sweveghem, Alva's agent in the matter of the trade embargo, as charge d'affaires. She was afraid that he might leave at any moment since, by 10 January 1572, his negotiations had broken down.

33 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 220 n. 1-222, La Marck to Elizabeth; 235-6 [December 1571], La Marck to Elizabeth; 288, 16 January 1572, Sweveghem to Alva; 293, 21 January 1572, Thomas Fiesco to Albornoz; 295, 25 January 1572, La Marck to the privy council. 34 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 297-8, 27 January 1572, La Marck to the privy council. The juridical status of the Sea Beggars assumed some importance. La Marck is said to have held letters of marque issued in the name of William of Orange in 1569; Elizabeth may, or may not, have known. Henri Malo, Les Corsaires dunkerquois, 2 vols (Paris, 1912-13), i, 164-5.

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England and Spain were teetering on the very brink of war, and the continued succour in England of the Sea Beggars was one of Alva's principal complaints.3 5 He had not forgotten the guns of Dover castle, and he was entertaining notable English exiles in the Netherlands. Thus the departure of the Sea Beggars - desired since the early summer of 1571 - was not only necessary, it was also very urgent. During February 1572, therefore, Elizabeth took an impressive series of measures, both against the Sea Beggars, and for the 'better prosequuting and feablinge' of the pirates and sea rovers — a problem which had to be tackled at sea as well as in the ports and harbours. While some, or all, of these measures might well have been taken in any case, it is hardly surprising to find that their timing can, nevertheless, be significantly correlated with the queen's negotiations with Sweveghem. Diplomacy, which was virtually exhausted, had somehow to be sustained — at the very least until after the conclusion of the treaty which was pending with France.36 If, in the meanwhile, the Sea Beggar problem could be overcome — a problem which was intrinsically very serious for Elizabeth as well as for Spain — then an accommodation with Alva might still be possible. Consequently, the government made a determined attempt to police the Narrow Seas. William Holstock was placed in command and allotted a ship called the Swallow. He was instructed to intercept any who had 'robbyed or spoyled' any English merchants, or the merchants or subjects of any friends or allies. If they refused to surrender, they were to be forced to yield, brought to port, imprisoned and tried.3 7 While the lord high admiral sought to police the Narrow Seas, the privy council attended to the problem of La Marck and his captains, both to signify her Majesty's 'discontentacion', and also to declare her

35 CSPF., 1569-71, p. 575, 16 December 1571, Elizabeth to Philip II. Sweveghem was sent to England in February 1571, Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 67, 24 February 1571, instructions; 245-7, 30 December 1571, Alva to Sweveghem; 268-74, 7 & 8 January 1572, Thomas Fiesco to Albornoz; 311-13, 8 February 1572, Alva to Sweveghem; 321-5, 22 February 1572, declaration du conseil prive. 36 The negotiations ran into serious difficulties at the beginning of January 1572 when Anjou's final demands amounted to a blunt refusal to marry Elizabeth. CSPF., 1572-4, p. 11, 7 January 1572, Anjou's demands. 37 R. G. Marsden Documents Relating to Law and Custom of the Sea, 2 vols (Colchester, 1915-16), i, 191-3, 5 February 1572, commission from the queen to the lord high admiral; 196-7, 7 February 1572, commission to William Holstock, controller of the navy.

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pleasure. Her pleasure was that 'with as much speede as they may, they doe prepare themselves to depart, and to remayne noe longer upon those coastes'. La Marck and his captains were, furthermore, to be required, within a time limit to be set by the commissioners for the Cinque Ports, to certify in writing the name of everyone they recognised to be in their service and for whom they accepted responsibility. After the expiry of the time limit, everyone else would be prosecuted for piracy. Thereafter, not one single person, man or woman, 'of what state or condicion soever he be under the cullor of beinge of those companies [might] have repaire unto that towne or porte' [Dover] or to any other place within the commissioners' jurisdiction. 'And yet,' the letter continued, 'that you do earnestly solicite the saide counte to departe with his trayne by some resonable tyme'. Resuming a more peremptory tone, La Marck was to be required to surrender an Englishman recently captured between Dunkirk and Gravelines, because 'by noe cullor' may they detain her Majesty's subjects. Finally, the commissioners were to report immediately upon 'what successe you shall coniecture to followe thereof.38 This combination of reasonable persuasion with magisterial commands reflects the intrinsic and ineradicable ambivalence of Elizabeth's relations with the Sea Beggars, whom she could neither safely embrace, nor wholly reject, nor yet govern and control. While Elizabeth was awaiting the commissioners' reply as to what success they might conjecture, Sweveghem received an audience, on 17 February 1572, and gave the queen to understand that if the several provocations did not cease — of which the Sea Beggars was one — he would be obliged to depart, in order not to appear to condone them.3 9 La Marck had not gone, and the queen was becoming understandably impatient. She neither wanted Sweveghem to leave, nor was she content that the council's orders should be flouted. While the council strove to obtain more detailed information about the nature and dimensions of the problem of piracy, Elizabeth herself intervened with an interesting letter of 21 February to the mayor of Dover. Elizabeth stated that she had granted La Marck a passport to leave with certain armour, and that she had never meant him to remain in Dover, or all his company to congregate there, 'otherwise than in any former time hath been used in 38 British Library, Additional Mss, 32323, ff. 34-5, 9 February 1572, the privy council to sir Henry Crispe (Crips) and others. 39 Other problems related to matters arising from the trade embargo. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 314-17, 18 February 1572, memoire adressee par Sweveghem a la reine; 317-19, 19 February 1572, Sweveghem to Alva. Sweveghem had had a previous audience on 13 January 1572, ibid., 284-8, 16 January 1572, Sweveghem to Alva.

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the town being a principal port and eye of our realm'. Consequently La Marck was to be commanded cto order the fleet to depart from her sea coast and himself and train to depart from Dover'. The rest of the letter interestingly reveals the queen's predicament and embarrassing weakness: how could La Marck actually be made to go, without recourse to hostilities? The authorities were to employ every sanction they could think of, barring only the use of force, pending further instructions.4 ° The next day, 22 February 1572, Sweveghem was received by the privy council, and truthfully informed that neither the queen nor her council was content that the Sea Beggars should remain in the Channel, and that everything appropriate had been done to induce them to leave. The council elaborated upon their efforts in some detail. The only thing they naturally did not say was that La Marck had actually — and more than once — been formally ordered to leave, but had not gone. Instead, they asserted that since their measures had proved to be insufficient, the queen had the matter so much at heart that, within a few days, it would be seen that she meant her orders to be carried out.41 This was a reference to yet further measures which the government was about to take. The Spanish were apparently so convinced of Elizabeth's irredeemable wickedness as to be psychologically incapable of believing that she had really tried. If La Marck still failed to go, Sweveghem would not believe what the council had told him; he would then leave himself, and the breach with Spain would be final. Clearly the most drastic, emergency measures were necessary. Yet what more could possibly be done? It has always been alleged that Elizabeth expelled the Sea Beggars by a 'proclamation' of 1 March 1572. Since they had at least twice already been formally required to leave, their expulsion was clearly not the purpose of the document in question. The Beggars, after all, were embittered men with nothing to lose; they were exiles engaged in a desperate war, and it was already embarrassingly apparent that the queen had been powerless to make them go. Thus it is hardly plausible that she would deliberately parade that impotence by attempting — yet again — to evict them, by means of a proclamation. Just as, on the one hand, Elizabeth would never formally recognise the Sea Beggars, or enter into any agreement with them, so, on the other hand, she never sought to expel them by means of any direct or public document, but only through communications by and to her own servants. In order to 40 41 prive.

HMCHatfield, ii, 12-13, 21 February 1571/2, Elizabeth to the mayor of Dover. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 321-5, 22 February 1572, declaration du conseil

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establish the purpose of the so-called proclamation, it is necessary to consider the 'other' measures to which the council referred when it declared to Sweveghem that Elizabeth had the matter much at heart and meant her orders to be carried out. Sometime in February 1572 a fresh commission was prepared (but not then issued) for George Wynter and John Hawkins, who were already commissioners for marine causes, together with six others — the four commissioners for the Cinque Ports, plus sir Henry Radcliffe, captain of Portsmouth, and sir Edward Horsey, captain of the Isle of Wight, to clear the sea of freebooters.4 2 They were to repair to the sea coasts of Kent, Sussex, Southampton and the Isle of Wight, to execute certain instructions of the privy council. The version of these instructions which has survived is, like the commission itself, a very untidy and sometimes verbally imperfect draft, heavily corrected in Burghley's hand. The instructions of the privy council required their commissioners to evict all 'sea rovers' from any town, port, haven or rode of the queen's majesty, upon one day's warning, or more as they should see fit according to the wind and weather. Secondly, noone at all was to 'use any kynde of trafficke' with the sea rovers, upon pain of death. If this order was breached, in any place, the chief officer of that place was to be imprisoned, during pleasure, for 'suffringe thereof'.43 The commissioners were, furthermore, to cause the following proclamations - plural - to be made in the places of their commission (Kent, Sussex, Southampton and the Isle of Wight): 'whosoever shalbe manifestly convicted [of trafficking with the sea rovers] ... shall therefore suffer Marshal lawe as a manifest breaker of the common peace betwixt this Realme and other Realmes and countryes'.44 Similar 42 PRO/SP/12/85/133-4. This heavily amended draft bears several dates, the latest being 29 February 1572 (sic). The names are jotted on an adjoining sheet. The trial of offences committed at sea was governed by a statute of 1536. It provided for the appointment of special commissioners to try marine causes, together with a jury, according to the common law in respect of treasons, felonies, robberies, murders and confederacies committed on land. In the case of the Cinque Ports, the commission was to be directed to the lord warden or his deputy, plus three or four others. A proclamation of 1569 extended the penalities for piracy to those who trafficked with pirates. P. L. Hughes, and J. F. Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, 3 vols (New Haven, London, 1964-9), ii, 313-15, 27 April 1569, extending penalties against piracy. See on this subject, 'The Vice-Admirals of the Coast, English Historical Review, xxii (1907); R. G. Marsden, Documents , i, 486 seq. 43 British Library, Lansdowne Mss. 13, ff. 129-30, 1 March 1571 [/2], instructions for George Wynter and John Hawkins. 44 This quotation is taken from 'the fourme of the proclamations', rather than from the instructions, because the draft of that document is garbled. Humphrey Dyson, A Booke containing all such proclamations as were published during the Reigne of the late Queene Elizabeth (London, 1618), 138; Hughes and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, ii, 357-8. It is interesting to note that the entry in the Calendar of State Papers Domestic derives from a French translation of the 'fourme of the proclamations'. It was made three and a half years later by an English merchant, in connection with a court case relating to a bourgeois of Rouen. rnn tinned

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severity also awaited foreign recidivists, and any Englishmen serving with the freebooters who refused to quit their service within five days. In other words, it was to be announced that these offences would henceforth be deemed to be acts of war, in order that the offenders might incur the death penalty, to be imposed by martial law. The commissioners' instructions then turned to the 'Countey de La Marck, now lying at Dover'. He was to be 'presently required and afterward commanded to departe with all his retinue'. The following words were crossed out: 'notwithstandinge any clause contaynd in his passporte or lycence which he hath from the Queenes Majtie to the contrary'. The draft continued: 'and if he shall make any unnecessary delay, then you shall take order that first he be not suffered to have any manner of... necessytie, and if it will not suffice, then shall you cause hym to be arrested and advise the same'. Here we have a peep into policy in the making. Those words were added in Burghley's hand in place of: 'you shall take order for the shippinge of him and his retinue thence by any waye you maye'. So far as we know, this was the first time that La Marck's arrest had been authorised. This was clearly a last resort; the sands were running out; Sweveghem might leave; the queen had simply got to show that she really had the matter of the Sea Beggars at heart.45 Having considered the new commission and the instructions to Wynter, Hawkins and others, the so-called 'proclamation of 1 March 1572' may now be seen in its proper context, and the meaning of its title becomes comprehensible which, in isolation, it is not. The document is headed: 'the Fourme of the Proclamations [plural] to be> published in the port townes, and market townes, or other publia places, within the limittes of the commission [namely, Kent, Sussex, Southampton and the Isle of Wight] geven by the Queenes Maiestie the first of March 1571 [/2] to sundry persons of credite for reformation of disorders upon the sea coastes'. In other words, the heading relates to the commission and, by extension to the instructions issued to Wynter, Hawkins and others. The document was not, therefore, a proclamation of 1 March 1572, but that part of the commissioners' instructions of which they must - in the near future - 'cause proclamation to be made' in the stated places. Such announcements were necessary because of the penalties specified in the instructions. It The English merchant - whose French was good - evidently failed to understand the original apparently being confused by the word 'martial' which was spelt 'Marshal'. Consequently, the retranslation into English is garbled and incomplete. PRO/SP/15/14; CSPDom. Add. 1566-7%^ p. 385. 45

British Library, Lansdowne Mss, 13, ff. 129-30, 1 March 1571[/2].

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is clear that piracy itself could already constitute a capital offence, and a proclamation of 21 July 1561 claimed that 'pains of death' had been 'divers times extended by her Majesty against sundry pirates'.46 By a further proclamtion of 27 April 1569, those who assisted pirates were to be punished 'as the principal offenders and pirates ought to be'. The instructions of 1 March 1572 plainly stated that the penalty was death. Consequently, the so-called 'proclamation' repeated those clauses of the instructions which erected trafficking with pirates into an act of war, to be punished by death under martial law. It also repeated the penalties to be incurred by chief officers and corporate towns, but omitted — which seems curious — those to be imposed on foreigners. Taken together, the commission, instructions and 'fourme of the proclamtions' are three remarkable documents. All eight of the commissioners named were already empowered to take action in such marine causes. Clearly the necessity for the fresh commission of 1 March 1572 was to provide for an extraordinary tribunal. The commissioners were therefore instructed to apply martial law, under either Wynter or Hawkins - thereby making two tribunals if necessary — plus one or more of the others, and were given commensurate powers. The twin effects of martial law were severity and speed, explicitly enabling the government to avoid 'any such long delays as the common law requireth'.47 The extension by the Tudors of martial law into the sphere of criminal justice was one of a series of innovations to protect public order in dangerous times, albeit in the absence of circumstances categorised as tempus belli, which included the treason of rebellion.48 There would have been an appropriate precedent for reputing the pirates and sea rovers to be rebels, and consequently subject to martial law at the hands of a lord lieutenant or his provost marshals. Instead, however, of reputing the offenders to be rebels, Elizabeth reputed their offences to be acts of war. This was a clever device which simulated the necessary tempus belli, at the same time as covering the foreigners who could not have been indicted as rebels. It was not, however, normal to invest the execution of martial law in a divil commission devoid of any military camouflage. This was certainly 46 Hughes and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, ii, 171. On earlier aspects of the problem of privateering and piracy, see G. D. Ramsay, The City of London in International Politics at the Accession of Elizabeth Tudor (Manchester, 1975), chap. iv. 47 British Library, Lansdowne Mss, 13, ff. 129-30, 1 March 1571 [/2]. 48 Queen Mary was the first monarch to invoke martial law in time of peace. See on this vfrhole subject, J. V. Capua, 'The Early History of Martial Law in England from the Fourteenth Century to the Petition of Right', Cambridge Law Journal, 1977, pp. 152-73; Lindsay Boynton, 'The Tudor Provost-Marshal', English Historical Review, Ixx (1962).

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an exceptional use of martial law, and possibly unique. It therefore indicates just how gravely Elizabeth felt the state to be endangered, poised as it was on the brink of war with Spain. The required proclamations were made either on or before 13 March, not on 1 March which, it is clearly stated in the 'fourme of the proclamations', was the date of the commission and instructions to Wynter and Hawkins. Whether, therefore, the penalty clauses contained in the instructions to a 'court martial5 should properly be classified as a proclamation, is dubious. One surely must distinguish between a proclamation, in the juridical sense, and that which has to be proclaimed.49 The matter is technical and semantic, and one which would not greatly have worried queen Elizabeth, or any sixteenth-century prince, whose powers - in practice if not in theory were only limited by how much they could get away with. It does, however, appear likely that the intention was to pass this off as a proclamation — the customary means of declaring martial law — and indeed, it has been so regarded ever since. Nevertheless, it was quirkish, to say the least. Penalties had, perforce, to be publicised and, had there not, at the time, been worse things to worry about - such as the queen's desperate illness, and therefore the succession — also parliament and the fate of the duke of Norfolk, not to mention Mary queen of Scots - it is conceivable that the plain announcement of the death penalty in this way might have caused some outcry. It would in that case, have been perfectly possible to argue that the queen, upon the advice of the privy council — and that was explicitly stated in the commission - had declared martial law for the safety of the realm, which lay within the prerogative. There definitely was a subtle and calculated imprecision about the whole matter, typical of the queen's superb ingenuity.5 ° That La Marck escaped arrest, is about as much as we know. Presumably he moved off for a while, as he had in August 1571. But he did not go far, and was not away for long.5 * There is no sign of any radical change having occurred in the month of March, before the capture of Brille ignited revolt in the Netherlands, and redirected 49 One might normally expect a proclamation to be properly drafted, complete, and comprehensible, not a fragment of something else. 50 According to G. R. Elton, The Tudor Constitution (edn. Cambridge, 1972), 22, a proclamation could not 'touch life or member or create a felony or treason', Hughes and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, i, pp. xxix-xxx say: 'Proclamations stress the king's sovereign authority, issuing unmistakable public commands on grounds of the common good, and enforcing these legislative orders by means of penalties which include ... mutilation and death. By proclamation [the early Tudor monarchs] pronounce treasons...' Vol. ii, pp. xvi-xvii make it clear that the definition of a proclamation is no straightforward matter. 51 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 350-2, 25 March 1572, Sweveghem to Alva.

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everyone's attention. Sweveghem, for his part, was not impressed by the efforts of the English government; indeed, he was positively hostile. Reporting to Alva on 13 March, he made no comment on the severity of the new penalties which, he said, did not refer to the Sea Beggars, some of whom were still there. He based his opinion on the terminology of the 'proclamtions' which referred to 'sea rovers, commonly called frebutters'. That was not the way in which the government habitually referred to the Sea Beggars, who were presumed to be the servants of William of Orange. Sweveghem undoubtedly had a point, since the orders relating to La Marck were uniquely contained in the confidential instructions. In his opinion, the purpose of the 'proclamations' was to prevent future disorders, and he did not consider that the Spanish demands in respect of the 'pirates', as he called the Sea Beggars, had been met.5 2 Informed by Sweveghem, Alva's reaction was naturally similar; besides, the Sea Beggars had not gone, but were moving about as they always had. 53 Both Sweveghem and Alva appeared to be completely unaware that Elizabeth had actually stretched her powers and her administration to the limits in her efforts to be rid of the Sea Beggars, for composite political, commercial and civil reasons. While the Sea Beggars, privateers, and pirates also caused other, and serious problems, it has been seen that during the traumatic period in question, August 1568-April 1572, Elizabeth's priority — in this respect — was the avoidance of a breach with Spain. It has also been seen that the 'expulsion' of the Sea Beggars was something the government had been trying, unsuccessfully, to achieve, at least since June 1571. That was shortly after they had gathered and settled in large numbers in and around English ports and waters, about Easter of that year. It was in keeping with the character of the saga, that the Sea Beggars' formal 'expulsion' should have been contained in private letters to the queen's own servants. Thus Elizabeth avoided the creation of obstacles should she, in future, find it essential to assist William's servants in the formation or maintenance of a strategic force. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt Elizabeth's statement that neither she, William, nor Louis of Nassau, had ever intended that this unruly fleet should remain in and around England. That problem had arisen from the very long delay in launching the enterprise of the Netherlands - paradoxically a delay to which Elizabeth herself had substantially contributed. There were multiple reasons for this failure to be rid of the Sea Beggars: among them lucri causa, as it was said and, almost certainly, 52 53

Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 341, 13 March 1572, Sweveghem to Alva. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 355-9, 31 March 1572, Alva to Sweveghem.

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widespread sympathy for their cause among Elizabeth's subjects and servants — in itself a vast and separate study. Furthermore, the Sea Beggars could not simply dematerialise, and would not lightly surrender the Narrow Seas which might then constitute Alva's lifeline; nor would that have been any greater service to Elizabeth. This further paradox was inescapable. Elizabeth, therefore, might thunder and cajole, but she was still beset by many dangers. Day by day, with the continual fluctuations of their intensity she had, like a master juggler, to balance these dangers against each other. If the Sea Beggars were unaware of the intricate complexity of her problems, they had a sufficiently accurate notion of what she simply could not do and, for them, there was no greater security to be had in any other place. Thus there was no proclamation of 1 March 1572, and no expulsion of the Sea Beggars, in any previously accepted sense. Consequently these non-events were unrelated to the capture of Brille on 1 April — the timing of which can be otherwise explained. But for its unpredictable repercussions, no one would ever have paid more attention to the assault on Brille in April than, for example, the raid on Dunkirk and Gravelines in January. 54 The correlation of expulsion and attack was, in any case, barely plausible: since the Narrow Seas could not be held from Brille, Dover and Brille could not be regarded as alternative bases. Merely on the level of commonsense, it is obvious that a Beggar raid on Brille — or anywhere else — neither required the queen's intermeddling, nor any alteration in their relations with the English government. Those who make the connection between expulsion and attack, appear to have been unaware that the dramatic and far-reaching consequences of the raid took everyone completely by surprise. Thus they imply — at least by innuendo, since the idea was never precisely formulated - that Elizabeth's 'implication' extended to having willed that phase of the Netherlands revolt. It should not cost much reflection to realise that such an eventuality was far beyond her powers. In reality, any war in the Netherlands was almost the last thing that Elizabeth wanted, most particularly before achieving the alliance with France for which negotiations had been unavoidably suspended since the end of February 1572.55 Furthermore, for the first six months of 1572, Elizabeth was still gravely preoccupied with the repercussions of the Ridolfi plot, possibly the most dangerous domestic crisis of her 54 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 314-17, 18 February 1572, memoir to queen Elizabeth. 55 Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 226-7. The defensive treaty of Blois was signed on 19 April 1572.

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reign. That necessitated the calling of parliament, for which writs went out on 28 March. How could Elizabeth, amidst all this, be thought to have welcomed, let alone have fomented, a crisis in the Netherlands? It was sufficiently well known that any Netherlands' enterprise must necessarily precipitate what Elizabeth feared most of all and - since August 1570 and the end of the wars in France - had steadily laboured to avert: namely a French intervention in the Low Countries. How to obstruct the French in the Netherlands without, at the same time, offending Philip II, became a principal problem of the years 1572-85. If the assault on Brille on 1 April 1572 was not related to the Sea Beggars' 'expulsion' from England, its timing was nevertheless, interesting. It has been seen that in mid-March 1572 part of the Sea Beggar fleet was still there, in the Channel.56 Later in the month, La Marck was said to be at the Isle of Wight with sixteen ships, together with one English and four French ships which he had recently seized.5 7 About 25 March La Marck evidently 'gave out' to his company that he was expecting reinforcements for an enterprise against Brille.5 8 There is nothing surprising about that: strategically Brille was of paramount importance; it featured in all William's plans of campaign and had been one of his objectives in the autumn of 1570.59 Indeed, De Spes was later to claim that he had had information of the designs against Brille six months before the execution of the project, and that he had advised Alva accordingly. More reliably, Morillon, the prevot of Brussels, also reported that Alva had had several months' warning.60 These reports made very good sense. Lancelot de Brederode, who had splintered off from the Channel group in 1571, joined up about September with Willem van Blois van Treslong, a native of Brille, where his father had acted as bailli.6 1 Together they planned an assault on Brille in October or November. This, according to Dietz, was to have been a spoiling raid, before establishing a winter base at Delfzijl. The enterprise had failed, 56 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 341,13 March 1572, Sweveghem to Alva. 57 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 359-60, 31 March 1572, Sweveghem to Alva. 58 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 350-2, 25 March 1572, Sweveghem to Alva. 59 Dietz, 273. 60 CSPSp., 1568-79, p* 366 [June 1572] (placed under 1571), relation of the ambassador Don Gerau De; Spes; Charles Piot, Correspondance du cardinal de Granvelle, 1565-1586, 12 vols (Paris, 1877-96), iv, 227-30, 25 May 1572, Morillon to Granvelle. 61 Brederode's movements are difficult to ascertain with any precision. De Spes claimed to have obtained his detention in May 1571. On 19 July he said Brederode had had an interview with the council but 'seems to have gone back to his ships in poor health and with little stomach for fighting'. Dietz, 314, said that he went to Lowestoft in June and remained there as 'admiral'. CSPSp., 1568-79, p. 306, 9 May 1571, De Spes to Philip II, Brussels; Avermaete, Les Gueux, 58; J. C. A. de Meij, De Watergeuzen en de Nederlanden 1568-1572 (Amsterdam, 1972), 330; Dietz, 318.

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however, because one of Brederode's spies was captured, and the town was held by a Spanish garrison which did not leave until 19 November.62 Brederode and van Treslong were not on good terms. Whether or not for that reason, their fleets separated and Brederode rejoined the Channel fleet. There was, therefore, nothing in the least surprising that van Treslong should have wished to make another! attempt on Brille in the spring of 1572, together with La Marck, whor had sequestered property in the area. The final timing of the enterpriser would appear to have been governed by the movements of the greaf Spanish fleet which had left Zealand the previous December. According to Sweveghem, writing on 21 March, some of the 'pirates' had withdrawn to La Rochelle to join up with other forces, which may havei meant to take troops on board, in order to intercept this fleet.63! Presumably Sweveghem was right, since the interception was effected on 28 March in the straits of Calais and two valuable ships were, captured. 64 That done, the Sea Beggars raced for Brille. Had thei Spanish fleet eluded them and reached the Netherlands first, the consequences could have been very serious for the future. Alva — whoi had allegedly been warned — was already engaged in fortifying Flushing! and Walcheren. Indeed, though hampered by lack of money, he was generally putting that coast in a state of defence. Thus the whole Scheldt-Meuse area might shortly have been quite strongly held. 65 One should not, however, assume that the Sea Beggars' intention was to remain in Brille. La Mo the, the French ambassador in England, commented that Alva would soon chase them out.66 Alva himself, who had some interest in playing the matter down, observed with % nonchalance he may not have felt, 'no es nada'.6 7 Whether it was ever intended that the Channel fleet should eventually be employed against Brille as part of the projected Netherlands' enterprise, still rather vaguely intended for the spring of 1572, has never been established. Walsingham claimed that Nassau had not been 'pryvye' to the Sea Beggar intentions.68 Nassau himself was credibly, if uncertainly, 62 De Meij, De Watergeuzen, 330. 63 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 347, 21 March 1572, Sweveghem to Courtville. 64 La Mothe, Correspondance, iv, 427, 14 April 1572, La Mothe to Charles IX; Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 347, 21 March 1572, Sweveghem to Courtville. It is not clear if Alva's successor, Medina Cell, was on board. After much delay, he eventually arrived in mid-June 1572. Ibid., 425, 16 June 1572, Thomas Morgan to Burghley. 65 Granvelle, Correspondance, iv, 209, 28 April 1572, Morillon to Granvelle; Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, ii, 238, 3 April 1572, Alva to Philip II. 66 La Mothe, Correspondance, iv, 427, 14 April 1572, La Mothe to Charles IX. 67 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 386 n.l. 68 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, 414 n. 1, 22 April 1572, Walsingham to Burghley.

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reported to have said: 'Ah, les sotz, ils se sont trop hastez et ne m'ont pas voullu croire'.6 9 Since La Marck's intentions had been given out before 25 March, it seems likely that Nassau, as well as De Spes , had heard of this, and that Nassau may have sought to restrain them. On the other hand, he might have been referring, not to the raid, as such, but to the subsequent retention of Brille. Very likely they surprised even themselves. The town was, apparently, afraid of Alva and, owing to a protestant element there, the Beggars were not entirely unwelcome.70 William of Orange was astonished, because he had no intelligence links ift the area. Indeed, he was angry that La Marck had undertaken the Enterprise, not only without orders, but also without even informing him, so that operations could be combined and directed.71 According to Marnix de Sainte-Aldegonde, William had in fact determined to ignore the matter. But, when, within the next ten days, Delfshaven, Schiedam, Rotterdam and Gouda were all in revolt, William inevitably received appeals for help. He certainly needed support, and this apparently spontaneous combustion was something he could not afford to ignore.72 Indeed, it proved to be something that all Europe could not ignore including, of course, queen Elizabeth. , 6 9 L. P. Gachard, La Bibliotheque Nationale a Paris. Notices et extraits des manuscrits qui concernent I'histoire de Belgique, 2 vols (Brussels, 1875, 1877), ii, 370, 31 May 1572, Saint-Gouard to Charles IX. r 70 A verm aete, Les Gueux, 59-61. 71 J. F. van Someren, La Correspondance du prince Guillaume d'Orange avec Jacques de Wesenbeke (Utrecht, Amsterdam, 1896), 258-60, 25 April 1572, William to Wesenbeke. 72 L. P. Gachard, Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne, 6 vols (Brussels, 1850-7), ili, 369-73, 10 December 1573, report by Noircarmes of an examination of Marnix de Stain te-Aldegonde.

12 WILLIAM OF ORANGE AND THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS: A MISSING DIMENSION* William of Orange has traditionally been judged in a diversity of ways. He has been seen as an ambitious self seeker - which would be hard to substantiate; he has been seen as the traiterous author of rebellion against a lawful sovereign and, conversely, as the patriot hero of a brave and independent people. He has been represented as one who changed his religion as readily as his cloak, and also as the archetype of tolerant moderation. All these views tend to confine William narrowly within the affairs of the Netherlands. While it is not to be contested that the Low Countries were, and remained, his principal concern, it is because they became the political hub of western Europe that William's life and role should be placed in a broader, European context. Thus, the missing dimension, to be proposed, is that of William's role in the great ideological struggle of the sixteenth century — a significant role on account of his European stature. Besides his involvement in the variegated elements of the Netherlands - of close concern to all their neighbours - William steadfastly opposed the international catholic movement whose guiding purpose was, necessarily, the extermination of protestantism, everywhere. The conviction that heresy must be exterminated was as old as European Christendom and, at least since the twelfth century, embodied in canon and in civil law. One might, therefore, reasonably present the inevitable struggle as a sixteenth century crusade, both in the sense of a movement, and in the sense of a religious war backed by a reconstituted Roman Inquisition. Obviously the political circumstances of early modern Europe rendered this latter-day crusade different from those of the middle ages: in the first place, the religious conflict was paralleled by political and factional power struggles. On the other hand, the struggle against the protestant heresies - which continued to spread and to develop for several decades - was seen by the Papacy as another dimension or aspect of the ancient and continuing struggle against the infidel Turk - which, in the sixteenth century had also assumed a political dimension. This is especially true of the pontificate of Gregory XIII (1572-85), who laboured hard against both infidel and heretic.1 * I would like to thank Professor K. W. Swart for kindly reading this paper very carefully and for his advice and amendments, but without implying that he necessarily agrees with the end result. 1. Ludwig von Pastor: History of the Popes, 35 vols (London, 1891 etc.), xviii, 67-8;

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This European struggle contained the essence of tragedy in that the various contenders were doing what they felt compelled to do; and with roughly equal ruthlessness. It was proper for the pope to seek the overthrow of William and the destruction of queen Elizabeth, just as it was also proper for William and Elizabeth to defend their inheritance as best they might. The catholic will to oppose protestants could only be fulfilled through the action of leading catholics and catholic princes. But since they were not of one mind, this was a weakness which can now be seen to have ensured the movement's evanescence. The rigid Catholicism of Philip II of Spain did not render him a compliant executor of Papal politics. Yet the collapse of the French monarchy, after the death of Henry II in 1559, forced the reformed Papacy into a greater degree of dependence upon Spain, whose policy never more than partially co-incided with that of Rome.2 However, so far as the Spanish Netherlands were concerned, Papal policy and the Inquisition marched in step with royal authority - a combination which threatened to destroy both the prosperity and the identity of those provinces, such as contemporaries knew and cherished them.^ Thus, in default of any compromise agreement, or measure of toleration, there was a limit beyond which many people would recoil from the cruelty of an attempt to exterminate heresy, and from the iniquitous futility of destroying the life of whole communities in the pursuit of an unattainable goal.4 Obviously William of Orange belonged to this category. He did not seek the role he was to play in opposing what he saw as catholic oppression; rather he was carried on a powerful tide over which he had no control, constantly reacting to the faits accomplis of others. Thus his career should not be assessed either in simple or in static terms. The grave and haggard elder statesman bore little resemblance to the unspoilt darling of the Burgundian court. William was publicly proscribed by king Philip - in all serenity of conscience - as the suxix, 1-5; Liisi Karttunen: "Gregoire XIII comme politician et souverain," Annales Academiae Scientiamm Fennicae, serie B, vol. ii (1911), 1-2. 2. This point was explicitly made by cardinal Mo rone. Josef Susta: Die Romische Curie und das Condi von Trient unter PiusIV, 4 vols (Vienna, 1904-14), i, 258-61, 2 October 1561, Morone to Alva; Ludwig von Pastor: Histoire des papes, 16 vols (Paris, 1888-1934), xvi, 250; Karttunen, 1-4. 3. See, for example, the Compromise of January 1566, E. H. Kossmann, A. F. Mellink: Texts concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands (Cambridge, 1974), 59-62. 4. Peter Newman Brooks, Ed.: Reformation, Principle and Practice. Essays in Honour of A. G. Dickens (London, 1980), 135-57. Alastair Duke has analyzed why the suppression of heresy should have aroused such opposition in the largely catholic Netherlands.

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preme enemy of Spain.5 As such, William obstructed the subjection of the Netherlands, whose resistance depended, if not uniquely, upon Calvinist fervour. He also obstructed an enterprise of England for her restoration to Rome, without which it was alleged, and Philip fitfully believed, there could be no settlement of the Netherlands.6 This supreme enemy of Spain was also the supreme enemy of the catholic crusade; not that the two were inevitably synonymous, since Philip never truly accepted the massive burden of the catholic leadership or, in terms of the old cliche, he never quite became the secular arm of the Counter Reformation.7 Nevertheless, the Papacy, the Queen of Scots, English exiles and catholics everywhere all cast him in that role, and periodically induced him to assume it.8 It would not be right, because William opposed the catholic crusade, to represent him as a protestant hero. His distinction was of a higher order. William's God, when he discovered him, was neither that of Rome nor of Geneva, whose uncompromising votaries were equally intolerant. Above and beyond every practical impediment, William always sought religious peace. Paradoxically, he was quickly obliged to suffer the Netherlands conflict to become religious, and to found his own politics on protestant support, thereby undermining his true objective of one fatherland. Religion - together with the inadequacies of the sovereign and the rivalry of the nobility - divided those provinces he strove to unite, and brought them, like their neighbours in France, to civil war. It was not until about 1559, when the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis ended the European wars, that a catholic crusade could materialise. This was never an organisation, nor did it have a single, clear policy; it was rather an evolving aspiration and endeavour. Contemporaries generally expressed themselves in terms of their fears, or hopes, and spoke of catholic leagues and conspiracies. 5. Herbert H. Rowen: The Low Countries in Early Modern Times (New York, 1972), 77-8, 15 March 1580. 6. L. P. Gachard: Correspondence de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas, 5 vols (Brussels, 1848-79), ii, 198-202, 14 September 1571, Philip II to Alva. When Philip expressed this view in 1571, he feared the imminent conclusion of an Anglo-French marriage treaty. 7. See for example, Gachard, Correspondence de Philippe //, vol. v, 356-61, 26 May 1577, Don John to Philip II; 363-5, 26 May 1577, Don John to Antonio Perez; 376-8, 30 May 1577, Escovedo to Philip II. These letters illustrate Philip's reluctance to act. 8. P. O. von Torne: Ptolemee Gallio, cardinal de Come (Paris 1907), 157-9; P. O. von Tome: Don Juan d'Autriche et les pro/ets de conquete de I'Angleterre, 2 vols (Helsinki, 1915, 1928), ii, 64-9; Cuthbert Robinson: Nicolo Ormaneto, a Papal Envoy in the Sixteenth Century (Londonl 1920), 88-90; Pastor, Histoire des Popes, xvi, 250-1; Pastor, History of the Popes, xix, 407-8.

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Leagues and conspiracies certainly occurred, and such ideas were ubiquitous. However, there was no specific, continuous league, if only because the catholics - even the most militant - were not, politically, homogeneous, and events were moving fast. This conflict - generally represented as holy - was spasmodically adopted by leading catholics, here or there, usually when opportunity and self-interest co-incided. Thus, while the overall objective was steady, the target and the means would vary. One could say that France was the first target, followed by the Netherlands; then, at least from 1568, England complicated these closely related problems. However, in some ways, all three problems co-existed from 1559. The catholic crusade sprang, more or less simultaneously, from various sources, but is most clearly evident in France. This is simply because, for some years after the religious peace of Augsburg in the Empire, 1555, the problem of heresy was centred in France. Henry II had attempted to introduce a Papal Inquisition, and actually began a war of avowed extermination.9 Then, precisely at the time of the treaty, in April 1559, the acts of Supremacy and Uniformity in Elizabethan England added a fresh complication to the problem of continental heresy, and despite their declared amity, drove a new wedge between Spain and France.10 The skein was therefore already tangled. William's opposition to this nascent catholic movement originally consisted largely in his attitudes at home, and in an apprehensive aversion from developments in neighbouring France. It is therefore necessary to examine these attitudes, and the connections between William's early career and the beginning of the catholic movement. Secondly, it will be seen how it was that William emerged as an international leader who necessarily opposed the catholic crusade - then actively pursued by the Papacy, and less actively by Spain — and, finally, how this leadership reached a climax during the governorship in the Netherlands of Don John of Austria. The last phase of William's career, 1578-84, comprised the disastrous Anjou episode, at a time when leadership of the catholic crusade once again reverted to the French. What, then, were William's attitudes, and his connections with the catholic crusade as it developed in France? 9. N. M. Sutherland: The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition (New Haven, London, 1980), chap, ii; E. Maugis: Histoire du Parlement de Paris, 2 vols (Paris, 1914), 3 seq.; G. Ribier: Lettres et memoires d'Estat, 2 vols (Blois, 1666), ii, 677-8, 13 February 1556/7, Henry II to de Selve; 678-84, 28 March 1556/7, de Selve to Henry II; A. Fontanon: Les Edits et ordonnances des rois de France, 4 vols (Paris, 1611), iv, 227-8, 26 April 1557, Papal brief. 10. This problem of England was expressed by Alva, who was in Paris when Henry II died. Duque de Alba: Epistolario del III duque de Alba Don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, 3 vols (Madrid, 1952), i, 507, 11 July 1559, Alva to Philip II.

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Together with the duke of Alva, and Granvelle - then known as the bishop of Arras - William was a Spanish commissioner for the peace negotiations between France and Spain; later he became a hostage for its ratification, and also attended the coronation of Francis II.11 It is very well known that, in hisApology of 1581, William claimed to have learnt from Henry II that Alva was negotiating ways of exterminating all suspected protestants in France, the Netherlands and elsewhere. The oruel execution of protestants, the Apology declared, had never been to William's liking.12 The Apology has generally been rejected as bad evidence, but there are now sufficient reasons why the statement about Henry II and Alva should be taken seriously. In the first place, it appears to be firmly established that, in January 1559, during the peace negotiations, an agreement was reached between the Kings of France and Spain to intensify their persecution of heresy, and also to return to their own country any heretics who crossed the frontiers - which naturally included the Netherlands.13 By the summer of 1559, both kings had already shown that they were in earnest. After the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, the cardinal de Tournon expressed to Henry II his hope of organising something against the new religion while the duke of Alva was still in France.14 The subject was not secret, and William of Orange was there. Indeed, his claim was confirmed when explicitly reported by Granvelle in 1562; and Granvelle should have known since, in terms of Spanish politics, he belonged to the Alva faction. In that sense, he was Alva's representative in the Netherlands. William's claim was also recalled by his brother, Louis of Nassau, in 1571.15 Nassau informed sir Francis Walsingham that after the resignation of Charles V, the cardinal of Lorraine had "practised secretly" with Arras to advise peace and the establishment of an Inquisition in France and Flanders.16 Lorraine, Arras, and possibly Alva had met to discuss peace, and

11. L. P. Gachard: Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne, 6 vols (Brussels, 1850-7), i, pp. xxxv-xxxvii. 12. H. Wansink: The Apologie of Prince William of Orange against the Proclamation of the King of Spain (Leiden, 1969), 61-2; Rowen, 80-91, 13 December 1580, the prince's reply to the king; F. A. M. Mignet: Journal des Savants, March 1857, p. 170; Theodore Juste: Histoire de la Revolution des Pays-Bas sous Philippe II, 2 vols (Brussels, 1860), i, 141-2. 13. Geoffrey Parker: The Dutch Revolt (London, 1977), 285 n. 38. 14. Ribier, ii, 806-8, 9 July 1559, Tournon to Henry II. 15. Charles Weiss: Papiers d'Etat du cardinal de Granvelle, 9 vols (Paris, 1841-52), vi, 567-70, 14 June 1562, Granvelle to Philippe II. 16. Dudley Digges: The Compleat Ambassador (ed. London, 1655), 123, 12 August 1571, Walsingham to Burghley.

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presumably also religion in May 1558.17 The Spanish were deeply anxious about the expansion of heresy in France because of its obvious threat to the Netherlands, where protestantism was not yet firmly established. There were suspicions, almost certainly false, that Lorraine and Granvelle had formed some sort of pact about this time. There is also evidence between 1559 and 1562 of talk about a more general catholic league of the Papacy, France and Spain, variously directed against Gfeneva, the huguenots and England.18 While Philip II was not, at this time, in favour of a catholic league, there was no concealing that he intended to use the peace for the containment and extermination of heresy, which was only to be expected as a direct continuation of his father's policy. Before leaving the Netherlands for Spain in August 1559, he ordered the regent, Margaret of Parma, to enforce the placards precisely. William claimed to have circumvented Philip's parting orders to execute several suspects, because he could not do so in good conscience.19 The future was already inauspicious, and William's decision in 1560 to seek a rich, Lutheran marriage would appear to have been a precaution; it certainly cost him considerable disapproval and brought him no happiness. Well before the marriage was solemnised in August 1561, William of Orange, Lamoral count of Egmont, and Philippe de Montmorency, count Homes had begun to fall out with Granvelle. This celebrated quarrel arose between March and July 1561, and is relevant both to an examination of William's religious attitudes and to the beginnings of the catholic crusade in France.20 There were, of course, many reasons for the opposition of the nobles to Granvelle. P. D. Lagomarsino has shown conclusively that conflict was inevitable because Granvelle and the Netherlands' high nobility had, already in Charles' reign, belonged to opposing political factions. The cynical struggles of the factions for power, and the fruits of power, super17. J. Lestocquoy, Ed.: Acta Nuntiaturae Gallicae, xiv, Correspondence des nonces en France. Lenziet Gualtiero, legation du cardinal Trivultio, 1557-1561 (Rome, 1977), 120, 19 April 1558, Trivultio to Carafa; 123-4, 6 May 1558, Trivultio to Carafa. 18. Mignet, Journal des Savants, March 1857, pp. 169-71, 171 n. 1, 26 June 1559, Alva to Philip II; Patrick Forbes: A Full View of the Public Transactions in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, 2 vols (London, 1740-1), i, 144, 21 June 1559, Throckmorton to the privy council; Pastor, Histoire des popes, xvi, 107, 115; Susta, i, 512, 27 July 1562, Odescalco to Borromeo; 521,3 August 1563, Crivello, nuncio in Spain, to Borromeo. 19. L. P. Gachard: Collection de documens inedits concernant I'histoire de la Belgique, 3 vols (Brussels, 1883-5), i, 332-9, 8 August 1559, Philip II to the grand conseil de Malines; P. Claessens: L'Inquisition et le regime penal pour la repression de I'heresie dans les Pays-Bas du passe ((Turnhout, 1886), 108-1 l;Rowen, 88-9. 20. Gachard, Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne, ii, pp. vii, viii.

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seded all other considerations.21 The conflict which already existed was heightened by evolving circumstances. Since Philip's accession, Granvelle had played a central role in the Spanish Netherlands government. In March 1561 he became a cardinal - which afforded social precedence - at the same time as the creation of new bishoprics, which increased his power. The new bishoprics were guaranteed to cause trouble, especially opposition to religious persecution in areas of the Netherlands which concerned William, particularly Brabant and its city of Antwerp.22 It was Granvelle himself who indicated that concurrent events in France were also a contributory factor in the crisis in his relations with the nobles between March and July 1561. In March 1561, huguenot leaders entered the council and appeared likely to prevail at court.23 Catholic leaders, under the due de Guise, responded with the so-called treaty of the Triumvirate, April 1561.24 The treaty's declared intention was to destroy the lieutenant-general, the King of Navarre, and his whole house of Bourbon - held to be corrupting the young king - and also to destroy the heretics in France and, thereafter, those in neighbouring countries. This was very much what Alva was said to have proposed. Furthermore, some six months later, it was determined in Rome that heresy in France would have to be resisted. According to Philip's ambassador in Rome, the pope declared that he would damn the French heretics and "venir a las manos", there being no other remedy. It is interesting to note that in urging on Spain that she should execute the policy of the Triumvirate, by overthrowing Navarre and exterminating heresy in France, cardinal Mo rone addressed himself to Alva rather than to Philip II. 25 In evolving ways, Triumvirate policy was, indeed, pursued for the rest of the century. The existence and policy of the Triumvirate was known to the huguenots and, 21. P. D. Lagomarsino: "Court Factions and the Formulation of Spanish Policy Towards the Netherlands, 1559-1567," (Cambridge, Ph. D., 1973). 22. G. D. Ramsay has shown how the quarrel between the nobles and Granvelle shortly affected the affairs of Antwerp, of which William was Burgrave, as well as relations with England. The City of London in International Politics at the Accession of Elizabeth Tudor (Manchester, 1975), ch. vi. 23. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 120 seq. 24. Text in N. M. Sutherland: The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559-1572 (London, 1973), 347-50. 25. Weiss, Papiers d'&ats, vi, 398-401, 7 November 1561, Vargas to Philip II. This letter expresses the Papal opinion that severity should have been used in France from the start. Susta, i, 258-61, 2 October 1561, Morone to Alva; Calendar of State Papers Foreign, 1561-2, p. 365, 11 October 1561, intelligences from Italy, which are confirmed by Morone's letter.

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through them, to the Netherlands nobility. The admiral Coligny, a Montmorency, was a cousin of William's associates Homes and his brother, Floris de Montmorency, baron of Montigny. On 14 June 1562, Granvelle reported to Philip II that Orange and Egmont had accused him of having formed a catholic league with the Guises, linking this with Alva's plans - previously voiced by Henry II - to negotiate ways of exterminating protestants in France, the Netherlands and elsewhere.26 In view of Alva's subsequent career, there is no reason to doubt this. Thus it appeared that the catholics were simultaneously beginning to marshal their strength, both in France and in the Netherlands; even from this early stage, the separate French and Netherlands causes were to some extent associated. There was indeed substance in the nobles' accusation, only it was the king himself, rather than his servant Granvelle, who had been anxiously seeking Guise co-operation; furthermore, he did so with Papal encouragement. Genuinely anxious about the Netherlands, Philip was also prepared to play along with Papal policy to get the leading protestants out of the French council. This was achieved in February 1562.27 Franco-Spanish relations before the civil wars is a big subject. In general terms, however, Philip was deeply involved in the affairs of France and, when she reached the brink of civil war, he meant to intervene - albeit not on the conquering scale proposed by Morone.28 It was not a simple matter, since intervention from the neighbouring Netherlands required the co-operation of William and the nobles. When, therefore, they finally had to be consulted, on 26 May 1562, they were angry at having been kept in ignorance. Furthermore, they were strongly opposed to supporting the catholic oppression in France, which trampled on conscience and threatened the life, liberty and property of their kinsmen, among thousands of others.29 Besides, for four months past, Calvinism had been recognised and legalised. Thus, William's positive opposition to Philip's 26. Weiss, Papiers d'faat, vi, 540-5, 13 May 1562, Granvelle to Philip II; 567-70, 14 June 1562, Granvelle to Philip II. Thedore Juste: Le Comte d'Egmont et le comte de Homes (Paris, 1862), 56-7. 27. Weiss, Papiers d'fitat, vi, 375-9, 6 October 1561, Philip II to Granvelle; 432-43, late 1561, rapport secret de Courteville; 444-53, 13 December 1561, Margaret to Philip II; 453-60, 15 December 1561, Granvelle to Philip II; C. Paillard: Considerations sur les causes generates des troubles des Pay s-Basau X Vie siecle (Brussels, 1874), 85; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 135 & n. 117. 28. Susta, i, 258-61, 2 October 1561, Morone to Alva. 29. The nobles were consulted in a meeting of the knights of the Order of the Golden Fleece, 26 May 1562. Parker, 52-3. Weiss, Papiersd'&at, vi, 444-53, 13 December 1561, Margaret to Philip II; vii, 11 seq., 11 March 1563, Granvelle to Philip II; 44-53, 10 March 1563, Granvelle to Philip II.

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religious policy, and to the objectives of the Triumvirate, is clearly established by May 1562. The first civil war was then about to begin; Pius IV bargained with the catholics in France and sought to draw Spain into a union, or league both words were used - of catholic princes. In the Netherlands the nobles sustained their opposition, levelled at Granvelle.30 The eventual departure of Granvelle in March 1564, did not shield the Netherlands from the effects of the recent decrees of Trent, December 1563. The termination of the council of Trent stimulated an alarming increase in catholic pressure and activity. The issues were now defined, and the irreparable breach was proclaimed. However, the decrees of Trent were rejected in France. Furthermore, the murder of Francis due de Guise, general of the Triumvirate and hope of the Papacy, was followed by the peace of Amboise, 19 March 1563, which again afforded limited toleration. Clearly, therefore, something had to be done about it. The problem of heresy in France, and elsewhere, had certainly been scheduled for consideration at Trent, but appears to have become submerged by various disagreements on other matters. Catherine de Medici, the peacemaker, had strongly deprecated the way the council at Trent had been going and, in April 1563, had proposed a summit meeting of the pope, emperor, King of the Romans and the Kings of France and Spain. Late in 1563, the pope adopted this idea, hoping thereby to obtain collective ratification of the decrees: "qui n'est pas moings dire en parolles couvertes," Catherine wrote, "que de faire une ligue pour le fait de la religion." That, she went on, was "toute au contraire de madite intention."31 In these circumstances, William was among those who insisted upon the need for a radical change in religious policy in the Netherlands. If that was partly a matter of practical possibilities, in December 1564 he declared in council that he could not approve of any prince who attempted to rule the consciences of

30. In May 1562, Paolo Odescalco was sent to Spain for the purpose of seeking a league. §usta, ii, 166; 167-9, 23 May 1562, Borromeo to the legates at Trent; 512, 27 July 1562, Odescalco to Borromeo; 521, 3 August 1563, Crivello, nuncio in Spain, to Borromeo; Pastor, Histoire des popes, xvi, 106-7; Louis de Maimbourg: Historic de la ligue (Paris, 1864), 12-15. 31. Pastor, Histoire des popes, xvi, 110 n. 2, 110-11; A. O. Meyer: England and the Catholic Church under Queen Elizabeth (London, 1967), 471 [2 June 1563], Borromeo to the legates at Trent; H. de La Ferriere: Catherine de Medicis, Lettres, vols i-iv (Paris, 1880-95), ii, 26-8, 30 April 1563, Catherine to Rennes; 110-11, 9 November 1563, Catherine to Rennes; 125-8, 29 December 1563, Catherine to Rennes; 151-5, 28 February 1564, Catherine to Rennes; Le Laboureur: Memoires de Michel de Castelnau, 2 vols (ed. Brussels, 1731), ii, 320-6.

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his subjects.32 William thereby ranged himself in open opposition to militant Catholicism, and to the decrees of Trent, which Philip sought to impose on the Netherlands without consultation. With royal permission, Margaret referred the religious problem to a special commission in 1565, when Philip was pre-occupied with the great siege of Malta. The commissions' report, submitted in June, recommended some modifications, which were rejected by Philip.33 The report co-incided with the notorious interview at Bayonne between the courts of France and Spain, at which Philip was represented by the redoubtable Alva. Both the huguenots and the Netherlanders felt that their fate was sealed. Years later, William referred to the league that was made at Bayonne in which, therefore, he too believed.34 While Catherine de Medici had agreed to nothing, Alva himself claimed to have established close relations with French catholic leaders and to have discussed the murder of the huguenot leaders.35 Thus, from 1565 there was, indeed, a sort of league, but a factional one rather than, as some supposed, a league of princes on the national level.36 Philip II, who refused to attend the meeting, was far more cautious than Alva, and Catherine's policy was clean contrary. Indeed, it was her adamant refusal to co-operate in extreme catholic policy which led the pope to declare that the only way to restore France to order - meaning one religion - was to proceed seriously against Coligny, the prince de Conde and the chancellor Michel de L'Hospital; that could only be done by force of arms. Proceedings against Coligny, Conde, and de L'Hospital, and renewed civil war, were precisely the policies which Lorraine pursued until his disgrace in August 1570.37 32. K. W. Swart: William the Silent and the Revolt of the Netherlands (Historical Association pamphlet, 1978), 11. 33. Alphonse Wauters: Memoires de Viglius et d'Hopperus (Brussels, 1858), 91-103; Claessens, 135-7. 34. CSPF., 1575-7, p. 585, Notes on the State of the Prince of Orange and the provinces of Holland and Zealand, May 1577; Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 35-46. 35. Weiss, Papiersd'&at, ix, 294-309, 21 June 1565, Alva to Philip II. Alva, whose policy did not change, was reported a little later to have favoured a catholic league against all who denied the pope's authority. Ricardo de Hinojosa: Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Pontificia en Espana (Madrid, 1896), 183-4, 17 November 1566, Rossano to Alessandria, 23 December 1566, Rossano to Alessandria. 36. John Sturm, for instance, was not accurately informed. He referred later to the treaty made between France and Spain at Bayonne. CSPF., 1577-8, p. 353,5 December 1577, Sturm to Elizabeth. 37. Benno Hilliger, "Katharina von Medicis und die Zusammenkunft in Bayonne, 1565," Historisches Taschenbuch, vi (1892), 293 n. 1, 14 September 1565, cardinal Francisco

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After Bayonne, Lorraine was forbidden to communicate with Philip's servants. The meeting drew the huguenots and the Netherlands much closer together and it is small wonder that the passage of Alva from Milan to the Netherlands in the summer of 1567 should have caused a panic, both there and in France. On the personal level, there was extensive cousinage between the nobles and seigneurs; now, increasingly clearly, they were all threatened by the same executors of the catholic crusade. Granvelle warned Philip at this time of the close and regular correspondence between Montigny and his Chatillon cousins in France.38 Fears aroused in the Netherlands by the interview at Bayonne were hardly allayed by Philip's famous letters from the Segovia Woods, 17 October 1565, followed by Margaret's instructions of 18 December.39 She again commanded the meticulous application of the decrees of Trent, the Inquisition and the placards, according to the exact letter of the law. A few weeks later, on 24 January 1566, William repudiated responsibility for the execution of such orders, and offered his resignation. Twice in his letter to the regent, William referred to the affairs of their neighbours, thereby suggesting his awareness of events in France. Gacriard described this letter as having been a watershed in William's career, though it followed logically enough from his attitude and utterances all along.40 January 1566 was, nevertheless, a watershed in the growing ideological struggle. William's offer of resignation came just twelve days after the election to the Holy See of that austere Dominican, Pius V, who had served as inquisitor general since 1558. The support of Catholicism was, not surprisingly, Pius V's ruling idea. He wished to unite all catholic powers against heresy in the Netherlands, England and, above all, in France, his chief pre-occupation. This "idee directrice" was embodied in the instructions of his nuncio to France, Michel della Torre, who was required to demand the execution of the decrees of Trent, and the complete restoration of Catholicism. He was not well received.41 The outlook for the Netherlands was grave. It is well known that violent disorders hit the Netherlands in that summer of 1566. While William strove to contain Antwerp — a Calvinist centre where one Pacheco to Philip II. He gives an incomplete Simancas reference. On what happened to Coligny, Conde and de L'Hospital, see Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. 38. Weiss, Papiers d'fitat, ix, 404, 18 July 1565, Granvelle to Philip II. 39. Kossmann and Mellink, 53-6; Gachard, Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne, ii, pp. xxvii, 106 n. 1-107. 40. Gachard, Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne, ii, 106-10, 24 January 1566, William of Orange to Margaret of Parma. 41. Charles Hirschauer: La Politique de St. Pie V en France, 1566-1572 (Paris, 1922), pp. vi-vii, 13-16, 25; Pastor, History of the Popes, xvii, 47-9, 67-8; xviii, 288-92.

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of the new bishoprics had had to be suspended in 1563 — the huguenots offered armed assistance to the confederate nobility meeting at St. Trond.42 Although the offer was not then accepted, the French and the Netherlands struggles were nevertheless rapidly merging. "It is doubtful," professor Swart has written at this stage, "whether Orange would ever have become a rebel if his views on the issue of religious toleration had not been diametrically opposed to those held by Philip II."43 One might add, in passing, that they were remarkably similar to those of Catherine de Medici. The problem, William wrote to his brother, count John, in February 1567, was how to reconcile Christian duty with obedience.44 That was a problem without solution, and one that William may have laid aside. If, when he left the Netherlands in April 1567, there were any tenaciously hopeful doubts in William's mind, they did not survive his summons on a charge of treason in January 1568, the confiscation of his property, and the abduction of his son — the king's godchild — Philip William, who was never to see his father again. William had either to retire to Dillenburg or else to assume the heavy cross of opposition to the catholic crusade. He elected to make war on the captain general, the duke of Alva, the very personification of the movement he - Alva had fostered before its clear adoption by the post-Tidentine Papacy.45 In this image, Alva was execrated in the Netherlands. There he became a military inquisitor, concerned not only with those provinces, but also with the French and, had Philip had his way, with a timely extinction of protestant England.46 42. CSPF., 1566-8, p. 103, 10 July 1566, John Keyle to Cecil; 119-20, 17 August 1566, Hugh Fitzwilliam to Cecil, Paris. All the great protestants were said to be in Paris consulting how to help the Netherlands. Kervyn de Lettenhove: Relations politiques des Pays-Bas et de VAngleterre sous le regne de Philippe II, 11 vols (Brussels, 1882-1900), iv, p. iv, "La [Antwerp] reside le conseil des consistoires et la se recrutent les milices." Claessens, 166. 43. Swart, William the Silent, 12; La Ferriere, Lettres, ii, 151-5, 28 February 1564, Catherines to Rennes. 44. Groen van Prinsterer: Archives ou correspondence inedites de la maison d'OrangeNassau. Serie i, 8 vols (Leiden, 1835-96), hi, 26, 2 February 1567, William of Orange to count John. 45. William said that he could in no wise take the new oath required of him, so he would withdraw "pour quelque temps." He still thought the king might come in person. Gachard, Correspondence de Guillaume le Taciturne, ii, 357-9, 13 April 1567, William of Orange to Berghes; 360-70, 10 April 1567, William of Orange to Philip II; CSPF., 1569-71 (sic) appendix, p. 595, Declaration of William of Orange, 20 July 1568; 592, 10 June 1568, Commission by the Prince of Orange. William referred to the "tyrannic Albanique." 46. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, v, p. xvi; CSPF., 1575-7, pp. 218-19, "Discourse of Flanders," refers to the confederacy of the last council of Trent... for the rooting-out by

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In his Justification of April 1568, William himself declared: "The Spanish ... endeavour, by ... renewal of edicts, to extirpate the pure word of God, so as to achieve more effectively their designs and aims in other adjacent lands." He commissioned his brother Louis and others, "to contend against these conditions."47 This "contention" was to protect the freedom and liberty of everyone in his religion and conscience, as well as to serve the fatherland. But the fatherland was not a reality, and religion itself endangered the way ahead. Having temporised as long as possible, the loyal William then became the only member of the high nobility who consistently supported the revolt. This can hardly be explained except in broad religious terms. Since 1559, William had been stadtholder of Holland and Zealand - the only members of the estates general which, in 1558, rejected the religious regulations of Charles V, which were then re-issued. It was by and through these provinces, which remained in rebellion after 1572, that William opposed a bulwark against the advance of what he saw as catholic tyranny.48 By 1568, therefore, William, in the Netherlands, was committed to a struggle which was already international. This is illustrated not only by his own Justification of April that year, but also by the events of 1567-70. The arrival of Alva in August 1567 followed, on 9 September, by the arrest of Egmont and Homes, terrified the huguenots. Less than three weeks later (26 September) they attempted to seize the cardinal of Lorraine at Meaux. War in France had no sooner begun than Lorraine appealed to Alva for help and, in November, he sent a force of 2 000 men. The huguenots shortly proposed an alliance with William.49 Louis' victory at Heiligerlee in May 1568 was followed by the execution of Egmont and Homes on 5 June, among several hundred others, over three days.50 The fifth of June was precisely the day on which three seigneurs were to have murdered the huguenot leaders, Conde, Coligny and d'Andelot; violence of all those who profess the Gospel. The duke's [ AlvaJ repair into the Low Countries tended ... also to the invasion of England as the appointed executor of the said confederacy in that part of Europe." This is an indication of what contemporaries believed. The document would appear to be misplaced. In 1569 Philip certainly came round to the opinion that the conquest of England was necessary, though he should not be assumed to have held that opinion consistently. Calendar of State Papers Spanish, 1568-79, pp. 10910, 18 February 1569, Philip II to Alva. 47. Rowen, 38-9. 48. Claessens, 123. 49. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, vi, 63, 25 January 1568, Avis d'Anvers; Groen van Prinsterer, iii, p. xxxv; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 153. 50. Groen van Prinsterer, iii, 244-50, 19 June 1568, William of Orange to Schwendi in the Empire.

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but they escaped. These were startling coincidences to say the least. The outrage against the Netherlands nobility precipitated a sympathetic, but abortive huguenot invasion.51 Together, these events averted the enterprise of England, in favour of Mary queen of Scots, which Lorraine had intended to launch, once the huguenot leaders were safely dead. Lorraine's next move against them was scheduled for 25 August, two days after William himself was expected to invade the Netherlands.52 Again the huguenots escaped, and this time drafted a formal alliance of mutual assistance and support between themselves and William.53 After the failure of his first campaign in the Netherlands, William and Louis entered France, in mid-November 1568, and served with the huguenots, whose military and diplomatic victories finally thwarted Lorraine's deferred invasion of England.54 Louis, unlike William, remained in France where, in 1571, he devised the second Netherlands enterprise in which, it was vainly hoped, England would participate.55 In spite of prolonged misfortune as the Netherlands' leader, "William," professor Swart has said, "increasingly felt called upon to perform an historic mission."56 This historic mission related to the fatherland, and its eventual substitute, the United Provinces; it also related, albeit fortuitously, to William's concurrent stand against the catholic crusade. Orange later claimed that he had hindered a Spanish enterprise of England in 1571, and after his second, abortive invasion in 1572, he emerged as the leading opponent of the catholic movement.57 There were various reasons for William's emergence as an international figure. In the first place, not only Spain, but also the Papacy and England as well as France and the huguenots, were affected by the Netherlands revolt; thus everything began to focus on their leader. "William," professor 51. Groen van Prinsterer, iii, 260, July 1568, William of Orange to Louis of Nassau; 267, 24 July 1568, Malberg to Solaigre (Jacob van Solloguren). 52. There were a number of huguenot captains in the service of William of Orange. Groen van Prinsterer, iii, 291, September 1568; Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 165, 167-8. 53. Groen van Prinsterer, iii, 282-6, August 1568. While it cannot be shown that this treaty was signed, there can be no doubt that it existed. 54. William entered France on 17 November 1568. H. de La Ferriere: "La Troisieme guerre civile et la paix de St. Germain," Revue des questions historiques, xli (1887), 85. Teligny told sir Henry Norris of the ships Lorraine was arming against England at Bordeaux, Le Havre and Dieppe - about nineteen in all. CSPF., 1569-71, pp. 181-2, 5 February 1570, Norris to Elizabeth; Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, 161-74. 55. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle, chap. vi. 56. Swart, William the Silent, 15. 57. CSPF., 7575-7, p. 585, May 1577.

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Swart has rightly said, "was to prove himself a statesman of outstanding ability."58 The catholic crusade, which William inevitably opposed, entered a new phase after the flight to protestant England of Mary queen of Scots in May 1568. The Papacy became involved in the rising of the northern earls, followed by the Ridolfi plot in 1571.59 Furthermore, the excommunication of queen Elizabeth in February 1570 at - or after - the request of the northern earls, also comprised her deposition, which catholics everywhere thought it encumbent upon Philip to perform.60 Consequently, the catholic crusade, which had previously been centred in France, turned somewhat more against the Netherlands and England. Politically, the Netherlands lay between Spain and England, and they quickly became a complex element in England's defence. By the same token, the Netherlands in revolt were not only a problem to Spain, but also an obstacle to the Papacy.61 After the excommunication of Elizabeth, her deposition was to become a principal objective of the Papacy while, in this respect, it was the termination of the revolt which remained the principal objective of Spain. Opinions both varied and fluctuated as to which problem should be tackled first, since the defeat of either must entail the subjection of the other - or so it was believed.62 This hesitation partly arose from the widespread, but erroneous supposition that the Netherlands revolt was sustained by Elizabeth. William's emergence as an international figure and his opposition to the catholic movement meant that by 1573 his adoption of Calvinism could hardly be avoided. His sovereign rank was now of great significance since, even more than the huguenots, he had to seek allies in order to survive. His change of religion had already been preceded by the idea of a protestant league. Indeed, the Netherlands enterprise, which briefly materialised in 1572, had been founded by Louis of Nassau on the hope of forming a protestant league to oppose the 58. Swart, William the Silent, 19. 59. CSPF., 1569-71, p. 199, 8 March 1570, Robert Hogan to Leicester. The pope was reported to have contributed 600000 ducats. He requested Spain to help the rebels also. Ibid., 212, March 1570. The rebels had long since been defeated. 60. Privately, Philip might recognise this duty, but in practice it was always costly and inconvenient. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, ix, 15-22, 11 November 1576, instructions for Don John. The excommunication was to be the pretext for an invasion of England. 61. Hinojosa, 180; Tome, Gallio, 150; Calendar of State Papers Rome, 1572-8, pp. 297-9, 2 April 1577, Como to Don John. 62. For example: Groen van Prinsterer, vi, 115, 28 July 1577, Ste-AIdegonde to count John; Tome, Don Juan, ii, 69; Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 356-61, 26 May 1577, Don John to Philip II.

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catholic one - the catholic crusade being currently exemplified by the Holy League of 1571. The Holy League was, initially, primarily directed against the Turks, and Don John of Austria had obtained the dramatic victory of Lepanto in October 1571. Nevertheless, Walsingham was not joking when he observed that it really threatened "as many as they repute to be Turks."63 Nassau's idea had been to combine England, France and the protestant princes behind William and the Netherlands. William and Louis were both French pensioners.64 This endeavour was quite as unrealistic as the Papal desire to unite the catholic kingdoms of Spain and France against the Netherlands and England.65 Neither "side", confessionally speaking, was ever politically united. Both propositions, however, indicate the importance of France; in the event, her alliance was carried off by England; but, as a kingdom, France was paralysed.66 William was effectively deprived of the huguenot alliance by the massacre of St. Bartholomew in 1572, which placed the French forces of militant Catholicism once more in the ascendant. Similarly, in William's opinion, the French disaster thwarted the imminent overthrow of Alva, and no general rebellion had materialised. Instead, the massacre altered the nature of the huguenot leadership, and diverted protestant energies back into a fourth civil war in France. These events isolated the Netherlands, placing the whole burden upon William. Shattered by this adversity, William wrote to his brother, count John, that it was time for the Germans to wake up, and understand what was really happening: "ils," [the catholics], "sont deliberes de mettre en execution leur vieille alliance de Bayonne et autres semblables." This, William pleaded, meant both the extirpation of all who were not under the domination of Rome, and the reduction of Europe to the obedience of the pope. William went on to indicate that when people like themselves had been liquidated, the German princes would find that it was their turn next. There was, he said, a long-standing intention against them. This could be called a standard version of the Dutch, huguenot and Palatinate view of the catholic victories in France and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, William did no more than repeat the terms of the Triumvirate, and experience had established its general validity. Furthermore, it had 63. The idea of a protestant league was not, of course, new. See, for example: Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, v, 147-9, 17 August 1568, Mundt to Cecil; Digges, 26-7, 28 January 1571, Walsingham to Cecil. Walsingham's remark was apposite, since Gegrory XIII conceived of the Turks and protestants as two aspects of one struggle. Karttunen, 1-9. 64. Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 174 & n. 3. 65. CSPF., 1572-4, p. 218, 22 December 1572, Walsingham to Burghley; Torne, Gallio, 137-8, 151, 152-4; Karttunen, 14. 66. CSPRome, 1572-8, pp. 14-16; CSPF., 1572-4, p. 87, 19 April 1572.

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received support in Rome, whose counter reformation efforts were not unsuccessful in parts of Germany.67 Thus, in pleading for the formation of a protestant league, by means of the landgrave of Hesse, William was taking the lead in opposing the catholic crusade; indeed, he was really the only prince who could. Most of the Germans, however, were more afraid of destroying the peace of Augsburg.68 William's conception of the necessary protestant league was quite specific. It was in June 1573 that he first offered to yield the entire possession of Holland and Zealand to queen Elizabeth, if she would agree to be the sovereign head of a league with them and Germany. "If," it was urged, Elizabeth "were thus settled in the Low Countries and knit with Germany, neither were the Bayonne league nor that of Lansberg able to prevail."69 No doubt: but Elizabeth had just concluded an agreement with Spain, in April 1573, and the league that she entertained was rather pro-huguenot than anti-Spanish;70 in other words, it was not to operate in the Netherlands, but in France, which principally occupied her attention at least until 1576. A substantial defeat in April 1574, at which both Louis and Henry of Nassau were killed, wrenched some further reflections from the perplexed and melancholy prince, which clearly show that he had come to see the resistance of Holland and Zealand as the bulwark of opposition to the catholic crusade. But, if neither England nor France would help them, the Netherlands would be lost and returned to the tyranny of the Spaniards. Not only, he said, would religion then be endangered in all other countries, but it might actually be uprooted for ever — extirpated in fact, as the catholics intended. In time, William went on, the Germans would realise the damage that was done, and so would the English, whom he inaccurately described as over cautious. Finally, the poor, brave French - the huguenots - would find themselves in even greater perplexity.71 67. Susta, i, 258-61, 2 October 1561, Morone to Alva. 68. Groen van Prinsterer, iii, 244-50, 19 June 1568, William of Orange to Schwendi; 501-8, 21 September 1572, William of Orange to count John. For Papal plans at precisely this moment, see Karttunen, 4-6, 6 n. 1, 23 September 1572, Ormaneto to Como. 69. CSPF., 1572-4, pp. 360-3, 11 June 1573, William Herle's Discourse with the Prince of Orange. The Landsberger Bund was a union primarily of catholic princes led by the duke of Bavaria; it was not, however, offensive. Ibid., 287-8, 24 March 1573, Advices from Germany. 70. CSPF., 1572-4, p. 448, 18 December 1573, Articles for a league between the Queen and the Princes of Germany; 449, 21 December 1573, proposed league; 537-9, 9 August 1574, conference with Dr. Wyer. 71. Kossmann and Mellink, 112-15, 7 May 1574, William of Orange to count John. France was involved in a succession crisis.

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This letter was intercepted: William's enemies were therefore well aware of the nature, scope and importance of the role he had by then assumed. While William vainly sought to shake Elizabeth from what he wrongly supposed to be her lethargy, the Papacy had begun to threaten them both; Elizabeth because of her excommunication and the imprisonment of Mary queen of Scots, and William because the Papacy wanted Philip released from the preoccupation of the Netherlands. Then, as sovereign head of a reconstituted catholic league, he would be free to oppose the English as well as the Turks.72 It was after the Venetians had made peace with the Turks in March 1573 that Gregory XIII seriously turned his attention to northern Europe, and laboured unceasingly for several years both to obtain a catholic league between France and Spain, and to launch an enterprise of England.73 For this purpose, he not surprisingly favoured Don John of Austria, captain general of the Holy League of 1571. This princely hero of Catholicism triumphant was, furthermore, a glamorous suitor for the hand of queen Mary, who was to be liberated. Thus it was during Don John's governorship in the Netherlands, 1576-8, that William's international role as an opponent of the catholic crusade reached its climax. It is therefore necessary to show how the crusade came to be focused on Don John at the time of his appointment to the Netherlands. This is the key to a reassessment of William's still controversial conduct following Don John's arrival in November 1576. William then opposed the wider catholic movement from within the context of the struggle in the Netherlands, which had become the hub and regulator of European affairs. Philip had, for some time, considered sending Don John to the Netherlands, and the Papal enterprise of England was, originally, a completely separate initiative.74 But the enterprise, which was dependent on Spanish money and cooperation, was just taking shape, early in 1576, when news of the death of Don Luis de Requesens, the governor in the Netherlands, disrupted everything. Don John was immediately appointed to succeed Requesens, but displayed no alacrity in accepting.75 However, the cardinal di Co mo, Papal secretary of state, saw in Don John's appointment an auspicious means of solving various prob72. Karttunen, l-4;T6rne, Gallio, 145 seq. 73. For example: CSPF., 1575-7, pp. 518-20, 16 February 1577, Paulet to Burghley; 565-8, 28 April 1577, Paulet to Walsingham; Tome, Gallio, 151, 153-4; Pastor,History of the Popes, xix, 4-5, 533-4;Hinojosa, 207. 74. CSPF., 1572-4, pp. 443-4, 25 November 1573, Bizarri to Burghley. Don John made it plain that there was nothing he dreaded more. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. iv, 161-6, 27 May 1576, Don John to Philip II. 75. Torne, Don Juan, ii, 12, 15, 17-21; Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. iv 38-41, 8 April 1576, Philip II to Don John.

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lems inherent in the enterprise, which Don John was eager to undertake; he suffered from romantic delusions.76 Philip simply wanted him to go, as soon as possible, to rectify the near collapse of Spanish power. Don John found the Netherlands assignment unalluring, and Philip — albeit without enthusiasm was already embarrassingly committed to the Papal enterprise. He was therefore willing to allow the Papacy to think that Don John's presence in the Netherlands might prove to be useful for the enterprise. At the end of 1576, Philip sent a first instalment of 50000 ducats to Rome; the second instalment was never disbursed.77 Don John, not without some cogent reasons, refused to go on Philip's terms and, by way of compensation, evidently extracted Philip's permission to proceed to the enterprise of England. His departure was desperately urgent, and Philip had little alternative but to yield to Papal pressure. Late in August, he agreed to give Don John "all the orders that might be necessary and expedient in aid of the enterprise." These were carefully chosen words, and it did just flit through the obtuse mind of the nuncio that the affairs of the Netherlands might interfere with the enterprise.78 After six months of delay, during which mutinies and revolution convulsed the previously loyal Netherlands provinces, Don John finally made a precipitate departure, on 18 October 1576, racing across France in disguise.79 For the moment, therefore, nobody knew what could be done to further the enterprise of England, and Papal exhortations were temporarily suspended. Don John's objective, nevertheless, remained the rapid disposal of the Netherlands, in order to launch the enterprise of England, rescue, crown and marry Mary. But, if Don John despised the Netherlands as a stepping stone, to be trodden on, he had reckoned entirely without the Prince of Orange. William stood, incorruptible, between Don John and the accomplishment of either objective.80 When Don John reached Luxembourg on 3 No76. Tome, Don Juan, ii, 7. 77. CSPRome, 1572-8, pp. 260-4, 17 April 1576, Ormaneto to Como; Tome, Gallic 157, 10 September 1575, Como to Ormaneto; 160;Gachard, Correspondance dePhilippe II, vol. iv, 52-5, 8 April 1576, Philip to Zuniga in Rome', Tome, Don Juan, ii, 33-4, 735, 87-8. Philip's 50 000 ducats were given by the nuncio, Sega, to Don John in July 1577. Ibid., 152-3. 78. CSPRome, 1572-8, pp. 278-9, 23 August 1576, Ormaneto to Como; Torne, Don Juan, ii, 17 seq. 79. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. iv, 408-10, 29 October 1576, Balthasar Schetz to the estates of Brabant; Tome, Don Juan, ii, 36-46; CSPR, 1575-7, pp. 407-8, 29 October 1576, Philip II, probably to Roda. 80. Thomas Wilson made this point precisely. CSPF., 1575-7, pp. 514-15, 10 February 1577, Wilson to Walsingham.

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vember, the Pacification of Ghent was ready for signing - 8 November.81 Consequently, Don John was faced with a new and far more intractable situation, for which neither he, Philip, nor the Papacy had ever calculated. The Pacification of Ghent ended the civil war between the formerly loyalist and the rebel provinces, theoretically uniting them behind the estates general in order to drive out the Spanish. All other problems, including religion, were deferred to a future assembly of the estates general. It is doubtful if the Pacification of Ghent should be represented as William's masterpiece, but it did provide his greatest, if rather forlorn opportunity, and afforded him a brief glimpse of his vision of the fatherland. This Union, however, was never comprehensive, nor was it based on any positive unity of purpose.82 The estates general contained strong elements of opposition to William, in particular the catholics and the Walloon nobility. The principal southern provinces and the council of state were anxious for a settlement with Spain, broadly upon conditions which were already clearly formulated before the Pacification. Thus it was in co-operation with these elements, and without the agreement of William, that Don John concluded the so-called Perpetual Edict, 12 February 1577, with the estates general.83 Although the Edict purported to ratify the Pacification of Ghent, it did so according to a specious misinterpretation of the terms of the Union, which was thereby effectively destroyed — although William was to make repeated efforts to reconstitute it.84 Don John, for his part, described the Edict as "une grande bassesse," caused by his lack of forces.85 This was typical of the grumbling reluctance with which he executed his instructions. Together, the Pacification 81. Nameche: Le Regne de Philipp II et la lutte religieuse dans les Pays-Bas au XVIe siecle, 8 vols (Louvain, 1885 etc.), v, 469-78, text of the Pacification of Ghent, 8 November 1576. Philippe Marnix de Ste-Aldegonde played a prominent part in the negotiations. T. Juste: Vie de Marnix de Sainte-Aldegonde (Brussels, 1858), 29-31. 82. This is clear from the negotiations which preceded the Union. T. Juste: La Pacification de Gand (Brussels, 1876), pp. 21 seq. 83. Groen van Prinsterer, v, 629; Nameche, vi, 481-91, text of the Perpetual Edict. It bears two dates: 12 February 1577, and 17 February 1577 when it was published in Brussels. CSPF., 1575-7, pp. 525-6, 19 February 1577, William of Orange and the estates of Holland and Zealand to the estates general; 556, 7 April 1577, royal proclamation in Brabant ratifying the Perpetual Edict. 84. Objections to the terms on which the Edict was negotiated were explicitly stated by William. Groen van Prinsterer, v, 566-70, 15 & 16 December 1576; also ibid., 584-5, December 1576, note du prince d'Orange relative aux negotiations avec Don Juan; Juste, Sainte-A Idegonde, 41-2. 85. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 178-9, 2 February 1577, Don John to Philip II.

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of Ghent, the first Union of Brussels, 9 January 1577, which was intended to re-inforce it, and the Perpetual Edict created a semantic jungle in which, for a time, the various hostile species all sought to shelter. Only Philip was honest, or naive, enough to complain that the jungle was not clearly charted.86 To William, the Perpetual Edict was a disaster, albeit not complete so long as Don John had not yet 6een received as governor. The estates had at least insisted upon the departure of the Spanish troops - one point of general agreement - and this much was achieved before his reception in May.87 William has been criticised for his apparent intransigence after the arrival of Don John, when the Union was still at war with Spain but ostensibly prepared for peace according to the terms of the Pacification of Ghent. William had sternly warned the estates general against any negotiations with Don John, at least before the withdrawal of the troops.88 This is doubtless why, in his opinion, Don John should have been arrested. Precisely what William had in mind is uncertain, but obviously some sort of capitulation before Don John was established.^Professor Swart has alleged that William's "high-handed tactics in undermining Don John's position were far from admirable." He "failed to do justice to the conciliatory spirit which at this time prevailed in Spanish policy."90 This, however, is the edge of a quagmire. One could write a separate article on "the conciliatory spirit of Spanish policy:" whether, to what extent, in what respect, at which moments, and in relation to whom, Spanish policy could be thus described; for they neither spoke with one voice, nor pulled in only one direction. In general terms, however, it is fair to say that Philip yearned to be free of a burden which poisoned his life. It was, however, with Don John, not with the king, that William had to deal. Don John, for his part, did indeed strive for a settlement: he did so with peev86. Nameche, vi, 479-81, 9 January 1577, Acte de TUnion; Gachard, Correspondence de Philippe //, vol. v, 158-9, 26 January 1577, Philip II to Don John. 87. CSPF., 1575-7, p. 573, 29 April 1577, Instructions of the estates to deputies sent by them to Don John. 88. CSPF., 1575-7, p. 501, 1 February 1577, Advice of the Prince of Orange; 502, 1 February 1577, Advice to the estates general; 515-16, 10 February 1577, instructions for M. de Favars sent to queen Elizabeth - i.e. Charles de Lievin, seigneur de Famars; 522-3, 17 February 1577, negotiation between Don John and the Prince of Orange; Groen van Prinsterer, v, 542, 29 November 1576, William to Ste-Aldegonde; Gachard, Correspondence de Guillaume le Taciturne, iii, 140-5, [November! 1577, William of Orange to the estates general; Juste, Sainte-Aldegonde, 33-4. 89. Groen van Prinsterer, v, 494-7, November 1576, avis du prince d'Orange aux etats. This document is defective and what William had in mind does not appear. 90. Swart, William the Silent, 27; Juste, Sainte-Aldegonde, 33.

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ish ill humour in the hope of thereby removing an obstacle on the route to England. But there was certainly no conciliation in his heart, and least of all for William, whom he described as a very great traitor and an even greater heretic.91 By rejecting the Perpetual Edict - which both confirmed and destroyed the Pacification of Ghent - William, together with Holland and Zealand, completely barred his way ahead. There was, in the first place, no reason why William should trust Don John, the king's brotheV and captain general of the Holy League. But perhaps the principal key to William's conduct is that he had seen Don John's instructions and other related documents.92 If Spanish policy is a quagmire, Don John's instructions - formal, secret, verbal, supplementary and successive - are a labyrinth.93 What was it that William had seen? He must, first of all, have been aware of the contents of a disquieting document of which two French copies found their way to England.94 This is an unsigned, draft memorandum for the revision of Don John' instructions.95 Such draft notes could not have been formally despatched to anyone, thus it is to be supposed that they were leaked from Spain. They were drawn up before the departure from Madrid of Don John (he left on 18 October 1576), and some of their principal proposals were omitted from his subsequent instructions of 30 October. The proposed revisions related, in particular, to the Spanish troops, the general pardon, and Holland and Zealand. It was here suggested that, in order to allay suspicions, the Spanish troops should be withdrawn "pour quelque temps" - not, therefore, 91. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 84-8, 6 December 1576, Don John to Philip II. 92. It is obvious from a volume of evidence - much of it internal - that William had seen Don John's instructions but, in one letter he explicitly said so: Gachard: Analectes Belgiques (Brussels, 1830), 301-11, 30 November 1576, William of Orange to the estates general. 93. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. iv, 450-64, 30 October 1576, instructions and other related documents; 468-72, 31 October 1576, Philip II to Don John; 425, [October 1576] note autographe remise par le Roi a Don Juan d'Autriche; ibid., vol. v, 5-6 [5 November 1576], Philip II to Don John; 27-8, 11 November 1576, Philip II to Don John; Tome, Don Juan, ii, 46-54; Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, ix, 15-21, 11 November 1576, instructions donne par le roi a Don Juan. 94. Public Record Office SP/70/140/857, 858, two copies, the second endorsed 1577; CSPF., 1575-7, pp. 409-10, [October] 1576, described as instructions for Don John of Austria. Elizabeth's agents in the Netherlands did not intercept Spanish correspondence. They obtained such intelligence from William and his agents. 95. "La commission de Messire Jehan d'Austrice ... va fort bien et ny a que reduire. Comme aussi vont les instructions sauf quil semble convenir y changer le point d'y entretenir les soldats Epaignoiz."

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definitively or in good faith; the matter, however, was referred to Don John's absolute discretion. The exclusion of William of Orange from the general pardon might, it was suggested, be dropped, lest it should hinder a general pacification. His case could be referred to a chapter of the Order of the Golden Fleece. It was evidently hoped that if William were not excluded from the pardon, Holland and Zealand would submit, but their pardon and restitution depended upon the total restoration of Catholicism. When Holland and Zealand had also caused all foreign troops to withdraw, and religion and authority had been everywhere restored, then Philip's will could be reimposed, and he could make use of the Netherlands to give the law to his neighbours. Don John's principal instructions of 30 October 1576 were evidently carried to the Netherlands by Le Vasseur, secretary to Maximilian Vilain, seigneur de Rassenghein - who followed him. Le Vasseur was intercepted and the instructions were communicated to William by J. de Pennants on 20November 1576.% Whether William had, by then, already seen the draft notes, we do not know. In the instructions, the general pardon was to be "sans exception de personne, sinon du seul prince d'Orenges, inventeur, autheur et continuateur de tout le mal," with no mention of justice. Only the German troops were to be withdrawn and, if Holland and Zealand did not shortly submit, Don John was advised to get the estates general to assist him in arms against them. In his letter to William, J. de Pennants also mentioned that the Spanish troops would not be withdrawn in good faith, but only to play for time. We do not know what he had seen; this could even have been deduction or, possibly, it was through him that the draft notes were also transmitted. Letters patent of 30 October 1576, based on the general instruction - which w-as personal to Don John — were intended for publication, so that whether or not they were also intercepted, their contents must shortly have been made known. In the letters patent, Philip authorised Don John to summon the estates general, but only to raise money to pay the hated troops. They were not to be allowed to touch religion, the principal problem which, in the meanwhile, had been relegated to them by the terms of the Pacification of Ghent. The letters patent made it clear that pardon and restoration were dependent upon submission to Catholicism whereas, in the instructions, the two points were not linked. While William was still uniquely excluded from the pardon, there is a vague reference to his being placed on trial.97 96. Groen van Prinsterer, v, 530-1, 20 November 1576, J. de Pennants to the Prince of Orange. I am grateful to professor Swart for drawing my attention to this letter. 97. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. iv, 460-4, 30 October 1576.

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Quite a number of documents were intercepted at this time, and it is not certain what else William may have seen.98 In a letter to lord Burghley of 3 December 1576, Thomas Wilson said that he was sending the "advices given to Don John how to use himself with the states and how to prosecute his affairs" - his general instructions - and Philip's cipher. To Walsingham, at the same time, he sent three other advices for Don John, all in French and sent out of Spain. He also referred to Philip's ciphers (sic) and five of his deciphered letters." Unfortunately we do not know what the "other advices" comprised. They could have included a letter of 31 October 1576 from Philip to Don John, which was to be sent ahead of Rassenghein, and is therefore likely to have been carried by Le Vasseur, who preceded him. If so, then William would have seen that Don John was directed to conceal the fact that the despatches brought by Rassenghein — a member of the council of state — "ne sont que pour la fourme."100 However this may be, it was abundantly clear that Spanish policy was shifting and ill defined; that Don John had full discretionary powers; that William was not to be pardoned - though he might possibly be tried - and that reconciliation was only to be for the previously loyal provinces. Holland and Zealand were to be defeated, not pacified, whereupon the Netherlands were to provide for other Spanish wars — which might well mean England. Furthermore, even before the end of 1576, William had also seen a considerable volume of other intercepted letters, which clearly showed what sort of treatment the offending Netherlands could expect.101 No one had offended more than William, and no one was more likely to thwart the ambitions and wound the vanity of Don

98. Both Don John and Geronimo de Roda referred to interceptions and Roda feared correctly - that William had acquired Philip's cipher. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe //, v, 52-9, 21 November 1576, Don John to Philip II; 63-8, 26 November 1576, Roda to Philip II. 99. PRO/SP/141/914, 3 December, 1576, Wilson to Walsingham; 862 [3 December! 1576, Wilson to Burghley. The letter to Burghley was dated by Wilson himself 3 November; it is, however, endorsed 3 December, which is clearly the correct date. It is very similar to the letter to Walsingham: for instance, both refer to the estates general expecting an answer from Don John by 12 December. It also refers to two documents which did not yet exist by 3 November. 100. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe //, vol. iv, 468-72, 31 October 1576, Philip II to Don John. 101. By 22 November 1576, the duke of Aerschot had sent William some twenty-six intercepted letters. Groen van Prinsterer, v, 558-9, 10 December 1576, Aerschot to William of Orange. References to intercepted letters are too numerous to list.

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John. Don John was not discreet and, as the months went by, his histrionic lamentations were increasingly filled with fire, fury, blood and hatred.102 It is unlikely that William was aware of Philip's more explicit instructions of 11 November 1576, on the enterprise of England.103 These reflected Philip's final recognition that the Spanish troops would have to be withdrawn. Consequently, he accepted a revised version of the Papal enterprise, which was the invasion of England under pretext of the withdrawal of the Spanish forces by sea. This was Don John's own intention, and much of his bitterness arose from the fact that, by the end of January 1577, he had been forced to agree to withdrawing the Spanish forces overland.104 Don John believed, and it appears to be true, that it was both queen Elizabeth - via her envoy Edward Horse and the Prince of Orange who had insisted upon this condition.105 Both William and Elizabeth were equally aware that unless William stood firm, the catholic enterprise of England for the deposition of Elizabeth might not be long delayed. While it is obvious now that there was not really any imminent danger, contemporaries were bound to feel otherwise, and to take the matter seriously. Before the Perpetual Edict was signed, William explained to Elizabeth very clearly the danger Don John represented to the Netherlands and to England.106 The Perpetual Edict, which briefly afforded the illusion of a Netherlands pacification, was the signal for renewed Papal activity. Not yet knowing that even their latest plans had been wholly "disconcerted," by the overland departure of the troops, the pope immediately sent Don John a nuncio, Philip Sega, bishop of Ripa, to agitate the enterprise, "that it may not grow stale," and to accompany Don John to England.107 Once the Spanish troops were to be withdrawn overland, Philip's co-operation was at an end; the Netherlands 102. Various letters illustrate this point. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, v, 425, 21 June 1477, Don John to Philip II; Groen van Prinsterer, vi, 113-18, 28 July 1577, SteAldegonde to count John. 103. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations, ix, 15-21, 11 November 1576. These instructions derive from a Spanish source and are said to have been delivered only verbally. 104. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 166-78, 31 January 1577, Don John to Philip II; 374-5, 29 May 1577, Escovedo to Perez. 105- Edward Horsey was, significantly enough, captain of the Isle of Wight. 106. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 130-5, 2 January 1577, Don John to Philip II; CSPF., 1575-7, pp. 515-16, 10 February 1577, instructions for M. de Famars, sent to England from the Prince of Orange. Philip had told Ormaneto that - verbally - Don John had discretionary powers to undertake the enterprise of England. CSPRome, 1572-8, p. 296, 25 March 1577, Ormaneto to Como. T6rne,Z)o« Juan, ii, 133-4. 107. T6rne,DoH Juan, ii, 131-2; A- Theiner: AnnalesEcclesiastici, 3 vols (Rome, 1856), ii, 333, 11 February 1577, the pope|to Don John;CSP/tome, 1572-8, pp. 295-6.

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were trouble enough.108 Cardinal di Como therefore tried briefly to influence Don John directly and, with the help of his secretary, Escovedo, to reconstitute the Papal enterprise of England.109 Don John was later said to have posed more as the champion of Catholicism than as the Spanish viceroy.110 These plots and plottings - as contemporaries might say - did not remain secret. William received about nine letters of April 1577, from Don John and Escovedo to Philip and his secretary Antonio Perez; they had been intercepted in France by the huguenots. From these letters it was again made plain to William that the Perpetual Edict meant nothing to Don John, and the Pacification of Ghent meant even less. Don John's hope was that William could somehow be seduced, otherwise the islands of Holland and Zealand would first have to be "shot at;" then England will "easier be conquered."111 Thus, Wilson wrote to Walsingham on 8 May 1577, "there is a meaning now to win the Prince by all the sweetest devices that IT ay be."112 Various efforts to win William - with or without Holland and Zealand - lasted from March into the summer of 1577; but they were little more than timespinning devices.113 No realistic bases of peace with the rebel provinces had ever 108. Philip had virtually said that he regarded the matter of the enterprise as suspended. Torne, Don Juan, ii, 107 n. 1, 17 December 1576, Ormaneto to Como. He was, however, prepared to allow the Spanish troops to be used for the enterprise if they left the Netherlands by sea. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 158, 26 January 1577, Philip II to Don John; 163-5, 31 January 1577, Philip II to Don John. Philip remained uncooperative during 1577 and 1578. 109. CSPRome, 1572-8, pp. 297-9, 2 April 1577, Como to Don John; 307-11 [May] 1577, Sega to Como; Torne, Don Juan, ii, 137-9. 110. Torne, Don Juan, ii, 181. 111. CSPF., 1575-7, pp. 556-7. These letters were later sent by Daniel Rogers to Walsingham; ibid., 1577-8, pp. 22-5, 20 July 1577; Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 198-9, 13 February 1577, Don John to Philip II. This letter, written immediately after the Perpetual Edict, makes it perfectly plain that Don John thought it essential to conquer Holland and Zealand. Not surprisingly, Escovedo thought the same. PRO/SP/70/ 144/1169, 7 April 1577; intercepted letter. Ibid., f. 1170, 9 April 1577, Escovedo to Philip II. He suggested here that the conquest of England would facilitate the subjection of Holland and Zealand. Groen van Prinsterer, vi, 113-18, 28 July 1577, Ste-Aldegonde to count John. 112. CSPF., 1575-7, p. 574, 8 May 1577, Wilson to Walsingham; 583-5, May 1577, notes on the state of William of Orange and of Holland and Zealand. 113. Gachard, Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne, iii, pp. 1-lix, 8-13 March 1577; Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 245-8, 16 March 1577, Don John to Philip II. The last serious effort to reach an agreement was in May 1577 at Gertrudenberg. Ibid., v, App. x, 801-16; Don John and Sega later tried to persuade William to meet them in disguise. CSPF., 1577-8, pp. 22-5, 20 July 1577, Rogers to Walsingham.

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seriously been considered; only their eventual submission. William, however, would never yield without, for a start, the original terms of the Pacification of Ghent. It was, in any case, a mere beginning, not an end, and the issues were by then entwined in the semantic jungle surrounding the Pacification and the Perpetual Edict. The Union, furthermore, had virtually ceased to exist. Some of Philip's more desperate despatches would stand the interpretation that he could have been induced to accept some compromise - even on the fundamentals of religion and authority. But, in William of Orange, he had lost his only statesman of distinction.114 Don John repeatedly declared that he did not wish to govern the Netherlands, though given the necessary forces, he was itching to emulate the example of Alva.115 His only interest in the northern provinces was the removal of William - by whatever means.116 It was no secret that his ambitions lay in furthering the Papal cause, through which there were kingdoms to be won. Clearly, therefore, it would make no sense to compromise with the Calvinists in the Netherlands as a preliminary to the restoration of England to Rome.117 Equally clearly, William was not going to vacate his maritime provinces, invite the catholics to dispose of England, and the Spanish to control the Channel. In this respect, he continued to protect the whole, ungrateful fatherland from the bellicose hatred of Don John, and the true desire of Philip. Thus, for William, the defence of all that he had fought for in the Netherlands merged with his steady opposition to the international catholic crusade as it focused on Don John. These were the deadlock circumstances in which, it is alleged, William conspired to molest Don John.118 In July 1577, Don John, complaining of his dan114. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 62-3, 26 November 1576, Philip II to Don John; 163-5, 31 January 1577, Philip II to Don John; 193-4, 12 February 1577, Philip II to Don John; 205, 21 February 1577, Philip II to Don John. 115. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 180-2, 2 February 1577, Don John to Philip II; 198-9, 13 February 1577, Don John to Philip II; 201-2, 16 February 1577, Don John to Perez; 202-3, 17 February 1577, Don John to Philip II; 221, 1 March 1577, Don John to Perez; 248-50, 16 March 1577, Don John to Philip II; 442-6, 21 June 1577, Don John to Philip II, in which he prescribed for the Netherlands, "feu et sang." Groen van Prinsterer, vi, 113-18, 28 July 1577, Ste-AldegondSto count John. 116. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe 77, vol. v, 218-21, 1 March 1577, Don John to Philip II; 356-61, 26 May 1577, Don John to Philip II. 117. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe 77, vol. v, 351-5, 24 May 1577, Don John to Philip II; 356-61, 26 May 1577, Don John to Philip II; 422-6, 21 June 1577, Don John to Philip II. 118. CSPF., 1577-8, p. 25, 19 July 1577, Anon; 25-6, 21 July 1577, Anon; 26-8, 24 July 1577, Rogers to Walsingham; Juste, Sainte-Aldegonde, 44 n. 3-45, refers to 'Texecution de Tentreprise contre la personne dudit Sr. (Don John]."

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ger, sent Escovedo to Madrid and himself withdrew to Namur, still purposing "his endeavour for the English business."119 From Namur he recalled his Spanish troops, whether for war in the Netherlands or, in some unimaginable way, in England. In either case, William was desperately anxious to induce Elizabeth to establish a protestant league in opposition to the pope, as head of the catholic one. By 1577, William no longer saw Philip in that role; he was now awar of having other catholic enemies; not the least of these was the energetic nuncio, Sega, who refused to allow Don John to recognise reality.120 Sega stoutly alleged that Elizabeth was Philip's greatest enemy. One wonders what he really believed, since his ignorance of English policy verged on the hilarious.121 Furthermore, he argued that Philip had lost face by treating with the estates general. But, when it was realised that he had thereby facilitated "that which was of more pressing importance against the foreigner" — in other words the enterprise of England - his credit would be restored. Waxing lyrical, not to say hysterical, Sega declared that, bearing the title of Catholic King, Philip should exert all his strength against England. "Under the standard of Holy Church and wafted by the salutiferous gale of the Holy Ghost the expedition will safely attain its goal ... seeing that it will ... liberate an innocent captive [queen] and chastise a most wicked and iniquitous woman ..." "All matters would be set right," Sega proclaimed, if the catholic king would only make up his mind, and "we were quit of apprehension of this Prince of Orange who is an obstacle of capital importance."122 Don John, but more soberly, described William as "le pilote qui conduit cet barque et lui seul peut la perdre ou la sauver." From Madrid, Antonio Perez, second to none in his support of the catholic crusade, advised Escovedo to consider means of having William murdered.123 Escovedo replied that, as Perez already knew, he had long entertained the idea; but, he said, it was not so easily accomplished. Escovedo and Don John were of one mind, and Don John also had not hesitated to write about getting rid of William.124 Death was, indeed, what every implacable enemy of the catholic crusade must necessarily fear although, paradoxically, it was perhaps more as a 119. CSPF., 1577-8, pp. 29-3($24 July 1577, Rogers to Walsingham; Tome, Don Juan, li, 142-6; CSPRome, 1572-8, p. 326, 23 July 1577, Sega to Como. 120. CSPF., 1577-8, pp. 22-5, 20 July 1577, Rogers to Walsingham. 121. CSPRome, 1572-8, pp. 353-4, 28 November 1577, Sega to Como. 122. CSPRome, 1572-8, pp. 307-11 [May] 1577, Sega to Como. 123. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 296-8, 7 April 1577, Perez to Esoovedo. 124. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, vol. v, 356-61, 26 May 1577, Don John to Philip II; 374-5, 29 May 1577, Escovedo to Perez.

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Spanish rebel that William was finally assassinated. In 1577, he is reported to have received various warnings that his life was in danger, and his ability to trust the Spanish and other catholics was devastated by the haunting memory of Egmont, Homes, Coligny and others, to whom, from time to time, he would refer.125 The reconstituted Papal conspiracy of 1577-8, appeared dangerous enough to impress queen Elizabeth. Her agent, William Davison, reported that William was diligently occupied in "ripping open the very bowels of the Spanish drifts against us," and enclosed a paper entitled "designs against England." "From what I see and find here," Davison wrote, "there is nothing more certainly projected than to shake the state of her Majesty."126 Elizabeth moved, at this time, to the brink of sending the eager Leicester to the Netherlands. Such an expedition was not, however, really to be expected, so long as Elizabeth still perceived some means of keeping the balls of mediation in the air. Rejected by England, the Netherlands' alliance went to the due d'Anjou, who might otherwise have been procured by the jealous Walloon nobility, a loose faction which never shared Willaim's objectives. Anjou was, indeed, also concerned about the developing catholic conspiracy, if not in the same ways as Elizabeth and William. Before going to join Escovedo to harp upon the enterprise in Spain, Sega had clearly proclaimed William's role as the catholics' principal obstacle.127 Beyond his personal, class, and political interests, beyond his basic loyalty to Holland and Zealand,128 and his fading dream of the fatherland, William was also doing more than anyone else to oppose the catholic crusade. With Don John unable to escape from the Netherlands, the pope was forced to abandon that particular English enterprise and, in October 1577, diverted his attention to Ireland and Scotland.129 William, however, was still endangered, not least because the Papacy was once more ranged behind the due de Guise, who was already well disposed to help Don John. That his cousin, Mary queen 125. Groen van Prinsterer, vi, 70-2, 19 April 1577, Wilson to William of Orange; CSPF., 1575-7, pp. 514-15, 10 February 1577, Wilson to Walsingham; 543, 10 March 1577, Wilson to Walsingham; 559, 18 April 1577, Wilson to Burghley. 126. CSPF., 1577-8, pp. 82-3, 19 August 1577, Davison to Walsingham; 125-6, 2 August 1577, reply to certain points of Don John; 222-4, 3 October 1577, Davison t Leicester; 418-19, December 1577, terms of [the English! loan to the estates genera 423-5 [August or September?] 1577, Designs against England; 468-71, 24 January 1578, Paulet to the secretaries;494-5, 12 February 1578, Paulet to the secretaries. 127. CSPRome, 1572-8, 8 July 15t7, Como to Sega; 326, 23 July 1577, Sega to Como Sega left the Netherlands on 22 July 1577. Torne, Don Juan, ii, 152 n. 1. 128. Gachard, Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne, iii, p. xxxviii. 129. CSPRome, 1572-8, pp. 340-1, 15 October 1577, Como to Sega.

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of Scots, should marry Don John, was a proposition Guise applauded. When, in July 1577, Don John withdrew to Namur, it was to the Guisard faction that he looked for support.130 The wheel had therefore come full circle. The last phase of the catholic crusade — within William's lifetime - was, like the first, centred in fragmente France, where he too sought support. Thus, when we know more about this movement, and William's relations with the French, we shall more clearly understand the ill-starred Anjou experiment, which is insufficiently explained in terms of dynasty and desperation. The Netherlands' treaty with Anjou was signed in August 1578. This was precisely when the death in Africa of king Sebastian of Portugal directed Philip's attention to the acquisition of that country; it remained his priority until 1581. Furthermore, the now deflated, half forgotten, Don John died forlornly in the Netherlands on 1 October 1578. The Papacy, therefore, had little alternative but to revert to the house of Guise as champions of the catholic crusade. Anjou, who was neither protestant nor altruistic, had nevertheless been, in respect of his rank, the principal opponent of the Guises since the massacre of 1572. Therein lay much of his significance, to the huguenots, to queen Elizabeth and to William of Orange. When Anjou died, in June 1584, and William was murdered in July, their disappearance from France and from the Netherlands respectively, precipitated a multiple crisis of the utmost gravity. As a result, the great ideological struggle soon emerged from the penumbra of conspiracy, with the outbreak of open war.

130. CSPF., 1575-7, pp. 492-3, 28 July 1577, Wilson told Burghley that Don John looked for forces from Guise; ibid., 1577-8, pp. 36-7,26 July 1577, Advices from the Netherlands. Don John was said to have intelligence with Guise who had suddenly gone to Champagne. Torne, Don Juan, ii, 182-8; there is a good deal of evidence on this subject. William, for his part, also enjoyed huguenot help. In 1578, for instance, Francois de la Noue became a marechal de camp in his service. P. Kervyn de Volkaersbeke: Correspondence de Francois de la Noue (Ghent, 1854), 7. La Noue's son, Teligny, son-in-law of Coligny, also served in the Netherlands. Ibid., 35.

13 CATHERINE DE MEDICI: THE LEGEND OF THE WICKED ITALIAN QUEEN FEW GREAT HISTORICAL figures have come down to us so loaded with malediction as Catherine de Medici. The legend of her wickedness, which reached its apex in the nineteenth century, embraced a great variety of disagreeable qualities. It depicted her, among other things, as cold, cruel, calculating, treacherous, and evil. She was a monster of selfish ambition, who sacrificed her children, her adopted country, her principles - if she ever had any - and all who stood in her way, to the satisfaction of her all-consuming desire for power. Thus, she was fully prepared to commit any crime. Naturally there are many variations on this theme, some moderate and some immoderate. But, in one form or another, it has continued to receive widespread credence and support, and there are still few historians who have not been influenced by the legend of the wicked Italian queen. Sanctioned by successive generations of authors, it became established, not on account of its validity, but apparently through its emotional force. While it is possible to trace the development of the legend of Catherine's wickedness, its origins are harder to establish. It appears to have sprung from the extreme polemical writings of the Protestant pamphleteers, who laid on Catherine all the blame for the massacre of St. Bartholomew. Their indignation, however, embraced all other discontents, and in language so intemperate that Catherine is reported to have read their denunciations with interest but relative unconcern. While it is possible that further research might trace the origins of the legend to an earlier date than 1572, it is nevertheless the massacre of St. Bartholomew which has mesmerized historians of sixteenthcentury France. They have apparently felt compelled, not to understand the event, but to plant the blame for it. This might plausibly have been fixed on the due de Guise, or even on the king, but since historians worked on the pamphleteers, the scapegoat — with few exceptions — has always been Catherine. Thus, the growth of the legend of the wicked queen was closely related to the attitude of historians to the massacre. As an historical interpretation, moreover, the legend appears to have contained an intrinsic appeal because it corresponded to the emotions aroused in French posterity by the internecine strife of the second half of the sixteenth century. Thus, in some works Catherine became not only the wicked author of the massacre but also the symbol of all that was held to be degraded in the mores of the time. It was perhaps

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inevitable that Catherine should have suffered in this way because her vulnerability was increased by a dual disadvantage. She had the misfortune to be both a woman and of Italian paternity. This invited comparisons with the notorious Machiavelli, with whose undeservedly sinister reputation her name has often been emotively associated. Furthermore, she bore the responsibilities of the crown without enjoying its authority. This, and the semi-mystical devotion bestowed upon his sacred person, pertained to the king alone. Catherine's career has therefore frequently been interpreted in terms of her supposed wickedness which, though primarily revealed by the massacre, was nevertheless related to her whole life. This was done, for example, as late as 1920, by the French historian, J. Mariejol,1 whose overall judgment of Catherine was determined by his view of the massacre. In less extreme cases, the whole interpretation may not be based upon an assumption of her guilt, and therefore of her wickedness, but the influence of the legend remains. During her lifetime Catherine attracted both hostility and admiration from Catholics and Protestants alike since bigots, extremists, and self seekers, as well as moderates, existed on both sides. It is notable, however, that no resentment against Catherine is expressed in the Histoire ecdesiastique des eglises reformees de France,2 first published in Geneva in 1580. This said nothing worse than that she wished to rule, representing her as someone struggling against forces so powerful that she could never hope to prevail against them. Historians to whom Catherine was still a living memory were mostly aware that, in so far as the crown was to blame for the state of France, the damage had been done before Catherine's emergence from obscurity about 1561. The three most celebrated histories of the age of Catherine appeared during the forty years which followed her death. They were all by men with some personal knowledge of her and with access to much information from those who knew her well. The Histoire universelle of de Thou began to appear in Latin in 1604; the Histoire universelle of the Calvinist Agrippa d'Aubigne appeared between 1616 and 1620; and the Historia delle guerre civili di Francia by the Italian, Davila, appeared in Venice in 1630. The extent to which these works support each other is very striking, considering how different were the lives and sympathies of their authors. They were, for a long while, the principal authorities, and not one of them contributed to the legend. It was only later that this began to seep into the mainstream of history, and it is difficult to see why the old, standard histories were largely discarded in favor of the literature of opposition. The first aspect of the legend to emerge in the seventeenth century was the theme of Catherine's great ambition. This was emphasized by the royal historian Scipion Dupleix - the appropriate volume of whose work was pub1 2

J. Maiiejol, Catherine de Medicis, 1519-1589 (Paris: Hachette, 1920). Edited by G. Baum & E. Cunitz, 3 vols. (Paris, 1883-1889).

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lished in 1634 -, but he did not assume mat Catherine was wicked.3 M£zeray, whose Histoire de France appeared in Paris between 1636 and 1651, was the outstanding historian of the seventeenth century although he has been criticized for a lack of erudition. His work - though still moderate - was moderately unfavorable to Catherine. He took up the theme of ambition, represented her as deliberately embroiling others to her own advantage, and associated her with the desire of the house of Guise to exterminate the Protestants. This was an opinion which earlier Protestant historians had never held. Even before the end of the seventeenth century the general trend was clearly towards the legend. A moderate and thoughtful work was produced by a Jesuit, Gabriel Daniel, whose Histoire de France was published in Paris in 1696 and appears to have exercised a certain influence for about a century. He was one of the very few authors to express bewilderment in the face of already conflicting material, and to admit to having experienced difficulty in forming an honest opinion about Catherine. He shows that he was conscious of the existence of the legend — presumably from a study of the pamphleteers. In a strongly-worded passage he complained of the injustice of vilifying the characters of princes and causing posterity to think them execrable for ill-founded and ambiguous reasons and on account of actions which might be thought legitimate were we not ignorant of the motives behind them and of the effects which they produced. In his bewilderment Daniel tried to be fair. He gave an account of what had been said against Catherine, and also of what he could see in her favor. Louis Legendre,4 writing shortly after Daniel, in 1718, based his work principally on the old historians; he wrote of Catherine as a princess of infinite charm and ability. He believed, however, that she had been misled by evil counsel, and he was one of the first to allege that towards the end of her life she abandoned her son, Henry III, to support his enemy, the due de Guise. This introduces another theme of the legend: that of treachery for personal advantage. Voltaire, whose study of this period appeared in the Essai sur les moeurs (Geneva, 1756), restated the current position in better and more lucid French but added nothing of interest. His work was largely based on Daniel, from whom he lifted a good deal; on Mezeray who, surprisingly, he considered far superior; and on the early, Catholic historian, Pierre Matthieu, whose relatively balanced but boring Histoire de France appeared in Paris in 1631. It was in the second half of the eighteenth century that the picture really began to change. Bonnot de Mably in his Observations sur I'histoire de France (Geneva, 1765) described Catherine as an intriguer incapable of inspir3 4

Scipion Dupleix, Histoire generate de France, 5 vols. (Paris, 1634-1636), iii. Louis Legendre, Nouvelle histoire de France, 3 vols. (Paris, 1718), ii.

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ing respect, and his account of her character was very dark, contrasting sharply with those of Daniel and Legendre. A similar point of view was expressed by C. F. X. Millot in his Elements de I'histoire de France (Paris, 1767-1769). He linked the queen's name with that of Machiavelli, so as to produce a sinister impression. These authors must have known the work of Daniel, but his caution finds no echo in their pages. With the publication in 1783 of the Histoire de Francois II by Madame Thiroux d'Arconville,5 the legend was complete in all its ugly, incoherent vituperation. It is therefore worth looking more extensively at this otherwise insignificant work, in which there is scarcely a reference to Catherine unaccompanied by some disparaging comment. She is said to have been a woman without character but possessed of every imaginable weakness. These she employed successively in the service of her insatiable ambition, for the satisfaction of which she stopped at nothing. Consequently she drifted ceaselessly between two opposing parties, irresponsibly signing contradictory treaties. These are not identified. Catherine was said to have been "fourbe par petitesse," "intriguante par incapacite," irresolute, false, inconstant, and coldly cruel. Furthermore, she was declared to have been incapable of any virile (sic) or vigorous action. At the same time she was alleged to have seen her wicked counsels result in tides of blood, and without any shadow of remorse. She was blinded by her ambition to the dangers of constant changes of policy and, equally for the sake of her ambition, she sacrificed without regret the interests of her own sons and the interests of France. All this closely corresponds to one of the better-known of the pamphlets against Catherine, the Histoire merveilleuse de la vie... de Catherine de Medicis, first published in several languages in 1575. It was frequently reprinted and also incorporated into other works and collections and may be assumed to have had a considerable influence. Thus, Madame d'Arconville's overriding assumption of Catherine's wickedness led her to distort her evidence by the attribution of an unworthy motive for everything Catherine was alleged to have done; none of this was relevant to her subject, the brief reign of Francis II, which was over before Catherine had made her presence felt. It is impossible to say what influence — if any — Madame d'Arconville may have had. Certainly the first big history published after the Revolution, Fantin-Desodoards' Histoire de France,6 was based on the early histories and on Daniel, from whom he lifted, almost word for word, his account of Catherine's death and his appraisal of her character. This is interesting in so far as 1808 is too early to expect a pro-monarchical bias from historians. Catherine's policy is presented as having been constructive and the best that was possible in the circumstances. The allegation that she favored the due de Guise, as against the interests of Henry III, is dismissed as being intrinsically improbable 5 6

2vols. (Paris, Berlin, 1783). 26vols. (Paris, 1808-1810).

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and incapable of withstanding critical examination. But, in spite of the moderation of Desodoards, the legend was about to triumph. It was firmly supported by Henri Martin in his Histoire de France,1 which began to appear in 1830, although he is exceptional in stating that the truth about the massacre lay concealed in a chaos of contradictory material. The legend, by now, was so strongly established that Chateaubriand, a noted monarchist and Catholic, could write somewhat crudely about 1845 that Catherine's character presented no more than "un lieu commun use," so often had it been described. His own description conformed to the legend, which was soon to be propagated far and wide as the result of incorporation into innumerable general works. Among those few historians whose names are still remembered, Jules Michelet was one of the first to come out strongly against Catherine. In his romantic and highly inaccurate Histoire de France* he scathingly referred to the innocence of previous historians who had been naive enough to take Catherine seriously. For himself, he claimed with staggering arrogance to have seen the face of the sixteenth century and therefore to have given the world a definitive history. His version of the legend of the wicked Italian queen was quite as hysterical as that of Madame d'Arconville and, swept away on the torrent of his own emotions, he finally descended to pure abuse of a remarkably vulgar kind. The Petit Larousse illustre of 1964 commented on this laconically: "le souffle epique 1'emporte sur 1'exactitude." The propagation of the legend, however, did not mean that Catherine was without supporters in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the legend was reaching the height of its influence at just about the time when historians were beginning to turn their attention to archives. Huillard-Breholles published an article in 1847 entitled "Essai sur le caractere et 1'influence de Catherine de Medicis,"9 in which he made a constructive attempt to assess her character and work in relation to her background and the problems with which she had to contend. It is still one of the most interesting of works on Catherine. In 1838 the Italian Alb£ri brought out his eulogistic Vita di Caterine dej Medici, her first biography, and Capefigue's Catherine de Medicis, mere des rois Fran$oisll, Charles IX, et Henri HI was published in Paris in 1856. Capefigue was the first scholarly historian to denounce the legend, which he described without exaggeration as "la fantasmagoire sanglante." His book is important since he was also the first, so far as one can tell, to have done any serious documentary research on Catherine, and he was particularly knowledgeable on the Spanish archives. These had been seized by Napoleon and were then in Paris. When he came to write Catherine's life, he had been studying the period for a long time; it was already over twenty years since the publication of his massive work, Histoire de la Reforme, de la Ligue, et du regne de Henri IV.l ° 7

15 vols. (Paris, 1834-1836). Jules Michelet, Histoire de France, 15 vols. (Paris, 1833-1865). 9 L'Investigateur, journal del'InstitutHistorique, 1847. 1 0 8 vols. (Paris, 1834-1835). 8

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In England, later in the century, E. Armstrong produced his French Wars of Religion (London, 1892), and the American, James Westfall Thompson, in 1909,11 a much larger work by the same name, which was serious if uninspired, and ended in 1576. Most important of all was the publication of Catherine's vast correspondence, which appeared in Paris in nine volumes between 1880 and 1905.12 Nevertheless, those who tried to check the influence of the legend met with very limited success, as one can see from a study of the works of this century. Twentieth-century works on Catherine present a scene of great confusion. The legend is principally represented by Edith Sichel,13 who said that Catherine was a great villain, compounded of indifference and cynicism, and by Milton Waldman, 14 whose version of the legend reverted to the extreme position of Madame d'Arconville. On the other hand, two serious French historians, Henri de Maricourt 15 and Gaston Dodu, 16 denounced the legend, together with its prejudice against women and foreigners, and tried to study Catherine in the context of her times. In this connection, the work of Lucien Romier cannot be ignored although he never took Catherine as his subject. His well-known book, Le Royaume de Catherine de Medicis, provided the arras against which she could be studied, as well as the elements of a sane interpretation. 17 In 1920 J. Mariejol brought out a long, confused life of Catherine, which is probably still the most widely known. Its interest lay in the fact that he was the first historian to have studied Catherine's correspondence, but unfortunately he appears to have studied very little else. Mariejol was followed in 1923 by the American historian, Paul Van Dyke, with two rather dull but worthy volumes of the life and times variety. 18 Van Dyke devoted a few pages to a discussion of the legend, without entirely rejecting it. In attributing to Catherine responsibility for the massacre, he wrote of "the terrible potentiality of her heart for evil." Nevertheless — and this is important — , he did reject the distortions which arise from the transposition of evidence and denied that one could interpret Catherine's early life in terms of her alleged conduct at the time of the massacre. Another American, Ralph Roeder, published in 1937 a long and

11

(1909; Chicago: Ungar, 1965). Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, vols. i-iv, ed. by H. de la Ferriere (1880-1895), vols. vi-ix, ed. by Baguenault de Puchesse (Paris, 1897-1905). 13 Edith Sichel, Catherine de' Medici and the French Reformation (London: Constable, 11905). 4 Milton Waldman, Biography of a Family, Catherine de Medici and her Children (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1936). 15 Henri de Maricourt, Les Valois (Paris, 1939). 16 G. Dodu, "Le Drame conjugal de Catherine de Medicis," Revue des etudes historiques, 1930. 17 Lucien Romier, Le Royaume de Catherine de Medicis, 2vols. (Paris: Perrin, 1922). 18 Paul Van Dyke, Catherine de Medicis, 2 vols. (New York/London: Scribner's, 1923). 12

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highly individual work with the interesting title of Catherine de' Medici and the Lost Revolution.19 His predominant idea appears to have been that Catherine was entirely negative. This ill-balanced book contains some stimulating ideas: it suggests, for example, that one of the great disasters of the period was the inability of Catherine and the admiral Coligny to co-operate. Probably one of the most influential works of its time was A History of Europe by H. A, L. Fisher. He adopted a predominantly contemptuous and dismissive attitude toward Catherine. He introduced her as "this cultured and cynical Italian lady of the middle class." He presented her as a failure because "a bold policy, which might have attracted a native king" whoever that may refer to, "was beyond the reach of a foreigner. An enthusiastic policy which would have elicited the cordial support of either Catholic or Huguenot, was alien to her indifferent and essentially lay temperament." This is an excellent example of the way in which moral strictures have been used to mask complete ignorance of the factors and circumstances which moulded her policy. "Encompassed by perils," Fisher continued, ... she resolved to preserve the enjoyment of the monarchy for her sons and, for herself, the substance of power, by the method which seemed to her to be most apt to secure that end, a religious peace based on compromise.... In her contempt for veracity, in her gluttony, and in the remorseless pursuit of private revenge she was an Italian of her age. Her great political virtue was the cool persistence with which she strove to secure a peaceful balancing between two fanatical parties. B u t . . . a moment came when this fat, agreeable, industrious woman, whose taste in art was so delicate and true ... who never forgave or forgot an injury, and was first of all the rulers of France to organize immorality as an instrument of political power, discarded her policy of indulgence and helped to engineer the Massacre of St. Bartholomew.20 Two other books, J. E. Neale, The Age of Catherine de Medici, and G. Mattingly, The Defeat of the Spanish Armada 21 , are of interest in this connection because they show that, although the legend was gradually giving way to scholarship and understanding, its influence was far from dead among post-war historians. Not only did these authors reproduce certain elements of the legend, but, like Fisher, they also used qualifying phrases solely calculated to prejudice the reader's mind: for example, Catherine's "unscrupulous italianate mind."22 Professor Neale stressed Catherine's inferior, merchant origin, a line of attack which normally forms a part of the legend. At the time of her marriage she was not thought an unworthy match for Prince Henry, 19

(London: Viking, 1937). (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1935), p. 380. I am grateful to Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Hunter for drawing my attention to this passage. 21 Neale, The Age of Catherine De Medici (London: Cape, 1943), and Mattingly, The Defeat of the Spanish Armada (London: Cape, 1959). 22 Neale, p. 73. 20

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who was in fact a cousin by marriage. It was not until later that the eminence of her French descent on her mother's side was conveniently forgotten. 23 This strand of the legend was a source of further misconceptions. Professor Neale went on to attribute to a sense of inferiority what he considered to be Catherine's exaggerated respect for royalty and her pursuit of thrones for her children. He chose to disregard the obvious explanation, that marriage negotiations were the stock-in-trade of diplomacy, an intrinsic part of Catherine's foreign policy, though this was clear enough to him in the case of Queen Elizabeth. Furthermore, as a part of a generally adverse picture, Neale asserted, unlike Fisher, that Catherine was not genuinely cultivated but liked to have the trappings of culture about her. She had, however, been acceptable at the highly cultured court of Francis I, and the "trappings" in her Paris house alone were valued at over 800,000 ecus.2* In another section Neale wrote of Catherine's lack of principles, which made her unlikely to have qualms about murdering the Huguenot leader, Coligny. Such statements illustrate the strongly-felt prejudice which is a distillation of the legend. Professor Mattingly was altogether more extreme in the few passages which he devoted to Catherine. Once again, the assumption of her wickedness becomes overwhelming, and everything is seen from this angle. He blamed her for the massacre and asserted that she abandoned the service of Henry III to support his enemy, the due de Guise. Catherine, he said, "was not squeamish about killing." :But when, as he alleged, she dissuaded Henry III from killing Guise at the time of the barricades in Paris in 1588, "we can be sure it was for some selfish, personal reason." Elsewhere this is described as having been cynical, selfish advice which served to "compound horror and confusion." Professor Mattingly confidently declared that Catherine did not inconvenience herself for the Faith. "She had no more interest in the orthodoxy she sometimes invoked, than she had in the principles of justice and toleration she also mouthed. In fact she had no interest in any abstractions at all - not in the monarchy,... not in France, not in Christendom, not even in a dynasty." Her real interest, he maintained, was in "comfort, safety and personal aggrandizement," and chiefly in herself. Such statements revert to the extreme eighteenth century position and, in place of information, convey a strong, negative emotion which springs from the legend.25 These two books have been treated in relative detail because they provide excellent examples of the lingering vitality of the legend and also because they are in English and by historians who are well respected in their own fields. 23

Catherine was related in some degree to most of the high nobility. See, for example, [Old] Cambridge Modern History, (London: Macmillan, 1902-1912), XIII genealogical table, nos. 22, 69. 24 This figure represents something in the region of two and a half million livres. C Chevalier, Archives royales de Chenonceaux. Debtes et creanciers de la royne mere, 25 Catherine de Media's (1864), II, xliii. Mattingly, pp. 202-203.

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A more recently available work, and one of the most ambitious, is Jean Hdritier's Catherine de'Medici.26 This is the principal full-scale book on Catherine readily available in English. It is stimulating but unscholarly and incoherent. In relation to the legend, however, Heritier makes his position perfectly clear: "Historians may leave to [Catherine's] libellers the legend of an imaginary Medici who delighted in availing herself of poison." Elsewhere he states that the legend was created by the civil wars because Catherine was incomprehensible to those whose passions she did not share. Both she and her favorite son, Henry III, were completely and profoundly misunderstood. He not only rejected the "maternal" interpretation of Catherine as sacrificing the interests of France to those of her sons - a curious distinction, one might think - but even denied that she had any particularly deep maternal passions at all. He added that Henry II had fussed over the children far more than their mother. Heritier also denied that maternal solicitude can be used to explain Catherine's various marriage negotiations for her children. He agreed that she had a passion for politics, and even for power, but not in any illegitimate sense. Her passion for power, he said, was "as one with her love for the crown of France."27 Heritier also departed from the legend in his treatment of the massacre. He distinguished clearly between the death of Coligny and a few other Protestant leaders, and the massacre which followed. Catherine, he believed, decided that Coligny must die because he was determined to defy the government which had forgiven his entire past, restored, paid and honored him. He was ready to enter the Netherlands with 14,000 men. Here Heritier overlooked the fact that Coligny first obtained the king's permission. Heritier made the interesting point that Coligny had already been judicially condemned by the parlement of Paris but, having been rehabilitated by the treaty of Saint-Germain in 1570, it was impossible to proceed against him in this way again. It was for this reason, he said, that Catherine decided to have Coligny shot, together with a few of his principal lieutenants. Heritier, however, emphasized the juridically incontrovertible fact that the king's authority rendered their deaths a legitimate act of summary royal justice. The following massacre, he believed, had nothing to do with the court but was the responsibility of the Guises and the city of Paris. Buried among a great deal of verbiage, Heritier's book contains an overall interpretation of Catherine as a great, national, and moderate statesman, who struggled in isolation, with diplomacy as her principal weapon, against two mutually hostile and armed factions. His theme is that she preserved for Henry IV a kingdom which was battered but not mutilated, exhausted but not extinct. 26 Jean Heritier, Catherine de' Medici (Paris, 1940, 1959; trans, by Charlotte Haldane, London: Allen & Unwin, 1963). 27 Ibid., ed. 1963, pp. 158, 209, 313.

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The latest full-scale work on Catherine by Irene Mahoney 28 is unfortunately retrogressive. Her stated purpose, to investigate the legend of "the sinister queen," as she called it, becomes obscured in its mists. The legend is largely evoked, and some of its elements are again endorsed. The theme of maternal jealousy is restated to account for the events of 1572 and, in the epilogue, Catherine ends up as the Italian shopkeeper. This is closer to Edith Sichel than to Van Dyke or Heritier. A little further consideration of those aspects of the legend which have emerged from a survey of the principal historians, will disclose the astonishing degree of confusion which they have created. Subsidiary elements of the legend, as well as a chain of related misconceptions, all stem from the twin assumptions that Catherine was both wicked and ambitious, qualities which also entailed that of extreme selfishness. For example, from the belief in her ambition arose the assumption that she had a free choice in all that she did or was alleged to have done - , and one need go no further in order to produce a fantastic distortion of her career. Yet the idea that Catherine was virtually powerless has never been seriously investigated. Legendre did raise this point for the reign of Francis II, and it is now implied in the work of Heritier The accusation of ambition is common to all versions of the legend. Author after author has repeated some strong expression of Catherine's "insatiable ambition," of her "mania for power," that she put "power before affection," and so on. Even historians who rejected the legend often assert that Catherine was ambitious; indeed this may be supported by some reliable contemporary sources. But here the question arises as to what is meant by ambition? In the hands of historians who do not subscribe to the legend, the word has been used in three separate ways. There are those who mean that Catherine wanted to govern France because she enjoyed the exercise of power, but without inferring that she wished to do so merely to her own advantage; those who mean that she wanted to govern because no one else could be trusted to do so in the interests of France; those who believe that her inclination to govern coincided with her duty to do so. There can be no doubt that Catherine intended — if she could - to guide and control the administration while her sons, the rightful kings of France, were too young or too unwell to rule. But the extent to which she did so was very limited. Her motives for this, and her fears of any other outcome, are clearly expressed in her correspondence.29 The question of ambition is often linked with that of Catherine's relations with her children by those who accuse her of having perverted and dominated them in order to uphold her own authority. The charge of perver28 29

Irene Mahoney, Madame Catherine (London: Gollancz, 1976). La Ferriere, Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, passim.

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sion — the precise implication is not very clear — is lifted from the pamphleteers; that of domination is more common. J. E. Neale, for instance, interpreted Catherine's life in terms of a dominant maternalism. To him, her children were her passion, not the country; she did not know what patriotism meant, a perverse judgment when one considers the painful care with which she defended the independence of France. Related to this aspect of the legend is the allegation — most recently made by Professor Mattingly — that Catherine deserted her son, Henry III, in favor of assisting the aspiring due de Guise in 1588. This idea is directly derived from a belief in Catherine's perfidy and the wickedness of her ambition; this led her to place power before duty or affection. It runs contrary to her known adoration of the king and cannot be illustrated from the correspondence of the due de Guise, who deplored Catherine's refusal to play his Spanish game. 30 There are various other branches of the legend which spring from a belief in Catherine's general wickedness. She has been accused of murders. This was a common enough practice in the sixteenth century, but we are not told who she is supposed to have murdered. She has also been accused of intriguing, lying, profound dissimulation, and of sowing dissension all around her in order to profit from the resulting chaos. The needs of diplomacy naturally called for qualities other than transparent honesty, and dissimulation was, if anything, admired as a quality in the sixteenth century. The charge of sowing dissension could easily be disposed of by the vast documentation on her work of conciliation. The chaos, of course, was real enough; but it was not of Catherine's making, and it would be interesting to learn in what way she profited from it. The confusion which historians have created can most clearly be seen in their estimation of Catherine's character and policy. It is not simply that opinions have varied from age to age. They have varied from author to author and from one year to the next. Even among those who all subscribe to the legend, there is disagreement in detail. For instance, Millot allowed Catherine a supple genius worthy of Machiavelli, but his contemporary, Mably, considered her weak and irresolute, and Madame d'Arconville called her a woman without force of character, cruel, false, and inconstant. Among her defenders Maricourt wrote of the great authority of her character, and to Alberi she was one of the strongest characters in the history of mankind. On the other hand, indifference and cynicism were her dominant qualities, according to Edith Sichel; but to another English author, Benson Rose, she was one of the most courageous, prudent, and capable of queens.31 To Mezeray and Laponneraye 32 she was artful, crafty, sly, and cold, but Legendre, who saw her as 30

Archives Rationales, Paris, fonds Simancas, K 1565, 1567, no pagination. John Benson Rose, A Treatise on the Reign and Times of Queen Catherine de Medici (London, 1871). 32 A. Laponneraye and H.Lucas, Histoire des guerres civiles de France, 2 vols. (Paris, 1847). 31

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infinitely lovable, extolled her greatness, her genius, and her natural aptitude for government. Desodoards, for his part, admired her refinement and magnificence while Michelet reviled her for her rotten natural baseness. When it comes to Catherine's policy, the divergence of opinion is no less bewildering. This is a very large subject, but the type of confusion can be quickly illustrated. For example, during the reign of Francis II, according to Laponneraye, Catherine exercised an unbridled dictatorship. But those who read Legendre will learn that she was quite without authority. Mezeray and others declared that she decided to support the Guises, but in Mably's opinion she had no choice; according to Roeder she was too stunned, inexperienced, and even too unambitious, to take any positive action at all. Roeder again praised her patience, optimism, and far-sighted opportunism. But to Neale her policy of appeasement was dangerously short-sighted, and her opportunism was merely feminine. While some historians believe that she rendered the civil wars inevitable, others allege that she curbed their violence and duration. She has frequently been criticised, in a well-known expression, for a policy of "bascule," but to the opponents of this view it was not Catherine but the factions who kept ringing the changes. This state of confusion has partly arisen from historians having founded their interpretations upon different basic data. Thus, a general lack of understanding of the period has hampered the study of Catherine almost as much as the lasting influence of the legend itself. Historians have mostly failed to consider the nature of the revolution which Catherine was striving to contain. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the conception of revolution, in relation to this period, has yet been generally accepted although the works of Maulde La Clavi£re and Lucien Romier have long since established the point. The only way to escape from this jungle of contradictory opinions into a plausible, consistent interpretation of Catherine, is to study her life and work more closely, within its context of the ancien regime.33 It is essential to bear in mind the violent pressures to which Catherine was subjected, and to follow the steady and closely connected principles by which she strove to guide the kingdom along a path of moderation. By preserving the monarchy, in spite of its weakness, Catherine preserved the only remaining principle of unity,,

33

I have tried to outline such an interpretation in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15. ed. (Chicago/London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1974), Macropaedia 3, 1007-1009 and in Catherine de Medici and the Ancien Regime, above chap. 3.

INDEX Adrian VI, pope, 7 Alengon, Franqois, due d', due d'Anjou (1576): courted by the huguenots, 44; his ambitions, 44, 45 ;^and Henry III, 47; malcontent, 50; his insubordination, 50; and the Netherlands, 235, 236; his death (1584), 236 Alexander IV, pope, 17 Alexander VI, pope, 17 Alva, Fernando Alvarez de Toledo y Pimental, duke of: militant catholic, 8; faction leader, 9; captain general of the Netherlands (1567), 9, 39, 41, 165-6, 175, 217, 218, 219;atBayonne(1565), 39, 163, 164, 165, 211, 213, 214, 216; conspired with French catholic leaders, 164, 165; marched against Mons (Aug. 1572), 173-4, 181; and the Sea Beggars, 192, 195, 202; and the seizure of Brille, 204, 205, 206; commissioner for peace negotiations (1559), 211; sent forces to France (1567), 219 Amboise, conspiracy or tumult of (March 1560), 79-84 passim, 97, 115-21 passim, 139-40 Amboise, peace and edict of (March 1563), 37, 40, 118, 150, 154, 155, 160, 164, 215; its execution, 39 Anjou, Francois, due d'. See Alengon, Francois, due d' Anjou, Henri, due d'. See Henry III, king of France Arran, James Hamilton, earl of, heir apparent to Scotland, 82-3, 110 Assembly of notables, at Fontainebleau (Aug. 1560), 33, 35, 122-4, 152, 158 Augsburg, confession of, 113 Augsburg, the religious peace of (1555), 5, 116, 210, 223 Ausances, seigneur d', envoy of Navarre, 14-15, 16, 68-9, 70 Bayonne, conference at (1565), 8, 39, 40, 147, 163-4, 216, 217 Bedford, Francis Russell, earl of: mission to France (1561), 89-90 Berwick, treaty of (Feb. 1560), 80, 83, 98, 103 Beze, Theodore de, pastor, 143-4, 147 Boisnormand, Dugue de, alias Frangois Le

Gay, pastor: served Navarre (1557), 57 Bourbon, Charles de, cardinal: inquisitor general for France, 27, 28; warned the due de Guise, 151 Bourbon-Vendome, Jeanne de, 31 Bourg, Anne du, parlementaire: arrested, 28 Bourges, pragmatic sanction of (1438), 19 Boys, Edward, commissioner for the Cinque Ports (1571), 193 Brederode, Lancelot de, Sea Beggar, 204, 205 Brille (HoUand), 183, 184, 185, 186, 201-6 passim Burghley, William Cecil, lord (1571), 75, 77, 79, 80, 83-95 passim, 100, 102, 111, 112,185,186,191,198,230 Buy, Gaspard de Heu, seigneur du, agent of Navarre, 58, 59, 149 Calais (France), 5, 11, 74, 78-9, 85, 86, 90, 95,99,112,141,158 Calvin, Jean: influence in France, 23; appealed to Navarre, 58, 59; and the conspiracy of Amboise, 102, 107, 108 Cambrai, peace of (1529), 22 Carlos, Don, prince of Spain: proposed marriage with Mary Stuart, 11 Cateau-Cambresis, treaty of (April 1559), 4, 7, 31, 34, 40, 50, 56, 60, 73, 78, 86, 90, 98, 99, 100, 116, 175, 176, 178, 209, 210, 211 Catherine de Medici: chaps. 3 and 13 passim] marriage to Henry of Orleans (1533), 22, 31, 32, 243-4; personal qualities, chap. 13 passim, 32; childhood, 32; and Francis I, 32; regent of France in 1560, 334, 129; in 1574, 45; and the Guises, 33, 34, 35, 37, 41, 88, 142, 155; conservative ideals, 34; her religious policy, 35, 36, 37, 117-20 passim, 127; sought to reconcile Guise and Conde (1561), 36; and the edict of January 1562, 36; her position in 1562, 37, 144-5; her position in 1563, 37-8; and the prince de Conde, 38; instructions for Charles IX, 38-9; dangerously ill in 1563, 38; in 1568, 41, 167; in 1585, 47; progress round France (1564-6), 39, 40, 41, 163, 165; and Spain, 39, 40, 50-1, 66, 178, 180, 181;

252 her position in 1566-70, 40-3; and the Massacre of St. Bartholomew (1572), 434, 237-8, 241, 242, 244, 245, 246; and Henry HI, 45-8; death of (1589), 47; problems which confronted her, 48-54; defended the succession, 50; and queen Elizabeth I, 51; precursor of cardinal Richelieu, 53; betrayed by Navarre (1562), 71; and the collogue of Poissy (1561), 114, 115; at Bayonne (1565), 1634, 216; and the enterprise of the Netherlands, 178, 181; proposed summit meeting (April 1563), 215; opposed a catholic league in 1563, 215; her alleged ambition, 238-9, 240, 246-7; her alleged treachery, 239, 240-1, 244, 247 Catholic League, the (1584), 6, 8, 47, 50 Cecil., William. See Burghley, William Cecil, lord Chambre ardente, the, 24, 25 Chantonnay, Thomas Perrenot, seigneur de, Spanish ambassador in France, 9, 35, 36, 62, 68, 69, 70, 99, 105, 106, 111, 120, 130, 134, 139, 142, 151, 154, 163 Charles V, holy Roman emperor, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 175 Charles IX, king of France: accession, 33, 64; declared of age (1563), 38; dependent on his mother, 43; debility, 43, 45; threatened by Alenqon, 44-5; death of (1574), 44, 45; coronation (1561), 68; seriously ill (1566), 165; and the enterprise of the Netherlands (1571-2), 1734, 177-8, 179, 180, 181 Chartres, Franqois de Vendome, vidame de, 81-2 Chateaubriant, edict of (June 1551), 25, 26, 118 Chatillon, Odet de Coligny, cardinal, inquisitor general for France (1557), 27, 28, 167, 168 Chenonceaux, chateau of, 35, 37 Clement IV, pope, 17 Clement VII, pope, 22, 31 Cobham (alias Brooke), Thomas, brother of William, lord Cobham, 193 Cobham, William, lord, lord warden of the Cinque Ports, 193 Coligny, Gaspard de, seigneur de Chatillon, admiral of France: chap. 9 passim; advocated an assembly of notables (1560), 33; frightened Catherine de Medici (1561), 36; accused of the murder of Guise, 41; declared innocent

Index of the murder of Guise (1566), 41, 165, 166, 171; murdered (1572), 43, 173; returned to court (Sept. 1571), 43; and the enterprise of the Netherlands, 43, 178-9, 180, 181, 189; huguenot leader, 76; wanted English support for a national council (1561), 89; meeting with Throckmorton (Apr. 1561), 90; at court (Feb. 1560), 104; advised religious moderation, 118; presented petitions at Fontainebleau (1560), 122-3, 127-8, 158; warned the duchesse de Guise of her husband's danger, 140; incriminated by Poltrot de Merey, 143-4, 145, 148, 151-2, 159; his reply to Poltrot's deposition, 146-8; rejoiced in the death of Guise, 148, 160; compromised by the death of Guise, 154; his defensive role, 157; captured at Saint-Quentin (1557), 158, 175; restored to the council by Catherine de Medici (1561), 158; promoted the edict of January 1562, 158; expelled from the council (Feb. 1562), 159; joined Conde in arms (1562), 159; tried to return to court (May 1563), 161; intercepted by the Guises, 162; brief return to court (1563), 162; endangered by the Guises, 162, 165, 166; at La Rochelle (1570-1), 169, 178, 179; returned to court (Sept.-Oct. 1571), 169, 180; offered royal protection (Dec. 1571), 170; summoned to court (Nov. 1571), 170; returned to court (June 1572), 170, 180; licensed to depart to the Netherlands (Aug. 1572), 173; enemy of Spain, 173, 178-9, 180, 181; converted to Calvinism in prison (1557-9), 175; favoured marriage of Navarre to Elizabeth I, 179; distrusted the king (1571), 179; advised war on Spain, 180 Compiegne, edict of (July 1557), 28, 118, 119 Concordat, the (1516), 19, 20, 28 Conde, Louis de Bourbon, prince de: declined to attend assembly of notables (Aug. 1560), 33; arrested at Orleans and condemned to death (1560), 33, 63, 86, 89, 153; liberated (20 Dec. 1560), 33, 64, 88, 153; captured at Dreux (Dec. 1562), 37, 142, 160; signed the treaty of Hampton Court (Sept. 1562), 38; expelled the English from Le Havre (1563), 38; denied the rank of lieutenant general of France (1563), 38;

Index alliance with William of Orange (1568), 42; out of favour at court (1559), 55-6; ratified the treaty of Cateau-Carnbresis (1559), 61; hope of the protestants, 63; huguenot leader, 73, 76, 78, 82, 94; sought to contact Elizabeth I (May 1560), 85; threatened by the Guises, 121, 145, 153, 165; blamed for the conspiracy of Amboise (1560), 140; and the crisis of March 1562, 144-5; allegedly planned to escape from prison (Feb. 1563), 151; and the murder of Guise, 151, 152, 154; forced to flee from court (Apr. 1560), 152; joined Navarre at Nerac (1560), 152; suspected of planning a general rebellion (1560), 152; his princely grievances against the Guises, 152-3; returned to the council (March 1561), 153; catholic efforts to win his allegiance (1563), 154, 155, 161, 164; captured at Jarnac and murdered (March 1569), 154, 168; fled to La Rochelle (1568), 168 Correro, Giovanni, Venetian ambassador in France, 51 Cosse, Arthus de, comte de Segondigny, seigneur de Gonnor, marshal of France (1567): arrested (1574), 45 Coucy, edict of (July 1535), 22-3 Crispe, sir Henry, commissioner for the Cinque Ports (1571), 193 Crispe, William, commissioner for the Cinque Ports (1571), 193 Damville, Henri de Montmorency, comte de, marshal of France (1567), due de (1579), gouverneur of Languedoc: opposition leader (1574), 45 Davison, William, English agent in the Netherlands, 235 Diaceto, Florence, secret agent, 110 Dreux, battle of (Dec. 1562), 142 Diane de Poitiers, mistress of Henry II, 32 Dominican friars: papal inquisitors (1233), 16, 17, 18 Dudley, Robert, earl of Leicester. See Leicester, Robert Dudley, earl of Duprat, Antoine, chancellor of France, archbishop of Sens, cardinal legate, 21 Ecouen, edict of (1559), 119 Edict of January 1562, 36, 71, 93,158 Edinburgh, treaty of (July 1560), 84, 85, 105 Egmont, Lamoral, count, stadtholder of

253

Flanders, 166, 168, 175,176, 212, 214, 219 Elisabeth de Valois, wife of Philip II, 4, 34, 35, 39, 40, 69, 74 Elizabeth I, queen of England: her foreign policy, see especially introduction and chaps. 5, 6, 11, 12; accession, 4; her essential mission, 4; and the cause of religion, 8, 10, 11, 12, 74, 75-77, 85, 90, 112, 187-90 passim, 221, 223, 224, 235; and the Ridolfi plot, 9; her marriage negotiations, 9, 74, 75, 86-7, 89, 92-3, 191; and the Netherlands, 10, 11, 12, 179, 181-91 passim, 194, 202, 203, 204, 220, 221; her excommunication (Feb. 1570), 10, 11, 187, 190, 221, 224; and parliament, 12; her royal supremacy, 12; sent help to Scotland (1560), 80 Escars, Franqois d', French ambassador in Rome, 69 Escovedo, Juan, secretary to Don John of Austria, 232, 234, 235 Estates general, of Orleans (1560-1), 33, 34, 35, 52, 64, 86; extracted the promise of a general or national council, 126, 127; supported Navarre's claim to the regency, 129 Esternay, protestant of Picardy: presented a protestant petition (June 1561), 132 Ferdinand, king of Aragon: took Navarre (1512), 56 Ferrara, Hippolyte d'Este, cardinal of, papal legate, 15, 17, 69, 71, 122, 125, 136 Feuquieres, gouverneur of Roye, 143, 147, 148, 150, 152, 153 Fontainebleau, edict of (June 1540), 23 Fontainebleau, edict of (Apr. 1561), 68, 130 France, Dominican province of, 14, 16 Francis I, king of France, 31, 32, 34, 38, 45; and the inquisition, 20, 21, 22 Francis II, king of France, 78, 114; betrothed to Mary queen of Scots, 3; dauphin, 31, 33; dominated by the Guises, 33, 61; death of (Dec. 1560), 33,64,88,126 Franciscan friars: papal inquisitors (1233), 16 Frederick I, holy Roman emperor, 15 Frederick II, holy Roman emperor: constitutions of (1232), 15-16 Fronde, the, 49, 50, 51

254

Index

Galilean church, the, 14 Galilean liberties, 24, 28 Genlis, Jean de Hangest, seigneur de, 177, 180 Gonston \ (or Gonson), Benjamin, commissioner for marine causes, 193 Granvelle, Antoine Perrenot de, bishop of Arras, cardinal, 8, 9, 99, 163, 211, 213, 215 Gregory IX, pope: his statutes of 1231, 15; appointed inquisitors (1233), 16,18 Gregory XIII, pope, 7, 207, 224; and the Netherlands, 9; his enterprise of England, 218, 224-5, 231-3, 234, 235 Guise brothers, the, 5, 6,10,11, 12, 33, 74; dominant at court under Francis II, 28, 55-6, 59, 60, 61, 97, 98, 101; persecuted protestants, 33, 58, 75, 97, 102, 140, 153; hostility to the Bourbon princes, 33; assumed control of the government under Francis II, 33, 74-5, 78; quarrelled with Navarre (1561), 34; struggled to control the council, 34; eclipsed at court under Charles IX, 34, 66, 67, 76, 88, 153; and Spain, 34, 67, 88, 93, 157; left court without licence (Oct. 1561), 36; refused to recognise the edict of January 1562, 36, 71; formed the Catholic League (Dec. 1584), 47; sought to subvert the succession, 50; said to have tried to bribe Catherine de Medici, 68; Scottish ambitions, 74-5, 77-8, 79, 86, 88, 93, 94, 98; designs on England, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83-4, 86, 93, 94, 95, 98,108; growth of opposition to, 75, 76, 78; recovered initiative at court (1560), 85; dominant in council under Henry II, 140; alleged to have advised the king to kill Conde (March 1560), 140; their unpopularity, 141; planned to seize the king (1563), 162; occupied Troyes (1571), 170; in disgrace (1570-2), 178 Guise, Fran§ois, due de: murdered (Feb. 1563), chap. 8 passim, 8, 37, 41, 75, 88, 158, 159, 160, 215; leader of the Triumvirate, 34,142; his popularity, 35, 141; summoned to Paris by Navarre (Feb. 1562), 71; conqueror of Calais (1558), 74, 141, 158;lieutenant general of France (March 1560), 118; his early career, 140-1; military hero, 140-1, 142; victor of the battle of Dreux (1562), 142; believed to be an obstacle to peace (1563), 145, 153; designated lieutenant

of the pope, 153-4,160 Guise, Henri, due de, 47, 171, 235-6 Guise, Louis de, cardinal, 153 Hampton Court, treaty of (1562), 11, 38, 73, 77, 78, 95 Hawkins, John, commissioner for piracy, 198, 199, 200, 201 Henry II, king of France: his accidental death (July 1559), 4, 31, 32, 33,40, 48, 50, 51, 55, 59, 60, 61, 62, 74, 77, 78, 82, 98, 101, 108, 116, 141, 177, 208; executor of catholic policy, 7; and the inquisition, 13, 19, 20, 23-4, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29; his coronation oath, 24; marriage to Catherine de Medici, 31; qualities as king, 32-3; persecuted protestants, 77, 210 Henry III, king of France: marriage negotiations with queen Elizabeth I, 9; manipulated by Lorraine, 42; lieutenant general of France (1567), 42; allegedly threatened at La Rochelle, 44; king of Poland (1573-4), 44, 45; declared rightful heir to France (1574), 45; his characteristics, 45, 46; menaced by the Catholic League, 47; instigated the murder of Henri due de Guise (1588), 47; murdered (1589), 48; leader of the catholic extremists, 178 Henry IV, king of France: and the Catholic League, 6, 8; and the United Provinces, 9; marriage to Marguerite de Valois (15 72), 43, 170,171,181; heir apparent to France (1584), 47; ended the isolation of the crown, 49; his abjuration (1593), 50; stabilized the succession, 50; his creative achievements, 53-4; nearly defeated by Spain, 178 Holstock, William, controller of the navy, commissioner for marine causes, 193, 195 Holy League, the (1571), 222 Holy Office, the, 6 Honorius III, pope, 15 Home, Philippe de Montmorency, count, 166,168,175,176,212,219 Horsey, sir Edward, captain of the Isle of Wight: commissioner for piracy (1572), 198, 199; English envoy in the Netherlands, 231 Hotman, Francois, professor of law at Strasbourg, 102, 107

Index Innocent III, pope, 15 Innocent IV, pope, 17 Inquisition, the, 6, 14-15, 207, 208, 210, 217; in Languedoc, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20; medieval, 13,14, 17, 19, 22, 25, 26, 27; desired by the Guises, 33; desired by the clergy (1560), 127 Inquisition, edict of (1554 or 1555), 116 Inquisitors, papal, 16 Intendants, the, 52 Jeanne d'Albret, queen of Navarre, 65, 90, 178 Jesuits, the, 9 John, Don, of Austria: captain general of the Holy League, 8; governor of the Netherlands, 10, 210, 224-5, 226, 227, 228, 230, 233; and the enterprise of England, 10, 224-5, 228, 231, 232, 233; victor of Lepanto (1571), 222; and Mary queen of Scots, 224, 236; his instructions for the Netherlands, 228-9, 230, 231; withdrew to Namur, 234, 236; died in the Netherlands (Oct. 1578), 236 Jones, Robert, servant of Throckmorton, 86,87,109,110 Killigrew, sir Henry, English ambassador in France, 81, 82, 83, 170; and the conspiracy of Amboise, 97, 98, 107, 109, 110, 111; met Navarre at Vendome (1559), 101, 102, 110 Knox, John, reformer, 77 Lainez, Diego, general of the Jesuits, 136 La Marck, Guillaume de, baron de Lumay, Sea Beggar, 184, 192-9 passim, 201-6 passim Lane, Ralph, commissioner for piracy (1571), 193, 194 La Noue, Francois de, 153,177 La Renaudie, Jean de Barry, seigneur de, leader of the conspiracy of Amboise, 109, 149 La Roche-Chandieu, Antoine de, Paris pastor, 58 La Rochefoucauld, Francois, comte de, 144, 152, 159, 165 Lateran council, the fourth (1215), 15 Laubespine, Qaude de, secretary of state, 57, 130 Laubespine, Sebastien de, bishop of Limoges, French ambassador in Spain, 105, 116,131

255 Leicester, Robert Dudley, earl of, 12, 84, 86-7, 92-3, 94, 235 Lepanto, battle of (1571), 222 Le Petit, Robert, inquisitor general for France (1255), 17 L'Hospital, Michel de, chancellor of France (1560), 33, 35, 36, 41-2, 52-3, 71,118, 133 Limoges, Sebastien de Laubespine, bishop of. See Laubespine, Sebastien de, bishop of Limoges Lizet, Pierre, premier president of the parlement of Paris, 24 Loches, edict of (May 1560), 119 Longjumeau, peace of (1568), 41, 42, 43, 166-7, 176 Louis VIII, king of France, 15, 22 Louis IX, king of France, 15,16, 22 Louis X, king of France, 16 Louis XII, king of France, 38 Louise de Savoie, regent of France, 21 Lorraine, Charles de Guise, cardinal, papal legate: 8, 27, 28, 85, 114, 115, 124, 211; relations with Alva, 9, 219; influence over Henry II, 24, 28; assumed control of the government (1559), 33, 55-6, 59, 60, 61; his unpopularity, 35, 141, 142; returned from the council of Trent (Jan. 1564), 40-1, 162-3; instigated civil war, 41; influence at court (1568), 41-2; threatened by the huguenots, 41, 42, 166, 219; in disgrace (1570-4), 43, 169, 178, 188; and the conspiracy of Amboise, 98, 99, 104, 105, 106, 111, 117, 118, 119,121; and the confession of Augsburg, 113,135-6; and the council of Trent, 116,126,128, 137, 154; his persecution of protestants, 116-19 passim', forced to abandon extreme persecution, 117; under attack (1560), 120; at the assembly of notables (1560), 123-4; withdrew to Rheims (Feb. 1561), 128, 130; crowned Charles IX (1561), 131; would-be saviour of Christendom, 135-7; pursued Triumvirate policy, 141, 154; and the catholic leadership, 141-2, 158, 178, 216-17; said to have been all-powerful under Francis II, 142; sought to arrest Conde after the conspiracy of Amboise, 142; loss of influence under Charles IX, 142; planned to destroy the huguenot leaders, 150, 167, 168, 176, 187, 219, 220; resumed control of the council (1564), 163; sought to enter Paris in

256

Index

arms (1565), 163; in control at court (1566), 165; quarrelled with L'Hospital, 165; threatened Coligny, 169-70; went to Rome (May 1572), 171; thwarted a huguenot invasion of the Netherlands (1568), 176; his intended enterprise of England, 187,188, 219 Lucius IV, pope, 15 Lumbres, Guislain de Fiennes, sieur de, Sea Beggar, 192 Macar, Jean, Paris pastor, 58, 59 Madeleine de la Tour d'Auvergne, comtesse de Boulogne, 31 Madrid, treaty of (1525) 21 Margaret, duchess of Parma, regent of the Netherlands, 212, 216,217 Marguerite de Valois, 43 Marillac, Charles de, archbishop of Vienne, 123 Martinengo, abbe, papal nuncio, 90-1, 92, 93 Mary of Lorraine, regent of Scotland, 3, 74, 83,98 Mary Tudor, queen of England, 2, 3, 4,11, 74 Mary queen of Scots: embodied French claims to Scotland and England, 2, 74; betrothed to the dauphin Francis, 3; claim to the throne of England, 4, 10, 74, 76; catholic figurehead, 9; and the Ridolfi plot, 9; imprisoned in England, 10, 167, 187, 190, 201, 221, 224; marriage projects for, 11, 88, 89, 91, 92; danger to England, 12; marriage to the dauphin Francis (1558), 59, 98; queen of France (1559), 74; and Spain, 209; supported by Lorraine (1568), 220 Meaux, incident de (1567), 41, 42, 166, 219 Medici, Lorenzo def, duke of Urbino, 31 Mendoza, Bernadino de, Spanish ambassador: expelled from England, 9 Merey (or Mere), Poltrot de: chap. 8 passim:, assaulted the due de Guise, 139, 143, 148, 159; interrogated, 143-4, 148; his deposition, 143-5, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 154; imprisoned in the conciergerie, 148; tortured, 148; his motives for assaulting Guise, 148-9; execution, 148, 150,154,160; captured during the tumult of Amboise, 149; kinsman of La Renaudie, 149; final confession, 149-50 Monluc, Blaise de, 62, 168 Monluc, Jean de, bishop of Valence, 123,

125-7 Montigny, Florent de Montmorency, baron de, 175 Montmorency, Anne, due de, constable of France: member of the Triumvirate, 34, 67, 158; taken prisoner (1562), 37,160; died (1567), 42; commissioner at Cateau-Cambresis, 56; captured at Saint-Quentin (1557), 158 Montmorency, Francois, due de (1567), marshal of France, 45 Montpensier, Louis de Bourbon, due de, 145 Morvilliers, Jean de, bishop of Orleans, garde des sceaux, 180 Moulins, ordinance of (1566), 26 Mundt, Christopher, English agent in Strasbourg, 85, 94,102, 103,107 Nantes, edict of (1598), 31, 36, 53 Nassau, Louis, count of: and the enterprise of the Netherlands, 43, 177, 179, 180, 189, 191, 192, 220, 221; served in France, 177, 220; and Brille, 205, 206; victory at Heiligerlee (1568), 219; sought a protestant league, 221-2; killed (1574), 223 Navarre, Antoine de Bourbon, king of: his ambition to recover Spanish Navarre, chap. 4 passim; declined to attend the assembly of notables (1560), 33; lieutenant general of France (Dec. 1560), 34, 48, 64, 66, 67, 69, 71, 129; death at Rouen (1562), 37, 153; in disfavour at court (1559), 55-6, 57; rivalry with the Guises, 55-69 passim, 153, 213; gouverneur of Guyenne, 56; rivalry with Montmorency, 56; relations with Spain, 56-71 passim', his uncertain religion, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 68, 70, 82, 90, 101; and the protestant leadership, 57-63 passim, 82, 101, 129; at court (1558), 58; sponsored political action in Germany, 58, 59, 60; summoned to court by Montmorency (1559), 61; relations with England, 61, 82, 101; escorted Elisabeth de Valois to Spain (1559), 62; detained at Orleans (Oct. 1560), 63, 86; his claim to the regency (1560), 64; struggle for his allegiance, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71; regency partnership with Catherine de Medici, 64, 65, 66,67, 68, 129; supreme military commander, 67, 71; opposed the edict of January 1562, 71; seduced

Index by the Triumvirate, 71, 94; and the conspiracy of Amboise, 100, 101, 103, 104 Navarre, Henri de Bourbon, king of. See Henry IV of France Nevers, Louis de Gonzague, due de, 180 Norfolk, Thomas Howard, duke of, 193, 201 Norris, sir Henry, English ambassador in France, 168 Northern earls, the rising of (1569), 5, 10, 187, 190, 221 Orleans, ordinance of (1561), 35, 52-3 Orleans, siege of (1563), 139 Orange, William of Nassau, prince of: chap. 12 passim, 187; supported by the huguenots, 42, 176, 220; his Justification (1568), 167, 219; served in France, 168, 177, 220; invaded the Netherlands (1572), 181; and the Sea Beggars, 188, 202; and the seizure of Brille, 204, 206; and religion, 208, 209, 212, 213, 214-15, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 223, 224; enemy of Spain, 208-9, 212, 214-15; commissioner at Cateau-Cambresis, 211; his Apology (1581), 211; marriage to Anna of Saxony (1561), 212; quarrel with Granvelle, 212-13, 214, 215; charged with treason (1568), 218; his property confiscated, 218; his son abducted, 218; opposed Alva, 218, 219; sought a protestant league (1572), 222-3; and England, 223, 224, 231, 234, 235; and Don John of Austria, 225-6, 227, 228, 229, 230-1, 232-3, 234; murdered (1584), 236 Ory, Matthieu, inquisiteur de la foi, 20, 24-5 Pacification, edicts of: not enforced, 175 Pacification of Ghent, the (1576), 226, 227, 228, 229, 232, 233 Paris: centre of the inquisition, 17; disorders in (1571), 170; siege of (1567), 173 Paris, edicts of: (Jan. 1536), 22; (June 1539), 23; (July 1543), 23; (Nov. 1549), 24 Parlement of Paris, the, 38, 45; criminal procedure, 14; composition of, 17, 26; and the inquisition, 17-29 passim; defender of Gallican liberties, 19, 20; and censorship, 20; suspected of heresy by Henry II, 23; suspected by the prelates, 23; eight members arrested

257

(1559), 28; obstructionist tactics, 35, 52, 53; approved the regency government (1560), 64; resisted the edict of January 1562, 71; opposed persecution by Lorraine, 116; executed Poltrot de Merey, 160 Parlement of Rouen, the, 23, 38 Paul IV, pope, 7 Perez, Antonio, Spanish secretary, 234 Perpetual edict, the (1577), 226-33 passim Philip II, king of France, 15 Philip IV, king France, 17-18 Philip VI, king of France, 16,17-18 Philip II, king of Spain, 1, 2, 4, 8; marriage to Mary Tudor, 3; marriage to Elisabeth de Valois, 4, 50; fear of an Anglo-French alliance 6; and France, 8, 40, 175; his catholic role, 8, 208, 209, 212, 216, 217, 219, 221, 224; and the enterprise of England, 9, 10, 12, 224-5, 231-2, 234, 235; and the Ridolfi plot, 9, 191; and the Netherlands, 10,175, 212, 214, 216, 221, 227, 233, 234; and the Turks, 11; and queen Elizabeth I, 11, 12, 187; absent from Bayonne (1565), 39; favoured the marriage of Elizabeth and Dudley, 87; and the council of Trent, 116, 134-5; and the Papacy, 208, 214, 224-5; sought the co-operation of Guise (1561), 214 Pius IV, pope, 120, 121-2,125 Pius V, pope, 6, 7, 171, 215, 216, 217 Placards, the affair of (1534), 22 Poissy, the colloque of (1561), chap. 7 paw/m;35, 36,69, 93,158 Poitiers, Diane de. See Diane de Poitiers Poitiers, second national synod at (1561), 129 Pourparlers de Paris, the (1561), 130-2,133, 134 Presidial courts, the, 25, 26,119 Prideaux, Thomas, commissioner for piracy, 193 Privateers, chap. 11 passim Protestant state, the (1575), 44 Pyrenees, the treaty of (1659), 31, 50 Quadra, Don Alvaro de, bishop of Aquila, Spanish ambassador in England, 9, 80, 82, 87-95 Radcliffe, sir Henry, captain of Portsmouth, commissioner for piracy (1572), 198, 199 Raymond VII, count of Toulouse, 15

258

Index

Requesens, Don Luis de, governor of the Netherlands, 224 Ridolfi, Roberto, Papal agent, 9 Ridolfi plot, the (1571), 9, 10, 187, 191, 192,193, 203-4, 221 Romorantin, edict of (May 1560), 35, 119, 127 Saint-Andre, Jacques d'Albon, seigneur de, marshal of France, 34, 37,158 St. Bartholomew, the massacre of (1572), chap. 10 passim, 43-4,157, 222, 237 Saint-Germain, assembly of (Jan. 1562), 36, 70 Saint-Germain, edicts of: (Dec. 1530), 22; (July 1561), 133-4 Saint-Germain, treaty of (Aug. 1570), 43, 169,177,179 Saint-Quentin, the battle of (1557), 141, 158 Saint-Sulpice, Jean d'Ebrard de, French ambassador in Spain, 163 Sansac, Louis Prevot de, 145 Santa-Croce, Prospero de, Papal nuncio in France, 25,151,153,154 Sainte-Aldegonde, Marnix de, 206 Scott, sir Thomas, commissioner for the Cinque Ports (1571), 193 Sea Beggars, the: their alleged expulsion from England, 183, 184,185,186,187, 197, 203 Sega, Philip, bishop of Ripa, Papal nuncio, 231, 234, 235 Seguier, Pierre, president of the parlement of Paris, 25-6 Selve, Odet de, French ambassador in Rome, 27 Sidney, sir Henry, 87 Smith, sir Thomas, English ambassador in France, 145,151,154,161,176 Sorbonne, the, 19, 20, 21,136 Soubise, Jean de Parthenay-Larcheveque, sieur de, 143,144,149 Spanish treasure ships, the affair of (1568), 187,188-9 Spes, Don Guerau De, Spanish ambassador in England, 9,193,194, 204, 206 Sweveghem, M. de, agent of Alva, charge d'affaires in England (1571), 194-9 passim, 202, 205 Tavannes, Gaspard de Saulx-, marshal of France, 180 Teligny, Charles de, 177 Theophile, remonstrance of (May 1560),

120 Throckmorton, sir Nicholas, English ambassador in France, 75, 77, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 90, 101, 112, 119, 162; warned Elizabeth I of her danger, 77-8, 79, 83, 86, 87, 88-9, 91, 93, 94; returned to England (Nov. 1559), 79-80, 98, 102, 107,108,109, 110; threatened in France (1560), 80, 98; relations with the protestants, 81, 83, 84, 90; opposed lord Robert Dudley, 84, 86; and the conspiracy of Amboise, 97, 98, 99,100, 101, 104, 105, 107, 108-9, 110, 111; reported a plot to murder Guise (1560), 140; reported suspicions of Conde, 140 Torre, Michel della, Papal nuncio in France, 217 Tournon, Francois de, cardinal, 13-14,67-8, 116, 120, 121, 122, 124,125,136, 211 Tremayne (Tremain), Nicholas, 90 Trent, the council of, 6, 7, 21, 116, 122, 125-6,134-5, 215 Trent, the decrees of (Dec. 1563), 7, 215, 216,217 Treslong, Willem van Blois, van, Sea Beggar, 204, 205 Triumvirate, the (April 1561), treaty and members of, 34, 36,142,153, 213, 214, 215; known to Catherine de Medici, 35; threatened Catherine de Medici, 36; coerced the crown, 37; collapse of, 37; affiliated to Spain, 38; formed by the Guises, 67; entered Paris (March 1562), 71; policy of, 154; terms of the treaty, 158-9; policy pursued by Lorraine (1563), 160; supported in Rome, 222-3

Urban IV, pope, 17 Union of Brussels, the (Jan. 1577), 227 Vargas Mexia, Juan de, Spanish ambassador in Rome, 69 Vendetta, the Guise/Chatillon, chaps. 8 and 9 passim, 41, 42-3 Verona, the council of (1184), 14 Viterbo, Sebastien Gualtieri, bishop of, legate a latere and Papal inquisitor (1560), 122,133 Walsingham, sir Francis, English ambassador in France, 205, 211, 222, 230 Wilson, Thomas, English envoy in the Netherlands, 230 Wynter, George, commissioner for piracy (1572), 193,198,199, 200,201